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THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 DELIVERED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD 
 
 ONE HUNDREDTH CELEBRATION 
 
 BATTLE OF BEMIS HEIGHTS 
 
 September 19, 1877 
 
 / 
 
 JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS, \S^^^ 
 
 NEW YORK 
 ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH & COMPANY 
 
 900 B ROADWAY 
 1877. 
 
 VW , V.V . vv 
 
£233 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 
 
 Mr. Chairman, Citizens of Saratoga County, 
 
 Ladies and Gentlemen : 
 
 To appear before you on this interesting occasion, com- 
 memorative of an important event in the annals of the State and 
 country, is to me not only a signal honor and a grateful task 
 but a filial duty. Proud to be chosen to recite the incidents 
 of the campaign which culminated in the surrender of the first 
 British army to the infant republic, it is a source of still 
 greater pride to me that I am thus permitted to link my own 
 name in the chain of history with that of my grandfather, 
 Col. Ebenezer Stevens, of the Continental army, who, on this 
 field, a century ago, directed, as Major Commandant of the 
 Artillery of the Northern Department, the operations of that 
 arm of the service which in great measure contributed to and 
 secured the final success of the American troops. 
 
 The ground on which we stand is memorable. Before the 
 discovery of the continent, this territory, at whose southern 
 angle we are now gathered, was the battle-field of the Indian 
 tribes, whose war trails lay upon its boundaries, and from the 
 days of European settlement it has been the debatable ground 
 of the French and Dutch, the French and English, and the 
 colonists and English, by turns. Here the fate of Ameri- 
 can empire has been repeatedly sealed. Not because of its 
 matchless beauty of hill and dale, its mirrored lakes and crys- 
 tal streams, its invigorating atmosphere and perfect skies, 
 
4 SARATOGA — HISTORIC GROUND. 
 
 nor yet because of its unmeasured forests and fertile fields, 
 was this old territory of Saratoga and Kayaderosseras the 
 object of rivalry and contention. Its possession was of 
 supreme military importance. The Mohawk pours into the 
 Hudson at its southernmost limit ; its borders are protected 
 by their waters, while a series of declivities, descending from 
 the mountain ranges of Luzerne and Kayaderosseras and ter- 
 minating in groups of isolated hills, present an admirable 
 strategic point. The discovery of Lake Champlain in 1609, 
 by the brave Frenchman whose name it bears, and the sailing 
 up the Hudson by Henry Hudson, the same year, gave rise to 
 a contest for its possession between the Canadian and New 
 York colonists which lasted for more than a century and a half. 
 
 The French settlements spread rapidly up the St. Lawrence 
 and far into the western country, while the Dutch and Eng- 
 lish slowly and methodically pushed their way along the Hud- 
 son, and thence by the Mohawk to the great interior lakes. 
 From the mouth of the Mohawk, northward, skirting the 
 shores of the Hudson and the lakes, lay the highway between 
 the rival settlements and posts. In its route it passed the 
 carrying-places of the Indians. Over this road, then but an 
 Indian trail, the troops of Frontenac passed in 1693, on their 
 way to strike the fortified villages of the Mohawk. Upon it 
 Colonel Schuyler built the forts from Stillwater to Fort Ann, 
 in the war of 1709. 
 
 In the campaigns of 1744 and I755> the French and their 
 Indian allies, with war-whoop, scalping-knife and tomahawk, 
 swept down through the forests to the settlements of this 
 region ; and in the seven years' war that followed, from 1755 to 
 1763, it was by this road that Abercrombie led his troops to 
 defeat and Amherst to the final triumph of the English arms ; 
 and here again swept back and forth the tide of war in alter- 
 nate ebb and flow during the earlier period of the American 
 Revolution. 
 
 In the beginning of the contest the spirit of the colonies 
 was little understood in England. Notwithstanding the 
 warning of the American agents, it was believed that the war 
 
INDEPENDENCE, A CERTAINITY. 5 
 
 would be localized in Massachusetts, and that General Gage 
 and a few regiments would easily reduce the rebellious col- 
 ony. The uprising of the continent in reply to the guns at 
 Lexington dispelled this illusion, and the British Ministry 
 awakening to the magnitude of their undertaking, plans were 
 laid for a continental campaign. 
 
 Here a protest may be pardoned against the assumption of 
 those who have doubted the ability of the colonies to main- 
 tain the liberty they had asserted without the French inter- 
 vention, which the victory of Saratoga secured to the Ameri- 
 can cause. A careful examination of the letters and news- 
 papers of the day, which, in the words of Webster, are the 
 only true sources of historic information, will show that the 
 colonists never doubted of their cause, and that they knew 
 the reason of the faith that was in them. They were fully 
 aware of the numbers they had contributed to the British 
 forces in the Canadian conquest, and of the prowess they had 
 displayed side by side with the best of the British regiments. 
 
 They were also informed of the extreme difficulty with 
 which the home Government obtained its recruits. Already 
 in the middle of the last century, under the atrocious land 
 system of England and the development of manufactures, 
 the agricultural population, the yeomanry, hardy sons of 
 the soil, which is the base of every great military state, had 
 been fast disappearing. It was in 1770, before the Revolution, 
 that Goldsmith, the poet of the people, breathed his lament 
 over the happy days long past — 
 
 " Ere England's grief began. 
 When every rood of land maintained its man." 
 
 The words of the poet were as familiar to Americans as to 
 their English parents, and they had received -a striking con- 
 firmation in the enlistment by the Ministry of Hessian mer- 
 cenaries, whose appearance in the colonies, while exciting the 
 indignation of the patriots, was positive proof of the unpopu- 
 larity of the war in England and the weakness of the mother 
 country. 
 
6 OCCUPATION OF CANADA. 
 
 The earlier movements of the colonial leaders show that 
 they were thoroughly acquainted with the art of war in its 
 larger sense. They recognized the value of the great lines of 
 water communication — the St. Lawrence and the Hudson — 
 and foresaw that the first efforts of the British Ministry would 
 be to control their mouths, from which, by their superior 
 naval power, they could force the passages of the rivers and 
 divide the territory. The Northern and Eastern people recog- 
 nized this intuitively, and gave point and direction to the 
 movement toward Canada by the seizure of Ticonderoga and 
 Crown Point at the outset of hostilities. These important 
 posts were surprised by the Eastern militia. Their artillery 
 and stores were of priceless value to the Continental cause. 
 
 The road to the St. Lawrence thus opened, and the temper 
 of the Canadians and Indians of the lower provinces favoring 
 the undertaking, it was resolved by Congress, in June, I775> to 
 take possession of St. John and Montreal, and General Schuy- 
 ler was intrusted with the command of the forces destined for 
 that purpose. No appointment could have been more appro- 
 priate than this. A gentleman of large landed estate in the 
 northern section, thoroughly conversant with its resources 
 and topography, and familiar not only with the habits and 
 customs of the frontier population, but also wielding a great 
 personal influence with the Indian tribes, he was the only man 
 who could effectually neutralize the efforts of the British 
 agents to influence the savages, who had always taken an active 
 part in the border warfare. Moreover, his great wealth and 
 family alliances gave strength to the cause. Selecting Ticon- 
 deroga as his natural base of operations, Schuyler built boats 
 for a movement to surprise St. John, a position so important 
 that it was called by the British officers the key of Canada. 
 
 It is not possible here to recount the various incidents of 
 the campaign. On the 3d of November, 1775, after a siege of 
 fifty days, the garrison at St. John capitulated to Montgomery, 
 whom Schuyler, forced by illness, contracted in the wet, un- 
 healthy country, to return to Ticonderoga, had left in com- 
 mand. On the 1 2th Montgomery was at Montreal. Mean- 
 
RETREAT FROM CANADA. 7 
 
 while, Washington, to create a diversion in favor of the main 
 movement, had sent Arnold by the way of the Kennebec and 
 the Chaudiere to a direct attack on Quebec, After incredible 
 hardships, in the midst of a winter remarkable for its in- 
 clemency, Arnold reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, on 
 the lOth November. The junction of Montgomery and 
 Arnold was made on the 3d December. 
 
 On the morning of the last day of the year the assault was 
 made ; the Americans were repulsed, and Montgomery fell. 
 Thus ended the offensive movement upon Canada. Its result 
 was the permanent holding by the British of the post of Que- 
 bec — which became impregnable with the reinforcements re- 
 ceived from England — and the mouth of the St. Lawrence, for 
 a naval movement toward the lakes. In the beginning of 
 1776 efforts were made to strengthen the American force in 
 Canada ; and the old road by the riverside, from Albany 
 through Stillwater and Saratoga, was again trodden by thou- 
 sands of recruits, marching to almost certain death by battle 
 or disease. Upon the death of Montgomery the command of 
 the army before Quebec devolved on Wooster. He was 
 superseded by Thomas in May. The small-pox was raging. 
 To convey an idea of the extent to which it had ravaged the 
 army, it is only necessary to state that, on taking command, 
 Thomas found that of 1,900 men and officers 900 were sick, 
 chiefly with this disease. A retreat was ordered, but the rein- 
 forced garrison sallying suddenly forth, the artillery was aban- 
 doned, and the Americans fled in precipitation. In June 
 Thomas died of the small-pox at Chamblee, leaving Sullivan in 
 command. An attempt by the new chief to arrest the retreat 
 was the cause of further disaster. Thompson, who led an expe- 
 dition against Three Rivers, fell into an ambuscade, and was 
 defeated by General Fraser. Among the British troops en- 
 gaged were some who, arrived from England with the reinforce- 
 ments under Burgoyne, had been piloted past Quebec by the 
 orders of the sagacious Carleton in the very transports that 
 had conveyed them across the ocean, and pushed up the 
 river to the scene of action. Already the vast importance of 
 
8 DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF THE TROOPS. 
 
 the river as a means of military communication was apparent. 
 The remainder of the fleet with the British reinforcements 
 coming up, the post of Sorel was abandoned by the Ameri- 
 cans and the retreat again began. So close was the pursuit 
 that the British advance entered Chamblee as the American 
 rear left the town. At St. John they were joined by Arnold 
 from Montreal. Firing the city, they again fell back to Isle 
 aux Noix, and thence, slowly pursued by Burgoyne, to Crown 
 Point, which they reached in the last days of June, [i/?^-] 
 So ended the invasion of Canada, an expedition remark- 
 able for its display of human suffering, human energy, and 
 human endurance. History may be searched in vain for ex- 
 amples of greater pertinacity under disaster, greater vigor 
 under the severest trials. The fragments of the gallant 
 bands which had united before Quebec and were now huddled 
 together at Crown Point presented a picture which wrung 
 the stoutest hearts. Pestilence was in their countenances. 
 Pestilence infested the very air ; not a tent in which there was 
 not a dead or dying man. The bones of the heroic Mont- 
 gomery and his aide-de-camp, McPherson, lay within the walls 
 of Quebec ; Burr and Lamb were prisoners ; Arnold still 
 chafed under a painful wound, and the army itself had dwin- 
 dled to a handful of emaciated skeletons. The troops at 
 Crown Point now fell under the authority of General Schuyler. 
 From the beginning the ill-health of Schuyler had rendered it 
 impossible for him to take the field at the head of the army ; 
 moreover, his great organizing spirit, his tireless energy, 
 were of more service to the cause at the Albany headquarters, 
 where his encouraging presence was indispensable. 
 
