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SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 FOR USE IN 
 
 NORMAL SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 
 
 W. A. CLARK, PH. D. 
 
 Professor of Psychology and Education in the Missouri State Normal School 
 
 at Kirksville 
 
 Copyright 1913 by W. A. Clark 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR 
 
 1913 
 

 ©CI.A34749 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 3 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 While this Syllabus is printed for use in the author's own classes, 
 where in the conduct of the class exercises its philosophical presupposi- 
 tions may be ignored or only incidentally stated as the exigencies of the 
 • discussions appear to demand, respect for the critical general reader, into 
 whose hands it may by chance come, necessitates a brief fore-word of 
 explanation. 
 
 The author regards Psychology as a '^natural science", concerned 
 with the description and explanation of a characteristic body of phe- 
 nomena. He accepts the spirit and method of the ^'New Psychology'', 
 without disparaging the results of observation and constructive thinking 
 in the past. While in his philosophical attitude he would probably find 
 his place with the monistic idealists, as a teacher of elementary General 
 Psychology his standpoint is that of a naive dualism, accepting unques- 
 tioned for the purposes of scientific study the existence of an external 
 world that may be sensed through the body mechanism and known in the 
 conscious individual life. It is thought that each modern science may 
 rightfully transform reality for its own purposes, leaving to the meta- 
 physician the justification of all of its ontological and epistemological 
 assumptions and postulates. Consequently, no question is raised as 
 to the substantial nature of the human soul, either to insist that it is 
 ''nothing but a stream of mental processes" or a static entity with ca- 
 pacities, or ''faculties", for various forms of functioning. Introspective 
 analysis, as the immediate critical study of personal experiences during 
 their continuance, is accepted as the ultimate source of all scientific 
 knowledge of psychic life. Consciousness is so defined that the "subject- 
 object problem", the Banquo's ghost of psychological study, is not per- 
 mitted to vitiate all examination of mental facts as such. Psychological 
 experiments are viewed as introspective observations under artificially 
 controlled conditions; and an effort is made to distinguish between bio- 
 logical and psychological study of the living human organism. 
 
 The details of matter and method in this synoptic outline have been 
 determined largely by two important considerations ; first, the intellectual 
 status and needs of the students for whose use it has been specifically 
 prepared; and second, a well-defined theory as to the purpose of all in- 
 struction in elementary General Psychology, especially for students in 
 State Normal Schools. In the State Normal School at Kirksville this 
 course is open to students of the grade of the Freshman and Sophomore 
 years of college study, and presupposes a fair knowledge of the elements 
 of the physical and biological sc iences with some acquaintance with 
 modern laboratory work. Starting with the student's general knowledge 
 
4 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 of the facts of his own mind, his body, and his relation to his physical and 
 spiritual environment, it seeks to lead him in a critical study of the facts 
 of his own conscious life, without any radical reconstruction of his point 
 of view. The order of study is the conventional one — ^'knowing", 
 "feeling", "willing"; and only the principal subjects are considered, thus 
 laying in outline a foundation for subsequent studies in the same field. 
 As to the second consideration, the principal purpose of this course is to 
 give to the student such a knowledge of himself and of the rational con- 
 trol of his own experiences as will secure for him integrity of character 
 and efficiency in the affairs of his daily life. His acquaintance with the 
 technical terms of his science and its logically outlined system is held to 
 be secondary to this character-forming result in his own personal being. 
 It is to this end that Part III has been differentiated from the analysis 
 of experience in Part II and has been made a constructive study in "the 
 making of a life". Even for Normal School students, for whom Psy- 
 chology is too often treated as a sort of propaedeutic to Pedagogy, the 
 essential fact sought to be reahzed by the instruction is a well-knit man- 
 hood and womanhood through a clear knowledge of self. 
 
 The "directions for recording results in experimental introspective 
 observation", given on page 6, provide for more comprehensive "labor- 
 atory work" than the author has himself found feasible, or desirable, in 
 an introductory course. They are printed here in this full form to indi- 
 cate to his students the spirit and attitude of thoroughness in such work 
 which, he holds to be essential in more advanced study, if Psychology 
 would justify its claim to a place among modern positive sciences. In 
 the very hmited experimentation employed in his own classes much sim- 
 pler forms of expressing results are found adequate. Experimenting 
 in the beginning study in the sciences in general is for illustration and 
 personal corroboration, not for discovery or research; what the beginner 
 in Psychology does with "Weber's -Law" is analogous to what the be- 
 ginner in Physics does with his Atwood's Machine Avith the "Laws of 
 Falling Bodies", and in neither case should he take the scientific validity 
 of his work too seriously. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude 
 that the author undervalues direct critical study of mental facts under 
 controlled conditions even by beginners; the fact simply is that long ex- 
 perience as a teacher of beginners in this science has made his method 
 more pedagogical, if less logical. 
 
 The list of "Questions and Problems" given at the close of the 
 Syllabus is appended, somewhat artificially, as a provocative of inde- 
 pendent thought. There is no synthetic order in them, and they are 
 not intended for formal answering, seriatim or otherwise. The earnest, 
 ambitious student is encouraged to attack such of them as interest him. 
 Some are easily within his proper field, while others are far out on the 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 5 
 
 border line of metaphysical speculation. The value of some of them for 
 students of this grade is to be found in their suggestions of other worlds 
 of human interest, not in their contribution to a mapping out of the one 
 in which they already somewhat comfortably dwell. 
 
 The "references" for library study at the close of the various sections 
 will doubtless appear to be needlessly full and to be lacking in equal 
 authoritativeness, but they have their justification in local conditions. 
 The economic use of a reference library by large classes necessitates many 
 references, even to the point of duplication; the books named here are 
 those readily accessible in our own school library, for obvious reasons 
 limited to the English language. In the choice of references no attempt 
 has been made to corroborate narrowly the dogmatic statements of the 
 Syllabus, rather it has been the aim to throw a sidelight on the matter 
 from diverse points of view. 
 
 The Index is added to facilitate the use of the little book in subse- 
 quent study. It is regretted that the increased size of this Syllabus 
 has made it necessary to abandon the blank righthand pages found so 
 valuable for important classroom memoranda; it is urged that the student 
 keep a concise record of his own growing thought during the daily work 
 of the class. 
 
 W. A. Clark. 
 Missouri State Normal School at Kirksville, May 23, 1913. 
 
6 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Directions for Recording Results in Experimental 
 Introspective Observation 
 
 The record should include four points: (1) the object of the experi- 
 ment, (2) the apparatus employed, (3) the method of controlling the 
 phenomena, and (4) introspective memoranda of facts of consciousness. 
 To these in many cases a fifth point, always under a separate heading, 
 should be added, a general remark upon the success of the experiment. 
 
 In stating the object of the experiment, while it is well to define it 
 as clearly as possible, the student should avoid a bias in favor of a preju- 
 diced conclusion. It is better to propose 'Ho examine", 'Ho explore", 
 'Ho test", "to discover", etc., thai), "to prove", "to show", "to fix", 
 etc. 
 
 The apparatus should be described with reference to its special 
 function in the present experiment; a drawing is often desirable. Let 
 the description include all of the material conditions of controlling the 
 mental processes that are not noted as purely a matter of "method" 
 under the third heading. 
 
 The method should be described as the control of the life process 
 from without. It is limited to the physiological side of the experiment; 
 .and when an assistant is employed in the experimenting, the account 
 is largely of what he does, learned from him subsequent to the experi- 
 ment. No introspective facts or theorizings should be given under this 
 head, the aim being merely to show how the conditions of the experience 
 were controlled. 
 
 The introspective memoranda are designed to be a transcript of the 
 processes of the experience as revealed in consciousness and reviewed in 
 memory as soon after as possible. This is the heart of the record, and 
 no pains should be spared to make it an honest exhibit of the facts. Bear 
 in mind that it is to be an unbiased account of what actualty happens, 
 ivithout theory or self-stultification. Self-observation under artificially 
 controUed conditions is the essential method of .modern Psychology, and 
 it requires earnest effort and much practice to use it successfull}^ Do 
 not be too solicitous for fullness of your account; one or two facts clearly 
 and indubitably perceived are far better than a lengthy list of what you 
 think ought to be perceived. 
 
 Under the fifth heading may be given explanations, theoretical 
 conclusions, and other matters that properly find no place in the succinct 
 record of the experiment under the first four headings. This can be 
 A\ritten up at any time after the experiment, while it is very desirable 
 that the "introspective memoranda" should be made immediately after 
 the experiment. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 7 
 
 ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS 
 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 Definition of Psychology 9 
 
 Forms of definition 
 Psychology a true science 
 The subject matter 
 
 Method of Psychology 13 
 
 Nature of psychological analysis 
 
 Nature and* validity of introspection 
 
 Some valuable auxiliary methods 
 
 Function and form of psychological experiments 
 
 Field of Psychology 22 
 
 General delimitation 
 Relations to allied sciences 
 Subdivisions of the science 
 
 ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
 General character of an experience 27 
 
 An experience defined 
 
 The procession of experiences 
 
 Relation of mind to body 
 
 Three phases of an experience distinguished 
 
 Cognition: the knowing aspect of experience 34 
 
 Nature of cognitive growth 
 
 A conscious object-seeking activity 
 What ''knowledge is 
 Process of knowing an external object 
 Three aspects of cognition distinguished 
 
 Presentative cognition 37 
 
 Sensation: Subjective aspect of presentative cognition 
 
 What sensations are 
 
 Kinds of sensations 
 
 Threshold of sensation 
 
 Quantity of sensations 
 
 Localizing sensations in the body structure 
 
 Centrally aroused sensations 
 Perception: objective aspective of presentative cognition 
 
 Distinguished from sensation 
 
 The "outer world" of perception 
 
 Perception a constructive process 
 
 Illusory perceptions 
 
8 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Representative cognition .*. .51 
 
 Distinguished from presentative cognition 
 
 What a memory experience is 
 
 Four elements of a memory 
 
 Retention, or ''liability to recall'^ 
 Recalling, or reviving a past experience 
 Recognition, or accepting a revived experience as such 
 LocaKzing, or placing the experience in ''the past" 
 Elaborative cognition 58 
 
 Relation of elaboration to acquisition 
 
 Apperception 
 
 Conception 
 
 Imagination 
 
 Judgment 
 
 Reasoning 
 
 Knowledge as achievement and as self 
 
 Affection : the feeling aspect of experience 73 
 
 Affection in general 
 
 Nature of affection 
 
 Relation of "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness" to 
 metabolic body processes 
 
 Distinction of "ideational" and "sensuous" feelings 
 
 "James-Lange theory" of emotions 
 Emotions 78 
 
 Nature and kinds 
 
 Alleged antagonism between feehng and knowing 
 Sentiments .- . . . 82 
 
 The place of sentiments in human life 
 
 Classification of sentiments 
 
 "Moods", "temperaments", "dispositions", "passions" 
 
 Conation: the doing aspect of experience 87 
 
 Willing in the wide and in the narrow sense 
 
 Impulse as the simple will element 
 
 Attention "voluntary" and "involuntary" 
 
 Interest 
 
 Choice; motives, deliberation 
 
 Execution; sustained activity, "resolution" 
 
 "Freedom of the will" 
 
 SYNTHESIS OF SELFHOOD (This section is omitted from this 
 edition) 
 (Genesis of self-consciousness) 
 (Establishing personal character) 
 (Ideals as final causes in building a life) 
 
A SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 Chapter I — Definition of Psychology 
 
 1. Psychology defined. Psychology is the science of personal 
 experiences as they exist in consciousness. 
 
 (a) Importance of a strict definition. It is important that the 
 
 student of Psychology should at the very outset of his study determine 
 with precision the field and method of his science, since vagueness in the 
 fundamental conceptions of what Psychology is about and the methods 
 by which its data are handled and evaluated will obscure all his inves- 
 tigations and discourage him from his highest efforts in study. No other 
 science has suffered more from lack of accurate definition of subject 
 matter and strict delimitation of its field than Psychology. The definition 
 given above is in general narrower than that of the common textbook or 
 scientific treatise; it purposely restricts the matter to be studied to 
 the events of conscious personal life, leaving to the biologists and sociol- 
 ogists large areas and groups of phenomena which many later writers on 
 Psychology have sought to conquest for their own science. 
 
 (b) Other definitions. The student will find a critical study of 
 the common definitions of Psychology profitable. The following will 
 serve as types: — 
 
 '^ Psychology is the science of consciousness." This is analogous to 
 defining Geometry as/Hhe science of space," or Algebra as "the science 
 of time; " and just as there can be no science of space or of time so there 
 can be no science of ''consciousness " in any proper use of that term. Nor 
 is the definition improved by the statement that it is "the science of the 
 phenomena of consciousness," since every explanatory science deals 
 with phenomena, not with any substantial reality of which they are 
 viewed as manifestations. The question is, Is consciousness, continuous 
 or discrete, the concrete entity whose phenomena are to be described and 
 explained by the psychologist? Is not consciousness related to the 
 real objects of psychological study very much as "space" is to the figures 
 of Geometry, or "nature" to the objects of study in Physics? 
 
 "Psychology is the science of mental processes," is Titchener's defi- 
 nition, to which Stout adds the word " positive " ("the positive science of 
 mental processes") to distinguish Psychology as a fact science from the 
 normative sciences. In a similar definition Baldwdn introduces the word 
 "actual" ("the science of actual psychical processes") to emphasize 
 the fact that Psychology deals with real processes in the life of an individ- 
 ual person, not with the abstractions of science. These are good working 
 definitions; but does not Psychology deal immediately with the concrete 
 events in personal life, with bits of life that have a kind of real complete- 
 ness in themselves which scientific analysis transforms and resolves into 
 "processes"? 
 
 Those who define Psychology as "the science of the soul," or "the 
 science of mind," or "the science of the facts or phenomena of self," 
 
10 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 recognize a unit}^ and integrity of personal life that is not regarded in 
 the definitions just considered. Some psychologists, especially those 
 who have " Si Psychology without a soul," object to the metaphysical 
 presuppositions and implications of these definitions; but they are 
 analogous to defining Physics as ^'the science of matter," or ''the science 
 of inorganic nature," and are no more objectionable from the standpoint 
 of philosophy than the commonly accepted definitions of other sciences. 
 In Ladd's widely approved definition of Psychology as "the science 
 of the states of consciousness as such," the words ''as such" are added 
 to restrict the subject matter of the study to the facts of mental life as 
 facts, mthout metaphysical assumptions or speculations. The student 
 should, however, bear in mind that no scientific study of "facts" is 
 possible apart from a "working hypothesis," and that all true science 
 deals constructively with its data in formulating laws and outlining theo- 
 ries. What does Ladd mean by "states of consciousness"? In a simi- 
 lar way Bowne seeks to limit the field in his definition "the science of 
 mental facts and processes. " There is certainly much more room for meta- 
 physical theory in James' definition as "the science of mental life, both of 
 its phenomena and its conditions." What does he mean by "mental 
 life"; and are its "conditions" merely the bodily aspects of such life? 
 
 References 
 
 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p 1. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 1. 
 
 Wimdt, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 1-2. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. I- pages 1 and 9. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 1-13. 
 
 Ladd, Outline of Descriptive Psychology, p. 1; Psychology Descriptive and Ex- 
 planatory, p. 1; Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 1-2. 
 
 . Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 1-8; Elements of Psychology, p. 1. 
 
 Dewey, P.sychology, p. 1. 
 
 Titchener, Outline of Psychology, pp. 6-11. 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, p. 1. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man, p. 37. 
 
 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 1. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 1 and 13. 
 
 AngeU, Psychology, p. 1. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, p. 3. 
 
 Dexter and GarUck, Psychology in the Schoolroom, pp. 1-2. 
 
 Encyclopedia Britannica, Ward's article. Vol. XX, pp. 43-44; also in Werner's 
 American Supplement, Vol. XXVIII, p. 513. 
 
 Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II, p. 382. 
 
 2. Psychology a science. The major genus in the definition of 
 iPsychology in the preceding section is "science"; the assertion is that 
 Psychology is a science. Now, the justification of the claim to rank our 
 study as a science depends upon both its method and its subject matter; 
 its method is "scientific," and its materials are worthy the critical ex- 
 planatory^ investigations of its students. 
 
 (a) Method in science. Whether any body of knowledge or 
 field of study is a science is primarily a question of method. Karl Pearson 
 (Grammar of Science) says,~ "The unity of all science consists alone in 
 its method, not in its material. The man who classifies facts of any kind 
 whatever, who sees their mutual relation and describes their sequence, 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 11 
 
 is applying the scientific method and is a man of science. It is not the 
 facts themselves which form science, but the method in which they are 
 dealt with." What is "the scientific method " : and is it true that any 
 related body of knowledge, however unworthy of serious inquiry its 
 subject may be, may truly become a science? 
 
 (b) Materials of Psychology scientific. A little reflection will 
 convince the student that the events of personal fife as given in individ- 
 ual consciousnesses are worthy materials of scientific investigation; and 
 as he progresses in his study and learns to see these facts more clearly^ 
 the field of his science will become definitely fixed. 
 
 (c) Psychology an actual science. The right of Psychology to be 
 called a science does not depend upon the amount of knowledge that has 
 been acquired regarding mental processes; if the method of the psycholo- 
 gist is scientific and his materials worthy of critical study, the fact that 
 his branch of knowledge as defined today is comparatively new cannot 
 debar it from the family of sciences. However, Psychology is more 
 than "a. science in posse''; it is a science in esse, and its '^ Weber's Law" 
 is surely as scientific as the "laws of sliding friction" in Physics, though 
 its "coefficients'' may not be quite so arbitrarily established. 
 
 References 
 
 Pearson, Grammar of Science, p. 14 et. seq. 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 3-7. 
 Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology, pp. 18-33. 
 Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, pp. 5-6 and 20-22. 
 
 Ladd, Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, p. 6; Psychology Descriptive and 
 Explanatory, pp. 2-4. 
 
 Titchener, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 1-11; Textbook of Psychology, pp. 1-6. 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, pp. 1-11. 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 1-4. 
 FuUerton, Introdutcion to Philosophy, pp. 230-235. 
 . Hoffding, Problems of Philosophy, pp. 12-13. 
 Report of Congress of Arts and Sciences, St. Louis, Vol. V, pp. 593-604. 
 
 3. Subject matter of Psychology. The differentia of our defi- 
 nition, '^personal experiences as they exist in consciousness," designates 
 a perfectly definite subject matter for the science. Psychology deals 
 with conscious facts, facts as they are found in individual consciousness; 
 or as Kulpe states it, "the facts of experience in their dependency upon 
 experiencing individuals." 
 
 (a) Two views of mind. There are two pretty sharply distinguish- 
 ed views of mind in modern Psychology; the "structural view" and "the 
 functional view." In the first the events of conscious life are thought 
 to constitute the mind, that is, the mind is nothing but a "stream of 
 processes. " In the second the mind is thought to be a substantial entity, 
 a ding-an-sich, of which the conscious events are the phenomena. This 
 is a metaphysical question, the metaphysical question of all ages, with 
 which the student of Psychology is not immediately concerned Just 
 as the student of Physics need not concern himself with the "substantial 
 nature" of matter, but only with its "phenomena," so in Psychology the 
 
12 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 matter to be studied, the events of conscious life, may be viewed indiffer- 
 ently by the psychologist as a form of "becoming" or the manifestation 
 of a ''being." 
 
 (b) Psychical facts and physical facts. The facts of Psychology 
 are the conscious facts of an individual organism, while the facts of Physics 
 are common facts, belonging alike to many organisms. Compare 
 the physical "sound" of the vibrating violin string with the feeling of 
 satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the hearer. A physical process takes 
 place in space and time, and it is conceived to be independent of the per- 
 ceiving mind, thus the snowfiakes fall upon the mountain top where man 
 has never climbed. A psychical process is not in space and time, and it 
 owes its existence to a psycho-physical organism. In our experiences we 
 share physical facts with others; but our thoughts and feelings (psychical 
 facts) we cannot share with others. "Psychical facts are individual 
 facts; physical facts are over-individual facts." — Munsterberg. 
 
 References. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 2-6. 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 1-7. 
 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 1 et seq. 
 
 Ladd, Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 1-6; Psychology Descriptive and 
 Explanatory, p. 1 et seq. 
 
 Munsterberg, Psychology and the Teacher, pp. 31-32; Eternal Values, p. 134. 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 1-13. 
 Titchener, Primer of Psychology, pp. 4-12. 
 Wundt, dutUnes of Psychology, pp. 1-22. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 13 
 
 Chapter II — ^Method of Psychology 
 
 4. Psychological analysis. The method of Psychology is strictly 
 the method of all modern science, i.e., analysis for the purpose of des- 
 cription and explanation. The concrete expedience is resolved into 
 constituent factors, which are in turn split up into still simpler components 
 and so on until the simplest -elements are reached ; the description and 
 explanation of the -experience depends upon a constructive synthesis 
 of these elemental factors, noting the effect and value of each in the 
 life event. 
 
 (a) Psychology became a science only a generation ago, when, 
 breaking away from a priori assumptions as to the nature of the soul 
 and how it should manifest itself, earnest students devoted themselves 
 to direct observation of the facts of mental life as they actually are. 
 The problem of the new science was the explanation of the phenomena 
 of conscious life. As a positive science it found its field in the description 
 of the facts of personal life as revealed in consciousness; and its explana- 
 tions were made to depend upon careful observation of the facts them- 
 selves, instead of upon preconceived philosophical theory. 
 
 (b) The modern psychologist bases his description and explanation 
 of the events of personal life upon an analysis of their structure. How- 
 ever, the analysis of an experience does not consist in splitting it up into 
 '' smaller experiences," each with a kind of completeness in itself, nor 
 even into separate ''part processes" of knowing, feehng and wilhng to 
 be viewed as independent facts of life. While the botanist tears his 
 flower apart that he may examine separately its stamens and pistil and 
 the chemist resolves the compound in his crucible into simpler substances, 
 there is no such partitioning of the events of life in their critical study 
 by the psychologist. The analysis of an experience consists in disting- 
 uishing within the unity of the conscious event phases or aspects which 
 may be abstracted for critical observation. The study of ''feeling" 
 by the psychologist is analogous to the study of color by the physicist, 
 each is possible only by an abstraction which transforms the reality for 
 its special purpose. 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 14 et seq. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, p. 19. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 22-26. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 20-24. 
 
 Titchener, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 15-18. 
 
 Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, pp. 10-12. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 7-10, 17. 
 
 5. Introspection, The immediate source of psychological data 
 is the critical observation of the events of personal life as they are given 
 in consciousness. Introspection differs essentially in its field from the 
 extro-spective observation of the physical sciences. Just as the meteor- 
 ologist finds the data of his science in space, so the psychologist finds 
 his in his own consciousness; the one looks outward to an objective world 
 
14 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 of physical phenomena, the other attends to an inner subjective world 
 of mental phenomena. The place of introspection in the work of psy- 
 chologists is emphasized by James in his usual cogent expression as fol- 
 lows: '^Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and 
 foremost and always." 
 
 (a) To deny, as some leading psychologists do on theoretical grounds, 
 the possibility of the immediate examination of mental processes is to 
 reject patent facts. That a person is immediately aware of the events 
 of his own life is a fact so universally accepted that no amount of philo- 
 sophical speculation can discredit it. The existence in conscious life 
 of ideas and feelings is undoubted both in the naive experience of the un- 
 critical person and in the reflective attention of the scientific student; 
 the one great fact that has remained unquestioned throughout the episte- 
 mological speculations of all ages is that we are aware of our own exis- 
 tence in the activities of a personal life. Similarly the fact that attention 
 may be directed to this consciousness of events of personal life and that 
 they may be critically observed is commonly admitted, even by those who 
 assert for a priori reasons that such observation is ''entirely worthless." 
 Whatever theory there may be to the contrary, we do know that there are 
 mental facts revealed in individual consciousness and we do know that 
 we may critically investigate such facts. 
 
 (b) The subject-object problem in psychological theory is one which 
 the beginner in the study does not need to solve. It is easy to ask un- 
 answerable questions regarding how the mind can be both the knowing 
 subject and the known object, how "consciousness is both the instrument 
 and the object of inquiry"; but it can be shown that in all such questions 
 there is an unwarranted assumption of similarity in the observation of 
 physical facts to the observation of psychical facts. There is an attempt 
 to force the extrospective attitude of the physicist with its space-con- 
 ditioned facts upon the psychologist whose facts are essentially unspatial 
 and unobjective in character. In the introspective examination of events 
 in consciousness there is no such "objectifying" as is employed in the 
 examination of the objects of Phj^sics; the critical analysis of personal 
 events for description and explanation is essentially different from the 
 botanist's analysis of a plant structure. 
 
 (c) The assertion that " all introspection is essentially retrospection, " 
 that "introspective examination must be a post mortem examination," 
 is not warranted by the facts. What is a memory; is it any more static, 
 any more a thing to be objectified than an experience originating in direct 
 contact mth the stimulating environment? If a memory is itself a pro- 
 cess in consciousness, is it any more adapted to objective examination 
 from without than the original experience of which it is in some sense a 
 revival? Does the statement that the introspective examination of the 
 facts of personal life is a post mortem dissection mean that there is such 
 a thing as a corpse of an experience that may be floated upon the stream 
 of psychic processes for analytic study? Is it not rather true that a 
 life consists in the progressive reconstruction of experiences about con- 
 tinuously changing image centers; and that it is impossible to conceive 
 of any such flotsam as tl)is view of memory implies? Whatever may be 
 
A Syllabus of PsYCHOLOG-y 15 
 
 the difficulty in the direct examination of an experience during its pro- 
 gress, such examination is the essential method of Psychology. 
 
 (d) The statement is frequently made that 'introspection so alters 
 the state of consciousness to be observed as to render the process worth- 
 less for scientific purposes"; thus, according to this view, one cannot 
 enjoy the taste of fruit and at the same time critically observe the cog- 
 nitive and affective processes that constitute the enjoyment. While 
 it is certainly true that attention to a psychic fact does modify that fact as 
 given in consciousness, it is equally true that attention to a physical 
 fact in like manner modifies that fact as known to the observer. It is 
 not only true that all sciences transform reality for their own purposes, 
 but also that all scientific analysis alters the phenomena with which it 
 deals to accord with a point of view and a perspective of the observer. 
 In general the study of psychical phenomena presents no more difficulty 
 to the trained student than the study of physical phenomena. Each 
 requires proper method and allowance for exaggeration due to concen- 
 trated attention and for errors of the "personal equation." 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 14-19. 
 
 Ladd, Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, p. 11. 
 
 Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology, p. 9. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man,>p. 15-22. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 8-9. 
 
 Scripture, The New Psychology, pp. 8-12. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 6-8. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology,' Vol. I, p. 185 et seq. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 14-20. 
 
 Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, p. 13. 
 
 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 16-21. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 15-18. 
 
 Iveatinge, Suggestion in Education, p. 135. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, p. 9. 
 
 Villa, Contemporary Psychology, pp. 129-134. 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 16-18. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, p. 14. 
 
 Morgan, Introduction to Comparative Psychology, p. 20. 
 
 Morgan, Psychology for Teachers, pp. 71 and 77. 
 
 Brackenbury, Primer of Psychology, pp. 6-7. 
 
 Pillsbury, Attention, pp. 212-214. 
 
 Roark, Psychology in Education, pp. 9-10. 
 
 Betts, Mind and Its Education, pp. 2-3. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, pp. 13-15, 
 
 Titchener, Outhne of Psychology, pp. 39-41. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 19-25. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, p. 4. 
 
 6. Inferential Methods. While the primarj^ source of psychological 
 data is the direct observation of the facts of one's own conscious life, 
 there are important supplementary sources to which the psychologist 
 may profitably have recource under well defined conditions. In the use 
 of these secondary sources certain '^ auxiliary methods" have been 
 developed to supplement the fundamental ^'introspective method" of 
 Psychology. These may be properly called inferential methods to dis- 
 tinguish them from the direct method of introspection. The most im- 
 
16 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 portant of these secondary sources and methods are: (1) observation of 
 the actions of other persons constituted hke ourselves, as a means of 
 discovering how the mind works of which these actions are the accepted 
 physiological expression; (2) observation of the development of children 
 as they grow to maturity of structure and functioning, seeking in their 
 less complex experiences more easily distinguished elements, just as the 
 student of Sociology turns to the lives of primitive people? for data iu 
 his science; (3) observation of the life processes of defectives — the blind, 
 the deaf, and the bodily maimed — , as nature's ready-made "control 
 experiments; " (4) observation of the imbecile, the insane and the criminal, 
 whose biased lives throw a side-light upon normal life processes; (5) 
 analytic study of literature, art, customs and institutions of peoples, as 
 expressions of mind; and (6) observations of the activities of animals as 
 manifestations of intelligent adaptation to environment. In the analogi- 
 cal reasoning involved in all of these auxiliary methods of seeking psy- 
 chological facts the student is in constant danger of overestimating the 
 value of his work; he overlooks the fact that his own consciousness is 
 the field in which all psychological data have value for his science. He 
 ''reads into" the workings of the animal and the insane mind facts of 
 his own consciousness and deceives himself into thinking he has found 
 them there. Nevertheless, with proper care this indirect method of 
 seeking mental facts will yield good results. 
 
 (a) We study our own experiences directly; the experiences of others, 
 indirectly. We find the facts of our own mental life immediately in the 
 field of consciousness; we infer the facts of the mental life of others from 
 bodily signs. We accept the changes in the body of another person 
 as the result of mental processes, and we infer what the mental processes 
 are from known relations between body states and mind states. That 
 we often make mistakes in attributing to others thoughis and feelings 
 which they do not have does not wholly discredit this important mode 
 of studying mental life; it only reveals to us our lack of clear knowledge of 
 the relation of mind to body, and warns us against errors of "personal 
 equation" of the observer. Since all interpretation of the physiological 
 expression of mind in others must be in terms of facts of the observer's 
 own consciousness, it follows that the more closely the experiences of 
 those observed parallel those of the observer the more reliable will be the 
 data thus gathered. Hence the most important auxiliary source of 
 psychological data is the lives of normal adult persons living under the 
 same conditions as the observer. 
 
