• ENGLAND 
 
 ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 and DEVELOPMENT and 
 
 THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 
 
 EDUARD MEYER 
 
Class // 4^0 
 
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 COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 
 
ENGLAND 
 
 ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 and DEVELOPMENT and 
 
 THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 
 
ENGLAND 
 
 ITS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 
 and DEVELOPMENT and 
 
 THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY 
 
 BY 
 
 EDUARD MEYER, Ph.D., LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 
 EXCHANGE PROFESSOR TO HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 1909-10 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 HELENE S. WHITE 
 
 JOINT TRANSLATOR OF VON SYBEL'S FOUNDING 
 OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 RITTER & COMPANY 
 1916 
 
=D/W£ 
 
 Copyright 1916, by 
 Ritter & Company 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 Copyright of the German edition by 
 I. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Stuttgart. 
 
 OCT -91813 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY 
 BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK 
 
 GI.A445023 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In offering this book to an English speaking 
 public we feel assured that its contents will prove of 
 value to the open-minded reader who desires an all 
 round knowledge of the absorbing topic of the day, 
 — the great war and the causes that led up to it. 
 The author is a highly distinguished historian who, 
 in undertaking this work, departs from his previous 
 and chosen field of ancient history to discuss his 
 present subject with engaging frankness. Concisely 
 and clearly he places before the reader the part that 
 England has played in history, especially in regard 
 to the relations that the English have borne to the 
 other nations of the world. The ripe judgment and 
 keen insight of the thorough student of history and 
 of world politics gives the book the claim to be the 
 most reasonable, accurate and far seeing work that 
 has as yet been offered to the public with regard to 
 the development and character of the English people, 
 as viewed from the German standpoint. 
 
 In the concluding chapter the newly created con- 
 ditions and problems of world-wide concern are pre- 
 sented with prophetic insight and eloquent earnest- 
 ness, and this in itself should make the book worth 
 while, even if that which precedes it were of less 
 high merit than it is. 
 
 v 
 
vi Introduction 
 
 While we fully realize that English history is a 
 familiar subject to most American readers, we are 
 equally convinced that there are many among them 
 who will follow with interest a portrayal of Eng- 
 land's development as a state, as it appears to a Ger- 
 man historian, an outsider of marked ability, who 
 judges it from the German standpoint, whereas the 
 Americans, who, as a whole, are readers of English 
 literature only, have practically received their im- 
 pressions of England and the English people ex- 
 clusively from English sources — the insider's fav- 
 orable view of his own state and his own people. 
 
 Although the subject is treated with critical keen- 
 ness in this volume, and the opinions expressed in it 
 are based on professional knowledge of the highest 
 order, and although the conclusions reached are a 
 stern arraignment of the course pursued by modern 
 England, nevertheless the restraint of the profes- 
 sional judgment, and the conclusions at which the 
 searching analysis of the historian arrives, appear all 
 too mild to the average German who, in defending 
 his fatherland and its traditions, is fighting for his 
 most sacred possessions, and to whom England's part 
 in the present war seems to be that of the unrighteous 
 money changers whom Christ cast out of the temple. 
 
 In placing this translation of Professor Meyer's 
 " England " at this time before the American people, 
 who are neither English nor German, we believe that 
 it is the only book which sets forth clearly the funda- 
 mental differences between the English and German 
 state organizations, as well as between the aspira- 
 tions and views of life entertained by the two nations 
 
Introduction vii 
 
 as a whole. In no sense is it to be classed with the 
 propaganda literature of the day, as it was written 
 by the ablest living German historian, for perusal by 
 his own people, in exposition of English conditions, 
 past and present, and of the English national char- 
 acter. 
 
 The Publishers. 
 September, 191 6. 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 This work was finished about the middle of Jan- 
 uary of the present year; the comments on subse- 
 quent events were added while the book was in the 
 printer's hands. Now, however, still further com- 
 ments seem absolutely necessary with regard to the 
 events of the past few days. 
 
 That I did not make a mistake in my judgment 
 of the American attitude has been clearly shown by 
 the contrast between the two notes just sent by the 
 American government, one to Germany and one to 
 England, — the occasion for the former being the an- 
 nouncement of Germany's policy of attack by under- 
 sea craft upon the English coast and commerce; the 
 latter, called forth by the consequent misuse of neu- 
 tral flags by English ships. 
 
 The note to England is expressed in most friendly 
 terms, and asks that some regard be shown for the 
 welfare of American commerce, saying that although 
 " the occasional use of a neutral flag under stress of 
 immediate pursuit " may seem justifiable, neverthe- 
 less the systematic misuse of the American flag 
 should be discontinued, since " such a policy of gen- 
 eral misuse of a neutral's flag jeopardizes the vessels 
 of the neutral visiting British waters," and " would 
 even seem to impose on Great Britain a measure of 
 responsibility for the loss of American lives and 
 
 ix 
 
x Foreword 
 
 vessels in case of an attack by hostile naval vessels." 
 The note to Germany, on the other hand, utters a 
 distinct threat in spite of the courteous terms in 
 which it is expressed. It flatly denies that the 
 American attitude has been anything but one of sin- 
 cere neutrality, and then, with regard to Germany's 
 announced policy, it goes on to say that, if in pur- 
 suance of it, " an American vessel should be de- 
 stroyed or the life of an American citizen be lost, the 
 government of the United States would be con- 
 strained to regard it as an indefensible violation of 
 neutral rights, which would be very hard to reconcile 
 with the friendly relations existing between the two 
 countries " ; should such a regrettable event really 
 result " the government of the United States would 
 be constrained to hold the German government to a 
 strict accountability for such acts of their naval 
 authority, and to take any steps which might be 
 necessary to secure to American citizens the full 
 enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high 
 seas." 
 
 To England and her allies all things are to be 
 permitted, — by them international law may be tram- 
 pled under foot with impunity; but, when Germany 
 will not meekly suffer this, and, in self-defense, re- 
 taliates by measures made necessary by the policy of 
 her enemy, these are at once decried as inexcusable 
 violations of international law, with entire forget- 
 fulness of the fact that England had been the first 
 to repudiate it. 
 
 The proud reply which the German government 
 made to this note received hearty endorsement 
 
Foreword xi 
 
 throughout the country. In calm and dignified 
 terms it sets forth that Germany is justified in 
 adopting the proposed measures, and then, in 
 friendly terms but very pointedly, it calls the atten- 
 tion of the Americans to their own shortcomings. 
 If they would have their ships out of peril, they must 
 be kept out of the danger zone, or else England must 
 be induced to change her methods ; not Germany, but 
 England is at fault. 
 
 We are not to be intimidated by America, but on 
 the contrary, we will persist in the measures which 
 this struggle for existence, together with England's 
 policy, has forced us to adopt. If America is 
 offended at this, it can be of no great moment to us, 
 since the attitude of the United States has been such 
 that in the future it can hardly do us greater injury 
 than it has in the past. 
 
 Meanwhile Japan also has laid aside the mask, and 
 is openly stretching out a greedy hand toward China, 
 while neither the nominal allies of the one country 
 or the other can do aught to interfere. The Japa- 
 nese policy is well defined and purposeful, and quite 
 as unscrupulous as that of England. Japan found 
 England useful to aid her in driving the Germans 
 out of China and the islands of the Pacific; now it 
 is England's turn to be dispossessed. But she is reap- 
 ing only what she has sowed, and it remains now to 
 be seen what Australia and America will say to it. 
 But the great question confronting the future is not 
 only whether at the end of another century there will 
 still be any European possessions in eastern China, 
 in the islands of the Pacific, or even in Australia, but 
 
xii Foreword 
 
 whether one person of European extraction may 
 then be found within these regions. 
 
 There is yet one last comment necessary. On 
 page 302 I had said that " English gentlemen do not 
 shrink from any crime, not even from that of assas- 
 sination, if only appearances can be preserved." 
 When I wrote this, I was fully informed with regard 
 to a plot made to assassinate the Irish patriot, Sir 
 Roger Casement, a plot devised by Findlay, the Brit- 
 ish Minister at Christiania, and to be carried out by a 
 young Norwegian, Adler Christensen, then in the 
 service of Sir Roger. However, since at that time 
 I lacked documentary evidence, it seemed advisable 
 not to refer to the matter prematurely, and so the 
 words " not even from that of assassination " were 
 erased in the proof. Since then the whole affair has 
 been made public through the note addressed by Sir 
 Roger Casement to Sir Edward Grey, the instigator 
 of the plot, and at whose behest Findlay devised it. 
 
 On the voyage from America to Norway, Sir 
 Roger fortunately eluded his English pursuers; 
 hardly, however, had he arrived in Christiania, on 
 October 29, 19 14, when Christensen was summoned 
 to the British legation and questioned with regard 
 to his employer. On the following day Christensen 
 was closeted for two hours with the British Minister, 
 Findlay, himself, a man who had gained an unenvi- 
 able notoriety through the brutality of his conduct 
 in Egypt. Christensen was given to understand that 
 it would be an easy matter for him to secure for 
 himself a comfortable and care-free future if he 
 would undertake to make Sir Roger " disappear." 
 
Foreword xiii 
 
 " The man who would deal him a mortal blow would 
 never have to work again." Findlay promised " on 
 his word of honor " to pay Christensen five thousand 
 pounds sterling for the delivery of Sir Roger Case- 
 ment alive into the hands of the English. 
 
 But Christensen remained loyal. He made a pre- 
 tence of accepting the proposition, whereupon he 
 was given a secret address, together with a code to 
 be used in future correspondence. From Berlin, 
 whither he accompanied Sir Roger, he forwarded to 
 the British Minister a number of letters that he was 
 supposed to have filched from his employer, but 
 which in reality Sir Roger had written for this ex- 
 press purpose. Later, Christensen returned to Chris- 
 tiania where he carried out this game of deception 
 with great skill. On December 7th he was given 
 the key to a rear door of the British legation, and 
 on the 3rd of January he induced Findlay, after 
 considerable urging, to give him the following docu- 
 ment in Findlay's own handwriting, a facsimile of 
 which has been made public, and which must be 
 quoted here as indisputable proof of English cor- 
 ruption. 
 
 " British Legation, 
 
 " Christiania, Norway. 
 
 " On behalf of the British Government I promise 
 that if, through information given by Adler Chris- 
 tensen, Sir Roger Casement be captured either with 
 or without his companions, the said Adler Christen- 
 sen is to receive from the British Government the 
 sum of £5000 to be paid as he may desire. 
 
 Adler Christensen is also to enjoy personal im- 
 
xiv Foreword 
 
 munity and to be given a passage to the United 
 States should he desire it. 
 
 " M. DE C. FlNDLAY, 
 
 " H. B. M. Minister." 
 
 To the Norwegian newspapers Findlay declared 
 that he could make no statement with regard to the 
 matter; perhaps Sir Edward Grey would explain. 
 If ever Sir Edward does so, it will be interesting to 
 learn to what subterfuges he will resort to clear 
 himself. 
 
 This incident shows conclusively how great are 
 the anxieties that Ireland is causing the British gov- 
 ernment, despite all the official assurances of the 
 island's loyalty. Moreover, six Nationalist Irish 
 newspapers have been suppressed, no Irish- American 
 papers are permitted, and the importation and sale 
 of arms has been forbidden by proclamation; but 
 recruiting is as unpopular in Ireland now as hereto- 
 fore, and the opposition of the political parties is 
 as violent as ever. 
 
 At the same time the incident serves to illustrate 
 in a most startling manner the moral depth to which 
 the ruling classes in England have fallen. If the 
 evidence were not indisputable, we would not be- 
 lieve it possible, even after all we have recently ex- 
 perienced at the hands of England. 
 
 Because of the loyalty of a young Norwegian 
 sailor, Sir Roger Casement escaped the fate that was 
 intended for him, but the Boer, General Delareij, 
 was not so fortunate. While riding through the 
 streets in an automobile with General Beyers, in 
 September 191 4, he was shot and killed by an Eng- 
 
Foreword xv 
 
 lish policeman. It was, of course, an " unfortunate 
 accident." Surely, in this " war of humanitarian 
 culture against German barbarism," the English are 
 not unworthily associated with the Serb assassins 
 and with the Russians whose diplomacy has ever 
 resorted to means such as these. 
 
 " Tis evident, the ' gentleman ' is no Sumarai " 
 are the words with which the Japanese admiral closes 
 his report of the naval battle among the Falkland 
 Islands. 
 
 Eduard Meyer. 
 Berlin-Lichterfelde, 
 
 February 18, 191 5. 
 
 \ 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 Introduction v 
 
 Foreword ix 
 
 PART I — THE CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH 
 STATE 
 I The Development and Fundamental 
 Features of the English Consti- 
 tution 3 
 
 • II The English Idea of the State and 
 
 of Freedom 29 
 
 III Some Effects of the English Consti- 
 
 tution — The Army — The Re- 
 forms 42 
 
 IV England as a " Nightwatchman 
 
 State " — Education and Science — 
 Social Reform Legislation ... 53 
 
 V Ireland 73 
 
 VI The Scottish Highlands . . . .101 
 
 VII Free Trade and the Doctrines of the 
 Manchester School — The Agri- 
 cultural Pursuits 108 
 
 VIII The English Attitude Toward 
 
 Other Nations 117 
 
 xvii 
 
xviii CONTENTS 
 
 PART II — ENGLAND'S POLICY AND ENGLAND 
 AS A WORLD POWER 
 
 CHAPTER P AGE 
 
 IX The Beginning of England's Power 
 at Sea — Wars with Spain and 
 Holland 127 
 
 X England's Wars with France — The 
 Beginning of English Supremacy 
 at Sea 134 
 
 XI English World Supremacy, 1814-1863 151 
 
 XII New Dangers — France — Russia — 
 
 America and Germany .... 166 
 
 XIII The Crisis and English Retrogres- 
 
 sion 1862-1864 173 
 
 XIV Suspension of Colonial Aggression 
 
 — Tension Between England and 
 Russia, 1865-1881 184 
 
 XV The Period from 1881-1901 — Rela- 
 tions with France — America — 
 Russia and Turkey 189 
 
 XVI Germany's Prosperity and Her Co- 
 lonial Policy — The English in 
 Africa — Japan and China . . . 203 
 
 XVII Edward VII and the Hatred of Ger- 
 many 214 
 
 XVIII The Triple Entente and the Alli- 
 ance with Japan — Morocco . . 242 
 
 XIX The Encircling of Germany — Bel- 
 gium — Agadir — The Balkan War 251 
 
CONTENTS xix 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 XX Preliminary Arrangements for War 
 — The Beginning of the World 
 War 270 
 
 XXI England's Conduct of the War — 
 The Moral Decadence of the Eng- 
 lish 296 
 
 PART III — THE NEW WORLD CONDITIONS 
 AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE 
 
 XXII Problems of the Future .... 309 
 
PART I 
 
 THE CHARACTER OF THE ENGLISH 
 STATE 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 The Development and Fundamental Features 
 of the English Constitution 
 
 It is impossible to form a correct estimate of Eng- 
 land's part in the history of the world, or of the 
 motives that led her into the present war, unless 
 we call to mind the fact that English political 
 development has proceeded in an exactly contrary 
 course to that followed by the continental coun- 
 tries. 
 
 The common foundation upon which the political 
 structure of all modern states rests is the dual organi- 
 zation of the Middle Ages, in which the overlord 
 and the Estates sought their own ends along diver- 
 gent paths which frequently led to bitter antagonism. 
 Rarely indeed were they brought into harmonious 
 co-operation through the pursuit of a common ad- 
 vantage, and then only after long and wearisome 
 negotiations and intricate compromises. 
 
 Such a political organization is as far removed 
 from the idea of centralized government as the an- 
 cients knew it, as it is from that which is find- 
 ing ever-increasing development in modern times. 
 When it could no longer adequately meet the grow- 
 ing demands of more highly civilized conditions, 
 
 3 
 
4 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 it gradually disappeared from the continent, while 
 the functions of government were more and more 
 combined in the hand of the overlord. In France 
 and Spain, as well as in the Scandinavian countries, 
 this process brought about the monarchy, under the 
 influence of which the national state was achieved 
 and the foundation for the development of the mod- 
 ern national spirit laid. In Germany and Italy a 
 like course of development was rendered impossible 
 by the dominance and invulnerability of the Empire, 
 — within its sphere of influence only local and ter- 
 ritorial sovereignties could exist. 
 
 But everywhere the process was the same, — 
 through a firm and enduring hold upon the finances, 
 through the control of the administration and of the 
 men-at-arms, the Kingship grew more and more in- 
 dependent of the co-operation of the Estates, which 
 was always difficult to obtain and never to be relied 
 upon. And so the Estates gradually lost every ves- 
 tige of their former power, either as the result of 
 defeat in a bitter struggle for supremacy, 1 or else 
 through neglect; their consent being no longer 
 needed, they were no longer summoned, and in 
 time came to be a forgotten institution. Thus state 
 sovereignty was evolved, and with it the conception 
 of the modern monarchical form of government. 
 Its claim and justification are based upon the fact 
 that it not only gave the people a single centralized 
 
 1 Only in one instance did the reverse of this process take 
 place, and that is in the Netherlands where the Estates 
 triumphed over the monarchical tendencies of the Spanish 
 dominion. The dualistic organization of the Middle Ages 
 is still to be found in the Duchy of Mecklenburg. 
 
English State in Sixteenth Century 5 
 
 administration at the head of affairs, but out of the 
 chaos of mediaeval anarchy it brought law and order 
 together with prosperity and a sence of security. As 
 opposed to the particular interests of the Estates, 
 the monarchy advanced and shielded the interests 
 that promoted the common welfare of all the differ- 
 ent classes of the population, and it is because of 
 this, the beneficent exercise of its authority in the 
 interest of all as against class interest, that the 
 monarchy derived its high claim to authority by 
 right divine. That it may be free ever to uphold 
 the right, its power must be unlimited, and it can- 
 not therefore be responsible to man, but to God 
 alone. 
 
 In England also the political development seemed 
 at first to be following the common course when 
 the power of the feudal lords was broken in the Wars 
 of the Roses, and the Tudor, Henry VII, seized 
 the crown by the victor's right of battle, and set up 
 a vigorous regime. Apparently England under the 
 Tudors made as close an approach to the ideal of 
 an absolute monarchy as did France under the later 
 kings of the house of Valois (with the exception of 
 the time of greatest disruption during the religious 
 wars), or as did Spain under the Hapsburgs. 
 There was, however, always this marked difference, 
 that the English Estates in the Parliament had 
 gained for themselves a position of greater authority 
 than had the Estates in any of the continental coun- 
 tries. Although the higher nobles, together with 
 the magnates of the Church, had isolated themselves 
 in the exclusive Upper House, they had found an 
 
6 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 active ally in the Lower House in a popular element 
 that had derived its privileges from the Crown, and 
 therefore was always eager to uphold the monar- 
 chical order of things, but nevertheless, and indeed 
 for that very reason, strongly upheld the principle 
 that taxes could not be levied without the consent of 
 the taxed. Under these circumstances a standing 
 army under the control of the Crown was not pos- 
 sible in England, and, because of the sense of se- 
 curity from foreign attack that the insular position 
 of the kingdom afforded, the need of an army of 
 defence was less imperatively felt there than in the 
 states of the continent. Even the despotic Tudor s 
 could not ride rough shod over the inalienable rights 
 of the English people, although they summoned Par- 
 liament as seldom as possible, and made more than 
 a few of its recalcitrant members feel the heavy 
 hand of their royal displeasure. Moreover, parlia- 
 mentary authority made a great stride forward 
 when Henry VIII undertook to free his country 
 from the yoke of Rome; it made another when, 
 after a first and abortive attempt on the part of 
 Edward VI, — which was followed by the temporary 
 triumph of Spanish Catholicism under Queen Mary, 
 — Elizabeth, constrained by the exigencies of her 
 position, established the Anglican Church as the na- 
 tional church polity, and compelled all resisting ele- 
 ments to yield to its authority; it made yet another 
 when, in the bitter struggle with Spain, she appealed 
 to the national spirit and rallied the nation to her 
 side. 
 
 Indeed it was by these highly autocratic acts 
 
Beginning of Parliamentary Control y 
 
 themselves, carried out, as they were, with utmost 
 relentlessness, that the authority of Parliament and 
 the rights of the people it represented were strength- 
 ened. Without the firm hold upon the nation which 
 the monarchy had obtained for itself, the English 
 Reformation could hardly have been achieved, nor 
 England's independence maintained against the at- 
 tacks of Spain. 
 
 How the Stuarts attempted to force upon the 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain (united under 
 their dynasty) a despotic government patterned after 
 the monarchies of the continent, and so provoked 
 the people to civil war, — how this war resulted in 
 the defeat of the Crown because the King did not 
 have a military force under his control strong enough 
 to defeat the national army organized by the radical 
 elements of the country, — how the fall of the mili- 
 tary despotism that followed, together with the dis- 
 persion of the Puritan army, was followed in turn 
 by the restoration of the monarchy, which could 
 not, however, shake itself free of the restraining 
 hand of Parliament, — how, on the contrary, the at- 
 tempt of Charles II to regain independence for the 
 Crown by a closer approach between the two king- 
 doms of Great Britain and France brought about 
 the very reverse of the desired object in that the 
 dependence upon Parliament grew greater instead of 
 less, — how James II, by his endeavor to wreck the 
 Anglican Church, precipitated a crisis that resulted 
 in the invasion of England by the army of William 
 of Orange, and this gave the Opposition its oppor- 
 tunity to break the power of James, whose army, 
 
8 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 on which he had relied, forsook him and went over 
 to the enemy, — all these are familiar facts of his- 
 tory and need no enlargement here. 
 
 Although the crown could be conferred upon Wil- 
 liam and Mary, as it was upon their sister, Anne, 
 also, only by overriding the rights of their father 
 and brother, it was nevertheless formally conferred 
 upon them by Act of Parliament, and was accepted 
 by these sovereigns, together with stated conditions 
 (the Bill of Rights), to which they pledged them- 
 selves in solemn ceremony. They therefore became 
 the legally acknowledged rulers of the English peo- 
 ple, whose loyalty they consequently had a right 
 to claim. That these sovereigns left no heir to 
 the throne was the final disaster in the struggle to 
 maintain the supremacy of the Crown, for it now 
 passed to a foreign prince. The first two sovereigns 
 of the house of Hanover remained strangers in the 
 land they ruled, for they had little or no understand- 
 ing of its people, or of the political conditions which 
 prevailed, and found it possible to maintain them- 
 selves upon the throne only because their presence 
 there was a distinct advantage to certain interests 
 for which the men at the head of affairs, and who 
 had derived their power from Parliament, were con- 
 tending. 
 
 Thus it was that in England, in contrast to politi- 
 cal development on the continent, the sovereignty in 
 the later political structure devolved not upon the 
 Crown, but upon the organized Estates as repre- 
 sented in Parliament. Since George I understood 
 no English and had to resort to the Latin language 
 
Parliamentary Control in Eighteenth Century 9 
 
 when in consultation with his ministers, it was not 
 possible for him to take part in the deliberations 
 of the Cabinet, a circumstance through which this 
 body grew more and more independent, until finally 
 it emancipated itself entirely from royal control. 
 Whereas in the reign of William III, and in that 
 of Queen Anne also, the Cabinet had been the King's 
 Council, it now became the executive committee of 
 the Parliament. To be sure in all important mat- 
 ters, especially in those that concerned England's 
 foreign policy, the first two Georges, who were men 
 of energy and by no means lacking in ability, en- 
 deavored to make the royal will felt, in which they 
 were oftentimes successful, or at least partially so. 
 
 But, in strong contrast to the policy followed by 
 both William III and Queen Anne, the two succeed- 
 ing sovereigns added to the dependence of their 
 position by refusing every concession to the Tories, 
 and by surrendering themselves entirely into the 
 hands of the Whigs, the party that had set them 
 on the throne. When at last, with the accession 
 of George III, a king with truly national sympathies 
 came to the throne, it was too late to stem the tide. 
 It is true, he brought the Tories back into power, 
 yet his attempt to realize Bolingbroke's ideal of a 
 " Patriot King " failed utterly in spite of the honest 
 efforts of the King, and served only to increase the 
 confusion and add to the entanglements of odious 
 personal intrigue by which English politics were con- 
 trolled throughout the eighteenth century. 
 
 For this is what parliamentary government de- 
 generated into from the outset. In theory, no doubt, 
 
10 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 it fulfills the ideal of a perfect form of government, 
 and has been lauded as such ever since the days of 
 Montesquieu. Even yet the glamour which sur- 
 rounds it dazzles not only the masses of European 
 populations, but also those many well-intentioned 
 men who believe that in it they behold the realization 
 of their ideal, — the government of the people by 
 representatives that are chosen by a majority to give 
 expression to the public mind, — yet fail to look be- 
 yond the mere form, and so recognize the true 
 conditions. But it has ever been thus; mere form, 
 well-phrased, convinces the majority of men every- 
 where, and they are ready to swear by it. 
 
 The fact is that the English Parliament in its 
 formative period and up to the enactment of the 
 reforms of 1832 never was representative of the 
 people, but was rather the organization by which 
 a powerful aristocracy ruled. To be sure, by the en- 
 actment of the Bill of Rights parliamentary ascend- 
 ency was swung round to the Lower House, since 
 this body was thereby invested with the sole right to 
 levy taxes; no money bills, could even be amended 
 in the Upper House, which was limited to either ac- 
 cepting or rejecting them. But the right to elect 
 the members of the Lower House rested upon priv- 
 ileges granted by the Crown, by virtue of which cer- 
 tain villages, towns and counties received represen- 
 tation, while many others were either not represented 
 at all, or were inadequately represented. Moreover, 
 the right of suffrage was exercised by free land- 
 holders only, and was therefore restricted to a small 
 minority of the population. By such means as 
 
Control by the Upper House II 
 
 these it was possible for the higher nobles, of whom, 
 together with the Episcopal prelacy, the House of 
 Lords was constituted, to control the Lower House, 
 not legally but effectually; and in the widest range 
 of its activities, and so to maintain their ascendency, 
 both social and political. Many of the seats in the 
 Lower House were in the direct gift of the titled 
 members of the Upper House, since these had entire 
 control of the rotten boroughs — those small repre- 
 sented districts in which there were only very few 
 voters, in some cases not half a dozen. It has been 
 estimated that at one time not less than 306 mem- 
 bers of the Lower House owed their election to the 
 votes of only 160 persons. Moreover, the nobles 
 knew full well how to use this privilege to bring 
 into' the Lower House able men, to attach these to 
 themselves and their class interests, and finally, by 
 elevation to the peerage, to draw them within their 
 own circle. 
 
 In the other boroughs the election contests were 
 a wild farce in which any means of corruption, 
 bribery, deception, and even open violence were re- 
 sorted to without scruple, — scenes which have often 
 been pictured in drastic colors by English writers, 
 conspicuously so by the brilliant pen of Charles 
 Dickens. 
 
 In the Lower House itself, ever since the days of 
 William III, the most shameful corruption flour- 
 ished, — an indirect barter of votes for the nu- 
 merous government offices and for the very lucrative 
 sinecures in the gift of the government was carried 
 on side by side with open bribery on a vast scale. 
 
12 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 On the other hand the sovereignty that the revo- 
 lution of 1688 had transferred to the Lower House 
 was exercised in a manner that would have done 
 credit to the most vigorous of absolute monarchies. 
 Leze majesty was in England made to apply to the 
 Parliament, whereas it is notoriously the privilege 
 of every Englishman to speak as slightingly or as 
 offensively as he pleases about the nominal bearer 
 of the sovereignty — the King. Every offender 
 against the " privileges " of Parliament, every per- 
 son who dared attack the Parliament itself or its 
 Acts, was and is still rigorously prosecuted, and 
 is liable to severe and humiliating penalties. A free 
 criticism of all action by the legislative body, such 
 as is taken for granted in the countries of the con- 
 tinent, is not allowed even yet in England, and it 
 behooves him who ventures to step on this forbid- 
 den ground to choose his words carefully and to 
 weigh them well before he does so. 
 
 That its sittings were held in secret insured Parlia- 
 ment against control by public opinion. It is a 
 well known fact that even to-day visitors and re- 
 porters are admitted by courtesy only, the legal re- 
 strictions being officially ignored, and that all such 
 persons can be ejected at any moment if a member 
 announces that he sees " a stranger " present. 
 Moreover, to make a report of the proceedings of 
 Parliament was not only forbidden, but was a pun- 
 ishable offense. 
 
 Under conditions such as these the irresponsi- 
 bility of the Crown was assured; while, since the 
 days of William III, Parliament itself has shown 
 
Struggle for Supremacy Among Leaders 13 
 
 so little sense of responsibility, and, by its erratic 
 enactments, its subservience to momentary currents 
 of opinion, as well as to caprice and personal in- 
 fluence, has so often embarrassed a capable adminis- 
 tration, and prevented it from carrying out its well- 
 planned policies, that we can but wonder that Eng- 
 land has come forth so successfully from the foreign 
 conflicts in which she has been obliged to engage. 
 And, indeed, this would hardly have been possible 
 except for her insular position, which shielded Eng- 
 land against many a vital danger and prevented the 
 states of the continent, with the means then at their 
 command, from endangering her existence by at- 
 tacks such as they themselves had frequently to face. 
 It is in these conditions that we find a reason for the 
 dangerous vacillations that mark England's policy 
 during the reign of William III, in the war of the 
 Spanish Succession, in the Seven Years' war, and in 
 the Napoleonic wars, as well as for the serious 
 blunders that were made in the early conduct of the 
 Seven Years' war, the revolutionary wars, and at 
 other times. Certainly in the American war of 
 independence England suffered the full consequences 
 of these internal conditions. 
 
 The natural accompaniment of a parliamentary 
 form of government is the wide opportunities it 
 offers to men of ambition and to intriguing schemers. 
 During the reigns of George I and George II, Wal- 
 pole established his party, the Whigs, on a firm 
 foundation, and then, by a resort to any means of 
 bribery and intrigue, maintained himself in office for 
 two decades. Many ambitious and more or less 
 
14 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 gifted men found it to their advantage to join his 
 following and so to secure for themselves a share 
 of the flesh pots; to the man who felt himself ca- 
 pable of higher things, there was no course open ex- 
 cept to join the Opposition. But gradually the 
 Opposition grew in strength, probably for the sim- 
 ple reason that the men in power had been at the 
 head of affairs for so long a time; at last, foreign 
 complications gave the opportunity to accomplish 
 Walpole's downfall (January, 1742). And so mat- 
 ters went on until the close of the eighteenth century. 
 
 Most party leaders and other men of ambition 
 either belonged to the aristocracy by birth, or were 
 affiliated with them through close personal or family 
 relations, and, if they followed the usual course, 
 closed their careers as members of the Upper House. 
 What motto they emblazoned on their banners, what 
 measures of government they denounced with fa- 
 natical zeal as utter failures, or as schemes of ill 
 will or of treason mattered little. The fine-sound- 
 ing phrases and deep chest-tones of profound moral 
 conviction have always been the ready resort of the 
 orator, and the layman finds them very convincing. 
 At the psychological moment, at an election for in- 
 stance, they may turn the scales in the desired direc- 
 tion. If they do, they have served their purpose; 
 indeed, nothing more is expected of them, and it is 
 a great mistake to take them seriously. 
 
 No English statesman, when he attained to power, 
 has ever hesitated to support the very measures 
 which he had previously bitterly denounced, pro- 
 vided that they now served his purpose, whereas the 
 
Reforms 1 5 
 
 principles which he had advocated as leader of the 
 Opposition were allowed to fall into neglect as soon 
 as he undertook the leadership for the Government. 
 It all resolves itself into a struggle for power, and 
 has never been a battle for principle. I have asked 
 a number of educated and well-informed English- 
 men whether in their opinion a single one of the 
 English statesmen of the eighteenth century, with 
 the exception of Burke (an Irishman), really be- 
 lieved in the principles he advocated, except in so far 
 as they stood for the power and renown of his 
 country, of course, but have never received a con- 
 fident affirmative in reply. 
 
 The nineteenth century, however, has seen great 
 changes in England's political life. The reforms 
 of . 1832 did away altogether with the " rotten 
 boroughs," and in their stead all the many towns 
 that had grown into great centers of population in 
 recent years were given adequate representation, and 
 the franchise was greatly widened in other ways. 
 Through later reform bills the franchise became 
 more and more democratic, until, since 1885, about 
 two-thirds of all male inhabitants of the kingdom 
 over twenty-one years of age have the right to vote; 
 but from a universal right of suffrage such as is in 
 force in Germany and in other continental states, 
 England is still far removed. 
 
 By this redistribution of the franchise the way 
 was opened for an enormous development of the 
 commercial and industrial interests of the coun- 
 try, for they gained a wide political influence by 
 means of it. The great centers of commerce and 
 
1 6 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 of industry in the North, which had hitherto suffered 
 political neglect, now became a highly influential, at 
 times even a deciding factor in the political life of 
 the country. The introduction of free trade and the 
 check this gave to the agrarian interests, that until 
 then had been paramount in the country, were the 
 next links in the chain of consequences. Unre- 
 strained capitalization, commerce and manufacture, 
 that as early as the eighteenth century had become 
 the economic foundations of England's greatness, 
 and had exerted a deciding influence upon the 
 political action of the state, now received official 
 recognition in its constitutional structure, and be- 
 came the dominating factors in its political life, be- 
 fore which all else had to give way. 
 
 Meanwhile the people were emancipated from the 
 restraining shackles of a narrow creed, by means 
 of which the masses had been controlled by the Eng- 
 lish State Church, than which there has been no less 
 edifying offspring of the Christian religion, — a sort 
 of bastard product compounded of politics and the- 
 ology, organized with great but cynical refinement 
 for the special purpose of keeping the people in 
 spiritual subjection to the ruling classes, to whom 
 it afforded the opportunity of exploiting the bene- 
 fices, while the spiritual welfare of the people was 
 all but neglected. Even at the present time the 
 State Church in England has in no way relinquished 
 its political rights, its dominant social position, nor 
 its revenues, and its benefices are still subjects of 
 presentation, as in the past ; their advowson belongs 
 in part to the Crown, to Church dignitaries, and to 
 
The English State Church ij 
 
 colleges and universities ; but the larger half belongs 
 to persons in private life, whereby the presentation 
 of the benefices is in the hands of laymen of almost 
 any confession of faith. 
 
 In Ireland the Disestablishment Act of 1868 de- 
 prived the English Church of its position there as 
 the only recognized state church, but at the same 
 time it received so great a compensation for the 
 revenues it had to relinquish that it still controls 
 funds and holds a position of eminence quite out 
 of proportion to the small number of its communi- 
 cants. The same is true of Wales, where the people 
 are largely Methodists, and where the services of the 
 English Church are as little attended as they are in 
 the larger part of Ireland. An Act to disestablish 
 the State Church here also twice passed the Lower 
 House in 19 13, but was lost in the Upper House. 
 In Scotland, of course, the Presbyterian Church is 
 the recognized church of the state; but here the laws 
 by which other Protestant denominations, " the dis- 
 senters," suffered constraint are no longer in force 
 anywhere, and the Catholics and Jews are as emanci- 
 pated now as are any other religious sects. The 
 Catholics of Ireland have sent so large a represen- 
 tation to Parliament that they have compelled con- 
 sideration there, and in the great political crises the 
 deciding vote has often been theirs. 
 
 The reforms of recent years have broken the in- 
 fluence which the great families and the ministry 
 formerly exerted upon the elections, and the cor- 
 ruption in Parliament, the barter of votes, has 
 ceased. But in spite of all preventive measures il- 
 
1 8 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 legal influences, such as direct or indirect bribery, 
 must still be reckoned with at the elections, and in 
 a much greater extent than such things occur, for 
 instance, with us. And there is little hope that in 
 England this practice will be entirely uprooted, for 
 the Englishman seems to have no scruples in this 
 respect, — corrupt practices do not seem to disturb 
 the English conscience, if only outward appearances 
 are preserved. Nevertheless acts of bare-faced cor- 
 ruption such as used to take place at the polls are 
 now no longer possible, and, generally speaking, the 
 will of the majority finds expression in the elections 
 of to-day. But the most important step forward 
 lies in the fact that the proceedings of Parliament 
 are now fully reported in spite of the prohibitory 
 law, and consequently the attitude and vote of its 
 members are under the control of their constitu- 
 encies. The result is that the Parliament, that once 
 was in no way responsible, is now subject to the 
 scrutiny of the public and the electorate, and so 
 has become responsible to the people. This has put 
 an end to open corruption, i. e., the exploitation of 
 a seat in Parliament for the purpose of personal ag- 
 grandizement. 
 
 By this process of development an entirely new 
 element has been introduced into the political life 
 of England. In the Parliaments of the eighteenth 
 century small parties were frequently formed within 
 the two principal parties, or else were associated 
 with them. These then unfurled their banner in 
 support of some principle involved in some one of 
 the political questions of the day, and made use 
 
Political Parties 1 9 
 
 of it to vanquish the men in power, hoping in this 
 way to secure the flesh pots for themselves, or, 
 failing of this, at least to compel consideration of 
 themselves by a coalition. , In the place of these 
 smaller groups there now exist two well-defined 
 parties, the Irish Party and the Labor Party, with 
 which every Government must reckon. In the main, 
 however, the old conditions still persist, because, 
 through the concessions that are made to these 
 smaller political elements by one or the other of the 
 principal parties for the purpose of gaining their sup- 
 port, the condition arises that a majority and a mi- 
 nority stand opposed to each other, who, however, 
 when it comes to a vote, always hold together until 
 some vital question brings about a crisis and the de- 
 feat of the Government. This sometimes leads to 
 the formation of a new party, as it did in connec- 
 tion with Gladstone's Home Rule Bill for Ireland, 
 when a large number of the Liberals deserted him to 
 combine with the Conservatives and form a new 
 party, the Unionists. Generally speaking, however, 
 in England as in America, the conviction is abroad 
 that in parliamentary contests it is not so much the 
 principle of the party program that must be victo- 
 rious, be it ever so enthusiastically advocated, but the 
 party itself that must triumph in order to gain and 
 hold a political power that is only attainable when, 
 forgetful of all minor interests, two great parties 
 stand opposed to each other. This tendency may 
 be ascribed to a common trait of the political char- 
 acter of the two nations, and one in which they dif- 
 fer from the nations of the European continent, 
 
20 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 especially from the Germans; their idea of political 
 freedom is not liberty to realize their own political 
 ideals, but submission to the will of a majority. 
 What is determined by the majority must receive 
 the support of the individual, whether it coincides 
 with his convictions or not. We will consider this 
 subject more fully later. 
 
 This procedure finds especial favor in these two 
 countries because there the elections are decided by 
 a relative and not by an absolute majority as is the 
 case with us, and therefore the deplorable final elec- 
 tions which so embitter our political life are dis- 
 pensed with. It also makes it next to impossible 
 for more than two candidates to be nominated in 
 an electoral district; the campaign is planned from 
 the outset to be a contest between two great political 
 parties, and not, as with us, for a struggle between 
 a dozen or more smaller groups. 1 
 
 1 In America candidates must be residents of the district 
 in which they are nominated, a restriction which, though 
 not obligatory by law, is nevertheless maintained by un- 
 broken precedent. This greatly diminishes the opportunity 
 for men of distinguished ability to find their way into the 
 House of Representatives of the Congress, and by far the 
 larger number of its members arrive there through the 
 machinations of the " wire-pullers." The election cam- 
 paigns are managed for each party organization by means 
 of its " machine," with a resort to any questionable 
 measures, and an unscrupulous, systematically planned 
 corruption. In the United States it is therefore the Senate, 
 the members of which are elected by the states (two from 
 each state and for a term of six years), that holds first rank 
 in the estimation of the people, and is of chief importance, 
 just the reverse of what it is with us. But in America, as 
 
Parliament in Nineteenth Century 21 
 
 In earlier times the elections by which the Gov- 
 ernment appealed to the people for support and upon 
 the outcome of which their continuance in office de- 
 pended were comparatively rare in England; mem- 
 bers of Parliament were free to vote upon many 
 questions, even on questions of great moment, ac- 
 cording to their personal convictions and without 
 regard to party lines. But during the course of the 
 nineteenth century this freedom has grown steadily 
 
 every one knows, no attempt is made to maintain a truly 
 parliamentary system. The President of the United States 
 is quite independent of Congress, although his nomina- 
 tions require confirmation by the Senate, and his financial 
 policy is dependent upon the appropriations made by Con- 
 gress. He is free to select the members of his Cabinet ac- 
 cording to his own judgment, and it is their duty to carry 
 out his wishes, and they are responsible to no one but him ; 
 whether or not they belong to the party which has a ma- 
 jority in one or both Houses is of no importance. More- 
 over, the President, — and in the individual states, the gov- 
 ernors, — exercises the right of veto to a degree of which 
 we in Europe have scarce an idea. The fact that he is 
 elected by the whole people gives him an authority far 
 greater than that held by any constitutional monarch. 
 Generally speaking, the legislative bodies are regarded in 
 America as necessary evils that must be endured, but whose 
 power, at least in the individual states, must be limited as 
 much as possible that they may do a minimum of mischief. 
 This is accomplished in part by fixing a time limit for the 
 sessions of the legislatures, which in most of the newer 
 states are not allowed to be called for more than sixty 
 days in two years (in Alabama it is only for forty-five 
 days in four years), and further, by submitting a large 
 number of questions to the direct vote of the people, and 
 so making it possible to incorporate new laws into the 
 state constitutions without the action of the legislatures. 
 
22 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 less until at the present time the vote on every ques- 
 tion of importance is strictly a party matter, con- 
 trolled by the " whips," who see to it that rigid party 
 discipline is maintained. 
 
 Although the bills brought in by the Government 
 are modified and frequently much amended in conse- 
 quence of their discussion in Parliament, still, on all 
 fundamental questions the decision rests with the 
 Cabinet, and not with Parliament, although the Cabi- 
 net finds itself compelled to show a due regard for 
 the drift of opinions within its own party, and to 
 make frequent compromise where they differ. As 
 a consequence, the prestige of Parliament has waned 
 in a measure, and that of its members, very ma- 
 terially. The representative in Parliament is not a 
 free agent, but is bound to follow the instructions 
 of the party that elected him. His constituents keep 
 him under constant surveillance, and if he should 
 disappoint them, he would not only have to lay down 
 his office, but he would be a dead man politically. 1 
 The Parliament, therefore, is now actually in a sim- 
 ilar position to that once held by the former bearer 
 of the sovereignty, the King. Just as the latter, ac- 
 cording to the official and jealously guarded interpre- 
 tation of the constitution, is not allowed to hold, or 
 
 1 This is, of course, not the case when a politician goes 
 over permanently to the other party and begins his political 
 career anew, it may be with pre-eminent success, as was 
 the case with Gladstone, and before him with Sir Robert 
 Peel, in both cases because of an honest change in convic- 
 tions; and of Lord Palmerston because he followed his 
 instinct for power. Disraeli, too, was a Liberal before he 
 began his parliamentary career. 
 
Supremacy of the Cabinet 23 
 
 at least to express an opinion, but must blindly fol- 
 low the advice of his ministers, 1 so now the ordi- 
 nary member of parliament can not have an opinion 
 of his own, but must render unquestioning obedience 
 to his party leaders. 
 
 This development found its culmination when re- 
 cently (1911) the House of Lords was deprived of 
 the right of veto, a right which enabled the Upper 
 House to take a hand in the party struggles, and 
 to bring to nought the measures forwarded by the 
 party in power, an interference which of course was 
 always in favor of the Conservatives and Unionists, 
 and against the Liberals and Radicals. With this 
 right fell the last bulwark that stood against the 
 achievement of absolute party domination and the 
 nominal sovereignty of the Lower House, which, in 
 fact, however, is the rule of a Cabinet brought into 
 office by the vote of the people. Officially the pres- 
 ent form of government in England is a democracy, 
 i. e., a government by a majority of the people, or 
 rather, by a nominal majority as shown by the re- 
 turns of the elections. It is, of course, not so radi- 
 cal a democracy as is to be found in many of the 
 states of the continent, or in America or Australia, 
 since England has not as yet granted universal man- 
 hood suffrage. Moreover it must not be overlooked 
 
 1 The exceptional position in this respect which Edward 
 VII created for himself will receive attention later in this 
 volume. On the other hand, his successor, George V, met 
 with reproach during the past year because, instead of 
 taking the initiative himself in the effort to prevent civil 
 war in Ireland, he left it to a conference of party leaders 
 with instructions to seek a compromise. 
 
24 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 that although the political organization of the Eng- 
 lish state is that of a democracy, and in spite of the 
 important political role that the citizen element now 
 plays in the political life of the nation, and the 
 great influence which capital and the commercial 
 and industrial interests exert, the English social 
 structure is nevertheless now, as it always has been, 
 an out-and-out aristocracy, more so, indeed, than 
 that of any other country in the world. This may 
 be attributed to the fact that the old families have 
 been wise enough to adapt themselves to the new 
 conditions, to preserve to themselves the dominat- 
 ing influence, and to draw to themselves new ele- 
 ments from out the opposing circles, and thoroughly 
 to assimilate these. Therefore it is that, in a meas- 
 ure, they still hold the reins by which the country's 
 course is guided, and even the most radical statesmen 
 must, in spite of themselves, conform to their de- 
 mands and seek their co-operation. As yet it would 
 be quite impossible to form a Government in which 
 the aristocracy and the Upper House are not ade- 
 quately represented by some shining titles, just as 
 no private undertaking of a scientific or of a social 
 nature can hope for success without such support. 
 As in other matters, so also does the superficial 
 observer, and with him the general public, base his 
 judgment of the English Constitution on its official 
 form. Such forms, however, never represent the 
 true character of existing institutions, but contain 
 many antiquated clauses, the original meaning of 
 which has been modified by a more modern inter- 
 pretation, or else they have lost their meaning alto- 
 
Parliament's Dependence Upon Cabinet 25 
 
 gether. In England, which has no constitution and 
 where countless institutions now regarded as in- 
 violable rest entirely upon tradition, on precedent, 
 or on a re-construction of old statutes, this condition 
 is in especial evidence, as it also was in ancient 
 Rome. Meanings almost diametrically opposed to 
 each other may be read into almost any clause of the 
 Common Law, according to the predilections of the 
 interpreter, i. e., according to the opinion for which 
 the commentator desires legal support. By the pro- 
 visions of the constitution the King is entitled to 
 numerous rights and privileges, — but he is not al- 
 lowed to make use of them ; they have in fact, and 
 in so far as they are not obsolete, been transferred 
 to the Cabinet, and the sovereignty of the Crown 
 plays no greater role in England than it did in the 
 Roman Empire; or as, in the Common Law of the 
 Middle Ages, did the sovereignty of the people, who 
 were recognized as the official bearer of all political 
 authority for the sole purpose of transferring that 
 authority to the Emperor, as the representative of 
 the people. In our times the English Parliament 
 has had the selfsame experience, except that the 
 process of development has as yet not reached its 
 completion. The actual ruling body of the English 
 state, the Cabinet, is unknown to the constitution, 
 and, in so far as any foundation can be found for it, 
 it rests on the provision made for the Privy Coun- 
 cil, which still has an official existence, but has lost 
 all significance, and is never summoned. 
 
 Practically, the feature of the English constitu- 
 tional organization of to-day is that two groups of 
 
26 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 statesmen stand opposed to each other and ready at 
 any moment to assume the government. How these 
 groups are formed, and who belongs to them is no 
 one's concern but their own, and is regulated by the 
 party leaders, who keep in touch with the currents 
 of party opinion. The one indispensable condition 
 is that aspirants for places in the ministry must be 
 entitled to a seat in Parliament, some in the Lower 
 House, and some in the Upper House, since a minis- 
 ter can only address the House of which he is a 
 member. The party leader is chosen by his party, 
 or rather by the most important group of its mem- 
 bers, according to their own judgment, and he is 
 the man who, when a cabinet crisis arises, is sum- 
 moned by the King and charged with the formation 
 of a new ministry. The decision as to which of the 
 two political parties shall be entrusted with the gov- 
 ernment is given by the people in an election for 
 the Lower House. The successful party then has 
 the right to govern England for seven years, the 
 length of life of a Parliament. The Parliament can 
 be dissolved at any time, however, and a new de- 
 cision at the polls called for. Such a course may 
 be desirable for several reasons. It may be that the 
 men in power regard the time as favorable to an 
 increase of their majority in Parliament by means 
 of a new election, and a consequent extension of 
 their term in office ; or, on the other hand, they may 
 have seen their majority there gradually dwindling 
 in consequence of subsequent by-elections in which 
 the returns were unfavorable to their party; or their 
 coalition with some of the smaller, more or less 
 
Practical Working of English Constitution 2J 
 
 independent groups, such as the Irish Party, or the 
 Labor Party, or other extremists, is in danger of 
 being ended; or else the current of public opinion 
 may be setting strong against them. For the last, 
 however, the evidence must be strong indeed, if it 
 is to have the desired effect, for cabinets have been 
 known to remain calmly in office even after they 
 were fully aware that they could no longer count 
 upon the support of a majority of their constituents, 
 and that at the next election they would surely be 
 defeated, — if only they retained their majority in 
 Parliament. It has moreover become traditional to 
 dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people when, 
 during the rule of one party, new problems of funda- 
 mental importance arise, such as the home rule and 
 tariff questions, and the Lords' right of veto. 
 
 Plainly then, the decision as to which of the two 
 groups of statesmen shall direct the government for 
 a term of years rests with the voters of the country. 
 The majority as it is rendered at the polls makes the 
 decision, — the subsequent nomination by the Crown 
 and the confirmatory vote of the Parliament are 
 merely necessary formalities. Nominally, one or 
 the other of the two well defined parties that have 
 faced each other for centuries must bear off the vic- 
 tory. In fact, however, the scales are turned by 
 those political elements of the population that are 
 not permanently associated with either party. Al- 
 though, because of tradition, personal interests, and 
 the viewpoint from which they regard life, the great 
 majority of the population hold unwaveringly either 
 to the one or the other of the two great parties, and 
 
28 Features of the English Constitution 
 
 can see nothing but evil in the other, the two parties 
 are yet so evenly balanced that neither can depend 
 wholly upon its own adherents for a decision and an 
 assured majority. 1 Between the two parties stand 
 many men who take a broader view and do not 
 cling unquestioningly to any one group, either be- 
 cause they are truly above party domination, and 
 so judge events and conditions for themselves, or 
 else because the course taken by the ruling party 
 does not satisfy them, and their expectations have 
 not been fulfilled, and consequently they want to 
 give the other side a trial ; or simply because in their 
 opinion a change of party is beneficial and promotes 
 the general good. Indeed these new elections have 
 almost without fail resulted in shifting the responsi- 
 bility of government to the shoulders of the former 
 minority. 
 
 It is the minor elements therefore upon which the 
 change of party depends. It is they who decide the 
 election and in reality determine who is to be at 
 the head of the English government, and so control 
 the " play of English institutions." 
 
 1 The same is true of the United States. During a po- 
 litical campaign little or no effort is spent on those states in 
 which one or the other of the two principal parties feels 
 assured of a majority; nor do these states receive consider- 
 ation when a candidate for the presidency is to be selected, 
 while every effort is made to win the doubtful states in 
 which either party may hope for victory, and it is largely 
 with this in view that the presidential candidates are 
 chosen. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 The English Idea of the State and of 
 Freedom 
 
 Of all these many changes in the mode of govern- 
 ing only a small part found formal expression in 
 decisions and Acts of Parliament, while in reality 
 they influenced the deeper meaning and structure of 
 the constitution and its practical interpretation to a 
 much greater degree than is apparent on the sur- 
 face. Nevertheless the political life of the England 
 of to-day still rests on the old basis and fundamental 
 opinions that were evolved in the constitutional 
 struggles of the seventeenth century, and which have 
 shaped political thought in England ever since. 
 
 The political life of England, — and that of Amer- 
 ica also in so far as this is built upon foundations 
 inherited from England, — must be gauged by an 
 entirely different standard from that by which we 
 judge the continental states, and especially is this 
 true in so far as the most vital issues in both the 
 home and the foreign policy are concerned, since 
 the political organization on the continent is the 
 exact opposite of that in the insular kingdom. The 
 most important and most deeply rooted difference 
 lies in the continental idea of the state as it has 
 been developed in its relation to the central author- 
 
 29 
 
3<3 English Idea: State and Freedom 
 
 ity, the sovereign; of this the English, or we will 
 say, the people of Great Britain have no concep- 
 tion. To us the state is the most indispensable as 
 well as the highest requisite to our earthly existence, 
 not with regard to our political welfare alone, but to 
 the daily life and activity of the individual as well, 
 uniting, as it does, the entire population dwelling 
 within the utmost limits of its jurisdiction in whole- 
 some activity for the general good ; we therefore be- 
 lieve it to be worthy of, as well as entitled to the 
 entire devotion of every citizen, in honorable effort 
 to further its purposes. All individualistic en- 
 deavor, of which there is no lack with us too, as 
 well as the aspirations of those shattered foreign 
 nationalities that are included within the boundaries 
 of our state, must be unreservedly subordinated to 
 this lofty claim. On the other hand, the state, 
 through its organ, the government, also has its high 
 obligation to fulfill, i. e., to hold itself free and un- 
 prejudiced, above the influence of the individualistic 
 aspirations of persons and classes, of industrial com- 
 binations and political parties, and, unaffected by 
 these, to promote the interests and solve the prob- 
 lems that concern the entire nation, and to carry 
 them to a successful issue in spite of the antagonism 
 of all opposing elements. The state is of much 
 higher importance than any one of these individ- 
 ualistic groups, and eventually is of infinitely more 
 value than the sum of all the individuals within its 
 jurisdiction. For it has a life apart; its mission 
 is unending, and, in theory at least, unless it is 
 wrecked by a force from without, its existence is 
 
Contrast: English and Continental Idea 31 
 
 endless, encompassing, as it does, all the generations 
 yet to come, and weldmg them into a great unit, — 
 the mighty life of a nation acting its part in the 
 history of the world. 
 
 This conception of the state, which is as much a 
 part of our life as is the blood in our veins, is no- 
 where to be found in the English Constitution, and 
 is quite foreign to English thought, and to that of 
 America as well. To be sure, in contradistinction 
 to the dualism of the mediaeval state, the union of 
 the will to do and the power to act for the state has 
 been achieved in the Kingdom of Great Britain and 
 Ireland, and in the American Republic also, where 
 this idea, in opposition to that of the sovereignty 
 of each individual state, came off victorious in the 
 bloody struggle of the war of secession from which 
 the American people emerged as a nation. 1 To 
 the potency of this centralization of power may be 
 ascribed the vigorous conduct of Britain's more re- 
 cent foreign wars, and the pursuit of a well-defined 
 national policy abroad. As a consequence, a strong 
 national feeling has developed in England. t In this 
 the people of Scotland and of Wales share, at least 
 in times of important crises, whereas in Ireland, 
 whose official status is one of equality with the other 
 
 1 The idea of this new oneness of the country finds char- 
 acteristic proof in the use of its name as a singular sub- 
 stantive — " The United States has done something," — 
 whereas formerly it was customary to speak of " These 
 United States " with the use of the plural form of the verb, 
 a peculiarity of speech which is no longer used except by 
 the fast disappearing remnant of the advocates of partic- 
 ularism. 
 
32 English Idea: State and Freedom 
 
 members of the Kingdom, but whose real position 
 is that of a subject kingdom exploited for the bene- 
 fit of English interests, the sentiments that prevail 
 stand in harshest contrast to this feeling. 
 
 In England it is the Parliament to which the state 
 delegates the centralized authority, or, more accu- 
 rately speaking, to a ministry that has the support 
 of a majority in the House of Commons. This 
 circumstance in itself precludes the possibility of a 
 governing institution of the state that shall be su- 
 perior to party bias, and representative of the people 
 as a whole, uniting them in a common purpose. 
 Here, as in all countries ruled by a parliament, it is 
 ever a question of majorities and minorities with 
 which the people concern themselves, and never one 
 of a truly centralized authority of the state. 
 