 Arnold arrived at Albany with news of the retreat from 
 Canada on the 24th of June. The next day Schuyler received 
 information of the appointment of Major-General Gates to 
 the command of the forces in Canada. 
 
 The instructions to Gates gave him unusual powers. A 
 question of jurisdiction at once arose, however, between him- 
 self and Schuyler, which they agreed to submit to Congress, 
 which on the 8th determined it by leaving the supreme 
 
GATES TAKES COMMAND. 9 
 
 authority to Schuyler while this side of Canada, and to Gates 
 when on the other side of the line. 
 
 Horatio Gates, who now first appears upon the scene on 
 the Canadian frontier, was of English birth. The son of a 
 clergyman, he received his name from his godfather, Horace 
 Walpole, under whose protection he early entered the British 
 service, and rose rapidly to the rank of major. His regiment 
 being ordered to America, he was badly wounded in the 
 Braddock campaign. Later he distinguished himself by his 
 bravery and capacity as an aide to Monckton on the expedition 
 against Martinique. At the close of the French war he pur- 
 chased a fine estate in Berkeley County, Ya., and became 
 a successful farmer. On the breaking out of the Revolution 
 he volunteered his services to Congress, and receiving the 
 rank of brigadier, was chosen adjutant -general of the army. 
 In this capacity his military experience and training were of 
 great value in the organization of the Continental forces, 
 and he was thus engaged in daily communication with Gen- 
 eral Washington when he was assigned to his new command. 
 He had been elected by Congress to the rank of major-gen- 
 eral in May. 
 
 Sullivan, taking offence at Gates' appointment, had retired 
 from the army at Crown Point, the command of which was 
 now assumed by Gates. A council of war, at which Schuyler, 
 Gates, Sullivan, Arnold, and Baron de Woedtke were pres- 
 ent, considering Crown Point as not tenable, ordered a 
 withdrawal to Ticonderoga, which was effected. This gave 
 great umbrage to Colonel Stark and other New Eng- 
 land officers, who remonstrated with Schuyler against the 
 move. The council which ordered the withdrawal also 
 resolved upon the defence of Lake Champlain, by a naval 
 armament of gondolas, row galleys, and armed batteaux. 
 
 On the i6th of July Gates reported that the loss sustained 
 by death and desertion during the campaign amounted to 
 more than five thousand men, and that three thousand more 
 were sick. The army gradually recovered its health and 
 spirits, the defences of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence 
 
lO INVASION OF NEW YORK. 
 
 were strengthened, connection was made between the camp 
 and the road to Skenesborough, guns were mounted, and, in 
 a word, every endeavor made to secure the northern gateway 
 of the New York colony. Though a further offensive move- 
 ment against Canada seemed no longer practicable, the line 
 of the Hudson and the lakes was of paramount importance. 
 While all eyes were turned in this direction, danger suddenly 
 appeared at the other end of the line. New York City was 
 invested by the most powerful fleet that had ever appeared 
 in these western waters, and Washington was threatened by 
 Lord Howe with a force of thirty thousand men. In July, 
 Long Island was occupied by the enemy ; in September, New 
 York fell into their permanent possession, and Washington 
 retreated to the mainland. 
 
 The naval armament prepared for the defence of Lake 
 Champlain, by Arnold and the Americans, with incredible 
 patience and labor, consisted of eight gondolas, three row gal- 
 leys, and four sloops orschooners, but when finished there were 
 only landsmen to command and soldiers to manoeuvre them. 
 Arnold, it is true, had gained some experience as a super- 
 cargo on West India voyages ; yet, with his usual careless 
 imprudence, he left the main channel of Lake Champlain free, 
 and on the 4th of October sailed into the open lake. Mean- 
 while Carleton, assisted by shipbuilders from England, with 
 abundant material from the Admiralty and the fleet on the 
 Canadian stations, had constructed more than two hundred 
 flat-boats at Montreal, and hauled thera to St. John, where 
 they were launched and manned by seven hundred sailors and 
 picked officers from the ships-of-war and a large force of Ger- 
 man sharpshooters and light artillery trained for the special 
 service. On the nth he sailed into the lake, and taking 
 the main passage which Arnold had left open, fell on the 
 American rear. A sharp action ensued, and for two days 
 a running fight was maintained. Arnold's vessel sustained 
 the contest to the last, but was finally driven into a creek 
 on the eastern shore, where she was fired, the crew marching 
 away in perfect order, with colors flying. 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
CARLETON RETIRES TO QUEBEC. II 
 
 On the 14th Carleton landed at Crown Point, the master 
 of the lake. Two hours distant lay Ticonderoga, an easy- 
 prey. But further movement was not his intention. He 
 returned to Canada, and went into winter quarters in No- 
 vember. Thus was the golden opportunity lost for a junc- 
 tion of his forces with those of Lord Howe. This military 
 blunder must not be ascribed to Carleton, who had re- 
 ceived explicit instructions from Lord Germain to return to 
 Quebec and re-establish good order and government in the 
 province. He was also directed to send a detachment, under 
 Burgoyne or some other officer, to reinforce General Howe at 
 New York. When Gates heard that Carleton had turned his 
 back on Crown Point he dismissed the militia, which had 
 rallied in large numbers to his support. He had no provis- 
 ions for their maintenance, and no ammunition for an offensive 
 movement, had such a movement been desirable. The season 
 of 1776 closed with Quebec and New York in the hands of 
 the British. The lines of invasion by the St. Lawrence and 
 lower Hudson were entirely open to the enemy. Schuyler 
 was at Albany, indefatigable in his labors to secure the 
 northern defences, and Washington in the Jerseys, covering 
 the Highlands, and ready to move on any menaced point. 
 
 Having thus endeavored as hurriedly as possible to sketch 
 the Canada campaign from its promising beginning to its 
 disastrous close, a few words may be permitted before pass- 
 ing to the consideration of the events of 1777, which we are 
 to-day celebrating, as to the attitude and position of New 
 York at this juncture. For both the offensive campaign of 
 1776 and the defensive campaign of 1777 Northern New York, 
 with Albany as its centre, was the base of operations. It was 
 the Albany Committee of Safety which first garrisoned Ticon- 
 deroga after its capture. At Albany, arms, ammunition, 
 and supplies were gathered. There guns were mounted, am- 
 munition fixed, cartridges prepared. The magazines, arsenals, 
 and laboratories were there. Till the final peace in 1783, 
 Albany was not only the secure base for all the operations of 
 the Northern Department, but the supply point whence the 
 material of war was drawn even for distant expeditions. 
 
12 PATRIOTISM AND PRIVATIONS OF NEW YORK. 
 
 Unfortunately for the perfect fame of our great State, jus- 
 tice has never yet been done to its history. The Dutch period 
 has been admirably portrayed by O'Callaghan and Broadhead, 
 but the recital of her struggle for liberty and independence 
 through the whole of the eighteenth century yet awaits the 
 pen of some one of her gifted sons. When it shall be written, 
 it will be found that she was second to none in devotion to 
 the principles of individual freedom, not for herself alone, but 
 for all the colonies. Her first commercial corporation dis- 
 played this feeling in the adoption of the generous motto : 
 ^' Noil nobis nati sohun" — we are not born for ourselves 
 alone, and during her subsequent history this has been her 
 marked characteristic. 
 
 Her central position made her the seat of war and sub- 
 jected her to privations and sufferings which were unknown 
 to the other colonies. Indeed, her calamities were a source 
 of profit to her Eastern neighbors. When New York flour- 
 ished they participated in her commerce and shared her pros- 
 perity, but when by the fortune of war her opulent seaport 
 fell into the hands of the enemy, she was not only burdened 
 by a large population which had depended upon the luxury 
 and trade of the capital, but, by an unjust customs discrimina- 
 tion, was compelled to pay tribute to neighboring colonies, 
 who refused to permit the passage through their territory of 
 goods intended for consumption within her borders without 
 payment of an import duty to themselves. This injustice was 
 long remembered. There were other sufferings greater than 
 the paralysis of trade. There was not a county in the State 
 which was not at some time overrun by the enemy, carrying 
 with them devastation and ruin. And still more terrible, her 
 defenceless homes were exposed to the merciless savages, 
 armed and incited by the ruthless policy of Great Britain. 
 The traditions of these sufferings have been handed down 
 among our people, and form the thrilling incident of legend 
 and of song. 
 
 After the return of Carleton to Quebec, Burgoyne, whose 
 ambition was not satisfied with a secondary command, ob- 
 
BURGOYNE PLANS A CAMPAIGN. 1 3 
 
 tained in December a leave of absence and returned to Eng- 
 land, where he was sure of court favor. Of obscure and 
 probably illegitimate birth, he had allied himself by a runa- 
 way match with Lady Stanley, a daughter of the Earl of 
 Derby. Immediately on his arrival he offered his services to 
 the King in a personal interview, and submitted his views in 
 a paper, entitled " Thoughts for Conducting the War from 
 the side of Canada," on the 28th of February, 1777. In this 
 plan we find for the first time a thoroughly devised scheme 
 for the junction of the Canadian army with that of General 
 Howe. The Canada army, operating from Ticonderoga, was 
 to take possession of Albany, and after opening communica- 
 tion with New York, to remain upon the Hudson River, and 
 thereby enable Howe to act with his whole force to the south- 
 ward. The plan included a diversion by the Mohawk, and a 
 rising of the loyalists in that region by means of an expedition 
 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger. The 
 King's remarks upon this plan still exist in the original docu- 
 ment, in his handwriting in the British Museum. His criticism 
 of it shows strong common sense, and a thorough knowl- 
 edge of the field of action in America. The point which will 
 be found of most interest is his urgent recommendation 
 "that possession should be taken of Lake George." Noth- 
 ing, he says, " but an absolute impossibility of succeeding in 
 this can be an excuse for proceeding by South Bay and 
 Skenesborough," which Burgoyne had suggested as an al- 
 ternative. With regard to the Indians, the King says that 
 " they must be employed." 
 