 (b) Valuable data may be obtained by the psychologist from the 
 judicious observation of the mental processes of children as they are 
 manifested in bodily expression and conduct. The systematic watching 
 and recording of stages in the development of infants is a field much 
 worked in recent years by over-hopeful and over-credulous students of 
 Psychology; but the attempt to differentiate from the general sciences 
 of Anthropology and Biology a special science of "Child Study" has not 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 17 
 
 proved successful. Much of this Child Study, inexpert and quasi-scien- 
 tific, is not psychological, and it has contributed practically nothing to 
 Psj^chology. Even when the observations of the lives of children are 
 discriminatingly carried on by trained psychologists in a proper search 
 of mental facts there are peculiar difficulties in such study which render 
 the validity of the results questionable. The persistent misunderstanding 
 of children in the home and the schoolroom is a vicious fault from which 
 even the psychologist seems unable to free himself. 
 
 (c) The relation of the mind and the body, whether regarded as two 
 separate interacting entities or as two phases of one indivisible "stream 
 of experience," is so vital that any defect of the body (lack of eye, ear 
 or other organ) lessens or impairs the mind also; thus, a person congenit- 
 ally blind or deaf cannot have ideas of colors or tones as persons have 
 whose end-organs of vision and audition give them perceptions of the 
 physical environment. A critical study of these abridged lives serves 
 to determine in a negative way the place of the sensation factors of sight 
 and hearing in the normal stream of consciousness. It is important here 
 that the psychologist should know thoroughly the structure and func- 
 tioning of the normal body-mind organism in order that he may correctly 
 perceive and rightly value his facts, just as the physician must diagnose 
 his case on the basis of what he knows of the healthy life. The chief 
 difficulty is the observer's inability to distinguish the vicarious action 
 of other end-organs from the normal action of the missing organs. The 
 student should bear in mind constantly that he is not concerned with 
 how one sense organ may by increased delicacy make up, in a measure, 
 for the absence of another organ, but with the nature and conditions of 
 the psychic factors of the experience of the one whom he observes, so far 
 as he is able to interpret them from bodily expressions; he is a psychologist, 
 not a physiologist. 
 
 (d) A systematic study of the behavior of the insane as a means of 
 discovering facts concerning mental hfe m general is a field worthy of 
 more attention than it has received. What is recommended here, however 
 is not the aUenist's study of psychopathology from the physician's stand- 
 point, but the psychologist's study of the phenomena of conscious life 
 in the mental aberation of those observed. A similar study of the feeble- 
 minded, the sick, and the criminal would prove profitable, provided 
 always that the psychologist's point of view is maintained. 
 
 (e) The creations of art— in sculpture, in painting, in literature, 
 in music — are manifestations of the minds of the artists, which properly 
 studied may be made to furnish some data for Psychology. In a similar 
 way the customs, laws and institutions of peoples -are embodiments of 
 mental activities that may be interpreted by the psychologist. In fact, 
 all that man has done or does, individually and collectively, is but the 
 embodiment of mind to be critically examined by the psychologist in 
 accordance with his well-defined working hypothesis. 
 
 (f) When the student observes the life activities and behavior of 
 animals in his search for facts concerning mind, he enters the domain of 
 general Biology. If we are to define Psychology as " the science of mind " 
 wherever and in whatever form it may exist, then we are equally inter- 
 
18 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 ested in all the phenomena of sentient life in human beings, in animals, 
 and even in plants. Such definition is analogous to defining Geography 
 as 'Hhe science of the earth" to the obliteration of all lines of demarkation 
 mth Astronomy and Geology. Strictly Psychology is not even con- 
 cerned with all the facts of human mind, but only with such as rise above 
 the threshold of consciousness; it deals with conscious personal exper- 
 iences, and a knowledge of all other mental phenomena is merely con- 
 tributory intelligence in the fields of cognate sciences. There is much 
 to interest the student of the general phenomena of life — of mind in the 
 biological sense — in the systematic observation of animals; but such ob- 
 servations yield little for Psychology. He should especially beware of 
 the credulous acceptance of the theories of life attributed to bees, ants 
 and beavers by romancing naturalists. He is not concerned with the 
 question of Svhether animals have minds', or 'whether a dog that has 
 done wrong from the human standpoint has remorse' ; his interest in the 
 manifestations of life in animals is determined by the hope of some help 
 in the rational description and explanation of the phenomena of his own 
 conscious fife. 
 
 References 
 
 Kiilpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 12-18. 
 
 Bascom Comparative Psychology, pp. 2-6. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 16-22. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 194. 
 
 Sully, Human and Animal Mind, Vol. I, pp. 18-22. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 8-10. 
 
 Dexter and Garlick, Psychology in the Schoolroom, pp. 4-6. 
 
 Villa, Contemporary Psychology, pp. 153-165. 
 
 Drummond, Introduction to Child-Study, pp. 1-95. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 20-24. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 30-36. 
 
 7. Experimentation is doing for modern Psychology what it has 
 done for the older descriptive and explanatory sciences. It is in the 
 psj^chological laboratory with its experimental research that the center 
 of all systematic study of mental processes is to be found. That some 
 leading psychologists speak disparagingly of experimenting in the field 
 of psj^chic events is doubtless due, in part at least, to a failure to recog- 
 nize the fact that experimental observation the characteristic indispen- 
 sible method of all analytic explanatory science, must vary with the 
 subject matter of investigation. Experiments must be adapted in aim 
 and procedure to the field of the science in which they are employed; 
 thus, the experiments in Biology differ in purpose and process from the 
 experiments in Chemistry. If it is admitted that is it at all possible to 
 observe events in consciousness and that it is possible to so control the 
 circumstances of life activities as to produce such events at will, then 
 experimenting in Psycholog}^ has precisely the same warrant in scientific 
 method as experimenting in Agriculture. That the purpose and the 
 limitations of such experimenting have been misunderstood by some over- 
 zealous advocates of the ''New Psychology" and that some of the results 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 19 
 
 have no psychological value should not discredit this mode of study. 
 From its beginnings with Fechner wonderful work has been done in Psy- 
 chology through experimentation, and there is no doubt that the earnest 
 worker, with rightly determined purpose and process, will in the future 
 reap richly in this field 
 
 (a) All observations of phenomena, in whatever field of investigation , 
 ma}^ be grouped in two well differentiated classes; observations under 
 natural conditions, in which the student attends to the phenomena as 
 they occur incidentally in the ordinary course of nature; and observation 
 under artificial conditions, in which he so controls and directs natural 
 processes as to bring before him at will under the most favorable condi- 
 tions the phenomena which he wishes to observe. Observing under arti- 
 ficial conditions is experimenting, in which the essential element is the 
 intelligent observation made more systematic and accurate by simpli- 
 fying the conditions. The value of experimenting in science consists 
 in the definiteness of the observation; the experimenter restricts the field 
 of his observations with specific purpose and actively seeks within it the 
 particular facts of his immediate interest. In experimenting the student 
 (1) brings before him phenomena when desired, (2) repeats his material 
 at will, (3) issolates particular phenomena for critical examination, and 
 (4) uses mechanical instruments for excitation and record. The observer 
 works under understood conditions, and is thus able to test theories of 
 casual connection by varying the conditions. Since he, in a sense, makes 
 his material when he wishes it, instead of finding it as in observation 
 under natural conditions, an hour may give him greater results than years 
 of waiting for nature to reveal herself in her ordinary course. Experi- 
 menting has been somewhat poetically defined as "asking questions of 
 nature." 
 
 (b) All that has been said in the preceding paragraph about experi- 
 menting in general applies to experimenting in Psychology, making proper 
 allowance for the nature of the material employed. A psychological 
 experiment is the introspective analysis of a conscious experience under 
 controlled conditions. The so-called '^ experimental method" in psy- 
 chology is not a new source of distinct data; it is merely more accurate 
 observation under specifically prearranged conditions. It is also possible to 
 experiment in the interpretative study of the mental processes of others as 
 manifested in their bodily states; thus the student of Psychology may 
 ''experiment upon another" as the zoologist experiments upon the living 
 animal in his laboratorj^ Where the students work in pairs in the 
 psychological laboratory, the one who introspectively examines and 
 reports the facts of his own experiences is truly the " experimenter " and the 
 other who merely aids in controlling the circumstances of his observa- 
 tions is the "assistant." In the indirect experiment, however, the one 
 who stimulates action in the other is properl3^c ailed an " experimenter ' ' 
 in the general biological sense, and the one upon whose life processes he 
 works is called the "subject" of his experiments. It is essential to clear- 
 ness" in his investigations that the student should note that the experi- 
 ment in this indirect observation of mental phenomena in the lives of 
 others is not strictly a "psychological experiment" in the field of the 
 
20 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 science. Each science must deal with its own data directly in its own 
 field. The subject matter of Psychology is mental facts as given in indi- 
 visual consciousness; and psychological experimentation is essentially 
 emplo3^ed with such facts in the consciousness of the experimenter. 
 
 (c) The scope of psychological experiments has unfortunately been 
 a disputed point. Some psychologists contend that the possible field 
 of experiment in their science is a very narrow one, confined entirely to 
 a kind of physiological testing of sense organs as the bodily concomitants 
 of the elements of cognition. As "physiological psychologists" they 
 have devoted themselves to investigations of sensations due to various 
 forms of stimulation of the peripheral end-organs of the nervous mecha- 
 nism. They have persistently robbed Psychology of a proper scientific 
 interest in the whole field of human experience; for there is probably no 
 form or phase of personal life that may not be critically examined under 
 experimental conditions. A curious form of this biased experimental 
 study is shown in the attempt to discover mathematical laws in the re- 
 lation of the physical stimulus to the psychic state. While important 
 bi-products have been obtained in the work with ''Weber's Law," "re- 
 action times," and other conceptions of "Psycho-physics," the fact that 
 psychical facts cannot be measured precludes the possibility of any direct 
 results for Psychology in such study. Psychological facts are qualita- 
 tive, not quantitative; and a mechanics of the psycho-physical organism 
 is unthinkable in the field of a true Psychology. The present great need 
 in this science is such a defining of its subject matter and delimitation of 
 its field as will center the earnest efforts of research students profitably 
 upon the rich materials of their own subject of study. 
 
 (d) A psychological laboratory is a material equipment in building 
 and apparatus to facilitate the experimental observation of facts of men- 
 tal life. The construction and equipment of such a laboratory depends 
 upon both the particular work to be done and the end sought in the work. 
 There are a few standard pieces of apparatus for stimulating action, 
 registering results and recording time which are found in all laboratories; 
 but the field is so broad and at present so vaguely defined that each lab- 
 oratory worker devises and constructs his own apparatus to meet his 
 particulai need Much of the direct introspective study of the phe- 
 nomena of one 's own consciousness requires very simple apparatus ; more 
 elaborate apparatus is frequently emploj^ed in experimenting on others 
 in the indirect observation of mental facts. Doubtless as the center of 
 interest shifts from the attempted quantitative investigation of the re- 
 sults of stimulating the sense organs to the broader and richer field of the 
 explanatory study of complete experience in all its phases, there will be 
 many more additions to the discarded apparatus in the lumber rooms of 
 our universities, and new forms of delicate mechanism will be devised to 
 aid in the ana)3'tic examination of emotions and volitions. As to their 
 purpose there are two distinct kinds of psychological laboratories, ju.st 
 as there are in all the other analytic sciences; research laboratories and 
 teaching laboratories. It is the purpose of the research laboratories with 
 their trained workers to add to the sum of human knowledge through the 
 discovery of new facts ; the primary purpose in the teaching laboratories 
 is exemi)lification of known facts and truths by following along the trail 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 21 
 
 of the research explorer. In the psychological teaching laboratory, how- 
 ever, this distinction is less marked. The material is so immediately 
 personal and always so new that every student is, in a measure, a seeker 
 for new facts. The laws of this science, so far as they have been formu- 
 lated, have less authority than those in Physics or Biology. The great 
 need of Psychology at present is not the corroboration of some over- 
 hasty generalizations in the field of Psycho-physics, but a careful analysis 
 of concrete personal experiences and an honest search for facts of a strictly 
 psychological nature; and in such a critical study every student can par- 
 ticipate, observing the phenomena of his own conscious life unbiased as 
 far as possible by any preconceived theory regarding what he ought to 
 find there. 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 22-24. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, pp. 11-12. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 23-28. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 22, 30, 31. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. I, p. 11. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 192 and 193. 
 
 SpiUer, Mind of Man, pp. 34-37. 
 
 Scripture, The New Psychology, p. 53 et seq. 
 
 Royce, Outhnes of Psychology, pp. 18-19. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 5-7. 
 
 Hoffding, Outhnes of Psychology, p. 21. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, p. 9. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 10-11. 
 
 Titchener, Experimental Psychology, Vol. I, Part I, pp. xiii-xviii. 
 
 Witmer, Analytical Psychology, pp. xix-xxvi. 
 
 Myers, Textbook of Experimental Psychology, pp. 1-10. 
 
22 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Chapter III — Field of Psychology 
 
 8. Psychology is one of a group of sciences that deal directly with 
 human nature and human affairs. Its special field is determined by its 
 limitation in subject matter and its point of view. It is a study of the 
 events of personal life in much the same way as modern History is a study 
 of the events in the life of a social organism. History, as a science, is 
 a phase of genetic Sociology; so Psychology may be viewed as a genetic 
 study of individual character. The psychologist deals ^vith the life 
 events of a human organism as biological factors seen from within. The 
 concrete objects of his study are personal experiences as found in indi- 
 vidual consciousness; and his work with such materials is possible only 
 in the subjective awareness of his consciousness. The field of Psychology, 
 then, strictly defined is human life as known in consciousness; it seeks 
 to describe and explain the life as it manifests itself in personal exper- 
 iences, analyzing them to determine what they are and synthesizing them 
 into the organic structure of a human being. 
 
 (a) While the temptation to the system-making psychologist is 
 strong to extend the field of his science beyond the narrow limits here 
 given, definiteness in investigation and clearness in discussion are pro- 
 moted by keeping strictly within the proper field of the science. '^ Ani- 
 mal Psychology" and '^Race Psychology" are interesting and profitable 
 studies, but they are not Psycholog}^ in any true sense of the term, any 
 more than the so-called ''Agricultural Botany" is a legitimate division 
 of the science of Botany. 
 
 (b) On the other hand, the student should endeavor to free himself 
 from the present tendency of psychologists to restrict his field too much 
 by placing undue emphasis upon cognition; the affective and conative 
 phases of experience are at least as worth}- of his study. Knowing is 
 but one aspect of conscious human life, with which feeling and willing 
 are inseparably connected. Our study should include in its scope an 
 impartial examination of all the elements and aspects of personal exper- 
 iences as they cumulatively build a human life. 
 
 9. The field of Psychology. The field of Psychology may be 
 negatively defined by distinguishing it from the fields of other sciences. 
 In tracing the lines of demarkation the student should remember two 
 things: first that the fields of sciences do not "overlap," each science 
 being exclusive in its own field; and second, that the same phenomena 
 may be rightfully examined, explained, and evaluated in two or more 
 sriences, each science dealing with them from its own point of view. It 
 is neither desirable nor possible to give here a logical classification of 
 sciences, nor even to give a complete scheme of relations between Psy- 
 chology and its more immediately^ cognate and allied sciences. What 
 is desired is to suggest some characteristics of a few common fields of 
 scientific study in distinction from the clearl}^ defined field of Psychology. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 23 
 
 Physics is the science, or more properly group of sciences, that seeks 
 to describe and explain the objective world of matter and energy — an 
 ''over-individual," ''independent" world of facts that may be analyzed 
 and valued. Psychology is the science that seeks to describe and explain 
 the subjective world of mind — an "individual," "dependent" world of 
 facts that can also be analyzed and valued. The facts of Physics are in 
 space and time; the facts of Psychology are in consciousness. 
 
 Biology is the general science of life, both of animals and plants; 
 it is concerned with the structure and functions of living organisms. 
 Physiology in its more technical sense deals with functioning only, though 
 in Human Physiolog}^ it commonly includes a study of both structure 
 and function. Human Physiology is a study of the psychophysical or- 
 ganism from the side of the body; Human Psychology is a study of the 
 same organism from the side of the mind. 
 
 Epistemology is the general science of knowledge, with special refe- 
 rence to the validity of the knowledge, i.e., its relation to its objects; 
 Logic is the science of constructive thinking, with special reference to 
 the validity of the process. Psychology is concerned with the process 
 of knowing as such; Epistemology with the truth of what is known as it 
 consists in the concord of the cognitions with reality. Psychology deals 
 with the actual processes of reasoning as they occur in reflective cogni- 
 tion; Logic, with the processes as they ought to be in effective reasoning. 
 Psychology is strictly a fact science, while both Logic and Epistemology 
 have important normative characteristics. 
 
 The science of Aesthetics has its contact with Psychology in the 
 province of feeling; while in its Greek etymology the term denotes per- 
 ception of the outer world through the sense of touch, in its present 
 usage it denotes subjective appreciation rather than objective knowing. 
 The psychologist describes and explains feelings as a phase of conscious 
 experience; the student of Aesthetics objectifies the feeling of agreeable- 
 ness in "beauty" and determines rules for its 'mitation in the fine arts. 
 
 Ethics is a normative science dealing with the laws of right living; 
 it resembles Aesthetics, the science of beauty of form, in treating of 
 beauty of moral conduct. Psychology is concerned with understanding 
 conscience and the processes of moral living; Ethics formulates the norms 
 of right conduct as the realization of ideal individual and social life. 
 Psychology furnishes the data for modern "evolutionary Ethics," the 
 "pragmatic," "energistic" Ethics of self-realization; but Ethics itself 
 is essentially a science of values, not of facts as such. 
 
 History (political History), like Psychology, is a positive science; 
 its province is the events in the organic life of a community of persons. 
 It endeavors analytically to describe and explain the progressive ideals 
 and developing institutional forms of a social organism. Psychology is 
 
24 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 concerned with personal experiences and its data are essentially individ-, 
 ual; History is concerned with group experiences and its data are '' over- 
 individual." 
 
 Pedagogy is the science of education, i. e., of the rational cultivation 
 of another's life through determining his experiences. It is a normative 
 science, and is related to Psychology as Politics is to Sociology. In the 
 psychology of suggestion we learn how one may intentionally modify 
 another's life; in Pedagogy, how one ought to modify it so as to make 
 it larger and better than it would be without such intentional influence. 
 
 References. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 17. 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 5-11. 
 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 27. 
 Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, p. 7. 
 Creighton, Introduction to Logic, pp. 4-7. 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 4-6. 
 Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, p. 27. 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 379-382 
 
 10. Kinds and divisions of Psychology. Various kinds and di- 
 visions of Psychology have been recognized by writers upon the subject, 
 depending on divisions of the field and special methods of investigation. 
 While the greater part of these ''Psychologies" are illcgically disting- 
 uished and place undue emphasis upon incidental facts in matter and 
 method, a critical examination of their claims to separate treatment will 
 serve still further to clear up the definition, scope, and method of our 
 science. 
 
 Some psychologists distinguish between a General Psychology, 
 dealing with the normal adult mind, and various Special Psychologies, 
 dealing with the mind at some other stage than that of its best estate or 
 with some limited aspect of the mental life. 
 
 Infant Psychology investigates the less complex events of the nas- 
 cent mind of children; Adolescent Psychology is concerned with the 
 mind of youth in the transition from childhood to manhood; Senile Psy- 
 chology deals with the mind of old age, when the catabolic processes of 
 the body are in the ascendency. Psychology of the Senses is a study 
 of elementary cognitive processes with a strong bias to a physiological 
 study of the peripheral end-organs of the nervous mechanism; Psychology 
 of Feeling is but a special chapter of Psychology proper, concerned with 
 the affective phases of consciousness. Psychology of Art, Psychology of 
 ReUgion, Psychology of Crime, etc., are descriptive phrases of obvious 
 meaning. 
 
 Psychology is divided into Individual (or Personal) Psychology 
 and Collective Psycholog}^, accord'ng to whether the phenomena con- 
 sidered are given in individual consciousness or are objective manifesta- 
 tions of the ''collective mind" of contemporaneous or successive groups 
 of people. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 25 
 
 The term '^Individual Psychology" is also used to denote a study 
 of mental differences between individuals, for which Variational Psycol- 
 ogy is a better name. Social Psychology has many divisions and names, 
 such as Race Psychology, Ethnic Psychology, etc., all closely akin to 
 scientific History. 
 
 A very natural division of the province of Psychology, in the broad- 
 est use of the term, is into Psychology of the Normal Mind and Psychology 
 of the Abnormal Mind. 
 
 Psychiatry, or Medical Psychology, includes both Psychopathologj^ 
 and Psychotherapj^ and is concerned with the improvement of bodily 
 states and their physical concomitants through mental control. Educa- 
 tional. Psychology is a study of the process of cultivating the minds of 
 others through the constructive intentional influence of the educator. 
 
 Psychology is characterized as Human Psychology or Animal Psy- 
 chology, according to whether the facts investigated relate to human 
 life or animal life. 
 
 Animal Psychologj^, also called Comparative Psychology, is really 
 a phase of Biology, though it may furnish important extrospective inter- 
 pretaive data for Psychology proper. 
 
 An attempt has been made to dist'nguish Genetic Psychology from 
 the proper study of the mature mind in its normal activity, using the 
 being through cumulative investigation of the development of the human 
 being through cumulative experiencing. While it is possible to make a 
 specialized study of the growth of children from the mental side, it should 
 not be overlooked that all Psychology deals mth growth processes. AU 
 Psychology is dj^namic, not static, and is a study of development. 
 
 Psychology is also distinguished as Functional Psychology and 
 Structural Psychology, according to the philosophical presupposition as 
 to the nature of mind with which the student sets out in his investigations. 
 In Functional Psychology all forms of psychoses are regarded as functions 
 of a mind as a substantial entity; it is this unified spiritual existence that 
 perceives, and feels, and attends. In Structural Psychology the know- 
 ings, feelings and doings constitute the mind, i.e., a mind is '' nothing 
 but a stream of processes. " From the functional standpoint the student 
 seeks to discover what mind does; from the structural what mind is. 
 
 Both these psychologies deal with the same material; it is merel}^ 
 a question of the philosophic working hypothesis — not a matter of vital 
 import to the beginning student, since on either hypothesis he will be 
 able to make a satisfactory investigation of his own psychoses. 
 
 The distinction between Introspective Psychology and Objective 
 (extrospective) Psychology is implied in most of the dichotomous divis- 
 ions given above. In the first the data of the science are the facts given 
 immediately in one's own consciousness; in the second they are inter- 
 
26 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 pretations of the physiological manifestations of mind in others. The- 
 comparative value of these two kinds of Psychology is the subject of end- 
 less discussions by psychologists. 
 
 'Most psychologists admit that these two methods of studjdng mental 
 facts are complemental, though they differ widely as two the relative 
 values of the to as sources of data for their scientific generalizations. 
 Some regard introspection as "the sole method which we can follow"; 
 others say that is is "rather to be used as an auxiliary of the other methods 
 than as a method capable of leading the way. " It would seem, however, 
 that a strictly Objective Psychology is impossible. 
 
 The distinction between the New Psychology and the Old Psychology 
 is based upon both matter and method. The Old Psychology dealt 
 with the activities and states of a hypostatized mental entity,* which, 
 while it was loosely encased in the body, was not vitally dependent 
 upon it; the New Psychology, whether structural or functional, treats 
 all forms of experiences as conditioned upon the body. The new study 
 is of the mind as truly as the old, but it alwaj^s has regard to the phj^sio- 
 logical concomitant of the mental activities and states; its slogan is, 
 "No psychosis Avithout somatosis." While the province of the new 
 Psychology is enlarged by adding to the explanation of mental states 
 a determining of their relation to the body, the most important change 
 is in method ; the New Psychology has become a modern science by em- 
 ploying experimentation in its investigations of phenomena. The dis- 
 tinguishing characteristics of the New Psychology are thus the recogni- 
 tion of the vital immanence of the mind in the body and the use of the 
 laboratory methods of all modern science. 
 
 The older Psychology is sometimes called Rational Psychology as 
 distinguished from the new as Empirical Psychology, since it attempted 
 an 2i priori explanation of mental facts on an assumed nature of the soul, 
 while the new seeks to discover meanings by observation of the facts 
 themselves. On account of the approach to the mental phenomena from 
 the side of the bodily conditions the whole of the newer Psychology is 
 frequently called Physiological Psychology; on account of its method 
 it is sometimes called Experimental Psj^chology. 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 15-16. 
 
 Lackl, Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 1-8. 
 
 Ziehen, Introduction to Physiological Psychology, pp. 1-3. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 3-4. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, pi). 8-18. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of P.sj'chology, pp. 8-11. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psycholog\ , Vol. I, pp. 15-17 
 
 Baldwin, Story of the Mind, pp. 1-7. 
 
 Villa, Contemporary Psychology, pp. 154-163. 
 
 Bascom, Comparative Psychology, pp. 1-3. 
 
 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 1-7. 
 
 Siilly, Human Mind, \'ol. 1, pp. 14-23. 
 
 Pvoss, -Sociiil Psychology, pp. 1-4. 
 
 Buel, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 1-3. 
 
 Thorndike, Elements of Psychology, pp. 319-321. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 351-354. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 27 
 
 ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE 
 
 Chapter IV — General character of an experience 
 
 11. What an experience is. An experience, in ttie province of 
 Psychology, is a bit of conscious human Hfe, an event in the personal 
 history of a human being. It is a longer or shorter segment of the life 
 current as revealed in consciousness. An experience may extend through 
 hours or days, as when one's life centers for a time about the final sickness 
 and death of a friend; or it may last but a moment, as when one brushes 
 a troublesome fly from his ear. Life is a stream of cumulative exper- 
 iencing, in which each natural division of the stream has a distinct uni- 
 tary character. Each experience is determined by some formative 
 image center, and it may be introspectively isolated from other matter 
 in consciousness. As a concrete object of psychological study, it has a 
 beginning, a development and an ending. One's experience is his real 
 personal, present possession; it is always here-and-now in his life. 
 
 The term ^'experience" is used in common speech and in philosophi- 
 cal discussions with various meanings. It is here defined in its technical 
 meaning in the province of Phychology proper. It is used by soma writers 
 to designate all kinds of happenings to objects both animate and in- 
 animate, thus, the caressing of a dog, the breaking of a twig, or the freez- 
 ing of water is called an "experience" of the animal, the plant or the 
 water. For the purposes of our present study it is convenient, and not 
 at all arbitrary, to limit the meaning strictly to the events in human life. 
 
 Not all the facts of the human life even are experiences in the strict 
 sense of our definition, but only such organic processes as arise in con- 
 sciousness; that is, experiences are facts of conscious life only. With 
 the biological facts of unconscious ''reflex action" the psycholo- 
 gist has to do only in a general way upon the margin of his true field. 
 
 A mind grows by its own working; and each conscious bit of work 
 that it does is an experience. An experience is essentially active ; seen 
 from within, it is a dynamic process, not a static state. A body-mind 
 organism does not passively undego or receive an experience; it makes 
 its experience through its own intiative and constructive activity. 
 
 The etymological meaning of the term experience is trial. In his 
 experiences the human being discovers himself through a more or less 
 rationally ordered trial of life's possibilities. A life is organized experienc 
 es, progressively elaborated in body and soul. Each experience is re- 
 productive and representative, as well as acquisitive and elaborative, 
 making thus a continuity and integrity in the life progress. 
 
 We account for an experience as a happening in consciousness by 
 distinguishing two conditions of its existence: the occasion, or stimulus, 
 and the reacting mind. Though fundamentally a self-originated activity, 
 it is also contingent upon circumstances. As to its objective content 
 
28 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 it refers primarily to the outer world of limiting conditions; as to its^ 
 subjective processes, it is a stase of the evolution of a unified spiritual 
 being. 
 
 In every experience there is always something more than the indi- 
 vidual fact as-such ; there is always recognition of the transcendant unity 
 of the life in which the event occurs. As given in consciousness the 
 actuality of the experiencing mind as a substrate of the experience is as 
 real and as unquestionable as the actuality of the material world imping- 
 ing on the peripheral end-organs of sense. With the philosophical specu- 
 lations which would explain away either of these two complemental 
 factors of an experience the student of elementary Psychology is not 
 concerned; he deals with a world of reals, in both subject and object. 
 
 Doubtless the most satisfactory statement of the nature and phases 
 of "experience, " for the student prepared to read it, is found in Dr. Mun- 
 sterberg's explanation of the plan of the Congress of Arts and Sciences at 
 in St. Louis Exposition in 1904, as given in the first volume of the Re- 
 port of the Congress. It must be insisted, however, that the beginner 
 the-psychology need not concern himself with the philosophical meaning 
 of this word, of which Shadworth Hodgson says "there is no larger word" 
 in the vocabulary of scholarly thinking. 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 619, 628. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 13-14. 
 
 Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. I, p. 360. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, p. 1. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man, p. 333. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, pp. 51-54. 
 
 Mitchell, Structure, and Growth of the Mind, pp. 8, 83, 107, etc. 
 
 Krauth-Fleming, Vocabulary of Philosophical Sciences, pp. 177, 661. 
 
 12. The procession of experiences. In the analytic study of 
 the scientist a personal life may be regarded as a succession or events in 
 consciousness; and some psychologists have even defined mind as a col- 
 lection of segments of consciousness, a mere processional aggregation of 
 mental processes. Thus the discrete events in a life history are viewed 
 as pouring along like a school of minnows in shallow water. Professor 
 James, with his usual happy phrase, has called this on-moving body of 
 psychic facts ''the stream of consciousness." Professor Titchener has 
 defined a mind, as the subject-matter of analytical Psychology, as ''the 
 sum-total of the mental processes occurring in the life-time of an indi- 
 vidual." In his view the mind of the psychologist's study is nothing 
 but a stream of experiences, which may be analyzed into more or less 
 elemental part-processes of knowing and feeling. Professor Royce 
 accepts the idea of a stream of life events, but says that conscious life is 
 not like "a shower of shot, but a stream with distinguishable ideas or 
 other such clearer mental contents floating on its surface " He contends 
 that "beside and beneath what one can distinguish in his [consciousness] 
 there is the body of the stream, the background of consciousness." 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 29 
 
 The ''stream of consciousness" is the current of Ufe events of which 
 an individual is immediately aware; it is the procession of his experiences. 
 This does not mean that the mind is ''chopped up in bits." It is con- 
 tinuous; only the concrete events appear in time as a train of thoughts 
 and feelings. It is interesting to note when one is looking from the car 
 window of a rapidly moving train how he sees a succession of views, or 
 landscapes, sensibly distinct from each other and without the dissolving- 
 view effect that might be expected. Similarly the trained introspec- 
 ionist cannot catch the scene shifter at work as he transforms one con- 
 sciousness into another. The human mind is a continuum ; but the con- 
 scious experiences with which the psychologist deals are a somewhat 
 loosely linked chain. Professor James's term "stream of thought 
 [thoughts?]" designates rather the happenings that float into conscious- 
 ness on the surface of the life current than the mind of which they are the 
 phenomenal manifestations. 
 