 This explains why the English have no concep- 
 tion whatever of our idea of a centralized state. 
 The German word Stoat is untranslatable into Eng- 
 lish. There is absolutely no English equivalent to 
 express the idea which this word conveys to us. 
 The Britain speaks of " the Empire," which is a 
 much more comprehensive term, for it brings to 
 mind all the British possessions in the five continents, 
 and therefore expresses England's position as a 
 world power; or he speaks of " the Government," 
 and this implies much less, for it designates only the 
 representatives of the party then at the helm of 
 state, while it excludes the smaller half of the popu- 
 lation standing in marked opposition to them and 
 antagonizing their every measure. Instead of being 
 ruled by a centralized authority representing the 
 
England's Sudden Changes of Policy 33 
 
 state, and superior to all party bias, England is gov- 
 erned by representatives of a political party. To se- 
 cure a majority for his party, and so to gain for 
 it the control of the government, is the first duty 
 of every English statesman, and of every American 
 statesman as well. This is the viewpoint from 
 which all his plans are made, however dear to his 
 heart may be his country's position as a world power, 
 or the promotion of its interests abroad, for even 
 the foreign policy of the country is shaded accord- 
 ing to this consideration, and in the end is but a 
 move in the game of politics. It is here that we 
 find the reason for the sudden changes in England's 
 foreign policy that have so often accompanied a 
 change of Government; for the party in opposition, 
 when it takes the helm, can naturally feel no com- 
 pulsion whatever to carry to completion the meas- 
 ures of its predecessors in office, since up to this 
 time they have been its special objects of attack. 
 In so far as they may be considered obligations of 
 the state, this too can have but little weight, since the 
 state has no existence as an independent authority. 
 Of a continuously homogeneous foreign policy there 
 can therefore be no thought in England, except in 
 so far as there are certain views and plans of action 
 that are entertained by both parties alike, and which 
 both are eager to see carried out. To these belongs 
 the continued and complete supremacy at sea, to- 
 gether with the consequences which it may entail, 
 because this is of vital importance to the entire popu- 
 lation of Great Britain. 
 
 Just as the English have no conception of what 
 
34 English Idea: State and Freedom 
 
 the word " Stoat " conveys to the German mind, 
 nor a word to express it, so neither do they under- 
 stand, nor have they a word for our " Vaterland." 
 They have become familiar with its use through 
 contact with the Germans, and to convey the Ger- 
 man meaning have translated it by the word father- 
 land. But for them this word designates the Ger- 
 man's fatherland, and it is spoken most often in a 
 tone slightly ironic, or with a pitying sneer in de- 
 rision of German sentimentality. The Britain has 
 a " home," but no fatherland. He has no compre- 
 hension of what the German embodies in the word 
 fatherland, which is his highest and most sacred pos- 
 session, calling forth his noblest sentiments and as- 
 pirations. To this the Britain is a stranger, and 
 therefore it is absolutely impossible for him to un- 
 derstand the German national song " Deutschland, 
 Deutschland iiber alles, iiber alles in der Welt." 
 With childish naivete he misconstrues it into an ex- 
 pression of the German nation's aspiration for world 
 dominion, a thought which certainly was never en- 
 tertained by the poet, Hoffmann von Fallersleben, 
 himself, nor by the unnumbered millions of Germans 
 who have sung it, nor by those who still sing it with 
 enthusiastic abandon, and to whom the English in- 
 terpretation of it seems incomprehensible. The 
 British look upon it as a match for their national 
 song " Britannia, Rule the Waves," and, with 
 further childish naivete, take it for granted that 
 Britain's right to rule the sea is the most natural 
 thing in the world, and must be conceded by every 
 one as a matter of course, while the aspiration of 
 
England's Leadership Overtaken 35 
 
 any other nation to a position of independence in 
 the world, and one of importance as a national unit, 
 is not only regarded as prejudicial to English in- 
 terests, but is loudly decried as a crime against all 
 mankind. 
 
 In its practical operation the English Constitution 
 influences every phase of public life. It is the popu- 
 lar belief that it secures to Great Britain the most 
 highly developed form of government, far in ad- 
 vance of all others; and this was true of it at the 
 time of its conception and of its development during 
 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The espe- 
 cial feature which justified this high claim is that 
 it protected every citizen's right of personal liberty, 
 and bestowed upon a fractional part of the popula- 
 tion — by no means upon all the people, as is gen- 
 erally believed — the right to participate in the life 
 of the state, and so strengthened the foundations 
 upon which the efficiency of state authority is based. 
 To these advantages must be added the far greater 
 degree of freedom which it secured to the industrial 
 interests of the country, and the consequent in- 
 crease in material and resources which were placed 
 at the disposal of state and nation alike. But the 
 English advance in state organization has long since 
 been overtaken, and since the beginning of the nine- 
 teenth century England has fallen more and more 
 to the rear, while it has tardily and grudgingly, and 
 therefore ineffectually introduced the institutions 
 which in other countries have been developed to a 
 much higher degree. 
 
 We may find the reason for this reluctance in the 
 
36 English Idea: State and Freedom 
 
 English idea of freedom that was developed in the 
 conflict between the Parliament and the Crown, and 
 which was begun by the higher nobles, and was then 
 continued to its conclusion by some of these in com- 
 bination with the House of Commons. In this con- 
 flict the primary issue was parliamentary privilege, 
 but in its wider and national issues it laid the foun- 
 dation for the Englishman's right to personal lib- 
 erty. The Habeas Corpus Act, by which in 1678 
 he was protected against imprisonment without a 
 fair trial, is the great bulwark of personal freedom, 
 while the provisions of the Declaration of Rights, 
 by which the supremacy of Parliament was estab- 
 lished in 1689, gave the nation's aspirations for free- 
 dom legal form. In this struggle both parties took 
 part, Whig and Tory alike; for the Tories are by 
 no means wholly committed to the support of roy- 
 alty, but, on the contrary, they have been known 
 to oppose the Crown more vigorously than ever did 
 the Whigs. If on the other hand they have fre- 
 quently defended the rights of the Crown, this was 
 at times but the winning card in the game of politics 
 by which they hoped to promote the interests of the 
 proprietary and agrarian elements of the popula- 
 tion, and so to add to their own power, and by no 
 means a disinterested desire on their part to add to 
 the lustre of a self-sufficient monarchy. Their dis- 
 affection in 1688 decided the outcome of the Revo- 
 lution and defeated James II. 
 
 The English idea of freedom is of a peculiarly 
 negative character; it expresses itself in effort to 
 dispense as much as possible with state authority. 
 
English Idea of Freedom 37 
 
 Accordingly, the English seek to reduce to a mini- 
 mum the claims of the state upon the citizen, as 
 well as the interference of state authority in the life 
 of the individual citizen, to whom they would se- 
 cure the utmost liberty of action, and entire free- 
 dom to pursue his own interests in private life and 
 in the realm of industry, an object which has been 
 realized in a high degree and with stupendous re- 
 sults. 
 
 But, after all, man is a social being and cannot 
 exist in isolation, dependent upon himself alone, but 
 finds life possible only in well organized and united 
 communities regulated by inviolable laws. There- 
 fore, what the state cannot and, according to the 
 English idea, should not do to accomplish this end 
 must be provided for by other means. In England, 
 and in America also, it would seem that the rights 
 and the functions of the state have been reduced to 
 their smallest limit, and here the abrogated state 
 authority has been replaced by a subtle something 
 styled " public opinion " — custom, tradition, prec- 
 edent — together with an unquestioning subordi- 
 nation of the individual to the will of the majority. 
 
 The English and American idea of freedom dif- 
 fers totally from ours. 1 If on the one hand the 
 
 1 From the moment that a well educated German steps 
 foot upon the pier in New York until the time that he 
 leaves from it, he feels himself under a restraint that is 
 foreign to his nature and is irksome to him, but which he 
 cannot escape. At every turn he comes upon established 
 customs and dominating opinions that demand his implicit 
 submission, and so encroach upon his sense of personal 
 freedom in matters which he feels he should be allowed to 
 
38 English Idea: State and Freedom 
 
 control of the citizen by the state has been reduced 
 to its lowest quantity, and which according to our 
 views is far too low, on the other hand the indi- 
 vidual Englishman or American lives under a con- 
 stant social constraint which is unknown to us, and 
 which we would resent as absolute tyranny, and as 
 a lack of personal freedom. To our mind the essen- 
 tial condition of freedom is the liberty of the in- 
 
 decide for himself. Of all the problems that America 
 offers for solution to one who becomes thoroughly ac- 
 quainted with this " land of contrasts," the strangest and 
 most difficult for him to understand is how the people can 
 believe themselves to be a free nation, the free nation in 
 fact, while in reality they live under hourly restraint or 
 compulsion of which, however, they are not aware, because 
 they have been accustomed to it from youth up, and there- 
 fore accept it as a matter-of-course. There is the con- 
 straint of numberless convictions hallowed by tradition, the 
 influence of which is felt in all daily intercourse', but above 
 all in the sphere of religion, and which acts as a check 
 on the free expression of opinion, and stifles independent 
 thought. There is the constraint exercised by public 
 opinion, or what passes for such, and which makes pos- 
 sible the insufferable intrusion of impertinent interviewers 
 who daily drag before the public all the private affairs of 
 the individual citizen and his family, — no one is secure 
 against the possibility of finding himself at any time 
 charged in the newspapers with the most serious offenses, 
 pure inventions of the reporters, for which, however, there 
 is no redress. And lastly, there is the dreadful tyranny 
 of organized labor, and of the unscrupulous host of poli- 
 ticians who control state and municipality alike, and whom 
 the average American looks upon as a necessary evil that 
 must be endured, and so does nothing to break their power. 
 " Politicians are despised in this country " — but they are 
 allowed to have their way. 
 
English and German Ideas 39 
 
 dividual to develop his intellectual and spiritual 
 personality according to his own ideas, — the right 
 to shape his views of life independently of the opin- 
 ions of others, and, from the standpoint thus gained, 
 to determine his attitude toward the events of life, 
 and to be allowed unhindered to take an honest stand 
 for his convictions among his fellow-men. This 
 tendency, which is paramount in every German and 
 in which he will not allow himself to be thwarted, 
 and which therefore is the fundamental characteris- 
 tic of the political as well as of the spiritual and in- 
 tellectual life of the German people, is foreign to the 
 Englishman and to the American as well, or, to say 
 the least, is but meagerly developed in them. To 
 them freedom means the right of the majority to 
 have- their way, and there is nothing left to those 
 who think otherwise but unqualified submission. 
 Therefore " public opinion " is the highest authority 
 for the Englishman and the American, whereas for 
 the German it seems to be almost the reverse, for 
 when an argument is upheld by the statement that 
 it is in accord with " public opinion," or that it is 
 " generally accepted," he is repelled rather than per- 
 suaded, by it, and often almost unconsciously ranges 
 himself on the opposing side. This constraining 
 influence of public opinion is most potently felt in 
 the spiritual and intellectual sphere, especially in 
 that of religion, where freedom and recognition of 
 personal convictions means practically freedom for 
 the majority only, or for those who have succeeded 
 in getting the upper hand, and so are accepted 
 as being the majority, while for all others it 
 
40 English Idea: State and Freedom 
 
 means intolerance of their views, and an uncondi- 
 tional surrender to the mind of the majority. Very 
 slowly, and only after long continued struggle and 
 when the futility of trying to force every one to 
 subscribe to the same views was beyond controversy, 
 did the idea of tolerance in matters religious gain 
 ground in England and America, and even yet it 
 is not as general there as in the foremost countries 
 of the continent. It is a matter of common knowl- 
 edge how largely individual freedom of conscience 
 is still restrained by the English law, and even to a 
 much greater degree by long established custom and 
 by public opinion, which makes itself felt in an op- 
 pressive spiritual constraint, or at least in a demand 
 for outward conformity to prevailing custom. 
 
 It will be profitable in this connection to relate an 
 incident in my own early life, which confirms my 
 opinion and by which my eyes were first opened to 
 existing conditions in England, as well as to the Eng- 
 lish idea of freedom. Just after I was graduated, 
 I held the position of tutor during the years 1875 
 and 1876 in the family of the English consul-general 
 at Constantinople, Sir Philip Francis, a highly edu- 
 cated man who had studied in Germany and was a 
 member of the radical reform party, and with whom 
 I came into close personal relations. One day I 
 said to him that I would like to read the " Essay 
 on Liberty/' by John Stuart Mills, to which he re- 
 plied, " It isn't at all necessary that you should read 
 it; for England that essay was of great importance, 
 for it advances ideas that must be realized there. 
 But for you it has little that is new; what it advo- 
 
Narrowness in Religious Thought 41 
 
 cates for England has been accomplished in Ger- 
 many for over a century." And this is quite true. 
 The essay discusses ideas of religious liberty and 
 freedom of thought that have been in practice with 
 us ever since the era of our emancipation of thought 
 and of our classic literature, whereas in England 
 they are not generally accepted even yet. Until 
 very recently any one in England who openly 
 acknowledged himself to be an atheist stood with- 
 out the pale of the law, and we all know with what 
 rigid narrowness the " keeping of the Sabbath " is 
 still construed and enforced there. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 Some Effects of the English Constitution — 
 the Army — the Reforms 
 
 Whereas the English submit to social compulsion 
 without protest, and, in striking contrast to the Ger- 
 mans, actually accept it as a matter of course, and 
 hardly realize its existence, on the other hand they 
 are distrustful of all and every assumption of au- 
 thority on the part of the state, and oppose them- 
 selves to it. This want of confidence in the state, 
 nay, it may even be said this antagonistic attitude 
 toward it, is but the natural consequence of the con- 
 stitutional struggles between Parliament and Crown. 
 The spirit of this long continued struggle still sur- 
 vives, although when it ended, a victorious Parlia- 
 ment had appropriated the authority of the Crown, 
 which now serves merely to give expression to the 
 unrestricted authority of the Parliament and of 
 the Cabinet that is dependent upon the latter for its 
 tenure of office. This want of confidence finds pe- 
 culiar expression in the provision which makes it 
 impossible to raise taxes in England, either direct 
 or indirect, without the consent of Parliament; and 
 further, in that the taxes may be levied only for a 
 stated period of time, in part, for no longer than a 
 year. Moreover, in contrast to our law, they can- 
 
 42 
 
The English Army 43 
 
 not continue to be collected after the expiration of 
 this prescribed time limit except by the sanction 
 of Parliament, a circumstance by which this body, 
 in theory at least, is given the power to bring the 
 entire machinery of government to a standstill. 
 
 The like is true of the army, in connection with 
 which the distrust of the Crown, which showed itself 
 in the constitutional struggles that occurred during 
 the reigns of Charles II and William III, brought 
 about some unique and bizarre situations that were 
 not only detrimental to England's status as a world 
 power, but to her political activity as well. This, 
 too, is but a survival of the ancient antagonism. In 
 theory, England is provided with an army only when 
 outer conditions make it a necessity, viz. : when the 
 country is at war, or on the eve of war. A standing 
 army has ever been regarded by the English as the 
 implement with which kings impose their tyranny 
 upon the people, and therefore it has been but slowly 
 and deficiently developed. Until far into the last 
 century the army was dependent for its pay and 
 disciplinary powers upon an annual grant by the 
 Mutiny Act. The provision for the purchase of 
 commissions and all advancement in the army was 
 intended as a further check upon its control by the 
 Crown, since this made it impossible for any but 
 men of means to become officers. Their financial 
 independence was supposed to insure independence 
 of their sovereign also, because it enabled them to 
 lay down their commissions at any time, if called 
 upon to render a service contrary to conscience or 
 to the constitution. This provision for the sale of 
 
44 Effects of English Constitution 
 
 commissions was abrogated in 1871; but the spirit 
 of independence still prevails in the army, as does 
 also the absence of any strong sense of obligation on 
 the part of the officers to carry out their orders with 
 unquestioning obedience. Instead, they reserve to 
 themselves the right to decide according to their 
 political convictions what their military duty is. Of 
 this we had a drastic example during the past year 
 in Ireland when the army refused to act against 
 the openly organized rebellion of the Orangemen of 
 Ulster, an act of insubordination which the govern- 
 ment had to accept, since it had no remedy at its 
 command. 
 
 The sovereign has been deprived of every in- 
 fluence over the army; since the time of George II 
 no English king has taken the field at the head 
 of his forces, and although Queen Victoria with ad- 
 mirable persistence long refused to relinquish her 
 right to appoint the commander-in-chief of the 
 army, and to select him from among the members 
 of her family, she was after all compelled in 1871 
 to acquiesce in his subordination to the Secretary 
 of State for War. In 1904 the office of command- 
 er-in-chief of the army was abolished, and the Eng- 
 lish army and navy are now under the exclusive 
 control of the Cabinet. 
 
 Although the ranks of the officers of the army 
 and of the navy are largely filled by men from the 
 moneyed classes, or else by younger sons of the 
 nobility, and therefore command the respect of the 
 community, it is notorious that the rank and file 
 of the army is recruited from the lowest strata of 
 
English Army and Navy 45 
 
 the population. This is but the natural and un- 
 avoidable result of the enlistment system; military 
 service as private or non-commissioned officer is 
 only sought either by brawling adventurers, or by 
 men who have suffered shipwreck in life, or are un- 
 fitted by nature to earn a livelihood in other ways; 
 or else by young men who have been overpersuaded 
 or have been lured on by deceptive promises, and 
 who all too often sign their contract while under 
 the influence of liquor. All attempts to better the 
 situation by an increase in the pay of the soldiers, 
 and by the promise of a well-paying position in the 
 civil service upon conclusion of their military serv- 
 ice have proved fruitless. And this is unavoidable, 
 because it lies in the very nature of things that where 
 the enlistment system is in force and a man holds his 
 life at a price, the soldier's vocation should be re- 
 garded with contempt. In England private soldiers 
 and non-commissioned officers are excluded from 
 society and are refused at all the better class of pub- 
 lic houses, and it is a well known fact that army 
 officers when off duty do not wear the uniform, and 
 are rather ashamed of it. 
 
 An army of mercenaries can be kept together only 
 by the most rigid discipline, and therefore it was 
 not until well in the seventies of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury that whipping was abolished as a punishment 
 in the English army and navy, whereas in Germany 
 it had been out of use for the past two generations. 
 To supply the navy, England's main arm of defence, 
 with a sufficient number of seamen, impressment 
 was resorted to up to the close of the Napoleonic 
 
46 Effects of English Constitution 
 
 wars. A commission appointed for the purpose 
 seized such young men as seemed fitted for the serv- 
 ice, and compelled them to become seamen, — a 
 proceeding which was an offense to the nation's 
 sense of personal freedom, and aroused the amazed 
 wonder of Voltaire when he was a witness to it on 
 his first visit to this remarkable country, but which, 
 for instance, the author of the Junius letters re- 
 garded not only as a necessity, but as justifiable both 
 morally and politically. 
 
 Ever since these measures have been discontinued, 
 it has been most difficult to secure a sufficient num- 
 ber of men for the British army and navy. The 
 brilliantly illustrated recruiting placards that are dis- 
 played in most public places, and that picture in 
 glowing colors the special arm of the service that 
 they advertise as desirable above all other employ- 
 ments and as an especially easy and attractive way 
 of earning a livelihood, are viewed by the stranger 
 in England with an amused contempt. But they are 
 displayed to little purpose. Discipline in the service 
 is relaxed more and more; unruliness and revolts, 
 demands for better pay, better rations and better 
 treatment generally, have become the order of the 
 day, but nothing can be done to put an end to it. 
 When the troops are to embark for over-sea serv- 
 ice, they are not infrequently driven aboard half- 
 seas-over and strongly guarded. That such an army 
 cannot be fitted to meet the demands of modern war- 
 fare, which depends so largely upon every soldier's 
 patriotic devotion to duty as well as upon a sense of 
 moral obligation on the part of the troops to hold 
 
Aversion to Military Service 47 
 
 together in scattered engagements, needs not to be 
 argued. 1 Moreover, the officers generally, al- 
 though not without conspicuous exceptions, are de- 
 ficient both in that preparatory intellectual develop- 
 ment and military education which would fit them 
 to meet the problems of modern military tactics. 
 And as for the volunteers and the militia, they are 
 entirely lacking in this education, for their espe- 
 cial preparation has been merely in the nature of a 
 popular sport in which the real military problems 
 and demands can hardly receive any consideration. 
 In battle, to be sure, the British troops are no 
 cowards; but this is largely to be attributed to the 
 self-respect and stubborn tenacity inherent in the 
 English national character, as well as to the Britain's 
 love of a fight of which he gives ample evidence in 
 his every-day life, and which is no insignificant ele- 
 ment in the national love of sport. To how great 
 a degree not only the land forces, but the navy as 
 well, are insufficiently fitted to meet the exigencies of 
 modern warfare, how lacking in preparedness, and 
 how incomplete their equipment is in spite of official 
 assurances to the contrary, has been amply shown in 
 all the wars that Great Britain has waged in recent 
 years, for they have invariably begun with defeat 
 
 1 This is well illustrated by a story told by Prince Kraft 
 zu Hohenlohe. ("Aus Meinem Leben " III, 328 f.) 
 During the war of 1866 an English major went about look- 
 ing for the Prussian encampment, but in vain, until finally 
 he exclaimed that he could not understand how the troops 
 could be kept together without an encampment, or how 
 without it they could be got together to start on their on- 
 ward march. 
 
48 Effects of English Constitution 
 
 for the British. The fact is that the English are in- 
 capable of methodic and exhaustive organization, 
 for they are not only wanting in the education that 
 fits for it, but their political and social conditions 
 are opposed to the close organization that is insep- 
 arable from successful warfare. 
 
 In view of the glaring discrepancy between this 
 inefficient military organization and the constantly 
 increasing demands made upon it for the mainte- 
 nance and expansion of Britain's world empire, there 
 has been during the last decade an ever growing de- 
 mand on the part of the wise for the introduction of 
 universal military service. But for the average 
 Englishman this is an abomination ; unlike the Ger- 
 man, he looks upon universal military service with 
 its demand for the entire devotion of the individual 
 to the state for the time being, as ignominious slav- 
 ery, and the end of all his much lauded liberty. If 
 necessary, he is quite ready to pay for the demands 
 of the state, and therefore is willing enough that 
 soldiers shall be bought in whatever market they 
 may be found; but to offer himself, even to the ex- 
 tent of his life, for the highest duty that his country 
 and its people ask of him appears to him to be 
 an unendurable compulsion. Even while his coun- 
 try is at war, he desires not to be disturbed in the 
 ordinary routine of his life, nor in the pursuit of his 
 own interests, and he considers it to be the business 
 of the state to make this possible for him. Both in 
 England and in America this deep-seated aversion 
 to universal military service is at the bottom of all 
 the hatred of Germany, and of the outcry against 
 
Reform Legislation 49 
 
 German " militarism," and it is therefore indirectly 
 the cause of the present war. The war between 
 England and Germany is in fact merely a repetition 
 of the historic struggle of a backward and outgrown 
 form of political and national organization against 
 one that is far in advance of it, and by which it has 
 been overtaken and distanced, and which is both eth- 
 ically and politically of a much higher order. 
 
 This condition of backwardness as compared with 
 the states of the continent, and especially with the 
 German form of state organization, is apparent in 
 every department of public life. Nevertheless, even 
 the United Kingdom could not withdraw itself en- 
 tirely from the influence of the constantly advancing 
 development of the nineteenth century and the new 
 and far-reaching demands made by it. The parlia- 
 mentary reforms of 1832, immediately preceded by 
 the emancipation of the Catholics (1829), made an 
 end of the brutal and irresponsible rule of the reac- 
 tionaries, and opened the way for a long series of 
 changes by which England instituted reforms that 
 had long been in effective operation on the continent. 
 The barbaric law by which any form of theft was 
 made punishable by death, or at least by deportation 
 to Australia, was modified; imprisonment for debt, 
 so drastically pictured by Dickens and so frightful 
 in its consequences, was abolished, and the deplorable 
 Poor Laws, according to which, for instance, or- 
 phans or the children of paupers could actually be 
 sold as apprentices for the sake of ridding the com- 
 munity of the expense of maintaining them, were 
 materially improved. All ardent admirers of Eng- 
 
£0 Effects of English Constitution 
 
 land and her free institutions should reflect upon the 
 opposition that all these reforms encountered, as well 
 as upon the tardiness with which these humanitarian 
 principles were put into practice. 
 
 The local government also underwent a complete 
 re-organization. The ancient " self-government " 
 system, by which the great landed proprietor in the 
 capacity of justice became the legal administrator 
 of the county, as church warden controlled the par- 
 ish, and, most important of all, was also charged 
 with the care of the poor, proved itself more and 
 more unsatisfactory, — and the like may be said of 
 the municipal corporations. Although in the ad- 
 ministration of both municipal and county boroughs, 
 the newly organized system of self-government re- 
 tained the old historic foundations in their place of 
 honor, yet it now rests on as democratic a basis as 
 does the Parliament. The administration is in the 
 hands of an elected Council, the ordinary members 
 of which, the councillors, hold office for a term of 
 three years; to these are added one-half as many 
 aldermen, elected for a term of six years. Subordi- 
 nate to the Council are the numerous permanently 
 appointed and salaried officials, such as there are in 
 the ministerial departments, and it is they who really 
 transact the great bulk of official business. This 
 form of local government has born the test of time, 
 although it suffers under the disadvantage that im- 
 portant and responsible positions are often held by 
 men little versed in the matters entrusted to them, 
 whereas the men best fitted for these positions of re- 
 sponsibility hesitate to undertake them, because they 
 
English Local Government 5 1 
 
 shrink from the excitement and bitterness that are 
 inseparable from the election campaigns. This is a 
 disadvantage from which the German municipal ad- 
 ministration suffers less ; for not only does a differ- 
 ently constituted election system make for better 
 conditions with us, but the longer term of office, and 
 the institution of a city magistracy of technically 
 educated councillors and mayor, who are fitted for 
 the special positions which they hold, are absolutely 
 necessary conditions to continuity of purpose in ad- 
 ministration and to the efficient discharge of munici- 
 pal business. In the elections for our parliament, 
 however, we too are experiencing in an ever-increas- 
 ing degree the great disadvantage to which the dem- 
 ocratic system is subject, viz., that men of a more 
 sensitive nature are deterred from accepting political 
 nominations because of the distasteful experiences 
 that are inseparable from the campaign for election, 
 while the uncertainty of the outcome makes it im- 
 possible for many men especially well qualified for 
 the positions to decide upon a political career. 
 
 English local government suffers under still an- 
 other drawback in that the numerous transactions 
 which with us are entrusted to the local administra- 
 tion are dependent in the United Kingdom upon 
 special Act of Parliament, even to so small a matter 
 as the franchise of a street railway. But to get such 
 measures through Parliament (by way of private 
 bills) is not only a tedious and expensive process, but 
 is always accompanied by a degree of uncertainty 
 as to the outcome. Moreover, in England there is 
 no provision made for the combination of small po- 
 
cj2 Effects of English Constitution 
 
 litical districts into a larger political unit which 
 would then have charge of the affairs and special 
 interests of an entire section of country, as is the 
 case with us in our government districts and prov- 
 inces. The Home Rule movement in Ireland and 
 Wales has for its object precisely such a political 
 organization, an arrangement by which the people 
 could manage their own affairs within limits pre- 
 scribed by law, and independently of Parliament. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 England as a " Nightwatchman State " — 
 Education and Science — Social Reform 
 Legislation 
 
 If aspirations for reform fail of consistent real- 
 ization in the United Kingdom, this must be ascribed 
 in a large measure to the English idea of personal 
 freedom by which these aspirations are thwarted at 
 every turn, as well as to the native opposition to any 
 increase of state authority. This condition of af- 
 fairs has found characteristic expression in the term 
 " Nightwatchman State," which means neither more 
 nor less than that the state's sole business is to pro- 
 vide conditions whereby those who live within its 
 jurisdiction may lead an existence secure against vio- 
 lence and illegal interference, and by which it will be 
 made possible for them, unhindered except by such 
 legal restrictions as are necessary to community life, 
 to pursue their own interests with perfect freedom, 
 so that every man may gain for himself the greatest 
 degree of prosperity that opportunity and his own 
 ability place within his reach. 
 
 Such a conception of the state refutes the idea that 
 it has an existence apart, and one of much greater 
 value in itself than that of the individual citizens, 
 since it unites into a civic organism the atoms of 
 
 53 
 
54 ds a " Nightwatchman State " 
 
 a society that otherwise would fall apart, and lends 
 to their existence its highest value by making it pos- 
 sible for them to realize ideal conditions which as 
 individuals they could never realize. According to 
 the English idea, the state dwindles into a sort of 
 higher police force. To fulfill the duties that have 
 been left to it, it must have a financial foundation, 
 and a body of officials; it must be allowed occa- 
 sionally to interfere with the absolute freedom of 
 action desired by its citizens, since it is obliged to 
 make some demands upon them which, though nec- 
 essary, are much to be deplored. Its functions and 
 authority are therefore to be limited as much as pos- 
 sible; every movement and every effort that tend 
 toward clothing the state with wider powers are 
 looked upon as destructive of personal freedom, and 
 are therefore to be opposed in every conceivable 
 way, and, if possible, thwarted. Toward foreign 
 influences the attitude is the same, for, should a new 
 form of state organization be established abroad and 
 found to be good, England also might feel con- 
 strained to adopt it. 
 
 The conception of the state as it exists at present 
 became general in England during the middle of the 
 nineteenth century in close connection with the free 
 trade movement and the teachings of Cobden and 
 the Manchester School. Even so able an historian 
 as Macaulay approved of it in all its essentials, al- 
 though, while his great historical work was in prog- 
 ress, he evidently realized more and more the fun- 
 damental value of wider state authority, as well as 
 the desirability of a continuity of purpose in state 
 
Limitation of State's Authority 55 
 
 policy, and that this should therefore not be sub- 
 jected to the fluctuating influences of party bias. 
 This change in the historian's views is apparent to 
 any reader who compares his later with his earlier 
 writings. It is due to this limitation of the state's 
 authority that many institutions and undertakings, 
 the organization and administration of which consti- 
 tute some of the most important duties of the state 
 in other countries, are either entirely withdrawn 
 from government control in England, or, through 
 pressure of circumstances, have only lately been re- 
 luctantly assumed in part by the state, and so are 
 largely left to private enterprise. 
 
 Conspicuous among the public interests from 
 which the English state has kept aloof is the great 
 sphere of intellectual life, — education, science and 
 art. Of the popular education the state was com- 
 pelled to take charge if England was not to be out- 
 distanced in this field by all the more advanced coun- 
 tries of the continent. When compulsory education 
 was proposed, it met with the most violent opposition 
 from the proprietary classes, and more especially 
 from the capitalists, who argued that the working 
 classes were much more useful, as well as much more 
 contented, without the ability to read or write, an 
 accomplishment which could only serve to awaken 
 within them aspirations that after all could not be 
 satisfied. This argument was accompanied by the 
 fine-sounding phrase that compulsory education is in 
 itself an infringement upon the personal freedom of 
 the individual and of his right to be the master of 
 his fate. Finally, however, although not without 
 
5 6 As a Nightwatchman State " 
 
 vigorous agitation and violent opposition, education 
 was made obligatory by the state in 1870 ( !), and 
 since that time numerous bills have been enacted 
 by which the elementary schools have been systema- 
 tized, state support has been provided for them, and 
 their control placed in the hands of officials ap- 
 pointed by the state. Thus an end has been made of 
 the appalling conditions to which the writings of 
 Dickens called attention. 
 
 For the higher education however there is still a 
 deplorable lack of systematized provision. On the 
 one hand there are the " day schools," in charge of 
 the parish or the county, together with the somewhat 
 similar private schools that are patronized by the 
 children of the lower middle class, who, while con- 
 tinuing to live in the homes of their parents, receive 
 in these schools a practical technical education in- 
 tended to fit them for their calling in life. On the 
 other hand are the great public schools, conspicuous 
 among which are the famous old foundations of 
 Eton, Harrow and Rugby, where the sons of the 
 aristocracy are educated to be " gentlemen," and are 
 also fitted to enter Oxford and Cambridge. The 
 sharp class distinctions which characterize English 
 social life are especially marked in the sphere of edu- 
 cation ; it is still felt to be a sort of social stigma if a 
 boy cannot afford to go to one of these public 
 schools, but must content himself to remain at the 
 home of his parents and attend the day school. 
 
 As for the English universities, they are, as every 
 one knows, all private institutions either of old 
 foundations or, as is the case with the newer col- 
 
English Universities 57 
 
 leges and universities, endowed with funds contrib- 
 uted by men of means. The state has nothing to do 
 with them except to grant them a charter by virtue 
 of which they become incorporated institutions with 
 the right to confer degrees; in addition, the newer 
 universities receive from the state a small — ab- 
 surdly small — financial aid. Among the universi- 
 ties class distinction reigns supreme. The newer 
 ones (Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Birmingham, 
 Wales and London University, which has been in the 
 throes of birth for decades) are patronized by the 
 sons of the middle class, who here receive an educa- 
 tion which in its essentials is much like that which 
 the upper classes in our high schools offer, together 
 with a purely practical technical training. Oxford 
 and Cambridge, on the other hand, are attended by 
 the rising generations of gentlemen that are here 
 fitted for the higher spheres of life, i. e., they receive 
 that general intellectual education that is traditional 
 in England, while they perfect themselves in the 
 sports and in the art of parliamentary debate, as well 
 as in that of spending money with elegant ease. 
 Really scholarly interests and pursuits are quite out- 
 side the ordinary student's sphere, nor are they ex- 
 pected of him. 
 
 The endeavor to re-construct the old English uni- 
 versities along lines followed by the universities of 
 the continent and of America, and to transform them 
 into truly scientific institutions for higher learning 
 has proved futile because the necessary material is 
 lacking both in the teaching force and in the student 
 body. The learned celebrities who figure as mem- 
 
58 As a t( Nightwatchman State " 
 
 bers of the faculties do not as a rule give class in- 
 struction ; two or three lectures a year are all that is 
 required of them. Indeed, there are those among 
 them who boast that they have never lectured at all. 
 It is therefore outside of the universities that most of 
 the scientific and other intellectual work in England 
 is accomplished, and by scholars who stand in no 
 official relation to any institution of learning. That 
 every man's knowledge and capability are not merely 
 his personal possession, but that they impose upon 
 him a duty toward his fellow men, and that especially 
 those scholars who are scientific experts should pass 
 their knowledge on to the next generation as teach- 
 ers of its youth is the high idea by which all intel- 
 lectual workers in Germany are inspired, and to this 
 the English are strangers. 
 
 The natural inference would be that under such 
 conditions England would fail to hold her own in the 
 world of science; and this is the case. During the 
 last few generations she has lost her leadership in 
 the lines in which so many of her scientists have 
 been pre-eminent in the past. The places which these 
 leaders in science left vacant have not been filled by 
 men of later generations; most English scholars of 
 to-day lack a broad education, and so are content to 
 be specialists, and fail to get the wider outlook be- 
 yond the narrow limits of their special branch into 
 the domain of universal science. 
 
 It is not the part of wisdom therefore to induce 
 young men from Germany or America to avail them- 
 selves of the Rhodes' scholarship to become students 
 at Oxford or Cambridge, where they can doubtless 
 
Science and Art 59 
 
 get an insight into the English manner of life, but 
 can never obtain the scholarly education that the uni- 
 versities of their home land can offer them. Habits 
 of luxury they do contract, however, and learn to 
 spend money with a lavishness that is amazing to us. 
 The least that a student in these universities can get 
 along on with utmost, nay, with painful economy, is 
 £200 (4000 marks) a year; students who would live 
 in easy circumstances must expect to spend twice or 
 three times that amount. This is the danger by 
 which the young men who take advantage of the of- 
 fered scholarship are beset, and there are many in- 
 stances in which it has worked them harm. 
 
 That in England the state does practically nothing 
 to promote the interests of science and of art no one 
 will deny; in these spheres everything is left to 
 chance and private initiative, and, with the abundant 
 means at hand, some wonderful results have doubt- 
 less been achieved in this way. But what the state 
 itself does to further these interests is far outdone by 
 all other countries that lay claim to national culture 
 of the highest rank, and not only by the powerful 
 nations of ancient civilization and by America, but 
 by so small and poor a people as the Greeks, who 
 have done and are still doing marvelous things in 
 science and art, and in the realm of intellect gener- 
 ally, and this not alone through the activity of the 
 state, but by private enterprise and through associa- 
 tions for the advancement of culture. There is no 
 other body of men in the world, having a just claim 
 to be representative of the best there is in the way of 
 culture in their own land, who have so little appre- 
 
60 As a " Nightwatchman State " 
 
 ciation of all matters of science and of art, and as 
 little interest in them, as have the members of the 
 British Parliament and Ministry. 
 
 The English are talking a good deal just now 
 about their own deficiency and backwardness in sci- 
 ence and the arts; for these shortcomings are not 
 only making themselves felt in the intellectual life of 
 the nation, but in the practical enterprises of life as 
 well, and England is falling more and more to the 
 rear in the struggle for industrial supremacy. Of 
 well-intentioned resolutions and newly-organized so- 
 cieties to further these interests there are many, and 
 funds are collected and an occasional new profes- 
 sorship is made possible by endowment ; all with the 
 wish to better these conditions, but to little purpose. 
 What is accomplished usually depends wholly upon 
 circumstances, and upon the inclination of the donor, 
 who may be interested in Egyptology, or Chinese, or 
 biology, and who looks upon himself as a benefactor 
 of the community if he endows a chair in some uni- 
 versity for instruction in the subject which is of 
 special interest to him, with little thought as to 
 whether or not there are students who desire this 
 instruction, which is usually imparted by men of 
 mediocre ability, and in the form of popular lectures. 
 
 The fault that lies at the root of these unprom- 
 ising conditions is the total absence of all organized 
 direction in such matters; this is however the only 
 way in which something really worth while can be 
 accomplished. Nor is there any provision made by 
 which the young people can be led into the newer 
 paths of instruction ; for this also requires organized 
 
Social Reforms 6 1 
 
 direction under the control of the state, a method of 
 procedure which the English reject with righteous 
 indignation. How often has the advisability of ac- 
 quiring a foreign language, especially German, been 
 preached in England as absolutely indispensable, if 
 the country would maintain its old-time pre-eminence 
 in the industrial world. But with what result? 
 The German language has been studied less and less 
 in the English secondary schools and universities 
 during the last decades, until at present it is hardly 
 studied at all, while in America just the reverse has 
 taken place. 
 
 The fact is that England is beginning to show the 
 effects of her tenacious adherence to the rigid forms 
 of an old and decrepit cultural system from which 
 she finds it impossible to extricate herself. The 
 familiar " Don't move from the beaten track " has 
 been her watchword in this sphere of activity as it 
 has been in others, and therefore all the well-meant 
 discussions and resolutions amount to nothing. A 
 real improvement can be accomplished only by means 
 of a radical reform and a new structure from the 
 ground up. Whether England can bring herself to 
 adopt such drastic measures, time alone can reveal. 
 
 Social conditions are not much better. To be 
 sure, much was accomplished by the reforms that 
 were inaugurated during the third decade of the 
 nineteenth century, and by which the appalling state 
 of affairs in the factories and in the relief of the poor 
 was improved ; child labor was restricted, and a pro- 
 vision for government inspection of factories was 
 made. In 1842 a law was passed prohibiting the 
 
62 As a " Nightwatchman State " 
 
 employment of women in the mines, and in 1847 tne 
 working day for women and children was limited to 
 ten hours. In 1848 the extreme tendencies of the 
 chartist movement were suppressed, but were imme- 
 diately followed by the organization of labor in 
 trades unions, whereby the material condition of the 
 laboring classes was greatly ; bettered. When in 
 1868 Disraeli's reform bill greatly widened the fran- 
 chise, the political status of the working classes ex- 
 perienced a decided uplift through the influence they 
 had thus obtained upon the elections for the Parlia- 
 ment. In 1893 tne Labor Party was organized as 
 an independent political group, standing between the 
 two great parties, and since then it has been the de- 
 ciding element in many a hard fought battle in 
 Parliament, and it has had the satisfaction of seeing 
 its leaders take their places in a Liberal Government. 
 But never has there been an effort to improve the 
 condition of the working classes by legislative act 
 that has not met with violent protest from the mon- 
 eyed classes and the interests of capital; for these 
 look upon any such legislation as an interference 
 with the natural course of things in general and 
 with the Englishman's right to personal freedom in 
 particular. I have a vivid recollection, for instance, 
 of the vigorous opposition which Plimsoll's bill for 
 " the sailer's load line " met before it became a law 
 in 1875. The phrase refers to the line which marks 
 the limit up to which the law allows a vessel to be 
 laden ; for it had been a common trick of the trade 
 to load an old and unseaworthy vessel far beyond its 
 capacity, and then send it to sea and to certain de- 
 
Opposition to Social Reform 63 
 
 struction, so that the insurance money, which more 
 than covered the loss, might be collected. That this 
 meant the sacrifice of many lives was a matter of 
 little consideration to the shipowners ; theirs was the 
 right to do as they pleased with their ship, and the 
 sailors were free to exercise their own discretion 
 when they undertook the risk of sailing a vessel. It 
 is an amazing fact that a reputable economic publi- 
 cation at the time argued in opposition to the bill, 
 saying that British trade necessarily involved the 
 annual sacrifice of a certain number of lives; that 
 this was but the course of nature with which man 
 could not hope to interfere ; and it then went on to 
 compute the exact money value of each life — " the 
 commercial value of human life." 
 
 All effort to improve social conditions has met 
 with like opposition, for England is by no means the 
 leader in this field either, but follows far behind 
 some of the states of the continent. Germany was 
 the pioneer; the stupendous transformation which 
 has been accomplished there was made possible only 
 by the idealistic attitude of the nation toward the 
 realization of the ideas for which Bismarck pointed 
 the way. Germany's lead in social re-organization 
 was followed by the other states of the continent, 
 one after another, although not always without re- 
 luctance. Belgium, once the idealist's embodiment 
 of all things liberal, now lags behind in the very 
 last rank of this forward movement; and France, 
 where capital reigns supreme, has as yet not even 
 found it possible to enact any just tariff and personal 
 tax legislation, while England has finally felt com- 
 
64 As a " Nightwatchman State" 
 
 pelled to take the first steps in this onward march. 
 
 When in 1906 a Liberal Radical Government with 
 Lloyd George and the Labor leader, Burns, came 
 into office, an energetic program of social reform 
 legislation was undertaken. In 19 13 there was even 
 an attempt made to render it impossible for unrea- 
 sonably large areas of land in England to be held 
 by one landowner, and the proposed preventive leg- 
 islation was along lines such as had been success- 
 fully carried out during the last decades against the 
 same evil in Ireland, under the pressure of the Irish 
 movement and the boycott (p. 93). Should the 
 party really succeed in putting through a social- 
 agrarian reform measure, and so break the dominat- 
 ing influence of the large landowners, this would 
 greatly strengthen the position of the Liberals, and 
 perhaps give them enduring political control of Eng- 
 land. 
 
 How far England is behind Germany in the solu- 
 tion of the ever-present social problems is evident to 
 every one who has traveled extensively in the two 
 countries. The abject poverty that may be seen on 
 every hand in the larger cities of England, the 
 wretched way in which the poor are housed, the 
 ragged garments in which men and women alike are 
 seen in the streets, dirty and unkempt, — such things 
 are unknown to us in Germany, where the poorest 
 person would be ashamed to appear in clothing that 
 is full of holes, out at the elbows, and with sleeves 
 and trousers fringed with rags. German mothers 
 or wives would patch the garments and make them 
 presentable, if the wearer himself failed to do so, 
 
Condition of the Working Classes 65 
 
 and no woman would go about in the ragged cloth- 
 ing in which women may daily be seen in England. 
 This sense of decency is but one of the many testi- 
 monials to the educational value of universal mili- 
 tary service. Aside from this, however, there is the 
 love of surroundings that are not only comfortable, 
 but pleasing as well, which is inborn in the Germans 
 and prompts them to keep their houses tidy, be they 
 ever so humble, to make them cheery with flowering 
 plants, to love and cherish every green bush and tree, 
 and to plant a little garden, if this is at all possible. 
 In the rural districts of England the people show a 
 like appreciation of pleasing surroundings in the 
 care they take of their homes; but the poorer ele- 
 ments of the city populations lack this sense alto- 
 gether; their every effort is given to securing the nec- 
 essaries of life, and nothing is left with which to 
 provide anything more. Any one who has visited 
 the ugly industrial centers of England, — Birming- 
 ham, Wolverhampton, Sheffield, and similar manu- 
 facturing districts of other large cities, — where 
 everything is black, not a spear of grass in sight, and 
 has seen the monotonously similar houses with their 
 many chimneys, all covered with dirt and grime, 
 will think himself in a workingman's paradise when 
 he sees manufacturing districts such as those of 
 Westphalia, where every workingman has a neat 
 little cottage with a garden. 
 
 How dissatisfied the English working classes 
 really are, and how serious is the danger which 
 threatens from this quarter, has been unmistakably 
 indicated by the great strikes of the last few years, 
 
66 As a " Nightwatchman State " 
 
 by which traffic was brought to a standstill, the 
 receipt and distribution of food-stuffs prevented, and 
 the whole country brought to the verge of a tempo- 
 rary food famine. It would seem therefore that 
 England may be seriously menaced from within, if 
 the war should continue much longer, the wheels of 
 industry be stopped, and thousands of men be out of 
 employment. With us the state has made provision 
 for such an emergency, and comes to the relief of 
 all who would otherwise be in distress, as it is doing 
 most wonderfully at present, and as it will continue 
 to do. But of forethought such as this there is no 
 trace in England, where the people will soon learn 
 that if they would maintain their position of emi- 
 nence among the nations, they will have to desert 
 their old time ideals, and entirely change their atti- 
 tude toward the social and labor problems that con- 
 front them. 
 
 For the idea of unrestricted freedom of action for 
 every one, which has so long shaped all English life 
 and has inspired the Liberals of every country with 
 so much enthusiasm for English institutions, means 
 virtually the dominance of capital, and the advance- 
 ment of the material interests of the moneyed 
 classes. To this idea, too, may be traced the Eng- 
 lish aversion to any form of government provision 
 for social welfare, as well as to the assumption of 
 any degree of responsibility on the part of the pros- 
 perous for the well-being of the community and of 
 the poorer and more dependent elements of the popu- 
 lation. This is the reason also why the system of 
 old age and invalid pensions provided for by compul- 
 
English Egoism 6j 
 
 sory insurance, and patterned after the one operative 
 in Germany, met with so much opposition a few 
 years ago (1908). According to the English view 
 all these matters should be left to the care of private 
 philanthropy, which, every one will concede, has 
 certainly rendered great and praiseworthy service in 
 these lines. But after all, this would leave it en- 
 tirely to personal inclination whether these important 
 interests were to be looked after or not. That the 
 state should step in and equalize the burden of re- 
 sponsibility so that it may be shared by all is an idea 
 that is repugnant to the Englishman, and one which 
 is irreconcilably opposed to his conception of the 
 state and of his own personal freedom. 
 
 Surely no one will claim that the English are 
 wanting in devotion to their ideals any more than 
 are other nations, and England can point with pride 
 to many of her sons who, with entire self-devotion 
 and a persistence characteristic of the English, have 
 striven to further the idealistic tendencies and hu- 
 manitarian efforts of their generation. That they 
 have accomplished much in spite of every endeavor 
 to thwart them, and, in bitter and prolonged strug- 
 gle with the opposing tendencies, have come off vic- 
 torious in the end, has already been shown, and it 
 would be but a foolish misrepresentation of facts 
 to deny this. Nevertheless, of the average English- 
 man, the characteristically national type, it may be 
 said that his chief trait is the unbridled selfishness 
 which, sustained by the English idea of personal 
 freedom, leads him to seek his own interests regard- 
 less of all else, and with ruthless indifference to the 
 
68 As a " Nightwatchman State" 
 
 rights of others to trample them underfoot, as he 
 proceeds on his self seeking way. And this crass 
 egoism is transferred from private and business in- 
 terests to the political struggles within the country, 
 as well as to its relations to foreign nations and 
 states. Another characteristic of the English, still 
 less attractive and more dangerous, is that they do 
 not take this stand openly and frankly, but under- 
 stand excellently well how to disguise their real mo- 
 tives by high sounding phrases that claim for them 
 idealistic and humanitarian intentions, and so give 
 the impression that England and the English are 
 ever seeking to advance the best interests of all man- 
 kind, or at least are contending for no more than 
 their legitimate rights, while in reality the matter 
 at stake is simply their own advantage and the power 
 to exploit others. 
 
 The opium war with China in 1842, the bombard- 
 ment of Alexandria and the occupation of Egypt, 
 Jameson's invasion of the Transvaal, and lastly, the 
 Boer war, are all especially drastic instances of Eng- 
 land's humanitarian activity during the last few 
 decades. Indeed, for three hundred years English 
 history has been marked by the same characteristic ; 
 all the wars that were waged, all the numberless ac- 
 quisitions of territory that were made, and which in 
 part were wrested from European countries, from 
 the civilized peoples of Asia, and from the " bar- 
 barian " races, bear witness to this. When the more 
 conscientious men of England would not counte- 
 nance these proceedings and raised a voice in pro- 
 test, as, for instance, did the large minority that dis- 
 
English as Humanitarians 69 
 
 approved of the Boer war, it availed them nothing, 
 and eventually they had to accept what the Govern- 
 ment proposed to do. 
 
 This national tendency is furthered by another 
 characteristic trait. The English mind has a natu- 
 ral bent toward the apprehension of the practical side 
 of things and the immediate advantages to be de- 
 rived from them ; with rare and conspicuous excep- 
 tions, pure speculation and theory have little attrac- 
 tion for the English. The intuitive craving of the 
 German to arrive at a consistent apprehension of the 
 universal plan of things is quite foreign to the Eng- 
 lishman, as is also our propensity to meditate on the 
 problems of life, which gives rise to so much pon- 
 dering thought even among our people in the lower 
 walks of life, and often develops in men of very 
 ordinary ability a tendency to critical examina- 
 tion, together with an astonishing ability for logical 
 reasoning, although within limitations, of course. 
 
 These national traits incline the Englishman to 
 accept authoritative statements and whatever has the 
 support of public opinion without question, espe- 
 cially if they are well phrased. 1 Now it never is 
 
 1 This is especially noticeable in the way in which the 
 great mass of the English people, and a goodly number of 
 Americans also, blindly accept the statements of the Bible 
 in their literal sense, and in which they far exceed in 
 credulity the most orthodox Germans. This is not seldom 
 true even of men who in other matters have a very clear 
 and unprejudiced judgment. In their opinion, however, 
 religion and creed are matters apart, and are not subject to 
 the ordinary methods of reasoning. Accordingly it is an 
 easy matter to reverse this argument and find a convenient 
 
yo As a " Nightwatchman State" 
 
 difficult to find some wise sounding sentence or 
 maxim from which a reason or excuse may be de- 
 ducted for almost any course of reasoning or of ac- 
 tion, and make it appear to be almost an ethical ne- 
 cessity. And so it comes about that the Englishman 
 has two sets of principles to draw upon, one of 
 which is certain to serve him as a justification for 
 any course of action which he proposes to pursue. 
 That the two do not harmonize does not seem to 
 disturb the average Englishman in the least. 1 It 
 would be a mistake however to call this peculiarity 
 of character plain hypocrisy; the average English- 
 man simply accepts what is told him, and, inten- 
 tionally or unintentionally, carefully avoids a closer 
 scrutiny of it for fear that his eyes may be opened 
 to something that may disturb him, and perhaps 
 shake his faith in his comfortable double system of 
 justification. This way of dealing with the prob- 
 
 excuse for temporarily ignoring the dictates of religion and 
 ethics when these conflict with special interests, either per- 
 sonal or national. 
 
 1 This remarkable process of reasoning was laughably 
 illustrated during the present war when, on December 16, 
 1914, Scarborough and Westhartlepool were fired upon by 
 German war vessels. This occurrence roused the English 
 to an indignant protest in which they declared it to be 
 a flagrant violation of international law, since these places 
 were open ports and therefore unfortified. (We have yet 
 to learn of an instance when England refrained from an 
 attack upon such ports if it was to her advantage.) At the 
 same time, however, they announced that the forts of 
 Westhartlepool had returned the fire. But I question 
 whether the average Englishman so much as noticed this 
 glaring discrepancy. 
 
English Cant 7 1 
 
 lems of life has one great advantage, — it banishes 
 all qualms of conscience, a very troublesome weak- 
 ness for those who would win success on the prac- 
 tical side of life, and one from which the English 
 seem to be peculiarly free. 
 
 What has been said of English credulity does not, 
 of course, apply to the most intelligent people, and 
 especially not to the " smart " business men and the 
 political wirepullers; these are very well aware of 
 how little there is back of all their loudly proclaimed 
 adherence to principle. The English have a particu- 
 lar word for this assumed attitude of virtue, this 
 unctuously expressed devotion to high standards of 
 morality; they call it " cant," and they are quick to 
 look through it, too. But foreigners, and especially 
 the Germans, are deceived by it again and again, 
 because they cannot understand how a man of 
 honor can resort to means so unscrupulous. This 
 was once more the experience of our diplomats in 
 their negotiations with Great Britain just before the 
 beginning of the present war. But to a certain 
 class of English diplomatists it matters little what 
 they do, if only an appearance of virtue and decorum 
 is preserved, and when one of their especially per- 
 fidious tricks has proved successful, the English pub- 
 lic not only accepts it, but gives them hearty ap- 
 plause. 1 
 
 1 At the time when Edward VII, then Prince of Wales, 
 was implicated with others in dishonesty at cards while 
 playing bakkarat, his most eminent associate in this deplor- 
 able incident was awaited on his return to his home by an 
 enthusiastic crowd of admirers, who detached the horses 
 
72 As a " Nightwatchman State " 
 
 The present war must have opened the eyes of 
 even the dullest observers to what may be expected 
 of the English gentleman and of his love of fair play 
 and regard for moral principles and justice, unless, 
 indeed, they are keeping them shut intentionally be- 
 cause, like many of the neutrals, they do not want 
 to see things as they are. 
 
 from his carriage, and themselves dragged it to its destina- 
 tion. They evidently believed that he had acquitted him- 
 self as an English gentleman should, in knowing how to 
 come off victor in the game, honestly or dishonestly ; after 
 all, why were people so stupid as to allow themselves to be 
 cheated ! 
 
CHAPTER V 
 Ireland 
 
 One member of the United British Kingdom has 
 ever been the object of ruthless exploitation for the 
 benefit of specifically English interests, and, while 
 nominally recognized as a member on equal terms 
 with the others, has in reality received the treatment 
 of a mercilessly subjugated province, and been de- 
 prived of every vestige of its much-desired inde- 
 pendence ; — it is needless to mention the name of 
 Ireland. In the treatment accorded the " emerald 
 isle " the true nature of English humanitarism is 
 glaringly revealed, together with the hollo wness of 
 all the loudly proclaimed liberal intentions with 
 which the English deceive themselves, and have too 
 long duped all credulous foreigners. 
 
 Although Ireland first came under English domi- 
 nation during the reign of Henry II, it was not until 
 the close of the sanguinary warfare waged against 
 it with utmost cruelty by Henry VIII, and especially 
 by Elizabeth, that the island lay prostrate at the 
 feet of its conqueror. The English Revolution was 
 the signal for an equally bloody uprising of the Irish, 
 which was suppressed with terrible thoroughness 
 by Cromwell. This conquest of the island that pro- 
 
 73 
 
74 
 
 Ireland 
 
 tects the west coast of England was by no means 
 confined to its political subjection and the union of 
 the two islands in one kingdom, for its first and fore- 
 most purpose was to gain possession of the land it- 
 self and to distribute this among the foreign invad- 
 ers, — a sort of colonization by violence. For this 
 reason the war against Ireland was in its widest ef- 
 fect one of extermination, just as were the wars 
 against the Indians of North America, waged first by 
 England, and later by the United States. A large 
 part of the population was put to the sword, while 
 thousands of children were sent to America, there 
 to be sold as slaves. 
 
 In the provinces of Ulster, Munster and Leinster 
 all lands were confiscated, and then parceled out 
 among the soldiers and the immigrants that followed 
 them; the native population was transferred to the 
 northwestern and least fertile part of the island, 
 and crowded together in the province of Connaught 
 where land was assigned to the " innocent Papists," 
 — those of the Irish who could prove that they had 
 taken no part in the rebellion. In the other three 
 provinces only the laboring classes were allowed to 
 remain, since these could not be spared. 
 
 This war of races was also a religious war; the 
 conquerors were Protestants, and the vanquished 
 were Catholics, whose zeal for their church was 
 strengthened by the relentlessness of their persecu- 
 tion. It is a well established fact that during the 
 two hundred years in which Catholicism was sup- 
 pressed in Ireland and its adherents persecuted with 
 utmost cruelty, the Protestant religion made prac- 
 
Subjugation of Ireland 75 
 
 tically no converts among the natives of the island. 
 Conversion was not the object of the invaders, but 
 quite the contrary, since every conversion would 
 have been a distinct disadvantage to themselves, for 
 they would have had to make concessions to these 
 newly made fellow Protestants. 
 
 Cromwell's terrible method of settlement was but 
 little modified at the time of the Restoration by the 
 Bill of Settlement in 1660; but even the slight ameli- 
 orations it provided were not carried out in full, for 
 the Protestant settlers looked upon every concession 
 made to the Catholics and Irish as an infringement 
 of their own rights, and as detrimental to English 
 interests, and therefore protested against them, both 
 vigorously and successfully. And so only a small 
 number of those who had been dispossessed of their 
 land received it back again ; about four-fifths of the 
 island remained in the hands of Protestants, 
 while large domains were conferred upon English 
 magnates and favorites of the Crown. 
 
