!i|--::''Mip-p^P^^ mjt-fj «! .tmm steaaS; - J ■f\'m%/ f/ 1 i cTiijoHcrj^ami^i ! BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA, Fought Nov. 23 — 25, 1863, BY THE ARMIES OF THE CUMBERLAND AND TENNESSEE, UNDER GENERALS GRANT, THOMAS, SHERMAN, AND HOOKER. GENERAL BRAGG COMMANDING THE CONFEDERATE FORCES. Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge AND LOCALITIES MADE FAMOUS BY THE BATTLES OF CHICKAMAUGA, WAUHATCHIE, GRAYSVILLE, RINGGOLD, ETC. A Resume of the Situations Shown in the Panorama of MISSIONARY RIDGE, AND VERY FULL EXTRACTS OF OFFICIAL REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM THE LIBRARY OF WILLIAM WEHNER'S PANORAMA STUDIO, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN. PUBLISHED BV ^ W. J. JEFF'EfvSON,,''.,ir PRINTER OF PANORAMA CATALOGUES, 170 Madison Street, Chicago, HI. x886. MISSIONARY RIDGE Is the initial panorama painted in William Wehner's great panorama studio, in jMihvaukee, Wis., a structure erected expressly for panorama and diorama painting, which is as substantial as it is perfectly equipped, with e^•ery appliance to promote the comfort of both artists and models. Veteran soldiers of both North and South have contributed to the col- lection of uniforms and accoutrements of every description, which are con- stantly in use to study and paint from. An experienced ex-officer of engineers, Captain Wm. Arms, supervises every mechanical detail, and is i^esponsible for all that pertains to his department. The artists in charge of the work of the studio are men of note and ex- cellence in their profession, who were selected by Mr. Wehner after long and careful consideration of the best panoramas painted for exhibition in Europe. These principals are Professors August Lohr, of Munich, and F. W. Heine of Dresden. Each being eminent in his specialty as the follow- ing brief accounts will show. Professor Lohr is to-day in the prinie of life, a man of fine physique, and genial disposition. His pei'sohal" qualities attract and bind his immed- iate assistants to him. By birth an Ausfri'an^fhis native place was Hallein, near Salzburg. In his art education a " Munich man" he possesses great pow'er and breadth of color, while in the tender treatment of sky and dis- tance there is a reflex of his thoughtful mind. Mr. Lohr has painted the landscape of several panoramas ranked as the most important in Evn'ope. Among these are the battles of Weissenberg, St. Privat, Mars La Tour, and Sedan. His present work bears full evidence of his conspicuous ability. In every way his equal, is his co-worker and long-time friend. Professor F. W. Heine, the battle painter, upon whom the important work of com- position and the labor attending the same devolves. While both these gentlemen work in concert, each is independent of the other, a fact which neither seems to be aware of. Professor Heine was born at Leipsic, a student of the academies of Leipsic and Weimar. His campaign life began with the Prussian army in the Austrian war of 1866, during which his personal courage and ability as an artist attracted marked attention. Throughout the Franco-Prussian war Professor Heine prosecuted his studies, braving danger to be present with his sketch book in the important battles of that war. He w^itnessed the siege of Paris and the coronation of the Emperor William at Versailles. His spacious studio in Dresden is rich in the studies thus obtained, and these, together with arms, uniforms and military equipments of every description, gives to the place the semblance of an armory. His colossial painting of the "Triumphant entry of King Albert into Dresden at the head of his troops," painted on order, adorns the council chamber of the city hall of that city. He painted four mammoth battle- pieces for the Duke of Brunswick, representing the heroic deeds of the three arms of the Brunswick troops in the war with France. His water- , BATTLES OF CH ATTANOOCi A. color studies of armv life in peace and in war, sketched in the barracks and on the |5arade j^rouiid, are known tu all Munich and Dresden collectors. The corjjs of assistants chosen by Messrs. Lohr and Heine comprise- amonj; others Bernard Schneider and Wilhelni Schroter, landscape artists from Dusseldorf, Ciilhert Richter, the well known animal painter of Dresden, Hermann Michalowsky and Franz Rohnbeck, fi<(ure painters of Berlin, and Th. lireitwiser, known in Vienna as a prominent battle painter. This incomplete list will serve to show the hiojh rank of the artists. MISSIONARY' RIDGE, was selected from many subjects for panoramas, after very careful consider- ation on the part of its present owners. It was known to be a theme of un- usual difficulty, owing^ to the vast extent of country within the range of vision, but this fact was urged as an advantage possessed by no other battle field. To be successful the exceptional grandeur of the scenery required masterly treatment and the conflict to be depicted would necessitate the intro- duction of t/iousa)ids of carefully delineated combatants where hundreds are made to suffice in similar works. These are but few of the difficulties to be met and overcome. \\MHiam \\'ehner, who was fully conversant with the facts, met the stockholders and signed a contract which distinctly specified that "The Panorama of Mission- ary Ridge" should be better in every way than the battle of Gettysburg and the Siege of Paris combined, or it need not be taken from his Milwaukee studio. As an expression of belief on the part of the stockholders that this contract was filled, the following resolutions \\\\\ be interesting: Chicago, January ::4th, 1886. An informal meeting of the Board of Directors of the American Panorama Co. was- this day held on special train from Milwaukee to Chicago. After viewing the painting of Missionary Ridge, it was moved by F. A. Bragg, and seconded by Geo. R. Jenkins, that it is the opinion of this Board that the painting fills the requirements of the contract, and that it be accepted, subjected to ratification at a regular meeting of the Board. Carried unanimously. Moved by F. A. Bragg, and seconded by \V. H. Hogan, that the thanks of the American Panorama Co. be extended to the Military Men, Members of the Press, and other guests for their attendance on the trip to Milwaukee, to view the painting of Missionary Ridge, and the appreciative criticisims expressed regarding the picture. Carried unanimously. The meeting then adjourned. R. L. WEBSTER, Sec'y. Resolutions adopted by the Cpmmitiee of Military Men, Representatives of the Chicago Daily Press and others, after viewing the painting of Missionary Ridge : Whereas: The Directors of the American Panorama Co. saw fit in their generous heartedness to invite representatives of each of the Chicago daily newspapers, militarv men, artists, and other guests, to accompany them on an excursion to Milwaukee to visit the studo of Wm. Wehner, and view the painting representing the battle of Missionary Ridge just completed and to be permanently exhibited in Chicago, Resolved, That the Press of Chicago through the representatives, and military men, artists, and other guests, who accepted that invitation, hereby extend its hearty thanks for the royal entertainment of its members. BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. Resolved Further, that the picture on exhibition, as to design and execution, more especially in its representation of the scenery of the locality is one of the greatest paint- ings in our opinion ever put upon canvas, and that its spirited representation of the historic assault and capture of the ridge is evidence of the great progress scenic art is making in this country, The manner in which this \vork \vas prosecuted is so interesting and characteristic that a succinct narrative of it will not fail to be read with satis- faction by thousands who view the results. Mr. Lohr selected the artist, Schneider, to proceed with him to Chatta- nooga to study and paint prominent points in the landscape. Mr. Wehner in company with Professor Heine started in quest of his friend, Theo. R. Da\is, known to army men and others as artist correspondent of Harper's Weekly throughout the war. In Mr. Davis' unique studio at Asbvny Park, N. J., the problem was carefully considered, maps, sketches, photo- graphs, and note books w^ere consulted and a promise obtained that when pressing orders w^ere disposed of, he w^ould journey to Chattanooga via Washington, and together with Professors Heine and Lohr would make a most exhaustive reconnoissance not only of the battle-fields, but of the his- toric ground stretching for miles in every direction. In this preliminary work no pains were spared and no needed expense was questioned. Owing to the fact, that most of the old army roads ^vel"e obliterated, and in many instances the earth ^vorks and old land marks were destroyed, that forests had changed places with fields and fields with forests. The scene was changed. Chattanooga was no longer a town but a thriving city, with Look-Out, Missionary and Waldron's Ridges assum- ing suburban character. Had this reconnoissance been made without very full and reliable data antedating twenty years, the result w^ould have heen questionable. The view from Orchard Knob was no longer that obtained on the November battle davs by Generals Grant, Thomas, and others. Shrubs had gro\vn to trees, to over top which a substantial look-out was erected from which to studv and sketch the scene, not of to-day, but to recover and secure topographical features as they existed twenty years before. This outlook with its picturesque surrounding and bough topped shelter became for the nonce the studio to which ex-ofhcers of all armies were welcomed. Colored citizens — now land owners — the "contraband" Sams, Charlies and Toms of officers and valued friends long since marked missing on the rolls, came in quest of answers to timid interrogations, made with mingled ex- pression of fear and hope. The preliminary work done, the composition was made by Professor Heine. The panorama as finished presents a scene exhibiting the skill of Professors Lohr and Heine and their assistants, who have ever been ready to profit by the suggestion and council of veteran officers and soldiers, and of their friend THEO. R. DAVIS. CHATTANOOGA. A description of the scenes and incidents depicted in tiiis Panorama would be incomplete, probably unsatisfactory, without a brief sketch of the locality, and a sullicient outline to assist the comprehension of moyements which led up to the situation