a I LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. i JMe/A ,„L3 # - i # f UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. J THE PHILOSOPHY OF §tol Mnmify & itol f mtom, IN TWO PARTS. PART FIRST. PRINCIPLES OF NECESSITY AND OF FREEDOM. PART SECOND. PRINCIPLES OF HARMONY ; RECONCILING PARTICULARLY MAN'S MORAL FREEDOM WITH lilmu JwtotoUJwj* ani f rttetoiiflti BY REV. J. LAGRANGE. AUBURN, N. Y. WILLI AM V MOSES. 1854. & Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S51, by J . LAGRANGE, In th9 Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Northern District of New-York. STEREOTYPED BY WILLIAM J. MOSE AUBURN, N. Y. PREFACE. To all finite minds, the development of truth is progres- sive. Those portions which are most open to observation, or which are most easy to comprehend, are first perceived; and afterwards those which are more recondite and abstruse. This process may be indefinitely extended; and it may take place in respect to almost or quite, every subject of human belief or knowledge. The facts appertaining to our moral agency, are not exceptions to the general rule. Like natural objects, they are discovered successively; and their true relations are unfolded gradually. Therefore, even at this late and enlightened period, a more complete view of the principles of moral Necessity and moral Freedom, than has hitherto been presented, may perhaps be possible. That it is attainable, very many believe ; and that it should be af- forded, if possible, is demanded by the age in which we live. This desideratum, the author thinks, is supplied in the fol- lowing pages; but whether his opinion be correct or not, must remain for others to decide. The work at least is not a hasty production. It is the result of reading, reflecting, conversing, and writing, in so far as the duties of the ministry would permit, during about 4 PREFACE. fourteen years. Its plan is simple, but comprehensive: being a statement of principles, together with their proof, in two parts. In executing it, such language has been employed as is easily understood, if read from the beginning, or in due order. Care has been taken to distinguish those things which differ, to identify those which are not distinct, to analyze ideas which are compound, and to harmonize those relevant Bible truths which appear to conflict. Bible doctrines are harmonized when they are properly explained; for when they are truly understood, their exact relations are clearly perceived. In respect to critical differences of opinion, an effort has been made to ascertain the real points in dispute, to distin- guish their relevant from their irrelevant bearings, to dis- criminate between sound argument and sophistry, and to "hold fast that which is good;" but as it was not intended to impart to the following pages the character of a review, the theories of others have not been extensively obtruded on the reader's attention. However, the most important and plausible errors relating to the subject, have been exposed; and the most cogent arguments by which they are attempted to be sustained, have been refuted. What it was thought essential to do, has been accomplished; not in the perfection of which the. subject is worthy, but as the author was able. CONTENTS PART FIRST. Principles : Page. I. Human beings exercise Agency, .'..., 9 II. Agency is distinguished into Natural and Moral, .... 9 III. Natural Agency is the exercise of natural powers, ... 10 IV. Moral Agency is the exercise of natural powers or facul- ties, under obligations of Law, 11 V. Moral Agency is two-fold: essential and adventitious, . . 12 VI. Moral Agency implies adequate capacity, 16 VII. Capacity as positive, consists of the faculties of thinking, feeling, and acting, 16 VIII. Capacity as relative, consists of the availability of the faculties, as enjoyed through appropriate relations, . . 20 IX. Capacity for Moral Agency is moral capacity, 27 X. Moral capacity is enjoyed by mankind in general, .... 29 XI. Moral capacity may vary in degree, 81 XII. In each degree, moral capacity may be either unigenous power, or diversified power, 32 XIII. Unigenous power admits of distinct proof, 34 XIV. Diversified power admits of distinct proof, 44 XV. Unigenous power implies the predominance of a given motive or motives, 55 XVI. The predominance of a given motive may have its origin extrinsic of the agent affected, 57 XVII. When the predominance of a given motive has its ori- gin extrinsic of the agent affected, the agent is subject to extrinsic causation in a two-fold respect, .... 59 XVIII. Causation by motives is moral causation, 60 XIX. Subjection to extrinsic moral causation is moral necessity, 62 6 CONTENTS. Principles : Page. XX. Moral necessity may respect agency in the abstract only, or also in the concrete, 65 XXI. Moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, may be either factitious or radical, . 66 XXII. Radical moral necessity, in the concrete of moral agen- cy, may be conceived of as being either adventitious or absolute, 69 XXIII. Absolute radical moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, cannot be proved to exist, 70 XXIV. Moral necessity is a proper necessity, 73 XXV. Diversified power implies the existence and influence of diverse motives, 84 XXVI. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of moral wrong, may consentaneously affect a sinful agent, 87 XXVII. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of evil, nay consentaneously affect an innocent or holy being, 88 XXVIII. Both good and evil influences were experienced pre- viously to the existence of sin, 90 XXIX. Diversified power implies an equilibrium of diverse motives, 93 XXX. Motive equilibrium admits of distinct proof, .... 98 XXXI. The equilibrium of diverse motives involves exemp- tion from extrinsic causation, 113 XXXII. Exemption from extrinsic moral causation, is moral freedom, 116 XXXIII. Moral freedom may be distinguished into generic and specific, 122 XXXIV. Moral freedom may be distinguished into essential and non-essential, 124 XXXV. Moral freedom, as exemption from extrinsic causation, involves intrinsic causation, 125 XXXVI. Intrinsic causation involves accountability, . • . . 131 XJ XVII. The modus operandi of the soul in causation, is be- yond the sphere of philosophy, or of legitimate in- quiry, ..... 135 CONTENTS. PART SECOND. Principles : Page. I. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine foreknowledge, . . 137 II. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predestination, . 167 III. Moral freedom is consistent with election, \ 188 IV. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact, that salvation is of grace, 199 V. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact, that regenera- tion is a Divine work, 201 VI. The moral quality of a given volition, may differ from the previous moral state of the agent, 204 VII. Moral freedom is consistent with the agent's susceptibil- ity of moral suasion, 207 VIII. The ideas of freedom and necessity are correlatives, . . 210 IX. Freedom and necessity arc correlated in the same quality, . 210 X. Moral quality is gencrically natural, 211 XI. Liability to evil and capacity for good are correlatives, . 212 XII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, are primarily cor- related in the same state, 21G XIII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, as correlated in the same state, are equal, 217 XIV. Liability to evil is imposed only for the sake of the cor- related capacity for good, 219 XV. The correlation of liability to evil, and capacity for good, is temporal, 221 XVI. The loss of an adequate representation in Adam, and the enjoyment of an adequate representation out of Adam, are correlatives, 222 8 CONTENTS. Principles : Page. XVII. An adequate representation of all mankind in Christ, and the salvation of all who die in their infancy, are correlatives, 228 XVIII. An adequate representation of all mankind in Christ, and the possibility that Pagans may he saved, are cor- relatives, .....% , 233 XIX. Moral freedom consists not in the possession of intellec- tual and moral faculties, 244 XX. Moral freedom consists not in the exercise of volition, . 245 XXI. Moral freedom consists not in power to execute volition or choice, 249 XXII. Moral freedom consists not, and is not implied, in igno- rance of God's decrees, 265 XXIII. Moral freedom consists not of legal or moral right, . . 267 XXIV. Moral freedom consists not of itself, in deliverance from the bondage of Satan, 268 PART FIRST. PRINCIPLES OF MOKAL NECESSITY AND OF MOKAL FREEDOM. CHAPTER I ©it t\)t Sa-kjwi 0f gpntj, PRINCIPLES. I. Human beings exercise agency. That is to say, they act, or exert power : they produce results, or effects. "The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul ;" and in becoming a living, sentient being, he became an agent or actor. Agency may be either internal, or internal and exter- nal conjoined. II. Agency is properly distinguished into Natural and Moral. If of a given number of subjects which have properties in oommon, some possess a property which is peculiar, there must obtain between them some difference of quality ; and any distinction which intelligibly ex- presses this difference, is correct and proper. The 1* 10 AGENCY. appropriate office of language is simply to convey truthful ideas. But all agencies have properties in common, such as power, limitation, and dependence ; while some possess also a property which is peculiar. Hence, between them must obtain some difference of quality ; and this difference is intelligibly expressed by the distinction of Natural and Moral. III. Natural agency is the exercise of natural powers. 1. It is the exercise of such powers as preclude the obligations of law. Such is the action of infants, idiots, lunatics, madmen. It is performed on princi- ples of instinct, imitation, education, habit, or illusion ; and it implies a fundamental ignorance, or a radical privation of the use of knowledge. In this sense, Natural is opposed to Moral. 2. In a more extended sense, it is the exercise of such powers or faculties as are not miraculous. As thus defined, it is any action or exercise of any order of innate faculties or endowments ; and hence it may be the deliberate action of a rational and mature mind. What the occasion may be, enters not into the account. It may be superhuman, or miraculous, like the Savior's ejectment of demons, or re-animation of the dead ; but the action elicited from the beholder, being merely the exercise of natural endowments, is natural agency. If the occasion consists of the direct influences of the Holy Spirit, the case is not altered, so long as those influences merely remove obstruction or embarrass- AGENCY. 11 nient, by counter working other influences which are adverse ; or so long as they impart no new faculties, and no superhuman vigor. The ability thus secured may in a sense be gracious ; but in contra-distinction from miraculous or foreign, it is natural ; and hence its exercise is natural agency. In this sense, Natural is not opposed to Moral. IV. Moral agency is the exercise of natural powers or faculties, under obligations of divine law. Its relation to law constitutes its peculiar property, and imparts its distinctive quality ; for in proportion as we recede from the light of divine law, moral dis- tinctions become confused, and fade away. Every possible moral action, like every other act, requires to be performed by natural powers, because moral agents, as such, possess no other faculties than those which are inherent in their nature ; and every possible moral action requires to be performed under obligations of law, because it must be either right or wrong. Moral agency, therefore, is natural agency of a particular order ; or natural agency under peculiar circumstances. It is a species, of which natural agency is the genu-, That moral distinctions have reference to divine law, is a doctrine of the Bible. It is written, "Sin is the transgression of the law ;" and again, " Where no law is, there is no transgression." 1 John 3 : 4. Kom. 4 : 15. The same thing is implied in what our Lord said on the subject of divorce. According to his teaching, a separation for slight reasons is a moral wrong ; and yet he allows, at least tacitly, that while 12 AGENCY. the permission of Moses on this subject was law, it was not a sin. See Matt. 19 : 3-9. V. Moral agency is two-fold : essential and adven- titious. 1. Essential moral agency is that action in which moral quality has its beginning. This action is voli- tion or choice. As exercised under law, which as moral action it must be, it may be termed moral voli- tion. Independent of moral volition, outward actions, though they may be either favorable or injurious, are neither virtuous nor vicious, right nor wrong. The act of destroying life is not murder, that of taking another man's money is not robbery, and that of burn- ing another's dwelling is not arson, if in each case the act be not willed, or not willed with a sane mind ; whereas the act of deliberately willing murder, or rob- bery, or arson, with a sane mind, or so as to act under law, is in each case a moral act, involving the agent in guilt, though the volition be not carried into effect. On the same principle, he who utters a falsehood, be- lieving his statement to be true, is not guilty of a lie ; but he is guilty of a lie, who utters what is true, be- lieving his statement to be false. Therefore, in moral agency, volition or choice is the essential action. Volition, choice, preference, purpose, and determination, are respectively so many acts of essential moral agency ; not in those attributes in which they differ, but in that respect in which they are identi- cal as acts of willing. The difference between them is not generic, but specific ; and perhaps we should say. AGENCY. 13 merely circumstantial. For example ; a man chooses not to live : lie chooses death. This choice extends itself into a choice of suicide ; and then we call it a purpose or determination. In the interim between the choice and the consummation, he experiences strong influences in favor of life ; but his mind remaining unchanged, we now call his choice, preference : we say, he still prefers death. When the fatal moment arrives, his choice, as extending itself to the method as well as to the end, is denominated a volition. This volition his hand obeys, and he dies. Thus his hand obeys the volition, the preference, the determination, the purpose, the choice ; which is simply saying, it obeys the soul's act of willing, as repeated under dif- ferent circumstances, and with a variation in its refer- ences. The most important difference obtains between choice and preference. " We always choose in prefer- ring, but we do not always prefer in choosing. To choose, is to take one thing from among others : to prefer, is to take one thing before or rather than an- other. We choose a thing for what it is, or what we esteem it to be of itself : we prefer a thing for what it has, or what we suppose it has, superior to another. 1 Judgment was wearied with the perplexity of choice, where there was no motive for preference.' " — John- son. — Cr abb's Synonymes. Choosing and refusing are likewise specifically dif- ferent, but generically the same. They are exercises of the same faculty, and are therefore the same in 14 AGENCY. their nature. Indeed, to refuse an object, is but to choose not to have it ; and to choose an object, is to refuse its alternative. That the exercise of willing is the essential agency, agrees with the following Scriptures. "If there be first a willing rnind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." — 2 Cor. 8 : 12. " Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life."— John 5 : 40. 2. Adventitious moral agency is action which is in- cidental or contingent. It is action which constitutes a subordinate part of moral agency ; not necessarily or invariably, but conditionally and generally. It is the action of execution : that in which an act of wil- ling is carried into effect. It is not essential, because moral volition or choice may exist without it. The principle has its illustration in the offering up of Isaac. The purpose was accepted for the deed. " By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying, I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is. upon the sea shore, and thy seed shall possess the gate of his ene- mies. And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, because thou hast obeyed my voice." — Gen. 22 : 16-18. • By affirming that the action of execution is not the essential, but the adventitious part of moral agency, we do not intend to convey the idea, that the action AGENCY. 15 of execution is a matter of indifference. It may in some instances be essential to the agent's salvation ; " for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified." Even " faith without works is dead, being alone." In using the term adventitious, our meaning is, that the action to which it applies, is but a duplicate of a primary action which precedes it, and which covers the same subject ; and that this duplicate is not necessary to the existence and moral quality of the primary and in- ternal action. CHAPTER II ®n % Subject 0f tfapots. PEINCIPLES. VI. Mokal agency implies adequate capacity. It implies power, appropriate power, and appropri- ate power in sufficient degree ; or it implies the existence of adequate faculties, and the requisite con- ditions of their exercise. It implies, therefore, a capacity which, in its existence, is two-fold : positive and relative. VII. Capacity as positive, consists of those facul- ties of a rational being which are exercised in think- ing, FEELING, ACTING. " All the facts which fall under the consciousness of man, and consequently under the reflection of the philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental facts, which contain all others. These facts, (which beyond doubt are never in reality solitary, and separate from each other, but which are essentially not the less distinct, and which a careful analysis ought to distin- guish without dividing, in the complex phenomena of intellectual life,) these three facts are expressed in the words to feel, to think, to act." — Cousin. CAPACITY. 17 " Is this a full and correct classification of the phe- nomena of the human mind ? Are these distinctions real? Are all mental phenomena included in these fundamental facts ?" These questions I answer in the affirmative, for the following reasons : 1. jSTo mental phenomena can be conceived of, which do not fall under one or the other of these facts. What mental operation can we conceive of, which is not a thought, feeling, or choice, purpose, or deter- mination ? 2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, not in degree, hut in kind. How entirely distinct, for example, is thought, in every degree and modification, from feeling on the one hand, and mental determination on the other. Feelings also, of every kind and modification, stand at an equal remove from thoughts, and mental acts, or determinations. So of the class last mentioned. Choice, in every degree or form, makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no approach whatever to thoughts or feelings. 3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by the above expressions, as actually existing in human con- sciousness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other. When I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, at one time that I think so and so, at another that I have particular feelings, and at another still that I have resolved or determined upon a particular course of con- duct, both alike readily apprehend my meaning, and understand me as referring to states of mind perfectly distinct. 18 CAPACITY. 4. In all known languages, there are terms employed to designate these three classes of phenomena ; terms, each of which is applied to one class exclusively, and never to either of the others. Thus, the term thought is never applied to any mental phenomena but those designated by the words to think. We never use it to designate feelings, or mental determinations of any Mnd. The terms sensation or emotion, are never applied to any but the phenomena oi feeling. In a similar man- ner, we never apply the terms purpose, willing, deter- mining, &c, to the phenomena of thought or feeling ; but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. The existence of such terms, undeniably evinces that the different classes of phenomena under consideration, are recognized by universal consciousness, not only as existing, but as entirely distinct from one another. 5. As. a final reason, I would adduce an argument presented in a work , recently published on the will: "The clearness and particularity with which the uni- versal intelligence has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that there are qualifying terms in common use, which are applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of the others. It is true that there are such terms, which are promiscuously applied to all classes of phenomena. There are terms, however, which are never applied but to one class. Thus we speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or CAPACITY, 19 resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determina- tions, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect distinctness, then, must the univer- sal consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and determinations, as phenomena entirely distinct from one another — phenomena,, differing not in degree, but in kind. "The threefold classification of mental phenomena above established and elucidated, clearly indicates a tri-unity of mental faculties and susceptibilities, equally distinct from one another. These faculties and susceptibilities we designate by the terms intel- lect or intelligence, sensibility or sensitivity, and will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sen- sibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires and affections. To the Will we refer all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, purposes, &e. When I speak of a diversity of mental faculties, I would by no means be understood as teaching the strange dogma, that the mind is made up of parts which may be separated from one another. Mind is not composed of a diversity of substances ; it is one substance, incapable of division. Yet this simple substance, remaining as it always does, one and iden- tical, is capable of a diversity of functions or opera- tions, entirely distinct from one another. This diver- sity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate by the words mental faculties. As the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, are entirely distinct from 20 CAPACITY. each other, so we speak of the powers of thought, feeling, and willing, to wit, the intelligence, sensibil- ity, and will, as distinct faculties of the mind. "The remarks made above, respecting the mind itself, will at once appear equally applicable to the mental faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak of the intelligence, for example, as a faculty of the mind entirely distinct from those of the sensibility and will, without supposing that the mind is not strictly one substance, so we may speak of the different powers or faculties of the intelligence itself, without implying that that faculty is composed of a diversity of parts. The term faculty, whether applied to the whole mind, or to any of the departments of the mind, implies a diversity of functions of the same power or substance, and not a diversity of substances or parts/' — Mohan. VIII. Capacity as relative, consists of Hie avail- ability of the faculties, as enjoyed by means of appro- priate relations. 1. It implies the relation of an object or objects. Capacity for moral agency, as such, cannot exist, except under such circumstances that the exercise of the faculties shall be moral agency. But the exercise of the faculties cannot be moral agency, unless it be a rational exercise ; and it cannot be a rational exercise, unless it be performed in view of something which the agent recognizes as sustaining to him the relation of an object. An utterly aimless action must necessarily be as truly void of moral quality, as the fall of a snow- flake, or the devastation of an earthquake. CAPACITY. 21 The object may be considered as two-fold. It com- prises something to be obtained or produced, and the result of its beirig obtained or produced. The former is the proximate, and the latter is the remote object. 2. Capacity, as relative, implies also the relation of a motive or motives. The motive is identical with the object, and hence it is also twofold — proximate and remote. The one resides in the other, or is insepara- bly connected with it, as the result, with its occasion. In other words, the distant motive is some result or results, to be derived from a possession of the object, as such, which constitutes the proximate motive. That in view of which an action is performed, whether it be designated object, or motive, or both, is essential to a capacity for moral agency, because it is that alone by which the action is distinguished from the vagary of lunacy and madness. When we speak of the motive in favor of a volition or action, we may either mean the proximate, or the remote object ; but when we speak of the motive in favor of the object, we mean by object, the proximate object, and by motive, the remote object. We may further remark, that motives may evidently be as various as proximate objects and their results. The proximate motive may be anything which exists, or which, may exist ; and the distant motive may be the positive or comparative absence of suffering, the enjoyment of happiness, the disinterested performance of duty, or the recognition of intrinsic worthiness. The motives of finite beings are generally recognized in forms of misery or happiness ; but not always. 22 CAPACITY. These results, as relating to themselves, moral agents frequently disregard ; as when they consider only the proximate object, and their own duty to God and man. The motives of the Supreme Being, for his acts of creation, providence, and grace, exist not in any danger of suffering, nor in any susceptibility of greater happiness, nor in any sense of duty to a supe- rior, but in the recognition of his own infinite worthi- ness. Because of the contusion which exists in the specu- lations of some writers, it may be well to remark, in this place, what motive is not ; though after what has been said, it would seem to be scarcely necessary. Motive is not any exercise of the affections. Such exercise is action ; and motives are not action, but only incentives to action. Again, motive is not susceptibility. The sours susceptibilities are simply its adaptations to be impressed by motives. Finally, motive is not identical with an existing state or con- dition. The state of the mind, as existing, is present, whereas the motive, as such, is an object which is fu- ture ; and besides, the state of the mind may be changed by motive, but it cannot be changed by itself. 3. Capacity as relative, implies the relation of sub- jection to motive influence. Motive influence is neces- sary to a capacity for moral agency, for the same reason that the object is necessaiy ; or because it constitutes the force or power, which the object exerts on the agent's mind. CAPACITY. 23 It is on account of its influence, that the object is denominated motive ; but the two are not therefore identical. It is on account of his action, that a ra- tional being is called an actor ; but the actor and his action remain forever distinct. That motives and mo- tive influences are distinct, appears in that the latter are experienced^ before the former, as ends are gamed. Motive influence is enjoyed previous to the action, and of course is experienced independently of the action ; whereas the object which constitutes the motive, is enjoyed only in the action, or. after it, and in conse- quence of it. 4. Capacity, as relative, implies the relation of sub- jection to extrinsic causation. That is to say, sub- jection to extrinsic causation in the abstract of moral agency. The existence of motive influences depends not primarily on the agent affected ; nor can he pos- sibly avoid being a subject of such influences. Wheth- er he will or not, he must constantly experience them in some form, and of some kind or other ; and thus, as also by the very nature of his own mind, he is ab- solutely and irresistibly caused to act : caused to be an agent. As the author of his faculties, and of mo- tive influences, is extrinsic of himself, so the causation is extrinsic of himself ; and as moral agency can exist in no other way, it follows that capacity implies this subjection to extrinsic causation. In so far as the subjection is produced by motive influence, it is implied in capacity as relative. Having mentioned causation, it may perhaps be 24 CAPACITY. well to remark in this place, that we employ the term cause, in itj stiict and proper sense. Metaphysical truth is as exact as mathematical truth, and hence the terms employed to express it, like those of mathemat- ics, must be understood in an exact sense. The lack of exactness in this respect, has brought metaphysics into contempt ; nor could the result very well have been otherwise. Such writers as President Edwards, for example, employ " the word cause, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, or the manner of the event, de- pends, whether the antecedent has any positive influ- ence or not ;" and hence they give the term cause, at least three or four different meanings in one. This will appear, if we consider for a moment, the antecedents on which depends an accountable human action. Grod is an antecedent, the finite agent is an antecedent, the motive influence is an antecedent, and the medium of that influence is an antecedent, on which a given moral action depends. The author who is allowed to employ the term un- der consideration, with such latitude, enjoys an advan- tage which renders hi m invincible in any cause, whether good or bad, true or false : he is not to be overcome, in such a case, by logic nor by Scripture ; for he may employ the term in one sense in the major premise, and in another sense in the minor premise, and then draw his conclusion as if the one meaning were equivalent to the other. If it be allowed, there is an end of reasoning. All that remains is a sort of CAPACITY. 25 Insane and profitless disputation. " It is sufficient for my present purpose to remark, that Edwards has in- cluded a number of different ideas in his definition of cause ; and that he turns from the one to the other of these ideas, just as it suits the exigencies of his ar- gument/' — Bledsoe. In this work, by causation is not meant occasional- ity. The terms, cause and occasion, express entirely different relations ;. and the distinction between those relations, is one of vital importance. These facts may appear from a comparison of different agencies, which relate to a given result. Cain, for instance, caused the death of Abel ; but God, by a rejection of Cain's offering, occasioned the death of Abel. To reverse the statement, and say that Cain occasioned, and that God caused the murder, would be a gross misrepresen- tation. Again, the martyrs, by their faithfulness, oc- casioned many bloody persecutions ; but wicked men and devils caused those persecutions. The former, fox presenting the occasion of this wickedness, were in the highest degree praiseworthy ; whereas the latter, for causing it, were in the highest degree criminal. Why obtained this moral difference ? Simply because of the difference between cause and occasion. A similar difference exists between cause and means, and between cause and subject ; and it possesses a similar importance. To illustrate these distinctions, we may remark, that the mower, his want, his scythe, the grass, and the cutting of the grass, instance the cause, the occasion, the means, the subject, and the 2 2G CAPACITY. effect. The cause improves the occasion, by employ- ing the means, to operate on the subject, and to pro- duce the effect. In a general way, the means and the subject are included in the occasion, as occasion is un- derstood when it means both need and opportunity ; and hence when we speak of the means as producing the result, we may say that they occasioned it, but not that they caused it. An event is an effect only to its cause : to the occa- sion, the subject, and the means, it is merely a result. That moral action takes place instead of no action, is to man, and to the motives operating on him, a re- sult : to Him who gave man his being, and subjected him to motive influence, it is an effect. Therefore, in respect of a given result, the term cause ; designates the primary and sovereign mover. The agent's being subject to extrinsic causation, in so far that he must act instead of not acting, is not to be understood to imply, that he is so subject to extrinsic causation, that he must act in a given manner. The two states have no necessary connection. 5. Capacity, as relative, implies the relation of sub- jection to law. It is this relation which renders national action moral action ; for it is this which ren- ders it either right or wrong. If this relation did not exist, no agency whatever could have moral quality ; and if no agency could have moral quality, no agent could have a capacity for moral agency. Subjection t o law, therefore, is absolutely indispensable to relative power for moral agencv, CAPACITY. 27 This subjection implies the existence of a universal principle of law ; and by such a principle is meant, a universal ground for the distinctions of right and wrong. This ground of distinction exists in the rela- tions of being. 