 Later, James II made Ireland the mainstay of his 
 endeavor to Catholicize his realm, and after the revo- 
 lution of 1688, used the island as a base of opera- 
 tions in his attempt to regain his crown with the aid 
 of France. The national uprising of the Irish under 
 the flag of the legitimate King, and with the hope of 
 winning their independence, led to the notorious Bill 
 of Attainder, enacted by the Irish Parliament in 
 1689. By it the Irish paid back the English invad- 
 ers in their own coin, by confiscating their lately ac- 
 quired land as having never been rightfully theirs, 
 and moreover, as having been forfeited by their par- 
 
j6 Ireland 
 
 ticipation in the rebellion, and then restored these 
 lands to the original owners, but with a provision 
 to indemnify the recent English owners for their 
 loss. 1 These measures were never carried out, how- 
 ever; with the victory that William III won in the 
 battle of the Boyne (July i, 1690), and the subse- 
 quent conquest of the entire island, the fate of Ire- 
 land was sealed. The Act of Settlement was re- 
 stored, the English settlers received back the lands 
 of which they had been dispossessed, and the provi- 
 sions for toleration guaranteed to the Catholic 
 Church and its adherents by the terms of surrender 
 when Limerick capitulated were evaded as much as 
 possible. The Irish received the treatment of an 
 enslaved race having no rights whatever; but since 
 their physical fitness made them very desirable as 
 soldiers, they were urgently induced to recruit in 
 England's army, — of Englishmen there always have 
 been comparatively few in the British army aside 
 from the corps of officers, and of this, too, Irish- 
 men have always formed a considerable part. 
 
 The English High Church became the established 
 church of Ireland ; for its support the Roman Catho- 
 lics were forced to pay the customary tithe, which 
 was collected by brutal middlemen with a resort to 
 any form of violence, and they were also compelled 
 
 1 Macaulay, in his interesting rehearsal of these events, 
 gives a very one-sided picture of the conditions that pre- 
 vailed in Ireland at this time. A much less partisan and 
 very detailed account of them may be found in the second 
 volume of Lecky's " History of England in the Eighteenth 
 Century." The German historian Ranke also gives a brief 
 and striking portrayal of them in his history of England. 
 
The Oppression of Ireland JJ 
 
 to build the churches; numerous profitable benefices 
 were established for dioceses in which, aside from 
 the fatly endowed clergy, there was hardly a com- 
 municant. Catholics were debarred from teaching; 
 if any dared undertake it, they did so at the risk of 
 incurring the heavy penalties provided for such a 
 breach of the law. In the disposition and inherit- 
 ance of property the Catholics were subject to man- 
 ifold restrictions, while the statutes abounded in va- 
 rious cunningly devised clauses that made it possible 
 to deprive them of the little that was left them. 
 How every effort was made to ruin Irish agriculture, 
 industry and trade we will see later. The govern- 
 ment of the country was left to the Irish Parliament 
 under strictest supervision by the Parliament at Lon- 
 don ; the Dublin Parliament was elected exclusively 
 by the Protestant settlers, and far exceeded both in 
 corruption and impotence the English Parliament, 
 until, in 1801, when the two Parliaments were 
 merged into one, the political union of the two is- 
 lands was consummated, and the United Kingdom 
 of Great Britain and Ireland established. 
 
 Under this terrible oppression large numbers of 
 the Irish died every year from hunger and from 
 sheer misery, while their masters looked on utterly 
 devoid of pity; it was intended that they should 
 perish in ignorance and privation. How absolutely 
 appalling the conditions really were is revealed by 
 Dean Swift in the biting satire of his pamphlets, 
 and which culminates in the tragic advice, grounded 
 in deepest pity but carried out in his inimically de- 
 tailed and absurdly realistic style, to butcher the 
 
y2> Ireland 
 
 children and to breed them systematically for this 
 purpose, since thus they would be of use to hu- 
 manity, and at the same time an end would be made 
 of all their misery, as well as of the crowds of beg- 
 gars who were allowed to grow up only to fulfill a 
 useless and hopeless existence. What Swift says 
 is the more effective since, although Dean of St. 
 Patrick's in Dublin, he was by no means in sympathy 
 with the Irish people, and his religious views were 
 biased by his sincere adherence to the narrow stand- 
 ards of the English High Church. 
 
 The marks which this horrible state of affairs left 
 upon the national character of this gifted, good-na- 
 tured, and highly imaginative race are familiar to 
 every one. If the Irish were originally inclined to 
 take life easy and to give little thought to the mor- 
 row, these traits could but be deepened by the long 
 years of oppression during which they were denied 
 every prospect of providing an independent or defi- 
 nite future for themselves. The rags, the dirt and 
 the beggary that may be seen in Ireland and in such 
 English cities as Liverpool, where there is a large 
 Irish laboring population, can only be equaled in 
 southern Italy and Spain. Doubtless there are 
 Irish traits of character that afford a partial expla- 
 nation of this deplorable condition, but by far the 
 greater blame lies at the door of England, the pow- 
 erful state that should have educated this subject 
 people to a realization of better things, but instead, 
 actually fostered these conditions because they con- 
 stitute no insignificant factor in the impotence of the 
 race. All the more should we be inclined to appre- 
 
The Irish Exodus 
 
 79 
 
 ciate the humor, the light heartedness and mental 
 elasticity that have not deserted the Irish despite 
 the sense of oppression from which they cannot es- 
 cape. They still are inclined to make the best of 
 things, and although much given to noisy discus- 
 sion and long rhetorical outbursts, not seldom of a 
 distinctly poetical character, as well as to quarrel- 
 some and often offensive haranguing, they are 
 neither vindictive nor fanatical. Religious perse- 
 cution also is quite foreign to their nature in spite 
 of all their Church has suffered at the hands of the 
 English, who resemble the Irish in this respect as 
 little as they do in most others. 
 
 During this period of Ireland's deep distress be- 
 gan the exodus of her sons, which has continued un- 
 broken for many years ; some emigrated to the col- 
 onies, others to England, and still others chose to 
 become mercenaries in the armies of a foreign 
 prince. Many, as has already been said, accepted 
 the terms of the English recruiting officers and 
 fought England's battles on many a field, not sel- 
 dom against their own kinsmen serving as merce- 
 naries under the banners of France, just as did the 
 Greeks in ancient times, and in more modern days, 
 the Swiss. The English policemen, too, those big, 
 sturdy, and very sensible and helpful officers of the 
 law with whom every visitor in England is familiar, 
 are usually sons of Erin. 
 
 Intellectually gifted Irishmen most frequently 
 turned to journalism, and they now form a large 
 proportion, perhaps the majority of the great edi- 
 torial staff of the English newspapers. And so it 
 
80 Ireland 
 
 comes about that often an Irish editor, in obedience 
 to orders from his chief, writes fulminating articles 
 in support of a policy that is diametrically opposed 
 to his own convictions, and which personally he de- 
 tests and antagonizes. The curse of modern jour- 
 nalism is this insincerity of its latest form of develop- 
 ment, — the anonymous editorial, that only too often 
 expresses in strongest terms convictions that are not 
 those of the writer at all, — mere exercises in style, 
 written in support of interests, personal or political, 
 that the paper represents. It is needless to say that 
 fortunately there are many happy exceptions to this 
 general rule. 
 
 Under the foreign yoke the native speech of Ire- 
 land has all but disappeared from the island; only 
 in the northwestern part, in the county of Con- 
 naught, may it still be heard as the language of the 
 people. 1 But this has by no means made English- 
 men of the Irish; on the contrary, the difference 
 between them is as great as ever. A bitter hatred 
 of the English oppressor and a longing to regain his 
 lost right to have a voice in shaping the destiny of 
 his race fills the heart of every true Irishman. 
 These emotions are stimulated by the love that the 
 Irish have for their emerald isle, their romantically 
 deep devotion to their homeland; for the Irishman, 
 unlike the Englishman, has a fatherland. 
 
 1 The reverse of this is true of the Celtic language in 
 Wales and among the Gaelic populations of the Scottish 
 Highlands. The people of these regions could not be 
 crushed as were the Irish, and moreover, being Protestants 
 (though in Wales not of the established church), their 
 church services were conducted in their native tongue. 
 
Suppression of Irish Industries 8 1 
 
 Whenever opportunity offered, the hatred of 
 England found expression in rebellion, especially 
 when made more hopeful by promised aid from 
 France ; at other times it found vent in insurrections 
 that during the last few centuries became a habit 
 with the Irish. As questionable as are the means 
 that are resorted to at such times, we must never 
 forget that the men who in their dire need have had 
 recourse to them in Ireland were and are idealists 
 and patriots inspired by high motives, and often men 
 of charming personality. The English fiction that 
 the Irish are subjects of the United Kingdom, and 
 that their civic duty as such is loyalty to the Brit- 
 ish government is not accepted by the subjugated 
 race, and never can be. 
 
 > In this connection the incredible short-sightedness 
 of England's self seeking policy toward Ireland is 
 fully revealed. It has achieved what one would be 
 inclined to believe impossible in that the foreign in- 
 vaders, the Protestant settlers themselves have been 
 forced into the ranks of the insurgents by the ruth- 
 lessness of English oppression. Ireland has been 
 well endowed by nature; in spite of the excess of 
 moisture, the great stretches of moorland, the rocky 
 areas and the scarcity of mineral and other natural 
 wealth (there are no coal deposits and few min- 
 erals), the country could be a prosperous one because 
 of its advantages for agriculture and stockraising, 
 and its industrial and commercial possibilities. But 
 that is just what the people of the English mother- 
 land wished to prevent, for they feared Irish indus- 
 trial competition, and saw in it a serious menace 
 
82 Ireland 
 
 to their own profits. Ireland was not to be allowed 
 to achieve prosperity or industrial independence; it 
 was intended that it should remain a subjugated 
 province to be drained of everything for the benefit 
 of England. 
 
 A like policy was adopted by England in her rela- 
 tions to her colonies across the sea, but without suc- 
 cess, because of the distance which separated them 
 from the motherland and because of the greater in- 
 dependence of their attitude; it therefore resulted in 
 the loss to England of the greater part of North 
 America. Scotland, too, was to receive similar 
 treatment, and under William III various measures 
 were adopted with this end in view. But Scotland 
 was an unsubjected kingdom, strong in its sense of 
 independence, and was not to be trodden under foot. 
 In the union consummated in 1707 it secured for 
 itself valuable concessions, and, above all, was placed 
 on an equal footing with England in industrial mat- 
 ters. The result was that before long England was 
 over-run with keen and closely calculating Scotch 
 business men, who for years were a cause for bitter 
 but useless complaint on the part of their English 
 competitors. 
 
 Ireland on the contrary lay helpless at the feet of 
 England, and so here the full intent of the English 
 policy could be freely worked out. Whenever it ap- 
 peared probable that Ireland was about to realize a 
 degree of prosperity through success in some one 
 particular field of industry, England at once stepped 
 in and crushed the prospect. The Navigation Acts 
 of 1663, which were but those of 165 1 in a some- 
 
Ireland Enslaved and Desolate 83 
 
 what altered form, were made more stringent in 
 1693, and deprived Irish commerce of its former 
 terms of equality with that of England, decreeing 
 that the export and import trade with the colonies 
 should henceforth be carried on only through Eng- 
 lish ports and in English vessels. In 1665 and 1680 
 all exportation of cattle, meats, butter and cheese 
 from Ireland to England was forbidden. When the 
 Irish landowners then turned to sheep raising, to 
 which the rich meadow lands of the island were well 
 adapted, and the woolen manufacturers of Ireland 
 soon afterward appeared to be in a fair way toward 
 active competition with the manufacturers of Eng- 
 land, all exportation of woolen goods from Ireland 
 was prohibited, not only to England and her col- 
 onies, but to any part of the world. The raw prod- 
 uct however was admitted into England since in 
 this way the English woolen factories could be sup- 
 plied with the cheapest wool. Ireland's next move 
 — to foster the flax growing industry and the manu- 
 facture of linen — was checkmated with an import 
 tax, so high that it was prohibitive, on all hemp and 
 linen goods entering British ports. 
 
 The English kings, who were also the sovereigns 
 of the nominally independent kingdom of Ireland, 
 were obliged in spite of any attempted remonstrance 
 to conform their action to the English demands. 
 And although the impotent Irish Parliament roused 
 itself to occasional demonstrations of resistance, it 
 could, of course, accomplish nothing. Ireland has 
 more and better harbors than has any other country 
 of its size in the world, and its position should make 
 
84 Ireland 
 
 it the natural outlet of a large export trade to west- 
 ern Europe and America ; but the harbors lie unused 
 and neglected, for an Irish mercantile marine does 
 not exist, and would not be tolerated by England. 
 In addition, and for the purpose of still greater 
 discouragement of native industries, Ireland was 
 flooded with manufactured wares from England of 
 a kind such as the Irish people themselves were pro- 
 ducing. Yet England annually drew, and continues 
 to do so, large sums of money out of this handi- 
 capped island for the benefit of the Crown and nu- 
 merous magnates and prelates, and which eventually 
 redounded to the benefit of England, since these 
 officials are notoriously distinguished for their ab- 
 sence from the country in which they hold office, and 
 rarely set foot upon their possessions there, but 
 spend their incomes in England. 
 
 By these combined means Ireland was systemat- 
 ically consigned to pauperism and desolation; and 
 with it all, its unhappy people have to endure the 
 open scorn and derision of their subjugators, who 
 themselves have brought about the degradation they 
 despise. 
 
 Now all these destructive measures not only af- 
 fected the people at whom they were aimed, but, 
 equally with the Irish, the English settlers in the 
 land also suffered the consequences. They, too, felt 
 their every industrial effort to be intentionally handi- 
 capped, and their indignation against the mother 
 country was the greater because they belonged to the 
 superior race, and by means of their possessions and 
 their greater alertness could have pursued lucra- 
 
Dean Swift's Picture of Ireland 85 
 
 tive occupations to their advantage and the better- 
 ment of their fortunes, if the law had allowed them 
 a free hand. But considerations for a community 
 of blood and of religion, as well as for the dictates 
 of a wholesome policy of provident care for the na- 
 tion's future, were of as little importance to Eng- 
 land as were the dictates of humanity and decency 
 when these came in conflict with the desire to keep 
 the neighboring island in slavish subjection, whereby 
 every possibility of an inconvenient competition and 
 consequent division of profits was avoided. 
 
 And so it came about that the English settlers 
 themselves were drawn into opposition to the 
 motherland, and, despite all differences of race and 
 creed, made common cause with their Irish depend- 
 ents against the common oppressor. Thus a com- 
 munity of interests was established, and a fellow- 
 feeling for Ireland developed that is vividly apparent 
 in the fiery pamphlets that came from the pen of 
 Dean Swift in the early years of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury. He says : " The conveniency of ports and 
 havens, which nature has bestowed so liberally on 
 this kingdom, is of no more use to us than a beau- 
 tiful prospect to a man shut up in a dungeon. 
 
 " As to shipping of its own, Ireland is so utterly 
 unprovided, that of all the excellent timber cut down 
 within these fifty or sixty years, it can hardly be 
 said that the nation has received the benefit of one 
 valuable house to dwell in, or one ship to trade with. 
 Ireland is the only kingdom I ever heard or read of, 
 either in ancient or modern story, which was de- 
 nied the liberty of exporting their native commodi- 
 
86 Ireland 
 
 ties and manufactures wherever they pleased. . . . 
 We are forced to obey some laws we never con- 
 sented to. . . . We are so far from having a king 
 to reside among us, that even the viceroy is generally 
 absent four-fifths of his time in the government. 
 . . . One-third part of the rents of Ireland is spent 
 in England; which, with the profit of employments, 
 pensions, appeals, journeys of pleasure or health, 
 education at the Inns of Court and both Universi- 
 ties, remittances at pleasure, the pay of all superior 
 officers in the army, and other incidents, will amount 
 to a full half of the income of the whole kingdom, 
 all clear profit to England. ... Ye are idle! ye 
 are idle! answered Pharaoh to the Israelites, when 
 they complained to his Majesty that they were forced 
 to make bricks without straw. 
 
 " England enjoys every one of those advantages 
 for enriching a nation which I have above enumer- 
 ated ; and, into the bargain, a good million returned 
 to them every year without labour or hazard, or one 
 farthing value received on our side; but how long 
 we shall be able to continue the payment, I am not 
 under the least concern. One thing I know, that, 
 when the hen is starved to death, there will be no 
 more golden eggs. " 1 
 
 This picture of Ireland as Swift saw it is a true 
 portrayal of Irish conditions in all their essential 
 features up to the time of the reform legislation of 
 the nineteenth century. In spite of the Union con- 
 summated in 1 80 1, Ireland remained the subjugated 
 land it had been, languishing in misery, and the scene 
 
 1 Swift, A Short View of the State of Ireland, 1727. 
 
Ireland in Nineteenth Century 87 
 
 of constant uprisings and conspiracies. Its posses- 
 sion was, of course, a political necessity to England, 
 since without it the position of Great Britain as a 
 world power would be jeopardized, as also would 
 her maritime ascendency. Ireland as an independ- 
 ent state or, worse still, as a dependency of some 
 foreign power, would bar England from immediate 
 access to the open ocean, and would threaten, or 
 at least circumscribe her maritime interests, just as 
 England had herself prevented the full development 
 of Holland and France as sea-powers, and had de- 
 stroyed the maritime ascendency of the Netherlands 
 altogether. Aside from this, Ireland was needed 
 by England as the chief recruiting ground for her 
 army; but, at the same time, the willingness of the 
 Irish to risk their lives for a price in serving as 
 mercenaries was a proof of their inferiority to the 
 free Englishman who would not stoop to the 
 despised military service. Moreover, the revenues 
 that Ireland yielded under compulsion were a very 
 welcome addition to the treasury of the realm, and, 
 above all, provided a care-free existence for many 
 of England's ruling class and for the higher nobles 
 who, as legislators by inheritance, composed the 
 Upper House of the Parliament. 
 
 When, at the close of the Napoleonic wars, the 
 evils of misgovernment became apparent in the 
 homeland also in an ever increasing degree, and the 
 country was evidently hastening toward a crisis, 
 the first decisive blow to the existing system came 
 from Ireland. The political ferment in the island 
 under the leadership of the great agitator, O'Con- 
 
88 Ireland 
 
 nell, assumed such dimensions that it soon became 
 evident that another uprising of the Irish people was 
 at hand. Some of the more discerning of the Tory 
 leaders realized that England was in no condition 
 to cope successfully with such a peril ; even the Duke 
 of Wellington himself admitted that it would be 
 the part of wisdom to make concessions, and him- 
 self undertook to see them through. It was Ireland 
 therefore that forced the Catholic emancipation in 
 1829, and so made the first break in the prevailing 
 system of control, and this was soon followed by the 
 parliamentary reforms and further reform legisla- 
 tion. 
 
 In this general movement for reform Ireland was 
 not wholly neglected. In 1834 the Catholics of Ire- 
 land were released from compulsion to build the 
 churches and from payment of the tithe to the Eng- 
 lish High Church, the tithe being henceforth levied 
 as a charge upon the land, a sort of income tax 
 based on landed property values. Next came the 
 improvement of the school system, and in 1868 the 
 Anglican Church of Ireland was disestablished, but 
 received a large indemnity. Ireland was benefited 
 by some of the parliamentary reforms also. 
 
 But all of these, as well as other measures of re- 
 form, were too tardily undertaken, and did not strike 
 deep enough to be a real help to Ireland, or to lessen 
 the bitter feeling of hatred that its people bear their 
 oppressors. The Irish people realize that these con- 
 cessions were all grudgingly made, and only because 
 of the compulsion exercised by irresistible pressure, 
 
Decrease in Ireland* s Population 89 
 
 and that England's attitude toward them remains 
 unchanged. 
 
 England still draws immense sums out of Ireland 
 every year; Ireland is still compelled to send most 
 of her exports by way of English ports and re-laden 
 into English vessels; the Irish harbors still are un- 
 developed as they were in the days of Swift, and 
 the great international navigation companies, such 
 as the Hamburg-American Line, are not allowed a 
 port of entry in Ireland. The total value of Irish 
 exports for the year 19 10 amounted to nearly 63 J/2 
 million pounds sterling; of this total, a proportion to 
 the value of S 2l A millions was sent to England; the 
 other 11 millions worth of goods were shipped to 
 foreign ports, and of these only 700,000 pounds' 
 worth were exported direct from Irish ports, and 
 the remaining amount, valued at 10 millions, had to 
 be sent via England. 
 
 The chief source of Ireland's distress remained, — 
 the wretched agrarian laws were in no way modi- 
 fied. By far the larger part of the land was still, 
 as it had been, in the hands of the English aristoc- 
 racy and only a small number of these landholders 
 ever set foot on Irish soil, while by far the greater 
 part of the Irish people themselves, seven-eighths of 
 the population, was at the mercy of the English 
 landlords, and almost without redress. From the 
 small piece of land which was allotted to an Irish 
 peasant, and which he preferably planted with po- 
 tatoes, he could not provide the most meager support 
 for his family after meeting the heavy tax demands. 
 
90 
 
 Ireland 
 
 And so Ireland grew more desolate with every year, 
 while the exodus to America and to the manufactur- 
 ing cities of England took on ever greater dimen- 
 sions. In addition, the terrible famine of 1845, 
 which came as the result of the potato blight, car- 
 ried away a very large part of the population. 
 While in 1840 the census showed a population of 
 8,177,000 inhabitants, in 1850 this number had 
 been reduced by death and emigration to 6,696,000. 
 This diminution has continued uninterruptedly, and 
 Ireland is the only country of Europe where the 
 population has grown steadily less during the course 
 of the nineteenth century, and where, in city and 
 country alike, the visitor may see on every hand de- 
 serted and ruinous houses that are uncared for be- 
 cause the entire families that once lived in them have 
 either died out or have left home and country. In 
 1870 the number of inhabitants was 5,408,000, in 
 1900 it was 4,458,000, and in 191 1 only 4,390,000. 
 These figures in themselves are a terrible ar- 
 raignment of English rule in Ireland, and at the 
 same time are a convincing proof that the Irish 
 movement could never be abandoned. O'Connell's 
 attempt in 1843 to force the repeal of the Act of 
 Union failed, but it was followed by the Fenian 
 conspiracies, in connection with which so many deeds 
 of murder were committed, and which the English 
 government found so difficult to suppress. Then 
 came the organization of the Irish Party as a po- 
 litical unit in Parliament, its purpose being to ob- 
 tain for Ireland an Irish administration, and there- 
 fore the establishment of an independent national 
 
Revolutionary Tendencies 9 1 
 
 parliament at Dublin. It is actually to the advan- 
 tage of this party — so strange are the results of 
 circumstances sometimes — that the population of 
 the island has diminished, since, as a consequence, 
 the electoral districts in Ireland are much smaller 
 than those of England, and therefore Ireland has a 
 much larger representation in the Parliament of the 
 Kingdom than it is entitled to by the size of its 
 population. 
 
 These Irish aspirations are shared, for reasons al- 
 ready mentioned, by a large part of Ireland's Prot- 
 estant population of English descent. The com- 
 munity of interests that is developed by living to- 
 gether in the same land and under like conditions 
 is after all the deciding influence, and outweighs all 
 other considerations. It is a significant fact that 
 the foremost political leader that Ireland produced 
 in the nineteenth century, Parnell, " the uncrowned 
 king of Ireland," was a Protestant of English ex- 
 traction. It is only a part of the people of north- 
 eastern Ireland, the descendants of the English set- 
 tlers of Ulster, with Londonderry and Belfast as 
 the central points of their influence, who have taken 
 a stand in marked contrast to this general attitude. 
 
 Those who have these political aspirations of Ire- 
 land at heart find great encouragement in the sup- 
 port, chiefly financial, that they receive from the 
 Irish in America, who hate England bitterly as the 
 power that drove them from their homes and their 
 native land. In America the Irish have shown of 
 what they are capable when given a chance. It must 
 be admitted that many of them, especially those who 
 
9 2 
 
 Ireland 
 
 came from most primitive circumstances and were 
 without education of any kind, became the ready 
 tools of agitators and unscrupulous politicians who 
 had it in their power, through the existing state of 
 political corruption, to provide these new Ameri- 
 cans with easy means of earning a livelihood. But, 
 generally speaking, the Irish have done well in 
 America, and count among their numbers there some 
 of the ablest and most respected citizens of the west- 
 ern republic. 
 
 By the English, it is needless to say, these Irish 
 aspirations were regarded as entirely unjustified, and 
 as the extravagant pretensions of an inferior and 
 wholly incorrigible race whose inferiority was never 
 more apparently evinced than in the ingratitude 
 shown for all the benefits conferred by England, as 
 well as in the total lack of a due appreciation of 
 the great advantages to be derived from association 
 with so powerful a state as England, and in an in- 
 satiable desire for ever more privileges. In 1848, 
 Queen Victoria, who naturally looked at these mat- 
 ters through colored glasses, wrote to her uncle, 
 King Leopold of Belgium : " There are ample means 
 of crushing the rebellion in Ireland, and I think it is 
 very likely to go off without any contest, which peo- 
 ple (and I think rightly) rather regret. The Irish 
 should receive a good lesson or they will begin 
 again." 
 
 It is true that murder and other deeds of violence 
 of every description were the means to which the 
 Irish resorted in their extremity, and these were 
 not to be condoned from a moral point of view, and 
 
The Boycott. Agrarian Reforms 93 
 
 could not be tolerated by any government. Never- 
 theless they achieved results in one field at least 
 where other means had proved fruitless. The agi- 
 tation for agrarian reforms, which was strenuously 
 renewed early in the seventies of the last century, 
 found its most potent weapon in the newly invented 
 " boycott," that derived its name from that of the 
 landlord on whom it was first practiced in 1880, — 
 viz., no laborers would work for the boycotted land- 
 lord, and his tenants refused to pay their rents or 
 any other charges; and, since there was no money 
 to be extracted from them, any legal action against 
 them would have proved futile. To enforce this 
 new method and make it general, all tenants who 
 would not conform to this national demand, but pre- 
 ferred to pay their rents, were terrified into com- 
 pliance, some even were murdered, others had their 
 cottages burned down, or their cattle mutilated. By 
 these brutal means the English were at last compelled 
 to yield. 
 
 In 1 88 1 Mr. Gladstone's Land Reform Bill was 
 passed. According to it the tenants and peasants 
 were to pay a fair rent based on legally established 
 property values, while at the same time fixity of 
 tenure was secured to them, since the landlord could 
 no longer evict them at his pleasure. Further modi- 
 fying measures were enacted, until finally, in 1903, 
 the tenants received the legal right to acquire prop- 
 erty rights from the landlord by the payment of an 
 annual interest at a moderate rate, by which in time 
 the title to the land passed to them ; for this purpose 
 the government advanced the purchase price to the 
 
94 Ireland 
 
 tenants. The English landowners resisted this en- 
 croachment upon their unrestricted privileges as 
 long as they possibly could, but yielded in the end, 
 as they could get no money out of their tenants in 
 any other way. Indeed, they had reason to be 
 thankful to get even so much for property that 
 had become almost worthless. 
 
 In order to hold the Irish Party to the Liberals, 
 Mr. Gladstone adopted " home rule for Ireland " 
 as a part of his program in 1886. This meant, of 
 course, an independent parliament for Ireland, and 
 since that time this has always been the chief issue 
 in England's home policy, and between the political 
 parties. It led, first of all, to the formation of the 
 Unionist Party, and since then has more than once 
 contributed to the overwhelming defeat of the Lib- 
 erals. But the question was not thus disposed of by 
 any means, for the Irish Party was much too power- 
 ful and influential a political element to have its de- 
 mands left without consideration for any length of 
 time. Joseph Chamberlain, by far the most able of 
 the Unionist statesmen, attempted to crowd the Irish 
 question into the background by proposing a gigan- 
 tic plan of forming a closer political union between 
 all the integral parts of the British Empire, and 
 sought to accomplish this end by all the means avail- 
 able to a demagogue. But the English colonies were 
 not at all inclined to relinquish either their inde- 
 pendence or their high protective tariffs, and the 
 great agitation for tariff protection in England, 
 especially on food stuffs, which Mr. Chamberlain 
 conducted on a tremendous scale, failed to accom- 
 
Home Rule 
 
 95 
 
 plish its purpose. The election in 1906 showed an 
 overwhelming majority in favor of free trade, and 
 at the same time for a Liberal ministry. 
 
 This decided the Irish question also, and there 
 was nothing left for the majority of the British 
 people to do but to accept the inevitable. The op- 
 position of the Conservatives, who found their main 
 stay in the Upper House, was broken when, in 191 1, 
 the Lords' right of veto was restricted by Act of 
 Parliament. The Orangemen of Ulster raised a 
 vigorous protest, however, and prepared for armed 
 resistance, aided and abetted by the Conservatives 
 and the corps of British army officers who, as has 
 already been related, refused to act against them. 
 By these events the country was brought to the 
 verge of civil war. On July 26, 19 14, two thou- 
 sand rifles were secretly landed in Ireland, some- 
 where in the vicinity of Dublin, and distributed 
 among the Irish volunteers. When the government 
 authorities made an attempt to deprive them of these 
 rifles — the Irish nationalists were not to be al- 
 lowed to have arms, although the Orangemen of 
 Ulster were being plentifully supplied with them — 
 a bloody encounter ensued. Most of the volunteers 
 succeeded in escaping and taking their arms with 
 them, but in one of the Dublin riots which followed, 
 a Scotch regiment in garrison there fired two vol- 
 leys into the mob, killing and wounding several per- 
 sons, mostly women and children. The inquiry into 
 this affair, promised by Mr. Asquith, and by which 
 " the army would doubtless be fully justified and 
 come off with honor," as he declared in the Parlia- 
 
gS Ireland 
 
 ment, was never undertaken, since immediately after- 
 ward the war with Germany was begun. For the 
 same reason all action on the Irish question was 
 deferred. There were several considerations, how- 
 ever, that made it very desirable to secure the favor 
 of Ireland, and specially the good will of the hoped 
 for Irish recruits. It was therefore deemed expe- 
 dient to go through with the form of passing the 
 Home Rule Bill and ceremoniously placing it on the 
 statute book, but with the proviso that the Act would 
 be suspended from operation until after the close of 
 the war, and was not then to be in effect until Par- 
 liament had had the fullest opportunity to revise 
 it by amendment. 
 
 By this procedure, which seems well fitted for a 
 place in a comedy, it was supposed that Irish senti- 
 ment would be changed, and the passions that had 
 been kindled be appeased. The leaders of the Irish 
 Party, Mr. Redmond foremost among them, have 
 indeed declared themselves content with it, and are 
 now vigorously upholding the Government, espe- 
 cially in the endeavor to secure recruits. In the 
 public meetings that have been held for this purpose, 
 Mr. Redmond has pictured the atrocious conduct 
 of the Germans in Belgium, and how this was espe- 
 cially directed against the Catholic Church (Eng- 
 land being renowned for her love of it!), and how 
 the priests were murdered and the nuns violated. 
 The Archbishop of Mechlin, who was brought from 
 Belgium for the occasion, sat by and wept as he 
 listened. 1 And so England finds herself in a posi- 
 1 In the severely Protestant province of Ulster no such 
 
Attitude in the Present War 97 
 
 tion to announce to the world that all the people of 
 the United Kingdom are standing as a unit against 
 the common foe, in brotherly harmony, and for- 
 getful of all former differences, their only rivalry 
 being in their devotion to their common country. 
 " Ireland," declared Sir Edward Grey in his speech 
 in which he outlined the Government's policy to the 
 Parliament on August 3, 19 14, " is the only bright 
 spot in this entire terrible situation." 
 
 In reality, however, things look very different. 
 The Irish would still be offering open resistance to 
 England if they were not forcibly suppressed. The 
 country is destitute of arms and is surrounded by 
 mines; its few ports are closed to all foreign ves- 
 sels, even to those of neutral countries; the freedom 
 of the press is restricted, and the least criticism un- 
 favorable to England, or suspicious behavior of any 
 kind is considered cause for legal prosecution. The 
 press justifies this attitude in a characteristically 
 English fashion by declaring that although freedom 
 of speech is a fundamental and inalienable right of 
 every citizen of Great Britain, it is nevertheless not 
 to be tolerated that the Irish nationalists should be 
 allowed to frustrate the will of the majority of the 
 English people by interfering with the recruiting of 
 soldiers in Ireland. 
 
 appeal as this was made, it is needless to say. There the 
 men were urged to fight for England because that country 
 had been " the only one that had dared to defy the Pope 
 and Rome ! " But this is only another evidence of English 
 efficiency to advocate with an equally honest mien two 
 doctrines that are diametrically opposed to each other, — a 
 talent in which no other nation can compete with them. 
 
98 Ireland 
 
 Since there is not the slightest prospect of success 
 for their cause at this time, the Irish are content- 
 ing themselves with a passive resistance, which they 
 manifest by refusing to recruit in spite of all offered 
 inducements, although doubtless many a man is 
 driven to it by absolute want. The true Irishman 
 feels it to be treason to his own land to take up 
 arms for England's cause, and Mr. Redmond and 
 his colleagues have lost all their former influence, 
 and are repudiated by the great mass of the Irish 
 people, as has been shown in the by-elections which 
 give great majorities against them. The patriotic 
 Irish hope for German success in the present war, 
 since they believe that their cause will benefit by it, 
 and that perhaps it may even help them to gain their 
 long desired freedom for Ireland. In what measure 
 these sentiments may influence the Irish soldiers who 
 are at the front, it would be difficult at present to 
 say. 
 
 Ireland is evidently still " England's Heel of 
 Achilles." * That England is not blind to the situ- 
 
 1 Under this title appeared Schiemann's translation of 
 the most interesting parts of Sir Roger Casement's 
 pamphlet entitled " The Crime against Ireland and how the 
 War may right it," which he wrote before the beginning of 
 the war, and the whole tenor of which shows a remarkably 
 clear insight in predicting the future. 
 
 The author was at one time British consul in the Congo 
 Country, and while there was a witness of the evil results 
 of its misgovernment and of the frightful atrocities prac- 
 ticed on the natives. Later he saw a repetition of these 
 brutal scenes in the dreadful abuse of the Putumayo In- 
 dians in the region around the sources of the Amazon. It 
 was due to him that public attention was directed to these 
 
England's Present Attitude 99 
 
 ation may be inferred from the fact that no sooner 
 had the Pope, by request of the German govern- 
 ment, sent two high Irish ecclesiastics to minister to 
 the spiritual needs of the Irish prisoners in Ger- 
 many, than England also entered into negotiations 
 with the Vatican for a similar purpose, although 
 never before having manifested any such concern. 
 A delegate to the Pope was appointed, and a fa- 
 natically devout Roman Catholic at that, in the 
 person of the Earl of Norfolk, a descendant of the 
 ancient family of Howards who count among their 
 number so many martyrs to Catholicism. For Eng- 
 land this was a most remarkable proceeding, and one 
 at variance with the entire trend of English tradi- 
 tion. Since the downfall of James II England has 
 never entered into any official relations with Rome 
 until now, and at any other time this step would 
 have roused a storm of indignant protest and the 
 cry of " No Popery!" in every part of the land. 
 But in the present great emergency and in the face 
 of the danger that threatens from across the Irish 
 Sea, the English grasp at any means that will serve 
 
 frightful atrocities and steps taken against them. He is 
 an enthusiastic Irishman who is striving for the liberation 
 of Ireland from the English yoke, and during his present 
 visit to Germany has been working energetically for that 
 end. He has clearly revealed the true relation which Ire- 
 land's cruel subjection by England bears to that country's 
 greatness as a sea-power, and at the same time expresses 
 hopes of Ireland's ultimate political separation from Eng- 
 land, if not as a consequence of this war, still at no far 
 distant day, whereby true freedom of the sea will be se- 
 cured, and its domination by England be ended. 
 
IOO Ireland 
 
 their purpose. This whole proceeding shows plainly 
 enough how far different the real attitude in Ire- 
 land is from that which it is reported to be for the 
 sake of allaying the anxiety of the public. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 The Scottish Highlands 
 
 Perhaps the fate of the Scottish Highlands is 
 even more significant than that of Ireland as indic- 
 ative of English purpose in the domination of a 
 conquered country. Of complaints there are none 
 in these highland regions; their fate has been ac- 
 complished ; and so the treatment to which they have 
 succumbed has been little criticized; indeed, their 
 peaceful condition has even been cited in praise of 
 England. 
 
 As is well known, the Highland Scotch, the stock 
 whose ancestors came from Ireland, were originally 
 the dominating race in the northern kingdom of 
 Great Britain. When later their name and au- 
 thority together passed to the people of the Low- 
 lands, who were of Anglo-Saxon descent, the dis- 
 tinguishing name Gael or Gaelic, was commonly ap- 
 plied to the Highland people of Celtic origin. With 
 them, as with their Celtic brethren in Ireland, the 
 ancient clan system was maintained unaltered. The 
 members of a clan regarded themselves as bound to- 
 gether by the ties of kinship and the duty of revenge 
 for an injury done to one of their kind ; at the head 
 of each clan was the chieftain, the hereditary head 
 of the family, to whom all owed implicit obedience 
 
 101 
 
102 Scottish Highlands 
 
 together with their allegiance. The authority of the 
 King and government at Edinburgh was therefore 
 always comparatively slight. Moreover, a bitter 
 enmity existed between many of these clans, and 
 they stood opposed to each other in deadly feuds 
 that were passed from one generation to the next, 
 and extended through hundreds of years. For these 
 reasons they were especially prone to be drawn into 
 the fierce religious and civil conflicts that marked 
 the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whereas 
 some of these clans held steadfastly to the Parlia- 
 ment and to the austere Presbyterian Church, chief 
 among these being the Campbells of Argyle, others 
 were firm adherents of the Stuart dynasty, and, to 
 a small extent even attached themselves to the Cath- 
 olic cause. 
 
 Their impetuous manner of attack in battle con- 
 tinued quite unaltered by any of the more modern 
 methods of warfare; bare-legged, and throwing off 
 their outer garments, they made a wild charge on the 
 foe, wielding their broadswords with deadly effect, 
 and so, often drove all before them in a complete 
 rout. Thus they fought under Montrose in 1645, 
 under Dundee in the Pass of Killiecrankie in 1689, 
 and in the revolt for the Pretender, James III, in 
 171 5. But because of the total absence of any united 
 action, as well as on account of their primitive po- 
 litical organization, they were never enabled to reap 
 the full benefit of their victories. When the ad- 
 herents of James II were defeated by William of 
 Orange in 1690, the government authorities got their 
 first opportunity to gain a firm foothold in the High- 
 
Subjection of the Highlands 103 
 
 lands by building forts and laying roads. Finally 
 the ancient enmity of the clans found vent in a 
 terrible catastrophe when the Campbells, aided by 
 the government at Edinburgh, treacherously fell 
 upon the MacDonalds of Glencoe on February 2, 
 1692, and all but exterminated them in a bloody mas- 
 sacre. But still the organization of the clans and 
 the authority of their chiefs continued much as be- 
 fore. In 1745 the Highlands rose for the last time 
 in support of a Stuart, Charles Edward, who with 
 his army of Highlanders penetrated as far into Eng- 
 land as Derby, setting the whole country into a 
 panic. But after their terrible defeat in the dis- 
 astrous battle of Culloden on April 27, 1746, and 
 the deadly work of the executioner that followed, 
 the Highlanders were subjected to extreme measures 
 of repression. They were disarmed and forbidden 
 to wear the national garb, the tartan, under heavy 
 penalty; or to assemble for public worship under 
 any confession of faith other than that of the Estab- 
 lished Presbyterian Church; 1 and, most effective 
 of all, the hereditary jurisdictions of the chiefs were 
 bought up and transferred to the Crown, followed 
 by a general Act of Indemnity. And so the organi- 
 zation of the clans came to an end. 
 
 At the same time the English ideas of property 
 and property rights were made applicable to the 
 entirely different conditions that had prevailed in 
 the clans. The hereditary head of a noble family 
 
 1 These restrictions affected the Anglican Church in 
 Scotland more than any other, since its communicants were 
 decidedly Jacobite in their tendencies. 
 
104 Scottish Highlands 
 
 who had been the chief of a clan now became the 
 owner of all the land that had belonged to his clan, 
 while his kinsmen, who hitherto, as vassals and 
 trusted servants, had enjoyed his protection, were 
 now degraded to the condition of mere tenants with 
 no assured rights of their own, their existence 
 henceforth being entirely dependent upon his pleas- 
 ure. 
 
 These measures were devastating in their effect, 
 especially so since together with them English cap- 
 ital made its entrance into the Highlands. With 
 the primitive methods that prevailed in the agri- 
 cultural industries, the land could yield but little 
 profit, and yet the new owners cared for it only in 
 proportion to the money they could get out of it. 
 Consequently they ejected scores of families from 
 the homes that had been theirs for generations, and 
 procured new tenants from whom they hoped to get 
 better returns on their investments. But if the com- 
 petition with foreign imports made it impossible for 
 the agricultural interests in England to maintain 
 themselves on a profitable basis, and ever since the 
 repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 these had been 
 steadily losing ground, to how much greater a de- 
 gree must this have been true of the mountainous 
 districts of Scotland. So it finally came about that 
 the proprietors preferred to use their holdings as 
 pasture land for sheep raising; or, more preferably 
 still, to turn them into vast parks and hunting 
 grounds, not only for their own use (to be the 
 owner of a great game park is deemed essential to 
 the dignity of people of rank in England), but as 
 
The Deserted Highlands 105 
 
 a means of increasing the income of the proprietor 
 by letting them, as is quite customary, 1 to rich 
 Englishmen who are either really devoted to the 
 national sport, or think that they ought to be be-' 
 cause it is the fashion. 
 
 And so the Highlands became entirely deserted, 
 although at one time they had been populated by 
 a numerous and, although very primitive, yet con- 
 tented people. Instead of promoting the welfare of 
 these Gaelic natives of the soil by well chosen regu- 
 lations, and by educating them for a more advanced 
 stage of civilization, and so protecting them in their 
 mode of life, the British government allowed these 
 unfortunates to be driven from their native land, 
 and their descendants drifted into the great manu- 
 facturing cities, or emigrated to America, or, as 
 bandits or thieves, ended their days on the gallows. 
 Thus the country that under different circumstances 
 might have been developed similarly to Switzerland 
 and might now be supporting a large and prosperous 
 population is practically a deserted land. Quite iso- 
 lated, and miles apart, lie a few small hamlets of 
 only a few houses, to which none are ever added, 
 since the landowners do not allow the erection of 
 new buildings. So it happens that on the shores of 
 Lock Awe, a lake in the southern Highlands some- 
 what resembling the Lake of Zurich both in shape 
 and size, and like it surrounded by rolling hills, there 
 
 1 Likewise the enormous expense incurred for the main- 
 tenance of many a one of the country estates belonging to 
 the English aristocracy is met by letting it to some rich 
 tenant for a while. 
 
106 Scottish Highlands 
 
 is hardly a house to be seen. All told, there are five 
 tiny villages in the region that borders on its waters. 
 Even the roads frequented by tourists are being 
 closed to them more and more for fear that the 
 game may be frightened off. Between these villages 
 stretch wide pasture lands where a few shepherds 
 find support. Near the shores of the lake a few 
 summer hotels may be seen and the castles that are 
 fitted out with every luxury by their titled owners, 
 who, it needs hardly be said, count a Highland piper 
 among their retinue, and require their menials to 
 wear the once despised garb of the Highlander, that 
 has become popular again since the novels of Sir 
 Walter Scott have roused new enthusiasm for the 
 romance of the Highlands. 1 
 
 Nowhere may the true nature and the devastating 
 influence of English " personal freedom," and of 
 the English capitalist be more clearly exhibited. 
 Only nature lovers who cannot be happy except 
 where no human being is in sight will be enthusias- 
 tic admirers of the loneliness and beauty of the Scot- 
 tish Highlands. To him who regards the earth as 
 the dwelling place of an active and productive race, 
 the scene is one that fills him with a deep sadness. 
 To me it was more depressing than the devastation 
 of Asia Minor under the Turkish yoke ; for I could 
 but reflect that the Turk knows no better, and is 
 
 1 The ancient and bitter antagonism between the Gaelic 
 and the Anglo-Saxon populations of Scotland is quite for- 
 gotten; the latter regard the Gaelic Highlanders as their 
 ancestors, and are proud of the victories that these won 
 over their own Anglo-Saxon progenitors. 
 
The Deserted Highlands 107 
 
 therefore not capable of producing or fostering a 
 higher state of culture. The desolation of the 
 Highlands, however, is the work of a cultured na- 
 tion, of one that claims not only a leading position 
 among the peoples of the world, but also that its 
 influence everywhere is favorable to the highest civi- 
 lization and the best interests of mankind. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 Free Trade and the Doctrines of the Man- 
 chester School — The Agricultural Pur- 
 suits 
 
 With the abrogation of the Corn Laws in 1846 
 and the adoption of free trade by England, capital 
 and commerce became the controlling factors in 
 the national development. As early as 1842 most 
 of the old tariff regulations had either been dis- 
 carded altogether, or had at least been greatly modi- 
 fied, and in 1849 tne Navigation Act also was dis- 
 continued. When these steps had been taken, the 
 fate of the agricultural pursuits, that had hitherto 
 been the chief source of the national wealth, was 
 sealed. They had for years been growing less and 
 less profitable, and could henceforth be continued as 
 a practical means of support only through artificial 
 protective measures, for the industrial and commer- 
 cial activities had not only come to be the controlling 
 interests in the life of the nation, but in the political 
 life also they had gained a deciding influence. 
 
 The products of English soil had become quite 
 insufficient to feed the rapidly growing population, 
 and therefore the terrible famine of 1845, Dv which 
 not only Ireland but England also suffered, turned 
 the scales in favor of a free entry of food products 
 
 108 
 
Agricultural Industries 109 
 
 into the country. From that time forth domestic 
 production could no longer maintain itself on a profit 
 paying basis in face of the immense imports of cheap 
 grains from abroad, and with every year grew less 
 desirable as an occupation from a pecuniary point 
 of view. The raising of grain is now almost en- 
 tirely abandoned, and the sojourner in England may 
 travel a long distance without seeing a single grain 
 field. Live stock and garden produce can, of course, 
 be raised to greater advantage, but even in these 
 pursuits the domestic producers are obliged to meet 
 an ever increasing competition from abroad. 
 
 At the present time about two-thirds (109,836 
 sq. km.) of the entire area of England and Wales 
 (150,359 sq. km.) are devoted to agriculture, 1 and 
 of this only a little more than one-fifth (23,194 
 sq. km.) is planted with grain and potatoes. Of the 
 total number of industrially employed persons in 
 England and Wales only 8.5 per cent 2 are engaged 
 
 1 Of woodland there is practically none in England. 
 According to the data in the year book of statistics for 
 1914 issued by the Imperial German government and a 
 few other data derived from the handbook of political 
 economy from which I have taken my figures and made 
 my computations, the forest lands in England and Wales 
 amount to 7,626 sq. km. as against 139,959 sq. km. in Ger- 
 many. 
 
 2 Unfortunately in the data of the year book of statistics, 
 agriculture, fisheries and forestry are all included under 
 one head, and since the fishing industry employs quite a 
 large number of men, although those engaged in forestry 
 are a negligible quantity in England but a considerable 
 one in Germany, the conclusion is that the percentage of 
 persons in England that are engaged in tilling the soil is 
 
IIO Free Trade: Manchester School 
 
 in agricultural pursuits, including those employed 
 in raising live stock and garden produce, as against 
 35.2 per cent in Germany. Naturally Ireland 
 makes quite a different showing, with 43 per cent 
 of all the industrially employed population engaged 
 in some form of agriculture, largely, however, in the 
 raising of live stock. Of the entire amount of land 
 in use for these purposes (69,760 sq. km. out of a 
 total area of 82,260 sq. km.), approximately one- 
 ninth only (7,465 sq. km.) is devoted to the produc- 
 tion of grain and potatoes. In 1913 the yield of 
 the grain harvest in England and Wales, including 
 wheat, barley, oats, and a very small quantity of 
 rye, which the English like so little, amounted to 
 3,921,800 tons, in Ireland to not more than 1,174,200 
 tons, a total of 5,096,000 tons; in addition, Eng- 
 land produced 2,941,000 tons of potatoes, and Ire- 
 land 3,799,400 tons, amounting to 6,741,300 tons 
 in all. In the same year .30,265,700 tons of grain 
 were raised in Germany, and 54,121,100 tons of po- 
 tatoes, or approximately six times the amount of 
 grain, and eight times the quantity of potatoes. At 
 the same time the population of the United King- 
 dom, according to the census of 19 10, was almost 
 three- fourths of that of Germany (more exactly, 
 nine-thirteenths, or 45^ millions against 65 millions 
 in Germany). With regard to live stock the fig- 
 even smaller than the given 8.5 per cent. With regard 
 to Scotland, where very little is done in the way of farm- 
 ing, the year book of statistics gives no data whatever 
 concerning the raising of agricultural products or live- 
 stock. 
 
Dependence on Food from Abroad m 
 
 ures show a very much better situation in the United 
 Kingdom, although the amount raised is quite in- 
 sufficient for the needs of home consumption. In 
 the year 19 13 England, Wales and Ireland (un- 
 fortunately here again the figures for Scotland are 
 not at hand) raised in round numbers 10,650,000 
 head of beef cattle as against 20,182,000 in Ger- 
 many, only 3,160,000 pigs as against 20,182,000 in 
 Germany, but 20,750,000 sheep as against 5,803,000 
 in Germany. 1 
 
 The United Kingdom has therefore arrived at the 
 stage that in ancient times was first reached by the 
 Athenian state, soon to be followed, however, by 
 all the other Grecian states, and in which the Italians 
 found themselves in the second century before the 
 Christian era, and from that time forth until the 
 fall of the Empire, 2 — viz., the condition of abso- 
 
 1 The number of horses raised in England, Wales and 
 Ireland is 2,017,000, and in Germany 4,532,000. 
 
 2 The following extract is from an address sent by the 
 Emperor Tiberius to the Senate in the year 22 a. d. : " It 
 is wonderful that nobody represents, That Italy is in con- 
 stant want of foreign supplies, that the lives of the Roman 
 people are daily at the mercy of uncertain seas and tem- 
 pests : were it not for our supports from the provinces, 
 supports by which the masters and their slaves, and their 
 estates, are maintained, would our own groves and villas 
 maintain us? This care therefore, Conscript Fathers, is 
 the business of the Prince, and by neglect of this care the 
 foundations of the state would be dissolved." (Tacitus, 
 Annals III.) All the many attempts to change the eco- 
 nomic condition of Italy proved ineffectual; when in the 
 year 300 the Empire crumbled as a result of the civil wars, 
 the complete desolation of the country and of the cities 
 was inevitable. 
 
112 Free Trade: Manchester School 
 
 lute dependence upon the importation of food from 
 across the seas. The gravity of this situation to- 
 gether with the necessity of providing for it must 
 in the end become the controlling factor in the na- 
 tional policy, and one before which all else must 
 give way. Should an enemy succeed in cutting 
 England off from communication by sea with its 
 foreign food supply, as happened to the Athenians 
 in 404 and 388 B. C, and to the Italians again and 
 again during the period of their factional wars, the 
 country would be lost, and would have to submit to 
 the terms of the victor, though not a single soldier 
 of the enemy had set foot upon English soil. 
 
 With every step in the further development of 
 this situation the results of Great Britain's economic 
 policy have become more and more apparent, not 
 to English statesmen only, but to the people gen- 
 erally, as they realize that this is not only a vital 
 danger that threatens their position of leadership 
 among the nations, but that the very existence of 
 the British Kingdom as an independent state is at 
 stake. This is the nightmare that awaits the Brit- 
 ish slumberers at the close of their days of rejoicing 
 and self -congratulation because of the position of 
 supremacy they have won for themselves among 
 the nations of the earth — the anxious thought of 
 the future and how to provide for it - — that will 
 not let them rest in peace, for, as the danger grows 
 in magnitude, it threatens to unsettle the very foun- 
 dations of their political structure and social organi- 
 zation, and to compel a radical change in their order 
 of life. 
 
Free Trade and Its Results 1 13 
 
 To be sure, when Sir Robert Peel turned his 
 country's course into untried paths by the repeal of 
 the Corn Laws and the introduction of free trade, 
 the future seemed to hold no such corroding care. 
 By the Napoleonic wars and the continental blockade 
 Britain had gained full command of the sea and of 
 the world's commerce; there was not a rival to dis- 
 pute her rule, and the keenest glance into the future 
 failed to reveal a power that was at all likely to de- 
 velop the ability successfully to compete with her. 
 The whole world, so it seemed, had accepted Britain 
 as the mistress of the sea and had conceded to her 
 without protest her position of supremacy among 
 the nations of the world. 
 
 Meanwhile the English manufacturing industries 
 had passed through a stage of enormous develop- 
 ment, and were in no need of protection, for with 
 the aid of the British merchant marine they were 
 flooding the world with their products, and were 
 finding little or no competition from the backward 
 industries of the continent and of North America. 
 
 Therefore, when Cobden proclaimed his doctrine 
 of free trade, it was eagerly accepted as the gospel 
 of a new era that was to bring emancipation to man- 
 kind, and in which the mists of prejudice and past 
 error were to vanish in the sunshine of the new day. 
 For well did the apostles of this latest doctrine know 
 how to present it as a scientifically established prin- 
 ciple, good for all people at all times, and they 
 found ready listeners, and made countless converts 
 in every quarter of the globe. We in Germany well 
 remember with what fanatical zeal these doctrinaire 
 
114 F ree Trade: Manchester School 
 
 advocates of free trade preached it in our own coun- 
 try, and tried to impress every one with the truth 
 of their theory, while they belittled the opinions of 
 those who differed with them and whom they sought 
 to suppress as intellectually and morally their in- 
 feriors. It seemed impossible to them that intelli- 
 gent beings could fail to be convinced by the rea- 
 sonableness of their doctrine and so adopt it 
 themselves, unless, indeed, they were influenced by 
 sinister motives. 
 
 Moreover, these free trade enthusiasts were them- 
 selves so convinced of the truth of their doctrine 
 that they rejected all historic evidence to the con- 
 trary as unscientific, and with extreme ingenuous- 
 ness simply denied the fact that all political and 
 economic systems must of necessity be conditional, 
 and dependent upon the combined influences of all 
 the many factors that enter into the situation and 
 give rise to the ever changing and diversified prob- 
 lems of the times. Any one who entertained such 
 opinions was regarded by the free trade advocates 
 as a stubborn reactionary, or as an ignoramus of 
 limited mentality, or, what is most probable, as a 
 self seeking egoist who, under cover of belief in 
 the older theory, was following some reprehensible 
 object, and was therefore an impediment in the way 
 of human progress. 
 
 The conception of the state as it was developed 
 in the course of English political life, and which has 
 already been discussed, was taken up by the Man- 
 chester School and systematized in a formula some- 
 what after this fashion: Economic activity is the 
 
Doctrines of Manchester School 115 
 
 chief factor in human life, compared with which 
 all else is insignificant; it is the duty of the state 
 to remove all obstacles that may impede its prog- 
 ress, and therefore all interference on the part of 
 the state itself should be limited to the smallest pos- 
 sible minimum, so that all may have fair play ; in this 
 way the ideal formulated by Bentham during the 
 period of clarified thought will be realized, — " the 
 greatest happiness of the greatest number." The 
 English conception of the state is evidently thought 
 to be the only correct one, and all others to be either 
 antiquated or fallacious. When these ideas have 
 been generally accepted and acted upon, so it was 
 believed, all cause for war, all rivalry of the nations 
 in a struggle for existence will be eliminated; for 
 the nations and states will then be dissolved into 
 loosely united groups of people held together and 
 protected by police regulations only, all of them 
 following their own individual interests unhindered 
 by any restrictions, and given the opportunity to atr 
 tain the end for which they are striving by free 
 economic competition. 
 
 That the objects so attained and the happiness 
 realized are on a wholly material basis, ignoring 
 some of the highest and most influential springs of 
 human action, which are thereby relegated to the 
 rubbish heap of outgrown ideas; that there is no 
 place in this system for the most important duties of 
 the state, and a total disregard of the individuality 
 of each of the great states and national entities that 
 are uninterruptedly striving with one another, dur- 
 ing the years of peace as well as during the times 
 
Il6 Free Trade: Manchester School 
 
 of warfare between them, and who by this mighty 
 contention are advancing human development, — all 
 these considerations are entirely disregarded in the 
 doctrines of the Manchester School. 
 