 The order of the campaign being definitely arranged, Lord 
 Germain addressed instructions to General Carleton, on the 
 20th March, and the next day Burgoyne left London for Ply- 
 mouth to take passage for Canada. He arrived at Quebec on 
 the 6th May. Carleton immediately put under his command 
 the troops destined for the expedition and committed to his 
 management the preparatory arrangements. Before he left 
 Plymouth Burgoyne had advised Sir William Howe of his pur- 
 pose to effect a junction with him, and he also sent him a 
 
14 THE CAMPAIGN OPENED. 
 
 second letter to the same effect from Quebec. On the loth 
 June he issued his orders for the general disposition of the army 
 at St. John. The movements of the troops were somewhat 
 delayed by bad weather and bad roads, but notwithstanding 
 all impediments the army of invasion assembled between the 
 17th and 20th June at Cumberland Point, near the foot of 
 Lake Champlain. On the 21st he held a conference with the 
 Indian tribes at the camp on the River Bouquet. Burgoyne, 
 with the main body, reached Crown Point on the 27th June. 
 Many accounts have been written of the picturesque appear- 
 ance oj the brilliant array of the British army as it passed up 
 the lake. That of Captain Thomas Anburey, an educated 
 young officer in the British service, and an eye-witness of the 
 scenes he described, deserves repetition. " It moved," he 
 says, " by brigades, gradually advancing from seventeen to 
 twenty miles a day, and regulated in such a manner that the 
 second brigade should take the encampment of the first, and 
 so on, each successively filling the ground the other quitted. 
 The time for departure was always at daybreak." The spec- 
 tacle the enthusiastic young gentleman portrays as one of the 
 most pleasing he ever beheld. " When in the widest part of 
 the lake it was remarkably fine and clear, not a breeze stirring, 
 when the whole army appeared at one view in such perfect 
 regularity as to form the most complete and splendid regatta 
 ever beheld. In the front the Indians went in their birch 
 canoes, containing twenty or thirty in each ; then the advanced 
 corps in a regular line with the gun-boats ; then followed the 
 Royal George and Inflexible, towing large booms, which are 
 to be thrown across two points of land, with the other brigs 
 and sloops following ; after them the brigades in their order." 
 On the 30th Burgoyne issued his famous order : " This army 
 embarks to-morrow to approach the enemy. The services re- 
 quired of this particular expedition are critical and conspicu- 
 ous. During our progress occasions may occur in which nor 
 difficulty nor labor nor life are to be regarded. This army 
 must not retreat." An advanced corps, under command of 
 General Fraser, was ordered up the west shore of the lake to 
 
THE ARMY OF BURGOYNE. 1$ 
 
 a point four miles from Ticonderoga, and the German reserve, 
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman, moved up the eastern 
 shore. 
 
 On the 1st July the whole army made a movement forward, 
 encamping in two lines, the right wing at the four mile point, 
 the left nearly opposite, on the east shore. Two frigates with 
 gun-boats lay at anchor, covering the lake from the east to 
 the west shores. Just beyond cannon-shot lay the American 
 batteries. The effective strength of the army of invasion at this 
 period is precisely known. Burgoyne himself stated it to have 
 been on the 1st July, the day before he encamped before Ticon- 
 deroga, at 7,390 men, exclusive of artillery. These were com- 
 posed of: British rank and file 3,724, German rank and file, 
 3,016 ; in all 6,740 regulars ; Canadians and provincials, about 
 250 ; Indians about 400 ; the artillerymen numbered 473. 
 The total force was therefore 7,863 men. The field train con- 
 sisted of forty-two pieces, and was unusually complete in all 
 its details, Burgoyne in his narrative complained that the 
 force of Canadians, which was estimated in the plan at 2,000, 
 did not exceed* 1 50; a significant circumstance, as showing 
 the correctneg? of the American estimate of the temper of the 
 province. Of the discipline of the British and German troops 
 nothing need be said ; they were all drilled and experienced 
 soldiers. Among their officers were many who thoroughly 
 understood the service in which they were engaged and the 
 topography of the country in which they were to act. Bur- 
 goyne had served with credit, and had distinguished himself 
 by his dash and gallantry in Portugal, and had also the knowl- 
 edge acquired in Canada the year previous. Major-General 
 Phillips, who commanded the artillery, had won high praise 
 at Minden. Brigadier-General Fraser, who led the picked 
 corps of light troops, had taken part in the expedition against 
 Louisburg and was with Wolfe at Quebec, He also had 
 served in the Canada campaign of 1776. Riedesel was an 
 accomplished officer, carefully trained in the service of the 
 Duke of Brunswick, and had been selected by him to com- 
 mand the German contingents, with the rank of major-general. 
 
1 6 FALL OF TICONDEROGA. 
 
 The territory threatened by this formidable invasion was 
 again at this period under the sole control of Major-General 
 Schuyler, Congress, on the 22d May, on the recommendation 
 of the Board of War, having resolved that Albany, Ticon- 
 deroga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, should form 
 the Northern Department, with General Schuyler in command. 
 Vague reports of the movements of Burgoyne reached Schuy- 
 ler toward the middle of June, and he at once visited Ticon- 
 deroga to look to its defences. No accurate information of 
 the force or designs of the enemy could be obtained, their 
 advance being thoroughly covered by Indian scouts, who either 
 captured or drove in all the reconnoitering parties of the 
 Americans. Nevertheless, it was decided in a council of 
 general officers, held on the 20th June, to defend the post. 
 On the 22d Schuyler returned to Albany to hurry on rein- 
 forcements and provisions, leaving the garrison, which con- 
 sisted of less than twenty-five hundred men, in command of 
 Major-General St. Clair. This was increased by the arrival 
 of nine hundred militia in the course of a few days. 
 
 The post at Ticonderoga, notwithstanding its high reputa- 
 tion, was not really tenable. It was overlooked by an emi- 
 nence known by the name of Sugar Hill, or Mount Defiance, 
 the occupation of which had been neglected, either because 
 of the supposed impracticabihty of carrying guns to its sum- 
 mit, or of the weakness of the garrison, already spread over 
 an extensive area, St. Clair had expected an attack from the 
 lake side, and had fortified to meet it, but recognized the dan- 
 ger of his situation when on the morning of the 5th the British 
 were seen in possession of Sugar Hill. With his accustomed 
 vigor. General Phillips had ordered a battery of artillery to 
 the top of this eminence, to which the cannon were hoisted 
 from tree to tree. The occupation of Mount Hope by Fraser 
 on the 3d had already cut off the line of retreat by Lake 
 George. There was but one course to pursue — an immediate 
 evacuation of the post and a withdrawal by the only remain- 
 ing line, that of the lake to Skenesborough. That night part 
 of the cannon were safely embarked on batteaux, those left 
 
SKIRMISH AT HUBBARDTON. 1 7 
 
 behind were spiked, and a hasty retreat began ; the sick and 
 the baggage, ordnance and stores, were sent up the lake un- 
 der charge of Colonel Long, and the main body crossing the 
 lake by the bridge to Mount Independence moved towards 
 Skenesborough by the new road lately cut by the garrison, 
 to which allusion has already been made. The retreat was 
 discovered at daylight on the 6th, and pursuit instantly began, 
 Fraser, taking the route pursued by the garrison with the 
 picket guard, hastened on, closely followed by Riedesel in 
 support, while Burgoyne opened a passage through the bridge 
 and led the galleys in chase of the battery up the lake. The 
 wind being favorable, he overtook the retreating flotilla at 
 Skenesborough, captured two of the covering galleys and 
 compelled the destruction of the batteaux, which were fired 
 by the Americans, who also destroyed the fort and mills at 
 Skenesborough and retired up Wood Creek to Fort Ann. 
 General Burgoyne took post at Skenesborough. ^ 
 
 Meanwhile the main body of the Americans under St. Clair, 
 hurrying along the unfinished road through the wilderness, 
 reached Hubbardton, twenty-five miles distant, at one o'clock 
 on the 6th, when a halt was made. At five o'clock, hearing 
 that the rear guard under Colonel Francis, for which he had 
 waited, was coming up, St. Clair, leaving Colonel Warner 
 with one hundred and fifty men at Hubbardton, with orders 
 to follow when they arrived, moved on to Castleton, six miles 
 distant, which he reached at dusk. When Francis joined War- 
 ner, they concluded to spend the night at Hubbardton, where 
 they were overtaken the next morning, when on the point of 
 resuming their march, by Fraser's advance The Americans, 
 about twelve hundred in number, formed in a strong position 
 and maintained their ground with spirit until the bugle of the 
 Hessians announced the approach of Riedesel's corps. Their 
 arrival decided the fortune of the day. The Americans 
 behaved with great bravery until overpowered by numbers, 
 when they broke and scattered. The losses in killed and 
 wounded were about equal on the two sides. Fraser led his 
 men in person. Major Grant, an officer of high reputation. 
 
1 8 THE AMERICANS RALLY AT FORT EDWARD. 
 
 was killed. The Earl of Balcarras, who led the light infantry, 
 and was now for the first time in action, was slightly, and 
 Major Ackland severely, wounded. Of the Americans, Col- 
 onel Francis fell while bravely rallying his men. St. Clair, 
 hearing of the capture of Skenesborough, struck into the 
 woods on his left. At Rutland he found some of Warner's 
 fugitives. Taking a circuitous route, he reached the Hud- 
 son River at Batten Kill, and joined General Schuyler at Fort 
 Edward on the I2th. 
 
