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HOW A mm PEOPLE 
 
 CONDUCT A LONG WAR: 
 
 A CHAPTER FROM ENGLISH HISTORY. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES J. STILLE, 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 MARTIEN, PRINTER, 619 & 621 JAYNE STREET. 
 
 1863.- 
 
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 V 
 
 I'l 
 
 
 "History, if it be uot the merest toy, the idlest pastime of our vacant 
 hours, is the record of the onward march of Humanity towards an entU 
 Where there is no belief in such an end, and therefore no advance towards 
 it, no stirrings of a Divine Word in a people's bosom, where not as yet the 
 beast's heart has been taken away, and a man's heart given, there History 
 cannot be said to be. They belong not, therefore, to History, least of all 
 to sacred History, those Babels, those cities of confusion, those huge pens, 
 into which by force and fraud, the early hiinters of men, the Nirarods and 
 the Sesostrises drave, and compelled their fellows: and Scripture is only 
 most true to its idea while it passes them almost or wholly in silence 
 by, while it lingers rather on the plains of ]Mamre with the man that 
 "believed God and it was counted uuto him for righteousness," than by 
 "populous No" or great Babylon, where no faith existed but in the blind 
 powers of nature, and the brute forces of the natural man." 
 
 Trench's Hclsean Lecture, 
 
 The Unity of Scripture. 
 
 In excJiang:© 
 APR 1 7 191? 
 
We have known hitherto in this country so little 
 of the actual realities of v/ar on a grand scale, that 
 many are beginning to look upon the violent oppo- 
 sition to the government, and the slowness of the 
 progress of our arms, as signs of hopeless discourage- 
 ment. History, however, shows us that these are the 
 inevitable incidents of all wars waged by a free peo- 
 ple. This might be abundantly illustrated by many 
 remarkable events in English history, from the days 
 of the great Eebellion down through the campaigns 
 of the Prince of Orange, and of Marlborough, to the 
 wars which grew out of the events of the French 
 Revolution. War is always entered upon amidst a 
 vast deal of popular enthusiasm, which is utterly 
 unreasoning. It is the universal voice of history, 
 that such enthusiasm is wholly unreliable in sup- 
 porting the prolonged and manifoM burdens which 
 are inseparable from every war waged on an exten- 
 sive scale, and for a long period. The popular idea 
 of war is a speedy and decisive victory, and an 
 
4 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 immediate occupation of the enemy's capital, fol- 
 lowed by a treaty of peace by which the objects of 
 the war are permanently secured. Nothing is 
 revealed to the excited passions of the multitude, 
 but dazzling visions of national glory, purchased by 
 small privations, and the early and complete subju- 
 gation of their enemies. It is, therefore, not unna- 
 tural that at the first reverse they should yield at 
 once to an unmanly depression, and, giving up all 
 for lost, they should vent upon the government for 
 its conduct of the war, and upon the army and its 
 generals for their failure to make their dreams of 
 victory realities, an abuse as unreasoning as was 
 their original enthusiasm. 
 
 Experience has taught the English people that the 
 progress of a war never fulfils the popular expecta- 
 tions; that although victory may be assured at last 
 to patient and untiring vigour and energy in its 
 prosecution, yet during the continuance of a long 
 war, there can be no well-founded hope of a uniform 
 and constant series of brilliant triumphs in the field, 
 illustrating the profound wisdom of the policy of 
 the Cabinet; that, on the contrary, all war, even that 
 which is most successful in the end, consists rather 
 in checkered fortunes, of alternations of victory and 
 disaster, and that its conduct is generally marked by 
 what were evidently, when viewed in the light of 
 experience, blunders so glaring in the policy adopted 
 by the government, or in the strategy of its generals. 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 5 
 
 that the wonder is success was achieved at all. The 
 English have thus been taught that the true charac- 
 teristic of public opinion, in its judgment of a 
 war, should be, not hopefulness nor impatience of 
 immediate results, but rather a stern endurance — 
 that King-quality of heroic constancy which, rooted 
 deep in a profound conviction of the justice of the 
 cause, supports a lofty public spirit equally well in 
 the midst of temporary disaster, and in the hour of 
 assured triumph. 
 
 We have had no such experience here. Our 
 people are perhaps more easily excited by success, 
 and more readily depressed by reverses, than the 
 English, and it is, therefore, worth while to consider 
 how they carried on war on a grand scale and for a 
 protracted period. It will be found, if we mistake 
 not, that the denunciations of the government, so 
 common among us of late, and the complaints of the 
 inactivity of the army, have their exact counterpart 
 in the history of the progress of all the wars in which 
 England has been engaged since the days of the 
 great Rebellion. He who draws consolation from 
 the lessons of the past, will not, we think, seek com- 
 fort in vain when he discovers that in all those wars 
 in which the government and the army have been so 
 bitterly assailed, (except that of the American Revo- 
 lution,) England has at last been triumphant. It is 
 worth while, then, to look into English history to 
 understand how war is successfully carried on, not- 
 
6 HOTT A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 withstanding the obstacles which, owing to a per- 
 verted public opinion, exist within the nation itself. 
 These difficulties, although they inhere in the very 
 nature of a free government, often prove, as we shall 
 see, more fruitful of embarrassment to the favourable 
 prosecution of a w^ar, than the active operations of 
 the enemy. 
 
 AVe propose to illustrate the propositions which 
 we have advanced by a study of the series of cam- 
 paigns known in English history as the Peninsular 
 War. We select this particular war because we 
 think that in many of its events, and in the policy 
 which sustained it, there are to be observed many 
 important, almost startling parallelisms with our 
 present struggle. We have, of course, no reference 
 to any similarity existing in the principle which 
 produced the two wars, but rather to the striking 
 resemblance in the modes adoptq^l by the two people 
 for prosecuting war on a grand scale, and for the vin- 
 dication of a principle regarded- as of vital impor- 
 tance by them. 
 