 In this topic we reach again the philosophic borderland of our study. 
 As beginners in the science we must turn back from these attractive 
 fields of speculation, assured that we shall find abundant material to 
 investigate within the province of Psychology itself. The ultimate 
 nature of mind, the theory of "mind stuff," and the idealistic construct- 
 ion of experience mil prove good food for later thought. 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 274 et seq. 
 
 James, Briefer Course, pp. 151-175. 
 
 James, Talks to Teachers, pp. 15-21. 
 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, pp. 4-10. 
 
 Ladd, Outlines of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 34, 390. 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 82-88. 
 
 Wenzlaff, Mental Man, p. 59. 
 
 Titchener, Outline of Psychology, pp. 11-15 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 15-19. 
 
 13. Relation of mind to body. Not only in life as a whole, but 
 in every event of a personal life, the mind and the body are inseparably 
 connected. This is the greatest word of the "New Psychology," as it 
 seeks by the analytic methods of modern science to understand conscious 
 life in its dependence upon the body structure. In modern Psychology 
 the mind is no longer dealt with apart from "the body in which it dwells" 
 as a temporary lodger ; the mind is no longer regarded as inhabiting the 
 body as a man dwells in a house, through the rooms of which he may 
 move at will without modification of their form or arrangement ; the eyes 
 and ears are no longer thought of as "mere windows of the soui" in 
 the "clay tenement," through which the roaming spirit, encased in this 
 loosely-fitting body, may occasionally glance at the world beyond its 
 confines. The psychologist no longer looks upon the body as an impedi- 
 ment to a larger spiritual life, "a clog to the soul" in its upward striving. 
 Whatever may be true of "disembodied spirit" in an existence after 
 
30 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 death, in the present life the mind lives in and through and by means of. 
 the body. The connection of a mind and a body in a personal self is 
 not a mere association; it is a vital union, essential to the very existence 
 of a person as we know him. 
 
 The function of the body in life experiences may be viewed in two 
 ways : the body may be regarded as the medium through which the mind 
 discovers and utilizes the environment, or it may be regarded as the 
 material expression of the mind's creative activities. Either view is 
 obviously partial and onesided; nor are they taken together completely 
 complemental in the whole meaning of life. In the first view the ner- 
 vous mechanism furnishes in its various forms of peripheral end-organs 
 a means of contact with a surrounding world of independent facts, a 
 world whose existence ''would be as though it were not" if there were 
 no specially adapted instruments by which to ''sense it." Thus, a par- 
 ticular form and rate of molecular quiver in the mechanical universe of 
 the physicist is sensed as color by the mind through the special optical 
 end-organ; and in this view the retina of the eye finds its sole meaning 
 as an avenue of ingress of light impressions. In the second view the 
 mind as a self -active entity realizes itself progressively in a body struc- 
 ture. It grows with its body form; each experience of the uaified self 
 enlarges and reforms both the body and the mind; and the human being 
 as a body-mind structure is evolved through cumulative experiences. 
 In this second view the mind is what it is only in its bodily fo^m; and all 
 its conscious events are thus bodily conditioned. 
 
 The study of Psychology presupposes a general knowledge of the 
 human body, its organic structure and functioning. While it is cus- 
 tomary to pad out a textbook on Psychology with a chapter on the anat- 
 omy of the nervous system, such matter is as foreign to the book as a 
 chapter on organic chemistry is in a treatise on Botany. From his pre- 
 vious studies in Physics and Physiology the student of Psychology should 
 have obtained such a knowledge of the phenomena in those fields as to 
 be able to orient his problems in his new subject; but with optical phe- 
 nomena and theories and the histology of nervous tissue he is not here 
 immediately concerned. Whether a monist or a dualist in philosophic 
 theory, his material is strictly the facts of consciousness. 
 
 For the purpose of the psychologist the nervous mechanism may 
 be regarded as a central mass of tissue with radiating threadlike pro- 
 cesses extending to all parts of the body; he should loiow in a general 
 way the anatomy of the brain and spinal cord, the distribution and 
 accepted physiological function of the auxiliary ganglionic centers, the 
 theory of the so-called sympathetic nervous system, the biological con- 
 ception of the neurone elements of the tissue; he should also note the 
 physiologist's classification of nerves as "afferent" and efferent »" the 
 rather hypothetical division of the central brain mass into functional 
 centers, and the common theories of "reflex action. " But as a psyholo- 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 31 
 
 gist he should not take these matters too seriously until he has entered 
 critically into the province of his own science. 
 
 A more interesting histological matter for the psychologist is the 
 particular forms of end-organs of the nerves, especially the peripheral 
 terminations of the "afferent sensor}^ nerves" by which he senses the 
 outer world of physical facts. The tendency of modern biologists and 
 physiological psychologists is to seek a special form of peripheral nerve 
 ending for each particular mode of sensing the material environment, 
 and also a special neuronic center at the inner end of such nerves. 
 
 The theories of the relation of mind and body in human experience 
 deal with a very attractive problem of philosophy, but they lie on the 
 margin of our present field of study. They have, however, been given so 
 large a place in recent psychological literature that the student will 
 find it helpful to distinguish the leading types as a background of his 
 studies. The theory of interaction postulates two distinct substantial 
 entities, the mind and the body, which co-exist in such a manner that 
 each is capable of acting upon the other or of being acted upon by the 
 other. According to this theory the mind as a discrete factor in a dual 
 being influences the body, and the body as a like factor influences the 
 mind. Such casual connection is recognized between the two conceiv- 
 ably independent existences as will enable mind states to produce body 
 states and body states to produce mind states. The theory of parallel- 
 ism asserts that while the mind and the body lie side by side in so intimate 
 relation that each fact of the one is associated with a fact of the other, 
 there is no casual connection between the two parallel series of facts, 
 that is, a fact in neither series can cause a fact in the other. No attempt 
 is made by the advocates of this theory to account for the synchronous 
 variations of the phenomena of the two substances. In its simplest 
 statement it is an agnostic acceptance of the concomitance of parallel 
 lines of phenomena without the responsibility of explanation. A third 
 theory is known as the double-aspect theory, which regards mental phe- 
 nomena and bodily phenomena as distinguishable phases of a single 
 substantial entity. In this view the mind is one aspect of a reality, 
 and the body merely another aspect of the same reality. The casual 
 sequence is viewed neither as two interlacing lines of events or as two 
 relatively independent lines of paired events, but as a single line of events 
 seen from two pomts of view; a mind-body entity produces mind-body 
 phenomena. In addition to the three theories named the student will 
 doubtless note in his reading various others, both dualistic and monistic ; 
 but those instanced here mil serve as types in determining his own in- 
 cipient theory. 
 
 The second and third of the two theories stated above are frequently 
 identified as the same theory: "psychophysical parallelism" is accepted 
 as a loose formulation of what Bain has called the "theory of a double- 
 
32 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 faced unity. '' Both theories are regarded as monistic in contrast to the 
 first strictly duahstic theory of interaction. The student should note 
 that while he is naturally at first inclined to accept the duaJistic theory, 
 the movement of critical thought in our day is toward some form of 
 monism. The phenomenal manifestations of ''mind" and ''body" are 
 accepted as but two aspects of one world experience. In any event, he 
 should know that as a student of Psychology he need give his allegiance 
 to no theory of the philosophical conception of human experience; even 
 in the farthest researches of " Physiological Psychology " one may be loyal 
 to his science and be either a dualist or a monist in his philosophical 
 theory. 
 
 References 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 36-38; Vol. II, pp. 366-369. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 358-363. 
 
 Titchener, Primer of Psychology, pp. 12-18. 
 
 Titchener, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 360-364. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, p. 4. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 34-35. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man, pp. 323, 333. 
 
 MitcheU, Structure and Growth of the Mind, pp. 1-24. 
 
 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 54 et seq. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, pp. 44-45. 
 
 Strong, Why the Mind has a Body, ad lib. 
 
 Bain, Mind and Body, p. 6 et seq. 
 
 Ladd, Physiological Psychology, pp. 633-667. 
 
 Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, p. 208 et seq. 
 
 Ziehen, Introduction to the Study of Physiological Psychology, pp. 299-305. 
 
 14. Three phases of a conscious experience. In his study of 
 human life as revealed in personal consciousness the concrete facts which 
 the psychologist seeks to describe and explain are the relatively discrete 
 experiences which make up each individual life. He follows in his in- 
 vestigations the analytic method of modern science, with the peculiarity — 
 already noted in Section 4 — ^that the analysis of a psychological object 
 is not a separating into parts, but a distinguishing by abstraction of 
 phases of an indissoluble unity. An experience presents in the field of 
 consciousness three well defined phases: self-expressive activity, ac- 
 quisitive growth, and subjective valuing. Every person is immeaiatly 
 aware of these aspects of the events of his life; and it is the primary pur- 
 pose of the psychologist's critical study to give scientific definiteness to 
 these three great categories of mental phenomena. The beginning student 
 should, b}^ repeated introspective analysis of his own experiences, satisfy 
 himself of the validity of this fundamental grouping of mental facts, and 
 thus prepare himself for a more detailed study of psychic phenomena. 
 
 Knowing, feeling, and willing (here named in the conventional order 
 of treatment) are the chapter headings of the three great divisions of 
 any systematic treatise on Psychology. As ''the Intellect," ''the Sen- 
 sibility", and "the Will" they were to the older psychologists groups of 
 faculties, " or "powers of the mind"; and in their expository treatment the 
 mirid was partitioned into three divisions, whose separate functions were 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 33 
 
 subdivided with a logical consistency not warranted by observed facts. 
 In such outlined formulations of the science it was customary, as is still 
 too often the case in modern treatments, to give to the Intellect by far 
 the larger share of consideration, leaving for the other two divisions scant 
 treatment. While he follows the beaten trail, the student should not be 
 misled by this partiality in dealing with the forms of mental life into 
 undervaluing feeling and willing. He should guard himself, at least 
 until he has acquired some facility in introspection, against giving the 
 cognitive aspect of his life any priority either in genesis or importance. 
 Life is much more than knowing; and each experience may be viewed with 
 equal profit from the side of its activity, its possession of its environment, 
 or its appreciative valuing. 
 
 Aristotle's division of conscious life into knowing and willing was 
 accepted almost unquestioned for more than two thousand years. Feel- 
 ing was regarded as a vague form of knowing. In the eighteenth century 
 the German psychologists differentiated the feeling phase of consciousness ; 
 and Emmanuel Kant gave authoritative expression to the present tri- 
 partite view of mind as intellect, sensibility and will. Rousseau's empha- 
 sis upon the feeling phase of experience contributed much to the accept- 
 ance of this new scheme of mental faculties. While the English psycholo- 
 gists were ^slow to accept the classification of Kant, it was more readily 
 accepted upon the continent and it has now universally superseded the 
 earlier bipartite division. All attempts to derive these three aspects 
 from a single root function of the mind, as from the will or the sensibility, 
 have proved unsuccessful. 
 
 The present three-fold classification of mental processes gives a very 
 satisfactory working hypothesis, probably as consistent as the atomic 
 theory of matter in Chemistry; but it need not be regarded as the final 
 word by the well equipped research student. One of the most notable 
 attempts to discover another basis for the functional analysis of psychoses 
 is that of Professor Royce, in his Outline of Psychology. 
 
 References 
 
 Judd, Psychology, p. 66 et seq. 
 
 Bain, Mental Science, pp. 2-3. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 52-55. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 35-41. 
 
 Dewej", Psychology, pp. 15-25. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 18-22. 
 
 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 87-100. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, Vol. I, p. 59 et seq. Vol. II, pp. 327-329. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 56-70. 
 
 King, Rational Living, pp. 106-110. 
 
34 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Chapter V — Cognition 
 
 15. Cognitive growth. A human life is a growth, presenting the 
 two aspects of all biological growth: enlargement and organization. 
 This is true not only of the mind-body organism as a unified whole ; it is 
 equally true of the mind and the body separately as they are distinguished 
 in common thought and in analytic science. The growing mind, abstract- 
 ed for the purposes of science from its bodily concomitant, is enlarged by 
 increasing its knowledge content and organized by the expressive recon- 
 struction of itself in its experiences. The mind grows larger through the 
 accumulation of knowledge; and it grows better in organic structure 
 through its self-realizing activities. 
 
 The term "larger" as here used should not suggest increase in vol- 
 ume, of a material space-filling entity. It signifies merely greater abund- 
 ance of qualities and resources, as when one through the cumulative 
 character of experiencing is said to realize " Si larger life." 
 
 The process of enlarging a mind by increasing its knowledge is known 
 as "cognition" Cognition, as one of the three primary coordinate phases 
 of mental life, is found in every experience, that is, there is no experience 
 that does not add to the knowledge content of life. 
 
 Cognition (from cognosco, to know) comprises the entire knowing 
 aspect of consciousness, the mind's awareness of objective content. It 
 is a common error, due doubtlessly to the artificial partitioning of the 
 mental structure into ''faculties, " to restrict the term to the presentative 
 elements of knowing, excluding the elaborative movements of Judgment 
 and reasoning; but a consistent classification of mental functions natur- 
 ally segregates in one group all those aspects of mental life whose dominant 
 characteristic is satisfying interest in ''objects," and the term "object" 
 designates as truly the demonstration of a geometric theorem as the 
 finding of a dime in the street. "Thinking", in all its forms, is as truly 
 cognitive as is "sense perception." 
 
 Cognition is conditioned fundamentally upon a relation existing 
 between states of consciousness and external reality. It is always object- 
 seeking; and in its elementary forms it is a grasping of an outer trans- 
 subjective world of reals by means of the bodily sense-organs. "In its 
 higher forms in which the more complex elaborative processes of thinking 
 supersede the mere sensing of the environment, it is still essentially an 
 awareness of an object as distinguished from the knowing mind itself. 
 There is no cognition that does not deal with objects in the field of con- 
 sciousness. Cognition is a true life process, and it is, consequently, never 
 a passive receiving of impressions from the environment; it is funda- 
 mentally an active seeking of life materials that may be utilized in the 
 growing mental entity. It should be noted, however, that there is no 
 merely "perceptive cognition;" there is always a constructive building 
 side to even the most elementary form of sense- impression. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 35 
 
 Cognition is essentially conscious, that is, there is no such thing as 
 ^'unconscious knowdng. " While the human organism is continually ad- 
 justing itself to its environment in thousands of activities in which there 
 is no immediate awareness, psychologists restrict the term "cognition" 
 to those adjustments which are given in consciousness. Cognition is 
 conscious mental growth. 
 
 A beginner in Psychology needs to guard himself against miscon- 
 ception regarding the nature of '' knowledge. " Knowledge is not a pro- 
 duct, but a process; it is not a static result of cognition, but it is cognition 
 itself. It is a dynamic process both in its simplest perceptional form and 
 in its most highly elaborated forms of reasoning. One's knowledge is 
 not something that he has, something "stored up" in some wslj in a sort 
 of mental granary, something conceived to have a kina of separate exis- 
 tence apart from himself as its possessor and user; his knowledge is him- 
 self, and it has its existence only in the actual processes of his growing 
 life. Knowledge is the knowing phase of the mind and is identical with 
 cognition. 
 
 The question of the ultimate nature of knowledge, as dependent upon 
 the reality of the external world ana of the means by which the indi- 
 vidual mind is able to relate it to itself, belongs properly to the episte- 
 mologist. As students of Psychology it is enough for us to know that we 
 do know; and we may profitably confine our study to the processes of 
 knowing as we find them given in our own consciousnesses. 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Outline of Descriptive Psychology, po. 308-311. 
 
 Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 98-100. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 216-220. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 15, 81-84, 156-157. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 56-59. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 80. 
 
 Bowen, Hamilton's Metaphysics, pp. 268-272, 276. 
 
 16. Knowing an external object. Considered as the reaction of 
 the mind to the stimulating touch of its environment, the intellectual 
 process by which an external object is apprehended exhibits the follow- 
 ing details: (1) an impression (physical or chemical) upon the body 
 mechanism; (2) a vague blanket affecting of the mind corresponding to 
 the disturbed state of the body; (3) an attentive focalizing of conscious- 
 ness in this new mental state; (4) a localizing of the focalized mental 
 state, in a particular sense-organ; (5) a perceiving in the sense-organ of 
 the knowledge elements corresponding to the stimulus; and (6) an ap- 
 perceptive evaluating of these sensation elements in the life structure 
 built up by previous experiencing. This gives us the following simple 
 outline of 
 
 The Knowing Process: 
 
 1. Impression on the nervous mechanism, 
 
 2. Sensation continuum. 
 
36 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 3. Attention, 
 
 4. Sensation, 
 
 5. Perception, 
 
 6. Apperception. 
 
 Of these the first is rather a condition of the knowing than a part 
 of the process itself. It may be regarded as a change wrought in the 
 body medium through which the mind grasps the material world, and not 
 as an immediate affair of the mind. It is, thus considered, merel}^ the 
 effect of the causal action of some form of molecular vibration in the ex- 
 ternal material world upon the no less material body. 
 
 In its nascent stage a knowing process is a nebulous, undefined mental 
 state, vaguely given in consciousness as more of a feeling tone than a 
 cognitive fact. It is a true "sensation continuum," a sort of mental 
 protoplasm out of which sensation elements are formed. By centering 
 the conscious life in the blanket disturbance of the mental continuum 
 occasioned by the impression on the nervous substance, the developing 
 process is localized in a particular sense-organ, and the ''.sensation con- 
 tinuum" is converted into ''sensations." Sensations are elemental 
 mental processes that are given quality and intensity by being associated 
 with particular end-organs of the nervous system. In "perception" 
 these elemental factors are given objective reality as constructs in space 
 and time — are attributed to the outer world as qualities of the physical 
 objects acting upon the nerve end-organ. Perception identifies the 
 psychic elements with the physical phenomena which give rise to them. 
 In "apperception" the perceptions of external phenomena are inter- 
 preted in terms of the existing results of previous experiences. The new 
 conscious material is taken up into the mental structure through its re- 
 lationships to material already there. Apperception is a species of 
 mental assimilation by which the new perceptions find a place in the 
 growing conscious life. The process of knowing an external object is 
 completed in apperception, which gives conceptual meaning to the per- 
 ceived attributes. 
 
 In this brief tentative description of the process of knowing an object 
 presented to the conscious life through the sense-organs, given here in 
 anticipation of a more detailed statement in subsequent sections, there 
 are two serious sources of misapprehension: first, it appears to imply 
 a succession of steps in time; and second, it appears to find the origin 
 of knowing in the action of the material outer world upon the mind through 
 the medium of the body. 
 
 The six detailed items given above do not constitute a succession of 
 steps in a time series, that is, the impression on the body does not pre- 
 cede in time the sensation state of the mind, and so throughout the list 
 of elements. These six items are but distinguishable aspects of a single 
 process, which may be abstracted for critical study, after the manner of 
 all psychological analysis. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 37 
 
 Knowing is essentially mental activity, both in its origin and in its 
 development; it starts in the mind's reaching outward for larger life in 
 possessing itself of its environment. The mind finds its environment 
 through the medium of its body; it is not passively awakened by the 
 environment. The branching nerves of the body structure with their 
 sensitive end-organs hungrily seek for life materials, just as the tentacles 
 of the medusa explore its environment for food. 
 
 References 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 27-34, 159. 
 
 Stout, I\Ianual of Psychologj', pp. 117-124. 
 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, pp. 70-73. 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, pp. 32-34. 
 
 Buell, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 91, 94-95, 97-98. 
 
 17. The three aspects of cognition. Cognition, as the entire 
 knowledge phase of personal life, has three clearly distinguishable forms, 
 or aspects: presentative, representative, and elaborative. These forms 
 of cognition are not separate processes or modes of conscious activity 
 that may exist independently of each other; there can be no presentative 
 cognition that does not involve representation and elaboration, and 
 similarly of each of the others. 
 
 Once more the student should note that the analysis of a psychic 
 fact is not a partition, but a discrimination of aspects. While a knowing 
 process may be viewed as a presentation, a representation, or an elabora- 
 tion, it is in every case all of these. 
 
 References 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 80-81. 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 137-138. 
 Roark, Psychology in Education, pp. 67, 79, 98. 
 Snyder, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, pp. 54-59. 
 Baker, Elementary Psycholog>^, pp. 52-57, 73-77, 108-112. 
 
 Presentative Knowing. 
 
 18. Presentative t^hase of cognition. Presentative knowing, 
 or '' simple apprehension," depends upon the relation of the knowing 
 mind to the objects of knowledge. It is an acquisitive process, enlarging 
 life by bringing to it elemental knowledge materials. The active mind 
 grasps the phenomena of its material environment through, the medium 
 of the body mechanism. It presents the outer world before itself in con- 
 sciousness, and thus constantly lengthens the radius of its sphere; it 
 finds its larger self in this conquest over the surrounding world of facts. 
 It presents to itself, or before itself, the physical world by presenting in 
 itself facts of its otvti activities and states. Presentative cognition in- 
 cludes Sensation and Perception, as the subjective and objective phases 
 of the process. 
 
 The presentative aspect of cognition is characterized by the bring- 
 ing to notice of a definite object of knowledge; it presents (brings before, 
 prae-esse^ to be before) to consciousness a state of mind originating 
 primarily in the bodily contact with the material environment. In 
 
38 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 presentative knowing a mental state becomes present in consciousenss, 
 
 and thus becomes an ''object of knowledge." The student should note 
 
 that it is not the material object of the outer world that is presented in 
 
 consciousness, but the state of the mind. Presentation is a modification 
 
 of consciousness, and the object cognitively "presented" is a state of the 
 
 mind itself. 
 
 References 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 80-81. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, p. 63, note. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. I, p. 47. 
 
 Baker, Elementary Psychology, p. 52. 
 
 Bowens, Hamilton's Metaphysics, p. 268 et seq. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 231. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, Index. 
 
 Morgan, Psychology for Teachers, pp. 12, 66. 
 
 19. Sensation. Sensation is a primar}^ state of consciousness, 
 originating in the relation of the mind to its material environment and 
 furnishing the means from the side of the mind by which the persona^ life 
 relates itself to its surroundings. " Sensation is the common ground upon 
 which the self and the non-self come together." All knowledge has its 
 origin in sensation; 'Hhere is nothing in the mind that is not first in the 
 senses." While it is convenient to speak of sensation as "a state of 
 consciousness," it must be understood that all "states" of consciousness 
 are active, rather activities. Sensitiveness to environment, or using the 
 term of more significance sensation '\^ an essential characteristic of mind; 
 in its present state as embodied spirit mind is actively alive to all the 
 world about it, finding its life in its lowest terms in sensation. 
 
 20. What sensations are. Sensations are the elements of conscious 
 life, the rudimentary forms of all cognition of the external world. As 
 mental activities they originate in impressions made upon the outer ends 
 of the sensory nerves by the material environment of the body. They 
 are the materials out of which the higher forms of thought and feeling are 
 elaborated. "Sensations are not knowledge any more than wool is cloth; 
 they are the raw material out of which knowledge is slowly spun." — 
 Halleck. 
 
 Three components are distinguishable in the process of knowing the 
 material environment : the active mind, the body medium, and the physi- 
 cal stimulus. From the side of the mind as it seeks self-realization, it 
 may be said to 'find the physical object in a state of the body organ'; 
 or from the side of the material environment as it impinges upon the 
 sensitive end-organ of the body, it may be said to 'cause the mental 
 state'. In either view the fact is the same, the states or processes of the 
 mind associated with states or processes of the body in particular nerve 
 structures and conditioned upon contact with physical objects aiC the 
 ultimate elements of all conscious life. Titchener's definition of a sensa- 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 39 
 
 tion (with slight verbal alteration) is the best: '^ A sensation is an ele- 
 mental conscious process connected with a body process in a particular 
 body organ." 
 
 While it is convenient for the purposes of scientific explanation to 
 recognize the material stimulant and the bodily state as constituents in 
 the knowing process, it should be understood that a sensation is purely 
 a psychic fact ; it is a fact of conscious life manifested in the body structure 
 in its relation to its material environment. 
 
 In opposition to the view that all conscious life is elaborated out of 
 sensations, some, notably the Scotch philosophers of a generation ago, 
 have held that certain fundamental concepts are given directly to the 
 mind by ''intuition". In this use of the term intuition (note that it has 
 another use also) it denotes a "power of the mind which gives us ideas 
 and truths not furnished by the senses, nor elaborated by the understand- 
 ing". Among the knowledge thought to be obtained thus are the con- 
 cepts of space and time. Modern psychologists generally reject this 
 view^, maintaining that all such ideas are empirically built up through 
 experience of the material world in the medium of the body. 
 
 The student should note that while we speak here of sensations as 
 cognitive elements merely, they are the elements of all phases of conscious 
 life, including its affections and volitions as well as its cognitions. Sensa- 
 tions are related to experiences in the analytic study of the psychologist 
 as elements are to compounds in the study of Chemistry; both chemical 
 elements and psychic elements (sensations) are, however, to be regarded 
 as artificial abstractions for the purposes of the sciences, rather than real 
 entities. 
 
 References 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 27-46. 
 
 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 39-45. 
 
 Ladd, Outline of Descriptive Psychology, p. 168 et seq. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, p.' 206. 
 
 Kulpe, Outline of Psychology, p. 29. 
 
 21. Kinds of sensations. Sensations are classified naturally 
 according to the sense-organs employed as Visual Sensations, Auditory 
 Sensations, etc. It is a tenet of modern Biology, accepted alike by phys- 
 iologists and psychologists, that each distinguishable life movement has 
 its special form of nerve ending; thus, the retina of the eye is a nerve end 
 specially fitted for sensing the vibratory movements of matter known to 
 the physicist as light, and so of each of the other "special sense organs. 
 The sense organs sort out the various forms of molecular stimulations 
 and give endless kaleidoscopic variety to the elements of mental structure. 
 
 Visual Sensations are mental processes associated with body processes 
 in the peripheral ending of the optic nerve, that is, they are conscious 
 states localized in the retina. The cognitive phase of these sensations 
 gives perceptions of "brightness" and "color." Many interesting de- 
 tails have been worked out experimentally concerning these two sub- 
 classes of visual sensations; but in general such studies are matters of 
 
40 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Physics and Physiology rather than Psychology. The dependence of 
 brightness and color upon mixed and pure light or complementary color 
 relations is of only incidental interest to the student of Psychology, whose 
 special field of investigation is consciousness. 
 
 Auditory Sensations originate in the stimulation of the peripheral 
 end of the auditory nerves by molecular vibrations. Sounds, as psychic 
 facts, are distinguished as 'Hones" and "noises," corresponding roughly 
 to the distinction of ''colors" and "brightnesses" in eye sensations. 
 
 Other sensation elements, dependmg for their aistinction upon an 
 imperfectly known variation in nerve endings, are Olfactory, Gustatory, 
 Tactile, Thermal, etc. While many interesting problems relating to the 
 various kinds of sensations are invesigated in " Physiological Psychology, 
 a list of the arbitrarily distinguished kinds of sensation elements is of 
 little value to the student of general Psychology. For our present pur- 
 poses it is sufficient to know that there is a growing tendency to add to 
 the conventionally accepted "five senses" other forms of "special senses". 
 Doubtless the discrimination of kinds of sense elements is as limitless as 
 the discovery of new "elements" by the research students of Chemistry; 
 but it may be questioned whether there is not in both cases an unwarran- 
 ted divorcing of states that are not essentially dissimilar. 
 
 Physiologists and psychologists generally distinguish between sensa- 
 tions originating in the periphery of the body mechanism in the stimu- 
 lation of nerves from without and the so-called "organic sensations" 
 originating in states of the body in its internal structure. While such a 
 classification of sensations may, in our limited knowledge of the facts, 
 be convenient for the purposes of description and explanation, it can never 
 be a definite one. Every impression made upon a particular organ of the 
 body with its consequent mental disturbance of consciousness as a whole 
 and probably every organic affection of the whole organism may be localiz- 
 ed in particular structures. 
 
 The attempts by some psychologists to discover a common ground for 
 the various senses, a primordial sense out of which they have been func- 
 tionally differentiated, have much the same theoretical interest for be- 
 ginning students as the similar attempts in the field of Chemistry to re- 
 duce the eighty-odd elements to a single element in distinguishable 
 forms. "Attempts at unifying the senses have been chiefly made in two 
 quarters. Spencer assumes a primitive shock as the origin of all sense 
 systems; while Horwicz traces every primary or secondary system back 
 to the primitive sense of pain." — Spiller. . 
 
 The human race have developed the end organs of the optic nerves 
 through their functional use to such a degree of perfection and to such 
 a primacy among the means of intellectual life that the race may truly 
 be said to be "eye minded." The perfection of written language as a 
 means of cognitive gro^vth doubtless contributes much to this exaltation 
 of seeing as a mode of living. Hearing ranks next to seeing in the per- 
 fection of the senses, the gamut of tones comparing very favorably with 
 the spectrum of colors. All the other possible modes of sensing the 
 material environment are undervalued in the partiality for seeing and 
 hearing. Proper cultivation of the sense of touch would doubtless add 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 41 
 
 largely to the volume and grace of human life; and tasting and smelling 
 are certainly worthy as means of life of more consideration than they re- 
 ceive. A gamut of tastes may in a more highly developed human Ufe of 
 the future supersede the unscientific conventional ''sweet, bitter, acid 
 and salt," or ''pleasant and unpleasant." Smelling, the scullion the 
 household of the senses, but awaits the wand of the fairy godmother of a 
 more critical age to take her true place among her sisters. 
 
 References 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 129-136. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 50-80. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 55-200. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp' 134-198. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 136-142. 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, pp. 41-61. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, pp. 34-43. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 91-113. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 87-103, 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man, pp. 50-58. 
 
 22. Threshold of sensation. When the psychological activity due 
 to the stimulation of a sensory end-organ is just sufficient to claim con- 
 scious attention the sensory state is said to be "at the threshold." 
 The "threshold of sensation" is thus the line of demarkation between 
 conscious and unconscious relation to the effect of the stimulating touch 
 of the phj^sical environment. It is the state of mental disturbance, due 
 to the impression of the physical object upon the peripheral end of a 
 sensory nerve, when the stimulation is just sufficient to give rise to con- 
 scious adjustment. 
 