 Schuyler heard on the morning of the 7th, in Albany, rumor 
 of disaster, and immediately started for Fort Edward, to take 
 command of the troops there, and await the arrival of Nixon's 
 brigade from Peekskill, which had been detached from Put- 
 nam's command at the Highlands by Washington's orders. 
 At Fort Edward he learned that the party under Colonel 
 Long had turned at Fort Ann and checked the pursuit. Set- 
 ting fire to the work, they pushed on to Fort Edward, which 
 they reached on the 9th. St. Clair, as has been stated, did 
 not come in till the I2th. The whole force under Schuyler 
 consisted of seven hundred Continental troops and a smaller 
 number of militia, without a single piece of artillery. St. 
 Clair brought in about fifteen hundred men. On the 13th 
 Nixon arrived with his brigade of six hundred from Albany, 
 and on the 20th the whole force fit for duty was returned at 
 4,467 men, half-equipped and deficient in ammunition and 
 every kind of supplies. Before them, at Skenesborough, 
 within a day's forced march, lay Burgoyne with his superior 
 force of veteran troops, flushed with victory. 
 
 The first period of the campaign, as Burgoyne termed it 
 in his narrative of his operations, ended at Skenesborough. 
 So far his march had been successful ; triumphant even. 
 With proud exultation his general orders of the loth, issued 
 at Skenesborough House, directed that divine service should 
 be performed on the next Sunday at the head of the line and 
 of the advanced corps, and a fen de joie to be fired at 
 sunset on the same day with cannon and small arms at 
 Ticonderoga, Crown Point, the camp at Skenesborough, 
 
MILITARY ERROR OF BURGOYNE. I9 
 
 the camp at Castleton, and the post of Breyman's corps. In 
 the hour of pride commenced the second period of Burgoyne's 
 campaign, which may be termed the period of his errors and 
 his misfortunes. In the plan laid before the King, Burgoyne, 
 as has already been stated, had himself expressed his belief 
 that the possession of Lake George was of great consequence 
 as the most expeditious and most commodious route to 
 Albany, and that by South Bay and Skenesborough should 
 not be attempted ; and the King himself expressed a similar 
 opinion, adding that nothing but an absolute impossibility of 
 succeeding by Lake George should be an excuse for proceed- 
 ing by the other route. A glance at the map, even to one 
 not familiar with the topography of the country, will make 
 this apparent. The distance from Ticonderoga to Lake 
 George is little over two miles. Lake George itself is about 
 thirty-five miles long. The petty naval force on the lake, 
 consisting of two small schooners, could not have resisted a 
 brigade of gunboats. Fort George could have opposed no 
 serious obstacle to the conqueror of " Ty." 
 
 Gordon says, on military authority, and adds that Gates, 
 who was familiar with every inch of ground, had repeatedly 
 expressed the same opinion, that by a rapid movement with 
 light pieces Burgoyne could have reached Albany by the 
 time he got to the Hudson. This view was corroborated by 
 Captain Bloomfield, of the Royal Artillery. In evidence 
 before the committee of the House of Commons on the con- 
 duct of the campaign, he said that the artillery could have 
 been easily moved by land from Fort George to the Hudson 
 River in two days. Even when at Skenesborough the true 
 policy of Burgoyne was an immediate return to Ticonderoga 
 to avail of the water line. His orders were to move by the 
 most expeditious route. But General Burgoyne had pro- 
 claimed, "This army must not retreat," and Phillips, his 
 chief adviser, is known to have held the Americans in great 
 contempt. Jefferson said of him, of personal knowledge, 
 " that he was the proudest man of the proudest nation on 
 earth." It has been said further that Burgoyne was misled 
 
20 SCHUYLER OBSTRUCTS THE ROAD. 
 
 ^ by Mr. Skene, who had persuaded him of a rising of the 
 loyalists in the region ; and of Skene, that his main object was 
 to secure the building of a military road through the extensive 
 property of which he was proprietor, and which bore his 
 name. Skenesborough is the present Whitehall. ^ 
 
 Burgoyne, in excuse for his delays, says that, from the 
 nature of the country and the necessity of waiting a fresh 
 supply of provisions, it was impossible to follow the quick 
 retreat of the Americans, and considered the short cut from 
 Fort Ann to Fort Edward, though attended with great labor, 
 as the most available route. Here was the first great error, 
 of which the alert Schuyler, to whom every inch of the 
 ground was familiar, was quick to take advantage. Imme- 
 diately upon the arrival of Nixon's Brigade at Fort Edward 
 it was advanced to Fort Ann to fell trees into Wood Creek, 
 and upon the road from Fort Ann south. So thoroughly 
 was this effected that the invading army was compelled to 
 remove at every ten or twelve yards great trees which lay 
 across the road, and exclusive of the natural difficulties of the 
 country, the watery ground and marshes were so numerous 
 that they were compelled to construct no less than forty 
 bridges (one of which was nearly two miles in length) on the 
 march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. Lake George 
 was partially used for the transport of stores. Fort George, at 
 the head of the lake, having been abandoned by the Ameri- 
 cans, who, after saving forty pieces of cannon and fifteen tons 
 of gunpowder, barely escaped being cut off by the movement 
 of the enemy to Fort Edward. Such were the obstructions 
 thrown in his way that Burgoyne only made his headquarters 
 at Fort Edward on the 30th of July, having consumed twenty- 
 four days after his arrival at Skenesborough in a movement 
 of twenty-six miles. Here his eyes were cheered with a first 
 view of the Hudson, a vision delusive as a mirage. 
 
 Schuyler, having secured his artillery, began to fall back 
 and, on the 27th, abandoned Fort Edward to the British, 
 taking post at Moses' Creek, four miles below, which Kosci- 
 usko had settled upon as a more defensible place than Fort 
 
WASHINGTON AND SCHUYLER HOPEFUL. 21 
 
 Edward, which was almost in ruins. So elated was Schuyler 
 by the bringing off of the artillery, that he wrote that " he 
 believed the enemy would not see Albany this campaign." 
 A week later, by advice of all the general officers, he moved 
 his army, first to Fort Miller, six miles below, then to Sara- 
 toga, and finally to Stillwater, about thirty miles north of 
 Albany, where he proposed to await reinforcements and 
 fortify a camp. Stillwater was reached on the 3d of August, 
 and an intrenchment was begun the next day. 
 
 The fall of Ticonderoga had excited intense alarm through- 
 out the country ; the popular imagination had invested it with 
 the impregnability of an enchanted castle. Its capture had 
 been the first conquest of the patriots, and it was supposed to 
 be the natural key to the Northern region. Yet in spite of the 
 popular discouragement, the leaders were still hopeful of a 
 happy result of the campaign. So confident was Schuyler in 
 ultimate success that he expressed the presentiment on the 14th 
 of July that " we shall still have a Merry Christmas," and on 
 the 25th he wrote to the Committee of Albany that the pro- 
 gress of Burgoyne need give no alarm — to use his own words, 
 that should he ever get as far down as Half Moon he would 
 run himself into the greatest danger, and that in all proba- 
 bility his whole army would be destroved. This hopefulness 
 was not confined to Schuyler. Washington himself at this 
 period expressed his opinion that the success Burgoyne had 
 met with "would precipitate his ruin," and that his " acting 
 in detachments was the course of all others most favorable to 
 the American cause." He adds: " Could we be so happy 
 as to cut one of them off, supposing it should not exceed 
 four, five or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people and 
 do away with much of their present anxiety. In such an 
 event they would lose sight of past misfortune, and, urged at 
 the same time by a regard for their own security, they would 
 fly to arms and afford every aid in their power." In view of 
 the events about to transpire, the words of the great chief 
 seem almost prophetic. 
 
 To us in these days, looking over the field without passion, 
 
22 FAILURE OF ST. LEGER. 
 
 prejudice or fear, it seems that even a junction between Bur- 
 goyne and Howe would not have been by any means fatal to 
 the patriot cause. The British had not the force adequate to 
 maintain the line of the Hudson. At no time did their army 
 at the north hold more than the ground on which they stood. 
 Howe, like Burgoyne, derived his provisions and supplies 
 from England. 
 
 While Burgoyne was slowly plodding his way against al- 
 most insuperable difficulties in the path he had chosen, check- 
 ing desertion only by constant executions, and even by au- 
 thority to the savages to scalp every soldier found outside 
 the lines, St. Leger, with his command reinforced by Sir 
 John Johnson and the loyalists of Tryon county, appeared 
 before Fort Stanwix on the 2d of August. The story of the 
 siege and the bloody struggle on the field of Oriskany need 
 not be recited here. The brave resistance of the garrison 
 under Gansevoort and Willett, and the heroic behavior of 
 Herkimer and the yeomanry of Tryon against desperate 
 odds, have lately been occasion of centennial celebration. 
 This expedition was a principal feature of the original plan of 
 the campaign, and, although St. Leger held an independent 
 command, his failure was a complete paralysis of the right 
 wing of the army of invasion. Stunned by the resistance he 
 encountered, and learning of the reinforcement of the Ameri- 
 cans by troops from Schuyler's command, he retraced his 
 steps to Oswego, and thence with the remnant of his force to 
 Montreal, where he arrived too late to take any further part 
 in the campaign. 
 
 From the 30th of July to the 15th of August, Burgoyne 
 was busy at Fort Edward, getting down batteaux, provisions, 
 and ammunition from Fort George to the Hudson, a distance 
 of about sixteen miles. The roads were out of repair in some 
 parts, steep and much broken by exceeding heavy rains ; 
 with all his exertions he was not able in fifteen days to ac- 
 cumulate more than four days' provisions for a forward move- 
 ment. This delay, however, enabled him to carry out an- 
 ther cherished plan, that of detaching a corps from his left, 
 
BURGOYNE RESUMES HIS MARCH. 23 
 
 in order, to use his own words, " to give jealousy " to Con- 
 necticut, and hold in check the country known as the Hamp- 
 shire Grants. To this he had been further incited by Major- 
 General Rjiedesel, who had commanded the Black Hussars in 
 Germany, and was now anxious to mount his dragoons. 
 
 Besides this inducement, Burgoyne had learned that Ben- 
 nington was the great deposit of corn, flour, and cattle, that it 
 was guarded by militia only, and that the country about was 
 much disaffected to the Americans. Under these impres- 
 sions, with this purpose, and being now ready for his own 
 advance, he despatched an expedition under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Baum. At daybreak on the 14th, Burgoyne broke 
 camp at Fort Edward and began his advance. His objective 
 point was Albany, where he expected to be joined by St. 
 Leger coming down the Mohawk, and Baum from his raid 
 upon Bennington. 
 