 The Peninsular War on the part of England, as 
 was contended by the ministry during its progress, 
 and as is now" universally recognised, was a struggle 
 not only to maintain her commercial supremacy, 
 (which was then, as it is now, her life,) but also to 
 protect her own soil from invasion by. the French, 
 by transferring the scene of conflict to distant Spain. 
 The general pui'pose of assisting the alliance against 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 7 
 
 Napoleon seems always to have been a subordinate 
 motive. It is now admitted by all historians, that 
 upon success in this war depended not only Eng- 
 land's rank among nations, but her very existence 
 as an independent people. The war was carried 
 on for more than five years, and on a scale, so 
 far as the number of men and the extent of 
 the military operations are concerned, until then 
 wholly unattempted by England in her European 
 wars. The result, as it need not be said, was not 
 only to crown the British arms with the most brilliant 
 and undying lustre, but also to retain permanently in 
 their places the party whose only title to public favour 
 was that they had carried on the war against the most 
 serious obstacles, and brought it to a successful ter- 
 mination. Thus was delayed, it may be remarked, 
 for at least twenty years, the adoption of those meas- 
 ures of reform which at last gave to England that place 
 in modern civilization which had long before been 
 reached by most of the nations of the Continent by 
 passing through the trials of a bloody revolution. If 
 we, then, in our dark hours, are inclined to doubt and 
 despondency as to the final result, let us not forget 
 the ordeal through which England successfully passed. 
 We shall find that, in the commencement, there was 
 the same wild and unreasoning enthusiasm with which 
 we are familiar; the same bitter abuse and denuncia- 
 tion of the government at the first reverses; the same 
 impatient and ignorant criticism of military opera- 
 
8 HOTT A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 tions; the same factious and disloyal opposition on 
 the part of a powerful party ; the same discourage- 
 ment and despondency at times on the part of the 
 true and loyal; the same prophecies of the utter 
 hopelessness of success ; the same complaints of griev- 
 ous and burdensome taxation, and predictions of the 
 utter financial ruin of the country ; the same violent 
 attacks upon the government for its arbitrary decrees, 
 and particularly for the suspension of the writ of 
 habeas corpus ; the same difficulties arising from the 
 inexperience of the army; and the same weakness 
 on the part of the government in not boldly and 
 energetically supporting the army in the field. These 
 are some of the more striking parallelisms between 
 the Peninsular War and our own struggle, which a 
 slight sketch of the progress of that war will render 
 very apparent. 
 
 The insurrection in Spain which followed immedi- 
 ately upon a knowledge of the intrigues of Napoleon 
 at Bayonne, in April 1807, by which the royal family 
 was entrapped into an abdication of its right to the 
 throne, and Joseph Bonaparte made king of that 
 country, roused universal admiration and enthusiasm 
 in England. It was thought by all parties that an 
 obstacle to the further progress of Napoleon's schemes 
 of the most formidable character had at last been 
 found. It was the first popular insurrection in any 
 country against Napoleon's power, and consequently, 
 when the deputies from the Asturias reached Eng- 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAE. 9 
 
 land imploring succour, their appeals excited the 
 popular feeling to the highest pitch, and the opposite 
 parties in Parliament and the country vied with each 
 other in demanding that England should aid the in- 
 surrection with the whole of her military power. It 
 is curious to observe, that when the question of aid 
 was brought before Parliament, Mr. Canning and 
 Mr. Sheridan, who had probably never acted toge- 
 ther before on any political question, rivalled each 
 other in their praise of the Spaniards, and in their 
 expressions of hope and belief that Napoleon had at 
 last taken a step which would speedily prove fatal to 
 him. Large supplies were voted by acclamation, 
 and an important expedition, afterwards operating 
 in two columns, one under the command of Sir John 
 Moore, the other under that of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 
 was dispatched to the Peninsula to aid the insur- 
 gents. It is not our purpose to trace the progress of 
 this expedition, but merely to notice the effect which 
 its immediate results, the retreat to Corunna, and 
 the Convention of Cintra, produced upon popular 
 feeling in England. As we look back on the history 
 of that time, the folly and madness which seized 
 upon the popular mind when the terms of the Con- 
 vention of Cintra became known, can only be ex- 
 plained by recalling the high-wrought and extrava- 
 gant expectations of immediate success with which 
 the war had been entered upon. By this Conven- 
 tion, and as the result of a single battle, Portugal 
 
10 BOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 was wholly evacuated by the French ; yet such were 
 the unreasonable demands of public opinion, that 
 because the whole French army had not been made 
 prisoners of war, the Ministry was almost swept 
 away by the outburst, and it could only control the 
 storm by removing the two generals highest in rank. 
 It required all the family and political influence of 
 the third, Sir Arthur Wellesley, to enable him to re- 
 tain his position in the army. The disastrous re- 
 treat of Sir John Moore's army to Corunna, and the 
 easy triumphs of the French at that period through- 
 out all Spain, plunged the English into despair. 
 Going from one extreme to another, men who, only 
 three months before, had quarrelled with the army 
 in Portugal because it had not given them the spec- 
 tacle of a French marshal and twenty thousand of his 
 soldiers as prisoners of war at Spithead, now spoke 
 openly of the folly of any attempt at all on the part 
 of England to resist the progress of the French arms 
 in the Peninsula. In Parliament there was the 
 usual lame apology for disaster, an attempt to shift 
 the responsibility from the Ministry to the General 
 in command ; but the great fact, that all their hopes 
 had been disappointed still remained, and after the 
 explanations of the government the general despond- 
 ency became more gloomy than ever. It is not dif- 
 ficult in the light of history to see where the blame 
 of failure should rest. Any one who is disposed 
 now to sneer and cavil at the shortcomings orour own 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. H 
 
 administration, to impute to it views sliort-sighted 
 and impracticable in their policy, and to blame it 
 for want of energy and vigour in the prosecution of 
 the war, has only to turn to Colonel Napier's account 
 of the stupid blunders of the English government, its 
 absurd and contradictory orders, its absolute ignorance 
 not only of the elementary principles of all war, but 
 of the very nature of the country in which the army 
 was to operate, and of the resources of the enemy, to 
 be convinced that had its mode of carrying on hos- 
 tilities, (which was the popular one,) been adopted, in 
 six months not an English soldier would have remained 
 in the Peninsula except as a prisoner of war. The 
 history of this campaign contains important lessons 
 for us; it shows conclusively that the immediate re- 
 sults of war are never equal to the public expecta- 
 tion, and that if this public expectation, defeated by 
 the imbecility of the government, or soured by disas- 
 ter in the field, is to be the sole rule by which mili- 
 tary operations are to be judged, no war for the de- 
 fence of a principle can long be carried on. 
 
