LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. ©^.r...:-?.. Sopijrig^t "^a, Shelf ^.U"? UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ELEMENTARY COUESE OF 0hristian J^hllosophy, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BEST SCHOLASTIC AUTHORS. Chiefly fnyrf I the French of .. BROTHER LOUIS OF POISSY. PART I. ^^c- ^tO't^er-i^ o^ i^xZ' ©Ivr-io-ticP'K' Jdvool^. F. S. C. PKOCURE 50 Second Street, NEW YORK. 1889. c \^ ^' THE UBRARYJ OF C(JNURESS WASHINGTON Entered According to Act of Congress, in the year 1881, by JOHN P. MURPHY, In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. Electrotyped and Printed at The New York Catholic Protectory, West Chester, N. Y. i Approbation of the Rt. Eev. Bishop of Montpellier. MONTPELLIER, Aug. 15, 1875. It is with pleasure that we authorize Brother Louis, Sub-Director of the Boarding School of Be- ziers, to publish for the use of his pupils his Course of Christian Philosophy based on the Principles of the best Scholastic Authors, which by our order he sub- mitted to a careful examination. The learned priest to whom we entrusted the revision of the work has returned it with a flattering testimonial of its merit. We shall, therefore, be glad to see it in the hands of the young men of our schools, and to learn that its principles have been made familiar even to the pupils of our first classes. For it is these old philosophical teachings, which prepared our fathers to become such good theologians, and which rendered their faith so enlightened and their reasoning so sound. ^ Fr. M. Anatole, Bp. of Montpellier. iii BRIEF OF OUE HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX. Dilecto Filio, I): Aloisio de Foissy, Congr. Fratrum Scholarum Chris- tianarum, Biterras. PIUS PP. IX. DiLECTE FiLI, SaLUTEM ET ApOS- TOLICAM BeNEDICTIONEM, 3i sedulo cavendum est in quali- bet arte aut scientia, ne quoqiio modo principia deflectant a vero, id maxime profecto curandum est in philosophia earum duce, prsesertim vero in tanta errorum colluvie, quae ah ipsius nimirum corruptione manavit. Grratulamur itaque te, Dilecte Fili, scientise hujus elementa tradi- turum, rejectis recentiorum com- toentis, Angelicum Doctorem et ceteros fuisse sequutum, qui, Ec- clesia veritatis magistra praelucente, sapientia et operositate sua philo- sophiam mirifice illustrarunt ; et ex iis deprompsisse doctrinas, quibiis mentes fingeres commissorum tibi adolescentium. To our Beloved Son, Brother Louis of Foissy, of the Congregation of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, Beziers. PIUS IX. POPE. Beloved Son, Health and Apostolic Benediction. If in any art or science whatever special care must be taken that principles may in no way conflict with truth, this is above all neces- sary in philosophy, the queen and moderatrix of the arts and sciences. But especially must we be on our guard in the great flood of errors, of which the corruption of philosophy has been the unfail- ing source. "We, therefore, congratulate, you. Beloved Son, on the manner in which you have treated of the elements of this science. Setting aside the false systems of more recent writers, you have followed the Angelic Doctor and those who, guided by the light of the Church, the Mistress of truth, have, by their wisdom and diligent labor, wonderfully illustrated philosophy. From their works you have drawn the doctrines by which to form the minds of the young men confided to your care. Ti APOSTOLIC BRIEF OF HIS HOLINESS, PP. PIUS IX. Gaudemus autem, Eleinentarem Liursum Phllosophue Christiame, a te editum, probatura fuisse egregio Kpiscopo tuo; et cum ipso tibi ominamur, ut illud in plurimorum utilitatem vergat. Interim vero divini favoris au- spicem et patemje Nostrae benevo- lentijB pignus Apostolicam Bene- dictionem tibi Dilecte Fili, pera- manter impertimus. Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die 13 Martii, anno 1876, Pontifi- catiis Nostri anno tricesimo. PIUS PP. IX. We are glad that the Elementary Course of Christian Philosophy, which you have pubhshed, has received the approbation of a Bishop so distinguished as yours ; and with him we earnestly wish that it may prove beneficial to many. In the meantime, as a presage of the divine favor and a pledge of our paternal love, we very affectionately impart to you, Beloved Son, the Apostolic Benediction. Given at Rome, near St. Peter's March 13, 1876, in the thirtieth year of Our Pontificate. PIUS IX., POPE. ' TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page Preface - - - - xiii Introductory xix PHILOSOPHY OF RATIONAL BEING, Divisions of Philosophy of Rational Being - - 1 LOGIC. Its Definition. — Its Utility . — Its Divisions - - 1 Part First. Reasoning and the Elements of which it is composed. CHAPTER I. — Simple Apprehension - - - - 3 Art. i. — Nature of Simple Apprehension - - . 3 Art. II. — Tlie Mental Term and the Oral Term - 4 Art. III. — Divisions of Terms - - . - 4 Art. IV. — Universals ------ s Art. V. — Predicaments or Categories - - 9 Art. VI. — Properties of the Terms in a Proposition 11 Art. VII. — Means to Insure Exactness in Terms. — Definition 14 • Art. VIII. — Division 16 CHAPTER II.— Judgment ..... 17 Art. I. — Nature of Judgment - - -. - 17 Art. II. — The Proposition and its Elements - 18 Art. III. — Divisions of the Proposition - - - 19 Art. IV. — Properties of Propositions - - . 23 vii viii Contents. PAGE CHAPTER III. —Reasoning 26 Art. I. — Definition and Elements of Reasoning 26 Art. ir. — Divisions of Reasoning - - - - 27 Art. III. — The C-ategorical Syllogism and its Rules 28 Art. IV. — Modes and Figures of the Syllogism - 31 Art. v. — The Hypothetical Syllogism and its Rules 33 Art. VI. — The Imperfect Syllogism and the Com- l)ound Syllogism ; or, the Enthymeme, the Prosyllogism, the Epichirema, the Sorites, and the Dilemma - - 35 Art. VII. — Induction - - - - - 37 Art. viii. — The Probable or Dialectic Syllogism - 39 Art. IX. — The Finding of the Middle Term - 40 Art. X. — The Sophistical Syllogism - - - 42 xVrt. XI. — Utility of the Syllogism . - . 45 Part Second. Truth and Science. CHAPTER I.— Truth and the Different States of THE Mind with respect to Truth 46 Art. I. — Truth - 46 Art. II. — In which Operation of the ^Mind Logical Truth is found . . . . 47 Art. III. — Different States of the :Mind with respect to the True ----- 48 Art. IV. — Ignorance, Error, and their Causes - 49 CHAPTER II.— Demonstration 51 CH.VPTER III. — ScriENCE. — Divisions of Science. — Co-ordination of the Sciences 54 Contents. ix PAGE Part Third. Method. CHAPTER I .—Method in General and its Laws 57 Art. I. -Method ------- 57 Art. II. — Analysis and Synthesis in relation to Method ------ 58 CHAPTER n. — Different Kinds of Method and THEIR Laws ----- 60 Art. I. — Different Kinds of Method - - - 60 Art. II. — Special Laws for each Method - - 61 CHAPTER III.— Processes proper to certain Methods 62 Art. I. — Hypotheses 62 Art. II. — Experimentation 6S Art. III. — Classification 66 IDEOLOGY. General Ideology. CHAPTER I.— The Idea in General . - _ 68 Art. I. — Nature of the Idea - - - _ 68 Art. II. — Characters of the Idea - - - - 69 CHAPTER 11. — Systems concerning the Origin of Ideas 70 Art. I. — Principal Systems concerning the Origin of Ideas ------ 70 Art. II. — Sensism - - - - - - 71 Art. III. — Transcendental Rationalism - - 73 Art. IV. — The System of Innate Ideas - - - 74 Art. V, — Ontologism - - . . _ 76 Art. VI. — The Intermediate System - - _ 77 Art. VII. — Traditionalism 79 Art. VIII. — The Scholastic System - - - - 80 >' Contents. PAGE CHAPTER III. — Universals 84 Art. I. — Nature of Universals - - - - 84 Art. II. — Different Opinions on the Nature of Universals . . . . . S7 Special Ideology. CHAPTER I. — How Human Knowledge is Acquired 90 Art. i. — The First Operation of the Mind and the Perception of Essences - - - 90 Art. h. — How the Human Soul Knows Particular Bodies - 93 Art. III. — The Knowledge that the Human Soul acquires regarding Itself - - 94 Art. IV. — "Whether the Human Soul can know Pure Spirits 95 Art. v. — How the Human Soul knows God - 96 Art. VI. — Necessity of Sensible Images for the Act of the Human Intellect in the Present Life 98 Art. VII. — Mode of Cognition in the Disembodied Soul 100 CHAPTER II.— Knowledge of First Principles - 101 Art. i. — What is meant by Principles of Knowl- edge 101 Art. ii.— The Principle of Contradiction - - 102 Art. III.— The Principle of Causality - - - 104 Art. IV.— The Principle of Substance - - 106 CHAPTER III. — Lajjguage in its relations to the De- velopment OP Knowledge - 108 Art. I. — Utility of Language in Developing the Mind 108 Art. II. -The Origin of Language - - - 109 Contents. xi CRITERIOLOGY, Or, a Treatise on Certitude, CHAPTER I. — Our Faculties as means of Arriv- 111 iNG at Truth ----- Art. I. — Which are our Cognoscitive Faculties 111 Art. II. — Veracity of the Senses - - - 112 Art, III. — Veracity of Consciousness - - - 113 Art. IV. — Veracity of the Intellect and the Reason 114 CHAPTER II.— Scepticism 115 Art. I. — Nature of Scepticism. — Different Kinds of Scepticism - - - - 115 Art. II. — Refutation of Scepticism - - - IIG CHAPTER III. — The Ultimate Foundation of Certi- tude - . - . - iig Art. i. — What is meant by the Ultimate Founda- tion of Certitude - - - - 118 Art. II. — The Intrinsic Principle of Certitude 118 Art. III. — The Extrinsic Principle of Certitude - 121 Art. IV. — The Means by which Testimony is trans- mitted 122 Art. v. — Authenticity of the Testimony of Com- mon Sentiment and of Scientists - 125 Art. VI. — Importance to our Cognitions of the Au- thority of Testimony as a Principle of Certitude 127 PREFACE. The object of this work is to present, in as brief an outline as possible, a complete course of philosophy. Besides questions immediately useful for examina- tions, we have endeavored to introduce, at least summarily, many others of real importance, without which there can be no philosophy properly so-called. A few words will suffice to explain our mode of procedure and the use which may be made of this work. Each paragraph contains an abridged formula intended to be learned verbatim, and a short develop- ment, which may serve as a basis for the explanation of the professor. The formulas will prove of great utility to the student who takes pains to memorize them : they classify in the mind distinctly and logically all the notions indispensably required in philosophy ; they render the preparation for an ex- amination easy ; and very often they are a brief, precise, and full answer to the questions proposed. The part called the development usually indicates the principal proofs of the foregoing formula, re- duced to what is essential. Comparisons, multiplied examples, detailed commentaries, have been purpose- ly retrenched. We have confined ourselves to simple summaries, which will enable the student to follow and remember the instructions of the professor. Experience has proved that this method, apparently somewhat abstract and barren, is in reality very ad- vantageous, since it obliges the student to have xiii xiv Preface. recourse to that direct and personal work without which there can be no true intellectual formation. Some, doubtless, ma}^ be of opinion that this work introduces questions too difficult for beginners : for example, ideas^ universah. matter and form, space, time, and others, which offer serious difficulties even in treatises which investigate them in detail. But, these questions being essential, it seems to us that they cannot be altogether omitted without leaving philoso- phy destitude of foundation and consistency. This remark is especially applicable to the treatise on Gen- eral Metaphf/sics. Presented in its present concise form, it will, perhaps, be found too abstruse ; still we have thought proper to retain it, should it prove of no other use than to serve as a summary for those who wish to make a more profound study of the sub- ject. Another charge may be brought against this course, that of being based on the method and doctrine of the Scholastics. For we have, in fact, everywhere endeavored faithfully to reproduce the principles of the Thomistic school, as interpreted by Goudin, San- severino, Liberatore, Kleutgen, Prisco, Gonzalez, Tap- arelli. and other-", wliose text we have often merely summarized and sometimes embodied in full. But this reproach, were it really merited, would be as- suredly in our eyes the best eulogy that could be be- stowed on this modest work. The Scholastic philoso- phy, which was adopted during many centuries by all the universities of Europe, and the abandonment of which has been accompanied by such fatal results, has undeniably in its favor, not only the sanction of time and the authority of the greatest geniuses, but that which to the Christian is of more value, the sane- Preface. xv tion of the Church. Following this philosophy we are sure never to stray from Catholic teaching ; while out- side of it we find only discordant, unsubstantial doc- trines, often evidently erroneous and proscribed. But some may object that we must pay due def- erence to the necessities of the times, and therefore the wisest course nowadays is, indeed, to avoid mani- fest errors, but still not to return, at least openly, to these old doctrines, which would expose us to be re- garded as not only not progressive but even retro- grade minds. To this we reply that to reject the false without affirming the true is to leave the mind in suspense, without knowing where to rest ; it is to take from it all energy and vitality, by depriving it of its proper and necessary element ; it is, in fine, to deliver it over without power or defence to the seduc- tions of error. May this humble work be free from that vagueness, or rather absence, of doctrine, too often met with in certain elementary works on philosophy ; and may it contribute, in its own modest way, to the diffusion of the beautiful and faithful teachings of the Scholastic philosophy. Shortly after the publication of the first edition of this work, a Latin translation of it was made at Eome by Mgr. Amoni, canon, at present secretary of the Apostolic Nunciature of Vienna. We give below the preface of the learned translator : " I will be brief, kind reader, but I wish that you should know the two principal motives which have led me to consider the publication of this Element- ary Courfie of Philosophy as eminently opportune. x\'i Preface. First, thongli distinf^uished bv an admirable brevity, it omits nothing necessary to a full knowledge of the suV)ject ; secondly, and this is much more important at tlie present time, the method of teaching adopted by the French author is conformable to that of the okl Scholastics, and his doctrines agree on all points with those of St. Thomas of Aquin. Now, however little you consider with what earnestness the learned Roman Pontiff Leo XIII. recommends to all the faith- ful of Jesus Christ the philosophy of the holy Doctor, you will surely understand that, in our day especial- ly, this w^ork merits the preference over all others. '' In fact, if the love of truth should always and everywhere move the minds and hearts of men, and if every one should direct all his efforts to acquire truth, since its possession constitutes man's happi- ness, we must apply ourselves so much the more earnestly to the task, now that the war against truth has become more active, and w^e are exposed to great- er danger of falling into error. Although charged during seventeen years with the duty of teaching philosophy to young men, I shall never regret having undertaken this translation, because, in my opinion, there can be found in no other work anything more methodical, more exact, or more useful." At the time of the publication at Rome of the Latin translation, the Osservatore Romono recom- mended the work in a lengthy article, from which we extract tlie following: *' He who desires to make use of this work, either for himself or others, must not expect to find therein anything new in matter or form. We assure him, however, that he will find in it a special advantage : it contains an abridged and lucid exposition of all the Preface. xvii parts of a sound philosophy, — principles, method, and doctrine, — all is conformable to or rather bor- rowed from the most accredited and safe source of a sound philosophy, whether ancient or modern. In short, errors are briefly exposed and so successfully refuted as to make young men certain of the truth and competent to defend it against Eationalism and Naturalism, which, in our day more than in any other age, infect society. " Those who study philosophy should feel thankful to the author, as well as to the learned translator, who has favored Italy, and especially institutions of scientific education, with a book entirely safe on all points. It is also extremely useful on account of the principles which it contains and expounds, the matter for reflection which it offers to young men, and the opportunity of making a fuller exposition which it furnishes to professors of philosophy. We believe, in fact, that it is neither useful nor advisable to put into the hands of young students a book which fatigues by its copiousness and the unnecessary difficulties introduced, and which, moreover, renders the oral instruction of the teacher superfluous. " A Vienna journal, the Vaterland^ in the issue of April 9, 1882, concludes an article upon the same work translated by Mgr. Amoni in these words : *' This work, by the richness of the matter presented, must take its place among the best works on Chris- tian Philosophy which have appeared in these latter times. We do not possess in German any manual of philosophy which, in 416 pages, contains such a large amount of matter so happily and perfectly elabor- ated." INTRODU CTORY, Philosophy is the hioivledge of things in their ultimate causes— Its object is being in general ; but this object may be considered under three aspects : as 7'eal and possessing attributes independent of our cognition : as ideal and having attributes which result from our mental activity ; or as moral when regarded as the term of voluntary action. Philosophy, therefore, may treat of the ultimate principle of things either in the order of reality, or of knowledge, or of morality ; in other words, it comprises philosophy of real being, philosophy of rational being, and moral philosophy. Philosophy of rational being or logic is studied first, because it points out the laws of the human mind in the acquisition of knowledge, and enables it to dis- cern the true from the false, thus furnishing the means to study real being with greater ease and cer- tainty. XIX PHILOSOPHY OF RATIONAL BEING. ITS DIVISIONS. Philosophy of rational being is divided into Logic, Ideology, Criteriology . — As rational philosophy con- siders being in respect to our knowledge of being, it ought, first, to investigate the laws which govern the mind, the instrument by which we know; secondly, to treat of ideas, the means by which we know ; thirdly, to determine the value of the knowledge ac- quired by the mind. Hence rational philosophy is divided into three principal parts : 1. Logic, or the science of the laws of thought ; 2. Ideology, or the science of ideas ; 3. Criteriology, or the science of the criteria of certitude. LOGIC. DEFINITION OF LOGIC. — ITS UTILITY. — ITS DIVISIONS. 1. Logic is the science of the laios luhich the mind must obey in order to acquire readily and luitli certainty the knowledge of truth. — The human mind in its search after truth is subject to laws imposed on it by its. very nature. The study of these laws constitutes Logic. Logic is a science rather than an art, because it considers the laws of the mind in their intrinsic 2 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. principles and general applications, and is not con- lined to an enumeration of practical rules. 2. Logic is of great utility in acquiring truths in guarding against errors and in advancing in any science whatever. — As Logic habituates the mind to classify and co-ordinate knowledge, it gives us a great facility for the acquisition of truth; moreover, by familiariz- ing the mind with all the aberrations of reasoning, it enables us readily to discern the flaws of a fallacy and the false appearance by which error seeks to mislead the mind. Finally, it is evident that, as the sciences can advance onl}^ by means of reasoning, notliing is more conducive to their progress and easy acquisition than Logic, which is, in fact, the very science of reasoning. 3. Logic is divided into three j^rincipal parts : tlie first investigates the nature and lows of reasoning; the second treats of the general conditions of knoiuledge ; the third, determines the general rules of method. — The object of logic is reasoning ; but in reasoning three things may be considered : the nature of reasoning, the end of reasoning, which is science, and, lastly, the process or method followed to reach this end readil3\ Logic, therefore, is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three aspects under wliich reasoning may be con- sidered. PART FIRST. EEASONING AND THE ELEMENTS WHICH COMPOSE IT. 4. Tlte first part of Logic, ivhicJi has reasoning for its object, treats :1. Of simple apprehension ; % Of judgment ; 3. Of reasoning. — Reasoning is a complex operation, whose elements are judgment and simple apprehen- sion. All reasoning supposes several judgments, and every judgment supposes the apprehension of two objects. Hence, before considering reasoning in itself, we must treat of judgment and simple appre- hension. CHAPTER I. Simple Apprehension. ART. I. — NATURE OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 6. Simple Apprehension is the first operation of the mind, an operation by ivhich it perceives an object ivithout any affirmation or negation concerning it. — The first act of the mind is a simple glance, by which it apprehends objects presented to it, without affirming or denying anything. The result of this operation is an ideal reproduction of the object perceived ; this reproduc- tion is called a mental term. If the mental term is •expressed in words, it is called an oral term. 4 . CHRISTIAN PHILOSOrHY. ART. II. — THE MENTAL TERM AND THE ORAL TERM. 6. The mental term is the ideal and formal re/tresenta- tioii in which the objf ct perceived is reproduced and hiown. —When sensible objects have made an impression on our external senses, this impression passes to the im- agination, which forms an image of the objects. The intellect, instantly apprised of these images, acts on them ; it cognizes the objects by more perfect simili- tudes, in which it discerns many things which the senses could not perceive, such as the character of cause, of heinrf, of substance, etc. From this the mind may afterwards rise to a knowledge of spiritual beings, God, virtue, vice, etc., which are not in the im- agination. These similitudes, greatly differing in Dature and number from those of the imagination, are called ideas, concepts, reasons of things; but in Logic they are named mental terms, because they are the elements in which the decomposition of judgment and reasoning terminates. 