Class _EL4G>rL_ 
 
 GoiiyrightN''_ 
 
 COFYRIGHr DEPOSIT. 
 
f(^ 
 
 
'^ 
 
"^7^^ 
 
 THE LIFE 
 
 OF 
 
 Jefferson Davis. 
 
 Br FRANK H. ALFRIEND, 
 
 Late Editor of The Southern Literary Messenger. 
 
 CD CINCINNATI AND CHICAGO: 
 
 CAXTON PUBLISHING HOUSE. 
 PHILADELPHIA, RICHMOND, ATLANTA AND ST. LOUIS 
 
 NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO. 
 
 BALDWYN, MISS. : P. M. SAVERY & COMPANY. 
 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. : J. LAWS & CO. 
 
 1868. 
 
Eiitered, according to Act o/ goagress, in tlie year 1807, by 
 FRANK H. ALFRIEND, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the 
 District of Virginia. 
 
PEEFACE. 
 
 In offering this volume to the public, the occasion is embraced to avow, 
 with unfeigned candor, a painful sense of the inadequate manner in which 
 the design has been executed. Emboldened rather by his own earnest 
 convictions, than by confidence in his capacity, the author has undertaken 
 to contribute to American History, an extended narration of the more 
 prominent incidents in the life of Jefferson Davis. Whatever may be 
 the decision of the reader upon the merits of the performance, the author 
 has the satisfaction arising fi-om a conscientious endeavor to subserve the 
 ends of truth. In pursuit of the purpose to write facts only, to the aid of 
 familiar acquaintance with many of the topics discussed, and to informa- 
 tbn derived from the most accurate sources, has been brought laborious 
 investigation of numerous interesting papers, which his avocation made 
 accessible. It is therefore claimed that no statement is to be found in 
 this volume, wliich is not generally conceded to be true, or which is not a 
 conclusion amply justified by indisputable evidence. 
 
 Nor is it to be fairly alleged that the work exhibits undue sectional bias. 
 As a Soutlicrn man, who, in common with his countrymen of the South, 
 was tiiught to believe the principles underlying the movement for Southern 
 independence, the only possible basis of Republicanism, the author has 
 regarded, as a worthy incentive, the desire to vindicate, as best he might, 
 the motives and conduct of the South and its late leader. 
 
 Disclaiming the purpose of promoting sectional bitterness, or of a whole- 
 sale indictment of the Northern people, he deems it needless to dwell upon 
 the obvious propriety of discrimination. Holding in utter abhorrence 
 the authors of those outrages, wanton barbarities and petty persecutions, 
 
 (iii) 
 
IV PEEFACE. 
 
 of which her people were the victims, the South yet feels the respect of 
 an honorable enemy for those distinguished soldiers, Buell, Hancock, 
 McClellan and others, who served efficiently the cause in which they were 
 employed, and still illustrated the practices of Christian warfare. To fitly 
 charactei'ize the remorseless faction in antagonism to the sentiments of 
 these honorable men, it is only necessary to recall the malice which assails 
 a "lost cause" with every form of detraction, and aspires to crown a tri- 
 umph of arms with the degradation and despair of a conquered people. 
 
 In his especial solicitude for a favorable appreciation of his efforts, by 
 his Southern countrymen, the author has striven to avoid affront to those 
 considerations of delicacy which yet affect many incidents of the late w^ar. 
 He has not sought to revive, unnecessarily, questions upon which Southern 
 sentiment was divided, and has rarely assailed the motives or capacity of 
 individuals in recognized antagonism to the policy of President Davis. 
 Perhaps a different course would have imparted interest to his work, and 
 have more clearly established the vindication of its subject. But besides 
 being wholly repugnant to the tastes of the author, it would have been in 
 marked conflict with the consistent aim of Mr. Davis' career, which was 
 to heal, not to aggravate, the differences of the South. 
 
 A large part of the labor, which would otherwise have devolved upon 
 this enterprise, if adequately performed, had already been supplied by the 
 writings of Professor Bledsoe. To the profound erudition and philosophi- 
 cal genius of that eminent writer, as conspicuously {displayed in his work 
 entitled, "Is Davis a Traitor?" the South may, with confidence, intrust 
 its claims upon the esteem of posterity. 
 
 The author heartily acknowledges the intelligent aid, and generous en- 
 couragement, which he has received from his publishers. 
 
 January, 1868. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 J (Page 13-19.) 
 ATTRACTIONS OF THE LATE WAR TO POSTERITY — ilR. LIKCOLX's REMARK — DIS- 
 ADVANTAGES OP MR. DAVIs' SITUATION — SUCCESS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH 
 MERIT ORIGIN OP THE INJUSTICE DONE MR. DAVIS REMARK OP MACAU- 
 LAY — REMARK OF MR. GLADSTONE THE EFFECT THAT CONFEDERATE SUC- 
 CESS WOULD HAVE HAD UPON THE FAME OF MR. DAVIS — POPULAR AFFECTION 
 FOR HIM IN THE SOUTH — HIS VINDICATION ASSURED. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 (Page 20-a3.) 
 BIRTH — EDUC.VTIONt-^AT WEST POINT — IN THE ARMY — RETIREMENT — POLITICAL 
 TRAINING IN AMERIC.\---MRrDAVIS NOT EDUCATED FOR POLITICAL LIFE AFTER 
 THE AMERICAN MODEL — BEGINS HIS POLITICAL CAREER BY A SPEECH AT THE 
 MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION — A GLANCE PROSPECTIVELY AT HIS 
 FUTURE PARTY ASSOCIATION-S — HIS CONSISTENT ATTACHMENT TO STATE.s' 
 RIGHTS PRINCIPLE.S — A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TITE QUESTION OF 
 states' RIGHTS — MR. CALHOUN NOT THE AUTHOR OF THAT PRINCIPLE — HIS 
 VINDICATION FROM THE CHARGE OP DISUNION ISM — MR. DAVIS THE SUCCESSOR 
 OF MR. CALHOUN AS THE STATES' RIGHTS LEADER. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 (Page 34-48.) 
 RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1844 ^JIR. DAVIS ELECTED TO CON- 
 GRESS — HIS FIRST SESSION — PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE — DOUG- 
 LAS, HUNTER, SEDDON, ETC. — DAVIs' RAPID ADVANCEMENT IN REPUTA- 
 TION — RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY HIM — SPEECHES ON THE OREGON EXCITE- 
 
 (V) 
 
VI . CONTEXTS. 
 
 BIENT, AND OX THE RESOLUTION OF THANKS TO GENERAL TAYLOR AND HIS 
 
 ARMY NATIONAL SENTIMENTS EMBODIED IN THESE AND OTHER SPEECHES 
 
 A CONTRAST IN THE JIATTKK OK PATRIOTISM MAS^VCHUSJEIIS_AKai-_MIS- 
 
 SISSIPPI IN THE MEXICAN WAR — DEBATE WITH ANDREW JOHNSON JOHN 
 
 QUINCY ADAMs' ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 (Page 49-67.) 
 
 THE NAME OF JEFFERSON DAVIS INSEPARABLE FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 
 
 MEXICAN WAR HIS ESSENTIALLY MILITARY CHARACTER AND TASTES JOINS 
 
 GENERAL TAYLOR's ARMY ON THE RIO GRANDE, AS COLONEL OF THE FAMOUS 
 "MISSISSIPPI rifles" MONTEREY BUENA VISTA GENERAL TAYLOR's AC- 
 COUNT OF DAVIs' CONDUCT DAVIs' REPORT OF THE ACTION NOVELTY AND 
 
 ORIGINALITY OF HIS STRATEGY AT BUENA VISTA INTERESTING STATEMENT 
 
 OF HON. CALEB GUSHING RETURN OF DAVIS TO THE UNITED STATES TRI- 
 UMPHANT RECEPTION AT HOME PRESIDENT POLK TENDERS HIM A BRIGA- 
 
 DIER's COMMISSION, WHICH HE DECLINES ON PRINCIPLE. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 (Page 68-84.) 
 
 MR. DAVIS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FIRST BY EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT, 
 AND SUBSEQUENTLY" BY UNANIMOUS CHOICE OP THE LEGISLATURE OF HIS 
 STATE — POPULAR ADMIRATION NOT LESS FOR HIS CIVIC TALENTS THAN HIS 
 
 MILITARY SERVICES FEATURES OF HIS PUBLIC CAREER HIS CHARACTER 
 
 AND CONDUCT AS A SENATOR AS AN ORATOR AND PARLIAJIENTARY LEADER 
 
 HIS INTREPIDITY AN INCIDENT WITH HENRY CLAY' DAVIS THE LEADER 
 
 OF THE states' RIGHTS PARTY IN CONGRESS — THE AGITATION OF 1850 
 
 DAVIS OPPOSES THE COJIPROMISE FOLLY OF THE SOUTH IN ASSENTING TO 
 
 THAT SETTLEMENT DAVIS NOT A DISUNIONIST IN 1850, NOR A REBEL IN 
 
 1861 HIS CONCEPTION OP THE CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 LOGICAL ABSURDITY OF CLAy's POSITION EXPOSED BY DAVIS THE IDEAL 
 
 UNION OF THE LATTER WHY HE OPPOSED THE COMPROMISE — THE NEW 
 
 MEXICO BILL DAVIs' GROWING FAME AT THIS PERIOD — HIS FREQUENT EN- 
 COUNTERS WITH CLAY, AND WARM FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THEM SIGNAL 
 
 TRIUMPH OP THE UNION SENTIMENT, AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE SOUTH. 
 
CONTENTS. MI 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 (Page 85-97.) 
 
 OPPOSITION TO THE COMPROMISE IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI — DAVIS 
 A CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR — HIS DEFEAT REALLY A PERSONAL TRICJIPH — 
 IN RETIREMENT, SUPPORTS GENERAL PIERCfi'S ELECTION DECLINES AN AP- 
 POINTMENT IN PIERCe's cabinet, but SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTS SECRETARY- 
 SHIP OP WAR REMARKABLE UNITY OF PIERCE's ADMINISTRATION, AND 
 
 HIGH CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE — DAVIS AS SECRETARY OF WAR KAN- 
 SAS-NEBRASKA BILL AND THE EXCITEMENT WHICH FOLLOWED DAVIS AGAIN 
 
 ELECTED TO THE SENATE — SPEECHES AT PASS CHRISTIAN AND OTHER POINTS 
 WHILE ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. 
 
 CHAPTER yi. 
 
 (Page 98-191.) 
 
 RETURN OF MR. DAVIS TO THE SENATE — OPENING EVENTS OF MR. BUCHANAN's 
 
 ADMINISTRATION — TRUE INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGISLATION OF 185-4 
 
 SENATOR DOUGLAS THE INSTRUMENT OF DISORGANIZATION IN THE DEMO- 
 CRATIC PARTY — HIS ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER — AN ACCOMPLISHED DEM- 
 AGOGUE DAVIS AND DOUGLAS CONTRASTED — BOTH REPRESENTATIVES OF 
 
 THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTIONS — DOUGLAS* AMBITION — HIS COUP DETAT, AND 
 
 ITS RESULTS THE KANSAS QUESTION DOUGLAS TRIUMPHS OVER THE SOUTH 
 
 AND THE UNITY OP THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY LOST — "SQUATTER SOVER- 
 EIGNTY*' — PROPERLY CHARACTERIZED — DAVIS* COURSE IN THE KANSAS 
 STRUGGLE — DEBATE WITH SENATOR FESSENDEN — PEN-AND-INK SKETCH OF 
 MR. DAVIS AT THIS PERIOD — TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS TO 
 THE SOUTH — SHE RIGHTLY INTERPRETS THEM — JIR. DAVIS* COURSE SUBSE- 
 QUENT TO THE KANSAS IMBROGLIO HIS DEBATES WITH DOUGLAS TWO DIF- 
 FERENT SCHOOLS OF PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKING DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE 
 
 REGULAR DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS — HIS RESOLUTIONS — 
 HIS CONSISTENCY — COURSE AS TO GENERAL LEGISLATION — VISITS THE NORTH 
 — SPEAKS IN PORTLAND, BOSTON, NEW YORK, AND OTHER PLACES — REPLY TO 
 AN INVITATION TO ATTEND THE WEBSTER BIRTH-DAY FESTIVAL — MR. SEW- 
 ARd's ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE "IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT** MR. DAVIS BE- 
 FORE MLSSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC STATE CONVENTION PROGRESS OF DISUNION 
 
 DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY — SPEECHES OF MR. DAVIS AT PORT- 
 LAND AND IN SENATE. 
 
Vm CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 (Page 192-232.) 
 
 ELECTION OF ABRAH.\iI LINCOLN — HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT — 
 THE OBJECTS AIMED AT BY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY IDENTICAL IN THE DIS- 
 CUSSION OF EVENTS OF THE LATE WAR — NORTHERN EVASION OF THE REAL 
 QUESTION THE SOUTH DID NOT ATTEMPT REVOLUTION SECESSION A JUSTI- 
 FIABLE RIGHT EXERCISED BY SOVEREIGN STATES BRIEF REVIEW OF THE 
 
 QUESTION — WHAT THE FEDERALIST SAYS CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL MR. 
 
 MADISON COERCION NOT JUSTIFIED AT THE NORTH PREVIOUS TO THE LATE 
 
 WAR REMARKS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS OP ABRAHAM LINCOLN OF HORACE 
 
 GREELEY — SUCCESSFUL PERVERSION OF TRUTH BY THE NORTH — PROVOCATIONS 
 
 TO SECESSION BY THE SOUTH AGGRESSIONS BY THE NORTH ITS PUNIC 
 
 FAITH LOSS OP THE BALANCE OF POWER PATIENCE OF THE SOUTH 
 
 REMARKS OF HON. C. C. CLAY WHAT THE ELECTION OF MR. LINCOLN 
 
 MEANT — HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY — REVELATIONS OF THE OBJECTS OF 
 
 THE REPUBLICAN PARTY WENDELL PHILLIPS NO SECURITY FOR THE 
 
 SOUTH IN THE UNION MEETING OF CONGRESS MR. DAVIs' ASSURANCE 
 
 TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN CONCILIATORY COURSE OF MR. DAVIS HIS CON- 
 SISTENT DEVOTION TO THE UNION, AND EFFORTS TO SAVE IT FORESEES 
 
 WAR AS THE RESULT OF SECESSION, AND URGES THE EXHAUSTION OF EVERY 
 
 EXPEDIENT TO AVERT IT THE CRITTENDEN AMENDMENT HOPES OF ITS 
 
 ADOPTION DAVIS WILLING TO ACCEPT IT IN SPITE OF ITS INJUSTICE TO 
 
 THE SOUTH REPUBLICAN SENATORS DECLINE ALL CONCILIATORY MEASURES 
 
 THE CLARKE AMENDMENT WHERE RESTS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DIS- 
 UNION ? STATEMENTS OF MESSRS. DOUGLAS AND COX SECESSION OF THE 
 
 COTTON STATES A LETTER FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO R. B. RHETT, JR. 
 
 MR. DAVIs' PAREWELL TO THE SENATE — HIS REASONS FOR WITHDRAWING — 
 RETURNS TO MISSISSIPPI — MAJOR-GENERAL OF STATE FORCES — ORGANIZATION 
 OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT — MR. DAVIS PRESIDENT OF THE CON- 
 FEDERATE STATES. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 (Page 233-265.) 
 
 THE CONFEDERACY ESTABLISHED AND IN OPERATION — CALMNESS AND MODERA- 
 TION OF THE SOUTH THE MONTGOMERY CONSTITUTION THE IMPROVEMENTS 
 
 UPON THE FEDERAL INSTRUMENT — POPULAR DELIGHT AT THE SELECTION OF 
 MR. DAVIS AS PRESIDENT — MOTIVES OF HIS ACCEPTANCE — HIS PREFERENCE 
 
CONTENTS. IX 
 
 FOR THE AR>ri' — DATIS THE SYMBOL OF SOUTHERN CHARACTER AND HOPES — 
 
 ON HIS WAY TO MONTGOMERY A CONTRAST INAUGURATION AND INAUGURAL 
 
 ADDRESS — THE CONFEDERATE CABINET TOOMBS — AVALKER — MEMMINGER — 
 
 BENJAMIN — MALLOBY — REAGAN — HISTORICAL POSITION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS 
 — THE TWO POWERS — EXTREME DEMOCRACY OF THE NORTH — NOBLE IDEAL 
 
 OF REPUBLICANISM CHERISHED BY THE SOUTH DAVIs' REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 QUALITIES AND DISTINGUISHED SERVICES THE HISTORIC REPRESENTATIVE OF 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE EARLY HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT MONT- 
 GOMERY CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS UNLIMITED PRESIDENT DAVIs' 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY — HIS MILITARY ADMINISTRATION — THE CONFED- 
 ERATE ARMY — WEST POINT — NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER OF FORTS SUM- 
 TER AND PICKENS — MR. BUCHANAN' S PITIABLE POLICY THE ISSUE OP PEACE 
 
 OR WAR PERFIDIOUS COURSE OP THE LINCOLN ADMINISTRATION MR. SE- 
 
 WARD's DALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS — HIS DECEP- 
 TIONS — THE EXPEDITION TO PROVISION THE GARRISON OF SU.MTER REDUC- 
 TION OF THE FORT — WAR — GUILT OF THE NORTH — ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
 THE WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 (Page 266-293.) 
 
 EVENTS CONSEQUENT UPON THE BOMBARDMENT OP FORT SUMTER — JtR. LINCOLN 
 BEGINS THE WAR BY USURPATION — THE BORDER STATES CONTINUED DU- 
 PLICITY OF THE FEDER.U. GOVERNMENT VIRGINIA JOINS THE' COTTON 
 
 STATES — AFFAIRS IN MARYLAND, MISSOURI, AND KENTUCKY — UNPROMISING 
 PHASES OF THE SITUATION, AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS OP THE SOUTH — 
 DIVISIONS IN SOUTHERN SENTIMENT — THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY — PRESI- 
 DENT DAVIs' ANTICIPATIONS REALIZED — HIS RESPONSE TO MR. LINCOLN'S 
 
 PROCLAJIATION OF WAR PUBLIC ENTHUSIASM IN THE SOUTH PRESIDENT 
 
 DAVIs' MESSAGE — VIRGINIA THE FLANDERS OF THE WAR — REMOVAL OF THE 
 CONFEDERATE CAPITAL TO RICHMOND — POLICY OF THAT STEP CONSIDERED — 
 POPULAR REGARD FOR MB. DAVIS IN VIRGINIA — ACTION OF THE VIRGINIAN 
 AUTHORITIES — NORTH CAROLINA ; HER NOBLE CONDUCT, AND EFFICIENT AID 
 TO THE CONFEDERACY — MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN VIRGINIA — GENERAL 
 LEE — HIS SERVICES IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR — MINOR ENG.\GE- 
 MENTS — PREPARATIONS FOR THE GRE.\T STRUGGLE IN VIRGINIA — -VN IM- 
 PORTANT HISTORICAL QUESTION — CHARGES AGAINST SIR. DAVIS CONSIDERED — 
 
 HIS STATESMAN-LIKE PREVISION DID HE ANTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FOR 
 
 WAR? — WHEN MR. DAVIS RESPONSIBILITY BEGAN — HIS ENERGETIC PREPAR- 
 ATION — THE PREVAILING SENTI.MENT AT MONTGOMERY AS TO THE WAR — 
 QUOTATIONS FRO.M GENERAL EARLY AND GENERAL VON MOLKTE. 
 
X CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 (Page 294-325.) 
 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAR IN 1861 — THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DI- 
 RECTLY CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT 
 
 PERIODS MR. DAVIs' CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE 
 
 CONFEDERACY THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE 
 
 DEFENSIVE POLICY OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES FEDERAL PREPARATIONS 
 
 GENERAL SCOTT DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES DISTRIBUTION 
 
 OF THEIR FORCES THE CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 JUSTIFIED DIS- 
 TRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN GENERALS 
 
 PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON ^JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON 
 
 MANASSAS — PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE BATTLE-FIELD — HIS DISPATCH — HIS 
 RETURN TO RICHMOND — A SPEECH NEVER PUBLISHED BEFORE — REFLECTIONS 
 
 UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS MR. DAVIS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
 
 ABSENCE OF PURSUIT — STONEWALL JACKSON's VIEWS DAVIS IN FAVOR OF 
 
 PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS MISREPRESENTATIONS MILITARY MOVEMENTS 
 
 IN VARIOUS QUARTERS — THE "TRENT AFFAIR " — RESULTS OP THE FIRST 
 YEAR OF THE WAR. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 (Page 326-3UU.) 
 
 PROSPECTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1862 — EXTREME CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH — 
 EXTRAVAGANT EXPECTATIONS — THE RICHMOND EXAMINER ON CONFEDERATE 
 
 PROSPECTS WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES PREDICTED 
 
 THE BLOCKADE TO BE RAISED THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY DECREED BY 
 
 HEAVEN RESULT OF THE BOASTFUL TONE OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS THE 
 
 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISASTERS OF 1862 — 
 PRESIDENT DAVIS URGES PREPARATION FOR A LONG WAR — HIS WISE OPPOSI- 
 TION TO SHORT ENLISTMENTS OF TROOPS — PREMONITIONS OP MISFORTUNES 
 
 IN THE WEST THE CONFEDERATE FORCES IN KENTUCKY GENERAL ALBERT 
 
 SIDNEY JOHNSTON HIS CAREER BEFORE THE WAR CHARACTER APPEAR- 
 ANCE THE FRIEND OF JEFFERSON DAVIS ^MUTUAL ESTEEM SIDNEY JOHN- 
 STON IN KENTUCKY — HIS PLANS — HIS DIFFICULTIES — THE FORCES OF GRANT 
 AND BUELL — CRUEL DILEMMA OF GENERAL SIDNEY JOHNSTON — ^A REVERSE — 
 GRANT CAPTURES FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON — LOSS OP KENTUCKY AND 
 TENNESSEE FEDERAL DESIGNS IN THE EAST BURNSIDE CAPTURES ROAN- 
 OKE ISLAND SERIOUS NATURE OF THESE REVERSES POPULAR DISAPPOINT- 
 MENT ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION 
 
 CHAR.-VCTER AND MOTIVES OF THIS OPPOSITION AN EFFORT TO REVOLUTIONIZE 
 
CONTEXTS. XI 
 
 PRESIDENT DAVIs' CABINET — ASSAULTS UPON SECRETARIES BENJAMIN AND 
 MALLOKY CORRECT EXPLANATION OF THE CONFEDERATE REVERSES CON- 
 GRESSIONAL CENSURE OF MR. BENJAMIN SECRETARY MALLORY — CHARAC- 
 TERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN MIND — THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT — SECOND 
 
 INAUGURATION OF MR. DAVIS — SEVERITY OF THE SEASON — THE CEREMONIES 
 
 APPEARANCE OP PRESIDENT DAVIS — HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS ITS EFFECT 
 
 POPULAR RE-ASSURANCE — MESSAGE TO CONGRESS — COMMENTS OF KICUMOXD 
 PRESS. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 (Page 3C1-389.) 
 
 POPULAR DELUSIONS IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE WAR — A FEAV CONFLICTS 
 AND SACRIFICES NOT SUFFICIENT — MORE POSITIVE RECOGNITION OF .MR. DAVIs' 
 
 VIEWS — HI.SC.VNDID AND PROPHETIC ANNOUNCEMENTS MILITARY REFOU.MS 
 
 CONSCRIPTION LAW OF THE CONFEDERACY THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS AND 
 
 COURSE AS TO THIS LAW — HIS CONSISTENT REGARD FOR CIVIL LIBERTY AND 
 OPPOSITION TO CENTRALIZATION — RECOMMENDS CONSCRIPTION — BENEFICIAL 
 RESULTS OF THE LAW — GENERAL LEE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, " UNDER THE 
 president" — NATURE OP THE APPOINTMENT FALSE IMPRESSIONS COR- 
 RECTED — MR. DAVIs' CONFIDENCE IN LEE, DESPITE POPULAR CENSURE OF THE 
 
 LATTER CHANGES IN THE CABINET MR. BENJ^V-AIINS MANAGEMENT OF THE 
 
 WAR OFFICE — DIFFICULTIES OF THAT POSITION — THE CHARGE OF FAVORITISM 
 AGAINST MR. DAVIS IN THE SELECTION OF HIS CABINET HIS PERSONAL RE- 
 LATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OP HIS CABINET — ACTIVITY IN MILI- 
 TARY OPERATIONS — THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE OF ELK HORN OPERA- 
 TIONS EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI GENERALS SIDNEY JOHNSTON AND BEAURE- 
 GARD ISLAND NO. 10 — CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS BY THE CONFEDERATE 
 
 AUTHORITIES — FAVORABLE SITUATION SHILOH A DISAPPOINTMENT DEATH 
 
 OF SIDNEY JOHNSTON TRIBUTE OF PRESIDENT DAVI.S POPULAR VERDICT 
 
 UPON THE B.\TTLE OF SHILOH — GENERALS BEAUREGARD, BRAGG, AND POLK 
 ON THE BATTLE — THE PRESIDENT AGAIN CHARGED WITH "INJUSTICE" TO 
 BEAUREGARD — THE CHARGE ANSWERED — FALL OP NEW ORLEANS — NAVAL 
 BATTLE IN HAMPTON ROADS — NAVAL SUCCESSES OF THE ENEMY. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 (Page ;«0-I21.) 
 
 THE "anaconda SYSTEM " — HOW FAR IT WAS SUCCESSFUL — TERRITORIAL CON- 
 FIGURATION OP THE SOUTH FAVORABLE TO THE ENEMY — ONE THEATRE OF 
 WAR FAVORABLE TO THE CONFEDERATES — THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA 
 
Xil CONTENTS. 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE FORCES — THE POTOMAC LINES CRITICAL SITUATION IN 
 
 VIRGINIA EVACUATION OF MANASSAS TRANSFER OF OPERATIONS TO THE 
 
 PENINSULA MAGRUDER's LINES EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN STRENGTH 
 
 OF THE OPPOSING FORCES BEFORE RICHMOND DESTRUCTION OF THE " VIR- 
 GINIA" — PANIC IN RICHMOND — MR. DAVIs' CALMNESS AND CONFIDENCE — 
 HE AVOWS HIMSELF " READY TO LEAVE HIS BONES IN THE CAPITAL OF THE 
 confederacy" — REPULSE OF THE GUNBOATS "MEMENTOES OF HEROISM" 
 
 Jackson's valley campaign — a series of victories, with important 
 
 results battle op " seven pines " a failure general johnston 
 
 wounded president davis on the field president davis and gen- 
 eral johnston an attempt to forestall the decision of history — 
 
 RESULTS OF LEe's ACCESSION TO COMMAND — JOHNSTOn's GENERALSHIP — 
 MR. DAVIs' ESTIMATE OF LEE — LEe's PLANS — THE ADVISORY RELATION BE- 
 TWEEN DAVIS AND LEE — THEIR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE NEVER INTERRUPTED — 
 
 CONFEDERATE STRATEGY AFTER m'cLELLAN's DEFEAT BEFORE RICHMOND 
 
 MAGICAL CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERACY THE INVASION 
 
 OF MARYLAND ANTIETAM TANGIBLE PROOFS OF CONFEDERATE SUCCESS 
 
 GENERAL BRAGG — HIS KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN CONFEDERATE HOPES BATTLE 
 
 OF PERRYVILLE — BRAGG RETREATS — ESTIMATE OF THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN 
 OF 1862 — OTHER INCIDENTS OP THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN — REMOVAL OF 
 m'cLELLAN — A SOUTHERN OPINION OF m'cLELLAN — BATTLE OF FREDERICKS- 
 BURG BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO' BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE THE SITUA- 
 TION AT THE CLOSE OF 18(32 PRESIDENT DAVIs' RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
 
 CONGRESS — HIS VISIT TO THE SOUTH-WEST — ADDRESS BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI 
 LEGISLATURE. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 (Page 422-449.) 
 
 RESPECT OF MANKIND FOR THE SOUTH — THE MOST PROSPEROUS PERIOD OF THE 
 WAR — HOW MR. DAVIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTINCTION OF THE SOUTH — 
 FACTION SILENCED — THE EUROPEAN ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS — HOW 
 HE DIGNIFIED THE CAUSE OF THE SOUTH — HIS STATE PAPERS — HIS ADMINIS- 
 TRATION OF CIVIL MATTERS — THE CONTRAST BET\^^:EN THE TWO PRESIDENTS 
 — MR. DAVIs' OBSERVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS — ARBITRARY AD- 
 MINISTRATION OF MR. LINCOLN — MR. DAVIs' MODERATION — HE SEEKS TO CON- 
 DUCT THE WAR UPON CIVILIZED IDEAS — AN ENGLISH CHARACTERIZATION OF 
 DAVIS — COLONEL FREEMANTLe's INTERVIEW WITH HIM — MR. GLADSTONES 
 OPINION — THE PURELY PERSONAL AND SENTIMENTAL ADMIRATION OF EUROPE 
 FOR THE SOUTH — INCONSISTENT CONDUCT OF THE EUROPE.AN GREAT POWERS — 
 THE LONDON "TIMES " BEFORE m'cLELLAN's DEFEAT — THE CONFEDERACY EN- 
 TITLED TO RECOGNITION BY EUROPE ENGLAND'S SYMPATHY WITH THE NORTH 
 
CONTENTS. Xlll 
 
 — DIGNIFIED ATTITCDE OF I'RKSIDENT DAVIS UPON THE SUBJECT OF RECOGNI- 
 TION — HIS EARLY PREDICTION UPON THE SUBJECT — FRANCE AND ENGLAND 
 EXPOSED TO INJURIOUS SUSPICIONS — TERGIVERSATIONS OF THE PALMERSTON 
 CABINET THE BROAD FARCE OP "BRITISH NEUTRALITY" — ENGLAND DE- 
 CLINES TO UNITE WITH FRANCE IN AN OFFER OF MEDIATION BETWEEN THE 
 AMERICAN BELLIGERENTS— England's "policy" — SHE SOUGHT THE RUIN OF 
 BOTH SECTIONS OF AMERICA — CULMINATION OF THE ANTISLAVERY POLICY OP 
 THE NORTH — MR. LINCOLN'S CONVERSATION WITH A KENTUCKY MEMBER OF 
 CONGRESS — THE WAR A " CRIME " BY MR. LINCOLN'S OWN SHOWING — VIOLA- 
 TION OF PLEDGES AND ARBITRARY ACTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — THE 
 MASK REMOVED AFTER THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM — THE REAL PURPOSE OF 
 EMANCIPATION — MR. DAVIs' ALLUSION TO THE SUBJECT — INDIGNATION OF THE 
 SOUTH AT THE MEASURE — MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS AND MISSISSIPPI — 
 
 VICKSBURG PORT HUDSON — LOSS OF ARKANSAS POST — FEDERAL FLEET RE- 
 
 PUL.SED AT CHARLESTON PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN — UNITY AND 
 
 CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH MR. DAVIs' ADDRESS TO THE COUNTRY IMPOR- 
 TANT EXTRACTS GENERAL LEE PREPARES FOR B.^TTLE HIS CONFIDENCE 
 
 CONDITION OF HIS AR.MY — BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE JEFFERSON DAVIS' 
 
 TRIBUTE TO STONEWALL JACKSON. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 (Page 4.50-176.) 
 
 CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE — THE MIL- 
 ITARY SITUATION PRI.MARY' OB.IECTS OF THE CONFEDERATES AFFAIRS IN 
 
 THE WE.ST — A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF SEVERAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN SUG- 
 GESTED TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES — VISIONARY STRATEGY — AN OF- 
 FENSIVE CAMPAIGN ADOPTED — THE INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA JUSTIFIED — 
 CONDITION OF THE ARMY OP NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THIS PERIOD — THE 
 MOVEMENT FROM THE RAPPAHANNOCK — LEADING FEATURES OF THE CONFED- 
 ERATE PLAN lee's STRATEGY AGAIN ILLUSTRATED GETTYSBURG A FATAL 
 
 BLOW TO THE SOUTH — LEE RETURNS TO VIRGINIA — THE SURRENDER OF VICKS- 
 BURG OTHER REVERSES EXULTATION OF THE NORTH THE CONFEDER.VTE 
 
 ADMINI.STRATION AGAIN ARRAIGNED BY ITS OPPONENTS — THE CASE OF GEN- 
 ERAL PEJIBERTON — POPULAR INJUSTICE TO A GALLANT OFFICER — A BRIEF 
 REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT — PEMBERTON's APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDED BY 
 
 DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS HIS ABLE ADMINISTRATION IN MISSLSSIPPI HIS 
 
 RE.SOLUTION TO HOLD VICKSBURG, AS THE GREAT END OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 HIS GALLANTRY AND RE.SOURCE.S NOBLE CONDUCT OF THIS PERSECUTED OP 
 
 PICER A FURTHER STATEMENT THE MISSION OF VICE-PRESIDENT STEPHENS 
 
 —ITS OBJECTS — PRESIDENT DAVIS SEEKS TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OF 
 
XIV CONTENTS. 
 
 WAR — MAGNANIMITY AND HUMANITY OF THE OFFER — PROUD POSITION IN 
 
 THIS MATTER OF THE SOUTH AND HER RULER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 DECLINES INTERCOURSE WITH MR. STEPHENS — EXPLANATION OF ITS MOTIVES 
 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. DAVIS AND STEPHENS. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 (Page 477-501.) 
 
 OPERATIONS OF GENERAL TAYLOR IN LOUISIANA — THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY IR- 
 RECOVERABLY LOST TO THE CONFEDERACY FEDERALS FOILED AT CHARLES- 
 TON THE DIMINISHED CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH FINANCIAL DERANGE- 
 MENT DEFECTIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE SOUTH MR. DAVIs' LIMITED 
 
 CONNECTION WITH IT THE REASONS FOR THE FINANCIAL FAILURE OF THE 
 
 CONFEDERACY — INFLUENCE OF SPECULATION — ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF THE 
 SOUTH — MR. DAVIs' VIEWS OF THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE SOUTH AT THE 
 
 BEGINNING OF THE WAR MILITARY OPER.ATIONS IN TENNESSEE BRAGG 
 
 RETREATS TO CHATTANOOGA MORGAN's EXPEDITION SURRENDER OF CUM- 
 BERLAND GAP — FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF CHATTANOOGA — BATTLE OF CHICKA- 
 MAUGA BRAGG's expectations GRANTS OPERATIONS BRAGG BADLY DE- 
 FEATED PRESIDENT DAVIs' VIEW OF THE DISASTER GENERAL BRAGG RE- 
 LIEVED FROM COMMAND OF THE WESTERN ARMY CENSURE OF THIS OFFICER 
 
 HIS MERITS AND SERVICES THE UNJUST CENSURE OF MR. DAVIS AND GEN- 
 ERAL BRAGG FOR THE REVERSES IN THE WEST OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA 
 
 IN THE LATTER PART OF 1863 CONDITION OF THE SOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF 
 
 THE YEAR SIGNS OF EXHAUSTION PRESIDENT DAVIs' RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 PUBLIC DESPONDENCY — THE WORK OP FACTION — ABUSE OF MR. DAVIS IN 
 CONGRESS THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS ASSAILANTS DEFI- 
 CIENCY OF FOOD HOW CAUSED THE CONFEDERACY EVENTUALLY CONQUERED 
 
 BY STARVATION. 
 
 CHAPTER XYII. 
 
 (Page 502-532.) 
 
 AN EFFORT TO BLACKEN THE CHARACTER OF THE SOUTH — THE PERSECUTION OP 
 MR. DAVIS AS THE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ASSUMED OFFENSES OP THE SOUTH — 
 
 REPUTATION OF THE SOUTH FOR HUMANITY TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF 
 
 WAR — EARLY ACTION OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT UPON THE SUBJECT 
 — MR. DAVIs' LETTER TO MR. LINCOLN — THE COBB-WOOL NEGOTIATIONS — PER- 
 FIDIOUS CONDUCT OF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES A CARTEL ARRANGED BY 
 
 GENERALS DIX AND HILL COMMISSIONER OULD HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH 
 
 THE FEDERAL AGENT OF EXCHANGH — REPEATED PERFIDY OF THE FEDERAL 
 
CONTENTS. XV 
 
 GOVERNMENT — SUSPENSION OF THE CAKTEL CAUSED BY THE BAD FAITH OF 
 THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION, AND THE SUFFERING WHICH IT CAUSED — 
 EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES TO RENEW THE OPERATION OP 
 THE CARTEL — HUMANE OFFER OF COMMISSIONER OULD — JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
 CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES — GUILT OF THE FEDERAL GOVEKNxMENT — MR. 
 DAVIs' STATEMENT OF THE MATTER — COLONEL OULd's LETTER TO MR. ELD- 
 RIDGE — NORTHERN STATEMENTS: GENERAL BUTLER, NEW YORK TRIBUNE 
 ETC. — THE CHARGE OF CRUELTY AGAINST THE SOUTH — A CONTRAST BETWEEN 
 ANDERSONVILLE AND ELMIRA — IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE SOUTH — DISREPU- 
 TABLE MEANS EMPLOYED TO AROUSE RESENTMENT OF THE NORTH — THE VIN- 
 DICATION OF THE SOUTH AND OF MR DAVIS — HIS STAINLESS CHARACTER, HIS 
 HUMANITY AND FORBEARANCE — AN INQUIRY OF HISTORY. 
 
 CHAPTER Xyill. 
 
 (Page 533-562.) , 
 
 INDICATIONS OF POPULAR FEELING AT THE BEGINNING OF 1864 — .\PATHY AND 
 
 DESPONDENCY OF THE NORTH — IMPROVED FEELING IN THE CONFEDERACY 
 
 THE PROBLEM OF ENDURANCE PREPARATIONS OP THE CONFEDER.iTE GOV- 
 ERNMENT — MILITARY SUCCESS THE GREAT DESIDERATUM — A SERIES OP SUC- 
 CESSES — FINNEGAN's VICTORY IN FLORIDA — SHEKMAn's EXPEDITION — FOR- 
 
 eests victory — the raid op dahlgren — taylor defeats banks — 
 Forrest's Tennessee campaign — iioke's victory — the value op these 
 
 •WWOR victories — C0NCENTR.\TI0N FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLES IN VIRGINIA 
 
 AND GEORGIA FEDERAL PREPARATIONS— GENERAL GRANT — HIS THEORY OF 
 
 WAR — HIS PLANS THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA SHERMAN FEEBLE 
 
 RESOURCES OF THE CONFEDERACY — THE " ON TO RICHMOND" AND " ON TO 
 ATLANTA" — GENERAL GRANT BAFFLED — HE NARROWLY ESCAPES RUIN — HIS 
 OVERLAND MOVEMENT A TOTAL FAILURE — SHERIDAN THREATENS RICHMOND 
 
 — DEATH OF STUART ^BUTLER S ADVANCE UPON RICHMOND THE CITY IN 
 
 GREAT PERIL — BEAUREG.VRD's PLAN OF OPERATIONS— VIEWS OF MR. DAVIS 
 
 DEFEAT OF BUTLER, AND HIS CONFINEMENT IN A " CUL DE SAC " FAILURE OP 
 
 grant's COMBINATIONS — CONSTANTLY BAFFLED BY LEE — TERRIBLE LOSSES 
 OP THE FEDERAL ARMY GRANT CROSSES THE JAMES — HIS FAILURES RE- 
 PEATED — HIS NEW COMBINATIONS — EARLY's OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY 
 AND ACROSS THE POTOMAC — THE FEDERAL COMBINATIONS AGAIN BROKEN 
 DOWN — FAVORABLE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA — THE MISSION OF MESSRS. CLAY, 
 THOMPSON, AND HOLCOJIBE CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN — THE AR- 
 ROGANT AND MOCKING REPLY OF THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT. 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 (Page 5C3-589.) 
 
 DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULTS OP THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN HOW FAR IT WAS 
 
 PARALLEL WITH THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN DIFFERENT TACTICS ON BOTH 
 
 .^IDES REMOVAL OF GENERAL JOHNSTON THE EXPLANATION OP THAT 
 
 STEP — A QUESTION FOR MILITARY JUDGMENT THE NEGATIVE VINDICATION 
 
 OF GENERAL JOHNSTON — DIFFERENT THEORIES OF WAR THE REAL PHILOS- 
 OPHY OF THE SOUTHERN FAILURE — THE ODDS IN NUMBERS AND RESOURCES 
 AGAINST THE SOUTH WATER FACILITIES OF THE ENEMY STRATEGIC DIFFI- 
 CULTIES OF THE SOUTH THE BLOCKADE INSIGNIFICANCE OF MINOR QUES- 
 TIONS JEFFERSON DAVIS THE WASHINGTON OP THE SOUTH GENERAL JOHN 
 
 B. HOOD HIS DISTINGUISHED CAREER — HOPE OF THE SOUTH RENEWED 
 
 hood's OPERATIONS — LOSS OF ATLANTA — IMPORTANT QUESTIONS — ^PRESIDENT 
 DAVIS IN GEORGIA — PERVERSE CONDUCT OP GOVERNOR BROWN — ^MR. DAVIS 
 
 IN MACON AT HOOd's HEAD-QUARTERS HOW HOOd's TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN 
 
 VARIED FROM MR. DAVIs' INTENTIONS SHERMAn's PROMPT AND BOLD CON- 
 DUCT — hood's MAGNANIMOUS ACKNOWLEDGMENT — DESTRUCTION OF THE CON- 
 FEDERATE POWER IN THE SOUTH-WEST. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 (Page 590-613.) 
 
 INCIDENTS ON THE LINES OP RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG DURING THE SUMMER 
 
 AND AUTUMN CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS j- BY 
 
 GRANT THE SITUATION NEAR THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL NEARLY S VALLEY 
 
 CAMPAIGN POPULAR CENSURE OF EARLY INFLUENCE OP THE VALLEY CAM- 
 PAIGN UPON THE SITUATION NEAR RICHMOND WHAT THE AGGREGATE OF 
 
 CONFEDERATE DISASTERS SIGNIFIED DESPONDENCY OF THE SOUTH THE IN- 
 JURIOUS EXAJIPLES OP PROMINENT MEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL LEE 
 
 ^MR. DAVIs' POPULARITY WHY HE DID NOT FULLY COMPREHEND THE DE- 
 MORALIZATION OP THE PEOPLE HE HOPES FOR POPULAR REANIMATION WAS 
 
 THE CASE OF THE CONFEDERACY HOPELESS? — VACILLATING CONDUCT OP CON- 
 GRESS THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS A WEAK BODY MR. DAVIs' RELATIONS 
 
 WITH CONGRESS PROPOSED CONSCRIPTION OF SLAVES — FAVORED BY DAVIS 
 
 AND LEE DEFEATED BY CONGRESS LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE 
 
 PRESIDENT — DAVIs' OPINION OF LEE — RUMORS OP PEACE — HAMPTON ROADS 
 
 CONFERENCE — THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM THE ABSURD CHARGE AGAINST 
 
 MR. DAVIS OF OBSTRUCTING NEGOTIATIONS — HIS RECORD ON THE SUBJECT OF 
 
 PEACE A RICHMOND NEWSPAPER ON THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM — DELUSIVE 
 
 SIGNS OP PUBLIC SPIRIT — NO ALTERNATIVE BUT CONTINUED RESISTANCE- 
 REPORT OF THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE. 
 
CONTENTS. Xvii 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 (Page 014-630.) 
 
 MILITARY OPERATIONS IX THE EARLY PART OF 1805 — LAST PHASE OF THE MILI- 
 TARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY — THE PLAN TO CRUSH SHERMAN — CALM 
 
 DEMEANOR OF PRESIDENT DAVIS CHEERFULNESS OP GENERAL LEE — THE 
 
 QUESTION AS TO THE SAFETY OF RICHMOND — WEAKNESS OF GENERAL LEE'S 
 ARMY — PREPARATIONS TO EVACUATE RICHMOND BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 OPENED — A NEW BASIS OF HOPE WHAT WAS TO BE REASONABLY ANTICI- 
 
 ,PATED — THE CONTRACTED THEATRE OF WAR — THE FATAL DISASTERS AT 
 PETERSBURG — MR. DAVIS RECEIVES THE INTELLIGENCE WHILE IN CHURCH — 
 RICHMOND EVACUATED — PRESIDENT DAVIS AT DANVILLE — HIS PROCLAJIATION 
 — SURRENDER OF LEE — DANVILLE EVACUATED — THE LAST OFFICIAL INTER- 
 VIEW OF MR. DAVIS WITH GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD HIS AR- 
 RIVAL AT CHARLOTTE — INCIDENTS AT CHARLOTTE — REJECTION OF THE SHER- 
 M-tN-JOHNSTON SETTLEMENT — MR. DAVIs' INTENTIONS AFTER THAT EVENT — 
 HIS MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD — INTERESTING DETAILS — CAPTURE OF MR. DA- 
 VIS AND HIS IMPRISONMENT AT FORTRESS MONROE. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 (Page 637-045.) 
 
 MOTIVE OF MR. DAVIS ARREST — AN AFTER-THOUGHT OF STANTON AND THE 
 BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE — THE EMBARRASSMENT PRODUCED BY HIS CAP- 
 TURE — THE INF.tMOUS CHARGES AGAINST HIM — WHY MR. DAVIS WAS TREATED 
 WITH EXCEPTIONAL CRUELTY — THE OUTRAGES AND INDIGNITIES OFFERED 
 HIM — HIS PATIENT AND HEROIC ENDURANCE OF PERSECUTION — HIS RELEASE 
 
 FROM FORTRESS MONROE — BAILED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AT RICHMOND 
 
 JOY OF THE COMMUNITY — IN CANADA — RE-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL 
 COURT — HIS TRIAL AGAIN POSTPONED CONCLUSION. 
 
LIFE OF JEFFEKSON DAYIS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ATTRACTIONS OF THE LATE WAR TO POSTERITY — MR. LINCOLN'S REMARK — DIS- 
 ADVANTAGES OP MR. DATIS' SITUATION SUCCESS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH 
 
 MERIT — ORIGIN OF THE INJUSTICE DONE MR. DAVIS — REMARK OP MACAU- 
 LAY — REMARK OP MR. GLADSTONE — THE EFFECT THAT CONFEDERATE SUC- 
 CESS WOULD HAVE HAD UPON THE FAME OF MR. DAVIS — POPULAR AFFECTION 
 FOR HIM IN THE SOUTH — HIS VINDICATION ASSURED. 
 
 rVyO future generations the period in American history, of 
 
 -■- most absorbing interest and profound inquiry, will be 
 
 that embracing the incipiency, progress, and termination of 
 
 the revolution which had its most pronounced phase in the 
 
 memorable war of 1861. Hi.storians rarely concur in their 
 
 estimates of the limits of a revolution, and usually we find 
 
 quite as much divergence in their views of the scope of its 
 
 operations, as in their speculations as to its origin and causes, 
 
 and their statements of its incidents and results. If, however, 
 
 it is difficult to assign, with minute accuracy, the exact limits 
 
 and proper scope of those grand trains of consecutive evcnt.s, 
 
 which swerve society from the beaten track of ages, divert 
 
 nations from the old path of progress into what seems to be 
 
 the direction of a new destiny, and often transform the a.spect 
 
 (13) 
 
14 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of continents, it is comparatively an easy task to reach a re- 
 liable statement of their more salient and conspicuous inci- 
 dents. It is in this aspect that the Titanic conflict, which 
 had its beginning with the booming of the guns in Charleston 
 harbor in April, 1861, and its crowning catastrophe at Appo- 
 mattox Court-house in April, 1865, will be chiefly attractive 
 to the future student. As a point of departure from the 
 hitherto unbroken monotony of American history, the begin- 
 ning of a new order of things, the extinction of important 
 elements of previous national existence, embracing much that 
 was consecrated in the popular affections; in short, as a com- 
 plete political and social transformation, an abrupt, but thor- 
 ough perversion of the government from its original purposes 
 and previous policy, this period must take its place, with 
 important suggestions of theory and illustration, among the 
 most impressive lessons of history. 
 
