. ' • - - ,. = .\' ,/\ -~ :j I - , C, y'- ,\> ,r. >^^. ^■^:>^-^/: ^ •/. ^ ^' ^'^"-^^ N^^. ^ "---v. ,5 ^';^ i . '■ ^^ ^ .■ . '■ •f' .' -. - A'- ^ ■'-, .-■■'-'.- , ^ / "^ A-' '/' " " . - v^^ c- \- , ~ -f^ ..^ ^ .0" . ^ ^ ' ," ^ , '-^ .C>^ . ---^ '■ . , -^O. ' ' ^' ^ AV . ^ '" ^ --^ -^V . \ -O aX ~- ^-^^ ^ ■■■^ •' ^ A' ' '• '' ■<- aX ■0' r% --i^p: ,v^A., AA-A> -r'-- .;^ -a;-/'.^ '^ ,a,..a;'A% ^^.' ■ 5^., aX '^ . A ■<,-. aX ^ •■^^^. : A^ ■>- •.V ^.. ■r '^->. ,0 o %.,^- Ai> 'K< c,-^ * .V ,^>^'- , '/• •^.^ '^oiV v.^ -C, -'/% *"'^^ \>''^^::' .Oc '.. ^ ^. ^^■ ^ .#"^- -r^ xO o. '.:> * ., .■^ -0- %^'''' - ; ^^-.o^^ V^' ,x<\ ^^. .xC^ -^ V^ ':p .-V \'' ^^^ c » ^ '• -. -Z;^ ' * <- ^ ^^-> ^ V I » A' v '■y^ .'■' .0- oX' ■^ .^ -^. • ^ ■"^.x^ .^■% -O^ V- ^-,N .0- .0- vN-^' .<^' -S: "V- ,n\' '^:.. ^v ^V co-.;V'^^^;p^^ .-^' N^- ■'■p. ' ^ ,' • ^ .^ y . ^ ' ' r ,0 o. v>^"; %.,^' ,nX^'-: .0 o. '^, ,v N^:.. V READ AND DISTRIBUTE. REPORT MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, UPON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, FROM JULY 26, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 7, 1862. Eeprhtted entiee from the Copt transmitted by the Secuetart of War to the House of Represkntatives. BOSTON: PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICE OF THE BOSTON COURIER. 1864. ^ ■']'{() 7 In the Senatk of the Uxited States, .7rt7nw7-?/ 20, 1SC4. Resolved, That five tliousanci copies of the Report of General George B. MeClelhin upon the operations of th. Army of the Potomac, recently communicated by the Secretary of War to the House of Representatives, be prints for the use of the Senate, without the accompanying documents and maps. Stereotyped and Printed by i. E. Fakwell and Compaht, 87 Confess Street, Boston. LETTER THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING THE KEPOET OF MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN Upon the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and its Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862. December 23, 1863. — Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. War Department, 1 Washington City, D. C, December 22, 1863. j Sir: — In compliance with the resolution dated December 15, 1863, I have the honor to communicate herewith " the Report made by Major-General George B. McCIellan, concerning the organization and operations of the army of the Potomac, while under his command, and of all army operations while he was commander-in-chief. " I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Hon. Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the House of Representatives. EEPORT. FIRST PERIOD niAPTER I. New York, August 4, 1863. Sir : I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the army of the Potomac wliilo under my charge. Accom- panying it are the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important documents connected willi its organization, sujjply, and movements. These, with lists of maps and memoranda siibmitted, will ])e found duly ap- pended, duly arranged, and marked for conven- iiiit reference. Charged, in the spring of ISOl, with the oper- ations in the Department of the Ohio, which included the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and latterly Western Virginia, it had become my duty to counteract the hostile designs of the enemy in Western Virginia, which were imme- diately directed to the destruction of the Balti- more and Ohio railroad, and the possession of the Kanawha valley, with the ultimate object of gaining Wheeling and the control of the Ohio river. The successful affairs of Phillippi, Rich Moun- tain, Carrick's Ford, &c., had been fought, and I had acquired possession of all Western Vir- ginia north of the Kanawha valley, as well as of the lower portion of that valley. I had determined to proceed to the relief of the upper Kanawha valley, as soon as provision was made for the permanent defence of the mountain passes leading from the east into the region under control, when I received at Bever- ly, in Randolph county, on the 21st of July, 1801, intelligence of the unfortunate result of the battle of Manassas, fought on that day. On the 22d I received an order by telegraph, directing me to turn over my command to Brig- adier General Rosecrans, and repair at once to Washington. I had already caused reconnoissances to be made for intrenchments at the Cheat Mountain pass : also on the Hunterville road, near Elk- water, and at Red House, near the main road from Romney to Graft(m. During the afternoon and night of the 22d I gave the final instructions for the construction of these works, turned over the command to Brigadier General Rosecrans, and started, on the morning of the 23d, for Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of the 2Gth. On the 27th I assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington, on both banks of the river. With this brief statement of the events which immediately preceding my being called to the command of the troops at Washington, I pro- ceed to an account, from such authentic data as are at hand, of my military operations while commander of the army of the Potomac. The subjects to be considered naturally ar- range themsels-es as follows : — The organization of the army of the Potomac. The military events connected with the defences of Washington, from July, 1801, to March, 1802. I'he campaign on the Peninsula, and that in Maryland. The great resources and capacity for powerful resistance of the South at the breaking out of the Rebellion, and the full proportions of the great conflict about to take place, were sought to be carefully measured ; and I had also en- deavored, by every means in my power, to im- press upon the authorities the necessity for such immediate and full preparation as alone would enable the Government to prosecute the war on a scale commensurate with the resistance to be offered. On the fourth of August, 1801, I addressed to the President the following memorandum, pre- pared at his request. MEMORANDUM. The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are engaged, mainly in this : that the purj)ose of ordinary war is to con- quer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this contest it has become necessary to crush a population suffiiicntly numerous, intel- ligent and warlike to constitute a nation. "We have not only to defeat their armed and organ- ized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in tiie re- cent battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been spared the labor and expenses of a great effort. Now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the Rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class, now it is with a people, — our mili- tary success can alone restore the former issue. I3y thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly pro- tective policy as to private property and un- armed persons, and alenient course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent res- toration of a peaceful Union. But in the first instance the authority of the Government nuist be supported by overwhelming physical force. Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the military action of the Government should be prompt and irresist- ible. The Rebels have chosen Virginia as their bat- tle-field, and it seems projier for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus direct- ing our main etibrts, it is necessary to diminish the resistance there offered us, by movements on other jjoints both by land and water. Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong movement be made on the Mississippi, and that the Rebels be driven out of Missouri. As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement through that State into East- ern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the east. The possession of those roads by us, in con- nection with the movement on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining tlie evacuation of Virginia by the Rebels. In the mean time all the passes into Western Virginia from the east should be securely guarded, but I would advise no movement from that quarter towards Rich- mond, unless the political condition of Kentucky renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee through that State. Every effort should, how- ever, be made to organize, equip and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and reopen the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to re- tain them in our possession. The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac in tlie direction of Lees- burg will be very materially diminished so soon as our force in this vicinity becomes organized, Btrong, and efficient, because no capable general will cross the river north of this city, when we have a strong army here ready to cut off his re- treat. To revert to the West. It is probable that no very large additions to the troops now in Mis- souri will be necessary to secure that State. I presume that the force required for the movement down the Mississippi will be deter- mined by its commander and the President. If Kentucky assumes the right position, not more than 20,000 will be needed, together with those that can be raised in that State and Eastern Ten- nessee, to secure the latter region and its rail- roads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville. The Western Virginia troops, with not UKire than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, siiould, under proper management, sufiice for its protection. When we have reorganized our main army here, 10.000 men ought to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Pdto- mac, 5.000 will garrison Baltimore, ;l,000 Fort Monroe, and not more than 20.000 will be neces- sary at the utmost for the defence of Washing- ton. For the main army of operations I urge the following composition : — 250 regiments of infantrj', say 22.'>,000 men. 100 field buttcTios, 000 gnus l.'i.OOO '' 28 regiments of cavalry 25,500 " 5 regiments engineer troops 7,500 " Total 273,000 " The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transpor- tation for everything save tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean and tli.' rivers emjjtying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the emi)Ioyment of a strong naval force to protect the movement of a lleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diver- sions and rendering it necessary for them to detach largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be thrcati-ned, or else landing and forming estahlisliments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also co- operate with the main army in its eftbrts to seize the imiiortant seaboard towns of the Rebels. It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very impor- tant element into war, by the great facilities thusi given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations. It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such others as the particular case may require. We must en- deavor to seize places on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the confederate army. The proposed movement down the Slississippi will produce important results in this connection. That advance and the progress of the main army at the east will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to be encountered by each. The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all questions connected with cotton is too well understood by the President and cabinet to need any illustration from me. There is another independent movement that has often been suggested and which has always recommended itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian territory upon Red River and western Texas for the purpose of protecting and devel- oping the latent Union and free-State sentiment well known to predominate in western Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment in AVestern Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a free State. How far it will be possible to support this movement by an advance throtigh New Mexico from California, is a matter which I have not sufficiently examined to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practic- able, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as well as identifying them with our cause and connecting tlie bond of Union between them and the General Government. If it is not departing too far from my pro- vince, I will venture to suggest the policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests are with us, — their antipathies exclusively against our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not be difficult to obtain from the Mexican gov- ernment the right to use it at least during the present contest, the road from Guaymas to New Mexico ; this concession would very materially reduce the obstacles of the column moving from the Pacific; a similar permission to use their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and tlie Rio Grande, would enable us to throw a column of troops by a good road from Tampico, or some of the small harbors north of it, upon and across the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any, it woidd be desirable to take into service and employ Mexican sol- diers, is a question entirely political, on which I do not venture to ofler an opinion. The force I have recommended is large ; the expense is great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish the object in view, but I understand it to be the purpose of tliis great nation to reestablish the power of its govern- ment and restore jteace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time. The question to be decided is simply this : shall we crush the Rebellion at one blow, termi- nate the war in one campaign, or shall we leave it as a legacy for our descendants ? When the extent of the possible line of oper- ations is considered, the force asked for for .tlie main army under my command cannot be re- garded as unduly large ; every mile we advance carries us further from our base of operations and renders detachments necessary to cover our communication, while the enemy will be con- stantly concentrating as he falls back. I propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virgina and occupy Richmond, hut to occupy Charleston, Savannati, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile and New Or- leans ; in other words to move into the heart of the enemy's country, and crush the Rebellion in its very heart. By seizing and repairing the railroads as wo advance, the difficulties of transportation will be materially diminished. It is perhaps unneces- sary to state that, in addition to tlie forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur. In conclusion, I would submit that the exi- gencies of the treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the obligations of the United States for such 'sup- plies as may there be obtained. GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. I do not think the events of the war hare proved these views upon the method and plans of its conduct altogether incorrect. They cer- tainly have not proved my estimate of the num- ber of troops and scope of operations too large. It is probable that I did undcr-estimate the time necesary for the completion of arms and equip- ments. It was not strange, however, that by many civilians intrusted with authority there should have been an exactly opposite opinion held on both these particulars. The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to destroy the morale and organiza- tion of our army, and to alarm Government and people. Tlie national capital was in danger ; it was necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, to build works for its defence, strong and capable of being held by a small force. It was necessary also to create a new army for active operations and to expedite its organiza- tion, equipment, and the accumulation of the ma- terial of war, and to this not inconsiderable la- bor all my energies for the next three months were constantly devoted. Time is a necessary element in the creation of armies, and I do not, therefore, think it neces- sary to more than mention the impatience with which many regarded tlie delay in the arrival of new levies, though recruited and pressed forward with unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and sufjply of arms and cqui])ments, or the vehe- mence with which an immediate advance upon the enemy's wcjrks directly in our front was urged by a patriotic but sanguine people. The President, too, was anxious for the speedy employment of our army, and, although pos-, sessed of my plans through frequent conferences, de.-ired a paper from me upon the condition of the forces under my command, and the imme- diate measures to be taken to increase their efficiency. Accordingly, in the latter part of October, I addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War. SiK : In conformity with a personal under- standing with the President yesterday, I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of the army under my command, and the means required for the preservation of the Government and the suppresbion of the Rebellion. It will be remembered that, in a memorial I had the honor to address to the President soon after my arrival in Wasliington, and in my com- munication addressed to Licutenant-General Scott, under date of 8th of August, in my let- ter to the President, authorizing him, at liis re- quest, to withdraw tlie letter written by me to General Scott; and in my letter of the 8th of September, answering your note of inquiry of that date, my views on the same subject are frank- ly and fully expressed. In these several communications I have stated tlie force I regarded as necessary to enable this army to advance with a reasonable certainty of success, at the same time leaving tlie capital and the line of the Potomac sufficiently guarded, not only to secure the retreat of the main army, in tlie event of disaster, hut to render it out of the enemy's power to attempt a diversion in Maryland. So much time lias passed, and the winter is ap- proaching so rapidly, that but two courses are left to the Guvernment, viz: either to go into winter quarters, or to assume the offensive with forces greatly inferior in number to the army I regarded as desirable and necessary. If politi- cal considerations render the first course unad- visable, the second alone remains. Wliile I regret that it has not been deemed expedient, or perhaps possible, to concentrate tlie forces of the nation in tliis vicinity, (remaining on the de- fensive elsewhere,) keeping the attention and efforts of the Government fixed upon this as the vital point, where the issue of the great contest is to be decided, it may still he that, by introducing unity of action and design among the various armies of the land, by determining the courses to be pursued by the various com- manders under one general plan, transferring from the other armies the superfluous strength not required for the purpose in view, and thus reinforcing the main army, whose destiny it is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able to move with a reasonable prospect of success before the winter is fairly upon us. The nation feels, and I share tliat feeling, tliat the army of the Potomac holds the fate of the country in its hands. The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and the effect of the next battle will be so in)i)or- tant throughout the future, as well as the present, tliat I continue to urge, as I ever have done since I entered upon the command of this army, upon the Government to devote its energies and its available resources towards increasing the num- bers and efficiency of the army on which its sal- vation depends. A statement carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers and artillery of this army, gives us the necessary garrison of this city and its fortifica- tions, 33,70.5 men,— say 35,000. The present garrison of Baltimore and its de- pendencies is about 10,000. I have sent the chief of my staff to make a careful examin ition into the condition of these troops, and to obtain the infor- mation requisite to enable me to decide whether this number can be diminished, or the reverse. At least 5,000 men will be required to watch the river hence to' Harper's Ferry and its vicin- ity; probably 8,000 to guard the lower Poto- mac. • As you arc aware, ,all the information we have from spies, prisoners, &c., agrees in showing tliat the enemy have a force on the Potomac not les:^ than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched. It is plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to ren- der it reasonably certain, the active army should not number less than 150,000 efficient troops, with 400 guns, unless some material change occurs in the force in front of us. The requisite force for an advance movement by the army of the Potomac may be thus esti- mated : — Column of active oper.ations 150,000 men, 400 guns. (iarrison of city of Washi,K,'ton.. .'JojOOO " 40 " To guard the rotoraac to Har- pi>r'ii.Forry 5,000 " 12 " To guard tlic lower Totoiuac fci,000 " ','4 " Garrison for Baltimore and An- napolis 10,000 " 12 " Total effective force required. . 205,000 men, 488 guns, or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 210,000 men, should the losses by sickness, &e., not rise to a higher percentage than at ])resent. Having stated what I regard as the requisite force to enable this army to advance, I now pro- ceed to give the actual strength of tiic army of tlie Potomac. Tlic aggregate strength of the army of the Po- tomac, by the official report on the morning of the 27th instant, was 108,318 officers and men, of all grades and arms. This includes the troops at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the upper and lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. The force present for duty was 147,095. Of this numt)er, 4,208 cavalry were completely un- armed. 3,103 cavalry only partially armed, 5.1)79 infantry unequipped, making 13,410 unlit for the field, (irrespective of those not yet sufficiently drilled.) and reducing the effective force to 134.- 2S5, and the number disposable for an advance to 70,285. The infantry regiments are, to a con- siderable extent, armed with unscrviceal)le we;?p- ons. Quite a large number of good arms, which had been intended for tins army, were ordered elsewl\ere, leaving the army of the Potomac in- sufficiently, and. in some cases, badly armed. On the 30th of September there were with this army 228 field guns ready for the field ; so far as arms and equij)ments are concerned, some of the batteries are still quite raw, and unfit to go into action. I have intelligence that eight New York batteries are en route hither : two others are ri'udy for the field. 1 will still (if the New York bat- teries have six guns each) be 112 guns short of the number required for the active column, say- ing nothing, for the present, of those necessary for the garrisons and corps on the Potomac, which would make a total deficiency of 200 guns. I have thus briefly stated (mr present condi- tion and w^nt! ; it remains to suggest the means of supplying the deficiencies. First, that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as procured, wlietlier mantifactured in this country or purchased abroa — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 12-pounder howitzer guns ; Wilson's battery, F, 1st New York Artillery, 4 3-inch ordnance guns. Infantry. — Kearney's brigade. 1st. 2d, 3d, and 4th New Jersey volunte«.rs ; Sloeum's brig- ade, 10th and 27th New York, 5th Maine, and 90th Pennsylvania volunteers; Newton's brig- ade, 18th, 31st, and 32d New York, and 95th Pennsylvania volunteers. m'call's division. Artillery. — Seymour's battery, C, 5th United States, 6 Najjoleon guns; Easton's battery. A, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 Napoleon guns; Cooper's battery, IJ, 1st Pennsylvania, lO-jxiunder Par- rott guns; Kein's battery, C, 1st Pennsylvania, 6 — 2 10-pounder, and 4 12-pounder Parrott guns. Infantry. — Reynolds's brigade, 1st, 2d, 5th, and 8th Pennsylvania reserve regiments; Meade's brigade, 3d, 4th, 7th, and 11th Penn- sylvania reserve regiments ; Ord's brigade, Otii, 9th, 10th, and 12th Pennsylvania reserve reg- iments. 1st Pennsylvania reserve rifles. king's division. Artillery. — Gibbon's battery, B, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns; Monroe's battery, D, 1st Rhode Island. 6 10-pounder Parrott guns; Gerrish's battery. A, Mew Hampshire, Js'apo- leon guns; Durrell's battery, Pennsylvania, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns. Infantry. — brigade, 2d, 6lh, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana volunteers; Patrick's brigade, 20th, 21st, 23d, and 25th New York State Militia; Augur's brigade, 14th New York State Militia, and 22d, 24th, and 30ih New York volunteers. FIFTH COUPS, GEXKRAL BANKS. Cavalry. — 1st Maine, 1st Vermimt, 1st Michi- gan, 1st Rliode Island. 5th and 8th New York, Keyes's battalion of Pennsylvania, 18 companies of Maryland, 1 squadron of Virginia. Unattached. — 28th Pennsylvania volunteers, and 4th regiment Potomac home brigade, (Mary- land volunteers.) "Williams's division. Artillery. — Best's battery, F, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Hampton's battery, Maryland, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns; Thomp- son's battery, Maryland, 4 10-poiuider Parrott 17 guns ; Matliews's battery, P, Pennsylvania. G 3-inch ordnance guns; battery, M, 1st New Yorli, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Knapp's battery. Pennsylvania, 6 lO-puunder Parrott guns; McMahon's battery, New York, 6 3-inc'b ordnance guns. Infanfrij. — Abercrombie's brigade, 12tli and . 2d Massachusetts, and ICth Indiana, 1st Poto- niac home brigade, (Maryland.) 1 company I Zouaves D'Afrique, (Pennsylvania,) volunteers. brigade ; Otli New York State militia, 1 and 20th Pennsylvania, 29th Indiana and 3d Wisconsin volunteers. brigade; 28tli New York, 5th Connecticut, 46th Pennsylvania, 1st Maryland, 12th Indiana, and 13th Massachu- setts volunteers. SHIELDS'S DIVISION. AHillery. — Clark's battery, E, 4th United States, 6 lO-pounder Parrott guns ; Jenks's bat- tery, A, li-t V^irginia. 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 6-pounderguns ; Davy's battery, B. 1st Virginia, 2 10-poundcr Parrott guns ; Huntington's bat- tery, A, 1st Ohio, fi 13-pounder James's guns; ! Robinson's battery, L, 1st Ohio, 2 12-pounder howitzers and 4 G-pounder guns ; and battery, 4tli Ohio artillery. InfantvLj. — brigade, 14th Indiana, 4th, 8th, and (;7th Ohio, 7th Virginia, and 84th Pennsylvania volunteers ; brigade, 5tli, 62d, and Glith Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 30ih Illinois volunteers; brigade, 7th and 20th Ohio, 7th Indiana, 1st Virginia, and lull Pennsylvania volunteers. Andrew sharp- shooters. GENERAL WADSWORTH's COMMAND. Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry, at Alex- andria, and 4th Pennsylvania cavalry, east of the Capitol. Artillery and Infnniry. — 10th New Jersey volunteers. Bladcnsburg road ; 104tli New York volunteers, Kalorania Heights; 1st Wisconsin heavy aitillcry. Fort Cass Virginia; 3 batteries of New York artillery, Ft)rt9 Ethan Allen and Marcy ; depot of New York light artillery, Camp Barry; 2d District of Columbia volun- teers, Washington City; 2Gth Pennsylvania vol- unteers, G Street wharf; 2(jth New York vol- unteers. Fort Lyon ; 95th New York volun- teers Camp Thomas ; 04th New York, and detachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers, Alexandria; 91st Pennsylvania volunteers, Franklin Square barracks ; 4th New York artil- lery. Forts Carroll and Greble; 112th Pennsyl- vania volunteers. Fort Saratoga; 7()th New York volunteers. Fort Massachusetts ; 59th New York volunteers. Fort Pennsylvania ; de- tachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers. Fort Good Hope; 99th Pennsylvania volunteers, F.>rt Mahon ; 2d New York light artillery, Forts Ward, Worth, and Blenker; 107th and 54th Pennsylvania volunteers, Kendall Green ; Dick- erson's light artillery, 8(>th New York, and detachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers, east of the Capitol; 14tli Massachusetts (volun- teers) heavy artillery, and 56th Pennsylvania volunteers. Forts Albany, Tillinghast, Richard- son, Runyon, Jackson, Barnard, Craig, and Scott ; detachments of 4th United States .artil- lery and 37th New York volunteers, Fort Wash- 3 ington ; 97th, 101st, and 91st New York, anj 12th Virginia volunteers. Fort Corcoran. In Camp near Washington. — 6th and lOtli New York, Swain's New York, and ild Pennsyl- vania cavalry, all dismounted. These troops (3,359 men) were ordered to report to Colonel Miles, commanding railroad guard, to relieve 3,306 older troops ordered to be sent to Manassas to report to General Aber- crombie. GENERAL Dlx's DEPARTMENT, BALTIMORE. Cavalry. — 1st Maryland cavalry and detach- ment of Purnell Legion cavalry. Artillery. — Battery I, 2d United States ; bat- tery — , Maryland; battery L, 1st New York, and two independent batteries of Pennsylvania artillery. Infantry. — 3d and 4th New York, 11th, 87th, and 111th Pennsylvania, detachment 21st Mas- sacliusetts, 2d Delaware, 2d Maryland, 1st and 2d Eastern Shore (INIaryland) home guards, and Purnell Legion (two battalions) Maryland vol- unteers. lu a staff charged with labors so various and important as that of the army of the Potomac, a chief was indispensable to supervise the various departments and to relieve the commanding gen- eral of details. The officer of chief of staff, well known in European armies, had not been con- sidered necessary in our small peace establish- ment. The functions of the office were not defined, and, so far as exercised, had been in- cluded in the Adjutant-General's dejiartment. The small number of officers in this department, and the necessity for their employment in other duties, have obliged commanding generals dur- ing this war, to resort to other branches of the service to furnish suitable chiefs of staff. On the 4th of September, 1861, I appointed Colonel R. B. Marcy, of the inspector general's department, chief of staff, and he entered upon service immediately, discharging the various and important duties with great fidelity, industry, and ability, from this period until I was removed from command at Rectortown. Many improve- ments have been made during the war in our system of staff administration, but much re- mains to be done. Our own exxierience, and that of other armies, agree in determining the necessity for an effi- cient and able staff. To obtain this our staff establishment should be based on correct princi- ples, and extended to be adequate to the necessi- ties of the service, and should include a system of staff and line education. The affairs of the Adjutant-General's depart- ment, while I commanded the army of the Poto- mac, were conducted by Brigadier-General S. Williams, assisted by liieutenant Colonel James A. Ilardie, aide-de-camp. Their management of the department during the organization of the army in the fall and winter of 1861, and during its subsequent operations in the field, was excel- lent. They were, during the entire period, assisted by Captain Richard B. Irwin, aide-de-camp, and during the organization of the army by the fol- lowing-named officers : Captains Joseph Kirk- land, Arthur McClellan, M. T. McMahon, Wil- 18 Ham P. Mason, and William F. Biddle, aidcs-de camp. My personal staff, when we embarked for the Peninsula, consisted of Colonel Thomas M. Key, additional aide-de-camp; Colonel E. H. Wright, additional aide-de-camp and major, Gth United States cavalry; Colonel T. T. Gantt, additional aide-de-camp ; Colonel J. J. Astor, Jr., volunteer aide-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Col- burn, additional aide-de-camp and captain, Ad- jutant-General's department; Lieutenant-Colo- nel X. B. Sweitzer, addhional aide-de-camp and captain, Ist United States cavalry; Lieutenant- Colonel Edward McK. Hudson, additional aide- de-camp and captain, 14th United States infan- try; Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Von Radowitz, additional aide-de-camp; Major PL "Von Ham- merstein, additional aide-de-camp; Major W. W. Russell, United States marine corps ; Major F. LeCompte, of the Swiss army, volunteer aide-de-camp; Captains Joseph Kirkland, Ar- thur McClellan, L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, M. T. McMahon, William P. Mason, Jr., Wil- liam F. Biddle, and E. A. Raymond, additional aides-de-camp. To this number I am tempted to add the Prince dc Joinville, who constantly accompanied me through the trying campaign of the Penin- sula, and frequently rendered important services. Of these officers Captain McMahon was assigned to the personal staff of Brigadier-General Frank- lin, and Capt-ains Kirkland and Mason to that of Brigadier-General F. J. Porter during the siege of Yorktown. They remained subsequently with those general officers. Major Le Compt left the army during the siege of Yorktown; Colonels Gantt and Astor, Major Russell, Captains, L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, and Raymond at the close of the Peninsula campaign. Before its termination Captains W. S. Abert and Charles R. Lowell, of the 6th United States cavalry, joined my staff" as aides-de-camp, and remained with me until I was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac. All of these officers served me with great gallantry and devotion ; they were ever ready to execute any service, no matter how dangerous, difficult, or fatiguing. ENGINEERS. Wlien I assumed the command of the army of the Potomac I found Major J. G. Barnard, United States engineers, subsequently brigadier- general of volunteers., occupying the position of chief engineer of that army. I continued him in the same office, and at once gave the neces- sary instructions for the completion of the de- fences of the capital, and for the entire reorgani- zation of the department. Under liis direction the entire system of de- fences was carried into execution. This was completed before the army departed for Fort Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence of the skill of the engineers and the diligent labor of the troops. For some months after the organization of the army of the Potomac was connncnced there were no engineer troops with it. At length, however, three companies were assigned. Under the skilful management of Captain J. C. Duane, United States Engineers, these new companies rapidly became efficient, and, as will be seen, rendered most valuable service during the ensu' ing campaigns. The number of engineer troops being entirely inadequate to the necessities of the army, an ef- fort was made to jiartially remedy this defect by detailing the 15th and 50th New York volunteers, which contained many sailors and mechanics, as engineer troops. They were first placed under the immediate superintendence of Lieutenant- Colonel B. S. Alexander, United States Engin- eers, by whom they were instructed in the duties of pontoniers, and became somewhat familiar with tliose of sappjrs and miners. Previous to the movement of the army for the Peninsula this brigade was placed und-jr the connnand of Brigadier-General D. P. Woodbury, major Unit- ed States Engineers. The labor of preparing the eni^ineer and bridge trains devolved chiefly upon Captain Duane, who was instructed to procure the new model French bridge train, as I was satisfied that the India-rubber pontoon was entirely useless for the general purposes of a campaign. The engineer department presented the fol- lowing complete organization when the army moved for the Peninsula : — Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, chief engin- eer; First Lieutenant H. C. Altbott, topographi- cal engineers, aide-de-camp. Brigade volun- teer engineers, Brigadier-(4eneral Woodbury commanding : 15th New York volunteers. Colo- nel McLeod Murphy; 50th New York volun- teers, Colonel C. B. Stewart. Battalion, three companies United States Engineers, Captain J. C. Duane commanding ; companies respectively* commanded by First Lieutenants C. B. Reese, C. E. Cross, and O. E. Babcock, United States Engineers. The chief engineer was ably assist- ed in his duties by Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Al- exander, and First Lieutenants C. R. Comstock, M. D. McAlester, and Merrill. United States Engineers. Captain C. S. Stuart and Second Lieutenant F. U. Farquhar, United States Engin- eers, joined after the army arrived at Fort Mon- roe. The necessary bridge equipage for the opera- tions of a large army had been collected, con- sisting of batteaux with the anchors and flooring material, (French model,) trestles, and engin- eers' tools, with the necessary wagons for their transportation. The small number of officers of this corps available rendered it impracticable to detail engineers permanently at the hcad([uarters of corps and divisions. The companies of regular engineers never had their jjroper number of offi- cers, and it was necessary, as a rule, to follow the principle of detailing engineer officers tem- porarily whenever their services were required. TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS. To the corps of topographical engineers was intrusted the collection of topographical informa- tion and the preparation of campaign maps. Until a short time previous to the departure of the army for Fort Monroe, Lieutenant-Colonel John W. Macomb was in charge of this depart- ment, and prepared a large amount of valuable material. He was succeeded by Brigadier-Gen- eral A. A. Humphreys, who retained the position throughout the Peninsula campaign. These « 19 oflBcers were assisted by Lieutenants H. L. Abbott, O. G. Wagner, N. Bowon, John M. Wilson, and James H. Wilson, topographical engineers. This number, being the greatest avaihible, was so small that much of the duty of the department devolved upon parties furnished by Professor Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survejs and other gentlemen from civil life. Owing to the entire absence of reliable topo- graphical maps, the labors of this corps were difficult and arduous in the extreme. Notwith- standing the energy and ability displayed by General Humphreys, Lieutenant-Colonel Ma- comb, and their subordinates, who frequently obtained the necessary information under fire, the movements of the army were sometimes unavoidably delayed by the difllculty of obtain- ing knowledge of the country in advance. The result of their labors has been the preparation of an excellent series of maps, which will be inval- uable to any array traversing the same ground. During the campaign it was impossible to draw a distinct line of demarkation between the duties of the two corps of engineers, so that the labors of reconnoissances of roads, of lines of iutrench- ments, of fields for battle, and of the position of the enemy, as well as the construction of siege and defensive works, were habitually performed by details from either corps, as the convenience of the service demanded. I desire to express my high appreciation of the skill, gallantry, and devotion displayed by the officers of both corps of engineers, under the most trying circumstances. During the Maryland campaign I imited the two corps imder Captain J. C. Duane, United States Engineers, and found great advantages from the arrangement. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. For the operations of the medical department I i-efer to the reports, transmitted herewith, of Surgeon Charles S. Tripler and Surgeon Jona- than Letter man, who, in turn, performed the duties of medical director of the army of the Potomac, the former from August 12, 1861, until July 1, 1862, and the latter after that date. The difficulties to be overcome in organizing and making effective the medical department were very great, arising principally from the inexperi- ence of the regimental medical officers, many of whom were physicians taken suddenly from civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, " had to be instructed in their duties from the very alpha- bet," and from the ignorance of the line officers as to their relations with the medical officers, wliich gave rise to confusion and confiict of authority. Boards of examination were insti- tuted, by which many ignorant officers were removed; and by the successive exertions of Surgeons Ti'ipler and Letterman, the medical corps was brought to a very high degree of effi- ciency. With regard to the sanitary condition of the army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says that the records show a constantly increas- ing immunity from disease. " In October and November, 1861, with an army averaging 130,000 men, we had 7,932 cases of fever of all sorts ; of these, about 1,000 were reported as cases of, typhoid fever. I know that errors of diagnosis were frequently committed, and therefore tliia must be considered as the limit of typhoid cases. If any army in the world can show such a record as this, I do not know when or where it was assembled." From September, ISOl, to Feb- ruary, 1862, while the army was increasing, the number of sick decreased from 7 per cent, to 6.18 per cent. Of those, the men sick in the regimental and general hospitals were less than one half; the remainder were slight cases, under treatment in quarters. " During this time, so far as rumor was concerned, the army was being decimated by disease every month." Of the 8termined to move the army to the Peninsula, the duties of providing water transportatiiin were devolved by the Secretary of War upon his assistant, the lion. John Tuc- ker. The vessels were ordered to Alexandria, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls was placed in immediate charge of the embarkation of troops, transportation, and material of every descrip- tion. Operations of this nature, on so extensive a scale, had no parallel in the history of our country. The arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls were perfected with remarkable skill and energy, and the army and its material were era- barked and transported to Fortress Monroe in a very short space of time, and entirely without loss. During the operations on the Peninsula, until the arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, Gen- eral Van Vliet retained the position of chief quartermaster, and maintained the thorough or- ganization and efficiency of his department. The principal depots of supplies were under the im- mediate charge of Lieutenant Colonels Ingalls and Sawtelle. On the 10th of July, 1862, General Van Vliet having requested to be relieved from duty with the army of the Potomac, I appointed Lieuten- ant-Colonel Ingalls chief quartermaster, and he continued to discharge the duties of that office during the remainder of the Peninsula and Mary- land campaigns, in a manner which fully stis- tained the high reputatio^n he had previously acquired. The immediate amount of labor accomplished, often under the most difficult circumstances, the admirable system under which the duties of the department were performed, and the entire suc- cess which attended the etiorts to supply so largHj an army, reflect the highest credit upon the offi- cers upon whom these onerous duties devolved. The reports of General Van Vliet and Lieuten- ant-Colonel Ingalls, with the accompanying doc- uments, give in detail the history of the depart- ment from its organization imtil I was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac. SUBSISTENCE DJ'.PARTMENT. On the 1st of August, 1861, Colonel H. F. Clark, eomnusary of subsistence, joined my staff", and at once entered ujion his duties as chief com- missary of the army of the Potomac. In order to realize the resijonsibilities pertaining to this office, as well as to form a proper estimate of the vast amount of labor M'hich must necessarily de- volve upon its occupant, it is only necessary to consider the unprepared state of the country to engage in a war of such magnitude as the pres- ent, and the lack of practical knowledge, on the part of the officers, with reference to supply- ing and subsisting a large and at that time unor- ganized army. Yet, notwithstanding the exist- ence of these great obstacles, the manner in which the duties of the commissary department were discharged was such as to merit and call forth the connnendation of the entire army. During the stay of the army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, prior to the Penin- sula campaign, its subsistence was drawn chiefly from the depots which had been established by the commissary department at Washington, Al- exandria, Forts Corcoran and Runj'on. In the imi)ortant task of designating and establishing dei)ots of supplies. Colonel Clark was ably sec- onded by his assistants. Colonel Amos Beck- with, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-Colonel George Bell, commissary of 21 subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Porter, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. : Captain Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsist- ence, U. S. A.; Captain BrownwcU Granger, commissary of subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; Cajitain W. H. Bell, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A ; Captain J. H. Woodward, commissary of subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; and Captain W. R. Murphy, commissary of subsistence, U. S. volunteers. For a full knowledge of the highly creditable manner in which each and all of the above-men- tioned officers discharged their duties, I invite attention to the detailed report of Colonel Clarke. The remarks and suggestions contained in his report are worthy of attention, as affording valuable rules for the future guidance of the subsistence department in supphdng armies in the field. The success of the subsistence depart- ment of the army of the Potomac was in a great measure attributable to the fact that the sub- sistence department at Washington made ample provision for sending supirfies to the Peninsula, and that it always exercised the most intelligent foresight. It moreover gave its advice and countenance to the officers charged with its duties and reputation in the field, and those officers, I am happy to say, worked with it, and together, in perfect harmony for the public good. During the entire period that I was in command of the a,rmy of the Potomac, there was no instance within my knowledge where the troops were without their rations from any fault of the officers of this department. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. This very important branch of the service was placed under the charge of Captain C. P. Kingsbury, ordnance coi'jis, colonel and aide-de- camp. Great difficulty existed in the proper organization of the department for the want of a sufficient number of suitable officers to perform the duties at the various headquarters and depots of supply. But far greater obstacles had to be surmounted, from the fact that the supply of small arras was totally inadequate to the demands of a large army, and a vast proportion of those furnished were of such inferior quality as to be unsatisfactory to the troops, and condemned by their officers. The supply of artillery was more abundant, but of great variety. Rifled ordnance was just coming into use, for the first time in this country, and the description of gun and kind of projectile which would prove most effective, and should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere matter of tlieory. To obviate these difficulties, large quantities of small arms of foreign manu- facture were contracted for; private enteii^rise in the construction of arms and ammunition was encouraged; and by the time the army was ordered to move to the Peninsula the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. Much also had been done to bring the quality, both of arms and ammunition, up to the proper standard. Boards of officers were in session continually during the autumn and winter of 18G1, to test the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. The reports of these boards, confirmed by^ subsequent experience in the field, have done much to establish the respective claims of diflTer- ent inventors and manufacturers. During the campaigns of the Peninsula and IMaryland, the officers connected with the department were zealous and energetic, and kept tlie troops well supplied, notwithstanding the perplexing and arduous nature of their duties. One great source of perplexity was the fact that it had been necessary to issue arms of all varieties and calibres, giving an equal diversity in the kinds of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness was, therefore, incumbent upon the officers in charge, to prevent confusion and improper dis- tri])ution of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury dis- charged the duties of his office with great effi- ciency until the day of July, 1SG2, when his health required that he should be relieved. First Lieutenant Thomas G. Baylor, ordnance corps, succeeded him, and performed his duty during the rcmaintler of the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns with marked ability and success. The want of i-eports from Colonel Ivingsbury and Lieutenant Baylor renders it impossible for me to enter at all into the details of the organi- zation of the department. PROVOST marshal's department. Immediately after I was placed in command of the " Division of the Potomac," I appointed Colonel Andrew Porter, IGth regiment infantry, provost marshal of Washington. All the avail- able regular infantry, a battery and a squadron of cavalry were placed under his command, and by his energetic action he soon corrected the serious evils wliich existed, and restored order in the city. When the army was about to take the field, General Porter was appointed Provost Marshal General of the army of the Potomac, and held that most important position imtil the end of the Peninsula campaign, when sickness, contracted in the untiring discharge of his duties, com- pelled him to ask to be relieved from the posi- tion he had so ably and energetically filled. The Provost Marshal General's dej)artment had the charge of a class of duties which had not before, in our service, been defined and grouped under the management of a special department. The following subjects indicate the sphere of tliis department : ^.uppression of marauding and depredations, and of all brawls and disturb- ances, preservation of good order, and suppres- sion of disturbances beyond tlie limits of the camps. Prevention of straggling on the march. Suppression of gambling houses, drinking houses, or bar-rooms, and brothels. Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and places of public amusement. Searches, seizures, and arrests. Execution of sentences of general courts-martial, involving imprisonment or capital punishment. Enforce- ment of orders proliibiting the sale of intoxicat- ing liquors, whether by tradesmen or suttlers, and of orders respecting passes. Desei-ters from the enemy. Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. Countersigning safeguards. Passes to citizens within the lines, and for purposes of trade. Complaints of citizens as to the conduct of the soldiers. 22 General Porter was assisted by the following- named officers : — Major W. H. Wood, 17th United States in- fantry; Captain James McMillom, acting assist- ant adjutant-general, 17th United States infantry; Captain W. 'T. Gentry, 17th United States in- fantry; Captain J. W. Forsurth, 18th United States infantry; Lieutenant J. W. Jones, 12th United Statesinfantry ; Lieutenant C. F. Trow- bridge, IGth United Statesinfantry; and Lieu- tenant C. D. Mehafl'ey, 1st United States in- fantry. The provost guard was composed of the 2d Uniied States cavalry. Major Pleasanton, and a battalion of the 8th and 17th United States in- fantry. Major Willard. After General Porter was relieved. Major Wood was in charge of this department until after the battle of Antietam, when Brigadier-General Patrick was appointed Provost Marshal General. COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEACQUARTEES. When the army took the field, for the purpose of securing order and regularity in the camp of headquarters, and facilitating its movements, the office of conmiandant of general headquarters was created, and assigned to Major G. O. Haller, 7th LTnited States inf'antrJ^ Six companies of infantry were placed under his orders for guard and police duty. Among the orders appended to this report is the one defining his duties, which were always satisfactorily performed. JUDGE ADVOCATE. From August, 18G1, the position of judge advocate was held by Colonel Thomas T. Gantt, aide-de-camp, until compelled by ill health to retire, at Harrison's Landing, in August, 18G2. His reviews of the decisions of courts-martial during this period were of great utility in cor- recting the practice in military courts, diflusing true notions of disci])Hne and subordination, and setting before tlie army a higli standard of soldi- erly honor. Upon the retirement of Colonel Gantt the duties of judge advocate were ably performed by Colonel Thomas M. Key, aide-de- camp. SIGNAL CORPS. The method of conveying intelligence and orders, invented and introduced into the service by Major Albert J. Myer, signal officer United States army, was first jn-actically tested in large operations during the organization of the army of the Potomac. Under the direction of Major Myer a signal corps was formed by detailing officers and men from the different regiments of volunteers and instructing them in the use of the flags by day and torciies by night. Tlie chief signal officer was indefatigable in his exertions to render his corps effective, and it soon became available for service in every division of the army. In addition to the flags and torches. Major Myer introduced a portable insulated telegraph wire, which could be readily laid from point to point, and which could be used under the same genera! system. In front of Washington, and on the Lower Potomac, at any point within our lines not reached by the rrulitary telegraph, the great usefulness of this system of signals was made manifest. But ;* was not until after the arrival of the army upo the Peninsula, and during the siege and battU^i ji of that and the Maryland campaigns, that i\-* '; great benefits to be derived from it on the fie:d and under fire were fully appreciated. There was scarcely any action or skirmish in whicli the signal corps did not render important services. Often under heavy fire of artillery, and not unfrequently while exposed to musketry, the officers and men of this corps gave infor- mation of tlie movements of the enemy, and transmitted directions for the evolutions of our own troops. The rei)ort of the chief signal officer, with ac- companying documents, will give the details of the services of this corps, and call attention to those members of it who were part'icnlarly distinguished. TELEGRAPHIC. The telegraphic operations of the army (»* the Potomac were superintended by Major Thomas J. Eckert, and under tlie immediate direction of Mr. Caldwell, who was, with a corps of operators, attached to my headquarters during the entire campaigns upon the Peninsula and in Maryland. Tlie services of this corps were arduous and efficient. Under the admirable arrangements of Major Eckert they were constantly provided with all the material for constructing new lines, •which were rapidly established whenever the army changed position ; and it was not unfre- quently the case that the operatives worked un- der fire from the enemy's guns ; yet they invari- ably performed all the duties required of them with great alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom that I was without the means of direct telegraphic communication with the War De- partment and with the corps commanders. From the organization of the army of the Po- tomac up to November 1. 1862, including the PeninjJiila and Maryland campaigns, upwards of twelve hundred (1,200) miles of military tele- graph line had been constructed in connection with the operations of the army, and the number of operatives and builders employed was about two hundred, (200.) To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enter- prising aeronaut, who had the management of the balloons, I was greatly indebted for tlie valu- able information obtained during his ascensions. I have more than once taken occasion to re- commend the members of my staff, botii general and personal, for promotion and reward. I beg leave to repeat these recommendations, and to record tluir names in the history of the army of the Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their country owes a debt of gratitude still unpaid, for the courage, ability, and untiring zeal they dis- played during the eventful campaigns in which they bore so prominent a part. CHAPTER II. On the 15th of October the main body of the army of the Potomac was in the immediate vicinity of Washington, with detachments on 23 the left bank of the Potomac as fnr down as Liverpool point, and as far up as Williamsport and its vicinity. The different divisions wore posted as follows : Hooker at Budd's ferry, Lower Potomac ; Heintzelman at Fort Lyon and vicinity ; Franklin near the theological semi- nary; Blcnker near Hunter's chapel; McDowell at Upton's hill and Arlington; F. J. Porter at Hall's and Miner's hills ; Smith at Mackall's hill;McCall atLangley; Buellat Tenallytown, Meridian hill, Emow's chapel, &c., on the left bank of the river; Casey at Washington; Stone- man's cavalry at Washington; Hunt's artillery at Wasliington; Banks at Darnestown, with de- tachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Wil- liamsport, &o. ; Stone at Poolesville ; and Dix at Baltimore, with detachments on the Eastern Shore. On the 10th of October, 18GI. General McCall marched to Drainsville with his division, in order to cover reconnoissances to be made in all direc- tions the next day, for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, and of covering the operations of the topographical engineers in making maps of tlv.it region. On the 2'Jth, acting in concert with General McCall, General S'mith jiushed strcmg parties to Freedom hill, Vienna, Flint hill. Peacock hill, &c., to accomplish the same ])urpose in that part of the front. These reconnoissances were suc- cessful. On the morning of the 20th I received the following telegram from General Banks's head- quarters : — " Darnestown, October 20, 1861. " Sir : The signal station at Sugar Loaf tele- graphs that the enemy have moved away from Leesburg. All quiet here. "R. M. COPELAND, " Assistant Adj utant- General. "General Mabcy." Wliereupon I sent to General Stone, at Pooles- ville, the following telegram : — "Camp Griffin, October 20, 1861. " General McClcllan desires me to inform you that General McCall occupied Drainsville yes- terday, and is still there. Will send out heavy reconnoissances to-day in all directions from that point. The general desires that you will keep a good look-out iijoon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them. "A. y. COLBURN, " Assista7it Adjutant- General. " Brigadier-General C. P. Stone, Poolesville." Deeming it possible that General McCall's movement to Drainsville, together with the subsequent reconoissances, might have the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburg, and tiie despatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to confirm this view, I wish General Stone, who had onlj' a line of pickets on the river, the mass of his troops being out of sight of, and beyond range from, the Virginia bank, to make some display of an intention to cross, and also to watcn the enemy more closely than usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend that he should cross the river in force, for the pur- pose of fighting. The above despatch was sent on the 20th, and reached General Stone as early as 11 a. m. of that day. I expected him to accomplish all that was intended on the same day; and this he did, as will be seen from the folhnving despatch, re- ceived at my headquarters in Washington from Poolesville on the evening of October 20 : — " Made a feint of crossing at this place this af- ternoon, and at the same time started a recon- noitring party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island. The enemy's pickets retired to in- trencliments. Report of reconnoitring party not yet received. I have means of crossing one hundred and twenty- five men once in ten min- utes at each of two points. River falling slowly, "C. P. STONE. " B rigadier- General. " Major-General McClellan." As it was not foreseen or expected that Gen- eral McCall would be needed to co-operate with Gener.il Stone in any attack, he was directed to fall back from Drainsville to his original camp, near Prospect hill, as soon as the required re- connoissances were completed. Accordingly he left Drainsville, on his return, at about 8^ a. m. of the 21st, reachmg his old camp at about 1 a. m. In the mean time I was surprised to hear from General Stone tJiata portion of his troops were engaged on the Virginia side of the river, and at once sent instructions to General McCall to re- main at l)rains\ille, if he had not left before the order reached him. The order did not reach him until his return to his camp at Langley. He was then ordered to rest his men, and hold his division in read- iness to return to Drainsville at a moment's no- tice, should it become necessary. Similar instruc- tions were given to other divisions during the af- ternoon. The first intimation I received from General Stone of the real nature of his movements was iu a telegram, as follows : — " Edwards's Ferry, October 21 — 11.10 a. m. " The enemy have been engaged opposite Har- rison's island ; our men are bchavinerly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property. " You will please report your operati-'i.- "J otYen as an o])portunity offers itself. " With my best wishes for vour success, I am. &c., &c. GEO. B. MtCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding in Chief. "Brigadier-General A. E. Buexside, " Commanding Expedition." The following letters of instruction were sent to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman, and Butler; and I also communicated verbally to these officers my views in full regarding the held of operations assigned to each, and gave them their instructions as much in detail as was neces- sary at that time : — ^ " Headquarters of the Army, " Washington, D. C, Noremher 11, 18(J1. " General : In assigning you to the command of the department of Missouri, it is probably unnecessary for me to state that I have intrusted to you a duty which requires the utmost tact and decision. " You have not merely the ordinary duties of a military commander to perform; but the far more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of changing probably the majority of the personnel of the staff of the department, and of reducing to a point of econom}', consistent with the inter- ests and necessities of the State, a system of reckless expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard of before in tlie hi-;tory of the world. " You will find in your department many gen- eral and staff' officers holding illegal commissions and appointments, not recognized or approved by the President or Secretary of War. You will please at once inform these gentlemen of the nullity of their appointment, and see that no pay or allowances are issued to them until such time as commissions may be authorized by the Presi- dent i)V Secretary of War. " If any of them give the slightest trouble, you will at once arrest them and send them, under gtiard, out of the limits of your depart- ment, informing them that if they return, they will be placed in close confinement. You will please examine into the legality of the organiza- tion of the troops serving in the department. When you find any illegal, unusual, or impropei organizations, you will give to tb.e officers and men an opportunity to enter the legal military establishment under general laws and orders from the War Department ; rex)orling in full to these headquarters any officer or organization that may decline. " You will please cause competent and reliable staff officers to examine all existing contracts immediately, and suspend all payments upon them unt 1 you receive the report in each case. Where there is the slightest doubt as to the pro- priety of the contract, you will be good enough to refer the matter, with full explanation, to these headquarters, stating in each case what would be a fair compensation for the services, or materials rendered under the contract. Discontinue at once the reception of material or services under any doubtful contract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all officers who have in any way violated their duty to the Government. In regard to the political conduct of affairs, you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent Stntcs that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to ■apl'old the power of our National Government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. "With respect to military operations it is probable, from the best inforniation in my pos- session, that the interest of the Government will be best served by fortifying and holding in con- siderable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, keeping strong patrols constantly moving from the terminal stations, and concen- trating the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interests may demand. " I would be glad to have you make as soon af? possible a personal inspection of all the important points in your department, and report the result to me. I cannot too strongly impress upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly advised of the strength, condition, and location of your troops, together with all facts that will enable me to maintain that general direction of the armies of the United States which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to you to maintain thorough organization, discipline, and economy throughout your department. Please inform me as soon as possible of everything relating to the gunboats now in process of construction, as well as those completed. " The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of Missouri for its defence will be under your orders. "I am. General, iSbc, &c. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, ^'- Major- General Commanding U. S. A. " Maior-General H. W. Hallecic, U. S. A. " Commanding Department of Missouri." Headquarters of the Army, Washington, November 7, 1862. "General: In p-' ing you instructions for your guidance in command of the Department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely wish to express plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of operations there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River is by its position 27 80 closely related to the States of Illinois and Missouri, that it has seemed best to attach it to the Department of Missouri. Yoiir operations there, in Kentucky, will be confined to that por- tion of the State east of the Cumberland liiver. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard the importance of the territory committed to your care as second only to that occupied by the army under my immediate command. It is ab- solutely necessary that we shall hold all the State of Kentucky ; not only that, but that the majority of its inhabitants should be warmly in favor of our cause, it being that which best sub- serves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military opera- tions. I certainly cannot overestimate the im- portance of the former. You will please con- stantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting ; that issue is the preser- vation of the Union, and the restoration of the full authoritj-^ of the General Government over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily suppress this Rebellion, and restore the authority of the Government, by religiously re- specting the constitutional rigiits of all. I know that I express the feelings and opinion of the President, when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the General Govern- ment. "Tlie inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no man- ner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in all re- spects carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of these in- structions. " So nmch in regard to political considera- tions. Tlie military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences ; such is not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville sliould be your first and principal ob- jective point. It so happens that a large major- ity of the inhabitants of eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union; it therefore seeins proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you tlirow the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knox- ville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of east- ern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same time cut off the railwa ' connimnication between eastern Virginia and the Mississippi. It will be prudent to fortify the pass before leaving it in your rear. " Brigadier-General D. C. Bcell." " Headquarters of the Army, " Washington, November 12, 1862. " Geiteral: Upon assuming command of the department, I will be glad to have you make, as soon as possible, a careful report of the con- dition and situation of your troops, and of the military and political condition of your com- mand. The main point to which I desire to call your attention is the necessity of entering east- ern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances of success, and 1 hope that you will, with the least possible delay, organize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding at the same time the main avenues by which the Rebels may invade Kentucky. Our conversa- tions on the subject of military operations have been so full, and my confidence in your judg- ment is so great, that I will not dwell furlhur upon the subject, except to urge upon you the necessity of keeping me fully inf)riaed as to the state of affairs, both military and political, and your movements. In regard to political mat- ters, bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to up- hold the power of the General Government; as far as military necessity will admit, religious- ly respect the constitutional rights of all. Pre- serve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost energy in mili- tary movements, be careful so to treat the un- armed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the Rebels. " I mean by this that it is tije desire of the Government to avoid unnecessary irritation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. Where there is good reason to believe that per- sons are actually giving aid, comfort or infor- mation to the enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest them ; but I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexa- tious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well to direct that no arrest shall be made ex- cept by your order or that of your generals, unless in extraordinary cases, always holding the party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of his course. It should be our con- stant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by adhering to the causo of the Union. " If the military suggestions I have made in this letter prove to have been founded on erro- ne(jus data, you are of course perfectly free to change the plan of operations. " Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Commanding Department of the Ohio." " Headquarters of the Army, " Wusliiiigtou, February 14, 18G2. " General : Your despatches in regard to the occupation of Dafuskie island, &c., were re- ceived to-day. I s.aw also to-day, for the first time, your requisition for a siege train for Sa- vannah. " After giving the subject ail the consideration in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that, under present circumstances, the siege and cap- ture of Savannah do not promise results com- mensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah River, above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind, as its immediate results. " First. The capture of Savannah by a '■coup de main,' — the result of an instantaneous ad- vance and attack by the army aud navy. 28 "The time fortius has passed, and your letter indicates tliat you are not accountable for the failure to jcizu the propitious moment, but that, on the ci^ntrary, you perceived its advantages. " Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut otf its supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by a bombardment. "Although we have a long delay to deplore, the second course still remains open to us ; and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am con- fident you can thus reduce it. "With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essential ; you obtain comi)lete control of the harbor; you relieve the blockading lleet, and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations. "I do not consider the possession of S:tvan- nah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our liMndo. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first im- portance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and 1 shall be glad to learn that it is ours. " But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced by the reduction of Charleston and its defences. There the Rebellion had its birth ; there the unnatural hatred of our Government is most intense ; there is the centre of the boasted power and courage of the Rebels. " To gain Fort Sumter and held Charleston, is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we can be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route and armies are in motion wliich have certain preliminar}'^ objects to accomplish, before we are ready to take Charleston in hand. But the time will before long arrive when I shall be prepared to make that movement. In the mean time it is my advice and wish that no attempt be made upon Savannah, unless it can be carried witli certainty by a ' coup de main." " Please concentrate your attention and forces upon Puiaski and Fernandina. St. Augustine might as well be taken by way of an interlude, while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. Success attends us evurywhere at present. Very truly yours, "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, *^ Major- Genei-al Commaiuling United States Army. " Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, " Commanding at Port Royal, <5'c." " Headquauters of the Akmt, " Washington, February 23, 18G2. " General : You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to co-operate with the navy in the attacks upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief of staff, and Lieutenant VVeitzell, of the engineers The force at your disposal wdl consist of the first thirteen regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in jjcrson, tiie 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Gtli Michigan, (old and good regiments from Baltimore.) "The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Gth Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Mon- roe. "Two companies of the 21st Indiana are well drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island will be suffi- cient for your purposes. "After full consultation with officers well ac- quainted with the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived to the conclusion that two (2) light batteries fully equipped, and one (1) without horses, will be all that are neces- sary. " This will make your force about 14,400 in- fantry, 275 cavalry, 580 artillery; total 15,255 men. The commanding general of tlie depart- ment of Key West is authorized to loan you, temporarily, two regiments; Fort Pickens can, probai)ly, give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000. " The object of your expedition is one of vital importance — the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perluips the only one) is in the resistance oQ'ered by i'orts St.Pliilip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garri- son in them to render them perfectly secure ; and it is recommended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy guns and some troops be left at the pilot station (at the forks of the river) to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster. These troops and guns will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured. " Should the navy fliil to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault. " The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some eartlien batteries. Here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and cooperate with the naval attack, al- though it is more than probable that the Navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works arc taken, the city of New Orleans neces- sarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also the eastern bank of the river above the city. It may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order ; but if there appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to con- trol the city, it may be best for purpc^ses of dis- cipline to keep your men out of the city. " After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and par- ticularly to gain the Manchac pass. "Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Liv- ingston, will next claim your attention. " A feint on Galveston may facilitate the ob- jects we have in view. I need not call your at- tention to the necessity of gaining possession ot all the rolling stock you can on the different rail- ways, and of obtaining control of the roads them- selves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force should be accom- plished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to oj)en your com- munication with the northern column by the Jlississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as 29 you can safely dc so, either after or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the har- bor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves. '• I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition arc, Jirsf, the reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches ; then Mo- bile and its defenses ; then Pensacola, Galves- ton. &c. It is probable that by the time New Orleans is reduced, it will be in the power of the Government to reinforce the land forces suffi- ciently to accomplish all these olijects. In the mean time you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact tliat the great object to be achieved is the cap- ture and firm retention of New Orleans. I am, &.C. GEO B McCLELLAN, Major- General Commanding United States Army. " Major-General B. E. Butler, United States Volunteers. The plan indicated in the above letters com- prehended in its scope the operations of all the armies of the Union, the army of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be car- ried out simultaneously, or nearly so, aud in cooperation along the whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the army of tlie Potomac to perform its sliare in the execution of the wliole work. But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering fi-om a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration. A change had just been made in the War De- partment, and I was soon urged by the new Sec- retary Mr. Stanton, to take innuediate stej^s to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and to free the banks of the lower Potomac from the Rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels. Very soon after his entrance upon office I laid before him verbally my design as to the part of the plan of the campaign to be executed by the army of the Potomac, Avhich was to attack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. He in- structed me to develop it to the President, which I did. The result was that the President dis- approved of it, and by an order of January 31, I8ti2, substituted one of his own. On the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued without consultation with me : — " [President's General War Order No. 1.] " ExF.cuTivE Mansion, " Washington, January 27, 1862. ** Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of tlu' United States against the insurgcut forces. Tliat esi)ccially tlie army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virgiuia, the army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and fl(jtilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. " That all other forces, botli land and naval, with their respective conunanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey addi- tional orders when duly given. " That the heads of departments and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-iu-eliief, with all other commanders and sultordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibihties for prompt execu- tion of this order. " ABRAHAM LINCOLN." The order of January 31, 1862, was as fol- lows : — fPresidcnt's Special War Order No. 1.] " ExiiccTivE Mansion, "Washington, January 31, 1862. " Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south- westward of what is known as Manassas Junc- tion, all details to be in the discretion of tiie commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move on or before the 22d day of February next. " ABRAHAM LINCOLN." I asked his excellency whether this order was to be regarded as final, or whether I could be permitted to submit in writing my objections to his plan, and my reasons fu* preferring my own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore pre- pared the letter to the Secretary of War, which is given below. Before this had been submitted to the Presi- dent, he addressed me the following note : — " Executive Mansion, " Washington, February 3, 1862, " My dear Sir : You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the army of the Potomac : yours to be done by the Chesa- peake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on tiie railroad southwest of Manassas. "If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours : — " 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine ? "2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine ? " 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine ? " 4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this : that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? 30 i " 5th. Tn case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? " Yours, truly, "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. " Major-General McClellan." These questions were substantially answered by tlie following letter of the same date to the Secretary of War : — " Headquarters of the Army, "Washintjton, February 3, 1862. " Sir : I ask your indulgence for the follow- ing papers, rendered necessary by circum- stances. " I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27, 18G4, six days after the battle of Bull Run. "I found no army to command; a mere col- lection of regiments cov^^ering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispir- ited by the recent defeat. "Notliing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works ; nothing wliatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the I'otomac. "The troops were not only undisciplined, un- drilled, and dispirited ; they were not even placed iu military positions. The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. " Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me ; that task the hon- orable Secretary knows was given to me without solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplislied it will best be shown by the past and the present. " The capital is secure against attack, the ex- tensive forlilications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous arni}^ the enemy have been held in check, the State of Maryland is securely in our possession, the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all appre- hension of (rouble in Delaware is at an end; the enemy are confined to the positions they occu- pied before the disaster of tiie 21st July. More than all tliis, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army, to which the des- tinies of the country may be confidently com- mitted. This army is young and untried in bat- tle ; but it is animated liy the highest spirit, and is capalile of great deeds. "That so much has been accomplished, and euch an army created in so short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the liighcst glories of the administration and the na- tion. " Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack ; but there is a vast differ- ence Ixitween tiiat and the efficiency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory, and intrenched in a position long Kinoe selected, studied, and fortified. " In the earliest papers I submitted to the President, I asked for an effective and movalile force far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks of tlie Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. " Even when in a subordinate position, I al- ways looked beyond the operations of tlie army of the Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory, but looked to com- bined and decisive operations. " When I was placed in command of the ar- mies of the United States, I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, re- garding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command. "I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan which iiad before existed, nor did I know that utter disorganiza- tion and want of preparation pervaded the west- ern armies. " I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to move towards the fulfilment of my plans. I acknowledge that I made a great mistake. " I sent at once — with the approval of the Ex- ecutive — officers I considered competent to com- mand in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instruc- tions looked to prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation and organization had to be performed there ; transportation — arms — clothing— artillery — discipline, all were want- ing. These things required time to procure them. " The generals in command have done their work most creditably, but we are still delayed. I had hoped tliat a general advance could be made during tlie good weather of December; I was mistaken. " My wish was to gain possession of the east- ern Tennessee railroad, as a preliminary move- ment; then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible. "I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart. "Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the army of the Potomac. "1st. That of Washington — its present posi- tion — involving a direct attack upon the in- trenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combina- tion of the two plans. "The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks : an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detach- ments now on his extreme right and left. " Should we attack his riglit flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river, and near his batteries, we could perhaps prevent the junction of the en- emy's right with his centre, ( we might destroy the former;) we would remove tlie obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway com- munication. " The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth 31 of the Bull Run are watched by the Rebels ; bat- teries are said lo be placed on the heights in the rear, (concealed by the woods,) and the arrange- ment of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream. Information has just been received, to the effect that tlie enemy are intrenching a line of heights extcrrding from the vicinity of Sangs- ter's ( Union mills ) towards Evansport. Early in January, Spriggs's ford was occupied by General Rhodes, with 3,600 men and eight (8) guns ; there are strong reasons for believing that Davis's ford is occupied. These circum- stances indicate or prove that the enemy antici- pates the movement in cpiestion, and is prepared to resist it. Assuming for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our column ( for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least five or six) can reach the Accatinck without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan, our riglit flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax station, Sangster's, and Union mills. This danger must be met by occupying in some force either the two first-named places, or better, the point of junction of the roads leading thence to the vil- lage of Occoquan ; this occupation must be con- tinued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a battle is won. " The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's run to the mouth ; the points of crossing not being neces- «arly confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force, we must, with what assistance the flotilla can afford, en- deavor to force the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line, or be taken in flank himself. " Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a column by tlie shortest route to Dumfries ; partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac ; partly to cover our left flank against an attack from the direction of Aquia ; and lastly, to estab- lish our communications with the river by the best roads, and thus give us new depots. The enemy would by tliis time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bull Run, holding Brents- ville in force, and perhaps extending his lines somewhat further to the southwest. " Our next step would then be to prevent the enemy from crossing the Occoquan between Bull Run and Broad Run, to fall upon our right flank while moving on Brentsville. This might be effected by occupying Bacon Race church and the crossroads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more effectually by moving to the fords themselves, and preventing him from debouch- ing on our side. " These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would require some time to effect them, as, nearly at the same time as possible, we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad Run. Having secured our right flank, it would become necessary to carry Brents- ville at any cost, for we could not leave it be- tween the right flank and the main body. The firial movement on the railroad must be deter- mined by circumstances existing at the time. "This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defence enabling Jiiin to remain on the defensive, witli a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a de- cisive action. "Should WG place a portion of our force in front of Centrcvillc, while the rest crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a dis- tance too great to enabk' the two parts to sup- port each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check. " I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly on the fact that the force left near Sangster's nmst be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occoquan until the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our retreat in the event of disaster, unless it should be decided to select and intrench a new base somewliere near Dum- fries, a proceeding involving nmch time. " After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, tliis covering force could be drawn into a more central and less exposed position, — say Brimstone hill or nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the weather will for a considerable period be very uncertain, and a movement com- menced in force on roads in tolerably firm con- dition will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by rains and snow. It will, therefore, be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a disadvantage by rapid mana-uvres. Our slow progress will enable him to divine our purposes, and take his measures accordingly. The probability is, from the best information we possess, that the enemy has improved the roads leading to his lines of defence, while we have to work as we advance. " Bearing in mind what has been said, and the present unprecedented and impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line. Nor can its duration be closely calcu- lated ; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to commence the march. Assuming tlie success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the ques- tion at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral efl'ect of the vic- tory ; important results, it is true, but not de- cisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for lie could fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of the troops permit. If he is in no condition to figlU us again out of the range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very diSicult and tedious matter to follow him up there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise impede our pro- gress through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be. and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to 32 Richmond, with a sniiillor availahle force, and at an expenditure of much more time, than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy t'l concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive m.>asures at the very points wliere it is desirable to strike him when least prepared. " II. The second base of operations available for the army of the Potomac is that oftlie Lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest pos- sible land i-oute to Richmond, and strikes direct- ly at tlie he;irt of the enemy's power in the east. " The roads in that region are passable at all periods of the j'ear. •'The country now alluded to is much more fovorable for otfensivc operations than that in front of Washington (which is very unfavor- able), mueli more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the ene- my to abandon his intrenched position at Manas- sas, in order to liasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this ; for should he per- mit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the cap- ital, the cainmunications, the supplies of the Rebels ; Norfolk would fall ; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours ; all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tenner ee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, dis- perse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks. " Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. •' During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time ; he can only oppose us in front ; we bring our fleet into full play. "After a successful battle our position would be, — Burnside forming our left, — Norfolk held securely, — our centre connecting Burnside with Buell. both by Raleigh and Lynchburg, — Buell in eastern Tennessee and Nortli Alabama, — Hal- leck at Nashville and Memphis. "The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilming- ton and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army in Georgia ; to throw Halleck south- ward to meet the naval expedition from New Or- leans. " We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the southern seaports ; to oc- cupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi ; to re-estab- lish our Government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, instead of that of the Rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign interfer- ence. Such is the object I have ever had in view, — this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish. " For many long months I have labored to pre- pare the army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme ; from the day when I vvaS placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted my- self to place all the other armies in such a con- dition that they, too, could perform their allotted duties. " Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught ; it is nei- ther occupied n.>r observed by the enemy, — it is but one mai'ch from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two mirches to Rich- mond. A ra5)id movement from Urbana would probably cut off" Magruder in t'ic Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond, before it could be strongly reinforced. Shouhl we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy, cross the James, and throw ourselves in the rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position would be un- tenable, with us on the southern bank of the river. " Should circumstances render it not advisa- ble to land at Urbana, we can use Mobjack bay; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with com- plete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, — up the Peninsula. " To reach whatever point may be selected .as a base, a large amount of cheap water transpor- tation must be collected, consisting mainly of canal boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very different character from those required for all previous e.xpeditions. This can certainly be accom- plished within thirty days from the time the order is given. I propose, as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing-place for the first detach- ments ; to transport by water four divisions of infantry with their batteries, the regular infen- try, a few wagons, one bridge train, and a few squadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as possible ; to move the regular caval- ry and reserve artillery, the remaining bridge trains and wagons, to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means of North River ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahannock, (covering the move- ment by an infantry force near Heathsville,) and to cross the Rappahannock in a similar way. The expense and difficulty of the movement will then be very much diminished, (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 horses.) and the result none the less certain. "The concentration of the cavalry, &c., on the lower counties of Maryland can be effected without exciting suspicion, and the movement made without delay from that cause. "This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger. " The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, according to circumstances, from 110,000 to 140.000. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washing- ton, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully real- ize that in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valuable consideration. It is my 33 decided opinion that, in that point of view, t1ie second phxn should be adopted. It is possible, na}', liig'lily probable, that the weather and state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement from Wa^hinjjton, with its unsatisfac- tory results and great risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second plan. In the first case we can fix no definite time for an advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. Nothing like their present condition was ever known here before; they are impassable at present. We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that we can beat tiiem at Manassas. On the other line I re- gard success as certain by all the chances of Avar. We demoralize the enemy by forcing liiiu to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and wlierc success must produce immense results. " My judgment, a.s a General, is clearly in fa- vor of this i)roject. Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of this move- ment. So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fortress Monroe as a base, — as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urb:ina, to an attack upon Manassas. " I know that His Excellency the President, you, and I. all agree in our wishes ; and that these wishes are, to bring this war to a cluse as promptly as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us, — I am sure of it. Let us, then, look only to the great result to be accomplished, and disregard eveiything else. " I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- vant, "GEO. B McCLELLAN, • ' Ma jo r- General, Commanding. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, '■' Secretary of IFrrr." This 1' tter rau«t have produced some efl'ect upon the mind of the I're.-ident, since the execution of his ord(.'r was not requi ■cd, although it was not revoked as formally as it had been issued. Many verlial conferences ensued, in which, among other things, it was determined to collect as many canal-boats as possilile, with a view to employ them largely in the transportation of the army to the lower Chesajieake. The idea was at one time entertained by the President to use them in forming a bridge across the Potomac near Liverpool Point, in order to throw the army over that point; but tliis was subsequently aban- doned. It was also found by experience that it wftuld require much time to prepare the canal- boats for use in transportation, to the extent that hal been anticipated. Einally, on the 27th of February. 1862. the Secretary of War, by the authority of the Presi- dent, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, to procure at once the neces- sary steamers and sailing craft to transport the army of the Potomac to its new field of opera- tions. The following extract from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated April ,5, will show the nature and progress of this well-executed service. ****** " I was called to Washington by telegraph, on 17th January last, by Assistant Secretary of War Tliomas A. Scott. I was informed that Hujor- General McClcllan wished to see nic. From him I learned that he desired to know if trans- portation on smooth water could be obtained to move at one time, for a .short distancK', ai)out 50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment of such' an army. He frankly stated to me that he had always supposed such a movemeiU entirely feasi- ble, until two experienced quartermasters had recently reported it impracticable, in their judg- ment. A few days afterwards, I reported toGeii. McClellan tliat 1 was entirely confident the trans- ports could be commanded, and stated the mode by which his object could be accomplished. A Aveek or two afterwards I had tlie iionor of an interview with the President and General Mc- Clellan, when the subject was further discussed, and especially as to the time required. "I expressed the opinion that, as the move- ment of the horses and wagons would have to be made chiefiy by schooners and barges, that as each i^chooner would require to be properly fitted for the protection of the horses, and furnished with a supply of water and forage, and each transport for the troops provided wUh water, I did not deem it prudent to assume that such an expedition could start within thirty days from the time the order was given. "The President and General McClellan both urgently stated the vast importance of an earlier movement. I replied that if favorable winds prevailed, and there was great despatch in load- ing, the time might be materially diminished. " On the Uth February you (Secretary of War) advertised for transports of various descrip- tions, inviting bids on the 27th February. I was informed that the proposed movement by water was decided upon. That evening the Quarter- master-General was informed of the decision. Directions were given to secure the transporta- tion, — any assistance was tendered. He prompt- ly detailed to this duty two most efficient assist- ants in his department. Colonel Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Annapolis, where it was then proposed to embark the troops, and Captain Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. With these arrangements I left Washington on the 28th February. ***** Hi " I beg to hand hercAvith a statement, prepared by Captain Hodges, of the vessels chartered, which exhibits the prices paid, and parties from Avhom they Avere taken : — 113 steamers, at an average price per flay, $215 10 188 schooners, " " " " ' 24 45 88 barges, •' " " " 14 27 " In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington, (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days.) these vessels trans- ported from Perryviile, Alexandria, and Wash- ton, to Fort Monroe, (the place of departure having been changed, which caused de^ay,) 121,500 men, 14.502 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., i-equired for an army of such magnitude. The only loss of which I have 34 heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe, — llie cargoes being saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest accident has occurred, to my knowledge. "I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, ifor economy and celerity of movement, this 'expedition is without a parallel on record. ****** "JOHN TUCKER, " Assistant Secretary of War." In the moan time the destruction of the bat- teries on tlie lower Potomac, by crossing our troops opposite them, was considered, and prep- arations were even made for throwing Hooker's Division across the river, to carry them by assault. Finally, however, after an adverse report from Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, Ciiief Engineer, given below, who made a recon- noissance of the positions, and in view of the fact that it was still out of the power of the Navy Department to furnish suitable vessels to co-op- erate with land troops, this plan was abandoned as impracticable. A close examination of the enemy's works and their approaches, made after they were evacuated, showed that the decision was a wise one. The only means, therefore, of accomplishing the capture of these works, so much desired by the President, was by a move- ment by land, from the left of our lines, on tlie right bank of the Potomac, — a movement obvi- ously unwise. The attention of the Navy Department, as early as August 12, 18G1, had been called to the necessity of maintaining a strong force of efn- cient war vessels on the Potomac : — " Headquarters Division of the Potomac, " Washington, August 12, 18G1. "Sir: I liavo to-day received additional in- formation which convinces me that it is more than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to throw a respectable force from the moutli of Aquia Creek into Maryland. This attempt will probal)ly be preceded by the erection of batteries at Matthias and White- House Points. Such a movement on the part of the enemy, in connection with others probaljly designed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strong- est possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, bo as to render such passage of the river abso- lutely impossible. " I recommend that the Minnesota and any other vessels available from Hampton Roads be at once ordered up there, and that a great quan- tity of coal be sent to that vicinity, sufficient for eeveral weeks' supply. At least one strong war vessel should be kept at Alexandria, and I again urge the concentration of a strong naval force on the Potomac without delay. " If the Naval Department will render it abso- lutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly increased. " I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests. " T am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " MaJ3r-G:aeral Comhianding. " Hon. GiDEOX Welles, " Secretartj of the United States Navy. It was on tlic 27tli of September, 18G1, that General Barnanl, Chief Engineer, in company with C;i;)tain Wynian of the Potomac llotilla, had been instructed to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's batteries as fir as Matthias Point In his report of his observations he says : — '• Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and thence down 1o Chopawampsic, cannot be prevented. Wo may, indeed, prevent tlieir con- struction on certain points, but along here some- where the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What is the rem- edy? Favorable circumstii.nces, not to be antici- pated nor made the basis of any caiculations, might justify and render successful the altsck of a partic- ular battery. To suppose that we can capture cdl, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the n:ivigation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose tiiat the hostile army in our own front can prevent us building and main- taining field-works to protect Arlington and Al- exandria by capturing them, one and all, as fast as they are built." In another communication upon the subject of crossing troops for the purpose of destroying the batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac, General Barney says : — " The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defence of the enemy, and all that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign against them there. " It is true we hope to force this line hy turn- ing it. by landing on Freestone Point. With reason to believe that this may be successful, it cannot be denied that it involves a risk (-f failure. Should we, then, considering all the consequences which may be involved, enter into the operation, merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I think not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by one other gunboat capable of keeping alongside tliesc batteries, so fir control tlieir fire as to keep the navigation sufficientl}' free as long as we require it? Captain Wyinan says yes." It was the ojiinion of competent naval officers, and I concur with them, that had an adequate force of strong and well armed-armed vessels been acting on the Potomac from the beginning of August, it would have been next to in>possible for tile Ilel)els to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks of tlie river. The enemy never occupied Matthias Point, nor any other point on the river, which was out of sup- porting distance from the main army. Wiien the enemy commenced the construction of these batteries, the army of the Potomac was not in a condition to pre\ent it. Their destruction by our army would have afl'orded Imt a tem- porory relief unless we had been strong enough to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This could be done either by driving the enemy from Manassas and Aquia Creek, by main force, or by manoeuvering to compel tiiem to vacate their position. The latter course was finally pursued, and with success. About the 20th of February, 1SG2, additional 35 measarcs wore talr.en to secure the roopcninEr of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. The prelim- inary operations of General Lauder for this ob- ject are el.scwiiere described. I had often observed to the President and to members of the cabinet tliat the reconstrnetion of this railway could not be undertaken until wo were in a condition to fight a battle to secure it. I regarded the possession of Winchester and Strasburg as necessary to cover the railway in the rear, .ind it wa« not till the month of Feb- ruary that f felt prepared to accomplish this very desirable but not vital purpose. The whole of Banks's division and two brig- ades of yedgwiek's division were thrown across the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe and guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the moutii of the Monocaey. A sutficient number of troops of all arms were held in readiness in the vicinity of Washington, cither to march via Leesburg or to move by rail to Harper's Ferry, should this be- come necessary in carrying out the objects in view. The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently addressed to the War Department will siifBcicutly explain the conduct of these op- erations. ♦' Wlien I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly stated to the President and Secretary of War that the chief object of the operation would be to open tiie Baltimore and Oiiio railroad by cross- ing the river in force at Harper's Ferry; that I had collected the material for making a perma- nent bridge by means of canal-boats; that from the nature of the river, it was doubtful whether such a bridge could be constructed; that if it could not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the re- building of the railroad bridge ; and finally, when the communications were perfectly secure move on Winchester. " When I arrived at the place I found the bat- teaii bridge nearly completed; the holding- ground proved better than had been anticipated; the weatiicr was favorable there being no wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades which bad arrived, and took steps to hurry up the other two. belonging respectively to Banks's and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of crossing snp[)lies had not then become apparent. Tliat night I telegraphed for a regiment of regular cavalry and four batteries of heavy artillery to come np tlie next day (Thursday)besides directing Kevc>'s division of infantry to be moved up on Friday. " Me\'t morning the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift-lock, in order to conmience at once the construction of a perina- nent bridge. It was then found for the first time that the lock was too sniall to permit the passage of the boats, it having been built for a class of boats running on the Shenandoah canal, and too narrow by some four or six inc'ies for the canal- boats. The lift-locks, above and below, are all large enough for the ordinary boats. I had seen them at Edwards's Ferry thus used. It had al- ways been represented to the engineers by the military railroad employes, and others, that the lock was large enongh. and, the difTerence bein? too small to be detecteil by the eye. no one had thought of measuring it, or suspecting any diffi- culty. I thus suddenly found myself unable to build the i)erinuient bridge. A violent gale had arisen, whieli tluvatened the safety of our only means of communication ; the narrow approach to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with wagons that it was very clear that, under exist- ing circumstances, notiiing more could be done than to cross over the b;)ggage and supplies of the two brigades. Of the others, instead of being able to cross both during the morning, the last arrived only in time to go over just Ijefore dirk. It was evident that the troops under or- ders would only be in the way, should they ar- rive, and tliat it would not be possible to subsist them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was therefore deemed necessary to countermand the order, content ourselves with covering the re- opening of the railroad for the present, and in the mean time tise every exertion to establish, as promptly as possii)le, dejjots of forage and subsistence on the Virginia side, to supply the troops, and enable them to move on Winchester independently of the bridge. Tlie next day (Friday) I sent a strong reconnoissance to Charlestown, and imder its protection, went there myself. I then determined to hold that place and to move the troops composing Lander's and Williams's commands at once on M.irtinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually covering tJio reconstruction of the railroad. " Having done this, and taken all the steps in my ])ower to insure the rapid transmission of supplies over the river, I reiurned to tliis city, well satisfied with what had been accomplished. While up the river I learned that the President was dissatisfied with the state of aifairs; but, on my return here, understood from the Secretary of War that upon learning the whole state of the case the President was fully satisfied. I eon- tented myself, therefore, with giving to the Sec- etary a brief statement, as I have written here." Tlie design aimed at was entirely compassed, and before the first of Ajiril, the date of my de- parture for the Peninsula, the railroad was in running order. As a demonstration upon the left fiank of the enemy, this movement no doubt assisted in deterniining the evacuation of his lines on the 8th and 'Jth of March. On my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 28th of February, the preparations neee'-sary to carry out the wishes of the President and Secre- tary of W^ar in regard to destroying the i)atter- ies on the lower Potomac were at once under- taken. Mature retlection convinced me that this operation would require the movement of the entire army, for I frit sure that the enemy would resist it with his whole strength. I undertook it with great reluctance, both on account of the extremely unfavoraiile condition of the roads and my firm conviction that the proposed move- ment to the lower Chesapeake would necessarily, as it subsequently did, force the enemy to aban- don all his positions in front of Washington. Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign to precipitate tiiis evaeuati(m by any direct at- tack, nor to subject the armv to any needless loss of life and material by a battle near Wash- ington, which could produce no c^ecisive results. 36 The preparations for a movement towards the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, however, advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I had invited the commanders of divisions to meet at lieadquarters on the 8th of March, for the purpose of giving thera their instructions, and receiving their advice and opinion in regard to tlieir commands, when an interview with tlie President indicated to me the possibility of a change in my orders. His Excellency sent for me at a very early hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed his expressions of dissatisfaction with the atfair of Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the new movement down the Chesapeake. Another recital of the same facts which had before given satisfaction to His Excellency again produced, as I supposed, the same result. The views which I expressed to the President ■were reinforced by the result of a meeting of my general officers at headquarters. At that meeting my plans were laid before the division commanders, and were approved by a majority of those present. Nevertheless, on the same day two important orders were issued by the President, without consultation with me. The first of these was the general war order No. 2, directing the formation of army corps, and as- signing their commanders. I had alwnys lieen in favor of the principle of an organization into army corps, but preferrecl deferring its practical execution until some lit- tle experience in campaign and on the field of battle shoidd show what general officers were most competent to exercise these high commands, for it must be remembered that we tlien had no officers whose experience in war on a large scale WAS sufficient to prove that they possessed tlie necessary qualifications. An incompetent com- mander of an army corps might cause irrepar- able damage, while is is not probable tliat an incompetent division commander could cause any very seriims mischief. These views had frequently been cxpresseil by me to the Pres- ident and members of the cabinet; it was there- fore with as much regret as surprise that I learned the existence of this order. The first order has been given above ; the second order was as follows : — [ Preside ut's General W.ar Order No. 2. ] "ExECDTivE Mansion, " Washinrjton, March 8, 18G2. ^^ Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the general-in- chief and tlie commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. "That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops ) of said army of the Po- tomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of tlie Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, sliall be freed from enemy's batteries, and otiicr ob- structions, or until the President shall hereafter give express i)ermission. That any movement as afores.aid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the general-in-chief, and which may be in- tended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th March instant, and the general-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day. " Ordered, That the army and navy co-oper- ate in an immediate eflTort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Wasbiog- ton and the Chesapeake Bay. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. "L. Thomas, Adjutant- General" After what has been said already in regard to the eflTect of a movement to the lower Chesa- peake, it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this document, further than to say that the time of beginning the movement depended upon the state of readiness of the transports, the entire control of which had been placed by the Secre- tary of War in the hands of one of the Assistant Secretaries, and not under the Quartermaster General ; so that even if the movement were not impeded by the condition imposed, in re- gard to the batteries on the Potomac, it could not have been in my power to begin it before the 18th of March, unless the Assistant Secre- tary of War had completed his arrangements by that time. Meanwhile important events were occurring which materially modified the designs for the sub- sequent campaign. The appearance of the Mer- rimack off Old Point Comti)rt, and the encounter with tlie United States squadron on the 8th of March, threatened serious derangement of the plan for the Peninsula movement. But tiie en- gagement between the Monitor and Merrimack on the 9th of March, demonstrated so satisfac- torily the power of the former, and the other na- val preparations were so extensive and formid- able, tliat the security of Fort Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt ; and althougli the James Kiver was closed to us, the York Hiver, with its tributaries, was still open as a line of water communication with the for- tress. The general plan, therefore, remained undisturbed, although loss promising in its de- tiiis than when the James Kiver was in our con- trol. On Sunday, the 9tli of March, information from various sources made it apparent that the enemy was evacuating his positions at Centre- ville and Manassas as well as on the upper and lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of War were present when the most positive in- formation reached me, and I expressed to them my intention to cross the river immediately, and there gain the most authentic information, prior to determining what course to pursue. The retirement of the enemy towards Rich- mond had been expected as the natural conse- quence of the movement to thePeninsula, but the adoption of this course immediately on ascer- taining that such a movement was intended, wliile it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors, and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our position and theirs deprived us of the opportu- nity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a pow ■ erful adversary. 37 The retirement of the enemy and the occupa- tion of the abandoned positions whieli necessarily followed presented an opportunity for the troops to gain some experience on tlie marcli and biv- ouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the siipcrtluous baggage and other " impedi- ments " which accumulate so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality. A march to Manassas and back would produce no delay in embarking for the lower Chesa- peake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the camps around Washington, and the rigors of active operations, besides accomplishing the important object of determining the positions and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harass their rear. I therefore issued orders during the night of the 9th of March for a general movement of the army the next morning towards Centreville and Manassas, sending in advance two regiments of cavalry under Colonel Averill, with orders to reach Manassas, if possible, ascertain tlie exact condition of affairs, and do wliatever he could to retard and annoy the enemy if really in retreat; at the same time I telegraphed to the Secretary of War that it would be necessary to defer the organization of the army corps until the comple- tion of the projected advance upon Manassas, as the divisions could not be brouglit together in time. The Secretary replied, requiring imme- diate compliance with the President's order, but on my again representing that this would com- pel the abandonment or postponement of tlie movement to Manassas, he finally consented to its postponement. At noon on the 10th of March the cavalry ad- vance reached tlie enemy's lines at Centreville, passing througli his recently occupied camps and works, and finding still burning heaps of military stores and much valuable property. Immediately after being assigned to the com- mand of the troops around Washington, I organ- ized a secret service force, under Mr. E.J. Allen, a verj' experienced and efficient person. This force, up to the time I was relieved from com- mand, was continually occupied in procuring from all possible sources, information regarding the strength, positions, and movements of the eneni}'. All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, and many prisoners of war, coming into our lines from the front, were carefully examined, first by the outpost and division commanders, and then l>y my Chief of Staff and the Provost Marshal General. Their statements, taken in writing, and in many cases under oath, from day to day, for a long period previous to the evacua- tion of Manassas, comprised a mass of evidence which, by careful digests and collations, enabled me to estimate with considerable accuracy the strength of the enemy before us. Summai-ies showing the character and results of the labors of the secret service force accompany this re- port, and I refer to them for the facts they con- tain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that time, and persons in high office, unwittingly to trifle with the reputa- tion of an army, and to delude the country with quaker gun stories of the defences, and gross iin- der statements of the numbers of the enemy. The ft)llowing orders were issued for the ex- amination of persons coming from the direction of the enemy. [" Ch'ciilar.] "Headquarters Army op the Potomac "Washinfjion, December Ifi, 18G1. " The Major-General commanding directs that hereafter all deserters, prisoners, spies, ' contra- bands,' and all other persons whatever coming or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the commander of the division within whose lines they may come or be brought, without previous examination by any one, except so far as may be necessary for the officer commanding the ad- vance guard to elicit information regarding his particular post; that the division commander examine all such persons himself, or delegate such duty to a proper officer of his staff, and allow no other persons to hold any communica- tion with them ; that he then immediately send them, with a sufficient guard, to tlie provost-mar- shal in this city forfurther examination and safe- keeping, and that stringent orders be given to all guards having such persons in charge not to hold any communication with tlieiu wliatever; and further, that the information elicited from such persons shall be immediately couimunicated to the major-general commanding, or to the chief of staff, and to no other person whatever. " The Major-General commanding further directs that a sufficient guard be placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, and that such guards be instructed not to allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, general officers, and such staff officers as may be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of the sound of the telegraph instruments. " By command of Major-General McClel- LAN. "S. WILLIAMS, " Assistant Adjutant- General." " Headquartfjis Army of the Potomac, " Washington, February 26, 1862. " General Order No. 27. * * * "All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming within our lines, will be taken at once to the provost marshal of tlie near- est division, who will examine them in presence of the division commnnder, or an officer of his staff designated for the purpose. This exami- nation will only refer to such information as may affect the division and tiiose near it, especially those remote from general headquarters. '• As soon as this examination is completed, — and it must be made as rapidly as possible, — the person will be sent, under proper guard, to the Provost Marshal General, with a statement of his replies to the questions asked. Upon re- ceiving him, the Provost Marshal General will at once send him. with his statement, to tlie chief of staff of the army of the Potomac, who will cau«e the necessary examination to be made. The Provost Marshal General will have the cus- lody of all such persons. Division commanders will ill once conimunlcate to otlier division com- manders all information tims obtained which affects them. ***** * * " By command of Major-General McClel- LAN. "S. WILLIAMS, " Assistant Adjutant- General." In addition to the foregoing orders, the divi- sion commanders were instructed, whenever tiiey desired to send out scouts towards the enemy, to make known tlie object at headquarters, in order that I might determine whether we had the in- formation it was proposed to obtain, and that I might give the necessary orders to other com- manders, so that tlie scouts should not be mo- lested by the guards. It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret service corps, dated Marcii 8, that the forces of the Rebel army of the Potomac, at that date, were as follows : — At Manassas, Ccntrt-'villc, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, an'l vicinity 80,000 men. At Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Oj- coquan, and vici .lity 18,000 men. At Leesljurg- and vi.anity 4.5!io men. In the Shenandoah Valley 13 000 men. 115.000 meu. Ahout three hundred field guns and from twenty-six to thirty siege guns were with the Ilehel army in front of Washington. The report made on the 17th of Marcli, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville, corroborates the statements contained in the report of the 8th, and is fortified by the affidavits of several rail- road engineers, constructors, baggage-masters, &c., whose opportunities for forming correct esti- mates Avere unusually good. These afiidavits will be found in the accompanying reports of the chief of the secret service corps. A reconnoissance of tlie works at Centreville made by Lieutenant McAlcster, United States Engineers, on March 14, 1SG2, and a survey of those at Manassas, made by a party of the United States Coast Survey, in April, 1SC2, confirmed also my conclusions as to the strength of the enemy's defences. Those at Centreville con- sisted of two lines, one facing cast and the other north. The former consisted of seven works, viz : one bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries ; all containing embrasures for forty guns, and connected by infantry parapets and double caponieres. It extended along the crest of the ridge a mile and three quarters from its junction with the northern front to ground thickly wooded and impassable to an attacking column. The northern front extended about one and one fourth mile to Great Rocky Run, and thence three fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, impassable ground in the valley of Cub Run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with embrasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillerc line with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the rear of all the works witliin r.ango, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten embrasures. Manassas Station was defended in all directions by a system of detached works, with platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine carriages, and often connected by infiintry parapets. ThLs system was rendered complete by a very large woz'k, with sixteen embrasures, whicii command- ed the highest of the other works by about fifty feet. Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be found among the maj^s ax:)i)ended to this Kcport. From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the enemy at Centreville and Manas- sas were naturally very strong, witli imjiassable streams and broken ground, afibrding ample pro- tection for their fianks, and tliat strong lines of intrenchments swejJt all the available approaches. Although the history of every former war has conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occupying strong jjosilions, defended by heavy earthworks ; yet, at the commencement of this war, but few civilians in our country, and, indeed, not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. New levies that have never been in battle can not be expected to advance Avithout cover under the murderous fire from sucli defences, and carry them by assault. This is work in wliich veteran troops frequently fiilter and are repulsed with loss. That an assault of the eneiny's positions in front of Washington, with the new troops composing the army of the Potomac, during the winter of lSGl-"(32, wt>uld have resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. The same army, though inured to war in many battles, hard fought and bravely won, has twice, under other generals, sufi'ered such disasters as it was no excess of prudence tiien to avoid. My letter to the Secretary of War, dated Feb- ruary 3, 18G2, and given above, expressed the opinion that the movement to the Peninsula would compel the enemy to retire from his posi- tion at jManassas and free Washington from danger. When the enemy first learned of that plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninstila campaign, as at no former period, northern Virginia was completely in our posses- sion, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders for the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison's Bar, and were again left free to advance northward and menace the national capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the best defence of Washington is a Peninsula attack on Richmond. My order for the organization of the army corps was issued on the 13th of March ; it has been given above. While at Fairfax Court-House, on March 12, I was informed through the telegraph, by a mem- ber of my staff, that the following document had appeared in the National Intelligencer of that morning : — [President's War Order, No. 3.] "Executive Mansion, " Washington, March 11, 1862. " Major-Gcneral McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the army of the 39 Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the otlier military depart- ments, he retaining command of the department of the rotomac. '^ Ordered further, That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals lial- leck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, he consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississipi)i ; and that, imtil otherwise ordered, ]\Iajor-Gcneral Halleck have command of said department. " Ordered, also. That the country west of the Department of the Potomac and east of the De- partment of the Mississippi he a military depart- ment, to he called the Mountain Department, and that tlic same be commanded by Major-Geaeral Fremont. "That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them, respec- tively report severally and directly to the Secre- tary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN." Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the position of General-in- chief, I clieerfiilly acceded to tlie disposition he saw fit to make oi my services, and so informed him in a note on the 12th of March, in which occur these words : — "I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection with some western matters, th.at no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, and you will find that, under present circum- stances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with the dischai'ge of mj' public duties. Again thanking you for tlie official and personal kindness you have so often evinced towards me, I am," &c., &c. On the 14th of March a reconnoissance of a large body of cavalry with some infautrj-, under command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Rappahannock, but the roads were in such condition that, finding it impossible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to return after reaching Cedar Run. The following despatch from him recites the result of this expedition : — " Headquarters, Union Mills, " March IG, 18G2. " We arrived here last evening about dark. We got corn for horses ; no f "ovisions for men. Bull Run too high to cross. Had we stayed an hour longer we should not have got here to-day, owing to tlie high water in the streams. Felt the enemy cautiously, and found him in force at Warrentun Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and tliree bodies of infantry on the otlier side of Cedar Run. Had we crossed, should not have been able to get back for high water. Had three men of 5th cavalry hit in driving in enemy's pickets ; one slightly wounded in thq head. Enemy acted confidently, and followed us some way hack on the road, but did not mo- lest us in any way. Enemy's force con^i^ted of Stuart's and I'^well's cavalry, a battery of artiil- lery, and some infantry. Railroiul bridges all burned down up to Warrenton Juncliun ; still entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a moment's warning, iiaving dry wood piled upoa tlieni. Heard cars running during nigiit before last; probably bringing up troops from i;;ippa- hannock. Heard of two regiments of infantry at Warrenton engaged in inijiressing ilio militia and securing forage. Heard of a large forces of infantry tins side of Rappahannock River, having come up to Warrenton Junction from Aquia Creek diiy before yesterday. Bridges all destroyed this side of Broad Run. The aides who take this will give you further particulars. "Very respectfully, &c. "GEORGE SrONEMAN, " Brigadier- General CoKiraanding. " COL. COLBUKN." The main body of the army was, on tlie 15th of Mareli, moved back to the vicinity of Alexan- dria to be embarked, leaving a jjart of General Suinnur's corps at Manassas until other troops could be sent to relieve it. Before it was with- drawn a strong reconnoissance, under General Howard, was sent towards the R!i[)i),ihannock, the result of wliich appears in the following de- spatch : — " Warrenton Junction, ''March 29, 1862. " Express just received from General How- ard. He drove the enemy across the Rappa- hannock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and near the Rappahannock River. " The enemy blew up the bridge in Iiis retreat. There was skirmishing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. General Howard will return to thia cami) to-raorrow morning. "E. V. SUMNER, " Brigadier- General. " General S. Williajis." The line of the Rappahannock and the Man- asses Gap railroad was thus left reasonably se- cure from menace by any considerable body of the enemy. On the 13th of March a council of war was assembled at Fairfax Court-house, to discuss the militarj- status. The President's order No. 3, of March Sth, was considered. The follow- ing is a memorandum of the proceedings of the council : — " Headquarters Arjit of the Potomac, Fairfax Court-house, March I'd, 1862. " A council of the generals comiiLinding army corps, at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, were of tlie opinion — "I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappa- hannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the oper- ations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers : Provided, 40 " 1st. Tliat tlie eneiuj^'s vessel, Merriraack, can be neutralized. " 2d. That the means of transportation, sufH- cient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; and, " 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silcncmg, the enemy's bat- teries on tlie York River. " 4th, that tiie force to be left to cover Wash- ington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unani- mous.) "II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enenu', behind the llappahannock, at the earliest i)os,sible mo- ment, and the means for reconstructing Ijridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with ma- terials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alexandria, and Aquia and Richmond railroads, (Unanimous.) "N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank ( f the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.") This was assented to by myself, and immedi- ately communicated to the War Department. The following reply was received the same day:— War Departjient, 3Iarch 13, 18C2. ''The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no olijec- tion to the -same, but gives the following direc- tions as to its execution : — "1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. " 2. Leave Washington entirely secure. " 3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and tliere, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. " EDWIN M. STANTON, " Sccreiary of Wcu\ " Major-Gcneral George B. McClellan." My preparations were at once begun in ac- cordance with these directions, and on the Kith of March the following instructions were sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth : — ''Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " March IG, 1802. " Sir : You will pf)st your command in the vicinity of Manassas, intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry yjickcts well out to the front. "Your first care will Ijc the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas, and to Strasl)urg, in order to open your conmiunica- tions with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah valley, as well as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps be advantageously occupied by a detachment of infantry, well intrencheil. Block-houses siiould be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction and Warren- ton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as soon as the railway bridge is repaired. " Great activity should be observed by the cav- alry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your dis- posal, to scout towards the Occoquau, and prob- ably a fourth towards Leesburg. "To recapitulate, the most important points wMch should engage your attention are as fol- lows : — "1. A strong force, Avell intrenched, in the vicinity of JManassas, perhaps even Centrcville, and another force, (a brigade.) also well in- trenched, near Strasburg. " 2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. '• 3. Constant emjjloyment of the cavalry ■well to the front. "4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction and in advance, as far as the Rappahannock, if jjos- sible. "5. Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as to the enemy. "6. The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington. "The above is conununicated by command of Major-General McClelhin. "S. WILLIAMS, " Assistant A/^jutant- General. " Major-Gtneral N. P. Banks's, " Commanding FifiJt Corjjs, Army of the Potomac." " Headquaeters xVrmy of the Potomac, " March IG, 1802. " Sir : The command :o which you have been assigned, by instructions of the President, as military governor of the District of Columbia, embraces the geographical limits of the District, and Avill also include the city of Alexandria, the defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Oecoquan to Difficult Creek, and the post of Port Washington. " I enclose a list of the troops and of the de- fences embraced in these limits. " General Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of Williams ai^.d Shields, composing the fifth corps, but you should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in yoiu- front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced guards. You will use the same precautions on either flank. "All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington and Georgetown, for the garri- sons north of the Potomac, and for other indi- cated special duties, should be moved to the south side of the river. " In the centre of your front you should post the main body of your troops, and proper pro- 41 portions at sriiitable distances towards your right and left flanks. Careful patrols will be made, la order thoroughly to scour the country in front, from right to icft. '• It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and their armaments in the best possi- ble order, to look carefully to the instruction and discipline of their garrisons, as well as all otlier troops iinder your command, and, by frequent and rigid inspections, to insure the attainment of these ends. " The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges, and ferries, within the above-named lim- its, will devolve upon you, and you are to insure their security and provide for thcu" protection by every means in your power. You will also pro- tect the depots of the public stores and the transit of stores to troops in active service. '' By means of pati'ols you will thoroughly scour the neigiiboring country, south of the East- ern Branch, and also on your right, and you will use every possible precaution to intei'cept mails, goods, and persons passing unauthorized to the enemy's lines. "The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. "You will forward and facilitate the move- ment of all troops destined for the active part of the army of the Potomac, and especially the transit of detachments to their proper regiments and corps. " The charge of the new troops arriving in "Washington, and of all troops temporai'ily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, composition, and equipment, by every opportu- nity. "Besides the regular reports and returns, whiph you will be required to render to the Adju- tant-General of the army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated report of your com- mand, every Sunday morning, and monthly re- turns on the first day of each month. " The foregoing instructions are communi- cated by command of Major-General McClellan. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General. "Brigadier-General J. S. Wadswokth, " Military GoTcmor of the District of Co- lumbia." The Secretary of War had exi^ressed a desire that I should communicate to the War Depart- ment my designs with regard to the emplojmient of the army of the Potoniiic in an official foi'm. I submitted, on the 19th of March, the follow- ing: — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 18G2. " Sir : I have the honor to submit the follow- ing notes ^n the proposed operations of the active portion of the army of the Potomac. " The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Riclmiond as the line of operations, Eich- mond being the objective point. It is assumed C that the fall of Richmond involves that of Nor- folk and the whole of Virginia; also, tluit we shall figlit a decisive battle between West Pomt and Riclnnond, to give wliich battle the llubels will concL'ulraU^ all their availalile forces, under- stancUng, as tluy will, that it involves the tate of tlieir cause. It therefore follows, — " 1st. That we sliould collect all our available forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintain- ing perfect communication between our colunms. "2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of battle. "The advantages of the peninsula between York and James rivers are too obvious to need explanation; it is also clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached, and used as our main depot, that we may have the shortest lino of land transportation for our supplies, and the use of the York River. "There are two methods of reaching this point, — " 1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the ro;ids for our sup- plies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to tui'a the Rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown ; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks, perhaps. " 2d. To make a combined naval and land at- tack upon Yorktown, the first object of the cam- paign. This leads to the most rapid and deci- sive results. To accomplish tins, the navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries ; its reduction shotild not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorkto\vn, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Riclmiond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. " It is impossible to urge too strongly the ab- solute necessity of the full co-operation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to (larry in front several strong positions which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of either time or men. " It is also of first importance to bear Ln mind the fact already alluded to, that the captureof Richmond necessarily involves the prompt fall of Norfolk, while an operation agixinst Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the Rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would have accom- plished it in the bcgimiing, having meanwhile afforded the Rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements, for they would well know, from the moment the army of the Poto- mac changed its base to Fort I\Ionroe, that Rich- mond must be its ultimate object. ••It may be summed up in a few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it ia 42 absolutely necessarj'- that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorkt.own. There is the most important point, — there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the subject- matter of tills communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the oc- casion. " I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, " GEOEGE B. McCLELLAN, Major- General. *' Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War" In the mean time the troops destined to form the active army were collected in camps conven- ient to the points of embarkition, and every preparation mtide to embark them as rapidly as possible when the transports were ready. A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, while still encamped near Alesindria. I met the President, by appointment, on a steamer. He there infonned me that he had bien strongly pressed to take General Blonker's division from my command and give it to General Fremont. His Excellency was good enough to suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented to the force of his sugges- tions, and was extremely gratified by liis decis- ion to allow the division to remain with the army of the Potomac. It was therefore with surprise that I received, on the 31st, the follow- ing note : — " Executive Mjjnsiox, Washington, March 31, 1SG2. " My dear Sir : This morning I felt con- strained to order Blenker's divi-^ion to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, uiidcrstsmding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pres- sure of tlie case, I am coufideot that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the coimuauder-in-chief may order what he pleases. " Yours, very truly, " A. LmCOElT. " Major-General McClellan." To this I replied, in stibstance, that I regretted the order, and could ill afford to lose ten thou- sand troops which had been coiinted upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there was no remedy, I would yield, and do the best I could without them. In a conversation with the President a few hours afterwards I repeated ver- bally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's division had been given to Gen- eral Fremont from any pressure other than the requirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President's positive and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that no more troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be tiken from me, or in any way detached from my command. At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our forces occupying Charlestown, and Shields's reaching Buaker Hill on the 11th. On the morning of tlie 12th, a brigade of General Banks's troops, under General Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock t the evening before, his rear guard of cavalry - leaving an hour before our advance entered the • place. The enemy having made his preparations i for evacuation some days beforc, it was not pos- sible to intercept his retreat. On the 13th the mass of Banks's corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Winchester, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. On the 19th (leneral Shields occupied Stras- burg, driving the enemy tAventy miles south to Monnt Jackson. On the 20th the first division of Banks's corps commenced its movement towards IMunassas, in compliance with my letter of instructions of the IGth. Jackson probably received information of this movement, and siiirposcd that no force of any consequence was left in the vicinity of Win- chester, and ujjon the falling back of Shields to that place, for the purpose ofeniicing Jackson in pursuit, the latter promptly followed, whereupon ensued a skirmish on the 22d, in wliicli (ieneral Shields was wounded, and an atiair at Winches- ter on the 23d, resulting in the tlefcat of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly as the l'xilau^tion of our troops and the ditlicully ol obtaining supi)lie3 permitted. It is presumed that the full reports of the battle of Winchester were forwarded direct to the War Department by General Banks. It being now clear that the enemy had no in- tention of returning b}' the Manas^as route, the following letter of April 1, was written to Gen- eral BaJiks : — "Headqcartt.rs Akmt of the Potomac, *' On board the Commodore, April 1, 1862. "General: The change in affairs in the val- ley of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, from the jihin we some days since agreed upon. " In my arrangenn-nts 1 assume that you have with you a force amply sufficient to diivc Jack- son before you, provided he is not reinforced largely. I also assume that yuw nniy find it im- possible to detach anytliing towards JManassas for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army have drawn all the Kebel force towards Richmond. " You are aware that General Sumner has for some days been at IManassas Junction with two divisions of Infantry, six batteries, and two regi- ments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to the liappahamiock forced the enemy to destroy the railway bridge at Kappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Piiilroad. Since that time our cavalry have found notliingon this side the Rappahamiock in that direction, and it seems clear that we have no reason to fear any return of the Rebels in that quarter. Their movements near Fredericksburg also indicate a final aban- donment of that neighborhood. I doubt whether Johnson will now reinforce Jackson with a view of offensive operations. The time is probably passed when he could have gained anything by doing so. I have ordered in one of Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson's, late Sumner's) to Alexandria for embarkation. Blenker's has been detached from the army of the Potomac and ordered to report to General Fremont. 