RESERVE STORAGE COLLECTION y^\ ^-'^- .,mK& mf^ vv :tM ^«^-^^ AV^:^ / jlECiition ftc Itoxc The Edition de Luxe is printed frmn type and will be limited to Five Huiidred Copies, of which this is No. X GEBBTE and COMPANY. President. Secretary. UNIFORM EDITION THE NAVAL WAR OF 1812 OR THE History of the United States Navy during the last WAR WITH Great Britain, to which is appended an account of the Battle of New Orleans By THEODORE ROOSEVELT Volume 11. PHILADELPHIA GEBBIE AND COMPANY 1902 ^i'lS THE LIBRARY C'^ ] COisiGKtSS j i wo Ccpiee Recc'vnd nro 27 ^'0? Copyiight Entry CLASS (X^ XXc. No i^ t h % i COPY A. Copyright, 1882 Copyright, 1902 by G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS This edition of " The Naval War of 18 12 " is issued under special arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN CHAPTER IV Alison, Sir A. History of Europe. Ninth edition. 20 vols. London, 1852. Butler, Adjutant-General Robert. Official Report for the Morning of January 8, 181 5. Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, Memoir of, by Lady Bour- chier. London, 1873. Cole, John William. Memoirs of British Generals Dis- tinguished During the Peninsular War. London, 1856. Court of Inquiry on Conduct of General Morgan. Official Report. Gleig, Ensign H. R. Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Philadelphia, 1821. Jackson, Andrew. As a Public Man. A sketch by W. G. Sumner. Boston, 1882. Jackson, General Andrew. Official Letters. James, William. Military Occurrences of the Late War. 2 vols. London, 18 18. Keane, Major-General John. Letter, December 26, 18 14. Lambert, General. Letters, January 10 and 28, 18 15. Latour, Major A. Lacarriex. Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana. Translated from the French by H. P. Nugent. Philadelphia, 1816. Lossing, Benson J. Field-Book of the War of 1812. New- York, 1859. Patterson, Com. Daniel G. Letters, December 20, 18 14, and January 13, 1815. Monroe, James. Sketch of his Life, by Daniel C. Gilman. i6mo. Boston, 1883. Napier, Maj.-Gen. Sir W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula. 5 vols. New York, 1882. Scott, Lieut.-Gen. W. Memoirs, by himself. 2 vols. New York, 1864. Thornton, Col. W. Letter, January 8, 18 15. iii CONTENTS CHAPTER I 1814 ON THE OCEAN Strictness of the blockade— Cruise of Rodgers— Cruise of the Constitution — Chased into Marblehead — Attempt to cut out the Alligator— ^he Essex captured after an engagement with Phabe and Oierub — The Frolic captured — The Peacock captures the Epervier — Commodore Barney's flotilla afloat —The British in the Chesapeake — Capture of Washington, and burning of the public buildings — The Wasp captures the Reindeer — The Wasp sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of the Adams — The privateer General Armstrong — The privateer Prince de Neufchdtel — Loss of the gunboats on Lake Borgne — Fighting near New Orleans — Summary 1-85 CHAPTER II 1814 ON THE LAKES Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely — . Statistics of the two squadrons — Serious sickness among the Americans — Extreme caution of the commanders, verging on timidity — Yeo takes Oswego and blockades Sackett's Harbor — British gunboats captured — Chauncy blockades Kingston. — Erie — Captain Sinclair bums St. Joseph — Makes unsuccessful expedition against Mackinaw — Daring vi Contents and successful cutting-out expeditions of the British — Cap- ture of the Ohio and Somers. — Champlain — Macdonough's and Downie's squadrons — ^James's erroneous statements con- cerning them — Gallant engagement and splendid victory of Macdonough — Macdonough one of the greatest of American sea-captains 86-143 CHAPTER III 181S CONCLUDING OPERATIONS The President captured by Captain Hayes's squadron — Successful cutting-out expedition of the Americans — Ameri- can privateer Chasseur captures St. Lawrence — The Consti- tution engages the Cyane and the Levant and captures both — Escapes from a British squadron — The Hornet captures the Penguin and escapes from pursuit of the Cornwallis — The Peacock's wanton attack on the Nautilus — Wanton attack on American gunboat after treaty of peace — Summary of events in 181 5 — Remarks on the war — Tables of comparative loss, etc. — Compared with results of Anglo-French struggle, 144-210 CHAPTER IV 181S THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS The war on land generally disastrous — British send great expedition against New Orleans — ^Jackson prepares for the defence of the city — Night attack on the British advance guard — Artillery duels — Great battle of January 8, 181 5 — Slaughtering repulse of the main attack — Rout of the Ameri- cans on the right bank of the river — Final retreat of the British — Observations on the character of the troops and commanders engaged 21 1-260 Appendix 261 Index 299 ILLUSTRATIONS Battle of Lake Champlain . . Frontispiece Walter Russell Capture of the Reindeer by the Wasp . 52 Albert Henke The President dismantling the Endymion . 148 Albert Henke The Constitution captures the Cyane and the Levant ....... 172 Albert Henke Tii NAVAL WAR OF 1812 CHAPTER I 1814 ON THE OCEAN Strictness of the blockade — Cruise of Rodgers — Cruise of the Constitution — Her unsuccessful chase of La Pique — Attack on the Alligator — The Essex captured — The Frolic captured — The Peacock captures the Epervier — Commodore Barney's flotilla — The British in the Chesapeake — The Wasp captures the Reindeer and sinks the Avon — Cruise and loss of the Adams — The privateer General Armstrong — The pri- vateer Prince de Ncufchdtel — Loss of the gunboats on Lake Borgne — Fighting near New Orleans — Summary. DURING this year the blockade of the Ameri- can coast was kept up with ever increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered like hawks off every seaport that was loiown to harbor any fighting craft; they almost invariably went in couples, to support one another and to lighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work. On the northern coasts, in particular, the intense cold of the furious winter gales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations ; the ropes were 2 Naval War of 1812 turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were coated with ice, and many, both of men and offi- cers, were frost-bitten and crippled. But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn and hardy British from their posts. With ceaseless vigilance they traversed continually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the privateers, harry- ing the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships confined to port ; " no American frigate could proceed singly to sea without imminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the nu- merous British squadrons." ' But the sloops of war, commanded by officers as skilful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as ever sailed salt water, could often slip out ; generally, on some dark night, when a heavy gale was blow- ing, they would make the attempt under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success. The harder the weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coast the greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the most imtiring vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have mentioned as being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for this kind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers of superior force, and were over-matches for any British flush-decked ship, that is, for anything below the rank of the frigate-built corvettes of the Cyane's class. The danger of recapture was too ^ Captain Broke's letter of challenge to Captain Lawrence. N Naval War of 1812 3 great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were generally destroyed as soon as captured ; and as the cruising grounds were chosen right in the track of commerce, the damage done and conster- nation caused were very great. Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the coast in couples or small squadrons, there were two or three places that were blockaded by a heavier force. One of these was New London, before which cruised a squadron under the direc- tion of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74-gun ship Ramillies. Most of the other cruising squadrons off the coast contained razees or two-deckers. The boats of the Hogue, 74, took part in the de- struction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge in April; and those of the Superb, 74, shared in a similar expedition against Wareham in June.^ The command on the coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir Alex- ander Cochrane. The main British force con- tinued to lie in the Chesapeake, where about fifty sail were collected. During the first part of this year these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May he was relieved by Rear-Ad- miral Cockbum.^ The President, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the beginning of 181 4 was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only making a few prizes of not much value. She then turned * James, vi., 474. * James, vi., 437. ; 4 Naval War of 1812 toward the American coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thence proceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached on February i8th. The Hght was passed in the night, and shortly afterward several sail were made out, when the President was at once cleared for action.' One of these strange sail was the Loire, 38 (British), Captain Thomas Brown, which ran down to close the President, unaware of her force ; but, on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off.^ The President did not pursue, another frigate and a gun-brig being in sight. ^ This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both sides ; one American writer calls the Loire the Plantagenet, 74; James, on the other hand, states that the President was afraid to en- gage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter declined the combat was because she was short of men. The best answer to this is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi., p. 402), that "the admiralty had issued an order that no 18- pounder frigate was voluntarily to engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America." Coupling this order with the results of the combats that had already taken place between frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set down as sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 ^ Letter of Commodore Rodgers, February 20, 1814. ^ James, vi., 412. 3 Naval Monument, p. 235. \ Naval War of 1 8 1 2 5 refusing to give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to say that a British line-of- battle ship would hesitate for a minute about en- gaging any frigate. On January ist, the Constitution, which had been lying in Boston harbor undergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command of Captain Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate Nymphe had been lying before the port, but she disappeared long before the Constitution was in condition, in obedience to the order already mentioned. Captain Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the 14th of February cap- tured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner Pictou, with a crew of seventy-five men. After making a few other prizes and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the 23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage, with the British 3 6 -gun frigate Pique (late French Pallas), Captain Maitland. The Constitution at once made sail for the Pique, steering free ' ; the latter at first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but when the latter was still three miles distant she made out her force and immediately made all sail to escape ; the Constitution, however, gained steadily till 8 P.M., when the night and thick squally weather caused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on board the prohibitory order * Letter of Captain Stewart, April 8, 1814. 6 Naval War of 1812 issued by the admiralty/ and acted correctly. His ship was altogether too light for his antagon- ist. James, however, is not satisfied with this, and wishes to prove that both ships were desirous of avoiding the combat. He says that Captain Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports and a bridle on the Pique's main-deck," and "saw at once that she was of a class inferior to the Guer- riere or Java,'' but "thought the Pique's i8's were 24's, and therefore did not make an effort to bring her to action." He portrays very picturesquely the grief of the Pique's crew when they find they are not going to engage; how they come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain Maitland reads them his instructions, but " fails to persuade them that there had been any necessity of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors, overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-time grog, — which was certainly re- markable. As the Constitution had twice cap- tured British frigates "with impunity," according to James himself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounter with a ship which she "saw at once was of an inferior class" to those already conquered? Even such abject cowards as James's Americans would not be guilty of so stupid an action. Of course, neither Captain Stewart nor any one else supposed for an instant ^ James, vi., 477. Naval War of 1 812 7 that a 3 6 -gun frigate was armed with 24-pounders. It is worth while mentioning, as an instance of how utterly untrustworthy James is in dealing with American affairs, that he says (p. 476) the Constitution had now "what the Americans would call a bad crew," whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been "picked." Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. In no case was an American ship manned with a 'picked' " crew, but the nearest approach to such was the crew the Constitution carried in this and the next cruise, when "she probably possessed as fine a crew as ever manned a frigate. They were principally New England men, and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to fight the ship without her officers." ^ The state- ment that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and most skilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a greatly inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortun- ately, such denial is needless. Captain Stewart's account being fully corroborated in the Memoir of Admiral Durham, written by his nephew, Captain Murray, London, 1846. The Constitution arrived off the port of Marble- head on April 3d, and at 7 a.m. fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates Junon, Captain Upton, and Tenedos, Captain Parker. "The American ^ Cooper, ii., 463. 8 Naval War of 1 8i 2 frigate was standing to the westward with the wind about north by west and bore from, the two British frigates about northwest by west. The Junon and Tenedos quickly hauled up in chase, and the Constitution crowded sail in the direc- tion of Marblehead. At 9.30, finding the Tenedos rather gaining upon her, the Constitution started her water and threw overboard a quantity of pro- visions and other articles. At 11.30 she hoisted her colors, and the two British frigates, who were now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same. At 1.30 P.M. the Constitution anchored in the har- bor of Marblehead. Captain Parker was anxious to follow her into the port, which had no defences ; but the Tenedos was recalled by a signal from the Junon.'' Shortly afterward the Constitution again put out and reached Boston unmolested. On January 29, 1814, the small U. S. coasting schooner Alligator, of 4 guns and 40 men. Sailing- master R. Basset, was lying at anchor in the mouth of Stone River, S. C, when a frigate and a brig were perceived close inshore near the break- ers. Judging from their motions that they would attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. Basset made his preparations accordingly.^ x\t half-past seven six boats were observed approach- ing cautiously under cover of the marsh, with ^ James, vi., 479. ' Letter of Sailing-master Basset, January 31, 1S14. Naval War of 1 8 1 2 9 muffled oars; on being hailed they cheered and opened with boat carronades and musketry, com- ing on at full speed; whereupon the Alligator cut her cable and made sail, the wind being Hght from the southwest; while the crew opened such a heavy fire on the assailants, who were then not thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance and fell astern. At this moment the Alligator grounded, but the enemy had suffered so severely that they made no attempt to renew the attack, rowing off down stream. On board the Alligator two men were killed and two wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down by a grape-shot while standing at the helm ; and her sails and rig- ging were much cut. The extent of the enemy's loss was never known ; next day one of his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much injured and containing the bodies of an officer and a seaman.' For his skill and gallantry, Mr. Basset was pro- moted to a lieutenancy, and for a time his exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out expedi- tions along that part of the coast. The Alligator herself sank in a squall on July ist, but was after- ward raised and refitted. It is much to be regretted that it is almost im- possible to get at the British account of any of these expeditions which ended successfully for the Americans ; all such cases are generally ignored by ^ Letter from Commander J . H. Dent, February 21, 1814. lo Naval War of 1812 the British historians; so that I am obhged to rely solely upon the accounts of the victors, who, with the best intentions in the world, could hardly be perfectly accurate. At the close of 1813, Captain Porter was still cruising in the Pacific. Early in January, the Essex, now with 255 men aboard, made the South American coast, and on the 12 th of that month anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. She had in company a prize, re- christened the Essex Junior, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, ten long 6's, and ten 18-pound carronades. Of course, she could not be used in a combat with regular cruisers. On February 8th, the British frigate Phcehe, 36, Captain James Hilyar, accompanied by the Cherub 18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, the former carrying 300, and the latter 140, men,' made their appearance, and apparently proposed to take the Essex by a coup de main. They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the Cherub falling to leeward; while the Phcebe made the port quarters of the Essex, and then, putting her helm down, luffed upon her starboard bow, but ten or fifteen feet distant. Porter's crew were all at quarter, the powder-boys with slow matches ready to discharge ^ They afterward took on board enough men from British merchant vessels to raise their complements, respectively, to 320 and 180. Naval War of 1812 11 the guns, the boarders standing by, cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke; everything was cleared for action on both frigates. Captain Hil- yar now probably saw that there was no chance of carrying the Essex by surprise, and, standing on the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's health; the latter returned the inquir^^ but warned Hilyar not to fall foul. The British cap- tain then braced back his yards, remarking that if he did fall aboard it would be purely acci- dental. "Well," said Porter, "you have no busi- ness where you are; if you touch a rope-yam of this ship I shall board instantly." '^ The Phoebe, in her then position, was completely at the mercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agi- tated, assured Porter that he meant nothing hos- tile; and the Phoebe backed down, her yards passing over those of the Essex without touching a rope, and anchored half a mile astern. Shortly afterwards the two captains met on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, on his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing his safety to the latter' s forbearance. Porter need be under no apprehension as to his breaking the neutrality. The British ships now began a blockade of the port. On February 27th, the Phoebe being hove to close off the port, and the Cherub a league to * Life of Farragiit, p. 33. 12 Naval War of 1812 leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the Essex interpreted this as a chahenge, took the crew of the Essex Junior aboard and went out to attack the British frigate. But the latter did not await the combat; she bore up, set her studding- sails, and ran down to the Cherub. The American officers were intensely irritated over this, and American writers have sneered much at " a British 36 refusing combat with an American 32." But the armaments of the two frigates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make comparison. When the fight really took place, the Essex was so crippled and the water so smooth that the British ships fought at their own distance ; and as they had long guns to oppose to Porter's carro- nades, this really made the Cherub more nearly suited to contend with the Essex than the latter was to fight the Phcube. But when the Essex, in fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the Essex Junior aboard, was to windward, the circum- stances were very different; she carried as many men and gims as the Phccbe, and in close combat, or in a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have taken her. Still, Hilyar's conduct in avoiding Porter except when the Cherub was in company was certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to explain in a man of his tried courage. On March 27th, Porter decided to run out of the harbor on the first opportunity, so as to draw Naval War of 1812 13 away his two antagonists in chase, and let the Essex Junior escape. This plan had to be tried sooner than was expected. The two vessels were always ready, the Essex only having her proper complement of 255 men aboard. On the next day, the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the Essex parted her port cable and dragged the starboard anchor to leeward ; so she got under way, and made sail ; by several trials it had been found that she was faster than the Phcche, and that the Cherub was very slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his own ship, only fearing for his consort. The British vessels were close in with the weathermost point of the bay, but Porter thought he could weather them, and hauled up for that purpose. Just as he was rounding the outermost point, which, if accomplished, would have secured his safety, a heavy squall struck the Essex, and, when she was nearly gunwale under, the main-topmast went by the board. She now wore and stood in for the harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of her crippled con- dition she could not gain it; so she bore up and anchored in a small bay, three miles from Valpar- aiso, and half a mile from a detached Chihan battery of one gun, the Essex being within pistol- shot of the shore.' The Phoebe and Cherub now bore down upon her, covered with ensigns, union- ^ Letter of Captain David Porter, July 3, 18 14. H Naval War of 1 8i 2 jacks, and motto flags; and it became evident that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as soon as he saw that Porter was disabled. So the Essex prepared for action, though there could be no chance whatever of success. Her flags were flying from every mast, and everything was made ready as far as was possible. The attack was made before springs could be got on her cables. She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude the possibility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead of her ' ; so his two ships came cautiously down, the Cherub taking her position on the starboard bow of the Essex, and the Phoshe tmder the latter's stem. The attack began at 4 p.m. ^ Some of the bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon the Cherub, and, as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran down and stationed herself near the Phosbe. The latter had opened with her broadside of long i8's, from a position in which not one of Porter's gims could reach her. Three times springs were got on the cables of the Essex, in order to bring her round till her broadside bore; but in each instance they were shot away, as soon as they were hauled taut. Three long 12's were got out of the stern-ports, and with these an ani- mated fire was kept up on the two British ships, ^ Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814. ' Mean time. Porter says 3.54; Hilyar a few minutes past 4. The former says the first attack lasted half an hour; the latter, but ten minutes. I accordingly make it twenty. Naval War of 1812 15 the aim being especially to cripple their rigging. A good many of Porter's crew were killed during the first five minutes, before he could bring any guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer much, and at 4.20, after a quarter of an hour's fight between the three long 12's of the Essex and the whole 36 broadside gims of the Phoebe and Cherub, the latter were actually driven off. They wore, and again began with their long guns ; but, these producing no visible effect, both of the Brit- ish ships hauled out of the fight at 4.30. "Hav- ing lost the use of mainsail, jib, and mainstay, appearances looked a little inauspicious," writes Captain Hilyar. But the damages were soon re- paired, and his two ships stood back for the crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on her port quarter, the Phoebe at anchor, with a spring, firing her broadside, while the Cherub kept under way, using her long bow-chasers. Their fire was very destructive, for they were out of reach of the Essex's carronades, and not one of her long guns could be brought to bear on them. Porter now cut his cable, at 5.20, and tried to close with his antagonists. After many ineffectual efforts, sail was made. The flying- jib halyards were the only serviceable ropes uncut. That sail was hoisted, and the fore-topsail and foresail let fall, though the want of sheets and tacks rendered them almost useless. Still the Essex drove down on her assail - 1 6 Naval War of 1812 ants, and for the first time got near enough to use her carronades ; for a minute or two the firing was tremendous, but after the first broadside the Cherub hauled out of the fight in great haste, and during the remainder of the action confined her- self to using her bow-guns from a distance. Im- mediately afterward, the Phcebe also edged off, and by her superiority of sailing, her foe being now almost helpless, was enabled to choose her own distance, and again opened from her long i8's, out of range of Porter's carronades.^ The carnage on board the Essex had now made her decks look like shambles. One gun was manned three times, fifteen men being slain at it; its captain alone escaped without a wound. There were but one or two instances of flinching; the wounded, many of whom were killed by flying splinters while under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their comrades, and themselves worked at the guns like fiends as long as they could stand. At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotch- man, named Bissly, who had one leg shot off close ^ American writers often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the Essex, and out of reach of her short guns; but his conduct was eminently proper in this respect. It was no part of his duty to fight the Essex at the distance which best suited her; but, on the contrary, at that which least stiited her. He, of course, wished to win the victory with the least possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly. His conduct in the action itself could not be improved upon. Naval War of 1812 17 by the groin. Using his handkerchief as a tourni- quet, he said, turning to his American shipmates: " I left my own country and adopted the United States, to fight for her. I hope I have this day proved myself worthy of the country of my adop- tion. I am no longer of any use to you or to her, so good-by!" With these words he leaned over the sill of the port, and threw himself overboard." Among the very few men who flinched was one named Wilham Roach; Porter sent one of his midshipmen to shoot him, but he was not to be found. He was discovered by a man named William Call, whose leg had been shot off and was hanging by the skin, and who dragged the shattered stump all round the bag-house, pistol in hand, trying to get a shot at him. Lieut. J. G. Cowell had his leg shot off above the knee, and his life might have been saved had it been ampu- tated at once ; but the surgeons already had rows of wounded men waiting for them, and when it was proposed to him that he should be attended to out of order, he replied: " No, doctor, none of that; fair play's a jewel. One man's life is as dear as another's; I would not cheat any poor fellow out of his turn." So he stayed at his post, and died from loss of blood. Finding it hopeless to try to close, the Essex ^ This and most of the anecdotes are taken from the in- valuable Lije of FarragiU, pp. 37-46. VOL. 11. — 2 i8 Naval War of 1 8i 2 stood for the land, Porter intending to run her ashore and burn her. But when she had drifted close to the bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took her fiat aback and paid her head off shore, ex- posing her to a raking fire. At this moment Lieutenant Downes, commanding the Junior, pulled out in a boat, through all the fire, to see if he could do anything. Three of the men with him, including an old boatswain's mate, named Kingsbury, had come out expressly "to share the fate of their old ship" ; so they remained aboard, and, in their places. Lieutenant Downes took some of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept up a tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the wind gave Porter a faint hope of closing; and once more the riddled hulk of the little American frigate was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put his helm up to avoid close quarters; the battle was his already, and the cool old captain was too good an officer to leave anything to chance. See- ing he could not close, Porter had a hawser bent on the sheet anchor and let go. This brought the ship's head around, keeping her stationary and from such of her guns as were not dismounted and had men enough left to man them, a broad- side was fired at the Phcehe. The wind was now very light, and the Phoebe, whose main- and miz- zen-masts and mainyard were rather seriously wounded, and who had siiffered a great loss of Naval War of 1812 19 canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a num- ber of shot between wind and water/ and was thus a good deal crippled, began to drift slowly to leeward. It was hoped that she would drift out of gunshot, but this last chance was lost by the parting of the hawser, which left the Essex at the mercy of the British vessels. Their fire was deliberate and destructive, and could only be occasionally replied to by a shot from one of the long 12's of the Essex. The ship caught fire, and the flames came bursting up the hatchway, and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many of the crew were knocked overboard by shot, and drowned; others leaped into the water, thinking the ship was about to blow up, and tried to swim to the land. Some succeeded ; among them was one man who had sixteen or eighteen pieces of iron in his leg, scales from the muzzle of his gun. The frigate had been shattered to pieces above the water-line, although from the smoothness of the sea she was not harmed enough below it to reduce her to a sinking condition. ^ The carpenter reported that he alone of his crew was fit for duty ; 1 Captain Hilyar's letter. James says the Phcebe had seven shot between wind and water, and one below the water-line. Porter says she had eighteen 12-pound shot below the water- line. The latter statement must have been an exaggeration; and James is probably further wrong still. 2 An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop Reindeer. 20 Naval War of 1812 the others were dead or disabled. Lieutenant Wilmer was knocked overboard by a sphnter, and drowned; his Httle negro boy, "Ruff," came up on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, dehberately leaped into the sea and shared his master's fate. Lieutenant Odenheimer was also knocked over- board, but afterward regained the ship. A shot, glancing upward, killed four of the men who were standing by a gun, striking the last one in the head and scattering his brains over his comrades. The only commissioned officer left on duty was Lieutenant Decatur McKnight. The saiHng-mas- ter, Barnwell, when terribly wounded, remained at his post till he fainted from loss of blood. Of the 255 men aboard the Essex when the battle began, 58 had been killed, 66 wounded, and 31 drowned ("missing"), while 24 had succeeded in reaching shore. But 76 men were left unwoimded, and many of these had been bruised or otherwise injured. Porter himself was knocked down by the windage of a passing shot. While the young midshipman, Farragut, was on the ward-room ladder, going below for gun-primers, the captain of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struck full in the face by an 18-pound shot, and tumbled back on him. They fell down the hatch together, Farragut being stunned for some minutes. Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, an old quartermaster named Francis Bland, a shot Naval War of 1 812 21 coming over the foreyard took off the quarter- master's right leg, carrying away at the same time one of Farragut's coat tails. The old fellow was helped below, but he died for lack of a tourni- quet, before he could be attended to. Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 the Essex surrendered and was taken possession of. The Phoebe had lost four men killed, includ- ing her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the Cherub, i killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded. Total, 5 killed and 10 wounded.' The difference in loss was natural, as, owing to their having long guns and the choice of position, the British had been able to fire ten shot to the Americans' one. The conduct of the two English captains in at- tacking Porter as soon as he was disabled, in neutral vv^aters, while they had been very careful to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good condition, does not look well ; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only been withheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all the worse when it is remembered that Hilyar ^ James says that most of the loss was occasioned by the first three broadsides of the Essex; this is not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the last were dis- charged when half of the guns had been disabled, and there were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of the time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long guns as would bear. 22 Naval War of 1812 owed his ship's previous escape entirely to Porter's forbearance on a former occasion, when the British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the British captain had afterward expressly said that he would not break the neutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act very differently from the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the Civil War, — witness the capture of the Florida. And after the battle was once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well as the par- ticipators in the fight, have showered upon the British captains, for not foregoing the advantages which their entire masts and better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are decidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as well as his treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a minor matter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularly just and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass ' : "The action displayed all that can reflect honor on the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his crew, which, without the assistance of the Cherub, would have ensured the same ter- mination. Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful distance the Phwbe kept are in fact acknow- ledgments of the ability with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of his arms; it was a brilliant affair." While endorsing * Naval Gunnery, p. 149. % Naval War of 1 812 23 this criticism, it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author's comments upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the Macedonian. To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were against Porter, it would be necessary to suppose that the Mace- donian had lost her main-topmast, had but six long i8's to oppose to her antagonist's 24's, and that the latter was assisted by the corvette Adams; so that, as a matter of fact. Porter fought at fully double or treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrendering when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater loss and damage on his antag- onists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord Douglass says, the defence of the Macedonian brilliantly upheld the character of the British navy for courage, how much more did that of the Essex show for the American navy; and if Hilyar's conduct was " brilliant," that of Decatur was more so. This was an action in which it is difficult to tell exactly how to award praise. Gaptain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skill with which he made his approaches and took his positions so as to destroy his adversary with least loss to him- self; and also for the precision of his fire. The Cherub's behavior was more remarkable for ex- 24 Naval War of 1812 treme caution than for anything else. As regards the mere fight, Porter certainly did everything a man could do to contend successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and the few guns that were available were served with the utmost precision. As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed since the time when the Dutch captain, Klaeson, after fighting two long days, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crew to death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race, and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim "sea-beggars" of Holland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic king, and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the great floating castles of Spain. Any man reading Farragut's account is forcibly reminded of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, the heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hil- yar, in his letter, says : " The defence of the Essex, taking into consideration our superiority of force and the very discouraging circumstance of her having lost her main-topmast and being twice on fire, did honor to her brave defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter and those under his command. Her colors were not struck until the loss in killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered condition so seriously bad as to render all further resistance Naval War of 1 812 25 unavailing." ' He also bears very candid testi- mony to the defence of the Essex having been effective enough to at one time render the result doubtful, saying :" Our first attack , . . pro- duced no visible effect. Our second . . . was not more successful; and having lost the use of our mainsail, jib, and mainstay, appearances looked a little inauspicious." Throughout the war no ship was so desperately defended as the Essex, taking into account the frightful odds I James (p. 419) says: "The Essex, as far as is borne out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned) , had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Captain Porter, thinking by exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 sUghtly," etc. This would be no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications, were it not followed by various British writers. Hilyar states that he has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that three wounded were taken off, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainder are either killed or wounded." It is by wilfully preserving silence about this last sentence that James makes out his case. It will be observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 -f- 23 + 3 -j- 25 (say) or 212, and says the remainder were either killed or wounded ; Porter having 255 men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161 prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans iii killed and wounded. James's silence about Hilyar's last sentence enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is qtiite on a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterly destroy the reliability of his work. By Hilyar's own letter, it is thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was certainly in, perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There still remain 26 Naval War of 1812 against which she fought, which always enhances the merit of a defence. The Lawrence, which suffered even more, was backed by a fleet; the Frolic was overcome by an equal foe; and the Reindeer fought at far less of a disadvantage, and suffered less. None of the frigates, British or American, were defended with anything like the resolution she displayed. But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether some discrepancies between the official accounts, which can be compared in tabular form: Hilyar Porter Prisoners unwounded 119 Prisoners unwounded 75 " wounded 42 " slightly wounded. . . 27 Taken away wounded 3 " severely wounded.. . 39 Those who reached shore 25 Killed 58 Remainder killed or wounded. 43 Missing 31 Killed 23 Reached shore 25 255 2SS The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "wounded" do not include Porter's "27 slightly wounded," and that his "161 prisoners" include Porter's "25 who reached shore," and his "25 who reached shore" comes under Porter's "31 missing." This would make the accounts nearly tally. At any rate, in Porter's book are to be found the names of all his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received pensions from the American government, which, if the rettims were false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception. It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may have counted in the Essex Junior's crew, which would entirely account for the discrepancies. In any event, it must be remembered that he makes the American killed and wounded iii (Porter, 124), and not 69, as James says. The latter's statement is wilfully false, as he had seen Hilyar's letter. Naval War of 1812 27 Porter's course, after the accident to his topmast occurred, was altogether the best that could have been taken. On such a question no opinion could have been better than Farragut's, although, of course, his judgment was ex post facto, as he was very young at the time of the fight. "In the first place, I consider our original and greatest error was in attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior in sailing powers, we should have borne up and run before the wind. If we had come in contact with the Phosbe we should have carried her by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by her greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fire and passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replaced our topmast, by which time they would have been separated, as unless they did so it would have been no chase, the Cherub being a dull sailer. "Secondly, when it was apparent to every- body that we had no chance of success under the circumstances, the ship should have been run ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and fought as long as was con- sistent with humanity, and then set on fire. But, having determined upon anchoring, we should have bent a spring on to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it was exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on." 28 Naval War of 1 812 But it must be remembered that when Porter decided to anchor near shore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate and treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere disregard of neutrality. Whatever in- ternational moralists may say, such disregard is a mere question of expediency. If the benefits to be gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as to counterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutral power, why then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when he first made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attacked Porter, con- sidering the destruction of the Essex as outweigh- ing the insult to Chili, why, his behavior would have been perfectly justifiable. In fact, this is unquestionably what he intended to do; but he suddenly found himself in such a position that, in the event of hostilities, his ship would be the captured one, and he owed his escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provoca- tion. Then he gave his word to Porter that he would not infringe on the neutrality ; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter was disabled and almost helpless! This may seem strong lan- guage to use about a British officer, but it is justly strong. Exactly as any outsider must consider Warrington's attack on the British brig Nautilus Naval War of 1 812 29 in 18 1 5 as a piece of needless cruelty, so any out- sider must consider Hilyar as having most treach- erously broken faith with Porter. After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and courteously to the prisoners ; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, for it would hav^e been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages. But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious. It was to be expected that the Essex would make her escape as soon as practica- ble, and so he should have used every effort to bring her to action. Instead of this, he always declined the fight when alone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the Essex, instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed, hoping to bring the Phosbe to action single- handed. It must be remembered that the Essex was almost as weak compared to the Phcehe as the Cherub was compared to the Essex. The latter was just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen by the following comparison. In the action the Essex fought all six of her long 12's, and the Cheriih both her long 9's, instead of the corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularly used. This gives the Essex a better armament than she would have had fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can be seen how great the inequality still was. It must also be kept in mind that, while in the battles 30 Naval War of 1812 between the American 44's and British 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had in reality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight i8's of their opponents, in this case the Phoebe's full weight i8's had a very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12's of the Essex. COMPARATIVE FORCE Phoebe Cherub Essex Men Broadside Guns Weight (Total) ? 320 13 long i8's 234 lbs. I " 12 12 " I " 9 9 " (255) 7 short 32 's 224 " I " 18 23 guns, 18 " (242) 497 lbs. b.... 180 2 long 9's 18 lbs. (18) 2 short i8's 36 " 9 " 32's 288 " (324) 13 guns, 342 lbs. 500 men, 36 guns, 839 lbs. metal. (273 long. I (566 short. ) Taking 7 255 6 long 12's 66 lbs. I per cent, off 504 " for short 17 short 32's .weight. 255' men, 23 gtms, 570 lbs. All accounts agree as to the armament of the Es- sex. I have taken that of the Phosbe and Cherub Naval War of 1 812 31 from James; but Captain Porter's official letter and all the other American accounts make the Phoshe's broadside fifteen long i8's and eight short 32's, and give the Cherub, in all, eighteen short 32's, eight short 24's, and two long 9's. This would make their broadside 904 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I would have no doubt that the American accounts were right if the question rested solely on James's veracity; but he probably took his figures from official sources. At any rate, remembering the difference between long guns and carronades, it appears that the Essex was really nearly inter- mediate in force between the Phoebe and the Cherub. The battle being fought, with a very trifling exception, at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled ship throwing a broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships throw- ing 273 lbs., who, by their ability to manoeuvre, could choose positions where they could act with full effect, while their antagonist could not return a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a single instance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds. The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantially in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the Essex, are found in the Life of Farragut. But, although the British captain does full justice to his foe, British his- torians have universally tried to belittle Porter's ^ 2 Naval War of 1812 conduct. It is much to be regretted that we have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedings before the fight, when the Phoshe dechned single combat with the Essex. James, of course, states that the Phaehe did not decUne it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would be valueless even if uncontra- dicted. His account of the action is grossly in- accurate, as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report. One instance of this I have already men- tioned, as regards Hilyar's account of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the Essex was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this, thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. There is really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he has it most fully in the Life of Farragut, p. 37 : " The men came rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this could not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. . . . One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body which had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days, he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West Indies." The third unfounded statement in James's account is that buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main-deck of the Essex, and that most of Naval War of 1 812 33 the prisoners were drunk. No authority is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He ends by stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speak well of Captain David Porter." After these various paragraphs we are certainly justified in rejecting James's ac- count in toto. An occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of a good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regard to some others with which he is acquainted ; but a wilful and systematic perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong doubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supported by unquestionable authority. But if British historians have generally given Porter much less than his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns, his lost topmast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have done in similar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowances in the case of the Essex for her having carronades only, but utterly fail to allude to the Cyane and Levant as having suffered under the same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut both ways. The Essex having suffered chiefly above the water-line, she was repaired sufficiently in Val- paraiso to enable her to make the voyage to Eng- land, where she was added to the British navy. The Essex Junior w^as disarmed and the American 34 Naval War of 1 812 prisoners embarked in her for New York, on parole. But Lieutenant Mc Knight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman, and eleven seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British prisoners on board the Essex Junior. McKnight and Lyman accompanied the Phoebe to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel, were taken out of her by the Wasp, Captain Blakely, and were lost with the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached New York in safety. Of the prizes made by the Essex, some were burnt or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so, after nearly two years' un- interrupted success, the career of the Essex ter- minated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least her officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere. The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the Frolic, Master-Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early in Feb- ruary. Shortly afterward, she encountered a large Carthagenian privateer, which refused to sur- render and was sunk by a broadside, nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before day- light on the 20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N., long. 81° 25' W., she feU in with the British 36-gun frigate Orpheus, Captain Pigot, and the 12 -gun Naval War of 1812 35 schooner SJielburne, Lieutenant Hope, both to lee- ward. The schooner soon weathered the Frolic, but of course was afraid to close, and the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to escape, for nearly thirteen hours; the water was started, the anchors cut away, and finally the guns thrown overboard — a measure by means of which the Hornet, the Rattlesnake, and the Adams succeeded in escaping under similar circumstan- ces, — but all was of no avail, and she was finally captured. The Court of Inquiry honorably ac- quitted both officers and crew. As was to be expected, James considers the surrender a dis- graceful one, because the guns were thrown over- board. As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in several cases of a like nature ; the criticism is a piece of petty meanness. Fortunately, we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on the surrender {Memoirs, vol. i., p. 310), which he evidently considered as perfectly honorable. A sister ship to the Frolic, the Peacock, Cap- tain Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the 28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., long. 80° 7' W., several sail were made to the windward.' These were a small convoy of mer- chantmen, bound for the Bermudas, under the pro- tection of the 1 8 -gun brig-sloop Epervier, Captain ^ Official letter of Captain Warrington, April 29, 18 14. 36 Naval War of 1812 Wales, 5 days out of Havana, and with $118,000 in specie on board.' The Epervier, when discov- ered, was steering north by east, the wind being from the eastward; soon afterward, the wind veered graduahy round to the southward, and the Epervier hauled up close on the port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the Peacock came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 a.m., the vessels were within gun- shot, and the Peacock edged away to get in a rak- ing broadside, but the Epervier frustrated this by putting her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded to and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard broadside of the Peacock at 10.20 a.m. These first broad- sides took effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the Peacock's foreyard was totally disabled by two round shot in the star- board quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her foresail and fore-topsail, and compelled her to run large. However, the Epervier eased away ^ when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongside of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The Peacock's fire was now very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which it told heavily, while she did not suffer at ^ James, vi., 424. * According to some accounts, she at this time tacked. Naval War of 1 812 2>7 all in return. The Epervier coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss of head-sail, Captain Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, A/ iSLSS # /• m-^n M/O / PtAsacx .."^ / y . ja.io ! £f£8UJ£S /Las « / m I/Las' but they refused, saying "she's too heavy for us," ' and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled down. ^ James, Naval Occurrences, p. 243. 38 Naval War of 1 8 1 2 Except the injury to her foreyard, the Peacock's damages were confined to the loss of a few top- mast and topgallant backstays, and some shot- holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, all told, of 166 men and boys,' only two were wounded, both slightly. The Epervier, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes in her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-topmasts over the side, mainmast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded severely, and most of the fore- rigging and stays shot away; and of her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any official report), 9 were killed and mortally wounded and 14 severely and slightly wounded. Instead of two long 6's for bow-chasers and a shifting carronade, she had two 1 8-pound carronades (according to the Amer- ican prize-lists '^•, Captain Warrington says 32's). Otherwise she was armed as usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very " tubby," being as broad as the Peacock, though ten feet shorter on deck. Allowing, as usual, seven per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the ^ Niles's Register, vi., 196, says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington's letter of June ist, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives. The crew con- tained about ten boys, was not composed of picked men, and did not number 185 — vide James. ^ American State Papers, xiv., p. 427. Naval War of 1812 39 COMPARATIVE FORCE No. Broadside Weight Tons Guns Metal Crew Loss Peacock 509 II 315 166 2 Epervier 477 9 274 128 23 That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the relative execution done was as 12 is to i, and the Epervier surrendered before she had lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the Epervier closely resem- bles that of the Argus. In both cases the officers behaved finely ; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier, in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the Argus, nor the crew of the Epervier fought with the determined brav- ery displayed by the combatants in almost every other struggle of the war. But it must be added that the Epervier did worse than the Argus, and the Peacock (American) better than the Pelican. The gunnery of the Epervier was extraordinarily poor; "the most disgraceful part of the aftair was that our ship was cut to pieces and the enemy hardly scratched." ' James states that after the first two or three broadsides several carronades became unshipped, and that the others were dismounted by the fire of the Peacock; that the men had not been exercised at the guns ; and, most important of all, that the crew (which contained several "foreigners," but was chiefly ''^ Memoirs of Admiral Codrington, i., 322. 40 Naval War of 1812 British; as the Argus's was chiefly American) was disgracefully bad. The Peacock, on the contrary, showed skilful seamanship as well as excellent gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over the foreyard had been sent down and fished, the foresail set up, and everything in complete order again ' ; the prize was got in sailing order by dark, though great exertions had to be made to prevent her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, first of the Peacock, was put in charge as prize-master. The next day the two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island when two frigates were discovered in the north, to leeward. Captain Warrington at once directed the prize to proceed to St. Mary's, while he separated and made sail on a wind to the south, intending to draw the frigates after him, as he was confident that the Peacock, a very fast vessel, could outsail them.^ The plan succeeded per- fectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the first of May, and the ship three days afterward. The Epervier was purchased for the U. S. Navy, under the same name and rate. The Peacock sailed again on June 4th, ^ going first northward to the Grand Banks, then to the Azores: then she stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, and afterward cruised off Cork, the mouth of the 'Letter of Captain Warrington, April 29, 1S14. ^ Letter of Captain Warrington, May 4, 1814. 3 Letter of Captain Warrington, October 30, 1S14. Naval War of 1812 41 Shannon, and the North of Ireland, capturing several very valuable prizes and creating great consternation. She then changed her station, to elude the numerous vessels that had been sent after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal, Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barba- does reaching New York, October 29th. During this cruise she encountered no war vessel smaller than a frigate ; but captured 1 4 sail of merchant- men, some containing valuable cargoes, and manned by 148 men. On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner BallaJiou, 6, Lieutenant King, while cruising off the American coast was captured by the Perry, privateer, a much heavier vessel, after an action of ten minutes' duration. The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed the British to turn their energies altogether to America; and in no place was this increased vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay, where a great number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transports had assembled, in prepara- tion for the assault on Washington and Baltimore. The defence of these waters was confided to Cap- tain Joshua Barney,' with a flotilla of gunboats. ' He was born at Baltimore, July 6, 1759; James, with habitual inaccuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Deca- tur, by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being bom in "Maryland, Virginia." 