6. Capacity, as relative, implies a perception or knowledge of the principle of law. An agent cannot truly possess a capacity for moral action, who cannot be a subject of praise or blame ; and he cannot be a subject of praise or blame, who has never attained to the idea of right and wrong ; and he has never at- tained to this idea, who has never attained to the knowledge of the principle of law. Therefore, utter privation of this knowledge involves, relatively, utter privation of a capacity for moral action ; as it is writ- ten, " If ye were blind, ye should have no sin." — John 9 : 41. Consequently, capacity, as relative, hnplies that the knowledge exists. IX. Capacity for moral agency is moral capacity. It is such in a two-fold sense. 1. It is moral, because it is power to perform such actions, as shall possess the quality of being either right or wrong. Webster defines the term moral, thus: "Moral, 1. Relating to the practice, manners or conduct of men as social beings in relation to each other, and with reference to right and wrong." In this sense it is contra-distinguished from natural. The distinction here made, is however specific, and not generic ; for moral capacity is merely natural capacity, as enjoyed under obligations of law. It is natural, as 28 CAPACITY. being not miraculous ; and it is gracious, as being not original. As personally enjoyed by us, it was forfeited in Adam, and restored through Christ. "For when we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the ungodly." — Kom. 5:6. 2. It is moral also, because it appertains particular- ly to the soul, and has respect to motive influence. In this sense, it is moral in contra-distinction from physical ; and may be predicated without any reference to right and wrong. We say " moral capacity" in the former sense, when we mean power to obey or disobey God ; whether that power be predicated of the soul only, or also of the body. We say "moral capacity" in the latter sense, when we mean that internal power to perform a given action, which depends on the ex- istence and relation of motive influence. In this sense, the term moral, means much the same as in the phrases, moral certainty, moral impossibility, moral courage, moral suasion, and the like ; in which are suggested, not the distinctions of right and wrong, nor the operations of material force, but siruply the influences of motives. In this sense, then, capacity, as moral, means sim- ply capacity in so far as influences are concerned : in so far as they are concerned in their existence, their relevancy, and their degree. By denominating capac- ity in this respect moral, it is not intended to say, that influences are not impulses ; but that they are the impulses of ideas in the mind, and not immediately of physical contact with extrinsic physical means. CAPACITY. 29 Neither is it intended to say, that these impulses are not effects upon the soul as substance ; but that they have not an immediate, and hence not always a neces- sary, connection with the will and the affections. Our Lord " was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin/' Pie experienced therefore influences in favor of evil, hi all their primary force ; yet they had no physical effect at all on his will or his affections. It is not essential what we call the capacity under consideration, only so we understand that it is capacity in so far as influence is required, or is in any way con- cerned. X. Moral capacity is enjoyed by mankind in gen- eral. 1. Mankind in general possess positive capacity. They are generally endowed with the facidties of think- ing, feeling, and acting ; and they are constantly sur- rounded with the objects, and subjected to the influences, which induce thinking, feeling, and acting. It is a capacity which depends neither on men's agency, nor on their situation in life ; being an unconditional gift of the Creator, bestowed alike on the civilized and barbarous. 2. Mankind in general possess relative capacity. Fust, a principle of law exists ; and mankind enjoy a knowledge of it. A revelation of it is given in the Holy Bible. " All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for cor- rection, for instruction in righteousness, that the man 30 CAPACITY. of God may be perfect, thoroughly- furnished unto all good works."— 2 Tim. 3 : 16, 17. A revelation of the principle of law, is imparted also in the relations of being. These relations cannot fail of being more or less clearly understood ; and hence the idea of moral obligation, and of divine law, cannot fail of being in some measure developed in ev- ery rational mind. The Pagan Hindoo exclaims, " I am sin, I commit sin, my nature is sinful ; mercifully deliver me, Godavar." But " sin is the transgression of the law m " and hence the Pagan's knowledge of sin, proves his knowledge of Divine law. u When the Gentiles, who have not the [written] law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts ; their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another." — Rom. 2 : 14, 15. Again, God regards and treats mankind in general, as beings who are endowed with moral capacity ; and they must possess that which his treatment implies. " Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained ; whereof he hath given as- surance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead/'— Acts 17: 31. " For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according CAPACITY. 31 to that he hath clone, whether it be good or bad." — 2 Cor. 5 : 10. XI. Moral capacity may vary in degree. 1. It may exist in a high degree. Among mankind, it is enjoyed in its highest measure by enlightened Christians : by such men as the apostles, the martyrs, the reformers. They possess the power to be exten- sively useful and greatly good, or eminently injurious and wicked ; for their influence extends onward through all ages and all lands, and their knowledge of right and wrong is equal to their influence. They are the persons " to whom much has been given :" the servants to whom then Lord has committed the " five talents." 2. Moral capacity may exist in a very low degree. As enjoyed by Pagans, especially the less informed of them, it must exist in its smallest measure ; for if there are any to whom little has been committed, it is they who are destitute of God's written revelation, and of its attendant means of grace. They are, how- ever, moral agents ; and as such, they cannot but pos- sess a measure of moral capacity. If they act beyond their measure of such capacity, they in so far act not as moral agents, and in so not accountable. 3. Moral capacity may exist in an intermediate de- gree. Unenlightened Christians, and sinners who enjoy but the few advantages which some nominally Christian countries afford, may perhaps be mentioned, as possessing moral capacity in this degree. Their state is not absolutely that of paganism, and yet, in 32 CAPACITY. so far at least as the latter are concerned, it is but lit- tle different. They are indeed not limited to the pos- session of the one talent ; nor are they entrusted with the five. The degrees of moral capacity, as enjoyed by mankind in general, must in reality be very numer- ous ; but in these three classes, high, low, and inter- mediate, they are all comprehended. XII. In each degree, moral capacity may be either unigenous power, or diversified power, 1. It may be simply unigenous power. That is to say, it may be a moral power, to perform in a given Instance, that particular agency, and that only, which is actually exercised ; or to choose that particular ob- ject, and that only, which is actually chosen. 2. It may also be diversified power. By diversified power is not meant a power to choose either one of two contrary objects, at or in the moment of a given choice ; because at this moment, the choice which ob- tains, renders a contrary choice impossible. An agent cannot in the same sense and respect, and at the same time, choose both life and death ; nor any other two objects which are contrary. But by diversified power is meant, a moral power to choose or refuse a given object, or either one of a number of objects, until the object no longer remains for the agent to choose or re- fuse, but is chosen or refused. It is an alternative power, which terminates when the alternative ceases ; and the alternative ends, when the relevant volition or choice is exercised. In the relevant choice, it has for the time accomplished its end and ceased ; and in so CAPACITY. 33 far as the choice is decisive or irretrievable, that cessa- tion is so likewise. It has ceased, because the agent, so to speak, has used it up ; and thus it is only his own action, which even then precludes the possibility of a different volition. Diversified power has by some been termed, the power of contrary choice ; by which is simply meant, that under certain circumstances, the agent exercising a given choice, had power to will otherwise than he does. 2* CHAPTER III. PRINCIPLES. XIII. — Unigexous power admits of distinct proof . 1. It is proved by the agent's subjection to a natural law of reason. All moral action must be rational ; or, it must be a result of some reason which influences the agent's mind. In so far as outward, or corporeal action is concerned, the reason lies in the will. The body, while in the ordinary state, must obey the soul's volition. If the volition be to raise the hand to the mouth, as in the act of taking nourishment, the hand must comply ; or, if the volition be to recline the hand upon a table, the hand must still obey. This principle of subordination to the will, is true of the body in general ; and by subordination to the will, we mean subordination to the soul in willing. But in a given respect, the soul in willing, is also subject. It is subject to what the agent knows and feels to be either positively or comparatively 'desirable. We do not say that he must desire every object which he real- UNIGENOUS POWER. 35 izes to be desirable — for Christ did not, when he was tempted — nor that he must love every object which he realizes to be in itself lovely; but that every object which he does love, desire, or choose, must appear to have in it, or in its results, something to love, desire, or choose. This condition of the soul's action, or this demand of its nature, is the law of reason : of reason, not as it lies in the intelligence only, but as it exists in both the intelligence and the sensitivity; and, being the law of reason, it cannot be transcended in rational action. He who should choose, or otheiwise act, in opposi- tion to this law, would prove himself to be, not a rational agent, and not even a being of sane or natural instincts. He would be like a lost world — a world bo far out of its orbit as to be beyond the regulating forces of the universe. But if this law of reason cannot be transcended in rational action, it cannot be transcended in moral action ; for all moral action must be rational action. That is to say, it must be rational to the actor, at the time, and under the circumstances of the case. To others it might appear irrational, and if performed by them might really be so ; because they may enjoj altogether a different sense of the relevant reasons. Bu t if it is impossible to them as rational action, it is, for that reason, impossible to them as moral action ; and so it still holds good, that in moral action the law of reason cannot be transcended. If, then, this essential law of our being, as moral agents, shall in any instances operate wholly in a given 36 UNJGENOUS POWER. direction, it must be wholly irresistible in that direction. That is to say, if several objects of choice be presented, and this law of our being operate wholly in favor of a given one, and thus wholly against the others, that given object must be chosen. We have no more power to refuse, than the hand has power to disobey the will ; for the relevant law of our being is in each case equally binding. If it were not binding, it would not be law ; and rationality in practice would be mere accident, and accountability would be the same, if indeed they were at all possible. The law of reason is equally irresistible, when it operates not wholly, but mostly in a given direction, or when the intelligence and the sensitivity point mainly in the direction of a given object, but also to some extent in the direction of another object or objects. It operates then like the strong current of a swollen river, in which many an eddy may be discerned, but which, nevertheless, bears irresistibly on the timber which floats on its bosom. Subjection to the law of reason, precludes the agent from choosing that which, in view of the in- telligence and the sensitivity both, is to him, upon the whole, unreasonable. Hence it follows that a moral agent can choose against a lesser reason in favor of a greater, because that would not be unreasonable ; and that he can choose against a given reason in favor of an equal reason, because that also would not be unrea- sonable ; but that he cannot choose against a greater reason in favor of a lesser, for that would be unrea- sonable. It would be unreasonable, because in so far UNIGENOUS PQWEK. 37 as the greater should exceed the lesser, he would choose against reason, in favor of no reason ; which by the law of rationality is impossible. We repeat, therefore, that whenever the law of reason operates wholly or mostly in a given direction, it is in that direction irre- sistible. But may this law of our being, as moral agents, operate wholly or mostly in one given direction ? We answer in the affirmative. That it may, is proved by our own consciousness. We are all conscious, that in many instances of an alternative, our understanding and feelings are such, that our sense of the desirable is wholly or mostly in favor of a given choice, or against it. For example, if suicide be proposed to those who love life, and are happy in it, they are immediately conscious that their sense of the desirable, or the law of reason within them, operates wholly against the act, and in favor of life. Or, if blasphemy against the Holy Spirit be proposed to those who love God more dearly than the world, or their life, they are immediately con- scious that the law of reason operates in them wholly against it ; for they realize only a desirableness to for- bear the horrible crime. It follows, therefore, that the power of choice is sometimes unigenous. As the laws of the universe hold back the earth from flying off into infinite space, so the laws of our being may hold us back from much that is good, or, by the grace of God, from much that is evil ; and that not only outwardly, but in the very disposi- tions of the heart, and in the exercise of the will. 38 UNIGENOUS POWER. 2. Unigenous power accrues to ail who commit un- pardonable sin. " Whosoever speaketh a word against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come/' — Mat. 12: 32. They who can never be forgiven, can never be "in Christ;" and. hence they can never bring forth good fruit. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me/' — John 15 : 4. They who cannot bring forth good fruit, must necessarily bring forth evil fruit. But- to bring forth evil fruit, as such, it must be cho- sen • and hence they who must necessarily bring forth evil fruit, must necessarily choose to do so. They who in any respect must necessarily choose to do evil, cannot, in the same respect, choose holiness; and hence, in that respect, their power of choice must be unigenous. If they are not severed from Christ, as branches which were in him by faith, they are at least severed from his mercy, and have therefore only power to wither and season as fuel for the fire. Again, it is written of some, "G-od shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a he, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness/' — 2 Thess. 2 : 11, 12. In such cases, the light of truth becomes extinct, and a judicial blindness takes its place, on a fundamental point or points of faith ; or, such persons are abandoned to a previously beloved He, with the purpose that the abandonment shall be final, and the error fatal. Here UNIGEXOUS POWER. 39 is recognized no relevant alternative power, but only a power sg to believe as to perish. We read again, "It is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, if they shall fall away, to renew them again to repentance ; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame/' — Heb. 6 : 4, 6. The persons here spoken of, have no poAver to repent ; but they have power not to repent. Therefore, in re- spect .to the act of repentance, they possess no other than mere unigenous power. It may perhaps be said, the passage simply teaches that God cannot consistently pursue them any longer with favorable influences, and that, consequently, He cannot renew them to repentance; but that they can of themselves repent. For we are told by certain teachers, that even the lost in hell are under obliga- tion to repent and love God, and that therefore they can do so. In reply, we would cite the following scriptures: "Him hath God exalted with Iris right hand, to be a Prince and a Savior, for to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins." — Acts 5: 31. "Then hath God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life." . — Acts 11 : 18. "In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth/*' — 2 Tim. 2 : 25. These passages affirm a divine agency in repentance. Either that agency is essential, or it is 40 UNIGENOUS POWER. not. If not, God does an unnecessary thing ; and, indeed, a great part of the scheme of salvation is then unnecessary — a mere work of supererogation. On the other hand, if the scheme of salvation is essential in all its parts, and if the divine agency for which it provides is indispensable, then repentance is impossible, when God cannot consistently have an agency in it. What the obligations of the lost may be, affects not the ques- tion ; because their abandonment is self-produced, in spite of their obligations, by abusing the grounds of those obligations. 3. Unigenous power may result from habit. " Can the Ethiopian change his skin? or the leopard his spots ? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed to do evil." — Jer. 13 : 23. This passage is very plain. The African we know has power to retain his color, but no power to dispense with it; and hence his power respecting it, like that of the leopard concern- ing his spots, is unigenous. And such, if we may believe Jeremiah, was the power of some, respecting moral evil. Isaiah and Paul were of the same opin- ion ; as appears from the following passage: "And when they agreed not among themselves, they . depart- ed, after that Paul had spoken one word. Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers, saying, Go unto this people and say, Hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand, and seeing ye shall see, and not perceive. For the heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they closed, lest they should see with UNIGENOUS POWER. 41 their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them." — Acts 28 : 25-27. Men have no power to improve that which they do not understand, and which they neither hear nor see ; and they may put themselves into that condition, relative to the means of grace. With, this fact agrees the following- language of our Savior: "And when he was come near, he beheld the city and wept over it, saying, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace ! but now they are hid from thine eyes/' — Luke 19 : 41, 42. 4. Unigenous power may result from God's sover- eign providence. "The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom ruleth over all." — Ps. 103 : 19. " The kin^s heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water ; he turneth it whithersoever he will." — Prov. 21 : 1. In so far as God turns the heart of a ruler, he does it for practical purposes; and hence the turning of the heart must include the turning of the will. In so far as God turns the mind or will of the agent for practical purposes, he does it with a design not to fail, but to succeed ; and that design the finite agent cannot overcome or defeat. The relevant language of Jehovah is, "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my plea- sure." In so far, therefore, as God, in this sovereign manner, turns the will of the finite agent, that agent possesses no power to will otherwise than he does ; and hence, in so far he possesses only unigenous power. 42 TJNIGENOUS POWER. 5. Unigenous power is clearly instanced. "And the Lord said unto Moses, When thou goest to return into Egypt , see that thou do all those wonders before Pharaoh, which I have put into thine hand ; but I will harden his heart, so that he shall not let' the people go." — Ex. 4 : 24. In these Avoids assurance was given, that Pharaoh should, for a time at least, have moral power to re- fuse, but no such power to grant, what Moses was commissioned to demand ; and consequently, that he should morally possess only power to choose and com- mand as he actually did. To do otherwise, he could not, because he could not overcome the power and purpose of Groci ; which were as truly concerned in hardening him, as in sending the plagues. The hardening of his heart was simply fixing or confirming him judicially, either directly or indirectly, in his sense of the desirable ; or it Was a perpetuating, or a forbearing to destroy, that operation of the law of reason, as it existed in Pharaoh, which was adverse to his choosing the release of the Hebrews. This law of his being, like every other to which he was subject, he could neither suspend nor transcend ; and hence while it operated mainly against the liberty of his bondmen, he had not, upon the whole, power to choose or command their liberty. For him to have chosen it, without a corresponding change in the ope- ration of the law of reason within him, would have been as truly a miracle as any which Moses wrought. It is true, Pharaoh himself may have been the cause UNIGEXOUS POWER. 43 why this law began to operate as it did, but this does not prove thai he could suspend or rise above it ; which he would have had to do ; in order to change his action, or to choose in opposition to its main opera- tion. No moral agent, unaided by the grace of God, can deliver himself from the sequences of his sins ; and hardness is one of those sequences. In the case of Pharaoh, the requisite grace could not, at the time of which we speak, be afforded ; and so God caused, that the plagues should not, upon the whole, bring that grace to his heart. The object of the plagues, in so far as Pharaoh and his people were concerned, was not grace, but punishment ; and to break their grasp upon the children of Israel. Pharaoh's case was not singular ; for it is written, " Sihon, King of Heshbon, would not let us pass by him ; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand, as appeareth this day/' — Deut. 2 : 30. Here we are taught, that God determined to destroy Sihon ; that he determined, to this end, to deliver him into the hands of the Israelites as their enemy ; that he determined, to this end, that Sihon should refuse to let Israel pass ; and that to this end, he purposely hardened him. But what God determined, the king of Heshbon could not avoid or prevent. Therefore he could not avoid refusing to let Israel pass ; or he could not avoid choosing to oppose them. Conse- quently, in respect to Israel's passage through his country, he possessed only unigenous power of choice. 44 UNIGENOUS POWER. By these examples, let every one be admonished, and fear to offend against God ; and let no sinner boast of an absolute self-control. XIV. Diversified power admits of distinct proof. That is to say, it may be distinctly shown that such power is enjoyed at times. 1. It is proved by the fall of our first parents. " God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good." If Adam and Eve were constituted very good, they must have been made very good, as moral agents. If they were made very good, as moral agents, they were endowed, in every respect, with power to obey God, under all the actual circumstances of their primary probation. If they were thus en- dowed, they had power to resist the temptations of sa- tan. If they had power to resist the temptations of satan, they had diversified power ; for they proved by their fall, that they possessed also the power not to resist. If they had not power to resist, they were so made as to sin of necessity, or of a moral inability, arising from a defective creation. In that case, the work of their creation could not have been pronounced " very good." This conclusion is the more evident, when we consider, that such a defect in them must unavoidably overwhelm their posterity with the miseries of sin and death. They were constituted the representatives of the entire human race ; and hence, by their conduct and fate, they deeply affected all mankind in the interests of soul and body, life and death, time and eternity. If, as representatives in a DIVERSIFIED POWER. position the most responsible that finite beings could - \ occupy, they were worthy of the high encomium passed upon them ; they must have been competent to preserve the interests committed to their trust ; and they must have been competent, if in placing them in so important a post, God was faithful to the unborn millions of mankind. That the encomium, was appro- . priate, and that God was faithful, we cannot doubt ; and hence, that our first parents were competent, we cannot doubt. But in being essentially competent to preserve the interests committed to their trust, they must have possessed the moral power to avoid moral evil. We conclude, therefore, that Adam and Eve enjoyed the requisite power to resist the devil, and to obey God • and because they exercised the opposite power, we conclude that they possessed this also. But power -to obey God, in connection with power not to obey, is diversified power. 2. Diversified power is proved by natural conscious- ness. A consciousness of this power is indicated in legislation. First, legislation is applied to such per- sons as are presumed to be competent to obey. This is evident, from the fact that laws do not appeal to in- fants, idiots, madmen, or inferior animals ; who are incompetent to that self-control which it requires. Second, legislation is applied to such persons as are presumed to be competent to disobey. This is implied in its penalties, and indeed in its very existence. It proclaims, therefore, diversified power : power to obey, and power to disobey. 46 DIVERSIFIED POWER. But legislation is in a sense universal. It prevails in all ages, and among all nations. It is therefore in- dicative of diversified power, as recognized primarily in natural consciousness. Praise and blame are indicative of the same thing. They are employed among mankind universally ; which is evidence of a natural consciousness, that they are pro£>er in themselves, and truthful in their essen- tial implications. But in their application to mankind, they imply that the good and evil actions of men might have been other than they are, or have been ; and this is a direct implication of diversified power. A man is not praised for having been born the heir of an estate, but for having acquired one by industry and economy ; and he is not blamed for losing his estate through an unavoidable dispensation of Providence, but for losing it through imprudence or neglect. "Why is this difference made ? Manifestly, because in the one case the agent is so circumstanced, that only one thing is possible ; whereas in the other, he is pre- sumed to have been so situated, that either one of two things were possible. Finally, every unsophisticated individual is con- scious of having omitted many duties which he might have performed, and of having done many things which he mighthave omitted. Even when the power of contra- ry choice has terminated, the consciousness of its ha vino- been enjoyed, still remains ; and it seems to become more deep and pungent as life wears away. Hence it is that the despairing are led to exclaim, " The time DIVERSIFIED POWER. 47 was when I might have repented ; but now it is too late." 3. Diversified power is proved by the fact, that the human will may be exercised in opposition to the Di- vine will. The Divine will may be opposed, or it may not. If it may not be ojyposeel, it is in all things, in all respects, and by all mankind obeyed ; and then all mankind are children of God, and will be finally glori- fied in heaven. For it is written, " He that doeth the will of God, abideth forever." — 1 John 3 : 17. And Christ said, " Whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother." — Mark 3 : 35. But all are not Christ's brothers and sisters. He says of some, " Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do." — John 8 : 44. And again, " That servant who knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes." — Luke 12 : 47. Therefore, though it is written of "the Most High," " He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth," so that we may say, " Who hath resisted his will," as it is con- tained in his purposes concerning his own action, it still is true, that his will, as it is expressed in his com- mandments concerning the moral actions of his ra- tional creatures, may be, and is opposed. If God's will is opposed by sinners, it must be that he wills they should do otherwise than they do ; and if so, 48 DIVERSIFIED POWER. he wills that they should possess the power to do oth- erwise. To suppose that he wills the one and not the other, is to suppose a contradiction in the Divine mind. It is like supposing that a father is willing his child should eat, but not willing that he should have power to eat. If such inconsistency cannot be true of a man, much less can it be true of God. But if God wills that sinners should possess the power to do otherwise than they do, then, at times at least, they actually enjoy that power ; for their pos- session of it depends primarily on the Divine agency, and in respect to his own agency in a given matter, God's will is in every instance accomplished. " None can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou V But if sinners possess at times the power to do other- wise than they do, since they certainly have power at all times to do as they do, then, at times at least, they actually enjoy diversified power. All power is from God ; and to say that he imparts to sinners the power to oppose his will, but withholds from them the power not to oppose, is to say that in his operations God is divided against himself. It is to say, that he has at the same time, and in the same respect, a will that they shall do as they do, and a will that they shall not do as they do ; and that in those very actions in which they oppose the Divine will, they are entirely subject to the Divine will, and do not op- pose it. On this plan, the Supreme Being opposes himself through the moral actions of his creatures, DIVERSIFIED POWER. 49 (which "infers a moral necessity of those actions/') and then, because he pressed them into his thankless service, he is angry with them, and delivers them over to the eternal pains of the second death ! No wonder that the necessitarian, unable to perceive any consistency in these views, should denominate them a " mystery/' They constitute indeed a mystery : not the " mystery of godliness/' nor the " mystery of iniqui- ty," but the mystery of " philosophy falsely so called.' In his lamentation over Jerusalem, our Lord said. " How often would I have gathered thy childre: together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not." Hear his solemn protestation, in words so plain that a child may under- stand him, and behold his tears in proof of his sincer- ity ; and then say that his will was not opposed ! The man who can do it, is not to be reasoned with : he labors under a metaphysical monomania, which would prompt him to act the part of Peter, and to merit the rebuke which he received, when he attempted to cor- rect our Savior, and said, " Be it far from thee, Lord: this shall not be unto thee." 4. Diversified power is proved by future punish- ment. " If men are to be punished in another world, God must be the punisher. If Grocl be the punisher, the punishment must be just. If the punishment be iust, the punished must be guilty. If the punished be guilty, they could have done otherwise ; if they could have done otherwise, they were" possessed of diversified power. 50 DIVERSIFIED POWER. 5. Diversified power is proved by particular pas- sages of Scripture. " God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting Hie ; for God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved." — John 3 : 16, 17. The term world, either means the elect, or all mankind. It does not mean simply the elect. If it did, the phrase, " that whoso- ever believeth in him should not perish," would mean, that whosoever of the elect believeth in him, should not perish ; and then the passage would imply, that some of the elect would disbelieve and perish. Thus it would involve a contradiction. Therefore the term world, does not mean the elect only, but all mankind ; and in this sense it agrees with the next verse : " He that believeth not, is condemned already." The verb, " might be saved," can have but one of two meanings. Either it means that God sent his Son into the world to make salvation possible to all mankind, or else that he sent Mm to make it sure to all. It does not mean the latter ; because all are not saved, though Christ accomplished the Divine purpose, and could say, " I have finished the work which, thou gavest me to do." — John 17 : 4. It means, therefore, the. former. But if salvation is possible to all man- kind, then all ' have power to be saved ; and as they who are lost have also power not to be saved, it follows that they, a least, are at some time or other possessed of diversified power. DIVERSIFIED POWER. 