of armies and llie (.iilminatini^ battles of November, 1S63. Protestant missionaries were here laboring among the Creek and Cherokee tribes in 1817, the Rev. Mr. Kinsbury being the pioneer. He was shortly joined by his co-workers, Hall and Williams, and the two missionary stations, Brainard and Elliott, were established. The name Mission jVIills, now Bird's Mill, near which a marble shaft marks the last resting place of Dr. Worcester, Secretary of the Domestic Missions, needs no interpretation. The origin of Missionary Ridge is equally plain. Soldiers of the Union Army abbreviate the name to Mission, ex-Con- federates refer to it as Missionary Ridge. The name Chattanooga is de- rived from two Indian words, Chatta, place of, Ooga^ rocks. It is now nearly fifty years since the Government decree to remove the Indians from this vicinity was enforced. How, may be inferred by the statement sub- sequently made, that more than five thousand aged persons and children per- ished by the way. Those Indians who clung to their old homes were forced out by soldiers, and whites who befriended them were punished by law for their crime. It is said than John Howard Payne was among those who suffered. Chattanooga, then Ross Landing, grew from a settlement to a village. In 1S61 it was a town of considerable population, evidencing enterprise, and a point towards which the attention of commanding officers of both the Union and Confederate armies was early directed. The vicinity of Chattanooga was reached by Union troops but no occupation was effected until September, 1863, when General Rosecrans skillfully manoeuvered General Bragg's forces out of the town and its immediate vicinity. Con- cerning this General Boynton writes vividly in an admirable article pub- lished in the National 7^ribiine. After referring to the difficulties of transportation which beset the accumulation of food and ammunition sufficient for advance, plans for which General Rosecrans had already matured. General Boynton men- tions with some comment General Halleck's imperative orders telegraphed persistently from Washington. " General Rosecrans pushed his preparations, and as he could not ob- tain forage for the animals, or transport it in quantities, he waited till the corn had ripened, and when it had, having in the meantime accumulated 25 days' rations and a liberal supply of ammunition, lie gave orders for the advance." "By a brilliant feint, extending through the mountains north of Chatta- nooga toward Buckner's forces in East Tennessee, the appearance of four BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. brigades opposite the city, on tlie line from Kingston above to the mouth of Lookout Valley below, and of a division in the .Sequatchie Valley east of the first range of the Cumberlands, he had wholly deceived Bragg as to the movement, and the entire army effected a crossing in the vicinity of Bridgeport \vithout special opposition. "The facts of the crossing show that Rosecrans had moved at the earliest possible moment. He did not even take time to bring up sufficient bridges. Brannan's division crossed at the mouth of Battle Creek on rafts and in canoes which the men cut out for themselves. In fact, those who could swim well did not wait either for rafts or canoes, but put their guns and clothing on a few fence rails and pushed these before them over the wide stream. The artilleiy was ferried on a single pontoon, which would not carry a piece and its limber at the same time. Another division was taken over at Bridgeport in small boats. The crossings began on the 38th of August, the river being at the points selected 1,200 feet at the narrow- est and 2,700 feet at the widest point. In spite of the very limited bridge facilities for any portion of the troops, and the fact that some divisions were without any, at the end of seven days the army was on the south bank, ready for its mountain marches." " Once across, the columns moved with expedition. They had before them, and between them and the valleys that led from the south into Chatta- nooga, the precipitous Sand Mountains and Lookout ranges. These were of the general height of the Cumberland Mountains, very steep, with rock pallisades along the summits. The trails which crossed them were narrow and exceedingly difficult for teams, in fact impassible for loaded trains, ex- cept where, as in an army, there is unlimited command of horse and man power. The teams were doubled both for baggage wagons and artil- lery, and in addition, at the steepest points, ropes at which entire com- panies pulled were also attached. An idea of the difficulties of ascend- ing these mountains will be gained by a knowledge of the fact that it re- quired from sundown to sunrise for the artillery and moderate train of a single brigade thus assisted to reach the summit of the first range. But by utilizing every trail, and working day and night, at the end of the fourth day, namely, on September 8, the whole army had crossed Sand Mountains and descended into Lookout Valley, and the heads of its columns had gained the summit of Lookout at two points, one 26 and the other 43 miles south of the river, from which positions they looked down on Bragg's communica- tions. Crittenden's corps had moved down the valley toward the north point of Lookout, where it occupied the position of an observing force near Chattanooga." When General Bragg found the Union Army on the south bank of the river threatening his supplies he evacuated Chattanooga, withdrawing to Lafayette, 25 miles southeast to await reinforcements from Mississippi, and the arrival of Longstreet from Virginia. " On the 9th of September Crittenden's division passed around the point of the mountain into Chattanooga. It was this appearance of one division in the city which gave rise to the report, still generally believed, that the Army of the Cumberland had occupied Chattanooga without a ' battle, had moved thence to attack Bragg, had been overwhelmed at Chick- amauga and driven back again in confused and disastrous retreat to Chatta- nooga. But Crittenden only left a brigade in the city, and passed through, following Bragg's retreat for purposes of observation and to join the rest of 8 BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. the arniv then emcrginj^ from the j^asses over Lookout into the valley far south of Chattaiu)o- BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. of those engaged. The camjDaign was a success for Rosecrans. The battle was the full revelation of Thomas — the most perfect military character of Union history — and the matchless fighting along his lines glorified the private soldiers who held them steady and saved an armv. Much of the ground described above is within the scope of the pan- orama; but, being too distant for distinct portrayal, the description is made as complete as space will admit. General Cist states, "that General Rose- crans had on the field 55,000 effective men, opposed to Bragg's 70,000 troops in line, and that Rosecrans' losses aggregated 1,687 killed, 9,394 wounded, 5,255 missing, total 16,336. Bragg's losses, in part estimated, were 2,673 killed, 16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A full report of rebel losses was never made." Chattanooga was converted into a fortress, the outer lines of which ex- tended from the bluffs on the river above to the banks of the river below the town, which was encircled and covered from all land approach. These \vorks, a little more than three miles in extent, were strengthened where- ever possible by special fortifications. Forts Wood and Neglev, Batteries Sheridan, Rosseau, Cheatham, were among these within this line. Other works were built, all finally covered by the fort on Cameron Hill. To an assault, Chattanooga was practicably impregnable. The question of forage and rations was the problem to be solved. General Bragg with his army occupied Alissionary Ridge, from which to Lookout Mountain a strong line of rifle-pits crossed Chattanooga Valley. Lookout, a fortress in itself, had been strengthened by rifle-pits. The only possible route for supplies was forty miles long, across mountain ranges, over roads which were such in name alone. Day by day the starved battery horses fell dead at the picket ropes, and rigid economy of food was every where practiced. Mat- ters grew more and more desperate. The I'oad over Waldron's Ridge w^as fringed with dead mules. Soldiers had vmsoldered their canteens, and with nails improvised graters, with which to provide meal when ears' of corn could be obtained. The bark of young cottonwood trees sustained such mules as had perforce acquired an inclination for it. These were starva- tion times in Chattanooga, and to add to the hardship, the weather \vas un- usually severe for that region, and fuel difiicult to obtain. With the situation as outlined, it would seem impossible that the morale of the army should be what it was. The troops \vere cheerful, and confident as to the future. The relief of General Rosecrans occasioned unquestionable regret, but the confidence of the Army in General Thomas was unbounded. The transportation of General Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac to Bridgeport, was under the personal supervision of Col. Thomas A. Scott, with such Lieutenants as Frank Thomson as aids. General Grant reached Chattanooga on the night of October 23. Plans alreadv in progress to open and control the navigation of the Tennessee River were examined and ordered executed imder the super- vision of General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. Under cover of darkness fifteen hundred gallant men of Hazen's brigade floated from Chattanooga down the Tennessee to Brown's Ferry. The enemy's pickets and batteries were passed without discoverv, and at dawn on October 27, the lodgement at Brown's Ferr}' Was complete, being held by Hazen's and Turchin's brigades, protected by ample fortifi- BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA, cations. The same afternoon I Iooker''s advance occiii;)iecl Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley, and at nij^ht repelled a vigorous attack made by I^ing- strcet's men who were driven back to their camps at Lookout, after a short but determined en<2^a<2^ement. Hooker's occupation of Lookout Valley settletl the cjuestion of suj)plies, and Chattanooj^a was presently filled with stores of food and ammunition. Heavy ordnance replaced field batteries in the fortifications, and much needed clothin<^ was provided for the