 Sensations vary in intensity with variations in the stimuli, the 
 stronger stimulus generally giving rise to the more intense sensation. A 
 very weak stimulus, while it doubtless affects the general tone of the 
 mental life, does not so focus attention upon the disturbance as to give 
 content to consciousness. There appears to be a kind of inertia in the 
 material nerve structure, in overcoming which a portion of the molecular 
 irritation is expended, with a consequent impeding of the mind's cogni- 
 tive apprehension of physical objects. There are doubtless innumerable 
 modifications of the mental structure, originating in the impigning of 
 the environment upon the body structure, in which there is no conscious- 
 ness ; it is only when the ringing of the body doorbell, as it might be called, 
 is insistent enough to secure attention that the sensory state claims an 
 audience in the forum of consciousness. Bowne says, "Consciousness is 
 something which results from psychical activity when it reaches a certain 
 degree of intensity, called the "threshold". 
 
 The threshold of sensation has also been called the "threshold of 
 consciousness," "threshold of excitation," "threshold of impressionabili- 
 ty", "threshold of awareness, " etc. ; and it is uncritically applied to either 
 
42 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 the degree of the stimulus or the degree of the mental state, though . 
 strictly it designates a just noticeable degree of sensation. 
 
 References 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, pp. 87-88. 
 
 Villa, Contemporary Psychology, pp. 143-146, 296. 
 
 McKendrick and Snodgrass, Psychology of the Senses, p. 37. 
 
 Jastrow, The Subconscious, pp. 413-418. 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, pp. 35-41. 
 
 Witmer, Analytical Psychology, pp. 25-26. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man, pp. 47-49. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 201-224. 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 267-268. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 534-549. 
 
 23. Quantity of sensations. An attempt to work out a mathe- 
 matical relation between amounts of stimulus and amounts of sensation 
 led to the formulation of the ''Weber-Fechner Law," the first great law 
 of psychophysics, discovered by Weber but given definite formulation by 
 Fechner. The basic idea in this law is that "the intensity of a sensation 
 is a function of the intensity of its stimulus. " The formal statement is, 
 "Sensations increase in arithmetic progression as their stimuli increase 
 in geometric progression", or "Sensations vary as the logarthms of their 
 stimuli." 
 
 This law is based upon the assumptions (1) that mental states are 
 measurable and (2) that the differences in amounts of a particular sensa- 
 tion are constant units. The first assumption is thought to be demanded 
 by the requirement of positive science that all exact study of data result 
 in mathematical formulation of laws, hence sensations must be dealt 
 with mathematically in some system or other. The second assumption, 
 that just noticeable differences in the intensity of a sensation are uniform, 
 that is, starting with a conscious sensation state and increasing it until 
 it is perceptibly "more", and again until it is "more," and so on through 
 a series of perceptibly different states, quantitative steps from state to 
 state are mathematically equal. There is probably also a third assump- 
 tion in the minds of most who recognize this law, though not essential to 
 it, that there is a true causal connection between the physical stimulus 
 and the psychic state, that is, that the stimulus "causes" the sensation 
 and that there is a consequent necessarj^ mathematical relation between 
 the varying stimulus and the varying sensation. 
 
 As to the question of "mental measurement" it is well for the be- 
 ginner in psychology to accept the Scotch verdict of "not proved" and 
 to leave the case, for the present at least, as non-suited. Munsterberg 
 denies strenuousl}^ that there can be any quantitative dealing with psy- 
 chic facts, asserting that "the psychic series is purely qualitative." 
 
 Further, if the first assumption be granted, it is still to be shown that 
 sensations increase by regular unit steps. This is not only not proved 
 but introspection appears to be incapable of offering any evidence in the 
 case. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 43 
 
 To assume, in the third place, that mental states are "caused" is 
 to deny spontaneity in mental action, introducing into the field of Psy- 
 chology an abstraction from the field of Physics and making all spiritual 
 life mechanical. 
 
 This law, which is of doubtful validity and certainly of little inter- 
 est to the beginning student in General Psychology, is often heralded 
 as the great charter of ''psj^chophysics, " marking the ''beginning of 
 scientific Psychology." Thus Titchener in his Textbook of Psychology 
 page 223, finds in it the prophesy of a mathematical Psychology. He 
 says: "Indeed, while little has been done in comparison with what .still 
 remains to do, there is no doubt that, in principle, ever}^ single problem 
 that can now be set in Psychology may be set in quantitative form. The 
 psychological textbooks of the next century will be as full of formulas as 
 the textbooks of Phj^sics are today.'' On the other hand, Munsterberg 
 says, "A mathematical psychology is impossible"; and he regards the 
 law as " dealing wdth physiological facts only. " See also James's estimate 
 of the value of this law in the first volume of his Principles of Psychology, 
 page 549 and preceding discussion. 
 
 References 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 215-223. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 199-209. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 143-145. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 533-549. 
 
 James, Briefer Com-se in Psychology, pp. 16-24. 
 
 SpiUer, Mind of Man, pp. 31-34. 
 
 Witmer, Analytical Psychology, pp. 204-218. 
 
 Sanford, Expermiental Psychology, pp. 333-362. 
 
 I<add, Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 356-381. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 136-140. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 128-130. 
 
 Myers, Textbook in Experimental Psychology, pp. 201-255. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 281-287. 
 
 Ribot, German Psychology of Today, pp. 134-187. 
 
 Villa, Contemporary Psychology, pp. 137-152. 
 
 24. Localizing sensations in the body structure. Sensations 
 are consciously localized in particular parts of the body, — are referred to 
 particular end-organs in which they originate, — are given nativity in 
 definite regions of the body world. The differential quality of a sensation 
 by virtue of which ii: is localized in the process of preception is called its 
 "local sign". "By a local sign is understood that peculiar coloring of 
 a sensation which depends, not on the outer object as such, but on the 
 direction of its attack against the periphery of the sensory nerves." 
 — Lindner. "Local signature is that differential quality of a sensation 
 which varies with the part of the sensitive surface stimulated and not with 
 the nature of the stimulus. " — Stout. The local sign is the characteristic 
 of a sensation by which the unified self localizes it in that part of its body 
 structure in which it originates, and thus in perception projects it outward 
 to its physical excitant in the material environment. 
 
 James, with his usual clearness and consistent loyalty to Psychology 
 in its own field, makes an effective protest against cumbering the concep- 
 
44 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 tion of the "local sign" with theories of space perception. The existence 
 of a peculiar quality of a sensation by virtue of which it is associated with 
 a local affection of the body is not primarily a matter of space, and it 
 may be accepted by the student as a sort of local stamp or organ signature 
 which gives it value in the constructive life movement. While it is 
 ''where" in the body, it is ''what" in the mind. 
 
 While the local sign of a sensation is in general sufficiently definite 
 to cause a ready reference of the mental state to the organ stimulated, 
 it is by no means uncommon for a second, or "concomitant sensation," 
 to originate in the same stimulation, that is, two sensations accompany 
 the impression made upon one end-organ, one referred directly to "the 
 region affected and the other to some other region or organ. The most 
 common forms of this " synaesthesia " are known as "photism" and 
 "phonism". They are an interesting subject of psychological inquiry 
 as yet but little understood. 
 
 References 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, pp. 68-70. 
 
 Titchcner, Outline of Psychology, pp. 167-169. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 194-200. 
 
 Ribot, German Psychology of Today, pp. 68-95. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 332. . 
 
 Ladd, OutUne of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 179-181. 
 
 Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 386-387, 396-398. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, p. 50. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 155-166. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 116. 
 
 Hoffding, Outhnes of Psychology, p. 200. 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, p. 359. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, p. 147. 
 
 Buell, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 74-76. 
 
 Sanford, Experimental Psychology, pp. 1-2. 
 
 Witmer, Analytical Psychology, pp. 110-113. 
 
 Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. 
 
 25. Centrally aroused sensations. Two modes of origin of sen- 
 sations may be distinguished: the action of external stimuli upon the 
 peripheral end-organs of the nervous system, and internal stimuli acting, 
 as exciting causes operating directly upon cortical areas of the brain 
 Titchener says, "Sensations may be aroused centrally as well as peripher- 
 ally," and "they are just as much sensations in the former case as in the 
 latter." Again he says, "Sensations arise in two ways: from peripheral 
 stimulation (flash of yellow hght) and from central excitation (remem- 
 brance or imagination of yellow)"; and "a remembered 'yellow' and a 
 seen 'yellow' are just the same as sensations, as 'yellows'." To get the 
 full significance of these statements of Professor Titchener we must bear 
 in mind his definition of sensations, "Sensations are those elemental 
 conscious processes which are connected with bodily processes in definite 
 bodily organs." This certainly means that when one sees a dandelion 
 in imagination he uses the retina in a similar wa^^ to his use of it when he 
 sees it in the direct stimulation of the physical light vibrations, though 
 Titchener says, "the bodily processes connected with the remembered 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 45 
 
 yellow and the imagined cold are central only^ not peripheral." How- 
 ever, if we accept the slogan of modern psychology, ''no psychosis without 
 neurosis," and the conception of sensations as those elemental conscious 
 states into which all cognitive processes can in ultimate analysis be re- 
 solved, we are constrained to believe that the ear, as the peripheral ter- 
 mination of the auditory nerve, is employed in remembering a strain 
 of music in a way quite similar, if not identical, to the way in which it 
 is emploj'^d in hearing the strain from physical sound vibrations outside 
 the body. Certainly in imaging in reproductive imagination the odor of 
 concord grapes, close attention to the process ^ill discover on its body 
 side a sniffing like that in actively smelling the grapes held in the hand. 
 
 Sensations are classified by Hy slop in his Syllabus of Psychology in two 
 great classes with their subdivisions as follows: 1. Peripheral sensations, 
 those initiated by stimuli external to the sensorium, though not necessari- 
 ly to the body, including (a) Epi-peripheral sensations which originate 
 on the external surface of the body, and (b) Ento-peripheral sensations 
 which originate at points on the internal surface of the body; 2. Central 
 sensations, those originating in general unlocalized body states or in 
 mental activities spontaneously initiated, including (a) General vital 
 feelings of vigor or depression, etc., (b) After images in the continuation 
 of the sensation after the stimulus has been removed, (c) Dreams as re- 
 productions of images and feelings not directly tracable to external stimu- 
 lation of the nervous mechanism, (d) Hallucinations in persistent re- 
 production of images from central abnormal states, and (e) Deliria in 
 images and feelings due to diseased states or artificial stimulants. While 
 this classification is somewhat artificial and not strictly psychological, 
 it is quite suggestive. The real question is. Do some sensations originate 
 in states of the boay and others originate in activities of the mind? The 
 philosophical questions of the spontaneity of the mind and the inter- 
 action of mind and body are involved here. 
 
 Is the fact that a. person without retinal endings of the optic nerves, 
 as through surgical extirpation of the eyeballs after experience with 
 perfect eyes had given him color concepts, can see the colors in his im- 
 agination satisfactory proof that all remembered sensations are limited 
 on their physiological side to the brain cortex? Do the stumps of the 
 nerves still participate in the "seeing" process? What is the psycho- 
 logical explanation of the itching in the toes of an amputated limb? 
 
 Stout denies the name ''sensation" to elemental mental states in 
 memory because they differ in some important respects from similar 
 states originating in physical excitation of peripheral end-organs; but 
 are not the points of similarity in such states to what are called "sensa- 
 tions proper" sufficient to justify us in including them in the same class? 
 It should not be forgotten that "sensations" in modern Psychology are 
 abstractions apparently necessitated by the analytical study of a mental 
 structure. They are the simplest conceivable aspects of life, involving 
 both mental activity and concomitant bodily states. The mind works 
 in the body, and for the purposes of the psychologist the space distinction 
 between the outer and the inner end of a nerve is unimportant. 
 
46 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 The ability to produce definite bodily states at will is doubtless to 
 prove a rich field for experimental study for careful unprejudiced inves- 
 tigators. Dr. John Hunter, the great prophet of modern medicine, said 
 two generations ago, ^'I am confident that I can fix my attention to any 
 part until I have a sensation in that part; " and a later eminent American 
 physician, D. Hack Tuke, said, "There is no sensation, whether general 
 or special, excited by agents acting upon the body from without which 
 cannot be excited also from within by emotional states affecting the 
 sensory centers, such sensations being referred by the mind to the point 
 at which the nerves terminate in the body." 
 
 References 
 
 Titchener, Outline of Psychology, pp. 36, 108, 131-132. 
 
 Titchener, Primer of Psychology, pp. 95-96. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 95. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, pp. 33-34. 
 
 Halleck, Education of the Central Nervous System, pp. 213-214. 
 
 Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, p. 37. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 119-120. 
 
 Shoup, Mechanism and Personality, p. 86. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 169-224. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 42-43. 
 
 Gordy, New Psychology, pp. 166-171. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 68-75. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 310-311. 
 
 26. Nature of perception. Perception is direct apprehension of 
 the external world in the senses. It is the process of taking the outer 
 world to one's self through the organs of sense; and since it is immediate 
 kno^ving of the 'Hhings" of the material environment, it has been called 
 "thing-knowledge." Experience begins in the mind's conscious relation 
 to some thing; with Kant an act of perceptual knowledge was purely a 
 conscious relation between an individual mind and an individual object^ 
 that is, perception gives direct knowledge of discrete things. In per- 
 ception we may discriminate the apparently paradoxical dual process 
 of setting objects of sense apart from ourselves an*d at the same time of 
 uniting them to ourselves. The "world of things" is given in perception 
 separate objective existence and is also made an inseparable part of our 
 own existence as a perceiving subject. We project the thing from us 
 while grasping it back to us, as a child plays with a return-ball toy. Per- 
 ception thus creates a world of objects out of a world of conscious states. 
 
 Without entering into the general question of the theory of know- 
 ledge the student may accept in his theory of perception an actually 
 present world of separate things distinct from himself as a knowing mind, 
 which things he is able to unite with himself in a process of growth. He 
 should look upon perception as a constructive appropriation of life ma- 
 terials from an external world of real distinct objects. 
 
 References 
 
 ^^'ard, Article in Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
 
 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 253-268. 
 
 Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 382-419. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 47 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 89-95, 318-322. 
 
 Ladd, Outlines of Descriptive Psvchology, pp. 58-60, 168-173. 
 
 Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, pp. 148-149, 224-227, 250-251. 
 
 Calkins, Peisistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 423. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychologv, pp. 169-184. 
 
 PoweU, Truth and Error, pp. 226-236. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 82-85, 116-144. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 111-127. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 1-8, 76-81. \ 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 12-16, 312-315. 
 
 Hoffding, Outhnes of Psychology, pp. 101-107, 121-130. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psvchologv, pp. 94-99. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind. Vol. I, pp. 81-82, 206-215. 
 
 Murray, introduction to Psvchology, pp. 139-145. 
 
 Mitchell, Structure and Growth of the Mind, pp. 213-217. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of IMan, pp. 174-175. 
 
 Titchener, Outline of Psychology, pp. 33-36, 158. 
 
 27. Perception distinguished from sensation. The charac- 
 teristic difference between a sensation and a perception is that a sensa- 
 tion is purely a subjective modification of consciousness whereas a per- 
 ception always relates to an object. Sully defines perception as 'Hhe 
 process of localizing sensations and referring them to definite objects." 
 It is in perception that sensations are given meaning and converted into 
 knowledge. Pure sensation, so far as it may be said to exist, is affective 
 rather than cognitive, a state of consciousness due to the action of an 
 external stimulus upon a sense-organ; it is a continuum of feeling tone, 
 rather than a definite cognitive movement; it is a subjective state, which 
 perception converts into awareness of the external object that gives rise 
 to it. In perception sensation elements are built up into presentations 
 of an outer world, which is thus constructively taken possession of as 
 life materials. This "grasping of the outer world through the sense- 
 organs" is a process of growth in which the mind constructs in itself 
 a larger content of knowledge out of primordial sensation states. 
 
 There is a definiteness of life in perception that is not reached in 
 sensation. In sensation the mind accepts impartially the various affec- 
 tions of its substance by the environment impinging upon the end-organs 
 of its bodily concomitant, adjusting itself somewhat passively to the 
 constant augmenting of its current; in perception it selects particular 
 states for use in its own structure, so attending to them as to give them 
 definiteness and permanence in the organic life, and permitting others 
 to fade into the marginal field or to drop below the threshold of conscious ■ 
 ness, never to have value in true cognition. In perception a particular 
 sensation element is attended to, isolated from the general sensation 
 continuum, and presented to the unified consciousness as a determining 
 center of its activities. Perception is thus the beginning of a self- con- 
 trolled gro\\i:h bj' attentive selection of the materials and form of the 
 growth. 
 
48 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 In perception a mental state is identified in terms of the concepts 
 originating in previous experiences. While a sensation state exists 
 without significance in the life current, in perception the sensation of the 
 present is structurally related to the past. The meaning which percep- 
 tion gives to sensation depends upon the revival in consciousness of 
 previous experiential supplements. Perception is a process of interpret- 
 ing sensations -by means of concepts; and it is the memory concept that 
 gives value to the present sensation state. 
 
 Sensations as distinguishable aspects of mental life are purely sub- 
 jective, that is, there is in them no conscious acceptance of an outer 
 world of objects; in perception on the contrary, the individualized sensa- 
 tion is projected outward by means of its ''local sign'' to the world of 
 environing things. Thus, the sensation of yellowness is by perception 
 referred to the dandelion that occasions it, and we say, "The dandelion 
 is yellow." "Local signs" are marks of sensations due to association 
 with particular modifications of end-organs, which cause the mind to 
 project its own states out to the material object sensed. Thus, the 
 "yellow sensation" is known as a "yellow object" in space. 
 
 References 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology/ pp. 68-70. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 1-43, 76-82. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, p. 212. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, pp. 56-59. 
 
 Bowen, Hamilton's Metaphysics, pp. 313-326. 
 
 Angell Psychology, pp. 118-123. 
 
 Royce, Outhnes of Psychology, pp. 119-147. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 83, 111. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 136, 158-161. 
 
 Bain, Mental Science, pp. 27, 197-214, Appendix 94-95. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 81, 156-162. 
 
 Calkins, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 103, 169-184. 
 
 Brooks, Mental Sciencce, pp. 85-98. 
 
 Halleck, Psychology, and Psychic Cultm-e, pp. 59-61, 66-68. 
 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, pp. 70-87. 
 
 Salibsury, Theory of Teaching, pp. 86-92. 
 
 28. The "outer world" as given in perception. The student of 
 General Psychology need not concern himself with the philosophical 
 problem as to whether the apple which I "see" on the plate before me is 
 ''a mere modification of my consciousness or a real existence." For 
 him, at least, the world of matter exists as "si permanent possibility of 
 sensations." He may without compromising his philosophical position 
 admit the reality of the world of 'Hhings," and may limit his theoretical 
 inquiry in this direction to the question of how the thing differs from his 
 idea of it. The thing is perceived directly in the sensations to which 
 it gives rise, and a person knows no more of the world of material things 
 than his organs of sense mediate for him. A ''thing," for the psycholo- 
 gist at least, is not ''a mere group of sensations"; a thing is a fact of the 
 environing world, and sensations are elements of personal experience. 
 The sensation of redness is not to be identified with the molecular motion 
 in the skin of the apple; qualities of the material object and activities 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 49 
 
 of the mind should be sharply distinguished as belonging to two aspects 
 of experience. I perceive the vibrations of the substance of the apple 
 as ''red" and thus find a ''cause" in the outer fact of the material world 
 for the inner fact of my sensation. It is essential to perception that the 
 object known shall stand opposed to the knowing mind. In perception 
 the mind isolates itself from the world of things which it perceives, setting 
 the thing perceived over against itself as an admitted "cause" of its 
 sensation states. To perceive the redness of the apple is to find a cause 
 in the outer world for the sensation originating in my relation to it. 
 
 This admitting of a world of "real things" to be grasped in sense- 
 perception does not commit the psychologist to a dualistic theory of the 
 universe; he may still be a monistic idealist and accept for the purposes 
 of bis science the separation of the known thing from the knowing mind. 
 Psychology, like all other descriptive and explanatory sciences, is not a 
 study of "reality," but of reality as transformed for its special purposes. 
 It hypostatizes a world of real objects separate from the world of knowing 
 minds, and it seeks to explain mental activities as originating in the re- 
 lation of the active minds to these objects. 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 218-220. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 159-162. 
 
 Pearson, Grammar of Science, pp. 47-53. 
 
 Fullerton, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 32-58. 
 
 Bain, Mental Science, pp. 198, 202-214. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 9-13. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, pp. 62-70. 
 
 Krauth-Floming, Vocabulary of Philosophy, under "Matter". 
 
 Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, under "Matter". 
 
 29. Perception a constructive process. A perception is not a 
 mere aggregation of sensations; it is an elaborative building process- 
 Perception is active; in it the mind realizes itself in conscious activity. 
 In perception it centers itself attentively in a chosen mode of action and 
 acquiring experience materials and initiating constructive growth. Thus 
 seeing is not a mere mechanical photographing of physical phenomena; 
 it is an active associative appropriation of life substances. 
 
 In insisting on the active character of perception it is not implied 
 by contrast that sensations are mere passive "states" of consciousness. 
 Sensations also are active. All aspects of mind are active; and there 
 is evidently a possibility of error in Ladd's statement that, "We have 
 sensations; but we perceive objects." It should not be forgotten that 
 perception and sensation are but the objective and the subjective aspects 
 of presentative knowing, and are essentially active processes. 
 
 In direct opposition to this view of the active character of perception 
 see Davis's discussion on pages 94 and 95 of his Elements of Psychology 
 He concludes with these words: "Perception, then, relatively to its ob- 
 jects, is an affection, not an action; a capacity, not a faculty. In it, the 
 mind receives impressions without being able to reject or to modify them; 
 
50 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 it does not act, but is acted on: it does not affect, but is affected. In 
 perception my state is merely receptive; I am strictly passive." 
 
 References 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 65-72. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 246, 255, 263-268. 
 
 Salisbury, Theory of Teaching, pp. 86-92. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 157-158. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 138-140. 
 
 Morgan, Psychology, for Teachers, pp. 93-94, 113-114. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, pp. 118-160. 
 
 Mitchell, Structure and Growth of the Mind, pp. 281 et seq. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 1-2, 76-82. 
 
 Rogers, Modern Philosophy, pp. 242-248. 
 
 Putnam, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 60-62. 
 
 Halleck, Psychology and Psychic Culture, pp. 66-84. 
 
 30. Illusory perception. While we readily accept the opinion that 
 our senses may in general be depended upon to give us a true report of 
 phenomena of the outer world as they affect our nervous substance, we 
 no less readily admit that we often err in perceiving that which does not 
 exist in such phenomena. A sensation state is often the source of illusion 
 in perception. These illusions are of many kinds and are traceable to a 
 great variety of physical, physiological, and psychical facts, as when one 
 sees a straight stick partially submerged in a bowl of water as a bent 
 stick, or hears a tone in the "after sensation" when the "physical sound" 
 has ceased, or sees a ghost in a white stump after listening to "ghost 
 stories". Without concerning himelf with the philosophical question of 
 the "reality of the outer world as separate from the percipient mind", 
 the student may accept the view that these "false perceptions" are as 
 facts of psychic experience true perceptions. Gurney's emphatic state- 
 ment that, "Every psychological phenomenon that takes the character 
 of a sense-impression is a sense-impression" is scientifically exact, that is, 
 what one "sees" he sees in the meaning of psychology, not merely "imag 
 ines that be sees." Perceiving is but interpreting sensation states, and 
 it is not essential to the validity of the process that the source of these 
 states should conform to certain common conventional modes of contact 
 of the body mechanism with its material environment. 
 
 The various forms of "illusory prception" are an interesting field 
 of study, for example, the student may introsepctively Avatch his atti- 
 tude toward his perception in the Aristotle experiment of rolling a small 
 marble between the crossed ends of his first and second fingers. I have 
 myself for years enjoyed questioning my friends about perceiving a gre^n 
 sunset sky as "blue " because the sky is conventionally known to be blue. 
 
 References 
 
 Parish, Hallucinations and Illusions, ad lib. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 85-106, 243-268. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 317-325. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. II, p. 3l2. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 370-375. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 51 
 
 Witmer, Analytical Psychology, Index "Illusions" 
 
 Sanford, Experimental Psychology, Index "Illusions." 
 
 Myers, Textbook of Experimental Psychology, Index "Illusions". 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 295-00. 
 
 Titchener. Primer of Psychology, pp. 115-117. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 192-201. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 132-135. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 413-417. 
 
 Reprensatative Knowing. 
 
 31. Distinguished from presentative knowing. Knowledge 
 as the cognitive aspect of consciousness presents in respect to "time" 
 three phases: (1) of the accepted present, (2) of the recalled past, and (3) 
 of the anticipated future. We "know" with equal validity as facts of 
 personal life what is "here and now", what "has been", and what "may 
 be", that is, the cognitive phase of an experience may be predominantly 
 perceptived, reperceptive, or prepercepfcive. In representative knowirg 
 the life event is given in consciousness as having been experienced before. 
 There is a sense of familiarity or acquaintance with the psychic fact or 
 event which refers it to a prior experience. The recognitive idea is no 
 less an experience of "the immediate present" than an idea in direct 
 apprehension in which the familiarity sense is wholly lacking. Con- 
 sciousness is always of what is "present", but in representative knowing 
 the experience content is placed in a "past" of the life structure. The 
 'been-here-before' feeling is the distinctive mark in all representative 
 knowing. 
 
 The chief difficulty in understanding the nature of representative 
 knowing is due to a naive conception of the objective character of time. 
 Time is not a "thing" in which events are located at intervals with longer 
 or shorter stretches of vacancy between them. Time is but a general 
 view of events, a constructed system of relations in a changing life current. 
 Past, present, and future are but attitudes of personality toward its own 
 events. What we accept is "present"; what we turn from is "past"; 
 what we look toward is "future". 
 
 References 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 80-81, 145-151. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 128-133. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 643-652. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 280-286. 
 
 Shoup, Mechanism and Personality, pp. 116-119. 
 
 Bowen, Hamilton's Metaphysics, pp. 409-411. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 176-180, 188-191 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, pp. 222-228. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 161-162, 184-185. 
 
 Davis, Elements of Psychology, p. 187. 
 
52 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 32. What a memory is. A memory is a cognitive experience in 
 which there is a dominant consciousness of a recreated content. A mem- 
 ory is an event in the life, as real and vital as any event due to a primary 
 reaction to a situation in which the recognitive element is not consciously 
 present. What is known in a memory experience is actually present in 
 consciousness as a new vital movement, not the lifeless bodj^ of a vanished 
 movement. As a mental fact it belongs wholly to the "present" of the 
 life, though it images with more or less fidelity a past experience. View- 
 ed as a bit of personal life, a memory is a resuscitation of a phase or form 
 of the life structure that has temporarily ceased to be. It is "the psychi- 
 cal aspect of the preservation of form in living substance. " To remember 
 is to live again, though the resurrected life is never identical with the 
 former life ; it is always a life of the here-and-now with its own increment 
 of added material. 
 
 In common speech the term "memory" has three rather loosely 
 distinguished meanings; it means the general capacity for keeping some- 
 where and somehow out of consciousness the results of experiences; it 
 means the recurring in consciousness of ideas that have before been facts 
 of personal life ; or it means the static results of former experiences some- 
 how kept and somehow brought back as unaltered objects of cognition. 
 The first and third of these uses have no justification in the science of 
 Psychology. A mind is not a granary in which harvested ideas may be 
 stored; it is a spontaneously active existence, without objective content 
 of "things" of any kind. It is possible to state the second meaning so 
 as to give it scientific validity. A memory is a conscious life process 
 recurring as a vital fact of the structure of the personal self. 
 
 Memory is the connective tissue of character, the essential bond of 
 the inner structure of a personal life. It is the memory image that pre- 
 sents in the imagination what has happened to me, and thus makes possi- 
 ble the progressive building of a life. Ladd says, "Without memory, 
 knowledge of the past would be a meaningless phrase; without know- 
 ledge of the past, through memory, present knowledge both of things and 
 self would be impossible; and growth of knowledge for the individual 
 or the race could not take place. " The art of memory is but the art 
 of constructive thinking, in which all selfhood consists. 
 
 References 
 
 Krauth-Fleming, Handbook of the Philosophical Sciences, ''Memory". 
 
 Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, "Memory". 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 353-354. 
 
 Judd, Psychology, pp. 236-237. 
 
 Scripture, Thinking, Feeling, Doing, p. 239. 
 
 Calkins, Fust Book in Psychology, pp. 115-123. 
 
 Kay, Memory, etc., pp. 1-46. 
 
 Wentzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 184-185. 
 
 Dorpfeld, Thought and Memory, pp. 24-27, 36-38. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 53 
 
 33. Four elements of a memory. In a memory experience four 
 components may be distinguished: (1) preservation of constituents of 
 former experiencing, (2) revival of a past experience structure, (3) recog- 
 nition of the revived experience as such, and (4) referring the revived 
 experience to a past time. It is essential to a memory that there should 
 be ' ' retaining " , " recalling " , " recognizing ' ' , and ' ' localizing in time ' ' 
 These coexist in a memory process as simultaneous aspects. 
 
 34. Retaining the past experiences. By "retention of a past 
 experience'-' we do not mean a process, but merely a possibility of a 
 process — in fact, "retention" is not a factor of the memory experience, 
 but merel}?- a condition of it. James says, "Retention means liability 
 to recall, and it means nothing more than such liability. The only proof 
 of there being retention is that recall actually takes place. The retention 
 of an experience is, in short, but another name for the possibility of 
 thinking it again, or the tendency to think it again, with its past sur- 
 roundings. " As a fact of mental life, retention is the permanent possi- 
 bility of reviving a state that is vanishing or that has vanished from con- 
 sciousness. It is analogous to the "latent force" of the physicist; and it 
 is, at most, but an abiding condition of all memory events. 
 
 The term memory is frequently erroneously used to designate this 
 possibility of keeping, or the actual keeping, of a past event. Even 
 among psychologists the meaning of the term alternates between the 
 preserving and the reproducing of the mental states. A memory is, 
 however, an experience, and the possibility of such a bit of life is no more 
 a part of the experience than the materials used by the carpenter are a 
 part of the process of building the house. The memory is the actual 
 coming-to-be in consciousness of what is greeted as having been before 
 in a more or less definite past. 
 