51 Again, " To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to bfm it is sin." — James 4 : 17. The term "knoweth/' is translated from eido, (Ejfe). In Mat. 7: 11, this word is rendered, "know how." " If ye then, being evil, Jenoiv how to give good gifts unto your children." In Luke 12 : 56, it is translated can. " Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky." In James it cannot mean less ; because it is employed to exjoress an essential ground of moral ob- ligation. But power to do good, in connection with power not to do it, which is also implied in the pas- sage, is diversified power. Again, " Seek ye the Lord while he may be found : call ye upon him while he is near." — Isa. 55 : 6. This passage implies at once a possibility to find the Lord, and a possibility not to find him ; which constitutes a two-fold power. The same power is implied in the following passages : " She hath done what she could." — Mark 14: 8. " Ye did run well ; who did hinder you ?"— Gal. 5 : 7. " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength." — Mark 12 : 30. Is this command reasona- ble? Is obedience possible? Christ says, "My yoke is easy, and my burden light." — Mat. 11 : 31. It is therefore possible. But is it possible to those who have but little strength ? It is ; for the injunction requires, in that case, only the exercise of that little. But again, is disobedience possible to those to whom obedience is possible ? Is it possible that they should 52 DIVERSIFIED POWER. not love God ; or that they should not love him with all their strength ? It is, for it is written, " The love of many shall wax cold." — Mat. 24 : 12. And again, " Ye did run well ; who did hinder you ?" — Gal. 5 : 7. This two-fold possibility constitutes diversified power. " Unto the angel of the church of Ephesus write : These things saith he that holdeth the seven stars in his right hand, who walketh in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks : I know thy works, and thy labor, and thy patience, and how thou canst not bear them which are evil ; and thou hast tried them which say they are apostles, and are not ; and hast found them liars : and hast borne, and hast patience, and for my name's sake hast labored, and hast not fainted. Nevertheless, I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first love. Kemember therefore from whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do the first works ; or else I will come unto thee quickly, and will remove thy candlestick out of his place, except thou repent." — Kev; 2 : 1-5. Those who were addressed in this Scripture, had power to do that which was laid to their charge : they had power to fall from this first love. Had they also power not to fall ? They had ; for it is written, " God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able ; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it." — 1 Cor. 10 : 13. They possessed, therefore, diver- sified power. We may perhaps be reminded, by way of objection, DIVERSIFIED POWER. 53 of the following passages : " The carnal mind is en- mity against God ; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh, cannot please God/' — Kom. 8 : 7, 8. "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." — Mat. 7 : 18. In view of these passages, the objector may inquire, how can a sinner be supposed to have any relevant power to exercise a right volition ? We answer, on the same principle that a Christian may be supposed to have a relevant power to exercise a wrong volition ; for, that " a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit," is not any truer, than that " a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit." The figure of the tree refers to what moral agents are, in their positive disposition ; and it teaches that with this internal disposition, the exter- nal conduct must agree. This is what is meant by St. Paul when he says, " So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God." The " carnal mind," and the "carnally minded" soul, are not identically the same thing. The carnal mind is a sensual or wicked disposition, and such a disposition is enmity against God ; and hence the soul cannot please God in this disposition. On the same principle, a moral agent cannot displease him in a spiritual disposition. Yet Christians may sin, and displease their Maker ; for they have done it. They must therefore have been so tried or operated on, that, in a given respect, all posi- tive disposition was removed before they sinned : and thus the hindrance was removed before their state was 54 DIVERSIFIED POWER. changed. The same thing may take place with the sinner. He may be so influenced, that, in a given respect, all positive disposition shall be removed before he chooses aright ; and thus all hindrance may be re- moved before his state is changed. Having shown that capacity may develope itself in either of two distinct forms of power, unigenous or diversified, we shall now proceed to trace out the facts which are connected with each separately. We begin with unigenous power. CHAPTER IV, ©it % f retonmraa of prtto & faxixfam fymiwn PRINCIPLES. XV. Unigenous power implies the predominance of a given motive or motives. There are those who contend that in every instance of moral agency, and therefore in every instance of moral capacity, some one motive predominates over all others, and in every respect determines the agent's choice. We believe, that some one motive predomi- nates only in cases of unigenons power. They who believe a predominance to obtain in every instance of moral agency, as the occasion of such agency, are con- strained to sustain their position by reasoning ir- a vicious circle. " They first assume gratuitously, that the mind acts mechanically, like the body ; and that it never can act, unless the motive which occasions the action, L? greater than any other then existing in the mind. Any particular volition is then declared to be necessary. because the motive which occasioned it was the strongest then in the mind. But when asked for the proof that this motive was the strongest, they simply 56 MOTIVE PREDOMINANCE. refer us to the volition, which otherwise (say they) could not have taken place. That is, the volition was necessary, because it was produced by the strongest motive ; and the motive must have been the strongest, because -the volition was produced/' — Sedge's Logic. Any doctrine which requires to be supported by such reasoning, cannot be true. We believe, however, that some one motive predominates in all instances of moral capacity, as unigenous power. This form of ca- pacity is a moral power, in a given case, to will or act exclusively in one given direction. It involves, there- fore, a moral inability for any other action ; for it is this which renders it unigenous. As a moral power, to exercise a given volition, it implies an adequate motive as the ground of its specific existence ; and as involv- ing a moral inability for any other volition in the case, it implies an absence or deficiency of motive influence for any other. But the motive which, in a given case, is adequate to the power of action, must be greater than those which in the same case are not adequate. That is to say, it must be greater in its influence on the agent. What it may be in itself, affects not the question. Therefore, moral cajDacity, as unigenous power, im- plies that the motive which operates in the direction of its existence and action, is predominant. To act in favor of the weaker, and against the stronger of diverse motives, is impossible, because it would involve a contradiction. It would imply, that the agent is at least as powerfully moved by that MOTIVE PREDOMINANCE. 57 which influences him less, as by that which influences him more ; which is an absurdity. The predominance of a given motive, and the existence of unigenous moral power, do therefore mutually imply each other. If an agent could be subjected to unigenous power of moral action, independently of the predominance of a given motive, he might be limited to a given course of volition or action, independently of his convictions and affections ; and if so limited, Iris action would be purely mechanical. If his action were merely mechanical, it could not be properly rational ; and if it could not be rational, it could not be moral action. Therefore, if an agent could be subjected to unigenous power of moral action, independently of the predominance of a given motive, then might that which to him is moral action, be to hini at the same time not moral action. On the other hand, if this absurdity cannot obtain, then unigenous power involves the predominance of motive influence in a given direction. XVI. The predominance of a given motive may have its origin, extrinsic of the agent affected. 1. This sentiment is rational. Reason teaches us the existence of a Supreme Being ; and that he exer- cises not only a physical, but a moral government over mankind. It teaches also, that in the exercise of such a government, he must employ motives ; that motives may possess such positive and relative strength as he p 1 eases ; and that he may please they shall, in their influence, at times at least, and in given cases, be un- equal. If the Divine Being were excluded from this 58 MOTIVE PREDOMINANCE. control over the diverse influences of good and evil, he would be almost entirely without a moral govern- ment ; and then either finite beings or blind fortuity, would bear almost unlimited rule. Even then, how- ever, given motives might, in given instances, predom- inate ; and their predominance might have its origin, extrinsic of the agent affected. 2. This sentiment is also scriptural. "And the Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Eamoth Gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him, wherewith ? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And He said, thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also. Go forth and do so." — 1 Kings, 22 : 20-22. Some contend, that in all cases the result of motives might have been avoided, or that the strongest influ- ences may be resisted; but this idea appears to be disproved by the case of Ahab. When God had de- termined to destroy him at Karoo th Gilead, he actu- ated him by a predo urinating motive influence, to go up to that place; and that he could not resist this influence, we infer, not only from the predominance of the influence, but from the Divine purpose, which would have been defeated, if the influence had been resisted. "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water : he turneth it whitherso- ever he will." — Prov. 21 : 1. EXTRINSIC CAUSATION. 59 XVII. When the predominance of a given motive, in respect to a given action, has its origin extrinsic of the agent affected, the agent is, in a two-fold respect, subject to extrinsic causation. 1. He is subject to extrinsic causation in the abstract of bis action. . That is to say, through the means of the existing motive, and by some power distinct from himself which employs that motive, he is caused to act, instead of being permitted to forbear acting. It precludes the possibility of his being not an agent. This result, however, is not confined to motives in pre- dominance ; because it depends not on what motives are relatively, but on what they are in themselves. What we mean to say, is, that man is caused to act by means of motives ; and that this is particularly true of motives in predominance. 2. The agent is, at the same time, subject to extrinsic causation in the concrete of his action. That is to say, under a predominance of motive influence, he is not only caused to act, but he is caused to act in a particular manner; so that his action, as distinct and specific, is the effect of an extrinsic cause. He is caused to act as he does, instead of being permitted to act otherwise. In accordance with this view, we read, " I will send my fear before thee, and will de- stroy all the people to whom thou shalt come, and I will make thine enemies turn their backs unto thee." — Ex. 23 : 27. "Now the Lord had told Samuel in his ear, a day before Saul came, saying, To-morrow about this time, I will send thee a man out of the land 60 MORAL CAUSATION. of Benjamin, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel." — 1 Sam. 9 : 15, 16. Was it possible for Saul to falsify this word of God to Sam- uel, or to prevent Jehovah from doing his pleasure in this matter? If not, then the influences under which Saul acted in visiting Samuel, were irresistible, as well as divinely originated. XYIII. Causation by means of motives, is moral causation. As are the means, and as is the nature of their op- eration, such is the effect ; and when the means con- sist of motives, they are properly moral means. Physical events or conditions are not precluded, but their agency in moral causation, is in a sense remote. They conspire to render the agent susceptible of the motive influence on which the effect depends, or they contribute to produce that influence ; but their con- nection with the effect is not immediate. The influ- ence intervenes as the connecting and essential link, and it is this which distinguishes the result from a merely physical or mechanical effect ; or it is this which constitutes it a moral effect. The subject is illustrated in the manner in which Saul was divinely caused to visit Samuel, that the purpose of God might be accomplished in his being anointed king over Israel. God told Samuel the day before, that he would send him " a man out of the land of Benjamin," and the youthful Saul was that man whom the prophet was to anoint ; but God said nothing of this to Saul, and neither did he physically MORAL CAUSATION. 61 necessitate him to go. Yet the event was brought to pass. It was providentially so arranged that "the asses of Kish, Saul's father, were lost ; and Kish said to Saul his son, Take now one of the servants with thee, and arise, go seek the asses/' Here was, at the right time, a motive, predominant and irresistible to a dutiful son, in favor of setting out on what proved to be a considerable journey, which motive was from time to time modified by new cir- cumstances, in such a manner as to consummate the Divine purpose. He was influenced of God to seek in the right direction, not to find the animals, but to find the prophet ; and when he was disposed to turn back, the servant was prompted to suggest a visit to the man of God, to inquire of him, in whose vicinity they had now arrived. Besides, it was so arranged that Saul should have no insuperable objection to the proposed visit, and that the servant's suggestion should strike his mind with peculiar force. " Then said Saul to his servant, But behold, if we go, what shall we bring to tjie man? for the bread is spent in our vessels, and there is not a present to bring to the man of God : what have we ? And the servant answered Saul again, and said, Behold, I have here at hand the fourth part of a shekel of silver ; that will I give to the man of God, to tell us our way. Then said Saul to his ser- vant, Well said : come, let us go : and they went unto the city where the man of God was." 1 Sam. 9 : 3, 7, 8, 10. * CHAPTER V. PRINCIPLES. XIX. Subjection to extrinsic moral causation, is moral necessity. 1. It is necessity. This term always expresses some one essential idea, which is obvious to mankind in gen- eral. That idea lies not in the nature of the cause, the subject, or the effect; for in the . application of the term necessity, the nature of things is not regarded. Neither is the idea realized in the opposition of the subject ; for that is also disregarded in the use of the word. The iden of necessity, must, therefore, lie in subjection, or in the state of the agent as subject. * Necessity cannot be more than subjection, and it cannot be less. When a cause has done its work to the utmost, and has created its largest effect, if the agent acted on, is not literally annihilated, it has only produced his subjection ; and when it has created its smallest effect, it has still produced his subjection, in so far as the effect extends. To suppose an extrinsic cause of the agent's action to exist, exclusive of his subjection to that cause, is to suppose that the cause MORAL NECESSITY. 63 of his action is not the cause. To avoid this absur- dity, we must admit, that as the cause never produces to the agent more than subjection, so it never produ- ces to him less than subjection ; and, at the same time we must admit, that it never produces more nor less to him, than necessity ; and hence, that in so far as the agent's state is concerned, it produces nothing differ- ent from necessity. The agent may be free in placing himself within the range of the cause, but not free, perhaps, to retreat, nor free, when the cause seizes him, to break or prevent the relation between cause and effect. In this lack of freedom lies his subjection, and in this subjection lies his necessity. 2. It is moral necessity. It is such, because it is produced by motive influence, as the means ; or, be- cause it is properly a necessity of the mind. Motive influence, when it is evil, is the charm of that "old serpent the devil ;" which, when it predominates, though it leaves its subject in possession of limbs to escape, yet so controls his mind as to render flight impossible. When the predominating influence is holy, the neces- sity which it involves, is like that which confirms the glorified saints and angels in their happy state of obe- dience. We may here remark, First. If subjection to extrinsic causation is alone ne- cessity, unigenous power is not. A wide and marked difference exists between the two. It is the difference between a possession of power, and a concomitant lack of power ; or rather between power, and a concomi- tant subjection, in its exercise, to the power of another. 64 MORAL NECESSITY. The two may co-exist, and in moral agency may mutu- ally imply each other, but they are not, on that account, identical. Second. If moral necessity consists of a subjection to extrinsic causation, winch implies the predominance of a given motive, and if this motive predominance in- volves moral capacity, in the form of unigenous power, then moral capacity is implied in moral necessity ; and then moral capacity is not moral freedom. Freedom and necessity are merely states in which capacity is exercised ; and hence they are both distinct from it, though each implies a corresponding form of its ex- istence. Third. If moral necessity consists of a subjection to extrinsic causation, it cannot consist of a mere a want of disposition," or "a will not." A mere "will not/' is only a refusal ; a refusal is an act of choice ; an act of choice is an act of moral agency; an act of moral agency is not identical with the state in which it is performed. It may, perhaps, be said, that the exercise of a given choice is inconsistent with the exercise of a contrary choice at the same time ; and that therefore it involves necessity. But the necessity of not also choosing an object when we refuse it, or of not also refusing it when we choose it, is not the necessity under consid- eration — it is not a moral, but a natural necessity. It is not produced by any peculiarity in motive influence, and it is as really true in respect to those volitions in which the agent is free, as in respect to those in which MORAL NECESSITY. 65 he is not. A projectile cannot also descend when it ascends ; but this necessity of its nature is entirely dis- tinct from its necessity to ascend, or its necessity to descend. Fourth. Finally, since moral necessity consists of a subjection to an extrinsic causation, which is exerted through motive influence, it follows that those teachers of philosophy are in error, who say that "Freedom con- . sists in power to choose according to the motive which is placed before the mind." It is impossible to choose, as a rational or moral agent, without a motive ; but it is not impossible to be necessitated to choose. There- fore, power to choose according to some motive, is not of itself freedom. XX. Moral necessity may apply to the agent, either in respect to his agency in the abstract only, or also in respect to his agency in the concrete. 1. Necessity in respect of agency in the abstract, is simply a necessity to act, instead of not acting. It is an impossibility to forbear the exercise of choice, and of other functions of the mind and body. This necessity, during our conscious moments, is universally and perpetually present. It operates as truly, steadily, and effectually,, on every being in the universe of mind, as does the law of gravity on every star and planet in the universe of matter. The proof lies in the nature and relations of being, and in every man's conscious- ness of lus own condition. We cannot cease to expe- rience want, and we cannot cease to think of various 66 MORAL NECESSITY. objects around us, which are adapted to relieve our necessities, and to afford us pleasure. Concerning these necessities, and these objects, the law of God prescribes our duty; and this law we must necessarily either obey or disobey — we must either obey or disobey, in the will and otherwise. But thus to ful- fill or transgress God's law, is moral action. Therefore, we are moral actors or agents, of absolute necessity. Necessity, in respect to agency in the concrete, is a necessity to act in a given manner. It is a necessity to choose a particular object or objects, and of pursu- ing a particular course of conduct, instead of some other object, or course of action ; or it is a necessity in full, so that the agent has no available alternative. It includes necessity in the abstract, and therefore differs from it only in extent ; yet this difference creates a distinction which is of great importance — a distinction which lies at the very foundation of freedom and ac- countability. XXI. Moral necessity, in the concrete of moral agency, may he either factitious or radical. 1. Factitious necessity is that which is a direct re- sult of the agent's own action. The exercise of given volitions, at least under particu- lar circumstances, is adaptedto enhance given influences; and hence it may produce a temporary dominion of those influences, and by this means a temporary sub- jection to extrinsic causation. In choosing, the agent relinquishes, in favor of a given influence, whatever of reserve he had till then maintained ; and if the result MORAL NECESSITY. 67 be pleasant, that influence will be augmented : if it be not pleasant, that influence may be destroyed, and an- other be augmented to a state of predominance. In either case, such a modification of influences may ensue as shall prove the means of his being irresistibly con- trolled. The exercise of a given volition may so change his relations, that the sources of a given influence shall be multiplied, and brought nearer, while the sources of opposing influences are rendered fewer, and more re- mote. Finally, the -exercise of volition in a given di- rection, may result in a particular habit ; and that habit may become irresistible. "Know ye not, that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey ; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?" — Rom. 6: 16. The word servants, (<5ou/o») signifies slaves. " Can the Ethi- opian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil." — Jer. 13: 23. The dominion of a given kind of influence, as result- ing from a given volition, may even be permanent. "If we sin willfully, after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sac- rifice for sins ; but a certain fearful looking for of judg- ment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the ad- versaries. — Heb. 10: 26, 27. "Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." — Mat. 12 : 32. 68 MORAL NECESSITY. 2. Kadical moral necessity, in the concrete of moral agency, is a necessity which is wholly the effect of an extrinsic cause. We have an instance of it in the case of the Syrians who flecl from Samaria, under a sudden and irresistible impulse of fear: "For the Lord had made the host of the Syrians to hear a noise of chari- ots, and a noise of horses, even the noise of a great host ; and they said one to another, Lo, the king of Israel hath hired against us the kings of the Hittites, and the kings of the Egyptians, to come upon us. Wherefore, they arose and fled in the twilight, and left their tents, and their horses, and their asses, even the camp as it was, and fled for their life." — 2 Kings, 7: 6,7. Their own conduct, it is true, was made the occa- sion of the moral necessity under which they fled ; but the necessity was nevertheless radical, because their hostile operations against Samaria, had in themselves no tendency to produce it. Again we read, "But Sihon, king of Heshbon, would not let us pass by him; for the Lord thy G-ocl hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver hirn into thy hand, as appeareth this day." — Deut. 2 : 30. These are very plain instances of an extrinsic cause operating on finite moral agents, and producing their actions as effects ; and the relation of cause and effect, is always, to the subject of the operation, a necessary relation at the time of the operation. The agent af- fected is then truly a subject. MOKAL NECESSITY. 69 XXII. Radical moral necessity, in the concrete of moral agency, may he conceived of, as being either ad- ventitious or absolute. 1. As adventitious, it is casual or occasional. It does not cover the agent's whole life ; but it is divinely created, at an appropriate time or times, as required by particular circumstances. It is such as has been already instanced in the case of the terrified Syrians, and in that of Sihon, the obstinate king of Heshbon. It may also be instanced in the case of the ten kings, who give their power to the apocalyptic beast. " For God hath put in their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled."— Eev. 17 : 17. That is to say, " God has given it into their hearts to execute his sentence/' — Campbell. When God pleases that it shall exist, it unites with that necessity which we have denominated facti- tious ; which it renders proof against approaching events, as in the case of Pharaoh. In the world to come, it confirms the wicked in their hostility, and the righteous in their allegiance. 2. As absolute, it is conceived of as applying to every moral agent, during every period of his existence, and in every act of his agency. This absolute radical moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, is what we usually mean by the simple phrase, " moral necessity ;" because it is the only moral necessity in dispute. The question is, does it exist ? The necessi- 70 MORAL NECESSITY. tarian answers in the affirmative : we answer in the negative. XXIII. Absolute radical moral necessity in the con- crete of moral agency, cannot 'be proved to exist. If its existence were a truth, it might be proved, either by Scripture, reason, or consciousness ; but it cannot be made out by 'either. 1. It cannot be proved by the Inspired Scriptures. Kadical moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, may exist. As we have shown, it is affirmed in the Holy Bible ; but it is always spoken of in the Scriptures as adventitious, and never as absolute. The instances of its existence which are specified, are recorded as uncommon events ; and then occasions are described as having in them something peculiar. For instance, we are not informed that the Lord always hardened Pharaoh's heart, or that he always made Si- hon's heart obstinate, or that he always sent " strong delusions" upon some minds, or that he does the like to all sinners ; but we are told that hardness, obstina- cy, and delusion, were sent upon particular persons, on particular occasions, and with exclusive relevancy in the reasons. They are recorded as instances of a necessity, which does not cover the agent's entire life ; and therefore as instances of a necessity which is not absolute. 2. As absolute, it cannot be proved by reason. " The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom ruleth over all ;" so that the neces- sity in question cannot exist, unless God subject man- MOKAL NECESSITY. 71 kind, dining every moment of their probation, to the circumstances which produce it, and so make himself its primary and proper cause. But God is infinite in wisdom, goodness, and justice ; -and therefore he can- not be the cause of such a necessity. The supremacy of the Divine government, and the wisdom, goodness, and justice of God, are all ascer- tained facts ; and hence they all come under the cog- nizance of reason. What, then, is the voice of reason ? It proclaims clearly, that the necessity in question does not exist, because it would be a necessity for all the crimes and miseries of the present state, and for all the blasphemies and eternal agonies of the future ; and that it would be wholly gratuitous to those who are thus doomed. Gratuitous to Adam was the boon of his existence, and gratuitous to his posterity was the boon of their existence in him ; and if Aclani was under this absolute necessity, his fall was gratuitous ; and whether he was or not, the fall of his posterity was to them gratuitous, because of a gratuitous con- nection with him. In his fall, Adam forfeited his ex- istence ; and by a gratuitous connection with him, his posterity suffered a gratuitous forfeiture of theirs. By a gratuitous provision, the forfeited personal ex- istence of Adam's posterity, was gratuitously imposed upon them ; and hence if this absolute moral necessi- ty accompanies it as an inseparable adjunct, that also is gratuitous. Reason asserts that such an exercise of sovereignty would be an exercise of enormous tyranny : that it woidd be cruel and unjust in the extreme. In 72 MOEAL NECESSITY. such a case, God might be just to others, but not to those whom his Almighty hand chained down to sin, and misery, and death. Keason further affirms, that if God were not just to all, but exceedingly cruel to some, he could not be " good to all ;" and that in such a case, his justice and goodness could not be infinite ; and hence, that he could not be infinitely wise : not wise enough to be universally good and just. Thus the necessity in question, if it existed, would preclude the Divine In- finitude ; and hence it would, in reality, preclude the Divine existence itself. Perhaps we shall be told, that this necessity, though it involves so much that is terrible, is upon the whole wisest and best ; but such a statement wholly fails to relieve the subject. It simply affirms that it is wisest and best upon the whole, that to a large portion of mankind God should be utterly and eternally unjust ; and to say this, is to affirm that infinite wisdom and goodness are inconsistent with infinite justice. It is to affirm that the multitude of sinners is a sacrifice, not to justice, but in opposition to justice ; a sacrifice to that wisdom and goodness which God exercises, not towards them, but towards a few favorites, called " the elect." Such a sentiment is not according to the deductions of reason, unless it be from false premises. 3. The necessity in question is not proved by con- sciousness. Consciousness is found not to contradict Scripture and reason, but to endorse and verify them. MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 73 There are seasons in men's lives, when their internal experience is not of a state of hardness, obstinacy, and judicial delusion ; but of a state of tenderness, inquiry, and salutary convictions. In this internal experience, they enjoy a consciousness, that they may " break off their sins by righteousness ;" and that they may " return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon them, and to our Grod, for he will abun- dantly pardon." XXIV. Moral necessity is a proper necessity. The necessitarian affirms that it is not. His language is such as the following : " It must be observed, that in what has been ex- plained as signified by the name of moral necessity, the word necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word ; for, as was observed before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, etc., in common speech, and in their most proper sense, are always relative ; having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral ne- cessity ; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself, which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it." Again he says : " It must be observed concerning moral inability in each kind of it, [i. e., general and particular] that the word inability, is used in a sense very diverse from its origi- nal import. The word signifies only a natural inabil- ity, in the proper use of it ; and is applied to such 4 74 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. cases only, wherein a present will or inclination to the thing with respect to which a person is said to be un- able, is supposable. " It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed if the act of the will were present. And if it be im- properly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions which dejDend on the will, it is in some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves ; because it is more evidently false with respect to these, that he cannot, if he will ; for to say so is a downright contra- diction : it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will." — - Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sec. IY. By "voluntary actions/' nothing appears to be meant distinct from "actions which depend on the will." That moral necessity is not termed necessity im- properly, but properly, appears from the following con- siderations : 1. The criterion by which it has been pronounced to be not properly necessity, is a false criterion. The criterion is, that proper necessity always instances " contrary will or endeavor." By this rule, the indi- vidual who dies in a struggle for his life, dies necessa- rily ; whereas he whose head is cloven by an unseen hand, so that he perishes in a moment, without put- ting forth any opposition of will or endeavor, dies not properly of necessity, but freely. But common sense MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 75 tells us, that the latter victim is as truly necessitated in his death as is the former; and hence that Ed- wards' criterion is utterly false. 