 The profound interest which shall center upon the period 
 that we have under consideration, must necessarily subject to 
 a rigid investigation the lives, characters, and conduct of those 
 to whom were allotted conspicuous parts in the great drama. 
 It is both a natural and reasonable test that the world applies 
 in seeking to solve, through the qualities and capacities of 
 those who direct great measures of governmental policy, the 
 merits of the movements themselves. The late President of 
 the United States, Mr. Lincoln, avowed his inability to escape 
 the judgment of history, and the bare statement sufficiently 
 describes the inevitable necessity, not only of his own situa- 
 tion, but of all who bore a prominent part on either side of 
 the great controversy. 
 
 Jefferson Davis confronts posterity burdened with the 
 disadvantage of having been the leader of an unsuccessful 
 
INTRODUCTION. 15 
 
 political movement. "Nothing succeeds like success," was 
 the pithy maxim of Talleyrand, to whose astute observation 
 nothing was more obvious than the disposition of mankind to 
 make success the touchstone of merit. It is, nevertheless, a 
 vulgar and often an erroneous criterion. What could be more 
 absurd than to determine by such a test the comparative valor, 
 generalship, and military character of the two contestants in 
 the late war? Concede its applicability, however, and we 
 exalt the soldiership of the North above all precedent, and 
 consign the unequaled valor of the Southern soldiery to re- 
 proach, instead of the deathless fame which shall survive them. 
 To such a judgment every battle-field of the war gives em- 
 phatic and indignant contradiction. History abounds with 
 evidence of the influence of accident and of extraneous cir- 
 cumstances, in the decision of results, which, if controlled by 
 the question of merit, as understood by the predominant sense 
 of mankind, would have borne a vastly diiFerent character. 
 
 But, in addition to the disparaging influence of the failure 
 of the cause which he represented, Mr. Davis has encountered 
 an unparalleled degree of personal hate, partizan rancor, of 
 malignant and gratuitous misrepresentation, the result, to a 
 great extent, of old partizan rivalries and jealousies, engen- 
 dered in former jieriods of the history of the Union, and also 
 of the spirit of domestic disaffection and agitation which inevi- 
 tably arises against every administration of public affairs, espe- 
 cially at times of unusual danger and embarrassment.* The 
 
 *A pertinent remark of Macaulay is, "It is the nature of parties to re- 
 tain their original enmities far more firmly than their original principles. 
 During many years, a generation of Whigs, whom Sydney would have 
 spurned as slaves, continued to wage war with a generation of Tories 
 whom Jefi&ies would have hanged." 
 
16 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 almost fanatical hatred of the Northern masses against Mr. 
 Davis, as the wicked leader of a causeless rebellion against the 
 Government of his country, as a conspirator against the peace 
 and happiness of his fellow-citizens, and as a relentless monster, 
 who tortured and starved prisoners of war, springs from the 
 persistent calumnies of such leaders of Northern opinion, as 
 have an ignoble purpose of vindictive hatred to gratify by the 
 invention of these atrocious charges. Yet this feeling of the 
 North hardly exceeds in violence, the resentment with which 
 it was sought to inflame the Southern people against him, at 
 critical stages of the war, as an unworthy leader, whose inca- 
 pacity, pragmatism, nepotism, and vanity were rushing them 
 into material and political perdition. Of popular disaffection 
 to the Confederate cause, or dislike of INIr. Davis, there was 
 an insignificantly small element, never dangerous in the sense 
 of attemj^ted revolt against the authorities, but often hurtful, 
 because it constituted the basis of support to such prominent 
 men as fancied their personal ambition, or amour propre, offended 
 by the President. A misfortune of the South was that there 
 were not a few such characters, and their influence upon cer- 
 tain occasions was as baleful to the public interests as their 
 animus was malignant against Mr. Davis. Hoping to advance 
 themselves by misrej^resentations of him, during the war they 
 persistently charged upon him every disaster, and do not scru- 
 ple to impute to his blame those final fiilures so largely trace- 
 able to themselves. A patriotic regard for the public safety 
 imposed silence upon ISIr. Davis while the war continued, and 
 a magnanimity which they have neither deserved nor appre- 
 ciated, coupled with a proper sense of personal dignity, have 
 impelled him since to refrain from refutation of misstatements 
 utterly scandalous and inexcusable. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 The distinguished English statesman,* who, during the prog- 
 ress of the late war, declared that " Mr. Jefferson Davis had 
 created a nation," stated more than the truth, though he hardly 
 exaggerated the flattering estimate which the intelligent public 
 of Europe places upon the unsurpassed ability and energy with 
 which the limited resources of the South, as compared with 
 those of her enemies, were, for the uiost part, wielded by the 
 Confederate administration. Nor, indeed, would such an esti- 
 mate have been too extravagant to be entertained by his own 
 countrymen, had the South achieved her independence by any 
 stroke of mere good fortune, such as repeatedly favored her 
 adversaries at critical moments of the war, when, apparently, 
 the most trifling incidents regulated the balance. More than 
 once the South stood upon the very threshold of the full frui- 
 tion of her aspirations for independence and nationality. Had 
 Jackson not fallen at Chancellorsville, the Federal Army of 
 the Potomac, the bulwark of the Union in the Atlantic States, 
 would have disappeared into history under circumstances far 
 different from those which marked its dissolution two years 
 later. At Gettysburg the Confederacy was truthfully said to 
 have been " within a stone's-throw of peace." If at these 
 fateful moments the treacherous scales of fortune had not 
 strangely turned, and in the very flush of triumph, who doubts 
 that now and hereafter there would have come from South- 
 ern hearts, an ascription of praise to Jefferson Davis, no less 
 earnest than to his illustrious colaborers? At all events, it 
 is undeniable that, as the Confederate arms prospered, so the 
 affection of the people for Mr. Davis was always more en- 
 thusiastic and demonstrative. Only in moments of extreme 
 public depression could the malcontents obtain even a patient 
 
 *Mr. Gladstone. 
 2 
 
18 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 audience of their assaults upon the chosen President of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 The people of the late Confederate States, whose destinies 
 Jefferson Davis directed during four years, the most moment- 
 ous in their history, are competent witnesses as to the fidelity, 
 ability, and devotion with which he discharged the trust con- 
 fided to hira. 
 
 Their judgment is revealed in the affectionate confidence 
 with which, during their struggle for liberty, they upheld him, 
 and in the joyful acclaim, which echoed from the Potomac to 
 the E.io Grande upon the announcement of his release from his 
 vicarious captivity. As he was the chosen representative of 
 the power, the Mdll, and the aspirations of a chivalrous people, 
 so they will prove themselves the jealous custodians of his 
 fame. Be the verdict of posterity as it may, they will not 
 shrink from their share of the odium, and will be common 
 participants with him in the award of eulogy. There is more 
 than an unreasoning presentiment, something more tangible 
 than vague hope, in the calm and cheerful confidence with which 
 both look forward to that ample vindication of truth which 
 always follows candid and impartial inquiry. 
 
 That time will triumphantly vindicate Mr. Davis is as cer- 
 tain, as that it will dispel the twilight mazes which yet obscure 
 the grand effort of patriotism which he directed. The rank 
 luxuriance of prejudice, asperity, and falsehood must eventu- 
 ally yield to the irresistible progress of reason and truth. 
 Bribery, perjury, every appliance which the most subtle inge- 
 nuity of eager and unscrupulous malice could invent, have 
 been exhausted in the vain effort to make infamous, in the 
 sight of mankind, a noble cause, by imputation of personal 
 odium upon its most distinguished representative. Day by 
 
INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 day he rises beyond the reach of calumny, and his character 
 expands into the fair proportions of the grandest ideals of 
 excellence. An adamantine heroism of the antique pattern ; 
 purity exalted to an altitude beyond conception even of the 
 vulgar nilnd; devotion which shrank from no sacrifice and 
 quailed before no peril, were qualities giving tone to the genius, 
 which, wielding the inadequate means of a feeble Confederacy, 
 for years, withstood the shock of poAV erful invasion, baffled and 
 humiliated a nation, unlimited in resources, and in spite of dis- 
 astrous failure, lends unexampled dignity to the cause in which 
 it was employed. 
 
20 LIFE OP JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 BIRTH — EDUCATION — AT WEST POINT — IN THE ARMY — RETIREMENT — POLITI- 
 CAL TRAINING IN A3IERICA MR. DAVIS NOT EDUCATED FOR POLITICAL LIFE 
 
 AFTER THE AMERICAN MODEL — BEGINS HIS POLITICAL CAREER BY A SPEECH 
 AT THE MISSISSIPPI DEJIOCRATIC CONVENTION — A GLANCE PROSPECTIVELY AT 
 
 HIS FUTURE PARTY ASSOCIATIONS HIS CONSISTENT ATTACHMENT TO STATES* 
 
 EIGHTS PRINCIPLES A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OP THE QUESTION OP 
 
 states' RIGHTS -MR. CALHOUN NOT THE AUTHOR OP THAT PRINCIPLE HIS 
 
 VINDICATION FROM THE CHARGE OF DISUNIONISM — MR. DAVIS THE SUCCESSOR 
 OF MR. CALHOUN AS THE STATES' RIGHTS lEADER. 
 
 JEFFERSON DAVIS was born on the third day of June, 
 1808, in that portion of Chri.stian County, Kentucky, 
 which, by subsequent act of the Legislature, was made Todd 
 County. His father, Samuel Davis, a planter, during the Rev- 
 olutionary war served as an officer in the mounted force of 
 Georgia, an organization of local troops. Subsequently to the 
 Revolution Samuel Davis removed to Kentucky, and continued 
 to reside in that state until a few years after the birth of his 
 son Jefferson, when he removed with his family to the 
 neighborhood of "VVoodville, Wilkinson County, in the then 
 territory of Mississippi. At the period of his father's removal 
 to Missi^jsippi, Jefferson was a child of tender years. After 
 having enjoyed the benefits of a partial academic training at 
 home, he was sent, at an earlier age than is usual, to Transyl- 
 vania University, Kentucky, where he remained until he 
 
WEST POIXT AND THE ARMY. 21 
 
 readied the age of sixteen. In 1824 he was appointed, by 
 President Monroe, a cadet at the West Point Military Academy. 
 
 Among his contemporaries at the academy were Robert E. 
 Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, Leonidas 
 Polk, John B. Magruder, and others who have since earned 
 distinction. Ordinary merit could not have commanded in 
 such an association of talent and character the position which 
 Davis held as a cadet. A fellow-cadet thus speaks of him : 
 " Jefferson Davis was distinguished in the corps for his manly 
 bearing, his high-toned and lofty character. His figure was 
 very soldier-like and rather robust ; his step springy, resem- 
 bling the tread of an Indian * brave' on the war-path." He 
 graduated in June, 1828, receiving the customary appointment 
 of Brevet Second Lieutenant, which is conferred upon the 
 graduates of the academy. Assigned to the infantry, he served 
 with such fidelity in that branch of the service, and with such 
 especial distinction as a stiiflf officer on the North-western fron- 
 tier in 1831-32, that he was promoted to the rank of First 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant of a new regiment of dragoons in 
 March, 1833. 
 
 About this period tlie Indians, on various portions of the 
 frontier, stimulated by dissatisfaction with the course of the 
 Government concerning certain claims and guarantees, which 
 had been accorded them in previous treaties, were excessively 
 annoying, and the Government was forced to resort to energetic 
 military measures to suppress them. Lieutenant Davis had 
 ample opportunity for the exhibition of his high soldierly 
 qualities, cool courage, and admirable self-possession, in the 
 Black Hawk war, during which he was frequently employed 
 in duties of an important and dangerous character. During 
 the captivity of Black Hawk, that famous Indian chieftain and 
 
22 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 warrior is said to have conceived a very strong attachment for 
 Lieutenant Davis, whose gallantry and pleasing amenities of 
 bearing greatly impressed the captive enemy. After his trans- 
 fer to the dragoons, Lieutenant Davis saw two years of very 
 active service in the various expeditions against the Pawnees, 
 Camanches, and other Indian tribes, and accompanied the first 
 expedition which successfully penetrated the strongholds of the 
 savages, and conquered a peace by reducing them to subjection. 
 
 Though attached to the profession of arms, for which he has 
 on repeated occasions, during his subsequent life, evinced an 
 almost passionate fondness and a most unusual aptitude, Lieu- 
 tenant Davis resigned his commission in June, 1835, and re- 
 turning to Mississippi devoted his attention to the cultiva- 
 tion of cotton and to the assiduous pursuit of letters. Not 
 long after his resignation, he had married the daughter of .Col. 
 Zachary Taylor, under whose eye he was destined, in a few 
 years, to win such immortal renown upon the fields of Mexico. 
 Living upon his plantation in great seclusion, he devoted him- 
 self with zeal and enthusiasm to those studies which were to qual- 
 ify him for the eminent position in politics and statesmanship 
 which he had resolved to assume. In that retirement were 
 sown the seed, whose abundant fruits were seen in those splen- 
 did specimens of senatorial and popular eloquence, at once 
 models of taste and exhibitions of intellectual power ; in the 
 pure, terse, and elegant English of his matchless state papers, 
 which will forever be the delight of scholars and the study of 
 statesmen, and in that elevated and enlightened statesmanship, 
 which scorning the low ambition of demagogues and striving 
 always for the ends of patriotism and principle, illumines, for 
 more than a score of years, the legislative history of the Union. 
 
 The period of Mr. Davis' retirement is embraced within the 
 
EETlllEMEXT. 23 
 
 interval of his ■withdrawal from the army, in 1835, and the 
 beginning of his active participation in the local politics of 
 Mississippi, in 1843, a term of eight years. The diligent 
 application with \vhich he was employed during these years 
 of seclusion constituted a most fortunate preparation for the 
 distinguished career upon which he at once entered. There is 
 not, in the whole range of American biography, an instance 
 of more thorough preparation, of more ample intellectual dis- 
 cipline, and elaborate education for political life. 
 
 The trade of politics is an avocation familiar to Americans, 
 and in the more ordinary maneuvers of party tactics, in that 
 lower species of political strategy which, in our party vocabu- 
 lary, is aptly termed "wire-pulling," our politicians may boast 
 an eminence in their class not surpassed in the most corrupt ages 
 of the most profligate political establishments which have ever 
 existed. Statesmanship, in that broad and elevated conception 
 which suggests the noblest models among those who have 
 adorned and illustrated the science of government, combining 
 those higher attributes of administrative capacity which are 
 realized equally in a pure, sound, and just polity, and in a 
 free, prosperous, and contented community, is a subject utterly 
 unexplored by American politicians at the outset of their 
 career, and is comparatively an after-thought with those in- 
 trusted with the most responsible duties of state. 
 
 The political training of ]\Ir. Davis was pursued upon a 
 basis very different from the American model. It has been 
 more akin to the English method, under which the faculties 
 and tlie tastes are first cultivated, and the mind qualified by 
 all the light which theory and previous example afford for the 
 practical labors which are before it. The tastes and habits 
 f »rmed during those eight years of retirement have adhered to 
 
24 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAYIS. 
 
 Mr. Davis iu his subsequent life. When not engrossed by the 
 absorbing cares of state, he has, with rare enthusiasm and 
 satisfaction, resorted to those refining pleasures which are ac- 
 cessible only to intellects which have known the elevating in- 
 fluences of culture. 
 
 Emerging from his seclusion in 1843, when the initiatory 
 measures of party organization were in course of preparation 
 for the gubernatorial canvass of that year and the Presidential 
 campaign of the next, he immediately assumed a prominent 
 position among the leaders of the Democratic party in Missis- 
 sippi. At this time, probably, no state iu the Union, of equal 
 population, excelled Mississippi in the number and distinction 
 of her brilliant politicians. Especially was this true of Yicks- 
 burg, and of the general neighborhood in which Mr. Davis 
 resided.* The genius of Seargent S. Prentiss was then in its 
 meridian splendor, and his reputation and popularity were 
 coextensive with the Union. Besides Prentiss were Foote, 
 Thompson, Claiborne, Gholson, Brown, and many others, all 
 comparatively young men, who have since achieved professional 
 or political distinction. The appearance of Mr. Davis was soon 
 recognized as the addition of a star of no unworthy effulgence 
 to this brilliant galaxy. 
 
 The Democratic State Convention, held for the purpose of 
 organization for the gubernatorial canvass, and for the appoint- 
 ment of delegates to the National Convention, assembled at 
 Jackson in the summer of 1843. From the meeting of this 
 convention, which Mr. Davis attended as a delegate, may be 
 dated the beginning of his political life. In the course of its 
 
 * Mr. Davis has, since his withdrawal from the army until the breaking 
 out of the war, resided on his plantation in Warren County, a few miles 
 from Vicksbura;. 
 
FIRST SPEECH. 25 
 
 deliberations he delivered his first public address, which im- 
 mediately attracted toward him much attention, and a most 
 partial consideration by his party associates. The occasion 
 is interesting from this circumstance, and as indicating that 
 consistent political bias which, beginning in early manhood, 
 constituted the controlling insj)iration of a long career of em- 
 inent public service. The undoubted preference of the con- 
 vention, as of an overwhelming majority of the masses of the 
 Southern Democracy, was for Mr. Van Buren, and its entire 
 action in the selection of delegates, and formal expressions of 
 feeling, was in accordance with this well-ascertained pref- 
 erence. To a proposition instructing the delegates to the 
 National Convention, to support the nomination of Mr. Van 
 Buren so long as there was a reasonable hope of his selection 
 by the party, Mr. Davis proposed an amendment instructing 
 the delegates to support Mr. Calhoun as the second choice of 
 the Democracy of Mississippi, in the event of such a contin- 
 gency as should render clearly hopeless the choice of Mr. Van 
 Buren. In response to an inquiry from an acquaintance if his 
 amendment was meant in good faith, and did not contemplate 
 detriment to the interests of Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Davis rose and 
 addressed the convention in explanation of his purpose, and in 
 terms of such earnest and appropriate eulogy of Mr. Calhoun and 
 his principles as to elicit the most enthusiastic commendation. 
 
 So favorable was the impression which Mr. Davis made 
 upon his party, and so rapid his progress as a popular speaker, 
 that in the Presidential campaign of 1844, the Democracy con- 
 ferred upon him the distinction of a place upon its electoral 
 ticket. In this canvass he acquired great reputation, and estab- 
 lished himself immovably in the confidence and admiration of 
 the people of Llississippi. 
 
26 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 This seems an aj^propriate point from which to glance pros- 
 pectively at the political principles and party associations of 
 Mr. Davis in his after career. Until its virtual dissolution at 
 Charleston, in 1860, he was an earnest and consistent member 
 of the Democratic party. To those who are familiar with the 
 party nomenclature of the country, no inconsistency with this 
 assertion will appear involved in the statement, that he has 
 also been an ardent disciple of the doctrine of States' Rights. 
 The Democratic party and the States' Rights party were in- 
 deed identical, when a profession of political faith in this 
 country was significant of something ennobling upon the score 
 of principle, something higher than a mere aspiration for the 
 spoils of office. When, in subsequent years, to the large major- 
 ity of its leaders, the chief significance of a party triumph, con- 
 sisted in its being the occasion of a new division of the spoils, 
 many of the most eminent statesmen of the South became in 
 a measure indifferent to its success. Its prurient aspiration 
 for the rewards of place provoked the sarcasm of INIr. Cal- 
 houn, that it " was held together by the cohesive power of the 
 public plunder," and the still more caustic satire of John Ran- 
 dolph, of Roanoke, that it had " seven principles : five loaves 
 and two fishes." 
 
 Nevertheless, in its spirit thoroughly national, catholic in all 
 its impulses, for many years shaping its policy in^iarmony 
 with the protection of Southern institutions, and with few 
 features of sectionalism in its organization, it worthily com- 
 manded the preference of a large majority of the Southern 
 people. To this organization JNIr. Davis adhered until the 
 inception of the late conflict, supporting its Presidential nom- 
 inations, in the main favoring such public measures as were 
 incorporated in the policy of the party, and he was, for sev- 
 
PARTY ASSOCIATIONS. 27 
 
 eral years prior to the war, by no means the least prominent 
 of those named in connection with its choice for the Presi- 
 dency in 1860. ^ 
 
 It is no part of the task which has been undertaken in these 
 pages to sketch the mutations of political parties, or to trace 
 the historical order and significance of events, save in their 
 immediate and indispensable connection with our appropriate 
 subject. So closely identified, however, has been the public 
 life of Mr. Davis with the question of States' Rights, so ardent 
 has been his profession of that faith, and so able and zealous 
 was he in its advocacy and practice, that his life virtually 
 becomes an epitome of the most important incidents in the 
 development of this great historical question. His earliest 
 appearance upon the arena of politics was at a period when the 
 various issues which were submitted to the arbitrament of 
 arms in the late war^began to assume a practical shape of most 
 portentous aspect. / The address which first challenged public 
 attention, and that extensive interest which has rarely been 
 withdrawn since, was an emphatic indorsement of the political 
 philosophy of Mr. Calhoun and a glowing panegyric upon the 
 character and principles of that immortal statesman and ex- 
 pounder. Unreservedly committing himself, then, he has stead- 
 fastly held to the States' Rights creed, as the basis of his po- 
 litical faith and the guide of his public conduct. 
 
 If it be true that the decision of the sword only establishes 
 facts, and does not determine questions of principle, then the 
 principle of States' Rights will be commemorated as something 
 more valuable, than as the mere pretext upon which a few 
 agitators inaugurated an unjustifiable revolt for the overthrow 
 of the Government of the Union. Nothing is more likely than 
 that many who recently rejoiced at its suppression by physical 
 
28 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 force, may mourn its departure as of that one vital inspiration, 
 which alone could have averted the decay of the public liber- 
 ties. Practically a " dead letter " now in the partizan slang of 
 the demagogues who rule the hour, since its prostration by mil- 
 itary ]30wer in the service of the antipodal principle of consoli- 
 dation, it will live forever as the motive and occasion of a 
 struggle, unparalleled in its heroism and sacrifices in behalf of 
 constitutional liberty. 
 
 There is little ground for wonder at the total ignorance and 
 persistent misconception in the mind of Europe, at the com- 
 mencement of the war, of the motives and purposes of the 
 Confederates in seeking a dissolution of the Union, when we 
 consider the limited information and perverted views of the 
 Northern people and politicians respecting the nature of the 
 Federal Government and the intentions of its authors. Nat- 
 urally enough, perhaps, the North, seeing in the Union the 
 source of its marvelous material prosperity, and with an astute 
 appreciation of its ability, by its rapidly-growing numerical 
 majority, to pervert the Government to any purpose of sec- 
 tional aggression agreeable to its ambition or interests, refused 
 to tolerate, as either rational or honest, any theory that con- 
 templated disunion as possible in any contingency. In their 
 willful ignorance and misapprehension most Northern orators 
 and writers denounced the doctrines of States' Rights as new 
 inventions — as innovations upon the faith of the fathers of the 
 Republic — and professed to regard the most enlightened and 
 patriotic statesmen of the South, the pupils and followers of 
 illustrious Virginians and Carolinians of the Revolutionary 
 era, as agitators, conspirators, and plotters of treason against 
 the Union. Upon the score of antiquity, States' Rights prin- 
 ciples have a claim to respectability — not for a moment to be 
 
states' IIIGHTS. 29 
 
 compared with the wrctcliccl devices of expediency or the 
 hybrid products of political atheism, to Avhich the brazen 
 audacity and hypocrisy of the times apply the misnomer of 
 " principles." 
 
 They are, in flict, older than the Union, and antedate, not 
 only the present Constitution, but even the famous Articles 
 of Confederation, under which our forefathers fought through 
 the first Revolution. The Congress which adopted the Dec- 
 laration of Independence emphatically negatived a proposition 
 looking to consolidation, offered by New Hampshire on the 
 15th of June, 1776, that the Thirteen Colonies be declared 
 a " free and independent State," and expressly affirmed their 
 separate sovereignty by declaring them to be " free and 
 independent States." The declaration of the Articles of Con- 
 federation was still more explicit — that "each State retains 
 its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and eveiy power, 
 jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation 
 expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assem- 
 bled." The Convention of 1787 clearly designed the present 
 Constitution to be the instrument of a closer association of 
 the States than had been effected by the Articles of Confed- 
 eration, but the proof is exceedingly meager of any general 
 desire that it should establish a consolidated nationality. 
 
 At this early period the antagonism of the two schools of 
 American politics was plainly discernible. The conflict of 
 faith is easily indicated. The advocates of States' Rights 
 regarded the Union as a compact between the States — something 
 more than a mere league formed for purposes of mutual safety, 
 but still a strictly volnntary association of Sovereignties, in 
 which certain general powers were specifically delegated to 
 the Union ; and all others not so delegated were reserved by 
 
30 LIFE OF JEFFEBSOX DAVIS. 
 
 the States in their separate characters. The advocates of Con- 
 solidation considered the Union a National Government — in 
 other words, a centralized power — to which the several States 
 occupied the relation of separate provinces. 
 
 The famous resolutions of ^98, adopted respectively by the 
 Yiroinia and Kentucky Legislatures, were the formal declar- 
 ations of principles upon which the States' Rights party was 
 distinctly organized under Mr. Jefferson, whom it successfully 
 supported for the Presidency against the elder Adams at the 
 expiration of the term of the latter. AVith the progress of 
 time the practical significance of these opposing principles be- 
 came more and more apparent, and their respective followers 
 strove, with constantly-increasing energy, to make their party 
 creed paramount in the policy of the Government. A major- 
 ity of the Northern people embraced the idea of a perpetual 
 Union, whose authority was supreme over all the States, and 
 reo-ulated by the will of a numerical majority, which majority, 
 it should be observed, they had already secured, and were 
 yearly increasing in an enormous ratio. The South, in the 
 course of years, with even more unanimity, clung to the idea 
 of State Sovereignty, and the interpretation of the Govern- 
 ment as one of limited powers, as its shield and bulwark 
 against the Northern majority in the collision which it was 
 foreseen the aggressive spirit of the latter would eventually 
 occasion. 
 
 A common and totally erroneous impression of the North- 
 ern mind is that John C. Calhoun invented the idea of State 
 Sovereignty for selfish and unpatriotic designs, and as the 
 pretext of a morbid hatred to the Union. That eminent 
 statesman and sincere patriot never asserted any claim to the 
 paternity of the faith which he professed. It is true that^ 
 
MR. CAIJIOUX. 31 
 
 in a certain sense, he was the founder of the States' Riglits 
 2)arty as it existed in his day, and which survived him to 
 make a last unsuccessful struggle to save first the Union, 
 and, failing in that, to rescue the imperiled liberties of tlie 
 South. During the eventful life of Mr. Calhoun the question 
 of the relative powers of the Federal and State Governments 
 assumed a more practical bearing than before, and his far- 
 reaching sagacity was illustrated in his efforts to avert the 
 impending evils of consolidation. He was the authoritative 
 exponent and revered leader of the votaries of those princi- 
 ples which he advocated, but did not originate or invent^ 
 and sought to apply as the legitimate and safe solution of 
 the circumstances by which he was surrounded. 
 
 Equally absurd and unfounded with the pretense, asserted at 
 the North, of the novelty of the idea of State Sovereignty and 
 its incompatibility with the spirit of the Constitution, was the 
 charge so persistently iterated against Mr. Calhoun and his 
 followers, of disunionism; of a restless, morbid discontent, 
 which sought continually revenge for imaginary wrongs in a 
 dissolution of the Union. To the contrary we have the irre- 
 futable arguments of Mr. Calhoun himself in favor of the 
 superior efficacy of the States' Rights interpretation, as an 
 agency for the preservation of the Union as it was designed 
 to exist by its authors. So far from having an anarchical or 
 disorganizing tendency, he, on all occasions, maintained that 
 his theory was "the only solid foundation of our system and 
 the Union itself." 
 
 To this faith the public life of Jefferson Davis has been 
 dedicated. For more than twenty years he sought to illustrate 
 it in the realization of a splendid but barren vision of a time- 
 honored and time-strengthened Union, consecrated in the com- 
 
32 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 mon affections and joint aspirations of a people, now, alas! 
 united only in name. 
 
 During the period of their public service together, Mr. Davis 
 received a large share of the confidence and regard of Mr. Cal- 
 houn, and when the death of the latter deprived the South of 
 the counsels of an illustrious public servant, Mr. Davis, though 
 comparatively a young man, stood foremost as heir to the 
 mantle of the great apostle of States' Rights.* 
 
 * Dr. Craven relates the following incident, which is an impressive 
 illustration of the depth and intensity of Mr. Davis' veneration for the 
 character of Mr. Calhoun : 
 
 "General Miles observed, interrogatively, that it was reported that 
 John C. Calhoun had made much money by speculations, or favoring the 
 speculations of his friends, connected with this work (the Rip-Raps, near 
 Fortress Monroe). 
 
 "In a moment Mr. Davis started to his feet, betraying much indigna- 
 tion by his excited manner and flushed cheek. It was a transfiguration 
 of friendly emotion. The feeble and wasted invalid and prisoner, sud- 
 denly forgetting his bonds — forgetting his debility, and ablaze with elo- 
 quent anger against this injustice to the memory of one he loved and 
 reverenced. Mr. Calhoun, he said, lived a whole atmosphere above any 
 sordid or dishonest thought — was of a nature to which even a mean act 
 was impossible. It was said in every Northern paper that he (Mr. Davis) 
 had carried with him five millions in gold when quitting Richmond — 
 money pilfered from the treasury of the Confederate States; and that 
 there was just as much truth in that as in these imputations against 
 
 Calhoun Calhoun was a statesman, a philosopher, in the true 
 
 sense of that grossly-abused term — an enthusiast of perfect liberty in 
 representative and governmental action." — Prison Life of Jefferson Davis. 
 Library edition, pages 206, 207. 
 
PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS. 33 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1844 — MR. DAVIS ELECTED TO CON- 
 GRESS — HIS FIRST SESSION — PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE — DOUG- 
 LAS, HUNTER, SEDDON, ETC. DAVIs' RAPID ADVANCEMENT IN REPUTA- 
 TION RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY HIM SPEECHES ON THE OREGON EXCITE- 
 MENT, AND ON THE RESOLUTION OF THANKS TO GENERAL TAYLOR AND HIS 
 
 ARMY N.\TIONAL SENTIMENTS E.MBODIED IN THESE AND OTHER SPEECHES 
 
 A CONTRAST IN THE MATTER OF PATRIOTISM MASSACHUSETTS AND MIS- 
 SISSIPPI IN THE MEXICAN WAR DEBATE WITH ANDREW JOHNSON — JOHN 
 
 QUINCY ADAMs' ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 nnHE Presidential canvass of 1844 was one of the most 
 -*- memorable and exciting in the annals of American pol- 
 itics. By its rcsnlts the popular verdict was rendered upon 
 vital questions involved in the administrative and legislative 
 policy of the Government. The Democratic party was fully 
 committed to the annexation of Texas, with the prospect of 
 war with Mexico as an almost inevitable condition bf the 
 acquisition of that immense territory, desirable to the Union 
 at large, but especially popular with the South, for obvious 
 and sufficient reasons. But apart from the signal victory 
 achieved by the Democracy, in favor of this and other leading 
 measures of that party, the election of 1844 had an incidental 
 significance, which the country generally recognized, in its final 
 and irrevocable disappointment of the Presidential aspirations 
 of Henry Clay. This canva.ss, too, has a peculiar historical 
 interest in the demonstration which it gave of the real popular 
 3 
 
34 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 strength of the respective parties which had so long divided 
 the country. Comparatively few temporary issues, of a char- 
 acter to excite strong popular feeling respecting either party 
 or its candidates, were made, and there was a square and 
 obstinate battle of Democracy against Whiggery, of what 
 Governor Wise called the old-fashioned " Thomas- Jeiferson- 
 Simon-Snyder-red- waistcoat-Democracy," against Henry Clay 
 and his "American System." 
 
 The canvass was remarkable not only for its duration and 
 the ardor with which it was conducted, but for its unsurpassed 
 exhibitions of " stump oratory." The best men of both parties 
 were summoned to the fierce conflict; and many were the 
 youthful paladins, hitherto unknown to fame, who won their 
 golden spurs upon this their first battle-field. Mr. Davis had 
 borne a leading part in support of Polk and Dallas and Texas 
 annexation in Mississippi. His services were not of a charac- 
 ter to be forgotten by his party, nor did an intelligent and 
 appreciative public fail to discover in the young man whose 
 eloquence and manly bearing had so enlisted their admiration, 
 such abilities and acquirements as qualified him to represent 
 the honor of his State in any capacity which they might 
 intrust to his keeping. 
 
 Of Mississippi it might have been said, as of Virginia, that 
 " the sun of her Democracy knew no setting." If possible, 
 however, the State was more closely than ever confirmed in her 
 Democratic moorings by the decisive results of the election in 
 18-14. When Mr. Davis received the appropriate acknowledg- 
 ment of popular appreciation in his election to the House of 
 Representatives, in November, 1845, Mississippi sent an un- 
 broken Democratic delegation to Washington. His associates 
 were Messrs. Roberts and Jacob Thompson (afterward Secre- 
 
ELECTED TO CONGRESS. 35 
 
 tary of the Interior under Mr. Buchanan) in the House, and 
 Messrs. Foote and Speight in the Senate. 
 
 On Monday, December 8, 1845, Mr. Davis was quahfied as 
 a member of the House of Representatives, and from that day 
 dates his eventful and brilliant legislative career. The Twenty- 
 ninth Congress was charged with some of the gravest duties of 
 legislation. The questions of the tariff, the Oregon excitement, 
 during which war with England was so imminent, and the set- 
 tlement of important details pertaining to the Texas question, 
 were the absorbing concerns which engaged its attention until 
 the provisions and appropriations necessary to the successful 
 prosecution of the Mexican war imposed still more serious 
 labors. The records of this Congress reveal many interesting 
 facts concerning individuals who have since figured promi- 
 nently in the history of the country. The fact to which we 
 have alluded of the unusual interest which had been exhib- 
 ited in the recent Presidential contest, doubtless had a consid- 
 erable influence in the choice of members of Congress in the 
 various States, and largely contributed to its elevated standard 
 of ability. 
 
 The debates in the House of Representatives of the Twenty- 
 ninth Congress, are unsurpassed in ability and eloquence by 
 those of any preceding or subsequent session of that body, and 
 upon its rolls are to be found many names, now national in rep- 
 utation, which were then but recently introduced to public at- 
 tention. Stephen A. Douglas, the most thoroughly representa- 
 tive American politician of his time, uniting to a more than 
 average proportion of the respectability of his class, his full 
 share of its vicious characteristics, politic, adroit, and ambi- 
 tious, was comparatively a new member, and, at this time, in 
 the morning of his reputation. R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, 
 
36 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 a statesman of sound judgment and accurate information, who 
 based his arguments upon the facts, and reduced the compli- 
 cated problems of governmental economy to the conditions of 
 a mathematical demonstration, had not yet been transferred to 
 the Senate. James A. Seddon, the safe theorist, whose study, 
 like Edmund Burke's, was ^' rerum cognoscente causas" the 
 acute dialectician, who, in his mental characteristics, no less 
 than in his principles, was so closely allied to Mr. Calhoun, 
 was, like Jeiferson Davis, for the first time a member of Con- 
 gress. Andrew Johnson was then a member of the House and 
 at the outset of his remarkable career ; and in addition to these 
 were Brinkerhoff, Washington Hunt, Dromgoole, George S. 
 Houston, and a score of others, whose names recall interesting 
 reminiscences of the day in which they figured. 
 
 To a man of ordinary purpose, or doubtful of himself, the 
 prospect of competition with such men, at the very outset of 
 his public career, would not have been encouraging. But there 
 are men, designed by nature, to rejoice at, rather than to shrink 
 from those arduous and hazardous positions to which their re- 
 sponsibilities summon them. An attribute of genius is the 
 consciousness of strength, and that sublime confidence in the 
 success of its own eiforts, which doubly assures victory in the 
 battle of life. It was with an assurance of triumph, far differ- 
 ent from the harlequin-like effrontery which is often witnessed 
 in the political arena, that Jefferson Davis advanced to contest 
 the awards of intellectual distinction. With the activity and 
 vigor of the disciplined gladiator, with the gaudia certamiyiis 
 beaming in every feature, Avith the calm confidence of the 
 trained statesman, and yet with all the radiant elan of a youth- 
 ful knight contending for his spurs at Templestowe, he pursued 
 his brief but impressive career in the lower house of Congress. 
 
RESOLUTIONS AND SPEECHES. 37 
 
 As a member of the House of Representatives Mr. Davis 
 rapidly and steadily won upon the good opinion of his associ- 
 ates, and the favorable estimate of hira, entertained by his con- 
 stituents and friends, was confirmed by his greatly advanced 
 reputation at the period of his withdrawal from Congress in 
 the ensuing summer. He became prominent, less by the fre- 
 quency with which he claimed the attention of the House, than 
 by the accuracy of his information, the substantial value of 
 his suggestions and the easy dignity of his demeanor. His 
 speeches, though not comparable with his senatorial efforts, 
 were characterized by great perspicuity, argumentative force, 
 and propriety of taste, and frequently rose to the dignity of 
 true eloquence. They, in every instance, gave promise of that 
 rhetorical finish, power of statement, unity of thought and 
 logical coherence, which, in subsequent years, were so appropri- 
 ately illustrated on other theaters of intellectual effort. Mr. 
 Davis participated prominently in the debates upon the Oregon 
 excitement. Native Americanism, and the various other con- 
 temporary topics of interest, which were then before Con- 
 gress, but was especially prominent in the discussion of mili- 
 tary affairs, the interests and requirements of the army, and the 
 measures devised for the prosecution of the Mexican war. Upon 
 the latter subjects his experience was of great practical value. 
 
 On the 19th of December, 1845, he offered the following 
 resolutions: " Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs 
 be instructed to inquire into the expediency of converting a por- 
 tion of the forts of the United States into schools for military 
 instruction, on the basis of substituting their present garrisons 
 of enlisted men, by detachments furnished from each State of 
 our Union, in the ratio of their several representation in the 
 Congress of the United States." 
 
38 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 " Resolved, That the Committee on the Post-office and Post- 
 roads be required to inquire into the expediency of establish- 
 ing a direct daily mail route from Montgomery, Alabama, to 
 Jackson, Mississippi." 
 
 The occasion of these motions was the first upon which he 
 occupied the floor of the House. 
 
 On the 29th of December, Mr. Davis spoke in a very earnest 
 and impressive manner upon Native Americanism, which he 
 strongly opposed, and on subsequent occasions addressed the 
 House in favor of the bill to receive arms, barracks, fortifica- 
 tions, and other public property, the cession of which to the 
 Federal Government, by Texas, had been provided to take 
 place upon its admission to the Union ; in favor of the prop- 
 osition to raise additional regiments of riflemen ; in opposition 
 to appropriations for improvement of rivers and harbors ; upon 
 the Oregon question, and in favor of a resolution of thanks to 
 General Taylor and his army. 
 
 The extracts from his speech on the Oregon question, and 
 the speech in favor of thanks to General Taylor and his army, 
 which is here given in full, are taken from the reports of the 
 Congressional Globe. The intelligent reader will appreciate 
 their real value, as to accuracy, without any suggestion from us. 
 
 On February 6, 1846, the House, having resolved itself 
 into Committee of the Whole, and having under consideration 
 the joint resolution of notice to the British Government con- 
 cernino; the abroo-ation of the Convention between the United 
 States and Great Britain respecting the territory of Oregon, 
 Mr. Davis spoke at some length, and in an attractive and 
 instructive style, upon the subject before the House. A great 
 portion of the speech consists of interesting historical details, 
 evincing a most accurate acquaintance with the subject, and 
 
SPEECH UPON THE OREGON QUESTION. 39 
 
 giving a clear and valuable analysis of facts. We have space 
 for only brief extracts, which arc sufficient to reveal Mr. Davis' 
 position upon this important question : 
 
 " Sir, why has the South been assailed in this 
 
 discussion? Has it been with the hope of sowing dissensions 
 between us and our Western friends? Thus far, I think, it 
 has failed. AVhy the frequent reference to the conduct of the 
 South on the Texas question ? Sir, those who liave made re- 
 flections on the South as having sustained Texas annexation 
 from sectional views have been of those who opposed that 
 great measure and are most eager for this. The suspicion is 
 but natural in them. But, sir, let me tell them that this 
 doctrine of the political balance between different portions of 
 the Union is no Southern doctrine. We, sir, advocated the 
 annexation of Texas from high national considerations. It 
 was not a mere Southern question ; it lay coterminous to the 
 Western States, and extended as far north as the forty-sec- 
 ond degree of latitude. Nor, sir, do we wish to divide the 
 territory of Oregon ; we would preserve it all for the exten- 
 sion of our Union. We would not arrest the onward prog- 
 ress of our pioneers; we would not, as has been done in this 
 debate, ask why our citizens have left the repose of civil gov- 
 ernment and gone to Oregon ? We find in it but that energy 
 which has heretofore been characteristic of our people, and 
 which has developed much that has illustrated our history. 
 It is the onward progress of our people toward the Pacific 
 which alone can arrest their westward march, and on the 
 banks of which, to use the language of our lamented Linn, 
 the pioneer will sit down to weep that there are no more for- 
 ests to subdue It is, as the representative of a high- 
 spirited and patriotic people, that I arm called on to resist this 
 
f 
 
 40 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 war clamor. My constituents need no such excitements to 
 prepare their hearts for all that patriotism demands. "When- 
 ever the honor of the country demands redress; whenever its 
 territory is invaded — if, then, it shall be sought to intimidate 
 by the fiery cross of St. George — if, then, we are threatened 
 with the unfolding of English banners if we resent or resist — 
 from the gulf shore to the banks of that great river, through- 
 out the length and breadth — Mississippi will come. And 
 whether the question be one of Northern or Southern, of 
 Eastern or Western aggression, we will not stop to count the 
 cost, but act as becomes the descendants of those who, in the 
 war of the Revolution, engaged in unequal strife to aid our 
 
 brethren of the North in redressing their injuries 
 
 We turn from present hostility to former friendship — from 
 recent defection to the time when Massachusetts and Virginia, 
 the stronger brothers of our family, stood foremost and united 
 to defend our common rights. From sire to sou has descended 
 the love of our Union in our hearts, as in our history are 
 mingled the names of Concord and Camden, of Yorktown 
 and Saratoga, of Moultrie and Plattsburgh, of Chippewa and 
 Erie, of Bowyer and Guildford, and New Orleans and Bun- 
 ker Hill. Grouped together, they form a monument to the 
 common glory of our common country; and where is the 
 Southern man who would wish that monument were less by 
 one of the Northern names that constitute the mass? Who, 
 standing on the ground made sacred by the blood of Warren, 
 could allow sectional feeling to curb his enthusiasm as he 
 looked upon that obelisk which rises a monument to free- 
 dom's and his country's triumph, and stands a type of the 
 time, the men and event that it commemorates; built of ma- 
 terial that mocks the waves of time, without niche or mold- 
 
SPEECH IN FAVOR OF THANKS TO THE ARMY. 41 
 
 ing for parasite or creeping thing to rest on, and pointing 
 like a finger to the sky, to raise man's thoughts to phikm- 
 thropic and noble deeds." 
 
 It is well known that, upon this subject, there was consid- 
 erable division among the Democracy. The effort to conmiit 
 the party, as a unit, to a position which would have inevita- 
 bly produced war with England signally failed. The country 
 had not then reached its present pitch of arrogant inflation, 
 which emboldens it to seek opportunity for exhibition in the 
 vainglorious role of braggadocio. Mr. Davis, upon this and 
 other occasions, significantly rebuked the demagogical clamor 
 which would have precipitated the country into a calamitous 
 war. His reply, on the 17th of April, 1846, to Stephen A. 
 Douglas, who was among the leading instigators of the war- 
 feeling in the House, is exceedingly forcible and spirited. 
 
 The following speech in favor of the resolution of thanks 
 to General Taylor, the officers and men of his army, for their 
 recent successes on the Rio Grande, was delivered May 28, 
 1846: 
 
 "As a friend to the army, he rejoiced at the evidence, now 
 afforded, of a disposition in this House to deal justly, to feel 
 generously toward those to whom the honor of our flag has 
 been intrusted. Too often and too long had we listened to 
 harsh and invidious reflections upon our gallant little army 
 and the accomplished officers who command it. A partial 
 opportunity had been offered to exhibit their soldierly quali- 
 ties in their true light, and he trusted these aspersions were 
 hushed — hushed now forever. As an American, whose heart 
 promptly responds to all which illustrates our national char 
 acter, and adds new glory to our national name, he rejoiced 
 with exceeding joy at the recent triumph of our arms. Yet 
 
 art\ 
 ar- ■] 
 
42 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 it is no more than he expected from the gallant soldiers who 
 hold our post upon the Rio Grande — no more than, when oc- 
 casion offers, they will achieve again. It was the triumph of 
 American courage, professional skill, and that patriotic pride 
 which blooms in the breast of our educated soldier, and which 
 droops not under the withering scoff of political revilers. 
 
 " These men will feel, deeply feel, the expression of your 
 gratitude. It will nerve their hearts in the hour of future 
 conflicts, to know that their country honors and acknowledges 
 their devotion. It will shed a solace on the dying moments 
 of those who fall, to be assured their country mourns their loss. 
 This is the meed for which the soldier bleeds and dies. This 
 he will remember long after the paltry pittance of one month's 
 extra pay has been forgotten. 
 