 The English aristocracy adopted this doctrine in 
 its entirety and conformed their action to it, and so 
 maintained their ascendency, as has already been 
 stated. The fact is, however, that when these ideas 
 together with free trade were put into practice, cap- 
 ital eventually became supreme, and all other na- 
 tional considerations had to give way before it ; and 
 then, unsatiated by the profits at home, it turned 
 to the nations abroad and ruthlessly exploited them 
 in the interest of England. If the English had 
 succeeded in converting the states of the continent 
 to the doctrine of free trade, their doors would all 
 have been opened wide to English commerce and to 
 the output of English factories, and they would then 
 have grown more and more dependent upon Britain, 
 until at last they would have lost all hope of ever 
 extricating themselves from their economic depend- 
 ence, while every possible danger to British suprem- 
 acy among the nations of the world would have 
 vanished. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 The English Attitude Toward Other 
 Nations 
 
 The purpose of this volume requires that one 
 other English characteristic should be discussed: 
 The attitude that the Briton assumes toward the 
 people of other countries. 
 
 In consequence of Britain's isolated position phys- 
 ically, its development has been along lines peculiarly 
 its own, and its people therefore differ from the na- 
 tions of the continent much more than these do 
 among themselves. Just as the structure of the 
 state and the organization of its political life are 
 unlike those on the continent, so there are other 
 marked differences in the national customs and views 
 of life — differences that extend down to such small 
 things as the daily meals and their preparation in 
 the kitchen — small matters in themselves, but by 
 no means unimportant in their effect upon the social 
 life of the nations and their relations to one another. 
 
 Although the people of each country and province 
 of the European continent have their own distinctive 
 habits and customs, these countries stand in this re- 
 spect as a single group in contrast with the British 
 Isles and America. To the average Englishman the 
 customs and manners to which he has been accus- 
 
 117 
 
Il8 Attitude Towards Other Nations 
 
 tomed from youth up seem the only proper ones, and 
 every deviation from them appears to him to be a 
 social offence of which he disapproves the more be- 
 cause he himself has been accustomed to bow to 
 the dictates of public opinion, and to regard tradi- 
 tion as inviolable. 
 
 The Briton therefore expects every foreigner who 
 sets foot upon his island to conform to English cus- 
 toms and views of life, and one would therefore sup- 
 pose that when he himself is abroad, he would adapt 
 himself to the manners and ways of the land in 
 which he finds himself. But not so ; he sees in these 
 but an evidence of the inferiority of all other na- 
 tions and their degree of culture to that of his own, 
 and demands as a matter of course that every one 
 should conform to his ideas of propriety. The Eng- 
 lish, for instance are shocked when a foreigner vis- 
 iting England wears a dress coat at some ceremo- 
 nious or festive occasion that takes place in the day 
 time, or, what is still more shocking, appears in 
 anything but a dress coat in the evening, for the 
 Englishman who lives as etiquette demands wears 
 evening dress even when dining alone, or only with 
 the members of his immediate family. But, on the 
 other hand, at a state occasion such as the break- 
 fast at Court to which the members of the congress 
 of historians that met in Berlin in 1908 were invited, 
 and at which guests are requested to wear full 
 dress, the Englishmen coolly appear in frock-coats, 
 and we are good-natured and forbearing enough to 
 let such a disregard of our social customs pass un- 
 noticed. 
 
Attitude When Abroad 119 
 
 It is to demeanor such as this that the English- 
 man owes his reputation abroad of being overbear- 
 ing and irritating, even though it may be uninten- 
 tional, and he may be quite unconscious of it. But 
 although the individual Briton gets himself dis- 
 liked and into frequent difficulties by this attitude, 
 the nation as a whole is the gainer by it, for the peo- 
 ple of the continent, who are much used to inter- 
 course with foreigners and to their various customs, 
 have condoned the British lack of courtesy the more 
 readily because it is accompanied by English gold. 
 And so it has come about that during the last century 
 customs as well as etiquette on the continent have 
 become more and more Anglicised, especially so in 
 those circles that aspire to recognition as " good 
 society." 
 
 This is peculiarly true of Germany where long 
 dependence upon foreign countries, and a belated 
 achievement of political independence has made the 
 people prone to imitate others, a tendency to which 
 they yielded the more readily because of their native 
 repugnance to fixed customs and forms, and their 
 strong inclination to criticize their own institutions 
 and to disapprove of them. Aside from all this, 
 there is among us Germans a good-natured desire 
 to meet the stranger half way, and to make things 
 pleasant for him. Indeed this toadying to the for- 
 eigner, and especially to the foreigner from Eng- 
 land, has come to be a national ailment with us, and 
 one that so far has withstood every effort at a cure ; 
 and it is a question whether after the conclusion of 
 the present war, we will be able to overcome it, or, 
 
120 Attitude Towards Other Nations 
 
 in spite of our recent bitter experience, will yield 
 to it again, and the leading social circles will return 
 to this aping of foreign manners. 
 
 It is all of a piece with this tendency of the Brit- 
 ish to do as they like when abroad, that they make no 
 attempt to speak the language of the country in 
 which they happen to be. While at home, most 
 likely, they did not study it at all, or its rudiments 
 only, and, as they have little ability in this direction 
 and are very averse to exposing themselves to pos- 
 sible ridicule, they make no effort to use a foreign 
 language. In this reluctance we probably see the 
 constraining effect of the habit of past generations, 
 for the Americans, in sharp contrast to the English, 
 study foreign languages assiduously in their schools, 
 and are very ready to use them as best they may, 
 and therefore make extraordinarily rapid progress 
 in them. The English, on the contrary, always try 
 to get along with the use of their native tongue only, 
 and this usually serves their purpose very well. 
 This is especially the case in Germany where the 
 acquisition of foreign languages is very general, and 
 where every one is eager to perfect himself in them, 
 and the English therefore find the people most ready 
 to accept their language as the medium of inter- 
 course. All this has greatly furthered the use of 
 English as the universal tongue. 
 
 But this attitude has its darker side also, for it 
 makes the Briton incapable of understanding and 
 appreciating the institutions and view point of other 
 nationalities, and he considers it quite beneath his 
 dignity to make any attempt to do so. How greatly 
 
Failure to Understand 121 
 
 it handicaps him in his commercial relations with 
 foreign nations has become glaringly apparent ever 
 since German industries have reached the point 
 where they can offer serious competition to the Eng- 
 lish in this direction. 
 
 The English merchants as a rule offer in foreign 
 markets only such goods as they themselves have 
 been accustomed to use, and which meet their own 
 requirements; they pay no heed to the tastes and 
 habits of the people among whom they hope to find 
 customers, but instead, try to impose their goods 
 upon them whether they suit or not. The Germans, 
 on the contrary, consult not only the habits and 
 needs of their foreign customers, but their tastes 
 as well, and moreover can carry on all necessary 
 business transactions with them in their own speech. 
 This attitude of the English is not simply the re- 
 sult of self-satisfaction and conceit, but may prob- 
 ably be traced in a much larger measure to a lack 
 in their power of adjustment, which is inherent in 
 the English mentality, and due, no doubt, to the rigid 
 traditions of English culture and education, and 
 which has taken on proportions in the national char- 
 acter that threaten to become fatal. The English 
 hardly deem it possible that they might act differ- 
 ently or cultivate other habits, and all the warnings, 
 speeches, and resolutions advising a change of atti- 
 tude and a better preparation for commercial enter- 
 prise, such as the study of foreign languages, etc., 
 that have been the order of the day in England dur- 
 ing the last few decades, have had no results what- 
 ever. The Briton cannot escape from his habit. 
 
122 Attitude Towards Other Nations 
 
 The English show a like inability when confronted 
 by the problems that arise in connection with the 
 social or political institutions of foreign lands, and, 
 failing to arrive at a correct estimate of the ideas 
 and sentiments that underlie them, can neither in- 
 augurate nor carry out measures best fitted to solve 
 them. No one will question that there are many 
 highly educated Englishmen who have a thorough 
 knowledge of foreign countries and their affairs; 
 and, on the other hand, it would be a fatal mistake 
 on our part to allow ourselves to believe that there 
 is a correct judgment to any widely extended de- 
 gree in our own land concerning conditions abroad. 
 This applies most pertinently to our impressions of 
 England and America where the views and circum- 
 stances of life depart so decidedly from our own, 
 and with regard to which a true appreciation is con- 
 fined to a very small circle in Germany. Our daily 
 press is by no means well posted with regard to 
 these matters, and gives us only meager and inade- 
 quate reports, while it is not unusual to meet Ger- 
 mans of otherwise wide attainments who make the 
 most surprising statements, and entertain quite ab- 
 surd views in regard to conditions in England or 
 America. 
 
 This is the fruit we are reaping as the result of 
 the Prussian government's incredibly narrow and 
 short-sighted policy of public instruction that, quite 
 out of touch with the actual demands of life and 
 its practical requirements, has neglected the study of 
 the English language in the high schools, and even 
 in the colleges has ranked it as a secondary require- 
 
Failure to Understand 1 23 
 
 ment and virtually as an optional study. On the 
 other hand English is assiduously studied in the prac- 
 tical arts and vocational schools, and it follows that 
 a much greater familiarity with that language is to 
 be found among the middle and even the lower 
 classes of our population than in the circles that 
 claim leadership in our intellectual life. How little 
 distinguished for a correct appreciation of foreign 
 conditions the members of our diplomatic corps 
 as a whole really have been, and how inadequately 
 their special education and preparation has fitted 
 them to get into touch with the influential circles 
 abroad and to get correct impressions from them, 
 and so be enabled to influence them in turn, has re- 
 ceived ample and regrettable proof at every step of 
 our diplomatic activity during the last decades. In 
 the negotiations that were the forerunners of the 
 present war, as well as in those that are connected 
 with its progress, this experience has been repeated. 
 In England, however, the information and prep- 
 aration so necessary to diplomatic efficiency is lack- 
 ing in a still greater degree. It is a matter of com- 
 mon knowledge that the foreign policy of England 
 has been hampered, and at times has entirely mis- 
 carried, because of a want of sympathetic apprecia- 
 tion of affairs abroad. The English are totally ig- 
 norant of conditions in Germany, and are absolutely 
 unable to grasp our views of life, and are therefore 
 wholly out of sympathy with the institutions of 
 state and the military organization that are their 
 natural outgrowth. That they had entirely failed 
 to reach a correct estimate of our military strength, 
 
124 Attitude Towards Other Nations 
 
 as well as of the efficiency of our organization, and, 
 above all, of the lofty feeling of patriotism that is 
 the well-spring of the German nation's strength, this 
 latest war has amply revealed to the world. 
 
 This is not to be wondered at, however, when we 
 consider that a man like Sir Edward Grey has been 
 charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, — a 
 man who, aside from a little French, knows nothing 
 of any language except his own, and has never been 
 outside of his native land, except once on a visit to 
 Paris. But the situation is no better with a large 
 majority of British statesmen, — Mr. Gladstone's is 
 a typical case. And this is true also of most of the 
 eminent men of England who, because of their 
 social position, their political influence or their lit- 
 erary activity, have shaped the destiny of their 
 country. 
 
PART II 
 
 ENGLAND'S POLICY AND ENGLAND AS A 
 WORLD POWER 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 The Beginning of England's Power at Sea — 
 Wars with Spain and Holland 
 
 We may now turn our attention to an inspec- 
 tion of the successive steps by which a definite Eng- 
 lish policy was evolved, and of the course by which 
 England attained her supremacy at sea. 
 
 The foundation for her country's present strength 
 at sea was laid by Elizabeth in her struggle with 
 Spain, which was then at the height of its power 
 as a world empire, and was seeking to extend its 
 control to the island kingdom also, and to turn it 
 back to Catholicism; or rather, Spain was trying 
 to regain the influence over England that it had 
 once held when Mary, wife of Philip II of Spain, 
 was on the English throne. The first step in this 
 conflict was taken when Elizabeth allied herself with 
 the Netherlands in their revolt against Spanish op- 
 pression; another, when she brought Scotland into 
 complete political subjection to England by her sup- 
 port of the party that opposed Mary Stuart; and 
 still another, when Elizabeth sought to attach 
 France to English interests during the period of that 
 country's political uncertainty due to religious 
 dissension and the factional war between the no- 
 bles. 
 
 It was at this time in their history that the Eng- 
 127 
 
128 England's Power at Sea 
 
 lish first ventured upon daring undertakings at sea, — 
 the half piratical adventures of Drake and Raleigh 
 in their bold aggressions upon the colonies and com- 
 merce of Spain, which brought about a declaration 
 of War, and the dispatch of the Spanish Armada to 
 British waters. This was the time also when the 
 first, although fruitless attempt to form a settlement 
 on the shores of America was made by the English 
 in 1584; and in the year 1600 the East India Com- 
 pany was formed. 
 
 It is not to our purpose to follow the uncertain 
 attempts and irresolute course of England's policy 
 during the reigns of the earlier Stuarts, under whom 
 Scotland had been united with England in a personal 
 union. The Spanish monarchy, in close connection 
 with the German House of Hapsburg, was still the 
 dominating power in Europe. Neither James I nor 
 Charles I was capable of inaugurating an aggres- 
 sive English policy, the difficulties of which would 
 have been greatly increased by the growing antago- 
 nism between the Parliament and the Crown. On 
 the other hand, the contemptible peace policy to 
 which Raleigh was sacrificed when James I sent him 
 to the scaffold in 161 8 to appease Spain for the at- 
 tack upon her colonies on the Orinoco River, came 
 to nought in 1624 through the failure of the King's 
 plan to arrange a marriage between his son and a 
 Spanish Infanta. The King's next attempt, as 
 champion of the Protestant cause in Europe, to 
 wrest the Palatinate from the grasp of the Haps- 
 burgs, and so to participate in the German war, also 
 ended in dismal failure. 
 
The Navigation Acts 129 
 
 Years of continued peace, however, offered the 
 opportunity to plant English colonies in North 
 America, — the first one in Virginia in 1607, and 
 another on the New England shore in 1620, which 
 soon received great additions from the Puritans who 
 were seeking refuge from persecution at home. 
 
 While the Spanish power as a world empire was 
 fast waning, and could be maintained only with 
 great difficulty, more especially so since Richelieu 
 had begun to assail it with all his resourcefulness of 
 policy, and with the strength of French arms, an- 
 other sea power was fast claiming the attention of 
 the world. The Netherlands reached the zenith of 
 their glory as a maritime power just at the time 
 when England's weakness at sea compelled her to 
 withdraw from the carrying trade of the world. 
 On October 21, 1639, Admiral Van Tromp found 
 the Spanish fleet off the coast of England in the 
 vicinity of Dover, and through the connivance of 
 Charles I, whose habitual weakness allowed him as 
 usual to be led into a contemptible act of duplicity, 
 this last expedition that Spain was able to send 
 against the Netherlands was crushed. 
 
 All England felt the pressure of the Dutch as- 
 cendency at sea very keenly in every branch of com- 
 merce and trade. In spite of their community of 
 interests as two Protestant nations, and the analo- 
 gous situation of the two countries in the antago- 
 nistic relation in which each stood to one of two 
 royal houses allied by marriage — the house of 
 Orange and that of the Stuarts — this commercial 
 competition engendered in the English a bitter op- 
 
130 England's Power at Sea 
 
 position toward the powerful merchants of the 
 Netherlands. 
 
 With the establishment of the Commonwealth 
 England's vigor was first fully revealed to the world. 
 At home the newly established government sternly 
 suppressed every attempt at revolt within the three 
 kingdoms, by means of the efficient army that out- 
 matched every opponent, and to which it owed its 
 victory. Abroad the English fleet under Blake pur- 
 sued the adherents of their King, who had died on 
 the scaffold, into every sea, and compelled the lately 
 rehabilitated Kingdom of Portugal, as well as its 
 Spanish adversaries, not only to refrain from giving 
 them aid, but also to surrender the arms and ships 
 that had found safety under their protection. 
 
 On October 9, 1651, the first of the Navigation 
 Acts was passed that for two centuries were not only 
 to be the fundamental principle of Britain's commer- 
 cial policy, but were to shape that country's policy 
 throughout. It prohibited the importation in for- 
 eign vessels of any but the products of the countries 
 to which they belonged, or else these were to be 
 brought to England in English vessels. This pro- 
 vision pertained to European products; all others 
 were to be imported in English vessels only. 1 As 
 Holland was not disposed to accept these terms, the 
 Dutch vessels then in British ports were seized, and 
 a piratical warfare was begun against the sea craft 
 of the Netherlands, which soon led to a declaration 
 
 1 After the Restoration, the Navigation Act was made to 
 apply to Ireland also, by which the ruin of Irish commerce 
 was accomplished, as has already been told. 
 
Wars Waged 131 
 
 of war. Cromwell, who was then Lord Protector 
 of England, soon brought the war to a close, how- 
 ever, and compelled Holland to accept his terms of 
 peace (1654), and submit to the Navigation Act. 
 
 Cromwell then renewed the war against Spain. 
 It was begun while the two countries were still at 
 peace by the conquest of Jamaica (1655), which 
 England has retained ever since. The war was then 
 prosecuted in alliance with the French, to whose aid 
 the English owed their acquisition of Dunkirk. It 
 was due to this alliance also that the thirty years' 
 war between France and Spain was brought to a def- 
 inite close, and the latter country was forced to con- 
 clude the Peace of the Pyrenees by which the posi- 
 tion of dominance in Europe, so long held by Spain, 
 was lost to her and passed to France. 
 
 This fast developing power of France, which soon 
 received a further and tremendous impetus through 
 the purposeful and sweeping policy of aggrandize- 
 ment pursued by Louis XIV, was viewed by Eng- 
 land with great and growing concern. But the 
 kings of the dynasty that ruled England just after 
 the Restoration held persistently to France at every 
 important turn in the affairs of England, with but 
 rare exceptions, hoping from that country to draw 
 the strength that would enable them to hold their 
 own against the Parliament in their struggle for a 
 position of independence within their own realm. 
 One permanent advantage accrued to England as a 
 result of this policy of the Stuart kings in the pre- 
 dominating influence that their country gained in 
 Portugal, whose independence was enforced by Eng- 
 
132 England's Power at Sea 
 
 land and France as victorious allies in their war 
 with Spain. 
 
 The people of the Netherlands, however, were 
 still the real rivals of the English, and in both the 
 wars that Charles II conducted against Holland 
 (1664- 1 667 and 1 672- 1 674), he could depend upon 
 the strong approval of his people. It was the Earl 
 of Shaftesbury, at first the head of the Cabal Min- 
 istry (1667-1673), and later the leader of the ruth- 
 less and popular Opposition, who designated Hol- 
 land as the Carthage that must at all hazards be de- 
 stroyed. In spite of an immediate and victorious 
 conflict at sea, the conduct of these wars did not 
 redound to England's glory; the internal weakness 
 of the administration, the prevailing resort to in- 
 trigue at Court, and the repeated quarrels with the 
 Parliament, the very reverse of Cromwell's master- 
 ful and relentlessly despotic regime, made an ener- 
 getic war policy impossible. In the first war, the 
 government of the Netherlands under the direction 
 of John De Witt ordered Admiral De Ruyter to sail 
 with his fleet to the Thames, from where he threat- 
 ened London and compelled England to conclude a 
 peace. In the second war, Van Tromp and De Ruy- 
 ter successfully defended the coast of Holland 
 against a British attack upon the island of Texel. 
 
 Nevertheless the final outcome of these wars was 
 not without some advantage to England. At the 
 close of the first one, England held New Amster- 
 dam, which she retained, renaming it New York, 
 and so dislodged the wedge which Holland had 
 driven into the new world between the two English 
 
Wars with Holland 1 33 
 
 colonies, New England in the north, and Virginia 
 to the south of it, in North America. During the 
 second war, the Netherlands suffered a serious set- 
 back in the attack which Louis XIV made upon them 
 at the same time, and so England was enabled to 
 enforce submission to the Navigation Act, and to 
 demand a large indemnity from Holland besides. 
 Moreover, the natural conditions that make for 
 power among the nations, such as England's pre- 
 ponderance in population, and the wealth of her re- 
 sources, began to tell more and more ; gradually the 
 Netherlands sank into a position of secondary im- 
 portance, and in time ceased to be a menace to Eng- 
 land. The former rivalry between the two nations 
 was then gradually replaced by a constantly increas- 
 ing relation of friendship. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 England's Wars with France — The Begin- 
 ning of English Supremacy at Sea 
 
 The closer relations between England and the 
 Netherlands were made more desirable, and eventu- 
 ally became a political necessity to England, by the 
 great strides that France was making toward a po- 
 sition of supremacy in the world. By land the 
 French had already secured for themselves the place 
 of dominance among the nations of the continent, 
 and they now were striving to gain a like pre-emi- 
 nence at sea. The French navy and merchant ma- 
 rine were greatly enlarged, and the harbors im- 
 proved; French supremacy in the Mediterranean 
 was secured beyond dispute; to their colonies in 
 America they added the new territory of Louisiana, 
 by which English colonization was hemmed in from 
 the west ; San Diego and other smaller islands in the 
 West Indies were occupied, and the settlement of 
 Pondichery on the eastern coast of India established. 
 It was this prodigious expansion that soon led the 
 English people to recognize in France their greatest 
 rival, with whom they would have to contend if 
 they were to maintain their ascendency at sea. In 
 sharp contrast to the policy of the Crown, the popu- 
 lar tide of anti-French sentiment grew ever stronger 
 
 134 
 
European Balance of Power 1 35 
 
 in England, and was still further swelled, not only 
 by the fundamental differences in the political or- 
 ganization of the two countries, but even more so 
 by the religious antagonism that was stimulated by 
 the sharply emphasized Catholic attitude of Louis 
 XIV, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
 
 (1685). 
 
 All those European powers that looked upon 
 French preponderance as a menace to their independ- 
 ent existence now endeavored by all imaginable 
 measures to enlist England on their side. A deci- 
 sive step in this direction was taken when the ac- 
 tion of the Netherlands made it possible for Wil- 
 liam III to enter England with his army in 1688, by 
 which the Opposition received their long-desired op- 
 portunity, the Stuart dynasty was driven from the 
 throne, and, as a consequence, the great coalition 
 against France was formed. From this time forth 
 the policy of England has gone hand in hand with 
 that of Holland, with the natural result that the 
 smaller nation has followed more and more sub- 
 missively in the wake of the greater. The two 
 countries were henceforth grouped together and 
 styled " the sea powers " by the nations of the con- 
 tinent. 
 
 In all the great wars that have taken place since 
 that time one feature of England's policy has clearly 
 revealed itself, and has remained its leading char- 
 acteristic up to the present day: England allies 
 herself with the weaker nations of the continent to 
 give battle to the strongest. The catch-word that 
 has been coined to meet this situation is that " the 
 
136 England's Wars 
 
 balance of power in Europe must be maintained," 
 which is right enough. But the English interpreta- 
 tion of it is that the continent is a world by itself, 
 that England lies outside of it, and therefore is not 
 a part of Europe at all; no one of the continental 
 states is to be allowed to become supreme, and so 
 become a menace to England; while the nations of 
 the continent are destroying one another in warfare, 
 England is to be free to follow her own interests 
 unhindered, and so gain for herself a dominating 
 position in the world, and then, at the close of the 
 conflicts, take a hand in the bargaining among the 
 nations and decide according to her own needs what 
 the conformation of political Europe shall be. 
 
 England has therefore ever sought to combine the 
 power of the weaker nations in a coalition, and to 
 make use of this to accomplish her own purpose by 
 the humiliation of her most troublesome rival. 
 Meanwhile she has always known well how to se- 
 cure all the spoils for herself, and to hold on to them, 
 and has never felt any compunction to withdraw 
 from a coalition without in any way fulfilling the 
 promises she had held out to her allies, and when- 
 ever her own ends had been accomplished, or if the 
 conquests of the alliance promised to be greater than 
 had been foreseen, and consequently threatened se- 
 riously to unsettle existing European conditions. 
 This rapid change of front that finds an ever ready 
 excuse in a change of ministry has deservedly given 
 England a reputation for faithlessness. That no 
 dependence could be placed upon England, and no 
 lasting compact made with her was soon discovered 
 
European Balance of Power 137 
 
 by the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the pressing 
 need of the moment frequently compelled the states 
 of the continent to combine with England, only to 
 discover to their sorrow what might be expected 
 from an alliance with " perfidious Albion." By the 
 pursuit of this unscrupulous policy, and by the abso- 
 lute selfishness of her attitude, England has carried 
 off one triumph after another, and so has constantly 
 added to her power. 
 
 In the war that England waged in alliance with 
 Holland, Austria and Spain from 1689 to 1697, she 
 triumphantly asserted her independence of action, 
 and secured recognition of her lately established 
 form of government, crushed the overweening am- 
 bition of France, and in the naval battle of La 
 Hogue (1692), as well as in the later encounters 
 at sea, and despite the valorous deeds of Jean Barts 
 and other French privateers, did immense damage 
 to the French sea power. Then, in the Peace of 
 Ryswick, after her own purpose had been achieved, 
 England manifested no concern for the welfare of 
 her recent allies, but compelled them to accept the 
 terms of peace that she had arranged in conjunc- 
 tion with France. It was by the terms of this 
 treaty that France acquired Strassburg and Alsace. 
 
 Later, in the war of the Spanish Succession, a 
 definite end was made of French domination. 
 Then, when Queen Anne finally ventured to assert 
 herself, shook off the constraint that the Whigs had 
 imposed upon her, and brought the Tories back into 
 power, England under the control of this party not 
 only immediately concluded a peace — so much was 
 
138 England's Wars 
 
 politically justifiable — but played her former allies 
 false, and secretly connived with France to obtain 
 advantages for both. But as usual, England did 
 not fail to secure for herself the lion's share of the 
 spoils by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). In Amer- 
 ica she acquired Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova 
 Scotia) and Hudson Bay from France, while in 
 Spain she retained Gibraltar and Minorca, which 
 gave her control of the gateway to the Mediterra- 
 nean as well as a strong position within its western 
 extent. By the re-establishment of the Dutch bar- 
 rier — the right given to Holland to hold certain 
 forts on the Belgian frontier — a limit was set to 
 French ambition in the direction of the English 
 coast, which had been threatened. France was 
 compelled to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk 
 which had been purchased from Charles II, and to 
 fill up the harbor. In consequence of the Methuen 
 Treaty, December, 1703, Portugal had become an 
 English satellite even before the beginning of the 
 war, and had been entirely at the mercy of Eng- 
 land's commercial methods ever since the agree- 
 ment to import no woolen cloths except from that 
 country ; but from this time forth Portugal virtually 
 sank into a condition of vassalage, and has re- 
 mained in this state of dependence upon England 
 up to the present day. 
 
 From Spain England secured the right of the As- 
 siento — the contract for furnishing the colonies 
 in America with negroes — probably the most lu- 
 crative trade of the Atlantic. Every one knows 
 that England understood well how to make the 
 
War of the Spanish Succession 139 
 
 most of this privilege, and, not content with this 
 alone, far exceeded it in the smuggling trade that 
 the English merchants carried on with the African 
 coast. In large measure it is to this slave trade 
 that Liverpool owes its present prosperity, its 
 streets, as the saying goes, being paved with negro 
 skulls. The prosperous descendants of these slave 
 traders have not turned pious only — every correct 
 Englishman is that — but are filled to overflowing 
 with benevolence and philanthropic devotion, as be- 
 fits all beati possidentes. It is not necessary to re- 
 view the negotiations that took place during the 
 next few decades, since the chief events of this 
 period were the indecisive commercial wars that 
 England carried on with Spain, and the renewed 
 hostilities against France in connection with the 
 war of the Spanish Succession. Although British 
 trade and British sovereignty at sea grew apace, of 
 definite results there were none. 
 
 So far as the struggle between France and Eng- 
 land was concerned, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 in 1748 was no more than an armistice, for the 
 American problems remained unsettled, and the 
 Americans themselves, who by this time had de- 
 veloped a strong feeling of self-reliance, showed 
 as little consideration for their own rivals as did 
 their mother country at home for hers, and, quite 
 untroubled by diplomatic negotiations abroad, 
 adopted a policy of territorial expansion on their 
 own account, and by a petty but unremitting war- 
 fare attempted to break the bounds that the French 
 possession of Canada and Louisiana set to their ter- 
 
140 England's Wars 
 
 ritory. In addition there was the strong position 
 that the French had gained for themselves in the 
 Indian Ocean by the acquisition of the islands of 
 La France (Mauritius) and Bourbon (Reunion), 
 which the valiant deeds of Labourdonnais and Du- 
 pleix had won for France, and the further French 
 successes in the eastern part of India, by which the 
 few positions that England held in this region, such 
 as Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, were seriously 
 menaced. Although the two nations were still of- 
 ficially at peace, the conflicting interests of the sit- 
 uation soon led to violent armed encounters in 
 which the native princes of the rival dynasties of 
 the Deccan took sides, and in which Captain Clive 
 gained his first brilliant victories. 
 
 It was as the result of this conflict of interests in 
 the East and in the West that England and France 
 faced each other in the bitter Seven Years' war, 
 from 1755 to 1763. In this struggle the war 
 waged by Frederick the Great in alliance with Eng- 
 land against the greater part of Europe is but an 
 episode, and constituted the continental war by 
 which England meant to keep her chief adversary 
 fully engaged by land so that she herself might be 
 free to pursue her maritime policy undisturbed. 
 And her aim was achieved, for it was in this war 
 that the foundations were laid for the world empire 
 of Great Britain, for the dominance of the English 
 nation, and for the world-wide use of the English 
 tongue. 
 
 The war began in the usual English way, with 
 severe reverses, chief among them being the loss of 
 
Pitt and Seven Years' War 141 
 
 Minorca; and it ended in the usual English way 
 also, — with desertion of the ally that had won 
 England's battles for her on the continent, and so 
 had made possible her victories beyond the seas. 
 But between the beginning and the end of this 
 war lies the vigorous administration of Pitt, the 
 great English war minister. Pitt is perhaps the 
 most typical representative of England during this 
 epoch of her aspiration to pre-eminence among the 
 nations of the world. His was a masterful spirit 
 that felt within itself the capability for great 
 achievement, and with proud self -consciousness 
 looked with disdain upon all rivals, who on every 
 occasion were made to realize his superiority to 
 themselves. In the struggles between the contend- 
 ing political parties, or rather between the men who 
 were hungry for power, and in which his own 
 power was developed, he showed himself to be quite 
 as unscrupulous and vindictive in the means he em- 
 ployed to make his way upward, by a coalition first 
 with one rival and then with another, as have most 
 great English personalities. And he, too, as head 
 of the administration, devoted all his energy to put- 
 ting through the very measures, such as the occu- 
 pation and defence of Hanover, which previously, 
 as member of the Opposition, he had fiercely de- 
 nounced. But he was above striving for personal 
 advantage, and proof against all the temptations of 
 sordid gain, which in the lives of so many men of 
 renown shows itself at the decisive moment to be 
 the mainspring of their actions. The lofty patri- 
 otism in which the measures he advocated with 
 
142 England's Wars 
 
 glowing eloquence had their origin was not, as in 
 the case of so many others, the result of a carefully 
 prepared and well studied rhetorical effort — 
 though that, too, was not wanting — but was in 
 reality the deepest well-spring of his action, and 
 the inspiration of his life, revealed with impulsive 
 and therefore convincing eloquence. By the fulmi- 
 nating oratory with which he mercilessly beat to 
 earth every opposition, he controlled the Parlia- 
 ment entirely, and won for himself the idolizing 
 admiration of the people; with a vigorous and re- 
 lentless assertion of this power he now procured 
 the means for the conduct of the war on a grand 
 scale. To him, therefore, England owes the crea- 
 tion of her world dominion. 
 
 It was during the Seven Years' war that Give 
 established English supremacy in India by the cap- 
 ture of Bengal. Together with these victories in the 
 East, Canada also was won for England, for in the 
 Peace of Versailles France definitely relinquished 
 all her possessions in North America. Canada was 
 ceded to England, and Louisiana to Spain, which 
 in its advanced state of decadence knew not what 
 to do with it. Thus fate decided that the North 
 American continent was to be dominated by the 
 Anglo Saxon race, and, as an inevitable conse- 
 quence, that the French tongue should eventually 
 cease to be the language of international intercourse 
 in spite of the tenacity with which it clung to its 
 place in the traditions of diplomacy, and despite the 
 pre-eminent position that French literature held in 
 
American Independence 143 
 
 the world of letters; gradually it was replaced by 
 the English language. 1 
 
 Getting rid of French rivalry in North America 
 was not an unqualified advantage to England how- 
 ever, for it brought with it a new danger to the 
 fulfillment of her desire for world dominion, and it 
 was not long before this made itself known, and in 
 a most vigorous manner. The Americans in Vir- 
 ginia, New England, and in the other English colo- 
 nies held to the motherland and fought for it with 
 apparent enthusiasm so long as they felt the pres- 
 sure of French domination just beyond their own 
 boundaries, and therefore were in need of protection. 
 But these agricultural colonies had long since be- 
 come so strong and self-sustaining that they had de- 
 veloped a national individuality with well defined 
 interests of their own, together with a strong liking 
 for independence, which they had inherited from 
 their English forefathers. They were little in- 
 clined therefore to allow the motherland to shape 
 their destiny, or to control their local government 
 and commercial interests. England's narrow com- 
 mercial policy, and the endeavor of the English Par- 
 liament and the English government to assert their 
 authority, at least in form, — for the import tax on 
 tea and other commodities amounted to little else, 
 
 1 That the meridian of Paris (of which the meridian of 
 Ferro is but another form) has been replaced on our maps 
 by that of Greenwich is a parallel instance, and one equally 
 indicative of this progressive pro-English development 
 in international intercourse. 
 
144 England* s Wars 
 
 — had exactly the opposite effect of that which was 
 desired, and only served to precipitate the crisis. 
 
 It was hardly a decade after the Peace of Ver- 
 sailles that the rupture between England and her 
 American colonies was brought about by the fa- 
 mous Boston Tea Party, when the tea was thrown 
 overboard into the harbor, and in the following year 
 the first American Congress met in Philadelphia; 
 in 1775 the first armed encounter took place, and 
 in 1776 came the declaration of independence. But 
 all the loudly decried grievances were after all but 
 pretexts, and there can be no doubt that the Ameri- 
 can colonies would have revolted even had the Eng- 
 lish government followed an entirely different 
 course, for the deciding influence was the American 
 desire for absolute independence, which no form of 
 federation in connection with the motherland would 
 have satisfied. 1 In its widest aspect the American 
 Revolution was a civil war, for a considerable part 
 of the proprietary and aristocratically inclined ele- 
 
 1 This view of the great revolutionary movement is re- 
 ceiving increasing recognition in America also in oppo- 
 sition to the usual representation, which is due not so much 
 to the opinion of the Americans themselves as to the bias 
 of English tradition. According to the popular idea, which 
 is an absurd one, the responsibility for the entire situation 
 rests upon King George III, a true hearted man, although 
 one of decided mental limitations, and he is made to appear 
 as a monstrous tyrant, whereas in reality he merely snared 
 the views that were held by the great majority of the 
 English people, and which he represented, until in the 
 end, after the disastrous termination of the war, it was 
 convenient to make him the scape-goat, a tendency that 
 is usual under such circumstances. 
 
Armed Neutrality 1 45 
 
 ment in the community sided with England, and 
 after the close of the conflict a large number of these 
 people emigrated to Canada where the French popu- 
 lation, animated by the old spirit of hostility toward 
 the Anglo-Americans, now held loyally to England. 
 
 France took part in this war with a hope to re- 
 gain her former position at sea, as well as her lost 
 colonial dominion, but in spite of some early suc- 
 cesses and although Spain made common cause 
 with her in 1779, without definite results of any 
 kind. England, however, took advantage of her 
 supremacy at sea to prey upon the commerce of the 
 other nations by privateering and by an utter disre- 
 gard for the rights of neutrals, an element in war- 
 fare to which she has held ever since without any 
 regard for the protests of other nations, and which 
 she has introduced into the present war with ut- 
 ter ruthlessness. The " armed neutrality," which 
 originated with Chararine II in 1780, now compelled 
 England to show some consideration for the coun- 
 tries bordering on the Baltic, but at the same time 
 afforded her the welcome opportunity to declare 
 war upon Holland, and, although the Dutch trium- 
 phantly withstood the English attack on the Dog- 
 gerbank, they not only lost a large part of their 
 merchant marine, but their possessions in eastern 
 India as well. 
 
 When peace was concluded, England relinquished 
 Ceylon to the Dutch, but retained all her conquests 
 on the main land of India. About this time also 
 the British were victorious in a fierce war with Hy- 
 der AH of Mysore, who had made an alliance with 
 
146 England' 's Wars 
 
 the French. This British success eventually led to 
 the subjugation of the Deccan, which meant the ac- 
 quisition of by far the greater part of peninsular 
 India. 
 
 It is apparent therefore that although England 
 lost her North American colonies, she nevertheless 
 emerged from the war with no inconsiderable profit 
 to herself, 1 and, what was most important of all, 
 her rivals in Europe had made no appreciable gains 
 at any point, but had been weakened at sea, and 
 their commerce had been demoralized. England 
 on the other hand had not only maintained her mar- 
 itime ascendency throughout the war, but had been 
 able to increase it, and within a few years had 
 crowded the Dutch out of their leading position in 
 the trade of the Baltic. Not long before this time 
 Captain Cook had been sent on his voyages of ex- 
 ploration in southern seas, and in 1788 the penal 
 colony at Sydney was established, and thus a firm 
 foothold gained on the fifth continent. 
 
 English supremacy at sea found its greatest op- 
 portunity for development during the war main- 
 tained for twenty years against the French, at first 
 against the revolutionary power, and later against 
 Napoleon, with but one interval of peace endur- 
 ing for little more than a year, after the Peace of 
 Amiens. On the surface this war appeared as a 
 conflict for principle, and was so regarded not only 
 
 1 There were other, less important changes in territorial 
 possessions by which England lost some of the acquisitions 
 she had obtained in 1763, such as the recession of Senegal 
 to France, and Florida to Spain, the latter, like Louisiana, 
 soon to be transferred to the United States. 
 
War with the French Republic 147 
 
 by men like Burke but by the great mass of the 
 English people. It was in fact, however, a struggle 
 for power, for pre-eminence in the world, — the last 
 and most decisive passage at arms between England 
 and France in their century long conflict for as- 
 cendency, interrupted only by brief intervals of 
 peace. It was precipitated not so much by the ex- 
 ecution of the French King as by the French con- 
 quest of Belgium, which took place toward the close 
 of the year 1792, and which the English regarded 
 as an immediate danger to the security that their 
 insular position afforded them. 
 
 By land England's conduct of the war was but a 
 lukewarm one, and was carried on with quite insuf- 
 ficient means and with a display of the usual lack 
 of military ability, until the uprising in Spain gave 
 England the opportunity to organize and support 
 this civil war against Napoleon with the use of her 
 vassal-state, Portugal, as a military base, and so 
 was enabled seriously to undermine the power of 
 the great Emperor. Otherwise England's aid to 
 her allies consisted chiefly in the payment of large 
 subsidies for the further prosecution of the war. 
 
 At sea, however, the English conducted the war 
 with all their usual vigor and ruthlessness. That 
 Holland had become vassal to France was a wel- 
 come opportunity of which they eagerly took ad- 
 vantage, and Ceylon, Capeland and the Dutch pos- 
 sessions in upper India fell an easy prey to English 
 greed. In the Mediterranean, Malta was taken to 
 console England for the loss of Minorca, and her 
 refusal to surrender it, as stipulated in the Treaty 
 
148 England's Wars 
 
 of Amiens, was the immediate cause for a renewal 
 of hostilities between France and England in 1803. 
 In India the British subdued the uprising of the 
 natives of the Deccan under Tippoo Sahib in alliance 
 with the French in 1799, and with their defeat the 
 dream of a French empire in India vanished for- 
 ever, for, although Napoleon evidently cherished 
 the hope of it more than once, he never found it 
 possible to take even the first step toward its reali- 
 zation. All attempts of the French to maintain 
 their independent position at sea failed utterly; in 
 the battles of Abukir and Trafalgar the French 
 fleets were annihilated, and Napoleon was obliged 
 to abandon his plan for an invasion of England. 
 
 How little England was inclined to regard the 
 rights of neutrals became apparent when in 1800 
 the Russian Emperor, Paul, made the attempt to re- 
 vive the armed neutrality of the North European 
 states ; England at once announced this to be equiv- 
 alent to a declaration of war, and promptly sent 
 Nelson to attack Copenhagen (April 2, 1801) in the 
 hope of forcing the entrance to the Baltic. A still 
 more drastic repetition of this utter regardlessness 
 of the rights of others occurred in 1807 when, after 
 peace had been concluded between Napoleon and 
 Alexander I, England was approached with regard 
 to possible terms of peace. She replied with the 
 demand that Denmark should relinquish her atti- 
 tude of neutrality and attach herself to the English 
 cause. When Denmark refused to comply, Copen- 
 hagen was immediately bombarded for three days, 
 
War with the United States 149 
 
 from September 2 to September 5, 1807, and the 
 entire Danish fleet was captured and carried away, 
 although no rupture of the friendly relations exist- 
 ing between the two governments had taken place. 
 Henceforth England was the only country to de- 
 rive any benefit from the continental blockade, and 
 soon became the unchallenged mistress of the seas 
 with undisputed control of the world's commerce; 
 thus assured against all rivalry, her industries also 
 made wonderful strides forward. 
 
 America endeavored in so far as possible to 
 maintain its commercial relations with Europe, but 
 the continued inroads upon American commerce by 
 privateering and the persistent impressment of 
 American seamen for service in the British navy — 
 900 vessels were thus captured and about 6000 
 American seamen compelled into enforced service 
 for Britain — finally ended in a declaration of war 
 by the United States in 181 2, after long drawn out 
 negotiations had proved futile, and after the em- 
 bargo, by which American ports were closed to all 
 foreign shipping, had been maintained for four 
 years, a measure that had proved suicidal to Ameri- 
 can commerce. But both by sea and by land the 
 Americans were poorly prepared for war, and, in 
 spite of many victories, the United States was really 
 no match for England. Indeed, Washington, its 
 newly founded capital was entered by the British in 
 1 8 14 and partially destroyed by fire, including the 
 capitol building itself. It was not until December 
 24, 1 814, just at the time of the Congress of Vienna, 
 
150 England's Wars 
 
 that peace between the two countries was concluded 
 by the treaty of Ghent, in which everything was re- 
 stored as far as possible to the state which had ex- 
 isted before the war. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 English World Supremacy 1814-1863 
 
 Meanwhile England had fully harvested the 
 fruits of the war. On the continent she had pro- 
 tected herself by establishing the Kingdom of the 
 Netherlands into which Belgium was incorporated, 
 and which was thus to form a barrier against any 
 possible future attack upon the English coast by the 
 French. This experiment proved a failure how- 
 ever, as is well known, for the Belgians, who are a 
 strongly Catholic people, naturally gravitated to- 
 ward France, and entertained a bitter feeling of 
 hostility toward their Protestant neighbors of the 
 Netherlands, with whom they had been in constant 
 conflict for centuries, while the pressure of rival 
 industries had still further deepened the antagonism 
 between the two nationalities. 
 
 French interests were protected by England in so 
 far that she would not permit the diminution of 
 French territory to anything less than had been in- 
 cluded within the limits of that country in 1700, and 
 further, by preventing the restoration of Alsace to 
 Germany. It was evidently the English intention 
 to keep Germany's strength fettered in so far as 
 possible, so that the latter might not develop suffi- 
 ciently to become a formidable industrial rival for 
 
 151 
 
152 English World Supremacy 
 
 England. With this purpose in view the old con- 
 dition of confusion which had been crystallized in 
 the form of the German Confederation, and which 
 afforded a ready opportunity for interference on the 
 part of any one of the powerful European states, 
 was kept intact, and Prussian ambition was re- 
 pressed at every point, while Austria, England's 
 former ally, was eagerly supported in her aspira- 
 tions. As is well known, in the crisis that arose in 
 the settlement of European affairs by the Congress 
 of Vienna, England formed a secret league with 
 Austria and France with the intention of eventually 
 meeting Prussia's claims for the annexation of Sax- 
 ony by force of arms. 
 
 England, on the other hand, retained almost all 
 of her over-seas conquests. In Europe, in addi- 
 tion to Malta, she kept the little island of Helgo- 
 land, which had been taken from Denmark, and 
 furthermore established a British protectorate over 
 the Ionian Islands. In America, Trinidad, which 
 had belonged to Spain, now remained in the pos- 
 session of England, as did also the half of Guiana 
 that had been wrested from the Dutch, and that 
 part of the coast of Honduras which the English 
 had occupied in their conflict with the filibusters, 
 whereas Martinique and Guadalupe were returned 
 to France, and St. Thomas and the neighboring is- 
 lands, to Denmark. In Africa Britain's chief ac- 
 quisition was Cape Colony, besides which she re- 
 tained the colony of Sierra Leone, and in the In- 
 dian Ocean the island of Mauritius and the Sey- 
 chelles, whereas Reunion and the west African col- 
 
England's Acquisitions 1 53 
 
 onies were receded to France. In Asia the Nether- 
 lands retained possession of the Sunda Islands, chief 
 among which was the rich island of Java; but Cey- 
 lon was not relinquished by the English, and in 18 19 
 they added Singapore to their Asiatic acquisitions, 
 whereupon the Dutch ceded their possessions in Ma- 
 lacca to Great Britain in exchange for a small part 
 of Sumatra. From continental India the Dutch 
 were now excluded altogether, while the French and 
 Portuguese possessions there were restricted to a 
 few positions that could be of but little significance 
 in the development of the country, whereas English 
 influence in India was constantly being broadened, 
 chiefly by the subjugation of the Mahrattas (com- 
 pleted in 1 818), and further by the concessions 
 which Nepal was forced to make ( 1816), and by the 
 seizure of the coast lands of Burma (1826), which 
 was followed by the subjection of the Punjab and 
 other native states in the basin of the Indus River 
 (1843-1849). To this progressive territorial ag- 
 grandizement must be added the gradual settlement 
 of Australia, the acquisition of Tasmania in 1803, 
 and of New Zealand in 1840. 
 
 In her domination of the world Britain now had 
 no rival. There was not a power on earth that 
 would have ventured for a moment to entertain the 
 idea of opposing the English at sea. Britain's em- 
 pire of the seas was therefore accepted by the other 
 nations as the decree of fate, as something unalter- 
 able, almost as a matter of course; and as for the 
 English themselves, they regarded it as their indis- 
 putable right, a right which had been bestowed upon 
 
154 English World Supremacy 
 
 them, any opposition to which was to be regarded 
 as rebellion against the divine order of things, and 
 as a crime against the highest interests of mankind. 
 
 But even England could not escape the depression 
 that followed the tremendous struggle with Na- 
 poleon, and the misery was still further increased 
 by the mismanagement of internal affairs, and by the 
 convulsive clutch by which outgrown and decrepit 
 institutions and privileges were retained, although 
 they had long since been abandoned on the continent. 
 
 But as soon as Canning came into power, he gave 
 a new turn to English politics (from 1822 onward), 
 which was manifested by a disinclination on the part 
 of England to be subservient to the designs of the 
 Holy Alliance, and by the distinct purpose to follow 
 a purely English policy under cover of the mantle 
 of liberalism, although this harmonized but illy with 
 the existing internal conditions. The result was an 
 immediate re-awakening of the English spirit of en- 
 terprise. Furthermore, by giving the President of 
 the North American republic cause in his message 
 of December 2,1823 to assert the principle known by 
 his name as the Monroe Doctrine, which declared 
 that any attempt by European governments (in 
 which the colonial governments are not included) to 
 interfere in American conditions, or " to extend 
 their system to any portion of the western hemi- 
 sphere " would be resented by the United States, and 
 later, by following the example of the American re- 
 public in recognizing the independence of the Span- 
 ish-American colonies early in 1825, Canning 
 
England's Relations to Continent 155 
 
 opened a new and extensive market for the products 
 of British industry. Then, when the reform legis- 
 lation of 1832 widened the possibilities for indus- 
 trial development, and finally when the Corn Laws 
 were repealed, and free trade was introduced, a new 
 impetus was given to British commercial and indus- 
 trial enterprise also. 
 
 Simultaneously and uninterruptedly Great Britain 
 proceeded with the expansion of her colonial empire 
 in every quarter of the globe, — in India and Indo- 
 China, in Africa, in Australia, and in the islands of 
 the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, from 1840 to 1842, 
 she waged the shameful opium war against China, 
 which gave her the opportunity to seize Hong Kong, 
 and in 1839 she wrested Aden from the Turkish Em- 
 pire, although at the time the relations of the two 
 countries were absolutely peaceful, and in 1857 she 
 completed her acquisitions in this region by adding 
 to them the island of Perim in the Strait of Bab-el- 
 Mandeb. Naturally, by such a policy of ruthless 
 acquisition Great Britain became embroiled in war 
 after war, first in one part of the world and then in 
 another, so that from the year 1793 until the present 
 time there have been but few years in which the 
 British were not fighting somewhere, and had Lon- 
 don, like Rome, possessed a temple of Janus, its 
 gates would rarely have been found closed. 
 
 Since these wars were carried on with an army of 
 mercenaries officered by men who made military 
 service their profession in life, the mother country 
 was little affected by them, and the English could 
 
156 English World Supremacy 
 
 calmly proceed with the development of their indus- 
 trial pursuits, and, quite undisturbed, enjoy the bene- 
 fits to be derived from them. 
 
 Britain no longer found it necessary to interfere 
 in the affairs of continental Europe by force of 
 arms ; * all that was needed now was to rouse the 
 jealousy of one state for another, and, if feasible, 
 to stir up internal dissensions, so that no one of 
 these countries might gain in power sufficient to be- 
 come a formidable rival for Britain, To this task 
 the British statesmen now devoted themselves 
 with both zeal and persistence, for which they de- 
 serve the greater credit since their total ignorance of 
 actual conditions on the continent and of the sen- 
 timents prevailing among the different nationalities 
 there was a constant hindrance to the success of their 
 efforts, and led them into frequent blunders. 
 
 The past master in this art was Lord Palmerston, 
 who at the time of the reform legislation accepted 
 office in the Whig ministry although hitherto he had 
 been a Tory, and in the capacity of secretary for 
 foreign affairs now continued Canning's policy. He 
 soon came to be both the inspiration and the strength 
 of the Liberal ministries of which he continued to 
 be a member up to the time of his death in 1865. 
 
 1 There is but one exception ; it is to be found in Britain's 
 participation in the Greek war of independence, to which 
 Canning was largely influenced by his disinclination to 
 allow Russia a free hand in this connection. That Eng- 
 land, as the ally of France and Russia, took part in the 
 battle of Navarino was referred to as an " untoward 
 event" in which the English had become involved much 
 against their will. 
 
Lord Palmerston 1 57 
 
 He was the typical representative of the England of 
 his day just as the elder Pitt had been representative 
 of his country a century earlier. But that he was 
 far from being Pitt's equal either in intellectual abil- 
 ity or in the weight of his personality is clearly 
 shown by the nature of the development which Eng- 
 land experienced while under his influence, for this 
 was the time when the country entered upon its 
 epoch of subservience to public opinion, and there- 
 fore of mediocrity. Since the passage of the Re- 
 form Bill England has produced but two truly great 
 statesmen, men who were eminently self-reliant, and 
 because of the steadfastness of their convictions 
 could follow their own course and withstand the 
 pressure of popular currents of opinion. The first 
 of these, Sir Robert Peel, made the enactment of 
 the reform measures possible by the invincible man- 
 ner with which he met every hostile attack, and 
 overcame and discarded outgrown opinions as soon 
 as he was convinced that they were no longer ten- 
 able; the other, Disraeli, was the organizer of the 
 new Conservative party. 
 
 Palmerston, on the contrary, sailed with the wind, 
 and allowed himself to be borne on the currents of 
 public opinion which he had an apt way of embody- 
 ing in convenient but by no means profound phrases, 
 that had the merit, however, of being readily appre- 
 hended by the most ordinary intelligence, and which 
 were oftentimes characterized by a perplexing cyni- 
 cism. He was therefore the very man to be popular 
 with the people, — the warm-hearted aristocrat who 
 was in sympathy with them. If in this respect he 
 
1^8 English World Supremacy 
 
 went farther than did his more cautious and reticent 
 colleagues, this but served to increase his popularity. 
 He had a way of saying bluntly and without reserve 
 just what all Englishmen felt and desired in their 
 hearts, and he was little concerned as to whether or 
 not it would give offence to benighted foreigners. 
 
 Just as he did at home, so abroad in his foreign 
 policy also, Lord Palmerston assumed the role of the 
 well-meaning, inoffensive gentleman who was dis- 
 interested enough to give good advice to the deluded 
 people and Cabinets of other countries that had as 
 yet not attained to the height of culture and intellec- 
 tual superiority of the English, and to lead these for- 
 eign nations in the right direction, so that, as he 
 once said, they might follow the shining example of 
 England, though of necessity still far behind her. 
 That these plans for other nations always harmo- 
 nized with England's best interests was regarded as 
 a happy coincidence, or, more likely, as both the evi- 
 dence and the result of Britain's moral and political 
 superiority. That the principles he advocated on 
 one such occasion were often diametrically opposed 
 to the counsel he had given on another, or to Eng- 
 land's course of action, disturbed him not one whit, 
 for he was like every normal Englishman, who al- 
 ways has two conflicting sets of principles at his 
 command, either one of which may be produced as 
 the occasion may demand, and then be proclaimed in 
 lofty phrases, and with every evidence of absolute 
 conviction. 
 
 In contrast to the policy pursued by the powers 
 of the Holy Alliance, England now declared and 
 
Policy of Interference 1 59 
 
 maintained the principle of non-intervention, — ev- 
 ery nation's right to settle its own affairs without 
 interference from abroad; nevertheless England did 
 interfere unasked in every political movement of 
 consequence that took place on the continent. In 
 Spain England fomented and supported the sangui- 
 nary civil war between the Carlists and the Christi- 
 nos, and perpetuated the political unrest there by ex- 
 cluding the legitimate heir from the throne and se- 
 curing it for the female line. In France any revo- 
 lutionary uprising was sure of British sympathy, 
 every newly established form of government re- 
 ceived British recognition, it mattered little whether 
 its nature was liberal like that of the monarchy un- 
 der the " citizen King," or that of the Republic, 
 or whether it was a newly created imperial despo- 
 tism such as resulted from the usurpation by Napo- 
 leon III. In the former instances it was the liberty 
 of the people that had to be defended ; in the latter, 
 the state of anarchy and the need of a restoration 
 of political order called for intervention; both of 
 these excuses served the British government as ready 
 catchwords in defense of its policy. The aspira- 
 tions for a united Italy found quick and sympathetic 
 response in England, where the government not only 
 granted asylum to the revolutionary agitators and 
 other Italian political refugees, but, by diplomatic 
 measures as well as by secretly extended financial aid 
 and by still other means, supported the Italian move- 
 ment in so far as possible without entangling the 
 two countries in a war. In like manner, although 
 failing of the desired result, England countenanced 
 
160 English World Supremacy 
 
 the Polish insurrections, and was the abettor of the 
 revolutionists in Russia also. 
 
 In Germany every tendency toward liberalism met 
 with encouragement from England, as did also the 
 aspirations of the smaller states to maintain their 
 sovereignty undiminished; when, however, in 1848 
 the German people made the attempt to achieve po- 
 litical unity, England was found in the ranks of their 
 opponents, while every effort to create a German 
 navy was frowned upon by England with ever in- 
 creasing enmity, and its new ensign was declared an 
 emblem of piracy. When the Belgians revolted 
 against the Netherlands, England intervened in sup- 
 port of the doctrine that every nation has the right 
 to decide its own destiny, and in combination with 
 France favored the establishment of the Belgian 
 kingdom, to be held henceforth as neutral territory. 
 But when the people of Schleswig-Holstein, who are 
 Germans, endeavored to throw off the Danish yoke, 
 England declared the integrity of the Danish king- 
 dom to be necessary to the stability of European con- 
 ditions, and, in alliance with Russia, compelled these 
 German duchies to return to Danish domination. 
 
