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ARGUMENT 
 
 ASA BIRD GARDNER, 
 
 111 
 
 Counsel for Government, 
 AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OF' 
 
 FITZ-JOHN PORTER, 
 
 BEFORK THE 
 
 BOARD OF ARMY OFFICERS AT WEST POINT, 
 
 J^^N^U^HY, 1879 
 
 WASHINGTOE^: 
 
 aoVERNMENT PRINTINa OFFICE. 
 1879. 
 
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ARGUMENT OF ASA BIRD GARDNER, 
 
 COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 ^ • 
 
 Mr. Pkesident and (Ientle^ien of the Board: After a series 
 ol" iiieetiiijis, not eqnaliii.u, liowever, the iiiniil>er held by the hi<ih mih- 
 tary couit wliieli tried this petitioner sixteen years a<iO, the Board will 
 soon exhibit to the reviewiiij^- authority, to the future historian, and to 
 the Jud<iiiient of the country a mass of statements respecting- the cam- 
 paign in A^irginia in Angnst, 1802, such as no other campaign, not even 
 that terminating in Waterloo, has ever ])reseiited. 
 —-———»— ~-..<. . -TT^.-i..,! ctj-^j^u^r. ,^f +v,„ iT^itiirJ «f..f«^^ i»io\i(1(i for the 
 
 ElMJATA. 
 
 On ]>n'r^i' \'2. in flic fortictli lini- slionld icjul '• Hoard" instoad of "Court." 
 
 On ici;;.-:!'.!, jn llif t wcnt.v-liftli linr. tin- words "desist from" slionld be ''permt in." 
 
 On |t.i;Lcr .')7. in fin- liCticntli line, tin- wtirds " Ltin-] road to (;ro\ iton" should read, 
 
 ^' rii/lil liiiriinl (Jrovetoii." 
 On i>.ij;i' -i". in lli«- furly-linii lini-. llie word ■• liattalions " slionld he '' hat (cries.''' 
 On |ia;ie I'J-J, ill ihr loriy-hrst line, tin- wnids ••alionf 4 p. in." slionld he •• ahoiit 
 
 'J p. ni." 
 
 On pa;,^- l','it. in llu- ei';liteent li line. IJie word ■' foreed" should he '' /irrd." 
 
 On p.i;ie l-J'.t, in the t wenly-lourth lim-, the words "Hampton's hri<;ade" should 
 
 read : " //uiiIihi''k hri;;;ide." 
 On pa;ie i:!.'. I he answer i(M|iiestioii in thirt iet li line is: "Ves: we were on his ri"-ht." 
 On jia^^e 1 t:{ the answer to (|neslion in liflv -tilth line is: "I am certain it was at 
 
 llaniptoii ( 'die's." 
 
 deprived of, as he terms it — 
 
 The iiiestimahh advautajie ol'havin<i his ease advocated hy those who are iiraetieed 
 in tlie science and skill ol advticacy. and who know how to hrinj; out everythinj;- that 
 < an jiossihly make for the lienetit oi' the client, whereby, in the end, truth, is elicited by 
 all that can be said on either side, beinjr heard, and the tribunal which has to judge 
 is jil.-K cd in the most a<l\ anta^eous position for deciding according to right. 
 
 In the American Army, the accused i.s, under tlie Constitution, al- 
 ways entitled to coun.sel as of right. This is exemplitied in the case of 
 this jietitioner, who, on his trial, was defended by able coiuisel in the 
 |M'isons of tlie late lion. Keverdy Johnson and Charles Kames, esq. 
 
 Tlie Iiistory of tlie Army shows no instance of a body of commis- 
 siontMl olliccis assembled ity executive order for the purpo.ses which 
 broiiglit this iJoard together. 
 
 Nc'cessarily the IJoard had to hear counsel for ])etitioner betbre deter- 
 mining its method of jjiocedure. That statement, instead of formulat- 
 ing points as to what he desired to do, took the character of an ehibo- 
 
^1 
 
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 ^v3 
 
>t. ■ 
 
 ARGUMENT OF ASA BIRD GARDNER, 
 
 COUNSEL FOR THE l-NITED STATES. 
 
 ^) 
 
 ^Ir. PRESIDENT AND (1ENTLE3IEN OF THE BOARD : After a seiieS 
 
 of iiiH'tiii^s, not e(jnaliiif;-, liowever, the ininilRn- held l)y tlie liiiih mili- 
 tary eouit which tried this ])etitioiier sixteen years a«>o, the Board Avill 
 soon exliihit to the reviewing- authority, to the future historian, and to 
 the Jndjirnent of the country a mass of statements respecting tlie cam- 
 ]»aign in Virginia in August, ISGli, such as no other campaign, not even 
 that terminating- in Waterloo, has ever presented. 
 
 AVhile the Bevised Statutes of the United States provide for the 
 institution of courts-martial (ir courts of inquiry to administer justice 
 to those who are in the military service of the nation, an«l minutely 
 provide for the oaths which have to he taken hy the m<'ml)crs and 
 iudge-advocate or iccitrder ])reliminarv t<» any investigation or incpiiry, 
 (.'ongiess has ]iev«'r ]ii-o\ided for any ajijical or writ of error from the 
 judgment of a c(Miitiuart iai after it has been linally acted u]>on by the 
 coiixcning authority. 1 1 is decision is tinal and conclusi\e when the court 
 whicli tiies the case has jurisdiction (tver the olfense an<l individual. 
 
 In the ciiminal ])racti('e of the circuit and district courts of the Tnited 
 Sliitcs we lind that, in many instances, judgnuMit is tinal. 
 
 I'hc present J.ord ( 'hief .Iustic<' Cockburne of England, in ISdT, in 
 tlie case of Colonel ^'elson and Lieutenant Brand, said, when refciring 
 to general courts-martial : 
 
 \(i line, I iliirik. i;in diiiv thai llu- siilistaiiif of justice is caiTfiillx atti'iidcd to. 
 Tlitic is notliiii;; ailiitraiy, iiotliiii^^ caitiirioiis, iKitliin;^ iiiiscttltd. * * » lViliai)s 
 IliiTc arc no trilmiials in tlic wovlil in wliirh .jnstitc is ailniinistficd with a liiglier 
 sense oC tin' ol>li<;ation w Jiiili the exercise of Jndicial Innctions imposes, witli a liifjher 
 sense ol' honoi', or a j^reater (h'sir<' to (hi just ice. 
 
 These, 1 think, so far as experience has shown, are, generally siieaking, the charac- 
 teristics of the mUHurii trihnnals wliicli exercise tlu'ir functions under tlie name of 
 (•(nirts-niarliah 
 
 The eminent Jiiiisl who used this hinguagc did it after alhision to the 
 fact that the accused, in general courts-mait ial in the Ihitish army, is 
 dei>ri\ »'d of, as he terms it — 
 
 Tlie inestimahlc advantage (dliaving his case advocated hy those wlio are ))racticed 
 in the scienc<' and skill of advocacy, and who know how to hring mit everything that 
 can ]iossil)ly make lor the lienclit oi' the client, whenhy. in the end, truth, is elicite<l Ijy 
 all that <aii lie said on either side, lieing heard, and the triliuual which has to judge 
 is jdaiM'd in the most advantageous position tor deciding according to right. 
 
 In the American Army, the accused is, under the Constitution, al- 
 ways entitled to counsel as of right. This is exemplitied in the case of 
 this ]>ctitioiier. who. on his trial, was defended by able counsel in the 
 pel sons of tlie late Hon. Beverdy Johnson and Charles Eames, esq. 
 
 The history of the Ariuy shows no instance of a body of commis- 
 sioned ollicers assembled liy executive order for the purposes which 
 l»i(»ught this r>oard together. 
 
 Necessarily the Uoard had to hear counsel for petitioner before <leter- 
 mining its method of procedure. That statement, instead of tbrmulat- 
 ing i>oints as to what he desired to do, took the character of an elabo- 
 
rate arji'iimont in detail, with presentation at the same time to each ol' 
 us of the iir.uument in printed form. From this it appeared that hepro- 
 l)osed to iiitrodnce: 
 
 1st. tSo calh'd newly discovered evidence; 
 
 2d. Cumulative evidence ; and 
 
 3d. Evidence as to his conduct on the 30th of August, 1862, in order 
 to show animuti, which had been ruled out after argument on the orig- 
 inal trial. In other words, he substantially proposed a new trial. 
 
 He also asked "justice"; alleged he had been wronged, and by another 
 of his counsel declared that he desired the very fullest and most search- 
 ing examination to be made of the facts of the case, so that the actual 
 truth should be known, and would certainly expect that if it came to the 
 knowledge of the Board in any way that witnesses can be had who are 
 known to have knowledge upon the subject, even if it is inconsistent 
 with the claims that he puts forth, they shall have opportunity to ap- 
 pear, and that all the knowledge that they should have on the subject 
 should be drawn from them, and that the petitioner did not desire his 
 witnesses to give any more ex parte statements, but that they should be 
 subjected to the tesf of cross-examination so that the actual truth should 
 be developed. (Board's Record, pp. 3 and 1.) 
 
 The petitioner's counsel also proposed to present the record of the 
 court-martial and read evidence there taken to the Board preliminarily 
 to introduction of what we may term, colloquially, oral evidence. 
 
 It also a])peared that the names of a number of supposed witnesses, 
 who had written letters, had been sent by the War Department and 
 Army lleadcpiarters either to the President of the Board or myself, who 
 at that time in this case was merely the Recorder of the Board, with such 
 duties as usually pertain to such oihce and mere regulation boards, 
 where no law prescribes duties such as are prescribed for him on a court 
 of iiH|uiry. These names of witnesses I communicated to counsel. 
 
 A\'itli this state of facts the Board was called uj^on to decide what po- 
 sition it should occupy in the proposed action of counsel for petitioner. 
 
 Had this Board confined the petitioner's counsel to the i^resentatiou 
 of attidavits in the natiu-e of newly discovered evidence, so as to deter- 
 mine : 
 
 1st. Wliether it was in fact newly discovered e\ddence, and, 
 
 2d. AMiether, if it had been placed before the general court-martia] 
 which tried petitioner, it would have aftbrded ground for an acquittal 
 this was all he could, under the circumstances, have reasonably expected. 
 
 This Board, however,' saw very plainly, that if evidence, so called, was 
 to be i)resented and received by it as to the merits, and petitioner's 
 counsel did not desire their witnesses to give any mere ex parte state- 
 ments, some one nnist cross-examine and present rebutting evidence, if 
 any tlicre was. 
 
 I'liis obligiition, therefore, having been specifically devolved upon me 
 by this Boai-d on the 2()th day of June, 1878, under the designation of 
 "counsel for the government," with the full responsibility thus directly 
 placed on me to cross-examine and to produce rebutting evidence, I 
 have, with no knowledge of the case before that time, endeavored to 
 elicit the truth, and the whole truth, irrespective of persons, so far as 
 want of any judicial authority has permitted. 
 
 The rei»resentative of the government should never forget that justice 
 is all that his government desires, but this does not demand of him a 
 
tacit or exi^ressed acquiesceuce iu whatever may be proposed by an 
 accuse<l. 
 
 The petitioner has come here with th'e assistance of three skilful, able, 
 and learne<l counsel, after sixteen years' careful preparation, admitting 
 also the legal assistance heretofore (by name) of some of the ablest 
 counsel in the land, and that one of his present advisers here had been, 
 when this Board tirst met, already a year engaged in his cause. 
 
 Wliile, therefore, as representative of the government, I have never 
 intentionally kept from petitioners knowledge any properly admissible 
 e^^dence which I deemed material to him (an ol3ligation, by the way, 
 which liis counsel would not necessarily be under to the government), 
 and while the record shows that I have even called ncAv Avitnesses for 
 government at his instance without knowing what they could testify 
 to, tlius gixing him the i)rivilege of cross-examination (Board's Eecord, 
 p. .')l*S), iie\'('rtheless, T have considered and do consider, despite some 
 unthinking criticism, that the government has some rights, and that it 
 is my duty to look out for them by tlie fullest endeavor to ascertain the 
 trutlj, the Board itself being responsible for its method of procedure. 
 
 That o1)ligiition whiclj, as I have said, this Board placed ui)on me I 
 have not sought to avoid, for tlie reputation of the Army as well as the 
 reputations of this Board as individual officers are concerned, that there 
 sliall be no one-sided, jciitial investigation of this case, if investigation 
 like a retrial is admissible, and tliat the solemn record of a statutory 
 court of nine duly sworn general otticers shall not be review<Hl without 
 a previous exhiljition of the most complete and conclusive evi<lence, so 
 convincing that all may understand and acquiesce. 
 
 All examinations of a judicial or (piasi-judicial nature havQ t;o take, 
 for the ascertainment of truth, a Mcll-detined course. 
 
 In all courts of criminal Jurisdiction of the United States and in all 
 its military tribunals, which are criminal courts of si)ecial and limited 
 jurisdiction, the rules of common law in criminal cases, which are the 
 result of nuitured experience of generatiojis, prevail under the express 
 ruling of tin; Supreme Court of the United States, excejtt where such 
 rules have been specifically nioditied by statute. 
 
 The i)roceeding ])efore this Board is in the nature of a criminal case 
 where these rules ought to ai)ply; because, if we take the original re- 
 <'ord of evidence of ])etitioner's court-martial, with intent to comi)are 
 it with other so-called evidence here introduced, certainly that which it 
 is to be comi)ared with must be such only as would be legally admissi- 
 ble on a court-martial in case it had been ottered on the trial ; for any- 
 thing presented and received of a ditt'erent character would have a 
 tendency to inq)air the conclusion arrived at: 
 
 1st. liecause it would be inii)ossible to determine Avhat weight had 
 been given to it as against h-ffal evidence iu the original j-ecord; and, 
 
 2d. Because it would violate the only legal mode for the ascertain- 
 ment of truth and satisfaction of juiblic justice in military procedure. 
 
 These remarks I make ]»reliminarily to future discussion of some i)or- 
 tions of ]»etitioner's evidence, so called. 
 
 When I heard and read the elal)orate opening statement of petitioner's 
 counsel, I was glad to jterceive that it coin(,'i<led with the opinions and 
 synq)athies 1 had hitheito entertained. With no knovrledge of the 
 facts, it seemed to me that the petitioner's case was strong — that injustice 
 had i)ossibly been done him, and 1 did not hesitate, in a private way, to 
 express my sentiments, sentiments entertained by many others, on i)re- 
 cisely the same grounds. 
 
 2 G 
 
Petitioner's unreliable state:ments: 
 
 After I be^an to study the case under the respousibility put upon me 
 by the Board, several things in that argument or statement attracted 
 my attention, and led me, on further search for the truth, to the reluc- 
 tant conclusion I felt constrained to exjiress in my opening argument. 
 Those were — 
 
 First. A suppression Or avoidance of the fact (petitioner's opening 
 statement, pp. G and 7) that the extraordinary exertions the petitioner 
 made to embarlv at Newport News for Aquia Creek by midnight of the 
 20th of August, 18G2, did not arise, as he Avould have had us believe, from 
 eagerness to join General Pope and come under his command, but were 
 because he had an express order to that effect direct from Major- General 
 Halleck, the general-in-chief at Washington, and also a pressing tele- 
 gram from ]\lajor-General McClellan, his then immediate commander, to 
 push off", as it was a matter of life or death (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 233). 
 
 Second. An allegation in his argument that the regiments forming 
 Piatt's brigade of Sturgis' division never reported to petitioner on the 
 29th of August, 1802, an allegation which the evidence of General Grif- 
 fin (pp. 104 and 105) and also the testimony of General Sturgis or Gen- 
 eral Piatt show to have been directly contrary to the fact. This is also 
 apparent fi'om the opening statement (p. 89), in which he shows that this 
 brigade was with him at Warrentou Junction. 
 
 Third. Another allegation in that deliberate and well-considered argu- 
 ment or statement (page 29), viz, that the petitioner knew Longstreet's 
 separate force was strongly posted in his front and that it did not amount 
 to less than 25,000 men, when in his equally well considered defense 
 before the general court-martial which convicted him (G. C. M. Eecord, 
 p. 266), he <leliberately averred that this separate force, which he then 
 also insisted was in front of him, amounted as he then (January 10, 1863) 
 calculated it, at "from ten to fifteen thousand strong." Thus on his 
 trial he advanced i^recisely the same line of defense as now, and in order 
 then to make a reasonable excuse, alleged that tlie enemy before him on 
 the 29th of August, 1862, was, according to his then assimied belief, 
 "from ten to fifteen thousand strong"; but subsequently, in order to get 
 a rehearing or review of his case, and to lead to the conclusion that he 
 was the victim of circumstances, the presence of even 15,000 men before 
 him would not liave been sufficient to excuse his conduct, and he adds, 
 for convenience, at least 10,000 more to the enemy, and presents to us 
 the possibility generally offered by the Confederates (as see Longstreet's 
 letter in petitioner's oi)euing argument, x>- 51, and his evidence, Board's 
 Eecord, p. 64, also Beverly Eobertson's testimony. Board's Eecord, p. 
 178), that if the Union forces had attacked, annihilation or destruction 
 would have been the inevitable result. We know from our own military 
 experience what forces three years later were placed in that category. 
 
 FoTTRTH. The fourth allegation which attracted my notice was one 
 deliberately made by counsel for petitioner after concluding petitioner's 
 opening statement (Board's Eecord, p. 9), to the effect that dming the 
 battle of the 29th of August, 1862, the petitioner did not have any belief 
 whatever that the trooi)s of General Pope were sustaining defeat and 
 retiring fi^om tlie field, and further that there was no ground for such a 
 belief on petitioner's part or on the part of anybody else. This, it will 
 be percei\ed, is directly contrary to a different part of tbe opening- 
 statement of petitioner, wheie, for another purpose, he introduced a dis- 
 
patcli lie sent that very day to Generals McDowell and King, in which 
 he said that — 
 
 * * * as they [the enemy] appear to have drive?! onr forces liaclc, the fire of the 
 enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. 
 (Petitioner's statement, p. 35, dispatch No. 29.) 
 
 If the x)etitiouer never had any belief whatever that General Pope's 
 forces on his right were being driven back and retiring from the li'eld, 
 and if there was no ground for such belief, on his part or on the part of 
 anybody else, or that they were even engaged, why did he actually send 
 such a dispatch, a dispatch, it may be added, which he was proven on 
 the original trial to have sent, and which he was willing to acknowledge 
 for another line of defense before this Board ? 
 
 If lie sent that dispatch knowing it was false, but as an excuse for 
 what lie proposed in it to do, he intentionally sent thereby a notice the 
 effect of which would have been to absolutely paralyze any offensive 
 movement which the commanding general might have proposed to make 
 at an auspicious moment, and thus ruin any plan of battle about to be 
 executed, and possibly compel the commanding general, in the midst of 
 success, to stop and order a retrograde movement to prevent being out- 
 flanked on his left by the advance of the forces from whose flank peti- 
 tioner Mithdrew. If the petitioner did not believe what he said in that 
 dispatch, he committed a great, a stupendous crime, for on those and 
 previous exertions of General Pope dejiended the safetj- of the national 
 ca]»ital. 
 
 The petitioner has stated in the part of his argument where he quotes 
 this dispatch, tliat, " on going to the head of his column," he found he 
 was misinformed, but he does not anywhere show (nor has he shown at 
 any time in this case) that he notified either Generals Pope, McDowell, 
 or King that he did not intend to carry out the determination expressed 
 in that message. 
 
 We now kiKnv, and will see in the course of this argument, how he 
 issued other orders and sent other messages of the same tenor, which, if 
 they liad come to the notice of the general court which tried him, would 
 possibly have saved us all the trouble of reviewing this case. 
 
 l^'iFTii. The fifth ]»oint in petitioner's maturely considered opening 
 statement which attracted iny attention was in language as Ibllov.s 
 
 (page .")7) : 
 
 And I DOW repeat (and it is shown in the record) that at no time hefore dark had I 
 or my ol'licers knowh^dfie of any other than an artillery contest going on, or of any 
 6<titli' pending, or that General Pope needed any aid. 
 
 On his trial he had called Col. E. G. Marshall, Thirteenth Xew York 
 Volunteers (now colonel Ignited States Army, retired, then a captain 
 in the Kegnlar Army), ^\ho commanded his advance skirinishers, and 
 who said : 
 
 I coukl see General Pope's left and the enemy's right during the greater part of the 
 tlay, about two miles off, perhaps more, diagonally to our front and to the right. The 
 enemy set up their cheering and ajipeared to be charging and driving us, so that not a 
 man of mii voinniand bitt was certain that General Pope's army iras being driven from the field. 
 In the dirterent battles I have been, I have learned that there is no mistaking the 
 enemy's yell when they are successful. It is different from that of our own men. Our 
 men give three successive cheers, and in concert, but theirs is a cheering without any 
 reference to regularity of form, a continual yelling. 
 
 Which evidence he also (pioted in his defense. (G. C. M. Record, pp. 
 190, 209.) 
 
 The ])etitioner has since, as we have seen, recalled Colonel Marshall 
 before this Board for additional evidence on other points. 
 
That origiual evidence of tliis 'witness, just quoted, itself absolutely 
 contradicts the petitioner's declaration in his opening statement or ar- 
 gument here. The Board will perceive that this is a little different from 
 the state of affairs as described by the counsel who has last preceded 
 me. The petitioner's troops at the head of his column saw and heard 
 this firing and fighting on the left of General Pope's army, but he, away 
 back to tlie rear, at junction of the Sudley Springs and Manassas and 
 Gainesville roads, was in a position to hear Kearney's firing upon the 
 right, near Sudley church. Additional thereto, in the opening statement 
 itself, we find some of petitioner's own orders or dispatches, which he 
 sent on the I'Dth of August, from which I quote, viz (dispatch No. 27, 
 p. 94): 
 
 To Geii'l MoRELL : 
 
 Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike iu his rear. * * * gee if you canuot give 
 help to Sigel. If you iiud him retiring, move back toward Manassas. 
 
 If ]\Iajor-General Sigel's cori)s of General Pope's army had not then 
 been in action, and the petitioner did not know that it was, or that it 
 needed hel]i, why did he issue this order I 
 
 Again (dispatch No. 37, p. 90) : 
 
 General Morell : 
 
 * * * The baiUe works well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring 
 up the pike. 
 
 Again (dispatch Xo. 31, p. 95) : 
 
 General Morell : 
 
 * * * All goes well with the other troops. 
 
 Again (dispatch No. 38, p. 90) : 
 
 General Morell : 
 
 * * * McDowell says all goes well and we are getting the best of the fight. 
 
 From these (from page 94 to 90 of his statement), over his own signa- 
 ture, despite his deliberate statement to the contrary, on page 57, it is 
 apparent that both he and his officers knew there was a battle pending, 
 and that he himself knew, by his order to his senior division commander 
 to push over and help Sigel, that aid was needed. 
 
 He also knew a battle was impending, from a dispatch General Pope 
 had sent to him that very morning, which was received by lietitioner at 
 Bristoe, at 5.30 a. m., August 29, in which General Pope ordered him up 
 and said (see dispatch in petitioner's opening statement, p. 93, and G. 
 C. M. liecord, p. 235): 
 
 It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. 
 A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. 
 
 It is apparent, therefore, from the admitted, heretofore proven facts 
 set forth for other purposes by the petitioner in his own opening state- 
 ment, that during all of that same 29th of August, 1802, both he and* 
 others of his comman4 had knowledge of a iiending battle, and that 
 General Pope needed aid, des])ite the emphatic statement the petitioner 
 has made to the contrary. 
 
 Sixth. My attention was further drawn to still another paragrai)h in 
 petitioner's ox)ening statement (page 38), in which, referring to Friday, 
 29th August, 1802, he said as follows : 
 
 My troops were without food at this time, and so continued throughout the next 
 day, except a small supply of hard-tack which they received tliat night. 
 
 On ]»age 91, however, of that statement he printed a dispatch he sent 
 
to Maj. Gen. A. E. Biimside, at Aquia Creek, dated Bristoe, 28th August, 
 1862, 9.30 a. m., in wliich lie said : 
 
 I feel as if on my way now, and tlins far have kept my command and tx'ains well np 
 More supplies than I supposed on hand have heeu brought, but none to spare. * * * 
 
 And on page 92, in another dispatch to Major-General Burnside, dated 
 Bristoe, a. m., 29th August (the very day of the battle), he said : 
 
 I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night. Your train of forty wagons [provisions] 
 cannot be found. 
 
 Thus, according' to his own official reports, made at the time, he had — 
 even without Burnside's forty wagons — enough subsistence for his com- 
 mand, not onl}^ for the 29th, but for the .30th, and yet he has stated here, 
 apparently forgetful of these dispatches, that he had no i)rovisions for 
 his command that very 29th of August, when he re|)orted he had. 
 
 Seventh. Another point in his deliberate opening- argument which 
 impressed me was the statement (on page 17) that he — 
 
 Became informed ('27th August) that the general policy of the campaign was to 
 avoid a general action with the main forces of the enemy till large re-enibrccments 
 from the Army of the Potomac should join us. 
 
 Nevertheless, he knew that IVIaj or- General Banks' corps of General 
 Poi)e's Army had attacked the enemy at Cedar Mountain on the 9th of 
 August; and in his (petitioners) opening" statement (page <S2), in a dis- 
 l)atcli he sent on the 24tli of August, 2 p. m., to Generals ]Morell and 
 JSykes, lie himself said: 
 
 /'«/*<■ rt//rtf7,(YM lie enemy yesterday ne.ir Suli>hiu' Springs, .and tlie latter retreated. 
 He v.as to rviiciv the (tlhtck to-day, and it ispro))able I'opc v,ns jjiisJiiiH/ after him, know- 
 ing the river at Ikapi)ahaiiuock was not fordable. General Ilalleck's orders are for us 
 to hold the Kappahannock. 
 
 Again, in another dispatch of petitioner — this time to Major-General 
 Burnside (petitioner's oi)ening- statement p. SI) — dated ''Advance, 2.jth 
 August, 18()2," ])etitioner said: '' Banks and Sigel are at Sulphur Springs 
 lighting to-day." 
 
 Again, in another dispatch, which petitioner 1ms printed (opening' 
 statement, p. 87), i'rom (ieneral Pope to himself, dated "Headquarters 
 ^Vrmy of \'irginia, W'arrenton Junction, 2Gth August, 1862, 7 a. m.," the 
 latter, after onlering him to move forward as si^eedily as possible * * * 
 so as to "easily move to the front," said: 
 
 I do not see how a (jcneral engagement can be i)ostponed more than a day or two. 
 
 Again, in another dispatch to ijetitioner from General Pope, printedin 
 the former's same statement (i)age ^S)^ dated Headquarters Army of 
 Virginia, Warrenton Junction, 27th of August, 1862, 4 a. m.. General 
 Pope said he wanted petitioner to march direct to that place as rapidly 
 as possible, and, referring to the enemy, said : 
 
 "We will probably move to attack him to-morrow in the neighborhood of Gainesville? 
 wliich may bring our line farther back towards Washington ; of this I will endeavor to 
 notify you in time. You sliould get here as early in the day as i)Ossible, in order to 
 rcnih'r assistance should it be needed. 
 
 Again, in another dispatch of petitioner to General Burnside, which 
 he prints in his opening statement (page 17), just after saying that the 
 general ]>olicy of the campaign was to avoid a general action with the 
 main foices of the enemy, he said: "I send you the last order from Gen- 
 eral Pope, which indicates the /«i?«'e as well as the present;" and in that 
 order (]>age 18) movements of troops were ordered for " operation 
 against the enemy," and for jxrtitioner's corjjsto push forward to "assist 
 the operations on the right wing." 
 
8 
 
 Again, in another dispatch of General Pope to petitioner, which the 
 latter also printed (page 91 of his opening statement), dated Headquar- 
 ters Army of Virginia, Bristoe Station, 27th of August, 1862, 6.30 p. m., 
 referring to General Hooker's fight at Bristoie, he said : 
 
 The enemy liasl)cen driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive 
 lum from ISIanassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where 
 McDowell is. 
 
 Again, at 0.30 a. m., petitioner sent a dispatch to General Buruside, 
 dated Bristoe, 28th August, in which he said : 
 
 Mv command will soon be uj) and will at once go into position. Hooker drove Ewell 
 some three miles, and Pope says * * * He hopes to get Ewell and push to Manas- 
 sas to-day. 
 
 The statement, deliberately made by petitioner, that he l)ecame in- 
 formed from General Pope at Warrenton Junction, on the 27th of August, 
 that tlie general policy of the campaign was to avoid a general action 
 with the main force of the enemy till large re-enforcements should join 
 from the Army of the Potomac, is a statement made by way of prelimi- 
 nary justification or excuse for petitioner's subsequent conduct in not 
 taking part in the battle of the 29th and his other oifense of which he 
 was convicted ; but in the light shed by the dispatches and orders he 
 himself has presented for other i)urposes, it is i)lain that General Pope 
 was constantly on the oft'ensive instead of the defensive, attacking the 
 enemy on every possible occasion ; that the petitioner knew it, and that 
 his (petitioner's) deliberate opening statement as to the general policy 
 being to avoid a general action is contradicted too pointedly in the dis- 
 I)atches just cited to require further illustration. 
 
 If, however. General Pope had been attemi)ting to avoid any engage- 
 ment until the Sixth and Second Corps of the Army of the Potomac 
 joined him, then a trel>le, an awful responsibility, rests on whoever kept 
 the gallant fighting Sixth Corps from joining General Pope at Centre- 
 ville, which it did not do until late in the afternoon of the 30th of August, 
 after our forces had been compelled to retire there after two days' battles 
 (\\'hose cannonade could be heard even in Washington), although the 
 road by which it came from Alexandria was good and unobstructed — an 
 easy day's march — and orders for its advance went to the commanding 
 generalof the Army of the Potomac on the 26t]i of August, and one 
 brigade, Taylor's, of the Sixth Corps (Franklin's) was shoved up unsup- 
 ported to Manassas Junction to meet the Confederate Ma.ior-General 
 Jackson as he came in there. Brigadier-General Taylor liimself lost his 
 life while gallantly attacking, despite the enemy's superiority of force. 
 
 That the petitioner has no grounds whatever for the statement in his 
 opening argument, that the general policy of the campaign was to avoid 
 an action, is further evidenced by still later dispatches of General Pope, 
 cited by him, as, for example, one of General Pope to petitioner, dated 
 near Bull Pun, August 29, 1862, 3 a. m. (petitioner's opening statement, 
 p. 93), in which he was told that — 
 
 Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn * * * . A 
 severe engagement is likely to take place and your presence is necessary. 
 
 We know from the charges of which petitioner was convicted that 
 General Pope attacked the" enemy at dayliglit of Friday, the 29th of 
 August, 1862; and ])etiti()ner's own opening statement (on pages 26 et se- 
 qnitur) shows tliat the ojf'cndre on that day was taken by the national 
 Army. 
 
 Even on the 30th of August our forces again resumed the offensive, 
 and petitioner himself says (oi)ening statement, j). 65) that: "Early in 
 
the clay [30tli Aiig-ust] General Pope suggested plans of attack," thus 
 showing all through General Pope's career with the Army of Virginia 
 that that gallant officer was ever seeking to cany out the genei-al policy 
 of the cami>aign, " to fight like the de\il," as previously ordered by 
 Major-General Halleck, which was in strong and marked contrast to the 
 conduct of the petitioner, who kept his command from becoming engaged 
 until the immediate presence of that very commander, on the 30th, com- 
 pelled him to make an attack. All this is in striking contrast to peti- 
 tioner's unjustifiable remark that the general policy of General Pope's 
 campaign was not to fight. 
 
 As we proceed in the consideration of this case, I shall be under the 
 disagreeable necessity of presenting other instances whicli may compel 
 the application of tlie mnxim fals us in nno,faJ.sus in omnibun. 
 
 STATUS OF TETITIONER AND SIETHOD OF PEOOEDURE ADOPTED. 
 
 The petitioner in this case asked for "justice," not mercy. The par- 
 doning poAver is an act of grace, clemency, or amnesty, and may be 
 granted from the mere volition of the Executive, with or without cause; 
 but whether or not it comes from compassion, from a settled policy, or 
 as a mode of celebrating some joyful event, the petitioner, when he says 
 he was unjustly convicted and wronged and wants to be " vindicated," 
 does not appeal to that attril)ute of the Executive. As to a "review" 
 which he asks for, we have seen Congress recently by law give the 
 President power, specially and solely, to revise Ex-Surgeon-General Wm. 
 A. Hammond's case (which this Board also had in charge), from which 
 Hows the necessary legal implication that without such legislative sanc- 
 tion such action would be co>y(w non judice. 
 
 To take the original record of the court-martial as offered by the 
 petitioner and compare it with other evidence and to re])ort, is to review. 
 Precisely, therefore, what the petitioner may lawfully demand and 
 receive it is apparent he does not ask for. 
 
 It is to be regretted that this Board has no judicial or quasi judicial 
 l)Ower ; that is, power to comi)el attendance of witnesses, administe ran 
 oath, or make any affidavit which nmy be presented "legal evidence," 
 so that malicious false swearing to a material fact shall be perjury. 
 
 It is a great homage ])aid to justice and law that very few who are 
 ever convicted of criminal offenses will admit guilt, but will declare to 
 the last their innocence and the injustice of their punishment, even when 
 about to suffer the extreme i)enalty of the law. 
 
 That this petitioner has on several occasions, as he asserts, sought by 
 ap]ieals to the Executi\'e to obtain some sort of review or revision, I at- 
 tach no importance to. It was not granted in the case of Brig. Gen. 
 William Hull, U. S. A., but it has in this case })ermitted the fal)rication 
 of specious, and, in the case of his counsel (the late lieverdy Johnson), 
 libelous pamphlets, which have gone to the tiles of the War Department, 
 the public lil)raries and i)ress of the country, and therel)y manufactured 
 unsubstantial sentiment. 
 
 My appearance in this case, under the ruling of this Board, was the 
 first instance where any <luly authorized representative of the govern- 
 ment could publicly, and I believe honestly, say, during all these sixteen 
 years of specious pleas, that the court of general officers which tried this 
 jjetitioner, and con\icted him of one of the gravest crimes, was composed 
 of his personal friends, six of the nhie being graduates of the United 
 States Military Academy, and all men who he said on his trial knew 
 
10 
 
 limi well, and as to each of whom he twice said, of record, he had no ob- 
 jection. 
 
 I have no desire to enter on an extended view of this case, nor liave 
 my current oiflcial duties and some considerable governmental counsel 
 business in the civil courts during the recess afforded me that complete 
 leisure to pre])are such an elaborate argument as the three counsel on 
 the other side present. 
 
 Furtliei'more, I do not deem it necessary. I have sought in this in- 
 vestigation to confine it to exactly what the petitioner did or failed to 
 do under the orders he had. 
 
 The specifications and charges of which he was convicted are definite 
 and precise, and the whole matter is really in a small compass, despite 
 the collateral issues which counsel have skillfully presented, as to what 
 this or the other did, or failed to do, so as to withdiaw attention from 
 their client and fix it upon somebody else, in order that the petitioner's 
 disobedience, or criminal negligence, or positive willful offense, shall be 
 lost sight of in the vague j^ossibilities surrounding acts or omissions of 
 others. 
 
 He comes before this Board, not with, the presumption of innocence 
 which attaches to those who plead '^ not guilty," but under a valid, sub- 
 sisting, and executed sentence. Such foct, however, should not, and I 
 believe has not, impaired the slightest of his rights, and I believe he 
 has been treated, certainly by me, with courtesy and consideration. He 
 has, however, everything to gain l»y this or any other rehearing, and 
 nothing to lose. 
 
 When his counsel sought here (Board's Eecord, p]). 22, 23) to intro- 
 duce: 
 
 1st. The very evidence as to his conduct on the oOtli of August, in 
 order to show animns, which had been, after careful argument by Eev- 
 erdy Johnson, his counsel, ruled out on the original trial (G. C. M. Eecord, 
 pp. 118, 133, 252, 280), it being the conduct of a day subsequent to peti- 
 tioner's alleged offense; 
 
 2d. When he undertook to introduce cumulative evidence (p. 259); 
 
 3d. When he presented such evidence as General Pope's historical 
 order to the Army of Yirginia before petitioner joined him — an order 
 known to })etitioner ou his trial — not produced there, but introduced 
 here by way of justification or excuse as to animus (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 278); 
 
 4th. When he undertook to recall some of his own witnesses who 
 were witnesses on his trial in December, 1802, in order to add to and 
 explain })ortions of their direct examination (Board's Eecord, pp. 282, 
 307, 410, 444, 401, 1127); and, 
 
 5th. AVhen counsel declared, after referring to the "former trial," 
 that the luoceedings before this Board area "full trial" (p. 293), and 
 cross-examined government witnesses here on evidence given on the 
 trial sixteen years ago (Board's Eecord, pp. 348, 801, 820), the effect was 
 to make this Board an "appellate" tribunal to pass in judgm-ent on the 
 original court and to give weight to such evidence in its findings, and 
 to make recommendations looking toward the revocation of this sentence 
 (m the ground, ])artially if not Avholly, that in the judgment of this 
 Board this special evidence, had it not been ruled out by the general 
 court-martial, w<mld have brought that tribunal to a different verdict. 
 
 In my o]H'ning argument of October 2 I went quite fully into certain 
 branches of tliis case, botli as to law and tact, stating, of course, as to 
 the lattei', only v.liat J believed to be the real condition of affairs. The 
 
11 
 
 representative of the goverument, in a case like this, stands in a post 
 tion that he need only pursue that line of reasoning which he believes 
 to be just, with no obligation to a personal client to do the best that he 
 can for him. 
 
 Thus have I approached this case. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, of the United States Volunteers, and 
 colonel of the Fifteenth United States IntVmtry, and brevet brigadier- 
 general of the United States Army, was tried and convicted on two 
 charges : 
 
 CIIAKGES AND .SPECIFIf'ATIONS OF WHICH PETITIONER WAS DULY 
 
 CONVICTED.' 
 
 FIEST. 
 
 Disobedience of orders, in violation of the [old] 0th Article of War, 
 an offense punishable with death or such other punishment, according 
 to the nature of the offense, as a court-martial miglit inflict. 
 
 SECOND. 
 
 Viohition of the [old] .j2d Article of War, in misbehaving Iiiuiself 
 before the enemy ; also an offense ])unishable with death or such other 
 inmishment as shall be ordered bv the sentence of a general court-mar- 
 tial. 
 
 Tliese Articles of War are now hnowu in the Kevised Statutes of the 
 United States res])ectively as artich's 21 and 42. 
 
 The specifications Of which he was convicted were briefly and sul)- 
 stantially as follows, namely: 
 
 CIIAKCK 1st. — VIOI.ATIOX OF THE UTII ARTICLE OF WAK. 
 
 Firsi sjjccijj cation . 
 
 Tliivt lie rocoived, at Warrenton Junetioii, Ya., in the evening of 27t]i Angii.st, l!^62, 
 an order from General Pope, dated at 6.30 p. ni., from Bristoe Station, auuonncing a 
 severe tight there hetween Hooker's division (of Heintzelman's corps) and the enemy 
 (.Jackson's forces, Eweli's division), and directing him to .start at one o'clock at nifjhf, 
 and come forward icith hh lehoJe corp>i, or >iuch part of it as was with him, so as to be at Bris- 
 toe Station at daiilitjht the next morning, as it was necessary on all accounts that lie sliould 
 be there by daylight. Tliat if Morell's division (of accused's own corps) had not joined 
 him (accused) yet at Warrenton, to send word to him to push forward immediately, 
 and to send word to General Banks to hurry forward with his (Banks' corps) at all 
 speed to take accused's place at Warrenton Junction. Further, that he, General 
 Pope, sent an officer Avith this dispatch to conduct him to the place (Bristoe). 
 
 Second specification . 
 
 That the accused, being in front of the enemy at Manassas, Ya., on the morning of 
 the 29th August, lc'62, received from General Pope a joint order, addressed to Generals 
 McDowell and Porter, to move forward with their joint commands toward Gainesville, 
 the accused having received written orders to the same effect an hour and a half before 
 (see both orders hereafter set forth), and communication to be established bctw6eu 
 the two wings of the army ; which order he did then and there disobey. 
 
 Third specification. 
 
 Tliat the accused, being in front (»f the enemy during the Itattle of Manassas, on Fri ■ 
 day, the •29th of August, 18j2, did receive the following lawful order: 
 
 "Headquarters in the Field, 
 
 " J«</Hsi29</i— 4.:i0p. m. 
 
 "Major-General Porter: Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right 
 flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if 
 possible on his rear, keeping your right in comnmnication with General Reynolds, 
 
12 
 
 The euemy is masked in the woods iu front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
 engage their tlank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed 
 to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right 
 and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. 
 
 "JOHN POPE, 
 '■'•Major-General Commanding" 
 
 Which he did disobey, and fail to push forward his forces into action either on the 
 enemy's llauk or rear, and did iu ftll other resx)ects fail to obey said order. 
 
 CHARGE 2XD. — VIOLATION OF THE 52d ARTICLE OF WAI!. 
 
 First simcification. 
 
 That during the battle of Mauassas, on Friday, 29th August, 1862, wlnle within sight 
 of tlic field and in f nil hearing of its artiUerii, accused received from Major-General Pope 
 the 4.30 order (see above. Spec. No. 3), Avhich he did then and there shamefully diso- 
 bey, without any attempt to engage the enemy or aid the troops who were already 
 fighting greatly superior numbers and Avere relying on the Hank attack to secure a 
 decisive victory and to capture the enemy's army; a result which must have followed 
 from said flank attack had it been made in compliance with the order which accused 
 so shamefully disobeyed. 
 
 Seco)id speeifcaiion. 
 
 Tliat the accused, l)cing with his army corps, on Friday, 29th August, 1862, between 
 IManassas Station and the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United 
 States and those of the rebels, and within sound of its guns and in the presence of the 
 enemy, and knowing that a severe action of great consequence was being fought and 
 that the aid of his corps w as greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on tlie field, 
 and did shamefully fall back an<l retreat from the advance of the euemy without any 
 attempt to give them battle and without knowing the forces from which he shame- 
 fully retreated. 
 
 Third siKcijication. 
 
 That the accused, being with his army corps near the field of battle of Manassas, on 
 the 29th August, 1862, while a severe action was being fought by the troops of Major- 
 General Pope's command, and being in the lielief that the troops of the said General 
 Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, did shamefully fail to go to 
 the aid of the said troops and general, ami did shamefully retreat away and fall back 
 with his army and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army, and did 
 fail, by any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a dis- 
 jister that would have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. 
 
 In my opening argument in rebuttal, on the 2d of October, I discussed 
 quite lully tlie composition of the court, the legal character of the court, 
 and its jurisdiction over this case. As, however, the petitioner has, on 
 various occasions, and even before this court, stated that he had been 
 "improperly convicted and removed from the United States Army," and 
 as the expression "improperly convicted" may l)e deemed to apply 
 equally to the composition of the court as to the character of the evidence 
 on which he was convicted, the exact condition of affairs, so tar as the 
 court is concerned, cannot be too i)rominently noticed. 
 
 JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL. 
 
 The court consisted of nine general ofticers of the Army, appointed by 
 Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, then the General in Chief. On his trial, 
 the then accused, l)efore pleading to the merits, raised the question 
 wlictlier the court shoidd not have been appointed by the President of 
 the United States, under the act of May 20, 1830, for the reason that the 
 otticer who preferred the cliarges on which he was tried was inspector- 
 general of the late Army of Virginia. That officer was Brig. Gen. B. S. 
 itoberts. United States Volunteers, and at the time in the Regular Army. 
 The implication iu the point thus raised was, that as General Eoberts had 
 held this position by detail on the staff of the army commanded by Maj. 
 
13 
 
 Gen. John Pope, therefore tlie latter must be assumed to have preferred 
 the charges, or, that they were preferred " by his order," It further 
 appeared on tlie record that there had been a previous military commis- 
 sion ordered to try the accused, but which was dissolved without action, 
 and relative to whiclithe then accused alleged (G. C. M. Record, p. 9) that 
 "the subject-matter of its investigation was charges preferred against" 
 him '"by MaJ. Gen. Jolm Pope." In reply the judge-a<lvocate of the 
 coui't, the lion. Joseph Holt, said (G. C. M. Eecord, i>. 10), referring to 
 the pre^'ious military commission, that " in point of fact no charges 
 were ever preferred " by Major-General I'ope ; that the commission was dis- 
 solved and the geiu'ral court-martial appointed, as first stated; that tliere 
 was no reference in tlie order appointing the court-martial to General Pope 
 at all; and further, that he wished to state distinctly that General Pope 
 was not the pro^iecutor in thh case, nor had he preferred the charges, nor 
 did he, the judge-advocate, present them as lieing i>referred by him. 
 As the tlien accused did not pursue the matter further, the court was 
 cleared for deliberation and very properly overruled the objection. 
 
 The general court-martial was appointed upon the 25th of Js'oveml)er, 
 ]8()2. Major-General Pope's connection with the Army of Virginia had 
 terminated on or alxmt the 7th of September. His army had been dis- 
 solved and incorporated with other forces, and \w himself had, on the 
 Kith of September, assumed command of the geograpliical ^Military I)e- 
 jiartment of the Xorthwest, with liis headquarters at Saint Paul, Minn. 
 
 Tlie act of 1830. to which I have alluded, had been, it is pertinent to 
 r(Miiark, made for a very different purpose than the one to which it was 
 sought to be ajiplied on the trial of this petitioner. It had been enacted 
 for the purpose of preventing a commanding general from preferring 
 charges against a commissioned otticer and sending them before a court 
 of hi a own appointment and then acting upon the proceedimjs in the case, 
 as had been done but a short time l>efoie l)y a major-general command- 
 ing, who had jireferred charges against the then Adjutant-General of the 
 Army, had himself a])iH>inted the court and acted upon the proceedings, 
 instead of forwarding the charges to the next higher authority, in order 
 that a court might l>e appointed from that quarter, and the proceedings 
 acted upon by the superior authority. 
 
 It will be perceived that in the case of this petitioner, Major-General 
 Pope was not his commanding general at the time his court was ordered. 
 He had not the slightest military jtower or authority in any particular 
 over him ; he was in a different sphere of duty: he could neither api)oint 
 the court for his trial, nor act upon its ])roceedings, nor carry the proceed- 
 ings into execution. As to Brigadier-General Eoberts, he was a general 
 oiiicer, detailed by the War Department for duty as inspector-geiK^ral 
 to that Army of Virginia, irrespective of who might be commanding 
 general for the time l)eing of that army. He belonged to the staff' of that 
 army, and not to the ]iersonal staff, like an aide-de-camp, of the command- 
 ing general. He had as much right to prefer charges against any ofii- 
 cer in that army, or out of it, as anybody else. Theiefore, as the peti- 
 tioner was not under the command of JMajor-Creneial Pope when the 
 charges were submitted to trial or when the court was appointed, Major- 
 General Pope was not his commanding officer, within the purview or in- 
 tent of the act of 1830. 
 
 If anything further were needed in this case to show General Pope's 
 connection with the charges, it is to be found in his evidence on the 
 court-martial, where he testified, December 5, 1802 (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 
 23), that he did not of his own knowledge- know who preferred the 
 charges; that he had not preferred the charges against the accused. 
 
14 
 
 He bad, liowever, set forth in his official reports the latter's operations, 
 as he did those of everybody else concerned in the campaign of Angust, 
 18G2. It is (jnite needless to say that the inalcing of his official report 
 was but liis duty, in order that justice might be done to all concerned. 
 It possibly brought the accused to justice, because General Pope, as a 
 sworn iniblic ofticer of the government holding a high official position 
 wherein the lives of thousands were within his control, was bound to 
 state everything tliat he knew or believed bearing upon the events of 
 the campaign winch he had conducted, either in praise or censure of 
 whoever might have been connected with that campaign. His reports 
 were one source of information to the government and the ]>ublic as to 
 the transactions and the acts of commission and omission of the accused. 
 The record i^hows that there were other sources of such information 
 also. 
 
 General Pope's power or ability to bring the accused to justice after 
 he became tirinly convinced of his guilt was a power limited solely to 
 the preparation and presentation of official reports; because, as we 
 know from the Court-Martial Eecord, it was not until he arrived in 
 Washington after the close of the campaign that he became flrmly con- 
 vinced of the criminal conduct of the accused, made evident to him l)e- 
 yond peradventure by the exhibition to liim by President Lincoln of the 
 dispatches and comnnmications which the accused had sent to ]Ma,ior- 
 General P)urnside, and which that faithful officer had sent to the Piesi- 
 dent (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 23). His, Pope's, poAver to act or command 
 had then ceased, as Major-General Porter had resumed his connection 
 with the Army of the Potomac, under a different commander. General 
 Pope couhl not even order charges to be preferred by any of his statf 
 except his personal staff, because he had no longer a military staff to 
 the Army of Virginia, which was now dissolved. In military practice 
 we know that wlien a staft* officer prefers charges by direction of his 
 commander he does so with the explicit statement, "By order.'' 
 
 I am constrained to enter into this collateral issue somewhat from 
 the manner in which the i^etitioner has for a series of years, without the 
 slightest warrant, held up Major-General Pope as his "prosecutor,'- be- 
 cause of General Pope's lemarks in his report to the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, made January 27, 1803, that he considered it a 
 duty he owed to the country to bring Fitz-John Porter to justice, lest 
 at another time, and with greater opportunities, he might do that which 
 would be still more disastrous ; and that with his conviction and punish- 
 ment ended all official connection that General IN)pe had since had with 
 anything that related to the operations he conducted in Virginia. 
 
 The ])etitioner knew as well as we know that it was a moral obliga- 
 tion and a duty on the part of the commanding general, as far as was 
 in his ])ower, to bring to the notii.-e of the govei'ument anything that 
 he believed would tend to bring a delinquent officer to justice. The 
 verdict of the general c<^)urt-martial which tried and convicted this peti- 
 tioner of these grave crimes shows that General Pope had sufficient 
 probable cause to induce a belief that the i)etitioner Avas guilty when he 
 made his reports. This obvious official duty of General Pope should 
 relieve hiin from any imi)utation of being animated by personal hostility 
 to the petitioner, for whatever his personal feelings might have been 
 towards the accused, friendly or otherwise, his duty would remain the 
 same. If the accused, or his counsel, on tlie original trial had desired 
 to know how or why or when Brigadier-CJeneral Iloberts had come to 
 prefer the charges against him, he could undoubtedly have ascertained 
 when General Iloberts was called and sworn as a witness, by asking 
 him the question. 
 
15 
 
 COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL. 
 
 Having thus shown the legality of the general court-martial as a 
 court pro]>erly appointed, merely for the pmpose of again refuting the 
 many insinuations and implications on behalf of the petitioner which 
 have gone forth for so many years, next to be considered is the compo- 
 sition of the general court-martial. 
 
 The petitioner has deliberately asserted here, when referring to the 
 court of nine general officers which tried him, that they " could not sit with 
 that calm necessary for a judicial deliberation"; that his sentence Avas 
 "undeserved," and that he was "improperly convicted." 
 
 In my opening argument I mentioned who those nine general officers 
 were who, with the Hon. Joseph Holt as Judge- Advocate, formed the 
 judicial tribunal under the military laws to administer justice. There 
 had not been a court in the Army of the United States composed of 
 officers of such rank since the close of the Kevolutionary war. They 
 sat, not as we are sitting, under the mere oath which we took when we 
 accepted our commissions as officers in the Army years ago. but under 
 the oath which the statute has wisely i)rovided in cases of trials, "to 
 well and truly try and determine, according to the evidence, and to duly 
 administer justice without i)artiality, favor, or affection." When a court 
 sits thus, it is only the most overwhelming and convincing proof Avhich 
 would justify in the slightest degree anyone in saying that the sentence 
 awarded by it was undeserved, or that the court "could not sit with that 
 calm necessary for a judicial deliberation." The officers who tried the 
 accused were, many of tlieiii, his intimates, and all his friends. Even 
 when he raised the point as to jurisdiction, he said it was "not with the 
 slightest purpose of taking any exception to any member of the court" 
 (G. C. M. Ifecord, p. 10); and yet two of the members of that court had 
 been active parti<'i])ants with him in the August cami)aign. Even before 
 he raised the jvirisdictional (piestion he declared formally of record that 
 he had no ol)jection to any member of the court (G. C. M. Kecord, p. 5), 
 thus, on two different occasions, deliberately placing himself on record in 
 this matter. Of the nine general officers, six were graduates of the 
 United States Military Academy, and the President of the Court was an 
 intimate j^ersonal fiiend of the accused. The latter, in his defense on 
 his tiial, said, in addressing the coiut (G. C. ^l. Record, p. 250) : 
 
 Yourselves most, if not all of yon, have known me well. Yonr eminent official law 
 adviser [nieaninjij Judge-Advocato-fieneral Holt], who bas conducted this prosecution 
 calmly and fairly, so far as on him depended, l)ut with a vij^ilance which his duty 
 demanded, himself, in the recent jiast, when numerous events hinged on the great sway 
 which in his high post he bore, has trusted me, and has felt that his trust was in nowise 
 betrayed. 
 
 It is plain from this that the court were his friends, and that the Judge- 
 Advocate-General had respected him and esteemed him, or he woidd 
 not have trusted him, or would have been prejudiced against him. 
 
 To the petitioner's carefully prepared written defense on the merits 
 the Judge- Advocate made no reply whatever, but in alluding to the 
 length of the investigation said (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 227) : 
 
 I will sim]ily remark that this case has been thoroughly and most patientiy investi- 
 gated. A continuous session of forty-live days sufficiently attests this. 
 
 I know of no instance in the history of the American Army where a 
 general court-martial in the trial of a cause has devoted as many days 
 to it as were given to the case of the petitioner. This fiict of itself is 
 sufficient answer to the remark he has made that they "could not sit 
 with that calm necessary for a judicial deliberation." In his address here 
 
16 
 
 lie has asserted that many of liis witnesses were actively engaged in tlie 
 Army and were nnattainable. The record, however, of his trial does not 
 show it. On the contrary, he specifically stated that he was ready to go on 
 with his case (G. C. M. Record, p. 118). From then until its close there is 
 nothing whatever to show that he did not have summoned and in attend- 
 ance every witness he ask«d for. When all his evidence was in, the 
 jcourt gave him all the time he desired to prepare his written address 
 (G. C. M. Record, p. 225). 
 
 Soon after his court had adjourned sine die^ President Lincoln, over 
 his own hand, by an order dated January 12, 1863, directed Judge- 
 Advocate- General Holt, in his quality as head of the Bureau of Military 
 Justice, and in the usual course in such cases under the law — 
 
 To revise the proceedings of the conrt-niartial in the case of Maj. Gen. Fitz-John 
 Porter, and to report fully any legal questions that may have arisen in them, and upon 
 the bearing of the testimojiy in reference to the charges and specilications against the 
 accused, and upon which he was tried. 
 
 We have seen this review which the Judge- Advocate-General made 
 under the law the subject of severe animadversion on tlie part of the 
 petitioner. In other words, as I have said in my opening argument, the 
 reviewer has been reviewed, and no longer is " the eminent official law 
 ad^^ser " who, through forty-five days of trial, had "conducted the prose- 
 cution so calmly and so fairly." 
 
 It is a curious fact, among the many unusual defenses which the peti- 
 tioner has set up here, that he has attempted to show that President Lin- 
 coln, who acted upon the proceedings and the findings and sentence of 
 the court, which was that he should be cashiered and forever disquali- 
 fied from holding any office of profit or trust under the Government of 
 the United States, never read the proceedings at all, but came to his 
 determination of approval from the review made by the Judge-Advocate- 
 General under his order. If this even was true, it is none the less a fact 
 that the sentence is a valid and subsisting and a final and completed 
 act. But it must be borne in miiul that while the case was still pro- 
 gressing the record was being ])rinted and published in the newspapers 
 of the day (pp. 053, 055, and 050 Board's Record), and that portion of it 
 AN hich comijosed merely the record of the prosecution was printed as 
 soon as the prosecution was completed (p. 340, Board's Record). So that 
 when the case finally came into the hands of Mr. Lincoln he was quite 
 thoroughly conversant with all its principal i)oints; and all that he 
 practically would have had to do would have been to examine the ques- 
 tions raised by the ac(;used in his defense, and consider them in connec- 
 tion with the review. I believe that the court which tried this convicted 
 officer was a court of as honorable and just men as ever have been assem- 
 bled on any court-martial in the Army of the United States. 
 
 I am constrained as the representative of the government to say this 
 on belmlf of the members of tiiat court, many of whoni I knew person- 
 ally, because bound by their oaths not to disclose or discover the vote or 
 oi)inion (»f any particular member, those who still survive have for six- 
 teen years suffered with dignity and patience language of aspersion and 
 reproa(;li from this petitioner, and iji his l)ehalf. Had it been confined 
 simjily to a portion of the secular press of the day I shoidd hardly in 
 an argnment like this have considered it my duty to notice it. But the 
 j)etiti<)iu'r has made himself a party to the slanders and libels by in- 
 (h>rsing and making use of the pamphlet published by his senior coun- 
 sel, the late Reverdy Johnson, shortly after his trial, in July, 1803. The 
 language of that panii)hl<'t (p. 1)91, Board's Record) in reference to the 
 members of the court-mariial was indefensible and unwarranted. To 
 
17 
 
 charge that the general officers who sat upon that court were promoted 
 in rank by President Lincoln, with the consent of the Senate of the 
 United States, on account of and because they had voted for con\ictiony 
 \^as a reflection not only on the court, or the members who were referred 
 to, but upon the President and the Senate. It contained an implication 
 tliat certain members had been false to their oaths and had disclosed or 
 discovered the votes and opinions of the members of the coiu't. It was 
 an implication that President Lincoln himself was corrupt, tliat he 
 wanted the conviction of the petitioner, and sought it by corrupting the 
 very fountain of justice. 
 
 This pamphlet to which I have referred (page 11) was, on the 10th 
 day of June, 1809, forwarded by the petitioner to President Grant, in 
 an appeal which he then made over his own signature, in whicli he 
 spoke of the •'unparalleled injustice" with which he had been treated. 
 The fact that so bold and malicious an attack on respectable and honor- 
 able men who deserved weU of their country should thus be made is but 
 one of the indications of a systematic and sustained plan, since the time 
 the court rendered its judgment, to abuse and hold up to contempt all 
 wiio have been unfortunately, directly or indirectly, concerned in the 
 prosecution and conviction of the petitioner, either as judges, as judge- 
 advocate, as witnesses, or as executive reviewing authority. 
 
 We have seen here that instead of confining the evidence to what the 
 petitioner did or did not do on the 27th and L'Oth of August, under the 
 specific limited charges on which he was tried, it has been sought, di- 
 rectly and indirectly, at one time for one purpose, at another time for 
 another purpose, either to test the recollection of the witnesses by cross- 
 examination, or in order to haxe a connected narrative, or presumably to 
 discover bias or prejudice or contradiction, to bring in detached por- 
 tions of the cami)aign for the purpose of showing inconsistencies or 
 seeming confusion or errors in the campaign as conducted by those who 
 had been witnesses against the accused in his trial or concerned therein, 
 without o])portunity for them to defend themselves, or judicial sanction 
 to such proceeding, 
 
 COXDTTIOX OF AFFAIRS JUST PRIOR TO THE FIRST CHARGE. 
 
 In taking up the charges seriatim of which the petitioner was con- 
 victetl, a preliminary sketch of military affairs as they then stood in 
 Virginia will be desirable for a correct understanding of the merits. 
 
 In the report or rather statement made by General Pope, by request, 
 to the committee of Congress on the "Conduct of the War" (subse- 
 quent to petitioner's conviction, and introduced by the latter before this 
 Board against my objection, and for purposes quite apparent), occur 
 some remarks which will illustrate the subject. Said he (Pojie) : 
 
 When I first assumed command of these forces the troops nntter Jackson had retiivd 
 from the Valley of the Shenandoah and were in rapid march toward Richmond, so 
 that at that time there was no force of the enemy of any consequence withm a day's 
 march of any of the troops assigned to my command. 
 
 It was the wish of the government that I should cover the city of Washington from 
 any attacks from tlie city of Richmond, make such dispositions as were necessary to 
 assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time so to operate 
 upon the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Char- 
 lottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the euemj- from Richmond, 
 and thus relieve the operations against that city of the Army of the Potomac. The 
 first object I had in view was to concentrate as far as possible all the movable forces 
 under niv command. 
 
18 
 He then "refers to the disposition of the troops : 
 
 King's division of tho same corps it was thon<;ht best to leave at Fredericksburg 
 to cover the crossing of the Rappahannock at that point, and to protect the raihoad 
 thence to Aquia Creek, and the pul)lic buiklings which had been erected at the latter 
 place. While I yielded to this wish of the War Department, the wide separation of 
 this division froin the main body of the Army, and the ease with which the enemy 
 would be able to inteiiiose between them, engaged my earnest attention, and gave me 
 very serious uneasiness. 
 
 While these movements were in progress commenced the series of battles which 
 preceded and attended the retreat of General McClellan from the Chickahomiuy to- 
 wards Harrison's Landing. When first General McClellan began to intimate by his 
 dispatches that lie designed making this move towards James River, I suggested to 
 the President of the United States the impolicy of such a movement, and the serious 
 consequences which would be likely to result from it, and urged upon him that he 
 should send orders to General McClellan that if he were unable to maintain his posi- 
 tion iipon the Chickahomiuy, and were pressed by superior forces of the enemy, to 
 mass his whole force on the north side of that stream, even at the risk of losing much 
 material of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court- 
 House ; but in no event to retreat with his army farther to the south than the White 
 House on York River. I stated to the President that the retreat to James River was 
 carrying General McClellan away from any re-euforcemeuts that could possibly be sent 
 him within a reasonable time, and was absolutely depriving him of any substantial 
 aid from tlie forces under my command ; that by this movement the whole army of 
 the enemy would be interposed between his army and mine, and that they would then 
 be at liberty to strike in either direction, as they might consider it most advantageous ; 
 that this move to James River would leave entirely unprotected, except in so far aa 
 the small force under my command was able to protect it, the whole region in front of 
 Washington, and that it would then therefore be impossible to send any of the forces 
 under mj- command to re-enforce General McClellan without rendering it certain that 
 the eneuiy, even in the worst case for themselves, would have the privilege and power 
 of exchanging Richmond for Washington City ; that to them the loss of Richmond 
 would be trifling, while the loss of Washington to us would be conclusive, or nearly 
 so, in its results upon this war. 
 
 I was so deeply imiuessed with these views that I repeatedly and earnestly urged 
 them upon tlnr President and the Secretary of War. 
 
 After General McClellan had taken up his position at Harrison's Landing I adtli-essed 
 to him a letter stating my position and the distribution of the troops under my com- 
 mand, and recjuesting in all earnestness and good faith to write me fully and freely 
 his views, and to suggest to me any measures which he thought desu'able to enal)le me 
 to co-operate with him or to render any assistance in my power in the oijeratious of 
 the army under his command. I stated to him that I had no object except to assist 
 his operations, and that I would undertake any labor and run any risk for that pur- 
 pose. I, therefore, desired him to feel no hesitation in communicating freely with me, 
 as he might rest assured that every suggestion that he would make would meet all 
 respect and consideration at my hands, and that so far as it was in my power to do so 
 I would carry out his wishes with all energy and with all the means at my command. 
 
 In reply to this communication I received a letter from General McClellan, very 
 general in terms, and proposing nothing towards the accomplishment of the purpose 
 1 had suggested to him. It became apparent that considering the situation in which 
 the Army of the PotouKK" and the Army of Virginia were placed in relation to each 
 other, and the absolute necessity of harmonious and prompt co-operation between 
 them, some military'superior, both of General McClellan and myself, should be called 
 to Washington and ])laced in command of all the operations in Virginia. 
 
 In acconlaiHc with these views Major-General Halleck was called to Washington 
 and placed in general c(naniand. Many circumstances which it is not necessary here to 
 set forth indiiced nie to express to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to 
 General Halleck my desire to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia 
 and to ])ii returned to the western country. My services were, however, considered 
 Tiecessary in tin- i)rojected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with. I ac- 
 cordingly took till' ticld in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a 
 determination to carry out the plans of the govennneut with all the energy and with 
 all the ability of which 1 was master. 
 
 On the 29th of July, 1862, he left Washington with the design to covi?r, 
 as far as i)ossil)l<>, the front of Washington, and make secure the Valley 
 of the Sheiiand(»a]i, and so o]»erate u])on the enemy's lines of communi- 
 cation to tlic west and northwest as to force liim to make heavy detach- 
 ments from his main force at Ivichmond, and thus enable the Army of 
 
19 
 
 the Potomac, without molestation, to withdraw from its position at Har- 
 rison's Landing-, and take transports for Aqnia Creek or Alexandria. 
 
 During these movements the battle of Cedar Creek was fought 9th 
 August, 
 
 On the IGth he became apprised by an intercepted dispatch that Gen- 
 eral E. E. Lee, with the main portion of the Confederate army, intended 
 to overwhelm him before the Army of the Potomac could come to his 
 assistance. The fate of the country depended on his ability to hold his 
 ground until re-enforced by that army, for if the capital had fallen it is 
 highly probable the Confederate Government would have been recog- 
 nized by foreign powers. 
 
 On tiie 14tli August the Confederate Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson had 
 begun his march from Gordonsville. He had obtained permission from 
 General Lee to make- one of his characteristically bold and decisive 
 moves in advance, and on the knowledge of this fact many subsequent 
 events will become plain. The permission was incautiously given ; soon, 
 I have reason to believe, repented of. Even General Longstreet himself 
 admits having remonstrated wlien he heard of it. 
 
 The movements of General Pope's army during these trying days are 
 worth studying. Limited, as he was, by orders from Washington, he 
 did all that acom^ageous and able general could do. 
 
 As late as the 20th, he was ordered by the general-in-chief to hold 
 the line of the Ilai)iiahannock, and on the 21st " to dispute every inch 
 of ground, and tight like the devil until we can re-enforce you." 
 
 Meanwhile Jackson, covered by the Bull Eun Mountain Eange, was 
 marching rapidly to Salem and Thoroughfare Gap, positively outflank- 
 ing General P()])e, who, confined l>y liis imperative instructions, could do 
 but little. Jackson was now about three days ahead of the main body 
 of the Confederate army. 
 
 General Pope's army had Won re-enforced from the xVrmy of the 
 Potomac by the Army Corps of Major-General Heintzelman and much 
 of Burnside's Ninth Corps, under Eeno, and by the division of Maj. 
 Gen. John F. Eeynolds, of Pennsylvania Eeserves. 
 
 On the 20tli August, Jackson marched from White Plains through 
 Thoroughfare Gap, by Haymarket and Gainesville, reached Brlstoe Sta- 
 tion at sunset, and the same night sent a detachment to seize Manassas 
 Junction. 
 
 On the 25th General Pope's headquarters had been at Warrenton, 
 and the 26tli they were at Warrenton Junction. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th General Pope, having relinquished his 
 former line of operations, which he had held later than his judgment 
 dictated, under tlie orders he had, began his movement against Jackson, 
 and on the evening of tliat day General Hooker's division of Heiutzel- 
 man's corps having moved along the railroad from Warrenton Junction 
 toward Manassas Junction, and meeting Swell's division of Jackson's 
 forces at Bristoe Station in the afternoon, after a sharp fight drove him 
 out in the direction- of Manassas Junction. General Poi^e made his 
 headquarters with this division. 
 
 In his rear, at Warrenton Junction, was the petitioner's command, 
 the galhmt Fiftli Corps of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 General McDowell with his own and Sigel's corjis, and Eeynolds' 
 division, were at Gainesville, interposed between Jackson and Thor- 
 oughfare Gap, while Eeno, with his corps and Kearney's division of 
 Heintzelman's corps, was at and near Greenwich, within supporting 
 distance of McDowell. Jackson's main force was concentrated at Ma- 
 nassas Junction — a point, by the way, he would possibly never have 
 .3 G 
 
20 
 
 readied if the promised re-enforcemeuts liad been sent from Alexandria 
 to that point. 
 
 The New Jersey brigade under Brig. Gen. Geo. W. Taylor, of the 
 Sixth Corps (Franklin's), got up to Manassas Junction in season from 
 Alexaniliia, but unsupported, after a gallant fight were routed and their 
 commander mortally wounded. Had the entire corjjs been there the 
 subsequent days' battles might not have occurred (Board's Eecord, j)^. 
 540, 750). 
 
 Two courses now remained open for Jackson, seeing that his line of 
 retreat throngh Gainesville and Hsiy market to Thoroughfare Gap was 
 held by ]\IcI)owell, viz, to retire through Centreville, which would carry 
 him still farther from the main body of General Lee's army, or to mass 
 his force and assault Hooker at Bristoe Station and turn his right. 
 
 If this last move should be made, daybreak- was the time when it 
 would be most likely to be carried into effect. 
 
 At this juncture General Hooker reported his ammunition nearly 
 exhausted, and that he had but about five rounds per man left. 
 
 We now come to the charges in this case. 
 
 FIRST SPECIFICATION, FIRST CHARGE, CONSIDERED. 
 
 The petitioner was convicted of this specification, that he had received 
 at Warrenton Junction, Virginia, on the evening of August 27, 1862, 
 an order from General Pope, dated 0.30 p. m., from Bristoe Station, an- 
 nouncing a severe fight there between Hooker's division of Heintzel- 
 man's corps and the enemy (Jackson's forces, Ewell's division), and di- 
 recting him to start at one o'clock at night and come forward with his 
 whole corps, or snch part of it as was with him, so as to be at Bristoe 
 Station at daylight next morning, as it was necessary on all accounts that 
 he should h6 there by daylight, and that if Morell's division of his corps 
 had not joined him at Warrenton to send wor<l to him to push forward 
 immediately, and to send word to General Banks to hurry forward with 
 his (Banks') corps at all speed to take the place of the accused at AVar- 
 renton, and that General Pope had sent an officer with this peremptory 
 dispatch to the petitioner at Warrenton Junction. 
 
 Did Major-General Porter do what he was distinctly and explicitly 
 ordered to do by Major-General Pope, namely, march with his corps at 
 one a. m. of August 27th from Warrenton Junction? Or did he arrive 
 at Bristoe Station at daylight as commanded? The answer is that be 
 neither started nor attempted to start at one a. m., nor did he arrive at day- 
 light at the point to which he was ordered. The court convicted him 
 of that offense, and he has not produced before this Board a single par- 
 ticle of "newly-discovered evidence," or even a new excuse, as the Board 
 will perceive by reference to the record of his court. 
 
 On his trial he claimed that the roads Avere blocked with wagons, that 
 the night was dark, that his troops were fatigued, that he made great 
 personal exertions after the march began, after dayliyht, to clear the road. 
 It further appeared that Major-General Pope sent messages to him to 
 expedite his movements (accused's defense, G. C. M. Eecord, p. 250). 
 It is no answer to such a charge in military law to enter upon a collat- 
 eral issue by way of justification or excuse in order to ascertain whether 
 there was any real necessity for a punctual compliance with the exact 
 terms of snch an order, or even Avhether it could be fully complied with. 
 On the commanding general of the Union Army of Virginia, who issued 
 the order, rested the res])()nsibility of the operations with which he was 
 charged 1)y his government, in the face of an active and enterprising 
 
21 
 
 enemy flxislied Avitli success, it Laving: recently relieved Eiclnnond from 
 danger, and having put tlie gallant Army of the Potomac for the time 
 being on the defensive, in a position at Harrison's Landing, where it 
 could not prevent the Confederates from entering on offensive opera- 
 tions. When Major-(ieneral Pope issued a peremptory order and indi- 
 cated a certaili time when its execution should be commenced, the peti- 
 tioner had no right whatever to set his will uj) in opposition, and to say 
 that he would not start until a later hour. 
 
 The cumulative evidence presented here has exhibited some curious 
 facts, and careful examination will jjossibly show that they leave the 
 petitioner's case worse than before. 
 
 It appears that under this order, instead of arriving at daylight as 
 directed, the petitioner did not arrive himself until between 10 and 11 
 o'clock in the morning at Bristoe Station. In examining the language 
 of the order it would seem to be quite im^^ossible to put it in terms more- 
 precise or imperative. It was dated late in the afternoon, and it shows 
 on its face that it contemplated the possibility that Major- General Mo- 
 rell's division of the Fifth Corps, then under the petitioner's commands, 
 had not yet arrived at Warrenton Junction. That the petitioner should 
 be informed of the state of affairs, the order with unusual minuteness 
 ])laced before him the circumstances as they were then seen by the com- 
 manding general. The order iiositively directed that he should leave' 
 Warrenton Junction at a precise time — no discretion was allowed ; and 
 the commanding general, in order that there should be no mistake as to 
 the execution of it, sent an officer of his own staff to conduct the accused 
 to P>rist(»e, so that he should have the benefit not only of that officer's 
 knowhidgc of tlie road, but also the direct, immediate influence and au- 
 thority of the commandinfi (/cncral himself in doing anything that might he 
 necessarg to further the objects of the order. As a reason why lie slumkl 
 start at one o'clock in flic morning this strong language is used: "It is 
 necessary on all accounts that you should be here by daylight.'' 
 
 Tiicrf' is nocpu'stion that the order was a lawful order. General Pope, 
 in his examination lu'forc tli<' court-martial, explained the reasons for 
 the uigen('.\- of the order (G. C.M. Ifecord, p. 12). Captain DeKay,Four- 
 t<'enfli I'nited States Infantry, who carried the order, swore, on the 
 original trial, that he delivered it between nine and nine-thirtv p. m. 
 (G. C. M. Peconl, p. 13). 
 
 Tlie assistant a Ijut mt-gener.il of the asciised, Lieut. Col. Frederick 
 T. fjocke, said the order was received at verv nearly ten o'clock i>. mi 
 (G. C. ]\I. Pecord, 1). i;U). 
 
 The petitioner had two divisions in his corps — the Fifth Army Corps — 
 then under his coinuumd, viz, MaJ. (ien. George W. Morell's and Brig. 
 Gen. (Jeorge Sykes'. 
 
 :MaJ. (ieii. George W. Morell. on tla^ trial in ISCL' (G. C. M. Eeeord, p. 
 If.')) said, when called for the accused, as to the time of his arrival at 
 AVanenton Junction : 
 
 I arrived there myself about the middle of the afternoou. I think my coinmaud — 
 tlie last of it — did not arrive there iiutil near sunset. 
 
 And before this Board he has said that most of his divisions Mere there 
 before dark (Board's Record, p. 130). 
 
 As to Sykes' division, Capt. Drake De Kay, who had been in Warren- 
 ton Junction early in the day of the 27th, testified on accused's trial, 8th 
 December, 18G2 (G. C, M. Pecord, p. 41), that the regulars of Sykes' divis- 
 ion were in camp there as early as ten a. m., because he visited several 
 otticers of his own regiment in camp there. 
 
22 
 
 Bii«i'. Geii. Ge<irge Sykes, United States Volunteers (now eolonel Twen- 
 tieth United States Intantiy), says before this Board that he tliinks his 
 command got into AVarrenton Junction about one p. m. 27th August 
 (Board's Record, yt. 445). Therefore, as the petitioner in his openingstate- 
 ment before this Board has stated (p. 22) as one of his excuses for dis- 
 obeying ]\rajor-(ienera] Pope's order, that General Sykes, when discuss- 
 ing it with liini at the time, represented his men, '^ after a long fatiguing 
 march extending into night, as in no condition to renew the march with- 
 out some interval of rest," it is sufficient to refer to Sykes' sworn state- 
 ment as to the time his division arrived in Warrenton Junction — 
 contirmed as it is by other evidence — in order to lead to the conclusion 
 that the latter- never said anything of the sort. 
 
 IS^ow, what did this petitioner do when he got the order? Did he 
 direct his assistant adjutant-general, who has been so much and so often 
 a witness in this case, to send out a detachment to clear the roads, or to 
 stop any wagons passing through Warrenton Junction towards Bristoe? 
 
 Captain De Kay, at the time {G. C. M, Record, p. 43), told him of the 
 condition of the road — that it was good — that there were a good many 
 ■wagons on it, but that he had passed the last wagon a little beyond 
 Catlett's Station moving slowly. 
 
 Thus was he apprised of what was necessary in order to perform the 
 required duty ; but, handing the order to one of his generals, he re- 
 marked, "Gentlemen, there is something for von to sleej) on" (G-. 0. 
 M. Record, p. 43). 
 
 This precise expression remains uncontradicted, and even the peti- 
 tioner's witness on his trial, Brigadier-General Butterfield, the only one 
 he seems to have cared to interrogate on the subject, said that petitioner 
 remarked " there was a chance fin- a short nap, or something of that 
 sort, I do not remember the exact words" (G. C. M. Record, p. 185). 
 
 Captain De Kay then spoke up and told him — 
 
 That the last thing General Pope said to me [him] on leaving Bristoe Station, was 
 that I [hej should remain -svith General Porter and guide the column to Bristoe Sta- 
 tion, leaving at one o'elock, and that General Pope expected him certainly to be there 
 by daylight, or relied upon his being there by daylight. 
 
 The petitioner, however, determined not to start until daylight (G. C* 
 M. Record, p. 44), and Captain De Kay had nothing to do but wait and 
 accept the hospitalities of corps headquarters. 
 
 Thus did the petitioner set up his will against the lawful order of his 
 commanding general — orders he had sworn to obey in accepting his 
 commission — and a jury of his peers convicted him of the crime after a 
 j)atient and laborious investigation of forty-tive days. 
 
 It vnW always be impossible to know the exact thoughts which influ- 
 enced this jjetitioner in his manifold acts of omission and commission 
 during the few eventful days he was under IVIajor-General Pope's im- 
 mediate command. We can gather them oidy from his words and acts. 
 
 The order being an urgent as well as ajn imperative one, why did he 
 not send word to General Pope, of his determination not to move. His 
 delay might possibly ruin any movement or combination contemplated 
 by Ills commanding general. Did he hope for this, or was he merely 
 using e^ ery means to interpose delays, so that his late commanding 
 genei'al shouhl reach the front from Alexandria and assume command 
 of the whole ? 
 
 To 8iiy that the veteran division of regulars under Brigadier-General 
 ►Sykes would have straggled or become disordered and disintegrated in 
 tljc nine-mile march to Jbistoe, is to assume a want of discipline and 
 csjuit de corps in that s])l('jidid di\ ision wliicli few who ever knew it will 
 
23 
 
 ^ concede. To say that it was fatigued and not able to march is contra- 
 dicted by pointing to the hour at ^Aiiich it arrived in Warrenton Junc- 
 tion. 
 
 According to peititioner's own witnesses, Greneral Sykes' division had 
 been in camp nearly fourteen hours, from 12.30 p. m. of the 27th August, 
 before it Avould have had to move at all under General Pope's order, 
 and if the government evidence is to be relied on, given as it was when 
 tlie recollection was vivid, the division had been quietly in camp fifteen 
 hours. 
 
 It is fiu'ther to be remembered that General Pope's order contemplated 
 only the march at 1 a, m. of Sykes' division, leaving Morell -to follow, 
 as he did not know whether the latter had yet arrived at Warrenton 
 Junction or not. 
 
 However, even Morell's entire division, according to petitioner's own 
 Avitnesses, had been in camp at least six hours, from 7 p. m., before any 
 march was required. 
 
 No pretense can be raised that the petitioner here did not fully know 
 the intent and ett'ect of the order, for one of his ^^itnesses on his trial, 
 Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 185) said that the 
 accused, at the time, stated — 
 
 Eatlier decidedly, there was tlie order; it must be obeyed. Tliat those wlio gave the 
 order knew whether the uecessities of the case wonhl warrant the exertions that had 
 to be made to comply with it. 
 
 Did he make the exertions to comply with it ? 
 
 The whole allegation of disobedience of orders in this specification 
 finds the true principle of obedience enunciated by the petitioner at the 
 time he made that remark. 
 
 So necessary did the commanding general seem to think it was that 
 the petitioner's troops should be speedily at Bristoe, that, as was shown on 
 the original trial, he sent messengers to him en route, and even vouch- 
 safed as late as G.05 o'clock on the morning of the 28th to inform petitioner 
 that General Hooker reported his ammunition exhausted, and requested 
 him to come forward at once with all possible speed (Board's Record, p. 
 1126). 
 
 Fortunately for the nation General Jackson did not know the condi- 
 tion General Hooker's division was in, and made a night march with his 
 whole command — infantry, cavalry, and artillery — via Manassas Junc- 
 tion to Centreville and stone house, on the very night petitioner pleads 
 that it was too dark for him to move Sykes' regulars. 
 
 General Pope need not have given any reason whatever why he de- 
 sired petitioner to march at 1 a. m. or why he desired him to be at 
 Bristoe at daylight. His courtesy was thrown away, but the fact that 
 he did go fully into his reasons for issuing the order took from the 
 petitioner any possible opportunity for exercising any discretion whatever 
 as to literal compliance. 
 
 There is not a word in the whole order which shows that General 
 Pope left him any discretion as to the end to be obtained, viz, "On all 
 accounts to be in Bristoe at daylight." 
 
 Anxious hours they must have been to the cojumanding general from 
 daylight until all certainty of Jackson's attacking had passed away. 
 
 However, as the commanding general was not bound to give any 
 explanation of his order, none is needed in considering whether tlie 
 petitioner obeyed or disobeyed it. 
 
 Those were i)erilous and critical times for the government, requiring 
 great and unusual exertions on the part of that army, and so far as the 
 
24 
 
 field and line and rank and file were concerned, there can be no qnestion 
 that tliey ■were actnated by a desire to do their whole duty. 
 
 The petitioner here took counsel with some of his general officers 
 what should be done as to General Pope's order, althoug:li he had no 
 power to call a council of war in order to transfer responsiliility. 
 
 As to what the petitioner actually did, reference to the testimony of 
 some of the witnesses will atfor<l some indication. 
 
 If there were wagons on the road between Warrenton Junction and 
 Bristoe, it is plain that the first simple duty of a commanding officer 
 who had to make a niglit march would be to get control of the road by 
 sending a 'detachment in advance and parking such wagons on each 
 side as might be found in the way. 
 
 The Board Mill recollect the evidence of Brevet Brigadier-General Tay- 
 lor, First Pennsylvania Cavalry, who had been encampe<l in that coun- 
 try for some weeks, and been over it a number of times, in which he 
 described what an immense i)lain it was, with roads, as we see in their 
 evidence, running parallel to each other for operations on both sides of 
 the track; it was all open country at that time, with very little, if any, 
 woods, and those in l)ut detached i)ieces (Board's Eecord, p. 910). 
 
 ]*s^ow, what were the exertions of the petitioner of after he got the 
 order between 9 and 10 p. m. to move precisely at 1 a. m. ! It seems he 
 stepped out from the light of his tent to look around, and concluded it 
 was dark, and then decided to postpone marching until 3 a. m. instead 
 of 1 (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 185). 
 
 The same witness to this fact says he sent two aides to investigate the 
 fondition of the road and to ask General Pope to have the road cleared 
 so that they coiTld come up. 
 
 In this there must l)e error, or more would have been produced on the 
 subject; but as the petitioner's aides actually remained with him, as 
 appears by their evidence, they evidently did not do anything of the 
 sort. 
 
 However, if such messengers were sent to General Pope, it appears 
 explicitly l)y the witness's evidence that they were sent before the peti- 
 tioner decided to postpone the marching until 3 a. ni., which the witness 
 .also had recommeiuled. Therefore, assuming it true that the request 
 was sent to General Pope, it would have led him to believe that the peti- 
 iioner proposed to start at the time he himself had ordered. 
 
 If the petitioner did actually send any one to General Pope during 
 that night, requesting the road cleared, it would show that he Anew ivhat 
 he should do before marehhuj at his end of the line. 
 
 When Lieut. Col. Joseph F. Brinton, of the Second Pennsylvania Cav- 
 .:alry, went (G. C M. Eecord, p. 205), at ten o'clock at night, from Catlett's 
 Station to Warrenton Junction, on this very road that petitioner was to 
 march over, and saw the latter at midnight, the petitioner then asked 
 him if he womd not send out some men, when he got back, to have the 
 road cleared. Colonel Brinton says that he sent some men to get the 
 wagons out of the way, bnt didn't know the result. 
 
 This, it Avill be observed, was after midnight. Already had the peti- 
 tioner, for upwards of two hours, the order in his possession. 
 
 Major General ^fo)•eU sa>s he himself received no oi-ders from petitioner 
 to send anv of his command to clear the road to Bristoe (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 430). 
 
 Had anyl)een sent from General Sykes' division it would undoubtedly 
 have been shown, l)nt it has not been. 
 
 Capt. Francis S. Earle, General ]\Ioreli's assistant adjutant- general, 
 (Board's Record, p. Ill,) knew of no orders being given the night before, 
 
2h 
 
 or any ettort made to clear tlie road from AVarreiitou Junetioii to Bris- 
 toe Station. 
 
 Lieut. Stephen J/. Weld, petitioner's aide-de-camp, has stated before 
 this board on his belialf that at'fer dayhoht he found tlie road completely 
 blocked froui Warrenton Junction for the first tliree miles. 
 
 General Syl-es. however, and other of his witnesses, testified on the 
 court-martial, in December, 1802, that his division, whicli led the column, 
 ran upon this train of wagons within two miles of camp {G. C. M. Record, 
 p. 177). He says tliat they halted for fully an hour on the Bristoe side 
 of the stream, two miles) from Bristoe, and arrived at that place at 10.30 
 o'clock. His division was then thrown into jtosition a little in advance 
 of that i^lace. 
 
 Maj. G. K. Warren, Cori)s of Engineers,^ then Colonel Fifth Xew York 
 Volunteers, commanding a brigade of Sykes' division, called by petitioner, 
 says (Board's Kecord, p. .31), they arrived at Bristoe between 8 and 9 
 a. m., 28th August. He further says as follows (Board's Record, p. 30). 
 
 I think we Avere under arms at about '.i a. ni. AVe stood there waitiuj; to get our 
 place in column until dayligiit. Never left our camp until it was lij;iit enough to 
 see. * » » Saw wagons all over the ]>laiu, l)ut we were eualtleil, at the time we 
 uuirched, to avoid them. I don't remember uow of being impeded by any of the 
 wagons after we got daylight. 
 
 Petitioner's chief of staff, Lieut. Col. Fredericic T. Loclce, says (Board's 
 Record, p. 29G) : 
 
 Question. How far did you get along before there was any relief from cavalry sent 
 forward by Geut^ral Pojie to your aid ? 
 
 Answer. My recollection is that we had got out into open groniul, aud were not far 
 from liristoe. 
 
 Question, ("atlett Station, I think you said before ? 
 
 Answer. 1 think that is the name of the ]ilaee. 
 
 Question. IJefore the arrival of that regiment did you have any cavalry that were 
 available to clear the rojid"? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. We had three or four orderlies 
 
 Question. Did you accompany (jeneral INjrter and ride up with him to General Pope 
 on arrival '? 
 
 Answer. I did. 
 
 Qiu'stion. What happened then ? 
 
 Answer. We rode up to where Gi'ueral Pope was sitting on his horse, I think on 
 the sloi»eof a hill nearly <)i)i>osito Bristoe Station. General Porter rode up and acco.sted 
 him, and told him the difticulties we had met on the march, aud asked that measures 
 be taken in order that the trains might be jtarked so that his column could come through ; 
 that the cavalry had only just reported that had been sent to him, for which he ha»i 
 aitplied. I was immediately sent back with authority from General Pope to have this 
 cavalry close up the trains and park them as rapidly as jiossible, which I did. 
 
 The cavalry here referred to was probably the First Maine, left at Cat- 
 lett's Station, according- to this witness's evidence oit the court-martial 
 ((t. C. M. Record, p. 130), though he did not then say tliat General Pope 
 sent them. 
 
 This witness's recollection, however, is sllo^^^l in his evidence in this 
 belialf to be faulty, for Capt. George Montieth, petitioner's aide-de-camp, 
 and called bv him on the trial 2d December, 1862, said (G. C. M. Record, 
 p. 12(i): 
 
 Question by accused. What efforts were actually made, and how long were you in 
 removing the wagons, if you removed them at all? 
 
 AnswiM'. * * * We were also assisted by soHie cavaZri/senf !('(//( «s. I think there 
 were some half dozen mounted men. After General Porter sent us with the cavalry- 
 jnen, he also sent Lieutenant-Colonel Locke with either a company or squadron of cav- 
 alry to labor in the same way. 
 
 That is, from the other end of the line. 
 
 This cavalry, it will be perceived, was that which the petitioner tern- 
 
26 
 
 porarily bad under Lieut. Col. Jacob S. Buchanan, Third Indiana Cav. 
 airy, at Wairenton Junction. 
 
 The fact that Lieutenant-Colonel Locke ha.s a mistaken recollection on 
 this interesting j^oint will become of serious import in discussing later 
 his recollection on other serious points. 
 
 As the column tardily approached Bristoe over the plains of Manas- 
 sas, despite General Pope's urgent messages, " stumps " make their ap- 
 pearance in the road near that place, which shows that the column must 
 have advanced on different parallel army roads over those extensive 
 jjlaius, as the main road had been in use probably a century. 
 
 As to when they arrived. Col. Charles A. Johnston, Fifteenth New 
 York Volunteers, Martindale's brigade, Morell's division, a witness for 
 petitioner, says, substantially (Board's Eecord, ]i. 84), his regiment did 
 not leave Warren ton Junction until C a. m., and reached Bristoe at about 
 3 p. m. Was under arms at 2 a. m. ; but as the roads were blocked with 
 wagons, did not leave until G. 
 
 This shows the character of petitioner's efforts to join General Pope, 
 for a guard across the roads at W^arrehton Junction would have com- 
 pelled the wagons to take to the tields in order to get along. 
 
 His recollection, however, it will be perceived, is very different from 
 General Warren's. 
 
 Maj. George Hyland, jr., Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Martin- 
 dale's brigade, Morell's division, called by petitioner (Board's Eecord, p. 
 114), says his regiment camped "that evening, I think, at Bristoe," 
 28tli August. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. Chmincey ilic^e^'ver, assistant adjutant-general United 
 States Army, a witness for petitioner, and formerly chief of staff", 
 Heintzelman's corps, has testified, on cross-examination, as follows 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 151) : 
 
 Questiou. If a peremjitory order liad been received at Warjrentou .Junction to move 
 from that place to Bristoe at 1 a. m. on the uight of the 27th and 28th of August, is 
 it your opinion, as a military man, that the troops at Warrenton could have been put 
 in motion on the road to Bristoe in order to conii)ly with such a command ? 
 
 Answer. They could have been put in motion, I presume. I know nothing to pre- 
 vent their being put in motion. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect about what time it was daylight on the 28th of August? 
 
 Answer. I should think about four o'clock ; may be a little later — not much. 
 
 Just here it is well to observe that while the petitioner thought it was 
 too dark to move at one o'clock, he fixed the time for lea^^ng at twO' 
 hours later, when it would still be dark ; in fact, at a time when, as we 
 know, just before day, it is always the darkest. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Eohert Thompson, One hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania 
 Volunteers, a witness for petitioner, said there were " stumps in the 
 road," in one part, and then, on cross-examination, testified as follows 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 239) : 
 
 Question. Supnos^ part of your troops had several liou rs' rest on the day of the 27t]i, and 
 you hail received a i)ereui]>tory order to march at one o'clock, with such troops as.vou 
 could, with your coninuind from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, could you have done 
 itthat<lay? 
 
 Answer. If I could I would. I would have iricd it. 
 
 Capt. B. B. Fijield, commissary of subsistence, called by the accused 
 on tlie trial in 1802 (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 123), said that the wagons 
 stretched along for three or four miles. He found them on the way 
 from Warrenton ,Iunction to Bristoe, between Warrenton and Kettle 
 Eun; that theie was a jam between Warrenton Junction and Kettle 
 Eun ; but wlieii ({uestioned by the court he stated the case as follows : 
 
27 
 
 Examination by the Court : 
 
 Question. With one hundred efficient men, commencing- at 10 o'clock that night, do 
 you think you could have cleared the wagon-road so as to have rendered it passable 
 ibr troops ? 
 
 Answer. If I could have had 'command of the wagon-road and of sufficient force 
 when the wagon-trains commenced their movement, I think I couhl have kept them 
 liom a jam. 
 
 Col. Robert E. Clary, called by the accused in 1862, answered, on cross- 
 examination, as follows (G. C. M. Record, p. 121) : 
 
 Question. In your opinion, could or could not General Porter, after the receipt of 
 liis order to move, which receipt was at 9.30 p. m. on the 27th of August, have cleared 
 the road entirely of wagons by one or two o'clock that night, so that his march would 
 not have been much impeded ? 
 
 Answer. I think the troops could have passed over during the night had a sufficient 
 force been sent in advance to have cleared that road of those obstructions, which, at 
 the time I ]»assed over it, extended only three miles, I think. When I passed over the 
 road it was between two and three o'clock in the morning. What the obstructions had 
 been i)revious to that time I am unable to say. 
 
 Question. Will you state whether at one o'clock the character of the night and the 
 state of the road was such as, in your judgment, to render practicable the march of 
 General Porter's troops to Hristoe Station, to aiTive at or about daylight ? 
 
 Answer. Not without the jueliminary steps which I have previously stated ought to 
 have been taken. 
 
 Question. Were or were not the firat three or four miles of the load from Warrenton. 
 unobstructed ? 
 
 Answer. They were, as I passed over them. 
 
 It will be remembered that the accused's witnesses corroborated 
 exactly what Cai)tain J)e Kay, the government witness, said as to the 
 character of the road at tliat time of night, between Warrenton Junc- 
 tion and the run, for the tirst two or three miles; and also what General 
 Sykes, a witness for the accused, stated to be the case next morning. 
 
 It is a curious fact that one of petitioner's then aide-de-camps, Lieut. 
 George Monteith, Mas on the route from Warrenton Junction to Catlett's 
 Station — this very road — liaving left the former place half an hour before 
 sunset (G. C. M. Kecord, ]>. 120), and found some wagons stopped, and 
 others moA'ing along ; but when he got back, although undoubtedly be- 
 co ming aware of the order which Porter had received, he made no report 
 as to the wagons. He had been ordered to find a road to Greenwich, 
 where, under previous orders. Porter's corps was destined. Yet he did 
 not consider it of sufficient importance to allude to the fact of wagons 
 being on the road. The fact is it was too common a thing, and did not 
 imi)ress itself upon his mind as an insui)erable obstacle to any move- 
 ment. Next morning Porter sent him and Lieutenant Weld, with but 
 about half a dozen cavalrymen, to clear the road of wagons, although 
 he then had quite a strong detachment at his headquarters of cavalry. 
 This was between 4 and 5 a. m. — after daylight — when he nnist have 
 known that the wagoners were on the move again. Of course those 
 that were in the park during the night by the side of the road, after 
 daylight, taking an hour to feed, and so forth, being, as is seen, several 
 miles beyond AVarrenton, began to pull out into the road and move in 
 the same direction as petitioner's troops. Of course, when his advance 
 came up with them, he found the road quite full. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Loclce, assistant adjutant-general, already referred 
 to, Avlio was a witness for the accused in i802 as well as before this Board 
 on this subject, then swore that petitioner had a report of the condition 
 of the road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe at about 8 p. m. (G. C. 
 ]\r. Kecord, ]>. 131)) ; tliat jtetitioner made great personal exertions to clear 
 the way after dai/Iif/Iit, and that his staff assisted, and that at Catlett's 
 Station he got a detachment of the First Maine Kegiment assigned to 
 
28 
 
 liiiii (G. C. M. Record, p. 131). Tliis witness stated wliat was undoubtedly 
 the more prudent course in answer to the following' question by the court : 
 
 Qiiestio'.i. Upon a ve])ort of bad roads, would it he a reason for commencing the 
 -march before or after the time lixed in the oi'der, if the time ought to l)e varied from 
 at all? 
 
 Answer. If the time were to be varied from, it would be better to have it prior to 
 the time tixed than after. 
 
 Corporal Solomon Thomas, Eigliteentli Massacliusetts Volunteers, Mar- 
 tindale's brigade, Morell's division, called for the government, corrobo- 
 rates Col. Charles A. Joliuston and Major Ilyland, petitioner's witnesses, 
 as to the late hour Martindale's brigade arrived, though he puts the 
 arrival of his own regiment at about 2 p. m. 28th August (Board's Record, 
 p. 844); but, like General Warren, can recollect no obstacles to their 
 march until near Bristoe, where they turned into a road where there were 
 "stumps" (page 843, Board's Record). 
 
 It is not necessary to discuss a collateral issue, such, for example, as 
 to whether there was any necessity, real or fancied, for the issuance of 
 General Pope's order to the petitioner, because, as has just been re- 
 marked, he was not bound to give any reason for it. 
 
 However, departing in this instance from the straight i)ath of argu- 
 ment as to what the petitioner did or failed to do under the specitic 
 charges of wliich he was contacted, it seems proper, in consequence of 
 the unprecedented assault made by him on his former commanding gen- 
 eral, to say, collaterally, that General Pope, on the original trial, ex- 
 plain^l to the court some of the reasons for the urgency of the order 
 {G. C. M. Record, p. 12). 
 
 Petitioner, with an assumption of knowledge as to what was transpiring 
 at Bristoe on the afternoon of the 27th, which was necessary in order to 
 justify his departure from his orders, says that General Pope did not 
 know that General Hooker's division was out of ammunition until an 
 hour after he sent petitioner his orders at 0.30 p. m. 
 
 Not only did General Pope swear that he did know it (G. C. M. Rec- 
 ord, p. 12), but General Heintzelman, General Hooker's corps commander, 
 also has sworn (G. C. M. Record, p. 80) that he himself made known 
 that fact to General Pope late in the afternoon of the 27th of August, so 
 that General Po]»e had that information both from General Hooker and 
 General Heintzelman. 
 
 Bvt. iNIaj. Willard Bullard, Seventy-fourth Few York Volunteers, sec- 
 ond brigade. Hooker's division, has said before this Board (Board's Rec- 
 ord, p. 732) that, on the afternoon of the 27th of August, his regiment had 
 pretty well exhausted its ammunition. 
 
 Lieut. Charles DuHght, A. I). C, says on this subject as follows (Board's 
 Record, p. 722) : 
 
 Question. Where were you on the evening of August 27, 1862 ? 
 
 Answer. I was on the held where the skirmish with the rear brigade occurred, at 
 Bristoe Station, in Hooker's division, Excelsior brigade. 
 
 (Question. When that action was over what was the condition of yonr command as 
 to auMuunition '! 
 
 Answer. We were short of ammunition. I was sent by Colonel Taylor to General 
 Hooker to ascertain what we should do in case we were attacked during the night, as 
 tlierc seemed to be some doubt as to whether it was a rear guard or whether there 
 would be an attack made. General Hooker replied to me, nearly as I can recollect, 
 "Tell Colontd Taylor tliat we have no ammunition, but that there has been communi- 
 cation had with (ienei-al Pope, and General Pope has communicated to General Porter, 
 and General I'orter should be here now; he Avill be here in the morning certainly." 
 
 Question. What direction did you receive in case you were attacked? 
 
 Answer. To do the best we could and dejyend upon our bayonets. 
 
29 
 
 The fact that when petitioner got to Bristoe Station the occasion for 
 liis presence had i)asse(l, had nothing to do with tlie (piestion whether 
 lie liad obeyed or disobeyed liis orders. 
 
 Lient. CoL Frederick Myer, chief quartermaster to ]\rajor-Geueral 
 ZMcl )o'neirs corps, was ordered just before dark by (icneral Pope, in 
 ■conseciuence of General Hooker's action ahead of him, to put all the 
 trains in i)ark. 
 
 He testitied that he did so, '-and gave directions to all the quarter- 
 masters to go into ])ark.''* and that ''the head of the train commenced 
 moving- just at dayliglit"; that the roads between Warrenton Junction 
 imd Bristoe were in "excellent condition at that time" (G. CM. Record, 
 p. 10<S), On cross-examination he said, " the trains were not unharnessed, 
 but ready to move at a moment's notice.'' The head of the train was 
 about a mile and a half from where General Hooker had his battle, and 
 tlie wagons were coming into i>ark nearly all night. 
 
 From this evidence it will be perceived that the time tixed for the 
 petitioner's march to Bristoe was jitfit the time ichen the road would he 
 ieast ohstrueted, and with the most ordinary and customary precautions, such 
 HS hare been indicated, the petitioner could hare obtained complete control 
 of not only the road, but the fields on each side, if necessary. 
 
 It is also to be noted that only precisely the same points are raised 
 now as were presente(l to the court. 
 
 With referem-e to the exertions which the petitioner kiu^w at the time 
 he could have made to have prevented the slightest obstruction to his 
 march, the testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan is important. 
 This gentleman, unexpectedly called f(U' the govermnent so far as he 
 -was conceined, and leaving his professional engagements in the courts 
 with relu(;tance, came here and testitied as follows: 
 
 Quostif)ii. Have yon any r<'oi>ll<'cti()n of any movement of General Porter's Corps 
 from Warren ton .Jnnotion toward Bristoe on the morning of the 28tli ? 
 
 Answer. If I have got the (bites right, General Porter was there on the morning of 
 the -''Jth. I was there wh(!n (ieneral Porter left in the morning of. the day ho started 
 for Bristoe ; my recolleetion is that it was on the morning of the 29Mi. 
 
 (^lu'stioii. What eonversation had you with General Porter before he started oflf to 
 Bristoe Station ? 
 
 Answer. On tlie evening before he started somebody gave me an order to be in 
 readiness to move at three o'elock in the morning. I -vsas in front of General Porter's 
 headipiartersat three o'clock in the morning, but I saw no one until after the break 
 •of day. Tiien some one came to me and told me to let the men get their breakfasts 
 4ind let the horses be fed ; that was done, and I immediately went back to the place I 
 •occupied. Some time afterward, after sunrise, I saw General Porter. I Avanted to go 
 back to Fredericksburg to my reginH^nt. I only had about ninety men with me, and 
 I exiK'ctcd to go back the day before. I ro<le out with him in the woods, where he 
 T\-as in canii>, until we got into an open field; he asked me to send a detachment of the 
 <-onnnand I had forward to clear the road toward Bristoe Station two or three miles ; 
 this was done. I waited sonu; little time and the infantry began to move. About that 
 time he handed me a letter, and directed nie to give it to General liurnside. and told 
 me I could go. I started toward Fredericks! uirg; he sent an aide after me and 
 bronght me back, and told me he was apprehensive that I might be captured. He told 
 me to say to (Jencral Ibirusidc— I cannot get his language— but the idea w^as that 
 there was no disaster that was very threatening as yet, and he hoj^ed for the best. 
 
 Qnestion. You did not acconii>auy any of y(Hir detachment toward Bristoe ? 
 
 Answer. No. sir; I believe I waited until four or live of the nu>n came back. 
 
 Qnestion. When did you get this order from General Porter to send a detachment 
 down there ? 
 
 Answer. After I got out of the open woods into the field. 
 
 Question. What time of day would you say it was, having reference to daybreak f 
 
 Answer. The sun was probably an hour high. 
 
 Qnestion. What troops were there with General Porter at that time ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know. When I first went there General Pope was there; General 
 I'ope had left, and General Heintzelman commanded there. I do not think I saw any 
 other general officer that I knew except those two. 
 
30 
 
 Question. Do you know whether General Heintzehnan's corps was there at that time ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. I was camped in fiont of General Porter's headquarters, that is, 
 toward the road. I came up probably a hundred aud fifty yards, and a little to his 
 left ; and the troops were generally, I think, over south, and farther on toward Man- 
 assas. I did not move about any while I was there — but very little. I staid with my 
 command. I was expecting every hour to get permission to return to my regiment at 
 Fredericksburg. As to the roads, as we went up, I think, on Monday night, I feel 
 pretty well satisfied that there was a little rain ; but there was no mud that I recol- 
 lect of. As we went back it was dry. I recollect the next night I was sent by Gen- 
 eral Eiirnside Tip over part of the road that I had gone down to see what there was 
 up there, and I recollect that night as being very dusty. 
 
 Question. You say you were in front of General Porter ; at what time ? 
 
 Answer. Three o'clock in the morning I had got the order. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect anything moving along to the road ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; when I went there it was very quiet. I saw no. light in his head- 
 quarters at all, I did not know whether he was tliere or not. 
 
 Question. During that night do you recollect whether there were troops or wagons 
 or artillery moving ? 
 
 Answer. I did not hear any. I slept but little ; we had no tents, and I slept in 
 blankets. 
 
 Question. Between three o'clock in the morning, the time you were in position in 
 front of General Porter's headquarters, to the time the troops began to move, as you 
 have stated, have you any recollection as to any forces or wagons or artillery passing 
 down on the road toward Bristoe ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; not until after we went out in the open field, if my memory serves 
 me correctly ; very soon after we were there the infantrj' began to move, but they 
 may have been moving before that and I not know it. 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Question. When you say the infantry began to move at that time, you only mean 
 to say that it is the first time you saw them moving. 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Might they not have been moving for an hour or two before and jou not 
 know it. 
 
 Answer. Yes, sii'. 
 
 Question. Two or three houi's Ijefore f 
 
 Answer. Yes ; might have been moving all night if they were not near enough to 
 me for me to hear it. 
 
 Question. Did you see the head of the column ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. We went right back of General Porter's headquarters, out of the 
 woods, on the road toward Bristoe Station ; when I got out into the open field, prob- 
 ably a hundred yards. General Porter halted, aud there is where he directed me to 
 send a detachment to clear the road. 
 
 Question. How long were the cavalry gone? 
 
 Answer. They caught uj) with me — I don't know how far — after I was on the road 
 home. 
 
 Question. Did General Porter, when he gave you the direction to clear the road, 
 leave you and go on ? ^ 
 
 Answer. No, sir; he remained with me. 
 
 Question. About how long? 
 
 Answer. Not very long. 
 
 Question. According to your present recollection? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell you. 
 
 Question. An hour? 
 
 Answer. O, no, sir. 
 
 Question. Half an hour? 
 
 Answer. Well, yes; it may have been longer; it may have been shorter. 
 
 Question. You say the sun, you think, was about an" hour high at that time? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Did you see any of General Porter's troops moving at that time ? 
 
 Answer. I did not see any troops moving until after I had got out into the open 
 field, until the detachment had been forwarded to clear the road, aud then I saw the 
 infantry moving. 
 
 Question. But you saw nothing to indicate a movement until about that time. 
 What time was it when you first heard these indications of life ? 
 