 '' Beyond this expression of the nation's thanks, he liked 
 the principle of the proposition offered by the gentleman from 
 South Carolina. "VYe have a pension system providing for the 
 disabled soldier, but he seeks well and wisely to extend it to 
 all who may be wounded, however slightly. It is a reward 
 offered to those who seek for danger, who first and foremost 
 plunge into the fight. It has been this incentive, extended so 
 as to cover all feats of gallantry, that has so often crowned the 
 British arms with victory, and caused their prowess to be rec- 
 ognized in every quarter of the globe. It was the sure and 
 high reward of gallantry, the confident reliance upon tneir 
 nation's gratitude, which led Napoleon's armies over Europe, 
 conquering and to conquer ; and it was these influences which, 
 in an earlier time, rendered the Roman arms invincible, and 
 brought their eagle back victorious from every land on which 
 it gazed. Sir, let not that parsimony (for he did not deem it 
 economy) prevent us from adopting a system which in war- 
 
SPEECH IN FAVOR OF THANKS TO THE ARMY. 43 
 
 •will add so much to the efficiency of troops. Instead of seek- 
 ing to fill the ranks of your army by increased pay, let the 
 soldier feel that a liberal pension will relieve him from the 
 fear of want in the event of disability, provide for his family 
 in the event of death, and that he wins his way to gratitude 
 and the reward of his countrymen by periling all for honor in 
 tlw field, 
 
 "The achievement which we now propose to honor richly 
 deserves it. Seldom, sir, in the annals of military history has 
 there been one in which desperate daring and military skill 
 were more happily combined. The enemy selected his own 
 ground, and united to the advantage of a strong position a 
 numerical majority of three to one. Driven from his first po- 
 sition by an attack in which it is hard to say whether profes- 
 sional skill or manly courage is to be more admired, he retired 
 and posted his artillery on a narrow defile, to sweep the 
 ground over which our troops were compelled to pass. There, 
 posted in strength three times greater than our own, they 
 waited the approach of our gallant little army. 
 
 "General Taylor knew the danger and destitution of the 
 band he left to hold his camp opposite Matamoras, and he 
 paused for no regular approaches, but opened his field artil- 
 ler}-, and dashed with sword and bayonet on the foe. A single 
 charge left him master of their battery, and the number of 
 slain attests the skill and discipline of his army. Mr. D. 
 referred to a gentleman who, a short time since, expressed 
 extreme distrust in our army, and poured out the vials of his 
 denunciation upon the graduates of the INIilitary Academy. 
 He hoped now the gentleman will withdraw these denuncia- 
 tions; that now he will learn the value 9f military science; 
 that he will see, in the location, the construction, the defenses 
 
 > 
 
44 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 of the bastioned field-works opposite Matamoras, the utility, 
 the necessity of a military education. Let hini compare the 
 few men who held that with the army who assailed it ; let him 
 mark the comparative safety with which they stood within that 
 temporary work ; let him consider why the guns along its ram- 
 parts were preserved, whilst they silenced the batteries of the 
 enemy ; why that Intrenchment stands unharmed by Mexican 
 shot, whilst its guns have crumbled the stone walls In Mata- 
 moras to the ground, and then say whether he believes a 
 blacksmith or a tailor could have secured the same results. 
 He trusted the gentleman would be convinced that arms, like 
 every occupation, requires to be studied before It can be un- 
 derstood: and from these things to which he had called his 
 
 . . . * 
 
 attention, he will learn the power and advantage of military 
 
 science. He would make but one other allusion to the re- 
 mcyks of the gentleman he had noticed, who said nine-tenths 
 of the graduates of the Military Academy abandoned the serv- 
 ice of the United States. If he would take the trouble to ex- 
 amine the records upon this point, he doubted not he would 
 be surprised at the extent of his mistake. There he would 
 learn that a majority of all the graduates are still In service; 
 and If he would push his inquiry a little further, he w-ould 
 find that a large majority of the commissioned officers who 
 bled in the action of -the the 8th and 9th were graduates of 
 that academy. 
 
 "He would not enter Into a discussion on the military at 
 this time. His pride, his gratification arose from the success 
 of our arms. Much was due to the courage which Americans 
 have displayed on many battle-fields In former times ; but this 
 courage, characteristic of our people, and pervading all sections 
 and all classes, could never have availed so much had It not 
 
SPEECH IX FAVOR OF THANKS TO THE ARMY. 45 
 
 been combined with military science. And the occasion seemed 
 suited to enforce this lesson on the minds of those who have 
 been accustomed, in season and out of season, to rail at the 
 scientific attainments of our officers. 
 
 " The influence of military skill — the advantage of discipline 
 in the troops — the power derived from the science of war, in- 
 creases with the increased size of the contending armies. "With 
 two thousand we had beaten six thousand; with twenty thou- 
 sand we would far more easily beat sixty thousand, because the 
 general must be an educated soldier who wields large bodies 
 of men, and the troops, to act efficiently, must be disciplined 
 and commanded by able officers. He but said what he had 
 long thought and often said, when he expressed his confidence 
 in the ability of our officers to meet those of any service — 
 favorably to compare, in all that constitutes the soldier, with 
 any army in the world ; and as the field widened for the ex- 
 hibition, so would their merits shine more brightly still. 
 
 " With many of the officers now serving on the Rio Grande 
 he had enjoyed a personal acquaintance, and hesitated not to 
 say that all which skill, and courage, and patriotism could 
 perform, might be expected from them. He had forborne to 
 speak of the general commanding on the Rio Grande on any 
 former occasion ; but he would now say to those who had ex- 
 pressed distrust, that the world held not a soldier better qual- 
 ified for the service he was engaged in than General Taylor. 
 Trained from his youth to arms, having spent the greater 
 portion of his life on our frontier, his experience peculiarly 
 fits him for the command he holds. Such as his conduct was 
 in Fort Harrison, on the Upper Mississippi, in Florida, and 
 on the Rio Grande, will it be wherever he meets the enemy 
 of his country. 
 
46 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 "Those soldiers, to whom so many have applied deprecia- 
 tory epithets, upon whom it has been so often said no reliance 
 could be placed, they too wdll be found, in every emergency 
 renewing such feats as have recently graced our arms, bearing 
 I the American flag to honorable triumphs, or falling beneath 
 1 its folds, as devotees to our common cause, to die a soldier's 
 ^ death. 
 
 " He rejoiced that the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. 
 Black) had shown himself so ready to pay this tribute to our 
 army. He hoped not a voice would be raised in opposition to 
 it — that nothing but the stern regret which is prompted by re- 
 membrance of those who bravely fought and nobly died will 
 break the joy, the pride, the patriotic gratulation with which 
 we hail this triumph of our brethren on the Rio Grande." 
 t A striking feature of these two speeches, as, indeed, of all 
 "'v^.J^Mr. Davis' Congressional speeches, is the strong and outspoken 
 i nationa l^ feeling which pervades them. It is a part of the 
 history of these times, that while Jefferson Davis eloquently 
 avowed a noble and generous sympathy with his heroic com- 
 patriots in Mexico, a prominent Northern politician bespoke 
 for the American army, "a welcome with bloody hands to 
 hospitable graves." When, a few months afterwards, the 
 names of Jefferson Davis and his Mississippi Rifles were 
 baptized in blood amid those frowning redoubts at Monterey, 
 and when, upon the ensanguined plain of Buena Vista, he 
 fell stricken in the very moment of victory, just as his genius 
 and the valor of his comrades had broken that last, furious 
 onset of the Mexican lancers. New England and her leaders 
 stood indiflerent spectators of the scene.* Yet the same New 
 
 ♦Massachusetts even refused military honors to the remains of a gal- 
 lant son of her own soil, (Captain Lincoln,) and a descendant of one 
 
DEBATE WITH ANDREW JOHNSON. 47 
 
 England bounded eagerly to the conquest and spoliation of 
 their countrymen, and the same leaders clamored valiantly for 
 the humiliation, for the blood even, of Jefferson Davis, as a 
 traitor and a rebel. Quosque tandem. 
 
 An interesting sequel of this speech was the debate, which 
 it occasioned two days afterwards, between Mr. Davis and 
 Andrew Johnson, now President of the United States. Mr. 
 Johnson, who boasts so proudly of his plebeian origin, and is 
 yet said to be morbidly sensitive of the slightest allusion to it 
 by others, excepted to Mr. Davis' reference to the " tailor and 
 blacksmith," warmly eulogized those callings and mechanical 
 avocations in general, and took occasion to expatiate exten- 
 sively upon the virtue and intelligence of the masses. ISlr. 
 Davis, whose language is clearly not susceptible of any inter- 
 pretation disparaging to "blacksmiths and tailors," disclaimed 
 the imputation, saying that he had designed merely to illus- 
 trate his argument, that the profession of arms, to be under- 
 stood, must be studied, and that a mechanic could no more fill 
 the place of an educated soldier, than could the latter supply 
 the qualifications of the former. Mr. Johnson, however, was 
 resolved to seize the opportunity for a panegyric upon the 
 populace^ and no explanations could avail. The Globe reports 
 this debate as, "in all its stages, not being of an entirely 
 pleasant nature." 
 
 As an appropriate conclusion to this sketch of Mr. Davis* 
 career in the Ilouse of Representatives, we quote the follow- 
 ing extract from an interesting work,^ published some years 
 
 of her most eminent families, who was killed at Bucna Vista. Iler 
 fanatical intolerance would not forget that he had fallen in a war which 
 she did not approve. 
 * ''Our Living Representative Men," by Mr. John Savage. 
 
48 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 since : " John Quincy Adams had a habit of always observing 
 new members. He would sit near them on the occasion of 
 their Congressional debut, closely eyeing and attentively list- 
 ening if the speech pleased him, but quickly departing if it 
 did not. When Davis first arose in the House, the Ex- 
 President took a seat close by. Davis proceeded, and Adams 
 did not move. The one continued speaking and the other 
 listening ; and those who knew Mr. Adams' habits were fully 
 aware that the new member had deeply impressed him. At 
 the close of the speech the ' Old Man Eloquent ' crossed over 
 to some friends and said, 'That young man, gentlemen, is no 
 ordinary man. He will make his mark yet, mind me.' " 
 
MILITARY CHARACTEE OF MR. DAVIS. 49 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE NAME OF JEFFERSON' DAVIS IXSEPARARI.E FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 
 
 MEXICAN WAR HIS ESSENTIALLY MILITARY CHARACTER AND TASTES JOINS 
 
 GENERAL TAYLORS ARMY ON THE RIO GRANDE, AS COLONEL OF THE FAMOUS 
 "MISSISSIPPI RIFLES " — MONTEREY — BUENA VISTA — GENERAL TAYLOR's AC- 
 COUNT OF DAVIs' CONDUCT — DAVIs' REPORT OF THE ACTION — NOVELTY AND 
 ORIGINALITY OF HIS STRATEGY AT BUENA VISTA — INTERESTING STATEMENT 
 OP HON. CALEB CUSHING RETURN OF DAVIS TO THE UNITED STATES TRI- 
 UMPHANT RECEPTION AT HOME PRESIDENT POLK TENDERS HIM A BRIGA- 
 DIER'S COMMISSION, WHICH HE DECLINES ON PRINCIPLE. 
 
 fTHHE name of Davis is inseparable from those lettered glo- 
 -■- ries of the American Union, which were the brilliant 
 trophies of the Mexican war. In those bright annals it was 
 engraven with unfading lustre upon the conquering banners of 
 the Republic, and his genius and valor were rewarded with a 
 fame which rests securely upon the laurels of Monterey and 
 Buena Vista. 
 
 Jefferson Davis is a born soldier. Even if we could forget 
 the glories of the as.sault upon Tcncria and El Diablo, and 
 banish the thrilling recollection of that movement at Buena 
 Yista, the genius, novelty, and intrepidity of wliich electrified 
 the world of military science, and extorted the enthusiastic 
 admiration of the victor of AVaterloo, we must yet recognize 
 the impress of those rare gifts and graces which are the titles 
 to authority. The erect yet easy carriage, the true martial 
 dignity of bearing, which is altogether removed from the 
 4 
 
^ 
 
 §0 JAFE OF iEFFKLiaoy: DAVIS. 
 
 supercilious hauteur of the mere martinet, the ahnost fascinat- 
 ino- expression of suaviter in modo, which yet does not for an 
 instant conceal the fortiter in re, constitute in him that imperial 
 semblance, to which the mind involuntarily concedes the right 
 to supreme command. It is impossible, in the presence of 
 Mr. Davis, to deny this recognition of his intuitive soldier- 
 ship. Not only is obvious to the eye the commanding mien 
 of the soldier, but the order, the discipline of the educated sol- 
 dier, whose nature, stern and unflinching, was yet plastic to 
 receive the impressions of an art with which it felt an intuitive 
 alliance. This military precision is characteristic of Mr. Davis 
 in every aspect in which he appears. There is the constant 
 fixedness of gaze upon the object to be reached, and the cau- 
 tious calculation of the chances of success with the means and 
 forces ready at hand; a constant regard for bases of supply 
 and a proper concern for lines of retreat, and, above all, the 
 prompt and vigorous execution, if success be pra;cticable and 
 the attack determined upon. Even in his oratory and states- 
 manship are these characteristics evinced. In the former there 
 is far more of rhetorical order, harmony, and symmetry, than 
 of rhetorical ornament and display ; and in the latter there is 
 purpose, consistency, and method, with little regard for the 
 shifts of expediency and the suggestions of hap-hazard te- 
 merity. 
 
 The attachment of Mr. Davis for the profession of arms is 
 ' little less than a passion — an inspiration. True, he volunta- 
 rily abandoned the army, at an age when military life is most 
 attractive to men, but the field of politics was far more invit- 
 ing to a commendable aspiration for fame, than the army at a 
 season of profound peace. But a more jjotent consideration, 
 of a domestic nature, urged his withdrawal from military life. 
 
CJOLONEI. OF VOr.UJSTJKERS. 51 
 
 He -vvfls about to be married, and preferred not to remain in 
 the army after having assumed the responsibilities of that 
 relation. His speeclies in the House of Representatives, in- 
 dicating his earnest interest in military affairs, his solicitude 
 in behalf of the army, his enthusiastic championship of the 
 Military Academy, and his thorough information respecting 
 all subjects pertaining to the military interests of the country, 
 show his ambitious and absorbing study of his favorite science. 
 
 In common with an overwhelming majority of the Southern 
 people, he had favored the annexation of Texas, and cordially 
 sustained Mr. Polk's Administration, in all the measures which 
 were necessary to the triumphant success of its policy. While 
 in the midst of his useful labors, as a member of Congress, in 
 promoting the war policy of the Government, he received, with 
 delight, the announcement of his selection to the command of 
 the First Regiment of Mississippi Volunteers. He immedi- \ 
 ately resigned his seat in Congress and started to take com- \ 
 mand of his regiment, after obtaining for it, with great diffi- l^ 
 culty, the rifles which were afterwards used with such deadly | 
 effect upon the enemy. Overtaking his men, who were already \ 
 en route for the scene of action, at New Orleans, by midsum- \ 
 mer he had reinforced General Taylor on the Rio Grande. 
 
 The incidents of the Mexican war are too fresh in the rec- 
 ollection of the country to justify here a detailed narrative of 
 the operations of the gallant army of General Taylor in its 
 progress toward the interior from the scenes of its splendid 
 exploits at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. For several 
 weeks after the arrival of Colonel Davis and his ^Iississip[)i- 
 ans, active hostilities were suspended. When the preparations 
 for the campaign were completed, the army advanced, and 
 reached Walnut Springs, about three miles from Monterey, 
 
62 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 on the 19th of September, 1846. Two days afterwards began 
 those series of actions which finally resulted in the capitula- 
 tion of a fortified city of great strength, and defended with 
 obstinate valor. Of the part borne in these brilliant opera- 
 tions which so exalted the glory of the American name, and 
 immortalized the heroism of Southern volunteers, by Colonel 
 Davis and his " Mississippi Rifles," an able and graphic pen 
 shall relate the story : 
 
 " In the storming of Monterey, Colonel Davis and his rifle- 
 men played a most gallant part. The storming of one of its 
 strongest forts (Teneria) on the 21st of September was a des- 
 perate and hard-fought fight. The Mexicans had dealt such 
 death by their cross-fires that they ran up a new flag in exul- 
 tation, and in defiance of the assault which, at this time, was 
 being made in front and rear. The Fourth Infantry, in the 
 advance, had been terribly cut up, but the Mississippians and 
 Tennesseeans steadily pressed forward, under a galling fire of 
 copper grape. They approached to within a hundred yards 
 of the fort, when they were lost in a volume of smoke. Mc- 
 Clung,* inciting a company which formerly had been under 
 his command, dashed on, followed by Captain Willis. An- 
 ticipating General Quitman, Colonel Davis, about the same 
 time, gave the order to charge. With wild desperation, his 
 men followed him. The escalade was made with the fury of 
 a tempest, the men flinging themselves upon the guns of the 
 enemy. Sword in hand, jNIcClung has sprung over the ditch. 
 After him dashes Davis, cheering on the Mississippians, and 
 then Campbell, with his Tennesseeans and others, brothers in 
 the fight, and rivals for its honors. Then was wild work. 
 The assault was irresistible. The ISIcxicans, terror-strickei 
 * Lieutenant-Colonel A. K McClunfr. 
 
MONTEREY. 53 
 
 fled like an Alpine village from the avalanche, and, taking 
 position in a strongly-fortitied building, some seventy-live 
 yards in the rear, opened a heavy fire of musketry. But, 
 like their mighty river, nothing could stay the Mississippians. 
 They are after the Mexicans. Davis and McClung are simul- 
 taneously masters of the fortifications, having got in by diiier- 
 ent entrances. In the fervor of victory the brigade does not 
 halt, but, led on by Colonel Davis, are preparing to charge 
 on the second post, (El Diablo,) about three hundred yards 
 in the rear, when they are restrained by Quitman. This 
 desperate conflict lasted over two hours. The charge of the 
 ISIississippi Rifle Regiment, without bayonets, upon Fort Ten- 
 eria, gained for the State a triumph which stands unparal- 
 leled. 
 
 "Placed in possession of El Diablo, on the dawn of the 
 23d Colonel Davis was exposed to a sharp fire from a half- 
 moon redoubt, about one hundred and fifty yards distant, 
 which was connected with heavy stone buildings and walls 
 adjoining a block of the city. Returning the fire, he pro- 
 ceeded, with eight men, to reconnoitre the ground in advance. 
 Having reported, he was ordered, with three companies of 
 his regiment and one of Tennesseejms, to advance on the 
 works. 
 
 " When they reached the half-moon work a tremendous fire 
 was opened from the stone buildings in the rear. Taking a 
 less-exposed position, Davis was reinforced, and, the balance 
 of the Mississippians coming up, the engagement became gen- 
 eral in the street, while, from the house-tops, a heavy fire was 
 kept up by the Mexicans. ' The gallant Davis, leading the 
 advance with detached parties, was rapidly entering the city, 
 penetrating into buildings, and gradually driving the enemy 
 
54 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 from the position/ when General Henderson and the Texan 
 Rangers dismounted, entered the city, and, through musketry 
 and grape, made their way to the advance. The conflict in- 
 creased, and still Davis continued to lead his command through 
 the streets to within a square of the Grand Plaza, when, the 
 afternoon being far advanced. General Taylor withdrew the 
 Americans to the captured forts."* 
 
 Thus, in their first engagement, the Mississippians and their 
 commander achieved a reputation which shall endure so long 
 as men commemorate deeds of heroism and devotion. Veteran 
 troops, trained to despise death by the dangers of a score of 
 battles, have been immortalized in song and story for exploits 
 jnferior to those of the "Mississippi Rifles" at Monterey. 
 Colonel Davis became one of the idols of the array, and took 
 a prominent place among the heroes of the war. The nation 
 rang with the fame of " Davis and his Mississippi Rifles ; " 
 the journals of the day were largely occupied with graphic 
 descriptions of their exploits ; and the reports of superior offi- 
 cers contributed their proud testimony to the history of the 
 country, to the chivalrous daring and consummate skill of 
 Colonel Davis. A becoming acknowledgment of his conduct 
 was made by General Taylor in assigning him a j)lace on the 
 commission of officers appointed to arrange with the Mexicans 
 the terms of capitulation. The result of the negotiations, 
 
 *For this spirited account of the operations of the Mississippi regiment 
 at Monterey, the author is indebted to a sketch of Mr. Davis in Mr. John 
 Savage's "Living Representative Men," which was published a year or 
 two prior to the war. Though having several other accounts, possibly 
 more complete, I have selected this as the -most graphic. The author 
 readily acknowledges the assistance which he has derived from the work 
 of Mr. Savage. 
 
BUENA VISTA. 55 
 
 though approved by General Taylor, was not approved by 
 the Administration, which ordered a termination of the arm- 
 istice agreed upon by the commissioners from the respective 
 armies and a speedy resumption of hostilities. The terms of 
 capitulation were assailed by many, who thought them too 
 lenient to the Mexicans; among others, by General Quitman, 
 the warm, personal, and political friend of Colonel Davis. A 
 very important portion of the history of the war consists of 
 the latter's defense of the terms of surrender and his memo- 
 randa of the incidents occurring in the conferences with the 
 Mexican officers. 
 
 To sustain the proud prestige of Monterey — if possible to 
 surpass it, became henceforth the aspiration of the Mississip- 
 pians. But the name of Mississippi was to be made radiant 
 with a new glory, beside which the lustre of Monterey paled, 
 as did the dawn of Lodi by the full-orbed splendor of Auster- 
 litz. All the world knows of the conduct of Jefferson Davis 
 at Buena Vista. How he virtually won a battle, which, con- 
 sidering the disparity of the contending forces, must forever 
 be a marvel to the student of military science ; how like Des- 
 saix, at Marengo, he thwight there was " still time to win an- 
 other battle," even when a portion of our line was broken and 
 in inglorious retreat, and acting upon the impulse rescued 
 victory from the jaws of defeat ; saving an army from destruc- 
 tion, and flooding Avith a blaze of triumph a field shrouded 
 with the gloom of disaster, are memories forever enshrined in ^ 
 the Temple of Fame. Americans can never weary of listen- J— 
 ing to the thrilling incidents of that ever-memorable day. By » 
 the South, the lesson of Buena Vista and kindred scenes of 
 the valor of her children, can never be forgotton. In these 
 days of her humiliation and despair, their proud memories 
 
56 T.iFE OF jp:fferson i>ayis. 
 
 throng upon her, as do a thousand noble emotions upon the 
 __modern Greek, who stands upon the sacred ground of Mara- 
 thon and Pisetea. 
 
 The following vivid and powerful description of the more 
 prominent incidents of the battle is from the pen of Hon. J. F. 
 H. Claiborne, of Mississippi : 
 
 "The battle had been raging sometime with fluctuating for- 
 tunes, and was setting against us, when General Taylor, with 
 Colonel Davis and others, arrived on the field. Several regi- 
 ments (which were subsequently rallied and fought bravely) 
 were in full retreat. O'Brien, after having his men and horses 
 completely cut up, had been compelled to draw off his guns, 
 and Bragg, with almost superhuman energy, was sustaining 
 the brunt of the fight. Many officers of distinction had fallen. 
 Colonel Davis rode forward to examine the position of the 
 enemy, and concluding that the best way to arrest our fugitives 
 would be to make a bold demonstration, he resolved at once 
 to attack the enemy, there posted in force, immediately in 
 front, supported by cavalry, and two divisions in reserve iu 
 his rear. It was a resolution bold almost to rashness, but the 
 emergency was pressing. With a handful of Indiana volun- 
 teers, who still stood by their brave old colonel (Bowles) and 
 his own regiment, he advanced at double-quick time, firing as 
 he advanced. His own brave fellows fell fast under the roll- 
 ing musketry of the enemy, but their rapid and fatal volleys 
 carried dismay and death into the adverse ranks. A deep 
 ravine separated the combatants. Leaping into it, the Missis- 
 sippians soon appeared on the other side, and with a shout that 
 was heard over the battle-field, they poured in a well-directed 
 fire, and rushed upon the enemy. Their deadly aim and wild 
 enthusiasm were irresistible. The Mexicans fled in confusion 
 
A SriRlTED DEHCnirTION. 57 
 
 to tlioir reserves, and Davis seized the commanding position 
 thov had occupied. He next fell upon a party of cavalry and 
 compelled it to fly, with the loss of their leader and other 
 officers. Immediately afterwards a brigade of lancers, one 
 thousand strong, were seen approaching at a gallop, in beauti- 
 ful array, with sounding bugles and fluttering pennons. It was 
 an appalling spectacle, but not a man flinched from his posi- 
 tion. The time between our devoted band and eternity seemed 
 brief indeed. But conscious that the eye of the army was 
 uj)on them, that the honor of Mississippi was at stake, and 
 knowing that, if they gave way, or were ridden down, our un- 
 protected batteries in the rear, upon which the fortunes of the 
 day depended, would be captured, each man resolved to die in 
 his place sooner than retreat. Not the Spartan martyrs at 
 Thermopylae — not the sacred battalion of Epaminondas — not 
 the Tenth Legion of Julius Ceesar — not the Old Guard of Xa- 
 poleon — ever evinced more fortitude than these young volun- 
 teers in a crisis when death seemed inevitable. They stood 
 like statues, as fr'nnd and motionless as the marble itself. 
 Impressed with this extraordinary firmness, when they had 
 anticipated panic and flight, the lancers advanced more delib- 
 erately, as though they saw, for the first time, the dark shadow 
 of the fate that was impending over them. Colonel Davis had 
 thrown his men into the form of a reentering angle, (familiarly 
 known as his famous V movement,) both flanks resting on 
 ravines, the lancers coming down on the intervening ridge. 
 This exposed them to a converging fire, and the moment they 
 came within rifle range each man singled out his object, and 
 the whole head of the column fell. A more deadly fire never 
 Avas delivered, and the brilliant array recoiled and retreated, 
 paralyzed and dismayed. 
 
 \ 
 
OS LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 " Shortly afterwards the Mexicans, having concentrated a 
 large force on the right for their final attack, Colonel Davis 
 was ordered in that direction. His regiment had been in 
 action all day, exhausted by thirst and fatigue, much reduced 
 by the carnage of the morning engagement, and many in the 
 ranks suffering from wounds, yet the noble fellows moved at 
 double-quick time. Bowles' little band of Indiana volun- 
 teers still acted with thera. After marching several hundred 
 yards they perceived the Mexican infantry advancing, in three 
 Tines, upon Bragg's battery, which, though entirely unsup- 
 ported, held its position with a resolution worthy of his fame. 
 The pressure upon him stimulated the Mississippians. They 
 increased their speed, and when the enemy were within one 
 hundred yards of the battery and confident of its capture, they 
 took him in flank and reverse, and poured in a raking and 
 destructive fire. This broke his right line, and the rest soon 
 gave way and fell back precipitately. Here Colonel Davis 
 was severely wounded." 
 
 The wound here alluded to was from a musket ball in the 
 heel, and was exceedingly painful, though Colonel Davis re- 
 fused to leave the field until the action was over. For some 
 time grave apprehensions were entertained lest it should prove 
 dangerous by the setting in of erysipelas. 
 
 General Taylor, who was deeply impressed with the large 
 share of credit due to Colonel Davis, in his official report of 
 the battle, says: "The Mississippi Riflemen, under Colonel 
 Davis, were highly conspicuous for their gallantry and steadi- 
 ness, and sustained throughout the engagement, the reputation 
 of veteran troops. Brought into action against an immensely 
 superior force, they maintained themselves for a long time, un- 
 supported and with heavy loss, and held an important part of 
 
DA vis' KErORT OF THE BATTLE. 59 
 
 the field until reinforced. Colonel Davis, though severely 
 wounded, remained in the saddle until the close of the action. 
 His distinguished coolness and gallantry, at the head of his 
 regiment on this day, entitle him to the particular notice of 
 the Government." 
 
 The report of Colonel Davis, of the operations of his regi- 
 ment, is highly important as a description of the most im- 
 portant features of the action, and as an explanation of his 
 celebrated strategic movement. We omit such portions as em- 
 brace mere details not relevant to our purpose. 
 
 "Saltillo, Mexico, 2(1 March, 1847. 
 
 " Sir : In compliance with your note of yesterday, I have 
 the honor to present the following report of the service of the 
 Mississippi Riflemen on the 23d ultimo : 
 
 " Early in the morning of that day the regiment was drawn 
 out from the head-quarters encampment, which stood in advance 
 of and overlooked the town of Saltillo. Conformably to in- 
 structions, two companies were detached for the protection of 
 that encampment, and to defend the adjacent entrance of the 
 town. The remaining eight companies were put in march to 
 return to the position of the preceding day, now known as the 
 battle-field of Buena Vista. AVe had approached to within 
 about two miles of that position, when the report of artillery 
 firing, which reached us, gave assurance that a battle had com- 
 menced. Excited by the sound, the regiment pressed rapidly 
 forward, manifesting, upon this, as upon other occasions, their 
 more than willingness to meet the enemy. At the first con- 
 venient place the column was halted for the purpose of filling 
 their canteens with water; and the march being resumed, was 
 directed toward the position which had been indicated to me, 
 
60 JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 on the previous evening, as the post of our regiment. As we 
 approached the scene of action, horsemen, recognized as of our 
 troops, were seen running, dispersed and confusedly from tlie 
 field; and our first view of the line of battle presented the 
 mortifying spectacle of a regiment of infantry flying disor- 
 ganized from before the enemy. These sights, so well calcu- 
 lated to destroy confidence and dispirit troops just coming into 
 action, it is my pride and pleasure to believe, only nerved the 
 resolution of the regiment I have the honor to command. 
 
 " Our order of march was in column of companies, advancing 
 by their centers. The point which had just been abandoned 
 by the regiment alluded to, was now taken as our direction. I 
 rode forward to examine the ground upon which we were going 
 to operate, and in passing through the fugitives, appealed to 
 them to return with us and renew the fight, pointing to our 
 regiment as a mass of men behind which they might securely 
 form. 
 
 ''With a few honorable exceptions, the appeal was as un- 
 heeded, as were the offers which, I am informed, were made by 
 our men to give their canteens of water to those who com- 
 jjlained of thirst, on condition that they would go back. Gen- 
 eral Wool was upon the ground making great efforts to rally 
 the men who had given way. I approached him and asked if 
 he would send another regiment to sustain me in an attack 
 upon the enemy before us. He was alone, and, after promising 
 the support, Avent in person to send it. Upon further examin- 
 ation, I found that the slope we were ascending was intersected 
 by a deep ravine, which, uniting obliquely wdth a still larger 
 one on our right, formed between them a point of land diffi- 
 cult of access by us, but which, spreading in a plain toward 
 the base of the mountain, had easy communication with the 
 
COT.OXET. DA vis' RErOTlT. 61^ 
 
 main body of the enemy. This position, important from its 
 natural strength, derived a far greater vahie from the relation 
 it bore to our order of battle and line of communication with 
 the rear. The enemy, in number many times greater than our- 
 selves, supported by strong reserves, flanked by cavalry and 
 elated by recent success, was advancing upon it. The moment 
 seemed to me critical and the occasion to require whatever sac- 
 rifice it might cost to check the enemy. 
 
 " My regiment, having continued to advance, was near at 
 hand. I met and formed it rapidly into order of battle; the 
 line then advanced in double-quick time, until within the esti- 
 mated range of our rifles, when it was halted, and ordered to 
 ' fire advancing.' 
 
 " The progress of the enemy was arrested. "We crossed the 
 difficult chasm before us, under a galling fire, and in good 
 order renewed the attack upon the other side. The contest 
 was severe — the destruction great upon both sides. We steadily 
 advanced, and, as the distance diminished, the ratio of loss in- 
 creased rapidly against the enemy; he yielded, and was driven 
 back on his reserves. A plain now lay behind us — the enemy's 
 cavaliy had passed around our right flank, which rested on the 
 main ravine, and gone to our rear. The support I had ex- 
 pected to join us was nowhere to be seen. I therefore ordered 
 the regiment to retire, and went in person to find the cavalry, 
 which, after passing round our right, had been concealed by 
 the inequality of the ground. I found them at the first point 
 where the bank was practicable for horsemen, in the act of de- 
 scending into the ravine — no doubt for the purpose of charging 
 upon our rear. The nearest of our men ran quickly to my 
 call, attacked this body, and dispersed it with some loss. I 
 think their commander was among the killed. 
 
62 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 "The regiment was formed again in line of battle behind the 
 first ravine we had crossed; soon after which we were joined 
 upon our left by Lieutenant Kilbourn, with a piece of light 
 artillery, and Colonel Lane's (the Third) regiment of Indi- 
 ana volunteers. . . . We had proceeded but a short distance 
 when I saw a large body of cavalry debouche from his cover 
 upon the left of the position from which we had retired, and 
 advance rapidly upon us. The Mississippi regiment was filed 
 to the right, and fronted in line across the plain; the Indiana 
 regiment was formed on the bank of the ravine, in advance of 
 our right flank, by which a reentering angle was presented to 
 the enemy. Whilst this preparation was being made, Sergeant- 
 Major Miller, of our regiment, was sent to Captain Sherman for 
 one or more pieces of artillery from his battery. 
 
 " The enemy, who was now seen to be a body of richly- 
 caparisoned lancers, came forward rapidly, and in beautiful 
 order — the files and ranks so closed as to look like a mass of 
 men and horses. Perfect silence and the greatest steadiness 
 prevailed in both lines of our troops, as they stood at shoul- 
 dered arms waiting an attack. Confident of success, and anx- 
 ious to obtain the full advantage of a cross-fire at a short 
 distance, I repeatedly called to the men not to shoot. 
 
 "As the enemy approached, his speed regularly diminished, 
 until, when, within eighty or a hundred yards, he had drawn 
 up to a walk, and seemed about to halt. A few files fired 
 without orders, and both lines then instantly poured in a vol- 
 ley so destructive that the mass yielded to the blow and the 
 
 survivors fled At this time, the enemy made his 
 
 last attack upon the right, and I received the General's order 
 to march to that portion of the field. The broken character 
 of the intervening ground concealed the scene of action from 
 
COLONEL DAVIs' REI'ORT. 63 
 
 our view ; but the heavy firing of musketry formed a £ufficicnt 
 guide for our course. After marching two or three hundred 
 yards, we saw the enemy's infantry advancing in three lines 
 upon Captain Bragg's battery; which, though entirely unsup- 
 ported, resolutely held its position, and met the attack with a 
 fire worthy the former achievements of that battery, and of the 
 reputation of its present meritorious commander. AVe pressed 
 on, climbed the rocky slope of the plain on which this combat 
 occurred, reached its brow so as to take the enemy in flank 
 and reverse when he was about one hundred yards from the 
 battery. Our first fire — raking each of his lines, and opened 
 close upon his flank — was eminently destructive. His right 
 gave way, and he fled in confusion. 
 
 " In this, the last contest of the day, my regiment equaled — 
 it was impossible to exceed — my expectations. Though worn 
 down by many hours of fatigue and thirst, the ranks thinned 
 by our heavy loss in the morning, they yet advanced upon the 
 enemy with the alacrity and eagerness of men fresh to the 
 combat. In every approbatory sense of these remarks I wish 
 to be included a party of Colonel Bowles' Indiana regiment, 
 which served with us during the greater part of the day, un- 
 der the immediate command of an officer from that regiment, 
 whose gallantry attracted my particular attention, but whose 
 name, I regret, is unknown to me. When hostile demonstra- 
 tions had ceased, I retired to a tent upon the field for surgical 
 aid, having been wounded by a musket ball when we first 
 went into action Every part of the action hav- 
 ing been fought under the eye of the commanding General, 
 the importance and manner of any service it was our fortune 
 to render, will be best estimated by him. But in view t)f my 
 own responsibility, it may be permitted me to say, in relation 
 
64 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 to our first attack upon the enemy, that I considered the ne- 
 cessity absolute and immediate. No one could have failed to 
 perceive the hazard. The enemy, in greatly disproportionate 
 numbers, was rapidly advancing. AYe saw no friendly troops 
 coming to our support, and probably none except myself ex- 
 pected reinforcement. Under such circumstances, the men 
 cheerfully, ardently entered into the conflict; and though we 
 lost, in that single engagement, more than thirty killed and 
 forty wounded, the regiment never faltered nor moved, except 
 as it was ordered. Had the expected reinforcement arrived, 
 we could have prevented the enemy's cavalry from passing to 
 our rear, results more decisive might have been obtained, and 
 
 a part of our loss have been avoided 
 
 "I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient 
 servant. "JEFFERSON DAVIS, 
 
 '''Colonel Mississippi Rijles. 
 "]\[ajor W. W. S. Bliss, Assistant AJjutant-GeneraV 
 
 The reputation earned by Colonel Davis at Buena Vista 
 could not fail to provoke the assaults of envy. An effort, 
 equally unwarranted and unsuccessful, has since been made to 
 deprive him of a portion of his merited fame of having con- 
 ceived and executed a movement decisive of the battle. It has 
 been pretended, in disparagement of the strategy of Colonel 
 Davis, that his celebrated V movement (for so it is, and will 
 always be known) had not the merit of originality, and be- 
 sides was forced upon him by the circumstances in which he 
 was placed, and especially by the conformation of the ground, 
 which would not admit of a different disposition of his troops. 
 Such a judgment is merely hypercritical. There is no account 
 in military history, from the campaigns of Caesar to those of 
 Napoleon, of such a tactical conception, unless we include a 
 
INTERESTING STATEMENT. 65 
 
 slightly-analogous case at "Waterloo. The movement in the 
 latter engagement, however, differs essentially from that exe- 
 cuted by Davis at Buena Yista. A party of Hanoverian cav- 
 alry, assailed by French huzzars, at the intersection of two 
 roads, by forming a salient, repulsed their assailants almost as 
 effectually as did the reentrant angle of the Mississippians at 
 Buena Vista. As to the second criticism, it is certainly a 
 novel accusation against an officer, that he should, by a quick 
 appreciation of liis situation, avail himself of the only possible 
 means by which he could not only extricate his own command 
 from imminent peril of destruction, but also avert a blow de- 
 livered at the safety of the entire army. 
 
 In a lecture on "The Expatriated Irish in Europe and 
 America," delivered in Boston, February 11, 1858, the Hon. 
 Caleb Gushing thus alludes to this subject : " In another of 
 the dramatic incidents of that field, a man of Celtic race (Jef- 
 ferson Davis) at the head of the Eiflcs of Mississippi, had 
 ventured to do that of which there is, perhaps, but one other 
 example in the military history of modern times. In the des- 
 perate conflicts of the Crimea, at the battle of Inkermann, in 
 one of those desperate charges, there was a British officer who 
 ventured to receive the charge of the enemy without the pre- 
 caution of having his men formed in a hollow square. They 
 were dra-wn up in two lines, meeting at a point like an open 
 fan, and received the charge of the Russians at the muzzle of 
 their guns, and repelled it. Sir Colin Campbell, for this feat 
 of arms, among others, was selected as the man to retrieve the 
 fallen fortunes of England in India. He did, however, but 
 imitate what Jefferson Davis had previously done in IMexico, 
 who, in that trying hour, when, with one last desperate effort 
 to break the line of the American army, the cavalry of Mex- 
 
66 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ico was concentrated in one charge against the American line ; 
 then, I say, Jefferson Davis commanded his men to form in 
 two lines, extended as I have shown, and receive that charge 
 of the Mexican horse, with a phinging fire from the right and 
 left from the Mississippi Rifles, which repelled, and repelled 
 for the last time, the charge of the hosts of Mexico." 
 
 These puerile criticisms, however, were unavailing against 
 the concurrent testimony of Taylor, Quitman, and Lane, and 
 the grateful plaudits of the army, to shake the popular judg- 
 ment, which rarely fails, in the end, to discriminate between 
 the false glare of cheaply-earned glory and the j ust renown of 
 true heroism. 
 
 The term of enlistment of his regiment having expired, 
 Colonel Davis, in July, 1847, just twelve months after the 
 resignation of his seat in the House of Representatives, re- 
 turned to the United States. His progress toward his home 
 was attended by a series of congratulatory receptions, the 
 people every-where assembling en masse to do honor to the 
 " Hero of Buena Vista." Mississippi extended a triumphant 
 greeting to her soldier-statesman, who, resigning the civio 
 trust which she had confided to his keeping, had carried her 
 flag in triumph amid the thunders of battle and the wastes 
 of carnage, carving the name of Mississippi in an inscription 
 of enduring renown. 
 
 During his journey homeward, there occurred a most im- 
 pressive illustration of that strict devotion to principle which, 
 above all other considerations, is the real solution of every act 
 of his life, public and private. While in New Orleans, Col- 
 onel Davis was offered, by President Polk, a commission as 
 Brigadier-General of Volunteers, an honor which he unhesitat- 
 ingly declined, on the ground that no such commission could 
 
DECLINES PROMOTION'. 67 
 
 be conferred by Federal authority, either by appointment of 
 the President or by act of Congress. As an advocate of States' 
 Rights, he could not countenance, even for the gratification of 
 his own ambition, a plain infraction of the rights of the States, 
 to which respectively, the Constitution reserves the appoint- 
 ment of officers of the militia.* The soldier's pride in de- 
 served promotion for distinguished services, could not induce 
 the statesman to forego his convictions of Constitutional right. 
 The declination of this high distinction was entirely consistent 
 with his opinions previously entertained and expressed. Be- 
 fore he resigned his seat in the House of Representatives, the 
 bill authorizing such appointments by the President was in- 
 troduced, and rapidly pressed to its passage. Mr. Davis de- 
 tected the Constitutional infraction which it involved, and 
 opposed it. He designed to address the House, but was sud- 
 denly called away from Washington, and before leaving had 
 an understanding with the Chairman of the Committee from 
 which the bill had come, that it would not be called up before 
 the ensuing Monday. On his return, however, he found that 
 the friends of the measure had forced its passage on the pre- 
 vious Saturday. 
 
 This is but one in a thousand evidences of an incorruptible 
 loyalty to his convictions, which would dare face all opposi- 
 tion and has braved all reproach. It is an attribute of true 
 greatness in the character of Jeiferson Davis, which not even 
 his enemies have called in question, to which candor must 
 ever accord the tribute of infinite admiration. 
 
 * This Constitutional question was again raised by yir. Davis, while 
 President of the Confederacy, and his action with reference to similar 
 legislation by the Confederate Congress, was in entire accordance with 
 the reason assigned for declining Mr. Polk's appointment. 
 
68 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 MR. DAVIS IN THE TTNITED STATES SENATE, FIRST BY EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT, 
 AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF HIS 
 STATE — POPULAR ADMIRATION NOT LESS FOR HIS CIVIC TALENTS THAN HIS 
 MILITARY SERVICES — FEATURES OF HIS PUBLIC CAREER — HIS CHARACTER 
 AND CONDUCT AS A SENATOR — AS AN ORATOR AND PARLIAMENTARY LEADER 
 
 HIS INTREPIDITY — AN INCIDENT WITH HENRY CLAY — DAVIS THE LEADER 
 
 OF THE states' RIGHTS PARTY IN CONGRESS — THE AGITATION OF 1850 — 
 DAVIS OPPOSES THE COMPROMISE — FOLLY OF THE SOUTH IN ASSENTING TO 
 THAT SETTLEMENT — DAVIS NOT A DISUNIONIST IN 1850, NOR A REBEL IN 
 1861 — HIS CONCEPTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 LOGICAL ABSURDITY OF CLAY's POSITION EXPOSED BY DAVIS — THE IDEAL 
 
 UNION OP THE LATTER — WHY HE OPPOSED THE COMPROMISE — THE NEW 
 MEXICO BILL — DAVIs' GROWING FAME AT THIS PERIOD — HIS FREQUENT EN- 
 COUNTERS WITH CLAY, AND WARM FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THEM — SIGNAI. 
 TRIUMPH OF THE UNION SENTIMENT, AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE SOUTH. 
 
 WITHIN less than two months from his return to Mis- 
 sissippi, Colonel Davis was appointed by the Governor 
 of the State to fill the vacancy in the United States Senate 
 occasioned by the death of General Speight. At a subsequent 
 session of the Legislature, the selection of the Governor was 
 confirmed by his unanimous election for the residue of the 
 unexpired term. Seldom has there been a tender of public 
 honor more deserved by the recipient, and more cheerfully 
 accorded by the constituent body. It was the grateful trib- 
 ute of popular appreciation to the hero who had risked his 
 life for the glory of his country, and the worthy recognition 
 
POPULAR FAVOR. 69 
 
 of abilities which had been proven adequate to the responsi- 
 bilities of the highest civic trust. Doubtless Colonel Davis 
 owed much of the signal unanimity and enthusiasm which 
 accompanied this expression of popular favor to his brilliant 
 services in Mexico. The military passion is strong in the hu- 
 man breast, and the sentiment of homage to prowess, illustrated 
 on the battle-field and in the face of danger, is one of the few 
 chivalrous instincts which survive the influence of the sordid 
 vices and vulgarisms of human nature. In all ages men have 
 declaimed and reasoned against the expediency of confiding 
 civil authority to the keeping of soldiers, and have cautioned 
 the masses against the risk of entrusting tbe public liberties 
 to the stern and dictatorial will educated in the rugged dis- 
 cipline and habits of the camp. Yet the masses, in all time, 
 will continue their awards of distinction to martial exploits 
 with a fervor not characteristic of their recognition of any 
 other public service. 
 
 But the tribute had a higher motive, if possible, than the 
 generous impulse of gratitude to the " Hero of Buena Vista," 
 in the universal conviction of his eminent fitness for the posi- 
 tion. His service in the House of Representatives, brief as it 
 was, had designated him, months before his Mexican laurels 
 had been earned, as a man, not only of mark, but of promise ; 
 of decided and progressive intellectual power ; of pronounced 
 mental and moral individuality. 
 
 Of all the public men of America, Jefferson Davis is the 
 least indebted for his long and noble career of distinction to 
 adventitious influences or merely temporary popular impulses. 
 The sources of his stren<rth have been the elements of his 
 character and the resources of his genius. Never hoping to 
 stumble upon success, by a stolid indifference amid the flue- 
 
70 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 tuations of fortune, nor engaged in the role of the trimmer, 
 who adjusts his conduct conformably with every turn of the 
 popular current, his hopes of success have rested upon the 
 merits of principle alone. He has succeeded in all things 
 where success was possible, and failed, at last, in contradiction 
 of every lesson of previous experience, with the light of all 
 history pleading his vindication, and to the disappointment 
 of the nearly unanimous judgment of disinterested mankind. 
 A peculiar feature in the public career of Mr. Davis was 
 its steady and consecutive development. He has accepted 
 service, always and only, in obedience to the concurrent con- 
 fidence of his fellow-citizens in his peculiar qualifications for 
 the emergency. From the beginning he gave the promise 
 of those high capacities which the fervid eulogy of Grattan 
 accorded to Chatham — to "strike a blow in the world that 
 should resound through its history." His first election to 
 Congress was the spontaneous acknowledgment of the pro- 
 found impression produced by his earliest intellectual efforts. 
 The consummate triumph of his genius and valor at Buena 
 Vista did not exceed the anticipations of his friends, who 
 knew the ardor and assiduity of his devotion to his cherished 
 science, and now in the noble arena of the American Senate 
 his star was still to be in the ascendant. 
 
 At the first session of the Thirtieth Congress, JefPerson 
 Davis took his seat as a Senator of the United States from 
 the State of Mississippi. The entire jieriod of his connection 
 with the Senate, from 1847 to 1851, and from 1857 to 1861, 
 scarcely comprises eight years; but those were years pregnant 
 with the fate of a nation, and in their brief progress he stood 
 in that august body the equal of giant intellects, and grap- 
 pled, with the power and skill of a master, the great ideas 
 
UNITED STATES SENATOR. 71 
 
 and events of those momentous days. Mr. Davis could safely- 
 trust, whatever of ambition he may cherish for the distin- 
 guished consideration of posterity, to a faithful record of his 
 service in the Senate. His senatorial fame is a beautiful har- 
 mony of the most pronounced and attractive features of the 
 best parliamentary models. He was as intrepid and defiant 
 as Chatham, but as scholarly as Brougham ; as elegant and 
 perspicuous in diction as Canning, and often as profound and 
 philosophical in his comprehension of general principles as 
 Burke; when roused by a sense of injury, or by the force of 
 his earnest conviction, as much the incarnation of fervor and 
 zeal as Grattan, but, like Fox, subtle, ready, and always armed 
 cap a pie for the quick encounters of debate. 
 