7. The oral term is a conventional icord luhicji ex- presses the mental term. — Unlike the mental term, which from its very nature represents the object, the oral term has a meaning only in virtue of the usage and agreement of men. It directly denotes only the mental term, and only by means of this term does it express the object itself ; but habit leads us usually to unite the idea of the word with the idea of the thing. ART. III. — DIVISIONS OF TERMS. 8. The mental term, is intuitive or abstract, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, comple'e or incomplete. — Considered with reference to the manner in which the object is presented to the mind, the mental term SIMPLE APPEEHENSION. 5 is concrete, when the object is a^pprehended in its physical realit}" ; it is abstract, when the object is ap- prehended apart from its real existence. Considered in respect to the degree of perfection with which the mind apprehends the object, the mental term is dear, when the object can be distinguished from any other object ; it is obscure, when the object cannot be dis- tinguished from another object ; the mental term is distinct, when the object, besides being distinguished from other objects, is known in its constitutive ele- ments ; it is confused, when the object, though dis- cerned from other objects, is not known in its con- stitutive elements ; the mental term is complete or * adequate, when all the constitutive elements of the object are known ; it is incomplete or inadequate, when some only of the constitutive elements are known. 9. The orcd term is significative or- non-significative, fixed or vague, univocal or equivocal, analogous by at- tribution or analogous by proportion. — The oral term is significative, if it means something, as Man; it is non-significative, if it has no meaning, as Tervoc. The oral term is fixed, if it has a settled meaning, as God ; it is vague, if its meaning varies at the will of him who uses it, as Nature, which sometimes means the visible universe, sometimes the essence of a thing, etc. The oral term is univocal, when it has but one meaning for the several objects to which it is applied, as 3Ian, which signifies one and the same thing when applied to Peter and to Paul ; it is equivocal, when its meaning varies for each of several different things, as Bog, which is applied to a star and to an animal. The oral term is analogous, if it signifies several things which are not wholly identical, nor yet alto- gether different, as Foot, which is applied to a 6 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. member of an animal and to the base of a mountain. The term is analogous by attribution, when it denotes one thing principally, and applies to others only on account of the relation which they have to the first, as in the foregoing example ; the term is analogous by j>ro;Jor^iO'/^ when it signifies several things which difier in reality, but which are, nevertheless, identical in a certain proportion, as Principle, which is ap- plied in a certain proportion to source, heart, and point. 10. Th- mental term, like the oral, is significative of itself or by means of another term, positive or negative, concrete or abstract, real or logical, absolute or connotative, simple or complex, transcendental or categorical, connected or unconnected, p)T'^dicate or subject, antecedent or conse- quent, collective or distributive, singular or universal, — The term, whether mental or oral, is ^significative of itself, when of itself it has a meaning, as 3Ian; it is significative by means of another, when it has no mean- ing of itself, as Some. The term is positive, when it signifies the thing itself, as. Sight; it is negative, when it denotes the absence of something, as Blind- ness. The term is concrete, when it denotes a thing as it really exists, as Peter; it is abstract, when it denotes a thing apart from the subject to which it belongs, and from which it has no separate exis- tence, as Wliifeness. The term is real, when it signifies something having physical existence, as God; it is logical, when it signifies a thing which has no exist- ence except in our mind, as Species. The term is absolute or substantive, when it denotes a thing exist- ing in itself, as Man; it is connotative or adjectivey when it denotes a thing as the accompaniment of another, as Good. The term is simple, when it de- SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 7 notes one thing by a single sign, as Angel; it is com- plex, when it includes several ideas or several words, as Poet, which is complex in idea, for it compre- hends the man and his art ; Julius Caesar, which is complex in word, for it expresses one idea in two words ; the Emperor Charlemagne, which is complex in word and in idea, for it embraces two words and two ideas. The term is transcendental, when it signi- fies something applicable to all beings, as Being, Thing, Something, One, True, Good; it is categorical, when it signifies something which applies only to certain beings ; as Man. Terms are connected, when one includes or excludes another, as Man and Animal, White and Blach; they are unconnected, when they have no relation of exclusion or subordination, as White and Learned. The term is predicate, when it is afiirmed of another ; it is subject, when another is affirmed of it ; thus, in the proposition, God is just, God is the subject smdjust the predicate. The ante- cedent term is that which includes another, as, Ma7i in respect to animal ; the consequent term is that which is included in another, as. Animal in regard to man. If the terms are deduced from each other, they are called reciprocal, as Man and Rational. The term is collective when it denotes several things taken conjointly, as The City; it is distributive, when it denotes several things in such a manner that it may be applied to each in particular, as Man. A term is singidar, when it signifies one thing only, as Aris- totle; it is universal, when it applies to several things univocally and distributively, as Animal. In con- nection with universal terms, two things may be con- sidered : 1. Universal terms in themselves and the five Species into which they are divided ; 2. Their 8 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. division into different Supreme Genera, called Cate- gories. ART. IV. — UNIVERSALS. 11. Universah are terms luhlch are applied univocal- J[l ami cUstribtitively to many things. — When the mind has perceived the essence of an object abstracted from the individual characteristics of that object, it may consider the mental term representing the essence as applicable to every being which has the common essence ; the term is then called universal, as Man. Its opposite is the singular term, which is applied to one thing only, as Socrates. The ^:>rt>*^ic- nlar term is a universal affected by the sign of particularity, which limits it to a part of its signifi- cation, as Some men. 12. Unlversals have two properties : comprehension and extension, which are in inverse ratio to each other. — The essence represented by the universal is formed of one element or of many elements ; thus : The essence of man consists of animality and rationality; hence the comprehension of the universal is the sum of the elements which it contains. The essence represented by the universal is found in a greater or less number of beings ; thus : The essence of man is found in all men; hence the extension of the universal is the number of beings to which the universal applies. The greater the comprehension of a term, the less its extension, and vice versa, 13. There ore five modes according to which a uni- versal term may be applied to individuals; there are, therefore, five kinds of universal, viz. : genus, species, difference, ^^ro^^erf?/, and accident. These unlversals are called predlcahles or categorema. — A universal term SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 9 expresses either the essence of a thing or something joined to the essence. If it expresses the essence, it expresses either the whole essence or a part of the essence. If it. denotes the Avhole essence, it is the species, and the beings to which it is applied are called individuals, as 3Ian. If the universal denotes a pa.rt of the essence, it expresses either the part common to other species, or the part by which the essence differs from other species : in the first case it is called the genus, and in the second the difference; thus : Ammality expresses what is common to both man and brute, and Bationality what distinguishes man from the brute. If the universal denotes what is joined to the essence, either this attribute cannot be separated from the essence, but is a necessary effect of it, in which case it is a property; or it can be separated without changing the essence, and then it is an accident; thus : Free Will is a property, Learn- ing is an accident of man. Genus, species, and differ- ence are divided into highest, intermediate, and lowest or proximate. Highest Genus : j Incorporeal ) Highest Species and Substance \ Corporeal ) Difference. Intermediate Genus : j Inanimate ] Intermediate Species and Body \ Animate f Difference. Lowest or Proximate j Irrational / Lowest Species and Genus : Animal { Rational f Difference. ART. V. — PREDICAMENTS OR CATEGORIES. 14. Predicaments or categories are generic terms under ivMch all the species of things are co-ordinated. — When the mind examines an object, it endeavors to find out what attributes or predicates it can affirm or deny of the object. Now, all the species of attributes which can be predicated of an object have been ar- 10 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ranged in logic under certain supreme genera ; these genera are called predicaments or categories. ^ 15. There are ten predicaments or categories : sub- stance, quality, relation, quantity, action, passion, time, place, posture, habiliment. — Every being exists either in itself or in another. If it exists in itself, it is called substance ; if it exists in another, it is called accident. The accident is subdivided into nine genera ; for, if we want to know the accidents of a sub- stance, Charlemagne, for instance, we may put the following questions : 1. How large a man is he ? which gives the quantity ; 2. Whose father or son is he? which gives the relation; 3. What are his quali- fications? which gives the quality; 4. What does lie do ? which gives the action ; 5. What does he suffer ? which gives the passion; 6. In what age did he live ? which gives the time ; 7. Where is he ? which gives the place ; 8. Is he sitting or standing ? which gives the j^osture ; 9. How is he clad ? which gives the habiliment. 16. Comparing things arranged under the j^redica- ments with one another, we may consider their opposition, priority, simultaneity, mutation, and mode of having ; these terms are called post-predicaments.— Opposition is the repugnance of one thing to another. There are four kinds : 1. Contrary, when the two things, fal- ling under a common genus, are mutually incompat- ' " What is the difference between the Predicaments or Categories and the Heads of Predicates ? The Categories are a classification of all existing things as they are themselves regarded in their own proper being, as the object of our mental concepts or ideas The Heads of Predicables are, on the other hand, a classification of the forms of thought, that is to say, of the various relations our ideas or concepts bear to each other. " Clarke's Lorjic, Manuals of Catholic Philosophv p. 190. SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 11 ible with the same subject ; as Heat and Cold ; 2. Belative, when the repugnance arises from a mutual relation, as Father and Son ; 3. Privative^ when the repugnance arises between a thing and its privation, as Sight and Blindness , 4 Contradictory, when the repugnance is between being and not-being, as Man. and not-Man. — Priority is that by which one thing precedes another. There are five kinds : 1. Priority of duration ; as Youth and Old Age ; 2. Of consequence ; as Man and Rationality ; 3. Of order, as Grammar and Literature 4. Of dignity, as a King and his Sub- jects ; 5. Of nature, as the Sun and its Rays. — Simul- taneity is opposed to priority, hence it is also of five kinds. — Mutation is the passage from one state to an- other. There are six kinds : 1. Generation or the passage from non-being to substantial being ; 2. Decay or the passage from a state of being to non- being ; 3. Augmentation or the passage from a less to a greater quantity ; 4. Diminution, which is the opposite of augmentation ; 5. Alternation or the passage from one quality to another ; 6. Locomotion or the passage from one place to another. The modes of having a thiyig are five : 1. By inherence, as Knowledge in man ; 2. By containing, as Wine in the cash ; 3. By Posses- sion, as The mans field ; 4. By relationship, as Father and son ; 5. By juxtaposition, as The garment on the man. ART. VI. — PROPERTIES OF THE TERMS IN A , PROPOSITION. 17. Terms ha.ve six properties : supposition, appel- lation, state, amplification, restriction, alienation. — Sup- position is the special meaning of a word in a given proposition, as Angel is a ivord. Angel here means 12 CHIUSTIAN PHILOSOPHi'. materially the word Ancjel. AppeUafion is the appli- catiou of one term to something denoted by another term, as God is good; here good is applied to God. — St((fc is the acceptation of a term for the time in- dicated by the verb, as Fefei^ sings.— Amplification is the acceptation of a term for a time different from that indicated by the verb, as The dumb speoL — Be- sfrictioii is the limitation of the broad signification of a term to a narrower sense, as Eve is the mother of the living ; here the word living is restricted to men. — Alienation is the transfer of the meaning of one term to another by the addition of a second term, as The Sun of Justice, used to designate the Saviour. 18. Supposition is material or formal, real or logic- al, particular^ collective, or distributive. — The supposi- tion of a word is material, when the word signifies the term itself, as Man is a word. It is formal, when the word denotes the object, as Blan is rational. It is real, when the word expresses the object such as it really exists, as 3Ian is a living being. It is logical, when the word denotes the object abstracted from its individual characteristics, as 3Ian is a species. It is particular, when the word signifies some only of the beings which it can represent, as Some men are de- ceitful. It is collective, when the word signifies all the beings which it can represent, taken conjointly, as The Apostles are twelve. It is distributive, when the word expresses all and each of the beings which it can represent, as Man is mortal. 19. Supjwsition is subject to the following rules : 1. A term affected by a universal sign has a distributive or collective supposition ; as, All the Evangelists are saints ; All the Evangelists are four. 2. A term SIMPLE ArPREHENSION. 13 affected hij a ijnrticular sign has a particular siqoposi- tion ; as, Some men are just. 3. When the subject of a proposition is not affected hy a sign, it has a universal supposition in necessary matter, that is, luhen the predicate must he attributed to the subject ; as, Man is rational ; it has a 2^ct^^ticular supposition in contingent matter ; as, The French are courageous. 4. In an affirmative proposition, the supposition of the predicate is always particular ; as, Man is immortal ; in a negative proposition, the supposition of the predi- cate is universal ; as, Man is not a vegetable. 5. In every proposition, the sujjposition of the subject is ac- cording to the requirement of the predicate ; thus a numerical term requires a collective supposition ; as. The Apostles are tv/elve ; a necessary term requires a distributive supposition ; as, The animal is sensitive ; a contingent term requires a particular supposition ; as. The French are courageous. 20. Appellation is material or formal. — Appellation is material when the predicate is applied to the matter of the subject, of the quality or form denoted by the subject, and not to the form itself ; as, The physician sings. It i^ formal when the predicate is applied to the form of the subject, i. e., to the quality or form which the subject expresses, as, The physi- cian cures. ^ 21. Appellation is subject to the following rules : 1. When the predicate is a concrete term, the appellation is material ; as, Man is a living being. 2. Wlien the subject is qualified, the predicate is affirmed of the sid)ject only and the appellation is material; as, St. ' In the first example the predicate singing must be applied, not to the form or quality of physician^ but to the matter, man^ to which the form is united. In the second example, curing naturally belongs to the physician as such and therefore is applied to the form. 14 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. Thomas of Aquin was the disciple of Albertns Mag- nus. 3. ly/ien the predicate is qaalijied, it is ajinited of the subject as having the quality expressed by the qualifier, and the appellation, is formal ; as, Thomas of Aquin was a saintly disciple of Albertus Magnus. In this example, disciple is aflirmed of Thomas of Aquin, but as being saintly. ART. VII. — MEANS TO INSURE EXACTNESS OF TERMS. — DEFINITION. 22. Terms, to be perfect, must be clear and distinct. To obtain this result, we must have recourse to defini- tion and division. — The object of these two processes being to clear up what is obscure or confused, it is evident they should not be employed wdien things are in themselves sufficiently clear and distinct. 23. Definition is a brief exjjlanation of the meaning of a icord or the nature of a thing. — Whence it follows that there are two kinds of definitions, the nominal and the real ; the first explains the meaning of the word, the second explains the nature of the thing signified by the word. It should be observed : 1. That the nominal definition ought to precede the real, when the nature of a thing is in question and the meaning of the word expressing it is not under- stood ; 2. That the nominal definition, in reasoning, must never be considered tantamount to the real def- inition ; 3. That the real definition only is scientific. 24. There are three kinds of nominal definition : 1. According to etymology; 2. According to nsage;3. Ac- cording to the meaning ivhich the person ivho uses the word loishes to attach to it. — The real definition is either causal or essential. — A nominal definition may be given according to etymology, as Intelligence (from SIMPLE APPREHENSION. 15 the Latin intus legere, to read within,) signifies intimate knowledge. We may also define a word in accordance with usage ; as By the word God, all understand the Infinite Being. Finally, we may attach to a word whatever meaning we choose. In this case, however, care should be taken : 1. Not to be so arbitrary in oar choice as to become unintelligible to others ; 2. Not to use the word in a different sense during the discourse. The causal definition explains a thing by stating the principle which produces or generates it ; as The sphere is a solid generated by the revolution of a semicircle about its diameter. The essential definition explains a thing by giving its essence, as Man is a rational animal ; this is the most perfect kind of defini- tion. A thing is sometimes explained by describing it ; such a description is called a descriptive or orator- ical definition. 25. The definition should contain the proximate genus and the specific difference. — By the definition the thing defined should be distinguishable from every other thing and should be known in its characteristics. But without the proximate genus the characteristics of the thing are not known ; and without the specific difference the species to which the thing belongs is not known. In the definition, Man is a rational am- mal, animal determines the proximate genus, and rational the specific difference. This rule includes that laid down by the modern logicians, viz., The def- inition must embrace the whole of the thing defined and nothing but the thing defined. Three rules are laid down for framing a definition : 1. The definition must be plainer than the thing defined ; 2. The def- inition must be convertible with the thing defined ; 3. The thing defined must not enter into the definition. 10 CHRISTIAN rHILOSOPHY. ART. VIII. — DIVISION. 