42 Naval War of 1812 These consisted of three or four sloops and schoon- ers, but mainly of barges, which were often smaller than the ship's boats that were sent against them. These gunboats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and each carried, according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, or 12-pounders. They were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is difficult to believe that they were handled to the fullest advantage. On June ist. Commodore Barney, with the block sloop Scorpion and 14 smaller "gunboats," chiefly row gallics, passed the mouth of the Patuxent, and chased the British schooner St. Lawrence and seven boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with the Dragon, 74, which in turn chased Barney's flotilla into the Patuxent, where she blockaded it in company with the Albion, 74. They were afterward joined by the Loire, 38, Narcissus, 32, and Jasseur, 18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard's Creek, while the frigates and sloop blockaded its mouth. A deadlock now ensued; the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and the ships' boats were just as afraid of the gunboats. On the 8th, 9th, and nth, skirmishes occurred; on each occasion the British boats came up till they caught sight of Barney's flotilla, and were promptly chased off by the latter, which, how- ever, took good care not to meddle with the Naval War of 1 812 43 larger vessels. Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of the artillery, with two long i8-pounders, assisted by the marines, under Captain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to co-operate from the shore while Barney assailed the two frigates with the flotilla. On the 26th, the joint attack took place most successfully ; the Loire and Narcissus were driven off, although not much damaged, and the flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of but 4 killed and 7 wounded. But in spite of this small success, which was mainly due to Col- onel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more attempts with his gunboats. The bravery and skill which the flotilla men showed at Bladens- burg prove conclusively that their ill success on the water was due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing of the men. At the same period the French gunboats were even more un- successful, but the Danes certainly did very well with theirs. Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet imtil August 2 2d, and then was burned when the British advanced on Washington. The history of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one on Baltimore, concerns less the American than the British navy, and will be but briefly alluded to here. On August 20th, Major-General Ross and Rear-Admiral Cockbum, with about 5000 soldiers and marines, moved on Washington by 44 Naval War of 1812 land ; while a squadron composed of the Seahorse, 38, Euryalus, 36, bombs Devastation, ALtna, and Meteor, and rocket-ship Erehiis, under Captain James Alexander Gordon, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, near Alexandria ; and Sir Peter Parker, in the Menelaus, 38, was sent "to create a diversion" above Baltimore. Sir Peter's "diversion " turned out most unfortunately for him: for, having landed to attack 120 Mary- land militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life, while fifty of his followers were placed hors de combat and the remainder chased back to the ship by the victors, who had but three wounded. The American army, which was to oppose Ross and Cockburn, consisted of some seven thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only about 1500 British had time to become engaged. The fight was really between these 1500 British regulars and the American flotilla men. These consisted of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, some of whom served under Captain Bar- ney, who had a battery of two i8's and three 12's, while the others were armed with muskets and pikes and acted with the marines. Both sailors and marines did nobly, inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, which amounted to 256 men, and in return lost over a hundred of their own men, including the two captains, who were Naval War of 1 812 45 wounded and captured, with the guns." Ross took Washington and burned the pubHc buildings ; and the panic-struck Americans fooHshly burned the Columbia, 44, and Argus, 18, which were nearly ready for service. Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington was conducted with great skill and success. Fort Washington was abandoned as soon as fired upon, and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most humiliating conditions. Captain Gordon was now joined by the Fairy, 18, Captain Baker, who brought him orders from Vice-Admiral Cochrane to return ; and the squadron began to work down the river, which was very difficult to navigate. Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two 44's, Guerriere and Java, tried to bar their progress, but had not sufficient means. On Sep- tember ist, an attempt was made to destroy the Devastation by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 4th the attempt was repeated by Commodore Rodgers, with a party of some forty men, but they were driven off and attacked by the British boats, under Captain Baker, who in turn was re- pulsed with the loss of his second lieutenant killed and some twenty-five men killed or woimded. The squadron also had to pass and silence a bat- ^ The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular regiments would have given the Americans this battle — which is open to doubt. 4^ Naval War of 1 8 1 2 tery of light field-pieces on the 5 th, where they suf- fered enough to raise their total loss to seven killed and thirty-five wounded. Gordon's inland expedition was thus concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost ; it was a most venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the captains and crews engaged in it. Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land early in September. On the 13th, an inde- cisive conflict took place between the British regulars and American militia, in which the former came off with the honor, and the latter with the profit. The regulars held the field, losing 350 men, including General Ross ; the militia retreated in fair order with a loss of but 200. The water attack was also unsuccessful. At 5 a.m. on the 13th, the bomb vessels Meteor, Mtna, Terror, Volcano, and Devastation, the rocket-ship Erebus, and the frigates Severn, Euryalus, Havannah, and Hebrus opened on Fort McHenry, some of the other fortifications being occasionally fired at. A furious but harmless cannonade was kept up be- tween the forts and ships until 7 a.m. on the 14th, when the British fleet and army retired. I have related these events out of their natural order because they really had very little to do with our navy, and yet it is necessary to mention them in order to give an idea of the course of events. The British and American accounts of Naval War of 1 812 47 the various gun-boat attacks differ widely ; but it is very certain that the gunboats accomplished little or nothing of importance. On the other hand, their loss amounted to nothing, for many of those that were sunk were afterward raised, and the total tonnage of those destroyed would not much exceed that of the British barges cap- tured by them from time to time or destroyed by the land batteries. The purchased brig Rattlesnake, 16, had been cruising in the Atlantic with a good deal of suc- cess; but in lat. 40° N., long. 33° W., was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig's commander, managed to escape only by throwing overboard all his guns except two long nines; and on June 2 2d he was captured by the Leander, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B. The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the Wasp, 22, Captain Johnston Blakely, which left Portsmouth on May ist, with a very fine crew of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; there was said not to have been a single foreign seaman on board. It is, at all events, certain that during the whole war no vessel was ever better manned and commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser. The Wasp slipped unper- ceived through the blockading frigates, and ran 4S Naval War of 1 812 into the mouth of the Enghsh Channel, right in the thick of the Enghsh cruisers; here she re- mained several weeks, burning and scuttling many- ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 a.m., in lat. 48° 36' N., long. 11° 15' W.,' while in the chase of two merchantmen, a sail was made on the weather beam. This was the British brig-sloop Reindeer, 18, Captain William Manners,^ with a crew of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas. Like the Peacock (British) the Reindeer was only armed with 24-pounders, and Captain Manners must have known well that he was to do battle with a foe heavier than him- self; but there was no more gallant seaman in the whole British navy, fertile as it was in men who cared but little for odds of size or strength. As the day broke, the Reindeer made sail for the Wasp, then lying in the west-southwest. The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smoothness of the sea was hardly disturbed by the light breeze that blew out of the northeast. Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his an- tagonist, as the latter came slowly down with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the weather that the vessels kept almost on even keels. It was not till quarter past one that the Wasp's drum rolled out its loud challenge as it beat to ^ Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. 2 James, vi., 429. Naval War of 1 812 49 quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship put about and stood for the foe, thinking to weather him; but at 1.50 the brig also tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skilful cap- tains being bent on keeping the weather-gage. At half-past two, the Reindeer again tacked, and, taking in her staysails, stood for the Wasp, who furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be weathered, at 2.50 put about in her turn and ran off, with the wind a little forward the port beam, brailing up the mizzen, while the Reindeer hoisted her flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the Wasp's weather quarter. At 1 7 minutes past three, when the vessels were not sixty yards apart, the British opened the conflict, firing the shifting 12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. To this the Americans could make no return, and it was again loaded and fired, with the utmost deliberation; this was repeated five times, and would have been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disciplined than the Wasp's. At 3.26, Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did not get on his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his guns from aft forward as they bore. For ten minutes the ship and the brig lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was terribly destructive. The concussion of the ex- plosions almost deadened what little way the ves- sels had on, and the smoke hung over them like vol.. H.— 4 50 Naval War of 1812 a pall. The men worked at the guns with desperate energy, but the odds in weight of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the Reindeer, where both sides played their parts so manfully. Captain Manners stood at his post, as resolute as ever, though wounded again and again. A grape- shot passed through both his thighs, bringing him to the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to death, he sprang to his feet, cheering on the sea- men. The vessels were now almost touching, and, putting his helm a weather, he ran the Wasp aboard on her port ' quarter, while the boarders gathered forward, to try it with the steel. But the Carolina captain had prepared for this with cool confidence ; the marines came aft ; close under the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in their hands the naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up th^ pikemen. As the vessels came grinding together the men hacked and thrust at one another through the open port- holes, while the black smoke curled up from between the hulls. Then through the smoke ap- peared the grim faces of the British sea-dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough ; for the stubborn English stood well in the hard hand-play. But those who escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, ^ Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper says starboard: it is a point of little importance; all accounts agree as to the relative positions of the craft. Naval War of 1812 51 escaped only to be riddled through by the long Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands, the foremost of the assailants died, and the others gave back. The attack was foiled, though the Reindeer's marines kept answering well the American fire. Then the English captain, already mortally wounded, but with the indomitable courage that nothing but death could conquer, cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, sword in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; and they followed him with a will. At that in- stant a ball from the Wasp's maintop crashed through his skull, and, still clenching in his right hand the sword he had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face to the foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while above him yet floated the flag for which he had given his life. No Norse Viking, slain over shield, ever died better. As the British leader fell and his men recoiled. Captain Blakely passed the word to board ; with wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the ham- mock nettings, there was a moment's furious struggle, the surviving British were slain or driven below, and the captain's clerk, the highest officer left, surrendered the brig at 3.44, just 27 minutes after the Reindeer had fired the first gun, and just 18 after the Wasp had responded. Both ships had suffered severely in the short struggle; but, as with the Shannon and Chesa- 52 Naval War of 1812 peake, the injtiries were much less severe aloft than in the hulls. All the spars were in their places. The Wasp's hull had received 6 round, and many grape; a 24-pound shot had passed through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, REINDEER yNASP. S./7 3.28 ..J .41 3.2 a II were killed or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly. The Reindeer was completely cut to pieces in a line with her ports; her upper works, boats, and spare spars being one entire wreck. Of her crew of 118 men, ■x,'^ were killed outright or died later, and 34 were wounded, nearly all severely. COMPARATIVE FORCE Broadside Weight No. Tons Guns Metal Men Loss ^asp 509 II 315 173 26 Reindeer 477 10 210 iiS 67 It is thus seen that the Reindeer fought at a greater disadvantage than any other of the various British sloops that were captured in single Naval War of 1 812 53 action during the war ; and yet she made a better fight than any of them (though the Frolic, and the Frolic only, was defended with the same des- perate courage)— a pretty sure proof that heavy metal is not the only factor to be considered in accounting for the American victories. "It is difficult to say which vessel behaved the best in this short but gallant combat." ' I doubt if the war produced two better single-ship commanders than Captain Blakely and Captain Manners; and an equal meed of praise attaches to both crews. The British could rightly say that they yielded purely to heavy odds in men and metal; and the Americans, that the difference in execution was fully proportioned to the difference in force. It is difficult to know which to admire most, the wary skill with which each captain manoeuvred before the fight, the perfect training and discipline that their crews showed, the decision and prompti- tude with which Captain Planners tried to retrieve the day by boarding, and the desperate bravery with which the attempt was made ; or the readi- ness with which Captain Blakely made his prepara- tions, and the cool courage with which the assault was foiled. All people of the English stock, no matter on which side of the Atlantic they live, if they have any pride in the many feats of fierce prowess done by the men of their blood and race, ^ Cooper, ii., 2S7. 54 Naval War of 1812 should never forget this fight; although we can- not but feel grieved to find that such men — men of one race and one speech ; brothers in blood as well as in bravery — should ever have had to turn their weapons against one another. The day after the conflict the prize's foremast went by the board, and, as she was much damaged by shot, Captain Blakely burned her, put a por- tion of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, and with the remainder proceeded to France, reaching I'Orient on the 8th day of July. On July 4th, Sailing-master Percival and 30 volunteers of the New York flotilla ^ concealed themselves on board a fishing-smack, and carried by surprise the Eagle tender, which contained a 3 2 -pound howitzer and 14 men, 4 of whom were wounded. On July 12th, while off the west coast of South Africa, the American brig Syren was captured after a chase of 11 hours by the Medway, 74, Captain Brine. The chase was to windward dur- ing the whole time, and made every effort to escape, throwing overboard all her boats, anchors, cables, and spare spars. ^ Her commander, Cap- tain Parker, had died, and she was in charge of Lieut. N.J. Nicholson. By a curious coincidence, * Letter of Commodore J. Lewis, July 6, 1814. ' Letter of Captain Brine to Vice- Admiral Tyler, July 12, 1814. Naval War of 1 812 55 on the same day, July 12th, H. M. cutter Land- rail, 4,' of 20 men, Lieut. Lancaster, was captured by the American privateer Syren, a schooner mounting i long heavy gun, with a crew of 70 men; the Landrail had 7, and the Syren 3 men wounded. On July 14th, Gunboat No. 88, Sailing-master George Clement, captured, after a short skirmish, the tender of the Tenedos frigate, with her second lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10 seaman.^ The Wasp stayed in 1' Orient till she was thor- oughly refitted, and had filled, in part, the gaps in her crew, from the American privateers in port. On August 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, making two prizes during the next three days. On September ist, she came up to a convoy of 10 sail under the protection of the Armada, 74, all bound for Gibraltar; the swift cruiser hovered round the merchantmen like a hawk, and though chased off again and again by the line-of-battle ship, always returned the instant the pursuit stopped, and finally actually succeeded in cutting off and capturing one ship, laden with iron and brass cannon, muskets, and other military stores of great value. At half -past six on the evening of the same day, in lat. 47° 30' N., long. 11° W., ^ James, vi., 436; his statement is wrong as regards the privateer. ' Letter of Captain Isaac Hull, July 15, 18 14. 56 Naval War of 1 812 while running almost free, four sail, two on the starboard bow, and two on the port, rather more to leeward, were made out." Captain Blakely at once made sail for the most weatherly of the four ships in sight, though well aware that more than one of them might prove to be hostile cruisers, and they were all of unknown force. But the determined Carolinian was not one to be troubled by such considerations. He probably had several men less under his command than in the former action, but had profited by his experience with the Reindeer in one point, having taken aboard her 1 2 -pounder boat carronade, of whose efficacy he had had very practical proof. The chase, the British brig-sloop Avon, 18, Captain the Honorable James Arbuthnot,^ was steering almost southwest; the wind, which was blowing fresh from the southeast, being a little abaft the port beam. At 7.00, the Avon began making night signals with the lanterns, but the Wasp, disregarding these, came steadily on; at 8.38 the Avon fired a shot from her stern-chaser,^ and shortly afterward another from one of her lee or starboard guns. At twenty minutes past 9, the Wasp was on the port or weather quarter of the Avon, and the vessels interchanged several ^ Official letter of Captain Blakely, September 8, 1814. ^ James, vi., 432 3 James, vi., 432. Naval War of 1 812 57 hails ; one of the American officers then carne for- ward on the forecastle and ordered the brig to heave to, which the latter declined doing, and set her port fore-topmast studding-sail. The Wasp then, at 9.29, fired the 12 -pound carronade into her, to which the Avon responded with her stern- chaser and the aftermost port guns. Cap- tain Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his adversary would try to escape, and ran to lee- ward of her, and then ranged up alongside, having poured a broadside into her quarter. A close and furious engagement began, at such short range that the only one of the Wasp's crew who was wounded, was hit by a wad; four round shot struck her hull, killing two men, and she suffered a good deal in her rigging. The men on board did not know the name of their antagonist; but they could see through the smoke and the gloom of the night, as her black hull surged through the water, that she was a large brig ; and aloft, against the sky, the sailors could be discerned, clustering in the tops.' In spite of the darkness the Wasp's fire was directed with deadly precision ; the Avon's gaff was shot away at almost the first broadside, and most of her main-rigging and spars followed suit. She was hulled again and again, often be- low water-line; some of her carronades were dis- mounted, and, finally, the mainmast went by the ^ Captain Blakely's letter. 58 Naval War of 1 812 board. At 10.00, after 31 minutes of combat, her fire had been completely silenced and Captain Blakely hailed to know if she had struck. No answer being received, and the brig firing a few random shot, the action recommenced; but, at 10.12, the Avon was again hailed, and this time answered that she had struck. While lowering away a boat to take possession, another sail r WASP woo (H. B. M. brig-sloop Castilian, 18, Captain Braimer) was seen astern. The men were again called to quarters, and everything put in readiness as rapidly as possible; but, at 10.36, two more sail were seen (one of which was H. B. M. Tar- tarus, 20 0. The braces being cut away, the Wasp was put before the wind until new ones could be rove. The Castilian pursued till she ^ Niles's Register, vi., 216. Naval War of 1812 59 came up close, when she fired her lee guns into, or rather over, the weather quarter of the Wasp, cutting her rigging slightly. Repeated signals of distress having now been made by the Avon (which had lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the Castilian tacked and stood for her, and on closing found out she was sinking. Hardly had her crew been taken off when she went down. Counting the Wasp's complement as full (though it was probably two or three short), taking James's statement of the crew of the Avon as true, includ- ing the boat carronades of both vessels, and con- sidering the Avon's stem-chaser to have been a six-pounder, we get the COMPARATIVE FORCE Tons No. Guns Weight Metal No. Men Loss Wasp 509 12 327 160 3 Avon 477 II 280 117 42 It is self-evident that in the case of this action the odds, 14 to 11, are neither enough to accoimt for the loss inflicted being as 14 to i, nor for the rapidity with which, during a night encounter, the Avon was placed in a sinking condition. " The gallantry of the Avon's officers and crew cannot for a moment be questioned ; but the gunnery of the latter appears to have been not one whit better than, to the discredit of the British navy, had fre- 6o Naval War of 1812 quently before been displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, judging from the specimen given by the Castilian, is it hkely that she would have per- formed any better." ' On the other hand, "Cap- tain Blakely's conduct on this occasion had all the merit shown in the previous action, with the additional claim of engaging an enemy under circumstances which led him to believe that her consorts were in the immediate vicinity. The steady, officer-like way in which the Avon was destroyed, and the coolness with which he pre- pared to engage the Castilian within ten minutes after his first antagonist had struck, are the best encomiums on this officer's character and spirit, as well as on the school in which he had been trained." ^ The Wasp now cruised to the southward and westward, taking and scuttling one or two prizes. On September 21st, lat. t,t^° 12' N., long. 14° 56' W., she captured the brig Atalanta, 8, with 19 men, which proved a valuable prize, and was sent in with one of the : midshipmen, Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize-master, who reached Savannah in safety on November 4th. Meanwhile, the Wasp kept on toward the southeast. On October 9th, in lat. 18° 35' N., long. 30° 10' W., she spoke and boarded the Swedish brig Adonis, and took out of her Lieutenant McKnight and Mr. Lyman, a ^ James, vi., 435. ^ Cooper, ii., 291. Naval War of 1812 61 master's mate, both late of the Essex, on their way to England from Brazil. This was the last that was ever heard of the gallant but ill-fated Wasp. How she perished, none ever Imew; all that is certain is that she was never seen again. She was as good a ship, as well manned, and as ably commanded as any vessel in our little navy; and it may be doubted if there was at that time any foreign sloop of war of her size and strength that could have stood against her in a fair fight. As I have said, the Wasp was manned almost exclusively by Americans. James says they were mostly Irish ; the reason he gives for the assertion being that Captain Blakely spent the first sixteen months of his life in Dublin. This argument is quite on a par with another piece of logic which I cannot resist noticing. The point he wishes to prove is that Americans are cowards. Accord- ingly, on p. 475 : "On her capstan the Constitution now mounted a piece resembling seven musket barrels, fixed together with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock, and each barrel threw twenty-five balls. . . . What could have im- pelled the Americans to invent such extraordinary implements of war but fear, downright fear?" Then a little farther on : " The men were provided with leather boarding-caps, fitted with bands of iron, . . . another strong symptom of fear!" 62 Naval War of 1812 Now, such a piece of writing as this is simply evidence of an iinsound mind; it is not so much malicious as idiotic. I only reproduce it to help prove what I have all along insisted on, that any of James's imsupported statements about the Americans, whether respecting the tonnage of the ships or the courage of the crews, are not worth the paper they are written on ; on all points connected purely with the British navy, or which can be checked off by official documents or ships' logs, or where there would be no particular object in falsifying, James is an invaluable assistant, from the diligence and painstaking care he shows, and the thoroughness and minuteness with which he goes into details. A fair-minded and interesting English critic,' whose remarks are generally very just, seems to me to have erred somewhat in commenting on this last sloop action. He says that the Avon- was first crippled by dismantling shot from long guns. Now, the Wasp had but one long gun on the side engaged, and, moreover, began the action with the shortest and lightest of her carronades. Then he continues that the Avon, like the Pea- cock, "was hulled so low that the shot-holes could not be got at, and yielded to this fatal circum- stance only." It certainly cannot be said, when ' Lord Howard Douglass, Treatise on Naval Gunnery, p. 416. Naval War of 1 812 63 a brig has been dismasted, has had a third of her crew placed hors de combat, and has been rendered an unmanageable hulk, that she yields only be- cause she has received a few shot below the water- line. These shot-holes undoubtedly hastened the result, but both the Peacock and the Avon would have surrendered even if they had remained abso- lutely water-tight. The Adams, 28, had been cut down to a sloop of war at Washington, and then lengthened into a flush-decked, heavy corvette, mounting on each side 13 medium i8's, or columbiads, and i long 12, with a crew of 220 men, under the command of Captain Charles Morris, late first lieutenant of the Constitutions She slipped out of the Potomac and past the blockaders on January 18th, and cruised eastward to the African coast and along it from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas, thence to the Canaries and Cape de Verde. She returned very nearly along the Equator, thence going to- ward the West Indies. The cruise was unlucky, but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and ivory, being made. In hazy weather, on March 25th, a large Indiaman (the Woodbridge) was cap- tured; but while taking possession the weather cleared up, and Captain Morris found himself to ^Autobiography of Commodore Morris, Annapolis, 1880, p. 172. 64 Naval War of 1812 leeward of 25 sail, two of which, a two-decker and a frigate, were making for him, and it took him till the next day to shake them off. He entered Savannah on May ist and sailed again on the 8th, standing to the Gulf Stream, between Makanilla and Florida, to look out for the Jamaica fleet. He found this fleet on the 24th, but the discovery failed to do him much good, as the ships were under the convoy of a 74, two frigates, and three brigs. The Adams hovered on their skirts for a couple of days, but nothing could be done with them, for the merchantmen sailed in the closest possible order and the six war vessels exercised the greatest vigilance. So the corvette passed northward to the Newfoundland Banks, where she met with nothing but fogs and floating ice, and then turned her prow toward Ireland. On July 4th, she made out and chased two sail, who escaped into the mouth of the Shannon. After this the Adams, heartily tired of fogs and cold, stood to the southward and made a few prizes; then, in lat. 44° N., long. 10° W., on July 15th, she stumbled across the i8-pounder 36-gun frigate Tigress, Captain Henderson. The frigate was to leeward, and a hard chase ensued. It was only by dint of cutting away her anchors and throwing overboard some of her guns that the Adams held her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Captain Morris and his first lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, Naval War of 1812 65 had been the first and second Heutenants of Old Ironsides in Hull's famous cruise, and they proved that they had not forgotten their early experience, for they got out the boats to tow, and employed their time so well that by sunrise the frigate was two leagues astern. After eighteen hours' more chase the Adams dropped her. But in a day or two she ran across a couple more, one of which, an old bluff -bows, was soon thrown out; but the other was very fast, and kept close on the cor- vette's heels. As before, the frigate was to lee- ward. The Adams had been built by contract; one side was let to a sub -contractor of economical instincts, and accordingly turned out rather shorter than the other; the result was, the ship sailed a good deal faster on one tack than on the other. In this chase she finally got on her good tack in the night, and so escaped.' Captain Morris now turned homeward. During his two cruises he had made but ten prizes (manned by 161 men), none of very great value. His luck grew worse and worse. The continual cold and damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his crew were prostrated by the disease; and the weather kept on foggy as ever. Off the Maine coast a brig-sloop (the Rifleman, Captain Pearce) was ^ This statement is somewhat traditional; I have also seen it made about the John Adams. But some old officers have told me positively that it occurred to the Adams on this cruise. VOL. II. — 5 66 Naval War of 1 812 discovered and chased, but it escaped in the thick weather. The fog grew heavier, and early on the morning of August 17th the Adams struck land — literally struck it, too, for she grounded on the Isle of Haute, and had to throw over provisions, spare spars, etc. , before she could be got off. Then she entered the Penobscot, and sailed twenty- seven miles up it to Hampden. The Rifleman meanwhile conveyed intelligence of her where- abouts to a British fleet, consisting of two line-of- battle ships, three frigates, three sloops, and ten troop transports, under the joint command of Rear-Admiral Griffith and Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke.' This expedition accordingly went into the Penobscot and anchored off Castine. Captain Morris made every preparation he could to defend his ship, but his means were very limited ; seventy of his men were dead or disabled by the scurvy; the remainder, many of them also diseased, were mustered out, to the number of 130 officers and seamen (without muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, however, by 30 regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed with squirrel guns, ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc., — in all between 500 and 550 men,^ only 180 of whom, with 50 muskets among them, could be ^ James, vi., 479. * Autobiography of Cominodore Morris. Naval War of 1 812 67 depended upon. On September 3d, the British advanced by land and water, the land-force being under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting of 600 troops, 80 marines, and 80 seamen. I The flotilla was composed of barges, launches, and rocket-boats, under the command of Captain Barry of the Dragon, 74. In all, there were over 1500 men. The seamen of the Adams, from the wharf, opened fire on the flotilla, which returned it with rockets and carronades ; but the advance was checked. Meanwhile, the British land-forces attacked the militia, who acted up to the traditional militia standard, and retreated with the utmost promptitude and celerity, omit- ting the empty formality of firing. This left Captain Morris surrounded by eight times his number, and there was nothing to do but set fire to the corvette and retreat. The seamen, marines, and regulars behaved well, and no attempt was made to molest them. None of Captain Morris's men were hit; his loss was confined to one sailor and one marine, who were too much weakened by scurvy to retreat with the others, who marched ^ James, vi., 481. Whenever militia are concerned, James has not much fear of oflficial documents and lets his imagina- tion run riot; he here says the Americans had 1400 men, which is as accurate as he generally is in writing about this species of force. His aim being to overestimate the number of the Americans in the various engagements, he always sup- plies militia ad libitum to make up any possible deficiency. 68 Naval War of 1 8i 2 to Portland, 200 miles off. The British lost ten men killed or wounded. On September 9th, Gunboats Nos. 160 and 151, commanded by Mr. Thomas M. Pendleton, cap- tured off Sapelo Bar, Ga., the British privateer Fortune of War, armed with two heavy pivot guns, and 35 men. She made a brief resistance, losing two of her men.' On September 15th, the British 20-gun ship- sloops Hermes and Carron, and i8-gun brig-sloops Sophie and Childers, and a force of 200 men on shore,"* attacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, but were repulsed without being able to do any damage whatever to the Americans. The Hermes was sunk and the assailants lost about 80 men. On the 26th of September, while the privateer- schooner General Armstrong, of New York, Cap- tain Samuel C. Reid, of one long 24, eight long 9's, and 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road of Fayal, a British squadron, composed of the Plantagenet, 74, Captain Robert Floyd, Rota, 38, Captain Philip Somerville, and Carnation, 18, Captain George Bentham, hove in sight. ^ One or more boats were sent in by the British, to ^ Letter from Commodore H. G. Campbell, St. Mary's, September 12, 1814. 2 James, vi., 527. 3 Letter of Capt. S. C. Reid, October 7, 1814; and of John B. Dabney, Consul at Fayal, October 5, 1814. Naval War of 1 8 1 2 69 reconnoitre the schooner, as they asserted, or, according to the American accounts, to carry her by a coup de main. At any rate, after repeatedly warning them off, the privateer fired into them, and they withdrew. Captain Reid then anchored, with springs on his cables, nearer shore, to await the expected attack, which was not long deferred. At 8 p. M. four boats from the Plantagenet and three from the Rota, containing in all 180 men,' under the command of Lieutenant William Matter- face, first of the Rota, pulled in toward the road, while the Carnation accompanied them to attack the schooner if she got under way. The boats pulled in under cover of a small reef of rocks, where they lay for some time, and about midnight made the attack. The Americans opened with the pivot gun, and immediately afterward with their long 9's, while the boats replied with their carronades, and, pulling spiritedly on amidst a terrific fire of musketry from both sides, laid the schooner aboard on her bow and starboard quarter. The struggle was savage enough, the British hacking at the netting and trying to clamber up on deck, while the Americans fired their muskets and pistols in the faces of their assailants and thrust ^ James, vi., 509. Both American accotmts say 12 boats, with 400 men, and give the British loss at 250. According to my usual rule, I take each side's statement of its own force and loss. /o Naval War of 1812 the foremost through with their long pikes. The boats on the quarter were driven off; but on the forecastle all three of the American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and the men were giving back when Captain Reid led all the after-division up and drove the British back into their boats. This put an end to the assault. Two boats were sunk, most of the wounded being saved, as the shore was so near ; two others were captured, and but three of the scattered flotilla returned to the ships. Of the Americans, two were killed, includ- ing the second lieutenant, Alexander O. Williams, and 7 were wounded, including the first and third lieutenants, Frederick A. Worth and Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were killed and 86 were wounded; among the former being the Rota's first and third lieutenants, William Matter- face and Charles R. Norman, and among the latter her second lieutenant and first lieutenant of marines, Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner's long 24 had been knocked off its carriage by a carronade shot, but it was replaced and the deck cleared for another action. Next day the Carnation came in to destroy the priva- teer, but was driven off by the judicious use the latter made of her "Long Tom." But affairs being now hopeless, the General Armstrong was scuttled and burned, and the Americans retreated to the land. The British squadron was bound Naval War of 1812 71 for New Orleans, and on account of the delay and loss it had suffered, it was late in arriving, so that this action may be said to have helped in saving the Crescent City. Few regular com- manders could have done as well as Captain Reid. On October 6th, while Gunboat No. 160 was convoying some coasters from Savannah, it was carried by a British tender and nine boats.' The gun vessel was lying at anchor about eight leagues from St. Mary's, and the boats approached with muffled oars early in the morning. They were not discovered till nearly aboard, but the defence though short was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. Of the gunboat's 30 men but 16 were fit for action; those, under Saihng- master Thomas Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, especially, fought with the greatest gallantry; his thigh was broken with a grape-shot at the very beginning, but he hobbled up on his other leg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust through by a pike and had received two sabre cuts. Any one of his wounds would have been enough to put an ordinary man hors de combat. On October nth, another desperate privateer battle took place. The brigantine P%ince de Neiifchdtel, Captain Ordronaux, of New York, was a superbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 'Letter from Commander H. G. Campbell, October 12, 1814. 72 Naval War of 1812 17 guns, and originally possessing a crew of 150 men/ She had made a very successful cruise, having on board goods to the amount of $300,000, but had manned and sent in so many prizes that only 40 of her crew were left on board, while 37 prisoners were confined in the hold. One of her prizes was in company, but had drifted off to such a distance that she was unable to take part in the fight. At mid-day, on the nth of October, while off Nantucket, the British frigate Endymion, 40, Captain Henry Hope, discovered the privateer and made sail in chase. ^ At 8.30 p.m., a calm having come on, the frigate despatched 5 boats, containing in men, 3 under the command of the first lieutenant, Abel Hawkins, to take the brig- antine; while the latter triced up the boarding nettings, loaded the gims with grape and bull- ets, and prepared herself in every way for the coming encounter. She opened fire on the boats as they drew near, but they were soon alongside, and a most desperate engagement ensued. Some of the British actually cut through the nettings and reached the deck, but were killed by the ^ History of A^nerican Privateers, by George Coggeshall, p. 241, New York, 1876. ^ James, vi., p. 527. 3 According to Captain Ordronaux; James does not give the ntimber, but says 28 were killed, 37 womided, and the crew of the launch captured. Ten of the latter were un- wounded, and 18 wounded. I do not know if he included these last among his "37 wounded." Naval War of 1 812 "jz privateersmen ; and in a few minutes one boat was sunk, three others drifted off, and the launch, which was under the brigantine's stem, was taken possession of. The slaughter had been frightful, considering the number of the combatants. The victorious privateersmen had lost 7 killed, 15 badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9 un- touched! Of the Endymion's men, James says 28, including the first lieutenant and a midship- man, were killed, and 37, including the second lieutenant and a master's mate, wounded; "be- sides which the launch was captured and the crew made prisoners." I do not know if this means 37 wounded, besides the wounded in the launch, or not'; of the prisoners captured 18 were wounded and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55 wounded, and 10 unhurt prisoners; or else 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10 prisoners; but whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much matter. It was a most desperate conflict, and, remembering how short-handed the brigantine was, it reflected the highest honor on the American captain and his crew. After their repulse before Baltimore, the British concentrated their forces for an attack upon New Orleans. Accordingly, a great fleet of line- ^ I think James does not include the wounded in the launch, as he says 28 wounded were sent aboard the Saturn; this could hardly have included the men who had been captured. 74 Naval War of 1812 of -battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, under Vice-Admiral Cochrane, convoying a still larger number of store-ships and transports containing the army of General Packenham, appeared off the Chandeleur Islands on December 8th. The American navy in these parts consisted of the ship Louisiana and schooner Carolina in the Miss- issippi River, and in the shallow bayous a few gunboats, of course without quarters, low in the water, and perfectly easy of entrance. There were also a few tenders and small boats. The British frigates and sloops anchored off the broad shallow inlet called Lake Borgne on the 12th; on this inlet there were 5 gunboats and 2 small tenders, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas Catesby Jones. It was impossible for the British to transport their troops across Lake Borgne, as contemplated, until this flotilla was destroyed. Accordingly, on the night of the 1 2th, 42 launches, armed with 24-, 18-, and 12-pounder carronades, and 3 unarmed gigs, carrying 980 seamen and marines, under the orders of Captain Lockyer,' pushed off from the Arniida, 38 in three divisions ; the first under the command of Captain Lockyer, the second under Captain Montresor, and the third under Captain Roberts.^ Lieuten- ^ James, vi., 521. ^ Letter of Captain Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, December 18, 1814. Naval War of 1 812 75 ant Jones was at anchor with his boats at the Malheureux Islands, when he discovered, on the 13th, the British flotilla advancing toward Port Christian. He at once despatched the Seahorse of one 6-pounder and 14 men, under Sailing- master William Johnston, to destroy the stores at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the bank, where she was assisted by two 6-pounders. There the British attacked her with seven of their smaller boats, which were repulsed after sustain- ing for nearly half an hour a very destructive fire.' However, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent it from being taken by a larger force. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Jones got under way with the five gun vessels, trying to reach Les Petites Coquilles, near a small fort at the mouth of a creek. But as the wind was Hght and baffling, and the current very strong, the effort was given up, and the vessels came to anchor off Malheureux Island passage at i a.m. on the i4th.^ The other tender, the Alligator, Sailing-master Sheppard, of one 4-pounder and 8 men, was discovered next morning trying to get to her consorts and taken with a rush by Captain Roberts and his division. At daybreak, Lieutenant Jones saw the British boats about nine miles to the eastward, and moored his five gun vessels abreast in the channel, ^ James, vi., 521. 2 Official letter of Lieutenant Jones, March 12, 1815. 76 Naval War of 1812 with their boarding-nettings triced up, and every- thing in readiness; but the force of the current drifted two of them, Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred yards down the pass and out of hne, No. 156 being the headmost of all. Their exact force was as follows: No. 156, Lieutenant Jones, 41 men and 5 guns (one long 24 and four 12 -pound carronades) ; No. 163, Sailing-master George Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns (one long 24 and two 12 -pound carronades) ; No. 162, Lieutenant Robert Speddes, 35 men, 5 guns (one long 24 and four light 6's) ; No. 5, Sailing-master John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (one long 24, four 12-pound carronades); No. 23, Lieutenant Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 giins (one long 32 and four light 6's). There were thus, in all, 182 men and a broadside of 14 guns, throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British forces amounted, as I have said, to 980 men, and (sup- posing they had equal numbers of 24's, iS's, and 12's) the flotilla threw seven htindred and fifty- eight pounds of shot. The odds, of course, were not as much against the Americans as these figures would make them, for they were station- ary, and had some long, heavy guns and boarding- nettings ; on the other hand, the fact that two of their vessels had drifted out of line was a very serious misfortune. At any rate, the odds were great enough, considering that he had British sailors to deal with, to make it anything but a Naval War of i8i 2 11 cheerful look-out for Lieutenant Jones ; but, nowise daunted by the almost certain prospect of defeat, the American officers and seamen prepared very coolly for the fight. In this connection, it should be remembered that simply to run the boats on shore would have permitted the men to escape, if they had chosen to do so. Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antago- nist. When he had reached a point just out of gunshot, he brought the boats to a grapnel to let the sailors eat breakfast and get a little rest after the fatigue of their long row. When his men were rested and in good trim, he formed the boats in open order, and they pulled gallantly on against the strong current. At 10.50, the Americans opened fire from their long guns, and in about fifteen minutes the cannonade became general on both sides.' At 11.50, Captain Lockyer's barge was laid alongside No. 156, and a very obsti- nate struggle ensued, "in which the greater part of the officers and crew of the barge were killed or wounded,"' including among the latter the gallant captain himself, severely, and his equally gallant first heutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the Seahorse frigate, mortally. At the same time Lieutenant Tatnall (of the Tonnant) also laid his barge aboard the gunboat, only to have it sunk; another shared the same fate ; and the assailants were for the mo- ^ Lieutenant Jones's letter. ^ Captain Lockyer's letter. ']'^ Naval War of 1 812 ment repulsed. But at this time Lieutenant Jones, who had shown as much personal bravery during the assault as forethought in preparing for it, received a dangerous and disabling wound, while many of his men received the same fate; the boarding-nettings, too, had all been cut or shot away. Several more barges at once assailed the boats, the command of which had devolved on a young midshipman, Mr. George Parker ; the latter, fighting as bravely as his commander, was like him severely wounded, whereupon the boat was carried at 1 2 . i o. Its guns were turned on No. 163, and this, the smallest of the gunboats, was soon taken ; then the British dashed at No. 162 and carried it, after a very gallant defence, in which Lieutenant Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 had her long 24 dismouted by the recoil, and was next carried; finally, No. 23, being left entirely alone , hauled down her flag at 12.30.' The Ameri- cans had lost 6 killed and 35 wounded ; the British 17 killed and 77 (many mortally) wounded. The greater part of the loss on both sides occurred in boarding No. 156, and also the next two gunboats. I have in this case, as usual, taken each com- mander 's account of his own force and loss. Lieu- tenant Jones states the British force to have been 1000, which tallies almost exactly with their own account ; but believes that they lost 300 in killed ' Minutes of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851. Naval War of 1 812 79 and wounded. Captain Lockyer, on the other hand, gives the Americans 225 men and three addi- tional Hght guns. But on the main points the two accounts agree perfectly. The victors certainly deserve great credit for the perseverance, gallantry, and dash they displayed; but still more belongs to the vanquished for the cool skill and obstinate courage with which they fought, although with the certainty of ultimate defeat before them, — which is always the severest test of bravery. No comment is needed to prove the effectiveness of their resistance. Even James says that the Amer- icans made an obstinate struggle, that Lieutenant Jones displayed great personal bravery, and that the British loss was very severe. On the night of December 23d, General Jack- son beat up the quarters of the British encamped on the bank of the Mississippi. The attack was opened by Captain Patterson in the schooner Caro- lina, 14 ; she was manned by 70 men, and mounted on each side six 12 -pound carronades and one long 12. Dropping down the stream unobserved till opposite the bivouac of the troops, and so close to the shore that his first command to fire was plainly heard by the foe, Patterson opened a slaughtering cannonade on the flank of the British, and kept it up without suffering any loss in re- turn, as long as the attack lasted. But, on the 27th, the British had their revenge, attacking the 8o Naval War of 1 812 little schooner as she lay at anchor, unable to as- cend the stream on account of the rapid current and a strong head-wind. The assailants had a battery of five guns, throwing hot shot and shell, while the only gun of the schooner's that would reach was the long 12. After half an hour's fight- ing the schooner was set on fire and blown up; the crew escaped to the shore with the loss of 7 men killed and wounded. The only remaining vessel, exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats was the Louisiana, 16, carrying on each side eight long 24's. She was of great assistance in the battle of the 28th, throwing during the course of the cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very little in return.^ Afterward, the American seamen and marines played a most gallant part in all the engagements on shore; they made very efficient artillerists. SUMMARY The following vessels were got ready for sea during this year^* : Name Rig Where Built Cost C a 3 22 a H 509 Remarks Wasp, Ship Newburyport $77.4S9.6o [60 Built Frolic. •• Boston 72,094.82 " " t« Peacock, " New York 75.644-36 " " " «( Ontario, " Baltimore 50,343 69 " •• " •* Erie, " " 56,174-36 ** " *' (( ^ Cooper, ii., p. 320. 2 Ainerican State Papers, xiv., p. 828; also, Emmons's Sta- tistical History. Naval War of 1812 81 SUMMARY (continued) Name Rig Where Built Cost c 90 n 12 w c 260 Remarks Tcrni Bowline, Schooner Portsmouth $13,000.00 Purchased Lynx, '• Washington 50 6 Built Epervier, Brig England 50,000.00 130 i8 477 Captured Flambeau, " Baltimore 14,000.00 90 14 300 Purchased 'Spark, ti " 17,389.00 " " " Firefly, " " 17,435.00 " " zzi Torch, Spitfire, .Eagle, Schooner N. 0. 13,000.00 20,000.00 60 12 260 2S6 270 Prometheus, " Philadelphia 20,000.00 •• " 290 • Chippeway, Brig R. I. 52,000.00 90 14 390 Saranac, tt Middleton 26,000.00 •■ ■• 360 Boxer, " " 26,000.00 •• " 370 Despatch, Schooner 23 2 S2 The first five small vessels that are bracketed were to cruise under Commodore Porter; the next four under Commodore Perry ; but the news of peace arrived before either squadron put to sea. Some of the vessels under this catalogue were really almost ready for sea at the end of 181 3; and some that I have included in the catalogue of 1 8 1 5 were almost completely fitted at the end of 1 81 4, — but this arrangement is practically the best. VOL. II. 82 Naval War of 1812 LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH I. Destroyed by British Armies Name Tons Guns Columbia 1508 52 j Destroyed to prevent Adams 760 28 [■ them falling into hands Argus 509 22 ) of enemy. Carolina 230 14 Destroyed by battery. 3007 116 2. Captured, etc., by British Navy on Ocean Name Tons Guns Essex S60 46 Captured by frigate and corvette. Frolic 509 22 " by frigate and schooner. Rattlesnake.. 258 16 " by frigate. Syren 250 16 " by seventy- four, 4877 100 Total, 7884 tons. 216 guns. There were also a good many gunboats, which I do not count, because, as already said, they were often not as large as the barges that were sunk and taken in attacking them, as at Craney Island, etc. LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM BRITISH I. Captured by American Privateers Name Tons Guns Ballahou 86 4 Landrail 76 4 162 8 Naval War of 1812 8- 2. Captured, etc., by American Navy on Ocean Name Tons Guns Epervier. ... 477 18 Captured by sloop Peacock. Avon 477 20 Sunk " " Wasp. Reindeer.... 477 19 " " " " Pictou 300 14 Captured by frigate. 1731 71 3. Sunk in Attacking Fort Name Tons Guns Hcrines 500 22 Total, 2393 tons. 10 1 guns. Taking into account the losses on the lakes, there was not very much difference in the amount of damage done to each combatant by the other; but, both as regards the material results and the moral effects, the balance inclined largely to the Americans. The chief damage done to our navy was by the British land forces, and consisted mainly in forcing us to burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. On the ocean, our three sloops were captured in each case by an overwhelming force, against which no resistance could be made, and the same was true of the captured British schooner. The Essex certainly gained as much honor as her opponents. There were but three single-ship ac- tions, in all of which the Americans were so su- perior in force as to give them a very great advantage ; nevertheless, in two of them the vic- tory was won with such perfect impunity, and the 84 Naval War of 1812 difference in the loss and damage inflicted was so very great, that I doubt if the result would have been affected if the odds had been reversed. In the other case, that of the Reindeer, the defeated party fought at a still greater disadvantage, and yet came out of the conflict with full as much honor as the victor. No man with a particle of generosity in his nature can help feeling the most honest admiration for the unflinching courage and cool skill displayed by Captain Manners and his crew. It is worthy of notice (remembering the sneers of so many of the British authors at the "wary circumspection" of the Americans) that Captain Manners, who has left a more hon- orable name than any other British commander of the war, excepting Captain Broke, behaved with the greatest caution as long as it would serve his purpose, while he showed the most splendid personal courage afterward. It is this combination of courage and skill that made him so dangerous an antagonist; it showed that the traditional British bravery was not impaired by refusing to adhere to the traditional British tactics of rushing into a fight "bull-headed." Needless exposure to danger denotes not so much pluck as stupidity. Captain Manners had no intention of giving his adversary any advantage he could prevent. No one can help feeling regret that he was killed; but if he was to fall, what more Naval War of 1812 85 glorious death could he meet? It must be re- membered that, while paying all homage to Cap- tain Manners, Captain Blakely did equally well. It was a case where the victory between two com- batants, equal in courage and skill, was decided by superior weight of metal and number of men. PRIZES MADE Name of ship Number of prizes President 3 Constitution 6 Adams lo Frolic 2 Wasp IS Peacock IS Hornet i Small craft 35 87 CHAPTER II 1814 ON THE LAKES Ontario — The contest one of ship-building merely — Ex- treme caution of the commanders, verging on timidity — Yeo takes Oswego, and blockades Sackett's Harbor — British gun- boats captured — Chauncy blockades Kingston. — Erie — Cap- tain Sinclair's unsuccessful expedition — Daring and successful cutting-out expeditions of the British. — Champlain — Mac- donough's victory. ONTARIO THE winter was spent by both parties in preparing more formidable fleets for the ensuing summer. All the American schooners had proved themselves so unfit for ser- vice that they were converted into transports, ex- cept the Sylph, which was brig-rigged and armed like the Oneida. Sackett's Harbor possessed but slight fortifications, and the Americans were kept constantly on the alert, through fear lest the British should cross over. Commodore Chauncy and Mr. Eckford were as unremitting in their ex- ertions as ever. In February, two 2 2 -gun brigs, the Jefferson and Jones, and one large frigate of 50 guns, the Superior, were laid; afterward a 86 Naval War of 1812 87 deserter brought in news of the enormous size of one of the new British frigates, and the Superior was enlarged to permit her carrying 62 guns. The Jefferson was launched on April 7th, the Jones on the loth, and the Superior on May 2d — an attempt on the part of the British to blow her up having been foiled a few days before. An- other frigate, the Mohawk, 42, was at once begun. Neither guns nor men for the first three ships had as yet arrived, but they soon began to come in, as the roads got better and the streams opened. Chauncy and Eckford, besides building ships that were literally laid down in the forest, and seeing that they were armed with heavy guns, which, as well as all their stores, had to be carried over- land hundreds of miles through the wilderness, were obliged to settle quarrels that occurred among the men, the most serious being one that arose from a sentinel's accidentally killing a shipwright, whose companions instantly struck work in a body. What was more serious, they had to con- tend with such constant and virulent sickness, that it almost assumed the proportions of a plague. During the winter it was seldom that two thirds of the force were fit for duty, and nearly a sixth of the whole number of men in the port died be- fore navigation opened.^ ^ Cooper mentions that in five months the Madison buried a fifth of her crew. 88 Naval War of 1812 Meanwhile, Yeo had been nearly as active at Kingston, laying down two frigates and a huge line-of-battle ship, but his shipwrights did not succeed in getting the latter ready much before navigation closed. The Prince Regent, 58, and Princess Charlotte, 42, were launched on April 15th. I shall anticipate somewhat by giving tabular lists of the comparative forces, after the two British frigates, the two American frigates, and the two American brigs had all been equipped and manned. Commodore Yeo's origi- nal six cruisers had been all renamed, some of them rearmed, and both the schooners changed into brigs. The Wolfe, Royal George, Melville, Moira, Beresford, and Sydney Smith, were now named, respectively, Montreal, Niagara, Star, Charwell, Netly, and Magnet. On the American side, there had been but slight changes, beyond the alteration of the Sylph into a brig armed like the Oneida. Of the Superior's 62 guns, 4 were very shortly sent on shore again. chauncy's squadron Broadside Name Rig Tonnage Crew Metal Armament •30 long 32's Superior. . . . Ship 1580 500 1050 lbs. ■ 2 " 24's .26 short 42 's ('26 long 24's Mohawk... (1 1350 350 554 " j 2 " iS's 1 14 short 32's Naval War of 1812 89 chauncy's squadron (continued) Name Pike.... Madison. Jones Jefjerson . Sylph. . . . Oneida. . . Rig Ship Brig Tonnage Crew 875 300 593 500 500 300 243 200 160 i6o 100 100 Broadside Metal 360 lbs. 364 " 33^ " 33^ " 180 " 180 " Armament \ 26 long 24 ] 2 "24 j 2 " 12 22 short 32 long 12 short 32 j 2 long 12 I 20 short 32 ) 2 long 12 1 14 short 24 j 2 long 12 I 14 short 24 I 20 8 vessels 5941 1870 3352 lbs. 228 guns This is considerably less than James makes it, as he includes all the schooners, which were abandoned as cruisers, and only used as gunboats or transports. Similarly Sir James had a large number of gunboats, which are not included in his cruising force. James thus makes Chauncy's force 2321 men, and a broadside of 4188 lbs. YEO S SQUADRON Name Rig Tonnage Broadside Crew Metal Armament Prince Regent. . . Ship 1450 485 872 lbs. [ 32 long 24's -! 