 Likewise for many decades the preservation of 
 Turkish integrity constituted a fundamental dogma 
 of Britain's foreign policy because it was a neces- 
 sary precautionary measure, not only to protect Brit- 
 ish commerce with the Levant, but also to safeguard 
 the importation of grains from southern Russia and 
 from the fertile basin of the Danube. At that time 
 this was a matter of vital importance to Great Brit- 
 ain, but through the tremendous increase of grain 
 
Relations: Turkey, Greece and Russia 161 
 
 production in India, Australia and Canada, as well as 
 in the Argentine Republic, this precautionary policy 
 has become less and less of a necessity to Britain. 
 This explains the change that has gradually taken 
 place in the English attitude toward Turkey and 
 Russia, and which began at some time during the 
 eighties of the last century. Up to that time it 
 would have been fatal for England to allow a for- 
 eign power to gain control of the narrow water- 
 ways leading into the Mediterranean, and she could 
 unfortunates were obliged to pay tribute to the Turk, 
 ish Empire to a state of vassalage. This is the rea- 
 son also why England looked on with indifference 
 while the Christian subject populations of the Sul- 
 tan's empire struggled for political liberty ; that these 
 unfortunates were obliged to pay tribute to the Turk 
 and were dependent upon his despotic will was re- 
 garded as an unalterable dispensation of Providence, 
 just as was Britain's sovereignty of the seas, or Ire- 
 land's thraldom. It explains also why England 
 was a partner in the negotiations by which the do- 
 main of the newly established Greek kingdom was 
 so circumscribed in extent that its political signifi- 
 cance was dwarfed, and a full development of its 
 power made impossible. What the Greek nation 
 has nevertheless accomplished is astounding, and 
 merits the highest praise. 1 It was all of a piece 
 
 1 The ill treatment that Greece has suffered at the hands 
 of the European powers forms one of the saddest chapters 
 in the history of the nineteenth century. Moreover, a pes- 
 simistically inclined historian would find a most promising 
 subject for his pen in the record of the attempts by which 
 
1 62 English World Supremacy 
 
 with this policy also that a Bavarian prince, who 
 was then still a minor, was placed upon the throne 
 of Greece, and was succeeded, upon his abdication, 
 by an entirely apathetic Danish prince who, in con- 
 trast to his predecessor, King Otho, never took any 
 deep interest in the land whose official head he had 
 come to be. In the despicable game of intrigue in 
 which the diplomats at the Court of Athens were 
 engaged, and by which the poor little country was 
 kept in a never ending state of unrest, England took 
 an eager hand, while the several attempts of the 
 Cretans to gain their liberation from the Turk, and 
 finally to achieve their union with Greece, were al- 
 ways suppressed with the force of British arms. 
 It was in the further pursuit of this policy of self- 
 interested caution that in 1840 England prevented 
 the victorious Pasha, Mehemet AH, then in alliance 
 with France, from reaping the full fruits of his 
 military successes, and with the use of the powerful 
 British fleet compelled him to relinquish his terri- 
 torial acquisitions, and confined his dominion to the 
 limits of Egypt. 
 
 But, when in 1853 Nicholas I began his intended 
 
 the " concert of European powers " endeavored by a diplo- 
 macy of the grossest intrigue to get rid of the problems 
 that at different times threatened to precipitate a European 
 conflict. Fortunately these attempts generally resulted as 
 they deserved, — events took their own course in spite of 
 them, and the diplomats had their trouble for their pains. 
 Nevertheless it must not be overlooked that a deal of suf- 
 fering and much bloodshed that might have been averted 
 were the invariable consequences of this kind of diplo- 
 macy, while of good results there were none. 
 
Loss of Prestige in Europe 1 63 
 
 war of aggression against the Turkish Empire, Eng- 
 land at once allied herself with France to stay his 
 sword, and proceeded against him with the imme- 
 diate assistance of French arms. In the progress 
 of the Crimean war England showed herself to be 
 an adept in the art of making her ally's soldiers 
 fight for the advancement of British interests, 
 whereas Napoleon found it impossible to carry out 
 the wider plans with which he had entered the war. 
 To engage the Germanic powers also, and, as in the 
 preceding century, to secure German armies to fight 
 her battles on the continent for her, was England's 
 further intention ; but in this she failed, despite the 
 pressure exerted by her diplomacy. The Prussian 
 state had by this time become too conscious of its 
 growing strength, and, in spite of much vacillation 
 and evidence of internal weakness in its policy, had 
 preserved sufficient self-esteem to prevent Prussia 
 from renouncing her position among the great pow- 
 ers of Europe and becoming vassal to Britain. 
 And again, both in the diplomatic and military 
 preparations for war, England clearly revealed the 
 weakness and confusion that are characteristic of 
 her political organization, and showed how much 
 of truth there is in the frequently heard English 
 expression of " we are drifting into the war." 
 Nevertheless, since England had once assumed the 
 attitude that she had, this war undoubtedly served 
 her ends. 
 
 The alluring promises with which Lord Palmer- 
 ston sought to win over the nations of the continent 
 seemed at first to meet with the desired response; 
 
164 English World Supremacy 
 
 gradually, however, their true import became more 
 and more apparent. Indeed, it was hardly possible 
 that the absolute selfishness of England's European 
 policy could long remain unrecognized, for her mer- 
 ciless procedure with regard to the peoples of more 
 distant parts of the world, as well as her constantly 
 increasing territorial acquisitions, made too striking 
 a contrast to her humane sounding phrases, to judge 
 from which one would suppose Britain's sole pur- 
 pose to be the achievement of human welfare., 
 Moreover, time revealed that although the demands 
 that the English government made under Lord Pal- 
 merston were both high sounding and imperious, 
 they were usually not insisted upon in the face of 
 a courageous and vigorous resistance. Only the 
 weak and faint-hearted were likely to suffer from 
 open violence at the hands of England, which in 
 the end always seemed timidly indisposed to become 
 involved in a great war, and, in view of the internal 
 organization, not without good reason. For rea- 
 sons such as these Britain suffered a gradual loss 
 of respect on the continent; but the deep seated aver- 
 sion to the English that soon became more and more 
 general among the continental nations, and which 
 was greater than all political differences, is to be 
 attributed to the influence of Lord Palmerston more 
 than to any other cause. 
 
 The half century succeeding the fall of Napoleon 
 witnessed the high water mark of British suprem- 
 acy. During this period of her history England 
 may well be said to have held the sceptre of a world 
 empire even in a far wider sense than did Spain in 
 
Height of English Supremacy 165 
 
 the sixteenth century, or than did Louis XIV, or 
 even the great Napoleon himself. For, although 
 British domination did not express itself in the sub- 
 jugation of the other countries but left them their 
 independence, and although England was by no 
 means in a position everywhere and at all times to 
 enforce her demands, nevertheless there was not a 
 power in the world that would have dared to oppose 
 her, whereas against the former empires half the 
 world stood in arms. England's wishes, on the con- 
 trary, were respected by the states of the European 
 continent and were usually carried out, while her 
 sovereignty of the seas, and with it the control of 
 the world's commerce, was absolute. In the other 
 continents, aside from the North American republic 
 arid the Russian possessions in Asia, England's will 
 was law, in so far as she desired it to be enforced, 
 and within the limits she set for herself; nor did she 
 find it a difficult task, whenever it was necessary, to 
 compel obedience by force of arms. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 New Dangers — France — Russia — America 
 and Germany 
 
 By and by, however, clouds began to appear in 
 the clear sky of British world domination, and then 
 gradually gathered into a storm that threatened to 
 break in violence. France, England's old-time rival, 
 could of course not for a moment entertain the 
 thought of another passage at arms with her former 
 enemy. But that prosperous country had soon re- 
 cuperated from the after effects of the Napoleonic 
 wars; industry and commerce received a fresh im- 
 petus, and France could now turn her attention to 
 regaining her former position on the Mediterranean, 
 as well as to renewed efforts to secure colonial pos- 
 sessions, which she inaugurated by the conquest of 
 Algeria, begun in 1830. 
 
 Although England resorted to arms in 1840 for 
 the purpose of frustrating the French attempt to gain 
 a preponderating influence in Egypt and in the Turk- 
 ish Empire, still it was not at all likely that France 
 would ever again become a formidable foe, able 
 to dispute Britain's supremacy. It was not long, 
 therefore, before a number of overtures were made 
 with the intention of establishing a " cordial un- 
 derstanding " between these two great powers, both 
 
 166 
 
Attitude toward France and Russia 167 
 
 at the time of Louis Philippe and of Napoleon III, 
 but, it goes without saying, always with the tacit 
 reservation that each of these cordial friends would 
 take advantage of every opportunity to out-manceu- 
 vre the other, a part of the program which each of 
 the participants carried out with scrupulous care. 
 England and France therefore fought side by side 
 in the Crimean war, whereby the French influence 
 on the Mediterranean and in the commerce of the 
 Levant was greatly strengthened; nor did England 
 protest when Napoleon interfered in Italian affairs, 
 nor did she take any steps to prevent his war with 
 Austria, while as early as 1842 the English looked 
 on with complaisance when the French seized a 
 number of islands in the Pacific. From 1857 to 
 i860, England and France, as allies, together waged 
 a war of aggression against China, while at the 
 same time France laid the foundations for her 
 colonial possessions in Cochin China and Cambodia, 
 and took a neighborly position next to the English 
 near the outlet of the Red Sea on the Gulf of Ta- 
 jura; she also began to extend and develop her 
 colonial interests in Senegambia. 
 
 A much more dangerous expansion was proceed- 
 ing in another quarter. Basing her claims on her 
 protectorate of the Eastern Christians, Russia was 
 exerting pressure upon the Sultan in the hope of 
 gaining free access to the Mediterranean by re- 
 ducing his empire to a state of complete subjection 
 to Russia. On the Asiatic continent Russia sub- 
 jugated the region south of the Caucasus, en- 
 croached upon Persia, and extended her dominions 
 
1 68 New Dangers 
 
 southward from Siberia, not only toward the Amur 
 River and China (1858-1860), but into central 
 Asia as well, with an unwavering persistence ever 
 since the year 1846, although a first attempt in 1839 
 had ended in failure. In 1867 the province of 
 Turkestan was established, and the khanates of this 
 region made subject to Russia. Thus the danger 
 of Russian encroachment upon India grew more 
 imminent with every year; the vast resources that 
 the giant empire had at its command, and which 
 the Russians were slowly learning to utilize, were 
 constantly increasing its power of conquest. Con- 
 sequently the Russian menace of Turkey and of 
 Persia, as well as the Czar's eager desire for an 
 ice-free port on one of the world's great bodies of 
 water, from whence Russian trade could mingle with 
 the commerce of the world, were causing the Brit- 
 ish increasing anxiety for the maintenance of their 
 empire of the seas. 
 
 Thus it came about that the British began to look 
 upon Russia as their most formidable opponent, 
 and the desire to keep that vast empire within bounds 
 became the central thought of their foreign policy. 
 Although the armies of Britain and Russia had 
 marched together against France at the time of the 
 great Napoleon, the turn of affairs now led the 
 British to behold in their one-time ally their pres- 
 ent foe, and in their usual way they proceeded to 
 plan how all the other states of the continent might 
 be called to arms for a united attack upon the former 
 ally whose power had increased all too greatly. 
 Therefore France, Britain's rival of the past, that 
 
Relations with America 169 
 
 by this time, however, had been sufficiently humbled, 
 was not only allowed a free hand, but was even 
 sought as an ally. After the Crimean war England 
 only very seldom opposed the Emperor of France, 
 in spite of the tension to which his restless and dar- 
 ingly adventurous policy often gave rise. As usual, 
 in this war against Russia the English posed as 
 the vanguard of European civilization arrayed 
 against Asiatic oppression and barbarism, and were 
 full of reproaches for the nations that would not 
 respond to England's call. 
 
 Meanwhile two other countries had each entered 
 on the road leading to political power and an ever 
 increasing industrial and commercial importance: 
 the United States of North America and Germany. 
 Ever since the revolutionary war the new republic 
 had been increasing its territory step by step until 
 it had reached truly vast proportions; meanwhile 
 the land was gradually being peopled by the con- 
 tinuously arriving streams of immigrants, and the 
 industrial and commercial interests had begun to 
 be developed. In the early forties of the past cen- 
 tury the United States began to show a desire for 
 Texas and the Pacific coast. This almost led to 
 another war with England, since, in the excited 
 state of American " public opinion," which had 
 been purposely and artificially stimulated, a claim 
 was made to the entire territory reaching as far 
 north as 54 , 40'. However, when all the vehement 
 talk had accomplished its purpose in the campaign 
 for the presidential election of 1844, the Americans, 
 after all, preferred to come to an agreement with 
 
I JO New Dangers 
 
 England, and the 49th parallel was decided upon to 
 mark the northern boundary of the United States. 
 The American republic then sought consolation by 
 an attack upon her weaker .neighbor in the south, 
 and deprived Mexico of California and New Mex- 
 ico. 
 
 Very soon after these events England most de- 
 cidedly sounded a retreat when, by the Clayton- 
 Bulwer Treaty (April 19, 1850), she abandoned 
 her plans for an inter-oceanic canal through Cen- 
 tral America, and discontinued her negotiations for 
 the purchase of the necessary territory in that re- 
 gion, while the United States assumed like obliga- 
 tions. A few years later the interpretation of this 
 treaty, as well as England's reckless impressment of 
 Americans for service in the Crimean war, involved 
 the two countries in serious complications, more 
 especially so since Lord Palmerston, with his habit- 
 ual haughtiness, refused to meet the Americans half 
 way. 
 
 Meanwhile on the other side of the water Ger- 
 many was making steady although slow progress 
 toward economic strength. Her industries were 
 being developed in a vigorous and alert spirit of 
 enterprise, although her over-seas trade was still 
 largely in the hands of foreign nations and of the 
 Hanse cities. The latter had understood well how 
 to increase their commercial importance and en- 
 large their fleet of merchantmen by pursuing a pol- 
 icy that had interwoven the interests of the great 
 powers into its fabric, and especially by fostering 
 amicable relations with Great Britain. This pol- 
 
The Rise of Germany 171 
 
 icy had, however, served to alienate these cities from 
 the German land in which they are situated, and 
 their relations to it came to be almost those of for- 
 eign states. 
 
 The leadership in the German economic develop- 
 ment devolved upon Prussia, this state being com- 
 pelled to assume the responsibility because of the 
 absurd distribution of the territory which the Con- 
 gress of Vienna had allotted to its jurisdiction, as 
 well as by the political questions with which it was 
 confronted. The deciding event was the forma- 
 tion of the Zollverein (customs union) ; its gradual 
 extension to include every part of German terri- 
 tory aside from Austria was a peremptory necessity, 
 and from it the smaller states could not, in spite of 
 much opposition, remain permanently aloof. More- 
 over, the system of universal military service which 
 Prussia had newly introduced exerted an influence 
 by which all the people of all the provinces within 
 Prussian jurisdiction felt themselves to be united 
 into a single nation, proud of their national indi- 
 viduality and self-reliant independence. This gave 
 the Prussian state a firm foundation, and one that 
 made the pursuit of an independent policy possible 
 to the government, if it had the courage to devise 
 one and carry it through. It is all too well known 
 how the English sought to disparage this highest 
 achievement of the modern state, and to represent 
 it as unworthy of a free nation, and far inferior to 
 the system of voluntary enlistment by means of 
 which Britain provides herself with an army of 
 hirelings disciplined with the lash, and how this 
 
Ij2 New Dangers 
 
 representation found an echo in the particularism 
 of the smaller German states, whose people were 
 quite content in the comfort that their quiet political 
 life afforded them. 
 
 Likewise England endeavored to retard the prog- 
 ress of the Zollverein, for this conflicted with her 
 doctrine of free trade, the Englishman's cure-all, 
 while it also set a limit to the flood of English man- 
 ufactured wares pouring into Germany, and made 
 German economic development possible. That the 
 German aspirations for political unity met with vig- 
 orous opposition from England has already been 
 stated. But gradually it dawned upon the English 
 that with the methods they were employing they 
 could never hope to prevent this economic and po- 
 litical progress, and they therefore began to recog- 
 nize in Germany a competitor who was likely to 
 cause them a deal of uneasiness in the future, al- 
 though for the present, England could still afford 
 to assume the mien of a generous magnate who did 
 not grudge an insignificant neighbor his small gains. 
 
 In connection with the Crimean war Prussia 
 showed that she, and all Germany with her, refused 
 to be taken in tow by England and her policy, and 
 that this German state was powerful enough to 
 proceed on the way of her own choosing. Soon 
 afterward, under the direction of William I, who 
 persevered in the face of much opposition from 
 among his own people, Prussia entered upon the 
 course by which the national aspirations could be 
 realized. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 The Crisis and English Retrogression 
 1862-1864 
 
 Thus it would appear that at the beginning of 
 the sixties English prestige had suffered a decline, 
 and that British influence was far from what it had 
 been during the decades just preceding this period 
 of her history, in spite of her material prosperity 
 and the continued expansion of her colonial empire. 
 The most serious disturbance to which that empire 
 had yet been subjected, the terrible Indian revolt, 
 had just been quelled, the East India Company 
 practically discontinued, and the government of In- 
 dia organized on a reasonable basis. Everywhere 
 new and intricate problems had arisen, and it was a 
 question whether England would be able to solve 
 them to the advantage of her own interests, and so 
 preserve to herself the latent sovereignty of the 
 world. For the conduct of a war on the continent 
 was even more impossible to England now, with her 
 diminutive army against the enormous military 
 forces at the command of the continental states, than 
 it had been in former times, unless, as heretofore, 
 she could procure powerful allies, and these were 
 hard to find, while nowhere, as of yore, were there 
 soldiers to be bought at the courts of petty princi- 
 
 i73 
 
1^4 Retrogression 1S62-1864 
 
 palities. Nor would a serious conflict at sea be 
 free from dangers for Britain, even should her navy 
 remain quite unscathed; for British commerce and 
 British industry — for the very reason of their 
 magnitude — would incur such tremendous losses 
 thereby, and experience so great a set back, that 
 British statesmen had good reason to shrink from 
 such a war. 
 
 The deciding events by which the tide was turned 
 were the American civil war and the German con- 
 flict with Denmark, and may be said to date from 
 the year 1862 to 1864. That it would be to Brit- 
 ain's advantage if the American republic should be 
 severed into two parts each filled with hatred of the 
 other, and for years likely at any moment to fall 
 upon each other in open hostility is too obvious to 
 need enlargement. Should the Republic remain an 
 undivided country, it would inevitably develop into 
 a mighty power through the rapid increase of its 
 population by immigration from abroad, as well as 
 by the utilization of the " unlimited possibilities " 
 that were enclosed within its own boundaries. 
 More than once in the past had its truly invulner- 
 able position inspired the United States with confi- 
 dence sufficient to meet the British demands with a 
 curt refusal, which Britain had been obliged to ac- 
 cept. Now the opportunity seemed at hand for 
 England to deal this growing rival of the west a 
 fatal blow without over much exertion on her own 
 part, nor all too great an expenditure of treasure. 
 The industries and the commercial cities of the 
 northern states only were England's competitors; 
 
American War of Secession 1 75 
 
 the southern states were her profitable customers. 
 Moreover, it was from this section of the country 
 that England annually received enormous quantities 
 of raw cotton, the manufacture of which constituted 
 a very important source of her industrial prosperity. 
 To these considerations must be added the sympathy 
 which the aristocratic circles in England entertained 
 for the southern gentry. 
 
 Thus a strong sentiment in favor of the slave 
 states prevailed in England. So intense was this 
 feeling that it would not be satisfied with conceding 
 the rights of a belligerent to the Confederacy at the 
 very outset of the war, in consequence of which the 
 seceded states ceased to be looked upon as rebels, 
 and their cruisers were no longer regarded as pirate 
 craft, but as vessels of war. It demanded still more. 
 — the official recognition of the Confederacy as an 
 independent state, for this step would inevitably 
 have led to an open stand in favor of the South, 
 and therefore to a participation in the war against 
 the North. That in this event England would be 
 fighting to maintain slavery was an ugly side-issue 
 which caused the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord 
 John Russell, many anxious doubts as to whether 
 he ought to follow his predisposition toward an 
 idealistic and humanitarian course, or surrender to 
 the urgent demands for the pursuit of a conscience- 
 less policy of self-interest on the part of England. 
 With his usual bluntness of speech Lord Palmerston, 
 who was then Prime Minister, placed the situation 
 squarely before the American minister at London, 
 Mr. Charles Francis Adams, when he said, " We 
 
lj6 Retrogression 1862-1864 
 
 are no lovers of slavery; but we need cotton, and 
 your Morrill Tariff (America's high protective 
 tariff) is not to our liking at all." 
 
 This sentiment in favor of the South and against 
 the northern states was promoted by the serious 
 defeats that the North suffered in the early part of 
 the war, and still further by the excitement which 
 followed a grave violation of international law by 
 the North through the capture of two Confederate 
 envoys while on their way to Europe, Mason and 
 Slidell, who were taken from the British steam 
 packet Trent by the commander of a United States 
 man-of-war on November 8, 1861. 1 The " Times," 
 which has always been both the creator and the 
 mouthpiece of the ruling current of public opinion, 
 was, as has been only too often the case, on the side 
 of the morally less worthy cause, which it advocated 
 with its customary resort to expressions of great 
 ethical pathos, and apparently quite untroubled by 
 conscientious scruples of any kind. It now became 
 the champion of the seceded states, proclaimed their 
 right to independence, and deluged the North with 
 vindictive abuse. Even Gladstone, who considered 
 himself a Liberal, and who at the time was Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer, favored the official recog- 
 
 1 Whenever it is to her advantage, England assumes the 
 attitude of the devoted advocate of international law, and 
 breaks the vials of her morally justified wrath upon the 
 head of every offender against it; when she is the gainer 
 by its violation, however, she has never hesitated to 
 trample it under foot. In the present war England has far 
 outdone any breach of international law of which the 
 Americans were guilty in 1861. 
 
Opposition to the North IJJ 
 
 nition of the Confederacy. The moral justification 
 for this attitude was found in the phrase that the 
 states of the South had shown a firm determination 
 to maintain their independence, and at the same time 
 had proved themselves to be unconquerable; it 
 therefore was England's duty to acknowledge the 
 right of every nation to decide its own destiny, and 
 to stand for it. 
 
 Although the Florida, a war vessel built in Liver- 
 pool for the Confederacy, was seized by the British 
 authorities in the vicinity of the Bahama Islands 
 soon after it had put to sea, for in this instance the 
 violation of the law had been all too flagrant, it soon 
 regained its freedom by process of law. In the case 
 of the Alabama, however, another English built 
 cruiser, the British authorities made no attempt to 
 detain the vessel, but allowed her to slip to sea on 
 July 29, 1862 ; hardly had she made her escape 
 when the order came to detain her in compliance 
 with a demand for an investigation of her status, 
 which had been made by the American minister, 
 the order having been intentionally delayed by the 
 English authorities until it was too late to enforce 
 it. When out at sea the Alabama was then pro- 
 vided with guns, ammunition and coal by two Brit- 
 ish vessels, — of course, without the knowledge of 
 the entirely innocent British government. 
 
 At last, Lord John Russell himself was per- 
 suaded to open negotiations for combined inter- 
 vention on the part of the European great powers. 
 Russia absolutely declined ; Napoleon, however, who 
 at this time was just entering upon his Mexican 
 
178 Retrogression 1862-1864 
 
 adventure, eagerly accepted the opportunity, and 
 early in 1863 did in fact offer French mediation, 
 which the North, of course, politely refused. This 
 step on the part of Napoleon acted rather as a 
 deterrent upon the English government because of 
 the deep distrust with which it regarded the Em- 
 peror of the French. In addition, a strongly un- 
 favorable sentiment had developed in England 
 among the democratic masses to whom slavery was 
 an abomination and war a horror, and this feeling 
 was further stimulated by a vigorous agitation con- 
 ducted by a part of the Liberals under the leader- 
 ship of John Bright. Moreover, the United States 
 was very fortunate in its representative at London, 
 Mr. Charles Francis Adams, whose consummate 
 skill in handling the interests of his country, as well 
 as the great tact he displayed in correcting or 
 smoothing over the blunders made by Mr. Seward, 
 President Lincoln's Secretary of State, did much 
 toward saving the situation for the northern states. 
 President Lincoln made the decisive counter- 
 move, however, when on September 22, 1862, he 
 issued a preliminary proclamation, to be followed 
 on January 1, 1863, by the final proclamation by 
 which the slaves were emancipated, for by this de- 
 parture from his original intention, he made the 
 war not only a struggle to maintain the Union, but 
 one to eradicate slavery as well. As much as the 
 ruling circles in England desired and tried to be- 
 little the character and effect of this step, its influ- 
 ence upon the general public could not fail even- 
 tually to be a powerful one. It was altogether too 
 
England Yields ijg 
 
 incongruous that England, the country that in 1807 
 had prohibited the slave trade, in 1833 had abol- 
 ished slavery in its colonies, and since that time 
 had sought to suppress the slave trade on every 
 ocean by the pursuit and capture of all slave ships, 
 should now turn about and participate in open war- 
 fare for the preservation of slavery in the states of 
 the South. As late as March 27, 1863, Lord Pal- 
 merston, in his speech to the Parliament, defended 
 the Government for the course it had pursued in 
 the case of the Florida and of the Alabama; but on 
 April 5, Lord Russell ordered the detention of an- 
 other war vessel that was intended for the Confed- 
 erate service, and which at the time was still in dock 
 at Liverpool. At last this long continued state of 
 uncertainty came to an end when, after frequent 
 defeats, the North was victorious at Gettysburg on 
 July 3, the greatest as well as the decisive battle 
 of the war, followed immediately afterward by the 
 surrender of Vicksburg to General Grant. On 
 September 5, two more armored cruisers that were 
 being built at Liverpool for the Confederacy were 
 prevented by Lord Russell from putting to sea; the 
 claim that they were intended for France or Egypt, 
 and that therefore England had no right to inter- 
 fere with them, proved untenable, thanks to the 
 efforts made by Mr. Adams, and after long drawn 
 out negotiations the vessels were finally bought by 
 the English government in order to put an end to 
 the matter. 
 
 To make the defeat of the English attitude com- 
 plete the American government soon afterward 
 
l8o • Retrogression 1862-1864 
 
 made all the negotiations in the matter public. 
 There was then nothing left for Parliament to do, 
 in spite of much violent criticism of the Cabinet for 
 the discreditable and vacillating policy that it had 
 pursued, but to refuse to pass a vote of censure 
 (February 2$, 1864), since this would have been 
 equivalent to a declaration of war against the north- 
 ern states, and under these circumstances the Oppo- 
 sition could not have undertaken the government. 
 
 This ended the matter; the British intention to 
 support the Confederacy had come to nought, and 
 Britain made no further attempt to interfere in the 
 American civil war. That the outcome is not to 
 be regarded as a triumph for America only, but also 
 as a decided defeat for the English aristocracy and 
 as a complete victory for democratic tendencies, has 
 been pointed out by an American historian. 1 It 
 was only two years later that Gladstone, the heir 
 to Lord Palmerston's leadership in the Commons, 
 introduced his bill for comprehensive parliamentary 
 reforms, and although he and his bill were defeated, 
 
 1 Brooks Adams, a son of the American minister at Lon- 
 don, in a paper entitled, " The Seizure of the Laird Rams " 
 (the armored cruisers that were built in the Birkenhead 
 dock near Liverpool for the southern states), and pub- 
 lished in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical 
 Society, December, 191 1, the society to which he presented 
 the highly interesting correspondence and documents that 
 were left him by his father. Other valuable and instruc- 
 tive material on the subject may be found in " The Trent 
 Affair " and in " A Crisis in Downing Street " by C. F. 
 Adams, another son of the American minister to England, 
 and published in the Proceedings of November, 191 1, and 
 of May, 1914. 
 
Germany 's War with Denmark 181 
 
 it was but a short time afterward that Disraeli, 
 whose keen political insight had recognized the sit- 
 uation, and who also knew well how to turn it to 
 the advantage of Conservative interests, put through 
 a bill for still wider reforms in 1867. 
 
 Meanwhile in Germany the Schleswig-Holstein 
 question, which had dragged on indefinitely, now 
 reached an acute stage. In December, 1863, the 
 armies of the German allies occupied Holstein, and 
 on February 1 the Prussian and Austrian forces 
 crossed the Eider, and the war against Denmark 
 was on. The English government again did all in 
 its power to preserve the integrity of Denmark and 
 to prevent Prussia from taking possession of the 
 Kiel Haven and the coast of Schleswig. The Eng- 
 lish were especially eager to frustrate the Prussian 
 plans because they were aware of the further, and 
 in the sight of England highly reprehensible plan 
 to cut a canal from the mouth of the Elbe through 
 to the Baltic, whereby Germany's naval position 
 would be greatly strengthened, and an end would 
 be made of the dangerous possibility of closing the 
 Baltic by a blockade of the Sound. Therefore, 
 while Lord Russell was again seeking an adjust- 
 ment, this time as to how the demands of political 
 moral integrity and the perfectly just German claims 
 might be made to harmonize with the preservation 
 of British interests, Palmerston, together with Lord 
 Clarendon and with a resort to all that English 
 diplomacy could offer, was doing what he could to 
 stiffen the necks of the Danes, and at the same time 
 to bring about another European coalition against 
 
1 82 Retrogression 1 862-1 864 
 
 Germany, like the one of 1848. The entire Eng- 
 lish press was on the side of Denmark, and de- 
 clared German interference in the " internal af- 
 fairs " of Denmark to be absolutely unjustified. 1 
 All England, whose fleet in 1801 and 1807 had bom- 
 barded Copenhagen, although the two countries 
 were then absolutely at peace, and in the Crimean 
 war had fired upon Russian seaport towns and fish- 
 ing hamlets without the slightest compunction, now 
 was ablaze with righteous indignation because dur- 
 ing the siege of the Diippel fortifications, the town 
 of Sonderburg, lying just back of them, also suf- 
 fered from the bombardment. Lord Shaftesbury 
 shed crocodile tears over so great a crime, and Lord 
 Palmerston portrayed with fiery eloquence the 
 enormity of a bombardment of Copenhagen by the 
 Prussians. 
 
 Thus the war against Denmark was at the same 
 time a war against England and her domination of 
 the world. In reliance upon the English promises 
 privately conveyed, the Danish government declined 
 all proffered mediation, and so lost the opportunity 
 to retain at least a part of Schleswig in her posses- 
 sion. We know how finally all obstacles and dan- 
 gers were overcome by Bismarck's statesmanship, 
 and the complete separation of the duchies from 
 
 1 Abroad this has remained the prevailing view up to the 
 present day. Charles Eliot, the leader of public opinion in 
 America, in an article upon the present war that is re- 
 markable for the arrogance and self-sufficiency of its tone 
 as well as for the ignorance it displays, declares that Prus- 
 sia made war upon Denmark for the purpose of gaining 
 possession of the harbors of Schleswig. 
 
Defeat in the Danish War 1 83 
 
 Denmark was accomplished. When matters came 
 to a final decision, it became evident how much, or 
 rather how little England's high sounding talk and 
 fierce threats really amounted to; all obligations of 
 an official nature had been carefully avoided, and 
 England now refused to give Denmark any sup- 
 port whatever, and withdrew entirely from the mat- 
 ter. The scales were turned when Prussia gained 
 Russian favor by her attitude on the Polish ques- 
 tion, and when it became evident that Napoleon 
 was not at all inclined to undertake a war against 
 the German powers, but rather hoped in this con- 
 nection to find an opportunity to fish in troubled 
 waters, and was therefore justly regarded with little 
 confidence by England. Dependent upon herself 
 alone, England did not find it advisable to venture a 
 war ; she might, without doubt, have destroyed Ger- 
 many's over-seas commerce, but her own would 
 have suffered incalculable loss, and for a war by 
 land her army was quite too insufficient. 
 
 Again there was nothing for Parliament to do 
 but to accept the situation as best it might, and it 
 did so by giving its tardy sanction to the Govern- 
 ment's policy with all its pitiful vacillations by a 
 vote of thanks to the Queen for the preservation of 
 peace. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 Suspension of Colonial Aggression — Ten- 
 sion Between England and Russia 
 (1865-1881) 
 
 In consequence of these two serious defeats of 
 her diplomacy the prestige of England's supremacy 
 was somewhat dimmed; they indicate the turning 
 point in British sovereignty of the world. From 
 this time forth, and for many years to come, Eng- 
 land kept aloof from the affairs of the continent, 
 and in a large measure allowed them to take care 
 of themselves. She stood by with arms crossed 
 when Prussia and Austria were at war, and again 
 when the German Confederation was established. 
 At the London Conference with regard to Luxem- 
 burg in 1867, in which England participated with 
 great reluctance, she made the neutralization of this 
 tiny state assume a most illusive nature by the ex- 
 planation which the Cabinet gave to the Parliament, 
 saying that, according to the agreement, the con- 
 tracting powers guaranteed the neutrality of Luxem- 
 burg jointly, and against a third party only, and 
 that should one of the contracting parties attempt 
 its violation, the guarantee of neutrality would in- 
 stantly become inoperative. During the war be- 
 tween Germany and France, England proclaimed 
 
 184 
 
Attitude During the Turkish War 185 
 
 her neutrality, although this in no wise prevented 
 the English government from allowing the very 
 lucrative exportation of arms and other contraband 
 of war to France. When Russia improved the op- 
 portunity that this war gave her to renounce the 
 obligation never to maintain a war fleet on the 
 Black Sea, which had been imposed upon her by the 
 terms of the Peace of Paris in 1856, England not 
 only failed to protest against this, but was obliged 
 to sanction it at a conference held in London. 
 
 The only difficulties that seemed insurmountable 
 were those that resulted from England's relations 
 to Russia, and from the English purpose to main- 
 tain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The ten- 
 sion caused by Russia's advance into central Asia 
 was constantly growing, and threatened more than 
 once to end in war. Lord Salisbury's attempt to 
 settle the Balkan troubles by means of a conference 
 at Constantinople ended in utter failure early in 
 1877, the Sultan's checkmate to the English pro- 
 posal being the proclamation of a sham constitu- 
 tion, whereupon he announced that in the future 
 he could enter into no binding negotiations without 
 the consent of the Turkish Parliament, and that 
 therefore the conference would be to no purpose. 
 Later, when Russia, in secret alliance with Aus- 
 tria, began a new war upon the Turkish Empire, 
 England did not hesitate to offer instant opposition, 
 and really made serious preparations for war, in 
 consequence of which Russia modified her demands 
 at a conference held in Berlin, and at which a com- 
 promise was effected by means of German media- 
 
1 86 Suspension of Colonial Aggression 
 
 tion. As usual, England again did not fail to 
 pocket the reward of her disinterested intervention 
 in behalf of the Turk and of European interests in 
 general, — the Sultan was obliged to cede Cypress 
 to her. Strange to say, and quite contrary to Eng- 
 land's customary skill in handling her colonial pos- 
 sessions, and in spite of the apparently favorable 
 situation of this island, England failed to utilize 
 the advantages it offered, and did not succeed in 
 establishing an efficient economic life upon the 
 island. Cypress is to the present day the most 
 neglected and undeveloped of all the British pos- 
 sessions. Furthermore England made the most of 
 the time during which Russia's hands were bound 
 by the war upon Turkey, to interfere in the affairs 
 of Turkestan, and to re-establish her former pre- 
 dominating influence there ; in addition she widened 
 the boundaries of her Indian domain by taking pos- 
 session of the Khyber Pass, as well as of the passes 
 of the Suleiman Mountains and of a part of Be- 
 luchistan, and thus strengthened her hold upon the 
 entire country, since it gave her control of its nat- 
 ural boundaries. 
 
 Otherwise, during this epoch of her history, Eng- 
 land shows traces of weariness that are usually 
 seen in an old and glutted civilization, one that is 
 no longer capable of great exertion, and resignedly 
 accepts the inevitable, all of which are the more 
 apparent because of the vigor and tremendous pros- 
 perity that mark the period just preceding. The 
 restraint which is the chief characteristic of Eng- 
 land's foreign policy at this time, and her with- 
 
Gladstone's Foreign Policy 1 87 
 
 drawal from any active participation in the affairs 
 of the continent were quite in keeping, it must be 
 said, with the theories of the Manchester School — 
 the " laissez aller " — the disposition to restrain, in 
 so far as possible, all interference on the part of the 
 state, and to leave everything to the natural devel- 
 opment of the economic forces. That the better 
 part of Britain's possessions in North America had 
 separated from the motherland, as had Mexico and 
 South America from Spain, together with the ever 
 increasing desire for an absolutely independent home 
 government on the part of Britain's other colonies, 
 led men to conclude that this was but the process 
 of a natural law, and that whenever colonies ar- 
 rived at the time when they could dispense with the 
 protection of the motherland, they separated from 
 it just as naturally as a ripe fruit drops from the 
 tree. With perfect sincerity the question was dis- 
 cussed as to whether it were not advisable for Eng- 
 land to break her connection with the colonies of 
 her own accord, to confer absolute independence 
 upon them, and so rid herself of the obligations 
 and responsibilities that their possession entailed. 
 Britain did in fact withdraw from the Ionian Is- 
 lands in 1863, and in 1856 she refused to annex the 
 Fiji Islands, of which she nevertheless did take pos- 
 session in 1874. 
 
 With this novel doctrine Mr. Gladstone was fully 
 in harmony, himself the greatest of dilettantes in 
 politics, and one who seemed better fitted to be a 
 professor of orthodox theology, or of Greek, than 
 to be the political leader of a great nation. His 
 
1 88 Suspension of Colonial Aggression 
 
 knowledge and understanding of foreign lands and 
 their peoples — in sharp contrast to his rival, Dis- 
 raeli — were even less than were possessed by any- 
 one of his predecessors in office, and in the myster- 
 ies of foreign politics he was always at sea. It 
 must be said, however, that he was an honest be- 
 liever in the doctrines that he proclaimed with great 
 eloquence. When in 1881 it came to a war with the 
 Transvaal Republic, which under Disraeli's admin- 
 istration had been annexed to the British dominions 
 in 1877, and the British arms suffered defeat at 
 Majuba Hill, Gladstone accepted the outcome, and, 
 in conformity to the doctrines he advocated, in- 
 duced his government to recognize the autonomy 
 of the Transvaal. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 The Period from 1881 to 1901 — Relations 
 with France — America — Russia and 
 Turkey 
 
 Meanwhile it became evident that whenever 
 England's vital interests were at stake their con- 
 sideration far outweighed the claims of any polit- 
 ical theory. The attitude that the government had 
 taken, together with the ever growing influence 
 which was being exerted by public opinion, had for 
 its inevitable consequence that, instead of being the 
 leader in matters political, the government was now 
 being led, and was frequently driven to pursue a 
 course the end of which it could not foresee, while 
 behind the scenes there were irresponsible and un- 
 controllable forces at work, and skillful intriguers 
 were influencing the affairs of the state, and were 
 exploiting them for their own benefit. There was 
 the further drawback that the ministers of state 
 were never chosen for their professional fitness to 
 administer the departments of which they had 
 charge, but were chosen because of the political 
 services they had rendered their party, or in ac- 
 knowledgment of their influence in Parliament. 
 The business of the state was therefore in the hands 
 
 189 
 
190 Period from 1881 to 1901 
 
 of men who had no professional knowledge of the 
 affairs which they were conducting. 
 
 It is for these reasons that Britain usually finds 
 herself so illy prepared to enter upon large under- 
 takings ; there is no comprehensive oversight of the 
 available means with which to meet them, and 
 therefore a want of unity in the direction of the 
 state's activities. Consequently England's political 
 conduct is characterized by irresolution and spas- 
 modic action. As was said at the time of the battle 
 of Navarino and of the Crimean war, England is 
 inclined to allow herself to be controlled by events 
 instead of herself controlling them. Usually, after 
 long continued irresolution, she either withdraws al- 
 together, if the timorous mood gains the upper hand, 
 or else the government takes energetic but impul- 
 sive measures by which a war is made inevitable, 
 but from which it does not appear clearly whether 
 this is the result of intended and definite action, or 
 whether the administration allowed itself to be hur- 
 ried unawares and by influences over which it had 
 no control to take an unpremeditated step, — for in- 
 stance, by the action of some diplomatic agent, or 
 by some energetic measure taken by a zealous offi- 
 cer, or in consequence of an agitation by the press. 
 Generally, a reaction ensues, the war opens with a 
 series of heavy defeats, for the reason that the nec- 
 essary military measures were unexpectedly and 
 hurriedly taken, and the defects in the organization 
 make themselves felt at every step. On the other 
 hand, it is in just this situation that the dogged 
 persistence of the Englishman is revealed at its best; 
 
Influences at Work 191 
 
 once he finds himself at war, he does not allow him- 
 self to be discouraged by defeats, but fights to a 
 finish — a quality by which in the long and weari- 
 some twenty years' war with France some glorious 
 results were achieved. It matters not how bitter 
 the opposition to the government and its measures 
 may have been, — as was the case at the time of 
 the English Revolution, — when the critical mo- 
 ment arrives, the administration is not embarrassed 
 by opposition. " Right or wrong, — my country! " 
 is the watchword then, and all criticism is deferred 
 into the future when that which has come to pass 
 can no longer be undone, and, in spite of any moral 
 misgivings, is accepted with satisfaction. While at 
 the close of the war of the Spanish Succession, and 
 of the Seven Years' war also, the immediate change 
 that took place in the public mind had its origin, 
 no doubt, in internal conditions, still it was due in 
 no small degree to the fact that England had in the 
 main achieved her ends, and could point with pride 
 to rich results when she came to make peace. When 
 the reverse of this was true at the end of the Amer- 
 ican revolutionary war, the English nation came to 
 the conclusion that the revolting colonies were un- 
 conquerable, and that therefore it was best to con- 
 cede their independence, and so avoid what might 
 be worse. 
 
 This feature of English political life has been 
 clearly revealed in connection with Egyptian affairs 
 ever since the beginning of the political disturbances 
 in 1879. Up to that time Egypt had been chiefly 
 under the influence of the French, who had in- 
 
icj2 Period from 1 88 1 to igoi 
 
 troduced European civilization into the country to- 
 gether with its associated evil of political corruption, 
 and who now regarded it as a part of their domin- 
 ions, with the secret hope some day to carry out Na- 
 poleon's cherished plan, and, with Egypt as their 
 base, to launch an attack upon England's empire in 
 India, and upon her domination of the world as well. 
 England had allowed this situation to continue until 
 it threatened to become perilous, although in 1840 
 she had put an end to the tremendous political 
 power that Mehemet Ali had obtained with the aid 
 of France. The construction of the Suez Canal 
 (completed in 1869), financed with French capital, 
 was regarded by England with apprehension, and 
 an attempt was made to prevent it, but without suc- 
 cess. As the value of this new waterway became 
 more and more apparent, Egypt assumed a position 
 of tremendous importance in relation to England's 
 world domination. When this was fully realized, 
 England laid her hand upon the canal through Dis- 
 raeli's purchase of a large number of the company's 
 shares of stock in 1875. Soon afterward this states- 
 man secured for England a position of influence 
 equal to that of France in the land of the Khedive 
 by the introduction of the Anglo-French system of 
 " joint control "of Egyptian finances, which had 
 reached the point of bankruptcy through unparal- 
 leled recklessness in the expenditure of the state's 
 income. 
 
 Meanwhile the political mismanagement led to 
 the revolt of a military popular party under the 
 leadership of Arabi Pasha, which, after it had 
 
English in Egypt 193 
 
 seized the government, soon proved itself quite in- 
 capable of enforcing the much needed reforms. 
 For a while England stood by as an observer ; then 
 the recently established Gladstone ministry cast to 
 the wind the peaceful doctrine of non-intervention 
 and the beautiful theory of every nation's right to 
 independence and self-government, which Gladstone, 
 as leader of the Opposition, had but lately pro- 
 claimed to the world with soul-stirring eloquence at 
 the time that he advocated intervention in behalf of 
 the Bulgarians and against their Turkish oppressors. 
 Suddenly a British fleet appeared on the coast of 
 Egypt and bombarded Alexandria on July 11, 1882. 
 France, entirely possessed by her hatred of Ger- 
 many and the desire for revenge, withdrew in a 
 spirit of short-sighted amiability, General Wolseley 
 took triumphant possession of the country, and made 
 short work of Arabi Pasha's authority. Since that 
 time Egypt has been a vassal state under control of 
 England on the same order as are the principalities 
 of India, although some unimportant concessions 
 are made to the claims of France and to the sov- 
 ereignty of the Sultan. When a short time after- 
 ward, the uprising under the Mahdi occurred, it 
 soon became evident how little system there really 
 was in the British rule, and how deplorably deficient 
 were the means at hand. The Anglo-Egyptian 
 forces in Kordofan were annihilated in 1883, and 
 General Gordon was sent to Khartum to fall a sac- 
 rifice to British inefficiency in 1885. For a decade 
 afterward the Sudan was left to shift for itself, 
 until in 1898 General Kitchener made an end of 
 
194 Period from 1881 to IQOI 
 
 the Mahdi's rule, and the Sudan was then annexed, 
 not to Egypt, but to the British dominions. 
 
 If on the one hand Britain opposed the domina- 
 tion of the French in Egypt, and crowded them out 
 of the valley of the Nile, it was for the sake of 
 placing her possession of India beyond a peradven- 
 dure, for in other directions she now generally al- 
 lowed the French a free hand. Republican France 
 soon developed a well-planned and vigorous co- 
 lonial policy whereby that country's resources were 
 enormously enlarged. The conquest of Tongking 
 was begun in 1883 and its possession successfully 
 defended against China; Annam became a vassal 
 state to France, the Kingdom of Siam was forced 
 to relinquish a part of its territory into French 
 hands, the subjugation of Madagascar was begun in 
 1885, an d in 191 1 Tahiti was annexed. In addition 
 to all these acquisitions France proceeded with a 
 systematic plan of conquest in northwestern Africa, 
 for which Algeria and Senegambia served her ex- 
 cellently as centers of action. As early as 1881 
 Tunis was subjugated; in 1883 the French explorer, 
 de Brazza, penetrated to the banks of the Congo, 
 and the country as far as Lake Chad fell under 
 French domination, as did also the Niger territory 
 together with Timbuktu and the Sahara, and in 1892 
 Dahomey was added to the French conquests. 
 Thus, aside from the English and German colonies 
 that were sprinkled here and there among all these 
 French territorial possessions, and of the Canary 
 Islands owned by Spain, and the Cape Verde Islands 
 by Portugal, the control of the entire northwestern 
 
Relations: France and America 195 
 
 part of the African continent had passed to France, 
 with the single exception of the Kingdom of 
 Morocco. This was now the only remaining inde- 
 pendent state, but was so closely pressed on all sides 
 by French territory that it was evidently the morsel 
 that had been reserved for the last, and it was now 
 but a question of time when it also would become a 
 victim to the French appetite for conquest. 
 
 England did not bar the way to this tremendous 
 expansion of French dominion, but whenever a con- 
 flict of interests occurred, as in Siam, allowed the 
 matter to be adjusted by treaty. The only time that 
 England assumed a threatening attitude was in 1898 
 when a French expedition under General Marchand 
 made the attempt to advance from the Congo as 
 far north as Fashoda on the upper Nile, and so 
 drive a dividing wedge between the British posses- 
 sions in the valley of the Nile and those in equa- 
 torial Africa. In this instance only did British 
 arms compel a surrender of French territorial aspi- 
 rations. 
 
 As compliant as was England's attitude toward 
 France, it was even more so toward North America. 
 When in 1895 a dispute arose between England and 
 Venezuela with regard to the boundary line between 
 the latter country and British Guiana, the United 
 States demanded that England should desist from 
 enforcing her claim by a resort to arms, and com- 
 pelled an adjustment by arbitration. In this con- 
 nection President Cleveland's Secretary of State, 
 Olney, construed the Monroe Doctrine in a wider 
 sense, and so as to include within its prohibition any 
 
196 Period from 1 881 to 1Q0I 
 
 armed interference on the part of a European power 
 in American affairs, and declared that the United 
 States would not tolerate a European power to take 
 possession of any disputed territory in America. 
 In 1902 England was compelled, after long drawn 
 out negotiations, to agree to the annulment of the 
 treaty of 1850 regarding the construction of an in- 
 ter-oceanic canal through Central America, and at 
 the same time renounced any possible right herself 
 to build such a canal at any future time. Imme- 
 diately afterward the United States effected the 
 separation of the newly constituted state of Panama 
 from Colombia, and then undertook the construc- 
 tion of the canal herself. 
 
 It was at a time somewhat earlier than this that, 
 in order to protect the interests of California, the 
 most independent and self-assertive state of the 
 Union, the American republic felt impelled to ex- 
 tend the sphere of her influence beyond the shores 
 of the Pacific, and in 1897 annexed the Hawaiian 
 Islands. The war with Spain for the liberation of 
 Cuba in 1898, and the consequent acquisition of 
 over-seas territory (Porto Rico and the Philip- 
 pines, to which were added several islands of the 
 Samoan group in 1899), together with the es- 
 tablishment of vassal states (Cuba, soon followed 
 by Panama), consummated the decisive step by 
 which the Republic advanced beyond the con- 
 fines of America, and took her place among the 
 other nations of the world in the control of its 
 affairs, while at the same time it required a funda- 
 mental change in the internal structure of the 
 
Relations with North America igy 
 
 American government. Thus the United States has 
 entered upon a course the end of which no man 
 can foresee, but from which, we may be certain, 
 there can be no turning back. It is a step which is 
 of as great moment to the American republic as 
 was the conquest of Sicily, and the resulting acqui- 
 sition of her first province, to Rome. Henceforth 
 American interests will be affected by all the great 
 questions of world politics; the immediate conse- 
 quence must be that the United States will find it 
 imperative to obtain for herself the dominating in- 
 fluence on the Pacific with the unavoidable result 
 that she will be opposed by Japan. This undoubt- 
 edly was a consideration when the United States 
 determined to construct the Panama canal, and plays 
 no . unimportant part in shaping the attitude which 
 that country takes toward the confused state of af- 
 fairs in Mexico. 
 
 As a counterpoise to the preponderating power 
 of the Republic, Britain has developed her Canadian 
 dominion with great energy, while at the same time 
 she has sought to win the devotion of its people by 
 showing great consideration for their wishes and 
 interests, and by granting them an almost complete 
 autonomy. By opening up large areas of agricul^ 
 tural lands in Manitoba, Assiniboia and Saskatche- 
 wan, and by developing the harbors on the west 
 coast of Canada the importance of this British 
 province has been greatly increased. In recent 
 years there has been continuous immigration from 
 the United States into Canada, mostly of young 
 men of the farming population who can there obtain 
 
198 Period from 1881 to iqoi 
 
 much land for little money, and so find the oppor- 
 tunity to acquire wealth. It is a much discussed 
 question in America whether this element of the 
 population will eventually pave the way toward fu- 
 ture annexation to the United States, or whether, 
 like the French Catholic population of Canada, these 
 immigrants and their descendants will hold loyally 
 to Britain in grateful recognition of the stable and 
 well organized political conditions that prevail in 
 the land of their adoption, in striking contrast to 
 the frequent changes and at times almost anarchical 
 conditions that occur in their homeland. The an- 
 swer to this question will be decided by the future 
 development of the country; meanwhile the large 
 majority by which the people of Canada in 191 1 
 declared themselves as opposed to the proposed 
 reciprocal trade relations with the United States is 
 sufficient evidence to conclude that British affiliation 
 is still paramount in Canada. 
 
 In general, England has accepted the masterful 
 and highly independent spirit of the American pol- 
 icy, and has allowed the old enmity to be forgotten, 
 although its echoes were heard until late into the 
 nineteenth century. Since that time, however, Eng- 
 land has shown herself willing to meet the Ameri- 
 can republic more than half way, and has been as 
 unscrupulous as she has been skillful in her manipu- 
 lation of the American press to enlist it in favor 
 of English interests. Moreover, the harmonizing 
 influence of a common language, a common litera- 
 ture, and common customs and views of life is a 
 powerful one, and the result is that in America also 
 
Attitude of American People 199 
 
 the old feeling of resentment against England and 
 her policy of extreme selfishness has gradually died 
 out, although at times and upon occasion there is 
 evidence that it still lingers. To what proportions 
 this pro-English feeling has grown, the present war 
 has revealed all too clearly. It generally assumes a 
 sentimental form, and expresses itself in the old 
 adage, " Blood is thicker than water," which, though 
 it stirs the imagination, is not upheld by the lessons 
 that history teaches. In reality it is never senti- 
 ment, but always the hard and uncompromising de- 
 mands of political and material conditions that de- 
 cide the course of historical events. Such is the 
 case in the present instance also, and it is by their 
 common opposition to the economic development of 
 Germany, and even in a greater measure to the po- 
 litical institutions of the German state, " its mili- 
 tarism," that England and America are united in a 
 common dislike of Germany. 
 
 This sentiment is deepened by the inherent Amer- 
 ican opposition to a monarchical form of govern- 
 ment, especially when it is one that is both vigorous 
 and creative, as it is in Germany. That the Amer- 
 ican people as a whole are kindly disposed and easily 
 touched by pity is a further consideration, and one 
 that is emphasized by the feminizing influence of 
 the schools that are almost entirely in the hands of 
 women. This also accounts for the visionary Amer- 
 ican enthusiasm for a universal brotherhood of the 
 nations, and the hope of an eternal peace, though, 
 it must be said, these sentiments harmonize but illy 
 with the practical policy of a nation that in the 
 
200 Period from 1881 to IQOI 
 
 nineteenth century acquired more land by conquest 
 than did any other one, and that has allowed itself 
 to be drawn into war on very slight provocation. 
 
 It is to these circumstances that we Germans must 
 look for the reason why our many attempts to create 
 a friendly relation between the American and the 
 German nations, and a better understanding of each 
 other have utterly failed in spite of repeated protes- 
 tations of good will on our part, and of the recent 
 endeavor to bring the cultural elements of the two 
 nations in touch by an exchange of professors at 
 the universities of the two countries. It would 
 seem that our efforts in this direction have been 
 harmful rather than helpful to us, in that they have 
 been misconstrued into an admission of weakness, 
 and have even been supposed to be prompted by 
 sinister motives. The opportunity in time of peace 
 to secure an influence upon the foreign press has 
 been neglected here as elsewhere by German di- 
 plomacy. 
 
 At the outbreak of the war the true sentiment of 
 the great body of Americans toward Germany was 
 plainly revealed. Under the influence of a degen- 
 erate and wholly unscrupulous press they not only 
 lent a willing ear to all the malicious slander with 
 which our enemies overwhelmed us, but added to 
 it. Even men of weight who had apparently been 
 friendly to Germany, such as Carnegie and Bigelow, 
 the " companion of the Emperor's youth," now 
 made common cause with our bitterest enemies. 
 Harvard University, where the exchange of pro- 
 fessors was begun, is altogether on the side of the 
 
Russia j Turkey and Germany 201 
 
 Allies, and although occasionally a voice is raised 
 in favor of Germany at Columbia University, New 
 York, the seat of the " Kaiser- Wilhelm-Professor- 
 ship," the head of this institution, President Butler, 
 pursues the Germans with attacks of bitter calumny 
 under guise of a proclaimed neutrality. That the 
 action of the American government has been uni- 
 formly detrimental to Germany's cause, and to the 
 advantage of her enemies will not be disputed by 
 any one. 
 
 The English attitude toward America, and more 
 especially toward France, has been determined by 
 Britain's relations to the other two great powers, 
 Russia and Germany. For a time Russia continued 
 to be the dreaded rival against whom England 
 sought to form a combination with the other powers, 
 and, if possible, induce them to make war upon the 
 colossus of the north. Russia's advance into cen- 
 tral Asia, the subjugation of the khanates, her en- 
 croachment upon Afghanistan and the Pamir, the 
 opening up of the economic possibilities of this con- 
 quered territory, and making her possession of it 
 assured by the construction of an extensive system 
 of strategically located railroads, together with the 
 Russian aspiration to obtain a dominating influence 
 in Persia, all were circumstances by which a war 
 between Russia and England was made a constant 
 possibility. In the end it was found advisable, how- 
 ever, to settle the main differences by compromise 
 or treaty, for the dangers attending such a war were 
 far too grave, while the remoteness of the terri- 
 tory and the impossibility to place any reliance upon 
 
202 Period from 1881 to igoi 
 
 the conquered or partially subjugated tribes ren- 
 dered the outcome too uncertain to make the venture 
 of a war advisable. 
 
 The other cause for irritation between England 
 and Russia, viz., the Turkish Empire, was grad- 
 ually being relegated to a position of secondary im- 
 portance. The changes that had taken place in 
 grain production and in the routes by which it was 
 transported, to which attention has already been 
 called, were making themselves felt more and more ; 
 traffic by way of the Black Sea had become a mat- 
 ter of less vital importance to England, and although 
 large quantities of grain are still imported by this 
 route, England, in time, found herself in the position 
 where she could drop the dogma that the integrity 
 of the Turkish Empire constituted a European neces- 
 sity. To this was added the further consideration 
 that England had forfeited her former influence at 
 Constantinople by Gladstone's intervention in be- 
 half of the Bulgarians during the reign of Abdul 
 Hamid, and by his denunciation of the " unspeakable 
 Turk," as well as by other blunders in diplomacy. 
 England could therefore afford to allow Russia a 
 free hand in this direction. Austria now was Rus- 
 sia's chief opponent in the Balkan peninsula where 
 the Russian policy had blocked its own way to suc- 
 cess by first obtaining independence for the Bul- 
 garians and then according them the treatment of 
 an absolutely dependent state. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 Germany's Prosperity and Her Colonial Pol- 
 icy — The English in Africa — Japan and 
 China 
 
 Meanwhile the German Empire had been at- 
 taining a position of constantly increasing impor- 
 tance. As soon as the nation was united, and the 
 shackles of political limitation had fallen away, its 
 native vigor and spirit of enterprise asserted them- 
 selves to a remarkable degree. At first the buoy- 
 ancy consequent upon immediate success in newly 
 tried spheres of industry gave rise to a laxness of 
 conscience in business enterprise that, in 1873, re- 
 sulted in a financial crash from which the economic 
 conditions of the country recovered but slowly. 
 But this served the German nation as a lesson; un- 
 der the widely comprehensive guidance and inspira- 
 tion of the government the people now entered upon 
 a course of self-training that led to so high a stand- 
 ard of business rectitude that certain products of 
 German industry intended for the exhibit at the 
 World's Fair at Philadelphia in 1876, and which 
 were ranked as " cheap and poor " by the German 
 Imperial Commissioner, Reulaux, still compared fa- 
 vorably with articles of the same kind that were 
 
 203 
 
204 Germany *s Prosperity 
 
 produced in other countries a number of years later, 
 and proved their superiority in open competition. 
 