 On the 14th, he established his headquarters at Duer's 
 house (at Fort Miller), about six miles below. A bridge of 
 rafts was constructed, over which the advance corps passed 
 the Hudson and encamped on the heights of Saratoga. On 
 the 17th, before the main body could be gotten over, the 
 river being swollen by heavy rains, and the current running 
 rapidly, the bridge was carried away. The advance being 
 thus isolated, was recalled, and recrossed the river in scows 
 and took up their old encampment on the Batten Kill. 
 Here, at a shoal part of the river, a pontoon was constructed 
 across the Hudson, directly opposite Saratoga, which was 
 completed about the 20th. But obstacles of another nature 
 presented themselves. On the 17th, Burgoyne receiving in- 
 formation of disaster to Baum, and suddenly convinced of 
 the impossibility of obtaining provisions and supplies from 
 the country, in his general orders informed the troops of 
 the necessity of a halt. For the first time his eyes were 
 opened to the difficulties of his situation. He found himself 
 with an extended line of communication, no hope of obtain- 
 ing provisions in the neighborhood, deceived as to the senti- 
 ment of the country and in the midst of a hardy population 
 
24 FAILURE OF BAUM, 
 
 exulting in success. The surprise and defeat of Baum by 
 Stark and Warner with the New England militia on the 15th 
 of August was not to him the most discouraging feature of 
 the battle of Bennington. It was the rally of the farmers 
 from every quarter, all accustomed to the use of firearms 
 from childhood in a section of country abounding in game. 
 Not Braddock himself in the toils of Indian stratagem was 
 more helpless than the Hessians of Baum and Breyman, with 
 clumsy accoutrements, their heavy boots sinking at every 
 step deep in the wet soil, and moving with military disci- 
 pline, exposed to the fire of a thousand marksmen concealed 
 by bushes and trees. 
 
 To relate the incidents of the glorious victory at this time 
 and before this audience would be to tell a " twice-told tale." 
 But it is not to be forgotten that this battle also was fought 
 on the soil of the Empire State. Its result justified Washing- 
 ton's military judgment in his opinion of the danger to Bur- 
 goyne of detached operations, and the enthusiasm it aroused 
 realized his prediction and showed his thorough knowledge 
 of the temper of the people. To the army of Burgoyne the 
 consequences were serious. The return of the scattered rem- 
 nant of the force, which went out from camp in such high 
 hopes and spirits, damped the ardor of both officers and men, 
 A few days later a courier from St. Leger, guided by a 
 friendly Indian by Saratoga Lake and Glens Falls, brought 
 intelligence of failure in that quarter. The shadow which 
 had fallen on the army now deepened into gloom. In spite 
 of all these discouragements the proud spirit of Burgoyne 
 could not brook the thought of abandoning the expedition. 
 Choosing to adopt a strict construction of the King's orders 
 "to go to Albany," he assumed the entire responsibility of 
 further advance without consultation of his officers. 
 
 It was not until the 12th September that Burgoyne, com- 
 pelled to depend wholly upon Canada for supplies, had 
 accumulated the thirty days' provisions which he thought 
 necessary to his further advance. On that day he issued his 
 orders to move. 
 
BURGOYNE CROSSES THE HUDSON. 25 
 
 His army crossed the Hudson on the 13th, and on the 14th 
 encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga. Here was 
 the country seat of General Schuyler, with his commodious 
 dwelling, his mill, a church and several houses. Not a living- 
 creature was to be seen, but broad fields, rich with waving 
 grain ready for the reaper. Before night the wheat was cut 
 and threshed and in the mill for grinding. The Indian corn 
 was apportioned as forage for the horses, and the beautiful 
 plantation, which in the morning was a scene of peace and 
 plenty, stripped to the last blade. The passage of the river 
 was the close of what Burgoyne terms the second period of 
 his campaign. 
 
 Before entering on the third period, which may be termed 
 the battle period, we must return to the American army, 
 which we left under Schuyler at Stillwater, intrenching their 
 camp on the 4th August. On the same day he received ad- 
 vice of the investment of Fort Stanwix ; on the 7th reports of 
 the battle of Oriskany, with exaggerated account of the 
 American loss. On the i ith he detached General Learned 
 to the assistance of the garrison, and on the 15th Arnold, 
 whom Washington had ordered to the Northern Department, 
 because of his encouraging presence to the dispirited militia, 
 was sent up with full powers to cover the Mohawk settle- 
 ments. Alarmed by the prospect of St. Leger's descent by 
 the Mohawk River, Schuyler, who on every occasion dis- 
 played strategic skill of the first order, fell back from Still- 
 water to the confluence of the Hudson and the Mohawk, 
 where, on the 14th, he took post on Van Schaick's Island, nine 
 miles from Albany. This had been selected as a secure posi- 
 tion for the main body, which had been greatly weakened by 
 the detachments sent up the valley of the Mohawk and to the 
 Hampshire Grants, where General Lincoln had gone, by 
 order of Washington, to organize a movement to cut ofi" Bur- 
 goyne's communication with Canada. 
 
 Correct as all these movements of General Schuyler appear 
 to us now, as seen in the light of history, they were the cause 
 of intense dissatisfaction to the people, whom each successive 
 
26 POPULAR DISTRUST OF SCHUYLER. 
 
 movement of Burgoyne had filled with alarm. Rumors derog- 
 atory to the personal courage and integrity, as well as the 
 patriotism, of Schuyler were rife in all sections, particularly 
 in New England, where the old prejudice against their Dutch 
 neighbors still prevailed. In all the difficulties with regard to 
 boundary Schuyler had been prominent in defence of the 
 rights of the New York colony, and the antagonism between 
 the two sides of the river was now intensified by the revolt of 
 the Hampshire Grants against the authority of New York, 
 and their declared purpose to set up a State for themselves. 
 Schuyler, whose spirit was high and whose nature was sensi- 
 tive to excess, chafed sorely under the accusations against 
 him, but, sustained by his own sense of the value of his ser- 
 vices, the sympathy of the New^ York Government and the 
 confidence of Washington, he had maintained his command. 
 The year before he had demanded an investigation into his 
 conduct in evacuating Crown Point, which was looked upon 
 as the beginning of disaster, and had tendered his resignation 
 to Congress, who, however, refused to accept of it, and prom- 
 ised an investigation of his conduct. In November he had 
 applied again to Congress for permission to repair to Phila- 
 delphia on that business, to which Congress consented. Ap- 
 pointed delegate to Congress by the New York Convention, 
 he had taken his seat in April, and secured the passage of a 
 resolution of inquiry. The committee made a report in May, 
 which thoroughly vindicated him and placed him in full com- 
 mand of the Northern Department. 
 
 The advance of Burgoyne, penetrating into the heart of the 
 country, and the fact that Schuyler himself had personally 
 participated in no engagement, revived the distrust with 
 which he was viewed by the Eastern troops ; a distrust which 
 paralyzed his influence and made a change in the command 
 of the Northern Department an absolute necessity. No 
 stronger proof of the existence and strength of this feeling 
 is needed than his own words. Writing to Washington from 
 Saratoga, on the 28th July, he said : "So far from the 
 militia that are with me increasing, they are daily dimin- 
 
GATES RELIEVES SCHUYLER. 2/ 
 
 isliing, and I am very confident that in ten days, if the 
 enemy should not disturb us, we shall not have five hundred 
 left ; and although I have entreated this and the Eastern 
 States to send up are-enforcement of them, yet I doubt much 
 if any will come up when the spirit of malevolence knows no 
 bounds, and I am considered as a traitor." 
 
 On the 1st of August Congress passed resolutions ordering 
 General Schuyler to repair to headquarters, and directed 
 Washington to order such general officer as he deemed proper 
 to relieve him in his command. On the 4th a letter from 
 Washington was laid before Congress, asking to be excused 
 from making an appointment of an officer to command the 
 Northern army. An election was then held by Congress, and 
 Major-General Gates was chosen by the vote of eleven States. 
 Washington was informed of the result, and was directed to 
 order General Gates at once to his post. Washington was 
 then at Philadelphia, and the same day informed Gates of his 
 appointment. Schuyler was at Albany when the resolution 
 reached him on the loth. His magnanimity on this occasion 
 is matter of record. Solomon tells us that, " Better is he 
 that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city." To no man 
 of whom history, ancient or modern, makes mention can this 
 phrase be more justly applied than to Schuyler. The judg- 
 ment of Congress as to the propriety of a change is sufficiently 
 shown by Schuyler's own letters to that body on the 15th 
 August, in which he said that he had not been joined by any 
 of the New England militia, and that there were only sixty or 
 seventy on the ground from the State of New York. Whether 
 Schuyler had great military capacity or not is a question 
 which cannot be answered. That he had no opportunity of 
 displaying it on the field is certain ; that he was possessed of 
 the strongest common sense and of that rarest quality in the 
 human mind, the organizing faculty, is beyond doubt. No 
 other man in America could have performed the services 
 which he rendered, and it may certainly be said that they 
 were second only to those of Washington in importance and 
 extent. He continued in command of the troops until the 
 
28 GATES ADVANCES TO BEMIS HEIGHTS. 
 
 arrival of Gates on the 19th August, to whom he gave the 
 cordial reception of a soldier and a gentleman. 
 
 Gates was by no means overjoyed at the responsibility with 
 which he was entrusted. He found the army dejected, although 
 somewhat encouraged by the victory at Bennington. His 
 arrival revived the spirits of the troops, and the precision which 
 he at once introduced into the camp increased their resolution. 
 Words of congratulation and encouragement pressed in upon 
 him from the eastward, and the announcement of the approach 
 of militia from all sections added to the courage of the men. 
 
 During the retreat the army had been greatly distressed by 
 the savages in Burgoyne's command, who hung upon the 
 flanks and outposts, and by their merciless cruelty excited an 
 alarm which their real importance by no means justified. 
 Washington, aware of the disadvantage under which the militia 
 lay in their apprehension from this cause, on the 20th dis- 
 patched Colonel Morgan to his assistance with his corps of rifle- 
 men. This corps of five hundred men was a corps d' elite, which 
 had been selected from the entire army for their proficiency 
 in the use of the rifle and the Indian mode of warfare. Gates 
 thanked Washington warmly for this valuable assistance and 
 for his advice concerning the use to be made of them. They 
 arrived on the 23d. To them Gates added two hundred and 
 fifty bayonets, also carefully picked from the line, whom he 
 placed under the command of Major Dearborn, a determined 
 officer. 
 