43 " Abcrcrombie is probably at "Warrcnton Junc- tion to-day. Geary is at White Plains. "Two regiments of eavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. " Four thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once for IManassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days., and soon after some three thousand additional. " I will order Blcnker to march on Strasburg and to report to you for temporary duty, so that should you find a, large force in your front you can avail j^ourscif of his aid as soon as possible. Please direct him to Winchester, thence to report to the Adjutant-General of tiie army for orders : but keep liim until you are sure what you have in front. " In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at present is to throw Jackson ■well back, and then to assume such a position as to enabk' j'ou to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communiciitions are re-established it Avill be jjrobably important and advisable to move on Staunton, but this would require secure communications, and a force of from twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on Richmond, at all events not so long before it as to enable the Rebels to concentrate on you, and then return on mo. I fear that you cannot be ready in time, although it may come in very well with a force less than that I have mentioned, after the main battle near Richmond. When General Tiumner leaves Warrenton Junc- tion, General Abercrombie will be placed in im- mediate command of Manassas and Warrcnton Junction, under your general orders. Please inform me frequently by telegraph and otherwise as to the state of things in yorn- front. " I am very truly yours, "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major- Goieral Commanding. " Major-General N. P. Banks, " Commanding Fifth Corps. "■ P. S. — From what I have just learned, it ■would seem that the regiments of cavalry in- tended for Warrenton Junction have gone to Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional regi- ments placed under your orders, two should as promptly as possibly move by the shortest route on Warrcnton Junction. " I am, sir, very respectfully, ■your obedient servant, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General Commanding." This letter needs no further explanation than to say that it was my intention, had the operations in that quarter remained under my charge, either to have resumed the defensive position marked out in the letter of Mnrch IG, or to have advanced General Banks upon Staunton as might in the progress of events seem advisable. It is to be remembered that Avhcn I -wrote the preceding and following letters of April 1, I had no expectation of being relieved from the charge of the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, the Prefident's War Order No. 3 giving no intimation of such an intention, and that so far as reference ■was made to final operations after driving Jackson back and taking such a position as to prevent his return, no positive orders were given in the letter, the matter being left for future consid- eration, when the proper time arrived for a decision. From the following letter to tlie Adjutant- General, dated April 1, 1SG2, it will be s en that I left for the dctenee of the national capital and its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, 73,45(j men, witli 109 pieces of liglit artillery, including the 32 pieces in Washington alluded to, but not enumerated in my Ictterlu the Adju- tant-General. It will also be seen that I recom- mended other available troops in Isew York (more than 4,000) to be at once ordered for- ■ward to reinforce them. "HEADQUAnTEUs Army OF the Potomac, " Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1SG2. " Gexerae : I have to request that yoii -vrill lay the following communication before the Hon. Secretary of War. " The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are as follows : — "General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient'to give him 5,000 for the defence of Baltimore, and 1.988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. " The garrisons of the forts around Washing- ton amount to 10,G00 men; other disposable troops now with General Wadsworth about 11,400 men. "The troops employed in guarding the various railways in ]\Iaryland amount to some 3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send forv/ard to JIanassas. "General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force, which, including Colonel Geary, at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his dis- posal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery. " I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there arc some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from General Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force under the conmiand of General Abercrom- bie of something like 18,G39 men. " It is my design to push General Blenker's division from Warrcnton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Straslnirg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. " The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus, — including Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery ; Banks's 5th corps which embraces the command of General Shields, 19, GST strong, with 41 guns, some 3,G52 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men, — amount to about 35,4G7 men. " It is designed to relieve General Hooker by 44 one regiment, say S50 men, being, with some 600 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac. To recapitulate : — *' At. Warrcnton there is to he 7,7^^0 men " At jnuiiissas, say lO.So'J " "In the valU'y of'thc Sheuaudoah 35,4i>7 " " On the lower rotoaiac 1,3)0 " "luall 55,4.55 " " Tliere would thus bo left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, imder General Wadsworth, some 18.000, inclusive of the bat- teries under instruction. The troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at AVashington, sub- ject to dis])osition where their services may be most required. " I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- vant, " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, " Adjutant- General U. S. Army." The following letter from General Barry shows that thirty-two (02) field guns, Avith men, horses, and equipments, were also left in Washington city when the army sailed. These were the bat- teries under instruction referred to above : — " Headquarters Ixspector of Artillery, " Washington, December 16, 1862. " General : It having been stated in various public prints, and in a speech of Senator Chan- dler, of Michigan, in his place in the United States Senate, quoting what he stated to be a portion of the testimony of Brigadier-General Wadsworth, MiUtary Governor of Washington, before the joint Senate and House Committee on the Conduct of the War, that Major-Gcneral McClellan had left an inefficient force for the defence of Washington, and not a gun on wheels, — " I have to contra,dict this charge as follows : — " From ofHcial reports made at the time to me, (the Chief of Artillery of the army of the Poto- mac,) and now in my possession, by the com- manding officer of the light artillery troops left in camp in the city of 'Washington by your orders, it appears that the following-named field batteries were left : — " Battery C, 1st New York artillery. Captain Barnes, 2 guns; battery K, 1st New York artil- lery. Captain Crounse, 6 guns; battery L, 2d New York artillery, Cnptain Iloliinson, 6 gims ; 9th New York independent battery, Captain Mon- zordi, 6 guns ; 16th New York independent bat- tery, Captain Locke; battery A, 2d battalion New York artillery, Captain Hogan, G guns; battery B, 2d battalion New York artillery. Cap- tain McMahon, 6 guns ; total of batteries, 32 guns. " With the exception of a few horses which could have been procured from the quarter- master's department in a few hours, the batteries •were all fit for immediate service, excepting the 16th New York battery, which having been pre- viously ordered, on General Wadsworth's appli- cation, to report to him for special service, was unequipped with either guns or horses. " I am. General, very respectfully, your obe- dient servant, W. F. BARRY, " Brig.-Gen., Inspector of Artillery, " United States Army. "Maj.-Gen. McClellan, " United States Army." It is true that Blenker's division, which is in- cluded in the force enumerated by me, was under orders to reintbrce General Fremont, but the fol- lowing despatch from the Secretary of War, dated March 31, 1862, will show that I was authorized to detain him at Strasburg until mat- ters assumed a definite form in that region, be- fore proceeding to his ultimate destination; in other words, until Jackson was disposed of. And had he been detained there, instead of mov- ing on to IIarper"s Ferry and Fi-anklin, under other orders, it is probable that General Banks would have defeated Jackson, instead of being himself obliged subsequently to retreat to Wil- liamsport. " War Department. " Washington, D. 0., March 31, 1862. " The order in respect to Blenker is not de- signed to hinder or delay the movement of Rich- ardson, or any other force. He can remain wherever you desire him as long as required for your movements, and in any position you desire. The order is simply to place him in position for reinforcing Fremont, as soon as your dispositions will permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry 1/y such route and at such time as you shall direct. State your own wishes as to the movement, when and how it shall be made. "EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. "Maj.-Gen. McClellan." Without including General Blenker's division, there were left 67,428 men and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, under existing circumstances, I deemed more than adequate to insure the perfect security of Washington against any force the enemy could bring against it, for the following reasons : — Tlie light troops I had thrown forward under General Stoneman in ptirsuit of the Rebel army, after the evacuation of Manassas and Ccntreville, had driven their rear guard across Cedar Run, and subsequent expeditions from Sumner's coii.a liad forced them beyond the Rappahannock. They had destroyed all the railroad bridges l;e- hind them, thereby indicating that they did not intend to return over that route. Indeed, if they had attempted such a movement, their j-.rogress must have been slow and difficidt, as it would have involved the reconstruction of the bridges; and if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry patrols well out to the front, to give timely no- tice of any approacli of the enemy, had been strictly enforced, (and I left seven regiments of cavalry for this express purpose,) they could not by any possibility have reached AVasJiington be- fore tliere would have been ample time to con- centrate the entire forces left for its defence, as well as those at Baltimore, at any necessary point. It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, that the movement of the army 45 of the Potomac would have the effect to draw- off the hostile army from Mannssas to the de- fence of their capital, and thus free Washington from menace. Tliis opinion was confirmed the moment the movement coniuienccd, or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our inten- tions ; for witli the exception of Jackson's force of some •15.000, which his instructions show to have been intended to operate in such a way as to prevent McDowell's corps from being sent to reinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude made its appearance in front of Washington during the progress of our operations on the Peninsula; nor until the order was given for my return from Harrison's Landing was Washington again threatened. Surrounded, as Washington was, with numer- ous and strong fortifications, well garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy could not afford to detach from his main army a force sufficient to assail them. It is proper to remark, that just previous to my tle{)arture for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief of str.ti" to General Hitchcock, who at that time held staff relations witli His Excellency the Pres- ident and the Secretary of War, to submit to him a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the defence of Washington, and the positions in which I designed posting them. General Hitch- cock, after glancing his eye over tlie list, ob- served that lie was not the judge of what was )-e(|uircd for defending tlie capital ; that General ^IcC'lellan's position was such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did, and he presumed tiiatif the force designated was, in his judgment, sufficient, nothing more jwould be required. He was then told by the Ichief of staff that I would be glad to have his opinion, as an old and experienced officer ; to this he replied, that as I had had the entu-e con- trol of the defences for a long time, 1 was the best judge of what was needed, and he declined to give any other expression of opinion at that time. On the 2d of April, the day following my de- parture for Fort Monroe. Generals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of War to examine and report whether the Presi- dent's instructions to me, of March 8 and 13 had been complied with ; on the same day their re- port was submitted, and their decision was — 'That the requirement of the President, that this city (Washington) shall be left entirely se- cure, has not been fully complied with." The President, in his letter to me on the 9th of April, says : " And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Eichmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except wliat resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops." In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that there was no danger of an attack from the direc- tion of Manassas, in these words : ''In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume thaji^hey have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no large force would be necessary to hold that position." That, as remarked before, was precisely the view I took of it, and tliis was enforced by the subsequent movements of the enemy. In another paragraph of the report it is stated that fifty-five thousand men was the number considered adequate for tiie defence of the capital. That General McClellan, in his enu- meration of the forces left, had included lianks's army corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, but whether this corps should be regarded as available for the protection of Washington, they decline to express an opinion. At the time this report was made, the only enemy on any approach to Washington was Jackson's force, in front of Banks iu the Shen- audoah Valley, with the Manassas tJaj) Railroad leading from this valley to Washington ; and it will be admitted, I presume, iliat liiuks, occu- pying the Shenandoali Valley, was in the best ])osition to defend not only that approach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and above. The number of troops left by me for the de- fence of Washington, as given iu my letter to the Adjutant-General, were taken from the latest official returns of that date, and these, of course, constituted the most trustwortiiy and authentic source from which such information could be obtained. Another statement made by General Hitch- cock before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," in reference totiiissame order, should be noticed. He was asked the following ques- tion ; "Do you understand now that the move- ment made by General McClellan to Fort Mon- roe, and up the York Iviver, was in compliance with the recommendation of the council of gen- erals commanding corps, and held at Fairfa.x Court-house on the 13th of March last, or in violation of it? To which he replied as follows : " I have con- sidered, and do now consider, that it was in vio- lation of the recommendation of that council in two important particulars ; one particular being that portion of this report whieli represents the council as agreeing to the expedition by way of the Peninsula, provided the Rebel steamer Mer- rimack could first be neutralized. Tiiat impor- tant provision General McClellan disregarded. If * :ti :|t 4t 4< The second particular alluded to by General Hitchcock was in reference to the troops left for the defence of Washington, Avhich had been dis- posed of above. In regard to the steamer Merrimack, I have also stated that, so far as our operations on York River were concerned, the power of this vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to that ccnclusion. Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, was sent by the President to Fort Monroe to consult with Flag-officer Goldsborough upon this subject. The result of that consultation is contained in the following extract from tiie evidence of Ad- miral Goldsborougli before the '• Committee on the Conduct of the War," viz : •' I told Mr. Wat- son, Assistant Secretary' of War, that the Presi- dent might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimack going up York liiver ; that she 46 could never get there, for I had ample means to prevent tlmt." Captain G-. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifies before the commiUee as fol- lows : — "General McClcllan expected the navy to neutralize tlie Merrimack, and I promised that it sliould be done." General Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, testifies as follows bcibre the committee : — " During the time that tlie subject of the change of base was discussed, I had refused to con-^ent to the Peninsula line of operations until 1 had sent word to the Navy Department and asked two questions : First, whether the Merrimack was certainly neutralized, or not? Second wheth- er the n;ivy was in condition to co-operate effi- ciently with the army to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester Point? To both of these, answers were returned in the affirmative; that is, the Merrimack was neutralized, and the navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently to break through between Yorktown and Glou- cester Point." Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed Lieutcnnnt-Coloncl 13. S. Alexander, of the United States corps of Engineers, to visit Ma- ll issas Junction and its vicinity for the purpose of determining upon the defensive works necessary to enable us to hold that place with a small force. The accompanying letters from Colonel Alex- ander will show what steps were taken by him to carry into cll'cct this important order. I regret t.) say that those who succeeded me in command of the region in front of Wasiiing- ton, whatever were the fears for its safety, did not deem it necessary to carry out my plans and instructions to them. Had Manassas been placed in condition for a strong defence, and its communications secured as recommended by Colonel Alexander, the result of General Pope's campaign would probably have been ditierent. "Washington, D. C, April 2, 18G2. " Sir : You will proceed to Manassas at as early a moment as practicable and mark on the ground the works i'or the defence of that place, on the ))ositii)ns whicii I indicated to you yester- day. You will find two carpenters, experienced in tliis kind of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpen- ter of the Treasury extension. "The general idea of the defence of this po- sition is, to occupy the fringe of elevation which lies al)out halfway between Manassas depot and the junction of the railroad, with a series of works open to the rear, so that they may be commanded by the work hereafter to be de- scribed. " There will be at least four of these works, three of them being on the left of the railroad leading from Alexandria, at the positions occu- pied by the enemy's works. The other on the right of this road, on the position we examined yesterday. The works of the enemy to the ncjrth of this latter position, numbered 1 and 2 on Lieu- tenant Comstock's sketch, may also form a part of the front line of our defence; but tlie sides of these works looking towards Manassas station should be levelled, so that the interior of the works may be seen from the latter position. "Embrasures should be arranged in all these works iov field artillery. The approaches should be such that a battery can drive into the works. The number of embrasures in each bat- tery will depend upon its size and the ground to be commanded. It is supposed there will be from four to eight embrasures in each battery. "The other works of the enemy lool^ing to- ' wards the cast and south may be strengthened so as to afford sufficient defence in these directions. The work No. '6 in Lieutenant Conistock's sketch may be also strengthened and arranged for field ' artillery, when time will permit. Tliis work is in a good position to cover a retreat, whicii would be made down the valley in which tiie railroad runs towards Bull Kun. " At Manassas station there should be a fort constructed. The railroad will pass through this fort, and the depot, if tliere should be one built, should be placed in its rear. This latter work should be regarded as the key to the position. It should be as large as the nature of the ground will permit. " liy going down tlie slopes, which are not steep, it may be made large enough to accommo- date 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the posi- tion need not be cut away ; it will be better to throw up tlie earth into a large traverse, which may also be a bomb-proof. Its profile should be strong, and its ditches shoidd be flanked. It should receive a heavy armament of 24- or ?>2- pounders, with some rifled (Parrott) 20 or oO- pounders. Its guns should command all the exterior works, so that these works could be of no use to the enemy, should he take them. In accommodating the fort to the ground this con- sideration should not be lost sight of. "After tracing these works on the ground, you will make a sketch embracing the whole of them, showing their relative positions and size. This sketcli should embrace tlie junction of the railroads, and the ground for some distance around the main work. It need not be made with extreme accuracy. The distances may be paced, or measured, with a tape line. The bear- ings may be taken by compass. " Having located the works and prepared your sketch, you will report to Captain Frederick E. Prime, of the corps of engineers, who will fur- nish yon the means of construction. " It is important that these works should be built with tlve least possible delay. You will, therefore, expedite matters as fast as possible. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. S. ALEXANDLR, " Licificnani-CoJoncJ, Aids-dc-Camp. " Captain Fueu. 11. Muntueu, Present." " Washington, April 0, 1SC2. " SrR : I enclose you hcrewitii a co])y of the instructions which I gave to (Captain Munthcr, in reference to the defences of Manassas. " As there has been a new department created, (that of the IJaiipahani.ock.) it is possible that you and I, as well as General McClellan, are re- lieved from the further consideration of this subject at the present time. " I will, however, state for your information, should the subject ever come before you again, that in my opinion the comnuinication with Manassas by land should be secured. 47 " To effbct this in the best manner, so far as my observations extended, I think tlic bridge over Bull lliin, near Union Mills, and just above the railroad bridge, siiouid be rebuilt or thor- oughly repaired, and that a small work, or two or three open batteries, should be erected on the adjacent beiglits to protect it as well as the rail- road bridge. " Tlie communication by land would then be through or near Centreville, over the road used by the enemy. "I write this for fear something shotild detain me here; but I hope to leave here to join you to-morrow. My health is much improved. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "B. S. ALEXANDER, " Lieutenant- Colonel, Aide- de- Camp. " Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, •' Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac." I may be permitted also to mention that the plans (also unexecuted by my successor^ indi- cated in my letter of instructions to f eneral Banks, dn,ted March IG, 18G2, for intrencliing Chester Gap and the point where the Manassas Railroad crosses the Shenandoah, were for the purpose of preventmg even the attempt of such a raid as that of Jackson in the month of May following. M'L'TARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD. X fore taking up the liistoi'y of the embarka- tion and Peninsula campaign, I should remark tliat during the fdl and winter of 1SG1-'(J2, while tlie army of the I'otomac was in position in front of VVashinglon, reeoimoissances wero made from time to time, and skirniishes fre- quently ocx'urred, whieli were of great impor- tance in the education of the tioops, accustt)ming them to the presence of the enemy, and giving them confidence under fire. Tliere were niany instances of individual gallantry displayed in these affairs ; the reports of ihem will be found among the documents which accompany this report. One of the most brilliant of these affairs was that whicli took i)laco at Drainsville on Dceem- cer 20, ISGl, when tiie 3d biigade of McCall's division, under Brigadier-General E. 0. C. Ord, with Easton's battery, routed and pursued four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a bat- tery of six pieces. The operations of Brigadier-General F. W, Lander on the upper Potomac, during the months of January and February, 18G2, frus- trated the attempts of General Jackson against the Baltimore and O.iio liairoad, Cumberland, &c., and obliged him to fill back to Winchester. His constitution was impaired by liie hard.siiips he had experienced, and on tlie 2d March the fearless General Lander expired, a victim to the excessive fatigue of the campaign. SECOND PERIOD. CHAPTER I. The council composed of the four corps comman- ders, organized by tiie President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the army of the Potomac upon Ilieiunond. For the prompt and successful execution of tiie projected operation, it was re- garded by all as necessary tiiat the whole of tiie four CO ps should be employed, with at least the addition of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, that position and its dej)endencies being regarded as amj)ly jjrotected by the naval force in its neigh- borhood, and tlie ativance of the main army up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrison. In addition to the land forces the co-operation of the navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and James rivers for tlie protection of our flanks, and the use of the transports in bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewliere in this re])ort, my original plan of moving by Urbuna and West Point was aban- doned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the transpor- tation of the army to the Peninsula Ijy water, the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous" mainly at Anna|,olis; but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the Ixatteries of the lower Poto- mac by the enemy, it became more convenient to embark the troops and materials at Alexandria, and orders to that efl'ect were at once given. In making the prelimniary aiTangements for the movement it was determined that the first corps. General McDowell's should move as a unit first, and efi'eet a landing eitlier at the Sand- box, some four miles south of Yorktown, in or- der to turn all the enemy's defences at Ship Point, Howard's Bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, shi.uld existing circumstances render it prefera- ble, land on tiie Gloucester side of York River and move on V\ est Point. Tiie transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, therefore, to exjiedite matters, I dec ded to embark the army by divis- ions, as transports arrived, keejiing army corps togeliier as mucli as possible, and to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarkation, convenience and ex])edition were especially consulted, except that the lirst corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined. On the 17th of March Hamilton's division, of the 3d corps, embarked at Alexandria and pro- ceeded to Fort Monroe witn the following or- ders : — Washington, D. C, March 17, 1862. " You Avill, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General Wool and request liim t > as- sign )0U jiround for encamping your division. You will remain at F rt Monroe until further orders from General McClcUm. Should Gen- eral Woul require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. " li. B. MARCY, " Chief of Staff. " General C. S. Hamilton, " Cummundinc) Uicision." On the 22d of March, as soon as transporta- tion was ready, General Fitz John Porer's division of the same cor|)s, embarked. General Ileintzelman was ordered to accompauy it, mider the following instructions : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Seminary, March 22, 1862. " General : Upon tlie disembarkation of Por- ter's division at Fori Monroe, I have to request tiiat you will move your two divisions, Poner's and Hamilton's, some three or four miles out from the fort to tind good camping places, where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your positions will be good in a de- fensive point of view. You may find it advisa- Ijle to place one division on or near the r.iad le id- ing to Yorktown from Newport News, — the other upon that leading t > Yorktown direct from F..rt Mouro.'. It you tind that the nature of the coun- try will permit easy communication and mutual support between the two divisions, it will lie best to place one on each road. It will be best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconn()i>sanoes well to the front to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possi- ble, reinforce you by the third division of } our corps, and it is probable that a part or the wiiole of the 4th corps will also move from Fort Mon- roe. This will probably be determined betiire your disembarkation is completed, and you will be informed accordingly. '• My desire would be to make no important move in advance until we are fully prepiu-ed to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. "Ihe quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in regard to land transporU- tion from General Van Viiet. 49 " It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay, and have it pre- pared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without dii^ay. " Please report to rae frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations, and wliatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. " Engage guides in sufficient numbers at onc«, andenleavor to send out spies. " I am very truly yours, "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-Oencral, Co nima riding. " Brigadier-General S. P. Heixtze^man, " Commanding Zd Corps." The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be supplied. On the 1st of April 1 embarked with the head- quarters on the steamer Commodore, and reach- ed Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. In consequence of the delay in the arrival of the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its disem- barkation. I found there the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry and the 5th regular cavalry; the 2d regular cavalry and a portion of the 1st had arrived, but not disembarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was not possible to move Casey's division at all for several days, while the other divisions were obliged to move with scant supplies. As to the force and position of the enemy the information then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from the staff officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect that Yorktown was sur- rounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with sti-on-j water batteries on the York Kiver, and ga-risoned by not less than 15,000 troops, under command of General J. B. Magruder. Maps, which had been prepared by the topo- graphic.il engineers under General Wool's com- mand, were furnished me, in which the War- wick River was represented as flowing parallel to, but not crossing, the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island ; and we had no information as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works which it covered. Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15.000. It was also known that there were strong de- fensive works at or near Williamsburg. Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to reinforce Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York rivers to the same point, I proposed to invest that town without delay. The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. Topographical Engineers, attached to General Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several montiis' labor indicated the feasibility of the design. It was also an object of prunary im- portance to reach the vicinity of Vorktown be- fore the enemy was reinforced sulficieiuly to enable liim to hold in force his works at Big Bfthel, ILnvard's Biid^v, Ship Point, &(:., oa the direct road to Yorktown and Young's Mills, on the road from Newport News. This was the more urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the first corps could arrive. Everything possible was done to hasten the disembaikatiou of the cavalry, artillery, and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders of march were given for the following day. There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 3d corps, two divisions of the 4th corps, and one division of the 2d corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named, in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division of artillery. Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and 3d corps had not arrived, and Casey's division of the -Ith corps was unable to move for want of wagons. Before I lefl Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and itjs dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool a division of about 10,0(JO men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. During the night of the 3d I received a tele- gram from the Adjutant-General of the army, stating that, ])y the President's order, I was de- prived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. This order left me without any base of opera- tions under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the c luses which led to it. On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River was declared by the naval authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the Confederate steamers Merri- mack, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag- Officer Goldsborough, then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, re- garded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutral- ize the Merruaack ; and as he designed using his m jst powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had been previously stated to rae, and materially affected my plans. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works. I had hoped, let me say, by rapid moveraenis, to drive before me or capture the enemy on tha Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to Richmond before he should be materially re- inforced from other portions of the territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be de- veloped which frustrated these apparently well- grounded expectations. 50 I determined then to move the two divisions of tlie 4th corps by the Newport News and Wil- lianishiirg road, to take up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburs^, while the two di- visions of the 3d corps moved direct from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown; the reserves moving so as to support either corps as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious re- sistance, to land the 1st corps, reinforced if necessary on the left bank of the York or on tlie Severn, to move on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse whatever force the eneuiy might have on the Peninsula, and com- pel him to abandon his positions. In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encoun- tered from the want of precise topographical in- formation as to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and the coun- try, though known in its general feature, we found to be inaccurately described in essen- tial particulars in the only maps and geograph- ical memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads ■were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of tlie State of Virginia, through ■which my military operations have extended. Keconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, pos- sessed or were able to communicate very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information. On the 3d the following orders ■were given for the movement of the 4th : — " Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Aver- ill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedgwick's di- vision of the 2d corps, under Brigadier-General Heintzelman, commanding 3d corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter's division with Averill's cavalry at 6 a. m. over the Newmarket and New bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge. This division will send forward to tlie batteries where the Ship Point road intersects tiie main Yorktown road a suffi- cient force to hold tiiat ])oint, and cut off the garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The ■whole division may be used for tliis purpose if necessary, and if possible the batteries should he occupied by our troops to-morrow. Tiie portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard's Bridge. '• Hamilton's division will march at 7 a. m. by the New Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's Creek. " Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a. m. by the Newmarket Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's Bridge. " Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding 4th corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's di- visions at 6 A. M. (Smith's division in advance), by the .lames River road. The 5th regular cav- alry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's Mills, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. Couch's divisiou will encamp at Fisher's Creek. "The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m. by the Newmarket bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's division." The following is an extract from the order issued on the 4th for the march of the 5th : — " The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (oth). " General Keyes will move forward Smith's division at G a. m. via Warwick Court House and the road leading near the old shipyard, to the ' Half-way House ' on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. '• General Couch's division will march at 6 a. m. to close up on General Smith's division at the ' Half-way House.' " General Koyes's command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the ' Half- way H(nise,' so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and prevent reinforcements being thrown in. " General Heintzelman will move forward General Porter's two rear brigades at 6 a. m. upon the advanced guard, when the entire di- vision will advance to a point about two and three quarters miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to tiie north, and wiiere a road comes in from Warwick Court House. " General Hamilton's division will move at 6 A. M. and follow General Porter's division, camping as near it as possible. "General Sedgwick's division will march at 5 A. M. as far as the Warwick road, which en- ters the main Yorktown road near Doctor Pow- ers's house, and will await furtlier orders. "The reserve will march at ti a. m. upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Doctor Powers's House ; the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. " General Sedgwick's division will, for the present, act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from headquarters." In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th, it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the 3d corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's Mills, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown wotild place Ship Point in our posses- sion, together vith its garrison, unless they abandoned it piomptly. The result answered the expectation. During the afternoon of the 4th, General Keyes obtained information wf the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong position at Lee's Mills. The nature of that posi- tion, in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, I instructed General Keyes to attack and carry this position upon coming in front of it. Early in the afternoon of the 5th the advance of each column was brought to a halt, that of Heintzelman (Porter's division) in front of York- town, after overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge ; that of Keyea (Smith's division) unexpectedly before the ene my's works at Lee's Mill, where the rgad from 51 Newport News to Williamsburg crosses Warwick Kiver. The progress of each column had been re- tarded by heai-y rains on that day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Keyes's column, and impassable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the ammu- nition, provisions, and forage could not be brought up at all. When General Keys approached Lee's Mills his left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery fire from the further bank of the Warwick, and upon reaching the vicinity of the mill he found it altogether stronger than was expected, unap- proachable by reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being carried by assault. The troops composing the advance of each col- umn were, during the afternoon, under a warm artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right cohimn being engaged when covering reconnois- sances. It was at this stage and moment of the cam- paign that the following telegram was seat to me : — " Adjotant-General's Office, April 4, 18C2. " By direction of the President, General Mc- Dowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail. "L. THOMAS, " Adjutant- General. " General McClellan." The President having promised, in an inter- view foUoAving his order of March 31, withdraw- ing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of the sort should be repeated, — that I might rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no furtlier de- ductions from the force upon which its opera- tions had been planned, — I may confess to hav- ing been shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed nearly 00,000 men from my command, and re- duced my force by more than one third, after its task had been assigned ; its operations plan- ned; its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply comitutted to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of an- other, a different and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant opera- tions impossible. It was a fatal error. It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had, there- fore, no choice left but to attack it directly in front, as I best could with the force at my com- mand. Reconnoissances made under fire on that and the following (day determined that the sources of the Warwick River were near Yorktown, com- manded by its guns, while that stream, for some distance from its mouth on the James River, was controlled by the Confederate gunboats ; that the fords had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were generally through dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by extensive and formidable works; that timber telled for defensive purpust-s and tlio (luoding of the roads, caused by tliu daias, had made these works ai)parently iruiccessihle and iiupos.siiile to turn; that Yorktown was strongly forlilied. armed, and garrisoned, and connected with tiie defences of the Warwick by forts and intrenchmeuis, the ground in front of which was swejit by tlic guns of Yorktown. It was also ascertained tliat the garrisons had been, and were daily being re- inforced by troops from Norfolk and tlie army under General J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and delayed the arrival of troops, annnunition, and supplies, while storms prevented for several days the sailing of transports from Hampton Roads, and the establishment of depots on the creeks of York River, near the army. The ground bordering the Warwick River is covered by very dense and extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. This, with the comparative flatness of the country, and tlie alert- ness of the enemy, everywhere in force, ren- dered thorougli reconnoissances slow, dangerous, and difficult, yet it was impossible otherwise to determine whether an assault was anywhere practicable, or whether the more tedious l)Ut sure operations of a siege must be resorted to. I made, on the 6th and 7tli, close personal re- connoissances of the right and left of the ene- my's positions, which, with information acquired already, convinced me tliat it was best to pre- pare for an assault by the preliminary employ- ment of heavy guns, and some siege operations. Instant assault would liave been simple foUv. On the 7th I telegraphed to the President as fol- lows : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''April!, 18G2. "Your telegram of yesterday is received. In repl}', I have the honor to state, that my entire force for duty amounts to only about (85.000) eighty-five thousand men. General Wool's com- mand, as you will observe from the accompany- ing order, has been taken out of my control, al- though he has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The only use that can be made of his com- mand is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time only fifty-three thou- sand men have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. " Please refer to my despatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the details of our present situation. "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " To the President, Washington, D. C." On the same day I sent the followmg : — "Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, " In front of Yorktown, " April 1, 18G2, — 7 p. m. " Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent, examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely. " The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly de- fended by detached redoubts and other fortifica- tions, armed with heavy and light guns. The 52 approaches, except at Torktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to re- sort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege operations, before we assault. All the prisoners state that G^n. J. E. Johnston arrived at York- town ycsterdiiy witli heavy reinforcements. It seems clear tliat I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands, — probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and prob- ably more. In consequence of the loss of Blen- ker's division and the 1st corps, my force is pos- sibly less than tliat of the enemy, wliile they have all the advantage of position. " I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the Government will be as fully and as speedily un- der my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created. " Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men have been taken from my command. Since my despatch of theotli inst., five divisions have been in close observation of tlie enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all joins, I shall have about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards, scouts, &c. With tliis army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them ; but were I in posses- sion of their intrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the result. " Under the circumstances that have been de- veloped since we arrived here, I feel fully im- pressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the exist- ing contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's •works, but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should if possible, have at least the whole of the 1st corps to land upon the Severn River and attack Gloucester in the rear. " My present strength will not admit of a de- tachment sufiieient for this purpose, without ma- terially impairing tlie efl[iciency of this column. Flag-Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter and one of the commander of the gunboats here. "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, ^'■. Major- Geyieral. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, *' Hecretarij of War." I had provided a small siege train and moder- ate supples of intrenching tools for such a con- tingency as the present. Immediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions. While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertain- ing the character and stix-ngth of all the defences, and the configuration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to determine the point of attack and to develop the approaches, the troops were occujiied in opt'ning roads to the depots established at the nearest available points, on branches of York River. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 10th of April the array was posted as follows : — Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hooker's, and Hamilton's divisions, in front of Y'orktown, extending in tlie order named, from the mouth of Wormley's Creek to the Warwick road, opposite Winn's Mills. Sumner's corps — Sedgwick's division only having arrived — on the left of Hamilton, extending down to Warwick and opposite to Winn's Mills works. Reyes's corps, (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the left of Sedgwick, lacing the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's Mills, &c., on the west bank of the Warwick. Sunmer, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of his own and Reyes's corps. Throughout the preparations for, and during the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under General Reyes, and afterwards the left wing, under General Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched upon the right bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of de- fence, so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut oft' Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under Gen- eral Heintzelman were engaged in similar efibrts upon the works betwaen Winn's INIills and York- town. General Reyes's report of the IGih of April, enclosing reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconnoissances up to that day, said, " that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his own) line, so far as discovered, can be taken by assault, without an enormous waste of life." Reconnoissances on the right flank demonstrated the fact that the Warwick was not passable in that direction, except over a narrow dam, the approaches to which were swept by several bat- teries, and intrenchments which could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber immediately in rear. General Barnard, chief engineer of the army of the Potomac, whose position entitled his opin- ions to the highest consideration, expressed the judgment that those formidable works could not, with any reasonable degree of certainty, be car- ried by assault. General Reyes, commanding 4th army corps, after the examination of the enemy's defences on the left, before alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United States Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly ofiicial, it describes the situation at that time in some respects so well, that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here : — " Headquarters 4th Corps, " Warwick Corni, House, Va., April 7, 1862. "My dear Senator: The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct imder- standing that four army corps should be employ- ed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River. "To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which by the President's order was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of tlie 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether 53 from this line of operations, and from the army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am in- formed, the navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunl)oats up James River, for fear of the Merrimack. " The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major-General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Kc3'cs, and was concurred in by Major-General McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base. " This army being reduced by forty-five thou- sand troops, some of them among the best in the service, ami without the support of the navj', the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for. " I command the James River column, and I left my camp near Nevqiort News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and one of my divisions had not all ar- rived in camp the day I left, and for the want of transportation has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the ad- vance, and in fact we marched so quickly, and so rapidly, that many of our animals were twenty- four and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, wc were stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream, or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown, and the other ending in the James River, which is com- manded by the enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either. " The approaches on one side are generally inrough low, swampy, or thickly wooded ground, over roads which wc are obliged to repair or to make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving reinfoi'cements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in >iny country. " You will, then, ask why I advocated such a line for our operations ? My reasons are few, but I think good. " With proper assistance from the navy we could take Yorktown, and then with gunboats on both rivers we could beat any force opposed to us on Wai'wick River, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; so that if the enemy should re- treat — and retreat he must — he would have a long way to go without rail or steam transporta- tion, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed. " Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was, that this line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Richmond. " Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next ? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James River, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficidty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies. " You will see, therefore, by what I liave said, that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should l)e all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary when I supposed the navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the ol)stacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, how nnich more should 1 think the full complement of troops requisite nowtliat the na\'y cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immeas- urably greater than I had been led to expect. The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here, who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of l)cing increas- ed beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently of the strenccth of the lines in front of us, and of the force of t!ie enemy be- hind them, we cannot advance until we get com- mand of either York River or .James River. The efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe. "An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; and if several strong gunboats could be sent up James River also, our success will bt certain and complete, and the Rebellion will soon be put down. " On the other hand we must butt against the enemy's works with heavy artillery, and a great waste of time, life, and material. " If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from two great water- courses in the hands of the enemy ; our supplies would give out, and the enemy, equal if not su- perior in numbers, would, with the other advan- tages, beat and destroy this arm}'. " The greatest master of the art of war has said, ' that if you would invade a country suc- cessfully you must have one line of operations, and one army, under one general.' But what is our condition ? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz : Freniont. Banks, Mc- Dowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix. " The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the Rebellion will be crushed, — if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I care to tell. The plan of cam- paign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain. " It is no cioabt agreeable to the commander of the 1st corps to have a separate department, and as this letter advoca.?s liis return to General McClellan's command, it .s proper to state that I am not at all influenced bv .personal regard or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that in regard to my present fine command. I owe much to General 54 McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregardeil all such officiousncss, and I have from last July to the j)rescnt day sup- ported General McClelJan, and obeyed all Ids or- ders with as hearty a good-will a.s though he had been my brother or the frieud to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last, and so long as he is my couunander. And I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understand- ing that he was to execute a definite plan of cam- paign with certain prescribed means. The plan ■was good and the means sufficient, and without modification the enterprise was certain of suc- cess. But with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success. " Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond; and when you see me working the hardest, you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now to my utmost. " Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect, "Your most obedient servant, E. D. KEYES, Brigadier- General ^ Commanding ith Army Corps. " Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate. On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Generals Hooker, Eichardson, and Casey, I received the following despatches from the President and Secretary of War : — Washington, April 6, 1862 — 8 p. m. "Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Secre- tary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to War- wick River at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can. "A. LINCOLN, President. " General G. B. McClellan." " Washington, April 6, 1862—2 p. m. " The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been received. General Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's divisicm is now on the advance towards Manas- sas. There is no moans of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph frequcntlj% and all in the power of the Government shall be done to sustain you as occasion may require. " E. M. STANTON, " Secretary of War. " General G. B. McClellan." By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the position and strength of the enemy's works, and the ol)stacles to l)e over- come. On that day I received the following let- ter from the President : — " Washington, April 9, 1862. "My dear Sir: Your despatches complain- ing that you are not properly sustained, while they do not oti'end me, do pain me very much. " Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acqui- esced in it, — certainly not without reluctance. " After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was di- verted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exijosing the upper Potomac and the Bal- timore and Ohio Eailroad. This presented, or would present, when IMcDowell and Sumner should 1)6 gone, a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Eappahannock and sack Washington. My implicit order that Washing- ton should, by the judgment of all the command- ers of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. " I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junc- tion ; but when that arrangement was broken ui>, and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to sulistitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Kichmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entire- ly open, except what resistance could be present- ed by less than 20,000 unorganized troops ? This is a question wliich the country will not allow me to evade. There is a curious mystery abotit the number of troops now with you. When I telegrai^hed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrep- ancy of 23,000 be accounted for? "As to General Wool's command, I under- stand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time. And if so, I '■liink t is the precise time for you to strike a blow. 3y delay tise enemy will rela- tively gain upon ycu, — that is, he will gain faster by fortifications aiid reinforcements than you can by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, it is indi-^pensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help tlds. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not surmounting, a diffi- culty ; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the i)resent hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. 55 " I beg to assure you that I have never writ- ten you or spoken to you in {greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judg- ment, I consistently can. But you must act. " Yours, very truly, "A. LINCOLN. " Major-General McClellan." With great deference to the opinions and wishes of His Excellency the President, I most respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I have presented and those contained in the ac- companying letter of General Keyes, with the reports of General Barnard and other officers, as furnishing a reply to the above letter. His Excellency could not judge of the formidable character of the works before us as well as if he had been on the ground; and whatever miglit have been his desire for prompt action, (certain- ly no greater than mine,) I feel confident if he could liave made a personal inspection of the en- emy's defences, he would have forbidden me risking the safety of the army and the possible successes of the cmipaign on a sanguinary as- sault of an advantageous and formidable posi- tion, wJiich, even if successful, could not have been followed up to any other or better result than would have been reached by the regular op- erations of a siege. Still less could I forego tlie conclusions of my most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal conse- quences intimated in the President's despatch. The following extracts from the report of tlie chief engineer (Brigadier-General J.G. Barnard) embody the result of our reconnoissances, and give, with some degree of detail, the character and strength of the defences of Yorktown and the Warwick, and some of the obstacles which the army contended against and overcame. Extracts from General Barnard's Report. " The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accuracy the outline and armament of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the detached works immediately connected with it. '• The three bastioncd fronts, looking towards our approaches, appear to have been eai'liest built, and have about fifteen feet thickness of parapet and eight to ten feet depth of ditch, the width vai-ying much, but never being less at top of scarp than fifteen feet, — I think generally much more. •' The works extending around the town, from the western salient of i'ronts just mentioned, ap- pear to have been finished during the past win- ter and spring. They have formidable profiles, eighteen feet thickness of parapet, and generally ten feet depth of ditch. " The water batteries had generally eighteen feet parapet, the guns in barbette. " They were (as well as all the works men- tioned) carefully constructed with well-made sod revetments. '•There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines; how sufficient in bomh-pruof qualities I am unable to say. "The first two guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as well as the land, and were of heavy calilire. " The list herewith gives all the guns in posi- tion, or for which tliere were emplacements. The vacant emplacements were all occupied be- fore the evacuation by siege guns, ritled 4.i-inch 24:-pounders, and 18-pounders. " In Fort Magruder (ihe first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42- pounder, and one 8-inch siege howit'/er; the two former in barbette. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on iiLld and siege carriages; making, I tliink, witli the foregoing, twenty-tAvo. Two of these were placed behind traverses, with embrasures covered by blind- ages. " The two external redoubts, with the connect- ing parapets, formed a re-entrant with tlu; fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our ap- proaches. " It will be seen, therefore, that our ap- proaches were swept by tlie fire of at least forty- nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them the most formidable guns known. Besides that, two thirds of the guns of the water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, thougli under disadvanta- geous circumstances. "The ravine behind which the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not very difficult, as the heads formed depressions in front of their left, imperfectly seen by their fire, and from wliicli access could be had to the ditches ; but we could not be stire of the fact be- fore the evacuation. The enemy held, liy means of a slight breastwork and rifle trenches, a jiosi- tion in advance of the heads of these ravines as far forward as the burnt house. " The ravines which head between the York- town fortifications and the exterior works are deep and intricate. Tiiey were tolerably well seen, however, by the works which run west- wardly from the Yorktown works, and wliicli were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper. " Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built at an early period. '•The external connection between this work was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards en- larged into a parapet, with external ditch and an emplacement for four guns in or near the small redan in the centre. " Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulments, with connecting boyaus not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended probal-ly to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our artillery. "From the ' red redoubt ' these trenches and epaulments ran to the woods and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and continue almost without break to connect with the works at Wynn's Mill. This stream, just mentioned, whatever be its name, (the term • Warwick,' ac- cording to some, applying only to the tidal chan- nel from the James Kiver up as high as Lee's Mill,) was inundated by a number of dams from near where its head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned down to Lee's Mill. '• Below Lee's Mill the Warwick follows a tor- tuous course thr(nigh salt marshes of two hun- dred or three hundred yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of thirty or forty feet. " The first group of works is at Wynn's Mill, 56 where there is a dam and bridge. The next is to guard another dam between Wynn's and Lee's mills ; (this is the point attaelied by Gen- eral Smith on the liJth ultimo, and where Lieu- tenant JSIerrill was wounded ; the objeet of the attaek was merely to prevent the further eon- struetion of works and feel the strength of the position.) A work, of what strength is not known, was at the sharp angle of the stream just atiove Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of works at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. " From Lee's Mill a line of works extends across Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. " At Southal's Landing is another formidable group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across to the James River. "These groups of field-works were connected by rifle-trenches or parapets for nearly the whole distance. " They are for more extensive than may be supposed from tlie mention of tliem I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country af- fords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skilfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times. " The country on both sides of the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have con- stantly had, except where our own labors had corduroyed them. " If we could have broken the enemy's line across the Isthmus, we could have invested York- town, and it must, witli its garrison, have soon fallen into our liands. It was not deemed prac- ticable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of iiandling our forces, (owing to the impracticable character of the country,) to do so. " If we could take Yorktown, or drive the en- emy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attexnpt the reduction of the place by assault." The plan of the approaclies and their defences, as determined upon and finally executed, is ex- hibited on the accompanying map, (No. — .) It was, in words, to open the first parallel as nc-ar as possible to the works of the enemy, and under its protection to establish almost simultaneously batteries along the whole front, extending from York River on the riglit, to the Warwick on the left, a cord of about one mile in length. The principal approaches were directed against the east end of the main work, wJucli was most heavily armed, and bore both on the water and land, and lay between Wormley's Creek and York River. There also were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front to enfilade the water batteries, and to act upon Gloucester. I designed at the earliest moment to open si- multaneously with several batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land between Wormley's Creek and the War- wick, were crippU-d and their fire kept down, to push the trenches as far forward as necessary, and to assault Yorktown and the adjacent works. I'lie approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been vigorously pusJied to completion by the troo is under Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, and were available for infantry, and in some in- stances for artillery, on the 17th of April, when the batteries and their connections were com- menced, and labor upon them kept up night and day until finished. Some or the batteries on easy ground and concealed from the view of the enemy, were early completed and armed, and held ready for any emergency, Init not permitted to open, as the return tire of the enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more important works. The completion of the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores at the wharf in York- town, on May 1st battery No. 1 was opened with eflect upon the wharf and town. _ On the 22d of April General Franklin, with his division from General McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me. Tlie garrison of Gloucester Point had been reinforced and the works strengthened; but as this division was too small to detach to the Severn, and no more troops could be spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking it on the north bank of the York River, under the protection of the gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship while the necessary preparations were made for landing them, and supporting them in case of necessity. For a full account of this labor I refer to the report of Lieutenant- Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the engineer corps, detailed for this expedition. While the siege works wei-e being rapidlv completed, the roads on the leic wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemy's guns, and drive him from his works at Wynn's and Lee's mills, preparatory to the general attack. Active recon- noissanees were continually going on, and at- tempts in force made to drive the enemy from the banks. The result of various reconnoissances made under the immediate direction of General W. F. Smith, commanding second division fourtli corps, led to the belief that the weakest point of the enemy's lines was opposite a field where it was ascertained that there was a dam covered by i battery known to contain at least one gun. It was determined to puoli a strong reeonnois- sance on this point to silence the enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the position. Being prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party by a real attack, if found expedient. Gen- eral W. F. Smith -was directed to undertake the operation on the KJth of April. He silenced the fire of the enemy's guns, discovered the ex- istence of other works previously concealed and unknown, and sent a strong party across the stream, which was finally forced to retire with some loss. Smith intrenciied himself in a posi- tion immediately overlooking the dam and the enemy's works, so as to keep them under con- trol, and prevent tlie enemy from using the dam as a means of crossing the Warwick to annoy us. Many tunes toward the end of the montli ti?.e 57 enemy attempted to drive in our pickets, and take GUI' i-itle-pits near Yorktown, but always without success. As the siege progressed, it was with great diffi- culty that tlie ritie-pits on the right could be ex- cavated and held, so little covering could be made against the hot fire of tlie enemy's artillery and infantry. Their guns conthmi'tl liriiig up to a late hour of the night of the od of ]May. Our batteries would have lieen ready to open on the morning of the Gth May at latest ; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the enemy had already been compelled to evac- uate his position during the night, leaving behind him all Ids heavy guns, uninjured, and a large amount of ammunition and supplies. For the details of the la!)or of the siege I refer to the ficcompanying reports and journals of Brigadier- General J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged with the selections, laying out, and completion of the approaches and batteries ; of Brigadier- General Willi;im F. Barry, chief of artillery, charged with arming and supplying with auuim- nition all the siege and field batteries ; and of Brigadier-General Fitz-John Porter, director of the siege, to whom were assigned the guarding of the trenches, the assembling and distribution of the working parties, &c., &c. Early in the morning of the 4th, on the ene- my's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered all the availalile cavalry force, with four batteries of horse artillery, under Brigadier-General Stoneman, chief of cavalry, in immediate pursuit by the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, with orders to harass the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his forces as had taken the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road. General Heintzelman was directed to send Hooker's division forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road to support General Stone- man; and Smith was ordered to proceed with his division upon the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road for the same purpose. Afterwards, the di- visions of Generals Kearney, Couch, and Casey, were put en route, — the fb\st on the Yorktown road, and the others on the Lee's Mill road. These roads unite about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and are connected by cross-roads at sevei'al points between Yorktown and Williamsburg. After these directions had been given. General Sumner (the officer second in rank in the army of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take immediate charge of operations until my arrival. General Stoneman moved forward promptly with his command, consisting of four batteries of horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, the 1st and 6th United States cavalry, the 3d Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois, and Barker's squadron, meeting ^vith but little opposition until he arrived in front of the enemy's works about two miles east of Williamsburg. At a point about eight miles from Yorktown, in accordance with my instructions, he detached General Emory with Benson's battery, the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Avcrill,) and Barker's squadron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of General Smith, to cut off the portion of the enemy's rear guard which had taken that route. General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regi- ment of cavalry and a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's Mill. General Smith having met with olistructions in his front, had transferred his coluiim, by a cross-road, to the Yorktown and Williamsljurg road, so that General Emory, finding no force to *j6perate with him, was unable to cut off the rear guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route along the bank of tne James liiver. The position in which General Stoneman en- countered the enemy is about four miles in extent, the right resting on College Creek, and the left on Queen's Creek ; nearly three fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds. The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, con- sisting of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulments for field guns. The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, lilkd with water. The length of the interior crest is about GuO yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having tiices of aliout forty yards. The woods in front of the position were felled, and the oi)en ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous riile-pits. The roads leading from tiie lower part of the Peninsula to Williamsburg, one along the York River, (the Yovktownroad,) and the other along the James, (the Lee's Mill road,) unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by wliich they are commanded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James Iliver road leaves it about one and three fourths of a mile below Fort Magruder and unites with the road from Allen's Landing to Williamsburg, which crosses the tributary of College Creek over a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just in rear of the line of works, being com- manded by the three redoubts on the right of the line, at about the same distance from Fort Ma- gruder. A branch leaves the York River road and crosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, and passing over the position-.and through the works in its rear, finally enters Williams- burg; this road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of the works. General Stoneman debouclied from the woods with his advance guard, (consisting of a part of the 1st United Slates cavalry, and one section of Gibson's battery, under the cnniinand of General Cooke,) and the enemy immediately opened on him witli several field-pieces from Fort Magru- der, having the correct range and doing some execution. Gil)son's battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would per- mit, and returned the fire ; while the t>th United States cavalry was sent to feel the enemy's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with in- fantry and artillery, came down upon it, where- upon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under command of Captain Saun- 58 dcrs, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in the most galhvnt manner. In the mean time the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, and the artillery fire becoming very hot. General Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered tiie withdrawal of the battery. Tliis was accomplished, with the exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. Tlie enemy attempted to prevent the .TPovement, hut their ciiarges were met by the 1st United States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing several olficers and one stand of colors. General Stoneman then took a defen- sive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry. The advance of General Smith's column reached Skiff's Creek about llf^ o'clock, and founly liim by that route. " The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward. "By order of the President. "EDWIN M. 