26. Division is the distribution of a whole into its /xtrts. Division is actual ^ or potential. — As division is the separation of a whole into its parts, there are as many kinds of division as there are different kinds of whole. But a whole may be actual or potential, hence division may be actual or potential : actual, when the whole is divided into parts which it has actually, as Man is composed of body and soul; po- tential, when the whole is divided into parts which it has in virtue of a logical consideration, as Sub- stance is corporeal or incorporeal. 27. The division must be adequate, it must be made njJ of the most universal members, and of parts that exclude one another. — 1. The division must be complete, and hence equal to the whole thing divided ; thus we should not divide trianrjles into isosceles and equila- teral. 2. It should be made in such a way as to proceed from the more general parts to those which are less general ; thus the division of living tilings into plants, animals, and men would be defective ; they should first be divided into sentient and non-stntient. 3. The division should be such that the members in some way exclude one another, that is, no one must contain any other, much less all. so as to be equal to the whole divided ; thus man should not be divided into snul, body, and arms. To these three rules may be added a fourth : The division must be brief, that is, tlie members should be few in number. ' The actual wliole is ehher jihyskal or metaphysical ; physical when composed of physical parts, as body and soul in man ; metaphysical when composed of metaph3-sical parts, as animal nature and rational nature in :n:in. CHAPTEE II. Judgment. ART. I. — NATURE OF JUDGMENT. 28. Judgment is the second operation of the mind, hy ivhich it perceives the agreement or disagreement of the predicate loith the subject. — By apprehension, the mind perceives the subject and predicate separately ; but, after this operation, it compares the subject and predicate, and perceives their relation, that is, it forms a judgment. The mind, by this second act of knowl- edge, perfects the first, which is initial and imperfect. The chief division of judgments is that based on their nature, and embraces the two classes of a 2^™ri and a posteriori judgments. An a ^^rzori judgment is one in which the agreement or disagreement of the ideas compared is necessary, and either is manifest or can become so from their mere consideration ; as God is infinite. An a jDosteriori judgment is one in which the agree- ment or disagreement of the ideas compared is not necessary and can be known from experience alone ; as Columbus discovered America. A priori judgments are also called necessary, analyt- ical, pure, metaphysiccd, absolute. A posteriori judg- ments are styled contingent, synthetical, empirical, physiccd, hypothetical. 29. The a priori synthetical judgment of Kcmt must be rejected. — In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant lays down this third kind of judgment, the a priori syn- thetical. He holds rightly that all apriori or analj^ical 18 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. judgments must fulfil three conditions : 1. Tlie pred- icate must be included in the notion of the subject ; 2. It must be necessary ; 3. It must be univeral. But he further maintains that such judgments as Every effect has its cause, or 7 and 5 arc 12, are wanting in the first condition. But ever}^ judgment implies the percep- tion by the mind of the identity or diversity of the ideas compared. This identity or diversity can be apprehended either from the consideration of the ideas, and in this case the judgment is a j^'i^iori or analytical ; or from the consideration of the objects represented by the ideas, and then the judgment is a posteriori or synthetical. Between these there is, therefore, no middle. Moreover, if the second and third conditions are fulfilled, evidently, the first must also be fulfilled, since from it the other two result.^ ART. II. — THE PROPOSITION AND ITS ELEMENTS. 30. A proposition is the expression of a judgment. The elements of the proposition may he reduced to tiuo, the noun and, the verb. — The proposition, being the expression of the judgment, must contain as many terms as the judgment. But the judgment is com- posed of three elements : the subject, the predicate, and the copula. To these three elements of the judgment correspond three elements of the pro- position : two terms, which express the subject and the predicate, and the copula, which unites them. The two terms are generally nouns ; the copula is a verb. The copula is called a verb, because the word (verbiim) of our mind is not complete without the judgment, and the judgment is formally constituted * See the clear but extended explanation in Clarke's Logic, p. 62 et seqcj. JUDGMENT. 19 only by the copula. The terms constitute the matter of the proposition ; the copula, which gives being to the proposition, is its form. The verb to be, is often contained in the predicate, as in Hove God, which is equivalent to I am loving GocL ' Besides the noun and the verb. Grammar recog- nizes other parts of speech, as the pronoun, adverb, conjunction, etc. ; but logic is not concerned with these terms, because tliey do not constitute an essen- tial element of the proposition, and because they serve only to represent or modify or correct nouns or verbs. ART. III. — DIVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITION. 31. The divisions of the projoosition are the same as those of the judgment The proposition is simple or compound, according to the nature of the judgment expressed. The simple proposition is either categorical or hypothetical. — The proposition, being regarded in logic simply as the expression of the judgment, is divided into as many kinds as the judgment. But the judgment is simple or compound : simple, when the relation is established between one subject and one predicate ; compound, when there are several subjects or several predicates. When the judgment , is one, the predicate or subject may be absolutely simple, or simple by reason of the connection be- 1 The use of the term predicate m Logic must be carefully distin- guished from that iu Grammar. In logic the predicate never includes the copula. Moreover, the copula, as the formal element of the judg- ment, must be iu the present tense, indicative mood. Henoe, such propositions as. The Martyrs suffered for the Faith, must be resolved into the equivalent, The Martyrs are persons who suffered for the Faith. 20 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. tween the parts which compose it ; in the first case, the judgment is categorical, as God is good ; in the second, hypothetical, as // 2jou are good, you will be rewarded. The proposition, then, considered logically, is categorical, hypothetical, or compound. 32. Tlte categorical proposition, considered in respect to its quantity, is universal, particular, or singular, def- inite or indefinite; considered in respect to its quality, it is affirmative, negative, or infinite ; considered in re- spect to the mode or manner in ivhich it asserts that the predicate applies to the snbjict, it is modal. — The cate- gorical proposition may be divided in the same manner as the judgment which it expresses. Hence according to its quantity, that is, according to the extension of its subject, it is universal if the subject is universal ; as All men are mortal ; particular, if the subject is particular, as Some men are just ; singular, if the subject expresses only one individual, as Peter is just. The proposition may sometimes appear uni- versal without in reality being so, as Men are de- ceptive. Propositions are called indefinite, ^ when the subject is not affected by a determinate sign, as The French are courageous ; and definite, when the subject is affected by a determinate sign, as So7ne men are deceptive. According to its q^iality, that is, according to the affirmation or negation indicated by the copula, the proposition is affirmative, as God is good ; or neg- ative, as The soul is not mortal. If the negation does not affect the copula, but the predicate, the proposi- tion is then said to be infinite, as The human soul is not * Tlie singular proposition is tlic most limited case of the particular proposition. The indefinite proposition is universal or partic\ilar ac- cording as it expresses a necessary or a contingent truth. See Clarke's Loi/ic, pp. 274, 275. JUDGMENT. 21 mortal A proposition is modal when it expresses the mode or manner in which the predicate is attributed to the subject, as, God is necessarily good. The pred- icate may be asserted of the subject according to four modes : the necessary, the contingent, the possible, and the impossible. There are, then, four kinds of modal proposition : as 3Ian is necessarily rational ; Man may be good ; Man can be bad; Man cannot be an angel. The truth of the modal proposition depends on the mode according to which the predicate is attributed to the subject ; thus, the proposition, Man is necessarily bad, is false. ^ 33. The hypothetical proposition is copulative, disjunc- tive, conditional, causal, relative, adversative, exclusive, exceptive, comparative, or reduplicative. — The hypothet- ical proposition consists of several propositions ex- pressing several judgments which make but one in virtue of some logical bond established between them ; as If you are good, you icill be reivarded. The truth of the hypothetical proposition depends not upon each judgment, but upon the connection between the various judgments ; as // the said is material, it is not immortcd. ^ The hypothetical proposition is copula- tive, when the several categorical propositions are united by the conjunction and, expressed or under- stood ; as Time and Truth are friends. It is disjunc- tive, when the several categorical propositions are ^ The mode always aJfects the copula in true modal propositions. They are always capable of being resolved into another proposition of which the word or words expressing the mode is the predicate. Thus, Man can be bad is equivalent to That man be bad is possible. 2 Hence either subject or predicate, or both, in a conditional propo- sition may be affected by a negative, but the proposition will not be negative imless the dependence of the consequent on the antecedent be not true. 22 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. united by the particles either, or ; as It is either day or night. It is conditional, Avhen, by means of the particle if, it unites two categorical propositions, one of wliicli contains the reason or condition of the other ; as If he is good, he will he rewarded. The first proposition, which contains the reason of the other, is called the antecedent, the second the consequent. The causal proposition states the reason why the an- tecedent contains the consequent, by means of the particle because or a word of similar import ; as He is 2^youd, because he is rich. The relative proposi- tion expresses some similitude between the proposi- tions which compose it ; as Such as life is, such shall death be. The adversative proposition, on the con- trary, expresses some opposition between its mem- bers by means of the particles hut, nevertheless, etc. ; as Virtue is persecuted, hut it icill be rewarded. — Be- sides these hypothetical propositions proper, there are others, hypothetical in reality, though seemingly categorical, and called expositive. They are of four kinds : exclusive, exceptive, cortiparative, and redupli- cative. The first is affected by an exclusive particle ; only, alone, etc. ; as Virtue only is p)raiseivorthy. The second is affected by an exceptive particle, besides, except ; as All is lost except honor. The third is affected by a comparative particle, expressed or im- plied ; as Gentleness effects more than violence. The fourth is a proposition whose .subject is affected by a particle which repeats it, inasmuch as, in the sense th(tf, etc. ; as Fire, inasmuch as it is fire, burns. 3-4. The jn-opositions composing the compound j^ro- position may be j^^'i^i^^ip^^l or i))cidentcd. — The com- pound proposition is that which, in one proposition, contains several independent judgments, which may JUDGMENT. 23 be expressed in several propositions ; as, Patience and meekness are virtues ; Charity is meek and patient. That the compound proposition may be true, all the parts which compose it must be true ; thus, the proposition 3Ien and angels are mortal is false. The compound proposition may be resolved into several grammatical propositions either co-ordinate, i. e., simply in juxtaposition, as in the foregoing example, or into propositions some of which are principal and others explanatory incidents ; as Siuy detested by God, sullies the soid, which is equivalent to the two independent judgments, Sin is detested by God, and Sin sidlies the soul. If the propositions joined to the principal one are subordinate or are restricting inci- dents, the whole proposition is not compound but simple. ART. IV. — PROPERTIES OF PROPOSITIONS. 35. The properties of propositions are three: opposi- tion, conversion, equiptollence. 36. Opposition is the affirmation and negation of one and the same thing on one and the same point. 37. Opposition is tivofold, contradictory and con- trary. — Contradictory opposition is the repugnance between two opposite propositions, the one being universal and the other particular, or both being singular. Contrary opposition is the repugnance be- tween two opposite universal propositions. Some recognize what is called Suhcontrary opposition, which holds between two opposite particular proposi- tions ; but this is not true opposition, since the sub- jects of the two propositions may express different things. Still less can we consider as opposition that which is called Subaltern, and which holds between *24: CHRIS riAN PHILOSOPHY. two affirmative or two negative propositions, the one being universal and the other particular. In this case there is no opposition, since there is no affirma- tion and negation of one and the same thing on one and the same point. Of the four propositions : All me)) are wise, No man Is wise, Some men are wise. Some men arc not icise, the first and second are contraries; the first and fourth, the second and third, contradic- tories ; the third and fourth, subcontraries ; the first and third, the second and fourth, subalterns. Representing the universal affirmative proposition by A, the universal negative by F, the particular affirmative by 7, and the particular negative by 0, we have the following diagram : A CONTliARIES E o I %. .#"• 1 cP^ \^ i I SUBCONTRARIES O 38. Contrary or coniradictonj propositions cannot both he true. Of two contradictories, the one must be true and the other false. Contraries may both be false. Subcontraries may both be true, but cannot both be false. Subalterns may both be true or both false, or, the one may be true and the other false. 39. Equipollence is the equivalence in meaning of two propositions which are expressed in different terms. — Equip(^llence may also be defined, The reduction JUDGMENT. 25 of two opposite propositions to the same meaning ; as, Every man is a rational being ; Every rational being is a man. These two propositions are said to be equipollent. 40. When the subject of a contradictory 2^'^^oposition is affected by a negation, it becomes equivalent to its contradictory. When the predicate of a contrary proj)- osition is affected by a negation, it becomes equivalent to its contrary. When the predicate of a subcontrary proposition is affected by a negation, it becomes equiva- lent to the other subcontrary. When the negation affects both subject and predicate of a subaltern prop- osition, it becomes equivalent to the other subaltern. — These three rules result from what has been said concerning the nature and rules of opposite proposi- tions. 41. Conversion is that change in a proposition by ivhich, tvithout altering its truth, the predicate is made the subject, and the subject the predicate. — The proposi- tion susceptible of being converted is called convert- ible, the proposition which results from its conversion the converse. 42. Conversion is simple, per accidens, and by contra- position. — The conversion is simple when, the predi- cate being made the subject, the proposition retains its quantity ; as, No man is a plant ; No plant is a mem. It is per accidens, when, the predicate being made the subject, the proposition changes its quantity ; as, The French are men ; Some men are Freyicli. It is by contraposition, when, the predicate being made the subject, finite terms are changed into infinite ; s,^ All men are animals ; All not-animals are not-men ; Only animals are men. The universal negative propositions and the par- 26 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ticular affimative are converted simply, as, No man is (fit ((iKjel ; No cnigel is a man. The universal affirmative and the universal negative are converted /jer accidens, as. All men are mortalSy Some mortals are men. ^ The particular negative and the universal affirma- tive are converted by contraposition, as, Some men are not just ; Some individuals not-just, are not no-men. Some luho are not just are men. CHAPTER III. Reasoning. ART. I. — DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF REASONING. 43. Reasoninrj is the third operation of the mind, by icliich, from the relation existing between two judg- ments, it infers a third as the result of the other two. — There are two kinds of judgments- Some are self-evi- dent, and, on that account, are called intuitive or im- mediate. Others are not self-evident, and are called deductive or mediate ; the relation between the ^predicate and the subject cannot be perceived with- out comparing them with a third term. The act by which we seek to determine the relation of two terms by comparing them with a third is reasoning. 44. The elements of reasoning are three terms and three judgments, and the relation existing between these ' *' Conversion by contraposition is based on the fact that to assert an agreement of two objects of thought is to deny the agreement of either of them with the contradictory of the other. "-See Clarke's Logic^ pp. 301, 302. KEASONING. 27 tei^ms and judgments. — Reasoning must contain three terms, since its end is to establish the relation be- tween a subject and a predicate bj means of a third term. Again, it must contain three judgments : two to show the relation of the subject and predicate with a middle term, a third to point out the relation of the predicate with the subject. The three terms and the three propositions constitute the matter of reasoning, their connection constitutes its /orm. 45. The truth of a reasoning may he considered in respect both to its matter and its form. — That a reason- ing may be materially true, it suffices that the prem- ises and the conclusion be separately true ; but that it be formally true, the connection between the conclu- sion and the premises must be true ; hence it is clear that reasoning may be materially true and formally false, and vice versa. 46. All reasoning is based on one of these two axioms : 1. Ttuo things ivhich agree luith a third, wholly or in part, agree ivith each other, luholly or in part ; 2. Tivo things, one of which agrees, wholly or in part, luith a third, with ivhich the other does not agree, do not agree ivith each other. — The first axiom is the principle of affirmative reasoning ; the second is the basis of negative reasoning. ART. II. — DIVISIONS OF EEASONING. 47. Beasoning considered in respect to its form, is deductive or inductive ; considered in respect to its mat- ter, it is categorical or hypothetical. — In a reasoning a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject, because, after comparing each of them with a middle term, it becomes manifest whether the middle term does or does not contain the other two. Now, as one thing 28 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. may be in auotlier as a part is in the whole, or as the whole is in the sum of its parts, reasoning is of two kinds, according as we proceed from the whole to its parts, or from the parts to the whole ; that is, ac- cording as we proceed from genera to species and from species to individuals, or from individuals to species and from species to genera. The first is il'ducfive reasoning, the second is inductive. Rea- soning considered in respect to the judgments entering into it, is categorical or lujpotheiical. But whether reasoning be inductive or deductive, categorical or hypothetical, the truth of the conclusion is always mediate and deduced. Hence the regular form of all reasoning is deduction or the syllogism. ART. III. — THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM AND ITS RULES. 48. The syllogism is th<;Lt form of reasoning in which the two extremes of a 2^^^oposition are compared affirm- atively or negcdiuely luith a third, in order to determine luhether their relation icith each other is affirmative or negative. — It is easily seen from this definition that the syllogism must contain three terms and three propositions. The subject of the deduced proposi- tion is called the minor term or minor extreme ; the predicate is called the major term or major extreme, because the predicate, when not identical with the subject, has always a greater extension than the sub- ject. The term with which the extremes are com- pared is called the middle term. The two proposi- tions in which the two extremes are compared with the middle are tlie premises or the antecedent ; that wliich contains the major term is called the major premise ; that which contains the minor term is called the minor premise. The proposition whicli is REASONING. 