 On the 8th September, the army having been recruited to 
 about 6,000 men. Gates felt strong enough to make a forward 
 movement, and marched to Stillwater, where ahne of intrench- 
 ments was begun the next day. It was soon found, however, 
 that the extent of low ground was too great to admit of proper 
 defence of the centre and left. A more favorable point was 
 selected, two miles and a half to the northward, where a range 
 of hills, covered by a narrow defile in front and jutting close 
 upon the river, offered an admirable defensive position. The 
 fortification was at once begun, under the direction of Kos- 
 ciusko, the Engineer-in-Chief, and the army took possession on 
 
burgoyne's communications cut. 29 
 
 the 1 2th. The ground is that which was then and is now 
 known as Bemis' Heights, and upon it were contested the 
 hard-fought actions which determined the campaign. Here 
 Gates resolved to await the attack of Burgoyne, without pre- 
 cipitating movements with his mostly raw troops until they had 
 acquired some discipline ; certainly not until he should hear of 
 the success of the attempt making to reach Burgoyne's rear 
 and distress his army. 
 
 General Lincoln, who was charged with this expedition, 
 moved from Manchester to Pawlet with his militia force, con- 
 sisting of about two thousand men. On his advance, the 
 British guard at Skenesborough fell back, destroying a num- 
 ber of boats. On the 13th he despatched Colonel Brown with 
 five hundred men to the landing at Lake George, to release 
 the American prisoners and destroy the British stores, and the 
 same number of men under Colonel Johnson to Mount Inde- 
 pendence, to create a diversion in favor of the operations of 
 Colonel Brown, who was directed to push to Ticonderoga, if 
 opportunity offered. A like number of men was also sent, 
 under Colonel Woodbridge, to Skenesborough, thence to 
 Fort Ann, and on to Fort Edward. Lincoln at once advised 
 Gates of this movement. Colonel Brown managed his op- 
 erations with great skill and secrecy. After a night march he 
 reached the north end of Lake George at daybreak on the 
 morning of the 17th, surprising in detail all the outposts be- 
 tween the landing and the fortress of Ticonderoga ; Mount 
 Defiance, Mount Hope, the French lines, a block-house, two 
 hundred batteaux and several gunboats, taking prisoners two 
 hundred and ninety- three British and Canadians, and releas- 
 ing one hundred Americans. Among his trophies was the 
 Continental standard left at Ty when the Fort was evacuated. 
 The guns at Fort Defiance were turned upon the fortress of 
 Ticonderoga, but no impression could be made on its walls. 
 Taking the gunboats. Brown sailed up the lake, and on the 
 24th made an attack on Diamond Island, about four miles 
 north of Fort George, but was warmly received and repulsed. 
 Making for the eastern shore, he reached the camp of Gejieral 
 
30 BURGOYNE MOVES TO ATTACK. 
 
 Warner at Skenesborough on the 26th, by way of Fort Ann. 
 A curious testimony to the effect of these raids on the rear of 
 the British army exists in the Gates papers, in an intercepted 
 letter from St. Leger, written at Ticonderoga the 29th Septem- 
 ber, informing Burgoyne of his arrival there, and asking for 
 guides to lead him down. 
 
 To return to Burgoyne, whom we left encamped at Sara- 
 toga on the 14th. The next day he moved forward at noon, 
 forming his troops into three columns, after passing Schuyler's 
 house, and encamped at Dovogat (the present Coeville), 
 where they lay accoutred that night. On the i6th there was 
 a fog so heavy that even foragers were forbidden to leave 
 camp. Later in the day detached parties were employed in 
 repairing the bridges and reconnoitering the country. 
 
 On the 17th the army resumed their march, repaired 
 bridges and encamped at Sword's Farm, four miles from 
 Gates' position. The general orders directed the army to be 
 under arms at an hour before daybreak. His approach was 
 known to Gates by report of his adjutant, Wilkinson, who 
 led a scouting party and sawthe passage of the river. On 
 the 1 8th preparations were made to harass him, and General 
 Arnold was sent out with fifteen hundred men to endeavor 
 to stop the repair of the bridges. After some light skir- 
 mishing Arnold fell back, and Burgoyne moved forward as far 
 as Wilbur's Basin, about two miles from the American posi- 
 tion. He there established his camp, which he fortified with 
 intrenchments and redoubts, his left on the river, his right 
 extending at right angles to it across the low ground about 
 six hundred yards, to a range of steep and lofty heights ; a 
 creek or gully in his front, made by a rivulet which issued 
 from a great ravine formed by the hills, known as the North 
 Ravine. 
 
 On the morning of the 19th, Burgoyne, after a careful recon- 
 noitering of the passages of the great ravine and the road 
 around its head, leading to the extreme left of the American 
 camp, advanced to the attack in three divisions. Fraser on 
 the right, with the light infantry, sustained by Breyman's Ger- 
 
THE AMERICAN POSITION. 3 1 
 
 man riflemen, and covered on the flanks by Canadians, Pro- 
 vincials, and Indians, made a wide circuit to the west in order 
 to pass the ravine without quitting the heights, and afterwards 
 to cover the march of the hne to the right. The centre, com- 
 manded by Burgoyne in person, passed the ravine in a direct 
 line south, and formed in order of battle as fast as they gained 
 the summit, where they waited to give time for Fraser to 
 make the circuit. The left wing, led by Riedesel and Phillips, 
 and composed of the Hessian troops and the artillery, moved 
 along the river road and meadows in two columns. Their 
 advance was delayed by the repair of the bridges. The 
 Forty-seventh Regiment were charged with the guard of the 
 batteaux containing the stores of the army. Burgoyne's pur- 
 pose was himself to attack the left of the American lines in 
 front and engage their attention until Fraser, moving over the 
 table land, should turn the extreme left of the American posi- 
 tion and reach their rear. Riedesel and Phillips were to 
 change direction at the southern end of the ravine and march 
 west to connect with the British centre. When, between one 
 and two o'clock, the columns had reached their positions they 
 moved at signal guns. From the conformation of the ground 
 this was the only practicable manner by which Burgoyne 
 could possibly advance, the river road being covered by the 
 American artillery. 
 
 Beyond the great North Ravine in front of the British posi- 
 tion, and half way between it and the ground fortified by the 
 Americans, there was another deep ravine called the Middle 
 Ravine, through which Mill Creek still runs, and directly in 
 front of the American camp and covered by its guns was 
 another ravine of lesser extent, but still a formidable obstruc- 
 tion to the advance of an enemy. The whole country, with 
 the exception of a few cleared patches, was heavily wooded, 
 the ravines as well as the upper table lands. On the high 
 ground (Bemis' Heights) south was the American entrenched 
 line, extending eastwardly to the river bank and westwardly 
 to the extremity of the hill where a redoubt was begun. 
 Beyond it felled trees obstructed the passage of the gullies 
 
32 GATES ATTACKS THE ENEMY. 
 
 between the flank defences on the left and the neighboring 
 hills. The lines, which were about a mile in extent, en- 
 closed what is still known as Neilson's Farm. The hills on 
 the east of the Hudson commanded a general view of Bur- 
 goyne's camp. 
 
 On the morning of the 19th, Gates was informed by Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Colburn, of the New Hampshire line, who 
 had been sent out the day before to observe the movements 
 of the enemy, that the British had struck their tents and 
 crossed the gully at the gorge of the great ravine, and were 
 ascending the heights toward the American left. Arnold, 
 who commanded the left wing, and was at this time at head- 
 quarters, suggested a movement to attack. Colonel Morgan, 
 with his rifle corps, supported by Major Dearborn's light 
 infantry, was immediately ordered out to observe their direc- 
 tion and harass their advance. About half-past twelve a re- 
 port of small arms announced that Morgan's men had struck 
 the enemy. They had fallen in with Burgoyne's pickets, who 
 made the advance guard of the British line, and had posted 
 themselves in a cabin on Freeman's farm, which was one of 
 the few cleared spots in that thickly wooded country. They 
 were quickly dislodged by Morgan, who, pursuing hotly, fell 
 on the main body, which Burgoyne had formed into line in 
 the first opening in the woods, by whom they were instantly 
 routed, with loss of several officers and men. Wilkinson, who 
 witnessed the rally of the riflemen, hurried to Gates, who at 
 once gave directions for their support. Cilley's and Scam- 
 mel's regiments of New Hampshire (part of General Poor's 
 brigade of Continental regulars) were ordered to advance 
 through the woods and take ground on the left of Morgan, 
 and the action was renewed about one o'clock. 
 
 This movement would have turned the British right but for 
 the disposition of General Fraser, who had promptly arrived 
 at his appointed post and taken an advantageous position on 
 a height, which covered the British right. Meeting this ob- 
 stacle the Americans counter-marched, and pushed through 
 the woods toward the left of Burgoyne's column. To their 
 
THE:, BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. 33 
 
 support the five remaining regiments of Poor's brigade, con- 
 sisting of Hale's, of New Hampshire ; Van Cortlandt's and 
 Henry Livingston's, of New York, and Cook's and Latimer's, 
 of the Connecticut Militia, were successively led to the field 
 at the points of the action where greatest pressure was per- 
 ceived. About three o'clock the action became general. Bur- 
 goyne's division was vigorously attacked and suffered severely. 
 One regiment of grenadiers and part of the light infantry under 
 Lord Balcarras from Eraser's division participated at times in 
 the action, but it was not thought advisable to weaken Era- 
 ser's force on the heights, except partially and occasionally. 
 Major-General PhiUips, hearing the firing, made his way at 
 once through the woods to Burgoyne's support, bringing with 
 him four pieces of artillery, a difficult task, considering the 
 nature of the ground, and entered the action at a critical time. 
 Riedesel also got up with part of the left wing before the close 
 of the battle. The Americans, feeling the pressure of this 
 reinforcement. Gates ordered out the whole of Learned's 
 brigade, consisting of Bailey's, Wesson's, and Jackson's regi- 
 ments, of the Massachusetts line, and James Livingston's, of 
 New York, and also Marshall's regiment, of the Massachusetts 
 line. They were but shghtly engaged. Darkness ended the 
 contest, the Americans only withdrawing when objects became 
 undistinguishable. The number engaged on each side was 
 not far from equal. The American force was about 3,000, 
 and Burgoyne stated his to be about 3,500. The mode of 
 fighting of the Americans more than equalled this discrep- 
 ancy. The field of action was such that, although the com- 
 batants changed ground a dozen times in the course of the 
 day, the contest terminated with each body in its original po- 
 sition. The British were formed on an eminence in a thin 
 pine wood, having before it Freeman's farm, an oblong field, 
 stretching from its centre toward its right, the ground in 
 front sloping gently down to the verge of the field, which was 
 bordered on the opposite side by a close wood, held by the 
 Americans. The sanguinary scene lay in the cleared ground 
 between the eminence occupied by the enemy and the wood 
 3 
 