 The various theories of retention take three principal forms: first, 
 it is thought that each experience "stamps its image" on the brain 
 tissue, that every mental event so alters the body structure as to es- 
 tablish a material basis for its recurrence ; second, "the mind is thought of 
 as a sort of storehouse, or case of pigeon-holes, in which images of past 
 experiences are stored away, like the negatives in a photographer's back- 
 room, to be pulled out as occasion requires"; third, the life activity per- 
 sists in "the ceaseless flow of the subconscious current," to rise into 
 consciousness as germinant centers of definite experiences. The truth 
 would doubtless be expressed by a proper statement of the first and 
 third theories combined; the second may be rejected as wholly irrational. 
 A life is a growing structure of experiences that involve mind and body 
 in an inseparable unity: and the present, conscious and unconscious, 
 contains the whole of the accumulated structure. The absurdity of the 
 second theory is apparent when we consider that there is nothing to keep 
 as a static thing and no place to keep any such dead form of existence. 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 654-676. 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 178-180. 
 
54 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 152-164. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 170. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 186-187. 
 
 Ladd, Outhnes of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 419-424. 
 
 AngeU, Psychology, pp. 188-194. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 254-263. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 76, 435. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 184-187. 
 
 Davis, Elements of Psychology, pp. 189-190. 
 
 Brooks, Mental Science, pp. 129-131. 
 
 35. Reviving a past experience. The fundamental characteristic 
 of a memory is the reviving of a life event, the reproducing in conscious- 
 ness of prior states of ideas and feelings. The past experience is resur- 
 rected from its grave in the brain cells, or raised from a submerged state 
 below the threshold of consciousness, or reenacted in similar form in the 
 habitual flow of mental elements. The revived or resucitated event is 
 not a mere echo of the original bit of life; it is a new experience, recognized 
 in the structural form of the vanished experience. The memory is ac- 
 cepted in the consciousness as a re-presentation, though it has never 
 been in the life current before in exactly its present form. It incorporates 
 elements of knowing and feeling from the past life, so organizing them 
 that the structure has the familiar, been-here-before appearance. It 
 is not its brought-back component elements that makes it a memory, but 
 the familiar form. All conscious processes of life are cumulative, and 
 each new process involves those preceding it; but it is only when the 
 process presents the having-been-before aspect that it is called a memory. 
 
 The reappearance of an idea in consciousness reveals a continuity of 
 mental structure which psychologists have sought to explain by the 
 '^laws of the association of ideas". The presence of one idea in con- 
 sciousness is thought to give rise to another through some form of ''asso- 
 ciation" ^vith it, thus the idea that my room is cold brings into con- 
 sciousness the idea of putting coal in the furnace, through the previous 
 association of these ideas. Critical discrimination of the relations by 
 which ideas suggest other ideas have led to the forinulation of ''laws of 
 association", of which the following are most common: — 
 
 (1) Law of Similarit}^: "Similar concepts reproduce one another." 
 
 (2) Law of Contiguity: "Concepts that have been together tend to 
 
 reappear together. " 
 
 (3) Law of Cause and Effect: "Concepts related as cause and effect 
 
 tend to recall each other." 
 
 Probably no subject of psychology has been discussed with more 
 earnestness and with less scientific clearness than this question of the 
 relation of mental states in the stream of conscious events. The number 
 and the formulation of these so-called laws have varied through more than 
 two thousand years. Aristotle gave formal statement to the laws of 
 "resemblance", "contrast", and contiguity"; and a long list of great 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 55 
 
 thinkers have expended time and effort on the subject. Later writers 
 have sought to reduce all laws to the single law of contiguity, thus Ladd 
 says, ^'All merely mechanical reproduction falls under the principle of 
 contiguit}^". St. Augustine's law of " redintigration " is probably the 
 most notable effort in this direction: ''Objects that have been previously 
 united as parts of a single mental state, tend to recall or suggest one 
 another ". Baldwin makes a very clear statement of this truth in his ''law 
 of correlation": "Every association of mental states is an integration 
 due to the previous correlation of these states in apperception. " 
 
 A fundamental error is revealed in much of the discussion of the 
 'laws of the association of ideas". There is evident an attempt to dis- 
 cover a linkage between two ideas as objective static existences, that is 
 ideas are believed to cohere in some mechanical manner as burs stick 
 together. The whole question, however, relates to the flow of thought as 
 the mental life progressively reconstructs itself about changing image 
 centers. The relation between two mental events is not an external one, 
 but an internal dynamic one. A memory is a bit of present life, full of 
 meaning in itself; and its recognitive aspect does not demand any asso- 
 ciation of discrete idea forms. 
 
 Memory processes are distinguished as "voluntary" and "invol- 
 untary", according to the presence or absence of a sense of effort in the 
 reviving of the states of consciousness. In voluntary memory, called 
 "recollection" in contradistinction to mere "remembrance" as invol- 
 untary memory, there is intensified consciousness of a lack of something 
 in the present experience, which is sought with more or less persistence in 
 the "structure of the past." The effort to recall has its origin in an in- 
 tentional completing of an experience state. It is impossible to seek 
 what is wholly absent from consciousness. St. Augustine says, "We 
 still hold of it, as it were, a part, and by this part which we hold we seek 
 that which we do not hold." In involuntary memor}^ one idea succeeds 
 another without conscious effort; the incoming idea is often accepted mth 
 surprise, though, we, in general, feel that it must be in some way due to 
 a "suggestion" in the preceding idea. Reverie, as a loose, effortless 
 chain of memory images, is an extreme case of involuntary memory. 
 
 "Forgetting'' is temporary inability to recall a past experience. It 
 is not a process, but is merely the negative of the remembering projess. 
 It is failure to reproduce a previous experience when voluntarily sought. 
 For an experience not to reappear in consciousness spontaneously is not 
 to forget it; forgetting is antithetic to voluntary memory only. Also 
 to forget does not mean to lose beyond the power to recall; it does not 
 mean that what has been a part of a life may be annihilated, but only 
 that it is so displaced from consciousness as not to be found when 
 wanted. While an event may never recur in the life (untold thousands 
 never do), there is always the possibility that it may. 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 550-604, 679-681. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 289-292. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 418-434. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 90-117. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 191-203. 
 
56 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Baldwin, Elementg of Psychology, pp. 161-174. 
 
 Ladd, Psvcholoffv Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 263-286. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 294-360, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 339-342. 
 
 Kay, Memory, etc., pp. 271-288, 235-239. 
 
 Dorpfeld, Thought and Memory, pp. 39-53. 
 
 Bowen, Hamilton's Metaphysics, pp. 421-442. 
 
 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 267-271. 
 
 Bain, Mental Science, pp. 85-127, Appendix, pp. 91-92. 
 
 36. Recognizing a revived experience. Recognition is the third 
 of the four components which our analysis of a memory experience has 
 revealed. An experience is (1) retained, (2) reproduced, and (3) recog- 
 nized; that is '^ known as having been known before". In a memory I 
 am not only conscious of an experience as something that has been pre- 
 served and recalled, but also it now appears as my experience returned. 
 It is in identifying a present experience with an experience of my past life 
 that it becomes a memory; hence, in a memory there is a consciousness 
 of a self to which the memory belongs. The recognition element of a 
 memory demands an awareness of a unified personality of which the 
 memory experience is but a form of present realization. The retrospect- 
 ive glance of memory is incident to comprehension of selfhood; it is of the 
 same nature as prospecting the future, and both serve to give fuller mean- 
 ing to the present. ''Every act of memory with recognition transcends 
 the present, and connects the present into a known real unity with the 
 past. " 
 
 Since the memory idea is not an object floated upon the stream of 
 conscious life as something distinct from the substance of the stream 
 itself, but is an aspect of the moving current, an eddy in its progressive 
 reaUzation, all figurative explanations of recognition, ''acquaintance", 
 "familiarity", etc., must be received critically. The psychologist finds 
 clear thinking in his field hampered at every turn by lack of technical 
 terminology, untainted by prejudiced use in the material sciences. Psy- 
 chology has little scientific language of its own, but masquerades in the 
 verbal forms of extrospective objective science. A memory image is a 
 process, not a product, and recognition is not of something that has been 
 but no longer is, it is but a phase of present life processes. All life is 
 present life, whether accepted as a "now" projected into "the past", 
 or prospected in "the future". 
 
 References 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 172-179, 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 149-152. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 195-197. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 377-378, 381-382, 397-402. 
 
 Calkins, Firtst Book in Psychology, pp. 124-132. 
 
 Brooks, Mental Science, pp. 136-139. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 673, 676. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, p. 299. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, p. 190. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 187-192. 
 
 37. Localizing a memory in time. The most peculiar aspect 
 of a memory experience is its pastness. A memory is a bit of conscious 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 57 
 
 life which in some strange way is objectified and thrust out into a "past 
 time". It is a revival of cognitive activity, accepted as familiar, and 
 projected into a "time" construct. We are not only conscious of the 
 state as having been, but there is a more or less sense of when it has been. 
 In our attitude toward it as a bit of life's substance we turn our back on 
 it, denying to it either the acceptance of the "present" or the anticipa- 
 tion of the "future"; it simply has been "back there somewhere". 
 
 Much of the difficulty in understanaing this localizing of a memory 
 event in a past time is due to lack of clearness as to the nature of time. 
 Time is not an object,ive "thing", as a roadway along which events pro- 
 ceed in a more or less uniformly-spaced order, as a procession in which 
 there are gaps of vacancy, or "empty time". Such a view is philosophi- 
 cally absurd. Herbert Spencer has well said, "Time is the abstract 
 (general view) of all relations of sequence"; and consciousness of "empty 
 time' ' is impossible. Time is but a way of looking at life events, in their 
 sequence of content and form. *'Each individual constructs his own 
 time-order from the standpoint of the ' specious' or felt present by means 
 of images in which the past and future, not actually present, are repre- 
 sented". My "past" and "future" are my constructs of experience 
 changes; and when I think an event as past, I merely place it in a cate- 
 gory of those events from which I have turned. Fastness, presentness 
 or futureness are not qualities of the events as such, but consist solely 
 in the will attitudes of the person toward his experiences; what we turn 
 from as gone is "past", what we act toward as here is "present", and 
 what we anticipate as coming is "future." 
 
 The dating of an event in the past, i. e., giving it a fixed place in 
 the time construct, depends upon its relations to other events in conscious- 
 ness. There are two forms of projecting an event into past time, in the 
 one we merely say "it has been"; in the other, "it was at a relatively 
 determined point". All memory events have the 'has-been' character- 
 istic; but in some there is a more or less definite determining of 'when 
 it has been', while in many the reference to the past is satisfied by mere 
 acknowledgement of the pastness. There are also apparently two forms 
 of determining the date of a past event: first, placing it among a somewhat 
 vaguely located group of events as 'belonging to their time'; and second, 
 estimating in objective artificial time units 'how long since' it has been. 
 But even in this how-long-since the place of the event is fixed in the time 
 schedule by its relations to other contiguous events. It is impossible 
 to measure back to an event from the present along a vacant stretch of 
 time, that is, in locating a point in past time there is always more involved 
 than a present point and a time measuring-rod. Whereness in time — 
 past, present, or future — is a matter of the whole form of the experience 
 content To know that an event is a past event or to determine when 
 it was in the past demands a comprehensive view of the content and 
 form of the experiential life as a whole, and it cannot be narrowed to a 
 mere mechanical matter of objective time units and records. 
 
58 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 The part that rythm plays in determining the place of an experience 
 in the progressive life movement is an interesting study, but I doubt 
 that it fully explains the determining of the '' length of time" between 
 two time stations, as some writers seem to think it does. Try, with a 
 stop watch, the experiment of closing your eyes for one minute, noting 
 in critical introspection your attitude toward the process. How do you 
 determine how long to keep your eyes shut? 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 605-642. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 280-286. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol I, pp. 179-188. 
 
 Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, article "Time". 
 
 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Ward's article on "Psychology". 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 384-391, 496-500. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 183-191. 
 
 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 207-215. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, Vol. T, pp. 318-329; Vol. II, pp. 343-345. 
 
 Ladd, OutUnes of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 299-302. 
 
 Ladd, Psycholog3^ Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 495-499. 
 
 Spiller, Mind of Man, p. 384. 
 
 Munsterberg, Psychology and Life, p. 14. 
 
 Hoffding, OutHnes of Psychology, pp. 184-190. 
 
 Elaborative Knowing. 
 
 38. Nature of elaboration. The third form of cognition is the 
 elaboration of the knowledge structure out of germinant sense-percep- 
 tions and accumulated knowledge content. In its growth the mind 
 acquires knowledge materials in presentation, maintains its continuity 
 and integrity in representation, and gives form to its structure in elabora- 
 tion. Elaboration is the organizing of the cognitive life in constructive 
 growth. In the analytic structure of the process numerous forms are 
 distinguished, of which the following are most important : Apperception, 
 Conception, Imagination, Judgment, and Reasoning. 
 
 40. Apperception is mental assimilation. It is a natural biological 
 process of transforming mental food into mental tissue; it builds the 
 raw materials of sensation into unified knowledge structure. The mind 
 as a growing organism constantly reconstructs itself in the acquisition 
 of new substance. This apperceptive process of relating new percepts 
 to previously formed knowledge structure is cooperative between the old 
 and the new; the new is not only assimilated (''made like" the old), 
 but the old is reconstructed ("formed again") to take in the new. Ap- 
 perception is the process of integrating ("wholing") the new increment 
 into the coherent whole of a personal life. In this process the present 
 sense-percept becomes the germinant center of a more or less completely 
 unified experience; and the life as a whole is formed progressively by this 
 assimilative reconstruction of its substance in successive experiences. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 59 
 
 Apperception is the synthesizing activity which gives significance 
 and value to mental data. Apperception interprets the present in the 
 light of the past; and it is only in this interpreting that sensory elements 
 acquired in perception have any "meaning". "Meaning is past exper- 
 ience which a mind reads into present experience. " It is an apperception 
 that the mind values and utilizes present possessions by relating them 
 to its whole experience structure previously acquired and organized. 
 
 Apperception is not supplemental to perception in the sense that it 
 is added to- it as a discrete extension or continuation; it is unavoidably a 
 part of all perception. As the mind grasps the phenomenal world in 
 perception, it simultaneously values it in terms of what it already has, or 
 is. Perception is never without this assimilative interpretation, which 
 is inceptive of the organizing process of forming coherent knowledge UDits, 
 Some psychologists use the term "perception" to designate the whole of 
 the active assimilation of new sense-impressions by the structure origina- 
 ting in previous experience; but in the interest of explanatory science 
 there is some advantage in distinguishing the organizing phase of the 
 process from the acquisitive phase, even though they are not separable. 
 
 In the Herbartian Psychology the existing mental systems by which 
 the new perceptions are welcomed and assimilated are called "apper- 
 ception masses", or "apperception bases". The "apperception mass" 
 is life already attained focalized in a concept or notion, and used as a 
 means of acquiring additional life. To the Herbartian psychologists 
 apperception is "the reaction of the old against the new," as when a 
 person familiar with oranges but who has never seen a grape fruit, ex- 
 claims on seeing a grape fruit for the first time, "What a big orange!" 
 They regard the "apperception masses" as active entities seizing what- 
 ever they desire for their own enlargement. One of them says, "The 
 apperceiving conceptions usually stand like armed soldiers within the 
 strongholds of consciousness, ready to pounce upon everything which 
 shows itself within the portals of the senses, in order to overcome it and 
 make it serviceable to themselves." 
 
 Clearness in description and explanation of mental growth requires 
 that apperception should be distinguished from conception. Since per- 
 ception is the acquisitive phase and apperception is the organizing phase 
 of the growing process, it might appear that there would be no use for 
 the term "conception"; but conception is as clearly distinguishable 
 from apperception as apperception is from perception. Conception 
 (as will be seen in the next section) is the forming of mental units. It 
 creates notions as the discrete facts of rational life. It is teleological, 
 while apperception is mere procedure as such. Conception is concerned 
 primarily with what is achieved in life structure, while apperception re- 
 lates to how it is achieved. 
 
 References 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, A^ol. II, p. 110 et seq. 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 84-90. 
 Lindner, Empii*ical Psychology, pp. 123-130. 
 Lange, Appreception, DeGarmo's translation. 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, Index. 
 
60 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Baldwin, Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy. 
 Munsterberg, Psychology and Life, pp. 88-92. 
 Munsterberg, Psychologj^ and the Teacher, pp. 128-136. 
 Pillsbury, Attention, p. 214 et seq. 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, p. 161 et seq. 
 Gordy, New Psychology, pp. 846-353. 
 
 41. Conception is forming notions, or '^ideas''. It is elaborating 
 universals out of particulars acquired in perception, thus simplifying life 
 by unifying in comprehensive notions the elements grasped in sense- 
 perception. It is not, however, a mere '' grasping together", as the 
 etymology (con-capio) would imply, but a true creative process of making 
 meaningful units in the knowledge structure. These mental units, 
 called "concepts", are not percepts, either "simple" or ' 'complex"— not 
 single apprehensions of concrete objects nor combinations of such per- 
 ceptive apprehensions; they are veritable creations in which the individ- 
 ual elements have lost their identity. Thus, in the concept dog, when 
 we say "a dog is on the doorstep", the quality of four-footedness is not 
 in consciousness. 
 
 Conception creates the universal. A concept is always a " universal " 
 whether it is the notion of an individual thing or of a class of things. 
 There are in fact, two classes of concepts, both alike universal: class 
 concepts, originating in a synthesis of the common features of the indi- 
 vidual things of a species or class; individual concepts, originating in a 
 like synthesis of the important features of an individual thing. A concept 
 is always an ideal construction: and an individual concept is 
 no less a collective universal than a "general concept "of a class. Thus, 
 the notion of the individual Roosevelt is an abstract universal in exactly 
 the same sense as the notion of the class man, — that is, the "individual 
 concept" which we denominate by a proper noun is no more a group of 
 separate characteristics loosely combined than the "general concept" 
 which we embody in a common noun is a congeries of perceptions of 
 human qualities; and the one can no more be imaged than the other. 
 A concept is abstract and universal and cannot in any case be imaged. 
 Conception is cognition of the universal, as distinguished from perception 
 of the particular. While we refer perceptions to definite objects which we 
 image, we do not so refer concepts. 
 
 Conception gives meaning to the life elements. The acquisitions of 
 perception would be as valueless as the miser's gold, if conception did 
 not build them into significant structures. All of our valuable know- 
 ledge, that is, all laiowledge that has meaning for us, exists in concepts; 
 in fact, our intellectual lives are but sj^stems of rationally related concepts . 
 
 Conception is initiated in the formation of the "generic image" by 
 uniting in an associative way a number of concrete images of particular 
 objects. Into this generic image, as a framework, are progressively built 
 selected materials. Conception creates the ideational units of life by 
 ceaseless constructive organization of materials selectively appropriated 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 61 
 
 by differentiated knowledge sj^stems. The ''general concept" is thus 
 not a static entity at any stage of its existence, but is a continuous groAvth, 
 originating in the generic image as a germinant center and continuing 
 by perceptive acquisition and intellective organization. Four part 
 processes are commonl}^ distinguished in conception: (1) comparison, 
 (2) abstraction, (3) generalization, and (4) denomination — that is, we 
 note likeness and unlikeness in the phenomena perceived, abstract like 
 qualities for consideration, generalize these qualities into a class, and give 
 the class definite existence in a name. A concept is never ''completed", 
 even when named; it is not a static result; it is perpetually a djTiamic 
 process of the gro^^dng mind. It is the concept units, or "mental systems " 
 pre^aousl}^ elaborated out of perception materials, that serve as "apper- 
 ception masses" in distributing new acquisitions in the whole mental 
 structure. Concepts thus not only conserve the experiences of the past 
 and unify the present, but they also anticipate a future of new exper- 
 iences. 
 
 Conception is the initial process of all thinking, considered as the 
 organizing aspect of mental gro'^i:h complemental to the acquisitive 
 aspect of sense-perception. In thinking the mental substance accumu- 
 lated in sensing the material en\TLronment is built into structural unity; 
 and the higher forms of judging and reasoning not only begin in concept- 
 ion but are themselves but more elaborate forms of the same process. 
 
 It is important to distinguish the use of the term "concept" in Logic 
 from its use in Psychology. In Logic it means more the static result of 
 mental activity than the activity itself; it is viewed from the side of its 
 verbal embodiment and is dealt with as a "term" -with a fixed meaning. 
 In Psychology- it is a process, a constantly changing mental procedure 
 which "denomination" does not check. In Logic the symbolic aspect 
 of the concept often obliterates the meaning, while in Psychology the 
 meaning as a growdng process finds but loose embodiment in the sym- 
 bolizing term. 
 
 "Can we think ^\ithout language?" The logician must answer 
 this question in the negative; for so far as the formal thinking of Logic 
 is concerned, at least of deductive Logic, the term embodiments of the 
 concepts are indispensible. The symbolic phase of the concept as "fixed " 
 in the verbal sign overshadows its meaning, obscuring it and in the formal 
 syllogism even obliterating it. In the more rigorous forms of deductive 
 reasoning the "terms" are in general as abstract as the letter s^^mbols 
 in the algebraic equation, and the validity of the reasoning depends 
 essentially upon the right use of these verbal forms, with but slight ref- 
 erence to their content. Even in less systematic thinking the "word" 
 often becomes a meaningless form to juggle with in apparent thought — 
 witness the common use of the word "instinct". But our question is 
 not as easy as this. Observation of human life about us reveals thought 
 processes of apparently much cogency in which the conventional forms 
 of articulate speech are wholly wantmg. A young child (especially one 
 who is "slow in beginning to talk") will discuss for some minutes a sit- 
 ation with his mother without using even one conventional word symbol. 
 
62 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 In this connection the question of the '' language of animals is interesting ". . 
 For suggestive brief discussions of this whole matter, see Sully's Human 
 Mind, Vol. I, p. 419, and Titchener's Textbook of Psychology, p. 521. 
 
 While the distinction of the ''intension" and ''extenison" of terms 
 is more properly a matter for the student of Logic, these two aspects of 
 the word-embodied concept are not without interest to the psychologist. 
 The "intent of a term" is its qualitative meaning, while its ''extent" is 
 its quantitative use: the intent of the term man is the qualities which it 
 connotes, while its extent is the aggregation of things which it names. 
 Psychology is properly concerned with the intent, leaving the extent 
 to Philosophy and Logic. 
 
 References 
 
 Porter, Human Intellect, pp. 388-430. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 413, 433. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 204-213. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 203-222. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 437-445. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 206-211. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 272-283. 
 
 Wentzlaff, The Mental Man, op. 211-215. 
 
 Davis, Elements of Psychology, pp. 219-224, 227-230. 
 
 Lotze, Outhnes of Logic, I., 9-25. 
 
 Brown, System of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 543-548, Vol. II, pp. 65-83. 
 
 Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 3rd Series, Vol. II, pp. 463-467. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 447 et seq. 
 
 Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, pp. 142, 145. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. II, p. 168, et seq. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, pp. 165-176. 
 
 Gordy, New Psychology, pp. 273,304. 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, pp. 140-145. 
 
 Calkins, First Book in Psychology, pp. 136-143. 
 
 Brooks, Mental Science, pp. 210-227. 
 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, pp. 147-154. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, p. 478 et seq. 
 
 Mm-ray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 253-255. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 220-228. 
 
 Read, Introductory Psychology, pp. 232-240. 
 
 42. Imagination is forming ideal images by combining in new 
 forms selected images of past experiences. It gives sensuous form, '^ with- 
 out the present help of the senses", to objects never apprehended in 
 sense-perception; and thus it creates a new world of concrete facts. The 
 "pictures of imagination" are new wholes, not mere aggregations of re- 
 perceptive fragments; its objects have the integral unity of the ''reals" 
 of sense-perception. It presents in consciousness images of possible 
 concrete existences, as distinguished from the actual ''things" of the 
 world of sense. Imagination never deals with the abstract, as one cannot 
 imagine "mercy" or "truthfulness"; it aever deals with the general, 
 as one cannot imagine the meaning of a class noun; it never deals with 
 the spiritual, or "immaterial", as one cannot imagine God, except in 
 terms of the crudest material anthropomorphic features. Stated afiirma* 
 tively, imagination deals with concrete, individual, material possibilities. 
 It converts actual experience data into ideal presentations. Wundt has 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 63 
 
 defined it as 'thinking in particular sense ideas", as distinguished from 
 thinking in geaeral concepts; and Shakespeare says, '' Imagination bodies 
 forth the forms of things unknown. " 
 
 Imagination differs from memor}^ in two respects: first, its images 
 are ideal constructions, not mere representations as in memor}^; second, 
 while in memory there is always a sense of familiarity — a been-here-be 
 foreness — , in imagination there is a distinct sense of newTiess or strange- 
 ness. The images of imagination are like those of memory in that their 
 materials are representations of cognitive elements acquired in sense- 
 perception; but they differ from the memory images" in that they are not 
 pictures of existing things, but are ideal constructions. In general it 
 may be said that memory revives perceptive elements in the combinations 
 in which they were experienced, while imagination arranges them in new 
 forms. It should be noted, however, that no image is ever an exact 
 reproduction of a perceptive structure as it originates in the actual sensing 
 of a concrete particular object; every memory image, however sure we 
 are of its faithfulness to the original, is at best a modified picture. It is 
 only in the most general characterization that we may say that, "old 
 forms are imaged in memory; new forms, in imagination". Since in its 
 use of its reproduced materials imagination ignores the limitations of 
 the real data of sense-perception, it has been called "idealized memory". 
 Memory brings into consciousness what has been, wdth a sense of acquaint- 
 anceship; imagination, what may be, without recognition of former 
 existence in its perceptive data. Memory has been called "a witness to 
 the past", and imagination) "a prophet of the future"; but, strictly, 
 there is no sense of time in imagination. In perception the mind grasps 
 an external world of physical phenomena; in memory it represents its 
 acquisitions in consciousness; and in imagination it sets before itself a 
 new^ world of possibihties, which it concieves as actualities. 
 
 Imagination differs from conception in objectifying its creations as 
 images; concepts are not so objectively imaged. "Picturing", the prom- 
 inent characteristic of imagination, is w^holly absent in conception. Both 
 conception and imagination are constructive elaborative processes in 
 which cognitive elements are built into mental units of a higher order; 
 but in conception the product is an abstract general notion, a "univer- 
 sal" that cannot be pictured as an objective real, while in imagination it 
 is a concrete particular image, viewed as a sensory real in an objective 
 world of such reals. An imagined tree is individual; the concept tree is 
 universal. "Imagination is thinking in particular sense images", as 
 distinguished from thinking in universal concepts. 
 
 43. Three phases, or forms, of imagination may be distinguished: 
 intensifying, idealizing, and creating. Imagination intensifies a mental 
 process originating in sensing the physical environment, as when a mother 
 in coddling sympathy increases the pain, both in its cognitive and its 
 affective phases, in her child's hand as it bleeds from the scratch of a pin. 
 The pain is greater not only because of the focussing of attention upon it, 
 but also because it is made greater by imagination. This enlarging of 
 experience by imagination is common to both perceptive apprehension 
 
64 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 and representative memory images; in any event of life the mind may - 
 add by im-agination to its importance in the vital structure. Tn the 
 second form of imagination, idealizing, the mind builds upon and 
 improves its structural units, modifying them in accordance with its own 
 desires and purposes. Starting with an image of some concrete reality, 
 selecting valued characteristics of it to serve as a framework, ignoring 
 other undesirable features and replacing them by desirable ones found in 
 other similar images, and rounding out the improved structure into a finish- 
 ed whole, the mind constructs an integral ideal image for its own world as 
 it would have it be. It is in this way that we create our heroes, and 
 exalt our friends. The idealized product is always much more than a 
 mere intensified image; it is also more than a mere aggregation of se- 
 lected qualities; it is a birth of the generating mind. In the third form 
 of imagination, creating, the mind rises to the highest activity of its 
 willed selfhood. Here it forms in and of its own substance images to 
 which there are no objective reals of experience. By virtue of its free 
 personal spontaneity, as a being created in the image of God, it creates 
 a world of its own. While these creatures of the imagination find their 
 materials in the perceptions of the senses as reproduced in memory images, 
 their individualized forms are ideal structures, new existences in the 
 spiritual world that are as real creations as when God thought the stars 
 into being. The scenes in "Alice in Wonderland " or the streets and walls 
 of St. John's "New Jerusalem" are none the less creations because their 
 sensuous materials originated in ordinary experience. 
 
 The distinction of the three phases of imagination as intensifying, 
 idealizing, and creating does not imply three separate modes of mental 
 action; thej^ are but aspects of a single elaborative process, which may be 
 viewed as intensifying, idealizing, or creating. The "Heaven" of John's 
 Revelation may be viewed as his thought creation, or as his idealiza- 
 tion of a walled city in which the images of beauty are rationally intensi- 
 fied. 
 
 The distinction of imagination experiences as "passive imagination'' 
 and "active imagination", made by many psychologists, is misleading — 
 as, in fact, is the term "passive" everywhere when applied to mental 
 processes. It involves the absurdity of a passive activity ! It is, however 
 profitable to make a distinction between the erratic play of "phantasy" 
 and the intelligent work of "imagination proper", provided such classi- 
 fying of mental events does not implj^, as some writers seem to think, 
 "a total absence of will in phantasy". Phantasy, or "fancy", is the 
 "spontaneous uncontrolled play of images in consciousness," a passive (?) 
 experiencing in which the mind drifts meaninglessly like a mental ka- 
 leidoscope. The term "active imagination" is used to denote the more 
 rationally purposed building of ideal images. The difference noted here 
 is not so much one of varying degrees of activity as of planned or planless 
 ordering of life events. There is every shade of deUberative directing 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 65 
 
 of the life current in imagination from the most playful prospecting of 
 the world of fancy's possibilities to the constructive anticipations of the 
 architect; but to no phase of this self achieving can the term "'passive" 
 be properly applied. 
 
 SuUv, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 362-387. 
 
 Hamilton, D. H., Autology, pp. 567-588. 
 
 Bascom, Science of Mind, pp. 148-159. 
 
 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 277-278. 
 
 McCosh, Psvchologv, Cognitive Powers, pp. 167-174. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 213-243. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 192-201. 
 
 Porter, Human Intellect, pp. 351-376. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 161-183. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, p. 281 et seq. 
 
 Davis, Elements of Psychology, pp. 198-215. 
 