soldiers. For the safetv of Burnside's position at Knoxville there was apj^re- hension which became ti^rave from the fact that Lonj^street's command, re- inforced by troops from Bragg's immediate army, was marching toward Last Tennessee. liut Sherman was close at hand. After a march of .joo miles, his lead- ing division reached Brown's Ferry November i8. " Two of his divisions crossed and moved along concealed roads, through the woods and behind the hills to a point on the north bank of the river eight miles above the town, near the mouth of the North Chicka- mauga and opposite Bragg's position on the northern extremity of Mission- ary Ridge. Here thev were cainped out of sight. The breaking of the bridge at Brown's prevented the crossing of the third division. On the 22nd of November the Eleventh Corps, under Howard, composed of Schurz's and Stein wehr's divisions, was brought over the bridge from Hooker's position, marched into the town, and given prominent position in the line to convey the impression to the enemy watching from theheights that the town was being reinforced by the troops passing on the bridge, and thus direct attention from Sherman's movements, and the preparations for crossing at the North Chickamauga. "The first contest opened on the Union side with what the enemy mis- took for a grand review, but which suddenly and unexpectedly developed into a battle worthy of the initial move in the series to follow. In front of Fort Wood and its adjacent batteries located in the eastern limits of the city, and looking out over the plain towards Missionary Ridge, the ground at first descends rapidly, and then rolls gently away, furnishing abundant space for a great review. About noon of November 23, this portion of the plain and the open country to the right and left of it began, under orders from General Thomas, to fill with troops. First, Wood's division moved out ajid deployed. Sheridan followed and took position farther to the right and slightly to the rear. Howard's corps, massed by divisions and brigades, marched with the precision of a review into place in rear of Wood and vShcridan, liaird moved out of the works to the right of the latter, and formed in echelon in his rear, while Johnston's division stood to arms in the intrcnchments in rear of the centre. For a brief time, while the various commanders were receiving their orders, this grand pageant of twenty thousand men, ready for a spring on the enemy's advanced line, stood motionless as if for review. The rebel pickets leaned lazily on their guns, enjoying the spectacle. Groups of Confederates could be seen on Lookout, on Orchard Knob, and along the ridge, watching the display. Even the for- ward movement of the leading deployed divisions did not dispel the illusion until the Ibiion picket-line advanced, firing. Wood, followed by an army on his Hanks and in rear, moved rapidly on Orchard Knob, a mile and a ([uavtcr to the front, sweeping away pickets and reserves, and carrying the Knob and hill on the right. Sheridan swiftly moved upon and grasped the i^ositions still farther to the right. Howard's two divisions deployed to the left, and after sharp fighting occupied the rebel line in his front. Before BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. night the vast drill ground, over which an army under guise of a review had moved to the attack with the precision of parade, had been extended until the entire advanced line of the enemy, two miles in length, was in the possession of these very practical columns of review. Seldom had troops moved under more inspiring circumstances. On the Union side. Grant and Thomas, v^^ith crowds of staff officers, the population of a city, and thousands of their comrades, looked down on them from the town. From the enemy's line a large part of the Confederate army on its many heights was watching them. The heavy guns from the forts covering the move- ment called universal attention to their imposing advance and gave the added inspiration of a tremendous cannonade. Thus incited, the quiet but magnificent pageant developed into the swift advance and speedy victory of an army. The captiu"ed line afforded distinct views of the rebel works along the foot of the Ridge beyond, and the exact character of the ground before them, and formed an excellent base for the final assault which two days later closed the battle and gave victory to the Union arms. While this movement was in progress Sherman w^as laboring hard to concentrate his forces for crossing the river, but the bridge at the ferry breaking again, while one of his divisions was still on the south bank, the plan of battle was changed for the second time, and Hooker w^as ordered to move at daylight and attack Lookout. For this he had Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, the delayed division of Sherman's column, under Oster- haus, and two brigades of Cruft's division of the Fourth Corps; troops which thus first met each other while advancing in actual battle. It was a busy night on both sides. Believing that an assault on Look- out was the least likely of all, and that the next blow would fall on his right, Bragg during the night withdrew an entire division from the mount- ain to strengthen the Ridge. All night long the rebel signal torches were waving in the sight of both armies from all the heights, busily writing their mysterious characters of fire against the sky. Hooker, in Lookout Valley, was preparing his forces to move at daylight, against the craggy heights above him. At midnight, far away on the other flank, one hundred and sixteen boats, carrying Giles A. Smith's brigade of Sherman's men, floated silently out of the mouth of the North Chickamauga, and shot rapidly to the south bank of the Tennessee. The enemy's pickets were surprised, and a landing made near the mouth ot South Chickamauga Creek without serious opposition. At daylight two divisions were over, a strong bridge-head had been constructed, the bridge itself w^as well advanced, and Sherman's forces stood facing the strongly fortifled right flank of the Confederate position. Wood and Sheridan used the night for strengthening their lines, and placing batteries on the hills they had captured. As the light gre%v strong enough to reveal positions, the enemy's attention was mainly fixed on Sherman's threatening position. Bragg's expectation of an attack on his right seemed about to be realized, as three divisions moved forward and slowly deployed a little more than a mile away. But the real mysteries of this second day were veiled by the fogs on Lookout. Under that impenetrable cui'tain Hooker was arranging his lines for an assault which a few hours later was to present to the hosts of both armies on the plains and lesser ridges below, a drama of battle played on such lofty summits, and so wrapped in cloud-effects of fog, as to seem more like a contest raging in the skies, than one borne upward on the solid mountain. A brief preliminary sketch of the position somewhat more in detail than the general view already presented, is needed to fix the features of the BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. wonderful scene in mind. Advancinj:^ towaid Chattanooga from the south alonj^ the crest of Lookout Mountain, the road traverses a gently broken table-land of very considerable width, terminated on each side by high precipices. For two miles before reaching the point of the mountain which looks down upon the citv, and is fourteen hundred feet above it, this table- land narrows to a width of half a mile, and the precipices on either side are about one hundred feet in height. From the base of those sheer rocky walls, the mountain slopes on the right to Chattanooga Creek, on the left to Lookout Creek, and directly under the point, downward to the Tennessee. These slopes of the mountain are something over a mile in extent, and the streams both in the eastern and the western valley require bridges. Ex- cept on the portions facing the town, which had been partially cleared for farming, the ground was everywhere crossed with ledges of rock, strewn with detached masses from the precipices above, tangled with fallen timber, and studded with sufficient forest to conceal defensive works and forces. The onlv roa'd to the summit led up from Chattanooga Valley from a point within the Confederate lines. These apparentlv impracticable slopes had been heavilv fortified against approach from Hooker's position, and, after the withdrawal the night before of one division, were still held bv six brigades, which, counting the immense strength of position and works, al- most equalled as many divisions for offensive purposes. At 8 o'clock in the morning of the 24th, Geary crossed Lookout Creek, about two miles up the valley, with his own division and Whit- taker's brigade of the Fourth corps, and under cover of the fog marched directly up the western slope of the mountain till his right rested at the foot of the palisades, his left reaching the base of the mountain below. Mean- time a brigade had forced the passage of the creek a half ajnile above the rebel intrenchments, and planted artillery to enfilade one portion of their line. Guns had also been dragged to the tops of several high hills in the valley, while batteries were brought close to the enemy's lines at a bridge near the mouth of the creek, where the division of Osterhaus confronted the rebel works. A section of twenty-pounder Parrotts was hauled to an elevation that would enable them to reach the camps on the upper slopes, and the heavy casemated guns of Brannan, on Moccasin Point, across the river, were made ready to open on the front of the mountain. All these .preparations to strike had progressed under cover of the night and the morning fog, and had only provoked brisk picket-firing, which was inaud- ible in the main Union lines. While the sounds of general movement rose through the fog, its character could not be ascertained bv the enemv above till the blows began to fall; and the distance to Bragg's headquarters on Missionarv Ridge and the impossibilitv of signalling prevented anv notification of the great stir in Lookout Valley reaching him, and so he continued to give chief attention to Sherman's demonstration. At eleven o'clock, Geary's line, sweeping the slope from palisades to base, reached the forces posted with the enfilading artillery. Here, while the Union lines were being re-arranged and reinforced for their great swing against the rebel works and around the point of the mountain, nature's