 Fortunately for the fame and the power of Eng- 
 land, the Ministry, although ignorant of the true 
 mode of prosecuting hostilities, had sense enough to 
 perceive that their only true policy was perseverance. 
 They were strong enough to resist the formidable 
 opposition which the events we have referred to de- 
 veloped in Parliament and the country, and, undis- 
 mayed by the experience of the past, concluded a 
 
12 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 treaty with the Provisional Government of Spain, by 
 which they pledged England never to abandon the 
 national cause until the French were driven across 
 the Pyrenees. The army was placed upon a better 
 footing, was largely reinforced, and Sir Arthur Wel- 
 lesley was appointed to the chief command. The 
 government, not yet wholly awakened from its illu- 
 sions, still thought it practicable to reach Madrid in 
 a single campaign, and to that end the efforts of 
 Wellington were directed. It became necessary first 
 to dislodge Soult at Oporto, and the magnificent 
 victory of the English, gained by the passage of the 
 Douro at that point, went far to revive confidence at 
 home in the in\incibility of their army. Yet so 
 clear is it that victory in war often depends upon 
 what, for some better name, we may call mere good 
 fortune, that we have the authority of the Duke of 
 Wellington himself for saying, that this army, which 
 had just exhibited such prodigies of valour, was then 
 in such a state of demoralization, that although "ex- 
 cellent on parade, excellent to fight, it was worse 
 than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution 
 alike by success or defeat." Certainly no severer 
 criticism has ever been justified by the inexperience 
 and want of discipline of our own raw levies than 
 that contained in this memorable declaration. A 
 little reflection and candour might perhaps teach us, 
 as it did the English, that nothing can compensate 
 for the want of experience, and that every allowance 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 13 
 
 is to be made for disasters where it is necessary to 
 educate both officers and soldiers in the actual pre- 
 sence of the enemy. Wellington soon afterwards 
 moved towards the Spanish frontier, hoping by a 
 junction with the army under Cuesta to fight a battle 
 with the French which would open to him the road 
 to the capital. The battle was fought at Talavera, 
 and although it has since been claimed by the Eng- 
 lish as one of their proudest victories, and the name 
 of Talavera is now inscribed upon the standards of 
 the regiments who took part in it with those of Sala- 
 manca and Vittoria, yet the result was in the end, 
 that Wellington was obliged to retreat to Lisbon just 
 three months after he had set out from that place, 
 having left his wounded in the hands of the French, 
 having escaped as if by a miracle from being wholly 
 cut off in his retreat, and having lost one-third of 
 his army in battle and by disease. Of cotirse the 
 blame was thrown upon the want of co-operation on 
 the part of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to 
 do with ; it is the result of the campaign with which 
 we are concerned. Dependence upon the Spaniards 
 was certainly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was 
 one of the fair chances of war, and it was a fault in 
 which Wellington, made wise by experience, was 
 never again detected. 
 
 When the news of the untoward result of this 
 campaign reached England, the clamour against the 
 government and against Wellington was quite as 
 
1-i now A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 violent as that excited by the disasters of Sir John 
 Moore's army. The opposition in Parliament took 
 advantage of this feeling to rouse public opinion to 
 such a manifestation as might compel the termina- 
 tion of the war in the Peninsula and drive the minis- 
 try from office. The Common Council of London, 
 probably a fair exponent of the opinions of the middle 
 class, petitioned the King not to confirm the grant 
 of £2000 a year, which the Ministry had succeeded 
 in getting Parliament to vote to Wellington. The 
 petitioners ridiculed the idea that a battle attended 
 with such results should be called a victory. "It 
 should rather be called a calamity'' they said, " since 
 we were obliged to seek safety in a precipitate flight, 
 abandoning many thousands of our wounded country- 
 men into the hands of the French." In the opinion 
 of the strategists in the Common Council and of 
 their friends 'in Parliament, Wellington might be a 
 brave officer, but he was no general ; he had neglected 
 the protection of his flanks and his line of communi- 
 cation. When it is remembered, that at this very 
 time, Wellington, profiting by the experience of the 
 past, was diligently making his army really efi'ective 
 within the lines of Torres Vedras, from which strong- 
 hold it was in due time to sally forth like a giant 
 refreshed, never to rest until it had planted the Eng- 
 lish flag on the heights of Toulouse, we may perhaps 
 smile at the presumption of those who, sincere well- 
 wishers to the cause, displayed only their ignorance 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 15 
 
 in their criticism. But what shall be said of those 
 who, knowing better, bemg quite able to understand 
 the wisdom of the policy adopted by the General to 
 insure success in the stupendous enterprise in which 
 the country was engaged, yet with a factious spirit 
 and with the sole object of getting into power them- 
 selves, took advantage of the excitement of the igno- 
 rant multitude to paralyze the energies of the govern- 
 ment ] 
 
 That hideous moral leprosy, which seems to be the 
 sad but invariable attendant upon all political dis- 
 cussions in a free government, corrupting the very 
 sources of public life, breeding only the base spirit 
 of faction, had taken complete possession of the oppo- 
 sition, and in its sordid calculations, the dishonour 
 of the country, or the danger of the army, was as 
 nothing provided the office, the power, and the patron- 
 age of the government were secured in their hands. 
 It mattered little to them, provided they could drive 
 the ministry from office, whether its downfall was 
 brought about by blunders in Spain, or by the King's 
 obstinacy about Catholic Emancipation, or by an 
 obscure quarrel about the influence of the Lords of 
 the bed-chamber. The sincerity of these declama- 
 tions of the opposition was curiously enough put to 
 the test some time afterwards, when the ministry, 
 wearied by the factious demagogueism with which 
 all their measures were assailed, and understanding 
 perfectly their significance, boldly challenged their 
 
16 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 opponents, if they were in earnest, to make a definite 
 motion in the House of Commons, that Portugal 
 should, be abandoned to its fate. This move com- 
 pletely unmasked their game, and for a time silenced 
 the clamour, for it was perfectly understood on all 
 hands, that deep in the popular heart, undisturbed by 
 the storms which swept over its surface, there was a 
 thorough and abiding conviction of the absolute ne- 
 cessity of resisting the progress of Napoleon's arms, 
 and that the real safety of England herself required 
 that that resistance should then be made in Spain. 
 Still this noisy clamour did immense mischief; it 
 weakened the government, it prolonged the strife, it 
 alarmed the timid, it discouraged the true, and it so 
 far imposed upon Napoleon himself, that thinking that 
 in these angry invectives against the government he 
 found the real exponent of English sentiment, he 
 concluded, not unnaturally, that the people were 
 tired and disgusted with the war, and that the priva- 
 tions which it occasioned were like a cancer, slowly 
 but surely eating out the sources of national life. 
 