 Amono; all the eminent associates of Mr. Davis in that bodv, 
 there were very few who possessed his peculiar qualifications 
 for its most distinguished honors. His character, no less than 
 his demeanor, may be aptly termed senatorial, and his bearing 
 >vas always attuned to his noble conception of the Senate as 
 an august assemblage of the embassadors of sovereign States. 
 He carried to the Senate the loftiest sense of the dignity and 
 responsibility of his trust, and convictions upon political ques- 
 tions, which were the result of the most thorough and elaborate 
 investigation. Never for one instant varying from the princi- 
 ples of his creed, he never doubted as to the course of duty ; 
 profound, accurate in information, there was no question per- 
 tainins: to the science of government or its administration that 
 he did not illuminate with a light, clear, powerful, and orig- 
 inal. 
 
 It has been remarked of Mr. Davis' style as a speaker, that 
 it is " orderly rather than ornate," and the remark is correct 
 60 far as it relates to the mere statement of the conditions 
 
72 LIFE OF JEFFEKSON DAVIS. 
 
 of the discussion. For mere rhetorical glitter, Mr. Davis' 
 speeches afford but poor models, but for clear logic and con- 
 vincing argument, apt illustration, bold and original imagery, 
 and genuine pathos, they are unsurpassed by any ever deliv- 
 ered in the American Senate. Though the Senate was, un- 
 doubtedly, his appropriate arena as an orator, and though it 
 may well be doubted whether he was rivaled in senatorial 
 eloquence by any contemporary, Mr. Davis is hardly less gifted 
 in the attributes of popular eloquence. Upon great occasions 
 he will move a large crowd with an irresistible power. As a 
 popular orator, he does not seek to sway and toss the will Avith 
 violent and passionate emotion, but his eloquence is more a 
 triumph of argument aided by an enlistment of passion and 
 persuasion to reason and conviction. He has less of the char- 
 acteristics of Mirabeau, than of that higher type of eloquence, 
 of which Cicero, Burke, and George Canning were representa- 
 tives, and Avhich is pervaded by passion, subordinated to the 
 severer tribunal of intellect. It was the privilege of the 
 writer, on repeated occasions, during the late war, to witness 
 the triumph of Mr, Davis' eloquence over a popular assem- 
 blage. Usually the theme and the occasion were worthy of 
 the orator, and difficult indeed would it be to realize a nobler 
 vision of the majesty of intellect. To a current of thought, 
 perennial and inexhaustible, compact, logical and irresistible, 
 was added a fire that threw its warmth into the coldest bosom, 
 and infused a glow of light into the very core of the subject. 
 His voice, flexible and articulate, reaching any compass that 
 was requisite, attitude and gestures, all conspired to give power 
 and expression to his language, and the hearer was impressed 
 as though in the presence of the very transfiguration of elo- 
 quence. The printed efforts of Mr. Davis will not only live 
 
AS A PARLIAXIENTARY LEADER. 73 
 
 as memorials of parliamentary and popular eloquence, but as 
 invaluable stores of information to the political and historical 
 student. They epitomize some of the most important peri- 
 ods of American history, and embrace the amplest discussion 
 of an extended range of subjects pertaining to almost every 
 science. 
 
 The development in Mr. Davis of the high and rare quali- 
 ties, requisite to parliamentary leadership, was rapid and deci- 
 sive. His nature instinctively aspires to influence and power, 
 and under no circumstances could it rest contented in an atti- 
 tude of inferiority. Independence, originality, and intrepidity, 
 added to earnest and intelligent conviction ; unwavering devo- 
 tion to principle and purpose ; a will stern and inexorable, and 
 a disposition frank, courteous, and generous, are features of 
 character which rarely fail to make a representative man. 
 After the death of Mr. Calhoun, he was incomparably the 
 ablest exponent of States' Rights principles, and even during 
 the life of that great publicist, Mr. Davis, almost equally with 
 him, shared the labors and responsibilities of leadership. His 
 personal courage is of that knightly order, which in an age of 
 chivalry would have sought the trophies of the tourney, and 
 his moral heroism fixed him immovably upon the solid rock 
 of principle, indifferent to the inconvenience of being in a 
 minority and in no dread of the storms of popular passion. 
 His faith in his principles was no less earnest than his confi- 
 dence in his ability to triumphantly defend them. In the 
 midst of the agitation and excitement of 1850, Henry Clay, 
 the Great Compromiser, whose brilliant but erring genius so 
 long and fatally led estray, from the correct understanding of 
 the vital issue at stake between the North and the South, a 
 numerous party of noble and true-hearted Southern gentle- 
 
74 Life of jefferSon da vis. • 
 
 men, furnished the occasion of an imj^ressive illustration of 
 this quality. Turning, in debate, to the Mississippi Sena- 
 tor, he notified the latter of his purpose, at some future day, 
 to debate with him elaborately, an important question of prin- 
 ciple. "Now is the moment," was the reply of the intrepid 
 Davis, ever eager to champion his beloved and imperiled 
 South, equally against her avowed enemies, and the not less 
 fatal policy of those who were but too willing to comj)romise 
 upon an issue vital to her rights and dignity. And what a 
 shock of arms might then have been witnessed, could Clay 
 have dispelled thirty years of his ripe three-score and ten ! 
 Each would have found a foeman worthy of his steel. In an- 
 s^ver to this bold defiance. Clay, like Hotspur, would have 
 rushed to the charge, with visor up and lance couchant; and 
 Davis, another Saladin, no less frank than his adversary, but 
 far more dexterous, would have met him with a flash of that 
 Damascus scymetar, whose first blow severed the neck of the 
 foeman. 
 
 That would have been a bold ambition that could demand 
 a formal tender of leadership from the brilliant array of gal- 
 lant gentlemen, ripe scholars, distinguished orators and states- 
 men, who, for twenty years before the war, were the valiant 
 champions in Congress of the principles and aspirations of the 
 South. Yet few will deny the preeminence of ISIr. Davis, in 
 the eye of the country and the world, among States' Rights 
 leaders. Equally with Mr. Calhoun, as the leader of a great 
 intellectual movement, he stamped his impress upon the en- 
 during tablets of time. 
 
 Like Mr. Calhoun, too, Mr. Davis gave little evidence of 
 capacity or taste for mere party tactics. Neither would have 
 performed the duties of drill-sergeant, in local organizations, 
 
VIEWS UPON PUBLIC AFFAIRS. 7^ 
 
 for the purposes of a political canvass, so well as hundreds 
 of men of far lighter calibre and less stability. Happily, both 
 sought and found a more congenial field of action. 
 
 The unexpired terra, for which Mr. Davis had been elected 
 in 1847, ended in 1851, and, though he was immediately re- 
 elected, in consequence of his subsequent resignation his first 
 service in the Senate ended with the term for which he had 
 first been elected. A recurrence to the records of Congress will 
 exhibit the eventful nature of this period, especially in its con- 
 clusion. In the earlier portion of his senatorial service, Mr. 
 Davis participated conspicuously in debate and in the general 
 business of legislation. Here, as in the House of Representa- 
 tives, his views upon military affairs were always received with 
 marked res|)ect, and no measure looking to the improvement 
 of the army failed to receive his cordial cooperation. 
 
 The extensive conquests of the army in Mexico, and the 
 necessity of maintaining the authority of the Federal Govern- 
 ment in the conquered country until the objects of the war 
 could be consummated, created considerable embarrassment. 
 Upon this subject Mr. Davis spoke frequently and intelli- 
 gently. His sagacity indicated a policy equally protective of 
 the advantages which the valor of the army had achieved, 
 and humane to the conquered. In a debate with Mr. John 
 Bell, in February, 1848, he defined himself as favoring such 
 a military occupation as would " prevent the General Gov- 
 ernment of Mexico, against which this war had been directed, 
 from reestablishing its power and again concentrating the scat- 
 tered fragments of its army to renew active hostilities against 
 us." He disclaimed the motive, in this policy, of territorial 
 acquisition, and earnestly deprecated interference with the po- 
 litical institutions of the Mexicans. The estimate entertained 
 
76 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 by the Senate, of his judgment and information upon military 
 subjects, was indicated by his almost unanimous election, (thii'ty- 
 two for Mr. Davis, and five for all others,) during the session of 
 the Thirty-first Congress, as Chairman of the Committee on 
 Military Afiairs. His speeches on the subject of offering con- 
 gratulations to the French people upon their recent successful 
 political revolution, resulting in the establishment of a repub- 
 lican form of government, the proposed organization of the 
 territorial government of Oregon, upon various subjects of 
 practical and scientific interest, and his incidental discussions 
 of the subject of slavery, were able, eloquent, and character- 
 istic. 
 
 The session of Congress in 1849 and 1850 brought with it 
 a most angry and menacing renewal of sectional agitation. 
 Previous events and innumerable indications of popular sen- 
 timent had clearly revealed to candid minds, everj^-where, that 
 the increasing sectional preponderance of the North, and its 
 growing hostility to slavery, portended results utterly ruinous 
 to the rights and institutions of the South. To the South it was 
 literally a question of vitality, to secure some competent check 
 upon the aggressive strength of the North. To maintain any 
 thing like a sectional balance, the South must necessarily se- 
 cure to her institutions, at least, a fair share of the common 
 domain to be hereafter created into States. The immense terri- 
 torial acquisitions resulting from the Mexican war were now 
 the subjects of controversy. After a contest, protracted through 
 several months, and eliciting the most violent exhibitions of 
 sectional feeling, a plan of adjustment, under the auspices 
 chiefly of Henry Clay, whose fatal gift was to preserve, for 
 a time, the peace of the country by the concession of the most 
 precious and vital rights of his section to an insolent and in- 
 
COMPROMISE OF 1850. 77 
 
 satiate fanaticism, was finally reached. This settlement, known, 
 by way of distinction, as the " Compromise of 1850," averting 
 for the time the dangers of disunion and civil war, met the 
 approval of the advocates of expediency, but was opposed, with 
 heroic pertinacity, by Mr. Davis and his associates of the States' 
 Rights party. They saw the hollowness of its pretended just- 
 ice, its utter worthlessness as a guarantee to the South, and 
 sought to defeat it — first in Congress, and afterwards by the 
 popular voice. But the sentiment of attachment to the Union 
 triumphed over every consideration of interest, principle, even 
 security, and the snare succeeded. Again the South receded, 
 again received the stone instead of the askcd-for loaf, and again 
 did she compromise her most sacred rights and dearest interests, 
 receiving, in return, the reluctant and insincere guarantee of 
 the recovery of her stolen slaves. ^ 
 
 The folly of the South in assenting to this adjustment is 
 now obvious to the dullest understanding, and subsequent 
 events were swift to vindicate the wisdom, patriotism, and 
 foresight of Mr. Davis and those who sustained him in oppo- 
 sition to the much- vaunted Union -saving compromise. Yet, 
 they were no more disunionists in 1850 than rebels and trai- 
 tors in 1861. The charge of disunionism was freely iterated 
 against them, and not without effect, even in their own section, 
 where the sentimental attachment to the Union was stronger, 
 just as its sacrifices in behalf of the Union were greater, than 
 those of the North. Jefferson Davis never was a disunionist, 
 not even in his subsequent approval of secession, in the sense 
 of a wanton and treasonable disposition to sever the bonds of 
 that association of co-equal sovereignties which the founders 
 of the Federal Government bequeathed to their posterity. 
 
 His action, at all times, has been thoroughly consistent with 
 
78 JAhK OF JKFFKKWl^N 1>AVJS. 
 
 his declared opinions, and with the earnest attachment to the 
 Union, avowed in his congressional speeches and in his public 
 addresses every-where. In 1850 and in 1861 his course was 
 the logical sequence of his opinions, maintained and asserted 
 from his introduction to public life. To save the Union, upon 
 the only basis upon which it could rest as a guarantee of liberty, 
 — the basis of absolute equality among the States; to blend 
 Federal power and States' Rights, was the grand, paramount 
 object to which all his aspirations and all his investigations 
 of political science were directed. Repudiating the power of 
 a State to nullify an act of Congress, and yet not surrender 
 its normal relations as a member of the Union, he always as- 
 serted the right of secession, in the last resort, as an original, 
 inherent, and vital attribute of State Sovereignty. The Fed- 
 eral Government, to his mind, was a mere agent of the States, 
 created by them for a few general and intestate purposes, but 
 having in it no principle subversive of the paramount sover- 
 eignty of the States. Rapidly extending its power by enact- 
 ments of Congress and judicial constructions, he foresaw, and 
 sought to counteract, its tendency to obliterate all State indi- 
 viduality, and ultimately absorb into its own keeping the 
 liberties of the people. With dread and indignation, he con- 
 templated its progress towards that monstrum horrendum, a 
 consolidated democracy — the Union of to-day, in which we 
 see that the will of the majority is the sole measure of its 
 powers. 
 
 Such was his consistency, and such his sagacity, as vindi- 
 cated in the light of subsequent events, and patent to the eyes 
 of the world to-day. Who can now doubt which was the 
 better and more logical theory ? Clay said : " I owe allegiance 
 to two sovereignties, and only two : one is to the sovereignty 
 
DAVIS' iDEAT. UNION. 79 
 
 of this Union, and the other is to the sovereignty of the State 
 of Kentucky." Thus he held to the paradox of an impenimi 
 in hnperio, that obvious absurdity in our system of govern- 
 ment, a divided sovereignty. In his ardent Unionism, the 
 great exponent of expediency disavowed allegiance to the 
 South, though still holding to his allegiance to Kentucky. 
 But suppose Kentucky asserts her sovereignty, and chooses 
 to unite with the South, what, then, becomes of State Sover- 
 eignty and State allegiance? Just here was the hiatus in Clay's 
 logic, and, closely pressed by Davis, he emphatically declared 
 his first allegiance to the Union as the supreme authority ; and 
 the State Sovereignty of Clay's conception was seen to be as 
 intangible and unreal as the " baseless fabric of a vision." 
 
 Far more fair in its semblance, noble in its proportions, and 
 beautiful in its harmonies, was the ideal of Davis. In his 
 speech on the compromise measures, July 31, 1850, he said: 
 
 "Give to each section of the Union justice; give to every citi- 
 zen of the United States his rights as guaranteed by the Consti- 
 tution ; leave this Confederacy to rest upon that basis from which 
 it arose — the fraternal feelings of the people — and I, for one, have 
 no fear of its perpetuity; none that it will not survive beyond the 
 limits of human speculation, expanding and hardening with the 
 lapse of time, to extend its blessings to ages unnumbered, and a 
 people innumerable; to include within its empire all the useful 
 products of the earth, and exemplify the capacity of a confeder- 
 acy, with general, well-defined powers, to extend illimitably with- 
 out impairing its harmony or its strength." 
 
 The grounds of Mr. Davis' opposition to the so-called " Com- 
 promise" programme of ISIr. Clay were far otherwise than a 
 factious and impracticable hostility to an amicable adjustment 
 
80 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAYIS. 
 
 of sectional differences. He conscientiously doubted the dis- 
 position of the North to abstain from all future interference 
 with Southern institutions, and he detected and exposed the 
 utter want of ejfficacy of the compromise measures as an as- 
 surance of protection against future aggression. He abhorred 
 the substitution of expediency for principle ; could see no com- 
 pronhse where one side simply surrendered what the other had 
 no right to demand, and correctly estimated this settlement, 
 like those which had preceded it, as but an invitation to still 
 more incolerable exactions by an implacable sectional majority. 
 rHiile discussing, in private conversation with Mr. Clay, the 
 merits of Mr. Webster's memorable speech of the 7th of 
 March, 1850, a few days after its delivery, he briefly, but 
 sufficiently defined his position. "Come," said Mr. Clay, 
 "my young friend; join us in these measures of pacification. 
 Let us rally Congress and the people to their support, and 
 they will assure to the country thirty years of peace. By 
 that time" (turning to John M. Berrien, who was a party to 
 the conversation) "you and I will be under the sod, and my 
 young friend may then have trouble again." "No," said 
 Davis, "I can not consent to transfer to posterity a question 
 which is as much ours as theirs, when it is evident that the 
 sectional inequality, as it will be greater then than now, will 
 render hopeless the attainment of justice." 
 
 His clear, penetrating glance discovered, under the guise of 
 a friendly and pacific purpose, the insidious presence so mis- 
 chievous to Southern interests, just as George Mason, more 
 than fifty years before, had seen the "poison under the wing 
 of the Federal Constitution." "While the bill for the organ- 
 ization of the Territory of New Mexico was pending, the vig- 
 ilance and sagacity of Mr. Davis elicited the most flattering 
 
HIS OPPOSITION TO THE COMPROMISE. 81 
 
 commendation from his Southern associates. In this bill there 
 was a general grant, in loose and ambiguous phrascolor"'', of 
 legislative power, with a reservation that no law should be 
 passed " in respect to African slavery." Strangely enough, this 
 provision, though obviously involving an inhibition against 
 the enactment of laws for the protection of Southern property, 
 escaped general detection. . Mr. Davis promptly exposed its 
 pur2)oso, and offered an amendment, striking out the restraint 
 against legislation " in respect to African slavery," and pro- 
 hibiting the enactment of any law interfering " with those 
 rights of property growing out of the institution of African 
 slavery as it exists in any of the States of this Union." To 
 meet the concurrence of other Senators, the amendment was 
 variously modified, until, as explained by Mr. Davis, it em- 
 bodied "the general proposition that the Territorial Legisla- 
 ture should not be prevented from passing the laws necessary 
 for the protection of the rights of property of every kind 
 Avhich might be legally and constitutionally held in that ter- 
 ritory." It is needless to say that so just a proposition, 
 affording equal protection to Southern with ^Northern insti- 
 tutions, was defeated. 
 
 While there was little in INIr. Clay's plan of pacification to 
 recommend it to Southern support, beyond the merely tempo- 
 rary staving off of a dissolution of the Union and civil war, 
 it embodied propositions utterly incompatible with the security 
 of the South. Mr. Davis especially and persistently com- 
 bated its provision for the abolition of the slave-trade in the 
 District of Columbia, and tlip concession that slavery did not 
 legally exist in the newly-acquired territory. His position 
 upon the general issues involved can not be more clearly and 
 
 forcibly stated than in his own language : 
 6 
 
•f 
 
 82 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 " But, sir, we are called upon to receive this as a measure of 
 compromise ! — as a measure in which we of the minority are to 
 receive something. A measure of compromise! I look upon it as 
 a modest mode of taking that, the claim to which has been more 
 boldly asserted by others ; and that I may be understood upon 
 this question, and that my position may go forth to the country in 
 the same columns that convey the sentiments of the Senator from 
 Kentucky, I here assert that never will I take less than the Mis- 
 souri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean, with specific right to 
 hold slaves in the territory below that line; and that before such 
 territories are admitted into the Union as States, slaves may be 
 taken there from any of the United States, at the option of the 
 owners. I can never consent to give additional power to a ma- 
 jority CO commit further aggression upon the minority in this 
 Union ; and I will never consent to any proposition which will 
 have such a tendency without a full guarantee or counteracting 
 measure is connected with it." 
 
 The parliamentary annals of the Union embrace no period 
 more prolific of grand intellectual efforts than the debates in- 
 cident to this gigantic struggle. The prominence of Mr. Da- 
 vis, with his extreme ardor in behalf of the rights and interests 
 of his section, brought him constantly into conflict with the 
 most eminent leaders of both the great political parties, who 
 had cordially agreed to ignore all minor issues and unite in 
 the paramount jjurpose of saving the Union. Ca:=s, Douglas, 
 Bright, Dickinson, and King, earnestly cooperated with Clav, 
 Webster, and other Whig champions, in the advocacy of the 
 measures of compromise. That Davis, younger In years and 
 experience than most of these distinguished men, amply sus- 
 tained his honorable and responsible role as the foremost cham- 
 pion of the South, contemporary public opinion and the Con- 
 
MR. clay's regard FOR DAVIS. 83 
 
 gressional records give abundant testimony. The great com- 
 proraise chieftain, between whom and Davis occurred such 
 obstinate and protracted encountei's in debate, delighted to 
 testify his respect for the talents and intrepidity of his " young 
 friend," which was his habitual salutation to Davis. Despite 
 the pronounced antagonism between them, on all measures of 
 public policy, and their comparatively brief acquaintance, Mr. 
 Clay repeatedly evinced, in a most touching manner, his warm 
 regard for one who had been tlic compunion-in-arms and cher- 
 ished friend of a noble son,* who lost his life on the same 
 field, upon which Davis won such deathless distinction. "My 
 poor boy,'' were his words to the latter, upon his return from 
 Mexico, "usually occupied about one-half of his letters home 
 in praising you." A still more touching incident, illustrative 
 of his friendly regard, at the moment not understood by those 
 present, occurred, in the heat of discussion during the exciting 
 period, which we have had under consideration. Replying to 
 Davis, said Mr. Clay : " My friend from Mississippi — and I 
 trust tliat he will permit me to call him my friend, for between 
 ys there is a tie, the nature of which we both well understand." 
 At this moment the utterance of the aged statesman became 
 tremulous with emotion, and, bowing his head, his eyes w'ere 
 seen to fill with tears. This friendship was warmly recipro- 
 cated by Mr. Davis, and its recollections are among those the 
 most highly-cherished of his public life. 
 
 With the defeat of those who had opposed the compromise, 
 terminated, for the present, Southern resistance in Congress, 
 though it did not for an instant check Northern aggression. 
 Yet many prominent public characters at the South, and, as the 
 
 * Henry Clay, Jr., a graduate of West Point, and at the time of his 
 death, Lieutenant-Colonel of volunteers. He fell at Bucna Vista. 
 
84 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 sequel demonstrated, indorsed by popular sentiment, avowed 
 themselves fully satisfied with a mere show of triumph and 
 pretense of justice — a few paltry concessions, not worth the 
 parchment upon which they were written. In the meantime, 
 upon another arena, Mr. Davis entered upon a gallant strug- 
 gle, in opposition to a policy from which he foresaw and pre- 
 dicted a fruitful yield of disaster in the future. 
 
THE COMPEOMLSE BEFORE THE PEOrLE. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 OPPOSITION TO THE COMPROMISE IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI — DAVIS 
 A CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR — HIS DEFEAT REALLY A PERSONAL TRIU5IPH — 
 IN RETIREJIENT, SUPPORTS GENERAL PIERCE's ELECTION — DECLINES AN AP- 
 POINTMENT IN Pierce's cabinet, but subsequently accepts secretary- 
 ship OP war — REMARKABLE UNITY OP PIERCE's ADMINISTRATION, AND 
 HIGH CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE — DAVIS AS SECRETARY OF WAR — KAN- 
 SAS-NEBRASKA BILL AND THE EXCITEMENT WHICH FOLLOWED — DAVIS AGAIN 
 ELECTED TO THE SENATE — SPEECHES AT PASS CHRISTIAN AND OTHER POINTS 
 WHILE ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON. 
 
 ~|3UT, though the battle had been fought and won in Con- 
 -*-' gress, and it was evident, at an early date, that the weight 
 of great names in favor of the Compromise, aided by the ever- 
 timid counsels of capital and commerce, would command for 
 that measure the overwhelming support of the country, the 
 States' Rights men were resolved upon a test of popular senti- 
 ment. Accordingly, in South Carolina and Mississippi, States 
 at all times the most advanced in Southern feeling, the oppo- 
 nents of the Compromise organized, as did its friends also. 
 The issue, though substantially the same, was presented in a 
 somewhat different form in these two States. 
 
 In South Carolina, where public sentiment was always sin- 
 gularly unanimous, upon all questions affecting the honor and 
 interests of the South, and in entire accord as to the mode 
 and measure of redress for the grievances of the States, the 
 propriety of resistance was a foregone conclusion. The only 
 
86 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 question was, whether South Carolina should act separately, 
 or await the cooperation of other Southern States. The j^arty 
 of cooperation triumphed in the election of members to a State 
 convention, by the decisive popular majority of seven thousand 
 votes. 
 
 In Mississippi the issue was one of resistance or acquiescence. 
 The States' Rights, or resistance party, embraced four-fifths of 
 the Democracy of the State and a small accession of States' 
 Rights Whigs ; while the Union, or Compromise party, was 
 composed of the Clay Whigs and a fraction of the Democracy. 
 
 The Legislature provided an election for members of a State 
 convention to consider the subject of Federal aggressions, to 
 be held in September, 1851, and, in the ensuing November the 
 regular election of Governor occurred. Much interest centred 
 upon the gubernatorial contest, and the State was for months 
 previous to the election the scene of great excitement. Gen- 
 eral John A. Quitman, one of the most distinguished officers 
 of the army, daring the INIexican war, a man of the loftiest 
 character, a reliable statesman, and sterling patriot, was nomi- 
 nated by the States' Rights Convention. Mr. Henry S. Foote, 
 then a Senator from Mississippi, and an active supporter of 
 the Compromise measures, was the candidate of the Union 
 party. While an exceedingly animated canvass between these 
 candidates was still in progress, the election for members of 
 the convention resulted in an aggregate majority of seven 
 thousand five hundred votes for the Union candidates. Gen- 
 eral Quitman, disappointed by such an unexpected and deci- 
 sive exhibition of public sentiment, and viewing it as the 
 forerunner of the result of the gubernatorial election in No- 
 vember, withdrcAV from the contest. 
 
 Mr. Davis, who had already been elected for a second term 
 
CANDIDATE FOR COV HKNOUSiriP. 87 
 
 t 
 
 to the Senate, was now looked to as almost the sole depend- 
 ence of the States' Rights men, and they summoned him to 
 take the field as the adversary of ^Ir. Foote. There was little 
 inducement, had he consulted selfish considerations, to relin- 
 quish a high position, already secured, and become the leader 
 of a forlorn hope. Though greatly enfeebled in health, and 
 at that time an acute sufferer, he accepted the nomination. 
 His sense of duty and devotion to his principles triumphed 
 even over his physical infirmities, and, resigning his seat in 
 the Senate, he entered upon the canvass. 
 
 The result was, as had been foi-cscen, the defeat of Mr. Da- 
 vis. Mr. Foote, a man of more than average ability, and of 
 varied and extensive attainments, whose excessive garrulity and 
 total want of discretion disqualified him for usefulness as a 
 member of a legislative bod}'-, or for any practical end of 
 statesmanship, Avas, nevertheless, an adroit party tactician. 
 "With great dexterity he had conducted the canvass with Gen- 
 eral Quitman, by skillfully evading the real issue, introducing 
 side questions, and thus breaking the force of the plain and 
 statesman-like arguments of his more open and less dexterous 
 adversary. When Mr. Davis entered the field, under all the 
 disadvantages to which we have alluded, the election of Foote 
 was almost universally conceded. Had the canvass lasted a 
 few weeks, however, the result, in all probability, would have 
 been different. The popularity of Mr. Davis was indicated 
 by the paltry majority (nine hundred and ninety-nine votes) 
 given against him, as compared with the Union majority at 
 the election in September, for members of the convention. 
 Under all the circumstances, his friends rightly viewed it as a 
 personal triumph, and he emerged from the contest with in-, 
 creased reputation and public regard. 
 
05 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The results of these appeals to popular judgment were 
 scarcely less decisive, in favor of the Compromise, than had 
 been its congressional victory. It was evident that the 
 Southern people were yet far from being ready for organized 
 and practical resistance, and were not likely to be, until some 
 flagrant outrage should arouse their resentment. 
 
 Mr. Davis was now in retirement, and, though abiding the 
 decision of Mississippi, he was yet avowedly determined to 
 devote his energies to the efficient organization of the States' 
 Rights party for future struggles. Yet nothing was farther 
 from his purpose than a factious agitation. His aim was to 
 secure for the States' Rights principle a moral and numerical 
 support in the ranks of the Democracy, which should enable 
 its friends to wield an appropriate influence upon the policy 
 of that party. He contemplated no organization outside of 
 the Democracy, for the promotion of disunionism jjer se ; and, 
 in the Presidential canvass of 1852, separated himself from 
 many of his closest personal and political friends, who had 
 nominated the Presidential ticket of Troup and Quitman, 
 upon the distinctive platform of States' Rights and separa- 
 tion. 
 
 The nomination of Franklin Pierce, upon the Baltimore plat- 
 form, met his cordial approbation, and received his active sup- 
 port. With General Pierce, Mr. Davis held the most friendly 
 relations, and in his constitutional opinions he had entire con- 
 fidence. His support of the platform was quite as consist ': 
 as his advocacy of the nominee. Both indorsed, with em- 
 phasis, the Compromise, which he had opposed, but which Mis- 
 sissippi had ratified, and both avowed their acceptance of it, 
 as a finality, beyond which there was to be no farther agitation 
 of the slavery question. In Mississippi, Louisiana, and Ten- 
 
SECRETARY OF WAR. 89 
 
 nessee he participated actively in the canvass, and rendered 
 most efficient service to his party, especially in the two latter 
 States. 
 
 General Pierce indicated his estimate of Davis, by a prompt 
 tender of a position in his Cabinet. Considering himself com- 
 mitted to the fortunes of his principles in Mississippi, he pre- 
 ferred to "remain and fight the issue out there," and reluc- 
 tantly declined. Subsequently the President-elect addressed 
 him a letter expressing a desire that, upon personal grounds 
 at least, Mr. Davis should be present at his inauguration. 
 After he had reached Washington the tender of a Cabinet ap- 
 pointment was repeated. The obvious advantages to the States' 
 Eights party of representation in the Government, an argu- 
 ment earnestly urged upon him by prominent Southern states- 
 men, at length overcame his personal preference, and he ac- 
 cepted the position of Secretary of War. 
 
 With the policy of President Pierce's administration, Secre- 
 tar)^ Davis was, of course, fully identified. Whatever of in- 
 fluence and sympathy he could command, were employed in 
 promoting its success, and between the President and himself 
 there was an uninterrupted harmony of personal and official 
 intercourse. Indeed the glory of this administration and the 
 explanation of its title to that high award which it earned 
 from impartial criticism, for its courageous pursuit of an up- 
 right, constitutional policy, was the characteristic unity which 
 j^' '^vailed between its head and his advisers. During the four 
 years of its existence the Cabinet of President Pierce continued 
 unchanged, at its close the head of each department surrender- 
 ing the seals of office which he had received at its inaugur- 
 ation. The history of no other administration is adorned with 
 such an instance of cordial and unbroken cooperation, and the 
 
90 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 fact is equally creditable to the sagacity of General Pierce in 
 the selection of his advisers, and his consummate tact in the 
 reconciliation of those antagonisms, which are hardly to be 
 avoided in the operations of the complicated machinery of 
 Government. 
 
 A common statement of its enemies, that the administration 
 must eventually break down by disorganization, in consequence 
 of the utterly discordant elements which composed it, was never 
 realized. At one time Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of State, was 
 the wily Macchiavelli, against whose intrigues the rest ^of the 
 Cabinet was in arms, while Mr. Davis was charged with play- 
 ing alternately the roles of Richelieu and Marplot. 
 
 Of all American executives, Franklin Pierce is preemi- 
 nently entitled to the designation of the constitutional Presi- 
 dent. The great covenant of American liberty, so ruthlessly 
 despoiled in these degenerate days, when opportunity and pre- 
 text are the sufficient justification of flagrant violations of 
 justice, was the guide whose precepts he followed without de- 
 viation. His Northern birth and training did not swerve from 
 his obligations to extend an equal protection to the interests 
 of other sections, the patriotic executive, Avhom posterity will 
 delight to honor, for his wisdom, purity, and impartiality, just 
 in proportion as those qualities provoke the clamor of the 
 dominant ignorance and passion of to-day. 
 
 In a Cabinet, noted for its ability, of which "William L. 
 Marcy was the Premier, and Caleb Cushing the Attorney- 
 General, Secretary Davis occupied a position worthy of his 
 abilities and his previous reputation, and peculiarly gratifying 
 to his military tastes. It is no disparagement of his associates 
 to say that his strongly-marked character commanded a con- 
 stant and emphatic recognition in the policy of the Government. 
 
SKCUKJ-AUV or WAV.. 91 
 
 Under his control the department of war was greatly ad- 
 vanced in dignity and -importance, receiving a character far 
 more distinctive and independent of other branches of the 
 Government than it had previously claimed. He infused into 
 all its operations an energy till then unknown, introducing im- 
 provements so extensive and comprehensive as to occasion ap- 
 prehension of an almost too powerful and independent system 
 of military organization. It is a fact univ^ersally conceded 
 that his administration of the War Office was incomparably 
 superior to that of any official w^ho has filled that position — 
 contributing more to the promotion of efficiency in the armv, 
 to the advancement of those great national establishments so 
 vital to the security of the nation, and to the systematic, prac- 
 tical management of the details of the office. In reviewing 
 Mr. Davis' conduct of this important department of the Gov- 
 ernment, the splendid improvements Avhich he inaugurated, his 
 earnest and. unceasing labors in behalf of the efficiency of the 
 army, it is impossible to overestimate his eminent services to 
 the Union, which even at that time his traducers and those of 
 the South would j)retend he was plotting to destroy. In the 
 Cabinet, as in the Senate, there was no measure of national ad- 
 vantage to which he did not give his cordial support, no great 
 national institution which he would not have fostered with 
 generous and timely sympathy; nothing to which he was not 
 zealously committed, promising to redound to the glory, pros- 
 perity, and perpetuity of that Union, in whose service he had 
 been trained, whose uniform he had proudly worn, and beneath 
 whose banner he had braved a soldier's death. 
 
 Secretary Davis made many recommendations contemplat- 
 ing radical alterations in the military system of the Union. 
 One of his first measures was a recommendation for the thor- 
 
92 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 ough revision of the army regulations. He opposed the plac- 
 ing of officers, at an early period of service, permanently upon 
 the staff, and advocated a system, which, he contended, would 
 improve the discipline and efficiency of officers, " whereby the 
 right of command should follow rank by one certain rule." 
 The increase of the medical corps ; the introduction of camels ; 
 the introduction of the light infantry or rifle system of tac- 
 tics, rifled muskets, and the Minie-ball were all measures ad- 
 vocated by Secretary Davis, and discussed in his official papers 
 with a force and intelligence that make them highly valuable 
 to the military student. He urged a thorough exploration of 
 the Western frontier, and important changes in the arrange- 
 ment of defenses against the Indians, demonstrating the ineffi- 
 ciency of the system of small forts for the purposes of war 
 with the savages. To obviate, in a measure, the expense, and 
 almost useless trouble, of locating military posts in advance 
 of settlement, he suggested the plan of maintaining large gar- 
 risons at certain points, situated favorably for obtaining sup- 
 plies and accessible by steamboat or railway. From these 
 posts strong detachments could be supplied and equipped for 
 service in the Indian country. His efforts were most strenu- 
 ous to obtain an increase of pay to officers of the army, and 
 pensions to the widows and orphans of officers and men, upon 
 a basis similar to that of the navy. 
 
 During the Crimean war. Secretary Davis sent a commis- 
 sion, of which Major-General McClellan, then a captain of 
 cavalry, was a member, to study and report upon the science 
 of war and the condition of European armies, as illustrated in 
 the operations incident to that struggle. At his suggestion 
 four new regiments — two of cavalry — were added to the army, 
 and numerous appropriations made for tlie construction of new 
 
EEVIVAL OF AGITATION. 93 
 
 forts, improvements in small arms, and the accumulation of 
 munitions of war. 
 
 The Presidential term of Pierce expired on the 4th of 
 March, 1857, and with it terminated the connection of Mr. 
 Davis with the executive branch of the Government. He re- 
 tired with the hearty respect of his associates, and in the 
 enjoyment of the most confiding friendship with the late 
 head of the Government, a feeling which is cherished by 
 both, with unabated warmth, at this day. All parties con- 
 curred in pronouncing Mr. Davis' conduct of his department 
 successful, able, and brilliant, and in the midst of the tide 
 of misrepresentation, with which, during and since the war, 
 it has been sought to overwhelm his reputation, the least 
 candid of his accusers have been compelled to this reluctant 
 confession. 
 
 Incidental to the late administration, but by no means 
 traceable to its influence, had been legislation by Congress of 
 a most important character, which was to give a powerful im- 
 pulse to agencies long tending to the destruction of the Union. 
 The election of Pierce had been carried with a unanimity un- 
 precedented, upon the distinct pledge of the acceptance of the 
 Compromise as a finality. The country, for months subse- 
 quently, reposed in profound quiet, produced by its confidence 
 in aai approaching season of unequaled prosperity, and exempt 
 from all danger of political agitation. This hallucination was 
 destined to be speedily and rudely dispelled by events, which 
 afford striking evidence of how completely the peace and hap- 
 piness of the American people have always been at the mercy 
 of aspiring and unscrupulous demagogues. Mr. Stephen A. 
 
94 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 Douglas must ever be held, equally by both sections, respon- 
 sible for the disastrous agitation, which followed his introduc- 
 tion of certain measures, under the j^i'ctense of a sentimental 
 justice, or a concession of principle to the South, but in reality 
 prompted by his personal ambition, and which greatly aided 
 to precipitate the catastrophe of disunion. 
 
 Upon the application of the Territory of Nebraska for ad- 
 mission into the Union, Senator Douglas, from the Committee 
 on Territories, submitted a bill creating the two Territories of 
 Nebraska and Kansas, and affirming the supersession of the 
 Missouri restriction of 1820, which prohibited slavery north 
 of 36° 30', by the Compromise of 1850. It declared the Mis- 
 souri restriction inconsistent with the principle of non-inter- 
 vention by Congress with territorial affairs, which had been 
 adopted in the settlement of 1850, and therefore inoperative. 
 
 This bill was apparently a mere concession of principle to 
 the South, not likely to be of much practical value, but still 
 gratifying, as it gave to her citizens the right to carry their 
 property into districts from which it had been hitherto in- 
 hibited. Passing both houses of Congress, in 1854, it was 
 approved by the Pierce administration,* sanctioned by the 
 
 * The repeal of the Missouri Compromise has been commonly alluded 
 to as the special and leading measure of the Pierce administration. It 
 was, in reality, not an administration measure. The Avell-known cor- 
 diality of Mr. Davis' relations with President Pierce induced a number 
 of Senators to call upon Mr. Davis, on the Sunday morning previous to 
 the introduction of the Kansas-Xebraska Bill, and ask his aid in securing 
 them the pledge of the President's approval. They represented the meas- 
 ure as contemplating merely the assertion of the rights of property, slavery 
 included, in the Territories. Mr. Davis objected, at first, to an interrup- 
 tion of the President, on the Sabbath, for such a purpose, but finally 
 yielded. The President promptly signified his approbation of a measure 
 contemplating such a purpose. It is .not necessary to say that the legis- 
 lation of Congress embraced a far greater scope than that indicated. The 
 
ELECTED UNITED STATES SENATOR. 95 
 
 Democracy generally, and greeted by the South as a triumph. 
 It was not imagined that a victory, so purely sentimental 
 and intangible, could be accepted by the North, as a pretext 
 for violent eruptions of sectional jealousy, and least of all did 
 the South believe its author capable of the subsequent duplic- 
 ity with which, by specious arguments and verbal ingenuity, 
 he claimed for the measure, a construction far more insidious, 
 but not less fatal to her interests, than the designs of pro- 
 claimed Abolitionists. The immediate result was a tempest 
 of excitement in the Northern States, in the midst of which 
 the so-called Republican party, for the first time, appeared as 
 a formidable contestant in political struggles, and defeated the 
 Democracy in almost every State election. The latter, with 
 extreme difficulty, elected Mr. Buchanan to the Presidency two 
 years afterwards. 
 
 In the meantime, while his term of office as Secretary of 
 War was still unexpired, Mr. Davis had been elected, by the 
 Legislature of Mississippi, to the Senate, for the term beginning 
 March 4, 1857. On his return home, he was received by the 
 Democracy of the State with distinguished honors. Dinners, 
 receptions, and public entertainments of various kinds were 
 tendered him; and, during the summer and autumn, previous 
 to his departure for Washington, he addressed numerous large 
 popular gatherings with his accustomed force and boldness 
 upon pending issues. These addresses commanded universal 
 attention, and were highly commended for their able, dispas- 
 sionate, and statesman-like character. 
 
 administration indorsed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in full, because the 
 principle Avas correct, thou^ih its assertion then was wholly unnecessary, 
 unprofitable, and likely to lead to mischievous results. This was the real 
 connection of the Pierce administration with a measure for whose conse- 
 quences the ambition of Judge Douglas was almost solely responsible. 
 
96 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 His speech at Pass Christian, while on his journey to Wash- 
 ington, was a masterly and eloquent review of the condition 
 of the country, with its causes and remedies. He attributed 
 the national difficulties chiefly to the puritanical intolerance 
 and growing disregard of constitutional obligations of the 
 North. These influences seriously menaced the safety of the 
 Union, for which he had no hope, unless in the event of a 
 reaction in Northern sentiment, or of such resolute action by 
 a united South as should compel her enemies to respect their 
 constitutional duties. To the latter policy he looked as the 
 best guarantee of the security of the South and the preserva- 
 tion of the Union. Interference by one State with the in- 
 stitutions of another could not, under any circumstances, be 
 tolerated, even though resistance should eventually result in 
 a dissolution of the Union. The latter event was possible — 
 indeed, might become necessary — but should never be under- 
 taken save in the last extremity. He would not disguise the 
 profound emotion with which he contemplated the possibility 
 of disunion. The fondest reminiscences of his life w^ere asso- 
 ciated with the Union, into whose military service, while yet 
 a boy, he had entered. In his matured manhood he had fol- 
 lowed its flag to victory; had seen its graceful folds Avave 
 in the peaceful pageant, and, again, its colors conspicuous 
 amid the triumphs of the battle-field; he had seen that flag 
 in the East, brightened by the sun at its rising, and, in the 
 West, gilded by his declining rays — and the tearing of one 
 star from its azure field would be to him as would the loss of 
 a child to a bereaved parent. 
 
 This speech — one of the most eloquent he has ever made — 
 was received by his audience with unbounded enthusiasm, and 
 was approvingly noticed by the press of both sections. 
 
VIEWS UPOX IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. 97. 
 
 At Mississippi City he delivered an address in explanation 
 of his personal course, and in vindication of the admini.-^tra- 
 tion of which he had lately been a member. He had obeyed 
 the \vill of Mississippi, respecting the legislation of 1850, 
 though against his convictions, and, in the present disorders 
 in Kansas, he saw the fruits of the unwise substitution of 
 expediency for principle. Of President Pierce he could speak 
 only in terras of eulogy, defended his vetoes of bills '*for in- 
 ternal improvements and eleemosynary purposes," depicting, 
 in passages of rare and fervent eloquence, his heroic adherence 
 to the Constitution, elevated patriotism, and distinguished vir- 
 tues. Contrasting the conduct of the Fillmore and Pierce 
 administrations concerning the Cuban question, .he avowed 
 his belief that Cuba would then be in possession of the United 
 States had Congress sustained General Pierce in his prompt 
 and decided suggestions as to the Black Warrior difficulty. 
 
 Mr. Davis expressed his approbation of the course pursued 
 by the late administration with reference to Nicaragua. " Un- 
 lawful expeditions" should be suppressed, though he should 
 rejoice at the establishment of American institutions in Cen- 
 tral America, and maintained the right of the United States 
 to a paramount influence in the affairs of the continent, with 
 which European interference should be, at all times, promptly 
 checked. 
 
 When the Thirty-fifth Congress assembled in December, 
 1857, the Kansas question had already developed a difficult 
 and critical phase. The rock upon which Mr. Buchanan's 
 administration was to split had been encountered, and the 
 wedge prepared, with which the Democratic party was des- 
 tined to be torn asunder. 
 7 
 
98 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER yi. 
 
 RETURN OF MR. DAVIS TO .THE SENATE — OPENING EVENTS OP MR. BUCHANAN's 
 
 ADMINISTRATION TRUE INTERPRETATION OP THE LEGISLATION OP 1854 
 
 SENATOR DOUGLAS THE INSTRUMENT OP DISORGANIZATION IN THE DEMO- 
 CRATIC PARTY HIS ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER AN ACCOMPLISHED DEM- 
 AGOGUE DAVIS AND DOUGLAS CONTRASTED BOTH REPRESENTATIVES OF 
 
 THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTIONS DOUGLAS AMBITION HIS COUP d'eTAT, AND 
 
 ITS RESULTS THE KANSAS QUESTION DOUGLAS TRIUMPHS OVER THE SOUTH 
 
 AND THE UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY LOST " SQUATTER SOVER- 
 EIGNTY" PROPERLY CHARACTERIZED DAVIs' COURSE IN THE KANSAS 
 
 STRUGGLE DEBATE WITH SENATOR FESSENDEN PEN-AND-INK SKETCH OF 
 
 MR. DAVIS AT THIS PERIOD TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS TO 
 
 THE SOUTH SHE RIGHTLY INTERPRETS THE3I MR. DAVIs' COURSE SUBSE- 
 QUENT TO THE KANSAS IMBROGLIO HIS DEBATES "mTH DOUGLAS TWO DIF- 
 FERENT SCHOOLS OF PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKING DAVIS THE LEADER OP THE 
 
 REGULAR DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS HIS RESOLUTIONS 
 
 HIS CONSISTENCY — COURSE AS TO GENERAL LEGISLATION VISITS THE NORTH 
 
 SPEAKS IN PORTLAND, BOSTON, NEW YORK, AND OTHER PLACES REPLY TO 
 
 AN IxVVITATION TO ATTEND THE WEBSTER BIRTH-DAY FESTIVAL MR. SEW- 
 
 ARD's announcement op the " IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT " MR. DAVIS BE- 
 FORE MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC STATE CONVENTION PROGRESS OF DISUNION 
 
 DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY — SPEECHES OF MR. DAVIS AT PORT- 
 LAND AND IN SENATE. 
 
 "E/TR. DAVIS returned to the Senate at a period marked 
 -*-"-*- by agitation, no less menacing to the Union than that 
 which had so seriously threatened it in 1850. His health at 
 this time was exceedingly infirm, and for several months he 
 was so much prostrated by his protracted suffering.s, that a 
 proper regard for the suggestions of prudence would have jus- 
 
RETURNS TO THE SENATE. 99 
 
 tified his entire abstinence from the labors and excitements of 
 this stormy period. Again and again, however, did his heroic 
 devotion carry him from his sick bed to the capitol, to engage 
 in the death-struggle of the South, with her leagued enemies, 
 for safety in the Union, which she was still loath to abandon, 
 even under the pressure of intolerable wrong. Frequently, 
 with attenuated frame and bandaged eyes, he was to be seen 
 in the Senate, at moments critical in the fierce sectional con- 
 flict; and at the final struggle upon the Kansas question, not 
 even the earnest admonitions of his physician, that to leave 
 his chamber would probably be followed by the most dan- 
 gerous results, were availing to induce his absence from the 
 scene. 
 
 The opening events of the first session of the Thirty-fifth 
 Congress, (the first incidental to the administration of Mr. 
 Buchanan,) were far from being auspicious of the continued 
 unity of the Democratic party, which, for several years past, 
 the intelligence of the country had correctly appreciated as an 
 essential condition to the preservation of the Union. 
 