Viist curtain of fog began to rise upon the opening scenes of the great drama. Suddenly the Union batteries opened on the mountain, calling the enemy's attention away from Sherman's threatening movements, and announcing unexpected battle around the crags of Lookout. Except where Sherman was advancing, silence fell along the many miles of opposing lines, from every part of which the Confederate works on the front of the BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA, 13 mountain covild be seen. From the valley beyond these, and so behind the mountain, came the sound ot the volleys, of Geary's advance. More than a hundred thousand spectators stood motionless, listening intently, with gaze fixed on the points where the storm of battle, roaring down the west- ern valley, might be expected to burst over the front of the mountain. Just befoi-e the contending lines came into view the fog lifted still higher, and a scene such as battle-story cannot surpass was clearly revealed. Its appear- ance was announced by the crashing shot of many guns and the cheers of charging infantry, which drove the Confederates from their lower works, and forced them back to their main lines. The Union line could be plainly seen in its advance, its flags dotting the front at intervals, from the precipices above to the river bluff below. The heavy batteries on Moccasin Point continually burst their shells in front of this line; the rebel artillery flamed in its very face, and volley after volley rained on its advancing, but never-halting veterans. As the sharp contest for the rebel line in the open space went on, the Union forces in the plain below cheered, seemingly as soldiers never could have cheered before, and all the bands along that front of many miles played on and on, while Hooker's lines, ten thousand strong, swept around the mountain, pushing the enemy from its front, and forcing him southward along its eastern slopes. At two o'clock the heavy fight- ing was done, and the lower stronghold of the mountain had been wressed from the enemv. Carlin's brigade, from Chattanooga, marched with supplies of ammunition up the mountain to Hooker's right, under the pal- isades, and did good service at the close of the day. All night the flash of rifles from the outposts shone through the fog; and when morning broke it had not yet been determined whether the enemy had withdrawn from his unassailable position on the top of the mountain. The day dawned clear. All eyes in the Union bivouacs were strained towards the summit. Gradually it grew purple with the strengthening light; and just as the sun broke over it a squad of men walked out on the rock overhanging the precipice at the point of the mountain, and, in the view of the watching and breathless thousands, unfurled the Stars and Stripes. Once more cheers and music swept along the plain, and an army of veterans looked long- through its tears at this mute announcement of a second victory. Then came the closing scene and fitting culmination of the three days' pageant. While Hooker's assault on Lookout was at its height, Sherman moved unmolested, and at 4 p. m. had apparently carried the northern ex- tremity of Missionary Ridge. The mystery of this failure to oppose him was explained by the discovery that the elevations he had occupied were not a part of the continuous ridge, but that Bragg's strongly fortified flank rested on the next hills to the south. At this point the heavy fighting of the closing day began in Sherman's effort to carry the rebel right. The cheering of the flag displayed on Lookout, at sunrise on the 25th, had scarcely died away before Sherman moved to the attack, and the sounds of action turned universal attention away from the mountain to the Union left. Hooker also moved at daylight, through Chattanooga Valley, driving before him the rear-guard of the column retreating from Lookout. On reaching Rossville, after sharp fighting, he ascended Missionary Ridge, and forming his lines across it, threatened Bragg's left. He had, however, been much delayed by the necessity of bridging Chattanooga Creek, and Sher- man on the right had been furiously fighting many hours before Hooker gained position. The entire rebel army was now concentrated upon ,4 BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. Missionary Ridj^c, covcrinji^ its crest for about six miles. Four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland faced three miles of this position, occupyinj^ the works which had been carried in the tirst day's advance. Howard's corps of the same army, still farther to the left, confronted the Ridge to a point within a mile of Sherman. During the forenoon Confederate troops could be plainh' seen moving along the summit, strengthening their centre, and massing heavily against Sherman. The plan of battle made .Sherman's advance the guiding movement. His centre was to carry the northern extremity of the Ridge, while his wings swept its western and eastern slopes. The Army of the Cuiyibcr- land, closing to the left, was to join Sherman's right, and moving southerly with his line, clear the Valley to the base of the Ridge, and aid in the flank attack on the lower line of works. The battle opened early by three brigades of Sherman's troops descend- ing the hills thev had occupied the day before, which had at first been sup- posed to be a part of the continuous Ridge, and assaulting the works of Bragg's right on the next heights beyond. These rested not only across the Ridge, but extended along lateral spurs, which gave abundant room for strong works, and the operations of a heavy defending force. The moment Sherman's leading brigade moved out of the cover of woods on the hills, and began to descend into the gorge separating them from the enemy, they were exposed to a murderous fire; but after reaching the valley they rushed upward to the attack, and seized and held a spur within a hundred yards of the rebel works. From this point assault followed assault, the Union line being constantly swept back by the concentrated fire of the Confederate lines, delivered almost in their faces. Howard's corps was sent to Sherman from Thomas' left as early as ten o'clock, and six divisions were then en- gaged in the attempt to capture the extremity of the Ridge. Still, every front assault though made on all parts of the line with the utmost courage, was hurled back, and the same fate met the flank attacks on the eastern and western slopes. The terrible pendulum swings of Sherman's troops against the heights — more terrible because seemingly fruitless — were plainly seen from Orchard Knob, where Grant, Thomas, and Sheridan stood watching the contest hour after hour, with an intensit}^ of interest and a growing impatience which were inseparable from the situation. The sun was nearing the west- ern ranges. Hooker's guns had not been heard on the right, and Sherman was unable with all his force to make further impression on the left. Baird was hurried to his aid. He then had seven divisions, or over half the Union army, but there being no room for Baird to operate, he returned to the centre, and had just formed again on the left of the Army of the Cumberland, when the grand spectacular movement began which closed the fight. It came from a sudden change in the plan of battle, demanded by the exigencies of the field. Thomas was ordered to move directly against the Ridge. It was three o'clock in the afternoon when he received the order to advance. Four of his divisions, with a front of about two miles and a half, stood facing the Ridge, at a distance of a mile and a quarter from its base. Johnson held the right, Sheridan and Wood the centre, and Baird the left. The ground between them and the Ridge was a plain, broken with shallow streams, and thinly covered with patches of thicket and forest. The rebel works along the foot of the hills could be plainly seen, the BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. 15 ground before them having been well cleared to give effective play to the guns. Half way up the slope was a second line, while the crest was strengthened with continuous tield-works carrving fifty guns, and defended along the line of Thomas' assault by four veteran divisions. At half past three o'clock, at a signal of six gims from Orchard Knob, twenty thousand men, in four lines, swept forward over the plain, deploy- ing somewhat as they advanced, so as to cover three miles of the Ridge. Fifty guns rained shot and shell upon them as they started, and sprinkled them with deadly sleet over all the way. There were many dead and wounded, but no stragglers, as those magnificent waves of battle rolled on. In fifteen minutes they were within range of the galling infantry fire from the lower line of works; in fifteen more they had swept over them along their entire front, and the rebel troops not captured were in full retreat towards their second line above. The orders for the movement contem- plated a halt in the first line of works for slight rest, and a re-forming of lines for forward movement; but impatient under the galling fire from above, elated by success, anxious and determined to plav their full part in the day's pageant, the front line scarcely halted at the lower works, but springing over and out of them, began to climb the rough face of the Ridge. It was five hundred yards to the summit. The general elevation \^^as five hundi-ed feet, and from a point a short distance within the works at the base, the slope became precipitous. It was broken by ravines, tangled with fallen timber, strewn ^vith masses of rock, and covered at jDoints with loose stone from the ledges on the crest. Spurs projected from the face of the Ridge at intervals, serving for natural bastions from which field artillery and riflemen swept the intervening curtains of the slope with an enfilading fire. But nothing less than the palisades of Lookout could have stopped that Army of the Cumberland, though Bragg and his thousands above still deemed their position impregnable. All heights were fringed with spec- tators of that wonderful assault. The guns in the Union works which had covered the first advance were necessarily silent. The sun shone clear on the slopes, and the advancing flags and glittering bayonets marked the rush of the swift ascent. Under the fire of sharpshooters, color-bearers fell at every point of the line, only to be relieved by other hands eagerly bearing the colors forward. This deadly fire gradually drew each regiment towards its flags, and soon, far as the eye