 Answer. The day had broken — the sun was not up — pretty near after daybreak. 
 Question. How long after that before you saw General Porter? 
 Answer. I did not see him until after sunrise. 
 
31 
 
 ■Question. How did you conie to sec liim tJien? 
 
 Answer. He was on liis horse. 
 
 QiHstiou. How did you happen to see him? 
 
 Answer. I was directed to report back iu the same position after the horses were fed 
 •and the men liad their breakfasts, so I went back and halted in front of headquarters. 
 
 Question. Tliat was after the men had tlieir breakfasts '? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; after sunrise. 
 
 Question. HoV lonj; after ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell ; it was not very long after sunrise. It may have been half an 
 Lour, may be an hour. It is a good while ago. 
 
 Question. Did General Porter say anything to you about the fact that he was in 
 -want of cavalry '? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Did he say to you that he wanted to detain you there ? 
 
 Answer. Ye.s. sir. 
 
 Question. ^Vhy did he not detain you ? 
 
 Answer. He did detain me two days, using my men for orderlies. 
 
 Question. How did he come to let you go ! 
 
 Answer. I don't know. 
 
 Question. How many men did he use for the purpose of orderlies? 
 
 Answer. Pretty hard to tell ; sometimes more, sometimes less. 
 
 Question. Where was your cavalr\ in camp ? ^ 
 
 Answer. About I'i.') or l.od yards nearly in front of General Porters headquarters. 
 Question. Were they all tliere ? 
 
 Answer. When they were not out acting as messengers. 
 
 Question. They wen^ there during these three nights and twf> days of which you 
 speak, exce))t when they were out on duty ? 
 Answer. O, yes. 
 
 It will be i^erceived tbat Colonel Biielianaii has i)laced the departure 
 •of the petitioner a day later than the fact, but at the same time he 
 Jittem])ted to make it plain that he was notpositiv^e as to the dates, be- 
 cause lie rejtcatcd dnrinj? his evidence the remark, indicative of doubt 
 wlietlicr lie was "correct as to dates." The substance of his evidence 
 shows that lie was with the i)etitioner when the latter received from 
 <(Jeneral Poi)e the orders to move at 1 a. m., for he himself was required 
 Hjy petitioner to ^ct his dctacliment under arms in front of petitioner's 
 tent at 3 a. m. Jle s;iw the trooi)s move towards Bristoe after daylight 
 ;aijd then gave a small detachment, by petitioner's personal orders, to 
 «-le;ir the road towards Hristoc. lie Mas probably detained as long as 
 Hie wa-"* at Warrenton .Junction in consequence of petitioner's desire for 
 cai'alry which he had expressed to General BiuMiside in a dis])atch two 
 <lays before (r/V/c a(;cused's Exhilut A, G. C. ]\I. Kecord, p. 228), in which 
 lie said, ''I want cavalry to remain with me for a few days." 
 
 When a witness states a fact as having positively occurred on a par- 
 ticular date, it places his evidence under a different form of inspection 
 from that of the witness who states facts as having occurred on or 
 silxnit a ])articular time, and does not pretend to be precise as to dates. 
 
 'i'hat Colonel liuchanan's detachment was at Warrenton Junction at 
 daylight on the 28th of August, 18G2, is apparent from Captain Mou- 
 tieth's evidence Just given. The orders to him of the petitioner show 
 that the latter knew perfectly what was necessary in order to comply 
 ■*vith General l*ope's order. 
 
 CHAUACTEE, OF THE NIGHT — FOllCES MARCHING. 
 
 In comj)aring the evideiu;e of Avituesses on this point considerable 
 discrepancy is observed, which is to be expected after the lapse of 
 sixteen years, and the only way to determine what the night really was 
 as to darkness is by ascertaining what was actually done by ijersons 
 .^luring the night. 
 
32 
 
 During tlie day's actions to wliicli our attention is directed I recollect 
 liaving- been sent up the Shenandoah Valley from near Harper's Ferry 
 to AVinchester, on special service, in command of my own company and 
 of three hundred men of another regiment ; but although the duty in- 
 volved possible contact with the enemy, and my resiiousibility was con- 
 siderable, I find I cannot say without reference to my papers whether I 
 made that movement on the 20th or 30th of August, 1862, or whether 
 there was a moon at night or clouds, although I was up nearly all of two 
 nights, at that time, from anxiety for the safety of my command in the- 
 position I was placed in. 
 
 Probably the description by some of the witnesses that the night of 
 the 27th August, 18G2, was a "dark starlight night" will explain it.. 
 This is what Capt. William W. Macy, Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers, 
 Gibbon's brigade, King's division, McDowell's corps, terms it. This 
 witness (for government) says his regiment was on the march most of 
 the day from Sulphur Springs until 10 or lOi p. m. (Board's Record, p. 
 583); that the night "was most too dark to march plea*santly. We 
 marched (says he) some nights that were a good deal darker than it was 
 that night. AVe were on the march, but, of course, it is unpleasant 
 marching after night." He further remarked that the regiment kept its. 
 ranks (p. 581) and that the roads were dusty, and then referred to ob- 
 structions as follows : 
 
 I tliink that the wagon-trains and artillery hart the road a good part of the time^ 
 and we had the side of the road off through the fields. 
 
 Question. Did you find any difficulty in marching through the fields up to 10 o'clock 
 at night ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; not that I recollect. 
 
 Private WiJli((m E. Murray, Company C, Nineteenth Indiana Volun- 
 teers, Gibbon's brigade, King's division, McDowell's cori)s (for govern- 
 ment), who kept a diary and noted the time by his watch, corroborates 
 this last-named witness in the facts noted, and says they marched up to 
 10 p. m. ; that he did not lie down until midnight ; aud was in line at 4 
 a. m. There were peculiar cii'cum stances of a dramatic nature narrated 
 by him, which indelibly impressed that night on his memory. 
 
 The next evening (28th August) he was wounded in King's action- 
 with Jackson on the Warrenton pike, and was carried to Manassas 
 Junction — to the Weir house. There he recorded in his diary for the 
 29th August, 1802 (p. 589): "News from the field communicates very 
 hard fighting all day; heavy cannonading." 
 
 Private Samuel G. Hill, of the same company and regiment as the last 
 witness (government witness), says the night of the 27th was a clear 
 night, as he and some of his companions were out foi-aging for poultry 
 and cooking their suppers until 3 a. m. (Board's Eecord, j). 592). He 
 was badly wounded the next evening. 
 
 Capt. William M. CampheU, Company I, same regiment as the last 
 witness, corroborates the other witnesses for government from that regi- 
 ment by other incidents which fixed the character of the night in his 
 recollection. (Board's Eecord, p. 591). 
 
 Private J. H. Stein, of Company C, of the same regiment, while cor- 
 roborating the others (p. 597), remarked that from eight to eleven it was 
 not so light as afterwards. He was badly Avounded the next evening, 
 28th August. This statement of Mr. Stein is in harmony with the state- 
 ments of some others, as for example. Brig. Gen. Gilman Marsfon, then 
 colonel Second New Hampshire Volunteers (government witness), whose 
 recollection is that the night, at the place where he was, some miles dis- 
 
33 
 
 taut, Avas from 9 to 10 o'clock misty and rainy and (luite dark. After- 
 wards he thinks it was not rainy {Board's Eecord, p. 800). 
 
 Bvt. Brig-. Gen. BnfuH Dawes, colonel Sixth Wisconsin (then its ma- 
 jor). Gibbon's brigade, King's division, McDowell's corps, says that on 
 the 27th they marched to a camp near Buckland's Mills, and got there 
 after dark, and marched again before daylight (Board's Eecord, p. 835). 
 
 Bvt. Brig-. Gen. TJiofi. F. 2IcCoy, colonel commanding One hundred 
 and seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, Duryea's brigade, Eicketts' 
 division, McDowell's corps, kept a diary and noted time from his watch, 
 and says his regiment marched all night on the 27th until 1 a. m. of the 
 28th, and he then understood, as his regiment had the rear, that all of 
 the division also marched during the same time (Board's Eecord, p. 
 040). 
 
 P>vt. Maj. Gen. Wm. Birney, commanding Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania 
 "X'olunteers, Kearney's division, Heintzelman's corps, says that his regi- 
 ment marched that night (27th August), some time before daybreak, in 
 the direction of Bristoc Station (Board's Eecord, p. 080); that they ar- 
 rived there at a very early hour, an hour after daybreak, and that he 
 was in the rear of the column as his brigade (Kearney's division) had 
 gone lt«4bre he marched, and his movement was then impeded by other 
 troo]ts for whom he waited until they passed (p. 083). He thought it 
 Avas a dark night. 
 
 Brig. Gen. I. If. ]>iiral], United States Volunteers, then major First 
 West Virginia Volunteers, Eieketts' division, McDowell's corps, has 
 given some interesting testinumy as to the road he took for a portion of 
 the Avay, on the night of the 27th August, which was the identical road 
 petitioner Avas recpiired by Major-(ieneial Pope's orders to march upon 
 from AVarrenton rhinetion to Bristoe Station A'ia Catlett's Station. His 
 statement as to that I'oad shows Avhat petitioner might have done had 
 he lof/dlli/ undertalcen to eoni])ly with his orders. 
 
 lirigaclier-General Durall testified as follows (Board's Eecord, pp. 800 
 and 802) : 
 
 Answer. On tlic f\ fniiii; of Auj;iist "27 I was with my brifjado ; wo woro about four 
 uiilcs, I think, nortliwi-st of AVarrcntcni at that tiuic. north or northwest, and I was- 
 directed by my colomd to earry a letter that he handed tome from General Kieketts to 
 General Pope. 
 
 Question. To what point ? 
 
 Answer. It was su)i]»osed to be somewhere near Ceutreville; that Avas my order. 
 
 (Question. AVhat diil you then do? 
 
 Answer. I started and made the trip and delivered the letter. 
 
 Question. Von left the caniji about what time? 
 "Answer. Nearly dark ; it was after sundown. 
 
 Question. What road did you take i 
 
 Answer. I eanu' back to AVarrenton, and Ifcdlowed then the road runninj;from AVar- 
 lenton in the direction of Catlett .Station. I wa.s directed to go that way and keep out 
 of the way of the enemy. 
 
 Question. Did you pass through AVarrenton Junction? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I struck the load at Catlett's. 
 
 (Question. AVhat direction did you then take ? 
 
 Answer. I took the road leading from Catlett Station to Manassas Junction, by the 
 way of Hristoe. 
 
 Question. Where did you find Oeneral Pope? 
 
 Answer. I found (iencral Pope near Manassas Juuction. 
 
 Question. AViiat was the character of that night ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that I recollect distinctly in regard to that; I rode all night, 
 though, Tintil about tiiree o'clock in the morning, when I took a little rest; I had no 
 particular difficulty in tinding the way. 
 
 Question. From (.'atlett Station to Bristoe did you meet with any obstruction to your 
 ]novements ? 
 
 Ajiswer. There were a great many wagons along the line ; there Avere some troops, 
 
34 
 
 but I went along -without any particular obstruction. There were no obstacles that 
 
 kept me from going. 
 
 # * # -.f * if # 
 
 Question. In your movements on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th from 
 Warrentou to Catlett Station and Bristoe, did you find these wagons that you speak 
 of an obstruction to the movement of troops ? 
 
 Answer. I had no troops. I was on horseback ; I rode along and occasionally I 
 would have to ride around some wagons in the road ; but I kept going ; I didn't stop 
 for them. 
 
 Question. What was your opinion as to whether troops could have been moved, a 
 column or a brigade for example, from Catlett Station to Bristoe on that road that you 
 
 went over at that time ? 
 
 ******* 
 
 Answer. I think troops could have marched ; there were places where they could 
 not have marched in regular order ; they would have had to go around wagons in some 
 way, but there would have been no difficulty in discovering the road ; troops could 
 not have marched in regular order of marching ; they could have, broken tile, perhaps. 
 
 Lieut. E. P. Brooks^ acting adjutant Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, 
 "with a detachment of sixteen cavalrymen from the Sixth New York 
 Volunteer Cavalry, that same night carried orders from Major- General 
 Pope to Major-General Reno and Maj.-Gen. Phil. Kearney, received, 
 respectively, at 12.20 a. m. and 1 a. m. 
 
 The petitioner has seen lit to criticise these orders and introduced 
 one, against objection, on cross-examination, in order to make " com- 
 parisons" (Board's Kecord, p. 1025). 
 
 A discussion of these mere collateral questions will be avoided in this 
 argument for the government as much as is consistent with reasonable 
 regard for the rights of others, not parties plaintiif or defendant, but 
 whose reputations are assailed with no opportunity to them to defend 
 themselves. 
 
 The record of the trial in 1862 shows that the character of the night, 
 obstacles on the road, and eiforts to remove them, were very fully 
 inquired into. 
 
 The character of the night of the 27th August, 1862, was passed upon 
 l)y the court. 
 
 The petitioner did not march his troops during that night — this is a 
 fact which is too thoroughly fixed to require argument — while numerous 
 other troops did march. Indeed, it is safe to say that it is a single 
 instance where orders to march that night in both armies at any time 
 that night were not complied with. 
 
 During the whole four and a half years of the war of the rebellion, 
 the national troops, when occasion required them to march, permitted 
 DO such plea as darkness in an August night to interfere with the 
 movement. 
 
 History is fiill of illustrations of immense difficulties surmounted by 
 arndes and corps in the effort to comply with orders. 
 
 Several recur, but whoever hears or reads this argument will be 
 able to give illustrations for themselves. 
 
 During the "Wilderness" campaign, under General Grant, the Army 
 of the Potomac surmounted difficulties in comparison to which the pleas 
 in the way of excuse by the petitioner appear puerile. 
 
 JACKSON'S COMMAND MOVING NIGHT 27TH AUGUST. 
 
 On this samenight in August when the petitioner would not march, Maj- 
 Gen. T. J. Jackson, commanding the Confederate forces then operating 
 against Major-General Pope, was marching his entire army, some from 
 near Bristoe and tlie remainder from Manassas Junction to Centreville 
 or stone house, on the (jlainesville and Centreville turnpike. 
 
35 
 
 Oil this subject Major Henry Kyd Bonglas, of his staff, goverumeut 
 witness, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, page 707) : 
 
 Question. "Were you at Manassas Junction during that moutli before this time ? 
 
 Answer. I was at Manassas Junction on the 27th. 
 
 Question. At what time did you leave there ; or rather, at what time did the entire 
 command of General Jackson leave there f 
 
 Answer. After dark some time, when the troops had been supi)lied with as many 
 stores as they could well carry — you know there were a quantity of them captured 
 there — they were marched olf along through the night. With some of them it may 
 have been hetween miduight and morning before the last of them got away. The 
 leading division of A. P. Hill's was Taliaferro's. I dont know whether he went up 
 by Uawkins' Branch or whether he went up this way [Manassas Junction to Grove- 
 ton]. Ewell went on the Manassas and Sudley road up toward Sudley Church. A. 
 P. Hill went to Centreville. Lawtou went up toward the Warrenton, Alexandria and 
 Washington road. 
 
 Question. Then all of General Jackson's command were moved in the night-time 
 from Manassas Junction up to that line between Centi'eville and Groveton ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; sonu' of tliem may have started out before night, and those that were 
 there moved away from Centreville on the night of the 27th. 
 
 Juhal A. Early, a government witness, who was a Confederate briga- 
 dier-general during this campaign in Ewell's division of Jackson's com- 
 mand, says (Board's Becord, ]). SaU) that Jackson's forces marched the 
 night of the 27th and tliat his brigade '' covered the withdrawal." He 
 further testified as follows: 
 
 Question. Did you ex])erience any difficulty in marching that night? 
 Answer. O, no ; that was an open country there ; it was very familiar to us ; we 
 had been there the year l»efore. 
 
 This evi<lence is but confirmatory of the Confederate reports which 
 liave been submitted liere on the subject and which I read from in my 
 0])ening argument. 
 
 Thus it is ai>i»arent tliat during tlic night the 27tli August, 1SG2, very 
 nearly all tlw contending forces o[)erating in the vicinity of the Bull 
 Bun battle-liehls were in motion to take up new ])ositions. 
 
 The evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan lias afforded the oppor- 
 tunity to contrast tlie movenuMits that night of the commanding general 
 of the Army (►!■ \'irginia and the sulxn-dinate cori)s commanders, who 
 had but that 27th August come under his orders. 
 
 The former at the front is with Hooker when he makes his gallant 
 little tight against Ewell. and, loyally desirous to carry out the wishes 
 of the (ieneral-in-Chief an<l President *' to fight like the devil," and to 
 open tin* road then ban-ed to the National Capital, spends much of this 
 night in Avriting disi)atches and making combinations to destroy the 
 overconfident enemy, who had pushed three days ahead of his supports. 
 
 The latter, the petitioner, receiving a peremptory and imperative order 
 to march at 1 a. in,, tells his .sympathetic division and brigade command- 
 ers that it is sometlnng for them to sleep on, and proceeds to follow his 
 own advice, for, says Colonel Buchanan, " the first indication of life that 
 I saw al)out the headquarters was some one came to me after break of 
 day and directed me to have the men get their breakfasts" (Board's 
 Eecord, ]>. G()8). He had been patiently sitting on his horse with his 
 cavalry detachment in front of petitioner's quarters from 3 a. m. until 
 daylight and never saw the petitioner until " after sunrise." 
 
 ^Meanwhile, the conuiianding general of the army, sanguine of his 
 ability to o^■erwhelm Jackson if loyally and understandingly supported, 
 and anxious to deliver an ettective blow in the cause of his country, 
 waits, and waits in vain, for the presence of petitioner's corps — the finest 
 body of troops in his command — a portion of which did not reach camp 
 until late in the daj'. 
 4g' 
 
One C'lnious cireuinstaiice is to be noted in connection witli the peti- 
 tioner's excuses as to the enormous number of wagons on Manassas 
 Plains between Warrenton Junction and Bristoe, that a detachment 
 started with ambulances from Bristoe on the same road for Warrenton 
 on the morning of the 28th. 
 
 The testimony on this subject by Capt. James Haddow, Thirty-sixth 
 Ohio Volunteers, confirmed as it was in essential particulars by that of 
 Lieut. A. F. Tiflany and Private N. P. Beach (Board's Bee, pp. 874, 877, 
 878), is as follows : 
 
 Qnostion. Where were ycm at sunsot on the 27th of August, 1862 — about that time? 
 Answer. We were on the road between Catlett Station and Bristoe. 
 
 Question. Did you after that go toward Catlett Station ; if so, at what time and under 
 ■what circunistanees ? 
 
 Answer. We marched that night to Bristoe, arriving at Bristoe Station after dark 
 some time ; we remained there that night ; on the following morning tlie regiment 
 went on in tlie direction of Manassas ; tlie company of which I was a member was de- 
 tached and put in charge of a major of the medical department to go back in the direc- 
 tion of Warrenton with ambulances and obtain medical supplies; Ave returned to some- 
 where near Warrenton, passing Catlett Station at some distance on the morning of the 
 28th ; we returned to Bristoe on the evening of the 28th. 
 
 Question. At what time did you set out from Bristoe Station to go in the direction 
 of Catlett Station ? 
 
 Answer. I could not give the hour, Init pretty early in the morning — as soon as we 
 got up and got breakfast. 
 
 Question. Did you during that day see General Porter's corps? 
 
 Answer. W^e met troops (it was a frequent habit to ask soldiers what troops they 
 were), and they said they were Gereral Porter's troops. Porter's troops lay at War- 
 renton Junction on the afternoon of the 27th when we left there. 
 
 Question. What dititicnlty, if any, did you experience on the morning of the 28th in 
 taking this ambulance train from Bristoe Station to Catlett Station? 
 
 Answer. I don't think we had any material difficulty in getting through ; we must 
 liave had at least thi-ee ambulances ; we passed through trains and passed troops ; we 
 must undoubtedly have made a marcli that day of 16 miles; we could not have met 
 with serious obstructions. 
 
 Questions. Do you know what troops you met ? 
 
 Answer. They said they were General Porter's; we inquired frequently; of course 
 I was not ac(iuainted with General Porter's corps, we had just reached the East from 
 the West, and all troops were strange to me. 
 
 That the order to petitioner to march at 1 a. m. was urgent and im- 
 perative in its terms is beyoiul question. That it was disobeyed is 
 clearly proved. The petitioner proffers excuses for this disobedience, 
 and by this protfer admits the disobedience, giving his reasons for non- 
 compliance with the terms of the order. These excuses are presented 
 by him as coming under four heads: 
 
 First. Darkness of the night. 
 
 Second. Obstructions on the road. 
 
 Third. The fatigite of his troops. 
 
 Fourth. The counsel of his subordinate generals. 
 
 1. The i)lea of darkness is conclusively answered by the fact, fully 
 proved, tliat 1)odies of troops, both of our own army and of the enemy, 
 were nuuchiug on that very night, both north and east of petitioner, 
 and at no sucli distance from him as could have made any difference in 
 the character of the night. 
 
 2. If the road was "obstructed, this was a reason for the greater 
 promptness in beginning his march prom])tly and for urging it forward. 
 If he had no cavalry to (;lear the road, it was also the more imperative 
 to start early. This A\as but a reason for sending a detachment of in- 
 fantry forward in advance of the time at which he was ordered to march, 
 in order to gi\-e notice of his coming and to explore the roads and clear 
 the way as far as ])ossible. It was no reason for foregoing such prepa- 
 rations or for deferring ilic time to begin his marcli. 
 
37 
 
 But the obstrnctious were sure to be less than at any hours of the 
 twenty-four if his march began at one o'clock. By that hour most, If 
 not all, of the wagons would be likely to be parked or halted for the 
 night. The time to which he adjourned his march was the very time at 
 which they would again be taking the road. 
 
 3. The fact that he was ordered to march with one division of his 
 troops only, if the others were not up, shows that no discretion was left 
 him such as he claims, because of the late arrival and fatigue of his rear- 
 most division. It was a plain im])lication that one division would be 
 very nearly behind or immediately following. 
 
 The divisions were in no way detached from each other. The cori^s. 
 was marching as a whole, yet his commanding general orders him to 
 march with one division, even if the other had not arrived. How muek 
 interval of rest for the leading division did these terms allow "? Plainly 
 no discretion in this respect was allowed. The requirement of the order 
 was absolute. 
 
 4. What was the counsel of his generals? Their own evidence, 
 as given in 1862, though cited at liis instance and as his witnesses, paints 
 the line of proceeding he adopted in this council of his officers in too 
 condemnatory colors to be obliterated or lost sight of by any ingenuity 
 before this board. 
 
 He did not utter or make known to tliem anything but the single fact 
 that he was directed to march at one o'clock. He named the hour and 
 invited their counsel, but said nothing of the urgency, and he encouraged 
 them to the counsel he wished by adding to his mention of the hour the 
 sneering or indifferent remark, " There is something for you to sleep 
 on." He handed the order to the one of his generals with whom he was 
 most intimate with this remark ; and the result was that the one who 
 recei\'ed it, if he looked at it at all, glanced at it so slightly that he re- 
 mained unac(piainted with its terms. 
 
 General Sykes said (p. 170, G. C. M. Eec.) : 
 
 General Porter informed ine that lie had received an order * * * directing his 
 corps to march at one oV-h)ck. 
 
 (P. 178): 
 
 Question by the Judge-Advocate. Do you remember Avliether yon were made ac- 
 f[nainted with the urgent language of the order stating that by all means General 
 Porter nnist l)e at Bristoe Station by daylight the next moniing f 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I did not ; for I am satistied that if the urgency had been made 
 known to us we would have moved at the hour prescribed. 
 
 General Sykes subsequently attempted to modify this opinion so far as 
 to claim a certain discretion on the part of a corps commander ; but I 
 am content to let this, the opinion which as a soldier he gave at once 
 when the matter was tirst clearly presented to him, answer. 
 
 General Butterfleld said (p. 185) : 
 
 Question by the accused. Will you state what was said by OJeneral Porter in rela- 
 tion to that order and what the order was 1 
 
 Answer. The order, I believe, was for General Porter to move his forces at 1 o'clock 
 in tile morning to Bristoe. 
 
 (P.i87)r 
 
 Question by the Judge Advocate. Did you see the order, the 27th, from General 
 Pope, or know anything about the urgency of its terms? 
 Answex". I did not read it. 
 
 General Morell says, in answer to the question as to "what oc- 
 curred": 
 
 (P. 145): 
 
 General Porter said to us that he had received this order to march at one o'clock 
 that night ; we immediately spoke of the condition of our troops — they being very 
 
38 
 
 iinuli fatigiH'd, and tlie (Lirkiiess of the night, iuid .said that we did not helicve wo 
 could make any l)etter progre.ss attjmpting to start at that hour than had we waited 
 until (hiyliglit. After some little conversation (ilcneral Porter said, "Well, we will 
 start at three o'clock — get ready." I immediately left his tent, &c. 
 
 Such was tliis council of geueraLs, and .such tlie way that petitioner 
 directed its counsels on this Jirst occasion in which he wa.s called on to 
 act in support of the general under whose unwelcome command he had 
 newly come. 
 
 Wlien the pleas of the night being too dark, troops fatigued, and the 
 road obstructed with stumps b^" way of excuse were gravely advanced 
 here as insuperable obstacles to any movement whatever, the history of 
 the regular American Army suggested a striking example as applicable 
 to this case. 
 
 On the 2d January, 1777, General Washington found himself in Tren- 
 ton, N. J., with the Delaware behind him impassable from the ice and 
 the enemy in full force before him under Lieut. Gen. Earl Cornwallis, 
 and separated from him only by the narrow Assunpink Creek. The 
 question of the existence of this nation as an independent republic hung 
 ui^on the events of that night. The night before, two of his brigades, 
 under General Washington's order, had made a night march through 
 mud, snow, and water, over rougii roads, to join him, and that day were 
 in action. Ill-clad and suffering, the whole army was on this 2d January 
 called upon for another night march, and proceeding around the left 
 flank of Cornwallis' forces by a wood road filled with stumps from two 
 to five inches high, they approached towards morning the town of Prince- 
 ton, were in action that day also, and marched until between ten and 
 eleven o'clock that night to Somerset Court-House. 
 
 The darkness of those nights, the roughness of the roads, the severe 
 inclemency of the weather, or the want of shoes and proper clothing, did 
 not deter those patriots who were loyal to the orders of their general 
 from making a night march ; and the nation was saved. 
 
 The first specification to the first charge has now been considered. 
 
 It is particularly significant, as showing the first in a series of disobe- 
 diences to orders all having one object, disloyalty to the orders of the 
 commanding general, and a determination to do nothing until the com- 
 manding general of the Army of the Potomac should arrive from Alex- 
 andria and assume command under the sixty-second article of war. 
 
 Comparisons are never agreeable, and for Major-General Pope to have 
 been hailed as the saviour of the national capital would probably never 
 have met the petitioner's preferences. 
 
 General Washington early laid down the rule of obedience to orders, 
 as understood in the British army, from whence came the American 
 articles of war and customs of the service. Said he : 
 
 It is not for every officer to know the principles upon which every order is issued, 
 and to Judge how they may or may noL he dispensed with or suspended, but their duty 
 is to carry them into execution with the utmost punctuality and exactness. They are 
 to consider that military movements are like the working of a clock, and they will go 
 qnickly, regularly, and easily if every officer does his duty ; hut without it be as easily 
 disordered, because neglect from any one, like the stopping of a wheel, disorders the 
 whole. 
 
 The general, therefore, expects that every officer will duly consider the importance 
 of the ol)servatiou, their own reputation, and the duty they owe to their country. He 
 claims it of them and earnestly calls upon them to do it. (General Orders, Army Head- 
 quarters, Toameusing, Penn., October 10, 1777.) 
 
 ^^Hien one of ])ctitioner's general officers, Avho advised him not to march 
 at 1 a. m., sai<l in tlic original trial that " the movement would not have 
 been impractical »h', but * * * woidd have been a false military 
 
39 
 
 movement" (G. C. M. Record, p. 179), lie made an nnfortnnate commentary 
 ui)on the language of Wasliington, Avhicli requires no remark. 
 
 The rule thus enunciated by the great patriot was well known in both 
 armies. 
 
 Mr. Samuel, in his "Historical Account of the British Army and of 
 the Law Military" (London edition, 1816, page 285), in discussing the 
 British article of war, which is identical with the American, as to "dis- 
 obedience of orders," first adverted to mere neglects, Avhich in that 
 service, as in our own, are chargeable only as conduct "to the prejudice 
 of good order and military discipline," and then proceeded to discuss 
 and define the meaning of the article under which the petitioner in this 
 case was tried on the first charge. Said he : 
 
 In the second, the absohite resistance of, or refusal of obedience to, a present and 
 nrgent command, conveyed either orally or in writing, by the non-compliance with 
 which some immediate act necessary to be done might be impeded or defeated, as 
 high an offense is discoveraV>le as can well be contemplated by a military mind ; inas- 
 mnch as tlie principle wliich it holds ont would, if encouraged, or not siippressed by 
 some heavy penalty, forbid or preclude a reliance on the execution of anj military 
 measure. 
 
 It is ilnn posiUve disobedience, therefore, evincing a refractory spirit in the inferior, 
 an active opposition to the commands of a superior, against which, it must be sup- 
 posed, that the severe penalty of the article is princixially directed. This highly crim- 
 inal disobedience may arise, either out of the refusal of the officer or soldier to act as 
 he is ordered — to march, for instance, whither he is bidden — or to desist from any act 
 or pm-jiose which he is prohibited by a direct command from pursuing ; for it would 
 in many circumstances, which nuiy easily be imagined, be as dangerous to persist in a 
 forbidden course, as to decline or rccetle from one that is commanded. 
 
 AVhether the orders of the superior enjoin an active or a passive conduct, the officer 
 or soldier subject to them is equally obliged to obey. Otherwise, every military 
 operation or enterprise would be made to depend, not on the prudence or counsel »f 
 the connnander, but the will or caprice of the soldiery, either for the furtherance or 
 obstruittion of its object. 
 
 Promj)t, ready, nuhesitating obedience in soldiers, to those who are set over them, 
 is so necessary to the military state, and to the success of every military achievement, 
 that it would he i»ernicions to have it understood that military disobedience, in any 
 instance, may go unquestioned. 
 
 It is not to be overlooked, notwithstanding the construction or modification which 
 the disobedience, contemplated in the article, may appear to be capable of — and which 
 favorable sense is often put on the severe terms of its letter by the lenient sentences 
 pronounced by courts-martial on cases of a negative character, or of minor consequence — 
 that the fifth article, in fact, makes no distinction between one act of disobedience or 
 another. And that when any is to be made, it must always depend on the view which 
 a court-martial may take of the circumstances submitted to it, with their contempla- 
 tion of the spirit of the article, or the mutiny act ; and that wherever it is made, it 
 Avill be, not in relaxation of the princiide of implicit obedience inculcated by the ar- 
 ticle, but in the exercise of a discretion, lawfully resident in the court, to mitigate, 
 according to circumstances, the rigor and severity of the law. 
 
 Except in the solitary instance where the illegality of an order is glaringly apparent 
 on the face of it, a military subordinate is compelled to a complete and undeviating 
 obedience to the very letter of the command received. The most important conse- 
 quences may often rest on the precise mechanical execution of an order which in ap- 
 pearanct^ to the military inferior may have a substantive and a sole object in its view, 
 Avhiie in the design of the commander it may be comltiued with a vast and various 
 machinery, and a deviation from it, even with the best intentions and the best success, 
 separately considered, might defeat the grand end of the meditated enterprise. Hence 
 it is scarcely possible to imagine a case when a subordinate officer would be at liberty 
 to dejtart from the positive command of his siiperior. The justice of the Roman father 
 who put his brave and successful son to death for disobedience to his commands, has 
 never been called in f[uestion ; though many have Avished that the feelings of the father 
 had softened, in that particular case, the stern severity of the judge. 
 
 None, however, Avill quarrel Avith the precept, though they may incline not to imi- 
 tate the example. But CA'en a mild and Christian philosopher, sitting in his own 
 closet and stmlying an excuse for the breach of a military command, Avas after all 
 obliged to content himself Avith an apology, in a x'ossible but single case ; or rather, 
 his ingenuity being tasked, was unable to suggest anything more than an expedient, 
 and thatperiiaps not altogether unexceptionable, which might plead for a suspension in 
 the execution, not in the supei'session of a military order. 
 
40 
 
 To use tlie words of Archdeacon Pctley : "If tlie comniaiuler-in-cliief of au army 
 detach an offlcor luidcr liini upon a i)articular service, ■which service turns out more 
 (liflQcult or less expedient tlian was supposed, insomuch tliat tlie ofHcer is convinced 
 tliat liis commanch'T, if he were acquainte<l witli tlus true state in whicli the atfair is 
 found, would recall his orders, yet must this officer, if he cannot Avait for fresh direc- 
 iioi>>i without prejudice to the expedition he is sent upon, pursne, at all hazards, those 
 which he brought out with him." 
 
 The impression of this passage might be broken, but could not apparently be 
 strengthened, by any comment. 
 
 SECOND .SPECIFICATION, FIR8T CHARGE. 
 
 The secoiul speciflcatioii under tlie first cliarg'e of disol)e(lieiice of 
 orders is next to be considered. Tliat specification was based on the 
 following order : 
 
 [General Order No. i5.] 
 
 Headquaktehs Army of Vircuxia, 
 
 CentreviUe, August 30, 1862. 
 Gens. McDowell and Porter: You will please move forward with your joint com- 
 mands towards (iaiuesville I sent General Porter written orders to that etiect an 
 hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Keno are moving on the Warreuton 
 turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire tliat, as soon as com- 
 munication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall 
 halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at CentreviUe, to-night. I 
 presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any descrijt- 
 tion to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's 
 troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his posi- 
 tion on the Warrenton pike until tlie troops from here should fall upon the enemy'.s 
 flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been aljle to find 
 out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell 
 will take immediate stei)s to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to 
 rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicalde. If any considerable 
 advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried 
 out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a j)osition from 
 which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the 
 whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them 
 here by to-morrow night or next day. My own head(piarters will be, for the present, 
 with Heintzelinan's corps or at this place. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Mujor-GcneraJ Coinmaudiuf/. 
 
 To nndorstand the condition of affairs at this time, a little exjdanation, 
 in order to nuike a connected narrative, is desirable. We liave seen that 
 on the 27tli of August General McDowell with his corps and Eeynolds' 
 div ision and Sigel's corps were int^7)0sed between Jackson and Thorough- 
 fare Gap, and tliat Jackson's supports were beyond that range of mount- 
 ains, pusliing forward with all their might lest he should be captured, 
 and that Heintzelman's corps, comprising Hooker's and Kearne3''s divis- 
 ions and General Reno's detachment of the Ninth Army Corps, Avere 
 within easy striking distance, and petitioner's corps was but a few miles 
 away between Manassas Junction and Bristoe, while Banks' corps was 
 behind petitioners in charge of the trains. In order to envelop Jackson, 
 Kearney's division of Heintzelman's cor])s and lieno's detachment on the 
 same night received orders which brought them, one to Bristoe and the 
 other to ^lanassas Junction; but as Jackson had retired to CentreviUe, 
 these forces and Hooker's division of Heintzehnan's corps were pushed 
 up towanl the stone liouse and CentreviUe. It is not necessary to discuss 
 here the curious <'oncatenation of circumstances by which in the move- 
 ment of ^McDowell's and Sigel's corps from the neighborhood of Gaines- 
 ville east betwe(Mi the Warrenton i)ike and the Manassas and Gainesville 
 road on the 28th they became se]>arated, Sigel moving to Manassas 
 Junction, liicketts' division of McDowell's corps being sent back to hold 
 
41 
 
 Tlioiougiifare Gap, aiTiviii,ii too late to make it etlectual, Kiii,ii's division 
 of McDowell's corps pursuiiiji' the Warrenton, Gainesville, Gioveton, 
 and Centreville i)ike towaid Groveton, running into Jackson, avIio bad 
 abandoned Centix^Aille, taken up a concealed defensive i)osition just 
 north of (jroveton within a few hundred yards of the Independent line 
 of the Manassas Gap Ivailroad, having a hght there on the night of the 
 28th, then, without, seemingly, the best of reasons. King's division quit- 
 ting that ])ike and moving down to ^lanassas Junction l)y the very road 
 l)y which petitioner was next day, in view of this falling back, ordered 
 to advance; lieynolds' di\'ision meanwhile having come down between 
 Sigel and King partially across the country and <lown to Bethlehem 
 Church and then up the Sudley Springs' road and out to the left, south 
 of the Warrenton road. General Jieynolds, we have seen, was within 
 sui)i)orting distance of King on the night of the 28tli, because he testi- 
 fied he rode over across the country from ]Srewmarket to the Warrenton 
 pike near Groveton and then westward to General King's position along 
 the Warrenton pike (G. C. M. IJecord, p. 170). His troops followed him, 
 as is plain from Bvt. Brig. (ien. Charles Barnes' evidence (Board's Record, 
 ]). OOO). The fight of the liStli has nothing to do with this case; but on 
 the morning of tlie 29tli, when it was found by the commanding general, 
 Pope, that King's division, one of the finest in the Army, had left its 
 ])osition of the night before, where it was interposed between General 
 Jackson and Tlutroughfare Gap (General King himself being ill at the 
 tinu^), and had come ^lown to ^lanassas Junction and left the door open, 
 he undeitook to clos(^ that door by sending petitioner's corps, a fresh 
 l)ody of troops, right out on that road with the greatest expedition. 
 
 Oil the morning of tlie -!!>th of August at 5.30 o'clock the petitioner 
 had received an order from ( Jencriil J*ope, dated 3a. m. near Bull Bun, " to 
 move upon Centreville at tlie first dawn of day with your [his] whole com- 
 mand, leaving your train to follow. It is very important that you should 
 be h(>re at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is 
 likely to take place and vour presence is necessary." (Accused's Ex. 
 Xo. 4, G. C. M. Record, ])'. 235.) 
 
 It has been sought on behalf of the petitioner to put the receipt of 
 this order at a later time for the reason that in a comnmnication which 
 lie dated C a. m. to General Burnside he said he had just received the 
 order, and also to put the time of his departure from Bristoe towards 
 Manassas Junction at half past six o'clock because the iietitioner in the 
 same dispatch to Crcneral Burnside said, '' I shall be off in half an hour." 
 aVs to the time of the receipt of the order it is sufficient to say that his 
 own exhibit i)resented to the general conrt-martial on his trial shows the 
 hour of receipt to be at r).30 a. m. His own witness. General Morell, 
 on that trial (G. C. M. Record, ]>. 140) said the dispatch was received 
 between daylight and sunrise, not after sunrise as narrated in the peti- 
 tioner's ojx'uing statement, and that the leading division (Sykes') did not 
 march until seven o'clock, and his own division followed immediately. 
 
 The fact remains, therefore, even on the petitioner's own showing in 
 evidence that the first order he received on the 29th of August, 1802, 
 was not promptly obeyed. At the hour of its receipt as the troops were 
 merely in bivouac it seems quite plain that they were prepared for imme- 
 diate movement and had already their breakfasts. 
 
 The ])etitioner has said in his opening statement that this order sur- 
 prised him ; that no severe engagement could take place near Centi-e- 
 ville ; that Jackson's army had not gone there. Of this he could know 
 nothing, for he was not at the front. But the statement is gravely made, 
 nevertiieless ; and at once he sets his judgment up against that of his 
 
42 
 
 commander — settles it to suit liimself. Fully apprised that a severe 
 engagement was likely to take place and that his presence was neces- 
 sary, we perceive that he did not instantly and vigorously push forward, 
 although his troops were now fresh. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. Horace Bouton, formerly of the Thirteenth New York, 
 Martindale's brigade, Morell's division, says his regiment Avas encamped 
 half a mile toward Manassas. The distance from Bristoe Station to 
 Manassas Station was about four miles. (Board's Record, p. 51.) 
 
 Accor<ling to Capt. George Monteith, formerly aid-de-camp of the peti- 
 tioner, and called by him as a witness (Board's Eecord, p. 310), the head 
 of the column [Sykes'] was halted when it had gone a quarter to a half 
 mile beyond Manassas Junction ; and that Major-General McDowell 
 came up a very few minutes after their arrival, and after the arrival of 
 Brigadier-General Gibbon. He also said (Board's Record, p. 315) that 
 the petitioner's troops turned to go to Gainesville, about 9. a. m. He 
 also testifies, he being with petitioner, that General Gibbon told them of 
 the action of the night before of King's division upon the Warrenton 
 turnx)ike, between Groveton and Gainesville. There is a distinction, not, 
 however, of much importance to be made between Manassas " Station " 
 and Manassas "Junction "5 Manassas Junction being according to the 
 testimony of Capt. J. A. Judson, called by the petitioner (Board's 
 Record, p. 110), where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad joins the 
 Manassas Gap Railroad ; and according to General G. K. ^yarren (Board's 
 Record, p. 51), if you wanted " to shorten the distance from Bristoe by 
 tiuiiing oft' towards Gainesville where the roads separated at a very 
 small angle, there would be a variation of a mile," which Avonld be gained 
 in moving ofl" at Manassas Junction towards Gainesville on the Manassas 
 and Gainesville road, instead of coming uj) at Manassas Station. 
 
 As to how far Sykes' division got on the road towards Centreville, 
 under the pressing order the petitioner had received at 5.30 a. m., Gen- 
 eral Warren has said (Board's Record, p. 17) : 
 
 While our corps was passin<i Manassas JuDction the order came for us to move to- 
 wards Gainesville. General Sykes' division had already passed the junction towards 
 Centreville, and my brigade was at the rear of it. I suppose to avoid delay, and with- 
 out any delay, Morell's division, which was following, tuiued oif on this road towards 
 Gainesville : as soon as it cleared the road our division faced about, which brought my 
 brigade iu advance in Sykes' division. 
 
 He further said (Board's Record, p. 33) : 
 
 My brigade just got past the road at the junction which leads up to Gainesville^^ 
 * * ^ General Morell's division moved at once upon the Gainesville road. 
 
 So that Morell's division did not go to Manassas Station according to 
 General Warren, but struck ott" where that small angle is made at Man- 
 assas Junction. 
 
 Private John 8. 8Iater^ Thii'teenth Kew York Volunteers, called for 
 the government, jNlartindale's brigade, Morell's division, said (Board's 
 Record, p. 324) that they marched towards JVIanassas from Bristoe, and 
 tlien cut across the country. 
 
 Tliis is further confirmed by the evidence of ^Maj. Geo. ITyJandy jr., of 
 the Thirteenth Xew York Volunteers, called for the petitioner (Board's 
 ]{ecord, ]>. 115), who says that from near Manassas Junction they went 
 toward (iaincsvilh*. 
 
 Sergeant Ferdinand Molde, \\\\o belonged to the same regiment in 
 Morell's division, a government Avitiiess (Board's Record, p. 075), says 
 that tliey got not (juitc up to ."Manassas Junction when they counter- 
 marched. 
 
 It is confirmed also l)y tlic t<'stimony ol' Brevet Lieut. Col. Joseph P. 
 
43 
 
 Clary of the same regiment, a government witness (Board's Kecord, p. 
 672), who says the same thing substantially. 
 
 Tlie petitioner has said (p. 26 of his opening statement), that hasten- 
 ing in advance of his command to join General Pope he met verbal 
 orders to March to Gainesville and take King with him; that this verbal 
 order required him to reverse his march and move back through Manas- 
 sas Junction and along the Gainesville road past Bethlehem Church to 
 Gainesville ; that because it was a verbal ortler he sent one of his statt", 
 Dr. Abbott, to General Pope in order to procure a written order. 
 
 For some occult purpose Capt. John H. Piatt, an aide-de-camp of Gen- 
 eral Pope, has been introduced into this case by the petitioner. In his. 
 testimony he stated substantially that after General Pope reached Cen- 
 treville on the morning of the 2yth, he was sent back with an order to- 
 General McDowell which Avas to direct General Porter to take General 
 King and advance towards Gainesville; and that he met the petitioner 
 near Bull Kun Creek on the west side of the creek, and also his troops, 
 about nine o'clock, moving up towards Centreville in marching order 
 (Board's Eecord,pp. 1142, 3, 4, 5) ; that he gave the purport of the order 
 to the petitioner who told him where he would probably find General 
 McDowell ; that he rode on and found General McDowell about or near 
 Manassas Junction and gave him the order; and that General McDowell 
 told him " to say to General Pope that he had received his order and he 
 had directed Porter to put King upon his right so he could have him if 
 he wanted him — that is, if General Pope said so." 
 
 Unfortunately for the credibility of this evidence. Captain Monteithy 
 as we have seen, had made a dift'erent statement. If General McDowell 
 had directed General Porter to do that which he told Captain Piatt he 
 had directed him to do, it is hardly conceivable that petitioner would 
 have i)resumed to continue his march towards Centreville in defiance of 
 such an order. But everything points to the conclusion, from the i>eti- 
 tioner's own statement, that the verbal order he received was addressed 
 to himself and followed almost immediately by a written order from 
 General Pope through General Gibbon ; and certainly before he had 
 seen General McDowell at all, because General Gibbon's order was in 
 his possession before General McDowell apijeared, according to his own 
 evidence. 
 
 It is further evidenced by the joint order which forms the l)asis of this 
 specification in which General Pope mentions that he did not know Gen- 
 eral McDowell's position until a late hour in the morning. 
 
 Major-General Morell, also a witness for the petitioner, says (Board's, 
 llecord, p. 421), that General Sykes' division was at Manassas Junction 
 at 8.30 a. m., as appears by the dispatch of Sykes to Morell. 
 
 Also by disi)atch which he produced, of the petitioner's assistant 
 adjutant-geneial, that the head of the column was halted beyond the 
 junction. 
 
 Lieut. aS. M. Weld, another former aid-de-camp of the petitioner and 
 a witness on his behalf, has stated (Board's Record, p. 262) his impres- 
 sion that the head of the column did not get over half a mile beyond 
 Manassas Junction, though the petitioner himself went beyond towards 
 Centreville ; and that they turned towards Gainesville about 9 a. m. 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General Locke has said in his evidence on this 
 subject as follows : 
 
 Qiiestiou. How far did yon and General Porter, being in advance of the ti'oops, get 
 beyond Manassas Junction towards Centreville ? 
 
 Answer. We got to tlie brick house called a warehouse (Weir house), which was a 
 little below the junction. There we stojjped for some little time, and General Porter 
 held a conference with General McDowell. 
 
44 
 
 Question. Ill that lionsf ? 
 
 Answer. Tlie outside of the house. After this eonversrtion ch)se(l, the general uiul 
 myself I'ode on pri>l>al>ly a quarter of a mile towards Centreville. There we were met 
 l)y an oflieer from General Pope, who gave General Porter a verbal onler to the effeet 
 that tliat mareh was to Ix- ehanged to the direetion of (iainesville, and then iiiuiiedi- 
 ntely sent me 1)ack to halt the eolnmn fur fear that it should get too far and they 
 woiikl have to retrace their steps. 
 
 So tliat tliis witness did not pass all of General I'orter s corps, or pass 
 any of it. 
 
 Question. Did not he aeeompaiiy you ? 
 
 Answer. Not just then. I left him in conversation with this officer. 
 
 Question. How soon did he come u}) ? 
 
 Answer. Very soon after. 
 
 Question. And joined you at Manassas? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. You having halted the column as yon passed u]) ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. I met the head of the column as I got up just uear where we turned 
 to go up the Gainesville road. 
 
 Question. Did you know Dr. Abbott on the staff of General Porter at that time? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Do you know of his having that morning gone to General Pope and 
 brought back an order or h message ? 
 
 Answer. I think I recollect the circumstance. 
 
 Question. When you got back to Manassas Junction, what hapi)enedf 
 
 Answer. As I halted the head of the column. General Gibbf)n rode up with an order 
 to General Porter from General Pope in writing. He gave me the order and I think I 
 read it before General Porter joined us. He came up almost immediately. The order 
 ■was signed by General Pope himself. 
 
 As the column was lialted at IManassas Junction at 8,30 a. ni. (Sykes' 
 division), according to Sykes' own dispatch, it is plain that the verbal 
 order which the petitioner received to move toward Gainesville must 
 have come into his possession before the column had halted. AVhile 
 there they were taking ammunition from their train, which, according 
 to General Morell (Board's Eecord, p. U22), took only half or three-quar- 
 ters of an hour ; and according to Assistant Adjutant-General Francis 
 S. Earle, a witness for the petitioner (Board's Record, p. 409), detained 
 them only about half an hour, lie also says (Board's Record, p. 414) 
 that they left Bristoe that morning about 7 a. m. for Manassas Junction. 
 As Capt. George Monteith, petitioner's former aide-de-camp, has said (G. 
 C. M. Record, p. 127), in 1862, that they found their ammunition train 
 going into Manassas Junction when they got there, and as it took half 
 an hour for them to ol)tain it from the wagons before countermarching 
 partially toward (rainesville (Sykes' division being the only one that 
 had to face about, the head of Morell's division not having gone l)eyond 
 the junction, where the roads, according to General Warren, made a 
 very small angle), it is apparent, even on tlie petitioner's own statements, 
 that nine o'clock is about the time, at the outside, the head of Morell's 
 division moved to the left toward Bethlehem Church and Gainesville, 
 followed thereafter by Sykes, who, from being on the right, had now be- 
 come the left division. 
 
 Much has been said of an interview at the Weir house between IMajin-- 
 General ^McDowell and the p<'titioner, near Manassas Junction, on that 
 morning. It will be noticed that Captain Piatt, the officer or aide-de- 
 camp of General Pope, who had luet the j^etitioner on the road between 
 Manassas Junction and Centreville, had (]uite a long conversation with 
 him there, according to Colonel Locke. Therefore, when the petitioner 
 met (Jenciiil ."McDowell at the Weir house, it is ai)parent that he must 
 have had the hitest infoimation from (rcneral Po])e of what was going 
 on and what was to be done. That should be contrasted with his open- 
 ing statement that he looked to JNlcDowcll as the man above all others 
 to give him thai inlbiinatioii. 
 
45 
 
 Brigadier-General Gibbon, of King's division, after tlie night marcli 
 of the 28th Angust down from the Warrenton pike to ^lanassas Junc- 
 tion, started just as tlie day was breaking (Board's Kecord, p. 243) to 
 find General Pope in order to notify him of the faet that General King's 
 division had retired from the Warrenton i>ike and was no longer inter- 
 posed between Jackson, who was north of trroveton, and Thoroughfare 
 ■Gap. Finding General Pope at Centreville, having ridden tliere as rap- 
 idly as lie could, a distance of six miles, he gave him information, and 
 immediately received a written dispatch to petitioner, Avas furnished 
 with a fresh horse, and started back, meeting the petitioner at the junc- 
 tion. He says wheu he arrived l^ack he found petitioner's troops sta- 
 tionary. Almost immediately afterward, while the petitioner had the 
 order in his Imnd, General McDowell came up and the petitioner gave 
 it to him. Brigadier-General Gibbon says (Board's Kecord, p. 245) : 
 
 General McDowell requested General Porter, when he foniiecl his line of batth; wliich 
 it was supposed he would finin in the direction of Giiinesvine, that he would place 
 ffing's division on his right, so that he (McDowell) could have his coiinuand together, 
 it being known at the time that llcyuolds' division, a portion of McDowell's command, 
 was out in that direction somewhere, supposably on the right of what would be 
 Torter's line. 
 
 At that time General Gibbon says that General McDowell did not 
 -assume command over the petitioner, hence the request. Tlmt order 
 which the i»etitioner received at the hands of General Gibbon was as 
 rlollows : 
 
 HEADQrAKT?:RS Army of A'irgixia, 
 
 Centreville, Any. 29, 1862. 
 Punh forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, 
 inpon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton turuiiike. Bo 
 ajxpedJtious, or we will lose much. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 M(tj. (ienl. Commanding. 
 
 Certainly language couhl not be plainer in order to apprise the peti- 
 i:ioner what the commanding general j^roposed to do, and General Gib- 
 l)Ou's own testimony, which I have thus cited, shows the intent to form 
 ^ line of battle. 
 
 Gainesville may be assumed, for the consideration of the geographical 
 :fe^tures of this case, to be the apex of an equilateral triangle to the 
 ■^vestward, with ^Manassas Junction at the angle to the south and Centre- 
 ville at the angle to the north, the base line being between Centreville 
 and Manassas Junction. It is apparent, therefore, that by rapidly 
 moving up what is known as the Manassas and GainesWlle road toward 
 Cxainesville on one side of the triangle, and Major-General Pope's forces 
 moving up on the Gainesville, Warrenton, and Centreville pike (" War- 
 renton pike") from Centre\'ille on the other side of the triangle, the 
 two separated portions of General Pope's army w<mld ra])idly converge 
 npon the same i)oint. If General Pope's forces were following the enemy 
 <:down the Warrenton pike and petitioner's tbrces on an unobstructed 
 Toad could move with expedition, it would place them on the Hank and 
 |)0ssibly on the rear of the enemy. 
 
 KOUTE OF MARCH TO GAINESVILLE. 
 
 At 9 a. m., which is the hour also put by Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, a 
 witness for the accused on his original trial (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 1(>2) as 
 irhe time when they started out, Morell's division of the petitioner's 
 ■<*3orps moved toward Bethlehem Church and Gainesville. 
 
46 
 
 The petitioner puts the arrival of liis command at Dawkins^ Branehj. 
 beyond which it did not collectively go, at 11.30 a. m. 
 
 According to the petitioner's witnesses Major Warren and Mr. Jud- 
 son, the distance from Manassas Junction to Bethlehem Church is three 
 miles, and from Bethlehem Church to Dawkins' Branch, the point at 
 which petitioner's head of column halted for the day, is two miles — in all 
 live miles. (Board's liecord, pp. 51, 109.) 
 
 Brigadier-General Gibbon says (Board's Record, p. 253) that he ac- 
 companied the head of the column to pilot it into the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road, which he had just passed over the night before; and 
 says, further : 
 
 I accompauied General Morell, my impression- is, until I approaehed the position 
 ■where I had left my brigade in the morning. I cannot tell where that was. I 
 don't know how far from the junction that was. When I got to that position, proba- 
 bly before, I left the column of the Fifth Corps, and resumed command of my own 
 brigade. 
 
 His brigade of King's division, to which belonged the Sixth Wis- 
 consin Volunteers, was lying between Bethlehem Church and Manassas 
 Junction, where he rejoined it when he ceased to pilot Morell's division 
 on the road he had been on during the night. On cross-examination, 
 with reference to this interview between the petitioner and General Mc- 
 Dowell, Gibbon said (p. 251): 
 
 Question. General McDowell said he wanted to have you so place your division that 
 you could come in on the left of Reynolds ? 
 
 Answer. That was not the way he put it. It was to go in on Porter's right ; that 
 was the way he said it ; tliat is what he meant according to what I understood ; on 
 the left of Reynolds, but he didn't put it that way. 
 
 Lieut. U. P. Broolcs, adjutant of the Sixth Wisconsin, appears to have 
 been detailed to show Morell's division the road. His testimony is as 
 follows (Board's Record, p. 1022) : 
 
 Question. Where were you on the morning of Friday, August '29, 1862 ? 
 
 Answer. On the morning of the 29th I came with King's division from the battle- 
 field of the night of the 28th back to Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. What orders, if any, did you receive that moniing ? 
 
 Answer. I received an order to go with Morell's division of Porter's corps back ta 
 the battle-field where King had fought the night before. 
 
 Question. Did you do so ? 
 
 Answer. I went back to a point where I presumed G*?iiprfil Morell would have na 
 difficulty in finding his way to the turnpike, and then I returned to King's division. 
 
 Question. Could you, by looking at the map, indicate the point to which you went 
 with Morell's division [Duffee map shown witness] ? 
 
 Answer. We moved out on the Gainesville road. I do not think this map is quite 
 complete. 
 
 Question. State in Avhat respect. 
 
 Answer. There is a road running from somewhere in this vicinity across in that 
 direction [across to Lewis lane No. 1]. 
 
 Question. From whose place and to what point? 
 
 Answer. I could not say. I merely know from the general direction that I carried 
 Morell's division; I rode with Morell at the head of the division until we reached this 
 point. My impression is that we crossed Dawkins' Branch, but I am not positive 
 about that. We certainly got so uear here that I could point out to him the direction 
 of the battle-tield of the night before. 
 
 Question. Which road had you come down the night before from Gibbon's battle- 
 field? 
 
 Answer. The battle-field of the night before, the line of battle ran across there 
 [near the Douglass and lirewer houses]. There were two n-giments of Gibbon's brigade 
 engaged on the east of tlie woods.' When we fell back that night Ave fell back directly 
 across the Warrenton turnpike, and struck the lane about there [about near the word 
 "lane" of Lewis lane No. 2]. Colonel Bragg and myself were at the head of the col- 
 unm ; and we marched down this way until we reached this road here [not indicated], 
 and this iioad [road marked in ink on tlie map "E. P. B.'']. Then we followed down 
 the Mana.Siias and (Gainesville road to the junction. When we got there, as I say, in 
 tjie morning, I went back with Morell's division to tliLs point. [Witness indicates a 
 point near j3.a wJiius' Branch. ] 
 
47 
 
 The general concuiTent testimony of tlie witnesses ])uts the arriv'al 
 somewhere ax abont 11 a. m. 
 
 Capt. AugmtuH F. Martin, chief of artillery to tlie petitioner, and 
 called as a witness for him, both on the original trial and now (Board's 
 Eeeord, p. 11-8), ]nits the arrival of the colnmn at Dawkins' Branch at 
 abont 11 a. m. Tliat wonld make its rate of march 2^ miles an honr; 
 King's division following behind ; and Major-General "McDowell being 
 with it, he being the senior to tlie petitioner in rank, bnt not at first ap- 
 parentl.^' assnniing any command. 
 
 From the fact that (lenerai Gibbon l)r()nght the order from General 
 Pope, and Lientenant Brooks was detailed from his [Gibbon's] brigade to 
 act as pilot the remainder of the distance, it seems to be manifest that 
 when General Pope ordered the petitioner to ])ush forward ni)on Gaines- 
 ville he intended that they shonld take the verj' road that King's divi- 
 sion had come down npon the night before, which ran into the Warrenton 
 Pike a little easterly of Gainesville. 
 
 It is to be noted here that the road leading from Beats', jnst sonth of 
 Dawkins' Branch at its jnnction with the Manassas and Gainesville dirt- 
 road, np to Lewis lane Xo. 1, is not indicate<l on this map, althongh 
 testified to by Lieutenant Brooks as a road then in existence. It was 
 presnmably an army road, like one of the many made through that por- 
 tion of the country during the years 1801-02, while the Union and Con- 
 federate armies were res]>ectively encamped there. I find by my notes 
 jrnidc during a personal ins]»ection of the ground last August that the 
 inhabitants of tliat locality ]»ointed out to me the location of this very 
 load, the traces of which are still visible, and that I put it down at the 
 time upon my map not knowing of the jwsitive evidence Lieutenant 
 Brooks has since given as to its former existence. In looking at the 
 ;oflicial map it is ai)parent that that would be the shortest route, from 
 Milford and liristcK' up through Deals' past Thomas Xealon's, a little to 
 ^.he eastward of his lesidence, and so on up to Lewis lane Xo. 1, where it 
 ;strikes the old Warrenton, Alexandria and Washington road, and thus 
 :throngli Gro\ eton, to Sudley ('hurcli, and Aldie. The fact, therefore, of 
 ithe existence of that road in 1802 does not nunxdy depend ui)on the 
 aiotes of my own insi»cction, but is sui)ported 1\v the evidence of a ma- 
 terial witness. But one witness has given a different route for King's 
 ■division in coming <l()wn from the Warrenton ])ike to Manassas Junction 
 •during the ])revi(nis night, and that is Ca})tain Jndson (Board Record, 
 p 108); but on cross-examination (p. 1011) he said, "I have no recollec- 
 tion of the march at all." 
 
 Brig. (ien. Marcoiiis h\ ratri<'l\ another witness for the petitioner, 
 who was in the fight of King's division on the 28th, said they "struck 
 south" (Board's Record, p. 185); and on page 187 Board's Record he 
 .said (after mentioning their position next morning near Bethlehem 
 Church): 
 
 Question by petitioner. TThat happened next after Kine/s departure for CentreriUe? 
 
 Answer. I was ordered I tliink by McDowell in person, to move as soon as I could 
 ill the rear of fJ<'nei;il Porter: Porter having just passed through, or passing through 
 iiean-r Manas.sas Junction, to go back to the scene of our fight the night previous. 
 
 From this it will be perceived incidentally that Brig. Gen. Rufus King, 
 who commanded the particular division of General McDowell's corps, 
 Jimi at this very time departed for CeiitreriUe from Manassas Junetion. 
 On cross-examination this same witness, referring to this movement of 
 the i)etitioner's corps towards Gainesville, and past the place where 
 King's division was lying in the road, quotes from his diary as follows: 
 
 At about ten o'clock INuter's eorits having passed on towardj^ our lines of yesterday 
 ive wen^ oidered to follow liini, and did so. 
 
48 
 
 Further on the witness said (Board's Record, p. 190) : 
 
 (Cross-examined by Recordek:) 
 
 Question. Did you know at the time what ordei's they had ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I (h)n't think I did; but I knew that Porter was ordered forward: 
 to tlie scene of yesterday's o]ierations, because McDowell told me that. 
 
 Question. Wlieie was the scene of the previous operations'? 
 
 Answer. Where we had the tight before. 
 
 Question. On the Warrenton ]»ike ? 
 
 Answer. My inference was, from what McDowell said to me, that he wanted me to 
 go in there, because I could pilot Porter. 
 
 Question. On the Warrenton pike l 
 
 Answer. Our tight was up where Gibbon was [northwest of Groveton]. 
 
 Question. Was that light reported as being at (Gainesville, rather than at Groveton, 
 of the night liefore '! 
 
 Mi\ C'liuATE. Keported by whom ? 
 
 Question. W*ell, l)y anybody. By King. 
 
 Answer. It had not taken form yet. I don't know that many people knew about it. 
 I don't know that Poi'ter knew about the tight much until I told him. I don't remem- 
 ber whether it was called Gainesville or Groveton. 
 
 Question. How did this convei'sation between you and McDowell arise, in which 
 you have said that he made some remarks in reference to General Porter's position on. 
 that road ? 
 
 Answer. Do you mean when he met me to turn me l)ack ? 
 
 Question. Yes. 
 
 Answer. It Avas because he had ordered me to tell General Porter to keep with me 
 and to pilot him back to the scene of last night's operations. I think the language 
 was that I was to go with Porter back to the scene of last night's operations. 
 
 Question. When he spoke of General Porter's i)osition when he came and took you 
 n]» the Sudley road, do you recollect his language ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. 
 
 * # # *• if if * 
 
 Question, How rapidly did yon march that morning on that road from Manassas 
 Junction towards and beyond Bethlehem Church f 
 
 Answer. I think Porter's rear had got ahtng some little distance before I joined, and 
 that I marched rather rax)idly until I got up with him. 
 
 Thus it is apparent that at the time Lieutenant Brooks was piloting* 
 the petitioner's corps under the order that Brigadier-General Gibbon had 
 brought from Major-General Pope, i\\Q purport and intention of that order 
 was that petitioner'' H corps should move up to the lines occupied in the fight of 
 the evening before hy King's division on the Warrenton pike just south of the 
 Brotcner-JJouglass place delineated on the nuq) which has been used in 
 this case. 
 
 ]\Iaior G. K. Warren, the i>etitioner's witucss says (Board's Record, p. 
 18) that arri\ing at Dawkins' Branch he '■'■ found that General Morell's " 
 division had moved oft' to the right towards the Manassas Gap Railroad, 
 * * * sa> a (luarter of a mile"; that General McDowell has been at 
 Manassas Junction that morning with the petitioner. At the last-named 
 place the petitioner was not under his [McDowell's] command and had 
 received tlie latest information from ^Vlajor-General Pope. Whatever 
 information .Major-General McDowell could furnish him at that time 
 relative to the actual situation of affairs from the limited knowledge he 
 [McDowell] then had might be and possibly was serviceable, but it would 
 nave had no itft'eat whatever so far as the petitioner's order was con- 
 cerned which he [petitioner] had received at that time from General 
 Po])e to move "at once towards (irainesville and be expeditious or we 
 should lose much." That was the order whicli controlled and governed 
 petitioner's action at that time, and neither ^Fajor-General McDowell 
 nor any one else could rightfuily have inlliu'nced him in delaying to 
 obey that order. 
 
 That General McDowell was anxious to furnish him with all the in- 
 formation possible is niiinifested in the fact that he ga\e him his own 
 
49 
 
 map of that part of the country, which, as it turns out, was the oulj' map 
 they had at that time. 
 
 About the time the cohimn halted at Dawkins' Branch, on the Manassas 
 and Gainesville road, Dr. Abbott, of the petitioner's staff, returned from 
 General Pope's headquarters with the written response that the peti- 
 tioner had requested in the morning when he first received a verbal 
 order from General Pope to move in that direction, this Avritteu order 
 by Dr. Abbott's liands being- supplementary to a written order which 
 had been sent intermediately to tlie petitioner by the hands of Brigadier- 
 General Gibbon. (G. C. M. Kecord, p. (J5.) 
 
 For disobetlience to the joint order the petitioner was trie<l under the 
 specification we are now considering. He has shown in his opening- 
 statement, page 31, that he knew what the objects were to be accomplished 
 under this joint order, namely: 
 
 1st. To move towards Gainesville ; 
 
 2d. To estabhsh communication with General Pope's forces on the 
 right ; and 
 
 3d. When this communication w^as established to halt. 
 
 He says that there was nothing in this order that contemplated a battle ;; 
 but in the light of prerious orders that he had received that dai/, and of the 
 orders he had received on previous days^ it seems quite clear that this las^ 
 statement of the petitioner is one that cannot be sustained. The very 
 first order he received from General Pope that morning said : 
 
 A severe engagement is likely to take plaee, and your presence is necessary. 
 
 Two days before, on the 27th of August, he had received a communi- 
 cation froin General Pope, tlirough the chief of staff of the Army of Vir- 
 ginia (see page 88, petitioner's opening statement), in which he was told 
 that the army would probably move to attack the enemy next day in 
 the neighborhood of Gainesville. And on the day before that, the 26th 
 of August, General Pope in ])erson wrote him a communication (see peti- 
 tioner's opening statement, page 87), in which he said: 
 
 I do not see how a general engagement can be jiostponed morq than a day or two. 
 
 The second order from General Pope that the petitioner received, at the 
 hands of General Gibbon, that morning, the 2yth August, at Manassas 
 Junction to push forward Avith his corps and King's division on Gaines- 
 ville, and " be expeditious," showed that the purpose of General Pope 
 was to attack the enemy before he could receive re-enforcements, and, if 
 possible, overwhelm and destroy him. And from the fact that General 
 Gibbon liad delivered the order to petitioner in person, and told hiin all 
 about the operations of the night before, and of his [Gibbon] proceeding 
 of his own accord to see General Pope in order to have troops sent out in 
 this very direction to intervene between Jackson and anything that might 
 be coming through Thoroughtare Gap, for the express purpose of over- 
 whelming Jackson, if possible, it is apparent that at the moment the 
 petitioner received the joint order from General Pope at the hands of Dr. 
 Abbott, of his staff", he hiew that the movement on Gainesville ivas for 
 the express purpose of enfjaginr/ the enemy. Otherwise, no reasonable 
 explanation could be given of the order which he had received from Gen- 
 eral (libbon, tliat as General Pope's army was following the enemy down 
 the Warreuton pike, lie, the petitioner, Avas to " be expeditious " in get- 
 ting up towards Gainesville, or we should " lose much." It must he noted, 
 also, that in this joint order the previous order received at the hands of 
 General Gibbon is taken as expressive of the intention of tlie command- 
 ing general with reference to the joint order itself, for he says, in the 
 joint order : 
 
 I sent General Porter written orders to that effect au hour and a half ago. 
 
50 
 
 Xamely, to move forward on Gainesville. 
 
 But General Poi)e also stated what troops were moving down the 
 Warrenton i)ike or that vicinity ; that they could not lie very far from 
 Gainesville, and tliat as soon as commumcation was esfahlished heUveen 
 that force and the petitU)ner\^ and General 31cI>on-elPs, the whole command 
 should halt. The accidental fact mentioned that it might be necessary 
 to fall back behind Bull Kun at Centreville that night was, as General 
 Pope presumed, "on account of his supplies." General McDowell, by 
 the joint order, was directed to take immediate steps to communicate with 
 his other di\'ision commander, Brigadier-General Kicketts, so as to in- 
 struct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. 
 Now, one of the divisions attached to General McDowell's corps at that 
 time was Brigadier-General Reynolds' division, which was placed on the 
 left of Maj. Gen. Franz Si gel at daylight by General McDowell's personal 
 orders, having reference to an offensive movement which General Sigel 
 had been directed to make by General Pope against the enemy. The 
 petitioner teas aware of this, and yet he says there was nothing in this 
 order that contemplated a battle. The "joint order" itself was merely 
 the result of petitioner sending Dr. Abbott of his staff to General Pope 
 for written orders when he received between S and 9 a. m. verbal orders — 
 *he not then knowing that written orders were coming intermediately to 
 him from General l*o])e, at General Gil)bon's hands. 
 
 The moment General McDowell received /<is copy of the joint order, 
 he rode forward to the head of the ]ietitioner's column from the position 
 he himself had taken on the JVfanassas and Gainesville road near Sudley 
 road, to await General llicketts' arrival from Bristoe Station. 
 
 We know from the testimony of a iuiml)er of witnesses that even while 
 petitioner was at Manassas fTunction in consultation with General Mc- 
 Dowell, Sigel's artillery was heard in action ; and that when the peti- 
 tioner's head of column reached Dawkins' Branch the noise of the contest 
 obliquely on liis right and rear was ])lainly ])erceptible. In other words, 
 the main column, under General l?ope, had met the enemy east of Gaines- 
 vdle, between it and Groveton, and had become engaged witli it. For 
 the petitioner, therefore, to continue his march towards Gainesville on 
 the road to the left and southwest of Thomas Nealon's was to march 
 awaj' from the place of action and separate still more widely the two 
 flanks of the army. 
 
 In order to carry out the requirements of the joint order that the army 
 should not l)e in this unmilitary shajie, it Avas absolutely necessary that 
 the Fifth Corps should be taken directly over to the north and right, in 
 order to form connection with Brigadier-General Keynolds' division, 
 which was on the left of General Sigel's corps of General Pope's army. 
 
 There were three ways of doing this : 
 
 1st. Of moving directl}^ by the Army road (which Lieutenant Brooks 
 had shown General Morell as being the one which King's division had 
 come down that night) due north to Groveton from Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 2d. By directing the head of the regular division, under General Sykes, 
 to take the Milford road from Milford and Bristoe which went up through 
 Five Forks to Compton's lane. 
 
 .jd. To take the road known as the Manassas and Sudley road to the 
 rear of the line of battle, which would have made it necessary that the 
 divisions of the petitioner's corps should countermarch for that purpose; 
 the forks of the ^Manassas and Sudley and the Manassas and Gaines- 
 ville road being distant 2^ miles from the head of petitioner's column at 
 Dawkins' Biancli. 
 
 But in this connection it shouhl be noted under this third head, that 
 
51 
 
 as the country was quite open midway between those two points, troops 
 coukl be carried right across the country to that road, just as General 
 McDowell carried, according to General Patrick's evidence, the hitter's 
 brigade of King's division to the Manassas and Sudley road in order to 
 ai)ply it and put it in action soonest in the manner which had been sug- 
 gested by petitioner himself to McDowell just before. 
 
 No explanation has been given why the petitioner made no effort dur- 
 ing all that long I'Oth day of August, 1S02, to push his corps up into 
 conjunction with General Po])e's army l)y means of the roads passing 
 through Five Forks, If north of the Manassas Gap Eailroad the woods 
 had been as impenetrable as he would have us believe, it is plain that 
 in passing through tliose roads in order to take position to the left rear 
 of our army, under General Pope, his troops would have been protected 
 from any tlank attack which he would have appear as so much to have 
 been dreaded while making the movement. 
 
 John T. Leachman^ one of the petitioner's witnesses, a resident of that 
 vicinity, whose evidence is yet to be (jommentod upon, said, however 
 (Board's Kecord, p. 123), that in 18(51 and 1802 the Confederate forces 
 encamped not far from Bethlehem Church: and on page 125, that some- 
 times wagons for country pur])oses are driven along these very roads 
 through Five Forks ; this e\idence of the Avitness having reference to the 
 road as it was in August, 1802. 
 
 Miijor ^V(ln•cll^ the ])etiti(>iiers witness (Board's Record, p. 17), said 
 that IK) ])rud('iit man having anything at stake would march his men 
 through there unless he had possession of the outskirts; if he had pos- 
 session of the outskirts lie could marcli a column through there very 
 Avell. This evid(Mice he (lualilied further (Board's Eecord, p. 39) by 
 saying : 
 
 It is always i)o.ssiblc where a man cau go afoot to take an army. 
 
 By examining the record it will be seen that no effort whatever was at 
 any time made by the petitioner during that day to ascertain the charac- 
 ter of the roads through " Five Forks'' up to the left and rear of General 
 Pope's army. He does not seem to Imve sent any staff ofticers up there, 
 nor any orderlies, nor anybody, and his failure to do so can then only be 
 explained on the supposition that he did not care as to what was being 
 done on the right. 
 
 \Ve Icnow from the testimony of two government witnesses, Captain 
 Mcl-Jhloioicy, of the Twenty-seventh Confederate Virginia Infantry, and 
 J^ieut. B. T. Boiccfs, First Ohio Battery (Board's Record, pp. 952, 953, 
 950), that the roads through Five Forks from the Manassas and Gaines- 
 ville road uj) to the old Warrenton, Alexandria and Washington road 
 at (Jompton's lane are good and that they drove through that very road 
 at a trot in a two-horse wagon. 
 
 \\'lieu the ])etitioner's corps came to a halt, the head of the column at 
 or near Dawkins' Branch, which, hy the way, in the month of August is 
 nothing but a dry ditch or ravine, General McDowell, who was with 
 King's division on the rear of the road awaiting the arrival of General 
 Rickctts' division from Eristoe, received his copy of the joint order, and 
 immediately moved to the front in order to communicate with petitioner 
 and assume comnmnd for the time being under its requirements. 
 
 Major General MoreU, petitioner's witness, who was at the head of 
 the cohimn, says (lioard's Record, p. 432,) that they met a mounted man 
 before reports came from the skirmishers. In his original evidence be- 
 fore the court-martial he said as follows (G. C. M. Record, p. 110) : 
 
 AVe had gone up the road towards Gainesville, perhaps about three miles, when I 
 met a mounted man coniiug towards us. I stopped him and asked him tlie road to 
 
 5 u 
 
52 
 
 Gaiiiosvillc ami al.-o llir news trdin llic front. H»> said he liad just coiiit' from Gaim-s- 
 ville. an<l that the cnciiiy's skirmisliiTs were then tliere to the inimber of about 400 
 and their main body Avas not far behind them. I tlien moved up the road, and in a 
 short time our own skirmishcr.s reported that they had diseovered the enemy's skir- 
 mishers in their front. Thi' cohmni was tlien halted by General Porter, who was with 
 me. 
 
 Tliis luoniited iiiaii to wliom tliis^ witness refers was evidently one of 
 General Ihifoi'd's cavalry ; becanse lie wonld otherwise have lield liini 
 in eustody as a suspicions character. And as this argnnient progresses 
 in reference to the evidence in this case it will be perceived that on that 
 very road had come down that morning and was then with (ieneral 
 ]Morell a sqnadron of this very cavalry nnder Capt. -lohn P. Taylor. 
 Therefore, if there were any of the enemy's skirmishers on that road at 
 that time tliey were just arriving there ; and it remains to be considered 
 Avhat skirmishers they were and where they came from. 
 
 It seems that the Sixty-second Pennsylvania held the infantry advance 
 on this road ; and when it was tired iii)on l)y the skirmishers, the col- 
 umns halted by the petitioner's orders. Two companies of that regiment 
 were in the advance; immediately the other eight comi)anies were sent 
 ont. What was done at that time is best described by Brig. Gen. Charles 
 Griflin, who testitied for the accnsed on the original trial, and whose 
 evidence is given in brief at page 497, Board's Record: 
 
 Page 161 G. C. M. Record: The halt at Manassas Junction was for half an hour. 
 Page 162: Left Manassas at 9. The skirmishers, Sixty-seeond Pennsylvania, com- 
 menced tiring with the enemy's pickets possibly tive miles from Manassas. Porter rode 
 np and colnnni halted. The other eight companies Sixty-second sent out. Porter 
 then read Po])e's connuunication (the one jointly to Porter and McDowell) to himself, 
 Morell, and Untterlield, all dismounted. We then went back to the rear on a hill, say 
 three hundred yards. A battery, I believe, was placed in position there. We were 
 there some time when McDowell rode np. Pickets of the Sixty-second were recalled 
 by Griflin by order. P. 162 : I received an order almost directly after General 
 McDowell had left, to recall my pickets and orders to move my command to the right. 
 I attempted to go to the right and moved probably 600 yards until with the head of 
 my column I crossed a railroad said to run to Gainesville. Here we met with olistruc- 
 tions which we could not get through. It was repoi-ted by somebody, I cannot say 
 who, "You can't get through there." We then faced about and moved back to the 
 lull. * * * ]y£y i^vigade was then placed in position. It was a very goo<l 
 position to repel an attack. P. 165 : When my brigade moved to the right across the 
 railroad we ran into some little, thick, pine bushes ; halted until ordered to move 
 back again ; made no reconnaissance Avhatever. P. 169 : Merely obeyed orders. P. 
 162 : During the day^ large clouds of dust were going to our front and to our left 
 from a })oint stated to us then to be passing through TlKn-oughfare Gap. There were 
 large clouds of dust all that afternoon, in fact nearly all day, as I can recollect, 
 coming irom a point said to ns to be Thoroughfare Gap. I should say it was tlu'ce 
 or four miles from where I Avas ; fully that. I except, of course, these batteries that 
 opened on us about 10 o'clock; they were nearer. They were within 1,200 or l,r>ll(l 
 yards. We saw scattering groups of horsemen or of infantry. In fact, there i.s not a 
 doubt, if that point was Thoroughfare Gap, that the imcmij teas coming thyongh there all 
 day. P. 16:?: When Morell got his orders near sundown to attack "we had started 
 back towards Manassas Junction." 
 
 The skirmishers from the Sixty-second Pennsylvania, which crossed 
 Dawkins' Branc'h, appear to have been almost immediately withdrawn 
 and the Thirteenth New York Volunteer Infantry, under Col. E. (i. 
 Marshall of the liegular Army (now colonel United States Army, re- 
 tired), sent out in its stead. 
 
 Lieut. WaHer *S'. Davis, Twenty-second Massachusetts Tolunteers, 
 petitioner's witness, says (Board's l\ec()rd,p. 398), that Colonel ^hirsliall 
 was sent out before General McDowell arrived. 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General Frnnch H. Earle, petitioner's witness 
 (Board's liecord, ]». 415), says that Marshall was thrown out as soon as 
 they began to deploy, which was immediatel\ ,and that General JNIcDowell 
 
53 
 
 came up aftenc((r(ls (Board's Eccord, p. 410); also that (iciioral Moiell 
 that day said lie had about 0,000 men in his division. 
 
 Capt. George Monteith, aid-de-canip of the petitioner, called for liini 
 (Board's Record, p. 311,) says General Morell detailed Colonel MarslKilI 
 to move out before (leneral McDowell came up. 
 
 Private John ^S. Slater ^ Thirteenth Xew York Volunteers, now a hr.v- 
 yer, a government witness, says that petitioner detailed Colonel Marsludl 
 for this duty. (Board's Becord, p. 325.) 
 
 Maior-( leneral J/oi-e// him self, petitioner's witness, said (Board's Becord. 
 p. 432) that Colonel ^Marshall was sent out as soon as the division halted 
 at Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 Lieut. James H. Wilson, Thirteenth ISTew York Volunteers (Board's 
 Record, p. 370), called by the government, says that his regimeut, under 
 Colonel Marshall, was immediately deployed. Ee answered further as 
 follows : 
 
 By the Recorder: 
 Question. Did yon see the eiieiiiy tliat day ? 
 
 Answer. I don't reeoUect that I did. I ilo not have any recolleetion now of s;'eini>- 
 any of them. 
 
 We know the direction in which Colonel Marshall's reghiient was 
 deployed, from his own evidenct^ as well as the evidence of otheis not 
 disputed; they were thrown (mt in the space directly to the front be-, 
 tween a ravine just northeast of Thomas Nealon's and the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road where it took a turn towards the left from Dawkins' 
 Branch and westerly to the woods in front. A continuation of that 
 road, which led somewhat to the left from Dawkins' Branch, would have 
 carried the petitioner's corps still lurther away at every step he would 
 have taken from General Poi)e's army, which at this time, from the 
 sound of cannonading, was northeast of him, to the right and a little to 
 the rear. 
 
 At this juncture Major-General ^McDowell rides up with a copy of the 
 joint order in his hand. ^^l^-'f; 
 
 It was testitied to in the original trial by Assistant Adjutant-General 
 Locke, for the defense (G. C. ]M. Record, p. 135), that (Jeneral McDowell 
 said : 
 
 Porter, yon are too far out ahcady. Tliis is no i>laee to light a hatth?. 
 
 That portion of the remark, that it was no place to fight a battle, 
 (ieneral McDowell explicitly denied in his evidence, because it was a. 
 very good place in which to tight a battle. 
 
 There were, however, other considerations to come in there, namely, 
 whether it was a good place to fight a battle in when he did not believe 
 the enemy to be on his immediate front in force, and when by remaining, 
 there the left wing of the army would be separated from the right, con- 
 trary to all military princii)les, a distance from a mile and a half to two 
 miles ; so that if any enemy did come down in their front they would 
 be enabled to interpose and destroy them in detail. General 3IcDowelI 
 said on the original tiial on cross-examination as follows (G. C. M, 
 Record, p. 87) : 
 
 I have no reeoUection ahont tlnit phxce not being the one inwliicli to light' a hattle. 
 .Something may have been said about not going further toward {laiuesville in refer- 
 ence to falling l)ehind Bull Run that niglit. 
 
 Question. If anything was saifl in relation to the facility of getting l)aek to Bull 
 Run tliat night, do you rcnu-mlier wlietlu'r it was that the aeeused was too far in the 
 front or wouhl be too far in tlie front if he move<l further oir? :mi6i^s» •i 
 
 Answer. It was hardly a ([uestion of going further on ; it was more a ijuestion of 
 turning to the right and going against the enemy then passing down the Warreutou 
 pike. 
 
54 
 
 AYith reference to the remark testified to by Assistant Adjutant- 
 General Locke, and which has been repeated in other forms by other 
 witnesses for the accused before this IJoard, General ]\IcDowell in the 
 original trial further said (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 218): 
 
 I cauiiot rocolh'ct iircci.sely what occurred between General Porter and myself, or 
 what conversation and what words ]>assed between us at that time. The subject of 
 our conversation, as near as I can recall it to mind, was the order which we, each of 
 Tis, had received from General Poi^e, and particularly that ])art of it which referred to 
 our not goinjf so far forward that we should not be able to get behind Bull Kun that 
 night or before morning. I cannot say what language I used or how it may have been 
 understood whilst talking on that point. As to that particular speech, that the 
 ground, so far as topograpliy was concerned, not being a place to tight a battle, I 
 have no recollection of having said anything to the effect that it was not a good place 
 to tight on. It was about as good a place, so far as topography was concerned, as any 
 other in that }»art of the country. I think our conversation vfds chietiy upon the sub- 
 ject of not putting ourselves in a position to be unable to fulfill the requirements of 
 the order about retiring behind Bull Run, and about not going so far towards Gaines- 
 ville, or going to Gainesville, that, ih in could not be done. Without being able to say 
 what was said either by him or me, I think, so far as my best recollection goes, that 
 the. object and purpose of our conversation at that time was in relation to tEat point. 
 
 As the principal purpose in that movemeait towards Gainesville, after 
 it became evident by the cannonading- that General Pope's right was 
 engaged, was that the two wings should unite, the remark attributed to 
 General McDowell l)y these persons is the one that he would most nat- 
 urally have made under the circumstances, that the petitioner was too 
 '{nr out, too much to the left, at too great distance from the other wing 
 of the army to render it any service under the circumstances as they 
 then existed. The presence of two regiments thrown forward as skir- 
 mishers beyond Dawkins' Branch, principally to the left of Xealon's, 
 showed that a continuation of the movement in that direction was im- 
 proper and faulty. IMajor-General McDowell was then in command 
 under the (old) sixty-second article of war by reason of the joint order. It 
 was his duty to decide upon the circumstances of the case and determine 
 what should be done in order to comply with the wishes of the command- 
 ing general. The order itself specifically gave him a discretion to vary 
 its mode of execution to suit the circumstances. Had no discretion been 
 given his action might have been different. The discretion being given 
 him, his decision was conclusive, and formed part of the joint order itself 
 as communicated by him at the time to the petitioner, wlio was the other 
 corps commander, and who himself suggested the variation. 
 
 General McDowell made the decision, and we shall see what was re- 
 quired to be done under it. In point of fact, that which General McI>owell 
 directed under the joint order was precisely that wliich the order pre- 
 viously received by the petitioner at the hand of General Gibbon from 
 General Pope required, namely, to go to the rif/htfrom I)aivl-i)i,s' Branch., 
 so as to strike tJte Gainesville and Warrotton turnpike at the point where 
 Kitujs (lirision had been in action the }>i(/ht />(/o>'f, and not to take the 
 road, still in use, to the left of Thomas Xealon's house, just beyond Daw- 
 kins' Branch, but the ''army road," running- from Dawkins' Branch due 
 north to Ijcwis Lane No. 1. 
 
 Bvt. Maj. Gen. John Gibbon, U. S. A., King's division, McDowell's 
 corps, a witness for jtetitioner, referring- to his interview with Major- 
 General Po])e early that morning at Centreville, when he went to apprise 
 }iim of the Avithdrawal of King's division the night before, said (Board's 
 liecord, p. 251 ») : 
 
 Question. Did ha exj)laiu to you the pni-pose of that order? 
 
 Answer, Well, tlie fact is that the imrjiose of the ordci' was rather dictated by my- 
 •self, because I Told him I bad rid<lcu tliai distance togi\(' him this inlbrmatioii. deem- 
 ing it important, supposing if lie had any a\ailable troops he would send them out on 
 
55 
 
 tlie road. At that lie turned around to Colonel Ruggies and told liim to write the 
 order in pretty much the terms I have seen it, directing General Porter to move out 
 on the road, and take King's division with him. 
 
 Question. Was that order intended to be the substance of what you had conmiuni- 
 cated f 
 
 Answer. I think so. 
 
 Question. Towards what point did that order direct the march ? 
 
 Answer. / understood rUjht out on the road we had come in. 
 
 Question. Where you were the night before ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; if he could get there for the ]>urpose of interposing a force between 
 Jackson's detached force and Lee's main army. 
 
 Question; Was it not Lieutenant Brooks who acted as guide on that occasion ? . 
 
 Answer. I recollect an officer by that name who was reported to me as having been 
 over a i)ortion of the ground, and I think it more than likely that he is the officer. 
 
 (Board's ]?eeor<l, p. 245,) He fnrtlier answered as follows [after lie 
 returned to Manassas Junction] : 
 
 Quflstion. What did you then do ? 
 
 Answer, I think, at the reipiest of General Porter — at any rate, at the request of some 
 one — I passed to the head of his coluinn, and accompanied General Morell, the com- 
 man<ling officer of the leading division, into the road leading towards Gainesville, and 
 rode along with General Morell until we reached the position where I had left my 
 brigade in the morning, and then joined that, and the troops passed on in the direction 
 of Gainesville, 
 
 Question, Then had General ilorell passed the point with his division where your 
 troops were lying in the morning ? 
 
 Answer, Yes ; not only General Morell, but I presume the whole corps. 
 
 Question, That is, they had gone on the road towards Centreville ? , 
 
 Answer, They had passed where the Gainesville road came into the Gordonsville 
 railroad. 
 
 Question. They were going in the direction of Centreville when you delivered this 
 order ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. I don't think, however, the head of the column was verv far abead 
 of it. 
 
 if. S ^ • * * if * 
 
 Question, You took an order Ity which they were to return and go towards Gaines- 
 ville ? 
 
 Answer. They werc^ stationary when I saw them. 
 
 Question. Do you know how long they had been stationary ? 
 
 Answer, No, sir. 
 
 Question, You went back with General Morell? 
 
 Answer, My impression is I accompanied him until I got to mj- position. 
 
 Question, They were marching toward Centreville? 
 
 Answer, Yes, sir. 
 
 Answer. I didn't know where General Reynolds was. 
 
 Question. You overheard a conversation previous to that between General Porter 
 and General McDowell, did you not ? 
 
 Answer. Previous to a\ hat ? 
 
 Question. Previous to being taken off up the Sudley pike. 
 
 Answer. Yes; in the morning when I delivered this order. 
 
 Question. General McDowell said he wanted to have yon so place your division 
 [King's] so that yon could come in on the left of Reynolds ? 
 
 Answer. That was not the way he put it. ■ It was to go in on Porter's right ; that was 
 the way he said it ; that is what he meant according to what I understood ; on the 
 left of Reynolds, but he didn't put it that way. 
 
 From this evidence it is plain that petitioner knew from General Gib- 
 bon before he [petitioner] left Manassas Junction towards Gainesville, 
 on the mornino- of the 29th, that General Pope's order required him to 
 march just in the direction subsequently indicated by General McDowell. 
 
 Qo\. Timothy SuUivan, of the Twenty-fourth New York Volunteers, 
 King's division, McDowell's corps, a witness for the petitioner, said 
 (Board's Eecord, p. OS), when referring to the fact of his division lying 
 along the road between Bethlehem Church and Manassas Junction, oji 
 the morning of the 20th, that petitioner's corps passed them going back 
 on the road that they had come down on. 
 
56 
 
 Bvt. J>i"i^'. Geu. Ediraril I). Fowler, coiiiinaiHliiif;- at that time the Four- 
 teenth New York Vohinteers, the well known "Brooklyn" regiment, 
 Hutch's brigade, King's division, McDowell's corps (a witness for the 
 government), testified (Board's Record, p, 548) that Porter's corps passed 
 them at Manassas Junction from half past 8 to a. m., and they followed 
 some distance. Said he : 
 
 It was exjieeti'd Ave would go up and go in at tlie same place Ave were hi at the 
 night before ' but the story Avas then that somebody over on the right Avas pressed — 
 8igelor some one else — and Ave Avere turned otl'in this direetion [north], on the Sndley 
 For<l road to go there. We niarehed in tliis (lire<'tion and then on the Sndley Ford 
 road to the A'ieinity of the (dd battle-tield of Bull Kun; I recognized it lieeanse I Avas 
 there, the a]ipearance of the ground, stunted ])ines, and the nearness of the WaiTen- 
 ton pike. We arrived at that place perhaps at two o'clock in the afternoon — auy- 
 Avhere from one to three o'clock in the afternoon. I was Aery anxious, and expected 
 ^'A'en before Ave halted there to hear, on Avhat Avas our front and left, the guns of Porter's 
 niAision. I had an idea that Ave had Jackson rather in a trap. We remained at that 
 idacenear the battle-held of Bull Run, near the stunted pines and cedars, on an eleva- 
 tion Avhere avc could see the Ijattle going on — not the l)attle, but the smoke of the 
 battle, because there Avas a ridge thatinterA'ciu'd between us and Avhere the battle was. 
 We could hear artillery and infantry firing, and cheers and shouts beyond this ])lacf. 
 We remained there until perhaps hA'e o'clock in the afternoon, maybe half past five, 
 Avhen Ave had oiders to go down on the Warrentou pike and nioAc on the enemy. 
 The impression I had then was that the enemy Avere falling back. 
 
 Petitioner himself, as a witness before Major-General McDowell's court 
 of inquiry, admitted that from information received from Brigadier- 
 General Gibbon he knew that the — 
 
 Object Avas to strike the turnpike before the advancing enemy should arrive. The 
 sooner Ave arrived there the more effective Avould be our action. (Board's Itecord, p. 
 1009.) 
 
 The fact being substantiated that it was exj^ected that the petitioner's 
 corps should go directly to the right at Dawkins' Branch, at right angles 
 to the road he was then on (the Manassas and Gainesville road), the 
 next pohit to be considered is, what was done while General McDowell 
 was in command of the joint corps ? Whether the command of the peti- 
 tioner moved up with expedition to Dawkins' Branch, or not, from Man- 
 assas Junction, under the very urgent orders he received, is of compar- 
 atively little importance. If he left Manassas Junction at l> o'clock and 
 arrived at Dawkins' Branch at eleven, we find that he marched at the 
 rate of -^ miles an hour. He would have l)een careful, under those im- 
 perative orders, to ha^'e done as nnich at that time, for the reason that 
 3Ia)or-(ieneral McDowell knew his orders and was directly behind him 
 and was witnessing his movements, and there was no possibility, so long- 
 its ^lajor-General AIcDowell was there, for any evasion. 
 
 GENERAL M'DOAVELL'S ORDERS TO PETITIONER. 
 
 It is a singular and important tact, in the consideration of this case, 
 that the jietitioner himself has, on several different occasions, delil)er- 
 ately made statements concerning the movements that we are now con- 
 sidering which cannot 1)e reconciled under any possible state of facts. 
 AVliat tlie petitioner has said as to the interview he had at the front 
 witli .Major-General McDowell will be found to contain many contradic- 
 tions. General McDoiceWs evidence on that subject before the court 
 which tried the petitioner is as follows (G. V. M. Record, p. 84): 
 
 Question. M'ill you slate fully what occurred in that conference ? [The one aboA^e 
 referred to. ] 
 
 AnsAver. On passing the head of General Porter's column, which Avas on the road 
 I liave liefore mentioned, (ieneral Porter Avas in adA'ance of the head of iiis colnnni — 
 I tJiiiik on a slight emineiu'c, some of his start' near jiim. I rode up to him, and saw 
 
57 
 
 that lie had thf same order as myself — the joint order. Soon after my attention was 
 directed to some skirmishing — I think some dropping shots in front of us. The coun- 
 try, in front of the position where General Porter was when I joined him, was open 
 for several hundred 'yards, and was. as I supposed, by seeing the dnst coming up above 
 the trees, [near] the Warrenton turnpike, Avhich was covered from view by woods. 
 How deep those woods were I do not know. It did not seem at that time to be a great 
 distance to that road — the Warrenton turnpike. I had an impression at the time that 
 these skirmishers were engaged with some of the enemy near that road. 
 
 I rode with General Porter from the position he occupied eastward to the right. 
 That is, the column being somewhat west of north, and I going east, made an angle 
 with the line of troops on the road. The joint order of General Pope was disenssed 
 between us; the i)oint to Ire held in view, of not going so far that we should not l>e 
 able to get beyond Bull Run that night; that was one point. The road being blocked 
 with General Porter's troops from where the head of his column was Itack to Bethlehem 
 Church ; the sound of battle, which seemed to be at its height on our [fke] road to 
 Groveton ; the note of General Buford indicating the force that had pjissed tlirougii 
 Gainesville, and, as he said, was moving towards Groveton, where the battle was going 
 f)n, the dust ascending above the trees seeming to indicate that force to be not a 
 great distance from the head of (Jeiieral Porter's column. I am si>e:iking now of that 
 forc(' of the enemy referred to by General Buford as passing down the A^'arrenton turn- 
 jiike towards Groveton. I understand this note of General Buford to refer to a fo:ee 
 of the enemy. 
 
 The (|uestion with me was how, soonest, within the limit tixed by General Pojie, 
 this force of ours could be a])i>lied against the enemy. General Porter made a remark 
 to me which showed me that he had no (|uestion but that the enemy was in his imme- 
 diate front. I said to him: " Yon put ijour force In licfc, and I iriU tide mine up to the 
 Sndlcji S2)rhitis road, on the left of the troopx enj/oijed at that point with the enemi/,'' or wiu'ds 
 to tliiit eftect. I left General Porter with the lielief aiul understanding that he would 
 ])ut his force in at that point. 1 moved back by the shortest road I could find to the 
 head of my own troops, near Bethlehem Church, and inunediately turned them up 
 north on the Sudley 8i)rings roa<l to join General Keynolds' division, which belonged 
 to my comnutnd, and which I had directed to co-operate with (Jeneral Sigel in tlu^ 
 
 movements he (General Sigel) was making at the time I left him in the morning. 
 
 * # * if • * # # 
 
 Question. You have said that the accused made an observation to yttu wliicli showeil 
 that he was satislied that the enemy was in his innuediate front; will you state what 
 that observation was? 
 
 Answer. I do not know that I can repeat it exactly, and I do not know that the 
 ac(;used meant exactly what the remark nnght seem to imply. The observation was 
 to this effect — putting his hand in the direction of the dust rising above the trees — 
 •'We cannot go in there anywhere without getting into a fight." 
 
 Question. What reply did you make to that remark? 
 
 Answer. I think to tins effect : " That is Avlutt we came here for." 
 
 Question. Was or not the battle imaging at that time ? 
 
 Answer. The battle was raging on our right ; that is, if you regard the line of the 
 road from Bethlehem Church to Gainesville to be substantially northwest ; the battle" 
 was raging to the right and east of that line at Groveton. 
 
 The expression wliicli General McDowell testifies to as used by the 
 petitioner as indieative of a reluctance to fight at that time is uncontra- 
 dicted. We shall see, as we proceed in the consideration of the evidence 
 adduced before this board and before the coiu't originally, that this sig- 
 nificant expression was l)ut the continuation of a remark that he had 
 really made but a few minutes before to Colonel Marshall, when he sent 
 him out in command of the skirmish line. The dust rising over the trees 
 to their right and front, in the direction of Meadowville Lane, to which 
 both the petitioner and General McDowell referred, we shall see was the 
 dust then being raised by the hundred troopers of Col. T. L. Eossers 
 Fifth A^irginia Cavalry of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry division of 
 Jackson's" command, in order to delude and retard the advance of the 
 petitioner's corps. 
 
 Capt. Mark J. Bunnell, then lieutenant of the Thirteenth Xew York 
 Volunteer Infantry, Col. E. G. Marshall, says (Board's liecord, ]>. GTS) as 
 follows [his regiment being the one petitioner deployed as slcirmishers 
 at Dawkins' Branch] : 
 
 Question. Do you know what the orders Avere under which they Avere deployed ? 
 
 Answer. My recollection is that the regiment was halted there: I Avas lyiug on the 
 
58 
 
 grass at the timo, and General Porter rode up and asked where the commander of the 
 regiment Avas. I stated that he was a short distanee from tliere, with a group of 
 officers. He wauted to see him, and I think I calknl to an orderly and stated to him 
 Avhat I wanted, lie called Colonel Marshall, and they came down within a feAV paces 
 of where I was, and Colonel Marshall then leceived his orders to deploy his regiment 
 as skirmishers in front. 
 
 (,>uestion. Did you hear the order? 
 
 Answer. I stood right there so I could hear. 
 
 C^uestion. What were the orders that General Porter gave Colonel Marshall ? 
 
 Answer. I could not hear all the conversation, but to deploy his regiment as skirm- 
 ishers, as we were about ready to move out; not fobrhuj on a general enya/jement, but 
 the idea was that we had to do duty only as skirnushers. " 
 
 Question. What could you see and hear during that day ? 
 
 Answer. I saw some skirmishers from the opposite side — two or three cavalrymen I 
 .ijaw come out in a corntield in front a little to the right — and heard firing. 
 
 Question. In which direction 'i 
 
 Answer. Soon after we were in position there was some firing in front, and a little 
 to til' right of the front. 
 
 Question. Artillery or infantry? 
 
 Answer. Artillery and some carbine liring — cavalry. That was the skirmish lijie, I . 
 judge. 
 
 Question. Could you see any enemy in your front? 
 
 Answer. Only those few cavalrymen that came out there. 
 
 (,)in stion. Do yon know whether the enemy came down in force in your front that 
 day ; if so, when? 
 
 Answer. The im])ression was that thei'e was some force there in the latter part of 
 the afternoon. I did not see them ; I could not see them. 
 
 Question. Was there any contest of any description in any other direction than di- 
 rectly in your front and right ? 
 
 Answer. Judging from the firing, tliere was at the right. 
 
 Question. What was it ; infantry, or artillery, or both ? 
 
 Answer. Eoth. , ' 
 
 Question. How near were yon to that contest? 
 
 Answer. It would be almost impossible to tell. 
 
 Question. Yon could hear musketry distinctly? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; very distinctly. 
 
 Question. Could you hear anything else indicating a contest or battle ? 
 
 Answer. Late in the afternoon we could hear the huzzas and howling of the soldiers, 
 apparently as though they were charging, and going backwards and forwards a num- 
 ber of times. 
 
 Question. How early in the afternoon did you hear those sounds of cheering, &c.? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell you the time. I should judge it must have been towards five 
 or six o'clock, and perhaps later, because the tiring was kept u\) after dark. 
 
 Question. Kelative to sunset, when did you first begin to hear those indications? 
 
 Answer. I should judge about sundown. 
 
 Question. Before that time could you hear any infantry and artillery firing ; if so, 
 wlien ; before yon heard the cheers ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; there was some firing to our left [right?], but not to any great extent. 
 
 Question. How early in the day was that? 
 
 Answer. Along in the afternoon. 
 
 Question. The artillery firing ? 
 
 Answer. Yes: some artillery firing soon after we took our i)osirion as skirmishers 
 from perhaps one battery off a little to our right in front. 
 
 Question. Any other artillery firing in the distance? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; to the right. 
 
 Cross-examination bj- ]Mr. Ciioatk : 
 
 (Question. How near were you toCcdonel ilarshall and (ieneral Poiterwhen General 
 I'orter was giving to Marshall his orders? 
 
 Answ'er. About as near as I ain to you. 
 
 Question. Did you hear in that position? 
 
 Answer. I tliink so ; but peiliaps not all. 
 
 (Question. Do you recollect all the conversation? 
 
 Answer. I don't know as I do recollect all that passed, because I may not have heard 
 all that passed. 
 
 * * -X # * rf 7f 
 
 Question. Did yon see any cai>tnrcd scouts brought in ? 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
59 
 
 By llie Eecorder : 
 
 Que8tion. What was it that transpired that time Avhen General Porter gave that 
 couimancl that especially impresses it upon your recollection? 
 
 Answer. It was this : That Ave were going to have, we supposed, a pretty hard 
 battle; liad talked of it from the time wo were countermarched from Manassas Junc- 
 tion, as soldiers naturally will ; and I remarked to some of the men afterwards what 
 I heard as we were going down on the skirmish line ; I remarked it because it was a. 
 sort of relief to me ; like a great many soldiers, I did not care to go into a tight unless 
 it was really necessary. That is why it impressed my memory. 
 
 By the President of the Board : 
 Question. You were shot the next day, I understand? 
 Answer. Yes, and laid on the held nine days. 
 
 From this uncontradicted evidence of a witness wlio lieard the peti- 
 tioner give these orders to Colonel Marshall not to bring on a general 
 engagement, possibly within five, certainly not more than ten or fifteen 
 minutes before the conversation of the petitioner with General McDowell^ 
 it is evident that the same thought was then running in his mind, of an 
 intention or desire not to fight at that time under Major-General Pope. 
 Major-General McDowell, loyal to the orders of his superior, anxious to 
 see a union effected between the then separated wings of the army as 
 soon as possil)le in consequence of the contest then going on to the right, 
 after giving his orders to the petitioner, under the discretion given him 
 by the joint order, moved immediately by the shortest line, as will be 
 perceived on looking on the map, down to the location of his own corps, 
 one division of which (King's under (ieneral H^tch) was between Beth- 
 lehem Church and the Sudley Springs road, on the ]\Ianassas and Gaines- 
 ville road. Had the Manassas Gap Railroad from near Dawkins' Branch, 
 where Major-General McDowell and the petitioner had made their ob- 
 servations, dowii to Bethlehem Church l)een rendered impassable by the 
 open culverts which the petitioner's witness, Leachman, seemed to think 
 would prevent infantry moving along (Board's Record, p. 141), and if 
 the wood^ at that place had been so dense and impenetrable for foot- 
 troops as the petitioner would have us believe, it would have been 
 impossible for Major-General McDowell to have moved down there on 
 the shortest line on horseback at a gallop or so rapidly as to leave his 
 staff behind. The speed at which he moved, after a determination had 
 been reached as to the next military movement, shows the anxiety he 
 had to unite the two wings of the army as si:)eedily as possible. Himself 
 zealous and unsus})icious, he did not, at the time, attach to the remark 
 of the petitioner, that by putting his forces in at the right he would get 
 into a fight, that significance which, in view of its repetition in various 
 forms, i)revious and subsequent, should ])ropeiiy be attached to it. 
 
 King's division, it will be noticed, was at this time quite 2i miles from 
 the head of the petitioner's colunni, then at Dawkins' Branch. To have 
 deployed it to the left and brought it to the front there in line of battle 
 would have been to separate the wings of the army still further, with 
 less possibility of their being united. As the Sudley Springs road was 
 the nearest for that division to move upon in order to come the quickest 
 into position on the right of petitioner's corps, so as to be joined to the 
 other divisions of Major-General McDowell's proper command, the 
 (piickest way to apply it in the contest then raging was by moving it in 
 the very direction that Major-General McDowell took it. 
 
 *As there had been much misrepresentation in the press and consider- 
 able misunderstanding hi the public mind as to the responsibility for the 
 various disasters in that campaign, and as General McDowell had been 
 a prominent actor in it, he asked President Lincoln, after its ccmclusion, 
 for a court of inquiry under the statute to examine into his entire con- 
 
60 
 
 'iluct from its very beginniu^-, and at tlie same time lie invited all who 
 knew anything- of the tran«actions of that eampaigii iu wliieh his corps 
 or command was concerned to come forward and give evidence on the 
 subject. 
 
 This court sat a long time in Washington, in the same building and 
 contemporaneously with the general court-martial that tried the j^eti- 
 tioner. Major-General IMcDowell gave evidence in the case of the i)eti- 
 tioner, because he was subpcenaed as a witness and had to do so. The 
 petitioner volunteered evidence in the case of Major-General McDowell 
 before the latter's court of inquiry, because General McDowell had given 
 a general invitation to all to come forward. The petitioner having l)een 
 duly sworu as a witness before General McDowell's court of inquiry, 
 testified, and the following are extracts from his evidence : 
 
 petitioxer's testimony befork general m'dowell's c.'>ui!T of inquiry. 
 