 This development was due in great measure, and 
 in fact was made possible only by the wonderful 
 transformation that was brought about in economic 
 conditions by the customs tariff adopted in 1879, and 
 which Germany owes to Bismarck's persistent effort 
 in the face of bitter opposition from the doctrinaire 
 advocates of free trade, and from those elements 
 in the population that were on principle opposed to 
 any further extension of the authority of the Em- 
 pire, and of the functions of the state in general. 
 It was by this measure, which placed the country on 
 an enduring economic basis, that Bismarck finished 
 his great and self-imposed task of establishing the 
 German Empire. It is due to his foresight that 
 Germany accomplished what Britain neglected to 
 do, viz., to maintain a vigorous agricultural pro- 
 duction at the same time that the manufacturing in- 
 dustries were taking their great strides forward, 
 and thus secured to the German Empire self-sup- 
 porting conditions by which its independence of 
 other nations is assured. How great is Germany's 
 debt on this account alone to this wise statesman, 
 and how shortsighted and misleading was the doc- 
 trinaire advice of the free-trade advocates, is now 
 sufficiently apparent to be recognized by even the 
 dullest. Had Germany continued to follow Ca- 
 privi's policy instead of returning, as it did, to the 
 course laid out by Bismarck, we would now have 
 found it impossible to maintain the present war, and 
 
German Trade Legislation 205 
 
 England's purpose to starve Germany out would 
 have proved successful. 
 
 Tariff legislation was followed by social reform 
 legislation in 1881. From this time forth the ma- 
 terial welfare of Germany has advanced with leaps 
 and bounds, and is enjoyed not only by the lead- 
 ing classes, as is the case in England, Belgium, and 
 other industrial countries, but is shared by the en- 
 tire population. Indeed, the country's prosperity 
 has been increasing in a measure that is not only a 
 surprise to other nations, but far surpasses the ex- 
 pectations of even the best informed Germans them- 
 selves. The plane of social life has been raised 
 throughout, and yet, in the main, this has continued 
 wholesome; the facilities for intercourse and the en- 
 tire railroad system have been developed to a point 
 where they may serve as models of perfection; pre- 
 viously insignificant towns have grown into flour- 
 ishing business centers ; and, although the population 
 increased from nearly 41 millions in 1871, to 65 
 millions in 19 10, emigration, that had reached quite 
 considerable proportions, has practically ceased dur- 
 ing this period. Germany is not only able to feed 
 and employ her entire population, but can offer so 
 attractive an existence to her people that they have 
 no desire to leave their native land. 
 
 The development of Germany's commercial capa- 
 bilities has kept pace with the degree of her indus- 
 trial prosperity and general welfare. The number 
 of sea going vessels rose from 4519 in the year 
 187 1, of which 4372 were sailing craft, to 4850 with 
 
206 Germany's Prosperity 
 
 a remaining number of only 2752 sails in 191 3, 
 while the tonnage went from 982,000 in 1871 to 
 3,000,000 in 19 1 3, an increase to three times the 
 former capacity. Hamburg has become the princi- 
 pal seaport on the European continent, having out- 
 stripped Antwerp, Rotterdam and Liverpool, and 
 is now exceeded in importance only by New York 
 and London. This commercial development made 
 a German navy an imperative necessity, and one 
 which the nation had long realized. After a first 
 and fruitless attempt in this direction had been made 
 in 1848, Prussia undertook the construction of a 
 war fleet on a very modest scale. Although Ger- 
 many had reason to be proud of the ensign she had 
 unfurled upon the seas, still her navy was kept within 
 very narrow limits for fear that its support might 
 prove too great a drain upon the material resources 
 of the Empire, or that the nation's defense by land 
 might be weakened for the sake of the desired 
 strength at sea. It was for reasons such as these 
 also that the government entered but timidly and 
 with many misgivings upon the long wished for pol- 
 icy of acquiring for Germany some of the little re- 
 maining territory of the world that was still open 
 to colonization, and so making a beginning toward 
 an extension of Germany's influence and power into 
 world affairs. There was, moreover, a large and 
 influential element in the Reichstag which was 
 wholly opposed to this policy, and which placed en- 
 tire faith in the doctrine of free trade and in the 
 lessons that were supposedly to be learned from 
 England's weariness of colonial enterprise. Never- 
 
Germany's Colonial Policy 207 
 
 theless, in 1884, Bismarck decided to acquire for 
 Germany the colonial territory now known as Ger- 
 man Southwest Africa, Togoland, Kamerun, Ger- 
 man East Africa and a part of New Guinea, al- 
 though an earlier movement to gain a footing for 
 Germany in the Samoan Islands had been defeated 
 in the Reichstag in 1880. 
 
 Thus, from a country weakened by internal po- 
 litical dissension, and from a nation that had been 
 regarded askance by most of the other great na- 
 tionalities of the world, Germany had developed, 
 over night as it were, into a powerful and aspiring 
 empire, and its people into a nation whose standing 
 in the world was worthy of the respect it demanded 
 and which it could at any time enforce. England 
 began to realize more and more that this newly estab- 
 lished power was destined to be her chief competitor. 
 That Germany's voice in continental matters was 
 the deciding one, and that her efficient army was the 
 compelling element in the enforcement of a contin- 
 uous state of peace in Europe, and that consequently 
 England could no longer gather in her customary 
 harvests from the continental conflicts which she 
 had found so advantageous to the expansion of her 
 empire were conditions that had to be accepted. In 
 fact, England had found herself in a position where 
 she had reason to be grateful to Germany for the 
 mediation by which at the Congress of Berlin the 
 war that was threatening with Russia had been 
 averted. It was indeed exasperating that there was 
 no way of getting at this firmly established German 
 state, conducted so efficiently by its thoroughly or- 
 
208 Germany's Prosperity 
 
 ganized and purposeful government in spite of the 
 welcome illusion entertained by its antagonists, that 
 the Empire was being kept together only by force, 
 and that the smaller states, as well as the great 
 body of the people, were eager to throw off the 
 Prussian yoke, and so escape from the irksome duty 
 imposed by the Prussian institution of universal 
 military service. To a belief in this illusion, which 
 apparently had its origin in the wrangles so usual 
 among the political parties in Germany, the Eng- 
 lish were especially inclined because of their inabil- 
 ity to understand the conditions prevailing in foreign 
 lands, or to appreciate the motives and circumstances 
 by which the people there are influenced. 
 
 England was the more disposed to be resentful 
 of the great progress that German industries and 
 commerce had made, because the English themselves 
 had lost the ability to adapt themselves to the new 
 demands by discarding antiquated methods and cus- 
 tomary ways of doing things, and adopting more 
 modern ones. But there was little that could be 
 done about it; the preventive measure that was re- 
 sorted to had just the opposite effect of that which 
 was desired. It had been hoped that if all imports 
 from Germany were marked with the distinguishing 
 label, " Made in Germany," the English purchasing 
 public would discriminate against them, but the 
 astounding result was that this but increased their 
 sale, and therefore their importation also. 
 
 But now Germany began to manifest the intention 
 to step beyond her own confines by adopting a co- 
 lonial policy of her own beyond the seas, which 
 
German Competition 209 
 
 would necessarily be followed by an expansion of 
 her war fleet. In the eyes of the English this con- 
 stituted a trespass upon the domain which they had 
 reserved to themselves; and that was more than 
 could be borne. Germany, therefore, was now to 
 be denied privileges such as France had received, 
 and which indeed had been conceded by England as 
 an offset to Germany's growing power. Similar 
 privileges also had been bestowed upon the King of 
 the Belgians by the Congo Conference in 1885, at 
 the time that the Congo Free State, that political 
 bastard, was born. England therefore now sud- 
 denly discovered that all the territory to which Ger- 
 many laid claim, or to which she aspired, or was 
 likely to aspire at any future time, was already 
 within British jurisdiction, based on well grounded 
 claims, and that this territory especially could not, 
 for most valid reasons, patent to every unbiased 
 mind, be relinquished to Germany for colonization, 
 much as England regretted this. Openly to throw 
 down the gauntlet to Bismarck was more than Eng- 
 land cared to do, however, and so there was noth- 
 ing to be done eventually but to withdraw the Eng- 
 lish objections, and, with a sour mien, to wish 
 Germany God-speed on her new ventures at colon- 
 ization. But again Britain did not fail to carry 
 off a prize herself. She acquired the southern part 
 of New Guinea — the western part was Dutch ter- 
 ritory — and secured recognition of her claim to 
 Walfish Bay, a harbor just in the middle of the 
 coastline of German Southwest Africa. From this 
 time forth the Germans encountered English oppo- 
 
210 Germany's Prosperity 
 
 sition, even more than they had before, in whatever 
 they planned or undertook, even if it was no more 
 than the acquisition of a coaling station. 
 
 To be sure, better relations between the two coun- 
 tries developed during the regrettable administra- 
 tion of Capri vi who, as the outspoken opponent of 
 any kind of German colonial policy, acted upon his 
 maxim of " the less we have of Africa, the better 
 for us," and so pursued a course that was highly 
 pleasing to the English. In 1890 he relinquished 
 Uganda and Witu to England, and resigned Ger- 
 many's claim to Zanzibar in exchange for Helgo- 
 land and a corner in Southwest Africa. That this 
 occasion was not utilized to secure at least Walfish 
 Bay for Germany is to be ascribed to a lack of inter- 
 est, or to a want of skill on the part of her envoys. 
 In the treaty by which Germany obtained possession 
 of Kamerun, England's claims to the entire terri- 
 tory of the upper Nile were recognized, which gave 
 great offence to France, while in the subsequent 
 negotiations with France in regard to the Hinter- 
 land of Kamerun, Germany's interests were repre- 
 sented with quite as little skill. At a somewhat 
 later date, and while engaged in the Boer war, Eng- 
 land agreed to Germany's long desired acquisition 
 of the Samoan Islands (1899), although at the 
 same time a number of these islands passed into the 
 possession of the United States. A short time pre- 
 vious to this, Germany had purchased the Canary 
 Islands from Spain. 
 
 Otherwise the chief result of Germany's entrance 
 into the competition for colonial acquisition was a 
 
England's African Realm 211 
 
 re-awakening of England's spirit of colonial enter- 
 prise. The period of her weariness in this respect 
 was past; the practical interests of the day had tri- 
 umphed over the theories of the visionaries, and 
 there was now abroad in England a constantly grow- 
 ing realization of the incalculable value that attaches 
 to a political connection, even of the loosest sort, 
 with extensive and ever more richly developing co- 
 lonial dominions. Such relations are especially ad- 
 vantageous to the trading interests of the mother- 
 country, for England's colonies not only afford a 
 market for the products of her manufacturing in- 
 dustries, but provide her with a source from which 
 to draw raw materials, and, most important of all, 
 they furnish her with the most indispensable neces- 
 saries of life. The waning current of public opin- 
 ion was therefore now met by the demand for a 
 " greater Britain," a catchword coined by Sir 
 Charles Dilke, and meant to convey the idea of a 
 close union of all the English speaking dominions 
 with the English motherland in a harmonious po- 
 litical fraternity. This thought was later taken up 
 by Chamberlain, and advocated by him with great 
 zeal, but with little result. 
 
 Meanwhile England did what she could to secure 
 for herself as much as possible of that portion of 
 the world's territory that was not already in the 
 possession of one or the other of the civilized na- 
 tions ; in other words she now sought to supplement 
 her colonial empire, which already comprised Can- 
 ada, Australia, India, and many of the islands of 
 the Pacific, by the addition of an African realm 
 
212 Germany's Prosperity 
 
 also. Leaving Capeland in 1890, Cecil Rhodes be- 
 gan his adventurous project by the conquest, first of 
 Bethuanaland, and then of Matabeleland, and then, 
 proceeding to the hinterland of Portugal's coast- 
 land territory of Mozambique, took possession of 
 the vast interior region now known as Rhodesia, 
 and extending northward to the lakes of Central 
 Africa. There was but one hindrance to the real- 
 ization of Britain's ambitious desire to control the 
 whole of the African continent from Cape Town 
 to Cairo, and to connect these two extremes by a 
 great continental railroad system, — this hindrance 
 was the barrier which the Congo Free State together 
 with German East Africa formed directly across 
 the continent. But most inconvenient of all, and at 
 the same time most alluring, were the Boer repub- 
 lics enclosed on all sides, as they were, by British 
 colonies, and rich in diamond and gold mines. All 
 the world knows how on January 1, 1896, Jameson 
 made a raid on the Transvaal in a bold attempt to 
 subdue it, and, when this had ended in defeat, how 
 the English government made the Uitlander ques- 
 tion the excuse for a declaration of war against the 
 Dutch republics, which after a long and brave re- 
 sistance were conquered and forced to accept Brit- 
 itsh rule. 
 
 Meanwhile another nation had made its entry as 
 a great power into the affairs of the world — the 
 Empire of Japan. To rid themselves of the stifling 
 encroachment of the Europeans, the Japanese had 
 come to the daring determination themselves to ac- 
 quire the culture of the West, which they did in an 
 
Japan 213 
 
 amazingly short time, and then, having learned all 
 they desired from these intrusive foreigners, em- 
 phatically to show them the door. The time had 
 now arrived when Japan could feel that her days 
 of schooling were at an end, and that she could be- 
 gin to make use of her newly acquired ability. In 
 1894 the war with China was undertaken by which, 
 through the terms of the Peace of Shimonoseki 
 (1895), Japan obtained the sovereignty over Korea 
 and Formosa together with the harbors of Port 
 Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, on either side of the en- 
 trance to the Gulf of Pet-shi-li. This was an en- 
 croachment upon Russian spheres of interest, and 
 was therefore met by a protest from Russia with the 
 result that Japan was compelled to return the two 
 seaports to China, one of which, Port Arthur, was 
 occupied by the Russians themselves a few years 
 later (1898). 
 
 In her attitude toward Japan Russia had the 
 sympathy of France, and of Germany also in the 
 belief that she was thus serving the common cul- 
 tural interests of Europe against aggression by the 
 yellow race. This introduction of sentiment into 
 politics is probably the most serious blunder that 
 has been made in Germany's policy since the Empire 
 has been founded ; its consequences were revealed in 
 the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and again in Japan's 
 participation in the war against Germany. Nor was 
 the blunder righted either by Germany's occupation 
 of Kiao-Chow, or by her participation, not only with 
 the other great powers of Europe but with Japan 
 herself, in quelling the Boxer rebellion. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 Edward VII and the Hatred of Germany 
 
 Rarely in the history of mankind has a period 
 of political development brought about so great a 
 transformation as did the nineteenth century. That 
 Africa had become a factor in European politics, 
 and above all, that two newly developed great pow- 
 ers, the United States and Japan, had made their 
 entrance into the affairs of the world and, in close 
 connection with this event, the manifold questions 
 of policy that arose in relation to the Chinese Em- 
 pire, had widened the horizon of the entire world 
 of politics, and offered wholly new problems for its 
 solution. The narrow relations and circumscribed 
 viewpoint to which Europe had been accustomed 
 were now relegated to the background, and politics 
 of world wide interest absorbed the attention of the 
 great powers, and determined their attitude toward 
 one another. 
 
 In the course of this new development England 
 had for the time being been crowded out of her po- 
 sition in the front of the stage. Russia had as- 
 sumed the leading role in eastern Asia, although 
 England had taken possession of Wei-hai-wei as an 
 equivalent to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. 
 In Persia and central Asia, toward eastern Turke- 
 
 214 
 
The World Situation in igoo 215 
 
 stan and Tibet, Russia was extending her influence 
 more and more, and England could do nothing to 
 prevent it, while her hope that Germany might be 
 persuaded into an alliance against Russia was 
 doomed to disappointment. In September, 1898, 
 Germany did, however, enter into a treaty with Eng- 
 land, by the terms of which the Germans secured 
 the right to purchase the Portuguese territory in 
 Africa — an empty promise, since, as England's 
 vassal state, Portugal could do nothing without Eng- 
 lish consent. Nevertheless, by her participation in 
 the treaty, Germany abandoned the anti-English 
 policy she had adopted in connection with the Peace 
 of Shimonoseki and at the time of the Jameson raid 
 upon the Transvaal. At the same time she main- 
 tained her traditional relations of friendship with 
 Russia, although these, too, were by no means en- 
 tirely free from friction, and, what was most im- 
 portant of all, she held unwaveringly to her stead- 
 fastly maintained peace policy. Then, in 1899, the 
 fierce Boer war broke out, in which England's lack 
 of organization as well as her military weakness 
 were even more conspicuously revealed than they 
 had been in her former wars. Equally conspicuous 
 was the total lack of political conscience displayed, 
 and the wholly inhuman manner of her warfare. 
 The concentration camps in which the Boer women 
 and children were confined were purposely so lo- 
 cated, as some of the British officers highest in com- 
 mand freely admitted, that the great mass of those 
 that were detained within them were necessarily 
 doomed to perish miserably, the intention being thus 
 
2i6 Hatred of Germany 
 
 to exert pressure upon the men in the field, and at 
 the same time to lessen the numbers of the coming 
 generation that might prove dangerous to British 
 rule. 
 
 In her war with the Boers England discovered 
 how little she was in favor with the rest of the world, 
 and how bitter were the feelings which the arro- 
 gance of her attitude had engendered in the other 
 nations, for among them all there was not one whose 
 sympathies were not with the Boers. The Ger- 
 mans were never forgiven for their attitude in con- 
 nection with this war, although the German govern- 
 ment, in compliance with the pact of 1898, main- 
 tained a strict neutrality, which was a bitter disap- 
 pointment to the Boers, who had hoped for German 
 assistance. On the other hand the much greater 
 spirit of enmity which the French exhibited — for 
 they still remembered Fashoda — was quickly for- 
 gotten by England. But at all events, Britain had 
 no friends to rely upon, and so consoled herself for 
 this necessary dependence upon herself alone with 
 what comfort she could derive from her " splendid 
 isolation," as the newly coined phrase expressed it. 
 
 But on January 21, 190 1, the aged Queen Vic- 
 toria died, and her son, Edward VII, took her place 
 upon the English throne. This brought about a 
 complete change in the state of affairs. In the long 
 years during which as Prince of Wales he had 
 played the sorry part of a figurant, and had never 
 been expected to reveal any sign of possessing an 
 opinion of his own, he had adapted himself to the 
 situation with great skill, and had utilized the time 
 
Edward VII: Personality and Policy 2IJ 
 
 to enjoy life to the utmost. As King of England, 
 however, he showed the world what may be ac- 
 complished by a strong personality when placed in 
 a position of supreme eminence, and how, through 
 one man's masterful influence, the natural develop- 
 ment of events may be arrested and directed into an 
 entirely different channel. What no one had sup- 
 posed possible, he found it within his power to ac- 
 complish, — once more an English sovereign as- 
 sumed the leadership in determining his country's 
 destiny, and shaped its policy in a measure which no 
 other English monarch since the reign of William 
 III had even attempted. That the English people, 
 ever jealously watchful to guard against an infringe- 
 ment of their constitutional rights and of the pow- 
 ers of Parliament, accepted this new turn of affairs 
 without any show of resistance, may be laid to King 
 Edward's wonderful tact and ability to keep his own 
 personality in the background, and to avoid every 
 occasion for friction — everything that would openly 
 conflict with established tradition. 1 By his skillful 
 management of the sovereigns of Europe, whom he 
 met during his frequent sojourns at the watering 
 places of the continent or upon his family visits, 
 
 1 The nearest parallel, to my knowledge, that history 
 affords is King Agesilaus of Sparta who, after his country 
 had been deeply humiliated, was able persistently to direct 
 its policy in a similar manner. The Spartan king however 
 had the advantage of being commander in chief of the 
 army, and therefore was in full control of it, and he also 
 had the right to express his opinion both to the national 
 council and to the people themselves, whereas the King of 
 England has none of these privileges. 
 
2l8 Hatred of Germany 
 
 King Edward gained the friendship of foreign na- 
 tions, and secured such alliances as were desirable, 
 and the British ministers found themselves obliged 
 to relinquish the conduct of Britain's foreign policy 
 into his hands, in spite of any misgivings they may 
 have had as to the constitutionality of this proceed- 
 ing, since they themselves were in no way fitted to 
 undertake such personally conducted negotiations. 
 
 As a ruler, Edward VII stands forth as an ideal 
 figure in history, — a man of large ideas, and one who 
 was able to hew his own way to the accomplishment 
 of his purpose. He was endowed with a keen na- 
 tive discernment, was highly intelligent, cool and cal- 
 culating, but entirely devoid of any appreciation of 
 the moral forces by which human life is controlled. 
 To him these were no more than convenient phrases 
 with which dullards might be duped, and that served 
 the wise as cloaks with which to cover their naked 
 egoism ; and this egoism he held to be the mainspring 
 of human action. It is for this reason, his total 
 disregard of all the deepest sources from which are 
 drawn the influences that govern the history of man- 
 kind, that King Edward's life work has resulted in 
 failure despite the keenness of his calculations; for 
 the course into which he guided his country will not 
 lead to power and renown, but to ruin. 
 
 That the political situation demanded a war with 
 Germany, that England's future could not be free 
 from danger, nor her power assured without the 
 humiliation of Germany was the controlling thought 
 that Edward VII infused into England's policy. 
 This prince of German extraction, whose mother 
 
The Emperor s Telegram 219 
 
 tongue was German, the fruit of a marriage that at 
 the time of its consummation was hailed by the 
 Germans with greater joy than had any other, the 
 uncle of the German Emperor, has proved to be the 
 most dangerous foe that Germany has had to 
 contend with during the past few generations. 
 Whether his attitude was the result of honest con- 
 viction and a truly patriotic sentiment for his Eng- 
 lish realm, or whether it resulted from purely per- 
 sonal motives, or, perhaps, from a blending of both, 
 who will attempt to say? Certain it is that in the 
 policy he followed, he had the support of a strong 
 current of public opinion in his own country, and 
 that during the years of his reign this swelled to 
 ever greater proportions, until it controlled by far 
 the greater part of the British public. The old 
 antipathy to Russia receded more and more into the 
 background, and in its place arose the fear of Ger- 
 many, and consequent spirit of enmity toward the 
 German people, which finally grew to be the dom- 
 inating political sentiments of the English nation. 
 
 Should we ask how this spirit of enmity received 
 its first impulse, we would probably be told that its 
 immediate occasion was the congratulatory telegram 
 that the German Emperor sent to President Kriiger 
 in January, 1896, at the time that the Jameson raid 
 was successfully repulsed by the Boers. This tele- 
 gram was of far wider significance than attaches to 
 a mere expression of sympathy; it could but be con- 
 strued, both at home and abroad, as an announce- 
 ment to the world that Germany was inclined to 
 protect the independence of the Boer republics and 
 
220 Hatred of Germany 
 
 to defend them against an unwarranted attack from 
 abroad, if need be by a resort to arms. In England 
 it was therefore received by a spontaneous and 
 mighty outburst of popular wrath against Germany, 
 which vented itself in violent invectives against the 
 German Emperor. There can be no doubt that the 
 tendencies which the telegram indicated were 
 strongly approved by a large part of the German 
 nation. There was a feeling of moral indignation 
 abroad in Germany at England's ruthless breach of 
 the peace, and any energetic measures which the 
 government might have taken in disapproval of this 
 gross violation of political rectitude, and of the 
 cruel attack of the greater upon the smaller nation, 
 would have found as ready a response from the 
 German people at this time as at a somewhat earlier 
 date had been evinced in connection with Russia's 
 base interference with the Bulgarians. But just as 
 then Bismarck stubbornly refused to yield to the 
 tide of popular sentiment and, quite in opposition to 
 it, fostered friendly relations with Russia, so now 
 the German government showed no inclination to 
 follow up the Emperor's telegram with any cor- 
 responding action, but on the contrary, sought to 
 maintain, or rather re-establish cordial relations with 
 England. Accordingly the treaty with England, by 
 which Germany gained the right to purchase Por- 
 tugal's African possessions, and of which mention 
 has already been made, was negotiated in September, 
 1898. Furthermore, the German government de- 
 clined to support the French in their contentions 
 with England regarding the Fashoda expedition 
 
Germany* s Relations to Turkey 221 
 
 (1898), and preserved an attitude of strict neutral- 
 ity during the Boer war. The German Emperor, 
 moreover, made his customary visit to England, 
 quite undeterred by the offensive treatment that the 
 British press had accorded him, believing his visit 
 would mitigate the resentment against Germany and 
 regain for her the British favor. Indeed he even 
 went so far as to advise the English with regard to 
 their military operations, a circumstance with which 
 he acquainted the public in 1908. 
 
 Occasions for a conflict of national interests and 
 consequent political tension such as that in 1895 have 
 been of frequent occurrence in the course of history 
 without leading to a continued feeling of national 
 antagonism, or to war. England herself has had 
 the experience many a time. Moreover, in France 
 the indignation against England on account of the 
 Boer war manifested itself in a much more pro- 
 nounced manner than it did in Germany, — indeed it 
 went so far that Englishmen were insulted on the 
 Paris Bourse. Why, we cannot fail to ask, why did 
 the English tide of resentment against Germany not 
 subside as did that against France ? 
 
 The determining factor in the situation created by 
 the Emperor's telegram was that it was the first and 
 at the same time a most emphatic indication that 
 henceforth Germany meant not only to take a hand 
 in the affairs of the European continent, — to this 
 England had become accustomed, — but in those of 
 the world beyond as well, and demanded considera- 
 tion for her interests there, together with a willing- 
 ness to listen to her views. This was an encroach- 
 
222 Hatred of Germany 
 
 ment upon England's sphere of influence, and it is 
 probably to be regarded as the decisive step by which 
 Germany made her entrance into world politics. 
 The demand then made was never withdrawn by 
 Germany, but, in spite of her conciliatory attitude, 
 has ever since been persistently maintained. If on 
 the one hand South Africa was relinquished to 
 Britain, Germany on the other hand took a much 
 more active part in Eastern affairs from this time 
 forth (1895); in 1898 she obtained Kiau-Chow 
 from China, and a little later gained possession of 
 the Caroline and Samoan islands, while in 1900, in 
 connection with the international adjustment of 
 Chinese affairs, Germany compelled the recognition 
 of the principle of the " open door " in China. Of 
 even greater moment, in all probability, was the care- 
 ful cultivation of cordial relations with the Turkish 
 Empire, a policy which may be ascribed to the Em- 
 peror, who with far seeing judgment adopted it at 
 the very beginning of his reign. 
 
 The fraternal relations with Austria made it pos- 
 sible for Germany to reach beyond that country to 
 gain a footing in territory that hitherto had been 
 regarded as within the domain of Russia, or of the 
 powers of western Europe. Before long German 
 influence came to be the dominating one at Con- 
 stantinople, and the development of the Sultan's 
 army was entrusted to German officers. By the con- 
 struction of the Bagdad railroad Germany estab- 
 lished herself in the more distant East, and in this, 
 Britain saw a future menace to her own position of 
 dominance on the Persian Gulf and the Indian 
 
German Influence in East 223 
 
 Ocean. Everything was done, therefore, that Eng- 
 lish ingenuity could suggest to prevent the Germans 
 from extending this railroad beyond Bagdad to the 
 sea, and, as a means to that end, England seized 
 Kuwet to the west of the mouth of the Euphrates. 
 Furthermore, when the German Emperor visited 
 Jerusalem and Damascus in November, 1898, he did 
 so as the open friend and protector of Islam. Now, 
 by the orthodox Summite Mohammedans the Sul- 
 tan is regarded as the Caliph, the religious head of 
 all Islam, a position of influence which he magnified 
 by means of a skillfully devised and highly success- 
 ful propaganda, and which he emphasized the more 
 with every year that saw the political power of his 
 empire crumble. Through this medium the Ger- 
 man influence could be extended at least indirectly 
 to the people of a large part of the British do- 
 minions, and of the French and Russian as well, 
 since these realms count among their subjects vast 
 numbers of Mohammedans, aside from the fact that 
 the Sultan was, nominally at least, the suzerain of 
 Egypt. 
 
 In 1905 Germany also entered into friendly rela- 
 tions with Abyssinia, however with no enduring re- 
 sult, since the German withdrawal from Morocco 
 in the following year was construed by the entire 
 Oriental world as a surrender, and as an evidence 
 that Germany was not powerful enough to extend 
 effective protection to these distant lands. Further- 
 more, the German government did not find it ad- 
 visable to give the Turks any material aid when in 
 1904 England opposed their plan to increase the 
 
224 Hatred of Germany 
 
 railroad facilities of their country by adding to the 
 Mecca railroad a branch line with a terminal at 
 Akabah, on the east arm of the Red Sea. The 
 Turks therefore felt compelled to abandon the con- 
 struction of the railroad, and at the same time had 
 to look on with what patience they could command 
 when the whole of the Sinai peninsula was annexed, 
 nominally to Egypt, but in reality to the British 
 dominions. 
 
 To these numerous causes for irritation there was 
 now added the supreme source of England's annoy- 
 ance in tire constantly growing development of the 
 German sea power, the especial work of William 
 II, and one which he carried to completion with 
 brilliant success. With unyielding resolution he 
 broke away from the Prussian tradition according 
 to which the enlargement of the war fleet was looked 
 upon as a menace to the efficiency of the German 
 land forces; for Germany had grown strong, and 
 was now not only capable of maintaining her land 
 forces on a plane that made them superior to all 
 others, but also of providing herself with a defence 
 at sea sufficient to meet all present demands. By 
 arguments both spoken and written, and more espe- 
 cially by the arrangement and distribution of con- 
 venient tables which presented a comparison between 
 the German war fleet and the fleets of other coun- 
 tries, and showed its state of backwardness in a 
 striking and convincing manner, the Emperor won 
 his people over to his way of thinking. 
 
 When in 1895 tne canal which connects the North 
 Sea with the Baltic was completed, the preliminary 
 
The German Navy 225 
 
 condition requisite to Germany's possession of a 
 war fleet was provided in that the harbors on the 
 east and those on the west coast of Germany were 
 made directly accessible to each other by a water- 
 way passing through German territory alone. The 
 little island of Helgoland, that at the time of its 
 acquisition had appeared as an almost worthless 
 possession, — indeed the Germans had reason to be 
 thankful that it did not belong to them while they 
 were at war with France, but instead was owned 
 by England, since this made its capture and use as 
 a base by the French fleet impossible, — was now 
 fortified and turned into an impregnable defence 
 for the German fleet when in the North Sea, a cir- 
 cumstance by which the canal which connects this 
 sea with the Baltic is practically projected far out 
 into the sea. The year 1900 saw the first extensive 
 naval legislation enacted, and the plan for the foun- 
 dation of a German navy drawn up. This was not 
 only consistently carried out, but was greatly broad- 
 ened at intervals in later years, until Germany's war 
 fleet attained proportions that corresponded in mag- 
 nitude to the importance of her merchant marine, 
 and came to be the second largest in the world, al- 
 though a second that was still far behind the power- 
 ful British navy. 
 
 All these measures were viewed by the English 
 as being aimed directly at themselves, and as a con- 
 stantly growing menace to the maintenance of their 
 world dominion. And that there was reason for 
 this view is not to be denied, since the absolute con- 
 trol of the seas, which Britain claimed as hers by 
 
226 Hatred of Germany 
 
 right, could no longer be maintained if the German 
 fleet became sufficiently powerful to defend German 
 interests at sea in defiance of Britain. In conjunc- 
 tion with the fleets of other nations it might even 
 prove more than a match for Britain's naval force, 
 both in numbers and efficiency. 
 
 How Britain's supremacy at sea might be assured 
 to her for the future assumed the proportions of a 
 question of life and death in the eyes of the Eng- 
 lish, and rightly so, for it is not only the condition 
 upon which the continued hold upon their vast em- 
 pire abroad depends, but the safety of the homeland 
 is involved in a still larger measure. This danger 
 to the mother country is two fold, for, should the 
 German war fleet become powerful enough to over- 
 match the British, the Germans might not only be 
 enabled to land an army on British shores, but they 
 could cut Britain off from her source of supplies, 
 which would soon bring her to her knees before her 
 foe. Therefore no effort must be left untried by 
 which this threatening danger might be averted. 
 
 The first step in this direction was the enlarge- 
 ment of England's navy, which not only kept pace 
 with that of her prospective adversary, but far ex- 
 ceeded its increase not only in the number of ves- 
 sels but in their destructive efficiency also, as shown, 
 for instance, in the dreadnought type first con- 
 structed in 1905. At first England was content 
 with her " two power standard " of efficiency, viz., 
 the British war fleet was to be maintained on a basis 
 equal in strength to that of the combined fleets of 
 any two of the great powers, the combination 
 
Rivalry in Naval Construction 22J 
 
 against which this precautionary measure was first 
 directed being that of the Russian and French 
 fleets. In time, however, the English became con- 
 vinced that even this would not suffice, and that they 
 must be sufficiently prepared to cope successfully 
 with any possible combination of foes at sea. This 
 not only proved a serious drain upon England's 
 financial resources and upon the ability of the peo- 
 ple to bear the constantly growing burden of taxa- 
 tion, — so wealthy a country as England is could 
 have endured this drain well enough, despite the 
 frequently heard sighs of regret, — but it became a 
 question whether Britain could furnish seamen in 
 sufficient numbers to man so large a war fleet; for 
 in this respect, too, England was showing her age 
 and inability to adapt herself to new conditions. 
 The number of available British seamen has been 
 growing less with every year; even the vessels of 
 the English merchant marine are manned in large 
 measure by foreigners, of which by far the greater 
 number are Norwegians, although there are some 
 Germans, while the firemen are all negroes. The 
 men of England have grown too demanding and 
 fond of ease and the comforts of life, and so the 
 later generations of Englishmen have been as little 
 inclined to fill these places as they have those in 
 many other strenuous callings in life. Moreover, 
 the British sea-captains, as well as the larger em- 
 ployers of labor in England, prefer to hire foreign- 
 ers because they are not only willing to work for a 
 lower wage, but at the same time are more willing 
 and better workers. To return to the old method 
 
228 Hatred of Germany 
 
 of procuring seamen by impressment was not pos- 
 sible, and to allow the British war fleet to be manned 
 almost wholly by foreigners involved altogether too 
 great a risk, a reason for which alone England saw 
 the time approaching when she would be compelled 
 to call a halt in the enlargement of her war fleet. 
 The only way out of this dilemma, or at least the 
 one that commended itself above all others, was 
 through an agreement between England and Ger- 
 many according to which neither country would 
 enlarge its war fleet beyond a certain percentage 
 of its present strength ; another proposition was that 
 at stated intervals of time both countries were to 
 observe a " fleet-holiday year," during which there 
 was to be a total cessation of naval construction. 
 Both of these proposals came to nothing, although 
 Germany manifested a willingness to consider them. 
 The truth is that no independent great power can 
 afford to bind itself in such a manner with regard 
 to questions of vital importance to its own inde- 
 pendence, and to surrender the control over its own 
 action and means of warfare to a foreign power, 
 even aside from the fact that England's customary 
 duplicity made it almost a certainty that at the con- 
 venient moment that country would find an excuse 
 in any one of her code of ethics to withdraw from 
 the agreement, with the disadvantages all on the side 
 of Germany. 
 
 To all these reasons for anxiety another was 
 added through the inadequacy of the British land 
 forces, for these were but just sufficient to carry on 
 England's frequent colonial wars, to keep Ireland 
 
The German Peril 229 
 
 in subjection, and to maintain the necessary garri- 
 sons and reserves at home. The militia and the 
 volunteer corps that had been organized and their 
 development attempted as a defence for the home- 
 land, out of which they may not be sent, did not 
 attain the desired proportions in spite of the en- 
 thusiasm which had been aroused for them through- 
 out the country. The alarming conviction therefore 
 gained ground that England was in no way capable 
 of withstanding the vigorous attempt of a strong 
 foe to invade her territory, and a constantly grow- 
 ing feeling of insecurity took possession of the peo- 
 ple. 
 
 The " German peril " was the spectre that made 
 every Englishman quake, and which yet he could 
 not banish. In numberless pamphlets, tales of fic- 
 tion, sensational plays, and moving pictures the 
 terrors of a German invasion of England wera 
 vividly portrayed, and, in imitation of the French, 
 the Germans were represented in the entire popular 
 and school literature, down to the very copy books 
 used by the little children, as bloodthirsty barbarians 
 who did not shrink from any crime or deed of 
 cruelty. The British government did all within its 
 power to heighten this impression and to spread it 
 throughout the country; an avaricious press, that 
 was well aware of the trend that public opinion was 
 taking and was quick to recognise in it an oppor- 
 tunity to make money, now both catered to it and 
 controlled it, and dished up to the gullible public one 
 imaginary and soul harrowing tale after another, 
 until the timid were so frightened that their hair 
 
230 Hatred of Germany 
 
 stood on end. The paper that was especially adept 
 at this was the " Daily Mail," owned by an un- 
 scrupulous journalist, Harms worth by name, who, 
 after having failed in other journalistic attempts, 
 made a financial success with this publication, and 
 then acquired others, chief among which was " The 
 Times." That later, as Lord Northcliffe, he be- 
 came a peer of the realm is in itself evidence suffi- 
 cient to conclude that he is in close touch with the 
 government and has earned its gratitude. 
 
 But the climax was reached when air craft were 
 developed into a new and startling means of war- 
 fare, the effects of which no one could foresee, and 
 Germany began to build her Zeppelins in 1908, 
 for then English terror knew no bounds. There 
 were constantly recurring reports in the daily papers 
 of how German airships had been seen flying over 
 English coast towns ; when the London people went 
 to bed their imagination pictured their city under 
 a night attack by air craft, and when the frightened 
 dreamers awoke in the morning they wondered why 
 the Germans had not arrived over night. There 
 were even people in England, and among them a 
 number of men well known in intellectual circles, 
 who kept a supply of canned food on hand in antici- 
 pation of the famine that might result should their 
 country go to war. Meanwhile the number of those 
 who raised a voice in favor of Germany grew con- 
 stantly less in England, while in every German who 
 came to the country a spy was suspected, or at least 
 an enemy in disguise, not excepting even the always 
 large number of German clerks and waiters em- 
 
English Dread of Military Service 23 1 
 
 ployed in England, for these, the English were 
 aware, were still connected with the German army 
 as reservists, and therefore the imagination sug- 
 gested all manner of possible and impossible serv- 
 ices that they might be rendering their country in 
 this capacity. The fear of espionage and the ama- 
 teur search for spies took on dimensions such as 
 were not surpassed even in France, for the English 
 public knows absolutely nothing about military mat- 
 ters, and so the silliest inventions and the wildest 
 fancies of an hysterical imagination found full 
 credence. 
 
 It appeared, therefore, that if matters really stood 
 as they seemed, there was but one course open by 
 which war might still be averted, — England must 
 again follow the example set her by the states of 
 the continent and adopt their system of universal 
 military service. This step had long been advo- 
 cated by military authorities, such as Lord Roberts, 
 for instance, but, as we have seen, it was not only 
 contrary to English tradition, but it struck a blow 
 at the very foundation of the Englishman's system 
 of state organization and of his ideas of personal 
 freedom; if, after all, this measure would have to 
 be resorted to, the England of tradition would in- 
 deed be a thing of the past. The only other re- 
 maining way out of the difficulty was the course 
 which Edward VII adopted and carried to comple- 
 tion, viz., the war against Germany must be begun 
 at once, before it was too late, before Germany was 
 fully prepared; and, since Britain was not strong 
 enough to undertake the struggle unaided from 
 
232 Hatred of Germany 
 
 abroad, the first step to be taken was to seek allies 
 for her among the nations of the continent. 
 
 Repetition does not strengthen an argument; 
 nevertheless it cannot be overemphasized that in the 
 circumstances cited above lies the real reason for 
 the hatred of Germany and the cause of the world- 
 wide war that England has incited against her. 
 The other reasons that one hears mentioned, such 
 as Germany's stupendous economic development, 
 the conflict of colonial interests, the anticipation of 
 the rich profits that England would derive from her 
 commerce should Germany's commerce and the Ger- 
 man fleet be destroyed, did all doubtless enter into 
 the situation, but England had accepted these, and 
 would have continued to accept them in the future. 
 The truth of the whole matter undoubtedly is that 
 the time had arrived when two distinct forms of 
 state organization must face each other in a strug- 
 gle for life or death, one of the two being retrograde 
 and sterile, while the other was far in advance of it 
 and full of creative possibilities. In the present war 
 Germany — i. e., the German state together with 
 the form of organization peculiar to it, and the idea 
 that underlies it — will be crushed so completely 
 that it can never recover from its defeat, or else 
 England, if she would play any part whatever in 
 the world's future, must rebuild her political struc- 
 ture from the ground up, and adopt a state organ- 
 ization such as prevails on the continent, and which 
 has found its fullest development, and therefore its 
 highest efficiency in the German state. 
 
 Beyond question, therefore, the war with Ger- 
 
Moral Factor Underestimated 233 
 
 many is very popular with the English people, and 
 is welcomed by them as the break in the unendur- 
 able tension under which they have lived for years. 
 That in England, as elsewhere, there are people of 
 distinction, and many of them, who fully appreciate 
 Germany and the culture for which it stands is cer- 
 tain, while instances of warm friendship between 
 individual Germans and Englishmen are of still 
 more frequent occurrence. But the unspoken con- 
 dition under which alone these kindly sentiments 
 might endure has always been that Germany must 
 eventually change her attitude, as well as the char- 
 acter of her state organization; or else it was be- 
 lieved that the latter, together with the German 
 form of military service, was at heart as thoroughly 
 detested by the German people themselves as by the 
 English, and was endured by compulsion only, al- 
 though the Germans dared not confess it, — an illu- 
 sion which the English eagerly cherished. Another 
 interpretation of the situation, and one with which 
 we have grown familiar through its recently very 
 frequent appearance in print, was that the originally 
 fine German character has been corrupted by the 
 writings of men like Treitschke, Nietzsche, Biilow 
 and Bernhardt — a remarkable idea, and one in 
 which the ignorance of the English, and of other 
 nations as well, regarding the true condition of 
 affairs in Germany is fully revealed. But on the 
 other hand the number of Englishmen who really 
 deplore the war are very few at present, and of 
 these by far the greater proportion do so because 
 they appreciate the seriousness of the situation, and 
 
234 Hatred of Germany 
 
 realize far better how terrible a danger England 
 has incurred, than does the English government it- 
 self, or than do the men who are responsible for 
 English " public opinion." 
 
 Moreover, the English are misled in their calcu- 
 lations by overlooking one great factor in the situa- 
 tion, — they undervalue the moral element, indeed 
 they overlook it altogether, and are quite incapable 
 of understanding or appreciating it. The present 
 but unexpressed thought by which English opinion 
 is moulded is that if England had the gigantic power 
 that Germany possesses, she would make use of it 
 at once to fall upon her neighbors and ruthlessly 
 despoil them of their possessions, and if Germany 
 has so far failed to do so, it is not, as they believe, 
 because of any true desire for peace, but rather be- 
 cause the Germans have as yet not felt fully pre- 
 pared to carry their plans to a successful termina- 
 tion, and fear to show their hand prematurely. 
 That Germany has so long been the preserver of 
 peace is therefore, in their estimation, but an evi- 
 dence that her sinister intentions are even more 
 far reaching than if she had struck sooner, by which 
 England is more than justified in attacking her at 
 once, before she can carry them into effect. 
 
 Such has been England's way always. But Ger- 
 many is not to be gauged by the English measure. 
 As incredible as it may appear to the English, it 
 is nevertheless a fact that peace has ever been and 
 still is the prevailing desire of the German people, 
 as well as of their government, and, above all, of 
 their ruler. Germany desires no more than that 
 
Desire for Peace Misunderstood 235 
 
 she may be secure against any hostile attack from 
 abroad, — therefore she bears the weight of her gi- 
 gantic armor not only willingly but gladly. She 
 would live at peace with all the world, but only on 
 condition that in the peaceable competition between 
 the nations as fair play shall be accorded to her 
 people as is enjoyed by the others, and that they 
 may have the privilege of advancing their interests 
 just as freely as do the other nations, but which has 
 hitherto been jealously denied them. In her foreign 
 relations Germany has given evidence of her peace- 
 able temper again and again; her emperor, William 
 II, has more than once willingly withdrawn claims 
 to which he was justly entitled, and has entered 
 into negotiations and accepted terms that were of 
 very questionable advantage to Germany, even to 
 a point of leniency where, in the opinion of a large 
 number of his people, he had yielded more than was 
 advisable. Now, to be sure, we Germans realize 
 that we cannot be too grateful to our Emperor that 
 he gave this repeated proof of his desire for peace, 
 since it led to the wholly united and firm resolve 
 of the German people to stand together to the last 
 breath in this war that has been forced upon them, 
 a resolve which they have lived up to most gallantly. 
 With the English also William II made every 
 possible effort to maintain peaceable relations, to 
 revive the old-time feelings of mutual friendliness, 
 and to dissipate their distrust of Germany. The 
 Emperor's attempts in this direction were followed 
 by other manifestations of the German nation's 
 friendly disposition, — delegations of working men's 
 
236 Hatred of Germany 
 
 associations, of magistrates, of clergymen and of 
 men of letters and science visited back and forth 
 between the two countries, and were feasted and 
 toasted with fine speeches. On these occasions we 
 Germans went to the verge of sacrificing our na- 
 tional dignity in the avowal of our peaceable inten- 
 tions, until it became a question seriously discussed 
 at home whether it were not advisable to make a 
 public protest against this procedure by an open 
 announcement of the nation's real attitude. A like 
 course was followed with regard to other countries ; 
 even in France, and especially in America no effort 
 was spared to convince the people of the German 
 nation's peaceable and friendly sentiments. But 
 nobody believed these protestations, and they only 
 reacted to our disadvantage in that they were con- 
 strued into attempts to curry favor abroad, and as 
 indications of a mean spirit of toadyism for which 
 the other nations despised us, while our foes re- 
 garded them as admissions of weakness and fear 
 on our part, and so felt encouraged to begin the 
 attack upon us without further delay. By this time, 
 it is to be hoped, the eyes of the German people have 
 been opened, and they realize how greatly they de- 
 meaned and injured themselves by this well meant 
 but wholly impolitic course of action, the fruits of 
 which, as shown by the attitude of the neutral na- 
 tions even more than by that of our openly declared 
 foes, have given us a bitter but much needed lesson. 
 The time when such an attitude on our part was 
 possible, and even deemed advisable, is past, and, — 
 may it never return ! 
 
Moral Responsibility 237 
 
 We can but conclude that the reason why our in- 
 tentions were doubted and our assurances disbe- 
 lieved, is to be found in the circumstance that outside 
 of Germany no one has any idea of how fully the 
 German people realize the great responsibility they 
 have assumed through the institution of universal 
 military service and the national strength that arises 
 from it, or in how large a measure this sense of re- 
 sponsibility is the controlling element in the action 
 of the German government, and that it is in a still 
 higher sense the guiding influence by which the Em- 
 peror's every thought and deed are inspired. In a 
 state such as England is there is no conception of 
 what true responsibility means, for the formal re- 
 sponsibility of the ministry which is passed upon 
 by a vote of the Parliament, and, in case of an accu- 
 sation, is determined in the House of Lords by a 
 long and wearisome procedure that is complicated 
 by the introduction of all manner of personal and 
 party questions, does not enter into our considera- 
 tion here. 
 
 All true responsibility must necessarily be of a 
 purely moral nature, accounted for before the tri- 
 bunal of a personal conscience, and the sense of 
 it is in no way deepened by a legal responsibility, 
 but, on the contrary, is lessened by it. Now in 
 England there is no one who bears the burden of 
 such responsibility. The King does not, for he has 
 no voice in state affairs, and can only indirectly in- 
 fluence the destiny of his realm by the sort of skill- 
 ful manoeuvring in which Edward VII was so great 
 an adept. Although the ministers of state are re- 
 
238 Hatred of Germany 
 
 sponsible to their party, they are not so to the state 
 as a whole, and when they lose the support of the 
 majority in Parliament, they retire, and their places 
 are filled by new men whose business it then is to 
 carry on the government as best they may. More- 
 over, on all important measures the decision rests 
 with the Cabinet, and there it becomes a question of 
 majorities and minorities, whereby each individual 
 member is shielded from criticism, and is relieved 
 of all personal sense of responsibility. Further- 
 more, it is in the very nature of things that a cor- 
 porate body cannot be the bearer of true responsi- 
 bility, for responsibility shared is not responsibility 
 at all. In England, therefore, politics in a meas- 
 ure assume the character of a game that doubtless 
 has its charms and at times becomes highly inter- 
 esting, the outcome of which, however, is entirely 
 dependent upon a thousand possibilities and the com- 
 bination of a variety of forces, which it is quite 
 impossible for the leading statesman either fully to 
 recognise or to control. 
 
 In a strongly monarchical government on the 
 other hand, like that of Prussia or of the German 
 Empire, the final decision in every measure that the 
 state undertakes rests with the sovereign, who there- 
 fore assumes full responsibility for it, both in what 
 is done and in what is left undone, and no one can 
 relieve him of it. Although he may be following 
 the advice of his prime minister absolutely, still, by 
 giving his consent to a measure, the sovereign makes 
 it his own act, and he therefore must bear the re- 
 sponsibility for its consequences. In this personal 
 
The German Monarchy 239 
 
 element lies the tremendous advantage that a mo- 
 narchical form of government has over any other, in 
 that it unites in one person the power to act for the 
 state together with the undivided responsibility to 
 conscience for the consequences of the act. Of this 
 highest conception of monarchy and its consequent 
 tremendous moral superiority to any other form of 
 state organization, the English, and the Americans 
 especially, have not the faintest idea ; therefore they 
 believe in childish naivete that they have reason to 
 look down upon our splendidly creative monarchy 
 as upon a less advanced form of government which, 
 in the evolutionary development of state organiza- 
 tion, has long since been overtaken and distanced 
 by their own. 
 
 That our sovereigns have realized this great re- 
 sponsibility that their position entails, and have 
 shouldered the full weight of the burden that it 
 imposes, has been manifested by all of them ever 
 since the days of Frederick William I; Frederick 
 William IV succumbed to it. This in itself is 
 sufficient reason why it is quite impossible, from 
 a moral, not legal standpoint, that a German sov- 
 ereign should precipitate his country into a war by 
 which the lives of thousands of his people will be 
 sacrificed, unless the highest interests of the state 
 are at stake, and if it can be avoided without loss of 
 honor. The restraint and desire for peace that Wil- 
 liam II has evinced have surely not been indications 
 of weakness or of faint-heartedness, — this has been 
 so conclusively proven by the present war that even 
 those who were inclined to doubt it must now be 
 
240 Hatred of Germany 
 
 convinced, — but, on the contrary, were the result 
 of a full appreciation of the great responsibility 
 which rests upon him, and which is heightened by 
 the realization of how gigantic are the means at his 
 command. " Neither our own people nor the peo- 
 ple of other lands have formed any correct estimate 
 of the high national spirit and conscientious devo- 
 tion to duty that form the guiding motives of our 
 German rulers and their ministers, in the control of 
 their country's affairs," said Bismarck in his speech 
 on February 6, 1888. 
 
 In consequence of their failure duly to appreciate 
 the moral factor, the English under Edward VII 
 made still another miscalculation, and in quite a 
 different direction from the one we have so far fol- 
 lowed. Because of it, they underestimated, nay, to- 
 tally disregarded the moral and physical power of 
 endurance of which the German people are capable, 
 as well as their sense of national unity, and their 
 unswerving devotion to the fatherland ; for this rea- 
 son alone the English could form no correct idea of 
 the potency of Germany's means of warfare. The 
 opportunity to become acquainted with them, and so 
 learn to value them correctly, was open to the Eng- 
 lish, but they failed to take advantage of it, pre- 
 ferring, instead, to remain disillusioned and continue 
 in their belief in conditions as their fancy had 
 painted them, just as did the French in 1870. 
 
 Had the English had any clear conception of Ger- 
 many's giant strength, of the inexhaustible numbers 
 of her people, of her ability to feed them all, of her 
 great economic possibilities, of her financial strength, 
 
German Strength Underestimated 2\1 
 
 o( her perfectly organized system of defence, of her 
 complete command of all that science and technical 
 skill can offer by way of aid, of the exalted spirit 
 of devotion by which the German nation is inspired, 
 and which knows no weakness when once it has been 
 roused, — had they had any adequate appreciation 
 of the dangers which England would encounter in 
 combat with this German resourcefulness, they 
 might yet have hesitated to undertake the struggle, 
 in spite of all the allies they could marshal to their 
 side. As it is, the English have jeopardized the 
 very thing they were so eager to secure against any 
 peradventure of the future, for in this titanic strug- 
 gle which England has brought about, the integrity 
 of the British Empire is at stake, and the future 
 alone can tell in what condition it will emerge from 
 it. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 The Triple Entente and the Alliance with 
 Japan — Morocco 
 
 Immediately after his accession to the throne 
 Edward VII brought the Boer war to a close by 
 compelling his ministers to grant terms that were 
 acceptable to the vanquished, and then, by making 
 some concessions to Ireland, pacified that island also 
 in a measure. When so much was accomplished, 
 the King of England turned to the task which he 
 had set himself to be his life work. The first and 
 greatest obstacle to be encountered was the opposi- 
 tion between English and Russian interests, — the 
 English, in their desire to thwart Russia in her en- 
 croachment upon Manchuria, Persia and in central 
 Asia, having but just asked aid of Germany, and 
 been refused. At that time, therefore, Russia was 
 still regarded as Britain's chief rival, and the Eng- 
 lish press overflowed with bitter criticism of the 
 greed for territory, and of the political misrule of 
 this state so opposed to European culture, and still 
 so barbarous. 
 
 The course which commended itself to England 
 was first, to accomplish the humiliation of the giant 
 empire to a point where its government would wel- 
 come an agreement with England, and then to change 
 
 242 
 
Alliance with Japan and France 243 
 
 about and combine with this one-time enemy in alli- 
 ance against the friend of former days, the friend 
 that had fought shoulder to shoulder with England 
 in the Seven Years' war and at Waterloo. For this 
 change of front the British public had to be pre- 
 pared, and this was done by means of the propa- 
 ganda against the Germans, as has been described. 
 Japan's aspiration to power offered England the 
 first opportunity to enter upon her proposed course 
 of action. On January 30, 1902, England formed 
 an alliance with Japan to continue for ten years; 
 by its terms Japan secured recognition of her de- 
 sired position in eastern Asia, and each of the two 
 allies agreed to aid the other if, while engaged in 
 war with another power, it were to be attacked by 
 a second foe. 1 By this treaty Japan felt she had 
 obtained backing sufficient to justify her in a war 
 upon Russia, and this was promptly begun with the 
 attack upon Port Arthur on February 8, 1904, just 
 as Russia was about to re-open her Balkan policy, 
 and to instigate new disturbances within the Turk- 
 ish Empire. The outcome is known to every one. 
 By the terms of the peace that was brought about 
 by American mediation, Russia beat a decided re- 
 treat in Asia, while the defeat she had suffered led 
 to the great Russian revolution which, although it 
 
 1 Subsequently the treaty was so modified by England 
 that its terms did not apply to the United States, whereby 
 Japan was left to face that country alone in case of a war 
 between' the two, — a conflict that in all likelihood will be 
 the next great war, and one which may not be far distant, 
 — while England was left free to determine upon the 
 course she would pursue in that event. 
 
244 The Triple Entente 
 
 was suppressed, nevertheless resulted in a change 
 of government, in form at least, from an absolute 
 to a constitutional monarchy. 
 
 Meanwhile England had made use of the time 
 during which Russia was prostrated by the war to 
 come to an agreement with France, Russia's ally. 
 On April 8, 1904, a treaty was concluded between 
 the two countries. By its terms, a number of co- 
 lonial differences were adjusted (with regard to the 
 fishing rights along the coast of Newfoundland, 
 which France relinquished, and with regard to Siam, 
 Senegambia, etc.), and France desisted from her 
 demand that England should withdraw from Egypt 
 at the end of a stated time, and to offset this, Eng- 
 land consented to the establishment of a French 
 protectorate over Morocco. An understanding with 
 Spain was also foreshadowed in the treaty, whereas 
 the strong German interests in Morocco were abso- 
 lutely ignored; that these were to be crowded out 
 was evidently the fully intended, though unex- 
 pressed purpose of the treaty. 
 