4 short 68 's 'l 22 " 32's Princess Charlotte. (< 1215 315 604 " ' 26 long 24's 2 short 68's 'l 14 " 32's Montreal. . . i( 637 220 258 " { 7 long 24's 1 18 " 18's 90 Naval War of 1812 YEo's SQUADRON (continued) Name Rig Tonnage Crew Niagara Ship 510 200 Broadside Metal Charwell.. . . Brig Star " Netly " Magnet " 279 262 216 187 no no 100 80 332 lbs. i I 20 236 " Armament 2 long 12 236 " 180 " 156 " 8 vessels 4756 1620 2874 lbs. short 32 2 long 12 14 short 32 \ 2 long 12 ( 14 short 32 2 long 12 14 short 24 j 2 long 12 (12 short 24's 209 guns This tallies pretty well with James's statement, which (on p. 488) is 15 17 men, and a broadside of 2752 lbs. But there are very probably errors as regards the armaments of the small brigs, which were continually changed. At any rate, the American fleet was certainly the stronger, about in the proportion of six to five. The dis- proportion was enough to justify Sir James in his determination not to hazard a battle, although the odds were certainly not such as British command- ers had been previously accustomed to pay much regard to. Chauncy would have acted exactly as his opponent did, had he been similarly placed. The odds against the British commodore were too great to be overcome, where the com- batants were otherwise on a par, although the refusal to do battle against them would certainly Naval War of 1 812 91 preclude Yeo from advancing any claims to supe- riority in skill or courage. The Princess Charlotte and Niagara were just about equal to the Mohawk and Madison, and so were the Charwell and Netly to the Oneida and Sylph; but both the Star and Magnet together could hardly have matched either the Jones or the Jefferson, while the maindeck '32's of the Superior gave her a great advantage over the Prince Regent's 24's, where the crews were so equal ; and the Pike was certainly too heavy for the Montreal. A decided superiority in the effec- tiveness of both crews and captains could alone have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo in engaging, and this superiority he certainly did not possess. This year, the British architects outstripped ours in the race for supremacy, and Commodore Yeo put out of port with his eight vessels long before the Americans were ready. His first attempt was a successful attack on Oswego. This town is situated some sixty miles distant from Sackett's Harbor, and is the first port on the lake which the stores, sent from the seaboard to Chauncy, reached. Accordingly, it was a place of some little importance, but was very much neglected by the American authorities. It was insufficiently garrisoned, and was defended only by an entirely ruined fort of six guns, two of them dismounted. Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston to attack it on the 3d of May, having on board his ships a 92 Naval War of 1812 detachment of 1080 troops. Oswego was garri- soned by less than 300 men/ chiefly belonging to a light artillery regiment, with a score oi; two of militia ; they were under the command of Colonel Mitchell. The recaptured schooner Growler was in port, with seven guns destined for the harbor; she was sunk by her commander, but afterward raised and carried off by the foe. On the 5th, Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent in Captain Collier and 13 gunboats to draw the fort's fire ; after some firing between them and the four guns mounted in the fort (two long 24's, one long 12, and one long 6), the gunboats retired. The next day the attack was seriously made. The Princess Charlotte, Montreal, and Niagara engaged the batteries, while the Charwell and Star scoured the woods with grape to clear them of the militia.^ The debarkation of the troops was superintended by Captain O'Connor, and until it was accom- plished the Montreal sustained almost the whole fire of the fort, being set on fire three times, and much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging.^ Under this fire, 800 British troops were landed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, assisted by 200 sea- men, armed with long pikes, under Captain Mul- ^ General order of General Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, Assistant Adjutant-General, May 12, 1814. * Letter of General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814. 3 Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814. Naval War of 1 812 93 caster. They moved gallantly up the hill, under a heavy fire, and carried the fort by assault ; Mitch- ell then fell back unmolested to the Falls, about twelve miles above the town, where there was a large quantity of stores. But he was not again attacked. The Americans lost 6 men killed, in- cluding Lieutenant Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both of these last falling into the enemy's hands. The British lost 22 soldiers, marines, and seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed, and 73 (including the gallant Captain Mulcaster dan- gerously, and Captain Popham slightly) wounded,' the total loss being 75 — nearly a third of the American force engaged. General Drummond, in his official letter, reports that "the fort being everywhere almost open, the whole of the garrison . . effected their escape, except about 60 men, half of them wounded." No doubt the fort's being "everywhere almost open" afforded excel- lent opportunities for retreat ; but it was not much of a recommendation of it as a structure intended for defence. The British destroyed the four guns in the bat- tery, and raised the Growler and carried her off, with her valuable cargo of seven long guns. They ^ Letter of Lieutenant-Colonel V. Fischer, May 17, 18 14. James says " 18 killed and 64 wounded," why, I do not know; the official report of Colonel Fischer, as quoted, says: "Of the army, 19 killed and 62 wounded; of the navy, 3 killed and II wounded." 94 Naval War of 1812 also carried off a small quantity of ordnance stores and some flour, and burned the barracks; otherwise but little damage was done, and the Americans reoccupied the place at once. It cer- tainly showed great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo's part that he did not strike a really impor- tant blow by sending an expedition up to destroy the quantity of stores and ordnance collected at the Falls. But the attack itself was admirably managed. The ships were well placed, and kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to effectually cover the debarkation of the troops, which was very cleverly accomplished; and the soldiers and seamen behaved with great gallantry and steadi- ness, their officers leading them, sword in hand, up a long, steep hill, under a destructive fire. It was similar to Chauncy's attacks on York and Fort George, except that in this case the assailants suffered a much severer loss compared to that in- flicted on the assailed. Colonel Mitchell managed the defence with skill, doing all he could with his insufficient materials. After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his squadron for Sackett's Harbor, where he appeared on May 19th and began a strict blockade. This was especially troublesome, because most of the guns and cables for the two frigates had not yet arrived, and though the lighter pieces and stores could be carried overland, the heavier ones could Naval War of 1 812 95 only go by water, which route was now made dan- gerous by the presence of the blockading squad- ron. The very important duty of convoying these great guns was entrusted to Captain Woolsey, an officer of tried merit. He decided to take them by water to Stony Creek, whence they might be carried by land to the Harbor, which was but three miles distant ; and on the success of his en- terprise depended Chauncy's chances of regaining command of the lake. On the 28th of May, at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 19 boats, carry- ing twenty -one long 32's, ten long 24's, three 42 -pound carronades and ten cables — one of the latter for the Superior, being a huge rope 2 2 inches in circumference and weighing 9600 pounds. The boats rowed all through the night, and at sunrise on the 29th, 18 of them found themselves off the Big Salmon River, and, as it was unsafe to travel by daylight, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy Creek, eight miles from the Harbor. The other boat, containing two long 24's and a cable, got out of line, ran into the British squadron, and was captured. The news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at once to send out an expedition to capture the others. He accordingly despatched Captains Popham and Spilsbury in two gunboats, one armed with one 68-pound and one 24-pound carronade, and the other with a long 32, accom- panied by three cutters and a gig, mounting be- 96 Naval War of 1 812 tween them two long 12's and two brass 6's, with a total of 180 men.' They rode up to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the night, and be- gan ascending it shortly after daylight on the 30th. Their force, however, was absurdly inadequate for the accomplishment of their object. Captain Woolsey had been reinforced by some Oneida Indians, a company of light artillery, and some militia, so that his only care was, not to repulse, but to capture the British party entire, and even this did not need any exertion. He accordingly despatched Major Appling down the river with 120 riflemen and some Indians to lie in ambush.^ When going up the creek the British marines, under Lieutenant Cox, were landed on the left bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieutenant Brown, on the right bank ; while the two captains rowed up the stream between them, throwing grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. Major Appling waited until the British were close up, when his riflemen opened with so destructive I James, vi., 487; while Cooper says 186, James says the British loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded; Major Appling says: "14 were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 sailors captured." 2 Letter from Major D. AppHng, May 30, 1814. 3 Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June i, 1814. There were about 60 Indians; in all, the American force amounted to 180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and "a large body of miUtia and cavalry," — none of whom were present. Naval War of 1 812 97 a volley as to completely demoralize and "stam- pede" them, and their whole force was captured with hardly any resistance, the Americans hav- ing only one man slightly wounded. The British loss was severe, — 18 killed and 50 dangerously wounded, according to Captain Popham's report, as quoted by James ; or "14 killed and 28 wounded," according to Major Appling's letter. It was a very clever and successful ambush. On June 6th, Yeo raised the blockade of the Harbor, but Chauncy's squadron was not in con- dition to put out till six weeks later, during which time nothing was done by either fleet, except that two very gallant cutting-out expeditions were successfully attempted by Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, U. S. N. On June i6th, he left the Har- bor, accompanied by Sailing-masters Yaughan and Dixon and 22 seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of the enemy's provision schooners; on the 19th he was discovered by the British gunboat Black Snake, of one 18-pound carronade and 18 men, commanded by Captain H. Landon. Lieu- tenant Gregory dashed at the gunboat and carried it without the loss of a man; he was afterward obliged to burn it, but he brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, safely into port. On the I St of July, he again started out, with Messrs. Yaughan and Dixon and two gigs. The plucky little party suffered greatly from hunger, but on vol.. II. — 7 98 Naval War of 1812 the 5th, he made a sudden descent on Presque Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner just ready for launching; he was off before the foe could assemble and reached the Harbor in safety next day. On July 31st, Commodore Chauncy sailed with his fleet ; some days previously the larger British vessels had retired to Kingston, where a loo-gun two-decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to the head of the lake, where he intercepted the small brig Magnet. The Sylph was sent in to destroy her, but her crew ran her ashore and burned her. The Jefferson, Sylph, and Oneida were left to watch some other small craft in the Niagara ; the Jones was kept cruising between the Harbor and Oswego, and with the four larger ves- sels Chauncy blockaded Yeo's four large vessels lying in Kingston. The four American vessels were in the aggregate of 4398 tons, manned by rather more than 1350 men, and presenting in broadside 77 guns, throwing 2328 lbs. of shot. The four British vessels measured in all about 3812 tons, manned by 1220 men, and presenting in broadside 74 guns, throwing 2066 lbs. of shot. The former were thus superior by about 15 per cent., and Sir James Yeo very properly declined to fight with the odds against him, although it was a nicer calculation than British commanders had been accustomed to enter into. Naval War of 1812 99 Major-General Brown had written to Commo- dore Chauncy on July 13th: "I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field and to march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carr>' Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry that place. For God's sake, let me see you: Sir James will not fight." To which Chauncy replied : "I shall afford every assistance in my power to co-operate with the army whenever it can be done without losing sight of the great object for the attainment of which this fleet has been created, — the capture or destruction of the enemy's fleet. But that I consider the primary object. . . . We are intended to seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and I shall not be diverted from my efforts to effec- tuate it by any sinister attempt to render us sub- ordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." That is, by any "sinister attempt" to make him co- operate intelligently in a really well-concerted scheme of invasion. In further support of these noble and independent sentiments, he writes to the Secretary of the Navy on August loth^ " I told him [General Brown] that I should not visit the head of the lake unless the enemy's fleet did so. ^ See Niles, vii., 12, and other places (under "Chauncy," in index) , loo Naval War of 1 812 . . . To deprive the enemy of an apology for not meeting me, I have sent ashore four guns from the Superior to reduce her armament in number to an equaHty with the Prince Regent, yielding the advantage of their 6 8 -pounders. The Mo- hawk mounts two guns less than the Princess Charlotte, and the Montreal and Niagara are equal to the Pike and Madison.'' He here justi- fies his refusal to co-operate with General Brown by saying that he was of only equal force with Sir James, and that he has deprived the latter of "an apology" for not meeting him. This last was not at all true. The Mohawk and Madison were just about equal to the Princess Charlotte and Niagara; but the Pike was half as strong again as the Montreal; and Chauncy could very well afford to "yield the advantage of their 6 8 -pound- ers," when, in return, Sir James had to yield the advantage of Chauncy' s long 32's and 42 -pound carronades. The Superior was a 3 2 -pounder frig- ate, and, even without her four extra guns, was about a fourth heavier than the Prince Regent with her 24-pounders. Sir James was not acting more warily than Chauncy had acted during June and July, 18 13. Then he had a fleet which tonned 1701, was manned by 680 men, and threw at a broadside 1099 lbs. of shot; and he declined to go out of port or in any way try to check the operation of Yeo's fleet, which tonned 2091, was Naval War of 1812 loi manned by 770 men, and threw at a broadside 1374 lbs. of shot. Chauncy then acted perfectly proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeo for behaving in the same way. Whatever either commander might write, in reality he well knew that his officers and crew were, man for man, just about on a par with those of his antagonists, and so, after the first brush or two, he was ex- ceedingly careful to see that the odds were not against him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers to Brown's letter, ignored the fact that his supe- riority of force would prevent his opponent from giving battle, and would, therefore, prevent any- thing more important than a blockade occurring. His ideas of the purpose for which his com- mand had been created were erroneous and very hurtful to the American cause. That purpose was not, except incidentally, "the destruction of the enemy's fleet"; and, if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish it. The real purpose was to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to assist in repelling an invasion of the United States. These services could only be efficiently per- formed by acting in union with the land forces, for his independent action could evidently have little effect. The only important services he had performed had been in attacking Forts George and York, where he had been rendered "subor- dinate to, and an appendage of, the army." His I02 Naval War of 1812 only chance of accomplishing anything lay in similar acts of co-operation, and he refused to do these. Had he acted as he ought to have done, and assisted Brown to the utmost, he would cer- tainly have accomplished much more than he did, and might have enabled Brown to assault King- ston, when Yeo's fleet would, of course, have been captured. The insubordination, petty stickling for his own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the necessity of acting in concert that he showed, were the very faults which proved most fatal to the success of our various land commanders in the early part of the war. Even had Chauncy's as- sistance availed nothing, he could not have ac- complished less than he did. He remained off Kingston blockading Yeo, being once or twice blown off by gales. He sent Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midshipman Hart and six men, in to reconnoitre on August 25th; the lieutenant ran across two barges containing thirty men, and was captured after the midshipman had been killed and the lieutenant and four men wounded. On September 21st, he transported General Izard and 3000 men from Sackett's Harbor to the Gen- esee; and then again blockaded Kingston until the two-decker was nearly completed, when he promptly retired to the Harbor. The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on the lake till October 15th; he did not indulge in Naval War of 1 812 103 the empty and useless formality of blockading his antagonist, but assisted the British army on the Niagara frontier till navigation closed, about November 21st. A couple of days before, Mid- shipman McGowan headed an expedition to blow up the two-decker (named the St. Lawrence) with a torpedo, but was discovered by two of the enemy's boats, which he captured and brought in; the attempt was abandoned, because the St. Lawrence was found not to be lying in Kingston. For this year, the material loss again fell heavi- est on the British, amounting to one 14-gun brig burned by her crew, one lo-gun schooner burned on the stocks, three gunboats, three cutters, and one gig captured; while, in return, the Americans lost one schooner loaded with seven guns, one boat loaded with two, and a gig captured and four guns destroyed at Oswego. In men, the British loss was heavier still, relatively to that of the Ameri- cans, being in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and damage, which was too trivial to be of any account to either side, the success of the season was with the British, inasmuch as they held command over the lake for more than four months, during which time they could co-operate with their army ; while the Americans held it for barely two months and a half. In fact, the conduct of the two fleets on Lake Ontario during the latter part of the war I04 Naval War of 1 812 was almost farcical. As soon as one, by building, acquired the superiority, the foe at once retired to port, where he waited until he had built another vessel or two, when he came out, and the other went into port in turn. Under such circumstances it was hopeless ever to finish the contest by a stand-up sea-fight, each commander calculating the chances with mathematical exactness. The only hope of destroying the enemy's fleet was by co-operating with the land forces in a successful attack on his main post, when he would be forced to be either destroyed or to fight — and this co- operation Chauncy refused to give. He seems to have been an excellent organizer, but he did not use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) his materials by any means to the best advan- tage. He was hardly equal to his opponent, and the latter seems to have been little more than an average officer. Yeo blundered several times, as in the attack on Sackett's Harbor, in not following up his advantage at Oswego, in showing so little resource in the action off the Genesee, etc., and he was not troubled by any excess of daring ; but during the period when he was actually cruising against Chauncy on the lake, he certainly showed to better advantage than the American did. With an inferior force he won a partial victory over his opponent off Niagara, and then kept him in check for six weeks; while Naval War of 1812 105 Chauncy, with his superior force, was not only partially defeated once, but, w^hen he did gain a partial victory, failed to take advantage of it. In commenting upon the timid and dilatory tactics of the two commanders on Ontario, how- ever, it must be remembered that the indecisive nature of the results attained had been often paralleled by the numerous similar encounters that took place on the ocean during the wars of the preceding century. In the War of the Amer- ican Revolution, the English fought some nineteen fleet actions with the French, Dutch, and Span- iards; one victory was gained over the French, and one over the Spaniards, while the seventeen others were all indecisive, both sides claiming the victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some of them, though indecisive as regards loss and damages, were strategetical victories; thus, Ad- miral Arbuthnot beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesapeake, in March of 1781 ; and near the same place in September of the same year the French had their revenge in the victory (one at least in its results) of the Comte de Grasse over Sir Thomas Graves. . In the five desperate and bloody combats which De Suffrein waged with Sir Ed- ward Hughes in the East Indies, the laurels were very evenly divided. These live conflicts were not rendered indecisive by any overwariness in ma- noeuvring, for De Suffrein 's attacks were carried io6 Naval War of 1812 out with as much boldness as skill, and his stub- bom antagonist was never inclined to baulk him of a fair battle; but the two hardy fighters were so evenly matched that they would pound one another till each was helpless to inflict injury. Very different were the three consecutive battles that took place in the same waters on the 25th of April, 1758, the 3d of August, 1758, and on the loth of September, 1759, between Pocock and d'Ache,' where, by skilful manoeuvring, the French admiral saved his somewhat inferior force from capture, and the English admiral gained inde- cisive victories. M. Riviere, after giving a most just and impartial account of the battles, sums up with the following excellent criticism =>: "It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of November, 1757, and the combats of Pocock and d'Ache, from which date two distinct schools in the naval affairs of the eighteenth century: one of these was all for promptness and audacity, which were regarded as the indispensable con- ditions for victory; the other, on the contrary, praised skilful delays and able evolutions, and created success by science united to prudence. ^ La Mari)ic Frangaisc sous le Regne de Louis XV., par Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859). Pp. 385 and 439- * Ibid., p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to the letter in my translation. Naval War of 1812 107 . . , But these two schools were true only according to circumstances, not absolutely. When two fleets of equal worth are facing one another, as in the War of the American Revolution, then tactics should come into play, and audacity would often be mere foolhardiness. If it happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic, or during the last years of Louis XV., that an irresolute fleet, without organization, has to contend with a fleet prepared in every way, then, on the part of this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would be cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts himself time to become more hardy. The only school always true is that one which, freed from all routine, produces men whose genius will unite in one, in knowing how to apply them appropriately, the audacity which will carry off victory, and the prudence which knows how to ob- tain it in preparing for it." These generalizations are drawn from the results of mighty battles, but they apply just as well to the campaigns carried on on a small scale, or even to single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said, does not deserve the praise which most American historians, and especially Cooper, have lavished on him, as well as on all our other officers of that period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely de- tracts from the worth of the writer's favorable criticisms. Our average commander was, I firmly io8 Naval War of 1812 believe, at that time superior to the average com- mander of any other nation; but to get at this average we must include Chauncy, Rodgers, and Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough, Perry, Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and War- rington. Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his op- ponent, and like him was a good organizer; but he did little enough. His campaigns must be con- sidered as being conducted well or ill, according as he is believed to have commanded better men than his opponent, or not. If, as many British writers contend, his crews were an overmatch for the Americans, man for man, even to a slight degree, then Yeo's conduct was very cowardly; if, on the contrary, the officers and men of the two fleets were on a par, then he acted properly and out- generalled his opponent. It is to be regretted that most of the histories written on the subject, on either side of the Atlantic, should be of the "hurrah" order of literature, with no attempt whatever to get at the truth, but merely to explain away the defeats or immensely exaggerate the victories suffered or gained by their own side. ERIE AND THE UPPER LAKES Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on Ontario) had been under the command of Com- modore Chauncy; but they were now formed Naval War of 1 812 109 into a separate department, under Captain Arthur Sinclair. The Americans had, of course, com- plete supremacy, and no attempt was seriously made to contest it with them ; but they received a couple of stinging, if not very important defeats. It is rather singular that here the British, who began with a large force, while there was none whatever to oppose it, should have had it by degrees completely annihilated; and should have then, and not till then, when apparently rendered harmless, have turned round and par- tially revenged themselves by two cutting-out expeditions which were as boldly executed as they were skilfully planned. Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with the Niagara^ Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, and Tigress, and on July 20th burned the fort and barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned by their garrison. On August 4th, he arrived off the fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw), which was situated on such an eminence that the guns of the vessels could not reach it. Accordingly, the troops under Colonel Croghan were landed, cov- ered by the fire of the schooners, very successfully; but when they tried to carry the fort they were driven back with the loss of seventy men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the Nattagawassa Creek, at- tacked and destroyed a block-house three miles up it, which mounted three light guns, and also a no Naval War of 1 8i 2 schooner called the Nancy; but the commander of the schooner, Lieutenant Worsley, with his crew, escaped up the river. Captain Sinclair then departed for Lake Erie, leaving the Scorpion, Lieutenant Turner, and Tigress, Sailing-master Champlin, to blockade the Nattagawassa. News was received by the British from a party of Indians that the two American vessels were five leagues apart, and it was at once resolved to attempt their capture. On the first of September, in the evening, four boats started out, one manned by 20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsley, the three others by 72 soldiers under Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army — in all 92 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3-pounder. A number of Indians accompanied the expedition but took no part in the fighting. At sunset on the 2d, the boats arrived at St. Mary's Strait, and spent twenty-four hours in finding out where the American schooners were. At 6 p.m., on the 3d, the nearest vessel, the Tigress, was made out, six miles off, and they pulled for her. It was very dark, and they were not discovered till they had come within fifty yards, when Champlin at once fired his long 24 at them; before it could be reloaded the four boats had dashed up, those of Lieutenants Worsley and Armstrong placing themselves on the starboard, and those of Lieu- tenants Bulger and Raderhurst on the port side. Naval War of 1 8i 2 in There was a short, sharp struggle, and the schooner was carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 were killed and 5, including Mr. Champlin, dan- gerously wounded. The assailants lost three sea- men killed. Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and several seamen wounded.' "The defence of this vessel," writes Lieutenant Bulger, "did credit to her officers, who were all severely wounded." Next day, the prisoners were sent on shore, and on the 5th, the Scorpion was discovered working up to join her consort, entirely ignorant of what had happened. She anchored about two miles from the Tigress; and next morning at 6 o'clock the latter slipped her cable and ran down under the jib and foresail, the American ensign and pendant still flying. When within ten yards of the Scorpion, the concealed soldiers jumped up, poured a volley into her which killed two and wounded two men, and the next moment carried her, her surprised crew of thirty men making no resistance. The whole affair reflected great credit on the enterprise and pluck of the British, without being discreditable to the Americans. It was like Lieutenant Elliott's capture of the Detroit and Caledonia. Meanwhile, a still more daring cutting-out expe- ^ Letter of Lietit. A. H. Bulger, September 7, 1814. James says only 3 killed and 8 wounded; but Lieutenant Bulger distinctly says, in addition, "and several seamen woimded." 112 Naval War of 1 8i 2 dition had taken place at the foot of Lake Erie. The three American schooners, Ohio, Somers, and Porcupine, each with thirty men, under Lieuten- ant ConkHng, were anchored just at the outlet of the lake, to cover the flank of the works at Fort Erie. On the night of August 12, Captain Dobbs, of the Charwell, and Lieutenant Radclifte, of the Netly, with seventy-five seamen and marines from their two vessels, which were lying off Fort Erie, resolved to attempt the capture of the schooners. The seamen carried the captain's gig upon their shoulders from Queenstown to French- man's Creek, a distance of twenty miles; thence, by the aid of some militia, five batteaux as well as the gig were carried eight miles across the woods to Lake Erie, and the party (whether with or without the militia, I do not know) embarked in them. Between 11 and 12 the boats were dis- covered a short distance ahead of the Somers and hailed. They answered " Provision boats," which deceived the officer on deck, as such boats had been in the habit of passing and repassing con- tinually during the night. Before he discovered his mistake the boats drifted across his hawse, cut his cables, and ran him aboard with a volley of musketry, which wounded two of his men, and before the others could get on deck the schooner was captured. In another moment, the British boats were alongside the Ohio, Lieutenant Naval War of 1 8 1 2 113 Conkling's vessel. Here the people had hurried on deck, and there was a moment's sharp struggle, in which the assailants lost Lieutenant Radcliffe and one seaman killed and six seamen and marines wounded; but on board the Ohio Lieutenant Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally were shot down, one seaman killed, and four wounded, and Captain Dobbs carried her, sword in hand. The Porcupine was not molested, and made no effort to interfere with the British in their retreat; so they drifted down the rapids with their two prizes and secured them below. The boldness of this enterprise will be appreciated when it is remem- bered that but 75 British seamen (unless there were some militia along), with no artillery, at- tacked and captured two out of three fine schooners, armed each with a long 32 or 24, and an aggregate of 90 men; and that this had been done in waters where the gig and five batteaux of the victors were the only British vessels afloat. CHAMPLAIN This lake, which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, was now to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. A British army of 11,000 men, under Sir George Prevost, imdertook the invasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain. This VOL. II. — 8 114 Naval War of 1 8i 2 advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strong British naval force to drive back the American squadron at the same time. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the Confiance, to be added to their already existing force, which consisted of a brig, two sloops, and twelve or fourteen gunboats. The Americans already possessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and ten gunboats or row- gallies ; they now began to build a large brig, the Eagle, which was launched about the i6th of August. Nine days later, on the 25th, the Con- fiance was launched. The two squadrons were equally deficient in stores, etc.; the Confiance having locks to her guns, some of which could not be used, while the American schooner Ticonderoga had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at the touch-holes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downie were hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselves thor- oughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose from the nature of the case, which called for immediate action. The British army advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by General Macomb with less than 2000 effec- tive American troops. Captain Thomas Mac- donough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two before his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg Harbor. The British fleet, Naval War of 1 8 1 2 115 under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle aux Noix, on September 8th, and on the morning of the nth sailed into Plattsburg Harbor. The American force consisted of the ship Sara- toga, Captain T. Macdonough, of about 734 tons,' carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 4 2 -pound and twelve 3 2 -pound carronades; the brig Eagle, Cap- tain Robert Henly, of about 500 tons, carrying eight long i8's and twelve 32-pound carronades; schooner Ticonderoga, Lieutenant - Commander Stephen Cassin, of about 350 tons, carrying eight long 1 2 -pounders, four long i8-pounders, and five 3 2 -pound carronades; sloop Preble, Lieutenant Charles Budd, of about 80 tons, mounting seven long 9's; the row-gallies Borer, Centipede, Nettle, Allen, Viper, and Burrows, each of about 70 tons, and mounting one long 24- and one short 18- pounder; and the row-gallies Wilmer, Ludlow, Aylwin, and Ballard, each of about 40 tons, and mounting one long 12. James puts down the ^ In the Naval Archives {Masters-Commandant Letters, 18 14, i., No. 134) is a letter from Macdonough in which he states that the Saratoga is intermediate in size between the Pike, of 875, and the Madison, of 593 tons, this would make her 734. The Eagle was very nearly the size of the Lawrence or Niagara, on Lake Erie. The Ticonderoga was originally a small steamer, but Commodore Macdonough had her schooner- rigged because he found that her machinery got out of order on almost every trip that she took. Her tonnage is only approximately known, but she was of the same size as the Linnet. ii6 Naval War of 1 8i 2 number of men on board the squadron as 950, — merely a guess, as he gives no authority. Cooper says ' 'about 850 men, including officers, and a small detachment of soldiers to act as marines." Lossing (p. 866, note i) says 882 in all. Vol. xiv. of the American State Papers contains on page 572 the prize-money list presented by the purser, George Beale, Jr. This numbers the men (the dead being represented by their heirs or ex- ecutors) up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, but many of the numbers are omitted, probably owing to the fact that their owners, though belong- ing on board, happened to be absent on shore or in the hospital ; so that the actual number of names tallies very closely with that given by Lossing; and, accordingly, I shall take that.' The total number of men in the gallies (including a number of soldiers, as there were not enough sailors) was ^ In the Naval Archives are numerous letters from Mac- donough, in which he states continually that, as fast as they arrive, he substitutes sailors for the soldiers with which the vessels were originally manned. Men were continually being sent ashore on account of sickness. In the Bureau of Navi- gation is the log-book of "sloop of war Surprise, Captain Robert Henly" {Surprise was the name the Eagle originally went by). It mentions from time to time that men were buried and sent ashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore on September 2d) ; and finally mentions that the places of the absent were partially filled by a draft of twenty-one soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the day of battle are very brief. Naval War of 1812 117 350. The exact proportions in which this force was distributed among the gunboats cannot be told, but it may be roughly said to be 41 in each large galley, and 26 in each small one. The com- plement of the Saratoga was 210; of the Eagle 130, of the Ticonderoga, 100, and of the Preble, 30 ; but the first three had also a few soldiers distributed between them. The following list is probably pretty accurate as to the aggregate; but there may have been a score or two fewer men on the gunboats, or more on the larger vessels. MACDONOUGH S FORCE Name Tons Crew Saratoga 734 240 Eagle 500 150 Ticonderoga 350 112 Preble 80 30 Six gunboats 420 246 Four gunboats 160 104 Broadside 414 lbs. 264 180 252 48 Metal, from long or short guns j long, 96 \ short, 318 long, 72 short, 192 long, 84 short, 96 long, 36 j " 144 \ short, 108 long, 48 In all, fourteen vessels of 2244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing at a broadside 11 94 lbs. of shot — 480 from long, and 714 from short guns. The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately, as most of it was cap- ii8 Naval War of 1 8i 2 tured. The Confiance rated for years in our lists as a frigate of the class of the Constellation, Congress, and Macedonian; she was thus of over 1200 tons. (Cooper says more, "nearly double the tonnage of the Saratoga.") She carried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She did not have a complete spar-deck; on her poop which came forward to the mizzen-mast, were two 3 2 -pound (or possibly 4 2 -pound) carronades, and on her spacious topgallant forecastle were four 32- (or 42-) pound carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot.' She had aboard her a furnace for heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot were found with the furnace.^ This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage. The Linnet, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same size as the Ticonderoga, mounting sixteen long 12's. The Chubb and Finch, Lieutenants James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly the American sloops Growler and Eagle, of 112 and no tons, respectively. The former mounted ' This is her armament as given by Cooper, on the authority of Lieut. E. A. F. Lavallette, who was in charge of her for three months, and went aboard her ten minutes after the Linnet struck. ^ James stigmatizes the statement of Commodore Mac- donough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehood as ever was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, and it appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his part. Every American officer who went aboard the Confiance saw the furnace and the hot shot. Naval War of i8i 2 119 ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the latter six 18-pound carronades, four long 6's, and one short 18. There were twelve gunboats.' Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; three mounted a long 24 and a 3 2 -pound carronade each; one mounted a long 18 and a 3 2 -pound carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven were smaller, of about 40 tons each ; three of these carried each a long 18, and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There is greater difficulty in finding out the number of men in the Brit- ish fleet. American historians are unanimous in stating it at from 1000 to 1 100 ; British historians never do anything but copy James blindly. Mid- shipman Lee of the Confiance, in a letter (already quoted) published in the London Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxii., p. 292, gives her crew as 300; but more than this amount of dead and prisoners were taken out of her. The number given her by Commander Ward, in his Naval Tactics, is probably nearest right — 325.^ The Linnet had about 125 men, and the Chitbb and Finch about 50 men each. According to Admiral ' Letter of General George Prevost, September ii, 1814. All the American accounts say 13 ; the British official accotmt had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no author- ity; he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things connected with this action. "James gives her but 270 men, without stating his au- thority. I20 Naval War of 1812 Paulding (given by Lossing, in his Field-Book of the War of 18 12, p. 868) their gunboats averaged 50 men each. This is probably true, as they were manned largely by soldiers, any number of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost's great army; but it may be best to consider the large ones as having 41, and the small 26 men, which were the complements of the American gunboats of the same sizes. The following, then, is the force of downie's squadron From what guns. Name Tonnage Crew Broadside long or short Confiance z 300 3^5 480 lbs. | l^J;^ 384 Linnet 350 125 96 " long, 96 ^^^"^^ "^ so 96 " ]^^^^^^ ^^ Finch no 50 84 " j^?."^; '" I short, 72 ■^- , . .. j long, 12 Five gunboats 350 205 254 "j short, 72 Seven gunboats.... 280 182 182 " ] g^ort 128 In all, 16 vessels, of about 2402 tons, with 937 men,' and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a broad- side 1 192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 from short pieces. These are widely different from the figures that ^ About ; there were probably more rather than less. Naval War of 1 812 121 appear in the pages of most British historians, from Sir Archibald Ahson down and up. Thus, in the History of the British Navy, by C. D. Yonge (already quoted), it is said that on Lake Cham- plain "our (the British) force was manifestly and vastly inferior, . . . their (the American) broadside outweighing ours in more than the pro- portion of three to two, while the difference in their tonnage and in the number of their crews was still more in their favor." None of these historians, or quasi-historians, have made the faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves, following James's figures with blind reliance, and, accordingly, it is only necessary to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman ends his ac- count (Naval Occurrences, p. 424) by remarking that Macdonough wrote as he did because "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood with currency equal to a pious expression, . . . his falsehoods equalling in number the lines of his letter." These remarks are interesting as showing the unbiassed and truthful character of the author, rather than for any particular weight they will have in influencing any one's judgment on Commodore Macdonough. James gives the engaged force of the British as "eight vessels, of 1426 tons, with 537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the force down to this, he first excludes the Finch, because she "grounded 122 Naval War of 1812 opposite an American battery before the engage- ment commenced," which reads especially well in connection with Captain Pring's official letter: " Lieutenant Hicks, of the Finch, had the morti- fication to strike on a reef of rocks to the east- ward of Crab Island about the middle of the engagement y ' What James means cannot be im- agined ; no stretch of language will convert " about the middle of" into "before." The Finch struck on the reef in consequence of having been disabled and rendered helpless by the fire from the Ticon- deroga. Adding her force to James's statement (counting her crew only as he gives it), we get nine vessels, 1536 tons, 577 men, 849 lbs. of shot. James also excludes five gunboats, because they ran away almost as soon as the action com- menced (vol. vi., p. 501). This assertion is by no means equivalent to the statement in Captain Pring's letter "that the flotilla of gunboats had abandoned the object assigned to them," and, if it was, it would not warrant his excluding the five gunboats. Their flight may have been dis- graceful, but they formed part of the attacking force, nevertheless ; almost any general could say that he had won against superior numbers if he refused to count in any of his own men whom he suspected of behaving badly. James gives his ten I The italics are mine. The letter is given in full in the Naval Chronicle. Naval War of 1 812 123 gunboats 294 men and 13 guns (two long 24's, five long i8's, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them average 45 tons; adding on the five he leaves out, we get 14 vessels of 1761 tons, with 714 men, throwing at a broadside 1025 lbs. of shot (591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Prevost, in the letter already quoted, says there were 12 gunboats, and the American accounts say more. Supposing the two gunboats James did not include at all to be equal, respec- tively to one of the largest and one of the smallest of the gunboats, as he gives them (Naval Occur- rences, p. 417) — that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24, and a 3 2 -pound carronade, the other, 25 men and a 3 2 -pound carronade — we get for Downie's force 16 vessels, of 185 1 tons, with 774 men, throwing at a broadside 11 13 lbs. of shot (615 from long guns, 498 from carronades). It must be remembered that so far I have merely corrected James by means of the authorities from which he draws his account — the official letters of the British commanders. I have not brought up a single American authority against him, but have only made such alterations as a writer could with nothing whatever but the accounts of Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him to compare with James. Thus it is seen that, accord- ing to James himself, Downie really had 774 men to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broadside 124 Naval War of 1812 1 1 13 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 11 94 lbs. James says {Naval Occurrences, pp. 410, 413): " Let it be recollected, no musketry was employed on either side," and "The marines were of no use, as the action was fought out of the range of musketry"; the 106 additional men on the part of the Americans were thus not of much conse- quence, the action being fought at anchor, and there being men enough to manage the guns and perform every other duty. So we need only at- tend to the broadside force. Here, then, Downie could present at a broadside 615 lbs. of shot from long guns to Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs. from carronades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. of shot more from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. This is equivalent to Downie 's having seven long i8's and one long 9, and Macdonough's having one 24-pound and six 3 2 -pound carronades. A 3 2 -pound carronade is not equal to a long 18; so that even by James's own showing Downie' s force was slightly the superior. Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James solely by the evidence of his own side; now I shall bring in some American authorities. These do not contradict the British official letters, for they virtually agree with them ; but they do go against James's unsupported assertions, and, being made by naval officers of irreproachable reputa- tion, will certainly outweigh them. In the first Naval War of 1 812 125 place, James asserts that on the main-deck of the Confiance but 13 guns were presented in broadside, two 3 2 -pound carronades being thrust through the bridle-, and two others through the stem-ports ; so he excludes two of her guns from the broadside. Such guns would have been of great use to her at certain stages of the combat, and ought to be included in the force. But be- sides this, the American officers positively say- that she had a broadside of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and making a trifling change in the arrangement of the guns in the row-gallies, we get a broadside of 1192 lbs., exactly as I have given it above. There is no dilBculty in accounting for the difference of tonnage as given by James and by the Americans, for we have con- sidered the same subject in reference to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the American tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, as regards the British vessels, he allows for the shallow holds that all the lake craft had; that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other the real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the dis- crepancy. It only remains to account for the difference in the number of men. From James we can get 772. In the first place, we can reason by analogy. I have already shown that, as re- gards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted (by English, not by American, evidence) of having 126 Naval War of 1812 underestimated Barclay's force by about 25 per cent. If he did the same thing here, the Brit- ish force was over 1000 strong, and I have no doubt that it was. But we have other proofs. On p. 417 of Naval Occurrences he says the com- plement of the four captured British vessels amounted to 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners, including the wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given by the American authorities, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or but slightly wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other wounded whose number was unspecified. Supposing this number to have been 82, and adding 54 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four ships, the number I have adopted in my list. This would make the British wounded 129 instead of 116, as James says; but neither the Americans nor the British seem to have enumerated all their wounded in this fight. Taking into account all these con- siderations, it will be seen that the figures I have given are probably approximately correct, and, at any rate, indicate pretty closely the relative strength of the two squadrons. The slight differ- ences in tonnage and crews (158 tons and 55 men, in favor of the British) are so trivial that they need not be taken into account and we will merely consider the broadside force. In absolute weight of metal, the two combatants were evenly Naval War of 1812 127 matched — almost exactly; but, whereas from Downie's broadside of 1192 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough's broadside of 1194 lbs. but 480 were from long and 714 from short pieces. The forces were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180 lbs. from long guns to 182 from carronades; as if ten long i8's were opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This would make the odds on their face about 10 to 9 against the Americans ; in reality they were greater, for the possession of the Confiance was a very great advantage. The action is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those between Chauncy and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Bur- lington on September 28, 181 3. Yeo's broadside was 1374 lbs. to Chauncy 's 1288; but whereas only 180 of Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's but 536 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus much the superior. At least, we must say this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force, then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before an inferior foe; but if we contend that Macdonough' s force was inferior to that of his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo's was in like manner inferior to Chauncy's. These rules work both ways. The Confiance was a heav- ier vessel than the Pike, presenting in broadside one long 24- and three 3 2 -pound carronades more than the latter. James (vol. vi., p. 355) says: 128 Naval War of 1812 " The Pike alone was nearly a match for Sir James Yeo's squadron," and Brenton says (vol. ii., 503): "The General Pike was more than a match for the whole British squadron." Neither of these writers means quite as much as he says, for the logical result would be that the Confiance alone was a match for all of Macdonough's force. Still, it is safe to say that the Pike gave Chauncy a great advantage, and that the Confiance made Downie's fleet much superior to Macdonough's. Macdonough saw that the British would be forced to make the attack in order to get the control of the waters. On this long, narrow lake the winds usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the set of the current is of course northward ; all the vessels, being fiat and shahow, could not beat to windward well, so there was little chance of the British making the attack when there was a southerly wind blowing. So late in the season there was danger of sudden and furious gales, which would make it risky for Downie to wait outside the bay till the wind suited him; and inside the bay the wind was pretty sure to be light and baffling. Young Mac- donough (then but twenty-eight years of age) cal- culated all these chances very coolly and decided to await the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line so far to the north that it could hardly be turned ; and then proceeded to Naval War of 1812 129 make all the other preparations with the same foresight. Not only were his vessels provided with springs, but also with anchors to be used astern in any emergency. The Saratoga was fur- ther prepared for a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding ship, by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawser and preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading from each quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not been time to train the men thoroughly at the guns; and to make these produce their full effect the constant supervision of the officers had to be exerted. The British were laboring imder this same disadvan- tage, but neither side felt the want very much, as the smooth water, stationary position of the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both sides very destructive. Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the south- ward; so that a wind which would enable the British to sail up the lake would force them to beat when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth of the bay is formed by Cumberland Head; the entrance is about a mile and a half across, and the other botmdary, southwest from the Head, is an extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is called Crab Island, and on it was a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which was to be manned, in case of necessity, by the strongest i^o Naval War of 1812 patients. Macdonough had anchored in a north- and-south hne a httle to the south of the outlet of the Saranac, and out of range of the shore bat- teries, being two miles from the western shore. The head of his line was so near Cumberland Head that an attempt to turn it would place the op- ponent under a very heavy fire, while to the south the shoal prevented a flank attack. The Eagle lay to the north, flanked on each side by a couple of gunboats; then came the Saratoga, with three gunboats between her and the Ticonderoga, the next in line; then came three gunboats and the Preble. The four large vessels were at anchor; the gallies being under their sweeps and forming a second line about forty yards back, some of them keeping their places and some not doing so. By this arrangement his line could not be doubled upon, there was not room to anchor on his broad- side out of reach of his carronades, and the enemy was forced to attack him by standing in bows on. The morning of September nth opened with a light breeze from the northeast. Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came down the lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloops swinging out to starboard. At half- past seven,' the people in the ships could see their ^ The letters of the two commanders conflict a little as to time, both absolutely and relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours and three quarters; the American accounts, Naval War of 1812 131 adversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending in Cumberland Head, before the Brit- ish doubled the latter. Captain Downie hove to with his four large vessels when he had fairly opened the bay, and waited for his gallies to over- take him. Then his four vessels filled on the star- board tack and headed for the American line, going abreast, the Chubb to the north, heading well to windward of the Eagle, for whose bows the Linnet was headed, while the Confiance was to be laid athwart the hawse of the Saratoga; the Finch was to leeward with the twelve gunboats, and was to engage the rear of the American line. As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared his foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes of perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy for the opening of the fight. The Eagle spoke first with her long i8's, but to no effect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the Linnet passed the Saratoga, she fired her broadside of long 12's, but her shot also fell short, except one that struck a hen-coop which happened to be aboard the Saratoga. There was a game-cock inside, and, instead of being frightened at his sudden re- two hours and twenty minutes. Pring says it began at 8.00; Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc. I take the mean time. 132 Naval War of 1812 lease, he jumped up on a gun-slide, clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. The men laughed and cheered ; and immediately afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shot from one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball struck the Confiance near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, killing and wounding several men. All the American long guns now opened and were replied to by the British gallies. The Confiance stood steadily on without reply- ing. But she was baffied by shifting winds, and was soon so cut up, having both her port bow- anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that she was obliged to port her helm and come to while still nearly a quarter of a mile distant from the Saratoga. Captain Downie came to anchor in grand style, — securing everything carefully be- fore he fired a gun, and then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. The Chubb and Linnet stood farther in, and anchored forward the Eagle's beam. Meanwhile, the Finch got abreast of the Ticonderoga, under her sweeps, supported by the gunboats. The main fighting was thus to take place between the vans, where the Eagle, Saratoga, and six or seven gunboats were engaged with the Chtibb, Linnet, Confiance, and two or three gunboats ; while, in the rear, the Ticonderoga, the Preble, and the other American gallies en- gaged the Finch and the remaining nine or ten Naval War of 1812 133 00 English gallies. The battle at the foot of the line was fought on the part of the Americans to prevent their flank being turned, and on the part of the British to effect that object. At first, the fighting was at long range, but gradually the Brit- ish gallies closed up, firing very well. The Amer- ican gallies at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones, armed with one 12 -pounder apiece, and they by degrees drew back before the heavy- fire of their opponents. About an hour after the discharge of the first gun had been fired, the Finch closed up toward the Ticonderoga, and was com- pletely crippled by a couple of broadsides from the latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and grounded near Crab Island; some of the con- valescent patients manned the 6-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearly half of her crew being killed or wounded. About the same time the British gunboats forced the Preble out of line, whereupon she cut her cable and drifted inshore out of the fight. Two or three of the British gunboats had already been suffi- ciently damaged by some of the shot from the Ticonderoga' s long guns to make them wary; and the contest at this part of the line narrowed down to one between the American schooner and the re- maining British gunboats, who combined to make a most determined attack upon her. So hastily had the squadron been fitted out that many of 134 Naval War of 1812 the matches for her guns were at the last mo- ment found to be defective. The captain of one of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years old, Hiram Paulding. When he found the matches to be bad he fired the guns of his section by having pistols flashed at them, and continued this through the whole fight. The Ticonderoga' s commander, Lieutenant Cassin, fought his schooner most nobly. He kept walking the taffrail amidst showers of musketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of the gallies, and directing the guns to be loaded with canister and bags of bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The British gal- lies were handled with determined gallantry, under the command of Lieutenant Bell. Had they driven off the Ticonderoga they would have won the day for their side, and they pushed up till they were not a boat-hook's length distant, to try to carry her by boarding; but every attempt was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, some of them so crippled by the slaughter they had suffered that they could hardly man the oars. Meanwhile, the fighting at the head of the line had been even fiercer. The first broadside of the Confiance, fired from sixteen long 24's, double- shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point- blank range, produced the most terrible effect on the Saratoga. Her hull shivered all over with the shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half of Naval War of 1812 135 her people were seen stretched on deck, for many had been knocked down who were not seriously hurt. Among the slain was her first lieutenant, Peter Gamble ; he was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun, when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a portion of it against his side, killing him without breaking the skin. The sur- vivors carried on the fight with undiminished energy. Macdonough himself worked like a com- mon sailor, in pointing and handling a favorite gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot cut in two the spanker-boom, which fell on his head and struck him senseless for two or three minutes ; he then leaped to his feet and continued as before, when a shot took off the head of the cap- tain of the gun and drove it in his face with such a force as to knock him to the other side of the deck. But after the first broadside not so much injury was done; the guns of the Confiance had been levelled to point-blank range, and as the quoins were loosened by the successive discharges they were not properly replaced, so that her broad- sides kept going higher and higher and doing less and less damage. Very shortly after the begin- ning of the action her gallant captain was slain. He was standing behind one of the long guns when a shot from the Saratoga struck it and threw it completely off the carriage against his right groin, killing him almost instantly. His skin was not 136 Naval War of 181 2 broken; a black mark, about the size of a small plate, was the only visible injury. His watch was found flattened, with its hands pointing to the very second at which he received the fatal blow. As the contest went on, the fire gradually decreased in weight, the guns being disabled. The inexperience of both crews partly caused this. The American sailors overloaded their carronades so as to very much destroy the effect of their fire ; when the officers became disabled, the men would cram the guns with shot till the last projected from the muzzle. Of course, this lessened the execution, and also gradually crippled the guns. On board the Confiance the confusion was even worse: after the battle the charges of the guns were drawn, and on the side she had fought one was found with a canvas bag containing two round of shot rammed home and wadded without any powder; another with two cartridges and no shot ; and a third with a wad below the cartridge. At the extreme head of the line, the advantage had been with the British. The Chubb and Linnet had begun a brisk engagement with the Eagle and American gunboats. In a short time the Chubb had her cable, bowsprit, and main-boom shot away, drifted within the American lines, and was taken possession of by one of the Saratoga's mid- shipmen. The Linnet paid no attention to the American gunboats, directing her whole fire Naval War of 1 812 137 against the Eagle, and the latter was, in addition, exposed to part of the fire of the Confiance. After keeping up a heavy fire for a long time her springs were shot away, and she came up into the wind, hanging so that she could not return a shot to the well-directed broadsides of the Linnet. Henly ac- cordingly cut his cable, started home his topsails, ran down, and anchored by the stem between the inshore of the Confiance and Ticonderoga, from which position he opened on the Confiance. The Linnet now directed her attention to the American gunboats, which at this end of the line were very well fought, but he soon drove them off, and then sprung her broadside so as to rake the Saratoga on her bows. Macdonough by this time had his hands full, and his fire was slackening; he was bearing the whole brunt of the action, with the frigate on his beam and the brig raking him. Twice his ship had been set on fire by the hot shot of the Con- fiance; one by one his long guns were disabled by shot, and his carronades were either treated the same way or else rendered useless by excessive overcharging. Finally, but a single carronade was left in the starboard batteries, and on firing it the naval-bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage and fell down the main hatch, leaving the commodore without a single gun to oppose to the few the Confiance still presented. The battle would have 138 Naval War of 181 2 been lost had not Macdonough's foresight pro- vided the means of retrieving it. The anchor suspended astern of the Saratoga was let go, and the men hauled in on the hawser that led to the starboard quarter, bringing the ship's stern up over the kedge. The ship now rode by the kedge and by a line that had been bent to a bight in the stream cable, and she was raked badly by the accurate fire of the Linnet. By rousing on the line the ship was at length got so far round that the aftermost gun of the port broadside bore on the Confiance. The men had been sent forward to keep as much out of harm's way as possible, and now some were at once called back to man the piece, which then opened with effect. The next gun was treated in the same manner ; but the ship now hung and would go no farther round. The hawser leading from the port quarter was then got forward under the bows and passed aft to the starboard quarter, and a minute afterward the ship's whole port battery opened with fatal effect. The Confiance meanwhile had also attempted to round. Her springs, like those of the Linnet, were on the starboard side, and so of course could not be shot away as the Eagle's were ; but, as she had nothing but springs to rely on, her efforts did little beyond forcing her forward, and she hung with her head to the wind. She had lost over half of her crew, most of her guns on the engaged side Naval War of 1812 139 were dismounted, and her stout masts had been splintered till they looked like bundles of matches ; her sails had been torn to rags, and she was forced to strike, about two hours after she had fired the first broadside.' Without pausing a minute, the Saratoga again hauled on her starboard hawser till her broadside was sprung to bear on the Linnet, and the ship and brig began a brisk fight, which the Eagle from her position could take no part in, while the Ticonderoga was just finishing up the British gallies. The shattered and disabled state of the Linnet's masts, sails, and yards precluded the most distant hope of Captain Pring's effecting his escape by cutting his cable ; but he kept up a most gallant fight with his greatly superior foe, in hopes that some of the gunboats would come and tow him off, and despatched a lieutenant to the Confiance to ascertain her state. The lieu- tenant returned with news of Captain Downie's death, while the British gunboats had been driven half a mile off ; and, after having maintained the fight single-handed for fifteen minutes, until, from the number of shot between wind and water, the water had risen a foot above her lower deck, the plucky little brig hauled down her colors, and the fight ended, a little over two hours and a half ^ Midshipman Lee, in his letter already quoted, says "not five men were left unhurt"; this would, of course, include bruises, etc., as hurts. HO Naval War of 1812 after the first gun had been fired. Not one of the larger vessels had a mast that would bear canvas, and the prizes were in a sinking condition. The British gallies drifted to leeward, none with their colors up; but as the Saratoga's boarding-officer passed along the deck of the Confiance he acci- dentally ran against a lock-string of one of her starboard guns,' and it went off. This was ap- parently understood as a signal by the gallies, and they moved slowly off, pulling but a very few sweeps, and not one of them hoisting an ensign. On both sides the ships had been cut up in the most extraordinary manner; the Saratoga had 55 shot-holes in her hull, and the Confiance 105 in hers, and the Eagle and Linnet had suffered in propor- tion. The number of killed and wounded cannot be exactly stated; it was probably about 200 on the American side, and over 300 on the British.^ ' A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James's assertion that the guns of the Confiance had to be fired by matches, as the gun-locks did not fit! ^ Macdonough returned his loss as follows: Killed Wounded Saratoga 28 29 Eagle 13 20 Ticonderoga 6 6 Preble 2 Boxer 3 1 Centipede i Wilmer i A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded; but the latter had Naval War of 1812 141 Captain Macdonough at once returned the British officers their swords. Captain Pring writes: " I have much satisfaction in making you acquainted with the humane treatment the wounded have received from Commodore Mac- donough ; they were immediately removed to his own hospital on Crab Island, and furnished with every requisite. His generous and polite atten- tion to myself, the officers, and men, will ever hereafter be gratefully remembered." The effects apparently only included those who had to go to the hospital. Probably about 90 additional were more or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring, in his letter of September 12th, says the Confiance had 41 killed and 40 wounded; the Linnet, 10 killed and 14 wounded; the Chubb, 6 killed and 16 wounded; the Fincli, 2 wounded: in all, 57 killed and 72 wounded. But he adds "that no opportunity has offered to muster . . . this is the whole as yet ascertained to be killed or wounded." The Americans took out 180 dead and wounded from the Confiance, 50 from the Linnet, and 40 from the Chubb and Finch; in all, 270. James (Naval Occur- rences, p. 412) says the Confiance had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his letter in Plattsburg Bay the day after the action, he of course could not give the loss aboard the British gunboats; so James at once assumed that they suffered none. As well as could be found out, they had be- tween 50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss was between 300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. For this action, as already shown, James is of no use whatever. Compare his statements, for example, with those of Mid- shipman Lee, in the Naval Chronicle. The comparative loss, as a means of testing the competitive prowess of the com- batants, is not of much consequence in this case, as the weaker party in point of force conquered. 142 Naval War of 1812 of the victory were immediate and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army at once fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving our northern frontier clear for the remainder of the war ; while the victory had a very great effect on the negotiations for peace. In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery, and left nothing to be de- sired in this respect ; but from their rawness they of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of the American and some of the British ocean cruisers, such as the Constitution, United States, or Shannon, the Hornet, Wasp, or Reindeer. Lieutenant Cassin handled the Ticonderoga, and Captain Pring the Linnet, with the utmost gal- lantry and skill, and, after Macdonough, they divided the honors of the day. But Macdonough in this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war, British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contend against, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a par in every respect ; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource that we won the vic- tory. He forced the British to engage at a dis- advantage by his excellent choice of position; and he prepared beforehand for every possible contingency. His personal prowess had already been shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in this action he helped fight the guns as ably as Naval War of 1812 14: the best sailor. His skill, seamanship, quick eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck, are beyond all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War, he is the greatest figure in our naval history. A thoroughly religious man, he was as generous and humane as he was skilful and brave; one of the greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a stainless name behind him. BRITISH LOSS Name Tons Guns Brig 100 10 Magnet 187 12 Black Snake 30 i Gunboat 50 2 50 3 Confiance 1200 37 Linnet 350 16 Chubb 112 II Finch no 11 9 vessels 2189 103 AMERICAN LOSS Name Tons Guns Growler 81 7 Boat 50 2 Tigress 96 i Scorpion 86 2 Ohio 94 I Somers 98 2 6 vessels 505 15 Remarks Burnt by Lieut. Gregory. Burnt by her crew. Captured. Remarks Captured. CHAPTER III 1815 CONCLUDING OPERATIONS President captured by Captain Hayes's squadron — Success- ful cutting-out expeditions of the Americans — Privateer brig Chasseur captures St. Lawrence schooner— Constitution cap- tures Cyane and Levant — Escapes from a British squadron — The Hornet captures the Penguin, and escapes froin a 74 — The Peacock and the Nautilus — Summary — Remarks on the war— Tables of comparative loss, etc. — Compared with re- sults of Anglo-French struggle. THE treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain was signed at Ghent, December 24, 18 14, and ratified at Washington, February 18, 18 15. But during these first two months of 181 5, and until the news reached the cruisers on the ocean, the war- fare went on with much the same characteristics as before. The blockading squadrons continued standing on and off before the ports containing warships with the same unwearying vigilance ; but the ice and cold prevented any attempts at harry- ing the coast except by the few frigates scattered along the shores of the Carolinas and Georgia. There was no longer any formidable British fleet 144 Naval War of 1812 145 in the Chesapeake or Delaware, while at New Orleans the only available naval force of the Americans consisted of a few small row-boats, with which they harassed the rear of the retreating British. The Constitution, Captain Stewart, was already at sea, having put out from Boston on the 1 7th of December, while the blockading squadron (composed of the same three frigates she subse- quently encountered) was temporarily absent. The Hornet, Captain Biddle, had left the port of New London, running in heavy weather through the blockading squadron, and had gone into New York, where the President, Commodore Decatur, and Peacock, Captain Warrington, with the Tom Bowline, brig, were already assembled, intending to start on a cruise for the East Indies. The blockading squadron off the port consisted of the 56-gun razee Majestic, Captain Hayes; 24-pounder frigate Endymion, Captain Hope; i8-pounder frigate Pomone, Captain Lumly; and i8-pounder frigate Tenedos, Captain Parker.' On the 14th of January, a severe snow-storm came on and blew the squadron off the coast. Next day it moderated, and the ships stood off to the north- west to get into the track which they supposed the Americans would take if they attempted to put out in the storm. Singularly enough, at the in- stant of arriving at the intended point, an hour ^ Letter of Rear- Admiral Hotham, January 23, 181 5. VOL. 11. — 10 146 Naval War of 181 2 before daylight on the 1 5th, Sandy Hook bearing W.N.W. 15 leagues, a ship was made out on the Majestic's weather-bow, standing S.E.' This ship was the unlucky President. On the evening of the 14th she had left her consorts at anchor, and put out to sea in a gale. But by a mistake of the pilots, who were to place boats to beacon the passage, the frigate struck on the bar, where she beat heavily for an hour and a half,^ spring- ing her masts and becoming very much hogged and twisted.^ Owing to the severity of her in- juries, the President would have put back to port, but was prevented by the westerly gale/ Ac- cordingly, Decatur steered at first along Long Island then shaped his course to the S.E., and in the dark ran into the British squadron, which, but for his unfortunate accident, he would have escaped. At daylight, the President, which had hauled up and passed to the northward of her opponents, 5 found herself with the Majestic and Endymion astern, the Pomone on the port, and the Tenedos on the starboard quarter.^ The chase now became very interesting.^ During the early part of the day, while the wind was still strong, the Majestic led the Endymion and fired occasion- ^ Letter of Captain Hayes, January 17, 18 15. ' Letter of Commodore Decatur, January 18, 18 15. 3 Report of Court-martial, Alex. Murray presiding, April 20,1815. 4 Decatur's letter, January 1 8th. ^ Ibid. 6 James, vi., 529. 7 Letter of Captain Hayes. Naval War of 1 812 147 ally at the President, but without effect.' The Pomone gained faster than the others, but by- Captain Hayes's orders was signalled to go in chase of the Tenedos, whose character the captain could not make out ' ; and this delayed her several hours in the chase.^ In the afternoon, the wind coming out light and baffling, the Endymion left the Majestic behind,^ and, owing to the Presi- dent's disabled state and the amount of water she made in consequence of the injuries received while on the bar, gained rapidly on her,s although she lightened ship and did everything else that was possible to improve her sailing.'^ But a shift of wind helped the Endymion^ and the latter was able, at about 2.30, to begin skirmishing with her bow-chasers, answered by the stem-chasers of the President.^ At 5.30, the Endymion began close action," within half point-blank shot on the Presi- dent's starboard quarter, '° where not a gun of the latter could bear." The President continued in the same course, steering east by north, the wind being northwest, expecting the Endymion soon to come up abeam ; but the latter warily kept her ^ Letter of Commodore Decatur. ^ James, vi., 529. 3 Log of Pomone, published at Bermuda, January 29th, and quoted in full in the Naval Chronicle, xxxiii., 370. 4 Letter of Captain Hayes. s Letter of Decatur. ('Ibid. 7 Cooper, ii., 466. ?• 'Log oi Pomone. 9 Letter of Captain Hayes. ^° James, vi., 5.30. " Letter of Decatur. 148 Naval War of 181 2 position by yawing, so as not to close. ^ So things continued for half an hour, during which the President suffered more than during all the remainder of the combat/ At 6.00, the Presi- dent kept off, heading to the south, and the two adversaries ran abreast, the Americans using the starboard and the British the port batteries.^ Decatur tried to close with his antagonist, but whenever he hauled nearer to the latter she hauled off "^ and, being the swiftest ship, could of course evade him; so he was reduced to the necessity of trying to throw her out of the com- bat ^ by dismantling her. He was completely suc- cessful in this, and after two hours' fighting the Endymion's sails were all cut from her yards ^ and she dropped astern, the last shot being fired from the President/ The Endymion was now com- pletely silent,^ and Commodore Decatur did not board her merely because her consorts were too close astern ^ ; accordingly, the President hauled up again to try her chances at running, having even her royal studding-sails set,^° and exposed her stern to the broadside of the Endymion,^^ hut the latter did not fire a single gun.^^ Three hours ' Letter of Decatur. ^ Cooper, 470. 3 Log of Ponione. 4 Report of Court-martial, s Letter of Commodore Decatur. 6 Letter of Captain Hayes. 7 Log of Pomone. 8 Ibid. 9 Report of Court-martial. '° James, vi., 538. '' Letter of Commodore Decatur. '^ Log of Pomone. Naval War of 1 812 149 afterward, at 11,' the Ponione caught up with the President, and, luffing to port, gave her the star- board broadside ' ; the Tenedos being two cable lengths' distance astern, taking up a raking position.^ The Pomone poured in another broad- side, within musket-shot,'* when the President sur- rendered and was taken possession of by Captain Parker, of the Tenedos.^ A considerable num- ber of the President's people were killed by these last two broadsides.^ The Endymion was at this time out of sight astern. ^ She did not come up, according to one account, for an hour and three quarters,^ and according to another, for three hours ^ ; and as she was a faster ship than the President, this means that she was at least two hours motionless, repairing damages. Com- modore Decatur delivered his sword to Captain Hayes, of the Majestic, who returned it, stating in his letter that both sides had fought with great gallantry. '° The President having been taken by an entire squadron," the prize-money was divided ^ Letter of Captain Hayes. ^ Log of Pomone. 3 Decatur's letter. ^ Log of Pomone. 5 James, vi., 531. 6 Letter of Commodore Decatur, March 6, 181 5; deposi- tion of Chaplain Henry Robinson before Admiralty Court at St. George's, Bermuda, January, 1815. 7 Letter of Decatur, January 18th. S Log of Pomone. ' Letter of Decatur, March 6th. '° Letter of Captain Hayes. " Admiral Hotham's letter, January 23d. I50 Naval War of 1812 equally among the ships.' The President's crew, all told, consisted of 450 men,^ none of whom were British. 3 She had thus a hundred more men than her antagonist and threw about 100 pounds more shot at a broadside; but these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the injuries re- ceived on the bar, and by the fact that her powder was so bad that while some of the British shot went through both her sides, such a thing did not once happen to the Endymion,'^ when fairly hulled. The President lost 24 killed and 55 wounded s; the Endymion, 11 killed and 14 wounded.'' Two days afterward, on their way to the Bermudas, a violent easterly gale came on, during which both ships were dismasted, and the Endymion in addi- tion had to throw over all her spar-deck guns. 7 As can be seen, almost every sentence of this account is taken (very nearly word for word) from the various official reports, relying especially on the log of the British frigate Pomone. I have been thus careful to have every point of the narrative established by unimpeachable reference : first, be- cause there have been quite a number of British ^ Bermuda Royal Gazette, March 8, 1815. 2 Depositions of Lieutenant Gallagher and the other officers. 3 Deposition of Commodore Decatur. 4 Bermuda Royal Gazette, January 6, 18 18. 5 Decatur's letter. 6 Letter of Captain Hope, January 15, 1815. 7 James, vi., 534. Naval War of 1812 151 historians who have treated the conflict as if it were a victory and not a defeat for the Endymion; and in the second place, because I regret to say that I do not think that the facts bear out the assertions, on the part of most American authors, that Commodore Decatur "covered himself with glory" and showed the "utmost heroism." As regards the first point, Captain Hope himself, in his singularly short official letter, does little be- yond detail his own loss, and makes no claim to having vanquished his opponent. Almost all the talk about its being a "victory" comes from James; and in recounting this, as well as all the other battles, nearly every subsequent British historian simply gives James's statements over again, occasionally amplifying, but more often altering or omitting, the vituperation. The point at issue is simply this: Could a frigate which, according to James himself, went out of action with every sail set, take another frigate which, for two hours, according to the log of the Porno ne, lay motionless and unmanageable on the waters, without a sail? To prove that it could not, of course, needs some not overscrupulous manipu- lation of the facts. The intention with which James sets about his work can be gathered from the triumphant conclusion he comes to, that Decatur's name has been "sunk quite as low as that of Bainbridge or Porter," which, comparing 152 Naval War of 1812 small things to great, is somewhat like saying that Napoleon's defeat by Wellington and Blucher "sunk" him to the level of Hannibal. For the account of the American crew and loss, James relies on the statements made in the Bermuda papers, of whose subsequent forced retraction he takes no notice, and of course largely overesti- mates both. On the same authority, he states that the President's fire was "silenced," Commo- dore Decatur stating the exact reverse. The point is fortunately settled by the log of the Pomone, which distinctly says that the last shot was fired by the President. His last resort is to state that the loss of the President was fourfold (in reality threefold) that of the Endymion. Now we have seen that the President lost "a considerable num- ber" of men from the jfire of the Pomone. Esti- mating these at only nineteen, we have a loss of sixty caused by the Endymion, and as most of this was caused during the first half hour, when the President was not firing, it follows that while the two vessels were both fighting, broadside and broadside, the loss inflicted was about equal; or, the President, aiming at her adversary's rigging, succeeded in completely disabling her, and inci- dentally killed twenty-five men, while the En- dymion did not hurt the President's rigging at all, and, aiming at her hull, where, of course, the slaughter ought to have been far greater than Naval War of 1812 i 00 when the fire was directed aloft, only killed about the same number of men. Had there been no other vessels in chase, Commodore Decatur, his adversary having been thus rendered perfectly helpless, could have simply taken any position he chose and compelled the latter to strike, without suffering any material additional loss himself. As in such a case he would neither have endured the unanswered fire of the Endymion on his quarter for the first half hour, nor the subsequent broad- sides of the Pomone, the President's loss would probably have been no greater than that of the Constitution in taking the Java. It is difficult to see how any outsider with an ounce of common sense and fair-mindedness can help awarding the palm to Decatur, as regards the action with the Endymion. But I regret to say that I must agree with James that he acted rather tamely, certainly not heroically, in striking to the Pomone. There was, of course, not much chance of success in doing battle with two fresh frigates; but then they only mounted eighteen-pounders, and, judg- ing from the slight results of the cannonading from the Endymion and the first two (usually the most fatal) broadsides of the Pomone, it would have been rather a long time before they would have caused much damage. Meanwhile, the Presi- dent was pretty nearly as well off as ever as far as fighting and sailing went. A lucky shot might 154 Naval War of 1812 have disabled one of her opponents, and then the other would, in all probability, have undergone the same fate as the Endymion. At least it was well worth trying, and though Decatur could not be said to be disgraced, yet it is excusable to wish that Porter or Perry had been in his place. It is not very pleasant to criticise the actions of an American whose name is better known than that of almost any other single-ship captain of his time ; but if a man is as much to be praised for doing fairly, or even badly, as for doing excellently, then there is no use in bestowing praise at all. This is perhaps as good a place as any other to notice one or two of James's most common mis- statements ; they really would not need refutation were it not that they had been re-echoed, as usual, by almost every British historian of the war for the last sixty years. In the first place, James puts the number of the President'' s men at 475; she had 450. An exactly parallel reduction must often be made when he speaks of the force of an American ship. Then he says there were many British among them, which is denied under oath by the American officers; this holds good, also, for the other American frigates. He says there were but four boys ; there were nearly thirty ; and on p. 120 he says the youngest was fourteen, whereas we incidentally learn from the Life of De- catur that several were under twelve. A favorite Naval War of 1 812 155 accusation is that the American midshipmen were chiefly masters and mates of merchantmen; but this was hardly ever the case. Many of the mid- shipmen of the war afterward became celebrated commanders, and most of these (a notable in- stance being Farragut, the greatest admiral since Nelson) were entirely too young in 181 2 to have had vessels under them, and, moreover, came largely from the so-called "best families." Again, in the first two frigate actions of 181 2, the proportion of killed to wounded happened to be unusually large on board the American frigates ; accordingly, James states (p. 146) that the returns of the wounded had been garbled, underestimated, and made "subservient to the view^s of the com- manders and their government." To support his position that Captain Hull, who reported seven killed and seven wounded, had not given the list of the latter in full, he says that " an equal num- ber of killed and wounded, as given in the Ameri- can account, hardly ever occurs, except in cases of explosion"; and yet, on p. 519, he gives the loss of the British Hermes as 25 killed and 24 wounded, disregarding the incongruity involved. On p. 169, in noticing the loss of the United States, five killed and seven wounded, he says that " the slightly wounded as in all other American cases, are omitted." This is untrue, and the propor- tion on the United States, 5 to 7, is just about 156 Naval War of 181 2 the same as that given by James himself on the Endymion, 11 to 14, and Nautilus, 6 to 8. In supporting this theory, James brings up all the instances where the American wounded bore a larger proportion to their dead than on board the British ships, but passes over the actions with the Reindeer, Epcrvier, Penguin, Endymion, and Boxer, where the reverse was the case. One of James's most common methods of attempting to throw discredit on the much vilified " Yankees" is by quoting newspaper accounts of their wounded. Thus he says (p. 562) of the Hornet, that several of her men told some of the Penguin's sailors that she lost 10 men killed, 16 wounded, etc. Utterly false rumors of this kind were as often indulged in by the Americans as the British. After the capture of the President, articles occasionally ap- peared in the papers to the effect that some American sailor had counted "23 dead" on board the Endymion, that "more than 50" of her men were wounded, etc. Such statements were as commonly made and with as little foundation by one side as by the other, and it is absurd for a historian to take any notice of them. James does no worse than many of our own writers of the same date; but while their writings have passed into oblivion, his work is still often accepted as a standard. This must be my apology for devoting so much time to it. The severest criticism to Naval War of 1812 157 which it can possibly be subjected is to compare it with the truth. Whenever deaHng with purely- American affairs, James's history is as utterly un- trustworthy as its contemporary, Niles's Register, is in matters purely British, while both are in- valuable in dealing with things relating strictly to their own nation ; they supplement each other. On January 8th, General Packenham was de- feated and killed by General Jackson at New Orleans, the Lotiisiana and the seamen of the Caro- lina having their full share in the glory of the day, and Captain Henly being among the very few American wounded. On the same day, Sailing- master Johnson, with 28 men in two boats, cut out the British armed transport brig Cyprus, con- taining provisions and munitions of war, and manned by ten men.' On the i8th, the British abandoned the enterprise and retreated to their ships ; and Mr. Thomas Shields, a purser, formerly a sea-officer, set off to harass them while em- barking. At sunset, on the 20th, he left with five boats and a gig, manned in all with 53 men, and having under him Sailing-master Daily and Master's-mate Boyd.^ At 10 o'clock p.m., a large barge, containing 14 seamen and 40 officers and ^ Letter of Sailing-master Johnson, January 9, 181 5. ^ Letter of Thomas Shields to Com. Patterson, January 25. 1815. 158 Naval War of 181 2 men of the 14th Light Dragoons, was surprised and carried by boarding, after a slight struggle. The prisoners outnumbering their captors, the latter returned to shore, left them in a place of safety, and again started at 2 a.m. on the morn- ing of the 2 2d. Numerous transports and barges of the enemy could be seen, observing very little order and apparently taking no precautions against attack, which they probably did not apprehend. One of the American boats captured a transport and five men; another, containing Mr. Shields himself and eight men, carried by boarding, after a short resistance, a schooner carrying ten men. The flotilla then reunited and captured, in suc- cession, with no resistance, five barges containing 70 men. By this time the alarm had spread and they were attacked by six boats, but these were repelled with some loss. Seven of the prisoners (who were now half as many again as their cap- tors) succeeded in escaping in the smallest prize. Mr. Shields returned with the others, 78 in num- ber. During the entire expedition he had lost but three men, wounded; he had taken 132 pris- oners, and destroyed eight craft, whose aggregate tonnage about equalled that of the five gunves- sels taken on Lake Borgne. On January 30, 181 5, information was received by Captain Dent, commanding at North Edisto, Ga., that a party of British officers and men, in Naval War of 1 812 159 four boats belonging to H. M. S. Hebrus, Captain Palmer, were watering at one of the adjacent islands.' Lieutenant Lawrence Kearney, with three barges containing about 75 men, at once proceeded outside to cut them off, when the militia drove them away. The frigate was at anchor out of gunshot, but as soon as she per- ceived the barges began firing guns as signals. The British on shore left in such a hurry that they deserted their launch, which, containing a 12- pound boat carronade and six swivels, was taken by the Americans. The other boats — two cut- ters, and a large tender mounting one long 9 and carrying 30 men — made for the frigate; but Lieutenant Kearney laid the tender aboard and captured her after a sharp brush. The cutters were only saved by the fire of the Hebrus, which was very well directed — one of her shot taking off the head of a man close by Lieutenant Kearney. The frigate got under way and intercepted Kear- ney's return, but the Lieutenant then made for South Edisto, whither he carried his prize in triumph. This was one of the most daring ex- ploits of the war, and was achieved at very small cost. On February 14th, a similar feat was per- formed. Lieutenant Kearney had manned the ''Letter of Lawrence Kearney of January 30, 1815 (see in the Archives at Washington, Captains' Letters, vol. xlii., No. 100). i6o Naval War of 1812 captured launch with 25 men and the 12 -pound carronade. News was received of another harry- ing expedition undertaken by the British, and Captain Dent, with seven boats, put out to attack them, but was unable to cross the reef. Mean- while, Kearney's barge had gotten outside, and at- tacked the schooner Brant, a tender to H. M. S Severn, mounting an i8-pounder, and with a crew of two midshipmen and twenty-one marines and seamen. A running fight began, the Brant evi- dently fearing that the other boats might get across the reef and join in the attack; suddenly she ran aground on a sand-bank, which accident totally demoralized her crew. Eight of them escaped, in her boat, to the frigate ; the remaining fifteen, after firing a few shot, surrendered and were taken possession of.' I have had occasion from time to time to speak of cutting-out expeditions, successful and other- wise, undertaken by British boats against Amer- ican privateers ; and twice a small British national cutter was captured by an overwhelmingly su- ' Letter of Captain Dent, February i6th (in Captains' Letters, vol. xlii., No. 130). Most American authors, headed by Cooper, give this exploit a more vivid coloring by increas- ing the crew of the Brant to forty men, omitting to mention that she was hard and fast aground, and making no allusion to the presence of the five other American boats, which un- doubtedly caused the Brant's flight in the first place. Naval War of 1812 161 perior American opponent of this class. We now, for the only time, come across an engagement between a privateer and a regular cruiser of ap- proximately equal force. These privateers came from many different ports and varied greatly in size. Baltimore produced the largest number ; but New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Salem were not far behind ; and Charleston, Bristol, and Ply- mouth supplied some that were very famous. Many were merely small pilot-boats with a crew of 20 to 40 men, intended only to harry the West Indian trade. Others were large, powerful craft, unequalled for speed by any vessels of their size, which penetrated to the remotest corners of the ocean, from Man to the Spice Islands. When a privateer started she was overloaded with men, to enable her to man her prizes; a successful cruise would reduce her crew to a fifth of its orig- inal size. The favorite rig was that of a schooner, but there were many brigs and brigantines. Each was generally armed with a long 24 or 32 on a pivot, and a number of light guns in broadside, either long 9's or short i8's or 12's. Some had no pivot gun, others had nothing else. The largest of them carried seventeen guns (a pivotal 32 and sixteen long 12's in broadside) with a crew of 150. Such a vessel ought to have been a match, at her own distance, for a British brig-sloop, but we never hear of any such engagements, and there 1 62 Naval War of 1812 were several instances where privateers gave up, without firing a shot, to a force superior, it is true, but not enough so to justify the absolute tameness of the surrender.' One explanation of this was that they were cruising as private ventures, and their object was purely to capture merchantmen with as little risk as possible to themselves. An- other reason was that they formed a kind of sea- militia, and, like their compeers on land, some could fight as well as any regulars, while most would not fight at all, especially if there was need of concerted action between two or three. The American papers of the day are full of "glorious victories" gained by privateers over packets and Indiamen ; the British papers are almost as full of instances where the packets and Indiamen "hero- ically repulsed" the privateers. As neither side ever chronicles a defeat, and as the narration is apt to be decidedly figurative in character, there is very little hope of getting at the truth of such meetings ; so I have confined myself to the men- tion of those cases where privateers, of either side, came into armed collision with regular cruisers. We are then sure to find some authentic ac- count. The privateer brig Chasseur, of Baltimore, Cap- 'As when the Epervier, some little time before her own capture, took without resistance the Alfred, of Salem, mount- ing 16 long nines and having io8 men aboard. Naval War of 1812 16 J tain Thomas Boyle, carried sixteen long 12's, and had, when she left port, 115 men aboard. She made eighteen prizes on her last voyage, and her crew was thus reduced to less than 80 men; she was then chased by the Barossa, frigate, and threw overboard ten of her long 12's. Afterward, eight 9-pound carronades were taken from a prize, to partially supply the places of the lost guns; but as she had no shot of the calibre of these carro- nades, each of the latter was loaded with one 4-pound and one 6-pound ball, giving her a broad- side of 76 lbs. On the 26th of February, two leagues from Havana, the Chasseur fell in with the British schooner St. Lawrence, Lieut. H. C. Gordon, mounting twelve 12 -pound carronades, and one long 9; her broadside was thus 81 lbs., and she had between 60 and 80 men aboard.^ The Chasseur mistook the St. Lawrence for a merchant- man and closed with her. The mistake was dis- covered too late to escape, even had such been ^ Letter of Captain Thomas Boyle, of March 2, 1S15 (see Niles and Coggeshall) ; he says the schooner had two more carronades; I have taken the number given by James (p. 539). Captain Boyle says the St. Lawrence had on board 89 men and several more, including a number of soldiers and marines and gentlemen of the navy, as passengers; James says her crew amounted to 5 1 "exclusive of some passengers," which I suppose must mean at least nine men. So the forces were pretty equal; the Chasseur may have had 20 men more or less than her antagonist, and she threw from 5 to 21 lbs. less weight of shot. 1 64 Naval War of 1812 Captain Boyle's intention, and a brief but bloody action ensued. At 1.26 p.m., the St. Lawrence fired the first broadside, within pistol-shot, to which the Chasseur replied with her great guns and musketry. The brig then tried to close, so as to board; but having too much way on, shot ahead under the lee of the schooner, which put her helm up to wear under the Chasseur's stem. Boyle, however, followed his antagonist's ma- noeuvre, and the two vessels ran along side by side, the St. Lawrence drawing ahead, while the firing was very heavy. Then Captain Boyle put his helm a-starboard and ran his foe aboard, when, in the act of boarding, her colors were struck at 1.41 P.M., fifteen minutes after the first shot. Of the Chasseur's crew 5 were killed and 8 wounded, in- cluding Captain Boyle slightly. Of the St. Law- rence's crew 6 were killed and 17 (according to James, 18) wounded. This was a very creditable action. The St. Lawrence had herself been an American privateer, called the Atlas, and was of 241 tons, or just 36 less than the Chasseur. The latter could thus fairly claim that her victory was gained over a regular cruiser of about her own force. Captain Southcomb of the Lottery, Captain Reid of the General Armstrong, Captain Ordronaux of the Neufchdtel, and Captain Boyle of the Chasseur deserve as much credit as any regularly com- missioned sea-officers. But it is a mistake to Naval War of 1 812 165 consider these cases as representing the average; an ordinary privateer was, naturally enough, no match for a British regular cruiser of equal force. The privateers were of incalculable benefit to us, and inflicted enormous damage on the foe ; but in fighting they suffered under the same disadvan- tages as other irregular forces ; they were utterly unreliable. A really brilliant victory would be followed by a most extraordinary defeat. After the Constitution had escaped from Boston, as I have described, she ran to the Bermudas, cruised in their vicinity a short while, thence to Madeira, to the Bay of Biscay, and finally off Por- tugal, cruising for some time in sight of the Rock of Lisbon. Captain Stewart then ran off south- west, and on February 20th, Madeira bearing W.S.W. 60 leagues,' the day being cloudy, with a light easterly breeze,^ at i p.m. a sail was made two points on the port bow; and at 2 p.m.. Captain Stewart, hauling up in chase, discovered another sail. The first of these was the frigate-built ship corvette Cyane, Captain Gordon Thomas Falcon, and the second was the ship-sloop Levant, Cap- tain the Honorable George Douglass.^ Both were ^ Letter of Captain Stewart to the Secretary of the Navy, May 20, 1815. ^ Log of Constitution, February 20, 1S15. 3 Naval Chronicle, xxxiii., 466. 1 66 Naval War of 1812 standing close-hauled on the starboard tack, the sloop about ten miles to leeward of the corvette. At 4 P.M. the latter began making signals to her consort that the strange sail was an enemy, and then made all sail before the wind to join the sloop. The Constitution bore up in chase, set- ting her topmast, topgallant, and royal studding- sails. In half an hour she carried away her main royal mast, but immediately got another prepared, and at 5 o'clock began firing at the corvette with the two port-bow guns ; as the shot fell short the firing soon ceased. At 5.30, the Cyane got within hail of the Levant, and the latter's gallant com- mander expressed to Captain Falcon his inten- tion of engaging the American frigate. The two ships accordingly hauled up their courses and stood on the starboard tack; but immediately afterward their respective captains concluded to try to delay the action till dark, so as to get the advantage of manoeuvring.' Accordingly they again set all sail and hauled close to the wind to endeavor to weather their opponent; but, finding the latter coming down too fast for them to suc- ceed, they again stripped to fighting canvas and formed on the starboard tack in head and stem line, the Levant about a cable's length in front of her consort. The American now had them com- pletely under her guns and showed her ensign, to ''■Naval Chronicle, xxxiii., 466. Naval War of 1 812 167 which challenge the British ships replied by setting their colors. At 6.10, the Constitution ranged up to windward of the Cyane and Levant, the former on her port quarter the latter on her port bow, both being distant about 250 yards from her ' — so close that the American marines were constantly engaged almost from the beginning of the action. The fight began at once, and continued with great spirit for a quarter of an hour, the vessels all firing broadsides. It was now moonlight, and an im- mense column of smoke formed under the lee of the Constitution, shrouding from sight her foes; and, as the fire of the latter had almost ceased. Captain Stewart also ordered his men to stop, so as to find out the positions of the ships. In about three minutes the smoke cleared, disclosing to the Amer- icans the Levant dead to leeward on the port beam, and the Cyane luffing up for their port quarter. Giving a broadside to the sloop, Stewart braced aback his main- and mizzen-topsails, with top- gallant sails set, shook all forward, and backed rapidly astern, under cover of the smoke, abreast ' Testimony sworn to by Lieut. W. B. Shubrick and Lieutenant-of-Marines Archibald Henderson before Thomas Welsh, Jr., Justice of the Peace, Suffolk Street, Boston, July 20, 1 81 5. The depositions were taken in consequence of a report started by soine of the British journals that the action began at a distance of three quarters of a mile. All the American depositions were that all three ships began firing at once, when equidistant from each other about 250 yards, the marines being engaged almost the whole time. 1 68 Naval War of 1 812 the corvette, forcing the latter to fill again to avoid being raked. The firing was spirited for a few minutes, when the Cyane's almost died away. The Levant bore up to wear round and assist her consort, but the Constitution filled her topsails, and, shooting ahead, gave her two stem rakes, when she at once made all sail to get out of the combat. The Cyane was now discovered wearing, when the Constitution herself at once wore and gave her in turn a stern rake, the former luffing to and firing her port broadside into the starboard bow of the frigate. Then, as the latter ranged up on her port quarter, she struck, at 6.50, just forty minutes after the beginning of the action. She was at once taken possession of, and Lieuten- ant Hoffman, second of the Constitution, was put in command. Having manned the prize. Captain Stewart, at 8 o'clock, filled away after her consort. The latter, however, had only gone out of the combat to refit. Captain Douglass had no idea of retreat, and no sooner had he rove new braces than he hauled up to the wind, and came very gallantly back to find out his friend's condition. At 8.50, he met the Constitution, and, failing to weather her, the frigate and sloop passed each other on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides. Finding her antagonist too heavy, the Levant then crowded all sail to escape, but was soon overtaken by the Constitution, and at about 9.30 the latter Naval War of 1812 169 opened with her starboard bow-chasers, and soon afterward the British captain hauled down his colors. Mr. Ballard, first of the Constitution, was afterward put in command of the prize. By one o'clock, the ships were all in order again. The Constitution had been hulled eleven times, more often than in either of her previous actions, but her loss was mainly due to the grape and musketry of the foe in the beginning of the fight.' The British certainly fired better than usual, es- pecially considering the fact that there was much manoeuvring, and that it was a night action. The Americans lost 3 men killed, 3 mortally and 9 severely and slightly wounded. The corvette, out of her crew of 180, had 12 men killed and 26 wounded, several mortally; the sloop, out of 140, had 7 killed and 16 wounded. The Constitution had started on her cruise very full-handed, with over 470 men, but several being absent on a prize, she went into battle with about 450.=' The prizes had suffered a good deal in their hulls and rigging, and had received some severe wounds in their masts and principal spars. The Cyane carried on her main-deck twenty-two 3 2 -pound carronades, and on her spar-deck two long 12's and ten 18- ' Deposition of her officers, as before cited. ^ Four hundred and ten officers and seamen, and 41 marines, by her muster-roll of February 19th. (The muster- rolls are preserved in the Treasury Department at Washing- ton.) 170 Naval War of 1812 pounder carronades. The Levant carried, all on one deck, eighteen 3 2 -pound carronades and two long 9's, together with a shifting 12-pounder. Thus, their broadside weight of metal was 763 pounds, with a total of 320 men, of whom 61 fell, against the Constitution's 704 pounds and 450 men, of whom 15 were lost; or, nominally, the relative force was 100 to 91, and the relative loss 100 to 24. But the British guns were almost ex- clusively carronades, which, as already pointed out in the case of the Essex, and in the battle off Plattsburg, are no match for long guns. Moreover, the scantling of the smaller ships was, of course, by no means as stout as that of the frigate, so that the disparity of force was much greater than the figures would indicate, although not enough to account for the difference in loss. Both the British ships were ably handled, their fire was well directed, and the Levant in especial was very gal- lantly fought. As regards the Constitution, "her manoeuvring was as brilliant as any recorded in naval annals," and it would have been simply impossible to sur- pass the consummate skill with which she was handled in the smoke, always keeping her antag- onists to leeward, and, while raking both of them, not being once raked herself. The firing was ex- cellent, considering the short time the ships were actually engaged, and the fact that it was at night. Naval War of 1 8 1 2 171 Altogether, the fight reflected the greatest credit on her, and also on her adversaries.' The merits of this action can perhaps be better appreciated by comparing it with a similar one that took place a few years before between a British sloop and corvette on the one side, and a French frigate on the other, and which is given in full by both James and Troude. Although these 6.05 P.^ ^^-^"^ ^^"^^^^^^^"cJws/y/fff/aA/ S.£0 e.25 CYANE authors differ somewhat in the account of it, both agree that the Frenchman, the Nereide, of 44 guns * There is no British official account of the action. James states that the entire British force was only 302 men, of whom 12 were killed and 29 wounded. This is probably not based on any authority. Captain Stewart received on board 301 prisoners, of whom 42 were wounded, several mortally. Curiously enough, James also underestimates the American 172 Naval War of 1 812 on February 14, 18 10, fought a long and inde- cisive battle with the Rainbow of 26 and Avon of 18 guns, the British sloops being fought sepa- rately, in succession. The relative force was al- most exactly as in the Constitution's fight. Each side claimed that the other fled. But this much is sure : The Constitution, engaging the Cyane and Levant together, captured both ; while the Nereide, engaging the Rainbow and Avon separately, cap- tured neither. The three ships now proceeded to the Cape de Verdes, and on March loth anchored in the har- bor of Porto Praya, Island of San Jago. Here a merchant-brig was taken as a cartel, and a hun- dred of the prisoners were landed to help fit her for sea. The next day the weather was thick and loss, making it only 12. He also says that many attempts were made by the Americans to induce the captured British to desert, while the Constitutions officers deny this imder oath, before Justice Welsh, as already quoted, and state that, on the contrary, many of the prisoners offered to enhst on the frigate, but were all refused permission — as "the loss of the Chesapeake had taught us the danger of having renegades aboard." This denial, by the way, holds good for all the similar statements made by James as regards the Giierriere, Macedonian, etc. He also states that a British court-mar- tial found various counts against the Americans for harsh treatment, but all of these were specifically denied by the American officers, under oath, as already quoted. I have relied chiefly on Captain Stewart's narrative, but partly (as to time, etc.) on the British accoimt in the Naval Chronicle. Naval War of 1 812 173 foggy, with fresh breezes.' The first and second Heutenants, with a good part of the people, were aboard the two prizes. At five minutes past twelve, while Mr. Shubrick, the senior remaining lieutenant, was on the quarter-deck, the canvas of a large vessel suddenly loomed up through the haze, her hull being completely hidden by the fog-bank. Her character could not be made out; but she was sailing close-hauled, and evi- dently making for the roads. Mr. Shubrick at once went down and reported the stranger to Captain Stewart, when that ofhcer coolly re- marked that it was probably a British frigate or an Indiaman, and directed the lieutenant to re- turn on deck, call all hands, and get ready to go out and attack her.^ At that moment the canvas of two other ships was discovered rising out of the fog astern of the vessel first seen. It was now evident that all three were heavy frigates. ^ In fact they were the Newcastle, 50, Captain Lord George Stewart; Leander, 50, Captain Sir Ralph Collier, K. C. B. ; and Acasta, 40, Captain Robert Kerr, standing into Porto Praya, close-hauled on the starboard tack, the wind being light northeast by north. "* Captain Stewart at once saw that his ^ Log of Constitution, March ii, 1815. * Cooper, ii., 459. 3 Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April 10, 1815. 4 Marshall's Naval Biography, ii., 535. 174 Naval War of 1812 opponents were far too heavy for a fair fight, and, knowing that the neutraHty of the port would not be the slightest protection to him, he at once signalled to the prizes to follow, cut his cable, and, in less than ten minutes from the time the first frigate was seen, was standing out of the roads, followed by Hoffman and Ballard. Cer- tainly a more satisfactory proof of the excellent training of both officers and men could hardly be given than the rapidity, skill, and perfect order with which everything was done. Any indecision on the part of the officers or bungling on the part of the men would have lost everything. The prisoners on shore had manned a battery and delivered a furious but ill-directed fire at their retreating conquerors. The frigate, sloop, and corvette, stood out of the harbor in the order indicated, on the port tack, passing close under the east point, and a gunshot to windward of the British squadron, according to the American, or about a league, according to the British, accounts. The Americans made out the force of the strangers correctly, and their own force was equally clearly discerned by the A casta; but both the Newcastle and Leander mistook the Cyane and Levant for frigates, a mistake similar to that once made by Commodore Rodgers. The Constitution now crossed her topgallant yards and set the fore- sail, mainsail, spanker, flying jib, and topgallant- Naval War of 1 812 175 sails ; and the British ships, tacking, made all sail in pursuit. The Newcastle was on the Constitu- tion's lee quarter and directly ahead of the Leander, while the Acasta was on the weather quarter of the Newcastle. All six ships were on the port tack. The Constitution cut adrift the boats towing astern, and her log notes that at 12.50 she found she was sailing about as fast as the ships on her lee quarter, but that the Acasta was luffing into her wake and dropping astern. The log of the Acasta says: "We had gained on the sloops, but the frigate had gained on us." At i.io the Cyane had fallen so far astern and to leeward that Cap- tain Stewart signalled to Lieutenant Hoffman to tack, lest he should be cut off if he did not. Ac- cordingly, the lieutenant put about and ran off toward the northwest, no notice being taken of him by the enemy beyond an ineffectual broadside from the stemmost frigate. At 2.35 he was out of sight of all the ships and shaped his course for America, which he reached on April loth.' At 1.45, the Newcastle opened on the Constitution, firing by divisions, but the shot all fell short, ac- cording to the American statements, about 200 yards, while the British accounts (as given in Marshall's Naval Biography) make the distance much greater ; at any rate, the vessels were so near that from the Constitution the officers of the New- ^ Letter of Lieutenant Hoffman, April ro, 1815. 176 Naval War of 181 2 castle could be seen standing on the hammock net- tings. But, very strangely, both the 50-gun ships apparently still mistook the Levant, though a low, flush-decked sloop like the Hornet, for the ''Presi- dent, Congress, or Macedonian,'" Captain Collier believing that the Constitution had sailed with two other frigates in company. By three o'clock, the' Levant had lagged so as to be in the same position from which the Cyane had just been rescued ; ac- cordingly, Captain Stewart signalled to her to tack, which she did, and immediately afterward all three British ships tacked in pursuit. Before they did so, it must be remembered the A casta had weathered on the Constitution, though left con- siderably astern, while the Newcastle and Leander had about kept their positions on her lee or star- board quarter; so that if any ship had been de- tached after the Levant it should have been the Leander, which had least chance of overtaking the American frigate. The latter was by no means as heavily armed as either of the two 50's, and but little heavier than the Acasta; moreover, she was shorthanded, having manned her two prizes. The Acasta, at any rate, had made out the force of the Levant, and, even had she been a frigate, it was certainly carrying prudence to an extreme to make more than one ship tack after her. Had the New- castle and Acasta kept on after the Constitution ' Marshall, ii., 533. Naval War of 1 812 177 there was a fair chance of overtaking her, for the A casta had weathered on her, and the chase could not bear up for fear of being cut off by the New- castle. At any rate, the pursuit should not have been given up so early. Marshall says there was a mistake in the signalling. The British captains certainly bungled the affair ; even James says (p. 558) : " It is the most blundering piece of business recorded in these six volumes." As for Stewart and his men, they deserve the highest credit for the cool judgment and prompt, skilful seamanship they had displayed. The Constitution, having shaken off her pursuers, sailed to Maranham, where she landed her prisoners. At Porto Rico she learned of the peace, and forthwith made sail for New York, reaching it about the middle of May. As soon as he saw Captain Stewart's signal. Lieutenant Ballard had tacked, and at once made for the anchorage at Porto Pray a, which he reached, though pursued by all his foes, and an- chored within 150 yards of a heavy battery.' The wisdom of Captain Stewart's course in not trust- ing to the neutrality of the port now became evi- dent. The A casta opened upon the sloop as soon as the latter had anchored, at 4.30.^ The New- castle, as soon as she arrived, also opened, and so ^ Letter of Lieutenant Ballard, May 2, 1815. 