 (Question by Court. What order did General McDowell give, or what authority did 
 he exercise o\'er you, and in virtue of whose order? State fully and jiartieulaily. 
 
 Answer. General McDowell exercised autlifirity over me in ohcdiciice to an order of 
 General Pope's addressed jointly to General McDowell and me, and which I presume is 
 in possession of the court. I have no copy of it. Our connnamls heing united he 
 necessarily came into the command under the Articles of War. 
 
 ******* 
 
 * * * General McDowtdl on arriving showed me the joint order, a copy of 
 Avhich I acknowledged luiving in my jiossessioii. An expression oto]iinion tlien given 
 by him to the elfect that theft was no ])lace to light a battle and that I was too far out, 
 which, taken in connection with the conversation, I considered an order, and stopped 
 further progress towards Gainesville for a short time. General McDowell and I went to 
 the right, which was rather to the north, with the view of seeing the character of the 
 country, and with the idea of connecting, as that joint order re(iuired, with the troops 
 on my right. But very few words passed between us, and I suggested, from the charac- 
 ter of the country, that be should take King's division with him and form connection 
 •on the right of the timber, which was then on the left of Reynolds, or i)resumed to be 
 Ecynohls. He left nu' suddenly, not replying to a call from me to the effect, "What 
 should I do?" and with no underslanding on my part how I should be governed, I im- 
 mediately returned to my command. On the Avay l»ack, seeing the enemy gathering 
 in my front, I sent an officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, my chief of staff, to King's 
 division, directing it to r<Mnaiu where it was for the present, and counneuced moving 
 lay connnand towards Gainesville and one division to the right, ov north of the load. I 
 received an answer from (ienmal McDowell to remain where I was; he was going to 
 the right and would take King with him. He did go, taking King's division, as I pre- 
 sumed, to take position on the left of Keyuolds. I remained where lAvas. W^hen Gen- 
 eral McDowell left me I did not know where he had gone. No troops were in sight, and 
 I knew of the position of Reynolds and >Sigel, who were on our right, merely by the 
 sound of .Sigel's cannon, and from information that day that Reynolds Avas in the 
 vicinity of Groveton. The head of my corps was on the first stream after leaving Ma- 
 nassas Junction on the road to Gainesville, one division in the line of battle, or the 
 most of it. 
 
 Question. Did you consider the expressiim of General McDowell, as stated by you, 
 that yoH were too far to the front, and that this was no i)lace to tight a battle, in the 
 light of an order not to advance, but to resume your original position ! 
 
 Answer. I did when King's division was taken from me, and as countermanding the 
 first order of General Po])e, under the authority given him by tliat joint order. 
 ******* 
 
 Question by Court. State, as far as you know, what followed, so far as the move- 
 ments of (Jeneral McDowell's troops and your own were concerned, and a^ hat orders 
 you subseijuently received from (General McDowell. 
 
 Answer. General McDowell took King off to the right. I knew nothing further of 
 liis movements. I remained where 1 was until three o'clock next morning. A portion 
 «»f file command left at (la\ break. I received no orders whatever from General Mc- 
 Dowell. 
 
 Question by (Jeneral McDowell. What did you understand to be the effect of Gen- 
 •eral McDowell's conversation ? Was it that you were to go no further in the direction 
 <jf (iainesville than vou then were? 
 
61 
 
 Answer. Tlic coiivfisatioii wns in connectiou witli moving over tt) the right, which 
 neee.ssarily wuuhl prevent an julvanee. 
 
 Question by General McDoweU. Witness speaks of tlie efteet of (k-neral McDowell's 
 message (as hronght Ity Colonel Locke) to have been to can.se him to remain in posi- 
 tion at the place where General McDowell first saw him. How long did witness' troojis 
 continue in this position ' 
 
 Answer. A portion of the command remained thei'e till daybreak the following 
 morning, and some till after daybreak. The most of Morell's division was on or near 
 that ground all day. 
 
 (Question by (ieueral McDowell. Did witness conceive himself proliibited from march- 
 ing or attempting to make any movement to the front, or to the right, or to the front 
 and light '/ 
 
 Answer. By that direction or order, taken in connectiou with the joint order, I con- 
 si<lere(l myself checked in advancing, especially taken in connection with the removal 
 of King's division. I did not consider that I could move to the right, and I considered 
 that General McDowell took King's division to forma connection on the right or to go 
 to tilt; right and form such a connection as was jjossible. I add further that I con- 
 sidered it ini]iracticab]e to go to tiie I'ight. 
 
 Qut^stion 1iy General McDowtdl. Did witness attempt to make any movement in either 
 of tlie directi(jns above named? 
 
 Answer. Not directly to the right. I did to the right and front, and when I received 
 the last message from General McDowell to remain where I was I recalled it. 
 
 Question by General McDowell. Did you make no attempt to go to the front or to 
 tlie right and front after that message ? * 
 
 Answer. I niaile no attemjjt with any body of troops. I sent messengers through 
 there to go to General Po[»e and to get information from the troops ou the righ>. 
 
 (Question liy General McDowell. After General [McDowell left the witness, did the 
 Avitucss not know he was expected by General McDowell to move to the right or to 
 the right and front ? 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
 Qu(!stion by Geiuiral McDowell. Witness speaks of having reported to General Pojie. 
 Wiien did witness conceive himself as no longer under (iencral McDowell 1' 
 
 Answer. My messages were addressed to General McDowell, 1 think, all of them. 
 TJie messengers were directed to deliver them to General Pope if they saw or met him. 
 I cousideredmyself as limited in my operations under General McDowtdl's orders until 
 I should receive directions from (ieiieral Pope. 
 
 (Question by General McDowell. How long was witness and General Mcl)owcll to- 
 gether Ix'fore they moved to the right with a view of seeing the character of the 
 country .' 
 
 Answer. I do not think that we were together more than four or five minutes: though 
 I have no distinct recollection. 
 
 Question by General McDowell. How long were tlicv togetlier after moving to tin- 
 right .' " 
 
 Answer. It may have been teuvOr twelve minutes, perha]>s longer. 
 
 Qni'stion by (ieneral McDowell. Witness refers to some conversation betv.cen him- 
 self and General McDowell when they first met, which, taken in connection with an 
 exi»ression of oi)inion by General McDowell, witness considered an order. Can the 
 witness state what that conversation was? 
 
 Answer. I only recollect the impression left u])(ni my mind at the time, and merely a 
 refer(>iice to the artillery contest going on far to our right. 
 
 (Question by General McDowell. Was not the joint order referred to, in that conver- 
 sation ? 
 
 Answer. I have no recollection of it. It may have been referred to, because we Avent 
 to the right, my belief is, to look at the country ; but 1 do not recollect anything at all 
 of the order being i-eferred to. 
 
 Question hy General McDowell. "Were not the remarks witness here states to have 
 been nnide )>y General McDowell iinide Avith reference to the point in the joint order 
 which reipiiied the troops not to go to a point from which they conH not get behind 
 15nll li'un that night? 
 
 Answer. I think I have replied to that question by stating I do not recollect. 
 
 Question by General ^McDowell. Does not the witness recollect asking General Mc- 
 Dowtdl if he knew of any roads leading to the right or right and front of the head of 
 Avitness' column ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. Early in the day General McDowell loaned me a map and may 
 have given more exjdanation with it. This is all the information I recollect of receiv- 
 ing, or having in my possession, of the country. 
 
 Question by General McDowell. Does not the witness recollect of being made ac- 
 i(uainted by General McDowell with information received by him from General Bu- 
 ford as to the ftnx-e of the enemy which had passed through Gainesville ? 
 
62 
 
 Ans^v<>l■. I do. 
 
 C^ucstioii by General McDowell. Wheu the witness and General McDowell moved 
 to the right, "with a view of seeinj^ the character of the conntry," what were the few 
 words which witness states jiassed between them f 
 
 Answer. 1 have •>iven some of the words already ; that was, my suggestion to take 
 King's division to the right. I have no recollection of any conversation or any words 
 being used by me or him, except when reaching the railroad, remarking that the rail- 
 road was an obstacle — we having some little difficulty in getting over it with our 
 liorses. 
 
 Question by General McDowell. Does the witness recollect nothing of what was said 
 V)y General McDowell on that occasion, and of his telling the witness to take his troops 
 across to the Warrenton road, and of General McDowell's intention to go back to take 
 his troops n]) the Sndley Springs road f 
 
 Answer. To the best of my recollection nothing of the kind was con\'eyed to my 
 niinTl. 
 
 From the petitioner's own statements made at this time, it is appar- 
 ent tliat he perfectly understood what was meant by (General ^IcDowell 
 when he arrived at the head of petitioner's cohimn at Dawkins' Branch, 
 and convei'sed with liim about his i)ositioii. 
 
 Two superserviceable witnesses, Walter S. Davis (Board's Eecord, p. 
 391) and Francis S. Earle (Board's Eecord, p. 410), appeared before this 
 Board on petitioner's behalf. Davis says that General McDowell re- 
 marked to the petitioner when he arrived uj) the Manassas and (xaines- 
 villeroad atDawkius' Branch, "Porter, you are too far out; move your 
 troops back into these woods " ; and Francis S. Earle says that he heard 
 ( reneral ]McDowell say, " Porter, you are too far out," aiul make a motion 
 with his hand back, and heard the word " back" ; he did not hear him say 
 "move your command further back." The latter witness, however, on 
 the cross-examination (Board's Eecord, p. 11<>), said he did not see the 
 .enemy's skirmishers, even during the day ; couse(piently, if he did not 
 see any skirmishers during- the day, he could not have understood at 
 the time any remark that General McDowell might have made relative 
 to the then position of the troops as having any reference to a battle 
 directly in their front. 
 
 But whether or not Major-General IMcDowell said anything then iis 
 to their position to the petitioner, whatever he did say, as understood 
 by the petitioner, appears to correspond exactly with the general plan 
 of operations from the moment the "Gibbon" order was received in the 
 morning ; for on the question by General McDowell on his Court of In- 
 (piiry to the petitioner : 
 
 Question. What did yon understand to be the etfect of General McDowell's conver- 
 sation ; was it that you were to go no further in the direction of Gainesville than you 
 then were '? 
 
 Answer. The conversation was in connection with moving over to the right, which 
 necessarily would prevent an advance. (Board's Eecord, i). 1011.) 
 
 The petitioner, therefore, perfectly understood whatever remark Gen- 
 eral McDowell made at the time, as appears by his own evidence ; and 
 that to pursue a nuirch to the left of Thomas Nealon's with two regi- 
 ments of skirmishers thrown out along the Manassas and Gainesville 
 road, was not the movement to the right which General Pope intended 
 tlu'v should make. 
 
 From the extracts just given from petitioner's evidence on General 
 McDowell's Court of luipiiry, it will be seen that he then claimed : 
 
 1. Tliat General ^McDowell exercised authority over him in obedience 
 to an order of General Pope's addressed jointly to General McDowell 
 and himself; and, further, that " our cohimands being united, he ueces^ 
 ■sarily came into the command under the Articles of AVar.'' 
 
 2. That he considered himself limited in his operations under Gen- 
 
63 
 
 ■eral McDowell's orders until he should receive directions from Geueral 
 Pope. 
 
 3. That General McDowell gave him no orders to take his troops to the 
 right over to the Warrenton road — none to move to the front or right, or 
 the right and front — but that he was checked hj Geueral McDowell in 
 his intention to advance. And yet, as has just been noted, it was api^ar- 
 ent when General McDowell got up to Dawkins' Branch it was under- 
 stood by McDowell's own con^^ersation with him that it was desired that 
 the petitioner should go to the right and no longer make an advance. 
 
 4. He, therefore, claims to have been reduced .to a state of inaction, 
 so far as any order, direction, or instruction of General McDowell was 
 concerned ; and that this condition of enforced inaction continued till 
 he should receive directions from General Pope. 
 
 We have seen, however, by Brigadier-General Griffin's testimony al- 
 ready cited, that while General McDowell was with petitioner at the 
 front, the latter made a sort of effort to nu)ve to the right as directed. 
 
 PETITIONER'S REPLY OF MARCH, 1870, TO HON. Z, CHANDLER'S SPEECH 
 IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FEBRFARY 1*1, 1870. 
 
 In this he said : 
 
 I liavf asserted, and ever sliall assert, that General McDowelFs order to me was to 
 remain wliere I tlien was, while he would i)Iaee King's division on my right and form 
 the conneetiou enjoined in the joint order. * * * * * 
 
 He further says in that reply : 
 
 * * * An inuiiediate examination by ns of the country towards 
 
 Grovetou showed the impracticability of doing direcih/ what he desired, "jjlacing King 
 <m my right and thus forming connection with the troops near Grovettm ; " and Gen- 
 eral McDowell left me without further instructions, but with the understanding that 
 he wouhl, by going around behind the woods sei)aratiug us from Groveton, take King 
 and Kicketts with him to join his command (Reynolds and Sigel), th^en at Groveton. 
 
 As General McDowell's order to me at that time alone prevented an immediate en- 
 gagement of my troops, and resulted in prolonging the "inaction" which you condemn 
 in me, I deem it ])roper to state these facts fully. i. # *. # 
 
 I have shown that my ''inaction" ux)'to the afternoon of the 29th was in strict 
 obedience to orders. 
 
 I now meet your charge of inaction up to a later hour in that day. 
 
 After General McDowell left me (early afternoon 2ytli), and up to the time of Gen- 
 eral Pope's positive order of 4.30 p. m. (2ytli), reaching ine 6.30,p. m., I was certainly 
 a,s free to exercise my '"discretion" under Pope's "joint order" as McDowell was. 
 
 Under the ''joint order" he elected to divide our forces and march to another tield, 
 where it seems lie arrived too late for his Troops to be successfully used. Under it I 
 elected to hold my position, neutralize double ray force, and, in the enemy's opinion, 
 saved by my action both Poiie and McDowell from capture or total rout. * ^ * 
 
 He further adds : 
 
 To show that my views are in no wise changed, and that I now raise no new issue, I 
 rpiote from my defense before the court : 
 
 It isAvell that this alleged order, "]uit yourtroops in there," to me by General McDowell, 
 does not so appear charged as sj)ecitied, for now I will demonstrate that he did not then 
 give me, and cannot be believed to have given me, any such order. * * * It would 
 have been proclaimed forthwith at the hea<lquarters of General Pope ; it would have 
 been blazoned among the charges and sjiecitications side by side with the order itself, 
 and. if true, it ought to have made the words of exculpation which General Pope uttered 
 to me at Fairfax Court-House on the 2d September, four days afterwards, choke him 
 as he spoke. But it is not true that General McDowell then, or at any time in that day, 
 gave me any such orders, "to put my troops in there." or to do auytliing of the kind ; 
 and fortunate is it for (ireneral McDowell that it is not true, Ibr if he had given me any 
 such mandate to thrust my corps in one [over?] that broken ground between Jackson's 
 right and the se]»arate enemy massing in my front, the danger and disaster of such a 
 
64 
 
 movemout would hnvf Iummi then .-unl now upon his liands. I :ini ,<;]iul thai I can say 
 that General MeDowell is utterly in error upon this point, and is no way ehargeahle 
 with such military blunder. 
 
 This narrative covers the i)eiiod of tinu' between noon of the "Jltth and the hour of 
 Pope's order of 4.30 p. m. * # ^ * ■* 
 
 petitionee's statement to president "GRANT. 
 
 In the petitioner's appeal to the President, in June, 1869, ''forare-ex- 
 antination of the proceedings of the general conrt-niartial in his case," he 
 undertook to answer a statenieut which had been made to the express 
 ettect that he " did^ not even try to pass over the ground between him 
 and the enemy on the 20th August, wliich lie claimed as impassable, and 
 also occupied bv tlie right wing of the enemy." 
 
 Said he: 
 
 I shall show that the movement to pass over that ground was thwarted by (Jeueral 
 MeDowell's orders to me, and fortunately it was so. 
 
 And also : 
 
 That even an effort to comnmnieate by messengers failed from the nature of the 
 eountry and the occupation of it by the enemy. 
 
 Eefereuce to petitioner's "illustrative" maps in these closing argu- 
 ments will show that over this alleged "'broken ground" and impracti- 
 cable or impassable country Longstreet subsequently moved his divisions 
 in line of battle. 
 
 petitioner's statement before this board. 
 
 Again, before this Board, he has said (p. 31 statement) : 
 
 The three objects to be accomplished under the joint order were : 1. To move 
 towards Gainesville. 2. To establish connnunication with Heiutzelmau, Sigel, and 
 Reno. :i. When this communication was established to halt. 
 
 But the troops should occupy a ])ositiou from which they could reach Bull Run l)y 
 night or the next morning. Thei-e was nothing in this order that contemplated a 
 ))attle. 
 
 On the contrary, the conmiaud being to halt when comnmnicatious Avere established, 
 implied the contrary. 
 
 The joint order had been fultilled as far as it could l)e complied with, when Gen- 
 eral McDowell rendered it impossible to move any further towards Gainesville with 
 our joint forces by taking King's division with him. 
 
 After he left me, I was not only authorized l)nt Viouiid to exercise the discretion 
 authorized in the joint, order, holding in view " that the troops must occu]ty a position 
 from which they can reach Bull Kun to-night or by morning." The cor})s had alreatly 
 inarched ten miles, and was then about eight miles from Bull Run. 
 
 While returning to my command, I saw the enemy's infantry coming to the rail- 
 road, and artillery moving to a slight elevation nortli of it. 
 
 Impressed as I was witli tlie strength of the force in my front, I yet determined to 
 make the effort to move towards Gainesville if it was at all feasible to do so. 
 
 Believing that then, if ever, before the enemy formed in too great strength so close 
 to us, was the time to strike with our unite<l forces, I determined. General McDowell 
 having left me, to take the responsibility, and directing ^lorellto continue the deploy- 
 ment for an ailvance, sent my ihief of staff. Colonel Locke, to instruct King not to go 
 away. Sykes was coming u]i as rapidly as jNIoreil's deployment permitted. 
 
 Colonel Locke soon returned and gave me the following message from General Mc- 
 Dowell, whom he had found with King's division: "Give my eoinpliments to (ieneral 
 Porter, and say I am going to the right, and shall take King with me. He had better 
 remain where he is, but,^if necessaryjto fall back, he can do so on my left.'' (({. C. M. 
 Record, p. 135.) 
 
 This message decided my course. Not that I regarded it as an order (djligatory u]ion 
 me — for I was now indcix'udeut of (iencial McDowell — but. in face of what we liad the 
 best reason to bclirve was a largely superior force to mine, (ieneral McDowell's moving 
 away with King's I'oree beyond all ])ossible assistance to me, left me no alternati\'e but 
 to conform to tlie. course he had adopted, because I was too weak to make an effective 
 attack. 
 
65 
 
 These deliberate statements of petitioner, it will be perceived, are ir-^ 
 reconcilable, ten- in one he says snl)stantiallythat after McDowell left hiui 
 and n]) to receipt of the 4.;^0 p. m. order he was certainly as free to ex- 
 ercise his discretion niuler l*ope's joint order as McDowell was, and that 
 he (lid tJo so; in the other he says that a movement to the right was 
 thwarted by General McDoweirs orders; and yet it appears he felt it 
 incnmbent on him dnring that day to report to McDowell that he had nn- 
 dertaken to do the very thing- he says McDowell thwarted. (See dis- 
 patches Xos. 28 and 1*9, in petitioner's opening statement.) 
 
 [DisjiatcliXo. 28.] 
 
 [Original not dated.] Arcirsr 29, 18(12. 
 Gen. Morell: Pusli over to tlie aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If yon reacli 
 a road nit which King is moving, and he has got ahead of yon, let him pass, Init see if 
 yon cannot give help to Sigel. 
 
 If yon find him retiring, move hack towards Manassas, and shonld necessity recinire 
 it, and yon do not hear from me, jtush to Centreville. If yon tind the din^ct road 
 tilled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as yon return. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 M((J. Geul. 
 Look to the points of the compass for Manassas. 
 
 Of conrse, if the petitioner had been np to the front himself with 
 Major-General Morell at that time insteatl of 2| miles to' the rear at the 
 forks of the Manassas and (xainesville and Sndley Si)rings road, no 
 icritfcn order wonld have been necessary. That written order was evi- 
 dently sent after petitioner had retired to the rear, and after (Tcneral 
 ^McDowell had gone, ^lorell being- left at the front near Dawkins^ 
 liranch. This petitioner has stated that he himself previonsly sent Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Locke, his adjutant-general, back to General McDowell on 
 the road (that is before he himself went back beyond Bethlehem Church), 
 and General McDowell sent him u]) word that he was going to take 
 King's division away, and for him to remain where he was. Xeverthe- 
 less, we see that this petiti<nier did send ]Morell an order to " jmsh over 
 to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear" — the very route and direction 
 that he has attemj^ted to make us believe was so impracticable. If, when 
 he was with (General McDowell to the right of the "^lanassas and Gaines- 
 ville" dirt road near Dawkins' Branch, he discovered, as he says he 
 .(lid, that the route over towards the Warrenton pike was imi)racticable 
 (p'etitioner's opeiung- statement, p. 31). why did he, from his tield head- 
 (juarters 2^ miles to the rear of Dawkins' Branch, if he had any orders 
 from (xeneral 3IcDowell to remain where he was, send that order to Morell 
 to go over to the aid of Sigel, who was then out on this line north of the 
 latter in the vicinity of (rrovetou t 
 
 rDisjiatcli No. -29.] 
 
 Au(;rsT 29, 1862. 
 Generals McDowell and King: 
 
 I fonnd it impossible to commnnicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The ene- 
 my are in strong force on this road, and as they appear to have driven onr forces back, 
 the tiring of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to with- 
 draw to Manassas. I have attempted to comnnmicate Avith McDowell and Sigel, bnt 
 my messengers have rnn into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry 
 aild infantry, and the advancing nnisses of dnst show the enemy coming in force. 
 
 I am nowgoing to the head of Ihe column to see what is passing and how aifairs are 
 iroini!.-. Hacfvon not better send vour train back ? I will connnnnicate with yon. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 JJaj. GenL 
 
66 
 
 RELATIONS OF THE PETITIONER TO GENERAL M'DOWELL AS TO COM- 
 MAND ON THE 29th august. 
 
 It will be of interest to note i)etitioiier's several statements toncliing- 
 the relations as to command, and as to his responsibility, in connection 
 with General McDowell. 
 
 In his first statement, made under oath before the court of inquiry 
 within a few weeks after the occurrences in question, being asked: 
 
 Wlieu did lie conceive lumself no longer under General McDowell ? 
 
 Said : 
 
 My messnges were addressed to General McDowell, I think all of tlieni. The mes- 
 sengers were directed to deliver them to General Poi)e, if they saw or met him. I 
 •considered myself as limited in my operations under General McDowell's orders until 
 I should receive directions from General Pope. 
 
 Seven years after, in his appeal to the President, he speaks of having 
 recalled Morell's division to its former position under McDowell's " re- 
 iterated order" — an order he claims to have received after McBozcell hud 
 left hm. 
 
 A year later, his view of his relations to General McDowell were that — 
 
 After General McDowell left me (early afternoon, 29th), and up to the time of Gen- 
 eral Pope's positive order of 4.30 p. m. (29th), reaching me 6.30 p. m., I was certainly 
 as free to exercise my " discretion " under Pope's- "joint order" as McDowell was. 
 
 Under the "joint order " he elected to divide our forces and march to another field. 
 
 Under it I elected to hold my position. 
 
 (Yet, with strange inconsistency, he speaks of receiving a message 
 from McDowell, att:er the latter had left him, as one not to be disregarded, 
 and which he claims to have obeyed.) 
 
 And (after the lapse of another eight years) in his late statement be- 
 fore this Board he states, in reference to the message he says he received, 
 that McDowell was going to the right with King : 
 
 This message decided my course. Not that I regarded it as an order ohlU/atory on me, 
 for I tvati now independent of General McDowell. 
 
 So it appears that, in 1862-'G3, he prefers that it should be held that 
 the acts and omissions of the 2!>tli were due to McDowell's orders to him. 
 .But in 1870 and 1878, having in the meantime seen that this position was 
 not tenable — not tenable from the fact that it had been shown he had, 
 during the day, given abundant proof he did not feel himself forced to 
 a state of inaction — he shifts his ground. He no longer claims that it 
 was General McDowell's orders to him, for after McDowell left him he 
 had been free to act — was independetd of him. He now holds that it was 
 McDowell's act in taking King to the right which restrained him. This 
 act having prevented his doing what he claimed he desired to do — engage 
 the enemy in the direction of Gainesville; or do, even had the ground 
 l)ermitted it, as McDowell swears he had directed him to do, engage the 
 enemy in the direction of GrftA^eton, viz, to the right and front of that 
 ])lace. 
 
 Bat this very act, which petitioner alleges as the cause of i)aralysis on 
 his i)art, and wliich lie and his defenders have condemned as unwise, is 
 one he states in 18(>2-(j.), under oath, to have been done at hisoirn Hucjijes- 
 tion. 
 
 It will be seen from his testimony bet()re the court of in(juiry that, in 
 recounting what ]>assed between jNIcDowelland liimself, after the second 
 jneeting at the h«*ad ol" his column, petitioner testified as follows: 
 
 General McDowell and I went to the right, Avhich was rather to the north, with the 
 view of seeing the character of the country, and with the idea of connecting, as that 
 
67 
 
 joint order required, with the troops ou uiy right. But very few Avords passed l)et\ve,eu 
 us, and / suggested, from the character of tlie country, th-at he should take Klmfs dlnsion 
 with him and form counectioii on the right of the timher, which was then ou the left of 
 Reynolds, or presumed to be Reynohls. 
 
 And in his reply to Hon. Zacliaiiah Chandler, he says : 
 
 * * * And General McDowell left me without further instructions, hut ((•(/// the 
 understanding that he woidd, by goin<j; around behind the woods separating us from 
 Groveton, take King and Ricketts with him to join his command (Reynolds and Sigei) 
 at Groveton. 
 
 In connection with this march of King's division, and in view of peti- 
 tioner's claim that while McDowell was with him he was subject to his 
 orders, and after he left him he was independent of him, it is unaccount- 
 able that — after McDowell had left him ^Wth, as petitioner says, the 
 understanding- that he was to take King- and Ricketts around beliind 
 the woods -to join the troops at Groveton — petitioner should almost im- 
 mediately have sent direct to a division, under McDowell's immediate 
 command, orders in contravention ot those he admits he knew McDowell 
 himself was to give it ! 
 
 petitioner's sworn statement and dispatches contrasted in 
 
 RELATION to GENERAL M'DOWELL'S ORDER. 
 
 If there is one thing more than another which the petitioner here 
 claims with constant and unvarying pertinacity and vehemence, it is 
 that when General McDowell left him he had given him no orders to go 
 into action witli his troojxs, and thereafter that he gave him none. He 
 ■was asked, when a "vvitness, among other questions to the same end : 
 
 If he did attempt to make any movement in either of the directions named? ["To 
 tlie front or riglit, or to the front and right."] 
 
 He said : 
 
 Not directly to tin' riglit ; I did to the right and front, and when I received the last 
 message from General McDowell to remain where I was, I recalled it. 
 
 He Avas then asked : 
 
 Did you make no attempt to go to the front, or to the right and front, after that 
 message ? 
 
 And said : 
 
 1 made no attem})t with any body of troop.s. 
 
 He was further asked : 
 
 After General ^IcDowell left the Avitness did the witness not know lie was expected 
 by General McDowell to move to the right, or right and front / 
 
 And said : 
 
 I did not. 
 
 In his defense before his own court-martial he is still more emphatic, 
 and in speaking of the ])eriod of time from noon on the 29tli to the hour 
 of General Pope's order of 4.30 p. m., says : 
 
 But it is not true that General McDowell then, or at any time during that day, 
 gave me any such orders "to putmy troops in there" orto do anything of the kind; and 
 fortunate is it for General McDowell that it is not true, for if he had given me any 
 such nnindate to thrust my corps in over that broken ground, between Jackson's right 
 and the separate enemy massing in my front, the danger and disaster of sucli a move- 
 mc^nt would have been then and now upon his hands. I am glad that General Mc- 
 Dowell is utterly in error ujjon this point, and is in no way chargeable with such 
 fatal military blunder. 
 
 G G 
 
68 
 
 But iu his statement before tliis Board the petitioner publishes two 
 of his dispatehes of the 29th (p. 3~)), numbered IS^os. 28 and 20. In the 
 first he orders General Morell (commanding the advanced division of his 
 corps) to — 
 
 Push oi'CT' to the aid of Sigcl and .strike in liis rear. 
 
 In the second, addressed to Generals McDowell and King, he says: 
 
 I found it impossible to communicate by crossing tlie woods to Grovetou. * * * 
 
 Communication, we must recollect, was by the joint order directed to 
 be established by General Pope between Generals Porter and McDowell 
 and the left of the main army, where Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds was. 
 
 RECENTLY DISCOVEEED DISPATCHES. 
 
 General McDowell swore he ordered i^etitioner " to put his troops in 
 there." The latter denied it, but these dispatches just cited show, even 
 in petitioner's own statement to this Board, that he Icneic it u-as expected 
 of him by McDowell; and now we come to the consideration of the neicly- 
 discovered dispatches^ on the same subject, of great importance, viz, one 
 addressed to General McDowell dated 21)th August, p. m., which says: 
 
 Failed in (jetting Morell orrr to yon. After wandering about the woods for time I 
 withdrew bim, and while doing so artillery opened on us. * * * ^ 
 
 Another, addressed to General McDowell or King, says : 
 
 I have been wandering over the woods and failed to get a communication to you. 
 
 In the third, addressed to General McDowell, he says : 
 
 The tiring on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot advance and have failed to 
 get over to yon except by the route take'i hy King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. * * * 
 
 It will be seen from some of the foregoing extracts, taken in connec- 
 tion with the '' sketc'h of 2d Manassas, August 29, 1SG2," published in 
 petitioner's statement before this Board, that petitioner, after receiving- 
 McDowell's last message, deliberately reported that he had made an 
 attem])t, or attempts, of some kind or other, to move some of his troops 
 over the country to the United States forces at or near Groveton ; though, 
 ■when especially interrogated with respect thereto hj General McDowell, 
 while on the witness-stand, he denied having done so. 
 
 They show, as before stated, that he did not feel himself held to a 
 state of inaction by any order General ^McDowell gave him ; and they 
 also show that wliat he says he attempted was in the exact duection of 
 what McDowell states he ordered him to do, to wit : 
 
 To put his troops in there. [In the direction of the Warrenton pike and Jleadovv- 
 villc Lane. ] 
 
 In view of petitioner's claim, that as this attempt to move INIorell over 
 to the AVarrenton pike, '' to aid Sigel," or " over to McDowell," was 
 made after the latter had left him, he had then become indejtendent of 
 M(;l )o well, " free to exercise his own discretion," and, in view of peti- 
 tioner's most emphatic declaration, made iu his defense before his court 
 in ISO;], and rei»eated as emphatically' in 1S70, that any such movement 
 would, in his judgiiMMit, have been a "fatal military Ijlunder," involving- 
 disaster, it is not onlijanobiHoHS inference hut an inevitable conclusion , that 
 he must have been acting under the constraint of some superior authorifi/ ; 
 that he would not mcrclif of his own motion hare inrolved his troops in the 
 conse<iucnces of, as he states it, '^ a fatal militari/ blunder.''^ 
 
 And as, during this time, there was no autliority acting upon him 
 
69 
 
 but that of Pope, and McDowell, dining tlie time the latter was with 
 him, and as he then received no orders from Pope, he must liare acted, in 
 the particular in question, under the order McDowell gave Mm before they 
 parted and tchile he was still subject to his control. 
 
 Therefore, in the assertion by (reneral McDowell, that before he left 
 petitioner for the last time on the 29th August, he did order him to put 
 his troops in there [in the direction of Warrenton pike], where the dust 
 was rising, and in the denial by petitioner that McDowell gave him any 
 such order, it is petitioner's memory which is in fault. 
 
 There are some interesting bits of confirmatory evidence to Major- 
 General McDowell's as to the orders he gave petitioner at the Manassas 
 Gap Railroad from petitioner's own witnesses. 
 
 Thus Avhen the latter during the afternoon sent a dispatch from his 
 remote headquarters 2| miles to the rear to General Morell (dispatch 
 No. 31.) to put his division back in the bushes, Morell swears (Board's 
 Record, p. 422) that he had two brigades deployed on the ridge facing- 
 Da wkins' Branch in front of the bushes, and that they were not put back 
 until the receipt of that disi>atch. 
 
 It is thus plain that General ]McDowell wlien he arrived at Dawkins' 
 Branch, before riding to the right, never gave any such order "to put the 
 division back in the woods" as testified to by the witnesses Earle and 
 ])avis, or the petitioner would have done it then and there instead of 
 de])loying (m the ridge. 
 
 This witness's testimony is noticeable (Board's Record, p. 425): 
 
 Question. lu yonr former testimony, as well as in that of many otlier witnesses, there 
 are <lescrij)tions of movemeuts, of operations of your troops that ilay to aud fro, back- 
 wards and forwards, ou the ground in the neighborhood of Dawkins' Branch ; you 
 recollect that ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Will you please state to the Board what was the general object of such 
 movements 
 
 Answer. Do you mean from the time we tirst arrived there ? 
 
 Question. Yes; not in detail, l)ut general. 
 
 Answer. While we were getting into liue. General McDowell joined General Porter, 
 and very soon they rode off to the right. General Porter returned and directed me to 
 move my connnand to the right. McDowell and Porter went off in this direction [east] 
 and passed over a corn-field until they came to heavy timbered land. We followed 
 close behind them ; they seemed to have examined the timber and found that it was 
 impracticable. It looked so to me, also. General Porter returned, and ordered me to 
 return to my former ]>osition. 
 
 Question. Keturned from his ride with General McDowell ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir; about off in this direction [near Five Forks]. 
 
 Question. Across the railroad? 
 
 Answer. Across the railroad. Part of my command then came back and immediately 
 resumed position on the ridge. I did not go f-AV enough to extend my whole division. 
 Hazhitt's battery did not move at all. As we wer^, condng back, moving by the flank, 
 and were passing by Hazlett's battery, a section of the enemy's artillery opened fire. 
 As soon as the infantry cleared the battery, Hazlett replied ; then this section of artil- 
 lery moved ofi' some distance to the right on higher ground and commenced firing 
 again. We then remained in that position until I received an order from General 
 Porter to put the men untler cover. Then I put them in the pine bushes. 
 
 This witness in his eagerness assumes that both General McDowell 
 and the petitioner examined the timber to their right rear, at their backs, 
 towards Five Forls, aud found it impracticable. Apparently retreat in- 
 stead of advance was what was in his mind, for he did not know that 
 McDowell in the few^ minutes' conversation there with petitioner was dis- 
 cussing how to move to the right and front the quickest in order to apply 
 where the dust was rising the full force at their joint disposal. 
 
 Ca])t. Georfje Monteith, petitioner's then aide-de-cam]), who was with 
 him, saw this "heavy cloud of dust that was rising on the Warrentou 
 pike." (Board's Record, p. 312.) 
 
70 
 
 Lient. Stephen M. WehJ, aiiotlior of petitioner's tlieii aides-de-camp^ 
 says (l>oard\s Eecord, j). 1M)3) that after (xeiieral McDowell aud petitioner 
 had been there a verv short time, off to the right of the railroad, General 
 McDowell- 
 turned oft" to the left iiiul went to Bethleliem Clmrcli, and General Porter came back the 
 same way he came in, recrossed the railroad, and joined his corps. 
 
 It is plain that petitioner's staff knew where McDowell went, as the 
 railroad was a sliort cnt to Bethlehem Ohnrch. If the woods were as 
 imx)enetral)le as Morell then says he thonght them to be, McDowell could 
 not go on horseback down that railroad to any point but Bethleliem 
 Church. 
 
 Nevertheless, we tiiul petitioner, when a witness before McDowell's 
 court of inquiry, swearing as follows: " When General McDowell left 
 me I did not know Avhere lie had gone." In his opening statement, how- 
 ever, before this Board he has said (p. 31) : 
 
 General McDowell decided to take his divisions then on the I'oad immediately in 
 my rear and to turn back aud go by the Sudley Springs road to Grovetou to place 
 them on the left of the troops at that place. * * * After he left me, &c. 
 
 It is here apparent that a decision iras reached at the Manassas Gap 
 Eailroad and that McDowell moved off by the shortest road to do liis part. 
 
 Which is to be believed, Weld or petitioner, as to the factcite<^l, is for 
 those who read or hear this argument to determine for themselves. 
 
 Petitioner's evidence as a witness, when he ajipears against McDowell, 
 is opposed to his own witnesses and own knowledge iu his own case as 
 to McDowell's intentions and movements, for in the first he swore that 
 when General McDowell left him he, petitioner, "did not know where 
 he had gone," while iu his reply to the Hon. Zacliariah Chandler he, 
 petitioner, admits that General McDowell left him only after an explicit 
 "understanding" that he, McDowell, sliouhl do the very thing he did 
 do. Petitioner also, in his opening statement before this Board, further 
 admits, as we have seen, that while he and General McDowell were 
 together at the railroad, the latter came to a decision as to the mode of 
 putting their corps in. 
 
 Another confirmatory bit of evidence as to what McDowell said when 
 at the front of petitioner's colnmn is found in that of Brigadier-General 
 Butterjield, another of accused's witnesses. 
 
 Petitioner had ordered him with his brigade (Board's Ilecord, p. 4G2) 
 to cross the railroad and strike between Grovetou and Gainesville so as 
 to cover the dirt road which ran to the latter place to the left of Thomas 
 Nealon's. 
 
 This, it will be observed, wgs a continuation of the march in a direc- 
 tion from Dawk ins' Branch not contemplated by petitioner's orders, 
 which were to go up by the road to the right which King came down on. 
 
 While going out on this movement General McDowell, having arrived 
 at Dawkins' Branch, witnessed the movement, and then, having ridden 
 towards the INIanassas Gap Railroad with petitioner, Bntterfiehrs brigade 
 was withdrawn, and the latter significantly says: " We were then moved 
 a little fdrther to the ri<jht ; then returned to the left." 
 
 So long as General McDowell was on the ground, in actual com- 
 mand for the time being, the petitioner luid to make pretense of obey- 
 ing; but the moment McDowell departed, his reluctant brigadiers find 
 a few pine bushes iu their movement to the right (see Grittiii's testimony, 
 G. C. M. Pecord, j). 105), lialt, make '■'■no reeonnaissance whatever,''^ and 
 are ordered by iietitioner to move back again. 
 
 Thus, through this long summer afternoon, with the sound of the bat- 
 
71 
 
 tie iti his ears, aud while thousands were oiieriug themselves willing- 
 sacrifices to their country's cause, the iietitioner, with his headquarters 
 placed 2| miles to the rear of his column (see his opening- statement, p. 
 40), where he cannot possibly take instant advantage of any opportu- 
 nity either for connecting with the right or for moving into action, 
 remains inactive, and holds his gallant corps from going to the aid of 
 their comrades. 
 
 If, indeed, overwhelming numbers had been on his front ready aud 
 eager to attack, as he now pretends, the indifference which would have 
 permitted him to remain continuously so far to the rear is nothing short 
 of criminal. 
 
 If, as has been shown, he knew that Eeynolds' division, of three 
 brigades, comprising thirteen regiments and four batteries, was operating 
 on his (petitioner's) right (petitioner's opening statement, p. 31), aud on 
 ])etitioner's assumption of locations operating directly against Long- 
 street, facing him, then no assumed 25,000 men in that Confederate 
 general's command should have prevented petitioner from pushiug in 
 with what he terms his own 9,000 (?) men on the right Hank of that 
 Confederate force. We will see that the petitioner's own forces were 
 Aery much larger, by the official record, than what he undertakes in his 
 oi>ening statement to put them. 
 
 Had l)etitioner7>/^s7»v/ into action^ as he should have done, even on his 
 own assumptions of positions and force under Longstreet, his own corps 
 and Keynolds' division, with Schenck's division (Stahel's aud McLean's 
 brigades) of Sigel's cori)S and Stevens's brigade (Eeno's division of Biu-n- 
 side's cori»s,) all of which were dei)loyed in line on Keynold's right Houth 
 <)t the turnpike, would lia\'e, without the assistance of King or Kicketts, 
 quite equaled the whole rebel co-operating force, and left Jackson's 
 exhausted and anxious troops to contend alone against the remainder 
 of General Pope's army. 
 
 This is even on petitioner's ])resent assumption that Longstreet had 
 1*5,000 men, at that time, present on the field. 
 
 According to the hitter's statements here, two brigades (of Hood's di- 
 vision) were always north of the turnpike, and for most of the time 
 AVilcox's diA'ision also. 
 
 NATURE AND EXTENT 0¥ PETITIONER'S OPERATIONS AFTER GENERAL 
 
 3I'D0WELL LEFT HIM. 
 
 Petitioner having received an order from General McDowell modifying 
 the mode of execution of the joint order given by General Pope when 
 IMcDowell was with him, and clothed with the necessary authority to 
 give him a valid order, this order did not lose its force and validity after 
 they parted, but was one which imposed duties on i)etitioner, for the due 
 discharge of which he is to be held res])()nsible till he can show it was 
 either countermanded by superior authority, or that its execution was, 
 or became, impossible. 
 
 As to the natiuT. and extent of what was done by petitioner after ]Mc- 
 Dowell left him, it is significant of how feel)le and inconsequential it 
 must have been, that, within a very short time afterward, even the mem- 
 ory had passed away from his mind, and he could not recollect under oath : 
 
 (1.) That lie had ordered his leading divisiou commander to ])ush on to the aid of 
 Sk/d ; 
 
 (2.) That he had informed McDowell at 6. p. m. that he had ^^ failed in (jettinij MorcU 
 over" to him ; 
 
 (3.) That he had (at six o'clock) oi'dered Morell "to ^msh up two regiments, supported 
 hij two others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and 
 ATTACK the party with the section of artillery opposed to you {him)." 
 
72 
 
 For, wlien a witness on the court of inquiry being asked if, after tlie 
 alleged return of Colonel Locke, lie afiempted even to make any move- 
 ment " to the front or to the right, or to the front and right," he denied 
 having done so ; and, according to his version of the case in 18(33, he 
 simply continued in a state of inaction after McDowell left him. 
 
 To judge from his most recent statement, his principal object was not 
 to make any attack on the enemy at all, but to conceal himself from him 
 — to put everything out of sight — for he says to ]\Iorell (dispatch 30) : 
 
 Come tlie same game over them they do over us, aud yet your men out of siyht. 
 
 So it ai)pears that it was more a game of hide and seek than one of 
 attack that was contemplated or that was carried out. Petitioner had 
 established himself personally near the forks of the Sudley Church and 
 the Manassas and Gainesville road, which is, according to the map made 
 up from the survey of last June, two miles and live-eighths behind the 
 place where he was when joined by McDowell the second time, and where 
 he had commenced deploying his leading division, with alleged thick 
 woods between him and the head of his column or his partly deployed 
 line. And it was from this place, so retired fiom the possible held of 
 action, and from any chance of his knowing anything from his own ob- 
 servation, that he received Morell's reports and sent to him and to Mc- 
 J)owell the dispatches heretofore referred to. 
 
 AVe shall see a little later in this argument that some of these reports 
 of the petitioner to General McDowell that day had no foundation in 
 fact. 
 
 petitioner's recollection in 1863 of his second meeting with 
 general mcdowell and iiis subsequent statements. 
 
 The petitioner has claimed in his opening statement here that he and 
 General AIcDowell at their second meeting on the 29th at Dawkins^ 
 Branch <liscnssed the joint order, conversed on the subject of the force 
 reported* by Buford as belonging to Longstreet, yet his own testimony 
 given imme<liately after his trial, when a witness on General McDowell's 
 court of inquiry, is inconsistent with this modern recollection of their 
 intercourse at that time. 
 
 Then he said as follows : 
 
 Question by General McDowell. Witness refers to some conversation between him- 
 self and General ^McDowell when they first met -which, taken in connection with an 
 expression of opinion hy General McDowell, witness considered an order ; can the wit 
 jiess state what tliat conversation was 'I 
 
 Answer. I only recollect the impression left upon my mind at the time, and merely a 
 reference to the urtiUery context yoiny on far to our right. 
 
 Question. Was not the joint order referred to in that eonversatioii '! 
 
 Answer. I hare no recollection of it. It )nay hare been referred to, because we went to the 
 right, my belief is to look at the country, but I do not recollect anything at all of the order 
 being referred to. 
 
 * A reference to this report, which is below, will show that Buford did not state 
 Longstreet's arrival, but merely mentioned that a certain force had passed Gainesville, 
 without saying who commanded it or to whom it l)elonged. 
 
 " Headquarters Cavalhy Bkioadk — 9.30 a. m. 
 "Gknekal Rickktts: Seventeen I'egiments, one battery, 550 cavalry, passed through 
 Gainesville three-iiuarters of an honrago onthe Ceiitrevilleroad. Itliink this division 
 should join our forces now engaged, at once. 
 
 "JOHN BUFORD, 
 
 " lirig. General. 
 " Please forward this." 
 
 This is the dispatch General McDowell sliowed to petitioner at Dawkins' Branch. 
 (G. C. M. Record, j). J-4.) 
 
73 
 
 Qnestiou by General McDoAvell. Were not the remarks witness here states to have 
 been niaile by General McDowell made with reference to the point in the joint order 
 wliich reqnired the troops not to go to a point from which they conld not get behind 
 Bull Run that night ? 
 
 Answer. I think I have replied to the question by stating I do not recollect. 
 
 And with reference to their conversation when they rode to the right 
 the petitioner testitied that — 
 
 But very few words passed between us, and I suggested, from the character of the 
 country, that he should take King's division with liim and form connection on the 
 right of the timber, which was then on the left of Reynolds, or presumed to be Reynolds. 
 
 It is evident, as jnst shown, that the petitioner knew he had been tohl 
 by General McDowell to act, and act in support of the very moA'enient he 
 was making to come up on the left of Keynolds. 
 
 And it is also e\'ideut that this petitioner's failure to get over to aid 
 Si gel, or march over to McDowell, was not because he met with any ob- 
 stacle in his march or any restraint from the enemy. He failed to get 
 over, tliat is true. It is also true, and he himself furnished all the evi- 
 dence, that he failed to start, while from the dispatches which have been 
 introduced for the government he would have it inferred that he had 
 attempted to do as it is claimed he was ordered to do. 
 
 He eqnally defends his not having acted at all. In otlicr irords, the 
 petitioner gives evidence of liioicing he was to act, and of his determining 
 not to act. 
 
 ROUTE TAKEN BY GENERAL 3l'r>OWELL AND PETITIONER TO THE 
 RIGHT FROM THE MANASSAS AND GAINESVILLE ROAD. 
 
 Just here it is pro])er to indicate the direction taken by Major-General 
 jNlcDowell and i)etitioner when they moved to the right from the head 
 of the hitter's column after it halted on the Manassas and Gainesville 
 road at Dawkins' Branch, 
 
 My beliefis, from having been on tlie ground myself and from having ex- 
 amined it carefully last August, that those t avo corps commanders followed 
 the direction of the branch — on its easterly side, not exactly where a road is 
 delineated on the map, but quite near it on the ISO contour, where there 
 is a sort of road — -just in front of the then bushes which are now woods. 
 
 On the westerly side of the branch the ground gradually rises, and 
 Xealon's, Carrico's, and Britt's are easily seen from the 180 contour near 
 the branch and just in front of the timber or bushes marked upon the 
 map. 
 
 If General McDowell and the petitioner had ridden northerly towards 
 the railroad on the 200 contoiu\ as the latter would have us believe, they 
 would have been in thick bushes and unable to have seen the open coun- 
 try to the west and nortliwest. 
 
 As the two watered their horses in a little stream; and as even Daw- 
 kins' Branch at that seasoji of the year is so dry as to consist of but a 
 few pools, the only point where they could readily have done so would 
 have been between the railroad and James Xickerson's house, and more 
 than likely in the branch itself, whose name was not then known to them. 
 
 Grifltin's brigade was deployed on the ridge, and also moved along it 
 across the railroad until some "little, thick, pine bushes" brought them 
 to a halt. 
 
 Had they deployed or moved on the 200 contour, they would, from the 
 first, have "been concealed, if any credence whatever is to be given to the 
 map used in this case, and petitioner's subsequent order to Morell to 
 post all the head of his column in he bushes (opening statement, p. Do, 
 ^'o. 31) would have been needless. . 
 
74 
 
 EXCUSES FOR PETITIONER'S INACTION CONSIDERED. 
 
 There are but two i)oiiit.s in tlie i>etitio]iei'.s case as to the 29th of 
 August, whicli, despite the collateral issues raised iu order to withdraw 
 attention from the main facts, are really material. 
 
 The tirst is, whether he got any orders from General McDowell which 
 held him to a state of inaction on the 29th of August, 1802. 
 
 The second, whether he ever received any order from Major-General 
 Pope, later in the day, to move into action (4.30 order). 
 
 The last point will be discussed by itself. 
 
 It was testitied to upon the original trial by Assistant Adjutant -Gen- 
 eral Locke, chief of staff (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 135), that immediately after 
 General ]McDowell had left the petitioner over by the Manassas Gap Eail- 
 road, and the petitioner had returned to the head of his column on Daw- 
 kins' Branch, the latter sent him, Locke, to General Kiiiy with directions 
 to him, Ki)ig, to remain where he was; and that he brought back orders 
 from General McDowell to thepetitioner for the petitioner to remain where 
 he was. The court-martial that tried and convicted the petitioner had 
 before it the full evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Locke upon the subject, 
 and undoubtedly gave it all the weight that it was justly entitled to. 
 In the investigation before this Board an additional witness has been 
 introduced upon this subject in the person of an orderly named Leipoldt 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 50), who went to the Bethlehem Church with 
 Colonel Locke after the petitioner got back to the ht^ad of Dawkins' 
 Branch from the reconnaissance he and General McDowell had made 
 to the light. When Major-General McDowell and the petitioner sepa- 
 rated after the final interview near the Manassas Gap Eailroad, it 
 was in the belief and understanding on Major-General McDowell's 
 part that the petitioner would, as soon as practicable, carry out his 
 l)art of the programme agreed ujion between them, and put his 
 forces ''in there," in the direction of the enemy on his right front 
 towards the Warrenton pike where the dust was rising at the time 
 in heavy columns (Colonel Eosser's brush-dragging). It will be 
 observed, by reference to the map, that the point to which General 
 McDowell rode with the ]>etitioner from Dawkins' Branch on the Manas- 
 sas Gap Eailroad was the best point from Avliich to ascertain any possible 
 movement of the enemy ; and that the nearer a person approached to 
 where the head of the petitioner's column was, on the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road, the less opportunity there was, on account of rising 
 ground in ti'ont and trees, to determine where the enemy could be. In 
 l)oint of fact, at that time the two regiments, the Sixty-second Peniisyl- 
 vania and Thirteenth Xew York, were shoved into the trees w hich lined 
 the left-hand road towards Gainesville. The distance frcmi the Manas- 
 sas Gap Eailroad to Dawkins' Branch and the (iainesville road is about 
 half a mile and i)erfectly level on the ground over which the two gen- 
 eral officers had moved with rapidity. The petitioner, as appears by his 
 own sworn evidence in the McDowell court of inquiry, had suggested, 
 at the time he and General McDowell were at the Manassas Gap Eail- 
 road, that the best meanS' of carrying out the joint order and the 
 quickest way to ap])ly King's division in the action then going on, 
 would be for General ^rcDoAvell to take it up around by the ]\[anassas 
 and Sudley road, and come in with it north of the old Warrenton, Alex- 
 andria, and Washington road, on the left of Eeynolds' division, then 
 attached to ^IcDowell's command and operating with Sigcl. There- 
 fore, General .AIcDowell was gallojting by a short cut down the ^NLanas- 
 sas Gaj) Eailioad to Bctlilcliciii Cliurch, leaving his staff' behind him 
 
75 
 
 from the rapidity of bis ]no^'elnellts, in consequence of liis haste to per- 
 form liis share in the operations and help General Pope's army, then 
 tiohting Jackson, The petitioner says that, in the five or six minutes' 
 time it must have taken him to gallop back to the head of his o^^^l col- 
 umn, at Dawkins' Branch, on the Manassas and Gainesville road, he saw 
 the enemy gathering in his front, which induced him to send Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Locke with the remarkable message to which 1 have just refer- 
 red. This statement that, in this brief and hasty ride back to his corps, 
 he saw the enemy gathering in his front in such force as to induce him 
 to attemi)t to change the whole plan of oj^erations that had been agreed 
 upon not live minutes before, will be found, on considering the evidence 
 of his own witnesses, to be based upon assumptions, not sustained by 
 facts. Had he seen any enemy gathering Tipon his front from any quar- 
 ter Avhatever, he would have brought, undoubtedly, some of his staff 
 Avho were with him when he went with General McDowell, to testify as 
 to the circumstances ; and we know that that staff have been brought 
 here, as well as before the original court that tried him, several times to 
 give evidence on other points. They were, possibly, as much interested 
 as he in knowing whether there was an enemy gathering in their front 
 lit the ti]ne. Certainly, if he had i)erceived any such thing he would 
 have indicated it to them in some way. Ividing with his back to tlie 
 point from whence the dust Avas rising above the trees and with but a lim- 
 ited view on his right as he returned, in consequence of the woods where 
 his own skirmishers were, it is apparent that he could not see that which 
 he has asserted he did see. A glance at the map Avill show this. 
 
 There are some significant facts connected with this pretended mes- 
 sage which must be referred to. 
 
 The division commanded by Brig. Gen. Bufus King, Avhich had that 
 morning been temporarily attached to the petitioner's command by 
 (xeneral Tope's order, through Gibbon, comprised the brigades of Hatch, 
 Gil)bon, Doubleday, and I'atrick; Brigadier-General Hatch l)eing the 
 ranking otticer under the division commander. 
 
 On the evening before, in the action of that division on the Warren- 
 ton pike between Gainesville and Groveton Avith Jackson's command, 
 it appears that l>rigadier-General King Avas, according to the evidence 
 of his assistant adjutant-general, John A. Judsoii, petitioners Avitness 
 (Board's Becord, i). 103), in an ambulance sick ; and that (ieneral Hatch 
 Avas '' practically in conunand." We have seen that on that morning of 
 the, 29th General Gibbon had given the petitioner an account of the ac- 
 tion the night before. IS^ow, when the petitioner's corps came along on 
 the ]\Ianassas and Gainesville road, past the place Avhere King's divis- 
 ion Avas lying, the folloAving took place, according to the evidence of 
 the same "witness, (Judson), the petitioner at the time being at the head 
 of the column, and Captain Judson, assistant adjutant-general, with his 
 own division there stationary : 
 
 Question. Did you liave any conversation with liini (pctitionci) ? 
 
 Answer. I did. 
 
 Question. State Avliat. 
 
 Answer. General P<nter asked me wliere tlieeommandiugofficer of those troops was. 
 / miidiiclcd him to GinuraJ Hatcli. 
 
 Question. Had General :Mel)owell at that time made his appearance ? 
 
 Answer. I have no recollection of seeing General McDowell since the day )»et'ore u]) 
 until that time. 
 
 Question. Did yon. learn from General Porter or General Hatch, after their interview, 
 ■what was to be done ? 
 
 Answer. J learned from some source- that "King's division" was to follow in the rear 
 of General Porter's column. 
 
76 
 
 Thus it is ai)pareiit that petitioner gave Ins orders to Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Hatch as commanding officer of King's division. 
 
 From further evidence of the witness (Board's llecord, p. 105) it ap- 
 X>ears that General Hatch remained in command of the division all that 
 day. 
 
 From the evidence of Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick, another of the peti- 
 tioner's witnesses (Board's liecord, p. 187), we learn the following : 
 
 Qiu'sticiu. Your brigade went alone when you got there? Had the other brigades 
 got to Manassas Junction? 
 
 Answer. I cannot answer tliat, for it was quite a length of time before I saw the 
 brigades or any other otticer. I think General King was the first whom I saw. It 
 was s<»niewlu're about eight or nine o'clock, while my commissariat and personal statf 
 were liunting up supplies, &c. Geiieral King rode orer to my headqitarfers, and fold me 
 that he was not fit to be in command ; that he teas going to ('cntrerille, and came orer to bid 
 me good-bg. I think Colonel Chandler, his adjutant-general, and I do not recollect 
 who else, were with him at the time ; he came to say good- by, and I do not know that 
 I saw him after that. * * * 
 
 Question. (By petitioner.) What happened next after King's departure for CenfreriUe? 
 
 Aiisw(^r. I was ordered, I think, by McPowi-ll in person to move as soon as I could 
 in the rear of General Pt)rter, Porter having just passed through, or ])assing tlirough 
 nearer Maua.ssas Junction, to go back to the scene of our tight the night previous. 
 
 Captain Jndson (Board's Record, p. 113), in speaking of the precarious 
 health of General King at that time, said that he rode in an ambulance 
 from the llappahanuock up, that he did not see him on horseback, to 
 his recollection, and that he was constantly attended by Dr. Pineo, his 
 medical director. Tlierefore, when this petitioner got to Dawkins* 
 Branch before General McDowell joined him, he was thoroughly and 
 fully ap])rised of tlie fact that Brigadier-General Hatch was in command 
 of King's division, and that General King had left for ]Manassas Junc- 
 tion and Ceutreville. 
 
 On the trial in 1802 Ave find the following testimony (by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Lode, petitioner's chief of staff, p. 133) : 
 
 I was sent by General Porter with a message to General King. On finding General 
 King, General McDowell was with him. I stated my message to General King, and 
 General McDowell answered: "Give my compliments to General Porter, and say to 
 him I am going to the right, and will take General King with me. I think he (Gen- 
 eral Porter) had better remain where he is, but if it is necessary for him to fall back, 
 he can do so upon my left." 
 
 This must have been after twelve o'clock, because it was after General 
 McDowell had left liim for the last time at the front. 
 
 Question. What was the message you carried from General Porter to General King? 
 
 Answer. For him to remain where he was until further orders. 
 
 Question. Did you understand that General King was under the orders of General 
 Porter ? 
 
 Answer. I did.' 
 
 Question. Did you deliver the message that General McDowell gave you for General 
 Porter, to the general ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 General McDowell testified as follows (G. C. M. Record, p. 87) : 
 
 Question. Have you any recollection that after you left the accused on the '2tHh and 
 took with you King's division, the accused sent a message to you requesting that the 
 division should be ])ermitted to stiiy with his command? 
 
 Answer. / reeeired no such message. 
 
 Question. "Will yon say in conse((uence of a message or otherwise, you sent a mes- 
 sage to the accused with your conii>Uuu-nts, telling him that you were going to the 
 right and should take King with you, and that he (the accused) should remain where 
 he was for tin- present, and if he had to fall back to do so on your left ? 
 
 Answer. I do not recollect. 
 
 Question. Are you able to say that you are certain that you did not send such a 
 message ? 
 
 Answer. That is my iiniiression, that I did not. 
 
77 
 
 Brig. Geu. Eitfus King testified as follows (G. C. M. Record, p. 212) : 
 
 Question. You will remember it has been testified here that on the afternoon of the 
 '2yth August a message was borne from General Porter to you by one of his stall' officers 
 directing that your division should remain where it was, and that this message was 
 communicated to you in the ]»resence of General McDowell who made a response to it. 
 The (question I wish you to answer is whether you remember any such message to 
 have been sent to you ? 
 
 Answer. I do not 
 
 Question. Do you remember to ha\e been with General McDowell on the afternoon 
 of that day f 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. It was also testified by the same witness, if you will remember, that in 
 reply to the message General McDowell said: " I will take General King's division 
 with me. Give my compliments to General Porter, and say to him that I think he 
 better remain where he is." Do you remember to have heard any such message as that 
 from General McDowell ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I do not remember any circumstance of that kind to have taken 
 place on ani/ day. 
 
 Question. Do you think it possible that an interview of that kind between yourself 
 and General McDowell, with a message of that kind communicated to you, and a re- 
 si)onse of that kin<l from General McDowell could possibly have occiured, and have 
 now totally escajied your recollection ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. 
 
 It is to be carefully noticed that Locke in his evidence distinctly and 
 deliberately said that he had seen General King and hand€'d the message 
 to General King, and so forth. 
 
 Now, it is incredible that if any such message had ever been delivered 
 to General King, and such response sent to it by General McDowell in 
 the presence of General King, that neither of these gentlemen remem- 
 bered it. The court-martial proceedings in the case of i)etitioner took 
 l»lace in December, 1862, not quite four months after this alleged occur- 
 rence, and while the memories of the witnesses to the events of the 29th 
 and 30th of the preceding ^Vugust were still unimpaired. This message 
 and the response to it would have been highly calculated to have made 
 i\, deep impression on all the persons concerned in it, involving, as it 
 would have done, a total change in the movements just agreed upon 
 between the petitioner and JVlcDowell. 
 
 General McDowell had just left petitioner, having given him an im- 
 ])ortant order, which, if* it had been obeyed, would haA'e brought his 
 forces in a brief time into collision with the enemy. When he left 
 petitioner he (petitioner) was in the act of deploying a portion of his 
 command with the apparent intention of moving forward to the attack. 
 < reneral ^IcDowell had witnessed part of this movement, and had left the 
 held with the understanding that his order to ''put his force in there '^ 
 would be obeyed. Before leaving, however, it was agreed between them 
 that General McDowell should take King's division with him in his move- 
 ment with his corps up the Sudley road, and had he, in so short a time as 
 is alleged, heard the request made to General King " to remain where'he 
 was" it must have caused him considerable astonishment, and made on 
 the instant an nnideasant impression on his mind. It would have sug- 
 gested at once the complete disruption of his i)lans — plans which were 
 made with the sound of battle in his ears. Is it credible, therefore, that 
 he could have sent such a response to such a message when he must 
 have thonght petitioner should be at the time alleged in actual move- 
 ment towards the enemy "I 
 
 The orderly, Leipold (Board's Record, p. 56), testified as follows : 
 
 Question. When next did you see General McDowell? 
 
 Answer. I saw him later in the day. 
 
 Question. You did see him afterwards ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. Later in the day General Locke asked me to accompany him. We 
 
78 
 
 went back on the same road we came in the nioruiii^, i)r()l)a1jly a mile or two. I 
 saw Geueral McDowell and some other person. They were s^tauding at the side of 
 the road, dismounted. 
 
 Question. About where were they ? 
 
 Answer. I think near a church. 
 
 If that was all down, and tlicre was notliinj( of it but a pile of bricks, 
 as at the last minute has been sought to be shown here by the petitioner's 
 witnesses, they could not have been standing near a " church." 
 
 Question. Near Bethlehem church ? 
 
 Answer. I was under the impression there was some other name to the church. 
 
 Question. Did you see General Locke deliver him any message ? 
 
 Answer. / don't remember. General Locke dismounted and I took his horse. He 
 "Went over and conversed with the officers. 
 
 Question. Did you see General McDowell after that ? 
 Answer. I don't think I saw him after that that day. 
 
 It will be perceived that this witness does not remember of any mes- 
 sage being delivered by Colonel Locke to General McDowell; he merely 
 went over and conversed with the officers. 
 
 Some unpleasant inquiries suggest themselves concerning the question 
 whether there was any such message. We have seen that the petitioner 
 knew that General King had gone to Centreville, and that Brigadier- 
 General Hatch was in command of the division. Why, then, should he 
 have sent his assistant adjutant-general to General King when he knew 
 General King was no longer in command and sicl-'^ Again, his assistant 
 adjutant-general says positively that he found General King with Gen- 
 eral McDowell ; and yet the petitioner's own witness, in conjunction with 
 General King's evidence, shows that he was not there near Bethlehem 
 church, but had already gone to Centreville. Again, if the enemy were 
 gathering in his front, as he asserts, in such force as within live minutes 
 after General McDowell left him it became necessary to change the en- 
 tire plans that had been agreed upon, and it was desirable that he should 
 move with his own corps and King's division instantly to the front, is 
 it conceivable that his assistant adjutant geueral would have dismounted, 
 given his horse to an orderly, and walked over to converse with these 
 officers ? • 
 
 There is another curious circumstance connected with this that re- 
 quires to be noticed, and that is that Brig. Gen. M. E. Patrick in his 
 evidence says that when General McDowell came back down this 
 Manassas Gap Railroad, out here, and met Patrick, he had a conversation 
 with him and told him that he was obliged to take him back — Patrick's 
 being the nearest brigade of King's division towards Dawkins' Branch 
 and nearest to petitioner's corps; and that General McDowell took 
 Patrick's division across the country to the Sudley road. So that, if 
 General Patrick is to be believed, (ieneral ^[cDowell, having taken the 
 last of his own brigades right over below F. M. Lewis' house in a nortli- 
 easterly direction and moved north up to the Sudley Springs road, could 
 not have been at Bethlehem church as testitied to by Lieutenaut-Cohmel 
 Locke, he, McDowell, lulling started off apparently immediately with 
 Patrick's brigade. (Board's Pecord, p. 180.) 
 
 Tliere is another curious circujustance connected with this which also 
 reijuires to be noticed. Col. Ednnind Schriver, brevet major-general, 
 and inspector- general, U. S. A., was then colonel and chief of staff to 
 the corj)S commjindcd by Major-(jeneral McDowell. For all who were 
 under the command of tliat general officer, he was the official organ of 
 comnuuiication ; and if the petitioner, while General McDowell was ex- 
 ercising commjiiid over the two corps, had anything to comnumicate to 
 
79 
 
 General McDowell, that comiiiuiiication, according to the regulations 
 governing the Army of the United States, would necessarily have passed 
 through the hands of Colonel Schriver. 
 
 Colonel Schriver went up to Dawkins' Branch on the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road with General McDowell, and rode to the right with him 
 and the petitioner to the Manassas Gap Eailroad, taking a few mounted 
 orderlies with them, xlfter the conversation between the petitioner and 
 General McDowell and the latter had decided, as petitioner says in his 
 opening statement, to act on the suggestion of the petitioner and take 
 King's division, under Hatch, to the right, and had moved rapidly, at a 
 gallop, down the Manassas Gaj) Kailroad, Colonel Schriver was left with 
 the escort and staff, and testifies as to his own future movements as fol- 
 lows (Board's Record, p. 832) : 
 
 Question. State yonr rank in the Army. 
 
 Answer. Inspector-general and brevet major-general. 
 
 Qnestiou. What position did you hold on the 29th of Angust, 1862 ? 
 
 Answer. I was then on General McDowell's staff, when he commanded the Third 
 Corps of the army of Virginia. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect being with him on the 29th of August, at the head of 
 General Porter's cohimn, in the ntugiiborhood of Dawkias' Branch f 
 
 Answer. I do. 
 
 Question. Where did you go then ? 
 
 Answer. Went out to the right with the generals, whose object was, I believe, to 
 make some observations, and then returned to the place whence we started. 
 
 Question. Where did General McDowell leave yon, or did he not leave yon 1 
 
 Answer. He left somewhere to the east or to his right looking out toward the rail- 
 road, my recollection is. 
 
 Question. Which direction did he take when he left ? 
 
 Answer. I think he Avent in a southterly direction, off to Avliere his divisions were. 
 
 Question. Did you go with him ? 
 
 Answer. No. 
 
 Question. Which direction did yon take? 
 
 Answer. I came a little to the left and went by iieneral Porter's headcpiarters, and 
 then came down, if I recollect rightly, tlu^ road General McDowell went, through 
 the woods ; I did not go with him. 
 
 Question. You went down the Gainesville road, then ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Did you go back with General Porter, or did you follow him ? 
 
 Answer. I really cannot recollect that ; I know we met again. 
 
 Question. What transpired at that time when you met him there? 
 
 Answer. I had a little conversation ; I cannot exactly recollect what it was, except 
 the general said or expressed the belief that he might become engaged with the enemy, 
 and that he had no cavalrymen ; he either then proposed, or I proposed, or at any rat© 
 the arrangement was made, that he should have half of General McDowell's escort 
 tliat was with me ; it was turned over, and I left. He wanted them to send messages. 
 
 Question. At that time where were the enemy ? 
 
 Answer. I am sure I do not know. 
 
 Question. Did you notice any ? 
 
 Answer. No ; I did not look for any ; it was not my business. 
 
 No cross-examination. 
 
 It is apparent from this evidence of Colonel Schriver that the peti- 
 tioner mnst, immediately after General McDowell's departure, have gal- 
 loped back to his column near Dawkins' Branch on the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road, at a speed certainly that would have prevented him 
 ntaking any special observation in any direction; because Colonel Schriver 
 follows immediately afterward, and has a con-versation with him there. 
 
 It is to be noted^ from tluit conversation that the petitioner said he 
 might become engaged with the enemy, and that he had no cavalrymen 
 for messengers or orderlies ; and Colonel Schriver leaves half of those 
 of General McDowell that he had with him. The expression that he 
 mkjht become engaged with the enemy was something for the possible 
 future — not an immediate engagement with the enemy that had been 
 
80 
 
 "gatlierino- in his frout" witliin five minutes. His remark evidently 
 contemplated the carrying out of (leneral McDowell's orders, because 
 lie borrows these cavalrymen for the express purpose of sending mes- 
 sages to General McDom ell ; and we shall see as we go along that he 
 sent several to him during the day. Had he at that time found it 
 necessary to change the plan tliat had been agreed upon by which he 
 was to put his force "in there" to the right front where the dust was in 
 consequence of the enemy "gathering in his front," icliy did he not tell 
 Colonel Schriver, who was the official organ of commnnieation between him 
 and General McDowell ? Why did he not call his attention to that which 
 was, on his assumed state of facts, going to change the arrangement 
 which General McDowell had just made at his own suggestion "? As 
 Colonel Schriver was going right down to where King's division was, if 
 it had been necessary for that division to remain. Colonel Schriver ^^'ould 
 have been the proper party for the petitioner to make the request to for 
 it to remain. He did not do so ; and it is significant, further, that Gen- 
 eral Schriver did not notice any enemy "gathering" in the front. If 
 there had been any serious demonstration in that direction he could not 
 have failed to notice It. As it was, he did not. It is more than likely, 
 in ftict it has appeared in evidence in one form and another, tliat Lieu- 
 tenant Colonel Locke, the petitioner's assistant adjutant-general and 
 chief of staff, went backwards and forwards a number of times that day 
 from Dawkins' Branch to Bethlehem church and the Sudley road 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 299). He says so himself. The strength of his rec- 
 ollection has been exhibited between himself and other members of the 
 petitioner's staff', relative to the efforts he himself made to remove ob- 
 structions on the road between Warrenton Junction and Bristoe on the 
 morning of August 28, 18G2. On cross-examination (Board's Eecord, p. 
 1042) he said his feelings are very strongly eidisted in l^ehalf of the 
 petitioner. That, of itself, whether enlisted in favor of him or against 
 him, should have no special effect in uncontradicted evidence. Assum- 
 ing for the sake of argument that General McDowell sent this message: 
 
 Give my compliineiits to General Porter and say that I am going to tlie right and 
 will take General King's division with me, and that he had better remain where he 
 is ; if he has to fall back, to do so on my left. 
 
 It is inconceivable that, after having made an entire plan of proceed- 
 ing in which the petitioner's corps was have been put into action, he 
 shouhl direct him to remain inactive. There is nothing to show that 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Locke saw any enemy "gathering" on petitioner's 
 front in the five minutes' ride from the railroad to the head of the col- 
 umn, or that the })etitioner ordered him to communicate any such fact to 
 General King, or anything more than a direction to General King, who 
 was tlien on his way to Centreville in an ambulance, to remain where 
 he was, assuming him to have been in command of the division for the 
 sake of the argument. On such a supposition to assert that General 
 McDowell should order tlie petitioner to remain where he was and not 
 do anything when a contest was actually taking ])lace on the right, is an 
 absurdity of which no one who knows that distinguished officer would 
 ever l)clieve him cajjable. 
 
 When General M(d)owcll left the petitioner on the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 r()a<l, after having amended the joint order so far as he Avas concerned, as 
 to tin' manner of execution undei' the discretion which had been given him 
 by the major-general commanding tlie whole army, it may be assumed that 
 he left the ])etitioner in absolute conunand of his own coi'i)s, and had no 
 further power or authority to order his movements in any direction. He 
 
81 
 
 only commanded the petitioner's corps by virtue of his seniority under the 
 (okl) sixty-second article of war, and while actually joined for and doing- 
 duty with them, and any direction or order which he might give from a 
 distance, he not being in command of the army, and only a corps com- 
 mander, would have amounted to nothing, and required no obedience, 
 which the petitioner well knew from his own long service in the Army. 
 Such a message as the petitioner on the original trial assumed was finally 
 delivered to him from General McDowell, in the light of his, petitioner's, 
 ]n-evious instructions to Colonel Marshall, not to bring on an engage- 
 ment; and his remark to General McDowell, when the latter was on the 
 Manassas Gap Railroad with him, that if he moved where IVIcDowell 
 ordered him he would get into a fight, would have well suited his views. 
 Tht' court which tried him evidentJi/ believed that there icas no .such message 
 and no such response. 
 
 The petitioner himself has for another jjurpose said here that " the 
 only positive order received by me [him] on the 2*Jth I [he] tried to exe- 
 cute, but it was received too late for any result to be obtained " (page G2, 
 Petitioner's opening statement). 
 
 It is particularly to be noticed from the evidence of General McDowell 
 on the trial, which bas been cited, that the i)etitioner claimed originally 
 that the enemy was in his innuediate front, and that General McDowell 
 made up his mind u])on such reports as the petitioner made to him at 
 the time and upon what he himself could see from tbe best available 
 point of observation, namely, near the ^lanassas Gap Kailroad. 
 
 Several witnesses for the petitioner on the trial and before this Board 
 have mentioned the fact of the capture of two or three scouts, so called — 
 possible scouts — cavalrymen, by our cavalry. It has been sought on 
 behalf of the petitioner to show that he was apprised of the presence of 
 the divisions commanded by Major-General Longstreet in his front, be- 
 cause of the capture of these scouts, so called. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Lode, chief of the staff of the petitioner, has 
 nndertalcen to explain this with the same degree of recollection as in the 
 other portions of his evidence, as follows (Board's Record, p, 301): 
 
 Direct examination: 
 
 Question. Wero you pit\st'ut wLieu two or three rebel scouts were brought in in the 
 moruing, after you got up to Dawkius' Branch ? 
 
 Answer. I was. 
 
 Question. Did you know or hear, at tliat time, -whose men they were ? 
 
 Answer. I kuow wliat one of them said. 
 
 Question. Wliat was it ? 
 
 Answer. He said tliey were Longstreet's men. 
 
 Question. Do you kiiow what cavalry there were in General Porter's command on 
 the '^yth, or what were thene cavalry that broitfiht in the scouts, and where he ijot them? 
 
 Answer. We picked them up on t)ie road ; there were but few that we had. We were 
 very short of cavalry. 
 
 It is to be noticed here incidentally, in reference to a matter hereafter 
 to be discussed, that this witness admits that they had picked up cav- 
 alry on the road, namely, the Manassas and Gahiesville road, and we shall 
 see^from the evidence of Capt. John P. Taylor that that cavalry which 
 the petitioner had there was a squadron of the First Pennsylvania under 
 Taylor that had come down on that very road from Gainesville that 
 morning, reported to Morell, and was leading the division back again 
 towards Gainesville. Had it been known or surmised by the petitioner 
 that Cai>tain Taylor and some of his men were to be brought here on 
 behalf of the government for another pur])ose the question he asked his 
 chief of staff would probably have been omitted, because it appears that 
 
82 
 
 since the evidence here of those who belonged to that sqnadron, tlie 
 petitioner lias songht to i)rove that there were no cavalry there, 
 
 Firsty by Major-General Morell, recalled (Board's Record, p. 968), who 
 said he did not recollect, upon being- questioned, seeing them, or heaiing 
 that thev were there ; and further remarked, '' 1 cannot recall anything 
 about it." 
 
 Second, by Capt. Augustus P. Martin, his chief of artillery, who 
 was also a witness on the original trial for him, who, after testifying 
 with a view to show that he was where lie knew everything that 
 was going on at the head of tlie petitioner's column that day at Dawkins' 
 Branch, nevertheless did not know (Board's Record, p. 1131) of any other 
 information coming in from the front than that of Colonel MarshalPs 
 Thirteenth New York Volunteers, and upon being (piestioned l)y the 
 petitioner whetlier he noticed "any body'' of l7nion cavalry of 50 or 70 
 men in the vicinity of the front that day, or anywhere thereal)onts, an- 
 swered nothing more than a few orderlies. Relative to the l>attery oft" 
 to the right and front of the petitioner's column as to whose operations 
 this witness testified quite minutely, he was obliged, on cross-examina- 
 tion, to make the following admissions : 
 
 Quostioii. Do ymi know of any effort being made to take that battery that \vas to- 
 Avard.s your front dnrin<j the day and tired npon you '! 
 Answer. The enemy's battery f 
 Question. Yes. 
 Answer. I do not. 
 
 From the e^•idence of some of the witnesses for the petitioner, who 
 were in the Confederate service, as well as from the evidence of other 
 offtcers of that service, called on behalf of the goverinnent. it has V)een 
 made manifest here that the only cavalry in those operations belonged 
 to the division of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, in the command of 
 Major-General Jackson (Board's Record, pp. 174, 521, 520, 091) ; and 
 that Longstreet had no cavalry whatever with him at that time. Part 
 of the day Col. T. L. Rosser's regiment of Fifth Virginia Cavalry (Stuart's 
 division) was picketed down near the front of the petitioner, and after- 
 wards Brig. Gen. Be\*erly H. Robertson's brigade of cavalry, belonging 
 to the same command of Jackson (Board's Record, p. 173). These cavalry 
 liad met the advance of Major-General Long-street's column between 
 Haymarket, or in its neighborhood, and Gainesville, and had then moved 
 off down to the right in order to be on the extreme right flank of the 
 Confederate force, and Avas undoubtedly the caAalry reported by Brig- 
 adier-General Bnford (G, C. M. Record, p. 84). 
 
 Such being the case, assuming that two or three cavah-y scouts, or cav- 
 alrymen, were cai)tared by our First Pennsylvania squadron of ^lorell's 
 command, the scouts belonged to Jackson's command, had been with 
 liini on all his movements down to Bristoe Station and present at the 
 destruction, at Manassas Juiu'tion, of the Union su])i)lies, and tlien gone 
 up by a niglit march to Centreville, Stone Cliurch, and (iroveton, and 
 tlience back in tlie flirection of Gainesville. Therefore, on this state of 
 facts, the scouts captured were not Longstreet's men ; it is not prol>able 
 that any of them stated that they were of Major-(4eneral Longstreet's 
 command. Tlie latter had no cavaliy wliatever (Board's Record, ]>. 71). 
 Therefore, wlien tlie petitioner, on this record, has expressed a strong- 
 desire to ascertain the whereabouts of those thiee scouts, had he secured 
 their attendance here they would have been of no possible advantage 
 for the reason that they belonged to riac.kson's command and not to 
 Longstreet's. Had he deemed them material on his trial they could 
 possibly then lune lieen easily secured. 
 
83 
 
 That they were mounted cavabymeu was testified to by Brig. Gen. 
 Charles Griffin, petitioner's witness on the trial in 1862 (G. C. M. Record, 
 p. 165). 
 
 This petitioner, in his evidence before General McDowell's court of 
 inquiry, swore that he knew from Brigadier-General Gibbon that the 
 order which the latter brought from General Pope — 
 
 Was to prevent the junction of the ailvancinir enemy and Jackson's force, then near 
 Groveton ; and that the oltject was to strike the tnrn])ike to Gainesville before the 
 advancing column should arrive. — (Board's Record, p. i009. ) 
 
 He testified that General McDowell had seen tliat order, " And when 
 he altered it, as I conceived he had the authority, I presumed he knew 
 more fully than I did the plans of General Pope.'' 
 
 The petitioner's presum])tioii was a non seqn'dur, illustrated by his 
 presumption in attacking the reputations of the court that tried him and 
 all concerned. 
 
 It is a difficult matter to follow this petitioner in all his many material 
 contradictions of himself. 
 
 In this evidence, we see he states, as I have just quoted (Board's Rec- 
 ord, p. 1009), that he conceived General McDowell had authority over him 
 sufficient to alter General Pope's order received by the hand of (reneral 
 Gibbon that morning; yet the latter himself was produced by jietitioner 
 as a witness, so far as this point is concerned, to show indirectly that 
 McDowell did not even claim to exercise any command over him until 
 receipt of the "joint order" (Board's Record, p. 21.5), and in i)etitioner's 
 closing arguments we find him insisting on the same theory, although he 
 kneio that while King's division of McDowell's corjjs was on the Ma- • 
 nassas and Gainesville road, and McDowell himself was there awaiting 
 arrival of Ricketts' division to put him in on the same line, the old 
 sixty-second article of war provided for just such a contingency. 
 
 General McDowell himself testified on this subject on the original 
 trial that when notified at Manassas Junction by petitioner that General 
 Pope had directed petitioner to" take King's division with him, he, Mc- 
 Dowell, was under some embarrassment at seeing one of his divisions 
 going otf under a junior, and that petitioner '' mentioned to the effect that 
 as I [McDowell] was the senior officer, I naturally and necessarily com- 
 manded the whole, his force as well as my own. and witli that under- 
 standing the division followed after his corps on the road he was ordered 
 to take ^* * ."— (G. C. M. Record, p. S2.) 
 
 Therefore, while ]McDowell could exercise command over both corj^s, 
 if occasion reciuired, he did not interfere as to the mar(;h conducted by 
 ]>etitioner, ostensibly up to the battle-field of the night before, until after 
 the liead of column had halted at Dawkins' Branch, he meanwhile re- 
 maining back on the road where lie could communicate with Ricketts' 
 division, then coming up from Bristoe. 
 
 Having received the joint order, he rode forvrard to communicate with 
 petitioner. As it was issued to them JoiittJt/, it showed that it was the 
 l>urpose of General Pope that they should act independently of each 
 other, and each in direct subordination to himself; and General Pope 
 testified that such was hin intention. 
 
 "Under these circumstances," as was said by the Judge-Advocate- 
 General in the able review he presented to President Lincoln under the 
 latter's instructions (G. C. M. Record), "it may be well questioned whether 
 under the sixty-second article of war General McDowell could continue 
 the command he had assumed over their joint forces." 
 
 Whether or not McDowell was in command of both corps under the 
 joint order, under the oi)eration of the sixty-second article of war, is and 
 7 ii 
 
84 
 
 was a question of /rnr which was directly presented to President Lincoln 
 for his consideration and decided by hiin, and his decision may be prop- 
 erly considered as final and conclusive. 
 
 Acceptino-, however, for argument, the view that under the ''joint 
 order" General McDowell necessarily commanded both corps while 
 acting together, it is to be noted that the order said if any considerable 
 advantages were to be gained by departing from it, it should not be 
 strictly carried out. McDowell, therefore, had the right as joint com- 
 mander to vary its terms — and his decision tixed the execution in the 
 manner indicated. His decision, however, under a positive order of this 
 character would be valid only as to the ^^^'ay of complying, not as to the 
 primary military end to be obtained, viz, to unite the wings of the army 
 then separated during a contest with the .enemy. 
 
 Petitioner himself knew, as his statements and dispatches show, that 
 110 pretended order from McDowell to remain where he was, with an un- 
 ■deployed column stretching at least three miles to the rear, fulfilled in the 
 slightest degree the i^urposes for which the joint order had been given, 
 interpreted as it w^as by the three previous orders this petitioner had 
 received that morning from General Pope. 
 
 They were all to ^\\^\x foricard to fight the enemy. 
 
 Petitioner's own dispatclies and reports during the day to McDowell 
 and to his own division commander, Morell, "to push over to help 
 •Sigel," and that he "failed in getting Morell over," show that he knew 
 McDowell never g^ve the improbable order he ])retends he did, and 
 that such an order, even had it been given, would have had no validity, 
 •because of its being in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of 
 Pope's orders io Jir/hf. 
 
 One can but be amazed in considering the various excuses and pleas 
 of this petitioner, that he should attempt to place on McDowell, who 
 was loyally and anxiously striving to carry out General Pope's orders, 
 the responsibility for their direct disobedience by himself. 
 
 Major-Crcneral McDowell's evidence, *on cross-examination (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 71>1), throws additional light as to the object of his meeting 
 petitioner at the head of the latter's column at Dawkins' Branch: 
 
 Qiiestiou. What was tlie jturpose you weut up there for [to the front at Dawkins' 
 Branch] ? 
 
 Answer. I went up because we came to a halt, and hecause I was in great anxiety 
 in reference to the iiring that was going on to the riglit. I went up there to see tlie 
 condition of affairs, to see wliat was to he done with this force of ours on the left ; 
 jToing lip there I received this letter of Buford. 
 
 Question. While you were there, if I am rightly informed, you decided, under the 
 latitude allowed you by the joint order of General Pope, that General Porter should 
 2)ut his troops in to the right of where the head of his column then was, and that you 
 would take yours away from the road on which those two commands then lay, uj) the 
 Sudley Springs road ?***** 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Did not you haye any idea as to how far it was or how long it would take 
 jou? 
 
 Answer. I thought I could get my troops into action ([uicker that way than I could 
 by bringing them up iu tlie rear of General Porter's, because the road was blocked up 
 ■with his corps. I Avas excessively anxious to join Keyuolds. 
 
 Question. Was it not for the purpose of coming in on the left of Reynolds with both 
 of your divisions? 
 
 Answer. I should have done so if left to myself. 
 
 Here, incidentally, permit me to allude to a point which is not mate- 
 rial so far as the ])etitioner is concerned, but which has been raised 
 according to the method of ]>rocedure on his part, as to the why and where- 
 fore of the time General McDowell's corps, viz. King's division, under 
 Hatch, and llicketts' division, took to get up into the fight. General 
 
85 
 
 McDowell before this Board answered this question (Board's Record, p. 
 
 817) : 
 
 Question. Wliy did it take your troops so long as it did taki' tlicui to get arouud 
 iuto action tkat day ? 
 
 Answer. Those troops liad marched day and night without mucii food, witliout niucli 
 rest, for so long atimetliat tliey were excessivtdy tired; officers, men, and horses were 
 all very tired. The rate of theii- advance was not fast ; when they went up they were 
 scut forward by me. I first found them halted. Do you mean on the evening of the 
 29th ? 
 
 Question. Yes. It must have been about those hours. 
 
 Answer. They went up towards the left of Reynolds ; they were recalled l)y order 
 of General Pope back to the road upon which they started; 'and I think oue'or two 
 brigades, by direct orders from him. were taken off in several directions. These 
 marches and countermarches consumed considera1)le time before they were sent up the 
 road in the evening to make the last attack, Avhich last attack was made by the direct 
 orders of General Pope. 
 
 Question. Did you not go to the right with your two divisions on that day because 
 that Avas the direction, from the right in fi-out, that the enemy were coming? 
 Answer. I went up there because there is where I heard a battle going on. 
 
 We find from the evidence of Col. TimofJiy Sullivan, of the Twenty- 
 fourth IS^ew York Volunteers, King's division, a witness for the peti- 
 tioner (Board Record, p. 98), that it took a couple of hours, may be two 
 and a half hours, to get up towards the position where they finally went 
 in. Bvt. Brig. Gen. F. I). Fon-let\ of Hatch's brigade, Kiiig's division, 
 under Hatch, says that they arrive<l nearly at the Henry house hill, be- 
 tween it and the Chinn house, about 2 p. m., or between 1 and 3 (Board's 
 Record, p. 548). 
 
 WHAT WAS THE CIIAllACTER OF THE ENEMY IN PETITIONER'S FRONT 
 AT DAWKINS' BRANCH, AND DID HE ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN ITS 
 STRENGTH ? 
 
 His witness (MaJ. G. K. Warren, Cor])S of Engineers) says (Board's 
 Record, p. 18) that they were tired at by artillery somewhere about 
 (Jarrico's, somewhat concealed. Could see mounted men, such as cav- 
 alrymen. 
 
 * # * * » # * 
 
 Question. If that l)att(^ry had not been put in that position, would there have been 
 anj' difficulty in crossing that open space in order to reach that ridge by Morell's 
 division '. 
 
 Answer. I regarded that artillery as only an indication. I should not have consid- 
 ered it alone as any obstacle at all. It might have been attached to cavalry and run 
 Jiway at the siglit of a demonstration. But as an indication of what might be — it 
 might be a whole line of battle along there. 
 
 Question. If you had been placed there Avith Morell's division in that way, as a 
 military man, what, in your judgment, would have been your duty in the i)remises'? 
 
 Answer. Of course I should have had to obey orders. 
 
 Question. Supposing you were there as he was, in a semi-independent cLaracter, at 
 that moment of time, as far as that battery was concerned, what, in your judgment, 
 would have been your duty in the premises ? 
 
 Answer. I should have considered the battery of no account at all. 
 
 Question. You could have moved forward and taken it if it had not been well sup- 
 ported ? 
 
 Answer. I suppose I could if Iliad chosen to go thai much out of my tvay. I should 
 not regard a section of artillery as being an object to divert me or attract me. (Pages 
 37,38B. R.) 
 
 Question. You have been asked by General Schofield what yon would have done if 
 you had had :>fl,000 num. Let me ask you whether, Avith not exceeding 10,U00 men, you 
 could liaA'c made an attack Avith any expectation of success 1 
 
 Answer. From what I now know I am satisfied that I could not. The most that 
 could have been done would liaA'c been to so far develop the force as to be satisfied 
 Avhether it could l)e engaged or not. If you were satisfied that it was too many for 
 you, it Avould be imprudent to do it. 
 
86 
 
 By tlic Eecordkr: 
 Question. Do you know wLether there was any such effort to develop it or not ? 
 Answer. I do not, to my personal knowledge. (Board's Record, jjp. 48,49.) 
 
 Question. WTiat was the character of the enemy you saw ? 
 
 Answer. I saw enough of them to see that there was an enemy there. I didn't know 
 
 how strong it was and could only have found out by some kind of a reconnaissance. 
 
 * # * * :^ # * 
 
 Question. You say that, in order to have gone along to the right of the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road toward the left of General Pope's army, indicated by Reynold's post 
 tion, that you thought at first a demonstration should have been made off in this direc- 
 tion to the southwest of that road ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Was that done during that day ? 
 
 Answer. Not that I know of. AVill you rejjcat what I said ? 
 
 Question. In order to have moved along in a northeasterly direction towards Daw- 
 kins' Branch, it would have been first necessary, in your judgment, to have pushed off 
 a column to the left of the Manassas and Gainesville road ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. What I said was this : that if I had been ordered to make a move- 
 ment in that direction, I should have considered it necessary to have made a demon- 
 stration here and see what would be on my tiank. If I could not shake them out of 
 their position, I would not have exposed my flank by moving northeasterly. 
 
 Question. Would you know if such a demonstration had been made by Morell's divis- 
 ion in your front, they being to the right of the Manassas and Gainesville road and 
 you to the left ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know whatthat demonstration should have been. A skirmish-line 
 might have been sufficient. 
 
 Question. My question is, would you haA^e known ? 
 
 Answer. I know that he did make a skirmish-line demonstration, but of the nature 
 of that I am not cognizant. 
 
 Question. In which direction did he send out those skirmishers ? 
 
 Answer. As far as I know they moved to the front. 
 
 Question. Not in the direction that you in your judgment say the demonstration 
 should have been made in order to develop the strength of the enemy f 
 
 Answer. I cannot say that, exactly. It was in the same direction ; of course I don't 
 know whether it would have been as far to the left as I would have made it. 
 
 Question. It would have been to the northeast of the Manassas and Gainesville road 
 rather than to the south and west of it f 
 
 Answer. It would have been in the direction of this road generally. 
 
 Question. Would you not have known if any demonstration had been made to the 
 south and west of that road that day ? 
 
 Answer. I think I would. 
 
 Question. Was any made to your recollection or knowledge ? 
 
 Answer. No; I think there was not. (Board's Record, pp. 36 and 37.) 
 
 ***** 7-^ -Je 
 
 W. W. Blac1:fo/'d, captain of Confederate engineers, on Maj. Gen. J. 
 E. B. Stuart's .staff, called by government, testified as follows (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 694) : 
 
 Question. Then yon followed the railroad down ? 
 
 Answer. Then we followed it down in this direction somewhere. [Southeast.] 
 
 Question. Did you come to any point of observation ? 
 
 Answer. We very soon opened communication with the cavalry videttes around 
 here (near Hampton Cole's). 
 
 Question. Whose cavalry videttes were those? 
 
 Answer. Robertson's. 
 
 Question. Belonging to Jackson's command ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; Stuart's command of cavalry. 
 
 Question. Do you know w^hen they had been put out there in observation ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I could not make out what command it Avas hardly, but it must 
 have been some of Robertson's. 
 
 Question. When did you first see the advance of the Federals? 
 
 Answer. Not long after we got out there. There were reports that they were ad- 
 vancing, and Stuart sent me out to verify the reports. 
 
 Question. State about the point you went to in order to get a view ? 
 
 Answer. I Avent To every point I could see. I just rode to wherever I could get a 
 view. 
 
 Question. Beyond Vessel's ? 
 
 Answer Yes; I went down on this side [south of Vessel's]; then, I think, over this 
 
87 
 
 road [from Vessel's toward Dawkius' Branch] ; and then came down by Carrico's. I 
 examined it from every point of view, that it was possible to get a view of it from, 
 I had a Aery powerful pair of glasses that I could observe with. The main point to 
 establish was whether it was infantry or dismounted cavalry. 
 
 Question. What did you observe ? "^ 
 
 Answer. As this was a powerful glass, I could tell by the bayonet-scabbards and the 
 color of the trimmings whether it was cavalry or artillery. 
 
 Question. What did you see? 
 
 Answer. The head of the column then was just about making its appearance. I 
 think they deployed on both sides of the Manassas and Gainesville road. 
 
 Question. What did you do ? 
 
 Answer. I went back as soon as I ascertained that it was infantry. 
 
 Question. Did you come into any close i>roximity to any of these advancing parties? 
 
 Answer. As close as the skirmishers would let me. I drew tlieir tire. 
 
 Question. Did. you return it? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I only had two or three men with me. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect just what look place ? 
 
 Answer. I went back and reported to General Stuart. 
 
 ***** -^ # 
 
 Question. Do yon know of any movement, during that day, of the corps that was 
 on tliis Manassas and Gainesville road, beyond Dawkius' Branch ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Was your jjosition such that it would have fallen under your observation 
 if there had been such a movement ? 
 
 Answer. I think we would have been sent over there if there had been. 
 
 Beverly H. Bohertson, then a Confederate brigadier-general in Major- 
 General Stuart's cavalry division of Jackson's command (Board's Rec- 
 ord, pp. 173, 174, ~)24, and 526), says that after Major-General Longstreet's 
 command, or a portion of it at least, arrived on the Held and finally 
 deployed, lie was placed on the enemy's extreme right, and had his 
 skirmishers in front of Dawkins' Brancli (Board's Eecord, pp. 175 and 
 181), with his brigade massed half a mile in rear in tlie woods. 
 
 He put Ills brigade as fully 2,500 men on the 29th August present un- 
 der arms, this being additional to Fitzhugh Lee and Eosser's regiments 
 of Stuart's division under Jackson. 
 
 It is curious to notice how this witness, who went from Jackson that 
 morning to Haynuirket, and Longstreet and Charles IMarshall and other 
 Confederates wIjo came from beyond Haymarket that day, give large 
 estimates as to the forces under their commands. In the consideration 
 of such estimates and in any other matter wiiere there nmy be a contra- 
 diction as to a fact, as this is a military case, the opinion at the time of 
 the Union officer will be accepted in this argument in preference to that 
 of the enemy, after stating each. Even petitioner's Confederate wit- 
 nesses, on whom he has so much relied, do not agree in their estimate 
 of the force under Longstreet. 
 
 Thus the latter (exclusive of .Vnderson's division, which did not arrive 
 during the battle of tlie 29th) says (Board's Eecord, p. 72) that his 
 divisions present, viz : Hood's, Kemper's, Wilcox's, and D. E. Jones' 
 had each between 0,100 and 0,300 men ; while C. M. Wilcox, one of his 
 division commanders (p. 228), put his own force at between 5,000 and 
 5,500 men — nearly 5,500. 
 
 Therefore, assuming Longstreet's extreme estimate as correct, he had 
 about 24,800 men (no cavalry) on the ground, while assuming AVilcox's 
 estimate as correct, about 21,000 would have been the numbers; a dif- 
 ference in the four divisions of 3,200 men ; enough for another division. 
 
 However, we are not left in nuich uncertainty as to the actual num- 
 ber w^hich passed through Gainesville in a body at 8.45 a. m., because 
 Brig. Gen. John Buford, U. S. volunteers, chief of cavalry, accused's wit- 
 ness on the trial — who saw this force pass through Gainesville — swore 
 as to the "extent of their entire force" (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 188), that 
 it consisted of "seventeen regiments of infantry, one battery of artillery, 
 
88 
 
 and about oOO cavalry"; that lie "iiuule a paiticular estimate," aud 
 tliouglit the regiments would average 800 men ; also that there were 
 besides the orgiinized force " some stragglers following"." 
 
 This intelligent witness did not have to trust to a recollection of six- 
 teen years through many vicissitudes of intermediate military service, 
 but made his estimate and report at the time to Major-General McDowell. 
 The latter received it as he went towards petitioner's head of column at 
 Dawkins' Branch and showed it to him. Buford's estimate, it will be 
 ])erceived, made Long-street's force about 14,100 men, instead of the 
 extreme com})utatiou of 24,800. 
 
 Major-General 3foreU, in a dispatch to petitioner (No. 35, Board's Rec- 
 ord, p. 303), said in the afternoon, '^Xo infantry in sight"; and his assist- 
 ant adjutant-general, Earle (Board's Becord, p. 419), did not see the 
 enemy'^s shirmishers that day. 
 
 Lieut. James Stei'enson, Thirteenth ]New York Volunteers (petitioners 
 witness), who came down aloiu/ the front from the left of General Pope' s 
 army to his regiment on the skirmish line, bringing the regimental mail, 
 says in the trial (G. C. M. Record, p. 201), that he judged tbe enemy that 
 afternoon, whom he saw, to have been 12,000 or 15,000 strong-; a fact, 
 if fact it was, which came directly before the court that tried this pe- 
 titioner. 
 
 This case must be considered, if at all, in the light he then had, based 
 upon what he then knew or eelieyed were the facts, in connec- 
 tion with the character of the sj)€cific orders he was acting nnder. 
 
 With every disposition to make his case appear as lavorable to him- 
 self as possible — he having been on trial for his life — and with nothing 
 to restrain him from estimating that separate force under Longstreet, 
 the senior Confederate division commander, at as large a figure as would 
 serve his purposes, this petitioner deliberately stated before the court 
 that tried him, on the 10th January, 1803 (G. 0. M. Record, p. 2(JG), that 
 this separate force was from ten to Jifteen thousand strong. 
 
 This accords with the estimate of his own witness, Brigadier-General 
 Buford, as to the number Major-General Longstreet brought to Jackson's 
 assistance that day (29th August) as an organized force, divided into 
 four divisions of three brigades each, and each brigade containing, as 
 an average thi-ee regiments, each about 375 strong. 
 
 This, it is to be understood, is considered a very liberal estimate of 
 the number of men Longstreet brought to Jackson's assistance, exclusive 
 of stragglers, that day. 
 
 When Longstreet's divisions did finally get into position, two of 
 Hood's brigades were north of the Gainesville, Groveton, ayd Centre- 
 Aille turnj^ike, with Wilcox's division in support; and facing those south 
 were Stevens's brigade of Reno's division, also Schenck's division of 
 Sigel's corps, about 4,500 strong, and Reynolds's division of thirteen 
 regiments and four battalions, besides petitioner's corps, on the right 
 flank of Longstreet, enough to have overwhelmed this fraguient of Lee's- 
 rebel army, had he loyally "iiushed in." 
 
 Brevet Brig.-Gen. Horace Bouton, then cai)tain Thirteenth Kew York 
 Volunteers, who was on the skirmish picket line front of petitioner's 
 corjjs, testified as follows (Board's Record, p. 332) : 
 
 Question. Wliiit forco of the enemy did yon pmreivc there? 
 
 Answer. All we eonld see were oeoasioniil skinaishers that we developed. 
 
 * * * * * » f 
 
 Question. In the morning when you were dejiloyed and went into the woods, or to- 
 the edge of the woods, what was the api>arent strength of the enemy's skirmishers ? 
 
 Answer. They seemed to be fully the stiength of ours. It was a regular sliirmish- 
 line dei)loyed. We {■(tuld only see them oieasi(uiaily ; we could not tell (he nund>er> 
 
89 
 
 There was no regular line t-xccpt a Hue of skiriui.shers ; there was no Hue of battle tliat 
 we discovered. 
 
 * # # * # * * 
 
 Question. I would like you to fix as near as you cau the earliest hour iu the day when 
 you heard any such luoveuu-iit or sound which indicated such a movement of troops, 
 in the rear of the enemy's skirmish-line. 
 
 Answer. As we did not get iu there until al)out noon, according to my impression it 
 must have been somewhere about the middle of the afternoon or a little after that. We 
 jjressed forward immediately after deploying ; and at that time was the first time that, 
 we developed the enemy. I supjiose not more than half an hour would have elapsed 
 from the time we halted to the time we nuvde the advance and discovei'ed the skir- 
 mishers. 
 
 This petitioner lias heralded the testimony from Confederate sources 
 as the "ne^vly discovered testimony" which should show that he was 
 justified in not attaclciuy them uu<ler the orders he had for fear of de- 
 struction. 
 
 In my opening" argument, which was purposely full in order to apprise 
 petitioner of the princii)al points in the government case, 1 observed 
 that " Confederate" testimony as to the strength and position of their 
 own force was not "• newly discovered" evidence of the kind that would 
 be entitled to consideration in any court of justice having appellate 
 authority, for the reason that subsecpiently acquired knowledge must 
 be excluded in determiniug what was then known by the petitioner in 
 connection with the orders he had. 
 
 The enemy might have had 50,000 men on his front, instead of the 
 25,000 he now asserts it was, as against the 10,000 or 15,000 he insisted 
 it tf> have been when on his trial in January, 1803. 
 
 The prospect of a "rei>ulse" in an attack, made under lawful orders^ 
 would i)e n<» excuse for failing to make it. 
 
 ''('ojifederate'' testimony, therefore, as to the numbers in his front on 
 the liOtli August, has nothing to do with the case in considering whether 
 he did attack under his orders or did not attack. If he made no vUjorous 
 cf'orfs to clerelop and ascertain what force of the enemy was in front of 
 him, he cannot, even on tlie assumption that he had no orders to attack, 
 justify, palliate, or excuse his latal inaction on the 29th xVugust, 1S62, 
 
 To ascertain wliat he did do, the testimony of those who were at the 
 front must be considered. His witness. General Morell, thus testified 
 on cross-examiuation (Board's Kecord, p. 4:32) : 
 
 Question. ^Vhen did you first see the enemy 1 
 
 Answer. I did not see them at all. Except that section of artillery, they were all 
 in the woods [around Vessels's]. I believe those who were farther to the left could 
 see something of them; but where I was I could not see them. I relied very much 
 upon Colonel ^.larshall. He was an educated Army officer, and I had perfect confidence 
 iu him. 
 
 Question. The moment you heard a little skirmish in front you halted and began to 
 deploy ? 
 Answer. I did not hear the fighting. Colonel Marshall sent back word; then we 
 
 halted immediately and began to deplov on the crest of the ridge. 
 
 # '^ * ■- * » * * * 
 
 (Question. Then I understand you did not hear any skirmish-firing at all iu your 
 front f " ^ , 
 
 Answer. I heard a few dropping shots, and the report came in immediately from 
 Colonel Marshall; that is what really stopped me. 
 
 Question. Could you see the dust raised by the enemy advancing during the day ? 
 Answer. I could see. dust off cm the left. 
 
 (Question. They a])peared to be coming in pretty much all the afternoon .' 
 Answer. Tliere' was ach)ud of dust iu the direction of Gainesville. 
 . Question. Did von understand they were coming up all the afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. From Colonel Marshall's report I did, and I inferred so from the appearance 
 of tltc count rv. 
 
90 
 
 Question. As soon as you heard the skiriuisli-line as you were marching along that 
 road, do I understand you to say that you immediately began to deploy? 
 
 Answer. As soon as wliat? 
 
 Question. As soon as you lieard the file of your skirmishers! 
 
 Answer. Yes; as soon as we heard that Lougstreet's skinnishers and ours had met 
 we began immediately to deploy. 
 
 Question. How long afterwards was it before General Porter came uj) ? 
 
 Answer. I think he was with me at the time. 
 
 Question. You deployed under his orders ? 
 
 Answer. Under his orders. 
 
 It will be perceived that this witness assumes that Loiu/.strcefs skir- 
 mishers were in his front, which, in i>oint of fact, from petitioner's own 
 " Confederate '■ witnesses, we have seen was not the case. They were 
 skirmishers from Stuart's cavalry division of Jackson's command. 
 
 Maj. George Hyland, jr.. Thirteenth New York Volunteers, the next 
 in rank in his regiment to Colonel IMarshall that day on i)etitioner's 
 sku-mish line, called by him, testified (Board's Eecord, p. 115) that peti- 
 tioner came up to the head of column at Dawkins' Branch and requested 
 Colonel Marshall to find where the enemy were in front; and he, witness, 
 took the left wing of his regiment and deployed it as skirmishers. He 
 then answered as follows : 
 
 Question. AVhere did you halt ; what was the topograjthy of the country ? 
 
 Answer. The division halted on a hill, and I deploj^ed my skirmishers directly to 
 the front of that hill, and as we j)assed doAvu at the bottom of the little valley there 
 was a stream passed through it to our right ; it was quite a swamp. I had to take the 
 left of the line, as they were advancing a great deal faster than the right. As we 
 came up the opposite side of the valley we fell in with the enemy's skirmishers at the 
 edge of the timber. About the same instant tliere was a squadron of cavalry upon my 
 right in a corn-field. I sent word back to General Griflin to send some shells into their 
 position. He placed half a dozen shells in there, and dislodged them. We were skir- 
 mishing the balivnce of the afternoon ■SA'itli the enemy's skirmishers ; sometimes they 
 would drive us back a few rods, then we woitld regaiu our former position. 
 