 Mainly through the undivided support given him by the 
 South, Mr. Buchanan was elected upon the Cincinnati plat- 
 form of 1856, which was a re-affirmation of the cardinal tenets 
 of the Democratic faith, involving also emphatic approval of 
 the Kansas-Nebraska legislation two years previous. Not 
 until months after his inauguration were there any indications 
 of hostility to his administration within the ranks of his own 
 party. Nor had there been any avowed difference of construc- 
 tion as to the end and effect of the legislation of 1854. The 
 rare unanimity with which the South had been rallied to the 
 support of the Democracy was based upon the unreserved 
 admission, by all parties, that the Kansas-Nebraska act was 
 
100 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 designedly friendly in its spirit, at all events, to Southern in- 
 terests. Xo Southern statesman, for a moment, dreamed that 
 it was capable of an interpretation unfriendly to his section. 
 That the plain purpose of the bill was to remove the subject 
 of slavery outside the bounds of congressional discussion, and 
 to place it in the disposition of the States separately, and in 
 the Territories, when organizing for admission as States, was 
 regarded by the South as the leading vital principle which 
 challenged her enthusiastic support. Such, indeed, was the doc- 
 trine asserted by the entire Democratic party of the South, 
 enunciated by the administration, and tacitly approved by the 
 ^Northern Democracy. Very soon, however, after the meeting 
 of Congress, the action of Senator Douglas revealed him as the 
 instrument of disorganization in his party. To a proper un- 
 derstanding of his motives and conduct at this conjuncture, a 
 brief statement of his antecedents is essential. 
 
 Stephen A. Douglas was now in the meridian of life and 
 the full maturity of his unquestionably vigorous intellectual 
 powers. For twenty-five years he had been prominent in the 
 arena of politics, and as a member of Congress his course had 
 been so eminently politic and judicious as to make him a favor- 
 ite with the Democracy, both North and South. To an unex- 
 ampled degree his public life illustrated the combination of 
 those characteristics of the demagogue, a fertile ingenuity, facile 
 accommodation to circumstances, and wonderful gifts of the ad 
 captandum species of oratory, so captivating to the populace, 
 which in America peculiarly constitute the attributes of the 
 " rising man." Douglas was not wanting in noble and attrac- 
 tive qualities of manhood. His courage was undoubted, his 
 generosity was princely in its munificence to his personal 
 friends, and he frequently manifested a lofty magnanimity. In 
 
A CONTRAST — DAVIS AND DOr(;r,A.S. 101 
 
 his early youth, deprived of tlic advantages of fortune and jio- 
 sition, the discipline of his career ^vas not propitious to the 
 development of the higher qualities of statesmanship — with 
 Avhich, indeed, he was scantily endowed by nature. It is as 
 the accomplished politician, subtle, ready, fearless, and inde- 
 fatigable, that he must be remembered. In this latter charac- 
 ter he was unrivaled. 
 
 Kot less than Davis was Douglas a representative man, }'et 
 no two men were more essentially dissimilar, and no two lives 
 ever actuated by aspirations and instincts more unlike. Doug- 
 las was the representative of expediency — Davis the exponent 
 of principles. In his party associations Douglas would toler- 
 ate the largest latitude of individual opinion, while Davis was 
 always for a policy clearly defined and unmistakable; and 
 ujion a matter of vital principle, like Percy, would reluctantly 
 surrender even the "ninth part of a hair." To maintain the 
 united action of the Democratic party on election day, to de- 
 feat its opponents, to secure the rewards of success, Douglas 
 would allow a thousand different constructions of the party 
 creed by as many factions. Davis, on the other hand, would, 
 and eventually did, approve the dissolution of the party, when 
 it refused an open, manly enunciation of its faith. For mere 
 jiarty success Douglas cared every thing, and Davis nothing, 
 save as it ensured the triumph of Constitutional principles. 
 Both loved the Union and sought its perpetuity, but by differ- 
 ent methods; Douglas by never-ending compromises of a quar- 
 rel, which he should have known that the North would never 
 permit to be amicably settled ; by staving off and ignoring 
 issues which were to be solved only by being squarely met. 
 Davis, too, was not unwilling to compromise, but he wearied 
 of perpetual concession by the South, in the meanwhile the 
 
102 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Xorth continuing its hostility, both open and insidious, and 
 urged a settlement of all diiferences upon a basis of simple and 
 exact justice to both sections. 
 
 Douglas was preeminently the representative politician of 
 his section, and throughout his career was a favorite with that 
 boastful, bloated, and mongrel element, which is violently 
 called the "American people," and which is the ruling element 
 in elections in the Northern cities. In character and conduct 
 he embodied many of its materialistic and socialistic ideas, its 
 false conception of liberty, its pernicious dogmas of equality, 
 and not a little of its rowdyism. 
 
 Davis was the champion of the South, her civilization, 
 rights, honor, and dignity. He was the fitting and adequate 
 exponent of a civilization which rested upon an intellectual 
 and sesthetical development, upon lofty and generous senti- 
 ments of manhood, a dignified conservatism, and the proud 
 associations of ancestral distinction in the history of the Union. 
 Always the Senator in the sense of the ideal of dignity and 
 courtesy which is suggested by that title, he was also the gen- 
 tleman upon all occasions; never condescending to flatter or 
 soothe the mob, or to court popular favor, he lost none of that 
 polished and distinguished manner, in the presence of a " fierce 
 Democracie," which made him the ornament of the highest 
 school of oratory and statesmanship of his country. 
 
 The ambition of Douglas was unbounded. The recognized 
 leader, for several years, of the Northern Democracy, his many 
 fine personal qualities and courageous resistance of the ultra 
 Abolitionists secured for him a considerable number of sup- 
 porters in the Southern wing of that jiarty. The Presidency 
 was the goal of his ambition, and for twenty years his course 
 had been sedulously adjusted to the attainment of that most 
 
DOUGLAS' COUP d'eTAT. 103 
 
 coveted of prizes to the American politician. On repeated 
 occasions he had been flattered by a highly complimentary 
 vote in the nominating conventions of the Democracy. Hith- 
 erto he had been compelled to yield his pretensions in favor 
 of older members of his party or upon considerations of tem- 
 porary availability. It was evident, however, that in order to 
 be President, he must secure the nomination in 1860. The 
 continued ascendancy of the Democracy was no longer, as here- 
 tofore, a foregone conclusion, and, besides, there were others 
 equally aspiring and available. His Presidential aspirations 
 appeared, indeed, to be without hope or resource, save through 
 the agency of some adroit coup d'etat, by which the truculent 
 and dominant free-soil sentiment of the North, which he had 
 so much affronted by his bid for Southern support in the in- 
 troduction of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, could be conciliated. 
 In Illinois, his own State, the Abolition strength was alarm- 
 ingly on the increase, and to secure his return to the Senate 
 at the election to be held in 1858, an object of prime impor- 
 tance in the promotion of his more ambitious pretensions, he 
 did not scruple to assume a position, falsifying his previous 
 record, wantonly insulting and defiant to his Southern associ- 
 ates, and in bold antagonism to a Democratic administration. 
 The sequel of this rash and ill-judged course was the over- 
 throw of his own political fortunes, the disintegration of ins 
 party, and the attemjjted dissolution of the Union. 
 
 The earliest recommendations of Mr. Buchanan, respecting 
 the Kansas controversy, which, several months since, had de- 
 veloped in that Territory into a species of predatory warfore, 
 marked by deeds of violence and atrocity, between the. Abo- 
 lition and Pro-slavery parties, were signalized by a coalition 
 of the follwvers of Douy:las with the Abolitionists and other 
 
104 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 opponents of the administration. The speedy pacification of 
 the disorders in Kansas, by the prompt admission of that 
 Territory, was the condition essential to the success of ]\Ir. 
 Buchanan's entire poHcy. He accordingly recommended the 
 admission of Kansas into the Union, with the "Lecompton" 
 constitution, wliich had been adopted in September, 1857, by 
 the decisive vote of six thousand two hundred and twenty-six 
 in favor of that constitution, with slavery, and five hundred 
 and nine for it, without slavery. A rival instrument, adopted 
 bv an election notoriously held exclusively under the con- 
 trol of Abolitionists, prohibiting slavery, was likewise pre- 
 sented. 
 
 For months the controversy was waged in Congress between 
 the friends of the administration and its enemies, and finally 
 resulted in a practical triumph of the Free-soil principle. The 
 Anti-Lecompton coalition of Douglas and the Abolitionists, 
 aided by the defection of a few Southern members, success- 
 fully embarrassed the policy of the administration by defeat- 
 ing its recommendations, and eventually carried a measure 
 acceptable to Northern sentiments and interests. 
 
 Mr. Douglas thus triumphed over a Democratic adminis- 
 tration, at the same time giving a shock to the unity of the 
 Democratic party, from which it has never recovered, and 
 effectually neutralized its power as a breakwater of the Union 
 against the waves of sectional dispute. The alienation be- 
 tween himself and his former associates was destined never to 
 be adjusted, as indeed it never should have been, in considera- 
 tion of his inexcusable recreancy to the immemorial faith of 
 his party. Mr. Douglas simply abandoned the South, at the 
 very first moment when his aid was seriously demanded. 
 Nay, more; he carried with him a quiver of Parthian arrows, 
 
SQUATTER SOVEilKIGNTY. 105 
 
 wliich he discharged into her bosom at a most critical moment 
 in her unequal contest. 
 
 It is not to be denied that Mr. Douglas' new interpretation 
 of the Kansas-Xebraskii act was urged by himself and his ad- 
 vocates as having a merit not to be overlooked by the North, 
 in its suggestion of a method of restricting slavery, presenting 
 superior advantages. " Squatter sovereignty," as advocated by 
 Mr. Douglas, proposing the decision of the slavery question 
 by the people of the Territories, while yet unprepared to ask 
 admission as States, was far more eifectual in its plans against 
 slavery, and only less prompt and open, than the designs of 
 the Abolitionists. It would enable the " Emigrant Aid Socie- 
 ties," and imported janizaries of Abolition to exclude the insti- 
 tutions of tlie South from the Territories, the joint possessions 
 of the two sections, acquired by an enormously dispropor^ 
 tionate sacrifice on the part of the South, with a certainty not 
 to be realized, for years to come, perhaps, from the Abolition 
 policy of congressional prohibition.* According to Mr. Doug- 
 las' theory, the existence of slavery in all the Territories was 
 to depend upon the verdict of a few hundred settlers or 
 "squatters" upon the public lands. It practically conceded to 
 Northern interests and ideas every State to be hereafter ad- 
 mitted, and under the operation of such a policy it M'as not 
 difficult to anticipate the fate of slavery, at last even in the 
 States. 
 
 From the inception of tliis controversy until its close 'Slw 
 Davis was fully committed to the policy of Mr. Buchanan, 
 and his position was in perfect harmony with that of all the 
 leading statesmen of the South. Less prominent, perhaps, in 
 
 * Governor Wise, of Virginia, characterized "squatter sovereignty" as 
 a " short cut to all the ends of Black Republicanism." 
 
106 lAFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 debate, from his constant ill-health during the first session, than 
 at any other period of his public life, he was still zealous and 
 influential. 
 
 An interesting incident of the session was a discussion be- 
 tween Mr. Davis and Mr.. Fessenden, of Maine, a Senator 
 second only to Mr. Seward among Abolition leaders, in point 
 of intellect, and behind none in his truculent animosity to 
 Southern institutions. Reviewing the message of Mr. Buch- 
 anan with great severity, Fessenden took occasion to discuss 
 elaborately the slavery question, with all its incidental issues. 
 -Mr. Davis replied, not at great length, but with much force 
 and spirit. The discussion terminated with the following col- 
 loquy, which is interesting chiefly in its personal allusions: 
 
 " Mr. Fessenden Sir, I have avowed no dis- 
 union sentiments on this floor — neither here nor elsewhere. Can 
 the honorable gentleman from Mississippi say as much? 
 
 "Mr. Davis. Yes. 
 
 "Mr. Fessenden. I am glad to hear it, then. 
 
 " Mr. Davis. Yes. I have long sought for a respectable man 
 who would allege the contrary. 
 
 " 3Ir. Fessenden. I make no allegation. I asked if he could 
 say as much. I am glad to hear him say so, because I must say 
 to him that the newspapers have represented him as making a 
 speech in Mississippi, in which he said he came into General 
 Pierce's cabinet a disunion man. If he never made it, very well. 
 
 "Mr. Davis. I will thank you to produce that newspaper. 
 
 "Mr. Fessenden. I can not produce it, but I can produce an 
 extract from it in another paper. 
 
 " Mr. Davis. An extract ! then that falsifies the text. 
 
 " Mr. Fessenden. I am very glad to hear the Senator say so. 
 I made no accusation — I put the question to him. If he denies 
 
DEBATE AVITH SIR. FESSENDEN. 107 
 
 it, very well. I only say that, with all the force and energy with 
 which he denies it, so do I. The accusation never has been made 
 against me before. On what ground does the Senator now put 
 it? . . . 
 
 "Mr. Davis. Does the Senator ask me for an answer? 
 
 "Mr. Fessenden. Certainly, if the Senator feels disposed to 
 give one, 
 
 " Mr. Davis. If you ask me for an answer, it is easy. I said 
 your position was fruitful of such a result. I did not say you 
 avowed the object — nothing of the sort, but the reverse. . . . 
 
 "Mr. Fessenden. That is a matter of opinion, on which I 
 have a right to entertain my view as well as the Senator his. . . . 
 
 "Mr. Davis. Mr. President, I rise principally for the pur- 
 pose of saying that I do not know whence springs this habit of 
 talking about intimidation. I am not the first person toward 
 whom a reply has been made, that we are not to carry our ends 
 by intimidation. I try to intimidate nobody; I threaten nobody; 
 and I do not believe — let me say it once for all — that any body 
 is afraid of me — and I do not want any body to be afraid of me. 
 
 "Mr. Fessenden. I am. [Laughter.] 
 
 " Mr. Davis. I am sorry to hear it ; and if the Senator is 
 really so, I shall never speak to him in decided terms again. 
 
 "Mr. Fessenden. I speak of it only in an intellectual point 
 of view. [Laughter.] 
 
 "Mr. Davis. Then, sir, the Senator was in a Pickwickian 
 sense when he began ; there were no threats, no intimidations, 
 and he is just where he would have been if he had said nothing." 
 [Laughter.] .... 
 
 "While the Kansas question was pending in Congress, a 
 sketch of Mr. Davis, in connection with two other prominent 
 Southern Senators, whicli appeared in the correspondence of 
 a leading journal, was extensively copied in the newspapers 
 
108 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of the day. We extract that portion which relates specially 
 to Mr. Davis. The portrait is from the pen of one who had 
 no sympathy with his political views : 
 
 DAVIS, HUNTER, AND TOOMBS, 
 
 THE SOUTHERN TRIUMVIRATE. 
 
 [Correspondence of the Missouri Democrat.] 
 
 " Washington Ci;rT, January 21. 
 " Yesterday, when Hale was speaking, the right side of the cham- 
 ber was empty, (as it generally is during the delivery of an anti- 
 shxvery speech,) with the exception of a group of three who sat 
 near the centre of the vacant space. This remarkable group, which 
 wore the air if not the ensigns of power, authority, and public 
 care, was composed of Senators Davis, Hunter, and Toombs. They 
 were engaged in an earnest colloquy, tvhich, however, was foreign 
 to the argument Hale was elaborating ; for though the connection 
 of their words was broken before it reached the gallery, their 
 voices were distinctly audible, and gave signs of their abstrac- 
 tion. They were thinking aloud. If they had met together, 
 under the supervision of some artist gifted with the faculty of 
 illustrating history and character by attitude and expression, who 
 designed to paint them, in fresco, on the walls of the new Senate 
 chamber, the combination could not have been more appropriately 
 arranged than chance arranged it on this occasion. Toombs sits 
 among the opposition on the left, Hunter and Davis on the right; 
 and the fiict that the two first came to Davis' seat — the one gravi- 
 tating to it from a remote, the other from a near point — may be 
 held to indicate which of the three is the preponderating body in 
 the system, if preponderance there be; and whose figure should 
 occupy the foreground of the picture if any precedence is to be 
 accorded. Davis sat erect and composed ; Hunter, listening, rested 
 his head on his hand; and ToombSj inclining forward, was speaking 
 
A PEX-ANJ)-1NK SKKTCH. 109 
 
 vehemently. Their respective attitudes were no bad illustration 
 of their individuality. Davis impressed the spectator, who ob- 
 served the easy but authoritative bearing with which he put aside 
 or assented to Toomb's suggestions, with the notion of some slight 
 superiority, some hardly-acknowledged leadership ; and Hunter's 
 attentiveness and impassibility were characteristic of his nature, 
 for his profundity of intellect wears the guise of stolidity, and 
 his continuous industry that of inertia ; while Toomb's quick ut- 
 terance and restless head bespoke his nervous temperament and 
 activity of mind. But, though each is diflPerent from either of 
 the others, the three have several attributes in common. They 
 are equally eminent as statesmen and debaters; they are devoted 
 to the same cause; they are equals in rank, and rivals in ambi- 
 tion ; and they are about the same age, and none of them — let 
 young America take notice — wears either beard or mustache. I 
 come again to the traits which distinguish them from each other. 
 In face and form, Davis represents the Norman type with singu- 
 lar fidelity, if my conception of that type be correct. He is tall 
 and sinewy, with fair hair, gray eyes, which are clear rather than 
 bright, high forehead, straight nose, thin, compressed lips, and 
 pointed chin. His cheek bones are hollow, and the vicinity of 
 his mouth is deeply furrowed with intersecting lines. Leanness 
 of face, length and sharpness of feature, and length of limb, and 
 intensity of expression, rendered acute by angular, facial outline, 
 are the general characteristics of his appearance." 
 
 The controversy, excited by the question of the admission 
 of Kansas, can not be viewed as liaviiig terminated with the 
 mere practical decision of her status, as a State tolerating or 
 prohibiting slavery. Southern men had freely admitted the 
 im})robability of the permanent abiding of the institution in 
 that Territory, or elsewhere, north of the line of 36° 30', and 
 their defeat had a far more alarm insr si<rnificance than the ex- 
 
110 T.IFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 elusion of slavery from soil where the laws of nature opposed 
 its location. Important conclusions were deducible from the 
 lesson of Kansas, which the South must have been smitten 
 with voluntary blindness not to have accepted. Of the j^ur- 
 pose of the Republican party, never to consent to the admission 
 of additional slave States, there was added to constantly accu- 
 mulating proof from other sources, the bold declarations of 
 Abolition members of Congress. Recent experience clearly 
 demonstrated that the South could no longer rely upon the 
 Northern Democracy in suj)port of the plainest guarantees of 
 the Constitution, for the protection of her property, when they 
 were in conflict with the dominant fanaticism of that section. 
 Accordingly, the Southern Democracy, wisely and bravely re- 
 solved, and the unfortunate issue should not prejudge their 
 action, to require of their Northern associates, as the condition 
 of continued cooperation, a pledge of better faith in the future. 
 
 It was in the progress of events, which may be justly called 
 the sequel of the Kansas controversy, that Mr. Davis was most 
 conspicuous during his second service in the Senate. His 
 course was such as might have been anticipated from his zeal- 
 ous and vigilant regard for constitutional principles, and the 
 rights and interests of his section. His feeble health had pre- 
 vented his frequent participation in the struggles incidental to 
 the Kansas question, but in those subsequent struggles, w'hich 
 marked the dissolution of the Democratic party, he was the 
 constant, bold, and able adversary of Douglas. The ingenious 
 sophistries of the latter were subjected to no more searching 
 and scathing refutations than those with which Davis met his 
 every attempt at their illustration. 
 
 At this period the position of Mr. Davis was no less jirom- 
 inent tlian in 1850, though his speeches were less frequent 
 
PAELIAMENTARY COXTPISTS WITH DOUGLAS. Ill 
 
 and voluminous. Upon both occasions his elevation was an 
 ample reward to honorable ambition, but would have been 
 perilous in the extreme had he been deficient in those great 
 and rare qualities which were necessary to its maintenance. 
 Among his numerous contests with the distinguished expo- 
 nents of the sentiment in opposition to the South, none are 
 more memorable than his collisions with Douglas. 
 
 Of these the most striking occurred on the 23d of Febru- 
 ary, 1859, and on the 16th and 17th of May, 1860. To have 
 matched Douglas with an ordinary contestant, must always 
 have resulted in disaster; it would have been to renew the 
 contest of Athelstane against Ivanhoe. Douglas was accus- 
 tomed to testify, cheerfully, to the power of Davis, as evinced 
 in their senatorial struggles; and it is very certain that at no 
 other hands did he fare so badly, unless an exception be made 
 in favor of the remarkable speech of Senator Benjamin, of 
 Louisiana. The latter was an adept in the strategy of debate, 
 a parliamentary Suchet. 
 
 The 23d of February, 1859, was the occasion of a pro- 
 tracted battle between Davis and Douglas, lasting from mid- 
 day until nearly night. This speech of j\Ir. Davis is, in many 
 respects, inferior to his higher oratorical efforts, realizing less 
 of the forms of oratory which he usually illustrated so happily, 
 and is wanting somewhat in that symmetry, harmony, and 
 comeliness in all its features, with which his senatorial efforts 
 are generally wrought to the perfection of expression. The 
 circumstances under which it was delivered, however, fully 
 meet this criticism, and show a most remarkable readiness for 
 the instantaneous and hurried grapple of debate, and this latter 
 quality was the strong point of Douglas' oratory. The latter 
 had replied at great length, and with evident preparation, to a 
 
112 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 speech made by Mr. Duvis' colleague (Mr. Brown), who was 
 not jDresent during Douglas' rejoinder. Without hesitation 
 Mr. Davis assumed the place of his absent colleague, and tlie 
 result was a running debate, lasting several hours, and exhib- 
 iting on both sides all the vivacious readiness of a gladiatorial 
 combat. 
 
 In their ordinary and characteristic speeches there was an 
 antithesis, no less marked than in their characters as men. 
 Douglas was peculiarly American in his style of speaking. He 
 dealt largely in the argumentum ad hominem; was very adroit 
 in pointing out immaterial inconsistencies in his antagonists; 
 he rarely discussed general principles; always avoided ques- 
 tions of abstract political science, and struggled to force the 
 entire question into juxtaposition with the practical consider- 
 ations of the immediate present. 
 
 In nearly all of Davis' speeches is recognized the pervasion 
 of intellect, Avhich is preserved even in his most impassioned 
 2)assagcs. He goes to the very '"'foundations of jurispru- 
 dence," illustrates by historical example, and throws upon his 
 subject the full radiance of that noble light which is shed by 
 diligent inquiry into the abstract truths of political and moral 
 science. Strength, animation, energy without vehemence, clas- 
 sical elegance, and a luminous simplicity, are features in j\Ir. 
 Davis' oratory which rendered him one of the most finished, 
 logical, and effective of contemporary parliamentary speakers. 
 
 During the Thirty-sixth Congress, which assembled in De- 
 cember, 1859, Mr. Davis was the recognized leader of the 
 Democratic majority of the Senate. His efforts, during this 
 session, were probably the ablest of his life, and never did his 
 great powers of analysis and generalization appear to greater 
 advantage. On the second of February, 1860, jNIr. Davis pre- 
 
RESOLUTIONS. 113 
 
 sentcd a series of seven resolves, ^vhicll embodied the views of 
 the administration, of an overwhehiiing majority of the Dem- 
 ocratic members of the Senate, and of the Southern Democ- 
 racy, and were opposed by Mr. Douglas (though absent from 
 the Senate by sickness), Mr. Pugh, and by the Abolition 
 Senators. They are important as the substantial exjjression 
 of the doctrines upon which the Southern Democracy were 
 already prepared to insist at the approaching National Con- 
 vention. 
 
 The first resolution affirms the sovereignty of the States and 
 their delegation of authority to the Federal Government, to 
 secure each State against domestic no less than foreign dan- 
 gers. This resolution was designexl with special reference to 
 the recent outrages of John Brown and his associate conspira- 
 tors, several of whom had expiated their crimes upon the gal- 
 lows, at the hands of the authorities of Virginia. 
 
 Resolution second affirms the recognition of slavery as prop- 
 erty by the Constitution, and that all efforts to injure it by 
 citizens of non-slaveholdiug States are violations of faith. 
 
 Third insists upon the absolute equality of the States. 
 
 The /our^A resolution of the series, which embodied the ma- 
 terial point of difference between Mr. Douglas and the major- 
 ity of Democratic Senators, was modified, as stated by Mr. 
 Davis, "after conference with friends/' and finally made to 
 read thus: 
 
 *' Resolved, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, 
 ■wli<*thcr by direct legislation, or legislation of an indirect and un- 
 friendly character, possesses power to annul or impair the consti- 
 tutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave 
 property into the common Territories, and there hold and enjoy 
 
 the same while the territorial condition remains." 
 8 
 
114 LIFE or JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Fifth declares it the duty of Congress to supply any needed 
 protection to constitutional rights in a Territory, provided the 
 executive and judicial authority has not the adequate means. 
 
 The sixth resolution was an emphatic repudiation of what 
 Mr. Douglas, by an ingenious perversion of terms, and a bold 
 array of sophisms, was pleased to designate "popular sover- 
 eignty" — reading thus: 
 
 '■'■Resolved, That the inhabitants of a Territory of the United 
 States, when they rightfully form a couytitution to be admitted 
 as a State into the Union, may then, for the first time, like the 
 people of a State when forming a new constitution, decide for 
 themselves whether slavery, as a domestic institution, shall be 
 maintained or prohibited within their jurisdiction; and 'they shall 
 be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as their con- 
 stitution may prescribe at the time of their admission.'" 
 
 The seventh and last of the series affirmed the validity and 
 sanctity of the Fugitive Slave Law, and denounced all acts, 
 whether of individuals or of State Legislatures, to defeat its 
 action. 
 
 The struggle upon these resolutions lasted more than three 
 months, the Senate not reaching a vote upon the first of the 
 series until May 24, 1860. They constituted substantially the 
 platform presented by the South at the Charleston Democratic 
 Convention, in April, and upon which, after the withdrawal 
 of the Southern delegations, the Presidential ticket of Breck- 
 inridge and Lane was nominated, and supported in tlie ensu- 
 ing canvass, receiving the electoral votes of eleven States of 
 the South. 
 
 It was alleged against these resolutions, and the general 
 principle of protection to Southern property in the Territo- 
 
DAA'IS' CONSISTENCY. 115 
 
 ries, which their advocates demanded should be asserted in 
 the Democratic creed, that they involved a new issue, raised 
 for factious purposes, and were not sanctioned by any previous 
 action of the party. This, even if it had been true, which 
 assuredly it was not, constituted no sufficient reason for deny- 
 ing a plain constitutional right. 
 
 But, however sustained might have been this charge of in- 
 consistency against other Southern leaders, it had no application 
 to Davis. Indeed, Douglas unequivocally admitted that the 
 position assumed by Davis in 1860 was precisely that to which 
 he had held for twenty years previous. While the Oregon 
 Bill was pending in the Senate, on the 23d of June, 1848, Mr. 
 Davis offered this amendment: 
 
 '^^ Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be so con- 
 strued as to authorize the prohibition of domestic slavery in said 
 Territory whilst it remains in the condition of a Territory of the 
 United States." 
 
 Eleven years afterwards, in his address before the INIissis- 
 sippi Democratic Convention, July 5, 1859, he said: 
 
 " But if the rules of proceeding remain unchanged, then all the 
 remedies of the civil law would be available for the protection of 
 property in slaves; or if the language of the organic act, by spec- 
 ifying chancery and common-law jurisdiction, denies to us the 
 more ample remedies of the civil law, then those known to the 
 common law are certainly in force; and these, I have been as- 
 sured by the highest authority, will be found sufficient. If this 
 be so, then we are content; if it should prove otherwise, then we 
 but ask what justice can not deny — the legislation needful to en- 
 able the General Government to perform its legitimate functions; 
 and, in the meantime, we deny the power gf Congress to abridge 
 • 
 
116 T.TFK OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 or to destroy our constitutional rights, or of the Territorial Leg- 
 islature to obstruct the remedies known to the common law of the 
 United States." 
 
 In 1848 he advocated General Cass' election in spite of the 
 Nicholson letter, and not because he either approved or failed 
 to detect the dangerous heresies which it contained. As a 
 choice of evils, he preferred Cass, even upon the Nicholson 
 letter, to General Taylor, his father-in-law, both because Cass 
 was the choice of his own party, and he distrusted the influ- 
 ences which he foresaw would govern the administration of 
 Taylor. 
 
 The attention of Mr. Davis was far from being confined 
 to the slavery question and the issues which grew out of it 
 during the important period which we have sketched. His 
 extensive acquaintance with the practical labors of legisla-: 
 tion, and his uniformly thorough information upon all ques- 
 tions of domestic economy, foreign affliirs, the finances, and 
 the army, were amply exemplified, to the great benefit of the 
 country. 
 
 During the debate in the Thirty-fifth Congress, on the bill 
 proposing the issue of $20,000,000 of Treasury notes, which 
 he opposed, he avowed himself in favor of the abolition of 
 custom-houses, and the disbanding of the army of retainers 
 employed to collect the import duties. Free trade was always 
 an important article of his political creed. He valued its fra- 
 ternizing effects upon mankind, its advantages to the laboring 
 classes ; and held that, under a system of free trade, the Gov- 
 ernment would not be defrauded. He traced the financial 
 distress of the country, in the "crisis" of 1857, to its commer- 
 cial dependence on New York, whose embarrassments must, so 
 long as that dependence continued, always afflict the country 
 
VISITS THE XOKTfl. IIT 
 
 at large. The army, as on previous occasions, received a large 
 share of his attention, and he advocated its increase on a plan 
 similar to that of Mr. Calhoun, when Secretary of War under 
 President Monroe, providing a skeleton organization in peace, 
 capable of expansion in the event of war. The fishing boun- 
 ties he opposed, as being obnoxious to the objections urged 
 against class legislation. 
 
 In the summer of 1858, during the recess of Congress, ISIr. 
 Davis visited the North, with a view to the recuperation of 
 his health. Sailing from Baltimore to Boston, he traversed 
 a considerable portion of New England, and sojourned for 
 some time in Portland, Maine. His health was materially 
 benefited by the bracing salubrity of that delightful locality, 
 and, both here and at other points, he was received with dem- 
 onstrations of profound respect. Upon several occasions he 
 was persuaded to deliver public addresses, which were largely 
 read and criticized. They were every-where commended for 
 their admirable catholicity of sentiment, and not less for their 
 bold assertions of principles than for their emphatic avowals of 
 attachment to the union of the States. His speech at Port- 
 land, Maine,* was especially admired for its statesman-like 
 dignity, and was singularly free from partisan or sectional 
 temper. In his journey through the States of Massachusetts 
 and New York, he was tendered distinguished honors, and 
 addressed the people of the leading cities. On the 10th of 
 October, he spoke in Faneuil Hall, Boston, and, on the 19th, 
 he addressed an immense Democratic ratification meeting in 
 New York. 
 
 The following is an extract from his address upon the lat- 
 ter occasion : 
 
 * To be found at the conclusion of this chapter. 
 
118 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 " To each community belongs the right to decide for itself what 
 institutions it will have — to each people sovereign in their own 
 sphere. It belongs only to them to decide what shall be property. 
 You have decided it for yourselves, Mississippi has done so. Who 
 has the right to gainsay it? [Applause.] It was the assertion of 
 the right of independence — of that very right which led your 
 fathers into the war of the Revolution. [Applause.] It is that 
 which constitutes the doctrine of State Rights, on which it is my 
 pleasure to stand. Congress has no power to determine what shall 
 be property anywhere. Congress has only such grants as are con- 
 tained in the Constitution ; and it conferred no power to rule with 
 despotic hands over the independence of the Territories." 
 
 The second se.ssion of the Thirty-fifth Congress was com- 
 paratively uneventful. Mr. Davis was an influential advocate 
 of the Pacific Railroad by the Southern route. His most elab- 
 orate effort during this session was his argument against the 
 French Spoliation Bill — denying that the failure of the Gov- 
 ernment, in its earlier history, to prosecute the just claims of 
 American citizens on the Government of France, made it in- 
 cumbent upon the present generation to satisfy the obligations 
 of justice incurred in the past. 
 
 In reply to an invitation to attend the Webster Birthday 
 Festival, held in Boston, in January, 1859, Mr. Davis wrote 
 as follows : 
 
 "At a time when partisans avow the purpose to obliterate the 
 landmarks of our fathers, and fanaticism assails the barriers they 
 erected for the protection of rights coeval with and essential to 
 the existence of the Union — when Federal offices have been sought 
 by inciting constituencies to hostile aggi-essions, and exercised, not 
 as a trust for the common welfare, but as the means of disturbing 
 domestic tranquillity — when oaths to support the Constitution have 
 
PATRIOTIC SENTIMENTS. 119 
 
 been taken with a mental ie.servation to disregard its spirit, and 
 subvert the purposes for which it was established — surely it be- 
 comes all who are faithful to the compact of our Union, and who 
 are resolved to maintain and preserve it, to compare differences 
 on questions of mere expediency, and, forming deep around the 
 institutions we inherited, stand united to uphold, with unfalterin"- 
 intent, a banner on which is inscribed the Constitutional Union 
 of free, equal, and independent States. 
 
 " May the vows of ' love and allegiance,' which you propose to 
 renew as a fitting tribute to the memory of the illustrious states- 
 man whose birth you commemorate, find an echo in the heart of 
 every patriot in our land, and tend to the revival of that frater- 
 nity which bore our fathers through the Revolution to the con- 
 summation of the independence they transmitted to us, and the 
 establishment of the more perfect Union which their wisdom de- 
 vised to bless their posterity for ever ! 
 
 "Though deprived of the pleasure of mingling my affectionate 
 memories and aspirations with yours, I send you my cordial greet- 
 ing to the friends of the Constitution, and ask to be enrolled 
 among those whose mission is, by fraternity and good faith to every 
 constitutional obligation, to insure that, from the Aroostook to 
 San Diego, from Key West to Puget's Sound, the grand arch of 
 our political temple shall stand unshaken." 
 
 In the meantime a variety of events measurably added to 
 the vehemence of the sectional dispute, which never, for a mo- 
 ment, had exhibited any abatement since the opening of the 
 Kansas imbroglio. The antagonism between the two sections, 
 becoming more and more pronounced eacli day, rapidly de- 
 veloped the true character of the struggle, as one for existence 
 on the part of the South, against the revolutionary designs of 
 the North. Mr. Seward, the Ajax of Black Republicanism, 
 
120 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 the founder and leader of the party organized for the destruc- 
 tion of Southern institutions, in the foil of 1858, at the city of 
 Rochester, for the first time proclaimed his revolutionary doc- 
 trine of an '' irrepressible conflict " between the civilizations of 
 the two sections. This announcement, from such a source, 
 could only be accepted by the South as a menace to her peace 
 and security. Such was her construction of it. 
 
 In his address before the Mississippi Democratic Conven- 
 tion, in July, 1859, from which we have already quoted, Mr. 
 Davis said : 
 
 "We have witnessed the organizatiou of a party seeking the 
 possession of the Government, not for the common good, not for 
 their own particular benefit, but as the means of executing a hos- 
 tile purpose against a portion of the States." 
 
 Approaching more directly the doctrine of Mr. Seward, he 
 said: 
 
 "The success of such a party would indeed produce an 'irre-. 
 pressible conflict.' To you would be presented the question, \Yill 
 you allow the Constitutional Union to be changed into the des- 
 potism of a majority? Will you become the subjects of a hostile 
 Government? or will you, outside of the Union, assert the equal- 
 ity, the liberty and sovereignty to which you were born? For 
 myself I say, as I said on a former occas^ion, in the contingency 
 of the election of a President on the platform of Mr. Seward's 
 Rochester speech, let the Union be dissolved. Let the ' great, but 
 not the greatest, evil ' come ; for, as did the great and good Cal- 
 houn, from whom is drawn that expression of value, I love and 
 venerate the Union of these States, but I love liberty and Missis- 
 sippi more." 
 
 When Congress assembled, in December, 1859, the lawless 
 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY DISSOLVED. 121 
 
 expedition of John Brown had greatly accelerated the inevit- 
 able climax of disunion. Thenceforward the incipient revo- 
 lution was, to a great extent, transferred from the hands of 
 Congress, whose action was but lightly regarded in comparison 
 with the animated scenes which marked the State conventions 
 and popular assemblages, held with reference to the approach- 
 ing presidential nominations. 
 
 ^Ir. Davis approved the test made at the Charleston Con- 
 vention, by the Southern Democracy, as to the construction of 
 the Cincinnati platform, and the demand for a more explicit 
 announcement of the position of the party concerning slavery 
 in the Territories. His speech, in reply to Judge Douglas, 
 on the IGth and 17th of May, 18G0, is a vindication of 
 Southern action at Charleston, and an exhaustive discussion 
 of all the phases of the issue upon which the Democracy had 
 divided. 
 
 Events soon demonstrated the irreconcilable nature of the 
 antagonism which had severed this giant organization. It had 
 simply realized the destiny of political parties. In one genera- 
 tion they rise, as a virtue and a necessity, to remedy disorders 
 and reform abuses ; in another generation, they are themselves 
 the apologists of corruption and the perpetrators of wrong. 
 The Democratic party became ini^nsiblc to the appeals of prin- 
 ciple, and its fifty years' lease of power terminated, not speedily 
 to be recovered. 
 
 HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS AT PORTLAND, MAINE. 
 
 [From the Eastern Argus.] 
 
 "SVe are gratified in being able to ofier our readers a faithful 
 and quite full report of the speech of Hon. Jeflferson Davis, of 
 Mississippi, on the occasion of the serenade given him by the 
 
122 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 citizens of Portland, without distinction of party, on Friday even- 
 ing last. It will be read with interest and pleasure, and we can 
 not doubt that every sentiment, uttered by the distinguished Mis- 
 sissippian, will find a hearty response and approval from the citi- 
 zens of Maine. The occasion was indeed a pleasing, a hopeful one. 
 It was in every respect the expression of generous sentiments, of 
 kindness, hospitality, friendly regard, and the brotherhood of 
 American citizenship. Prominent men of all parties were present, 
 and the expression, without exception, so far as we have heard, 
 has been that of unmingled gratification; and the scene was 
 equally pleasant to look upon. The beautiful mansion of Ren- 
 sallaer Cram, Esq., directly opposite to Madame Blanchard's, was 
 illuminated, and the light thrown from the windows of the two 
 houses revealed to view the large and perfectly orderly assemblage 
 with which Park and Danforth Streets were crowded. We regret 
 that our readers can get no idea of the musical voice and inspiring 
 eloquence of the speaker from a report of his remarks ; but it is 
 the best we can do for them. After the music had ceased, Mr. 
 Davis appeared upon the steps, and as soon as the prolonged 
 applause with which he was greeted had subsided, he spoke in 
 substance as follows : 
 
 Fellow-citizens: Accept my sincere thanks for this mani- 
 festation of your kindness. Vanity does not lead me so far to 
 misconceive your purpose as to appropriate the demonstration to 
 myself; but it is not the less gratifying to me to be made the 
 medium through which Maine tenders an expression of regard to 
 her sister, Mississippi. It is, moreover, with feelings of profound 
 gratification that I witness this indication of that national senti- 
 ment and fraternity which made us, and which alone can keep us, 
 one people. At a period but as yesterday, when compared with 
 the life of nations, these States were separate, and, in some re- 
 spects, opposing colonies, their only relation to each other was, 
 
SPEECH AT PORTLAND. 123 
 
 that of a common allegiance to the Government of Great Britain. 
 So separate, indeed almost hostile, was their attitude, that when 
 General Stark, of Bennington memory, was captured by savages on 
 the headwaters of the Kennebec, he was subsequently taken by 
 them to Albany, where they went to sell furs, and again led away 
 a captive, without interference on the part of the inhabitants of 
 that neighboring colony to demand or obtain his release. United 
 as we now are, were a citizen of the United States, as an act of 
 hostility to our country, imprisoned or slain in any quarter of the 
 world, whether on land or sea, the people of each and every State 
 of the Union, with one heart and with one voice, would demand 
 redress, and woe be to him against whom a brother's blood cried 
 to us from the ground. Such is the fruit of the wisdom and the 
 justice with which our fathers bound contending colonies into 
 confederation, and blended different habits and rival interests into 
 a harmonious whole, so that, shoulder to shoulder, they entered on 
 the trial of the Revolution, and step with step trod its thorny 
 paths until they reached the height of national independence, and 
 founded the constitutional representative liberty which is our 
 birthright. 
 
 When the mother country entered upon her career of oppres- 
 sion, in disregard of chartered and constitutional rights, our fore- 
 fathers did not stop to measure the exact weight of the burden, or 
 to ask whether the pressure bore most upon this colony or upon 
 that, but saw in it the infraction of a great principle, the denial of 
 a common right, in defense of which they made common cause — 
 Massachusetts, Virginia, and South Carolina vicing with each other 
 as to who should be foremost in the struggle, where the penalty 
 of failure would be a dishonorable grave. Tempered by the trials 
 and sacrifices of the Revolution, dignified by its noble purposes, 
 elevated by its brilliant triumphs, endeared to each other by its 
 glorious memories, they abandoned the Confederacy, not to fly 
 apart when the outward pressure of hostile fleets and armies were 
 
124 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 removed, but to draw closer tlieir embrace in the formation of a 
 more perfect Union. 
 
 By such men, thus trained and ennobled, our Constitution was 
 framed. It stands a monument of principle, of forecast, and, above 
 all, of that liberality which made each willing to sacrifice local 
 interest, individual prejudice, or temporary good to the general 
 welfare and the perpetuity of the republican institutions which 
 they had passed through fire and blood to secure. The grants 
 were as broad as were necessary for the functions of the general 
 agent, and the mutual concessions were twice blessed, blessing 
 him who gave and him who received. Whatever was necessary for 
 domestic government — requisite in the social organization of each 
 community — was retained by the States and the people thereof; 
 and these it was made the duty of all to defend and maintain. 
 Such, in very general terms, is the rich political legacy our fathers 
 bequeathed to us. Shall we preserve and transmit it to posterity? 
 Yes, yes, the heart responds; and the judgment answers, the task 
 is easily performed. It but requires that each should attend to 
 that which most concerns him, and on which alone he has rightful 
 power to decide and to act; that each should adhere to the terms 
 of a written compact, and that all should cooperate for that which 
 interest, duty, and honor demand. 
 
 For the general affairs of our country, both foreign and domes- 
 tie, we have a national Executive and a national Legislature. 
 Kepresentatives and Senators are chosen by districts and by 
 States, but their acts aifect the whole country, and their obliga- 
 tions are to the whole people. He who, holding either seat, would 
 confine his investigations to the mere ititerests of his imme- 
 diate constituents, would be derelict to his plain duty; and he who 
 would legislate in hostility to any section, would be morally unfit 
 for the station, and surely an unsafe depository, if not a treach- 
 erous guardian, of the inheritance with which we are blessed. Xo 
 one more than myself recognizes the binding force of the alle- 
 
SPEECH AT PORTI.AND. 125 
 
 giance which the citizen owes to the State of his citizenship, but 
 that State being a party to our compact, a member of the Uuion, 
 fealty to the Federal Constitution is not in opposition to, but 
 flows from the allegiance due to one of the United States. Wash- 
 ington was not less a Virginian when he commanded at Boston, 
 nor did Gates or Greene weaken the bonds which bound them to 
 their several States by their campaigns in the South. In propor- 
 tion as a citizen loves his own State, will he strive to honor by 
 preserving her name and her fame free from the tarnish of having 
 fiuled to observe her obligations and to fulfill her duties to her 
 sister States. Each page of our history is illustrated by the 
 names and deeds of those who have well understood and dis- 
 charged the obligation. Have we so degenerated that we can no 
 longer emulate their virtues? Have the purposes for which our 
 Union was formed lost their value? Has patriotism ceased to be 
 a virtue, and is narrow sectionalism no longer to be counted a 
 crime? Shall the North not rejoice that the progress of agricul- 
 ture in the South has given to her great staple the controlling 
 influence of the commerce of the world, and put manufiicturing 
 nations under bond to keep the peace with the United States? 
 Shall the South not exult in the fact that the industry and per- 
 severing intelligence of the North has placed her mechanical skill 
 in the front ranks of the civilized world — that our mother country, 
 whose haughty Minister, some eighty odd years ago, declared that 
 not a hob-nail should be made in the colonies, which are now the 
 United States, was brought, some four years ago, to recognize our 
 preeminence by sending a commission to examine our workshops 
 and our machinery, to perfect their own manufacture of the arms 
 requisite for their defense? Do not our whole people, interior and 
 soaboard, North, South, East and West, alike feel proud of the 
 hardihood, the enterprise, the skill, and the courage of the Yankee 
 pallor, who has borne our flag far as the ocean bears its foam, and 
 caused the name and character of the United States to be known 
 
126 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 I 
 
 and respected wherever tliere is wealth enough to woo commerce 
 
 and intelligence to honor merit? So long as we preserve and 
 appreciate the achievements of Jefferson and Adams, of Franklin 
 and Madison, of Hamilton, of Hancock, and of Rutledge, men 
 who labored for the whole country, and lived for mankind, we can 
 not sink to the petty strife which would sap the foundations and 
 destroy the political fabric our fathers erected and bequeathed as 
 an inheritance to our posterity forever. 
 
 Since the formation of the Constitution a vast extension of ter- 
 ritory, and the varied relations arising therefrom, have presented 
 problems which could not have been foreseen. It is just cause 
 for admiration, even wonder, that the provisions of the funda- 
 mental law should have been so fully adequate to all the wants 
 of government, new in its organization, and new in many of the 
 principles on which it was founded Whatever fears may have 
 once existed as to the consequences of territorial expansion must 
 give way before the evidence which the past affords. The General 
 Government, strictly confined to its delegated functions, and the 
 State left in the undisturbed exercise of all else, we have a theory 
 and practice which fits our Government for immeasurable domain, 
 and might, under a millennium of nations, embrace mankind. 
 
 From the slope of the Atlantic our population, with ceaseless 
 tide, has poured into the wide and fertile valley of the Missis- 
 sippi, with eddying whirl has passed to the coast of the Pacific ; 
 from the West and the East the tides are rushing toward each 
 other, and the mind is carried to the day when all the cultivable 
 land will be inhabited, and the American people will sigh for 
 more wildernesses to conquer. But there is here a physico-polit- 
 ical problem presented for our solution. Were it purely physical 
 your past triumphs would leave but little doubt of your capacity 
 to solve it. • A community which, when less than twenty thousand, 
 conceived the grand project of crossing the White Mountains, and 
 unaided, save by the stimulus which jeers and prophecies of failure 
 
SPEECH AT I'OllTEAND. 127 
 
 gave, successfully executed the Herculean work, might well be 
 iuipatieut if it were suggested that a physical problem was before 
 us too difl&cult for mastery. The history of man teaches that hi^h 
 mountains and wide deserts have resisted the permanent extension 
 of empire, and have formed the immutable boundaries of States. 
 From time to time, under some able leader, have the hordes of 
 the upper plains of Asia swept over the adjacent country, and 
 rolled their conquering columns over Southern Europe. Yet, after 
 the lapse of a few generations, the physical law, to which I have 
 referred, has asserted its supremacy, and the boundaries of those 
 States differ little now from those which were obtained three thou- 
 sand years ago. 
 