2 Newcastle's log, as given by Marshall and James. VOL. II. — 12 178 Naval War of 1 812 did the Leander, while the British prisoners on shore fired the guns of the battery. Having borne this combined cannonade for fifteen minutes,' the colors of the Levant were hauled down. The un- skilful firing of the British ships certainly did not redeem the blunders previously made by Sir George Collier, for the three heavy frigates dur- ing fifteen minutes' broadside practice in smooth water against a stationary and unresisting foe did her but little damage, and did not kill a man. The chief effect of the fire was to damage the houses of the Portuguese town.^ After the capture of the President, the Peacock, Captain Warrington, the Hornet, Captain Biddle, and Tom Bowline, brig, still remained in New York Harbor. On the 2 2d of January, a strong northwesterly gale began to blow, and the Ameri- can vessels, according to their custom, at once prepared to take advantage of the heavy weather and run by the blockaders. They passed the bar by daylight, under storm canvas, the British frigates, lying to in the southeast, being plainly visible. They were ignorant of the fate of the President,^nd proceeded toward Tristan d'Acunha, which was the appointed rendezvous. A few days out, the Hornet parted company from the two others ; these last reached Tristan d'Acunha about ^ Ballard's letter. * James, vi., 551. Naval War of 1 8 1 2 179 March i8th, but were driven off again by a gale. The Hornet reached the island on the 23d, and at half -past ten in the morning, the wind being fresh S.S.W., when about to anchor off the north point, a sail was made in the southeast, steering west.' This was the British brig-sloop Penguin, Captain James Dickenson. She was a new vessel, having left port for the first time in September, 18 14. While at the Cape of Good Hope, she had received from Vice-Admiral Tyler 12 marines from the Medway, 74, increasing her complement to 132; and was then despatched on special service against a heavy American privateer, the Young Wasp, which had been causing great havoc among the homeward-bound Indiamen. When the strange sail was first seen. Captain Biddle was just letting go his topsail sheets ; he at once sheeted them home, and the stranger being almost instantly shut out by the land, he made all sail to the west, and again caught sight of her. Captain Dickenson now, for the first time, saw the American sloop, and at once bore up for her. The position of the two vessels was exactly the reverse of the Wasp and Frolic, the Englishman being to windward. The Hornet hove to, to let her antag- onist close; then she filled her main -topsail and continued to yaw, wearing occasionally to prevent ^ Letter from Captain Biddle to Commodore Decatur, March 25, 1815. i8o Naval War of 1812 herself from being raked. At forty minutes past one, the Penguin, being within musket-shot, hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, hoisted a St. George's ensign and fired a gun. The Hornet luffed up on the same tack, hoisting American colors, and the action began with heavy broad- sides. The vessels ran along thus for fifteen minutes, gradually coming closer together, and Captain Dickenson put his helm a-weather, to run his adversary aboard. At this moment the brave young officer received a mortal w^oimd, and the command devolved on the first lieutenant, Mr. McDonald, who endeavored very gallantly to cany out his commander's intention, and at 1.56 the Penguin's bowsprit came in between the Hornefs main- and mizzen-rigging on the star- board side. The American seamen had been called away, and were at their posts to repel boarders, but as the British made no attempt to come on, the cutlass men began to clamber into the rigging to go aboard the brig. Captain Biddle very coolly stopped them, " it being evident from the beginning that our fire was greatly superior both in quickness and effect. ' ' There was a hea\y sea running, and as the Hornet forged ahead, the Penguin's bowsprit carried away her mizzen shrouds, stem davits, and spanker-boom ; and the brig then hung on her starboard quarter, where only small arms could be used on either side. An Naval War of 1 812 181 English officer now called out something which Biddle understood, whether correctly or not is disputed, to be the word of surrender ; accordingly, he directed his marines to cease firing, and jumped on the taffrail. At that minute two of the marines on the Penguin's forecastle, not thirty feet distant, fired at him, one of the balls inflicting a rather se- vere wound in his neck. A discharge of musketry from the Hornet at once killed both the marines. ; /ffS PENCUIN I. fO / LEO ...--^P-* "^-^Z^^"^ -^ ^- N., HORNET and at that moment the ship drew ahead. As the vessels separated, the Penguhi's foremast went overboard, the bowsprit breaking short off. The Hornet at once wore, to present a fresh broadside, while the Penguhi's disabled condition prevented her following suit, and having lost a third of her men killed and wounded (14 of the former and 28 of the latter), her hull being riddled through and through, her foremast gone, mainmast tottering, and most of the guns on the engaged side dis- 1 82 Naval War of 1 812 mounted, she struck her colors at two minutes past two, twenty-two minutes after the first gun was fired. Of the Hornet's 1 50 men, 8 were absent in a prize. By actual measurement she was two feet longer and slightly narrower than her antag- onist. Her loss was chiefly caused by musketry, amounting to i marine killed, i seaman mortally. Lieutenant Conner very severely, and Captain Biddle and 7 seamen slightly, wounded. Not a round shot struck the hull, nor was a mast or spar materially injured, but the rigging and sails were a good deal cut, especially about the fore- and main-topgallantmasts. The Hornet's crew had been suffering much from sickness, and 9 of the men were unable to be at quarters, thus reducing the vessels to an exact equality. Counting in these men, and excluding the 8 absent in a prize, we get as COMPARATIVE FORCE Weight Tonnage No. Guns Metal Hornet 480 10 279 Penguin 477 10 274 ^ This number of men is probably too great; I have not personally examined the Hornet's muster-roll for that period. Lieutenant Emmons, in his History, gives her 132 men; btit perhaps he did not include the nine sick, which would make his statement about the same as mine. In response to my inquiries, I received a very kind letter from the Treasury Department (Fourth Auditor's office) , which stated that the muster-roll of the Hornet on this voyage showed " loi officers and crew (marines excepted)". Adding the 20 marines, Crew Loss 142^ II 132 42 Naval War of 1 812 183 Or, the force being practically equal, the Hornet inflicted fourfold the loss and tenfold the damage she suffered. Hardly any action of the war re- flected greater credit on the United States marine than this — for the cool, skilful seamanship and ex- cellent gunnery that enabled the Americans to destroy an antagonist of equal force in such an exceedingly short time. The British displayed equal bravery, but were certainly very much be- hind their antagonists in the other qualities which go to make up a first-rate man-of-war's man. Even James says he "cannot offer the trifling disparity of force in this action as an excuse for the Pen- guin's capture. The chief cause is . . . the immense disparity between the two vessels in . . , the effectiveness of their crews." ' would make but 121 in all. I think there must be some mis- take in this, and so have considered the Hornet's crew as consisting, originally, of 150 inen, the same as on her cruises in 181 2. The Penguin was in reality slightly larger than the Hornet, judging from the comparisons made in Biddle's letter (for the original of which see in the Naval Archives, Captains' Letters, vol. xlii., No. 112). He says that the Penguin though two feet shorter on deck than the Hornet, had a greater length of keel, a slightly greater breadth of beam, stouter sides, and higher bulwarks, with swivels on the cap- stan and tops, and that she fought both her "long 12's" on the same side. I have followed James, however, as regards this; he says her long guns were 6-pounders, and that but one was fought on a side. ^ After the action but one official account, that of Captain 1 84 Naval War of 1 812 The Penguin was so cut up by shot that she had to be destroyed. After the stores, etc., had been taken out of her, she was thoroughly examined (Captain Biddle from curiosity taking her meas- urements in comparison with those of the Hornet). Her destruction was hastened on account of a strange sail heaving in sight ; but the latter proved to be the Peacock, with the Tom Bozvline in Biddle, was ptiblished; none of the letters of the defeated British commanders were published after 1813. As regards this action, every British writer has followed James, who begins his account thus: "Had the vessel in sight to wind- ward been rigged with three masts instead of two, and had she proved to be a British cruiser, Captain Biddle would have marked her down in his log as a 'frigate,' and have made off with all the canvas he could possibly spread. Had the ship overtaken the Hornet and been in reality a trifle superior in force, Captain Biddle, we have no doubt, would have ex- hausted his eloquence in lauding the blessings of peace before he tried a struggle for the honors of war." After this preface (which should be read in connection with the Hornefs un- accepted challenge to the Bonne Citoyenne, a ship "a trifle superior in force") it can be considered certain that James will both extenuate and also set down a good deal in malice. One instance of this has already been given in speaking of the President's capture. Again, he says, "the Hornet received several round shot in her hull," which she did — a month after this action, from the Cornwallis, 74; James knew perfectly well that not one of the Penguin's shot hit the Hornet's hull. The quotations I have given are quite enough to prove that nothing he says about the action is worth attending to. The funniest part of his accotmt is where he makes Captain Biddle get drunk, lose his "native cunning," and corroborate his Qames's) statements. He does not even hint at the authority for this. Naval War of 1 812 185 company. The latter was now turned to account by being sent into Rio de Janeiro as a cartel with the prisoners. The Peacock and Hornet remained about the Island till April 13th, and then, giving up all hopes of seeing the President, and rightly supposing she had been captured, started out for the East Indies. On the 27th of the month, in lat. 38° 30' S. and long. T,f E.,' the Peacock sig- nalled a stranger in the S.E., and both sloops crowded sail in chase. The next morning they came down with the wind aft from the northwest, the studding-sails set on both sides. The new 22- gun-sloops were not only better war vessels, but faster ones too, than any other ships of their rate ; and the Peacock by afternoon was two leagues ahead of the Hornet. At 2 p.m., the former was observed to manifest some hesitation about ap- proaching the stranger, which, instead of avoiding, had rather hauled up toward them. All on board the Hornet thought her an Indiaman, and "the men began to wonder what they would do with the silks," when, a few minutes before four, the Peacock signalled that it was a line-of -battle ship, which reversed the parts with a vengeance. War- rington's swift ship was soon out of danger, while Biddle hauled close to the wind on the port tack, with the Cornwall is, 74, bearing the flag of Ad- ' Letter of Captain Biddle, June loth, and extracts from her log. 1 86 Naval War of 1812 miral Sir George Burleton, K.C.B./ in hot pur- suit, two leagues on his lee quarter. The 74 gained rapidly on the Hornet, although she stopped to pick up a marine who had fallen overboard. Finding he had to deal with a most weatherly craft, as well as a swift sailer, Captain Biddle, at 9 P.M., began to lighten the Hornet of the mass of stores taken from the Penguin. The Cornwallis gained still, however, and, at 2 a.m., on the 29th, was ahead of the Hornefs lee or starboard beam, when the sloop put about and ran off toward the west. Daylight showed the 74 still astern and to leeward, but having gained so much as to be within gunshot, and shortly afterward she opened fire, her shot passing over the Hornet. The latter had recourse anew to the Hghtening process. She had already hove overboard the sheet-anchor, several heavy spare spars, and a large quantity of shot and ballast; the remaining anchors and cables, more shot, six guns, and the launch now followed suit, and, thus relieved, the Hornet passed tem- porarily out of danger; but the breeze shifted gradually round to the east, and the liner came looming up till at noon she was within a mile, a shorter range than that at which the United States crippled and cut up the Macedonian; and had the Cornwallis' s fire been half as well aimed as that of the States, it would have been the last of the ^ James vi., 564. Naval War of 1812 187 Hornet. But the 74's guns were very unskilfully served, and the shot passed for the most part away over the chase, but three getting home. Captain Biddle and his crew had no hope of ultimate es- cape, but no one thought of giving up. All the remaining spare spars and boats, all the guns but one, the shot, and in fact everything that could be got at, below or on deck, was thrown overboard. This increased the way of the Hornet, while the Cornwallis lost ground by hauling off to give broad- sides, which were as ineffectual as the fire from the chase-guns had been. The Hornet now had gained a little, and managed to hold her own, and shortly afterward the pluck and skill of her crew ' were rewarded. The shift in the wind had been very much against them, but now it veered back again so as to bring them to windward ; and every minute, as it blew fresher and fresher, their chances increased. By dark, the Cornwallis was well astern, and during the night the wind kept freshening, blowing in squalls, which just suited the Hornet, and when day broke the liner was hull down astern. Then, on the morning of the 30th, after nearly forty-eight hours' chase, she * It is perhaps worth noting that the accounts incidentally mention the fact that almost the entire crew consisted of native Americans, of whom quite a number had served as im- pressed seamen on board British war-ships. James multiplies these threefold and sets them down as British. 1 88 Naval War of 1812 abandoned the pursuit. The Hornet was now, of course, no use as a cruiser, and made sail for New York, which she reached on June 9th. This chase requires almost the same comments as the last chase of the Constitution. In both cases the American captains and their crews deserve the very highest praise for plucky, skilful seamanship ; but exactly as Stewart's coolness and promptitude might not have saved the Constitution had it not been for the blunders made by his antagonists, so the Hornet would have assuredly been taken, in spite of Biddle's stubbornness and resource, if the Cormuallis had not shown such unskilful gunnery, which was all the more discreditable since she carried an admiral's flag. The Peacock was thus the only one left of the squadron originally prepared for the East Indies; however, she kept on, went round the Cape of Good Hope, and cruised across the Indian Ocean, capturing four great Indiamen, very valuable prizes, manned by 291 men. Then she entered the Straits of Sunda, and on the 30th of June, off the fort of Anjier, fell in with the East India Com- pany's cruiser Nautilus, Lieutenant Boyce, a brig of 180 (American measurement, over 200) tons, with a crew of 80 men and 14 guns — four long 9's and ten 18-pound carronades.' Captain Warring- I History of the Indian Navy, by Charles Rathbone Low (late lieutenant of the Indian Navy), London, 1877, p. 285. Naval War of 1 812 189 ton did not know of the peace ; one of the boats of the Nautilus, however, with her purser, Mr. Bart- lett boarded him. Captain Warrington declares the latter made no mention of the peace, while Mr. Bartlett swears that he did before he was sent below. As the Peacock approached, Lieutenant Boyce hailed to ask if she knew peace had been declared. Captain Warrington, according to his letter, regarded this as a ruse to enable the brig to escape under the guns of the fort, and commanded the lieutenant to haul down his colors, which the latter refused to do, and very gallantly prepared for a struggle with a foe of more than twice his strength. According to Captain Warrington, one, or, by the deposition of Mr. Bartlett,' two broad- sides were then interchanged, and the brig sur- rendered, having lost seven men, including her first lieutenant, killed and mortally wounded, and eight severely or slightly wounded. Two of her guns and the sheet-anchor were disabled, the bends on the starboard side completely shivered from aft to the forechains, the bulwarks from the chess-tree aft much torn, and the rigging cut to pieces.^ The Peacock did not suffer the slightest loss or dam- age. Regarding the affair purely as a conflict be- tween vessels of nations at war with each other, ' As quoted by Low. ^ Letter of Lieutenant Boyce to Company's Marine Board, as quoted by Low. iQo Naval War of 1812 the criticism made by Lord Howard Douglass on the action between the President and Little Belt applies here perfectly. "If a vessel meet an enemy of even greatly superior force, it is due to the honor of her flag to try the effect of a few rounds; but unless in this gallant attempt she leave marks of her skill upon the larger body, while she, the smaller body, is hit at every dis- charge, she does but salute her enemy's triumph and discredit her own gunnery." ' There could not have been a more satisfactory exhibition of skill than that given by Captain Warrington ; but I regret to say that it is difficult to believe he acted with proper humanity. It seems impossible that Mr. Bartlett did not mention that peace had been signed ; and when the opposing force was so much less than his own it would have been safe at least to defer the order "Haul down your flag" for a short time, while he could have kept the brig within half pistol-shot, until he could have inquired into the truth of the report. Throughout this work I have, wherever possible, avoided all refer- ences to the various accusations and recrimina- tions of some of the captains about "unfairness," "cruelty," etc., as in most cases it is impossible to get at the truth, the accounts flatly contradicting one another. In this case, however, there cer- tainly seems some ground for the rather fervent ^ Naval Gunnery, p. 3. Naval War of 1812 191 denunciations of Captain Warrington indulged in by Lieutenant Low. But it is well to remember that a very similar affair, with the parties reversed, had taken place but a few months before on the coast of America. This was on February 2 2d, after the boats of the Erebus, 20, and Primrose, 18, under Captains Bartholomew and Phillot, had been beaten off with a loss of 30 men (including both captains wounded), in an expedition up St. Mary's River, Ga. The two captains and their vessels then joined Admiral Cockbum at Cumber- land Island, and on the 25th of February were in- formed officially of the existence of peace. Three weeks afterward the American gunboat. No. 168, Mr. Hurlburt, sailed from Tybee Bar, Ga., bear- ing despatches for the British admiral.' On the same day in the afternoon she fell in with the Erebus, Captain Bartholomew. Peace having been declared, and having been known to exist for over three weeks, no effort was made to avoid the British vessel; but when the gunboat neared the latter she was suddenly hailed and told to heave to. Mr. Hurlburt answered that he had despatches for Admiral Cockburn, to which Captain Bartholomew responded, with many oaths, that he did not care ; ^ Letter from Com. Campbell to Secretary of Navy, March 29, 1815, including one from Sailing-master John H. Hurl- burt, of March i8, 1815, preserved in the Naval Archives, in vol. xliii., No. 125, of Captains' Letters. See also Niles's Register, viii., 104, 118, etc. 192 Naval War of 1812 he would sink her if she did not send a boat aboard. When Mr. Hurlburt attempted to answer some muskets were discharged at him, and he was told to strike. He refused, and the Erebus immediately opened fire from her great guns ; the gunboat had gotten so far round that her pivot-gun would not bear properly, but it was discharged across the bows of the Erebus, and then Mr. Hurlburt struck his colors. Although he had lain right under the foe's broadside, he suffered no loss or damage ex- cept a few ropes cut, and some shot holes in the sails. Afterward, Captain Bartholomew apolo- gized, and let the gunboat proceed. This attack was quite as wanton and unpro- voked as Warrington's, and Bartholomew's foe was relatively to himself even less powerful ; more- over, while the Peacock's crew showed great skill in handling their guns, the crew of the Erebus most emphatically did not. The intent in both cases was equally bad, only the British captain lacked the ability to carry his out. SUMMARY The concluding operations of the war call for much the same comments as those of the preceding years. The balance of praise certainly inclines toward the Americans. Captain John Hayes's squadron showed great hardihood, perseverance, and judgment, which were rewarded by the cap- Naval War of 1 812 193 ture of the President; and Decatur's surrender seems decidedly tame. But as regards the action between the President and Endymion (taking into account the fact that the former fought almost under the guns of an overwhelming force, and was therefore obliged to expose herself far more than she otherwise would have), it showed nearly as great superiority on the side of the Americans as the frigate actions of 181 2 did — in fact, probably quite as much as in the case of the Java. Simi- larly, while the Cyane and Levant did well, the Con- stitution did better ; and Sir George Collier's ships certainly did not distinguish themselves when in chase of Old Ironsides. So with the Hornet in her two encounters; no one can question the pluck with which the Penguin was fought, but her gun- nery was as bad as that of the Cornwallis sub- sequently proved. And, though the skirmish between the Peacock and Nautilus is not one to which an American cares to look back, yet, re- garding it purely from a fighting standpoint, there is no question which crew was the best trained and most skilful. LIST OF SHIPS BUILT IN 1815 Name Rate Wliere Built Cost Washington 74 Portsmouth $235,861.00 hidependence 74 Boston 421,810.41 Franklin 74 Philadelphia 438,149.40 Guerritre 44 " 306,158.56 Java 44 Baltimore 232,767.38 Fulton 30 New York 320,000.00 Torpedo — " VOL. II. — 13 194 Naval War of 1 812 These ships first put to sea in this year. For the first time in her history, the United States pos- sessed Hne-of -battle ships ; and for the first time in all history, the steam frigate appeared on the navy list of a nation. The Fulton, with her clumsy central wheel, concealed from shot by the double hull, with such thick scantHng that none but heavy guns could harm her, and relying for offensive weapons not on a broadside of thirty guns of small calibre, but on two pivotal loo-pounder colum- biads, or, perhaps, if necessary, on blows from her hog snout, — the Fulton was the true prototype of the modern steam ironclad, with its few heavy gims and ram. Almost as significant is the pres- ence of the Torpedo. I have not chronicled the several efforts made by the Americans to destroy British vessels with torpedoes ; some very nearly succeeded, and although they failed it must not be supposed that they did no good. On the con- trary, they made the British in many cases very cautious about venturing into good anchorage (especially in Long Island Sound and the Chesa- peake) , and by the mere terror of their name pre- vented more than one harrying expedition. The Fulton was not got into condition to be fought until just as the war ended ; had it continued a few months, it is more than probable that the deeds of the Merrimac and the havoc wrought by the Con- federate torpedoes would have been forestalled by Naval War of 1 8 1 2 195 nearly half a century. As it was, neither of these engines of war attracted much attention. For ten or fifteen years the Fulton was the only war- vessel of her kind in existence, and then her name disappears from our lists. The torpedoes had been tried in the Revolutionary War, but their failure prevented much notice from being taken of them, and, besides, at that time there was a strong feeling that it was dishonorable to blow a ship up with a powder-can concealed under the w^ater, though highly laudable to burn her by means of a fire-raft floating on the water — a nice distinction in naval ethics that has since disappeared.' AMERICAN VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. By Ocean Cruisers Name Guns Tonnage Remarks President 52 1.576 Captured by squadron. 52 guns, 1,576 tons. BRITISH VESSELS DESTROYED, ETC. a. — By Privateers Name Guns Tonnage Remarks Chasseur 12 240 By ^vivaX'T St. Lawrence. b. — By Ocean Cruisers Cyane 34 659 By Constitution. Levant 20 500 Retaken. Penguin 19 477 By Hornet. 85 guns, 1,876 tons. 20 500 (Subtracting LeiianO . 65 giins, 1,376 tons. ^ James fairly foams at the mouth at the mere mention of torpedoes. 196 Naval War of 181 2 In summing up the results of the struggle on the ocean, it is to be noticed that very little was at- tempted, and nothing done, by the American navy, that could materially affect the result of the ' war. Commodore Rodgers's expedition after the Jamaica Plate fleet failed ; both the efforts to get a small squadron into the East Indian waters also miscarried ; and otherwise the whole history of the struggle on the ocean is, as regards the Americans, only the record of individual cruises and fights. The material results were not very great, at least in their effect on Great Britain, whose enormous navy did not feel in the slightest degree the loss of a few frigates and sloops. But, morally, the result was of inestimable benefit to the United States. The victories kept up the spirits of the people, cast down by the defeats on land ; practically decided in favor of the Americans the chief question in dispute, — Great Britain's right of search and im- pressment, — and gave the navy, and thereby the country, a world-wide reputation. I doubt if ever before a nation gained so much honor by a few single-ship duels. For there can be no question which side came out of the war with the greatest credit. The damage inflicted by each on the other was not very unequal in amount, but the balance was certainly in favor of the United States, as can be seen by the following tables, for the details of which reference can be made to the various years : BRITISH LOSS Guns Tonnage ' Guns 278 8,451 351 37 4.159 212 116 500 22 402 20 Naval War of 181 2 197 AMERICAN LOSS Caused Tonnage By Ocean Cruisers.. . 5,984 On the Lakes 727 By the Army 3>oo7 By Privateers Total 9,718 431 13.512 605 In addition, we lost 4 revenue-cutters, mounting 24 guns, and, in the aggregate, of 387 tons, and also 25 gunboats, with 71 guns, and, in the aggre- gate, of nearly 2000 tons. This would swell our loss to 12,105 tons, and 526 guns ^ ; but the loss of ^ The tonnage can only be given approximately, as that of the vessels on Lake Champlain is not exactly known, although we know about what the two fleets tonned relatively to one another. 2 This differs greatly from the figures given by James in his Naval Occurrences (App. ccxv.). He makes the American loss 14,844 tons, and 660 guns. His list includes, for exam- ple, the ''Growler and Hamilton, upset in carrying sail to avoid Sir James's fleet"; it would be quite as reasonable to pt:t down the loss of the Royal George to the credit of the French. Then he mentions the Julia and Growler, which were recaptured; the Asp, which was also recaptured; the "New York, 46, destroyed at Washington," which was not destroyed or harmed in any way, and which, moreover, was a condemned hulk; the "Boston, 42 (in reality 32), destroyed at Washington," which had been a condemned hulk for ten years, and had no guns or anything else in her, and was as much a loss to our navy as the fishing up and burning of an old wreck would have been; and eight gunboats, whose de- struction was either mythical, or else which were not national vessels. By deducting all these, we reduce James's total by 120 guns, and 2600 tons; and a few more alterations (such as 198 Naval War of 181 2 the revenue-cutters and gunboats can fairly be considered to be counterbalanced by the capture or destruction of the various British Royal Packets (all armed with from 2 to 10 guns), tenders, barges, etc., which would be in the aggregate of at least as great tonnage and gun force, and with more nu- merous crews. excluding the swivels in the President' s tops, which he counts, etc.) , brings his number down to that given above — and also affords a good idea of the value to be attached to his figures and tables. The British loss he gives at but 530 guns and 10,273 tons. He omits the 24-gun ship burnt by Chauncy at York, although including the frigate and corvette burnt by Ross at Washington ; if the former is excluded the two latter should be, which would make the balance still more in favor of the Americans. He omits the guns of the Gloucester, be- cause they had been taken out of her and placed in battery on the shore, but he includes those of the Adams, which had been served in precisely the same way. He omits all reference to the British 14-gun schooner burnt on Ontario, and to all 3- and 4-giin sloops and schooners captured there, although in- cluding the corresponding American vessels. The reason that he so much underestimates the tonnage, especially on the lakes, I have elsewhere discussed. His tables of the rela- tive loss in men are even more erroneous, exaggerating that of the Americans, and greatly underestimating that of the British; but I have not tabulated this on account of the im- possibility of getting fair estimates of the killed and wounded in the cutting-out expeditions, and the difficulty of enumerat- ing the prisoners taken in descents, etc. Roughl3% about 2700 Americans and 3800 British were captured; the com- parative loss in killed and wounded stood much more in our favor. I have excluded from the British loss the brigs Detroit and Caledonia, and schooner Nancy (aggregating 10 guns and Naval War of 1 812 199 But the comparative material loss gives no idea of the comparative honor gained. The British navy, numbering at the outset a thousand cruisers, had accompHshed less than the American, which numbered but a dozen. Moreover, most of the loss suffered by the former was in single fight, while this had been but twice the case with the Americans, who had generally been overwhelmed by numbers. The President and Essex were both captured by more than double their force, simply because they were disabled before the fight began, otherwise they would certainly have escaped. With the exceptions of the Chesapeake and Argus (both of which were taken fairly, because their an- tagonists, though of only equal force, were better fighters), the remaining loss of the Americans was due to the small cruisers stumbling from time to time across the path of some one of the innu- merable British heavy vessels. Had Congressional forethought been sufficiently great to have allowed a few line-of -battle ships to have been in readiness some time previous to the war, results of weight about 500 tons) , destroyed on the upper lakes, because I hardly know whether they could be considered national ves- sels; the schooner Highflyer, of 8 guns, 40 men, and 209 tons, taken by Rodgers, because she seems to have been merely a tender; and the Dominica, 15, of 77 men and 270 tons, be- cause her captor, the privateer Decatur, though nominally an American, was really a French vessel. Of course, both tables are only approximately exact ; but at any rate the balance of damage and loss was over 4 to 3 in our favor. 200 Naval War of 1812 might have been accomplished. But the only ac- tivity ever exhibited by Congress, in materially in- creasing the navy previous to the war, had been in partially carrying out President Jefferson's ideas of having an enormous force of very worthless gunboats — a scheme whose wisdom was about on a par with some of that statesman's political and military theories. Of the twelve ' single-ship actions, two (those of the Argus and Chesapeake) undoubtedly re- dounded most to the credit of the British, in two (that of the Wasp with the Reindeer, and that of the Enterprise with the Boxer), the honors were nearly even, and in the other eight the superiority of the Americans was very manifest. In three actions (those with the Penguin, Frolic, and Shannon) the combatants were about equal in strength, the Americans having slightly the ad- vantage; in all the others but two, the victors combined superiority of force with superiority of skill. In but two cases, those of the Argus and Epervier, could any lack of courage be imputed to ^ Not counting the last action of the Constitution, the President's action, or the capture of the Essex, on account of the difficulty of fairly estimating the amount of credit due to each side. In both the first actions, however, the American ships seem to have been rather more ably fought than their antagonists, and, taking into account the overwhelming dis- advantages under which the Essex labored, her defence dis- played more desperate bravery than did that of any other ship during the war. 'Naval War of 1812 201 the vanquished. The second year alone showed to the advantage of the British; the various en- counters otherwise were as creditable to the Americans at the end as at the beginning of the war. This is worth attending to, because many authors speak as if the successes of the Americans were confined to the first year. It is true that no frigate was taken after the first year, but this was partly because the strictness of the blockade kept the American frigates more in port, while the sloops put out to sea at pleasure, and partly be- cause after that year the British i8-pounder frigates either cruised in couples, or, when single, invariably refused, by order of the Board of Admi- ralty, an encounter with a 24-pounder ; and though much of the American success was unquestionably to be attributed to more men and heavier guns, yet much of it was not. The war itself gives us two instances in which defeat was owing solely, it may be said, to inferiority of force — courage and skill being equal. The Wasp was far heavier than the Reindeer, and, there being nothing to choose between them in anything else, the damage done was about proportionate to this difference. It follows, as a matter of course, that the very much greater disproportion in loss in the cases of the Avon, Epervier, etc., where the disproportion in force was much less (they mounting 32's instead of 24's, and the victors being all of the same class), 202 Naval War of 1 812 is only to be explained by the inferiority in skill on the part of the vanquished. These remarks apply just as much to the Argus. The Reindeer, with her 24's, would have been almost exactly on a par with her, and yet would have taken her with even greater ease than the Peacock did with her 32's. In other words, the only effect of our superiority in metal, men, and tonnage was to increase some- what the disparity in loss. Had the Congress and Constellation, instead of the United States and Con- stitution, encountered the Macedonian and Java, the difference in execution would have been less than it was, but the result would have been un- changed, and would have been precisely such as ensued when the Wasp met the Frolic, or the Hor- net the Penguin. On the other hand, had the Shannon met the Constitution there would have been a repetition of the fight between the Wasp and Reindeer; for it is but fair to remember that great as is the honor that Broke deserves, it is no more than that due to Manners. The Republic of the United States owed a great deal to the excellent make and armament of its ships, but it owed still more to the men who were in them. The massive timbers and heavy guns of Old Ironsides would have availed but little had it not been for her able commanders and crews. Of all the excellent single-ship captains, British or American, produced by the war, the palm should Naval War of 1 812 20 J be awarded to Hull.' The deed of no other man (excepting Macdonough) equalled his escape from Broke's five ships, or surpassed his half-hour's conflict with the Giierrihe. After him, almost all the American captains deserve high praise — Decatur, Jones, Blakely, Diddle, Bainbridge, Law- rence, Burrows, Allen, Warrington, Stewart, Por- ter. It is no small glory to a country to have had such men upholding the honor of its flag. On a par with the best of them are Broke, Manners, and also Byron and Blythe. It must be but a poor- spirited American whose veins do not tingle with pride when he reads of the cruises and fights of the sea-captains, and their grim prowess, which kept the old Yankee flag floating over the waters of the Atlantic for three years, in the teeth of the might- iest naval power the world has ever seen ; but it is equally impossible not to admire Broke's chivalric challenge and successful fight, or the heroic death of the captain of the Reindeer. Nor can the war ever be fairly understood by any one who does not bear in mind that the com- batants were men of the same stock, who far more nearly resembled each other than either resembled any other nation. I honestly believe that the American sailor offered rather better material for a man-of-war's man than the British, because the ' See Naval Tactics, by Commander J. H. Ward, and Life of Commodore Tatnall, by Charles C. Jones, Jr. 204 Naval War of 1812 freer institutions of his country (as compared with the Britain of the drunken Prince Regent and his dotard father — a very different land from the present free England) and the peculiar exigencies of his life tended to make him more intelligent and self-reliant; but the difference, when there was any, was very small, and disappeared entirely when his opponents had been drilled for any length of time by men like Broke or Manners. The advantage consisted in the fact that our average commander was equal to the best, and higher than the average, of the opposing captains; and this held good throughout the various grades of the officers. The American officers knew they had re- doubtable foes to contend with, and made every preparation accordingly. Owing their rank to their own exertions, trained by practical experi- ence and with large liberty of action, they made every effort to have their crews in the most perfect state of skill and discipline. In Commodore Tat- nall's biography (p. 15) it is mentioned that the blockaded Constellation had her men well trained at the guns and at target practice, though still lying in the river, so as to be at once able to meet a foe when she put out to sea. The British captain, often owing his command to his social standing or to favoritism, hampered by red tape,' and accus- tomed, by twenty years' almost uninterrupted ^ For instance, James mentions that they were forbidden Naval War of 1 812 205 success, to regard the British arms as invincible, was apt to laugh at all manoeuvring,' and scorned to prepare too carefully for a fight, trusting to the old British " pluck and luck" to carry him through. So, gradually, he forgot how to manoeuvre or to prepare. The Java had been at sea six weeks be- fore she was captured, yet during that time the entire exercise of her crew at the guns had been confined to the discharge of six broadsides of blank cartridges (James, vi., 184) ; the Constitution, like the Java, had shipped an entirely new and raw crew previous to her first cruise, and was at sea but five weeks before she met the Guerribre, and yet her men had been trained to perfection. This is a sufficient comment on the comparative merits of Captain Hull and Captain Lambert. The Amer- ican prepared himself in every possible way; the Briton tried to cope with courage alone against courage united to skill. His bad gunnery had not been felt in contending with European foes "^ as unskilful as himself. Says Lord Howard Doug- lass (p. 3) : " We entered with too much confidence into a war with a marine much more expert than to use more than so many shot in practice, and that Captain Broke utterly disregarded this command. ^ Lord Howard Douglass, A' aval Gunnery, states this in various places : "Accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring." ' Lord Howard Douglass; he seems to think that in 1812 the British had fallen off absolutely, though not relatively to their European foes. 2o6 Naval War of 1 812 any of our European enemies. , , . there was inferiority of gunnery as well as of force," etc. Admiral Codrington, commenting on the Eper- vier's loss, says, as before quoted, that, owing to his being chosen purely for merit, the American captain was an over-match for the British, unless " he encountered our best officers on equal terms." The best criticism on the war is that given by Capitaine Jurien de la Graviere.* After speaking of the heavier metal and greater number of men of the American ships, he continues: "And yet only an enormous superiority in the precision and rapidity of their fire can explain the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants. . . . Nor was the skill of their gunners the only cause to which the Americans owed their success. Their ships were faster; the crews, composed of chosen men, manoeuvred with uniformity and precision; their captains had that practical knowledge which is only to be acquired by long experience of the sea ; and it is not to be wondered at that the Con- stitution, when chased during three days by a squadron of five English frigates, succeeded in escaping, by surpassing them in manoeuvring, and by availing herself of every ingenious resource and skilful expedient that maritime science could sug- gest. . . . To a marine exalted by success, '^ Guerres Maritimes, ii., 269, 272, 274 (Paris, 1847). Naval War of 1 812 207 but rendered negligent by the very habit of vic- tory, the Congress only opposed the best of vessels and most formidable of armaments. . . ." • It is interesting to compare the results of this inter-Anglian warfare, waged between the Insular and the Continental English, with the results of the contest that the former were at the same time carrying on with their Gallo-Roman neighbors across the channel. For this purpose I shall rely on Troude's Batailles Navales, which would cer- tainly not give the English more than their due. His account of the comparative force in each case can be supplemented by the corresponding one given in James. Under drawn battles I include all such as were indecisive, in so far that neither com- batant was captured ; in almost every case each captain claimed that the other ran away. During the years 181 2 to 181 5, inclusive, there were eight actions between French and English ships of approximately equal force. In three of these, the English were victorious. In 181 2, the Victorious, 74, captured the Rivoli, 74. ' The praise should be given to the individual captains and not to Congress, however; and none of the American ships had picked crews. During the war the Shannon had the only crew which could with any fairness be termed "picked," for her men had been together seven years, and all of her "boys " must have been well-grown young men, much older than the boys on her antagonist. 2o8 Naval War of 1812 COMPARATIVE FORCE Broadsides, Metal, lbs. Troude James Victorious 1,014 1,060 Rivoli 1,010 1,085 In 1 814, the Tagus captured the Ceres and the Hehrus captured the Etoile. Broadsides , Metal, lbs. Troude James Tagus 444 467 Ceres 428 463 Hebrus 467 467 Etoile 428 463 The Ceres, when she surrendered, had but one man wounded, although she had suffered a good deal aloft. The fight between the 74's was mur- derous to an almost unexampled degree, 125 Eng- lish and 400 French falling. The Hebrus lost 40 and the Etoile 120 men. Five actions were "drawn." In 181 2, the Swallow fought the Renard and Garland. The former threw 262, the latter 290 pounds of shot at a broadside. In 181 5, the Pilot, throwing 262 pounds, fought a draw with the Egerie, throwing 260. In 181 4, two frigates of the force of the Tagus fought a draw with two frigates of the force of the Ceres; and the Eurotas, with 24-pounders, failed Naval War of 1 812 209 to capture the Chlorinde, which had only 18- pounders. In 181 5, the Amelia fought a draw with the A r^- thuse, the ships throwing, respectively, 549 and 463 pounds, according to the Enghsh, or 572 and 410, pounds, according to the French, accounts. In spite of being superior in force, the English ship lost 141 men, and the French but 105. This was a bloodier fight than even that of the Chesapeake with the Shannon ; but the gunnery was, never- theless, much worse than that shown by the two combatants in the famous duel off Boston har- bor, one battle lasting four hours and the other fifteen minutes. There were a number of other engagements where the British were successful, but where it is difficult to compare the forces. Twice a 74 captured or destroyed two frigates, and a razee performed a similar feat. An i8-gun brig, the Weasel, fought two i6-gun brigs till one of them blew up. The loss of the two navies at each other's hands during the four years was : English Ships French Ships I i6-gun brig 3 line-of-battle ships I i2-gun brig II frigates I lo-gun cutter 2 26-gun fldtes 2 i6-gun brigs I lo-gun brig 3L. II.— 14 Many gunboats, etc. 2IO Naval War of 1812 Or one navy lost three vessels, mounting 38 guns, and the other 19 vessels, mounting 830 guns. During the same time, the English lost to the Danes one 14-gun brig, and destroyed in return a frigate of 46 guns, a 6 -gun schooner, a 4-gun cutter, two galliots and several gun-brigs. In the above lists it is to be noticed how many of the engagements were indecisive, owing chiefly to the poor gunnery of the combatants. The fact that both the Eurotas and the Amelia, though more powerfully armed and manned than the He- brus, yet failed to capture the sister ships of the frigate taken by the latter, shows that heavy metal and a numerous crew are not the only ele- ments necessary for success; indeed, the Eurotas and Amelia were as superior in force to their an- tagonists as the Constitution was to the Java. But the chief point to be noticed is the over- whelming difference in the damage the two navies caused each other. This difference was, roughly, as five to one against the Danes, and as fifty to one against the French ; while it was as four to three in favor of the American. These figures give some idea of the effectiveness of the various navies. At any rate, they show that we had found out what the European nations had for many years in vain striven to discover— a way to do more damage than we received in a naval contest with England. CHAPTER IV 1815 THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS The war on land generally disastrous — British send expedi- tion against New Orleans — Jackson prepares for the defence of the city — Night attack on the British advance guard — Artillery duels — Great battle of January 8, 1815 — Slaughter- ing repulse of the main attack— Rout of the Americans on the right bank of the river — Final retreat of the British — Obser- vations on the character of the troops and commanders en- gaged. WHILE our navy had been successful, the war on land had been for us full of humiliation. The United States then formed but a loosely knit confederacy, the sparse population scattered over a great expanse of land. Ever since the FederaHst party had gone out of power in 1800, the nation's ability to maintain order at home and enforce respect abroad had steadily dwindled ; and the twelve years' nerveless reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us im- potent for attack and almost as feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man whose views and theories had a profound influence upon our national life, was perhaps the most incapable Executive that ever filled the presidential chair; being almost 211 212 Naval War of 1812 purely a visionary, he was utterly unable to grap- ple with the slightest actual danger, and, not even excepting his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to imagine a man less fit to guide the State with honor and safety through the stormy times that marked the opening of the present century. Without the prudence to avoid war or the fore- thought to prepare for it, the Administration drifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the navy prepared by the Federahsts twelve years be- fore, and weakened rather than strengthened dur- ing the intervening time, saved us from complete and shameful defeat. True to its theories, the House of Virginia made no preparations, and thought the war could be fought by "the nation in arms" ; the exponents of this particular idea, the militiamen, a partially armed mob, ran like sheep whenever brought into the field. The regulars were not much better. After two years of war- fare, Scott records in his autobiography that there were but two books of tactics (one written in French) in the entire army on the Niagara fron- tier; and officers and men were on such a dead level of ignorance that he had to spend a month drilling all of the former, divided into squads, in the school of the soldier and school of the com- pany.' It is small wonder that such troops were I Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott, written by himself (2 vols., New York, 1864), i., p. 115. Naval War of 1 812 21 o utterly unable to meet the English. Until near the end, the generals were as bad as the armies they commanded, and the administration of the War Department continued to be a triumph of imbecility to the very last.' With the exception of the brilliant and successful charge of the Ken- tucky Mounted Infantry at the battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the war in the North was the campaign on the Niagara frontier during the summer of 1814; and even here, the chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, though re- flecting as much honor on the Americans as on the British, was for the former a defeat, and not a vic- tory, as most of our writers seem to suppose. But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a contest between the two branches of the English race, and partly a last attempt on the part of the Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rapidly growing one of these same two branches ; and this last portion of the struggle, though at- tracting comparatively little attention, was really much the most far-reaching in its effect upon his- ' Monroe's biographer (see James Monroe, by Daniel C. Oilman, Boston, 18S3, p. 123) thinks he made a good Secre- tary of War; I think he was as much a failure as his prede- cessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passed on him. Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in word and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As an instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact that he never gave him a particle of practical help. 2 14 Naval War of 1812 tory. The triumph of the British would have dis- tinctly meant the giving a new lease of life to the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a time, of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps for many years, of the march of English civiliza- tion across the continent. The EngHsh of Britain were doing all they could to put off the day when their race would reach to a world-wide supremacy. There was much fighting along our Western frontier with various Indian tribes ; and it was es- pecially fierce in the campaign that a backwoods general of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, carried on against the powerful confederacy of the Creeks, a nation that was thrust in Hke a wedge between the United States proper and their de- pendency, the newly acquired French Province of Louisiana. After several slaughtering fights, the most noted being the battle of the Horse-Shoe Bend, the power of the Creeks was broken forever ; and afterward, as there was much question over the proper boundaries of what was then the Latin land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked the Spaniards, and drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile, the British, having made a successful and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia and Maryland, situated in the heart of the country, organized the most formidable expedition of the war for a winter campaign against the outlying land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson, of Naval War of 1812 215 necessity, became. Thus, in the course of events, it came about that Louisiana was the theatre on which the final and most dramatic act of the war was played. Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that cover the quaking delta thrust out into the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strong torrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French city of New Orleans. Its lot had been strange and varied. Won and lost once and again, in conflict with the subjects of the Catholic king, there was a strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that coursed so freely through the veins of its citizens ; joined by purchase to the great Federal Republic, it yet shared no feeling with the latter, save that of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour of sore need had come upon the city ; for against it came the red English, lords of fight by sea and land. A great fleet of war vessels — ships of the line, frigates, and sloops — under Admiral Cochrane, was on the way to New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of troop ships, with aboard them some ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and hardy veterans of the Peninsular War,' who had ^ "The British infantrj- embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England." (History of the War in the Peninsula, by Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier, K.C.B. New edition. New York, 1882. Vol. v., p. 200.) For discus- sion of numbers, see farther on. 2i6 Naval War of 1 812 been trained for seven years in the stern school of the Iron Duke, and who were now led by one of the bravest and ablest of all Wellington's brave and able lieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham. On the 8th of December, 181 4, the foremost ves- sels, with among their number the great two-decker Tonnant, carrying the admiral's flag, anchored off the Chandeleur Islands ' ; and as the current of the Mississippi was too strong to be easily breasted, the English leaders determined to bring their men by boats through the bayous, and disembark them on the bank of the river ten miles below the wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming. There was but one thing to prevent the success of this plan, and that was the presence in the bayous of five American gunboats, manned by a hundred and eighty men, and commanded by Lieuten- ant-commanding Catesby Jones, a very shrewd fighter. So against him was sent Captain Nicholas Lockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thou- sand sailors and marines, men who had grown gray during a quarter of a century of unbroken ocean warfare. The gunboats were moored in a head-and-stern line, near the Rigolets, with their boarding-nettings triced up, and everything ready to do desperate battle; but the British rowed up with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous fire of great guns and musketry ; the vessels were * See ante, p. 151. Naval War of 1812 217 grappled amid fierce resistance; the boarding- nettings were slashed through and cut away ; with furious fighting the decks were gained ; and one by- one, at push of pike and cutlass stroke, the gun- boats were carried in spite of their stubborn de- fenders ; but not till more than one barge had been sunk, while the assailants had lost a hundred men, and the assailed about half as many. There was now nothing to hinder the landing of the troops ; and as the scattered transports ar- rived the soldiers were disembarked, and ferried through the sluggish water of the bayous on small flat-bottomed craft; and, finally, December 23d, the advance guard, two thousand strong, under General Keane, emerged at the mouth of the canal Villere, and camped on the bank of the river,' but nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed a certain prize, almost within their grasp. Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at their very gates, nothing save fierce defiance reigned in the fiery Creole hearts of the Crescent City. For a master-spirit was in their midst. An- drew Jackson, having utterly broken and destroyed the most powerful Indian confederacy that had ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven the haughty Spaniards from Pensacola, was now bending all the energies of his rugged intellect and ^ Letter of Major-General John Keane, December 26, 1814. 2i8 Naval War of 1812 indomitable will to the one object of defending New Orleans. No man could have been better fitted for the task. He had hereditary wrongs to avenge on the British, and he hated them with an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of fear. Born and brought up among the lawless characters of the frontier, and knowing well how to deal with them, he was able to establish and preserve the strictest martial law in the city with- out in the least quelling the spirit of the citizens. To a restless and untiring energy he united sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. Prompt to attack whenever the chance offered itself, seizing with ready grasp the slightest van- tage-ground, and never giving up a foot of earth that he could keep, he yet had the patience to play a defensive game when it so suited him, and with consummate skill he always followed out the scheme of warfare that was best adapted to his wild soldiery. In after years he did to his country some good and more evil; but no true American can think of his deeds at New Orleans without profound and unmixed thankfulness. He had not reached the city till December 2d, and had therefore but three weeks in which to prepare the defence. The Federal Government, throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing for the defence of Louisiana; neither provisions nor munitions of war of any sort were sent to it, Naval War of 1 812 219 nor were any measures taken for its aid.' The inhabitants had been in a state of extreme de- spondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, for they had no one to direct them, and they were weakened by factional divisions - ; but after his coming there was nothing but the utmost enthu- siasm displayed, so great was the confidence he inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all opposition. Under his direction earthworks were thrown up to defend all the important positions, the whole population working night and day at them; all the available artillery was mounted, and every ounce of war material that the city con- tained was seized; martial law was proclaimed; and all general business was suspended, every- thing being rendered subordinate to the one grand object of defence. Jackson's forces were small. There were two war vessels in the river. One was the little schooner Carolina, manned by regular seamen, largely New Englanders. The other was the newly built ship Louisiana, a powerful corvette; she had, of course, no regular crew, and her officers were straining every nerve to get one from the varied ranks of the maritime population of New ^ Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisi- ana (by Major A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the French by H. P. Nugent, Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66. 2 Latour, 53. 2 20 Naval War of 1812 Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged Yankees, Portuguese, and Norwegian seamen from foreign merchantmen, dark-skinned Spaniards from the West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served under the bold privateersman Lafitte, — all alike were taken, and all alike by unflagging exertions were got into shape for battle.' There were two regiments of regulars, numbering together about eight hundred men, raw and not very well dis- ciplined, but who were now drilled with great care and regularity. In addition to this, Jack- son raised somewhat over a thousand militiamen among the citizens. There were some Americans among them, but they were mostly French Creoles, ^ and one band had in its formation something that was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free men of color, ^ who had gathered to defend the land which kept the men of their race in slavery ; who were to shed their blood for the Flag that symbolized to their kind not freedom but bond- age ; who were to die bravely as freemen, only that their brethren might live on ignobly as slaves. Surely, there was never a stranger instance than this of the irony of fate. But if Jackson had been forced to rely only on these troops, New Orleans could not have been 1 Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, December 20, 1814. 