 Question. What were the actions of Colonel Marshall, that you know of? 
 
 Answer. He came out to see me once or twice. He advanced to my left with one of 
 my men. I didn't go with him ; I staid Avith my command. He went out, and I think 
 he reported to me there were cavalry there, but I didn't see tlieoi ; I was not in a po- 
 sition Avhere I could see them. 
 
 Question. What was the impression made upon your mind ; that it was a large or a 
 small force ? 
 
 Answer. A very large force. 
 
 By the President of the Boakd : 
 Questifm. What arm or troops did those rebel ^kirmishers belong to? 
 AusAver. I don't know. They Avere infantry, in the Avoods. 
 
 On the trial of petitioner, Major Hyland was then a witness in his 
 behalf, and on the direct examination (G. C. M. Record, p. 174) answered 
 as follows : 
 
 Question by accused. Was there any enemy formed iu your front during that time 
 [viz, about 1 p. m. that day until daylight 3Uth August] 1 
 
 AnsAver. There Avas. 
 
 Question by accused. Do you knoAv at Avhat hour they commenced forming, or about 
 what hour ? 
 
 AnsAver. They commoiced forming hilnecii tiro and three o'clock, I think. 
 
 This evidence will be found iu entire harmony with the government 
 view of this case. 
 
 This witness, ^^judr/ingfrom the columns of dusf'' that he saw "coming" 
 from the same direction," stated as his conclusions to the court-martial 
 that there were probaldy 10,000 troops in front of petitioner. 
 
 Capt. Henry Geel-e, Thirteenth Xew York Volunteers, a witness for 
 government (Board's Kecord, p. 0(58), was ordered out by Colonel Marshall 
 in command of the left wing of the regiment on the skirmish line, Ma- 
 
91 
 
 jor Hylaiid having commaud of all of the regiment which went on this 
 duty. He has jint the time when he went out later than it actually was. 
 His evidence, however, as to what he coidd hear is confirmed by his col- 
 onel, Marshall. Captain Gecke testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 
 
 C68): 
 
 Right before me was a piece of wood and an open corn-field between me and the 
 woods. I remained and deployed my skirmisli line outside of the ditch there. At the 
 same time when I came there I saw skirmishers, dismounted cavalry, marching before 
 me in that corn-tield. My men fired at them and they fired over to us. Tlieu they went 
 back into the woods and I gave the command to cease firing. Then the adjutant of 
 the regiment came up between four and five o'clock with an order to the commanding 
 ofiicer of the skirmish line. I stepped up, and he said I should find out immediately 
 what was going on in the corner of the woods ; so I took a sergeant and a file of men 
 and went u]) there ; and the sergeant went ahead and looked in that direction, and 
 then we came down and reported to the adjutant that the enemy has been marching 
 out of the woods, and that they were moving cannon and ammunitiou-wagons to form 
 their proper com})anies, ajid turning to the left. A little while after this I heard a 
 few shots Mred over in that direction. 
 
 Question. When you went out with the skirmishers and deployed your men, what 
 orders did you have ! 
 
 Answer. I had no special order except to see what was going on. I sav,- no line 
 formed on tlie left ; no line formed on the right. 
 
 Question. When did you first observe the enemy coming down on your front ? 
 
 Answer. That was about four o'clock. 
 
 Question. Up to that time what indications were there of an enemy in yoiir front? 
 
 Answer. I should say I saw a few of a skirmish line moving through the corn-field 
 into the other side of th<^ \\ ood. 
 
 Question. During that day did you see any artillery firing ? 
 
 Answer. 1 lieard artillery firing. 
 
 Question. In what direction <lid yon hear it ? 
 
 Answer. The fire of artillery that forenoon I heard on the front of us; in the after- 
 no(m on our right. 
 
 Question. What was the character of that artillery firing that you heard ? 
 
 Answer. It commenced at five o'clock in the morning ; then it was in the far dis- 
 tance. Then about eleven or twelve o'clock we heard it better; we heard heavier 
 tiring. Then bet\ve»>n one and two o'clock there was no firing whatever. Then from 
 about three o'clock and afterwards there was heavy artillery firing and musketry fir- 
 ing uji to most nine o'clock at night and yelling hy the enemy and cheering by the 
 Union men. We heard tliat ofi' on our right. 
 
 Qiiestion. Did you at any time during that afternoon undertake to feel the enemy and 
 find out what their strength was ? 
 
 Answ(!r. Xo ; I only carried out the order I had. 
 
 Question. About what time in the day would you say you moved across Davvkius' 
 Branch to go forward with your skirmishers ? 
 
 Answer. About three o'clock. 
 
 Question. Did you know the position of the enemy after you got up on the skirmish 
 line '! 
 
 Answer. No ; I didn't see no other jiart of the troops except this dismounted 
 
 cavalry. 
 
 # ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 Question. This yelling and cheering that you heard by the enemy and the ITnion 
 troops, was that before or after you moved your skirmish line across Dawkins' 
 Braucli. 
 
 Answer. Afterwards. 
 
 Question. How long after ? 
 
 Answer. That commenced about five o'clock or half past fivCj and kept on until 
 darkness. 
 
 Question. The yelling and cheering that you lieard was between five o'clock anil 
 sundown ? 
 
 [The Confe<lerate General R. E. Lee's official report of that action says 
 that the battle continued until nine o'clock at night (Board's Becord, p. 
 
 520).] 
 
 Answer. Uj) to nine o'clock at night. 
 
 Question. Did you make any report of that to anybody ? 
 
 Answer. No. 
 
92 
 
 Question. Do yon mean to say that you did not send any messages to Colonel 
 Marshall at all that day ? 
 
 Answer. No; except this one, because I was not so far off from them. They could 
 hear all these things going on themselves. 
 
 Question. Then you could hear and he could hear ? 
 
 Answer. He could hear the tiriugv It took me about ten minutes, more or less, to 
 get there from my position back. 
 
 Sergeant Ferdinand Mohh, Thirteenth Xew York Volunteers (Boarcrs 
 Eecord, p. 67G), a g-overnment witness, has stated as follows as to his 
 position to the front : 
 
 Answer. I think we staid as skirmishers up towards night, and then we were with- 
 drawn on to a hill. It is kind of rolling country here. I think it was hollow along 
 that way and then it raised again. 
 
 Question. What did you see while you were on the skirmish line so far as the enemy 
 was concerned? 
 
 Answer. Saw a couple of rebel pickets in front of us. 
 
 Question. Infantry or cavalry ? 
 
 Answer. I could not say exactly ; I guess it was dismounted cavalry. 
 
 Question. What other indications of an enemy did you see during the day ; what 
 enemy did you see in front of you ? 
 
 Answer. I saw no enemy where I stood. I have just said it was a kind of hollow 
 place where we went through and we could not see many of the enemy except a line of 
 pickets ; they were not very active. We exchanged a couple of shots, and I recollect a 
 couple of cannon shots flew right over oui'line and came I guess from our i^ear — our own 
 men — two or three shots. 
 
 Question. Was there any cannonading going on then ? 
 
 Answer. There was. 
 
 Question. Where was that ? 
 
 Answ^er. That was to our right. 
 
 Question. What was the character of it ? 
 
 Answer. It was heavier towards evening than the time we went up there. We 
 heard the noise more in the evening — the noise of artillery and cheering — than when 
 "we first came up there. But still tiring was going on. 
 
 Question. When did the enemy come down in force on your front that day where 
 you were ? 
 
 Answer. What do you mean by the enemy ; the line of pickets ? 
 
 Question. Yes, or heavy force ; did you see any heavier force in front of you ? 
 
 Answer. I could not see any heavy force ; I could hear more. I could hear moving ; 
 I did not know whether it was artillery or cavalry, but I heard some words, some 
 commands. 
 
 Question. How late in the day was that ? 
 
 Answer. It was in the evening; towards night, I guess. 
 
 Question, When you wfut out there on that line, did you hear those commands and 
 movements ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot remember ; I did not hear any command that time ; but there was 
 a couple of shots exchanged between the pickets ; and finally, I think, the rebel pick- 
 ets went back a little, and word was brought to cease firing. 
 
 Question. Could you hear any musketry tiring in the afternoon where you were and 
 infantry firing? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I could hear that. 
 
 Question. How long in the afternoon did you hear infantry firing ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell exactly when it commenced, but I could hear cannon firing 
 when we were marching up there. 
 
 Question. After you got up there, was there any cannon firing ? 
 
 Answer. There was cannon firing at intervals ; it ceased sometimes, and toward night 
 it went on pretty heavy. 
 
 Question. Any musketry firing in the afternoon to your front or right ? 
 
 Answer. I think there was musketry firing, but we could not hear it so plain as in 
 the evening. 
 
 Question. About what time did you hear this cheering which you speak qH 
 
 Answer. About sinisct. 
 
 Cai)tain Jlfarl: T. BvnneU, then lieutenant Thirteenth New York Vol- 
 unteers, who was also on the skirmish hue of petitioner's column, testified 
 as follows : 
 
 Question. What could yon see and hear during that day? 
 
 Answer. I saw some skirmishers from the opposite side — two or three cavalrymen I 
 saw come out in a corn-fiehl in a front a little to the right ; and heard firing. 
 
Question. In wliicli direction ? 
 
 Answer. Soon after we were in position there was same firing in front, anl a little 
 to the right of the front. 
 
 Question. Artillery or infantry '! 
 
 Answer. Artillery and some carbine tiring — cavalry. That was the sliii-misli line, I 
 judge. 
 
 Question. Could you see any enemy in yonr fi-ont ? 
 
 Answer. Only those few cavalrymen that came out there. 
 
 Question. Do you know whether the enemy came down in force in your front that 
 day ; if so, when ? 
 
 Answer. The impression was that there was some force there in the latter part of 
 the afternoon. I did not see them ; I could not see them. 
 
 Question. Was there any contest of any description in any other direction than 
 directly in your front and right ? 
 
 Answer. Judging from the tiring there was at the right. 
 
 Question. What was it; infantry, or artillery, or- both? 
 
 Answer. Eoth. 
 
 Question. How near were you to that contest 1 
 
 Answer. It would be almost impossible to tell. 
 
 Question. You could hear musketry ilistinctly ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; very distinctly. 
 
 Question. Could you hear anything else indicating a contest or battle .' 
 
 Answer. Late in the afternoon we could hear the huzzas and howling of the soldiers, 
 apjiarently as though they were charging, and going backwards and forwards a num- 
 ber of times. 
 
 The rest of this witness' evidence has akeady been cited in another 
 connection ; but it will be perceived that the enemy's force in front of 
 petitioner's head of colnnm, of which the witness was well placed to 
 jud.i;'e, Avas cavalry skirmishers, and if there w^as any infantry force there 
 at iill it was not until the latter part of the afternoon ; meanwhile he 
 and his comrades were airare that General Fopeh army was pgJitinr/^ 
 althoiii;ii petitioner, with his headquarters 2f miles to the rear from 
 Dawkins' JJranch, insists that he, himself, was not. 
 
 Assistant Surgeon ]\ ilUam L. Faxon, Twenty-second Massachusetts 
 Yohmteers, ]\Iartindale's brii^ade, ^Nforell's division, called for govern- 
 ment, said (Board's Kecord, p. ^\H)), as to the halt at Dawkins' Branch: 
 
 Answer. We halted on a small knoll; part of it overlooked quite a large valley; 
 ([uite a large part of it was cleared, and on the right I saw the line of the Manassas 
 tJap Railroad. 
 
 Question. This point that I have indicated on the map as Dawkins' Branch ? 
 
 Answer. I should take the branch to be a little farther away. I should take the 
 branch to be about a mile away from the i)lace where we halted; there might have 
 been a dry rini at the foot of this knoll, but I think not. 
 
 Question. What did you do after you came to a halt there ? ^ 
 
 Answer. I went down on the railroad ; I went around generally in the woods and 
 looked at the situation generally ; saw tiring was going on along the right of us, over 
 toward Thoroughfare Gap. 
 
 Question. Did you see any indications of an enemy immediately in your front ? 
 
 Answer. I did not see any for a mile or more ; I looked along through tlie tield close ; 
 Ceneral Porter came up and borrowed a glass.of me; he asked me what I had seen. 
 I told liim I thought there was a battery coming in about a mile from us on the Wash- 
 ington side of the road. Not very far from it, I think, there was a small house, and I 
 saw something that led me to suppose that there were men going in there. 
 
 Question. I)o you recollect what reply he made? 
 
 Answei. I do not know that he made any reply to nie. 
 
 Question. Did that battery open upon you f 
 
 Answer. It opened shortly afterwards; of course I cannot tell you how many min- 
 utes, because I did not keep any note of the time. I had no intention of making any 
 memorandum. It opened and "tired before the troops were withdrawn, I think, not 
 exceeding three, might have been four, possibly but two shots. 
 
 Question. Where did those shots strike? 
 
 Answer. One of the shots struck a man in tlie front rank of the First Micliigan In- 
 fantry, and passed through his abdomen, and struck the tiist man in the rear rank in 
 the thigh. 
 
 Question. You were there at the time ? 
 
 Answer. I was at th<^ place and saw the men ; they were sitting or lying just a little 
 h)wer down on the slope of the hill in front of me. 
 
. 94 
 
 Question. Then what was done ? 
 
 Answer. Shortly after that we withdrew. 
 
 Question. What indications, if any, did you see of an enemy in your front, or to 
 your right and front, or to your right .' 
 
 Answer. To the riglit and front. 
 
 Mr. CiiOATE. I do not know that an assistant surgeon is a military expert. 
 
 The Recorder. I asked him what he saw. 
 
 !Mr. CiiOATE. I have no objection to what he saw. 
 
 Answer. (Continued.) Beyond this general clearing to quite a large extent there 
 was a .smaller clearing, only a part of which could be seen; there was a small opening 
 in the wood ; across that opening there came a small body of men ; they halted in the 
 opening where there was eAddeutly a depression, but their heads and shoulders could 
 be plainly seen. 
 
 Question. About how many men? 
 
 Answer. I should judge not over 20. 
 
 Question. Wliat else did you see of an enemy in your front, or to your right and 
 front, or to your right ? 
 
 Answer. Nothing. 
 
 Question. Could you see anything that would indicate the march of troops; if so, 
 what ? 
 
 Answer. I could see a large cloud of dust on the Warrenton turnpike moving to- 
 wards Centreville. 
 
 Question. After that where did you go? 
 
 Answer. I Avent into camp with troops at night, after then tvithdrew. 
 
 Question. Did they remain in this advanced position during the day? 
 
 Answer. They were uithdraicn in the afternoon ; the sun ivas declining in the hearens. 
 
 Question. How far were they withdrawn ? 
 
 Answer. I should judge in-side oj" a mile. 
 
 Question. More than a half a mile or less ? 
 
 Answer. That I could not tell you; I could go to the spot, to the place where they 
 came, because we withdrew on the same road, and then came back and went intocami) 
 
 again after dusk. 
 
 * * 71 * * *■ * 
 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 898.) (Eedirect). 
 
 Question. You say you heard firing off to the right. What firing was that ? 
 
 Answer. There was firing over, I should judge, somewhere on the northwest side of 
 the WaiTenton jiike; and on the pike that was lyin.g between us and Thoroughafare 
 Gap there was quite hard fighting ; volleys of musketry and artillery firing. There 
 was some musketry firing over beyond that ])oint, and but little artillery firing; you 
 could see the smoke of the rebel guns, and the shells exploding beyond, but not as 
 hard there as over on the right. 
 
 [It will be observed as I go along- that Caxitain Monteitli, petitioner's 
 then aide-de-camp, also saw those shells bursting in air.] 
 
 Q. How long did you hear that during the day ? 
 
 Answer. More or less all the time there was soumd of fighting, and we expected to 
 be in it. I would like to make an explanation in regard to distance, which the gen- 
 tleman refused to allow me to make. The body of men that came out here was fired at by 
 Hazlitt's battery, and the shell was exploded right in the place where these men were; 
 they ran away. I asked the sergeant for what time he cut his shell, and he said for a 
 mile; that is how I locate the distance of those men in front of me. 
 
 Question. The sergeant of Hazlitt's battery fired the piece? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Bvt. Lieut. Col. Jos. P. CJeanj, then of the Thirteenth Xew York 
 Yolunteers, under Colonel Marshall, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 073) : 
 
 Question. Do you know of any action in this direction [north] ; if so, what was its 
 ■character? ' - 
 
 Answer. To the right of where we lay along toward dark in the evening there was 
 musketry firing. I could hear the cheering of our men and the pecuUar yell of the 
 enemy as if they were charging and recharging. 
 
 Private Charles E. Brahm, Fifth ^S'ew York Volunteers, Warren's bri- 
 gade, Sykes' division, a government witness, testified as follows (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 930) : 
 
 Question. Did you hear any firing at that time ? 
 
 Answer. We heard firing mostly all d:iy; artillery. I could see the artillery in the 
 
85 
 
 morning at nine o'clock down toward the direction of Groveton. We laid alongside 
 of the road two or three hours, and heard musketry firing all that time — towards night 
 very heavy. 
 
 Question. Did you see any enemy in your front? 
 
 Answer. I did not. There was some artillery firing in our front — two or four shots 
 that I can recollect. This was the closest firing we had to our line. 
 
 Question. Did you hear any musketry firing during the afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; a great deal toward the right and rear of us. 
 
 Question. Oflf in what direction ? 
 
 Answer. Toward the right and rear. 
 
 Private Joseph Bohbins, Eigliteeiith ]\Iassacliitsett.s Volunteer.s, Mar- 
 tiudale's brigade, ^lorell's division, kept a diary at the time, in wliicli 
 he said (Board's llecord, p. 845) : ''On the 29th marched to Manassas; 
 then orders came to move towards ^Manassas Gap. Xow we expect to 
 have some fighting.^'' He says he "heard considerable firiuu;- on their 
 right'' until dark, np to the time of bivouacking. 
 
 By this witness' diary it is very evident the volunteers under Morell 
 in petitioner's corps knew what they were moving up towards Dawkins' 
 Branch tor. 
 
 They were not looking back to see how they could get beliind " Bull 
 Kun that night," but forward to meet the enemy. They knew a battle 
 was going on and that they should be in it. 
 
 Col. E. G. M((r!ih<(U, United States Army, retired, a graduate of the 
 United States ]Military Academy at ^^'est Point, called by the accused, 
 and since recalled before this Board, and his prior statements accepted 
 without question by petitioner (p. 11)0, G. C. M. Kecord, and p. 75, Board's 
 Eecord), has testified as follows : 
 
 Question. State the position and force of the enemy in the immediate vicinity of 
 General I'oitcr's cf)mmand as far as you know it. 
 
 Answer. luunediately after going there my skirmishers were fired on by a body of 
 dragoons, and slioitly afterward there was a section of artillery wliich opened fire 
 upon General Porter's command. Soon after that, perhaps about two o'clock, the head 
 of a large column came to my front. They dejiloyed their skirmishers and met mine, 
 and about three o'clock drove my skirmishers into the edge of the timber. We were 
 all on the left of the Manassas liaihoad, going toward Gainesville. Their force con- 
 tinued to come down all (ha/ ; in fact, until one o'clock at night. It was a very large 
 force, and they were drawn up in line of battle as they came down. 
 
 I reported at dirt'crent intervals to General Morell, my immediate commander, the 
 position of the enemy ; but at one time I deemed it so important tliat I did not dare 
 to trust orderlies or^others with messages, and I went myself up to him to confer con- 
 cerning the enemy." This was about dusk. General Morell told me that he had just 
 received orders from General Porter to attack the enemy — to conuuence the attack 
 with /oh/- reniments. He seemed to be very much troubled concerning the order, and 
 asked my advice, my opinion. I told him" by all means not to attack ; that it was cer- 
 tain destruction for'us to do so ; that I, for one, did not wish to go into the timber and 
 attack the enemy. Their position was a strong one, and they were certainly in force 
 at that time — twice as large as our force— all of General Porter's corps. He had ex- 
 pressed to me the tenor of General Porters order. I also deemed that we had executed 
 the same with reference to the other part of the army— General Pope's army— by keep- 
 ing this large body in force, and better than we would by attacking them, because if 
 we had attacked them, I felt that it was certain destruction, as we would have had to 
 move our line of battle across this ravine into this timber, and then perhaps our line 
 of retreat would have been entirely cut ofi" fi-om General Pope's army. 
 
 I may say that this army that came down in our front was a separate and distinct 
 army of the enemy fi-om that whkh ive saw General Pope's army fightimj icith. 
 
 About the same'time — before I went in to General Morell— I could hear and judge 
 of tlie result of the fighting between the force of the enemy and General Pope's army. 
 
 / could see General Pope's left and the enemy's right during the greater part of the day, 
 about two miles off, perhaps more, diagonally to our front and to the right. The enemy set 
 up their cheering, and appeared to be charging and driving us, so that not a man of my com- 
 mand but what was certain that General Pope's army was being driven from the field. 
 
 In the different battles I have seen, Ihave learned that there is no mistaking the enemy's yell 
 when they are successful. It is diferent from that of ourown men, our men giving three suc- 
 cessive eheerx, and in'concert, but theirs is a cheering without any reference to regularity of 
 form — a coniinual yelling. 
 
96 
 
 Tii!i.s (lid tills witness testify ou the original trial. It will l)e perceived 
 that tht; point that the petitioner has undertaken to raise here, of a sep- 
 arate and large force in his front dnring that day, was raised then before 
 the court; nevertheless it is to be observed that the receipt by Morell of 
 petitioner's order to attack with four regiments, at dusk or about dusk, is 
 a fair indication of the number of the enemy the petitioner at that time 
 thought were in front of him to i)ermit of two regiments supported by 
 two others making an attack. 
 
 Capt. John S. Hatch, Fii'st Michigan Volunteers, Martindale's brigade, 
 MorelFs division, a witness for the government, testifies as follows 
 (Board's "Record, p. 600) as to what transpired at the front, near Daw- 
 kin's Branch, on the 29th August : 
 
 Question. Tell what yon saw wlieu yon got tliere at that point. 
 
 Answer. When we tnrned oflf into the woods we were preparing to go into action, 
 as I supposed. I think the pieces were loaded. Caps were left oti" the guns, and car- 
 tridges examined and cartridge-boxes, and some such things as that. We remained 
 in the woods a little time, and then we moved off to an eminence where we could look 
 off into the depression or ravine ; and then the Thirteenth New York w^as thrown out 
 as skirmishers. 
 
 Question. How long had this been after you had arrived at that point before the 
 Thirteenth was thrown in ? 
 
 Answer. It is my impression that we were loading pieces and preparing, as we 
 supposed, to go into action. I recollect Ave were talking of it together ; that it was 
 about noon. I do not recollect looking at a watch. It was about twelve o'clock, I 
 should say ; not far from that any way. 
 
 Question. That the Thirteenth were thrown out? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. You remained there during the day ? 
 
 Anaw^er. Eemained there all that day. 
 
 Question. After the Thirteenth were thrown out what did you see ? 
 
 Answer. We came out of these woods, I guess, almost entirely, so that we could see 
 the Thirteenth New York maneuver, and see the ravine and woods on beyond. I 
 think our arms were stacked — our brigade. We lay there and saw the Thirteenth 
 New York moving ; they kept moving ou until they met with some little check on the 
 other side ; there were some shots fired ; then, some time after that, a solid shot came 
 over. General Porter was there with his staff. I do not know whether there were 
 any other generals there or not. There Avas a little scattering there and a little com- 
 motion all around, until ])retty soon another one came over, and there was a piece run 
 out of the woods where the Thirteenth New York had met with some opi)osition from 
 the infantry ; there was another shot fired soon after that, and we supposed the work 
 ■was commencing. There were three shots, I think, or four shots fired. We sn]>posed 
 that they were firing at General Porter and his staff, because they were mounted and 
 conspicuous. 
 
 Question. Then what was done ? 
 
 Answer. There was nothing done by us during that afternoon. We were lying there 
 at ease until early in the evening, Avhen our brigade, a portion of it — my regiment at 
 least — was thrown out, you might say, as skirmishers. We were thrown out to guard 
 against a surprise that night — thrown out to the right of where the New York Thir- 
 teenth went down. 
 
 Question. How long did yon remain there ? 
 
 Answer. Two hours ; about that. 
 
 Question. What indications, if any, did you observe of the presence of the enemy 
 dnring the day ? 
 
 Answer. We saw fighting going on on onr right and front. 
 
 Question What kind of a contest was it? 
 
 Answer. There w;is heavy artillery firing. 
 
 Question. How loug did that continue? 
 
 Answer. Fi'om the time we came out on to that eminence, out of the woods ; tliere 
 was firing all the afternoon, but not continuous ; there was at times heavy firing, rapid 
 firing. 
 
 Question. From the character of the firing a\ hat were tlie indications ? 
 
 Answer. It w^as heavy — artillery fire. 
 
 Question. I undfrsf and you to say that you could see the action going on ? 
 
 Answer. I could not see th(^ troojjs that 1 recollect. I do not think I could, but the 
 smoke and the bursting of shells could 1>e seen, and we could hear the sound of the 
 artillery, and see the lines of smoke ; towards evening we heard musketry firing. 
 
97 
 
 • Questiou. Hnw long wass it after the Thirteenth New York went out before you saw; 
 that gnu run out that you speak off 
 
 Answer. They had time to get down three-quarters of a mile or more — i>erhaps hak 
 an hour. 
 
 Question. During the day what enemy did yon see in your front besides what you 
 have mentioned at that time f 
 
 Answer. Saw a line of dust on the left making towards Jackson, Avho we imderstood 
 was opposing our forces. 
 
 Question. At the time ? 
 
 Answer. At the time. 
 
 Question. Did you see any enemy directly in your front ? 
 
 Answer. These woods were there ; nothing more than artillery. There were infantry 
 opposed to the Thirteenth New York. 
 
 Question. *How long did they remain there, artillery and infantry ? 
 
 Answer. I do not know that ; they did not remain all the afternoon. 
 
 Question. Had no more artillery firing from them ? 
 
 Answer. The artillery, t.hree or four shots, was all that bothered us. 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Question. What time was it, iu the afternoon or toward evening, that you heard 
 that musketry tiring ? 
 
 Answer. The day was well advanced. 
 
 Question. Five or six o'clock in the evening. 
 
 Answer. I should judge so; before sundown sometime. 
 
 Question. What you had heard, jirior to that time, was all arlillery firing ? 
 
 Answer. I do not recollect any musketry firing luitil toward sundown ; perluijis the 
 sun an hour or two high. 
 
 Question. What time was it that yon were sent out on that picket-line ? 
 
 Answer. The Thirteenth New York was sent out, and I was in the same brigade with 
 them. As I say, we were preparing for action in the woods about twelve o'clock, I 
 should think. 
 
 It is plain that a ixn'tioii of tlie petitioner's corps was, on the 29tli 
 August, 1802, as charged in the lirst and second specifications of the 
 second charge, "in sight of the field and in full hearing of its artillery." 
 
 Even the petitioner, in his 0]>ening statement (p. 28), had to admit 
 that as early as when he was at Manassas Junction that day " the sound 
 of artillery in the direction of Groveton" was heard by him. 
 
 From these witnesses, both petitioner's and the government's, is ob- 
 tained concurrent testimony to material facts, which can neither be 
 evaded nor disposed of by "want of recollection" on the part of others 
 who were called, or statements fi'om others still that they "did not 
 hear" or see the contest or hear the cheers of the Union soldiers and 
 yells of the Confederates. As for the petitioner himself, he had taken 
 good care to locate his headquarters sufficiently far to the rear to inter- 
 pose the heaviest woods between himself and the action and see and 
 hear the least of the battle. 
 
 Que of the nu^st remarkable pieces of evidence in this remarkable case 
 is found in that of INIaj. Gen. Samuel G. Sturgis, United States Volun- 
 teers, now colonel Seventh United States Cavalry and brevet major- 
 general United States Army, of a conversation he had with petitioner 
 at the front, which tends to show that at that time (after McDowell had 
 gone) the petitioner did not believe that the enemy was in force in his 
 front. We have also seen by the evidence of Dr. Faxon, which has 
 just been cited, that when the petitioner borrowed his glass, in order to 
 look to the front, he seemingly was not aware of artillery there. The 
 following comprise the extracts from General Sturgis' evidence (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 711): 
 
 Question. State your rank in the Army. 
 
 Answer. Colonel Seventh Cavalry, and l)revet major-general. 
 
 Question. What rank and command did you hold on the 29th of August, 1862"? 
 
 Answer. I was brigadier-general of volunteers. I had on that day only one brigade 
 of a division, the principal part of which was back of Alexandria. On that day I 
 had onlv <nie brioadc with me, General Piatt's brigade. 
 
98 
 
 Question. Where did you move from on the moming of the 29th of August, and up 
 to what place? 
 
 Answer. I am not exactly certain where I moved from on that morning, because the 
 march of tlie '28th of August is not clear in my mind ; but I think it is in the neigh- 
 borhood of Bristoe Station. 
 
 Question. To whom were you ordered to report ? 
 
 Answ^er. General Porter ; ordered by General Porter himself to join him ; that order 
 I received at Warrenton Junction. 
 
 The Board will recollect from ^Ybat I have cited of the petitioner's 
 Oldening statement, and of his own dispatches, that the petitioner knew 
 that Stnrgis was at Warrenton Jnnction at the time that Stnrgis here 
 says he was ; he speaks of him as there (p. 89, i^etitioner ^ ojjening 
 statement) : 
 
 Question. Wher-e did you find General Porter's column ? 
 
 Answer. I found it on the road leading from Manassas Junction in the direction of 
 Gainesville; I should think a mile and a half, about, beyond Bethlehem Church. 
 
 Question. Did you bring up this brigade with you? 
 
 Answer. O, yes. 
 
 Question. You say you went a mile and a half beyond Bethlehem Clnirch tow"ard 
 Gainesville ? 
 
 Answer. That is my recollection. 
 
 Question. What did you then do ? 
 
 Answer. I reported to General Porter. I rode in advance of my brigade. I found 
 troops occupying the road, and I got up as near as I could get and then halted my 
 conmiand, and then rode forward to tell General Porter that they were there. He 
 said, "For the present, let them lie there." 
 
 Question. AVhat did you do then, individually? 
 
 Answer. W^ell, I simply looked about to see what I could see. I was a stranger to 
 the lay of the land, and the troops, and all that ; so, without getting otf my horse, I 
 rode about from place to place watching the skirmishers, and among other things I 
 took a glass and looked in the direction of the woods, about a mile beyond which 
 seemed to be the object of attention — beyond the skirmishers ; there I saw a glint of 
 light on a gun ; and I remarked to General Porter that I thought they were probably 
 putting a battery in position at that place, for I thought I had seen a gun. 
 
 Question. State what the conversation was. 
 
 Answer. I reported this fact of what I had seen to the general; he tJiought I was mis- 
 taken about it, but I was not mistaken, because it opened in a moment — at least a few 
 shots were fired from that jjlace — four, as I recollect. 
 
 The Eoard will please recollect this remark and the evidence of Gen- 
 eral Stui'gis when we consider it in connection with the petitioner's 
 statement as to what he (petitioner) saw when he was riding back from 
 his interview with General McDowell : 
 
 Question. What force of the enemy did you see in that direction at that time ? 
 
 Answer. / didn't see any of the enemy at all. 
 
 Question. Then what did you do. 
 
 Answer. Then when they had fired, as near as I can recollect, about four shots from 
 this piece, General Porter beckoned to me ; I rode up to him, and he directed me to 
 take my command to Manassas .Junction, and take up a defensive position, inasmuch 
 as the fire seemed to be receding on our right. 
 
 Question. What firing do you mean ? 
 
 Answer. I mean the cannonading that had been going on for some time on our right, 
 probably in the direction of Groveton. 
 
 It will be recollected here that when Maj. S. N. Benjamin (then Second 
 United States Artillery) got to Groveton and pnt his battery in position, 
 that at first there was a lull, he says, of half an hour (Board's liecord, 
 p. 614). 
 
 Question, llow long had you heard that cannonading. 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect exactly where I heard it first. My impression has been 
 that I heard it all along the march from Manassas to General Portc-r's position. I do 
 not recolliM't distinctly that I did hear it, but I know I heard it all the time after I 
 arrived tllel•<^ until I left. 
 
 Question. What time of day was this that you received the order to move back with 
 your command to Manassas Junction? 
 
 Answer. I have no way of fixing the time of day. I have carried in my mind the 
 impression that it was more aliont tin- middle of the day — aljout one o'clock. 
 
99 
 
 In that connection tlie Board will notice in Major Benjamin's evidence 
 that tlie latter pnts it exactly between half past twelve and one o'clock 
 for that Inil. This was not long atf er petitioner had returned from the 
 railroad to the head of his column at Dawkins' Branch, and while Gen- 
 eral McDowell must have been taking Brigadier General Patrick's brig- 
 ade up the Sudley road. 
 
 Question. AVliat did yon do "wbon yon received that order ? 
 
 Answer. I sent word to General Piatt to move back to Manassas JunctioTi, and that 
 I woukl join liim there. 
 
 Question. Do you know wlietlier yonr order w-as obeyed 1 
 Answer. Yes ; it was obeyed. 
 
 Cross-examiuatiou by Mr. Bullitt : 
 Question. "What next did you do after that ? 
 Answer. I rode back myself as far as Bethlehem Church. 
 
 So it is apparent that this \\itness did not go the entire distance with 
 the brigade. 
 
 Question. Did you receive any order from General Porter subsequent to that ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. What was it ? 
 
 Answer. To bring forward my brigade again. 
 
 Question. AVhat (iid you do ? 
 
 Answer. Brought it forward as far as Bethlehem Church. 
 
 Question. What then ? 
 
 Answer. I was ordered to encamp there. 
 
 Question. You did encamp there '! 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. How long was it after you got the order to fall back to Manassas before 
 you got the order to march back to Bethlehenr Church ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot say exactly, but as soon as I got the order to come forward again 
 I brought the brigade forward and night overtook us at Bethlehem Church — dusk ; 
 tlu'U we were ordered to eneamp there 
 
 Thus it will be perceived that a considerable time must have elajised 
 between the time of the order to go to Manassas Junction and the time 
 when that order was received to go forward again — several hours. 
 
 Question. So that the order to fall back to Manassas might have been given late in 
 the afternoon, might it not ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I don't think it could have lieen beyond two o'clock. I haA'e no 
 way of lixing the hour except by my impression of the day, as it looked ; and I recol- 
 k'ct the heat of the day. 
 
 Question. In going back after receiving this order to fall back to Manassas, did you 
 meet troops coming up to the front .^ 
 
 Answer. Yes; we met some troojis. We met some of a division. 
 
 Question. Wlmse was it? 
 
 Answer. I rhink it was Ricketts' division. That is my recollection of my inquiries 
 at tile time. 
 
 Question. At what point was it ? 
 
 Answer. Near Bethlehem Church ; we turned off to their rir/ht. 
 
 So that he must have got back here, between Bethlehem Church and the 
 Sudley road, at the time he met Eicketts. 
 
 Question. Did you halt your command at that point ? 
 
 Answer. I was not with my own command. It had preceded me. They liad gone 
 back. I rode back following thein. 
 
 Question. Were you not left at Warrenton .Tunction on the 29th to guard a train 
 until the arrival of General Banks ? Do ynu recollect that ? 
 
 Answer. On the 'Slith ? No, sir. 
 
 Question. On the STtli? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; on the •27th ? 
 
 Question. You remained there until yoit were relieved from that duty ? 
 
 Answei-. My (uders from General Porter were to march and join him as soon as 
 fJcneral Banks would come up, who was bringing up the rear; but inasmuch as General 
 Banks got possession of the road in advance of me. I brought up the rear myself. 
 
 Qiu'stion. Do you recollect about what time of day it was when you rei)orted to 
 f Jeneral Porter that you were on the ground with your troojis ? 
 
 8 G 
 
100 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I tliiiik it was about tlie middle of tlie day. I cauuot fix it definitely 
 
 Question. Had General Porter's troops then deployed i? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; they were not deployed; many of them were occupying the road. 
 I don't know what troops were immediately there with them, except a battery. 
 
 Question. Did you see his troops deydoyed in front ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; uothinj^ but skirmishers. I saw the skirmish line. 
 
 Question. You did not see Morell's division deployed ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Were you up at the front ? 
 
 AnsAAer. Yes ; it might have been, but I don't recollect now seeing it. I don't 
 recollect that there were any troops deployed. 
 
 Eedirect examination : 
 
 Question. You have stated that you saw Ricketts' division come up toward Bethle- 
 hem Church while you were stationed at Manassas Junction ? 
 
 Answer. No ; as I was reaching Bethlehem Church on my way back I met it. 
 
 Question. As you were going back to Manassas Junction you met Ricketts' division 
 coming up ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect any incidents connected with the arrival of General 
 Ricketts' division which impressed that fact on your memory? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I recollect a fact that it struck me as strange that ice sliould be gobnj hack 
 rvhile they tcere apparently f/oing in the direction of the firing off to their right. 
 
 Question. Otf toward the Sudley road ? 
 
 Answer. On the right as they came uj) from Manassas Junction, off in the direction 
 of the firing. 
 
 Question. By looking at the map would you be aljle to indicate whether it was the 
 Manassas and Sudley road that you refer to? 
 
 Answer. That is on so large a scale that I doubt if I could. Ricketts was taking 
 the right-hand road, the Manassas and Sudley road ; my impression is it was right at 
 the church ; the junction of the roads was as far as I went back. My brigade had 
 moved back to Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. AYhere did you see a battery on the road that you have mentioned when 
 you went up to the front ? I understood you to say you saw some battery on the road. 
 
 Answer. There was a battery at the point where I reported to General Porter — in 
 that vicinity. 
 
 Question. What were the troops of General Porter's corps doing when you saw them? 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect that they were doing anything. They were perfectly quiet, 
 apparently waiting. 
 
 Question. Were their arms stacked ? 
 
 Answer. Everybody seemed to be lying around, just the waj" you do before a battle, 
 in anticipation of news of some movement. 
 
 # * * a » ■» *■ 
 
 Question. Was that General Piatt's regular brigade which you brought up ? 
 
 Answer. It was known as Piatt s brigade ; I was not familiar wit j it. The fact was 
 that thei'e was a division forming for me, and this brigade had been sent down to 
 Warrenton Junction; I was not so familiar with that brigade; I don't know that I 
 had seen it at that time. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Question. How did you learn that those were Ricketts' troops that you saw? 
 
 Answer. I simply inquired at the time what troops they were, and Avas informed — 
 I do not recollect by whom ; simply general notoriety at the time. 
 
 Question. Were they then on their march toward the Warrenton pike along that 
 Sudley Sjjrings road ? 
 
 AusAver. All I knoAA^ about them Avas tliat they turned off to their right on a road 
 close to the church. 
 
 Question. Did you see General McDoAvell at that point ? 
 
 AnsAvcr. I did; but not at that time. 
 
 ****** * 
 
 Question. Did you see General McDowell in that neighborhood that day? 
 AnsAver. I met him at Bethel Churcli on my Avay up to the front. 
 Question. When you were going u\> to General Porter? 
 AnsAver. Yes. 
 
 Question. You Avent up to the fi-ont. Y(ui remained there Iioav long? 
 Answer. I'robably Ave remained there an hour and a lialf, or two hours. 
 Question. Then you came back, and Avas it Avhen you returned that you saAV these 
 troojys of (ieneral Ricketts moving in the direction toAvard Warrenton? 
 An-swer. Yes. 
 
101 
 
 By the Presidext oi^ the Boaud : 
 
 Question. Was it on your return that you met General McDowell? 
 
 Answer. When I was going up. 
 
 Question. When you were eoniiug up vou met General ]\IeDowell at Bethlehem 
 Chiu-ch .' 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. In what direetion was he eoming ? 
 
 Answer. He told me where General Porter was ; whether he told mr he liad heen up 
 there I don't know. He had just arrived from some point, and told me where General 
 Porter was. 
 
 Question. Where did he go then ? 
 
 Answer. I left him there. 
 
 Question. Did you see auytking of King's division ? 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
 Question. It was when you came hack, then, that you saw Ricketts' division ? 
 
 Answer. We met a division which, on inquiry, we were told was Ricketts'. 
 
 It is apparent from tbi.s evideDce, iu connection with what had hap- 
 l)ened just before off to the right of Dawldus' Branch and the "Manas- 
 sas and Gainesville" road, towards the Manassas Gap Railroad, that the 
 portion of ^lorell's division nnder Griftin which had moved over to the 
 riyht had been bronght back and had 1)een pnt back on the road, and 
 that the moment petitioner saw any indications of an enemy, irrespect- 
 ive of the number, he actually began to retreat. 
 
 Brig. Gen. A. S. Piatt, United States Volunteers, of Sturgis' division, 
 also testitied as follows (Board's Becord, p. 1015) : 
 
 Question. From Manassas .Junction where did you go? 
 
 Answer. I was ordered up the Thoroughfare Gap road, and I marched up, as near as 
 I could judge, between three and fouj- miles. I cannot tell exactly the distance. There 
 1 was halted by General Sturgis on the lett of the railroad. 
 
 Question. Left of what raihoad? 
 
 Answer. The Manassas Gii]> Raihoad. 
 
 Question. That road that you went up, what ])lace did it go to or pass through? 
 
 Answer. As near as I know, it went througii Manassas Gai). 
 
 Question. Were there troops in front of you? 
 
 Answer. There were troops in front of me. When I came to a halt, there was a 
 brigade or more than a brigade in front of me ; tliey ]>assed a little in front, in fact 
 out of sight of where I was halted. 
 
 Question. Whose troops were they ? 
 
 Answer. I could not say. 
 
 Question. Did you hear any firing f 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I heard tiring from 10 o'clock in The day. There was continued firing 
 from the time I left Manassas Junction, according to my remembrance of it, up to the 
 time I lialted, and afterwards. 
 
 Question. AVhere was tliis firing ? 
 
 Answer. It was to my right and front, as it were. There was less firing out where 
 I was lialted. While I was standing thei'e I had time for observation. It was to my 
 right and front, and also to my right and back ; I seemed to be perpendicular to two 
 parallel lines of firing. 
 
 Question. That wlijch was more nearly in your front, what was it? 
 
 Answer. I supposed it to be a Confederate force. While I was standing there were 
 three shots fired, and, as I judged at tlu^ time, they were to my right and front, on the 
 right of the road, as I fae^id up the road. There were three shots fired there that I 
 coiild see the smoke rise from the guns from where I stood. 
 
 Question. Apparently a Confederate battery? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; where' I stood there was quite a uuml>er of trees ; then there were 
 patches of road ; there was an opening, and then there was a screen of trees or timber, 
 not very tali, that screened the position of this artillery which was tired from there. 
 At the time of seeing this position, it struck me as a very favorable one. I did not 
 know at that time tliat it was the Confederate artillery. 
 
 Question. What did you next do ? 
 
 Answer. The next I did, I was ordered to march to Manassas Junction from that 
 
 point by General Stiu'gis. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Question. What was the character of the country between you and the battery ? 
 
 Answer. It was up hill, slightly an elevation. 
 
 Question. Go on as near as you can recollect and describe the country. 
 
 Answer. The country was undulating, rolling slightly, not very much, from Manas- 
 
102 
 
 sas Junction up to the point I had readied. There was a little depression in the 
 ground that I had jjassed ; and it continued, as I recollect, to rise gradually up to this 
 point where I saw these three columns of smoke that rose from the artillery that was- 
 tired. 
 
 Question. Did you see any other Confederate force there ? 
 
 Answer. I saw no Coniederate force. I only saw thishattery. 
 
 Question. Did you form any estimate at the time as to what force would be sufficient 
 to take that hatterv ' 
 
 (Objected to.) 
 
 Answer. I could not form that estimate, for I did not see the force before me. The 
 only idea that struck me was the feasibility of attacking it. 
 
 Question. In the position in which that battery was placed, what opportunities 
 presented themselves to you from your observation, made at the time, for attack? 
 
 Answer. As the ground was interspersed over the road*with timber, a little opening, 
 and beyond was a screen of woods, and that could have been approached very easily, 
 and any force by oi)en order passed through, it struck me that the battery might have 
 been assaulted without great difficulty. 
 
 Question. After you marched back to Manassas Junction, what were the next orders 
 you received ? 
 
 Answer. I received orders to march back to Manassas Junction. I marched back 
 towards Manassas Junction, but before I reached Manassas Junction I was overtaken 
 by an order to countermarch and march back again, which I did, back to the original 
 position. 
 
 Question. What time was that when yon got back to your original position ? 
 
 Answer. It was along towards the close of the evening. 
 
 Question. What did you do then f 
 
 Answer. I then was ordered into camp for the night. 
 
 Question. How long during the day did you hear this firing that you say you heard 
 off to the right ? ' , 
 
 Answer. I think it was about from ten o'clock in the day, as near as I can recollect, 
 that there was a continued firing, more or less. 
 
 Question. Up to what time f 
 
 Answer. I think the firing, if I recollect correctly, was until I got back, or nearly 
 back, to the original position. They had ceased before I got quite back. 
 
 Question. What was the tiring that you heard ? 
 
 Answer. My remembrance is that it was artillery firing that I heard. 
 
 Question. How far did you march backward ? 
 
 Answer. About two-thirds of the distance from my position there, as I judge, to 
 Manassas Junction, before I was ordered back again. 
 Question. How long did your march take you f 
 Answer. When I got back it was in the eveniug. 
 
 Question. Do yoii know that that was a Confederate battery at all ? 
 Answer. I judge it was from the direction of the fire, it being perpendicular to 
 where I stood. 
 
 Question. Your line formed a right-angle with the two lines ? 
 
 [Witness indicates the relative situation.] 
 
 Question. Was that the only way you inferred that it was a Confederate battery ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Were there any batteries near you that responded ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. There was no response ? 
 
 Answer. None that I heard ; those were the only three shots while I was there. 
 
 * * * . # * * * 
 
 Question. Were you in the\icinity of any large body of troops when you encamped ? 
 
 Answ(u-. Griffin's brigade was right over the railroad from me when I encamped that 
 evening. 
 
 Question. Whei-e was Sykes' regulars? 
 
 Answer. I will state this: it was either Griffin's brigade or Sykes' regulars. 
 
 Question. Over The railroad — to your left or right '! 
 
 Answer. That would be to the right of the railroad. In taking the right I am 
 always facing toward the gap. 
 
 General McDowell, as we liave seen, stated on the orioinal trial that 
 when he and tlie petitioner went lialf a mile to the right to the ^Manassas 
 Gap Railroad the '^ sound of battle seemed to be at its height/' 
 
 In the cross-examination on the direct evidence he had given in 18G2 — 
 not the cross-examination tlieii concluded, but that instituted against 
 
103 
 
 objection before this Board — General McDowell vsaid (Board's Becord, p. 
 801): 
 
 Question. Then if, after you took Kinuaway, there was not only a large army of the 
 rebels, twice as large as yon thought, Ijetween Gainesville and Groveton. hut actual 
 information of its being there was brought in the way I have stated to General Porter, 
 woulfl yon not consider that he was then 1)ound to act on his own discretion, without 
 regard to the suggestion or direction yon had given on leaving him ? 
 
 The WiTXESS. My opinion at the time was formed upon the l)elief that in front of 
 General Porter was a force reported by General Buford. If there had been a ditt'ereut 
 force I do not doubt I shonld have acted ditferently, but how differently I do not now 
 know. 
 
 The question was then repeated. 
 
 Answer. I should say to this extent : I do not think it would have justified him in 
 doing nothing. I think he should have made some movement, some tentative opera- 
 tion, at least. 
 
 Question. I do not ask you what he should have done. 
 
 Answer. You made a certain sui)posed state of facts. You ha^e supposed a con- 
 dition of affairs and asked me what should have been done. 
 
 Mr. C'HOATE. I have asked the witness whether General Porter was then to act on 
 his own discretion, without regard to the suggestion or direction that General Mc- 
 Dowell had given to him. 
 
 The Witness. No. If that is the way you put it I will say this : I concede that at 
 the time I left General Porter, and for some short time lu-evious to that, he was sub- 
 ject 1o my orders. If I had given him an order, my separating from him — but that is 
 a (question for this Board to determine — but if he were under my command at that 
 time, and I at that time had power to give him a valid order, I think that my sepa- 
 rating and going away from him would not have relieved him from the operations of 
 that order, and he should have carried it out without it was either countermanded by 
 .some su)ienor authority, or that the execution of it became impossible. 
 
 Question. Didn't you think that when you left him he was left to the unrestrained 
 o])erations of General Pope's joint order? 
 
 Answer. Xo, sir; as modified by me. It is for the Board to decide that question. 
 
 Question. Suppose that General Porter ascertained after you left him that the rebel 
 force in front of hiin was twice what you had supi>osed it to be and spoken of to him, 
 and twice Porter's own force, do you think then that he should have made an attack? 
 
 Answer. I think he shonld have tbund out the force. 
 
 Question. You say he should have tested and tound out the force ? 
 
 Answer. I think so; that is a (piestion for this Board. 
 
 Question. Xow, having tested and found out a force quite as large as his own, do 
 you think he should have attacked them ? 
 
 Answer. He should have made some tentative operations. There are a number of 
 ways of attacking. You attack headlong, or you skirmish, or you shell. But to do 
 nothing whatever certainly would not be comidying with the order — to make no effort 
 with the trt)oi)S. 
 
 Question. \ow, I ask you, if after making efforts necessary for the purpose he had 
 ascertained there was "a force there double his own, after you left him and took 
 King away, do you say that he should have attacked? 
 
 Answer. He should have made an attack, yes. 
 
 Question. He should have made an attack just as you ordered it ? 
 
 Answer. My order was, I confess to yon, a very vague one. It was made to a person 
 whose zeal aiid activity and energy I had every knowledge of— I did not pretend to 
 give him any particular instructions or directions that he should skirmish, or shell, or 
 charge, or anything of the sort : I merely indicated the direction in which his troops 
 shouhl be applied. " Further than that I did not think and would not think now if I 
 had the thiug to go over again to direct. 
 
 Question. You did not construe it as an order given by you to an interior general? 
 
 Answer. Certainlv I did. 
 
 Questiini. \Vhat did you mean. then, by giving orders that were vague and amounted 
 to nothing ? 
 
 Answer. I did not say that. 
 
 Question. "Well, gave orders of the kind you have described? 
 
 Answer. ^Vhat orders ? 
 
 Question. "What did you mean by giving orders ''vague," and merely an indicatn)n ? 
 
 Answer. I meant just what I said: that General Porter commanded a corps. I did 
 not t(,'ll him that he should dephty so numy troops, or that he shonld put in so many 
 skirmishers, or so many liatteries, and do this, that, or the other. Those are questions 
 of detail which as an'army corps commander he was to carry out. All I did was to 
 give line to his operations. 
 
104 
 
 Question. You uicaut that with the iudieatiou you gave him he shoukl act on his 
 own discretiou '! 
 
 Answer. Yes; but he should act. 
 
 * * I * » * * * 
 
 Question. "Would it not make a difference, in your opinion, as to theprobahh' result 
 of an attack by General Porter, whether the rebel force in front of him was conliued 
 to the troops mentioned in Bulbrd's dispatch, or was an army twice as great ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Eecohder. I submit before that is answered that this is a line of questioning 
 that is foreign to my direct examination. 
 
 The President of the Board. I understand that this cross-examination is upon 
 his original testimony, 
 
 Tlie Recorder. I submit to the Board that he has no right to that. 
 
 The President of the Board. It is already decided. 
 
 Question. On page 95 you said : 
 
 "Question. Had the accused made a vigorous attack with his force on the right tiank 
 of the enemy at any time before the battle closed, would or would not, in your opinion, 
 the decisive res'.ilt in favor of the I'nion army, of which you have spoken, have fol- 
 lowed ? 
 
 "Answer. I think it would." 
 
 That was in refei-euce to what you had said about tive or six o'clock, namely: 
 
 "Question. What would proViably have been the effect upon the fortunes of that 
 battle if between five and six o'clock in the afternoon General Porter, with his whole 
 force, had thrown himself upon the right wing of the enemy, as directed in this order 
 of 4.30 p. m. of the 21)th of August, Avhicli has been read to you 1 
 
 "Answer. I think it would have been decisive in our favor.'' 
 
 AVould it not have made a difCerence, in your opinion, on-those questions, if Gen- 
 eral Porter's attack was to be made, not upon the force mentioned iu Buford's dis- 
 patch, but upon the whole of Longstreet's army of twice that niimber? 
 
 Answer. You will understand that that attack there, at least as it was projiounded 
 to me for an opinion, was to be an attack in conjunction Avith the attack made along 
 the "Warrenton pike, or with the forces that were confronting what was known as 
 Jackson's force. If you read a little farther on that same question, and give the Avhole 
 of Avhat I said there, and gi^e all the bases I then gave of the opinion that Avas asked 
 of me — it was that, excn if there Avere a superior force opposed to General Porter, he 
 should have attacked that suiierior force; that he would liaAe Avithdrawu the enemy 
 from and relieA'ed the front of another jiart of the line. 
 
 Question. AVould it make no difference, in your oi>inion, A\hether he had 1"2,000 or 
 25,(!00 troops in front of him? 
 
 AnsAver. Of course. 
 
 Question. It would just make the difference betAveen decisiA'e in our faA'or and not 
 being decisi\'e ? 
 
 Answer. I Avill not say that. 
 
 Question. What ditference Avould it have made ? 
 
 AnsAver. I cannot tell you. 
 
 Question. No man can tell, can he ? 
 
 AnsAA'cr. Xo, sir. Let me say this: If the main contest was equally balanced, and 
 under those circumstances an attack by 10,000 men had been vigorously made, it cer- 
 tainly would have turned the scale in our favor. 
 
 Question. * * * dj^i you intend that he should get into a general engagement 
 Avith the enemy Avhile you were remoA^ed from the scene back on the !Sndley road so as 
 
 to be out of all i^ossibility of rendering him immediate assistance ' 
 
 # * * # » * 
 
 Answer. AVlien I left General Porter I left him a coi'ps commander, for him to 
 operate in the direction iudicateil. How qrlickly he Avas to get in an engagement, 
 Avhether an hour or an hour and a half, and how he Avould do it, Avhether in one Avay 
 or another, I did not indicate, nor did I take it into my mind; it was simply that he 
 Avas to operate on the left, and necessarily when he got OA'er there the nature of his 
 operations Avould be determined l>y the condition of things that he would find. What 
 those conditions Avould be, I could not at that tinu' tell. As to saying that I did not 
 want him to do any fighting until I got around to a certain place, I made no such 
 caleulatif)ns. 
 
 Question. I ask you Avhat you exjiected or intended ? 
 
 Answer. I say Avhat I expected or intended. 
 
 (Question. You did not expect that he should become engaged Avith the enemy until 
 you should get around on the h'ft of Kcynolds '! 
 
 Answer. Yes, I did. 
 
105 
 
 It will be obser\'ed, iu reference to these questions so skillfully put by 
 the very able counsel who cross-examined General McDowell here on 
 his ''original" testimony, that he has been asking him as to Avhat he 
 expected or supposed the petitioner Avas to do. But that I sul)mit was 
 not and is not the light in which it is to be taken. We are to take the 
 words and acts of General McDowell, what he said' to the ijetitiouer, 
 and what the petitioner did under those orders that were given him, as 
 indicating" what was expected, or supposed, or understood. "What he 
 might have had iu his mind might have been very difterent from the 
 language that he used. I merely invite attention to this line of ques- 
 tioning on the part of the petitioner ; it, in my judgment, has no bearing 
 upon the case. However, upon examining the lauguage that General 
 McDowell swore on tlie trial he did use, and the acts of the petitioner 
 immediately afterwards in simulating to do precisely what General 
 McDowell had told him to do, we find that the orders of General IMcDow- 
 ell at that time correspond exactly with what he says, namely, that the 
 petitioner Avas to attdcl:. 
 
 AVe have now concluded as to what petitioner did on the 20th August 
 in tlie way of developing the enemy's strength except as to his dis- 
 patches, if the petitioner knew then all he claims to know now as to 
 this force, it is certain that he did not communicate his knowledge to 
 General McDowell; and his dispatches to and from his officers, to which 
 he refers as being some of the sources of his information, do not war- 
 rant the claim he has made that he then knew of this assumedly large 
 force being on General Jackson's right, or whose it was. 
 
 From hi"s skirmish or picket line was certainly the quarter from whence 
 such information in this case had to be obtained, yet those who were out 
 there gave no evidence of it. 
 
 See JMorelPs dispatch Is'^o. 'M), where lie says : 
 
 Gexkral : CoIoiU'l Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the woods 
 on our right, towards the railroad, aud two regimeuts of infantry on the road. If 
 this is so it will be hot here in the monniio. 
 
 See Colonel Marshairs rei>ort to General Morell (Xo. 34), where he 
 says, late in the day : 
 
 General Morell : The .MU'iiiy must be iu a niiich larger foree than I can see. From 
 the commands of the officers I sjionld judgf a hrUjade. They are endeavoring to come 
 in on our left, and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on the left as the 
 movement of artillery. Their advance is quite close. 
 
 In these there is nothing to indicate the knowledge it is claimed was 
 then possessed of this large force of Longstreet; two batteries and two 
 regiments in one instance, and at least a brigade in another. 
 
 And petitioner did not give evidence of such knowledge when, late in 
 the afternoon, he gave his" order to i»ush up "two regiments supporting 
 two others to attack" (see dispatch Xo. 37), at, as he says, about G p. m. 
 
 retitioner claims that by his course he held in check a force of the 
 eneniv at. least doul)le his own, and thus saved Pope from total defeat. 
 r>ut in the reports of their operations on the 20th, Generals Stuart and 
 Longstreet both concur iu stating that, after they had taken preliminary 
 measures to resist petitioner's advance, he, after firing a few shots, 
 retired — one said to ]\[anassas — and thereafter they were not materially 
 inlluenced by him. 
 
 They were however in error as to petitioner's having gone to Manas- 
 sas ; he had only been successful in " putting everything out of their 
 sight"; and, it will be seen, so far as his force was concerned, out of 
 their minds as well Part of his troops did go back to near there. 
 
 1 have already ^;aid that in my judgment Longstreet's testimony as to 
 
106 
 
 having about 25,000 ineu more or less ou the ground or near it, most of 
 the 29th, was not an important element in this case. 
 
 The question is solely what i)etitioner knew was in front of him. His 
 oicn e.rhibif.s are (■oncliisii-e af/ainst him. 
 
 In disi)ateh Xo. 30, jMajor-Geueral Morell stated two batteries and two 
 regiments to have eome down on their right, and then hazards the re- 
 mark, based on this report, '• If this be so, it will be hot here in the 
 morning,'' showing conclusively that at th<(t time Lougstre^t was not 
 thought to be in force in his front. 
 
 It was sufdcient, however, for the accused, and immediately the gal- 
 lant Fifth Corps was put out of sight, and part ordered to fall back to 
 Manassas Junction, several miles distant. 
 
 In this connection it seems pertinent to ask why Xo. 33 was sent, viz : 
 
 Gexeral Moijeix: Hold ou if yoii can to yoTir present place. What is passing? 
 
 This does not betray much confidence in his defensive position, nor 
 that he himself was in a place where he could know what was going on 
 nor his corps ready to resist assault. 
 
 If there was danger of l)eiug crushed, why instead of writing did he 
 not go at once to the front ? 
 
 It seems certain that he made no sustained, or vigorous, or even fitful 
 effort to ascertain during that <Uiy the strength of the force opposed, as 
 he claims, to him, or to establish commmiication between his corps and 
 the left of General Pope's army. 
 
 To say that because he then or now believes the force on his front to 
 have been very much greater than his own, and to offer such statement 
 as an excuse for failing to go to the aid of General Pope's army or failing 
 to attack is in derogation of the traditions and history of the American 
 army, some of whose most glorious victories have been won against 
 superiority of numbers, or apparent^ insurmountable obstacles. jMajor- 
 General Jackson at ZS^ew Orleans, Taylor at Buena Yista, Scott at 
 Lundy's Lane and in his ]:)attles from Tera Cruz to the city of 3Iexico, 
 and Grant in the Wilderness campaign are i)ertinent illustrations of the 
 point raised. 
 
 Mr. Peudergrast in his "^'Law relating to Officers in the Army" (re- 
 vised edition, 1854, ]>. .53), says: 
 
 The duty of military oliedieuce to the commands of superior officers is most fully 
 recognized by courts of law ; and it has heen held that disobedience never admits of 
 justification ; that nothing but the physical impossibility of obeying an order can ex- 
 cuse the non-performance of it : and that when such impossibility is proved, the 
 charge of disobedieiice falls to the ground. The learning ou this subject is to be found 
 in the great case of Sutton rs. Johnstone (1st Term Reports, p. 548), which was an 
 action by Captain Sutton, of His ^lajisty's ship Isis, against Commodore .Johnstone, 
 for arresting and imprisoning him ou cliarges of miscon(iuct and disobedieiu^e to orders 
 in the action with the French squadron under M. Suftrein, in Porto Praya Bay, 
 in the year 17S"2 ; and thei"e the Two chief Justices, Lord Mansfield and Lord Lough- 
 borough, laid down the law in the following terms: 
 
 A subordinate officer must not ji((lf/r of tlic ilanf/cr, jiroprieti/, expedicncn, or consequence of 
 V/ic order he rcceires; he must obey ; nofhiny ('((n excuse him but a plnjsical impossibilitu. 
 
 A forlorn hope ix devoted ; nianii fjaJIroil otticershare been devoted. 
 
 Fleets hare been sared and victories obtained hij orderimj particular ships upon f/cs;y>(v-a^' 
 services, ivith altnosta certaintij of death or capture. 
 
 Mr. Pendergrast in his citation makes the reservation always under- 
 stood that the oi-der given is not manifestly and clearly illegal. 
 
 The General in Chief of the AnuMican Army (Sherman), in referring 
 to this jtrinciiile of obedience to orders in action (24th February, 1870), 
 re-emmciated the rule laid down by the two eminent lord chief justices, 
 for he said •' that the stronger the force of the enemy present at the time 
 the oflicer recei\ed the ordeis, the greater the necessity for him and his 
 
107 
 
 troops to pitch in, even if roughly handled, to relieve, j^ro lanto, the otlier 
 forces engaged." 
 
 WAS THERE A BATTLE ON THE 29TH ? 
 
 One of the most astonishing things in the petitioner's case is the effort 
 he has made to prove no battle on the 20th August, and to do this he 
 has brought several ofticers to testify they di<l not hear any. 
 
 It is necessary lor petitioner to estal)lish this, because, as the Count 
 de Paris said, in a letter dated 8th October, 1876 : 
 
 Under liis first iiistriictious, liis duty would have been to attack tlie lar.i>e and wcll- 
 ]>osted forces of tlie enemy which he unexpectedly met near -the railroad Only in two 
 cases : 
 
 1. If lie had received from a superior the X'ositive orders to do so. 
 
 2. If he had been aware that a great battle was raging near enough for him to take 
 a direct or indirect part in it. 
 
 In this case it will be perceived the Count assumes a large force in 
 presence of petitioner. 
 
 Was there a 1)attle rcujiiui that day ? Let the oflicial reports. Union 
 and Confederate, which form part of the evidence now on file in the 
 War Department, attest the fact. 
 
 The theory of the petitioner on this head is the theory of civilians 
 without military experience — one like his 27th August theory, that the 
 night was too dark, &c., for him to even undertake to begin earnestly to 
 obey a peremptoiy order. 
 
 This petit ioucr wan as much eoHvicted Inj the erideiice he hiinse[fhron<jht 
 on his original trial as by that of (/overnmcnt. 
 
 Take, for example, the 4.30 ]►. m. order, to move at once into action. 
 
 Where was he when he got it ? 
 
 He was 2f miles from his front, at the forks of the Sudley Church and 
 Manassas and Gainesville roads, 
 
 Brigadier-General Sykes was with him. ami, on the original trial, testi- 
 fied to the receipt of a written order from General Po^je and then 
 answered on cross-examination as folh)ws (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 178) : 
 
 Question. Did General Porter make known to you the character of that order? 
 
 Answer. He did not. 
 
 Question. Did he read it in your presence ? 
 
 Answer. Not that I know of. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain with (ieneral Porter on that occasion after the 
 receipt of that order? 
 
 Answer. I continued with him from that time all night. 
 
 One thing may be considered as quite certain, and that is, if the i)eti- 
 tioner had at any time, from the mouu^nt of receipt of that imi)erative 
 order, any intention loyalty to oltey it, he would have acquainted his 
 division commander and personal friend. 
 
 It is aluu)st an insult to the memory of the Union dead who fell on that 
 field that day, while ol jeying orders, to discuss the question as to whether 
 there was a battle. 
 
 yo effort has been made here by me to ascertain the actual losses. 
 General Pope, in his oftlcial report (introduced by petitioner), estimated 
 them, from the reports he received, at six or eight thousand killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Hooler, says that his division alone, of Heintzelman's cori)s 
 lost between 1,000 and'l,200 men (Board's Pecord, p. 017), and .Maj. (icn. 
 Frauz Sigel swears that his own corps lost about 1,100 or 1,500 inen. 
 If to these losses are added those equally severe in Kearney's division 
 of Heintzelman's corps, and Maj. Gen. Ileno's division of Burnside's corps, 
 
108 
 
 togetlier with the heavy losses experienced by King's division, nnder 
 Hatch, of McDowelFs corps — witliout considering- the k>sses in Eeynokl's 
 division of ^fcDoweirs connnand, one of whose brigades, under Brig. 
 Gen. G. G. ]Meade, very hite in the day (Board's Ilecord, p. 500) got 
 seriously into action Avhile supporting King's attack, it will be seen 
 that General Pope's rough estimate was very near, if not below, the 
 actual loss. 
 
 The battle, like most of the battles of tlie war of the rebellion, con- 
 sisted in a series of detached assaults, instead of a united movement, 
 until late in tlie day. 
 
 Whether, in a military sense, this was the best under the circum- 
 stances, or whether different strategical or tactical movements would 
 have resulted in greater advantage to the national arms, is a question 
 wholly foreign to this case, which is as to what petitioner did or failed 
 to do under his orders. 
 
 In the afternoon — after the 4.30 order had been sent him — the com- 
 manding general endeavored to make a combined attack. Why it was 
 not completely successful will be found explained in petitioner's inaction. 
 
 Capt. .-1. M. Ifandol, First United States Artillery, Fifth Cori)s, a wit- 
 ness for petitioner, says (Board's Eecord, p. 04) he heard artillery firing 
 occasionally during the day, sometimes quite heavy, evidently batteries 
 engaging one another. 
 
 Heard no infantry tiring until evening, and then "a very severe 
 infantry fire, which attracted the attention of everybody as being very 
 severe, and evidently considerable fighting going on over towards 
 Groveton." . 
 
 At that time, according to his evidence, he was back where the i^eti- 
 tioner was, near the forks of the Sudley Springs and the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road. 
 
 Lieut. S. 21. Weld, iietitioner's then aide-de-camp, admits (p. 208) that 
 when General McDowell and the petitioner moved over to the railroad 
 he could see "shells bursting high in the air." Severe artillery fire at 
 times. 
 
 Col. George I). Ruf/gles, assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., then 
 chief of staii" to Major-General Pope, was called by petitioner on the 
 original trial, and said (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 159) : 
 
 Question by Court. Was or not tlie musketry tire, on the 29th August, which jon 
 have spoken of in your testimony, indicative of a severe engagement between large 
 bodies of men ? 
 
 Answer. Tlie musketry fire was ; but I desire to say that I did not hear the musketry 
 firing myself until I came on the ground. The musketry firing which I heard after I 
 came on the ground indicated an engagement between large bodies of men. 
 
 Commissary Sergeant John Bond., First Maryland Cavalry Volunteers, 
 Sigel's Corps (Board's Eecord, p; 882), government witness, saw three 
 distinct charges in tiie afternoon about one or two o'clock. 
 
 Capt. LeGrand Benedict^ assistant adjutant-general, Carr's brigade. 
 Hooker's division, ITeintzelman's corps (Board's Eecord, p. 934), gov- 
 ernment witness, read from the official report of Col. Joseph B. Carr, 
 commanding, as follows: 
 
 TTF,.\DQUARTr.i;s Third Bkigade, Hooker's Division', 
 Camp >ear Fort Lyox, Vii'.gixia, 
 
 SejUcmhcr B, ISIS. 
 
 At two (2) o'clock Friday morning, August 29, I received orders to march at three 
 a. m. and sujiport General Kearney who was in jiursuit of the enemy. A nnii'ch often 
 miles brouglit us to the Onll Run battle-field. About eleven (11) a. m. was ordered 
 in jiosiHon to suppni-t a battery in licnit of the woods, wh'.'re the enemy with Ceneral 
 
109 
 
 Sigel's troops was engaged. Eemaiuiug about one hour in that position, was ordered 
 to seud into the woods and relieve two regiments of General Sigel's corps. I sent in 
 the 6th and 7th New Jersey Volunteers. Afterwards received orders to take the 
 balance of the brigade iu the Avoods, which I did at about two (2) p. m. Here I 'at 
 once engaged the enemy, and fought him for a space of two hours, holding my position 
 until otir ammunition was all expended. About four (4) o'clock we were relieved by 
 General Reno and Colonel Taylor, but did not reach the skirt of the woods before a 
 retreat was made and the woods occupied by the enemy. When I arrived out of the 
 woods I was ordered to march about half a mile to the rear and bivouac for the 
 night. 
 
 Tlie wituess assisted in preparing the report, and knew of its ac- 
 curacy. 
 
 Col. 21. B. Lal-enian, commanding- Third Maine Yohinteers, Second 
 Brigade, First Division, Heintzelmau's corps, said (p. 034) there was 
 " very severe fighting on our front the whole time.'' 
 
 His regiment ^Yent into action three times; once at 11 a. m., again at 
 12 m., and again at three p. m. There was continuous fighting all the 
 time, from 11 up to dark, in his own brigade. (Board's Eecord, p. 935.) 
 
 B. F.BHttcrJield, Sixty-third rennsylvania Volunteers, Eobinson's bri- 
 gade, Kearney's division, Heintzelmau's corps, said they arrived on the 
 field about noon (Board's Eecoid, p. 939). " Before we went into action 
 there was an incessant firing on our left, and had been ever since we 
 arrived on the field — heavy infantry firing." This corresponds with what 
 Captain ]\Iouteith, General McDowell, Dr. Faxon, and Captain Hatch 
 have said, who could see the bursting of the shells. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Franz Sigcl (Board's Becord, p. 940) says the greater part 
 of his corps was in action the whole day until evening."' 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. Thomas F. McCoy, colonel One hundred and seventh 
 Pennsylvania Volunteers, Duryea's brigade, Eicketts' division, McDow- 
 ell's corps, says (Board's Eecord, i>. G-t2) they left Gainesville at day- 
 light, and heard heavy cannonading when they left Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. In going up from Manassas Jmiction toward Sudley Church, on that road, 
 what indications, if any, Avere there of an action on Friday the 29th / 
 
 AusAver. HeaA-'y cannonading. We heard, as I remarked before, heaA'y cannonading 
 Avheu Ave left Mana.ssas .Junction, which continued until Ave arrived within view of 
 part of The moA'ements and actions ; Ave could then see the infantry on the left of Pope's 
 line. 
 
 Question. What could you see going on ? 
 
 AnsAver. When we came in aIcav on a prominent piece of ground where the road 
 passed, Ave saw the left of Pope's line adA'ancing i»artly on a charge into a wood or to 
 a wood ; there was cheering from their troops and ours. 
 
 Question. Yoii mean Ricketts' diAisiou '? 
 
 AnsAver. Yes. There was a good deal of excitement about that tim'j among the sol- 
 diers. 
 
 Question. What musketry firing was there, if any ? 
 
 Answer. There Avas musketry tiring at that time. That Avas about the closing of the 
 day. 
 
 Question. About where Avas your regiment at that time, Avould you say, upon the 
 road f 
 
 Answer. I don't knoAV whether I could shoAV it ujion the map or not. It was a prom- 
 inent piece of ground upon the Sudley road that uiAcs a good AicAv of the battle- 
 ground — a pretty good view of it. AVheu Ave came there Ave first saAV the infantry. 
 
 That I assume to be the Henry house hill, where we find from other 
 evidence that General McDowell's corps was eucamped that night. 
 
 Qitestion. As to this cannonading that you heard from early iu the morning, what 
 was the character of it, heavy or intermittent .' 
 
 Answer. Sometimes it was heavy. 
 
 Question. Did you see any troops, other than of your own diAJsion, Avhen you Avere 
 at Manassas Junction ? 
 
 AnsAver. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Whose troops Avere they f 
 
 AnsAver. I understood them to be General Porter's corps. 
 
no 
 
 Question. At that time ? 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. AVhen you first arrived at Manassas Junction, was the cannonading then 
 in progress, or had it ceased ? 
 Answer, I don't recollect uow aViout that. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Samuel P. HeintzeJinan, U. S. A. (retired), then United States 
 A'olunteers, ke])t a diary, in Avhicli lie noted the time of events. He 
 saj^s (Uoard's Eecordj p. GIO) : 
 
 Question. Will you read to the Board from the diary those events which vou noted 
 at the time, August 29, 1862 .' 
 
 Answer. "Centreville, Friday, August 29, 1862: Kearney did not get oti" until after 
 daylight" that night: the night before the 29th General Kearney was advanced as 
 far as Centreville. I think General I'ope was quite near on the opposite sitle of the 
 river from Centreville. In the night an order came for Kearney to advance at 1 a. m. 
 and attack the enemy. Hooker at 3 a. ui. was to support him. Thereport wasGeneral 
 McDowell had intercepted the enemy, and the next morning I started at daylight as 
 I was directed. When I got to where Kearney was, his division had not started, and 
 he was killed not long afterward, before I made my report. 
 
 Question. Now, will you be good enough to read what you made notes of on the 29th 
 of August, as to the events of that day ? 
 
 The witness read as follows : 
 
 '•'Kearney did not get off till after dayliglit. We are all detained by him. There is 
 a heavy cloud of dust ou the road to Leesburg, upon which the rebels are retreating or 
 rather advancing. It is now a quarter i)ast 7 a. m. ; arrived at the bridge at 9 a. m. 
 Firing commenced some two hours ago and has just ceased. Report that we are driv- 
 ing the enemy. At 10 a. m. reached the field, a mile from the stone l>ridge. Firing 
 going on, and I called upon General 8igel. General Kearney was at the right. Part 
 of General Hookers division I sent to support some of Sigel's ti'oops. General Hooker 
 got up about 11 a. m. ; General Eeno nearly an hour later. Soon after General Pope 
 arrived — about qviarter to two. I rode to the old Bull Run battle-field, where my troops 
 "were. The enemy we drove back in the direction of Sudley's Chui'ch, and they are 
 now making another stand. AVe are hoping for McDowell and Porter. / feor we will 
 heout of am)in(iiitio)i. We have sent for it. At 3+ p. m. our troops driven back. At 
 forty-five minutes past three McDowell's troops reported arrived. Firing closed at 
 fifteen minutes past four. At half past four General Reynohls's troops arrived. Five 
 p. m. our troops engaged ou the enemy's right. Twenty minutes past five p. m., mus- 
 ketry firing commenced on our center. General Kearney has held his position. Forty- 
 five minutes past five General McDowell on the field at headquarters. Heavy firing 
 on our center. Kearney reports he is driving the enemy l)ack. General Portei{ 
 
 RErOKTS THE REBELS DEIVIXG HIM BACK, AND HE RETIRIXG OX MaXASSAS, Twenty 
 
 minutes past six very heavy musketry and artillery. McDowell's troops just entering 
 the battlefield. Kearney on the right with General Stevens's troops, and our artillery 
 drove the enemy out of the woods they temporarily occupied. The firing continued 
 until after night, but left us in possession of the battlefield." 
 
 Bvt. Maj. Gen. Willlrim Biniei/, U. S. Vols., testified as follows (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 081) : 
 
 Question. What was the character of the action from twelve o'clock noon until the . 
 sun .set ? 
 
 Answer. My recollection is that, with occasional lulls in the firing, there was some 
 heavy firing. The artillery was sounding all the time, and theie was rei)eated and 
 very heavy nnisketiy firing. It was not an action as heasy as the one of the day fol- 
 lowing, but if I had not witnessed the one of the day following I should have thought 
 the one of the day before very heavy, 
 
 if * ■> -a- ' -i^ , ^ * -^ 
 
 Question. What I want to get at is whether there was any continuous musketry 
 iiiing beginning at tlie tinu- you first approaclied that battlefield up to the night, 
 indicating a gcni-ral engagement along the whole line? 
 
 Answer. I should say that in the morning the firing was that of a series of assaults 
 and skirmishes — at least more of that character; occasional pretty heavy musketry ; 
 and in the afternoon it had more the sound of a continuous battle, although even then 
 there were inlcMinissions. as in a battk'. 
 
 Question. I under.-itand you that you were ou General Kearney's extreme right? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 * ^ rr -^ * *= *■ 
 
 Question. At otln-r times than these you speak of, towards thenuddle and towards 
 tiie close of tlie afternoon, about how large a force of infantry was at any one time 
 engaged, as indicated by the sound and smoke which yon heard and saw .' 
 
Ill 
 
 Auswor. Do yoii mean on Itotli sides ? 
 
 Question. On our side. 
 
 Answer. I sliould not think there were over s.dOO or 10.000 at a time. 
 
 Question. You speak of a period somewhat near tlie middle of the afternoon when 
 there was a somewhat general engagement, as I understand yon ? 
 
 Answer. My impression is that towards the close of the afternoon the fighting became 
 more persistent — along about four o'clock. 
 
 Question. This persistent and more extended attack, as indicated to you by the sound 
 and the smoke, was then towards the close of the afterniion .' 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. About what hour would you say ? 
 
 Answer. I should think from four on there was a gudd deal nion- tiring. 
 
 Question. How long -did it continue .' 
 
 Answer. The heaviest firing, of course, did not continue a great while at its heaviest 
 I>oint. 
 
 Question. I mean this general engagement in the latter j)art of the day. 
 
 Answer. My impression is that it was after four o'clock. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. Charles BarneSj then captain Xintli Penn.-^ylvania 
 Eeserves, Eeynolds' division, McDowelFs command, testified as follows 
 (Board's Kecord, p. GGl) : '• There was a heavy contest going on on onr 
 right all day, or nearly all day." Hea\';s' infantry tiring at 3. 
 
 Bvt. Maj. Gen. Ahuer Doitbledai/. U. S. A., commanding brigade, 
 King's divisiou, McDowelFs corps (Board's Kecord, p. 088), speaks of 
 of the heavy fighting between five and six p. m,, of his division. 
 
 Capt. George Shorkley, Fifteenth United States Infantry, then adju- 
 tant Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Ferreros' brigade, Eeno's divi- 
 sion (Board's Record, p. G81)), answered as follows : 
 
 Question by Recorder. In the afternoon, say from twelve o'clock up to sunset, 
 what Avas the character of the action '! 
 
 Answer. Decidedly heavy lighting in the evening. * * '* In the middle of the 
 afternoon we were lighting and we were then moving up to a new iiosition. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. Buftis R. Daices, Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers, Gib- 
 bon's brigade. King's division, McDowell's corps, testified as follows 
 (Board's Kecord, p. 831) : 
 
 Question. AVliere were you on the morning of August 29, 18(32 ? 
 
 Answer. We retreated from King's engagement and arrived near [Manassas Junction 
 about daybreak on the morning of the 29th. 
 
 Question. Did you see any other troops there during that morning aside from your 
 own division; if so, what ? 
 
 Answer. During the morning I saw the corps of General Porter. 
 
 Question. Which direction were they taking ' 
 
 Answer. They were moving along parallel with the Manasses Gap Eailroad in the 
 direction of the battle. 
 
 Question. Which direction do you mean by tJiat ? 
 
 Answer. That is about the position we occupied [between the forks of the Manassas 
 and Gainesville road and Manassas Junction] when we were in bivouac alongside the 
 Manassas Gap Kailroad. The cori>s of General Porter passed by. going up in that 
 direction. [Up the Manassas and Gainesville road.] 
 
 Question. At what time did they pass you / 
 
 Answer. Aboitt nine o'clock. 
 
 Question. While you were there, what indications were there, if any, of a battle 
 that day ? ' 
 
 Answer. Jt that time there was artillery, and during the dag at different times there was 
 mmketrg. It is ing recollection that there was musletrg firing ahout the time that General 
 Fits-John Porter's troops passed up, for the reason that our men talked with those troops in re- 
 gard to the battle that they expected to tale part in — thai appeared to he in progress at that time. 
 
 Question. How long did you hear during that day artillery and musketry firing .' 
 
 Answer. My recollection is at intervals all day. 
 
 Brig, and Bvt. Maj. Gen. Jos. B. Can\ United States Volunteers, com- 
 manding Third Brigade, Hooker's division, Heintzelman's corps, says 
 (Board's Kecord, p. 830) his brigade marched from Blackburn's Ford and 
 was at the Matthews house about 11 a. m., supporting some batteries. 
 There was, uj) to 12, firing in front and scattering infantry fire ; that 
 
112 
 
 Cleiierals Sigel and Scliiirz reported to him tliat their ammunition was 
 all expended, and he sent in his brigade to their relief and became imme- 
 diately engaged and expended all their ammunition and had to send for 
 more. 
 About 2 p. m. a general attack took place. 
 
 Question. Then that contest, ■within your own knowledge, or battle, extended from 
 ■what time to -what time djiring- that day ? 
 
 Answer. I should judge fnnii the api)earanre of the Avoods that I had entered about 
 twelve o'clock -with my commaiul, that they had been engaged all the morning — from 
 the appearance of the woods and the wounded and dead; there were a great many 
 wounded and dead. 
 
 Question. Federal ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Have you been in other actions'? 
 
 jVnswer. Yes; several of them. 
 
 Question. How would you characterize that Itattle as to severity, and the propor- 
 tion of loss of those engaged ? 
 
 Answer. Along our front I should say that it was as hotly a contested battle as I 
 had been in, Avith one or two exceptions. I Avould except Gettyslnirg and Chancel- 
 lorsville. Our loss was not as heavy there as in those other battles, although it Avas 
 Aery scAcre. 
 
 Question. On the 29th ? 
 
 AnsAver. Yes. sir. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. James M. Deems, then major First Maryland Cavalry, 
 on General Sigel's staff, has described (Board's Eecord, ]). 839) a charge 
 of the enemy on General Schurz's division, al)0ut 11 or 12 o'clock. 
 
 Brig, and Bvt. Maj. Gen. G. W. MindiJ, then assistant adjutant-gen- 
 eral to Kearney's division, Heintzelman's corps, says (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 815), that before his di\'ision reached the field, which was about or 
 9J a. m., the indications of a battle were wounded men coming to the 
 rear, " and a considerable number of Confederate prisoners.'' 
 
 At noon, when he reached the extreme right of the army in view of 
 the battle-tield, there was some infantry fighting going on by the trooi)S 
 of General Carl Schurz's division, and considerable cannonading. 
 
 Question bv Eecorder. Do a'ou understand that the battle continiied prettv much 
 all day ? ^ 
 Answer. There were no intermissions. * * * 
 
 First Lieut. Wm. Conivay, Twenty-second United States Infantry, 
 then Seventy-fourth IS^ew York Volunteers, Taylor's l)rigade. Hooker's 
 di\dsion, says (Board's Eecord, p. 817) his brigade made a charge about 
 4 p. ui. 
 
 The action was A'ery severe: men were knocked down with stones. 
 
 "WTien we come to look at the evidence of some Confederates of Jack- 
 son's command, we will find that they were considerably out of ammu- 
 nition at that time. 
 
 Brig. Gen. Gihnan Marston, United States Volunteers, then colonel 
 Second New Hampshire Volunteers, Grover's brigade (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 859). He was in Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover's heroic bayonet charge 
 and lost 123 out of 300 men. He says that from twelve o'clock up to 
 between three ami fcmr there was a little musketry fire on each side of 
 their i)Osition at Peach Grove (Dogan House,) and some artillery firing 
 to the left. 
 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 8G0.) There was pretty heavy artillery firing a lit- 
 tle to the left at dark. 
 
 That artillery firing was evidently the firing of Cooper's battery, 
 Meade's brigade, Eeynolds' division, in order to be at the left of the 
 position of Brigadier-General Marston. 
 
113 
 
 Capt. James Haddow, Thirty-sixtli Ohio Yoluuteers, said as follows 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 875) : 
 
 * * * Ou flie morning of the 29th we were at Manassas Junction. 
 
 Qnestion (by Recorder.) Did you hear any firing that morning ? If so, where and 
 iu what direction f 
 
 Answer. We did not leave there very early ; we were waiting for orders ; the major 
 under whom we were conveying these supplies would go oft' to get orders ; we must 
 have remained there until near nine o'clock. In going from the station out toward 
 a large building which the troops wlio were there said was McDowell's headquarters 
 or had l)eeu, there was considerable cannonading, partially to our rear and oft' to the 
 left. I recollect distinctly, as we went out toward tliat building [Weir house], there 
 were quite a number of people at the building looking towaid the direction of the 
 battle; we oiu'selves could see the smoke ; there was consideral)le cannonading some 
 time between daylight and eight or nine o'clock. 
 
 • Asst. Adjt. Gen. Hazard ^Stevens, ITnited States Volunteers, Stevens' 
 brigade, Reno's division, Burnside's corps (Board's llecord, p. 524), 
 refers to fonr assaults known liy bini to have been made l)y the national 
 troops on the enemy's lines, viz, one by his brigade, one by Hooker's 
 division, one by Kearney's division, and one by Xichols' brigade of 
 Eeno's division. 
 
 Bvt. Maj. Gen. .Geoy</e R. Gordon United States Volunteers, Third 
 Brigade, First Division, Banks' Oor])s, introduced by iietitioner (Jan- 
 uary 3, 1870), says, substantially, that the sounds of the battle of the 
 29th were heard in Major-General Banks' corps, and alluiles to their 
 anxiety as to the result. 
 
 Lieut. Stephen M. Weld^ formerly petitioner's aide-de-cam]), who was 
 (idled on his l>ehalf, testitied to going with petitioner and General Mc- 
 Dowell from Dawkiijs' Ibanch to the JManassas Ga]) Bailroad (Board's 
 Becord, p. 2GS), and says that while there he could both hear and see 
 the firing — 
 
 Severe at times; then it would slacken off and be slight, and then start oft' again. 
 
 * * * In a northerly direction we could see the shells bursting high iu the air, 
 which would indicate it somewhere al)out Groveton. 
 
 Despite this witness' testimony, the petitioner has severely criticised 
 General McDowell for saying there was a battle raging. 
 
 We see, however, by Lieutenant AVeld, who was there, the petitioner's 
 own witness, that there tvas a l)attle raging to the right. 
 
 Brig. Gen. I. H. Dnvall, United States Volunteers, then major First 
 West" Virginia Volunteers, says (Board's Eecord, p. 801) he went into 
 action with ^Milroy's brigade at 8 a. m., or earlier, and in referring to the 
 battle said, " It was a severe one at the start." He witnessed one assault 
 about 2 or 3 p. m. Some fighting, more or less, all day. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Oershom. Mott, United States Volunteers, then colonel Sixth 
 Kew ' Jersey Volunteers, Third Brigade, Kearney's division, Heintzel- 
 man's corps says (p. 8(58) he arrived on the field at noon and heard 
 artillery firing to the left. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. 'Gen. H. E. Tremaine, United States Volunteers, then 
 acting assistant adjutant-general Taylor's brigade. Hooker's division, 
 same corps, savs he arrived on the field a httle before noon (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 809). 
 
 Tlie troops on the left, which I at that time understood to be General Sigel's, were 
 pretty actively engaged. The troops oft' to the right, under Kearney, as I then under- 
 stood, were more or less engaged. 
 
 Maj. Oliver C. Boshysliell, then captain, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania 
 Volunteers, first brigade, second division (Eeno's) of the Ninth Corps 
 (Burnside's) (Board's Eecord, p. 872), says his regiment went into action 
 at three and lost one-fifth of the men. 
 
114 
 
 Capt. John C. Broirn, Twentieth Indiana Volunteers, Eobinson's brig- 
 ade, Kearney's division, Heintzelinan's corps, says (p. 873) "There was 
 heavy infantry tiring on our left and we expected it to strike us." His 
 regiment lost about a hundred. 
 
 Maj. Gen. John C. Eohinson, U. S. A. (retired), then brigadier-general 
 coninianding brigade in Kearney's division, says his brigade lost 578 
 men (IJoard's Eecord, p. 834). 
 
 The record shows other witnesses to the fact that there was a battle 
 on the 29th Angust, but these citations seem sufficient to show that there 
 ■w-'as fighting all day, artillery and infantry, and on Sigers front partic- 
 nlarly from noon to 3J p. m. 
 
 ]Maj. SamHel X. Benjamin^ assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., then 
 first lieutenant commanding Battery E, Second United States Artillery, 
 says he got into action as near as he can recollect about 1 p. m. at Grove- 
 ton, and for two hours was actively engaged witli eighteen guns of the 
 enemy ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 yards from him (Board's Eecord, p. 
 613), and that they soon brought in eight more against him. 
 
 In discussing a military question it is quite needless to say that the 
 heavy fire of artillery is generally but a prelude to the infantry assault 
 at the moment when the opposing forces are broken or the opposing fire 
 silenced. 
 
 It may be that the infantry will remain hours in exiiectation of such 
 opportunity while the cannonading continues. Therefore it is the duty 
 of co-operating forces to be ready and to move into action, in order to 
 create such a diversion as will enable the main attack to be successful. 
 
 CO>'FEDEEATE ACCOUNTS OF BATTLE. 
 
 When we look at the Confederate accounts of the battle of the 29th 
 August, 1802, we find them in perfect accord with those of the Union 
 commanders on the question whether there was a battle that day or not. 
 
 In his official report to the Confederate Government of this day's bat- 
 tle, the late. General JRohert E. Lee said (Board's Eecord, p. 520), " the 
 hattle raged icith great fury'''; that, in one part of the field, there were 
 ^^ several hours of severe Jighting-^ that the " contest was close and ob- 
 stinate"; that "the enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed 
 on the attack with fresh troops"; that "the battle continued until 9 p. 
 m."; that it was " the darkness of the night" which " put a stop to the 
 engagement," and that his " loss was severe." 
 
 All through the report he uses the expressions "battle was raging," 
 " warmly engaged," and " severe contest," sliowing how this superior 
 military critic vieAved the battle of the 29th (Board's Eecord, p. 519). 
 
 Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, in his report to Maj. Gen. T. J. Jackson, dated 
 25th February, 18G3, speaks of the repulse of " six distinct and separate 
 assaults, a portion of the time the men being without a cartridge," and 
 says that " soon his reserves were all in." 
 
 A critical examination of all the Confederate re])orts will not prove 
 uninstructive in this connection. 
 
 In examining the testimony of " Confederate" witnesses before this 
 Board, we find further corroboration. 
 
 Henrg Kyd Ihugla.ss, formerly major and assistant adjutant-general 
 to the Confederate General T. J. Jackson, caHed by government, testified 
 as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 704) : 
 
 QiioHtion. The force that iidvaiued against A. P. Hill's division — ^vliat was its cliar- 
 acter as to stn'ujftli and nuinlrcrs .' 
 
 Answer. W«'ll, hcinix on the oth r side, it would be difficult for me to determine. 
 "Wlu'tlu'r it was attacked by divisions or brijjadcs, I really do not know: but there 
 
115 
 
 were a uuuiber of attiicks made, uot less, I should suppose, tliau halt a dozeu, at differ- 
 ent times. 
 
 Question. How were those attacks carried on ? 
 
 Answer. Those attacks were vigorous dashes ; brief, but rery ilelermbml, and very 
 gallant. 
 
 Question. How close did the opposing lines get ? 
 
 Answer. Very close. Our Hue was driven back once or twice ; then they moved 
 forward again. 
 
 Questiou. What was the character of losses of that day's liattle — heavy or light? 
 
 Answer. I think the loss in A. P. Hill's division was heavy enough to be called 
 serious ; I should uot say it was very heavy or very disastrous. ' 
 
 Question. I understand you to say that the battle lasted from between two and three 
 o'clock up to what time ? 
 
 Answer. Dark. There was some little skirmishing or firing after dark, but you can- 
 not call it an attack. 
 
 Questiou. About what time did the final attack begin upon your lines ? 
 
 Answer. Do you mean the last assault ? 
 
 Question. Yes. There were a series of attacks, one after The other ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; at difl^'erent intervals. The first attack was something after two ; the 
 last may have been about sundown. 
 
 Question. Were the attacks nuide by heavy bodies of troops or by a light body, 
 comparatively? 
 
 Answer. The attacks covei-ed Hill's division front ; with what commands they were 
 made on the other side, I Avould have hesitation in saying ; they were vigorous. 
 
 Questiou. At the close of the day's action, on the 29th August, do you recollect 
 what was the state of the supply of ammunition in your division ? 
 
 Answer. General A. P. Hill was in a very bad way. His ammunition was in some 
 Jjrigades almost entirely exhausted. 
 
 James Lonfjstreet, late lieutenant-general in the Confederate army, so 
 called, says (Board's Eeeord, p. 62) : 
 
 At the time we apiiroached. General Jackson was engaged making a very severe fight 
 * * * a severe artillery combat going on * * * Infantry fight lasted from about 
 5 o'clock until dark. * * * Knew of no terrific battle raging that day with contin- 
 uous fury from daylight until after dark that day. 
 
 He previously said : 
 
 I did uot note the time by my watch of any o(-currence of that field. 
 
 He thus disputes the accuracy of Robert E. Lee's report, but in his 
 own official report dated near Winchester, Va., 10th October, 1862, 
 (Board's Record, j). 521), he said, after describing his march to join 
 Jackson after passing through Thoroughfare Gap on the 29th : 
 
 The noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville. The march was 
 quickened to the extent of our capacity. The excitement of battle seemed to give 
 new life and strength to our jaded men. * * * 
 
 His recollection woidd seem to be very much less vivid and exact than 
 in 1862, for he testified before this Board in reference to that march as 
 follows : 
 
 Question by Rkcordei;. Were your troops in n Jaded condition at that time? 
 Answer. I should hardly think they were. 
 
 This witness from his ])Osition during the rebellion as an officer of high 
 rank in the rebel army was brought prominently into this case as one 
 whose testimony would apparently have to be considered as conclusive 
 even if it did confiict with that of respectable Union officers. 
 
 Two instances have been given of the uncertainty of his recollection, 
 A'iz: 
 
 1. His statements here as to thei size of Cadmus M. Wilcox's division, 
 contradicted by the latter, 
 
 2d. His statements here as to the condition his men were in when 
 they passed through Gainesville, contradicted by his own official report 
 as Avell as by CoL Th<Mnas L. Rosser (Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Stuart's 
 
 9 G 
 
116 
 
 division), wlio testifies (Board's Eecord. p. 1153) that Loiigstreefs com- 
 inaiid came fioiii the direction of Thoroughfare Gaj* "in a very forced 
 and disordered niarcli * * moving rapidly and straggling badly." 
 
 3. A third instance is found in the numbers he' says Brig. Gen. Beverly 
 H. liobertson, of Stuarfs cavalry di^^sion, Jackson's command, had 
 there in his brigade. Longstreet (Board's Record, j). 73) puts them at 
 3,00(1, but Eobertsou himself says he had 2,500 (Board's Eecord, p. 173). 
 
 A fourth instance is found in Longstreet's statement (Board's Record, 
 p. 12) that he has no recollection of seeing any cavalry that day. 
 
 John ^S. Jloshy, formerly colonel of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart's 
 staft", testified as follows (Board's Record, p. 887) : 
 
 Question. When did that battle begin on the 29th — what time of day ? 
 
 Answer. Pretty early on tlie morning of the 29th there was heavy lighting. 
 
 Question. How long did that continne? 
 
 Auswer. My recollection is that there was heavy fighting during most of the day. 
 Early in the morning I suppose I was about the rear of the center of Jackson's line, 
 and I suppose about eight, or nine, or ten o'clock there came a report that our left 
 flank had been turned, over in the direction of Sudley ; I went over there with the 
 First Virginia Cavalry, according to my recollection, for the puri)ose of checking that^ 
 and we were there the whole of the day. 
 
 Question. What of the action could you see and hear? Describe all that you recall 
 of that action. 
 
 Answer. We couhl not see the fighting. I was with this cavalry, and I supjiose we 
 were lialf a mile, or part of the time within a mile of it. In the morning this regiment 
 that I got with I suppose was not half a mile in the rear of Jackson's line ; but when the 
 report came that the Federal cavalry was over on Jackson's left, and there was danger 
 of their capturing his wagons and ambulances that were in the rear of Sudley Church, 
 
 this cavalry was sent over there to protect Jackson's left, and I went with it. 
 
 *'* ^ ^ ^ * *; 
 
 Question. Do you know what the k)sses of Jackson were in that action? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. From twelve o'clock no(m up to three o'clock in the afternoon, do you 
 recollect the character of the fighting as far as you could judge from the sound? 
 
 Answer. My general recollection of it is that most of the day there was heavy fight- 
 ing. I cannot particularize. 
 
 Question. Musketry and .artillery? 
 
 Answer. Musketry and artillery. 
 
 Charles Marshall, formerly aid-de-camp to the Confederate General 
 R. E. Lee, having been called for petitioner (Board's Record, p. 1000), in 
 asserting that he was at the Gibbon wood on or about 12 o'clock, and 
 noticing Confederate dead and wounded on the Warrenton pike, said, 
 "There was a good deal of artillery and musketry filing on that road" 
 before he got up there. 
 
 The petitioner has been forced to the assertion that there was no bat- 
 tle on the 20th August, 1802 (Opening Statement, pp. 42 and 57), in order 
 to excuse his inaction in consequence of the Count de Paris's rule, cited 
 by me. 
 
 Unfortunately for the i)etitioner, he has advanced too many and con- 
 tradictory defenses, which can only be explained on the ground that his 
 case as licre presented and on his trial is largely an afterthought. 
 
 When he was at the Weir House at Manassas Station that morning, 
 conversing with Major-General McDowell (Board's Record, i>. 875), the 
 smoke of battle could be seen, and persons there were watching' its 
 l)rogi('ss and listening to the cannonading. 
 
 The unt|ualified statement of petitioner that there was no battle on 
 the 20th is positively disi)roven by two of his own dispatches of that 
 day, found in his own opening statement before this Board, viz: 
 
 First. (No. 28, to General Morell.) To ]>ush over and aid Sigel. * * * See if 
 you cannot help Sigel. If you find him n^tiring, move back toward Manassas. 
 
 Semnd. (No. 29.) Tin; enemy appear to have driven our foices back, the fire of the 
 enemy having advanced and ours retired. I have determined to withdraw to Manas- 
 saf^. 
 
117 
 
 He says he (petitioner) went to the head of the coluiim, and found lie 
 liad been misinformed, and no action was therefore taken by liim to 
 carry ont the deterniination expressed so i)0sitively in tliat disi>at(;h, 
 
 Tliese dispatches are fatal to petitioners theory, even if Col. E. G. 
 IMarshalFs evidence alone was not. 
 
 We have seen that he undertook, even earlier in the day, to carry out 
 the same determination to retire, based o^i the same belief a.s to our repulse. 
 
 If he was misinformed at that second time, as he alleges in his o})en- 
 in^^ statement, when did he again aseertain ve icere being beaten on the 
 right'/ for he sent another reeently'diseovered dispateh, addressed to (len- 
 eral McDowell or King, in which he said: 
 
 How goes the hatth? It .seeiii8 to go to our I'ear. 
 
 Does this in<Iicate no knowledge on his part of a battle? 
 Again, in another newly-disco\'ered disi>atch, this time to General Mc- 
 Dowell, he said : 
 
 Th«' firing ou luy riglit lias so far i-etired that, as i cauuot advance and have failed 
 to get over to yon, except by the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. 
 
 Did he withdraw as he, in this dispatch, positively announced he 
 would ? We shall tind that he commenced the movement. In the pre- 
 vious dispatch he said he had determined to withdraw to Manassas. 
 He afterwards concluded not to. In this dispatch to McDowell, dated 
 G }). m., he said he did withdraw Morell, who held the advance. 
 
 As to whether there was a battle on the 29th, he is precluded from 
 denying it by his own dispatches, ofilcially made at the time, and having 
 failed in proving the alternative expressed by the Count de Paris, was 
 pr'opeily convicted of '' shaniefnlhj failing to go to the aid of 3lajor- General 
 Pope's troops, and did shanufully retreat and fall baelc with his army and 
 leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army, and did fail, by 
 any attempt to attael; the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a dis- 
 aster that would hare endangered the safety of the national CapitaV^ 
 
 It Avas not necessary he should go back to Manassas Junction, though 
 a considerable portion of his troops did move back by his dii-ect orders. 
 
 He put his troops where they were not available, and he did it know- 
 ing a battle was — to use the language of General Lee — ''raging" at the 
 time. 
 
 No argument, however skillful, can influence these facts. General 
 Pope or any of his subordinate corps-commanders may have made move- 
 ments which to others may not seem to have been as effective as if some 
 other movement had been made. His plan of battle may be criticised, 
 his mode of attack cimimented upon by unfriendly critics, but none of 
 this has any relation to the petitioner. The duty of the latter was plain 
 and obligatory. He did not do it, and judgment came, the judgment of 
 his peers. 
 
 In vain did he on that fatal 29th August go to the point in his col- 
 umn most remote from the sound of the enemy's cannon, and cabnly 
 wait the issue between the contending forces with a safe line of retreat 
 open to himself. 
 
 Did he hope for a fsivorable opportunity to come at the last moment 
 to protect a retreat ? Such things history shows have happened before. 
 
 longsteeet's defensive position 29th august. 
 
 The next point to be considered is the position of the co-operating 
 C(mfederate forces which arrived on the 29th August to the support of 
 Jackson's hard-pressed troojis. 
 
118 
 
 By glaiu-ing at the map it will be seen that '^ ( Gainesville" was the 
 key to the Confederate position on that day. It was of vital importance 
 to General E. E. Lee — 
 
 First. To prevent a jianl; movement from any portion of the Army of the 
 Potomac, via Warrenton 'function. 
 
 ISlecond. To maintain camminiication ivith Thoroughfare Gap, through 
 vhich advancing re-enforcement,s, including Amlerson^s division of Long- 
 st reefs command, irere expected. 
 
 General Lee did not and conld not properly know what peculiar influ- 
 ences were operating- to retard the arrival of additional assistance from 
 the Army of the Potomac. Therefore we find from the ofticial Confed- 
 erate reports that at 8 a. m., the 29th August, while Lee was still at 
 Thoroughfare Gap, he dispatched Major Hairston, commissary of sub- 
 sistence on ]\[aj or- General Stuart's staff, to Warreutou, Va., to ascertain 
 whether any of our Army was there. 
 
 The turnpike from Centreville, it will be noticed, passed by the stone 
 house and through Groveton and Gainesville to Warrenton; consequently 
 any Union force from the Eappahanuock, via Warrenton, would have 
 struck in his rear and interposed, if in sufficient force, between his com- 
 mand near Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gaj). 
 
 It was not until 8 p. m., the 2l»th Augusff that Lee became apprised 
 that there was no danger from that quaiter. 
 
 The following is the report (Board's Record, p. 540): 
 
 REPORT OF MAJOR S. H. HAIRSTON. DIVISIOX QrARTKRMASTER, STUART'S CAVALRY 
 
 DIVISIOX. 
 
 Gainesville, Amjusi 29, lS6r2 — 8 p. m. 
 To Colonel Chilton, A. A. G. : 
 
 111 ol)f dieiice to General Lee's order I .started this niomiug at eioht o'clock with one 
 hnudred and fifty cavalry t© go to Warrenton, "to find out if any of the enemy's forces 
 were stiU in the vicinity of that place." I went from Thoroughfare to the right on a 
 hy-road, which took me into the Winchester road two miles helow Warrenton, and 
 came up to the rear of the town. I iucjuired of the citizens and i»ersons I met on the 
 way, but could not hear that any of their forces were in the vicinity of that place. 
 They informed me that the last left yesterday in the direction of Gainesville and War- 
 renton Junction. We picked up on the way forty-six prisoners, thirty muskets and 
 rifles, one deserter from the Stuart horse artillery, and one sutler, with his wagon and 
 driver. I also paroled two lieutenants iu Warrenton, who were too sick to travel. 
 What shall I do with the jji-isouers f 
 
 SAMUEL H. HAIRSTOX, 
 Major Commanding, by onkr of General Lee. 
 
 Note. — This was made of men from every regiment in your command, with one 
 entire company, headed l)y the captain, that General Lee had handled at Thoroughfare 
 and turned over to me when he ordered me to go ou the expedition. s. H. H. 
 
 On the 29th August, therefore, the Confederate General in Chief may 
 be said to have been fighting what General Pope termed a " defensive" 
 battle, because he had not all his forces available, viz : the large divi- 
 sions of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, consisting of five brigades with artillery; 
 Maj. Gen. L. McLaws' of four brigades, and Maj. Gen. R. 11. Anderson's 
 "very full division '' of Maj. Gen. Longstreet's special command (Board's 
 Record, p. (51.) 
 
 Already had Heintzelman's Corps, and Reno's division of Burnside's 
 corps, Reynolds' division of l*ennsylvania Reser%'es, and petitioner's 
 corps, all of the Army of the I'otomac, joined General Pope from the 
 Peninsula. 
 
 Sumner's Corps (second) and Franklin's corj)S (sixth) and the re- 
 mainder of the Army of the Potomac had l)een afforded reasonable time 
 to evacuate Harrison's Landing on James River and come into position, 
 and the latter was at Alexandria. . 
 
119 
 
 At that time there were no reguhir corj^.s- organizations in the Confed- 
 erate army (Board's Eecord, p. 950), and the senior division commanders 
 commanded the right and left wings and center of the army. 
 
 The fact th;it Lee left all his reserve artillery nuder Col/ Stephen D. 
 Lee at ThoronghtVire Gap on the 20th, shows that he was not prepared 
 for an offensive movement against unknown forces (Board's Becord, 
 p. 120). 
 
 Part of the forces which came np to Gainesville on the 29th appear, 
 according to Longstreet's testimony, if his recollection is reliable, to have 
 arrived at Thoroughfare Gap nearly half a day before attempting to 
 shove throngh. 
 