 Rome flew her conquering eagles over the then known world, 
 and has now subsided iuto the little territory on which the great 
 city was originally built. The Alps and the Pyranees have been 
 unable to restrain imperial France; but her expansion was a fever- 
 ish action, her advance and her retreat were tracked with blood, 
 and those mountain ridges are the reestablished limits of her em- 
 pire. Shall the Rocky Mountains prove a dividing barrier to us? 
 Were ours a central consolidated Government, instead of a Union 
 of sovereign States, our fate might be learned from the history of 
 other nations. Thanks to the wisdom and independent spirit of 
 our forefathers, this is not the case. Each State having sole charfre 
 of its local interests and domestic affairs, the problem, which to 
 others has been insoluble, to us is made easy. Rapid, safe, and 
 easy communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific will give 
 co-intelligence, unity of interest, and cooperation among all parts 
 of our continent-wide Republic. The net-work of railroads which 
 bind the North and the South, the slope of the Atlantic and the 
 valley of the Mississippi, together testify that our people have the 
 power to perform, in that regard, whatever it is their will to do. 
 
 We require a railroad to the States of the Pacific for present 
 uses ; the time no doubt will come when we hhall have need of 
 
128 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAYIS. 
 
 two or three, it may be, more. Because of the desert character 
 of the interior country the work will be difficult and expensive. 
 It will require the efforts of a united people. The bickerings of 
 little politicians, the jealousies of sections must give way to dig- 
 nity of purpose and zeal for the common good. If the object be 
 obstructed by contention and division as to whether the route 
 shall be Northern, Southern, or Central, the handwriting is on the 
 wall, and it requires little skill to see that failure is the interpre- 
 tation of the inscription. You are practical people, and may ask, 
 How is that contest to be avoided? By taking the question out 
 of the hands of politicians altogether. Let the Government give 
 such aid as it is proper for it to render to the company which 
 shall propose the most feasible plan ; then leave to capitalists with 
 judgment, sharpened by interest, the selection of the route, and 
 the difficulties will diminish, as did those which you overcame 
 when you connected your harbor with the Canadian provinces. 
 
 It would be to trespass on your kindness and to violate the pro- 
 prieties of the occasion were I to detain the vast concourse which 
 stands before me by entering on the discussion of controverted 
 topics, or by further indulging in the expression of such reflec- 
 tions as circumstances suggest. I came to your city in quest of 
 health and repose. From the moment I entered it you have show- 
 ered upon me kindness and hospitality. Though my experience 
 has taught me to anticipate good rather than evil from my fellow- 
 man, it had not prepared me to expect such unremitting atten- 
 tion as has here been bestowed. I have been jocularly asked in 
 relation to my coming here, whether I had secured a guarantee for 
 my safety, and lo ! I have found it. I stand in the midst of thou- 
 sands of my fellow-citizens. But, my friends, I came neither dis- 
 trusting nor apprehensive, of which you have proof in the fact 
 that I brought with me the objects of tcnderest affection and solic- 
 itude, my wife and my children ; they have shared with me your 
 hospitality, and will alike remain your debtors. If, at some future 
 
SPEECH AT PORTLAND. 129 
 
 time, when I am mingled with the dust, und the arm of my in- 
 fant son has been nerved for deeds of manhood, the storm of" war 
 should burst upon your city, I feel that, relying upon his inher- 
 iting the instincts of his ancestors and mine, I may pledge him in 
 that perilous hour to stand by your side iu tlie defense of your 
 hearth-stones, and in maintaining the honor of a flag whose con- 
 stellation, though torn and smoked iu many a battle by sea and 
 laud, has never been stained with dishonor, and will, I trust, for- 
 ever fly as free as the breeze which unfolds it. 
 
 A stranger to you, the salubrity of your location, and the beauty 
 of its scenery were not wholly unknown to me, nor were there 
 wanting associations which busy memory connected with your 
 people. You will pardon me for alluding to one whose genius 
 shed a lustre upon all it touched, and whose qualities gathered 
 about him hosts of friends wherever he was known. Prentiss, a 
 native of Portland, lived from youth to middle age in the county 
 of my residence; and the inquiries which have been made show 
 me that the youth excited the interest which the greatness of the 
 man justified, and that his memory thus remains a link to con- 
 nect your home with mine. A cursory view, when passing through 
 your town on former occasions, had impressed me with the great 
 advantages of your harbor, its easy entrance, its depth, and its 
 extensive accommodations for shipping. But its advantages and 
 its facilities, as they have been developed by closer inspection, 
 have grown upon me, until I realize that it is no boast, but the 
 language of sober truth, which, in the present state of commerce, 
 pronounces them unequaled in any harbor of our country. 
 
 And surely no place could be more inviting to an invalid who 
 sought refuge from the heat of Southern summer. Here waving 
 elms off"er him shaded walks, and magnificent residences, sur- 
 rounded by flowers, fill the mind with ideas of comfort and rest. 
 If, weary of constant contact with his fellow-men, he seeks a deeper 
 seclusion, there, in the background of this grand amphitheater, 
 9 
 
130 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, 
 
 lie the eternal mountains, frowning witli brow of rock and cap of 
 snow upon smiling fields beneath, and there in its recesses may be 
 found as much wilduess and as much of solitude as the pilgrim, 
 weary of the cares of life, can desire. If he turn to the front, 
 your capacious harbor, studded with green islands of ever-varying 
 light and shade, and enlightened by all the stirring evidences of 
 commercial activity, offer him the mingled charms of busy life 
 and nature's calm repose. A few miles further, and he may sit 
 upon the quiet shore to listen to the murmuring wave until the 
 troubled spirit sinks to rest ; and in the little sail that vanishes 
 on the illimitable sea we find the type of the voyage which he is 
 soon to take, when, his ephemeral existence closed, he embarks for 
 that better state which lies beyond the grave. 
 
 Richly endowed as you are by nature in all which contributes 
 to pleasure and to usefulness, the stranger can not pass without 
 paying a tribute to the much which your energy has achieved for 
 yourselves. Where else will one find a more happy union of mag- 
 nificence and comfort? Where better arrangements to facilitate 
 commerce? Where so much of industry with so little noise and 
 bustle ? Where, in a phrase, so much efi"ected in proportion to 
 the means employed ? We hear the puff" of the engine, the roll 
 of the wheel, the ring of the ax and the saw, but the stormy, 
 passionate exclamation so often mingled with the sounds are no- 
 where heard. Yet neither these nor other things which I have 
 mentioned, attractive though they be, have been to me the chief 
 charm which I have found among you. Far above all these, I 
 place the gentle kindness, the cordial welcome, the hearty grasp 
 which made me feel truly and at once, though wandering afar, 
 that I was still at home. My friends, I thank you for this addi- 
 tional manifestation of your good-will. 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 131 
 
 REPLY OF HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, OF MISSISSIPPI, TO THE 
 SPEECH OF SENATOR DOUGLAS, IN THE UNITED STATES 
 SENATE, May 10 and 17, 18G0. 
 
 [The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolutions submitted by 
 Mr. Davis on the first of .March, relative to State rights, the institution of 
 slavery in the States, and the rights of citizens of the several States in the 
 Territories.] 
 
 Mr. Douglas having concluded his speech — 
 
 Mr. Davis arose and said: 
 
 J/r. President: When the Senator from Illinois commenced his 
 speech, he announced his object to be to answer to an arraign- 
 ment, or, as he also termed it, an indictment, which he said I had 
 made against him. He therefore caused extracts to be read from 
 my remarks to the Senate. Those extracts announce that I have 
 been the uniform opponent of what is called squatter sovereignty, 
 and that, having opposed it heretofore, I was now, least of all, 
 disposed to give it quarter. At a subsequent period, the fact was 
 stated that the Senator from Illinois and myself had been opposed 
 to each other, on those questions which I considered as most dis- 
 tinctly involving Southern interests in 1850. He has not answered 
 to the allegation. He has not attempted to show that he did not 
 stand in that position. It is true he has associated himself with 
 Mr. Clay, and, before closing, I will show that the association does 
 not belong to him ; that upon those test questions they did not 
 vote together. lie then, somewhat vauntingly, reminded me that 
 he was with the victorious party, asserted that the Democracy of 
 the country then sustained his doctrine, and that I was thus out- 
 side of that organization. With Mr. Clay! If he had been with 
 him, he would have been in good company; but the old Jackson 
 Democracy will be a little surprised to learn that Clay was the 
 leader of our party, and that a man proves his allegiance to it by 
 showing how closely he followed in the footsteps of Ileury Clay. 
 
132 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 "When the Senator opened his argument, by declaring; his pur- 
 j)ose to be fair and courteous, I little supposed that an explanation 
 made by me in favor of the Secretary of State, and which could 
 not at all disturb the line of his argument, would have been fol- 
 lowed by the rude announcement that he could not permit inter- 
 ruption thereafter. A Senator has the right to claim exemption 
 from interruption if he will follow the thread of his argument, 
 direct his discourse to the question at issue, and confine himself to 
 it ; but if he makes up a medley of arraignments of the men who 
 have been in public life for ten years past, and addressing indi- 
 viduals in his presence, he should permit an interruption to be 
 made for correction as often as he misrepresents their position. It 
 would have devolved on me more than once, if I had been re- 
 sponsible for his frequent references to me, to correct him and 
 show that he misstated facts; but as he would not permit himself 
 to be interrupted, I am not responsible for any thing he has im- 
 puted to me. 
 
 The Senator commenced with a disclaimer of any purpose to 
 follow what he considered a bad practice of arraigning Senators 
 here on matters for which they stood responsible to their constitu- 
 ents ; but straightway proceeded to make a general arraignment 
 of the present and the absent. I believe I constitute the only 
 exception to whom he granted consistency, and that at the expense 
 of party association, and, he would have it, at the exj^euse of sound 
 judgment. He not only arraigned individuals, but even States — 
 Florida, Alabama, and Georgia — were brought to answer at the bar 
 of the Senate for the resolutions they had passed ; Virginia was 
 held responsible for her policy ; Mississippi received his critical 
 notice. Pray, sir, what had all this to do with the question? 
 Especially, what had all this to do with what he styled an in- 
 dictment against him? It is a mere resort to a species of dec- 
 lamation which has not been heard to-day for the first time ; a 
 pretext to put himself in the attitude of a persecuted man, and, 
 
EEPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 133 
 
 like the satyr's guest, blowing hot and cold iu the .same breath, 
 iu the midst of his complaiut of persecution, vaunts his supreme 
 power. If his opponents be the very small minority which he de- 
 scribes, what fear has he of persecution or proscription ? 
 
 Can he not draw a distinction between one who says: "I give 
 no quarter to an idea," and one who proclaims the policy of put- 
 ting the advocates of that idea to the sword? Such was his fijzur- 
 ative language. That figure of the sword, however, it seemed, "as 
 he progressed in his development, referred to the one thought 
 always floating through his brain — exclusion from the spoils of 
 office, for, at last, it seemed to narrow down to the supposition that 
 no man who agreed with him was, with our consent, to be either 
 a Cabinet officer or a collector. Who has advanced any such doc- 
 trine? Have I, at this or any other period of my acquaintance 
 with him, done any thing to justify him in attributing that opinion 
 to me? I pause for his answer. 
 
 Mr. Douglas. I do not exactly understand the Senator. I 
 have no complaint to make of the Senator from Mississippi of ever 
 having been unkind or ungenerous towards me, if that is what he 
 means to say. 
 
 Mr. Davis. Have I ever promulgated a doctrine which indi- 
 cated that if my friends were iu power, I would sacrifice every other 
 wing of the Democratic party? 
 
 Mr. Douglas. I understood the making of a test on this issue 
 iagainst me would reach every other man that held my opinions ; 
 and, therefore, if I was not sound enough to hold office, no man 
 agreeing with me would be; and hence, every man of my opinions 
 would be excluded. 
 
 Mr. Davis. Ah, Mr. President ; I believe I now have caught 
 the clue to the argument; it was not before apprehended. I w;is 
 among those who thought the Senator, with his opinions, ought 
 not to be chairman of the Committee on Territories. This, I sup- 
 pose, then, is the whole imposition. But have I not said to the 
 
134 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Senator, at least once, that I had no disposition to question his 
 Democracy ; that I did not wish to withhold from him any tribute 
 which was due to his talent and his worth ? Did I not offer to re- 
 sign the only chairmanship of a committee I had if the Senate 
 would confer it upon him ? Then, where is this spirit of proscrip- 
 tion the complaint of which has constituted some hours of his 
 speech ? If others have manifested it, I do not know it ; and as 
 the single expression of " no quarter to the doctrine of squatter 
 sovereignty" was the basis of his whole allegation, I took it for 
 granted his reference to a purpose to do him and his friends such 
 wrong must have been intended for me. 
 
 The fact that the Senator criticised the idea of the States pre- 
 scribing the terms on which they will act in a party convention 
 recognized to be representative, is suggestive of an extreme mis- 
 conception of relative position ; and the presumption with which 
 the Senator censured what he was pleased to term " the seceders," 
 suggested to me a representation of the air of the great monarch 
 of France when, feeling royalty and power all concentrated in his 
 own person, he used the familiar yet remarkable expression, "the 
 State, that's me." Does the Senator consider it a modest thing iu 
 him to announce to the Democratic Convention on what terms he 
 will accept the nomination; but presumptuous in a State to de- 
 clare the principle on which she will give him her vote? It is an 
 advance on Louis Quatorze. 
 
 Nothing but the most egregious vanity, something far surpassing 
 even the bursting condition of swollen pride, could have induced 
 the Senator to believe that I could not speak of squatter sover- 
 eignty without meaning him. 
 
 Towards the Senator, personally, I have never manifested hos- 
 tility — indeed, could not, because I have ever felt kindly. Many 
 years of association, very frequent cooperation, manly support 
 from him in times of trial, are all remembered by me gratefully. 
 The Senator, therefore, had no right to assume that I was making 
 
RErLY TO SENATon DOUGLAS. 135 
 
 war upon him. I addrcspcd myself to a doctrine of which he was 
 not the founder, though he was one of the early disciples ; but he 
 proved an unprofitable follower, for he became rebellious, and 
 ruined the logic of the doctrine. It was logical in ]Mr. Cass's 
 mind ; he claimed the power to be inherent in the people who 
 settled a new Territory, and by this inherent power he held that 
 they might proceed to form government and to exercise its func- 
 tions. There was logic in that — logic up to the point of sover- 
 eignty. Not so with the Senator. He says the inhabitants of the 
 Territories derive their power to form a government from the con- 
 sent of Congress; that when we decide that there are enough of 
 them to constitute a government, and enact an organic law, then 
 they have power to legislate according to their will. This power 
 being derived from an act of Congress — a limited agency tied down 
 to the narrow sphere of the constitutional grant — is made, by that 
 supposition, the bcstower of sovereignty on its creature. 
 
 I had occasion the other day to refer to the higher law as it 
 made its first appearance on earth — the occasion when the tempter 
 entered the garden of Eden. There is another phase of it. "Who- 
 ever attempts to interpose between the supreme law of the Creator 
 and the creature, whether it be in the regions of morals or politics, 
 proclaims a theory that wars upon every principle of government. 
 When Congress, the agent for the States, within the limits of its 
 authority, forms, as it were, a territorial constitution by its organic 
 act, he who steps in and proclaims to the settlers in that Territory 
 that they have the right to overturn the Government, to usurp to 
 themselves powers not delegated, is preaching the higher law in 
 the domain of polities, which is only less mischievous than its 
 other form, because the other involves both politics and morals iu 
 one ruinous confusion. 
 
 The Senator spoke of the denial of Democratic fellow.^hip to 
 him. After what has been said and acknowledged by the Senator, 
 it is not to be supposed that it could have any application to me. 
 
136 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 It may be proper to add, I know of no sucli denial on the part of 
 other Democratic Senators. Far be it from me to vaunt the fact of 
 being in a majority, and to hold him to the hard rule he prescribes 
 to us, of surrendering an opinion where we may happen to have 
 been in a minority. Were I to return now to him the measure 
 with which he metes to us, when he assumes that a majority in the 
 Charleston Convention has a right to prescribe what shall be our 
 tenets, I might, in reply to him, say, as a sincere adherent of the 
 Democratic party, how can you oppose the resolutions pending 
 before the Senate? If twenty-seven majority in a body of three 
 hundred and three constituent members had, as he assumes, the 
 power to la}^ down a binding law, what is to be said of him who, 
 with a single adherent, stands up against the whole of his Dem- 
 ocratic associates ? He must be outside of the party, according to 
 his enunciation ; he must be wandering in the dark regions to 
 which he consigns the followers of Mr. Yancey. 
 
 The Senator said he had no taste for references to things which 
 were personal, and then proceeded to discuss that of which he 
 showed himself profoundly ignorant — the condition of things in 
 Mississippi. It is disagreeable for me to bring before the Senate 
 matters which belong to my constituents and myself, and I should 
 not do so but for the fact of their introduction into the Senator's 
 elaborate speech, which is no doubt to be spread over all parts of the 
 country. The Senator, by some means or other, has the name of 
 very many citizens of Mississippi, and as there is nothing in our 
 condition to attract his special attention, his speech is probably to 
 be sent over a wide field of correspondence ; and it is, therefore, 
 tlie more incumbent on me to notice his attempt to give a history 
 of affairs that were transacted in Mississippi. He first announces 
 that Mississippi rebuked the idea of intervention asserted in 1850; 
 then that Mississippi rejected my appeal ; that Mississippi voted 
 on the issue made up by the compromise measure of 1850, and 
 vaunts it as an approval of that legislation of which he was the 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 137 
 
 advocate and I the opponent. Now, Mississippi did uoue of these 
 things, Mississippi instructed her Senators, and I obeyed her 
 instructions. I introduced into this body the resolutions which 
 directed ray course. On that occasion I vindicated Mississippi, 
 and especially the Southern rights men, from the falsehood of 
 that day, and reiterated now, of a purpose to dissolve the Union. 
 I vindicated her by extracts from the proceedings as well of her 
 convention as of her primary assemblies; and my remarks on that 
 occasion, as fully as the events to which he referred in terms of 
 undeserved compliment, justified the Senator in saying to-day that 
 he knew I had always been faithful to the Government of which I. 
 was a part. 
 
 Acting under the instructions from Mississippi — not merely 
 voting and yielding reluctant compliance ; but, according to my 
 ideas of the obligation of a Senator, laboring industriously and 
 zealously to carry out the instructions which my State gave me, I 
 took and maintained the position I held in relation to the meas- 
 ures of 1850. As it was with me a cordial service, I went home 
 to vindicate the position which was hers, as well as my own. 
 Shortly after that a canvass was opened, in which a distinguished 
 gentlemen of our party, who had not been a member of Congress, 
 was nominated for Governor. Questions other than the compro- 
 mise measures of 1850 arose in that canvass ; they were discussed 
 in a great degree to the exclusion of a consideration of the merits 
 of the action of Congress in 1850; and, at the election in Septem- 
 ber, for delegates to a convention, we had fallen from a party ma- 
 jority of some eight thousand to a minority of nearly the same 
 number. It was after the decision of the question involved in 
 calling a convention — after our party was defeated — after the can- 
 didate for Governor had retired, that the Democracy of Mississippi 
 called upon me to bear their standard. It was esteemed a forloru 
 hope, therefore an obligation of honor not to decline the invita- 
 tion. But so far as the action in the Senate in 1850 was cou- 
 
138 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 cerned, if it had any effect, it must have been the reverse of that 
 assumed, as, in the subsequent election for State officers on the 
 first Monday in November, this majority of nearly eight thousand 
 against us was reduced to about one thousand. 
 
 But when this convention assembled, though a large majority 
 of the members belonged to the party which the Senator has been 
 pleased to term the " Submissionists " — a name which they always 
 rejected — this convention of the party most adverse to me, when 
 they came to act on the subject said, after citing the "compro- 
 mise" measures of the Congress of 1850 : 
 
 " And connected with them, the rejection of the proposition to 
 exclude slavery from the Territories of the United States, and to 
 abolish it in the District of Columbia ; and, while they do not 
 entirely approve, will abide by it as a permanent adjustment of this 
 sectional controversy, so long as the same, in all its features, shall 
 be faithfully adhered to and enforced.'* 
 
 Then they go on to recite six different causes, for which they 
 will resort to the most extreme remedies which we had supposed 
 ever could be necessary. The case only requires that I should say 
 that the party to which I belonged did not then, nor at any pre- 
 vious time, propose to go out of the Union, but to have a South- 
 ern convention for consultation as to future contingencies, threat- 
 ened and anticipated. It was at last narrowed down to the ques- 
 tion, whether we should meet South Carolina and consult with her. 
 Honoring that gallant State for the magnanimity she had mani- 
 fested in the first efforts for the creation of the G-overnment, in the 
 preliminaries to the struggle for independence, when she, a favored 
 colony, feeling no oppression, nursed by the mother country, 
 cherished in every method, yet agreed with Massachusetts, then 
 oppressed, to assert the great principle of community independ- 
 ence, and to carry it to the extent of war — honoring her for her 
 unvarying defense of the Constitution throughout her whole 
 course — believing that she was true to her faith, and would re- 
 
BEPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 139 
 
 deem all her pledges — feeling that a friendly hand might restrain, 
 while, if left to herself, her pride might precipitate her on the trial 
 of separation, I did desire to meet South Carolina in convention, 
 though nobody but ourselves should be there to join her. 
 
 But, to close the matter, this couveutioo, in its seventh resolu- 
 tion, after stating all those questions on which it would resist, 
 declared : 
 
 " That, as the people of Mississippi, in the opinion of this con- 
 vention, desire all further agitation of the slavery question to 
 cease, and have acted upon and decided the foregoing questions, 
 thereby making it the duty of this convention to pass no act in the 
 perview and spirit of the law under which it is called, this conven- 
 tion deems it unnecessary to refer to the people, for approval or 
 disapproval, at the ballot-box, its action in the premises." 
 
 So that when the Senator appealed to this as evidence of what 
 the people of Mississippi had done, he was ignorant of the fact 
 that the delegates of the people of Mississippi did not agree with 
 him ; that their resolutions did not sustain the view which he took, 
 and that the people of Mississippi never acted on them. If, then, 
 there had been good taste in the intervention of this local ques- 
 tion, there was certainly very bad judgment in hazarding his state- 
 ments on a subject of which he was so little informed. 
 
 The Senator here, as in relation to our friends at Charleston, 
 takes kind care of us — supposes we do not know what we are 
 about, but that he, with his superior discrimination, sees what must 
 necessarily result from what we are doing; he says that, at Charles- 
 ton, they — innocent people — did not intend to destroy the Govern- 
 ment ; but he warns them that, if they do what they propose, they 
 will destroy it ; and so he says we of Mississippi, not desiring to 
 break up the Union, nevertheless pursued a course which would 
 liave had that result if it had not been checked. Where docs he 
 pet all this information? I have been in every State of the Union 
 except two — three now, since Oregon has been admitted — but I 
 
140 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 have never seen a man wlio had as much personal knowledge. It 
 is equally surprising that his facts should be so contrary to the 
 record. 
 
 We believed then, as I believe now, that this Union, as a com- 
 pact entered into between the States, was to be preserved by good 
 faith, and by a close observance of the terms on which we were 
 united. We believed then, as I believe now, that the party' which 
 rested upon the basis of truth ; promulgated its opinions, and had 
 them tested in the alembic of public opinion, adopted the only 
 path of safety. I can not respect such a doctrine as that which 
 says, " You may construe the Constitution your way, and I will 
 construe it mine ; we will waive the merit of these two construc- 
 tions, and harmonize together until the courts decide the question 
 between us." A man is bound to have an opinion upon any political 
 subject upon which he is called to act; it is skulking his respon- 
 sibility for a citizen to say, "Let us express no opinion; I will 
 agree that you may have yours, and I will have mine; we will co- 
 operate politically together; we will beat the opposition, divide the 
 spoils, and leave it to the court to decide the question between us." 
 
 I do not believe that this is the path of safety ; I am sure it is 
 not the way of honor. I believe it devolves on us, who are prin- 
 cipally sufferers from the danger to which this policy has exposed 
 us, to affirm the truth boldly, and let the people decide after the 
 promulgation of our opinions. Our Government, resting as it does 
 upon public opinion and popular consent, w^as not formed to deceive 
 the people, nor does it regard the men in office as a governing class. 
 We, the functionaries, .should derive our opinions from the people. 
 To know what their opinion is, it is necessary' that we should pro- 
 nounce, in unmistakable language, what we ourselves mean. 
 
 My position is, that there is no portion of our country where 
 the people are not sufficiently intelligent to discriminate between 
 right and wrong, and no portion where the sense of justice does 
 not predominate. I, therefore, have been always willing to unfurl 
 
REPr.Y TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 141 
 
 our flag to its innermost fold — to nail it to the mast, with all our 
 jiiinciples plainly inscribed upon it. Believing that we ask nothing 
 but what the Constitution was intended to confer — nothins: but that 
 which, as equals, we are entitled to receive — I am willing that our 
 case should be plainly stated to those who have to decide it, and 
 await, for good or for evil, their verdict. 
 
 For two days, the Senator spoke nominally upon the resolutions, 
 and upon the territorial question ; but, like the witness in the 
 French comedy, who, when called upon to testify, commenced 
 before the creation, and was stopped by the judge, who told him to 
 come down, for a beginning, to the deluge, he commenced so far 
 back, and narrated so minutely, that he never got chronologically 
 down to the point before us. 
 
 What is the question on which the Democracy are divided? 
 Arc we called upon to settle what every body said from 1847 down 
 to this date? Have the Detuocracy divided on that? Have they 
 divided on the resolutions of the States in 1840, or 1844, or 1848? 
 Have the Democracy undertaken to review the position taken in 
 1854, that there should be a latitude of construction upon a par- 
 ticular point o£ constitutional law while they did await the de- 
 cision of the Supreme Court? No, sir; the question is changed 
 from before to after the event ; the call is on every man to come 
 forward now, after the Supreme Court has given all it could render 
 upon a political subject, and state that his creed is adherence to 
 the rule thus expounded in accordance with previous agreement. 
 
 The Senator tells us that he will abide by the decision of the 
 Supreme Court ; but it was fairly to be inferred, from what he 
 said, that, in the Dred Scott case, he held that they had only de- 
 cided that a negro could not sue in a Federal Court. Was this 
 the entertainment to which we were invited? Was the proclaimed 
 boon of allowing the question to go to judicial decision, no more 
 than that, one after another, each law might be tested, and that, 
 one after another, each case, under every law, might be tried, and 
 
142 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 that after centuries should roll away, we might hope for the period 
 wheu, every case exhausted, the decisiou of our constitutional right 
 and of the federal duty would be complete ? Or was it that we 
 were to get rid of the controversy which had divided the counti-y 
 for thirty years ; that we were to reach a conclusion beyond which 
 we could see the region of peace; that trauquillity was to be ob- 
 tained by getting a decision on a constitutional question which had 
 been discussed until it was seen that, legislatively, it could not or 
 would not be decided? If, then, the Supreme Court has judicially 
 announced that Congress can not prohibit the introduction of slave 
 property into a Territory, and that no one deriving authority from 
 Congress can do so, and the Senator from Illinois holds that the 
 inhabitants derive their power from the organic act of Congress, 
 what restrains his acknowledgment of our right to go into the Ter- 
 ritories, and his recognition of the case being closed by the opin- 
 ion of the court? I can understand how one who has followed to 
 its logical consequences the original doctrine of squatter sover- 
 eignty might still stand out, and say this inherent right can not be 
 taken away by judicial decision ; but is not one who claims to 
 derive the power of the territorial legislation from a law of Con- 
 gress, and who finds the opinion of the court conclusive as to 
 Congress, and to all deriving their authority from it, estopped 
 from any further argument? 
 
 Much of what the Senator said about the condition of public 
 affairs can only be regarded as the presentation of his own case, 
 and repuires no notice from me. His witticism upon the honor- 
 able Senator, the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary 
 [Mr. Bayard], who is now absent, because of the size of the State 
 which he represents, reminds one that it was mentioned as an evi- 
 dence of the stupidity of a German, that he questioned the great- 
 ness of Napoleon because he was born in the little island of Corsica. 
 I know not what views the Senator entertained when he measured 
 the capacity of the Senator from Delaware by the size of that 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 143 
 
 State, or the dignity of his action at Charleston by the uuinVjcr of 
 his constituents. If there be Jiny political feature which stands 
 more prominently out than another in the Union, it is the equality 
 of the States. Our stars have no variant size ; they shine with no 
 unequal brilliancy. A Senator from Delaware holds a position 
 entitled to the same respect, as such, as the Senator from any 
 other State of the Union. More than that, the character, the 
 conduct, the information, the capacity of that Senator might claim 
 respect, if he was not entitled to it from his position. 
 
 Twice on this occasion, and more than the sarhe number of times 
 heretofore, has the Senator referred to the great benefit derived 
 from that provision which grants a trial in the local court, an 
 appeal to the Supreme Court of the Territory, and an appeal from 
 thence to the Supreme Court of the United States, on every ques- 
 tion involving title to slaves. I wish to say that whatever merit 
 attaches to that belongs to a Senator to whom the advocates of 
 negro slavery have not often been in the habit of acknowledging 
 their obligations — the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. HaleJ, 
 who introduced it in 1850 as an amendment to the New Mexico 
 Bill. We adopted it as a fair proposition, equally acceptable upon 
 one side and the other. On its adoption, no one voted against it. 
 That proposition was incorporated in the Kansas Bill, but unless 
 we acknowledge obligations to the Senator from New Hampshire, 
 how shall they be accorded for that to the Senator from Illinois? 
 
 I am asked whether the resolutions of the Senate can have the 
 force of law. Of course not. The Senate, however, is an inde- 
 pendent member of the Government, and from its organization 
 should be peculiarly watchful of State rights. Before the meeting 
 of the Charleston Convention, it was untruly stated that these 
 resolutions were concocted to affect the action of the Charleston 
 Convention. Now we are asked if they are to affect the Baltimore 
 Convention. They were not designed for the one ; they are not 
 prcssjcd in view of the other. They were introduced to obtain an 
 
144 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 expression of the opinion of the Senate, a proceeding quite fre- 
 quent in the history of this body. It was believed that they would 
 have a beneficial effect, and that they were stated in terms which 
 would show the public the error of supposing that there was a 
 purpose on the part of the Democracy, or of the South, to enact 
 what was called a slave code for the Territories of the United 
 States. It was believed that the assertion of sound principles at 
 this time would direct public opinion, and might be fruitful of 
 such reuniting, harmonizing results as we all desire, and which 
 the public need. Whether it is to have this effect or not; whether 
 at last we are to be shorn of our national strength by personal or 
 sectional strife, depends upon the conduct of those who have it in 
 their power to control the result. The Democratic party, in its 
 history, presents a high example of nationality ; its power and its 
 usefulness has been its co-extension with the Union. The Demo- 
 crats of the Northern States who vote for these resolutions, but 
 affirm that which we have so often announced with pride, that 
 there was a political opinion which pervaded the whole country ; 
 there was a party capable to save the Union, because it be- 
 longed to all the States. If the two Democratic Senators who 
 alone have declared their opposition should so vote, to that extent 
 the effect would be impaired, and they will stand in that isolation 
 to which the Senator points as a consequence so dreadful to the 
 Southern men at Charleston, 
 
 [Hero Mr. Davis gave way for a motion to adjourn, and on the 17th 
 resumed.] 
 
 Mr. Davis. At the close of the session of yesterday, I was 
 speaking of the hope entertained that the Democratic party would 
 yet be united ; that the party which had so long wielded the des- 
 tinies of the country, for its honor, for its glory, and its progress, 
 was not about to be checked midway in its career — to be buried in 
 a premature grave; but that it was to go on, with concentrated 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 145 
 
 energy, toward the great cuds for which it has striven since 1800, 
 by a long pull, and a strong pull, and a pull altogether, to bring 
 the ship of State into that quiet harbor where 
 
 "Vessels safe, without their hawsers, ride." 
 
 This was a hope, however, not founded on any supposition that we 
 were to escape from the issues which are presented — a hope not 
 based on the proposition that every man should have his own con- 
 struction of our creed, and that we should unite together merely 
 for success; but that the party, as heretofore, in each succeeding 
 quadrennial convention, would add to the resolutions of the pre- 
 ceding one such declarations as passing events indicated, and the 
 exigencies of the country demanded. 
 
 In the last four years a division has arisen in the Democratic 
 party, upon the construction of one of the articles of its creed. 
 It behooves us, in that state of the case, to decide what the true 
 construction is ; for, if the party be not a union of men upon prin- 
 ciple, the sooner it is dissolved the better; and if it be such a 
 union, why shall not those principles be defined, so as to remove 
 doubt or cavil, and be applied in every emergency to meet the 
 demands of each succeeding case? Thus only can we avoid 
 division in council and confusion in action. 
 
 The Senator from Illinois, who preceded me, announced that he 
 had performed a pleasing duty in defending the Democratic party. 
 That party might well cry out. Save me from my defender. It 
 was a defense of the "party by the arraignment of its prominent 
 members. It was the preservation of the body by the destruction 
 of its head — for the President of the United States is, for the time 
 being, the head of the party that placed him in position ; and the 
 head of the party thus in position can not be destroyed without 
 the disintegration of the members and the destruction of the body 
 itself. I suppose the Senator, however, was at his favorite amuse- 
 ment of "shooting at the lump.' The "lump" heretofore has 
 10 
 
146 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 been those Democratic Senators who dissented from him : this time 
 he involved Democrats all over the country. Not even the presiding 
 officer, whose position seals his lips, could escape him. And here 
 let me say that I found nothing in the extract read from that gen- 
 tlemau's address, which, construed as was no doubt intended, does 
 not meet my approval ; but if tried by the modern lexicon of the 
 Senator, it might be rendered a contradiction to his avowed opin- 
 ions, and by the same mode of expounding, non-intervention would 
 be a sin of which the whole Democracy might be convicted, under 
 the indictment of squatter sovereignty. The language quoted from 
 the address of the Vice-President is to be construed as understood 
 at the time, at the place, and by men such as the one who used it. 
 With that force which usually enters into his addresses — with 
 even more than his usual eloquence — the Senator referred to the 
 scene which awaited him upon his return to Chicago, when, as 
 represented, he met an infuriated mob, who assailed him for having 
 maintained the measures of 1850 — th(?se compromises which, in the 
 Northern section, it was urged had been passed in the interest of 
 the South. But, pray, what one of those measures was it which 
 excited the mob so described ? Only one, I believe, was put in 
 issue at the North — the fugitive slave law ; that one he did not 
 vote for. But it was the part of manliness to say that, though 
 absent and not voting for it, he approved of it. Such, I believe, 
 was his commendable course on that occasion. I give him, there- 
 fore, all due credit for not escaping from a responsibility to which 
 they might not have held him. Are we to give perpetual thanks 
 to any one because he did not yield to so senseless a clamor, but 
 conceded to us that small measure of constitutional right — because 
 he has complied with a requirement so plain that my regret is that 
 it ever required congressional intervention to enforce it? It be- 
 longed to the honor of the States to execute that clause of the 
 Constitution. They should have executed it without congressional 
 intervention ; congressional action should only have been useful to 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 147 
 
 give tluit uniformity of proceeding which State action could not 
 have secured. 
 
 Concurring in the depicted evil of the destruction of the Dem- 
 ocratic organization, it must be admitted that such consequence 
 is the inevitable result of a radical difference of principle. The 
 Senator laments the disease, but instead of healing, aggravates it. 
 While pleading the evils of the disruption of the party, it is quite 
 apparent that, in his mind, there is another still greater calamity; 
 'for, through all his arraignment of others, all his self-laudation, 
 all his complaints of persecution, like an air through its varia- 
 tions, appears and re-appears the action of the Charleston Conven- 
 tion. That seemed to be the beginning and the end of his solic- 
 itude. The oft-told tale of his removal from the chairmanship of 
 the Committee on Territories had to be renewed and connected with 
 that convention, and even assumed as the basis on which his strength 
 was founded in that convention. I think the Senator did himself 
 injustice. I think his long career and distinguished labors, his ad- 
 mitted capacity for good hereafter, constitute a better reason for the 
 support which he received, than the fact that his associates in the 
 Senate had not chosen to put him in a particular position in the 
 organization of this body. It is enough that that fact did not 
 divert support from him; and I am aware of none of his associates 
 here who have forced it upon public attention with a view to affect 
 him. 
 
 He claims that an arraignment made against his Democracy has 
 been answered by the action of a majority of the Convention at 
 Charleston ; and then proceeds to inform the minority men that he 
 would scorn to be the candidate of a party unless he received a 
 majority of its votes. There was no use in making that declara- 
 tion ; it requires not only a majority, but, under our ruling, a vote 
 of two-thirds, for a nomination. It was unnecessary for any body 
 to feel scorn toward that which he could not receive. Other un- 
 fortunate wights might mourn the event ; it belonged to the Sen- 
 
148 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 ator from Illinois to scorn it. The remark of Mr. Lowndes, which 
 has been so often quoted, and which, beautiful in itself, has ac- 
 quired additional value by time, that the Presidency was an ofl&ce 
 neither to be sought nor declined, has no application, therefore, 
 to the Senator, for, under certain contingencies, he says he would 
 decline it. It does not devolve on me to decide whether he has 
 sought it or not. 
 
 But, sir, what is the danger which now besets the Democratic 
 party? Is it, as has been asserted, the doctrine of intervention by 
 Congress, and is that doctrine new? Is the idea that protection, 
 by Congress, to all rights of person or property, wherever it has 
 jursdiction, so dangerous that, in the language employed by the 
 Senator, it would sweep the Democratic party from the face of the 
 earth? For what was our Grovernmeut instituted? Why did the 
 States confer upon the Federal Government the great functions 
 which it possesses ? For protection — mainly for protection beyond 
 the municipal power of the States. I shall have occasion, in the 
 progress of my remarks, to cite some authority, and to trace this from 
 a very early period. I will first, however, notice an assault which 
 the Senator has thought proper to make upon certain States, one of 
 which is, in part, represented by myself. He says they are seced- 
 ers. bolters, because they withdrew from a party convention when 
 it failed to announce their principles. There can be no tie to bind 
 me to a party beyond my will. I will admit no bond that holds 
 me to a party a day longer than I agree to its principles. When 
 men meet together to confer, and ascertain whether or not they do 
 agree, and find that they diifer — radically, essentially, irreconcil- 
 ably differ — what belongs to an honorable position except to part? 
 They can not consistently act together any longer. It devolves 
 upon them frankly to announce the difference, and each to pursue 
 his separate course. 
 
 The letter of Mr. Yancey — acknowledged to be a private letter, 
 an unguarded letter, but which, somehow or other, got into the 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 149 
 
 press — was read to sustain this general accusation against what arc 
 called the Cotton States. I do not pretend to judge how far the 
 Senator has the right here to read a private letter, which, without 
 the authority of the writer, has gone into the public press. It is 
 one of those questions which every man's sense of propriety must, 
 in his own case, decide. Whether or not the use of that letter was 
 justifiable, how is it to be assumed that the Southern States are 
 bound by any opinion there enunciated ? How to be asserted that 
 we, the residents in those States, have pinned our faith to the 
 sleeve of any man, and that we will follow his behest, no matter 
 whither he may go ? But was this the only source of information, 
 or was the impression otherwise sustained ? Did Mr. Yancey, in 
 his speech delivered at Charleston, justify the conclusions which 
 the Senator draws from this letter? Did he admit them to be 
 correct? There he might have found the latest evidence, and the 
 best authority. Speaking to that point, Mr. Yancey said: 
 
 "It has been charged, in order to demoralize whatever influence 
 ■we might be entitled to, either fi-om our personal or political char- 
 acteristics, or as representatives of the State of Alabama, that we 
 are disruptionists, disunionists per se; that we desire to break up 
 the party in the State of Alabama — to break up the party of the 
 Union, and to dissolve the Union itself. Each and all of these 
 allegations, come from what quarter they may, I pronounce to be 
 false. There is no disunionist, that I know of, in the delegation 
 from the State of Alabama. There is no disruptionist that I know 
 of; and if there are factionists in our delegation, they could not 
 have got in there, with the knowledge upon the part of our State 
 Convention that they were of so unenviable a character. Wc come 
 here with two great purposes : first, to save the constitutional 
 rights of the South, if it lay in our power to do so. We desire to 
 save the South by the best means that present themselves to us ; 
 and the State of Alabama believes that the best means now in ex- 
 istence is the organization of the Democratic party, if we shall be 
 able to persuade it to adopt the constitutional basis upon which 
 we think the South alone can be saved." 
 
150 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 He further says: 
 
 " We have come here, then, with the twofold purpose of saving 
 the country and saving the Democracy ; and if the Democracy will 
 not lend itself to that high, holy, and elevated purpose; if it can 
 not elevate itself above the mere question of how perfect shall be 
 its mere personal organization, and how wide-spread shall be its 
 mere voting success, then we say to you, gentlemen, mournfully 
 and regretfully, that, in the opinion of the State of Alabama, and, 
 I believe, of the whole South, you have failed in your mission, and 
 it will be our duty to go forth, and make an appeal to the loyalty 
 of the country to stand by that Constitution which party organiza- 
 tions have deliberately rejected." [Applause.] 
 
 Mr. Yancey answers for himself. It was needless to go back to 
 old letters. Here were his remarks delivered before the conven- 
 tion, speaking to the point in issue, and answering both as to his 
 purposes and as to the motives of those with whom he conferred 
 and acted. 
 
 The Senator nest cited the resolutions of the State of Alabama ; 
 and here he seemed to rest the main point in his argument. The 
 Senator said that Alabama, in 185G, had demanded of the Demo- 
 cratic convention, non-intervention, apd that, in 1860, she had 
 retired from the convention because it insisted upon non-interven- 
 tion. He read one of the resolutions of the Alabama Convention 
 of 1856 ; but the one which bore upon the point was not read. 
 The one which was conclusive as to the position of Alabama then, 
 and its relation to her position now, was exactly the one that was 
 omitted — I read from the resolutions of this year — was as follows : 
 
 '■'■Resolved, further, That we re-affirm so much of the first resolu- 
 tion of the platform adopted in the convention by the Democracy 
 of this State, on the 8th of January, 1856, as relates to the sub- 
 ject of slavery, to-wit." 
 
 It then goes on to quote from that resolution of 1856, as follows: 
 " The unqualified right of the people of the slaveholding States 
 
EEPLY TO SENATOIl DOUGLAS. 151 
 
 to the protection of their property iu the States, in the Territo- 
 ries, and in the wilderness, iu which territorial governments are 
 as yet unorganized." 
 
 That was the resolution of 185G ; and like it was one of Febru- 
 ary, 1848 : 
 
 '■That it is the duty of the General Government by all proper 
 legislation, to secure an entry into those Territories to all the 
 citizens of the United States, together with their property, of every 
 description; and that the same shall be protected by the United 
 States, while the Territories are under its authority." 
 
 So stands the record of that State which is now held responsible 
 for retiring, and is alleged to have withdrawn because she received 
 now what, in former times, she had demanded as the full measure 
 of her rights. Did she receive it? The argument could only be 
 made by concealing the fact that her resolutions of 1848 and 1856 
 asserted the right to protection, and claimed it from the General 
 Government. "What, then, is the necessary inference? That, in 
 the Cincinnati platform, they believed they obtained that which 
 they asserted, or that which necessarily involved it. So much for 
 the point of faith; so much for the poiat of consistency in the 
 assertion of right. But if it were otherwise ; if they had neglected 
 to assert a right; would that destroy it? If they had failed at 
 some time to claim this protection, are they to be estopped, in all 
 time to come, from claiming it? Constitutional right is eternal — 
 not to be sacrificed by any body of men. A single man may re- 
 vive it at any period of the existence of the Constitution. So the 
 argument would be worthless, if the facts were as stated. That 
 they are not so stated, is shown by the record. 
 
 Here allow me to say, in all sincerity, that I dislike thus to 
 speak about conventions ; it does not belong to the duties of the 
 Senate; we did not assemble here to make a President, except in 
 the single contingency of a failure by the people and by the House 
 
152 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of Representatives to elect. When that contingency arrives, the 
 question will be before us. I am sorry that it should have been 
 prematurely introduced. But since the action of the recent con- 
 vention at Charleston is presented as the basis of argument, it may 
 be as well to refer to it, and see what it is. The majority report, 
 presented by seventeen States of the Union, and those the States 
 most reliable to give Democratic votes — the States counted so cer- 
 tain to give Democratic votes that they have been regarded as a 
 fixed basis, a nucleus to which others were to be attracted — these 
 seventeen States reported to the convention a series of resolutions, 
 one of which asserted the right to protection. A minority of 
 States reported another series, excluding the avowal of the right — 
 not exactly denying it, but not avowing it — and a second minor- 
 ity report was submitted, being the Cincinnati platform, pure and 
 simple. It is true that a majority of delegates adopted the minor- 
 ity report, but not a majority of States, nor does it appear, by an 
 analysis of the votes, and the best evidence I have been able to 
 obtain, that it was by a majority of delegates, if each had been left 
 to his own choice ; but that, by one of those ingenious arrange- 
 ments — one of those incidents which, among jurists, is described 
 as the ftivor the vigilant receives from the law — it so happened 
 that, in certain States, the delegates were instructed to vote as a 
 unit; in other States they were not; so that, wherever they were 
 instructed to vote as a unit, the vote must so be cast, and wherever 
 they were not, they might disintegrate. Thus minorities were 
 bound in one instance, and released in another ; and, by a compari- 
 son made by those who had an opportunity to know, it appears 
 that the minority report could not have got a majority of the del- 
 egates, if each delegate had been permitted to east his own vote 
 in the Convention. Neither could it have obtained, as appears by 
 the action of the committee, in a majority of the States, if they 
 had been spoken as such. So that this vaunt as to the effect of 
 the adoption of the platform by a majority, seems to have very 
 
EEPI.Y TO .SK>;Aroll DOUGLAS. 153 
 
 little of substance in it. Again, I find that, after this adoption of 
 a platform, a delegate from Tennessee oifercd a resolution : 
 
 "That all the citizens of the United States have an equal right 
 to settle, with their property, in the Territories of the United 
 States ; and that, under the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States, which we recognize as a correct exposition of the 
 Constitution of the United States, neither their rights of person 
 or property can be destroyed or impaired by congressional or ter- 
 ritorial legislation." 
 