could reach along the slope, the line was transformed into countless wedge-shaped masses, with a flag at the point of each, cleaving their way upward, following the headlong push of the guards bearing the colors. The rebels that had been hurled back from the lower lines were soon driven out of the second parallel, and thence pursued so closely to the svnnmit, that retreating Confederate and the Union flags poured over the whole extended line of works together. There was sharp hand-to-hand fighting at points, after the crest was gained, and a battle of much spirit on the left, where columns of the enemy, hurrying from Sher- man's front, undertook, but without success, to drive Baird back. Bragg and Breckinridge in person barely escaped Sheridan's troops when they crowned the summit. Forty guns and several thousand prisoners were taken in the works. From the first it had been an advance almost wholly without firing. Each successive line of works and the summit were carried with the bavonet. In an hour from the sounding of the signal guns, Bragg had been swept from these dominating positions of a great natural fortress, i6 BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. strcnj^thciicd by every eii>^inecrinY.Y:,Lieutenant-General. There is discrepancy in the report of Lieutenant-General Hardee. General Grant's article on Chattanooga in The Century Magazine states that " In this battle the Union Army numbered in round figures about sixty thousand men ; we lost a little over seven hundred killed, and four thousand eight hundred and fifty wounded and missing. The rebel loss was much greater in the aggregate, as we captured and sent North to be rationed there over six thousand one hundred prisonei's. Forty pieces of 22 BATTLES OF CH ATTAN( )()(;. \. arlilkTv, over seven tlidiisaiicl stand of small arms, and many caissons, artillery wagons, and baggage wagons fell into our hanils. The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at three Innidred and sixtv-one; but as he reported his missing at foiu" thousand one-hun- dred and fortv-six, while we held over six thousand of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds, if not thousands, who deserted, but little reliance can be placed in this repoit." The ollicial report of Sle\enson's and Stewart's divisions, for the 24th and jqth of November, are as follows: Ritiirn of CcisiitilHits in Strt'CHSon^s Division, H,'(>inii report that the orijfinal plan of operations was somewhat modified, to meet and take the best advantage of emergencies, which necessitated material modilications of that plan. It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful re- sults. Tiie alacritv and intelligence disjilayed bv olHcers in executing their orders, the enthusiasm and spirit displaved bv the men who did the work, cannot be too highly ap- preciated bv the nation, for the defence of which they have on so many other memorable occasions nobly and ]>atriotically exposed their lives in battle. IIoward's"(ii) corps having joined Sherman on the 24th, his operations from that date will be included in Sherman's report. Also those of Brigadier General J. C. Davis, second division 14th corps, who reported to .Sherman for duty on the 2ist. I am General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEORGE H. THOMAS, Major-Gcncral U. S. V. Commanding. Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. True copy: ' S. C. KELLOGG, Brevet-Major and Aide-dc-Camp. Headquarters Chief of Artillery, D. C, Chattanooga, Tenn., Deceinber 5, 1863. General : I have the honor to submit, for the information of the major-general com- manding the departinent, the following report of the operations of the artillery in my charge during the recent battle of Chattanooga, November 23, 24, and 25 : With considerable difficulty owing to the deficiency in transportation, I succeeded in getting sixteen (16) pieces of heavy ordnance into position on the line of works, in addition to the two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts already in Fort Wood, by the 22d Novem- ber — four (4) 4>4-inch Rodman guns, with the two (2) 30-pounder Parrotts, being in F'ort Wood on the extreme left; four (4) 20-pounder Parrotts in P'ort Cheatham, and four (4) 4^ -inch Rodman guns in Battery Rousseau, 0:1 the centre, and four (4) 20-pounder Parrotts in Fort Sheridan, on the right. These forts occupied prominent positions on the line, the guns commanding the rebel intrenchments at the foot of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and sweeping the level ground in their front. In addition to the heavy guns on the line of intrenchments, by the night of the 23d I had two (2) 20 pounder Parrotts on Moccasin Point, a point on the north side of the river, commanding the approach to Lookout Mountain on its most northern extremity ; three (3) guns, with the tenth Indiana battery and the eighteenth Ohio battery, under Captain W. A. Naylor, (tenth Indiana battery,) subsequently did good service during Hooker's assault on Lookout Mountain, rendering it impracticable for the rebels to concentrate on the north side of the mountain to resist his attack. The tenth Indiana and eighteenth Ohio batteries had previously been stationed on tlijs point for some weeks, and had succeeded in cutting off, in a great measure, the enemy's communication with Lookout Mountain by the northern route. I had also seven (7) field batteries on the line, viz: C and M, first regiment Illinois volunteer artill- erv ; M, first regiment Missouri artillery; F and G, first Ohio volunteer artillery; sixth Ohio and seventh Indiana batteries, so arranged at the defensible points as to insure a safe retreat should the attacking line be repulsed. On the night of the 23d I had the following batteries placed in position on the north side of the river at four (4) several points, to cover the crossing of General Sherman's command and prevent a force moving to oppose him until he had taken up position and established connections with our left, viz: Company C, first regiment Ohio vohmteer. artillery. Captain (iary ; company B, first regiment Ohio vohmteer artillerv. Lieu- tenant Baldwin; company B, first regiment Ilinois volunteer artillerv, Captain Riunsey; company F, first regiment Illinois volunteer artillery. Captain Cheeney; company II, first regiment Illinois volunteer artiller\-, Lieutenant De Grass; com]>any I, fh"st regiment Illinois volunteer artillery. Lieutenant Burton; twentv-sixth Pennsylvania battery. Lieutenant McDowell; thirteenth New Lock batterv, Captain Wheeler; twelfth Wisconsin battery, Captain Zackerick ; Casswell's Illinois battery. Captain Casswell. These batteries were under the directions of Colonel James Barnett, first regiment Ohio volunteer artillery, commanding first division artillerv reserve, and Colonel Taylor, chief of artillery of General Sherman's command, and from their com- manding positions were well calculated to effect the purpose for which they were intended. BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. Even'thing could have been in position by the morning of the 20th, but the contem- plated attack having been postponed, it was unnecessary to make a final disposition of the guns until the night of the 22d. At about 1 2m. on the 23d instant I opened with the heavy guns from all points of the line on the rebel positions at the foot of Missionary' Ridge and the east side of Look- out Mountain with some effect, in many instances driving the enemy from their camps and line of works. At 3 p. m. on the 'following day I ordered a section of lo-pound Parrotts to be placed at the " Tannery," commanding the valley road and Chattanooga Creek, where it subsequently did good service. About I p. m. on the 23d, the infantry advanced under cover of the guns and car- ried the rebel rifle-pits situated about one and a half miles to our front. Such batteries as could be mounted were immediately thrown out on " Orchard Knoll," " Brush Knob," and such other elevations as the country afforded. With the assistance of General Sherman, who furnished me with horses for three (3) batteries, (the battery horses of the D. C. having either died or become so emaciated from starvation as to render but few of them fit for service,) I had succeeded in mount- ing seven (7) batteries; four (4,) however, were only brought into action. These did ex- cellent service during the attack of the 25th instant, as, being in easy range of the rebel intrenchments, they did considerable execution, and aided materially in forcing the enemy to abandon the works. On the 24th Sherman crossed the river and formed a junction with Howard near Citico Creek, the batteries on the north side of the river effectually preventing any masses of troops intercepting them. It was, however, found too hazardous to endeavor to enfilade the rebel line from these batteries, as was at first purposed, our troops being in such close proximity. During the 24th and the morning of the 25th the guns of Forts Wood and Cheat- ham opened on all bodies of troops observed to be concentrating or inoving on Mission- ary Ridge, distance 2>^ miles, soTnetimes with good effect. At about 2:30 p. m., on the 25th instant, the line made the advance that ultimately resulted in carrying the enemy's position ; the guns from the intrenchments continued to play on the rebel lines at the foot of the ridge until the proximity of our troops rendered such fire dangerous, when they turned their attention to the crest of Missionary Ridge, and made some excellent practice on the rebel troops inoving on that position. This engagement has proved beyond doubt the utter worthlessness of the projectile known as the Rodman projectile, furnished the 4^2 -inch Rodman guns, and unless other and better projectiles be obtained I consider that these guns will be little better than useless. There is a radical defect in the fuze of the shells furnished this department, which I believe to originate in the irregularity of their composition, rendering the explosion of the shell at the calculated time very uncertain. I have also remarked that the partitions in the fuzes are very thin, and liable to burst, then causing the explosion of the shell in a shorter period than the time for which the fuze was cut. \ In fact the entire practice with shell was very unsatisfactory, the shells either explod- ing too soon or not at all. The following guns, carriages, caissons, limbers, and ammunition were captured from the rebels during the engagement of the 24th and 25tli, and subsequent pursuit of the enemy: By General Davis's division at Chickamauga Station 2 24-pr. guns By General Geary's division on Lookout Mountain 2 field pieces By General Osterhaus's division on Missionary Ridge i " " By General Wood's division on Missionary Ridge 12 " " By General Sheridan's division on Missionary Ridge 6 " " By General Johnston's division at Graysville 4 " " By General Baird's division on Missionary Ridge i " " Claimed by Generals Baird and Wood 6 " " Claimed by Generals Wood and Sheridan 6 " " Total, (2 heavy guns, and 38 field pieces) 40 19 carriages for light 12-pounder guns. 4 carriages for lo-pounder Parrotts. 