29 deduced from the other two, or in which the minor term is compared with the major, is called the con- clusion or consequent. -iO. The syllogism is subject to thefolloiving eight rules: I. The syllogism must contain only three terms. II. No term must have a greater extension in the con- clusion than in the j^remises. III. The middle term must he ialcen universally at least once in the premises. IV. The middle term must not enter into the conclu- sion. V. Nothing can he concluded from tivo negative premises. VI. A negative conclusion cannot he draivn from tivo affirmative premises. VII. The conclusion ahvays foUoivs the iveaJcer part. VIII. From tivo particular premises nothing can he concluded. I. The first rule flows from the very essence of the syllogism, which consists in establishing a relation between two terms by means of a third. This rule is usually violated by using one of the terms in two different senses ; as, Every sp)irit is endoived luith in- telligence ; hut cdcohol is a spirit ; thereforCy it is endoived with intelligence. II. The conclusion cannot be more extended than the premises ; otherwise, we should have a conse- quent not contained in the antecedent, an effect which transcends its cause ; as. The eagle is an animals- hut the eagle flies in the air; therefore , all animals fly in the air. III. The middle term must be taken, at least once, universally ; otherwise, being twice particular, it 30 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. would be equivalent to two different terms, and we should have a syllogism containing four terms ; as, Some an'unate heuigs are endoiued with reason; but the horse is an animate heing ; therefore, the horse is en- doired luith reason. lY. The middle term must not be found in the conclusion ; because, being used as a term of com- parison, for the pui'pose of finding a relation between the other two terms, its proper place is in the prem- ises, where this relation is established. Its appear- ance in the conclusion really introduces a fourth term into the syllogism ; as, Astronomers are learned ; Peter is an astronomer ; therefore, Peter is a learned astronomer. Y. Two negatives give no conclusion ; for, in that case we simply see that the term chosen for the middle cannot serve to establish any relation be- tween the extremes ; hence the antecedent is null, and no consequent can be drawn from it ; as. Shep- herds are not learned ; hut Peter is not a shepherd. It cannot be concluded either that Peter is or is not learned. YI. A negative cannot be inferred from two affir- matives, for two things identical with a third cannot but be identical with each other. YII. Tlie conclusion alwa^^s follows the weaker part; that is, if one of the premises is negative the conclu- sion must be negative ; if one of the premises is par- ticular, the conclusion must be particular. In the first place, it is evident that, if one of two things is identical with a third, and the other is not, the two things cannot be identical with each other. In the second place, if one of two premises is particular, the conclusion cannot be universal, otherwise it will BEASONING. 31 have a term more extended here than in the premises. YIII. Two particulars afford no conclusion ; because if both are affirmative, the middle term must be twice particular ; if one of the two is negative, the conclusion must contain a universal term which is particular in the premises. All these rules may be reduced to the following Ride of Modern Logicians : The conclusion must he contained in one of the premises, and the other premise must show that it is therein contained. ART. IV. — THE MODES AND FIGURES OF THE SYLLOGISM. 50. The mode of the syllogism is its form according to the quantity and quality of the three propositions lohich enter into it. — Propositions, considered in re- spect both to their quantity and quality, are of four kinds : 1. Universal affirmative ; 2. Universal negative ; 3. Particular affirmative; 4. Particular negative. Logicians have designated these four kinds of propo- sitions by the letters- A, E, I, O. It is evident that these four propositions, combined in threes, give sixty-four possible combinations ; but applying to these the rules of the syllogism, there will be found only ten valid modes. These are : AAA, AAI, AEE, All, AOO, EAE. EAO, EIO, lAI, OAO. 51. The figure of the syllogism is its form according to the position of the middle term in the premises. — The middle term in the premises may be : 1. Sub- ject of the major and predicate of the minor ; 2. Predicate of both ; 3. Subject of both ; 4. Predicate of the major and subject of the minor. There are, then, four figures ; but many logicians make no account of the fourth, or turn it into the first. Each figure is 32 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. susceptible of tbe ten modes, because the proposi- tions may preserve their quality and quantity with- out changiug the place of the middle term. 52. There are only nineteen conclusive modes: they are chsignated by the folloicing lines : I. Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. II. Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco. III. Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Daiisiy Bocardo, Ferison. lY. Banudipton, Camentes, Dimatis, Fresapno, Fresisonornm. Applying the rules of the syllogism to these modes, we see that i\\Q first figure, in which the middle term is subject of the major and predicate of the minor, excludes : 1. Modes whose minor is negative ; 2. Modes whose major is particular ; 3. AAI, EAO as useless. The second figure, in which the middle term is used twice as predicate, excludes : 1. Modes whose two premises are affirmative ; 2. Those in which the major is particular ; 3. EAO as useless. The third figure, in which the middle term occurs twice as subject, excludes : 1. Modes in which the minor is negative ; 2. Modes in which the conclusion is universaL HhQ fourtli figure, m \\\\ic\\ the middle term is predicate of the major and subject of the minor, excludes : 1. Modes having an affirmative major with a particular minor; 2. Modes having an affirmative minor with a universal conclusion ; 3. OAO as contrary to the second rule. There remain only the following nineteen valid modes : 1st Figure, AAA, EAE, All, EIO. 2d Figure, EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO. 3d Figure, AAI, EAO, lAT. All, OAO, EIO. 4th Figure, AAI, AEE, lAI, EAO, EIO. REASONING. 33 All tliese modes may be converted into tlie four modes of the first figure, which, on that account, are called perfect. They are summed up in the four lines already given, which, by a happy disposition of vowels and consonants, designate at once a par- ticular mode, the perfect mode into which it may be converted, and the diverse operations by which the conversion is affected. The first three vowels of each word indicate the mode ; the initial consonant shows to what mode of the first figure this mode may be reduced ; the consonants S, P, C, M, denote the operation to be performed in order to effect the re- duction. S indicates that the proposition designated by the vowel before it must be converted simply ; P, that it must be converted per accidens ; C, that the syllogism must be reduced j^e?^ impossihile ; M signifies that the order of the premises must be changed. Thus the syllogism, What is material is not simple ; one simple being is the soul ; therefore, the soul is not material; is designated by Fresisonorum of the fourth figure ; for the mode is seen from the three vowels E A O, and the figure is known by the position of the middle term. This mode may be reduced to that mode of the first figure that begins with F, viz., Ferio. The letter S following E and I in Fresisonorum indi- cates that the premises represented by these two letters are to be converted simply. Hence the syllo- gism becomes: What is simple is not material; the soul is simple ; therefore, the soul is not material. AET V. — THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM A^D ITS EULES. 53. The hypothetical syllogism is that in which one of the premises is hypothetical, — If one premise of the syllogism is a disjunctive proposition, the syllogism 34 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. is called disjunctive. If one premise is a conjunctive proposition, the syllogism is conjunctive. Finally, if one premise is conditional, the syllogism is condi- tional. TLe hypothetical syllogism, of whatever kind, besides the rules peculiar to it, is subject to the eight rules of the categorical syllogism. 54. The disjunctive syllogism is suhject to the tivo fol- loiving rules: 1. One of the incompatible j^redicates being affirmed in the minor, all the others must be denied copu- latively in the conclusion; 2. One of the incompatible predicates being denied in the minor, all the others must be affirmed disjunctively in the conclusion. — It is evident that, for the legitimacy of the conclusion of the dis- junctive syllogism, the disjunctive premise must make a complete enumeration of all the predicates that can agree with the subject. Hence this syl- logism is false: The rich must either squander their money or hoard it; but they should not hoard it; there- fore, they should squander it. The disjunction is not complete ; it has omitted a third term, which is to ex- pend money prudently. 55. The conjunctive syllogism, from the affirmation of one of the members, infers the negation of all the others; but not vice versa. — It is clear that the conclusiveness of this syllogism requires that the members enumer- ated in the conjunctive proposition be opposed to each other in such a way that they cannot agree with the same subject at the same time ; as. No one can serve God and Mammon; but many serve Mammon; therefore, many do not serve God. From this example it is clear that, if the minor were negative, as, But the spendthrift does not serve Mammon, we could not infer the affirmative : Therefore, he serves God. ^ 1 The minor of a conjunctive syllogism always denies one of the two alternatives expressed in the major. REASONING. 35 56. The conditional syllogism concludes in tivo loays: 1. From the affirmation of the antecedent it infers the affirmation of the consequent; 2. From the negation of the consequent it infers the negation of the antecedent; hut not vice versa. — In fact, the antecedent contains the reason of the consequent ; therefore, the affirma- tion of the first implies that of the second, as the negation of the second implies that of the first ; as, If Clirist arose from the dead, he is God; hut he did arise from the dead; therefore, he is God. But since an effect may depend on several causes, the inverse of the rules laid down would not give a logical conclu- sion ; as, // Peter is studious, he merits a reward; but he is not studious; therefore, he does not merit a reward. It is clear that a reward may be merited for some other reason besides that of being studious. ^ ART VI.— THE IMPERFECT AND THE COMPOUND SYLLOGISM, OR THE ENTHYMEME, THE PROSYLLOGISM, THE EPICHIREMA, THE SORITES, AND THE DILEMMA. 57. The enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, one premise of ivhich is understood; as, God is Just; there- fore, he ivill reiuard the good. 58. The prosyllogism is a syllogism composed of two syllogisms J the conclusion of the first becoming the major of the second; as, Every virtue is rewarded by God; hid humility is a virtue; therefore, humility is rewarded by God; hut the bearing of injuries is humility; therefore^ the hearing of injuries is reivarded by God. 59. The epichirema is a syllogism composed of premises hs. This kind of demonstration serves to pre- pare the way for science and to defend it, but it does not constitute science. To indirect demon- stration may be referred the argumentation called ex datis, so designated because from the concessions of an adversary w^e draw conclusions which are evi- dently against him ; as, You grant that the ivorld could not make itself ; then God must have created it. The demonstration called circidar or regressive is at the 54: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. same time a lyr'wri and a posteriori ; a posteriori, since it ascends from effect to cause ; a jorioriy since, from the cause better known, it returns to the effect for a better knowledge of it ; as, Tlte order ive behold in the world proves the existence of Providence ; and as there is a Froi-ide)ice, we are certain that even events unknoion to Ks are ordained by it. CHAPTER III. Science —Divisions of Science. — Co-ordi- nation of the Sciences. 92. Science considered subjectively is the certain and evident cognition of the idtimate reasons of things, ob- tained by means of reasoning ; considered objectively, it is a complete system of demonstrated truths dependent 0)^ one principle. — Science considered as existing in our mind, that is, subjectively, must be certain cognition, otherwise it woukl not be perfect ; it must be evident cognition, otherwise it would not account to the mind for the subordinate truths contained in the principles which constitute the object of science. Finally, it must be the cognition of the ultimate reasons of things, for the mind knows things perfectly only when it knows tliem in their first principles. Science considered objectively is a body of co-ordinated truths dependent on one and the same principle and constituting what is called a scientific system. It is in this latter sense that the word science is usually understood. 93. Scie}ice must be both one and midtiple : one in re- spect to the /n'iiH'if)le whence floiv the truths embraced DIVISIONS AND CO-ORDINATION OF THE SCIENCES. 55 imdei^ the science ; multiple in resjject to the deductions made from the principle. — That first principle, from which the mind develops the truths contained therein, is the proper object of science and constitutes its unity. This unity is formal and not material ; for, though a science treats of objects materially multiple, yet these objects are considered under an aspect by which they are referred to one and the same principle, and hence the science is one. 94. A science is specified by its object. — The object of a science constitutes its unity and makes it this or that science ; hence the sciences are distinguished from one another by the diversity of their objects. Thus, science is natural or supernatural, according as its object is a natural or supernatural truth ; it is speculative or practical, according as its object is a purely speculative truth or a truth the knowledge of which may serve as a rule of action. Two sciences are said to be distinct, when the object of the one has certain relations to that of the other ; as, Geometry and Astronomy. They are said to be separate, when their objects have no relation to each other ; as, Algebra and Morals. 95. Philosophy is the science that governs all the others. They may be divided and co-ordinated according to the divisions instituted in philosophy. — Philosophy is the supreme and fundamental science. For it treats of being in itself and in general; but as every other science treats of being under some particular aspect, it follows that each has its foundation in philosophy, and that philosophy lays down its first principles. The general division of the sciences may be made to correspond to the divisions of philosophy by taking care to co-ordinate them and establish their dignity 56 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. on the greater or less degree of abstraction of their object from matter. Thus, to the philosophy of real being the physical or ?) Method of Difference.—'' If an instance in whicli the phenomenon under investigation occurs and an- other in which it does not occur have every circum- stance in common save one, that one occurring onlv in the former, the circumstance in which alone the instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an in- dispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon." PROCESSES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 65 (c) 3IetJiod of Concomitant Variation.— " Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation." (d) 3Iethod of Residues. — " Subduct from any phe- nomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining an- tecedent." ^ 113. Experimentation of itself does not constitute science; it only enables us to establish principles of ex- perience, — As experimentation does not go outside the order of facts, it cannot of itself constitute science ; but when well conducted, it enables us to establish principles of experience, as, Water slakes thirst. These principles, to be such, must fulfil two conditions : 1. The fact which we wish to transform into an experi- mental principle must have been found the same in many cases ; 2. This fact must be not an accidental, but a necessary physical effect. 114 Having by exioerimentation discovered points of agreement among several objects, we are enahled by the principle of analogy to infer other points of agreement : experimentation thus abridges scientific investigations and even makes up for impossible investigations. — When several objects are knowm to agree in certain points, the principle of analogy enables us to conclude other points of agreement. This conclusion may be based either upon the simple relation of qualities, or the relation of means to an end, or the relation of cause to effect or efect to cause. But it can be considered legitimate only inasmuch as it rests not upon fortui- 1 See Camments upon these Methods, Clarke's Logic, pp. 389-391. GO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. tons or accidental resemblances, but upon important resemblances, or, in the absence of these, upon many resemblances. ART. III. — CLASSIFICATION. 115. Classifications are the (listribution of beings in nature into r/enera and sj-fecies. — In every science it is necessary to proceed with order both in the discovery and in the communication of truth; in this sense, then, classifications are requisite in every science. But the term is especially applied to the distribution into genera and species made use of in natural his- tory. 116. The advantages of classification are : 1. It aids the memory and facilitates the knowledge of the objects classified ; 2. It in a luay initiates us into the divine plan, by showing us the admirable order which reigns among the beings of nature. — Classifications, b^^the fact that the}^ put order into the objects which we study, enable us to know them better and to apprehend tlieir relations ; but, above all, they elevate our mind, by enabling it to penetrate the admirable harmony of the divine plan. This last result can be obtained only in so far as the classification is based upon nature itself. An artificial classification serves only to put a certain order into our knowledge, and is not in itself of any scientific value. 117. The laws of classification are : 1. It must be complete ; 2. It must be based on the law of the suhor. dination of characteristics. — Evidently the first condi tion requisite for a good classification is that it ^•omprise all the objects for which it is made. But it is also necessary, if we desire a natural or scientific classification, to base it on the hnr nf the PROCESSES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS. 67 subordination of characteristics. In virtue of this law objects in nature have each a primary charac- teristic, to which other secondary characteristics are subordinate ; to these latter still others are subordi- nate, until we finally reach the least important charac- teristic. We classify according to this law when we establish the principal divisions according to the principal characteristics, then subdivide according to subordination of characteristics. It is easily seen that such a classification is nothing other than the science of the objects classified. Hence, if we know to what division an object belongs, we immediately know its nature and characteristics. The great progress made in the natural sciences since the Reforma- tion by the application of the experimental or a posteriori method has led many of its advocates to bring the same method into the field of philosophy in its different divisions and of theology. But such a pro- •ceeding has invariably been followed by results not only most disas- trous to all positive religion, but even suicidal to human thought. The Church is the " pillar and ground of truth " and has nothing to fear and much to gain from the daily advances of scientific research. " Grammar, philology, archaeology, history, ethnography, erudition, topography, aes- thetics, all that makes up the long line of rationalistic criticism, have in turn paid her a forced homage." ^ The well ascertained lesults of science, the well founded hypotheses, are all in harmony with her teach- ing. But when any rash conclusion is foisted on the public, the divine guardian of the truth sounds the alarm. " This is why in the philosophy of the Church there can be no new •discoveries, but only developments of truth already possessed. For fresh discovery means a setting aside of what exists already, and if what exists already is the perfect truth, to set it aside is but to intro- duce the destructive poison of error. We cannot, therefore, be surprised if the method of discovery did not fiourish among the scholastic philos- ophers. ISTor can it over be the adopted method of the Catholic Church,''"^ since she is not in search of Truth, but is its guardian and possessor. ^ Ajiologie Scientifique de la Foi Chretienne, by Canon Duilhe de Saint- Projet, p. 105. ^ Clarke's Logic, p. 483. IDEOLOGY. 1. Ideology is the science luhich treats of ideas. — As philosophy of rational being treats of beings known by reason, it must treat also of that in which and by which they are known, viz., ideas. This constitutes the object of Ideology. 2. Ideology may he divided into General Ideology and Special Ideology.