'STANTON, "Secretary of War. "Major-General George B. McClellan, " Commanding Army of the Potomac, before Richmond." It will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Rich- mond from the north. I had advised, and preferred, that reinforce- ments should be sent l)y water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would l)e left free to rest the army on the James River whenever the navigation of that stream should be opened. The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by watei', I could have approached Riclunond by the James, and tlms avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chicka- hominy, and would have had the army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream. The following is a copy of the instructions to General McDowell : — " War Department, " Washington, May 17, 1862. " General : Upon being joined by General Shiidds's division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fred- ericksburg railroad, cooperating with tlie forces under General McClellan, now threatening Rich- mond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. " While seeking to establish as soon as possi- ble a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the Rebel forces. " General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed 63 to hold himself in readiness to establish com- munication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and throwing itself upon your col- umn, before a junction of the two armies is effected. "A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of j'our force is annexed. "By order of the President. " EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War, "General McDowell, " Comrii'g Dcp't of Rappahannocli" Having some doubts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of General McDowell, and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent tliis dispatch : — " Headqdartkks Armt of the Potomac, " Camp near TunstalVs Station, Virginia, May 21, 18G2— 11 p. m. "Your despatch of yesterday, respecting our situation and the batteries of Fort Darling, was received wliile I was absent with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have com- municated personally with Captain Goldsborough and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I will not be in condition to afford for sev- eral days. Circumstances must determine the propriety of a land attack. "It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed the Chickahorainy to-day at Bottom's Bridge ford, and went a mile bej'ond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. Kcj-es's corps is on the New Kent road, near Bottom's Bridge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with advanced guard, is within one mile of New Bridge. Franklin, with two divi- sions, is aljout two miles this side of Stoneman. Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry and artillery, is within supporting distance. Headquarters will probably be at Coal Harbor to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over the Chickahominy are de- stroj^ed. The enemy are in force on every road leading to Eichmond, within a mile or two west of the stream. Their main body is on the road from New Bridge, encamped along it for four or five miles, spreading over the open ground on both sides. Johnston's headquarters are about tAvo miles beyond the bridge. "All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The position of the Rebel tt,rcbs, the declaration of the confederate authori- ties, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, tht action of the city government, the conduct of the citi5b-?ns, and all other sources of information accessible vo me give positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate bat- tle between the opposing armies. "All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment, and in such manner as to employ my greatest force. " I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's connnand. We must l)eat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that effort would do more to protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do anywhere else in the fiuld. The Rebels are concentrating from all points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still, most respectfully, suggest the policy of our concentrating here by movements on water. I have heard nothing as to the probabilities of the contemplated junction of McDowell's force with mine. I have no idea when he can start, wliat are his means of transjjortation, or when he may l)e expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can join me over land in time for the coming battle. Delays on my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoraliza- tion. This region is unhealthy for northern men, and unless kept moving, I fear that our soldiers may become chscouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our men remain in good heart. " I regret also the configuration of the depart- ment of the Rappahannock. It includes a por- tion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own department should embrace the entire field of military operations designed tor the cap- ture and occupation of that city. "Again, I agree Avith your Excellency that one bad general is better than two good ones. " I am not sure that I fidly comprehend your orders of the 17th instant addressed to myself and General McDowell. If a junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, aad the express language of the t)2d article of war, will place his command imder my orders, unless it is otherwise specially directed by your Excellency ; and I consider that he will be under my command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, or give any orders wliich can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxi- ous as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. " Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against by ex-plicitly placing General McDowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and hold- ing me strictly responsible for the closest obser- vance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. Presi- dent, that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instrTictlons would be observed in the utmost good faith, and that I have no personal 64 feelings which could influence me to disregard them in any particular. " I believe that tliere is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither di-:miiyed nor dis- couraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall figlit it with all the skill, caution, and determination tiiat I possess, and I trust that the result may either olitain for me the permanent confidence of mv Government, or that it may close my career. "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, ^'■President of the United States." On the 24th I received the following reply : — "May 24, 1862? " From Washington, 2ith. " I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields's command is there, but it is 80 worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth. (2oth.) We liave so thinned o-ur line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (IJ regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril. " The enemy's forces, under General Ander- son, now opposing General McDowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond. " If, in conjunction with McDowell's move- ment against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut oif the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent tlie army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, wiiile you are building the Chicahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will move Monday morning. / ivish you to move cautiously and safely. " You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the twenty-first, (21st.) " A. LINCOLN, President. " Major-General G. B. McClellan." This information that McDowell's corps would march for Fredericksburg on the following Mon- day, (the 2(;th,) and that he would be under my command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confi- dent that we would on his arrival be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting us. At a later hour on the same day I received the following : — " Mat 24, 18(12. " From Washington, 4 p. m. " In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend Gen- eral M( Dowcll's movements to join you. The enemy are makmg a desperate push upon Har- per's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force, and part of General McDow- ell's, in their rear. " A. LINCOLN, President. " Major-General Geo. B. McClellan." From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening 1 replied to the President that I would make my calculatioHS accordingly. It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries to compensate as much as possible for tlie inadequacy of men. I concurred fully witli the Pie>ident in the in- junction contained in his telegram of the 24Lh, that it was necessary with my limited force to move " cautiously and safely." In view of the peculiar cliaracter of t!ie Cliicahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundation, it became necessary to construct between Bot- tom's Bridge and Meclianicsville eleven (11) new i)ridges, all long and difficult, with exten- sive log-way approaclies. The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chicaliominy immediately after our arrival, l>ut this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communica- tions, or to protect our riglit and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of tlie Chicahominy, and tlie stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supply in advance, the troops nmst have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the army would liave been paralyzed. It is true I miglit have al)andoned my commu- nications, and pushed forward towards Rich- mond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the ene- my and the consequent fall of the city for a renewal of supplies ; but the approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments, requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations. Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army on tlie left I)ank of tlie river until our bridges were completed. It will be remembered that the order for the cooperation of General McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and tlierefore I was not at liberty to abandon the northern approach. .\ very dashing and successful reconnoissance was made near Newbridge, on the 24th of May, by Lieutenant Bowcn, topographical engineers, escorted by the 4tii Micl)igan volunteers and a squadron of the United States cavalry, com- mimded. respectively, by Cohmel Woodbury and Captain Gordon. Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, and with little loss drove it back upon its brigade, killing a large number and capturing several prisoners. Great credit is due to the statt" officers, as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Captain Gor- don, and their commands, for their conduct on this occasion. The work upon the bridges was commenced 65 at once, and pushed forward Avith great vigor; but the rains, which from day to day continued to fell, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a greater height than had been known for twenty j'ears. This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our first bridges, with their approaches, wliich were not made with reference to such extreme high water, were carried olF or rendered impassable. We were obliged, with immense labor, to construct others, much longer, more elevated, and stable ; our men worked in the water, ex\3osed to the enemy's fire from the op- posite bank. On the 25th of May I received the following telegram : — " WA.SH1NGTON, May 25, 1862. " Your despatch received. General Banks was at Sharpsburg with about six thousand (6,000) men. Shields liaving been taken from iiim to swell een disabled by vhe fire of Ben.son's battery. The firing here lasted alx)ut an hour. Tiie cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, fol- lowed by Morrell's infantry and artillery, with the exception of Martindale's brigade. War- ren's brigade having been delayed by i-epairing bridges, &c., now arrived, too late to particixiate in this afiair; a portion of this command was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and captured quite a number of prisoners ; the re- mainder followed Morell's division. In the mean time General Martindale, with the few re- maining regiments of his brigade and a section of artUlery, advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in position near Beake's Station, on Virginia Central railroad; he soon forced them to retire towards Ashland. The 25th Now York having been ordered to rejoin him. General Martindale was directed to form his brigatle and move up the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover Court House. He sent one regiment up the railroad, but re- mained with the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the main column. The enemy soon retnrned to attack General Martindale, who at once formed the 2d Maine, 25th New York, and a portion of the 44th New York, with one section of Martin's battery, on the New Bridge road, facing his own position of the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds, until reinforced. General Porter was at Hanover Court House, near the head of his column, w'nen he learned that the rear Iiad been attacked by a large force. He at once faced the whole column about, re« 67 called the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ash- land, moved the loth and 14th New York and Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, pushed the 9th Massachusetts and G2d Pennsyl- vania, of McQuade's brigade, through the woods on the right (our original left), and attacked the flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the 83d Pennsylvania and IGth Michigan, hastened towards the scene of action by the railroad, and through the woods, further to the right, and com- pleted the rout of the enemy. During the re- mainder of this and the following day our cavalry was active in the pursuit, taking a number of prisoners. Captain Harrison, of the 5th United States cav- alry, with a single company, brought in as pris- oners two entire companies of infantry with their arms and ammunition, A part of Rush's lancers also captured an entire company with their arms. The immediate results of these affairs were, some two hundred of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, seven hundred and thirty priyoners eent to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small arms, and two railroad trains, captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing. The force encountered and defeated was Gen- eral Branch's division, of North Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 strong. Their camp at Hanover Court House was taken and destroyed. Having reason to believe that General Ander- son, with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I ordered General Syke's division of regulars to move on the 28th from New Bridge toward Han- over Court House, to be in position to support General Porter. They reached a point within three miles of Hanover Court House, and re- mained there until the evening of the 29th, when they returned to their original camp. On tlic 2Sth General Stoneman's command of cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of infantry, were also placed under General Por- ter's orders. On the same day I visited Hanover Courv House, whence I sent the following despatch. " Hanover Court House, " May 28—2 p.m. " Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glo- rious victory ; too much credit cannot be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The rout of the Rebels was complete ; not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are constantly coming in ; two companies have tliis moment arrived with excellent arms. " There is no doubt that the enemy are con- centrating everything on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether I can. " It is the policy and duty of the Government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's com- mand. "I may not be able to cut them off, but will try ; we have cut all but the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad. The real issue is in the battle about to be fought in Vont of Richmond. All our available troops should he coUccUhI here] not raw regiments, but the well-drilh'd troops! It cannot bo ignored that a desperate l)attle is before us ; if any regiments of good troops re- main unemployed, it will he an irrei):iral)Io fault committed. G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War." Having ascertained the state of afl^airs, instruc- tions were given for the operations of the follow- ing day. On the 28th a party under Major Williams, Gth United States cavalry, destroyed tlio com- mon road bridges over the Pamunkey, and Vir- ginia Central railroad bridge over the South Ann. On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad bridge over the South Ann, and the turnpike bridge over the same stream. On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of Major Williams, General Emory moved a column of cavalry towards Ashland, from Hanover Court House. The advance of this column under Captain Chamhliss, 5tli United States cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, destroyed the railroad bridge over Stony Creek, broke up the railroad and telegraph. Another column of all arms, umlcr Colonel Wari;en, was sent on the same day by the direct road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after General Emory's column had retired, capturing a small party there. General Stoneraan on the same day moved on Ashland by Leach's Station, covering well the movements of the other columns. The objects of the expedition having been accomplished, and it being certain that the 1st corps would not join us at once, General Porter withdrew his command to their camps with the main army on the evening of the 29th. On the night of the 27th and 2Sth I sent the following despatch to the Secretary of War : — "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '' Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 18G2 — 12.30 A. M. " Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I fcol obliged to move in the morning with reinforcements to secure the complete destruction of the Rebels in that quarter. In doing so, I run some risk here, but I cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater force than I had supposed. I will do all that quick movements can accomplish, but you must send me all the troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to choice of com- manders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy the Rebels near Hanover Court House before I can advance. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- Geiieral. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." In reply to which I received the following from the President : — Washington, May 28, 1802. " I am very glad of General F. J. Poi ter's 68 victory; still, if it was a total rout of the ene- my, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puz- zled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Rich- mond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the wliole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think, cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that contrabands give certain information that iifteen thousand left Hanover Junction Monday morn- ing to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully im- pressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consist- ently with my view of due regcird to all points. "A. LINCOLN. " Major-General McClellan." At 6 p. >i. of the 29th I sent the Secretary of "War the following despatch : — " Headquarters Army or the Potomac, " May 29, 1862— G p. m. " General Porter has gained information that General Anderson left his position in vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 a. m. Sunday, with the fol- lowing troops : 1st South Carolina, Colonel Hamilton ; one battalion South Carolina rifles ; 34th and 38th North Carolina; 45th Georgia; 12th, 13th, and lith South Carolina; 3d Louisi- ana ; two batteries of four gnns each, namely, Letcher's Virginia and Mcintosh's Soutli Caro- lina batteries. General Anderson and his com- mand passed Ashland yesterday evening, en route for Richmond, leaving men behind to de- stroy bridges over the telegraph road which they travelled. This information is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch's command was from Gordonsville bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone. " It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no Rebel force between Fredericksburg and Junction. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." The following was also sent on the same day. " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "May 29, 18G2. " A detachment from General F. J. Porter's command, under Major Williams, Gth cavalry, destroyed the South Ann railroad bridge at about 9 A. M. to-day; a large quantity of Con- federate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning. "R. B. MARCY, " Chief of Staff. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." In reply to wliich, the following was received. " Washington, May 29, 1862. " Your despatch as to the South Ann and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank General McClellan and his army for their seizure. "A. LINCOLN. " General R. B. Marcy." On the 80th I sent the following : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " May 30, 18G2. "From the tone of your despatches and the President's, I do not think that you at all appre- ciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened ; routed and demoral- ized a considerable portion of the Rebel forces ; taken over seven Inindred and fifty prisoners ; killed and wounded large numbers ; one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has re- turned, and my armj' is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain tliat there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fredericksburg. I regai'd the Inirning of South Anna oridges as the least important result of Porter's movement. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. "Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." The results of this brilliant operation of Gen- eral Porter were the dispersal of General Branch's division, and the clearing of our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by rail with Fred- ericksburg, or with Jackson via Gordonsville, except by the very circuitous route of Lynch- burg, and the road was left entirely open for the advance of McDowell had he been permitted to join the army of the Potomac. His withdrawal towards Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error ; he could do no good in that direction, while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within the imme- diate intrenchments of Richmond, before Jack- son could have returned to its succor, and prob- ably would have gained possession promptly of that place. I respectfully refer to the i-eports of General Porter and his subordinate command- ers for the names of the officers who deserve especial mention for the parts they took in these aflairs, but I cannot omit here my testimony to the energy and ability here displayed by General Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly due the successes there gained. On the 20th of May a reconnoissance was or- dered on the south side of the Chickahommy towards James River. This was accomplished by Brigadier-General H. M. Naglee, who crossed 69 his brigade near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed forward to within two miles of James River without serious resistance, or finding tlie enemy in force. The rest of the 4th corps, commanded by General E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chiclia- hoininy on the 23d of May. On the 24th, 25th, and 26th, a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed by General Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on the 25th the 4th corps was ordered to take up and fortity a position in.the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The order was at once obeyed ; a strong line of rifle-i)its opened, and an abatis construct- ed a little in the rear of the point where the nine- mile road comes into tlie Williamsburg road. On the same day General Heintzelman was ordered to cross with his corps, (the 3d,) and take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's Bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the left wing of the army. Being the senior ofiiccr on that side of the river, lie was placed in com- mand of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp unless in an emergency. On the 2Sth General Keyes was ordered to advance Casey's division to Fair Oaks, on the Williamsburg road, some three quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Gen- eral Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A new line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field guns were commenced, and much of the timber in front of this line was felled on the two days following. The picket line was establish- ed, reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp. On the 30th General Heintzelman, represent- ing that the advance had met with sharp opposi- tion in taking up their position, and that lie con- sidered the point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to make such dispositions of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He immediately advanced two brigades of Kearney's division about the fourth of a mile in fi'ont of Savage's Station, thus placing them within supporting distance of Casey's division, which held the advance of the 4th corps. On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Cliickahominy were in position as follows : Casey's di%asion on the right of the Williams- burg road, at right angles to it, the centre at Fair Oaks ; Couch's division at the Seven Pines ; Kearney's division on the railroad, from near Savage's Station towards the bridge; Hooker's division on the borders of White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept up between our pickets and those of the enemy; while these lines were being taken up and strengthened, large bodies of Confederate troops were seen immediately to the front and right of Casey's position. During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred, the rain fall- ing in torrents rendered work on the rifle-pits and In-idges impracticable ; made the roads al- most impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges over the Chickahominy. The enemy perceiving the unfavorable posi- tion in which we were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off from the main liody by the rapidly rising stream, threw an overwlieiming force (grand divisions of Generals I). H. Uill, Hugcr, Longstreet, and (}. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey's division. It appears from the official reports of General Keyes and his subordinate couuManders, that at ten o'clock a. m. on the 3Ist of May, an aide-de- camp of GeneralJ. E. Johnston was captured by- General Naglee's pickets. But little intormation as to the movements of the enemy w;is o))tained from him, but his presence so near our lines ex- cited suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and the troops were ordered by General Keyes to be under arms at eleven o'clock. Between eleven and twelve o'clock it was reported to General Casey that the enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. At this time Casey's division was disposed as follows : Naglee's brigade extending from the Williamsburg road to the Garnett held, having one regiment across the railroad ; General Wes- sel's brigade in the rifle-pits, and General Pal- mer's in the rear of General Wessel's ; one bat- tery of artillery in advance with General Naglee ; one battery in rear of rifle-i)its to the right of the redoubt; one battery in rear of the redoubt, and another battery, unharnessed, in the redoubt. General Couch's division, holding the second line, had General Abercrombi-e's brigade on the right, along the nine-mile road, with two regi- ments and one battery across the railroad near Fair Oaks Station; General Peck's brigade on the right, and General Devins's in the centre. On the approach of the enemy. General Casey sent forward one of General Palmer's regiments to support the picket line, but this regiment gave way without making much, if any, resistance. Heavy firing at once commenced, and the pick- ets were driven in. General Keyes ordered General Couch to move General Peck's brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the Williams- burg road, which had not before been occupied by our forces, and thus to support General Ca- sey's left, where the first attack was the most severe. The enemy now came on in heavy force, attacking General Casey simultaneously in front and on both flanks. General Keyes sent to General Hemtzelman for reinforcements, but tlie messenger was delayed, so that orders were not sent to Generals Kearney and Hooker until nearly 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 p. m. when Generals Jameson and Perry's brigades, of General Kearney's division, arrived on the field. General Birney was ordered up the railroad, but by General Kearney's order halted his brigade before arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also despatched for General Plooker to move up from White Oak Swamp, and he ar- rived after dark at Savage's Station. As soon as the fire was heard at headquarters, orders were sent to General Sumiwr to get his command under arms and be ready to move at a moment's warning. Plis corps, consisting of Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, was encamped on the north side of the Chicka- hominy, some six miles above Bottom's Bridge ; each division had thrown a bridge over the stream opposite to its own position. At one o'clock General Sumner moved the two divisions to their respective bridges, with 70 instructions to halt and await further orders. At two o'clock orders were sent from headquar- ters to cross these divisions witliout deliiy, and push them rapidly to Genaral Heintzelman's support. This order was received and commu- nicated at half past two, and the passage was immediately commenced. In the mean time General Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of General Casey's division, which Genei-al Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the re- doubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming masses of the enemy. They were reinforced by a regiment from General Peck's brigade. T!i3 artillery under command of Colonel G. D. Bailey, 1st New York artillery, and afterwards of General Naglee, did good execution on the advancing column. The left of this position was, however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire opened upon the gunners and men in tlie rifle- pits. Colonel Bailey, Major Van Valkenberg, and Adjutant Ramsey, of the same regiment, were killed ; some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the position occupied hy General Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessel and Palmer, with the reinforcements which had been sent tliem from General Couch, had also been driven from the field with heavy loss, and the whole position occupied by General Casey's division was taken by the enemy. Previous to this time General Keyes ordered General Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon General Casey's right flank. In making this movement. General Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing towards our right, and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which had been held in reserve, and which was now mak- ing its way towards Fair Oaks Station. General Couch at once engaged this column with two regiments ; but, though reinforced by two ad- ditional regiments, he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his division. With these four regiments and one battery General Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grapevine Bridge, where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and prepared to hold the position. Generals Berry and Jameson's brigades had by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. General Berry was ordered to take possession of the woods on the left, and pushed forward so as to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This movement was executed brilliantly, General Berry pushing his regiments forward through the woods until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by General Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the enemy was very de- structive, and assisted materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held ids position in these woods' against several attacks of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off' by the enemy from the main body, he fell back towards White Oak Swamp, and by a cir- cuit brought his men into our lines in good order. General Jameson, with two regiments, (the other two of iiis brigade having been detached, — one to General Peck and one to General Birney,) moved rapidly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But large numbers of the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he, too, was forced to retreat through the woods towards White Oak Swamp, and in that way gained camp under cover of night. Brigadier-General Devins, who had held the centre of General Couch's division, had made repeated and gallant eflbrts to regain portions of the ground lost in front, but each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. Meantime General Sumner had arrived with tlie advance of his corps. General Sedgwick's division, at the point held by General Couch with four regiments and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge were so miry that it was only by the greatest exertion General Sedgwick had been able to get one of his bat- teries to the front. The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Colonel Sully) was immediatelj' deployed to the right of Couch, to protect the flank, and tiie rest of the division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery near the centre, in an angle of the woods. One of General Couch's regiments was sent to open communication with General Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made than the enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was each time repulsed witli great loss by the steady fire of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. After stistaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time. General Sumner ordered five regiments (the 34rth New York, Colonel Sinter ; 8:id New York, Lieu- tenant-Colonel Hudson; 15th Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Kimliall; 20th Massachu- setts, Colonel Lee ; 7th Michigan, Major Rich- ardson,— the three former of General Gorman's brigade, the two latter of General Dana's bri- gade,) to advance and charge with the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops springing over two fences which were between them and tlie enemy, rushed upon his lines, and drove him in confu.-iou from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day. During the night dispositions were made for its early renewal. General Couch's division, and so much of General Casey's as could be collected together, with General Kearney's, oc- cupied the rifle-pits near jeven Pines. Gen- eral Peck, in falling back on the left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a con- siderable number of stragglers, and was taking them once more into the action, when he was ordered back to the intrenched camp by General Kearney. General Hooker brought up his di- vision about dark, having been delayed by the heaviness of the roads and the throng of fugi- tives from the field, through whom the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he " was obliged to force his way with tlie bayonet." This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of the rail- road. General Richardson's division also came upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge op- 71 posite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed that he was forced to move Generals Howard and Meagher's brigades, with all his artillery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, wliile General French's brigade, with the utmost diffi- culty, crossed by the other. General Sedg- wick's division, with the regiments under Gen- eral Couch, held about the same position as when the fight ceased, and General Richardson on his arrival was ordered to place his division on the left to connect with General Kearney ; General French's brigade was posted along the railroad, and Generals Howard and Meagher's brigades in second and third lines. All his artil- lery had been left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud as rapidly as the infantry pushed towards the field, but dur- ing the night the three batteries of the division were brought to the front. About five o'clock on the morning of the first of June sldrmishers and some cavalry of the ene- my were disc:overed in front of General Rich- ardson's division. Captain Pettit's battery, (B, 1st New York,) having come upon the ground, threw a few shells ;unong them, when they dis- persed. There was a wide interval between General Richardson and General Kearney. To close this, General Richardson's line was ex- tended to the left and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they gained the po- sition, when the enemy appearing in large force from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range along the whole line. He approached very rapidly with columns of at- tiick formed on two roads which crossed the rail- road. These columns were supported by infan- try in line of battle on each side, cutting General I'rench's line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the first line of General Richardson's division stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being reinforced and relieved time after time, till finally General Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to General French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole line fell back on that part of the field. 0.1 the opening of the firing in the morning Ge'.ieral Hooker pushed forward on the railroad witli two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey,) followed by General Sickles's brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division fiom its position on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which were held by the enemy in force. General Hooker found Gen- eral Birney's brigade. Colonel J. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten General Sickles's brigade, but ascer- tained that it had been turnec* off to tlie left by General Heintzelman to meet a column advanc- ing in tliat direction. He at once made the at- tack with ilie two New Jersey regiments, calling upon Colonel Ward to supi)ort him with General Birney's brigade. This was well done, our troops advaiR-ing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pusliiiig the enemy before them for more than an liour of hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet was then ordered by General Hooker with the nth and Gth New Jersey, 3d Maine, and 3Sth and 40th New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, tlirowing down arms and even cloth- ing in his tliglit. General Sickles, having been ordered to the left, formed line of baUle on hoth sides of the Williamshurg road and advanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deplovud in the woods in front of him ; after a l)ri^k inter- change of musketry fire while crossing the open ground, the K.xcelsior brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemv to flight. ^ On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's cessation, wliicli was proni])tly respond- ed to by General Richardson's division. Again the most vigorous eflbrts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour General Richardson's whole line advanced, pour- ing in their fire at close range, which threw the line of the enemy back in some confusion. Tills was followed up by a bayonet charge led by General French in person, with the 57th and 6Gth New York, supported by two regiments sent by General Heintzelman, the 71st and 7.'3d New- York, which turned the confusion of the enemv into precipitated flight. One gun captured the previous day was retaken. Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by them on the 3 1st before the attack. On the battle-field there were found many of our own and the Confederate wounded, arms, cais- sons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and impossibility of manoeuvring artillery prevented further pursuit. On the next morning a reconnoissance was sent forward, which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to within five miles of Richmond; but again the impossibilitjr of forcing even a few batteries for- ward precluded our holding permanently this position. The lines held previous to the battle were therefore resumed. General J. E. John- ston reports loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and J. W. Smith's divisions at 4,283 ; General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2,500 ; which would give the enemy's loss G,7S3. Our loss was, in General Sumner's corps, 1,223; General Heint- zelman's corps, 1,304; General Keyes's corps, 3,120— total, 5,737. Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon the field of battle, on the 31st of May, General Heintzelman, the senior corps command- er present, was in the immediate command of the forces engaged. The first information I re- ceived that the battle was in progress was a despatch from him stating that Casey's division had given way. During the night of the 31st I received a despatch from him, dated 8.45 p. m. in which he says : "I am just in. When I got to the front the most of General Casey's division had dispersed. * * * xhe rout of General Casey's men had a most di,-piriting effect on the troops as they came up. I saw no reason -why we should have been driven back." This official statement, together with other ac- counts received previous to my arrival upon the battle-field, to the efl'ect that Casey's division had given way without making a proper resist- ance, caused me to state, in a telegram to the Secretary of War on the first, that this division "gave way unaccountably and discreditably." 72 Subsequent investigations, however, greatly modified the impressions first received, and i accordingly advised the iSecretary of War of tliis in a despatch on the 5th of June. The otticial reports of Generals Keyes, Casey, and Naglee show that a very considerahle portion of this division fought well, and that the brigade of General Kaglee is entitled to credit for its gal- lantry. This division, among the regiments of wliich were eight of comparatively new troojis, was attacked by superior numbers ; yet, accord- ing to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack " for three hours before it was reinforced." A portion of the division was thrown into great confusion ujjon the first onslaught of the enemy; but the personal etibrts of General Naglee, Col. Bailey, and other oflficers, who boldly went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence and example, at tliis critical juncture, rallied a great part of the division, and thereby enabled it to act a prominent part in this severe- ly contested battle. It therefore aiibrds me great satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained in my first despatch, and I cordially give my in- dorsement to the conclusion of the division com- mander, " that those parts of his command which behaved discreditai)ly were exceptional cases." On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly completed ; but the rising waters fiooded the log- way approaches and made them almost impassa- ble, so that it was only by the greatest efibrts that General Sumner crossed his corps and par- ticipated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had jiassed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced. On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, 1 attempted to cross the bridge where General Sumner had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time General Stmmer crossed this was tiie only available bridge above Bottom's Bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had been, I fotmd a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's Bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable crossing. The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries estab- lished upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having munerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it neces- sary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured. The only available means, therefore, of unit- ing our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance t in, give informa- tion confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reinforce- ments, in Kichmond, yesterday. " I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand (200,000,) including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to con- tend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, and repulse any attack " I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as J have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements, that this was the de- cisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splen- did army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroyed by overwiielming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders ; it must rest where it belongs. " Since I commencpil this I have received ad- ditional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beaure- gard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to- morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for reinforcements. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." The report of the chief of the "secret service corps," herewith forwarded, and dated the 2Gth of June, sh'^ws the estimated strength of the en- emy, at the "iiae of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report puts his numbers, on the 2Gth of June, at about 180,000, and the speciHcinf,)rma- tion obtained reg irding their organization war- rants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence contained in the report shows the fol- lowing organizations, viz : two hundred regi- ments of infantry and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and Ewell. just arrived; eight battalions of independent troops ; iivo battalions of artillery ; twelve; companies of infantry and independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery ; amounting, in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. There were undoubtedly many others whose designations we did not learn. The report also shows tiiat numerous and heavy earthworks had been completed for the defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these were mounted some two hundred guns. On the 2Gth, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy at- tacked our rigiit in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communica- tions and depots of supply. The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsula campaign. I notified the Secretary of War in the follow- ing despatch : — " Headquarters Akmt of the Potomac, " Camp Lincoln, June 2G, 1862 — 12 m. " I have just heard that our advance cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's ad- vanced guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communica- tions will probably be cut off. The case is per- haps a diflicult one, but I shall resort to des- perate measures, and will do my best to out- manoeuvre, out-wit, and out-figiit the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you learn that my communica- tions are cut off and even Yorktown in posses- sion of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. ♦' Hon. E. M. Stanton, " Secretary of War." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp Lincoln, June 2G, 1862 — 2,o0 p. m. " Your despatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of ap- proaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence ac- cording to state of affairs when they arrive. " It is not probable that I can maintain tele- graphic communication more than an hour or two longer. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-GenerdU " Hon. E. M. Stanton, '■'■Secretary of War." 78 On the same day I received the following de- spatches from the Secretary of War : — '* Washington, June 25, 18()2— 11.20 p. m. "Your telegram of 6.15 lias just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Government to send you any more reinforcements than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless for me to repeat them. ''Every etibrt has been made by the Presi- dent atad myself to strengthen you. King's divis- ion has reached Falmoutli, Shields's division and Ricketts's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done. "E. M. STANTON, '■ Secretary of War. " Major-General G. B. McClellan." Washington, June 26, 1862—6 p. m. " Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you five thousand (5,000j men as fast as they can he brought from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Freder- icksburg. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Noth- ing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me ad- vised fully of your condition. '■'EDWIN M. STANTON, " Secretary of War, " Major-General G. B. McClellan." But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in these communications came to the army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's iBar, after the seven days. In anticipation of a speedy advance on Rich- mond, to provide for the contingency of our com- munications with tlie depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our operations to James River, if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrange- ments more than a week previous (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of provisions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, sent up James River. They reached Harrison's Land- ing in time to bo available for the army on its arrival at that point. Events soon proved this change of base to be. though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps, on the 19th of June General Reynolds's and General Seymour's brigades, of General Mc- Call's division, (Pennsylvania reserves,) were moved from Gaines's farm to a position on Beaver Dam Creek, General Meade's brigade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's farm. One regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and a line of pickets extended along the Cliiekahominy River between the Mechanicsville and Meadow bridges. As has been already stated, I re- ceived, wliile engaged on the 25th in directing the operations of lleintzelman's corps, informa- tion which strengthened my suspicions that Jack- eon was advancing with a large force upon our right and rear. On this day General Casey, at the Wliite House, was instructed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive works were ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early on the 25th General Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitring parties towards Hanover Court House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolo- potamoy as fer as possible. Up to the 2Gth of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and northeast. The reasons (the President's anxiety about covering Wasiiington from Fredericksburg, McDowell's promised cooperation, partial advance, and im- mediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice of this line of approach, and our continuance upon it have been attended to above. The superiority of the James River route, aa a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that sub- ject had been early given, and need not be re- peated here. The dissipation of all hope of the cooperation by land of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of Washington, tlieir inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate cliange of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the 2Gth, every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base, in the presence of a powerful enemy, is one of tiie most difficult undertakings in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numl)ers, to fight its way through to the James River, and gei >, position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. On the same day General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my orders, telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quar- termaster at the White House, as follows : '■ Run the cars to the last morjient, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every WMgon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's Station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get oflT. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them your- self with all your force. It will be of vast im- portance to establish our depots on James River without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work ; after that you must ex- ercise your own judgment." All these commands were obeyed. So excel- lent were the dispositions of the different offi'.'ers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboars, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. 79 General Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut off, he fell hack upon the White House, and thence to Yorktown, when tlie White House was evacuated. On the 2Gtli orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the riglit bank of the Chicka- hominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen by the ap- pended telegrams. General Franklin receiv^-d instructions to hold General Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direc- tion of General Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further orders. At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy-, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 p. m. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of tlie line, and shortly after Martin- dale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove Church, to cover that tlank. Neither of these three brigades, liowever, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds's line just at the close of the action. The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and the right in tliick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor, The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's Mills. Seymour's brigade Iield the left of the line, from the Chickahominy to beyond th'; mill, partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and Reynolds's the right, principally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillery oc- cupied positions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek. Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, ex- cept by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed. At 3 r. M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determin- ed attempt to force the passage of the u[)perroa.d, which was successfully resisted by General Rey- nolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire with very heavy loss. A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmish- ing, was maintained along the wliole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by General Seymour with heavy slaughter. The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 p. Ji., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on tliis day. Tlie portion of the enemy encounter- ed were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near Meadow Bridge and at Mechanicsville. The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jack- son was really approaching in large force. Tho position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main army to make it ava.ilable to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines's houses over the Chicka- hominy during the night, with as many of the wagons of the rnh corps as possible, and to with- draw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within sup- porting distance of the main army. General Porter carried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable, at that tinne, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James River, l)y crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones's bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I deter- mined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, reinforced iiy all our disposable troops in the new position near the bridge heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arri'.ngemen:s *o secure the adoption of the James River as ouie' line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns and wag- ons having been removed to tlie right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam Creek was commenced shortly before daylight, and successfully executed. Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground ; Seymour's brigade covered the rear with the horse batteries of Captains Robertson and Tidball, but the withdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the preceding daj' so complete, that althougii the enemy followed the retreat closely, and some skirmishing occurred, he did not ajipear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 27tli, when we were prepared to receive him. About this time General Porter, believing that General Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the White House, and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could. On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his troops from Mechaiiicsville to the selected position already mentioned, Gen- eral Porter telegraphed as follows : — " I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin, or some other command, be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy arc so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portiim in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line." This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed. Notwithstanding all the efforts usod during tne entire night to remove the heavy guns and wag- 80 ons, some of the siegre guns were still in posi- tion at Gaines's house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to tlie bridges which connected our ritj;iit wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river. Morell's division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the bank of the Gains's Mill stream, resting its left Hank on the descent to the Chickaliominy, which was swept by our ajtillery on both sides of the river, and extend- ing into open ground on the right towards Now Coal Harbor. In this line General Butterficld's brigade held the extreme left, General Martin- dale's joined his right, and General Griffin, still further to the right, joined the left of General Sykos's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in the rear of Coal Harbor. Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. McCall's division having been en- gaged on the day before, was formed in a second line in the rear of the first, Meade's brigade on the left near the Chickaliominy, Reynolds's bri- gade on the right, covering tlie approaches from Coal Harbor and Despatch Station to Sumner's bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the second line, still further in the rear. General P. St. George Cooke, witli five companies of the 5th regular cavalry, two squadrons of tlie 1st regu- lar and three squadrons of the 6tii Pennsylvania cavalry, (lancers,) was posted beliind a hill in rear of the position, and near the Cliickahomi- ny, to aid in watching the left flank and defend- ing the slope of the river. The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery on the commanding ground, and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries, there were Kob- ertson's and Tidball's horse batteries, from tlie artillery reserve ; the latter posted on the right of Sykes's division, and tiie former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickaliominj'. Shortly after noon the enemy were discovered approaching in force, and it soon became evident that the entire position was to be attacked. His skirmishers advanced rapidly, and soon the firing became heavy along our whole front. At 2 p. M. General Porter asked for reinforce- ments. Slocum's division of tlie 6th corps was ordered to cross to the left bank of the river, by Alexander's Bridge, and proceed to his support. General Porter's first call for reinforcements, through General Barnard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more axes, through the same officer. By 3 p. M. the engagement had become so severe, anil the enemy were so greatly superior in numbers, that tiie entire second line and re- serves had been moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and desperate assaults along our whole front. At 3.o0 p. M. Slocum's division reached the field and was immediately brought into action at the weak i)oints of our line. On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running almost at right angles to the Chickahominy, in front of Adams's house, or between tliat and Gaines's house. The enemy severals times charged up to this wood, but were each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars, of Sykes's division, on the right, also repulsed several strong attacks. But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numbers was very se- vere, and the troops, most of whom had been un- der arms more than two days, were rapidly be- coming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly brought against them. When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased General Porter's force to some 35,000, who were probably contending against about 70,000, of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points, and as its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for General Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocum's division, and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threat- ened. About 5 p. M., General Porter having reported his position as critical, French's and IMeagher's brigades, of Richardson's divison. (3d corps,) were ordered to cross to his support. The ene- my attacked again in great force at 6 p. m., but f;uled to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy. About 7 p. M. they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided l)y the confusion that followed an unsuc- cessful charge by five companies of the 5th cav- alry, and followed as it was by more determined assaults on the remainder of our lines, now out- flanked, caused a general retreat from our posi- sition to the hill in rear overlooking the bridge. French's and Meagher's brigades now appear- ed, driving before them the stragglers who were thronging towards the bridge. These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadi- iness of their bearings reanimated our own troops and warned the enemy that reinforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, al- ready repulsed several times with terrible slaugh- ter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, and they again advanced up the hill ready to repulse another attack. During the night our thin and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear guard, and about 6 o'clock on the morning of tlie 2Sth crosed the river, destroying the bridge behind them. Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and missing, was very heavy, especially in officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners while gallantly leading on their men or rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impossible to arrive at the exact ntimbers lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the series of battles which followed each other in quick succession, and in which the whole army was engaged. No general rcttirns were made until after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, when the losses during the whole seven days were estimated together. Although we were finally forced from our first 81 line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been ob- tained. The enemy was held at bay Our siege guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined tiie main body of the army. The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was 22, three of which were lost by being run otf the bridge during the final withdrawal. Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces, or struck down, and the guns captured. Deidrich's, Knierim's, and Grimm's batteries took position during the engagement in tlie front of General Smith's line on the right liank of the stream, and witli a battery of siege guns, served by the 1st Connecticut artiller}', helped to drive back the enemy in front of General Porter. So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy, that it was impossible to decide until tlie afternoon where th-e real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and threat- ening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line on this side of the river, wliich rendered it necessary to hold a considera- ble force in position to meet them. On tlie 2Gth a circular was sent to the corps commanders, on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to reinforce General Porter, after re- taining sufficient to hold their positicius for twenty-four hours. To this the following replies were received : — " Headquarters Third Corps, " June 26 — 4 p. m. " I think T can hold the intrenchments vrith four brigades for twenty-four hours. Tliat would leave two bi'igades dispo^a'de for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. ***** "S. P. HEINTZELMAN, " Brigadier- General. " General R. B. Marcy." Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 25th and 2Gth, had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Generals Hooker and Kearney, and on the Charles City road, (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger,) and General Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night of the 2oth, that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements. General Keyes telegraphed, — " As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on tliis flank are small enough." On the morning of the 27th, the following despatch was sent to General Sumner : — 11 " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "June 27 — 8.45 a. m. " General Sraitli just reports that six or eight regiments have moved down to the woods in front of General Sumner. "R. B. MARCY, " Chief of Staff." "General E. V. Sumner, " Comd'g Second Army Corps." At 11 o'clock A. M. General Sumner tele- graphed, as follows : — " The enemy threaten an attack on my right, near Smith." At 12.30 p. M. he telegraphed — " Sharp shelling on both sides." At 2.45 p. M. — "Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns; we are replying with artillery and infantry. The man on tlie lookout reports some troops drawn up in line of battle ahout opposite my riglit and Smith's left; the number cannot be made out." In accordance with orders given on the night of the 2Gth, General Slocum's division commenc- ed crossing the river to support General Porter soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; but as the firing in front of General Porter ceased, the movement was suspended. At 2 p. m. General Porter called for reinforcements. I or- dered them at once, and at 3.25 p. m. sent him the following : — " Slocura is now crossing Alexander's Bridge with liis whole command ; enemy lias commenced an infantiy attack on Smith's left; I have order- ed down Sumner's and Heintzehnan's reserves, and you can count on the whole of Slocum's. Go on as you have begun." During the day the following despatches were received, wliich will ^how the condition of aifairs on the right bank of the Cliickahominy : — "June 27, 1862. " General Smith thinks the "nemy are massing heavy cohimns in the cleark |s to the right of James Garnett's house, and on the other side of the river opposite it. Three regiments are re- ported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangements are very good, made by Smith. W. B. FRANKLIN, " Brigadier- General. " Colonel A. V. Colburn, " Assistant Adj utant- General." Afterwards he telegraphed : — " The enemy has begun an attack ou Smith's left with infantry. I know no details." Afterwards the following : — " The enemy has opened on Smith from a bat- tery of three pieces to the right of the White House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross fire upon them that will silence them." Afterwards (at 5.50 p. m.) the following was sent to General Keyes : — " Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headciuarters, without a moment's dehiy. 