 In the midst of these violent tumults at home, 
 Wellington was silently preparing, for his great work 
 within the lines of Torres Vedras. It would not be 
 easy to overrate the difficulties by which he was sur- 
 rounded. He was fully aware of the outcry which 
 had been raised against him; he knew that from a 
 Cabinet so weakened by internal dissensions as to be 
 on the verge of overthrow from the vigorous assaults of 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAE. IT 
 
 the opposition, and from, its own nnpopularity occa- 
 sioned by the failure of the Walcheren expedition, 
 and the disasters in the Peninsula, he could expect 
 no thorough and reliable support. Indeed the gov- 
 ernment, almost in despair, threw the whole respon- 
 sibility for the military measures on the Continent on 
 him alone. He accepted the responsibility in a most 
 magnanimous spirit. " I conceive," he writes, " that 
 the honour and the interests of the country require 
 that we should hold our position here as long as pos- 
 sible, and please God, I will maintain it as long as I 
 can. I will neither endeavour to shift from my own 
 shoulders on those o£the ministers the responsibility 
 for the failure, by calling for means which I know 
 they cannot give, and which perhaps would not add 
 materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor 
 will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and 
 who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an 
 excuse for withdrawing the army from a position 
 which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the 
 country require they should maintain as long as pos- 
 sible." Animated by this heroic sense of duty, the 
 Commander-in-Chief prepared to contend against 
 the 200,000 men under Massena, whom Napoleon 
 had sent to chase him into the sea. He had, to oppose 
 this immense force, only 25,000 English soldiers, and 
 about the same number of Portuguese tolerably or- 
 ganized. Secure within the lines of Torres Vedras, 
 he quietly waited until the want of provisions, and 
 2 
 
18 HOT^^ A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 the utter hopelessness of an assault upon his position 
 forced upon Massena the necessity of retreating. 
 Then instantly pursuing, in a series of battles, of 
 almost daily occurrence, he drove Massena out of 
 Portugal, and reached once more the Spanish fron- 
 tier in May 1811, nearly three years after the Eng- 
 lish had sent an army to the assistance of the Penin- 
 sula. Here he rested for a long time, making prepa- 
 rations for the siege of Badajoz and Ciudad Podrigo, 
 operations requiring time, and the success of which 
 was essential to the safety of the army in its further 
 progress. Still, so little was Wellington's position, 
 military and political, understood in England even at 
 that time, after all the proofs he had given of com- 
 summate ability, that public clamour was again 
 roused against the mode adopted by him for conduct- 
 ing the war. As there were no disasters at which to 
 grumble, people talked of "barren victories," be- 
 cause like those of Crecy and Azincourt, they brought 
 no territorial acquisitions, forgetting then what they 
 have never been weary of boastingly proclaiming 
 since, that these victories were the best proofs that 
 their army was distinguished by the highest military 
 qualities, which, properly directed and supported, 
 were capable of achieving the most glorious results. 
 So profound was the conviction of the immense supe- 
 riority of the French, both in numbers, and in the 
 quality of their troops, that the public mind 'was in a 
 state of feverish anxiety, and many of the stoutest 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 19 
 
 hearts gave way to despair. About this period Sir 
 Walter Scott writes to Mr. Ellis: "These cursed, 
 double cursed news (from Spain) have sunk my 
 spirits so much, that I am almost at disbelieving a 
 Providence; God forgive me, but I think some evil 
 demon has been permitted in the shape of this tyran- 
 nical monster, whom God has sent on the nations 
 visited in his anger. The spring-tide may, for aught 
 I know, break upon us in the next session of Parlia- 
 ment. There is an evil fate upon us in all we do at 
 home or abroad." So Sir James Mackintosh, writing 
 to Gentz, at Vienna: "I believe, like you, in a resur- 
 rection, because I believe in the immortality of civi- 
 lization, but when, and by whom, and in what form, 
 are questions which I have not the sagacity to 
 answer, and on which it would be boldness to hazard 
 a conjecture. A dark and stormy night, a black 
 series of ages may be prepared for our posterity, 
 before the dawn that opens the more perfect day. 
 Who can tell how long that fearful night may be 
 before the dawn of a brighter morrowl The race of 
 man may reach the promised land; but there is no 
 assurance that the present generation will not perish 
 in the wilderness." As if to render the situation 
 more gloomy, if possible, the Marquis of Wellesley, 
 the brother of Wellington, left the ministry upon 
 the avowed ground that the government would not 
 support the war with sufficient vigour. History has 
 stripped his conduct of any such worthy motive, and 
 
20 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 shown that the real trouble was his anxiety to sup- 
 plant Mr. Perceval. At the same time, the attack 
 was kept up in the opposite quarter. "No man in 
 his senses," said Sir Francis Burdett, " could enter- 
 tain a hope of the final success of our arms in the 
 Peninsula. Our laurels were great, but barren, and 
 our victories in their effects mere defeats." Mr. 
 Whitbread, too, as usual, was not behindhand with 
 his prophecies. "He saw no reason," he said, "to 
 alter liis views respecting peace; war must otherwise 
 terminate in the subjugation of either of the con- 
 tending powers. They were both great; but this 
 was a country of factitious greatness. France was a 
 country of natural greatness." So, General Tarleton 
 "had the doctrine of Mr. Fox in his favour, who 
 wished for the pencil of a Cervantes to be able to 
 ridicule those who desired to enter upon a conti- 
 nental war."* 
 
 * The following description of the opposition of that day, taken from the 
 Annual Register for 1812, bears so striking a likeness to the peculiarities 
 of the leaders of an insignificant, but restless faction among us, that, 
 omitting the old-fashioned drapery of the proper names, they seem to 
 have sat for the photograph. "It may be remarked as a most singular 
 circumstance, that those persons in this country -who profess to have the 
 greatest abhorrence of ministerial tyranny and oppression, look with the 
 utmost coolness on the tyranny and oppression of Bonaparte. The regular 
 opposition do not mention it with that abhoi-rence which might be expected 
 from them ; but the leaders of the popular party in Parliament go further. 
 They are almost always ready to find an excuse for the conduct of Bona- 
 parte. The most violent and unjustifiable acts of his tyranny raise but 
 feeble indignation in their minds, while the most trifling act of ministerial 
 oppression is inveighed against with the utmost bitterness, lleady and 
 unsuspecting czedence is given to every account of Bonaparte's success; 
 while the accounts of the success of his opponents are received with cold- 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 21 
 
 Thus, from universal enthusiasm in favour of the 
 Spanish war, public opinion, at first manifesting 
 itself through the factious spirit of the opposition, 
 at length spoke through all its organs, in tones of 
 despondency and despair, of the situation and pros- 
 pects of the country, and simply because there had 
 not been that sort of military success which it could 
 understand, to sustain and direct it. Universal dis- 
 trust seized upon the public mind ; and had it not 
 been for the heroic constancy of that great com- 
 mander, whose task in supporting the ministry at 
 home was at least as difficult as that of beating the 
 French in Spain, the glory of England had sunk for 
 ever. 
 