 44. In the natural evolution of the knowledge structure of a mind 
 by elaborating its sensory elements, the notional units formed in con- 
 ception are combined in larger structures of judgment and reasoning. 
 Judgment asserts the agreement, or disagreement, of one idea with anoth- 
 er; and by such formal recognition of relationship, it gives meaning to 
 one through the meaning of the other. In its verbal embodiment a 
 judgment declares the identity of one concept with another, explicitly 
 defining it by asserting that it is (in the aspect considered) the other. 
 This predication is the essential characteristic of judgment as synthesizing 
 cognitive process; thus, in the judgment "the grass is wet", the concept 
 ''grass" is formally identified (so far as the present intellectual process 
 is concerned) with the concept of "wetness". A judgment creates a 
 larger mental system by incorporating one concept in another; thus, 
 the concept "wet" gives fuller and more definite meaning to the concept 
 "grass". Judgment defines the meaning of a concept by explicit atten- 
 tion to one feature of it. 
 
 The loose thinking of much Psychology and Logic is evidenced by tha 
 statement, common in textbooks in both sciences, that "Judgment dis- 
 cerns the agreement of two concepts", or "Judgment asserts the rela- 
 tion between two objects of thought". A little critical thinking will 
 show that a judgment deals specifically with one concept, or "object 
 of thought," which it seeks to define or enlarge through its relation to 
 another which enters the judgment merely as building material for the 
 first concept. These quotations would be less vague and more worthy 
 of a place in scientific textbooks, if they were "Judgment discerns the 
 agreement of one concept with another," and "Judgment asserts the 
 relation of one object of thought to another". Even the merest tyro in 
 grammar knows the significance of the "subject" in the sentence, and 
 that nothing is said about "fruits" in the declaration that "Apples are 
 fruits", or that in "a=b" the relation of b to a is not directly considered. 
 A "proposition" in Logic is not a swivel-link union of two terms, that may 
 be handled from either end; it is a specific defining of the meaning of a 
 term through its relation to another. 
 
66 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 45. Judgement, like conception, is an integrating, or ^Svboling", 
 process, in which the mind seeks by the discovery of a definite relationship 
 to unify discrete mental factors into a coherent whole. As a process of 
 interpreting new, or less known, concepts m terms of old, or better known 
 ones, it effects a re-forming of the units of mental structure; it effects 
 a larger synthesis of life materials by bringing one system of mental 
 facts into definite vital relation to another. It is a true growing process 
 in which one mental system is assimilated into another. In this apper- . 
 ceptive process the predicate concept is an ^'apperceptive mass" which 
 formally receives and orients the subject concept as a new center of a 
 growing knowledge system. The mind seeks in judgment a larger syn- 
 thesis of organized substance by working over its notional contents. 
 While judgment is a distinct form of mental elaboration, the process of 
 judging is a widely diffused one. Perception, Conception, Judgment are 
 but stages in one process — in the constructive growing of a mind. While 
 judgment is essential to the forming of the concept in the first instance, it 
 is specifically a further elaboration of the concept through discovered 
 relations to another concept. 
 
 A judgment is not a mere fusion of concepts; it is a formal predica- 
 tion of the union of one concept with another, fixed in a verbal body. 
 Sully says, "The connection between judging and asserting in words is 
 precisely similar to that between forming a concept and naming". Just 
 as naming is essential to the complete process of conception so the process 
 of judgment is completed in the proposition. The two expressions 'Hhe 
 yellow rose" and "the rose is yellow" embody essentially different mental 
 processes, however much they may appear synonymous in cominon life. 
 The first accepts a relation which the second explicitly determines. The 
 transition from "the rose is yellow" to the yellow rose" show the syn 
 thetic nature of judgment as a concept-building process. 
 
 Judgment is impossible without concepts, therefore without terms. 
 However, the "propositions" of Logic should not be confounded with the 
 judgments of Psychology. Logic deals with terms having fixed values; 
 it makes assertionns about static knowledge forms. Psychology deals 
 with concepts as constantly changing processes; it amplifies the processes 
 through their natural growth. Logic is concerned with the formal ex- 
 pression of relations of "completed concepts; Psychology, with the 
 processes of thinking concepts into vital union through their kinship to 
 each other. 
 
 References 
 
 Porter. Human Intellect, pp. 430-489. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 434,457. 
 
 Angcll, PsyfholoGry, pp. 223-234. 
 
 Dewev, Psychology, pp. 213-220. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 283-291. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of P.sychology, pp. 211-21G. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 445-452. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, pp. 498-507. 
 
 Calkins, First Book in Psycholog\, p]). 144-147. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 67 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 255-260. 
 Davis, Elements of Psychology, pp. 224-226. 
 Gordy, New Psychology, pp. 305-319. 
 Brooks, Mental Science, p. 228 et seq. 
 
 46. Reasoning is mediate judgment; it relates one concept to anoth- 
 er through their relation to a third concept. For example, if I judge that 
 a small feather-covered object which I see on a branch of a tree will fly 
 away, my judgment is indirect, or mediate: I judge it a bird; I judge 
 birds fly away; I judge it will fi}^ away. My judgment relates the con- 
 cept that object to the concept flying away through the concept bird to 
 which these concepts are separately related, thus, that object — a bird — 
 will fly awa3^ The distinction of reasoning from simpler forms of judg- 
 ing is essentially a matter of this mediating of the process; reasoning effects 
 the union of one concept with another through the medium of a third 
 concept related to each. 
 
 In the widest sense "reasoning" is synonymous with "thinking", 
 that is, with the organizing phase of all knowing from the simplest per- 
 ception to the most complex deliberative processes of the philosopher's 
 system. In the narrower technical sense, however, it is restricted to the 
 establishing of relationship between ideas through recognition of other 
 relationships. Judging, dealing with but two objects of thought, is 
 necessarily direct, or immediate, while reasoning, dealing with three or 
 more, arrives at its judgment by auxiliary judgments. The mental 
 process expressed by "it is raining", when I see the drops falling, is less 
 complex than the same judgment when I see passing people carrying 
 raised umbrellas; in the second I "infer" the judgment that people 
 carry umbrellas over themselves when it is raining. There is, however, 
 mference in the simplest judgment; and just as a concept is a "contracted 
 ludgment", so a judgment is a "contracted reasoning". 
 
 Reasoning is strictly a teleological process; it has been called "pur- 
 posive thinking". It is thinking directed to the accomplishment of some 
 desired end. All knowledge is growth, rather a continuous growing, and 
 reasonine is but its highest stage; hence reasoning is entitled to the dis- 
 tinctive term "purposive" only in the sense that its purposing is more 
 formal. It is a rationally directed apperceptive process in which one con- 
 cept is incorporated into another through dfinitel}^ progressive stages 
 of assimilation. This is readily seen in the formal statement of the 
 syllogism. 
 
 Reasoning may be defined as a succession of judgments leading to a 
 final judgment. Since this basing of a judgment on a judgment is the 
 essence of reasoning, it is common to say that " reasoning is discerning 
 relationships among judgments in the way in which judging is discerning 
 relationships among concepts". But this is not a clear statement of the 
 facts; for reasoning, at least in Psychology, deals directly with the con- 
 cepts. Its "unification of thoughts", or judgments, is in its final purpose 
 and result a unification of concepts. 
 
68 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 In Logic the ''terms" and ''propositions" are dealt with as static 
 expressions of results(?) of thinking; thus; in the formal reasoning, — 
 
 (1) Apples are good to eat; 
 
 (2) that object is an apple; 
 
 (3) that object is good to eat, — 
 
 the term "that object" is held to have identically the same meaning in 
 the second and third propositions; also, the second proposition is held to 
 be ''a completed judgment" with unchanging value wherever it occurs 
 in an argument. In Psychology there are no ''static concepts" of im- 
 mobile character in any knowing process. The concepts and judgments 
 are alike processes, which will not "stay put" in any succession of ap- 
 perceptive building of the mental content. What Logic ''views from 
 without" as objective beings. Psychology "views from within" as sub- 
 jective becomings. 
 
 47. There are two forms of reasoning, or rather two stages in the 
 process: Inductive Reasoning and Deductive Reasoning. The second of 
 these, given lasting form in the Organon of Aristotle, is the accepted 
 method of thinking in formal Logic; the first made prominent in the Novum 
 Organum of Bacon nineteen centuries after Aristotle, is the common 
 method of all modern observational science. The psychologist is in- 
 terested in this distinction of the inductive and deductive phases of 
 reasoning only as far as he discerns in them distinct stages in the elabora- 
 tive growth of knowledge; with the relative values and validities of in- 
 duction and deduction as means of arriving at generalized truth, the 
 controversy of the logicians, he has directly nothing to do. 
 
 Deduction was not only the first form of thought-movement to be 
 critically investigated, it is the fundamental form in all systematic pur- 
 posive thinking. All inductive reasoning is in the last analysis deductive. 
 It is the essence of all reasoning to relate a particular to a universal, that 
 is, to evaluate a present life center in terms of a life system originated in 
 previous growth. In deduction a concept is applied to a new perceptive 
 fact to define it and to give it concrete value in the life structure. All 
 growth in knowledge proceeds from the life that is to the larger and better 
 organized life that is apperceptively possible; and " deductive reasoning" , 
 in its strictly technical sense, is incorporating a new element into the 
 organic structure through the medium of an organicunit of that struct- 
 ure. It places the particular fact in the universal system by means of 
 its relation to a subordinate system. Deduction is a process of mental 
 assimilation through subsuming a particular fact under a more general 
 fact; thus, in looking from my window at a white substance covering the 
 ground, if I say "that substance is cold", I have brought that substance 
 into the general class of cold things by subsuming it under the class 
 snow, which I more or less definitely accept as a connecting medium. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 69 
 
 Deductive reasoning is formally expressed in the Syllogism, as in 
 the example just given — 
 
 (1) Snow is cold; 
 
 (2) that is snow; 
 
 (3) that is cold. 
 
 The typical syllogism consists of three judgments, of which the third 
 is the final cause of the reasoning process as a whole. In judging that 
 that substance is cold two subordinate judgments are involved, namely, 
 that it is snow and that snow is cold. The proper use of the syllogism 
 and its various forms in which effective reasoning may be cast concern 
 the logician rather than the psychologist; the psychologist describes and 
 explains how we reason (in a "fact science"), and the logician determines 
 how we should reason (in a "normative science")- 
 
 The "middle term" of a syllogism is the medium of comparison of 
 the "minor term "to the "major term "; thus in the syllogism in the para- 
 graph above, the middle term is '"snow", the minor term is "that sub- 
 stance", and the major term is "cold (substance) ". The middle term is 
 the characteristic fact in the syllogistic form of reasoning; it effects the 
 vital connection of the particular mental fact designated bj^ the minor 
 term with its defining concept embodied in the major term. Porter says, 
 "In every syllogism the force of reasoning depends on what is called the 
 middle term. " This is forcibly true as we view the syllogism as a "med- 
 iate judgment" concerned with concepts, rather than a chain of judg- 
 ments 
 
 The term "inductive reasoning" designates in a very loose way 
 the deriving of a "general judgment" from a number of relatively inde- 
 pendent "paticular judgments". The effect of this rather complex 
 process is to sum up in a single proposition, as a generalized truth relating 
 to a class of objects, what is stated in detail in the separate particular 
 propositions; thus, from the particular judgments — 
 
 Apples are perishable, 
 
 pears are perishable, 
 
 peaches are perishable, 
 
 plums are perishable, 
 
 grapes are perishable, — 
 we arrive by induction at the general judgment that fruits are perishable. 
 Induction is, however, more than a mere summation; it always advances 
 beyond the "aggregate knowledge of the particular judgments." It is 
 based upon the assumed reasoning canon that "what is true of many 
 in a class is true of all the class." 
 
 The so-called "inductive syllogism", as exemplified in the reasoning 
 about the perishableness of fruits, is not a syllogism; introspective ex- 
 amination of this complex process reveals a number of mediate judgments 
 that may be formally expressed in syllogisms. The "generalization" 
 of induction is a complex conceptive process that is much more than a 
 mere adding of parts; it advances to a new mental unit through inte- 
 grating an individual fact into an existing universal. To simplify the 
 content of mental life by tying judgments up in bundles (if that were 
 
70 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 possible) is not reasoning; the condensing of the judgments of particulars - 
 into the general judgment is a creating of a,new judgment, in which the 
 concepts appear in new stages of their evolution. The term '^ fruits" 
 in the induction above is much more than a common name for apples- 
 pears-peaches-plums -grapes. 
 
 It is misleading to say that, ''induction is reasoning which proceeds 
 from the particular to the general", in so far as it is intended to designate 
 a complete thought movement; all reasoning relates a particular to a 
 universal and is teleologically concerned with the particular. It is fre- 
 quently said that ''induction must precede deduction", for "we cannot 
 deduce particulars from generals until we have first made the generals"; 
 it would be just as true (or false?) to say that we cannot know particu- 
 lars until we first have generals in which to define them. This is the old 
 quibble of the hen and the first egg. The fact is that induction and de- 
 duction are not successive stages, or discrete steps, in a life movement; 
 they are but two aspects of one movement. Every complete thought 
 process is both inductive and deductive. The mental units built up in 
 perceptive experience are rationalized in coherent systems by elaborative 
 thinking; and this thinking of details into structural unity may be viewed 
 either as induction or as deduction, according as the process is intro- 
 spectively considered as an apperceptive structure or a vitalizing incre- 
 ment. Induction is formal conception; deduction is formal perception. 
 
 References 
 
 Porter, Human Intellect, p. 439 et seq. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 459-475. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 235-255. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 220-231. 
 
 Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 299-310. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, pp. 216, 221. 
 
 Brooks, Mental Science, p. 273 et seq. 
 
 Calkins, First Book in Psychology, pp. 148-162. 
 
 Gordy, New Psychology, pp. 230-245. 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, p. 260 et seq. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 228-237. 
 
 Snider, Psychology and the Psychosis, Intellect, pp. 507-512. 
 
 Read, Introductory Psychology, p. 243 et seq. 
 
 48. Knowledge is conscious growth. It is that aspect of human 
 life, as revealed in consciousness, which pertains to the enlargement and 
 organization of the personal being. Knowledge, or knowing, is the pro- 
 gressive realization of self through integrating experiences into the mental 
 content. It is active being, a becoming, not a static accumulation. So 
 far as it concerns the psychologist, the word "knowledge" may be spelled 
 with ing for its final syllable; it is essentially a process, not a product. 
 In the last analysis knowledge is the man himself, conscious of himself as 
 a growing entity; knowing (or knowledge) is interpreting one's own states 
 as they relate to himself. The knower is what he knows; he knows what 
 he is. Schelling said, "that only is knowing, when knowing and being 
 are the same thing." Knowing is conscious life, progressive being re- 
 vealed in consciousness. "To know is to be conscious of the facts of our 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 71 
 
 being", as our facts; in knowing we comprehend our own vital movements 
 as they contribute to our growth. 
 
 Knowing is not only conscious vital activity, it is consciousness of 
 something. Knowing is '' objective consciousness", that is, it is always 
 concerned with objects, or "things." The 'Hhing" known may be 
 objectified as "an external physical fact" or as "an internal mental 
 fact;" but in either case its "thinghood" or "thinginess" consists in 
 its being to the knower "a separable or distinguishable object of thought' 
 We know "things" as they belong to us, in our world of conscious life. 
 
 It is a common error of naive thinking to regard knowledge as 
 something apart from the mind in which it is in some way "contained", 
 as the chair is contained in the room. In this way "knowledge" is dis- 
 tinguished from "knowing", as a product from the process which pro- 
 duces it. It is in this sense that one is said to "acquire knowledge"; 
 but it should be noted that knowledge cannot be "taken into the mind" 
 ready-made, as a static product. One does not acquire knowledge as he 
 acquires sea shells by picking them up along the beach; "acquiring know- 
 lege" is developing mind through experience. 
 
 In a somewhat arbitrary way a distinction has been made between 
 two kinds of knowledge: "knowledge of acquaintance" and "knowledge 
 about", or knowledge that a thing is and knowledge of what it is. This 
 classification is most clearly stated in modern Psychology by James, who 
 admits, however, that the terms are practically relative. The purpose is 
 to discriminate the elaborated forms of meaning in experience from the 
 simpler forms of acceptance of the facts. "To know may mean either 
 to perceive or apprehend, or to understand or comprehend." In this 
 view sense-perception may give acquaintance with the world, but it is 
 only in the higher forms of cognition (in judgment and reasoning) that 
 we " ascend " to understanding it. This would seem to be an unnecessary 
 refinement of classification, since there can be no "acquaintance" except 
 through "understanding"; we acquire " knowledge-that " only as it be- 
 comes for us "knowledge-what". A person's knowledge is a systematic 
 explanation of his world, in its perceptive elements as truly as in its logical 
 inferences; it is such an explanation as gives each bit of experience its 
 proper place in his life structure. The most elementary forms of per- 
 ceptive knowing require explanatory valuation; the growing mind se- 
 lects its perceptions through their meanings, and the "that" of knowing is 
 possible only in the "what". Ladd says, "Cognition is one living pro- 
 cess throughout, and valuable as a distinction of its stages and kinds and 
 points of departure may be, there is one essential body of characteristics 
 to be recognized as everywhere present." 
 
 A word more may be said regarding the place of knowledge in life. 
 In knowledge each person builds his own life, selecting the materials and 
 
72 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 constructing the fabric. The meaning of all life demands continuous re-- 
 construction of its substance, and this conscious remaking of self is life. 
 All reality of life is knowledge; and each one gives form to his own life 
 in his knowledge systems. Bosanquet says, ''Knowledge is the medium 
 in which our world, as an interrelated whole, exists for us"; and again, 
 "Knowledge is the metal construction of reality." 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, ad lib. 
 
 Porter, Human Intellect, Index. 
 
 SuUy, Human Mind, Vol. I, pp. 483, 501. 
 
 Ward, Art in Encyclopaedia Britannica, p. 75 et seq. 
 
 Fullerton, System of Metaphynsics, pp. 63-70. 
 
 Montgomery, Philosophical Problems, etc., Index. 
 
 Hamilton, D. H., Autology, p. 279 et seq. 
 
 Lang, Primer of General Method, Contents. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 81-85, 156-158. 201-204, 210-213. 
 
 Wenzlaff, Mental Man, Index. 
 
 Baillie, Idealistic Construction of Experience, p. 44, et seq. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of General Philosophy, Index. 
 
 Hoffding, Problems of Philosophy, Index. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 73 
 
 Chapter VI — Affection 
 
 49. Affection (more commonly called ''feeling") is the subjective 
 aspect of experience as it relates to the experiencing person. It is con- 
 sciousness of worth, or the lack of it, in the experience for the life of which 
 it is a part. It is distinguished on the one hand from the objective cogni- 
 tive content of the experience, and on the other from its active volitional 
 expression. It is in feeling that volitional activity and cognitive growth 
 become significant in the appreciation or the personal self; feeling is 
 subjective valuing of mental states and processes. Since knowing in all 
 its forms has objective reference while feeling has reference solely to the 
 experiencing person, knowledge and feeling have been distinguished as 
 ''objective consciousness" and "subjective consciousness". They are 
 the outer and inner aspects of conscious life. 
 
 The technical use of the term "feeling" in Psychology to denote the 
 inner affective phase of conscious life should be clearly distinguished from 
 the common use to denote cognitive touching. Feeling a piece of cloth 
 is "active touching", as looking is "active seeing", and listening is "act- 
 ive hearing"; they are all cognitive aspects of experience. To know the 
 coldness of ice by "feeling" it in contact with the end-organs of tempera- 
 ture is a phase of experience clearly distinguishable from the pleasant- 
 ness or unpleasantness of its affective valuation. 
 
 50. Experiences are valued by the personal self according to their 
 contribution to its development; those that promote life are welcomed and 
 enjoyed, while those that interfere with or destroy life are rejected and 
 disliked. Every experience is a metabolic process, altering the life struct- 
 ure in both its mental and its bodily aspects. If it is anabolic, building 
 up the organic structure, it is agreeable; but if it is catabolic, tearing down 
 the structure, it is disagreeable. In general, the feeling aspects of 
 those experiences that promote life are pleasant, while the feeling aspect of 
 those that retard life are unpleasant. Thus, the fundamental classi- 
 fication of experiences as "pleasant" and "unpleasant" depends upon 
 their subjective significance to the life in thich they occur. Baldwin 
 says "Feeling is the sense in the mind that it is itself in some way influenc- 
 ed for good or ill by what goes on within it"; and Beaunis (quoted by 
 Ribot) says, "Agreeable states are the correlatives of actions which con- 
 duce to the well-being or preservation of the individual." 
 
 The affective, or feeling, phase of consciousness is a kind of life 
 thermometer, which rises in satisfaction as the experience contributes 
 to the life, and falls as the experience detracts from the life. In general, 
 the pleasantness of an experience is a valid index to its value in the life; 
 and unpleasantness in a normal healthy life indicates objectionable ex- 
 perience. Thus, Ebinghause says, "Pleasantness indicates that the 
 impressions made upon the organism are adapted to the needs or capaci- 
 ties of the organism, or at least to that part of the organism which is 
 directly affected; unpleasantness indicates that the impressions are ill 
 
74 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 adapted or harmful." Similarly Murray says, ''Pleasure is the con- 
 sciousness arising from the stimulation of a mental state to its normal 
 limit, and no further; pain is the consciousness arising from a mental 
 state being strained beyond, or restrained within, that limit". While 
 this figure of the thermometer refers to the consciousness of the rising 
 and falling of the life current, it should not be understood to imply an 
 affective "zero-point"; there is no experience that is feelingless. 
 
 A curious lack of scientific precision in analysis of experience is 
 shown by many psychologists in their discussion of "pleasure " and " pain ' 
 as "forms of feeling". While we may admit that "feeling is practically 
 summed up for us in the two mutually related words pleasure and pain, " 
 we should not overlook the fact that these two words signify more than 
 mere subjective "feeling" of an experience. They each designate mental 
 facts in which both a cognitive and an affective phase may be discrimi- 
 nated. The cognitive phase of the pain of toothache originates in sens- 
 ing the disturbed state of the body mechanism, and it is similar in every 
 respect to "knowing" the yellow of a dandelion in the sensation referred 
 to the retina. To the critical student of conscious mental events, these 
 knowings are equally distinct from their concomitant feelings; and there 
 is no more reason for treating "pain" as exclusively feehng than for 
 treating "color" so. 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, pp. 165-166. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 246-249. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 225-240, 263. 
 
 Titchener, Psychology of Feeling and Attention, ad lib. 
 
 Ribot, Psychology of the Emotions, pp. 31-32, 49-60. 
 
 Marshall, Consciousness, pp. 497-505. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 225-230. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Vol. I, pp. 115-122, Vol. II, p. 268 et seq. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 210-240. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 258-271. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, p. 256 et seq. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, Index. 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, p. 371 et seq. 
 
 Hoffding, Outhnes of Psychology, p 221 et seq. ad hb. 
 
 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 473 et seq. 
 
 Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, Index. 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 163-196. 
 
 Davis, Elements of Psychology, pp. 239-257. 
 
 Morgan, Psychology for Teachers, pp. 44-48. 
 
 51. Feelings are commonly classified as "sensuous feelings" and 
 "ideational feelings", sometimes called "lower" and "higher" feelings, 
 as they accompany "lower" and "higher" forms of cognition. Sensuous 
 feelings orginate in sense-perception through body states; they are the 
 pleasant-unpleasant valuation of experiences directly connected with 
 sensations. Ideational feelings are the affective phases of the higher, 
 elaborated cognitions of "emotions" and "sentiments"; they are like 
 sensuous feelings in that the satisfaction or dissatisfaction indicates an 
 anabolic or catabolic effect of the mental state upon the whole life struct- 
 ure. 
 
 Two important sub-olasses of sensuous feelings may be distinguished : 
 the first comprises the satisfactions and dissatisfactions accompanying 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 75 
 
 sensations localized in definite sense-organs, as in smelling and hearing, 
 and the second, the pleasantness and unpleasantnesses accompanying 
 cognitions of general bodily states, as weariness, well-being, etc. In 
 the first the subjective valuings of experiences are immediately referred 
 to '^ organs of special sense"; in the second they are vaguely associated 
 with what are called '^ systemic", or ''organic sensations". To 
 know weariness and to be aware of the disagreeableness of it are readily 
 compared with knowing the odor of a carnation and accepting its pleasant- 
 ness. 
 
 In the ''bodily appetites", which are commonly classed as feelings, 
 the three aspects of cognitive anticipation, affective valuing, and im- 
 pulsive seeking are readily distinguished. An appetite is the hunger of 
 the organism for larger life; it includes a sense of lack, an apprehension 
 of that which will supply the lack, and the going out in active desire for 
 such life material. An appetite is as truly cognitive and volitional as it 
 is affective. 
 
 References 
 
 Wenzlaff, Mental Man, pp. 131-135. 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 401-403, 404 at seq., 470 et seq. 
 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, p. 196. 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, p. 175 et seq. 
 
 Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 173-188. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, p. 473. 
 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, p. 231. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 270-271. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 246-346 ad lib. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, p. 246. 
 
 Halleck, Psychology and Psychic Culture, p. 246 et seq. 
 
 Read, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 146-148. 
 
 52. The discussion centering about the "James-Lange Theory of 
 Emotions" has contributed much, positively and negatively, to a better 
 understanding of the nature of all affective phases of consciousness. This 
 view, which finds the origin of the emotion not in the cognitive image 
 but in its concomitant body-state, is in striking contrast with the view 
 that regards the body-state as the "expression of the emotion". James 
 says, "we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid be- 
 cause we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are 
 sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be." According to this theory 
 the affective-state originates in, depends upon, or is caused by the body- 
 state, which is itself the immediate result of the cognitive-process; thus, 
 as Angell states it, "we never feel afraid unless we have already made 
 certain of the motor reactions which characterize fear," and the body- 
 states are " not merely expressions, they are rather indispensible causal 
 factors producing the psychical condition which we all recognize when 
 we experience it as the genuine emotion." According to the older and 
 what is still the more common view, the bear is seen, the fear is felt, and 
 the body trembles; according to the James-Lange view, the bear is seen 
 
76 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 the body trembles, and the fear is felt, In the one, the feeling of fear 
 preceded and causes the trembhng of the body; in the other, the trembling 
 of the body with the rising of the hair on the scalp precedes and causes 
 the feeling of fear. In the common theory the feeling originates directly 
 in knowing the fearful object and the body-state is but the physiological 
 accompaniment of the cognitive-affective mental state, while in the 
 James Lange theory the feeling of fear springs from the knowledge that 
 the body is trembling and the hair ''standing on end, " which state of the 
 body is thought to arise directly from knowing the fearful object. Re- 
 duced to its lowest terms, the whole question, so vigorously discussed for 
 a quarter of a century, is whether the order of procedure in such an ex- 
 perience is knowing the bear, feeling the scare, and raising the hair; or 
 knowing the bear, raising the hair, and feeling the scare. If it were not 
 for certain important implications of these theories, the whole might be 
 ignored by the student as a question of ''tweedledum and tweedledee. " 
 
 The heart of James's whole contention is in the claim that the body- 
 state is due to the instinctive or reflex reaction of the organism to the 
 exte?nal stimulus without the subjective valuing of feeling. He claims 
 that the motor reaction in jbhe body structure is feelingless, and that the 
 feeling is at most but a consequent index to the changed state of the or- 
 ganic structure. He says "My theory is that the bodily changes follow 
 directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the 
 same changes as they occur is the emotion"; and "The emotion is nothing 
 but the feeling of a bodily state, and it has a purely bodily cause. " Stout 
 states James's view (which he opposes) thus, "The emotion arises as a 
 kind of back-stroke. The primary nervous excitement must overflow 
 through efferent nerves, producing changes in the internal organs which in 
 their turn give rise to organic sensations. It is the organic sensations thus 
 produced which constitute the emotions." This considers the emotion 
 the subjective accompaniment of the instinctive reaction to the stimulus 
 of certain situations; the stimulus directly arouses the vital reaction 
 and the altered state of the body thus produced gives rise to the feeling 
 of pleasure or displeasure. 
 
 The important truth lying back of the James theory is that the 
 motor activity in response to a situation is essential to the existence of 
 feeling. Feeling is a subjective valuing of a life event, as that event -is 
 a "motor discharge" in body tissues. To have an emotion one must 
 act; or as Dewey puts it, "Feeling is an accompaniment of activity." 
 The fundamental error, frequently recurring in both sides of the dis- 
 cussion of this theory, is the assumption that there is a temporal causal 
 order in the aspects of the experience. It is assumed on the one side that 
 there is first cognition, then feeling, and then body change; or on the other 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 77 
 
 side, that there is first cognition, second bod}' change, and third feeUng, 
 in causally related sequence. The truth, negatively stated, is that 
 neither is the feeling a causal antecedent of the body-state nor is the 
 body-state a casual antecedent of the feeling. The affective phase of 
 the experience, whether '^ lower '* (''sensuous") or '' higher" ''(ideational") 
 inheres in the life event on the same level as the cognitive and conative 
 phases, and is not in any sense derivative from either of them or from both 
 of them combined. The state of the body, the cognitive activity, and 
 the affective- appreciation are but distinguishable aspects of a life event; 
 and one of them is no more the "effect" of another than the "form" of 
 the table is the effect of its "color". 
 
 This discussion of the cause-and-effect order of the aspects of ex- 
 perience is a notable example of pseudo-scientific analysis in Psychology. 
 An event in a human life cannot be separated into "processes" with 
 causal connection and a time order; there is no "body process" with 
 which the psychologist has any concern, no "cognitive process" as a 
 discrete existence apart from the state of the body and the subjective 
 valuing, and no "affective process" of quasi-independent course. ; The 
 experience, however complex it may appear in its various aspects, is one 
 fact in the field of Psychology, one "process" in consciousness. Psy- 
 chological analysis is necessarily an aspecting; it can never be m^vde a 
 partitioning. Each science transforms reality for its own purposes, and 
 the scientists in any field must determine the vieT\'point and methcd of 
 their study. The immediate matter of Psychology is the personal ex- 
 perience as given in consciousness; and the analysis demanded for its 
 description and explanation gives its sj^nchronous phases. Neither 
 general Biology nor Psychology requires such an artificial separation 
 into "part-processes" as the contestants on both sides of this contro- 
 versy appear to accept. 
 
 References 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 474-489. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, pp. 375-390. 
 
 Villa, Contemporary Psychology, pp. 191-200. 
 
 Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, p. 193. 
 
 Ribot, Psychology of the Emotions, pp. 93-97. 
 
 Sully, Human Mind, Vol. II, p. 58. 
 