 By this agreement the " entente cordiale " be- 
 tween France and England was effected; the bitter 
 hatred of England that the Fashoda contentions 
 had inflamed anew, and that at the time of the Boer 
 war had found expression in the press, and had 
 burst forth in passionate manifestations of popular 
 wrath, now began to cool off. In its place the 
 dream of the French to revenge themselves upon 
 Germany was revived, and grew ever stronger. By 
 connivance, as well as by open participation, the 
 French government stirred up a feeling of ani- 
 
The Conference of Algeciras 245 
 
 mosity toward the Germans, just as was being done 
 in England; through the press and in the schools, 
 as in every other way by which the people could be 
 reached, the Germans were maligned, and their 
 bloodthirsty conduct in the war of 1870 portrayed, 
 together with the ill treatment that Alsace-Lorraine 
 had suffered at their hands, until this slander of the 
 German nation attained amazing proportions. 
 
 Germany's countermove to the agreement between 
 England and France was the Emperor's visit to 
 Tangier on March 31, 1905, for this served as the 
 occasion to recognise the independence of the Sul- 
 tan of Morocco, which was sharply emphasized for 
 the benefit of the world at large. The consequent 
 diplomatic negotiations led to the Conference of 
 Algeciras early in 1906. Here Germany's views 
 were supported by Austria alone; even Italy, the 
 third member of the Triple Alliance, assumed a 
 more than doubtful attitude, for the government 
 of that country had been previously won over by 
 English and French promises that Italy would be 
 allowed a free hand in Tripoli ; henceforth her re- 
 lations to her official allies grew gradually less cor- 
 dial. With an evident desire to excuse this attitude 
 of the third member of the Triple Alliance, Chan- 
 cellor von Biilow wittily alluded to it as early as 
 January 8, 1902, in his speech to the Reichstag as 
 an " extra tour." * The actual result of the con- 
 ference, therefore, was that French supremacy in 
 Morocco was established, although very thinly 
 
 1 The German expression for " cutting in " during a 
 dance. Translator. 
 
246 The Triple Entente 
 
 veiled by the formal wording in which it was ex- 
 pressed. The interests of the German mercantile 
 firms in Morocco were recognised, however, and 
 were promised protection. This result of the con- 
 ference was looked upon, and rightly so, not only 
 as a retreat on the part of Germany, but as a definite 
 defeat. By the whole world it was regarded as 
 such, but more especially so by all the governments 
 of the Orient, to as remote a land as Abyssinia. 
 
 As soon as the entente was concluded, arrange- 
 ments were made for the co-operation of the Brit- 
 ish and French military forces in case of war with 
 Germany. To this end plans were laid for an ad- 
 vance of the two armies into Belgium as soon as 
 the British troops should have landed at Calais and 
 Dunkirk, with the intention of proceeding through 
 that country on the way to the Rhine provinces. 
 At the time of the Algeciras conference negotiations 
 had been begun by the British military attache at 
 Brussels and the Belgian General Staff for the pur- 
 pose of making definite arrangements for Belgian 
 co-operation with the French and English allies, and 
 for a mutual and precise knowledge of the military 
 plans made by each of the countries, and of the 
 means of warfare at their command. These nego- 
 tiations were not dropped when the conference was 
 over and peace was again assured, but were con- 
 tinued into the month of September, 1906. A copy 
 of an official note found by the Germans when they 
 occupied Brussels, a facsimile of which has been 
 published, gives exact information with regard to 
 these arrangements. Nominally they were to be en- 
 
Agreement with Belgium 247 
 
 forced in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality 
 by the Germans ; in fact, however, it is quite as ob- 
 vious that at the outbreak of the war the Allies would 
 have found a reason for entering Belgium with 
 their troops, as that, by making this agreement, Bel- 
 gium had ceased to be a neutral state at all. As it 
 was, the Belgians forthwith proceeded to strengthen 
 their fortifications at Liege, Namur and Antwerp, 
 in which they were aided by both England and 
 France, these fortifications being open at all times 
 to inspection by the army officers of either of these 
 countries. It was evidently intended that they were 
 to form bases for military action against Germany 
 in the anticipated war. 
 
 Meanwhile Russia had arrived at the point where 
 she was ready to enter into the English schemes. 
 Her defeat in the war with Japan had made it im- 
 possible for her to carry out her plans with regard 
 to eastern Asia. Therefore, as soon as the internal 
 disorders were somewhat subdued, Russian atten- 
 tion turned westward again to satisfy that impulse 
 for expansion by which Russian politics have been 
 controlled ever since the time of Peter the Great, 
 and more especially so since the reign of Catharine 
 II. The old plans with regard to Persia and Con- 
 stantinople were now revived. In Persia frequent 
 revolts among the mountain tribes against their 
 oppression by the government had finally led to 
 the granting of a constitution in 1906, and imme- 
 diately afterward to conflicts between the Shah and 
 his Parliament, by which Russia was furnished with 
 the welcome opportunity to intervene, and occupy 
 
248 The Triple Entente 
 
 Tabriz, in 1906. Here, however, the Russian ad- 
 vance came in conflict with England's claim to su- 
 premacy over the region bordering on the Persian 
 Gulf, and to maintain which she had taken pos- 
 session of the port of Bushire. On the other hand, 
 a renewal of Russian interference in the affairs of 
 the Balkan peninsula would undoubtedly lead to a 
 conflict with Austria, who had Germany at her back. 
 The conviction, therefore, gained ground in Russia 
 that " the road to Constantinople lay by way of 
 Berlin," and that a war with both the Teutonic 
 powers would have to be incurred, if her cherished 
 plans were to be carried out. 
 
 Russia also was therefore quite ready to fall in 
 with the English designs. On August 31, 1907, 
 both powers signed the convention by which their 
 differences with regard to their claims in Tibet and 
 Afghanistan were adjusted, and their separate 
 spheres of interest in Persia definitely limited. By 
 this arrangement all other nations were prevented 
 from gaining any foothold in that country, which 
 was thus reserved exclusively to English and Rus- 
 sian domination. This did not, however, prevent 
 these two great powers from encouraging the con- 
 stantly recurring revolts and the state of anarchy 
 under which this unhappy country languished, for 
 this condition of affairs afforded repeated and con- 
 venient opportunity for their intervention. < 
 
 By this agreement the alliance between Russia 
 and France was widened, and became the " Triple 
 Entente," to counterbalance the Triple Alliance be- 
 tween Germany, Austria and Italy. It was pur- 
 
The Triple Entente 249 
 
 posely always spoken of as an understanding, and 
 never as an alliance, for neither the British Ministry 
 nor the King of Great Britain is empowered to en- 
 ter into so formal an engagement as an alliance, since 
 this entails the assumption of obligations by the 
 nation, and therefore requires the consent of the 
 Parliament, the nominal sovereign power in Eng- 
 land. The less the government concerned itself 
 with it, the more this fiction was officially upheld, — 
 the " conversations " with the representatives of 
 the continental powers were mere informal discus- 
 sions in which a provisional agreement to meet cer- 
 tain assumed situations was outlined, by which Eng- 
 land, however, was in no way bound, but on the 
 contrary, both the country and the Parliament were 
 left free to act in the matter as they might deem 
 best in the future. Under these circumstances the 
 existence of an alliance, especially one of an aggres- 
 sive nature, could be disclaimed at any time, as, in- 
 deed, it was with solemn asseveration whenever it 
 seemed advisable. 1 In the meantime all requisite 
 arrangements could be made as occasion seemed to 
 demand, so that when the time was ripe for action, 
 the desired measure could be placed before the Par- 
 liament and the people, — whose opinion had mean- 
 while been moulded in the manner that has been 
 described, — as a completed fact. There was then 
 little left for Parliament to do but to acquiesce in the 
 decision that had already been made, just as in the 
 
 1 " The Triple Entente was not an alliance ; it was a 
 diplomatic group" (Sir Edward Grey in his speech to the 
 Parliament on August 3, 1914). 
 
250 
 
 nominal monarchies in which there is a fully do- 
 ped parliamentary government, the sovereign, or 
 the nt in France, affixes his signature to 
 
 measures the ministry places before him. 1 
 
 1 T m which the English Farlia.ir.cr.: occupies 
 
 sped to E as to 
 
 that which the R. ..:■..•. (officially the sole power 
 
 that had the right to declare war and to enter into alliances ) 
 occupied with respect to the Roman Senate, ind later, dar- 
 ing 1 he years of the Republic's agony, to the generals, who 
 were quite independent in their action. Nothing falls 
 wider of the mark than the Opinion which prevails in 
 Amei : in England and France the right to clc 
 
 for war or for peace lies in the hands of the people acting 
 
 MXgb their repl ves. whereas in Germany and 
 
 Austria the people ced into war by an irresponsible. 
 
 Arch. The exact reverse of this is true, aside from the 
 
 fact that in England and France, and in Russia also, the 
 
 the present war as a direct result of 
 
 ;r in which the three governments 
 
 B been inc ; .r people against their present foes. 
 
 Whether by a free vote of the people, if that were a pos- 
 
 lity, they would have declared for war is doubtful 
 nevertheless. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 Thk Encircling of Germany — Belgium — 
 Agadik — r \ 'he Balkan War 
 
 Edward VII and his ministers made strenuous 
 efforts to persuade still other states to join the 
 alliance against the Germans, and so to complete 
 the encircling of Germany. With Belgium they 
 were wholly successful, and with Italy partially so, 
 in spite of her official adherence to the Triple Al- 
 liance. Italy made her position more secure by 
 entering into agreements with France, England and 
 Russia (Oct 24, 1909;, while the wording of the 
 treaty constituting the Triple Alliance was SO al- 
 tered that Italy was not bound to participate in a 
 war. Practically this was the end of the Triple 
 Alliance, even though nominally it was renewed, 
 and Italy avers that it still is in force. But at the 
 outbreak of the war Italy assumed an attitude of 
 friendly neutrality toward the Allies, and more es- 
 pecially toward France, and would in all probability 
 have sided with them altogether if the German arms 
 had not met with such immediate and eminent suc- 
 cess. So far, therefore, Italy has hesitated to enter 
 the conflict, although her attitude has made it pos- 
 sible for the French to withdraw their troops from 
 the Italian frontier, while it compelled Austria to 
 
 251 
 
252 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 keep a strong force in the Alps, and Italy's attempts 
 to secure Trient and Trieste were renewed. 
 
 Of support from Portugal, her vassal state, Eng- 
 land felt practically assured from the outset, and at 
 one time it appeared that in spite of some misgiv- 
 ings on the part of the government, the services of 
 Portugal's army of hirelings would be sold to Eng- 
 land, and that the German vessels interned in the 
 harbor of Lisbon would become Portugal's easy 
 prey. At present, however (February, 191 5) the 
 peace party seems once more to be in control. On 
 the other hand, Portugal's attitude had the effect of 
 greatly stimulating the pro-German sentiment iri 
 Spain, where, in addition to the native antagonism 
 that exists between the Spaniard and the Portuguese, 
 the smart still lingers from the blow that England 
 dealt Spain with the capture of Gibraltar. Besides 
 this, there was the tension between France and Spain 
 on account of Morocco, and above all else, the ef- 
 fect of the anti-Catholic policy that the French Re- 
 public has followed in contrast to Germany's friendly 
 disposition toward both the Catholic Church and 
 the Pope. 
 
 In America the sentiment was entirely in favor 
 of England. From the very beginning of the war 
 the anti-German feeling manifested by the vast ma- 
 jority of Anglo-Americans has not only become in- 
 tensive, but is elemental in its nature. The appeal 
 made by the German Emperor to President Wilson, 
 asking that the influence of the United States be 
 exerted to secure a more humane mode of warfare, 
 and one more in keeping with the demands of inter- 
 
Portugal. America. The Netherlands 253 
 
 national law, was answered, or rather refused with 
 offensive curtness. In spite of all the humanitarian 
 and peace-loving sentiments that are constantly on 
 the lips of the Americans, they are quite content to 
 accept the English method of making war upon the 
 German people by an attempt to starve them out. 
 The British consul at New York was allowed to 
 carry on an enlistment bureau for the English serv- 
 ice. There can in fact be no doubt that the govern- 
 ment of the United States is wholly on the side of 
 Germany's enemies, and gives them whatever sup- 
 port is compatible with the preservation of a nom- 
 inal neutrality, while at the same time the American 
 people are making money out of the war. Should 
 the United States openly declare war against Ger- 
 many, the situation would hardly become more seri- 
 ous for us, since in reality the Americans can do 
 us but little harm. 
 
 Moreover, this anti-German attitude will be little 
 changed by the course of the war, nor will it be 
 affected by England's illegal interference with neu- 
 tral trade, but on the contrary, this is much more 
 likely to add to the American dislike of the Germans 
 because they are not inclined meekly to submit to 
 this interference, and do what they can to oppose it. 
 There is reason, however, to hope for better things 
 from the West where a strong anti-Japanese senti- 
 ment prevails, and from the Irish element in Amer- 
 ica, which is bitterly resentful of English methods, 
 and above all from the German- Americans, who, un- 
 der the influence of the present war, have been 
 roused to a stronger sense of solidarity, and polit- 
 
254 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 ically have, in a measure, combined with the Irish. 
 In the congressional elections on November 3, 1914, 
 the Democratic party, now in power, did in fact 
 suffer serious defeat in consequence of their com- 
 bined opposition. It is therefore possible that the 
 pressure exerted by these elements in the American 
 population may affect the future attitude of the 
 United States toward the belligerents as the war 
 progresses, and induce the government to take a 
 truly neutral stand, equally impartial to both sides, 
 in spite of its strong disinclination to do so. 
 
 The attempt that Edward VII made to win Aus- 
 tria over to a co-operation with his plans, and to 
 estrange her from Germany, proved utterly futile. 
 The Netherlands refused quite as firmly to enter 
 into the English schemes, in spite of the pressure 
 that England can bring to bear upon the Dutch 
 coast and commerce, and above all upon the colonial 
 possessions of the Netherlands. In April, 1906, the 
 British military attache, Colonel Barnardiston, noti- 
 fied the Chief of the Belgian General Staff that " at 
 the time 1 he had little hope of either support or 
 intervention from Holland." And as matters then 
 stood, they remained. This attitude on the part of 
 the Netherlands prevented the British from making 
 a landing at Antwerp, their nearest point of ap- 
 proach, since to reach this port they would have had 
 
 1 The word " actuellement " was subsequently inserted 
 into the sentence by the Chief of the Belgian General Staff. 
 This is of especial significance, since it indicates that the 
 hope to secure the co-operation of Holland had not then 
 been abandoned. 
 
Denmark: Japan 255 
 
 to pass through the mouth of the Scheldt, which 
 belongs to Holland. When in 1908, and again in 
 191 1, the Netherlands made plans to fortify Flush- 
 ing in order to be able to make their neutrality ef- 
 fective, England revealed how little was really meant 
 by her officially proclaimed and high sounding re- 
 solve to recognise and protect the rights of neutral 
 states. Since the proposed fortifications were for 
 the purpose of defending the Netherlands against 
 an English invasion, an immediate and indignant 
 protest was raised by England against the execution 
 of these plans for Holland's protection, and the 
 Dutch government was not allowed to carry them 
 out. This is but another illustration of the Eng- 
 lish interpretation of neutrality, which is nothing 
 more nor less than that the country in question is 
 expected to hold with England, and that although 
 all other nations are to be debarred from crossing 
 its frontiers, its territory is to be open to an entry 
 by the English at any time. 
 
 With Denmark, British diplomacy had better suc- 
 cess, as might have been expected, since its ruler 
 is closely related to both the English and the Rus- 
 sian royal houses, and since the conflict regarding 
 North Schleswig still keeps alive the feeling of re- 
 sentment against the Germans that has been strong 
 among the Danes. In 191 1, so far as can be 
 learned, a plan for the landing of British troops on 
 the coast of Jutland was not only taken into con- 
 sideration, but its immediate execution was for a 
 time seriously contemplated. But at that time an 
 outbreak of hostilities was avoided, and when in 
 
256 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 August, 19 14, the anticipated war had become a 
 reality, Denmark had decided upon an attitude of 
 strict neutrality, which has been maintained in a 
 highly creditable manner by closing the Sound to 
 the vessels of all the belligerents. 
 
 Japan, however, was to be included in the alliance 
 against Germany, as the ultimatum issued on Au- 
 gust 17, 19 14, stated that by her treaty of alliance 
 with Great Britain Japan was obligated " to insure 
 to eastern Asia a firmly established and enduring 
 peace." Although England had declared war 
 against Germany and had attacked her colonies, 
 Germany was nevertheless regarded as the disturber 
 of the peace, because, forsooth, she was inclined to 
 defend her colonial possessions, and sent her war 
 vessels to oppose the depredations of the British 
 raiders. As a result of her " entente " with Brit- 
 ain, Japan now entered into relations with Rus- 
 sia also. On July 3, 19 10, these two countries came 
 to an agreement with respect to Manchuria, and at 
 the same time Japan was allowed a free hand in 
 Korea, followed by its prompt and unqualified an- 
 nexation to the Empire of Japan. 
 
 In May, 1910, Edward VII died, and his son, 
 George V, who followed him upon the throne, is 
 neither fitted by nature, nor is he inclined to main- 
 tain the role that his father played in English poli- 
 tics; as a consequence, the political leadership has 
 again devolved upon the Cabinet. Therefore the 
 reign of Edward VII, although a very interesting 
 one, was nevertheless but a fleeting episode in the 
 history of Britain's internal politics. But for her 
 
Agadir 257 
 
 foreign policy, on the contrary, it was an epoch- 
 making decade, with consequences far reaching in 
 their effect. After the death of King Edward the 
 Liberal Asquith Cabinet, with Sir Edward Grey as 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, continued his policy, 
 and held to its consequences. 
 
 Meanwhile the negotiations with regard to Mo- 
 rocco dragged on, and were made more intricate by 
 a war between two brothers who were battling with 
 each other for the control of the country that was 
 fast slipping from their grasp. This state of af- 
 fairs played into the hands of France and gave her 
 the opportunity to gain a complete ascendency in the 
 land, and to displace German influence altogether. 
 Hereupon Germany again manifested her disap- 
 proval, and dispatched a gunboat to the harbor of 
 Agadir on July 1, 191 1. Germany made no claim 
 to territory in Morocco, if for no other reason than 
 for the sufficient one that as the protector of Islam 
 she could ill afford to annex any Mohammedan ter- 
 ritory; all that Germany desired was a sufficient 
 indemnification for the claims she had relinquished. 
 If, therefore, Germany and France had been left 
 to settle the matter between themselves, it would 
 soon have been adjusted. But behind France stood 
 England, encouraging her to opposition, and taking 
 advantage of this opportunity to take a bold stand 
 against Germany, and peremptorily to deny her the 
 right to acquire any harbor on the Atlantic Ocean, 
 — not so much even as a coaling station. As a con- 
 sequence, the excitement in France over " la geste 
 d' Agadir " grew ever greater, and for weeks an out- 
 
258 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 break of hostilities seemed daily imminent. Eng- 
 land not only planned to land her troops in Den- 
 mark, but made all the preliminary arrangements for 
 sending an army of 160,000 men to Belgium. On 
 this occasion Ostende and Zeebriigge were chosen 
 as ports for the landing of the troops, and the Bel- 
 gians were informed that this army " would land on 
 their shores even if Belgium did not ask aid of 
 Britain." x Eventually, however, an amicable set- 
 tlement was reached on November 4, according to 
 which Germany withdrew from Morocco, while 
 France ceded to her a part of the Kamerun hinter- 
 land and two small sections of territory reaching to 
 the Congo. This outcome of the negotiations was 
 looked upon both at home and abroad as a decided 
 defeat for the Germans, who had allowed them- 
 selves to be intimidated by England and France. 
 
 In the meantime Russia had again assumed a more 
 friendly mien toward Germany. During a visit 
 that Nicholas II made at Potsdam in 19 10, it was 
 agreed that neither Germany nor Russia would be- 
 come a party to an alliance inimical to the other, 
 which was in no way an inconsistency, since, accord- 
 ing to the terms of both the Triple Alliance and the 
 Triple Entente, these were to be defensive only, 
 and moreover, from an official standpoint the latter 
 was no "alliance" at all. In August, 191 1, while 
 the Morocco question was still unsettled, an agree- 
 ment favorable to Germany was reached in regard 
 to the Oriental railroads. A little later England 
 
 1 This document also was found in Brussels, and a 
 facsimile of it has been published. 
 
Preparations for War 259 
 
 took a corresponding attitude, and toward the close 
 of the year 191 3 entered into negotiations that were 
 to lead to an understanding with respect to the Bag- 
 dad railroad, as well as to the adjustment of other 
 differences. On July 15, 19 14, it was announced 
 that the German Ambassador at London and the 
 British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward 
 Grey, had signed an agreement which disposed of 
 these affairs. But this was all a ruse; it mattered 
 little how many concessions were made to Germany 
 for the sake of deluding her into a sense of security, 
 for with the outbreak of the anticipated war these 
 would of course all be nullified. 
 
 For the preparations for war had never been 
 abandoned, but were being vigorously pushed. On 
 the occasion of the visit made by the President of 
 the French Ministry, Poincare, to St. Petersburg 
 in 19 1 2, France agreed to increase the strength of 
 her army by re-instituting the three years' term of 
 military service, and in January, 19 13, just after 
 Poincare had been made President of the Republic, 
 the French Chambers adopted the measures neces- 
 sary to this step. At the same time Russia obtained 
 another large loan from France (2 l / 2 milliards of 
 francs in five-year instalments), in return for which 
 Russia pledged herself to build a number of stra- 
 tegically advantageous railroads in Poland, for the 
 purpose of facilitating the quick transportation of 
 troops to the German frontier. Russia also under- 
 took to rebuild her fleet, which had been practically 
 destroyed in the Japanese war and in the subsequent 
 revolution. 
 
260 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 By these measures France became vassal to Rus- 
 sia ; for, if she would not lose the vast sums she had 
 loaned, she would be compelled to follow unques- 
 tioningly the lead of Russia in her foreign policy, 
 and to go to war at her behest. At a somewhat 
 earlier date England had come to an understanding 
 with France with regard to the disposition of their 
 war fleets, according to which the defence of the 
 Mediterranean was assigned to France with the use 
 of Malta as a base, while the British fleet was thus 
 left free to be permanently concentrated near the 
 shores of the British Isles. From the other and 
 more distant naval stations all war vessels were 
 either withdrawn entirely, or the number remain- 
 ing was reduced to a minimum. By concentrating 
 her fleet in the Mediterranean, France left her 
 coasts on the Atlantic Ocean and on the English 
 Channel wholly unprotected against an attack by 
 the German fleet; in other words, England under- 
 took the defence of these coasts with her fleet. 
 With the consummation of this arrangement the 
 close alliance between the two states was openly 
 acknowledged despite the manifold official denials. 
 England had pledged herself so deeply for France 
 that a withdrawal was unthinkable. 
 
 On November 22, 19 12, the British Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, and the French 
 Ambassador at London, Paul Cambon, exchanged 
 similarly worded documents declaring that the con- 
 versations between the military and naval experts of 
 the two states were not to be construed as consti- 
 tuting an obligation by which the freedom of action 
 
Anglo-French Agreement 261 
 
 of either state was to be restricted in any way, and 
 " that, for instance, the present disposition of the 
 British and French fleets was not based on any obli- 
 gation by which the two fleets would be expected 
 to act together in the event of war." By this 
 shrewdly devised course of action it was intended 
 to give the distribution of the naval forces of the 
 two countries the appearance of being most inoffen- 
 sive in its intentions. But who could be so easily 
 duped as not to recognise in it a moral obligation 
 of the strongest kind, since it brought about a sit- 
 uation between the two states that was wholly un- 
 tenable without their mutual support of each other? 
 In answer to a possible objection raised by the Am- 
 bassador, Sir Edward Grey made the further state- 
 ment that in case of " immediate danger of an un- 
 provoked attack by a third power " upon either 
 Great Britain or France, the government of the 
 threatened state would have to ascertain at once 
 whether it could rely upon the other for support. 
 Therefore, should such a situation actually develop, 
 negotiations must immediately be set afoot with 
 regard to joint measures to be taken, and as to the 
 advisability of making an effort to preserve the 
 peace. Should the decision be for war, the plans 
 of the two general staffs must immediately be taken 
 into further consideration. This diplomatic achieve- 
 ment excellently displays the true nature of the En- 
 tente, — upon the surface, no more than the harm- 
 less discussion of measures that might be taken 
 under certain contingencies, — in fact, however, a 
 binding agreement by which two states are firmly 
 
262 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 united through the assumption of definite obliga- 
 tions. It needs no vivid imagination to picture to 
 one's self the furtively knowing look that was ex- 
 changed between the two diplomats at the same 
 time that they exchanged documents. 
 
 Meanwhile the negotiations with Belgium were 
 still under way. It was in vain that Baron Greindl, 
 the Belgian representative at Berlin, sent his govern- 
 ment a warning on December 23, 191 1, with regard 
 to the disclosures, as perfidious as they were naive, 
 that had been made by Colonel Barnardiston at the 
 time that the Entente Cordiale was concluded, 1 — 
 a warning to show that Belgium was in quite as 
 much danger of a French invasion supported by 
 Britain, against which precautionary measures must 
 be taken, as it was of a violation of its territory by 
 Germany. 2 This warning remained unheeded by 
 
 1 See page 246. 
 
 2 " The danger from France does not menace us from 
 the South only, by way of Luxemburg; it threatens us 
 along our whole common border. This conclusion is not 
 based upon conjecture, but upon positive evidence. The 
 design to surround Belgium from the north doubtless 
 forms a part of the combined plans of the Entente 
 Cordiale. If this were not the case, there would not have 
 been so great an outcry made both in Paris and in London 
 over our intention to fortify Flushing; there was not even 
 an attempt made at the time to conceal the reason for the 
 evident desire that the Scheldt should remain unprotected. 
 The object in view undoubtedly was to keep the way open 
 for a British garrison to be transported to Antwerp, the 
 ultimate purpose being to secure a base of operations in 
 Belgium for an offensive directed against the Lower 
 Rhine and Westphalia, and thus to sweep us into the cur- 
 rent of the war, which would have proved no difficult 
 task." 
 
Understanding: England and Belgium 263 
 
 the Belgian government, which gladly welcomed 
 every suggestion from the powers of the Entente, 
 of whose ultimate victory not the slightest doubt 
 was entertained. That they might have a strong 
 army to depend upon, the Belgians now also adopted 
 the system of universal military service through leg- 
 islative enactment on May 28, 19 13, with a fifteen 
 months' term of service. English and French. offi- 
 cers were constantly traveling back and forth 
 through the country, and their presence in the Bel- 
 gian fortifications was a common occurrence even 
 before the beginning of the war. The Belgian gov- 
 ernment furnished the British General Staff with all 
 the material necessary for a detailed description of 
 the military topography of Belgium, 1 so explicit, 
 indeed, that it filled four volumes, which, when 
 printed (1912-1914), were trustfully handed over 
 to the British officers. During the course of the 
 war these books fell into the hands of the Germans, 
 and did them good service in the conduct of their 
 military operations. 1 It would seem, therefore, 
 that Belgium invited the fate that overtook her. 
 
 Meanwhile Germany's reputation abroad suffered 
 another setback throught the events that were trans- 
 piring in the Turkish Empire. Here the frightful 
 
 1 Belgium, Road and River Reports prepared by the 
 General Staff, War Office, 4 voll., 1912-1914. 
 
 2 There were also found a large number of copies of the 
 formularies for levying requisitions to be furnished to the 
 British General Staff, and which had been printed in ad- 
 vance and marked with the stamp of the British Legation. 
 A facsimile was published in the " Norddeutsche All- 
 gemeine Zeitung " of November 5, 1914. 
 
264 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 oppression by the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, who lived 
 in daily terror of assassination, had resulted in a 
 thoroughly organized military conspiracy, in the 
 granting of a constitution, and finally to the deposi- 
 tion of the Sultan (1908-1909). The adoption of 
 this constitution gave Bulgaria the opportunity to 
 renounce her allegiance to the Sultan, and to con- 
 stitute herself an independent kingdom, while it 
 compelled Austria to decide upon the formal annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two provinces 
 that in 1878 had been placed under her administra- 
 tion ; at the same time, and with an amazing degree 
 of shortsightedness, Austria relinquished the sanjak 
 of Novipazar to Turkey. That this act of annexa- 
 tion, which after all was but a mere matter of form, 
 roused a storm of fiery indignation in both Russia 
 and her protege, Servia, and that the war which 
 threatened in consequence was averted only by the 
 firm stand that Germany took in behalf of her ally, 
 are matters of common knowledge. Against the 
 firmly welded alliance of the two central powers 
 Russia and her partners dared not yet venture a 
 war. 1 Servia was compelled to demobilize, and on 
 March 31, 1909, agreed to withdraw her objection 
 to the annexation, and henceforth " to live on a 
 friendly footing " with Austria. 
 
 Two years later, in the fall of 191 1, Italy under- 
 
 1 In a speech made on September 11, 1914, the First Lord 
 of the Admiralty, Churchill, declared that the present war 
 " would have been undertaken in 1909 if Russia had not 
 then so far humiliated herself as to retreat before the 
 German threats." 
 
The Balkan War 265 
 
 took her long planned step to gain possession of 
 Tripoli and Barka, and to this end made war upon 
 the Turks, who were not at the time in a position 
 to offer an effective resistance. And again Eng- 
 land did not fail to get a share of the spoils, for on 
 this occasion she seized the Libyan port of Solum, 
 250 km. west of Alexandria. These events deter- 
 mined Russia to proceed with her old plans, and to 
 carry them to completion. In March, 191 2, the 
 Czar brought about the alliance between Bulgaria, 
 Servia, and Montenegro, by which it was hoped to 
 put an end to Turkish rule in Europe, with the 
 reservation of Constantinople and the Dardanelles 
 for Russia herself. Bulgaria was to have the lion's 
 share in the distribution of the spoils of this con- 
 templated war, whereas Servia, the chief representa- 
 tive of Russian interests in the Balkan peninsula, 
 and Montenegro also, were to receive but meager 
 portions. The unexpressed but very evident inten- 
 tion was that these two states were to get their 
 reward at the expense of Austria. These plans 
 were frustrated, or at least greatly modified, by the 
 participation of Greece in the war, and by the skill- 
 ful and far-seeing statesmanship of Venizelos, the 
 Greek Premier, as well as by the course which the 
 war took. By far the heaviest burden of the war 
 fell upon Bulgaria, and she succeeded, although not 
 without a heavy sacrifice, in forcing the Turks back 
 upon Constantinople ; this success would hardly have 
 been possible, however, without the aid of Greece, 
 whose fleet prevented the transportation of the Sul- 
 tan's troops from Asiatic Turkey to the European 
 
266 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 front. But soon the old wrangles over Macedonia 
 divided the allies; the Greeks held Salonica, allied 
 themselves with Servia, and drove the Bulgarians 
 back. Meanwhile the Rumanians entered Bulgaria, 
 made sure of a gain in territory along their south- 
 ern frontier in the Dobruja, and compelled the Peace 
 of Bucharest (August 10, 1913). Russia had not 
 been in a position to lend her aid, and so the world- 
 wide war was still postponed; there was now noth- 
 ing for her to do but to make the best of a bad sit- 
 uation, and therefore to abandon the hopes that had 
 been entertained with regard to Bulgaria. Never- 
 theless the Russian attitude in these events revealed 
 both her sympathy for Servia and her deep-seated 
 distrust of Bulgaria, in which, from the Russian 
 standpoint, she was quite justified, for the Bul- 
 garians were striving to achieve a true independence, 
 as free from oppression by the Czar as by the Sul- 
 tan. For these reasons Bulgaria began to incline 
 toward Austria and the Triple Alliance, for she 
 realized that she had been betrayed by Russia. 
 
 By these conflicts Austria felt herself touched in 
 the most vital interests of her empire; there was 
 nothing left for her to do but to mobilize, which she 
 did toward the end of 1908. Otherwise, however, 
 Austria remained passive; and again she failed to 
 seize Novipazar, and so drive a wedge between 
 Servia and Montenegro, which would have made 
 her mistress of the situation, but at the same time 
 might have precipitated Europe into a general war. 
 Instead, Austria turned her attention to energet- 
 ically conducted negotiations with the other great 
 
Outcome of the Balkan War 267 
 
 powers concerning the reconstruction of affairs 
 along the Adriatic. The result was the birth of the 
 principality of Albania, the worthy offspring of the 
 " European concert of powers," a political change- 
 ling, at whose birth stood the wrangling great pow- 
 ers seeking a compromise between their perplexities 
 and their jealousies, and in which each one hoped 
 to outwit the other. For a long time the outbreak 
 of the great European conflict seemed imminent, 
 but still both sides hesitated to undertake it, and 
 so the mediatory endeavors on the part of both Ger- 
 many and England proved successful. For the next 
 few months appearances seemed to indicate that the 
 stage of acute irritation had passed, and that there 
 was a prospect of a return to the old relations of 
 friendliness. In the Balkan peninsula the inflamed 
 passions were subsiding, and conditions were be- 
 coming more stable, as was indicated by the close 
 relations into which Bulgaria and Turkey soon en- 
 tered in spite of the fact that the Turks had re- 
 taken Adrianople. England, as has been said, 
 opened the way to an agreement with Germany, the 
 British Ministry expressed cordial sentiments, and 
 Lord Haldane came to Berlin on a mission of peace. 
 From English official circles downward an effort 
 was made to repress the anti-German feeling among 
 the English people, and the way seemed again clear 
 for a renewal of Germany's earnest endeavors to 
 make peace a certainty. The official expression of 
 this desire by the German Ambassador was supple- 
 mented by numerous deputations and associations, 
 in speeches and at banquets. 
 
268 The Encircling of Germany 
 
 On the part of Germany and of Austria this atti- 
 tude was one of absolute sincerity. In both these 
 countries the people realized how much was at 
 stake, and preferred to be overlenient rather than 
 to assume the responsibility for precipitating the gi- 
 gantic struggle of the nations, if it could be averted. 
 But with England and her allies it was all pretense, 
 for while the official protestations of friendship and 
 of a desire for peace were being made, the prelim- 
 inary arrangements for war were being unremit- 
 tingly continued, and were now nearing completion. 
 The defeat suffered by the Turkish armies that had 
 been trained by German officers was everywhere re- 
 garded to be synonymous to a defeat of the Ger- 
 mans themselves. The inferiority of their methods, 
 of their organization, of their military efficiency, 
 that supposedly had degenerated into mere drill, of 
 their guns even, seemed now to have been proved 
 beyond question, and was triumphantly proclaimed 
 in numberless articles in the English, French and 
 Russian press. 
 
 In the Turkish Empire too, German prestige had 
 suffered a severe blow; the mistake that Germany 
 had made in expecting the ultimate victory of the 
 Sultan's armies was to her political disadvantage; 
 the Turkish government now turned for support to 
 the powers of the Entente; from France a large 
 loan was obtained; and there was very little good 
 will for Germany at Constantinople. Even so slight 
 a favor as a request from the German government 
 to share in the results of the excavations made by the 
 German Oriental Society, although based on pre- 
 
Germany's Loss of Prestige 269 
 
 viously made conditions, was refused. In Decem- 
 ber, 19 13, Germany suffered another serious diplo- 
 matic defeat when, in consequence of objection from 
 Russia, she was compelled to refrain from her pur- 
 pose of sending General Liman to Turkey as in- 
 structor. It appeared, therefore, that the time was 
 ripe for beginning the war. Germany's disposition 
 to yield a point was of course not believed to be 
 rooted in a sincere desire for peace — no one within 
 the territory of the three allied powers had the 
 slightest faith in that — but was construed as a con- 
 fession of weakness, and that in spite of her alli- 
 ance with Austria, and nominally with Italy also, 
 Germany lacked confidence to grapple with her foes. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 The Preliminary Arrangements for War — 
 The Beginning of the World War 
 
 In April, 19 14, the King of England, accom- 
 panied by his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Grey, 
 went on an official visit to Paris. There they met 
 the Russian Ambassador, Iswolski, the chief repre- 
 sentative of Russia's aggressive policy, — aside from 
 the energetic Grand Duke Nicholas, who controlled 
 the weak-willed Czar altogether and terrorized him 
 unsparingly, — and together they laid the basis for 
 a military agreement between England and Russia, 
 analogous to the one existing between England and 
 France, and supplementary to the measures estab- 
 lished by the alliance between Russia and France. 
 Through negotiations concluded at St. Petersburg 
 on May 26, this agreement received definite form. 
 
 The British and the Russian fleets were to enter 
 into close relations with each other, and were to 
 exchange information with regard to their own or- 
 ganization and latest technical equipment, as well as 
 with regard to what had been learned concerning 
 other fleets. By a similar arrangement to that 
 which had been made for the disposition of the 
 British and French fleets, the Russian fleet was now 
 also to co-operate with the British navy according 
 
 270 
 
Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement 271 
 
 to a definitely and previously established plan, al- 
 though the two would necessarily be separated by 
 distance. Russia's part in the intended operations 
 was to force a passage through the Bosphorus and 
 the Dardanelles, and to this end her fleet was to be 
 allowed to use the British and French harbors in the 
 western Mediterranean as bases. The British were 
 to hold as large a part of the German fleet as pos- 
 sible in the North Sea, and so give Russia an oppor- 
 tunity to land her armies in Pomerania, a measure 
 which was to be facilitated by the dispatch of Brit- 
 ish transport ships into the Baltic " before the be- 
 ginning of hostilities." For the rest, reliance was 
 placed on the hope of being able to compel Denmark 
 and Holland to join the alliance against Germany. 
 These plans were frustrated by the inferiority of 
 the Russian navy and by the watchful alertness of 
 the German fleet, as also by the inactivity of the 
 British, who dared not venture a bold attack upon 
 the well protected position of the German fleet for 
 the purpose of utterly destroying it, by which, how- 
 ever, a large number of their own vessels would 
 necessarily be sacrificed. 
 
 Naturally the convention with Russia carried as 
 little official obligation with it as did the similar 
 agreement with France. This furnished Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey with an ostensible reason for the cool 
 effrontery with which he denied the existence of an 
 alliance with Russia when he was questioned con- 
 cerning it in Parliament, and just as he had done on 
 a previous occasion, a year earlier, with regard to 
 the French agreement, he now declared that in case 
 
272 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 of war between the European powers " there were no 
 agreements existing by which the free decisions of 
 the English government, or of the Parliament to 
 determine whether or not Great Britain should be 
 a participant would be either hampered or re- 
 strained ; nor were there any such negotiations now 
 in progress, and, so far as he could judge, it was not 
 at all likely that any would be undertaken; should 
 any such agreement be concluded, however, it would, 
 in his opinion, have to be submitted to the Parlia- 
 ment, and this would in all probability be the case. ,, 
 The absolute untruthfulness of this statement was 
 recognised and publicly arraigned in the " Man- 
 chester Guardian," but with no further result than 
 to elicit a renewed denial in the semi-official press. 
 Both the Parliament and " public opinion " were 
 more than willing to be duped ; evidently there was 
 a perfect mutual understanding with regard to the 
 situation. 
 
 In Russia the same game of duplicity was carried 
 on. There was no longer even an attempt made to 
 conceal either the hatred of Germany or the prepara- 
 tions for war. 1 In this respect the Russian press, 
 
 1 1 cannot refrain from quoting in this connection from 
 a conversation that took place at the time that the Inter- 
 national Congress of Historical Sciences met at London 
 during Easter week of 1913. When the Russian delegation 
 invited the Congress to meet for its next session, in 1918, 
 at St. Petersburg, an eminent Russian savant with whom I 
 was on most friendly terms said to me : " We thought 
 we would risk the invitation although by that time we 
 shall have been at war with one another; but I trust that 
 five years hence we shall all be friends again." At that 
 
The Situation: Summer of 1914 2J 3 
 
 usually so fettered, was allowed a free hand. Un- 
 der Russian encouragement the Servian agitation 
 in Croatia proceeded vigorously despite all official 
 protestations to the contrary. Among the Rutheni- 
 ans also disturbances were fomented, and no effort 
 was spared to incite them against Austria. Fur- 
 thermore, a ruthless espionage was being conducted, 
 in the face of which Austria remained absolutely 
 passive. Nevertheless, when in July of 19 14 the 
 German Ambassador referred to these matters in 
 conversation with Minister Ssasonow, the latter de- 
 clared : " The information with regard to a Russo- 
 Anglican naval convention, that has ostensibly been 
 concluded, exists only in the fancy of the ' Berliner 
 Tageblatt ' ' (which had at once published an ac- 
 count of it) " and in the moon." At this very time 
 the President of the French Republic, Poincare, and 
 his Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Viviani, were in 
 St. Petersburg for the purpose of carrying the nego- 
 tiations still further, and to re-emphasize the inti- 
 mate relations existing between the two states; but, 
 naturally enough, among the toasts that were ex- 
 time I looked upon this expression of opinion as one of 
 extreme pessimism, although I was aware that the speaker 
 was a pan-Slavist. Since then, however, my thoughts have 
 recurred to it again and again, and it now seems to me to 
 be an evidence of the nature of Russian sentiment at the 
 time, and of how much publicity had been given to the 
 plans of the Russian government. In its first half the 
 prediction has been fulfilled ; but its second half, I venture 
 to say, will never be realized; for, should we live to the 
 age of Methuselah, we will not all meet again in an inter- 
 national congress. 
 
274 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 changed on this occasion there were none that were 
 not of a most harmless and friendly nature. 
 
 As has been learned from subsequent publications, 
 the German government was far better informed of 
 this state of affairs than we in Germany at first 
 knew, or had any reason to know in the face of 
 the inconceivable reticence observed by the govern- 
 ment at the outbreak of the war. It would now 
 appear that it would have been to our advantage 
 if the German government had done as Bismarck did 
 on similar occasions in so masterly a manner, and 
 had placed all the evidence it possessed before the 
 public, and called the world's attention to it. This 
 would have made Germany's position and her rela- 
 tions to neutral nations an entirely different one 
 from what it is to-day. The German Emperor did, 
 however, express himself very frankly with regard 
 to the situation in the speech which he made at the 
 launching of the Bismarck on June 20, when he 
 alluded to the grave dangers by which Germany was 
 beset from all sides, and then quoted Bismarck's 
 words, " We Germans fear God, but nothing else 
 in the world," with an increasing emphasis toward 
 the end of the phrase. It is quite remarkable that 
 these words, spoken as they were by the Emperor, 
 and which should therefore have left hardly a doubt 
 in the minds of his hearers that the world-wide war 
 was at hand, did not at the time make a deeper im- 
 pression upon his people. But we Germans be- 
 lieved in peace, and would not believe otherwise; 
 we could not conceive it possible that England, 
 holding the decision in her hand as she did, would 
 
The Crime of Sarajevo 275 
 
 force us into a war with half the world against us, 
 for without her co-operation, or at least without her 
 explicit promise of a definitely friendly attitude, 
 Russia and France had not ventured upon a war in 
 the past, nor would they have done so now. 
 
 It would appear that before the outbreak of the 
 war the Allies had fixed upon the spring of 19 15 
 as the most auspicious time for them to begin it; 
 by that time, it was expected, their preparations 
 would be complete, in a measure at least. 1 Mean- 
 while the Russians began the " trial mobilization " 
 of their army in Poland, which gave them the oppor- 
 tunity to mass a tremendous body of troops on their 
 western frontier, some being called in from as dis- 
 tant parts of the Empire as Siberia and eastern 
 Asia. A naval parade to be conducted on a gi- 
 gantic scale furnished England with the excuse to 
 concentrate her fleet off Portsmouth in the Spit- 
 head. All would then be in readiness, and the 
 negotiations could be set afoot by means of which 
 the war could be precipitated at any time when the 
 propitious moment had arrived. 
 
 But on June 28, 19 14, the crime at Sarajevo 
 hastened the fatal day. Although Austria had long 
 endured the Servian agitation and the Russian 
 espionage, and almost without active resentment, 
 the time had now come when she must act, or else 
 
 1 In his celebrated pamphlet Frobenius designates the 
 year 1916 as the " fateful year for the German Empire," 
 viz., the year that had been decided upon as the one for 
 beginning the war. Considering the measures that were 
 resorted to in the spring and summer of 1914, it would 
 appear that the intention was not to wait until that time. 
 
276 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 abandon all hope of a future. At the trial that fol- 
 lowed, all the complexities of the plot were un- 
 raveled, and the complicity of the Servian govern- 
 ment was established beyond a doubt. Austria 
 therefore delivered an ultimatum to Servia on July 
 23, with a time limit of two days in which to receive 
 the reply. When this proved to be an evasion, the 
 Austrian representative at Belgrade was recalled, 
 and took his departure on the evening of July 25, 
 and on July 28 Austria's declaration of war fol- 
 lowed. 
 
 The nature of the conditions which Austria had 
 made, and with which she peremptorily demanded 
 absolute compliance, was such that Russia was 
 forced to choose between the alternatives of aban- 
 doning her Servian protege, or of going to war for 
 her sake. By advising the Servian government to 
 yield, and at the same time accepting Austria's 
 declaration that the integrity of the Servian terri- 
 tory would be respected, Russia would have aban- 
 doned the position she had taken in recent years, 
 and would have returned to the old standpoint of 
 1876 and 1877, since it would have been a virtual 
 recognition of Austrian supremacy in the north- 
 western section of the Balkan peninsula. On the 
 other hand there could be no doubt that this was a 
 matter of vital importance to Austria, and that she 
 could no longer tolerate the Servian agitation that, 
 in imitation of the example set by Russian politics, 
 had resorted to the dagger, the bomb and other 
 criminal means to secure its ends. Not only did 
 Austria realize that this evil must be utterly up- 
 
Attempted Mediation 2JJ 
 
 rooted, but also that, as instigator of the entire situa- 
 tion, Russia must be regarded as the real evil doer, 
 and the Servians but as the ready and willing tools. 
 If Austria could not have done otherwise than 
 she did, it was not to be expected that in the end 
 she would yield, and more especially was this true 
 in consideration of the unscrupulous attitude that 
 Russia had assumed in this connection, as in all 
 others. Nevertheless, it seems, the war party was 
 not at once predominant; but on the contrary, the 
 current of opinion that inclined toward seeking 
 some kind of adjustment maintained itself for some 
 time side by side with the one for war, — how sin- 
 cerely it was meant is, however, a question. Even 
 now the efforts to avoid war received the earnest 
 support of the German government. The German 
 Under-Secretary of State went so far as to assure 
 the British Ambassador, on the evening of July 26, 
 that the expected and hurried return of the German 
 Emperor from his summer trip * in the North was 
 not due to any action on the part of the German 
 government, which was rather disposed to regret 
 it, " since it was likely to give rise to disturbing 
 rumors." 2 England also manifested a desire for 
 peace by suggesting a conference of the powers in 
 
 1 In order to make it clear to the world that Germany 
 was not a participant in the negotiations, nor making any 
 military preparations, but was merely a watchful observer 
 of the course that events were taking, the German Em- 
 peror had not allowed the murder of the Austrian Crown 
 Prince to prevent him from starting on his journey, nor 
 had he discontinued it. 
 
 2 English Blue book, No. 33. 
 
278 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 which England, France, Germany and Italy were 
 to participate for the purpose of suggesting a basis 
 of mediation. This proposition was of course un- 
 acceptable, since it would have entailed a deep hu- 
 miliation for Austria, and for Germany as well, if 
 the Hapsburg monarchy, the state that had been 
 deeply injured, and whose very existence was being 
 gravely imperiled, were to appear before a court of 
 the European powers virtually in the role of de- 
 fendant, on an equal footing with Servia, the state 
 whose hands were stained with murder, and there 
 allow herself to be driven to make concessions. 
 Therefore, on July 27, Germany rejected the pro- 
 posal made by the English, and at the same time 
 directed their attention to the circumstance that if 
 the Russians were mobilizing not only in the south, 
 on their Austrian frontier, but in the north as 
 well, Germany would feel compelled to resort to 
 counter measures. 1 Furthermore, it was stated 
 that Germany viewed the conflict between Austria 
 and Servia as a local matter in which she could not 
 interfere, but in which Austria must be allowed a 
 free hand. Austria took a similar stand, declined 
 the proposed conference, as well as the suggestion 
 made by England for further negotiations on the 
 ground that the Servian reply was not complete, as 
 she also did the proposal of a direct exchange of 
 opinions between the Russian and the Austrian gov- 
 ernments. And then, to leave no doubt as to the 
 
 1 Ibid., Nos. 43, 55 (toward the close), 67, 71, 81, 84. 
 German White book, Appendix 12. 
 
Attempts at Mediation Fail 279 
 
 finality of her decision, Austria declared war on 
 Servia. 
 
 The result was that the Russian government now 
 gave the official order for mobilization in her south- 
 ern military districts, which practically, however, 
 was already well under way, and on July 29, its 
 formal announcement was received at Berlin. The 
 German government expressed regret to England 
 that Austria had made so immediate a decision, 1 
 but did not remit its efforts in concert with the Eng- 
 lish to seek an adjustment through mediation. 2 In 
 its further action the German government prevailed 
 upon Austria not to break off her negotiations with 
 Russia, and on July 30 forwarded to Vienna the 
 English proposal, suggested as a basis for possible 
 future negotiations, that after her armies had en- 
 tered Servia, Austria should there dictate her terms. 
 At the same time the German government called at- 
 tention at St. Petersburg to the circumstance that 
 the Austrian mobilization was directed against Ser- 
 via and not against Russia, that, moreover, Austria 
 did not desire acquisition of Servian territory, that 
 there seemed therefore to be no reason at present 
 for interference on the part of Russia, and that in 
 Germany the Russian championship of Servia's 
 cause after the terrible deed at Sarajevo could not 
 be comprehended. 3 
 
 1 English Blue book, Nos. 75, j6. 
 
 2 Ibid., Nos. 46, 60, 67-69. German White book, Appen- 
 dix 13-16, 19. 
 
 3 German White book, Appendix I9~23a, as well as in the 
 main text. 
 
280 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 The final decision lay in the hands of England. 
 Had she declined to support her associates of the 
 Entente by declaring that she would not tolerate a 
 war in Europe, and that they who violated the peace 
 would find her opposed to them, even if only by the 
 observation of a stern and truly non-partisan neu- 
 trality, we may be almost sure that the Russian 
 war party would not have succeeded in the endeavor 
 to hurry France into the war, for the French would 
 have realized all too well that it would be they who 
 would have to bear the brunt of it, and Russia 
 would then have been compelled to modify her de- 
 mands. Then, too, the possibility would have re- 
 mained that by their concerted action England and 
 Germany might have been successful in their efforts 
 at mediation, while in the meantime Germany could 
 have influenced Austria to temper her procedure 
 against Servia. 
 
 But it was soon revealed that all the negotiations 
 and proposed conferences were but shams, sug- 
 gested for the sake of gaining time in which to com- 
 plete the preparations for war, 1 and to weaken the 
 German and Austrian position both from a military 
 
 1 On July 29 the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
 Sir G. Buchanan, reported that he had told the German 
 Ambassador that " the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
 (Ssasonow) gave me (the British Ambassador) to under- 
 stand that Russia did not wish to hasten the outbreak of 
 the war by an immediate crossing of her frontiers, and that 
 it would require at least a week or more before the mobili- 
 zation could be completed. Meanwhile we would all have 
 to work together to find a way out of the dangerous situa- 
 tion." English Blue book, No. 78. 
 
Russia s Decision for War 281 
 
 and a moral standpoint. The members of the En- 
 tente understood one another perfectly, and both in 
 Russia and in France there was a due appreciation 
 of how much was really meant by Lord Grey's at- 
 tempts to preserve the peace, and by his equivocal 
 declarations. During the night of July 30 a de- 
 cision was reached at St. Petersburg. A report 
 made at the time by the Belgian charge d'affaires 
 there, and which later fell into the hands of the 
 Germans, gives this account of it: It had been im- 
 possible during the two preceding days to dis- 
 tinguish between the true and the false among the 
 rumors concerning the intention of the Russian 
 government ; " the one thing that has been indis- 
 putably established is that both here and at Vienna 
 the German government has spared no effort to 
 avoid a general conflagration." These efforts were 
 frustrated, however, by the determination of the 
 Vienna Cabinet not to withdraw a single demand, 
 as well as by the Russian distrust of Austria. 
 " This morning an official communique to the press 
 announces that the reservists in a certain number of 
 provinces have been called in. Any one who is 
 familiar with these official Russian communiques, 
 and is aware of how much they always withhold, 
 will realize that this means a general mobilization. ,, 
 " At the outset, England intimated that she would 
 not allow herself to be drawn into the conflict; Sir 
 George Buchanan made this statement openly. To- 
 day, St. Petersburg is convinced, indeed the assur- 
 ance has been received, that England will stand by 
 France. This promise of English co-operation is 
 
282 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 of great significance, and it is largely due to it that 
 the war party here has gained the upper hand," — 
 principally for the reason, as is enlarged upon later, 
 that because of Russia's weakness by sea, England's 
 support was indispensable. " In the Cabinet coun- 
 sel that took place yesterday, a difference of 
 opinion was still evident; the order to mobilize was 
 delayed; but since then a marked change has taken 
 place; the war party is now predominant, and early 
 this morning, at 4 o'clock, the order for mobiliza- 
 tion was given." 
 
 It was the English attitude therefore by which 
 Russia was influenced to decide upon war. A num- 
 ber of telegrams passed between Berlin and St. 
 Petersburg (July 28 to 31) in the hope still enter- 
 tained by the German Emperor that by a direct ap- 
 peal to the Czar, peace might yet be preserved. Al- 
 though the replies received from the Czar bore a 
 favorable tone as a whole, and were accompanied by 
 a request that the Emperor continue his mediatory 
 endeavors, they contained the expression that " a 
 dastardly war has been declared against a weaker 
 nation, and the indignation which it has aroused in 
 Russia, and which I fully share, is a tremendous 
 one." But even before the formally delivered 
 declaration, saying that " Russia is far removed 
 from harboring any desire for war " and that " as 
 long as negotiations with Austria in regard to 
 Servia are in progress the Russian armies will take 
 no belligerent action" (July 31, 2 p.m.), was re- 
 ceived, the information was at hand that, beyond a 
 doubt, a general mobilization of the Russian forces" 
 
War Declared Against Russia 283 
 
 had been ordered, and that it was therefore directed 
 against Germany as well as against Austria. 
 Knowing this, it would have been a fatal mistake 
 to have waited longer; with every hour of hesita- 
 tion Germany was losing ground in the military 
 situation by which she was confronted. An ulti- 
 matum was therefore dispatched to Russia, and 
 when this remained unanswered, the order for 
 mobilization was given on August 1, at 5 p. M., and 
 war was declared. 
 
 That France was Russia's ally and would join 
 her in the war was never for a moment doubted, 
 and was fully confirmed by the French reply to the 
 German note of inquiry sent to France at the same 
 time with the ultimatum to Russia, asking whether 
 France intended to remain neutral; for the answer 
 was that France would do what her interests de- 
 manded of her. 
 
 The more real the danger of war became, the 
 more earnest grew the efforts on the part of the 
 German government to continue the friendly rela- 
 tions that had apparently been established with 
 England in the concerted endeavor at mediation 
 which had just been made, and to secure a promise 
 of neutrality from the English government. The 
 fact is that, in spite of all they knew and had ex- 
 perienced, neither the German Foreign Office nor 
 the men who shaped Germany's diplomacy could as 
 yet believe that England, or to be more correct, the 
 British Cabinet, had long ago determined upon its 
 course of action, and was now deliberately bring- 
 ing about the war for which it had so long made 
 
284 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 preparation. On July 29, Sir Edward Grey very 
 frankly said to the German Ambassador, as quoted 
 in the English Blue book, that " he must not be mis- 
 led by the friendly tone of our conversations into 
 any sense of false security that we should stand 
 aside if all the efforts to preserve peace, which we 
 are making in common with Germany, failed." * 
 But even this was evidently not understood in its 
 full meaning in Berlin, although it was practically 
 equivalent to a declaration of war. The truth is 
 that the Germans were not used to the custom that 
 prevails throughout England, and is followed even 
 in private intercourse, and according to which dis- 
 cussions such as this abound in all manner of gen- 
 eral and aimless remarks, while the chief thought, 
 and the one that alone is of significance, is only 
 casually mentioned and in a most cordial manner, 
 even though it is absolutely antagonistic to all that 
 is desired by the other party to the discussion. 
 This accounts for Germany's many and continued 
 attempts by far-reaching concessions to secure from 
 England a promise to remain neutral, but which 
 was always politely but persistently refused. 
 