 It does not appear that a vote was taken on it. There is a cur- 
 rent belief that it would have been adopted. If it had been, it 
 would have been an acknowledgment by the Democracy, in con- 
 vention assembled, that the question had been settled by the de- 
 cisions of the Supreme Court. But in the progress of the con- 
 vention, when they came to balloting, it appears, by an analysis of 
 the vote for candidates, that the Senator from Illinois received 
 from seventeen undoubted Democratic States of the Union, casting 
 one hundred and twenty-seven electoral votes, but eleven votes. 
 It is not such a great triumph, then, in the Democratic view, as is 
 claimed. It does not suffice to add up the number of votes where 
 they do not avail. It is not fair to bring the votes of Vermont, 
 where I believe nobody expects we shall be successful, and count 
 them for a particular candidate. The electoral votes — and these 
 alone, tell upon the result; and it appears that in those States 
 which have been counted certain to cast their electoral votes for 
 the candidate who might have been nominated at that convention, 
 the Senator received but eleven. This is but meagre claim to 
 bind us to his car as the successful champion of the majority. 
 This is but small basis for the boast that his hopes were gratified, 
 that he would not receive the nomination unless sustained by a 
 majority of the party, and that his opinions had received the in- 
 dorsement of the Democracy. 
 
 My devotion to the party is life-long. If the assertion be al- 
 
154 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 lowable, it may be said that I inherited my political principles. 
 I derive them from a revolutionary father — one of the earnest 
 friends of Mr. Jefferson ; who, after the revolution which achieved 
 our independence, bore his full part in the civil revolution of 
 1800, which emancipated us from federal usurpation and consoli- 
 dation. I therefore have all that devotion to party which belongs 
 to habitual reverence and confidence. But, sir, that devotion to 
 party rests on the assumption that it is to maintain sound prin- 
 ciples ; that it is to strive hereafter, as heretofore, to carry out 
 the great cardinal creed in which the Democratic party was 
 founded. When the resolutions of 1798 and 1799 are discarded; 
 when we fly from the extreme of monarchy to land in the dan- 
 ger to republics, anarchy, and the Democratic party says its arm 
 is paralyzed — can not be raised to maintain constitutional rights, 
 my devotion to its organization is at an end. It fails thencefor- 
 ward in the purposes for which it was established ; and if there 
 be a constitutional party in the land which, in the language of 
 Mr. Jefferson, would find in the vigor of the Federal Government 
 the best hope for our liberty and security, to that party I should 
 attach myself whenever that sad contingency arose. 
 
 The resolutions of 1798 and 1799, though directed against 
 usurpation, were equally directed against the dangers of anarchy. 
 Their principles are alike applicable to both. Their cardinal 
 creed was a Federal Government, according to the grants con- 
 ferred upon it, and these righteously administered. It is not fair 
 to the men who taught us the lessons of Democracy that they 
 should be held responsible for a theoi-y which leaves the Federal 
 Government, as one who has abdicated all authority, to stand at 
 the mercy of local usurpations. Least of all does their teaching 
 maintain that this Government has no power over the Territories; 
 that this Government has no obligation to protect the rights of per- 
 son and property in the Territories ; for, among the first acts under the 
 Constitution, was one which both asserted and exercised the power. 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 155 
 
 After the adoptiou of the Constitution, in 1789, an act was 
 passed, to which reiorence is frequently made as heing a confirm- 
 ation of the ordinance of 1787; and this has been repeated so 
 often that it has received general belief There was a constitu- 
 tional provision which required all obligations and engagements 
 under the confederation to hold good under the Constitution. If 
 there was an obligation or an engagement growing out of the or- 
 dinance of 1787, out of the deed of cession by Virginia, it was 
 transmitted to the Government established under the Constitution; 
 but that Congress under the Constitution gave it no vitality — that 
 they added no force to it, is apparent from the fact which is so 
 often relied upon as authority. It was in view of this fact, in full 
 remembrance of this and of other f:\cts connected with it, that 
 Mr. Madison said, in relation to passing regulations for the Ter- 
 ritories, that " Congress did not regard the interdiction of slavery 
 among the needful regulations contemplated by the Constitution, 
 since, in none of the territorial governments created by them, was 
 such an interdict found." I am aware that Justice McLean has 
 viewed this as an historical error of Mr. Madison. I shall not 
 assume to decide between such high authorities. The act is as 
 follows : 
 
 "An Act to provide for the government of the Territory north-west of the Ohio 
 
 River. 
 
 ""Whereas, In order that the ordinance of the United States in 
 Congress assembled, for the govcnuuont of the territory north-west 
 of the river Ohio, may continue to have full eflfect, it is requisite 
 that certain provisions should be made so as to adapt the same 
 to the present Constitution of the United States. 
 
 "Section 1. Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Rejyresen- 
 tatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, 
 in all cases in which, by the said ordinance, any information is to 
 be given, or communication made, by the governor of the said 
 Territory to the United States in Congress assembled, or to any 
 of their officers, it shall be the duty of the said governor to give 
 
156 LIFE OF JEFFEPtSOX DAVIS. 
 
 sueli information, and to make such communication, to the Presi- 
 dent of the United States; and the President shall nominate, and, 
 by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
 all officers which, by the said ordinance, were to have been ap- 
 pointed by the United States in Congress assembled ; and all 
 officers so appointed shall be commissioned by him; and in all 
 cases where the United States in Congress assembled might, by 
 the said ordinance, make any commission, or remove from any 
 office, the President is hereby declared to have the same powers 
 to revocation and removal. 
 
 " Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That in the case of the death, 
 removal, resignation, or necessary absence of the governor of the 
 said Territory, the secretary thereof shall be, and he is hereby 
 authorized and required to execute all the powers and perform all 
 the duties of the governor during the vacancy occasioned by the 
 removal, resignation, or necessary absence of the said governor. 
 
 "Approved August 7, 1789." 
 
 All that is to be found in this act which ftivors the supposition 
 and frequent assertion that, under the Constitution, the ordinance 
 of 1787 was ratified and confirmed is to be found in the preamble, 
 and that preamble so vaguely alludes to it that the idea is refuted 
 by reference to an act which followed soon afterwards — the act of 
 1793 — from which I will read a single section : 
 
 " Sec. 3. And he it further enacted, That when a person held 
 to labor in any of the United States, or in either of the Territo- 
 ries on the north-west or south of the river Ohio, under the laws 
 thereof, shall escape into any other of the said States or Territo- 
 ries, the person to whom such service or labor may be due, his 
 agent, or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize or arrest such 
 fugitive from labor," etc. 
 
 Is it not apparent that, when the Congress legislated in 1793, 
 they recognized the existence of slavery and protected that kind 
 of property in the territory north-west of the river Ohio, and is it 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 157 
 
 not conclusive that they did not intend, by the act of 1789 to 
 confirm, ratify, and give effect to the ordinance of 1787, which 
 would have excluded it? 
 
 This doctrine of protection, then, is not new. It goes back to 
 the foundation of the Government. It is traceable down throuo-h 
 all the early controversies; and they arose at least as early as 1790. 
 It is found in the messages of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, and 
 in the legislation of Congress; and also in the messages of the 
 elder Adams. There was not one of the first four Presidents of 
 the United States who did not recognize this obligation of protec- 
 tion, who did not assert this power on the part of the Federal 
 Government ; and not one of them ever attempted to pervert it to 
 a power to destroy. If division in the Democratic party is to arise 
 now, because of this doctrine, it is not from the change by those 
 who assert it, but of those who deny it. It is not from the intro- 
 duction of a new feature iu the theory of our Government, but 
 from the denial of that which was recognized in its very begin- 
 ning. 
 
 As I understood the main argument of the Senator, it was based 
 upon the general postulate that the Democratic Convention of 1848 
 recognized a new doctrine, a doctrine which inhibited the General 
 Government from interfering in any way, either for the protection 
 of property or otherwise, with the local affairs of a Territory ; he 
 held the party responsible for all the opinions entertained by the 
 candidate in 1848, because the party had nominated him, and he 
 quoted the record to show what States, by voting for him, had 
 committed themselves to the doctrine of the "Nicholson letter."' 
 He even quoted South Carolina, represented by that man who be- 
 came famous for a single act, and, as South Carolinians said, with- 
 out authority at home to sustain it. But this was cited as pledg- 
 ing the faith of South Carolina to the doctrine of the "Nicholson 
 letter;" and, worse than all, the Senator did this, though he knew 
 that the doctrine of the "Nicholson letter" was the subject of con- 
 
158 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 troversy for years subsequently; that, what was the true construc- 
 tion of that letter, entered into the canvass in the Southern States ; 
 that the construction which Mr. Cass himself placed upon it at a 
 subsequent period was there denied ; and the Senator might have 
 remembered, if he had chosen to recollect so unimportant a thing, 
 that I once had to explain to him, ten years ago, the fact that I 
 repudiated the doctrine of that letter at the time it was published, 
 and that the Democracy of Mississippi had well-nigh crucified me 
 for the construction which I placed upon it ; there were men mean 
 enough to suspect that the construction I gave to the Nicholson 
 letter was prompted by the confidence and affection I felt for Gen- 
 eral Taylor. At a subsequent period, however, Mr. Cass thor- 
 oughly reviewed it. He uttered, for him, very harsh language 
 against all who had doubted the true construction of his letter, 
 and he construed it just as I had done during the canvass of 
 1848. It remains only to add that I supported Mr. Cass, not be- 
 cause of the doctrine of the Nicholson letter, but in despite of it; 
 because I believed a Democratic President, with a Democratic cab- 
 inet and Democratic counselors in the two houses of Congress, and 
 he as honest a man as I believed Mr. Cass to be, would be a safer 
 reliance than his opponent, who personally possessed my confi- 
 dence as much as any man living, but who was of and must draw 
 his advisers from a party, the tenets of which I believed to be 
 opposed to the interests of the country as they were to all my 
 political convictions. 
 
 I little thought at that time that my advocacy of Mr. Cass, upon 
 such grounds as these, or his support by the State of which I am 
 a citizen, would at any future day be quoted as an indorsement of 
 the opinions contained in the Nicholson letter, as those opinions 
 were afterwards defined. But it is not only upon this letter, but 
 equally upon the resolutions of the convention as constructive of 
 that letter, that he rested his argument. I will here say to the 
 Senator that if, at any time, I do him the least injustice, speaking 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 159 
 
 as I tlo from such uotes as I could take while he progressed, I 
 will thank him to correct me. 
 
 But this letter entered into the canvass; there was a doubt about 
 its construction ; there were men who asserted that they had posi- 
 tive authority for saying that it meant that the people of a Terri- 
 tory could only exclude slavery when the Territory should form a 
 constitution and be admitted as a State. This doubt continued to 
 hang over the construction, and it was that doubt alone which 
 secured Mr. Cass the vote of Mississippi. If the true construction 
 had been certainly known he would have had no chauce to get it. 
 Our majority went down from thousands to hundreds, as it was. 
 In Alabama the decrease was greater. It was not that the doc- 
 trine was countenanced, but the doubt as to the true meaning 
 of the letter, and the constantly reiterated assertion that it only 
 meant the Territories when they should be admitted as States, 
 enabled him to carry those States. 
 
 But if I mistook the Senator there, I think probably I did 
 not on another point : that he claimed the support of certain 
 Southern men for Mr. Richardson as Speaker of the House to 
 be by them an acknowledgment of the doctrine of squatter sov- 
 ereignty. 
 
 I suppose those Southern men who voted for Mr. Richardson 
 voted for him as I did for Mr. Cass, in despite of his opinions on 
 that question, because they preferred Mr. Richardson to Mr. 
 Banks, even with squatter sovereignty. They considered that the 
 latter was carrying an amount of heresies which greatly exceeded 
 the value of squatter sovereignty. It was a choice of evils — not 
 an indorsement of his opinions. Neither did they this year in- 
 dorse the opinions on that point of Mr. McClernand when they 
 voted for him. According to the Senator's argument I could show 
 hira that Illinois was committed to the doctrine of federal protec- 
 tion to property in the Territories and the remedy of secession as 
 a State right; committed irrevocably, unmistakably, with no right 
 
160 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 to plead any ignorance of the political creed of the individual, or 
 the meaning of his words. 
 
 In 1852 — I refer to it with pride — Illinois did me the honor to 
 vote consistently for me for the Vice-Presidency, up to the time 
 of adjournment; though in 1850, and in 1851, I had done all 
 these acts which have been spoken of, and the Senator has admit- 
 ted my consistency, in opinions which were avowed with at least 
 such perspicuity as left nobody in doubt as to my opinion. Did 
 Illinois then adopt my theory of protection in the Territories, or 
 of the right of State secession ? No, sir. I hold them to no such 
 consequences. Some of the old inhabitants of Illinois may have 
 remembered me when their northern frontier was a wilderness, 
 when they and I had kind relations in the face of hostile Indians. 
 Some of them may have remembered me, and, I believe, kindly, as 
 associated with them, at a later period, on the fields of Mexico. 
 The Senator himself, I know, remembered kindly his association 
 with me in the halls of Congress. It was these bonds which gave 
 me the confidence of the State of Illinois. I never misconstrued 
 it. I never pretended to put them in the attitude of adopting all 
 my opinions. Never required it, never desired it, save as in so far 
 as wishing all men would agree with me, confidently believing my 
 position to be true. At a later period, and when these questions 
 were more important in the public mind, when public attention 
 has been more directed to them, when public opinion has been 
 more matured, at the very time when the Senator claims that his 
 doctrine culminated, the State of Illinois voted for a gentleman 
 for Vice-President at Cincinnati who held the same opinions with 
 myself, or, if there was a difference, held them to a greater ex- 
 treme — I mean General Quitman. 
 
 Mr. Douglas. We made no test on any one. 
 
 Mr. Davis. Then, how did the South become responsible for 
 the doctrine of General Cass, by consenting to his nomination in 
 1848, and supporting his election ? But at a later period, down 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. IGl 
 
 to the present session, what is the position in wliich the Senator 
 places his friends — those sterling Democrats, uncompromising Anti- 
 Know-Nothings; men who give no quarter to the American party, 
 and yet who voted this year for Mr. Smith, of North Carolina, to 
 be Speaker of the House of llepresentatives. Is the Senator an- 
 swered? Does he not see that tliere is no justice in assuming a 
 vote for an individual to be the entire adoption of his opinions? 
 
 He cited, in this connection, a resolution of 1848, as having been 
 framed to cover the doctrines of the Nicholson letter ; and he 
 claimed thus to have shown that the convention not only under- 
 stood it, but adopted it, and made it the party creed, and that we 
 were bound to it from that period forward. He even had that reso- 
 lution of 1848 read, in order that there should be, at no future 
 time, any question as to the principle which the party then avowed ; 
 that it should be fixed as a starting point in all the future progress 
 of Democracy. I was surprised at the importance the Senator at- 
 tached to that resolution of 1848, because it was not new; it was 
 not framed to ipeet the opinions of the Nicholson letter, but came 
 down from a period as remote as 1840; was copied into the plat- 
 form of 1844, and again into that of 1848, being the expression 
 which the condition of the country in 1840 had induced — a dec- 
 laration of opinion growing out of the agitation in the two houses 
 of Congress at that day, and the fearful strides which antislavery 
 •was making, and which Mr. Calhoun had labored to check by the 
 declaration of constitutional truths, as set forth in his Senate reso- 
 lutions of 1837-8. 
 
 That there may be no mistake on this point, and particularly as 
 the Senator attached special importance to it, I will turn to the 
 platform of 1840, and read from it, so that it shall be found to be — 
 
 Mr. Douglas. It is conceded. 
 
 Mr. Davis. The Senator concedes the ftict, that the resolution 
 of 1848 was a copy of that of 1840, and with the concession falls 
 his argument. The platforms of 1840 and 1844 were rc-affirmed 
 11 
 
162 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 in 1848; and, consequently, the resolution of '48 being identical 
 with that of '40, was not a construction of the letter written in 
 1847. 
 
 True to its instincts and to its practices, the Democratic party, 
 from time to time, continued to add to their "platform" whatever 
 was needful for action by the Government in the condition of the 
 country. Thus, in 1844, they re-asserted the platform of 1840; 
 and they added thereto, because of a question then pending, that — 
 
 " The re-annexation of Texas, at the earliest practicable period, 
 is a great American measure, which the convention recommend to 
 the cordial support of the Democracy of the Union." 
 
 In 1848 they re-adopted the resolutions of 1844; and were not 
 a little laughed at for keeping up the question of Texas after it 
 had been annexed. In 1852 a new question had arisen; the meas- 
 ures of 1850 had presented, with great force to the public mind, 
 the necessity for some expression of opinion upon the disturbing 
 questions which the measures of 1850 had been designed to quiet. 
 Therefore, in 1852, the party, true to its obligation to announce its 
 principles, and to meet issues as they arise, said : 
 
 " Resolved, That the foregoing proposition (referring to the res- 
 olution of 1848) covers, and was intended to embrace, the whole 
 subject of slavery agitation in Congress ; and, therefore, the Dem- 
 ocratic party in the Union, standing on this national platform, will 
 abide by and adhere to a faithful execution of the act known as 
 the compromise measure, settled by the last Congress, the act for 
 reclaiming fugitives from labor included ; which act, being de- 
 signed to carry out an express provision of the Constitution, can 
 not, with fidelity thereto, be repealed, or so changed as to destroy 
 or impair its efficacy.' 
 
 " Resolved, That the Democratic party will restrain all attempts 
 at renewing, in Congress or out of it, the agitation of the slave 
 question, under whatever shape or color the attempt may be made.' 
 
 This was the additign made in 1852, and it was made because 
 
KEPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 163 
 
 of the agitation which then pr.evailed through the country against 
 the fugitive slave act, and it was because the fugitive slave act, 
 and that alone, was assailed, that the Democratic convention met 
 the issue on that measure specifically, and for the same reason it 
 received the approbation of the Southern States. Had this been 
 considered as the indorsement of the slave trade bill for the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia, it would not have received their approval. The 
 agitation was in relation to recovering fugitive slaves, and the 
 Democratic party boldly and truly met the living issue, and de- 
 clared its position upon it. 
 
 In 1856 other questions had arisen. It was necessary to meet 
 them. The convention did meet them, and met them in a manner 
 which was satisfactory, because it was believed to be full. I will 
 not weary the Senate by reading the resolutions of 1856; they are 
 familiar to every body. I only quote a portion of them : 
 
 "The American Democracy recognize and adopt the principles 
 contained in the organic laws establishing the Territories of Kan- 
 sas and Nebraska as embodying the only sound and safe solution 
 of the 'slavery question' upon which the great national idea of the 
 people of this whole country can repose in its determined conserv- 
 atism of the Union — non-interference by Congress with slavery in 
 State and Territory, or in the District of Columbia. 
 
 " That, by the uniform application of this Democratic principle 
 to the organization of Territories, and to the admission of new 
 States, with or without domestic slavery, as they may elect, the 
 equal rights of all States will be preserved intact, the original 
 compacts of the Constitution maintained inviolate, and the perpe- 
 tuity and expansion of this Union insured to its utmost capacity 
 of embracing, in peace and harmony, every future American State 
 that may be constituted or annexed with a republican form of gov- 
 ernment." 
 
 Pray, what can this mean? Squatter sovereignty? Incapacity 
 of the Federal Government to enact any law for the protection of 
 slave property anywhere? Could that be in the face of a struggle 
 
164 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 that we were constantly carrying on against the opponents of the 
 f'uo-itive slave law? Could that be, in the face of the fact that a 
 majority had trodden down our constitutional rights in the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia, by legislating in relation to that particular char- 
 acter of property, and that they had failed to redeem a promise 
 they had sacredly made to pass a law for the protection of slave 
 property, so as to punish any one who should seduce, or entice, or 
 abduct it from an owner in this District ? 
 
 With all these things fresh in mind, what did they mean? They 
 meant that Congress should not decide the question, whether that 
 institution should exist within a Territory or not. They did not 
 mean to withdraw from the inhabitants of the District of Columbia 
 that protection to which they were entitled, and which is almost 
 annually given by legislation ; and yet States and Territories and 
 the District of Columbia are all grouped together, as the points 
 upon which this idea rests, and to which it is directed. It meant 
 that Congress was not to legislate to interfere with the rights of 
 property anywhere; not to attempt to decide what should be the 
 institutions maintained anywhere ; but surely not to disclaim the 
 right to protect property, whether on sea or on land, wherever the 
 Federal Government had jurisdiction and power. But some stress 
 has been laid upon the resolution, which says that this principle 
 should be applied to 
 
 "The organization of the Territories, and to the admission of 
 new States, with or without domestic slavery, as they may elect." 
 
 What does "may elect" mean? Does it refer to organization 
 of the Territory? "Who may elect? Congress organizes the Ter- 
 ritories. Did it mean that the Territories were to elect? It does 
 not say so. What does it say? 
 
 "That by the uniform application of this Democratic principle 
 to the organization of Territories, and to the admission of new 
 States, with or without domestic slavery, as they may elect." 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 166 
 
 And here it met a question which had disturbed the peace of 
 the country, and well-nigh destroyed the Union — the right of a 
 State holding slaves to bo admitted into the Union. It was de- 
 clared here that the State so admitted should elect whether it 
 would or would not have slaves. There is nothing in that which 
 logically applies to the organization of a Territory. But if this be 
 in doubt, let us come to the last resolution, which says : 
 
 " We recognize the right of the people of all the Territories, in- 
 cluding Kansas and Nebraska, acting through the legally and fairly- 
 expressed will of a majority of actual residents — " 
 
 Does it stop there? No — 
 
 " and whenever the number of their inhabitants justifies it, to 
 form a constitution, with or without domestic slavery, and be ad- 
 mitted into the Union upon terms of perfect equality with the 
 other States." 
 
 If there had been any doubt before as to what " may elect" re- 
 ferred to, this resolution certainly removed it. It is clear they 
 meant, that when a Territory had a sufficient number of inhabit- 
 ants, and came to form a constitution, then it might decide the 
 question as it pleased. From that doctrine, I know no Democrat 
 who now dissents. 
 
 I have thus, because of the assertion that this was a new idea 
 attempted to be interjected into the Democratic creed, gone over 
 some portion of its history. Important by its connection with the 
 existing agitation, and last in the series, is an act with the usher- 
 ing in of which the Senator is more familiar than myself, and on 
 which he made remarks, to which, it is probable, some of those 
 who acted with him, will reply. I wish merely to say, in relation 
 to the Kansas-Nebraska act, that there are expressions in it which 
 seem to me not of doubtful meaning, such as, " in all cases in- 
 volving title to slaves, or involving the question of personal free- 
 dom," there should be a trial before the courts, and \>ithout refer- 
 
166 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ence to the amount involved, an appeal to the Supreme Court of 
 the Territory, and from thence to the Supreme Court of the United 
 States. If there was no right of property there ; if we had no 
 right to recognize it there; if some sovereign was to determine 
 whether it existed or not, why did we say that the Supreme Court 
 of the United States, in the last resort, should decide the question? 
 If it was an admitted thing, by that bill, that the Territorial Leg- 
 islature should decide it, why did we provide for taking the case 
 to the Supreme Court? If it had been believed then, as it is as- 
 serted now, that a Territory possessed all the power of a State; 
 that the inhabitants of a Territory could meet in convention and 
 decide the question as the people of a State might do, there wag 
 nothing to be carried to the Supreme Court. You can not appeal 
 from the decision of a constitutional convention of a State to the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, to decide whether slave prop- 
 erty shall be prohibited or admitted within the limits of a State ; 
 and if they rest on the same footing, what is the meaning of that 
 clause of the bill ? 
 
 But this organic law further provides, just as the resolution of 
 the convention had done, that when a legal majority of the resi- 
 dents of either Territory formed a constitution, then, at their will, 
 they might recognize or exclude slavery, and come into the Union 
 as co-equal States. This fixes the period, defines the time at 
 which the territorial inhabitants may perform this act, and clearly 
 forbids the idea that it was intended, by those who enacted the law, 
 to acknowledge that power to be existent in the inhabitants of a 
 Territory during their territorial condition. If I am mistaken in 
 this ; if there was a contemporaneous construction of it difi"ering 
 from this, the Senators who sit around me and who were then mem- 
 bers of the body, will not fail to remember it. 
 
 The Senator asserts that, in relation to this point, those who 
 acted with him have changed, and claims for himself to have been 
 consistent. If this be so, it proves nothing as to the present, and 
 
EEPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 167 
 
 only individual opinions as to the past. I do not regard consis- 
 tency as a Very high virtue ; neither, it appears, does he ; for lie 
 told us that if it could be shown to him that he was in error on 
 any point, he would change his opinion. How could that be ? 
 Who would undertake to show the Senator that he was in error? 
 Who would undertake to measure the altitude of the Colossus who 
 bestrides the world, and announces for, and of, and by himself, 
 "We, the Democracy," as though, in his person, all that remained 
 of the party was now concentrated 1 Other men are permitted to 
 change, because other men may be mistaken ; and if they are 
 honest, when convicted of their error, they must change, but how 
 can one expect to convince the Senator, who, where all is change, 
 stands changeless still ? 
 
 In the course of his reply to me — if indeed it may be called 
 such ; it seemed to be rather a review of every thing except what 
 I had said — he set me the bad example of going into the canvass 
 in my own State. It is the first, I trust it will be the last time, I 
 shall follow his example ; and now only to the extent of the occa- 
 sion, where criticism was invited by unusual publicity. In the 
 canvass which the Senator had with his opponent, Mr. Lincoln, 
 and the debates of which have been published in a book, we find 
 much which, if it be consistent with his course as I had known it, 
 only proves to me how little able I was to understand his meaning 
 in former times. 
 
 The Kansas-Nebraska Bill having agreed the right for which I 
 contend to be the subject of judicial decision; it having specially 
 provided the mode and facilitated the process by which that right 
 should be brought to the courts and finally decided; not allowiug 
 any check to be interposed because of amount, that bill haviug 
 continued the provision which had been introduced into the New 
 Mexico Bill, how are we to understand the Senator's declarations, 
 that, let the Supreme Court decide as they may, the inhabitants of 
 a Territory may lawfully admit or exclude slavery as they please? 
 
168 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 "What a liollow promise was given to us in the provision referring 
 this vexed question to judicial decision, in order that we might 
 roach a point on which we might peacefully rest, if the inhabitants 
 of the Territories for which Congress had legislated could still de- 
 cide the question and set aside any decision of the Supreme Court, 
 and do this lawfully. I ask, was it not to give us a stone, when 
 he promised us bread ; to incorporate a provision in the organic 
 act securing the right of appeal to the courts, if, as now stated, 
 those courts were known to be powerless to grant a remedy? 
 
 Here there is a very broad distinction to be drawn between the 
 power of the inhabitants of a Territory, or of any local community, 
 lawfully to do a thing, and forcibly to do it. If the Senator had 
 said, that whatever might be the decision of the Supreme Court, 
 whatever might be the laws of Pongress, whatever might be the 
 laws of the Territories, in the face of an infuriated mob, such as 
 he described on another occasion, it would be impossible for a man 
 to hold a slave against their will, he would but have avowed the 
 truism that in our country the law waits upon public opinion. But 
 he says that they can do it lawfully. If his position had been 
 such as I have just stated, it would have struck me as the opinion 
 I had always supposed him to entertain. More than that, it would 
 have struck me as the opinion which no one could gainsay ; which, 
 at any time, I would have been ready to admit. Nothing is more 
 clear than that no law could prevail in our country, where force, as 
 a governmental mean, is almost unknown, against a pervading sen- 
 timent in the community. Every body admits that; and it was in 
 that view of the case that this question has been so often declared 
 to be a mere abstraction. It is an abstraction so far as any one 
 would expect in security to hold against the fixed purpose and all- 
 pervading will of the community, whether territorial or other, a 
 species of property, ambulatory, liable, because it has mind enough 
 to go, to be enticed away whenever freed from physical restraint, 
 and which would be nearly valueless if so restrained. It may be 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 169 
 
 an abstractioa us a practical question of pecuniary advantage, but 
 it is not the less dear to those who assert the constitutional right. 
 It would constitute a very good reason why no one should ever say 
 there was an attempt to force slavery on an unwilling people, but 
 no reason why the right should not be recognized by the Federal 
 Government as one belonging to the equal privileges and iuiuiu- 
 nities of every citizen of the United States. 
 
 But the main point of the Senator's argument — and it deserved 
 to be so, because it is the main question now in the public mind — 
 was, what is the meaning of non-intervention ? He defined it to 
 be synonymous with squatter sovereignty, or with popular sov- 
 ereignty 
 
 The Senator and myself do not seem to be getting any nearer 
 together; because the very thing which he describes constitutes 
 the only case in which I would admit the necessity, and, conse- 
 quently, the propriety of the people acting without authority. If 
 men were cast upon a desert island, the sovereignty of which was 
 unknown, over which no jurisdiction was exercised, they would 
 find themselves necessitated to establish rules which should sub- 
 sist between themselves; and so the people of California, when the 
 Congress failed to give them a government ; when it refused to 
 enact a territorial law ; when, paralyzed by the power of contend- 
 ing factions, it left the immigrants to work their own unhappy 
 way ; they had a right — a right growing out of the necessity of 
 the case — to make rules for the government of their local aflFairs. 
 But this was not sovereignty. It was the exercise, between man 
 and man, of a social function necessary to preserve peace in the 
 absence of any controlling power — essential to conserve the rela- 
 tions of person and property. The sovereignty, if it existed in 
 any organization or government of the world, remained there still ; 
 and whenever that sovereignty extended itself over them, whether 
 shipwrecked mariners, or adventurous Americans — whether cast oflf 
 by the sea, or whether finding their weary way across the desert 
 
170 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 plains whieli lie west of the Mississippi — whenever the hand of 
 the Government holding sovereign jurisdiction was laid upon them, 
 they became subject ; their sovereign control of their own affairs 
 ceased. In our case, the directing hand of the Government is laid 
 upon them at the moment of the enactment of an organic law 
 Therefore, the very point at which the Senator begins his sov- 
 ereignty, is the point at which the necessity, and, in my view, 
 the claim ceases. 
 
 But suppose that a territorial legislature, acting under an or- 
 ganic law, not defining their municipal powers further than has 
 been general in such laws, should pass a law to exclude slave 
 property, would the Senator vote to repeal it? 
 
 Mr. Douglas. I will answer. I would not, because the Dem- 
 ocratic party is pledged to non-intervention ; because, furthermore, 
 whether such an act is constitutional or not is a judicial question. 
 If it is unconstitutional, the court will so decide, and it will be 
 null and void without repeal. If it is constitutional, the people 
 have a right to pass it. If unconstitutional, it is void, and the 
 court will ascertain the fact ; and we pledged our honors to abide 
 the decision 
 
 Mr. Davis. If it will not embarrass the Senator, I would ask 
 him if, as Chief Executive of the United States, he would sign a 
 bill to protect slave property in State, Territory, or District of 
 Columbia — an act of Congress? 
 
 Mr. Douglas. It will be time enough for me, or any other 
 man, to say what bills he will sign, when he is in a position to 
 exercise the power. 
 
 Mr. Davis. The Senator has a right to make me that answer. 
 I was only leading on to a fair understanding of the Senator and 
 myself about non-intervention 
 
 I think it now appears that, in the minds of the gentlemen, 
 non-intervention is a shadowy, unsubstantial doctrine, which has 
 its application according to the circumstances of the case. It 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 171 
 
 ceased to apply when it was necessary to annul an act in Kansas 
 in relation to the political rights of the inhabitants. It had no 
 application when it was necessary to declare that the old French 
 laws should not be revived in the Territory of Kansas after the 
 repeal of the Missouri Compromise ; but it rose an insurmountable 
 barrier when we proposed to sweep away the Mexican decrees, 
 usages, or laws, and leave the Constitution and laws of the United 
 States unfettered in their operation in the Territory acquired from 
 Mexico. It thus seems to have a constantly varying application, 
 and, as I have not yet reached a good definition, one which quite 
 satisfies me, I must take it as I find it in the Senator's speech, in 
 which he says Alabama asserted the doctrine of non-intervention 
 in 1856. The Alabama resolutions of 1856 asserted the right to 
 protection, and the duty of the Federal Government to give it. Sa, 
 if he stands upon the resolutions of Alabama in 1856, non-inter- 
 vention is very good doctrine, and exactly agrees with what I be- 
 lieve — no assumption, by the Federal Government, of any powers 
 over the municipal territorial governments which is not necessary; 
 that the hand of Federal power shall be laid as lightly as possi- 
 ble upon any territorial community ; that its laws shall be limited 
 to the necessities of each case ; that it shall leave the inhabitants 
 as unfettered in the determination of their local legislation as the 
 rights of the people of the States will permit, and the duty of the Gen- 
 eral Government will allow. But when non-intervention is pressed 
 to the point of depriving the arm of the Federal Government of 
 its one great function of protection, then it is the doctrine which 
 we denounce — which we call squatter sovereignty; the renuncia- 
 tion by Congress, and the turning over to the inhabitants a sov- 
 ereignty which, rightfully, it does not belong to the one to grant 
 or the other to claim, and, further and worse, thus to divest the 
 Federal Government of a duty which the Constitution rc<j[uircs it 
 to perform. 
 
 To show that this view is not new — that it does not rest singly 
 
172 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 on the resolutions of Alabama, I will refer to a subject, the action 
 upon which has already been quoted in this debate — the Oregon 
 Bill. During the discussion of the Oregon Bill, I offered in the 
 Senate, June 23, 1848, an amendment which I will read : 
 
 '■'■Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be so con- 
 strued as to authorize the prohibition of domestic slavery in said 
 Territory, whilst it remains in the condition of a Territory of the 
 United States." 
 
 Upon this, I will cite the authority of Mr. Calhoun, in his speech 
 on the Oregon Bill, June 27, 1848: 
 
 " The twelfth section of this bill is intended to assert and main- 
 tain this demand of the non-slaveholding States, while it remains a 
 Territory, not openly or directly, but indirectly, by extending the 
 provisions of the bill for the establishment of the Iowa Territory 
 to this, and by ratifying the acts of the informal and self-consti- 
 tuted government of Oregon, which, among others, contains one 
 prohibiting the introduction of slavery. It thus, in reality, adopts 
 what is called the Wilmot proviso, not only for Oregon, but, as the 
 Bill now stands, for New Mexico and California. The amendment, 
 on the contrary, moved by the Senator from Mississippi, near me 
 [Mr. Davis], is intended to assert and maintain the position of the 
 slave-holding States. It leaves the Territory free and open to all 
 the citizens of the United States, and would overrule, if adopted, 
 the act of the self-constituted Territory of Oregon, and the twelfth 
 section, as far as it relates to the subject under consideration. We 
 have thus fairly presented the grounds taken by the non-slave- 
 holding and the slave-holding States, or as I shall call them, for 
 the sake of brevity, the Northern and Southern States, in their 
 whole extent, for discussion." — Appendix to Congressional Glohe^ 
 Thirtieth Congress, first Session, p. 868. 
 
 I will quote also one of the speeches which he made near the 
 close of his life, at a time when he was so far wasted by disease 
 that it was necessary' for him to ask the Senator from Virginia, 
 who sits before me [Mr. Mason], to read the speech which his 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 173 
 
 tameless spirit impelled him to compose, but which he was phys- 
 ically unable to deliver; aud ouce again he came to the Senate 
 chamber, when standing yet more nearly on the confines of death; 
 he rose, his heart failing in its functions, his voice faltered, but his 
 will was so strong that he could not realize that the icy hand was 
 upon him, and he erroneously thought he was oppressed by the 
 weight of his overcoat. True to his devotion to the principles he 
 had always advocated, clinging, to the last hour of his life, to the 
 duty to maintain the rights of his constituents, still he was here, 
 and his honored, though feeble, voice was raised for the mainten- 
 ance of the great principle to which his life had been devoted. 
 From the speech I read as follows : 
 
 "The plan of the administration can not save the Union, because 
 it can have no effect whatever towards satisfying the States com- 
 posing the Southern section of the Union, that they can, consist- 
 ently with safety and honor, remain in the Union. It is, in fact, 
 but a modification of the Wilmot proviso. It proposes to effect 
 the same object — to exclude the South from all territory acquired 
 by the Mexican treaty. It is well known that the South is united 
 against the Wilmot proviso, and has committed itself, by solemn 
 resolutions, to resist should it be adopted. Its opposition is not to 
 the nanie, but that which it proposes to effect. That, the Southern 
 States hold to be unconstitutional, unjust, inconsistent with their 
 equality as members of the common Union, and calculated to 
 destroy irretrievably the equilibrium between the two sections. 
 These objections equally apply to what, for brevity, I will call the 
 executive proviso. There is no difference between it and the Wil- 
 mot, except in the mode of effecting the object; and in that respect, 
 I must say that the latter is much the least objectionable. It goes 
 to its object openly, boldly, and distinctly. It claims for Congress 
 unlimited power over the Territories, and proposes to assert it over 
 the territories acquired from 3Iexico by a positive prohibition of 
 slavery. Not so the executive proviso. It takes an indirect 
 course, and, in order to elude the Wilmot proviso, and thereby 
 avoid encountering the united and determined resistance of the 
 South, it denies, by implication, the authority of Congress to 
 
174 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 legislate for the Territories, and claims the right as belonging 
 exclusively to the inhabitants of the Territories. But to effect 
 the object of excluding the South, it takes care, in the meantime, 
 to let iu immigrants freely from the Northern States, and all other 
 quarters, except from the South, which it takes special care to 
 exclude by holding up to them the danger of having their slaves 
 liberated under the Mexican laws. The necessary consequence is 
 to exclude the South from the Territories, just as effectually as 
 would the Wilmot proviso. The only difference, in this respect, 
 is, that what one proposes to effect directly and openly, the other 
 proposes to effect indirectly and covertly. 
 
 "But the executive proviso is more objectionable than the Wil- 
 mot in another and more important particular. The latter, to 
 effect its object, inflicts a dangerous wound upon the Constitution, 
 by depriving the Southern States, as joint partners and owners 
 of the Territories, of their rights in them ; but it inflicts no 
 greater wound than is absolutely necessary to effect its object. 
 The former, on the contrary, while it inflicts the same wound, 
 inflicts others equally great, and, if possible, greater, as I shall 
 next proceed to explain. 
 
 "In claiming the right for the inhabitants, instead of Con- 
 gress, to legislate for the Territories, the executive proviso assumes 
 that the sovereignty over the Territories is vested in the former, 
 or, to express it in the language used in a resolution offered by 
 one of the Senators from Texas [General Houston, now absent], 
 they 'have the same inherent right of self-government as the 
 people in the States.' The assumption is utterly unfounded, un- 
 constitutional, without example, and contrary to the entire prac- 
 tice of the Government, from its commencement to the present 
 time, as I shall proceed to show." — Calhoun s Works, vol. 4, p. 562. 
 
 Mr. Davis. 1 find that I must abridge, by abstaining from the 
 reading of extracts. When this question arose in 1820, Nathaniel 
 Macon, by many considered the wisest man of his day, held the 
 proposed interference to be unauthorized and innovative. In ar- 
 guing against the Missouri Compromise, as it was called — the 
 attempt by Congress to prescribe where slaves might or might not 
 be held — the exercise, by the Federal Government north of a cer- 
 
EEPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 175 
 
 tain point, of usurped power by an act of iuliibition, Mr. Macon 
 said our true policy was that which had tlius far guided the coun- 
 try in safety: the policy of non-iuterveutiou. By non-intervention 
 he meant the absence of hostile legislation, not the absence of gov- 
 ernmental protection. Our doctrine on this point is not new, but 
 that of our opponents is so. 
 
 The Senator from Illinois assumes that the congressional acts 
 of 1850 meant no legislation in relation to slave property; while, 
 in the face of that declaration, stand the laws enacted in that year, 
 and the promise of another, which has not been enacted — laws 
 directed to the question of slavery and slave property ; one even 
 declaring, in certain contingencies, as a penalty on the owner, the 
 emancipation of his slave in the District of Columbia. If no action 
 upon the question was the prevailing opinion, what does the legis- 
 lation mean? Was it non-action in the District of Columbia? 
 Be it remembered, the resolution of the Cincinnati platform says, 
 "Non-interference, by Congress, with slavery in State and Teni- 
 tory, or in the District of Columbia." They are all upon the same 
 footing. 
 
 Again, he said that the Badger amendment was a declaration of 
 no protection to slave property. The Badger amendment declares 
 that the repeal of the Missouri Compromise shall not revive the 
 laws or usages which preexisted that compromise ; and the history 
 of the times, so far as I understand it, is, that it intended to assure 
 those gentlemen who feared that the laws of France would be 
 revived in the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, by the repeal 
 of the act of 1820, and that they would be held responsible for 
 having, by congressional act, established slavery. The Southern 
 men did not desire Congress to establish slavery. It has been our 
 uniform declaration that we denied the power of the Federal Gov- 
 ernment either to establish or prohibit it; that we claimed for it 
 protection as property recognized by the Constitution, and we 
 claimed the right for it, as property, to go, and to receive federal 
 
1^ 
 
 176 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 protection wherever the jurisdiction of the United States is ex- 
 clusive. We claim that the Constitution of the United States, in 
 recognizing this property, making it the basis of representation, 
 put it, not upon the footing which it holds between foreign na- 
 tions, but upon the basis of the compact or union of the States; 
 that, under the delegated grant to regulate commerce between the 
 States, it did not belong to a State; therefore, without breach of 
 contract, they can not, by any regulation, prohibit transit, and the 
 compact provided that they should not change the character of 
 master and slave in the case of a fugitive. Could Congress sur- 
 render, for the States and their citizens, the claim and protection 
 for those or other constitutional rights, against invasion by a 
 State? If not, surely it can not be done in the case of a Terri- 
 tory, a possession of the States. The word " protecting," in that 
 amendment, referred to laws which preexisted — laws which it was 
 not designed, by the Democrats, to revive when they declared the 
 repeal of the Missouri Compromise; and, therefore, I think, did 
 not aflPect the question of constitutional right and of federal power 
 and duty. 
 
 In all these territorial bills we have the language "subject to 
 the Constitution ;" that is to say, that the inhabitants are to man- 
 age their local affairs in their own way, subject to the Constitu- 
 tion ; which, I suppose, might be rendered thus: "In their own 
 way, provided their own way shall be somebody else's way;" for 
 " subject to the Constitution " means, in accordance with an instru- 
 ment with which the territorial inhabitants had nothing to do; 
 with the construction of which they were not concerned ; in the 
 adoption of which they had no part, and in relation to which it 
 has sometimes been questioned whether they had any responsi- 
 bility. My own views, as the Senator is aware from previous dis- 
 cussions, (and it is needless to repeat,) are that the Constitution 
 is co-extensive with the United States; that the designation in- 
 cludes the Territories, that they are necessarily subject to the Con- 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 177 
 
 stitution. But if they be subject to the Constitution, and subject 
 to the organic act, that is the language used ; that organic act be- 
 ing the law of Congress, that Constitution being the compact of 
 the States — the territorial inhabitants having no lot or part in one 
 or the other, save as they are imposed upon them — where is their 
 claim to sovereignty ? Where is their right to do as they please ? 
 The States have a compact, and the agent of the States gives to 
 the Territories a species of constitution in the organic act, which 
 endures and binds them until they throw oflF what the Senator on 
 another occasion termed the minority condition, and assume the 
 majority condition as a State. The remark to which I refer was 
 on the bill to admit Iowa and Florida into the Union. The Sen- 
 ator then said : 
 
 "The father may bind the son during his minority, but the mo- 
 ment that he (the son) attains his majority, his fetters are severed, 
 and he is free to regulate his own conduct. So, sir, with the Ter- 
 ritories ; they are subject to the jurisdiction and control of Con- 
 gress during infancy, their minority; but when they attain their 
 majority, and obtain admission into the Union, they are free from 
 all restraints and restrictions, except such as the Constitution of 
 the United States imposes upon each and all of the States." 
 
 This was the doctrine of territorial sovereignty — perhaps that 
 is the phrase — at that period. At a later period, in March, 1856, 
 the Senator said : 
 
 " The sovereignty of a Territory remains in abeyance, suspended 
 in the United States in trust for the people, until they shall be ad- 
 mitted into the Union as a State. In the meantime, they arc 
 admitted to enjoy and exercise all the rights and privileges of self- 
 government, in subordination to the Constitution of the United 
 States, and in obedience to the organic law passed by Congress in 
 pursuance of that instrument." 
 
 If it be admitted — and I believe there is no issue between the 
 Senator and myself on that point — that the Congress of the United 
 12 
 
178 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 States have no right to pass a law excluding slaves from a Terri- 
 tory, or determining in the Territory the relation of master and 
 slave, of parent and child, of guardian and ward ; that they have 
 no right anywhere to decide what is property, but are only bound 
 to protect such rights as preexisted the formation of the Union — 
 to perform such functions as are intrusted to them as the agent 
 of the States — then how can Congress, thus fettered, confer upon 
 a corporation of its creation — upon a territorial legislature, by 
 an organic act, a power to determine what shall be property within 
 the limits of such Territory ? 
 
 But, again, if it were admitted that the territorial inhabitants 
 did possess this sovereignty : that they had the right to do as they 
 pleased on all subjects, then would arise the question, if they 
 were authorized, through their representatives, thus to act, whence 
 came the opposition to what was called the Lecompton Constitu- 
 tion ? How did Congress, under this state of facts, get the right 
 to inquire whether those representatives in that case really ex- 
 pressed the will of the people. Still more ; how did Congress get 
 the right to decide that those repi'esentatives must submit their 
 action to a popular vote in a manner not prescribed by the people 
 of the Territory, however eminently it may have been advisable, 
 convenient, and proper in the judgment of the Congress of the 
 United States ? What revisory function had we, if they, through 
 their representatives, had full power to act on all such subjects 
 whatsoever ? 
 
 I have necessarily, in answering the Senator, gone somewhat 
 into the argumcntum ad hominem. Though it is not entirely ex- 
 hausted, I think enough has been said to show the Senate in 
 what the difference between us consists. If it be necessary fur- 
 ther to illustrate it, I might ask how did he propose to annul the 
 organic act for Utah, if the recognition by the Congress of a suffi- 
 cient number of inhabitants to justify the organization of a terri- 
 torial government transferred the sovereignty to the inhabitants 
 
EEl'LY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 179 
 
 of the Territory? If sovereignty passed by tlie recoguition of tlic 
 fact, how (lid he propose, by congressioual act, to annul the terri- 
 torial existence of Utah ? 
 
 It is this confusion of ideas, it is this confounding of terras, 
 this changing of language, this applying of new meanings to 
 words, out of which, I think, a large portion of the dispute arises. 
 For instance, it is claimed that President Pierce, in using the 
 phrase "existing and incipient States," meafit to include all Ter- 
 ritories, and thus that he had bound me to a doctrine which pre- 
 cluded my strictures on what I termed squatter sovereignty. This 
 all arises from the misuse of language. An incipient State, ac- 
 cording to my idea, is the territorial condition at the moment it 
 changes into that of a State. It is when the people assemble in 
 convention to form a constitution as a State, that they are in the 
 condition of an incipient State. Various names were applied to 
 the Territories at an earlier period. Sometimes they were called 
 "new States," because they were expected to be States; sometimes 
 they were called " States in embryo," and it requires a determina- 
 tion of the language that is employed before it is possible to arrive 
 at any conclusion as to the differences of understanding between 
 gentlemen. Therefore, it was, and, I think, very properly, (but 
 not, as the Senator supposed, to catechise him,) that I asked him 
 ■what he meant by non-intervention, before I commenced these 
 remarks. 
 