2 When an extraneous cause rules the agent by over- coming his opposition, he is admitted to be in a state of necessity : why, then, is not his condition one of necessity, when an extraneous cause rules him with so much greater force, as to preclude or destroy the very power of opposition? If there is in either case any difference of condition in favor of freedom, it is when the slave possesses yet some power of resistance ; and not when that power is wholly precluded or destroyed. Opposition is a counter-act of the inner man, in the exercise of volition or choice; and it simply proves that what binds and enslaves the body, does not al- ways enslave the spirit or soul. It proves that the soul is either free, or under a contrary necessity. Hence, to say that "contrary endeavor" is essential to a given necessity, is to say that either freedom, or a contrary necessity is essential to it ; and to affirm this, is to affirm that if a given necessity should become absolute, so as to preclude all contrary necessity and all freedom, then that absolute necessity would not properly be necessity at all, but freedom. It is the same as to say, disease is a state which implies either a measure of contrary disease, or a measure of health ; and that when a given disease becomes universal, so as to preclude all contrary disease, and all health, then that given disease is not properly disease, but health. Or, to confine the illustration to "contrary endeavor," 76 MOEAL NECESSITY KEAL. instead of extending it to legitimate implications, the absurdity in question is the same as to say. disease is that state of the system in which medicine is taken ; and that therefore, in all cases in which medicine is not taken, or in which no contrary endeavor is made, the patient is not properly sick, but well. Edwards artfully says : " Necessity is always rela- tive ;" which is very true, and throws the reader off his guard. He then adds, " having reference to oppo- sition or endeavor that is insufficient ;" which is very untrue. It is relative in that being not a substance but a state, it cannot exist apart from its subject, like life 01 death, which has no separate or positive existence of its own, but which has a relative existence, because it relates to some being or beings. Or, neces- sity is relative because it is simply the agent's rela- tion of subjection to extrinsic causation. To say, therefore, that it is relative as "having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor that is insufficient" is wholly gratuitous and in- correct. Mankind in general believe, that absolute moral necessity in moral agency, is utterly inconsistent with proper freedom in that agency ; and hence when they call it necessity, they do not employ the term figura- tively, or as Edwards has it, " nonsensically." They mean what they say. Also, they speak of moral necessity as a real necessity, under no mistake or inadvertence as to contrary endeavor. They know perfectly well, that in all cases of moral necessity, the MORAL NECESSITY KEAL. 77 soul is constrained in the exercise of willing ; and that therefore no contrary endeavor is possible. It is there- fore the deliberate voice of mankind, or of natural consciousness in mankind, that contrary will or en- deavor is not essential to necessity ; and the argument which assumes it to be essential, is merely a sophism : a fallacia accidentis. But why is Edwards so anxious to make out, that moral necessity is not properly necessity ? It is an important part of his system ; -being inseparable from the idea, that moral freedom is not properly freedom. These two ideas contain the very essence of fatal- ism ; and they have done more, perhaps, than any others, to give currency to the necessitarian's creed. When one is persuaded that moral necessity is not properly necessity, he is easily persuaded that man- kind are universally and absolutely subject to it ; and though this conclusion requires him to discard the doctrine of moral freedom, he does it the more readily from considering, that if moral necessity be not prop- erly necessity, moral freedom is not properly freedom, and therefore is not of any consequence. When moral freedom, which is the essential and all-important freedom, has been thrown overboard, the mind is supplied, by way of compensation, with the idea of a natural freedom ; which idea simply is, that the agent is morally necessitated without being also necessitated after a physical manner. The meaning is, that the agent is only necessitated by one method, and not by two. 78 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. It is as if a coroner's jury should say, The man has only been murdered by having a dagger thrust to his heart, and not also by having his head cloven ; and because he had not also his brains dashed out, there- fore he was, properly speaking, not murdered at all. 2. A part of Edwards' argument is merely an irrel- evant truism. He says of the necessitated agent, " If it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions which depend on the will, it is in some respects more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves ; be- cause it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will ; for to say so, is a downright contradiction. It is to say, he cannot will, if he does will." The imposition to be proved is, he is able to exert given acts of the will, under a moral inability to exert them. The proof is, he can will them, if he ivill ; " for to say, he cannot will, if he does will, is a downright con- tradiction." This is strong reasoning : such as is worthy of its author, and of his cause ; for all must admit, what I believe none have ever denied, that an agent can will, if he does will. It would indeed be very conclusive reasoning, if it only had some bearing on the question in debate, or if the question were essentially othei than it is ; but, unfortunately for the argument, the question is not whether the agent can will when he does will, but whether he can will under a relevant MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 79 moral inability to will, and when of course lie does not will. To say, lie can if he does, is equivalent to say- ing, he can if he can ; which is all very true, and it would be very absurd to deny it, but it is also very irrelevant, and very simple. Thus Edwards has at- tempted to show, that moral agents can exercise given volitions under a moral inability to exercise them, and has failed ; elsewhere he has undertaken to prove the contrary, and apparently with success. His language is as follows : " Moral necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity ; that is, the effect may be as per- fectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. I suppose none will deny, but that in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it ; for this plain reason, because, what- ever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite ; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty de- grees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty, yet, if the difficulty 80 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. be increased to thirty, or a hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty."— On the Will, Part I. Sec. IY. This insufficiency of strength, is precisely what ob- tains in all cases of moral necessity j and hence that necessity is a real or proper necessity. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose that a difficulty in a given instance, may be wholly ^surmountable, and yet wholly surmountable, at the same time ; which is an absurdity. This very absurdity, however, belongs to Edwards' reasoning as a whole ; and it strongly reminds me of Dow's poetry. The crazy man's lines are, if I remember correctly, as follows : "You can, and you can't; You shall, and you shan't; You will, and you won't ; You '11 be damned if you do, And you '11 be damned if you don't." 3. The idea that moral necessity is termed necessity improperly, implies that moral freedom is termed freedom improperly ; and hence, that moral freedom has, properly speaking, no existence. This is no doubt the necessitarian's honest belief. He holds to no freedom, which does not permit him to attribute every moral action to some cause beyond the actor ; and hence he believes in no freedom which takes the actor out of the position of a subject in any respect. He could very well discard the troublesome word, freedom, from his vocabulary ; but he finds it necessary to con- MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 81 descend, somewhat, to the weakness of those who be- lieve in freedom as a reality. His only resource, there- fore, is to admit freedom in the name, and to exclude it in the sense. Thus freedom is taken by the beard, as if to be embraced ; but is immediately stabbed un- der the fifth rib, and buried in the dark grave of a false philosophy. 4. Moral necessity is real, in that the means and cause of its existence are real. Edwards himself " Moral causes may be causes in as proper a sense, as any causes whatsoever ; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason of an event's coming to pass." Then why are not the appropriate effects as real or proper as any other ? To suppose that they are not, is to suppose that the nature and reality of causes has nothing to do with the nature and reality of their ef- fects ; and hence, that the nature of the effect, and that of the cause, may be contrary. If a given event is an effect, so is the relation or connection between it and the cause ; and this connection is that of absolute subjection, which constitutes necessity. Now if the cause exists in a " proper sense," no matter what that cause may be, and if necessity exists as the effect only in an " improper sense," it follows that the effect of a proper cause of necessity, is, in a proper sense, free- dom ; for that is properly a state of liberty, which is not properly a state of necessity. Thus the necessita- rian's theory is reduced to a contradiction: 4* 82 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. The cause of an effect really controls its subject ; but the necessitarian will not call it proper necessity, when the subject puts forth no contrary endeavor. Now it happens so, that the cause of moral control is also the cause why the subject puts forth no contrary endeavor ; and hence the freedom which it involves is precisely like that of drift-wood on the bosom of the swollen stream : a freedom which is most purely and properly necessity. 5. Necessity consists of subjection to extrinsic caus- ation ; and whenever it obtains, it exists by occasion of the laws of our being. This is true of both natural and moral necessity. But in no case has the agent power to transcend the laws of his being ; and hence in no case has he power to transcend or contravene an existing necessity. The removal of the difficulty by himself, as it would involve a suspension of the laws of his being, would constitute a miracle. Therefore, in so far as moral agents do not possess the power to work miracles in their moral agency, in so far the moral necessity which they may experience, is neces- sity in the proper sense of the term. We may remark, that the reason why they are not exculpated from blame who are morally ne- cessitated in given instances of sin, as drunkards, liars, and murderers may be necessitated, is not be- cause the necessity is unreal ; but because it is founded on their own abuse of freedom. Its existence is by no means arbitrary. In other words, the agent who is necessitated to perform particular moral actions, MORAL NECESSITY REAL. £3 was primarily not necessitated to become thus necessi- tated ; or he was previously free to avoid it. The drunkard, the liar, or the murderer, who originates or occasions his peculiar moral necessity to commit a particular sin, does it, either primarily or remotely, against the remonstrances of his conscience, and of heavenly influences : does it in abuse and perversion of moral liberty. Consequently he is blameworthy as a sinner, for the very necessity under which he acts ; and if he is blameworthy for that, he is blameworthy for whatever of evil it involves. The necessity which mankind believe to be incom- patible with freedom and accountability, is in its ex- istence absolute and arbitrary : a necessity which, in respect to particular moral actions, they rightly believe does not take place. Having treated of the facts implied in unigenous power, we come now to speak of those which are con- nected with diversified power. CHAPTER VI PRINCIPLES. XXV. Diversified power implies the existence and influence of diverse motives. Power to perform a given act, as a moral act ; is pow- er to perform it as a rational act ; and power to perform it as a rational act, implies the existence of a reason for it ; and a reason is a motive. Therefore, power to perform a given moral act, implies the existence of a motive for that act. But a motive in favor of a given act, is not a motive in favor of any other act ; and specially not in favor of a contrary or rival act. There- fore, power to perform the contrary moral act, requires the existence of a contrary motive. Hence it is evident, that power to perform either one of two opposite moral acts, requires the existence of two opposite or diverse motives. In other words, power to choose either right or wrong, implies the existence, real or fancied, of at least two contrary objects, each of which exerts an in- fluence on the mind. Each of \\\p diverse objects may DIVERSE MOTIVES. 85 be two-fold — proximate and remote. The proximate object is a motive indirectly, or because it influences the agent by its real or apparent connection with the remote object ; but the remote object is a motive di- rectly, or because it influences the agent of itself. The remote object, therefore, is the motive in favor of the proximate object ; but the motive in favor of the re- mote object is the remote object itself. The remote ob- ject may be happiness, and the proximate may be that which involves the happiness ; or the proximate object may be the possession of that which produces happiness. Motives may be diverse in three respects. 1. They may differ in their relation to the divine law. As objects, the one may be prohibited, and the other not ; and this circumstance produces a contra- riety of moral quality. In other respects they may be generally the same. 2. They may be contrary in their relation to each other. As objects, either one may be attainable, but not both, or, not more than one ; or either one may be lawful, but not more than one. The enjoyment of the one, may preclude the enjoyment of the other. 3. They may be diverse in their nature. The one may be physical, or sensual, and the other spiritual. The allurements of sin, though specifically very nu- merous, are all summed up in the ideas of honor, wealth, and carnal pleasure ; or they consist of the "weak and beggarly elements of this world/' Said Paul, " Denias hath forsaken me, having loved this present world." — 2 Tim. 4: 10. 86 DIVERSE MOTIVES. The motives in favor of righteousness are also many, but our Lord sums them up in the following language : "He that believeth and is baptized;, shall be saved, but he that believeth not, shall be damned/' — Mark 16 : 16. Or, as given in the Kevelation, through St. John, thus : "And I saw a new heaven, and a new earth : for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away, and there was no more sea. And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her hus- band. And I heard a great voice out of heaven, say- ing, Behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. And God shall wijDe away all tears from their eyes ; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain ; for the former things are passed away. And he that sat upon the throne, said, Behold, I make all things new. And he said unto me, Write ; for these words are true and faithful. And he said unto me, It is done : I am Al- pha and Omega, the beginning and the end. I will give unto him that is athirst, of the fountain of the water of life freely. He that overcometh shall inherit all things, and I will be his God, and he shall be my son. But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abom- inable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcer- ers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone ; which is the second death/' — Bev, 21 : 1-8. DIVERSE MOTIVES. 87 XXVI. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of moral wrong, may consentaneously affect a sinful agent. 1. This principle is proved by two facts in the irre- ligious man's experience. The fact of his being a sin- ner, implies the existence of incentives to evil ; and the fact of his resolving at times to amend, as is often the case, implies the existence of benign and holy influen- ces. Every instance of a sinner's awakening, is an instance of his being acted upon by good motives ; for it is a collision between opposite incentives, which occa- sions the internal conflict, and that obdurate distress which is distinct from godly sorrow, but which may eventuate in such sorrow. 2. That sinners may be subject to both good and evil influences, is scriptural. Felix and Agrippa re- mained probably unconverted, and therefore under the influence of evil ; yet, under the preaching of Paul, the one trembled, and the other said, " Almost thou persua- dest me to be a Christian." Paul says, " Evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived ; " and yet it is written of Christ, "That was the true light, which light eth. every man that Com- eth into the world."— John 1 : 9. Paul speaks of sin- ners in the snare of the devil, as they " who are taken captive by him at liis will ; " yet Christ says of the Comforter, " When he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." — John 12 : 8. Again, Christ said of the Jews, "Ye are of your 88 DIVERSE MOTIVES. father the devil ; and the lusts of your father ye will do ; which means that they were under the influence of the devil. Yet Stephen said, " Ye stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Grhost : as your fathers did, so do ye. — Acts 7 : 51. If they resisted, they must have been affected by the Divine Spirit; and if so, they must have been wrought upon by a good influence. The same things are taught in the parable of the sower. The - seeds which "fell upon stony places, where they had not much earth," and those which "fell among thorns," were not without some effect, or influence ; but it was overcome by the greater influence of the stones and thorns. There must, therefore, have been a conflict, and, of course, a consentaneous operation of the di- verse influences. XXVII. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of evil, may consentaneously affect an innocent or holy being. 1. As proof, we may instance the temptation of our first parents in the garden. The tempter found them in- nocent, and under the influence of divine truth ; and he waited not for Grod to withdraw that influence, but ap- proached them at once with the counter influence of falsehood. As God was faithful to his goodly creature, he could not withdraw his sacred influence previous to that creature's transgression ; and that holy being, thus situated, could not sin without an evil influence. There- fore, the influences of good and evil must have met, on the mind and heart of our first parents, before that DIVERSE MOTIVES. 89 mind and heart were sullied with the guilt of a single offence. The prelinxinaries of the fall, especially in the case of Eve, consisted of a gradual process of in- ternal conflict and trial. 2. Paul had a similar experience. He says ; "I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God, after the inward man. But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my mem- bers/' — Kom. 7 : 21-23. This language cannot mean either more or less, than that the apostle experienced the operation of diverse influences. 3. The Lord Jesus experienced substantially the same quality and contrariety of incentives, but with- out any evil result. " For we have not a high priest, who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirm- ities, but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." — Heb. 4 : 15. If Christ was thus temp- ted, he was made to experience the influence of evil incentives ; and yet he was never destitute of an in- fluence from holy considerations. The two must there- fore have operated on his mind consentaneously. We cannot infer an agent's sinfulness, from his temp- tations. If there is any exception, it is in cases of self-originated temptation, which is itself a crime ; and even then, as in all other cases, sin is only com- mitted by yielding to temptation which existed, previ- ous to the sin, and which might have been resisted or avoided. If unavoidable temptation be ever so power- 90 DIVERSE MOTIVES. ful, or ever so protracted, the agent affected sins not, if he but constantly resists it. No one was ever so severely tried, or so powerfully tempted, as the great " Captain of our salvation •". yet through the whole process he remained spotless and pure : " a lamb with- out blemish." — 1 Peter 1 : 19. XXVIII. Both good and evil motives existed, or, both good and evil influences were experienced, previ- ously to the existence of sin. Concerning the prior existence of holy influences, there can be no difference of opinion. It only remains therefore to show, that influences in favor of moral evil, were antecedent to the first sin. Sin has now an existence ; but there was a period when it had not an existence. Previous to the existence of sin, every moral agent in the universe was perfectly holy ; consequently, till sin was committed, he was perfectly holy who com- mitted it. But sin is a moral act ; a moral act is a rational act ; a rational act is one for which the actor has a previous reason ; and a previous reason is a j)revious motive ; and a motive is an object which exerts an influence. Therefore, a motive influence in favor of moral evil, must have existed, and have operated on some mind or minds, previously to the existence of the first sin in the universe, and consequently while motive influence in favor of holiness yet obtained and prevailed. But how may this phenomenon be explained 1 We answer, in the following manner : Through Divine goodness, all intelligent beings were made with a view DIVERSE MOTIVES. 91 to the enjoyment of happiness ; and happiness depends on the means of happiness. These means can only answer their end by being good, useful, fair, beautiful, lovely ; and by these properties, they necessarily awa- ken, under favorable circumstances, certain emotions which they are adapted to gratify. Hence, to place an intelligent social being in the midst of these objects, so that he must necessarily behold and contemplate them, is to make him feel that it would afford him pleasure to enjoy them ; and this is to render him sub- ject to their influence as motives. If now a law be introduced, prohibiting the enjoyment of some of these objects, and permitting or commanding the enjoyment of some, then, by reason of their inviting influence, some of these objects are motives to transgression, and some are motives to obedience. Thus we arrive at the existence of good and evil motives, independently of sin, and antecedently to it. The moral agents who existed before any creature had sinned, were intelligent and social ; they were in the midst of the most inviting means of pleasure ; and they were under law which, allowed and command- ed to each a portion, and which denied to each a portion of those means. Hence, to each, the influence of those means was divided into an influence in favor of moral right, and an influence in favor of moral wrong. These diverse influences might affect them consentane- ously, because the prohibited and the enjoined objects by which they are produced, might, to some extent, be presented to their minds at the same time. 92 DIVERSE MOTIVES. Perhaps we shall be reminded of this Scripture : " God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man/' — James 1 : 13. But the passage is only in appearance, and not truly, relevant. That God em- ploys the means of happiness for the purpose of leading his creatures astray, is all that James really denies. That forbidden objects may have an influence, and that God gave them their properties, he cannot mean to deny. The passage implies that sin is not the nec- essary or intended result of what God has made or done ; but that moral agents, by cherishing wicked desires, may themselves be the cause of their entan- glement and ruin. Hence he further writes, " Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin ; and sin, when it is finished, bring- eth forth death." — James 1 : 14, 15. CHAPTER VII. (B\\ Iptiire (fpilibmm. PRINCIPLES. XXIX. Diversified 'power implies an equilibrium of diverse motives. Diversified power is power to clioose in favor of either one of two or more different or distinct motives. Power to choose as a moral agen$ in favor of either one of two contrary motives, is power to choose in fa- vor of either as a rational agent. Power to choose in favor of either as a rational agent, is power to choose in favor of either without a violation of reason. Pow- er to choose in favor of either without a violation of reason, is power to choose in favor of either with equal reason. Power to choose in favor of either of the diverse motives with equal reason, implies that in their influence the diverse motives are equal. Therefore, diversified power of choice implies an equihbrium of diverse motives. Diverse motives are essential to diversified power, as possessing the following properties : motivity, equality, distinction. By their motivity they are the 94 MOTIVE EQU1L1BBIUM. reason why action takes place instead of no action. A rational mind ; as such, cannot choose without some reason or incentive to move it, any more than matter can overcome its own inertia ; for the laws of spirit and the laws of matter, though different, are equally laws of nature, and therefore equally imperious. By their "equality they are precluded from being the cause why action occurs as it does, instead of other- wise. Motivity involves the necessity of volition ; and equality of diverse motivity so modifies this necessity, that either one of two or more volitions are possible. The distinction of diverse motives is implied in their equality, and hence in the result of their equality. It may be well to remark, that an equilibrium of diverse motives in respect to their influence, is not an equilibrium of something else^ and hence, that it is not an equilibrium of the will. It is not anything which can be expressed by a phrase so unmeaning. It is not anything which is different from what it is named ; and hence also, it is not identical with indifference. All objections and arguments which assume it to be other than it is, however they may be endorsed by great names, are unworthy of a reply ; because it is easily perceived, that they are, of themselves, null and void. Yet objections may be advanced, though equally in- valid, which, from their plausibility, demand some no- tice ; and such are the following : First, it may be objected, that diverse motives in MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 95 equilibrium must neutralize, and in effect destroy each other ; and hence, that their equality must produce a moral inability. This objection is a contradiction in terms. It is to say, that when the motives operate on the agent equally, they do not operate on him at all. The property of impelling to action, is an essential element in their nature ; for it is identical with their motivity. It is that, without which they would not be motives. In the property of action or motivity, motives do not positively operate on each other at all ; but merely on the agent. If diverse motives oppose each other, it is only by competition. Action, therefore, is that in which they completely agree ; and for that reason they can no more neutralize each other in this respect, than an alkali can neutralize an alkali. Diverse motives in a state of equality, cannot neu- tralize each other in their essential properties, because they cannot by their equality neutralize or destroy the functions of the human system. Man was intended to be a moral agent ; and in just such a world as we inhabit. He was designed, there- fore, to be capable of volition under all the influences, and relations of influences, to which he may be sub- jected ; and the Divine purpose is no doubt accom- plished. If an orange or an apple be divided into two equal parts, and then presented to some hungry child to choose one of the parts, the two pieces cannot by their equality destroy the child's appetite, or its keen relish for fruit ; and therefore, as every such experiment 96 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. proves, cannot destroy the child's relevant power of choice, or volition. But further, when diverse motives are unequal, the stronger influence does not neutralize the weaker. If it did, there would not be any weaker influence ; for to neutralize it in its action would be to destroy it. But this the superior motive does not of itself effect. The miser may love a dram, but love his gold still more, and so refuse to spend ; and all because each object has its influence, but the influence of the one, is less than that of the other. Therefore, as a given influence does not neutralize another which is less, so it does not neutralize another which is its equal. To suppose otherwise, is absurd. Secoxd, it may, perhaps, be objected, that motive equilibrium, if it occurs at all, must be too brief in duration for practical purposes : too brief to be avail- able in moral agency. This objection overlooks the ability of God ; or rather it charges him with a radi- cal incompetency. If motive equilibrium in respect of moral good and evil occurs at all, it takes place through Divine agen- cy ; and what God originates, he can preserve in being as long as the purposes of his moral government re- quire, and therefore as long as may be needful to its avanibility in moral agency. He has the wisdom to understand what is to be done, and the skill to accom- plish what his wisdom suggests. If, then, motive equilibrium does not exist sufficiently long to be avail- able in moral agency, it is because God does not will that it should ; and if he does not, it is because he MOTIVE EQUILIBKIUM. 97 does not will that moral agents shall enjoy diversified power ; which is contrary to what has been proved. Thikd. It is also objected, that good and evil motives are so different, that they cannot be compared, to as- certain that they are equal. We answer, if they can- not be compared to ascertain that they are ever equal, they cannot be compared to ascertain that they are ever unequal. In this respect, then, the necessitarian system has no advantage. Moreover, the objection assumes several things which are false. It assumes that the good and evil motives in a given case, must be essentially different in their nature, as well as in their moral quality, which is not the case. Of two desirable objects which are placed before the mind, the one may be prohibited, and the other not, and hence the one may be a motive in favor of evil, and the other not ; and yet the two objects may be essentially alike. It assumes also, that if any comparison takes j)lace, it must be a comparison of objects ; whereas the equilibrium respects only influences, and good and evil influences may be of the same species, and therefore essentially the same in their nature. Both may appeal to the same faculties, and in the same way. The objection, finally, is false, in assuming that the proof of the equilibrium of diverse motives or influ- ences, is made out by comparing those motives or influences. The proof depends on no such thing ; but is derived by induction from divinely revealed facts. 98 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. XXX. An equilibrium of diverse motives, in re- spect of their influence, admits of distinct proof . 1. It is proved by the conditions of the first crea- tion. " Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in all parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of G-od. Now when God determined to create the Universe, he must have resolved to locate its centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At that moment, there was present to the Divine intelligence an infinite number of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither point could have been selected because it was better than any other, for all were equal. So they must have ap- peared to (rod." — Median. What is true of space, is also true of duration or eternity. The first created object must have had its starting point in duration, as well as its location in space ; and for the commencement, all points of dura- tion were in themselves alike, and alike to the immu- table Jehovah, who could feel no new or pressing want. Yet of all equal moments for the commencement, one was selected. Therefore it is certain, that the Divine mind has acted under an equality of diverse motives ; or with- out any previous ^equality in their influences. 