34 BRAVERY OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS. 
 
 just mentioned. The fire of the American marksmen from the 
 wood was too deadly to be withstood by the British in Hne, and 
 when they gave way and broke, the Americans, making 
 for their centre, pursued them to the eminence, where, 
 having their flanks protected, they ralHed, and charging in 
 turn drove the Americans back into the wood, whence a 
 dreadful fire would again force them to fall back, and in this 
 manner did the battle fluctuate, like the waves of a stormy 
 sea, with alternate advantage^, for four hours without one mo- 
 ment's intermission ; the British artillery fell into the hands 
 of the Americans 'at every charge, but they could neither 
 turn the pieces on the enemy nor bring them off; the wood 
 prevented the last, and the want of a match the first, as the 
 linstock was invariably carried off, and the rapidity of the 
 transitions would not allow time tp provide one. The slaugh- 
 ter of the artillery was remarkable, the captain and twenty- 
 six men out of forty-eight being killed or wounded. Such is 
 Wilkinson's concise and picturesque account of this action, 
 which he considered one of the longest, warmest, and most 
 obstinate battles fought in America. Here was seen the su- 
 periority of the American rifle over the British bayonet, on 
 which Burgoyne so confidently relied. In his report to Con- 
 gress, Gates accorded the glory of the action entirely to the 
 valor of the rifle regiment and corps of light infantry under 
 the command of Colonel Morgan. The British were sur- 
 prised at the courage and obstinacy with which the Ameri- 
 cans fought, and, as one who was present has recorded, found 
 to their dismay that they were not that contemptible enemy 
 they had been hitherto imagined, incapable of standing a reg- 
 ular engagement, and willing only to fight behind strong and 
 powerful works. 
 
 The battle on the part of the Americans was essentially a 
 soldiers' battle. While Burgoyne led his men in person, ex- 
 posing himself with great bravery, directing the movements 
 of the British line, the Americans had no general officer in 
 the field until the evening, when General Learned was 
 ordered out. The battle was fought by the general concert 
 
BURGOYNE FORTIFIES HIS POSITION. 35 
 
 and zealous co-operation of the corps engaged, and sustained 
 more by individual courage than military discipline, as is 
 shown by the loss of the militia in comparison with that of 
 the regular troops. 
 
 During the action Gates and Arnold remained in front of 
 the centre of the camp. This is no matter for comment or 
 surprise, as it was neither the policy nor the purpose of 
 Gates to bring on a general engagement, which might have 
 involved his forces to such an extent as to leave his right 
 exposed and uncover the river road. The intrenchments 
 were not half completed, those on the left hardly begun. 
 Moreover, the militia were every day arriving. Each day's 
 delay increased his own chances of success while diminishing 
 those of the enemy. 
 
 The loss of the Americans, killed, wounded and missing, 
 was three hundred and twenty-one ; that of the British, 
 six hundred — a disparity more remarkable, as the ground 
 did not admit of the use of artillery by the Americans. 
 Both sides claimed the victory ; in reality it was a drawn 
 battle. The British held the strong position Fraser had 
 occupied in the morning, which, however. Gates had no 
 desire of disputing, as his army was acting on the defensive. 
 The Americans, on the other hand, had marched out from 
 their camp, met the enemy more than half way, and after 
 inflicting upon them a stunning blow, returned to their in- 
 trenchments. Far more important than any physical advan- 
 tage was the effect on the morale of the two armies. The 
 patriots had met the main body of the invading army on 
 equal terms, while the invaders had learned to their bitter 
 cost the terrors of a warfare in which their discipline was- of 
 little avail. 
 
 The British lay on their arms the night of the battle, and the 
 next day, the 20th, took a position just out of reach of the can- 
 non of the American camp, where they fortified, and at the 
 same time extended their left to the brow of the heights, so 
 as to cover the meadows on the, river. A bridge of boats 
 was thrown over the Hudson, and a work erected on the east 
 
2,6 GATES REMAINS ON THE DEFENSIVE. 
 
 side of the river. The Americans on their side worked dili- 
 gently in completing the defences of their extremely strong 
 position. The morning was foggy, and there was consider- 
 able alarm in the American camp, caused by the story of a 
 deserter, that an attack was intended. It has been since 
 stated that Burgoyne really directed a movement, but was 
 dissuaded by General Fraser, who, because of the fatigue of 
 his men, begged for a day's delay. Meanwhile a spy from 
 Clinton brought a letter to Burgoyne, with advice of his 
 intended expedition against the Highlands, which determined 
 him to postpone the attack and await events. If such were 
 the case, this was another and fatal error of Burgoyne. His 
 general orders, however, of the 20th, ordering the advance 
 of the army at 3 o'clock, seem inconsistent with the story, 
 and there is no confirmation of it in his own narrative ; but, 
 on the contrary, he admits that he was persuaded that the 
 American camp was strongly fortified. On the 22d, Gates 
 learned from General Lincoln of Colonel Brown's success at 
 Ticonderoga. His reply to Lincoln shows that at this time 
 he did not feel himself strong enough to prevent Burgoyne's 
 retreat. He therefore urged the destruction of all buildings, 
 batteaux, etc., on the line which should afford him shelter, 
 that, to use his own words, " he may have no resting-place 
 until he reaches Canada." The next morning he adds a 
 postscript, to the effect that, by his scouts, it was " past a 
 doubt that the enemy's army remain in their camp, that their 
 advance was within one mile of his own, and urged the 
 immediate forwarding of the militia. " He is satisfied, he adds, 
 " that New York, and not Ticonderoga, is General Burgoyne's 
 object." 
 
 On the 23d, in consequence of a direction in general orders 
 that Morgan's independent corps was responsible to head- 
 quarters only, a difference which had been long brewing 
 between Gates and Arnold ended in a public dispute. High 
 words passed between them. Arnold was excluded from 
 headquarters, and demanded permission to go to Philadelphia 
 to report to Congress, a request of which Gates took instant 
 
BURGOYNE HOLDS A COUNCIL OF WAR. 3/ 
 
 advantage. Suspended from command at his own desire, 
 Arnold found too late the unfortunate position in which he 
 would place his reputation by leaving the army at this critical 
 juncture. He changed his mind and remained in camp, mur- 
 muring discontent and spreading sedition by the intemper- 
 ance of his conduct and language. Gates took Arnold's 
 division under his own command and assigned Lincoln, who 
 came in the same day, to the command of the right wing. 
 
 With the militia who flocked to Gates' camp came a band 
 of Oneida and Tuscarora Indians, who had been persuaded 
 by the influence of Schuyler, then active as Indian Com- 
 missioner, to join the army. They were objects of such curi- 
 osity that it became necessary to forbid the soldiers from 
 flocking to their encampment. These Indians were, however, 
 a terror to the enemy. Gates' orders distinguished them from 
 Burgoyne's savages by a red woollen cap. 
 
 On the 3d October, Burgoyne was compelled to diminish 
 the soldiers' rations, the foraging parties meeting but little 
 success, and requiring heavy covering parties. The Ameri- 
 cans were constantly in the field, harassing the advanced 
 pickets, and night alarms prevented the British from quit- 
 ting their clothes and deprived them of rest. The main 
 bodies of both armies lay in quiet, while the woods resounded 
 to the stroke of the axe, felling trees for the fortifications. 
 Burgoyne sent word to Clinton on the 23d September, that 
 he would await news from him until the 12th October. 
 
 Riedesel, in his memoirs of the campaign, says that the 
 situation becoming daily more critical and the enemy too 
 strong, both in numbers and position, to be attacked, Bur- 
 goyne on the 4th called Generals Phillips, Riedesel, and Fra- 
 ser, to consult with them as to what measures to adopt. He 
 proposed to leave the boats and stores under strong guard, 
 and turning the left wing of Gates, to attempt an attack ; no 
 decision was arrived at. A second conference was held on 
 the evening of the 6th, when Riedesel recommended an im- 
 mediate attack or a return to Batten-Kill. Fraser approved 
 of this plan. Phillips declined to express an opinion. Bur- 
 
38 THE BATTLE OF BEMIS.. HEIGHTS. 
 
 goyne terminated the discussion by declaring that he would 
 make a reconoissance of the left wing of the Americans on the 
 7th^ and if there were any prospect of success he would at- 
 tack on the 8th or return to a position at Freeman's Farm? 
 and on the i ith begin a retreat to the rear of Batten-Kill. 
 
 Just before noon on the 7th Burgoyne marched out of camp 
 with fifteen hundred men and ten pieces of artillery, destined 
 for the reconnoissance, and also to cover a foraging party to 
 relieve their immediate distress. The troops were formed into 
 three columns, under Phillips, Riedesel, and Fraser, within 
 three-quarters of a mile of the American left. The rangers, 
 Indians, and provincials, were ordered to pass through the 
 woods and gain the rear of the camp. The foraging party 
 entered a field and began to cut the wheat in sight of the 
 American outposts, when the alarm was given and the Ameri- 
 cans beat to arms. Wilkinson went to the front to see the 
 cause, and observed the foragers at work, the covering party, 
 and the officers with their glasses endeavoring to reconnoitre 
 the American left. He reported their position to Gates and 
 gave as his opinion that they were inclined to offer battle. 
 " I would indulge them," he added, whereupon Gates re- 
 plied : " Well, then, order on Morgan to begin the game." 
 A plan was concerted, with the approval of Gates, for Morgan 
 to make a detour and gain a height on the right of the enemy, 
 time enough for which was allowed him before Poor's brigade 
 were sent to attack the left. The British generals were still 
 consulting as to the best mode of pursuing the reconnoissance 
 when the New Hampshire and New York troops of Poor's 
 Brigade fell upon the British left, where the grenadiers under 
 Major Ackland were posted, with impetuous fury and ex- 
 tended the attack to the front of the Germans. At this time 
 Morgan descended the hill and striking the light infantry on 
 the right endeavored to turn their flank. Seeing his danger 
 of being enveloped, Burgoyne ordered a second position to 
 be taken by the fight infantry to secure the return of his 
 troops to camp. Meanwhile Poor's brigade pressed the left 
 with ardor and compelled them to give way. Fraser, with 
 
BURGOYNE FALLS BACK. 39 
 
 part of his light infantry, moved rapidly to prevent an entire 
 rout, and fell mortally wounded. Phillips and Riedesel were 
 then ordered to cover a general retreat, which was effected 
 in good order, though hard pressed, the enemy leaving eight 
 pieces of cannon in the hands of the Americans, most of their 
 artillerymen being killed or wounded. 
 