 He testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 70) on cross-examination: 
 
 Qnestiou. Was uot tlie delay at Thoroughfare Gap for half a ihiy due partially at 
 least to the uiicertaiuty as to General Pope's movements ! 
 
 Answer. I think it must have been. 
 
 Question. "Would you not have been likely to knowJieing one oH the two superior 
 commanders? 
 
 Answer. I would be likely to know if General Lee expressed an opinion as to the 
 oceasion of the delay, more likely than anybody else. I think if he had known that 
 Jackson was pressed and wanted re-enforcements he would not have allowed us to 
 lialt on the west side of the gap. I think it is probably because he did not know any- 
 thing about it tliat we were detained there. If he had ex]>ected that gap would have 
 been oecui)ied by I'o]ie"s trooi>s, we would have moved imnu'diatcly tlnoagh. I think 
 we had some mounted stragglers who had been out to the front and reported to us that 
 there was nothing up there in that direction, and we were a little surprised when we 
 found our troops driven back into the gap on the afternoon of the 28th. 
 
 Question. Then you are not i)repared to say whether or not your delay there was 
 due partially to the fact that General Lee was not aware exactly of the movements of 
 General Po]>e? 
 
 Answer. All those things, you know, have their relations one to another. 
 
 (Also Board's Eecord, p. 157, Charles ]Marshairs evidence.) 
 
 Longstreet further testified (Board's Eecord, p. 08), on cross-examin- 
 ation, that when he heard, on the 26th August, of Major-General Jackson 
 having been detached to make the movement aronnd to the rear of Gen- 
 eral Pope's army he expressed considerable surprise to Lee, and intimated 
 his opinion that Jackson was in a ver}' hazardous position and liable to 
 ]»e cut off. 
 
 That Lee was apprehensive for Jackson's safety is evident from the 
 fact of his sending a dispatch to the latter. 
 
 William W. BlaeJiford, then captain of engineers in the Confederate 
 service, called bv government, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 
 093) : 
 
 Question. Can yon tix. with any degree of certainty, about what time in the morn- 
 ing that ^\*•as '! 
 
 Answer. No. sir : not exactly. The only thing I recollect about it is that it was 
 early in the day. We had been looking to Longstreet's coming with a great deal 
 of anxiety, and I recollect the feeling of relief that I had when Stuart told me that 
 he was going to open communication with him ; and the impression uuide upon my 
 mind at the time was that it was sufficiently early in the day for him to be there by 
 any time within which the enemy wotild probably make an attack. 
 
 Question. Can you swear at all as to the hour at which you met General Lee 1)efore 
 reaching Gainesville .' 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I could not swear to the exact hour, except that it was(|iiite early 
 in the day. 
 
 Question. What tixes it in your mind that it was quite early in the day ? 
 
 Answer. The fact that we had been rather nervous about Longstreet's joining us; 
 and as soon as I heard that we were going out tj^ open conniinnication to meet Gen- 
 eral Lee, I recollect the feeling of relief that I Inul in knowing that that junction 
 would be made so soon in the day. 
 
 # rf # ^ # * * 
 
 Question. You say that the morning of the'29th you were nervous about L<)ngstreet'8 
 
120 
 
 joiiiiuii- you, and that you experiencfd a feeling of relief wlieu yon found that you 
 were goiuj^ to Join him. What do you have reference to? 
 
 Answer. Jaekson had been o(eu])yino; an isolated |)osition there, and we were anx- 
 ious for Longstrett to rejoin ns. We knew that the enemy were coiitentratiug, and 
 we were anxious for our concentration to take place too. 
 
 Question. Was it the time you left the turu>pike in company with General Stuart to 
 go down to nnike this reconnaissance that I am to understand a division of Long- 
 fflreet's trooi)s had already passed the point where you weref 
 
 Answer. I suppose a division had passed. I know Avhile standing there the men 
 were very anxious to know what news there Avas from Jackson, ami we were standing 
 on the turnpike telling them as they passed. Then they would cheer. That was the 
 tirst intelligence they had of Jackson's safety. 
 
 Ale.ranrler I). Paynes then first lienteiiaiit Foiirtli Virginia Cavalry, 
 coinmandiiio: Lee's body-guard, called hy petitioner, on cross-examina- 
 tion said (Board's Record, p. 381) : 
 
 I have reason to know that General Lee was very uneasy al>out General Jackson 
 all the day hefore. 
 
 Capt. Rohert McEldorrney, Twenty-seventh Yrrginia Confederate In- 
 fantry, says (Board's Kecord, p. 951) tliat, on tbe 29tli, Jackson's com- 
 mand was in '^ a rather exhausted condition," and Col. Henry Kyd Douglas, 
 assistant adjiitant-general that day with Jackson, says the latter that 
 morning was "'lather trving to avoid'' an engagement (Board's Record, 
 p. 707). 
 
 As Major-General Sigel, l)y General Pope's orders, attacked Jackson 
 at daylight of the 29th, and as the night before Kicketts' and King's 
 divisions were so interposed as to prevent Jackson's withdrawal, Lee 
 was forced to come up sufficiently near to prevent Jackson being crushed ; 
 Imt not hiowing what forces he had to contend with he remained in such a 
 position as to cover (iainesville and protect his line of communication with 
 Thoroughfare Gap. 
 
 This is the exi)lanation Avhy his co-operating' divisions under Wilcox, 
 Kemper, Jones, and Hood, comprising part of Longstreet's command, 
 were not shoved into action. 
 
 They were strong enough to liold open the line of retreat for Jackson, 
 and towards evening, at sunset. Hood's division and Evans' brigade, 
 supi)orted by Wilcox's, was ordered to attack one of McDowell's divisions 
 (King's), under Hatch, down the AVarrenton pike, but was anticipated 
 by the latter (Board's Record, p. 529). 
 
 For Long-street to say that General Lee was very anxious for him to 
 bring on a battle on the 29th, is to say that which is very unlikely to 
 have been the actual case (Board's Record, i», 04). 
 
 1st. Because Lee did not know how main- or where all the Union forces 
 then were. 
 
 2d. l)ecause ]>etitioner*s corps w^as on his right tiank. 
 
 3d. Because IJaidcs' corps, over ten thousand strong, was also on his 
 right tlaidv at Bristoe on a direct road into Gainesville in his rear, and not 
 more than tivc miles from it. 
 
 That he may have desired Longstreet to make soiue tentative move- 
 ment to develop the strength of the opposing LTnion forces is not im- 
 prol>al)le. 
 
 Even on the next day (30tli August) after his reserve artillery and Ander- 
 son's diAision had joined him and he felt assured that there was no army of 
 the Potomac corjts coming uj) from the Rap])ahannock, through Warren- 
 ton on to his rear, he did not attack, but awaited the attack which Gen- 
 eral Poi>e made in the afternoon. 
 
 With this insight into tin? i)lans of the Confederate general, his opera- 
 tions on the 29th can be readily understood, an<l we can see why Wil- 
 
121 
 
 cox's, Kemper's, and Jones' divisions never tired a shot on tlie 29tli 
 (Board's Record, p. 2;Jli), while Jackson's command on the other hand 
 expended qnite all their ammunition (Board's llecord, p. 707). 
 
 Longstreet makes a verii significant admission in his evi<ience. He 
 says that with Lee's permission he made a personal reconnaissance and 
 got as far forward along by Young's Branch as he dared venture, au<l 
 thought there was a force along above the Warrenton and Gainesville 
 pike — artillery, and infantry too — "a considerable force," and tliat it 
 would be a little hazardous to make a front attack, that is making a 
 ])arallel battery, throwing his troops forward so as to breast the storm. 
 So he reported to General Lee that he had some doubt of their l)eiug 
 able to carry the position (Board's Record, p. 63). 
 
 While he and Lee were still discussing this, he says General St;uirt 
 sent^ — 
 
 A report of tbe advunct' of a force agaiust liis right. 
 
 As Hoou as that came, General Lee ordered liim (Longstreet) to cross to that jsoint 
 to re-cuforce it, which he did Avith three brigades under Wilcox. 
 
 Xow Longstreet, in his ofticial report, dated 10th October, l-SOi', puts 
 this circiuustance at a late hour hi the day. This is what liis : -port 
 says (Board's Record, p. 521) : 
 
 Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were thrown forward to the support < f the 
 left, and three otliers, under General Kemper, to the support of the right of these com- 
 mands. General D. E. Jones' division was placed upon the Manassas Gap Railroad to 
 the right and in echelon with regard to the three last brigades. Colonel Walton placed 
 his batteries in a commanding position between my line and that of General Jackson, 
 and engaged the enemy foi- several hours in a severe and successful artillery duel. At 
 a late hour in the day Major-General Stuiirt rei)orted the approach of the enemy iu 
 heavy columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox, with his three 
 brigades, from the left, aud placed his command iu ]iositiou to support Jones iu ca-^e of 
 an attack against my right. After some few shots the enemy withdrew his forces, 
 moving them around towards his front, and about four o'clock in the afternoon began 
 to press forward against General Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigades w^ere moved 
 back to their former position, and Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, were 
 quickly pressed forward to the attatk. 
 
 The expression at a "late hour" is .somewhat indefinite — though it is 
 quite unlikely he could have intemled it to apply to as early an hour in 
 the afternoon* even as 2 o'clock, at which he now puts it (p. 72)— yet he 
 says before this Board that this advance reported by Stuart was what 
 he aftenrards lea rued to be ^McDowell's and petitioner's forces on the 
 Manassas and (Gainesville dirt road (Board's Record, p. 63). 
 
 Unfortunately the information which he received afteru-ard does not 
 correspond with the facts, as neither petitioner nor General IMcDowell 
 made any advance >\ hatever on that road after noon. 
 
 We are left in no doubt as to the time when Stuart made a report of 
 the advance of Union forces on Lougstreet's right, because Cadmus M. 
 Wilcox, one of Lougstreet's di\ision commanders (Board's Record, p. 
 530), who had been stationed with his division a consideralde time in 
 reserve on the north of the A\'arrenton turnpike, in his otticial report, 
 dated 11th October, 1862, said as follows relative to his own three bri- 
 gades : 
 
 At half past four or tive p. m. the three brigades Avere moved acro,ss to the right of 
 the turnjiike, a mile or more, to the Manassas Gap Kailroad. While here musketry w;is 
 heard to our left, on the turu]>ike. This tiring continued, with more or le.ss vivacity, 
 until sundown. Now the command was ordered back to the turnpike and forward on 
 this to the sujiport of General Hood, who had become engaged with the enemy, and 
 had driven him bnck some distance, intlictiug severe loss upon him, being chei ked iu 
 his successes bv the darkness of the night. 
 
122 
 
 Eofore th\^ Board, Wilcox, who was oiio of petitioner's witnesses, also 
 tcstilied as to tliis movement of bis division as follows : 
 
 Qnostion. Next after that what order did you get ? 
 
 Answer. In the afternoon, about half pa>it four or five, I was moved over to the right 
 of the pike. * * * (Board's Reooid, p. "i^^O). I remained there until near sundown. 
 Mean rime there had been some musketry heard on the pike, &e. 
 
 He tints corroborates liis oflicial report in this interestinji' particnlar 
 and rixes the hour. 
 
 lioiiiistreet, on cross-examination (TJoard's Record, p. Q^)^ said he was 
 informed of the position of petitioner's troops abont 2 o'clock' p. m. 
 
 If. as soon as his divisions were all deployed, Lee wanted him, ac- 
 cording to his statement, to bring on a general engagement, and if he 
 took a little time to make a reconnaissance of the ground and reported at 
 once to Lee on the held, and while discussing the matter received Stu- 
 art's report at what he himself terms a " late hour in the day," it is 
 plain — 
 
 Fli'st. That his troops were not all up fiom Gainesville so as to be 
 deployed into line before 3 p. m. — possibly nearer 4 p. m. — despite the 
 earlier hour given by him ; because, according to Col. E. G. Marshall^ 
 Thirteenth New York Volunteers (now colonel, U. S. A., retired), peti- 
 tioner's witness, who commanded the hitter's skirmish-line, the enemy's 
 ^^ force continued to come dou-n all daij, in fact ttntil one o^cIock at niijlif^ 
 (G. C. ]\L Eecord, p. 190); and Major George Hyland, jr., same regiment, 
 another of petitioner's witnesses on the latter's trial, who had been on the 
 skirmish-line, sworeas follows: 
 
 Question by accused. Do you know at what hour they [the enemy] commenced 
 forming, or about Avhat hour ! 
 
 Answer. They coinmenced forming between two and three o'clock,! tliink (G. C. M. 
 Eecord, p. 174). 
 
 Tiuis two of the best-informed officers under petitioner confirmed this 
 particular evidence of Longstreet. 
 
 Erigadier-^Teneral Charles Griftin, I'nited States Volunteers, another 
 of jiciitioner's witnesses on his trial, said (G. C. M. Record, p. 103): 
 
 ■- Tiiat heavy bodies of troops were passing from Thoroughfare fjap down towards 
 our IVont all day long — that is, that they passed. Some of them may have been three 
 miles, some of them may have been live miles, and some of them may not have been 
 over J.OOO yards from us. 
 
 Therefore, all of Longstreet's assumed -!.>,000 men could not have been 
 uji iii position by 1 or 2 or 3 ]>. m. 
 
 Second. It is also plain that when Longstreet made his reconnaissance 
 about 4 p. m. he ga\"e no heed or attention to the jtosition where peti- 
 tioner's corps was lying inactive, quite out of sight, but devoted Ids at- 
 tention to the Union forces near the Warrenton, CJainesville, Grovrton 
 and (jentreville turnpike. 
 
 Tliis, we shall see, harmonizes exactly witli the evidence of distin- 
 guislied Union ohicers who have testified in this case. 
 
 Third. It is also j>lain tlmt it was the presence of LTnion troops wholly 
 nortli of ]>etitioner's]K)sition which made Longstreet reluctant to attack, 
 and induced him to tellljce it would be a ''little hazardous." 
 
 This fact, with the report between 4 and 4i }>. m. of the advance from 
 Bristoe toward Gainesville, toward Lee's rear, of the brigade of observa- 
 tion sent out by ]\Lajor-( Jeneral X. 1*. Banks, United States Volunteers,, 
 caused the Confederate commander to maintain liis condition of inaction 
 until ap})rehensi(m from that (pnirter had disa])[)eared, and at sunset he 
 shoved in down the pike Hood's division and Evans' brigade, with Wil- 
 cox's division as support, into an action with King's division, near the 
 
123 
 
 (iibbon wood, wliicli hi.sti'd, ;K*eoi(liiig to (General Lee's and other official 
 rei)orts, until NINE P. M. (lioard's Kecord, pp. 521, ooT). Longstreet also 
 l)nts it until U p. m. in his report.- 
 
 As, after noon, it is certain that petitioner's corps were kept by hiui 
 in a state of complete inactivity, stretched in column along a road con- 
 cealed by woods for at least three miles to tlie rear, it is tjuite clear that 
 Lee and Longstreet gave him no attention. 
 
 If^ as Longstreet says, a reconnaissance to his front, near the Warren- 
 ton pike, made him believe a front attack, even with his assumed 25,000 
 men, would be ''hazardous," the inquiry natui-ally suggests itself, What 
 would have been the consequences to bis command had the petitioner 
 imiihedfoncard on his (Longstreet's) i^ight flank, supported as lie would 
 have been by the gallant Eeynolds, with his division attached to Mc- 
 Dowell's corps, and by Schenck's division of Sigel's corps and Stevens' 
 brigade of Eeno, all of which were south of the Warrenton turni)ike, and 
 supported by King's division of jNlcDowell's corps ? 
 
 All our movements of the left wing south of the Warrenton turnpike 
 were absolutely paralyzed that day and rendered of no avail in conse- 
 quence of petitioner's lanu^ntable failure. 
 
 His pretense that his skillful arrangements to put his own forces out 
 of sight and in a "defensive" position, so as to hold the enemy in his 
 front, while at the same time, on the right flank of General Poi)e's Army, 
 assault after assault ^A'as being made on the Confederate lines, is a pre- 
 tense sucli as was, possibly, never before ventured upon in a judicial in- 
 vestigation by any defendant having military training. 
 
 Indeed, his own witness, Charles Marshall, aide-de camp to Lee, says 
 ({k)ard's Kecord, p. 171), on his (petitioner's) assumi)tion of facts that 
 Lee withdrew Wilcox's division of Longstreet's command from the right 
 late in the afternoon and sent him up on to the pike to support Hood, 
 because lie believed '■^ there iroiild be no further movement against his right.'''' 
 
 Brig. (Jen. Jo// « Buford,\J. S. Volunteers, petitioner's original witness, 
 did, as appears of rccoi'd, observe the advance of Longstreet and Lee 
 through Gainesville on tlie 2!>th August, and estinuited their numbers 
 liberally at 14,000. 
 
 Cadmus ]\[. Wilcox, division commander under Longstreet, (j)etitioner's 
 witness), testifies that tlie brigades and divisions were all together 
 (Board's Record, p. 230). 
 
 Longstreet, and Charles T. Williams, then aide-de-camp to D, E. Jones, 
 another division commander (lioth petitioner's witnesses), confirm this 
 (Board's Kecord, pp. 00, 221). 
 
 Bu lord's estimate and report, made from ]»ersonal and careful obser- 
 vation at the time, is much more reliable than the recollection of these 
 Confederates, which, as we have seen, varied among themselves to the 
 extent of several thousands. 
 
 Buford testified in 1862 that the cavalry with that marching column 
 was about 500 (G. C. ]VL Eecord, p. ISS): and also so reported to Major- 
 (ieneral ]VIcDowell on the morning of the 29th August; yet Beverly H. 
 Eobertson and Longstreet each, as we have seen, j/ut if now, from recol- 
 lection merely, as respectively 2,500 and 3,000. 
 
 These discrepancies are glaring. 
 
 At the close of the evidence before this Board (.jd January) petitioner 
 reproduced the witness Leachman, and in(piired, not however in sur- 
 rebuttal of anything developed during the recess, as to the character of 
 ihe country behiiul Pagelaiid Lane, which he declared to be a "morass." 
 He also i>reviously said (Board's Kecord, p. 141), men could only have 
 gone doAvn the Manassas Gap Kailroad to J. W. Jetfers' in single file, as 
 
124 
 
 the culverts were opeu ; and yet, we know. General McDowell galloped 
 rai)idly down. 
 
 His reliability is further exeniplitied when cross-questioned as to 
 "Monroe's" or Stuart's Hill, which overlooks his house (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 142) : 
 
 Question. Is tlure any coiuniamling elevation south from the Warrenton pike fi-oni 
 which you can see Centreville? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; not in tlie topography of the country at that time, nor is there 
 now. 
 
 As to the ground west of Pageland Lane, Lono-street himself indi- 
 cates that he came into position l)ack of it, and threw out one battery 
 northwest of Pageland Lane (Board's Record, p. OS). The Board has 
 got to take what may, for explanation, be termed "JudiciaF' notice of the 
 character of the country, and I insist that the countiy back of Pageland 
 Lane is high ground. 
 
 James MitclteU, formerly a captain. First Virginia Volunteers. Kem- 
 per's division, called l)y petitioner (Board's Eecord, p. 385), says that to 
 the best of his recollection they must have advanced to 7iear Pageland 
 Lane, and then filed on to the right and passed down an old and unfi-e- 
 quented road for some distance, and then diverged into the fields through 
 the woods. Further on he said as follows (Board's Eecord, ]>. 380) : 
 
 I saw no Federal troojis at all that day. 
 
 This is the only -uitness who has been produced iu this case from 
 Kemi^er's division of Longstreet's command, and his statement shows 
 conclusively how far back that division must have been placed, so far 
 as the battle was concerned. 
 
 The position of the portion of Longstreet's command which arrived near 
 the field on this 29th of August, is only indirectly of importance. 
 
 Assuming it to have been as far east as the easterly edge of the "Gib- 
 bon wood," where petitioner seeks to put it, such position would only 
 have put the petitioner in a better jxtsition to attack the enemy's flank 
 and possible rear, than the i^osition actually taken by Longstreet as indi- 
 cated by me. 
 
 Some few of the Confederates brought before this Board by petitioner 
 give evidence directly contradictory to that formerly and now given by 
 tJnion ofllicers, as indicati^ e of the enemy's position. And this evidence 
 of the Union oificers is supported by that of citizens and Confederates. 
 
 It must be rememl>ered that the enemy occui)ied substantially the 
 same ground for two days, having been moved back or forward in some 
 instances half a mile or more. 
 
 On the other hand, the Union officers were up on that line on\}'0)tedaif. 
 Consequently there is no possibility of confusion when they indicate that 
 they were located in a particular position. 
 
 As to the Confederates, there is strong probability that what was said, 
 for example, by Charles jNIarshall, of Lee's staff (Board's Eecor<l. pp. 158, 
 995), as to Longstreet's ]»osition, really referred to the 30th instead of 
 the 29th August. 
 
 A good illustration of this is found in the Eev. Franklin Stringfellow's 
 testimony (Board's Eeccnd, p. 1034). He was on duty with Maj. Gen. J. 
 E. B. Stuart, mentioned several incidents which occurred, and gives his 
 recollection of seeing rt'giments in jiosition liack of Pageland Lane, yet 
 when he came to describe i)ositions subsequent to the first seen by him,- 
 he became c(»nfused; and confounde<l the two days' battles so completely 
 as to ask to have his testimony not considered. 
 
 There is great discrepancy between petitioner's witnesses Longstreet 
 and Chas. 31arshall as to the former's station. 
 
125 
 
 Longsfreet (Board's Eeeord, p. OS) put liis line on the easterly slope of 
 the Douglas Biowuer house hill (where it would have been exposed to 
 the fire of the Union batteries), and carried it down on a line with Meadow- 
 ville Lane. (See his map.) 
 
 Clias. Marshall, equally positive, puts Longstreet far in advance of 
 Longstreet himself and to the east edge of the -'Gibljon" wood (Board's 
 Eecord, pp. 157, 240, and 1000) by 11 a. m. 
 
 However (Board's liecord, l^. 1)9G), in another part of his testimony, he 
 says that some time on the -9th or 30th, he does not recollevt ichich, he was 
 sent on a certain duty. 
 
 Alexander I). Payne, foiuierly first lieutenant Fourth Virginia Con- 
 federate Cavalry, commanding Lee's guards, having been called for peti- 
 tioner, says (Board's Eecord, p. 382), that Hood's division formed in the 
 Gibbon wood, very soon after Lee got there, between 10 and 11 a. m., 
 nearer 10. 
 
 Jubal A. Earlji, then brigadier-general Confederate service, a govern- 
 ment witness, says (Board's Eecord, p. 850) that Hood came \\\} about 
 11 a. m. He further testifies as folloAvs : 
 
 I moYod my own Lrigjulc across Pagelaiid road and ■.vaited tliere some time until 
 these tAvo regiments ['J hirteentli and Thirty-tirst Virginia Infantry] could be with- 
 drawn ; their'plaee ha<l to be su])plied by some other troops ou the flank' 
 
 I suppose it was hi the ofteriiooii sometime, liefore those regiments got there. I lay 
 there waiting for some iiine and then moved otf to the left in the rear of our line. 
 
 It will be noticed that these two legiments of Early's had l)een early 
 ill the day pushed down to guard Jackson's right flank. 
 
 Henry Kyd Doufjlas, assistant adjutant-general to Maj. Gen. T. J. 
 Jackson on the 20th August, a government witness, testified as follows 
 (Board's Eecord, ]►. 705) : 
 
 Question. Do you recollect seeing Genei'al Longstreet coming into position ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. I don't recollect seeing General Longstreet until about the time 
 Hood's command became involved, late in the evening. I think I had gone to Gen- 
 eral Jackson, and was sent to Longstreet to see what that was. 
 
 Question. That was along the line of attack? 
 
 Answer. That was rather on Longstreet's left. There was a gap between Jackson's 
 right and the position taken by Longstreet. That gap was a series of hills, as far as 
 I can recollect, occupied by artillery controlled by Colonel Kirchner, Jackson's chief 
 of staft'. I have not Iteen there since the war. I do not attempt to be accurate about 
 topographical features. 
 
 ^fUUam W. Blarlxf'ord, then ca])taiii of engineers, on Stuart's staff, 
 subsequently lieutenant-colonel of engineers, a government witness 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 701), when asked whether, according to his recol- 
 lection, the Confederate lines included Cundiffe's and the ravine near 
 "Meadow\dlle Lane," answered as follows: 
 
 Answer. Longstreet's first line was liack of that ; I think his first line was in these 
 woods. [West of I'agcland Lane.] 
 
 This witness had, just before testifying, been on the ground (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 690), and knew the country. 
 
 Lewis B. Carrioo, who resides on the battle-ground, called by govern- 
 ment, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 982) : 
 
 Question. Where do you reside ? 
 
 Answer. Prince William Coiinty, Virginia. 
 
 Question. Where did you reside on the •29th of August, 1862 1 
 
 Answer. W^iere I now reside, very near the Manassas Gap Railroad. 
 
 Question. Were you there on that day ? 
 
 Answer. I was. 
 
 Question. Up to what hour in the day did you remain there ? 
 
 Answer. I was there until very late Friday evening. 
 
 Question. During that day did you see any Confederate forces ? If so, where? 
 
126 
 
 Answer. I saw some cavalry scouts during tluit day. and in rhe evening there was a 
 l>attery firing some 75 or 80 yards back of my house, just west of my house, and an 
 officer came there and told me I was in danger, and to take my family and go back of 
 the line. 
 
 Question. Where did you go then? 
 
 Answer. I went up the road about a mile, to a faiiii owned now liy ^lajor Nutt. 
 
 Question. Towards Gaiuesville f 
 
 Answer. Between there and Gainesville. 
 
 Question. Did you meet any Confederate f(U'ce on that triy* ? 1/ so, about where? 
 
 Answer. I saw them a little beyond Hampton Cole's, a very small nu)nl)er. They 
 were sitting down on the side of the railroad, and their battery, that was planted at 
 the back ol my house — that opened upon the Federal troops diieetly after I passed it ; 
 and when I got up there against them, they got up and took shelter on the embank- 
 luent of the railroad. 
 
 Question. Did you at that time see any troops to the south of the railroad ? 
 
 Answer. None at all excei>t a little picket force that was a little to the south of the 
 railroad, just above there ; a small picket force. 
 
 Question. Did any Confederate force pass to the east of your house during the day? 
 If so, in what direction did they go ? 
 
 Answer. I saw none pass to the eastward. I saw soine shelling from the back of 
 what is called the Britt farm, and a disalded Federal wagon at the mouth of a lane 
 called Comptou's lane. 
 
 Qu"esti(m. About what time in tlie day was that? 
 
 Answer. I could hardly say ; twelve or one o'clock. 
 
 Question. "What do you mean by the exj)ression "evening"? 
 Answer. I mean something like three or four o'clock ; somewhere thereabouts. 
 Question. How do you tix the time f 
 
 Answer. I fix the time by having to leave home, and having to go the small dis- 
 tance I did go. 
 
 Question. What room did yon stay in? 
 
 Answer. I was all over the house ; very often up-stairs, looking out of the window. 
 
 Question. Which w ay ? 
 
 Answer. Towards Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 Question. What time was the cannon posted there ? 
 Answer. Possibly four o'clock. 
 Qitestiou. You are positive about that f 
 
 Answer. I am not positive; but according to the best of my judgment it was prob- 
 ably as late as four. 
 
 Question. Was it earlier or later than four? . - 
 
 Answer. It was not earlier, I do not think ; not earlier than three I am very sure. 
 
 Question. Were there anv soldiers of any description about your house, except the 
 battery ? 
 
 Answer. On Friday there was a Federal forc-e in Mr. Lewis' field, to the east of my 
 Louse. 
 
 Question. Where was Lewis' field ? 
 
 Answer. Within 300 or 400 yards to the east of my house. 
 
 Question. Were there any abont your house ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; there were some of the Federal forces; two men that Iliad had sorme 
 ac<iuaintauce with, who were in my house when this wagon was disabled at the end 
 of Comptou's lane. 
 
 » * if « * * * 
 
 Question. About where is the pla<e where you cariied your fannly? 
 
 Answer. Immediately at the Manassas Railroad, one mile ]iast Hanii)ton Cole's. 
 
 Questi(ui. You say yon did not meet any considerable body of the Confederate force 
 on your w ay there ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; I do say it; and I saw no considerable body there as I stated to you 
 and General Porter, if he was Avith you, until I got home next morning, about sun-up. 
 Tliey came there to my house and destroyed a great deal. 
 
 WUIunn T. Jlfo?j)Y>f, residing on '' Stuart'.s Hill," called by goveniuient, 
 testified ,a.s follows (Board's Kecord, p. 1)80) : 
 
 Question. Do you recollect anything of the occurrences of the 29th of August, 1862? 
 
 Answer. I recollect about eleven o'clock General Longstreefs troops first came in 
 there, or about twelve; I reckon that battery was posted on that hill — it may have 
 been a little earlier, but not later than twelve o'clock. 
 
127 
 
 Question. Do you know in what direction tliat battery was tired? 
 
 Answer. It tired in the direction of Groveton. 
 
 Question. Did it continue to fire in that direction ! 
 
 Answer. It fired in that direction some hour, or maybe more. 
 
 Question. Do you know wliere it went to from tliat i)oiut? 
 
 Answer. It went down by, just into the depot wliich is now u})on the raihoad, and 
 from there to the liill at the Britt house. 
 
 Question. Did you see it there in position ' 
 
 Answer. At the Britt house ? Yes. 
 
 Question. In wliich direction did it fire from there'? 
 
 Answer. At first it fired in the direction of the Lewis house. [Witness indicates 
 Leachman's.] Whether it fired in tluit direction all the time, I don't know. 
 
 Question. You did not see it fire in any other direction '! 
 
 Answer. No, sir; the Federal troops at the time were around the Leachniau house, 
 and this battery graped them, fired grape and canister. 
 
 Question. Do you know where the Confederate lines were, or forces, on that day, 
 aside fi-om that ]tarticular battery that finally got down to the Britt house? 
 
 Answer. There was infantry just in here, running from the Warrenton and Gaines- 
 ville pike [back of Pageland lane]. There was an army-road running through there, 
 and then they were posted on this road. [Witness marks the map. "1 
 
 Question. Do yon know how far down they were posted? 
 
 Answer. I don't know. [Witness closes his marking at the road just northwest of 
 Charles Randall's.] The skirmish line was drawn down as far as Vessel's. 
 
 Question. When did you first see the Confederate lines advance beyond Pageland 
 lane during that day — the infantry ? * 
 
 Answer. I don't know when this part of the line advanced at all. [Down near the 
 railroad.] It moved down under the hill, out of sight of the house. I did not see 
 them. 
 
 Question. Off in what direction? 
 
 Answer. Off in this way, I suppose. [In the direction of Hampton Cole's.] 
 
 Question. Down along the railroad, do you say '! 
 
 Answer. They moved in that direction, down along the railroad. 
 
 Question. About what time of day was that ? 
 
 Answer. I would not say positively. I think it was about the middle of the after- 
 noon, say three or four o'clock. 
 
 Question. You were describing some portion of the line that you did see. 
 
 Answer. This portion of the line marched through by the house — that was about 
 three o'clock. [The line just north of the house.] 
 
 Question. That portion of the line between your house and the turnpike, you mean? 
 
 Answer, l^es, sir. 
 
 Question. Marched to the front about four o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. I think it was General Hunton's brigade. General Huiit(m was along with 
 the brigade, and I thnugliT he was commanding. 
 
 Question. Do you know of the advance of any of the other" Ccmfederate forces tliat 
 day, during the day ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. 
 
 Cross-examination: 
 
 Question. How do you fix the time of the arrival of tlie Conft-derate force l)y your 
 house in the morning ? 
 
 Answer. The first came in about ten o'clock. 
 
 Question. Where did they come ?. 
 
 Answer. Marched around in here then. [On the army road.] But by eleven o'clock 
 that line was formed, and the troops were lying there in the line of battle. 
 
 Question. How do you fix those times ? 
 
 Answer. Well, I had a time-piece. 
 
 Question. Did you look at the clock ? 
 
 Answer. I do not say that it was exactly that time. 
 
 Question. It was in reference to the clock that you fixed it at about that time ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. How far down had they formed — down the railroad — by ten or eleven 
 o'clock? 
 
 Answer. They had formed down as far as the railroad by eleven o'clock. 
 
 Question. How long did they remain tliej-e ? 
 
 Answer. I know that they were there about one. When tliey left I don't know. 
 They had gone about four o'clock. 
 
 Question. Did you hear any cannonading anywhere within a mile to the south or 
 southeast of your place before their arrival ? 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
128 
 
 Qnestiou. Did yon lioar any firing of guns off toward-s Carrico's Lonse at or about 
 the time of their arrival ? 
 
 Answer. I ilidn't hear until after they arrived. 
 
 Question. How k)ng after ? 
 
 Answer. Some hour; maybe hour and a half. 
 
 Question. Did you hear any about three or four o'clock in the afternoon at Carrico's 
 house ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; I heard that. But the first gnus I lieard at all were — well, I heard 
 tliis battery. 
 
 Question. I do not refer to tlic battery near your house. 
 
 Answer. The first fire I heard after that was one o'clock. 
 
 Q;;estion. Where was that ? 
 
 Answer. That was off here in the direction of Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 Question. Can you see Dawkins" Branch from your house ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; we cannot see the branch, but we can see the hills on both sides. 
 
 Question. Can yon see the hill near Dawkins" Branch ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Do you know of any firing by Carrico's house about twelve o'clock? 
 
 Answer. I kuo^\' there was none at twelve or one o'clock, either. 
 
 Question. Do you know that all that aiTived there remained there until one o'clock ? 
 Answer. I know they staid there on this part of the line until one o'clock. 
 Question. The whole force that was there ? 
 Answer. I understood the skinnish line. 
 
 Question. Could you see from your house to Hampton Cf)le"s ? 
 
 Answer. Very plainly. 
 
 Question. Could you see any lines of troops that would be formed along what is 
 called Meadowville lane f 
 
 Answer. I did not see any troops at all formed along Meadowville lane, but about 
 some time between three and four o'clock there were some Confederate troops formed 
 
 right along here in the woods [south of Hampton Cole's], I think one regiment. 
 
 # ^ ^ ■ . * * ^ * 
 
 Question. Did you see the effect of the fire from the hill near your house in the 
 direction of Groveton ? 
 
 Answer. I saw^ that there was infantry in this field [east of Gibbons' battle-ground], 
 lying along in there [south of the pike]. When this battery commenced firing, they 
 got back into the woods. 
 
 Question. You mean along the branch running up from Lewis' lane No. 1 towardf^ 
 the letter "V'' in "Gainesville" — the line Avas just alongside of the striji of woods 
 between the branch and that? 
 
 Answer. RujM along in the edge of ihe troods. [Witness marks the point on the Doug- 
 lass Pope maj) as "Monroe."] That was about 12 o'clock. 
 
 Question. They retired then ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; they got back into the woods. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain where you could see the direction of that firing ? 
 
 Answer. Just as long as tliat battery was on the hill. That was some hour and a 
 
 half. 
 
 * ^ -jf # ■* . * * 
 
 Question. How do you fix the time of the advance of a Confederate force from behind 
 your house at three or four o'clock f 
 
 Answer. I don't know when they moved, but about 4 they were gone. They were 
 
 there at? late as one o'clock, and at four o'clock they were gone. 
 
 * * # * # ' * * 
 
 Question. If troops had been lying along here parallel with and east of Pageland 
 lane west of Meadowville lane, in the direction of Douglass Hill, would you have been 
 aide to see them ? 
 
 Answer. I would if they had been in lierc. [East of Pageland lane, west of 
 Meadowville lane, and jiarallel to Pageland lane, about midway between.] 
 
 By the Pkksioknt of the Board: 
 Question. The troops you saw coming up marched along what road ? 
 Answer. I did not see them nuirch at all. When I first saw them they were stand- 
 ing in line, back of Pageland latu\ 
 Question. That was aliout what time? 
 Answer. Bfstween ten and eleven o'clock. 
 Question. The first you saw was the skirmish line ? 
 Answer. Tlie tirst troops I saw was the skirmish line. 
 
129 
 
 From tlie evidence of Leiris B. Carriro it api)ears : 
 
 1st. Tliat during the day some of the Union soldiers came to his 
 house. 
 
 '2d. Tliat the first Confederates who came near his house did so in the 
 afternoon between 3 aud 4 o\4ock, although he saw some scouts possibly 
 earlier. 
 
 :3d. That a Confederate battery was not posted back of his house 
 until about 4 p. m. ; and 
 
 4th. That the first Confederate troops he saw were a little beyond 
 Hampton Cole's when he went back at that time towards Gainesviile. 
 
 5th. That he saw some shelling- from back of the "P>ritt" farm. 
 
 0th. That there were some Union troops in the Lewis fields. 
 
 From the evidence of ^ViUi(lln T. Monroe it ai>]»ears: 
 
 1st. That Longstreet's troops came into position back of Pageland 
 lane between 11 and 12 m. 
 
 I'd. That Long-street's troops formed down the railroad about 10 or 11 
 a. m., and were there about 1 p. m. 
 
 3d. That a battery was placed on the hill and forced first towards 
 Choveton, for an hour, maybe more, and then moved down first near 
 the depot on the railroad, and then to the Britt house from whence it 
 fired for a time in the direction of the Lewis- Leachman house. 
 
 4th. That some of Lougstreet'S forces moved, he supposes, in the direc- 
 tion of Hampton Cole's, somewhere between 3 and 4 p. m. 
 
 r>th. That about 4 p. m. Hamjjton's brigade moved forward, 
 
 Gth. Some time between 3 and 4 p. m. there were some Confederate 
 troops alcuig in the roads south of Hampton Cole's, he thinks one regi- 
 ment. 
 
 7th. He noticed effect of firing on Union forces between Gibbon battle- 
 ground and strip of woods east. 
 
 The battery continued firing an hour and a luilf. 
 
 Bushrod W. Frohelj then major commanding artillery of Hood's Con- 
 federate division, Longstreet's command, a government witness, says 
 that he was ordered to go to the right or soutli of the Warrentou turn- 
 pike, somewhere between 10 o'clock and noon or about 11 o'clock. 
 
 He then testifies as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 709) : 
 
 Answer. I was ordered by General Byrne to General J. E. B. Stnart, and Captain 
 Johnson, of General I^ee's staff, was sent with me to show me where I could find him. 
 
 Question. Where did you tind J. E. B. Stnart f 
 
 Answer. I found him near tlie Manassas Railroad. I stated in that report that it 
 "was near the Orange Railroad; it was a mistake, owing to not having a map to refer 
 to. It was near the Manassas Railioad. 
 
 Question. What then transpired'/ 
 
 Answer. He said the enemy were advancing uji the road and for me to go into posi- 
 tion and fire. 
 
 Question. What road did you understand the enemy were advancing on? 
 ■ Answer. I don't recollect. My impression is now some one told us they were ad- 
 vancing on what was called the Ocoquan. 
 
 Question. From what direction f 
 
 Answer. The direction of Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. What did yon then do after you came into position ? 
 
 Answer. I fired about fifteen or twenty rounds. 
 
 Question. Where was General Lee at this time? 
 
 Answer. He came over there just about the close of the firing. ■ 
 
 Question. Did he have anything to say in reference to the firing? 
 
 Answer. I think he told us not to waste any ammnuition; that we would have a uso 
 for it before The day was over. 
 
 Question. When you fired those shots in what direction did you fire them? 
 
 Answer. As near as I can recollect it was in the direction of the railroad; pretty 
 nearly in the direction in which the railroad passed. 
 
 Question. What did the I'ederal troops that were advancing do when you fired? 
 
130 
 
 Answer. I think tlu-y coiinnt'nced to retire ami moved, as near as I can recollect, 
 toward onr left and tlieir right. 
 
 Question. What was it that prevented your seeing the direction of that attack? 
 
 Answer. Woods. 
 
 Question. The woods near which they were? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Were they de]ih)yed when yon saw them or were they advancing? 
 
 Answer. We conkl see them, very indistinctly indeed, to the rear of the woods; it 
 seemed as it" they were advancing. After they got into tlie woods, we could not see at 
 all. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain in that position? 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect; i)roba1)ly an hour. 
 
 Question. Was there any return to this artillery tire of yours? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Between Major Froliel and Mr. 3Iunroe there is a contradiction as to 
 the point to which Frobel tired. HoMever, he says his impression is 
 that some one at the time told him onr forces were advancing on the 
 Ocoqnan road, which is designated on the map as the " Manassas and 
 Gainesville " du^t road. 
 
 The time at which he places himself on Mnnroe's or Stuart's Hill cor- 
 responds to the time of arrival of the head of petitioner's column on the 
 ridge hack of Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 We must not forget that it appears in evidence (see Mr. WTieeler's 
 latest testimony, corroborated by Leachman's, if the latter's evidence 
 is reliable in anything) that the Manassas Gap Eailroad at Dawkins' 
 Branch could be seen from Mnnroe's or Stuart's Hill, and also several 
 hundred yards towards the Manassas and Gainesville dirt road, and 
 the ridge back of the branch along which Griflin's brigade, after Mc- 
 Dowell left, moved up to and across the railroad into the little pine 
 bushes which, without exploration of any lind on the part of anybody, 
 were found suflScient pretended obstacle to i)revent the infantry com- 
 pMng with General McDowell's orders given before he left, to go into 
 action where the dust indicated the arrival of reinforcements to Jackson. 
 
 Col. Thomas L. Rosser, Fifth Virginia Cavalry, Stuart's division, a 
 government Avitness, testified, trom Saint Paul, Miun., as follows : 
 
 7th interrogatory. WTiere were yon at daylight on the morning of the twenty-ninth 
 of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two ? 
 
 Answer. I was on Jackson's extreme right, with pickets under my command, on the 
 Alexandria and Warrenton turnpike, and other roads leading in from the direction of 
 the Orange and Alexandiia Railioad. 
 
 8th interrogatory. Do you know where Sudley Church is ? If so, where were you 
 in reference to that point ? 
 
 Answer. I do ; and I was further up the stream, and to the west of the church. 
 
 9th inteiTogatory. Did you join General Stuart that morning ? If so, state at what 
 time, and narrate what happened. 
 
 Answer. At daylight I moved out, crossing the Alexandria and W^arrenton turnpike, 
 and occupied a road leading otf to Manassas Junction, a mile or two heyond the turn- 
 pike. At this point, ahont ten o'clock, I was joined by Stuart and his staff. Long- 
 street's command was coming in in a very forced and disordered march from the direc- 
 tion of Thoroughfare Gap, moving rapidly and straggling badly. My jiosition was 
 taken n]» with i-eference to their protection from a gnu of the enemy who were in my 
 front. When Stuart joined me, he notified me that the enemy was moving upon our 
 right flank, and ordered me to move my comnmnd up and do^vn the dusty road, and 
 to drag brush, and thus create a heavy dust as though troojjs were in motion. I kei>t 
 this up at least four or five hours. 
 
 10th inteiTogatcjry. Did yon see Capt. .John Pelham, or Major Patrick, or both, that 
 morning? If so, where, under what circumstances, and what did they do to your 
 knowledge ? 
 
 Answer. I do not remember Patrick. Pelham came to where I was, late in the day, 
 with some artillery, and was moved out to the right, where he engaged the enemy. 
 There was firing — at this time a cavalry command, with Stiiart, moved out and relieved 
 me from my position. I then took position on the extreme right of Longstreet's line, 
 which was then forming. 
 
 * # * # *1* * 
 
* . 131 
 
 loth iuteiTogatory. Were yon soutli of the WaiTPiitoii. (iaiiiesville and C'entreville 
 pike after this ? If so. where did yon go, wliat <lid .\(in do, and Ity whosi^ orders? 
 
 Answer. I was all the time sonth of it. I assniiied it in the first place withont orders, 
 and remained there afterwards by General Stn art's orders. 
 
 16th interrogatory. Do yon know of any artillery tiring sonth of the pike in the 
 direction of Manassas .Jnnction or Bristoe Station, on the twenty-ninth of Angnst, 
 eighteen hnudred and sixty-two '? If so, wheri; was it from, what was it directed to, 
 "what was its character and resnlt ? 
 
 Answer. The horse artillery, as I have stated, nnder Pelham, directed hy fttnart, 
 moved ont and engaged the Federal forces. It was east of Hay Market and sonth of 
 the tnrnpike. It was directed to a marching colnniu or advancing colnnni. It was so 
 reported to me by my sconts. They also leported that the colnmn had halted. 
 
 17th interrogatory. If yon were sonth of the (Gainesville pike did yon see any Federal 
 forces advancing from the direction of Manassas .Innction or Bristoe? If so, do yon 
 know whether any measiires or expedients were taken by General Stnart or yonrself, 
 or directed to be taken to retard, impede, or prevent sncli advance, or to divert snch 
 forces? If so, please state what they were. 
 
 Answer. .Stnart reported the advance of a Federal force, and that led to the drag- 
 ging of Virnsh as jirevionsly related. 
 
 1st cross-interrogatory. Please mark npon the map (herennto attached) with a red 
 letter A the varions places wliere yon know of yonr own knowledge yonr pickets were 
 placed abont daylight on the right of .Jackson's turces, Ang. •29th, 1862. 
 
 Answer to 1st cross-intenogatory. My pickets were posted along the line indicated 
 by the letter A marked on the map, as reijnested, on the date given. [From Pageland 
 lane on the pike to letter A in word Warrentou, then northeast to first brook.] 
 
 2d cross-interrogatory. If yon cannot do so, designate the roads which yon know 
 of yonr own knowledge were giiariled by yonr jiickets at that time. 
 
 Answer to 2d cross-interrogat(ny. My reply to the first qnestion answers that. 
 
 3d cross-interrogatory. Mark with a red letter B the road leading otf to Manassas 
 Jnnction which yon say yon occupied at daylight a mile or two beyond the tnrnpike. 
 
 Answer to 3d cross-interrogatory. ]\Iy position was at the point which I have 
 marked on the map with the letter Bl, and my pickets were extended ont on the roads 
 iiulicated by the other letters B, which I have marked, asreqnested. [B is on Meadow- 
 ville lane, 1,400 feet north of 1 Iani])ton Cole's ; B, B, B are at the junction of Meadow- 
 ville lane with old Warrenton and Alexandria road, on that road 2,200 feet east of 
 junction, and 1.800 feet southeast of junction on railroad.] 
 
 4th cross inteiTOgatory. Mark with red letter C the point where General Stuart 
 joined yon -with his staff about ten o'clock of 2i>th Aug., 1862. 
 
 Answer to 4th cross-interrog;ilory. It was at the forks of the roads which I have 
 marked on the map with the letter C. [Junction of Meadowville lane and old War- 
 renton and Alexandria road.] 
 
 oth cross-interrogatoiy. IMark with red letter D where the fin'ces of General Long- 
 street were when you first saw them on that day. 
 
 Answer to 5th cross-interrogatory. I have marked the points with the letters D, as 
 near as I can on this map. [2,800" feet west of Pageland hme on the pike, then S(mth 
 half-way to railroad.] 
 
 6th cross-interrogatory. Mark with the letter E the position of the "few of the 
 enemy who were in my (your) front." against whom you were posted to protect Long- 
 street's advancing forces, as I understand yon to state. 
 
 Answer to 6th cross-intcrrogatorv. Tliev run in front of my pickets at the points I 
 have marked on the map with the letters E. [On the railroad 2,200 fvet west of Daw- 
 kins' Branch, then into the woods to the southeast to the Manassas and Gainesville 
 dirt road.] 
 
 7th cross-interrogatory. Mark with red line and letters F F at each end of th(> Hue 
 the distaiice and road along which your command di-agged brush. 
 
 Answer to 7th cross-interrogatorv. I have marked the map as requested. [From 
 jnnction of Meadowville lane and oldWaiTenton road on the lane north 2,800 feet.] 
 
 8th cross-interrogatory. Did you, yourself, see this dragging of brush ? 
 
 Answer to 8th cross-interrogatory. I did. 
 
 9th cross-interrogatory. How many men were present for duty in yonr regnneur 
 on said 29tli Angnst ? 
 
 Answer to 9th cross-interrogatory. It was somewhere between three hundred and 
 four hundred. 
 
 10th cross-interrogatorv. How many were dragging brush ? 
 
 Answer to 10th cross-interrogatory. There was a large detail— several companies— 
 in the neighborhood of a hundred. 
 
 11th cross-interrogatory. With a view to getting their opinions as to hour ai.d 
 place of dragging brush'on 29th of August, lc62, please state if you rememlu r il;e 
 
 10 G 
 
132 
 
 names aud addresses of any officers or men now living who were eye-wituesses of sucli 
 dragging. 
 
 Answer to lltli cross-interrogatory. The regiment was subsequently so hadly cut 
 u]i that I do not now remember the name of a single living officer who was iH'csent, 
 unless it may be Hon. B. B. Douglas, now a member of Congress from Virginia. 
 
 12th cross-interrogatoiy. What time in the day did you l)egin dragging brush, and 
 when did you end it ? iState particularly how you fix the time. 
 
 Answer to l'2th cross-interrogatory. We began it, as near as I can remember, aboiit 
 ten o'clock in the morning. It must have been in the neighborhood of one o'clock 
 when we (juir. I state the time from my recollection. 
 
 13th cross-interrogatory. Draw a red line from the point wliere you said you met 
 General Stuart when he directed you to drag 1)rush to a place nuirked New Market, 
 another from the same first-named point to Manassas Station; a third line to a point 
 will re Milford road runs oft' at foot of map, and a fourth to Langley's Mills, and then 
 .state the position with reference to either of these lines of the Union forces to delude 
 whom yon dragged In-iish as Stuart rej)orted them advancing. 
 
 Answer to loth cross-interrogatory. I have marked the lines on the map as requested. 
 Tile forces I desired to delude were rei)orted to be in the direction of Manassas, between 
 the points I have previously marked on the map with the letters E and Manassas. 
 
 14th cross-interrogatory. Along what road did you understand the Union forces were 
 moving ujion our (yonr) right flank, because of which you were ordered to drag brush ? 
 I'lease mark the road witli red letters G G and the position of the Union forces with 
 red Ijars 
 
 Answer to 14th cross-interrogatory. I only understood the Union forces were mov- 
 ing as stated. I did not see them, aud cannot locate their position. 
 
 1.5tli cross-interrogatory. In whose command was Major Pelham ; in that of Long- 
 >strcet or of Jackson ? 
 
 xVuswer to loth cross-interrogatory. Major Pelham was chief of artillery with Stuart, 
 under Jackson. 
 
 l')th cross-interrogatory. Where were you when Pelhain came to von ? Mark with 
 red letter H. 
 
 Answer to 16th cross-interrogatory. I was near the point I have marked with the 
 letter H ; about at the point marked C [near junction of Meadowville lane and old 
 WaiTeuton and Alexandria road]. 
 
 17tli cross-interrogatory. To what point and in which direction did Pelham "move 
 out to the right'' where he engaged the enemy? Mark point with red letter I and 
 direction with red arrow and letter K, ^-. 
 
 Answer to 17th cross-interrogatory. I have marked the direction in which he went. 
 I do not know to what point he went. [A little east of south, towards Union skir- 
 mishers.] 
 
 18th cross-interrogatory. How many guns had he with him ? 
 
 Answer to I8tli cross-interrogatory. It is my impression he had only two. 
 
 19th cross-Luterrogatory. In which direction did he fire ? Mark with red arrow and 
 letter L. 
 
 Answer to 19th cross-interrogatory. I did not see him fire. I heard artillery in the 
 direction he took. 
 
 20th cross-iuteiTogatory. Where were the enemy at whom he fired f Mark with 
 red letter M. 
 
 Answer to 20th cross-interrogatory. That I could not tell. 
 
 21st cross-interrogatory. What cavalry command relieved you then, and from where 
 did they move out ? Mark point with red letter N. 
 
 Answer to 21st cross-interrogatory. It is my impression that I was relieved by Gen- 
 eral Bev. Roliinsou. They came in from the direction of Gainesville. I at once left 
 ujion being relieved. 
 
 22d cross-interrogatory. Where was your position on extreme right of Long-street, 
 \\liich was then forming, as you say '! ' Mark this position with red bars aiifl letter 0. 
 
 Answer to 22d cross-interrogatory. I have marked the map as requested. The point 
 near Brewer's S])riug. [One thousand three hundred feet east of junction Meadow- 
 ville lane and old Warrenton and Alexandria road.] 
 
 23d cross-interrogatory. Do you know of your own ol)servatiou that Jackson's 
 infantry was engaged all the morning '! 
 
 Answer to 23d cro.ss-interrogatory. I know there was more or less firing all morning. 
 I did not consider it a regular engagement. There was no battle. 
 
 24th cross-interrogatory. Have you had your memory refreshed lately ? If so, state 
 when, where, and by whom, or what. 
 
 Answer to 24tli cross-interrogatory. I have not. I have not even read the proceed- 
 ings of the jircsent trial. 
 
 2.jth cross-interrogatory. Have you ever been over the ground you speak of since 
 l':!'i2 ! If so. state when, and if you have examined the topography particularly. 
 
133 
 
 Answer to 25tli cross-interrogatory. I have uot been on tlie tield since that d.aj'. 
 I had previously examined the topography of the country particuhxrly, and made a 
 map of the tirst battle of Manassas. 
 
 B. S. White, tlieii major and assistant inspector-general of the rerfular 
 Confederate army, serving- on MaJ. Gen. J. E. B. Stnart\s staff, called 
 by the government, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 1052) : 
 
 Question. Where were you on the morning of Friday, August 29, 1362 ? 
 
 Answer. Near Sudley Church. 
 
 Question. Do you know anything that transpired in your immediate vicinity on that 
 morning? If so, what was it ? [Map shown and explained to witness.] 
 
 Answer. On that morning we were looking south ; there were 'some troops appeared 
 on our left, Federal troops, and there was some little confusion in our ambulance train 
 ,iust north of Sudley Springs. 
 
 Question. What then transpired ? 
 
 Answer. There were some artillery and troops put in position to open on the enemy 
 in that direction (witness indicates that the artillery was west of Sudley Church), firing 
 east across Bull Run. 
 
 Question. Do you know whose battery that was that was put in position ? 
 
 Answer. Pelham's l>attery; he commanded the Stuart horse-artillery. 
 
 Question. What then transpired .? 
 
 Answer. Major Patrick was ordered to charge, and did charge the enemy in that 
 direction, and lost his life there. 
 
 Question. That morning after Major Patrick liad those orders to charge, what did 
 you do ? 
 
 Answer. The enemy were dri%'en away. 
 
 Question. Then what was the next event that transpired .' 
 
 Answer. We moved oft' across the country to find out what had become of Loag- 
 street's corps ; we moved otf in this way, towards Thoroughfare Gap. 
 
 Question. Did you find General Longstreet's column or corx)S advancing ? 
 
 Answer. We did, between Hay Market and Gainesville. 
 
 Question. What did General Stuart then do ? 
 
 Answer. General Stuart then threw his command on Longstreet's right and moved 
 down with his right flank in the direction of Bristoe to Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. What did you then observe ? 
 
 Answer. We took the road leading directly down the Manassas Gap Railroad ; there 
 is a road running parallel with it. 
 
 Question. How far down did you go ? 
 
 Answer. General Stuart threw his command on the right of Longstreet, and passed 
 down the Manas.sas Gap Railroad to about that point [west of Hampton Cole's; point 
 marked "W"]. 
 
 Question. Then what did you do ? 
 
 Answer. We discovered a'colnnni in our front — discovered a force in our front com- 
 ing from the direction of Manassas Junction to Bristoe. 
 
 Question. What sort of a point was that where you discovered this column coming, 
 so far as observation is concerned ? 
 
 Answer. It was a good point for observation ; a high position, elevated ground. 
 We could see Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville and all the surrounding country. 
 
 Mr. Maltby. Do you refer to the point where he was ? 
 
 The Recorder. Yes ; where they saw this column approaching. 
 
 Question. How near the point on the railroad was it that this commanding ridge is? 
 
 Answer. Not very far from the railroad ; I suppose a half or three-quarters of a 
 mile — something like that. 
 
 Question. Could you indicate about Avhere you think it was ? 
 
 Answer. I think it was about there. [Marked thus : -f- .] 
 
 Question. You saw the column of troops advancing ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Did you at that time judge about how much of a column it was ? 
 
 Answer. I did not see it all, but it seejued to be a very large body of troops. 
 
 Question. Wliat did General Stuart then do ? 
 
 Answer. He put a battery in position on that hill. 
 
 Question. Did you receive any instructions at that time ? 
 
 Answer. I did. 
 
 Question. What were they ? 
 
 Answer. My instructions were to put a battery in position there and open on the 
 column advancing in this direction. His instructions to me were to go to General 
 Jackson and report the fact of this colunni moving in that direction. 
 
 Question. Did you go and do it I 
 
134 
 
 Answer. I did: I went across /iot. [Parallel with Pagelaml lane.] General Jack- 
 son's corps was here — that is, his command was along the Independent Manassas Gap 
 Eailroad, and the batteries were posted right on a range of hills in the rear of that. 
 I fonnd General Jackson on a range of hills jnst in the rear of his battery. 
 
 Question. Having reported, what did yon then do? 
 
 Answer. I then started to return to General Stuart. 
 
 Question. Where did you go ? 
 
 Answer. I tried to take a little short cut going back to him. I made a little detour; 
 I passed where there had been a skirmish the evening before. 
 
 Question. Did you iind any dead and wounded there? 
 
 Answer. I did. 
 
 Question. North of the pike or south of the pike? 
 
 Answer. On the north side. 
 
 Question Did you find General Stuart at once? 
 
 Answer. It was some time before I found him ; a half or three-quarters of an 
 hour. 
 
 Question. Di<l you halt on the way going back? 
 
 Answer I passed a little time with General Jackson after I reported to him, because 
 the batteries "were engaged ; his batteries were on Stony Ridge. (Witness indicates a 
 point back of the words " Stony Eidge.") His line of battle was along the Independ- 
 ent line of the Manassas Gap Railroad ; there Avas a battery that came out about the 
 point of that woods (just northwest of the Matthews house and west of the Sudley 
 pike) ; just about that point there was a battery from the Union side that came out 
 there and took position, and I staid there some time watching the artillery duel be- 
 tween the guns stationed licre and that batterj'. Then going back to General Stuart. 
 I took a little short cut and passed over some ground where there had been a light the 
 evening before, and there was some dead on the field. In going back I met a cousin 
 of mine, who commanded a battalion connected with Ewell's corps, which was engaged 
 in this fight; lie was reconnoitering ; I went aloim- with him, and saw what was in 
 my front ; I suppose it was half or three-quaiters of an hour, or maybe an hour, before 
 I got back to General Stuart. 
 
 Question. When you got back to General Stuart, where was he ? 
 
 Answer. Where I left him, on that hill. 
 
 Question. At that time wliere was General Longstreet's command? 
 
 Answer. They had come down aiid were forming here. ■ (Witness indicates a point 
 back, westerly of Pageland lane. ) 
 
 Question. About what time of day was it that this affair occurred at Sudley 
 Springs ; before j-ou and General Stuart started to cross the country towards Thorougli- 
 fare Gap ? 
 
 Answer.- Early in the morning. 
 
 Question. At what would you fix the time? 
 
 Answer. I suppose eight or nine o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Question. Did vou remain at this point with General Stuart after vou got back on 
 this hill ? 
 
 Answer. I did. 
 
 Question. What became of this column of troops that you saw advancing ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know wliat became of them ; they disappeared from our front. 
 
 Question. Do you know of any other position l>eing taken uj) by General Long- 
 street's command during the day in advance of the position that you have indica- 
 ted ? If so, when and where ? You indicated a position back of Pageland lane. 
 
 Answer. I do not. 
 
 Question. How long were you down in the neighborhood of thishill which you have 
 maiked witli a cross during that day: up to what time? 
 
 AnsAver. We were down there tin- greater part of the day ; we were on the extreme 
 right all the time afterward. The cavalry remained on the extreme right until the 
 morning of the HOth. 
 
 Question. Do yoii know of any other measures taken to retard the advance of this 
 column of troops from the direction of Manassas Junction orBristoe that tlay by Gen- 
 eral Stuart, otlu-r than tlie planting of the battery in that position ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. BelV>re that battery was i)ut in jiosition Robertson's brigade of 
 cavalry and Rosser were engaging the enemy in our front. When the battery was 
 put in x>osition and opened on the enemy it "checked them, and they retired. Then 
 (ieneral Stuart told me to go to General" Jackson and report the fact that this col- 
 umn was advancing in this direction. 
 
 Question. During tliat ilay what sort of an action was going on, on the 29th,'to your 
 knowledge ? 
 
 Answer. There was very heavy fighti7ig going on up here in .laekson's front. 
 
 Mr. Maltkv. Did you see it ? " 
 
 Answer. 1 licaid i\n- musketry filing and I heard artillery. 
 
135 
 
 Question. This euga^eineut wliifh you speak of between Robertson's cavalry and 
 the enemy — what was it ? 
 Answer. It was a skirmivsh simply. 
 
 Question. What time do you think you met General Lougstrt-et l)i>tweenHaymarket 
 and Gainesville ? 
 
 Answer. It was al)out eleven o'clock. 
 
 Question. Was General Longstrcet at the head of his column? 
 
 Answer. He was near the head of the column. 
 
 Question. Were there many troops in front of his connuand ! 
 
 Answer. Not many. 
 
 Question. Were they advancing? "" 
 
 Answer. They were 
 
 Question. Rapidly ? 
 
 Answer. They were marching at an tudinary pace. 
 
 Question. State the style of march; how many front? 
 
 Answer. Tliey were marching in column. 
 
 Question. How numy front '! 
 
 Answer. Marching in crilumn of regiments, perhaps four abreast. 
 
 Question. Were they in close order? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Wouhl you sAvear it was eleven o'clock? 
 
 Answer. It was about eleven o'clock. 
 
 Question. You are coutident that none of Longstreet's forces had passed through 
 Oainesville before eleven o'clock? 
 
 Answer. I don't think they had. 
 
 Question. Thos(» hours an* stated purely from memory? 
 
 Answei'. Froin memory' simi)ly. ' 
 
 Question. How did General .Stuart throw his cavalry to the right of Longstreet's 
 •column ? 
 
 Answer. By passing through Longstreet's line of march. 
 
 Question. Were they passed through in cohuun. 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. How? 
 
 Answer. By single file. 
 
 Question. What became of the cavalry then? 
 
 Answer. They took the road leading parallel witli the Manassas Gap Railroad, and 
 moved down in the direction of Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. Did you remain with the cavalry or did you go with General Stuart?J 
 
 Answer. I was with General Stu.irt. 
 
 Question. Did General Stuart have any conversation with General Longstreet or 
 'General Lee ? 
 
 Answer. He did. 
 
 Question. About where was that? 
 
 Answer. At the ])oint where we met Longstreet's column. 
 
 Question. Was tliat while you were on the march, or was it while you were person- 
 ally stationary ? 
 
 Answer. We were stationary at the time, of course, when Tve met Longstreet's 
 column; they were together when this conversation took place. General Lee passed 
 his connuand on the road, and Longstreet then moved tlown with Stuart, and they 
 then and there moved down in the direction of Manassas Junction. 
 
 Question. How long a conversation did General Stuart have with General Lee or 
 General Longstreet ? ^ 
 
 Answer. Ten or fifteen minutes. 
 
 Questioji. Did you converse at all with the men. 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Any of the command ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. How long was it before you arrived at the point marked '• W" by you oCl 
 this map? 
 
 Answer. It could not have been over three-quarters of an hour or an hour. 
 
 Question. Then about what time would that make it when you arrived at the point 
 marked "W"? 
 
 Answer. Between 11 and 12 o'clock. 
 
 Question. Nearer which ? 
 
 Answer. Nearer 12 than 11. 
 
 Question. Where were Rosser's cavalry at that time, if you know personally? 
 
 Answer. I judge they were riglit in ^e/v. (Witness indicates a point about south- 
 •west of Hampton Cole's. ) 
 
]36 
 
 Question. Were they all tliere, do you kuo\y ? 
 Answer. Yes ; tliey were there. 
 Question. All? 
 Answer. All. 
 
 Question. You say that the distance from the railroad, or from the point "W" to 
 ■where those two cannon or that battery were posted by General Stuart, Avas fi'om half 
 to three-quarters of a mile ; this map being on a scale of three inches to a mile, you 
 have marked it within half an inch, which would be far less than either of those 
 distances; liow do you come to put it there — that cross-mark? 
 
 Answer. That is about the distance they were; about three-quarters of a mile from 
 this ridge. 
 
 Question. That not being three-quarters of a }nile. where would you put their posi- 
 tion f 
 
 Answer. There is about where the battery was. (The witness measures the mai> 
 and marks the point indicated thus : +'• ) 
 
 Question. How did the forces of the enemy coming from the direction of Manassas 
 or Bristoe a]»pear ; how were tliey formed; in column, or line of battle, or how "? 
 
 Answer. They were in coliunn. 
 
 Question. How far off? 
 
 Answer. They were aboiat here. (Witness indicates a point on a line with '• SS" in 
 the word ''Manassas" on the Manassas Gaj) Raih-oad.) 
 
 Question. On the railroad ? 
 
 Answer. Coming up this I'oad running pai'allel to the railroad. 
 
 Question. From the jiosition where you were, did you see any house in the direction 
 of those troops ? 
 
 Answer. Of course we could see the whole surrounding country. 
 
 Question. Did you see any house in the direction of those troops betwe<^n you and 
 those troops, or neai"ly between yon and those troops ? 
 
 Answer. There were several houses ; yes. 
 
 Question. Were those troops near any house that you could see ? 
 
 Answer. They were near the Carraco hou.se. 
 
 Question. A^ery near ? 
 
 Answer. Perhaps a little boyond. 
 
 Question. Did not you see any troops in the direction of the place marked "Lewis- 
 Leachman house" on that day? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; there were troojis there, too. 
 
 Question. How were they disposed. 
 
 Answer. I could not say. 
 
 Question. Are you certain that no shots were tired from that direction at the men 
 about in the neighborhood of the Lewis-Leachman house ? [The position indicated 
 being -f"-]. 
 
 Answer. No, I am not certain ; though I believe that there were. 
 
 Question. Are yon not certain that most of the shots were fired in that direction ? 
 
 Answer. I am unable to answer thar, for this reason : at the time that battery was 
 put in there [+-], tiring in this direction upon the Manassas Gap Eaih'oad, General 
 Stuart requested that I should go here and report the fact to General Jackson, which 
 I did ; I went off there, and was gone at least three-quarters of an hour or an hour, 
 [Witness indicates a direction towards the Independent line of the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 road.] The firing commenced in the direction of the Manassas Gap Railroad. 
 
 Question. How many shots ? 
 
 Answer. I do not know. 
 
 Question. Much firing ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; a good deal. 
 
 Question. Fifty shots. 
 
 Answer. I could not say whether there Avere one or fifty, because when the firing 
 commenced, as I tell you. and that battery came in position, firing in this direction — 
 I know there were troops off hei'e [towards the Lewis-Leachman house] — some shots 
 may have been directed there in that direction [the Leachman house], and I went 
 away to report to General Jackson. 
 
 Question. Are you positive that there were two shots ? 
 Answer. Yes ; I am positive that there were two shots. 
 Question. Three ? 
 Answer. Yes, there were three. 
 
 Question. Was there not firing due south from -\--, in the direction of Langlev's 
 Mill? 
 Answer. Tliat I cannot answer. The object of ]>utting that battery in that position 
 
137 
 
 ■was, we saw troops coming from this direction, and it was put there for the piii'poso 
 of firing in that direetion [Manassas Gap road.] 
 
 Qne.stion. Have you Iteen informed during the last month of the position of the 
 column of troops commanded by General Porter, with reference to this map, on tlie 
 morning of the 29th ? 
 
 Answer. I have not ; I do not know whether this was General Porter's column, or 
 whose column it was. 
 
 * *f # * # # # 
 
 Question. How did they appear to you ; to be on top of a hill, or in a depression,^ 
 or in wof)ds, or liy woods, or in an open field? 
 
 Answer. Tlie position we occupied was a commanding one, of course. They were 
 in a depressed situation from the position we occupied. We were on this hill and they 
 were here. [Witness indicates.] 
 
 (Question. In column, marching along the Manassas Gap Eailroad? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Did you see the Manassas Gap Railroad right in their vicinity ? 
 
 Answer. The road they were marching on was parallel to tlie Manassas Gap Railroad. 
 
 Question. When you came back to that position did you see any Federal troops 
 anywhere 1 
 
 Answer. Yes. There were Federal troops oft' here. [Indicating the lines of the 
 regiments.] 
 
 Question. When you came back did yon see Longstreet's command ? 
 
 Answer. I saw Longstrcefs command on my way back from General Stuart; they 
 came and fornu'd in liere. [Pageland lane.] 
 
 ((•uestion. Did you remain in tliat position all day? 
 
 Answer. We were there most all day. Do you mean me individually ? 
 
 Question. Yes. 
 
 Answer. No. I was backward and forward several times during the day. I went 
 witii in<'ssages from Stuart to Lee and L<nigstreet"and to Jackson. 
 
 Question. Then, during tliat wliole day, you were in the vicinity of Longstreet's 
 troops and knew of tlieir position? 
 
 Qnestimi. You say you were on a hill that commanded Auews of the country in front 
 of you 'I 
 
 Answer. We had a Itattery off here [W. .'i] ; tliat is, there was a park of artillery in 
 ]>osition ;ind Longstreet's command was about that way [south]. 
 
 Question. Were there any artillery in front of the position called " W. 5" ? 
 
 Answer. Eight there we had 19 or 20 pieces of artillerv. 
 
 Question. Where " W. 5" is ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; between Jackson's line and Longstreet's line. 
 
 Question. Are you as positive about the iiosition of the guns marked " W. .5'' as you 
 are about the ]>osition of Hood '' W. 3" ? 
 
 Answer. Right here was wliere Hood was [witness indicates] ; beyond the piece of 
 woods there was a little brancli running down; over on a hill was a battery of the 
 Union troops. 
 
 By the RKCOiiDEP, : 
 
 Question. Do you know -what these red lines stand for? 
 
 Answer. No. sir; I do not. 
 
 Question. These red lines are contour lines marking the heights, and these numbers, 
 2(H> and 210, and so forth, mark the elevations. 
 
 Answer. Hood was here [W. 3] ; then there was a small branch. 
 
 Question. Do you know the marks which indicate branches ! 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Mr. Maltby. They are the black marks. 
 
 Answer. Well, that is the branch [Young's Branch]. My recollection is there was 
 a batterv or several batteries of the Federal forces right there. 
 
 Question. At Britfs? 
 
 Answer. Wait a moment ; it may be that piece of woods [between Bi-itt's and Cun- 
 litfe's]. There is where they were— in there [about south of the word " Meadowville," 
 under Cuulifie's]. There was a hill — I don't know how you mark it liere — there was a 
 hill, a very nice posititm for artillery, witere there were several batteries that were 
 firing olf here [at W. 5] in that direction ; with Longstreet's command right in here 
 [W. 3]. 
 
 Question. Did Longstreet's line curve from the position of the artillery [W. 5.] ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot answer that question. 1 had no connection with Longstreet's 
 command ; it was onlj' observations in passing witli messages from Stuart to Lee or 
 Jacksim. 
 
 Question. Where was Lee's position, headquarters, where he could be lieard from, 
 in reference to Longstreet's line, in front or behind it? 
 
138 
 
 Answer. It was Ix-liiud it. 
 
 Qnestiou, Cau you locate on the map wlieie General Lee's headquarters were ? 
 Describe as near as possible what his headquarters were. Were they a house? 
 
 Answer. No; the times I reported to him he was iu the field; he would more some- 
 times to oue ]>ositioii, sometimes to another. 
 
 Question. How far behind Longstreet's front line was General Lee ? 
 
 Answer. I found General Lee at one time just on a hill, just behind General Hood, 
 when I went with a message to him, just behind General Hood's command; he was 
 there with a glass looking otf iu the direction where this battery was. [Southeasterly 
 towards Britt's.] 
 
 Question. Do you know Col. Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff ? 
 
 Answer. I do. 
 
 Question. Did you see him during the day ? 
 
 Answer. I did ; several times. 
 
 Question. Was he in a stationary position, dismounted, or riding al)out ? 
 
 Answer. Eidiug about. Whenever I saw him he was mounted. I saw him several 
 times during the day, at different jiarts of the field. 
 
 Question. If his actual headquarters were about in the position marked P, would the 
 position of Hood be iu the position you have assigned it or in advance of the letter I', 
 that being on the edge of a hill, as you see by the map, Cunliffe's being in a depres- 
 sion — where would you put the line of General Hood ? 
 
 Answer. General Hood's line was just here. [Witness indicates. ] 
 
 Question. Sujipose Lee's headquarters were where the letter P is, where would the 
 line of General Hood be on this map ? 
 
 Answer. I never said that General Lee's headquarters were there [at the point 
 
 marked P. ] 
 
 « * # * * J" * 
 
 Question. What time do yoii put it that you came back from General Jackson after 
 being sent over by General Stuart ? 
 
 Answer. Half i)ast two or three o'clock. 
 
 Question. Do you know of any action that occurred along the Warrenton pike: 
 infantry ? 
 
 Answer. I heard firing. 
 
 Question. What time was that ? 
 
 Answer. In the evening. 
 
 Question. About what time ? 
 
 Answer. General Jackson's command was engaged all the time. 
 
 Question. Was Hood's command engaged at all ? 
 
 Answer. That evening they were. 
 
 Question. What time that evening ? 
 
 Answer. I suppose about three o'clock in the evening they were engaged ; two and 
 a half to three o'clock. 
 
 Question. Were they engaged vigorously ? 
 
 Answer. Quite a severe tight. 
 
 Question. Describe the action, so far as you observed it. 
 
 Answer. I was not present. I didn't see it. I heard the firing; it lasted, I suppose, 
 half to three-quarters of an hour. 
 
 Question. Was it very vigorous ? 
 
 Answer. It was a very sharp fight. 
 
 Question. Wa-s that the only occasion in which Hood's command was engaged that 
 day, to your knowledge ? 
 
 Answer. To my knowledge that is the only one until next morning. 
 
 Question. You say it was three o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. Between two and three o'clock. It may have been after three. It was 
 after he had got in position. 
 
 Question. How long after he got in position ? 
 
 Answer, He got in position, I suppose, about twelve or one o'clock. This engage- 
 ment took [dace about two and a half, or maybe three, or three and a half. 
 
 Question. Was it as late as five ? 
 
 Answer. I vAii't recollect. I don't think it was. 
 
 Questiiin. Wliat is your recollection about the time that that engagement took place 
 ui)on the Warrenton turnpike by Hood's troops? 
 
 Answer. I was away on tlie riglit. Of course there was fighting on the line. I 
 don't know what tro()i)s were engaged, but I know that Hood's troops had a fight there 
 that evening. I don't know wlictlu-r it was three, or three and <a half; it may-have 
 
 been five o'clock. I know thev had a sharp fight there, and I heard it. 
 
 * » * * # * # 
 
 Question. Do you lix tli;it time with more or less precision; and, if so, why, than 
 the tinii' yoii arri\ 111 ,it tlic ])oiiit nuirkfd + -? 
 
139 
 
 Auswer. Hood's commaud liad uot formed at the time we left here ; he formed after- 
 warda. 
 
 Question. Does your memory serve vou equally well as to all the hours stated by 
 you ? 
 
 Answer. The hours tliat I spoke of at the time I was conuected with our commaud, 
 of course, are more clear iu my mind. 
 
 Question. Thau the time wlien you heard the sound of vigorous battle near you ? 
 
 Answer. The cavalry were around on the right. Hood was right in there' [W'J; 
 and three and a half or three o'clock, to the best of my recollection, is the time I heard 
 this sharp fighting in Hood's front. From the positioii he occupied I supposed it was 
 his front, because we were just to his right. 
 
 rr 7f # « i^ * ^ 
 
 Question. If it were proven that no Union troops were upon the Manassas Ga,p 
 Ivailroad in the position you have marked, and that the position which they actually 
 did occujjy — the corps referred to in that neighliorhood — was invisible from the posi- 
 tion that you occujiied 
 
 Answer. I never said it was a corps; I said it was a cohimn of troops. 
 
 Question. Tlie coiiis referred in that neighborhood, would you or would you not say 
 that those trooiis were in the neighborhood of Leachman's '? 
 
 Answer. I saw troops in both directions. 
 
 Question. Might they not have l)een on the Alexandria and Washington road, about 
 the junction of Lewis' lane No. 1 with that road? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; there were troops off there; we could not see them from the posi- 
 tion we occu])ied. There were troo]>s over here V>oth iu the direction of the Lewis- 
 Leachman house and off in the diiectinn of tlie Manassas Gap Railroad. 
 
 Question. How much of the colunui did you see tliere on the Manassas Gap Railroad ? 
 
 Answer. I saw a good many troops there. I don't know how many they were. 
 
 Question. A regiment ? 
 
 Answer. I suppose there were more ; two. 
 
 Question. Two regiments? 
 
 Answer. Yes; perhaps more than two regiments. 
 
 Question. How much of tlie line did you see? 
 
 Answer. I saw the column; they were moving in column. 
 
 * * # * tt * * 
 
 Question. How many regiments should you judge you saw ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know how many regiments. When the head of that column ap- 
 peared there, this battery was put iu position and opened on them. I went by direc- 
 tion of iStuart to Jackson to re])ort to him. 
 
 By the Recordeu: 
 
 Question.' Assuming Hood's division to be in the place you have indicated by W-', 
 and suppose there had been a battery placed on this rise of ground marked C, would 
 that have fulfilled what you understood was the position of a battery firing off iu the 
 direction of ' ' W s " ? ' 
 
 Answer. Yes. Just beyond a small l>ranch there was a hill, a very fine position for 
 artillery, and it was firing off in the direction of ''W''." The highest gi-ound of that 
 hill is where that battery was placed, or rather a park of artillery ; 19 or 20 of our guns 
 were in that position. 
 
 Question. Suppose that the column of troops that you saw on that morning, or on 
 the noon of Friday. August 29, had been coming up the dirt road from Manassas 
 Junction to Gainesville and was in the neighborhood of Dawkins' Run, would that 
 have been the position of the column that you saw according to the map ? 
 
 (Objected to as leading.) 
 
 Answer. The troops that we saw approaching came more from the direction of Bristoo 
 than from Manassas. 
 
 Question. Therefore what road indicated on this map best fulfills the direction from 
 ■which you saw those troojts coming ? 
 
 (Objected to as leading.) 
 
 Answer. They were approaching more in the direction from Bristoe than from 
 Manassas. 
 
 Question. Therefore what road best of the roads you see on this map shows tha 
 direction from which you saw those troops coming [map exjdained to the witness] ? 
 Now where were the F'ederal troops 1 
 
 Answer. I remarked a while ago that the column that was advancing advanced 
 more from the direction of Bristoe than Manassas. 
 
 Question. Here is Bristoe and there is Manassas. Now where do you put it, what 
 direction* Make a line indicating the direction. 
 
 Answer. Tliev nuist have come in here or in here. 
 
140 
 
 Question. Tlieii vou ;iro uot positive tliat you saw tliem ou the Maua.ssas Gap Rail- 
 road ? 
 
 Answer. I never said I saw tbe Manassas Gap Railroad. I said I saw them on the 
 road running parallel Avitli the Manassas Gap Railroad. They were not marching on 
 the railroad. They were inarching on a road that I supposed, from the position I 
 occupied, was a line jtarallel with the Manassas Gap Railroad ; they may have been 
 on this road [from Gainesville to Stuart's Hill] and took position there [at-|--]. From 
 that position we saw the column coming up, but they were not on the raih'oad. 
 
 Question. Did you see the railroad in conjunction with seeing them, or at the same 
 time in connection with seeing them ? 
 
 Answer. I could not say. I was not looking for railroads. I was looking for troops. 
 I dou't recollect now whether I saw the railroad or not, because my attention was 
 directed to more important matters. 
 
 Question. Would you swear that those troops, Bristoe being hcrr andilanassas tliere — 
 that those troops Avere not on this road to Milford ? 
 
 Answer. No; they were not in tliat direction at all. They were oft" here [witness 
 indicates in the direction of the Manassas and Gainesville dirt roa<l]. 
 
 Question. Had you been to Bristoe that day! 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; we had been there the day before. 
 
 Question. How do you know where Bristoe was ? 
 
 Answer. Because I have been there a thousand times since. 
 
 Question. Could you see it from tliat position ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that you could see the station, luit I knew the general direc- 
 tion, and had been all over that country time and again. 
 
 Question. Did you see any of the shot tired fall near that column ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. What did the column do ? 
 
 Answer. The column seemed to retire. 
 
 Question. Did you see them retire ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; I saw them give back. 
 
 Question. How did they retire f 
 
 Answer. You know how troops retire. They gave bacdi into a piece of woods ; and 
 just at that time I went off with a message, as I stated before — went otf with a mes- 
 sage to General Jackson from General Stuart. 
 
 Question. Did anybody mention a piece of woods to you in connection with those 
 troops within the last month ? 
 
 Answer. Not if my memory serves me. 
 
 Question. AVere you reminded of a piece of woods by any marks on the map ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; because my memory serves me clearly that it was just in a piece 
 of woods when the head of the column showed itself, and they retired back into the 
 woods, and we fired our artillery into this piece of woods. 
 
 Question. Did you see a smaller column march from this main column in advance 
 and deploy ? 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect. When we took position tliere was a column advancing 
 more in the direction of Bristoe than from Manassas. - 
 
 Question. Looking at the map where you made a mark somewhat south and east 
 of Carraco's on the Manassas Gap Railroad, if that country was all open at that 
 time, would that position fulfill the position you have just indicated as where those 
 troops were that you saw that fell immediately back into the woods upon being fired 
 upon ? 
 
 Answer. My recollection is that the scale of this map is about the distance they 
 showed themselves in our front. I suppose that would indicate about three-quarters 
 of a mile, or something in that neighborhood-'— half or three-quarters of a mile. Tliat 
 is about the distance that they were in our front wlien we discovei'ed them and opened 
 upon them. At the same time we saw troojis off in this direction [the Lewis-Leachnian 
 Louse] ; just about here there was a narrow range of wooded hills. 
 
 By Mr. Mai.tby : 
 
 Question. You say that the artillery were stationed on the right of Jackson at the 
 highest point on the ridge. Now. did Longstreefs line bend back from the line of 
 Jackscm, or did they make an angle more iie.irly approaching right angles? 
 
 Answer. I had nothing to ilo with Longstreet's position. 
 
 Question. But yon saw it '? 
 
 Answer. I ]iassed in his rear several times. 
 
 Question. Take a pencil and mark Longstreet's line. 
 
 Answer. There was an angle formed between Jackson ami Longstreet's line; Jack- 
 eon's line ran along here. [Witness indicates.] 
 
 Qnestirm. Diaw it in pencil. 'I'here is the Inde])endent line of the Manassas Gap 
 Railroad. [Indicated to the witness.] 
 
141 
 
 Answer. Jackson's artillery was posted on this stony ridge. 
 
 Question. Draw a line where the nineteen or twenty guns were posted. 
 
 Answer. I had no connection Avith Lougstreet's command or Jackson's. I passed in 
 the rear of both lines several times with messages. I did not inspect their lines. I 
 just speak from general recollection of their lines. 
 
 Question. Then you do not recollect precisely where any one line was? 
 
 Answer. I do ; yes. Ihaveindicated there is Jackson's line ; his artillery was posted 
 on this range of hills ; General Longstreet formed here. [Witness indicates the differ- 
 ent positions.] Their lines did not join ; there was an angle there, an opening, and 
 tliere is where the battery of artillery was. 
 
 Question. Draw Jackson's line and the cannon of Longstreet. 
 
 Answer. I have indicated it. [Witness indicates the line of the Independent line 
 of the Manassas Gap Railroad.] His line did not go down that far [indicating Sudley 
 Church] ; it went to about there. 
 
 Question. Where do you run Jackson's line ? 
 
 Answer. Jackson's line ran about in this direction. [Marked with a pencil.] That 
 is about the direction of Jackson's line. 
 
 The line indicated by the witness by means of a pencil is followed in ink by the 
 IJecorder. 
 
 Question. AVhere were these eighteen or twenty guns of Jackson's? 
 
 Answer. That did not have reference to Jackson's command ; Jackson's artillery was 
 posted on this range of hills back of his line of battle. This park of artillery is where 
 AVMsandW'-. 
 
 Question. You still say that Hood occuined that position, and that his right was 
 Avhere + iiud -\ — f- are ? 
 
 Answer. There is where Hood was ; right there. 
 
 By Mr. Maltby : 
 
 Question. Did you see General Lougstreet's troojis or General Hood's troops wliile 
 they were forming in line of battle on the "^yth. and after they were formed f 
 Answer. I saw Hood's command after they had taken position. 
 Question. But not Avhile they were foiuuing .? 
 Answer. Not while they Avere forming. 
 
 By the Recoisder : 
 
 Question. Did you see them before they were formed ? If so. at what time ? 
 
 Answer. When we parted with them on the jiike between Haymarket and Gaines- 
 ville, we took the right and moved down to this position where we saw the column 
 advancing. AVhen that battery took jtosition there and opened in that direction I 
 went Avith a message immediately to General Jackson, and passed OAcr the ground 
 Avhere I saw Hood's conunand. Afterwards, Avhen I went on a message from .Stuart to 
 Lee, I found hiui on that hill in tlie rear of Hood's line and deliA'ered my message to 
 CJeneral Lee, looking to the south of the Warrenton jiike on that hill. 
 
 Question. He was not in that position when yon Avent to General Jackson with that 
 message ? 
 
 AnsAver. No, sir ; he had not taken position there then. 
 
 Ticv. John La ndsf reef, i'i\]\(M\hy the Eecorder, and oxamined in tlie city 
 of Baltimore October 22, 1878 (present, the Eecorder and Mr. Maltby, 
 of counsel for the petitioner), being duly sworn, testitled as follows : 
 
 Question. State your residence and occupation. 
 
 Answer. Minister of the gospel in the Southern Methodist Church ; I reside at 
 Reisterstown, Baltimore County, Maryland. 
 
 Question. What position did vou hold in the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia 
 on the 29th of August, 1862 ? 
 
 Answer. I Avas chaplain of the First Virginia Cavalry during the entire war. Before 
 I Avas commissioned I was Avitli General Sttiart. I received my commission Avhile with 
 him. 1 had a little more liberty than some of the others had, in view of my i)Osition, 
 ]ireaching to the different commands, and would often absent myself with less formality 
 than some of the rest Avould. I Avas with him in all his important engagements, or, 
 if I was not Avith him, he would generally send for me if he knew where I was. 
 
 Question. Where Avere you on the morning of August 29, 1862? 
 
 Answer. I was between Sudley Springs and Aldie, about midway in the mountain. 
 
 Question. Did you join General Stuart that day ? 
 
 AnsAver. I joined him for the first time for eight months, after our Catlett's Station 
 raid. I think I reached Sudley lyetAveen eight aud nine o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Question. Was General Stuart there ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect any circumstance transpiring after you arrived there? 
 
142 
 
 Answer. Xo, sir. Just before we anived there was a little confusion or kind of 
 stamijede among tlie baggage-train. I don't know tliat I noticed any of our cavalry 
 there nnless it was those connected with the commissary and quartermaster's depart- 
 ment. But there was a little skirmish, there about that time which attracted my 
 attention. 
 
 Question. Did yon see Captain Pelham any time that day ? 
 
 Answer. Yes: I saw him. I was very intimate with him. But where I saw him I 
 cannot tell. 1 have a journal in which I noted everything. I kept it at the request 
 of General Stuart and i)artly for my own gratitication, but especially at his request. 
 
 Question. Do yon know at what time you left Sudley ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I recollect that the next place where I was was called Cole's. It 
 was an elevated position, rather in the angle between Gainesville and Bristoe; Bristoe 
 Tjcing much farther oft'. [Witness looks at the map.] It was Hampton Cole's. 
 
 Question. At what time in the day were you at Hampton Cole's? 
 
 Answer. I did not have a watch, but I think it was somewhere towards ten o'clock 
 in the day. 
 
 Question. What did vou do or see there which has impressed itself upon your atten- 
 tion ? 
 
 Answer. There was considerable dust in this direction [witness indicates], indicat- 
 ing a body of troops; there was considerable down in this direction somewhere. Af ' 
 any rate, General Stuart ordered some of the Fifth Cavalry to go and cut brush and 
 drag it along the road. 
 
 Question. [By Mr. Maltby.] Did you hear the order? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; to drag the brush along the Gainesville road, so as- to serve as a f<Mut 
 and tQ convey the impression that there was a force coming down the Gainesville road. 
 It was given, I distinctly recollect, to a member of the Fifth Virginia Cavalry. 
 
 Question. Who was the colonel of that regiment ? 
 
 Answer. T. L. Rosser. We frequently after that conversed about it. 
 
 Question. What was done after that, while you were in the neighborhood of Hamp- 
 ton Cole's ? 
 
 Answer. There was some firing from this position [-j-2], in the direction of this 
 approaching force ; and from my recollection of it the force was a considerable dis- 
 tance down. If 3 inches indicate a mile here, and if it was a life and death case, I 
 would say that it was inside of a mile that they were oft". 
 
 Question. You should say it was a distance of about a mile? 
 
 Answer. I should say it was inside of a mile. It was not beyond a mile, certainly. 
 [Witness indicates from Hampton Cole's. ] There were several shots tired from this ' 
 point in the direction down there. 
 
 Question. In what direction? 
 
 Answer. That depends entirely upon where the man was standing at the time, and 
 what he was looking at. I did not charge my mind much with this Manassas Gap 
 Railroad, though I knew it very well. But I would not say whether it was here or 
 there [whether right or left]. It was pretty much in line with this railroad. [Ma- 
 nassas Gap Railroad. ] 
 
 Question. What became of this column of troops upon those shots being fired? 
 
 Answer. I did not see them. 
 
 Question. They disappeared from your sight ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Did they remain in the jjosition they weue in when they were fired upon? 
 
 Answer. Xo, sir. When my attention was directed to them they were where I could 
 see the column, or a considerable portion of it; and they were marching in good order, 
 close column. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect how many shots were fired at them? 
 
 Answer. I do not; but I am positive I didn't hear half a dozen; I know I did not. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain iu that position in the neighborhood of Hamp- 
 ton Cole's that day? 
 
 Answer. I was sent off after that to hunt up the First Virginia Cavalry, not very 
 far from there at that time; and I paid very little attention, indee<l, from that time. 
 When Longstreet came and formed there. General .Jackson being in position, I came 
 out from the command, and I was not in anj- of the fight at all except in the cavahy 
 juovements — skirmishing. 
 
 Question. Where did General Longstreet form his command? 
 
 Answer. It seems to me I struck a portion of Hood's connuand on General Long- 
 street's left, before I got anywhere in the direction of Longstreet's right. They seeme<l 
 to come iu a good w;iys iu the direction of (Jeneral Longstreet's left, if they were not 
 immediately on his li.-inU. 
 
 Question. About \\ JuTe would you put them; north of the l»ike, across the pike, or 
 fiouth of the jiike .' 
 
 Answer. Which ? 
 
 Question. Hood's (li\isinii of that connuand ? 
 
143 
 
 Answer. From my rccolleetiou, there was a portion of Longstrcet's connnand tliafi 
 crossed the Manassas Gap Eailroad [the witness marks a point with a lien] ; crossed 
 it, I am sure, some distance, but how far I don't know. I do not think it Avas far. It 
 extended, I think, up in this way. Hood's was in front of it ; part of it in the body 
 of the woods. My impression is that Hood came in a little in advance of Longstreet's 
 left. I am certain 1 came to Hood before I came to Lougstreet's force in position 
 [marked " Longstreet ■' and •'Hood'"]. 
 
 Question. What time of day was that that they were all in position ? 
 
 Answer. It is my recollection that it was somewhere between two and three o'clock. 
 
 Question. Do you know whether or not either Hood or the remainder of Lougstreet's 
 that was in advance to the east of Pageland lane at any time that day? 
 
 Answer. I do not. 
 
 Question. Was your position such that you could see the location of Hood and 
 Longstreet during the afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. O, yes : I could go where I pleased. 
 
 Question. How long did this action of that day continue? 
 
 Answer. The firing to my recollection continued up to about dark. It was near 
 dusk. At times it was heavier than at others ; and at times severer than I ever heard 
 it in any engagement. 
 
 Question. What were your opportunities during that day of knowing the fact, pro- 
 vided General Hood had advanced east of Pageland lane ? [Points of compass 
 upon the map explained to the witness.] 
 
 Answer. My answer is, tliat if I had a desire to know it, I could have known it 
 very easily; but I didn't think about it at all. It was not in my mind. I was well 
 acquainted with Hood and his command, and that made the impression upon me in 
 coming to this point. I came from the direction where Jackson's command was, and 
 passed this heavy batteiy at the time, though I think there were a few more guns 
 there than I have heard stated to-day. 
 
 Question. How- late in the day do you recollect seeing General Hood's division. 
 
 Answer. Between three and four o'clock. 
 
 Question. Where was it then ? 
 
 Answer. Where I have indicated on the map. 
 
 Question. Relative to the command that you heard given by General Stuart to the 
 member of the Fifth A'irginia Cavahy to drag brush, what do you know about 
 whether that order was obeyed or not ? 
 
 Auswer. After hearing this order given, and being very much interested in the ap- 
 proach of this column below there, I kept a lookout, and it was not long — lam sure not 
 more than 40 or 50 minutes — before the column of dust on the Gainesville road ap- 
 peared. 
 
 Question. You saw the column of dust arising? 
 
 Answ^er. I sa-w a cloud of dust. 
 
 Question. Arisiiig from this dragging of brush? 
 
 Auswer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Who arrived first at Hampton Cole's, you or General Stuart ? 
 Answer. He did ;- he was there when I got there. 
 
 Question. Will you describe the position on that map about where you saw the 
 column of dust arising after General Stuart gave the order ? 
 
 Answer. I think it was midway between this point and that. 
 
 Question. About midway between Hampton Cole's and Gainesville, along on the 
 line of the Manassas Gai» Railroad ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. It may have been farther. There is some wood-laud beyond that. 
 
 Question. Were yon on this commanding ridge where the guns were stationed, of 
 which you have spoken ? 
 
 Answer. Yes: right there at Hampton Cole's. 
 
 Question. Are yon certain it was at Hampton Cole's, and not at Carraco's ? 
 
 Question. Did you arrive at Hampton Cole's before this battery was stationed upon 
 this ridge ? 
 
 Answer. Yes: the battery was put in position after I got there. This column from 
 this direction made its appearance after I got there. 
 
 Question. W'hat battery was placed there? 
 
 Answer. I don't know. 
 
 Question. Were they guns belonging to Stuart's command? 
 
 Auswer. I think they w ere ; I am not certain of that. 
 
 Question. From your station at Hampton Cole's, in which direction Ayas Lougstreet's 
 command when yon first saw it, without reference to the map ? 
 
144 
 
 Answer. I am sorry yon brought me a map with anything on it now, because my 
 impression is that Longstreet's line commenced on the other side of the Gainesville 
 road and crossed it, but did not cross it far, and came up and passed the Warrentou 
 turnpike ; and that Hood's command was extended beyond his left. 
 
 Question. Didn't you understand Hood's command to have b^en a part of Long- 
 street's command .' 
 
 Answer. I mean Hood's division. 
 
 Question. In which direction, as you stood at Hampton Cole's facing the enemy, 
 was Longstreet's commaud from you, with reference to your own person — to the left, 
 right, front, or rear ? 
 
 Answer. Looking down in the direction from whicli the enemy were coming, a por- 
 tion of it was in my rear and a portion of it was not. 
 
 Question. At the time you arrived there at Hampton Cole's ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. They did not get in this position at the time I arrived at Hamp- 
 ton Cole's. I arrived at Hampton Cole's about ten or eleven in the morning. 
 
 Question. Where were the gvins stationed in reference to Hampton Cole's ? 
 
 Answer. The guns wei'e pointed down a little to the left of the railroad. 
 
 Question. How near were you to the guns ? / 
 
 Answer. Right up by them. 
 
 Question. How much of that column did you see ? 
 
 Answer. I could not say how many regiments there were. The column indicated 
 that it was the head of a consideralde body of men. 
 
 Question. What was that indication ? 
 
 Answer. They were marching in close column. 
 
 Question. Would not a regiment march in close column ? 
 
 Answer. Might not in as close column as that, and in good order. My judgment in 
 the matter was that it was the advance of a large army. 
 
 Question. Did you see a quarter of a mile of that column ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. An eighth of a mile ? 
 
 Answer. That is somewhere near it. 
 
 Question. Was it marching upon a plain ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell you that. It did not appear to me as if they were coming up 
 a hill, nor as if they were coming down a hill. 
 
 Question. As if they were marching upon a plain f 
 
 Answer. It looked pretty much as if they were on a level. 
 
 Question. Can you state whether any bushes were to their right or left, or trees ? 
 
 Answer. No, I could not. My impression is that the coiiutry was pretty well open 
 left and right of where I first saw them. 
 
 Question. Did you see them in flank at all ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. I don't know whether it is a military expression or not. 
 
 Answer. Do you mean did I see the rear of the enemy ? 
 
 Question. No, sir. I mean the side of the column as it advanced ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; it was the shortest space of time before the firing commenced here 
 at Hampton Cole's before I saw them no more. 
 
 if * -Jf if Tf * # 
 
 Question. Was this column to your right or left ? 
 
 Answer. From the position I was in, it was almost directly in my front. I think if 
 I had advanced in a straight line, I would have come up face to fiice with them. I 
 was a little to the right of Hampton Cole's and looking right straight down. 
 
 Question. Did yon see troops in the neigh])orhood of the Leachman house ? 
 
 Answer. I knew there were troops there, but how I knew it I am not now prepared 
 to say. 
 
 Question. How did they disappear? Did they march out of sight in the rear, or 
 did they retire in the Ijushes f 
 
 Answer. If you will let me nse an illustration : It Avas a very common thing for a 
 column of cavalry to advance, and one shot into a column of cavalry would make them 
 disappear in the woods, and that was the eiul of it. I never saw a column that got 
 out of siglit quicker than this column did. 
 
 Question. How do you fix it as being eleven o'clock in the day ? 
 
 Answer. During tlic war, when I di(l not carry my watch, I was accustomed to av- 
 erage the time — how long it took to go to this place, and how long it took to go to that 
 place, and I often came very close to it. 
 
 Question. Did yon average the time in this instance ? 
 
 Answer. I si)eal< now simply from my reet)liection of what myimpression was at the 
 time, when tlie time was that these things occurred. 1 have no (h)ubt in the world 
 that my inii)ression was taken exactly from my diary as I wrote it; the times of the 
 day were specified in that, when; I stated the times of the day. 
 
145 
 
 Question. You say you arrived at Cole's about teu o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. I should say between teu and eleven. I think it was nearer eleven than 
 half past ten. 
 
 Question. You cannot swear positively whether it was half jjast ten or eleven? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; only that it was in the forenoon : before twelve o'clock. 
 
 Questiou. From your position at Hampton C'ole"s, after the formation of Longstreet's 
 line, could you see them ? 
 
 Answer. Could I see who .' 
 
 Questiou. Could you see Long-street's line ? 
 
 Answer. I was not there when Longstreet's line was formed. I visited the lino 
 after it was formed. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain at Hampton Cole's? 
 
 Answer. I suppose I staid there until — well, it was just after the brush expedition; 
 shortly after that ; and I went in the direction of Gainesville from there. I don't know 
 but what I went right across to Gainesville : I think I did. 
 
 Question. How did you go ? 
 
 Auswer. I struck out on this Gainesville road that I had traveled hundreds of times 
 towards Gainesville; ])retty much along the line of the raih'oad. 
 
 Question. How long did you say that it was that you were at Hampton Cole's? 
 
 Auswer. I said I was there until after twelve o'clock. 
 
 Question, ^^'ere you there about an hour in all .' 
 
 Answer. I was there more than an hour; I was there fully an hour and a half. 
 
 Question. You passed along the Manassas Ga\> Eailroad '! 
 
 Auswer. I i»assed along the Gainesville turnpike. 
 
 Question. ^Vllat did you see on your route in the shape of troops? 
 
 Answer. I met some of, I think, Longstreet's forces ou the ^Varrenton jiike. 
 
 Question. Did you see any of Longstreet's troops? 
 
 Answer. I have no recollection of seeing them. 
 
 Questiou. Were there any troops marching on that turnpike? 
 
 Answer. There may have V>eeu. I did not i)ay any attention to it. 
 
 Question. How long did you stay away in the direction of Gainesville ? 
 
 Answer. I staid away until about three or half past three o'clock, I thijik. 
 
 Question. Then what did you ilo ? 
 
 Answer. Then I returned to the. First Regiment of Virginia Cavalry. 
 
 Question. Where was that ? 
 
 Auswer. If my recollection serves, it was between Hampton Cole's and Sudley. 
 
 Question. AVas that the detadnnent that had been sent off to drag brush there that 
 day? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. That was the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, commanded by Colonel 
 Rosser. 
 
 Question. When did you first see the place where Longstreet's line was formed after 
 you went off towards Gainesville? 
 
 Answer. I saw it for the hrst time a little after three o'clock. 
 
 Question. Was it then formed? 
 
 Auswer. Yes: it was then formed in good order. 
 
 Question. All along the whole line ? 
 
 Answer. Well, I did not ride along the whole line. 
 
 Question. Where were yon ? 
 
 Auswer. I could not tell you how it was along the whole line. I rode in along here 
 and I passed ou out here, t passed around ou Longstreet's left, and I found Hood^s 
 division in front of Longstreet, aud rather extending beyond his left. [Witness indi- 
 cates near Pagelaud lane.] 
 
 Question. Then what did vou strike ? 
 
 Answer. I didn't know what the name of the road was. I made for Sudley neigh- 
 borhood, and there I met a portion of the First Virginia. 
 
 Question. Ou Hood's left or Longstreet's left, did you find artillery ? 
 
 Auswer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Did Hood's liue extend quite up to the artillery ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; it did uot. lltere was a yap. 
 
 (Question. How much of a gap ? 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect how much it was, but it was a considerable gap. 
 
 Questiou. Half a mile ? 
 
 Answer. 1 don't knoAv. whether it was that much, but it was a considerable gap, a 
 considerable elevation. 
 
 (Question. Do yon know where that artillery was in reference to the Browner or 
 Douglass house ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I know nothing .ibout houses there. 
 
 Question. Were the batteries iu advance of Hood's line ? 
 
 Answer. Well, rather. 
 
 Question. Much ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir: tl'.ey were rather a little ;u advance of his left. 
 
146 
 
 Qnostiou. "Was the distauoe l)etweou Hood's left and tlie right of the artillery as 
 great as the gap ? 
 
 Answer. According to my recollection, the Lattery was i)retty nearly in the center 
 of the gap. 
 
 Question. Did the line of the Tiattery run in the same direction that Hood's line ran; 
 or did Hood's line form an angle with the battery? 
 
 Answer. It was at an angle. 
 
 Question. "Was the right of the battery much in advance of Hood's left? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; it was not much in advance, hut still it was in advance. 
 
 Question. Was it a hall-mile in advance ? 
 
 Answer. O, no. 
 
 Question. Was it a quarter of a mile? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I don't think it was that. 
 
 Question. Or an eighth ? 
 
 Answer. I don't think it was that. It was a very short distance in advance. I 
 Avould not say positively that it was in advance at all. 
 
 Question. If the actual position of the artillery on Jackson's right and on Hood's 
 left was in the general line A A. where would the left of Hood have joined him, and 
 where was the left of Hood in reference to that ? 
 
 Answer. Pretty much where the right of Jackson was in reference to it ; they sus- 
 tained jiretty much about the same relation. 
 
 Question. Where was the right of Jackson ? 
 
 Answer. Pretty much to the left, in the rear of that battery, from my recollection, 
 and about nearly the same distance that Hood's left was to the left. 
 
 Question. How for ? 
 
 Answer. About intermediate. 
 
 Question. Did you see Jackson's right come in there ? 
 
 Answer. No ; I did not see it. 
 
 Question. Mark where it did come. 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell. 
 
 Question. You saw Jackson's I'ight ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; but my recollection is that that distance is pretty much about equal, 
 the battery being in advance of both, between Hood's left and Jackson's right. 
 
 Question. Where was Jackson's right ? 
 
 Answer. Jackson's right at that rate would be somewhere about here (witness 
 indicates). 
 
 Question. Where would Hood's left be ? 
 
 Answer. Somewhere about here (witness indicates). 
 
 Question. Is there the same distance between them .^ 
 
 Answer. To my mind they look about the same. 
 
 Question. This is a third of a mile from Hood's left to that position ? 
 
 Answer. There is no third of a mile about it. 
 
 Question. Yoii have not got the full distance ? 
 
 Answer. It Avas just the ditference between tweedledum and tweedledee. It was a. 
 very fine jjositiou for artillery, which guarded both the left of Hood and the right of 
 Jackson. 
 
 Question. You say that .Jackson was back of the left of that line of artillery as far 
 as Hood was back of the right of the artillery ? 
 
 Answer. That is my recollection of it. 
 
 Question. You saw no troops marching ? 
 
 Answer. No; I didn't say that. I say I didn't know what troops they were. I .«aw 
 occasionally troops on the load. 
 Question. Many '? 
 
 Answer. At times I saw quite a number. 
 Question. How large a force did you see on the turnpike ? 
 Answer. I don't know. 
 
 # T* ?f -^ * * * 
 
 Question. Did you see one thousand ? 
 Answer. I may have seen that ; maybe more. 
 Question. Two thousand ? 
 Answer. I cannot tell yon. 
 Question. Did you see three thousand ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot answer the question, because I did not charge my mind with it. 
 Question. Was it your imjiressiou or ojiinion that tliey were the advanc*^ or the rear 
 of Longstrect's comnumd ? 
 Answer. It was my opinion that it was the rear, if I knew anything about it. 
 
 QueBtion. Allow me to refresh your recollection. Tliese guns were under the com- 
 mand of Major Froebel ? 
 
147 
 
 Auswer. I don't know ; I have never asked the question. 
 
 Question. How long did you watch this cloud of dust back between Hamilton Cole's 
 and Gainesville, which occurred immediately after the sending of that order to drag 
 brush f 
 
 Answer. It didn't occur until thirty minutes afterwards ; I suppose I watched it 
 four or five minutes. 
 