8 carriages for 6-pounder guns. I carriage for 3-inch gun. 3 carriages for 6-pounder Jaines' 3-80 bore. 3 carriages for 12-pounder howitzers. 38 carriages. 28 BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. 17 caissons for liijht 12-pounder {juns. 3 caissons for lo-poundcr Parrott's 3 caissons for 12-pounder liowitzers. 3 caissons for 6-pounder guns. 1 caisson for 3-inch f^un. 2 caisson for 3-80 James' rifle. 29 caissons. 13 limbers for Wght 12-poundcr guns. 4 limbers for 10-pounder Parrotts. 7 limbers for 6-pounder guns. I limber for 3-inch gun. 25 limbers. A good many parts of harness were also captured, but no complete sets. 805 rounds ammunition for 12-pounder guns. 283 rounds ammunition for 12-pounder howitzers. 332 rounds ammvmition for 6-poiuider gun. 2i6 rounds ammunition for lo-pounder Parrott. 57 rounds ammunition for 3-inch gun. 151 rounds ammunition for 3-80 James rifle. 1,844 rounds. This is all that has come in up to the present time. I am indebted to Major J. Mendenhall, assistant chief of artillery, for valuable assistance previous to and during the three days battle. J. M. BRANNAN, Major-General and Chief of Artillery, D. C. Brigadier-General Wm. D. Whipple, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Cumberland. Report of Major-General Gordon Granger. COMMANDING 4th ARMY CORPS. Headquarters 4th Army Corps, Loudon, East Tenn., February 11, 1864, General: I have the honor to forward to the major-general commanding the de- partment of the Cumberland, the following report of the operations of the 4th army corps in the recent battles of Chattanooga. For particular and detailed accounts of the facts mentioned therein I refer to the official reports of division, brigade and regimental commanders, herewith forwarded. On the 1 8th of November last I received instructions from Major-General Thomas directing me to hold the two divisions of my command, then at Chattanooga, in readi- ness to join in an attack about to be made upon the enemy in our front. In this attack I was to co-operate directly with Major-General Slierman after he had crossed his com- mand from the north bank of the Tennessee river, immediately below the mouth of Chickamauga creek, and had reached the north end of Mission ridge. This attack was ordered to be made at daylight on the morning of November 21. I was, therefore, directed to bridge Citico creek, a deep, narrow stream that would separate my command from the position that was to be occupied by Major-General Sherman, working under cover of darkness on the night of the 20th, and to cross it with my two divisions before daylight the next morning, moving toward the nortli end of Missionaiv ridge, and marching so as to ;u-ri\e at tiiat jioint simultaneously with Major-General Sherman. It was designed that after having effected a juncture with these troops I should change the direction of my column, and move along the north-western side and base of Mission- ary ridge, taking the enemy in front and flank. This contemplated attack, however, was not made on the morning of the 21st, the orders having been coimtermanded on the 20th, when it was found that Major-General Sherman's column, which had been much delayed on the march from Bridgeport, Ala- bama, by the heavy rains and the bad roads, could not get up in time for it. On the night of November 12, acting under orders similar to those above mention- BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. 29 ed, I bridged Citico creek and placed my command in readiness to cross it, but did noth- ing further, as I received a note, after dark, from department headquarters informing me that as an accident liad happened to the bridge at Brown's ferry, Major-General Sher- man would be there detained, and that consequently immediate action was to be sus- pended. The disposition of the troops of this corps on the morning of November 23M'as follows: The second division, under Major-General Sheridan, and third division, under Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, were camped within our advanced line of rifle pits in front of Chattanooga. The right of Major-General Sheridan's division resting on the Rossville road, and the left joming General Wood's right, while the left of Gen- eral Wood's di\'ision rested on the right bank of the Tennessee river, northeast of the town. The first brigade of the first division was at Bridgeport, Alabama, and the second and third brigades of the same division, the second commanded by Brigadier-General Whitaker, and the third commanded by Colonel Grose, and both under the temporary command of Brigadier-General Cruft, were marching from Shellmound and Whiteside en route to join Major-General Hooker's command, on the south side of the Tennessee river, near Brown's ferrv. On the night of November 22 there were movements in the enemy's camp indicating that he was advised of our intentions, which, by reason of delavs and accidents, had be- come somewhat apparent, and that he was either withdrawing or concentrating his forces. His front, however, remained unchanged. At eleven o'clock on the morning of the next day, November 23, I received a dispatch, of which the following is a copy: " Headquarters Department of the Cumberland, " Chattanooga, Tenn., November 23, 1863. " The general commanding department directs that you throw one division of the 4th corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob (and hold a second division in sup- porting distance) to discover the position of the enemy, if he still remain in the vicinity of his old camp. Howard's and Baird's commands will be ready to co-operate if needed. "J. J. REYNOLDS, " Major-General Granger, " Major General and Chief of Staff. " Commanding 4th Army Corps. Orchard Knob is a rugged hill, rising one hundred feet above the Chattanooga val- ley, lying between Fort Wood, a work on our exterior line of defence, northeast of Chatt- anooga and Missionary Ridge, being distant from the former point one mile and a quarter, and about one mile from the ridge. The ascent of the knob is very steep, save on the side to the right looking south, where the ground gradually sloping from the summit makes a dip or gorge, and rises on the other side to nearly the same height as the knob. From this point running off in a south-western direction for over one-half of a mile, turning to the right is a rough rocky ridge, which is covered with a sparse growth of timber. y Along the crest of this ridge the enemy had made breastworks of logs and stone, and a line of rifle-pits. Along the base of Orchard Knob, on the side towards Chatt- anooga, was another line of rifle-pits which extended beyond the knob on our left, for more than a mile, following the curvature of Citico creek ; and yet, to the left of its termination, and on the other side of the creek, ran two additional and parallel lines. A heavy belt of timber, ranging from one-quarter to three-quarters of a mile in width, lay between our lines and Orchard Knob, covering the front of the knob and the line of the ridge, and serving the enemy as a mask for his position and movements. Between this timber and Chattanooga were open fields, some of which, being low and swampy, were difficult to cross with troops. Through them runs the Atlantic and Western railroad, which, as it approaches the river, bends towards the north end of Missionary ridge, where it passes through the tunnel. The foregoing is a brief sketch of the ground and points over which and in the direction of which I was ordered to make a reconnoissance. It would be necessary to give a more complete description of such, to fully explain the movements of my troops that were made in obedience to this order. As such cannot be given in this brief report, I will forward a map of the topography of the country, to be attached hereto, and for reference, as soon as it can be procured. In order to carry out the instructions of Major-General Thomas, I directed Briga- dier-General Wood, commanding the third division, to prepare for an advance by form- ing his troops in an open field at the base of the slope of Fort Wood, and without the lines of our rifle-pits; and at the same time I directed Major-General Sheridan, com- manding the second division, to hold the troops within supporting distance on the right of General Wood, posting him along the line of the Atlantic and Western railroad, with his right resting opposite Lunette Palmer. The positions indicated w^ere promptly taken 30 BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. bv tliosc two divisions at noonday, with no attempts at concealment or surprise, and in plain \ie\v of the enemy, who watched them from Missionary ridge and Orchard Knob. The troops mo\ ed into line and position with such regularity and precision as to present the aj^pearance of a formation for review or parade, and the enemy's pickets, but a few huiuired feel off, were apparently awaiting a display or military pageant, when our skirmish line advanced and opened fire. At half past one o'clock p. m. I directed General Wood to advance. In a few mo- ments his troops having jiassed through the open fields engaged the enemv in the woods, and drove them back to their ritle-pits. The resistance here met with, especially in front of llazen's brigade, where we sustained the heaviest loss, was very stubborn, and the enemy was only driven back when his works were cleared by the bayonet. In this dash, which was quick and gallant, we lost one hundred and twenty-five olRcers and men, killed and woinuled, and by it we gained Orchard Knob and the ridge to its right, at the same time captin"ing man\- prisoners. The twenty-third Alabama infantry, almost en- tire, with the regimental colors, was captured. As soon as General Wood had occupied the knob and ridge, I directed Major-Gen- cral Sheridan to advance his division, and it was placed in position in echelon t)n the right of Cjeneral Wood, the two