2. Motive equilibrium is proved by the first sin. The first sin in the universe was committed, either from an evil motive, or a holy motive, or no motive. First. It was not committed without anv motive* MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 99 Every moral act must be a rational act ; every rational act must be performed in view of some reason ; and a reason is a motive. The first sin, therefore, was com- mitted in view of some motive. Second. It was not committed in view of a holy motive. Holy motives, no doubt, existed, and operated on the agent's mind ; but as holy, they must have op- erated in opposition to moral evil. Whatever reaches the mind as an incentive to moral evil, for that reason is not a holy, but an evil motive to the agent affected ; and the first sin must have been committed from a corresponding incentive, and therefore from an incen- tive to moral evil. Third. Therefore, the first sin was committed from an evil motive. Again, in its influence on the agent's mind, as the occasion of the first sin, this evil motive was either less, or greater than the opposite holy mo- tive, or else the two were just equal. First. It was not in its influence less than the holy motive. Previous to the first sin, all finite beings were not only holy, but completely rational ; and such, from the immutability of God, they must continue in their nature and action, until the laws of their being should be disturbed as a result of sin. Consequently, the first sin could not be an irrational act ; for it could not be a result of its own existence. But to suppose that the first sin was committed in view of an evil motive, which had less influence than the opposite holy motive, is to suppose that the first sin was an irrational act ; and hence it is to suppose 100 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. what is not true. Therefore, the evil motive in view of which the first sin was committed, was not, in its influence, less than the contrary holy motive. Second. The evil motive was not, in its influence, greater than the holy motive. The reason is this : antecedently to the first sin, it was impossible that evil influences should predominate. If an evil influence had predominatad previous to the first sin, its predomi- nance must have been caused ; for every effect must have its cause. If this predominance of evil influence had been caused to take place, it must have been caused either by the Creator, or by the agent who sinned, or by some other finite being. But it was not caused by either. God could not cause it by anything which he created or did, because he could not become the author of a creature's alienation and enmity. To suppose he could, and then eternally punish that creature, is to suppose him capable of the most horrible contradictions in his nature and in his conduct. If he had caused a holy being to experience a predominance of evil influence, he would have destroyed that creature's righteousness. But " The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." — Ps. 11:7. And he cannot destroy that which he exclu- sively loves. "God cannot be tempted with evil, nei- ther tempteth he any man." — James 1 : 13. Therefore no predominance of evil influence, as the occasion of the first sin in the universe, could be caused by the Creator. Neither could any such thing be caused MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 101 by some finite being or beings, distinct from the agent who first sinned. If any other finite agent than he had caused it ; that agent must have sinned in doing so ; and then there would have been a first sin, previous to the first. This contradiction could not take place. For the same reason, the first sinner himself could not cause it ; for he could not, any more than others, commit a sin that should be previous to the first sin. Therefore, antecedently to the first sin, or as the occasion of the first sin, no predominance of evil influence did or could take place. Third. Having shown that the evil influence which occasioned the first sin, was, as the occasion, neither less nor greater than the opposing holy influence, it follows that the diverse influences were equal. It may, perhaps, be objected, that motive equilibrium can only occur, if at all, in respect to trifles ; but if it respect only so small a thing as the eating or touching of a little forbidden fruit, it would not respect a trifle. The first sin in the universe, like that in the gar- den, may have been very insignificant in its form, and in its immediate object ; but in its nature, it was great as eternal death. The same littleness and great- ness conjoined, may possibly attach to our own con- duct. However, motive equilibrium depends not on the form of the actions, nor on the magnitude of the objects to which it refers; but on their relation in point of influence. It may also be objected, that motive equilibrium 102 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. must immediately produce indifference; and that therefore it could not occur before the first sin, except as an irresistible means of it, because indifference is sin. If this objection were valid, we should gain nothing, at least in respect to the first sin, by estab- lishing the doctrine of motive equihbrium; but the objection assumes what is not true. The immediate and necessary result is not a sinful indifference. A holy being, for example, must either remain holy, or he must become a sinner ; and he must remain holy, or he must become a sinner as the result of an evil volition, will, or choice. Under an equibbrium of diverse motives, he must either remain holy, or he must become a sinner by one of two choices: by choosing in favor of the evil motive, or by choosing in- difference. But neither of these choices is a necessary result. We cannot say that he must necessarily choose in favor of the evil motive, because we might as well say that he must necessarily choose in favor of the holy motive. If the equilibrium proves either, it proves both. But it cannot prove both. Therefore it proves neither. Nor can we say that the agent must necessarily choose indifference. First, he does not necessarily choose absolute indifference. When the diverse mo- tives are equal, they are still incentives to the choice of objects distinct from absolute indifference ; and there is then no motive to choose an absolute indiffer- ence. Consequently, there must be felt a general in- terest, as when the divided orange is before the hungry child. MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 103 Second, the agent does not necessarily choose a spe- cific indifference. The diverse motives are to be con- sidered under two aspects : the positive and the rela- tive. Each motive is positive in favor of its own ob- ject, and hence there obtains a certain amount of influence in favor of choosing either one of the diverse objects ; but by reason of the agent's inability to choose two contrary objects at the same time, each is also, by the relation of competition, a motive against the choice of the other's object, and hence there ob- tains indirectly or relatively, an equal amount of influence against the choice of any distinct object. If this latter influence must be considered an influence in favor of a specific indifference, it is in favor of it only as such indifference is put over against a distinct object of choice ; and hence that indifference must itself be regarded as an object of choice. It must present itself as an object of choice, before it can ob- tain as sinful. Consequently, the case involves merely an equihbrium of diverse motives between the choice of a specific indifference, and the choice of something else. Now will any one say, that this specific indifference must be chosen because of the equilibrium between it and a positive object? We have just the same ground to say, that a positive object must be chosen. The equilibrium in the case, proves the one quite as much as the other. But it cannot prove both. Therefore it proves neither. Consequently, a sinful indifference is not a necessary result of motive equilibrium. 3. The doctrine of motive equilibrium is proved by 104 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. taking a united view of God's promises, and the sins of God's people. It is written, " Sin shall not have dominion over you." — Horn. 6 : 14. And again, " God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able ; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it."— 1 Cor. 10 : 13. In these passages it is promised, that evil influences shall not be too mighty to resist : that they shall be so modified and limited, and that the righteous shall be so strengthened and guided, that transgression may be avoided. Yet transgression, on the part of God's people, is not always avoided. Their sins, alas, are many and va- rious. Hence, they must sometimes experience an equality of contrary influences. The fact that a righteous man does an evil act, proves that the relevant holy influence does not at the time predominate ; and the fact that God's promise is true, proves that as the occasion of that act, the relevant evil influence does not predominate. But when neither predominates, they must be in a state of equipoise. 4. Motive equilibrium is proved by the fact, that the Divine scheme of salvation is adapted to the fallen condition of mankind. If Christ fulfilled his mission, he is "the Savior of all men."— 1 Tim. 4: 10 ; Heb. 2 : 9. If Christ is " the Savior of all men," he exe- cutes a scheme of salvation which is adapted to the fallen condition, primarily, of "all men;" for to be really their " Savior," cannot admit of less. MOTIVE EQUILIBKIUM. 105 If Christ executes such a scheme, he removes from every accountable human agent, whatever would be to him morally an insuperable hindrance to salvation ; for the adaptation of an all-comprehending scheme to save, cannot admit of less. The difficulty being a moral one, the result of the provision made to meet it, must also be moral. If Christ removes from every accountable human agent, whatever would be to him morally an insuperable hindrance to salvation, then for every such agent he interrupts the predominance of evil influences ; for an uninterrupted superiority of such influences, would be morally an insuperable hindrance to salvation. If Christ interrupts for every accountable human agent, the predominance of evil influences, he causes every such agent to experience, at times at least, either a predominance of holy influ- ences, or else an equilibrium of the good and evil. But Christ does not cause every accountable human agent to experience a predominance of holy influences. If he did, every such agent, for a season at least, would love righteousness and pursue it, and that too of ne- cessity ; which multitudes of accountable human agents never do. Therefore, if Christ fulfilled his mission, he causes every accountable member of the human family to experience, at times at least, an equilibrium of good and evil influences. This conclu- sion is confirmed by the following passage : "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all tilings/' — Eom. 8: 32. It is true, the apostle here 106 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. reasons respecting the elect ; but he reasons from an act of mercy to the whole human family. His argu- ment is, that the gift of the Son is connected with the bestownient of such other blessings as are requisite to salvation. If the condition of the righteous, as such, is met with every requisite, so is that of the wicked ; and for the same grand reason : the death of Christ. 5. The doctrine of motive equilibrium agrees with the experience of men. First. It agrees with the internal conflict of the awakened sinner ; a conflict in which he realizes that he is on a poise between life and death. The influence of the Divine Spirit, as comprised in motive influence, and as thus producing true awakening, does itself pro- duce a consciousness of this fact. The fact, therefore, at times exists. At such times, the following language is peculiarly appropriate. "Seek ye the Lord while he may be found : call ye upon him while he is near." — Isa. 55 : 6. Second. It agrees with the experience of indecision. This experience obtains more or less with every person, at times, and in relation to particular objects of choice, or modes of action ; and it is indicated in such lan- guage as the following : I have not determined : I have not decided : I have not yet made up my mind : I have not come to a conclusion. "What I shall choose I wot not ; for I am in a strait betwixt two." — Phil. 1 : 22, 23. If Paul had not experienced a parity of diverse in- fluences, he never could have penned the passage just MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 107 cited ; for under a predominance of motive influence, indecision is impossible. The superior motive is in- stantly decisive. Therefore to experience indecision is to experience the proof of motive equilibrium. Third. It agrees with the fact that sin is not a mere blunder, arising from a .mistaken sense of "the greatest apparent good." That the pleasures of sin are not superior to the awards of righteousness, or that they are not the "greatest good," the transgressor is sometimes made both to know and to feel ; which could not be true, if he always acted from a predomi- nance of some evil motive, and if that motive con- sisted of "the greatest apparent good." Every moral agent comprehends enough of truth for his own guidance ; and the influence thus exerted on his mind, is, at times at least, as strong as that by which it is opposed. Fourth. The doctrine of motive equilibrium agrees with the fact that the lost are wholly "without ex- cuse." That their blameworthiness is complete, is no doubt keenly felt ; and that it will at last be fully and pub- licly acknowledged, is plainly declared in the following Scriptures: "As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God." — Kom. 14 : 11. " Now we know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law ; that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God." — Kom. 3 :' 19. Every sinner will confess the justice of his doom ; 108 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. but his mouth will be "stopped" against all excuse, or palliation of his guilt. Each will perceive, that in his measure his blameworthiness is complete. This could not be the case, on the supposition that the motives from which the lost acted were less than the holy mo- tives, for then they would necessarily not have acted from them at all ; and it could not be the case, if the motives from which they acted were always greater than the opposite holy motives, for then the evil motives would always have been irresistible, and so would have precluded accountability. Therefore the motives from which the lost will be found to have acted, were at times neither greater nor less than the opposite holy motives. If they had always been a little greater, they would in just so far have constituted an excuse ; and by that law of rational action which requires the strongest motive to be obeyed, the excuse would have been complete. God's moral laws do not abrogate his natural laws ; but the moral are conformed to the nat- ural, so that they do not necessarily contravene each other. This idea was inculcated by our Lord when he said, " The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath."— Mark 2 : 27. Fifth. The doctrine of motive equilibrium agrees with the fact, that all essential goodness and mercy are extended to the whole human family. " The Lord is good to all ; and his tender mercies are over all his works."— Ps. Ill : 5, 9. But there can be no essential mercy to sinners, if the predominance of evil motives be not interrupted. MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 109 The plan of salvation is null and void to them ; and that by a law of their being, derived immediately from then Maker, which requires obedience to the strongest motive. Every passage of Scripture, therefore, which declares that God is merciful to the whole human race, is a proof that no man is under an uninterrupted pre- dominance of what to him are evil motives. Yet some ' men sin on, and never repent. Therefore, with them the holy motives never predominate. Consequently, with them the diverse motives are in equipoise, when- ever the evil motives do not predominate. 6. Motive equilibrium is proved by the legitimate office of holy influence, in respect to sinners. In bringing good motives, or holy influences, to bear on the mind of sinners, God has doubtless some end in view ; and that end is invariably accomplished, for the divine Being cannot be disappointed. That end must be one of four which may be supposed. That is to say, it is either their worldly happiness, their regenera- tion, the immediate condition of their regeneration, or the possibility, on their part, of right volition. No other supposition is possible ; unless it be, that by it God intends to sinners only evil, and no good at all : a supposition which no rational mind will entertain for a moment. First. The office of good motives, in respect to the finally impenitent, is not primarily to improve their temporal condition. The essential motives to holiness are fruits of the death of Christ ; and the primary object of what his death procures, must be of more 110 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. importance than anything purely temporal : of more importance than merely to make men happier sinners. The sinner would be deceived in their import, if the case were otherwise ; and then St. Paul could not have said, " Our exhortation was not of deceit, nor of un- cleanness, nor in guile." — 1 Thess. 2 : 3. Second. The office of holy motives is not to do the work of regeneration. In regeneration, the soul is in a sense created anew, not mediately, but immediately, by the renovating energies of the Holy Ghost. If the work were accomplished by mere motive influence, we might find it devoid of mystery ; but now there is something in it which is enexplicable. " The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou nearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth : so is every one that is born of the Spirit." — John 3 : 8. David, after his "great trans- gression," was not satisfied with the exclusive opera- tion of holy motives ; but when he felt then influence he prayed, " Create in me a clean heart, God, and renew a right spirit within me." — Ps. 51 : 10. Third. The office of motive influence to holiness, is not to create of itself the proximate or immediate con- dition of regeneration. If it were, regeneration would in all cases ensue, and so all men would find the "strait gate," and the " narrow way ;" whereas, they are found, alas, by only a " few." Fourth. Therefore, the office of holy motives must be, to secure to the sinner the power of right volition. No other supposition remains to be made. This power MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. Ill may respect the exercise of choice between life and death, or between moral objects which are subordinate to life and death. Hence it is written, " Choose life, that thou and thy seed may live." A heart-felt choice of life, both in the abstract and in the concrete, is the grand condition of regeneration ; and good motives, by their influence, impart the moral power to make this choice. This office they perform at some time or other, or at different times, for every accountable human agent ; but they accomplish no more by their own immediate energy or influences. But to impart the moral power of right volition, absolutely, without necessitating such volition, is simply to counterpoise the influence of evil motives ; and the mere counterpoise of evil motives, is simply motive equilibrium. An objector may perhaps remark, that we represent a divine work as being dependent on a human work : on a volition or choice. We answer, the Scriptures do the same ; but that human work is first represented by us, as being itself dependent on a previous divine work. In this also we are scriptural ; for it is written, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling ; for it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure." — Phil. 2 : 12, 13. " For the grace of God that bringeth salvation, hath appeared to all men, teaching us that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously and godly, in this present evil world." — Titus 2 : 11, 12. The pri- mary gifts of God are the spontaneous and universal 112 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. blossoms of salvation. They bud and expand in every heart. But the ultimate fruit, which ripens into eter- nal life, is neither universal nor arbitrary ; for it results only to those who wisely cherish the incipient mercies. We may here remark, that an equilibrium of diverse motives involves not necessarily a joerversion of the un- derstanding, or it does not require that the agent should view right and wrong as being to him equally good. The inebriate, for example, after advancing to a certain position in the great stream of unholy influence, may be carried away irresistibly ; yet in every stage of his mad career, he understands that his course is not to him the " greatest good." But if the judgment may be correct, when evil motives are greater in their influ- ence than good motives, it may certainly be correct, when evil motives are not so strong, or when the diverse motives are just equal. Motives oj)erate on the soul, not only in respect to the understanding, but also in respect to the sensitivity or affections, and they are weak or strong, mainly as they operate in the latter respect. Now it must be apparent, that when the di- verse motives are equal, the judgment cannot be dis- turbed or enslaved by an obliquity of the feelings ; and hence, that an equality of motives only favors a correct judgment. CHAPTER VIII. (tojtimt from rove, that the foreknowl- edge of men's volitions involves moral necessity. If those acts in which moral agents will be necessi- tated, are foreknown independently of any distinct evidence concerning them, because the Divine fore- knowledge of them is eternal ; and if those acts in which moral agents will be free, are foreknown inde- pendently of any distinct evidence concerning them, because, no present evidence of them exists, then are FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 149 they not all foreknown on the same principle, and in a way unknown to finite beings ? If so, the Divine prescience affords the necessitarian no support. " That all things are known to God/' is freely ad- mitted ; but that they can be known, only by reason of their resulting from the necessitating influence of known causes, which are themselves necessitated, is more than any finite mind should presume to affirm. It were indeed to make our shallow, limited, and feeble intellects, the measure of all possible modes of knowl- edge. It were to make God Like one of ourselves. Yet this position the necessitarian has been compelled to assume. After all his pretended demonstrations from the foreknowledge of God, his argument can reach the point in dispute, only by means of this tre- mendous flight of presumption. Let the necessitarian show, that God cannot foresee future events, unless he " have determined to bring them to pass," or unless they are brought to pass by a chain of producing causes, ultimately connected with his own will, and he will prove something to the pur- pose ; but let him not talk so boastfully about demon- strations, while there is this exceedingly weak link in the chain of his argument. If God were so like one of ourselves, that he could not foresee future volitions, unless they are brought to pass by the operation of known causes ; then, I admit, that his foreknowledge would infer the moral necessity for which Edwards contends, provided he really possesses that knowledge ; but if he were so imperfect a being, I should be com- 150 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. pelled to believe, that there are some things which he could not foreknow. This assumption comes with a peculiarly ill grace from the necessitarian. He should be the last man to contend, that God cannot foresee future events unless they are involved in known producing causes ; just as all that we know of the future is ascertained by reason- ing from known causes to effects. For he contends that with God, " there is no time ;" but that to His view all things are seen as if they were present. This knowledge is without succession, and there is no before nor after with him : all things are intimate- ly present to his mind from all eternity. Such is the doctrine of both the Edwards ; and Dr. Dick be- lieves, that " God sees all things at a glance." Now, present things are not known to exist because they are implied by known causes, but because they are present and seen. And hence, if God sees all things as pres- ent, there is not the shadow of a foundation whereon to rest the proof of " moral necessity" from his fore- knowledge. It is all taken away by their own doc- trine, and their argument is left without the least sup- port from it. Indeed, there is no need of lugging the foreknowl- edge of God into the present controversy, except it be to deceive the mind. For all future events will cer- tainly and infallibly come to pass, whether they are foreknown or not ; and foreknowledge cannot make the matter any more certain than it is without it. We may say that God foreknows all things, and we FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 151 may mix this up with all possible propositions ; but this will never help the conclusion, that " all future things will certainly and infallibly come to pass." If God should cease to foreknow all future volitions, or if he had never foreknown them, they would neverthe- less just as certainly and infahibly come to pass, as if he had foreknown them from all eternity. The bare naked fact that they are future, infers all that is im- plied in God's foreknowledge of them ; and it is just as much a contradiction in terms, to say that what is future will not come to pass, as it is to say, that what God foreknows will never take place. Hence, by bringing in the prescience of Deity, we do not really strengthen or add to the conclusion in favor of neces- sity. It only furnishes a very convenient and plausible method of begging the question, or of seeming to prove something by hiding our sophisms in the blaze of the Divine attributes. I reason from what I know, to what I do not know : from my knowledge of the actual world as it is, up to God's foreknowledge respecting it. To illustrate this point : I know that I act : and hence I conclude, that God foreknew that I would act. And again, I know that my act is not necessitated : that it does not ne- cessarily proceed from the action or influence of [ex- trinsic] causes ; and hence I conclude, that God foreknew that I would thus act freely, in precisely this manner, and not otherwise. The necessitarian pursues the opposite course. He reasons from what he does not know, that is, from the 152 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. particulars of the Divine foreknowledge, about which he absolutely knows nothing a priori, down to the facts of the actual world. Thus, quitting the light which shines so brightly within us and around us, he seeks for light in tne midst of impenetrable darkness. He endea- vors to determine the phenomena of the world, not by looking at them and seeing what they are, but by de- ducing conclusions from God's infinite foreknowledge respecting them ! " In doing this, a grand illusion is practiced, by his merely supposing that the volitions themselves are foreknown, without taking into the supposition the whole of the case, and recollecting that God not only foresees all our actions, but also all about them. For if this were done, if it were remembered that He not only foresees that our volitions will come to pass, but also how they will come to pass ; the necessitarian would see, that nothing could be proved in this way except what is first tacitly assumed. The grand illu- sion v\ T ould vanish, and it would be clearly seen, that if the argument from foreknowledge proves anything, it just as well proves the necessity of freedom as any- thing else." — Bledsoe. 3. Moral freedom and Divine foreknowledge may be regarded as in harmony, on the principle that the "All wise God" possesses a faculty of knowledge which we do not. We have no faculty to foresee the future, except by induction ; and our power of induction is so limited in respect to future events, that, properly speaking, it does not constitute at all, a faculty to foresee. Have FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 153 we any right to attribute this principle of imperfection to the Supreme Being : " have we any reason for impo- sing upon the Deity the limitation of our own feeble- ness ? I think not. Unendowed, as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God ; but yet can we not from analogy form such an idea ? We have now two faculties of perception : of the past by memo- ry, and of the present by observation. Can we not imagine a third to exist in God : the faculty of perceiv- ing the future, as we perceive the past. "What would be the consequence ? This : that God, instead of con- jecturing, by induction, the acts of human beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them simply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those actions, than the percep- tions of similar acts in the past. To see that effects arise from certain causes, is not to force causes to pro- duce them ; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not whether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future : it is merely a percep- tion ; and therefore far from producing the effect per- ceived. I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be, is an operation of which our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of what we have never experienced ; but I do assert, that the power of seeing what no longer exists, is full as remarkable as that of seeing what has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving of the former, is only the fact 154 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. that we are endowed with, such a power : to my reason, the mystery is the same." — Jouffroy. 4. Moral freedom is consistent with foreknowledge, because effects cannot constrain their causes to produce them ; and because results cannot constrain the occa- sion to produce them. Moral agents, in the exercise of freedom, are causes ; and their volitions and actions are effects, of which foreknowledge is the result. Edwards, however, pre- sents us with an argument against freedom, in which foreknowledge is regarded, not as a result merely, but as an effect of finite causation. His argument or illus- tration, because of its plausibility and apparent strength, demands our notice. He says : " To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the ap- pearances and images of things in a glass; for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance and out of sight) which they re- semble : if it be so, as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become ut- terly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed ; so they, being the true effects of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the existing of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infalli- ble, finn, and necessary, as the existing of these effects ; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on, the other. Now let us suppose future existences some way or other to have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 155 exist, yea, in all preceding ages ; but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences, per- fectly dependent on, and connected with, their cause ; these effects and images having already had actual ex- istence, rendering that matter of their existing perfect- ly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise : this proves in. like manner, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things which are their causes is also equally sure, firm, and necessary ; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antece- dent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered." — Edwards on Will, p. 183. This illustration represents the volitions of moral agents as causing their results backward or beforehand, in the form of ideas in the Divine mind ; which ideas constitute foreknowledge. But volitions are mere oc- casions, and not causes. As occasions, however, they may be said in some sense to produce such results ; but these volitions produce these results beforehand, sim- ply on the ground that moral agents produce these volitions. So that if the Divine foreknowledge depends on the foreknown volitions, it depends to the same extent on the agents who produce or cause those voli- tions. And what does all this prove ? Merely that foreknowledge naturally must have its subject, and 156 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. that, its subject naturally must have its cause. And what then 1 Why then we have three things given to find a fourth : the agent, the act, and the knowledge of the act, to find whether the agent is morally free, or morally constrained in the act. Or we have the cause, the effect, and the result, to find whether the cause be a cause, or a medium only. Edwards concludes that the agent is not morally free, but morally constrained ; or that the cause is not the cause. His essential rea- son, including all other reasons, is, that the effects are "perfectly dependent on, and connected with, their cause." That is to say, the foreknowledge is per- fectly dependent on the act, and the act is perfectly dependent on the actor. This, however, is so far from sustaining Edwards' conclusion, that it is the very reason why the agent may be a cause, or why he mny be free in his volitions. The circumstance that the results are produced backward or beforehand, can make no difference. If, on account of this circumstance, the effects either cause or occasion their own cause to pro- duce them, (which will hardly be claimed except by implication) it still is true, that the effects are wholly " dependent on, and connected with, their cause;" or that they must be produced by their cause. It follows, therefore, that whatever constraint they involve, must primarily have its origin in their cause. That is to say, by means of his own effects or volitions, the cause or agent simply constrains himself ; and hence the case is merely one of intrinsic causation." But intrinsic causation involves a corresponding exemption from ex- FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 157 trinsic causation ; and exemption from extrinsic cau- sation is freedom. Thus, Edwards' reasoning from events, as producing their results in a given respect backward not only fails to sustain his theory, but when fully developed, it destroys his system. 5. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine fore- knowledge, although foreknowledge implies that our future volitions and actions are certain. We are told, " If the event be not necessary, then it is possible it may never be ; and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be ; and that is to know that the proposition which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true ; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain ; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth." " To say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous ; as much so, as to say that God may know contradictions to be true, for aught we know, or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain." — Edwards, p. 176. This statement assumes, that as foreknowledge im- plies the certainty of an act, so the certainty of the act implies the moral necessity of the actor ; and on the other hand, that the moral freedom of the actor, implies uncertainty of the act. These conclusions, which are but counterparts cf each other, we deny ; and for the following reasons : First. — Whatever will be, is certain. It is so in the 158 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. very nature of things, whether it be foreknown or not. But the future existence of moral freedom will be. It will be, because, as has been proved, such freedom is at some time or other accorded to every accountable agent. Therefore, the future existence of moral free- dom is certain. But if the future existence of moral freedom is certain, the results of that freedom are also certain ; for it is as much a truism in the one case as in the other, that " What will be, will be" And if the particular results of moral freedom are certain, it must be certain what the free agent will do, and what he will not do : what power of volition and action he will possess which he will exercise, and what power of volition and action he will possess which he will not exercise. But if the volitions and actions which result from the existence of moral freedom may be certain, it fol- lows that the certainty of the act, is not inconsistent with the moral freedom of the actor ; and consequently, that the foreknowledge of the act is also not inconsist- ent with the moral freedom of the actor. The fore- knowledge of the act, cannot prove more than is proved by the certainty of the act ; and the agent's moral freedom, it is evident, cannot disprove that certainty. Moral freedom and foreknowledge, as viewed together, do not imply, therefore, that our future volitions are both certain and uncertain, but simply that we will hereafter, as now, possess power to act which we will not exercise ; and that the extent of this power is spe- cific and certain. The future possession of unexercised FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 159 power, is an event, as truly as any other ; and all events are in their nature certain, and from eternity foreknown. Edwards' statement ought therefore to be corrected, so as to ^ead as follows : "If the event be not necessary, i. e. if the agent be not constrained to produce it, then it is possible to the agent for it never to be. If it is possible for it never to be, God knows it is possible for it never to be ; and that is to know that the agent will possess power which he will not exercise : it is to know that the proposition which affirms the existence of the event or act, does not de- pend on the moral necessity of the actor for its truth- fulness ; and that is to know that its truthfulness is by some other means certain ; which surely is not in- consistent with his knowing it as a certain truth/' The relation which the agent sustains to his action, may be either one of two : it may be that of cause, or that of medium ; and the difference between these two relations, determines and explains the difference be- tween acting with mere certainty, and acting with certainty and necessity combined. The mere medium, or constrained agent, performs the act with certainty, and of necessity ; but the proper cause, or uncon- strained agent, performs the act with certainty only, and not of necessity. Now it has been proved, that mankind exercise moral freedom, in at least some of their actions ; and that moral freedom, as exemption from extrinsic causation, involves intrinsic causation, in every instance of its exercise. Yet these very ac- tions are foreknown and certain. Therefore, the mere 160 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. certainty of the act, does not involve the moral neces- sity of the actor. To say it does, is the same as to say, that to act as cause, is only to act as medium ; and to say this, is to utter a contradiction in terms ; for he who is constrained in a given respect, is not a cause in that respect. That moral agents as free, will hereafter possess power which they will not exercise, and that this pow- er is specific and certain, may easily he conceived ; but how it may be foreknown, is apparent only to the mind of Deity. Therefore, the method of the Divine prescience, we cannot reasonably be required to devel- ope ; and yet to explain that method is the only diffi- culty in the case : a difficulty, however, which does not concern us. Necessitarians reason as if they understood the method ; and in this they depart from their usual modesty. " There is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent reverence upon the truth, that i secret things belong to God/ and those and those only, 'that are revealed, to us ;' that 'none by searching can find out God ;' that ' as the heavens are high above the earth, so are his ways above our ways, and his thoughts above our thoughts ;' and that it is the height of presumption in us, to j)retend to under- stand God's mode of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 161 favor of Necessity, is based entirely upon the assump- tion that they have found out and fully understand the mode of the Divine prescience of human conduct ; that they have so measured and determined the ' ways and thoughts' of God, that they know that he cannot foresee any but [morally] necessary events ; that among many events, all in themselves equally possi- ble, and none of them necessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which in fact will arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained this knowledge, so vast and deep ; whence he has thus ' found out the Almighty to perfection V To me the pretension to such knowledge appears more like presumption, than that deep self-distrust and hu- miliation which becomes the finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has not been obtained from revelation. God has never told us that He can foresee none but [morally] necessary events ; [and] if we admit ourselves ignorant of the mode of God's fore- knowledge of future events (and who will dare deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case ?) the entire argument of the necessitarian, based upon that foreknowledge, in favor of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once." — Median. Second. God has done what he had power not to do, though the event was certain and foreknown. Edwards' view of the subject involves the idea of an absolute fatality : a fatality which enchains not only man, but God himself. " Known unto God are all his works from eternity," and as known, they are certain. 162 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. If therefore an act can be certain only on the ground that the actor cannot avoid it, the conclusion is inevi- table, that God's actions are to Him unavoidable ; or that he is subject to the control of fate, as well as all his creatures. But this conclusion is inconsistent with the doctrine of Divine omnipotence. For example, God chose a particular moment in which to commence the work of creation, and a definite point of space in which to locate the primary centre of the universe ; and these acts of choice, as distinct from all others of the kind, were eternally certain and foreknown. If these acts of volition, as thus distinct, were to the actor unavoidable because they were certain and foreknown, the Divine Being must have labored under an inability or lack of power to choose any other moment or point ; and that lack of power must have been either moral or natural. It could not be moral, because some other moment, and some other point of space, might have been chosen with equal propriety, and by the same laws of rational action. Previous to the first act of creation, all moments of duration, and all points of space, were positively and relatively equal ; and hence the same influence, motive, or reason, which operated in favor of a given selection, operated equally in favor of a different selection. No moral inability, therefore, could exist. Consequently, if God was unable to com- mence the work of creation in some other moment, or to fix its primary centre in some other point of space than he did, he must have labored under a lack of natural power ; and it must have been a lack of natu- FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 163 ral power to do that which in itself involved no con- tradiction. But such a lack of power is wholly inconsistent with omnipotence. It is a natural defect : a radical weakness, characteristic of a finite being. But in God, no such weakness or defect exists. He is truly and absolutely Almighty. He might there- fore have commenced the work of creation in some other moment of duration, and might have located the centre of the universe in some other point of space ; and consequently, he had power to omit what was eter- nally certain and foreknown, and power to do what it was eternally certain he would not do. If, therefore, we admit that God is omnipotent, we must also admit, that the certainty of an act is consistent with the pos- sibility or power that it may not be ; or that the act may be certain, and hence foreknown, and yet be not performed of necessity. Third. The doctrine of man's essential moral free- dom, and that of the certainty of future events, inclu- ding man's moral volitions and actions, are both incul- cated in the sacred Scriptures. Either directly or in- directly, they are presented in almost every part of the Bible. They must, therefore, be in harmony : for the word of God does not contradict itself, either directly or indirectly. The ideas which men entertain of these great truths, do not in all instances agree ; but this disturbs not the harmony of the truths themselves. In despite of human creeds, they are in themselves harmonious and true ; and it had been well, if they who pronounce 164 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. the subject inscrutable, bad propounded tbeir conflict- ing views with more modesty, and less dogmatism. No man bas a right to affirm concerning that, of which he is confessedly ignorant. 6. Moral freedom is consistent with foreknowledge, notwithstanding the necessity of connection and agree- ment between that knowledge and the finite agent's volitions and actions. The connection and agreement are fully secured by one necessity ; and hence they re- quire not two necessities. That is to say, if they are in a given manner necessitated to exist, they do not need to be otherwise necessitated, because a single ne- cessity is as truly effectual as a double necessity. But the connection and agreement are fully secured by a natural necessity ; and that a necessity which af- fects not the finite agent whose actions are foreknown, but the Infinite Agent who foreknows them. The knowledge itself is in its very nature necessitated to connect and agree with the thing known ; and this necessity cannot be waived or obviated by the Supreme Being. Consequently, as possessing foreknowledge, God is naturally necessitated, or necessitated in the nature of things, to know things precisely as they will be. It is impossible for him to know them otherwise. Therefore, the agreement between the foreknowledge of Grod and the action of a finite agent, does not re- quire that agent to act from moral necessity. If the action cannot differ from the Divine fore- knowledge of it, it is because the knowledge cannot FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 165 differ from the action. Let the agent act with the greatest freedom possible, the Divine prescience can- not fail to be knowledge ; and therefore cannot fail to agree with the facts in the case. The case of the agent is like that of a man at work in the sunshine. His motions, it may be contended, cannot be different from the motions of his shadow : though he change them ever so often, or ever so much, the result or agreement is constantly the same. But why ? Is it because the agent lacks freedom ? Certainly not. It is simply because the motions of the shadow cannot be different from the motions of the man. Again, if the evolutions of an army cannot differ from the view which is taken of them by a well-formed eye, it is simply because the view of them by a perfect eye, cannot differ from them. So is God's prescience. It is his view of the immense, varied, and complicated scenes of eternity. These scenes are in a sense pres- ent with him ; for He is "the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity ;" and they are in a sense imaged in the Divine mind, as natural objects are imaged in the human eye. If, therefore, they cannot differ from his view of them, it is simply because his secret and all-compre- hending view of them cannot differ from them. In concluding these remarks, we ask, has there ever been any moral agent who has really had moral power to do otherwise than he did ; or have all moral agents been destitute of that power ? If the latter be true, the doctrine of universal moral 166 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. fatality must also be true ; and then God must be the primary and proper cause of whatever comes to pass in the moral world. But if the former be true, moral actions have occurred which were not performed of moral necessity ; and then, since those actions must have been foreknown, it follows that foreknowl- edge does not imply moral necessity. CHAPTER II fmimtt &nfa §iblial fnhsiioiifltt PRINCIPLES. II. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine pre" destination. That is to say, it exists whenever it obtains, in har- mony with God's eternal purpose, preordination, or decree, as that decree respects what God does, forbears to do, and prevents ; and also as it respects what finite moral agents do, forbear, and prevent. Predes- tination is simply a predetermination of the Divine providence, or of that positive and negative action which consists in producing, waiving, and preventing ; and in permitting or suffering his intelligent creatures to produce, waive, or prevent things. It is therefore to be distinguished into absolute and permissive, con- sisting of a predetermination to do what he does, and to suffer what he suffers or permits. The terms, permit and suffer, it will be observed, are not employed in the necessitarian sense. The ne- cessitarian believes in " such a providential disposing and determining of men's moral actions, as infers a 168 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. moral necessity of those actions ;" and hence by the terms, " permission" and " permitter," and by the phrase, " not a hinderer of sin," he must mean, that even in respect of sin, God merely suffers the effect of his own causation. That is to say, he suffers the event in the sense in which the surgeon suffers the natural effect of his knife in removing a tumor ; or in the sense in which the murderer merely permits the effect of the blow, by which he deprives his victim of life. Protesting against such a perversion of the terms un- der consideration, we employ them, not to signify that God allows the effects of his own causation to trans- pire, but to express the fact, that he allows the effects of other causation to transpire. Divine predestination is eternal, because it is connected with eternal fore- knowledge. " Known unto God are all his works from aizjvoff, eternity :" and hence he could never be uncertain, nor undetermined respecting them. The existence of such preordination is scriptural. The following are a few of many passages which might .be cited: "I am God, and there is none like me ; declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." — Isa. 46: 9, 10. "For .of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 169 done." — Acts 4 : 27, 23. " — According to the eter- nal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord." — Eph. 3 : 11. "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to he conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called ; and whom he called, them he also jus- tified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." — Kom 8 : 29, 30. Divine predestination is a three-fold purpose. It is composed of a purpose to accomplish an object, of a purpose to execute a relevant plan, and of a purpose to exercise the requisite power. The affairs of the universe are conducted intelligently, and therefore in pursuance of a previous design or determination ; and the intelligent determination of the All-wise God, must respect the object, the plan, and the power. 1. Divine predestination is the predetermination of an object. There can be no deliberate determination on the part of an intelligent being, without a relevant motive, for the motive is the essential ground and rea- son of the determination ; and there can be no rele- vant motive without an object, for the object is that which by its influence constitutes the motive. The object contemplated in Divine predestination is two- fold : primary and secondary, or ultimate and subor- dinate. First, the ultimate object is the declarative glory of God. That must be the grand object, which of all conceivable ends is the most worthv ; and such is the 170 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. Divine glory. " Before nature, before any part or be- ing of the objective universe existed, the God of the Bible had existed from eternity in his own self-sufti- cience. And the absolute perfection which that self- sumcience implies, determines that it shall be, in some sense, the chief reason and last end of everything cre- ated ; so that he will continue to inhabit his self-sufii- cience through the eternity to come." In other words ? " the ultimate, chief, and all-comprehending, end is his own glory." — J. Harris^ D. D. This sentiment is scriptural, as appears from the following passages : " Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things ; to whom be glory forever."— Rom. 11 : 36. " In whom also we have obtained an inheritance ; be- ing predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, that we should be to the praise of his glory." &c. — Eph. 1 : 11.' "As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God." — Rom. 14 : 11. " And^ that every tongue should con- fess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."— Phil. 2 : 11. Second, a subordinate object is the well-being of the universe. " We believe that while he supremely regards his own glory, he really regards the well-being of the created universe, for its own sake ; and that this well-being is regarded by God as an end, in the sense of being an object desirable on its own account, and that he delights in it as such." — J. H. " I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 171 saith the Lord God ; wherefore, turn yourselves, and live ye."— Ezek. 18 : 32. " The Lord is good to all ; and his tender mercies are over all his works." — Ps. 145: 9. "And God saw everything that he had made ; and behold, it was very good." — Gen. 1;: 31. 2. Divine predestination is the predetermination of a plan. There can be no wise determination of an ob- ject, without a reference to the proper means and measures of its attainment ; because the feasibility of the object, depends in part on the feasibility of some proper method of operation, which wisdom requires to be ascertained. On the part of God, the idea of such a method or plan, must from eternity have been com- plete and perfect ; and the plan itself must have been definite and specific. If in given instances a variety of means and measures might severally be feasible, the Divine mind must have apprehended and preferred the best ; and if they were equally good, a definiteness of method must notwithstanding have obtained in the Divine mind, because God always knew what plan he would pursue. " He hath made with me an everlas- ting covenant, ordered in all things, and sure ; for this is all my salvation, and all my desire." — 2 Sam. 23 : 5. 3. Divine predestination is a predetermination to exercise the power, which the execution of the plan requires. We are divinely assured that God executes his plan, and hence by implication, that he exercises the requisite power ; for it is written, " The counsel of the Lord standeth forever : the thoughts of his 172 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. heart to all generations." — Ps. 33 : 11. "He is in one 'mind, and who can turn him? and what his sou] desireth, even that he doeth." — Job 23 : 13. "All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing ; and he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth ; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou V Dan. 4:35. If Grod exercises the power to execute his great eternal plan, it is be- cause he determined to exercise it ; because he does nothing from accident or fortuity. If Grod determined to exercise this power, he must have determined it from eternity ; because by reason of his immutability, he can have no recent views, and can entertain no new designs. As in his nature, so in his purpose, he is "the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever." But if Grod from eternity purposed to exercise this power, he did not purpose it after he had purposed the plan to be executed by it, nor before he had purposed the plan ; because the predetermination of the plan was also from eternity. Therefore, when he determined the one, he also determined the other. To show that the moral freedom of finite beings is consistent with Divine predestination, the threefold character of the latter must be kept in view ; and that relation must be exhibited, which freedom sustains to it in each of the three fundamental distinctions or parts. In other words, it is necessary to exhibit the harmony which exists between moral freedom, and Divine jiredestination as embracing an obiect, a plan, FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 173 and the exercise of power to execute the plan. There- fore — 1. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- tination as embracing an object. First. It is consistent with predestination as em- bracing the grand or ultimate object. Whatever is conducive to a given end, is consistent with the pre-determination of that end. The severe and protracted study of the scholar, is in harmony with his pre-determination to be learned ; the arrange- ments and labors of the traveller, agree with his de- sign to visit distant places ; and the self-denial of the saints, is consistent with their purpose to glorify God ; because in each case the object is promoted. But moral freedom is subservient to the grand object divinely pre- destinated. It subserves that object in its existence, nature, exercise, occasions, scope, office, and duration. The existence of moral freedom is of God as a good gift ; for it implies a Divine influence, and is essential to moral agency. It . is therefore essential to God's declarative glory. In its nature it is exemption from extrinsic causation ; and as such it involves mtrinsic causation, which is a feature of the Divine likeness, and which therefore glorifies God. In other words, it sub- serves the end determined. " So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." Gen. 1 : 27. Moral freedom is also in its exercise subservient to the Divine glory. Its right exercise is a practical recognition of the Divine authority and claims ; and as 174 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. such it honors the Supreme Lawgiver. It is in the "highest sense obedience ; and " To obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of ranis." In its improper exercise, moral freedom subserves the same end indirectly, as an occasion for glorious developments of the Divine character and attributes. " Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee : the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Ps. 76 : 10. We may instance persecutions. These have proved to be fires, by means of which the refiner has purified his silver ; and when they have occasioned the shedding of blood, that blood has become " the seed of the church." Moral freedom is also conducive to the end deter- mined, in the occasions of its existence. By the fall of Adam, those holy influences which are requisite to moral freedom, were forfeited ; but mankind are per- mitted to enjoy them as a merciful result of Christ's death, at such times and under such circumstances as consist with the declarative glory of God. The same thing is true of other requisites of moral freedom, such as the enjoyment of life, and of a sane mind. They may all be so conferred, so modified, so suspended, and so ended, that God shall be glorified. Moral freedom is also in its scope subservient to the Divine glory. By the word scope, is here meant both direction and extent. In those instances in which God pleases that freedom shall exist, it is his prerogative so to locate its direction, and so to limit its extent, as to contribute to such ends as he determines ; for " He hath prepared his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom ruleth over FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 175 all." Ps. 103 : 19. Moral freedom is also in its office conducive to the glory of God. Its office is to render the creature responsible for his actions, and to justify the ways of the Almighty. It lies at the foundation of God's glory, in the bestowment of rewards and pun- ishments. Finally, moral freedom is in its duration subservient to the Divine glory. That is to say, the period of its existence is not determined by any necessity in its own nature, but by the sovereign will of Him for whose glo- ry it was imparted. So that there is nothing in the case which requires it to be unduly prolonged, or which in any way conflicts with the grand object de- termined. Second. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predestination as embracing a subordinate object or objects. That object which is subordinate to the grand object, cannot absolutely preclude that which is essen- tial to the grand object. To suppose it could, is to assume that what is subordinate is not subordinate. But moral freedom is essential to the grand object. It must at some time or other exist, in order that God may be glorified in his judicial acts ; and in order that his government in general may do him honor. There- fore no subordinate object can absolutely preclude moral freedom ; and consequently moral freedom, either as proximate or remote, must be consistent with any subordinate object which may have been determined. 2. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- tination as embracing a Divine plan. 176 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. It has been shown that predestination is threefold ; embracing an object or objects, and a plan, and the ' exercise of power to execute the plan. We now re- mark, that it is also threefold in respect to the plan alone ; for it respects the plan in its three depart- ments of means, relation of means, and modification of means. Therefore, to harmonize moral freedom with predestination as embracing or respecting a plan, it is necessary to harmonize it with the predetermina- tion of the means, the relation of the means, and the modification of the means, by which the predetermined objects are secured. First. Moral freedom is consistent with the pre- determination of the means. Freedom is itself one of the essential means ; and its specific exercises are other means, whether those exercises are good, as in the conduct of Joseph, or evil, as in the conduct of his brethren. The predetermina- tion of freedom as a means^ is absolute or efficient ; but the predetermination as means, of the immediate spe- cific exercises of freedom, is necessarily permissive. This distinction is not affected by the fact, that many other means are also determined ; because the Divine purpose is consistent with itself. But the Divine pur- pose, as being in part efficient, and in part permissive, is in fact a predetermination that freedom shall not be precluded ; and that it shall have all essential scope for its exercise. Consequently freedom is perfectly consistent with the predetermination of the Divine plan, in so far as the plan comprises means. FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 177 The fact that predestination is "both efficient and permissive, explains all such cases of apparently neces- sary wickedness, as that of Judas Iscariot in betraying the Lord Jesus. The Divine plan comprised the early freedom of Judas, his abuse of that freedom in the indulgence of covetousness, his judicial abandonment to his covetousness, and the consequent betrayal of Christ ; but his freedom was determined efficiently, and the abuse of it permissively. It was by reason of his previous freedom, that it was possible for God to be glorified by occasion of his ultimate wickedness ; and his freedom was in perfect harmony with his wickedness. That is to say, there was nothing in his freedom to hinder him from forming an inward habit of covetousness ; nor anything in his freedom to hinder its being terminated, by his being abandoned to his habit ; nor any tiring in his abandonment to his habit of covetousness, to prevent his betrayal of Christ for thirty pieces of silver. But if these things came to pass consistently, they were consistently certain before they came to pass ; and if they might be consistently certain before they existed, they might be consistently predetermined in a decree that is partly efficient and partly permissive. Perhaps it may be said, if Judas was at any time free, he might have entered and pursued till death, the way of righteousness ; and then what would have be- come of the prophecies, and of the grand scheme of redemption? It may be answered, if Judas had im- proved his freedom thus, it would have been eternally 178 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. certain, and the prophecies would have corresponded with the fact ; and the scheme of redemption would have been carried forward, either without a betrayal, or by the agency of some one else living in our Lord's time, who was no better than Judas. . Several no doubt might have been found, who would have per- formed the office, if only an opportunity had been al- lowed them. It is a wrong idea, however, to suppose that Christ, in making the atoning sacrifice, was de- pendent on wicked men and devils ; for to do that, is to assume a position which, in part, imputes to them the glory of the atonement. But " What communion hath fight with darkness ; and what concord hath Christ with Belial V 3 In the agony and bloody sweat of the garden, the great sacrifice was begun ; and there it might have been finished : there the Son of Man might have laid down his life, and have " tasted death for every man/' independently of any human agency. With this idea his own words agree. " Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself : I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." John 10 : 17, 18. Any necessity which certainty involves, and which therefore the prophecies involve, is simply a natural necessity of identity, or a natural necessity of agree- ment as implied in identity ; and hence it is not the necessity in question. It is such a necessity as apper- tains to freedom itself as a fact, and therefore cannot be inconsistent with freedom. FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 179 Second. Moral freedom is consistent with the pre- determination of the relation of means. Among the means of God's predetermined glory, are good and evil influences ; or influences in favor of good, and influences in favor of evil. These influences are in fact the summing up of all means ; and it is by their relation as equal, and of consequence by the corresponding relation of other things, that moral freedom is enjoyed. But this rela- tion, at least in our fallen state, could never obtain, if it were not Divinely produced ; and it cannot be Di- vinely produced without a determination to produce it ; and there can be no such determination unless it be eternal. " Known unto God are all his works from eternity/' and likewise all the reasons respecting them ; so that he was never in doubt or undetermined re- specting them, and he can never discover any new rea- son in relation to them, to change his mind. There- fore, since the relation of influences as equal, is the result of Divine predestination, and since moral free- dom is the result of that relation, it follows that moral freedom is the result of the predestination of that re- lation, and of the predestination of all necessary sub- ordinate relations : and hence that freedom and pre- destination in these respects, are in harmony. The same reasoning holds good concerning the rela- tions which obtain between freedom itself, and neces- sity. An agent's moral freedom in a generic sense, is consistent with the preordination of his moral necessity in a specific sense. He may be free, as was Moses, to 180 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION, choose between the service of God, and " the pleasures of sin for a season ;" but in executing his choice, what- ever it be, he will, in the providence of God, or ac- cording to the Divine purpose, be sometimes necessita- ted in particular acts. Moses, for example, could not serve God without obeying him ; he could not obey God without being leader and judge of Israel ; and he could not be leader and judge of Israel, without being sometimes pleasantly, and sometimes unpleas- antly necessitated to perform particular acts. Pharaoh, also, was primarily free to choose, in his measure, either to do right, or to do wrong. He chose the latter ; and the necessity to do wrong in a particular case, which he afterwards experienced, did not conflict with this exercise of generic freedom. If he was specifically necessitated, he experienced but a necessity which he was primarily free to avoid. He was but confirmed and fixed in that which he first freely chose ; and in this he was but treated as God finally treats all other incorrigible sinners. Tri^RD. Moral freedom is consistent with the prede- termination of the requisite modification of the means. All necessary means of God's glory, and of subordinate ends, may be adequately changed and yet exist. They may have more or fewer attributes, and be more or less extensive. Freedom, for instance, as one of the means, may be enjoyed respecting internal acts only ? or also respecting external acts ; and it may be enjoyed concerning a wide range of subjects, as in the case of FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 181 a cultivated mind, or only concerning a few subjects, as in the case of a savage. Other means also may be more or less complete in their parts, may be more or less eminent in their na- ture, and may exist in greater or less number. Such modifications, taking place as they do in harmony with moral freedom, and being in part produced by the Creator, and in part by the creature, may be in part efficiently, and in part permissively predetermined, in harmony with moral freedom ; because that which consistently takes place, it may have been consistently predetermined to do or suffer. These modifications include the great changes which have taken place in the dispensations of God's mercy and grace to mankind in general, as those dispensa- tions are distinguished into Patriarchal, Mosaic, and Christian ; and they include the changes which are constantly occurring in the condition and experience of individuals. They are in agreement with man's moral freedom, because either they do not vitally af- fect the agent's liberty, as in the case of an enlarged sphere of action, or they result from some specific ex- ercise of liberty, as in the formation of ruinous habits, or they actually produce moral freedom, by equalizing diverse motive influences. We may say of the Divine plan, that in subordina- tion to the glory of God and the good of the universe, it is a scheme to originate moral freedom, and to afford that freedom all suitable scope, in so far as justice and mercy require, by originating and modifying the ne- 182 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. cessary circumstances ; and that therefore moral free- dom exists, in so far as justice and mercy require, in perfect harmony with the predetermination of the Divine plan. 3. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- tination, in so far as predestination respects the exer- cise of power sufficient to execute the Divine plan. It has been shown, that freedom is in harmony with the predetermination of both the object and the plan. It must therefore be consistent with the execution of the one, and the attainment of the other ; for it is in reference to them as feasible, that the harmony is predicated and proved. But if moral freedom is con- sistent with the execution of the plan, it is consistent with the exercise of the requisite power 'to execute it ; and if so, it is consistent with the predetermination to exercise that power ; because in the exercise of it, the predetermination is implied. The predetermination of Grod, is indeed essential to moral freedom. Such freedom cannot exist, except as it is comprised in the Divine plan, as one of its pro- visions to secure the contemplated object ; and it can- not actually exist as one of those provisions, except as the Divine plan is in this . respect executed ; and the Divine plan cannot be executed in any respect, except in pursuance of the Divine purpose or predetermina- tion. "Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." — James 1 : 17. FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 183 The harmony under consideration may be illustra- ted as follows : A republican government determines to obtain satisfaction for injuries received from a sister republic. The object is redress ; and the plan is war. The latter comprises the plan of campaigns ; and, through the agency of generals, the subordinate plans of sieges and battles. The exercise of the requisite power, is that of a free government over a free and in some respects a sovereign people : a people whose officers are but their servants. Yet the indispensable volunteer soldiery are enrolled, the needful supplies are furnished, the enemy's country is invaded, the bat- tles are fought, and the object is gained. If there is any difference between this case and man's moral freedom under the Divine government, it is in favor of the latter ; and by so much, as the Di- vine administration is a more wise, benign, and appro- priate government. It may perhaps be objected concerning Pharaoh, that God said, " For this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." — Exodus 9 : 16. From this passage it may appear to some, that Pharaoh was brought into the world, that he might be arbitrarily hardened and afflicted ; that he was ac- tually so hardened and afflicted ; and that therefore he was not morally a free agent. This, however, is not the sense of the passage. " The word translated ' raised up,' does not signify to bring into existence, but to cause to stand, to make to continue. Thus : 1 184 FEEEDOM AND PEEDESTINATION. Kings 15:4, • Nevertheless for David's sake did the Lord his God give him a lamp in Jerusalem,- to set up his son after him, and to establish Jerusalem/ Heb. ' To make to stand/ i. e., to preserve. Proverbs 29 : 4, ' The king by judgment establisheth the land/ Hebraism : c Makes to stand / i. e., renders safe. So also Ex. 21 : 21, l If he continue a day or two/ Heb., c If he stand a day or two / i. e., survive. Paul, however, in quoting this passage, Kom. 9 : 17, employs the term c raised up / which will occasion no difficulty, if it be borne in mincl, that a person may be said to be ' raised up/ who is preserved alive when in danger of dying, a usage of the word which occurs James 5 : 15, c And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up.' It was in this sense of being spared from imminent destruction, that Pharaoh was raised up." — Bush. The passage however may mean, that Pharaoh was taken from some comparatively humble station in life, and exalted to the throne of Egypt. There had prob- ably occurred an intestine revolution, in which the old dynasty had passed away, and a new one originated, or " raised up" in its stead ; for it is written, " There arose up a new king over Egypt, who knew not Jo- seph/' — Ex. 1 : 8. That is to say, a strange or for- eign king : one at least who was not brought in by regular succession ; for the word "new" is elsewhere applied to gods and languages, to designate them as strange gods, and foreign languages. See Deut. 32 : 17 ; Judges 5:8; Mark 16 : 17. FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 185 Besides, Josephus, speaking of the oppressions en- dured by the Israelites after the death of Joseph, says, " The government having been transferred to an- other family." As thus viewed, the case of Pharaoh sinrply sustains the following propositions : I. God has a decisive agency in raising up men to stations of power ; and he exercises this power in pagan nations, as well as in others. " Is he the God of the Jews only ? Is he not also of the Gentiles ? Yes, of the Gentiles also."— Kom. 3 : 29. " There fell a voice from heaven, saying, king Nebuchadnez- zar, to thee it is spoken : the kingdom is departed from thee ; and they shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field. They shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and seven times shall pass over thee, until thou know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will." — Dan. 4 : 31, 32. II. God frequently raises up wicked men to stations of honor and power. It may be so done to them, even on account of their wickedness ; for they may be ex- alted, that they may be the more signally punished. III. God frequently raises up men to important sta- tions in life, by suffering fraud and falsehood to pre- vail. In the raising up of Pharaoh, he probably suf- fered not only these, but violence and bloodshed ; and his fate should be a perpetual warning to those who seek for worldly success in the employment of un- righteous means. Temporary prosperity is no criterion 186 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. of the Divine favor, and therefore not always a just occasion for rejoicing. IV. When Grod raises up the wicked to stations of power and affluence, it is generally to accomplish a variety of ends of his own. It may be, 1. To punish a wicked and cruel nation. 2. To make his sovereignty known. 3. To benefit and save his people, in the most effectual and glorious manner. V. God sometimes hardens men in their wickedness. This hardness may be created in either one or both of two ways. 1. It may obtain as the result of Divine forbearance and mercy. " And when Pharaoh saw that the rain, and the hail, and the thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants. And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, neither would he let the children of Israel go, as the Lord had spoken by Moses."— Ex. 9 : 34, 35. 2. It may obtain as a judicial visitation. It is writ- ten of some, " God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie : that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." — 2 Thess. 2 : 11, 12. VI. G-od sometimes hardens rulers in their wicked- ness, for the same reason that he raised them up in their wickedness ; or he justly withholds from them all melting and subduing grace, that the ends of justice to them, and of mercy to others, and of glory to Grod, may not be defeated. It should be borne in mind, that a judicial harden- FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 187 ing, or a hardening in the way of punishment, is never arbitrary ; but that it implies guilt in the unhappy subject, and therefore previous freedom which has been abused. Consequently, it is a hardening which might have been avoided : a hardening in which the agent is involved by means of his own free volitions and ac- tions. It is therefore merely that which all must acknowl- edge will ultimately befall every incorrigible sinner, though every such sinner has his probationary day of moral freedom. CHAPTER III. JtMiflW ani (BUttiaxt, PRINCIPLES. III. Man's moral freedom is consistent ivith person- al and eternal election to salvation. It may be well to observe, that election, generically considered, is various ; dividing itself into the follow- ing departments or branches : 1. An election of Christ as the Messiah. " Behold my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul delighteth : I have put my Spirit upon him, he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles." — Isa. 42 : 1. " Behold my servant whom I have chosen." — Mat. 12 : 18. " A living stone, disallowed indeed of men, but chosen of God, and precious." — 1 Peter 2 : 4. 2. An election of good angels. " I charge thee be- fore God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect angels."—! Tim. 5 : 21. 3. An election of the seed of Abraham, or of Israel, to the enjoyment of great national blessings, and reli- gious privileges. " I will bring forth a seed out of Jacob, and out of Judah an inheritor of my moun- FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 189 tains ; and mine elect shall inherit it, and my servants shall dwell there/' " They shall not build, and anoth- er inhabit : they shall not plant, and another eat ; for as the days of a tree, are the days of my people, and mine elect shall long enjoy the work of their hands."— Isa. 65 : 9, 22. u The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all people that are upon the face of the earth." — Deut. 7:6. " Israel mine elect." — Isa. 45 : 4. 4. An election of the G-entiles, or nations in gene- ral, to Gospel privileges. " Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; teaching them to observe all things, whatsoever I have com- manded you."— Mat. 28 : 19, 20. " I will declare the decree : the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." — Ps. 2 : 7, 8. "For this cause, I Paul, the prisoner of Jesus Christ for you Gentiles, if ye have heard of the dispensation of the grace of God, which is given me to you-ward. — That the Gentiles should be fellow- heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ, by the Gospel. — According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord."— Eph. 3 : 1, 2, 6, 11. 5. An election of the Christian Church, or Church- es, to be the peculiar people of God, as were the Jews of old. "The Church that is at Babylon, 190 FKEEDOM AND ELECTION. elected together with you, saluteth you, and so doth Marcus my son/' — 1 Peter 5 : 13. " As he saith also in Hosea, I will call them my people, which were not my people ; and her beloved, which was not "beloved/' — Rom. 9 : 25. " Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works/' — Titus 2 : 14. " Ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood/'— 1 Peter 2 : 9. 6. An election of individuals to particular duties, or offices. " He called unto him his disciples ; and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles." — Luke 6:13. " Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you, that you should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." — John 15 : 16. " Men and brethren, ye know how that a good while ago, God made choice among us, that the Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the Gospel, and believe." — Acts 15 : 7. 7. An election of particular individuals to salvation : " Paul, a servant of God, and an apostle of Jesus Christ, according to the faith of God's elect." — Titus 1:1. " God hath not appointed us to wrath ; but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ." — 1 Thess. 5:9. " God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth."— 2 Thess. 2 : 13. To elect is to choose. Divine election to salvation, is God's act of choosing to save ; and it is equivalent to a purpose, predestination, or decree. It is charac- FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 191 terized by two distinct and important properties ; be- ing personal and eternal. 1. Election to salvation is personal. " Knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God. For our gos- pel came not unto you in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance." — 1 Thess. 1 : 4, 5. " The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are his."— 2 Tim. 2 : 19. "For whom he did fore- know, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did pre- destinate, them he also called ; and whom he called, them he also justified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified."— Rom. 8 : 29, 30. " The elder un- to the elect lady and her children." — 2 John 1. " The children of thy elect sister greet thee." — 2 John 13. 2. Election to salvation is eternal. " According as he hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world." — Eph. 1:4. " Then shall the king say unto them on his right hand, Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world."— Mat. 25 : 34. " Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate." — Rom. 8 : 29. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father."— 1 Peter 1 : 2. That moral freedom is consistent with this election to salvation, appears from the following consider- ations : 1. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- 192 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. tination, and predestination includes election. " Ac- cording as lie hath chosen us in him, "before the foun- dation of the world, that we should be holy, and with- out blame before him in love ; having predestinated us unto the adoption of children/' — Eph. 1 : 4, 5. Divine predestination is the predetermination of an object, a plan, and the exercise of power sufficient to execute that plan ; and hence election, as included or involved in predestination, must be in harmony with the object, the plan, and the exercise of this power. But this predetermined plan comprises man's moral freedom, as one of its essential provisions. Therefore election must be in harmony with such freedom. It must agree with every essential provision of the plan, in order to agree with the plan itself. The salvation of the elect, is efficiently determined as a means of the Divine glory, or as a means of the predetermined object ; and that in harmony with their moral freedom, because only those " Whom he did foreknow" as freely choosing aright, " he did pre- destinate to be conformed to the image of his Son," and to be " glorified." 2. Personal and eternal election to salvation is con- sistent with man's moral freedom, because it obtains in the light of a perfect knowledge, of what will be possible and proper in harmony with such freedom. In the act of election God did not discard the benefit of his knowledge, because he could not dishonor one of his attributes, by slighting it in its own appropriate sphere ; and hence we read, " Whom he did foreknow, FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 193 he also did predestinate ;" and again, " Elect, accor- ding to the foreknowledge of God the Father." God foresaw " from eternity" whom he could con- " sistently save in harmony with their moral freedom ; and he foresaw from eternity, that those whom he con- sistently could save in harmony with their moral free- dom, he actually would thus save ; and as he foresaw from eternity, that he consistently could and would save them in harmony with their moral freedom, so he must from eternity have chosen, elected, or determined thus to save them ; for he is u the same yesterday, to- day, and forever." Heb. 13 : 8. His language is, "I am the Lord, I change not." This suggests the reason why he did not elect a larger number to salva- tion : he foresaw that more could not be saved in har- mony with their moral freedom. The doctrine of moral freedom has been proved Therefore free agents attain persooally to salvation ; " being justified freely by his grace, through the re- demption that is in Jesus Christ." Eom. 3 : 24. If free agents attain personally to salvation, their freedom is consistent with then salvation. If their freedom is consistent with their salvation, it is consistent with God's act of saving them ; and then it is consistent with God's purpose or choice, at the time, to save them. If their moral freedom is consistent with their being saved in- pursuance of a Divine choice, exercised at the time of their salvation, it is consistent with their being saved in pursuance of a Divine choice, ex- ercised from eternity ; for the reasons of that choice, 194 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. must in each case be the same. They were all present to the Divine mind from eternity ; and God can never entertain any new or different view of them. 3. The moral freedom of the saved, is consistent with their election to salvation, because it is consistent with their election to the means and method of salva- tion. "According as he hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love ; having predes- tinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will."— Eph. 1:4,5. God elected or chose a redeemer for the world : a " Saviour of all men, but especially of those who be- lieve ;" and the redeemer whom he elected is Christ Jesus. "Wherefore, it is contained in the scripture, Behold I lay in Zion a chief corner-stone, elect, pre- cious, and he that believeth on him, shall not be con- founded." — 1 Peter, 2 : 6. And again, " Behold my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul delighteth." — Isa. 42 : 1. In electing or choosing Christ to be the redeemer of mankind, God chose the means and method of salvation which he propounds. In choosing the means and method propounded by the Lord Jesus to the world, God chooses or elects to adop- tion and persevering holiness, all who, in the exercise of moral freedom, embrace his means and method ; and by thus electing them to adoption and persevering ho- liness in harmony with their moral freedom, he elects them to salvation in harmony with their moral free- FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 195 dom ; and by reason of the Divine foreknowledge, their election is both personal and eternal. It is an election in Christ ; because, as they would have been rejected in the rejection of Christ, so they are elected in the election of Christ. Therefore, " Give diligence to make your calling and election sure ;" or, to ac- quire a vital union or relation to Christ, as the branch to the vine, and hence a saving interest in his election, as your own. If you have already " gained" tHis interest, give diligence to confirm this your calling and election ; "for if ye do these things, ye shall never fall. For so an entrance shall be ministered un- to you abundantly, into the everlasting kingdom of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ/' — 2 Peter 1 : 10, 11. The doctrine of this portion of scripture is, not that God is in doubt concerning our final end, nor that election is not eternal ; but that obedience is indis- pensable. It may be illustrated by certain facts con- cerning Paul's dangerous voyage and shipwreck, as expressed by that apostle. He said, " There shall be no loss of any man's life among you, but of the ship. For there stood by me this night the Angel of God, whose I am, and whom I serve, saying, Fear not Paul, thou must be brought before Ca3sar, and lo, God hath given thee all them that sail with thee. Wherefore, sirs, be of good cheer ; for I believe God, that it shall be even as it was told me." Yet " as the shipmen were about to flee out of the ship," " Paul said to the Centurion and to the soldiers, except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved." — Acts 27 : 22, 31. 196 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. Eemarks. — 1. All who are elected to salvation, will certainly be saved. Not one of them will be lost. To suppose otherwise, is as absurd as to suppose that some may be lost whom God knows will be saved, and whom he has determined to save. We do not say that they cannot fatally apostatize, but that they will not. If, however, it be insisted that they cannot, it will not therefore follow that freedom and moral obligation have no existence. As freedom prevents not sinners from placing themselves in such a position that they cannot be saved, so it prevents not any from attaining to such a state, that they cannot practically deny the Lord that bought them ; and consequently, that they cannot be lost. And if this state should commence with regeneration, the case is not essentially altered. In their regeneration, the saints are not precluded from the exercise of a free choice ; and the choice which they then make, is that of eternal life, with all its prerequisite grace. They choose, therefore, a final preservation from apostasy. On eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord, their heart is fully set ; and therefore, on God's preserving grace. They make at the time an entire surrender of themselves to the Savior, and throw themselves wholly on his mercy and protection ; for they realize that his grace is abso- lutely indispensable. If, therefore, all they who are elected to salvation, are irresistibly " kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation," it is not in con- flict with their primary and essential freedom, but in harmony with it, as a consistent result of its proper FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 197 exercise. Besides, while they live, they are still in a state of trial ; for even if they may not fall away and perish, they may be more or less faithful in the im- provement of saving grace, and so be more or less use- ful and blest, as the result of this part of then pro- bation. 2. All who are elected to salvation, as adults, are also elected to the grace or blessing of regeneration. It may be less apparent in some than in others, and it may imply more in some than in others ; but all of mature mind, who are elected to salvation, do ex- perience it. " Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again/' — John 3 : 7. 3. The mere fact, that some are personally and eter- nally elected to salvation, and that all these are elect- ed to regeneration, does not of itself imply that none others are. elected to regeneration ; or, election to sal- vation, does not of itself imply that it includes all who in time are "born again/' Whether it includes them all, or whether it does not, can only be made out from the scriptures directly ; and not from anything in its nature as a Divine choice. 4. If the moral freedom of those who are saved, is consistent with their personal and eternal election to salvation, then the moral freedom of those who are not saved, is consistent with that election. Election can have no essential or direct effect on any, except on its subjects ; and if it precludes not the liberty of its subjects, it certainly cannot preclude the liberty of others. 198 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 5. To the inquiry, Is election conditional or uncon- ditional, the answer must be given in accordance with the sense in which the terms, conditional and uncon- ditional, are employed by him who puts the question. If by conditional be meant, that in election the terms of salvation are not set aside, but recognized and re- spected, or that faith and obedience are requisite to salvation, even in the case of the elect, the answer must be that election is conditional ; but if by conditional be meant, that the election or choice is not positive but provisional, in the Divine mind, then, in opposition to such a sense of conditional, the answer must be, that election is unconditional. On no subject whatev- er, can the All-wise God experience uncertainty or doubt ; and hence the eternal choice or predetermina- tion of his own action, in the final disposition of his creatures, is in no instance encumbered with a proviso to himself. CHAPTER IY. jfrrrttom ani n must acknowledge its superiority and worth. The nations that " sit in darkness, and in the region and shadow of death," are generally in a state of bar- barism, degradation, and destitution ; and if in either of these respects their condition be otherwise, they know not how to profit by their advantages. Therefore, " Blessed is the people that know the joyful sound : they shall walk, Lord, in the light of CORRELATIVES. 243 thy countenance. In thy name shall they rejoice all the day ; and in thy righteousness shall they be ex- alted." — Ps. 89 : 15, 16. To suppose that Pagans cannot be saved unless they are made acquainted with the Gospel, and to suppose, as we must, that they cannot "know the joyful sound unless it be imparted to them by their fellow men, is to suppose that God cannot be faithful to them, unless man be faithful to them ; and that the measure of God's essential faith- fulness to them, cannot exceed the measure of faith- fulness which is exercised by the Church : cannot ex- ceed the integrity of a body of frail beings, who have lived in great remissness for ages, and who at best do not perform their duty fully. Such a supposition is too derogatory to the Divine character, to be admitted for a moment. " The Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works." u Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty, just and true are thy ways, thou king of saints." — Kev. 15: 3. CHAPTER VI. $t$piito* frittrijlw PRINCIPLES. XIX. Moral freedom consists not in the possession of intellectual and moral faculties ; nor is it necessa- rily implied in the possession of faculties. It has been said ; "To be free is the property of an agent who is possessed of powers and faculties ; as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous." Freedom, it is true, implies the existence of facul- ties ; but faculties do not necessarily involve freedom. Ability to walk is the property of an agent who pos- sesses inferior limbs ; but the possession of limbs nei- ther constitutes nor implies necessarily freedom of locomotion. These important members of the body may be in a state of paralysis ; or they may be agita- ted by uncontrollable and useless motions, produced by disease. The same thing is true, in a sense, of the faculties of the soul. They may be unavailable for obedience, and be exercised only under constraint. If their existence implies power, that power is wholly indefinite ; and in the essential respect, it may be NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 245 wholly void. It may be power to clioose and act in one direction only ; and that in a disastrous direction. Power to love, is not of itself power to love God. It may be simply an ability to love evil, as in the case of the abandoned and lost ; and to denominate this freedom, or a state of exemption from extrinsic causa- tion, is a palpable contradiction. If the possession of faculties be freedom, it is freedom though the agent be constrained to exercise them in a given direction only ; and then it follows, that freedom does not ne- cessarily imply a correlation of liability to evil and capacity for good. If freedom were such a thing, it would be consistent with the most absolute fatality ; and then the lost in hell might have no upbraidings of a guilty conscience, but only the sense of a cruel and Almighty despotism. All which is not true. XX. Moral freedom consists not in the exercise of volition. Doctor Hopkins, in speaking of a moral agent as free, says, " He will doubtless find that the internal freedom of which he is conscious, consisteth in his vol- untary exercises, or in choosing and ivilling ; that he is conscious, that in all his voluntary exertions he is free, and must be accountable ; and has no conscious- ness or idea of any other kind of moral liberty ; or that the liberty that he exerciseth, hath anything more or less belonging to it ; or that it could be increased, or made more perfect freedom, by the addition of any- thing that is not implied in willing and choosing/' — - Syst. Divinity, Vol 1, p. 128. 