2 Latour, 110. ^ Latour, iii. Naval War of 1812 221 saved. His chief hope lay in the volunteers of Tennessee, who, under their Generals, Coffee and Carroll, were pushing their toilsome and weary way toward the city. Every effort was made to hurry their march through the almost impassable roads, and at last, in the very nick of time, on the 23d of December, the day on which the British troops reached the river bank, the vanguard of the Ten- nesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt of form and grim of face, with their powder-horns slung over their buckskin shirts, carrying their long rifles on their shoulders and their heavy htmt- ing-knives stuck in their belts, with their coon- skin caps and fringed leggings, — thus came the grizzly warriors of the backwoods, the heroes of the Horse-Shoe Bend, the victors over Spaniard and Indian, eager to pit themselves against the trained regulars of Britain, and to throw down the gage of battle to the world-renowned infantry of the island English. Accustomed to the most law- less freedom, and to giving free rein to the full violence of their passions, defiant of discipline and impatient of the slightest restraint, caring little for God and nothing for man, they were soldiers who, under an ordinary commander, would have been fully as dangerous to themselves and their leaders as to their foes. But Andrew Jackson was of all men the one best fitted to manage such troops. Even their fierce natures quailed before 222 Naval War of 1 812 the ungovernable fury of a spirit greater than their own; and their sullen, stubborn wills were bent at last before his unyielding temper and iron hand. Moreover, he was one of themselves; he typified their passions and prejudices, their faults and their virtues ; he shared their hardships as if he had been a common private, and, in turn, he always made them partakers of his triumphs. They admired his personal prowess with pistol and rifle, his unswerving loyalty to his friends, and the relentless and unceasing war that he waged alike on the foes of himself and his country. As a result, they loved and feared him as few generals have ever been loved or feared ; they obeyed him unhesitatingly; they followed his lead without flinching or murmuring, and they ever made good on the field of battle the promise their courage held out to his judgment. It was noon of December 23d when General Keane, with nineteen hundred men, halted and pitched his camp on the east bank of the Missis- sippi ; and in the evening enough additional troops arrived to swell his force to over twenty-three hun- dred soldiers.^ Keane 's encampment was in a long plain, rather thinly covered with fields and ^ James (Military Occurrences of the Late War, by Wm. James, London, i8iS), vol. ii., p. 362, says 2050 rank and file; the English returns, as already explained, unlike the French and American, never included officers, sergeants, driimmers, artillerymen, or engineers, but only "sabres and bayonets" Naval War of 1 812 223 farmhouses, about a mile in breadth, and bounded on one side by the river, on the other by gloomy and impenetrable cypress swamps ; and there was no obstacle interposed between the British camp and the city it menaced. At two in the afternoon word was brought to Jackson that the foe had reached the river bank, and, without a moment's delay, the old backwoods fighter prepared to strike a rough first blow. At once, and as if by magic, the city started from her state of rest into one of fierce excitement and eager preparation. The alarm-guns were fired; in every quarter the war-drums were beaten; while, amid the din and clamor, all the regulars and marines, the best of the creole militia, and the vanguard of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee, — forming a total of a little more than two thousand men,^ — were assembled in great haste; and the (Napier, iv., 252). At the end of Napier's fourth volume is given the "morning state" of Wellington's forces on April 10, 1814. This shows 56,030 rank and file and 7431 officers, ser- geants, and trumpeters or drummers; or, in other words, to get at the real British force in an action, even supposing there are no artillery^men or engineers present, 13 per cent, must be added to the given number, which includes only rank and file. Making this addition, Keane had 2310 men. The Americans greatly overestimated his force, Latour making it 4980. I General Jackson, in his official letter, says only 1500; but Latour, in a detailed statement, makes it 2024; exclusive of 107 Mississippi dragoons who marched with the column, but being on horseback had to stay behind, and took no part in the action. Keane thought he had been attacked by 5000 men. 224 Naval War of 1812 gray of the winter twilight saw them, with Old Hickory at their head, marching steadily along the river bank toward the camp of their foes. Patterson, meanwhile, in the schooner Carolina, dropped down with the current to try the effect of a flank attack. Meanwhile, the British had spent the afternoon in leisurely arranging their camp, in posting the pickets, and in foraging among the farmhouses. There was no fear of attack, and as the day ended huge camp-fires were lit, at which the hungry sol- diers cooked their suppers undisturbed. One di- vision of the troops had bivouacked on the high levee that kept the waters from flooding the land near by ; and about half -past seven in the evening their attention was drawn to a large schooner which had dropped noiselessly down, in the gather- ing dusk, and had come to anchor a short distance off shore, the force of the stream swinging her broadside to the camp.^ The soldiers crowded down to the water's edge, and, as the schooner returned no answer to their hails, a couple of mus- ket-shots were fired at her. As if in answer to this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly the ^ I have taken my account of the night action chiefly from the work of an EngUsh soldier who took part in it: Ensign (afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig's Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans. (New edition, Philadelphia, 1821, pp. 28O- 300.) Naval War of 1812 225 harsh voice of her commander, as he sang out: " Now then, give it to them for the honor of Amer- ica"; and at once a storm of grape hurtled into their ranks. Wild confusion followed. The only field-pieces with Keane were two light 3 -pounders, not able to cope with the Carolina's artillery; the rocket-guns were brought up, but were speedily silenced; musketry proved quite as ineffectual; and in a very few minutes the troops were driven helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced to shelter themselves behind it, not without having suffered severe loss.' The night was now as black as pitch; the embers of the deserted camp-fires, beaten about and scattered by the schooner's shot, burned with a dull red glow ; and at short in- tervals the darkness was momentarily lit up by the flashes of the Carolina s guns. Crouched be- hind the levee, the British soldiers lay motionless, listening in painful silence to the pattering of the grape among the huts, and to the moans and shrieks of the wounded who lay beside them. Things continued thus till toward nine o'clock, when a straggling fire from the pickets gave warn- ing of the approach of a more formidable foe. The American land-forces had reached the outer lines of the British camp, and the increasing din of the I General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British suf- fered but a single casualty; Gleig, who was present, says (p. 288) : "The deadly shower of grape swept down numbers in the camp." VOL. II.— 15 2 26 Naval War of 1812 musketry, with ringing through it the whip-Hke crack of the Tennesseean rifles, called out the whole British army to the shock of a desperate and uncertain strife. The young moon had by this time struggled through the clouds, and cast on the battle-field a dim, unearthly Hght that but partly relieved the intense darkness. All order was speedily lost. Each officer, American or Brit- ish, as fast as he could gather a few soldiers round him, attacked the nearest group of foes; the smoke and gloom would soon end the struggle, when, if unhurt, he would rally what men he could and plunge once more into the fight. The battle soon assumed the character of a multitude of in- dividual combats, dying out almost as soon as they began, because of the difficulty of telling friend from foe, and beginning with ever-increasing fury as soon as they had ended. The clatter of the firearms, the clashing of steel, the rallying cries and loud commands of the officers, the defiant shouts of the men, joined to the yells and groans of those who fell, all combined to produce so terrible a noise and tumult that it maddened the coolest brains. From one side or the other bands of men would penetrate into the heart of the enemy's lines, and would there be captured, or would cut their way out with the prisoners they had taken. There was never a fairer field for the fiercest per- sonal prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were Naval War of 1812 22 / of little service, and the fighting was hand to hand. Many a sword, till then but a glittering toy, was that night crusted with blood. The British sol- diers and the American regulars made fierce play with their bayonets, and the Tennesseeans, with their long hunting-knives. Man to man, in grim- mest hate, they fought and died, some by bullet and some by bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. More than one in his death agony slew the foe at whose hand he himself had received the mortal wound; and their bodies stiffened as they lay, locked in the death grip. Again the clouds came over the moon; a thick fog crept up from the river, wrapping from sight the ghastly havoc of the battle-field; and long before midnight the fighting stopped perforce, for the fog and the smoke and the gloom were such that no one could see a yard away. By degrees each side drew off.' In sullen silence, Jackson marched his men up the river, while the wearied British returned to their camp. The former had lost over two hundred,' 1 Keane writes: "The enemy thought it pmdcnt to retire, and did not again dare to advance. It was now 12 o'clock, and the firing ceased on both sides"; and Jackson: "We should have succeeded . . . in capturing the enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose about (?) o'clock, occasioned some confusion. ... I contented myself with lying on the field that night." Jackson certainly failed to capture the British; but equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest their march till he was in condition to meet and check them. 2 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing. 228 Naval War of 1812 the latter nearly three hundred ' men ; for the darkness and confusion that added to the horror lessened the slaughter of the battle. Jackson drew back about three miles, where he halted and threw up a long line of breastworks, reaching from the river to the morass; he left a body of mounted riflemen to watch the British. All the English troops reached the field on the day after the fight; but the rough handling that the foremost had received made them cautious about advancing. Moreover, the left division was kept behind the levee all day by the Carolina, which opened upon them whenever they tried to get away ; nor was it till dark that they made their es- cape out of range of her cannon. Christmas day opened drearily enough for the invaders. Al- though they were well inland, the schooner, by greatly elevating her guns, could sometimes reach them, and she annoyed them all through the day ^ ; and as the Americans had cut the levee in their front, it at one time seemed likely that they would be drowned out. However, matters now took a turn for the better. The river was so low that the * 46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I take the official return for each side as authority for the respective force and loss. 2 "While sitting at table, a loud shriek was heard. . . A shot had taken effect on the body of an unfortunate sol- dier . . . who was fairly cut in two at the lower portion of the belly!" (Gleig, p. 306.) Naval War of 1812 229 cutting of the levee instead of flooding the plain ' merely filled the shrunken bayous, and rendered it easy for the British to bring up their heavy guns ; and on the same day their trusted leader, Sir Ed- ward Packenham, arrived to take command in person, and his presence gave new life to the whole army. A battery was thrown up during the two succeeding nights on the brink of the river opposite to where the Carolina lay; and at dawn a heavy cannonade of red-hot shot and shell was opened upon her from eleven guns and a mortar/ She responded briskly, but very soon caught fire and blew up, to the vengeful joy of the troops whose bane she had been for the past few days. Her destruction removed the last obstacle to the immediate advance of the army ; but that night her place was partly taken by the mounted riflemen, who rode down to the British lines, shot the sentries, engaged the outposts, and kept the whole camp in a constant state of alarm. ^ In the morning Sir Edward Packenham put his army in motion, and marched on New Orleans. When he had gone nearly three miles he suddenly, and to his great surprise, stumbled on the Amer- ican army. Jackson's men had worked like beav- ' Latour, 113. 2 Gleig, 307. The Americans thought the battery con- sisted of five 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says nine field-pieces (9- and 6-pounders) , two howitzers, and a mortar. 3 Gleig, 310. 230 Naval War of 181 2 ers, and his breastworks were already defended by over three thousand fighting men,' and by half a dozen guns, and moreover were flanked by the corvette Louisiana, anchored in the stream. No sooner had the heads of the British columns ap- peared than they were driven back by the fire of the American batteries ; the field-pieces, mortars, and rocket-guns were then brought up, and a sharp artillery duel took place. The motley crew of the Louisiana handled their long ship guns with par- ticular effect; the British rockets proved of but little service ^ ; and, after a stiff fight, in which they had two field-pieces and a light mortar dismounted,'' the British artillerymen fell back on the infantry. Then Packenham drew off his whole army out of cannon shot, and pitched his camp facing the intrenched lines of the Americans. For the next three days the British battalions lay quietly in front of their foe, like wolves who have brought to bay a gray boar, and crouch just out of reach of his tusks, waiting a chance to close in. ^ 3282 men in all, according to the Adjutant-General's re- turn for December 28, 1 8 14. ^ Latour, 121. 3 Gleig, 314. The official returns show a loss of 18 Amer- icans and 58 British, the latter suffering much less than Jack- son supposed. Lossing, in his Field-Book of the War of 1812, not only greatly overestimates the British loss, but speaks as if this was a serious attack, which it was not. Packenham's army, while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American intrenchment, and recoiled at once, after seeing that his field- pieces were unable to contend with the American artillery. Naval War of 1812 231 Packenham, having once tried the strength of Jackson's position, made up his mind to breach his works and silence his guns with a regular battering train. Heavy cannon were brought up from the ships, and a battery was established on the bank to keep in check the Louisiana. Then, on the night of the last day of the year, strong parties of workmen were sent forward, who, shielded by the darkness, speedily threw up stout earthworks, and mounted therein fourteen heavy guns,' to face the thirteen ' mounted in Jackson's lines, which were but three hundred yards distant. New Year's day dawned very misty. As soon as the haze cleared off, the British artiherymen opened with a perfect hail of balls, accompanied by a cloud of rockets and mortar-shells. The Americans were taken by surprise, but promptly returned the fire, with equal fury and greater skill. ^ Ten long i8's and four 24-pound carronades (James, ii., 368). Gleig says (p. 318), "6 batteries mounting 30 pieces of heavy cannon." This must include the "brigade of field- pieces" of which James speaks. Nine of these, 9- and 6- pounders, and two howitzers, had been used in the attack on the Carolina; and there were also two field-mortars and two 3-pounders present; and there must have been one other field-piece with the army, to make up the thirty of which Gleig speaks. 2 Viz.: one long 32, three long 24's, i long iS, three long 12's, three long 6's, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small carronade (Latour, p. 147); and on the same day Patterson had in his water-battery one long 24 and two long 12's (see his letter of January 2d), making a total of 16 American guns. 232 Naval War of 1812 Their guns were admirably handled ; some by the cool New England seamen lately forming the crew of the Carolina, others by the fierce Creole pri- vateersmen of Lafitte, and still others by the trained artillerymen of the regular army. They were all old hands, who in their time had done their fair share of fighting, and were not to be flurried by any attack, however unexpected. The British cannoneers plied their guns like fiends, and fast and thick fell their shot ; more slowly, but with surer aim, their opponents answered them.' The cotton bales used in the American embrasures caught fire, and blew up two powder caissons; while the sugar-hogsheads of which the British batteries were partly composed were speedily shattered and splintered in all directions. Though the British champions fought with unflagging ^ The British historian, Alison, says {History of Europe, by Sir Archibald Alison, 9th edition, Edinburgh and London, 1852, vol. xii., p. 141) : "It was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superior in weight and number, that nothing was to be expected from that species of attack. ' ' As shown above ; at this time Jackson had on both sides of the river 16 guns, the British, according to both James and Gleig, between 20 and 30. Jackson's long guns were one 32, four 24's, one 18, five 12's, and three 6's, throwing in all 224 pounds; Packen- ham had ten long iS's, two long 3's, and from six to ten long 9's and 6's, thus throwing between 228 and 258 poimds of shot; while Jackson had but one howitzer and one carronade to oppose four carronades, two howitzers, two mortars, and a dozen rocket-guns; so, in both number and weight of giins, the British were greatly superior. Naval War of 1812 233 courage and untiring energy, and though they had long been versed in war, yet they seemed to lack the judgment to see and correct their faults, and most of their shot went too high/ On the other hand, the old sea-dogs and trained regulars who held the field against them, not only fought their guns well and skilfully from the beginning, but all through the action kept coolly correcting their faults and making more sure their aim. Still, the fight was stiff and well contested. Two of the American guns were disabled and 34 of their men were killed or wounded. But one by one the British cannon were silenced or dismounted, and by noon their gunners had all been driven away, with the loss of 78 of their number. The Louisiana herself took no part in this ac- tion. Patterson had previously landed some of her guns on the opposite bank of the river, placing them in a small redoubt. To match these the British also threw up some works and placed in I In strong contrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, an eye- witness, states the true reason of the British failure {Memoir of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, by Lady Bourchier, Lon- don, 1873, vol. i., p. 334) : "On the ist we had our batteries ready, by severe labor, in a situation from which the artillery people were, as a matter of course, to destroy and silence the opposing batteries, and give opportunity for a well-arranged storm. But instead, not a gun of the enemy appeared to suffer, and our own firing too high was not discovered till " too late. "Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be ex- pected, and I think it a blot on the artillery escutcheon." 234 Naval War of 1812 them heavy guns, and all through New Year's day a brisk cannonade was kept up across the river between the two water-batteries, but with very little damage to either side. For a week after this failure the army of the in- vaders lay motionless, facing the Americans. In the morning and evening the defiant, rolling challenge of the English drums came throbbing up through the gloomy cypress swamps to where the grim riflemen of Tennessee were lying behind their log breastworks, and both day and night the stillness was at short intervals broken by the sullen boom of the great guns which, under Jackson's orders, kept up a never-ending fire on the leaguer- ing camp of his foes.' Nor could the wearied British even sleep undisturbed; all through the hours of darkness the outposts were engaged in a most harassing bush warfare by the backwoods- men, who shot the sentries, drove in the pickets, and allowed none of those who were on guard a moment's safety or freedom from alarm. ^ But Packenham was all the while steadily pre- paring for his last and greatest stroke. He had determined to make an assault in force as soon as the expected reinforcements came up ; nor, in the light of his past experience in conflict with foes of far greater military repute than those now before Gleig, 322. ' Gleig, 323. I Naval War of 1 8 1 2 ^ ^ -JD him, was this a rash resolve. He had seen the greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, de- feated once and again, and driven in headlong flight over the Pyrenees by the Duke of Welling- ton; now he had under him the flower of the troops who had won those victories ; was it to be supposed for a moment that such soldiers ' who, in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and captured the forts of the mighty French emperor, would shrink at last from a mud wall guarded by rough backwoodsmen ? That there would be loss of life in such an assault was certain ; but was loss of life to daunt men who had seen the horrible slaughter through which the storm.ers moved on to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian? At the battle of Toulouse an English army, of which Packenham's troops then formed part, had driven Soult from a stronger position than was now to be assailed, though he held it with a veteran infantry. Of a surety, the dashing gen- eral who had delivered the decisive blow on the ' Speaking of Soult's overthrow a few months previous to this battle, Napier says (v., 209) : " He was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world, at the head of unconquer- able troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannte, Caesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's Guards at Austerlitz— such were Wel- lington's British soldiers at this period. . . . Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and fierceness a confidence that made them invincible." 236 Naval War of 181 2 stricken field of Salamanca/ who had taken part in the rout of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of Continental Europe, was not the man to flinch from a motley array of volunteers, militia, and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush- fighter, whose name had never been heard of out- side of his own swamps, and there only as the savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage Indian tribes. Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank at- tack. Under his orders a canal was being dug from the head of the bayou up which the British had come, across the plain to the Mississippi. This was to permit the passage of a number of ships' boats, on which one division was to be ferried to ' " It was about 5 o'clock when Packenham fell upon Thom- ieres. . . . From the chief to the lowest soldier, all [of the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant Packen- ham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the bat- tle. The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners, standing up manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grape into the advancing masses while a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavored to display a front. But, bearing onwards through the skirmishes with the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half- formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the ad- vancing supports. . . . Packenham, bearing onwards with conquering violence, . . . formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Packenham had first attacked; and that impetuous officer, with unmitigated strength, still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on the enemy's left." (Napier, iv., 57, 58, 59.) Naval War of 1812 237 the opposite bank of the river, where it was to move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and water-battery on the west side, flank Jackson's main position on the east side.' When this canal was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, two thousand strong, under General Lambert, arrived, and by the evening of the 7th all was ready for the attack, which was to be made at daybreak on the following morning. Packenham had under him nearly 10,000 ' fighting men; 1500 of these, ^ "A particular feature in the assault was our cutting a canal into the Mississippi. ... to convey a force to the right bank, which . . . might surprise the enemy's batteries on that side. I do not know how far this measure was relied on by the general, but, as he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine he did not place much depend- ence upon it." (Codrington, i., 335.) 2 James (ii., 373) says the British "rank and file " amounted to 8153 men, including 1200 seamen and marines. The only other place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the attack on the right bank, when he says "about 200" were with Thornton, while both the admirals, Cochrane and Cod- rington, make the number 300; so he probably underesti- mates their number throughout, and at least 300 can be added, making 1500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8453. This number is corroborated by Major McDougal, the officer who received Sir Edward's body in his arms when he was killed; he says (as quoted in the Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished During the Peninsular War, by John William Cole, London, 1856, vol. ii., p. 364) that after the battle and the loss of 2036 men, "we had still an effective force of 6400." making a total before the attack of 8436 rank and file. Call- ing it 8450, and adding 13.3 per cent, for the officers, ser- geants, and trumpeters, we get about 9600 men. 23^ Naval War of 1812 under Colonel Thornton, were to cross the river and make the attack on the west bank. Packen- ham himself was to superintend the main assault, on the east bank, which was to be made by the British right under General Gibbs, while the left moved forward under General Keane, and General Lambert commanded the reserve.^ Jackson's =* ^ Letter of Major-General John Lambert to Earl Bathurst, January lo, 1815. ^ 4698 on the east bank, according to the official report of Adjutant-General Robert Butler, for the morning of January 8th. The details are as follows: At batteries 154 Command of Colonel Ross (671 regulars and 742 Louisiana militia) 1413 Command of General Carroll (Tennesseeans, and somewhat under 500 Kentuckians) . . 1562 General Coffee's command (Tennesseeans, and about 250 Louisiana militia) 813 Major Hind's dragoons 230 Colonel Slaughter's command 526 Total 4698 These figures tally almost exactly with those given by Major Latour, except that he omits all reference to Colonel Slaughter's command, thus reducing the number to about 4100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusion to Slaughter's command as taking part in the battle ; and it is possible that these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the river by Jackson; in which case his whole force but slightly exceeded 5000 men. On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia — 260 of the First Regiment, 176 of the Second, and no of the Sixth, Jackson had ordered 500 Kentucky troops to be sent to re- inforce them; only 400 started, of whom but 180 had arms. Seventy more received arms from the Naval Arsenal; and thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546 already on the west bank. Naval War of 1812 239 position was held by a total of 5500 men.' Hav- ing kept a constant watch on the British, Jackson had rightly concluded that they would make the main attack on the east bank, and had, accord- ingly, kept the bulk of his force on that side. His works consisted simply of a mud breastwork, with a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight line from the river on his right across the plain, and some distance into the morass that sheltered his left. There was a small, unfinished redoubt in front of the breastworks on the river bank. Thir- teen pieces of artillery were mounted on the works. ^ On the right was posted the Seventh regular in- fantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana militia (both French Creoles and men of color, and comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen, who were Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth ' Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in wretched plight ; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found for about 250 more; and thus Jackson's army received an addition of 750 ver>' badly disciplined soldiers. "Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long ex- pected, are armed, and the arms they have are not fit for use." (Letter of General Jackson to the Secretary of War, January 3d.) ^ Almost all British writers underestimate their own force and enormously magnify that of the Americans. Alison, for example, quadruples Jackson's relative strength, writing: "About 6000 combatants were on the British side; a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the teeth in works bristling with bayonets and loaded with heavy artillcr)-. ' ' Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets 240 Naval War of 1812 regiment ; while the rest of the Hne was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians and over 1600 Tennes- seeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 Creole militia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard the head of a bayou. In the rear were 230 dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi, and some other troops in reserve; making in all 4700 men on the east bank. The works on the west bank were farther down stream, and were very much weaker. Commodore Patterson had thrown up a water- battery of nine guns, three long 24's and six long 12's, pointing across the river, and intended to take in flank any foe attacking Jackson. This battery was protected by some strong earthworks, mounting three field-pieces, which were thrown up just below it, and stretched from the river about two hundred yards into the plain. The line of defence was extended by a ditch for about a only "bristled" metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the Americans were armed with them; and the British breaching batteries had a heavier " load " of artillery than did the Amer- ican lines. Gleig says that, "to come nearer the truth," he "will choose a middle course, and suppose their whole force to be about 25,000 men" (p. 325). Gleig, by the way, in speak- ing of the battle itself, mentions one most startling evolution of the Americans, namely, that "without so much as lifting their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by one arm over the wall and discharged them" at the British. If any one will try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy rifle held in one hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the object aimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man in his senses attempting it. Naval War of 1812 241 quarter of a mile farther, when it ended, and from there to the morass, half a mile distant, there were no defensive works at all. General Morgan, a very- poor militia officer,' was in command, with a force of 550 Louisiana militia, some of them poorly armed; and on the night before the engagement he was reinforced by 250 Kcntuckians, poorly- armed, undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue/ All through the night of the 7th a strange mur- murous clangor arose from the British camp, and was borne on the moist air to the lines of their slumbering foes. The blows of pickaxe and spade, as the ground was thrown up into batteries by- gangs of workmen, the rumble of the artillery as it was placed in position, the measured tread of the battalions as they shifted their places or marched off under Thornton, — all these and the thousand ^ He committed every possible fault, except showing lack of courage. He placed his works at a very broad instead of at a narrow part of the plain, against the advice of Latour, who had Jackson's approval (Latour, 167). He continued his earthworks but a very short distance inland, making them exceedingly strong in front, and absolutely defenceless on ac- count of their flanks being unprotected. He did not mount the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines as he ought to have done. Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, he promptly divided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he stationed a small number of absolutely raw troops in a thin Hne on the open, with their flank in air; while a much larger number of older troops were kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a strong breastwork, with their flanks covered. 2 Latour, 170. vol.. II. -16 242 Naval War of 1812 other sounds of warlike preparation were softened and blended by the distance into one continuous humming murmur, which struck on the ears of the American sentries with ominous foreboding for the morrow. By midnight Jackson had risen and was getting everything in readiness to hurl back the blow that he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front. Before the dawn broke his sol- diery was all on the alert. The bronzed and brawny seamen were grouped in clusters around the great guns. The Creole soldiers came of a race whose habit it has ever been to take all phases of life joyously ; but that morning their gayety was tempered by a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety. They had more at stake than any other men on the field. They were fighting for their homes; they were fighting for their wives and their daughters. They well knew that the men they were to face were very brave in battle and very cruel in victory ' ; they well knew the fell destruc- tion and nameless woe that awaited their city should the English take it at the sword's point. ' To prove this, it is only needful to quote from the words of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring, it must be re- membered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a hostile, country. "It is impossible to describe to you the irregu- larities and outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of sight of their officers, I might almost say, out of sight of the commanding officers of the regiments, that out- rages are not committed. . . . There is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people Naval War of 1 812 243 They feared not for themselves ; but in the hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked a dull terror of what that day might bring upon those they loved.' The Tennesseeans were troubled by no such misgivings. In saturnine, who have uniformly received them as friends." "I really believe that more plunder and outrages have been committed by this army than by any other that ever was in the field." "A detachment seldom marches . . . that a murder, or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not committed by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed eight people since the army returned to Portugal." "They really forget everything when plunder or wine is within reach." ' That these fears were just can be seen by the following quotations, from the works of a British officer, General Na- pier, who was an eye-witness of what he describes. It must be remembered that Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Se- bastian were friendly towns, only the garrisons being hostile. " Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers' heroism. All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shame- less rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos. On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled." (Vol. iii., 377.) And again : ' ' This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxica- tion and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajos 244 Naval War of 1812 confident silence they lolled behind their mud walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out into the gray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, hour after hour, the two armies stood facing each other in the darkness, waiting for the Hght of day. lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes — one atrocity, of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity ... a Por- tuguese adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wicked- ness, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately, by a number of English soldiers . . . and the disorder continued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer, put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town." Packen- ham himself would have certainly done all in his power to prevent excesses, and has been foully slandered by many early American writers. Alluding to these, Napier remarks, somewhat caustically: "Pre-eminently distinguished for de- testation of inhumanity and outrage, he has been, with as- tounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous excesses; but from a people holding mil- lions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected? (Vol. v., p. 31.) Napier possessed to a very eminent degree the virtue of being plain-spoken. Elsewhere (iii., p. 450). after giving a most admirably fair and just account of the origin of the Anglo-American War, he alludes, with a good deal of justice, to the Americans of 181 2, as "a people who (notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mer- cantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their general government, uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe." Naval War of 1812 245 At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled through the morning mist they glinted on tlie sharp steel bayonets of the English, where their scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but four hundred yards from the American breast- works. There stood the matchless infantry of the island king, in the pride of their strength and the splendor of their martial glory ; and, as the haze cleared away, they moved forward, in stem silence, broken only by the angry, snarling notes of the brazen bugles. At once the American artillery leaped into furious life; and, ready and quick, the more numerous cannon of the invaders responded from their hot, feverish lips. Unshaken amid the tumult of that iron storm, the heavy red column moved steadily on toward the left of the American line, where the Tennesseeans were standing in mo- tionless, grim expectancy. Three fourths of the open space was crossed, and the eager soldiers broke into a run. Then a fire of hell smote the British column. From the breastwork in front of them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as rank after rank the wild marksmen of the back- woods rose and fired, aiming low and sure. As stubble is withered by flame, so withered the Brit- ish column under that deadly fire; and, aghast at the slaughter, the reeling files staggered and gave back. Packenham, fit captain for his valorous host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying 246 Naval War of 181 2 round him, sprang forward with ringing cheers. But once again the peaHng rifle-blast beat in their faces; and the hfe of their dauntless leader went out before its scorching and fiery breath. With him fell the other general who was with the column and all of the men who were leading it on ; and, as a last resource, Keane brought up his stalwart Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn moun- taineers rushed on, only to die as their comrades had died before them, with unconquerable cour- age, facing the foe to the last. Keane himself was struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the British column, quailing before certain destruction, turned and sought refuge beyond reach of the leaden death that had overwhelmed their com- rades. Nor did it fare better with the weaker force that was to assail the right of the American line. This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie who, when the confusion caused by the main at- tack was at its height, rushed forward with im- petuous bravery along the river bank. With such headlong fury did he make the assault, that the rush of his troops took the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regulars and artillerymen, fought to the last with their bayonets and clubbed mus- kets, and were butchered to a man. Without delay, Rennie flung his men at the breastworks be- hind, and, gallantly leading them, sword in hand, he and all around him fell, riddled through and Naval War of 1812 247 through by the balls of the riflemen. Brave though they were, the British soldiers could not stand against the singing, leaden hail, for if they stood it was but to die. So in rout and wild dis- may they fled back along the river bank to the main army. For some time afterward the British artillery kept up its fire, but was gradually silenced, and the repulse was entire and complete along the whole line ; nor did the cheering news of success brought from the west bank give any hope to the British commanders, stunned by their crushing overthrow.^ Meanwhile, Colonel Thornton's attack on the op- posite side had been successful, but had been de- ^ According to their official returns, the British loss was 2036; the American accounts, of course, make it much greater. Latour is the only trustworthy American contemporary his- torian of this war, and even he at times absurdly exaggerates the British force and loss. Most of the other American " his- tories" of that period were the most preposterously bom- bastic works that ever saw print. But as regards this battle, none of them are as bad as even such British historians as Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other bat- tles, notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts to lessen the seeming force of his side are generally of much the same character. For instance, Latour says that Soo of Jack- son's men were employed on works at the rear, on guard duty, etc., and deducts them; James, for precisely similar reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means, one reduces Jack- son's total force to 4000, and the other gives Packenham but 7300. Only 2000 Americans were actually engaged on the east banks. 248 Naval War of 181 2 layed beyond the originally intended hour. The sides of the canal by which the boats were to be brought through to the Mississippi caved in and choked the passage,^ so that only enough got through to take over a half of Thornton's force. With these, seven hundred in number,^ he crossed, but as he did not allow for the current, it carried him down about two miles below the proper landing place. Meanwhile, General Morgan, having under him eight hundred militia,^ whom it was of the ut- most importance to have kept together, promptly divided them and sent three himdred of the rawest and most poorly armed down to meet the enemy in the open. The inevitable result was their imme- diate rout and dispersion ; about one hundred got back to Morgan's lines. He then had six hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven hundred regu- lars. So he stationed the four hundred best dis- ciplined men to defend the two hundred yards of strong breastworks, mounting three guns, wliich covered his left, while the two hundred worst dis- ciplined were placed to guard six hundred yards of open ground on his right, with their flank resting 'Codrington, i., 386. 2 James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but Ad- miral Cochrane in his letter Qanuary i8th) says 600 men, half sailors; and Admiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this number, 300 being sailors. Adding 13^ per cent, for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get 680 men. 3 796. (Latour, 164-172.) Naval War of 1812 249 in air, and entirely unprotected.' This truly phe- nomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the cer- tain defeat of his troops, no matter how well they fought ; but, as it turned out, they hardly fought at all. Thornton, pushing up the river, first at- tacked the breastwork in front, but was checked by a hot fire; deploying his men, he then sent a strong force to march round and take Morgan on his exposed right flank. ^ There, the already de- moralized Kentucky militia, extended in thin order across an open space, outnumbered, and taken in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, and after firing a single volley they took to their heels. ^ This exposed the flank of the better dis- ciplined Creoles, who were also put to flight, but they kept some order and were soon rallied."* In bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his water- battery and marched off with his sailors, un- ' Report of Court of Inqtiiry , Major-General William Carroll presiding. 2 Letter of Col. W. Thornton, January 8, 1815. 3 Letter of Commodore Patterson, January 13, 181 5. 4 Alison outdoes himself in recounting this feat. Having reduced the British force to 340 men, he says they captured the redoubt, "though defended by 22 guns and 1700 men." Of course, it was physically impossible for the water-battery to take part in the defence; so there were but three gtms, and by halving the force on one side and trebling it on the other, he makes the relative strength of the Americans just sixfold what it was, — and is faithfully followed by other British writers 250 Naval War of 181 2 molested. The American loss had been slight, and that of their opponents not heavy, though among their dangerously wounded was Colonel Thornton. This success, though a brilliant one, and a dis- grace to the American arms, had no effect on the battle. Jackson at once sent over reinforcements under the famous French general, Humbert, and preparations were forthwith made to retake the lost position. But it was already abandoned, and the force that had captured it had been recalled by Lambert, when he found that the place could not be held without additional troops.' The total British loss on both sides of the river amounted to over two thousand men, the vast majority of whom had fallen in the attack on the Tennesseeans, and most of the remainder in the attack made by Colonel Rennie. The Amer- icans had lost but seventy men, of whom but thirteen fell in the main attack. On the east bank, neither the creole militia nor the Forty- fourth regiment had taken any part in the combat. The English had thrown for high stakes and had lost everything, and they knew it. There ^ The British Colonel Dickson, who had been sent over to inspect, reported that 2000 men would be needed to hold the battery; so Lambert ordered the British to retire. (Lam- bert's letter, January loth.) Naval War of 1 8 1 2 251 was nothing to hope for left. Nearly a fourth of their fighting men had fallen ; and among the officers the proportion was far larger. Of Iheir four generals, Packenham was dead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and only Lambert left. Their leader, their ablest officers, and all the flower of their bravest men were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody plain before them; and their bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on the green fields where they had fought and had fallen. It was useless to make another trial. They had learned, to their bitter cost, that no troops, however steady, could advance over open ground against such a fire as came from Jackson's lines. Their artillerymen had three times tried conclusions with the Ameri- can gunners, and each time they had been forced to acknowledge themselves worsted. They would never have another chance to repeat their flank attack, for Jackson had greatly strengthened and enlarged the works on the west bank, and had seen that they were fully manned and ably commanded. Moreover, no sooner had the assault failed than the Americans again began their old harassing warfare. The heaviest cannon, both from the breastwork and the water-battery, played on the British camp, both night and day, giving the army no rest, and the mounted riflemen kept up a trifling but in- 252 Naval War of 1812 cessant and annoying skirmishing with their pickets and outposts. The British could not advance, and it was worse than useless for them to stay where they were, for though they, from time to time, were rein- forced, yet Jackson's forces augmented faster than theirs, and every day lessened the numerical inequality between the two armies. There was but one thing left to do, and that was to retreat. They had no fear of being attacked in turn. The British soldiers were made of too good stuff to be in the least cowed or cast down even by such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just suffered, and nothing would have given them keener pleasure than to have had a fair chance at their adversaries in the open ; but this chance was just what Jackson had no idea of giving them. His own army, though in part as good as an army could be, consisted also in part of untrained militia, while not a quarter of his men had bayonets ; and the wary old chief, for all his har- dihood, had far too much wit to hazard such a force in fight with a superior number of seasoned veterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own ground and in his own manner. So he contented himself with keeping a sharp watch on Lambert ; and, on the night of January i8th, the latter deserted his position, and made a very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving eighty wounded men Naval War of 1 812 253 and fourteen pieces of cannon behind him.' A few stragglers were captured on land, and, while the troops were embarking, a number of barges, with over a hundred prisoners, were cut out by some American seamen in row-boats; but the bulk of the army reached the transports unmo- lested. At the same time, a squadron of vessels, which had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort Saint Philip for a week or two, and had been finally driven off when the fort got a mortar large enough to reach them with, also returned; and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile. The object was to capture Fort Boyer, which con- tained less than four hundred men, and, though formidable on its sea-front,' was incapable of de- " Letter of General Jackson, January 19th, and of General Lambert, January 28th. 2 "Towards the sea its fortifications are respectable enough; but on the land side it is little better than a block- house. The ramparts being composed of sand not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with plank, are barely cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within pistol-shot of the ditch, completely commands it. Within, again, it is as much wanting in accommodation as it is in strength. There are no bomb-proof barracks, nor any hole or arch under which men might find protection from shells; indeed, so de- ficient is it in common lodging-rooms, that great part of the garrison sleep in tents. . . . With the reduction of this trifling work all hostilities ended." (Gleig, 357) General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for sur- rendering so quickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely im- possible to act otherwise, and not the slightest stain rests upon the fort's defenders. 254 Naval War of 1812 fence when regularly attacked on its land side. The British landed, February 8th, some 1500 men, broke ground, and made approaches; for four days the work went on amid a continual fire, which killed or wounded 1 1 Americans and 3 1 British ; by that time the battering-guns were in position and the fort capitulated, February 12th, the garrison marching out with the honors of war. Immediately afterward, the news of peace arrived, and all hostilities terminated. In spite of the last trifling success, the cam- paign had been to the British both bloody and disastrous. It did not affect the results of the war, and the decisive battle itself was a per- fectly useless shedding of blood, for peace had been declared before it was fought. Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but profitable to the United States. Louisiana was saved from being severely ravaged, and New Orleans from possible destruction; and after our humiliating defeats in trying to repel the invasion of Virginia and Maryland, the signal victory of New Orleans was really almost a necessity for the preservation of the national honor. This campaign was the great event of the war, and in it was fought the most important battle as regards numbers that took place during the entire struggle ; and the fact that we were victorious not only saved our self-respect at home, but also gave us a prestige abroad which Naval War of 1 8 1 2 2 DD we should otherwise have totally lacked. It could not be said to entirely balance the numerous de- feats that we had elsewhere siiffered on land, — defeats which had so far only been offset by Harrison's victory in 1813 and the campaign in Lower Canada in 1814, — but it at any rate went a long way toward making the score even. Jackson is certainly by all odds the most prominent figure that appeared during this war, and stands head and shoulders above any other commander, American or British, that it pro- duced. It will be difficult, in all history, to show a parallel to the feat that he performed. In three weeks' fighting, with a force largely composed of militia, he utterly defeated and drove away an army twice the size of his own, composed of veteran troops, and led by one of the ablest of European generals. During the whole campaign he only erred once, and that was in putting General Morgan, a very incompetent officer, in command of the forces on the west bank. He suited his movements admirably to the various exigencies that arose. The promptness and skill with which he attacked, as soon as he knew of the near approach of the British, undoubt- edly saved the city; for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, instead of being able to advance at once, they were forced to delay three 256 Naval War of 181 2 days, during which time Jackson intrenched him- self in a position from which he was never driven. But after this first attack, the offensive would have been not only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly Jackson, adopting that mode of war- fare which best suited the ground he was on and the troops he had under him, forced the enemy always to fight him where he was strongest, and confined himself strictly to the pure defensive — a system condemned by most European authori- ties,' but which has at times succeeded to ad- miration in America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw Mountain, and Franklin. Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson's success was in nowise owing either to chance or to the errors of his adversary.^ As far as for- tune favored either side, it was that of the ' Thus Napier says (vol. v., p. 25): "Soult fared as most generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude com- manders and undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom against accomplished commanders, never when the assailants are the better soldiers." And again (p. 150): "Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system." 2 The reverse has been stated again and again, with very great injustice, not only by British, but even by American writers (as, e. g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his Andrew Jackson as a Public Man, Boston, 1882). The climax of absurdity is reached by Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his Memoirs of BritisJi Generals, ii., p. 364): "Sir Edward Packenham fell, not after an utter and disastrous defeat, but at the very moment when the arms of victory were extended Naval War of 1 812 257 British ' ; and Packenham left nothing undone to accomplish his aim, and made no movements that his experience in European war did not justify his making. There is not the slightest reason for supposing that any other British general would have accomplished more or have fared better than he did.^ Of course, Jackson owed much to the nature of the ground on which he fought ; but the opportunities it afforded would have been useless towards him"; and by James, who says (ii., 3 88) : "The pre- mature fall of a British general saved an American city." These assertions are just on a par with those made by Amer- ican writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the Chesapeake from capturing the Shannon. British writers have always attributed the defeat largely to the fact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the attack with fascines and ladders, did not act well. I doubt if this had any effect on the result. Some few of the men with ladders did reach the ditch, but were shot down at once, and their fate would have been shared by any others who had been with them; the bulk of the column was never able to advance through the fire up to the breastwork, and all the ladders and fascines in Christendom wovild not have helped it. There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any defeat; but on this occasion the truth is simply that the Brit- ish regulars found they could not advance in the open against a fire more deadly than they had ever before encoimtered. ^ E. g.: The unexpected frost made the swamps firm for them to advance through; the river being so low when the levee was cut, the bayous were filled, instead, of the British being drowned out; the Carolina was only blown up because the wind happened to fail her; bad weather delayed the ad- vance of arms and reinforcements, etc. 2 " He was the next man to look to after Lord Wellington " (Codrington, i., 339). VOL. II. — 17 258 Naval War of 181 2 in the hands of any general less ready, hardy, and skilful than Old Hickory. A word as to the troops themselves. The Brit- ish infantry was at that time the best in Europe, the French coming next. Packenham's soldiers had formed part of Wellington's magnificent Peninsular army, and they lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans. Their conduct through- out was admirable. Their steadiness in the night battle, their patience through the various hard- ships they had to undergo, their stubborn courage in action, and the undaunted front they showed in time of disaster (for at the very end they were to the full as ready and eager to fight as at the beginning), all showed that their soldierly qualities were of the highest order. As much cannot be said of the British artillery, which, though very bravely fought was clearly by no means as skilfully handled as was the case with the American guns. The courage of the British officers of all arms is mournfully attested by the sadly large proportion they bore to the total on the lists of the killed and wounded. An even greater meed of praise is due to the American soldiers, for it must not be forgotten that they were raw troops opposed to veterans; and, indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless care in drilling them could have brought them into shape at all. The regulars were just as good Naval War of 1 8 1 2 259 as the British, and no better. The Kentucky mihtia, who had only been 48 hours with the army and were badly armed and totally undis- ciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of New York and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, had previously shown them- selves to be. They would not stand in the open at all, and even behind a breastwork had to be mixed with better men. The Louisiana militia, fighting in defence of their homes, and well trained, behaved excehently, and behind breast- works were as formidable as the regulars. The Tennesseeans, good men to start with, and already well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, were in their own way unsurpassable as soldiers. In the open field the British regulars, owing to their greater skill in manceuvring, and to their having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans were unprovided, could in all likelihood have beaten them ; but in rough or broken ground the skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and woodsmen, would probably have given them the advantage ; while the extreme deadliness of their fire made it far more dangerous to attempt to storm a breastwork guarded by these forest riflemen than it would have been to attack the same work guarded by an equal number of the best regular troops of Europe. The American soldiers deserve great credit for doing so well ; but 26o Naval War of 1812 greater credit still belongs to Andrew Jackson, who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout heart and strong hand, stands out in history as the ablest general the United States produced, from the outbreak of the Revolution down to the beginning of the Great Rebellion. APPENDIX A TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN MEN- OF-WAR IN 1812-15 ACCORDING to Act of Congress (quoted in Niles's Register, iv., 64), the way of meas- uring double-decked or war vessels was as follows : " Measure from fore-part of main stem to after- part of stem-port, above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest part above the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be ac- counted the depth. Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth, multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth ; divide by 95; the quotient is tonnage." {i. e., If length = x, and breadth = y; Tonnage = (x - | y) X y X ^ y -> 95 Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's Shipmaster's Assistant, was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and measure dis- tance between such line and the after part of the stem-port at the load water-mark ; then measure from top of said plumb-line in parallel direction 261 262 Naval War of 1812 with the water to perpendicular point immediately over the load water-mark of the fore-part of main stem; subtract from such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is ship's extreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the load-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths of the ship's breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of keel for tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of the plank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the main wales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth is to be considered as one half the length. Tonnage will then be the length into the depth into breadth, divided by 94. Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbi- trary manner, with no regard to actual capacity or displacement ; and, moreover, what is of more im- portance, British method differed from the Amer- ican so much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominally about 15 per cent, larger than if measured by British rules. This is the ex- act reverse of the statement made by the British naval historian, James. His mistake is pardon- able, for great confusion existed on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowing the ton- nage of their own ships. When the President was captured, her officers stated that she meas- ured about 1400 tons; in reality, she measured Naval War of 1812 263 1576, American measure. Still more singular was the testimony of the officers of the Argus, who thought her to be of about 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by British meas- urement. These errors were the more excusable as they occurred also in higher quarters. The earliest notice we have about the three 44-gun frigates of the Constitution's class, is in the letter of Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddart, on December 24, 1798,' where they are expressly said to be of 1576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy list that mentions it for 40 years afterwards ; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton, in one of his letters, incidentally alludes to them as of 1444 tons. Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was changed, and their tonnage was put down as 1607. James takes the American tonnage from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1444, and states (vol. vi., p. 5) that this is equivalent to 1533 tons English. But, in reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1576; so that, even according to James's own figures, the British way of measurement made the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did; actually the difference was nearer 290 tons. James's statements as to the size of our various ships would seem to have been largely mere guess- work, as he sometimes makes them smaller and ^ American State Papers, xiv., 57. 264 Naval War of 181 2 sometimes larger than they were according to the official navy lists. Thus, the Constitution, Presi- dent, and United States, each of 1576, he puts down as of 1533; the Wasp, of 450, as of 434; the Hornet, of 480, as of 460; and the Chesa- peake, of 1244, as of 1 135 tons. On the other hand, the Enterprise, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245 ; the Argus, of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the Peacock, Frolic, etc., of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different stand- ards of measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from the British vessels, but even among the various American vessels them- selves. And there are other difficulties to be en- countered: not only were there different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements, but also there were different ways of getting what purported to be the same measurement. A ship that, according to the British method of meas- urement was of a certain length, would, according to the American method, be about 5 per cent, longer; and so, if two vessels were the same size, the American would have the greatest nominal tonnage. For example, James, in his Naval Occurrences (p. 467), gives the length of the Cyane's main-deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This same Cyane was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders from the United States navy de- partment, by Lieut. B. F. Hoffman, and in his Naval War of 1812 265 published report ' he gives, among the other dimen- sions: "Length of spar-deck, 124 feet 9 inches," and "length of gun-deck, 123 feet 3 inches." With such a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as of computing ton- nage from the measurements when taken, it is not surprising that, according to the Amer- ican method, the Cyane should have ranked as of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account of any of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statements of comparative tonnage. Thus, he makes the Hor- net 460 tons, and the Peacock and Penguin, which she at different times captured, about 388 each. As it happens, both Captain Lawrence and Captain Biddle, who commanded the Hornet in her two successful actions, had their prizes measured. The Peacock sank so rapidly that Lawrence could not get very accurate measure- ments of her; he states her to be four feet shorter and a half foot broader than the Hornet. The British naval historian, Brenton (vol. v., p. Ill), also states that they were of about the same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory evidence from Captain Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two days, and had her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, of course, final. He reports that the Penguin ^American State Papers, xiv., p. 417. 266 Naval War of 1 812 was by actual measurement two feet shorter and somewhat broader than the Hornet, and with thicker scanthng. She tonned 477, compared to the Hornet's 480 — a difference of about one half of one per cent. This testimony is cor- roborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the Epervier after she was captured by the Peacock. Those two vessels were, respec- tively, of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked on the navy lists. The American Peacock and her sister ships were very much longer than the brig-sloops of the Epervier' s class, but were no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the English sloops were broader in proportion than the American ones were ; thus, the Levant, which was to have mounted the same number of guns as the Peacock, had much more beam, and was of greater tonnage, although of rather less length. The Macedonian, when captured, ranked on our lists as of 1325 tons,^ the United States as of 1576; and they thus continued until, as I have said before, the method of measurement was changed, when the former ranked as of 1341, and the latter as of 1607 tons. James, however, makes them, respectively, 1081 and 1533. Now, to get the comparative force, he ought to have adopted the first set of measurements given, I See the work of Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the official records. Naval War of 1812 267 or else have made them 1081 and 1286. Out of the twelve single-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 3 8 -gun frigates like the Mace- donian, and seven with i8-gun brig-sloops of the Epervier's class; and, as the Macedonian and Epervier were both regularly rated in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our antagonists in those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight between the Enterprise and the Boxer, in which the latter was captured ; the Enterprise was appa- rently a little smaller than her foe, but had two more guns, which she carried in her bridle-ports. As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it comparatively, and not absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as estimated by the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels on the lakes has been already noticed. APPENDIX B PREVIOUS HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVY Very few students of naval history will deny that in 181 2 the average American ship was superior to the average British ship of the same strength; and that the latter was, in turn, su- perior to the average French ship. The expla- nation given by the victor is in each case the same: the American writer ascribes the success 268 Naval War of 1 812 of his nation to "the aptitude of the American character for the sea," and the Briton similarly writes that the "English are inherently better suited for the sea than the French." Race characteristics may have had some little effect between the last pair of combatants (although only a little), and it is possible that they some- what affected the outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form the main cause. This can best be proved by examining the com- bats of two preceding periods in which the English, French, and Americans were at war with one another. During the years 1 798-1 800, the United States carried on a desultory conflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was just built, and was rated in the most extraordinary man- ner: the Chesapeake, carrying i8-pounders, was called a 44; and the Constellation, which carried 24's, a 36; while the Washington, rating 24, was really much heavier than the Boston, rating 28. On February 9, 1799, after an hour's conflict, the Constellation captured the French frigate L'ln- surgente; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed and wounded. The Constellation car- ried but 38 guns; twenty-eight long 24's, on the main-deck, and ten long 12's on the quarter- deck, with a crew of 309 men. According to Troude (iii., 169), Llnsurgente carried twenty-six Naval War of 1812 269 long 12's, ten long 6's, and four 36-pound car- ronades; the Americans report her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus, in actual' (not nominal) weight of shot the Constellation was superior by about 80 pounds, and was in- ferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men. This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; but, of course, the long 24's of the Con- stellation made it impossible that Ulnsiirgente, armed only with long 12's, should contend with her. As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very little difference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns, repair damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details than any other French his- torian; but I think his details are generally wrong. In this case he gives the Constellation 12's instead of the 24's she really carried; and also supplies her with ten 3 2 -pound carronades — of which species of ordnance there was then not one piece in our navy. The first carronades ^ French shot was really very much heavier than the nomi- nally corresponding English shot, as the following table taken from Capt. T. L. Simmons's work on Heavy Ordnance (London, 1837, p. 62) will show: Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in of Shot English Pounds 36 lbs. 43 lbs. 4 oz. 24 " 28 " 8f " 18 " 21 " 4i ;: 12 " 14 " 7 •' 270 Naval War of 181 2 we ever had were those carried by the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed her armament, having twenty-eight long i8's on the main-deck, ten 2 4-poimd carronades on the quarter-deck ; and, I believe, six long 1 2 's on the forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered and fought a drawn battle with La Vengeance. Troude (vol. iii., pp. 201 and 216) describes the armament of the latter as twenty-six long i8's, ten long 8's, and four 3 6 -pound carron- ades. On board of her was an American prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns and 400 men (see Cooper, i., 306). The French and Amer- ican accounts thus radically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the report of the British captain, Milne, who, in the 5^w^, frigate, captured La Vengeance in the same year, and then reported her armament as being twenty-eight long iS's, sixteen long 12's, and eight 36-pound carronades, with 326 men. As the American and British ac- counts, written entirely independent of one an- other, tally almost exactly, it is evident that Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much over the Constellation' s armament. Thus, in this action, the American frigate fought a draw with an antagonist nearly as much su- perior to herself as an American 44 was to a Brit- ish 38. In November, 1800, the " 28-gun frigate, " Boston, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying twenty-four Naval War of 1812 271 long 9's on the main-deck, and on the spar- deck eight long 6's (or possibly 12-pound car- ronades) captured, after two hours' action, the French corvette Berceaii, of 24 guns, long 8's; the Boston was about the same size as her foe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about as 10 to 9. She lost 15, and the Berceau 40, men. Troude (iii., p. 219) gives the Berceau 30 guns, twenty-two long 8's, and eight 12-pound carronades. If this is true, she was in reality of equal force with the Boston. But I question if Troude really knew anything about the combat- ants; he gives the Boston (of the same size and build as the Cyane) 48 guns — a number impossible for her to carry. He continually makes the gross- est errors ; in this same (the third) volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun ship with 72 cannon, giving her a broadside fifty per cent, heavier than it should be (p. 141) ; and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of a British 3 2 -gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417). He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous. The United States schooner Experiment, of 12 guns, long 6's, and 70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted schooner La Diane, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men, and 30 passengers; and the Enterprise, the sister vessel of the Experiment, 2 72 Naval War of 1812 captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, a much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight. She was the Flam- beau, brig, of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, of whom half were killed or wounded. The Enter- prise had 3 killed and 7 wounded. Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the Americans were superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years 1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numerous single contests between vessels of Brit- ain and France, ending almost invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in each couple. The 1 2 -pounder frigate Dccdahis captured the i2-pounder frigate Prudente, of equal force. The i8-pounder frigate Syhille captured the frigate Forte, armed with 52 guns, thirty of them long 24's on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and as heavy as the Constitution. The Sybille lost 22, and the Forte 145, men killed and wounded. The i8-pounder frigate Clyde, with the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate Vestale, which lost 32. The cutter Courser, of twelve 4-pounders and 40 men, captured the privateer Guerriere, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44 men. The cutter Viper, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, captured the privateer Suret, of four- teen 4-pounders and 57 men. The i6-gun ship- sloop Peterel, with 89 men, engaged the Cerf, 14, Naval War of 1 812 273 Lejoille, 6, and Ligurienne, 16, with, in all, 240 men, and captured the Ligurienne. The 30-gun corvette Dart captured by surprise the 38-gun frigate Desiree. The Gypsy, of ten 4-poundcrs and 82 men, captured the Quidproquo, of eight guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and 98 men. The schooner Milbrook, of sixteen 18-pound carron- ades and 47 men, fought a draw with the priva- teer Bellone, of 24 long 8's and six 36-poimd carronades. Finally, six months after La Ven- geance had escaped from the Constellation (or beaten her off, as the French say) , she was cap- tured by the British frigate Seine, which threw a broadside about 30 poimds more than the Ameri- can did in her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander. Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxton, of the Constellation, accomplished what the latter failed to do. Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, while the Americans were then im- doubtedly much superior to the French, they were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British. From 1777 to 1782, the state of things was very different. The single combats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and, besides, it would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a great deal of trouble — the accounts given by Cooper, Schomberg, and VOL. II. — 18 2 74 Naval War of 1812 Troude differing so widely that they can often hardly be recognized as treating of the same events. But it is certain that the British were very much superior to the Americans. Some of the American ships behaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing from much smaller foes. Generally, the American ship was captured when opposed by an equal force — although there were some brilliant exceptions to this. With the French, things were more equal; their frigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as often they sunk or cap- tured their antagonists. Some of the most gal- lant fights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period; in 1781, the Minerve, 32, resisted the Courageous, 74, till she had lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the Bellepoule, 32, had performed a similar feat with the Nonsuch, 64, while the Capricieuse, 32, had fought for five hours before surrendering to the Prudente and Licorne, each of force equal to herself. She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists. Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them with the fight in which the British ship Glasgow, 20, beat off an American squadron of 5 ships, in- cluding two of equal force to herself, or with the time when the Ariadne, 20, and Ceres, 14, at- Naval War of 1812 275 tacked and captured without resistance the Alfred, 20, the latter ship being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her con- sort, the Raleigh, 32. At that period, the average American ship was certainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the same force, and the latter, in turn, was a little, but only a little, in- ferior to the average British ship of equal strength. Thus, in 1782, the British stood first in nautical prowess, separated but by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americans made a bad third. In 1789, the British still stood first, while the Americans had made a great stride forward, coming close on their heels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place. In 181 2, the relative positions of the British and French were unchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided step in advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the latter were ahead of the French. The explanation of these changes is not difli- cult. In 1782, the American war vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were unpractised, the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions and discipline of a regular service. At the same time the French marine was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughly trained especially, 276 Naval War of 181 2 in gunnery, by a long course of service on the sea. In courage, and in skill in the manage- ment of guns, musketry, etc., they were the full equals of their English antagonists; their slight average inferiority in seamanship may, it is pos- sible, be fairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that, when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboard are apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen.) In 1799, the revolution had de- prived the French of all their best officers, had let the character of the marine run down and the discipline of the service become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to frightful re- verses, and these, in turn, prevented the charac- ter of the service from recovering its former tone. Meanwhile, the Americans had established for the first time a regular navy, and, as there was ex- cellent material to work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant and arduous ser- vice, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the most unflagging attention to practical seaman- ship and gunnery, had, in 181 2, raised it far above even the high English standard. During all these three periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not fall off, but at least kept its position ; the French, on the contrary, did fall off, while the American navy advanced, by great strides, to the first place. Naval War of 1812 277 APPENDIX C After my work was in press I, for the first time, came across Prof. J. J'iusscll Soley's Naval Campaign of 1812, in the " I'roceedings of the United States Naval Institute," for October 20, 1881. It is, apparently, the precursor of a more extended history. Had I known that such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work of this kind, I certainly should not have at- tempted it myself. In several points our accounts differ. In the action with the Guerribre his diagram differs from mine, chiefly in his making the Constitution steer in a more direct line, while I have repre- sented her as shifting her course several times in order to avoid being raked, bringing the wind first on her port and then on her starboard quarter. My account of the number of the crew of the Guerriere is taken from the Constitution's muster book (in the Treasury Department at Washington) , which contains the names of all the British pris- oners received aboard the Constitution after the fight. The various writers used "larboard" and "starboard" with such perfect indifference, in speaking of the closing and the loss of the Guer- rihes mizzenmast, that I hardly knew which ac- count to adopt ; it finally seemed to me that the only way to reconcile the conflicting statements 278 Naval War of 181 2 was by making the mast act as a rudder, first to keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and then to bring her up into it. If this was the case, it deadened her speed, and prevented Dacres from keeping his ship yard-arm and yard-arm with the foe, though he tried to steady his course with the helm; but, in this view, it rather delayed Hull's raking than helped him. If Professor Soley's ac- count is right, I hardly know what to make of the statement in one of the American accounts that the Constitution "luffed across the enemy's bow," and of Cooper's statement (in Putnam's Magazine) that the Guerriere's bowsprit pressed against the Constitution's "lee or port quarter." In the action of the Wasp with the Frolic, I have adopted James's statement of the latter's force; Professor Soley follows Captain Jones's letter, which gives the brig three additional guns and 18 pounds more metal in broadside. My reason for following James was that his account of the Frolic's force agrees with the regular armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her two carronades on the topgallant forecastle, which must certainly be a mistake ; he makes her chase- guns long 12's, but all the other British brigs carried 6's; he also gives her another gim in broadside, which he calls a 12 -pounder, and Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father) a 3 2 -pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps Naval War of 1 812 279 be counted in; I excluded it because the two American officials differed in their account of it, because I did not know through what port it could be fought, and because James asserted that it was dismounted and lashed to the forecastle. The Wasp left port with 138 men ; subtracting the pilot and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number on board during the action. As the bat- tle was fought, I doubt if the loss of the brig's main-yard had much effect on the result ; had it been her object to keep on the wind, or had the loss of her after-sails enabled her antagonist to cross her stem (as in the case of the Argus and Pelican) , the accident could fairly be said to have had a decided effect upon the contest. But, as a short time after the fight began the vessels were running nearly free, and as the Wasp herself was greatly injured aloft at the time, and made no effort to cross her foe's stern, it is difficult to see that it made much difference. The brig's head- sails were all right, and, as she was not close- hauled, the cause of her not being kept more under command was probably purely due to the slaughter on her decks. Professor Soley represents the combat of the States and Macedonian as a plain yard-arm and yard-arm action after the first forty minutes. I have followed the English authorities and make it a running fight throughout. If Professor Soley is 28o Naval War of 1812 right, the enormous disparity in loss was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the American fire ; according to my diagram, the chief cause was the incompetency of the Macedonian's commander. In one event, the difference was mainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was mainly in the tactical skill of the captains. The question is merely as to how soon Garden, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was en- abled to close with Decatur. I have represented the closing as taking place later than Professor Soley has done ; very possibly, I am wrong. Could my work now be rewritten, I think I should adopt his diagram of the action of the Macedonian. But in the action with the Java, it seems to me that he is mistaken. He has here followed the British accounts; but they are contradicted by the American authorities, and, besides, have a very improbable look. When the Constitution came round for the second time, on the port tack, James declares the Java passed directly across her stern, almost touching, but that the British crew, overcome by astonishment or awe, did not fire a shot; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvre was repeated. When this incident is said to have occurred the Java's crew had been hard at work fighting the guns for half an hour, and they con- tinued for an hour and a half afterward ; it is im- possible to believe that they would have forborne Naval War of 1 812 281 to fire more than one gun when in such a superb position for inflicting damage. Even had the men been struck with temporary limacy, the offi- cers alone would have fired some of the guns. Moreover, if the courses of the vessels were such as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram, the Java would herself have been previously ex- posed to a terrible raking fire, which was not the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, per se, a decidedly apochryphal look; and, besides, they are flatly contradicted by the American accounts which state distinctly that the Java remained to windward in every portion of the fight. On this same tack Professor Soley represents the Java as forereaching on the Constitution; I have reversed this. At this time, the Java had been much cut up in her rigging and aloft generally, while the Constitution had set much additional sail, and in consequence the latter forged ahead and wore in the smoke unperceived. When the ships came foul. Professor Soley has drawn the Consti- tution in a position in which she would receive a most destructive stem rake from her antagonist's whole broadside. The positions could not have been as there represented. The Java's bowsprit came foul in the Constitution's mizzen-rigging and as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former gradually round till, when they separated, tlie ships were in a head and stem line. Commodore 282 Naval War of 1812 Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once "kept away to avoid being raked," while the loss of the headsails aboard the Java would cause the latter to come up in the wind, and the two ships would again be running parallel, with the American to leeward. I have already discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in this instance, the British report of their own force and loss. This was the last defeat that the British officially reported; the admiralty were smarting with the sting of successive disasters and anxious at all costs to put the best possible face on affairs (as wit- ness Mr. Croker's response to Lord Dundonald's speech in the House). There is every reason for believing that in this case the reports were gar- bled; exactly as, at a later date, the official corre- spondence preceding the terrible disaster at Cabul was tampered with before being put before the public (see McCarthy's History of our Own Times). It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action between the Hornet and Peacock, although it was so short, the accounts contradicting one another as to which ship was to windward and which on the " larboard tack" ; and I do not know if I have cor- rectly represented the position of the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Conner reported the number of men aboard the Hornet fit for duty as 135 ; Lawrence says she had eight absent in a prize and seven too sick to be at quarters. This Naval War of 1 812 28 J would make an original complement of 150, and tallies exactly with the number of men left on the Hornet after the action was over, as mentioned by- Lawrence in his account of the total number of souls aboard. The log-book of the Hornet just be- fore starting on her cruise states her entire com- plement as 158; but four of these were sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of four men, but during the course of the cruise nothing would be more likely than that four men should be gotten rid of, either by sickness, desertion, or dis- missal. At any rate, the discrepancy is very trivial. In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have probably overestimated the number of the Hor- net's crew; this seems especially likely when it is remembered that toward the close of the war our vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlier in the contest. If such is the case, the Hornet and the Penguin were of almost exactly equal force My own comments upon the causes of our success, upon the various historians of the war, etc., are so similar to those of Professor Soley, that I almost feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism; yet I never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But, in commenting on the actions of 181 2, I think the Professor has laid too much stress on the difference in "dash" between the combatants. The Wasp bore down with perfect confidence to 284 Naval War of 181 2 engage an equal foe ; and the Hornet could not tell till the Peacock opened fire that the latter was inferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostile vessel. In the action with the Guerriere it was Hull and not Dacres who acted boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and trying to keep it at long range for some time. In this fight it must be remembered that neither foe knew the exact force of the other until the close work began ; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. So with the Macedonian; James par- ticularly says that she did not know the force of her foe, and was confident of victory. The Java, however, must have known that she was to en- gage a superior force. In neither of the first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chance to display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory was won with such ease. But in each case they entered as bravely, al- though by no means as rashly or foolishly, into the fight as their antagonists did. It must always be remembered that, until this time, it was by no means proved that 24-pounders were better guns than i8's to put on frigates; exactly as, at a little later date, it was vigorously contended that 4 2 -pounders were no more effective guns for two- deckers than 3 2 -pounders were. Till 181 2, there had been no experience to justify the theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that, in Naval War of 1812 285 the first five actions, it cannot be said that the British showed any especial courage in beginning the fight ; it was more properly to be called igno- rance. After the fight was once begun, they cer- tainly acted very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate nature of the Frolic's defence has never been surpassed. But, admitting this is a very different thing from admitting that the British fought more bravely than their foes; the combatants were about on a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems to me, were always to the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were ; on each side there were few over-cautious men, such as Commodore Rod- gers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains on Lake Ontario, the commander of the Bonne Citoyenne, and, perhaps. Commodore Decatur; but, as a rule, either side jumped at the chance of a fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and common sense, not one of timidity. The United States did not " avoid close action" from over-cau- tion, but simply to take advantage of her oppo- nent's rashness. Hull's approach was as bold as it was skilful; had the opponent to leeward been the Endymion instead of the Guerribre, her 24- pounders would not have saved her from the fate that overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the Americans were as bold in begin- ning action, and as stubborn in continuing it, as 286 Naval War of 1 812 were their foes — although no more so. Neither side can claim any superiority on the average, though each can, in individual cases, as regards courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. A prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be looked upon as exceptionally brainless, not as exceptionally brave ; yet such a case is almost ex- actly parallel to that of the captain of the Mace- donian. APPENDIX D In the Historical Register of the United States (edited by T. H. Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), vol. i., p. 105 (State Papers), is a letter from Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to Master-commandant Wm. U. Crane, both of the Nautilus, dated Sep- tember 13, 1 81 2, in which he says that, of the six men imprisoned by the British on suspicion of being of English birth, four were native-bom Americans, and two naturalized citizens. He also gives a list of six men who deserted, and en- tered on the Shannon, of whom two were Ameri- can born — the birthplaces of the four others not being given. Adding these last, we still have but six men as the number of British aboard the Nautilus. It is thus seen that the crack frigate Shannon had American deserters aboard her — Naval War of 1812 287 although these probably formed a merely trifling fraction of her crew, as did the British deserters aboard the crack frigate Constitution. On p. 108, is a letter of December 17, 1812, from Geo. S. Wise, purser of the Wasp, stating that twelve of that ship's crew had been detained "under the pretence of their being British sub- jects"; so that nine per cent, of her crew may have been British — or the proportion may have been very much smaller. On p. 117, is a letter of January 14, 18 13, from Commodore J. Rodgers, in which he states that he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M. ships Moselle and Sappho, taken out of the captured packet Swallow ; and that these muster-rolls show that in August, 181 2, one eighth of the crews of the Moselle and Sappho was composed of Americans. These various letters thus support strongly the conclusions reached on a former page as to the proportion of British deserters on American vessels. In A Biographical Memoir of the late Commo- dore Joshua Barney, from Aiitographical Notes and Journals (edited by Mary Barney, Boston, 1832), on pages 263 and 315, are descriptions of the flotilla destroyed in the Patuxent. It consisted of one gunboat, carrying a long 24; one cutter, car- rying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-pound 288 Naval War of 1 812 carronad.es; and thirteen row-barges, each carry- ing a long 18 or 12 in the bow, with a 3 2 -pound or 18-pound carronade in the stern. On page 256, Barney's force in St. Leonard's creek, is described as consisting of one sloop, two gunboats, and thirteen barges, with, in all, somewhat over 500 men; and it is claimed that the flotilla drove away the blockading frigates entirely unaided, the infantry force on shore rendering no assistance. The work is of some value, as showing that James had more than doubled the size, and almost doubled the strength, of Barney's various gun- boats. It may be mentioned, that on page 108, Commo- dore Barney describes the Dutch-American frigate South Carolina, which carried a crew of 550 men, and was armed with twenty-eight long 42's on the main deck, and twelve long 12's on the-spar deck. She was far heavier than any of our 44-gun frig- ates of 181 2, and an overmatch for anything un- der the rank of a 74. This gives further emphasis to what I have already stated — that the dis- tinguishing feature of the War of 1 8 1 2 is not the introduction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frig- ates had been in use among various nations for thirty years previously, but the fact that for the first time the heavy frigate was used to the best possible advantage. Naval War of 1812 289 APPENDIX E In the last edition of James's Naval History of Great Britain, published in London, in 1886, by- Richard Bentley & Son, there is an appendix by Mr. H. T. Poweh, devoted to the War of 181 2, mainly to my account thereof. Mr. Powell begins by stating with naive solem- nity that "most British readers will be surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the infinite pains taken by William James to render his history a monument of accuracy, and notwithstanding the exposure he brought upon contemporary misstate- ments, yet to this day the Americans still dis- pute his facts. " It is difficult to discuss seriously any question with a man capable of writing down in good faith such a sentence as the above. James (unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly well how to be accurate ; but if Mr. Powell will read the comments on his accounts which I have ap- pended to the description of almost every battle, he will see that James stands convicted beyoijd possibility of doubt, not merely of occasional in- accuracies or errors, but of the systematic, malici- ous, and continuous practice of every known form of wilful misstatement, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestion of the false to the lie direct. To a man of his character, the tempta- tion was irresistible; for when he came to our VOL. II. — ig 290 Naval War of 181 2 naval war, he had to appear as the champion of the beaten side and to explain away defeat in- stead of chronicling victory. The contemporary American writers were quite as boastful and im- truthful. No honorable American should at this day endorse their statements; and, similarly, no reputable Englishman should permit his name to be associated in any way with James's book without explicitly disclaiming all share in, or sym- pathy with, its scurrilous mendacity. Mr. Powell's efforts to controvert my state- ments can be disposed of in short order. He first endeavors to prove that James was right about the tonnage of the ships ; but all that he does is to show that his author gave for the English frigates and sloops the correct tonnage by English and French rules. This I never for a moment disputed. What I said was that the comparative tonnage of the various pairs of combatants, as given by James, was all wrong; and this Mr. Powell does not even discuss. James applied one system cor- rectly to the English vessels ; but he applied quite another to the American (especially on the lakes) . Mr. Powell actually quotes Admiral Chads as a witness, because he says that his father con- sidered James's account of the Java's fight ac- curate; if he wishes such testimony, I can produce many relatives of the Perrys, Porters, and Rodgerses of 181 2, who insist that I have Naval War of 1812 291 done much less than justice to the American side. He says I passed over silently James's schedule of dimensions of the frigates and sloops. This is a mistake ; I showed by the testimony of Captains Biddle and Warrington and Lieutenant Hoffman that his comparative measurements (the absolute measurements being of no consequence) for the American and British sloops are all wrong; and the same holds true of the frigates. Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot exactly as he does with the tonnage — that is, he seeks to show what the absolute weight of the British shot was; but he does not touch upon the point at issue, the comparative weight of the British and American shot. When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. Powell is driven to conclude that what I aver must be accurate, because he thinks the Confiance was the size of the General Pike (instead of half as large again; she mounted 30 guns in battery on her main-deck, as against the Pike's 26, and stood to the latter as the Constellation did to the Essex), and because an American writer (very properly) expresses dissatisfaction with Commo- dore Chauncy! What ]\Ir. Powell thinks this last statement tends to prove would be difficult to say. In the body of my work I go into the minute details of the strength of the combatants in the lake action ; I clearly show that James was guilty 292 Naval War of 1 8i 2 of gross and wilful falsification of the truth ; and no material statement I make can be successfully controverted. So much for Mr. Powell. But a much higher authority, Mr. Frank Chiswell, has recently pub- lished some articles which tend to show that my conclusions as to the tonnage of the sea vessels (not as to the lake vessels, which are taken from different sources) are open to question. In the appendix to my first edition I myself showed that it was quite impossible to reconcile all the different statements ; that the most that could be done was to take one method and apply it all through, admitting that even in this way it would be impossible to make all the cases square with one another. Mr. Chiswell states that "the American ton- nage measurements, properly taken, never could give results for frigates varying largely from the EngUsh tonnage." But a statement like this is idle; for the answer to the "never could" is that they did. If Mr. Chiswell will turn to James's Naval Occurrences, he will find the Chesapeake set down as of 1135 tons, and the Macedonian as of 1081 ; but in the American navy lists, which are those I followed, the Chesapeake is put down as of 1244 tons. A simple appHcation of the rule of three shows that even if I accepted James's figures, I would be obliged to consider the Mace- Naval War of 1812 293 donian as of about 1185 tons, to make her cor- respond with the system I had adopted for the American ships. But this is not all. James gives the length of the Macedonian as 154 feet 6 inches. In the Navy Department at Washington are two plans of the Macedonian. One is dated 181 7, and gives her length as 157 ft. 3 in. This difference in measurement would make a difference of 20 odd tons; so that by the American mode she must certainly have been over 1200 tons, instead of under iioo, as by the British rules. The second plan in the Navy Department, much more elab- orate than the first, is dated 1829, and gives the length as 164 ft.; it is probably this that Em- mons and the United States Navy lists have fol- lowed — as I did myself in calling the tonnage of the Macedonian 1325. Since finding the plan of 181 7, however, I think it possible that the other refers to the second vessel of the name, which was built in 1832. If this is true, then the Macedonian (as well as the Guerriere and Java) should be put down as about 120 tons less than the measurements given by Emmons and adopted by me; but even if this is so, she must be considered as tonning over 1200, using the method I have applied to the Chesapeake. Therefore, adopting the same system that I ap- plied to the American 38-gun frigates, the British 294 Naval War of 1812 38-gun frigates were of over 1200 not tinder iioo tons. As for the Cyane, James makes her but 118 ft. and 2 in. long, while the American Peacock he puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieutenant Hoffman's official report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in., and the plans in the State Department at Washing- ton make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. in length. I care nothing for the different methods of meas- uring different vessels; what I wish to get at is the comparative measurement, and this stands as above. The comparative tonnage is thus the very reverse of that indicated by James's figures. Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them some ten feet shorter than the American ship- sloops. In the Washington archives I can find no plan on record of the measurements of the captured Epervier; but in the Navy Department, volume X of the Letters of Masters-Command- ant, 18 14, under date of May 12th, is the state- ment of the Surveyor of the Port of Charleston that she measured 467 tons (in another place it is given as 477). James makes her 388; but as he makes the American Wasp 434, whereas she stands on our list as of 450, the application of the same rule as with the frigates gives us, even taking his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when meas- ured as our ships were. But the measurements of the Surveyor of the Port who examined the Eper- Naval War of 1812 295 vier are corroborated by the statements of Capt. Biddle, who captured her sister brig, the Pen- guin. Biddle reported that the latter was two feet shorter and a httle broader than his own ship, the Hornet, which was of 480 tons. This would correspond almost exactly with the Sur- veyor's estimate. It still seems impossible to reconcile all these conflicting statements ; but I am inclined to think that, on the whole, in the sea (not the lake) vessels I have put the British tonnage too high. On the scale I have adopted for the American 44-gun and 38-gun frigates, and i8-gun sloops like the Hornet and Wasp, the British 38-gun frigates ought to be put down as of a little over 1200, and the British i8-gun sloops as of between 400 and 450 tons. In other words, of the twelve single-ship actions of the war, five — those of the Chesapeake and Shannon, Enterprise and Boxer, Wasp and Frolic, Hornet and Peacock, Hornet and Penguin — were between vessels of nearly equal size ; in six, the American was the superior about in the proportion of five to four (rather more in the case of the frigates, rather less in the case of the brigs) ; and in one, that of the Argus and Pelican, the British sloop was the bigger, in a somewhat similar ratio. This correction would be in favor of the British. But in a more important particular, I think I have 296 Naval War of 181 2 done injustice to the Americans. I should have allowed for the short weight of American metal on the lakes, taking off seven per cent, from the nominal broadsides of Perry and Macdonough ; for the American ordnance was of exactly the same quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the British was brought over from England, and must have shown the same superiority that ob- tained on the sea-going ships. Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that both the Guerribre and the Java, which were originally French ships, still carried French i8's on their main-deck, and that, therefore, about 20 pounds should be added to the broadside weight of metal of each. The American accounts stated this to be the case in both instances ; but I paid no heed to them until my attention was called to the fact that the English had captured enormous quantities of French cannon and shot and cer- tainly used the captured ordnance on some of their ships. In writing my history, I have had to deal with a mass of confused and contradictory testimony, which it has sometimes been quite impossible to reconcile, the difficulty being greatly enhanced by the calculated mendacity of James and some others of the earlier writers, both American and British. Often I have had to simply balance probabilities, and choose between two sets of fig- Naval War of 1812 297 ures, aware that, whichever I chose, much cnulrl be said against the choice. It has, therefore, been quite impossible to avoid errors ; but I am con- fident they have been as much in favor of the British as the Americans; and in all important points my statements are substantially accurate. I do not believe that my final conclusions on the different fights can be disputed. James asserts that the American ships were officered by cun- ning cowards, and manned, to the extent of half their force in point of efTectiveness, by renegade British. I show that the percentage of non- American seamen aboard the American ships was probably but little greater than the percentage of non-British seamen aboard the British ships ; and as for the charges of cowardice, there were but two instances in which it could be fairly urged against a beaten crew — that of the British Epervier and that of the American Argus (for the cases of Sir George Collier, Commodore Rodgers, Chauncy, Yeo, the commander of the Bonne Citoyenne, etc., cannot be considered as coming under this head). James states that there was usually a great superiority of force on the side of the Amer- icans this is true; but I show that it was not nearly as great as he makes it, and that in deal- ing with the lake flotillas his figures are absolutely false, to the extent of even reversing the relative strength of the combatants on Lake Champlain, 298 Naval War of 181 2 where the Americans won, although with an in- ferior force. In the one noteworthy British vic- tory, that of the Shannon, all British authors fail to make any allowance for the vital fact that the Shannon's crew had been drilled for seven years, whereas the Chesapeake had an absolutely new crew, and had been out of port just eight hours ; yet such a difference in length of drill is more im- portant than disparity in weight of metal. As a whole, it must be said that both sides showed equal courage and resolution; that the Americans usually possessed the advantage in material force; and that they also showed a de- cided superiority in fighting skill, notably in markmanship. INDEX Abeille, i., 258 Aboukir, i., 29, 67 Acasta, i., 54, 69, 90, 101, ii., 173-177, . , , , Accurate firing of the Amen- cans, i., 206 d'Ach6, ii., loi Achille, i., 51 Adams, i., 66, 78, 88, 89; ii., 23. 35. 63. 198; cruise, ii.. 63; chased by Tigress, ii., 64, 65; curious sailing qualities resulting from be- ing built by contract, ii., 65; grounds on Isle of Haute, ii., 66; attacked by British in Penobscot, ii., 66; burned by Captain Morris, ii., 67 Adams, Chaplain, ii., 34 Adams, Lieutenant, i., 278 Adirondack region, i., 170 Adonis, ii., 60 Molus, i., 90, 103, 107, 108 jEtna, i., 121, 123 Africa, i., 54, 90, loi, 103, 107, 108 Alacrity, i., 258 Albion, ii., 42 Alert, i., 99, 100, 168; cap- tured by Essex, i., 100 Alexandria, i., 214, 215 Alexandria surrenders to British, ii., 44, 45 Alfred, ii., 162 Alison, Sir A., ii., 121 Allen, ii., 115 Allen, Lieut. U. H., i., 251 Allen, Lieut. W. H., on United States, i. , 140 ; com- mander of Argus, {., 250, 253,255; ii.,203; mortally wounded, i., 250 Alligator, i., 267; ii., 8, 9, 75; futile attempt to cut her out, ii., 9 ; sunk in a squall, ii., 9 Almy, Sailing-master T. C, i., 318 Alwyn, Master J. C, i., 113, "4. 152 Ambuscade, i., 237 Amelia Island, ii., 40 Americans accused of treach- ery, i., 228 American gunboats employed in protecting coasting trade, i., 241, 242; futile attack on British vessels, i., 243; lesson taught by their failure, i., 266 American loss in all, ii., 197- 199 r. , . American navy, confidence m itself, i., 35 ; esprit de corps of its officers, i., 35; life- long training of sailors, i., 36; great effectiveness and reasons for it, i., 37; no im- pressment, i., 44; vessels not "largely manned by British sailors," i., 46-55; proportion of officers fur- nished by different States 299 300 Index American navy — Continued and sections, i., 55; ton- nage, i., 56; navy yards, i., 57; statistics of officers and seamen, i., 57; list of vessels, tonnage, and de- scription, i., 59-63; com- pared with British navy, i., 64; charges of under- rating, i., 65-70; unques- tionable superiority in force, i., 74; effectiveness due to small size, i., 75; crew of a '44, i., 84; of an i8-gun ship, i., 84; tabu- lated comparison of three British and three American vessels, i. , 86 ; superior dis- cipline of Americans, i., 164; officers better paid and of a better class, i., 164; American navy gave more damage than it re- ceived, ii., 196 American naval officers, rea- sons for their superiority, ii., 204-205; ignorance of army officers and men, ii., 212—213 American privateers cut out by British squadron, i., 210—2 12 American Revolution, fleet actions of British with Europeans mostly inde- cisive during war of, ii., 105 American sailors, compared with British, i., 43; of better material for man-of- war's crew than British, ii., 204; on Guerricre, i., 119 American sharpshooters, i., 164 American State Papers, i., 25, 59. 312; ii., 38, 80, 116 American vessels built and captured or destroyed in i8i2,i., 168; prizes made, i., 169; in 1813, i., 256- 267; in 1814, ii., 143; in 1815, ii., 193-195, sum- mary, ii., 192-196; make- shifts in use of merchant schooners, i., 176 American whalers, i., 43 American writings miscalled histories, i., 301 Amherst Bay, i., 295 Amherstburg, i., 309, 310 Anglo-French naval war, ii., 207; comparative force and loss, ii., 208-210 Angus, Lieut. S., i., 248, ii., 108; leads disastrous ex- pedition against Red House barracks, i., 193- 194 Anjier, ii., 188 AppUng, Major, ii., 96-97 Arab, i., 211-212 Arbuthnot, Admiral, victory over B arras off Chesa- peake, ii., 105 Arbuthnot, Capt. J., ii., 56 Argo, i., 132 Argus, i., 5, 48, 79, 86, 90, 119, 131, 195, 203, 249- 258, 265-267; h., 39, 40 45,82,199,200; makes six prizes, i., 131; engagement with Pelican, i., 250; is captured by her, i., 252; comparative force and loss, i., 252-254; not an action creditable to Americans, i., 254; diagram of ac- tion, i., 254; charges against her crew, i., 255; powder alleged to be bad, i., 255; comparison with previous combats, i., 256; inferiority of beaten crew unaccountable, i., 257 Index 301 Ariel, i., 309. 3". 3^5> 3i8- 321, 325. 327. 328; u., 109 Ar)nada, ii., 55 Arynide, ii., 74 Armstrong, Lieutenant, ii., 187 Arundel, Sailing-master, 1., 188; wounded and drowned, i., 189 Asp, i., 187, 247, 267, 271, 278, 281, 289, 296-299, 302, 311; ii., 197; cutout by boats from Mohawk and Contest, I., 247 Aspinwall, Lieutenant, i., 283 Astrea, i., 144 Atalanta, ii., 60 Atlas, ii., 164 Austrians, i., 74 Autobiography of a Seaman, i., 4. 157 Avon, i., 82, 254, 256, 257; ii., 56-59.62. 83, 172, 201; chased by Wasp, ii., 56; captured after short and furious engagement, ii., 58; sinks, ii., 59 Aylwin, ii., 115 Ayscough, Sir G., i., 66 Azores, i., 213 Badajos, ii., 235; instance of cruelty of British troops at, ii-. 243 Bainbridge, Commodore, 1., 45, 62, 146, 148, 150. 152, 154. 155. 157. 159.' ^^^' 165, 221, 223, 239; 11., 108, 151. 203 Bainbridge, Master J., 11., 34 Baker, Captain, ii., 45 Ballahou, ii., 41, 82 Ballard, ii., 115 Ballard, Lieutenant, ii., 169, 174, 177 Baltic, battle of, 1., 28, 336 Baltimore, i., 210; ii., 41, 73, 161, 162; unsuccessfully attacked by British, i., 11; ii., 46 Barbadoes, i., 265; ii., 35, 41 Barclay, Capt. R. H., i., 79, 85- 273, 306, 317, 331, 332, 336, 339; ii-. 114; com- mander of British forces on Lake Erie, i., 309-311; description of his squadron and crews, i., 311-315; engagement with Perry, i-. 317-320; severely wounded, i., 321 Barnegat, i., 102 Barney, Commodore J., i., 50; ii., 42, 44; errone- ously called an Irishman, ii., 41; attacks Albion and Dragon with flotilla, ii., 42, 43 Barnwell, Saihng-master, 11., 20 Barossa, i., 244; ii., 163 B arras, Admiral, ii., 105 Barrie, Sir R., relieved by Rear-Admiral Cochrane, ii-, 3 Barry, Captain, 11., 67 Bartholomew, Captain, ii., 191, 192; wanton attack on American gunboat, ii., 192 Bartlett, Purser, ii., 189, 190 Bassett, Sailing-master, ii., 8; promoted to Ueutenancy, ii., 9 Bastard, Capt. J., i., loi Batailles Navales de la France, see Gravidre, i., 121 Bathurst, Earl, ii., 238 Baynes, Adj.-Gen. E.,i., 284, 3^3y 31.4 . Bayonnaise, 1., 237 Beale, G., Jr., ii., 116 Bell, Lieutenant, ii., 134 302 Index Belvidera, i., 8i, 90-95, 10 1, 103, 106-108, 210; engage- ment with President, i., 91- 95 ^ ^ .. Bentham, Capt. G., 11., 68 Beresford, i., 272, 285, 306; ii., 88 Beresford, Capt. J. P., i., 130 Bermuda Royal Gazette, ii., Bermudas, 1., 132, 199; u., 165 Biddle, Captam, 1., 126, 130, 216; ii., 108, 14s, 178, 179, 182, 184, 187, 203 Bignall, Lieut. G., i., 318, 325 Big Salmon River, 11., 95 Big Sandy Creek, ii., 95, 96 Bingham, Captain, i., 8 Black Rock, i., 192 Black Snake, ii., 97, 143 Bladensburg, i., 11, 212; "•> 43 Blaeny, Lieutenant, n., 93 Blake's victory over Dutch, i., 336, 340 Blakely, Capt. J., i., 50, 82; ii-, 34, 47- 49-51, 53-60, 85, 203 Bland, Quartermaster F., ii., 20 Blockade of American coast, strictness of, ii., i Blucher, ii., 152 Blyth, Capt. S., i., 260; ii., 203; killed, i., 261; great personal courage and hu- manity, i., 263 Boarding nettings boiled in pitch, i., 198 Boasting on both sides, ii., 4 Bombay, i., 210 Bonne Citoyenne, i., 145, 159, 202, 221 ; ii., 184, Borgne, Lake, ii., 74, 158 Boston, i., 59; ii., 197 Boston, i., 109, 159, 165, 199; ii., 8, 145, 161, 165 Boston Gazette, i., 156 Boston Harbor, ii., 209 Boston Lighthouse, i., 222 Bowyer, Fort, ii., 68 Boyer, Fort, ii., 253 Boxer, i., 260, 262-264, 267; ii., 81, 115, 140, 156, 200, 296; engagement with Enterprise, i., 260-262; is captured, i., 262 Brailesford, Midshipman, i,, ^94 Braimer, Captain, ii., 58 Brant, ii., 160 Breckenbridge, Lieutenant, i., 245 Brenton's Naval History, i., 16, 17, 46, 47, 50, 51, 77, 91, 113, 142, 145. 157. .300; ii. , 1 2 8 ; its inaccuracy, i. , 1 7 Brest, i., 265 Brine, Captain, ii., 54 Bristol, ii., 161 British accused of brutality, i., 228; ii., 242-243 British Admiralty report, i., 53 British Infantry, u., 245, 258 British loss, summary, ii., 197, 207-210, 250, 251; balance of loss against the British, ii., 199 British navy, its great pres- tige at opening of war, i., 122; numbered a thousand vessels, ii., 199 British officers hampered by red tape, ii., 204 British vessels captured or destroyed in 181 2, i., 168; in 1813, i., 267; in 1814, ii., 82, 83; in 1815, ii., 195; total loss, ii., 197, 198; vessels on great lakes, in- experience of crews, i., 172 Index 303 British whalers in Pacific, i., 200 Broke, Capt. P. V., afterward Admiral, i., 43, 76, 102, 109, 116, 219—228, 233— 236; ii., 3, 84, 203-204; memoir of, i., 76; his chivalric challenge of Law- rence, i., 221; gallant con- duct in engagement against Chesapeake, i., 221-230 Brooks, Lieutenant, mortally wounded, i., 322, 325 Broom, Lieut. J., killed, i., 226 Brown, Capt. T., ii., 4 Brown, Gen. J., i., 283; ii., 92, 99, loi, 102 Brown, Lieutenant, i., 188, 278; ii., 96 Brutality of British troops, i., 197 Buchan, Lieut. E., i., 318: dangerously wounded, i., 321. 3?S Budd, Lieut. C, ii., 192 Budd, Lieut. G., i., 221, 226, 227 Bulger, Lieutenant, ii., no, III Bunker Hill, i., 41 Bureau of Navigation, i., 52 Burleton, Admiral SirG.,ii., 186 Burlington Heights, ii., 99 "Burlington Races," i., 306 Burrows, ii., 115 Burrows, Lieut. W., Com. of the Enterprise, i., 260; ii., 203; mortally wounded, i., 262; his gallant conduct and great popularity, i., 262, 263 Bush, Lieutenant, i., 113 Byng, Capt. H. D., i., 247 Byron, Capt. R., i., 91-95, loi, 109, 210; ii., 203 Calder, Sir R., i., 294 Caledonia, i., 173, 190, 192, 193, 282, 308, 311, 315, 317-325. 327- 328; n., 109, III, 198; and four schoon- ers brought into Lake Erie, i., 282 Caledonia, British privateer, captured by Norwich, i., 212 Call, William, ii., 17 Callao, i., 200 Campaign on the lakes, a fair account difficult, i., 175 Campbell, Commodore H. G., i., 240; ii., 68, 71, 191 Campbell, Master's Mate J., i-. 317 Camperdown, victory of Lord Duncan, i., 28, 337 "Canada must be con- quered," i., 9 Canadian colonies feebly de- fended, i., 9 Canadians, alleged cowardice of, i., 181 Canary Islands, i., 198; ii.,63 Captains' Letters, i., 102, 218, 223, 240; ii., 159, 160, 183, 191 Carden, Capt. J. S., i., 134- 136, 139-143; "■- 23; a poor commander, i., 139 Carnation, i., 258; ii., 68, 69 Caroband Bank, i., 202 Carolina, i., 53, 168; ii., 74, 79. 157. 219, 224, 225, 228, 232 Carolinas, i., 196; ii., 144 Carroll, Major-General, ii., 221, 240, 249. Carron, ii., 68 Cassin, Lieutenant - Com- mander, i., 24s; ii., 115, 134. 142 Castilian, ii., 59 Castlereagh, Lord, i., 53 304 Index Castine, ii., 66 Cathcart, Captain, i., 214 Centipede, i., 246; ii., 115, 140 Chads, Lieut. H. C, i., 147, 149, 151, 154-156, 158 Chameleon, i., 157 Champlain, Lake, i., 171, 174, 176, 180, 186; Battle of, i., 180, :i^T„ 334, 338. 341; ii., 113, 121, 197 Champlin, Sailing-master, i., 318, 324; ii., no. III Chandeleur Islands, ii., 74, 216 Charlestown, i., 223, 264 Charwell, ii., 88, 90, 91, 112 Chasseur, ii., 162-164, 195; American privateer, chased by Barossa, ii., 163; mis- takes St. Lawrence for merchantman and engages her, ii., 163 Chauncy, Commodore L, i., 82, 177, 186, 191, 235, 279, 282, 285, 287-289, 291-293; ii., 86-91, 198; commander of forces on Ontario, i., 186; at Sackett's Harbor, i., 188; attacks Royal George, i., 188; takes York, i., 279, and Fort George, i., 280; in action with Yeo does not compare favorably, i., 291, 292; advantage from long guns, i., 296; his account of action near Genesee River, i., 296; engagement in York Bay, i., 297-303; partial victory off Burling- ton, i., 299; criticised as a commander, i., 307, 308; blockades Kingston, ii., 98; refuses to co-operate with Gen. Brown, ii., 100, 104; does not make best use of his materials, ii., 104; not deserving of praise given him, ii., 107 Chauncy, Lieut. W., i., 278, 286 Chauncy's squadron on On- tario compared with Yeo's i., 271-273 Cherub, \\., 10-16, 18, 21, 27, 29-31 Chesapeake, i., 4, 51, 52, 83, 85, 8g, 130, 139, 182, 198, 216, 220—226, 228—231, 233-237. 