 Thorndike, Elements of Psychology, pp. 172-173. 
 
 Murray, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 397-401. 
 
 Marshall, Consciousness, pp. 109-111. 
 
 Mitchell, Structure and Growth of the Mind, p. 506 et seq. 
 
 Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology, p. 519. 
 
 Wenzlaff, The Mental Man, pp. 120-123. 
 
 Stout, Manual Psychology, pp. 289-297. 
 
 Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, pp. 192-195. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 316-318. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 246-346 ad lib. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 273-277. 
 
 53. Two classes of "higher", or Ideational Feelings are commonly 
 distinguished: Emotions and Sentiments. These varieties of the affec- 
 tive aspect of consciousness are alike in their complexity; they are not 
 
78 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 simple feelings, but are life events and attitudes characterized by domi- -^ 
 nant feeling tones. Sentiments differ from emotions in that they are 
 relatively more permanent and less intense. Emotions, viewed purely 
 as affections, are transient feelings, while sentiments are abiding emotional 
 dispositions; emotions are mental complexes characterized by strong 
 feelings, while sentiments are somewhat permanent qualities of the per- 
 sonal self as it gives appreciative valuation to its experiences. Senti- 
 ments are often predispositions to emotions, rising in intensity and cona- 
 tive impulse to become emotions; on the other hand, emotional states 
 msLj become fixed in sentiments as ''affective dispositions. " 
 
 While this classification of the so-called ''higher feelings" as Emo- 
 tions and Sentiments appears to be convenient, if not necessary under the 
 loose terminology of Psychology and the demands of popular speech, for 
 the description and explanation of psychical processes and events, it 
 does not meet the demands of critical science, in that there is no well- 
 deflued basis for the distinction and in that it ignores important elements 
 in the facts themselves. The difficulty in classifying feelings, "lower" 
 and "'higher" alike, i. e., all affective aspects of conscious life, arises from 
 confusing the 'cognitive and conative aspects of experience with the affec- 
 tive aspect. It is probable that if attention were rigorously directed to 
 the subjective valuing of feeling exclusively, the only distinction dis- 
 coverable in the whole field would be that of pleasantness and unpleasant- 
 ness connected with various intellectual and emotional activities. In the 
 investigation of the affective phase of conscious life the psychologists 
 appear to lose sight of the peculiar abstraction with which they are deal- 
 ing in a loose description of a complex of all aspects of the subject matter. 
 
 54. Emotions are complex mental states characterized by notable 
 disturbance of the affective equilibrium. They are prominent affective 
 phases of the more elaborated cognitions and impulses. "An emotion" 
 as an event in personal life has a discrete unity in which the three phases 
 of knowing, feeling, and willing are readily discernible. While it is 
 essentially a subjective feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, it origi- 
 nates in the cognition of a situation and realizes itself in active impulse. 
 The core of the emotion is the idea structure; its meaning is the sub- 
 jective valuation; and its form is the active expression. By the very 
 etymology of its name, an emotion is an "out-moving"; it is the con- 
 scious self moving outward in expression of the satisfaction or dissatis- 
 faction of its own state Just as a cognition is a taking in, so an emotion 
 is a going out; and it is this going out that makes the emotion so much a 
 matter of "body expression". An emotion is always a personal attitude 
 toward some object, as to be angry is to be angry with some one, or to 
 be sorry is to be sorry for some thing. An emotion is a feeling attendant 
 ipon an idea and directed toward some object. 
 
 An emotion arises spontaneously under certain conditions. It runs its 
 course briefly, usually growing up to a maximum stage and then as slowly 
 
79 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 declining; or it may grow up to a climax of intensity, and give way sud- 
 denly to a reaction, or "revulsion". An emotion may be cultivated in 
 its progress to a more rapid or larger growth by the intensifying imagina- 
 tion. Emotions grow through expression; and ''the inhibition of ex- 
 pression means the death of the emotion". 
 
 Emotion differs from simple pleasure-pain feelings in that they are 
 referred to ideas, while feelings are referred to body states. They are 
 more complex than the sensuous feelings, since their cognitive concomi- 
 tants are more developed. This is easily seen by comparing introspec- 
 tivety the unpleasantness of a toothache with the sorrow in learning of 
 the death of a friend. They also differ from sensuous feelings in their 
 conative impulse; sensuous feelings are subjective valuings of "things 
 as they are", while emotions face outward to "things as they should be". 
 
 The definition of an emotion in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy 
 and Psychology, for which Stout and Baldwin are jointly responsible, 
 is exceptionally good; it recognizes the presence of the cognitive and 
 conative elements and places the emphasis justly upon the affective 
 aspect of the mental complex. They say, an emotion is "a total state of 
 consciousness considered as involving a distinctive feeling-tone and a 
 characteristic trend of activity aroused by a certain situation which is 
 either perceived or ideally represented". We have recognized here (a) 
 a dominant feeling, (b) a trend of activity, and (c) an apprehension of a 
 situation. With characteristic clearness Yerkes says, "Our emotions 
 are complex experiences made up of cognitive processes, feelings, and' 
 volitions. They are classed with feelings simply because in them feelings 
 usually are predominantly important". It should however, be noted 
 that, while these complex mental states are emphatically affective and 
 impulsive in nature, the feelings and impulses originate in the knowledge 
 of the situation, and often the cognitive core is the chief thing revealed 
 by introspection. 
 
 References 
 
 Stout, Groundwork of Psychology, pp. 188-197. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 284-288. 
 
 Baldwin, Elements of Psychology, p. 266 et seq. 
 
 Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 177-182. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 315-339. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 297-308. 
 
 Calkins, First Book in Psychology, p. 170 et seq. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, pp. 175-182. 
 
 Ladd, Outhnes of Descriptive Psychology, pp. 238-239. 
 
 Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 534 et seq. 
 
 Ebinghause, Psychology, (Meyer's trans.), pp. 168-172. 
 
 Kulpe, Outhnes of Psychology, (Titchener's trans.), pp. 320-333. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 272-278. 
 
 Bain, Mental Science, p. 215 et seq. 
 
 55. Numerous schemes have been proposed in the Classification 
 of Emotions most of which are lacking in scientific clearness and pre- 
 cision. A very common classification is into Egostic Emotions, Altru- 
 istic Emotions, and Cosmic Emotions, meaning by egoistic emotions 
 those idealistic feelings that center in the welfare of self as distinguished 
 from those that have other objective centers, such as joy, content, dis- 
 
80 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 appointment, etc.; by altruistic emotions, those that center in the wel- 
 fare of others, either benevolent or malevolent in their impulses, such as 
 pity, malice, etc.; by cosmic emotions, those that center in the true, the 
 beautiful and the good, as they are appreciatively perceived in the en- 
 vironing world, such as delight in the discernment of truth, pleasure in 
 the perfection of form, etc„ 
 
 This distinction of ''egoistic", ''altruistic" and "cotoic" emotions 
 is worthless in any critical study of the affect've aspect of experience, 
 since it depends rather upon the cognitive and volitional aspects. Joy 
 and love may differ intrinsically as cognitions and impulses in that they 
 respectively pertain to self or others, but as affective aspects of life they 
 are alike pleasant. All emotions are essentially subjective valuing from 
 our own standpoints, and in a very important sense they are all self- 
 centered, or "egoistic". While as an "ideational feeling", or idea-cen- 
 tered feeling, every emotion originates in knowledge of some object and 
 impulsively seeks the welfare (or ill-fare) of something, strictly as a feel- 
 ing it begins and ends with the self. 
 
 Another ingenious classification is based primarily upon the time 
 aspect of this cognitive-affective activity. This scheme is logically 
 developed somewhat as follows: 
 
 r Immediate X^^^' gladness, content, etc. 
 
 L Sorrow, depression, discontent, etc. 
 
 Emotions I Prospective | H^Pe. courage, etc. 
 j ^ [^ Fear, cowardice, etc. 
 
 I Retrospective ||^*'«ff*'°"' self-gratulation, etc. 
 L . I^Kegret, reproach, etc. 
 
 Such a classification as this is of interest to the student of Psychology 
 only in affording him opportunity to discriminate the peculiar cognitive 
 or volitional ingredient in each form of experience that causes it to be 
 grouped as of the present, the future, or the past. It certainly has little 
 warrant or value in well defined scientific analysis. 
 
 This whole subject of kinds of emotions has been so confused by lack 
 of logical basis in classification and strict limitation of the matter in 
 hand that it is extremely difficult to determine what groupings are most 
 advantageous for the beginner in general Psychology. Probably Titchen- 
 er's statement that "there are two kinds of emotions, the pleasant and 
 the unpleasant," is the safest, if he and others would but hold to it. 
 Pillsbury, after accepting this purely affective basis for classifying 
 emotions, says, "Emotions are either pleasant, unpleasant, or, like 
 surprise, indifferent." Is surprise truly "indifferent", that is, without 
 feeling quality? It is not to be wondered at that a scientist who would 
 make such a statement would find; "The outcome of all the historic 
 attempts at classification is disappointment." The cause of all this 
 confusion is not far to seek : the term emotions is used to designate forms 
 of experience in their three aspects of knowledge, feeUng, and action, and 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 81 
 
 in the various classifications of these complex mental events the basis 
 is at times affective, again conative, and again cognitive. If, as we have 
 here done, we define emotions as ^'ideational feelings", to be studied as 
 feelings and classified as feelings, ignoring, in the abstraction of scientific 
 analysis, the knowing and mlling aspects, there wall be no confusing of 
 bases. Emotions, like the lower ''sensuous feelings", are primarily of 
 two kinds; pleasant emotions and unpleasant emotions. These two 
 fundamental classes may, however, be subdivided on the secondary 
 bases of cognitive and conative elements into such subordinate classes 
 as will serve the purposes of detailed description. 
 
 When, for example, we call joy an "emotion", the term connotes 
 the entire experience with emphasis upon its affective phase. For the 
 purpose of our descriptive science, however, we regard it as purely ''a 
 feeling." It is a pleasant feeling due to the anabolic assimilation of 
 valued life materials in healthful action. In the description and explana- 
 tion of experiences scientific analysis deals with the three phases separate- 
 ly; and there need be no con'^usion in such study, if we wi^l accept the 
 restriction of the abstraction. 
 
 References 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 489-493. 
 Calkins, First Book in Psychology, p. 175 et seq. 
 Thorndike, Elements of Psychology, pp. 75-81. 
 Kulpe, Outlines of Psychology, pp. 322-326. 
 Halleck, Psychology and Psychic Culture, pp. 253-272. 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, p. 278. 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 454. 
 BueU, Essentials of Psychology, p. 190. 
 Putnam, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 166-185. 
 Robertson, Elements of Psychology, p. 206 et seq. 
 Maher, Psychology, pp. 446-449. 
 Patrick, Psychology for Teachers, p. 285 et seq. 
 Baker, Elementary Psychology, p. 180 et seq. 
 
 56. An apparent antagonism of feeling and knowing has led to 
 such fallacious statements in some textbooks on Psychology as, ''We can 
 not know intensely and feel or will intensely at the same time; or feel 
 intensely and know or will intensely at the same time. " The truth, on 
 the contrary, is that feeling quickens thinking and increases volitional 
 activity. "Under the stimulus of strong feeling a man will accomplish 
 (both in intellection and in executive action) what he would not have 
 believed himself capable of performing. " This is not only true when the 
 feeling is the natural subjective concomitant of the particular knowing 
 process, that is, the appreciative enjoyment of a definite intellectual 
 activity, but it is also true at times when a strong feeling tone suffuses 
 the whole mind and renders more vigorous all its action, whether related 
 to the source of the emotion or not. Are not some of the brilliant passages 
 of "Rasselas" due to the fact that Johnson wrote the book "in the even- 
 ings of a single week" to pay his mother's funeral expenses? The 
 
82 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 statement that 'Hhe current of thought and the current of feeUng at 
 times flow in opposite direction" is due to an erroneous conception of 
 the nature of f eehng. The same writer speaks of thinking and f eehng 
 as 'Hwo activities to be brought into harmony"! And again he says, 
 "Profound thinking may thus overcome and exclude all feeling; or very 
 intense feeling may exclude all possibility of connected thinking. " Much 
 more of similar tenor might be quoted from various writers of greater 
 or less authority in Psychology, all of which reveals very vague concep- 
 tions of the nature of emotions and a prevalent lack of scientific analysis 
 in the study of conscious experience. The way out of all this confusion 
 would appear to be plain enough. If "experiences" are to be studied 
 in their three aspects of knowing, feeling, and willing, then when we are 
 critically investigating one of these aspects, abstracted from the others 
 for that purpose, the others for the time being should be rigorously 
 ignored^that is, v>"hen we are describing and explaining the affective 
 aspect as "emotion", the cognitive and conative aspects cannot be 
 recognized as determining "forms of feeling. " 
 
 Thus, to distinguish "prejudice", "envy" and "ambition" as 
 "kinds of emotions" through their cognitive phases is as meaningless 
 for the purposes of science as to group bits of ore in the qualitative an- 
 alysis of the mineralogist into classes as to their squareness, roundness, 
 etc. If the elemental composition is what is considered, that isexclus- 
 sively one thing; but if the geometric forms of the lumps are considered, 
 that is an entirely irrelevant matter. Both cannot be dealt with 
 simultaneously in any true scientific study. Similarly any critical study 
 of the affective phase of experience should not be obscured by consider- 
 ing concomitant aspects of knowing and willing. 
 
 References 
 
 Gordy, New Psychology, pp. 155-156. 
 Halleck, Psychology and Psychic Culture, p. 178. 
 Putnam, Textbook of Psychology, p. 147. 
 Patiick, Psychology for Teachers, pp. 294-295. 
 
 57. Sentiments are " emotional dispostions " connected with certain 
 ideal constructions of what ought to be rather than the more definite 
 ideational feelings of what actually is. A sentiment is a prevailing 
 emotional tone accompanying a complex form of ideation or judgment, 
 a sort of 'general susceptibility to certain kinds of emotions.' Such 
 affective phases of conscious life are related to emotions somewhat as 
 climate is related to states of weather; they are both permanent back- 
 grounds and prevalent forms of manifestation. Stout says, "a senti- 
 ment is constituted by the manifold emotions in which it manifests itself;" 
 thus, the sentiment of patriotism may be viewed as the totality of emotions 
 comprised in a general benevolent attitude toward one's country. While 
 the totality of ideational feelings in the sentiment of patriotism is in 
 general "well-wishing" toward the countrJ^ the constituent emotions 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 83 
 
 have various forms; thus, one's love for his country may be manifested 
 in malevolent feelings toward its enemies. To have patriotic sentiment 
 one must know his country appreciatively; and just as such knowledge 
 may include in its details ideas of something that are not for the country's 
 good, so the emotions connected with the ideas of these unfavorable 
 facts may be unpleasant. 
 
 A sentiment is an abstraction that is never given in consciousness 
 in its entirety. It is a kind of substantial background which may rise 
 into emotions of various kinds. Thus Stout correctly says, ^'Such a 
 sentiment as friendship cannot be experienced in its totalitj^ at any one 
 moment." Sentiments arise out of ideal constructions of thought to 
 which no definite objectified situation corresponds, hence they lack in 
 individual clearness and intensity. While an emotion may originate 
 directly in awareness of a situation, a sentiment depends upon a more 
 elaborate and abiding embodiment of thought in character. Sentiments 
 doubtless originate in concrete bodil}^ feelings in perceptual experiencing, 
 but they develop into relatively permanent subjective tones and atti- 
 tudes. As affective phases of consciousness they are less intense than 
 emotions, because they are further removed from sensuous feelings. 
 The awareness of sentiments appears to be rather the consciousness of 
 self in organic character than consciousness of an experiential event in 
 the progress of the self. A man's awareness of his sentiment of honest}' 
 is certainly not a consciousness of satisfaction or dissatisfaction in a 
 particular fact of his life. Viewed exclusively as affections, sentiments 
 are subjective valuings of life in its highest levels, the finding of pleasure 
 in the greater movements of self-realization. In his sentiments a man 
 enjoys his most worthy treasures, either as actually present or anticipated 
 in natural growth. 
 
 The student should note here, once more, that the difficulty in dis- 
 cussing the nature of sentiments arises from confusing the affections with 
 the cognitive and volitional aspects of conscious life. The names of 
 the various sentiments designate mental facts in which the three phases 
 of feehng, knowing and willing are easily distinguishable in psychological 
 analysis. The important thing when studying them as feelings is to 
 rigorously exclude from the analysis the other two concomitant aspects 
 which are inseparably a part of them and to treat them by abstraction 
 as mere feelings. 
 
 References 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology,, pp. 575-580. 
 
 Angell, Psychology, p. 336. 
 
 Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, p. 185. 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 498-500. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, p. 182. 
 
 Read, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 267-271. 
 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, pp. 189-192. 
 
84 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 58. Three great classes of sentiments are commonly recognized : 
 intellectual sentiments, or ''love of truth"; aesthetic sentiments, or 
 ''admiration of beauty"; and ethical sentiments, or "reverence for good- 
 ness." The basis of this classification is found in the common trich- 
 otomy of experience as knowing, feeling and willing. "The true" is 
 the perfect in knowing; "the beautiful" is the perfect in feeling; and 
 "the good" is the perfect in willing. The sentiments are satisfaction 
 in the ideals of perfection in the three great aspects of human Kfe. It is 
 in the sentiments that the soul finds its highest forms of subjective ap- 
 preciation of its possibilities, valuing its own realities from the three 
 points of view of its ideally perfect life. 
 
 Other classes of sentiments have been recognized, such as "religious 
 sentiments, " etc.. but there would appear to be no need for such additional 
 classes. The so-called "religious sentiments", for example, owe their 
 separate grouping to an artificial distinction between "the right" and 
 "the good." 
 
 Intellectual Sentiments are eternal satisfaction in right knowing. 
 The human mind by its very nature enjoys its own cognitive growth; 
 all true knowledge is satisfying. Logicians have distinguished two forms 
 of truth: the "truth of fact", or concord of fact with fact; and the "truth 
 of conception", or the concord of knowledge with its object. In the last 
 analysis these two are the same, and psychologically they are on the 
 affective side "the pleasure of knowledge for its own sake". This senti- 
 ment, common in some degree to all men, is a passion in some ; it is often 
 said that the characteristic fact about the life of John Locke was his 
 "love of truth". 
 
 Aesthetic Sentiments are the fundamental agreeableness of the harm- 
 ony of sensuous feelings. Intellectual sentiments depend upon the agree- 
 ment of a part with complemental parts in the whole of cognitive life; 
 aesthetic sentiments depend upon a balanced agreement of all parts in 
 a whole, a harmonious blending of all in perfection of form, of sound, etc. 
 While this "sentiment of beauty" has its objective cause and hence its 
 cognitive sensuous element, it is essentially a feeling of pleasure in the 
 subjective state. It is due to sensing the ideal as presented by the imag- 
 ination; Hegel defined beauty as "the ideal as it reveals itself to sense", 
 and probably no simpler definition of aesthetic sentiment can be given 
 than "love of the beautiful". 
 
 Ethical Sentiments are satisfaction in ideal human conduct. Just 
 as perfect knowledge gives rise to intellectual sentiment and pefect 
 sensuous ideals give rise to aesthetic sentiment, so perfect action in rela- 
 tion to others gives rise to ethical sentiment. The science of Ethics 
 deals with the ideal in human conduct, that is, with perfection in rational 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 85 
 
 action in the social world; and the ethical sentiment is the pleasure 
 which springs from contemplation of such constructive participation 
 in the lives of others. The moral sentiment gives "worthiness" to con- 
 duct as possible self-realization. 
 
 It is an error to identify ethical sentiment with "conscience", as 
 that term is used in the science of Ethics. Ethical sentiment is merely- 
 the feeling of satisfaction in ideal conduct, while conscience is essentially 
 an impulse to such conduct. There is no more "feeling of obligation" 
 in ethical sentiment than in intellectual sentiment or aesthetic sentiment. 
 One is "impelled" to perfect knowledge as he is to perfect feeling and to 
 perfect doing, but this impulsion is clearly distinguishable from the mere 
 agreeableness of such knowing, feeling, or doing. While the sentiments 
 as given in conscious experience are all inseparably connected with know- 
 ing and doing, they are in the abstraction of scientific analysis exclu- 
 sively affective in character. 
 
 References 
 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psycholog}', pp. 500-503. 
 
 Read, Introductory Psychology, pp. 267-268. 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, pp. 183-189. 
 
 Bald^an, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. II, p. 521. 
 
 59. There are certain terms relating to affective aspects of experi- 
 ence, used loosely in common speech and in troublesome confusion in 
 scientific description, that demand brief explanation. Such are "mood' ', 
 ^temperament", "disposition", "passion", etc. 
 
 Moods are somewhat prolonged emotional states of exhileration or 
 depression. While a mood is in general but a continuous emotion, it 
 differs from a true emotion both in its weaker affective quality and its 
 lack of a definite object or occasion. It resembles a sentiment in that 
 it is a prevailing predisposition to a class of emotions. Moods may shift 
 from general satisfaction to general dissatisfaction with life's experiences; 
 and persons in whom such changing states are quite pronounced are said 
 to be "moody". 
 
 "A Temperament is a mood that is permanent". It is a fixed 
 emotional character, an "affective congenital constitution" which gives 
 character to all of life's ideational feehngs. It is a life-long predisposi 
 tion to one kind of moods, just as moods are periodic predispositions to 
 kinds of emotions. Four such temperamental characters, or "tempers", 
 have long been distinguished: "sanguine", "choleric", "melancholic", 
 and "phlegmatic". 
 
 A Disposition, like a temperament, is an abiding characteristic, 
 dependent, commonly, upon inherited organic structure. It differs 
 
86 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 from a temperament in stressing the will more than the feelings. The 
 commonly recognized forms are ".energetic", ''sluggish", ''excitable", 
 etc. 
 
 Passions are "strong, uncontrolled emotional dispositions," They 
 are intense and relatively permanent emotional states, differing from 
 emotions on the one side in that they are more abiding, and from temper- 
 aments on the other in that they are more intense and more specifically 
 directed. One may have "a passion for gambling", "a passion for 
 flowers", etc. 
 
 References 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychologj, pp. 281-282. 
 Titcbener, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 497-498. 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, p. 210 et seq. 
 Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 182-183. 
 Angell, Psychology, p. 335. 
 Putnam, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 162-163. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 87 
 
 Chapter VII — Conation 
 
 60. Willing is the active aspect of conscious experience. It is 
 the third phase of a mental life event, coordinate with knowing as con- 
 scious growth and feeling as conscious valuing. In modern Psychology 
 the term conation has largely taken the place of the term willing, or 'Svill" 
 to designate the whole activity of a living organism conceived as depend- 
 ent upon its spontaneity. The new term, however, includes much that 
 does not come properly within the field of Psychology. The active 
 striving for life by plants, as well as by all forms of animal organisms, 
 is ''conation" (conor, to strive) ; but there is a distinct gain to Psychology 
 in restricting the term ''will" to conscious effort. Even in this limited 
 use of the word two meanings may be distingished : broadly, it includes 
 all mental action as given in consciousness, whether "impulsive" or 
 " dehberative " ; and in the narrow^est sense, it designates "the settle- 
 ment by the self of a psychic issue" in true "volition". 
 
 As an aspect of vital activity wilHng should be clearly distinguished 
 from concomitant movements of the body, either massic or molecular. 
 It is strictly "mental activity"; it is not space-conditioned, and its "pro- 
 cesses" do not involve change of place. The movements, or "motions", 
 in the fabric of tissues or in the relative locations of the body organs are 
 matters of Physiology, to be described and explained in terms of cause and 
 effect in a world of matter; on the other hand, the mental process willing 
 is given only in the field of consciousness, cannot be explained in terms 
 of cause and effect, and is to be dealt with strictly by the introspective 
 observation of Psychology. Just as extension in space is essential to 
 matter, so conative activity is essential to mind; and this conative ac- 
 tivity is given in consciousness as "willing". There is no more univer- 
 sally attested fact of human life than that mind is directly aware of its 
 activity as the ultimate form of its self-realization. Critical introspective 
 examination of experiences in the Psychological laboratory reveals the 
 active aspect of all mental events. "In all sensuous perception, in all 
 thought and feeling, there is some activity on the part of the individual. ' ' 
 — Hoffding. Will is the energy of a personal self manifesting itself in 
 consciousness; and there can be no will-less, or strictly passive conscious 
 existence. 
 
 The refusal of some leading psychologists to recognize the ^^dll as 
 "a third conscious element coordinate with cognition and affection" is 
 due principally to a philosophical bias regarding the nature of mind 
 One who persistently refuses to entertain the conception of an integral 
 personal self, spontaneously active and creative of life energy, naturall}'' 
 discovers in his introspective study of an experience only forms of object- 
 seeking knowledge and subjective-valuing feelings; but he who recognizes 
 
88 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 in the coherent unity of a personal hfe the structural realization of a 
 self -active entity discerns just as clearly the conative aspect of each 
 bit of conscious life. Here as elsewhere in science the student discovers 
 most readily what he seeks, and the working hypothesis limits the field 
 of perceptible facts. 
 
 References 
 
 Dewej', Psychology, p. 347 et seq. 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, pp. 226-227. 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, pp. 308-309. 
 Calkins, First Book in Psychology, p. 216 et seq. 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, p. 194 et seq. 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, Index. 
 Patrick, Psycholog}^ for Teachers, p. 298 et seq. 
 
 61. The impulse is the simple will element. It is in its impulses 
 that the self -active mind takes its initial steps toward self-completion 
 by conquest of its environment. The dynamic tendency of the impulse 
 originates in a sense of incompleteness; it is an appetency for completer 
 life. Originating in a feeling of unstable equilibrium in the present 
 state and in a contrast of the possible with the actual, the impulse seeks 
 to complete existing life. Impulses are the primordial manifestations 
 of conscious life; James says, "Consciousness is in its very nature im- 
 pulsive." Just as the kigher forms of will in ''choice" and "purpose" 
 are active expressions of desires for things believed to be attainable, so 
 the impulses express sanguine expectations. Purpose is but a higher 
 rational form of impulse. 
 
 "Impulsive action" is commonly contrasted with "deliberative 
 action" as lacking in definite cognition of its end; thus an impulse is de- 
 fined as "a dynamic tendency of mind to act toward its environment 
 without deliberation ". Similarly in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy 
 and Psychology an impulse is defined as "a conation in so far as it oper- 
 ates through its intrinsic strength, independently of the general system 
 of mental life." In this view impulse differs from choice only in its 
 relative simplicity; and rational growth, in purposed action, consists 
 in bringing constructive order into life's impulses. It is in this way that 
 Sull}^ treats impulses as "those inate promptings of activity in which 
 there is no clear representation of a pleasure, and consequently no dis- 
 tinct desire." 
 
 The conception of the impulse presented here postulates the essential 
 activity of the mind. It accepts as a patent fact the unity of the in- 
 dividual human life. Without such an unqualified admission of the 
 existence of self-activity in the human organism there is no consistent 
 Psychology. Spontaneity is the ultimate fact of sentient life, whether 
 examined in the field of general Biology or in the more limited field of 
 Psychology ; and impulses are discrete forms of spontaneous action, freed 
 from complex motives. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 89 
 
 The "sense of effort", which is characteristic in varying degrees 
 of all vital activity, vague and evanescent in the simplest impulses, be- 
 comes quite pronounced in the more complex forms of purposed action. 
 While it is doubtless due in part at least to the inert resistance of the body 
 mechanism to concomitant changes with the mental processes, intro- 
 spective observation indicates that it has not purely such a negative 
 origin. As an invariable accompaniment of the highest forms of active 
 attention it is certainly not painful or unpleasant as the feeling of resist- 
 ance to free life would be. The unsatisfactory attempts to explain the 
 feeling of effort as due to obstruction of life activity probably show a 
 wrong working hypothesis; life is more than the resistance of death, 
 and mental determination will probably admit of an affirmative naturahs- 
 tic explanation. The highest sense of effort is in the exhilaration of 
 selfdetermined growth. 
 
 References 
 
 Angell, Psychology, pp. 310-314, 
 
 HaUeck, Psychology and Psychic Culture, Index. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 347-358. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 526. 
 
 Kulpe, OutHnes of Psychology, Index. 
 
 Patrick, Psychology for Teachers, p. 34. 
 
 Lindner, Empirical Psychology, pp. 224-226. 
 
 62. Attention is intensified and cognitively directed consciousness. 
 Ladd says,'' Attention is a process of selective focusing of psychic energy". 
 It is essentially an integrating movement of self-organization. Mental 
 life at any moment is a continuum, in which centers of interest are cease- 
 lessly shifting in a more or less complete structural organization At- 
 tention selects the centers and emphasizes their importance for a longer 
 or shorter interval. It brings into clearness and prominence some bit 
 of mental content and thus unifies mind in selective cognition. In em- 
 phasizing a bit of mental life attention increases feeling as well as know- 
 ing; it renders cognition clearer and affection stronger. 
 
 While strictly we attend to mental facts only, centering life in them, 
 we commonly speak of "attending to the external object" which gives 
 rise to the conscious state; thus we speak of attending to the warmth of 
 the stove, when strictly we attend to the conscious state originating in 
 the sensing of such physical heat movement. Much confusion arises, 
 even with our leading psychologists, in treating attention as a matter of 
 knowing the external world objectively, rather than a focusing of mind 
 in its own content. Attention is a form of will which gives relative 
 clearness and intensity to mental content, whether such content is viewed 
 as directly related to some object or not. In attending to itself in 
 definite centers the mind knows and feels more actively. 
 
 It is common to distinguish "involuntary attention" from "vol- 
 untary attention". When the focus of one's consciousness suddenly 
 shifts through some accidental disturbance of the life movement, as the 
 bite of a mosquito, we say "he attends involuntarily", or "because he 
 could not help it". In this so-called involuntary attention, the mere 
 
90 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 force of the stimulus is thought to ^'compel the attention"; on the other 
 hand, in voluntary attention the mind selects unforced from its content 
 its center of interest. In voluntary attention there is commonly 
 a sense of effort in. the choice, while in involuntary attention such feeling- 
 is wholly lacking. The term '^involuntary attention" means merely 
 non- voluntary attention, not attention against the will. 
 