82 A staff officer will be here to direct tlie brigade where to go." Subsequently the following was sent to Gener- als Sumner and Franklin : — " Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front ? Can you spare any more force to be sent to General Porter ? Answer at once." At 5.15 p. M. the following was received from General Franklin : — " I do not tliink it prudent to take any more troops from here at present." General Sumner replied as follows : — " If the general desires to trust the defence of ray position to my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade, to the right; everything is so uncer- tain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it." These two brigades were sent to reinforce Gen- eral Porter, as has been observed. At 5.25 p. M. I sent the following to General Franklin : — "Porter is hard pressed; it is not a question of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possi- bly maintain your position until dark with two brigades ? I have ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to support Porter; one brigade of Couch's to this place. " Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sum- ner. If possible, send a brigade to support Porter. It sliould follow the regiments ordered from Sumner." At 7.. "5 p. M. the following was sent to General Sumner : — " If it is possible, send another brigade to re- inforce General Smith ; it is said three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him." From the foregoing despatches it will be seen that all disposable troops were sent from the right bank of the river to reinforce General Por- ter, and that the cor^js commanders were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they deemed adequate. To have done more, even though Porter's reverse had been prevent- ed, would have had the still more disastrous re- sult of impo rilling the whole movement across the Peninsula, The operations of this day proved the numeri- cal superiority of tli« enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, .which had already turned our right, and was in position to intercei)t the communications with our .depot at the White House, he was also ji;i large force between our army and Richmojid.; I ,tbere|bi;e effected a junction of our forces. This might probably have been execiited on either side of the Chickahominy ; and if the concentration had been etfe^ted on the left Laiik, it is possible we might, with our entire -force, have defeated the enemy thc-cc; but at that time they held the roads leading U) the White House, so that it would have been impossible to have sent forward supjjly trains in advance of the army in that direction, and the guardirjgof tliose trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle ; we would have been compelled to fight, if (CQReentrated on that baak of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been followed by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of the river operating upon our rear, and if, in the chances of war, we had been ourselves de- feated in the effort, Ave would have been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to Fort Monroe ; and, as Ijoth our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire su[)ply train, if not the greater part of the army itself, might have been lost. The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and, as they themselves acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. During the night of the 2Gth and morning of the 27th, all our wagons, heavy guns, &c., were gathered there. It may be asked, why, after the concentration of our forces on the right bank of the Chicka- hominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James River, fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he woidd sever our com- munications with the supply depot at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of ra- tions, and if we had advanced directly on Richmond, it wotild have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have bi-en destitute of food; and even if Richmond had fallen be- fore our arms, the enemy could still have occu- pied our sujiply communications between that place and the gunboats, and turned the disaster into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond dur- ing the progress of our attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla. The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank movement to the James River, with the exception of the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engageuient of Malvern Hill was the most de- cisive of all. On the evening of the 27th of Jime I assem- bled the corps commanders at my headquarters, and informed them of my plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution. General Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong posi- tions on tlie opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. This was executed on the 2.St]i by noon. Be- fore daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage's Station, and remained there during tlie day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army. Orders were given to the different command- ers to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of 83 the sick and wounded who could not be trans- ported, a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores. The large herd of 2,500 beef-cattle was, by the chief commissary, Colonel Clarke, trans- ferred to the James Uiver without loss. On t!ie morning of the 28th, wliile General Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding's Farm, the enemy opened upon Gen- eral Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines's Hill on tlie opposite side of the Chickahominy ; and, shortly afterwards, two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be vacated, but this attack was repulsed by the 23d New York and the 49tii Pennsylvania volunteers on picket, and a section of Mott's battery. Porter's corps was moved across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Rich- mond towards White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During tlie same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and the divison of Smith, were ordered into an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old intrenchments, and curving to the right, so as to cover Savage's Station. General Siocum's division, of Franklin's corps, was ordered to Savage's Station, in re- serve. They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the with- drawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and unite with the remainder of the army. On the 28th I sent the following to the Secre- tary of War : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '• Savage's Station, " June 28, 1862—12.20 a. m. "I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we re- pulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, — all that sol- diers could accomplish, — but they were over- whelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb ; and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand (20,000) or even ten thousand, (10,000,) fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in re- serve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and save the material oaA personnel of the army. " If we have lost the day, we have yet pre- served our honor, and no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small. " I again repeat tliat I am not responsible for this , and I say it with the earnestness of a gen- eral who feels in his heart tlie loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. 1 still liopc to retrieve our fortunes ; but to do this the Government niLi^t view tlie matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reiiit'urcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and tlunk I can v/ith- draw all our material. Please understand tliat in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those tlie best wo have. "■ In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think lie is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely in- timated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand (10,000) fresh men, I could gain the victory to-inorrow. " I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and can not hold me responsible for the result. " I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sus- tained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. " You have done your best to sacrifice this army. " G. B. McCLELLAN. *' Hon. E. M. Stanton." The headquarters camp at Savage's Station was broken up early on tlie morning of the 29th, and moved across White Oak Swamp. As the essential part of this day's operation was the passage of the trains across the swamp, and their protection against attack from the direction of Newmarket and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our com- munications with the gunboats, 1 passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of troops, and securing the uninterrupted move- ment of the trains. In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to James River, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left Hank. General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and prolong the line towards the right. The trains were to be pushed on towards James River in rear of these corps, and jilaced under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived. A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry ear- ly this day on the Quaker road showed that his efforts were about to be directed towards imped- ing our progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary. BATTLE OF ALLEN's FARM. General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29, at dayligiit, and marched Ids command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's Field, between Orchard and Savage's Station. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad facing tow- 84 ards Richmond, Richardson holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzehnan's corps. The first line of Richardson's division was held by General French, General Caldwell supporting' in tiie second. A log building in front of Richardson's division was held by Col. Brooks with one regiment, (53d Pennsylvania volunteers,) with Hazzard's battery on an ele- vated piece of ground, a little in rear of Colonel Brooks's command. At nine a. ji. the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but were i-epulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry tiie position of Colonel Brooks. Captain Hazzard's battery, and Pettet's battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great eifect, while the 5od Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compel- ling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed. BATTLE OF SAVAGE's STATION. General Slociira arrived at Savage's Station at an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to ijross White Oak Swamp and relieve General Keyes's corps. As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved, he moved towards James River, which he reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey Creek Bridge. During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing tiie Chickalioininy in large force, and advancing towards Savage's Station. He communicated this information to General Sum- ner, at Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's Station. A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with tiiose of General Franklin, and assumed command. 1 had ordered General lleintzelman, with his corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark, at a point where were several field-works, and a skirt of timber between these works and the railroad; but he fell back before night, and crossed White Oak Swamp at Brackett's Ford. General Sumner in his report of the battle of Savage's Station says : — " When the enemy appeared on the Williams- burg road 1 could not imagine why General Heintzelman did not attack him, and not till some time afterwards did I learn, to ray utter amazement, that General lleintzelman had left the field, and retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. This defection might have been attended with the most disastrous consequences ; and although we beat the enemy signally and drove him from the field, we should certainly have given him a more crushing blow if General lleintzelman liad been there with his corps." General Heintzelman in his report of the op- erations of his corps says : — "On the night of the 28th of June I received orders to withdraw the troops of my corps from the advance position they had taken on tlie 25th of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in the rear. A map was sent me, showing the positions General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps would occupy. " About sunrise the next day our troops slowly fell back to the new position, cautiously fo'lowed by the enemy, taking possession of our camps as soon as we left them. " From some misapprehension General Sum- ner held a more advanced position than was in- dicated on the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of about three fourths of a mile between the right of his corps and General Smith's divis- ion of General Franklin's corps. "vVtll A. M. on the 29th the enemy com- menced an attack on General Sumner's troops, a few shell falling within my lines. Late in the forenoon reports reached me that the Rebels were in possession of Dr. Trent's house, only a mile and a half from Savage's Station. 1 sent several cavalry reconnoissances, and finally was satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to my headquarters, when I learned of the interval between his left and General Sumner's right, in which space Dr. Trent's house is; also that the Ri'bels bad repaired one of the bridges across the ChickaUominy, and were advancing. " I rode forward to see General Sumner, and met his troops falling back on the Williamsburg road through my lines. General Sumner in- formed me that he intended to make a stand at Savage's Station, and for me to join him to de- termine upon tiie position. " Tins movement of General Sumner's un- covering my rigiit flank, it became necessary for me to at once withdraw my troops. * * * " I rode back to find General Sumner. After some delay, from the mass of troops in the fieUl, 1 found him, and learned that the course of action iiad been determined on; sol returned to give tiie necessary orders for the destruction of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still remaining on tlie ground. '' Tlie wiu)le open space near Savage's Station was crowded witli troops, — more than I sujjposed could be brougiit into action judiciously. An .lid from the commanding general had in the morning reported to me to point out a road across tlie VVIiite Oak Swamp, starting from the left of General Kearney's position and leading by Brackett's Ford. ***** " The advance of the column reached the Cliarles City road at 6^ p. m., and the rear at 10 p. M. without accident." The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin, were to hold the positions assigned them until dark. As stated by General lleintzelman. General Sumner did not occupy the designated position; but, as he was the senior officer present on that side of the White Oak Swamp, he may have thought that the movements of the enemy justified a devia- tion from the letter of the orders. It appears from his report that he assumed command of all the troops near Savage's Station, and determined to resist the enemy there ; and that he gave Gen- 85 eral Hemtzclman orders to hold the same posi- tion as I had assigned him. Tlie aid seit by me to General Heintzelnian to point out tlie road across the swamp was to guide him in retiiing after dark. On reaching Savage's Station, Sumner's and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods, and the right extending down to the rail- road. General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retain- ing his command. General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. At 4 r. m. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by General Burns's brigade, supported and re- inforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York G9th, Hazzard's and Pettet's bat- teries again doing good service. Osborn's and Bramhall's batteries also took part efiectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between 8 and t) p. m., when the enemy were driven from the field. Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished during the night in good order. By midnight all tlie troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp bridge, General French, with liis brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 a. m. on the 30th all had crossed and the bridge was destroyed. On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the corps commanders their instructions for the op- erations of the following day. As stated before. Porter's corps was to move forward to James lliver, and with the corps of General Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening commu- nication with the gunboats, and covering the pas- sage of the supply trains, which were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward, and posted so as to guard the ajiproach- es from Richmond, as well as the crossings of the White Oak Swamp, over which the army had passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of Wlute Oak Swamp bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with General Richardson's division and General Na- glee's brigade placed under his orders for the oc- casion. General Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles City road. On the moi'ning of the 30th I again gave to the corps commanders witliin reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, notwithstand- ing all the efibrts of my personal staff and other officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion. The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides. Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayed, — one by losing the road, and the other by repair- ing an old load, — and had not been able to send any information. We then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops and our immense trains. It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road as well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in the rear. I then examined the whole line from the swamp to tlie left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and tlu' ()!)st;-nctions of the roads toward Richmond, and all corps com- manders were directed to hold their positions un- til the trains had passed, after which a more con- centrated position was to be taken up near James River. Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White Oak Swninp to the river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy, below the swamp. Moreover the troops were then greatly exhaust- ed, and required rest in a more secure position. I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's. looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite very considerably the passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions of the troops. Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me informa- tion of the condition of affairs on the right. I re- turned from Malvern to Haxall's and having made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Cap- tain Rodgers's gunboat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our sup- ply vessels, and the state of things on the river. It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports, should the enemy occu- py it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termina- tion of this interview I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight. BATTLE OF " NELSON's FARaM," OR " GLENDALE." On the morning of the 30tli General Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale ( "Nelson's Farm.") General Mc- Call's division ( Pennsylvania reserves ) was halted during the morning on the New Market road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker Church. This line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds's l)rigade, commanded by Colonel S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Pennsylva- nia, in reserve ; Randall's regular battery on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the centre, and Dietrich's and Kanerhun's batteries of the artillery reserve on the left, — all in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCall's fi'ont was an open field, intersected towards the right by the New Market road, and a small strip of timber jiarallel to it ; the open front was about 800 yards, its depth about 1,000 yards. On the morning of the 30th General Heintzel- 86 man ordered the bridge at Bracketfs Ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road and tlie Charles City road. General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road. General Kearney's left to connect with General Slocum's left. General MeCall's position was to the left of the Long Bridge road, in connection with General Kearney's left. General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Between 12 and 1 o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannon- ade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson, and Naglee's brigade, at White Oak Swamp bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some in- fantry below our position. Ricliard^on's division Buffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery witli great etl'ect. Captain Hazzard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, and Cap- tain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was com- pelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's bat- tery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns. General Franklin lield his position until after dark, repeated!}' driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak Swamp. At two o'clock in the day the enemy were re- ported advancing in force by the Cliarles City road, and at half past two o'clock the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left, but was checked by his artillery. After tliis the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. General McCall, in his report of the battle, Bays : — ****** " About half past two my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part. "At three o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left centre and another on the right centre to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shells, and boldly ad- vanced, but were both driven back, — on the left by the 12th regiment, and on the right by the 7th regiment. "For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here." * * * " At last the ene- my was compelled to retire before the well-di- rected musketry fire of the reserves. The Ger- man batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them l)ack. It was, however, of lit- tle avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers." * * * * " The batteries in front of the centre were boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedily forced back." * * * * " Soon after this a most determined charge was made on llandall's battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have . stated, been previously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regi- ments without success, they having recoiled be- fore tlie storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randall's battery, and the 4th regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. " Its gallant connnander did not doul)t his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did, in- deed, mow down the advancing host, but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. " It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be re- moved. Two guns that were, indeed success- fully limbered, had their horses killed and wounded and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy, dashing past, drove the greater part of the 4tli regiment before them. " The left company, (B,) nevertheless, stood its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as did likewise, certain men of other companies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success." ******** " There was no running. But my division, reduced by the previous battles to less than six thousand, (G,000,) had to contend with the divis- ions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest and best among many of the Confederate army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them." ******** "General Heintzelman states that about 5 o'clock p. M. General MeCall's division was at- tacked in large force, evidently the principal at- tack ; that in less than an hour the division gave way, and adds: "General Hooker being on his left, by moving to his right, repulsed the Rebels in the handsomest manner with great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedg- wick in MeCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearney's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss." *******iii " Tliis attack commenced about 4 p. m., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled with the enemy; each repulse brouglit fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the 37th New York volunteers." General MeCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Captain DeRussy's battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery with orders to shell the Avoods. General Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back; other troops began to return from the White Oak Swamp. Late in the day, at the call of General Kearney, General Tay- lor's first New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of General Me- Call's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory filing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock at night General Heintzelman commenced to with- draw his corps, and soon after daylight both of 87 his divisions, with General Slocum's division and a portion of General Sumner's command, reached Malvern Hill. On the morning of the 30th General Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from General Frank- lin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. Gen- eral Sumner says of this battle, — "The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock p. M. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dai'k, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field." The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 4 p. M. At about this time the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he at- tacked Colonel \Va- -en's brigade. A concentrat- ed fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, Avhich, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in tlie hands of Colonel Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and heliied to drive back the enemy. It was very late at night before my aids re- turned to give me the results of the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from General Franklin, before semling orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that General Franklin was fall- ing back; whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, of my staff, with orders to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers sent from General Franklin's headquarters with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fell baclt also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement which was to commence on the right. Tlie orders met these troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. General Barnard then received full instruc- tions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rod- gers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vi- cinity. BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the 1st of July was with the left and centre of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved back- wards through a wooded country towards a point below Haxall's, on James River. Mal- vern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several con- verging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Towards tlic northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James River. From the posi- tion of the enemy his most obvious lines of at- tack would come from the direction of Ricli- mond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by mass- ing the troops and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held tho left of the line, (Sykes's division on the left, Morell's on the right,) with the artillery of his two divis- ions advantageously posted, and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any i)oint in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, suc- ceeded in getting ten of his siege guns in posi- tion on the higliest point of the hill. Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter ; next came Kearney and Hooker ; next Sedgwick and Richardson ; next Smith and Slo- cum; then the remainder of Keyes's corps, ex- tending by a backwood curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in re- serve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground to protect that fiank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slash- ing the timber and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James River, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flank, and to command the approaches from Richmond. Between 9 and 10 a. m. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing, witli his artil- lery and sldrmishers, as far to the right as Hook- er's division. About 2 o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving towards our right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrange- ments were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in that quarter, but, though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. The presumption is, that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our left. About 3 p. M. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musliet range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in dis- order back over their own ground. This advan- tage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Sluirtly after four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was station- ed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the general, and everytliing held in readiness to meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open sjjace and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, Avith the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several in- stances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed for- ward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confu- sion from the field. About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were accu- mulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops, to reinforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such regi- ments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended ; but, desjjite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and dark- ness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, tliough it was not until after 9 o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire. During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy, by throwing shell among liis reserves and advancing columns. As the army in its movement from the Chicka- hominA' to Harrison's Landing was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or ojiportunity for collecting data which Avould enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each engage- ment. The aggregate of our entire losses from the 2(ith of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's I anding, to be as follows : — ^ « 01 o rt '^r-HCOt^COt^COO C5 be 1^ ^ 1, I^ 1^ CO I<1 t^ -* O^'-H^O l^ ^J>^ '"' M ^ 1 be bo CO of S^' •'IH^ !>f o -< ^ < ^ ?^ t. S ^ J bi) r-t -/D CO ^ CO J^ r-H t-~ OO a Oj -* C>0 O O t^ K) C5 o ^ 1 "vj L0_ Xi « C>1 r-<^ -H^ cr>_ S ""^ \n uo T5 c-f S r^ "t— »N C' O O --H 1- O CO -M o CI s ^ 'O 'f L- O O O r-< O o i ^ c-i o o o •* co__ I— 'S,^ 3 o r4 -4' rt" ol' ^ t-T .s "*-> > '« ^ _CJ C-) r-1 ,-H O CI O S o 5 ^ "^ « -vS ►4 d rv ^ d 1 =^ s J^ ::^ 1 ^ *^ * 1 '■^ s ^ -^ - -o ^ -^ to Q • S r~ »< P4 L«* ^ Pi o cc /■" 43 ^ .,- G . . ^ s i_ t-1 o y^ y- irj ^ 5 O ■5 "3 o .t/s • . . A A A '^'''' "►^ 25i^5S5aa Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was, nevertheless, necessary to fall l)ack still further, in order to reach a point where our supi)lies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gunboat fiotilla, this could only be done below City Point; concurring in iiis opinion, I selected Harrison's Bar as tlie new position of the army. Tlie exhaustiiin of our sui)]ilies of food, forage, and ammunition, made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during tlie niglit of the 30tli of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troojis was at once issued upon the final re- pulse of the enemy at Malv<.-rn Hill. Tiie order ])rescribcd a movement by the left and rear, General Keyes's corps to cover the manoeuvre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as liad been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averill, of the 3d Penn- sj'lvania cavahy, was intrusted with this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regi- ment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's l)rigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a ju- dicious use of the resources at his command he deceived the enemy so as to cover the witlidrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remain- 89 ing himself on the previous day's battle-field until about 7 o'clock of the 2d of July. Mean- time General Keyes, having received liis orders, coininenced vigorous preparations for covei-ing llie movement of the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages per- taining to tlic army could not move witli celerity along a single road. General Keyes took advan- tage of every accident of the ground to open new- avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads, after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rajiid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey's Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable bj' felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the marcli so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use liis own words, " I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving towards the enemy in- stead of away from him. And when it is uader- 12 stood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, streched out in one line, would ex- tend not far from forty miles, the enert;y and caution necessary for tlieir safe witlidrawal from the presence of an enemy, vastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated." The last of tlie wagons did not reacli the site selected at Har- rison's Bar until after dark on the od of July, and the rear guard did not move into their cauip until everything was secure. The enemy fol- lowed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats. Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which character- ized his performance of the important and deli- cate duties intrusted to his charge. High praise is also duo to the officers and men of the 1st Coimecticut artillery, Colonel Tyler, for the manner in whicli they withdrew all the heavy guns during tlie seven days, and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these en- ergetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind. 90 THIRD PERIOD. On the 1st of July I received the following from the President : — " Washington, July 1, 1862—3.30 p, M. " It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not, 'the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. A. LINCOLN. "Major-General G. B. McClellan." In a despatch from the President to me, on 2d of July, he says; — " If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offen- sive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept." On the 3d of July the following kind despatch was received from the President. [Extract.] " Washington, July 3, 1862 — 3 p. m. " Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers and men, have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. • ••♦**• "A. LINCOLN. " Major-General G. B. McClellan." On the 4th I sent the following to the Presi- dent : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862. " I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant. " I shall make a stand at this place, and en- deavor to give my men the repose they so much require. " After sending my communication on Tues- day, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had continued from the afternoon of the 20th ultimo, in a daily series of engagements wholly unparalleled on tliis conti- nent for determination and slaughter on both sides. " The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous. That of the enemy certainly great- est. On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point, our line of defence there being too ex- tended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 p. M. on the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day and until the ftrenoon of yesterday. *' The roads became horrible. Troops, artil- lery, and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. " The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in con- dition to make. " We now occupy a fine of heights, about two miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river; our front is about three miles long ; these heights command our wliole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can ren- der valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. "Our positions can be carried only by over- whelming numbers. The sjjivit of the army is excellent ; stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiers exhibit the test results of disci- pline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast num- bers, and if so, our front will he the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. " I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten in any con- flict. " The enemy were unable, by their utmost efforts, to drive us from any field. Never did such a cliange of bise, involving a retrograde movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have lost no guns except 25 on the field of battle, 21 of which were lost by the giving way of McCall's division, under the onset of superior numliers. "Our commuuications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not cer- tam that our gunboats can drive them out. In 91 case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every eifort to preserve, at least, the per- sonnel of the army, and the events of the last few days leave no question that the troojis will do all that their country can ask. Send such rein- forcements as you can ; I will do what I can. We are shippinon oiu* wounded and sick and land- ing supplies. The Navy Department should co- operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rogers is doing all in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner. " When a'll the circumstances of the case are known, it will be acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult circumstances we have pre- served our trains, our guns, oiu- material, and, above all, our honor, " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-Gcueral, " Tlie President." To which I received the following reply : — " Washington, July 5, 1862—9 a. m. "A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches, of twelve and one P. M. yesterday, gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will bb, appreciated. " If you can hold your present position we shall hive the enemy yet. "A. LINCOLN. " Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan, " Commanding Ai-my of the Potomac." The following letters were received from His Excellency the President : — " War Department, " Washington City, 1). C, July 4, 1862. " I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suj)- pose.) and about ten thousand, I hope, you will have from Burnside very soon, and about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a montli. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which )ou will attempt, and of the means for effecting it I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position ; ijrovided, and so long as you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better re- move as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escajjcd your attention. " Yours, very trulv, "A. LINCOLN. " Major-General McClellan." " P. S.— If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. A. L." The following telegram was sent on the 7th: — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Berkeley, July, 7, 1862 — BMO a. m. " As boat is starting, I have only time to ac- knowledge receipt of despatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not at- tacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my commu7iications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-Otiicer Goldsborougli last night ; he is confident he can keej) river open. He should have al! gunboats possible. Will see him again this morning. My men in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again. " Alarm yourself as little as possil^le about me, and don't lose confidence in this arm v. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Maj or- General. " A. Lincoln, President." While General-in-Chief, and directing the op- erations of all our armies in the field, I had be- come deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were essential to its olijects and its success. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these were so fully con- firmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied, not to withhold a can- did expression of the more important of these views from the Commander- in Cnief, whom the Constitution places at the head cf the armies and navies, as well as of the government of the nation. The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. " Mr. President : You have been fully in- formed that the Rebel army is in the front, with the ])urpose of overwhelming tis by attacking our ])osition or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I cannot but regard our condi- tion as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies to lay before your Excel- lency, for your jjrivate consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the Rebel- lion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply im])ressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never he 92 abandoned ; it is the cause of free institutions and self-goveriiment. The Constitution and the Union must be i)reservccl, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If Secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neitlier military disaster, IKjliticul faction, nor foreign war, shake your set- lied purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the peoj)le of every State. " The time has come when the Government must determine u])Oii a civil and militury pol.cy, covering the whole ground of our national trou- ble. " The res])onsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national af- fairs in regard to the Rebellion, must now be as- sumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency. " This Rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted ujjon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of tiie people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, terri- torial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a mo- ment, '• In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military opera- tions ; all private property taken for military use should be jjaid or receip ed for ; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes ; all un- necessary trespass sternly ])rohibited, and offen- sive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hos- tilities exist ; and oaths, not required by enict- ments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. " Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protec- tion of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, under the act of Congress, seeking military pro- tection, should receive it. The right of the Gov- ernment to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized. This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a par- ticular State, thus working manumission in such State ; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Vir- ginia, also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, and ])ervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loval men, would deeply im])ress the Rebel misses and all foreign natioi.s, and it might be humblv hoped that it would commend itself to the fovor of the Almighty. " Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaraiion of radi- cal views, especiall" upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concen- trations of military ])ower. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thornighly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist. " In carrying out any system of policy which j-.)U may form, you will require a conimauder-in- chief of the army, one who possesses your confi- dence, understands your views, and who is com- petent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplish- ment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and i will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. " I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my countr}'. " Very respectfullv, your obedient servant, " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, "Major- General Com mandlag. " His Excellency A. Lincoln, President" I telegi-aphed the President on the 11th as follows : — " IIeadquaktee :; Army of the Potomac, ''Berkeley, July 11, 1862—3 P. M. « « * * * " "We are very strong here now, so far as de- fensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong en ugh to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits. •♦ GEORGE B. McCLELLAN", " Mqjor-General Commanding. "A. Lincoln, President" These telegrams were sent on the 12th, I7th, and 18th, to his Excellency the President : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Berkeley, July 12, 1862—7.15 A. M. "Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent county, via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterwards took, but will know shortly. " Nothing else of interest since last despatch. 93 Rair cea?ed, and everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight. " I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but promptly reinforced and thrown again upon Bichmond. IF we have a little more than half a chance we can take it. '' I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of the men. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Majoi'- General Commanding. " A. Lincoln, President." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, July 17, 1862—8 a. m. " I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and -t'ould commend to your favorable considera- tion the general's plan for bringing (7) seven ad- ditional regiments from North Carolina, by leav- ing Newbern to the care of the gunboats. It ap])ears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in Rebeldom. Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recom- mend that General Burnside, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the ofEensive as soon as possible. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, '■'■Major- General Commanding. " A. Lincoln, President." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Berkeley, July 18, 1862—8 A. M. " No change worth reporting in the state of affiiirs. Some (20,000) twenty thousand to (25,000) twenty-five thousand of the enemy at Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond. " Those at Petersburg say they are a part of Beauregard's army. New troops ari'iving via Petersburg. Am anxious to have determination of Government, that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, and perfect unity of action necessary. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General Commanding. "A. Lincoln, President." The following was telegraphed to General Hal- leck on the 28th : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, July 28, 1862.-8 A. M. " Nothing especially new except corroboration of reports that reinforcements reaching Rich- mond from south. It is not confirmed that any of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defence of Washington, and that I should be at once rein- foi'ced by all available troops to enable me to ad- vance. Retreat would be disasti-ous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, '* Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck. " Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C." On the 30t,h I sent the following to the gen- eral-in-chief : — Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, July 30, 1862 — 7 A. M. *•♦»»•» " I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and thit the decision may be to reinforce it at once. We are losino- much valuable time, and that at a monent when energy and decision are sadh- ncedt'd. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. ITallkck. "Commanding U. 8. Army, Washington, D. C." About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1, the enemy brought some light batteries to Coggin's Point and the Coles House, on the right bank of James River, directly opposite Harrison's Landing, and opened a heavy fire upon our shipping and encam|)nients. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when they were driven back by the fire of our guns ; this affair was reported in the following despatch. " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, August 2, 1862 — 8 A. M. "Firing of night before list killed some ten (10) men and wounded about (lo) fifteen. "No harm of the slightest consequence done to the shipping, although several were struck. Sent party across river yesterday to the Coles House, destroyed it and cut down the timber ; will complete work to-day, and also send party to Coggin's Point, which I wiU prol)ahIy occupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once; will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I will stir these people up. I need more cav- alry; have only (3,700) thirty-seven hundred for duty in cavalry division. " Adjutant-General's office forgot to send Sykes's com nission as major-general, with those of other division commanders ; do me the favor to hurry it on. "G.B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General Commanding. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C." To prevent another demonstration of this char- acter, and to insure a deliouche on the south bank of the James, it became necessary to occupy Cog- gin's Point, which was done on the 3d, and the enemy, as will be seen from the following de- spatch, driven b .ck towards Petersburg: — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Berkeley, August 3, 1862 — 10 P.M. " Coggin's Point was occupied 'to-day, and tim- ber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I went over the ground m\ self, and found that Duane had, as usual, selected an admirable position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of labor, so as in make it a formidible tcte de pont, covering the landing of a large for^'C. " I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of contrabands to-morrow. The position covers the 94 Ooles House, which is directly in front of Westo- ver. We have now a safe dcbouche on the south bank, and are secure against midnight cannon- ading. A few thousand more men w<,uld jjlice lis in condition at least to anno) and disconcert the enemy very much. "I sent Colonel Averill this morning with three hundred (300) cavalry to examine the country on the south side of the James, and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore Church, which is on the main road from Petersburg to Suflblk, and some five (5) miles from Coles House. He found a cavah-y force of five hun- dred and fifty (550) men, attacked them at once, drove in their advance guards to their camp, where we had a sharp skirmish, and drove them off in disorder. " He burned their entire camp, with their commissai-y and quart-^rmaster's stores, and then returned and recrossed the river. He took but two (2) prisoners, had one man wounded by a ball, and one t)y a sabre cut. " Captain Mcintosh made a handsome charge. The troops engaged were of the fifth (5th) regu- lars, and the third (od) Pennsylvania cavalry. " Colonel Averill conducted this afiair, as he does everything he undertakes, to my entire satis- faction. « G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- Oeneral Commanding. "Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army, Wash- ington, D. C. On the 1st of August I received the following despatches : — " Washington, July 30, 1862—8 p. m. " A despatch just received from General Pope, says that deserters report that the enemy is mov- ing south of James River, and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case. « H. W. HALLECK, " Major- Oeneral. ** Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." " Washington, July 30, 1862—8 p. m. "In order to enable you to move in any di- rection, it is necessary to relieve you of your sick. The Surgeon-General has, therefore, been directed to mike arrangements for them at other places, and the Quartermaster-General to pro- vide transportation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as possible, and advise me of their removal. " H. W. HALLECK, " Major- General. ♦'Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." It is clear that the General-in-Chief attached some weight to the report received from General Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the order in regard to the removing the sick contem- plated an ollensive movement rather than a re- treat, as I had no other data than the telegrams just given, from which to form an opinion as to the intentions of the Government, The following telegram strengthened me in that belief : — " Washington, July 31, 1862—10 a. m. " General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be evacuating Riclwnond, and fall- ing back on Danville and Lvnchburg. "H, W.' HALLECK, '* Majo7'- General, " Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." In occupying Coggin's Point, as already de- scribed, I was influenced by the necessity of jios- sessing a secure debouche on the south of the James, in order to enable me to move on the communications of Richmond in that direction, as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonades. To carry out General Halleck's first order, of July 30, it was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the ene- my, apparently in some little force, and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its temporary occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even the abandonment of the Peninsula. General Hooker, with his own division, and Pleasanton's cavalry, was therefore du'ected to gain possession of Malvern Hill on the night of the 2d of Au- gust. He failed to do so, as the following despatch recites : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 3, 1862—10.20 P. M. " The movement undertaken up the river last night failed on account of the incompetency of guides. " The proper steps have been taken to-day to ■ remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready to-mor- row night to carry out yoirr suggestions as to pressing, at least to accomplish the first indispen- • sable step. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General Commanding, " Maj.-Gen. Halleck, '* Commanding United States Army.'* On the 4th, General Hooker was reinforced by General S( dgwick's division, and having ob- tained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern Hill, and di-iving the enemy back towards Richmond. The following is my report of this affair at the time : — " Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 1 p. M. " General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, at- tacked a very considerable force of infantry and artillery stationed at this place, and carried it handsomely, driving the enemy towards New- market, which is four miles distant, and where it is said they have a large force. We have cap- 95 tured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded several, ■with a loss on our part of only three killed and eleven wounded ; among the latter, two officers. " I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to act as circumstances may require, after the return of my cavalry reconnoissances. " The mass of the enemy escaped under the cover of a dense fog ; but our cavalry are still in pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing many more. " This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and only 14| miles distant ; and I feel confident that with reinforce- ments I would march this army there in five days. " I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are four miles from here on the Quaker Road, and I have taken steps to prepai'e to meet them. " General Hooker's dispositions were admira- ble, and his officers and men displayed their usual gallantry. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-Oeneral Commanding. ' Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." " Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 8 p. m. " Since my last despatch Colonel Averill has returned from a reconnoissance, in the direction of Savage's Station, towards Richmond. He en- countered the 18th Virginia cavalry near White Oak Swamp bridge, charged and drove them some distance towards Richmond, capturing 28 men aud hoi-ses, killing and wounding several. " Our troops have advanced (12) twelve miles in one direction, and (17) seventeen in another, towards Richmond to-day. " We have secured a strong position at Cog- gin's Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which will eti'ectually prevent the Rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps. " I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about six miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river. Wii it their ob- ject is I do not know, but wLU keep a sharp look- out on their movements. " I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders, to push reconnoissances towards the Rebel capi- tal, and hope soon to find out whether the re- ports regarding the abandonment of that place are true. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, '* Major- General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck. " Commanding United States Army." To the despatch of 1 P. M. August 5, the fol- lowing answer was received : — •* Washington, August 6, 1862 — 3 a. m. " I have no reinforcements to send you. " H. W. HALLECK, " Major-Oeneral. "Major-General G. B. McClellan." And soon after the following : — " Washington, August 6, 1862. "You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillerv to Burn- side's command at Aqiiia Creek. It is rejjorted that Jackson is moving north with a very large force. " H. W. HALLECK, '■ Major- Oeneralm " Major-General G. B. McClellan." On the 4th I had received General Halleck's order of the 3d, (which appears below,) directing me to withdraw the army to Aquia, and on the same day sent an earnest jirotest against it. A few hours before this, General Hooker had in- formed me that his cavalry ])ickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them in, and that he would probaldy be attacked at daybre ik. Under these circumstances I had determined to support him ; but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon, I con- cluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the General- iii-Chief, to withdraw Gener.d Hooker, that there might be the least possible delay in conforming to General Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to General Hooker the follow- ing letter : — "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Berkeley, August 6, 1862 — 10 P. M. " My dear General : I find it will not be possible to get the whole army into position be- fore some time to-morrow afternoon, which will be too late to support you, and hold the entire position, should tlie enemy attack in large force at daybreak, which there is sti'ong reasons to suppose he intends doing. " Should we fight a general battle at Malvern, it will be necessary to abandon the whole of our works here, and run the risk of getting back here. " Under advices I have received from Wash- ington, I think it necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight. "Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to destroy the Turkey Creek bridge when they are forced back. " The roads leading into Haxall's from the right should be strongly watched, and Haxall's at least held by strong cavalry force and some hght batteries as long as possible. " I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your discretion. " Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about completed. " Report frequently to these headquarters. " General Sumner was ordered up to support you, but will halt where tliis passes him, and will inform you where he is, "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " General J. Hooker, ^'Commanding at Malvern HiM." 9G And the following reply was sent to General Halleck: — "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 6, 1862—11.30 P. M. " Despatch of to-day received. I have not quite (4,000) four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so tliat I cannot possibly spare any moie. " I really need many more than I now have to carry out yoiu- instructions. "The enemy are moving a large force on Mal- vern Hill. In view of your despatches, and the fact tiiat I cannot place the whole army in posi- tion before da\ tjreak, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw during the night if it is possible ; if he cannot do so, I must support him. " Until this matter is developed I cannot send anv batteries ; I hope I can do so to-morrow if transportition is on hand. " I wiil obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. Mv artillery is none too numerous now. I have only been able to send off some (1,200) twelve hundred sick. No transportation. There shall lie no delay that I can avoid. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. «* Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding U. S. Army." Five baferies, with their horses and equip- ments complete, were embarked on the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with General Hooker's oper- ations upon Malvern. I despatched a cavalry force under Colonel AveriU towards Savage's Stixtion, to ascertain if the enemy were aiaking any movements towards our right flank. He found a Rebel cavalry regiment, near the White Oak Swamj) bridge, and completely routed it, pursuing well towards Savage's S ation. These imjjortant jn-eliminary operations assist- ed my preparations for the removal of the army to Aquia Creek ; and the sending oft' our sick and supplies was pushed both day and night as rapidly as the means of transportation per- mitted. On the subject of the withdrawal of the army fi"om Harrison's Landing, the following corre- spondence passed between the General-in-Chief and myself, while the reconnoissances towai'ds Richmond were in progress. On the 2d of August I received the follow- ing : — " Washington, August 2, 1862—3.45 p. m. " You have not answered my telegram of July 30, 8 r, M., about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible, and tele- gi-aph me when they will be out of your wav. The President wishes an answer as early as pos- sible. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major-General. " Major-General G, B, McClellan." To which this reply was sent : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "Berkeley, August 3 — 11 P, M. " Your telegram of (2) second is received. The an-wer (to desjiatch of July 30) was sent this morning. "We have about (12, -500) twelve thousand five hundred sick, of whom perhaps (4,000) four thousand might make easy marches. We have here the means to transport (1,200) twelve hundred, and will emlxxrk to-morrow that num- ber of the worst cases, with all the means at the disposal of the medical director; the remainder could be shipped in from (7) seven to (10) ten days. " It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off', unless I know what is to be done with this army. " Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the sick who cannot march and fight should be despatched by water. " Should the army advance, many of the sick could lie of service at the depots. If it is to re- main here any length of time, the question assumes still a dift'eri'nt phase. " Until I am informed what is to be done, I cannot act understandinglv or for the good of the service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. " In the mean time I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes. "GE0RG1<: B. McCLELLAN, ^^ Major- General Commanding. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army, WasMngto7i, U. C." The moment I received the instructions for re- moving the sick, I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying them out. Witfi the small amount of transportation at hand, the removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take several days, and, in the mean time, I desired information to determine what I should do with the others. The order required me to send them away as quick Iv as possible, and to notify the General-in- Chief when they were removed. Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 2d of August, not having been advised of what the army under my command was expected to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the following de-^patch : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 3, 1862. " I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe; are thev for removing my sick ? If .so, to what ex- tent am I required to go in sending them off? There are not many who need go. '• As I am not in any way informed of the in- tentions of the Government in regard to this I 97 army, I am unable to judge what Droportion of the sick should leave here, and iiuist ask for specific orders. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding . " Major-General II. W. Halleck, *' CovLinandinfj United States Army, Wash- ington." If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important that it should be unincumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond, from tlie position we then occupied, tliere were many cases of slight sickness which would speed- ily be cured, and the jjatients returned to duty. As the service of every man would be impor- tant in the event of a forward oHensive move- ment, I considered it to be of the utmost con- sequence that I should know wliat was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch of 11 p. m. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram : — " Washington, August 3, 18(i2 — 7.45 p. m. " I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnoissance towards Kichmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram. " It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement t!ie best you can. " Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from yonr own officers. " Your material and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and apply to the naval forces for all the assist- ance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire e;:eculion of the movement is left to your discretion and judgm 'nt. " You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, which we must occupy. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major-- General Commanding United States Army. " Major-General Geo. B. McClellan." 1 proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the con- viction that the withdrawal of the army of the Po- tomac from Harrison's Landing, where its commu- nications had by the cooperation of the gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, at that time, have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. I did not, as the commander of that array, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly sea- ting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities in the following telegram : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 4, 1862—12 m. "Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek 13 will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so iini)oriant a movement as this, and wliik' llicy are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements. " This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debourhe on both banks of the James Kiver, so that we are free to act in any direction ; and, with tlic assistance of tlie gunboats, I consider our conununications as now secure. "We are twenty-five(25)miles from Kichmond, and are not likely to meet llie enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, wliich brings us practically within ten (10) miles of Uiclnnond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five (25) miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by watc'V during its advance, certainly to within twelve (12) miles of Kichmond. " At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five (75) miles from Kichmond, with land transpor- tation all the way. " From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I regard it as im- practicable to withdraw this army and its mate- rial, except by land. " The result of the movement would thus Iw a march of one hundred and forty-five (145) miles to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water transportation. "Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly de- pressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries ; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it ray imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling tliis army, it may be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive. "It may be said that there are no reinforce- ments available. I point to Burnside's force ; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the army of the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the Rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. "All points of secondary importance else- where should be abandoned, and every available man brought here ; a decided victory here, and the military strength of the Rebellion is crushed. It matters not what i>artial reverses we may meet with elsewhere ; here is the true de- fence of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided. "Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selSsh motives have intluencod me from the cf)m- mencement of this war, I do now, what I never 98 did in my life before, I entreat that tliis order may lie rescinded. " If iny counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad iieart obey your orders to the utmost of ray power, directing to the movements, which I clea.r- ly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. What- ever the result may be — and may God grant that I am mistaken in my tV)rebodings — I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to dQ tlie best in my power to avert disaster from my country. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. "Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." Soon after sending this telegram, I received the following in reply to mine of 11 p. m. of the 3d : — "Washington, August 4, 18G1 — 12.45 p. m. " My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future operations ; it was ex- pected that you would have sent off your sick, as directed, without waiting to know what were or would be tlie intentions of the Government respecting future movements. "The President expects that the instructions which were sent you yesterday, with his appro- val, will be carried out with all possible de- spatch and caution. The Quartermaster-General is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major- General, " Major-General G. B. McClellan." To which the following is my reply : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 5, 1862 — 7 a. m. " Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried out as promptly as possible. With the means at my command, no human power could have moved the sick in the time you say you expected them to be moved. :t. it * * * * * "GEO. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." My efforts for bringing about a change of pol- icy were unsuccessful, as wifll be seen from the following telegram and letter received by me in reply to mine of 12 m. of" the 4th : — " Washington, August 5, 18G2 — 12 m. " You cannot regret the order of the with- drawal more than I did the necessity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be ex- pected to execute it with all possible prompt- ness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay. I will write you my views more fully by mail. " H. W. HALLECK, ^^ Major-General CommtLuding United States Army. "Major-General G. B. McClellan." Tlie letter was as follows : — " Headquarters op the Armt, " Washington, August (>, 18(52. "Genervl: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I immediately tele- graphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by mail. " You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at receiving my order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by liigli officers, in whose judgment I had great con- fidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival iiere, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes from a personal inter- view. And even after that interview I tried every means in m^' power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. " I assure you. General, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more anxious tiiougiits than any other of my life. But after full and mature consideration of all tlie pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the order must be issued. — there was to my mind no alternative. "Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. " You and your officers at one interview esti- mated the enemy's forces in and around Rii;h- mond at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others report that they have re- ceived and are receiving large reinforcements from the South. General Pope's army, cover- ing Washington, is only about forty tuousand. Your effective force is only about ninety thou- sand. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between you, ready to tail with his su- perior numbers upon one or the other as he may elect ; neither can reinforce the other in case of such an attack. " If General Pope's army be diminished to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Penn- sylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the position you now occupy, sliould the enemy turn round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split in two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly be- tween them. They cannot be united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circum- stances, a military impossibility. Tiie only al- ternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies can be united. " Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged: You say that tlie with- drawal from the present position will cause the certain demoralization of the army, ' which is now in excellent discipline and condition.' '• I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no means distant base, will demoralize an army in excellent disci- pline unless the officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will not. "Your change of front from your extrema 99 right at Hanover Court Hon«e to your present position was over thirty miles, hut I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwith- standing the severe losses they sustained in ef- fecting it. " A new base on the Rappahannock at Freder- icksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of Riclimond, and secures a reinforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. " The change with such advantages will, I think, if properly represented to your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover you yourself suggested that a junc- tion might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. " You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further than Fredericksburg is. Be- sides, the latter is between Richmond and Wash- ington, and covers Washington from any attack of the enemy. " The political efiect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable ; but I think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a united army than in its separate fragments. " But you will reply, why not reinforce me here, so that I can strike Richmond from my present position? To do this, you said, at our interview, that you required thirty thousand ad- ditional troops. I told you that it was impossi- ble to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have ' some chance ' of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards tel- egraphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely rein- forced. " If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly rea- sonable ; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. " To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reinforced would almost de- stroy it in that climate. " The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River ; and even after you received the reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance on Richmond. " It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require consid- erable time, — perhaps as much as those at York- town. " This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the mean time Gen- eral Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. " In regard to the demoralizing eflTect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappa- hannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest oflicers, indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its aban- donment. " I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what reasons, the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. " I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been pre- sented for doing this. If you, or any one else, had presented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require reinforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to as/c for reinforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. " I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will give nie credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very difierent conclusions from your own. " "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, " H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major-General G. B. McCleli.an, *' Commanding, ^c, Berkeley, Virginia." On the 7th I received the following tele- gram : — " Washington, August 7, 1862—10 a. m. " You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order, the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal — that is, the num- ber of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control. " H. W. HALLECK, " Major- General. " Major-General G. B. McCleli.an." To which I made this reply : — " Headquarters Army of TtrE Potomac, " August 7, 18G2— 10.40 p. m. *' In reply to your despatch of 10 a. m. to-day, I report the number of sick sent off since I re- ceived your order, as follows : Three thousand seven hundred and forty, including some that are embarked to-night and will leave in the morning. The number still to be shipped is, as nearly as can be ascertained, five thousand seven hundred. " The embarkation of five batteries of artil- lery, with their horses, wagons, &c., required most of our available boats except the ferry- boats. All the transports that can ascend to this place have been ordered up ; they will be here to-morrow evening. Colonel Ingalls re- ports to me that there are no transports now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained I shall send off the first New York cavalry. " After the transports with the sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, we can transport twenty-five thou- sand men at a time. We have sonic propellers here, but they are laden with commissary sup- plies and are not available. " The transports now employed in transport- ing sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well in- f;mtry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draft to come here, will carry S, 000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers 100 liavebeen used for transporting prisoners of war, and have only become available for the sick to-day. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General, " Major-General II. W. Halleck, '• Commandiitg tlie United States Army." The report of my chief quarterraastei upon the subject is as follows : — ** Headquartkrs Army of the Potomac. " Office of Chief Quartermaster, narrison's Landing, August 7, 1862. " General : I have the honor to return the papers herewith which you sent me, with the following reuKirks : — " We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, &c., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferry-boats. The medical depart- ment has ten or twelve of our largest transport vessels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. " I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry. " There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-morrow, if the ves- sels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavalry ('an be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport 25.000 at a time. The number that can be transported is contingent on circum- stances referred to. " Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or otlier supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies. " I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, "RUFUS INGALLS, " Chief Quartermaster. " General R. B. Marcy, " Chief of Staff." On the 9th I received this despatch : — " Washington, August 9, 1862—12.45 p. m. " I am of the opinion that the enemy is mass- ing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and n)ove forward to the Potomac. "You must send reinforcements instantly to Aquia Creek. " Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity. "H. W. HALLECK, " Major-General. " Major-General G. B. McClellan." To which I sent the following reply : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 10, 1862—8 a. m. " Telegram of yesterday received. The bat- teries sent to Burnside took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to- day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert — not an hour's — but every- thing has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders. " G. B. McCLELLAN, '■'■'Major- General- Commanding. "Major-General H. W. Halleck. " Commanding United States Army." The following report, made on the same day by the ofl&cer then in cliarge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the de- spatch of the general-in-chief, that, "considering the amount of transportation at your disposal your delay is not satisfactory." " Assistant-Quartermaster's Office, " Army of the Potomac, " Hari-ison's Lan,ding, Virginia, August 10. "1862. " Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has re- quested me to telegraph to you concerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the 8th I despatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six sclioon- ers, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of whicli have yet returned. " Requisition is matle this morning for trans- portatiimof one thousand cavalry to Aquia Creek. All the schooners that had been ciiartered fjr carrying horses have been long since discharged, or changed into freight vessels. " A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores or are in the floating hospital service engaged in removing the sick. To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now here not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. Several steam- ers are expected here to-day, and we are unload- ing schooners rapidly ; most of these are not chartered, but are being taken for the service required, at same rates of pay as other char- tered schooners. If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here, it would facilitate matters. "C. G. SAWTELLE, " Capiai'n and Assist ant- Quartermaster ^ commanding Depot. " General M. C. Meigs, " Quartermaster- General United States " Army, Washington." Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were very limited, admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as they were disposable vessels, and the offi- cers of the medical and quartermaster's depart- ments, with all their available forces, were inces- santly occupied day and night in embarking and sending ofi' the sick men, troops, and material. 101 Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the general-in-chicf that such were the facts, on the 10th I received the following : — •' Wasuington, August 10, 1862 — 12 p. m. " The enemy is crossing the llapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day ; there must be no further delay in your move- ments ; that which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops. "H. W. PIALLECK, " Major- General. " Major-General G. B. McClellan." To which I sent this reply : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '* Berkeley, August 10, 1862—11.30 p. m. " Your despatch of to-day is received. I as- sure you again that there has not been any un- necessary delay in carrying out your orders. " You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation avail- able here. " I have pushed matters to the utmost in get- ting off our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burnside. " Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quartermaster-General of the condition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to keep the order secret, I took it for granted that you would take the steps nec- essary to provide the requisite ti'ansportation. " A large number of transports for all arms of service, and for wagons, should at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. " I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed. " The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to- night; (10) ten steamers were required for the purpose; (1,258) twelve hundred and fifty-eight sick loaded to-day and to-night. "Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some (^500) five hundred cases of slight sicknes.s. " The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessary, harsh, and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference to my offi- cial action. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, •' Commanding United States Army." On the eleventh this report was made : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeleij, August 11, 1802—11.30 p. m. "The embarkation of (850) eight hundred and fifty cavalry, and (1) one brigade of infantry will be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning; (500) five hundred sick were embarked to-day. Another vessel arrived to-night, and (600) six hundred more sick are now being embarked. I still have some (4000) four thousand sick to dis- pose of. You have been greatly misled as to the amount of transportation at my disposal. "Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indisjiensable for service here, have been reported to you as available for carry- ing sick and well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe to have them return here. I repeat that I have lost no time in car- rying out your orders. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " Major-General II. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." On the same day I received the following from the quartermaster in charge of the de- pot: — " Assistant Quartermaster's Office, " Army of the Potomac, ^^ Harrison's Landing, August 11, 1862. " Colonel : In reply to the comuiunication from General Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no disposable transports not already de- tailed, either for the use of the hospital depart- ment, for the transportation of the 1st N. Y. cavalry, or for the necessary service of the har- bor. I think the steamers loading and to be loaded with cavalry, could take in addition three thousand infantry. These boats are. however, directed to leave as fast as they are loaded; £Ome have already started. Tiie embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hurr}' the matter, although I have had several agents of the depart- ment and one commissioned officer at the wharf, to render all the assistance possible. The entire army is this morning turning in, to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other surplus property, and with our limited wharf facilities it is impossible, unless the regular issues of forage, &c., are suspended, to avoid great confusion and delay with what is already ordered to be done. Of course, if any infantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry trans- ports, the confusion and difficulties will be in- creased. " I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except the Soutli America and Fan- ny Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered to be sent back from Fort Monroe. " The transports with the artillery left for Aquia Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th. They were ordered to re- turn immediately. " I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- vant, "C. G. SAWTELLE, " Captain and A. Q. M. commanding Depot. " Lieut.-Colonel Rurus Ingalls, "^. D. C. and Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.'" On the 12th I received the following : — " Washington, August 12, 1862— 12 m. " The Quartermaster-General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the coun- try is now under your control. To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York, 102 would interfere with the transportation of array supplies, and break up the channels of travel by which we are to brin^ forward the new troops. Burnsirle moved nearly thirteen thousand (13,- 000) troops to Aquia Creek in less than two (2) days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that eight (8) or ten (10) thousand of your men could be transported daily. "In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which could be used as trans- ports. " The bulk of your material on shore it was thought could l)e sent to Fort Monroe, covered by tliat part of tiie army which could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the Government here ; perhaps we were misin- formed as to the facts. If so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was inten- tionally harsh or unjust, but the delay was so unexpected that an explanation was required. There has been, and is, the most urgent neces- sity for despat"h ; and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington. "H. W. HALLECK, ' ' Major- General. " Major-General McClellan." I telegraphed the following reply : — "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '■'■Berkeley, August 12, 1862—11 p. m. " Your despatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the fact that no more men could have been embarked hence tlian have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders were received. Colonel Ingalls directed all available vessels to come from Mon- roe. OfBcers have been sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burn- side's fleet. " Tliere are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhaust- ed this side New York. Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases for New York, and to encamp slight cases for tlie present at Mon- roe. In this way can ])robably get off the thirty- four hundred (3,400) sick, still on hand, by day after to-morrow night. " I am sure tliatyou have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot use heavily loaded supply vessels for troops or animals ; and such constitute the mass of those here, which have been represented to you as ca- pable of transporting this army. " I fear you will find very great delay in em- barking troops and material at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels and of facili- ties of embarkation ; at least two additional v^harves should at once be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter some two (2) weeks ago, but you countermanded the order. "I learn that wharf accommodations at .\quia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost in remedying this. "Great delay will ensue there from shallow wa- ter. You will find a vast deficiency in horse trans- ports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here ; I learn of only twenty (20) pro- vided now ; they carry about fifty (50) liorses each. More hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land cur- rent supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur. " With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, six (6) weeks about were occupied in embarking this army and its material. " Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarkation. All his means were in hand, his outfit specially prepared for the pur- pose, and his men habituated to the movement. " Tiiere shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state tliese diffi- culties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross purposes, because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difficulties of such an under- taking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. " If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia. " Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it, if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments, the result might be the loss of mucli material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to-mor- row morning. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C" To the reasons given in the foregoing de- spatch, to show why General Burnside's move- ment from Fort Monroe was not a feir criterion for our operations, tiie following may be added: He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men. He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers' horses. His baggage was already on the transports, where it had remained since his arrival from North Carolina, and his men had only to resume their places on board. The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my despatches of the 7th, lOtli, and 11th, were sent to supply his total deficiency in those arras. I may also repeat that the vessels used by General Burnside had not returned from Aquia Creek when the army left Harrison's Bar. It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of the foregoing despatch thiit in order to have a more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the condition of aflairs in the array than I could by sending a single despatch by steamer to the near- est telegraph office at Jamestown Island, some seventy miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a replv, I proposed to go in person to the office. This i did. On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was an interruption in the electric current, which rendered it necessary for me to continue on to 103 Fort Monroe, and across the Chesapeake Bay to Cherry Stone Inlet, on the "eastern shore," where I arrived late in the evening, and imme- diately sent the annexed despatches : — " Cherry Stone, August 13, 1862— 11.30 p.m. "Please come to the office; wish to talk to you. What news from Pope ? " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, Waahingion." " Cherny Stone Inlet, August 14, 1862—12.30 a.m. " Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; found cable broken and came here. Please read my long telegram. (See above dispatch of August 12, 11 p. M.) All quiet at camp. Ene- my burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No Rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's Point yesterd'ay. " Richmond prisoners state that large force with guns left Richmond northward on Sunday. "G. B. McLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General II. W. Halleck, Washington." To which the following reply was received : — " Washington, August 14."l862— 1.40 a.m. " I have read your despatch. There is no change of plans. You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is no difficulty in landing them. According to your own accounts, there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. Do so with all possible rapidity. " H. W. HALLECK, " Major General. "Major-General G. B. McClellan." Before I had time to decipher and reply to this despatch, the telegraph operator in Wash- ington informed me that General Halleck had gone out of the office immediately after writing this despatch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for me, or waiting for any further infoi'- mation as to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other com- munication with him at that time, I sent the fol- lowing despatch, and returned to Harrison's Landing : — " Cherry Stone Inlet, " August 14, 1862—1.40 a. m. " Yovir orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you, after travelling so far for the purpose. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Major-General IL W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C." On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to embark all our sick men, two army coi-ps were put in motion towards Fort Monroe. This was reported in the annexed despatch : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Berkeley, August 14, 1862—11 p. m. " Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to-morrow night. Every- thing being done to carry out your orders. I don't like Jackson's movements ; he will .sudden- ly appear when least expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in tlie inoi iiing. "G. B. McCLLLLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, Washington, U. C." The phrase, " movement has commenced," it need not be remarked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army, after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, &c., &c. The perversion of the term, to wiiich the gen- eral-in-chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War, should have been here rendered impossible by the despatches which precede this of tlie 14th, which show that the movement really begun immediately after the re- ceipt of the order of August 4th. The progress made in the movement on the 15th was reported in the following despatches :— " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, August 15, 1862—12 m. " Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking the remaining brigade of Mc- Call's division, with the sick, who are constantly accumulating, the transports now disposable will be all consumed. "Two of my army corps marclicd last night and this morning en route for Yorktown, — one via Jones's Bridge, and the other via Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads are clear ; and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire army in motion. " A report has just been received from my pickets that the enemy in force is advancing on us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it; shall know soon. Should any more trans- ports arrive here before my departure, and the enemy do not show such a force in our front as to require all the troops I have remaining to insure the safety of the land movement with its immense train, I shall send every man by water that transports will carry. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commandinff U. S. A." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 15, 1862—1.30 p. m. " The advanced corps and trains are fairly started. I learn nothing more in relation to reported advance of Rebels via Jones's Bridge. Shall push the movement as rapidly as possible. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C." "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Berkeley, August 15, 1862 — 10 p. m. " Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of McCall's division, with its artillery, is now en route for Burnsidc. We have not yet transpor- tation sufficient for our sick. I hoj^e we will get it to-morrow. "Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its 104 mouth, with his wagons and reserve artillery. Ilcintzclraan at Jones's Bridge with a portion of his corps. They will all be up by morning. "Avcrell's cavalry on the other side. All quiet thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as far as Charles City Court House before some time to-morrow afternoon. •' I am hurrying matters w itli the utmost rapid- ity possible. Wagons will move all night. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. "Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Waahingtoti, D. C." After the commencement of the movement, it was continued with the utmost rapidity, until all the troops and material were en route both by land and water, on the morning of the 16th. Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disajipeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the grand army of tlie Potomac ; bidding farewell to the scenes still covered with the marks of its presence, and to he forever memo- rable in history as the vicinity of its most bril- liant exploits. Previous to the departure of the troops, I had directed Captain Duane, of the engineer corps, to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that i)oint a pontoon bridge. This was exe- cuted promptly and satisfactorily under the cover of gunboats ; and an excellent bridge of alwut two thousand feet in length was ready for the first arrival of troops. The greater part of the army, with its artillery, wagon trains, &c., crossed it rapidly, and in per- fect order and safety, so that on the night of the 17th everything was across the Chickahominy, except the rear guard, which crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when the pontoon bridge was immediately removed. General Porter's corps, wJiich was the first to march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Wil- liamsburg, where I had directed him to halt until the entire army was across the Chicka- hominy. (Jn his arrival at Williamsburg, however, he received an intercepted letter, which led to the belief that General Pope would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his front, (ieneral Porter, therefore, very jn'operly took ^le responsibility of continuing his march direct- ly on to Newport News, ■v\iiich place he reached on the morning of the 18th of August, having ma relied his corps sixty miles in the short period of three days and one night, iialting one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy. The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, and on the 20th it had all saded for A quia Creek. I made the following report from Barrett's Ferry : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Barrett's Ferry, Chickahominy , "August 17, 1862—11 A.M. " Everything is removed from our camp at Harrison's Bar. No property nor men left behind. " The (5th) fifth corps is at Williamsburg with all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The (3d) third corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge to Williamsburg, rid Diascund Bridge, and has probably passed the latter before this hour. Averell's cavalry watches everything in that direction. "The mass of the wagons have passed the pontoon bridge here, and are parked on the other side. Peck's wagons are now crossing; his division will soon be over. Headquarters wagons follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to see Burnside, othei-wise should have remained with the rear guard. Thus tar all is quiet, and ncjt a shot that I know of since we began the march. " I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army beyontl the Cliickahominy. I will then begin to forward troops by water as fast as transportation permits. "G. B. M.'CLELLAN, " Major-General Co)iimandi7ig. " Major-General H. W. Halleck. " Comm'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C" On the ISth and 19th our march was continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fortress Monroe, and Newport News. The movement of the main body of the army on this uuirch was covered by General Pleasan- ton with his cavalry and horse artillery. That officer remained at Haxall's until the army had passed Charles City Court House, when he gradually fell back, ijicking up the stragglers as he proceeded, and crossed the bridge over the Chickahominy, after the main body had marched towards Williamsburg. His tro(3ps were the last to cross the bridge, and he deserves great credit for the manner in which he performed this duty. General Averell did a similar service, in the same satisfactory way, in covering the march of the 3d corps. As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot close this i)art of my report with- out giving an expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the officers and men whom I had the honor to command. From the conjmencoment to the termination of this most arduous campaign, the army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subor- dination, zeal, and alacrity in the performance of all the duties required of it. The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, &c.. was enormous; yet all the work was performed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interest of the service. During the campaign ten severely contested and sanguinary battles had been fought, l)esides numerous smaller engagements, in whicli the troops exhibited the most determined entiiusiasm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sick- ness, and even death without a murmur. In- deed, they had become veterans in their coun- try's cause, and richly deserved the warm com- mendation of the Government. 105 It was in view of these facts that this seemed to uie an appropriate occasion for the general- in-chief to give, in general orders, some appreci- ative exuression of tlie services of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th I sent him the following dispatch : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "August 18, 1862—11 p. M. " Please say a kind word to my army that I can repeat to them in general orders in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the Cliickahominy, as well as in regard to the (7) seven days and the recent retreat. " No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it. "G. B. McCLELLAN, *' Major- General. " Major-General Halleck, " Washington, D. C." As no reply was received to this communica- tion, and no order was issued hy the general-in- chief, I conclude that suggestion did not meet, with his approbation. All the lyersoanel and material of the army had been transferred from Harrison's Landing to the different jioints of embarkation in the very brief period of tive days without the slightest loss or damage. Porter's troops sailed from Newport News on the 19th and 20th. Heintzel- man's corps sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On that day 1 received the following telegram from the general-in-chief : — *' Washington, August 21, 18G2 — 6 p. si. " Leave such garrisons in Portress Monroe, Yorktown. &c., as you may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as pos- sible, " The forces of Burnside and Pope ai-e hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. " By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to light as soon as they land. " H. "W. HALLECK, '•'• Maj-Gen. Commanding United States Army. " General McClellan." To which the following are replies : — " Headquarters Army of the Potojiac, " Fortress Monroe, August 21, 1862—7.30 p. m. " Your despatch of (6) six p. m. received. I have not lost an hour in sending troops, nor will I. Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of his troops on board to-night. I had already ord(2red all the ammunition forward. " I will put headquarters on board sliip early to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a mo- ment's notice. 1 hope that I can get off to-mor- row. Shall I go in person to Aquia, or do you wish to see me first at Washington? If you 14 wish it I can probably ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this army. "G. B. McCLELLAN, . "■ Major- Utntral. "Major-General IIam.eck, " Washington, D. C." "Headquarters Akmy ov tiik Potomac, " Fort Mo7iroe, August 21, 18G2— 10.25 p. m. " I have ample supplies of ammunition for in- fantry and artillery, and will have it u]> in time. I can supply any deiiciency that may exist in General Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled field guns are on hand lie*,>. " The forage is the only question for you to attend to ; please have that reaily for "me at Aquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry horses ; they should have water on hand when they come here. " If you have leisure, and there is no objec- tion, please communicate to me fully the state of affairs, and your plans. I will tlien be enabled to arrange details undcrstandingly. "G. B. McCLELLAN, •■ Major- General. " Major-General Halleck, " Washington." Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave directions for strengthening the defences of Yorktown, to resist any attack from the direction of Richmond, and left General Keyes, with his corps, to perform the work, and temporarily gar- rison the place. I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862—2.15 p. m. " Dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sum- ner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as fast as transportation ari-ives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of de- fence. I think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to-day, and hope to commence with Sum- ner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and wagons. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Haileck, " Washington, D. C." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862—3.40 p. m. " Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are needed immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defences are arranged and commenced. " I recommend that five thousand (5,000) new troops be sent immediately to garrison York and Gloucester. They should be commanded by an experienced general officer, who can diseij)line and instruct them. About (900) nine hundred should be artillery. I recommend that a new regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or graduate, be designated a heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely neces- sary here. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." 106 On the 23cl Franklin's corps sailed. I report- ed this in the fullowing despatch : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '^Fori Monroe, August 23, 18G2 — 1.30 p. m. " Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Aquia in about half an hour. No transports yet for iSumner's corps. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. "Major-General H. W. IIalleck, " Commanding United Stales Army." On that evening I sailed with my staff for Aquia Creek, where I arrived at daylight on the following morning, reporting as follows : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ''Aquia Creek, August 24, 18G2. " I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders. G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. "Major-General Halleck, " Commanding United States Armij/' I also telegraphed as follows : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, '■'■Aquia Creek, August 24, 18(32 — 2 p. m. " Your telegram received. Morell's scouts report Rappahannock Station burned and aban- doned by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes. This was telegraphed you some hours ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens are sup- posed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower fords of Rappahannock, with no troops between there and Rappahannock Station, wiiich is reported abandoned by Pope. " Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is, and what doing; until I know that I cannot regulate Porter's movements ; he is much exposed now, and decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my command and position are to be, and whetlier you still intend to place me in the command indicated in your tirst letter to me, and orally through Gen- eral Burnside, at the Cliickahoniiny, I cannot decide where I can be of most use. If your determination is unchanged, 1 ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please define my position and duties. G. B. McCLELLAN, Major -General. " Major-General H. W. Haleeck, " Commanding United States Army." ToAvhich I received the following reply : — Washington, August 24, 1862. "You a^k me tor information which I cannot give. I do not know either where General Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain. H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major-General McClellan." On the 2Gth I received the following: — Washington, August 20, 1862—11 a. m. " There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Val- ley. Recoouoissances will soon determine. General Heintzelinan's corps was ordered to report to General Pope, and Kearney's will prob- ably be sent to-day againat the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down the Rappananock at present; we shall probably want them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave General Burnside in charge at Aquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities ai-e reported there. General Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation. " II. W. IIALLECK, " Gcncral-in-Ohief. "Major-General G. B. McClellan." On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as follows : — " Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 8 a. m. "I arrived liere last night, and have taken, measures to ascertain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over BuU Kuu was biu-ned last night. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General, "Major-Gener.al H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." Alexandria, August 27, 18G2— 9.40 a. m. "The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers, who are said to be chiefly convalescents. "The affairs of the quartermaster's depart- ment are reported as going on well. "It is said that Bull's Run bridge will be re- paired by to-moirow. The disembarkation ol Sumner's corps commenced at Aquia yesterday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappa- hannock Station earlier that way than from here. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." On the same day I received the following : — " Washington, August 27, 1862. " Telegrams from General Porter to General 'Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketta near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction, to reinforce Pope. Nothing said of Keintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carry- ing three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as far as possible, by railroad. Per- haps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops. Please see him, and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major-G<)Tieral McClellan." I replied as follows : — " Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10 A. M. " Telegraph this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair herein per- 107 son to inform mc as to his means of transpor- tation. '•Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock Station ; Porter at Ecaiton, Keliip, Barnells, &.c. JSuinner will commence rcacliin;^ Falmouth to- day. Williams's JMassachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. " I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one squadron 4th regulars) to scout down the liap- pahannock. " I have sent for Couch's division to come at once. As fast as I gain my information I will forward it, although you may already have it. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Major-Greneral H. W. Halleck, " Washington, D. C." I also receired the following telegrams : — "Washington, August 27, 1862. " Direct General Casey to furnish you about five thousand of the new troops under his com- mand. " Take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. " Determine questions of priority in transpor- tation, and the places they shall occupy. Pope's lieadquarters are near VVarrenton Junction, but I cannot ascertain the present position of his troops. " H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Cliief. *' Major-Goneral McClellan." " Washington, August 27, 1862. " I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or of our troops. There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as pos- sible. A competent officer should be sent out to take direction of affairs in that vicinity. "H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Cliief. " Major-General McClellan." Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegram to Generals Heintzel- man and Porter : — " Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10.30 a. m. " Where are you, and what is state of affairs — what troops in your front, right, and left ? Sumner is now landing at Aquia. Where is Pope's left, and what of enemy? Enemy burned Bull Run bridge last night with cavalry force. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. •' Major-General Heintzelman, Warrenton. " lilajor-General Porter, Bcalion. " P. S. — If these general officers are not at the places named, nearest operator will please have message forwarded." I also telegraphed to the general-in-chief as follows : — " Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 10.50 a. m. " I have sent all the information I possess to Burnside, instructing him to look out well for his right flank, between the Rappahannock and Potomac, and to send no trains to Por- ter without an escort. T fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull Run last night may trouble Bum- side a little. I have sent to communicate with Porter and Heintzelman, ria Falmouth, and hope to give you some definite iTiforniation in a few hours. 1 shall land the next cavalry I get hold of here, and send it out to keep open the communication between Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manassas. Please send me a number of copies of the best maps of present field of operations. I can use tifiy (50) to ad- vantage. " G. B. McCLELLAN, ^'' Major-General. " Major-General Hai-leck, " Commanding United States Armi/." " Alexandria, August 27, 1862—12.50 a. m. "In view of Burnside's despatch, just re- ceived, would it not be advisable to throw the mass of Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin to Centreville or vicinity ? If a deci- sive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any troops on the lower Rappalian- nock in a dangerous position. " They would do better service in front of Washington. " G. B. McCLELLAN, '^ Major-General. " Major-General Halleck, " Washington, D. C." " ALEXA.NDRIA, August 27, 1862—12.5 p. m. " My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camp; reports that Generals Frank- lin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washing- ton. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascer- tain the truth. I can find no cavalry to ,«end out on tlie roads. Are the works garrisonedand ready for defence ? "G. B. McCLTn:.LAN, " Major-General. "Major-General, Halleck, " Washington." " Alexandria, August 27, 1862— 12J?0r m. "What bridges exist over Bull Run? Have steps been taken to construct bridges for the ad- vance of troops to reinforce Pope, or to enable him to retreat if in trouble ? " There should be two gunboats at Aquia Creek at once. Shall I push the rest of Sum- ner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success? I have sent to inspect the works near here and their garrisons. "As soon as I can find General Casey, or some other commanding officer, I will see to the railway, &c. It would be well to liave them re- port to me, as I do not know where they are. I am trying to lind them, and will lose no time in carrying out your orders'. Would like to see Burnside. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Wasliington." "Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—1.15 p.m. " Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for four (4) gims without caissons. I can pick up no 108 cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's coi-ps here hy water as rajjidly as possilile, to make immediate arrange- ments for plaeing the works in front of Wash- ington in an ethcient condition of defence? 1 have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. " Can Franklin, without his artillery or caval- ry, effect any useful purpose in front? ''Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Acpiia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? " I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the vallcv? "G. B." McCLELLAN, " Major- General" *' Major-General IIallkck, " Washington." "Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—1.35 p. m. " I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morn- ing to Bull Eun Bridge, is either cut to pieces or captured. " That the force against them had many guns, and about (5,000) five thousand infantry, receiv- ing reinforcements every minute ; also, that Gainesville is in possession of the enemy. Please send some cavalry out towards Drains- ville, via Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Drainsville, and go as far as they can. If you will give me even one squadron of good cav- alry here I will ascertain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they can liave their artillery and cavalry. I have sent for Colonel Tyler to place his artillerymen in the works. "Is Fort Marcy securely held? "G. B. MoCLELLAN, " Major- General." " General Halleck." " Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—2.30 p. m. " Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that are within reach. Orders have been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with ths least possilile delay. But one squadron of mj cavahy has arrived ; that will be disembarked at once and sent to the front. "If there is any cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to report to me at once. "I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defence of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. " I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at onee what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. "G. B. McCLELLAN, "Major-General. "Major-General II. W. Hallkck, " Commanding United States Army." " Alexandkia, Aug. 27, 1862—6 p. m. " I have just received the copy of a despatch from General Pope to you, dated 10 a. m. this morning, in which he says : ' All forces now sent for'.vard should be sent to right at Gainesville. " I now have at my cUsposal here about (10,000) ten thousand men of Franklin's corps, about (2,800) twenty-eight hundred of General Tyler's brigade and Colonel Tyler's first Connecticut artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for the defence of Washington. " If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate. " In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order General Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them otf till further orders. G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. "Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." On the 28th I telegraphed as follows : — "Headquarters Camp near Alexandria, "August 28, 1862—4.10 p. m. "General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. " We are not yet in condition to move ; may be by to-morrow morning. "Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to gar- rison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be- held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a corps of good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which can- not be seriously menaced as long as it is held. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Major-General Halleck, " Washington, D. C." I received the following from the geueral-in-» chief: — " Washington, August 28, 1862. "I think you had better place Sumner's corps' as it arrives near the guns, and particularly ati the Chain Bridge. "The principal thing to be feared now is ar cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night time. " Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade, and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. " Porter writes to Burnside from Bristow, 9.30 A. Ji. yesterda_y, that Pope's forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. " General Cullum has gone to Harper's Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the office. " Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. Please an- swer. "H. W. HALLECK, "General-in- Chief. " Major-General McClellan." On the 29th the following despatch was tele- graphed : — " Camp near Alexandria, "August 29, 1862—10.30 a. m. "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about six (6) A. M. I can give him but two squadrons 109 of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's Hill, to liold that important point with its works, and to pusli cavalry scouts to Vienna, \'a Freedom Hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has (2) vfvo squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have di- ro'jted Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, to bold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached, last night, two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Aquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any relial)le troops in and near Washing- ton. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived ; have but three (3) squadrons. Franklin has but forty (40) rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in con- dition to accomplish much if lie meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainsville ? " G. B. McCLELLAN, '■'■Major- General. " Major-General Halleck, " WasJiington, D. C. To which the following is a reply : — " Washington, August 29, 18C2 — 12 m. " Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. " Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Drainesville. •'H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major-General McClellan." On the same day the following was received from His Excellency the President : — " Washington, "August 29, 18G2— 2.30 p. m. " What news from direction of Manassas Junction ? What, generally ? "A. LINCOLN. " Major-General McClellan." To which I replied as follows : — "Camp near Alexandria, " August 29, 18G2— 2.45 p. m. " The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable. " I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted : 1st, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope ; 2d, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once to use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. " No middle ground will now answer. Tell nie what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to de- lay longer. "G. B. McCLELLAN, i/o/or-GeneroZ. " A. Lincoln, President." And copy to General Halleck. To which the following is a reply : — " Washington, August 29, 18(52—4.10 p.m. " Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, ' to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one, but I wish not to con- trol. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels. "A. LINCOLN. " Major-General McClellan." It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy, in strong force, was moving through Vienna in the direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connection with the despatch of the general-in-chief on tlie 28th, before noted, induced me to direct Franklin to halt his com- mand near Anandale until it could be deter- mined, by reconnoissances to Vienna and to- wards Manassas, whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton's Hill towards Vienna and Drainsville in one direction, and towards Fairfax Court House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far to- wards Manassas as possible, in order to ascer- tain the true position of the enemy. With the enemy in force at Vienna, and towards Lewinsville, it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond Anandale. It must be remem- bered that at that time we were cut off from di- rect communication with General Pope ; that the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manas- sas in strong force, and that Franklin had only from 10.000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely in- sufficient force of cavalry and artillery. In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the general-in-chief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I tele- graphed as follows : — " Camp near Alexandria, "August 29, 1862— 12 m. "Have ordered most of the (12th) Pennsyl- vania cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty towards Rockville, Poolesville, &c. '"If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge and Tenallj-town. " Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenally- town ? "Franklin has only between ten thousand (10,000) and eleven thousand (11,000) for duty. " How far do you wish this force to advance? "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General Halleck, Washington." no " Camp near Alexandria, " August 29, 1802—1 p. m. ** I anxiously await reply to ray last despatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at once. " Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to ray old brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. 1 shall endeavor to hold a line in advance oi" Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. Tliis will give us timely warn- ing. .ShaU I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who I really tlank ought not, under present circum- st-ances, to advance beyond Anandalc ? "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " General Halleck." On the same day I received a despatch from the General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why I halted Franklin in Anandale, to which I re- plied as follows : — "Camp near Alexandria, " August 29, 18G2— 10.30 a. m. *' By referring to ray telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 12 M., and 1 p. m., together with your reply of 2.48 p. M., you will see why Franklin's corps halted at Anandale. His small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was ordered to push on as far as possible towards Manassas. " It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. "General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. " Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as soon as possible. " General Tyler to furnish the necessary guards. " I have directed General Banks's supply trains to start out to-night at least as far as An- andale, with an escort from General Tyler. " In regard to to-morrow's movements I de- sire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you com- mitted to me. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General. " Major-General Halleck, " Washington, D- C." On the same evening I sent the following despatches : — " Camp near Alexandria, "August 29, 18G2— 10 p. m. " Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to i)Iace himself in commu- nication with Genera) Pope as soon as possible. and at the same time to cover the transit of Pope's supplias. " Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with least possible ' delay. " I am having inspections made of all the forts around th(? city by merabers of my staff, with instructions to give all requisite orders. " I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening ; found them in good order. " Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. "Major-General Halleck, Washington." " Camp near Alexandria, " August 29, 1862—10 p. m. "Your despatch received. Franldin's corps has been ordered to march at G o'clock to-mor- row morning. Sumner has about fourteen thou- sand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here ; all these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except Franklin's to await further orders. " If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas, please inform me. " Colonel Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of Rebels near Fairfax Court House. Reports rumors from various sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas. "That the enemy, with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Baltimore. " General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of fortifications on this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional artillerymen, and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances ; at all events, he says an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regi- ments distributed along the lines to give confi- dence to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General, " General H. W. Halleck, " General-in-Chief, United States Army, Washington, D. C." "Camp near Alexandria, "August 30, 1862—11.30 a. m. "Your telegram of 9 a m. received. Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been en- deavoring to get transportation from the quar- termaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After Ill the departure of his corps he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition, by un- loading Banks's supply train. '•General Sumner endeavored by application upon the quartermaster's department, to get wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge boxes. " I have this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are landed be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Frank- lin; but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency. " Eighty-iive wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded with sub- sistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. with an es- cort, t;?'a Anandale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of tlie garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. " I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to vou. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " 3Iaj or- General. " Major-General Halleck, " General-in- Cliief.'" On the morning of the 30th heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court House, which I reported to the general-in- chief. At 11 A. M. the following telegram was sent : — " Camp near Alexandria, " August 30, 1862—11 a. m. " Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one bri- gade in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest via Columbia Pike on Anandale and Fairfax Court House. "Is this the route you wish them to take? fTe and Franlclin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. " Shall Couch move out also when he arrives? "G. B. McCLELLAN, ' ' Major- General. " Major-General Halleck, Washington." On the same day I received the following : — Washington, August 30, 1862 — 1.45 p. m. " Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all possible despatch. " H. W. HALLECK, " General-in- Cliief, " General McClellan." To which this reply was made : — " Camp near Alexandria, " August 30, 1862—2.10 p. m. " I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's ar- tillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will have to sec that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexan- dria shall be loaded at once. " The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near (Jhain Bridge and Ten- allytown, should go from your headquarters to save time. I understand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train, as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron- of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the army of the Potomac within my reach. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Halleck." At 10.30 p. M. the following telegram was sent : — *' Camp near Alexandria, August 30, 1862—10.30 p. m. " I have sent to the front all my troops, with the exception of Couch's division, and have given the orders necessary to insure its being disposed of as you directed. I hourly expect the return of one of my aids, who will give authentic news from the fi(;ld of battle. " I cannot express to you the pain and morti- fication I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As , ■can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of tlie conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more ; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the com- mand even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. "Please reply to this to-night. " I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I can to make arrangements for the wounded. I have started out all the ambu- lances now landed. As I have sent my escort to the front, I would be glad to take some of Gregg's cavalry with me, if allowed to go. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General IF. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army, Wash- ington, D. C" To which, on the following day I received this answer : — Washington, August 31, 1862—9.18 a. m. "I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately. I cannot answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in com- mand, by his orders, of the department. " I think Couch's division should go forward as rapidly as possible and find the battle-field. "H. W. HALLECK. " General-in-Chief" " Major-General McClellan." 112 On the same day the following was re- ceived : — '• Washington, August 31, 1862 — 12.45 p. m. " Tile sul)sistence department are making Fairfax Station their principal depot. It should ])e well guarded. Tlie officer in cliarge sliould he directed to secure the depot by abatis against cavalry. As many as possihk> of the new regi- ments sliould i)e prepared to take the field. Per- ]ia])s some more sliould be sent to the vicinity of C'liain liridge. " H. VV. HALLECK, •' Ge?ieral-in- Chief. '* Major-General McClellan." At 2.30 P.M. tlie following despatch was tele- grapiied : — *' Camp near Alexandria, " August :n. 18G2— 2.30 p.m. " Major Haller is at Fairfax Station with my provost and lieadquarters guard and other troops. I have requested (4) four more companies to be sent at once, and the pn cautions you direct to be taken. " Under the War Department order of yester- day I have no control over anytliing except my staff, some one liundred men in my camp liere, and the few remaining near Fort Monroe. I liave no control over the new regiments — do not know where they are, or anything about ttieni, except those near here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are not under me. " Where I have seen evils existing under my eye I have corrected tliem. I think it is the bus- iness of General Casey to prepare the new regi- ments for tlie field, and a matter between him and General Barnard to order others to the vi- cinity of Chain Bridge. Neitlier of tliem is under luy conimaud, and t)y the War Department order I have no right to give them orders. " G. B. MeCLELLAN, " Major-General. " General Halleck, Washington.'" " To which tlie following is an answer : — " Washington, August 31, 1862 — 10.7 p.m. " Since receiving your despatch, relating to command, I have not been able to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the order as published, but will write to you in the morning. You will retain tlie command of ev- erything in tills vicinity not temporarily belong- ing to Pojie's army in the field. " I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out. H. W. HALLECK, '^ General-in-Chief. " General McClellan." The order referred to in the preceding de- spatch was as follows : — " War Department, August 30, 1862. " The following are the commanders of the armies operating in Virginia: — " General Uurnside commands his own corps, excoi)t those lliat have been temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope. " General McClellan commands that portion of the army of tlie Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command. " General Pope (;ommands tlie army of Vir- ginia and all the forces temporarily attaclied to it. All the forces a "e tinder tlie command of Major-General Halleck, general-in-chief. " E. D TOWNSEND, ^'■Assistant Adjutant- General." I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the above was published by order of the Secretary of War. At 11.30 P.M. I telegraphed the following: — " Camp near Alexandria. " August 31, 18G2— 11.30 p. m. " The squadron of 2d regular cavalry that I sent with General Sumner was captured to-day about 2 p. M. some three miles from Fairfax Court House, beyond it on the Little Kiver Pike, by Fitz Hugh Lee, with three tliousand cavalry and three liglit batteries. •• I have conversed with the 1st sergeant, who says that when he last saw them they were with- in a mile of J'airfax. Pope had no troops on that road ; this squadron getting tliere by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centre- ville but Sumner's corps. There was much ar- tillery firing during the day. A Rebel major told the sergeant that the Kebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming towards Al- exandria. " It is clear from the sergeant's account that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. " I recommend that no more of Couch's divis- ion be sent to the front, thatBurnsidebe brought here as soon as practicable, and tliat everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including tlie mass of the troops on the railroad. I apprehend tliat the enemy will, or have by this time occupied Fairfax Court House and cut off Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax Station. " I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made as I gather them. To speak frankly — and the oc- casion requires it — there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruc- tion of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you may have to send. The occasion is grave, and demands grave meas- ures. The question is, the salvation of the coun- try. I learn that our loss yesterday amounted to fifteen thousand. We cannot afford such losses without an object. " It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost. " I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. Please answer at once. I feel con- fident that you can rely upon the information I give you. " I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. "G. B. MeCLELLAN, ' ' Major- General. " General Halleck, Washington." 113 To which this reply was received : — mation before I can order a retreat, as the falling hack oil the line of works must necessarily be "Washington, September 1, 18G2— 1.30 a. m. directed in case of a serious disaster. Give me " Burnside was ordered up very early yester- all additional news that is reliable, day morning. Retain remainder of Couch's " I shall be up all night, and ready to actus forces, and make arrangements to stop all re- circumstances may require. I am fully aware treating troops in line of works, or where you of the gravity of the crisis, and have lieen for can best establish an entire line of defence. My weeks. H. W. HALLKCK, news from Pope was up to 4 p. m. ; he was then " Gtneral-in- Chief. all right. I must wait for more definite infor- " Major-General McClellan." 15 114 FOUETH PERIOD. On the 1st of September I -went into "Wash- ington, where I had an interview with the gen- eral-in-chief, wlio instrncted me, verbally, to take comniani! ot its defences, expresslj' limiting my jurisdiction to tlie works and their garrisons, and ])ri)hibiting me from exercising any control over tlu> troops actively engaged in front under Grneral i'oi)e. During tliis interview 1 suggest- ed to the general-in-cliief the necessity of his going in person, or sending one of his personal statf, to the army under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining tlie exact condition of afTairs ; he sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general. During the afternoon of the same day I re- ceived a message from the general-in-chief, to the efiect that he desired me to go at once to liis house to see tlie President. The President informed me tliat he had reason to believe that the army of the Potomac was not cheerfully cooperating with and supporting General Pope; that he had "always been a friend of mine ; " and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed ; that I was sure, whatever estimate the army of the Poto- mac might entertain of General Pope, that tliey woukl obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to " Fitz-John Porter, or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any feeling that might exist; adding, that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else could. I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General Porter, or do anything else in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety; upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in the matter, &c., and left. I tiien wrote the following telegram to Gen- eral Porter, which was sent to him by the general-in-chief : — Washington, September 1, 1862. "I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial cooperation to General Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful cooperation of all in the field. This week is the ci-isis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that tlie last request I have to make of them is, that, for their coimtry's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. " 1 am in charge of the defences of Washing- ton, and am doing all I can to render your re- treat safe, should that become necessary. "GEO. E. McCLELLAN. " Major-General Pohtku." To which he sent the following reply : — "Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m. " September 2, 1862. " You may rest assured that all your friends,' as well as every lover of his country, will even give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial coiiperation and constant sui)port in thei execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our de- voted duty. "F. J. PORTER. " General Geo. B. McClellan, ^'- Maj.-Gen. Commaiidinrj, Washington." Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor at any other time, did I think for one moment that General Porter had been, or v.'ould be, in any manner derelict in the i)orformance of liis duty to the nation and its cause. Such an im- pression never entered my mind. The despatch in question was written pi^rely at the request of I the President. On the morning of the 2d the President and General Halleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the fron'. ; that our allairs were in a bad condition ; that the army was in full re- treat upon the defences of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers ; to place the works in a proper state of defence, and to go out to meet and take com- mand of the army, when it approaclied the vi- cinity of the works, then to place the troops in the best position — committing everything to my hands. I immediately took steps to carry out these or- ders, and sent an aid to General Pope with the following letter : — " Headquarters, Washington, " September 2, 1862. " General : General Halleck instructed me to report to you the order he sent tliis morning to withdraw your army to Washington, without unnecessary dcla3^ He feared that his messen- ger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution. " In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, it would l)e best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Ilili, &c. ; McDowell's to Upton's Hill ; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same' vi- cinity ; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practiea- 115 ble, to the Chain Bridge ; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most con- venient. " In haste, General, very truly yours, "GEO. 13. McCLELLAN, " Maj.-Gcn. United States Army. "Major-General John Pope, " Commanding Army of Virginia." In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the advanee of McDowell's corps, and with it Gen- erals Pope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aids at my disposal to the left to give instruc- tions to the troops approaching in the direction of Alexandria; and hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably engaged, I went, with a single aid and three orderlies, by the shorteit line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as tar as Lcwinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sunmer's) would l)e able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent in- structions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington. Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, &c. I felt sure on this day that we could repui.se any attack made by the enemy on the south side of tiie Potomac. On the 3d tlie enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and tlie information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the upper Potomac into Mary- land. This materially changed the aspect of alfairs, and enlarged the spliere of operations ; for, in case of a crossing in force, an active cam- paign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. I therefore, on the third, ordered the 2d and 12th corps to Tenallytown, and the 9th corps to a point on the Seventh Street road near Wash- ington, and sent such cavahy as was available to the fords near Poolesville, to watch and impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. On September 5, the 2d and 12th corps were moved to Rockville, and Couch's division ( the only one of the 4th corps that had been brought from the Peninsula) to Offut's Cross-roads. On the Gth the 1st and !)th corps were ordered to Leesburg; the Gth corps, and Sykes's division of the 5th corps, to Tenallytown. On the 7th the Gth corps was advanced to Rockville, to which place my headquarters were moved on the same day. Al l the necessary arrangements for the de- fence of the city, under tlic new condition of things, had been made, and General Banks was left in cominand, having received his instruc- tions from me. It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be avoided in moving the army of the I'otomac from the Peninsula to llie support of the arniy of Virginia; tliai 1 spared no ehort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at Port Monroe, Newport News, and Vorklown, re- maining at Port Monroe myself until ihe mass of the army had sailed; and that, after my arrival at Alexandria, 1 lett nothing in my jiower undone to forward sui)plies and reinforcements to Gen- eral Pope, i sent, wiih the troops that moved, all the cavalry I could get hold of. Even my personal escort was sent out upon tlie line of the railway as a guard, with the provost and camp guards at heackiuarters, retaining less thin one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, &c. All the head- quarters teams that arrived were sent out with sui)|)lies and ammunition, none being retained even to move the headquarters camp. I'lic squad- ron that habitually served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as he was deficient in cavalry. I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that the mass of the Rebel army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed into Mary- land ; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn Wasiiington by a tiank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which, at that time we had no means of determining This uncertain- ty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to inarch cautiously and to advance the army in such order as con- tinually to keep Washington and IJaltiinoro covered, and at the same time to hold the troops v/ell in hand so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania; or to return to the defence of Washington, if. as was greatly ie.ired by the au- thorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the capital. In the mean time the process of reorganiza- tion, rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly i)rogrcss- ing, the troops were regaining confidence, and their former soldierly ap])earance and discijiline were fiist returning. My cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps were taken to learn the positions and movements of the enemy. The following table shows tlie movements of tlie army, from day to day, up to the 14th of September. 116 Movements of the Army. September 4. September 6. September 9. September 10. BlfKNSIDE. 0th corps, Ueno 1st corps, Hooker SUMNER. 12th corps, Williams.. 2d corps, Sumner FRANKLIN, 6th corps, Franklin., . . Seventh Street road. Upton's Hill Alex. Seminary OflTut's Cross Roads.. Mouth of Seneca September 11. September 12. September 13. Septemb'^r 14. BUnNSIDE. 9th corps, Reno , 1st corps, Hooker. . . . , SUMNEK. 12th corps, Williams., 2cl corps, Sumner..... FRAXKLIN. 6th corps, Franklin,.., Couch's division New Market. Frederick. Sykes's division , Damascus.., Clarksburg., Barasville .. Poolesville., lliddleburg , Ridgeville, New Mar- ket, camp on the Monocacy. Tjnmsville Cross Uo.ids. Urbana Liekenwell Cross Road. Barusviile. Urljana. Middleburg.. Frederick.... Frederick.... Frederick. . . . Buckeystown Sicksville .... Frederick.... South Mountain . South Mountain . South Mountain . South Mountain. Burkettsville.... Burkettsville Middletown The right wing, consisting of the 1st and 9th corps, under tlie command of Major-General Burnside. moved on P'rcderick ; the first corps via Broolvsville, Cooksville, and Ridgcville, and the 9th corps via Damascus and Newmarket. Tlie 2d and 12tli corps, forming the centre, under tlie command of General Sumner, moved on Frederielv, the former ria Chirlcsl)urg and Urbana, the 12tli corps on a Literal road between Urbana and New Market, tlms maintaining the communication witli the right wing, and cover- ing tlie direct road from Frederick to Wasliing- ton. Tlie Gth corps, under the command of General Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via Darnestown, Dawsonville, and Barnesville, cov- ering the road from tlie mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support tlie centre, should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division moved by the " river road," covering that ajiproach, watching the fords of the rotornac, and ultimately following and sup- porting (he (!th corps. The following extracts from telegrams, receiv- ed by me after my departure froni Washington, will show how little was known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital. On the 9th 'of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows : — " Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think we must be very cautious about strijiping, too much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then attempt to attack from the Vir- ginia side of the Potomac. Think of this." Again, on the 11th of September, General Ilalleck telegraphed me as follows : — " Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared fi"om here." This despatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the general-in-chief, reads as follows : — "Why not order forward Porter's corps or Sigel's? If the main force of the enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here." I remark that the original despatch, as re- ceived by me from the telegraph operator, is in the words quoted above, " / think the main force of the enemy," &c. In accordance with this suggestion I asked. 