254, 266, 267; ii., 172, 199, 200; refitted out at Boston, inexperienced crew and new officers, i., 216; armament, i., 220; engagement with Shannon, i., 221-230; captured by her, i., 228; diagram of action, i., 229 Chesapeake Bay, i., 196, 210; Chesapeake River, i., 102; ii., 3, 105, 145, 194 Chevrette, i., 158 Childers, ii., 68 Chili, ii., 105 Chippeway, i., 173, 180, 314, 316, 317, 319, 321, 324, 327, 328, 343: 11-. 81 Chlorinde, i., 122 Chubb, i., 182, 343; ii., 118, 119, 131, 132, 136, 141, 143 Ciudad Rodrigo, ii., 235, 243 Claxton, Lieutenant, i., 128 Claxton, Midshipman, i., 325 Clement, Sailing-master G., "•- 55 Cleopatra, i., 144 Clyde, i., 73 Cockbum, Admiral, i., 196; ii., 191; attack on Wash- ington, ii., 43 Cochrane, Admiral, i., 4; ii., 3. 45. 74. 215, 237 Index 305 Codrington, Admiral, Me- moirs, i., 75, 174, 206; ii., 35, 39, 206, 233; comments on uselessness of mere martinets, i., 206 Coffee, Gen., ii., 221, 238 Coggeshall, G., History of American Privateers, i., 247; ii.,72,163; grossmis- statements and sneers, i., 247 Cole, Memoirs of British Gen- erals, ii., 237, 236 Collier, Captain, Sir G. R.,i., 146, 214; ii., 47. 173. 176, 178, 193; his blunders, ii., 178 . . Columbia, li., 45, 82 Comus, i., 144 Confiance, i., 80, 180, 181, 304.33s; ii-. 114, 118, 119, 125, 128, 131, 132, 135- 141, 143 Congress, 1., 70, 90, 91, 94, 131, 132, 169, 212, 215, 267; ii., 118, 176, 202 Congress, measure proposed against France and Eng- land, i., 7 Congressional forethought, lack of, ii., 199 Conldin, Lieut, A., i., 318 Conkling, Lieut., ii., 112, 113 . ^ . Conner, Lieut. D., i., 204, 205, 209, 259 Conquest, i., 185, 188, 271, 278, 280, 289, 296 Constellation, i., 33, 39, 70, 89, 144, 197, 211, 245, 246; ii., 118, 202, 204; unsuc- cessful attempt to capture her, i., 197, 198 Constitution, i., 5, 41, 45, 47, 51-54, 67-72, 80-83, 86- 89, 102-114, 116-122, 130, 140, 142, 144-152, 156- 163, 169, 217, 334; n., 5- 8, 63, 85, 142, 145, 153, 165-177, 188, 193, 202, 205, 206; skirmish with and escape from British squadron,!., 102— log; cap- tures and bums two brigs, i., 109; recaptures Ameri- can brig, i., 109; engage- ment with and captvire of Guerriere, i., no -114; comparative force and loss, i., 114; diagram of action, i., 115; her gunnery excel- lent, faultlessly handled, i., 117; crew new men, i., 118 ; engagement with Java, i., 147-15 1 ; cap- tures Java, i., 152; slight damage received, list of killed and wounded, i., 152; comparative force and loss, i., 155; diagram of action, i., 153; cruising, ii., 5; captures Pictoii, ii., 5 ; misstatements in regard to crew, ii., 6, 7; chased by two British frigates, ii., 7 ; engagement with Cyane and Levant, ii., 167-172; captures both, ii., 168, 169; comparative force and loss, ii., 169, 170; brilliant manoeuvring of C, dia- grain of action and com- ments on it, ii., 171; chased by British squad- ron, ii., 174-176; success- ful escape, ii., 177, 178 Contest, i., 247 Cooper, J. F., Naval History of the United States, i., 52, 82, 92, 102, 105, 112, 118, 124, 134, 178, 180, 181, 183, 198, 200, 203, 230, 231, 255, 269, 292, 310, 318, 330, T,T,y, ii., 50, 53, 3o6 Index Cooper — Continued 60, 80, 87, 107, 116, 118, 147, 148, 160, 173; disposi- tion to praise everything American, i., 22; his in- judicious praise, i., 330 Cooper's Miles Wallingford, Home as Found, Pilot, Two Admirals, i., 26 Cooper, Midshipman, i., 205 Copenhagen, i., 29 Coshnahan, Midshipman, i., 226 Comick, Lieut. H. D., i., 157 Cornwall, i., 249 Cornwallis, i., 69, 157, ii., 184, 185, 193 Courage alone does not make a great commander, i., 329 Courier National, i., 144 Cowell, Lieut. J. G., heroism when wounded, ii., 17 Cox, Lieut. W. S., ii., 96; his cowardice, i., 225 Crab Island, ii., 122, 133, 141 Crane, Lieutenant, i., loi Craney Island, i., 197, 245 Crawford, U. S. Minister to France, i., 249 Creeks, power of, broken at battle of Horseshoe Bend, ii., 214 Creerie, Lieut. J., i., 239, 240 Creighton, Captain, i., 46 Creole Militia, ii., 220, 239- 241 Croghan, Colonel, ii., 109 Crowninshield, Sec. B. W., i., 58 Crow's Shoal, 1., 248 _ Cumberland Head, ii., 129- Cumberland Island, n., 191 Cummings, Midshipman J. C, i., 192, 325 Curleiv, i., 212 Curry, Lieui. R. C, i., 247 Cutting-out expedition against privateers, ii., 160; daring and successful one by British, ii., no, in Cyane, i., 65, 76, 80, 81, 214, 334; ii-. 2, 2,^, 165-169, 171, 172, 174-176, 193, 195; engagement with Constitu- tion, ii., 167-172; surren- ders, ii., 168 Cyprus, ii., 157 Dabney, Consul J. B., ii., 68 Dacres, Capt. J. R., i., loi, 109, no, 116, 117, 119, 139, 141, 142; wounded in engagement with Constitu- tion, {., 113 Daily, Sailing-master, ii., 157 Danes defeated in battle of Baltic, i., 336 Danish gunboat, i., 242 Dart captured by Newport flotilla, i., 264 Davies, Lieut. D., i., 154 Dearborn, General, i., 278, 280, 281 Decatur, ii., 199 Decatur, Commodore, i., 31, 39-41, 49, 52, 71, 90, 133- 135. 138, 141. 162, 216, 221, 255, 257; ii., 23, 41, 154, 179, 203; chased in the President by British fleet, ii., 145-148; sur- renders, ii., 149; did not " cover himself with glory," ii., 151; but acted rather tamely, ii., 153, 154, i93 Delaware, i., 145 Delaware Bay, i., 196, 248 Demerara River, i., 202 Dent, Capt. J. H., ii., 9, 158, 160 De Ruyter, i., 66, 183, 336, 340 Index 307 De Sufifrein's five combats with Sir Edward Hughes, ii., 105 Detroit, 1., 190-193, 314, 316, 317. 319-321, 326-329, 330, 343; 11-, III, .198 Detroit, capture of, i., 190 Devastation, ii., 44, 46 De Winter, i., 28 Diadem, i., 245 Dickenson, Capt. J., ii., 179, 180 Dickson, Colonel, ii., 250 Dictator, i., 68 Didon, i., 121 Discipline displayed on American privateer Lot- tery, i., 210; neglect of essentials for mere inci- dents, in British navy, i., 206 Dixon, Corporal, i., 226 Dobbs, Captain, ii., 112, 113 Doctrinaire Democracy, ii., 211 Dolphin, {., 211, 212 Dominica, ii., 199 Douglass, Capt. G., ii., 165, 168 Douglass, Lord H., Naval Gunnery, i., 93, 94, 117, 140, 141, 234, 238; ii., 22, 190, 205; comments on action between Essex and Plicebe, ii., 22 Dover, i., 314 Downes, Lieutenant, i., 201; ii., 18 Downie, Capt. G., i., 81, 182, 273; ii., 120, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131; his force on Champlain, ii., 118-121; action with Macdonough, ii., 131, 132; killed, ii., 139 Dragon, ii., 42, 67 Dragoons from Mississippi, ii., 240 Drake singeing the beard of the Catholic king, ii., 24 Drummond, i., 304, 343 Drummond, Gen. G., ii., 92, 93 Drunkenness on the Argus, i., 25s. 257 Dudley, Midshipman, i., 194 Duncan, Lord, i., 28; victory at Camperdown, i., 337 Dundonald, Lord, Autobi- ography of a Seaman, i., 4, ^77. 157 , Durham, Admiral, memoir of, by Captain Murray, ii., 7 Dutch, i., 44 Eagle, {., 335, 341-344; ii., 81, 114, 115, 117, 130-132, 137-141; captured, i., 342 Earl of Moira, i., 172, 185, 272, 283, 306; ii., 88 Earle, Commodore, i., 172; feeble attack on Sackett's Harbor, i., 184; shows gross incompetence, i., 185 East Indies, ii., 105, 145, 18S Eckford, Henry, i., 180, 269, 311; ii., 86, '87 Egyptienne, i., 62 Elliott, Capt. J. D., i., 188, 191-193, 277, 297, 31S, 323^33°', n.,iii; captures Detroit and Caledonia, i., 192 Ellis, Captain, i., 214 Emmons, Lieut. G. E., Statis- tical History of U. S. Navy, i., 20, 59,65, 198, 271, 311- 312; ii., 80, 182; best American work on the sub- ject, i., 25 Endymion, {., 15, 64, 69-71, 79, 86, 229; ii., 72, 73, 145- 156,193; aXtsLcVi on Prince de Neufchdtel repiilsed after desperate struggle, ii., 72 3o8 Index English Channel, ii., 48 English vessels twice the size of Dutch, i., 336 English victories over Dutch due to superiority in force, i-, 336 Enterprise, i., 39; engage- ment with Boxer, i., 259- 264; captures her, i., 262; severity of action, i., 263; superior force of Ameri- cans, i., 263; unfit to cruise and made a guard- ship, i., 264 Epervier, i., 54, 65, 66, 82, 86, 256,257; ii., 36-40, 81,83, 155, 162, 200, 201, 206; captured by Peacock, com- parative force and loss, ii., 38, 39: gunnery of British, poor, ii., 39; Epervier pur- chased for U. S. Navy, ii., 40 Epworth, Captain, i., 131 Erebus, ii., 44, 46, 191, 192 Erie, ii., 81 Erie, Fort, i., 191; ii., 112 Erie, Lake, i., 170, 173-177, 180, 193, 194, 297, 308; ii., no; no American force there in 181 2, i., 190 Erie, Lake, battle of (18 13), i., 326; teaches advantage of having the odds, i., 333; victory honorably won, i., 337 : fought mainly by Canadians, i., 338 Espikgle, i., 202, 206, 221 Essex, i., 43, 49, 54, 64, 72, 78, 80, 89, 96-99, 139, 145, 165, 169, 200-202, 267, 335; ii-. ro-17. 19-21, 23- 26, 2S-34, 61, 82. 83, 170, 199, 200; cuts out trans- port from Minerva, i., 97; cruising, i., 97-101; en- gagement with Alert, i.j 99; captures N^ocfoM, i., 165; captures English merchant vessel, i., 166; struck by squall and disabled, ii., 13; attacked by Phcebe and Cherub, ii., 13-15; terrible loss and damage, ii., 20; surrenders, ii., 21; com- ments and criticism on the action, ii., 22-32; repaired at Valparaiso and sent to England, ii., 7,7, Essex Junior, ii., 10, 12, 13, i8> 33.. 34 Eurotas, i., 122 Euryalus, ii., 44, 45 Eurydice, i., 51 Evans, Captain, i., 62, 198 Evans, Surgeon A. A., i., 152, 156 Everard, Capt. T., i., 342 Fair American, i., 187, 271, 278, 289, 296 Fairy, ii., 45 Falcon, Capt. G. T., ii., 165, 166 Falkiner, Lieutenant, i., 226 False Duck Islands, i., 188, 296, 304 Farragut, D. G. (Admiral),!., 98, 200; ii., II, 17, 20, 21, in his memoirs comments on Phcebe-Essex fight, ii., 27, 28, 31, 32; greatest admiral since Nelson, ii., 155 Fayal, ii., 68 Fernando de Noronha, island, .i-> 165 Ferris, Sailing-master, ii., 76 Finch, i., 181, 182, 343; ii., 118-122, 131-133, 141, 143 Finch, Lieut. B., i., 165, 297, 302 Index 309 Finnis, Capt. R., ii., 128; killed, ii., 130 Firefly, ii., 81 Fischer, Lieut.-Col. V., ii., 92, 93 Flambeau, n., 8i Florida, ii., 22 Florida, ii., 64, 214 Floyd, Capt. R., ii., 68 Forrest, Midshipman, i., 325 Forte, i., 71, 120 Fortune of War, ii., 68 Forty Mile Creek, i., 285 Franklin, ii., 193 Franklin, ii., 256 Fredericksburg, ii., 256 Fredrickscoarn, i., 144 " Free Trade and Sailors' Rights, i., 7 French-English naval war, ii., 207 French histories of English compared with English histories of Americans, i., 238 French infantry, ii., 258 Frenchman's Creek, ii., 112 Frigate, definition and de- scription of, i., 67 Frio Cape, i., 166 Frolic, i., 14, 43, 48, 63, 85, 124-130, 160, 168, 220, 334; ii., 26, 35, 53, 80, 82, 85, 179, 200, 202; engage- ment with Wasp, captured by her after great slaugh- ter, i., 126; comparative force and loss, i., 127; dia- gram of action, i., 128 Fulton, ii., 193, 194 Fundy, Bay, i., 109 Funk, Lieut. J. M., i., 135 Galatea, i., 132 Gallagher, Lieutenant, i., 49; ii., 150 Gallapagos, i., 200 Gamble, Lieut. P., ii., 135 Gamo, i., 144 Garden, Capt. S. J., i., 325 Garland, Lieutenant, mor- tally wounded, i., 321 Geisinger, Midshipman, ii., 60 General Armstrong, ii., 68, 70, 164; attacked by Briti.sh boats, ii., 68; attacked by Carnation, scuttled and burned by her own crew, ii., 69, 70 General Pike, i., 80, 81; ii., 2-4, 8, 10, 17-22, 24, 29- 3?,^ 35. 39. 166, 168, 177, 192, 205 Genesee River, i., 286, 305, 308; ii., 102, 104; engage- ment near mouth, i., 295 George, Fort, i., 305-308; ii., 99, loi ; attacked and cap- tured by Chaiincy's squad- ron, i., 280—282, 284 Georgia, i., 196; ii., 144 Georgiana, i., 201 Gibbs, General, ii., 238, 251 Gibraltar, ii., 55 Gladiator, i., 149 Gloire, i., 144 Gloucester, i., 172, 185, 278, 279, 284, 343. ii-. 1.98 Good Hope, Cape, ii., 179, 187 Gordon, Capt. J. A., skilful attack on Fort Washing- ton, ii., 44, 45 Governor Tompkins, i., 185, 188, 271, 277, 280, 289, 296—299, 302 Graham, Midshipman, i., 194 Graig, Lieutenant, i., 244 Grasse, Comte de, victory over Sir T. Graves, ii., Graves, Sir T., ii., 105 3IO Index Graviere, Admiral J. de la, Guerres Maritimes, i., 129, 233; ii.,206; comments on first three engagements, i., 159-162; the best criti- cism on the naval war, ii., 206 Great Britain, views held in regard to neutral rights, i., I, 6, 7; find now no advo- cates, i., 7; ofifers apology for attack on Chesapeake, issues Orders in Council, i., 8; engaged in European conflict during early part of this war, i., 9; assem- bles army of 14,000 men, i., 1 1 ; greatness of naval power, i., 27, 28; upward of a thousand vessels at opening of war, ii., 199 Great Sodas, i., 286 Greene, Capt. P. B., i., 145 Greenwich , i.< 202 Gregory, Lieut. F. H., ii., 97 "Gridiron Flag," i., 35 Griffith, Admiral, ii., 66 Growler, i., 179, 185, 188, 278, 280, 287, 289, 291, 304, 341-344; ii-, 92. 93- 118, 143, 197; captured by gunboats, i., 342 Guerin, Histoire Maritime de France, i., 237 Giierriere, i., 13, 15, 48, 51, 54, 72, 79, 83, 85, 90, loi- 103, 105, 110-114, 117- 119, 122, 133, 139, 142, 158, 160, 161, 168, 230, 235; ii., 6, 45, 172, 193, 205 ; engagement with and capture by Constitution, i., 110-114; blown up by Americans, i., 116; falsely alleged to have been rotten i., 116; handling of her compared with that of Con- stitution, i., 117; outma- noeuvred by Constitution, i., 117 Gunnery, skill of British fal- len off, i., 206; ii., 205; accuracy and superiority of Americans, ii., 232, 251, 259 Halifax, i., loi, 228 Hambleton, Purser, i., 325 Hamilton, i., 185, 188, 271, 277, 281, 288, 304, 311; ii., 197 Hainilton, Secretary P., i., T 45-58 Hampden, ii., 66 Hampton Roads, i., 197, 243 Hampton sacked by British with revolting brutality, i., 196 Hanchett, Captain, i., 245 Hardy, Captain, i., 70 Hardy, Sir T., ii., j Harris, Sergeant, i., 226 Harrison, General, i., 318 Hatfield, Midshipman, i., 279 Haute, Isle of, ii., 66 Havana, ii., 163 Havannah, ii., 46 Hawkins, Capt. R., i., 97 Hawkins, Lieut. A., ii., 72 Hayes, Capt. J., ii., 146-149, 192 Head, Capt. J., i., 212 Hcbrus, ii., 46, 159 Hector, i., 201 Hell Gate, i., 216 Henderson, Captain, ii., 64 Henderson, Lieutenant, ii., 167 Henly, Capt. R., i., 54; ii., Henly, Lieut. J. D., 1., 210 Hermes, ii., 68, 83, 155 Hicks, Lieutenant, ii., 122 Highflyer, i., 215, 267; ii., 199 Index 311 Highlanders led by General Keane, ii., 246 Hilyar, Capt. J., ii., 10-12, 14-16, 19, 21-32; conduct in action with Essex, ii., 16, 18; letter concerning de- fence of Essex, ii., 24, 26; breach of faith, ii., 28; courteous treatment of prisoners, ii., 29 Hinn, Lieutenant, i., 27S Hislop, Lieut. G., i., 157, 15S Historical Register of the United States, ii., 287 Hoffman, Lieutenant, i., 112; ii., 168, 174, 175 Hague, ii., 3 Holdup, Lieut. T., i., 194. HoUaway, Capt., n., 93 Holmes' Hole, i., 208 Hood, Sir S., i., 28 Hope, Capt. H., ii., 72, 145, Hope, Lieut. D., 1., 133; n., 35 Horn, Cape, 1., 200 Hornet, i., 50, 64, 76, 82, 85, 90, 96, 131, 145. 146, 159. 163, 169, 199, 202-209, 2i6, 220, 252, 255, 256, 265, 267, 334; ii., 35. 85- 142, 145, 156, 176, 178- 188, 193, 202; captures a privateer, i. , 96 ; chased by Montagu, i., 202; captures Resolution, i., 202 ; engage- ment with Peacock, cap- tures her, i., 203, 204; comparative loss, i., 205; diagram of action, i., 207; comparative force, i., 208, 209; generous treatment to officers and crew of Pea- cock, i., 208; captures Pen- guin, ii., 181; diagram of action, ii., 181; compara- tive force and loss, ii., 182; a creditable action for Americans, ii., 183; chased by Cornwall is, but escapes. ii., 187 Horseshoe Bend, battle of, ii., 214, 221 Hotham, Admiral, ii., 145, 149 House of Virginia and its theories, ii., 212 Hughes, Sir E., ii., 105 Hull, Capt. J., i., 31, 102-109, 114, 116, 140, 162, 234, 260, 326; ii., 55, 108, 155; his letter, i., 52; foremost ship-captain of the war, i., 108-110, 114; exultation caused by victory over Guerriere, i., 122; his fa- mous cruise, ii., 65; de- serves palm as best single- ship captain, ii., 202-203 Humbert, General, ii., 250 Humble, James, i., 150, 154 Hunter, i., 173, 180, 209, 311, 314, 316, 318-321, 324, 327. 343 Hunter's Point, 1., 216 Hurlburt, Sailing-master, ii., 191, 192 Huron, Lake, i., 170, 176; ii., 109 Hutchinson, Lieut. W., i.,215 Icarus, i., 157 Impressment of American seamen, i., 1-4, 41; cases on record, i., 53 Indefatigable, i., 69 Independence, ii., 193 Indian Ocean, ii., 188 Inglis, Lieut. G., i., 322 Ingraham, E. D., Capture of Washington, i., 11 Ingram, Lieut. W., ii., 21 Ireland, i., 215; ii., 64 312 Index Irish Channel, i., 215 _ Irvine, Lieutenant, i., 190, 194, 320 Isle aux Noix, i., 341; ii., 115 Italians, i., 44 Izard, General, ii., 102 Jackson, General Andrew, ii., 79,157; at New Orleans, i., 212; a backwoods general , ii., 214; his campaign against the Creeks, ii., 214; attacks the Spaniards and drives them from Pensaco- la,ii., 214; becomes def en- derof Louisiana, ii., 214; his vigilance, military genius, and patience, ii., 218; fortifies New Orleans, ii., 219; raises 1000 militia- men, chiefly Creoles, ii., 220; his principal reliance, the Tennessee volunteers, ii., 221; his management of and popularity with them, ii., 222; learns of arrival of Keane's force and prepares to attack him, ii., 223; desperate hand to hand night en- gagement, ii., 226—227; " grizzled old bush-fighter," ii., 236; disposition of his forces in waiting for com- bined British attack, ii., 239-241; fierceness of the ensuing engagement, ii., 245-247; defeats the British at nearly all points, ii., 245-247; sends rein- forcements under Humbert to retake position lost by Morgan, ii., 250; his forces increasing daily, ii., 252; his unjust censure of garri- son of Fort Boyer for sur- rendering quickly, ii., 253; the most prominent figure in the war, ii., 255; the feat performed by him al- most unparalleled, ii., 255; his success due not to chance or errors of his ad- versaries, ii., 256; tireless care in drilling raw troops, ii., 258; the ablest Ameri- can general up to the time of the great Rebellion, ii., 260 Jamaica, i., 90 Jamaica fleet, ii., 64, 196 James, W., Naval History of Great Britain and Naval Occurrences, i., 2, 5, 6, 44- 52, 69, 76, 79, 83, 92, 93, 99, 105, 119, 122, 123, 134, 140, 145, 157. 174, 178- 185, 195, 197, 203, 206, 209, 210, 213, 214, 224, 229, 232, 237-239, 246, 252, 253, 258, 260, 269- 273, 279, 280, 284, 288, 294-297, 312, 313, 318, 35i' 337. 338; n., 4, 6, 8, 19, 21, 25, 31, 3.S-38. 41, 48, 55. 56, 59. 66-69, 72- 75. 89, 93. 96, 115. "8- 124, 139, 141. 146-153. 15s. 163, 171, 177, 178, 183-187, 195, 204, 207; most valuable authority on British affairs, hatred toward Americans, i., 18; misstatements, i., 19, 20; basis for all other English histories of the war, i., 21 ; unreliability, i., 178, 246; grossly inaccurate, inexcu- sable garblin g of reports , ii . , 32,33; wilful perversion of truth, ii., 32, ^T,'> endeavor to prove American seamen cowards, ii., 61; wherein his chief value for reference Index 3,^3, James — Continued lies, ii., 62; misstatements echoed by all British his- torians, ii., 154; utterly un- trustworthy, except for things purely British, ii., jfasseur, ii., 42 Java, i., 51, 72, 76, 77, 82-85, 122, 139, 146-163, 168, 230, 233. 334; ii-- 6, 45, 193, 202, 205, 210; engagement with Constitution, i., 147- 151; captured by her, i., 151; after receiving severe injuries, i., 152; list of killed and wounded, i., 152-155.. Jefferson, ii., 86, 89, 91, 98 Jefferson, Pres. T., project of having navy composed of small gunboats, i., 243; ii., 200; weakness of, as Executive, ii., 211, 212 John Adams, i., 59, 88; cu- rious tradition about her sailing qualities, ii., 65 John, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii., Johnson, Lieut. R., n., 70 Johnston, Sailing-master, ii., 75- 1.57 Jones, ii., 86, 8g, 91, 98 Jones, Capt. J., i., 123-127, 130, 216; ii., 203 Jones, Lieut. T. C, ii., 74-76, 79, 216 Jones, Surgeon J. C, i., 151, 156 Julia, i., 179, 185, 188, 280, 287, 289, 291, 304, 344; ii., 197 Junon, i., 210, 244, 248; ii., 7 Keane, Major-General John, advances on New Orleans, December 23d, ii., 17; camps on east bank of Mississippi, ii., 222; esti- mate of his force by differ- ent authorities, ii., 222; leisurely arrangement of his camps, ii., 224; sur- prised by attack of Patter- son in the Carolina, ii., 225; is disabled, ii., 246 Kearney, Licixt. L., ii., 159 Klaeson, Captain, blowing up his ship, ii., 24 Kcnesaw Mountain, ii., 256 Kentucky Militia poorly armed, ii., 238, 239; of little use, ii., 259 Kentucky Mounted Infantiy, brilliant charge of, ii., 213 Kerr, Capt. R. ii., 173 King, Captain, i., 193 King, Lieutenant, i., 193, 194; ii., 41 Kingston, i., 175, 1S8, 190, 270, 277, 2S3, 285, 2S7, 304; ii., 88, 91, 94, 98, 102 blockaded by Chauncy, i., 190; ii., 98 Knox, Pilot, i., 224 Lady Gore, i., 304, 343 Lady of the Lake, i., 269, 271, 278, 280, 286; cap- tures Lady Murray, i., 286 Lady Prevost, i., 173, 180, 314, 316, 318, 319, 321, 324, 328, 343 Lady Murray, i., 286 Lafitte, French privateers- man, ii., 220 Lamb, Midshipman, killed, i., 325 Lambert, Captain, i., 146, 150; ii., 205; mortally wounded in action with Constitution, i., 152 Lambert, General, arrives with reinforcement for 314 Index Lambert — Continued Packenham, ii., 238; re- treats, ii., 252; reaches transports safely, ii., 253; sails for Mobile and cap- tures Fort Boyer, ii., 253 Landrail, ii., 82 ; captured by Syren, privateer, ii., 55 Lang, Jack, i., 47, 126 Laugharne, Capt. T. L. O., i., 99 . Laurestinus, 1., 243 Law, Lieutenant, i., 225 Laivrence, i., 309-313, 315- 323, 326-328, 330; iii 26; reduced to a wreck on Lake Erie, i., 325; heroic cour- age shown in the defence, i-. 326 Lawrence, Captain, 1., 90, 145, 199, 202, 205, 208, 209, 216, 221, 222, 232, 263, 266; ii., 2, 203; fa- tally wounded, i., 225, 228; a "Bayard of the Seas," i., 234, 236 Leander,\\.,^T, 173, 174, 178; captures Rattlesnake, ii., 47 Lee, Midshipman, ii., 138, 141 Leopard, i., 52; attack on Chesapeake, i., 8 Les Petites Coquilles, ii., 75 Levant, i., 66, 80, 81, 214, 334; ii., 33, 166-168, 170- 172, 174, 176, 178, 193, 195 ; engagement with Con- stitution, \\., 167-172; sur- renders, ii., 169 Levees cut by Americans, ii., 228 Linnet i., 181; ii., 115, 118, 119. 131. 132, 137-143 Little Belt, i., 173, 180, 215, 314, 316, 318. 319. 321, 324, 327. 336, 343; "•' 190 Livermore, Chaplain, i., 226 Lockyer, Captain, ii., 74, 77, 79, 216, 217 Loire, ii., 4, 42, 43 London Naval Chronicle, i., 25; ii., 119, 123, 141, 165, 166, 172 Long Island, ii., 146 Long Island Sound, i., 196; ii., 194 Losack, Capt. W., i., 132 Losses in this war compared with Anglo-French naval struggle, ii., 207—210, and Anglo-Danish, ii., 210; bal- ance of loss against Great Britain, ii., 210 Lossing, Ficld-Book of War of i8i2,i., 14, 183, 191, 208, 279, 280, 311, 342; ii., 116, 119 Lottery, American privateer, i., 210, 212; ii., 164; cap- tured, after stubborn re- sistance, by British squad- ron, i., 210 Louis XV., ii., 107 Louisiana, i., 168; ii., 74, 80, 157, 219, 230, 231 Louisiana, ii., 214, 215; Fed- eral Government does nothing for defence of, ii., 218; militiaof, ii., 220, 239- 241. 250, 259 Low, C. R., History of Indian Navy,\., 252; ii., 188, 189, 191 Lower Canada, campaign m, ii., 255 Ludlow, ii., 115 Ludlow, Lieut. A., i., 217, 225, 227, 228; mortally wounded, ii., 214, 215 Lumley, Captain, i., 210; ii., 145 Lundy's Lane,i., 212; 11., 213 Lyman, Master's Mate, ii., 60 Lyman, Midshipman, ii., 34 Index 315 Lynhaven Bay, i., 210 Lynx, i., 211, 212; ii., 81 Macdonough, Capt. T., i., 11, 81, 273, 341, ii., 108; force on Lake Champlain, ii., 114-117, 121-124; victor against decided odds, i., 332, 335, 341; assumes command of Champlain, i., 341 ; builds three new ves- sels, i., 345, 346; prepara- tion for engagement, ii., 128; prays before the bat- tle, ii., 131; description of the action, ii., 132-143; Macdonovigh's gallant and energetic conduct, ii., 135- 137; courtesy and hu- manity to prisoners and wounded, ii., 141; his vic- tory, ii., 142; his character — one of the greatest of our sea-captains, ii., 143 Macomb, General, at Platts- burg, ii., 114 Macedonian, i., 13, 40, 54, 68, 71, 72, 82,83, 85, 130. ^33, 136, 138, 139, 142, 144, 158, 160, 161, 168, 216, 230, 235; ii., 23, 118, 172, 176, 186, 202; engage- ment with and capture by United States, i., 133-135; severely damaged and with great loss of crew, i., 136; Americans in her crew, i., 136 Machiliniacinac, ii., 109 Madeira, i., 198; ii., 165 Madison, i., 187, 270, 271, 274, 280, 289, 291, 296, 297, 299, joi-303, 306; ii., 87, 89, 91, 100, 115 Madison, incapacity of as President, ii., 212 Magnet, ii., 88, 90, 98, 143 Maidstone, i., 210 Maitland, Captain, ii., 5, 6 Majestic, ii., 146, 149 Makanilla, ii., 64 Malheureux Islands, ii., 75 Man, Isle of, ii., 161 Alanly, i., 144 Manners, Capt. W., i., 43, 90; ii., 53, 84, 85; heroic con- duct in action with Wasp, ii., 50; mortally wounded leading the attack, ii., 51; praise due him, ii., 202 Maples, Capt. J. F., i., 250- 253 Maranham, ji., 177 Marquesas, i., 200 Marryat's novels, i., 26 Mars, {., 264 Marshall, Captain, i., 154 Marshall's Royal Naval Bi- ography, i., 16, 41, 52, 102, 105, 133. 136; ii., 173. 176, 177 Martha's Vineyard, 1., 208 Martin, i., 248 Mary, i., 304. 343 Maryland, ii., 214, 254 Masters - Commandant Let- ters, i., 199, 249; ii., 115 Matterface, Lieut. W., ii., 69, 7° McCall, Lieut. E. R., 1., 260, 261 McClintock, Midshipman, i., ^47 ^ . . McCreery, Lieut. D., 1., 261 McDonald, Lieutenant, ii., 180 McGowan, Midshipman, ii., 103 McHenry, Fort, attacked un- successfully by bomb-ves- sels, ii., 46 McKeever, Lieut. J. D., ii., 76 McKnight, Lieutenant, ii., 20, 34, 60 3i6 Index McPherson, Lieutenant, i., i88, 277 Meduse, i., 265 Medway, ii., 54, 179 Melville, i., 272, 274, 288, 295, 306; ii., 88 Menelaiis, ii., 44 Merrimac, ii., 194 Meteor, ii., 44, 46 Milan, i., 144 Militia of U.S., as a rule, use- less in this war, but gain splendid victory at New Orleans, i., 12; not able to withstand much smaller well-trained force, i., 187; free colored, of New Or- leans, ii., 220; of Ken- tucky, ii., 238, 239, 259 Miller, Captain, ii., 43, 44 Miller, Lieutenant, i., 48 Mills, Colonel, i., 283 Minerva, i., 90, 97-99 Mindham, W., i., 223, 227 Mississippi, ii., 79, 215, 216; canal cut in, ii., 236, 248 Mitchell, Colonel, ii., 92, 94 Mix, Sailing-master, i., 188, 278 Mobile, ii., 253 Mobile Point, ii., 68 Mohawk, {., 247; ii., 87, 88, 91, 100 Mohawk River, i., 172 Mona Passage, ii., 5 Monk, Sailing-master J., i., 212 Montagu, {., 146, 202 Montgomery, i., 343 Montreal, ii., 88, 89, 91, 100 Montresor, Captain, ii., 74 Morgan, General, ii., 24S, 255 Morris, Captain Charles (Com- modore), Autobiography, i.. Ill, 164; ii., 63-67 Morris, Lieut. C, i., 104, 113, 142 Mount, Cape, ii., 63 Mulcaster, Capt. W. H., i., 298-302, 306; ii., 92, 93; best British officer on On- tario, i., 299 Murray, Capt. J., i., 342, 343; u., 7 Nancy, ii., no, 198 Nantucket, i., loi, 215; ii., 72 Napoleon's defeat by Wel- lington, ii., 152 Narcissus, i., 210, 239; ii., 42, 43; captures Viper, i., 210 Nattagawassa Creek, ii., 109 Nautilus, i., 48, 54, 90, loi, 168, 253; ii., 29, 156, 188, 189, 193; captured by British squadron, i., loi Naval archives, ii., 115 Naval Chronicle, i., 51, 152, 156, 157, 181, 261 Naval monument, ii., 4 Naval war of 181 2, causes of, i., i; impossibility of avoiding it, i., 7; decla- ration of war June 18,1812, i., 9; slight preparations made, i., 9; opens badly for United States, i., 10; battles mere skirmishes, i., 10; battle at Bladensburg, burning of public buildings at Washington, attack on Baltimore, i., 11; battle of New Orleans, i., 12; au- thorities referred to, i., 13; overwhelming naval su- premacy of Great Britain, i., 27; practical lessons conveyed by the war, i., 3 1 ; race identity of com- batants, i., 32; practically a civil war, i., t,2,\ Ameri- can navy at beginning of Index 317 Naval War of 181 2 — Cont'd war, i., 34; officers well trained, i., 34; efficiency of seamen and its causes, i., 36; similarity between British and American sea- men, i., 33. 43; American vessels manned chiefly by native Americans, many of whom had formerly been impressed into British navy, i., 40-54; quotas of seamen contributed by the different States, i., 55; navy yards, i., 57; lists of officers and men, i.,_ 58; tonnage and ratings, American ships properly rated, i., 60-75; arma- ments, three styles of guns used, i.,77; difference de- scribed, i., 78-Si; short weight of American shot, i.,82; comparison of British and American frigates, i., S3-88; Belvidera pursued by Commodore Rodgers, i., 9 1 ; engagement between Belvidera and President, i., 92-93; Hornet captures a privateer, i., 96; cruise of Essex, i., 96-101; Consti- tution captures Guerritre, i.,114; marked superiority shown by Americans, i., 119; Wasp captures Frolic after hot action, i., 123; disproportionate loss on British side, i., 130; both vessels captured by Poic- tiers, i., iT,o; United States captures Macedonian, i., 135; slight American and great British loss, i., 135; comments by Lord Doug- lass on the action, i., 140, 141; Constitution captures Java, {., 152; slight in- juries received by Consti- tution, i., 152; severe loss on Java, i., 152; diagram of action, i., 153; compara- tive force and loss, i., 155; comments by various au- thorities, i., 156-158; com- ments by Admiral de la Graviere on first three bat- tles of war, i., 159-162; comments by the author, i., 162-163; Vixen cap- tured by Southampton, and both wrecked, i., 165; Essex captures Nocton, afterward recaptured, i., 165; summary of the year's fighting, i., 166-169; vessels captured or de- stroyed, and vessels built, i., 168; prizes made, i., 169; war on the lakes, i., 170; combatants on nearly equal footing, i. , 171; diffi- culty of comparing the rival sqtiadrons, i., 176; unreliability of authorities, especially James, i., 178; Earle's feeble attack on Sackett's Harbor, i., 184; pursuit and attack on Royal George bv Chauncy, i., 188-189; Elliott cap- tures Detroit and Caledo- nia, i., 192; attack on Red House barracks by Lieu- tenant Angus, i., 193; disastrous result, i., 194; brutal sacking of Hamp- ton, i., 196; blockade of American coast, i., 196; Commodore Porter's cam- paign with Essex in South Pacific, i., 200; Hornet blockades Bonne Citoyenne, i., 159, 202; Hornet cap- 3i8 Index Naval War of 1812 — Cont'd tures Resolution, i., 202; Hornet captures Peacock, i. , 204; diagram of action, i., 207; comparative force and loss, i., 209; generous treatment shown by vic- tors, i., 208; Narcissus captures Viper, i., 210; Lottery, Dolphin, Racer, Arab, and Lynx, American privateers, cut out by British boats, i., 210-212; Norwich captures British privateer Caledonia, i. ,2 1 2 ; third cruise of Commo- dore Rodgers, i., 212-215; United States, Macedonian, and Wasp iDlockaded in New London, i., 216; Broke's challenge to Law- rence, i., 221; engagement between Shannon and Chesapeake, i., 222-230; Chesapeake captured after desperate fight, i., 228; comments and criticism by Cooper, i., 230-232; by de la Graviere, i., 233; by au- thor, i., 231-232; by Brit- ish historians, i., 236; Sur- veyor captured by Narcis- sus, i., 239-240; futile gun- boat actions, i., 243; Brit- ish attack on Craney Is- land, i., 245; repulsed with loss, i., 246; Asp cut out by boats from Mohawk and Contest, i., 247; American gunboat cut out by boats from Junon and Martin, i., 248; engagement between Argus and Pelican, i., 250- 251; capture of Argus, i., 252 ; comparative force and loss, and diagram of action, i., 253-254; not a credit- able action for Americans, i., 254; comments and com- parison with similar fights, i . , 254-259; Enterprise captures Boxer after very severe engagement, i., 262; British privateer Dart cap- tured by Newport flotilla, i., 264; ocean warfare of 18 13 in favor of British, i., 265; summary of year, i., 265-267; vessels sunk, taken, built, and pur- chased, prizes made, i., 266-267; on the lakes, 18 1 3, Chauncy's squadron compared with Yeo's, i., 271-276; Yeo's superior, i., 273; Chauncy takes York, i., 278; takes Fort George, inflicting heavy loss, i., 280-2S2; British evacuate Niagara frontier, i., 282; British attack on Sackett's Harbor is re- pulsed with great loss, i., 283-284; Lady of Lake captures Lady Murray, i., 286; Ha ) nil to n an d Sco urge founder in a squall, i., 288; evolution of the two squad- rons, i., 289; diagram showing position of vessels, i., 290; British gain ad- vantage in action ensuing, i., 291; but the result not decisive, i., 293; nor the victory brilliant, i., 294; Americans reinforced by Sylph, i., 295; engage- ment near Genesee River, i., 295; in York Bay, i., 297-300; diagrain of ac- tion, i., 298; comments and criticism by Brenton, James, and the author, i., 300-303; American force Index 319 Naval War of 18 12 — Cont'd superior, i., 301; reported heavy loss on the Wolfe and Royal George, i., 304; Yeo blockaded in Kings- ton, i., 304; summary of the season on Ontario, i., 305-308; success in favor of Americans, i., 305, 308; Yeo and Chauncy com- pared, i., 305, 306; reason for American success, i., 308; campaign on Lake Erie,!., 308; description of the squadrons, i., 31 1-317; engagement with hca\'y loss on both sides, i., 319- 325; American victory and its importance, i., 326; "glory" of it overesti- mated, i., 326; diagram of action, i., 327, 328; great valor displayed on both sides, i., 326; injudicious praise in Cooper's Naval History, i., 330; comments and criticism, i., 331-340; victor^^due to heavy metal, i . , 3 3 2 ; and superior equip- ment in general, i., 337; for which credit is due to Pern,-, i., 337; men form- ing the crews, i., 338; cam- paign on Champlain, i., 341; Growler and Eagle captured by gunboat at- tack, i., 342; total loss on lakes during 18 13, i., 343, 344; on the ocean, 18 14, ii. , I ; destruction of coast- ers and fishing-boats at Pettipauge, ii., 3; cruise of Rodgers, ii., Constitu- tion, chased into Marble- head, ii., 8; attempt at cutting out the Alligator defeated, ii., 8; British manoeuvres to capture Es- sex, ii., 18; fight between Phabe and Cherub and Es- sex, ii., 18-21; Essex cap- tured after great loss, ii., 21; comments and criti- cisms on the action, ii., 22-23; discrepancies in official accounts of loss on Essex, ii., 26; comparative force on the three vessels, ii., 30; action between Pea- cock and Epervier, ii., 36- 38; Epervier captured, ii., 37; diagram of action, ii., 37 : comparative force and loss, ii., 38, 39; comments, ii., 39; Commodore Bar- ney's flotilla attacks Dra- gon Sind Albion, li., ^^2; at- tack of British on Wash- ington by land and sea, ii., 43; capture of Wash- ington by General Ross, and burning of public buildings, ii., 46; Balti- more threatened, ii., 46; unsuccessful attack on Fort McHenr}'' and retire- ment of British fleet and army, ii., 46; Wasp cap- tures Reindeer after severe engagement, ii., 48-52; diagram of action, ii., 52; comments, ii., 53; the odds against Reindeer, ii., 53; gallantry of both cap- tains, ii., 53, 54; _£;ag/(7 tender captured, ii., 54; Syren taken by Med way. Landrail taken by priva- teer Syren, ii., 54, 55; Wasp chases Avon, ii., 56; captures her after brief and furious engagement, ii., 58; Avon sinks, ii., 59; dia- gram of action, ii., 58; 320 Index Naval War of 1812 — Cont'd comparative force and loss, comments, ii., 59; cruise of the Adams, ii., 63; chased by Tigress and escapes, ii., 64, 65; curious sailing qualities resulting from be- ing built by contract, ii., 65; attacked on Penobscot, ii., 66; burned by Captain Morris, ii., 67; privateer General Armstrong at- tacked in Fayal roads, ii., 68; crew compelled to scuttle and bum her, ii., 70; boats from Endymion attack privateer Prince de Neufchhtel, ii., 71, 72; re- pulsed after desperate struggle, ii., 73; American gunboats on Lake Borgne taken, ii., 74; serious loss of British, ii., 79; sum- mary of year's fighting, vessels built, lost, and cap- tured, ii., 80-83; general comments, ii., 83; prizes made, ii., 85; on the lakes, 1814 — Ontario: American schooners converted into transports, ii., 86; new vessels launched by Ameri- cans, ii., 86; by British, ii., 88; statistics of the two squadrons, ii., 89, 90; se- rious sickness among the Americans, ii., 87; Yeo takes Oswego, ii., 91; and blockades Sackett's Har- bor, ii., 94; raises blockade, ii.,97; Chauncy blockades Kingston, ii., 98; refuses to co-operate with General Brown, ii., 100-103; cau- tiousness of commanders of both squadrons, ii., 100- 108; Captain Sinclair, commander of American forces on upper lakes, bums St. Joseph, ii., 109; makes unsuccessful expe- dition against Mackinaw, leaves for Lake Erie, ii., no; daring ct:tting-out expedition of British on Huron and Erie, ii., iio- '112; capture of Ohio and Sojners, ii., 112; Cham- plain, description of Mac- donough's and Downie's squadrons, ii., 1 15-120; James's erroneous state- ments in regard to them, ii. ,121-127; description of action, ii., 1 30-141; gal- lant and energetic conduct of Macdonough, ii., 135; inexperience of the crews, loading cannon without powder, ii., 136; Macdon- ough's victor}^ ii., 142; extraordinary damage to vessels on both sides, ii., 140; Macdonough one of the greatest of American sea captains, ii., 142; his character, ii., 143; on the ocean, 1815, ii., 144; Presi- dent chased by Captain Hayes's squadron, ii., 146; dismantles Endy)iiion, ii., 148, but is raked by Tcne- dos and Pomone, and sur- renders, ii., 149; account of this action taken mainly from official reports, ii., 150; discussion of various misstatements in regard to it, ii., 1 51-156; brilliant cutting-out expeditions by Americans, ii.. 157-160; American privateer Chas- seur engages and captures St. Lawrence, ii., 162-164; Index 321 Naval War of 18 12 — Cont'd ability of several privateer captains, ii., 164; cruise of Constitution, ii., 165; en- gagement with Cyane and Levant, ii., 167-172; cap- tures both, ii., 168, 169; comparative force and loss, ii., 169, 170; brilliant manoeuvring of Constitu- tion, diagram of action, comments, ii., 171; Con- stitution chased by three frigates, ii., 174; success- ful escape, ii., 177; Hornet captures Penguin, ii., 180- 183; diagram of action , ii . , 181; comparative force, ii., 181; Hornet escapes from pursuit of Cornwallis, ii., 187 ; Peacock captures East Indiaman, Nautilus, ii., 189; Captain Warrington acts without proper pre- cautions, ii., 190; wanton attack on American gun- boat by Captain Bartholo- mew, after declaration of peace, ii., 191; summary of events in 1815, ii., 192; Americans deserve balance of praise, ii., 192; list of ships built and destroyed, ii., 193-195; feeling about use of torpedoes, ii., 195; material result of naval part of war slight, moral benefit to the Americans great, ii., 196; total loss on both sides compared, ii., 197; comments and criti- cisms on various actions of the war in general, ii., 199- 206; best criticism that of de la Graviere in Guerres Maritinies, ii., 206; com- paredwith resultsof Anglo- French struggle, ii., 207- 210; tonnage of vessels in 181 2, how estimated, ii., 262-267; twelve single- ship actions in war, ii., 268; causes of American suc- cess, ii., 269; previous his- tory of American navy, ii., 268-277; Soley's Naval Campaign of 181 2, ii., 278 Navigation bureau, i., 203 Navy list of 1816, i., 47 Navy of Great Britain com- pared with that of U. S., i., 64 Navy of U. S., reputation gained in the war, i., 8; in- creased fourfold in num- bers during war, i., 9; pre- vious history, ii., 269, 273; Troude's blunders, ii., 271; superior to French in 1800, ii., 274, but slightly infe- rior to British, ii., 275; but in 1777-82 muck inferior, ii., 276; reasons, ii., 276 Nayaden, i., 68, 71 Neale, Lieutenant, i., 245 Nelson, Lord, i., 41, 183; "presumptuous," i., 239; success against heavy odds, i., 336 Nereide, i., 73; ii., 171 Nereyda, i., 200 Netly, ii., 88, 90, 91, 112 Nettle, ii., 115 Neufchdtel, i., 15,86; ii., 164 Neutral rights, views held by United States and Great Britain, i., i, 6, 7 Newcastle, ii., 173-177 New England furnished 44 % of tonnage U. S. Navy, i., 56; loyalty doubted, i., 196 New England seamen on Carolina, ii., 219, 232 322 Index Newfoundland, i., 96, 109, 213, 215; ii., 64 New Jersey, i., 196 New London, i., 143, 216; ii., 145; blockaded by Hardy, ii., 3 New Orleans, i., 212; ii., 71, 73. 145. 157. 215, 217-221; battle of, i., 12; ii., 211- 260; a useless shedding of blood, i., 12 New York, i., 59, 170, 216; ii., 41, 145, 161, 177, 178, 19S Niagara, i., 310-313, 315- 320, 323-325, 327, 328, 330; u., 88-92, 100, 109, Niagara Bay, 1., 293 Niagara Falls, i., 174 Niagara, Fort, i., 287, 291; ii., 99 _ Niagara frontier evacuated by British, i., 282; cam- paign of 1814 on, ii., 213 Niagara River, ii., 98 Nicholson, Joseph, letter, i., 264 Nicholson, Lieut. N. J., ii., 40, 54 Nile, battle of, i., 237 Niles's Weekly Register, i., 25, 124, 156, 183, 208, 211, 212, 229; ii., 38, 58, 99, 163, 191; misstatements and buncombe, i., 20; ut- terly untrustworthy, ex- cepting for matters purely American ; supplements James, ii., 157 Nocton, i., 165 Nonsuch, i., 168 Norse, i., 44 North Bergen, i., 214 North Cape, i., 214 North Edisto, ii., 9, 158 Norwich captures privateer Caledonia, i., 212 Nova Scotia, i., 109 Nova Scotia privateers, i., 260 Nymphe, i., 131, 265; ii., 5 O'Connor, Captain, ii., 92 Odenheimer, Lieutenant, knocked overboard, ii., 20 Ogdensburg, i., 185 Ohio, i., 308, 310; ii., 112, 143 Old adage, "L'audace," etc., ' ' Old Ironsides ' ' (Constitu- tion), i., 107; ii., 15, 193, 202 Oliver, Capt. R. D., i., 216 Oneida, i., 184, 185, 187-190, 271, 274, 275, 277, 280, 289, 296, 298, 301, 303, 306; ii., 86, 88, 91, 98 Oneida Indians, ii., 96 Oneida Lake, i., 172 Ontario, i., 187, 271, 278, 280, 289, 296; ii., 80 Ontario, Lake, i., 170-176, 183, 184, 293, 310, 311; ii., 105, 198 Onyx, i., 144 Oporto, i., 250 Orders in Council of Great Britain, i., 8 Ordronaux, Captain, ii., 71, 72, 164 L'Orient, i., 249; u., 54, 55 Orpheus, i., 63; ii., 34 Ortegal, Cape, ii., 41 _ Osgood, Lieutenant, i., 277 Oswego, ii., 91, 95, 98, 104; taken by Yeo, ii., 92, 93 Packenham, Gen. Sir E., ii., 74, 216, 235-237; takes command at New Orleans, ii., 229; destroys the Caro- lina, ii., 229; surprised at meeting American force. Index 323 Packenham — Continued ii., 229; is repulsed by- batteries and the Louis- iana, ii., 232-233; har- assed b>^ Americans, ii., 234; waits for reinforce- ments, ii., 234; digs canal to the river, ii., 236; re- inforced by Lambert, ii., 237; fierce battle ensues, ii., 245-247; defeat not due to error on his part, ii., 257; his soldiers veterans of "Wellington, ii., 258; death of, ii., 157, 246 Packet, Lieut. J. H., i., 318 Paige, Lieutenant, i., 218 Paine, Sailing-master T., great gallantry shown, ii., Paliniire, 1., 2 58_ Palmas, Cape, ii., 63 Palmer, Captain, ii., 159 •Pamphlets in reply to Coop- er's account of battle of Lake Erie, i., 333 Park, Lieut. T., ii., 70 Parker, Capt. G., i., 51, 152, 158; ii., 7, 8, 54, 145. .549 Parker, Midshipman G., ii.,78 Parker, Sir P., ii., 44 " Parthian " mode of warfare, i.,238 Pasley, i., 144 Patterson, Captain, i., 46; ii., 79, 224, 233, 240, 249 Patuxent River, ii., 42, 43 Paulding, Admiral, ii., 119, 120 Paulding, Midshipman, ii., 133 Peacock, i., 14, 50, 54, 63, 65, 160, 199, 203-209, 253, 254, 256, 257, 265, 267; ii., 35-40, 48, 63, 80, 85, 145- 178, 184, 185, 189, 193, 202; engagement with Hornet, i., 203; surrenders to her and sinks, i., 204; generous treatment of crew by officers of Hornet, i., 208; captures £p^rw>r, ii., 37; diagram of action, ii., 37 ; comparative force and loss, ii., 38, 39; comments on the action, ii., 39; skil- ful seamanship and excel- lent gvmnery shown by the Americans, ii., 39; cap- tures East Indiaman Nau- tilus without loss or dam- age, ii., 189 Peake, Capt. W., i., 203; neglect of essentials for mere incidents of disci- pline, i., 206 Pearce, Captain, ii., 65 Pechell, Captain, i., 245 Pelican, i., 15, 250-257; ii., 39; engagement with Ar- gus, i., 250; captures her, i., 252; comparative loss and force, i._, 253-254; diagram of action, i., 254 Pendleton, Lieut. T. M., ii., 68 Penguin, i., 76, 82, 85, 145, 220, 254, 334; ii., 156, 177-184, 193, 195. 200, 202; captured by Hornet, ii., 182 ; diagram of action, ii., 182; destroyed, ii., 184 Penguin Point, i., 260 Penobscot River, ii., 66 Pensacola, ii., 214 Percival, Sailing-master, cap- tures Eagle, tender, ii., 54 Perry, ii., 41 Perry, Com. O. H., i., 79, 85, 194, 269, 28i_,_ 282, 287, 297, 308, 309; ii., 108, 154; commanding American forces on Lake Erie, i., 194, 308; description of squad- 324 Index Perry — Continued ron, i., 311; and crews, i., 312-317; engagement with Barclay, i., 317-318; his indomitable spirit, i., 323- 324; his humanity to the wounded enemy, i., 325; great reputation gained by his victory, i., 326, 329; praised by Cooper, i., 330, j,ii; deserves great credit for effectiveness of his squadron, i., 337-339; his methods similar to Blake, i-. 340 Pert, i., 185, 188, 271, 278, 289, 296, 311 Pettigrew, Lieutenant, i., 278 Pettipauge, destruction of fishing-boats, ii., 3 Philadelphia, i., 39 Philadelphia, ii., 161 Phillot, Captain, ii., 191 Phcebc, i., 68, 73, 80, 335; ii., 10-16, i8, 21, 22, 27, 29-32 Phcsnix, i., 121 Pictou, ii., 5, 85 Piedmontaise, i., 121 Pierce, Lieutenant, i., 218 Pigot, Captain, i., 64; ii., 34 Pike, General, i., 278, 284; killed by explosion, i., 279 Pique, ii., 5, 6 Plantagenet, ii., 4, 68, 69 Plattsburg, i. , 343 ; ii. , 1 14, 1 70 Plattsburg Bay, ii., 128, 129, 141 Plymouth, ii., 161 Pocock, ii., 106 Poic tiers, i., 130 Polkinghome, Lieut. J., cuts out four American priva- teers, i., 211; a brilliant ex- pedition, i., 212 Poinone, ii., 145-153 Popham, Captain, ii., 93, 95, 97 Porcupine, {., 309. 311, 315, 318, 321, 327, 328; ii., 112, Port Christian, ii., 75 Porter, Admiral, i., 18, 19, 42, 61, 72, 96, 145, 165, 200, 239; ii., 10-18, 20, 22, 29, 31, 32, 108, 151, 154, 203; thorough training of his crew on the Essex, i., 90; cruise in South Pacific, lareaking up whaling fleet, i., 42, 200 — 202, 265; knocked down by shot, ii., 20 Portland, i., 260; ii., 68 Porto Praya, ii., 173, 177 Porto Rico, ii., 177 Portsmouth, i., 149, 213; ii., 124 Portugal, ii., 165; her small navy, i., 76 Portuguese customs under British influence, i., 44, 200 Potoinac River, ii., 44, 63 Pratt, Lieutenant, ii., 77 Preble, i., 343; ii., 115, 117, 130, 132, 133, 141 Preble, G. H. i., 57, 65 President, i., 9, 67, 70, 90, 91, 131, 132, 169, 212, 215, 265, 267, 343; ii., 3, 4, 85, 145-154, 156, 176, 178, 185, 190, 193, 195, 198- 200; attack on Little Belt, i., 8 ; engagement with Bel- videra, i. , 91-95; chased by British fleet, li., 145; at- tacked by Endymion but dismantles her, ii., 148; at- tacked by Tenedos and Pomow^ and surrenders, ii., 149 Presque Isle, i., 286, 308; ii., 98 Prevost, Sir G., i., 11, 181, 269, 283, 284; ii., 113, 119, Index 325 Prevost — Continued 120, 123; attacks Sackett's Harbor with Yeo and is re- pulsed, i., 283, 284; re- turns in confusion to Can- ada, ii., 142 Primrose, ii., 191 Prince de Neufchdiel, ii., 71; attacked by boats of Endy- mion, ii., 72; repulses them after desperate strug- gle, ii.. 73 Prince Regent, 1., 172, 283; ii., 88, 89, 91, 100 Prince Regent, ii., 204 Princess Charlotte, ii., 88, 89, 91, 100 Pring, Captain, ii., 122, 123, 130, 139, 142 Privateer, American, descrip- tion of, ii., 1 61-163 Prize-money ($25,000) voted by Congress to crew of Wasp, i., 12,0; prizes made by American vessels in 1812, i., 169 Prometheus, ii., 81 Prosperous, i., 340 Prussians, i., 74 Psyche, i., 73 Put-in Bay, i., 310 Queen Charlotte, i., 173, 180, 314, 316, 319, 321, 324. 325, 327,328, 343 Queenstown, ii., 112 Queenstown Heights, ii. , 259 Race, Cape, i., 109 Racer, i., 211 RadclifiEe, Lieutenant, ii.,112, Rainbow, ii., 172 Ramillies, ii., 3 Rattlesnake, i., 48, 267; ii., 35, 47, 82; captured by Leander, ii., 47 Rawle, Lieut. R., ii., 70 Read, Lieut. G. U. i., 165 Reade, Colonel, ii., 44 Red House barracks attacked by Lieutenant Angus, i., 193 Reid, Capt. S. C, u., 68-71, 164 Reindeer, i., 43, 65, 90, 254; ii., 19, 26, 48-52, 83, 84, 142, 156, 200-203; en- gagement with Wasp, ii., 48-52; severity of action, ii., 50; diagram and com- parative force and loss, ii., 52; the odds against the Reindeer, ii., 53 Rennie, Colonel, ii., 246, 250 Renshaw, Lieutenant-Com- mander, i., 264; ii., 47 Resolution, i., 202 Rifleman, ii., 65 Rigolets, the, ii., 216 Rio de Janeiro, ii., 185 Riviere, Lieut. }!., La Marine Frangaise, ii., 106, 107 Roach, Lieut. I., i., 191, 192 Roach, William, ii., 17 Roberts, Captain, ii., 74, 75 Robinson, Batty, i., 154 Robinson, Chaplain H., ii., Rock of Lisbon, n., 165 Rodgers, Commodore, i., 8, 48, 90, 96, 103, 146; ii., 3. 45, 108, 196, 199; chase of Belvidera, fires first gun, i., 91, 92; leaves Boston, "., 131; chases Nyniphe, ., 131; captures Jamaica packet Swallow, pursues in vain Galatea, i., 131, 132 Ross, General, attack on Washington, ii., 43; cap- 326 Index Ross — Continued tures the city and bums the public buildings, ii. , 45 ; unsuccessful attack on Baltimore, is killed, ii., 46 Rota, ii., 68-70 Roulette, Lieutenant, i., 190, 321, 325 Rouvier, Lieutenant, His- toire des Mar ins Frangais, i., 237 Royal George , i., 172, 184, 188, 189, 272, 274, 283, 298- 302, 304, 306, 307; ii., 88; attacked by Chatoncy s squadron, i., 188 "Ruff,"ii., 20 Sackett's Harbor, i., 88, 175, 184, 188, 189,277,279,283, 293. 305. 306; ii., 97. 98, 102, 104; inadequate de- fences, i., 283; attack by Prevost, repulsed with great loss to him,_i., 284, 285 ; slight fortifications, ii., 86, 91; blockaded by Yeo, ii. ,94 ; blockade raised, ii. , 97 St. Augustine, ii., 3 St. Catharines, i., 199 St. David's Head, i., 250 St. George's Channel, i., 249 St. George's, Beirnuda, Ad- miralty Court, ii., 149 St. Joseph's Fort and bar- racks burned, ii., 109 St. Lawrence, ii., 42, 103, 115, 163, 164 St. Lawrence, Gulf, 1., 109 St. Lawrence River, i., 170 St. Leonard Creek, ii., 42 St. Louis Bay, ii., 75 St. Mary's, ii., 40, 7^ St. Mary's River, ii., 191 St. Mary's Strait, ii., no St. Phil'ip, Fort, ii., 253 Salamanca, ii., 236 Salem, ii., 161 Samwell, Midshipman, i., 226 Sanders, Captain, i., 243, 248 San Domingo, i., 134, 245 Sandy Hook, i., 196; ii., 4, 146 San Florenzo, i., 73, 121 San Gallan, i., 200 San Jago, i., 145. 165; ii., 172 San Salvador, i., 145, 147, 158, 159 San Sebastian, u., 235, 343 Sapelo Bar, ii., 68 Saranac, ii., 81 Saranac River, i., 343; ii., 130 Saratoga, i., 180, 335; ii., 115, 117, 129-132, 134-141 Saunders, Lieut. J., i., 154, 245 Savannah, u., 40, 64, 71 Sawyer, Admiral, i., loi Scorpion, i., 247, 309, 311, 312, 315, 318-321, 324, 325. 327. 328; u., 42, 109, III, 143 Scott, at Lundy's Lane, i.,2i2 Scott, Colonel, i., 280,284,286 Scourge, i., 187, 271, 277, 281, 288 Sea Horse, i., 144; "•, 44, 75, 77 Seamen on the lakes, their characteristics, i., 338 Seneca, i., 172, 283 Senhouse, Captain, i., 248 Seringapatam, i., 202 Serrat, Sailing-master G., i., 318 Severn, ii., 46, 160 Seybert's Statistical Annals, i- 58 Shannon, i., 54, 68, 83, 85, 90, 98, loi, 103-108, 117, 217- 226, 228-231, 234, 238; ii., 142, 200, 202, 206, 209; careful training of her Index 327 Shannon — Continued crew described by James, i., 218, 219; her armament, i., 220; engagement with Chesapeake, i., 222-229; captures her, i., 228; dia- gram of action, i., 229 Shannon River, ii., 64 Shaw, Captain, i., 46 Shead, Sailing-master, i., 248 Sheaf e. General, i., 278 Shelburne, ii., 35 Sheppard, Sailing-master, ii., 75 Sherbrooke, General, ii., 66 Shields, Purser T., ii., 157 Shubrick, Lieut. J. T., i., 204, 24 s Shubrick, Lieut. W. B., ii., 167, 173 Sigoumey, Lieutenant, 1., 247 Sintco, i., 172, 283 Simmons, Captain, Heavy Ordnance, i., 83, 142 Sinclair, Captain Arthur, i., 90, 131; commander of Ameri- can forces on upper lakes, ii., 109; burns St. Joseph, ii., 109; unsuccessful at- tack on Mackinaw, leaves for Lake Erie, ii., 109, no Single- ship actions in the war, twelve in all, ii., 268, 296 Slaughter, Colonel, ii., 238 Smith, Captain, i., 212 Smith, Lieut. S., in command of American forces on Champlain, i., 278, 341; makes plucky fight when attacked, i., 342 Smith, Midshipman, i., 226 Smith, Robert, i., 62 Soley, Prof. J. R., Naval Campaign of 1S12, ii., 278; compared with other au- thorities, ii., 279-283 Somers, i., 308, 311, 318, 319, 321, 325. 327. 328; ii., 112, 143 Somerville, Capt. P., ii., 68 Sophie, ii., 68 Sorel River, i., 341, 343 South Africa, ii., 54 Southampton, i., 90, 98, 165; captures Vixen, i., 165 Southcomb, Capt. J., i., 210; ii., 164 Spain, " Floating Castles," ii., 24 Spaniards driven from Pensa- cola by Jackson, ii., 214 Spanish countries under the British influence, i., 200 Spark, ii., 81 Spedders, Lieut. R., ii., 76, 78 Speedy, i., 77, 144 Speedy, Christopher, i., 149 Spice Islands, ii., 161 Spilsbury, Captain, ii., 95 Spitfire, i.,_ 214 Spithead, i., 146 Squaw Island, i., 193 Stackpole, i., 138 Statira, i., 71, 138, 210 Stevens, Sailing-master, i., 278 Stewart,Capt.C., i., 45, 76, 198, 211; ii., 5-7, 165, 167, 168, 171, 173, 176, 177 Stoddart, Sec. Benj., 1., 59 Stokes, Lieut. T., killed, i., 314, 320, 325 Stone River, ii., 8 Stony Creek, ii., 95 Stuart, Lord, i., 214 Sunda, Straits of, ii., 188 Superb, ii., 3 Superior, ii., 86, 88, 91, 95, 100 Surprise, i., 261; ii., 115 Surveyor, i., 239, 240 Swallow, i., 131 Swartout, Midshipman, i., 325 328 Index Sybil, i., 1 20 Sydney Smith, i., 272, 274, 285, 306; ii., 88 Sylph, i., 286, 295, 296, 298, 299, 302; ii., 86, 88, 91, 98 Syren, i., 48; ii., 54, 82; captured by the Medway, ii-. 54 Tarbell, Captain, i., 243 Tartarus, ii., 58 Tatnall, Lieutenant, life by C. C.Jones, Jr., i., 197, 246, ii., 77, 203, 204 Taylor, Capt. J., i., 203 Taylor, General, i., 151, 152 Taylor, Master, i., 325 Tenedos,\., ()2>\ ii., 8, 55, 145- 147, 149 Tennessee Volunteers, ii., 221-223, 259 Terror, ii., 46 Thalia, i., 95 Thames, battle of, ii., 213 Thompson, Midshipman, i., 279 Thorn, i., 144 Thomborough, Admiral, i., 250 Thornton, Colonel, ii., 247, 249, 250 Ticonderoga, ii., 114, 117, 118, 122, 130, 132-134, 140, 142 Tigress, i., 308, 311, 315, 318, 321, 327, 328; ii., 64, 109, no, 143 Tom Bowline, ii., 8r, 145, 178, 184 Tom Cringle's Log, i., 26 Tonnage of vessels in 1812, how estimated, ii., 262- 268; general uncertainty and difference between British and American methods, ii., 263-267 Tonnant, ii., 77, 216 Torch, ii., 81 Torpedo, ii., 193 Toulouse, battle of, ii., 235 Townsend, Captain Lord James, i., 101 Towsen, Capt. N., i., 191, 192 Trafalgar, i., 28, 29, 41 Trant, Sailing-master, i., 188, 278 Travis, W. S., i., 239 Treaty of peace signed Dec- cember 24, 18 14, ratified February 15, 1815, ii., 144 Trippe, i., 308, 311,312,315, 318, 321,323-325, 327,328 Tristan d'Acunha, ii., 178 Tromp, i., 336, 340 Troude, O., Batailles Na- vales, i., 120, 121, 144, 237, 23S, 294; ii., 171, 207 Truxton, i. , 34 Tucker, Capt. T.T.,ii., 10, 21 Tumbez, i., 200 Turner, Lieut. D., i., 318, 323; ii., no Twin, Sergeant, i., 226 Tybee Bar, ii., 191 Tyler, Admiral, ii., 54, 179 Ulrick, Sailing-master, ii., 76, United States, i., 40, 52, 67, 68, 70, 82, 87, 88, 90, 117, 121, 131, 134, 135, 136, 138, 141, 160, 161, 169, 215, 221, 249, 255, 257; u., 142, 155, 186, 202; en- gagement with Macedo- nian,!., 133, 134; the latter strikes in i^ hours, i., 135; American loss slight, i., 135; comparative force and loss, i., 138; struck by lightning, i., 216 United States, high commer- cial importance, i., 5; greatest injury received Index 329 United States — Continued from Great Britain, i., 6; principle contended for now universally accepted, i., 7; passes embargo act in retaliation for the Orders in Council, i., 8; declares war June, 1812, i., 8; badly worsted at first, i., 10; weakness of American navy, i., 29; policy of gov- ernment supported, i., 197; in 181 5, ii., 211 Upton, Captain, ii., 7 Valparaiso, i., 200; ii., 10, 13, 28- 33 . . Vashon, Captain, 1., 90 Vaughan, Sailing-master, ii., 97 Vengeance, 1., 34 Verde, Cape de, i., 198; ii., 63 Vermont, i., 170 Vessels mentioned (see also in proper alphabetical place): Abeille, Acasta, Achille, Adams, Adonis, Molus, Mtna, Africa, Alacrity, Albion, Alert, Alexandria, Alfred, Allen, Alligator, Arab, Argo, Ar- gus, Ariel, Arinada, Ar- mide. Asp, Astrea, Ata- lanta. Atlas, Avon, Ayl- win, Ballahou, Ballard, Ba- rossa, Belvidera, Beresford, Black Snake, Boston, Boxer, Bonne Citoyenne, Brant, Burrows, Caledonia, Car- nation, Carolina, Carron, Castilian, Centipede, Cha- meleon, Charwell, Chasseur, Cherub, Chesapeake, Chip- peway, Childers, Chubb, Cleopatra, Clyde, Columbia, Comus, C onfiancc , Congress , Conquest, Constellation, Constitution, Contest, Corn- wallis. Curlew, Cyane, Cy- prus, Dart, Decatur, De- troit, Devastation, Diadem, Dictator, Dolphin, Domin- ica, Dover, Dragon, Drunt- tnond. Eagle, Earl of Moira, Egypt ienne, Endymion,Ep- ervier, Erebus, Eric, Espi^- gle, Essex, Essex Junior, Eurotas, Euryalus, Eury- dice. Fair Ainerican, Fairy, Finch, Firefly, Flambeau, Florida, Fortu)te of War, Franklin, Frolic, Fulton, Galatea, General Arm- strong, General Pike, Gladiator, Gloucester, Gov- ernor Tompkins, Growler, Guerritre, Hamilton, Ha- vannah, Hebrus, Hermes, Highflyer, Hogue, Hornet, Hunter, Icarus, Indefatiga- ble, Independence, Jasseur, Java, Jefferson, John Adams, Jones, Julia, Junon, Lady Gore, Lady Murray, Lady of the Lake, Lady Prevost, Landrail, Laurestinus, Lawrence, Le- ander. Leopard, Levant, Linnet, Little Belt, Loire, Lottery, Louisiana, Ludlow, Lynx, Macedonian, j\lad- ison. Magnet, Maidstone, Majestic, Mars, Martin, Mary, Medway, Mcduse, Melville, Menelaus, Merri- mac. Meteor, Minerva, Mo- hawk, Moira, Montagu, Montgomery, Montreal, Nancy, Narcissus, Nauti- lus, Nereide, Netly, Nettle, Neufchdtel, New Castle, New York, Niagara, Noc- ton. Nonsuch, Norwich, Nymphe, Ohio, Oneida, On- 330 Index Vessels — Continued tario. Onyx, Orpheus, Pa- luiure, Pasley, Peacock, Pel- ican, Penguin, Perry, Pert, Philadelphia, Phcsbe, Phce- nix, Pictou, Pique, Plan- tagenet, Poictiers, Pomone, Porcupine, Preble, Presi- dent, Primrose, Princess Charlotte, Prince de Neuf- chdtel. Prince Regent, Pro- metheus, Prosperous, Psy- che, Queen Charlotte, Racer, Rainbow, RamilHes , Rattle- snake, Reindeer, Resolu- tion, Rifleman, Rota, Royal George, St. Lawrence, San : Domingo, San Florenzo, Saranac,Sara toga ,Scorpion , Scourge, Sea-horse, Seneca, Seringapatam, Severn, ' Shannon, Shclhurne, Simco, ' Soniers, Sophie, Southamp- i ton, Spark, Speedy, Spit- fire, Star, Statira, Superb, Superior, Surprise, Sur- veyor, Swallow, Sybil, Syd- ney Smith, Sylph, Syren, Tartarus, Tenedos, Terror, Thalia, Thorn, Ticonde- roga, Tigress, Tom Bowline, Tonnant, Torpedo, Torch, Trippe, United States, Viper, Vixen, Volcano, Washington, Wasp, Wil- liams, Wilmer, Wolfe, Woodbridge, Young Wasp V estate, i., 73 Victory, i., 40 Villeneuve, M., i., 294 Vincent, General, i., 280, 281 Viper, i., 48, 210, 267; ii., 115; captured by IVarcis- sus, i., 210 Virgin, i., 144 Virginia, success of British campaign in, ii., 214, 254 Vixen, i., 48, 165, 168; cap- tured by Southampton, i., Volcano, 11., 46 WadswortlT, Colonel, ii., 43 Wadsworth, Lieutenant, ii., 64 Wales, Captain, ii., 36, 37 War department, imbecility of its administration, ii., 213 War of 181 2: on land, disas- trous for U. S., ii., 21 1 ; its dtial aspect, ii., 213; what British triumph would have meant, ii., 214 Ward's Manual of Naval Tactics, {., 183, 318; ii., 119, 203 Wareham, ii., 3 Warren, Adm. Sir. J., i., 196, 295 Warrington, Capt. L., ii., 35, 38, 40, 108, 145, 178, 189, 190, 203; his attack on the Nautilus needless crvielty, ii., 28, 29; acted without proper humanity, ii., 190 Washington, ii., 193 Washington , burning of pub- lic buildings, i., 11; ii., 45; British advance on,ii.,43- 45 Washington, Fort, n., 44; at- tacked by Gordon, and abandoned, ii., 45 Wasp, i., 17, 43. 47. 49. 50. 54, 66, 82, 84, 89, 123-130, 168, 169, 203, 216, 220, 255. 256, 334; ii., 34, 47- 52, 55-62, 80, 85, 142, 179, 200-202; engagement with Frolic, i., 124; captures her after fight of 43 min- utes, i., 126; comparative Index 331 Wasp — Continued force and loss, i., 127 ; dia- gram of action, i., 128; enormous disparity in damage suffered by each vessel, i., 130; fine crew and daring commander, ii., 47; bums and scuttles many ships in English Channel, ii., 48; engage- ment with and capture of Reindeer, ii., 48-52; de- structive cannonade, ii., 49; diagram of action and comparative force and loss, ii., 52 ; chases and captures Avon, after furious engage- ment, ii., 57, 58; Avon sinks, ii., 59; captures /1/a- lanta, ii., 60; shortly after never heard of again, ii., 61; comments on vessel, crew, and their actions, ii., 61, 62 Waters, Midshipman K., i., 263 Watson, Lieutenant, i., 250, 251 Watt, Lieutenant, 1., 226 Watts, Sailing - master, i., 192 Webb's Peninsula; McClel- lan's Campaign of 1862, i., 231 Welhngton,"the Iron Duke," ii., 152, 216; his defeat of Napoleon's marshals, ii., 235 Wells, Lieut. H., i., 185 Welsh, T., Jr., ii., 167 Western frontier fighting, ii., 214 West Indies, i., 199; ii., 3 Westphal, Lieut. P., i., 248 Whaling trade of British in South Pacific broken up by Porter, i., 42, 200 Whinyates, Capt. T., i., 123, 125-127, 130 Wilkinson, General, expedi- tion of, to Canada, i., 285 William, i., 146 Williams, Lieut. A. O., ii., 70 Wilmer, ii., 115 Wilmer, Lieutenant, knocked overboard and drowned, ii., 20 Wintle, Lieutenant, i., 126 Wolje, i., 272, 274, 283, 288, 298-301,304,306,307; ii., 88 Wood, Lieut. P. V., i., 157 Woodbridge, ii., 63 Woolsey, Lieutenant, i., 172, 184, 188, 277; ii., 95, 96 Worsley, Lieutenant, ii., no Worth, Lieutenant F. A. ,ii. ,70 Wragg, Midshipman, i., 194 Wright, Lieut. F. W., i., 205, 209 Yamall, Lieutenant, i., 312; badly wounded, i., 322, 325 Yeo, Commod. Sir J. L., com- mander of British squad- ron on Lake Ontario, i., 98, 165, 177, 284-290; ii., 98 100; attacks Sackett's Harbor with Prevost , and is repulsed, i., 270, 274, 283- 285, 287-289; superiority of his vessels, i. , 2 7 5 ; action withChauncy, i., 291; cap- tures two schooners, i., 291-292; his victor^' nei- ther decisive nor brilliant, i., 293, 294; gets the worst of action near Genesee River, i., 295; his force not tised to best advantage, i., 297-303; blockaded in Kingston, i., 304, 305; crit- icised and compared with ^z^ Index Yeo — Continued Chauncy.i., 306; hissquad- ron in 1814, ii., 89, 90; takes Oswego, ii., 92-93, and blockades Sackett's Harbor, ii., 94; raises blockade, ii., 97; declines to fight against odds, ii., 98; cautiousness amount- ing to timidity, ii., 102; as good as his opponent, ii., 108, 127 Yeocomico Creek, i., 247 Yonge, CD., History of the British Navy, not good, i., 293; ii., 121 York (now Toronto) , i., 270, 277, 278, 280, 284, 297, 305, 307; ii., 198 Young Wasp, ii., 179 DEC 27 :902 .'•'/• ■ •JM^ 3 \903 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 'fi^rn^' 013 903 573 2 .^