 Question. How long was that dust there ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know ; tlie dust extended down a considerable distance. I am 
 satisfied that whenever I looked in that direction the dust was there. 
 
 Question. For how long a period ? 
 
 Answer. I am not willing to ansAver the question, inasmuch as I cannot answer it 
 Avith positiveness. 
 
 Question. Did you see it at various times during the period of one hour? 
 
 Answer. I say I saw it at various times during the period of twenty-five or thirty 
 minutes ; I know that in that space of time I was somewhat interested in it ; but no 
 further. 
 
 Question. Did you follow the line of the railroad at all in going hack there ? 
 
 Answer. I went part on the railroad after I left Hampton Cole's. 
 
 Question. Hoav far did you follow this railroad 1 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect anything more than that I went part of the way on a 
 railroad. 
 
 Question. Did you turn to the right or left after striking the railroad ? 
 
 Auswer. I don't recollect that ; I recollect nothing at all about it, in regard to the 
 items, as to my taking such a road as that. 
 
 Question, Would not any considerable body of men in line of battle have made an 
 impression upon you ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; would not have made a bit of impression, unless there was some- 
 thing in the case to particularly strike me. 
 
 Question. Then they might have been there or not ? 
 
 Answer. Might have been there or not. I could not testify as to whether they were 
 or not. 
 
 Question. About what time of day did you first see Longstreet's troops in position 
 after that ? 
 
 Answer. I saw them in position, I think, somewhere about three o'clock, or a little 
 after three, or a little before three. 
 
 Question. This position that you have given General Jackson here as his right, 
 was that based on the supposition that was given you by the counsel on the other side, 
 or fi'om your recollection ? 
 
 Auswer. I base nothing upon any supposition from anybody. I have had no con- 
 versation with anybody about these things. 
 
 Question. You misunderstood my question. Did vou notice a mark that you put 
 there ? ... 
 
 Answer. I told you a Avhile ago I was sorry Ihat map was marked, because I wanted 
 to do my own marking. I was trying to locate that thing all the time, and what 
 bothered me Avas that somebody else had been marking. 
 
 Mr. Maltby. There Avas only one mark there. That is the Henry Kyd Douglas 
 map. 
 
 The Witness. Intermediate between Hood's left and what I recollect on Jackson's 
 right there Avas a space. It AA'as an eleA^ated i)osition, and this large battery not only 
 guarded Hood's left, but Jackson's right, if necessary. That is the imi^ressiou I wanted 
 to make. 
 
 It will be perceived that Major White, the Eev. John Lamlstreet, Mr 
 Carrico, and Mr. Munroe all speak positively of Union troops at and in 
 the vicinity of the ^^ Lewis-Leachman" honse dnring the morning and 
 into the afternoon, which is confirmed, as we shall see, by the evidence 
 of Brevet Major-General Sickles, Brevet Brigadier-General Barnes, and 
 other Union officers of the Pennsylvania Reserves. 
 
 Therefore when Longstreet says he was at the Lewis-Leachman honse 
 between 11 and 12 on that day (Board's Eecord, p. 73) we mnst charita- 
 bly conclude that he has confounded the twenty-ninth w ith the thirtieth 
 day's operations. 
 
 He undoubtedly was there on the 30th, but the Union troops were 
 
 11 G 
 
148 
 
 tlien nowhere in the vicimty. One thing is particularly noticeable in 
 this case, and that is that witnesses' recollection as to the time of oc- 
 currence of events in which they were not immediately and dii-ectly con- 
 cerned, or which they saw, varies so much that it must be taken with 
 very great allowance. 
 
 The sequence of events, or a diary made at the time, will give a better 
 indication of the facts, and in this connection I regret that the diaries 
 which some of the government witnesses had were not spread ui)on the 
 record. 
 
 All these witnesses, White, La ndstreet, and Munroe, put the formation 
 of the divisions under Longstreet behind " Pageland lane." 
 
 Hood's division appears to have been somewhat in advance of the 
 rest of the line, with the Texas brigade on the south of the pike. 
 
 Henry Kyd Douglas, Jackson's assistant adjutant-general, has indi- 
 cated Jackson's right, which Avas turned off northwesterly beyond the 
 beginning of the word " Independent." (See map.) 
 
 That ridge there, " Stony Eidge," was 270 feet high, and along it in 
 rear of Jackson's line was placed the artillery which jilayed over his 
 own lines 50 feet below and behind the ^'Independent Manassas Gap" 
 embankment into the Union lines formed parallel to his own. 
 
 It was on the continuation of this 270 feet high ridge, which formed a 
 perfect glacis down to the northerly fi-inge of the " Gibbon wood," that 
 Colonel Walton's eighteen or twenty guns were placed, just where the 
 Eev. Mr. Landstreet and Major White placed them, and not on the low 
 ground southeast of the ''Browner-Douglas" house, where petitioner, 
 for purposes of his own, would put them in order to get Longstreet's 
 line forward of its actual position. 
 
 The map before us, prepared under Major Warren's direction by Capt. 
 J. A. Judson, who is in the government service under him, omits many 
 very material i^oints on this end of the line, as, for example, Stuart's Hill, 
 and the continuation of the ridge which runs northwest from the west- 
 erly end of the " Gibbon wood " and joins the ridge on which Longstreet's 
 artillery was placed and the high ground west of Pageland lane. » 
 
 POSITION OF UNION FORCES SOUTH OF THE WARRENTON PIKE. 
 
 The position of the troops south of the pike is important in deter- 
 mining what were the petitioner's opportunities which were lost by his 
 fatal inaction on the 29th. 
 
 In the first place the battle was directed against Jackson, who awaited 
 attack in a position of great strength behind the Independent Manassas 
 Gap Eailroad cut and tilling ; the right of his line following the direc- 
 tion of the railroad approached the turnpike at a small angle. 
 
 The position of General Pope's line accommodated itself to Jackson's, 
 and. thus Heintzelman's cor^^s, part of Eeno's division of Burnside's 
 corps, and part of Sigel's corps, were north of the pike, and the remainder 
 of Sigel's and Eeynolds' division south of the pike, not in the position 
 l)etitioner jilaces them, due south, along Lewis Lane ^o. 1, but conform- 
 ing to Jackson's line. 
 
 Thus, after Schenck's division of Sigel's corps and EejTiolds' division 
 of McDowell's command had moved forward in line of battle south of 
 the pike, driving Early's skirmishers from the Thirteenth and Thirty- 
 first Virginia of Jackson's command before them, they swung around by 
 a right half-wlieel, with the right of Schenck's division pivoted on 
 Groveton, and brouglit up the left (which was under Eeynolds) to and 
 
149 
 
 across the Warreutoii Pike, near Meadowville laue, in order to attack 
 Jackson'' s right. 
 
 Maj. Gen. E. C. Sclienck, as we shall see, and also Maj. Gen. Franz 
 Sigel, express great donbts as to Longstreet havmg been in their front 
 in any force during these movements. 
 
 Emor B. Cope^ then sergeant Company A, First Pennsylvania Eeserves, 
 Keynolds' division, called by petitioner (Board's Eecord, p. 918), in re- 
 bnttal, pnts Eeynolds' di^ision just east of Compton's lane, where it re- 
 mained most of the day, and near dusk General Eeynolds was at a 
 point south of Young's Branch and about 400 feet east of Lewis' lane. 
 The witness positively stated that there was very little skirmishing — 
 "very feeble indeed." 
 
 The late Col. Oiven Jones., formerly First Pennsyh^ania Cavalry, who 
 succeeded this witness, also in petitioner's behalf, and heard his evidence 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 926), swore that Eeynolds "advanced with one or 
 two brigades of reserves and had quite a severe skirmish" ; and Eeynolds, 
 in his official report, mentions the very brigade of the witness Cope as 
 one of those engaged. The latter put his regiment in camp east of the 
 Chinn house hill on the night of the 28th (Board's Eecord, p. 921), in a 
 place where, according to his storj^, they were shelled, but the contour 
 map shows conclusively that the location was such as to screen them 
 from the enemy. 
 
 Col. Owen Jones., First Pennsylvania Cavalry (Board's Eecord, p. 929), 
 says he first thought that about 2 p. m. he was on Eeynolds' left near 
 Compton's lane, but on cross-examination admitted that up in the direc- 
 tion towards Cundiffe's and ^Meadowville he " passed very near the head 
 of that ravine, and moved out into an open field, and forward, and then 
 discovered that there was a large force in the w^oods, which Eeynolds 
 went over to attack." He fixes the time at about 2 p. m., and says he 
 kept within 500 feet of Eeynolds' left, but would not attempt to desig- 
 nate the woods on the map, but says that at one time during the day 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 928) he came across a hospital, that had been, of 
 King's division the night before. This, of course, must have been the 
 hospital in the Gibbon wood, as there was no other. It is also plain that 
 as Col. Owen Jones, petitioner's witness, thus corroborates the numerous 
 government witnesses as to Eeynolds' division being near Meadow^ille 
 lane at 2 p. m. 
 
 Longstreet could not have been east of Eeynolds and behind him in 
 the Gibbon wood by 10.30 or 11 a. m. The position Col. Owen Jones 
 admitted Eeynolds was in at 2 p. m. shows that petitioner could have 
 moved his own corps up without hindrance to the point General McDowell 
 had indicated before he left him (i)etitioner) two hours before. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Franz iSif/el, United States Volunteers, a corps commander, 
 called on behalf of government, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 
 911) : 
 
 Question bv Eecordeu. Do vou kuow how far Sclienck's divisiou advanced tbat 
 day? 
 
 Answer. I kuow from his report that it advanced as far as the battlefield of Gibbou 
 and Doubleday of the evening before, the night of the 28th, and from this I suppose 
 that he was tliere ; but I kuow by my own eyes that he marched fi'om the Bald. Headed 
 hill, where I posted him lirst, and where tlie artillery was posted ; that he advanced 
 through the woods, and tried to get in and get across the road, across the Warrenton 
 road, "and attack the euemy's right wing ; and he was prevented fi-om getting across 
 the road by the euemy's position ou the ridge, which enfiladed his advance on the 
 right. 
 
 Question. Then as to the afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. In the afternoon one of my divisions on the right was relieved by the troops 
 of General Hooker, and, I think. General Keno ; but General Schcnck and General 
 Milroy remained in line of battle. 
 
150 
 
 By tlie President of the Board : 
 
 Questiou. You spoke of General Schenck's divisiou liaviug advanced on the left of 
 the Wanenton pike with the design of striking Jackson's right ; at Avhat hour of the 
 day did he reach his most advanced jjositiou ? 
 
 Answer. I think it was hetween twelve and one, or about one o'clock; it may have 
 been a little later ; but that was the time, about. 
 
 Question. Then he was induced to retire by some firing that you speak of, and he 
 crossed the Warrenton pike toward the north for the purposenof striking Jackson's 
 right, because the fire was received from what direction ? 
 
 Answer. From the right of Jackson on a ridge, there were artillery there ; and when 
 he advanced he presented his left fiank to this fire ; but then ho was under the neces- 
 sity of assisting Milroy, who was on the right ; and this space between Schenck's 
 right and Milroy's left was almost uncovered ; so I know very well that I ordered 
 General Schenck to draw more to the right to connect with Milroy, and then he sent 
 one of Ms brigades to the right to connect with Milroy. 
 
 Question. Was Schenck wholly to the left of the Warrenton pike ? 
 
 Answer. He was, at the commencement of the advance ; but then during the move- 
 ment in advance he sent one of his brigades — he had two brigades — he sent one of hia 
 brigades to the right, across the pike, to assist Milroy ; that was only temporary. 
 I'hen afterward, when the troops of General Stevens came and I put him in there, I 
 ordered him to the left, and he took line with Schenck on the left of the road. 
 
 Question. Where was General Rej-nolds' division during your advance ; did you 
 know of it then ? 
 
 Answer. I knew that it was somewhere near to our line. 
 
 Question. On which flank ? 
 
 Answer. On my left. 
 
 Question. You knew Reynolds was somewhere near your left ? 
 
 Answer. Somewhere near my left ; I don't know exactly where he was, because I 
 'was so much engaged with my own troops that I could not get away to look for him. 
 I found out that during the day he maneuvered on the left; advanced on our left, and 
 Avas with General Schenck in communication ; and it was reported to me so when he 
 
 came there. 
 
 * * * * # * * 
 
 Answer. Some of them — only the division of General Schurz was relieved ; this was 
 At two o'clock ; Schenck remained here all day. 
 
 Question. After he fell back from this x)osition (Gibbon's)? 
 Answer. Yes, and so did Milroy. 
 
 By Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Question. It was McLean's brigade that was south of the pike, was it ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; he was under General Schenck; he commanded the left brigade; 
 this brigade was on the left, Stahel's was on the right, therefore he was this side of 
 the road (south). 
 
 By the Recorder : 
 
 Question. You say that General Schenck maneuvered through Gibbon's battle-ground, 
 and got there, I think you 'said, about one o'clock. Now, do you know how long he 
 remained on that battle-ground before falling back, according to the report that was 
 made to yon ? There was a battery in action, was there not, there? 
 
 Answer. My impression is this, that he remained there and around there about an 
 hour, I think, from one to two o'clock ; at least I would not say that he was always 
 in one place, but he maneuvered around there (Gibbon's battle-ground). 
 
 By the President of the Board : 
 
 Question. That you get from the report of General Schenck? 
 
 Answer. Not only from the report, but from the reports sent me. I identify the 
 place from his report, and reports were sent by his officers and by my own that he was 
 about a mile in advance. 
 
 Question. The reports received on the battle-field at that time? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; and I see from his report that this is the place. 
 
 Maj. S. IK. Benjamin,, U. S. A. (then first lieutenant, Second Artillery, 
 Stevens brigade, lleiio's division, Bnrnside's corps), thinks he himself 
 went into position with his battery about V2h p. m. (Board's Record, p. 614). 
 He says it was very still for half an hour and tlien got engaged himself. 
 Benjamin ]mt liis battery with his right near the AVarrenton turni)ike 
 and his left south of it on the ridge about two hundred yards from 
 Groveton. The Board will recollect that General Sigel, after hav- 
 
151 
 
 ing given his evidence and been cross-examined (p. 944), said, after 
 the brief recess, that he desired to correct his testimony, to the effect 
 that General Schenck retired from his advance position betAveen twelve 
 and one, instead of between one and two, becanse Brig. Gen. Isaac I. 
 Stevens, of Eeno's division, came np and went into position in Sigel's 
 line between eleven and twelve. He added, however, that he was not 
 absolutely positive in regard to the time in this case ; this, althongli 
 Colonel Chesebrongh's official report to himself of Schenck's division on 
 that day, with specific honrs noted, had been put before him. 
 
 The invaluable diary of Major-General Heintzleman, however, who 
 noted the hours, said Hooker got up about eleven ; General lieno about 
 an hour later. At this time of day, Heintzleman Axes his own head- 
 quarters on the field about a mile from Stone Bridge. His head<iuarters 
 must have been on Buck Hill north of and near to Warrenton jjilce, be- 
 cause he says, after mentioning Eeno's arrival, that soon after General 
 Pope arrived, about a quarter to two. 
 
 For Eeno to march from stone house, on the Warrenton pike (which 
 was a little nearer Sigel than Heintzleman's headquarters), to the posi- 
 tion of Sigel's cori)S at Groveton was a trifle over a mile and a quarter ; 
 Sigel's own headquarters were on the "Chinn house hill." 
 
 From this it is apparent that Stevens did not get up with Sigel's corps 
 to go into position until within a quarter to one, or one o'clock. 
 
 This is confirmed by the eA idence of Maj., then Capt., Oliver C. Bosby- 
 shell. Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, first brigade, Eeno's divis- 
 ion, Burnside's corps, who says tlie division arrived on the field at 1 p. m. 
 (Board's Eecord, p. 872). 
 
 Sigel says Schenclv was a mile in advance of his corps' position, near 
 Groveton, maneuvering around (iil>V)ons' battle-ground (i). 944). 
 
 Chesebrough, the assistant adjutant-general, puts this at between 1 
 and 2 p. m., and Sigel, before having his attention called to tlie matter, 
 gave about the same time as his own unpression in response to a ques- 
 tion of the President of the Board (p. 1)42). He also w^as disposed to 
 admit (p. 944) an hour's time as having elapsed between the arrival of 
 Stevens and the retirement of Schenck from his most advanced station 
 during the day. Thus, by the aid of General Heintzleman's diary, we 
 find that General Sigel's inqn-essions as he first gave them in evidence 
 correspond with the "specific statements of Colonel Chesebrough, who, 
 as assistant adjutant-general, appears to have noted the time. It is to 
 be regretted that his al)sence abroad has prevented his own corrobora- 
 tive evidence being obtained. 
 
 Brigadier-General StaheVs brigade^ which was the right brigade of^ 
 Schenck's division, had to be taken still farther to the right to^aid Milroy, 
 and Stevens' brigade supplied its place, but it soon returned (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 507). 
 
 ^Vhen General Sigel says that he took line with Schenck on the left 
 of the road (p. 943), it must not be supposed that this line was formed 
 perpendicular to the Warrenton pike ; on the contrary, they were nearly 
 parallel to it, making but a slight angle at Groveton, because Milroy's 
 independent brigade and Schurz's division of Sigel's corps were north 
 of the pike, and fighting Jackson, who was behind the Independent 
 Manassas Gap Eailroad, running also nearly parallel with the pike. In 
 other words, the line that General Pope's army was taking in attacking, 
 was conformed to the "Independent Line of the Manassas Gap Eailroad." 
 Thus having a line of battle parallel to Jackson's, the left of Sclienck's 
 division was up near Gibbon's battle-ground of necessity, and Eeynolds 
 on his left. 
 
152 
 
 Therefore, -wlieu Eeynolds undertook to attack Jackson's right nat- 
 urally he was up near Cundiff's, at Meadowville lane. 
 
 That this was deemed by Sigel both jjossible and probable is evinced 
 by his own report of the IGth September, 1802 (Board's Record, p. 504) ; 
 said he : 
 
 Scarcely were these troops in position ^vllen the contest beg.an with renewed vigor 
 and vehenlence, the enemy attiitkiug furiously ahing onr whole line from the extreme 
 right to the extreme left. The infantiy brigade of General Steinwehr, commanded 
 by Colonel Koltes, was then sent forward to the assistance of Generals Schenck and 
 Schiirz, and one regiment was detailed for tJie protection of a batteiy posted in reserve 
 near our center. The troo2)S of Brigadier Reynolds had meanwhile (12 o'clock) 
 taken position on our left. In order to dtfi'nd our rUjht, I sent a letter to General Kearney, 
 f<ayhig that Lonystreet ivas not able to bring his ti'oops in line of battle that day, and request- 
 ing him (Kearney) to change his front to the left and to advance, if possible, against the 
 enemy's left flank. 
 
 Therefore, if General Sigel did not think Longstreet was able (when 
 he WTote his letter to Kearney after twelve) to bring his troops in line 
 of battle that day, it is j)lain he had not then aiiy ground for withdraw- 
 ing Schenck from the position near Gibbon's battle-ground, which 
 Schenck, as we shall see and have seen, maintained nearly all that day. 
 
 On this subject the report of Brigadier-General R. C. Schenck (by Col. 
 William H. Chesebrough, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G., Schenck's division, 
 Sigel's corps), says (Board's Record, p. 514) : 
 
 Washixgtox, D. C, September 17, 18G2. 
 
 On Thursday, 29th ultimo, we left Buckland's Mills, passing through Gainesville, 
 and proceeded on the Manassas Junction pike to within some four miles of that place, 
 and then turned eastwardly, marching towai'd "Bull Run." The scouts in advance 
 reported a force of the enemy, consisting of infantry and cavalry, in front. We were 
 hurried forward and formed line of battle with our right toward CentreWlle. Some 
 few shells were thrown into a clump of woods in front, where the enemy were last seen, 
 but without eliciting any response. Some two hours elapsed, when heavy tiring was 
 heard on our left, which we concluded was from McDowell's corps and the enemy, who 
 had worked around fi'om our front in that direction. ^Ve were immediately pnt in 
 motion and marched on the Warrenton road, and took position for the night on a hill 
 east of the "stone house," our right resting on the i>ike. On Friday morning early the 
 engagement was commenced by General Milroy on our right, in which we soon after 
 took part, and a rapid artillery tire ensued ti'om both sides. For some time heavy 
 coliimns of the enemy could be seen filing out of a wood in front, and gradually falling 
 back. They were within range of our guns, Avhich were turned on them, and must 
 have done some execution. An lionr after we received the order to move one brigade 
 by the flank to the left and advance, which was done. We here obtained a good posi- 
 tion for artillery, and stationed De Beck's 1st Ohio liattery, which did excellent serv- 
 ice, dismounting one of the enemy's guns, blowing up a caisson, and silencing the bat- 
 tery. Unfortunately, however, they were poorly sup^died with ammunition, and soon 
 compelled to withdraw. Our two brigades were now put in motion. General Stahel, 
 commanding>rfirst brigade, marching around the right of the hill to a hollow in front, 
 was ordered to draw up in line of battle and halt. Colonel McLean advanced around 
 the left of the hill under cover of the woods, iiressing gradually forward until he struck 
 the turnpike at a white house, about one-half mile in advance of the stone house. Gen- 
 eral Milroy's brigade arrived about the same time. We here halted and sent back for 
 General Stahel, -who took the X'ike and soon joined us. We then formed our line of 
 battle in the woods to the left of the pike, our right resting on the road, and then 
 pushed on slowly. Milroy, in the meanwhile, had deployed to the right of the road, 
 and soon became engaged with the enemy. Our division was advanced until we 
 reached the edge of tlie woods and halted. In front of us was an open space (which 
 also extended to the right of the road ami to onr right), beyond which was 
 another wood. We remained here nearly au hour, the firing in the meanwhile be- 
 coming heavy on the right. The emuiiy had a battery very advantageously placed on 
 a high ridge Ixdiiud the woods in front of Milroy, on the right of the road. It was 
 adinirably served and loitirely concealed. Our position becoming known, their fire was 
 directed towards us. The general determined, therefore, to advance, and so pushed 
 on across the ojk-u s])ace in front, and took position in the woods beyond. We here dis- 
 covered tliat we were on the battle-ground of the night before, and found the hospital 
 of Gibbon's brigade, who had engaged the enemy. The battery of the enemy still con- 
 
153 
 
 tinupil. We had no artillery. De Beck's and Scliirmer's ammunition liavino' oivon ont, 
 and Bnell's battery, which had rejiorted, after a hot contest with the enemy (who had 
 every advantage in position and range), was compelled to retire. It was now determined 
 to flank the battery and captnre it, and for this purpose General Hchenck ordered one of 
 his aids to reconnoiter the position. Before he returned, however, we were requested 
 by General Milroy to assist him, as he was very heavily jiressed. General Stahel was 
 immediately ordered to proceed with his^ brigade to Milroy's support. It was about 
 this time, one or two o'clock, that a line o'f skirmishers were observed approaching us 
 from the rear ; they proved to be of General Reynolds. We communicated with General 
 Reynolds at once, who took his position on our left, and at General Hchenck's sugges- 
 tion he sent a battery to our right in the woods for the purpose of flanking the enemy. 
 They secured a position and were engaged with him about an hour, but with what 
 result we were not informed. General Reynolds now sent us word that he had dis- 
 covered the enemy bearing down upon his "left in heavy columns, and that he intended 
 to fall back to the fii'st woods behind the cleared space, and had already put his troops 
 in motion. We therefore accommodated ourselves to his movement. It was about this 
 time that your order came to jjress towards the right. We returned answer that the 
 enemy were in force in front of us, and that A^•e could not do so without leaving the 
 left much exjiosed. General Schenck again asked for some artillery. General Stahel's 
 brigade that had been sent to General Milroy's assistance, having accomidished its 
 object under a severe fire, had returned, and soon after General Stevens reported with 
 two regiments of infantry and a battery of four twenty-pound Parrott gims. With these 
 re-enforcements we determined to advance again and reoccupy the woods in front of 
 the cleared space, and communicated this intention to General Reynolds. He, however, 
 had fallen back on our left some distance to the rear; he was therefore requested to make 
 his connection with our left. The Parrotts in the meanwhile were placed in position, 
 and under the admirable management of Lieutenant Benjamin did splendidly. Two 
 mountain howitzers also reported, and were i)laced on our right in the edge of 
 the woods near the road, and commenced shelling the woods in front of the open 
 H}»ace, which were now occupied by the enemy, our skirmishers having previously 
 fallen back. The artillery fire now became A'ery severe, and General Schenck was con- 
 vinced that it was very essential that he should have another battery, and so sent me 
 to you to get one. I an-ived to find one, Captain Romer's, just starting. You also 
 directed me to order General Schenck to fall gradually back, as he was too far forward. 
 This he had perceived, and, anticipating, fell slowly back, placijig his division behind 
 the slope of the hill in front of the one we had occupied in the morning. Cax)tain 
 Romer's battery in the meauwhile had taken position in front of the white house on 
 the right of the pike, a little in advance of the hill on which we were. Lieutenant 
 Benjamin's battery had suffered severely, so much so that he reported only one section 
 fit for duty, the other liaving lost all its cannoniers. They were placed in position and 
 fired one or two rounds at the woods in front of the position we had just left, more to 
 get the range than anything else. We were now ordered to d( scend the hill, cross the 
 road, and take up our position behind the house, in front of which was Captain Romer's 
 battery. This we did, deploying the brigades in line of battle, the second brigade in 
 front and the first brigade in the rear. We remained so during the night. 
 
 The above report is respectfully submitted, with the remark that it is made without 
 any communication with General Schenck, he being severely wounded, and prevented 
 by his surgeon's orders from attending to any business whatever-. And although fully 
 assured that the main points are correct, there may have been some orders or move- 
 ments of minor importance, which, in my position as aide, carrying orders, might not 
 have come within my notice. 
 
 As General Schenck, who had been wounded the day before, was 
 nnable to make the report, Colonel Chesebrongh made it ; though it 
 appears in the evidence of General Schenck that he was with him at 
 tlie time and in constant communication with him. 
 
 Colouel Chesebrongh wrote a letter to General McDowell in reply to 
 Brigadier-General Eeynolds' letter on the subject (Board's Kecurd, p. 
 oOl) which is as follows : 
 
 LETTER OF COLONEL ClIESEBlIurCII TO MA.IOR-GEXEKAL M'DOWELL, 
 
 Washington, D. C, October 20, 186-2. 
 
 General : In re]tly to General Reynolds' letter of the 9th instant, I have the honor 
 to make the following remarks : 
 
 I can discover but little difference between the statements of General Reynolds and 
 my report. 
 
 'He states firstly. "That his division manteuA-red on our left from early in the morn- 
 ing until we had gained the position alluded to <>u the pike, near Gibliou's battle-ground 
 
154 
 
 of the evening previons." This I (hi not attempt to deny. I merely give in my rei>ort 
 tlie time wiien we tirst became ac(inainte(l witli liis (Genei'al Reynolds') position. 
 
 He then says that "it was here that f jeneral Schenek asked me for a battery," which 
 agrees entirely with niyrei)ort, with the exception that I did not enter so much into the 
 details. He then remarks that, "in returning from this i)Osition to bring n|) the other 
 battery and .Seymour's brigade, I passed through Schenck's troops di'awn uj) on the 
 rif/ht of the woods before alluded to, in which Gibbon had been engaged." But in 
 bringing up the battery and Seymour's brigade, he noticed that " Schenck's troops had 
 disaitpeared from this jtositiou, and were nowhere in sight." In the first place Gen- 
 eral Ki'ynolds is incorrect in his impi-ession of our position. 
 
 Our troojis were always on the left of the pike throughout the day, exceiJt when the 
 brigade under General Stahel was sent to Milroy's assistance. 
 
 Our position before Stahel moved was in the woods which had been occupied as a 
 hospital by Gibbon's brigade, to the left of the pike, General Stahel's right resting on 
 the road and Colonel McLean's brigade on his left, the woods in which Gibbon had had 
 his principal fighting being across the x>ike and to our right. 
 
 At the time that General Reynolds returned from placing the Tiatteiy and Meade's 
 brigade it is probable that he passed through General Stahel's brigade, which was in 
 motion and had gained the right of the pike on its way to join Milroy, and that after- 
 ward, when General Reynolds was bringing up Ransom's batterj' and Seymom-'s 
 brigade, they were gone, which accounts for his impression that "he was left alone." 
 He soon discovered his error, however, as he states in his letter, "in doing which 
 McLean's brigade was discovered." 
 
 Colonel McLean still held his position, and was immediately moved so that his right 
 would rest on the pike, and General Reynolds made his movement to correspond. 
 
 It was about this time that our position was changed, but not because we had ascer- 
 tained that we were disconnected w^ith the rest of Sigel's troops. 
 
 We had been and tvere well aware of our position. 
 
 It is true we had advanced further than was intended, being constantly urged by 
 General Sigel to advance, and pressed toward the right, he evidently not understand- 
 ing our true position. We fell back, however, on account of the information received 
 from General Reynolds that the enemy were bearing down on his left. General Rey- 
 nolds did not communicate directly with General Schenek, as it would apiiear from my 
 report, but the information was received through Colonel McLean, who told General 
 Schenek that General RejTiolds had informed him "that the enemy were bearing 
 down, &c., and that he (Reynolds) intended to fall back, and has actually commenced 
 the movement." Colonel McLean wished to know if he should act accordingly. Gen- 
 eral Schenek directed him to accommodate himself to General Reynolds' movement. 
 
 We retired slowly across the open space to and within the woods and halted. Gen- 
 eral Stahel rejoined us here, and General Stevens also reported with two regiments of 
 infantry and a battery. Geiieral Stevens' force was thi'own to the right of the pike. 
 General Stahel on the left of the pike, and Colonel McLean on the left of Stahel. I 
 here state in my report that General Schenek, on receiving these re-enforcements, de- 
 termined to advance again, and communicated his intention to General Reynolds. I 
 carried this message myself, and after some difficiilty found General Reynolds, and re- 
 quested him to halt and form on the left of McLean. He had fallen back, however, 
 some distance to the rear of McLean's line of battle, so much so that the enemy's 
 skirmishers had actually flanked us, and in returning to the division I had a narrow 
 escape from being captured. I also asked General Reynolds to ride forward to meet 
 General Sclienck, who had directed me to say that he would be at the extreme left of 
 our line for that pnri)ose. General Reynolds neither gave me any positive answer as 
 to whether he would meet General Schenek or any information as to what he intended 
 to do. I do not know if he complied Avith the re([uest to make his connection on otir 
 left, as, on my return to General Schenek, I was immediately sent to General Sigel to 
 rei)resent our iiositioii ; and when returning again with the order to General Schenek 
 to retina slowly, I uwt the connnand executing the movement. 
 
 My r(!])ort was intended merely as a sketch of our movements for General Sigel's in- 
 formation, and ] endeavoicd throughout to be as concise as possible, and confine myself 
 solely to the operations and movements of our division. I now submit the above state- 
 ment, trusting that the explanations will be satisfactory to General Reynolds. 
 
 PIoii. Robert C. ^Schencl; late envoy extraordinary and minister pleni- 
 ])()teiitiary to Great J>ritian, brigadier-general of volnnteers, command- 
 ing tlie lirst division of Sigel's corps, wounded and promoted major-gen- 
 eral on the 30tli Angnst 1802, being dnly sworn, testitied as follows: 
 (Board's Eccord, p. 1082) : 
 
 Question. Where was that division early on the morning of that day, August 20 f 
 Answer. We were upon the hills below IJulI Run, up in tlie neighborhood ol Young's 
 Creek. » 
 
155 
 
 Question. North or soutli of the Warreutou tiiriii)ike ? 
 
 Autswer. South of the Warreuton turnpike. 
 
 Questit)n. In reference to the Mauas.sas and Sudley road, running up there to the 
 stoue house and Sudley Springs — east of it or west of it? 
 
 Answer. That must have heeu west of it. 
 
 Question. Where did you go to from that point where you eamped the night before? 
 
 Answer. Along the left side, the southerly side of the turnpike. 
 
 Question. What formaticm was your division in ? 
 
 Answer. I had Stahel's brigade upon the right and McLean's lirigade to the left, 
 moving along south of and parallel with the turnpike. 
 
 Question. Were they in coliuim or in line of battle? 
 
 Answer. They were for the most part of the time in line of battle ? 
 
 Question. About what time did you make that forward movement westerly ? 
 
 Answer. We set out very early in the morning, I cannot recollect the, hour,' and con- 
 tinued moving, with rests and delays, until we reached the farthest point that we at- 
 tained to, which, as I recollect, was a wood, in which some of Gi])bou's troops had been 
 engaged the night before. After that, I withdrew toward the position that I had 
 occupied in the morning, though not quite as far as to that position ; by those two 
 movements I occupied the day. 
 
 Question. In moving up to this i)osition, did you have in the morning of the 29th 
 August any enemy in front of yon ? 
 
 Answer. None, that we felt; throwing forward skirmishers and supposing the enemy 
 was present somewhere. Pretty early in the day a force of the enemy was developed 
 upon this ridge, where there were a number of batteries placed to our right; that 
 would be to the north of the turni)ike road. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect passing that lane, Lewis lane No. 1 ? 
 
 Answer. I have a very indistinct impression of it. I have a remembrance floating 
 in my mind having crossed some road which was not the tvurnpike, but I don't recall 
 it distinctly. 
 
 Question. At what time of the day did you reach your farthest point in advance. 
 
 Answer. I think it must have been sinnewhere about the middle of the day : pci'haps 
 a little earlier than the middle of the day. 
 
 Question. Did you see General RejTioIds' divisicm during that day? 
 
 Answer. No ; Init I understood he was off on my left. 
 
 Question. Did you see General Reynolds himself during the morning or afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. No; I think not. I don't recollect. 
 
 Question. How far did you get beyond the Gibbon's wood in which the wounded of 
 the night before were ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that we got beyond the Gibbon woods. My remembrance is 
 that the farthest jioint we reaclKMl was somewhere about the west edge of the Gibbon 
 wood — that is, the wood in whicli Gibbon's troops were engaged the night before. 
 We found there his wounded and the evidence of the battle that had taken place. 
 
 Question. Was anything done with these wounded that you found there ? 
 
 Answer. I ordered all the men in that and the piece of woods this side of that where 
 there were, I think, a few scattered, to be sent to the rear and taken care of. I don't 
 know that that is the Gibbon wood ; I mean the wood farthest in advance that I 
 reached was the wood in which the engagement took place. My impression is we did 
 not at any period go farther in that direction than to, perhaps, the west edge of that 
 wood. 
 
 Question. Look at the map ; which piece of timber is it that you consider to be the 
 Gilibou wood ? 
 
 Answer. T/((.y I suppose to be tlic wood. [In which the word ''Warreuton" ends; 
 marked S on the Laiidstreet map.] Tiiat I suppose is intended for the wood in which 
 Gibbon's engagement took place. 
 
 Qiiestion. How long did your division remain in that woods ? 
 
 Answer. We nmst have been in that wood altogether two or three hours. 
 
 Question. Did you see any battery of the enemy while you were in that position ? 
 If so, where was it ? 
 
 Answer. There was a battery otf to our right somewhere, which I recollect all the 
 more distinctly l)ecause it seenied to me to be detached from the general line of the 
 enemy, and I conceived the purpose of attempting to capture it, and sent one of my 
 statf over to reconnoiter with a view to see how it might be approached. But about 
 that time Milroy, who was engaged with the enemy off to my right, communicated 
 with me, or General Sigel for him — I think the message came from Mik'oy himself — 
 begging assistance, and I detached Stahel's brigade to support Milroy northeast of the 
 pike, and then gave up the idea of attempting to capture that battery. 
 
 Question. That battery was in the neighborhood of where? 
 
 Answer. It was on a hill on my right, to the I'ight of the wood where Gibbon's fight 
 had taken place. It was upon elevated ground, and seemed to be the spur of a hill. 
 I thought we might by^a sudden and decisive movement upon it capture it. 
 
156 
 
 Question. While yon were up in tins positicm, McLean's brigade, I understand, was 
 on tlie left. What was the position of Reynolds' division of Pennsylvania reserves as 
 reported to yon at that time in reference to your own position ? 
 
 Answer. I did not see them, but they were reported to me as being upon onr left, 
 and I may add that it was reported to me that they had stationed a battery somewhere 
 in advance of Gibbon's wood, I think Cooper's battery. 
 
 Question. In which direction was that battery operating? 
 
 Answer. Did not see the battery. 
 
 Question. At what time did you quit with your division this Cribbon wood? 
 
 Answer. I should think, to the best of my recollection, somewhere between one and 
 tlu'ee o'clock. I don't think I can be more iJositive than that. My recollection is that 
 it was some time after noon. 
 
 Question. To what point did you go then with your division? 
 
 Answer. In consequence of reports made to me in reference to the movements of 
 General Reynolds, I thought it best for me to fall back, and I came into a strip of 
 woods which I supposed to be these [south of the syllable " ville" in " Gainesville "]. 
 I formed in line of battle near the west edge of that woods. There we lay most of 
 the afternoon. 
 
 . Question. Up to what time ? 
 
 Answer. I can scarcely tell yon. I should think at least until the middle of the 
 afternoon, perhaps later. I recollect withdrawing from that point from wood to wood 
 as we had advanced. We found it quite late in the afternoon, or quite sunset, by the 
 time I reached my original position. The whole distance, I should think, was about 
 two miles from the point where we started in the morning to the farthest point to 
 which we advanced. 
 
 Question. While you were in the Gibbon wood, what enemy, if any, did you see in 
 your immediate front ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot say that I saw any enemy in our immediate front. There were 
 skirmishes in that direction, and as my skirmishers were thrown forward we would 
 have an occasional shot, but there seemed to me at that time to be no enemy in fi'ont — 
 in my innnediate frf)nt. The first intimation that I had that the enemy in considera- 
 ble force were upon our left was through Colonel McLean, the commander of my sec- 
 ond brigade, who told me that a messenger, or staff officer, or orderly, or some one 
 fi'om Reynolds, apparently with authority, had come to him, as he was in command of 
 a brigade, and communicated the fact that the enemy were ujion our left, and I think 
 that Avas coupled with the information that Reynolds intended to fall back. I tried 
 to communicate with Reynolds again, but did not succeed, but I thought that there 
 was no occasion for immediately falling back; but not finding any response fi'om Gen- 
 eral Reynolds, I concluded to withdraw slowly to at least a short distance and then 
 come across an open space into the next wood [into a little strip marked S 2], where I 
 rested the troops in line. 
 
 Question. While yon were holding position in that little strip of woods, do yon 
 know whether or not the enemy obtained the possession of the Gibbon w^ood ? 
 
 Answer. I am satisfied that they were not there in any force ; they had their skii'- 
 mishers thrown forward as I had men toward the Gibbon wood, and there were occa- 
 sional shots fired with or without good cause for them, but there was no movement in 
 force, nor was there indicated to me any presence of an enemy in force. 
 
 Question. Cau you fix with any degree of relative certainty the time in the after- 
 noon when you quit the little fringe of woods marked " S 2"; whether it was two or 
 three or four or five or six o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. The days in August are pretty long. I should say it was at least the mid- 
 dle of the afternoon, or prol^ably later. I reached my conclusion from measuring it 
 by the movement forward and the gradual withdrawal of the troops. 1 should think 
 it was after the middle of the afternoon. 
 
 Question. Do you mean to say three or four o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. I should think later, ])erhaps ; from one to seven. I should think it was 
 as late as four o'clock ; of that I cannot be positive at all. Such is the impression 
 when I attempt now to recall the circumstances and the movements. 
 
 Question. Have you seen the official report of the action of your division that day, 
 made by your assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Chescbrough ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Was that rejiort made under your direction or with your knowledge? 
 
 Answer. It was brouglit to my attention after it was made, wlien 1 was able to see 
 and read it, and of c-oui'sc^ I read it with a grcal. deal of interest, but my recollection 
 is that I was n<'itlu'r ahle to dictate to him nor did I give him any points in regard 
 to his report unless it was to suggest that favorable mention sliouhl be made of certain 
 officers. 
 
 Question. Did you see tliat report before it was finally filed? 
 
 Answer. I doul>t if I did. I think it nnist hav(^ been before I saw it. 
 
 Question. During the day did you know of any battle in progressat aiiy time; if so, 
 "what was its character and where was it .' 
 
157 
 
 Answer. The figlit was principally on our right. There was apparently a range of 
 batteries to oiu" right, which in the earlier part of the tlay directed their fire against 
 a battery of Benjamin's that was dra^vn up upon the spur of a hill. There was fight- 
 ing which I did not see, but which was reported to nie as going on, and of which I 
 could hear by the continual i-eports of musketry, that I supposed to have been Milroy's 
 forces. But on oiu' side of the turnpike there was no serious engagement of any kind 
 during that day. 
 
 Question. Do you know when any of the rest of General Lee's command of the 
 army of North Virginia came to the assistance of Jackson's forces? If so, when? 
 
 Answer. I do not ; I can only give yoii the imjiressiou we had at the time of when 
 they eft'ected anything like a jiuiction. 
 
 Question. What was it ? 
 
 Mr. Maltby. I object to impressions. 
 
 Answer. I think there was no junction of their forces until in the night or very 
 early next morning. That I do not know, however. That was our conclusion, sit- 
 uated as we were. 
 
 Question. This tiring that you heard to your right — what was its character — artil- 
 lery, infantry, or both ? 
 
 Answer. Principally artillery. 
 
 Question. How long did it continue during the day ? 
 
 Answer. That I cannot tell you; but during a part of the time there was evidently 
 a sharp engagement with small-arms. 
 
 Question. Towards dusk, do vou know of anv firing ? If so, what was its charac- 
 ter ? 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect. 
 
 Question. What were the losses of your division that day ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell you without refreshing my recollection. 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Maxtby : 
 
 Question. "WTiere did you start from on the morning of the 29th 1 
 
 Answer. On these hilfs, as I recollect, south of the turnpike, and not far from the 
 position where the fight took place on the 30th. 
 
 Question. Under whose immediate command were you ? 
 
 Answer. General Sigel's. 
 
 Question. At what time did you leave that position ? Was it near the Chinnhouse, 
 or where was it ? 
 
 Answer. It must have been somewhere in the neighborhood of the Chinn house. I 
 recollect the Chinn hou.se more in connection with the fight of the next day. It was 
 upon those hills. 
 
 Question. What time did you leave that position? 
 
 Answer. Quite early in the morning. I cannot indicate the hour. 
 
 Question. At daybreak ? 
 
 Answer. I think I ordered the men to take their breakfasts, but it must have been 
 an early breakfast ; it must have been at least by sunrise or earlier. We began the 
 movement, perhaps, at daybreak. 
 
 Question. Where did you first take possession in line of battle f 
 ■ Answer. That I cannot distinctly recollect, but it was some time before we reached 
 the wood where Gibbon was eng'aged, and I think the greater porti<m of the dis- 
 tance we were thrown into line, and Stahel with his first brigade marching on the 
 right and McLean on the left in line. 
 
 Question. Those Avere the only two brigades composing your division ? 
 
 Answer. Those were the only two brigades that I had there at that time. 
 
 Question. How far did Stahel advance with yon ? 
 
 Answer. Up to near the wood in which Gibbon was engaged, I think. 
 
 Question. Did he retire before you retired from that position ? 
 
 Answer. He was sent over to sustain Milroy. 
 
 Question. Then you were left with McLean's command alone ? 
 
 Answer I think Stahel did not join us until after the backward movement. 
 
 Question. Did Stahel move up on the right of the tm-npike in advancing ? 
 
 Answer. I tliiuk a portion of the time his command was upon the right of the turn- 
 pike, but I am not sure that his right did not rest on the turnpike, making the whole 
 of my line to the left of the turnpike. I recollect riding in the turnpike myself. 
 
 Question. Did you march rapidly from your position where you breakfasced to Avhere 
 you formed Une of battle ; i>revious to your forming line of battle, tlid you advance 
 iapidlv ? 
 
 Answer. No. My recollection is that all the way through the day we moAy ed but 
 slowly from one patch of Avoods to another across the intervening distance, feeling our 
 Avay f we Avould generally rest in a piece of Avood and sent forward skirmishers, and 
 then move forward across the open space. 
 
 Question. Hoaa' many men had you in your command ? 
 
158 
 
 Ans-\ver. I caimot recollect ; tliey were average brigades. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect a battery uuder Beiijamiu ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Where was that stationecl ? 
 
 Answer. On a point which I could indicate if I were on the ground. 
 
 Question. Have you been on the ground since the Itattle ? 
 
 Answer. No ; not that part of the ground. Immediately after the war I went down 
 to Manassas and went across in a wagou, out of curiosity, to see the ridge upon which 
 I had been wounded, but I did not go over the field. 
 
 Question. How far to the front did Benjamin's battery get, as you recollect? 
 
 Answer. It was i)laced to oui; right. I should think somewhere upon a spur about 
 here. 
 
 When General Sclienck thus phices Benjamin's battery on the right 
 of the di^^sion, he does not mean that his line of battle was perpendicu- 
 lar to the pike at Groveton and at right angles to the rest of General 
 Pope's line on Ms right, but that his own line was nearly jiarallel with 
 the pike, in continuation of General Pope's line, conforming" to the Inde- 
 pendent Manassas Gaj) Raikoad, and that his left was up in the Gibbon 
 wood. 
 
 Question. Across the pike from yon? 
 
 Answer. Across the pike. 
 
 Question. How far to your rear was he, or to your front, when you reached that 
 farthest point, according to your recollection ? 
 
 Answer. It was some distance to the right, and some considerable distance. I can- 
 not say how much ; possibly a quarter or a half a mile to the rear, the farthest point 
 that we reached ; half a mile, I should think, at least ; probably more. 
 
 Question. At what time did you reach the position in which he was placed? 
 
 Answer. I was in the advance of that position before he was placetl there ; it was 
 to meet the lire from these batteries as we advanced that I had Benjamin's battery 
 l)laced upon an eminence here; and I discovered very soon afterwartls that he had 
 drawn upon himself the concentrated fire of a number of batteries upon the stony 
 ridge where the enemy were, beyond. 
 
 Question. Where were you when Benjamin's battery was placed in the position of 
 which we are speaking? 
 
 Answer. I think I may have been, as I said, from a quarter to a half mile farther 
 west than the point where he was placed on the south side of the turnpike. 
 
 Question. With reference to your advanced i)oint, where were you at the time Ben- 
 jamin was placed where his batteries were? 
 
 Answer. That I cannot tell. 
 
 Question. Have you any recollection as to whether you were then in Gibbon's 
 ■woods ? 
 
 Answer. I do not recollect. My impression rather is that I was not at that time in 
 Gibbon's wood. 
 
 Question. How long after Benjamin being placed in that position do you think that 
 you reached Gibbon's wood ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell you. 
 
 Question. How long after that opening fire began with such severity uxton Benja- 
 min? 
 
 Answer. After he was placed there ? 
 
 Question. Yes. 
 
 Answer. I think he had occupied the jiosition for some little time. Perhaps half 
 an hour or more. He was tiring an occasional shot before the enemy seemed to dis- 
 cover his range and position and concentrated their lire u])on him. 
 
 Question. In what direction from your own commaudwere those guns at that time? 
 W^ere they immediately itpon your right or far to your front and right ? 
 
 Answer. You mean Benjamin's? 
 
 Question. No, sir; I mean the rebel battery ? 
 
 Answer. No. If this map is to be reli<'d upon as showing where the ridge is, if the 
 line had been continued they would have made an acute angle with the point towards 
 which I was moving. 
 
 Qu<'stion. liow far would it have been, according to your recollection, from your 
 front to the point where their line, if prolonged, would have struck the turnpike 
 road? 
 
 Answer. Their line, if prolonged. I should have thought would strike the road some 
 hundreds of yards, jterbaps a (piartcr of a mile, beyond tbe Gibbon woods; that is, if 
 their line had been ))rotra(tc(l. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain in tin- ])ositiou where you were when Benja- 
 min's battery opened .' 
 
159 
 
 Answer. I cauuot tell yon; I don't recollect. 
 
 Qnestiou. You were there in line of battle perhaps half a mile in his front, or per- 
 haps a qnarter ? 
 
 Answer. From a qnarter to half a mile in front. 
 
 Question. Did you lie a long time in that position before advancing? 
 
 Answer. We moved slowly, resting in each of these successive pieces of Avood, and 
 then marched more rapidly across the open sjiaces between, after having felt the 
 wood in adA'ance of xis, until by thCvse successive delays and marches, occupying the 
 forenoon, we reached finally what we call the Gibbon Voods. 
 
 Question. If Lieutenant Benjamin has sworn that that was his place, and if yon 
 place his battery there as opening, how far in advance of that position would you 
 judge you were ? 
 
 Answer. Wherever his battery was we were to his left in advance, and I should say 
 from a qnarter to a half a mile. 
 
 Question. Do you think you were in this strij) of woods, marked S^, at the time his 
 battery opened ? 
 
 Answer. That, as I understand the map, is a strip of woods back to which we fell 
 when we left Gibbon's woods, where I formed a line fronting towards the open space 
 
 and toAvards the Gibbon woods. 
 
 # * * * * # « 
 
 Question. How do you fix it as between one and three o'clock the time Avhen you 
 left Gibbon's Avoods? 
 
 AnsAver. Because we consumed about half a day or more in adA^ancing to that 
 point. We rested there for some time, and Ave consumed pretty much all the rest of 
 the day in regaining our original position to which Ave withdrew. I make it out, 
 therefore, that we must haA-e reached there about midAvay of that time. I will add 
 that after I was able to examine the report made Ijy my aide, I found that he had stated 
 the time in his report, and was satisfied that he had stated it correctly ; and I think, 
 though I have not his report now to refer to, that he makes it sonieAvhere betAveeu 
 one and tAvo o'clock. 
 
 Question. HaA'e you ever read the report of General Reynolds? 
 
 AusAver. I dare say I haA^e, but not for a long time. 
 
 Question. Did General Eeynolds retire fi'om his advance at the ti)ne that you re- 
 tired ? 
 
 AnsAver. General Reynolds, as I have stated, was reported to be conmianding the 
 troops Avhich Avere on my left when we were np in the Gibbon's woods. I had no 
 intention of retiring from that position then, at least, nor did I know that it would 
 become necessary for me to do so. We had then advanced about two miles on the 
 south side of the road from the point fiom Avhich we started in the morning [Warren- 
 ton turnpike]. I sent a staff-ofiicer to communicate with General Reynolds. He re- 
 turned and reported to me that there were indications of the presence of the enemy 
 off' in the front of Reynolds' skirmishing parties or pickets, and that he had mistaken 
 his way, as he thought, and came A'ery near being captured. I heard subsequently, 
 or about that time, from Colonel McLean, then commanding my second brigade, that 
 he had received a message from General Reynolds, which had been deliA^ered to him 
 instead of being conveyed to me, stating that Reynolds found the enemy Avere on his 
 left, and to my left, of course, therefore,"in sufficient force to make him think it ad- 
 visable to AvitlidraAV. I had no proof of any such iiulications, and I wanted Reynolds 
 to hold on, and sent accordingly to get into communication with him, so as to pre- 
 serve our line, but my message, 1 think, never reached him, or at least he had left his 
 jjosition, as was reported to me, and 1 did not haA'e communication .with him. 
 
 Question. Is your recollection as to the time Avhen you retired from your advanced 
 position so strong that if General Reynolds swore (December 30, 1862) that he retired 
 between twelve and one o'clock, or it may have been after one, that you Avould still 
 say that it was between one and three, or nearer three, that yon retired from Gibbon's 
 woods ? 
 
 Answer. I should not base my recollection upon tnayhing that you informed me as to 
 Reynolds' recollection. My I'emembrance is, as I uoav recall the circumstance, that it 
 Avas not earlier than one— nor, perhaps, later than three. It was after I had had indica- 
 tion from Reynolds, derived in the circuitous way I tell you, of his purpose to Avithdraw, 
 and while I Avas in the Gibbon's Avood ; and a messenger Avas sent to communicate 
 with Reynolds, and we found he was gone ; so that he must have retired before I did. 
 I should say I certainly did not retire before one, and as certainly not after three ; 
 but I do not think it is' possible for me, from my present recollection of the circum- 
 stances, to fix it more definitely than that. 
 
 Question. What was youi- final position that e.A^ening ? 
 
 Answer. We fell back to this hill which looks doAvn into a ravine occupied by Young's 
 Creek. 
 
 Question. Yon moved back to Young's Creek, on the ridge just behind that f 
 
160 
 
 Answer. Yes; I slept in a little grove. It could scarcely be called a grove. It was 
 a clump of woods. It Avas made disagreeable by some cattle tluit had takeu shelter 
 there duriug tlie day. They were driveu out that I might find shelter. It was nearly 
 dark, and I went soon to sleep. 
 
 Question. At wliat time did you reach that position? 
 
 Answer. It must luive been, I should think, not earlier than sunset. It was near 
 to the end of tlie day. 
 
 Question. Was thtjre no fighting going on on the pike in your vicinity at that 
 time ? 
 
 Answer. I have an indistinct recollection that shots were fired along in the evening. 
 I cannot recall the circumstances. 
 
 Question. Did you know of King's division ? 
 
 Answer. I had no immediate personal knowledge of them. 
 
 Question. Did you not know that they had a very severe fight in the neigliborhood of 
 Groveton that eveniug? 
 
 Answer; Evening of the 29th ? 
 
 Question. Yes. 
 
 Answer. I think I must have known of it. 
 
 Question. In reference to that fight what was your position when it took place ? 
 
 Answer. I was back on this hill, looking down into the ravine ; I should say, at 
 least as early as sunset. 
 
 Question. Was your whole line back there? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir; I had withdrawn my force. 
 
 Question. Did you have a watch ? 
 
 Answer. I am in the habit of carrying a watch. I don't recollect to have been with- 
 out one for a great many years. 
 
 Question. Did you fix times at all by reference to your watch on that day ? 
 
 Answer. I dare say I did at the time, but I have no recollection now when or where 
 I took out my watch to consult it as to time. This is sixteen years ago, yon must 
 recollect; but certain ijromineut facts or incidents would be, as it were, burned upon 
 my mind without ai recollection of the connecting details. 
 
 Question. Do you say that you were in the woods, the Gibbon woods, when General 
 Reynolds retired ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I should say I was. 
 
 Question. Then this statement of your aide-de-camp, Colonel Cheseborough, is in- 
 correct ? 
 
 Answer. What is the statement ? 
 
 Question. "With these re-enforcements we determined to advance again and re- 
 occupy the woods in front of the cleared sx>ace, and communicated this intention to 
 General Reynolds." 
 
 Answer. What re- enforcements ? 
 
 Question. From Stahel's brigade. 
 
 Answer. Stahel retired. 
 
 Question. Yes. "He, however, had fallen back on our left some distance to the 
 rear. He was, therefore, requested to make his connection with oiu- left." 
 
 Answer. My impression was that I got this report as coming from General Reynolds 
 in relation to his movemeiit when I was in the Gibbon woods. When I come to con- 
 sider the matter a little further my remembrance is, as I think I said before, that it 
 was not until we fell back to the strip of woods behind the Gibbon woods [S. 2] that 
 Stahel rejoined me, and therefore the jirobability is that I may have been there, and 
 ]>revented from making an advance again ui)on the Gibbon woods by hearing that 
 Reynolds was not going to remain on my left. 
 
 Questioia. You have stated that the enemy diil not occupy Gibbon's woods during 
 the time that you were in this strip of woods marked " S 2." 
 
 Answer. No ; I am very sure they were not. 
 
 Question. Couhl you see tlu'ough those woods ? 
 
 Answer. No. 
 
 Question. Then how do you know ? 
 
 Answer. Because I had skirhiishers forward, observing Gibbon's wooils, while I lay 
 in this strii> here. 
 
 Question. What time did you lie in that strip ? 
 
 Answer. From the time wo fell back from Gibbon's woods, between one and three 
 ■o'clock, and we lay for several hours in tlie strip of woods. 
 
 Question. Do you know how far your skirmishers advanced into that wood ? 
 
 Answer. No. 
 
 Question. Do you know where the line of the enemy's skirmishers was? 
 
 Answer. Tlie eneiuy liad skirmishers, I think, in the same wood. 
 
 Question. Were tiiey advanced far into the wood ? 
 
161 
 
 Answer. I do not know. I was not on the skinaisli line, Imt there was no serious 
 encounter between skirmishers anywhere; still we knew of the presence of the enemy 
 by an occasional shot tired — or supposed presence. 
 
 Question. In reference to the time that you retired, do you think that it was rather 
 two o'clock, as between one and three, or was it before or after that period 1 
 
 Answer. I should say nearer two than on(\ I think when I say from one to three 
 that about the average of that, two, would l)e perhaps the time. I will add here, 
 because it is a part of my answer, that I may be distinctly understood, I am perfectly 
 certain that the enemy did not occupy in force that which you call the Gibbon w^ood 
 while I was yet in this strip of woods with my line of battle there. [Marked " S 2."] 
 While I was remainiuj:; in that wood marked "S 2" the enemy did not in force at any 
 time occupy those woods. 
 
 Question. But you did not see them yourself? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. It would T)e very easy to distinguish what you call Gibbon wood 
 "SI" frona the other woods by the presence of indications of a battle having taken 
 place there the night before ; the wounded that we found there and the dead from that 
 battle ; and also somewhere in the turnpike, near there, I stopped to look at a caisson 
 that was blown up. 
 
 Question. The way you have of fixing this in your mind is only in reference to the 
 time occupied in advancing from your position in the morning by slow stages up to that 
 point, and retiring by slow stages to a point where you camped at night, somewhat in 
 advance of where you marched from in the morning ? 
 
 ' Answer. No. If I were called upon now for the first time after a lapse of sixteen 
 years, perhaps I shouhl have no other standard by which to determine it than a vague 
 recollection of that kind of measuring — marching and falling back ; but after the 
 battle, within a short time, within a few weeks, as I was well enough to become 
 acquainted with wiiat was said and known about the battle, there began in my mind 
 a distinctive impression that it was not later than 1 o'clock, that my aide, who had 
 made a report, was not wrong in his report ; and by that help I have ever since car- 
 ried in my mind a remembrance of the time. 
 
 Question. When did you i-ecover from your wound ? 
 
 Answer. I was carried to Washingtoiv, and I was out of the hotel in aljout seven 
 weeks. 
 
 Question. Had jow seen the report prior to your coming out? 
 
 Answer. Yes. Colonel Cheseborough remained with me during all or most of the 
 time while I was lying wounded, in attendance upon me, with two or three of my 
 staff; and during that time, as soon as I was well enough to know what he had re- 
 ported, and what hail been done, my attention was called to it, and he related to me 
 the sort of controversy into which he had been drawn by reason of this statement of 
 
 General Reynolds. 
 
 * if * ->' * * I # 
 
 By the EiiCORDER: 
 Question. You say that you are s:itislied that the enemy lia<l substantially no con- 
 eiderable force in the Gibliou wood after vou had fallen back to the fringe of woods 
 
 Answer. Not while I remained in the next woods east [S-]. 
 
 Question. How do you know that ? 
 
 Answer. The space between is not so great but that you could fire across from ono 
 wood to the othiT. If we had had artillery, or they artillery, we could soon, either 
 of us, have riddled the other out from the "wood, that is one reason why I suppose 
 they were not there in force. Another reason is that my skirmishers were out in 
 advance and entered that wood, and occasional shots w^ere fired over to the left of the 
 wood, indicating that the enemy also had skirmishers in that neighborhood, but noth- 
 ing more. My conclusion from that condition of things was that the enemy could not 
 l)ossibly be there in any very great force or any force at all. You could not very well 
 be in one strip of woods, with another strip of woods opposite to you, neither of them 
 large, without knowing whether there was an enemy in the other wood. An army 
 has a good many eyes and feelers. 
 
 Question. Assuniing that Lieutenant Benjamin was in a position just south of 
 Groveton, right on the pike, firing off in a northwesterly direction toward the word 
 "stony," where would that bring him so far as your troops are concerned? 
 
 Answer. I was to his left and in the advance ; wherever I was to his left and advance. 
 My impression would lead me now to think that he was just on the north side of the 
 /urnpike ; he could not have been very far from the turnpike ; he was upon a sort of 
 
 spur or hill. I have not been on the ground. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Question. Could not a force of the enemy have a line of pickets in the edge of this 
 Gibbon's woods without your knowing it — in the westerly edgef 
 Answer. Hardly ; until after we left this strip of woods. 
 Question. Were there skirmishers thrown out in your front? 
 
162 
 
 Answer. I hardly think they oonkl liave boen there at any time until we left iu the 
 mitldle of the afternoon; I think we should have known it. As I see by your map, 
 and as I have ah\ays nndeifstood, thei'e are other portions of the wood farther west 
 still, aud about these I can give no information. There may be a discrepancy between 
 my recollection and the recollection of others in regard to the piece of woods, but I 
 speak quite confidently that Gibbon's woods up to the time of my leaving that strip 
 of Avoods to the east were not occupied by the enemy. 
 
 Question. Did you carry from Gibbon's wood the Union dead and wounded ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; it was left to others to execute the order. I gave the order that they 
 should be taken from there. While we were in the wood I recollect them gathering 
 the soldiers who had suffered iu the engagement the night before. 
 
 By the Recorder: 
 Question. Do you mean wounded or dead, or both? 
 
 Answer. I think both. I was i)articularly concerned for the wounded. 
 Question. Do you recollect tiring by the enemy or any battle on yovir left? 
 Answer. I do not recollect. 
 
 Maj. T. C. H. Smitli, paj^naster, United States Army, then lieutenant- 
 colonel First Oliio A^oliinteer Oavalrj", testified as follows (Board's 
 Eecord, page 367) : 
 
 Question. What Avas the situation of affairs, as you understand it to have been, on 
 the afternoon of August 2yth f 
 
 Answer. The situation of affairs on August 29 was that early in the afternoon the 
 head of Longsti'eet's column got on to the turnpike and fired a few shots that we heard, 
 not knowing where they were from. I have since learned that they were from Long- 
 street. 
 
 Question. I a.sk you what you saw ? 
 
 Answer. What I saw was this : that our left was up on the turnpike beyond Groveton 
 and that it commanded the ground beyond Groveton, the very ground that Lougstreet 
 testifies his troops were on up to as late at least as one o'clock that day. I cannot 
 indicate the exact position that our troops were in. I knew that they were up and 
 beyond Groveton. * * * * i -^y^s out once or twice during the day to the Dogau 
 house. 
 
 Question. Whose troops were those which you saw on the left? 
 
 Auswer. Reynolds' and Scheuck's ; they were out there maneuvering for a position 
 for attack. 
 
 Brig. Gen. X. C. McLean, United States Yoliinteers, commanding Sec- 
 ond Brigade, Schenck's division, Sigel's cori)s, testified as follows 
 (Board's Eecord, page 937): 
 
 Question. AVhat time did you go into action? 
 
 Auswer. We were ordered quite early in the day, as I supposed at the time, on the 
 extreme left of our troops; we advanced toward the position of the enemy in line of 
 battle with a very heavy line of skirmishers ; the skirmishers were engaged more or 
 less as we advanced, sometimes severely, sometimes very lightly, but the opposition to 
 us was not so heavy as to prevent our advance. We advanced slowly aud regularly ; 
 that was the condition of afi'airs. We halted at times to examine the position, and 
 then went on again until the afternoon. Quite late iu the afternoon we were ordered 
 back into camp. During the day, exactly at what portion of the day I cannot now 
 state. General Meade came to me and said he was ordered to take position on our 
 left; he was in General Reynolds' division; General Meade was commanding the 
 brigade. 
 
 Question. George G. Meade? 
 
 Answer. Yes, afterward conunander of the Army of the Potomac ; I halted aud he 
 came up with his troops; we then went on, and he took position on our left. Some 
 time afterward — the intervals of time I cannot give you at all, regulated more by 
 events than time then — General Meade came back with his brigade, saying to me that 
 he had jjlaccd a battery, and he bad been shclltMl out of his position by the rebel bat- 
 teries, and had got into a hornet's nest of batteries ; he was then coming back, and 
 advised me to do the same. 
 
 Kow General Meade liad jdaced that battery upon the left and Avest 
 of that "Gibbon wood," on this same ridge on ichich some of the eitemifs 
 f/uns tvere placed; and acconling to the olficial report of Brig. Gen. Jno. 
 F. lleynolds, he ai)pears to have been in action there — Cooper's battery 
 
163 
 
 and Biiy. (4eii. George G. Meade's brigade— for about an hour or an 
 hour and a half. (Board's Record, p. 501.) 
 
 I reported to General Schenek, my divisioi'. commander, the facts, and in a short 
 time we were ordered back a little distance, and remained there until night-fall ; we 
 were, on the approach of night, ordered back into camp, some little distance farther 
 back toward the position from which we had started in the morning. The position 
 that we got into camp that night was a hill upon which our reserve batteries were 
 placed. I cannot indicate it to you upon the map, because the map docs not indicate 
 to me what the ground was at all. 
 
 Question. Did you know Maj. George B. Fox, of Cincinnati? 
 
 Answer. He was in my own regiment, the f^eventy-tifth Ohio. 
 
 Question. On that day ? 
 . Answer. Yes; he was there in that regiment, in that brigade. I had four regiments 
 and an Ohio Inigade. I was from Ohio. 
 
 Question. Major Fox has been here and testified. 
 
 Answer. He was a very competent and good officer. 
 
 * * ' * * # # if 
 
 Question. How far do you suppose you advanced forward? 
 
 Answer. I cannot give you an estimate ; we were in line of battle the whole time 
 from the time we moved early in the morning. We moved along for some time before 
 we found any reply to our skirmishers; then it was continuous dropping tire; some- 
 times it was very severe, and sometimes not severe. We kept advancing very slowly ; 
 occasionally we would halt and skirmish along to find out where we were and what 
 the enemy were doing, and then advance again. That was kept up all the day until 
 in the afteriioon wlien General Meade came back : we did not advance any more after 
 that ; we halted then and waited until it was time for us to retii-e — to go into camp 
 where we were ordered to go ; we then went back. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. W. P. Eichardson, in answer to telegraphic inter- 
 rogatories sent him. has testified as follows: 
 
 Marietta, Ohio, Oct. 15, 1878. 
 'A. Bird Gai'.dxer, Recorder, 
 
 Gorentor's Inland, N. T. : 
 
 I was colonel and in command of the 25th O. V. I., 2d brigade, Schenck's division, 
 Sigel's corjjs. 
 
 Came on the field the evening of the 28th. Halted on a hill on the south of the road 
 (which I supposed to be the Warrenton pike), at a point east of, and in full view, 
 looking westward, of the ground occupied by King's division during the engagement 
 of that division and Jackson's force on that evening, all of which we saw. Laid there 
 in position until daylight on the 29th. 
 
 Moved forward in line of battle, south of the road, early in the morning, slowly ; 
 passed over tlie ground fought on by King's division on the previous evening ; saw a 
 few of the dead and wounded. Passed this jioint about 1 p. m. 
 
 Proceeded until we came near the road at the foot of a high hill, on which was a 
 rebel battery. 
 
 Supposed we were about to attempt to take it, as we were formed in close column 
 by division. Tliere was at tliis time a force belonging to our Army on our left and 
 seemed to be crossing the road in front of us on our left. 
 
 Soon an artillery fire was opened on our left and rear, and we were withdrawn 
 nlowly over the ground we had traversed in the morning, to a narrow strip of timber, 
 where we lialted. Tliis was ])erhaps 2 or half past 2 p. m. 
 
 The artillery fire on our left and front increased, and we were withdrawn further 
 .across the fields to a heavy ])iece of timber, where we halted and remained until even- 
 ing, when we were still further withdrawn and placed (as I believe) on the north side 
 of the road in reserve in the rear of our coii)s. Here we remained during the night 
 and the greater part of the 30th. 
 
 The fiirtherest point westward from where we started on the morning of the 29th 
 reached by us on that day, was at the foot of the hill just described. Our own brigade 
 was where I have stated ; the 1st had crossed the road on our right. 
 
 I have not ])een on the ground since the battle, never was on it before, therefore 
 will not say I know where the Lewis house was. 
 
 W. P. RICHARDSON. 
 
 Although this witness was not furnished with any map, the move- 
 ments of his brigade, as narrated by him, can readily and with precision 
 be followed on the map used in this proceeding. 
 
 Maj. George B. Fox, then captain Seventv-fifth Ohio Volunteers, Mc- 
 
 ■ 12 G 
 
164 
 
 Lean's brigade, Sclieuck's division, Sigel's corps, called for government, 
 testilied as follows (Board's Record, p. 732) : 
 
 Question. "Wlierc were you on tlie early morning of August 29, 1862 ? 
 
 Answer. We camped about, I sliould say, 200 or 300 yards from the Cliiim liouse, as 
 indicated on the maj), the night previous — night of the 28th. 
 
 Question. Aiul on the morning of the 29th did you move forward from that position ; 
 if so, at wiiat time and in Avhat direction ? ■ 
 
 Answer. I should say about eight o'clock, perhaps nine, we commenced to advance 
 through the woods. 
 
 Question. Will you please describe on the tracing all the events of the day within 
 your knowledge ? 
 
 Answer. I was there yesterday. About this point on this ridge fnortheast of the 
 Chinn house] we advanced down through these woods in line of battle — heavy woods — 
 until we came to this ravine at Young's Bianch. We adjusted our lines and went up 
 through these woods, and came out on this open field [west of Lewis' lane No. 1], where 
 we again adjusted our lines, expecting to find the enemy in this clump of woods. 
 [Little fringe of woods south of the word Gainesville.] As soon as we reached this 
 point we saw a charge made. It was over across that field and across this field ; it was 
 off to our right. It seemed to me as though it was a little further in the rear than this. 
 I think it was north of the Dogan house. It was about there [peach grove] that charge 
 Avas made northwest and was repulsed. We could see the enemy drive them back 
 down the hill. After they were driven back we concluded to make an advance into 
 these woods. [South of the Avord Gainesville. ] I was in advance. The skirmish line 
 halted in these woods ; these are a narrow woods here. From that point we advanced 
 by flank movement, with the right in front parallel with the road. [Gainesville 
 and Centreville pike.] I think when we got into these woods, at this j)*>int,we de- 
 ployed in line ; the left came up and we deployed. W^e were lying along right in front, 
 the left back along the pike ; and I think when the right reached here — I am almost 
 sure — it deployed in line of battle. [In the thick woods between the words Warren- 
 ton and Gainesville.] After going out of these woods some distance we discovered a 
 great many dead and wounded, which we assisted in carrying off the field. 
 
 Question. Whose command did they belong to '? 
 
 Answer. I do not know ; but we heard firing there the evening before, and I suppose 
 that the troops were killed and wounded at that time. 
 
 Question. Wounded troops ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; said to be King's division, but I am not certain about that. 
 
 Question. Where did you go ? 
 
 Answer. We remained there some little time. I advanced out so that I could see 
 through these woods. [Trees to the west.] While out in there the Confederates 
 opened their battery from about this position, I should judge, at an angle across the 
 road, striking in the rear. [Battery to the west of the Douglass house.] Not many 
 shots were fired ; I do not think to exceed a dozen. That was as far as we advanced ; 
 and in looking down in this direction [southwest] there were some troops which did 
 not belong to our brigade. I do not know what troops they were. 
 
 Question. Union troops ? 
 
 AnsAver. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. In what du-ection ? 
 
 Answer. To our left ; down this way. 
 
 Question. Diagonally to the left from the pike ? 
 
 Answer. To the left, forward. 
 
 Question. Can you indicate the direction on the map ? 
 
 Answer. I should say down in this direction [toward Cunliffe's]. 
 
 Question. Then what did you do ? 
 
 Answer. We fell back from this point ; I think perhaps these troops moved back 
 first, because I could not hear any firing that would indicate that they were driven 
 back ; there was no infantry firing at all. They moved back from some cause, I don't 
 know what. 
 
 Question. At that point could you see any enemy? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I could see no enemy; I saw none at all on that daj' on our imme- 
 diate front. 
 
 Question. Then you fell back from these woods? 
 
 AnsAver. Fell back from those Avoods and remained there some little time — on the 
 edge of the Avoods. Of course we were a little in advance as skirmishers. We had 
 orders to be on the lookout and watch the column and rear, and moA'e back if they 
 moved l)ack. I know we moved back following them until we got to these woods 
 [little fringe of Avoods south of the word "Gainesville"]. Then we moved back again 
 on Lewis' lane No. 1, where we remained probably three hours, and rested there. 
 
 Question. Did you see or know of any actioit going on that day ; if so, what? State 
 what you saw and what you heard that indicated such. 
 
165 
 
 Answer. In our immediate front there was no figlitiug. 
 
 Question. You mean south of the pike ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, to the left of the pike, towariT Page Land lane ; there was no firing from 
 this direction [Page Land lane] that I know of; hut there was some tiring from that 
 direction [from the pike northwest]. In the morning, when we advanced to this point 
 [west of Lewis' lane No. 1], we saw a charge made by our line; the line had been 
 moved out from these woods, and were in some position here behind a knoll [south of 
 the school-house], up toward this position, held by the enemy [Independent line of 
 the Manassas Gap Railway]. A terrible volley was fired at them and our troops fell 
 back. 
 
 Question. \Vliat time of day was that? 
 
 Answer. That was the first charge.'; I suppose half-past nine or ten o'clock in the 
 morning. We started fi-om the Chinn house about eight, and it took us about an hour 
 and a half or two hours to get to this house [Lewis' lane No. 1]. 
 
 Question. What other evidence of an action did you witness '! 
 
 Answer. After we fell back we saw two other charges later in the day over the same 
 ground, exactly the same ground where we saw the fight in the morning ; could see 
 the men moving out away up in this direction later in the day [northwest of the school- 
 house]. That tiring and fighting continued throughout the day at intervals. 
 
 Question. What was the character of the contest that you witnessed ? 
 
 Answer. It was a very hotly-contested contest ; so much so that we felt we ought to 
 have gone over there, and wanted to go over to theii- assistance when they drove our 
 troops back. It was the intention of our general to move over there and help them if 
 he could, but I think he had orders to hold them on the left ; still, I don't know any- 
 thing about it. 
 
 Question. How long during the day did the battle continue ? 
 
 Answer. Throughout the dav ; not continually, but at intervals. 
 
 Question. Those intervals which you speak of, were they in the nature of assaults? 
 
 Answer. They were assaults on our part, none on the part of the enemy, except when 
 our folks were repulsed they would drive them back from that hill. 
 
 Question. From the Independent Manassas Gap Railroad line ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; it was from a hill up there. 
 
 Question. To how late an hour did that battle continue ? 
 
 Answer. My recollection is that there was firing even after dark. I know that up 
 
 to dusk in the evening, and I think after dark, there was firing over to the right. 
 
 # * * * * » # 
 
 Question. In going to the point where you encamped that night did you march 
 along a road ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir, across fields ; that is, personally with my company. 
 
 Question. Was there any road in your immediate viciiuty? 
 
 Answer, I think there was none that I saw ; we had difficulty in advancing and 
 moving along ; the enemy were iu our immediate front ; there was a few cavahy. 
 
 Question. Did you cross any stream ? 
 
 Answer. I know we crossed several small ravines — no stream of any consequence. • 
 #*♦**** 
 
 Question. About what time did you reach that ? 
 
 Answer, I should say about twelve or half past twelve ; we did not remain there 
 long, fin the fringe.] 
 
 Question. That was the farthest point to which you advanced ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain there ? 
 
 Answer. Not very long ; I think probably an hour, or not that. 
 
 Question. That would bring you to about what time ? 
 
 Answer. Between twelve ami one ; then we fell back again to this fringe of woods 
 gradually, not pressed back, but moved l)ack very carefully. 
 
 Question. About what time ? 
 
 Answer. Immediately. 
 
 Question. One o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. About one o'clock. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain there in falling back? 
 
 Answer. We did not remain iuthis fringe of woods very long ; just went and loitered 
 through, and fell back to this position [back to Lewis' lane No. 1], where we remained 
 for probably three or four hours. 
 
 Question. Up to what time ? 
 
 Answer. I should say four or five o'clock. 
 
 Question. Then you'fell back to what point? 
 
 Answer. Then we fell back on our camping ground ; the men had nothing to eat all 
 day long. I recollect a little controversy that occurred on the battle-field when the 
 brigade was brought back. General Sigel rode up to General Schenck to know why 
 
166 
 
 he was moving back ; he told him that the men had had nothing to eat all day long, and 
 he thought it l)est to get back where they could make some cofiee. 
 
 Question. What time did you get back 1 
 
 Answer. About dusk ; it was so you could not see a mile and a half away. I recol- 
 lect in looking out in front we heard some tiring on our right; when we got up on this 
 kuoll the tiring liecame indistinct ; we could not see it, but we could hear it. 
 
 Question. Do you know whether there were any troops to your left at all ? 
 
 Answer. I do not. Do you mean in the morning f 
 
 Question. Yes. 
 
 Answer. I don't know in the morning. 
 
 Question. Wer«^ there any troops there in the afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; to our left, when we were in this advanced position, we saw troops 
 in this direction. 
 
 Question. Please indicate where you saw them. 
 
 Answer. Down on our left, to these woods. 
 
 Question. How far? 
 
 Answer. Well. I would occasionally through the trees see — well, I don't suppose over 
 100 yards, if that far. It was wooded tliere. j^ 
 
 Question. Can you. on that map, point out about where you saw those troops? 
 
 Answer. Eight down in these woods, from " G. B. F." to "C. B." [Tracing so 
 lettered.] 
 
 Question. State about the hour at which you say you saw those troops? 
 
 Answer. I should say it was between one and two o'clock. 
 
 Question. Did I understand you to say that there was no musketry firing south 
 of the pike that morning ? 
 
 Answer. I never heard a musketry shot fired all the day along to the left of the 
 pike. 
 
 Question. Neither skirmish line nor anything else ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Did you hear any artillery firing south of the pike that morning ? 
 
 Answer. When we fell back the firing that I supposed to have been here might have 
 been along the line, probably a little south of here, but my opinion was all day long 
 that the most firing was north of the pike. 
 
 Question. And towards your front ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir ; one reason why I am pretty positive of it is that when we were 
 in this wood [the Gibbon wood] I looked back over this field, and the angle of the 
 shooting was right my way. I noticed from the firing of the shots that it would conae 
 close by. 
 
 Question. A northwesterly direction ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. What hour was it when you first saw that movement of Federal troops op 
 against that Independent line of railway * 
 
 Answer. In the morning, when we first saw it. 
 
 Question. About what time? 
 
 Answer. I guess about eight or nine o'clock. 
 
 Question. How long did that last f 
 
 Answer. The charge, I suppose, occupied a space of fifteen or twenty minutes. 
 
 Question. Then did the troops fall back ? 
 
 Answer. They did. 
 
 Question. AVlien was the next one ? 
 
 Answer. I think we saw fovir charges during the day. Whether we saw another one 
 that morning before we came back I do not know, but my impression is that I saw a 
 second charge before we advanced. 
 
 Question. You think you saw a second one before you made your advance from 
 Lewis' lane No. 1 ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. sir. . 
 
 Question. How long did it last? 
 
 Answer. About the same in character. 
 
 Question. Fifteen or twenty minut-es? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. When was the next one ? 
 
 Answer. After we fell back in the afternoon, then for two or three hours we could 
 hear them firing, and saw two or three charges in the afternoon. 
 
 Question. About what time was it in the afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. Some time between thre« and five o'clock. 
 
 Question. Not earlier than three ? 
 
 Answer. That is my recollection. Of course I took no notice of the time by a 
 watcl . 
 
167 
 
 Question. In other words, you saw two charges in the morning, and then you saw 
 several in the afternoon? 
 
 Answer. I saw one or two in the morning; I know I saw one. The impression ia 
 very distinct, for we expected, of course, to go over and assist th«iu, and that was the 
 first notice that we had when we were out in front ; so that the probabilities were 
 that if they di"ove them any farther back we would come in and assist them ; that is, 
 I expected to. 
 
 Question. What is yonr estimate of the whole distance yon advanced over that day? 
 Answer. Probably a mile and a quarter to a mile and a half. 
 
 Question. From the point where you camped the night before to the extreme ad- 
 vance ? 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Thus it will be perceived that General Schenck is corroborated by 
 General McLean, by the report of Colonel Chesebrough, by the evi- 
 dence of General Richardson, and by that of Major Fox, who was also in 
 Brigadier-General McLean's brigade and commanded the skirmishers 
 as they advanced. Major Fox was on the ground before he came to 
 testify here and identified the position ; so that while Charles Marshall, 
 the former aid of Lee, was there to identify, we have a Union officer also 
 to identify the pomts to which he advanced on the 29th August, and to 
 which he did not get the next day. 
 
 Attention is next invited to the evidence of an important witness on 
 the original trial, now deceased, viz. Brig. Gen. John F. Reynolds^ who 
 was called by the accused, in LS62, and testified as follows (G. C. M. 
 Eecord, p. 109) : 
 
 Question. Please to state the position of your command on the 29th, in the afternoon, 
 and the distance between your left and General Porter's command. 
 
 Answer. On the 29th I was on the left of General Sigel's command, engaged with the 
 enemy, wlio was then wholly on the right of the Warrenton pike as we faced it. Gen- 
 eral Sigel moving up obliquely across the pike ; I was on his extreme left. I had no 
 knowledge of General Porter's position at that time, but I suppose that the nearest 
 he must have been at any time was within two and a half or three miles, probably 
 three miles, across this broken country. 
 
 By the Judge- Advocate : 
 
 Question. Do you, or not, know where the enemy's right flank was on the afternoon 
 of the 29th, say towards sunset ? 
 
 Answer. / was on the extreme hft of our troops, facing the enenui, md their right, towards 
 sunset, had been extended across the pih\ icith fresh troops coming down the Warrenton turn- 
 pike. But up to twelve or one o'clock it was not across the pike, and I had myself made an 
 attack on their right with my division, but was obliged to change front to meet the enemy coming 
 down the Warrenton pike. I was forming my troops parallel to the pike, to attack the 
 enemy's right, which was on the other side of the pike, but was obliged to change from 
 front to rear on the right, to face the troops coming down the turnpike. That tvas, I 
 suppose, as late as one o'clock, and tliey continued to come in there until they formed 
 and extended across the turnpike. 
 
 Question. Will you now answer the question as to the probable effect upon the bat- 
 tle of an attack inade about that hour on the right flank of the enemy by General 
 Porter's comnumd? . 
 
 Answer. Supposing General P<uter's command to have been on the road from Gaines- 
 ville to Manassas Junction ? 
 
 Question. Yes, sir. 
 
 Answer. A vigorous attack made there ought to have resulted favorably to our suc- 
 cess ; ought to have contributed greatly towards it, certainly. 
 
 Question. Did you see any of the enemy's forces, on the 29th, on the south of the 
 pike leading froni Gainesville to Groveton, and do you not know that the right of the 
 enemy's line rested on the north of that road ? 
 
 Answer. Their line changed during the day. It was o:r the right up to twelve o clock, 
 or about that time. In the afternoon it was extended across the pike ; I cannot state 
 how far ; the country was very wooded there, and I could not see how ftir across it was. 
 / thought at the time they were extending it that afternoon until dark. ^ 
 
 Question. You have stated that the country between your left and General Porters 
 
168 
 
 position Avas a broken country. Will yon look at the map whicli is on the table and 
 designate at what point, in making that statement, you assumed the command of 
 General Porter to have occupied at that time ? 
 
 Answer. (Goinji: to the map.) [Map used on trial in 1862.] This map is very inaccu- 
 rate, and, as a military map, is not worth much, particularly this portion of it (indi- 
 cating the portion referred to). My left was somewhere about here (indicating the 
 place by the letter R), and I take it to be about two miles and a half in a straight 
 line across to where General Porter was, as I understood it (pointing to place marked 
 M. S. ). If there had been no troops in his fi-ont I suppose he could have made the 
 attack. 
 
 By the Court : 
 
 ******* 
 
 Question. On the 29th of August did or did not the enemy's right outtlank your left 
 at any time ? 
 
 Answer. I think it did toward evening. It was late, not dark, toward the dusk of 
 the evening. 
 
 So Keynolds, even, did not believe that Longstreet was in force down 
 in front of the petitioner's cohimn during the day. 
 
 Question. Will you look at the map and point out the positions your division occu- 
 pied on the 29th ? 
 
 Answer. The <livision was maneuvering almost all the morning, and indeed the 
 whole day in action on that day up to twelve o'clock, with what was supposed to be 
 Jackson's forces, which were in there the day before. (The witness indicated upon 
 the map several positions as occupied by his division dui-ing the day. ) 
 
 Question. Did the enemy outflank you at sunset on the 29th ? 
 
 Answer. My division, with a brigade of Sigel's corps, lost its connection for a time 
 with the remainder of General Sigel's corps, but at sunset we had closed in to the 
 right, so that the enemy, I think, did outflank us at sunset ; that is, I think his flank 
 extended beyond ours, although distant from us, not near enough to be engaged. 
 
 Question. Did the enemy that forced you to change front take position between 
 your command and that of the accused on the 29th? 
 
 Answer. I think his position was partially between myself and the position occupied 
 by the accused as far as I can judge. I wish the court to remember, in all this testi- 
 mony, that I had no knowledge at the time where General Porter was. / knew that 
 troopti ivere over toward Manassas, and was expecting to have them brought up on my left. I 
 was informed that such would be the case ; but they were not brought up there. 
 
 Question. Did you think that the force of the enemy, of which you have si^oken, 
 was large? 
 
 Answer. I thought it a pretty heavy force. I thought it amounted to about a divis- 
 ion. It extended, apparently, as far as my division did. 
 
 Question. Did not the enemy, in attacking the left and rear of General Pope, on 
 Saturday, the 30th of August, pass with artillery and infantry over much of the coun- 
 try that General Poiter would have had to pass over on the 29th to attack the right 
 of the Confederates ? 
 
 Answer. I think not ; I think he had gotten in, as it were, between that broken 
 country and our position on that day, occupying a ridge which crossed the turnpike 
 there, and having the broken country behind him. Because I maneuvered the day 
 before, 29th, all over up to that broken comitry, and got jiartially on that ridge with 
 one brigade. 
 
 Question. Do you know where the enemy commenced the movement of which you 
 have spoken, to (baw around General Pope's left flank ? 
 
 Answer. I supposed it commenced about the time I changed front, on the afternoon 
 of the 29th, between twelve and one o'clock; it may have been after one o'clock. I 
 suppose that to have been the commencement of that movement ; their re-enforcements 
 were constantly coming up, and their line was extended accordingly ; they commenced 
 throwing troops out on Jackson's right as they came iip, and extended their right out 
 along the ridge. 
 
 If anything else was needed confirmatory of the gallant Eeynolds, it 
 will l)e found in his ofticial reports, made at the time of these occurrences. 
 They absolutely contradict the two Confederate witnesses, Marshall and 
 Paine, introduced here bv i)etitioner, and are as follows (Board's IJecord, 
 p. 500). 
 
169 
 
 REPORT OF BRIGADIER- GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS, COMMANDING DIVISION OF PENN- 
 SYLVANIA RESERVES, ATTACHED TO M'DOWELL'S CORPS. 
 
 Headquarters Reynolds' Division, 
 Camp Near Munsou's HIU, Va., Septemher 5, 18G2. 
 
 General McDowell Joiued the command at dayliglit, and dii'ected my co-operatiou 
 with General Sigel. 
 
 The right of the enemy's jtosition could be discerned upon the heights above Grove- 
 ton, on the right of the pike. The division advanced over the ground to the heights 
 above Groveton, crossed the pike, and Cooper's battery came gallantly into action on 
 the same ridge on which the enemy's right was, supported liy Meade's brigade. While 
 pressing forward our extreme left across the pike, re-enforcemeiits were sent for by Gen- 
 eral Sigel for the right of his line under General Milroy, now hardly pressed by the 
 enemy, and a brigade was takeji from Schenck's command on my right. The whole 
 tire of the enemy was now concentrated on the extreme right of my division, and, 
 unsupported there, the battery was obliged to retire with considerable loss, in both 
 men and horses, and the division fell back to connect with Schenck. 
 
 Later in the day General Pope, arriving on the right from Centreville, renewed the 
 attack on the enemy and (bove him some distance. My division was directed to 
 threaten the enemy's right and rear, which it proceeded to do under a heavy fire of 
 artillery from the ridge to the left of the pike. Generals Seymour and Jackson led 
 Iheir brigades in advance; but notwithstanding all the steadiness and courage shown 
 by the men, they were compelled to fall back before the heavy fire of artillery and 
 musketry whicli met them both on the front and left flank, and the division resiimed 
 its original position. King's division engaged the enemy along the pike on our right, 
 and the action was continued with it until dark by Meade's brigade. 
 
 List of hrigmJcs, regiments, and hatterics in Bei/noJds^ division as jjcr las report of killed, 
 
 wounded, and missing. 
 
 First Brigade (Meade). 
 
 First Rifles, Colonel McNiel. 
 Third Infantry, Colonel Sickles. 
 Fourth Infantry, Colonel Magillon. 
 
 Seventh lufimtiy, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 
 Henderson. 
 Eighth Infantry, Captain Lemon. 
 
 Second Brigade (Seymour). 
 
 First Infantry, Colonel Roberts. I Fifth Infantry, Major Fentmyer. 
 
 Second Infantry, Colonel McCaudless, | Sixth Infantry, Colonel Sinclair. 
 
 Third Brigade (Jackson). 
 
 Ninth Infantry, Colonel Anderson. 
 Tenth lufantrV. Colonel Kirk. 
 
 Eleventh Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 
 Jackson. 
 Twelfth Infantry, Colonel Hardin. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Battery C, Fifth Artillery, Captain Ran- ' Battery B, Fii'st Pennsylvania Artillery, 
 (^ora. Battery G, First Pennsylvania Artillery. 
 
 Battery A, First Pennsylvania Artillery. \ 
 
 supplemental report of brigadier-general JOHN F. REYNOLDS. 
 
 Headquarters First Army Corps, 
 
 October 9, 18G2. 
 
 __ _ of 
 
 ...„ 2'ytii of J lujitst last (you will yourself observe the error in the dates), several misstate- 
 ments uninteutional no doubt, when referring to the movements of my division. My 
 division maneuvered on his left from eariy in the morning until he gained the position 
 alluded to on the pike near Gibbon's battle-ground of the evening previous It was 
 here that General Schenck asked me for a battery. Cooper's battery, inth_ Meadfs 
 brigade as a support, was immediateU/ placed in position on the ritlge to the right^ oj the pilce 
 anil on the left of the woods where Gibbon's brigade had been in action by General Meade and 
 
170 
 
 myself. In returuiug from this position, to bring up the otlier battery and Seymoiu-'s 
 brigade, I passed through Schenck's troops, drawn up on the right of the woods before 
 alluded to, iu which Gibbon had been engaged. But, in bringing up Ransom's battery 
 and Seymour's brigade along the pike, I noticed that Schenck's troops had disappeared 
 from this position and were nowhere iu sight. I understood that Schenck had detached 
 a brigade to the right to the support of Milroy, and that I was therefore left alone as 
 far as I knew. I immediately arrested Seymour's movement, and directed the divis- 
 ion to occupy the position across the pike from which it had moved, in doing which 
 McLean's brigade was discovered occupying a piece of woods just on the left of the 
 pike, and as soon as could be this movement was arrested and made to correspond with 
 his position. It was subsequently ascertained that he was disconnected from the rest 
 of Sigel's troops, and the position was again changed to make them correct. 
 
 I sent no word to General Schenck of the kind indicated in this paper of the move- 
 ment of the enemy at the time thLs change of position was made, nor at any time. 
 There was a report came later iu the evening that the enemy were moving over the 
 pike, but I am not aware that I communicated it to General Schenck, as at that time I 
 had no connection with him. 
 I am, &c., 
 
 JOHN F. REYNOLDS, 
 Brigadiei'-General Volunteers, Commanding. 
 
 Major-General McDowell, Washington, D. C. 
 
 I make this correction to you, and without any desire to enter into a controversy iu 
 the paper on utilicial matters. 
 
 J. F. R. 
 
 Thus we have fixed with a certaiuty which approaches the absolute that 
 the Union forces were in and beyond that " Gibbon wood" as late as 
 one o'clock, and held those positions as late, certainly, as three o'clock 
 in the afternoon. No wonder, therefore, that Longstreet thought "it 
 would be a little hazardous to make a front attack," and expressed to 
 General Lee a doubt of being able to carry the position held by Gen- 
 erals Schenck, Stevens, and Eeynolds, south of the pike, and, as Charles 
 Marshall says, "for reasons satisfactory to himself [Longstreet], rather 
 advised against it " (Board's Eecord, pp. 63 and 169.) 
 
 But there is still further evidence as to Reynold's position. 
 
 Bvt. Maj. Gen. H. G. SlcJcles, United States Volunteers, called by gov- 
 ernment, testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 1096) : 
 
 By the Recorder : 
 
 Question. What position did you hold in the military service of the United States 
 on the 29th of August, 1862 ? 
 
 Answer. I was colonel of the Third Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves, second brigade. 
 I do not recollect what our division was. We returned from the Peninsula and rejoined 
 our old corps. 
 
 Question. With what rank did you leave the service? 
 
 Answer. Brevet major-general. 
 
 Question. Whose corps? 
 
 Answer. General McDowell's. 
 
 Question. Who commanded your division? 
 
 Answer. General John F. Reynolds. 
 
 Qnestion. Who commanded your brigade? 
 
 Answer. General George G. Meade. 
 
 Question. Do you know where your regiment was eucauipei on the moruiug of Fri- 
 day, August 29, 18132, if it was encamped at all, or bivouacked? 
 
 Answer. I took it that, in looking over the map shown me here, it was near the 
 Lewis house, on the battle-field. 
 
 Question. What did your brigade do that moruiug of August 29, 1862? 
 
 Answer. We broke camp about daylight, I think, and nuived out to the front oij the 
 left of Sigel.Ithink. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain with the brigade? 
 
 Answer. It was probably eight o'clock, or nine, in the morning ; eight, perhaps. 
 
 Question. When you left it ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Yon did not then remain with it the remainder of the day ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I did uot. 
 
171 
 
 Cross-examinatioQ by Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Question. You say it was iu the neighborhood of the Lewis house where your camp 
 was; will you indicate 'on the map where it was? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that it was really the Lewis house ; I judge from the location. 
 I think that here is about the position (the Lewis-Leachnian house) where we wore 
 massed that evening; but I am not very sure ; I have such an indistinct knowledge 
 of the ground, and was with the command so little, that it would be hardly fair to 
 depend upon my testimony. 
 
 Question. You really do not recollect where it was? 
 
 Answer. No ; I have not a distinct recollection ; but I think that is the neighbor- 
 hood, judging from that stream there. (Witness indicates the Lewis-Leachmati 
 house. ) I saw a map upstairs which locates a stream of water which I am pretty suro 
 I have a recollection of. 
 
 Question. May it not have been this stream (Chiuu's Iiranch), or this (Yotiiig's 
 Branch)? 
 
 Answer. I think it was not so far to the rear as that. 
 
 Question. Do you feel any certainty al)0ut it ? 
 
 Answer. Of course I am not certain : but yet I am inclined to think it was hero 
 (Lewis-Leachman house). 
 
 5f * -* ^ -ft- # # 
 
 By the Recorder : 
 
 Question. Is there anything else iu the neighborhood of that location that fixes ifc 
 iu your recollection? 
 
 Answer. On the previous evening, the 2Sth, I think, I recollect there was a battle 
 took place, or a fight, between Gibbon's troo]»s and the enemy near our fi'ont, aiid 
 General Meade's brigade was oi-dered front. We advanced some distance, and formed 
 on a hill where we could overlook the fighting. It was then aboTit sunset. I think 
 we remained there until dark, when the firing ceased ; then we returned again to 
 where the first and third brigades were in camp. 
 
 Maj. William H. Ifope, Ninth Pennsylvania Eeserves, Third Brigade, 
 Reynohls' division, called by government, testified as follows (Board's 
 Record, j). 931) : 
 
 Question. When? was your regiment camped on the morning of the 29th of August, 
 Friday ? 
 
 Answer. We aiTived on the morning of the 29tli, about one o'clock, on the Bull Run 
 battle-field. 
 
 Question. And encamped near or at what place ? 
 
 Answer. Near Groveton, I think. 
 
 Question. Did you move out from that place after daylight? 
 
 Answer. We did. 
 
 Question. At aV)out what time ? 
 
 Answer. About daylight. We were ordered to the rear of General Sigel's troojts to 
 support him. 
 
 Question. Describe all your movements that day. 
 
 Answer. We were marching and countermarching nearly all day, until about be- 
 tween four and five o'clock in the afternoon ; our brigade was ordered iu to the ex- 
 treme left to try to take a battery ; we went down through a corn-field, and came to 
 this dry ravine^ and General Reynolds was there; he says, "General Jackson, you are 
 too damned slow." The regiment, the right wing, passed around to the right, and 
 the left wing passed to the left. I connnanded the third company from the right. 
 Company D ; we got between the rebel battery and on a line with a battery and 
 sharpshooters: Colonel Hardin, commanding the Twelfth Regiment, and the lieuten- 
 ant-colonel of my regiment were talking together : the sharpshooters opened on us. I 
 was standing probably ten feet from Colonel Hardin when a ball cut the cord of his 
 hat ; it was a little too hot, and we could not return the fire. The sharpshooters were 
 under cover; the battery had been supported by this time, and we could do nothing 
 with it, and all about-faced and got away from there. 
 
 Question. That was about what time ? 
 
 Answer. Half past five o'clock; probably a little later. 
 
 Question. Do you know where the Lewis house is ? 
 
 Answer. I do. 
 
 Question, Were you at any time in the day in the vicinity of that house ? 
 
 Answer. We passed that house, I think, where we went to try to capture a battery, 
 rather in front and to the left of the Lewis house. 
 
 Question. Off in the neighborhood of Bi-itt's ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that I can locate it. I think probably the battery was nearly 
 a mile from the Lewis house. 
 
172 
 
 Question. Can yon indicate about where that battery was? 
 Answer. I cannot locate that battery on that map. 
 Question. It was a little to the left and front ? 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. How far forward did you get on that day, in reference to the position of 
 the Lewis house ? 
 Answer. About a mile from the Lewis house. 
 Question. Forward ? 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. In which direction, west, northwest, or southwest ? 
 Answer. Northwest. 
 
 Question. What time in the day did you first see the enemy ? 
 
 Answer. About daylight. 
 
 Question. Where did you see them then ? 
 
 Answer. To the left of Groveton. 
 
 Question. When you say to the left of Groveton, do you mean the north or south 
 ofit? . 
 
 (The witness indicates on the tracing northwest of Groveton.) 
 
 Question. Did you see any fighting that day in that direction ? 
 
 Answer. I know we were not particularly engaged ; we were under fire, and some of 
 them gave us a little railroad iron that day. We went in to take a battery, and when 
 we came back they gave us some grapeshot in a corn-field. . 
 
 Question. Did you hear any cannonading that day ? 
 
 Answer, Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Which direction? 
 
 Answer. Groveton. 
 
 Question. Did you hear any infantry firing ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. How long? 
 
 Answer. More or less all day. In the morning there was quite a sharp cannonad- 
 ing. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect the Lewis house, whether it was a one-story or two-story 
 house? 
 
 Answer. A two-story house. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect distinctly being there that day ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 By the President of the Board : 
 Question. What was the formation of this division during this day ? 
 Answer. I do not know, only my own brigade. 
 Question. What was your formation? 
 
 Answer. The 9th, 10th, and 12th ; we were on the extreme left. 
 Question. How were you formed — in line or in column ? 
 
 Answer. I could not say as to the first and second brigades, how they were formed. 
 Our brigade was formed in column of battalions. 
 
 Question. You did not see the formation of the other brigades? 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Bvt. Brig. Gen. Charles Barnes, United States Volunteers, then cap- 
 tain Ninth Pennsylvania Reserves, Third Brigade, Keynolds' division, 
 called by government, testified as follows (Board's Record, p. CGO) : 
 
 Question. Where were you at daylight on the morning of August 29? 
 
 Answer. We were to the left of the Lewis house. 
 
 Question. From there where did you go? 
 
 Answer. From there we moved to the front, or between that and Groveton and the 
 Lewis house, in a raA'ine to the left of the Lewis house. 
 
 Question. The Lewis house that is now called Leachman's ? 
 
 Answer. The Lewis house was a two-story white frame house, one of the best in that 
 section of country. 
 
 Question. At what time did you arrive at that point? 
 
 Answer. To the best of my recollection we arrived in the position that we lay, to the 
 left of that house, about three o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Question. What were your movements from that position during the day ? 
 
 Answer. We were on the extreme flank of General Pope's army, and we kept moving 
 backwards and forwards from different ])oints on the extreme left ; my regiment was 
 on the skirmisli line a good }iart of the day, that is, we were kept flanking. 
 
 Question. Was there any contest going on that day ; if so, what was the nature of it ? 
 
 Answer. There was a heavy contest going on on our right all day, or nearly all day; 
 
173 
 
 there 'waa heavy cannonading in the fore part of the day, and there was heavy artil- 
 lery fire in the after part of the day on as Late as dark. 
 
 Question. At how early a period in the day did that heavy infantry firing begin ? 
 
 Answer. To the best of my recollection there was some infantry firing in the fore 
 part of the day, but the heavy infantry firing was, I should think, about thi-ee o'clock. 
 
 Question. How long did it continue ? 
 
 Answer. It continued heavy at intervals until dark. 
 
 Question. Do yovi know of any infantry firing between, say, about twelve o'clock 
 noon and three o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot say that I do. There was some cannonading. 
 
 Question. Can you indicate on the map the farthest nohit to the front that you cot 
 that day? ' "^ " 
 
 Answer. I believe I can. 
 
 Question. Is this house called the Leachraan-Lewis house the one that you refer to f 
 [Douglas Pope map shown to the witness.] 
 
 Answer. We were ordered late at night to charge up in this ravine, with two brig- 
 ades. [In the direction of .T. W. Cunliffe's. ] 
 
 Question. Will you mark it on the map ? 
 
 Answer. As near as I can tell from this map I should think that was the i-avine. 
 [Marked C. B.] Just south of the word Cundifl:'. 
 
 Question. With reference to the point farthest in advance that you reached that day^ 
 do you know where the right of your brigade was located ? 
 
 Answer. The right of our luigade was over near to Groveton, towards Groveton. 
 Our brigade kept flanking backwards and forwards down in this direction and off iu 
 that direction, feeling for the enemy, as we were directed. 
 
 Question. From about twelve o'clock iu the day where was your company ? 
 
 Answer. About twelve o'clock we were resting in a piece of woods up near, I should 
 think, inhere somewhere. [ In a piece of woods northwest of Britt's, marked No. 2C. B.] 
 
 Qiiestion. And tlie farthest point you reached was where ? 
 
 Answer. Where it is marked " C. B.," southeast of Cuudifie's. The enemy were firing 
 off in this direction somewhere. [From Pageland lane towards Gainesville.] 
 
 Question. Indicate the direction in which the firing was. 
 
 Answer. I should think it was olf in this direction somewhere. [Near to the rail- 
 road. ] We were ordered to move up into a run, just a dry ravine. We moved up by 
 the flank, three regiments. General Seymour was with us. As we got up near, I 
 think, this piece ot woods, we were ordered to halt. [Just west of the words " Mead- 
 owville lane."] General Reynolds came riding up to the rear of the column — we were 
 moving by the left flank — and ordered Seymour to halt, that he was too late, and for 
 lis to move right back ; he gave the order himself to about-face aud march back. We 
 marched back, and moved, I should think, down this ravine towards the Lewis house. 
 [Following the line of the branch.] 
 
 Question. At the time that he ordered you to move back, did he state anything 
 more? 
 
 Answer. He stated nothing more. He stated to General Seymour that he was too 
 late ; that the enemy were showing themselves off in this direction. [Beyond Page- 
 land lane. ] We could see their skirmish line coming in off' in this direction ; that would 
 be to the right of where we were moving up. 
 
 Question. Put down with your pencil and mark it C. B. 3 where you noticed the 
 enemy's skinuishers coming in. 
 
 (The witness does as directed.) 
 
 Question. What time of day was that ? 
 
 Answer. At the time we made this movement up here it was as late as four o'clock. 
 I recollect the time, because the sun was sinking in the west quite perceptibly. 
 
 Question. I understand you to say that you were on the left of General Eeynolds' 
 division ? 
 
 Answer. On the left of General Eeynolds' division, and my regiment did the flank- 
 ing, or, rather, the skirmishing. 
 
 Question. When you say did flanking, Avhat have you reference to ? 
 
 Answer. In moAi'ng the brigade backwards and forwards to feel the enemy. Men 
 were put to moving out in flank as feelers. 
 
 Question. Were you in that body ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. The right of the division rested over in the direction of the Warrenton 
 pike? 
 
 Answer. In the direction of Groveton and the Warrenton pike. 
 
 Question. During that time where was the enemy, so far as you were couccrued, 
 fi'om noon up to dusk ? 
 
 Answer. The body seemed to be on the right, where the heavy firing was, north of 
 the Warrenton pike, about Groveton. 
 
 Question. Could you see the enemy (inring tin' day from twelve o'clock ? 
 
174 
 
 Answer. Not where we were, we couldn't see them. We were kejit kind of down in 
 
 the ravine a little. 
 
 * * ^ # * * # 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Question. Will yon locate on the map yonr position at three o'clock in the night or 
 on the morning of the 29th? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that I can. 
 
 Question. As nearly as you can, about where were you at three o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. That was the time when we got where we bivouacked. 
 
 Question. Indicate that as well as possible. [Douglas Pope map shown to wit- 
 ness. ] 
 
 Answer. I don't know that I can indicate where we bivouacked that night. 
 
 Question. You can somewhere in the neighborhood ? 
 
 Answer. It must have been off here. It is in this direction from the Lewis house. 
 
 Question. Give your recollection of about the locality ; j'ou airived tin ro about 
 three o'clock ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Now the point you arrived at where you bivouacked that morning and 
 night? 
 
 Answer. It is pretty hard for me to state, but it was near the Lewis house. 
 
 Question. Which Lewis house ? 
 
 (The witness indicates Leachman's.) 
 
 Question. It was near the Lewis house, which is west of Lewis lane No. 1. Now 
 ■what time did you leave that point? 
 