117 on the same day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to reinforce me, but none carae. On the 12th I received the following telegram from His Excellency the President : " Govern- or Curtm telagraplis me, ' I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and prol,;Jjly the whole Rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.' " The President adds : " lle- ceiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martins- burg to-day,and positive information from Wheel- ing that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get ot!' without behig hurt." On the loth General Halleck telegraphed as follows : '* Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. 1 am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small col- umn towards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Wash- ington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over." Again on the l-lth, General Halleck telegraphed me that "scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, 1 fear you are exposing your left and rear." Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the most positive evidence that Lee's entire army was in front of us, I received the following : — " War Departmeft, September 10, 18G2— 12.3 p.m. " Yours of 7 A. M. is this moment received. As you give me no information in regard to the position of your forces, except tliat at Sliarpsburg, of course I cannot advise. I think, however, you will lind that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river ; I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Har- per's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Wasliington. This has ap- peared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A heavy rain might prevent it. " H. W. HALLECK, " Ckneral-in Chief. " Major-General McClellan." The importance of moving with all due cau- tion, so as not to imcover the national capital until the enemy's position and plans were devel- oped, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio railroad to the Potomac, with the ex- treme left flank moving along that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard ail the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it ap- pears from the foregoing telegrams that the gener- al-in-chief was of a different opinion, and that my movements were, in his judgment, too precij^i- tate, not only for the safety of Washington, but also for the security of my left and rear. The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a precipitate advance may now be i)er- ceivcd. The general-in-chief, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says : "In respect to General McClellan going too last or too slow from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He had mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that ho was going too far, not from Washington, but from tliu Po- tomac, leaving Gem'ral l^ce the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get belwocn him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." As I can find no telegram from the general- in-cliief recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, 1 am compellvil to believe that when he gave this testimony he had forgot- ten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, and had also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the time, that my left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and my centre was continually in posi- tion to reinforce the left or right, as occasion miglit require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly than the other columns marched upon the roads to the right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed it. And if I had marcheil the entire army in one column along the bank of the river instead of upon Ave different parallel roads, the column, with its trains, would have extended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action. Moreover, such a movement would have uncovered the communications with Baltimore and Washington on our right, and ex- posed our right and rear. I presume it will be admitted by every military man that it was neces- sary to move the army in such order that it could at any time be concentrated for battle ; and I am of opinion that this object could not have been accomplished in any other way than the one employed. Any other disposition of our forces would have subjected them to defeat in detached fragments. On the 10th of September I received from my scouts information which rendered it quite proba- ble that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his intention was to move towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then known. On the 11th I ordered General Burnside to push a strong reconnoissance across the National Road and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, towards New Market, and if he learned that the enemy had moved towards Hagerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keeping Ids troops constantly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corresponding movement of all the troops in the centre and on the left was' ordere(f in the direction of Urbana and Poolesville. On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskii'ts of the city and in the streets. On the loth the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through Frederick. It was soon ascertained that tlie main body of the ene- my's forces had marched out of the city on the two previous days, taking the roads to Boons- boro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it necessary to force the passes through the Catoc- tin and South Mountain ridges, and gain posses- sion of Boonsl)oro' and Rolirersville before any relief could be extended to Colonel Miles at Har- per's Ferry. On the 13th an order fell into my hands, 118 issued by General Lee, wliich fully disclosed his plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigorous fi)r\vard movement. Tlie following is a copy of tlie order referred to:— " SPECIAL ORDERS No. 191." "Headquarteus Army of Northern Virginia, September 9, 18G2. " The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Ilager.stown road. GeneralJaekson's comm ml will form the advance, and, after pass- ing Mid iletown, with such portion as he may select, t ike the route towards Sharpsburg, cross the I'oLomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday njght, take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Feri-y. " General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro', where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the army. " General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. II. Anderson, will follow General Longstrcet; on reaching Middletown, he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Mary- land Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. "General Walker, with his division, after accomplisliing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning; Keys"s Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of t!ie enemy. " General I). II. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ord- nance and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill. "General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. "The t;ammands of Generals Jackson, Mc- Laws, and Walker, after accomplishing the ob- jects for wliich they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro' or Ilagerstown. " Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to pro- cure wood, &c. "By command of General R. E. Lee. "R. 11. CHILTON, " Assistant Ad juia at- General. "Major-General 1). II. Hill, " Cjmmanding Division." In the report of a military commission, of which Major-General D. Hunter was president, which convened at Wasliington for the purpose of investigating the conduct of certain officers in connection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, I find the following: — "The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old ofBcer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it can- not, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such censure deserved. " Tiie general-in-chief has testified that Gen- eral McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Mary- land, marched only six miles j>er day, on an average, when pursuing the invading army. " The general-in-chief also testifies that, in his opinion, he could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in tliis opin- ion tlie commission fully concur." I have been greatly surprised that this com- mission, in its investigations, never called upon me, nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so far as I know, upon any oflicer of the arnjy of the Potomac able to give an intelligent statement of the movements of that army. But another paragraph in the same report makes testimony from such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows : — " By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that, at the very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland Heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crainpton's Gap, within seven miles of his position." Tiie corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army wliicli I at tiiat time had the honor to command, and they were act- ing under my orders at Crampton's Gap and elsewhere ; and if, as the commission states, Colonel Ford's " little army was in reality re- lieved " by those officers, it was relieved by me. I had, on the morning of the lOLh, sent the following despatch in relation to the command at Harper's Ferry : — " Camp near Rockville, " September 10, 18G2— 9.4o a. m. " Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with nine thousand troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I Luiggest tiiat he be ordered to join me by the most prac- tical route. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major- General, " Major-Goneral IIallecic, ^ Wasliington, D. C." To this I received the following reply : — " There is no v/ay for Colonel Miles to join you at present ; his only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with liiiu. "H. W. HALLECK. " George B. McClellan, " Major-General. It seems necessary, for a distinct understand- ing of this matter, to state that I was directed on the 12th to assume command of the garrison of Harper's Ferry as soon as I should open com- 119 munications with that place, and that when I received tliis order all communication from the direction from which I was approaching was cut off. Up to that time, however. Colonel Miles could, in my opinion, have marched his com- mand into Pennsylvania, by crossing the Poto- mac at Williamsport or above ; and tliis opinion was confirmed by tiie fact that Colonel Davis marched the cavalry part of Col. Miles's com- mand from Harper's Perry on the 14th, taking the main road to ilagL^rstown, and he encounter- ed no enemy except a small picket near the mouth of the Antietam. Before I left Washington, and when there certainly could have been no enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Colonel Miles I recommended to the proper authorities that the garrison of Plarper's Ferry should be with- drawn via Ilagorrito'.y:!, to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley ; or that, taking up the pon- toon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should fill back to the Maryland Heights, and there hold oat to t:ic last. In this position it ought to have maintained itself for many days. It was not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter was left to my discretion it was too late for me to do anything but endeavor to relieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artillery to be fired by our advance at frequent intervals as a signal that relief v/as at hand. This was done, and, as I al'terwards learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel Miles would hold out until v/e had carried the moun- tain passes, and wore in condition to send a de- tachment to his relief. The left was therefore ordered to nuvc through Crampton's Pass in front of Biirkittsville, while the centre and right marclied upon Turner's Pass in front of Middlctown. It may bo asked by those who are not ac- quainted with I lie ti)pograpghy of the couniry in the vicinity ol Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, instead of iiiarcliingliis column over the circui- tous road ironi Jelfersoii vie Burkittsville and Brownsville, was not ordered to move along the direct turnpike to Iviioxville, and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It was for the reason that I had received in- formation that the enemy were anticipating our approach in tliat direction, and had established batteries on the south side of the Potomac which cominnndod all the approaches to Knox- ville; moreover the road from that point winds dire(;ily along t!ie river bank at the foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no op- portunity of forming in line of battle, and where the enemy could have placed batteries on both sides of the river, to enfilade our narrow ap- proaching columns. The approacii tiirough Crampton's Pass, which debouches into Pleasant Valley in the rear of Maryland Heights, was the only one which af- forded any reasonable prospect of carrying that formidable position ; at the same time, the troops upon that road were in better relation to the main body of our forces. On the morning of the 14th a verbal message reached me from Colonel Miles, which was the first authentic intelligence I had received as to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed me that on the j-.receding afternoon IMaryland Heiglits had been ahandonod by our troo[)s alter repelling an attack of iho llebels, and that Colonel Mdes"s eniire Ibrce was concentrated at Ilarper'.s Ferry, the Mary- land, Loudon, and Bolivar lleightr< having been abandoned Ijy him, and occu[)ieil by the enemy. The messenger also stated that there was no ap- parent reason for the abaiulonment of the Mary- land Heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed him to say that he could hold out with certainty two (lays longer. 1 directed him to make his way back, if possi- ble, with the information that I was approaching ra[)idiy, and felt confident that 1 cuuld relievo the place. On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Colonel Miles, and despatched three copies by three different couriers on different routes, I did not, however, learn that anyof thcso men succeeded in reaching Harper's Feiry : — Minm.ETOWx. September 14, 1802. " Colonel: The army is being rapidly con- centrated here. \Ve are now attacking the i)as3 on t!ie llagerstown road over the Blue llidgc. A column is about attacking the Burki.tsvilleand Boonsboro' Pass. You m;iy count on our m ik- ing every efibrt to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplishing that oliject. Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heiglits with your whole force, if you can do that, i will certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoetin valley is in our possession, you can safely cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on tills side of the river is concerned. Hold out to the last. " GEOHGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General Commanding. " Colonel D S. Miles." On the previous d;iy I had sent General Frankr lin the following instructions : — " IIeadqdauteus Army of the Potomac, " C.iMp n:-ir Freleric'c, Septemoer Id, 1662 — G.20 p. M. "General: I have now full information as to movements and intentions of the enemy. Jackson has crossed the upper Potomac to cap- ture the garrison at Martinsburg and cut off Miles's retreat towards the west. A division on the south side of the Potomac was to carry Lou- don Heights and cut off his retreat in that direc- tion. McLaws with his own convnand and the division of 11. H. Anderson was to move by Boonsboro' and Kohrersvillcto carry tiie Mary- 1 inl Heights. The signal officers inform me that lij is now in Pleasant Valley. The firing shows that Miles still holds out. Longstreet was to move to Boonsboro', and there halt with the reserve corps; D. H. Hill to form tlic rear guard; Stuart's cavalry to bring up stragglers, &c. We have cleared out all the cavalry this side of the mountains and north of us. The last I heard from PIcasanton he occupied Mid- dletown, after several sharp skirmisiies. A di- vision of Burnside's command started several hours ago to support him. The whole of Burn- 120 Blip's command, including Hooker's corps, march ttiis evening and early to-morrow morning, fol- lowed by the corps of Sumner and Banks, and Sykes's division, upon Boonshoro' to carry tliat position. (Joucli has been ordered to concen- trate his division and join you as rapidly as pos- sible. Without waiting for the whole of that division to join, you will move at daybreak in the morning by Jeti'erson and Ikirkittsville upon the road to liohrersville. I have reliable infor- mation that the mountain pass by this road is practicable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon liohrersville in order to cut oti'the retreat of or destroy McLaws's command. If you find this pass held by the enemy in large force, make all your dispo^itions for the attack and connnence it about half an hour alter you hear severe firing at the pass on the Ilagerstown Pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLaws's command and relieve Colonel Miles. If you effect this you will order him to join you at once with all his disposable troops, first destroying the bridges over the Potomac, if not already done, and, leaving a sufficient gar- rison to prevent the enemy from pas^ing the ford, you will then return by liohrersville on the direct road to Boonsboro', if the main column has not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road to Rohrersville, to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, in order either to cut off' the retreat of Hill and Longstreet towards the Po- tomac, or prevent the repassage of Jackson. My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. I believe I have sufficiently^ explained my intentions. I ask of you, at this im- portant moment, all your intellect and the ut- most activity that a general can exercise. " Gi OHGE B. McCLELLAN. " Major- General Coinmanding. "Major-General W. B. Fkanklin, '• Commanding 6th Corps." Again, on the 14th, I sent him the follow- ing:— " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Frederick, September H. 18U2 — 2 p. m. *' Your despatch of 12.30 just received. Send back to hurry up Couch. Mass your troops and carry Burkittsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposition at both passes. As fast as the troops come up 1 will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of the passes let me know at once, and amuse them as best you can go as to retain them there. In that event I will prolialjly throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here. If I carry that it will clear the way for you. and you must follow the enemy as rapidly as possible. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " Major-General Franklin." Gi neral Franklin pushed his corps rapidly forward towards Crampton's Pass, and at about 12 o'clock on the 14th, arrived at Burkittsville, immediately in rear of which he found the ene- my's infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, vrith artillery in strong positions to defend the approaches to the pass. Slocum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the gap. and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbeti's brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the enemy at a charge on the rigiit. The enemy were driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope un- til they reached the position of their Imttery on the road, well up the mounuiin. There they made a stand. They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in echelon until, after an action of three hours, the crest was gained, and tlie enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. On the left of the road, Brooks's and Irvin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the pro- tection of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- tain in the same steady manner, driving the ene- my before them until tlie crest was carried. Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different or- ganizations, seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three colors, were cap- tured by our troops in tliis brilliant action. It was conducted by General Franklin in all its details. These details are given in a report of General Franklin, herewith submitted, and due credit awarded to the gallant officers and men engaged. The loss in General Franklin's corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, fotir hundred and six- teen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's loss was about the same. The enemy's position was such that otir artillery could not be used with any effect. The close of thj action found General Franklin's advance in Pleasant Valley on the night of the 14th, within three and a half miles of the point on Maryland Heights where he might, on the same night, or on the morning of the 15th. have formed a junction with the garri- son of Harper's Ferry, had it not been previous- ly withdrawn from Maryland Heights, and within six miles of Harper's Ferry. On the night of the 14th the following despatch was sent to General Franklin : — Bolivar, September 15 — 1 a. m. "General: — ***** "The commanding general directs that you occupy, with your command, the road from Roh- rersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force at Rohrersville to hold that position in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boons- boro". Endeavor to open communication with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in Pleasant Valley. Should yoti succeed in opening communication with Colonel Miles, di- rect him to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public ])roperty that he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be spiked or destroyed; the rest of the public pjroperty will also be destroyed. You will then proceed to Boonsboro', which place the com- manding general intends to attack to-morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place ; should you find, however, that the enemy have retreated from Boonsboro" towards Sharpsburg, 121 ^u will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat. "By command of Maior-Geueral McClellan. "GEOIIGE D. KUGGLES, " Colonel and Aid-de-Camp. " General Franklin." On the 15th the following were received from General Franklin : — "At the foot of Mount Pleasant, " 111 Pleasant Valleij, three miles from Rohrers- ville, September 15 — 8.50 a. m. " General : My command .started at daylight this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up here. General Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last night. I have ordered one of his brigades and one battery to Rohrersville or to the strong- est point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about two miles to our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as I am sure that llolu'ersville is occupied I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen — and the cessation of tiring makes me fear that it has — it is my opinion that I should be strongly I'ein- forci'd. If******* "W. B. FRANIvLIN, " Majo7-- General Commanditig Corps. " General G. B. McClellan." " September 15 — 11 a. m. " General : I have received your despatch by Captain O'Heefe. The enemy is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across tlie valley, and a large column of artillei-y and infantry on the right of the valley looking towards Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It will of course not answer to pur- sue tlie enemy under these circumstances. I shall communicate with Burnside as soon as pos- sijik^. 1 1 the mean time I shall wait here \mtil I learn what is V-f prospect of reinforcement. I have not the force to .i'.i--tify an attack on the force I see in front. 1 have had a very close view of it, and its position is very strong. " Respectfully, "W. B. FRANKLIN, " Major- General. " General G. B. McClellan, Commanding. Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a. m. on the 15th, as the cessation of the firing indicated, and General Franklin was ordered to remain where he was to watch the large force in front of him, and protect our left and rear until the night of the 16th, when he was ordered to join the main body of the army at Keedys- ville, after sending Couch's division to Maryland Heights. While the events which have just been described were taking place at Crampton's Gap, the troops of the centre and right wing, wlucli had united at Frederick on the 13th, were en- gaged in the contest for the possession of Tur- ner's Gap. On the morning of the 13th General Pleasan- ton was ordered to send McRcynolds's brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Get- tysburg, and Rush's regiment towards Jefferson to communicate with Franklin, to whom the Cth United Stsies cavalry and a section of artillery had previously been sent, and to proceed with the remainder of his force in the direction of Middletown in pursuit of the enemy. After skirmishhig with ilie eni,:niy all the morning, and driving them from several strong positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South Mountain in the afternoon, and iuund tlir i-iieiny in force and apparently detenniiu'il to defend the pass. lie sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to .support him, and proceeded to make a recennoissauce of the position. The South Mountain is at this point about one thousand feet in height, and its general direetioL. is from northeast to southwest. The national road from Frederick to llagerslown crosses it nearly at right angles through Turner's Gap, a depression wliich is some four hundred feet in depth. The mountain on the north side of the turn- pike is divided into two crests, or ridges, by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two counwy roads, one to the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called the " Old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The other road, called the " Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mtmntains about a mile from the turnpike, and bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass. On the night of the 13th the positions of the different corps were as follows : — Reno's corps at Middletown, except Redman's division at Frederick. Hooker's corps on the Monocacy, two miles from Frederick. Sumner's corps near Frederick. Banks's corps near Frederick. Sykes's division near Frederick. Franklin's corps at Buckeystown. Couch's division at Licksville. The orders from headquarters for the march on the 14th were as follows : — 13th, 11.30, p. M.— Hooker to march at day- light to Middletown. 13th, 11.30 F. M. — Sykes to move at 6 a. m., after Hooker on the Middletown and Hagers- town road. 14th, 1 A. M. — Artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely. 13th, 8.45 p. M.— Turner to move at 7 a. m. 14th, 9 a. m.— Sumner ordered to take the Shookstown road to Middletown. 13th, 6.45 p. M.— Couch ordered to move to Jefferson with his whole division. On the 14th General Pleasanton continued his reconnoissance. Gibson's battery and afterwards Benjamin's battery (of Reno's corps) were placed on high ground to the left of the turnpike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's posi- tion in the gap. General Cox's division, wliich had been ordered up to support General Pleasanton, lett its bivouac, near Middletown, at 6 A. m. The 122 1st bric^ade rcacliod the scene of action abont 9 A. M.. and was sent up the ohl Sh;irpshurg roail by General I'leasantou to feel the enemy and ascertain if he licld the crest on that side in strons^ force. This was soon found to be the case; and (loneral Cox having arrived with tlic other brigade, ard information iiaving been re- ceived from General lleno that the colinnn wouhl lie supp!)rted by the wliole corps, tlie di- vision was ordered to assaidt the position. Two 20-pounder Parrotts of Siannons's battery and two seclion-; of MeMuUan's battery were left in tlie rv.xv ill position near the turnpike, wliere they did good service during tlie day ag.anst the enemy's l).ilteries in the gap. Colonel Seam- mon's hrigide was deployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up tlie slope to the left of the roail with tlie ol)jeet of turning the enemv's right, if possible. It succeeded in gaining tlie crest and establishing itself there, in spite of tlie vigorous efforts of tlie enemy, who was posted behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the lire of a battery which poured in canis- ter and case shot on the regiment on the right of the iirig.ide. Colonel Cruoke's brigade marched in columns at supporting distance. A section of iMe.MuUan's battery, under l>ieu- tenant (Broome, (killed while serving one of his guns.) was moved up with great difficulty, and opened with cani--ter at vary sliort range on the enemy's infantry, by whom (after having done considerable execution) it was soon silenced and forced to withdraw. One regiment of Crook's brigade was now de- ployed on Seamnion's left, and the other two in liis rear, and they several times entered the first line and relieved the regiments in front of them when hard pressed. A section of Sumner's battery was brought up and placed in the open space in the woods, where it did good service during the rest of the day. Tlie enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a ]ioint more to the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. It was now about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which the rest of the cor[)s was coining up. General Wilcox's division was the first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain. General Cox advised him to consult General rieasant(m as to a posi- tion. The latter indicated that on the right, afterwards taken by General Hooker. General Wilcox was in the act of moving to occuiiy this ground, wlienhe received an order from General Keno to move up the old Sharps burg road and take a po-ition to its right, overlooking the turn- pike. Two regiments were detached to siqiport General Cox, at iiis request. One section of Cooke's bittery was placed in position near the turn of the roid, (on the crest,) and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the g;ip. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right of the road, when the enemy suddenly opened (at one hundred and fifty yards) with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused a tempiir irv panic in which the guns were nearly lost. But the 79th New York and 17th Michi- gnn promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, ■ind moved out to protect the guns with which Captain Cook had remained. Order was soon restored, and the division formed in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as mucli as possible under the hillside until the whole line advanced. It was exposeil not only to the fire of the battery in front, liut also to that of the liatteries on the other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily. Sliortly before this time Generals Burnside and Keno arrived at tlie base of the mountain ; and the former directed the latter to move up the divisions of General Sturgis and Kodnian to the crest held by Cox and \Vilcox, and to move upon the enemy's jiosition with his whole force as soon as lie was informed that General Hooker (who had just been directed to attack on the riglit) was well advanced up the mountain. General Reno then went to the front and as- sumed the direction of afliiirs, the positions hav- ing been explained to him by General Pleasan- ton. Shortly before this time I arrived at the ])oint occupied by General Burnside, and my lieadquarters were located there until the con- clusion of the action. General Sturgis had left his camp at 1 p. m. and reached the scene of ac- tion about S'i r. m. Clark's liattery, of his divis- ion, was sent to assist Cox's left. Ity order of General Reno, and two regiments (2d Maryland and Gth New Hampshire) were detached by Gen- eral Reno and sent forward a short distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was form- ed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rodman's division was divided ; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and Colonel Har- land's, under General Rodman's personal super- vision, on the right. My order to move the whole line forward and take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was executed with enthusiasm. Tlie enemy made a desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines witli fierceness, but they were everywhere routed and fled. Our chief loss was in Wilcox's division. The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of our infantry; but its position was made untenaVile, and it was hastily removed and not again put in positicn near us. But the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of shot and shell. General Wilcox praises very higlily the con- duct of the 17th Michigan in this i'.dvance — a regiment which had been organized scarcely a month, but which charged the advancing enemy in Hank in a manner worthy of veteran troops ; and also that of the 45th Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front. Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis's division was moved to the front of Wilcox's, occupying the new groniid gained on the further side of the slope, and bis artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. 'J'he enemy made ail effort to turn our left about dark, but were re- pulsed by Fairchilds's brigade and Clark's bat- tery. At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another eflfbrt to regain the lost ground, attacking along Sturgis's front and part of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until nearly 9 o'clock, several 123 charges being made by the enemy nnd repulsed with shiugliter, nnd we finally occupied the high- est part s's brigade gallantly advanced, under a hot fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fif- teen minutes of heavy firing on both sides, (in which General Hatch was wounded while urging 124 on his men.) the fence was carried by a charge, and our line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doubled.iy's brigade, now under tlie command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hoflman, (Colonel Wain- wright having been wounded,) relieved Phelps, and continued firing for an hour and a half; the enemy behind ledges of rocks, some thirty or forty paces in our front, making a stubborn re- sistance, and attempting to charge on the least cessation of our lire. About dusk Colonel Christian's brigade of Riclietts's division came up and relieveii Doul>leday's brigade, which fell back into line l)eliind Phelps's. Christian's bri- gade continued tiie action for thirty or forty minutes, when the enemy retired, after having made an attempt to flank us on the left, which was repulsed by the 75th New York and 7th Indiana. Tlie remaining brigade of Tlicketts's division (General Hartsuff 's) was moved up in the centre, and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's right. We now had possession of the summit of the first ridge which commanded the turnpike on both sides of the mountain, and the troops were ordered to hold their positions until further orders, and slept on their arms. Late in tlie afternoon. General Gibbon, with his brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th artillery,) was ordered to move up the main road on the enemy's centre. lie advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers, and followed by the other two regiments in double colunm; the artillery moving on the road until within range of the enemy's guns, which were firing on the column from the gorge. The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy from his positions in the woods and be- hind stone walls, imtil they reached a point well up towards the top of the pass, when the enemy, having been reinforced by three regiments, opened a heavy fire on the front and on both flanks. The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy being entirclj' repulsed ; and the brigade, after having sufl'ered severely, and having ex- pended all its ammunition, including even the cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'clock, when it was relieved by General Gorm.an's brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sum- ner's corps, (except the Gtli Wisconsin, wliich remained on the field all night.) General Gil)bon, in this delicate movement, handled his brigade with as much precision and coolness as if upon parade, and the bravery of lus troops could not be excelled. The 2d corps (Sumner's) and the 12th corps (Williams's) reached their final positions shortly after dark. General lUchardson's division was placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a position to support our right, if necessary ; the 12th corps and Sedgwick's division bivouacked around Bolivar, in a position to support our centre and left. General Sykes's division of regulars and the artillery reserve halted for the night at Middle- town. Thus, on the night of the Ltth the wliole army was massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, in readiness to renew the action the next day, or to move in pursuit of the enemy. At daylight our skirmishers were advanced, and it was found that he liad retreated during the night, leaving his dead on the field, and his wounded uncared for. About fifteen liundred prisoners were taken by us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy in killed was much greater than our own, and, probably, also in wounded. It is believed that the force opposed to us at Turner's Gap con- sisted of D. H. Hill's corps, (15,000,) and a part, if not the whole, of Longstreet's, and perhaps a jjortion of Jackson's, probably some 30,oDO in all. We went into action with about 30,000 men, and our losses amounted to 1,568 aggregate (312 killed, 1,23-i wounded, and 22 missing). On the next day I had the honor to receive the following very kind despatch from His Excellency the President : — "War Department, " WasMngfon, September 15, 18G2 — 2.45 p. m. "Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all with you; destroy the Rebel army if possible. "A. LINCOLN. "Major-General McClellan." " ANTIETAM." On tlie night of the battle of South Mountain, orders were given to the corps commanders to press forward the pickets at early dawn. This advance revealed the fact that the enemy had left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was ordered; the cavalry, under General Plcasanton, and the three corps under Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield, (the latter of whom had arrived that morning and assumed command of the 12tli, Williams's corps,) by the National turnpike and Boonsboro'; the corps of Generals Burnside and Porter (the latter command at that time consisting of but one weak division, Sykes's) by the old Sharpsburg road, and Gen- eral Franklin to move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a detachment, and en- deavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville to re- inforce Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. Franklin moved towards Brownsville and found there a force of the enemy, much superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong position to receive him. At this time the cessa- tion of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the surrender of that place. The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in Boonsboro', made a daring charge, killing and wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners and two guns. General Richardson's division of the 2d corps pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, passed Boonsboro' and Keedysville, and came upon the main body of the enemy, occupying in large force a strong position a few miles beyond the latter place. It had been hoped to engage the enemy during the loth. Accordingly, instructions were given that if the enemy were overtaken on the march they should be attacked at once ; if found in 125 heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be pUiced in position for attack, and await my arrival. On reaching the advanced position of our troops, I found but two divisions, Rich- ardson's and Sykes's, in position; the other troops were halted in the road; the head of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. The enemy occupied a strong position on the heights, on the west side of Antietam Creek, displaying a large force of infantry and cavalry, witii numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on our columns as they appeared in sight on the Keedysville road and Sharpsburg turn- pike, which fire was returned by Captain Tid- ball's liglit battery, 2d United States artillery, and Pettit's battery, 1st New York artillery. The division of General Richardson, follow- ing close on the heels of the retreating foe, halted and deployed near Antietam River, on the riglit of the Sharpsburg road. General Sykes, leading on the division of regulars on the old Sharpsburg road, came up and deployed to the left of General Richardson, on the left of the road. Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by four stone bridges — the upper one on the Kee- dysville and Wiiliamsport road; the second on the Kecdysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some two and a half miles below ; the tliird about a mile below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg road; and the fourth near the mouth of Antietam Creek, on the road leading from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles below the third. Tho stream is sluggish, with few and difficult fords. After a rapid examina- tion of the position, I found that it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed the placing of the batteries in position in the centre, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not all in their positions until the next morning after sunrise. On the morning of the 16th, it was discovered that the enemy had changed the position of his batteries. The masses of his troops, however, were still concealed behind the opposite heights. Their left and centre were upon and in front of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hid- den by weeds and irregularities of the ground ; their extreme left resting upon a wooded emi- nence near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm ; their left resting upon the Poto- mac. Their line extended south, the right rest- ing upon the hills to tlie south of Sharpsburg, near Shaveley's farm. The bridge over the Antietam, described as No. 3, near this point, was strongly covered by riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fences, &c., and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in front of this line consisted of undulating hills, their crests in turn commanded by others in their rear. On all favorable points the enemy's artil- lery v/as posted and their reserves hidden from view by the hills, on which their line of battle was formed, could manoeuvre unobserved by our army, and from the shortness of their line could rapidly reinforce any point threatened by our attack. Their position, stretching across the angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam, their flanks and rear protected by these streams, was one of the strongest to be found in this re- gion of country, which is well adapted to defen- sive warfare. On the right, near Keedysville, on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike, were Suumer's and Hooker's corps. In advance, on tiie right of the turnpike and near the Antietam River, General Uiciiardson's division of General Sumner's corps was posted. General Sykes's division of General Porter's corps was on tiie left of the turnpike and in line with General Richardson, protecting the bridge No. 2, over the Antietam. The left of the line, opposite to and some distance from bridge No. 3, was occu- jjied by General Purnside's corps. Before giving General Hooker his orders to make the movement which will presently bo described, I rode to the left of the line to satisfy myself that the troops were properly posted there to secure our left flank from any attack made along the lel\ bank of the Aniietain, as well as to enable us to carry bridge No. 3. I found it necessary to make considerable changes in the position of General Burnside's corps, and directed him to advance to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, and to reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge carefully. In front of General Sunmer's and Hooker's corps, near Keedysville, and on the ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and between the turnpilie and Fry's house on the right of the road, were placed Captain Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleizers and Lieutenant Weaver's batteries of twenty-pounder PaiTOtt guns. On the crest of the hill in the rear and right of bridge No. 3, Captain Weed's three-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's twenty- pounder batteries. General Franklin's corps and General Couch's division held a position in Pleasant Valley in front of Brownsville, with a strong force of tne enemy in their front. General Morell's division of Porter's corps was e>i route from Boonsboro', and General Humphrey's divis- ion of new ti'oops en route from Frederick, Maryland. About daylight on the IGth the ene- my opened a heavy fire of artillery on our guns in position, which was promptly returned ; their fire was silenced for the time, but was frequently renewed during the day. In the heavy fire of the morning. Major Arndt, commanding first battalion first New York artillery, was mor- tally wounded while directing tiie operations of his batteries. It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for attack, being com- pelled to spend the morning in reconnoitring the new position taken up by the enemy, examin- ing the ground, finding fords, clearing the ap- proaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, which had been delayed by the rapid march of the troops over the few practica- ble approaches from Frederick. These had been crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery pressing on ^vitli the hope of overtaking the enemy before he could form to resist an attack. Many of the trooijs were out of rations on the previous day, and a good deal of their ammunition had been expended in the severe action of the 14th. My plan for the impending general engage- ment was to attack the enemy's left with the 126 corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and if necessary by Franklin's ; and, as soon as matters looked fivorjlily there, to move the corps of Burnsidc against the enemy's extreme right, upon t'.ie ridge running to the south and rear of Sliarpsburg, and having car- ried tlieir position, to press along the crest to- wards our right; and whenever cither of these flank movements sliould be successful, to ad- vance our centre with all tlij forces then dis- posable. AI)out 2 p. M. General Hooker, with his corps, consisting of General Ilicketts's, Meade's and Uoubieday's divisions, was ordered to cross the Antietam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1, a short distance above, to attack, and, if possible, turn the enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered to cross tiie corps of General Mansfield (the 12th) during the night, and liuld ins own (^the 2d) corps ready to cross early the next morning. On reacliing tlie vicinity of the enemy's left a sharp contest commenced with the Pennsylvania re- serves, the advance of General Hooker's corps, near the house of D. Miller. The enemy were driven from the strip of woods where he was first met. The firing lasted until after dark, when General Hooker's corps rested on their arms on ground won from the enemy. During the night General Mansfield's corps, consisting of Generals Williams's and Green's divisions, crossed the Antietam at tlie same ford and bridge that General Hooker's troops had passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J.Fofl'en- bergor, about a mile in rear of General Hooker's position. At daylight on the 17th the action was commenced by the skirmishers of the Pennsyl- vania reserves. The whole of General Hooper's corps was soon engaged, and drove the enemy from the open field in front of the first line of woods into a second line of woods beyond, which runs to the eastward of and nearly paral- lel to the Sliarpsburg and Ilagerstown turnpike. This contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced tlie opposition became more deter- mined and the number of the enemy greater. General Hooker then ordered up the corps of General Mansfield, wliich moved promptly toward the scene of action. The first division. General Williams's, was deployed to the right on approaching the enemy ; General Crawford's brigade on the right, its right resting on the Hagerstown turnpike ; on his left General Gordon's brigade. The second divis- ion. General Green's, joining the left of Gor- don's, extended as far as the burnt buildings to t!ie north and east of the white church on the turnpike. During the deployment, that gallant veteran General Mansfield fell mortally wounded, while examining the ground in front of his troops. General Hartsuff, of Hooker's corps, was severely wounded, while bravely pressing forward his troops, and was taken from the field. The command of the twelfth corps fell upon General Williams. Five regiments of first divis- ion of this corps were new troops. One brigade of the second division was sent to support Gen- eral Doul)l('(lay. The one hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsyl- vania volunteers were pushed across the turnpike into t^e woods beyond J. Miller's house, with orders to hold the position as long as possible. The line of battle of this corps was formed, and it became engaged about seven a. m., the attack being opened by Knapp's (Pennsylvania), Cothran's (New York), and Hampden's (Pitts- burg) batteries. To meet this attack the enemy had pushed a strong column of troops into the op.'u fi^lJi in f-ont of the turnpike, while he occupied the woods on the west of the turnpike in strong force. The woods (as was found by subsequent observation) were traversed by out- cropping ledges of rock. Several hundred yards to the right and rear was a hill which commanded the debouche of the woods, and in the fields between was a long line of stone fences, con- tinued by breastworks of rails, which covered the enemy's infantry from our musketry. The same woods formed a screen behind which his movements were concealed, and his batteries ou the hill and the ril3e works covered from the fire of our artillery in front. For about two hours the battle raged with varied success, the enemy endi;avoring to drive our troops into the second line of wood, and ours in turn to get possession of the line in front. Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the enemy back into the woods near the turnpike, General Green with his two brigades crossing into the woods to the left of the Dunbar church. During this conflict General Crawford, com- manding first division after General Williams took command of the corps, was wounded and left the field. General Green being much exposed and ap- plying for reinforcements, the thirteenth New Jersey, twenty-seventh Indiana, and the third Maryland were sent to his support with a section of Knapp's battery. At about nine o'clock r. m. General Sedgwick's division of General Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing the ford previously mentioned, this di- vision marched in three columns to the support of the attack on the enemy's left. On ncaring the scene of action the columns were halted, faced to the front, and established by General Sumner in three parallel lines by brigade, facing towards the south and west; General Gorman's brigade in front, General Dana's second, and General Howard's third, with a distance between tlie lines of some seventy paces. The division was then put i:i motion and moved upon the field of battle, under fire from the enemy's concealed batteries on the hill beyond the roads. Passing diagonally to the front across the open space and to tiie front of the first division of General Wil- liams's corps, this latter division withdrew. Entering the woods on the west of the turn- pike, and driving the enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill commanding the exit from the woods; meantime a heavy column of the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of General Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. By command of General Sumner, General Howard faced the third line to the rear preparatory to a change of front to meet the column advancing 127 on tho left; hut this lino now snfTpring from a destructive fire both in front and on its left, wliicli it was unable to return, ojave way towarrls the riccht and rear in considerable confusion, and was soon followed liy the first and second lines. General Gorman's brigade, and one regiment of General Dana's, soon rallied and checked the advance of the snemy on the right. The second and third lines now formed on tho left of Gener- al Gorman's brigade, and poured a destructive fire upon the eneuiv. ■ During General Sumner's attack, he ordered General Williams to support him. Brigadier- General Gordon, with a portion of his brigade, moved forward, but when he reached the woods tho left of General Sedgwick's division had given way; and finding himself, as the smoke cleared up, oppo'^ed to the enemy in force with his small conim lud, he withdrew to the rear of the batt(!- rios at the second line of woods. As General Gordon's troops unmasked our batteries on the left, they opened with canister; the batteries of Capt. Cothran, 1st New York, and I, 1st artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff", doing good service. Unal)le to withstand this deadly fire in front and the musketry fire from the right, the enemy again sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond the turnpike. During this assault Generals Sedgwick and Dana were seriously wounded and taken from the field. General 8edgwick, though twice wounded, and faint from loss of blood, retained command of his division for more than an hour after his first wound, animating his command by his presence. About the time of General Sedgwick's ad- vance. General Hooker, while urging on his command, was severely wounded in the foot and taken from the field, and General Meade was placed in command of bis corps. General How- ard assumed command after General Sedgwick retired. The repulse of the enemy offered opportunity to rearrange the lines and reorganize the com- mands on the right, now more or less in confu- sion. The batteries of the Pennsylvania reserve, on higli ground, near I. Potf'enl)urger's liouse, opened fire, and checked several attempts of tho enemy to establish batteries in front of our right, to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. While the conflict was so obstinately raging on the riglit. General French was pushing his division against the enemy still further to tlie U'ft. This division crossed the Antietani at the same ford as General Sedgwick, and immedi- ately in his rear. Passing over the stream in three columns, the division marched about a mile from the ford, then facing to the left, moved in three lines towards the enemy ; General Max Weber's brigade in front; Colonel Dwight Mor- ris's brigade of raw troops, unurilled, and moving for the first time under fire, in the .second, and General Kimball's brigade in the third. The di- vision was first assailed by a fire of artillery, but steadily advanced, driving in the enemy's skir- mishers, and encountered the infantry in some for(;e at the group of houses on Houlette's farm. General Weber's brigade gallantly advanced with an unwavering front, and drove the enemy from their position about tho houses. While General Weber was hotly engaged with the first lino of the enemy. General French re- ceived orders from General Sunnu'r. bis corps commander, to push on with renewed vigor to mtike a diversion in favor of the attack on tho right. lAviving the new troops, who had been thrown into some confusion from their march through cornfields, over fences, &c , to f)rm as a reserve, he ordered the i)rigade of General Kimball to the front, passing to the left of Gen- eral Weber. The enemy was pressed back to near the crest of the hill, where he was encoun- tered in greater strength posted in a sunken road forming a natural rifle-pit running in a north- westerly direction. In a cornfield in rear of this road were also strong bodies of the enemy. As the line reached the crest of the hill a grilling firo was opened on it from tin; sunken road and corn- field. Here a terrific fire of musketry burst from both lines, ami the battle raged along the whole lino with great slaughter. The enemy attempted to turn tho left of the line, but were met by the 7th Virginia and 132d Pennsylvania volunteers and repulsed. Foiled in this, the enemy made a dcternKued assault on the front, but were met by a charge from our lines, whici) drove them back with severe loss, leaving in our hands some three hundred prison- ers, and several stand of colors, 'i'lie eneoiy having been repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries and tho musketry fire on the extreme right, now attempted to assist tho attack on Gen- eral French's division, by assailing him on his right, and endeavoring to turn this llink, bu» this attack was met and checked by tlie 14th In- diana and 8th Ohio volunteers, and by canister from Capt. Tompkins's battery, 1st Uhode Island artillery. Having been under an almost contin- uous fire for nearly four hours, and tlie ammu- nition nearly expended, this division now took po-iition immediately below the crest of the heights on which they had so gallantly fought, the enemy making no attempt to regain theii* lost ground. On the left of General French, General Rich- ardson's division was hotly engaged. Having crossed the Antiotam about 9.o0 a. nr. at the ford crossed by the other divisions of Sumner's corps, it moved on a line nearly parallel to the Antietam, and formed in a ravine behind the liigh grounds overlooking Roulette's house; the 2d (Irish) brigade, commanded by General Meagher, on the right; the 3d brigade, com- manded by General Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade commanded by Colonel Brooks, 53d Pennsylvania volunteers, in support. As the division moved forward to take its position on the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery against it, but owing to the irregularities of the ground did but little damage. Meagher's brigade advancing steadily soon became engaged with the enemy posted to the left and in front of Roulette's house. It contin- ued to advance, under a heavy fire, nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy being posted in a continuation of the sunken road and cornfield before referred to. Here the brave Irish brigade opened upon the enemy a terrific musketry fire. All of General Siimner's corps was now en- gaged; General Sedgwick on the riglit; General French in the centre, and General liichardson 128 on the left. The Irish brigade sustained its well- earned reputation. After suffering terribly in officers and men, and strewing the ground witli their enemies as they drove them baclc, their ammunition nearly expended, and their com- mander, General Meagher, disaliled l:)y the fall of liis horse shot under him, tliis brigade was ordered to give place to General Caldwell's bri- gade, whicli advanced to a short distance in its rear. The lines were passed by the Irish bri- gade breaking by company to the rear, and General Caldwell's by company to the front as steadily as on drill. Colonel Brooks's brigade now became the second line. The ground over which Generals Richardson's and French's divisions were fighting was very irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills covered with growing corn, enclosed by stone walls, behind wliich the enemy could advance unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempted to gain the right of Richardson's position in a cornfield near Roulette's house, where the divis- i >n had become separated from that of General French's. A change of front by the 52d New York and 2d Delaware volunteers, of Colonel Brooks's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the attack made by the 5od Pennsylvania volunteers, sent further to the right by Colonel Brooks to close this gap in the line, and the movement of the 132d Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia volun- teers of General Frenclvs division, before re- ferred to, drove the enemy from the cornfield and restored the line. The brigade of General Caldwell, with deter- mined gallantry, pushed the enemy back opposite the left and centre of this division, but sheltered in the sunken road, they still held our forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Colonel Barlow commanding tlie (51 st and fi4th New York regi- ments of Caldwell's brigade, seeing a fovorable opportunity, advanced the regiments on the left, taking tiie line in the sunken road in flauk, and compelled them to surrender, capturing over three hundred prisoners and three stands of colors. The whole of the brigade, with the 57th and 66th New York regiments of Colonel Brooks's brigade, who had moved these regiments into the first line, now advanced with galhmtry, driv- ing the enemy before them in confusion into the cornfield beyond the sunken road. The left of the division was now well advanced, when the enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, en- deavored to turn its left and rear. Colonel Cross, 5tli New Hampshire, by a change of front to the left and rear, brought his regiment fiacing the advancing line. Here a spirited con- test arose to gain a commanding height, the two opposing forces moving parallel to each other, giving and receiving fire. The 5th gaining the atlvantage, faced to the right and delivered its volley. The enemy staggered, but rallied and advanced desperately at a charge. Being rein- forced Ijy the 8 1st Pennsylvania, these regiments met the advance by a counter charge. The ene- my fled, leaving many killed, wounded, and pris- oners, and the colors of the 4th North Carolina, in our hands. Anotlu>r column of the enemy, advancing un- der shelter of a stone wall and cornfield, pressed down on the right of the division ; but Colonel Barlow again advanced the Gist and G4th New York against these troops, and with the attack of Kimball's brigade on the right, drove them from this position. Our troops on the left of this part of the line having driven the enemy far back, they, with reinforced numbers, made a determined attack directly in front. To meet this, Colonel Barlow brought his two regiments to their position in line, and drove the enemy througli the cornfield into the orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of musketry, and a fire of canister from two pieces of artillery in the orchard, and a battery further to the right, throwing shell and case shot. This advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the strong point contended for by the enemy at this part of the line, it being a defensible building several hundred yards in advance of the sunken road. The musketry fire at this point of the line now ceased. Holding Piper's house. General Richardson \\'ithdrew the line a little way to the crest of a hill, a more advantageous position. Up to this time the division was without artillery, and in the new position suffered severely from artillery fire which could not be replied to. A section of Robertson's horse battery, commanded by Lieutenant Vincent, 2d artillery, now arrived on the ground and did excellent service. Sub- sequently a battery of brass guns, commanded by Captain Graham, 1st artillery, arrived, and was posted on the crest of the hill, and soon silenced the two guns in the orcliard. A heavy fire soon ensued between the battery further to the right and our own. Captain Graham's bat- tery was bravely and skilfully served, but unable to reach the enemy, who had rifled guns of great- er range than our smooth-bores, retired by order of General Ricliardson, to save it from useless sacrifice of men and horses. The brave genera^', was liiraself mortally wounded wlule personally directing its fire. General Hancock was placed in command of the division after the fall of General Ivichardson. General Meagher's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Burke, of the G3d New York, having filled their cartridge-l>oxes, was again ordered forward, and took position in the centre of the line. The division now occupied one line in close proximity to the enemy, who had taken up a position in the rear of Piper's house. Colonel Dwight Morris, with the 14:tli Connecticut and a detachment of the 108th New York, of General French's division, was sent by General French to the support of General Richardson's division. This command was now placed in an interval in the line between General Caldwell's and the Irish bi'igades. The requirements of the extended line of battle had so engaged the artillery that the application of General Hancock for artillery for the division could not be comjjlied with immediately by the chief of artillery or the corps commanders in his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the troops. General Hancock felt confident tliat he could hold his position, although sufl'ering from the enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, as the great length of the line he was obliged to hold prevented him from forming more than one line of battle, and, from his advanced position, this line was already partly enfiladed by the bat- 129 teriL'S of the enemy on the riglit, which were protected from our batteries opposite them by the woods at the Danker church. Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some of our troops to the left vf his position, General Hanc ick obtained Hcxamer's battery from Gen- eral Franklin's corps, which assisted materially in frustrating this attack. 1 rlso assisted the at- tack of the 7th Maine, of Franklin's corps, which, without other aid, made an attack against the ene- my's line, and drove in skirmishers v/ho were an- noying our artillery and troops on the riglit. Lieu- tenant Woodruff, with battery I, 2d artillery, relieved Captain Hexainer, whose ammunition was expended. The enemy at one time seemed to be aoout making an attack in force upon this part of the line, and advanced a long column of infantry towards this division; but on nearing the position. General Pleasanton opening on them with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire and retreated, closing the operations on this portion of the field. I return to the incidents occurring still further to the right. Between 12 and 1 p. m. General Franklin's corps arrived on the field of battle, having left tiieir camp near Cranipton's Pass at V> a. m. leav- ing General Couch with orders to move with his division to occupy Maryland Heights. General Smith's division led the column, followed by General Slocum's. It was first intended to keep this corps in re- serve on tlie east side of the Antietam, to operate on either tiank or on the centre, as circumstan- ces might require ; but on nearing Keedysville, the strong opposition on the right, developed by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessary at once to send this corps to the as- sistance of the right wing. On nearing the field, hearing that one of our batteries, (.A.,) -tth United States Artillery, com- manded by Lieutenant Thomas, who occupied tlie same position as Lieutenant Woodruff's bat- tciy in the morning, was hotly engnged without supports. General Smith sent two regiments to its ridief from General Iluicock's brigade. On inspecting the ground. General Smith ordered the other regiments of Hancock's brigade, wrth Frank's and Cowen's batteries, 1st New York artillery, to the threatened position. Lieuten- ant Thomas and Captain Cothran, commanding batteries, bravely held tlieir positions against the advancing enemy, handling their batteries with skill. Finding the enemy still advancing, the 3d brigade, of Smith's division, commanded by Col- onel Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania volunteers, was ordered up, and passed through Lieutenant Thomas's battery, charged upon tlie enemy, and drove back the advance until abreast of the Dun- ker church. As the right of the brigade came opposite the woods it received a destructive fire, which checked the advance and threw the bri- gade somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind a rise of ground in the open space in advance of the batteries. Gener.al French having reported to General Franklin that his ammunition was nearly ex- pended, that officer ordered General Brooks, with his brigade, to reinforce him. General Brooks formed his brigade on the right of Gen- eral French, where they remained during the 17 remainder of the day and night, frequently under the fire of the enemy's artillery. It wa.- soon after the brigade of Colonel Irwin had fallen back behind the ri.