 Designating a form of attention in which the sense of effort is lack- 
 ing or not readily discernible as "involuntary attention" is unfortunate 
 for the purposes of exact science. Attention is will, that is, it is in all 
 its forms activity, self-determined and voluntary. All consciousness 
 is active, even when most diffuse and unorganized, and it centers itself 
 actively whether dehberatively or impulsively. It is a curious blunder 
 CO call this 'involuntary attention" "spontaneous attention"; all mental 
 action is spontaneous. Similarly attention has been called "voluntary 
 consciousness " ; but all consciousness is voluntary. Much of this attempt 
 to distinguish two kinds of attention is a mere matter of degree, and the 
 terms are useless and misleading. 
 
 Interest is the feeling that some fact in one's consciousness is im- 
 portant to the whole self. It fixes the attention in a definite center of 
 the conscious continuum. It is thus a sense of personal concern in a 
 distinct psychosis. What is called "interest" on the subjective side 
 becomes "attention" in object- seeking cognition; interest and attention 
 are strictly but two aspects of the one mental fact. Stout says, "Atten- 
 tion is interest determining cognitive processes"; and Baldwin defines 
 interest as "the impulse to attend". Considered strictly as an affective 
 phase of experience, interest is satisfaction in anticipated growth. The 
 etymology of the word {inter -esse) suggests that the object of interest 
 is between an actual state of the self and a possible completer state; the 
 interesting fact is felt to be in the pathway of natural self-realization, to 
 be an increment in a larger selfhood. It must, however, be noted that 
 "interest in an object" does not depend upon the nature of the object 
 as such, but upon the nature and state of the mind to which the object 
 is presented. As a subjective valuing of a fact of conscious experience, 
 interest is an uncompelled personal matter. It is never merely a passive 
 state of feeling due to a situation; it is "positively active, self-expressive, 
 self-assertive." — Angell. 
 
 The difficulty apparent in this discussion of interest is the common 
 one of all Psychology, namely, the attempt to separate the feeling of 
 interest from the cognition and conation of attention. The term always 
 designates more than mere subjective appreciation; it connotes cognitive 
 and conative striving. 
 
 References 
 
 Calkins, First Book in Psychology, pp. 93-103. 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology pp. 23-31. 
 Titchener, Textbook of Psychology, Index. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 91 
 
 Halleck, Psychology and Psychic Culture, Index. 
 
 James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology, p. 100 et seq. 
 
 James, Briefer Course in Psychology, Index. 
 
 Stout, Analytical Psychology, Index. 
 
 Yerkes, Introduction to Psychology, pp. 292-299. 
 
 Angell, ^Psychology, Index. 
 
 Pillsbury, Essentials of Psychology, p. 104 et seq. 
 
 Dewey, Psychology, pp. 132-148. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, Index. 
 
 Royce, Outlines of Psychology, Index. 
 
 Betts, Mind and its Education, Index. 
 
 63. Choice is preferential action in view of motives. It is definite 
 decision of mental issues in a final resolution of what is held in suspense 
 in deliberation. As executive fiat it commits the self in a preference of 
 a selected object. Choice is self-disposition in relation to cognized ob- 
 jects; it is active self-determination, essentially a fact of will to which the 
 preceding deliberation involving cognition and affection is but a prelude. 
 
 Motives are the conscious facts considered in the deliberations lead- 
 ing to choice. In choice one motive finally becomes the germinant center 
 of the will act, and other motives that have been similarly important in 
 various tentative partial choices in the course of the preceding delibera- 
 tions drop from consciousness. The etymology of the word motive 
 {moveo, to move) may be misleading; thus, it is inaccurately stated that 
 "motives move the will". A motive is not to be regarded as a deter- 
 mining force objectively distinct from one's self; it is one's self in ideas 
 and feelings. Choice is not '^ yielding to motives"; while it involves 
 motives, it is superior to them in the same way that the growing plant 
 is superior to the food elements in the soil and air in which it lives. At 
 most, motives furnish the occasion, not the cause, of the choice. 
 
 Deliberation is a comparative valuing of possible centers of exper- 
 ience. Stout regards it as "a state of unstable equilibrium" in which 
 *'the mind oscillates between alternatives". Deliberation proceeds by 
 many partial choices of motives, until decision cuts short the process in 
 a dominant final choice. ''Deliberation is a series of judgments or active 
 imagings that precede selective and volitional action" (Titchener). In 
 the final choice one judgment is rendered victorious by a decisive execu- 
 tive fiat. In the deliberative process one conative tendency is relatively 
 superior, then another, and so on, until one greater movement sweeps all 
 to a final conclusion. In Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy it is said 
 that "Deliberation is the comparison of alternative courses which per- 
 cede and issue in choice". The determining consideration in this com- 
 parison is the prospective values of such courses to the self as a whole. 
 In deliberation there is cognition of possible actions and a feeling of open 
 alternatives which choice resolves into the acceptance of one action 
 
92 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 with a feeling of satisfaction in a temporarily completed self. It is on 
 account of the cognition of the alternative courses of action in deliberation 
 that it is called ''the intellectual factor of will". 
 
 Decision is the termination of deliberative choice. In it the mind 
 puts the stamp of selective approval upon a particular conscious fact. 
 It denotes the completion of a process of mental construction, which we 
 commonly describe by the declaration ''my mind is made up". In de- 
 cision the mind passes "from a state of suspense to a state of resolution". 
 It terminates "a struggle of motives" by an executive fiat. It is the 
 overt act of choice. Betts says, "Decision consists in mentally agreeing 
 to attend to the images suggesting the accepted line of action and shutting 
 from mind those opposed to it ". It is the mind as a whole that " decides' ^ 
 it is not a mastery by an over- strong contending factor in a disorganized 
 arena. Decision is the typical will act. 
 
 To form any consistent conception of the nature of choice one must 
 hypostatize the existence of a unified mental entity realizing itself in 
 various psychoses, yet superior to them all. Whatever may be thought 
 to be the requirements of modern Psychology as a positive science of 
 mental phenomena, it gains nothing and loses much by the attempt to 
 dissolve integral personality into a mere "stream of processes". Neither 
 philosophical abstractions nor introspective analysis of concrete mental 
 events justifies such a view. On the other hand, the student will find 
 a most productive working hypothesis in the idea of a self active personal 
 will. 
 
 A good example of choice for repeated introspective study is found 
 in the buying of fruit at a f^uit stand on the sidewalk of a city. Note 
 critically the mental facts in considering the varieties of the fruit as it 
 is spread out in tempting array, in recognizing different claims of de- 
 sirableness, in limiting the purchase to one kind of fruit, in making the 
 selection. 
 
 References 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, pp. 528-535. 
 Dewe3% Psychology, pp. 365-368. 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, pp. 585-595. 
 Baker, Elementary Psychology, pp. 210-212. 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, pp. 199-203. 
 
 64. Execution is the carrying into effect in organic bodily activity 
 of the decision of the will. This term implies a misunderstanding of the 
 nature of will activity. Willing is not merely initiative action originat- 
 ing body movements which subsequently continue as effects; it is sus- 
 tained activity characterizing the whole movement. A will decision is 
 continuous throughout the whole body execution; as when I will to raise 
 my hand from the table, I not only will the beginning of the movement,, 
 but I will it all the way up. Willing is not prior deciding what to do; 
 it is doing viewed as mental activity. What one wills he is doing, and 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 93 
 
 his doing ceases with his willing. Willing is self-determined living and 
 is continuous throughout the whole life movement. Conscious life is a 
 succession of will acts, a progressive manifestation of the personal self. 
 
 The term '^ resolution" is sometimes used in Psycholog}^ to denote 
 decision to do what is not immediately done; as, when one resolves to 
 "write that letter after dinner". Bain says it ''indicates the situation 
 of having ceased to deliberate without having begun to act. " The error 
 here, for a little critical study of the facts will show that it is an error, 
 is the separating of a discrete fiat deciding an issue from the progressive 
 will movement of the growing life of which the particular decisive action 
 is but a momentary phase. Willing is progressively accomplishing re- 
 sults, it is the effective phase of life, as distinguished from feeling as the 
 affective phase. The ''purpose" of will is achieved in the purposing. 
 To resolve to do is to do, so far as the life has then progressed; subsequent 
 doing is subsequent willing. Anticipated action is already a fact so far 
 as life has gone; and the material embodiment is progressive purposing 
 seen from the sida of the body mechanism. It is impossible to separate 
 the psychosis of will from the neurosis of body movement. 
 
 65. The question of "the freedom of the will " has been the center 
 of endless philosophical and theological controversy. As students of 
 Psychology we are concerned here with the facts as revealed in introspec- 
 tive observation. We leave to the theologians the reconcihng of these 
 facts with a priori speculations as to the nature of man in his relation to 
 his Creator. Likewise we refuse to be biased by philosophical theories 
 of causation that would include mental entities in a closed circuit of 
 transformable unincreasable forces. In all the centuries of discussion 
 two theories, or rather groups of theories of varying forms, have been 
 distinguished; "necessity" and "free will". Necessity, or "determinism" 
 regards the will in terms of cause and effect, in a mechanical universe 
 whose whole explanation is summed up in the "conservation of energy". 
 Free-will, or "libertarianism", regards willing as the spontaneous, un- 
 caused activity of a free autonomous personality. While the idea of 
 freedom is involved in any rational conception of the will, it does not 
 mean "transcendental freedom" of arbitrary action. By "freedom of 
 the will" we understand natural mental activity spontaneously origi- 
 nated; and the evidence of the existence of such freedom is overwhelm- 
 ingly conclusive in any unbiased observation of the facts of rational 
 human life. Strict "determinism" and strict " trancendental freedom" 
 are alike psychological absurdities. 
 
 To explain the espression "I will" demands a recognition of the 
 unified entity designated by the word "I" and an equal recognition of 
 
94 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 the uncaused activity expressed by the word "will". These are patent 
 facts both in the naive consciousness of the uncritical and in the strictest 
 scientific examination of the forms and elements of human life. There 
 is no more indisputable fact of mind than willing, and willing has no 
 meaning in a mechanical universe. The will is both the beginning and 
 the ending of all psychoses; to will is to live. 
 
 References 
 
 Ladd, Primer of Psychology, p. 205. 
 
 Putnam, Textbook of Psychology, pp. 224-226. 
 
 Baker, Elementary Psychology, p. 218. 
 
 Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 589 et seq. 
 
 James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, p. 569 et seq. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 95 
 
 Questions and Problems. 
 
 1. Define Psychology as a chapter in Biology. 
 
 2. How does the "New Psychology" differ from the "Old Ps}^- 
 chology"? 
 
 3. Does a person "always do what he wants to do"? 
 
 4. Try creating an emotion by acting it out in body expression in 
 accordance with the James-Lange theory. 
 
 5. Is "somid" a physical fact or a mental fact? 
 
 6. What would mental life be without memory? 
 
 7. Close your eyes and bring together the little fingers of your hands, 
 noting in which touch is first perceived or is more definite ; test repeatedly 
 to see whether you can will the cognition in either finger as you choose; 
 note again what effect results when one hand remains stationary and the 
 other is brought to it. 
 
 8. Can a person at will so far annul consciousness as to "think of 
 nothing"? Try it. 
 
 9. Explain the statement that, "Psychology is a genetic study of 
 human nature." 
 
 10. Can you discover any evidences of synaesthesia in your sensing 
 of the material environment? 
 
 11. Clear the table in front of you of all objects; close your eyes 
 and then have some one place an unexpected object on the table; open 
 your eyes and note critically how you "know the object". 
 
 12. Criticise the use of the word "passive" in such expressions as 
 "passive attention", "passive imagination," etc. 
 
 13. What is the meaning of the statement that "an apperceptive 
 mass is a thought system"? 
 
 14. What is "Child Study"; is it strictly a division of Psychology? 
 
 15. What was the fundamental conception in Phrenology? 
 
 16. When occasion accidentally offers, note your attitude toward 
 an unrecognized sound. 
 
 17. What is the meaning of the statement that "the world is my 
 idea"? 
 
 18. Why should memory improve with age; or why decline? 
 
 19. Where in your body do you "feel that you are" when you at- 
 tempt to localize yourself? 
 
 20. How does one awaken at a previously determined unusual hour? 
 
 21. What is the psychological distinction between "work" and 
 "play"? 
 
 22. Tap lightlj^ on the floor with a cane or slender rod, noting in- 
 trospectively whether the sense of touching is referred to where the 
 cane touches the hand or to the point of contact of the cane with the floor. 
 
 23. Is mind involved in sneezing? 
 
 24. Can a person form a habit "against his will"? 
 
 25. How does jerking the hand back from a hot stove differ from 
 bowing to an acquaintance on the street? 
 
 26. What is a mind? 
 
 27. Can you have a general concept without a name? 
 
 28. Does my interest in an object depend upon the object or upon 
 me? 
 
96 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 29. Can you discover in your daily experiences any process of habit 
 forming? 
 
 30. Observe introspectively how you estimate the time without 
 looking at your watch. 
 
 31. Try measuring ''contentless time" by sitting before a clock 
 whose tick you cannot hear and closing you eyes for just a minute. Can 
 you observe introspectively any feeling of stress of attention? 
 
 32. Explain "blushing" psychologically. 
 
 33. What is sleep; and why are brief noonday naps good for efficient 
 work? 
 
 34. Could one train himself to a rhythm of prolonged awake periods 
 with relativel}^ briefer rest periods, say to sleeping everj^ third night? 
 
 35. Give three different formal syllogistic statements of the thinking 
 in buying an apple from a train boy. 
 
 36. What is a "beautiful life"? 
 
 37. Can you justify psychologically the teaching of a "language art ", 
 such as penmanship or spelling, by formal drill? 
 
 38. Why can you hear the sound of approaching footsteps sooner 
 wheii you are expectantly listening for them than when you are not 
 watching for the approaching person? 
 
 39. What is a "thing" as a "mental construct"? 
 
 40. What is the psychological explanation of lef thandedness ; and 
 are there valid theoretical reasons for cultivating ambidexterity in children 
 
 41. Do we remember feelings, or only their cognitive concomitants? 
 
 42. Image vividly a bright yellow dandelion in the grass by the 
 side of the walk; image similarly a strain of music; an odor; a taste; a 
 touch. 
 
 43. Is the name "instinct", as applied to certain tendencies without 
 conscious purpose, merely "a term to conceal ignorance" of the real 
 nature of such mental activity? 
 
 44. Justify psychologically returning a pupil's papers to him with 
 some markings to show his degree of success. 
 
 45. What does a person commonly mean when he says "I have such 
 a poor memory"? 
 
 46. Explain psychologically the nature and function of a teaching 
 question. 
 
 47. Distinguish between "illusions" and "delusions"; and give 
 examples. 
 
 48. Imagine the inhabitance of Mars with spherical bodies (legless 
 and armless, without protruberances of any kind) rolling about from 
 point to point in business and pleasure, noting critically your experience 
 content in its development. 
 
 49. Distinguish between color ignorance, color weakness, and color 
 blindness. 
 
 50. What is "faculty psychology"? 
 
 51. Is there rational meaning in the statement that "bodily fatigue 
 causes mental fatigue"? 
 
 52. What are dreams? 
 
 53. What is insanity? 
 
 54. Show that the terms "subliminal personality" and "uncon- 
 scious self' " are unwarranted and misleading. 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 97 
 
 55. Explain psychologically the statement that ''one never knows 
 a truth until he expresses it". 
 
 56. Trace psychologically the formation of a general concept, or 
 ''universal", such as the concept of "grape fruit". 
 
 57. Is there such a thing as a "latent idea" or "latent feelings"? 
 
 58. Explain the statement that "teachers do not create interest, 
 they merely direct it". 
 
 59. Recall by persistent vigorous effort your "train of thought" 
 through a preceding period, say ten minutes; and see what linkages of 
 "association" appear to predominate in the shifting of idea centers. 
 
 60. Estimate the height of a window sill from the floor, and note 
 introspectively the sense of effort; also the filling of the "empty space" 
 with intermediate points. 
 
 61. What do you understand by "sub-conscious attention to stimuli " 
 
 62. How does a blow on the head make one "see stars"? 
 
 63. Is "drilling" to "fix in memory " a rational method of teaching? 
 
 64. Why can we not remember when awake the mental constructions 
 of dreamless sleep? 
 
 65. Explain psychologically the nature of a "concrete problem" as 
 used in teaching. 
 
 66. How do you account for the painful "start" — drawing or quiv- 
 ering of the body — when you witness another falling on a hard pavement ?- 
 
 67. Compare psychologically novel-reading by adults and "playing- 
 mother" by children. 
 
 68. If there were no oblivion of forgetfulness into which unimpor- 
 tant details of experience are dropped, would retrospection be possible? 
 
 69. Explain the nature of "the blues", as designating a state of 
 mental depression, 
 
 70. Can you feel the stress of attention as a well defined will activity 
 when you force yourself to follow the thought on an uninteresting speakeJ? 
 
 71. Discriminate for several successive evenings the colors in the 
 sunset sky, naming them as far as you can; and note any growth dis- 
 cernible in sense perception. 
 
 72. Experiment with touch after-images, touching your forehead 
 with a pencil; can you create the touch sensation in a spot one minute 
 after you have touched that spot, or without touching it at all? 
 
 73. Explain the effect upon character of constantly stimulating the 
 emotions by the reading of fiction. 
 
 74. Show that interest is subjectively a feeling of value and object- 
 ively a dynamic seeking of an object. 
 
 75. Read through aloud the following linkage of words in pairs, 
 reading but once and noting introspectively the shock and the pleased 
 acceptance of each new association; repeat from memory noting attitude 
 of hesitancy or certainty of each transition to another term : Courthouse — 
 jail, jail — barred windows, barred windows — iron, iron — cannon, cannon — 
 fort, fort — Fortress Monroe, Fortress Monroe — Chesapeake Bay, Chesa- 
 peake Bay — oysters, oysters — ^winter, winter — ice, ice — skating. 
 
 76. How does a "dream" experience differ from a normal experience 
 of the awake life? 
 
 77. How do you insure your remembering of a fact that you need 
 shortly to have in mind? 
 
98 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 78. "Why is it that a hidden drawing in a 'puzzle picture' is so 
 difficult to see at first and so difficult not to see when you have once 
 found it? 
 
 79. Why do we not have a gamut of odors similar to our gamut of 
 tones and our gamut of colors? • 
 
 80. Is there a philosophically valid distinction between " physical 
 facts-" and "mental facts"? 
 
 81. What do you understand by the statement "he lost conscious- 
 ness"? 
 
 82. Discuss critically the physiological theory of "afferent" and 
 "efferent" nerves. 
 
 83. Find instances of heredity within your own observaton; can 
 the facts be accounted for on the grounds of post-natal imitation in the 
 environment? 
 
 84. What is Eugenics? 
 
 85. Discuss biologically the proposition that "children are naturally 
 good". 
 
 86. Is the statement of Bibot that "We study psychical variations 
 indirectly by the aid of physical variations that can be studied directly" 
 the whole truth? 
 
 87. Contrast psychologically the educational value of calisthenic 
 exercises with rationally encouraged and directed free play. 
 
 88. Can you justify psychologically the statement that "you cannot 
 get a child to attend to anything that has no interest for him"? 
 
 89. What is the "static sense"? 
 
 90. Explain "mental staring", as when in any situation one makes 
 no effort to interpret his sensations. 
 
 91. Show that the growth of knowledge depends upon "concepts"; 
 and explain the statement that "intellectual development is a process 
 of de-synonimization. " 
 
 92. How do you explain the fact that the experiences of childhood 
 are remembered better in old age than the experiences of middle life? 
 
 93. How does "a change of stiumulus give rest"? 
 
 94. Do we ever have an absolutely new experience in substance and 
 form? 
 
 95. Can you account for the readiness with which one forgets facts 
 crammed for examination after the examination is over? 
 
 96. Is the statement that "very young children do not reason" 
 justified in your own observation of child life? 
 
 97. Does the term "cause" properly designate the concomitant 
 relation of states of mind and body? 
 
 98. Can you readily recall (in image) the detailed structure of the 
 face of a friend; of a stalk of corn? 
 
 99. Compare the general theory of evolution as "progressive ceation " 
 by an "immanent God" with the theory that a person creates his own 
 organic structure by "progressive functioning". 
 
 100. Is educability heredity? 
 
 101. Does a bird anticipate the laying of eggs when it is building a 
 nest? 
 
 102. Why does a man do his best constructive work late in life — say 
 after sixty? 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 99 
 
 103. How do you account for the sense of ' been-here-before' in what 
 you know positively to be a new experience? 
 
 104. Is it probable that new sense organs will be developed in the 
 human race? 
 
 105. What is the psychological meaning of the ''born short" doc- 
 trine? 
 
 106. Do sensations have "extent"? (''The red quality of a peony 
 is larger, more extended than the same quality in a rose". — Titchener, 
 Outline of Psychology, p. 37) 
 
 107. If as a hypothesis of science it were desirable to select one of 
 the three fundamental apects or functions of the mind (knowing, feeling, 
 willing) as the primitive form out of which the others were differentiated 
 in a natural process of growth, which would you select? 
 
100 
 
 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Index 
 
 Abnormal psychology 25 
 
 Abstraction 61 
 
 Active character of experience 27 
 
 Aesthetics 23 
 
 Aesthetic sentiments 83 
 
 Affection 73 
 
 Agreeableness 73 
 
 Altruistic emotions 80 
 
 Anabohc body processes 73 
 
 Analysis in psychology 13 
 
 Animal psychology 17 
 
 Antagonism of feeling and knowing 81 
 
 Apperception 58 
 
 Apperception and perception . . . .59 
 
 Apperceptive masses 59 
 
 Aristotle's dichotomy .33 
 
 Aristotle's Experiment 50 
 
 Art products in psychology 17 
 
 Association, laws of 54 
 
 Attention 89 
 
 Attention and interest 90 
 
 Auditory sensations 40 
 
 Auxiliary methods in psychology 15 
 
 Biology 23 
 
 Body and mind 29 
 
 Body, function of 30 
 
 Body-mind organism 29 
 
 CataboHc body processes 73 
 
 Causation, not in psychic facts 91 
 
 Cause and effect, law of 54 
 
 Centrally-aroused sensations 44 
 
 ChHd Study 16 
 
 Choice 91 
 
 Cognition, aspects of 37 
 
 Cognition, essentially conscious 35 
 
 Cognition, nature of 34 
 
 Cognitive growth 34 
 
 Collective psychology 24 
 
 Comparative psychology 25 
 
 Comparison 61 
 
 Conation 87 
 
 Concept 60 
 
 Conception 60 
 
 Conscience 85 
 
 Consciousness 14 
 
 Contiguity, law of ". 54 
 
 Cosmic emotions 80 
 
 Creative imagination 63 
 
 Decision 92 
 
 Deductive reasoning 68 
 
 Deductive syllogism 68 
 
 Dehberation 91 
 
 Deliberative action 88 
 
 Denomination of a concept 60 
 
 Determinism 93 
 
 Direct observation of mental facts 15 
 
 Disagreeableness 73 
 
 Dispositions 85 
 
 Double-aspect theory 31 
 
 DuaHstic view 49 
 
 Educational psychology. 25 
 
 Effort, sense of 89 
 
 Egoistic emotions 79 
 
 Elaborative cognition 58 
 
 Emotions 78 
 
 Emotions, classification of 79 
 
 Emotions contrasted with simple 
 
 feelings 79 
 
 Epistemology 23 
 
 Ethical sentiments 83 
 
 Ethics 23 
 
 Events in conscious life 13 
 
 Execution 92 
 
 Experience 27 
 
 Experimental psychology 18 
 
 "Experimenter" and "assistant" 19 
 
 Experiments in psychology, scope, of. ...20 
 
 Extension of a concept 62 
 
 Eye-mindedness of the human race 40 
 
 Fancy 64 
 
 Feehng 73 
 
 "Feehng", as active touching 73 
 
 Feelings classified 74 
 
 Field of psychology 22 
 
 Forgetting 55 
 
 "Freedom of the will" 93 
 
 Functional psychology 25 
 
A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 101 
 
 ''Future" 57 
 
 General concept 60 
 
 Generalization 61 
 
 General psychology 24 
 
 Genetic psychology 25 
 
 Growth of mind 34 
 
 ' 'Has-been" character of a memory — 56 
 
 History 23 
 
 Human life studied in psychology 22 
 
 Ideahzing imagination 63 
 
 Ideational f eehngs 74 
 
 Illusory perceptions 50 
 
 Image 52 
 
 Imagination 62 
 
 Imagination and conception 63 
 
 Imagination and memory 63 
 
 Imagination, forms of . . . .• 63 
 
 Impulse 88 
 
 Impulsive action 88 
 
 Indirect observation of mental facts ... . 16 
 
 " Individual facts " of psychology 12 
 
 Individual psychology , 25 
 
 Inductive reasoning 69 
 
 Inductive syllogism 69 
 
 Infant psychology 24 
 
 Inferential study of mind 15 
 
 Insane mind, how studied 17 
 
 Intellectual sentiments 83 
 
 Intensifying imagination 63 
 
 Intension of a concept 62 
 
 Interaction of mind and body 31 
 
 Interest 90 
 
 Interest and attention 90 
 
 Introspection 13 
 
 Intuition 39 
 
 Involuntary attention 89 
 
 James-Lange theory 75 
 
 Judgment 66 
 
 Judgment as concept defining 65 
 
 Knowledge 70 
 
 Knowledge, identity with self 35 
 
 ' ' Knowledge that ' ' and ' ' knowledge 
 
 what" 71 
 
 Knowledge not "contained in" mind.. 72 
 
 Knowing an "external object" 35 
 
 Knowing, feehng and wilHng aspects... . 32 
 Knowing process 35 
 
 Laboratory study in psychology 20 
 
 Language in thinking 61 
 
 "Laws of association" 54 
 
 Libertarian theory of will 93 
 
 Life a stream of experiences 11 
 
 Localizing in memory 56 
 
 LocaHzing sensations 43 
 
 "Local signs" 43 
 
 Logic 23 
 
 Lower and higher feehngs 74 
 
 Material of psychology 11 
 
 Mathematical psychology an impossi- 
 
 • bility 42 
 
 Measm-ement of mental facts 42 
 
 Memory an experience 52 
 
 Memory as mental connective tissue . . .52 
 
 Memory, elements of 53 
 
 Memory image 52 
 
 Metabohc body processes 73 
 
 Method in science 10 
 
 Method of psychology 13 
 
 Mind a continuum 11 
 
 Mind and body 29 
 
 Mind, views of 11 
 
 Monistic theory of hfe 49 
 
 Moods 85 
 
 Motives 91 
 
 Necessitarian theory of will 93 
 
 Nervous mechanism and mind 40 
 
 "New psychology" and "old 
 
 psychology" 26 
 
 Observation of conscious facts 14 
 
 Observation alters facts observed 15 
 
 Observation under controlled condi- ... 
 
 tions 19 
 
 Organic sensations 40 
 
 "Outer world" of perception 48 
 
 "Over-individual facts " of physics 12 
 
 Pain 74 
 
 Parallelism of mind and body 31 
 
 Passions 86 
 
 Passive imagination 64 
 
 "Past" 57 
 
 Pedagogy 24 
 
 Perception a constructive process .... 49 
 
 Perception and sensation .47 
 
 Perception iUusory 50 
 
 Perception, nature of 46 
 
102 
 
 A Syllabus of Psychology 
 
 Personal life the subject of psychology ... 9 
 
 Phases of conscious experience 32 
 
 Phonism 44 
 
 Photism 44 
 
 Physical facts over-individual 12 
 
 Physics 23 
 
 Physiological psychology '26 
 
 Physiology 23 
 
 Pleasantness 73 
 
 Predication in judgment 66 
 
 "Present" 57 
 
 Presentative cognition 37 
 
 Procession of experiences in a life 28 
 
 Psychiatry 25 
 
 Psychical facts individual 12 
 
 Psychical facts not measurable 42 
 
 Psychological analysis 13 
 
 Psychological laboratory 20 
 
 Psychology a new science 13 
 
 Psychology a science 10 
 
 Psychology defined 9 
 
 Psychology, kinds of 24 
 
 Psychology, methods of 13 
 
 Psychology, subject matter of 11 
 
 Psychopathology 43 
 
 Psycho-physics 43 
 
 Psychotherapy 25 
 
 Purpose 88 
 
 Qualitative character of psychical facts. .42 
 Quantity of sensations 42 
 
 Race psychology 25 
 
 Rational psychology 25 
 
 Reasoning as purposive thinking ....... 67 
 
 Reasoning, forms of 67 
 
 Reasoning, nature of 67 
 
 Recalling in memory 35 
 
 Recognizing in memory 56 
 
 Recollection 55 
 
 Redintigration, law of 55 
 
 Representative cognition 51 
 
 Resolution 92 
 
 Retaining in memory 53 
 
 Retrospective introspection 14 
 
 Reviving a past experience 54 
 
 Rhythm in measuring time 57 
 
 Science, method in ; . 10 
 
 Science, psychology a 11 
 
 Sciences do not overlap 22 
 
 Science transforms reality 15 
 
 "Seeing ghosts" 50 
 
 Selfhood 56 
 
 Sensation continuum 36 
 
 Sensation, nature of 37 
 
 Sensation, produced at will 47 
 
 Sensation, quantity of 42 
 
 Sensation, threshold of 41 
 
 Sensation, Titchener's definition of 39 
 
 Sensations, Hyslop's classification of ... 44 
 
 Sensations, kinds of 39 
 
 Sensations, what they are 38 
 
 "Sense of effort" 89 
 
 Sense organs 39 
 
 Sensuous feelings 74 
 
 Sentiments 82 
 
 Sentiments, kinds of 84 
 
 Similarity, law of 54 
 
 Social psychology 25 
 
 Soul as subject of psychology 9 
 
 Special psychology 24 
 
 Spontaneity 88 
 
 Stimulus to sensation 42 
 
 Stream of consciousness 29 
 
 Structural psychology 25 
 
 Subject-object problem 14 
 
 Syllogism 69 
 
 Synaesthesia -44 
 
 Temperaments 85 
 
 Terms of a syllogism 69 
 
 "Things" and "ideas" 48 
 
 Thinking 71 
 
 Threshold of sensation 41 
 
 Time, ''a general view of events" 57 
 
 Time, as "past", "present", and .... 
 
 "future" 57 
 
 "Transcendental freedom" of the will .93 
 
 Unpleasantness 73 
 
 Universals 60 
 
 Visual sensations 39 
 
 Vital union of mind and body 31 
 
 Voluntary attention 89 
 
 "Weber-Fechner Law" 42 
 
 Will 87 
 
 Will, freedom of 93 
 
 Willing 87 
 
 Will to live ■ 94 
 
MAY 28 1913