— Ideology may be concerned simply with the nature and origin of ideas in general ; then it is General Ideology ; or it may treat of the special nature of certain fundamental ideas and the manner in which our mind acquires them ; then it is Special Ideology, GENERAL IDEOLOGY. CHAPTER I. The Idea in General. ART. I. — NATURE OF THE IDEA. 3. In every being we must distinguish the essence from the parficidar conditions which individualize the es- sence. — God has given being to every creature ac- cording to an eternal type existing in his infinite mind, a t^^pe according to which he can create an unlimited G8 THE IDEA IN GENERAL. 69 number of similar beings. But each being, in real- izing by its existence the divine type, is thereby in- vested with particular conditions which make it that being and not another. But that which reproduces the divine type in a being and constitutes that by which it is being, that which makes it tvhat it is-, is called the essence of the being. This essence cannot really exist without being individualized ; but it is, nevertheless, distinguishable from the conditions which individualize it. These conditions are seven in number: Form, figure^ place, time, name, family, and country. 4. The idea is the mental and formal representation ivhich our intellect naturally makes to itself of the es- sence of a being. — We not only know the concrete in- dividuality of sensible beings, but we may also know their essence. Our intellect naturally perceives this essence abstracted from its particular conditions, and forms in itself an image or similitude which mentally reproduces the essence. This image formed in and by the intellect is called the idea. 5. The idea is not that lohich th" intellect immediately Tcnoivs, but that by which it knoios the object. — As the image of an object formed in the eye is not that which the eye perceives, but that by which the visible ob- ject becomes known, so that which the intellect im- mediately knows by the idea is the objective essence. But as the intellect is capable of reflecting upon itself, it may, in the second place, perceive the idea or mental representation by which it knows the es- sence. * ART. II. — CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IDEA. 6. The idea is subjective inasmuch as it resides in 70 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. the subject hioivimj. — The formatiou of the idea is a vital aud intimate act wliicli not only proceeds from the intellect, but is accomplished and exists in the in- tellect itself. Now the idea considered as residing in the subject knowing, is said to be subjective. 7. IVtf iihici is objective inasmuch as that ivhich it immediately makes known to us is the object. — That which the idea immediately manifests to the subject knowing, is not the idea itself, but the object per- ceived. Hence the idea considered as the represen- tation of the object, a representation by which the object is immediately known, is said to be objective. S. The characteristics of the idea vary according as we consider it subjectively or objectively. — The idea con- sidered subjectively participates in the conditions of the intellect that has the idea. Thus, if the intellect is infinite and uncreated, the idea considered subjec- tively is infinite and uncreated ; it is finite and created, if the intellect is finite and created. In the same way, our idea, considered subjectively, is singu- lar like our intellectual act itself ; but, considered objectively, it is universal like the essence which it represents. CHAPTER II. Systems concerning the Origin of Ideas. ART. I. — PRINCIPAL SYSTEMS CONCERNl^^G THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 9. The jjrincipol systems concerning the origin of ideas are the following : 1. Sensism ,• 2. Criticism : 3. SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE OEIGIN OF IDEAS. 71 The System of Innate Ideas ; 4. The System if Im- jjersonal Eeason ; 5. Ontologism ; 6. The Scholastic System. — All other systems may easily be reduced to one or otlier of tliese six ; because the formation of ideas is explained either by the senses or by the in- tellect. If explained by the intellect, onlv one of the following hypotheses can be made : either the soul draws ideas from within itself, or God, in creating it, has engrayen them on it, or God communicates them to it directly, or a substance intermediate between it and God communicates them to it, or, finally, God gives it the power to form them itself in giving it the faculty of abstracting the Essence of sensible objects from the conditions which individualize that essence. AET. II. — SENSISM. 10. Sensism is the system lohich affirms sensation io he the only origin of ideas. — According to this system, all knowledge is merely a modification or transforma- tion of sensation. 11. Sensism is Atomic or Dynamic. The principal representatives of the former are Leucippus, Democri- tus, Fpicirrus ; of the latter, Locke, Condillac, Laromi- guiere. — Atomic sensism teaches that all bodies throw off subtle particles analogous to the exhalations of odoriferous bodies ; these particles, scattered through space, faithfully represent the objects from which they have been detached ; by means of the senses they find an entrance to the soul, and by their im- pressions produce sensation, memory, and thought. This system was taught by Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. Dynamic sensism holds sensation to be the only primitive act of the soul, an act which by successive transformation produces all the other acts 72 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. of the soul and of all its faculties, the sensitive faculty included. This system, taught in ancient times b}- Frotatforas, was renewed in the seventeenth century by Locke, and received its last complement from Condillac. Besides sensation, Locl-c admits reflection in the soul ; but, according to him, reflection is simply an observer of sensitive facts and is in no way active. Condillac denies that reflection or attention is distinct from sensation, and regards it simply as a more lively sensation than the others. He considers mem- ory as a twofold attention, — on the one hand, to a past sensation, on the other, to a present sensation. Finally, he asserts that judgment is nothing more than the comparison between two sensations. Laro- miguiere maintains the sense origin of ideas ; but he considers as necessary for their formation an ac- tivity distinct from sensation. 12. Sensism, under loliatever form it is considered, is false, both because it destroys intellectual facts and be- cause it renders even tJie fact of sensation inexplicable. — The operation and the object of the intellect cannot be reduced to the operation and the object of the sens- es. For the intellect reflects on its acts, judges, and reasons, which the senses cannot do. The object of the intellect is the immaterial, the universal ; the ob- ject of the senses is the material, the particular. Now, Sensism, b}^ identifying the intellect with sensation, destroys the true notion of the intellect and of intel- lectual acts. It is to no purpose that Locke admits reflection in addition to sensation ; for he limits re- flection to the perceiving of sensation, and hence it does not essentially differ from sensation itself. Sensism, moreover, renders the fact of sensation in- explicable, as is evident in the Atomic sj^stem. It SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 73 is also manifest in the Dynamic system, which by asserting that sensation is the principle of the sen- sitive faculty, becomes essentially contradictory. Sensism is also sufficiently refuted by its conse- quences : experience shows that it leads directly to the negation of all science and of all morality. ART III.— CRITICISM, OR TRANSCENDENTAL RATIONALISM. 13. Transcendental Rationalism makes ideas the product of the mere activity of the thinking subject. — In this system, which is the opposite of Sensism, thought does not demand for its exercise an object outside itself. 14. Transcendental Rationcdism teas represented first by Kant, ivhose principal disciples are Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. — Ka,nt teaches that we have within us a priori forms or concepts, and sensations ; all our cognitions result from the application of these con- cepts to the sensations. But as, according to the German philosopher, the a priori forms and the sen- sations are purely subjective, it follows that the object of knowledge, as it is in itself, remains unknown to us. Fichte allows only one principle of knowedge, the j9?(re Fgo, from which he evolves all things,— God, the world, and the human mind, — all which he considers as only conceptions of the Ego. Schelling maintains very nearly the same system ; instead of the pure Ego, however, he substitutes an abstraction, the abso- lute, from which everything, both mind and matter, emanates ideally. Finally, Hegel regards as the prin- ciple of all things the pure idea, in which the subject thinking and the object thought, the ideal and the real, are identified, and from which all proceeds, — ■ God, the world, and the human mind. 74 CllKISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 15. Transcendental Idealism, or Criticism, is absurd ; because, if ideas are j)^^^ely subjective, it follows either that the objects hiown do not exist, or that ice can af- firm nothing concerning their reality. — In fact, if ideas are pure modifications of the Ego, produced by the mind itself, we must hold either that nothing exists outside the Ego, which is Nihilism, or at least that wc know nothing about it, wliich is Scepticism. These consequences were vainly repudiated by Kant; his disciples glory in them, and with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, regard all existing things, even God him- self, as a pure creation of the human mind, or of the idea. ART. IV. — THE SYSTEM OF INNATE IDEAS. 16. The system of Innate Ideas considers ideas as infused by God into the soul from the moment of its creation. — This system, regarding thought as consti- tuting the essence of the soul, supposes that the soul must always have been engaged in thought, even from the first instant of its creation ; and as the soul cannot think without ideas, it also holds that ideas are innate in the soul. 17. The representatives of the system of Innate Ideas are Plato among the ancient logicians; Descartes, Leib- nitz, and Rosmini, among the modern logicians. — In Plato s system ideas are eternal types according to which God has ordained all things ; they reside not only in the divine mind, but also in the human mind, in wliich they are innate. The human intellect, Plato teaches, exists before the bod}' and recalls these ideas according as it perceives copies made in their likeness, that is, according as it perceives sensi- ble things. Descartes holds that innate ideas are SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 75 perfect in the soul ; but besides these ideas he udmits factitious ideas, or those formed by an effort of the imagination, as the idea of a gold mountain ; and adventitious ideas, or those which come from without, as the idea of the sun. Leibnitz teaches that all these ideas are innate, but are in our mind in their germ ; and as, according to Descartes^ innate ideas become present to the soul only through sensations, so, according to Leibnitz, the germs of ideas become perfect ideas only by occasion of sensation. Bosminiy laying it down as a principle that we ought to sup- pose as innate in the soul only that which is requi- site to explain the fact of consciousness, believed that he had found this sufficient element in the idea of being ; he admits, therefore, no other innate idea than that of possible being. In his system, all ideas represent nothing but being with different determi- nations. Hence it follows that all our ideas are formed from the idea of being by the same means by which we are enabled to perceive the different deter- minations that beings can receive, that is, by sen- sation. ] 8. The si/stem of Innate Ideas, besides not ac- counting for the fact of human knowledge, is absurd in its principles and leads to the same conclusions as the system of Transcendental nationalism. — In this system the close dependence which is shown by experience to exist between the senses and the in- tellect becomes inexplicable, and man appears no longer to act in the order of knowledge according to the laws of his nature, which is both spiritual and corporeal, but rather in accordance with the laws of angelic nature. Hence all those who advocate the doctrine of Innate Ideas err regarding the human 76 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. soul and its relations with the body. Moreover, the principle of their theory is that the essence of the human soul consists in thought. Bujb if thought constitutes the essence of the soul, the act of the intellect is confounded with the essence of the human soul ; but in God alone is essence identical with intelligence. Hence there is no further need of add- ing to the essence of the soul ideas infused by God. Finally, the system of Innate Ideas, in admitting fun- damentally the same principle as Transcendental Rationalism, viz., a priori subjective forms, leads to the same consequence ; that is, it renders all knowl- edge purely subjective and thus ends naturally in Idealism. ART v.— ONTOLOGISM. 19. Ontologism regards ideas as views of God by direct and immediate vision. — This system loses sight of the subjective character of ideas ; it considers them as the object of knowledge and as direct manifesta- tions of God himself to our intellect. 20. The chief exponents of Ontologism are Mcde- hranclie and Gioherti. — According to Malehranche man perceives nothing by his ideas, which are only the idea of God viewed under different aspects. Even this idea we know only in so far as God directly manifests himself to our mind. By our ideas we apprehend the contingent, the imperfect, the finite, which are conceived only as the privation of the necessary, the perfect, the infinite. Hence our soul sees all in God. even the material world. Gioherti departs from the principle of 3Jalehranche, that ideas, being universal and absolute, must be a direct, though partial, view of absolute being, that is, of God SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 77 himself ; lie regards ideas, not as the means, but as the very object of knowledge. He teaches that what we see are the divine ideas themselves, that we have permanent intuition of God, but that we are con- scious of this intuition only by reflection, which he calls ontological reflection. 21. Ontologism is false in its principles, contradicted hy experience, and fatal in its consequences. — Ontolo- gists teach that the intellect has a direct view of God ; but to see the being of God is to see his es- sence. We must then admit that in perceiving ideas our intellect is in a state similar to that of the blessed, who see the divine essence directly, a conclusion which is absurd and contrary to faith. In the second place, Ontologism renders the operation of the intel- lect independent of that of the senses. Such a supposition is opposed to the nature of man and is contradicted by experience, which sufficiently proves that the idea is formed in us and by us and does not constitute a vision of God. Finally, if we must admit that ideas are not the means, but the objects of knowledge, it follows that the ideal order is not distinct from the real, and as the real order alone exists, we must conclude that knowledge is impossible. Again, if our soul does not form ideas, but sees them in God, it is, by the very fact, deprived of all activity of its own. Hence Ontologism leads directly to Fatalism and Pantheism. ART. VI. — THE INTERMEDIATE SYSTEM. 22. The Intermediate system or system of Impersonal Reason supposes hetivcen God and man an imjjersonal reason, hy ivJiich our intellect acquires universal ideas. — According to this system, ideas are not innate in the 78 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. intellect, they are not acquired of themselves, they are not visions of God ; but they are views in an im- personal reason intermediate between God and man. 23. The principal defender of the Intermediate system is Cousin, tvho has done noticing more than reiieiv an error of Averrocs. — The reason of man, says Cousin, is individual and variable, and therefore cannot acquire of itself universal and immutable ideas. Hence man can form his ideas only in so far as they are revealed to him by a reason which, not being personal to him, is called impersonal. This reason is revealed to him from the very beginning, and the knowledge which the mind then has is said to be spontaneous. In this state, man knows, but does not know that he knows ; when he begins to reflect on his spontaneous knowledge, he acquires reflex knowledge. The former knowledge is always true ; not so the latter, for in it man may fix his attention exclusively on one part of the truth, and thus confound the part with the whole; thence arises error, which, however, Cousin asserts to be only incomplete truth. An almost analogous system was taught by Averroes, in the middle ages. 24. The system of Impersonal Reason is false in its principle, in its nature, and in its consequences. — This system starts with the principle that our intellect, being individual, cannot form a universal idea ; but this is to lose sight of the twofold aspect, subjective and objective, under which we may consider the idea. Again, if Impersonal Reason is anything, it must be individual, and hence it is incapable, according to Cousin himself, of forming a universal idea. Finally, this system easily generates Pantheism, since it destroys all activity proper to the intellect of man. SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 79 ART. VII. — TRADITIONALISM. 25. Traditionalism explains the formation of ideas hy speech. — This system, devised to combat that of the philosophers who hold that the reason of man is sufficient for itself, exaggerates the impotency of reason and its dependence on speech and tradition. 26. The principal representatives of Traditionalism are De Bonald, Bonnetty, and Ventura. — Be Bonald teaches the absolute necessity of speech for the existence of thought, so that without speech man can have no idea, no general notion, but only sensible perceptions. Bonnetty and Ventura concede the power of forming ideas of sensible things, without the help of speech, but maintain that, independently of social teaching, man cannot acquire notions of the spiritual and mor- al order, as those of God, of the soul, of duty, etc. Other philosophers admit that man may think without speech, but they deny that without it he can form clear and distinct ideas and that he can reflect on his thoughts. 27. It is false that speech is ahsolutely necessary^ either for the formation of ideas of sensible things, or for the formation of ideas of spiritual things, or for reflecting on ideas already formed. — Speech, being simply a sign, can make known an object to the intellect only through the idea which the intellect already has of the object ; therefore, before the intellect is fixed on the essence of a thing by the word, it has already the idea of it. The idea of sensible things being formed, we cannot, without contradiction, deny to rea- son the power to attain to ideas of spiritual things ; for, granting that reason can form ideas of sensible things in virtue of the abstractive power natural to it, we cannot deny it the power to ascend from these 80 CHRISTIxVN PHILOSOPHY. ideas to those of spiritual things, since the power of deduction is not less natural to reason than that of abstraction. Yet it is true that, owing to the feeble- ness of man's reason and the difficulties that beset his actual condition, but few men could, without the aid of speech, attain to those truths which regard God and his attributes, and even then only after much time and labor, with an admixture of many errors and great uncertainty. Besides, it is certain that, without speech, man would never arrive at complete intellectual and moral development. But, if the in- tellect has the power of forming its ideas without the aid of speech, evidently it may reflect on its ideas without speech, for the intellect is essentially a re- flective faculty, and requires for the exercise of its power of reflection only the idea, the object of reflec- tion. It will not do to cite in proof of the necessity of speech for the formation of ideas instances of deaf- mutes and savages abandoned in forests. A more attentive examination has shown that these facts have been imperfectly observed or have never existed. ART. VIII. — THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM. 28. The Scholastic system explains the origin of ideas hi/ the power which the intellect has of abstracting from the sensible images,— The Scholastic philosophers teach that sensible objects first aftect the external senses. The impression, passing from the external senses to the imagination, gives rise to a more perfect image of the object, an immaterial image, doubtless, but yet in- dividual and representing the object with the sensible and concrete conditions which make it that object and no other. As soon as this image is formed, the in- tellect becomes conscious of it, and calling into exer- SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE OKIGIN OF IDEAS. 