 Yet it happened, as it so often happens in the 
 order of Divine Providence, in the moral as in the 
 physical world, that the night was darkest just before 
 dawn. Amidst all this universal despondency and 
 sinister foreboding, events were preparing which in 
 a few short months changed the whole face of 
 Europe, and forced back that torrent of revolution- 
 ary success which had spread over the whole con- 
 tinent, until it overwhelmed the country where 
 it had its source in complete ruin. The discus- 
 sions in Parliament to which we have referred, took 
 
 ness and distrust. Were it not for these things, the conduct of Mr. Whit- 
 bread and his friends would be hailed with more satisfaction, and inspire 
 more confidence with the real lovers of their country; for they deserve 
 ample credit for the undaunted and unwearied firmness with which they 
 have set themselves against abuses and against every instance of oppres- 
 sion." 
 
22 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 place in February, 1812. With the siege of 
 Ciudad llodrigo on the 18th of January of that 
 year, with the fall of Badajoz on the 26th of March, 
 the first battle of Salamanca on the 20th of July, 
 and Napoleon's invasion of Russia in June in the 
 same year, began the downfall of the French 
 Empire. 
 
 Wellington at last reached Madrid in August, 
 1812, more than four years later than he ought to 
 have done, according to the strategists of Parliament 
 and the Press. This was all forgotten at the moment, 
 so magic a wand is held by success. The fickle 
 voice of popular applause was again heard, echoing 
 the spirit of confidence which his persistent and 
 undaunted conduct had revived in the hearts of his 
 countrymen. His career of victory, however, was 
 destined not to be unchecked; and when, after his 
 occupation of Madrid, his unsuccessful assault upon 
 the Castle of Burgos rendered a retreat to the Por- 
 tuguese frontier and the evacuation of the capital a 
 proper military movement, although that retreat was 
 compensated for by the abandonment of Andalusia 
 by the French, in order to concentrate their whole 
 force against him, still the blind multitude could 
 not be made to understand it, and began again to 
 murmur. 
 
 It is not now difiicult to see that the victory at 
 Salamanca was really what the far-seeing sagacity of 
 Marshal Soult predicted at the time it would become, 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 23 
 
 " a prodigious historical event," that it was the pivot 
 on which at that time hinged the destinies of Eng- 
 land, one of those battles of which we see perhaps a 
 dozen only in the whole course of history, which are 
 really decisive of the fate of empires. It completely 
 unloosed the French power in the Peninsula, and 
 prepared the way for the great success of Vittoria, 
 the next year, which gave the coup de grace to the 
 French military occupation of Spain. It is not our 
 present purpose to trace the history of the next 
 campaign, but it is curious to observe the effects 
 produced by assured success upon that public opinion 
 which had shifted so often and so strangely during 
 the progress of this eventful struggle. The opposi- 
 tion, as their only hope of escape from political 
 annihilation, and thinking to swim with the popular 
 current, abused the ministers for not supporting 
 Wellington with sufficient earnestness, complaining 
 that they had taken the advice which they themselves 
 had so often and so eloquently tendered. But it was 
 of no avail. This wretched charlatanism was too 
 transparent to impose upon any one; and of the great 
 party who opposed the war, no one ever after rose to 
 office or power in England. It required a whole 
 generation, in the opinion of the English constituen- 
 cies, to expiate the faults of those who had sneered 
 at the great Duke, and had called the glorious fields 
 of Vimeiro, Busaco, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onor, Ciu- 
 dad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, names which had become 
 
24 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 associated with the proudest recollections of English 
 renown, "mere barren victories, equal in their effects 
 to defeats." 
 
 We pass now to the consideration of another class 
 of difficulties inherent in the prosecution of every 
 war, and generally of far greater magnitude than any 
 other, — those connected with the raising of the vast 
 sums of money required for the support of military 
 operations. In this important matter, if we mistake 
 not, there are some striking points of resemblance 
 between the English experience during the war, and 
 our present situation. It is the fashion among many 
 who seek to excite the public alarm on this subject 
 from unworthy, and sometimes, it may be feared, 
 from treasonable motives, to represent the enormous 
 outlay of the nation's wealth which is poured Out to 
 save the nation's life, as wholly unparalleled in his- 
 tory. Yet it may be asserted, without any fear of 
 contradiction, that England, with a population then 
 little more than half of that which now inhabits our 
 loyal States, with resources infinitely less in propor- 
 tion at that time than our own, her .manufacturing 
 industry, so far as external outlet was concerned, 
 wholly crippled by the operation of the French con- 
 tinental system, and her own Orders in Council, 
 expended, during every year of the Peninsular war, 
 as large a sum as has been required here each year 
 to create and keep up the gigantic force now in 
 arms to put down the Eebellion. During the five 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 25 
 
 years that the war lasted, her average annual expen- 
 diture exceeded ninety millions of pounds sterling, 
 or four hundred and fifty millions of dollars, which 
 is about the same sum which is demanded of us. No 
 one, of course, pretends to say that this rate of ex- 
 penditure is not appalling, yet it concerns us to know 
 that it is not unprecedented, and that these vast 
 amounts have been raised from national resources far 
 inferior to our own. It should not be forgotten, 
 also, that they represent the money price of Eng- 
 land's independence, and if ours is secured by a far 
 greater outlay, we certainly are not disposed to quar- 
 rel with the wisdom of the investment. 
 
 The question is, how were these immense sums 
 raised in England] The man who would have pre- 
 dicted, at the commencement of the war with France, 
 that the English national debt would at its close 
 exceed one thousand millions of pounds sterling, and 
 that the country would be able to bear such a burden, 
 would have been regarded as a visionary as wild 
 as he who in this country, two years ago, might have 
 foretold the present amount of our national debt, and 
 have contended that, in spite of it, the public credit 
 would remain unimpaired. The difficulty in England 
 of raising these vast sums was tenfofd greater than it 
 is here. Napoleon, looking upon England as the 
 Southern peo]3le have been taught to regard us, as a 
 purely commercial nation, undoubtedly placed more 
 reliance for ultimate success upon the instinct of 
 
26 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 money getting, which would shrink from the pecu- 
 niary sacrifices necessary in a prolonged struggk?, 
 than upon the mere victories of his army. Hence 
 he pursued, during his whole career, an inflexible 
 purpose of ruining English commerce, and by a 
 series of measures known as the Continental system, 
 endeavoured to exclude English ships and English 
 products from the markets of the world. The efi'ect 
 of these measures, although not so serious as he 
 wished and had anticipated, nevertheless crippled 
 enormously the resources of England just at the 
 period when they were most needed. 
 