 Answer. It was after daylight. 
 
 Question. How far did you march ? 
 
 Answer. We marched a short distance in the first place, then we marched again, 
 and we kept marching and remarching. 
 
 Question. Please show the point to which you marched when you first left there 
 after daylight. 
 
 Answer. We marched direct, I should think, from the Lewis house up toward Grove- 
 ton. We marched from where we were bivouacked to the direction of Groveton. 
 
 Question. Was it a northerly direction ? 
 
 Answer. It was a northerly direction, if that map is correct. 
 
 Question. How near did yon go to Groveton ? 
 
 Answer. We Avent in sight of it. In the first place, you could see a long distance there 
 at some of those points. 
 
 Question. You know where the Warrenton and Centreville pike is? 
 
 Answer. I do. 
 
 Question. Were you immediately south of that ? Were you marched directly north 
 toward that road, at right angles with it ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know that we were marched at right angles, but in that direction 
 toward Groveton. 
 
 Question. How near did you go to Groveton ? 
 
 Answer. I suppose we were three-quarters of a mile. 
 
 Question. Groveton was in which direction from you ? 
 
 Answer. Groveton was in a northerly direction. It was a little to our right. 
 
 Question, Which way did you march and which way did you countermarch? Give 
 your movements as nearly as you can. 
 
 Answer. In marching up this ravine we marched off in this direction (toward Cuu- 
 liffe's) In moving back, we moved back right down the ravine. 
 
 Question. In countermarching, did you at any time go east of the point at which 
 you had bivouacked the night before f 
 
 Answer. I think not, to the best of my recollection. 
 
 Question. Then, during the whole day, according to your present recollection, you 
 were west of what is marked on this map as Lewis lane' No. 1 ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; that is the best of ray recollection. At night we fell back and took 
 position in here somewhere [north of Compton's barn]. 
 
 Question. Did you see no enemy along about in the vicinity of what you have marked 
 here as " C. B."? 
 
 Answer. There was an enemy up in here. [Towards Pageland lane.] We saw a 
 few moimted skirmishers. 
 
 Question. You saw no heavy bodies of troops ? 
 
 Answer. Had no heavy bodies of troops at that time until they commenced firing 
 upon us from this position. 
 
 Question. Do you recollect having seen Owen Jones, of Pennsylvania, with his cav- 
 alry, there ? 
 
175 
 
 Anewer. I don't recollect seeing any Peiinsylvauia cavalry there. There were cav- 
 alry moving backwards and forwards. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Question. Xow I ask you whether or not General Reynolds did not that day move 
 into the woods in front of you with more than one brigade, and whether he was not 
 driven out within fifteen minutes or half an hour afterwards ? 
 
 Answer. He was not driven out. He ordered the troops out ; they were not driven 
 out. 
 
 Question. That was a wood? 
 
 Anewer. That was up a dry ravine in an open field : there was a little woods to our 
 left. 
 
 Question. Will you indicate where that woods was ? 
 
 Anewer. If this map is correct, I would suppose that is it; it is a small piece of 
 wood. [West of the words "Meadowville lane."] 
 
 Question. You took a route along here, I suppose— you marched along that road f 
 [Manassas aud Sudley road.] 
 
 Answer. On the 28th we were moving along this road. [From Gainesville ea.st 
 along the Warrentou and Centreville pike. ] Que of our brigades was fired into, and 
 the eighth regiment had several men killed. 
 
 Question. Then which way did yovi go ? 
 
 Answer. Soon afterwards — after that the enemy left our front and we made a detour 
 off' towards Manassas. 
 
 Question. Tlutt is, you moved off towards the Manassas and Gainesville road on the 
 Manassas Gap Railroad f 
 
 Answer. We moved off towards the Manassas Gap Railroad. I don't recollect that 
 we crossed it : yet I am not positive but what we did cross it. Then we moved along 
 to Manassas or near Manassas. 
 
 Question. What time did -you lea\'e there ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell. 
 
 Question. About what time ? 
 
 Answer. We came in here and halted. 
 
 Question. Came in where and halted i 
 
 Answer. 8ouie point either on this side of the railroad or on that, I cannot tell which. 
 We halted for an hour or two aud then we moved off, and it was after dark when we 
 passed Manassas; we marched on from Manassas; we seemed to just turn right up 
 towards the Warrentou pike. 
 
 Question. Came up in this direction? [Along the Manassas and Sudley road.] 
 
 Anewer. I suppose that is the road ; from there we went up to this point that I indi- 
 cated, wliere we bivouacked. 
 
 Question. How did you get to that point from the Manassas and Sudley road ? 
 
 Answer. Across the country. 
 
 Question. Look at it there; did you march right across here? 
 
 Answer. I cannot tell ; it was after night. 
 
 Question. You do not know how you got there? 
 
 Answer. I don't know how we got there, but I know we were at Manassas, and I 
 know we marched that night during the night. 
 
 Question. Did you see the attack which was made late in the afternoon or evening 
 by King's division "! 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
 Question. Where were you at half past five to six o'clock ? 
 
 Anewer. At half past five or six, at the time that this charge was made up in here — 
 I put this at a later date than some of my comrades — but at the time.when we made 
 this charge, or just before it, this heavy musketry firing was going on. 
 
 Question. Then about what time I 
 
 Anewer. While we were falling back there was heavy musketry firing. 
 
 Question. About what time would you .say it was that you were there at " C. B." ? 
 
 Answer. I sliould say that it was not earlier in the day than five o'clock. 
 
 Question. That is, the movement by which you were at "C. B." was not later than 
 five o'clock on that day? 
 
 Answer. I should say that it was not later tlian five o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 Question. Not earlier than that? 
 
 Anewer. Not earlier than that. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain in that point ? 
 
 Answer. Not ten minutes. 
 » Question. Before you fell back to what point ? 
 
 Anewer. We flanked right around this ravine, I should think, and we halted there 
 for a little while. 
 
 Question. That is the ravine right under "Lewis lane, No. 2"? 
 
 Anewer. Yes. 
 
 Question. What I want to know is where you were at the time General Hatch's di- 
 
176 
 
 vision and King's division, General Hatch in command, charged uj) the Warrcnton 
 pike ? 
 
 Answer. The time the troops charged np there I cannot tell who commanded the 
 troops. We were in here. 
 
 * ^ ?^ * ■¥ . ^ * 
 
 Qnestion. Was there anv heavy fighting along on the Warrenton pike just north of 
 you ? 
 
 Answer. There was to our right very heavy firing in the vicinity of Grovetoul 
 
 This evidence, it is noticeable, corroborates Geneal Reynolds' official 
 report, before cited, of the 5th September, 18C2, that after General Pope 
 arrived on the field he proceeded, under the latter's orders, to threaten 
 the enemy's right and rear " to the left of the pike," viz : to the north of 
 it, and had a sharp contest. 
 
 It is a curious tact that Maj. G. B. Fox, of Schenck's division, and Bre- 
 vet Brigadier-General Barnes, of the Pennsylvania Reserves, Reynolds' 
 division, each i)ut the lines that they marked on the map in exactly the 
 same relative position, Reynolds having been on Schenck's left, near 
 Meadowville lane, and one being a continuation of the other. 
 
 The opportunity here presented to an enterprising and vigorous officer 
 was lost by this petitioner, for instead of pushing into action so as to 
 communicate with the left of General Pope's army, he retired without 
 any effort to carry out the specific orders for his march, tinder which he 
 was to halt only tchen he should have estahUshed communication with the 
 forces on his right (Pennsylvania Reserves), which, as he kneiv, were ordered 
 also to march toward Gainesmlle. 
 
 As, however, from the sounds of battle, it was evident that they had 
 met the enemy, communication could not, of course, be had by continu- 
 ing in the direction of Gainesville on one side of the triangle, Gainesville 
 forming the apex, but by pushing across to the other side on a more 
 northerly road, parallel to the base of the assumetl triangle. 
 
 While the petitioner was still at his furthest point of advance, with a 
 portion of his troops, near Dawkins' Branch, General Reynolds was cross- 
 ing the Wan'enton turnpike and attacking Jackson's right. 
 
 There were two brigade fronts between Reynolds' division and Grove- 
 ton, viz, Stahel's and McLean's, of Sigel's corps, and this shows how far 
 his force must have extended on the general line of the turnpike toward 
 Gainesville. 
 
 In his official report, General Reynolds says, as we have seen, that 
 "Cooper's battery, with Meade's brigade as a supi)ort, was immediately 
 placed in position on the right of the pike and on the left [viz, west] of 
 the woods where Gibbon's brigade had been in action" (2>. 72 official 
 printed report). 
 
 In his evidence on the general court-martial. General Reynolds said 
 " he supposes this to have been as late as one o''clocJc.''^ 
 
 In Brig. Gen. R. C. Schenck's official report (p. 140, ibid.), it is stated 
 that it was about one or two o'clock when General Reynolds' division 
 was seen coming up on the left of McLean's brigade of Schenck's division. 
 
 It was the "left rear" of the force of General Reynolds (thus offered 
 at an angle with oiu' main line) that the Confederate reports speak of as 
 •attained by their artillery from the high ground west of Pageland lane 
 in their advance from Gainesville. 
 
 From this we may consider what would have been the effect had peti- 
 tioner moved up to establish communication with our left (Reynolds'), 
 since the ground between them was necessarily entirely unoccupied by 
 the enemy, and since the enemy's check to Reynolds' attack of Jackson's 
 right would have been counterchecked by petitioner's advance. 
 
 All these troops south of the Warrenton turnpike were rendered of 
 comparatively little use, by reason of the petitioner's fatal inaction. 
 
177 
 
 As, according to General Schenck's report, Cooper's battery, after 
 going into position (west of Gibbon's battle-ground) between one and two 
 o'clock, was in action "about an hour" (p. 140, ibid.), it follows that the 
 enemy could not have attacked and flanked Eeynolds with artillery, 
 even so as to have compelled his falling back, until about three o'clock. 
 
 When, therefore, it is sought by petitioner's counsel to place the Con- 
 federate line of Hood's division in the neighborhood of Gibbon's battle- 
 ground and field-hospital at 10 a. m., we can only believe it by saying 
 that what John F. Reynolds swore to, and Schenck (by his aide-de-camp) 
 officially rei)orted in September and October, 18G2, was false, or else you 
 must come to the conclusion that the Confederate sources of information 
 were mistaken. 
 
 The field-hospital of our dead and wounded men of Gibl)on's brigade 
 has been too well fixed in evidence and too indelil)ly impressed on the 
 minds of those who i)assed over the ground on the 29th August, 1862, 
 and who have been witnesses, not to leave its impress. Nearly three 
 hours is a great discrepancy, but as Reynolds' and Schenck's reports and 
 the former's evidence were made and given when the subject was fresh 
 in their recollection, such sources of information are entitled to great 
 respect. 
 
 If the Confederates were anywhere near the position it is sought to 
 place them, Eeynolds would have been destroyed. 
 
 Leaving out of view the question of success or non-success of an attack 
 on the enemy's right, and whether Jackson or Longstreet was there, it 
 will not be questioned that an attack should be made as ordered, because 
 even if it fails it may so employ troops of the enemy as to insure else- 
 where against their line such success as to lead to victory. 
 
 The battle we are considering affords a striking illustration of this. 
 
 When Hood's advance (of Longstreet's command) had, towards the 
 middle of the afternoon, rendered the stay of the two brigades in Jack- 
 son's right front in observation of Reynolds no longer a necessity, they 
 were withdrawn and became a reserve greatly needed for Jackson's 
 nearly-exhausted lines. 
 
 When General Kearney, at about six o'clock, rolled up the enemy's 
 left npon his center, and Steven's, joining with Kearney, endeavored to 
 sweep their line still further and make the success decisive, it was Jubal 
 Early's Confederate brigade, with the Eighth Louisiana of Hay's bri- 
 gade, coming to the aid of A. P. Hill's exhausted troops, who had 
 already, says Hill in his report, suffered "six distinct and separate 
 assaults," that checked our advance and drove Stevens back. 
 
 Kearney's report says his own division "changed front to the left to 
 sweep with a rush the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. 
 The enemy rolled up on his own right. It presaged a victory for us all. 
 Still oiu' force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy 
 reserves, so that our fiu^ther progress was impeded. General Stevens 
 came up gallantlv in action to support us, but did not have the numbers." 
 
 These were the last reserves Jackson had upon the field. The other 
 regiments of Hay's Conlederate brigade had been put in some time pre- 
 viously on a similar necessity. 
 
 Second Lieutenant Jo/«t *S'. HolUngshead, Ninth Pennsylvania Reserves, 
 third brigade, Reynolds' division, called by government, testified as fol- 
 lows (Board's Record, p. 932) : 
 
 Question. Where were you on tlie morning of tliat day— 29th of August? 
 Answer. I could not scarcely tell ; we were marching during the night, and we lay 
 in an open field until daylight, then we commenced moving. 
 Question. Do you know where the Lewis house is ? 
 Answer. No, sir ; I could not say by name. All I know is that after we had been 
 
178 
 
 marching anil ooimtoruiarcliing during the day, and aftPr going through a strip of 
 woodB into a ravine to charge a battery, we all fell hack and got to a white house, 
 and staid there part of the night ; I don't know the name of the house. I have never 
 been on the ground since that time. 
 
 Question. Was there any branch near that house — any stream ? 
 
 Answer. The ravine that we went into was dry at that time ; just past w here our 
 company halted, in sight of that liattery, there was a swamp, then a clump of trees on 
 the other side; ])art of our brigade got into the woods across the swamp ; our com- 
 pany and two or three others were just on the edge of the kuoll that the battery was 
 ])laced on. General Seymour sat there on his horse, on the edge of the knoll, within 
 ten feet of where I was standing, and Avhile there General Reynolds rode up and says, 
 "You are too late, too late, about face," and we all went out together as quick as we 
 could get. 
 
 Question. You h.ad been moving up this ravine ? 
 
 Answer. Wlien we moved up that ravine and crossed the corn-field, a battery was 
 playing on us with grajie and canister, and we got back there as fast as we could, and got 
 behind a kni>ll in front. The battery played on us as we went across the corn-field, 
 and when we got upon the knoll, we changed direction ; then Avhen we got past where 
 that swamp is the battery changed direction again, and was tiring at our men in the 
 woods across the swam]). While we staid there in that jiosition General Reynolds 
 came up, and the words he said were to General Seymour. 
 
 Question. How far in advance of this house do you think you went up that ravine ? 
 
 Answer. About a mile, to the best of my recollection. 
 
 Question. Do you know what direction that ravine took which you went up from 
 this house ? 
 
 Answer. The strip of woods that we went throagh — we- had been marching and 
 countermarching along the roads during the day, and then we went to the right 
 through a Httip of woods and through a cornfield at about right angles. 
 
 By reference to the map at the time, between 1 and 2 o'clock p. m., 
 when General Eeynolds, as he originally testified, was swinging his 
 division by a right half wheel across the ''Warren ton" pike, near Mea- 
 dowville lane, and west of the Gibbon wood, in order to attack Jack- 
 son's right, it will be perceived w^hat an opportunity was presented to 
 petitioner, had he been at the head of his column, to move up in the 
 exact direction indicated by his early verbal and written orders from 
 General Pope and personal direction from General McDowell. 
 
 The position of Eeynolds' division at that time shows quite convinc- 
 ingly that the enemy could not have been in either x>osition or force 
 south of the pike, near enough to have otiered any obstruction to a 
 movement by petitioner to connect with the left wing of the "Army of 
 Yirginia." 
 
 Now with reference indirectly to the position that Maj. S. N. Benjamin, 
 then Second United States Artillery, fired at. The impression sought to 
 be conveyed is, that he fired ofitin the direction of the " J^rowner-Doug- 
 lass house"' towards a battery placed down on the easterly slope of the 
 hill, on that natural glacis. There is also a natural glacis from this 
 highest point noted as " Stony ridge," where Jackson had his artillery 
 in position behind his line down towards the Warrenton pike. K we 
 look at the position taken up by Major Jienjamin and examine the con- 
 tour lines and the respective heights, we find, for example, that, his posi- 
 tion being on the southerly edge of the ]»ike at the easterly corner of 
 Groveton, the next height westerly at its lughest northerly point is 20 
 feet above the i)oint at which his battery was located as just mentioned ; 
 that lidge which crosses the pike west of Groveton, and which is 20 
 feet higher than the one on which Benjamin's battery w as placed, has 
 still another west of it and east of the "Gibbon" road, which also crosses 
 the i)ike to a point still nujre northerly, and is also 20 feet higher, while 
 the northerly etlgeof the "(ribbon" wood north of the pike is still more 
 northerly on an elevation 200 feet high. 
 
 From this to})ographical «k'scription it is plain that he could not pos- 
 sibly have lired westerly dctwn the pike, or towards the "Browner- 
 
 iil 
 
179 
 
 Douglass" lionse, even had lie so wislied, on aeeonnt of inteiinediate hills 
 and "(Tibl)on" wood, bnt that his line of tire was noith\v(\sterly, in the 
 direction of the word "Stony," which best fnlfills his conditions as to 
 distance (Board's Record, p. Olo), besides which, we haA'e seen by the 
 evidence heretofore cited of Maj. B. S. White, inspector-general in the 
 regular Confederate army, Jackson's artillery was l)ehind his line on 
 that very " Stony ridge." 
 
 This direction of Benjamin's artillery contest corres])onds exactly with 
 the government theory of the trne situation ; for had he l>een tiring" west- 
 erly down the pike (had the topography permitted), General Eeynolds 
 would never have been able to cross it west of the "Gibbon" wood at 
 the time he swore in 1SG2 that he did, or march Seymour's brigade down 
 it to join his di^^sion, which was at precisely the same time Benjamin 
 swears he carried on his remarkably gallant artillery contest. 
 
 From the position which lieyuolds reached westerly Ijeyond the Gibbon 
 wood between 1 and 2 p. m. of the 21)th, and from the tact that the Con- 
 federate Capt. James ^Mitchell, First Yirginia Volunteers (called by peti- 
 tioner), the only witness from Kemper's division of Longstreet (which 
 division has been put iu line by petitioner south of the pike next to 
 Hood's), swears he "saw no Federal troops at all that day " (Board's 
 Becord, p. 380), it is plain that the re-enforcing enemy under Lee, com- 
 prising part of Longstreet's command, that day occui)ied a defensive 
 position only near enough to help Jackson if necessary. 
 
 I have noAv given the evidence of these Union witnesses as to the 
 position they occupied up to a very late hour iu the afternoon. K Gen- 
 eral Beynolds, as his official reports show and as he swears on the 
 original trial of this petitioner, got up in this position on the pike beyond 
 the Gibbon woo<l at a later hour than one o'clock on the 29th of August, 
 1862, remaing there a considerable time, and if that is corroborated, as 
 Ave tind it is, by the official report of Colonel Cheesebrough, Schenck's 
 adjutant-general, and by Major-General Schenck himself, and by Major 
 Fox. and by Brevet Brigadier-General Barnes, ^fajor Ho]ie, Lieutenant 
 Hollingshead, and General McLean, besides the citizens Monroe and 
 Carrico, ]\Iajor White, and Rev. Mv. Landstreet, it is quite plan that 
 Charles Marshall and Alex. 1). Payne, the two rebel officers who were 
 brought here l)y petitioner as witnesses, were mistaken as to that day's 
 position of Longstreet, which they fixed as on the easterly edge of the 
 Gibbon wood l)y 9.30 or 10 a. m. 
 
 4,30 p. 31. ORDER. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the 4.30 p. m. order, so called, 
 which is found in the third specification of the first charge, and is the 
 basis of the first specification, second charge, and is as follows : 
 
 That the afcnsetl, heino; iu front of the enemy dnrin.o; the battle of Manassas on 
 Friday tlie 29th August, ii'd2, did receive the following lawful order: 
 
 "Headquarters ix the Field, 
 
 ''Auffust 29 — 4.30 p. m. 
 "Major-General Porter: Your line of march brings you iu on the enemy's right 
 flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's Hank, and if 
 possible on his rear, keex)iug your right in communication ^vith General Reynolds. 
 The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
 engage their tiank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed 
 to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right 
 ami rear, so as to keep you iu close communication with the right wing. 
 
 "JOHN POPE, 
 " Major-General Commanding.^' 
 
 13 G 
 
ISO 
 
 Tlie petitioner (lenie.s tliat lie received this order at 5. or even 5.30 p, 
 m., or until on or about suu.set, when he was at his headquarters at the 
 juuetion of the Gainesville and Sudley Ford roads, east of Bethlehem 
 Church (petitioners opening" statement, p. 40,) and on the original trial 
 brought several witnesses to this point. He has produced no new evi- 
 dence upon the subject. He has, however, brought witnesses (Leachman 
 and Payne) to guess a road by which the order could have been carried. 
 
 As somewhat illustrative of this subject, it will be curious to note the 
 evidence of the petitioner's then aid-de-cam]), Lieut. S. M. AVeld, as given 
 in the original trial (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 120). 
 
 It seems that he was sent by the petitioner with a message to be de- 
 livered either to General McDowell or General Kiug, both verbal and 
 wiitten, and that lie started about four o'clock in the afternoon of the 
 i'Otli from the junction of the road that leads from Gainesville to Manassas 
 Junction and the road that leads to Sudley Springs. The purport of this 
 message was that (xcneral Morell would now be strongly engaged 5 that 
 there was a large force in front of us; that large clouds of dust were seen 
 there, &c. 
 
 He says that on the road he saw General Hatch, who told him that Gen- 
 eral King was si«-k and not there, and that he, General Hatch, commanded 
 his division ; a fact, by the way, which, as we have seen, the petitioner 
 himself knew beyond peradventure as early as ten o'clock in the morn- 
 ing. He says that General Hatcli gave him a message to the petitioner 
 to the etfect that we had driveii the enemy into the woods, which he sent 
 to the i^etitioner by au orderly. This was after •' quite a heavy tire of 
 musketry broke out to our right and front." He then went in the direc- 
 tion indicated in order to deliver the message to General McDowell, and 
 found him just leaving General Pope. He delivered the dispatch, and 
 General ^McDowell said he was not the man, and jiointed to General 
 Pope. He says that General Pope told him to tell the petitioner " that 
 we are having a hard light "; that he overheard General l*opetell Gen- 
 eral ^McDowell to send one of his divisions to the right, to which 
 General McDowell made some olijection. He, Weld, then left General 
 Pope, went down the road, and Avaited about five minutes ; wrote the 
 substance of the message, and sent it by an orderlj' to the petitioner. 
 He met the orderly on his way back, who told him he could not find the 
 petitioner, and he delivered it himself. He says he got back about sun- 
 <lown, and that he did not see Capt. Douglas Pojie until then. He says 
 he occupied at least an hour and a half returning, haA'ing come back 
 by a different road from that on which he went. He did not go to where he 
 had left the petitioner, because he understood fi'om the petitioner that the 
 latter would be up at the front, and therefore he went to the front, having 
 come out into the Manassas and Gainesville road near Bethlehem Church. 
 
 Of course, he did not find the petitioner at the front, because, as we have 
 seen, during the course of the evidence for that day, that was not the 
 idace that the petitioner frequented. However, Lieutenant Weld went 
 on up to the front, and then came back. He says he found the petitioner 
 where he left him, right in the forks of the two roads — the Sudley Springs 
 and the ^Manassas and Gainesville roads. 
 
 This message which he delivered to General Pope, with all the delay of 
 going to find King's division, conversing with General Hatch, afterwards 
 receiving a difiercnt message from him from the one mentioned collo- 
 (|uially, Avriting it <uit aiul then going to find General McDowell on Buck 
 Hill with (Tcneral Pope, took him, accoiding to his own evidence, about 
 an hour. 
 
 Therefore, at that time the distance from General Pope's headcpiarters 
 
181 
 
 on Buck Hill to wliere the petitioner was located was not, according to 
 his own witness and aid, more than an hour ; and it must be recollected 
 that the message which he gave his aid to carry to (leneral :\rcl)o\vell was 
 not one of urgency, requiring anything specially or immediately to be done 
 on the part of General McDowell; it was in' the nature of \i report.to 
 General McDowell, and shows that he conceived himself to be operating 
 still under the orders and instructions which General McDowell had 
 given him upon leaving him near the Manassas Gap Ifailroad. 
 
 If it took the petitioner's aid l»nt an hour to go to General McDowell at 
 Buck Hill (General Pope's liead(]uarters), even" including all these delays 
 en route of which I have spoken, it certainly could iiot have taken"^a 
 longer time for an ofticer starting half an hour later from Buck Hill with 
 an urgent message to go to the petitioner. 
 
 In considering this subject as to the delivery of this order, we must 
 <'onsider the character of the message which Captain Pope was to take 
 to the petitioner. 
 
 There was a battle progressing at the time, heavy infantry and artil- 
 lery tiring, assaults being made upon the enemy's lines; and all this was 
 spread out and under the notice of the commanding general and his stafl'. 
 Captain Pope hiniself had shortly before, according to his own statement, 
 l»een in a i)osition where he witnessed directly some of the serious por- 
 tions of the contest. The order which Captain Pope received was of an 
 urgent character. It was for the petitioner to move at once to attack 
 the €ne})i}j'.s right think and, if possible, his rear. Xo description of order 
 \\ hich could be given on the battle-tield would indicate the necessity of 
 greater .^peed and haste in its delivery than this. Is it to be assumed 
 therefore, for a moment, that Captain Poi)e, after receiving such a mes- 
 sage, should trot or"\valk as if on an excursion of mere pleasure to view 
 the scenery ? There is every reason to suppose, aside from the e\'idence 
 of the witnesses on the subject, that Captain Pope rode with that message 
 with all the haste and speed tliat was possible. 
 
 We have seen from the evidence and reports of both Sigel and Eey- 
 nolds on the left of General Pope's line of operations, that they had been 
 informed and were looking for the arrival of the petitioner upon their 
 left to take part in the action ; and the Hon. E. I). Fo/rler^ who then com- 
 manded the Fourteenth Brooklyn Eegiment in Hatch's brigade. King's 
 division, has said (Board's Kecord, p. 548) that his brigade got into posi- 
 tion to sup])ort Iie> nolds west of the Sudley Springs road after having left 
 the jManassas and Gainesville road, about 2 p. m., and that he was 
 •'very anxious, and expected, even before we halted, to hear, on what 
 was our front and left, the guns of Porter's division." 
 
 General AfeBoirell testitied on the original trial (G. C. M. Record, p. So, 
 and Board's IJeccnd, p. 818) that he met Captain Po[>e when carrying this 
 order near the ^Manassas and Sudley road, and that his troops were on 
 the Sudley road. Some of them, however, had been put in, as he himself 
 says, andas other testimony has corroborated, west of the Sudley road 
 between Xew Market and the stone house, to co-operate with General 
 lieynolds. 
 
 At the time, therefore, that Cxeneral :\IcDowell met Captain Pope, it is 
 rpiite apparent that the latter could not have strayed from the load in 
 the direction that the petitioner would put him in order to show that he 
 lost his way. 
 
 It is to be noticed in looking at the map prepared by Major Warren 
 that the road which the government witnesses unite in saying they took 
 on the afternoon of the L".)th of August is not fully delineated. For a 
 part of the distance along Chinn's Branch, between two roads running 
 
182 
 
 iiortlieasteily fioin tlie Cliiiin house, to tlie point where they cross the 
 l)raiich, is delineated a path wliieh, so tar as the map is concerned, stops 
 at tlie most southerly of those t^vo roads without any apparent reason. 
 
 The witness Leachman, and others, have testified to the presence in 
 that country, in camp the previous year, of a Confederate army, and that 
 the country was full of army roads. 
 
 The time of the dispatch of the order is fixed by its date, namely, 
 4.30 p. m. Three witnesses have testified as to the road that was taken, 
 and their e"\idence as to a part of the road is substantiated l)y that of 
 JVIajor-General McDowell. 
 
 When we come to look into the testimony of Mr. ^V.B. Wheeler., Rcit- 
 izen, who lives on the line of the road which Captain Pope and the 
 orderly, Mr. Dufl'ee, testified as to taking-, we find that there was for- 
 merly, at the time which we are considering, an army road in that very 
 direction testified to by those -sAitnesses. 
 
 As a slight corroborative circumstance it is to be noted that when 
 these two witnesses. Captain Pope and Orderly Duffee, at my request, 
 visited the battle-ground before coming in the i)resence of the Board to 
 testify, after leaving Buck Hill, General Pope's former headquarters, they 
 moved down the line of the Manassas and Sudley road towards jNIanassas 
 Junction the entire distance in a light wagon, without personally exam- 
 ining the road that ran up by Chinn's Branch around the spring, and so 
 on to AVheeler's and out l)y Smith's (Ui to the Manassas and Sudley road. 
 Nevertheless, they distinctly delineated upon the map the general direc- 
 tion that they were confident they had taken on the afternoon of the 29th 
 in delivering that order, a direction which, as we shall see, has since been 
 corroborated by Mr. Wheeler, in placing a road on the general line which 
 they thought they had taken, and which they indicated from memory 
 dating back sixteen years. The testimony of William B. Wheeler on that 
 subject is as follows : 
 
 Question. Please look at this map. [Douglass Pope niai) shown witness.] Tell nii^ 
 what ways there were at that time, on the 29th of August, 186<J, of going 1 ly roads from 
 Buck Hill down to Bethlehem Clnirch. 
 
 Answer. There was an ojipintunity of going any way that a person thought proper 
 to go. There Avere no obstructions to any party not in a vehicle of going any way 
 they thought proper to go. On some part of the route they would encounter woocl- 
 land, and would evade it. *The country was all open. There was no fencing there 
 except my own outside fencing. If they went on the Avest side of what is known with 
 us as the Manassas and .Sudley road, or, in other words, the road leading from Manas- 
 sas to Sudley, there was no fencing whatever except luy own outside fence. 
 
 Question. Will you please point out and descrihc any road there was, if there was 
 one, leading down west of the Manassas and Sudley road, and the nearest to it in the 
 direction of Bethlehem Church '? 
 
 Answer. There was no road at all that was known as a road except the one from 
 Grovetou, which crossed the old Warrenton and Alexandria road [Lewis lane No. 1]. 
 But the whole country was a load where any and every person thought of traveling. 
 There was itarticnlarly from ]\Ir. F. M. Lewis's, as laid down lure, through B. F. 
 Ijcwis's, and through Mr. Steers's to my own place (the AVheelcr place) into theChinn 
 farm — tliere was a load tluit was mostly traveled l)y soldiers in ])assiug from Manassas 
 to what was then known as the Bull IJun battle-held. During the spring of ld62 there 
 was a gi-eat many that wali<ed from Manassas up there, and while they were encamped 
 at Manassas, an eveiy-day occurrence. 
 
 Question. Wastheie any rond lending down in the neighborhood of. Chinn's Branch ? 
 If so. will you give its geni-ral direction ou the ma]> .' 
 
 Answer. There iritu ii spriiH/ ou the ire-st .side of that branch ; that is cleared land; on the 
 went aide of (hat hranrh there was a road, or cattle-path ; the whole country was open, 
 and everybody's cattle, whose cattle Avislu^l to go over tliat, passed down on the west 
 side of the bi'anch until tliey maile a path or road to the lowei point of those woods, 
 jiot including tliat small woodland that luns down there [just east of the l>ran(di]. 
 There was J'ornK rlji <i road, when Mr. IJoe owned that Chinn farm, that wan on the ouifiide of 
 
183 
 
 that woodhuid, doini to that point, and cattle and stock of all kinds passed on this west side 
 because there are hJiiffs on the east side. 
 
 Question. How Avonld tlif^y .u'ct out from this Cliinu's Bnnicli, Iroiii this lower point 
 of that piece of woodhuid to Bethhdieni Chnrch ? 
 
 Answer. They could come thronyh Inj mif house, or they couhl leave at the Spiiiift-. It 
 is in a small oak grove laid down oii thiit map (on the branch). Mr. Chinn ns(-d as an 
 inlet and outlet from his dwelling a road crossing that branch road. 
 
 Question. Was there any way of getting out from that point to the Manassas and 
 Sudley road, except by going due east on the Chinn road 'I 
 
 Answer. Yes ; as I just remarked, they could go where they pleased. The country 
 was entirely open. As far as I know, most of the cavalry that was stationed at Man- 
 assas and vicinity passed through my place, sometimes ont down here at New Market, 
 and sometimes through ]Mr. Steers's, and into the road. They went any way they 
 thought inoper, that their inclination leaned. 
 
 Question. Was there any road at that time between your house and the Sudley road 
 miming from that point up here, that you have alluded to f 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; there was no road. Persons riding about over the battle-iield for 
 the first time frequently rode through my field. 
 
 Question. Was there any old ruined house in that vicinity ? 
 
 Answer. There was a tenant house on the Chinn farm, in a northeasterly direction 
 from the residence, standing near a large cherry-tree in a northeasterly direction, but 
 rather nearer the s]jring branch. 
 
 Question. Alioiit where would you say that ruined tenement was? 
 
 Answer. If I knew the scale of this map, I coukl locate it. [The scale of the map 
 stated to the witness. ] I should say that that tenant house was within a hundred 
 yards northeast of the Chinn house — somewhat nearei* — 40 or 50, I suppose, nearer to 
 the si)ring branch. It was totally destroyed, except the heavy frame. 
 
 Question. How far from the liranch then was it f 
 
 Answer. I should thiidv f'O to 100 yards, probably not C|uite a hundred yards, from 
 the- branch. It was northeasterly, in the direction of the stone house, and pretty much 
 in the same direction as the branch. 
 
 The petitionor's witness, John T. Leacliman^ anotlier resident of that 
 region, who was called in order to (juess at a ronte which Captain Pope 
 took in delivering the order, nevertheless made some carious admissions 
 corroborative of the evidence of the government witnesses. 
 
 In takinga route which he i)retended Captain I*ope might possiblyhave 
 taken, a x'cry diflicult ]»iece of road much to the west of where Captain 
 I^ope came ont, and near (raskins' ; and yet, as will be perceived by a refer- 
 ence to tlie e^'idence that he g;iA'e, from which extracts will be made, he 
 admits, altlK:)ugh he is an elderly man, to have ridden at the rate of about 
 six miles an hour, including this rough piece of (jountry over which 
 Captain Pope never went, and which he included in his estimate of the 
 general rapidity with Avliich he travelled; and he was making this esti- 
 mate at the time specially for his own use as a witness in this case. 
 This witness, witlumt knowing anything al>out the exact direction that 
 Captain i'o])e took, and although making him start from the Matthews 
 house, a point nuich farther north than Buck Hill from whence he 
 (Pope) actually started, and although assuming that after he crossed 
 the Warrentcin and Centreville pike he (Pope) took a route via 
 the Chinn house, much to the west of the road he actually took, 
 so as to have brought him down via Compton's lane to the old AVarren- 
 ton, Alexandria, and A\^ashington road, thence out to Xew Market and 
 so on down the .Alaiuissas and t^udley road and aroimd up the Manas- 
 sas and (xainesvilh^ road to Betldehem Church, live-eighths of a nule 
 farther than the head(iuartcrs of tlu^ i)etitioner, nevertheless, the witness 
 Leachman was satisfied that Captain Pope did coiue out on the old 
 AVarrenton and Alexandria road. In this he was correct. AVe take up 
 his evid(-nce at that i)oint aiul find that he testified as follows: 
 
 He evidently struck this road somewhere. 
 
 Question. Which road .' 
 
 Answer. The old Alexandria road. 
 
 Question. Whv do vou say that he evidently struck that ? 
 
184 
 
 Answer. Because he says he eaine out around a farm-house. 
 
 Question. That is on tlic Sndle.v 8jtrings road? 
 
 Answer. Sudley Springs road. 
 
 Question. 'Wliere is tliat iiousi- ? 
 
 Answer. That is at Smith's: lie coukl not have come out around any other house to 
 have doni' it. That house at tliat time presented a dihipidated apiiearauce. It had a 
 hasement to it, ])ut the wall was very much cut to pieces. It has since been repaii'ed. 
 The chimneys were very much to pieces. 
 
 Question. That is the house you sujipose he means to designate when he says, "In 
 coming u]i to this farm-house we struck the road, and went right straight out to 
 where we found General Porter" ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, that is the ]»oint where he struck the Sudley Springs road. 
 
 Question. Is that the only liouse that answers to that description, or that did answer 
 to it- at that time ? 
 
 Answer. That is the only house, and I will give you my reasons for supposing that 
 he came out on that road. 
 
 Question. Fi'om there to Bethlehem Church, of course, it is a perfectly open road, no 
 trouble in tindiug the way ? 
 
 Answer. Noue at all ; it is a broad open road. 
 
 Question. Taking tlie route which you supjiosed him to have traveled, what is the 
 character of the road or roads, or what was it at that time for horses f 
 
 Answer. From this point uj) here until he struck the valley of Young's Branch, I 
 suppose the traveling was very good. There he struck rising ground, running up 
 towards the Chinn house, but iu)t enf)ugh to obstruct a Iwrsenuin but very httle, if he 
 came out at Gaskins' until he strvick that road. 
 
 Question. Taking the road as a whole, was it a road over which a man on horscl)ack 
 ordinarily could make a rapid ride, or would it be a moderate ride ? 
 
 Answer. We rode at the rate of about six miles an hour, and I think it was about as 
 fast as any ])rudent man would ride over such a road. I was Avell accjnainted witli 
 the road and knew in what direction to guide my horse, where to make time and 
 where not to make time. 
 
 * 7f * * # * * 
 
 Opposite Wheeler's hftuse the road is comparatively smooth, and you could travel 
 very rapidly over it with a very good degree of safety. 
 
 Question. In ])assing from the junction of the old Alexandria road with the Sudh-y 
 Springs road down to opposite F. M. Lewis', how rapidly could a man ride with safety 
 and ex])e(liency '! 
 
 Answer. I don't meaTi to l)e understood that there are not spots, say of 100 yards, 
 on that road that a man could ride at a brisk gait; but, as a general thing, I wouldn't 
 like to ride over five miles an hour on that road. 
 
 Question. Supi)osiug you had a sate horse ; with that soit of a horse you say that 
 five miles an hour would be the most rapid gait at which you would be willing to 
 ride ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, it certainly is. There are young men with less iirudcnee than I now 
 possess who might go faster. 
 
 Question. I believe at that time it was very dry ? 
 Answer. My recollection is that it was very dry and dusty. 
 
 Question. Please say, frimi the experience you have had, and the knowledge of that 
 road, how long, in your judgment, would it take a rider upon a good horse, riding as 
 rapidly as a man ought to do who is going upon a somewhat urgent missi.on — how 
 long would it take them, travelling with ])ru(lence and proiier regard for the safety of 
 his horse and himself, and only so nuxch as that — how long, in your judgment, would 
 it take him to ride over that load ' 
 
 Answer. Assuming that the rider took the route that I have indicated here ? 
 
 Question. I mean from the Matthew house to Bethh'hem Church. 
 
 Answer. Yes. I don't think it could lie done under an hour and a half. I wouldn't 
 
 like to do it in less time. 
 
 * * * * ^ * # 
 
 Question. Will you ]>lease indicat* on that map any house lying between the War- 
 renton ]»ikr and the Bethlehem Churcji, east of the line at Compton's lane— any wells 
 at any of those houses.' 
 
 Answei'. I will. Coming down this road [the Jlanassas and Sudley road] in the 
 direction of Manassas, Wheelei-'s is the tirst well ; Gaskins has a well. We pass on to 
 Smith's, and he has a well between his house and the road. W(^ jiass on down to F. 
 M. Lewis', and he has a well. These are all that there is anywhere in that whole 
 
185 
 
 rouutry between the Manassas and Siulley road and the Manassas and Gainesville 
 road, except at my honse. 
 
 Qnestion. I nnderstood you to say that all the fences wei'e (h>\vn ? 
 
 Answer. The fences were all down pretty much all through that section of country 
 at that time, and had been since 1861. 
 
 Question. Were there any neiohborhood roads running along within half a mile or 
 a mile to the eastward of the Sudley Springs road and down in a southerly direction? 
 
 Answer. I don't think 1 can answer that question, for even the tielils' were roads 
 then. People went where they pleased. If they could cut ott' a corner by going across 
 a field they would do it, and if many of them went along it would make something of 
 n, road, I suppose. 
 
 Question. I understand you to say the country was all open ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Question. Neighborhood roads there ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I presume neighborhood roads there. 
 
 Question. And that many of them were paths made by people going across that you 
 don't recollect now ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot speak of the number of roads there at all; as I stated liefore, the 
 country was all open and people traveled Avhere they pleased. 
 
 It will be seen that, upon his own assumption of the road which Cap- 
 tain Pope took (which assumption was not correct, and which included 
 nuich diflficult ground), he estimated an hour and a half as the time for 
 the delivery of the order, which would have brought it up to about six 
 o'clock. According to petitioner in one of his closing arguments here, 
 C.30 J), m. was some time he/ore flark. 
 
 In the delivery of an urgent order, which required speed, it is hardly 
 to be expected that the officer delivering it would bring his horse down 
 below its greatest ability to get over the ground rapidly unless some 
 serious obstacle intervened. 
 
 The evidence of the three witnesses, Captain Pope and the two order- 
 lies, Duflee and Dyer, shows that they found the petitioner's headquar- 
 ters exactly at the point where the iietitioner himself located it, namely, 
 at the forks of the two roads. The general route, which has been indi- 
 cated with much particularity by the three witnesses, was from the 
 southerly side of Buck Hill below the line of the trees, across the Man- 
 assas and Sudley road and Young's Branch at the ford there, then down 
 on the easterly side of Chinn's Branch to the place marked as a ford on 
 the map, then down on the westerly side of that branch, on the road in- 
 dicated i)artially by tlie map and wholly by Mr. Wheeler, to the spring 
 east of the Chinn liouse, thence directly down between Mr. Wheeler's 
 house and l)arn to the old Warrenton, Alexandria and Washington road, 
 thence easterly by a road across lots between Smith's house and his well, 
 which then existed, and thejocation of which is still plainly to be seen; so 
 on do^vn the jManassas and Sudley road until near its junction with the 
 Manassas and Gainesville road, nearly; obliquing to the right in the 
 woods there delineated they found the petitioners headipiarters at the 
 very ])oint he himself placed them. That road measures a little short of 
 five miles. 
 
 In the evidence as given by these three witnesses there are found some 
 sliglit discrepancies: as, for example, the A^itness Dyer, who, while at pe- 
 titioner's head<iuarters, noticed Bethlehem Church, and has an idea that 
 there was a spire upon it, though, singularly enough, cdl the witnesses 
 who were on the Manassas and Gainesville dirt-road ap^tear to have 
 recollected Bethlehem Church. 
 
 The last two witnesses produced by the petitioner here at the close of 
 the case were called for the purpose of showing that the walls had fallen, 
 and that it was an undistinguishable mass of ruins before this August 
 cami)aign of 18(52. This hardly seems to be borne out, for the reason 
 
186 
 
 that so many witnesses liaA'e testified to the position of the church, and 
 to the tact of its being impressed upon their recollection by passing" by 
 it. As it was but a small structure, if the walls had fallen in and it had 
 become a mere mass of bricks and rubbish, no one would have known 
 but that it was merely the ruins of a dwelling. While, on the other 
 hand, a number of witnesses distinctly recollect the fact of a church 
 being there, or the ruins of one. It is reasonable to sui^pose that 
 Messrs. ^Yheeler and Leaclimtoi, in i)lacing the falling of the entire 
 structiu^e as in the spring of 1862, were mistaken. Possibly the roof 
 fell in ; possibly even two of the walls ; but the remaining brick walls, 
 if standing, woidd have indicated the presence of a chiux-h, not a 
 dwelhug. 
 
 There were also some discrepancies in recollection as to the road they 
 took back beyond Xew ]Market. That is explained by Mr. Dyer, that 
 they cut across from Smith's until they struck the road they had come 
 down on around the Chinn Branch Spring. Captain Pope said that he 
 went to the Henry House hill on his way back to General Pope's head- 
 quarters, and saw General McDowell. His recollection is different from 
 that of Mr. Dyer. However, it may be that Captain Pope himself went 
 to that hill, as he says, and left the orderlies to return to headquarters. 
 If their evidence agreed after the lapse of sixteen years in all these 
 minor particulars, there would, according to the text-books ou evidence, 
 be a greater cause for suspicion than if they diverged. 
 
 The general route which they took has been positively identified by 
 all three, corroborated b}' General McDowell, and shown b}^ Wheeler, the 
 petitioner's witness, not only to have been possible but i^robable ; with 
 the additional verification that without such a road being delineated on 
 this map, and without Captain Pope and Mr. Dulfee going down that 
 road themselves before coming here they, nevertheless, put a road ex- 
 actly where the subsequent witness, Wheeler, says that there was such 
 a road. It is also in evidence by them that they did not go up on the 
 old Warrenton and Alexandria road into the vicinity of his house. 
 
 These corroborative circunistauces become of great value in deter- 
 mining the fact as to the route actually taken by Captain Pope and the 
 orderlies, particularly after the severe and unusual cross-examination 
 to which they were subjected by such skillful counsel as represent the 
 petitioner here. The corroborative evidence of General ^McDowell is 
 peculiarly valuable, given as it was upon the original trial, when his 
 i-ecollection was fresh, as well as before this Board, for the reason that 
 it gives a motive for the change of direction t.'^ken by Captain Pope in 
 Older to deliver that order. 
 
 General Poi)e, or Colonel Buggies, his chief of staff, had an idea that 
 the i>etitioner was to be found much farther up on the Manassas and 
 Gainesville road than the point at which he chose to locate himself. 
 Therefore, as Mr. Dyer lias said. Colonel Buggies indicated the general 
 line of Bristoe Station as the direction which Cai)tain Pojte should pur- 
 sue in Older to strike the Manassas and (Jainesville road in the \icinity 
 of the i»etitioner's force. That direction would have carried Captain 
 I'ope directly throngli Five Forks. 
 
 When the individual named Collins induced Mr. Dntfee to go from 
 his home u)» to Columbus in order to get sonu' sort of testimony out of 
 him — for wliat pnrjKjse I do not know — Mr. Duffee thought at the time, 
 in looking at that ma]>, that the road which he had taken was in the direc- 
 tion through Five Forks, until lie went down to the ground. (Board's 
 Ilecord, p. OL'.'i.) The fact that he rode uj) this road by Chinn's ]>rauch 
 in a southwesterlv direction shows that his line of travel had been indi- 
 
187 
 
 cated by the proper autliority, even if the evidence of the witnesses did 
 not state it. 
 
 General McDowell was of conrse ap])rised of the road on which i»eti- 
 tionerwas acting (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 3li), and ai)pearsto liave indicated 
 to Captain Pope the jnost convenient ronte by which to reach liiui ((r. C. 
 M. Eecord, j). 208), as appears by the evidence in the original trial. 
 This is the explanation why Captain Pope did not keep right on down in 
 the direction the petitioner wonld ha\e him go. General McDowell 
 even ottered to send a gnide with Captain Po])e, bnt the orderly, Mr. 
 Dnfiee, was familiar with those roads, and said that it was not necessary ; 
 and Captain Pope (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 0-5) relied npon his knowledge of 
 the conntry. Therefore, at the first point where the road ol)li<jned to the 
 left in the direction that they were going, they came out down by Wheel- 
 er's and so on to the Sudley road. 
 
 In determining the valne to be given to the evidence of witnesses 
 it often is desirable to consider the character of the persons who give 
 the evidence. 
 
 In the first place, as to Captain Pope, the evidence shows him to have 
 been an officer in the Eegnlar Army for some years, and to be at i»resent 
 occnpying a responsible position under the United States circuit Judge 
 for the eighth circuit. The orderlies who accompanied Captain 1*0] )e on 
 that day belonged to a detachment of the First Ohio Cavalry, which 
 was doing that duty under Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith, their coiinnand- 
 ing officer, at 3IaJor (leneral Pope's headquarters. These men had been 
 neither bounty-jumpers, conscripts, nor mendicants, but farmers and 
 farmers' sons, who had entered the service from patriotic motives, and 
 who evidently were of the most reliable character, or they wonld not 
 have been selected for the special duty as messengers and orderlies at 
 headquarters. We find, incidentally, in the record that all these men 
 owned the horses that they rode; and it is reasonable to suppose, there- 
 fore, that they were much better mounted than the ordinary cavalry- 
 men. It is to be noticed that both Mr. Duffee and the newly-discovered 
 witness Mr. ])yer, i)lace the time of the delivery of that order at less, in 
 their judgment, than an hour. 
 
 Mr. Dyer, it a])pears, is a farmer; he had no watch, and has never 
 l»een in the habit of carrying a watch, but has been always accustomed 
 to note the lapse of time by the i>osition of the sun. With a practical 
 experience of this description, and Avithout knowing the time at which 
 the order was dated, he placed it, in his judgment, as not later than half- 
 past four, and said that it took about three-<puirters of an hour to deliver 
 that order, and that he judged of the time by having noted the position 
 -of the sun at the time they started, and the position of the sun at the 
 time the order was delivered. The effort on the part of the petitioner, 
 through his counsel, to make this witness state the degree of rapidity 
 with which they traveled on the different parts of the road when en route 
 to deliver the order was an effort to induce the Avitness to say that which 
 it would be quite impossiVde for any one to say, unless he made par- 
 ticular note and memoranduiji at the time of the localities between which 
 he traveled and the rate of speed at which he traveled between certain 
 points. Possibly as accurate a -mode of computing the time taken in 
 the delivery of that order as could be given was that testified to by Mr. 
 Dyer, whose recollection of the length of the journey is fortified by actual 
 measurement, and shows (piite conclusively that he is an accurate obser- 
 ver both of time and distance. 
 
 To every person who is in the habit of judging time as he was, every 
 object which casts a shadoAV is a sun-dial to note the progress of the day. 
 
188 
 
 Sohtnton Thomas, a ^iioveniment witness (Board's liecord, p. 841), says 
 that ail officer caiiie liding troni the Manassas Junction way, having a 
 dispatcli, which he gave to the petitioner ; that at the time his brigade 
 was moving to the rear ; that they were ordered to face abont and move 
 again up to the JNIanassas and Gaines^^lle road ; and that the time of 
 the delivery of this dispatch, judging from the position of the snn, was 
 somewhere from five to half past five o'clock. The recollection of this 
 witness is that the petitioner was inonnted, and that he dismounted and 
 sat down by the roadside. The fact of the delivery of the dispatch, 
 which he says was delivered at that time, is the prominent point in the 
 recollection of the witness, because it is connected with the order which 
 he received to face about and move back towards the front. 
 
 On the original trial it was sought to be shown that the hour of the 
 arrival of Captain Pope was near sunset. The chief of staff of the peti- 
 tioner, however, Lieut. Col. Fredericl- T. Locke, on the original trial (G. 
 C M. Eecord, p. 139) said as follows: 
 
 Questiou. How much time elapsed between the departvue of Geueral McDowell aud 
 tlie arrival of the order of General Pope to attack the enemy ; and what were the ac- 
 cused aud his command doing duriug that time? 
 
 Answer. I cannot sa5' exactly as to the lapse of time; hut during that time General 
 Morell's troops were in position, aud our artillery were engaging some artillery of the 
 ■enemy, aud there was some musketry tiring also. 
 
 Questiou. State ai>])roxiuKitely the length of time that you think elajised between 
 the de])arture of Geueral McDowell aud the receijjt of that order. 
 
 Answer. I should think three hours. 
 
 General Paf?^/cK', one of petitioner's witnesses (Board's Record, p. 189), 
 said that General McDowell got back from the front of iietitioner's col- 
 umn at about half past twelve to one o'clock, and ordered him to halt, 
 and countermarched him, and then immediately led his brigade through 
 a wood road directly across the country, until it eventually came into 
 the Sudley Si)rings road. The evidence, however, of petitioner's chief 
 of staff as to the time of the receipt of the 4.30 order, although vague, 
 certainly shows that it was received, according to his recolloction, dur- 
 ing the afternoon, when the sun was high, and not at or about sunset. 
 
 Despite the witnesses produced by the accused on liis behalf on the 
 trial, the court convicted of the charges based upon this 4.30 order. 
 
 It is to be noticed that that order from General Pope did not state 
 that he was to attack JaclxSon''s flank; but merely the enemy''s right flank, 
 which, according to some statements, particularly his own, was in front 
 of him; though, according to Col. E. G. Marshall, Thirteenth New York 
 Volunteers, on skirmish line — not more than a brigade. Jackson's name 
 was not mentioned. General Pope afterwards expressed his opinion on 
 the subject in his evidence, and also said that it was his l)elief at the 
 time that the road on which ])etitioner's command was in column would 
 have conducted " him either to the right flank of the enemy or past 
 the right flank of the eneuiy, towards his rear." (G. C. M. llecord, pp. 
 33, 34.) J>nt ((t the time the order iras delivered to petitioner there n-as 
 nothing to shoir that (reneral Pope did not understand ichat the petitioner 
 pretends to s((g he himself hue n^ iras the ease. 
 
 The l>atth^ on tlie riglit of the ])etitioner contimuHl until some time 
 after dark, as testified to by the wituesses, ])articularly of Kiug's division, 
 ]VrcDoweirs corps, (ienerals Lee and Longstreet, in their official reports, 
 have stated thai it continued until 9 }>. m. This is no doubt true. If King's 
 division, under llatcli, of McI)ow<'irs cori)s (Board's Becord, p. 548), 
 could attack as hite as 9 }>. m., and be in action uj) to that time, just as 
 it had been in action the night Ix'forc to a late hour, certainly the i)eti- 
 
189 
 
 tioner's corps could equally have made some tentative movement. If the 
 petitioner was even so well ])repaied for (h'feusc as he assumes he was, 
 and the enemy was in force directly in his front, as he also assumes they 
 were, why should it have taken him an hour or uu)re to get ready to 
 move into action if he really had any intention or desire to assist his 
 companions in arms on tlie right, where, as the witnesses all say, very 
 heavv musketrv tiring was at that time heard ? (Board's Eecord, pp. 
 100, 103, 107, 189, 235, 505, 520, 521, 549.) 
 
 The order to the i)etitioner to move into action at once was part of the 
 l>lan of General Pope under which Kearney attacked and rolled u]) 
 Jackson's left, and a general movement was made against the enemy's 
 front on the Independent line of the Manassas Gap Ifaihoad, and down 
 the ]>ike by King's division of McDowell's corjjs and south of the ])ike by 
 Brigadier-General Meade's brigade of Beynolds' division, against whicli 
 Longstreet 0])posed Hood's division with Evans' brigade and Wilcox's 
 division as a support. 
 
 All day long, on the 29th, the petitioner, according to his theory, is 
 either ready or getting readj^ ; but never doing anything. Had he l)een 
 .so disi)0se<l, the cliaracter of the country on the left of the Manassas 
 and Gainesville road l»y which his corps moved up towards Dawkins' 
 Branch was ho oi)en that he couhl have massed his entire command 
 just beliind the ridge which overlooked the l)ranch. 
 
 In the delivery of this 1.30 order, the concurrent testimony of Capt. 
 Douglas Pope and the two orderlies is that no time was lost in start- 
 ing or delay experienced in moving along l)eyond the incidental ones of 
 the momentary meeting with General jNIcDowell and occasional rough 
 places on the Manassas and Dudley Si)rings road below New Market. 
 
 Captain Pope swore (Board's Kecord, p. 500) that the entire distance 
 from iStone house to where he met petitioner could have been galloped 
 over, except perhaps 300 yards. 
 
 However, it is hardly necessary to discuss this point, as all three wit- 
 nesses say that in their judgment they were not an hour — not more than 
 three-quarters of an hour — in riding <l(^\vn. Of course if Lieutenant 
 AVeld could go from petitioner to General Pope in an hour with all the 
 intermediate delays he experienced, then Captain Pope could go from 
 General Po]>e to petitioner in less time with an urgent message. 
 
 A point has l)een raised b> petitioner that Captain I*ope should have 
 seen King's or Eicketts' division while en route. It must, however, be 
 remembered — 
 
 1st, as to King's division : Heintzelman's diary reports it as arrived on 
 the main held at 3.45 p. m. (Board's liecord, p. Oil). It had, we know, 
 been previously supporting Ivcynolds' movements until General Pope 
 decided to put it in anotlier position. Patrick's brigade, which formed 
 the rear of King's division, under Hatch, when it uioved up the Sudley 
 Springs road, first halted at Conrad's above where Capt. Douglas Pope 
 struck the road, and afterwards (as well as Doubledays brigade. Board's 
 Eecord, p. O.SS) moved west, into the shoulder of woods northwest ot 
 Conra<l's, and afterwards west of the line of road by Chinn's Branch down 
 which Captain Pope came (Board's Eecord, p. 189), so that of course 
 Captain Pope did not, to his recollection, see any of King's division. 
 Cai>tain Pope also said (Board's Eecord, p. 572) that while he did not 
 meet any organized body of troops from the time he struck the Sudley 
 Springs' road until he met the petitioner, yet that lie thought there 
 were Union troops and wagons all along on his left on tlie Sudley 
 Springs road as he came down Chinn's Branch. 
 
 2d. Eelative to Eicketts' division being on the road, it nuist be remem- 
 
190 
 
 bered that after Captain l*oi)e left petitioner, after an intervieAv of fifteen 
 minntes, be went along- np tbe road, stopped at tbe well near Smitb's, 
 and was brongbt back for a furtber interview witb petitioner. Also tbat 
 on bis second jonrney np it was late in tbe day, and after Eicketts bad 
 got np to Henry bonse bill, some of tbat division baving, as we know 
 from Brevet Brigadier-General McCoy's testimony (Board's Eecord, p. 
 (Ul), taken tbe direct army road from ]\raimssas Jnnction wbicb on tbe 
 map nsed bere is called a new road. Tbe advantage of baving sncb a 
 road, as sbown by tbe movements dnring tbe war, nndonbtedly caused it 
 to be regnlarly made a county road wbeu peace came. Tbere was also a 
 road i)arallel to tbe Sudley road wbicb left it westerly at F. M. Lewis' 
 bouse, ran uortb tbrougb B. F. Lewis' and Steers to AYbeeler's ; wbat tbe 
 latter (;alls an army road. (Board's Eecord, p. 981.) 
 
 WHAT PETITIONER DID ON RECEIPT OF 4.30 ORDER? 
 
 AVe are now brongbt to tbe consideration of wbat petitioner did wbeu 
 be received tbe 4.30 order. 
 
 Tbat order imperatively required bim to j;?(s/t foricard at once into ac- 
 tion on tbe enemy's rigbt flank. 
 
 He bad received it at 5.15 p. m., or, witb furtber allowance, 5.30 p. ni. 
 
 He says bere, in tbe closing argument of bis counsel (Mr. Maltby), 
 tbat 0.30 p. m., an bour later, was some time before dark. 
 
 ]Jid be do anytbing to carry out bis urgent orders I Did be move at 
 once forward ? For if be was, as be says, apprebensive of attack and 
 ready for defense, be must also bave been ready for assault. 
 
 Tbe answer is, be nmde at tbe utmost only tbe feeblest momentary 
 eftorts — tbe merest pretense, and tben put bis troops into bivouac, after 
 marcbing some to the rear. 
 
 His own witness, Brigadier-General Sykes, division commander, con- 
 Aicts bim of tbe cbarge. 
 
 It is a melancboly story, but must be repeated. 
 
 On tbe original trial Sykes swore, on cross-examination, after saying 
 tbat be was witb tbe petitioner wbeu an officer brongbt bim tbe order 
 from General Pope, as follows (G. C. M .Eecord, pp. 177, 3 78) : 
 
 Question by Judge-Advocate. Did General Porter make kno i\n to you tlie char- 
 acter of that order ? 
 Answer. He did not. 
 
 Question. Did he read it in your presence ? 
 Answer. Not that I know of. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain with General Porter on that occasion, after the 
 receipt of this order f 
 Answer. I continued with liiin from that time all night. 
 
 (Question. You had then, as I nndvrstand you to saif, no knowledge that a positive order 
 had been yiren bi) (General Pope on that afternoon for General Porter to attaek the enemy on 
 their riyht Jiank.' 
 
 Answer. / had no sueh knowled(je. 
 
 Tbe evidence of General Sykes leads direcfly to tbe conclusion tbat 
 tbe i»etitioner bad no intention or desire to attack or be would bave told 
 liis division commandei- then and tbere. 
 
 Look at it in any ligbt, tbere was no effort tben, or at any time after- 
 wards on tbat day, to pnt Syk(is' division into position to support or 
 particii)ate in an assault. 
 
 On tills point, tbe evidence of Capt. Donglas Fope is corroborative 
 (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 57): 
 
 Question. AVhat statements, if any, did (Jencral Porter make to you in regard to the 
 movements whicli the order contemidated he should niakef 
 
 Answer. In a conversation which I had with General Porter, after his reading the 
 
191 
 
 order, he explained to me on the map, where tlie enemy had eonie down in force to 
 attacl< him, and had established a battery. I understood him to say that the enemy 
 had opened n])on him; bnt what he had done I do not now remember. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain with General Porter? 
 
 Answer. About titteen minutes. I suppose. 
 
 Question. While you were there, or at any time l)efore yon left, did you observe any 
 orders given or any indication of preparation for a movenient in the direetion of the 
 battle-lield? 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
 Question. In what condition were the troo])s there at that time ? 
 
 Answer. I saAV only a portion of them; the portion that I saw I believe belonged to 
 General Sykes' division. They were on the road between the forks of the road and 
 Maui^^ssas. what small portion of the troojjs I saw that belonged to Gent ral Porter's corjfs. 
 It was my impression they were halted there; I saw the arms of some of them stacked. 
 
 Question. They had their arms stacked .' 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. AVas not the sound of the artillery of the battle then pending distinctly 
 audil)le at that point? 
 
 Answer. It was. 
 
 Question. Did you, or not, have another interview Avith General Porter after that 
 time ? 
 
 Answer. I di<l not. After receiving a written rc])ly to the order I had delivered to 
 General Porter, I started on my way back, and I supjiose I had got a mile or a mile 
 ami a half from where General Porter was, when I was overtaken l)y an ornlerly, who 
 said General Porter wished to see me. I got part way back when I met an officer, I 
 supjjosed an aide-de-camp, of General Porter, who said that General Porter wished to 
 see me. I went back and tliis aide-de-camp tokl me I better wait a few minutes. I did 
 not see General Poiter then. 
 
 Question. Had you, or not, seen this officer whom yon snjjposed to l)e an aide-de- 
 camp, during your tirst interview with General Porter? 
 
 Answer. I had, and had had a Cftnversation with him. 
 
 Question. In the presence of General Porter '! 
 
 Answer. While General Porter was writing the reply to the order I had delivered to 
 him. 
 
 Question. What seemed to be his rank ? 
 
 Answer. He was a lirst lieutenant, I think. 
 
 Question. Did he, or not, perform any act or make any remark in the presence of 
 General Porter which induced you to believe that he was an aide-de-camp? If so, 
 state what that remark and what that act was. 
 
 Answer. I do not remember his making any remark to General Porter, or General 
 Porter saying anything to him. My impression is that he told me that he was an aide-de- 
 camp. I tirmly belicM'd at the time that he was General Porter's aide-de-camp. I did 
 not see any act imlicating that, excepting that he was associated with General Portei- ; 
 he was very close to General Porter at the time I had the conversation with him ; within 
 hearing of General Porter if he had listened to it. 
 
 Question. Do you, or not, suppose that his statement to you, that he was an aide- 
 de-camp of General Porter, could have been heard by General Porter if he had been 
 listening to your conversation ? 
 
 Answer. It could. 
 
 Question. Do I or not understand you, then, to say that that conversation occurred 
 in fact in the presence of General Porter ? 
 
 Answer. In the presence of General Porter; yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Were you, or not, charged by that officer with a message to General Pope 
 that a scout had come in. reporting that the enemy were retreating through Thorough- 
 fare Gap 1 
 
 Answ<'r. I was. 
 
 Question. Did you regard that message as given to you seriously or jestingly ? 
 
 Answer. Seriously. 
 
 Question. How long a time had elapsed from the time of your interview with Gen- 
 •eral I'orter until your return to General Porter's encampment ? 
 
 Answer. About three-ipiarters of an hour, I supi)0se: between that and an hour. 
 
 Question. On your return to his encampment, did you or not oliserve any prepara- 
 tion on the part "of his officers or of the troops for an advance ni)on the enemy ? 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
 And on cross-examinatiou as follows : 
 
 Question. When you were brought back by the orderly and the aide de camp, as 
 jou supposed him to be, you did not find General Porter. Do you know where he 
 then was ? 
 
192 
 
 Answer. I did not. 
 
 Question. Did anythinj; occur to induce you to believe that General Porter had gone 
 to the front .' 
 
 Answer. There did not. I sup]ios<'d he had just walked off a sliort distance, and 
 would he 1)ack in a few minutes. 
 
 Question. From the time when ytui arrived to deliver the order to General Porter, 
 up to the time of yonr second de))arture from General Porter's location to go towards 
 (General Poi>e, about what jieriod of time elapsed ? 
 
 Answer. I shoidd sn))pose about an hour. It may have been a little more than an 
 hour. I should think at least an hour. 
 
 Question. How long did yon stay at General Porter's headqnarterB or location, after 
 you were brought back by the orderly and the aide-de-cam]> f 
 
 Answer. A veiy few minutes. 
 
 (.Question. Would you say live or ten minutes ? 
 
 Answer. Aliout ten minutes. 
 
 Question. Did we understand you correctly to say that it was about fifteen minutes 
 after you delivered the order to General Porter before you tirst started on your return / 
 
 Answer. It was about tifteen minutes. 
 
 Question. The remainder of the hour, then, which you spent near General Porter'.s 
 ocation, was passed in yourgoiug about a ijiile and a half and returning about a mile 
 and a half, and .some ten minutes' further delay in General Porter's camp ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Will you state, if you please, at what point General Pope was when you 
 received from him the order of which you have spoken 1 
 
 Answer. I cannot state exactly where it was. It Avas on the battle-field, the ex- 
 treme right of it. 
 
 Intent may be gatliered from acts as well as words. 
 
 This petitioner, with his headquarters -§ miles from the head of his 
 column, never went to the front on receipt of the order, but permitted 
 General Pope's army to attack Avitlumt rendering the slightest assistance. 
 
 While all along the center and right, according to Heintzelman's diary, 
 a direct attack was l)eing made, and while Kearney was rolling the 
 enemy up on Jackson's left, and King's division of McDowell's corps was 
 gallantly pushing in down the turnpike against Hood and Evans and 
 Wilcox in sui)port of Longstreet's command, this petitioner was calmly 
 reposing at his headquarters, while the good, true-hearted men of the 
 Fifth Corps, at the head of his column, held by his commands to a state 
 of inaction, heard, with impatience that they could not do their share, 
 the cheers of our brave soldiers. When the rebel yells indicative of Con- 
 federate successes rose on the evening air, grief and indignation tilled the 
 breasts of even the private soldiery at the head of that inactive column. 
 They knew they had not done their part, and when, on the next after- 
 noon, they were moved into action up by the school-house against an 
 enemy, re-enforced by the Confederate li. H. General Anderson's large 
 division (Board's Eecord, p. 01,) and S. ]). Lee's artillery, although their 
 own numbers were reduced at least 2,300 by the absence of Brigadier- 
 General Piatt and of Brigadier-General Griffin at Centreville, tliey stood 
 up courageously against tlie rebel artillery which mowed their ranks, and 
 the battery of Chapman which unopposed enfiladed them fearfully, until 
 human nature coukl stand no moie. 
 
 Sullenly retiring, tliey felt they had vindicated the honor of their corps 
 from the stain put ui)on it by this i)etitioner's conduct of the day before. 
 
 I have not inquired into the action of the 30tli, nor brought Chapman 
 or others to sliow how they were X)ermitted to do their dreadful work 
 unchecked, becau.se what petitioner did on the 30th was ruled out on the 
 trial in 1S02. 
 
 We know incidentally that, with the exception of a section, this ]>eti- 
 tioner never brought his artillery into action on the .'iOth during that 
 assault. We also kuow tliat Gritlin's brigade went to Centreville and 
 never came up during all the action of the 30th, wliile Piatt's brigade, 
 of Sturgis' division, which followed Grillin, did move u]» ami lost heavily. 
 (G. C. M. Kec, pp. 107, 140.) 
 
193 
 
 The responsibility for tlie absence of Griffin ap^jears not to hnvQ de- 
 pended on the petitioner. The division commander, Morell. was with it 
 there, and the galhmt lUittertiehl led tlie remainder of Moreli's division, 
 
 Ketnrning to the consideration of the I'Utli, Me see that General Lee 
 had formed a jiood estimate as to what this petitioner might do, and was 
 in nowise apprehensive, for he bronght back Wilcox's division to the 
 snpport of Hood from the point sontli of the pike, to which he had sent 
 it late in the day, when he received information of approach of j\Iajor- 
 General Banks' brigade of observation from Bristoe. 
 
 The enemy had no available reserves beyond those in line. Jackson's 
 men were exhausted, their ammnnition nearly spent, and the cliances 
 for victory for the Union were good. All the prospects of snccess were 
 blasted by the petitioner's conduct. 
 
 He has said in the closing argnments, throngh his connsel, substan- 
 tially, that if guilty he ought to have been shot. He had, however, his 
 formerand subsequent services under ]\Iajor-General ]\[cClellan to i>lead 
 tV»r him. The members of the court were largely his personal friends, 
 and to these circumstances may possibly be ascribed its leniency. 
 
 Tlie history of the American Army gives but one other comparative 
 illustration, and that is in the case of Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, the second 
 in command, who was charged Avith having at the battle of Monmouth, 
 in June, 1778, made a shameful and disorderly retreat without engag- 
 ing the enemy. He pleaded that he did not believe General Washing- 
 ton desired him to attack and that he did make certain efforts. The 
 court found him guilty and sentenced him to suspension for one year. 
 After its expiration Congress dismissed him, believing, doubtless, the 
 punishment was too mild. 
 
 History has since shown with great directness, tliat he was not loyal 
 to Washington or to the hitter's plans of campaign. 
 
 The x>C'titioner, through his counsel, now says there was no goieral 
 battle or continuous battle on the 29th. This is a recession from the 
 first effort to prove that there was nothing but an "artillery" duel. 
 
 The reason there was no (jenenil battle, or continuous line of battle to 
 confront the enemy, was because this petitioner during the day did not 
 go into position or make any vigorous or sustained movement to con- 
 nect with the Union Army on his right. Had he done so, the country 
 would possibly have been spared the disaster of the following day — 
 the invasion of Maryland and battles of Sharpsburg and Antietam. 
 
 When he received the 4.30 order he knew that his force was needed 
 by his commanding general. He made no attempt to actually engage the 
 enemy or aid the troops who were already lighting greatly superior num- 
 bers, and were relying on the Hank attack to secure a decisive victory 
 and to capture the enemy's army. This the court of nine general offi- 
 cers which tried petitioner believed undoubtedly would have been the 
 result, or they would not have convicted him on that particular specifi- 
 cation. 
 
 Petitioner had placed before them the evidence of officers on his 
 skirmish line and at the front as to what he and they believed and 
 knew. Unfortunately the want of judicial authority in this Board ab- 
 solutely prevents any effort to ascertain whether any weight was given 
 to any witnesses' opinion on matters in which the court themselves were 
 experts. 
 
 He himself estimated Longstreet at from 10,000 to 15,000 strong; 
 and the court, as military experts, came to its conclusion, which the law 
 permitted. As their decision was based on their judgment of the prol)- 
 able results on a given state of facts, it was final and conclusive. 
 
194 
 
 The petitioner here, liowever, adds 10,000 to Long-street, and asks this 
 Board to pnt its judgment as militarj' experts against the nine. 
 
 If such were permissibk^ as a rule of practice, we shoukl never have 
 a final <hnerniiiiation in any case involving special professional knowl- 
 edge and oi>iiiions. 
 
 petitionee's movements to the eeak. 
 
 The petitioner has strenuously insisted before tliis Board tliat he did 
 not "retreat" during the I'Oth and that there was nothing in the natiu^e 
 of a retreat in any of his movements. 
 
 Tills point is vital to his assumed case, because he was convicted of 
 shamefully falling- l>ack and retreating from the advance of the enemy 
 without any attempt to give them battle . 
 
 In the crime of larceny it is sufficieut to prove that the article stolen 
 was taken from its place by a person with felonious i^^Yf^r to ai)propriate 
 it to his own use, knowing it to be the property of another, even if pos- 
 session is retained 1)ut momentarily. The (jht of the offense is the intent, 
 iind the one in question is analogous. 
 
 It was not necessary for the petitioner to fall back to Manassas Junc- 
 tion, or four, three, or two miles, in order to complete the offense of which 
 he was convicted. It was sufficient to show that he did move liack and 
 conceal his troops so that the enemj' considered them no longer an object 
 of special attention. 
 
 If he retired even a hundred yards with intent not to give battle 
 Mhen other parts of the army were engag-ed, and he Jcneic or had any 
 icamn to suppose assistance teas needed, he failed in his duty under the 
 military laws of his country. 
 
 The petitioner cannot say with propriety that he did not know help 
 was needed, because his own dispatch to Morell to push over and help 
 Sigel — "See if you cannot help Sigel" — (No. 28), conclusively answers 
 it. In his closing- argument on his trial he also spoke of General Pope's 
 "hard-pressed left." (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 278.) 
 
 Xow, wliat did he do looking towards falling l)ack when he should 
 liave been pushing foncard F 
 
 First. We have his orders to Col. E. G. Marshall, Tliirteenth XewYork 
 Volunteers, when he went forward with his regiment as skirmishers, 
 before JMcDowell came up, " not to bring- on an engagement," although 
 there was a contest then going on on the right, which Marshall soon 
 after saw from rear of his skirmish hue." (Board's Eecord, p. 678.) 
 
 Second. His order to Brigadier-General Sturgis, immediately after the 
 first shots from the liattery off on the right front, for him to go back 
 Avith Piatt's brigade to Manassas Junction and take up a defensive posi- 
 tion. We know the brigade marched nearly if not quite back to the 
 Junction, and did not get again up near its most advanced position until 
 about dusk. (Board's Eecord, p. 712.) 
 
 Third. His orders to Morell (Xo. 30) to " move the infantry and every- 
 tliing behind the crest and conceal the guns. We must hold the place 
 ami nudce it hot for them. Come the same-game over them they do over 
 us, and get your men out of sight." 
 
 Xow, this hide-and-seek g-ame which this ]>etitioner thus early began 
 in that day (Board's Eecord, ]>. 422,) was in consequence of Morell's first 
 <lispatchtohim,in which he said (No. 30) that Cohmel Marshall reported 
 two batteries to have come down in the woods on their riuht towards the 
 
 
195 
 
 railroad ami two rcgiiiieiits of ijifantry on the road. Moiell tliereforo con- 
 cluded with the intimation that "//* 'this he so, it will be hot here in the 
 morning." 
 
 From this it may be inferred — 
 
 First. That Morell doubted the accuracy of the information; and 
 
 Second. That, if true, tliere would prohahh/ he enoiujh of the enemy 
 come down dnrinr/ the remainder of the day and niyht to nlalce it '^ hot '^ for 
 petitioner's corps by the ncrt mornimj ; and 
 
 . Petitioner, miles to tlu^ rear, does not accept Marshall's aiul Morell's 
 report and conclusions, although for other purposes he asserts tlie utmost 
 confidence in them. 
 
 The pretense, however, of two regiments and two batteries near Ins 
 front as an obstacle is sufticient for his purjioses. 
 
 ]Morell then reported (dispatch Xo. ol) that he could move every- 
 thing out of sight except Hazlitt's battery, which was on the right of 
 the road, with Grifrtn's brigade on its right supporting it, principally in 
 the pine bushes. Also that "the other batteries and brigades are retired 
 out of sight.'"' 
 
 Morell then asked of his commander at tlie rear, "' Is this what you 
 mean by everything ?'^ To which petitioner replied : 
 
 I think yon can move Hazlitt's, or the most of it, and post him in the bnslies, with 
 the others, so as to deceive. I would get everything, if possible, in ambuscade. All 
 (jocs well with the other troops. 
 
 Sergt. John Bond., First Maryland Cavalry, a go^'ernment Avitness, 
 testified as follows (Board's Eecord, p. 882) : 
 
 Question. What did yon then ih» ? 
 
 Answer. I then retire(t to ilanassas .luncriou. 
 
 Question. AVliere did you come to a stop .' 
 
 Answer. I first met a lot of troops and I met a group of officers : one of them said 
 "Where from, sergeant ?" I said, "The battle-tield"; he says, "What news'?" I says, 
 "Good"; he says, "Do I understand you to say we are holding our own .^" I says, 
 "Yes, we have diiven the enemy"; he says, "Do I understand you we are liolding our, 
 own?" I says, "Yes"; lie re]>eated that ipu'stion three times. He says, "Youcaugo." 
 1 went oft" a short distance IVom where I was talking with the geiieral, and I asked 
 them Avho that general was ; they tohl me it was (Tcneral Porter. 
 
 Question. Did you return to the battle-tield then ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. After that time what indications were tliere of any battle going on ? 
 
 Answer. I conld hear tiring off and on. 
 
 Question. How long after that did you hear tiring .' 
 
 Answer. I couht not exactly sa\. 
 
 Question. With. relation to sunset or (tark '. 
 
 Answer. I could not exactly say : it was more or less the whole afternoon. 
 
 The next dispatch (Xo. 28) from petitioner was the one to Morell to 
 push over and aid Sigel, of the result of which we know. (Board's Eec- 
 ord, p. 423.) 
 
 If the petitioner at the time of that dispatch had hioivn or heUeved the 
 enemy in his front in the force he now pretends, he would never — being, 
 as he'claims he was at that time, an independent corps commander — 
 have given any su<'li order to Morell, unless in obedience to what Mc- 
 Dowell <lirected before he left him on the railroad. 
 
 Still later in the day he sends this interesting and suspicious dispatcb 
 to Morell : 
 
 Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is passing ? 
 
 This he now explains as countermamling the order to push over to aid 
 Sigel. 
 
 14 Cr 
 
196 
 This Ava.s followed by dispatch Xo. 32 to Morell, as follows : 
 
 Tell me what is ]mRsing quickly. If the enemy is coming, hohl to liim, and I -will 
 eo!ne np. Post yonr men to repulse hiin. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Jlajor-Cleucral. 
 
 Moroll now began to understand matters a little better, and sent this 
 dispatch in reply (Xo. 35) : 
 
 Col. ilai'shall reports a movement in front of his left. I think we had hettev 
 retire. Xa bif<tutr>i oi i^UjIit, taid 1 am L-ontinnUKj the iiioriincut. Stay where yon are, to 
 aid me if necessary. 
 
 MORELL. 
 
 Although there was no inlantry of the enemy in sight, the senior 
 division commander now thought they "had better retire," but seems 
 apprehensive his commander will fall back in advance of him. 
 
 The petitioner now concluded to give an order with a view to finding- 
 out a little about the force of two regiments reported on his front ; so he 
 assured ]Morell in a dispatch (Xo. 30) that he had all within reach of him, 
 and then said : 
 
 I wish you to give the enemy a good shelling, without wasting annnnnirion, and 
 push at the same time ii party over to see what is going on. Jf'c cannot retire while 
 McDowell lioJds /u'« own. 
 
 This shelling' does not seem to have taken place, though if the enemy 
 had been present in the force he pretends they were, he would never, on 
 his assumi)tion as to his own inferiority of force, have given such an 
 order to shell the enemy. 
 
 Late in the day Colonel Marshall sent Morell another report, as follows 
 (Xo. 34): 
 
 General Moi;kll: 
 
 Tlie enemy must Tie in much larger force than I can see ; from the commands of the 
 officers, £ nhouJd jmhje a bri(jade. They are endeavoring to come in on our left, and 
 have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on leit as the movement of artillery. 
 Their advance is quite close. 
 
 E. G. MARSHALL, 
 
 Col. IWi X. Y. 
 
 AVhen Marshall reported two regiments of infantry on his front on the 
 road, petitioner immediately moved back all his own forces. 
 
 Xow that Marshall rei)orted a brigade about p. m., the petitioner 
 gave orders for an attack, a;id he declares he did it of his own volition, 
 and not in conseipience of receipt of the 4,.')0 p. m. order. 
 
 Assuming it was done of his own volition, we can possibly foiiu some 
 idea of the amount of force under Longstreet he flioi bclicrcd was in his 
 front. 
 
 August 29/;*. 
 General ^r<)ni:r,L: 
 
 I wish you to ])ush up two regiments, su)iported hy two others, preceded by skii'- 
 mishers, tlie regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the section of 
 artillery o]>posed to you. 
 
 The />rt///e works well on our right, and the enemy aic said to be retiring up the 
 pike. 
 
 Give the enemy a good shelling as our troops adyauce. 
 
 F. J. POINTER, 
 Maj. Gtn'l Commund'g. 
 
 Thus did the ix'titioner wait until late in the day before issuing" any 
 orders to move forward, or engage even, until induced to do so by informa- 
 tion of success on the right of our line. 
 
 If he really belie\'ed Longstreet was in his front with five, ten, fifteen, 
 twenty, or t\yenty-fi\e tliousund men, it re(|uires no argunumt to show 
 
197 
 
 that tliose "two regiments supported by two otliers," ordered by liiin 
 to attack, Avould liave been destroyed in a few moments. 
 
 The character of the order shows he knew well what sort of o])era- 
 tions he should have undertaken, if necessary, early in the day. 
 
 In his opening statement (p. ."iS) he says as follows, viz: '■'■That ahout 
 C) (jclocJc /((rorahle reports from the right icing, Ht((ting that the enemg iras 
 retiring up the pihe, indnced me to direct General Morrell to attach:^ By 
 the rerg order jn.st quoted, to attach- with tn^o regiments, dr. 
 
 - Xeverthele.ss, assuming his otcn^ carefulhiiyrepared opening statement to 
 he correct <(s to ivhat he did at that time, he sent the follou-i'ng. dispatch to 
 Major-General McDowell, which constitutes one of those lately found hg the 
 latter, viz: 
 
 Geii'l McDowell: Failed in getting ilorcll over to yon. After wanderino- al.>out 
 the woods for a time I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened on iis. My 
 sconts could uot get through. Eaeh <me found the enemy hetween us, and 1 helieve 
 some have heen captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a hattery, 
 hut have not succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports 
 of scouts, think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please conuuuuicate the 
 way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know 
 your designs; whether you retire or not. 1 cannot get water and am out of provision. 
 Have lost a few men from infantrv tiring. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 iloj. Gen. Wila. 
 
 Aro. 29—6 p.m. 
 
 In this dispatch it is to be noticed he says, "Infantry are also in 
 front"; and yet a previous dis[)atch of Morell to petitioner said, " Xo 
 infantry in sight" (Xo. o.")). 
 
 These statements and dispatches speak for themselves ; th(\v are abso- 
 lutely and umpialitiedly unreconcilable, and no language which can be 
 used will add to the force of the contrast. 
 
 At sunset petitioner says he arrested his order to Morell to attack 
 with two regiments by dispatch Xo. o^, and ordered him to i>ut his men 
 in i)osition to remain during the night, remarking, also, that 3IcDowell 
 says all goes well and we are getting the best of the tight, and concluded 
 the dispatch as follows : 
 
 Keep me informed. Troops are pussingui» toGainesville, j>((.v/((////tlieencmy. * *^ * 
 
 He admits that at tinie of writing this last dispatch Just quoted he 
 had received tieneral I'ope's 4.30 (uxler to attack at once, and yet, although 
 he knew our troops on the right were in action and moving into action, 
 he i)ut his own corps into bivouac. 
 
 Was it that he did not propose to lend a helping hand to General 
 .lohn Pope to win a decisive victory .' AVe shall see when the subject 
 of ''animus'" is considered. 
 
 "Whether the petitioner did fall back and withdraw fnun the contest 
 into which duty should have led him or not, the dispatches just quoted 
 aftbrd strong indications that he put his troops far enough out of the way 
 to render them of no avail Avhatever to General Pope's army. 
 
 A reference to some of the evidence will further elucidate this. 
 
 Col. Benjamin F. Smith, One hundred and twenty-sixth Ohio Volun- 
 teers, called for government, testified in I8G2 as follows (G. C. 31. Rec- 
 ord, p. 112): 
 
 By the Judge-Advocatk : 
 
 Question. Will you state your position in the military service of the United States? 
 
 Answer. I am a^ captain of the Sixth Regular Infantry, and colonel of the One hun- 
 dred and twentv-sixth Regiment of Ohio Volunteers. 
 
 Question. Will you state to the court whether you were serving with any part of 
 the Armv of Virgiiiia, connnanded by Major-General Pope, on the days of the 27th, 28thj 
 29th. and 30th of August last ; and "if so, in what brigade and division ? 
 
198 
 
 Au.swor. I was serving in Colonel Chapan's brigade, of General Sykes' division. 
 
 Question. la what directiou did that brigade march ou- Friday, the 29th of August 
 last ? 
 
 Answer. "We had marched from Fredcritksbnrg, by way of Warrentou Junction, 
 and arrived at Manassas Junction, I think, on the 2'Jth of August, the day before the 
 battle of Bull Knn. We ai'rived exactly at the jtlace where the raihoad had Ijeen de- 
 stroyed ; the wreck of the train was there, and there we halte<l. I^ater in the day, in 
 the morning, we retraced our steps to the branch railroad running, I think, towards 
 Gainesville or Manassas Gap, and followed the direction of that road some few miles. 
 We then halted on some rising ground, where we could see the country beyond, over the 
 woods, the tops of the trees. It was a wooded country. While we were halted there 
 a battery of the rebels opened upon us, but tired some three or four shells only, I think ; 
 there may have been a half a dozen. Our brigade then marched into a field, and the 
 regiments wvve placed in order of battle. I recollect that General Morell's division 
 was in our advance, on the lower grouml. Some of our pieces replied to this reljel 
 battery. I received permission from the commanding officer of my regiment to go to 
 a more elevated piece of ground, a few rods distant, and while there I saw our batte- 
 ries rex)ly. 
 
 A short time afterwards (probably half an hour) we received orders to retrace our 
 steps, and march back in the direction we had come. We then marched Itack to near 
 Manassas Jnnetit)n, and camped in the woods aJoinjmdc this hninvli railroad I hare men- 
 tioned. That night I was placed on duty as the field otticer of the jtickets of Sykes' 
 division. About daylneak the pickets were called in, and we marched towards the 
 battle-field of Hull Knn, and were engaged in that l)attle. 
 
 Question. What was the efi'ect of the reply of your guns to this attack of the rebel 
 battei-y :' 
 
 Answei'. It seemed to silence that battery, and it withdrew. At least that was the 
 impression I had at the time. 
 
 Question. What amount of infantry force, if any, did there seem to be supporting 
 this rebel battery ? 
 
 Answer. I did not see them. 
 
 Qut'stion. Before you received orders to fall back and retrace your steps along this 
 road, had or had not this rebel battery been completely silenced ? 
 
 Answer. I think it had been. 
 
 Question. Were there or not, at that time, clouds of dust in view, showing an ad- 
 vance of the enemy ? 
 
 Answer. Clouds of dust were distinctly visible further over beyond the trees. Whether 
 there were trooiis advancing, or whether they were moving in another direction, I 
 could not tell. I could see distinctly the clouds of dust as if there was a large body of 
 troo]is moving. 
 
 Question. Did you or not see the accused, General Porter, at the head of the column 
 on that day ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I do not recollect of seeing General Porter at all that day. 
 
 Question. Did you or not see General McDowell that day ? 
 
 Answer. I saw General McDowell before we airived aj; the hill or rising ground I 
 have s])oken of. 
 
 Question. Do you or not know whether General McDowell had left the command 
 before this engagemeut with the rebel battery took place ? 
 
 Answer. I do not recollect about that. 
 
 Question. Will yon state at what hour on that evening you arrived at your eiicami)- 
 ment near Manassas Junction f 
 
 Answer. It was some time in the afternoon, I think ; I do not recollect distinctly. 
 
 Question. Was it nightfall ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; it was )>efore night. I went on dut\- to post niv }»ickets just at 
 dark. 
 
 Question. Was there or not any such display of the enemy's forces as to make it 
 necessary, in your judgment, to retreat before them? 
 
 Answer. I had no means of knowing. W^hen we mo^■<■d back from that ])osition I 
 su)tposed it was for some proper cause, but I did not understand at all what the cause 
 was. I did not iect'i\e any impression that we were retreating from the enemy. I 
 sii]ij)osed tliat we were making a reconnaissance to feel the eni'my in that direction, 
 aud, iiaving found him, that we ha<l moved back for some other purjjose ; and, not 
 knowing about tlie ordei's to the general, I remained under that impression. The ex- 
 amination by the Judge-Advocate here closed. 
 
 Examination hy the accused: 
 Question. Do you recollect the road over which you marched the following morning, 
 till! :}Oth of August, going up to tlie battlefield '! 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question, Was your camp near the junction of that roal aul the railoal ? 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
199 
 
 Question. W;is that road near to Manassas Jnnftion ? 
 
 Answer. I tliouglit it was about a mile or two troui the junction. 
 
 Question. It was not at the junction ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Do you rocollcet Bethlehem Church? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. By lookin,2,- at the map do you think you cou!;l reco,j;ni;':e the [);)int where 
 you were? 
 
 Answer. I mi,2;ht. 
 
 Question. Look at the niap I)el'ore tlie court, if you ^ilease, and point out the pLice, 
 it you can. 
 
 Answer. (After looking at the map.) I recollect that where our brigaile lay the 
 railroad was in view, and also the road we took next moniing-. 
 
 Question. According to the measurement upon the map, an imdi to tlie mile, how far 
 is that from Manassas .Junction ? 
 
 Answer. It is ^jrohahly some two miles. 
 
 Qiu'stion. When you say that the rebel battery Avas silenced, do you mean that it 
 was incapacitated, or that it ceased tiring, or was withdrawn ? 
 
 Answer. I thonght it was withdrawn. 
 
 Examination by the accused here closed. 
 
 Examination hij the court : 
 
 Question. At what time on the 2Tth of August did your division arrive at AVarren- 
 ton Junction, and how far had it marched that day .^ 
 
 Answer. I am under the impression that Ave arrived there about noon ; the time of 
 the day is not fixed distinctly on my mind. I do not recollect the camp beyond War- 
 renton, Avhich we left ; I nnght recall it by looking on the map. (Examining the map. ) 
 We marched from some point on this road (indicating on the uuip the road referred to) 
 by Bealtoil, and then down the side of the track to Warrenton. 
 
 Question. Was your brigade? the leading brigade? 
 
 Answer. I do not recollect whether it led that day or not. 
 
 The examination of this witness Avas here closed. 
 
 Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin, called on tlie trial for petitioner ((t. C. M. 
 Eecord, p. 102), after referring to General McDowell's arrival at Daw- 
 kins' IJrancli and going- to the right, testified as follows: 
 
 I received an order almost directly after General McDowell had left to recall my pickets 
 [Sixty-second PenusylAania, which Avere deployed in front to the left and south of 
 Thomas Nealon's], and orders to moAe my command to the rUjltt. 
 
 Xow, from whom did that order come ? It nutst have come from thi.s 
 petitioner in eonse<jnence of McDowell's verbal instrnctions and General 
 Pope's orders. The petitioner says, nevertheless, that as he went back 
 to where his troops were he saw the enemy gathering in sncli force in 
 his front, that he had to send down the road towards Manassas Jnuc- 
 tion, to rear of his colnmn, to direct King's division nnder Hatch to 
 remain with him. (Jeneral Griffin further said: 
 
 I attempted to go to the right and moved probably 600 yards, until, with the head of 
 my colunui, I crossed a railroad said to run to Gainesville. HereAvc met with obstruc- 
 tions which Ave could not get through. 
 
 It Avas re})orted by somebody, I cannot say who, '•'You can't get through there." We 
 then faced about and mov<Ml back to the hill Avhere the battery I first referred to was 
 stationed. 
 
 As Ave were getting to this hill the enemy's batteries opened upon us. 
 
 These batteries, the witness said in 18G2 (G. C. ^\. Record, p. 102), 
 opened on petitioner's head of column about one o'clock — the very time 
 Brevet Major-General Stnrgis lixes it (Board's Eecord, ]). 711), but take 
 notice that, up to that moment, after Griffin had been withdrawn, the 
 petitioner did not believe the enemy were in force in his front, as is 
 apparent from his conversation with Sturgis. 
 
 ;My brigade Avas then placed in position in rear and to the right of the batteries, and 
 remained there during considerable artillery tiring ; I cannot say how long. ^ =^ " 
 
200 
 
 Fintlier, as to tlie eucMiiy and lary'C clouds of dust which he noticed 
 from Thoi'ou<ihfai'c Gap, witness said: 
 
 I havf stated tliat the oiieiny si-euicd to l)c coming' from Tlioionj;]ifarc Ga]!. Ini'act, 
 tlicre is no donbt if that point was Thoroughfare Gap, that the enemy was ctnuing 
 throngh there all clcuj. 
 
 Xeitlier ])etitioner nor Lougstreet have claimed here that the latter 
 had more than 135,000 meu present at any time during the 29th of Au- 
 gust, so tliat ]»etitioner's statement on his trial that lu^ believed Long- 
 street had a force present on the 20th of between 10,000 and 15,000 men 
 was nearer the truth. (G. C. M. Eec, p. 2()0.) 
 
 On cross-examination as to the obstacles which made him retire wlum 
 going to the riglit and the efforts he made to overcome them, Brigadier- 
 General Griftin said : 
 
 I led otf my column. We ran )ip into some little, thick pine Imslies. We halted tlua'C. 
 The next order I got was to move back again. 
 
 Some one reported that we could not get throngh. I made no reconnaissance what- 
 ever myself. 
 
 Further on he was questioned bv the court as follows (G. C. M. IJec- 
 ord, p. 109) : 
 
 Question. You say that yon had failed to get throngh to the right during the day 
 of the '^ttth August. Will you state what efforts were made by you or by General 
 Porter to get through on the right during the day f 
 
 Answer. 1 mcrchj obeyed ordera. My positwH ivaa at the head of mij Jiv'ujade. What efforts 
 General Porter made I am not aware of. 
 
 After this supporting of batteries, Brigadier-General Griftin evidently 
 received orders from petitioner very similar to those received from peti- 
 tioner by General Sturgis at 1 p. m. when those rebel guns opened, for 
 he says (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 1G3) : " We liad started back towards Man- 
 assas Junction," when afiother order came from petitioner near sundown 
 to attack, and General Griftin says he faced his command about imme- 
 diately and started back. 
 
 He says, as to the point where this order came to hand (G. C. IM. Rec- 
 ord, p. 103) : 
 
 We were i)robably a mile and a half or two miles from the position referred to in uiy 
 previous testimony as occupied by this battery [Hazlitt's U. S. battery]. 
 
 In his examination by the court he said (G. C. M. Rec, p. 108), as to 
 this retreat l)y MorelFs division : " I should think my brigade, as I 
 have stated, mo\'ed a mile and a half or t^^'o miles — not far from a mile 
 and a half." 
 
 Tliis evidence of petitioner's witness was not a})parently satisfactory, 
 for it showed a good deal in the nature of a retreat, and certainly a fall- 
 ing back for a considerable distance. 
 
 MaJ. (L K. AVarren, Corjts of Engineers, who was then colonel Fifth 
 Xew York A'olunteers, ('ommanding a brigade under him, was called 
 before tJiis Board to prove that the falling back was not as great as Grif- 
 lin had said, sixteen years ago, when his recollection was fresh. 
 
 Tliis movement of (xriftin ap])ears to have been hy MorelFs order ami 
 about 5.;)0 ]». m. AVarrcn admits he himself fell back a hunderd yards 
 or so (Board's Record, ]>. 19), but says there w^as no retreat. 
 
 Jn the G ]). m. recently discovered dispatch of jtctitioner to General 
 M(;J)owell last before recited is this remark: 
 
 Failed in getting Morell ov(!r to you. After wanderbuj alioiit (lie woods for a time I 
 witiidrew him, and while doing so artillery opened on us. 
 
 Ilcie, it will be ]»erceived, i>etitioner has re])oited to McDowell that 
 he had made some sort of effort to do what McDowell says he ordered 
 
201 
 
 ordered liiju to do, viz, to put lii.s forces in where they could be joined to 
 the left of General Pope's army. 
 
 Tlio petitioner would not have iiiaile such a report if McDowell had 
 ordered him to hemain where he wan. 
 
 Further, this leport gives as excuses for not getting Morell over that 
 the character of the Moods through wliich he wandered ])i'evented, and 
 that even scouts could not get through, des])ite the fact tliat there was 
 the straight and unobstructed Sudley ^S^jring's road as well as tlu' Fiv(^ 
 Forks road. From the evidence of IJrigadier-General (Irihln jiist above 
 cited (and lie was ]>etitio]ier\s Avitness on his trial,) it is jdaiu that no 
 part of the Fifth Corps "wandered al)out the woods" on that da\'. 
 
 The artillery oi)cning is mentioned as merely a subsccpient iiuiident, 
 and not as the controlling cause, as petitioner would have us believe, 
 why he withdrew ^Morell. 
 
 Ca])t. J. J. Copplngcr^ Twenty-third United States Infantry, then ca])- 
 tain Fourth Infantry, a government witness, testified as follows (Board's 
 Kecord, p. 948) : 
 
 Question. Tlie next inoiniu.n' ynii inarched for what phice ? 
 
 Answer. Manassas .Junction. 
 
 Question. From there, what direction did you take .' 
 
 Answer. Towards Gaini'svilie. 
 
 Question. Do yon recollect a place named Betlileliem Church ? 
 
 Answer. I have an indistinct recollection of a small cliurch on the left of the road. 
 
 Although that church was an indistinguishable mass of ruins accord- 
 ing to the witness Leachman, nevertheless all the witnesses on that 
 road seemed to know that there was a "church" there. All refer to it 
 as Bethlehem Church, and recollect it, and speak of it in their evidence. 
 
 Question. Yon went out on tlnit road; do you recall any incident connected with 
 that nnxrcli out on the voinl towards Gainesville ''. 
 
 Answer. Do you mean the ])assage of other troops? 
 
 (i»nestion. Yiln went out on that road; when did you receive a command to lialt ? 
 
 Answer. When, I think, about two shots close to the edge of a wood — two shots, I 
 think, were tired; just about that moment our command halted. 
 
 Question. From what direction ? 
 
 Answer. Front ami right. 
 
 C^uestion. Then what did yonv regiment and Itrigade do? 
 
 Answer. Halted, and were onlcml lo Javc ((Jwiil. 
 
 Question. Then wliat '! 
 
 Answer. We were marched to the rear in colunni of fours. 
 
 Question. To what i)oiut ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot give yon the point ; hut tin; next jioiiit I recollect is being on a side 
 road which leads otf towards the ))attle-tield of Bull Ivun. I'erlia])s it would be better 
 if I were to sav that my memory of that ))attle-field— I was left on the held between 
 the lines senseless, until the next day, and my meinory of both those days is somewhat 
 sjiasmodic. .Some things 1 see as clearly as anybody 1 see in this room ; and there are 
 intervals r)f which I have a very i)Oor recollection. Now, between the time of our be- 
 ing marched heir, and our being halted, I don't recollect. (Witness indicates points 
 on the nui)).) 
 
 Question. As to this point of fact— these shots being fireil, and you countermarched 
 to the rear— how soon after the shots were tired m as the order for you to move to the 
 rear? 
 
 Answer. I think almost immediately. 
 
 The Board will notice how this witness corroborates what was said l)y 
 the petitioner to General Sturgis after those shots were fired, when 
 Sturgis called his attention to the fact that there nuist be a gun up there; 
 that he had just seen the glint of a gun, and the petitioner said he was 
 mistaken (Board's Eecord, p. 711). 
 
 Question. Do you recall with any certainty how long or how far you marched to 
 the rear? 
 
 Answer. AVe marched (luite a distance to the rear, I think from one to two nules, it 
 
202 
 
 not iiioro ; luit I :iiu almost corraiii that the roiiiniaijd was, "Halt; about face," and 
 within throe niiuutes I think, and perhaps a shorter time, we were in motion to the 
 rear. 
 
 Question. Duriug- that day did you move to the front afj^ain ; if so, when ? 
 
 Auswcr. We were mo\ cd on a cross-road, which led us the next day to the battle- 
 tield. (Witucss indicates in the dirccriou nt'lheSudley Spriugs road.) 
 
 Questiou. AMien did you say you uuule that move at the cross-road ? 
 
 Answer. I canuot give the time. 
 
 Question. Souu> time that day ? 
 
 Answer. In the attcruoon. 
 
 Question. Did you eueaui]) there, or did yon go back again ? 
 
 Answer. We passed the night there; stacked arms, and, I think, lay down by our 
 arms. 
 
 Cnpt. Georf/e M. RanflalJ, Tweiity-tliird United States Infantry, a gov- 
 ernment witness (Board's Eecord, p. 7125), testilied as follows: 
 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Question. On the SUth of August, 1802, whei'e were you, and wliat rank did yon 
 hold in the service ? 
 
 Answer. Second lieutenant. Fourth Infimtry, attached to Sykes' division. 
 
 Question. Where were you on that morning f 
 
 Answer. We were at Bristoe Station. 
 
 Questiou. Moved up from there to Manassas Junction ' 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir ; from Manassas Junction we took position on the Gainesville road 
 beyond Bethlehem Church. 
 
 Question. When you were at Manassas Junction were there any indications of an 
 action f If so, what were they? 
 
 Answer. Ves, I think so; I lieard very distinctly heavy fu-ing ; as near as I can 
 recollect, it was about half past nine or nine o'clock in the' morning. 
 
 Question. How long did you continue to hear thatf 
 
 AnsAvei-. I do not recollect; I heard artillery tiring during the day several times, 
 and I think along about three (n* quarter to four o'clock in the afternoon I heard it 
 again ; (juite a brisk firing at that time. 
 
 Question. How far did you get upon the Manassas and Gainesville road ? 
 
 Answer. I think we moved about three miles, proltably four nules beyond the 
 church. 
 
 Question. Did yon go up to the front ? 
 
 Answer. Very near it, sufficiently far that I could see the opening between our lines 
 and where the rebels were supposed to be ; at that time we were in a belt of timber; 
 the head of the column, as near as I can recollect, halted at the edge of it. 
 
 Question. What indications were there of ah enemy in front of you ? 
 
 Answer. I heard several shots exchanged, and also some few shots from the skir- 
 udsh line. 
 
 Question. Anything more ? 
 
 Answer. That is all. 
 
 Question. Did you see any enemy ? 
 , Answer. I did not. 
 
 Questiou. What did your brigade then do ? 
 
 Answei-. I think some tinu' in the afternoon we countermarched probably about two 
 and a half miles, and then halted and bivouacked for the night. 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt: 
 
 Question. About what time did your comjiauy get up into the fn ut .' 
 
 Answer. I think about eleven o'clock. 
 
 Question. How near to the front were yon ? 
 
 Answer. I su])po8e we were three-quarters of a nule from the front ; suftieiently near 
 so tliat we could see the o]>en space. 
 
 Question. You say three-quarters of a mile from the front; what do von call the 
 front f 
 
 Question. Did yon change your position that day at all to the right or leftf 
 
 Answer. I think not. I think we m()ved to the "rear. 
 
 Question. You have no recollection of being moved back into the woods? 
 
 Answer. 1 think we halted in the woods. 
 
 Question. The only moxc yon made was to march back about two miles ? 
 
 Answer. Ves; that is ;ill fri'collect. 
 
 X^uestion. How far back in the woods were you ? 
 
 * * * » -if. * * 
 
 Question. Will you mark the point to which you suppose you went back ? 
 
203 
 
 Answer. We went back about two and a half miles or two miles, Imt the exaet ]ioint 
 it is impossible for me to mark ; we may have moved up lirra [in the woods] and taken 
 a zigzag. 
 
 Question. Then you took your position in tlie woods, and tlien yon siibse(^nenfly 
 countermarched toward Bethleliem Churcli. Now, I want to know whether yon made 
 any otlier movement after yon had passed Bethlehem Church, and got up toward 
 Dawkins' Branch, except first to march to the point where you first halted, then you 
 got into the woods, aud afterward countermarched about two nules back to IJetlile- 
 hein Church ; did you make any otlier movenuMit during tluit day '! 
 
 Answer. Xo, sir. 
 
 Question. Will you exphiin what you nu'an by countermarcliing in that particular 
 instance.^ 
 
 Answer. W(^ man-lied to the front, and then faced the column about and went to 
 the rear. 
 
 Question. Did you countermarch by brigade ? 
 
 Answer. By regiiiients and brigades, as near as I can recollect. 
 
 Question. By whi(di, regiments or brigades? 
 
 Answer. By brigades, I think. 
 
 Question. You were in the leading brigade as you Avent forward ? 
 
 Answer. I was in the leading brigade, Sykes' division. 
 
 Question. When you countermarched audmarched to the rear, where were the other 
 two brigades of the division 1 
 
 Answer. I think they were going to the rear. 
 
 Question. You did not pass them ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; I think not. 
 
 Question. Did you march in the road, going back ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, as near as I can recollect. 
 
 The late Bvt. Ma]. Geii. Robert C. Bucliaiian, U. S. A., retiretl, called 
 by petitioner before this Board (Board's Becord, i). 215), testified as to 
 the moveuients of the brigade he coiainanded in Brigadier-General Sykes' 
 division, after they left Manassas Jnnction on the 29th, as follows : 
 
 Question. Which way did you move then ? 
 
 Answer. We had been moving l)y the right tiank ; we then moved by the left tiank : 
 we moved down by the road Avhicli takes us near a church, which I have since beard 
 called Bethlehem Church, in the direction of Gainesville. 
 
 Question. Where did you halt then '! 
 
 Answer. Near that cliurcli and in advance of it. 
 
 This witness also reeollected the cluirch, desi)ite the witness Leach- 
 nian that it was wholly fallen. 
 
 Question. In what position were your troops then! 
 
 Answer. At that time directly on the road. 
 
 Question. How were you formed when you halted there ? 
 
 Answer. We were forined in liue of battle immediately after we halted. 
 
 Question. How long did you remain in that position? 
 ' Answer. I cannot tell you. 
 
 Question. During the balance of the day, I mean. 
 
 Answer. We did not leave that ground that day except under various instructions 
 that we got to countermarch; from time to time we countermarched of course on the 
 same ground. 
 
 Question. You did not leave that ground ? 
 