81 cise its abstractive power, which constitutes the fac- ulty called the adhig hiiellect, it illumines this seDsible image, strips it of its sensible and individual condi- tions, and separates from it the intelligible. The ati- incj iutellccf having thus separated the intelligible, that is, the proper object of the intellect, the other intel- lective faculty, called the possible intellect, perceives the intelligible, and thus the idea is formed. These oper- ations, though distinct, are accomplished at the same time in virtue of the unity of the soul, and. one cannot take place without the other. As we shall see later, this sj^stem of the origin of ideas is very closely con- nected with the Scholastic system concerning the nature of the human soul, and follows from it as a consequence. 29. llie Scholastic system has recourse to fewer a ipriori 2:)rinci2oles than any other system. — It is an axiom among philosophers that nature is as fruitful in ef- fects as she is sparing in causes ; hence the simplicity of a system is a strong argument in its favor. But w^hile the other systems concerning ideas assume gra- tuitously one or many a priori elements which may easily be dispensed with, the Scholastic system re- quires for the formation of the idea only that which is absolutely indispensable, viz., the abstractive power of the acting intellect. This abstractive power cannot be dispensed with, and it alone suffices for the solu- tion of the problem. 30. The Scholastic system is true, because it is in per- fect harmony loith the essential laws of human nature, — Since the formation of ideas is an effect whose cause is the nature of our soul, a system concerning the formation of ideas is true, if it is in perfect harmony with the nature of the soul, if it places the effect in 82 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. ])erfect relation with the cause. But while the other systeuis do not take into account the nature of the human soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual, the Scholastic system does explain the concurrence of sensible images in the formation of ideas. It is also in accord wdth experience, which shows that we do not possess innate ideas, that w^e do not see ideas in God, but that we form the idea of a thing from its sensible perception. Thus the Scholastic system fol- lows as a simple consequence from the true theory of the nature of man. According to that theory, man is neither a mere animal nor an angel, but stands, so to say, midway between them ; for if, on the one hand, his intellect, like that of the angel, does not depend on an organ, on the other, being the faculty of a soul substantially united to a body, it can form the idea onl}" after the senses have presented the matter for its operations. Hence the Scholastic system pre- serves the unity of man's being and yet maintains the distinction between the soul and the body; the other systems, on the contrary, either make the soul nnd the body two distinct beings, or destroy one ol these two elements of man. 31. The Scholastic system rests on the authority of the greatest phiJosophei^s.— This system, first taught, though with a mixture of error, by Aristotle, w^as held by all the great philosophers of the middle ages, and espe- cially by St. Thomas, who developed it to its full per- fection. Up to the seventeenth century, it alone was admitted by all the great Catholic universities, and af- ter being for two centuries almost universally rejected, to the great detriment of philosophy, it has been ac- cepted by the most distinguished philosophers of the present day without restriction or modification. SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. 83 32. Tlie ScJioJasfic system gives a satisfactory solu- tion to all the difficulties connected with, the prohlem of the origin of ideas, and in no way contradicts the facts of common sense. — The principal difficulty connected with the problem of the origin of ideas is the neces- sity of reconciling elements apparently contradictory and yet evidently attested by experience, in the for- mation of ideas. On the one hand, there is the sensi- ble, particular, contingent element ; on the other, the intelligible, universal, absolute element. These con- tradictory elements cannot be united. But, while other systems avoid the difficulty by denying one of the two elements, and thus disregard both the nature of man and facts of experience, the Scholastic sys- tem shows how the two elements co-exist without being confounded ; how the sensible image furnishes the intellect with the matter of its operation ; and how the idea, while excluding the sensible image, cannot be formed without its concurrence. This system, explaining what is immutable and absolute in the idea by the nature of the essence perceived and not by the nature of the perception itself, accounts for the divine element in the idea without deifying the idea itself; finally, by attributing to man the power of forming his own ideas, it makes them de- pendent on him both for their causality and their very existence. At the same time, it enables us to comprehend the grandeur of the intellect, by making its intelligible light, its abstractive power, a sort of participation in the light of God himself. Thus, everything finds its proper place in this system, and far from excluding a single act of experience or of common sense, it admits them all, reconciles, and explains them. 84 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. 33. TJic Scholastic system entails none of the conse- quences with tvhich its adversaries rep'oaclt it ; the ob- jections raised against it rest on false explanations. — Bj recognizing tlie reality of the essence perceived, the Scholastic system avoids Subjectivism and Idealism, and it avoids Pantheism by making the idea a con- tingent production of our intellect. Those who object that it borders on Sensism in admitting a sensible element in the formation of the idea, forget that this element does not make part of the idea, but is simp- ly the matter on which the intellect operates in forming the idea. The reproach that this system is contradictory in making the universal proceed from the particular, can be uttered by those only who do not observe that particular beings have each a prop- er essence, which, abstracted b}^ the intellect, is capable of being considered, by another operation of the intellect, under the relation of universality. CHAPTER III. Universals. ART. II. — NATURE OF UNIVERSALS. 34. The universal is that tvhich may he found in mamj or affirmed of many ; it is nothing more than the essence of a being or the intelligible element perceived by the in- tellect. 35. The qiiesfion of the nature essence, hut only hy its oj^e rat ions. — The soul has no innate idea; it does not, therefore, know itself from its very origin, through its essence. But since its essence is present to it, the soul is capable of per- ceiving its own existence immediately and readily. And it attains to this perception as soon as it becomes conscious of any one of its operations. 50. The soul does not know the nature of its cffsence HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 95 immediately; it knows its essence only hy means of reasoning. — In order that the soul may perceive its own existence, it suffices that it be present to itself and perceive an act of which it is the principle. This is not the case with the knowledge which the soul acquires of its essence, for it attains this by means of deduction. For in perceiving another being, the soul perceives that the idea by which it apprehends the being is immaterial. The idea being immaterial, it is evident that the principle whence the idea pro- ceeds is also immaterial. From this property of im- materiality the soul afterwards deduces the other properties which it possesses. ART. IV.— WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL CAN KNOW PURE • SPIRITS. 51. In our present life, the said cannot, of itself, know the existence of pure spirits; hut it may conceive their existence as possible and even as very probable. — The intellect of itself cannot here below know pure spirits directly, since they are not present to it by any relation of Avhich it can have consciousness, and since their existence cannot be deduced with certain- ty from the existence of the objects which we know. We can, however, conceive the possibility of the ex- istence of pure spirits, by the fact that we perceive essences which may exist without matter. Moreover, the intellect can prove the existence of pure spirits to be very probable, from the harmony existing throughout the universe, a harmony which would be imperfect, if, besides beings purely material and those both material and spiritual, there did not also exist purely spiritual bpings. 96 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY ART. V. — HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS GOD. 52. TJie soul does not I'noic God immediately, hut it rises from created things to a hioivledcje of liis ixistencc. — The intellect perceives directlj' the abstract essence of sensible things. From the perception of these essences follow immediately the judgments called first principles of reason. By reflection on these acts of the intellect and on those of the senses, we imme- diately perceive our existence and that of corporeal individuals distinct from us. In this all other knowl- edge, including that of God, has its source, and is, consequently, only mediate knowledge. 53. Tlie first notion which ive acquire of God is thnt of his existence, binder the relation of first cause. — Creatures present themselves to us as contingent beings, which, consequently, must have a cause; thus, by the principle of causality we are led to assign them a first uncreated cause. 54. The knoidedge of God as first cause ofcdl create <^ beings contains in germ tdl the other notions luhich ic^ can acquire of him. — A cause must contain the perfec- tions which it communicates to the effect, and it must exclude the imperfections of the effect as such. But the First Cause, being the creator of all things, and, consequently, extending its power to all possible beings, immeasurably surpasses all the perfections of the creature. There are, however, three ways bv which we may know the divine attributes : by the relation of cause to effect, by the exclusion of the imperfections of creatures, by pre-eminent ]>ossession of every perfection. By the first, that of causalit>/, we know that God is the efficient, final, and exem- ])hiry causp of all things, that he is their preserver HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGi^: IS ACQUIUED. 97 and ordainer ; by the second, that of exchisioii, we deny of God whatever in the creature implies some defect as limitation, dependence, matability ; by the third, that oi pre-eminence, we attribute to God in an infinite degree all perfections, such as goodness, icisdom, beauty. The union of these two ways of pre-eminence and exclusion enables us to form the most exalted idea that Ave can have of God. by conceiving him as the absolutely pure Being, that is, as the Being that simply is, without any augmen- tation or super-added determination to the simple and pure characteristic of existence. 55. The idea of the finite is formed hy the union of being tcith that of j^rivation. — The finite is that which exists, but with limits, that is, it is affected by a privation of being. When the intellect " looks out upon an object external to itself," it forms the idea of being. On instituting a comparison between this object and objects which it knows already, it observes what is wanting in each, and thus conceives the idea of privation. The union of these two ideas gives the concept of tlie finite. From this explanation we see the error of Descartes and Malebranche, who assert that the idea of the finite is deduced from that of the infinite. 56. The idea of the infinite is formed as a conse- quence from the idea of first cause. — The intellect, when in possession of the idea of the finite and the idea of God as first cause, easily perceives that the first cause cannot be limited by itself or by any other cause, and thus conceives it without limits, that is, as infinite. Locke and Condillac, confounding the idea of the infinite with that of the indefinite, assert that the idea of the infinite is obtained by constantly \)S CHIUSTIAN PHILOSOPHY. addiug to a giveu perfection yet another perfection. But since tiie infinite is not susceptible of increase or diminution, this hypothesis would necessitate the intellect to know all the possible perfections con- tained in the infinite ; and this is absolutely impos- sible. 57. From the idea of the finite is derived that of the conditional or contingent, that is, of being ivhich does not contaiii in itself the reason of its existence. — By the finite we mean limited being ; but that which is ever tending to being and not to absence of being, can- not limit itself ; it must, therefore, be limited by an external agent. But the external agent which gives it limits must also give it its existence, in which those limits are found. In other words, the being is contingent, since the contingency of a being consists precisely in this, that it receives existence from an- other, as from its cause. As the opposite of the finite is the infinite, so the opposite of the contingent is the necessary and absolute, or that which exists in virtue of its own essence, and in which all is pure ^ct. ART. VI. — NECESSITY OF SENSIBLE IMAGES, IN OUR LIFE UP- ON EARTH, FOR THE ACT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT. 58. The human mind, in its ijresent state of u)iio}i with the body, can perceive no object ivithout the aid of a sensible representation apprehended by the imag- ination. — Experience teaches us that when the imagination is disturbed or incapable of acting, as in sickness or lethargy, the intellect is likewise troubled or powerless to produce any idea. It further shows us that when we wish to think of anything, even if it be spiritual, we always f(^rm a sensible represen- HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED. 99 tation ; and likewise, when we communicate our ideas to another, we make use of figures and sensible images. Besides this proof from experience, an a priori reason demonstrates that, in the present life, we cannot, without the concurrence of sensible images, either form ideas or even make use of the ideas which we already possess. For action follows being, that is, the action is a] 'ways conformed to the essence and mode of existence of the being that acts. But the essence of man is a soul substantially united to a body, and the actual mode in which his intellect exists is in union with the sensitive faculty. In order, then, that man may act as man, he must do so with the concurrence of the two principles of which he is composed ; moreover, the action of his intellect naturally requires the co-operation of the senses. We thus see the admirable harmony exist- ing between the subject that acts, the active faculty, and the object of the action. The subject is a com- posite of mind and body ; the active faculty is the intellect united to the sensitive faculty ; the object is an essence realized in individual and sensible conditions. 59. It is in one sense more perfect for the intellect of man to acquire hioivleclge of tilings by means of a sen- sible representation. — There are two kinds of created intelligence, that of the angel and that of man. That of the angel knows from the first instant of its creation by means of ideas infused into it by God ; that of man is much less elevated and knows nothing at first, but is simply adapted to know. But, own- ing to its inferior nature, it is more perfect for the mind to have the concurrence of sensible images, than to receive ideas from God by infusion, for then 100 CHEISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. it would know tliiugs. at least naturally, in a more confused and obscure manner. This principle may be rendered clearer by comparing the intellect to the eye of a near-sighted person, which is inferior by nature to an eye without any defect, but which for that very reason acts with greater perfection when the vision is strengthened or enlarged b}^ the use of spectacles. ARI. VII. — THE MODE OF COGNITION ' IN THE DIS- EMBODIED SOUL. 60. Tlie disembodied soul retains the knoiuledge ac- quired during life. — Though the soul separated from the body loses the faculties which reside in a corporeal organ, yet it retains, along with its being and its purely spiritual faculties, the knowledge which resides in those faculties as in its proper subject. Although the soul, so long as it is united to the body, cannot acquire knowledge without the help of sensible im- ages, yet once separated from tlis body, it has no further need of those images. 61. The disembodied soid has, besides the ideas which it retains ichen quitting this life, others which God is pleased to communicate to it. — While the soul is in the body, it receives images through tlie senses, and from these images it abstracts its ideas. But once separated from the body, it can no longer be directed towards sensible objects ; hence it must receive through species infused by God the new ideas which it possesses. ' Cognition is " sometimes nsed to express any kind of idea or con- cept: but it is properly applied exclusively to judicial concepts, or judgments of the mind as distinguished from simple apprehension. ** Father Harper's Metaphysics of the School, vol. i., p. 578. KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PRINCIPLES. 101 62. The ideas infused by God complete and perfect those ivhich the soul has retained from this life. Both together constitute the means by ivhich the soul loill know all that it has known in its former state ; and in addition, the order of the universe of ivhich it forms a part, the angels, and other souls ; but of the things of this ivorld it ivill remain ignorant txcep>t in so far as God may be pleased to manifest them to it. — When the soul is separated from the body, it is united to superior intelligible species ; - and, consequently, its former ideas are raised to the grade of its new ac- quisitions, are perfected and completed. Thus, the soul will have the representation of all that it should be acquainted with according to its state ; it will know all that relates to its former life, the order of the universe of which it forms a part, all that belongs to its new state, as the angels and other souls. But as it has departed from this life, it will have no knowledge of what pertains to our world save that which God will be pleased to impart. ^ CHAPTEK 11. Kno^A^ledge of First Principles. ART. I. — WHAT IS MEANT BY PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE. 63. A principle of knoivledge is that by ivhich some- thing is knoivn. — A principle, in general, is that from ^ *' The intelligible species is that character or abstracted essence of the thing which is imprinted on the mind, and by which it produces in itself an intellectual likeness of tlie thing known or expresses the word (judgment) of the mind; and by this word is placed in the state of actually knowing." Transl. Jouin's Compendium Logicce et M6iap?„ysicce, editio quarta, p. 1.98. 102 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPBY. wliicli something proceeds. Principles are of three kinds, metjiphj'sical principles, physical principles, and principles of knowledge. The last named include all those principles which when know^n lead to the knowledge of something else. In a more restricted sense, principles of knowledge, or simply principles, are those propositions which are so clear and evident, that they do not require proof. Hence they are also called axioms or self-evident truths. 64. differ the 2)erceptio)i of essences, the intellect im- TnecUatehj perceives first principles. — The intellect pro- ceeding gradually in the act of knowledge, first per- ceives what is most elementary, viz., essences. This imperfect knowledge it immediately develops in ob- serving the relations, properties, and accidents of es- sences, thus calling into action the judgment and the reasoning. Of the judgments which it pronounces, some are formed immediately and others mediately. The former are called ^>%sY principles. ART. II. — THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION. (do. Tlie first principle affirmed hij the intellect is: It is impossible for the same thing to he and not he at the same time. This is called the principle of contradiction. — As in the simple perception of essences there ex- ists a first universal idea, which precedes all others and serves as their basis ; so there must be a fii'st judgment, on which all others rest, and to which the mind must assent under penalty of being unable to accept any other truth whatever. This first truth is the principle of contradiction, and is formulated thus : It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to he at the same time and under the same conditions ; or, in a more didactic form, Beiiig is incompatible luith non- KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PllINClPLES. 