 Taking the three years before the issuing of the 
 Orders in Council and the vigorous enforcement of 
 the Continental system, which were coincident in 
 point of time with the commencement of the Spanish 
 war, the average annual exports sank from fifty- 
 seven millions to twenty-three millions, taking the 
 average of three years after they had been in 
 operation. Taxes were laid on at a most burden- 
 some rate. The income tax was ten per cent., 
 and besides, specific war taxes amounting to more 
 than twenty millions a year were imposed. Not- 
 withstanding all these taxes, the debt increased more 
 than one thousand millions of dollars during the Pe- 
 ninsular war. Discontent and violence among the 
 labouring classes became universal, and it was re- 
 marked that the achievement of the greatest victories 
 in Spain was celebrated in England "amidst a popu- 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 27 
 
 lation who had been prevented by the burden of tax- 
 ation on the absolute necessaries of life, from secur- 
 ing a livelihood by the strictest industry, and thus 
 pauperism had been generated throughout the land, 
 a pauperism aggravated by a spirit of pillage, v^^hich 
 it required a strong military force to repress." Bank- 
 ruptcy and ruin fell upon the trading classes, and 
 absolute exhaustion of the resources of the country 
 seemed almost reached. The public stocks had sunk 
 to such a degree that the three per cents., which are 
 now always above 90 per cent., were rarely higher 
 during the war than 65 per cent., and so depressed 
 at last had the public credit become, that the last 
 loan of the Continental war, that of April, 1815, 
 was taken by the contractor at 53 per cent., and 
 paid for in the depreciated paper of the day; and yet 
 the Chancellor of the Exchequer was congratulated 
 even by the opposition for having made "a good ope- 
 ration." The Bank was in a state of chronic sus- 
 pension, the buying and selling of gold were prohib- 
 ited to the public under severe penalties, and yet 
 every gold guinea which was sent by the govern- 
 ment to the army in Spain (and nothing else would 
 answer the purpose of money in that country) cost 
 thirty per cent, premium. How England survived 
 all this complication of troubles is one of the marvels 
 of history, but it is not our purpose to discuss that 
 question. The great fact that the money required 
 was somehow raised is all that we have to do with at 
 
28 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 present. When we have been at war for twenty 
 years, and are forced, in order to raise the means of 
 carrying it on, to submit to one tithe of the sacrifices 
 which were endured by the Enghsh, we may then 
 perhaps begin seriously to consider the money vahie 
 of the Union. 
 
 The lesson which this review of the progress of 
 the Peninsular war teaches, is, it seems to us, 
 one of hope and encouragement, for if it shows 
 anything, it proves clearly that in the support of 
 public opinion, and in the means requisite to main- 
 tain a great army, those fundamental essentials of 
 real military success, our Government is immeasure- 
 ably stronger than the English ever was at any period 
 of the war. It teaches also another important les- 
 son, and that is, that there is such a thing as public 
 opinion falsely so called, which is noisy just in pro- 
 portion as its real influence is narrow and restricted. 
 One of the most difficult and delicate tasks of the 
 statesman is to distinguish the true from this false 
 opinion, the factious demagogue from the grumbling 
 but sincere patriot, and to recognise with a ready 
 instinct the voice which comes from the depths of 
 the great heart of the people, in warning it may be 
 sometimes, in encouragement often, but always echo- 
 ing its abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the 
 good cause. 
 
 We have confined ourselves in our illustrations 
 to the discussion of questions- as they affected the 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 29 
 
 snccess of purely military operations, because we feel 
 that here our grand business is to clear away the 
 obstacles, real or fancied, which may in any way 
 impair our military efficiency. In military success 
 alone, we are firmly convinced, is to be found the 
 true solution of our whole difficulty, the only force 
 which can give vitality or permanence to any theory 
 of settlement. As the matter now stands, it is idle 
 to hope for either peace or safety until this question 
 of military superiority is unmistakably and definitively 
 settled. Upon this point then, the increase of our 
 military efficiency, which embraces not merely the 
 improvement of the condition of the army, but also, 
 as we have endeavoured to show by English exam- 
 ples, and in a greater degree than is often supposed, 
 the support of the Government in its general policy 
 of conducting the war, should the efforts of all those 
 who influence public opinion be concentrated. 
 
 There is a certain class of men among us, not very 
 numerous, perhaps, but still, owing to their position 
 and culture, of considerable influence, who, accus- 
 tomed to find in the European armies their standard 
 of military efficiency, are disposed to doubt whether 
 a force, composed as ours is of totally different mate- 
 rials, can accomplish great results. We may admit 
 at once the superiority of foreign military organiza- 
 tion, the result of the traditions of centuries of mili- 
 tary experience, digested into a thorough system, 
 and carried out by long trained officers perfectly 
 
30 HOTV A FREE TEOPLE 
 
 versed in the details of the service. Much incon- 
 venience has necessarily resulted in our case from 
 the ignorance of llcgimental Officers, to a greater 
 degree probably, however, from a want of proper care 
 and attention on their part to the troops when in 
 camp, than from any gross incompetency or miscon- 
 duct on the field of battle. Instances of such mis- 
 conduct there have undoubtedly been, but, consider- 
 ing the number of the officers and their want of 
 experience, those instances are extremely rare, and 
 when we call to mind the number of officers who 
 have fallen, while leading their men in battle, out of 
 proportion, as it undoubtedly is, with th*e losses in 
 other wars, we may well palliate deficiences in this 
 respect, out of considerations for their heroic gal- 
 lantry and devotion. AVe do not underrate certainly 
 the value of good officers, but history tells us that 
 great victories have been achieved by armies who 
 were no better led than ours. The incompetency of 
 his officers was one of Wellington's standing com- 
 plaints in Spain. Most of them knew absolutely 
 nothing beyond the mere routine of garrison duty; 
 they were all what is technically called "gentlemen," 
 for each one had purchased his commission at a high 
 price, but they had had no systematic training in 
 military schools; nearly all of them had had no ac- 
 tual experience of war, and their average intelligence 
 was undoubtedly below that of the men who hold 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 31 
 
 similar positions in our army.* All accounts agree 
 that at that period the scientific branches of the 
 great art of war were almost wholly neglected in the 
 British army, and such was the happy ignorance of 
 the elements of strategy, that at a court-martial com- 
 posed of general officers for the trial of General 
 Whitelock in 1808, for his failure at Buenos Ayres, 
 it was necessary to explain to the court what was 
 meant in military phrase by the "right bank" of a 
 river. 
 