 Answer. No ; except towards night we changed our direction, I think on to a little 
 road that led us otf to the turnjiiki'. 
 
 Question. Practically, you remained in that position during that day ? 
 
 Answer. During that day. 
 
 Questi<m. Do you recollect any stacking of arms? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; they stacked arms from time to time. 
 
 Question. When you did that what position was your line in— still in line of battle ? 
 
 Answer. Always; always ready. 
 
 Serg. Solomon TJiomas, Eighteenth ]\rassachn setts Volunteers, Mav- 
 tindale's lirigade, ^MorelFs division, a government witness (Board's Bec- 
 ord, p. 840),"testified as follows: 
 
 Question. Where were you on August 29, 1362 ? 
 
 Answer. With GenerarFitz-.John Porter's corps, Eigliteeuth Massachusetts, Martin- 
 dale's brigade, Morcll's division. 
 
204 
 
 Qiu'stitm. Do ycjii re-collect being at Manassas Junction on that day ? 
 
 Answer. I do. 
 
 Question. Did you move off on the Gainesville road? 
 
 Answer. We moved up on the line of the railroad. We moved more in a direct line 
 in front, tlioufjli Ave were intending- to move to the right. 
 
 Question. How far upon that road did your regiment go ? 
 
 Answer. We went upon that road nearly to a small creek, or what lui:! been origi- 
 nally a small creek; it was dry or nearli, so at that time. 
 
 (Question. What did you do there ? 
 
 Answer. We then halted, and the Thirt<-enth New York, or a i)art of it which was 
 thrown out as skirmisinns — a battery was ]ilanted in our front a little to our right, in 
 the tields, and as tlie slcirniishers of the Thirteenth advanced we were deployed to the 
 right, into the woods ; our right rested in the woods. We halted and lay down. 
 Tliis was probablv ten o'clock in the morning, I shouhl say ; might have beeit a little 
 later. 
 
 Qu(?stion. How long did you remain tlicre ? 
 
 Answer. We remained in tliat position— I should say it was half jiast four when we 
 were called to attention ami right-about face, and moved out from that ])osition, left 
 in front, upon the same road that we moved down on in the morning. I don't know 
 the distance, l)ut we had l>een marching some time. 
 
 Question. ]>ack toward ilanassas .Junction ? 
 
 Answer. Yi-s ; toward Manassas Junction— when an oliicer came riding from the 
 JIanassas .Junction way, having a dispatch, and rode up to General Porter and handed 
 him the dispatch. Then we were conmianded to halt ; we di<l. General Porter dis- 
 mounted and sat down by the side of the road and leaned his back against a tree — 
 quite a large tree — and read the dispatch, and went up and remounted ami called us 
 to attention and right-al)out face. We marched back upon the same road we had 
 come on, moving then right in front, ttutil we came near the i>osition of the road where 
 we had moved into the woods on the right in the morning. We then moved out to 
 the left, into an o])en tiehl. Tlie artillery was 1)ronght into the tield and parked in 
 our front. We were formed in line and were ordered to stack arms ; we did so. Or- 
 ders were received that there should be no fires made to make any coffee ; that Ave 
 Avere to remain iierfectly f[uiet. The adjutant receiA'ed orders that if there Avere any 
 orders receiA-ed during the night he should deliver those orders to the commander of 
 each regiment in person, so tliere should 1)e no loud AAords .spoken ; and we Avere to 
 remain. ]\Ie and some of my conu-ades s])rcad our blaidvcts and Aveie preparing to li(- 
 doAvn for the night. As avc sat down, betore Ave got ready to lie <lo\vn, we heard upon 
 our right a shout AA'hich Ave kucAv Avas a charge — from the shout; then we licard mus- 
 ketry discharges. 
 
 Question. What did you understand at that time ? 
 
 Answer. I felt at that time that Ave Avere expected to charge on the rear and Hank 
 in conjunction Avith Avhat Avas going on in front. 
 
 Question. About Avhat time in the day, in reference to sunset, Avas it that yon were 
 halted on your Avay back to Manassas Junction, and that an officer came up with a 
 disi)atch ? 
 
 Answer. I should judge from the position of the sun it must have been somewhere 
 from tiA-e to half past tiAe o'clock. 
 
 Question. During tlie day did yfui hear any indications of a battle going on ; if so, 
 Avhat AA'ere they iind where Avere they '! 
 
 Answer. In our immediate front Aye heard an occasional discharge of musketry, and, 
 in fact, they Avere pieces of railroad iron tired from a rebel l)attery right over our 
 right; and tAvo pieces lodged in the rear of where I lay, probably forty feet in our 
 rear. Some of the boys went and dug them up, and one of them Avas 18 inches in 
 length, the other Avas about 15. We thought of bringing them home, but they Avere 
 ratlier heavy, so avc left them on the field. Tln-n, Avhile avc Aver(- lying there, Ix-side 
 that Ave heard, upon our right, distant firing all day, but not continuous; there Avere 
 intervals that Ave could hear artillery distinctly. 
 
 Ca])t. 'a. M. Eanflol, First United States Artillery, a witness for i)eti- 
 tioner, testitied (Board's Kecord, l^. 1)3) that his battery moved back to 
 Avithin loi) yards ot'itetitioner's headquarters for ^vate^, and arrived there 
 at 4 p. m., and rennuned there. Tliis was east of Uethleheni Church — 
 a biiildino- wliich this witness recollects. 
 
 Lieut. /V. ]\f. Weld J formerly petitioner's ai<le-de-camp, said (Board's 
 Record, p. UTO) that (ienei'al Sykes' division was moved back to near 
 the junction (»f the Sndley Si)iin,ns and ^lanassas and Gainesville road, 
 some fifteen or tweidy minutes' march from ]\[orell, and that Warren 
 intervened. 
 
205 
 
 General Sykes' right was near petitioner's lieadijuarters, and liis left 
 ono-lialf mile baek. 
 
 Bvt. M:\}. (ien. Z. Ji. Toirer, U. S. A,, then of K'icketts' division, Mc- 
 Dowell's corps, said (p. 44:()) that as his brigade moved u]) they met 
 regulars on the Sudley Springs road about dusk, an hour after he left 
 Manassas — probably two miles distant. They were on his right. 
 
 Thus Ave perceive that much of ]»etitioner's corps was moved l)ack <'on- 
 siderable distances, and the regulars 2g miles to the rear from ])awkins' 
 Branch, and were in bivouac when King's division of ^McDowell's corps, 
 under the supervision of McDowell himself, was ha\ing its gallant fight 
 A\'ith Longstreet. 
 
 They were put out of sight and removed from a i^osition of usefulness. 
 
 An examiimtion of the dispatches sent that day by petitioner will lead 
 to the conclusion that he did not intend to tight under General Pope if 
 he could he]]i it. 
 
 PETITIONEH'S DISPATCHES. 
 
 Just befV)re I began this argument the ])etitioner, tlirough Ids coun- 
 sel, undertook deliberately to exi>lain some of his dispatclies and his 
 (•onduct to which tliose dispatches refer. 
 
 His first statement sul)stantially was that I>rig. Gxen. Charles Griflin, 
 who went with his Inigade to the right, canu^ back after Major-General 
 3IcJ>owelI left ; and the tact that batteries opened Just as he got back 
 shows, as ])etitioner would have us believe, that he did see enemy's bat- 
 teries as he was returning to his column from the last McDow'ell in- 
 terview. 
 
 Grifiin's evidence, however, does not confirm this (G. 0. M. Ilecord,p. 
 IGli). The latter remained over by the "little i)ine bushes" halted — 
 making no efibrt to push ahead or find out if there was any serious 
 o1)sta(;le in his way until oidered back by petitioner. 
 
 The [)retense had been made of obeying McDowell's orders — it was 
 emjugh for an excuse — and when petitioner's counsel deliberately states, 
 for his client, that "petitioner had no knowledge of the woods towards 
 1^'ive Forks" he increases the measure of his responsil)ility for failure. 
 
 There is probably nothing which more conclusively shows his inten- 
 tion to do nothing tliat day than this absolutely utter indifference to 
 these roads thi'ougli FWa Forks, by which he could have Joined (kneral 
 Poise's left, had he been so disposed. 
 
 To say that Griftin was moved to the right because petitioner intended 
 to mal-e an affacl- shows — seeing it was begun immediately after McDow- 
 ell's de])arture — that it was under his, McDowell's, orders to petitioner 
 to i)ut his forces in there where the dust was rising off to the north and 
 Avest, back of INIeadowville Lane. 
 
 The next ex])lanation petitioner has ventured upon, with great delib- 
 eration in the argument of counsel who last preceded me, is that his 
 dis])atch Xo. L*9 (Board's Eecord, p. XXVI), to McDowell expressing 
 an intention to retreat, was written for the reason that Lieut, (now Maj.) 
 S. N. Benjamin's battery. Second United States Artillery, ceased tiring 
 near (Jroveton about 1]). m.; that then firing ])ractically ceased and 
 l»egan near 3 p. m. near SiuUey Church, from wheiu-ethe petitioner con- 
 cluded our forces were retiring, and that General Pope was therefore 
 doing what he for his own pur]»oses asserts General Pope contemplated, 
 viz, " falling l)eliind Bull Bun." 
 
 Hence ])etitioner decided to withdraw. 
 
 I speak only from my notes of the learned counsel's closing remarks 
 
20G 
 
 Just before I began this iirgumeut, and would like to know if I interpret 
 liini correctly. 
 
 Mr. Bullitt, That is, that there was a lull in the firing of the artil- 
 lery about that time; it may be a little later. Perhaps you do not ex- 
 actly catch my meaning. ]\ry meaning was that the firing lulled. I do 
 not mean to say that there may not have been shots. 
 
 The Counsel fok the Government. That is as I understand it, an 
 occasional shot or so. 
 
 The limits of this argument will hardly jiermit all the irreconcilable 
 statements of this petitioner to be followed and contrasted or commented 
 u])on. 
 
 As to this latest utterance, it is sufficient to say that it is not founded 
 on Benjamin's evidence, for that officer distinctl}' says (Board's llecord, 
 p. 01-4) on cross-examination by petitioner's counsel, that he, Benjamin, 
 took position at Grovetou about 12i p. m. and renmined at that point 
 over three hours. 
 
 Wlien "Nve look at the jatter's direct examination wo find what a stub- 
 born and gallant fight he made from 1 p. m., against eighteen guns placed 
 from 1,000 to about l,r)00 yards from him. 
 
 These guns during that fight were added to by eight more, making in 
 all twenty-six guus that Benjamin had to contend with. 
 
 Altogether, from 1 p. m. to at least o^ j). m., there was an unusually 
 heavy cannonading in progress right at (Irovetou itself, and thence 
 northwesteily to the enemy's positiou — possibly heavier than at any 
 other time during that battle. 
 
 The petitioner's excuse, therefore, is answered by Benjamin's evidence. 
 
 During all that long afternoon until the final general assault, there 
 was heavy fighting on the whole of Jackson's line, as has been shown 
 by citations in this argument. 
 
 The third statement in this latest utterance is, that petitioner's dis- 
 ]>atch No. 28 (Board's Eecord, p. 4:2o) to Morell, to i»usli over and aid 
 Sigel, was written about o j;. m., and the movement over by way of re- 
 tiring, but with direction to ]V[orell to aid Sigel if he found he could 
 do so. 
 
 The idea, says petitioner through his counsel, was that Morell should 
 fall back to the northeast. In other words, the petitioner would have 
 us believe that he un<lertook to carry out his expressed determination 
 to withdraw to Manassas by sending Morrell's division in a eontrari/ 
 direetion. 
 
 The correct explanation is naturally found in General McDowell's 
 orders to i)etitioner before he left him. 
 
 In his n^ply to the lion. Zachariah Chandler, in his defense before his 
 court-martial, and in his opening statement here, has not this petitioner, 
 as we ha\e seen, insisted that the very gi'ound o^er which he oidered 
 ]MoreIl to go was broken country and imiu-acticable? 
 
 If he could order his leading division, the one nearest his assumed 
 powerful enemy, to march over that country by a flank movement at 3 
 ]). m., it is plain there was nothing then^ in his judgment, before him to 
 prevent such a flank movement. 
 
 ^N^evertheless, when judicially asked why he did not do it under the 
 joint order and ^McDowell's concurrent orders, he says there would have 
 been "danger aiul disaster" in obeying, and that it would be a fatal 
 militaiy blunder. 
 
 JIowe\er, if tliis ])etitioner lielieved at .3 ]). m. that he could of his 
 own volition order his leading dixision to i>usli over and aid Sigel, what 
 
207 
 
 was tlun-e to jnevLMit tlie rear dixisiou under S\ kes beiiij; soul eitlicr l).v 
 "ri\e Forks" or ''Sudley Springs" road to our struggling- troops, whom 
 he admits iu his dispatch he thought needed aid I 
 
 It was but a momentary order, the execution of Miiich was never at- 
 tem])ted, for it was followed by Xo. 33, from petitioner to Morell, to hold 
 on to his present place, but it sliows that he knew what was re(piired 
 of him and that it was not impracticable. 
 
 The petitioner says now, through his c(mnsel, that the two dis])atches 
 he sent, addressed, one to General McDowell and the other to CJenerals 
 McDowell and Kiiif/, expressing an intention to retreat, are identical, 
 and were sent by different messengers hefoye Lieutenant ^^'eld went with 
 another message at 4 p. m. ((r. C. ]Vr. llecord, ]). 129), to the effect that 
 General Morell would now l)e strongly engaged; that there was a large 
 force in front of him, &c. 
 
 Let me remark that this very message which AVeld did take at 4 p. m. 
 was one that would luiAe had the effect to lead both General McDowell 
 and General Pope to believe that the petitioner was making every effort 
 to do his share in the operations that were then being conducted. 
 
 The assertion that the two disi)atches, one to ]McDowell and the other 
 to ]\[cDowell, and IlIikj were identical, or in other words contemporane- 
 ous, does not seem to be borne out by the ftTcts. 
 
 retitioner had located his own head(]uarters in the forks of the Sud- 
 ley iSjtrings aiul Manassas and Gainesville road. (Petitioner's Opening 
 Statement, p. 40.) 
 
 The Sudley Springs road icas open all dai/ to our men, and wholly un- 
 obstructed to messengers and orderlies. 
 
 Possibly he sent the one to General ^McDowell l)efore 4 ]>. m., because 
 it is the dispatch which came into and has remained in General Mc- 
 Dowell's possession. 
 
 The ex])lanation of why General Pope did nothing, so far as the peti- 
 tioner is concerned, with reference to that dispatch expressing' an inten- 
 tion to retreat, was because AVeld, the petitioner's aide-de-camp, came 
 at 4, or between 4 and 5, to General l^ope and said that they, viz, peti- 
 tioner's forces, would be strongly engaged. This is merely a supposition. 
 However, we tind that at 4.30 General Pope ordered him to push into 
 action at once. 
 
 Accc|)ting for argument the petitioner's explanation, that he sent a 
 dispatch to ^IcDowell about 3 p. m., announcing his determination to 
 retreat to Alanassas, it seems plain that it was the following one, winch 
 General McDowell has produced before this Board, viz: 
 
 Genkkal McDowell: The tiring on my riglit has so far retired tliat, as I cannot 
 advance, and have failed to get over to yon, except 1)y the route taken hy King, I sliall 
 \vitlidravv to Manassas. If you liaxe auytliiug to eonnnunicate please do so. 1 liave 
 -st'ut niauv messengers to yon and Gen'l Sigel, and get nothing. 
 
 F. J. POKTEK. 
 
 AlaJ. (icii'l. 
 
 \n artiUerv duel is <><)iiii.- on now — been skirmisliing for a huig tiiue. 
 
 ■ "^ F. J. P. 
 
 If petitioner did not actually send this dispatch to McDowell until 
 aft,er he sent Lieutenant Weld to General Pope at 4 with Avord that 
 petitioner "would now be strongly engaged" (the two messages being 
 contradictory), he may have received General Pope's 4.30 order before 
 writing to McDowell, and saying he should withdraw. 
 
 AVe have an excellent clew to the time at which the first note aunounc- 
 
208 
 
 \u'^ an intention to withdraw was brouj^lit to General Pope's notice iu 
 Major-Oeneral lleintzelnian's <liary, in Avhicli lie says: 
 
 Forty-livt; niinntes past live, General McDowell on the field at lieailiniavters. Heavy 
 living on onr center. Kearney reports lie is driving the enemy hack. GtntruJ PorUr 
 reports the cnoiiij dririiuj him Iiack, and he is retiriiiy on J/«««*.st(.v. 
 
 Tims while tlie gallant Kearney was rolling' Jaekson np on the right 
 of onr line, ]i('titioner, withont either i)nshing in or nioN ing np tlie Sndley 
 road towards the Army, eahnly declares what he i>roposes to do, althongli 
 his loss by tlie artillery tire was the most insignilieant. 
 
 Throngii Major-General Sigel's report of the KJth ISeiiteniher, 1802, it 
 appears he exjiected petitioner's corps to come in on his left (Board's 
 Kecord, p. o05), and Heintzelman in his diary notes somewhere between 
 2 and 3 p. m., "We are hoping for McBoAvell and Porter." (Board's 
 Pecord, p. (ill.) 
 
 McDowell by the way had pnt King's division nnder Hatch in snpi)ort 
 of Peynohls nntil it was withdrawn and bronght np near stone house by 
 General Pope's OA\'n orders, ((r. C JNI. Pecord, pi). It4 and 221.) 
 
 The message at 4 ]>. m. by Lieut. S. M. Weld to Generals McDowell 
 and Pojie that 3[orell would be strongly engaged (G. C. jVI. Pe('ord, 
 p. 120), was one calculated to allay suspicion and lead to the belief that 
 jietitioner had been trying to engage the enemy. 
 
 Instead of that the corps was i)nt in concealment and no measures for 
 attacl' piojected until about p. m., and then the only C(mtemplated 
 movement was by two regiments supported by two others. (P. XX Xil I, 
 Board's Record.) 
 
 Petitioner says that after Lieutenant Weld was sent at 4 p. m. this 
 message was sent : 
 
 Gen'l McDowell or Kituj: I have heeu wandering over the woods and tailed to get 
 a coiiimnnicatioii to yon. Tell how matteis gi) with \on. The enemy is iu strong 
 force ill front of me, and I ^^■isll to know your designs for to-night. It' left to im- I 
 shall have to retire for food and Avati'r, which I cannot get here. How (joes the huith* 
 It seems to go to onr rear. The cneiin' are getting to onr left. 
 
 (Signed) ' " F. J. PORTER, 
 
 J/. G. Voh. 
 
 The context shows it must have preceded the last-cited dispat<di to 
 ]\IcDowell announ..ing' a determination to retreat to Manassas, and thus 
 more widely separate the wings of the army. 
 
 The second dispatch of i)etitiouer, declaring' his deterniinntion to re- 
 treat, was as follows: 
 
 [Xo.86.] 
 
 Aii<inst2Qth,lHm. 
 (tKNKHALS McDowell «»r/ King: I found it ini])ossil»ie to communicate by crossing 
 tlie woods to Groveton. 'J'he enemy are in strong force on this road, and as they 
 ajjpear to have driven our forces back, the tiring of the enemy having advanced and 
 ours retired, I have deterniined to withdraw to Manassas. I Inne attempted to 
 communicate with INIcDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. 
 They have gathered artillery and cavah'y and infantry, and the advancing masses of 
 tlust show tht! enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to 
 see what is jiassing and how affairs are going. 1 will communicate with you. Ha<l 
 \<in not better send your train back '! 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 It is the one which caused tlie amiable, kind-hearted President Lincoln, 
 when he read it, to say the ix'titioner deserved death, because withont 
 a stroke even to heli> our Arm> which ajipeared to be retiring from the 
 tiring of an advancing enemy, he himself announced his determination 
 to withdraw to .Manassas, still further away from the direction tlie 
 petitioner assumes the tiring was taking. 
 
2u:) 
 
 On the trial in 1S<)2, (lenoral Pope testified that he received this one 
 direct from ])etitioner between 7 and 8 ],. in. (p. ;{], G. C. M. IJecord), 
 and had retained it amoniii' his papers. 
 
 As liis own and i>etitioner\s lieachpiarters were each at tlic iiiiol)- 
 
 strneted and open Sndley Sprin.us road, and as iietitioner knew wlicre 
 
 liis headqnarters were from his own aide, AVehl, and Capt. Doniilas 
 
 ■ Pope, lie pro! )al)ly received it within lialf an lionr after it was written — 
 
 that being tlie time of travel between the two stations. 
 
 As to the firNf dispatch of jtetitioner to 31cl)owell. ex]>ressin<i- an in- 
 tention to retreat, the latter lias said before this ]U)ai'd that liis im- 
 preHHioii is tliat he received it after the day was over (Board's Pecord, 
 p. 80!)). This is at variance with Heintzelman\s diary. General Mc- 
 ])o\\ ell was at Pope's head(]narters on the evening ot the 29th, soon 
 after the receipt by the latter direct from petitioner of the second dis- 
 patch (to ]McDowell and King) and was shown it by General Pope; hence 
 his present impression. (G. C. M. I'ecord, pp. 22 and 24.) 
 
 It is asserted by petitioner that the fact of the discovery by General 
 AfcDowell among his jiapers of the dis])atch dated G p. m. (next to l)e 
 cited), in which petitioner reports he failed in getting M(n^ell over to 
 liim, is concdnsive proof that Major-Geueral Pope's 4.o0 order had not 
 then come to petitioner's hand. 
 
 It nuist not, however, be forgotten that the p. in. dispatch was not 
 to General i'o^^c bnt General McJhnceU. 
 
 It was a rei)ort under his in-evious instrnctions. It was not an ex- 
 l)lanation to General Fope, why he, petitioner, did not move into action 
 at once. It gives the impression, however, that he is trying to do S(mie- 
 thing. 
 
 He said: "lam trying to get a battery bnt have not succeeded as 
 yet." If he meant a rebel battery, his pre}>arations for assault were cer- 
 tainly not such as indicated any great fence in his front. If he meant 
 lie was trying to get a Union battery, he had certainly six on dnty with 
 him. 
 
 If at six o'clock he was trying to take a rebel battery, why did he not 
 make the effort four hours before. His eftbrts we know went no further 
 than writing and sending an order. 
 
 According, therefore, to his own admission this petitioner permitted 
 between three and live hours to elapse before he made report to General 
 McDowell of what he had been doing. 
 
 Was it a rejiort based on fact? 
 
 Is there any proof in this case that any ])art of his corps that day 
 " wandered oxer the woods" in the vain effort to get through, or did 
 Iietitioner do it himself? 
 
 The answer is, there is no such proof. 
 
 Another thing to be noticed is that the petitioner in some of these 
 dis])atches puts in the name of General Kinf/j although it is in evidence 
 that early in the morning he, petitioner, was informed that General King- 
 had gone to Centreville sick, and that llatcli was in c(mimand of the 
 division, and that he himself gave General Hatch orders that the divis- 
 ion that was King's sliouhl follow him. 
 
 The following is the (J p. in. dispatch which petitioner now says was a 
 duplicate of theone reporting he had been wandering over the woods and 
 wanting to know how </oe.s the battle? This statement, from what has 
 Just been said, is apparently not borne out by the facts. 
 
 Gen'l McDowell : Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about 
 the woods for a time I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery ojjened on us. My 
 scouts could not get through. Eacli one found the enemy between us, and I believe 
 
210 
 
 souic have been captiiicd. Infantry arc also in front. I am trying to get a l>attery. 
 but have not succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports 
 of scouts, think the enemy arc moving hirgely in that way. Please communicate the 
 ■way this messenger came. / hare )io cdralrt/ or messengers noiv. Please let me know 
 your designs ; whether yon retire or not. I cannot get water and am out of provision, 
 ilave lost a few men from infantry tiring. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Maj. Gen. Vols. 
 Aug. 29 — 6 p. m. 
 
 The inquiry again arises, is this report founded on fact? Did lie 
 make any efforts, sustained or vigorous, to get Morell over to the right, 
 oi- did Morell wander about the woods for a time with his division ? 
 
 The answer is, he did neither. His assumed difficulties in the way of 
 sending messages is answered l>y noticing where his headquarters were — 
 right at the open and direct Sudlev road to PoiJe's headcpiarters, then 
 at Buck Hill. 
 
 Xotice, however, that even at this hour (0 p. m.) he reports the 
 enemy coming down on hifi front., so that it is plain Lougstreet could not 
 have been there in full force deployed by 11 a. m. 
 
 Further, why did this petitioner leave this report until G p. m., when 
 McDowell had ordered him to attack about noon ? 
 
 If McDowell did not give him an order to attack when he was with 
 him, which was not countermanded, and petitioner was no longer sub- 
 ject to those orders, why did he report he had attempted the very thing 
 McDowell said he did order him to do ? 
 
 But there is something- more in this dispatch which requires com- 
 ment. 
 
 Petitioner says in it, ^' I have no cavalry or messengers now." 
 
 Was this true ? Let us look into it. 
 
 The following is the evidence of Bvt. Brig. Gen. Jno. P. Taylor, then 
 captain commanding squadron First Pennsylvania Cavalry, and others 
 of his squadron. 
 
 The Board will recollect that he testified to coming down from Gaines- 
 ville that very morning when General Picketts' division left it, coming- 
 down this very jManassas and Gainesville road that the petitioner was to 
 go up on, down here to the Sudley Church road and to Manassas Junc- 
 tion, and there met the head of petitioner's column starting back under 
 the orders that General I*ope had given him. Xow, at this point in his 
 testimony, we have got Bvt. Brig. Gen. Taylor back with a squadron up 
 to Dawkins' Branch, at head of petitioner's column. His evidence is as 
 follows (Board's Pecord, p. 905) : 
 
 Question. "Where did yon bring your squadron to a halt ? 
 
 Answer. The day was warm; there were frequent halts made, I presume. I can 
 scarcely say the distance that we marched ; it was some miles when the command 
 halted. There was <in engagement going on a little diagonally to our front and right ; 
 that was some time in the after part of the day. 
 
 The Witness. Wt remained there until after night. The engagement continued on 
 nntil after dark; thci'c was heaAy infantry tiring and artillery. We were with the 
 aihancc with Morell's <livisio]i, and I remember (listinctly after halting my squadron 
 was formed in front of ns, there being some skirmishers thrown out immediately in 
 our front. The enemy turned and tired two pieces. One of the shots fell immediately 
 in our front. AVe moved a little to the left, ami my command remained there until 
 the command nu)ved in the night. 
 
 Question. Then von got to the jjoint where General Porter's corps was halted on 
 that day ? 
 
 Answer. We were in the advance with Morell's division when it lialted, but the 
 
 point I cannot say. We did not reach Gainesville. 
 
 #"* jf * * # * 
 
 Question. What enemy, if any, did you see in your immediate front ? 
 
I 
 
 211 
 
 AuswL'i-. We ooulci uot tell what they wore, hut there was iiifautrv heavily engaged 
 at suudown. They were cheering and yelling, and there was mnsketrv rising from 
 the trees where the iiriug was. 
 
 Question. Was that in your front '? 
 
 Answer. To the right of our front — diagonally across. It might have been a mile, 
 or near two miles. 
 
 Question. From what time in the morning did you hear the sounds of hattle ? 
 
 Answer. We heard cauuonailiug during the day, all day, and there had been some 
 tlie day before. 
 
 Question. Did you know what vour sciuadron was ordered to rei)ort to General 
 Morellfor? 
 
 Answer. The order was to report for orderly dutv : that was the substance of the 
 order. 
 
 Question. Were you behind any ridge or hill ? 
 
 Answer. I don't recollect any hill right in front of ns, and I recollect seeing an en- 
 gagement in sight, and it seemed to be descending ground. 
 
 Question. What sort of an engagement did you'see ? 
 
 Answer. Infantry ;ind artillery. 
 
 Question. How many infantry engaged? 
 
 Answer. I could not tell — the firing was in woods. We could see the smoke of the 
 musketry rising above the trees, and could hear the cheering and yelling, as if a charge 
 were being made. 
 
 Question. What time of day was that ? 
 
 Answer. Near sundown; perhaps after sundown. 
 
 Question. AVhat nuni1)er of troops did you suppose to be engaged, from what yon 
 saw or heard — a large army, a division, a brigade, or a regiment '? 
 
 Answer. There was a brigade at least engaged, and there may have been a division. 
 
 Qtiestion.- Could yon see the rebel troops'? 
 
 Answer. After it began to get dusk we could see the flashes of their muskets. 
 
 Question. Sec the Federal troops ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir; could see the snu)ke of the musketry and the flashes of the miis- 
 kets. 
 
 Question. Yon laid in that field all that afternoon, did yon ? 
 
 Answer. During the time that we lay there I cannot say how long ; we were there 
 until dark. 
 
 Question. What did yon do then f 
 
 Answer. Went back in the night. 
 
 Question. Where did you go then ? 
 
 Answer. We moved back in the direction of Manassas with the same command, and 
 on the next day, the '^ihh, I was under General Grifiiu's command, and at C'eutrevillo 
 he ordered me to 
 
 Question. On the next dav, the •29th ? 
 
 Answer. On the 30th. AVent back during the night, and at some time on the 30th 
 this command halte<l at or near Centreville. We were ordered to encamp and tie our 
 liorses in a clump of woods a little to the right of Centreville, in order that any orders 
 that were given ns they could send. • 
 
 Question. What did Von say in reference to a skirmish lino that was being thrown 
 out by General Porter — was there any on the 29th ! 
 
 Answer. My impression is there was a skirmish line in front of us", and that is all 
 that was in front of us. There were no Federal troo])s in front of us. 
 
 Question. Did your squadron go on skirmish duty ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir: it did not. 
 
 Question. What was the mnnber of the s(iuadron you had with you? 
 Answer. I could not tell you the numljer ; Ave might have had 50 nn n and may have 
 had 75 men. Our numl)er was originally about 90 men. 
 
 **#■>■■>'** 
 
 Question. I undeistand you to say that yon laid idle, doing nothing, from the time 
 you halted until you left there that night ? 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Did not go upon skii-mish duty ? 
 Answer. No. 
 
 Question. Were not sent on any duty to carry dispatches ? 
 Answer. I have no recollection of any. 
 
 Question. Or perform any duty at all that you can recollect ? 
 Answer. No, sir. I got this information from a diary that I kept at the time. 
 
 15 G 
 
212 
 
 Capt. F. J. ^k■Xitt, First reiinsylvaiiia Cavalry (Board's Eecord, p, 
 913), testified as follows : 
 
 Question. Did yon soe any enemy that day 1 
 
 Answer. Xo, sir ; not, to the best of my knowledge. There were a couple of artil- 
 lery shots tired when we were in that ueio;hT)orhood. Towards evening on that day I 
 saw smoke from infantry tiring, and cheering of infantry apparently ahont sundown, 
 along in the neighborhood of snndt)wn. 
 
 Question. What direction was that from where you Avere? 
 
 Answer. That appeared to be a little to our right, I should think. 
 
 Question. Was there any action then going on between any of the troops of your 
 corps that you were with there and the enemy 1 
 
 Answer. Not as I recollect. 
 
 Question. Did you hear anj other cannonading during the day ? If so, where ? 
 
 Answer. We heard some scattering cannonading through the day, but it appeared 
 to be a good distance oft', over towards the Warrenton x>ike. 
 
 Question. Did you do anything up there ? 
 
 Answer. Not very much. 
 
 Question. You have no recollection of having done anything ? 
 
 Answer. Not a great deal. We remained there until we turned and came back 
 again. 
 
 Question. Were you mounted or oft" yonr horses ? 
 
 Answer. When we stopped, we generally got orders to dismount and rest our horses. 
 If we did not stop for half an hour we dismounted. 
 
 WllUam H. RaniMy, private Coinpauy B, First Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
 testified as follows (Board's Eecord, j). 914) : 
 
 Question. Do yon know of any Tiattle going on on that day ? • If so, where was it ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; there was heavy infantry tiring to our right and front towards the 
 evening, and artillery tiring during the day. 
 
 Question. Could you hear anything else which would indicate an action besides the 
 musketry ? 
 
 Answer, Y^es; cheering; both rebel cheering and our cheering. 
 
 Question. Were yonr command used tor anything on that day after you came to that 
 halt ? If so, what 'I 
 
 Answer. Not to my knowledge. There was not a man used, to my knowledge. 
 
 JoJin Hoffman J private Company C, First Pennsylvania Cavalry, tes- 
 tified as follows (Board's Kecord, p. 915) : 
 
 Question. Did you hear any tiring that day ? 
 Answer. Heard some tiring on the right f 
 Question. What kind of ftriug ? 
 Answer. Artillery and infantry. 
 
 ^YUliam H. Bayard, jnivate Company C, First Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
 testified as follows (Board's liecord, j). 910) : 
 
 Question. While you were there at that point did you see any enemy in your front ? 
 
 Answer. Well, no ; I did not. 
 
 Questiiin. Did you hear any tiring l 
 
 Answer. There was some tiring down to the front and the right. 
 
 Question. How far oft' f 
 
 Answer. I judge it was along a mile or a mile and a half; .something like that. 
 
 Question. What was the tiring, infantry or artillery f 
 
 Answer. Infantry and artillery both. 
 
 WiUlam Rcddy, private Company C, First Pennsylvania Cavalry, tes- 
 tified as follows (Board's Becord, p. 917) : 
 
 Question. While you were at this place, where you were halted with this body of 
 infantry, did you see any enemy in your front ? If so, what was it f 
 Ai.swer. Not in front exactly, but on our right in front. 
 Question. Aliout how far away ? 
 Answer. About a ndle, or a mile and a half. 
 Question. Was there any tiring on yonr front that day? 
 Answer. Not on our front, but there was to our right.^ 
 Question. Wliat was tliat tiring? 
 .Answer. Artilltrv and iiilantrv (iiins:. 
 
213 
 
 Question. Was there anything else by which you coukl tell that there was an action 
 going on ? 
 
 Answer. Not in particular, any more than the firing I heard off to the right. 
 
 Question. Did you see any artillery in your front that day f 
 
 Answer. I don't know whether there were two pieces or one, but anvwav there were 
 from two to four shots fired. I eonid not tell which. 
 
 Question. Where from f 
 
 Answer. From the enemy's side. 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt ; 
 
 Question. Do you recollect what timi^ tlial living occurred — tliat infantry and artil- 
 lery on your right '? 
 
 Answer. Early in the afternoon ; toward eveiniig. 
 
 By the Recorder : 
 Question. How long did you hear that artillery firing to your right ? 
 Answer. All the time we were out there. 
 
 The evidence of Brevet Brigadier-General Taylor and men of his squad- 
 ron would be sntticient as to whether there were any available cavalry 
 there, but on the original trial Col. E. G. JfarsJtall, Thirteenth Xew York 
 Volunteers, a witness for jietitioner, said: "Whilst my command was 
 being got into line prior to my going on this duty, my brigade was behind 
 some others. General Forter had sent some dragoons of another regiment 
 to the front, and my brigade was waiting in the road to get into position" 
 (G. 0. M. Record, p. 191), and on General INIcDowell's court of inquiry 
 petitioner hinrself swore he had on the roa 1 up to Dawkins' Branch a 
 small cavalry escort (Board's Record, p. 1010). 
 
 The presence of this cavalry would, of course, contradict the assertion 
 of petitioner in his report that he had none, aiul it l)ecame necessary, in 
 ^^ew of the fact that he had borrowed orderlies from Colonel Schriver and 
 General Pope, to show he had none. 
 
 Accordingly Maj. Gen. (}. W. Jlorell was recalled as a witness by 
 petitioner, but he did not recollect (Board's Record, p. 1>08). 
 
 Then Captain Atujiistus P. Jfarfin, formerly petiticmer's chief of ar- 
 tillery, was called, who " saw no cavalry except a few orderlies." (Board's 
 Record, page 1127). 
 
 In the closing arguments here, petitioner, through his counsel, has 
 ventured the explanation substantially that he did not know of this cav- 
 alry, and did not think they were there ; but it must not be forgotten that 
 the petitioner, moved up with ]Morell to Dawkins' Branch with the head 
 of the column where the cavalry were, and himself ordered out skir- 
 mishers. 
 
 At or about G.oO p. m., liaJf an hour after he had reported to INIcDowell 
 he had neither cavalry uov messengers, he sent a dispatch (Xo. 38) to 
 Morell, in which he said, after ordering him to put his men in bivouac 
 for the niiiht, ^'^ I wish you icoidd send me a do::en men from that cavalry.^'' 
 (G. C. M." Record, p. 153.) 
 
 Lieut. Stephen i\l. Weld, then aide-de-camp to the petitioner, also tes- 
 tified on this subject as follows (Board's Record, p. 202): 
 
 ******* 
 
 General Porter sent out some cavalry skirmishers They were halted on the side of 
 the hill facing west. The cavalry crossed the plain at the foot of this hill and went 
 into the woods, not a great distance in, nearly as I can recollect; I saw them going 
 in a little distance. 
 
 Thus it appears plain that the petitioner, in reporting he no had cav- 
 alry, in his knowledge reported that which had no foundation in fact. 
 
 Assuming for argument that he did not know he had a squadron of 
 cavalry at his front, the statement itself shows how little he knew what 
 was being done at the head of his column nearest the enemy. 
 
214 
 
 The fact of the previous nou-produetion by Major-Geueial McDowell, 
 until the nMpiest of thi.s Uoard, of the three disjiatehes received from i)e- 
 titioner, has been made the .subject of animadversion. 
 
 The acknowledjiinent of receipt on an envelope usually fixes time of 
 receipt; but neither the government nor petitioner have been able to 
 produce any such record in this present investigation, except in the 
 .solitary instance of Lieut. E. P. Brooks. 
 
 Petitioner's witness (Board's Eecord, p. 281), Major Euggles, swear.s 
 that at General Pope's headquarters it was customary to receipt dispatch 
 on the enveloi)e and return it by bearer, and yet i)etitioner has exhibited 
 none such or ])r()vcd contents of aUcj/ed missing reports of his. 
 
 Singularly enough, the ])ctitioner has ]>roduced here eight or ten dis- 
 patches which he either did not have or did not recollect of on his trial 
 or when he was a witness betbie General ^McDowell's court of inquiry. 
 In fact, he did not tlien recollect even having given an order to Morell 
 to "attack"' with two regiments, sui»ported by two others. 
 
 FOIJCES OF PJETITIONER AND CO-OPERATING FORCES. 
 
 It may be desirable, right here, as showing some of the inconsistencies 
 to which I have referred, to allude again incidentally to Piatt's brigade, 
 which the petitioner, in his oi)eniug statement, declared was not with 
 him. 
 
 Substantially we find, in looking at Assistant Adjutant-General 
 Locke's evidence before this Board, aside from what General Sturgis aud 
 General Piatt have si)ecifically testified to on the subject, that they were 
 there; that he (Locke) saw thou at the intersection of the Sudley and 
 the Manassas and Gainesville roads marching to the rear. 
 
 Then Locke says that he M^as not aware that they had been "assigne*! 
 to us " at that time ; but, on page 454, he admits, on further examination, 
 that they were "attached." 
 
 Griftin, in his evidence on the oi'iginal record, also mentioned them being 
 there; and we have seen introduced here by General Sturgis a dispatch 
 that he received that very 20th of August from the petitioner, while 
 there with him (Board's Pecord, p. 717), ordering hiin at daylight, Au- 
 gust 30, to march off and follow the corps when they were ordered to 
 join General Pope. 
 
 By reference to the maps it will be found that from Bristoe Station 
 up to Gainesville there was a direct road. There was also another road 
 up, A'ia Milford, which ran into this Manassas and Gainesville road, and 
 so on up to Gainesville, to the left of Thomas Xealon's. 
 
 The evidence of Capt. G. H. Dobson and of Prof. G. L. Andrews, of the 
 United States ]\Iilitary Academy, is to the positive effect that j\Iajor- 
 General Banks' cor])S were in Bristoe Station from the 28th up to and 
 including the 2!»th and ;50th, part of the oOth at least. 
 
 To contradict tliat has been brought here Brevet Major-General Gor- 
 don, of the United States Volunteers, to say that, instead of the cor])s 
 being at Bristoe. they were a mile and a half farther away, toward AA'ar- 
 rerrton Junction. 
 
 By referiing, however, to the record of stations of the coip-> during 
 August in tlie oflicial liiontlily ]'e])ort of Major-Cireneral Banks of the men 
 he had and jiositions, dated August 31, 18G2, now in this record, as 
 an exhibit filed in the Adjutant -General's Office IS^ovember 12, 18G2, 
 we find that the e^■idence of Professor Andrews (Board's Eecord, pj). 
 10U.J and 1000) and of Captain Dobson is i)articularly confirmed by the 
 
215 
 
 stateuieiit tliat the several brigades and divisions of General J'.anks' 
 corps were in Bristoe, having arrived there on the liSth. 
 
 Xow, on the 27th, two days before the battle, as appears by one of the 
 petitioner's own dispatches (Xo. 20, p. 90, petitioner's opening statement), 
 he was ordered to hold himself in constant commnnication with General 
 Banks; and that very morning, the 20th, General Stnrgis had come from 
 a position in the rear of General Banks np to and joining the petitioner 
 at the front, reporting to him there near Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 It is also in evidence (of Brevet Major-Creueral Gordon) that at Bristoe 
 Station the cannonading and sonnds of battle conld be heard distinctly, 
 and that they were anxions as to the resnlt (Board's Record, p. 12li). 
 These are contirmatory statements connected with the evidence of Ca\)- 
 tain Dobson himself. ^ (Board Becord's, p. 1134) : 
 
 George H. Doh.son, called by the Eecorder, and examined in the city 
 of iN'ew York on the 2;id day of November, 187S — present, the Eecorder, 
 and Mr. 3Ialtby, of connsel for the petitioner, and the petitioner — hav- 
 ing been dnly sworn, testified as follows: 
 
 Direct examiuatiou : 
 
 Question. Where do yon reside ? 
 
 Answer. Baltimore, Maryland. 
 
 Qnestion. What is your occniiatiou ' 
 
 Answer. Lnmber merchant. 
 
 Question. Were yon in the military service of the United States in August, 18o2; 
 if so, in what capacity? 
 
 Answer. As captain of Comj)any A, Third Regiment Mar\land Volunteer Infantry, 
 Col. David P. De Witt. 
 
 Question. With what rank did you leave the service ? 
 
 Answer. I left the service as captain. 
 
 Question. Where were you on the morning of Friday, August 29, 18'\2 ? 
 
 Answer. At Bristoe Station, or in that vicinity. 
 
 Question. To what division, brigade, and corps did you belong ? 
 
 Answer. Second Brigade, Prince; Second Division, Augur; I3anks' cov])s. It was 
 either Prince or Augur at the time you mention in command ; one was captured and 
 the other wounded. 
 
 Qiiestion. Do you know of any movements of your regiment, l)rigade, and division 
 on that day : if so, Avhat were they ? 
 
 Answer. I believe on that day our regiment with some other troops, I don't know 
 how many, were moved in the direction of Gainesville; it was given out that they 
 were to go to Gainesville, as I understood. 
 
 Question. At the time ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I think it was given out that they were going to Gainesville. 
 
 Question. At what time did your regiment and those other troops leave Bristoe 
 Station ? 
 
 Answer. I ttould not say exactly. I could tell you what time they halted and aliout 
 the distance they marched, so you could form some iilea of the time. I believe they 
 halted about half past three or four o'clock — between three and four o'clock — and the 
 distance was about three or three and a half miles. 
 
 Question. In what direction ? 
 
 Answer. Said to be in the direction of Gainesville. I was simply a line officer ; I 
 had no oi)portnnity, as a general officer Avould have, of knowing those things. 
 
 Question. Of knowing what? 
 
 Answer. Of knowing where we were destined. 
 
 Qnestion. What direction did you take on leaving Bristoe Station? 
 
 Answer. We took the direction of one of two roads that led from Bristoe Station 
 towards the enemy's front ; that is what we understood. 
 
 Qnestion. Now as to the ^loints of the comi^ass, the road that you took ? 
 
 Answer. I could not tell tix>m my knowledge then. 
 
 Question. Northeast or southeast? 
 
 Answer. I could not tell from the direction of the compass at that time. 
 
 Question. At what time did you say you halted .' 
 
 Answer. Between three and four o'clock. 
 
 Question. What then occurred, after halting, within your ki owledge? 
 
 Answer. 'I'o me individually? 
 
216 
 
 Question. Yes; state all. 
 
 Answer. A gentleman came and invited some of tlie officers of the regiment to take 
 dinner Avitb him in the neigliboihood. 
 
 Question. Was that to the front or. rear of the position iu which you "svere halted ? 
 
 Answer. A little to the front of us. 
 
 Question. Go ou and state what you then did, and what sort of a place it was that 
 you went to ? 
 
 Answer. I was one of a numher who accepted the invitation, and when I got to his 
 house it was too late for dinner ; he had had his dinner, hut he gave me something to 
 eat. I was then, to the best of my recollection, inside of our own lines ; our pickets 
 had been thrown out upon the road a piece. "When I got through eating, our pickets 
 were driven in towards our regiment, and I was inside the enemy's lines; they tired 
 at me as I came out, three or four shots. I escaped and went back to the regiment. 
 
 Question. Then what was clone ? 
 
 Answer. I think we went back to Bristoe Station. 
 
 Question. About what time in the day was that? 
 
 Answer. I could not tell you exactly ; it was late iu the day, between four and tive 
 o'clock, when I went up there, I supjiose. 
 
 Question. "What description of force of the enemy was it that drove in our pickets? 
 
 Answer. I don't know ; I suppose the cavalry videttes that were stationed on the 
 road when we came out. We did not see our pickets driven in ; the house sat Ijack 
 from the road some distance ; simply cavahy videttes that had dismounted and tied 
 their horses to the fence-posts. 
 
 Question. The enemy's cavalry? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. On which side of the road was this house as you Aveut up? 
 
 Answer. On the right of the road as we went ux>, to the best of my memory. 
 
 Question. Did you see any artillery ? 
 
 Auswer. No, sii'. 
 
 Question. Did you know, or were you informed at the time, of the j)urpose of this 
 movement of these troops out in this direction ? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I had no means of knowing that, except fi'om hearsay at that 
 
 time. I do not recollect that I ever heard auy object at all. 
 
 ***** -s ^ 
 
 Question. As to the number of regiments, as near as you can recollect, how many 
 regiments were there ? 
 Auswer. If I am not mistaken, there were the whole of our brigade of infantry and 
 
 a Maryland battalion, the Pernell Legion. 
 
 '****** * 
 
 Question. How long had your brigade been in Bristoe at this time, the 29th of 
 August ? 
 
 Auswer. I think they came there either on the night of the 27tli, or early on the 
 morning of the 28th ; I have had the impression that it was the 27th; I am not positive. 
 
 Question. What was the strength of the corps on that day ? 
 
 Answer. General Banks' army corps ? 
 
 Question. Yes. 
 
 Answer. AVe roughly estimated it at 10,000 troops ; that was the general idea that 
 jirevailed with us at that time. 
 
 * « * ^ 7^ * * 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Maltby : 
 
 Question. Who commanded your brigade on the 29th ? • ' . 
 
 Answer. I think the colonel of the One hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania, Stein- 
 berner. 
 
 Question. Who commanded that division? 
 
 Auswer. I think it was General Greene. 
 
 Question. What is liis first name ? 
 
 Answer. I don't know; he was commanding the brigade before General Augur got 
 wounded. 
 
 Questi(ni. AVhat regiments were in your brigade ? 
 
 Answer. The One hundred and elev<'nth Pennsylvania, One hundred and second 
 New York, one Ohio regiment, and our own, Third Maryland, and the Fourth and 
 Sixth Maine Batteries. 
 
 Question. That all ? 
 
 Answer. I think so. 
 
 Question. In wliich biigadc Avcrc you ? 
 
 Answer. Second. 
 
 Question. On the 29th, when you made this niai-ch, as you supposed, in the direction 
 of (iainesvilhi, how was your regiment occupied before you marched ? 
 Answer. Simjily at rest. 
 
217 
 
 Question. What caused you to think that you moved iu the direction of Gaines- 
 ville ? You say it was given out ; who gave it out ? 
 
 Answer. It was generally talked of in the mess that I messed with ; that is the in- 
 formation that I got. 
 
 Question. You had no information from superior officers .' 
 
 Answer. Yes; the mess that I messed with were all my superior ofiicers. 
 
 Question. With whom did you mess '! 
 
 Answer. Messed with the held and statt' officers of the regiment : they were my 
 superior officers at that time. 
 
 Question. Was your regiment the leading regiment ? 
 
 Answer. I think it was the leailing regiment on that occasion; we were known as 
 the second regiment iu the hrigade ; I think it was the leading regiment at that time. 
 
 Question. What causes the impression that the whole ))rigade was there with you 
 at your advanced position that day, iu the direction of Gainesville, as vou under- 
 stood it ? 
 
 Answer. I only judged from the l)ody of troops that were marched u]i ; I do not say 
 positively that the ^^hole brigade was'there. 
 
 Question. What causes the impression '! 
 
 Answer. The cause of the impression was the large Ijody of troops; it was ([uite an 
 imposing string on the road — a couple of thousand men, perhaps. 
 
 The petitioner lias sought to induce us to believe that Wilcox's clivis- 
 iou of Longstieet's special coinniand Avas shoved down from the north of 
 the Warreuton pike into the neighl)orhood and to the rear of D. II. Jones' 
 division, because of some movements of the petitioner. But when we 
 come to look at the record of what the petitioner did during- the day, we 
 find that he did not do anything-, that he made no tentative movement 
 of any description until six o'clock, when he gave an order which was 
 not carried out. 
 
 Thus we are oldiged to look to some other (piarter for the explanation 
 of AVilcox's division being- shoved down there ; and we find it iu the 
 movement of this brigade of observation of General Banks up in the 
 direction of Gainesville. 
 
 This affords a slight indication as to the position I have taken here 
 that General Lee during- that day was merely occupying- a defensive 
 position, not with a view to assault iu any sense whatever, because the 
 I)Ositiou that General Banks held upon his right liauk was one which, 
 if he, Lee, had not held on to Gainesville and kept his forces where he 
 could put them into position if necessary interposed l)etweeu Gainesville 
 and the direct road from Bristoe t(^ Gainesville, and through Haymarket 
 to Thoroughfare Gap, through which last point his, Lee's, re-enforce- 
 ments were coming-, he would have been in very much the position that 
 Jackson would have been in had the previous orders of General Pope in 
 every respect been complied with. 
 
 Therefore, I find the explanation of the movement of Wilcox's division 
 down theie to coincide witli the movement of this brigade of observation 
 up from Bristoe towards Gainesville to a point about half way between, 
 the two places. 
 
 Captain Dobsou's evidence on the subject, putting tliis movement after 
 three o'clock, coincides exactly with what is stated in the oflicial report 
 of Wilcox (of October 11, 18()2, Board's liecord, p. o3(>), that it was 
 between four and five that he, Wilcox, was moved down there to be ready 
 for anv contingencv, and what Wilcox has testified to before this Board. 
 (Board's Becord, p! 230.) 
 
 But if we assume what the petitioner would have us assume, tbat the 
 fact of his (petitioner) lying along that Manassas and Gainesville road, 
 stretched in column, all day, with a little skirmish line of one small regi- 
 ment thrown out iu the woods in front, was the reason why Wilcox came 
 down to the point iiulicated, then we must apply the remarks of Charles 
 Marshall, his own witness, to him (Board's Eecord,pp. lOU, 101, 1(50, 170, 
 and 171), that late in the day General Lee became i)erfectly satisfied that 
 
218 
 
 there was no apprelieiision of an attack agaiiist his (Lee's) right; that 
 lie couhl spare him, and therefore moved back ^Yilcox to the north of 
 the road to assist Hood, -wlio was then about pushing into a severe 
 action against McDowell's corps, because Hood required to be supported. 
 Marshall himself also says that the occasion of Wilcox being sent south 
 of the pike was the rex)ort of troops advancing from Bristoe, which 
 threatened their right flank. 
 
 After Wilcox returned to the north of the ^^"arrenton Turnpike D. E. 
 Jones, with his three brigades, was left alone to watch the national forces 
 on their right, as "Kemper's troops were never anywhere except just to 
 the south of the Warrenton pike on the right of Hood; they never were 
 anyivliere else." (Board's llecord, p. 100.) 
 
 PETinOIS'EE'S FORCES ON THE 21)TII. 
 
 Much has been said by the petitioner with reference to the condition 
 that he was left in when General 3IcDoweIl took, at the suggestion of 
 the iietitioner, King's division from the rear, and carried it up to 
 apply it intermediately; that he was thus in almost a defenseless posi- 
 tion; that his troops were too few to do anything, although it ai)pears 
 that late in the day his own commanding officer on the skirmish line. 
 Col. E. (t. Marshal], did not think more than a brigade bad got on his 
 fi'ont. Xevertlieless it has been stated here with great earnestness that 
 he could not do anything, because he had no supi^orting forces ; that 
 the absence of King's division left him utterly helpless ; that it would 
 have been an unmilitary movement for him to push forward against 
 what he now assumes to have been 25,000 of the enemy, instead of the 
 10,000 or 15,000 that he assumed on his original trial. But when we 
 come to look at the official returns we find that his plea or pretense here 
 that he had no sufficient support, or that his forces were not enough, must 
 be taken cum f/rano sails. 
 
 Sturgis had couie up to him, having passed Banks' corps that verj- 
 morning, and the petitioner had been directed, two days before, by Gen- 
 eral Pope, as appears in evidence, to keep in constant communication 
 with Banks. 
 
 In looking at the official return upon muster of ]Major-General Banks' 
 corps for the 31st of August, he having remained quietly all of two days 
 without being in action, we tind that General Banks reported specifically 
 for the 31st the entire number present for duty, commissioned and 
 enlisted, with him, as 10,301 (see attached exhil»it), Avhich coincides very 
 nearly with the rough estimate that Captain Dobson said that very morn- 
 ing of the 20th that the officers put upon the number of men that were 
 there. 
 
 Even Professor Andrews, United States Military Academy, has made 
 an estimate of, at least, 5,000 or 0,000 for duty present there at Bristoe 
 under Banks. (Board's Eecord, p. 1095.) 
 
 Now, let us see what were the forces of the petitioner and the co-oj^erat- 
 ing forces. 
 
 Here was Banks on his left at Bristoe; here was King's division mov- 
 ing ui> the " Sudley " road to go into position, and Picketts' just liehind — 
 Picketts' division having, according to tlie petitioner, 8,000 men, King's 
 division having 7,000. 
 
 Xext let us see wliat the petitioner bad. His assistant adjutant-general, 
 Locke, before this Board, admits (Board's Jfecord, p. 451) that when the 
 petitioner inarclied from Bristoe on the morning of the 20th the corps 
 was ''Well in liaiid. The next d;ty (30th .Vugnst) thej' appeared to be 
 
219 
 
 well closed up: and that the corps lost between 2,500 and 3,000 men that 
 day/' 
 
 General Butteriiehl thinks (Board's Record, p. 403) that the two bri- 
 gades of Morell's division under him lost over 2,000 men on the 30th. 
 The other brigade had marched oft' to Centreville and did not get into 
 action. 
 
 Sykes' return {vide exhibits) shows that his di\isi(m of regulars on the 
 30th lost 017 men. 
 
 AtBristoe, at a. m. on the 2Sth of August, tbe petitioner previously 
 reported to Burnside that he had kept his command well up (Xo. 22, 
 p. 91, petitioner's Opening Statement). 
 
 Therefore, such being the case, his command being well up on the 29th, 
 and well in hand. Laving moved but slowly from AVarrenton Junction up 
 to Bristoe and thence to the point where we have him now (31st August), 
 in order to ascertain what his actual strength was on the 29th, let us 
 take his officud repoj't that he has himself put in (Board's Eecord, p. 457), 
 the official return wbich he made of his forces at Centreville on the 31st 
 August, 18()2, and subtract therefrom the losses of the 30th. 
 
 The return that has been put in of Piatt's brigade showed that he had 
 on the Manassas and Gainesville road with the petitioner 824 men for 
 duty on the morning of the 29th. 
 
 On the 31st, according to the '^ official return '' put in here by the 
 petitioner, at Centreville, the total enlisted of Sykes' division present for 
 duty was 3,001 and 322 officers. From this com]>utation I exclude those 
 who were sick, in arrest, or confinement; but of course I include those 
 who were present on extra or daily duty, for those juen were under arms 
 and pait of the actual force. 
 
 Of ^lorell's di\ision there were officers for duty and on extra or daily 
 dutv 300, and of enlisted men present for dutv, or on extra or daily 
 duty, 5,<>59. 
 
 In that official return he puts as part of his force 19 batteries of artil- 
 lery. He had actually with him six batteries of artillery, as appears by 
 the evidence ; whether he had all the other batteries available I do not 
 know. But I take those six batteries and average them, 19 being the 
 total nund)er of batteries reported, and I find that it gives an average 
 of 12 officers and 344 men. 
 
 I exclude in tliis calculation 592 officers and men jiresent sick. Thus 
 the petitioner had present at Centreville on the 31st of August, when 
 muster canu^, according to his own report, a total of 11,302; that is, includ- 
 ing Piatt's brigade. 
 
 "Noav, Locke says tliat the corps on the 30th lost between 2,500 and 
 3,000. Butterfielcl says his oicn loss in Morell's division was over 2,000, 
 from the two brigades of the division under him, and he thinks those 
 two brigades went into action with about 0,200 men. 
 
 vSykes re})orts 917 as the loss from his own division, whose numbers he 
 roughly estimated on the trial in 1862 as 4,750 present on the 29th (G. 
 C. M. Pec, p. 1 79.) Assuming a less loss than either Butterfield or Locke 
 have done, viz, 2,104, the esfimated number found in the nominal un- 
 signed report of General Pope, adding this to the number actually 
 present on the 31st of August at Centreville at muster, and we find that 
 the petitioner had on the morning of the 29th at his service, exclusive 
 of sick men or men in arrest and confinement, or any but those who were 
 X)resent under arms ready for duty, 13,526 men. 
 
 If I add to that the dift^rence of losses between 2,164 in General Pope's 
 nominal report, and 3,000 as stated by the petitioner's chief of staff, there 
 will be added nearly 1,000 more men to the computation. 
 
220 
 
 That tliis is not an uureasouable estimate, Ave flud that ten days before, 
 when lii.s tri-niontlily re])Oit was made by petitioner, Morell's division 
 liad present for (Uity 0,731, omitting those who were in arrest or con- 
 finement {vide exhibits), besides many absent. 
 
 Thus this petitioner, assuming as he did, in January, 1863, that Long- 
 street had between 10,000 and 15,000 men in front of him, nevertheless 
 had onongh men subject to his own orders to liave made a movement that 
 "would lune had every prospect of success. 
 
 xVnd even if he had had less it would have been no excuse for not mak- 
 ing a movement against the enemy tiiat Avas near his front so as to pre- 
 vent that enemy, if possible, from assisting the rest of their forces 0]i 
 another line of operations.* 
 
 If instead of taking i^etitioners official returns offered by himself, we 
 take the recollections of his own witnesses, we may form some idea as to 
 the reliability of his "Opening Statement" (p. 5) that he had on the 20th 
 of August, 1802, less than 9,000. 
 
 Brigadier-General Sykes, on the trial in 1802, testified that he had in 
 his division of the Fifth Corps on the 29th, 4,750 present under arms, 
 including three batteries of artillery. (G. C. M. Eec. p. 179.) 
 
 Brigadier-General Butterfield has said before this Board that when he 
 went into action the next day in command of two brigades of Morrell's 
 division, he had about 4,200 men. (Board's Eecord, p. 402.) 
 
 Grifitin's brigade of Morrell's diAision, with Morrell himself, was then 
 (the morning of the 30th) at Centreville. (G. C. M. Eec, p. 148.) 
 
 It had actimlly under arms l^iJOd, possibly more, but that is the numl>er 
 admitted bv petitioner. (G. 0. M. Eec, p. 241, ami Board's Eecord, 
 p. 452.) 
 
 Added to these the nund)er Brigadier-General Piatt reported he him- 
 self had under petitioner on the 29th, Aiz, 824 (petitioner's exhibit. 
 Board's Eecord, p. 1123), and Ave hnxe a total of ofticei'S and men actually 
 on duty under petitioner's immediate orders, under arms, on the 29th, of 
 11,343, as shown by his oavh witnesses. 
 
 ^Official returns. 
 
 1.— Piatt'hi brigade, viz (Board's Record, p. 1123): Present 824 
 
 2. — Petitioner's cori>s. (His monthly retnru 31st August, p. 457 Board's Rec- 
 ord, excluding 591 }»reseut sick, ride Seventh Article of War.) 
 
 (1.) Sykes' division: 
 
 Officers for duty and present on extra or daily duty 157 
 
 Enlisted men present for duty 3, 211 
 
 Enlisted men present on extra or daily duty 390 
 
 Total Sykes' division 3,758 
 
 (2. ) Morell's division : 
 
 Officers for duty and present on extra or daily duty 300 
 
 Enlisted men ])resent for duty 5,345 
 
 Enlisted men present on extra or daily duty (>14 
 
 Total Morell's division 0,259 
 
 Artillery: 
 Six batteries arranged on an average l)asis of 19 batteries reported iu 
 the corps. 
 
 Total oflicers 12 
 
 Total enl isted 344 
 
 356 
 
 11,197 
 Add killed and wounded on the 'M)\\\ Au^nst, as ]ier G<'ue"al Pope's nominal re- 
 turn ' 2,164 
 
 Total ])resent foi' duty under petitifiner 29th August 13,361 
 
221 
 
 As Francis S. P^aile, who was MoiTell's assistant adjiitant-gcueral 
 and petitioner's witness, says tliat Morrell told biin, on tlie morning of 
 the 29th, that he (]\Iorrell) then had abont 0,000 men under arms (Board's 
 liecord, p. 410), tliis would increase the number actually present beyond 
 the above C()mi)utation, and make it 11,074. 
 
 To these should 1>e added the squadron of First Pennsylvania Cavaliy, 
 under Bvt. lUij;, (ren. (then captain) John P. Taylor, between 50 and 
 7.5 strong (Board's Becoid, p. 00!|), and corps headcpiarters staff and 
 mounted orderlies. 
 
 Again, all tliat day there were near to this i)etitioner, in proper posi- 
 tion to have assisted him if necessary in a very short time, Banks' corps 
 of over 10,000 men, and Pucketts' division of 8,000, exclusive of artillery. 
 
 btuakt's hill. 
 
 In the closing argument of the petitioner something was said as to 
 this commanding i)romontory called Stuart's or Monroe's Hill, which has 
 so singularly l)een left out of this map, l)ut which has played such a 
 prominent part in this argument, and which it has been sought to show 
 had but a slight elevation, some 10 or 15 feet, above the level of the 
 country. 
 
 As contradictory of that we have the evidence of Bvt. Brig. Gen. E. 
 D. Fowler, of the Fourteenth Brooklyn (Board's Eecord, p. 518), Capt. 
 ^y. W. Blackford, Confederate engineers (Board's liecord, p. 095), who 
 speak of this commanding position; and of .Tubal A. Early, of the Con- 
 federate ser\'ice (Board's liecord, ]>. 810), Avho said as follows, after pre- 
 liminary remarks, that an hour or two after sunrise Jackson shoAved 
 him a commanding ridge aljout a mile from the Warrenton pike, which 
 we know as y tuait's or Monroe's Hill : 
 
 It was a coraiiiaiuliiij;- ridgo and commanded a view of all tlie open country in front 
 to tlie " Warrenton pike,'" and all of the Helds to my left and General Jackson's right. 
 
 And Mr. Monroe, who lives there, says that from that point you can 
 see Manassas and Centreville, Bull Pun Mountains, and Thoroughfare 
 and Ilopeville Gaps. The witnesses last l>rought in here l)y the peti- 
 tioner have shown that the ridges on each side of " Dawkins' Branch" 
 near the railroad, and for several hundred yards from each side of the 
 railroad, can be seen from Stuart's Hill; though that is a matter cf 
 which the Board — it being a question of toi>ography — would take judi- 
 cial cognizance l)y reference to anything that would give information 
 upon the subject without necessarily having it in evidence, just as the 
 Board would'satisfy itself, if occasion re<iuired, as to the i>osition of the 
 sun or moon at a given time. It is to be regretted that the Board has 
 not visited the country. I find, however, in my own notes, made on 
 that hill last August from personal observation, the following remarks: 
 
 High commanding li Ige ; can see Carrico's, three-quarters mile; Centreville, Tho- 
 roughfare Gap, (^aint sville, Warrenton pike one spot, Britts' under the hill, also 
 Leachman's. 
 
 In the report of Col. E. M. Law ((]uoted l\v petitioner's counsel), of 
 Hood's division Longstreet's command, he said (Board's Pecord, p. 530) 
 his brigade moved forward, commanded l)y Generals Longstreet and 
 Hood, until it reached a commanding position in front of the enemy, 
 about three-fiuarters of a mile from the Dogan house. That report must 
 be taken with considerable allowance, for, according to the ofticer who 
 made the statement, it would have l)rought them down here in the val- 
 ley at the foot of the natural glacis eastward, and directly under the 
 
222 
 
 jjuns of the Union force, which he says opened on them, and far within 
 their range. That brigade conhl not have gone np on to " Stony Ridge,'' 
 becanse Henry Kyd Donglas, adjntant-general of Jackson, according to 
 his evidence, did not appear to know of Longstreet's arrival nntil late in 
 the day. In the i^osition connsel wouhl phice him, Major Donglas wonld 
 at once have discovered the brigade. As it Avas north of the pike, it pos- 
 siblj" attained the same ridge as Cooi)er's battery. 
 
 The next to be considered is the method of iirocednre of this peti- 
 tioner. 
 
 METHOD OF PROCEDUEE. 
 
 Next to be considered is the method of proeeJure of this petitioner, 
 and in this connection it is to be noticed : 
 
 First. That he did not hesitate to avail himself of the libels of his 
 former senior connsel against the court that tried hiai ; against the wit- 
 nesses who gave evidence against him; against the Judge-Ad vocate- 
 General who reviewed his case, and indirectly against President Lincoln 
 himself. (Board's Eecord, p. 994.) 
 
 Second. That he sought before this board to continue a cross-exami- 
 nation, voluntarily concluded by him sixteen years ago, of several who 
 were witnesses before his court-martial, for the purpose of throwing 
 doubt upon their statements on direct examination, when it was not 
 possible that, after the lapse of such time, any witness could recall viv- 
 idly all the circumstances then in his recollection upon wliich he based 
 his statement of facts. (Board's Eecord, pp. 1108 and lll-l.) 
 
 The history of juris})rudence will be searched in vain for such anotlier 
 like i)rocedure. 
 
 Third. His conduct towards Major-Generals McDou-ell and Pojje. 
 
 1. As to Major-General JIcBowell. 
 
 This officer's whole military career, during the eventful days of August, 
 1862, stands in striking contrast to the petitioner's. 
 
 He and Ma]. Gen. ]Sr. P. Banks and Maj. Gen. J. C. Fremont had 
 commanded independent corps— when Major-General Pope was called 
 from the West — and the three corps were assembled and constituted tlie 
 "Army of Yirg'inia." All were seniors to General Pope, and McDowell 
 was his senior both in the liegular Army and volunteers. 
 
 T/n'.s, however, did not prevent him from loi/ailij and earnestly, to the 
 fullest extent, supporting General Pope in all his i^lans and movements, 
 so far as he was made acquainted with and understood them. Indeed, 
 tlie petitioner, throughout this case, has endeavored to make it apparent 
 that General ]McDow"ell was an officer in whom the Commanding General, 
 Pope put implicit confidence. 
 
 This admission, though made for other purposes, shows what a loyal 
 and earnest man to do his duty — his whole duty to his country — Mc- 
 Dowell was, for tlie times were critical, the capital was in danger; yet, 
 although he must undoubtedly have had those feelings which any mili- 
 tary man would have experienced at seeing his Junior put over him 
 (which a sj^'cial law ]>ermitted), yet it did not infiuunce either his official 
 or ])ersonal action towards his coiiunanding general, and no dispatch 
 can be found Irom him criticising or refiecting on his commanding gen- 
 eral. 
 
 ]\raJor-General Fremont asked to be relieved, and Major-Genera^ Sigel 
 succeeded to the commaud oi' his corps. 
 
223 
 
 Ma] 01 -(General Banks, ^vho was by his date of coiumission next in 
 conniiand under General Tope, and General McDoAvell, continued iii tlie 
 sphere olduty their government put them in. 
 
 The methods, for example, by which it has been sought by petitioner 
 to throw the resi)onsibility of not tig'htingon tliis respected officer would 
 be a fit subject of animad^-ersion were it not that the petitioner's case 
 shows too many unfounded statements and contradictions in his own 
 behalf. 
 
 One little ])oint has l)een dwelt upim by him, viz, that Cieneral Mc- 
 Dowell would not admit that Longstreef s forces were those mentioned 
 in General ]>uford\s dis])atch, which ^McDowell showed ]>etitioner at 
 Dawkins' Brancli on the morning of the 29th, as the force coming in to 
 Jackson's aid. He holds up JMcDowelFs own previous orders of a day 
 or two Ijcfore, in which General McDowell referred to Loiigstreet as 
 pushing- for Tlioroughtare Gap. 
 
 This is wholly collateral to petitioner's own coiuluct, but is part of a 
 consistent ]»]an of intentional misconstruction. 
 
 General McDowell has said that when his officers reported '' Long- 
 street" was at a jdace, he himself assumed the fact and said "Long- 
 street" ; when the report did not say Longstreet, but merely an "enemy," 
 he did not say " Longstreet." 
 
 The fact that there were then no corps orgauizatious in the Confed- 
 erate army, and only divisional commands, the senior ranking- officers 
 havino- control of wings or detached portions, is sufficient answer to 
 this. 
 
 However, the ])etitioner is concIude<l by his own evidence in the Mc- 
 Dowell court <^f inquiry, in which the petitioner then showed that he him- 
 self /<«/? no recollection of .sxclt conversation. (Board's IJecord, pp. 1000- 
 
 ioi;{.) 
 
 General McDowell did show him General Buford's dispatch, and 
 whether it was D. H. Hill, Hood, 3IcLaws, Jones, Kemper, Longstreet, 
 Anderson, or Lee, he- gave him all the information he had as to au 
 
 ENEMY. 
 
 In point of fact, it is no\v plain it was Lee himself who came forward 
 Avith this fragment of his army. 
 
 1*. The next collateral point which was preseuted was in order to show 
 an assumed bias or prejudice of General McDowell against this peti- 
 tioner, to whom the former had previously been so good a friend. 
 
 After the unfounded statements published by this petitioner had been 
 ds^ii'nited, the late Prof. Denis H. Mahan, United States Military Acad- 
 emy, api)ears to have written to General McDowell on the subject, sug- 
 ges'ting- the ])ropriety of replying, and inclosing a copy of the publica- 
 tion. 
 
 Prol)ably the most dignified way of doing this was the very mode 
 adopted l)y General McDowell, who caused extracts to be taken from 
 the reports of Stuart. Longstreet, and Jackson with reference to the bat- 
 tle of the 20th August, and published them without conmient. 
 
 In looking at Long-street's report we find he reports that at 4 p, m. the 
 LTiiion forces began to press forward against General Jackson, and that 
 he sent forward some of his own command to attack. 
 
 The extract taken from Jackson's report of the battle, it is asserted, 
 ai)plies to the .'JOth ; that it is so stated. 
 
 It narrates, however, that at f p. m. Longstreet undertook to do pre- 
 cisely what he said in his own report he did do. 
 
 It appears by Assistant Adjutant-General Henry Kyd Douglas' evi- 
 dence (of Jackson's staff) that the report was written by Colonel Charles 
 
224 
 
 James Faulkner, of Jackson's staff (Board's Record, p. 704), who was not 
 present during the battles of the 29th and 30th, but made it up from 
 eports subse<pieutl3' received. 
 
 That which he ascribed to the 30th, and which General McDowell has 
 sworn he thought belonged to the 29th, actually did have reference more 
 to the first day's battle (the 29th) than the second, and was merely cor- 
 roborative of Longstreefs and Stuart's reports, which preceded it in the 
 little twO-page pamphlet published by Geoieral McDowell at the request 
 of his friend, the late distinguished professor Mahan, and others, in 
 answer to the petitioner's incorrect publications. 
 
 Longstreet's and Stuart's reports were sufficient to have been pub- 
 lished without the corroborative extract from Jackson's, but as the peti- 
 tioner has sought to turn attention from his own conduct on the 29th to 
 General McDowell's suhsequent acts, this explanation is due the latter. 
 
 It should be added that Jubal A. Early (Board's Record, p. SoS) says 
 that Faulkner, in writing it for Jackson, " confounded the facts in the re- 
 port." 
 
 We know (Board's Record, p. 522) it was never filed by Jackson, but 
 found among his pai»ers. 
 
 However, when General ]\rcDowell ascertained that a claim was made 
 that that report of Jackson ai)plied to the 30th rather than to the 29th, 
 it appears that he forwarded it to the Adjutant-General for the purj^ose 
 of having the extracts which he had published compared with the offi- 
 cial record as to whether those were extracts in relation to the opera- 
 tions of the 29tli of August, as the heading to his little printed publi- 
 cation assumed they were. 
 
 The reply of the Adjutant-General was, as we have seen (Board's 
 Record, p. 755), that it was "a true copy from the original report,'' and 
 that there were but some slight verbal corrections to be made, taken 
 from the rebel records. 
 
 Assuming the report has reference to the 30th, as stated, and which 
 I have always contended and do belicAe applied to the 29tLi, neverthe- 
 less that which does apply to the 29th in the report is of the same state 
 of facts, only in different language. 
 
 It is entirely collateral to this investigation, but the fact that such a 
 thing has been brought in, as it were, incidentally, shows that the 
 same line has been pursued consistently by the petitio ler, from the time 
 of the findings of the court-inartial. of attack on all concerned. 
 
 Had he attacked on the 29th, as was his duty, probably these attacks 
 would not have taken i>lace. 
 
 PETITIO^^ER'S CO^"DUCT TOWAKD.S GENERAL POPE. 
 
 3. The third is as to General Pope, who, it appears by the action of 
 the 29th, was attacking, yet in the arguments of counsel we find a posi- 
 tion ascribed to liiui very different from attack. 
 
 General Pope has furnished, I believe, all the information bearing on 
 this case of petitioner within his power — his original dispatch-books, 
 his letter- books have been put by him at the service of his counsel 
 through myself as counsel for the government. 
 
 During the course of this investigation, one of petitioner's counsel 
 stated tliat General Pope and General McDowell had been '■\f\tUy ex 
 amined-^ on the original trial. (Board's Record, p. 100.) In the course 
 of the argument for the petitioner, at the close, it was stated that General 
 Pope knew but little of the actual fiicts. 
 
 Such being the case, and he having been very fiilly examined and cross- 
 
225 
 
 examined on the original trial, we can see the petitioner's method of 
 procednre in asking this Board to bring General Pope here as a " govern- 
 ment'' witness, so tliat he may be asked merely his "opinions'' (Board's 
 Eecord, pp. 101(5, 1018, 1020), and, after correspondence had been had 
 w ith General Pope, then acknowledging that wliat they really wanted him 
 for was to '* cross-examine *' him on his original evidence of 18(52. (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 1111.) 
 
 As to General Pope's desire to further this investigation, we find that 
 as long ago as the 18th of April, 1874, he addressed a commnnication 
 to the President, upon learning that the petitioner had made a new 
 appeal, urging the very fullest examination by a i>roperly constitnted 
 board. 
 
 The petitioner, however, has said that his (petitioner's) appeals were 
 nnheard or unheeded ; that he from the time of his conviction had 
 sought for "justice,'' the indirect assumption being that the court of 
 nine general officers which convicted him could not give him justice. 
 
 But the President of the United States (Grant) who succeeded Presi- 
 dent Jolinson, and who had two of these appeals before him, gave, it 
 appears by his own letter in evidence here, the matter his personal atten- 
 tion, read the evidence, and came to the conclusion thatthe petitiomr was 
 not entitled to any rehearing. 
 
 This conclusion is found iu President Grant's reply to General Pope 
 of the 9th of May, 1874. (Board's Record, pp. 1176, 1177.) 
 
 If this petitioner had any sort of a case when all the witnesses were 
 alive and everything was fresh in their minds during the lifetime of 
 President Lincoln, and if President Lincoln himself was so ready to 
 gi^'e the petitioner a new hearing as the latter would have ns believe, 
 whv did he not put the matter before President Lincoln ? However, the 
 action of tlie only living ex-President shows that the petitioner's case 
 received due and careful attention, that it was passed upon, and that 
 the appeal was rejected. 
 
 General Pope's subsequent attitude towards this petitioner during this 
 investigation has been shown in the voluntary transmission by him, for 
 information or use of the latter's counsel, of all his original dispatch and 
 letter books (Board's Ptccord p. 1215), and by the following telegrams: 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kaxs., Ocfohcr 21, 1878. 
 To Gen. J. M. Sch()FIEI.d. 
 
 JVfst Point, JS\ Y.: 
 
 I have received your desiiateli of the seveuteeuth, in which you state that "in view 
 of the fact that the counsel for the petitioner have stated tliat tliey believe that justice 
 to their client reiiuires your presence here, the Board requests tluit you appear as a 
 witness l)efore them at Governor's Island next Thursday, tAventy-fourth inst." In reply 
 I liave to say that if the petitioner considers my presence as a witness necessary, Jie 
 sliould apply to have me suhpieuaed as a witness for him. Only as a witness for him 
 or for the government can I be expected, with any semblance of legality, to appear as 
 a witness iu the case. To do so on a mere request of the Boafd would be to place my- 
 self in a position not onlv false, but in every respect extraordinary and unknown to 
 the laws of or to the practice of the civil and military tribunals of the country. 
 
 While I stand ready to appear before your Board iu any position known to law or 
 practice. I cannot appear as a volunteer\vitness in the case on mere request, and with- 
 c ut knowledge whether I am called for the government or the petitioner. As you state 
 that I am re<iuested to appear as a witness because of the statement or suggestion of 
 the petitioner, it is to be inferred that I am called as a Avitness for him ; but this fact 
 is not defiuitelv stated, nor does your telegram convey a subpo-ua, but only a reqiiest. 
 To subptena, regularly issued, to appear as a witness for either side, I will cheertully 
 and Tiromptly respond. I am entirely williug to appear as a witness in the case, and 
 desire simply to be placed in the same relation to the Board and the parties in contro- 
 versy as that occupied by all the other witnesses. -nr^TD-c 
 
 Brig. Genl, U. S.J. 
 
226 
 
 Foin Leam:xw(>i;tii, Kansas, October 29, 1878. 
 To Major A. 15. Gari>xer, 
 
 Ih'cordvr and Coioisel for Gorerinnent, Governors hlatxl, KeivYork : 
 I mil iiiforiiied by tlie Secietavy of War, in telegram of tliis date, that the President 
 declines to order me to appear or not to appear before your Boanl as witness, but 
 leaves the matter to my discretion. lu view of this fact and of the telegraphic in- 
 structions of the Secretary of "War for the guidance of the Board, ct)py of which the 
 Secretary has sent, I must adhere to the positiim taken in my telegram of 21st in- 
 stant to General Schofield. Nevertheless, although the counsel for the government 
 refuses to subpn>na me as witness for the government, and the petitioner declines to 
 suliiKeiia nie as a witness for him, and therefore I am subpienaed by neither party, 
 if the IJoard reciuiro any information in my power to give on any jioiiits brought out 
 in this investigation, I will cheerfully give it either 1>y sworn replies to written inter- 
 rogatories, or, if the Board deem it necessary, l)y appearing in person before it for this 
 purpose, on due notitication to that ett'ect. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Breret Mujor-General, U. S. A. 
 
 THE ASSAULT MiVDE UPON THE CHAllACTER OF MR. BOWERS. 
 
 4. The petitioner's nietbod of procedure is here well exemplified. 
 The absence of any motive on Mr. Bowers' i)art should have protected 
 him from the remarks in the closing' argument of counsel, which, when 
 published, as this Board has no judicial power, will be actionable. 
 
 Mr. Bowers said j^etitioner's headquarters, at the time, were in the 
 earthworks at Centreville, which the latter's chief of staff corroborated. 
 (Board's Eecord, p. KMo.) He said petitioner had a tent. In rebuttal 
 some of the latter's witnesses said he had none — others a tent-tly. 
 {Board's Eecord, pp. 103C, 1040.) 
 
 As Mr. Bowers is a lawyer of prominence and respectability in West 
 Virginia, and only came here on the repeated summons of this Board, 
 leaving, with Capt. E. McEldowney (another witness), professional en- 
 gagements in the United States circuit court at Wheeling with incon- 
 venience, he is entitled, in view of the cross-examination to which he 
 was subjected, and the actionable language used towards him, to have 
 this statement. 
 
 His evidence shows he never was a spy, never witliin the Confederate 
 lines. He was in command of a detachment of scouts, in government 
 service, under and with the military family of Brig. Gen. E. H. Milroy, 
 United States Volunteers, until the latter was relieved from duty, when 
 he again accepted a lieutenancy in the volunteers, until the close of the 
 rebellion, and was then honorably discharged. (Board's Eecord, p. 953.) 
 
 petitionee's CONDUCT ON THE 30TII. 
 
 As he Avas not convicted of anything he did on the 30th, Avhile serv- 
 ing under the immediate oljservation of General Pope, and as the evi 
 deuce offered l)y him on his trial in ISd-J, as to Avhat he did on the 30th, 
 was ])roperly ruled out by the court after argument (G. C. M. Eec, pp. 
 118, 133, 252, and 280), I have, as I stated in my opening argument in 
 rebuttal, refrained from going into tliat subject at all oidy from the l)elief 
 that it was not germane to tlie case. 
 
 animus. 
 
 We now come to the consideration of the aiiiDiii.s of the petitioner 
 towards his commanding g«'neral. 
 
 In the o])«'ning statement of ])etitioner, all the disi)atches which he 
 cites up to the 20th August, 18(»2, sliow that he evidently" considered 
 
227 
 
 General Pope's army as yet a separate comraaud, witli wliicli lie was 
 merely to co-operate. 
 
 Before the petitioner came under General Pope's immediate command 
 he was under Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan's. 
 
 On tlie 25th, when he began to get near that army, he began to be 
 troubled with doubts, and in his dispatch to Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside 
 (marked No. 8) says, ^'- Does General MeCMlanjipprove V 
 
 And again on sa,me day to General Bm^nside, who was his immediate 
 commander, he asks (Xo 10), "Are my arrangements satistactorj'f " 
 
 When, on the 26th, he found no forces of the enemy in front of him, 
 below on the Eappahannock, but his own corps in close proximity to 
 General Pope's, he wrote to the latter to know where his command would 
 be most useful. 
 
 That night he received his first order from Major-General Pope. 
 
 It was dated 7 p. m., signed by Major-General Pope, and requested 
 the petitioner to "Please move forward" in a certain direction. 
 
 This at 11 p. m. petitioner acknowledged, and said his (Pope's) in- 
 structions would be obeyed as rapidly as possible; that his forces had 
 been disposed of under instructions from the General-in-Chief. (Board's 
 Eecord, p. 316.) 
 
 Possibly this reply had something to do with the query of Gen- 
 eral Pope" to his chief of staff. Col. George D. Euggles, whether peti- 
 tioner would fail him. (Board's Eecord, p. 280.) 
 
 The petitioner asserts (on page 19) that he " had used extraordinary 
 exertions to join General Pope," but this pretense of zeal fails in the 
 light shed on this transaction by his own witness. General Burn- 
 side, when the latter swore on the trial (p. 185, G. C. M. Eecord) that the 
 accused " used no energy or dispatch in joining the command of Gen- 
 eral Pope, and in his military movements in that direction, beyond those 
 which his duty as an officer required him to use. " 
 
 We now arrive at the point when he has received his first order from 
 General Pope, and is told by the latter that he. Pope, "does not see how 
 a general engagement can be postponed more than a day or two" (No. 
 16), and orders him to Imrrij up one of his divisions as rapidly as possible, 
 and to put the otlier where he can "easily move to the front." 
 
 This is not what the petitioner apparently expected. He had no de- 
 sire or intention to fight the new campaign under any but his old com- 
 mander. He shows he is troubled at what he has already done, for 
 he sends a dispatch to Major-General Burnside in which he says : 
 
 Have Just received orders from General Pope. * * * I shall move uji as ordered. 
 * * * 'iuform McClellau, that I may know I am doing rkjhf. 
 
 What had the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac to 
 do with deciding this point if the accused was in General Pope's com- 
 mand ? 
 
 On the other hand, if that commander's opinion was asked in order to 
 ascertain whether he had been rightfully ordered by General Pope, how 
 much could he have considered himself as a subordinate previously ? 
 
 The truth of it is, the petitioner, as was testified to by General McClel- 
 lan (on p. 197, G. C, M. Eecord), joined General Pope's command be- 
 cause he received orders direct from Major-General Halleck, General-in- 
 Chief, so to do. 
 
 General McClellan further swore that " when the accused was making 
 his efforts to leave the Peninsula, he did not know that he was to be 
 placed under the immediate command of General Pope." 
 
 The petitioner admitted his hopes and wishes in his opening state- 
 ment (p. 72) before this Board when he said he "thought that the main 
 16 G 
 
228 
 
 body of tlie Army of the Potomac was landiug- at Aquia Creek" [that is 
 iust where General Lee seems to have had au idea that the main body 
 woukllaud ami get in his rear on the 29th] ''andwoukl join the Army of 
 Virginia by the line of the Eap])ahannock; that the Army of the Poto- 
 mac and the Army of Virginia, nnder their respective commanders, 
 McClenau and Pope, wonld co-operate and be mano'uvered by one 
 head— General McClellan." 
 
 Said he: "I did not then know or suspect that it had been decided 
 that General McClellan was to have nothing to do with the campaign."'' 
 
 In another place (p. 80) he said that before he left Harrison's Landing- 
 he was informed that General McClellan would command both armies. 
 
 It will be a subject to be considered in the light of other dispatches how 
 far this petitioner i)ermitted his wishes as to commanders to control his 
 ofiticial conduct. 
 
 The next dispatch to be noticed is as follows : 
 
 No. 19. 
 
 Warre^'TOX, 27, p. m. 
 To General Burnside : 
 
 Everj^Mng liere is at sixes and sevens, and I find I am to take care of myself in 
 every respect. Oitr line of communication has taken care of itself, in compliance with orders. 
 The army lias not three days' provisions. The enemy captnred all Pope's and other 
 clothing ; and from McDowell tlie same, inclnding liquors. No guard accompanying 
 the trains, and small ones guard bridges. The wagons are rolliug on> and I shall be 
 here to-morrow. Good night ! 
 
 F. J. POETER, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 This dispatch shows the feelings which the petitioner had towards the 
 Army of Virginia, which already had been enduring fatigue and priva- 
 tions in the effort to protect the national capital. 
 
 The historian has yet to note the causes why General Pope's line of com- 
 munications was interrupted at Manassas Junction and his sui)i)lies de- 
 stroyed while he himself was holding an extended line of defense under 
 superior orders. 
 
 Whether it was a corps or army commander who was responsible is 
 foreign to this investigation. 
 
 However, this petitioner knew his special allusion, in the last-quoted 
 dispatch, to General McDowell, was and never has been founded in fact. 
 
 That dispatch was followed by No. 20 (G. C. M. Eecord, p. 99) : 
 
 [No. 20.] 
 (From Warrenton Junction , August 27, 1862 — 4 P. M.) 
 
 Gexer^vl Burnside, Fabnouth, Virginia: 
 
 I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as 
 the iiresent. Wagons are rolling along rapidly to the rear, as if a mighty power was 
 propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. McDowell is 
 moving to Gainesville, where 8igel now is. The latter got to Buckland bridge in time 
 to i)ut out the fire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his route unmolested to the 
 Shenandoah or Loudoun County. The forces are Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, 
 Whiting's, Ewell's, and Anderson's (late Huger's) divisions. 
 
 Everything has moved up north. I found a vast difference between these troops 
 and ours, b\it I suppose they Avere new, as to-day they burned their clothes, &c., when 
 there was not the least cause. I hear that they are much demoralized, and needed some 
 good troops to give them heart and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind 
 Bull Run, ami I presume will b(> there in a few days if strategy don't use us up. The 
 strategy is magnificent and tactics in the inverse proportion. I would like some of 
 my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksbura;, to push 
 
229 
 
 towards Hanover, oi', Avitli a larger force, to pnsli towards Orange Court-House. I 
 wish Suiuuer was at Washington, and up near the Monocacy, witli good hattei'ies. I 
 do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supphes provided for them, and I be- 
 lieve they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself awaij from it, with 
 all our old Army of the Potomac, nnd so do our companions. I was informed to-day by 
 the best authority that, in opposition to General Pope's views, this army was pushed 
 out to save the Army of the I'otomac, an aiuiy that could take care of itself. Pope 
 says he long since wanted to go behind the Occoquan. 
 
 Most of this is private, but if yon can get me away, please do so. Make what use 
 of this you choose, so it does good. 
 
 Don't let the alarm here disturb you. If you had a good force you could go to 
 Richmond. A force should at once be pushed on to Manassas to open the road. Our 
 provisions are verv short. 
 
 F. J. PORTER. 
 
 After telegraphing, this dispatch will be sent to General Burnside. 
 
 This was followed by another dispatcli, viz : 
 
 Bp.istoe, 9.30 rt. m., Juyusfi'*, 1862. 
 
 My connnand will soon be up, and will at once go into position. Hooker drove. 
 Ewell some three miles, and Pope says M<Do\vell intercepted Longstreet, so that with- 
 out a long detour he cannot join Ewell, Jackson, and A. P. Hill, who are, or supposed 
 to l)e, at Manassas. Ewell's train, he says, took the road to Gainesville, where Mc- 
 Dowell is coming from. We shall be to-day as folloA\s: I on right of railroad; Heint- 
 zelman on left; then Reno, then McDowell. He hopes to get Ewell and push to 
 Manassas to-day. 
 
 I hope all goes well near Washington ; I thiidc there need l»e no cause of fear for us. 
 I feel as if ()n my own way now, and thus far have kept my connnand and trains well 
 up. More supplies than I supposed on hand have l)een brought, but none to spare, 
 and we must make connection soon. I hope for the best, and my lucky star is alw,ays 
 u[i aljout my Inrthday, the ^llst, and I hope Mc's is up also. You will hear of ns sbou 
 ]iy way of Alexandria. 
 Ever yours, 
 
 ^ ' F. J. P. 
 
 General Burxside, Falmouth. 
 
 Oil the very niorninjj;' lie recei^'ed General Pope'.s order to move on 
 Ceiitreville (29tli August), statiuo- tliat it was very important that he 
 should be there at an early hour in the morning-, that a severe engage- 
 ment was likely to take place and his presence necessary, he sat down 
 half an hour later and sent this dispatch to General Ihirnside (p. 103, 
 
 G. C. 3r. Record) : 
 
 BiusTuE, G a. m., 29. 
 To General Bcrxside: 
 
 I shall be off in half an hour. The messenger who brought this says the enemy had 
 been at Centreville, and pickets were found there last night. 
 
 Sigel had severe fight last night ; took many prisoners. Banks is at Warreuton 
 Junct-icm; McDowell near Gainesville ; Heintzelman and Reno at Centreville, where 
 they marched yesterday, and Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a hody-yuard, 
 at the time not knowing where was the enemy, and where Sigel was fighting within 
 8 miles of him and in siyJit. Comment is unnecessary. 
 
 The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals not having been watered for 
 fifty hours ; I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night ; yonr train of forty wagons 
 cannot be found. 
 
 I hope Mac's at ivorl; and wc shall soon yet ordered out of this. It Avonld seem from 
 proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose, but I expect 
 they know what they are doing,' which is more than any one here or anywhere knows. 
 
 Comment on this almost seems needless, but it explains possibly why 
 he did not give Pope a hearty support in that day's action. 
 
 lie pretended to have no confidence in Pope ; and in his appeal to the 
 President of lOth October, 1807, i». 53, he went on to say that if his 
 dispatches to Burnside — 
 
 Manifested confidence in General McClellan and a distrust of General Pope's ability 
 to coudu.ct the'campaign (acclaimed by the prosecution), they but expressed the opin- 
 ion pervading our Eastern armies. 
 
230 
 
 General Buriiside, a witue.s« for the accused, iu his testimouy (p. 181, 
 G. C. M. Eecord), said be 
 
 Saw in Porter's tolograms exactly wliat lie heard expressed by a large portion of the 
 officers with whom he happened to be in coiumunicatiou at the time — a very great lack 
 of contidence in the management of the campaign. It was not confined to General 
 Porter. 
 
 The petitioner's late counsel, Eeverdy Johnson, in the pamphlet to 
 which I have referred, in undertaking to excuse or explain his, petitioner's, 
 telegrams to General Burnside, said (p. 31) : 
 
 Not only was the honor of the flag involved, but the very safety of the capital. 
 Porter naw that both were in danyer by ivhat he beUeved to be the incompetency of Pope. 
 
 Here, I submit, is one of the reasons of the accused's fatal inaction on 
 the 29th August, 1862. 
 
 He apparently does not appear to have received any replies to his dis- 
 I)atches here quoted to General Burnside or to others criticising the cam- 
 paign. 
 
 The moment he found himself actually under Major-General Pope's 
 orders and joined to duty with his army, and his late commander not at 
 the front, he says : 
 
 I wish myself away from it, with all our old army of the Potomac, and so do our 
 com^mnions. * * * If you can get me away please do so. 
 
 If he really spoke in this dispatch for his general officers, some expla- 
 nation might be found for the advice they gave on receii^t of the 1 a, m. 
 order, though, as has been shown, i)etitioner did not make known to 
 them its urgency. 
 
 All the time he is looking for General McClellan and hopes his "lucky 
 star is up." 
 
 Even when he gets an order, at 5.30 a. m. on the 29tli August, to move 
 forward at once, as a "severe engagement was likely to take place," he 
 does not do so until 7 a. m., and, meanwhile, writes a long note to Gen- 
 eral Biu"nside, in which he says : 
 
 I hope Mac's at work, and we shall soon get ordered out of this. 
 
 All these expressions taken together afford in connection with his acts 
 a clew to the motives of the petitioner. He was not satisfied with the 
 commanding general that the government had placed over him. His 
 service, theretbre, was reluctant and of the most dilatory character. 
 Either really or apparently he pretended to distrust his then commander 
 and did trust another, whom he was hourlj- looking to see come forward, 
 for he said that very morning he hoped tltcy would wmA-e connection soon (G. 
 C. M. Eecord, p. 119), and he did not propose to help Pope iu any of his 
 ■serious movements where he could possibly avoid it. 
 
 At any moment Sumner's or Franklin's corps might arrive, and with 
 them the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac fiom Alex- 
 andria. 
 
 The countermarches and singular movements of petitioner in coming 
 up to Warrenton Junction from the Eappahannock have not been spec- 
 ially inquired into, but apparently exhibit hesitation or delay. (Board's 
 Eesord, ]>p. 812 and 948.) 
 
 The evidence of Asst. Surgeon Win. L. Faxon, Eighteenth Massachu- 
 setts A'oliinteers, ^lorrlTs division, is notie«'al)le. 
 
 Sykes' division, wJiich tirst arrived on the 28th August from Warren- 
 ton Junction to liristoe, was moved beyond it and put in position. Mor- 
 ell's divi.sion came up later in the day into Bristoe. 
 
 Br. Faxon testified as follows : 
 
 By Rkcoudki; : 
 Question. At what time did you arrive at Bristoe Station with your regiment ? 
 Answer. I judge about the miihllc of the afternoou. 
 
231 
 
 Questiou. During that time did you see General Porter? 
 
 Answer. I saw General Porter only as I crossed the run at Bristoe. 
 
 Question. Where was he at that time? 
 
 Answer. He was at a little house on the left hand of where I crossed ; that is, on the 
 side toward Washington. He and his start" were at a little house ; I think it was 
 a kind of peach orchard ; I think most of them were sitting down. 
 
 Questiou. Describe what you saw and heard, so far as General Porter was concerned. 
 
 Answer. As I crossed the run I heard General Porter make this remark : " (io tell 
 Morell to halt his division ;" and he added, "I don't care a damn if we don't get there." 
 I am very particular about those words, because I recollect them, and I have 8i)oken 
 of them. 
 
 By Mr. Choate : 
 
 Question. Yoii put this and that together and thought it referred to getting to Bris- 
 toe didn't you ? 
 
 Answer. No ; I never have drawn any conclusion, except that the man had some 
 motive in his mind, in view of the disaster that followed ; because a general comnumd- 
 ing a division if he had a motive of that kind should have kept it to himself. 
 
 Question. In view of what disaster that followed ? 
 
 Answer. Second battle of Bull Rim. 
 
 ****** * 
 
 Questiou. What other circumstances were there that impressed General Porter's 
 remark upon you at the time it was made ? 
 
 Answer. I said in view of the disaster that followed, our defeat at the battle of Bull 
 Run, and the general talk thatevery body made about the displacement of McClellau 
 and the appointment of Pope. That was a matter of common report in the Army as 
 well as everywhere. 
 
 The next noticeable utterance of petitioner is at Dawkins' Branch, 
 August 20, where, when petitioner of his own volition, after the fire of 
 the few cavalry skirmishers of vStuart's, sent out Col. E. G. Marshall, he 
 directed the latter not to hring on a general engagement. (Board's Eecord, 
 p. 678.) 
 
 Then follows the remark of petitioner when General McDowell gave 
 him his orders at the Manassas Gap Railroad, to init his troops in there, 
 that he coidd not do so without getting into a light. (G. C. M. Eecord, 
 p. So.) 
 
 After this comes petitioner's remark to General kSturgis, when the latter, 
 after McDowell had gone and petitioner was back to his column, called 
 his attention to the glint of a gun, showing a force, that he, petitioner, 
 thought he was mistaken. 
 
 Then follows petitioner's orders to General Sturgis, after that section 
 did open on him, for Piatt's brigade to march back to Manassas Junction 
 and take up a '■'■ defensive position.'''' (Board's Eecord, p. 712.) 
 
 Then comes his, petitioner's, orders to Morell to put back and conceal 
 in the bushes all his division, after the feeble effort to move to the right. 
 (No. .'>1, p. 05, petitioner's opening statement.) 
 
 Before and after this, we have the conduct of petitioner in putting his 
 headquarters two and live-eighths miles to the rear of Dawkins' Branch, 
 from between 12 and 1 p. m. up to night. (Petitioner's statement, p. 40.) 
 
 Next to lie noticed is the conduct of petitioner in not making known 
 to General Sykes, who was with him for hours, the fact of receipt of the 
 4.30 order to push into action at once. (G. C, M. Record, p. 178.) 
 
 Lastly, on that day we have this series of telegrams, iu two of which 
 the i>etitioner expressed a positive determination to withdraw to Manas- 
 sas without having attacked, viz : 
 
 General ]SIcDo\vell: The tiring on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot ad- 
 vance, and have failed to get over to you except by the route taken by King, / shall 
 withdraw to Manassas. If "you have anything to c(jaiinunicate please do so. I have 
 sent many messengers to you and General Sigel aud get nothing. 
 
 (Signed) F. J. PORTER, 
 
 ^ " Major-Goicral 
 
 An artillery duel is going on now — been skirmishing for a long time. 
 
232 
 
 Geiioiiil McDowell or Kixo : I have been wanderiiig over the woods and tailed to 
 get a coinniunieatiou to yon. Tell how matters go with you. The euemy is in strong 
 force in front of me, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I 
 shall have to retire for food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the buttltf 
 It seems to go to our rear. The euemv are getting to our left. 
 
 (Signed) . ' F. J. PORTEE, 
 
 Major-General Volunieers. 
 
 Genei'al McDowell : Failed in getting ^lorell over to you. After wandering about 
 the woods for a time I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened niion us. My 
 scouts could not get througli. Each one found the euemy between us, and I l)elieve 
 some have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, 
 but have not succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports 
 of scouts, think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the 
 way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know 
 your designs ; whether you retire or not. I cannot get water and am out of provision. 
 Have lost a few men from iuftmtry firing. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 Major-Gineval J'oliivh'crs. 
 
 AuGl'ST 29 — Gp. m. 
 
 August 29, 1862. 
 Generals McDowell and Kixo: I found it impossible to communicate bj^ crossing 
 the woods to Grovetou. The enemy are in. strong force on this road, and as they ap- 
 pear to have driven our forces back, the firing of the enemy having advanced an(i ours 
 retired, / hare deteyrniucd to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to comnuinicate 
 with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy — 
 
 Altliongli at this very time he was away back by the Sudley road, 
 where he had a direct road i>erfeetly open and iiiiobstructed to Gen- 
 eral Pope's headquarters, or to any of those generals who were there — 
 
 They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses 
 of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column 
 to see what is passing and how affairs are going. Had yon not better send your train 
 back ? I will comnmulcate with vou. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 These, by themselves, afford evidence which might be deemed couclu- 
 siA^e that the petitioner was disloyal to his commandhig general. Pope. 
 
 Of this, however, we are not left to conjecture, for during his trial, when 
 the ofiticial reporter, Wm. Blair Lord, after the day's adjournment, called 
 on him on business, accompanied b}^ Mr. Waterman L. Ormsby, this 
 petitioner, in a moment of unguarded impulse, declared he " was not 
 loyal to Pope," but, as testified to by Mr. Ormsbv, he " was loyal to 
 McClellan." (Board's Record, pp. Goi and 9C>8.) 
 
 These witnesses, the one for many years and now tlie official reporter 
 of debates in the House of Eepresentatives, and the other for fifteen 
 years superintendent of transferring in the Continental Bank Xote Com- 
 l)any, indicate, additional to theh' characters and appearance, the 
 amount of trust to be reposed in their accuracy. 
 
 Nothing wliich can be said in this argument as to this language can 
 add to the force of that said by Mr. Lord in the private letter he wrote 
 at the time to his wife on the subject, which is as foHows (Board's 
 Record, p. OSO) : 
 
 I have been a little bothered about (Jeneral Fitz .John Porter. I had to go to his 
 room on Monday to get sfune papers that belonged to the court that he hail had to 
 copy. One of tiie reiiorters of the New York Times was along with me. While in the 
 room, after some conversation, (Jeneral Porter made the remark, " Well, I wasn't loyal 
 to Pope; there is no denying that." Now, that is really the charge against him before 
 the court-martial — that he did not do liis duty as an ofticer before the enemy, and that 
 he did not act rightly towards (ieneral I'ojie, his connnanding officer. General Porter 
 said what he did in the privacy of his own room; without thinking of the effect of 
 his words. After thinking it over, I have concluded it better not to say anything 
 alxnit it now, though I would not ]iromise as nuich for that newspaper correspondent. 
 
 ]\Ir. Lord, from motives of delicacy, did not communicate information 
 
233 
 
 of tliis interview to the Judge-Advocate-Geiieral until the evidence in 
 the trial in 1862 had been closed, couseciuently it was not used. 
 
 This petitioner, judging- from his utterances and acts, on the 29th 
 August, 1862, was apparently willing " to leave Pope to get out of the 
 scrape," an alternative proposition which it a^^pears from the record of 
 this Board (j). 750) he was not the only general officer of the Army who 
 was prepared to adopt. 
 
 The petitioner's remarks, as overheard l)y ]Mr. B. T. Bowers, then 
 lieutenant First Ohio Battery, on the 31st August, that he did not wish 
 any honors or courtesies shown to General Pope (I>oard\s Record, j). 
 Do.j) Mere not a necessary piece of evidence to show his animus. 
 
 The conduct of this petitioner in the eventful days of the August 
 campaign of 1862 has now been reviewed. 
 
 He cannot say that he has not had the vtmost latitude in the produc- 
 tion of anything favorable to his many-sided case. 
 
 Punishment in the systems of laws prevailing in enlightened nations 
 is not so much to visit condemnation on the individual as to deter others 
 from <'ommitting the like offense. 
 
 Gladly would General Washington have pardoned Adjutant-General 
 John Andre, of the British army, in October, 1780, l)ut an example 
 was necessary for the future safety of the state. 
 
 It must not be forgotten in the examination of the details of petitioner's 
 case that the strength of the evidence against him lay much in the consid- 
 eration that it jiresented a series of acts having throughout a charac- 
 ter in common and bearing on their face a common motive; that they 
 began ai)on his being placed under the command of a particular officer; 
 that they continued so long as he remained under that officer; that they 
 exhibited a half-compliance, non-compliance, or positi\'e disobedience to 
 both the letter and the spirit of successive orders received from that offi- 
 cer; and that his hostility to that officer was clearly proven, both in his 
 dispatches and utterances. 
 
 Again, what may be called the method of his defection looked to a 
 retirement of the army in which he found himself to a point in rear of 
 the field of operations, where, by the fact of this retirement, and the 
 assumed failure of the general under whom he was serving, he might 
 come under another command ; and his own private dispatches confirmed 
 this aspect of the case, since they showed this to h-dve been his ruling- 
 thought and desire. 
 
 It was, in short, the consistency of these acts with each other, their 
 contrast with the previous conduct of the same officer, and the key to 
 their purpose furnished by his own words, that trebly indicated his 
 accountability, and bore the minds of the court to his conviction. 
 
 Of the less flagrant of these acts, perhaps of e\ ery one except his 
 turning his back upon the field on the afternoon of the 20th and failure 
 to push in, it may be said that this or that, had it stood alone, might, 
 without knowledge of his anhuKS^ have been covered up or explained 
 away so as to have left him the benefit of a doubt. 
 
 It was more difficult to do this with several taken together. 
 
 It was impossible to do it with all. 
 
 I have now concluded the duty put upon me, a duty among the most 
 disagreeable in all my professional experience. 
 
 In performing it, I have felt that the honor of the service required 
 every exertion "on my part to ascertain the facts, so that the President, 
 tlie historian, and the public might read this case and know it had been 
 as fully investigated as possible, in the absence of any judicial or quasi- 
 judicial power in the Board. 
 
I 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
 ASA BIRD GARDNER, 
 
 Counsel for Government, 
 AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OF 
 
 FITZ-JOHN PORTER, 
 
 BKFOUE TIIK 
 
 BOARD OF ARMY OFFICERS AT WEST POINT, 
 
 J^NXJ^I^Y, 1879. 
 
 WASITTXGTOIir: 
 
 (1(»VERNMENT PRINTING- OFFICE 
 
 18 7 9. 
 
 L