 The Germans were fully aware that on account 
 of the obligations that England had assumed with 
 regard to France, she could not allow the German 
 fleet to make an attack upon the French coast along 
 the English Channel, which was left undefended by 
 French war vessels, according to the Anglo-French 
 naval agreement. And it was realized quite as well 
 that England would resent it as a trespass upon her 
 
 1 English Blue book, Nos. 87, 89, 102. 
 
Negotiations with England 285 
 
 interests, if the forced passage of troops through 
 Belgian territory that the German military authori- 
 ties were planning, and in which they were fully 
 justified by the practical breach of neutrality of 
 which Belgium herself had been guilty, were car- 
 ried into effect. The offer was therefore made that 
 when the time for making terms of peace had ar- 
 rived, Germany would respect the integrity of 
 French territory, and furthermore that the German 
 fleet would make no attack upon the French coast, 
 and eventually even that Belgian neutrality would 
 in no way be violated ; but all without the slightest 
 effect. On July 30, Lord Grey absolutely refused 
 to enter into any agreement by which England would 
 be bound to refrain from participation in the war. 1 
 On July 31, he informed the French Ambassador 
 that he had " not only definitely declined to agree 
 that England would remain neutral, but this morn- 
 ing he had gone so far as to say to the German 
 Ambassador that if France and Germany were to 
 become involved in war England would necessarily 
 be drawn into the conflict." 2 On August 1st the 
 German Ambassador asked him " whether if Ger- 
 many gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutral- 
 ity, Great Britain would remain neutral," and that 
 he (Grey) replied that he "could not say that," 
 that he did not think Great Britain " could give a 
 promise of neutrality on that condition alone." 
 Further Sir E. Goschen says : " The Ambassador 
 pressed me as to whether I could not formulate con- 
 
 1 English Blue book, Nos. 85, 101. 
 
 2 English Blue book, No. 119. 
 
286 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 ditions on which we would remain neutral. He 
 even suggested that the integrity of France and her 
 colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt 
 obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain 
 neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that 
 we must keep our hands free." 1 
 
 2 Ibid., No. 123. Compare the German White book, ap- 
 pendix 33-36, and " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung " of 
 September 5. At the outset the Ambassador believed that 
 a promise of English neutrality could be obtained if Ger- 
 many would declare that in case France remained neutral, 
 she would make no attack upon French territory, provided 
 that England would guarantee French neutrality. But 
 when the German Emperor in a telegram to King George 
 intimated that such an agreement would meet with his 
 approval, the reply that was immediately sent by the King 
 said that there must be some misunderstanding. These 
 circumstances plainly reveal how little was really meant by 
 the proposition that Lord Grey made to Berlin on July 30 
 (English Blue book, No. 101), and for which, in the in- 
 troduction to the Blue book (P. VII), he takes so much 
 credit to himself as an evidence of his honest desire for 
 peace, " If the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the 
 present crisis safely passed, his own endeavor would be to 
 promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a 
 party, by which she could be assured that no aggression or 
 hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by 
 France, Russia, and England, jointly or separately. He 
 had desired this and worked for it, so far as he could, 
 through the Balkan crisis, and Germany having a cor- 
 responding object, their relations sensibly improved. The 
 idea had hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of 
 definite proposals, but if this present crisis ... be safely 
 passed, he was hopeful that the relief and reaction which 
 would follow might make possible some more definite 
 rapprochement between the powers than had been possible 
 
England Determines upon War 287 
 
 In other words, England had long been bound to 
 France by an agreement, and therefore, in spite of 
 all her apparent endeavors to obtain an adjustment, 
 declined to consider every proposal that was made 
 by which the war might have been averted or re- 
 stricted. England wanted war. The situation is 
 clearly stated in a letter addressed by Charles Tre- 
 velyan, Under-secretary of State for Education, to 
 his constituents when he resigned his position at the 
 same time that his father, Sir George Trevelyan, 
 Lord Morley and Mr. Burns left the Cabinet. He 
 frankly says that if France had violated Belgian 
 neutrality " we would not have rushed into war, but 
 would have contented ourselves with a protest." 
 " The German offer to refrain from an attack upon 
 the French coast on condition that we would remain 
 neutral shows that Germany had by no means as- 
 sumed an attitude that would not admit of an ad- 
 justment. But we were not in the mood for it. 
 We had already taken the other side." 
 
 On August 2, Lord Grey took the decisive step. 
 As based on a decision of the Cabinet he announced 
 to the French Ambassador : " I am authorized to 
 give an assurance that if the German fleet comes 
 into the Channel or through the North Sea to un- 
 dertake hostile operations against the French coasts 
 or shipping, the British fleet will give all protection 
 in its power." To this he added, as he naturally 
 would: "This assurance is, of course, subject to 
 the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving 
 
 hitherto." These were however mere conventional 
 phrases without any true significance whatever. 
 
288 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 the support of Parliament, and must not be taken 
 as binding His Majesty's Government to take any 
 action until the above contingency of action by the 
 German fleet takes place." 
 
 The ancient illusion was to be kept up even now. 
 On the following day Lord Grey submitted the mat- 
 ter to Parliament. He gave the necessary informa- 
 tion with regard to the declarations that had been 
 exchanged on November 22, 19 12, which, he stated, 
 were in no way binding, and then proceeded in a 
 like manner with regard to the announcement he 
 had made to the French Ambassador on the day 
 before, and which he assured Parliament was as yet 
 not to be regarded as a declaration of war, and left 
 that body entirely free to act. Of the agreement 
 made with Russia he said not a word, and quite as 
 little, no one will be surprised to learn, about the 
 one with Belgium. To the long continued injuries 
 inflicted upon Austrian interests he made no allu- 
 sion, nor did he mention the perilous position into 
 which Germany had been brought, whereas the new 
 intimacy with France, entered into since the old 
 differences were laid aside, was sharply emphasized, 
 together with the moral obligation not to desert this 
 newly acquired friend. To this was now to be 
 added the German entry into Belgium, which was 
 about to be undertaken, and came to pass on the 
 evening of the same day. The Parliament was fur- 
 ther informed that the British fleet was already mob- 
 ilized, — it was then assembled in the Spithead, off 
 Portsmouth, for the ostensible purpose of a naval 
 parade, — and that the mobilization of the army 
 
England Declares War 289 
 
 must be begun at once. Any allusion to the cir- 
 cumstance that by making certain declarations to 
 France and Russia, or even by announcing her pur- 
 pose of observing a strict neutrality, England might 
 have averted the war was avoided with evident in- 
 tention. Instead, Lord Grey declared that in the 
 war that had been begun England could not remain 
 neutral. And in this connection the underlying mo- 
 tive with which England entered the war comes to 
 the surface in the partially veiled intimation of the 
 financial advantage which she was to gain from it, 
 when Lord Grey added : " For us, with a power- 
 ful fleet, which we believe able to protect our com- 
 merce, to protect our shores and our interests, if 
 we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little 
 more than we shall suffer if we stand aside." The 
 Parliament of course accepted these representations 
 and sanctioned what had been done. On the fol- 
 lowing day (August 4) the British Ambassador at 
 Berlin again questioned the German government 
 concerning its intentions with regard to Belgium, 
 and when he was informed that the order for the 
 entry of the German army into Belgium could no 
 longer be countermanded, he at once announced the 
 British declaration of war against Germany, at 7 
 o'clock in the evening of the same day. 
 
 It would seem that the British government would 
 gladly have delayed participation in the war for 
 some time, for in the meantime the army equipment 
 could have been vigorously pushed, and England 
 would then have entered the war at a time when 
 Germany was fully engaged in the conflict, and 
 
290 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 therefore had already been somewhat weakened. 
 England would then graciously have extended aid 
 to her allies, and, with little sacrifice to herself, have 
 destroyed Germany's commerce and seized her col- 
 onies. The entry of the German army into Bel- 
 gium rendered this course impossible to her. It 
 must be admitted that at the same time it furnished 
 England with a ready and popular pretext for par- 
 ticipating in the war, and we know all too well to 
 what extent she made use of it to her advantage, 
 both at home and abroad. The moral indignation 
 with which she clothed her pre-conceived purpose of 
 entering the war was the more readily assumed be- 
 cause, in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4, 
 the Imperial Chancellor openly and candidly ad- 
 mitted that the German occupation of Belgium was 
 a violation of international law. The additional 
 statement that the German government was at the 
 time aware of the French intention to occupy Bel- 
 gium (England's purpose to participate in this action 
 could not at the time be disclosed since England 
 had not as yet declared war) was at first discredited 
 by every one except those whose sympathies were 
 wholly with the Germans, while Germany's position 
 of extreme peril, by which she was justified in 
 grasping at any means of defense against the mur- 
 derous attack upon her from all sides, was recog- 
 nized quite as little. How much regard for her 
 agreements with other nations, and for their neu- 
 trality, England has shown in the past, we have al- 
 ready seen, and it has again been revealed in the 
 present war. 
 
Effect upon the German Nation 291 
 
 After the representations that had been made at 
 Berlin by the British Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, 1 
 the German diplomats were not prepared for Eng- 
 land's declaration of war, in spite of all that had 
 preceded it, and were both painfully surprised and 
 depressed by it. The German nation felt differently 
 about it. There can be no doubt that when we first 
 learned of it, and realized all that the gigantic strug- 
 gle in which we were about to engage would demand 
 of us, the German people were deeply affected. In 
 the beginning we, too, could hardly believe that all 
 our attempts to convince the English of the peace- 
 ful nature of our intentions had been in vain, and 
 that all the courteous and conciliatory messages that 
 we had received from them, especially in response 
 to our most recent overtures, were all mere empty 
 phrases. Then we set our faces grimly to the task 
 
 1 It is worthy of notice that the two ambassadors who 
 delivered the British declaration of war at Berlin and at 
 Vienna were both of German origin, Sir E. Goschen, a 
 descendant of the well known publisher who lived at the 
 time of the classical period of our literature, and Sir M. de 
 Bunsen, a grandson of the renowned friend of Frederick 
 William IV, who, as representative at London played so 
 disastrous a role in diplomacy, and in which he was as 
 much of a dilettant as he was in historical science, and 
 who felt highly flattered when the English aristocracy 
 welcomed him in its circles and accorded him almost the 
 treatment of an equal. The King of Great Britain also 
 is of German extraction. The question suggests itself 
 whether, in spite of their naturalization, these men will be 
 suspected of being German sympathisers, and so be sub- 
 jected to treatment similar to that which the Prince of 
 Battenberg and so many others have received. 
 
292 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 before us, fully recognising at last that an open foe 
 is far preferable to a perfidious friend. If it must 
 be, we would battle for victory with this latest re- 
 vealed foe also, and, in this struggle with a world in 
 arms, the moral and physical force of our nation 
 should be steeled and strengthened as never before. 
 And again the German Emperor was fully in sym- 
 pathy with his people. When in the evening of the 
 day on which the British declaration of war was 
 received, the windows of the British Embassy were 
 stoned, and which, according to the testimony of 
 trustworthy witnesses, was provoked by the bravado 
 of some of the employees of the Embassy, who 
 shouted " Hurrah ! " out of the windows, and threw 
 copper coins into the street, with the taunt that they 
 were intended to defray the costs of the war, the 
 Secretary of State, von Jagow, made excuses for 
 this demonstration. " The German Emperor, how- 
 ever," I quote the words of Sir E. Goschen, " sent 
 an adjutant to me on the following morning with 
 the message : ' The Emperor has charged me to 
 express to your Excellency his regret for the occur- 
 rence of last night, but at the same time to tell you 
 that you will gather from those occurrences an idea 
 of the feelings of his people respecting the action 
 of Great Britain in joining with other nations 
 against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty 
 also begs that you will tell the King that he has 
 been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and 
 British Admiral, but that in consequence of what 
 has occurred he must now divest himself of these 
 titles.' I could add," continues Sir E. Goschen, 
 
Sentiment in England and Germany 293 
 
 " that the message lost none of its acerbity by the 
 manner of its delivery." 1 
 
 For a time the idea was entertained in wide cir- 
 cles in Germany that England had been hurried into 
 the war through the machinations of unscrupulous 
 politicians, that a large number of Englishmen, al- 
 though swept along by their feelings in the excite- 
 ment of the moment, would soon awaken to a real- 
 ization of what was involved, and disapprove of it, 
 and that a pro-German sentiment would then set in 
 by which the Government would find itself opposed 
 in its measures after the same manner that it had 
 been by the strong Opposition that developed at the 
 time of the Boer war. Gradually, however, we dis- 
 covered that this too was an illusion. The number 
 of 'voices in England that were raised in our favor, 
 or at least, against the war, it would not have been 
 difficult to count, — some of them have already been 
 alluded to. Among the English savants, too, and 
 at the universities, where hitherto closer relations 
 with Germany had been so frequently both sought 
 and fostered, only few voices friendly to Germany 
 were heard, and many of the men who hitherto had 
 been counted among her staunchest friends were now 
 to be found with her most zealous opponents. 
 There cannot be the slightest doubt that the war 
 upon Germany is highly popular in England through- 
 out all the various grades of her population, and that 
 the conviction that it was not only a necessity, but 
 was inevitable, is practically universal among her 
 people. Not on Servia's account, nor for the sake 
 
 1 English Blue book, No. 160. 
 
294 Preliminary Arrangements 
 
 of Belgium, was it undertaken; but because Ger- 
 many's ruin was believed to be a necessary condi- 
 tion to the preservation of England's position of 
 dominance in the world. " Only children," writes 
 a highly intelligent Italian, " will now or in the fu- 
 ture speak of this war as a French or a Russian 
 war, whereas history and men will recognize in it 
 a struggle to the death between England and Ger- 
 many, fought out on French and Russian soil." 
 This aspect of it is strikingly revealed in the man- 
 ner in which Austria, the nominal instigator of the 
 war, once this was decided upon, immediately re- 
 ceded into the background, even before the negotia- 
 tions with regard to the war had been concluded. 
 The nations, and especially their governments, are 
 not fighting Austria, nor because of Austrian ag- 
 gressions on the Balkan peninsula, but against the 
 German Empire and the German nation, and deplore 
 the fact that Austria has remained their faithful 
 ally. 1 As a nation we grasped this situation at 
 once; and at the present time there is a conscious- 
 ness abroad among the German people, from the 
 highest to the lowest station in life, that England 
 is their deadly foe, and that it is England who has 
 
 1 After the war with Germany had begun Russia still 
 allowed her ambassador at Vienna to remain at his post 
 for the purpose of continuing the negotiations with 
 Austria, until, on August 6, the latter country put an end 
 to this absurdity by declaring war against Russia. Eng- 
 land did not declare herself to be at war with Austria until 
 August 12, and then with the accompanying explanation 
 that by declaring war upon Russia, Austria was also prac- 
 tically at war with Russia's ally, France. 
 
England, Germany's Bitter Foe 295 
 
 forced upon them this conflict which is to decide 
 whether they are to be or not to be, — this battle 
 for their national existence and for all that is of 
 highest worth to them. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 England's Conduct of the War — The Moral 
 Decadence of the English 
 
 To speak of the course that the war will take 
 would be out of place at this time, for as yet the 
 end can in no way be foreseen. At the outset Eng- 
 land has sent her allies into the field; she herself 
 could send but a relatively small army to Belgium 
 and France, the trained army of mercenaries with 
 which up to the present time she has fought her 
 wars. Contrary to all expectation the British fleet 
 has remained inactive, whereby all the proud threats 
 in which the British indulged before the war began, 
 as for instance that the day after war had been de- 
 clared the German fleet would have ceased to exist, 
 were proved to be but vain boasts. The course pur- 
 sued by the British fleet stands in striking contrast 
 to the spirit of enterprise shown by the German 
 vessels, and by the many splendid and surprising re- 
 sults of their activity. By this attitude of her fleet 
 Great Britain virtually admits the danger of her 
 position. She dares not risk the destruction of a 
 large number of her war vessels in a great and 
 decisive battle with the German fleet, well protected 
 as it is by its sheltered position, not only because 
 Britain's supremacy at sea would be imperiled 
 
 296 
 
Control of the Seas 2gj 
 
 through a possible reduction in the strength of her 
 sea power below that of the French, 1 and especially 
 below that of the Americans, but above all because 
 the British fleet must remain adequate to the task 
 of insuring safety to Britain's import trade. Should 
 this be tied up, or even restricted in a measure suffi- 
 cient to cause a food famine, British resistance 
 would be broken. Therefore the British fleet is fully 
 employed in securing to England the control of the 
 ocean routes, and above all, of the open sea to the 
 north of Scotland. To these demands that are made 
 on the fleet must be added the necessity of pursuing 
 the German cruisers, a purpose for which the Brit- 
 ish fleet alone was evidently deemed insufficient, 
 since the co-operation of the Japanese was accepted, 
 and for which Britain was obliged to extend thanks 
 to them for the victory in the battle of the Falkland 
 Islands, the most humiliating testimony to Britain's 
 inadequacy that she has yet been forced to render. 2 
 
 1 The inactivity of the French fleet in the Mediterra- 
 nean, augmented, as it is, by British vessels, can only be 
 explained in a similar manner. Its first duty is to insure 
 safety to the intercourse with the African possessions, 
 and secondly, to hold Italy in check. An attack upon the 
 Austrian coast and fleet could therefore not be ventured. 
 Whether an attempt to force the Dardanelles with a view 
 to protecting the Suez Canal will be made, remains to be 
 seen. 
 
 2 Since then England has however lowered her national 
 dignity even to a greater degree ; for at the very time 
 when her First Lord of the Admiralty was boasting to 
 Parliament that Britain's sovereignty of the seas had 
 never been as absolute as at the moment, orders were 
 being issued to the British merchant marine to lower the 
 
298 Conduct of the War 
 
 Whether the future will bring about a change in this 
 respect, and the British naval authorities will de- 
 cide upon a vigorous attack, and what dimensions 
 the war at sea will then assume, no one can foretell. 
 
 Of one thing we may be certain, however, which 
 is that, as the war progresses, England will greatly 
 increase her strength by land, until far beyond any- 
 thing she has hitherto accomplished in this direc- 
 tion. The appeal to the national spirit has met 
 with a wide response, especially from among the 
 upper classes, and although the results of the efforts 
 to obtain recruits have not fulfilled the high hopes 
 that had been entertained of them, and the men of 
 Ireland are evading service in the British army as 
 far as possible, nevertheless it would be a grave 
 error to value lightly the armies that are now being 
 trained in England. Through her desire to attack 
 and destroy militarism abroad, England will find 
 herself compelled to adopt the very institution she 
 is supposed to be fighting, for whatever may be the 
 outcome of the present war, certain it is that its in- 
 evitable consequence for England will be the intro- 
 duction of the universal military service she abhors. 
 
 In other respects England has so far conducted 
 the war in the manner traditional with her ; her allies 
 are fighting for her with all their available strength, 
 while the British forces that can be sent to the front 
 are both small in numbers, and are exposed as little 
 as possible. To this end England went begging 
 
 national emblem in fear of an attack by German sub- 
 marine boats, and fly in its place the flag of a neutral 
 nation. 
 
England Seeks Aid 299 
 
 among all the nations of the earth for troops to aid 
 her. And again, as of old, although she annexed 
 Egypt, subjugated the Boers, and is now compelling 
 them to fight against the Germans in East Africa, 
 and views with cold indifference the subjugation of 
 Finland by violence, England still poses as the lib- 
 erator and defender of the small states, and as the 
 noble champion of the independence of the nations. 1 
 While pretending to be battling against a violation 
 of neutrality by Germany, England is at the same 
 time seeking with every means at her command, 
 by the pressure of her powerful fleet, by the re- 
 straint of their commerce, as well as by direct 
 threats, to coerce the neutral states into a combina- 
 tion with her in a war that does not concern them, 
 and is, in fact, opposed to their interests. As yet 
 her results have been meager; even the Portuguese, 
 as used as they are to obey the commands of their 
 English lords, still seem to hesitate despite their evi- 
 dent willingness. This is but another evidence of 
 the loss that English prestige has suffered, princi- 
 pally through the inactivity of the British fleet, fur- 
 
 1 " Should I be asked what we are fighting for," said 
 Premier Asquith to the Parliament on August 6, " my an- 
 swer would be in two sentences, — in the first place, to fulfill 
 a solemn international pledge (Belgian neutrality). . . . 
 And secondly, we are fighting in defense of the principle — 
 in these days when force, material force, at times seems to 
 be the dominating factor in the development of mankind, — 
 for the principle that small nations shall not be crushed at 
 the pleasure of a strong power by which they are over- 
 whelmed in defiance of international fidelity and trust," 
 This is a true specimen of real English " cant." 
 
300 Conduct of the War 
 
 thermore through the exploits of the German ves- 
 sels, and, by no means least, through the wonderful 
 results achieved by the German submarine boats. 
 
 Japan, on the contrary, grasped eagerly at the op- 
 portunity, in conformity to her alliance with Britain, 
 to drive the Germans out of their positions on the 
 Pacific Ocean. And the Japanese would like to go 
 very much farther, and assume the protection of 
 British and French interests in Asia, but the ques- 
 tion would then arise as to how much they would be 
 willing to relinquish in the end. Whereas hitherto 
 England has held herself to be the champion of the 
 white race against all others, and although the 
 Briton looks with haughty disdain upon all men of 
 color, — in India, for instance, refusing social equal- 
 ity to Hindoos even of the highest culture, — the 
 English now combine with the Japanese, and set 
 them on the Germans, indifferent to the fact that 
 by so doing they are not only violating the princi- 
 ples they advocate, but are educating to efficiency the 
 future foe from whom they will have the most to 
 fear for their empire of the seas, just as they are 
 also willing to turn the European continent over to 
 Russian dominance. Nor is England ashamed, any 
 more than is France, to let loose against the Ger- 
 mans all manner of foreign races, — yellow, brown 
 and black hordes, down to the most brutal negroes. 
 The two nations who look upon themselves as the 
 vanguard of culture and morality in this war against 
 the modern Hun are truly worthy of each other! 
 
 In other directions also England's methods in the 
 present war have been in harmony with her usual 
 
Manner of Conducting the War 30 1 
 
 disregard of all standards of humane consideration, 
 only that now, in correspondence with the magnitude 
 of the present conflict, this exceeds even its ordinary 
 limits. All German colonies are being destroyed in 
 so far as this is possible through English agency, 
 and thus numerous centers for a wide and beneficent 
 service in the interest of civilization are being blotted 
 out. Moreover, Britain is not content with paralyz- 
 ing her enemies' commerce and capturing their mer- 
 chant vessels, but holds up all neutral shipping on 
 the high seas, to search for and capture German 
 citizens. Neither has she hesitated to violate the 
 mails to and from Germany. She interferes with 
 the trade of neutral nations at her pleasure, detains 
 their ships, declares to be contraband whatever it is 
 to her advantage to consider as such, and altogether 
 proceeds with an utter disregard of international 
 law and of the obligations she assumed through in- 
 ternational agreements. And the neutrals submit to 
 all this, although not without an occasional sigh of 
 regret; of them all, only the Americans venture to 
 make a half-hearted protest when the results are too 
 severe on their pocketbooks, but only to be put off 
 with fair words and a few crumbs of comfort. But 
 even they submit meekly when vessels plying be- 
 tween the United States and its island possession, 
 Porto Rico, are stopped by the British, and any Ger- 
 mans that may be found on them are seized and 
 carried off to Jamaica or to the Bahama Islands. 
 And this is what the Americans call neutrality ! Al- 
 though the other nations are little inclined to admit 
 it, it is daily being demonstrated that Germany's war 
 
302 Conduct of the War 
 
 against England is at the same time a war for the 
 liberation of the seas, and for the true independence 
 of nations. 
 
 But the worst that the war has revealed is the 
 appalling lack of conscience that England displays, 
 and the terrible decadence of the English character. 
 How much lying and empty phrasing is masked be- 
 hind the display of high motives that the English 
 parade before the world, how little they really mean 
 by their frequently quoted " love of fair play " as 
 soon as their own advantage is at stake, how dis- 
 reputable the individual Englishman often is who 
 outwardly passes for a perfect gentleman, the world 
 has long been learning; but the depth of moral base- 
 ness that they have shown in connection with this 
 war, no one would heretofore have believed possible. 
 In the masses, even of the more educated, this is ex- 
 cusable, for they believe what is told them, and 
 know no better; but all the more heavily does the 
 responsibility for it rest upon the leading classes — 
 the statesmen, the writers, the press, and to some 
 extent even with the higher army officers. We have 
 discovered that English " gentlemen " do not shrink 
 from any crime, if only outward appearances can be 
 preserved. Lord Haldane openly declared that in 
 the spring of 19 14, when he was the British Secre- 
 tary for War, and came to Berlin, ostensibly on a 
 mission of peace, and accepted the honors that were 
 bestowed upon him there as the messenger of peace, 
 that in reality he went there " not to pave the way 
 for more amicable relations, but to learn all that he 
 could from the German military organization which 
 
English Brutality 303 
 
 might prove useful to England." This is probably 
 false ; but all the more significant is the fact that the 
 noble Lord eagerly claims to be the perpetrator of a 
 contemptible action for the sake of gaining pop- 
 ular favor in England, and one of which he was not 
 even guilty. 
 
 The hideous dumdum bullets, such as the British 
 have long been using in their wars with " savage " 
 peoples, are being supplied to the army in great 
 quantities. The judges in England set aside every 
 idea of right or of justice with a smile of cold in- 
 difference when dealing with a German in the dis- 
 charge of their official duties. German men who 
 have been domiciled in England for decades, some 
 having been in the public service there, — at the uni- 
 versities, for instance, are apprehended, separated 
 from their families, and crowded together in concen- 
 tration camps, such as were used in the Boer war (p. 
 215), 1 or are placed on detention ships in the Ports- 
 
 1 Winston Churchill, now Britain's First Lord of the 
 Admiralty, who was war correspondent for the " Morning 
 Post " during the Boer war, wrote at the time : " There 
 is but one way in which the opposition of the Boers can be 
 broken, and that is by the most severe measures of sup- 
 pression, — we must kill the parents in order that their 
 children may have respect for us." Kitchener carried this 
 doctrine into effect in the most cruel manner. In the con- 
 centration camps 54,326 children and 38,022 women were 
 crowded together; of these, according to the British figures, 
 14,000, and according to those of the Boers, 20,000 per- 
 ished. English newspapers published in November, 1901, 
 reported of these camps that " the mortality is greater than 
 during an epidemic of cholera," and that of every 1,000 
 persons, an average of 383 died. 
 
304 Conduct of the War 
 
 mouth harbor. And in the face of these deeds of 
 their own, the English are making a great and ap- 
 pealing outcry over the alleged brutalities of which 
 the Germans are supposed to have been guilty on hos- 
 tile territory. The terrible and barbarous methods 
 that were resorted to in this war almost at the outset 
 are due to the English even more than to the French. 
 They compelled us to take measures of reprisal to 
 which we had recourse with great reluctance, such 
 as that of interning the English who were domiciled 
 in Germany; they have brought our soldiers to the 
 point where they look upon their British opponents 
 as their mortal foes, with whom they therefore fight 
 in a spirit of bitter hatred quite foreign to them 
 when in battle with the French or Russians. Since 
 the Germans cannot be vanquished in open warfare, 
 the great endeavor of the English is to cut them off 
 from all food supplies, and so to subdue them by 
 famine. The " humane " Americans seem to find 
 this method of procedure quite in the natural order 
 of things, but they nevertheless raise a cry of pro- 
 test at the injuries inflicted upon their interests when 
 we meet the English intention to starve us out by 
 declaring that we will destroy the merchant vessels 
 that are taking food to England. The evident in- 
 tention is not only to annihilate the power of the 
 German state, but to destroy the entire German peo- 
 ple as well, and above all else, their industries, their 
 factories, and their cities. With malicious satisfac- 
 tion the English technical journals, such as " The 
 Engineer," are portraying to their readers the large 
 profits that will accrue to Britain from such a result. 
 
Defamation of the Germans 305 
 
 The most despicable of all, however, is the fabric 
 of lies that the English have been weaving, and have 
 spread over the world. It reveals a moral degen- 
 eracy from which one turns with disgust. No 
 calumny is too despicable, no lie too unreasonable 
 to serve their purpose. That the very next day may 
 prove it false does not in the least deter them, for 
 once having been set afloat, it has done its mission, 
 and the mass of the British public is too ignorant 
 and too credulous to allow an opinion once formed 
 to be corrected by a later and truer statement of 
 facts. At the same time the total want of general 
 information, and the consequent inability to under- 
 stand other nations that prevails among the Eng- 
 lish people is drastically revealed. Momentarily 
 the English have achieved most astounding results 
 by this procedure to which they have had resort; 
 but in other countries there is even now a gradual 
 awakening to the truth, and the day must come when 
 in England also the eyes of the people will be opened. 
 Then, when it is too late to mend, they will realize 
 that, aside from the moral wrong, the greatest in- 
 jury inflicted by this system of calumny has been 
 to themselves and to their country's reputation. 
 
PART III 
 
 THE NEW WORLD CONDITIONS AND THE 
 PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 The New World Conditions and the Problems 
 of the Future 
 
 While the final negotiations about Sicily were 
 being concluded between Rome and Carthage, be- 
 fore they went to war about that island in the year 
 264 b. c, the Carthaginian said to the Roman 
 tribune : " What are you thinking of that you are 
 willing to go to war with us about an island ? You 
 have no fleet, you are inexperienced in the conduct 
 of a war at sea; without our permission you dare 
 not even venture to wash your hands in the sea." 
 But the Roman answered : " We have always made 
 it a practice to learn from our enemies. We have 
 frequently altered our method of warfare and our 
 army organization from the ground up, — we did 
 this a little at a time; do not therefore force us to 
 go to sea, for, once we are driven to it, we shall 
 soon have more and better ships than you have, and 
 shall then conquer you by sea as well as by land." 
 This prophecy was immediately fulfilled when Duil- 
 lius won the victory in the first battle at sea, and 
 again in many later encounters upon the water. 
 
 This is precisely the situation in which Germany 
 finds herself to-day with regard to England, with 
 the exception, however, that in the war about Sicily, 
 
 309 
 
3io 
 
 New World Conditions 
 
 Rome was the aggressor, whereas in the present con- 
 flict Germany is the one that has been forced against 
 her desire to engage in it. Whether the outcome 
 will bear out the similarity — who will venture to 
 prophesy ? 
 
 Then Hannibal took charge of the war against 
 Rome, and not only dealt her one staggering blow 
 after another, but also succeeded in forming a pow- 
 erful coalition against her, with the intention of 
 destroying this Italian state, and forcing Rome back 
 again into the unimportant position that she had 
 held in past centuries. In seeking to explain why 
 Rome nevertheless bore off the final victory, Polybius 
 draws a comparison between the character of the 
 two states. " The Carthaginian constitution," he 
 says, " was originally and in its main features a 
 well regulated one. The Carthaginians had a king, 
 the Counsel exercised the functions of an aristocracy, 
 and the people were given the rights to which they 
 were entitled. But at the time of Hannibal the 
 Carthaginian state had already passed the zenith of 
 its power, whereas Rome was then at the height of 
 its development. Carthage had arrived at that 
 stage of her history when most of the important mat- 
 ters of state were submitted to the people for deci- 
 sion (a fully developed democracy, therefore), 
 whereas in Rome the Senate, composed of the ablest 
 Romans, was in control. Consequently the deci- 
 sions of the Romans, and the measures they adopted 
 were superior to those of the Carthaginians, and 
 therefore they eventually conquered them." For 
 this achievement it was greatly to the advantage of 
 
Analogy 311 
 
 the Romans that they possessed an abundance of ma- 
 terial, especially the necessaries of life, or at least 
 had easy access to them, as Polybius points out, 
 " So far as the conduct of the war is concerned," he 
 then continues, " the Carthaginians were, of course, 
 better equipped and better trained for the war at 
 sea, whereas for the war on land the Romans were 
 far better prepared. For to this, the Romans de- 
 voted themselves with great ardor; the Carthagini- 
 ans, on the contrary, neglected their foot soldiers, 
 and made provisions only for their horsemen. The 
 reason for this is that the Carthaginians employed 
 foreigners and mercenaries, whereas the Roman sol- 
 diers were natives and citizens. The fortune of the 
 Carthaginians therefore depended upon the mood of 
 the mercenaries they hired, while the Romans placed 
 their dependence upon their own valor, and upon the 
 support of their allies. Even though the Romans 
 might lose at the beginning, they would nevertheless 
 continue without loss of zeal, which the Cartha- 
 ginians would not; for the Romans were fighting 
 for their fatherland and for their children; their 
 courage knew no abatement, therefore, and they 
 fought to the end, even to the sacrifice of their lives, 
 until the foe was vanquished. Because of the valor 
 shown by their warriors in the conflict at sea, they 
 were victorious there also, despite their lack of ex- 
 perience; for at the critical moment the courage of 
 the ship's soldiery is of higher value than is tech- 
 nical experience.' , 
 
 We need not follow this parallel in its particu- 
 lars. The divergences, mainly due to the great 
 
312 New World Conditions 
 
 changes that have taken place in the methods of 
 warfare, are apparent to every one. But quite as 
 evident also is the fact that the decisive elements in 
 the two situations are identical. 
 
 The analogy between the present war, between 
 England and Germany, and the Punic wars must 
 claim the attention of every student of history, and 
 has been frequently commented upon by historians, 
 without as well as within our own land. In the an- 
 cient conflict, however, the theater of war was con- 
 fined to the narrow limits of the Mediterranean 
 countries, whereas the one of to-day well nigh en- 
 circles the globe. Furthermore, Hannibal's invita- 
 tion to all the peoples and states of the ancient world 
 to combine with him against Rome, for its destruc- 
 tion, did not receive the wide response that Eng- 
 land's efforts to gain allies for a world war against 
 Germany have found. How completely in other 
 respects the analogy is borne out, in the struggle of 
 the state whose greatest strength is by sea with the 
 one whose main dependence is upon its land forces, 
 as well as in the utterly different structure of the 
 two state organizations, the careful reader will have 
 recognised. 
 
 The Punic wars are the turning point in ancient 
 history. With them the ancient system of state 
 organization begins to crumble, and at the same 
 time the development of ancient civilization has 
 reached its zenith, and henceforth slowly but stead- 
 ily declines, until it ends in the dead level of complete 
 disintegration and primitive conditions. Again the 
 similarity of events and of the historic situation is 
 
Utter Change in the World 313 
 
 plainly and undeniably evident. What may be the 
 relations and circumstances that will develop at the 
 close of the present gigantic struggle, the manner 
 of whose termination no eye can foresee, and in 
 what condition the individual states and nations will 
 emerge from it, no one would be rash enough to 
 prophesy, and as often as this question may be asked 
 of the future on either side of the firing lines, just 
 so often would it prove vain to venture an answer. 
 
 We Germans are firmly convinced that we shall 
 endure to the end, and, undismayed, shall carry the 
 war to a successful termination. But whether it 
 will then be possible to solve all the stupendous 
 problems by which the world will be confronted, 
 who can say ? In other words, will England's tyran- 
 nous supremacy at sea be broken, and a true free- 
 dom of the seas be secured, with a consequent free 
 intercourse between the nations, or will the general 
 exhaustion be so great that no more than a tem- 
 porary adjustment can be made, and the map of 
 Europe in no wise be changed? Should this be the 
 case, the peace that will follow the war will be no 
 more than a prolonged armistice, only a period of 
 waiting until the final solution must be reached. 
 
 But of so much we may be certain, — the world 
 in which we shall find ourselves after peace has been 
 concluded will be totally different from the one 
 with which we have been familiar, even should there 
 be no outward change, no shifting of the old-time 
 boundary lines. For this war that England has 
 brought about is not only the greatest war in the 
 history of mankind, but it is the most epoch making 
 
314 
 
 New World Conditions 
 
 event of modern history. The world as we knew 
 it before August I, 19 14, has ceased to be. What 
 precedes that date seems to belong to a remote past, 
 so far removed from us that we can hardly realize 
 that we had a share in it; we have suddenly been 
 called upon to adjust ourselves to a new world, and 
 to force our minds into wholly new channels of 
 thought. In addition to the new problems that the 
 war has brought with it, many old ones have been 
 revived, — problems that we had supposed were dis- 
 posed of, never to disturb us again, but which now 
 urgently demand adjustment. The responsibility 
 which this places upon us, — upon the government, 
 upon each one of us individually, and upon the peo- 
 ple as a whole, is a stupendous one, and one which 
 no one can realize without anxious misgivings. 
 But in this we are not alone, for the other nations, 
 those that forced this war upon us, deliberately 
 planned and began it, will discover that for them too 
 it will become a struggle for existence, or at least 
 for their political position in the world. 
 
 This is pre-eminently true of England, the insti- 
 gator of the war. The English set it afoot because 
 they believed continued peace to be incompatible 
 with the preservation of their position of dominance 
 in the world. But it has developed that the very 
 dangers that it was hoped would be averted by the 
 war are still clamoring at England's heels, and that 
 her world dominion and her empire of the seas are 
 menaced to-day as never before, not even during 
 the time when anxious fear of Napoleon's threat- 
 ened domination would not allow William Pitt to 
 
British Empire Imperiled 315 
 
 rest in peace, and hastened his early death. What- 
 ever may be the issue of a great battle at sea, the 
 belief that Britain is invincible upon the water has 
 been shattered; the fear of her fleet is waning, and 
 the achievements of the submarine boats have proved 
 her floating iron giants to be vulnerable. For the 
 first time in a period of two hundred years Eng- 
 land has had her coasts attacked and bombarded by 
 an enemy's vessels. She has been compelled to 
 close her ports to foreign vessels, and to restrict 
 her ocean routes in a measure that heretofore would 
 hardly have been deemed possible. The few Ger- 
 man cruisers and raiders have inflicted considerable 
 damage on British trade, and have carried the fear 
 of them to India's distant shores and into the Pacific. 
 While England plans to starve the Germans into 
 submission, the prices of grain have advanced to a 
 much higher level in Great Britain than they have in 
 Germany, and the fishing industry, upon which the 
 British are very dependent for food, is lying pros- 
 trate. As little as they may be disposed to admit 
 it, there can be no doubt that the anxious question 
 frequently suggests itself to the men of England 
 who bear the responsibility for the welfare of its 
 people, whether they will find it possible to supply 
 the British Isles uninterruptedly with at least the 
 minimum of necessary imports, especially if Ger- 
 many should decide to adopt the plan proposed by 
 Admiral von Tirpitz, and announce a blockade of the 
 British coast, and then proceed ruthlessly against 
 all merchant shipping destined for British ports, a 
 proceeding in which Germany is fully justified by 
 
316 New World Conditions 
 
 England's total disregard for the demands of inter- 
 national law. 
 
 To these anxious cares another is added by the 
 manifest unrest in various parts of the British Em- 
 pire. That the Irish question has again reached an 
 acute stage has already been mentioned. The Irish 
 are persistently refusing to enlist in the British 
 army, and the authorities in England feel compelled 
 to keep a strict guard upon the island, to suppress 
 all freedom of speech and of the press, and have 
 again resorted to the suspension of the Habeas Cor- 
 pus Act, that time hallowed institution for safe- 
 guarding the personal freedom of every citizen of 
 Great Britain. Irish patriots, both at home and in 
 America, are cherishing the hope that Ireland may 
 find her opportunity to sever her relations with 
 England, if not in this war then in a following one ; 
 and since, if accomplished, this step would be the 
 death blow to England's dominance at sea, Ireland 
 might then hope that her independence would prove 
 an enduring one. 1 
 
 In South Africa the Boers have again taken up 
 arms, and although they have suffered defeat, it is 
 clearly to be seen from the nature of the English 
 reports that as yet they are not entirely subdued. 
 How matters stand in India no one outside of the 
 initiated few in government circles has any idea. 
 But the most significant event in this connection is 
 the uprising of Islam against Britain, together with 
 Turkey's participation in the war, and the conse- 
 
 1 See note, page 98, referring to a pamphlet by Sir 
 Roger Casement. 
 
European Culture Endangered 317 
 
 quent menace to Britain's supremacy in Egypt and 
 her control of the Suez Canal, the main artery of sup- 
 ply to the British Kingdom. And even should Eng- 
 land and her allies be the victors in the war, these 
 dangers will not be lessened for that reason, but on 
 the contrary, they will become even greater. For 
 aside from the fact that the end of the war will by 
 no means assure the end of this political ferment, 
 England will then have to cope with the new situa- 
 tion which she herself will have created in deliver- 
 ing the whole of the European continent, together 
 with a large part of Asia, over to Russian domina- 
 tion, and at the same time having raised Japan to 
 a position of power at sea in both the Pacific and 
 Indian oceans, by which this island empire of the 
 East will but have had its appetite whetted for 
 further conquests. The inevitable consequence, and 
 one which English statesmen must fully realize, will 
 be that not many years after the present war is over, 
 England will be at war again, not only with Rus- 
 sia, but with Japan also, in a conflict that in all like- 
 lihood will assume even greater proportions than the 
 one in which she is engaged at present. 
 
 And for him who views the world's history in its 
 entirety, there looms up behind all these problems 
 of the future the haunting thought that the analogy 
 between the present and the Punic wars may persist 
 to the end, and that with the outbreak of this war 
 modern civilization may have reached its turning 
 point, and the future will witness its gradual de- 
 cline. The fact is that the indications point that 
 way in whatever direction we may look for evidence. 
 
<?l8 New World Conditions 
 
 International law has been annihilated by England ; 
 and although the attempt may be made to rehabili- 
 tate it when the war is over, who is credulous enough 
 to believe that in the future it will prove more en- 
 during than it has proved in the past? From the 
 outset, the present war has been characterized by 
 brutality such as no war of the nineteenth century 
 has shown. The reason for this is to be found in 
 the systematic and malicious slander of the Germans, 
 begun while the nations were still at peace by the 
 officially conducted propaganda among the French 
 soldiers, by which they were given the impression 
 that the Germans give no quarter in battle, and, 
 when established in an enemy's country, deport 
 themselves like barbarians there. A further reason 
 is to be found in the practice of the French soldiers, 
 when in action, of throwing down their arms and 
 displaying the white flag, and then, when the Ger- 
 man soldiers move forward with the expectation of 
 finding no further resistance, suddenly firing upon 
 them, — a trick which the English officers were 
 quick to learn from the French, and to accept as an 
 established military ruse, and to teach their soldiers. 
 In addition, there was the demoralizing effect of the 
 wholly irresponsible and untrustworthy behavior of 
 the Belgian people, many of whom not only par- 
 ticipated in the fighting clad as civilians, but treach- 
 erously fell upon the German soldiers, while in their 
 quarters and unarmed, to destroy them, frequently 
 perpetrating the most cruel mutilations. 
 
 Dispelled for all time are the dreams of those well 
 intentioned visionaries who hoped for a day when 
 
End of Internationalism 319 
 
 the nations would be at peace forever, and all their 
 disputes would be settled at the bar of an interna- 
 tional tribunal of arbitration by which war would 
 be made impossible, — dreams that have been so 
 widely entertained in America where the people have 
 become effeminate in their sentiments in recent 
 years. The Hague peace conferences instituted at 
 the suggestion of the Czar — how great a travesty in 
 the world's history ! — and the palace in which they 
 were held, are a satire on the times, and subsequent 
 events have fully justified Germany in her disinclina- 
 tion at first to participate in this empty farce. 
 
 Instead of continuous peace, a series of long and 
 sanguinary wars will mark the century upon which 
 we have but just entered, unless, indeed, Germany 
 should bear off a decisive victory now, and could 
 then stand for peace throughout the world, as for 
 forty-three years she has stood for peace in Europe, 
 much to the chagrin of England and her allies. But 
 in any case, the dominating circumstance by which 
 coming events will be most strongly influenced will 
 be the impassible gulf that has opened between Eng- 
 land and Germany, and their feeling of bitter enmity 
 for each other. So far as we can scan the future, 
 a reconciliation is not possible; we Germans can 
 never forget how England has served us. 
 
 After the confused cosmopolitanism of the 
 eighteenth century, and in marked contrast to it, the 
 nineteenth century developed a strong sense of in- 
 dividualism among the nations ; they grew strongly 
 conscious of their distinct existence as nations, and 
 of the power that is inherent in national unity. But 
 
320 
 
 New World Conditions 
 
 in more recent years there seemed to have arisen in 
 conjunction with the free expansion of the indi- 
 vidual nationalities, a desire for co-operation among 
 the peoples of the world, under fixed international 
 regulations, and in vigorous but friendly competi- 
 tion. This disposition toward combined action 
 among the nations may be regarded as the necessary 
 complement to their well defined individualism, and 
 seemed to promise an enduring and harmonious 
 progress of universal culture. But this, too, was a 
 dream that has vanished. The era of international- 
 ism is past and will never return. It will be re- 
 placed by a period of vigorous and ruthless assertion 
 of national ambition, — the struggle of the nations 
 with one another, — not in friendly rivalry now, 
 however, but in a much wider field, and by force of 
 arms. 
 
 We Germans have all too long given ourselves 
 over to the hallucination that by our well meant over- 
 tures of friendship we might arouse an honest recip- 
 rocation of our sentiments among the other na- 
 tions, and, by overcoming all prejudice, secure the 
 recognition of our equal position among them, — 
 the recognition of our right to a free exercise of our 
 national vigor within limits set by a just regard 
 for the rights of others. But at last the scales have 
 fallen from our eyes; not only has the onslaught 
 made upon us by our open enemies convinced us that 
 we have been pursuing an illusion, and hoping for 
 the impossible, but the attitude of the neutrals has 
 tended even more toward undeceiving us. This is 
 perhaps the bitterest disappointment we have yet ex- 
 
Loss to Cultural Influences 32 1 
 
 perienced; but we are men, and will face the truth, 
 and know how to bear it. Henceforth the welfare 
 of our own people and the measures necessary to its 
 preservation shall be our sole care. To the dictates 
 of conscience we will give ear, and it will be our 
 first duty to quicken it and keep it ever on guard; 
 but to return to the paths of internationalism, and 
 again sacrifice interests of great importance to our- 
 selves for the sake of it, would be a crime against 
 our own people. 
 
 But that the highest interests of civilization must 
 suffer when the nations are thus isolated through 
 the intensity of their individualism will be apparent 
 to every one. Science and art will be affected the 
 most of all. The international organizations that 
 were instituted for their advancement are dissolved, 
 and the ties that have thus been severed can never 
 again be restored. Personal relations of friendship 
 between individual savants and artists from among 
 even those nations that are now at bitter enmity 
 with one another will, we hope, be renewed; but 
 anything more than this can never, in so far as we 
 can foresee, be re-established. The gulf which 
 yawns between the nations cannot be closed within 
 the lifetime of the present generation. 
 
 And in this connection we cannot refrain from 
 deploring the terrible gaps that the war has torn in 
 the ranks of the entire younger generation, and 
 therefore also among the young men upon whom the 
 future of the intellectual life of the nation depends. 
 Quite beyond the power of our reckoning is the toll 
 of sacrifice in this respect that we have paid, and to 
 
^22 New World Conditions 
 
 which we are daily adding, — promising young sci- 
 entists, and men in the fulness of their intellectual 
 powers, whose names are everywhere honored for 
 the services they have rendered mankind. Of Aus- 
 tria and France, and Russia also, this is quite as true, 
 and even England will learn what the war entails 
 when once her volunteers are fighting at the front. 
 In deep sorrow and with anxious misgivings for the 
 nation's intellectual future, we scan the lists of the 
 missing from day to day. How can that which has 
 thus been destroyed ever be replaced! 
 
 There is yet another resemblance in which the 
 parallel between the present epoch in history and the 
 corresponding one in ancient times would appear to 
 be maintained, and perhaps the one in which the 
 similarity is most significantly apparent. The im- 
 mediate, and at the same time the most disastrous 
 result of Hannibal's war, and of the subsequent wars 
 that Rome waged with the Macedonian powers in 
 the eastern Mediterranean region, was the emanci- 
 pation of the Orient. Up to this period of time the 
 Hellenic form of culture, that had developed from 
 the Greek, had extended unrivaled throughout the 
 entire civilized world as far east as the Indus toward 
 the south, and northward to the Aral-Caspian steppe, 
 while its influence penetrated even farther, and made 
 an enduring impression upon India and central Asia. 
 As a result of the Roman conquests, that part of 
 Asia east of the Euphrates severed its connection 
 with the West, and ere long this political reaction 
 was followed by a corresponding return to the ear- 
 lier form of culture, — the re-awakening of the peo- 
 
Emancipation of the Orient 323 
 
 pie of the Orient and of its civilization. Rapidly 
 the movement spread — to Syria and to Egypt ; the 
 re-invigoration that Judaism experienced as a result 
 of it, is historically its most significant consequence. 
 But the deepest inroads it made were within the Ro- 
 man Empire itself, and upon the development of 
 western culture. Steadily the movement pressed 
 onward, until eventually it culminated in the advance 
 of the Arabs into Spain, the south of France and 
 Italy, and later in the acquisition of Constantinople, 
 the Balkan peninsula and Hungary by the Turks, 
 and therewith reached the limits beyond which it 
 could not penetrate. 
 
 At present there are indications that a similar 
 movement is under way, but, like all else at this time, 
 on a much larger scale. Until toward the close 
 of the nineteenth century, western civilization was 
 pressing forward with such persistence that there 
 was reason to believe it would ere long encompass 
 the world; even in China, whose homogeneous cul- 
 ture had maintained itself uninfluenced for three 
 thousand years, it made an effort to gain a foot- 
 hold. The first interruption to its onward march 
 was through the rise of the Japanese, the nation 
 of the East that accepted the outward forms and 
 acquirements of western culture for the purpose of 
 keeping its empire free from the interference of 
 Europeans, or at least with the intention to be rid 
 of them in time, and so to preserve its national in- 
 dependence, that rested on an entirely different basis. 
 This seemed quite acceptable to the western world, 
 and, by recognizing Japan as a great power, this 
 
324 New World Conditions 
 
 eastern empire was welcomed into the circle of states 
 whose entire structure was based on European ideals 
 of culture. Their purpose to divide the world 
 among themselves was by no means relinquished, 
 however, and we have seen in this brief outline 
 that we have been following, with what energy it 
 was being carried out in recent years. 
 
 How different is the prospect of the future that 
 the present war has opened to our eyes! Every- 
 where we see evidences of Asia's intention to sever 
 its connection with Europe. Japan is openly reach- 
 ing out to grasp the power that will give her the 
 dominating influence in the Pacific and Indian 
 oceans, while her endeavor to acquire supremacy 
 in China no longer encounters opposition from 
 Europe. Nevertheless, as has already been said, the 
 inevitable consequences will be a war with America 
 on the one hand, and with Europe and Australia 
 on the other, upon the outcome of which the fu- 
 ture of these countries will depend. In India a 
 strong current of sentiment is setting steadily to- 
 ward liberation from the British yoke, and it will 
 not be turned aside, no matter what may be the 
 issue of the present war, but on the contrary, it will 
 bide its time and will take advantage of the earliest 
 opportunity, when England's hands are tied, to ac- 
 complish its object. 
 
 But of supreme significance is the participation 
 of Islam in the present conflict. The Turks have 
 begun the struggle for the preservation of their em- 
 pire, knowing full well that its end is at hand if 
 Germany and Austria meet with disaster. The 
 
Holy War 325 
 
 Holy War which has been declared as a far reach- 
 ing call to the Moslem world, is meeting with in- 
 creasing response ; even the Shiite Persians are tak- 
 ing steps toward freeing their land from English 
 and Russian oppression, and are grasping at this, 
 their last opportunity, to regain their national inde- 
 pendence. How affairs will shape themselves if this 
 Mohammedan uprising is productive of results, — 
 whether, in the first place, the Turkish Empire under 
 the regime of the Young Turk party will find physi- 
 cal and intellectual force within itself sufficient to 
 allow of its reconstruction on foundations that will 
 be enduring, no one can foretell. But of this we 
 may feel certain, — if the present Islamitic move- 
 ment succeeds, the day will have dawned for a new 
 era of history for Asia Minor and Egypt, but not 
 for them alone! 
 
 To the dangers by which civilization in Africa is 
 being threatened, but a brief allusion will be made. 
 Not only is a valuable achievement of much labor, 
 and an agency for the dissemination of western cul- 
 ture being wantonly destroyed in the war of an- 
 nihilation that England is waging against the Ger- 
 man colonies in Africa, 1 but through the ruthless 
 
 1 On the other hand, the terrible deeds that were perpe- 
 trated in the Congo Free State — another bastard product 
 of the " concert of European powers " — under the mis- 
 rule of the now so much lauded Belgiums, were not only 
 viewed with indifference, but actually protected by the 
 English and French, until the Irishman, Sir Roger Case- 
 ment, exposed their ghastly cruelties, and made it im- 
 possible to refrain from taking at least some outward 
 measures to do away with the worst of them. 
 
326 New World Conditions 
 
 conflict in which the white settlers there are engaged, 
 the unrest among the natives is being promoted. 
 Their smouldering opposition to the white race, and 
 the awakening sense of their own power is stimu- 
 lated in even a greater degree, however, by the 
 shameful fact that England and France have trans- 
 ported, not only the Caucasian and semi-Caucasian 
 races of north Africa, but all the Negroes whom they 
 could procure, to fight for them on the battle fields 
 of Europe in the great conflict by which the fate 
 of the European nations is to be decided. It is 
 quite possible that consequences of a terrible nature 
 may eventually result from this step, and that the 
 European colonies, together with the rule of the 
 white man in Africa, will be as much a thing of the 
 past at the close of another century, as were the 
 Greek colonies and Greek rule in Bactria and Per- 
 sia in the second century b. c. 
 
 Should England and her allies carry off a decided 
 victory, the results, although different, will be even 
 more disastrous to the progress of western culture. 
 For in that event both Europe and Asia will be de- 
 livered over to Russian domination. The Russians 
 are not an integral part of the European world of 
 culture however, despite the veneer of its civiliza- 
 tion that they have laid on, but, on the contrary, are 
 distinctly opposed to it, as the leaders of the nation 
 have always declared; not only do they have noth- 
 ing in common with it, but to assail it is regarded 
 by them to be their mission in the world's history. 
 At present they are again revealing their true atti- 
 tude in the relentless oppression of the Germans, 
 
Responsibilities of the Future 327 
 
 Fins and Poles who are domiciled within the Rus- 
 sian Empire. The whole world is aware of what 
 Russian supremacy in Europe would mean; the Eng- 
 lish and the French know it too, as eagerly as they 
 would appear to have forgotten it. There can be 
 no doubt that where Russia treads, all true culture 
 and all national freedom are crushed under foot. 
 
 Whatever may be the outcome of the war, its 
 unalterable consequence has been an immeasurable 
 loss in those influences that make for the highest 
 cultural interests of the race, and this sacrifice will 
 continue even into the remote future. That we 
 Germans have been thoroughly roused to a national 
 self -consciousness, and have become absolutely 
 united as a nation, that a wonderful impetus has been 
 given to the idealistic side of our national life, and 
 a mighty wave of self-sacrificing devotion to all that 
 is highest has swept our land, we fully appreciate as 
 splendidly ennobling to our people, in spite of all the 
 misery and heart-ache we see on every hand. But 
 when weighed in the balance with all that has been 
 lost to mankind and to the progress of civilization 
 through this war, the gain is far outweighed by the 
 sacrifice. And the responsibility for all this, that 
 world conditions reached such a pass, is England's ! 
 Hers is the crime of having plunged the world into 
 a war brought about by the English statesmen who 
 followed the course laid out for his country by Ed- 
 ward VII, and for which they will be called to ac- 
 count before the tribunal of history! 
 
 Even with regard to our internal organization our 
 
328 New World Conditions 
 
 nation and our state will be called upon to solve 
 wholly new problems, and undertake wholly new 
 tasks. The old differences and antagonisms on 
 which the conflict of interests and of the political 
 parties was based, will, in a large measure, recede 
 into the background, or will at least take new forms, 
 or be re-adjusted, and new questions of tremendous 
 importance will take their place. But in this re- 
 spect, too, it is impossible to pierce the veil that hides 
 the future, and to foretell that which will come to 
 pass. Yet even now every German must clearly dis- 
 cern that if the German nation would maintain its 
 position in the world, there are three things that we 
 must cleave to as the inviolable basis of our inde- 
 pendent and vigorous existence, and which must 
 therefore be placed beyond the power of political 
 parties, — our military organization; our economic 
 organization, together with protection for our agri- 
 cultural industries, for by these the necessities of 
 life are assured to us, and we are made independent 
 of supplies from abroad; and lastly, a virile mo- 
 narchical government placed beyond the influence of 
 party strife, and wholly independent to act, that it 
 may be free to combine and utilize in creative activity 
 all the forces of which the nation is capable. For 
 the beneficent results of this activity we had every 
 reason to be grateful when the outbreak of the war 
 found us fully supplied with material, and thor- 
 oughly prepared, while every day that the war con- 
 tinues gives us renewed evidence of its efficiency. 
 
 THE END 
 
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