divisions forming a continuous line of battle resting on the rising ground lying almost parallel with Missionary Ridge, and sweeping on the ex- treme right aroimd towards our chain of defensive works at Chattanooga. The recon- noissance was a coinplete success. In making it we had not only obtained the desired information, but had also successfully attacked the enemy and had driven him from a strong and important position. Orchard Knob and the ridge to its right looked into the long line of rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, which were held by the enemy in force, and they also afforded points of observation upon movements that the enemy might make through the valley towards the scene of Major-General Sherman's operations. My command now remained in position awaiting further orders. I reported our success and the position and con- dition of the enemy in our front to Major-General Thomas, commanding the depart- ment of the Cumberland, and at 4 o'clock p. m., I received a despatch from him instruct- ing me to hold and strengthen my position, and stating that Major-General Howard's command was taking position on my left. In accordance with these instructions, a rude line of breastworks was thrown up along my front during the evening, and an epaulment of a six gun battery was constructed on the knob, in which Bridge's battery of four three-inch Rodman guns and two Napoleons was placed before morning. Immediately after rccei\ing the above instructions I observed from Orchard Knob, Major-General Howard was meeting with such resistance from the enemy in the double line of rifle-pits to the left of our position, and on the opposite side of Citico Creek, as to prevent him from making any further advance, or from gaining possession of them. I therefore ordered Brigadier-General Beatty, commanding third brigade, third division, to send two regiments through the woods as quietly as possible to surprise the party of the enemy and to attack them in flank. The regiments sent by him for this purpose, the nine- teenth Ohio, commanded by Colonel Manderson, and theninth Kentucky infantry, com- manded by Colonel Cram, came upon the enemy suddenly, attacked them in flank and drove them back towards Missionary Ridge The rifle-pits, however, not having been taken possession of by the troops in their front, were occupied by the enemy during the night, but they were again cleared in a similar manner by the same two regiments after dav- light the next morning, and for some reason unknown to me were not even then occupied by the troops of the nth corps. On the 24th day of November the two brigades of the first division of this corps, under command of Brigadier-General Cruft, were, with Major-General Hooker, engaged in his splendid assault upon Lookout Mountain. Copies of the olficial reports of Brigadier-General Cruft and of his brigade and regimental com- manders have bt-en forwarded to me. The original reports have been forwarded to' Major-General Hooker. To these and to the report of Major-General Hooker I refer for a full statement of the conduct of my troops on Lookout Mountain. It may be allowed me, however, as their commanding oflicer, to thank them for their conspicuous gallantry, for the important service they rendered, and for the hearty support which they gave to Major-General Hooker on that memorable day. During the njght of November 23, Major-General Sheridan's and Brigadier-General Wood's commands were engaged in strengthening their positions. All of the next day they remained in line watching the enemy in front and awaiting orders. No movement was made by them during the day, and the quiet of this part of our lines was only broken by an occasional exchange of shots between Bridge's battery on the Knob and theenemy's batteries on Missionary Ridge. At 6 o'clock p. m. I received a despatch, of which the following is a copy: BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. 'dl " Headquarters Department of the Cumberland. "General Granger: "The general commanding the department directs that you have everything ready for an offensive movement earlv to-morro\v morning. "J.J.REYNOLDS, ''C/ne/o/SfaJ'." One mile in front of our position and almost parallel with it was Missionarv" Ridge, a line or "back bone" of rugged hills running from a point about four miles northeast of Chattanooga, where it juts towards the Tennessee River in a southwesterly direction until it dips into the valley at Rossville, four miles south of Chattanooga. It is of al- most a uniform height along the part mentioned, rising about fi\e hundred feet abovp the valley that lies at its base. On the side looking toward Chattanooga it presents a bare, rough, and broken surface, marked bv gullies and ravines. This mountain barrier, even as nature planted it, was a most formidable fortress. The commander who lield it might be warranted in the conclusion that troops could not storm it. But strengthened as it was by the enemy, with a line of heavy breastworks running along its base, with two additional lines of rifle-pits, one partly girdling it midway up, and the other fringing its crest, and with empanelments on the summit for fifty guns, it could well be deemed impregnable. Lying between Missionary Ridge and Orchard Knob to the right is a broad, wooded valley extending on the right to the southwestern end of the ridge, while to the left it extends beyond Orchard Knob, stretching towards the river and Chattan- ooga. From the end of the ridge last mentioned this vallev sweeps around into the Chattanooga plain; that part of it, though, is almost altogether cleared of timber, leaving open ground for the most part between Missionary Ridge and the position held by Major-General Sheridan's division. In front of Missionary Ridge the enemy had cleared awaj' the timber for a distance of from three to five hundred yards, so as to leave no obstructions to a direct and enfilading fire fi'om them. During the night of November 24 the enemy withdrew from Lookout Mountain and from Chattanooga Valley, and commenced to mass his whole force upon Missionary Ridge. At daylight the next morning, November 25, Major-General Sherman, having crossed the Tennesse River at the designated point, gained possession of the northern end of the ridge near the railroad tunnel. Long columns of the enemy could be seen before sunrise moving towards that point, and it was not late in the day before their guns, with those of General Sherman briskly replying, were heard opening the battle. For hours my command, from behind their breast\vorks, anxiously and impatiently watched this struggle of their brothers-in-arms away off to their left on the northern end of the ridge. They saw these veterans from Vicksburg coming to their relief and engaging the same enem^^ who had beleaguered them for nine long weeks, holding them in their defensive Avorks by strong lines of circumvallation that rested upon Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge and in the Chattanooga Valley, and that stretched like an iron crescent from the river on their right to the river on the left. As the day wore on, their impatience of restraint gathered force, and their desire to advance became al- most uncontrollable. At last came the orders to move. General Sherman was unaljle to make any progress in moving along the ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front; therefore, in order to relieve him I was ordered to make a demonstration upon the works of the enemy directly in my front, at the base of Missionary Ridge. I accordingly directed Major-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General Wood to advance their divisions at a given signal, moving directly forward simviltaneously and briskly to attack the enemy, and, driving him from his rifle pits, to take possession of them. At twenty minutes before 4 o'clock p. m. six guns, the signal agreed upon, were fired in rapid succession, and before the smoke had cleared away these two divisions, Sheridan on the right and Wood on the left, had cleared away the "breastworks that had sheltered them for two days, and were moving forward. They were formed in the following order : first, a double line of skirmishers that covered the troops behind , then the line of battle by brigades, commencing on the extreme right Avith Colonel Sherman's brigade, then Colonel Harker's, then Brigadier-General Wag- ner's, then Brigadier-General Hazen's, then Brigadier-General Willick's, and next, on the extreme left, Brigadier-General Beatty's. Following this line were the reserves in niass. It pleases me to report that scarcely a straggler could be seen as this magnificent line, stretching one mile from end to end, swept through the valley up to the assault. At the moment of the advance of these troops Missionary Ridge "blazed with the fire from the batteries which lined its summit. Not less than fifty guns opened at once, throwing a terrible shower of shot and shell. The enemy now taking the alarm. Com- menced to move troops from both extremities of the ridge for the purpose of filling up the ranks below and around these batteries. In the meantime, the troops holding the 83 BATTI^KS OF CHATTANOOGA. woods were driven back to the works at the base of the ridge, their pursuers rapidly following. Here they halted and made a stout resistance, but our troops, by an impet- uous assault, broke this line in several places; then, scaling the breastworks at these points, opened a tlank and reserve fire upon them, which, throwing thetn into confusion caused their precipitate flight. Many prisoners were left in our hands, and we captured a large number of small arms. Mv orders liad now been fully and successfully carried out, but not enough had been done to ^atiNfv the l)ra\e troops who had accomplished so much. Although the batteries on the ridge, at short range, by direct and entilading fire, we'e still pouring down upon them a shower of iron, and the n.usketry from the hillsides were thinning their ranks, thev dashed over the breastworks, through the rifie-pits, and started up the ridge. Thev started without orders. Along the whole line of both divisions, from right to left and from left to right, simultaneously with one accord, animated with one spirit, and with heroic courage, eagerlv thev rushed forward to a danger before which the bravest, marching utuler oiciers, might tremble. Officers caught the enthuNiasm of the men, and the men in turn were cheered by the otllcers. Each regiment tried to surpass the other in fighting its way up