-.e of groun.l that the Tth Maine, by order of Colonel Irwin, niado the gallant attack already referred to. The advance of General Franklin's corps was opjtortune. The attack of tlie enemy on this po- sition, but for the tinu-ly arrival of his corps, must have been disastrous, had it succeeded in piercing the line between Generals Sedgwick's and French's divisions. General Franklin ordered two brigad(>s of Gen- eral Slocum's division, General ^awKju's and Colonel Torbert's, to form in colunm to assault the woods that had been so hotly contested be- fore by Generals Sumner and Hooker. General Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form as a re- serve. At this time General Sumner, having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for at- tack, would peril the safety of the whole army. General Porter's corps, consisting of General Sykcs's divifion of regulars and volunteers, and General Morell's division of volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, upon the mam turnpike leading to Siiarpsburg, and directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. This corps filled the interval between the right wing and General Burnside's command, and guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. It was neces- sary to watch this part of our line with the ut- most vigilance, lest the enemy should take ad- vantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to push upon us a vigorous assault, for the pur- pose of piercing our centre and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met with but fee- ble resistance, as there were no reserves to rein- force or close up the gap. Towards the middle of the afternoon, proceed- ing to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of aftairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to reinforce the right. Six battalions of Sykes's regulars had been thrown forward across the Antietam bridge on the main road to att^ick and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasanton's horse batteries in advance of the bridge; Warren's brigade of Por- ter's corps, was detached to hold a position on Burnside's right and rear; so that Porter was left at one time with only a portion of Sykes's division and one small brigade of Morell's divis- ion (but little over three thousand men) to hold his important position. General Sumner expressed the most decided opinion again-t another attempt during that day to assault the enemy's position in front, as por- tions of our troops were so much scattered and demoralized. In view of tliese circumstances, after making changes in the position of some of the troops, I directed the different commanders to hold their positions, and being satisfied that 130 this could be done without the assistance of the two brigades from the centre, I countermanded the order, wliicli was in course of execution. General Slocain's division rephiced a portion of General Surnnei-'s troops, and positions were selected for batteries in front of the woods. Tlie enemy opened several heavy tires of artillery on the position of our troops after this, but our bat- teries soon silenced them. On the morning of the 17th General Pleasan- ton, with his cavalry division and the horse bat- teries, under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and Lieutenant Haines, of the 2d ai-tillery, and Cap- tain Gibson, 3d artillery, was ordered to advance on the turnpike towards Sharpsburg, across bridge No. 2, and support the left oi General Sumnei-'s line. The bridge being covered by a fire of artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skir- mishers were thrown out, and Captain Tidball's batter}' advanced by piece and drove off the sharpshooters with canister sufficiently to estab- lish the batteries above mentioned, whicli opened on the enemy with etFect. The firing was kept up for about two hours, when, the enemy's fire slackening, the batteries were relieved by Ran- dall's and Van Reed's batteries, United States artillery. About 'd o'clock Tidball, Robertson, and Haines returned to their positions on the west of Antietam, Captain Gibson having been placed in position on the east side to guard the approaches to the bridge. These batteries did good service, concentrating their fire on the col- umn of the enemy about to attack General Han- cock's position, and compelling it to find shelter behind the hills in rear. General Sykes's division had been in position since the 15th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and sharpshooters. General Morell had come up on the IGtli, and relieved General Richardson on the right of General Sykes. Continually, under the vigilant watch of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point. The position of the batteries under General Pleasanton being one of great exposure, the bat- talion of the 2d and 10th United States Infantry, under Captain Pollard, 2d infantry, was sent to his support. Subsequently four battalions of regular infantry, under Captain Dryer, 4th in- fantry, wore sent across to assist in driving off the sharpshooters of the enemy. The battalion of the 2d and 10th infantry, ad- vancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon their guns. Few in numbers, and unsupported, they were unable to bring them off. The heavy loss of this small bodyof men attest their gallantry. The troops of General Burnside held the left of the line opposite bridge No. 3. The attack on the right was to have been supported by an at- tack on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on the evening of the IGth, General Burnside's corps was moved forward and to the left, and took up a position nearer the bridge. I visited General Burnside's position on the 16'Ji, and after pointing out to him the proper dispositions to be made of his troops during tlie day and night, informed him that he would prob- ably be required to attack the enemy's right on the follov/ing morning, and directed hun to make careful reconmussances. General Burnside's corps, consisting of the divisions of Generals Cox, Wilcox, RodcnaTi, and Sturgis, was posted as follows : Colonel Brooks's brigade. Cox's division, on the right, General Sturgis's division immediately in rear. On the left was General Rodman's division, with General Scammon's brigade, Cox's division, in support. General Wilcox's division was held in reserve. The corps bivouacked in position on the night of the IGth. Early on the morning of the 10th I ordered General Burnside to form his troops, and hold tliem in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to await further orders. At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieu- tenant V/ilson, topographical engineer, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. After some time had clasped, not hearing from him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with the infor- mation that but little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. The aid returned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in the possession of the enemy. Where- upon I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector gen- eral, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops without a mo- ment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet; and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside and see that the order was executed promptly. After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at one o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania volunteers. Other troops were then thrown over, and the opposite banK occupied, the enemy retreating to the heights beyond. A halt was then made by General Burnside's advance until 3 p. m., upon hearing which, I directed one of my aids. Colonel Key, to inform General Burnside that I desired him to push for- ward his troops with the utmost vigor, and carry the enemy's position on the heights ; that the movement was vital to our success ; that this was a time when we must not stop for loss of life, if a great object could thereby be accomplished. That if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, to inform me so at once, that his troops might be withdrawn and used elsewhere on ihe field. He replied that he would soon advance, and would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the left would permit. Upon this re- port, I again immediately sent Colonel Key to General Burnside with orders to advance at once, if possible to flank the battery, or storm it and carry the heights ; repeatiiig that 'i£ he considered the movement impracticable, to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the out- skirts of Sliarpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforcen>ents just then reach- ing the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked General Burnside's troops on their left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge. 131 If this important movement had been consum- mated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon tlie heights, from wliich our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear, our victory might thus have been much more decisive. The following is the substance of General Burnside's operations as given in his report : — Colonel Crook's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. This bridge, No. 3, is a stone struc- ture of three arches with stone parapets. The banks of the stream on the opposite side are precipitous, and command the eastern approaches to the bridge. On the hill side, immediately by the bridge, was a stone fence running parallel to the stream ; the turns of the roadway, as it wound up the hill, were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks of rails, &c. These works, and the woods that covered the slopes, were filled with the enemy's riflemen, and batteries were in posi- tion to enfilade the bridge and its approaches. General Rodman was ordered to cross the ford below the bridge. From Colonel Crook's position it was found impossible to carry the bridge. General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that purpose. He sent forward the 2d Maryland and the 6th New Hampshire. These regiments made several suc- cessive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back. The artillery on the left were ordered to con- centrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. Colonel Crook brought a section of Captain Simmons's battery to a position to command the bridge. The 51st New York and 51st Penn- sylvania were then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking advantage of a small spur of the hill which ran parallel to the river, they moved to- wards the bridge. From the crest of this spur they rushed with bayonets fixed and cleared the bridge. The division followed the storming party, also the brigade of Colonel Crook's as a support. The enemy withdrew to still higher ground, some five or six hundred yards beyond, and opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new positiron on the crest cf the hill above the bridge. General Rodman's division succeeded in cross- ing the ford after a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis, Scammon's brigade crossing as support. Gen- eral Wilcox's division was ordered to take posi- tion on General Sturgis's right. These dispositions being completed about 3 o'clock, the command nrwved forward, except Sturgis's division, left in reserve. Clark's and Durell's batteries accompanied Rodman's divis- ion; Cook's battery with Wilcox's division, and a section of Simmons's battery with Colonel Crook's brigade. A section cf Simmons's bat- tery and Mullenburgh's and McMullan's batteries were in position. The order for the advance was obeyed by the troops with alcarity. Gen- eral WLlcox's division, with Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the turnpike leading from the bridge to Sharpsburg, General Rod- man's division, supported by Scammon's brigade, on the left of General Wilcox. The enemy re- treated before the advance of the troops. The 9th New York, of General Rodman's division, captured one of the enemy's batteries and held It tor some time. As the command was driving the enemy to the main heigiits on tiie left of the town, the light division of General A. V Hill arrived upon the field of battle from Harper's Ferry, and with a heavy artillery fire made a strong attack on the extreme left. To meet this attack the left division diverged from tiie line of march intended, and opened a gap between it and the right. To fill up this it was necessary to order the troops frtwu the second line. During these movements General Rodman was mortally wounded. Colonel Harland's brigade, of General Rodman's division, was driven hack. Colonel Scammon's brigade, by a change of fr(jnt to rear on his right flank, saved the left from being driven completely in. The fresh troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumulation of artil- lery against this command, destroyed all hope of its being able to accomplish anything more. It was now nearly dark. General Sturgis was ordered forward to support tlie left. Notwith- standing the hard work in the early part of the day, his division moved forward with spirit. With its assistance the enemy were checked and held at bay. The command was ordered to fall back by General Cox, who commanded on the field the troops engaged in this affliir beyond the Antie- tam. The artillery had been well served duXng the day. Night closed the long and desperately contested battle of the 17th. Nearly two hun- dred thousand men and five hundred pieces of artillery were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer then in person directing their-operations We had driven them from their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. The army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent -success. Our soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy The night, however, brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th, or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question before me. After a night of anxious deliberation and a full and careful survey of the situation and con- dition of our army, the strength and position of the enemj', I concluded that the success of an attack on the I8th was not certain. I am aware of the fact that, under ordinary circumstances, a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success ; but at this criti- cal juncture I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country had I been willing to liazard another battle with less than an abso- lute assurance of success. At that moment — Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded — the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased on Washington, Bal- timore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and uude- 132 vastated country ; extorted tribute from wealthy and populous cities ; and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was tliere another organized force able to arrest its march. The following are among the considerations which led me to doubt the certainty of success in attacking before the 19th : — The troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long continued -and severely contested battle of the 17th, togetlu-r with the long day and night marches to which tliey had been subjected during the previous three days. The supply trains were in the rear, and many of the troops had suffered from hunger. They required rest and refreshment. One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and much scattered, so that they were for the time somewhat demoralized. In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by General Meade, commanding, there were but G.l'I'.) men present on the 18th; where- as, on the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 men present for duty in the same corps, showing that previous to and during the battle 6,364 men were separated from their command. General Meade, in an official communication upon this subject, dated September 18, 1862, says : — " I enclose a field return of the corps made this afternoon, which I desire you will lay before the Commanding General. 1 am satisfied the great reduction in the corps since the recent engagements is not due solely to the casualties of battle, and that a consideraltle number of men are still in the rear, some having dropped out on the march, and many dispersing and leaving yesterday during the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes, good. To resist an attack in our jjresent strong position, I think they may be depended on, and 1 hope tiiey will perform duty in case we malce an attack, though 1 do not think their morale is as good for an offensive as a defensive movement." One division of Sumner's corps had also been overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps commander in proper condition to attack the enemy vigorously the next day. Some of the new troops on the left, although many of them fought well during the battle, and are entitled to great credit, were, at the close of the action, driven back, and their morale impaired. On the morning of the 18th General Burnside requested me to send him another division to assist in holding his position on the other side of the Antietam, and to enable him to withdraw his corps if he should l)e attacked by a sujierior force. He gave me the impression that if he were attacked again that morning he would not be able to make a very vigorous resistance. I visited his position early, determined to send General Morell's division to his aid, and directed that it should be placed on this side of the Antie- tam, in order that it might cover the retreat of his own corps from the other side of the Antie- tam, should that become necessary, at the same time it was in position to reinforce our centre or right, if that were needed. Late in the afternoon I found that, although he had not been attacked. General Burnside had withdrawn his own corps to this side of the Antie- tam, and sent over Morell's division alone to hold the opposite side. A large number of our heaviest and most effi- cient batteries had consumed all their ammuni- tion on the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible to supply them until late on the following day. Supplies of provisions and forage had to be brought up and issued, and infantry ammunition distributed. Finally, reinforcements to the number of 14,000 men — to say nothing of troops expected from Pennsylvania — had not arrived, but were expected during the day. The 18th was, therefore, spent in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, remov- ing the wounded, burning the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the battle. Of the reinforcements, Couch's division, marching with commendable rapidity, came up into position at a late hour in the morning, Humphrey' s division of new troops, in their anxiety to participate in the battle which was raging, when they received the order to march from Frederick, at about half past three p. m., on the 17th, pressed forward during the entire night, and the mass of the division reached the army during the following morning. Having marched more than twenty-three miles after half past four o'clock on the preceding afternoon, they were, of course, greatly exhausted, and needed rest and refreshment. Large reinforcements ex- pected from Pennsylvania never arrived. During the 18th orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the lOtli. On the night of the 18th the enemy, after passing troops in the latter part of the day from thi> Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpslinrg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their position, and retreating across the river. As their line was but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty, and was effected before daylight. About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under the direction of Major Davis, assistant inspector general, counted and buried upon the battle-field of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy. This is con- clusive evidence that the enemy sustained much greater loss than we. Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies wdiich attest the success of our army in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antie- tam. Not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles. 133 Tabular Report of the Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Antietam on the IQth and 11 th of September, 18G2, Generjil officers. Other oflScers. Enlisted men. Aggregate. Corps and Divisions, 12 0) ■a a 3 O — j3 •a o ■c a a o •6 0) ■c B S o ti a 1 •6 5 •o it •o a a o ti) & to 3 •a i o FIRST CORPS. Major-Goner.'il Hooker, 98 157 97 669 89.S 449 95 137 23 802 1,188 569 Total 348 2,016 255 2,610 SKCOND CORPS. Major-General Sumner, 1 1 20 39 192 355 272 860 1,577 1,271 24 321 203 212 355 293 900 1,579 1,322 24 321 203 1,136 2, '^5 1,818 21 50 Total 4 41 89 819 3,708 548 860 3,!- 01 548 5,209 FIFTH CORPS. Major-General F. J. Porter, 2 13 7 92 13 1 1 13 8 94 13 1 1 108 1 1 22 Total 2 20 105 2 21 107 2 130 SIXTH CORPS. Major-General Franklin. 5 65 277 2 31 05 373 Total 70 335 33 438 NINTH CORPS. Major-ijJeneral Burnside, 2 7 8 5 20 29 40 7 44 121 212 33 2fi4 493 743 145 7 20 70 23 46 128 220 38 284 5J2 783 152 7 20 70 23 337 670 1,073 213 Total 22 90 410 1,045 120 432 1,741 120 2,293 TWELFTH CORPS. (Gen. Banks.) Brig.-Gen. Williams, commaud'g 9 6 35 20 151 107 1 827 481 15 54 30 1 160 113 1 862 507 15 54 30 1 1,076 650 17 Total 15 61 259 1,323 85 274 l,3,s4 85 1,743 1 8 9 23 9 Bri;,'-.-Gen. Ploasauton, cavalry 5 28 4 79 249 1,508 0,789 755 2,010 9,4! 6 1,013 12,469 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Camp near Sharpsburg, September 29, 1862. Official. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant- General. 134 An estimate of the forces under the Confeder- ate General Lee, made up by dh-ection of Gen- eral Banks, from information obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., {)revious to the battle of Antietam, is as fol- ows : — General J. J. Jackson's corps, 24,778 men. General James Longstreet's corps, 23,342 " General D. H. Hill's 2d division, 15,525 " General J. E. B. Stuart, cavalry, 6,400 " General Ransom's and Jenkins's brigade, 3,000 " Forty-six regiments not included in above, 18,400 " Artillery, estimated at 400 guns, 6,000 " Total, 97,445 These estimates give the actual number of men present and fit for duty. Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows : — 1st corps, 14,856 men. 2d corps, ^ _ 18,813 " 5th corps (one division not arrived), 12,930 " 6th corps, 12,300 " 9th corps, 13,819 " 12th corps, 10,126 " Cavalry division, 4,320 " Total in action, 87,164 " When our cavalry advance reached the river on the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that nearly all the enemy's forces had crossed into Virginia during tiie night, their rear escaping under cover of eight batteries, placed in strong positions upon the elevated bluft's on the opposite bank. General Porter, commanding the 5th corps, ordered a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes's brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river at dark, and carry the enemy's batteries. This was gallantly done under the fire of the enemy ; several guns, caissons, &c., were taken, and their supports driven back half a mile. The information obtained during the progress of this affair indicated that the mass of the enemy had retreated on the Charlestown and Martins- burg roads, towards Winchester. To verify this, and to ascertain how far the enemy had retired. General Porter was authorized to detach from his corps, on the morning of the 20tli, a recon- noitring party in greater force. This detach- ment crossed the river, and advanced about a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the enemy lying in ambush in the woods, and driven back across the rivtr with considerable loss. This reconnoissance showed that the enemy was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Poto- mac, prepared to resist our further advance. It was reported to me on the 19th that Gen- eral Stuart had made his appearance at Wil- liams|jort with some four thousand cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and that ten thousand infantry were marching on the same point from the direction of Winchester. I ordered General Couch to march at once with his division, and a part of Pleasanton's cavalry, with Franklin's corps, within sujjporling distance, for the pur- pose of endeavoring to capture this force. Gen- eral Couch made a prompt and rapid march to Winiamsport, and attacked the enemy vigor- ously, but they made their escape across the river. I despatched the following telegraphic report to the General-in-Chief: — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Shai-psburg, September 19, 1862. " I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's Ferry. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." On the following day I received this tele- gram r — Washington, September 20, 1862 — 2 p. m. " We are still left entirely in the dark in re- gard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should keep me advised of both, as far as you know them. «'H. W. HALLECK, " General-in-Chief. " Major-General G. B. McClellan." To which I answered as follows : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Near Sharpsbury, Sept. 20, 1862 — 8 p. M. "Your telegram of to- day is received. I tele- graphed you yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform ) ou of until this evening. Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland Heights at 1 P. M. to-day. The rest of the army is near here, except Couch's division, which is at this moment engaged with the enemy in front of Williamsport ; the enemy is retiring via Cliarlestown and Martinsburg, on Winchester. He last night reoccupied Williamsport by a small force, but will be out of it by morning. I think he has a force of infantry near Shepherds- town. " I regret that you find it necessary to couch every despatch I have the honor to receive from you in the sph'it of fliult-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this array, or even to allude to them. " I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, uiitil I could do so with some accm-acy. I hope 135 by to-morrow evenihg to be able to give at least an approximate statement. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-Oencrcd Commwidiiig. " Major-General IIalleck, " General-in-Chief, Washington." On the same day I telegraphed as follows : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " September 20, 1862. " As the Rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Potomac, must in a great measure be de pendent for supplies of ammunition and ))rovis- ions upon Richmond, I would res|)ectfully sug- gest that General Banks be directed to seiid out a cavalry force to cut their supply communication opposite Washington. This would seriously em- barrass their operations, and will aid tliis army materially. " G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General Commanding. " Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, " Commanding United States Army." Maryland Heights were occupied by General Williams's corps on this day, and on the 22d General Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry. It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the forces for the defence of the national capital, on the 2d day of September, 1862, the greater part of all the available troops were suffering under the dis- heartening influences of the serious defeat they had encountered din-ing the brief and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly reduced by casualties, their confi- dence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that ^'■esprit du corps," which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn out, the greatest part of their clothing and camp equipage, which required renewal before they could be in proper condition to take the field again. The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland was received in Washington on the 4th of September, and the army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day, so that but a very brief interval of time was allowed to reorganize or procure supplies. The sanguinary battles i f South Mountain and Antietam fought by this army a few days after- wards, with the reconnoissances nnmediately fol- lowing, resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers, many regimental and company officers. and a large number of enlisted men, amounting in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty (15,220). Two army c irps had been sadly cut up, scattered, and somewhat de- moralized in the action on the 17th. In General Sumner's corps alone forty-one (41) commissioned officers and eight hundred and nineteen (819) enlisted men had been killed; four (4) general officers, eighty-nine (89) other commissioned olRcers and three thousand ^cven hundred and eight (;5,7()8) enlisted men iiad been wounded, besides five hundred and foriy-f-i-dit (548) missing; making tiie aggregate h.ss^in this splendid veteran corps, in tliis one battle, five thousand two hundred and nine (5,209). In General Hooker's corjjs the casu.lles of the same engagement amounted to two thousand SIX hundred and nineteen (2,019). The entire army had been groallv exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and re.st, inevious to the last battle. When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia the means of transportation at my dis- posal were inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance. Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like veterans, but the morale. of others had been a good deal impaired in tho-e severely contested actions, and thev required time to recover as well as to acquire "the neces- siry drill and discipline. Under these circumstances I did not feel au- thorized to cross the river with the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in ])ursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and therebv place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply. I telegrai)hed on the 22d to the General-in- Chief as follows : — " As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiencv, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers ap]jointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are in- stances where captains are commanding regi- ments, and companies are without a single com- missioned officer." On the 23d the following was telegraphed to the General-in-Chief: — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "NcarShepherdsfoum, Sept. 23,1862— 9.30 A. M. " From several different sources I learn that General R. E. Lee is stid opposite to my posi- tion at Leestown, bet^veen Shepherdst i\vn and Martinsburg, and that GeneralJackson is on the Opequan Creek, about three miles above its mouth, both with large forces. There are also indications of heavy reinforcements moving towards them from Winchester and Charles- town. I have therefore ordered General Frank- lin to take position with his corps at the cross- roads about one mile northeast of Bakersville, on the Bakersville and Williamsport rv^ad, and General Conch to establish his division near Downsville, leaving sufficient force at Williams- port to watch and guard the ford at tha; [uace. The fact of the enemy's remaining so long in our 136 front, and the indications of an advince of rein- forcements, seem to indicate that he will give us another liattle with all his avai]al)le force. "As I mentioned to you before, our army has been very much reduced by casualties in the re- cnt battles, and in my judgment all the rein- forcements of old troops that can possiI)ly be dispensed with around Washington and otiier places, should be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. A defeat at this juncture would be ruinoi.s to our cause. I cannot think it possible that the enemy will bring any forces to hear upon Washington till after the question is decided here ; hut if he should, troojjs cm soon be sent back from this army by rail to reinforce tlie garrison there. " The evidence I have that reinforcements are coming to the R'_'bel army, consists in the feet Uiat long columns of dust, extending from Win- chester to Charlestown and from Charlestown in this direction, and also troops moving this way, were seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General Sumner, with his corps and Williams's (Banks's), occupies Harper's Feriy and the surrounding heights. I think he will be able to hold his position until reinforcements arrive. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Afajor-General. " Major-General H. W. IIalleck, " General-in-Chief, Washington." On the 27th I made the following report : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " September 27, 1862—10 A. M. " All the information in my possession goes to prove that the main body of the enemy is con- centrated not far from ISIartinsburg, with some troops at Charlestown ; not many in Winchester. Their movements of late have been an extension towards our right and beyond it. They are re- ceiving reinforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts — perhaps entirely so. " This army is not now in condition to under- take another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regi- ments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the old regiments — our main de- pendence — and In suppljing vacancies among the officers by promotion. " My j)resent purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry se- cure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. " Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure debouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of it until tlie railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross In force, I purpose concentrating the army some- where near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circums'ances, viz: moving on Win- chester, if from the position and attitude of the enemy we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the array and instruction of the new troops, preparatory to an advance on whatever lln'; may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely nece-*sary to send new regiments at once to the old corps, for ])urposes of in-;truction, and that the old regiments be filled at once. I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the line of .Manissas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear while thev have the garrison of W.shington in their front. " I rather a])prehend a renewal of the attemj)! in Maryland, should the river remain low for a great length of time, and should the) receive considerable addition to their force. I would be glad to hive Peck's division as soon as possible, I am surprised that Slgel's men should have been sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject was that they were at my disposition. In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in number, and it was only h) very hird fight- ing that we gained the advantage we did. As it was, the result was at oae period very doubtful, and we had all we could do to win t!ie day. If the enemy receives considerable reinforcements and we none. It Is possible that I may have too much on my hands in the next battle. My own view of the proper policy to be ])ursued is to re- tain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison It, and to send everything else available to veinf )rce this armv. The railways give us the means of promptly reinf rclng Washington should it become necessary. If I am reinforced, as I ask , and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washing- ton. Several persons recently from Richmond say that there are no troops there except con- scripts, and they few in number. I hope to give you details as to late battles by this evening, I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry. "G. B. McCLELLAN, " Major- General Commanding. " Major-General Halleck, " General-in-C hif'f, Washington." The work of reorganizing, drilling, and sup])ly- Ing the army, I began at t le earliest moment. The different corps were stationed along the river in the best posltl ms to cover and guard the fords. The great extent of the river front, from near Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred and fifty m.les,) together with the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was to be carefully watched and guarded, to jirevent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Vir- ginia side of the river, for the purpose of learn- ing the enemy's positions and movements, were 137 made frequently, so that our cavalry, which from the tune we left Washington had performed the most laborious service, and had from the com- mencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inadequate to the requirements of the army. This overwork had broken down the greater part of the horses ; disease had appeared among them, and but a very small portion of our original cavalry force was lit for service. To such an extent had this arm become re- duced, that when (jeneral Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania on the 11th of October with two thousand men, I could only mount eight hundred men to follow him. Harper's Ferry was occuj)ied on the 22d, and in order to prevent a cat istrophe similar to the one which had happened to Colonel Miles, I im- mediately ordered Maryland, Boliver, and Loudon Heights, to be strongly fortified. This was done as far as the time and means at our disposal per- mitted. The main army of the enemy, during this time, remained in the vicinity of Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, forcibly taking their property, where it was not voluntarily ottered, bm'ning bridges, and destroy- ing railroads. On the first day of October, his Excellency the President honored the army of the Potomac with a visit, and remained several days, during which he went through the ditterent encamp- ments, reviewed the 'roops, and went over the battle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam. I hid the opportunity during this visit to describe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the Po- tomac. On the 5th of October the division of General Cox (al)out 5,000 men) was ordered from my command to Western Virginia. On the 7th of October I received the follow- lowing telegram : — " Washington, D. C, October 6, 1862. " I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : The President directs that you cross the Poto- mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediatsly report whit line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river ; also to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on, before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add, that tiie SecreUiry of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur "witii the President in these in^truciioiis. "II. W. IL\LLECK, " Maj.-Gen. McClellan." At this time General Averill, with the greater part of our etficicnt cav^dry, was in the vicinity of Ctnnberland, and Gen'end Kelly, the com- manding otticer, had that day reported that a large force of the enemy was advancing on Colonel Campbell, at Saint John's lliver. This obliged me to order General Averill to proceed with his force to the supi)ort of Colonel Camp- bell, which delayed his return to the army f )r several days. On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's Ferry, with 2,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use all our cavalry against him. This ex- hausting service completely broke down neirly all of our cavalry horsey and rendered a remount absolutely indispensable before we could advance on the enemy. The following were the disposition of troo))3 made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid : — General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the upper Potomac, was ordered to move ra])idly down upon the north side of the river, with all his disposable c.ivaliy, using every exertion to get upon the trail of the enemy, and follow it up vigorously. General Pleasanton, with the remninlngcaralry force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, Harmon's Gaj), and Mechmicsville, and cut off the retreat of the enemy should he make for any of the fords below the position of the main army. His orders were to jjursue them Avith the ut- most ra])idity, not to spare' his men or horses, and to destroy or capture them If possible. General Crook, at that ti i.e commanding Cox's division, at Hancock, en route for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cirs, and remain in readiness to move to any point above should the enemy return in that direction, keeping his scouts well out on all the roads leading from the direction of Chambers- burg to the u])per Potomac. The other commandprs between Hancock and Harper's Ferrj- were instructed to keej) a vigi- lant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to prevent the escape of the Rebels within these limits. General Burnside was ordered to send two brigades to the Monocacy crossing, there to re- main in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any point on the railroad to which Stuart might be aiming, while Colonel Hush, at Frederick, was directed to keep his lancers scouting on the approaches from Chambersburg, so as to give timely notice to the commander of the two bri- gades at the Monocacy crossing. 138 General Stoneraan, whose headquarters were then at Poolesville, occupying with his division the different fords on the river below the mouth of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his caval- ry well out on the approaches from the direction of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any point where the enemy might at- tempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He was informed of General Pleasanton's move- ments. After the orders were given for covering all the fords upon the river, I did not think it possi- ble for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the capture or destruction of his entire force was per- fectly certain; but owing to th« lact that my orders were not in all cases carried out as I ex- pected, he effected his escape into Virginia with- out much los^. The troops sent by General Burnside to the Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the necessary orders to the commander, instead of remaining at the railroad cro-sing, as 1 direct- ed, marched four miles into Frederick, and there remained until after Stuart had passed the rail- road, only six miles below, near which point it was said he halted for breakfist. General Pleasanton ascertained, after his ar- rival at Mechanicsville, that the enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty retreat towards the mouth of the Monocacy. He pushed on vigorously, and, near its mouth, overtook th^m with a part of his force, having marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, and having left many of his horses broken down up:)n the road. He at once attacked with his artillery, and the firing continued for several hours, during which time he sta'es that he received the support of a small portion of Gener- al Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any material damage upon the enemy. "General St meman repr.rts that, in accordance with his instruction*, he gave all necessary orders for intercepting the return of the Rebels, and Colonel Staples, commanding one of his brigades, states that he sent two regiments of infantry to the mouth of the Monocacy, and one regiment to White's Ford; that on the morning of the 12th, about ten o'clock, he, by General Stoneman's order, marched the remaining three regiments of his command from Poolesville towards the mouth of the Monocacy ; that before getting into action he was relieved by General Ward, who states that he reported to General Pleasanton with his command, while the enemy was crossing the river, and was informed by him (General Pleas- anton) that he was too late; and that nothing could be done then. General Pleasanton, in his report of this affair, says: "It was at this time that Colonel Ward reported to me from General Stoneman's di- vision, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him thit his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed the river. Tliese are the only troo])s, that I knew of, that were in that vicinity, and this was the first intimation I received that any troops were endeavoring to assist me in capturing the Rebels. I succeeded in preventing the enemy from cross. ng at the mouth of the Monocacy, and dro-\e him to White's Ford, three miles below. Had White's Ford been OLCupied by any force of ours ])reviou3 to the time of the occu|)ation by the enemy, the cajjture of Stuart's whole f'rce would have been certain and inevitiible. With my small force, Avliich did not exceed one fourth of the enemy's, it was not practical )le for me to occupy that ford while the enemy was in front." It would seem from the report of General Stoneman, that the disjjosition he made of his troops, ])revious to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. He stationed two regiments at the mouth of Monocacy, and two regiments at White's Ford, the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and the former only three miles off, with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, some six miles distant. General Pleasanton's report shows that from the time the firing commenced until the enemy were across the river was about four and a half hours. General Stoneman states that he started the re- serve from Poolesville at about nine o'clock, but it appears, from the report of General Pleasan- ton, that it did not reach him until half-past one. At the time I received the order of October 6, to cross the river and attack the enemy, the army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large ])art of our troops were in the want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of cloth- ing, notwithstanding all the ettbrts that had been made since the battle of Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing, as well as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster, who believed that the necessary articles could be sup- plied in about three days. Orders were imme- diately issued to the different commanders who had not already sent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all the necessary steps were forth- with taken by me to insure a jjrompt delivery of the su])plies. The requisitions were forwarded to the proper department at Washington, and I ex- pected that the articles would reach our depots during the three days specified ; but day after day elapsed, and only a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon re- ceiving notice from the quartermasters that they might expect to receive their su]jplles at certain dates, sent the trains for them, which, after wait- ing, were compelled to return empty. Several instances occurred where these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots, as often as four or five different times, without receiving their supplies, and I was informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had travelled over 150 miles, to and from the depots, before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac, 139 and was moving into Virginia. General Reynolds's corps was delayed a day at Berlin, to complete its sup])lies, and General Porter only completed his on reaching the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. .1 made every exertion in my power, and my quartermasters did the same, to have these sup- plies hurried forward rapidly ; and I was repeat- edly told that they had filled the requisitions at Washington, and that the su])plies had been forwarded. But they did not come to us, and of course were inaccessible to the army. I did not fail to make frequent representation of this con- dition of things to the general-in-chief, and it appears that he referred the matter to the quartermaster-general, who constantly replied that the sujjpiies had been jiromjjtly orJered. Notwithstanding this, they did not reach our depots. The following extracts are from telegrams upon this subject : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " October 11, 18G2— 9 A. M. "We haye been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that it has been forwarded by railroad ; but, owing to bad man- agement on the roads, or from some other cause, it comes in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army, unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidlv. "" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-Geiio'ol. " Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, " General-in-Chief, Wasldngton." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "October 11, 1862. " I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes, and other indis- pensable articles of clothing, that still exists in some of the corps in this army. Upon the as- surances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculation upon information received fnm Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the army ready to move, as the men can- not march without shoes. Everything has been done that can be done at these headquarters, to accomplish the desired result. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, ^^ Major- General Commanding. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " Commander-in-Cidef, Washington." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " October 15, 1862—7 P. M. • •••*•* " I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. It was only yestcrduy that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Hagerstown, It is behig issued to tiie troops aa rapidly as possible. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, ** Major-Gcneral. " Major-General H. W. Halleck, " General-in-Chief." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " October 15, 1862— 7.:J0 p. M. " General Franklin reports that there is by no means as much clothing as was called for at Hagerstnwn. I think, therefore, you iiad better have additional sup])lies, esjieci.illy of shoes, for- warded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible. " R. B. MARCY, " Chief of Staff." " Colonel R. Ingat.ls, " Care of Colonel Bucker, Quartermaster, WasJi- ington." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "October 16, 1862. " General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows: ' My quartermaster reports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks at Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes.' " Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry as fast as possible. "R. B. MARCY, " Chief of Staff. " Colonel R. Ingalls, " Care of Colonel Rucher, Quartermaster, Wash- ington." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 9, 1862. " You did right in sendmg clothing to Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to send too much or too quickly. We want blankets, shoes, can- teens, &c., very much. "RUFUS INGALLS, " Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide-de- Camp, " Chief Quartermaster. " Colonel C. G. Sawtelle, " Depot Quartermaster, Washington." " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp near Knoxville, Aid., Oct. 10, 1862. " Shi]jments to Hagerstown must !)e made di- rect through, to avoid the contemptible delays at. Harrisburg. If Colonel Crosman was ordered to send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suf- fering and impatience are excessive. "RUFUS INGALLS, ^^ Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide de-Camp, " Chief Quartermaster. " Captain AUGUSTUS Boyd, " Quartermaster, Philadelphia." "Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Camp near Knoxville, October 13, 1862. " Has the clotbmg arrived yet ? If not, do 14 you know where it is ? "What clothing was taken by the Ptehels at Chambersburg ? Did they capture any property that was en route to you ? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Send an agent over the road to ol)tain information, and hurry up the supplies. Re])ly at once. "IIUFUS INGALLS, " Lieutenant- Culonel and Aldc-de-Gamp, " Chief' Quartermaster. " Captain George H. Weeks, " Depot Quartermaster. Ilagerstown." " Sh-^rpsbukg, October 15, 1862. " I have just returned from Hagerstown, where I have been for the clothing for the corps. There was nothing there but overcoats, trowsers, and a few uniform coats and socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts, or shelter tents. Will you please tell me where and when the bal- ance "can be had ? Shall I send to Harper's Ferry for them tomorrow? The corps surgeon has just made a requisition for 45 hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. Will you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's Ferry ? "FIELDING LOWRY, " Captain and Quartermaster. " General Ingalls." " Hagerstown, October 15, 1862. "I want at least, ten thousand (10,000) suits of clothing in addition to what I have received. It should be here now. " G. W. WEEKS, *^ Assistant-Quartermaster. *' Colonel Ingalls, " Quartermaster." " Harper's Ferry, October 22, 1862. " We have bootees, 12,000 ; gi-eatcoats, 4,000 ; drawers and shirts are pone ; blankets and stock- ings nearly so; 15,000 each of these four articles are wanted. "ALEX. BLISS, " Captain and Assistant-Quartermaster. " General Ingalls, " Chief Quartermaster, tfcc." " McClellan's Headquarters, " October 24, 1862—11 a. m. "Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's Ferry, 10.000 blankets, 12,000 caps, 5,000 over- coats 10,000 pairs bootees, 2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry boots, 15,000 pairs stockings, 15,000 drawers, and 15,000 pants. The clothing ar- rives slowly. Can it not be hurried along faster ? May I ask you to obtain authority for this shipment? " RUFUS INGALLS, '^Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-dc-Camp, " Chief Quartermaster. " Captain D. G. Thomas, " Military Storekeeper, Wasliington." " Hagerstown, October 30. " Clothing has arrived this morning. None taken by Rebels. Shall I supply Franklin, and retain portions for Porter and Reynolds until called for? " G. W. AVEEKS, " Captain and Assistant-Quartermaster. " Colonel Ingalls." The following statement, taken from a report of the Chief Quartermaster with the army, will show what progress was made in su])plying the army with clothing from the 1st of Sejitember to the date of crossing the Potomac on the 31st of October, and that a greater part of the clothing did not reach our depots until after the 14th of October : — Statement of Clothing and Equipage received at the different Depots of the Army of tha Potomac from September 1, 1862, to October 31, 1862. Kecelved at the depot. From September 1 to October 6. From October to October 15.. . From October 15 to October 25.. From October 25 to October 31.. Total , 10,700 17,000 40,(X)0 .30,000 97,700 E^ 4,000 11,000 iy,5oo 34,500 cc 0,200 4,190 22,025 05,200 30,000 123,425 4,190 3,000 500 1,250 1,500 6,250 0,000 10,221 9,000 3,008 28,229 6,200 18,325 18,876 2,200 45,.301 6,000 12,989 5,000 9,900 33,889 4,200 1,000 2,500 5,000 12,700 4,200 0,000 3,000 20,040 .33,840 11,100 3,000 9,000 23,100 141 Statement of Clothing and Equipage received, ^c. — Continued. •a ^ . a 3 ^ o o Eeoeived at the depot. m* X _e8 O .2 a o u H c o ea 799 2,030 3 500 1 200 20 1 ''OO 2,000 12,000 2,000 9,500 39,r)20 25,000 2,000 7,000 52,900 1,302 2,100 12 000 500 2,655 2,424 11,595 1,894 4,500 14 770 3,500 2,015 1,000 4,384 7,500 Total 3,905 8,630 30,270 4,450 10,904 7,590 9,200 44,060 76,120 61,900 16,674 Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his report upon this subject, says : — " There was great delay in receiving our clothing. The orders were promptly given by me and approved by General Meigs, but the roads were slow to transport, particularly the Cumberland Valley road. " For instance, clothing ordered to Hagers- town on the 7th Octolier for the corps of Frank- lin, Porter, and Reynolds did not arrive there until about the 18th, and by that time, of course, tfiere were increased wants and changes in position of troops. The clothing of Sumner arrived in great quantities near the last of Octo- ber, almost too late for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia, We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferr), partly on the cars just uiTtved, and partly in store." The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force have already been recited. The dilticulty in getting new supplies from the usual sources led me to ap()ly for and obtain authority for the cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their own hoi'ses. The following are the telegrams and letters on this subject: — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "October 12, 1862—12.45 P. M. " It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses. The present rate of supply is (1,050) ten hundred and fifty per week for the entire army here and in front of Wash- ington. From this number the artillery draw for their batteries. ♦' GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *^ Major- General Com manding. " Maj.-Gen. Halleck, •* General-in- Chief." The genera 1-in-chief, in a letter to me dated Washington, D. C, October 14, 1862, replies to this despatch in the following language : — " I have caused the matters complained of in your telegrams of the 11th and 12th to be in- vestigated. ^» * • ♦ # • • "In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of sujjjily is only 150 per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. I find from the records that the issues for the last six weeks have been 8,754, making an average per week of 1,459." One thousand and fifty (1,050) is the number stated in the original desimtch, now in my pos- session ; and as not only figures were used, but the number was written out in full, I can hardly see how it is possible for the telegraphic opera- tor to have made a mistake in the transmission of the message. " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " October 14, 1862 — 7 P. M. " With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to watch the line of the Potomac proper- ly, or even make the reconnoissances that are necessary for our movements. This makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much, by extending the infantry to guard the innumer- able fords. This will continue until the river rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent the Rebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morning, should be largely and imme- diately increased, under any hypothesis, whether to guard the river, or advance on the enemy, or both. " GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, " Major-General. " Major-General H. W. Hali.ec'k, " Commander-in-Chief." The following is an extract from the official report of Colonel Iiigalls : — " Immediately after the battle of Antictam efforts were made to supply deficiencies in cloth- ing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required 142 large numbors to cover losses siistained in battle, on the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms were deficient when tliey left Washington. A most violent and destructive disease made its appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported perfect- ly well one day would be dead lame the next, and it w is difficult to foresee where it woidd end, or what numlier would cover the loss. They were attacked in tlie hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account for the a})pearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in time, hut could not he icorkcd. I made ajjpli- cation to send West and ])urchase horses at once, but it was refu'^ed, on the ground that the out- standing contracts pi'ovided for enough, hid they tcere nek delivered sufficientlu fast, nor in suffi- cient numbers until late in October and early in November. I was authorized to buy 2,500 late in October, but the delivery was not completed until in November, after we had reached War- renton." In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 14th of October, and addressed to the general- in-chief, it is stated : " There have been issued, therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, (9,254) nine thousand two hundred and fifty- four horses." Whit number of horses were sent to General Pope before his return to Washington I have no means of determining ; but the following state- ment made upon my order, by the chief quarter- master with the army, and who had means for gaining accurate information, force upon my mind the conclusion that the Quartermaster-General was in error : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " Chief Quartermmtefs Office, Oct. 31, 1862. "Horses purchased since September 6, 1862, by Colonel Ingalls, Chiff Quar- termaster, and issued to the forces under the immediate command of Major-General George R. McClellan, 1,200 " Issued and turned over to the above force by Captain J. J. Dana. Assistant- Quartermaster (in Washington), 2,261 " Issued to forces at and near Washing- ton which have since joined the com- mand, 352 " Total purchased by Colonel Ingalls and issued and turned over by Captain Dana to the forces in this immediate command, 3,813 " Issued by Captain J. J. Dana, Assistant- Quartermaster, to the forces in the vicinity of Washington, 3,363 " Grand total purchased by Colonel R. Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, and is- sued and turned over by Captain J. J. Dana, Assistant-Quartermaster, to the entire army of the Potomac and the forces around Washington, 7,176 " About 3,000 horses have been turned over to the quartermaster's department by officers as unfit for service ; nearly 1,500 should now be turned over also, being worn out and diseased. " Respectfully submitted, "FRED. MYERS, "Lieutenant-Colonel and Quartermaster.^* This official statement, made up from the re- ports of the quartermasters who received and dis- tributed the horses, exhibits the true state of the case, and gives the total numlier of horses re- ceived by the army of the Potomac, and the troops around Washington, during a period of eight weeks, as (7,176) seven thousand one hun- dred and seventy-six, or (2,078) two thousand and seventy-eight less than the number stated by the quartermaster- general. Supposing that (1,500) fifteen hundred were issued to the army under General Pope, i)revious to its return to Washington, as General Meigs states, there would still remain (578) five hun- dred and seventy-eight horses which he does not account for. The letter of the general-in-chief to the Secre- tary of War on the 28th of October, and the let- ter of General Meigs to the general-in-chief on the 14th of October, convey the impression that, upon my repeated applications for cavalry and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, I had received a much greater number than was really the case. It will be seen from Colonel Myers's report that, of all the horses alluded to by General Meigs, only (3,813) three thousand eight hun- dred and thirteen came to the army with which I was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of course the remainder did not in the slightest de- gree contribute co tlie efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of the army with which I was to cross the river. Neither did they in the least ficiiitate any preparations for carrying out the order to advance upon the enemy, as the general-in- chiefs letter might seem to imply. During the same period that we were receiving the horses alluded to, about (3,000) three thou- sand of our old stock were turned into the quar- termaster's department, and 1,500 more reported as in such condition that they ought to be turned in as unfit for service ; thus leaving the active army some 700 short of the number re- quired to make good existing deficiencies, to say nothing of providing remounts for men whose horses had died or been killed during the cam- paign and those previously dismounted. Not- withstanding all the eflbrts made to obtain a re- mount, there were, after deducting the force engaged in picketing the river, but about a thousand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st day of October. In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the gen- eral-in-chief says : — '* It is also reported to me that the number of animals with your army in the field is about 31,000. It is believed that your present propor- 143 tion of cavalry and of animals is much larger than that of any other of our armies." What number of animals our other armies had I am not prepared to say ; but milicary men in European armies have been of the opinion that an army, to be efficient, while carrying on active operations in the field, should have a cavalry force equal in numbers to from one sixth to one fourth of the infantry force. My cavalry did not amount to one twentieth part of the army, and hence Ihe necessity of giving every one of my cavah')' soldiers a serviceable horse. Cavalry may be said to constitute th« antcnnce of an army. It scouts all the roads in front, on the flanks and in the rear of the advancing columns, and constantly feel the enemy's. The amount of labor foiling on this arm during the Maryland campaign was excessive. To persons not f miiliar with the movements of troops, and the amount of transportation required for a large army marching away from water or railroad communications, the number of animals mentioned by the general-in-chief may have ap- peared unnecessarily large ; but to a military man, who takes the trouble to enter into an accurate and detailed computation of the number of pounds of subsistence and forage required for such an army as that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 31,000 animals were considerably less than was absolutely necessary to an advance. As we were required to move through a coun- try which could not be depended upon for any of our supplies, it became necessary to transport everything in wagons, and to be prepared for all emergencies. I did not consider it safe to leave the river without subsistence and forage for ten days. The official returns of that date show the ag- gregate strength of the army for duty to have been about 110,000 men of all arms. This did not include teamsters, citizen employes, officers' servants, &c., amounting to some 12,000, which gave a total of 122,000 men. The subsistence alone of this army for ten days required for its transportation 1,830 wag- ons at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, and 10,980 animals. Our cavalry horses at that time amounted to 5,046, and our artillery horses to 6,836. To tran'jport full fi.rage for these 22,862 ani- mals for ten days required 17,832 addit onal ani- mals ; and iliis forage would only supply the en- tire number (40,094) of animals with a small fraction over half allowance for the time speci- fied. It will be observed that this estimate does not embrace the animals necessary to transport quar- termasters' supplies, baggage, camp equipage, ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage f r offi- cers' horses, &c., which would greatly augment the necessary transportation. It may very truly be said that we did make the march with the means at our disposal, but it will be remembered that we met with no serious opposition from the enemy ; neither did we encounter delays from any other cause. The roads were in excellent condition, and the troops marched with the most commendable order and celerity. If we had met with a determined resistance from the enemy, and our progress had been very much retarded thereby, we would have consumed our supplies before they could have been re- newed. A proper estimate of my responsibili- ties as the commander of that armv did not justify me in bising my jircparations for tlie ex- pedition upon the supposition that I was to have an uninterrupted march. On the contrary, it was my duty to be jjrejjared for all emergencies ; and not the least inijiort^mt of my responsihilities was the_ duty of making ample" i)rovision for sup- plying my men and animals with rations and forage. Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early movement, and sharing with him fully his anxiety for prompt action, on the 21st of October I telegraphed to the general-in-chief as follows : — " Headquarters Army of the Potomac, " October 21, 1862. " Since the receipt of the President's order to move on the enemy, I have been making every exertion to get this army supi)lied with clothing absolutely necessary for marching. " This, I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished. I have also, during the same time, repeatedly urged upon you the importance of supplying cavalry and artillery horses to re- place those broken down by hard service, and steps have been taken to insure a prompt de- livery. " Our cavalry, even when well supplied with horses, is much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, but in efficiency has proved itself superior. So forcibly has this been impressed upon our old regiments by repeated successes, that the men are fully persuaded that they are equal to twice their number of Ilebel cavalry. " Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picketing the river, I have not at present over about one thousand (1,000) horses for service. Officers have been sent in various directions to purchase horses, and I expect them soon. With- out more cavalry horses "our communications, from the moment we march, would be at the mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary in- formation of the position and movements of the enemy, in such a way as to insure success. My experience has shown the necessity of a lai'ge and efficient cavalry force. " Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask whetht-r the President desires me to march on the enemy at once, or to wait the re- ception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival. "GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, ^^Major-General (Jormnanding. " Major-General H. W. Halmx'K. " General-in-Ckief, Washington." 144 On the same day General Ilalleck replied as follows : — " Washington, October 21, 1862 — .'3 p. m. " Your telegnim of 12 M. has lieeii subinilted to the President. lie directs uie to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instiint. "If you have not been, and are not now, in condition to obey it, you will be alile to siiow such want of aliility. The President does not expect impossibilities; I)Ut he is very anxious that all this good weather shn the first of November as the earliest date at which the forward movement could well be commenced. The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Secre- tary of War, on the 28th of October, says : " In my opinion, there has been no such want of sup- plies in the army under .General McClellan as to prevent his comi)liance with the orders to advance against the enemy." Notwithstanding this opinion, expressed by such high auLJiority, I am compelh d to say again tli.it the delay in the reception of necessary sup- plies uj) to that dale had left the army in a condi- tion totally unfit to advance against the enemy, — tiiat an advance under the existing circumstances, would, in my judgment, have been attended with the liighest degree of peril, with great suffering and sickricss among the men, and with imminent dang r of being cut off from (11 as any other troops that may hereafter lie sent for the ]irotec- tion of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier within the liiiiits of the lines herein specified. The force which has been left to guard the line is not deemed adequate to prevent cavalry raids, but it is all that the commanding general feels authorized to detach from the army of the Poto- mac at the present time, and it devolves upon you to make the best use of this force in your power. Yoti will have four cavalry regiments under your command, which should be so dis- tributed along the. river as to watch all the avail- able fords, and give timely notice to the infantry of the approach of any force of Rebels. " You will afford all the protection in your power to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. "You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania. "Y"ou will take steps to have all the sick and wounded of our army, as well as of the Rebel army within your lines, properly taken care of until they can be sent to general hospitals, or discharged, or paroled. " You will make your headquarters at Hagers- town, and occasionally visit the ditterent parts of your line. "You will please report promptly to these headquarters everything of inqiortance that oc- curs within the limits of your conunand. "The three brigades now at Cumlwrland, WiUiamsport, and Sharpsburg. including the fifty-fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, near Cum- berland, will be under your command. They are commanded by Generals Kelly, Kenley, and Gordon. " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "S.WILLIAMS, " Assisfant. Adjutant- General. "General G. W. Mokell. " Commanding upper Potomac." On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at Berlin was constructed, there beinj; already one across the Potomac, and another across the Shen- andoah, at Harper's Ferry. On the 2(jth two division of the ninth corps, and Pleasanton's brigade of cavalry, crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. 148 The first, sixth, and ninth corps, the cavalry, and the reserve artillery, crossed at Berlin be- tween the 2Gth of October and the 2d of No- vember. The second and fifth corps crossed at Harper's Perry between the 2'Jth of October and the 1st of November. Heavy rains delayed the move- ment considerably in the beginning, and the first, fifth, and sixth corps were obliged to halt at least one day at the crossings to complete, as far as possible, necessary supplies that could not be procured at an earlier period. The plan of campaign I adopted during this advance was to move the army, well in hand, parallel to the Blue llidge, taking Warrenton as the point of direction for tlie main army ; seizing each pass on the Blue IJidge by detachments, as we approached it. and guarding them after we had passed as long as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with the eleventh corps and Sickles's division near Thorouglifare Gap. We depended upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the Manassas Gap railwa}- was reached ; when that occurred the passes in our rear were to be aban- doned, atid the army massed ready for action or movement in any direction. It was my intention if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other Pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac, in the val- ley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear. I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did ex- pect that by striking in between Culpepper Court Ilouse and Little Washington I could either sep- arate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far hack as Gor- donsville, and thus place the army of the Poto- mac in position either to adopt the Fredericks- burg line of advance upon Kichmond, or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply il l)y the Or- ange and Alexandria railroad beyond Culpepper. On the 27tli of October the remaining divis- ions of the ninth corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleasanton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. The concentration of the sixth corps, delayed somewhat by intelligence as to the movements of the enemy near Hedgesville, &c., was com- menced on this day, and the first corps was already in motion for Berlin. On the 28th the first corps and the general headquarters reached Berlin. On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and encamped near Lovettsville. Stoneman's divis- ion, temporarily attached to the ninth corps, occupied Leesburg; AveriU's cavalry brigade moved towards Berhn from Hagerstown ; two divisions of the ninth corps moved to Wheat- land, and one to Waterford. The second corps commenced the passage of tiie Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east of L(nidon Heights. On the 30th the first corps crossed at Berlin and encamijcd near Lovettsville, and the second corps completed the passage of the Shenanduali. The fifth cula was at times one vast morass ; the ("hickahominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the ad- vance, the crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction with reinforce- ments now promised and earnestly desired, and upon the arrival of which the complete success of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover Court House was fougiit. which opened the way for the first corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came. The bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming disappointment, than the army of the Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests their coui-age and endurance when they hurled back, again and again, the vastly superior masses of the enemy. But mortal men could not accomplish the miracles that seemed to have been expected of them. But one course was left — a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy to another .and better base — one of the most hazardous movements in war. The army of the Potomac, holding its own safety, and al- most the safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. The seven days are clas- sical in American history' ; those days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever-memorable vic- tory of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the entire eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place of rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital from tlie banks of the .lames. Hich- mond was still within our gras]>. had the army of the Potomac been reinforced and jK'ruiittcd to advance. Hut counsels, which 1 cannot but think subsequent events proved unwise, pre- vailed in Washington, and we were ordered to al)andon the campaign. Never did soldiers i)et- ter deserve the tlianks of a nation than tlie army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsular campaign, and although tjiat meed was withheld from them by the authoriliis, I nu\ persuaded they have received the applause of tiie American people. The army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Kichmond. and incorporated with the army of Virginia. The disap]iointments of the campaign on the Peninsida had not damped their ardor nor diminislicd their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, under General Pope; yet were compelled to fall back on Washington, defeated and almost demor- alized. _ The enemy, no longer occu]iied in guarding his own capital, poured his troops northward, entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself. Elated by his recent victories, and assured that our troops were dis- organized and dispirited, he Avas confident that the seat of war was now permanently transferred to the loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil was to be relieved from the liurden of sup- porting two hostile armies. But he did not un- derstand the spirit which animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, nor can I living, forget that when I was ordered to the command of the troops for the defence of the capital, the soldiers, with whom I had shared so nmch of the anxiety, and pain, and suffering of the war, had not lost their confidence in me as their com- mander. They sprang to my call with all their ancient vigor, discipline, and courage. I led them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they had fal'en hack defeated before Washington, they vanquished the enemy on the rugged height of South IMountain, pursued him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and drove him, broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into Virginia. The army had need of rest. After the terrible experiences of battles and marches, with scarcely an interv^al of repose, which they had gone through from the time of leaving for the Penin- sula ; the return to Washington ; the defeat in Virginia; the victory at South Mountain, and again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they were in a large degree destitute of the absolute necessaries to efl'ective duty. Shoes were worn out ; blankets were lost ; clothing was in rags ; in short, the army was unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and equipment was necessary. When the slowly forwanUd supplies came to us I led the army across the river, renovated, refreshed, in good order and disci- pline, and followed the retreating foe to a position where I was confident of decisive victory, when, in the midst of the movement, wliile my advance guard was actually in ct>ntact with the enemy, I was removed from liie conimaml. I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with this brave army was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the 152 greatest peril it had then undergone. I have not accoinplished my pu-pose if, by this Report, the army of the Potomac is not phiced high on the roll of tlio historic armies of the world. Its deeds enmjhle the nation to wliich it belongs. Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustwortliy, T never called on it in vain ; nor will tlie nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, under myself, or under other commanders to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body of American soldiers. No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the commanding general to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United States Government, and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have proved their feahy in much sorrow, sutl'ering, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on all the fields where we fought have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation's reverence than their survivors to the justice of a nation's gratitude. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major- General United States Army. Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adjutant- General United States Army. War Department, Adjutant-GcncraVs Office, Washington, December 22, 1863. I certify that the above is a true copy of the original Eeport on file in this office. E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant- General. READ AND DISTRIBUTE REPORT MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, UPON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY Of THE POTOMAC, ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, TROM JULY 26, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 7, 1B62. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.! Revrinted entifk Ke Chap. 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