246 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. This definition is incorrect, 1. Because it confounds things which in their na- ture are distinct and different. It confounds an act, with a state or condition. Volition or choice is action. It is that in which moral agency essentially consists ; whereas freedom is the state in which it takes place. The one is performed, while the other is enjoyed ; and the one proceeds from the agent, while the other is bestowed upon him. To speak of them, therefore, as if they were identical, is to do violence to the nature and relations of things, and to support conclusions which are both false and dangerous. The definition which we are considering, confounds also the absence of action or volition, with necessity ; for if volition be taken for freedom, the absence of vo- lition must be taken for the absence of freedom, and the absence of freedom is necessity. If the absence of an act be necessity, it must be the necessity of that absence ; and then the absence of an act, and the ne- cessity of its absence are one and the same thing, at the same time that the one is the occasion of the other. It is indeed the same as to say, that when an agent does not exercise a given volition, his not exer- cising it, constrains him not to exercise it ; or that the grand and irresistible reason why the agent forbears to exercise a given volition is, that he forbears. If freedom consists exclusively in willing or choosing, men are only free in so far as they actually choose ; and then they who do not choose to love Grod, are not free to love him. If therefore they perish, it is for NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 247 lack of freedom, and for nothing else ; and hence they are much to be pitied. Hopkins' definition is incorrect, 2. Because it makes terms interchangeable which are not so. " Choose you this day whom ye will serve," is made to signify, Free you this day whom ye will serve ; and, " Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her," is made to mean, Mary hath freed that good part. Paul is made to say, u What I shall free, I wot not ; for I am in a straight betwixt two ; " and Job is made to say, " My soul freeth strangling and death, rather than my life." The Doctor appeals to consciousness, but he has misunderstood its teaching. Its voice is, that there is a freedom of the soul in willing or choosing, and that the exercise of freedom implies of course the ex- ercise of volition or choice ; but its teaching is not, that the exercise of freedom and the exercise of volition are identical. If the Doctor clwse to hear the voice of consciousness, we fear he did not free himself to hear it, but remained utterly creed-bound. His definition is incorrect, 3. Because it creates tautology where there properly is none. If volition be freedom, agency is freedom : because volition is agency. If agency be freedom, the phrase, " free agency," must mean free freedom, or agency agency. Thus an arbitrary definition, invented to sustain an erroneous creed, reduces ideas to confu- sion, and language to nonsense. The definition under consideration is incorrect, 248 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 4. Because it involves a false distinction. If moral freedom consists in volition, or in willing what is willed, the only difference between the saint and sin- ner is, that the one has one kind of moral freedom, and the other has another kind of moral freedom ; and if the only difference between them is a difference in the kind of then freedom, then that is the only difference between sin and holiness ; and then also a mere differ- ence of freedom is the only ground of difference in the awards of eternity. That is to say, then the one class of mankind are hereafter punished for their freedom, and the other class are reivarded for their freedom. On this principle, Christ will say to sinners on the last day, " Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels/' because you exercised freedom ; and to the righteous, " Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world/' because you exercised freedom. How wonderful it is, that to a portion of mankind freedom is a crime, an endowment which con- stitutes them sinners and reprobates ; while to others it is a virtue, an endowment which constitutes them righteous and fit subjects for heaven ! And what is more wonderful still is, that, according to Hopkins, this freedom has not " anything more or less belonging to it." That is to say, the freedom of the sinner, which consists in exercising evil volitions, is not subordinate to any other freedom ; and the free- dom of the righteous, which consists in exercising holy volitions, is also not subordinate to any other. Neither NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 249 is free in the exercise of his freedom. The sinner must necessarily exercise evil volitions as his freedom, and the saint must necessarily exercise holy volitions as his freedom ; and the sinner must necessarily perish for that freedom in which he is not free, and the saint will be gloriously saved on account of that freedom in which he is not free. What a beautiful doctrine ! Through much transforming, it appears like " an angel of light ;" but when we deprive it of its disguise, it stands forth in all the deformity of a fiend. XXI. Moral freedom consists not in power to exe- cute volition or choice. President Edwards affirms that it does. He says : " The plain and obvious meaning of the words free- dom, and liberty, in common speech, is jioicer, oppor- tunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free froni hin- drance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect as he wills. And the contrary of liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being ne- cessitated to do otherwise." " But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called lib- erty ; namely, power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it, without taking into the mean- ing of the word, anything of the cause or original of that choice, or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition : whether it was caused by some external motive. <>r internal habitual bias ; 11* 250 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. whether it was determined by some internal antece- dent volition ; or whether it happened without a cause ; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom." — Inq. part 1, sec. 5. To understand this definition, it is necessary to de- termine the meaning of the following phrases : " To do as he pleases, doing or conducting as he wills, to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice." To understand these phrases, we must ascertain the sense in which the author employs the following terms : pleases or pleasure, ivills or will, chooses or choice. These terms, it is very evident, are all employed as synonyma ; and as including in their meaning, the exercise of the affections. The author says, " The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties ; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise." — On the Affec, p. 17. To understand him, it is also necessary to determine the sense in which he employs the terms, do, doing, conducting, pursuing, executing. These terms are all employed to express every kind of positive and nega- tive action : action of doing, and action of refusing to do, action of the body, of the intellect, of the affec- NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 251 tions, and of the will. They are sometimes employed by our author, in the sense of pleasing, choosing, thinking, loving. He tells us, the term "action," "is used in the same sense as doing ; and most commonly it is used to signify outward actions." u And some- times the word action is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of will and inclination : so meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing, and re- fusing, may be sometimes called acting ; though more rarely (unless it be by philosophers and metaphysi- cians) than in any of the other senses." — Inq. } part 4, sec. 2. That Edwards employs the terms doing, conducting, and executing, in this comprehensive sense, is evident from his own explanation, as given in a letter to a Scotch minister. In that letter he says, " If any one should here say yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting in any re- spect as he pleases, viz : a liberty of choosing as he pleases, Such a one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own instance. For is not choos- ing as he pleases, conducting, in some respect, ac- cording to his pleasure." — Inq. p. 418. Here we are plainly taught, that conducting includes choosing ; and of course that doing, pursuing, and exe- cuting include choosing. Edwards' definition of freedom is therefore this : Freedom consists in the power, oppor- tunity, or advantage that any one has to choose, love, and otherwise act, in pursuance or execution of previous will, choice, or affection. In other words, it makes freedom 252 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. to consist in that power to execute, which consists in a man's power to will and act according to his will or pleasure. As the exercise of choice or will, and the exercise of the affections or pleasure, are not the same, though confounded by our author, the definition constitutes really two generic definitions. The first is, that free- dom consists in power to choose and act according to choice or will. The second is, that freedom "consists in power to choose and otherwise act according to the agent's pleasure or affections. We will answer each definition separately, beginning with the last men- tioned. Therefore, (I.) Moral freedom consists not in power to choose and otherwise act in accordance with the affections. 1. A moral agent may have power to choose accord- ing to the affections, and yet be compelled to choose against the affections. Several different objects may excite the same affections, as for instance the agent's love and desire, of which objects he may with full power choose any one ; but of which he knows he may only choose one or neither. In this case he has power to choose and act according to his affections, because he may appropriate any one of the objects ; but to do so, is to forfeit all the other objects, and hence it is to choose and act against the love and desire which he cherishes for them. He must choose one or neither, and in either case he goes against his affections. Now if Edwards were correct, the agent in this case would be both free and not free, at the same time, NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 253 and in the same volition or act. Therefore, as freedom and necessity are opposites, so that the existence of either one in a given respect precludes the existence of the other in that respect, it follows that Edwards' definition is not correct. 2. A moral agent may have power to choose and act according to the affections, and yet in the exercise of that power be wholly subject to extrinsic causation ; and to be subject to extrinsic causation in a given respect, is to be necessitated in that respect. Suppose a sculptor, possessing the power to do so, should animate a statue, and endow it not only with intelligence, but with the affection of hatred against himself ; and suppose the hatred implanted should be so great as irresistibly to control all the other affec- tions, and the will itself ; so that in accordance with the affections, the statue should unavoidably choose to pursue the sculptor with curses, insults, and injuries, to the utter neglect of its own best interests : would the animated marble be free in its actions ? Would it not rather be the veriest and most pitiable slave ? It is true, the sculptor may also have given to the statue a consciousness of right and wrong, or an up- braiding conscience ; but conscience being of inferior power, and therefore inefficient to guide or reform, the case is not altered, except for the worse. This addi- tion merely enhances the wretchedness of the statue, and the cruelty of the sculptor. It may perhaps be said, the sculptor is very kind to the statue. He bestows on it freely and abundantly 254 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. the necessaries of its existence ; and lie endures its annoyances with great equanimity and forbearance. That may very well be, and to other animated statues, it may occasion great astonishment. They may re- gard this forbearance as a wonderful mercy ; but is the living marble any the less perfectly and irresistibly controlled by the artist ? Certainly not. We may also be told, that the superhuman blow with which the good artist finally shatters the wicked statue to fragments, and makes the pieces quiver with eternal pain, is a most impressive and glorious display of his power ; but let not the glory of this event ob- scure the fact, that the statue never resisted what it could not resist, the laws of its being, as imparted and controlled by the sculptor. In other words, it never resisted the guiding hand of its maker ; and as it could not resist, its power to choose and act according to the affections, is merely the power of a slave. It is cer- tainly very far from being freedom. (II.) Moral freedom consists not in power to choose and act in pursuance of choice. The action which is pursuant to an act of choice, may be simply an act of choice, or an act of choice conjointly with other action, or merely other action alone ; and it is properly termed executive action. As it consists of two kinds, acts of the will, and other acts, it may be important to consider these two classes of executive action separately, in order the more fully to show that the power exercised in them is not moral freedom. Therefore, NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 255 1 Moral freedom consists not in power to choose in pursuance of choice. In no instance can a moral agent exercise his first sinful volition in pursuance or execution of a previous choice. Such a previous choice would itself he evil ; and there can he no evil volition previous to the first evil volition. Take for example the first sinful volition of the first transgressor in the universe. It was impossible that he should exercise it in fulfillment of any previous choice, because all previous volitions, being absolutely holy, were entirely unlike such volition, and absolutely opposed to it. Yet in that first sinful volition he must have been free. It arose not as a calamity from some weakness in his moral constitution ; nor as a blunder from some defect in the Divine government. God is not chargeable with any such incompetency or mis- management. Therefore moral freedom consists not in power to choose in pursuance of choice. That cannot be a true idea, which is destroyed by a correlative idea. But the idea that freedom consists of power to choose in pursuance of an antecedent choice, is destroyed by a correlative idea. If this idea of freedom be allowed, it must also be allowed that the first transgressor was not free in his first sinful volition ; for that volition could not be exercised in pur- suance of a previous volition. If it be allowed that he was not free in his first sinful volition, it must like- wise be allowed that he is not free in those which fol- low ; for they are but necessary results of that first sinfnl volition. But the idea that he is not free in the 256 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. volitions which follow his first sinful choice, implies that he is not free in choosing according to previous choice ; and hence it destroys or precludes the idea that the power of thus choosing is freedom. This idea of freedom, therefore, is like an ancient representation of time, under the figure of a serpent eating himself : as fast as it grows at the head, it dies at the tail. 2. Moral freedom consists not in power to act in pur- suance of choice. No mere power to act is freedom, because the necessitated agent may exercise the power of action as well as the free ; and because the free agent may be destitute of the power of executive ac- tion, as well as the necessitated. The power to act in pursuance of choice, may be associated with either natural or moral freedom ; but of itself it constitutes neither. It is wholly subordinate to the power of choice. ' If it were not, its exercise could not be moral action. It is exercised, therefore, in a state of neces- sity, if it exists, whenever the power of volition is ex- ercised in that state ; and consequently it cannot be freedom. A correct definition of moral freedom, must make that freedom applicable to the agent, not only in his executive actions and volitions, but also posi- tively in his. imperate volitions. A definition which does not do this is false, because it implies that the vo- litions which constitute the essential part of moral agency, are not any part of moral agency ; and such a definition is the one of which we are treating. It is like a definition of duty, which implies that morality is the whole of piety, or that knowledge is the whole NEGATIVE PKINCIPLES. 257 of wisdom : a definition which contains a predicate that rejects an essential part of its logical subject. If there is any difference, it is that Edwards' definition is the more faulty ; because morality and knowledge are essential to piety, but the power of executive ac- tion is not essential to moral freedom. In Edwards' system, the distinction between neces- sity and freedom, is simply a distinction between ne- cessity in a given case, and the same kind of necessity in another case. He says, " There can be no act of will, choice, or preference of the mind, without some motive or in- ducement." , " It is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the will is always, and in every in- dividual act, necessarily determined by the strongest motive ; and so is always unable to go against the mo- tive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the will." "If it be so, that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does." — Inq. pp. 144, 232, 46. That is to say, in a moral sense, men cannot choose or act otherwise than they do ; or all their volitions and actions come to pass of moral necessity. What then is the distinction which he recognizes as existing between necessity and freedom 1 Simply this : in a state of necessity, the agent is necessitated to act con- trary to his necessitated will, or is "restrained" from acting agreeably to it ; whereas in a state of freedom, 258 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. the agent is necessitated to possess and exercise the power of acting according to his necessitated will. Thus we are taught, that necessity consists not in neces- sity, nor even in a double necessity, but in the opposition of two necessities ; and that freedom consists not in the absence of necessity, but in the agreement of two necessities. According to this idea of freedom, slaves may be liberated without any pecuniary loss to their owners ; and without any charity from others. Let the persons who are held to service, wear no chains ; but let their minds be influenced by the strongest of motives. Let them possess the domestic affections in the fullness of their strength, and let them thoroughly fear the blood-hound, the lash, and the bullet ; so that they shall of moral necessity choose to make no attempt to escape, but rather choose to remain quietly at their toil ; and let them have " power, opportunity, or advantage, to do as they please " or choose in this respect, and they are absolutely free men. They could not be more free than they are, in despite of the man- ner in which they are made to choose as they do ; or, as Edwards has it, "without at all considering how they came to have such a volition." Such an idea of actual freedom, places common sense at a discount. Edwards himself contradicts and destroys his own definitions. He says, " Metaphysical or philosophical necessity is nothing different from their certainty/' — Inq. p. 33. " Philosophical necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 259 things signified by the subject and predicate of a prop- osition which affirms something to be true/' — p. 34. By the terms metaphysical and philosophical, as here employed, he means moral. He expressly says, " Moral necessity is a species of philosophical neces- sity/' — Inq.p. 296. He speaks of the same necessity when he says, " And sometimes by moral necessity is meant, that necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense that I use the phrase moral necessity, in the following dis- course/' — p. 40. Speaking of moral necessity, as inability, he says : " Moral inability consists either in the want of incli- nation, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or, both these may oe re- solved into one ; and it may be said in one word, that moral inability consists in the opposition, or want of inclination." — p. 45. In this very concise statement, moral necessity is represented to consist in the following items : 1. Certainty. 2. Connection of subject and predicate. 3. That necessity of connection, which arises from the connection of a moral cause, and its effect. 4. Want of inclination, or opposition of inclination. 260 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 5. The superior strength of an inclination, which is contrary to a given action. 6. Want of sufficient motives, or strength of appa- rent motives to the contrary. Here we have six different definitions of one neces- sity — making it six different and distinct necessities. If necessity, including inability, consists in the above items, freedom, including ability, consists in the fol- lowing : T. Uncertainty. 2. Disconnection of subject and predicate. 3. That freedom of disconnection, which arises from the disconnection of a moral cause and its effect. 4. Inclination, or no opposition of inclination. 5. The strength or superiority of an inclination, in favor of a given action. 6. Sufficient motives, or weakness of apjwent mo- tives to the contrary. Therefore, according to Edwards, the following are the differences between necessity and freedom. 1. The difference between certainty and uncertainty. In keeping with this distinction, if we say, the visitor is coming, of a certainty, we shall be understood to say, he is coming of a necessity ; and if we say, his coming is a matter of uncertainty, we shall be under- stood to say, it is a matter of freedom. Further, if we would speak with strict j^ro-juiety and accuracy, we should not say, free agency, and free agent ; but uncertain agency, and uncertain agent. If the New Testament were translated by this philos- NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 261 ophy, some passages would be rendered quite intelligi- ble. We should then read, " Art thou called being a servant ? care not for it ; but if thou raayest be made uncertain, use it rather/' — 1 Cor. 7 : 21. "And the kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich men, and the chief captains, and the mighty men, and every certain man, and every uncertain man, hid themselves in the dens, and in the rocks of the moun- tains/' — Eev. 6 : 15. The difference between necessity and freedom is, 2. The difference between the connection and dis- connection, of "the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms some- thing to be true." This short sentence, the man eats, is " a proposi- tion which affirms something to be true;" and the things signified by the subject and predicate are, a hu- man being, and the act of taking food. When, there- fore, such a being and such an act are connected, or when the man actually eats, then we have an instance of moral necessity. So that, to say truthfully, the man eats, is to say, he eats necessarily ; and to say truthfully, the man does not eat, is to say, he eats freely. Or, which is the same thing, to say he eats freely, is to say he does not eat ; because, in all cases of moral freedom, there is no'" connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate." The same reasoning holds good of the proiDOsition, the man loves, or the man hates, or the man chooses. 262 NEGATIVE PBINCIPLES. The difference between necessity and freedom, is represented to be, 3. The difference between that necessity of connection which arises from the connection of a moral cause and its effect, and that freedom of disconnection which arises from the disconnection of a moral cause and its effect. That is to say, necessity now consists, not of con- nection, nor of necessity itself, nor of necessity of dis- connection; but of necessity of connection: and hence freedom consists, not of disconnection, nor of freedom itself, nor of freedom of connection; but of freedom of disconnection. Seasoning which involves such contra- dictory and absurd conclusions, may possibly emanate from a sane mind ; but only from a mind which is ut- terly enslaved by its creed. In the present instance, it is the effort of a man who is strong, but blind. His theological Delilah has occasioned his eyes to be put out. The difference under consideration, is, 4. The difference between a want of inclination, or opposition of inclination, and inclination or no oppo- sition of inclination. • We are taught, that an incli- nation to perform a given act, is moral ability to per- form it; and that a disinclination to perform it, is moral inability to perform it. But an inclination to execute a given act, includes a disinclination to waive that act ; and a disinclination, we are told, is moral inability. Consequently, ability to execute a given act, includes inability to forbear that act ; and inability to forbear a NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 263 given act, is a necessity to perform it. Therefore, ac- cording to Edwards, a moral ability to execute a given action, or to exercise a particular volition, involves a moral necessity to perform it. Thus freedom and ne- cessity are represented as coincident ; which is a con- tradiction, and proves the definition which implies it, to be false. The difference we are taught, is, 5. The difference between the predominance of an inclination which is contrary to a given action, and the predominance of an inclination in favor of a given action. Here freedom and necessity are made to con- sist of one thing : predominance, or superior strength of inclination. If we consider the diverse inclinations as distinct, this identity of freedom and necessity, is generic ; but if we consider the diverse inclinations as identical, or as being only the positive and negative of the same thing, then this identity of freedom and necessity, will appear to be not only generic, but specific. Such the necessitarian makes it. He teaches, that the predom- inance of inclination not to do good, is moral inability; and that the predominance of inclination to do evil, is freedom. But a predominance of inclination not to do good, and a predominance of inclination to do evil, are specifically identical : being the same thing, viewed positively and negatively. Therefore, as freedom and necessity are not identical, that definition is also false which implies it to be identical, and to which we have just referred. 264 NEGATIVE PEINCIPLES. The difference between necessity and freedom, ac- cording to Edwards, is, 6. The difference between a lack of motives, and a sufficiency of motives ; or between the strength of ap- parent motives to the contrary of a given action, and the strength of motives in favor of a given action. This distinction is properly two-fold; and the two parts, though not the same as the two preceding dis- tinctions, are yet exactly like them. The former part makes freedom and necessity coincident, and the latter makes them generically identical. The latter part makes them to consist in the strength of motives ; and both parts confound the state 'of the agent, with the means by which it is produced. The strength of motives may be a circumstance, on which may depend either freedom or necessity ; but of itself it is neither, because that which produces a state, cannot be that state itself. We have now gone over Edwards' definitions of freedom and necessity, and we trust it has been made apparent, that in themselves, and in their essential implications, they are false. Their number and diver- sity destroys them in the mass, because they all con- tradict and deny each other ; and the specific absur- dity of each, overthrows them individually. That any should have found it difficult to answer Edwards, arises from the fact, that it is difficult to understand him, in harmony with himself; and that this should be difficult, is occasioned by the fact, that on almost every important point, he occupies a variety NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 265 of positions. He who can adopt a variety of defini- tions of one thing, and then in his argument play from one meaning to another, must possess a great advan- tage, till his trick is discovered ; and till then, he will be very likely to confuse and bewilder his opponents. By a strange blending and confounding of tilings different, together with arbitrary distinctions and ab- surd definitions, Edwards has created a very dark and intricate labyrinth : a labyrinth in which his admirers are lost, and which others find it both difficult and unpleasant to explore. XXII. Moral freedom consists not, and is not im- plied, in ignorance of God's decrees. It may seem a little strange, but such is the fact, that mankind have been said to be free, because they choose and act without any knowledge of the Divine purposes concerning them ; as if ignorance of our state could change that state, or as if a knowledge of God's decrees could impart any new efficiency to those de- crees. If the Divine decrees are, as some suppose, absolute, all-comprehending, and efficient, they imply that to finite agents, every event whatever comes to pass of necessity ; and if this be so, no measure of ignorance on our part can possibly occasion our state to be one of freedom, and no measure of knowledge can by any means occasion the existing necessity. The decrees, in that case, provide for everything. If it were true, that ignorance of God's decrees in- volves freedom, and that a real, or proper freedom, it would follow, that nothing is so wonderful as the ex- 12 266 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. istence of harmony between the Divine purposes, and the actions of finite beings. It would follow, that during thousands of years, millions of human beings, under every variety of circumstances, have happened to think, feel, choose, speak, and otherwise act, so pre- cisely what God had efficiently decreed, that the effi- ciency of his decrees has by chance been superseded ; and this is brought forward as a plea to justify the ways of God to man ; implying that it is only by chance that God's honor is saved ! It implies that God would certainly have necessitated his creatures to do precisely as they do, and so would have made himself the effi- cient cause of all their sins and miseries, but that he is fortuitously relieved, and, for the sake of his honor, fortunately relieved of a disagreeable agency. What his creatures would have been compelled to perform, they have freely performed, in all ages, and in all in- stances, without any knowledge or design of such a co- incidence. Thus a vast series of arbitrary decrees, which are not allowed to be founded in Divine fore- knowledge, but foreknowledge in them, is in all its parts fulfilled as a casualty: as a mere matter of chance. That such should be the case, if the Divine purposes comprised only the thoughts of a single indi- vidual, for a single year of his life, would be exceed- ingly wonderful ; but that it should be true in respect to God's decrees, as comprehending every effort of the mind, every emotion of the heart, and every action of the body, of millions in all ages of the world, and throughout their entire lifetime, is more than wonder- NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. . 267 ful : it is impossible and false. A different definition, therefore, must be given of moral freedom ; and it will be found that, in so far as such freedom exists at all, it consists in exemption from extrinsic causation. ■ XXIII. Moral freedom consists not of legal or moral right. It is said, " Law gives a man his rights : law secures them. Law gives him his liberty : law secures it. He has no rights, he has no liberty, without law/' Freedom and legal sanction are here represented as being the same thing ; but legal license is not of itself liberty. It is merely the absence of any necessity that the law might -create, or that the absence of the law might occasion ; and this is so far from being itself moral freedom, that it is entirely consistent with the most absolute moral necessity. The agent may still be necessitated, either to obey the law, or to dis- obey ; or, he may still be subject to extrinsic causation, in all his volitions and other actions. If right and wrong, or permission and prohibition, were the same as freedom and necessity, our expressions would some- times be very tautological and absurd. The phrase, you are free to be right, would signify, you are free to be free, right to be right, and permitted to be permit- ted ; and the phrase, you are necessitated to be wrong, would signify, you are wrong to be wrong, necessitated to be necessitated, and prohibited to be prohibited. Error is confusion : truth only is order. 268 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. XX I Y. Moral freedom consists not of itself, in de- liverance from the power and dominion of Satan. " To whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants" or slaves "ye are to whom ye obey ;" and hence it is that sinners are " taken captive by the devil at Ms will." They first choose to be sinners ; and then they do many things which their state as sinners irresistibly occasions. Therefore, to deliver them from a sinful state, is to deliver them from a bondage : it is to exempt or free them from an extrinsic causation. This exemption may be a part of a man's freedom in the exercise of his moral agency, or it may not, ac- cording to the manner of its accomplishment. As it is actually achieved, it is comprehended in the agent's freedom. Freedom, like salvation, is general and par- ticular. " God is the Savior of all men, specially of those that believe ; " and as such, he makes all men free, but especially those that believe. 1. All men are rendered free at times to choose either good or evil. 2. They who exercise their freedom of choice aright, or in choosing holiness, are made to enjoy the farther freedom of exemption from the tyranny of Satan. In other words, this exemption is only experienced as it is first freely chosen ; and then as a necessary part of the agent's freedom, in respect to his course of life. " If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." — John 8 : 36. But deliverance from the tyranny of Satan, may be conceived of as being accomplished by the arbitrary NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 269 and irresistible action of an extrinsic cause ; or by the almighty and sovereign power of God, in controlling arbitrarily the will and affections of the agent. As thus achieved, it is not freedom, but necessity in moral agency ; for in such a case, the agent has merely ex- perienced a change in the source of his unavoidable subjection. In the essential point of an arbitrary subjection, his state is still the same. Therefore, moral freedom in the exercise of moral agency, consists not of itself in deliverance from the power and dominion of Satan. The true philosophy of moral freedom and necessity constitutes a connected and beautiful system. Like a stately tree, it has its several and distinct parts ; and all its parts are harmonious and necessary to the sym- metry and perfection of the whole. Moral agency constitutes the root, moral capacity is the trunk, and the two great divisions of this capacity into unigenous power and diversified power, are the two grand branches which put out from the trunk. The specific predominance of motive influence, ex- trinsic causation and moral necessity, are branches which belong to the great branch called unigenous power ; and motive equilibrium, exemption from ex- trinsic causation (which is freedom,) intrinsic causation, and accountability, are branches which belong to the grand branch called diversified power. The subordinate facts which are associated with these, are twigs covered with foliage and fruit. The fruit may be somewhat different in different cases, and 270 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. in all cases it consists of a variety, but the honor or glory of Grod, in one form or another, is produced in- variably. In the case of the righteous, the fruits are also usefulness and happiness. In treating of the will, or of the soul in willing, philosophers have generally chopped away one of the main branches, and have thus removed full one-half of the tree ; marring its beauty, and destroying its vi- tality. May we not hope that the time for such van- dalism has passed : that mankind are ready to appre- ciate and protect the tree in all its parts, and to sit down in amity and peace beneath its friendly and re- freshing shade. Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (724)779-2111 4tY