a hill that would try those of stout limb and strong lungs to climb, and each tried first to plant its fiag on the summit. Abo^e these men were an additional line of ritle-pits filled with troops. What was on the summit of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to inquire. The enemy was before them ; to know that was to know sutticient. At several points along the line my troops were ascending the hill and gaining positions less exposed to the enem_\ 's artiller\' fire, though more exposed to the fire of the musketry. Seeing this, I sent my assistant adjutant-general to inquire, first of General Wood and then of General Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up the ridge by them, and to instruct them to take the ridge if possible. In reply to this, General Wood told him that the men had started without orders, and that he could take it if he could be supported. In the mean time an aide-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that the general wished to know whether the orders that had been given to take the rifle pits "meant those at the base of the ridge or those on top." My reply was that the order had been to take those at the base. Conceiving this to be an order to fall back to those rifle pits, and on his way to General Sheridan, so reporting it to General Wagner, commanding second brigade of Sheridan's division, this brigade was ^^ithdra\vn from a position which it had gained on the side of the ridge to the rifle pits which were being raked by the enemy's artillery, and from this pointy starting again under a terrible fire, made the ascent of the ridge. My assistant adjutant-general, on his way to General Sheridan, reported to me General Wood's reply, but, by my instruc: tions went no further with the message which I had given him, as I had alreadv sent Captain Avrey, my aid-de-camp, directly to Major-General Sheridan, instructing him to go ahead and take the ridge if he could. I had also, in the mean time, sent all the rest of mv staff otKcers, some of them to deliver similar massages to Major-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General Wood, fearing the first message might not get through, and others to order up the reser\'es and every man that remained behind to the support of the troops starting up the ridge. Brigadier-General Johnson's division of the 14th army corps was now ordered up to the support of Major-General Sheridan, while Brigadier- Guneral Baird's divison of the same corps was pushed up to the support of Brigadier- General Wood on the left. Through the shower of musket shot that came from above, climbing up the ridge over rocks, and felled timber, mv command marched upward. In just one hour from the time of leaving Orchard Knob it was driving the enemv from his last line of breastworks and rifle-pits, and capturing his batteries. As soon as the enemv had been dri\en from the summit of the ridge in front of Major-General Sher- itlan, he fled down its southern slope, retreating towards Chickamauga Creek. General .Sheridan promptly followed them, moving with two brigades of his division (Brigadier- General Wagner's and Colonel Barker's) down the road leading to Chickamauga station. He had pursued but one mile, when as night was approaching, he came up with a large body of trof)ps posted, with eight pieces of artillerv, in a strong position on a high ridge. Our men elated with their success thus far, stopped not at this obstacle, but boldl_\' pushing up to the enemy's line, opened a vigorous fire of nuisketrv and then made a gallant assaidt, which caused him to fly. Two guns and part of the enemv's wagon train were here captiu'ed. It was now night, and as the troops were almost exhausted by the fatigues of the day, they were halted on this ridge for the purpose of taking a short rest before con- tinuing the pursuit. Brigadier-Cieneral Wood had just driven the enemy from his front, on the summit of the ridge, when I obserxed a large force of the enemy coming from that part of the hill occupied by Maj()r-(>eneral Sherman, and moving in the direction of oiu" left flank. Before General Wood could get his troops in shape to meet them, Brigadier-General BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. 33 Baird opportunely arrived with his division and went into position on our left. When the enemy came up a sharp contest here commenced, which afterwards lasted until dark. After the 17th Kentucky infantry had wheeled to the left and fired a few volleys into the enemy's flank thereby immediately relieving Baird's right, I directed General Wood to form his division on the ground it then occupied for the purpose of resting his men and getting them also ready for the anticipated pursuit of the enemy. Two miles and a half straightforward from the ridge held by General Wagner and Colonel Harker at dark is Chickamauga Creek. From this point it runs towards the north end of Missionary Ridge, which was held by Major-General Sherman, then sweep- ing around the same, it flows in a northwestern direction for a short distance, and empties into the Tennessee River. Taking the north end of Missionary Ridge as the apex, and then Ridge and Chattanooga Creeks as sides, we have an acute triangle. It was my design, as soon as the troops were sufficiently rested to move, and, as soon as I could procure guides, to push Sheridan's division^ supported by Wood's, down Moore's road, and, if possible, get possession of the crossing of Chickamauga Creek, then, swing- ing my column, to move towards the north end of Missionary Ridge. By this move- ment I expected to capture many prisoners, together with wagon trains "and artillery that could not get over the creek in time to be saved by the enemj'. The night was favorable for this movement, as the moon shone clear and bright. At 7>4^ p. m. I, sent a dispatch to Major-General Thomas, informing him that I thought we could cut off a large number of the enemy by making a bold dash upon the Chickamauga, moving down the roads, that led from our front, and that I was in readiness for any disposition that he might be pleased to make. Being, to my great disappointment, unable to procure guides acquainted with the country between the ridge and the creek, I was not able to commence the movement until midnight, so that by the time General Sheridan reached the creek the rear guard of the enemy was just crossing. The enemy was so closely pursued, however, that he was obliged to burn his pontoon bridge before all of his forces could cross the creek, leaving several hundred of them to fall into our hands as prisoners. We also captured a large number of wagons loaded with quarter-masters' supplies, together with caissons, limbers, small arms, artillerv, ammunition, &c. In accordance with orders received from Major-General Thomas, I withdrew the troops from this pursuit before daylight to make preparations to start on forced marches for the relief of Major-General Burnside, at Knoxville. The bold and successful attempt to storm Missionary Ridge, the results that followed, the short time consumed in beating back the enemy, and the fruits of the vic- tory, were such as to render this one of the most remarkable battles of the age' The ridge was taken after a hard struggle, and those who looked on from below were unable to tell which division or what regiment first reached its summit, for along my whole line many regiments appeared to dash over the breastwdrks on the crest at the same moment. Although it took but one hour to gain the Ridge, my command lost 20.21 per cent, of the force engaged in killed and wounded. For particulars of the casualties I refer to the tabular statement of the same, herewith filed. We captured thirty-one pieces of artillery and three thousand eight hundred and twelve prisoners. General Sheridan reports 1,762 prisoners taken by his division, for whom he obtained receipts, and General Wood reports 2,050 taken by his division, for over one thousand of whom he also obtained receipts. I do not hesitate to state that the enemy in his flight lost over five thousand stand of small arms. In many places the ground was covered with them ; we passed b\' without gathering them up, as we were pursuing and fighting the enemy until after dark, and as my command was recalled during the night for the purpose of marching to Knoxville. For an account of the capture made by the two brigades of my first division on Lookout Mountain, and for a statement of their losses, I refer to the official reports of Brigadier-General Cruft forwarded to Major-General Hooker. Were I to name all who in this most gallant feat of arms won credit, I must need call the roster and rolls of my command; sufficient be it then in this place that I refer for the names of officers and men worthy of special mention to the reports of their im- mediate commanders. To Major-General Philip H. Sheridan, conspicuous for his conduct and gallantry on every battle-field where he has been engaged, and not less so upon this one, to Brig- adier-General Thomas J. Wood, the tried and trusty soldier, who here added a new glory to his enviable record, to Brigadier-Generals Willich and Hazen and Wagner, and Samuel Beatty, and to Colonels Harker and Sherman, commanding brigades, whose names will be heard wherever is told the story of the marching and fighting of this 34 BATTLES OF CHATTANOOGA. armv, to the regimental and company officers, and to the private soldiers in the ranks, not merely my own acknowledgments but those of the whole country are due. To all of the members of my staff for rendering me important service in carrying despatches and orders over the hottest part of the field during the battle, and for promptly and cniciently performing all other duties required of them, 1 offer my sincere thanks. G. GRANGER, Major- General Commanding. Brigadier-General W. 1). Whipple, Chief of Staff, D. C. BATTLE OF MI.SSION RIDGE. Statement of killcci, ivoundcd, and missing in the second division, 4tli army corps, commanded by Major-iirncral P. H. Sheridan) and in the third division, 4th army corps, com- manded bv Brigadier-General Thomas 7^- Wood. Commander. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. Com nd. '•J c 1 H c y; 'e s 5 ^ c £ 5 e2 c p 'c B 1 W 266 65S 258 ■J 1 be < 1st brijr., 2ti division 2d brig., 2d division 3d brig., 2d division Colonel Sherman. . . . . Brig.-Gen. Wagner.. Colonel Harker 6 2 4 12 7 7 2 16 28 26 70 119 32 27 121 27 SO 34 2,30 SS6 23s 266 636 269 32 20S 2 2 296 III 1,060 1,171 2 2 123 1. 181 313 4S5 160 958 2, '39 ',.3