 Hardly had the British entered their camp when it was 
 stormed with great fury in the face of a severe fire of grape 
 and musketry. The British intrenchments were stoutly de- 
 fended by Balcarras and no impression was made. The Ger- 
 man entrenched camp of Breyman, with the provincials, was 
 carried by Learned, who appeared on the ground with his 
 fresh brigade at sunset, and an Qpening was thus made in 
 the right and rear which exposed the whole British camp, but 
 the darkness of the night, and the fatigue and disorder of the 
 men, prevented advantage being taken of this situation. 
 
 In the night Burgoyne broke up his camp and retired to his 
 original position, which he had fortified behind the Great 
 Ravine. Thus closed the second battle of Saratoga, known as 
 the Battle of Bemis Heights. The loss of the British was 
 estimated at six hundred killed, wounded and taken prisoners, 
 that of the Americans did not exceed one hundred and fifty 
 killed and wounded. Burgoyne lost the flower of his officers. 
 Besides General Fraser and Sir Francis Clark, his principal 
 aide, who were mortally wounded, and Breyman who was 
 killed. Majors Ackland and Williams were taken prisoners, 
 the former wounded. On the American side Arnold, who 
 behaved with the most desperate valor, exposing himself in a 
 frantic manner and leading the troops without authority, just 
 as the victory was won received a ball which fractured his 
 leg and killed his horse ; and General Lincoln, while on his 
 way to order a cannonade on the enemy's camp, received a 
 musket-ball in the leg which shattered the bone. With re- 
 gard to the conduct of this battle, much has been said. Gates 
 has been blamed for not leaving his camp, and Arnold has 
 been lauded as the hero of the day. These criticisms are 
 equally unjust. Up to sunset, when Learned's corps was sent 
 
40 BURGOYNE RETREATS TO SARATOGA. 
 
 forward to finish the action, there was only one brigade in 
 the field. Gates' place was with the centre and right, where 
 the militia were posted, and the security of his camp and the 
 protection of the road to Albany his one true concern. Ar- 
 nold's reckless daring no doubt encouraged and inspired the 
 troops, but there is no evidence of any generalship on his part. 
 Had the day resulted differently, he would have been deser- 
 vedly cashiered. Gates, in his report to Congress of the 
 1 2th, with great magnanimity, mentioned his gallantry and 
 wound while forcing the enemy's breastworks. While com- 
 mending all the troops engaged for their spirit, he gave es- 
 pecial praise to Morgan's riflemen and Dearborn's light 
 infantry. 
 
 When Burgoyne fell back to his original position, he was 
 in hopes that this change of front would induce Gates to form 
 a new disposition, and perhaps attack him in his lines, where 
 his superior artillery would have given him the advantage. 
 During the 8th, he repeatedly offered battle to the American 
 right, but Gates was too thorough a soldier to be tempted in 
 this manner. His plans were more comprehensive. On the 
 evening of the 7th he ordered General Fellows, who was at 
 Tift's Mill with thirteen hundred men, to move to a position 
 to prevent the recrossing of the Hudson at the Saratoga Ford. 
 On the morning of the 8th Fellows took possession of the 
 Saratoga barracks and began to throw up intrenchments, and 
 sent an express to Bennington to hurry up troops to his as- 
 sistance. Gates at once took possession of the abandoned 
 c-amp at Freeman's Farm. 
 
 Burgoyne receiving intelligence of this movement in his 
 rear, began his retreat at nine o'clock at night, leaving his 
 sick and wounded. A heavy rain causing him to delay at 
 Dovogat, he only reached Saratoga on the night of the 9th, 
 and his artillery could not pass the ford of the Fishkill till the 
 morning of the loth. On the approach of the advance guard, 
 Fellows, who had received notice of the retreat, crossed to 
 the east side of the Hudson, where he was joined by the 
 militia from Bennington, the rear of which arrived as Bur- 
 
GATES PURSUES. 4I 
 
 goyne's front reached Saratoga. General Bayley, who com- 
 manded the militia column, had posted a force of one thou- 
 sand men to guard an intermediate ford, and also detached 
 one thousand men to Fort Edward, to the command of which, 
 at the request of Bayley, Stark was assigned on the 14th. 
 The main body of Gates' army, having prepared their pro- 
 visions and equipped themselves, started in pursuit about 
 noon. In the afternoon of the loth at four o'clock the ad- 
 vance reached Saratoga, and found Burgoyne encamped on 
 the height beyond the Fishkill. -Gates' forces took a position 
 in the wood, on the Saratoga heights, their right resting on 
 the brow of the hill, about a mile in the rear of the Fishkill. 
 
 On the nth Morgan was ordered to cross the Fishkill and 
 fall upon the enemy's rear ; there was a heavy fog. Morgan 
 struck their pickets and concluded that Burgoyne had not re- 
 tired as was supposed. Patterson's and Learned's brigades 
 were ordered to his support, and a vigorous cannonade was 
 opened on the front and rear. Twelve hundred men of Pat- 
 terson's corps had hardly crossed the creek when the fog 
 lifted and the whole British Army was discovered in line of 
 battle. The Americans fell back over the creek in disorder. 
 Learned's corps was halted and the two brigades retired to a 
 point a half mile distant, where they threw up entrenchments, 
 which they held. The Americans succeeded in destroying a 
 large number of batteaux and stores. 
 
 The American artillery, which had taken no active part in 
 the earlier battles, now came into play ; the passages of the 
 river were covered by an incessant fire, every attempt to 
 move the batteaux was instantly arrested, and as Burgoyne 
 himself stated, no part of his position was secure from the guns. 
 
 On the 1 2th a council of war was called by Burgoyne, and 
 a retreat, leaving stores and baggage, was agreed upon, but 
 the scouts reporting that no movement could be made with- 
 out immediate discovery, the project was abandoned. On 
 the 13th, only three days' stores remaining, a second council 
 was held to which all field officers and captains commanding 
 corps were invited. THey decided that the situation justified 
 
42 BURGOYNE SURRENDERS. 
 
 capitulation upon honorable terms. Negotiations were open- 
 ed on the 14th with General Gates, and on the i6th the conven- 
 tion was signed. On the 17th October, the British army laid 
 down its arms on the green in front of old Fort Hardy, on 
 the north bank of the Fishkill, in the presence of Wilkinson, 
 Gates' adjutant, and Burgoyne, accompanied by Riedesel 
 and Phillips, rode to the American headquarters. They 
 were met by General Gates, followed by his suite, and ac- 
 companied by General Schuyler, who had come up from Al- 
 bany for the occasion. The British troops were then marched 
 past in view of the American army, whose moderation in the 
 hour of triumph is one of the most pleasing incidents of this 
 historic scene. Burgoyne completed the formality of surren- 
 der by the tender of his sword. 
 
 The total force surrendered, as appears by the official re- 
 turn, signed by General Burgoyne, and preserved among the 
 Gates papers in the New York Historical Society, was 5,791, 
 of which 3,379 were English and provincials and 2,412 Ger- 
 man auxiliaries, together with a train of artillery of twenty- 
 seven pieces. 
 
 The strength of the American army, rank and file, at Sar- 
 atoga on the day of surrender, appears from the same doc- 
 ume'nts to have been 11,098, of which 7,716 of the Continen- 
 tal line [regulars], and 3,382 militia. In reviewing the 
 whole campaign it will be observed how little real reliance 
 could be placed on the militia, whose short terms of service 
 were a source of perpetual anxiety to the General in com- 
 mand. No better or more appropriate illustration of this can 
 be given than the action of the militia of the Hampshire 
 Grants, whom General Gates had ordei?ed to his support. 
 The arrival in camp, on the i8th September, of these victors 
 of Bennington, under General Stark, the hero of that battle, 
 animated the whole army, who were aware that they were on 
 the eve of an engagement, but to the mortification and disgust 
 of Gates, their term of Service expiring the same day, they 
 marched home from the camp without unpacking their bag- 
 gage, and as Wilkinson asserts, without any effort to induce 
 
RESULTS OF THE VICTORY. 43 
 
 them to remain on the part of their officers. It is not to be 
 denied that the mihtia did occasional noteworthy service, but 
 the brunt of the engagements fell upon the regular Continen- 
 tal troops, who before the close of the war became in every 
 "way the equal of their British foes. 
 
 The series of engagements known as the battle of Saratoga 
 has been styled one of the fifteen decisive battles of the world. 
 Its consequences were of such vast importance as to entitle it 
 to this distinction. The long-cherished plan of the British 
 Ministry, pursued through two campaigns with persevering 
 obstinacy, was finally defeated. The open alliance of France 
 was secured ; the United States of America were recognized 
 by the continental powers. The news of the victory spread 
 rapidly over the land, carrying joy to the hearts of the 
 patriots. Washington viewed it as a signal stroke of Provi- 
 dence. Congress voted the thanks of the nation to General 
 Gates and his army, and a gold medal was struck and pre- 
 sented to him in commemoration of the event. 
 
 The last days of a century are closing upon these memor- 
 able scenes. How long will it be ere the government of this 
 Empire I^tate shall erect a monument to the gallant men who 
 fought and fell upon these fields and here secured her liberty 
 and renown ? 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 DELIVERED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD 
 
 ONE HUNDREDTH CELEBRATION 
 
 BATTLE OF BEMIS HEIGHTS 
 
 September 19, 1877 
 
 JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 ANSON I). F. RANDOLPH & COMPANY 
 
 900 Br o adway 
 
 , 1877. 
 

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