103 being. Evidently this judgment is the first which the mind pronounces. For, in looking at being, it cannot but perceive the negation of being, or non-being. In comparing these two concepts, therefore, it compares its two primary concepts ; and in discovering and af- firming their absolute incompatibility, it affirms the principle which precedes all others. This principle is so evident that it is immediately known by every intellect, and cannot rationally be denied. ^ 66. The princiijle of contradiction is implicitly con- tained in all other ])rinciples, even in tJiose loliicli are self-emdent ; it may he used to demonstrate them or, at least, to render them more evident, but can itself be proved by no other principle. — Besides the principle of contradiction, there are many other self-evident principles ; but, though the mind arrives at these by the simple perception of essence, and is not obliged to recur to a higher principle, yet in formulating them it must adhere, at least implicitly, to the principle of contradiction. Thus it is with the principle, Every being has its own essence, which is called the principle of identity ; with the principle, A thing either is or is not, which is known as the principle of excluded middle ; with the principle, There is no effect ivithout a cause, which is styled the principle of causality ; with the principle, Every accident supposes a substance, which is the principle of substance. So, too, is it with all the axioms ; as, The whole is greater than the part, 1 Kant denies to the principle of contradiction all objective reality and puts forth his doctrine of Antinomies, or the principle that con- tradictories may exist side by side. The repugnance of the mind to as- sent to such a principle is due, he asserts, to the limited circle of our experience, within which contradictories exclude each other. But in the nature of things, he maintains, there is no reason why two and two should not make five. 104: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. Two things equal to a third are equal to each other, etc. Although these principles do not require demonstra- tion, still they are made more evident by means of the principle of contradiction. Thus, for example, we demonstrate that the whole is greater than its part, from the fact that otherwise the \\hole would and would not be the whole. ^ ART. III. — THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY. 67. The intellect has the idea of cause when it ascends by abstraction from the knowledqe of a imrticidar effect and a particular cause to the pure idea of effect and cause. — In the act of sensation, in the act of intellection, and in that of volition, we necessarily distinguish two things : the sensitive, intellective, or volitive act, and the agent which produces the act as the term of its ac- tion ; this is nothing but the cognition of a partic- ular effect produced by a particular cause. But from this particular cognition the intellect can b}' abstrac- tion form tlie pure idea of effect and of cause, that is, the idea, first, of something whicli exists only in vir- tue of the action of an agent, and the idea, secondly, of an agent which by its action produces a term dis- tinct from itself. Hence the idea of cause compre- hends two elements : the perception of an agent as producing an effect by its action, and the perception of this agent as distinct from the effect produced by its action. ' Sir "Wm. llun.ilton denies that the principle of contradiction is the first of all principles, and intrudes into its place the principle of identitj'. But this intruder is not the true principle of identity, Every be- ing is its oivn nature, in which the two ideas are seen to be objectively identical, but a mere tautological proposition, A is A. This radical error in the principle of identity arises from Sir Wni. Hamilton's view of the idea as a mere bundle of qualities. KNOWLEDGE OF PIUNCIPLES. 105 68. When the intellect has the idea of cause and ef- fect, it immediately perceives the principle of causality, which is expressed in the formula, There is no effect ivithoid a cause. — This principle expresses nothing more than the essential dependence of the effect on its cause. But this dependence is known from the very idea of effect, since, when we speak of effect, we mean a being dependent on a cause. The mind, therefore, analyzing the idea of effect, immediately perceives its dependence on a cause ; it expresses this dependence in the judgment : There is no effect luith- oiit a cause. ^ 69. To the principle of causality is referred the prin- ciple of sufficient reason, ivhich is formulated in these terms: Whatever is, is conceived, or is made, must have a suffi- cient reason, either in itself, or in that ivhich produces it, conceives it, or causes it to exist. — This principle is only an extension of the principle of causality, but it has a more general application ; while the principle of causality properly applies only to things which con- stitute the real order, that of sufficient reason is ap- plied also to things of the ideal order. ^ ' The word cause here means efficient cause, and is marked by two characteristics, " immediate influence and active influence." Mr. Mil] ignores these marks when he defines cause us an invariable^ unconditional antecedent. When, too, lie tries to establish, b}- means of the principle of causality, the Uniformity of Naiuy^e as the fundamental principle of his Experimental school, he implies the existence of this very uniformity and thus falls into a vicious circle. 2 " After proving that all things save G-od have a sufficient reason in the efficient cause outside of themselves, and that God as the first cause has a sufficient reason of existence in Himself, we combine the Creator and his creatures under the universal Proposition, All things that exist have a sufficient reason. But this Proposition is no axiom or First Prm- ciple. It is a complex Proposition, which unites in itself the axiom, Evenj effect has a cause, with the derivative Proposition, The first cause is its oiun effect." Clarke's Logic, p. 18. 106 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. 70. The principle of causa! if u is analytic, and not syn- thetic as Kant maintains. — A judpjment is synthetic when the idea of the predicate is not contained in that of the subject ; as, Tliis icood is green. A judg- ment is analytic, when the anah^sis of the subject enables us to find the predicate in it ; thus, the mere analysis of the idea of effect suffices to give the idea of dependence on a cause. 71. The jn'inci pie of causality lias an objective vaue, uotu'itlistandinij the assertion of the contrary by many philos<)j)hers. among others Kant and Hume. — Many philosophers, recognizing that the destruction of the objective or real value of the principle of causality is the destruction of all science, profess the principle, but give it only a subjective or ideal value. It is evident, however, that the quality of depending on its cause, which the effect possesses, results from its nature as effect, and, consequently, is as real as the effect itself. ART. IV. — THE TRINCIPLE OF SUBSTANCE. 72. llie idea of svbstance is formed from a sensible concrete object by abstraction, by which the -mind per- ceives in the coiicrete object tliat by ivhich it is reed. — When the mind perceives a sensible concrete object as existing, it has the power of abstracting from it ex- istence in itself. But this perception of existence in itself includes that of substance, viz., of that by which a thing is in itself, without requiring anything else as its subject ; and it is obtained b}^ abstracting from all the particular characteristics which accompany the substance in the order of reality. For, when the intellect has formed the idea of substance by abstrac- tion from a sensible concrete object, it contemplates this idea as it is in itself, and perceives that it is ap- KNOWLEDGE OF PRINCIPLES. 107 plicable not only to corporeal beings, but also to spiritual beings. 73. JVhen the intellect has the idea of substance and of accident, it immediately perceives the 'principle of substance, ivhich is formulated thus: Every accident supposes a substance. — With the idea of substance, the intellect possesses implicitly that of accident. The comparison of these two ideas results in the immediate perception that accident cannot exist without sab- stance, since that which does not exist in itself can exist only in another being which has existence in it- self. Hence the principle of substance is an analytic judgment. 74. The Fhenomenalism of Hume, which denies the lyrincipde of substance, is absurd ; because, by denying the principle of substance, it makes the idea of accident contradictory. — Locke, by admitting no other source of ideas than that of the senses, was led to deny the idea of substance, and held that what is called sub- stance is in reality only a number of qualities held together by a common bond. But this is an absurd hypothesis ; for, if the bond is not substance, it must be accident, and hence in its turn requires a substance to support it. The principle of Locke led Berkeley to deny all corporeal substance, and Hume to deny all substance, corporeal and spiritual, and to assert that only qualities exist and are known to us. The phe- nomenalism of Hume, which rejects the very idea of substance, is absurd. For the accident exists either in itself or in another thing ; it cannot exist in itself, for it would then be no longer an accident ; therefore, it exists in something else. But this latter cannot itself be an accident, for we should then have to pro- ceed from one accident to another ad infinitum, thus 108 CHRIS riAN PHILOSOPHY. postul.iting an infinite series of accidents resting on nothing ; wiiicli is absurd. Therefore, the accident must be supported by something which is not an ac- cident, that is, by substance. CHAPTER III. Language in Relation to the Development of KnoAA^ledge. ART. I. — UTILITY OF LANGUAGE IN DEVELOPING THE MIND. 75. As men are composed of body and soul, they re- quire an exterior sign to communicate their thoughts to one another ; the most j)er feet sign is that of spetch. — Man is made to live in society ; but, since his intellect is joined to a body, he must make use of a sensible sign to communicate his thoughts. This sign may be of several kinds ; of these the easiest and most perfect is speech ; by it he can communicate the greatest number of things with the greatest clearness. 76. Language is not absolutely necessary either for the spontaneous or the reflex development of the intellect. — The intellect has in itself the power, by abstracting ideas from sensible images, of immediately perceiv- ing first principles and of deducing the consequences of its first cognitions ; therefore, it is not absolutely necessary that these cognitions and their conse- quences should be communicated to the mind by language. 77. Language is very useful, and even morally neces- sary, for the development of the intellect and for the ac- quisition of the greater jrnrt of our knowledge, especially of that which relates to spiritual bei)njs and to moraJ LANGUAGE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE. 109 truths. — If we consider the intellect in itself, we see that it requires a sensible image for the formation of the idea. But, as experience proves, this image formed by the imagination may also be an obstacle in speculative operations. But speech performs the essential function of the sensible image without hav- ing its inconveniences ; for it furnishes an image the most simple and the least material possible, an image not susceptible of being confounded with the idea, and easily concentrating the attention, since the words of a language are uniform and constant. Hence speech is ver^^ useful in the development of the in- tellect viewed in itself. But if we study it in its rela- tions to other intellects we must allow that speech is the principal means by which the greater part of our knowledge is communicated to us in a prompt and easy manner, especially that knowledge which relates to spiritual beings and to moral truths. Besides, every science requires the efforts and labors of many ages for its formation. How, then, could its discov- eries be transmitted or developed, if language were not at the service of the scientist to enable him to communicate to others the results of his labors ? ART. IL — THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE. 78. Language is of divine institution. — This is proved : 1. By Holy Scripture and the traditions of nations ; 2. By the silence of profane history about the invention of language and the epoch of its invention ; 3. By facts of philological science. The fact of the origin of language being then established, several hy- potheses are offered to explain how man received the gift of speech. Among these hypotheses, the simplest and most rational is, that man was created 110 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. with the faculty of speaking a language already formed. 79. Tlie invention of speecli tvoidd not have been ah- soJiitehj impossible to man. — The rationalistic philoso- phers, especially the Sensist school, maintain the possibility of the invention of language, but in the sense which they explain it, it is an absurdit3\ Other philosophers, as J. J. Rousseau, Be Bonald, and Ventura, have maintained the absolute impossibility of the invention of language. But some of the reasons which they give are false, and others are not wholly conclusive. Hence many eminent philoso- phers see no metaphysical impossibility in the hu- man invention of language. CRITERIOLOGY; OR, A Treatise on Certitude. 1. Griteriolocjy, or a treatise on certitude ^ investigates the value of our faculties as means of acquiring knoivl- edge and determines th^ idtimate criterion of certitude. — It would be of little use to the mind to form cogni- tions if ifc were not certain that these cognitions had an objective reality. Hence, after ideology has deter- mined how the soul forms its ideas and acquires its cognitions, criteriology shows : 1. That the faculties by which we know afford us certain knowledge ; 2. That there is an ultimate principle, which constitutes a solid foundation of the certitude of our knowledge. CHAPTER I. Our Faculties as Means of Arriving at Truth. ART I. — OUR COGNOSCITIVE FACULTIES. 2. Our cognoscitive faculties are: 1. The senses; 2. The intellect, including consciousness and reason. — We know^ two kinds of objects, viz., sensible and intel- ligible. The senses perceive the sensible; the intellect, the intelligible. When the intellect is considered as having for its object the soul and the internal facts of the soul, it is called consciousness; when it is con- 111 112 CHRISTIAN THILOSOPHY. sidered as iiiferring one truth from another, it is called recifion. ART. II. — THE VERACITY OF THE SENSES. 3. Sensation, considered as a modification of the sentient subject^ is not an illusion hut a reality, — This is a primary fact which cannot reasonably be called in question. To say that the soul is in a state of illu- sion as to its own sensation is equivalent to asserting that it feels a sensation when there is no sensation, or that it feels when there is nothing to feel, which is a contradiction in terms. 4. The senses f ichen in their normal state and exer- cised upon their proper sensible object, cannot deceive us. — No cognoscitive faculty can be deceived in re- gard to its proper object, when the conditions re- quired for the exercise of the power are fulfilled ; otherwise, it would be a power that could effect noth- ing, which implies a contradiction. 5. The errors arising from the senses are not jyi'operhj attributable to the senses, but to the intellect. — Error is found only in the judgment ; but the senses do not judge ; therefore, the senses, properl}^ speaking, do not deceive us. When they are diseased, or when any cause modifies or impairs the sensation, the senses cannot but receive the sensation so modified or impaired, and transmit it as they receive it to the intellect. Hence the intellect should not be pre- cipitate in judging, and should take into account any abnormal conditions under which the sensation may be produced. 6. The Idealism of Berkeley is absurd ; it admits no rrality but that of spirits. — The senses operating under fixed conditions cannot deceive us ; but the senses OUR FACULTIES TO ARRIVE AT TRUTH. 113 attest the existence of bodies ; therefore, bodies real- ly exist. ^ ART. III. — THE VERACITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 7. The veracity of consciousness is a jyf^iinctri/ fact, ivJuGh is affirmed even when it is doubted or denied. — He who doubts or denies the veracity of conscious- ness either does not know that he doubts or denies it, and therefore cannot say that it deceives him ; or else he does know that he doubts or denies the veracity of consciousness. But then, by what other faculty does he know this than by consciousness, the onl}^ witness of the internal facts of the soul? Therefore, he makes use of consciousness to deny consciousness, and is guilty of evident contradiction. 8. It is al)surd to hold with Transcendental philoso- phers, that the testimony of consciousness is a. mere illu- sion. — The ancient Sceptics never questioned the vera- city of consciousness ; the German Transcendental philosophy alone has dared to do so, and it has thus arrived at absolute scepticism. According to Fichte, our life is a dream, and the existence of a real Ego is a mere illusion. But if our life is a dream, if the ex- istence of a real Ego is an illusion, there must be a subject which dreams or which is under illusion. And this, subject must, by the very consciousness by which it knows that it dreams, know also a real Ego, by means of which it is enabled to pi-onounce as an illusion the knowledge of the Ego which dreams. Thus the contradiction of the system is evident. ^ Among the modern philosophers who deny, more or less, the trust- worthiness of the senses, are Mill, Bain, Clifford, Green, and Caird. See Manuals of Catholic Philosophy, First Principles of Knowledge, by John Rickaby, S. J., Part ii., chap. ii. 114: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ART. IV.— THE VERACITY OF THE INTELLECT AND THE REASON. 9. The intelUct cannot deceive us in immediate judg- ments lokich relate eitlter to the rational or to the ex- 2^erimental order. — The intellect cannot be deceived in regard to its proper object, when this object is pre- sented to it in such a way as to necessitate its as- sent ; otherwise, it could not know anything with truth, and thus it would be a faculty unable to effect anything. Hence the intellect cannot be deceived in the perception of essences ; nor can it be deceived in the formation either of rational or of experimental first judgments. For these judgments are accom- panied with the character of evidence : the former, because the attribute which is affirmed of the sub- ject is found in the very idea of the subject ; the lat- ter, because they are only the complex perception of a fact, a perception which is transformed by judg- ment into a distinct and explicit cognition. There- fore, it is impossible for the intellect to be deceived in regard to immediate first principles, whether rational or experimental. 10. Reason cannot deceive us in regard to conclu- sions readily deduced from first principles. — The whole art of reasoning consists in deducing from two given judgments a third judgment, which is found to be contained in them. Hence there is identity and, consequently, necessary connection between the con- clusion and the premises. But if the truth of the conclusion is based on the identity of the premises, reasoning evidently cannot deceive us, since a thing cannot both be and not be identical with itself. Hence arises the repugnance which the intellect ex- periences to dissent from the conclusions whicl] fol- SCEPTICISM. 115 low from a principle ; also that secret displeasure which we feel when an adversary, having accepted certain principles, is unwilling to allow the conclu- sions which are logically drawn from them. But, on the other hand, when the conclusions are derived from a first principle only by long and intricate argumen- tations, the reason may be deceived, not because the reasoning in this case deceives, but because the nat- ural weakness of the mind is such that it easily al~ low^s the attention to wander and thus overlooks some of the law^s of reasoning. 11. The objection raised against the veracity of rea- son on account of the errors of philosophers only proves that they made a had use of it. — From the fact that the abuse of reason gives rise to error, we must not infer that reason cannot in any case apprehend truth with certainty. This affirmation of La Mennais is contrary to good sense and sound logic. CHAPTER II. Scepticism. ART I. — NATUBE OF SCEPTICISM. — DIFFERENT KINDS OF SCEPTICISM. 12. Scepticism is a denial of the existence of truth or of the possibility of hnowing it ivith certainty. 13. Scepticism is partial or complete, modified or abso- lute. — Partial scepticism rejects the truth or certitude of only a certain class of cognitions. Thus, Ideal- ists, such as BerMey, reject the truth of sensible cognitions, while Materialists or Empiricists, with Loche and Condillac, admit as certain only facts per- 116 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ceivecl by the senses. Rationalists, like Descartes^ accept as certain only what appears evident to reason; the Sentimentalists, with Reid, consider as certain only what is not repugnant to instinct, to natural sentiment; the Traditionalists and Fideists, repre- sented by La 3IennaLs and Hfiet respectively, regard as certain only traditional or revealed truths. Partial scepticism, as experience shows, leads logically to complete scepticism. Complete scepticism rejects the truth or certitude of all knowledge, and is either absolute or modified. It is absolute, when it denies the existence of objective or ontological truth, admits that contraries may both exist, and regards all things as phenomena or illusions. This kind of scepticism was taught in ancient times chiefly by Gorgias and Protagoras; in modern times it has been dis- seminated by Kant, Ftchte, ScJieUlng, and Hegel. Scepticism is modified when it admits the existence of truth, but rejects the veracity of the means at our disposal to apprehend truth. The principal repre- sentatives of this phase of scepticism in ancient times wei*e Pyrrhus and Sextiis EmpiricuH: in modern times, Bayle and Hume are the most noted. ' ART. II. — REFUTATION OF SCEPTICISM. 