 It is said again, by those who have the standard 
 of foreign armies always before their eyes, that among 
 our soldiers there is not a proper deference to rank, 
 too much camaraderie in short, and that this is fatal 
 to discipline. But it should be remembered that 
 mere formal discipline may be one thing, and the true 
 spirit of discipline another, and yet both may answer 
 the same purpose. The first may be more showy 
 than the latter, but not more valuable to real mili- 
 tary efficiency. Everything depends upon the cha- 
 
 * We have no room to enumerate in detail tlie complaints made by the 
 Duke of the officers of his army. Those who are interested in the subject 
 may consult Col. Gurwood's 4th volume, pages 343, 346, 352, 363, 385, 
 899, and 407. The whole story is summed up, however, in the general 
 order occasioned by the disorderly retreat from Burgos, in which the Duke 
 said "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater 
 degree than he had ever witnessed, or ever read of in any army, and thiff, 
 without any disaster, or any unusual privation or hardship, that the offi- 
 cers had from the first lost all command over their men, and that the true 
 cause of this unhappy state of affairs was to be found in the habitual 
 neglect of duty by the Regimental Ojjlcers." This is the army of which the 
 Duke said later, that "with it, he could go anywhere and do anything," 
 and, good or bad, it saved Europe — in the English sense. 
 
32 HOW A FREE TEOPLE 
 
 racter of the soldier who is to be governed by it. 
 The British army is composed, as we all know, of 
 the refuse of the population, and in the war in the 
 Peninsula it was largely reinforced by the introduc- 
 tion into its ranks of convicts taken from the hulks, 
 who were there expiating infamous offences. AVi'th 
 such men, motives based on a sense of duty were 
 powerless. Drunkenness, theft, marauding, a muti- 
 nous spirit under privations, and a fierce thirst of 
 license which defied all control in the hour of vic- 
 tory, these were the brutal passions which could only 
 be checked by the equally brute hand of force. But 
 from such a vile herd, made useful only as a slave is 
 made useful, by fear of the lash, to the civilized, 
 sober, well educated American citizen, animated 
 with the consciousness that he is fighting for a great 
 cause, in the success of which he and his children 
 have a deep personal interest, and who learns obe- 
 dience because both his common sense and his sense 
 of duty recognise its necessity, how immeasurable is 
 the distance! The American volunteer, in this re- 
 spect, has not had justice done to his excellence. 
 He is certainly a soldier essentially sui generis, and 
 when we hear sneers at his want of discipline, let us 
 remember that although he may not regard his ofii- 
 cers as superior beings, yet experience has already 
 shown that in the cheerful performance of his new 
 duties under privations ; in his freedom from those 
 vices which in many minds are inseparably asso- 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAE, 33 
 
 ciated with the very idea of a soldier; in his cour- 
 ase, endurance, and steadiness in battle ; and, more 
 than all, in those higher qualities which are the 
 fruit of his education, general intelligence, and love 
 of country, he presents himself to us as a figure 
 hitherto wholly unknown in military history. 
 
 One of the most cruel statements which party 
 rancour has circulated in regard to the 'condition of 
 the army is, that the rate of sickness and mortality is 
 excessive, and that this is due to the neglect of the 
 Government. Fortunately we have the means of 
 showing that these statements are false. From 
 June 1, 1861, to March 1, 1862— nine months— the 
 annual rate of mortality for the whole army is ascer- 
 tained to be 53 in a thousand, and the sickness rate 
 104 in a thousand. The returns for the summer 
 campaigns are not yet printed, but it will appear 
 from them, that in the army of the Potomac on the 
 10th of June, after the battle of Fair Oaks, and 
 while the array was encamped on the Chickahominy, 
 the whole number of sick, present and absent, com- 
 pared with the whole force of that army present and 
 absent, was 128 in a thousand. During the stay of 
 the army on the Peninsula it lost less than 14,000 
 men by death from disease and wounds, and the an- 
 nual sickness rate during the campaign was about 
 that which has for some time prevailed in the 
 whole army, less than ten per cent, of the whole 
 force. It appears, strange to say, that the army was 
 3 
 
34 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 more healthy when in the trenches before Yorktown, 
 than at any other period of the campaign. Com- 
 pare this with the Enghsh experience. We have 
 already said that AVellington lost about one-third of 
 his whole army from malarious fever on his retreat 
 from Talavera: on the 1st of October, 1811, the An- 
 glo-Portuguese army had 56,000 men fit for duty, 
 and 23,000 sick in hospitals; and in the Crimea, 
 while the annual rate of mortality for the whole war 
 was 232 in a thousand, the period of active opera- 
 tions, the last three months of 1854 and the first 
 three months of 1855, shows the feaiful rate of 711 
 deaths in every thousand men. 
 
 It cannot be doubted that to many the most unfa- 
 vourable symptom of our present condition is the 
 slow progress of our arms. This slowness is more 
 apparent than real, for the history of modern warfare 
 scarcely shows an instance in which so great real 
 progress has been made in the same space of time, 
 and it is manifest that whenever our northern sol- 
 diers have had a chance of fighting the enemy on 
 anything like equal terms, they have fully main- 
 tained their superiority. It is none the less true, 
 however, that public expectation in this matter has 
 been much disappointed, and it is curious to look at 
 some of the explanations given for it. The Prince 
 de Joinville, in his recent pamphlet, speaking of the 
 battle of Fair Oaks, and of the neglect to throw 
 bridges over the Chickahominy at the proper time, 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAH, 35 
 
 by means of which the whole rebel army might have 
 been taken in flank, and probably destroyed, ascribes 
 the neglect on one page to what he calls la lenteur 
 Americaine^ which he seems to think always leads 
 dtir countrymen to let the chance slip of doin^ the 
 right thing at the right time, and again on the next 
 to '■'■fmite d'' organisation^ f ante de hierarchies fante de 
 lien, qui en result e entre Fame du chefet Farmee, lieu 
 puissant qui permet a un General de demander a ses 
 soldats et d'^en obtenir aveuglement ces efforts extra- 
 ordinaires qui gagneut les hattailles.^^ In other 
 words. General McClellan, knowing that he could 
 gain a decisive victory by laying down half a dozen 
 bridges, which, it is stated, were all ready for the 
 purpose, actually refused to order his soldiers to 
 do it, because he was afraid they would not obey his 
 orders. And this is the Prince's judgment of an 
 army, which, a few weeks later, according to his 
 own account, fought five battles in as many days, 
 all, with one exception, victories, over an enemy at 
 least double its numbers, and arrived at its new base 
 on the James River in excellent condition, and with- 
 out the slightest taint of demoralization. This illus- 
 tration shows the absurdity of ascribing the want of 
 immediate success to la lenteur Americaine, a quality, 
 by the way, which we learn for the first time, is one 
 of our national characteristics. 
 
 Among the many causes which might be named, 
 all perfectly legitimate, and presenting no obstacle 
 
36 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 which a little experience will not remove, we ven- 
 ture to suggest but one, and that is the character of 
 the early military education of our higher officers. 
 The system pursued at West Point, although admir- 
 able for qualifying officers for the scientific and stail" 
 corps of the army, seems to fail in teaching the 
 young soldier, what is just now the most important 
 quality he can possess for command, the character 
 and capacity of volunteer soldiers. The system of 
 discipline he has been taught is that which governs 
 the regular army, a system modelled upon the Eng- 
 lish, which is, with the exception of that in use in 
 Russia, the most brutal and demoralizing known in 
 any army in Europe. No wonder, therefore, that 
 when our educated soldiers are suddenly placed in 
 high positions, and with great responsibilities, and 
 when they discover that the sort of discipline which 
 they have been taught is wholly out of place in 
 securing the efficiency of a volunteer army, they 
 are led to doubt whether it can ever be made effi- 
 cient at all. These prejudices, however, are wearing 
 away before the test of actual experience. Generals 
 are gradually learning that they may confide in their 
 men, even for desperate undertakings; they begin 
 to see in their true light the many eminent qualities 
 of the volunteer; and he, in turn, begins to under- 
 stand something of that military system which 
 seemed at first so irksome and meaningless to him ; 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 37 
 
 and the advance of the army in the essentials of 
 discipline has been proportionably rapid. 
 
 There is a good deal of talk about the impossi- 
 bility of conquering or subjugating the South, which 
 is based upon very vague notions of what conquest 
 and subjugation signify. It is surprising to find 
 how even intelligent men have been imposed upon 
 by this favourite boast of the rebels and their sym- 
 pathizers. A pretended saying of Napoleon is 
 quoted, that "it is impossible to prevent any people 
 determined on achieving its independence, from 
 accomplishing its purpose;" and it is confidently 
 asked whether any one ever heard of the subjuga- 
 tion of twelve millions of people determined to be 
 free.' We reply, that history, ancient and modern, 
 is full of instances of the only sort of conquest or 
 subjugation which any sane man proposes shall be 
 submitted to by the South. No one thinks it pos- 
 sible or necessary, for the purpose in view, to 
 occupy the whole South with garrisons, but simply 
 to destroy the only support upon which its arrogant 
 pretensions are based, namely, its military power. 
 This gone, what becomes of all the rest "? and this 
 remaining, where is there any hope of permanent 
 peace and safety to US'? For what is all war, but 
 an appeal to force to settle questions of national 
 interest which peaceful discussion has failed to 
 settle; and what is an army but only another 
 
38 HOW A FREE PEOPLE 
 
 argument, the ultima ratio, which, if successful in 
 decisive battles, must give the law to the conquered] 
 To say nothing of instances in ancient history, 
 Poland, Hungary, and Lombardy, in our day, were 
 just as determined to be free as the South is, 
 and quite as full of martial ardour; and certainly 
 Prussia, Spain under the Bonaparte dynasty, and the 
 French Empire, are all examples of nations which 
 valued their independence, and had tenfold the re- 
 sources for maintaining it which the South possesses ; 
 yet the capture of Warsaw, the surrender of Yilla- 
 gos, the battles of Novara, of Jena, of Salamanca, 
 and of Waterloo, respectively, settled as definitively 
 the fate of the inhabitants of those countries, and 
 their future condition, as if the terms imposed by 
 the conquering army had been freely and unani- 
 mously agreed upon by the representatives of the 
 people in Congress assembled. And, in like manner, 
 can any one doubt, looking at the present compara- 
 tive resources of the two sections, that if we should 
 gain two decisive battles, one in the East and the 
 other in the West, which should result in the total 
 disorganization of the two rebel armies, and thus 
 enable us to interpose an impassable barrier between 
 them, we should soon hear a voice imploring in 
 unmistakable accents peace on our own terms'? It 
 would not be a matter of choice, but of necessity; a 
 simple question of how far the progress of exhaustion 
 had been carried, and that once settled, and no rea- 
 
CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 39 
 
 sonable hope of success remaining, the war would 
 not last a week longer. This is the experience of all 
 nations, and our Southern rebels, notwithstanding 
 their noisy boasting, do not differ in their capacity 
 of resistance from the rest of mankind. "Hard 
 pounding this, gentlemen," said the Duke of Wel- 
 lington to his officers, as he threw himself within 
 one of the unbroken squares of his heroic infantry at 
 Waterloo, " hut we'll see who can pound the longest ;" 
 and the ability of that infantry to "pound the long- 
 est" on that day settled the fate of Europe for gene- 
 rations. 
 
 Let us bend, then, our united energies to secure, 
 as much as in us lies, success in the field, and that 
 success gained, we may be sure that all things will 
 follow. Let us recognise with confidence as co- 
 workers in this great object all, never mind what 
 opinions they may entertain about the causes of the 
 war and the new issues which its progress has de- 
 veloped, who desire in all sincerity, no matter from 
 what motive, the success of our arms. Upon such a 
 basis, the wider and more catholic our faith becomes 
 the better. "In essentials. Unity; in non-essentials, 
 Liberty; in all things. Charity:" this should be our 
 motto. The only possible hope for the South is in 
 our own divisions. Let us remember that with suc- 
 cess all things are possible; without it, all our hopes 
 and theories vanish into thin air. With success in the 
 field, we should not only disarm the rebellion, and 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ^ 
 
 40 HOTT A FREE PEOPLE CONDUCT A LONG WAR. 
 
 rid ourselves for ever of the pestilent tribe of domes- 
 tic traitors by buiying them deep in that political 
 oblivion which covers the Tories of the Revolution, 
 and those who sneered at the gallant exploits of our 
 Navy in the war of 1812, but also force public opi- 
 nion abroad, whose faithlessness to the great princi- 
 ples which underlie all modern civilization has been 
 one of the saddest developments of this sad war, to 
 exclaim at last, '•''Invidiam gJorid superdsti.'" 
 
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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