14. Scepticism is contradictory; it is logically and practicallij impossible. — The consistent sceptic ought not to reason nor even to think; for, in thinking of his ' •• rnfortunately, though not going under the name of sceptics, but rather of agnostics, there is a largo party of our philosophers in this country wlio are pledged to the fundamental principles of scepticism ir accepting substantially the doctrine of Hume." First Principles nf Kaoiolefhie. by .John Rickaby, S. J. pp. 14:^, 144. Among these are Mill, n.imilton, Spencer. Baui, and (Jrocn. scErncisM. 117 doubt, lie affirms his doubt, and consequently is no longer a, sceptic. Above all, a sceptic should not at- tempt to propagate his scepticism, for in doing so he simpl}^ uses reason against itself. The consistent sceptic should no longer act, for all action proceeds from an affirmation of the mind, and thus involves the sceptic in self-contradiction. ' 15. Sc32Jficism is absurd, suice its consequence is the negation of all science and of all virtue. — Scepticism denies truth or the possibility of attaining truth with certitude, and thereby renders science impossible, for science is nothing more than the certain knowl- edge of truth. Scepticism subverts all morality, for it is a truth that every action is either good or bad ; but if we must deny or doubt all truth, evidentl}^ it is a matter of indifference whether we do this or that act. History, moreover, shows that the ages of scepticism have always been ages of intellectual and moral decay. 16. Scepticism is contrary to the nature of man. — Certitude is the life of the intellect, as air is the life of the body ; thus, scepticism is a state contrary to nature, an abnormal, eKceptional state, in which the mind can be placed only by an abuse of reason. 17. The facts brought forward by scepticism against certitude prove nothing. — Sceptics bring forward in support of their system the great variety of human opinions and the errors into which our faculties lead us. But if men differ in opinion on certain truths, they all agree on fundamental truths, and our facul- ' " The position of the dogmatic sceptics, when the}- have done and said all, remains worse than that of the dumb man who tries to speak out and declare his own condition; or that of those who had to solve the old puzzle, how to believe, on a man's own testimony, that he is an unmitigated liar." First Principles of Knowledge, p. 137. 118 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ties do not deceive us, when we apply them to their proper object and they act under the requisite con- ditions. CHAPTER III. The Ultimate Foundation of Certitude. ART I. — WHAT IS MEANT BY THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 18. Tlie principle of certitude is the motive which produces the adhesion of the mind to some truth. — Every cognoscitive faculty makes known the truth in regard to its proper object. But truth, properly speaking, resides solely in the intellect, which adheres firmly to a truth only when prompted by some motive. This motive is called the principle, or ultimate foun- dation, of certitude. 19. The principle of certitude is twofold, intrinsic and, extrinsic. — The intellect adheres to a proposition either because the proposition itself manifests its in- trinsic truth to the mind, or because an extrinsic motive produces conviction in the intellect, though the mind does not perceive the truth of the proposi- tion by an analysis of the proposition itself. In the former case, the principle of certitude is intrinsic ; in the latter, it is extrinsic. ART. II. — THE INTRINSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 20. The intidnsic princip)le of certitude is the objective and ontological evidence of the thing. — That which causes the intellect to know the intrinsic truth of a thing is that the entity of the thing manifests itself THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 119 to the mind. But that which produces in us the knowledge of truth also produces certitude, since certitude is only the state of the mind consequent on the possession of its proper object ; in other words, it is the repose of the mind in the possession of truth. The intrinsic principle of certitude, therefore, is the entity of the thing manifesting itself to the mind and determining its adhesion. This manifesta- tion of the entity of the thing is what is called the objective cuid ontological evidence of the thing. This evidence is immediate, or evidence of intuition, when the thing becomes manifest to the mind immediately and by its own light ; as, The lohole is greater than the j)art ; it is mediate, or evidence of deduction, when it becomes manifest only after some mental process, and by means of a second object. 2 1 . Htcet bases all certitude on revelation ; La Men- nais on the aidhority of common sentiment; Reid and the Sentimentalist school, on instinct and internal sentiment ; Descartes, on the clear and distinct idea of the thing ; Leibnitz and Arnaidd, on the principle of contradiction ; Cousin, on the impersonality of reason ; Galluppi, on the testimony of consciousness ; Kant, on practical reason ; Rosmini, on the idea of possible being ; Gioberti and the Ontologists, on the vision of the divine essence, or on the vision of the divine ideas. All these systems must be rejected as erroneons. — If, with Huet, we doubt that which we know by the senses, by con- sciousness, or by the intellect, and of which we are certain only by the intrinsic evidence of the thing, it is manifest that we must also doubt that which is known to us by divine revelation itself, since we can know what divine revelation teaches only by means of our senses and our intellect. 120 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. Our knowledge of the consent of mankind to a truth is obtained through the senses and the intellect ; therefore, according to the very principles of La Mennais, we are necessitated to doubt our knowledge of this consent. Besides, mankind is made up of individuals ; but, if certitude is impossible to the individual as such, the mere assemblage of the uncer- tain cognitions of individuals can never produce certain cognition. The adhesion of the mind, being the act of a ra- tional being, cannot be determined without a motive. But the instinct and internal sentiment of Beid are blind causes wliich do not make known the mo- tive of adhesion ; therefore, they cannot be the prin- ciple of human certitude. Instinct is peculiar to the animal and not to the intelligent being ; far from explaining anything, it requires explanation itself. Descartes regards evidence as the foundation of certitude ; but, according to him, evidence consists in the clear idea of the thing, and is purely subjec- tive ; that is, it is merely an act of the mind, and not the manifestation of the object to the mind. It is, consequently, variable and changiug. But the certi- tude which puts us in possession of truth must proceed from an immutable and objective principle, like truth itself. The clear idea of Descartes, being a pure modification of the cognoscitive act, cannot be the principle of certitude. Wo cannot, with Leibnitz and Arnaidd, base certitude on the principle of contradiction ; for our assent to this principle must be determined by a motive, and this motive is its intrinsic evidence. Besides the manifest absurdity that would result from admitting the Impersonal Keason of Cousin THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 1*21 and his school, we must remark that this reason, even if supposed to be real, could not produce cer- titude, unless there were also a different motive present. We cannot agree with Gallap^n in founding certi- tude on the testimony of consciousness. For con- sciousness testifies only to facts of the internal sense, and is a purely subjective witness ; hence it cannot produce objective certitude. The practical reason of Kant must necessarily have speculative reason for its basis ; therefore, if the speculative order is destroyed, the practical order will share the same fate. Rosmini errs in placing the principle of certitude in the idea of possible being ; for, aside from the falsity of the innateness of this idea, it cannot produce ob- jective certitude, since it is purely subjective. According to Ontologism, the intellect does not form to itself representations of the object known ; hence the ideal order is destroyed, and consequently, that of knowledge also. Thus, direct vision of the divine essence or of the divine ideas, far from being the principle of certitude, is the negation of all knowledge and of all certitude. ART. III. — THE EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 22. The extrinsic principle of certitude is the authority of him who affirms the fact, 23. The extrinsic p)rinciple of the certitude of anything is either divine or human authority : the latter is the authority of mere human testimony^ if there he question of fact ; or the authority of the testimony of scientists, if there be question of scientific truths ; or the authority of the testimony of common sentiment, if there he question 122 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. of the principal truths necessary to our intellectual or moral life. 24. The authority of divine te.^^timony, or revelation, is a 2^rinciple producing a certitude which is superior to all others and perfect. — God neitlier wishes to deceive us nor can be deceived himself. His infallibility gives us the must perfect certitude regarding the truths which he reveals to us. 25. Human testimony produces certitude in us when ive knoiu that the luitnesses cannot he deceived and do not loish to deceive. — The knoidedge and veracity of the witnesses are, therefore, the two essential conditions on which the authority of human testimony is based. 26. The absolute impossibility of the facts testified to, and in certain cases, tJte improhahility of the facts, argue against the acceptance of the testimony.— Ji a fact is absolutely impossible, evidently the testimony borne to it is false. If the fact is improbable, the testimony requires more careful examination. But it is some- times difficult to determine whether the fact is im- possible ; hence we should rely mainly on the positive sign afforded us in the knowledge and veracit}' of the witnesses. 27. IVe have a certain indication of the hioioledge and veracity of witnesses, ichen they agree in reporting a fact in the same ivay. — The testimony of a single w^it- ness does not, of itself, afford a guarantee of truth ; but if the witnesses are numerous and if they agree in their testimony, wo cannot call their testimony in question ; for then we must suppose either that all are deceived in the observation of the same fact, or that they all agree to deceive in reporting the fact. But, on the one hand, it cannot happen that many men should at the same time be subject to the same THE ULTIMATE FOUNDx\TION OF CERTITUDE. 125 defect in the organs of sense- perception ; and on the other hand, many men cannot maintain the same error in the same way. since a lie is produced by the passions, and the passions vary with individuals. But if the witnesses report facts humiliatir^ to themselves ; if they are very numerous, of different ages and conditions ; if they endure torments and pven death in support of their testimony ; if they leport public facts of great importance, which are not contradicted, but rather confirmed by the very persons whom these facts condemn, then their testi- mony produces perfect certitude. Such is the testi- mony in support of the truths on which Christianity rests. ART IV. — THE MEANS BY WHICH TESTIMONY IS TRANS- MITTED. 28. Tlie three means hy which human testimony is transmitted are : tradition, history, and monuments. — Tradition is an oral account transmitted from mouth to mouth. History is a written record of past events. 3Ionuments are all the works of men which may serve as signs of accomplished facts ; they comprise pillars, inscriptions, medals, charters, etc. Their testimony is indirect, if they afford knowledge which they were not intended to convey ; thus, the magnitude of the pyramids indirectly testifies to the power of the Egyptian kings. It is direct, when they make known the fact which they were designed to transmit ; thus, the medal commemorative of a victory bears direct testimony to that event. 29. When tradition is constant and relates to a public and important fact, it is a source of certitude. — Contem- poraneous witnesses of an event give certain in form a- 12J: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. tion of it to those who come after them. The latter may weigh the value of the testimony, but they will find deception and error impossible, if the wit- nesses to the fact are numerous. Hence, they can, in their turn, produce in those who succeed them a certitude equal to their own, and so the knowledge of the events may be carried down to the most remote ages. We thus see the falsity of the opinion of Locke, who holds that a tradition gradually loses its value by the lapse of time. 30. It is absurd to object against the value of tracU' tioii the fables current during many ages among different nations. — The account of these fables has come down to us devoid of consistency and universality, and the fact that it has at all times been easy to show their falsity is a proof that they cannot be confounded with true tradition. 31. Monuments are a source of certitude when ive can establish their authenticity. — At the time when a monu- ment is erected, it testifies that the fact the remem- brance of which it is intended to perpetuate is certain and universally believed. It is impossible for a counterfeit fact to be generally believed by those who are its contemporaries. But if it is to make known the truth, evidently the monument must really belong to the epoch to which it is referred ; a monu- ment erected subsequent to the event is simply a false witness. Doubt as to the authenticity of a monument produces doubt concerning the fact which it attests. 33. History is a source of certitude ichen it is authen- tic and uncorrupted. — When a historical narrative is published, it is equivalent to a public testimony by its contemporaries to its authenticity. If they receive THE ULTIMATE FOU.NDATION OF CEKTITUDE. 125 such a work as truthful, and if it has undergone no alterations in the lapse of ages, it merits equal cre- dence in all times. 83. We are certain that a writing is authentic : 1. When, hy (in unbroken tradition, it is recognized as such ; 2. When it is in harmony with the manners and customs of tlie time to tchich it is referred, and ivith the character and the genius of tlie author to tvh.om it is as- crihed ; 3. When by its nature it makes ini2)osition impossible. — If from the epoch to which it is referred a writing has always been recognized by the tradi- tion of the common people or of the learned as the production of a particular author, if the contents of the Avriting be in harmony with the known customs of the age, and with the life and genius of the author, its authenticity cannot be disputed. For this is es- pecially guaranteed l)y the moral impossibility of pub- lishing the writing without the immediate discovery of imposture. 34. We are certain that a ivriting is uncorrupted : 1. When its component parts agree both in matter and in form ; 2. When the copies ivhich have been made of it in different times and places are identical ; 3. When, on account of its importance and the great number of per- sons interested in it, alteration becomes impossible. — The intrinsic proof of the integrity of a writing is found in the perfect harmony of the different parts which compose it : the extrinsic proof consists in the iden- tity of the extant codices of the writing. Finally, if the writing interests a great number of persons, and if they have never protested against any altera- tion, the integrity of the work reaches its highest degree of certainty. 35. The veracity of a ivriting is established from the 126 CHllISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. very nature of the icritmg and from tlie hwivledge and veracity of the \oriters. — The intrinsic indications of the veracity of a writing are the notoriet}' of the facts recorded, their importance, and their relation to other facts which occurred at the same time. The knowledge and veracity of tlie writers are established in accordance with the rules of ordinary testimony. We should examine whether they are unbiassed by passions or prejudices, whether they could easily have ascertained the facts, and especially, whether they agree with other writers recording the same facts. To some extent, these rules apply in the ex- amination of the veracity of a monument. 36. The objections of scepticism against tJie value of historic testimony serve only to establish it the more firmly. — It is objected that many books, once received as authentic, have proved later to be forgeries. But if we have the means of establishing the spuriousness of certain writings, evidently the authenticit}^ of other works only remains the more firmly established. Again, it is true that many copies of ancient works have come down to us with alterations. But if the parts in which these copies do not agree prove that alteration has taken place, other parts, in which they do agree, prove that the original text has been pre- served intact. ART. V. — AUTHENTICITY OF THE TESTIMONY OF COMMON SENTIMENT AND OF SCIENTISTS. 37. By the testimony of common sentiment is meant the general and constant assent of mankind to some truth. — To know this general assent, it is not neces- sary to question all men ; it suffices to know the views of enlightened men and the opinion of nations in iX'Mieral. THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 127 38. Common sentiment is a source of certitude in re- gard to the tndhs to ivhich it bears testimony. — That men in different times and in different places may be unanimous in affirming a thing, it is necessary that this affirmation be produced in them by their very nature. But that which is the effect of nature cannot deceive ; we must, therefore, admit the testimony of ■common sentiment. 39. The truths affirmed by common sentiment are : 1. Principles ivhich are readily hioion by the natural use of reason ; 2. Those moral and religious truths the knoiuledge of ivhich is necessary to the moral life of man. — There are both immediate and mediate prin- ciples the cognition of which is easy and requires only the natural development of reason : as, TJie whole is greater than the part. These principles, therefore, are known to all men. The principal moral and religious truths, however, the knowledge of which is indispensable to man, are not readily known. But few minds could have attained to them, ■and even then only after much time, with an inter- mixture of error, and in an uncertain manner. Con- sequently, if they are known and accepted by all men, it is in virtue of a primitive revelation made by God to the first man, and handed down to his de- scendants by unbroken tradition. 40. It is vain to object against the authority of com- mon sentiment the corruption of primitive traditions among nations and the almost universal diffusion of certain errors. — The alterations produced in primi- tive tra^ditions are neither constant nor universal ; they are then without value. Thus, polytheism was professed only during a certain period among differ- •ent nations, and it was not universaL While admit- 128 CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY. ting the reality of certain errors, like that of the revolution of the sun around the earth, we must also observe that they are rather the result of ignorance ; but ignorance should not be confounded with error. 41. Prudence warns us to yield to the authority of scientists in matters relating to the science lohich tJiey teach. — The authority of the scientist in his science should be respected by the unlearned, since he who by the culture of his mind is fitted to apprehend a truth may impose it on him who could not of himself attain to its knowledge. But as scientists themselves are competent to examine the particular truths in question, they should judge the authority of other scientists by their own reason. Hence we may for- mulate the following three rules : 1. The authority of scientists should be accepted so long as there is no reasonable ground to believe it false or to suspect it ; it should be rejected, if it is known to be false ; 2. Every scientist is a competent judge only in the science of which he is master ; 3. One scientist should accept as authoritative the affirmations of another, when he cannot himself ascertain their truth or demonstrate their falsity. ' AllT. VI. — IMPORTANCE TO OUR COGNITIONS OF THE . AU- THORITY OF TESTIMONY AS A PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE. 42. Testimony is the condition of the com^oletc de- velopment of our mind and the source of the greater port of our knoioledge. — Without the aid of testimony, man could, indeed, acquire the knowledge of some truths ; ' For a clear exposition of the liarmony between the positive results of science and the truths of faith, Qon9,\\\l Apologie de la Foi Chre'denne. See also Jouin's Evidences of Religion, p2). 300, 301. THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF CERTITUDE. 129 but, if we except those which are sensible and ele- mentary, they would be very limited and bound up with many errors. Testimony develops his mind promptly and without fatigue, enriches it with a store of cognitions which it could never acquire by itself, either on account of their elevation or of the time required for their acquisition or of insurmount- able material difiQculties. It is because testimony is the condition of the normal and complete develop- ment of the intellect, that the mind is naturally inclined to accept authority, especially during the early years of life.