 In the same line of errors was the confusion which resulted in 
 his assuming that the evils I described as growing out of his doc- 
 trine on the plains of Kansas, were a denunciation, on my part, 
 of the bill called the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. At the time that bill 
 passed, I did not foresee all the evils which have resulted from the 
 doctrine based upon it, but which I do not think the bill sustains. 
 I am not willing now to turn on those who were in a position 
 which compelled them to act, made them responsible, and to divest 
 myself of any responsibility which belongs to any opinion I enter- 
 
180 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 taiued. I will not seek to judge after the fact and hold the 
 measure up against those who had to judge before. Therefore I 
 will frankly avow that I should have sustained that bill if I had 
 been in the Senate ; but I did not foresee or apprehend such evils 
 as immediately grew up on the plains of Kansas. I looked then, 
 as our fathers had looked before, to the settlement of the question 
 of what institutions should exist there, as one to be determined by 
 soil and climate, and'by the pleasure of those who should volun- 
 tarily go into the country. Such, however, was not the case. The 
 form of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill invited to a controversy — not 
 foreseen. I was not charging the Senator with any responsibility 
 for it, but the variation of its terms invited contending parties to 
 meet on the plains of Kansas, and had well-nigh eventuated in 
 civil war. The great respect which even the most lawless of those 
 adventurers in Kansas had for the name and the laws of the United 
 States, served, by the timely interposition of the Federal force and 
 laws, to restrain the excited masses and prevented violence from 
 assuming larger proportions than combats between squads of ad- 
 venturers. 
 
 This brings me in the line of rejoinder, to the meaning of the 
 phrase, " the people of a Territory, like those of a State, should 
 decide for themselves," etc., the language quoted against the Pres- 
 ident in the remarks of the Senator. This, it was announced, was 
 squatter sovereignty in its broadest sense ; and it was added, that 
 the present Executive was elected to the high office he holds on 
 that construction of the platform. Now, I do not know how it is 
 that the Senator has the power to decide why the people voted 
 for a candidate. I rather suppose, among the many millions who 
 did vote, there must have been a variety of reasons, and that it is 
 not in the power of any one man to declare what determined the 
 result. But waiving that, is it squatter sovereignty in its broadest 
 sense ? Is it a declaration that the inhabitants of a Territory can 
 exercise all the powers of a State? It says that, "like the peo- 
 
EErLY TO 8ENATOII DOUGLAS. 181 
 
 plc of a State," they may decide for themselves. Then ho\Y do 
 the people of a State decide the question of what shall be prop- 
 erty within the State? Every one knows that it is by calUn<^ a 
 convention, and that the people, represented in convention, and 
 forming a constitution their fundamental law, do this. Every one 
 knows that, under the constitutions and bills of rights which pre- 
 vail in the republican States of this Union, no legislature is in- 
 vested with that power. If this be the mode which is prescribed 
 in the States — the modes which the States must pursue — I ask 
 you, in the name of common sense, can the language of the Pres- 
 ident be construed to mean that a territorial legislature may do 
 what it is admitted the legislature of a State can not ; or that the 
 inhabitants of a Territory can assemble a convention, and form a 
 fundamental law overriding the organic act, to which the Senator 
 has already acknowledged they stand subject uitil they be admit- 
 ted as a State? 
 
 We of the South, I know, are arraigned, and many believe justly, 
 for starting a new question which distracts the Democratic party. 
 I have endeavored, therefore, to show that it is not new. I have 
 also asserted, what I think is clear, that if it were new, but yet a 
 constitutional right, it is not only our province, but our duty to 
 assert it — to assert it whenever or wherever that right is contro- 
 verted. It is asserted now with more force than at a former 
 period, for the simple reason that it is now denied, to an extent 
 which has never been known before. AVe do not seek, in the cant 
 language of the day, to force slavery on an unwilling people. We 
 know full well there is no power to do it; and our limited obser- 
 vation has not yet made us acquainted with the man who was 
 likely to have a slave forced upon him, or who could get one with- 
 out paying a very high price for him. He must first have the will, 
 and, secondly, he must put money in his purse to enable him to get 
 one. They are too valuable among those by whom they ai*e now 
 owned, to be forced upon any body. Not admitting the correctness 
 
182 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of tlie doctriue whicli the Senator promulgated in his magazine 
 article in relation to a local character of slave property, I recog- 
 nize the laws of nature, and that immigration will follow in the lines 
 where any species of labor may be most profitably employed ; all, 
 therefore, we have asked — fulfillment of the original compact of our 
 fathers — was that there should be no discrimination ; that all prop- 
 erty should be equally protected ; that we should be permitted to 
 go into every portion of the United States save where some sov- 
 ereign power has said slaves shall not be held, and to take with 
 us our slave property in like manner as we would take any other ; 
 no more than that. For that, our Government has contended on 
 the high seas against foreign powers. That has entered into our 
 negotiations, and has been recognized by every government against 
 whom a claim has been asserted. Where our property was cap- 
 tured on the land during the period of an invasion. Great Britain, 
 by treaty, restored it, or paid for it. Wherever it has sufi'ered loss 
 on the high seas, down to a very recent period, we have received 
 indemnity ; and where we have not, it was only because the power 
 and duty of the Federal Government was sacrificed to this miser- 
 able strife in relation to property, with the existence of which, 
 those making the interference had no municipal connection, or 
 moral responsibility. 
 
 I do not admit that sovereignty necessarily exists in the Fed- 
 eral Government or in a territorial government. I deny the Sen- 
 ator's proposition, which is broadly laid down, of the necessity 
 which must exist for it in the one place or the other. I hold 
 that sovereignty exists only in a State, or in the United States in 
 their associated capacity, to whom sovereignty may be transferred, 
 but that their agent is incapable of receiving it, and, still more, 
 of transferring it to territorial inhabitants. 
 
 I was sorry for some of the remarks which he thought it neces- 
 sary to make, as to the position of the South on this question, 
 and for his assertion that the resolutions of the convention of 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 183 
 
 18i8 put the pro-slavery men and the Aholitiouists on the same 
 grouud. I think it was altogether unjust. I did uot think it 
 (juite belonged to hira to make it. I was aware that his opponent, 
 in that canvass to which I referred, had made a prophecy that he 
 Was, sooner or later, to land in the ranks of the Republicans. 
 Even if I had believed it, I would uot have chosen — and it is due 
 to candor to say I do not believe 
 
 31r. Davis. Well, it is unimportant. I feel myself constrained, 
 because I promised to do it, to refer to .some portion of the joint 
 record of the Senator and myself in 1850, or, as I have consumed 
 so much time, I would avoid it. In that same magazine article, 
 to which I have referred, the Senator took occasion to refer to 
 some part which I had taken in the legislation of 1850 ; and I 
 must say he presented me unfairly. He put me in the attitude 
 of one who was seeking to discriminate, and left himself iu the 
 position of one who was willing to give equal protection to all 
 kinds of property. In that magazine article the Senator repre- 
 sents Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, as having endeavored to discrim- 
 inate iu favor of slave property, and Mr. Chase, of Ohio, as hav- 
 ing made a like attempt against it; and he leaves himself, by his 
 argument, in the attitude of one who concurred with Mr. Clay in 
 opposition to both propositions. 
 
 I offered an amendment to the compromise bill of 1850, which 
 was to strike out the words "in respect to," and insert "and in- 
 troduce or exclude," and after the word "slavery" to insert the 
 following: 
 
 " Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed 
 to prevent said territorial legislature passing such laws as may be 
 necessary for the protection of the rights of property of any kind 
 which may have been or may be hereafter, conformably to the Con- 
 stitution and laws of the United States, held in, or introduced into, 
 said Territory." 
 
 Mr. Chase's amendment is in these words: 
 
184 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 " Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be con- 
 strued as authorizing or permitting the introduction of slavery, or 
 the holding of persons as property within said Territory." 
 
 Whilst the quotation in the magazine article left me in the po- 
 sition already stated, the debates which had occurred between us 
 necessarily informed the Senator that it was not my position, for I 
 brought him in that debate to acknowledge it. 
 
 On that occasion, I argued for my amendment as an obligation 
 of the Government to remove obstructions ; to give the fair opera- 
 tion to constitutional right ; and so far from the Senator having 
 stood with Mr. Clay against all these propositions, the fact appears, 
 on page 1134 of the Globe, that, upon the vote on Chase's amend- 
 ment, Douglas voted for it, and Davis and Clay voted against it; 
 that upon the vote on Davis' amendment, Clay and Davis voted 
 for it, and Douglas voted against it. 
 
 Mb. Douglas. The Senator should add, that that vote was 
 given under the very instructions to which he referred the other 
 day, and which are well known to the Senate, and are on the table. 
 
 Mr. Davis. I was aware that the Senator had voted for Mr. 
 Seward's amendment, the "Wilmot proviso," under these instruc- 
 tions, but I receive his explanation. Mr. Berrien offered an amend- 
 ment to change the provision, which said there should be no legis- 
 lation in respect to slavery, so as to make it read, " there shall be 
 no legislation establishing or prohibiting African slavery." Mr. 
 Clay voted for that ; so did Mr. Davis. Mr. Douglas voted against 
 it. Mr. Hale offered an amendment to Mr. Berrien's amendment, 
 to add the word "allowing." Here Mr. Douglas voted for Mr. 
 Hale's amendment, and against Davis and Clay. Then a propo- 
 sition was made to continue the Mexican laws against slavery until 
 repealed by Congress. I think 1 proved — at least I did to my own 
 satisfaction — that there was no such Mexican law; that it was a de- 
 cree, and that the legislation which occurred under it had never 
 been executed. But that proposition by Mr. Baldwin, which was 
 
EEPI.Y TO SKXATOU DOUOLAS. 185 
 
 to continue the Mexican laws in force, was brouglit to a vote, and 
 again Mr. Douglas voted for it, and Mr, Davis and Mr. Clay voted 
 against it. When another proposition was brought forward to 
 amend by " removing the obstructions of Mexican laws and usa^^es 
 to any right of person or property by the citizens of the United 
 States in the Tei-ritories aforesaid," I do not find the Senator's 
 name among those who voted, though, by reference to the Appen- 
 dix, I learned he was present immediately afterwards, by his speak- 
 ing to another amendment. 
 
 Thus we find the Senator differing from me on this question, as 
 was stated; but we do not find him concurring with Mr. Clay, as 
 was stated; and we do not find the proposition which I introduced, 
 and which was mentioned in the magazine article, receiving the 
 joint opposition of himself and Mr. Clay; and yet his remarks in 
 the Senate the other day went upon the same theory, that Mr. 
 Clay and himself had been cooperating. Now, the fact of the case 
 is, that they agreed in supporting the final passage of the bill, and 
 I was against it. I was one of the few Southern men who resisted, 
 in all its stages, what was called the compromise, or omnibus bill. 
 I have consumed the time of the Senate by this reference, made as 
 brief as I could, on account of the remarks the Senator had made. 
 
 Coupled with this arraignment of myself, at a time when he says 
 he had leisure to discuss the question with the Attorney-General, 
 but when there was nothing in my position certainly to provoke 
 the revision of my course in Congress, is his like review of it in 
 the Senate. As I understood his remarks, for I did not find them 
 in the Congressional Glohe the next morning, he vaunted his own 
 consistency and admitted mine, but claimed his to be inside and 
 mine outside of the Democratic organization. Is it so? Will our 
 votes on test questions sustain it? The list of yeas and nays would, 
 on the points referred to, exhibit quite the reverse. And it strikes 
 me that, on the recent demonstrations we have had, when the Dem- 
 ocratic administration was, as it were, put on its trial in relation to 
 
186 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 its policy in Kansas, the Senator's associations, ratlier than mine, 
 were outside of the Democratic organization. How is it, on the 
 pending question — the declaration of great principles of political 
 creed — the Senator's position is outside of the Senate's Democracy, 
 and mine in it, so that I do not see with what justice he attempts 
 that discrimination between him and me? That the diflfereuce ex- 
 ists, that it involves a division greater or less in Democratic ranks, 
 is a personal regret, and I think a public misfortune. It gives 
 me, therefore, no pleasure to dwell upon it, and it is now dismissed. 
 
 Mr. President, after having for forty years been engaged in 
 bitter controversy over a question relating to common property 
 of the States, we have reached the point where the issue is pre- 
 sented in a form in which it becomes us to meet it according to 
 existing facts; whei-e it has ceased to be a question to be decided 
 on the footing of authority, and by reference to history. We have 
 decided that too long had this question been disturbing the peace 
 and endangering the Union, and it was resolved to provide for its 
 settlement by treating it as a judicial question. Now, will it be 
 said, after Congress provided for the adjustment of this question 
 by the courts, and after the courts had a case brought before them, 
 and expressed an opinion covering the controversy, that no addi- 
 tional latitude is to be given to the application of the decision of 
 the court, though Congress had referred it specially to them ; that 
 it is to be treated simply and technically as a question of mcinn et 
 tuum, such as might have arisen if there had been no such legis- 
 lation by Congress? Surely it does not become those who have 
 pointed us to that provision as the peace-offering, as the means for 
 final adjustment, now to say that it meant nothing more than that 
 the courts would go on hereafter, as heretofore, to try questions of 
 property. 
 
 The courts have decided the question so far as they could decide 
 any political question. A case arose in relation to property in a 
 slave held within a Territory where a law of Congress declared 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 187 
 
 tlia such property should not be held. The whole case was before 
 them; every thing, except the mere technical point that the law 
 was not enacted by a territorial legislature. Why, then, if we 
 are to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court in any future 
 ease, do they maiutaiu this controversy on the mei'e technical point 
 which now divides, disturbs, distracts, destroys the eflSciency and 
 the power of the Democratic party? To the Senator, I know, as a 
 question of property, it is a matter of no consequence. I should 
 do him injustice if I left any one to infer that I treated his arou- 
 ment as one made by a man prejudiced against the character of 
 property involved in the question. That is not his position ; but 
 I assert that he is pursuing an ignis fatinis — not a light caught 
 from the Constitution — but a vapor which has arisen from the cor- 
 rupting cess-pools of sectional strife, of fiiction, and individual 
 rivalry. Measured by any standard of common sense, its magni- 
 tude would be too small to disturb the adjustment of the balance 
 of our country. There can be no appeal to humanity made upon 
 this basis. Least of all could it be made to one who, like the Sen- 
 ator and myself, has seen this species of property in its sjiarse con- 
 dition on the north-western frontier, and seen it go out without 
 disturbing the tranquillity of the community, as it had previously 
 existed without injury to any one, if not to the benefit of the in- 
 dividual who held it. He has no apprehension, he can have none, 
 that it is to retard tlie political prosperity of the future States — 
 now the Territories. He can have no apprehension that in that 
 counti-y, to which they never would be carried except for domestic 
 purposes, they could ever so accumulate as to constitute a great po- 
 litical element. He knows, and every man who has had experience 
 and judgment must admit, that the few who may be so carried there 
 have nothing to fear but the climate, and that living in that cloye 
 connection which belongs to one or half a dozen of them in a fam- 
 ily, the kindest relations which it is possible to exist between mas- 
 ter and dependent, exist between these domestics and their owners. 
 
188 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 There is a relation belonging to tliis species of property, unlike 
 that of the apprentice or the hired man, which awakens whatever 
 there is of kindness or of nobility of soul in the heart of him who 
 owns it ; this can only be alienated, obscured, or destroyed by col- 
 lecting this species of property into such masses that the owner is 
 not personally acquainted with the individuals who compose it. In 
 the relation, however, which can exist in the north-western Terri- 
 tories, the mere domestic connection of one, two, or, at most, half 
 a dozen servants in a family, associating with the children as they 
 grow up, attending upon age as it declines, there can be nothing 
 against which either philanthropy or humanity can make an appeal. 
 Not even the emancipationist could raise his voice, for this is the 
 high road and the open gate to the condition in which the masters 
 would, from interest, in a few years, desire the emancipation of 
 every one who may thus be taken to the north-western frontier. 
 
 Mr. President, I briefly and reluctantly referred, because the 
 subject had been introduced, to the attitude of Mississippi on a 
 former occasion. I will now as briefly say, that in 1851, and in 
 1860, Mississippi was, and is, ready to make every concession 
 which it becomes her to make to the welfare and the safety of the 
 Union. If, on a former occasion, she hoped too much from frater- 
 nity, the responsibility for her disappointment rests upon those who 
 fail to fulfill her expectations. She still clings to the Grovernment 
 as our fathers formed it. She is ready to-day and to-morrow, as in 
 her past, and though brief, yet brilliant history, to maintain that 
 Government in all its power, and to vindicate its honor with all the 
 means she possesses. I say brilliant history ; for it was in the very 
 morning of her existence that her sons, on the plains of New Or- 
 leans, were announced, in general orders to have been the admiration 
 of one army and the wonder of the other. That we had a division 
 in relation to the measures enacted in 1850, is true ; that the 
 Southern rights men became the minority in the election which re- 
 sulted, is true ; but no figure of speech could warrant the Senator 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 189 
 
 in speaking of them as subdued ; as coming to him or any body 
 else for quartei". I deemed it offensive when it was uttered, and 
 the scorn with which I repelled it at the instant, time has only 
 softened to contempt. Our flag was never borne from the field. 
 We had carried it in the fice of defeat, with a knowledge that de- 
 feat awaited it ; hut scarcely had the smoke of the battle passed 
 away which proclaimed another victor, before the general voice ad- 
 mitted that the field again was ours ; I have not seen a sagacious, 
 reflecting man, who was cognizant of the events as they transpired 
 at the time, who does not say that, within two weeks after the 
 election, our party was in a majority; and the next election which 
 occurred showed that we possessed the State beyond controversy. 
 How we have wielded that power it is not for me to say. I trust 
 others may see forbearance in our conduct — that, with a determi- 
 nation to insist upon our constitutional rights, then and now, there 
 is an unwavering desire to maintain the Government, and to up- 
 hold the Democratic party. 
 
 We believe now, as we have asserted on former occasions, that 
 the best hope for the perpetuity of our institutions depends upon 
 the cooperation, the harmony, the zealous action of the Democratic 
 party. We cling to that party from conviction, that its principles 
 and its aims are those of truth and the country, as we cling to 
 the Union for the fulfillment of the purposes for which it was 
 formed. Whenever we shall be taught that the Democratic party 
 is recreant to its principles ; whenever we shall learn that it can 
 not be relied upon to maintain the great measures which consti- 
 tute its vitality, I, for one, shall be ready to leave it. And so, 
 when we declare our tenacious adherence to the Union, it is the 
 Union of the Constitution. If the compact between the States is 
 to be trampled into the dust; if anarchy is to be substituted fo^: 
 the usurpation and consolidation which threatened the Government 
 at an earlier period ; if the Union is to become powerless for the 
 purposes for which it was established, and we are vainly to appeal 
 
190 JAFE OF JKFFKIiSOX DAVIS. 
 
 to it for protection, tlien, sir, conscious of the rectitude of our 
 course, the justice of our cause, self-reliant, yet humbly, confid- 
 ino-ly trusting in the arm that guided and protected our fathers, 
 we look beyond the confines of the Union for the maintenance of 
 our ri"-hts. A habitual reverence and cherished aiFection for the 
 Government will bind us to it longer than our interests would 
 suggest or require ; but he is a poor student of the world's history 
 who does not understand that communities at last must yield to 
 the dictates of their interests. That the affection, the mutual de- 
 sire for the mutual good, which existed among our fathers, may be 
 weakened in succeeding generations by the denial of right, and 
 hostile demonstration, until the equality guaranteed, but not 
 secured within the Union, may be sought for without it, must be 
 evident to even a careless observer of our race. It is time to be 
 up and doing. There is yet time to remove the causes of dissen- 
 sion and alienation which are now distracting, and have for years 
 past divided the country. 
 
 If the Senator correctly described me as having, at a former 
 period, against my own preferences and opinions, acquiesced in the 
 decision of my party ; if when I had youth, when physical vigor 
 gave promise of many days, and the future was painted in the 
 colors of hope, I could thus surrender my own convictions, my 
 own prejudices, and cooperate with my political friends, according 
 to their views, as to the best method of promoting the public good; 
 now, when the years of my future can not be many, and experi- 
 ence has sobered the hopeful tints of youth's gilding; when, ap- 
 proaching the evening of life, the shadows are reversed, and the 
 mind turns retrospectively, it is not to be supposed that I would 
 abandon lightly, or idly put on trial, the party to which I have 
 steadily adhered. It is rather to be assumed that conservatism, 
 which belongs to the timidity or caution of increasing years, would 
 lead me to cling to — to be supported by, rather than to cast off, the 
 organization with which I have been so long connected. If I am 
 
REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS. 191 
 
 driven to consider the necessity of separating myself from tho.^e 
 old and dear rolatious, of discarding the accustomed support, under 
 circumstances such as I have described, might not my friends who 
 differ from me pause and inquire whether there is not something 
 involved in it which calls for their careful revision? 
 
 I desire no divided flag for the Democratic party, seek not to 
 depreciate the power of the Senator, or take from him any thing 
 of that confidence he feels in the large army which follows his 
 standard. I prefer that his banner should lie in its silken folds 
 to feed the moth ; but if it unrestrainedly rustles, impatient to be 
 unfurled, we who have not invited the conflict, shrink not from 
 the trial ; we will plant our flag on every hill and plain ; it shall 
 overlook the Atlantic and welcome the sun as he rises from its 
 dancing waters ; it shall wave its adieu as he sinks to repose in 
 the quiet Pacific. 
 
 Our principles are national ; they belong to every State of the 
 Union ; and though elections may be lost by their assertion, they 
 constitute the only foundation on which we can maintain power, 
 on which we can again rise to the dignity the Democracy once 
 possessed. Does not the Senator from Illinois see in the sectional 
 character of the vote he received, that his opinions are not accept- 
 able to every portion of the country? Is not the fact that the 
 resolutions adopted by seventeen States, on which the greatest re- 
 liance must be placed for Democratic support, are in opposition 
 to the dogma to which he still clings, a warning that if he persists 
 and succeeds in forcing his theory upon the Democratic party, its 
 days are numbered ? Wc ask only for the Constitution. We ask 
 of the Democracy only from time to time to declare, as current 
 exigencies may indicate, what the Constitution was intended to 
 secure and provide. Our flag bears no new device. Upon its folds 
 our principles are written in living light; all proclaiming the con- 
 stitutional Union, justice, equality, and fraternity of our ocean- 
 bound domain, for a limitless future. 
 
192 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER yil. 
 
 ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN — HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT — 
 THE OBJECTS AIMED AT BY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY IDENTICAL IN THE DIS- 
 CUSSION OF EVENTS OF THE LATE WAR NORTHERN EVASION OF THE REAL 
 
 QUESTION — THE SOUTH DID NOT ATTEMPT REVOLUTION — SECESSION A JUSTI- 
 FIABLE RIGHT EXERCISED BY SOVEREIGN STATES — BRIEF REVIEW OF THE 
 QUESTION — WHAT THE FEDERALIST SAYS — CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL — ^ME. 
 MADISON — COERCION NOT JUSTIFIED AT THE NORTH PREVIOUS TO THE LATE 
 
 WAR — REMARKS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAilS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN — OF HORACE 
 
 GREELEY SUCCESSFUL PERVERSION OF TRUTH BY THE NORTH PROVOCATIONS 
 
 TO SECESSION BY THE SOUTH — AGGRESSIONS BY THE NORTH — ITS PUNIC 
 FAITH — LOSS OF THE BALANCE OF POWER — PATIENCE OF THE SOUTH — 
 REMARKS OF HON. C. C. CLAY — WHAT THE ELECTION OP MR. LINCOLN 
 
 MEANT — HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY REVELATIONS OF THE OBJECTS OP 
 
 THE REPUBLICAN PARTY — ^WENDELL PHILLIPS — NO SECURITY FOR THE 
 SOUTH IN THE UNION — MEETING OF CONGRESS — MR. DAVIs' ASSURANCE 
 TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN CONCILIATORY COURSE OP MR. DAVIS — HIS CON- 
 SISTENT DEVOTION TO THE UNION, AND EFFORTS TO SAVE IT — FORESEES 
 WAR AS THE RESULT OP SECESSION, AND URGES THE EXHAUSTION OP EVERY 
 EXPEDIENT TO AVERT IT — THE CRITTENDEN AMENDMENT — HOPES OF ITS 
 ADOPTION — DAVIS WILLING TO ACCEPT IT IN SPITE OP ITS INJUSTICE TO 
 THE SOUTH — REPUBLICAN SENATORS DECLINE ALL CONCILIATORY MEASURES 
 THE CLARKE AMENDMENT WHERE RESTS THE RESPONSIBILITY OP DIS- 
 UNION? STATEMENTS OP MESSRS. DOUGLAS AND COX SECESSION OP THE 
 
 COTTON STATES — A LETTER FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO R. B. RHETT, JR. — 
 
 ME. DAVIs' FAREWELL TO THE SENATE — HIS REASONS FOE WITHDRAWING 
 
 RETURNS TO MISSISSIPPI — MAJOR-GENERAL OP STATE FORCES — ORGANIZATION 
 OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT — ME. DAVIS PEESIDENT OF THE CON- 
 FEDERATE STATES. 
 
 A 
 
 S had been foreseen, and, indeed, as was the inevitable 
 sequence of the disruption of the Democratic party, Abra- 
 
ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 193 
 
 liara Lincoln, the candidate of the Republican party, was, in 
 November, 1860, elected President of the United States. This 
 was the supreme and sufficient incitement to the ade)ption of 
 the dreaded resort of disunion. As the occasion which finally 
 brought the 'South to the attitude of resistance, tlie event ac- 
 quires vast historical importance. 
 
 When it is conceded that Mr. Lincoln was elected in ac- 
 cordance with the forms of the Constitution, having received 
 a majority of electoral votes ; that the mere ceremony of elec- 
 tion was attended by no unusual circumstances, we concede 
 every possible ground upon which can be based an argument 
 denying its ample justification of the course pursued by the 
 South. Such an argument, however, leads to a wholly unten- 
 able conclusion, and may be easily exposed in its hypocritical 
 evasion of the real question. We are here required to note 
 the distinction between caiLse and occasion. As the final con- 
 summation of tendencies, long indicating the result of dis- 
 union, this event has an appropriate place in the recapitulation 
 of those influences, and can be rightly estimated only in con- 
 nection with their operation. 
 
 Trite observations upon the influence of passion and preju- 
 dice, over contemporary judgment, are not necessary to a due 
 conception of the obstacles which, for the present, exclude 
 candor from the discussion of the late movement for South- 
 ern independence. In the face of the disastrous overthrow 
 of that movement, the wrecked hopes and fortunes of those 
 who participated in it, discussion is chiefly serviceable, as it 
 throws additional light upon the development of those eternal 
 principles in whose ceaseless struggles men are only temporary 
 agents. 
 
 History and biography arc here most intimately blended; 
 13 
 
194 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 beginning from the same stand-point, they encounter common 
 difficulties, and aim to explore the same general grounds of 
 observation. So far as a verdict — from whatever tribunal, 
 whether rendered at the bar of justice or in the award of pop- 
 ular opinion, when the embers of recent strife are still fiercely 
 glowing — can affect the dispassionate judgment of History, 
 the Southern people can not be separated, either in fact or 
 in sentiment, from Jefferson Davis. He was the illustrious 
 compatriot of six millions of freemen, who struck for nation- 
 ality and independence, and lost — as did Greece and Poland 
 before them; or he- and they were alike insurgents, equally 
 guilty of the crime of treason. 
 
 With an adroitness which does credit to the characteristic 
 charlatanism of the North, an infinite variety of special ques- 
 tions and side issues have been interwoven with the narrative 
 of the late war, for the obvious purpose of confounding the 
 judgment of mankind regarding the great question which 
 really constitutes the gravamen of the controversy. Conspic- 
 uous among these efforts, from both audacity and plausibility, 
 are appeals to the sympathies of the world, in consideration of 
 the abolition of slavery, which it is well known was merely an 
 incident, and not the avowed design of the war. 
 
 Persistent in its introduction of the moral question of slav- 
 ery, the North seeks to shield itself from the reproach justly 
 visited upon its perpetration of an atrocious political crime, by 
 an insolent intrusion of a false claim to the championship) of 
 humanity. Whatever may be the decision of Time upon the 
 merits of slavery, it is in vain for the North to seek escape 
 from its responsibility for an institution, protected and sus- 
 tained by a government which was the joint creation of South- 
 ern and Northern hands. 
 
SECESSION NOT REVOLUTION. 195 
 
 The attempted dissolution of the Union by the South was 
 a movement involving moral and political considerations, not 
 unlike those incidental to revolutions in general, yet presenting 
 certain peculiar characteristics, traceable to the inherent and 
 distinctive features of the American political system. These 
 latter considerations constitute a vital part of its justification. 
 The South did not appeal only to the inalienable right of rev- 
 olution, which is the natural guarantee of resistance to wrong 
 and oppression. Nor did the States, severally, as they as- 
 sumed to sever their connection with the Union, announce a 
 purpose of constitutional revolution, or adopt a course invit- 
 ing or justifying violence, Mr. Davis and those who cooper- 
 ated with him, neither by the acts of secession, nor the sub- 
 sequent confederation of the States under a new government, 
 could have committed treason against Mr. Lincoln, since they 
 were not his subjects. Nor yet were they traitors to the Gov- 
 ernment of the United States, since the States of which they 
 were citizens had rescinded the grant of powers voluntarily 
 made by them to that Government, and begun to exercise 
 them in conjunction with other powers which they had with- 
 held by express reservation. 
 
 It is impossible to conceive a movement, contemplating such 
 important political changes, more entirely unattended by dis- 
 plays of violence, passion, and disorder. A simple assertion, 
 with due solemnity, by each State, of its sovereignty — a herit- 
 age which it Jiad never surrendered, but which had been re- 
 spected by innumerable forms of recognition in the history 
 of the Union — and the exercise of those attributes of sover- 
 eignty, which are too palpable to require that they shall be 
 indicated, was the peaceable method resorted to of terminating 
 a political alliance which had become injurious to the highest 
 
196 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 interests of one of the parties. Could there have been a more 
 becoming and dignilied exercise of the vaunted right of self- 
 government? It is that right to which America is so con- 
 spicuously committed, and which has been such an inexhausti- 
 ble theme for the tawdry rhetoric of Northern eloquence. 
 
 Even in the insolence of its triumph, the North feels the 
 necessity of at least a decent pretext for its destruction of the 
 cardinal feature in the American system of government — the 
 sovereignty of the States. With habitual want of candor, 
 Northern writers pretend that the Constitution of the United 
 States does not affirm the sovereignty of the States, and that, 
 therefore, secession was treason against that Constitution to 
 which they had subscribed ; in other words, the created does 
 not give authority to the creator — i. e., the Constitution, which 
 the States created, does not accredit sovereignty to the States, 
 and, therefore, the States are not sovereign. It is not pre- 
 tended that the States were not, each of them, originally inde- 
 pendent powers, since they were so recognized by Great Britain, 
 in the plainest terms, at the termination of the first revolution. 
 Nor is it asserted that the union of the States, under the title 
 of United States, was the occasion of any surrender of their 
 individual sovereignty, as it was then declared that "each 
 State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." A 
 conclusive demonstration of the retention of sovereignty by the 
 States is seen in the entire failure of the Constitution, either 
 by direct assertion or by implication, to claim its surrender 
 to the Union. 
 
 If the sovereignty of the States be conceded, the South 
 stands justified as having exercised an unquestionable right. 
 It was never formally denied, even at the North, until Mr. 
 Webster, in his debate with Mr. Calhoun, affirmed the doc- 
 
A CHALLENGE NOT ACCEPTED. 197 
 
 trine of the supremacy of the Union, to which conclusion the 
 Nortliern masses sprung with ahicrity, as an available justifi- 
 cation for compelling the submission of the South to the out- 
 rages which they had already conuneuced. 
 
 Volumes of testimony have been adduced, proving the the- 
 ory of State sovereignty to have been the overwhelmingly 
 predominant belief among the statesmen most prominent in 
 the establishment of the Union, and in shaping the j)olicy of 
 the Government in its earlier history. Argument i)roved an 
 unavailing offset to the stern decrees of the sword, and is 
 quite unnecessary so long as the unanswerable logic of Cal- 
 houn, Davis, and a score of Southern statesmen remains upon 
 the national records — a perpetual challenge, as yet unaccepted, 
 to the boasted intellect of the North, and a significant warn- 
 ing of the final adjudication of the centuries. We shall in- 
 trude no argument of our own in support of State sovereignty, 
 upon which rests the vindication of the South and her leaders. 
 Before us are the apposite and conclusive assumptions of men 
 who have been the revered sources of political inspiration 
 among Americans. 
 
 The Federalist, that most powerful vindication of the Con- 
 stitution, and earnest plea for its adoption by the States, 
 assumes that it was a "compact," to which "the States, as 
 distinct and independent sovereigns," were the parties. Yet 
 this doctrine, the basis upon which rests the august liaiuli- 
 work of Madison and Hamilton, the "architects of the Con- 
 stitution," when applied by Davis and his ooni]>atriots, becomes 
 treason! Such is the extremity to which despotism, in its 
 wretched plea of expediency, is driven; and the candid, en- 
 lightened American of to-day realizes, in his country, a laud 
 in which "truth is treason, and history is rebelliou." 
 
198 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Chief-Justice Marshall, the great judicial luminary of Amer- 
 ica, and an authority not usually summoned to the support of 
 doctrines hostile to the assumptions of Federal power, gave 
 most emphatic testimony to the propriety of the States' Rights 
 view of tlie relations of State and Federal authority. In the 
 Virginia Convention which ratified the Constitution, he said: 
 "The State governments did not derive their powers from 
 the General Government. But each government derived its 
 powers from the people, and each was to act according to the 
 powers given it. Would any gentleman deny this? He de- 
 manded, if powers not given were retained by implication? 
 Could any man say, no? Could any man say that this power 
 was not retained by the States, since it was not given away ? " 
 The view so earnestly urged by Marshall, was not only avowed 
 generally, but Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania in- 
 sisted upon a written declaration, in the Constitution, of the 
 principle that certain attributes of sovereignty, which they did 
 not delegate to the Union, were retained by the States. 
 
 Mr. Madison, whose great abilities were taxed to the utmost 
 to secure the ratification of the Constitution by Virginia, vig- 
 orously and earnestly defended it against the allegation that 
 it created a consolidated government. With the utmost diffi- 
 culty, he secured a majority often votes, in the Virginia Con- 
 vention, in favor of the Constitution, which his rival, Patrick 
 Henry, denounced as destructive of State sovereignty. 
 
 Defining the expression, " We, the people," Mr. Madison 
 said : " The parties to it were the people, but not the people 
 as composing one great society, but the people as composing 
 'thirteen sovereignties.'" To quo.te Mr. Madison again: "If 
 it were a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of 
 the people would be sufficient to establish it. But it was to 
 
OriNIONS OF THE FATirKRS. 19^ 
 
 be hiiuUng on the people of a State only by their own separate 
 consent." Under the influence of these arguments, and others 
 of the same import from jMr. Madison, whom she thought, 
 from his close relations to the Constitution, high authority 
 upon all questions pertaining to its character, Virginia finally 
 acceded to the Union. It is especially noteworthy, however, 
 that Virginia, when becoming a party to the Constitution, 
 expressly affirmed, in the most solemn manner, the right to 
 "resume" her grants of power to the Federal Government. 
 
 In deference to the accumulated evidence upon this subject, 
 came the unqualified statement, from eminent Northern au- 
 thority,* that, " This right [of secession] must be considered 
 an ingredient in the original composition of the General Gov- 
 ernment, which, though not expressed, was mutually under- 
 stood." 
 
 But whatever may be thought of the prescriptive and in- 
 herent right of sovereignty, exercised by the South in with- 
 drawing from the Union, as deducible from the peculiar 
 nature of the American system, and as expounded by the 
 founders of that system, there can be no question as to its 
 entire accordance with the spirit of American polity. Au- 
 thority is abundant in support of the assertion that, not even 
 in the North, previous to the inception of the present revolu- 
 
 * William Rawle, of Philadelphia, an able laAvyer 'and constitutional 
 expounder. Mr. Buchanan, in his history of his own administration, 
 thus mentions him: "The right of secession found advocates afterwards 
 in men of distincrnished abilities and unquestioned patriotism. In 18'25, 
 it was maintained by Mr. William Rawle, of Philadelpliia, an eminent 
 
 and universally-respected lawyer His biographer says 
 
 tliat, 'in 1791, he was appointed District Attorney of the United States,' 
 and 'the situation of Attorney General was more than once tendered to 
 him by Washington, but as often declined,' for domestic reasons." 
 
200 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 tion, was tlie idea of a constrained connection with the Union 
 entertained. From every source of Northern opinion has come 
 indignant repudiation of a coerced association of communities, 
 originally united by a common pledge of fealty to the right of 
 self-government. 
 
 Upon this subject Mr. John Quincy Adams spoke in lan- 
 guage of characteristic fervor: "The indissoluble link of 
 union between the people of the several States of this confed- 
 erated nation is, after all, not in the right, but in the heart. 
 If the day should ever come (may heaven avert it !) when the 
 affections of the people of these States shall be alienated from 
 each other — when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold 
 indifference, or collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the 
 bands of political association will not long hold together par- 
 ties no longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated inter- 
 ests and kindly sympathies; and far better will it be for the 
 people of the disunited States to part in friendship from each 
 other than to be held together by constraint." 
 
 Even Mr. Lincoln, whose statesmanship is not likely to be 
 commemorated for its profundity or scholarship, fully com- 
 prehended the exaggerated reverence of the American mind 
 for the "sacred right of self-government." Now that his 
 homely phrases are dignified by the Northern masses with the 
 sanctity of the utterances of Deity, assuredly there should be 
 no apprehension that his opinions may not be deemed con- 
 clusive. In 1848, Mr. Lincoln said: "Any people whatever 
 have the right to abolish the existing government, and form 
 a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a 
 most sacred right." 
 
 A brave affirmation was this of the doctrine of the Declara- 
 tion of Independence, that "Governments derive their just 
 
OPINIONS OF NORTH EEN MEN. 201 
 
 powers from the consent of the governed ; " and one which 
 would have commanded the united applause of the North, 
 then and now, had the application concerned Hungary, Po- 
 land, Greece, or Mexico. But, with reference to the South, 
 there was a most important modification of this admirable 
 principle of equity and humanity. When asked, "AVhy not 
 let the South go?" Abraham Lincoln, the President, in 1861, 
 said : " Let the South go ! Where, then, shall we get our rev- 
 enue V And the united North reechoed: ^' Let the South go ! 
 Where, then, shall we look for the bounties and monopolies which 
 have so enriched us at the expense of those improvident, unsus- 
 pecting Southerners ? Where shall we find again such patient 
 victims of spoliation ? " 
 
 Mr. Horace Greeley frequently and emphatically, previous 
 to the war, affirmed the right of changing, its political associ- 
 ation asserted by the South. Three days after the election 
 of Mr. Lincoln, in November, 1860, his paper, the New York 
 Tribune, said : " If the Cotton States shall become satisfied 
 that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist 
 
 on letting them go in peace We must ever 
 
 resist the right of any State to remain in the Union, and nul- 
 lify or defy the laws thereof. To withdraw from tlie Union is 
 quite another matter ; and whenever any considerable section of 
 our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all 
 coercive measures designed to keep it in. We hope never to live 
 in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to another by 
 bayonets." On the 17th of December, 1860, the Tribune said: 
 " If it [the Declaration of Independence] justifies the secession 
 of three millions of colonists in 1776, we do not see why it loould 
 not justify the secession of five millions of Southerners from the 
 Federal Union in 1861." 
 
202 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Such are a few illustrations, to which might be added innu- 
 merable quotations, of the same import, from the most promi- 
 nent sources of Northern opinion. Never has there been a 
 question so capable of positive solution and easy comprehen- 
 sion, when subjected to the test of candid investigation, and 
 never so successful a purpose to exclude the illumination of 
 facts by persistent and ingenious misrepresentation. The 
 North has reason for its extravagant exultation at the skill 
 and audacity with which the brazen front of hypocrisy, for a 
 time, at least, has successfully sustained, in the name of hu- 
 manity and liberty, the most monstrous imposition and trans- 
 parent counterfeit of virtue ever designed upon an intelligent age. 
 
 To the triumphant historical vindication of the South, there 
 remains only the essential condition of a clear and truthful 
 statement of the provocations which impelled her to adopt 
 that long-deferred remedy, which is the last refuge of a people 
 whose liberties are imperiled. Secession, however strong in 
 its prescriptive or implied justification as a principle, was not 
 to be undertaken from caprice, or trivial causes of dissatis- 
 faction. 
 
 Abuses, numerous, serious, and consecutive, were required 
 before disunion became either desirable or acceptable to the 
 South. The native conservatism of the Southern character 
 renders it peculiarly averse to agitation ; to this were added 
 social features, the safety of which would be greatly imper- 
 iled by civil war, and thus a train of influences tended to 
 make Southern soil, of all others, the least favorable to the 
 growth of revolutionary principles. 
 
 In the development of this volume, we have glanced at the 
 progress of those sectional differences, at various periods pre- 
 cipitated by the insolent aggressions of Abolitionism, which 
 
NORTHERN AGGRESSION. 203 
 
 steadily depreciated the value of the Union in Southern esti- 
 mation. Continued aggressions by her enemies ; their Punic 
 faith, illustrated in a scries of violated pledges, and habitual 
 disregard of the conditions of the covenant which bound South 
 and North together; petty outrages, taunts and insults, ema- 
 nating from every possible source of public expression at the 
 North, for many years had banished fraternal feeling and 
 precluded those interchanges of comity between the sections 
 which were the indispensable requisites to national harmony. 
 It is undeniable, that for years previous to secession, the sen- 
 timental attachment to the Union, which was the distinctive 
 characteristic of Southern patriotism — unlike the coarse, utili- 
 tarian estimate of the Union as a source of pecuniary profit, 
 which constituted its value to the North — had been greatly 
 impaired. Since 1850, and to a considerable extent during the 
 preceding decade, the most sagacious statesmen of the South 
 contemplated disunion as an event almost inevitable, unless 
 averted by a contingency of very improbable occurrence. 
 There must be an awakening by the North to a more just 
 appreciation of its constitutional and patriotic obligations, or 
 an unmanly submission by the South, to a condition of de- 
 grading inferiority, in a government to whose construction, 
 prosperity, and distinction, she had contributed more than a 
 proportionate share of influence. 
 
 Chief among the considerations which admonished the South 
 of the perils which environed her situation in the Union, was 
 the total destruction of that sectional balance, which had been 
 wisely adjusted by its founders, as the safeguard of the weaker 
 against the stronger influence. Having in mind the wise say- 
 ing of Aristotle, that " the weak always desire what is equal 
 and just, but the powerful pay no regard to it," the states- 
 
204 L.IFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 men of 1787 designedly shaped the chart of government 
 with a view to the preservation of equality. The struggle 
 between the weaker element, naturally contending in behalf 
 of the equilibrium, and the stronger striving for its overthrow, 
 was, "at an early period, distinctly foreshadowed. With char- 
 acteristic prevision, Alexander Hamilton, probably the fore- 
 most statesman of his day, foretold the nature of this contest 
 over the principle of equality. Said that sagacious publicist: 
 '' The truth is, it is a contest for power, not for liberty." 
 
 This contest, indeed, so long waged, was, many years since, 
 decided overwhelmingly against the South. In 1850, the 
 Northern majority in the House of Representatives, the pop- 
 ular branch of the government, had increased from a majority, 
 in 1790, of five votes, to fifty-four. Years before, the legis- 
 lation of Congress assumed that sectional bias, which was un- 
 deviatingly adhered to for the purpose, and with ample suc- 
 cess, of the material depression of the South. Under the 
 baleful influences of hostile legislation, of tariffs aimed directly 
 at her commercial prosperity, of bounties for fostering multi- 
 farious Northern interests, her position in the Union was help- 
 less and deplorable in the extreme. Yet, like a rock -bound 
 Prometheus, with the insidious elements of destruction gnaw- 
 ing at her vitals, the South suffered herself to be chained by an 
 influence of sentiment, of association, and reminiscence to the 
 Union, fully conscious of the growing rapacity of her despoilcr 
 and of her own hopeless decline. Her infatuation was indeed 
 marvelous, in trusting to the dawning of justice and gener- 
 osity in a fierce, vindictive, and remorseless sectional majority. 
 
 The alarming portents of ultimately complete material pros- 
 tration, to be consummated by these perversions of the pur- 
 poses of the Union, were terribly significant, in view of the 
 
A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY. 205 
 
 venom which actuated the enemies of the South. The sec- 
 tional balance was hopelessly gone ; Southern material pros- 
 perity destroyed by sectional legislation; not a check, originally 
 provided by the Constitution for the protection of the weaker 
 section, but had been virtually obliterated; Northern perfidy 
 illustrated in the violation of every compact which, in opera- 
 tion, proved favorable to the South, while the latter was held 
 to a rigid fidelity in all agreements favorable to her enemies; 
 the nullification, by the legislatures of half the Northern 
 States, of Federal laws for the protection of Southern property, 
 are a few of those grievances which presented to the South 
 the hard and inexorable alternative of resistance, or abject 
 submission to endless insult and outrage. 
 
 A Southern Senator,* announcing the secession of his State, 
 and his own consequent withdrawal from the Senate, stated 
 the question in a form, which even then had the authority of 
 history. 
 
 "Not a decade, nor scarce a lustrum, has elapsed (since Ala- 
 bama became a State) that has uot been strongly marked by 
 proofs of the growth and power of that antislavery spirit of the 
 Northern people, which seeks the overthrow of that domestic in- 
 stitution of the South, which is not only the chief source of her 
 prosperity, but the very basis of her social order and State polity. 
 It is to-day the master-spirit of the Northern States, and had 
 before the secession of Alabama, of Mississippi, of Florida, or of 
 South Carolina, severed most of the bonds of the Union. It de- 
 nied us Christian communion, because it could not endure what 
 it calls the moral leprosy of slave-holding ; it refused us permis- 
 sion to sojourn, or even to pass through the North with our 
 property ; it claimed freedom for the slave, if brought by his 
 
 * lion. C. C. Clay, of Alabama. 
 
206 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 master into a Northern State ; it violated the Constitution, and 
 treaties, and laws of Congress, because designed to protect that 
 property ; it refused us any share of lauds acquired mainly by our 
 diplomacy, and blood, and treasure; it refused our property any 
 Bhelter or security beneath the flag of a common government; it 
 robbed us of our property, and refused to restore it ; it refused 
 to deliver criminals against our laws, who fled to the North with 
 our property or our blood upon their hands; it threatened us by 
 solemn legislative acts, with ignominious punishment, if we pur- 
 sued our property into a Northern State; it murdered Southern 
 men when seeking the recovery of their property on Northern 
 soil ; it invaded the borders of Southern States, poisoned their 
 wells, burnt their dwellings, and murdered their people ; it de- 
 nounced us by deliberate resolves of popular meetings, of party 
 conventions, and of religious, and even legislative assemblies, as 
 habitual violators of the laws of God and the rights of humanity ; 
 it exerted all the moral and physical agencies that human ingenu- 
 ity can devise, or diabolical malice can employ, to heap odium 
 and infamy upon us, and to make us a by-word of hissing and 
 of scorn throughout the civilized world." 
 
 There was no room for uncertainty as to the significance of 
 the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency, in 1860, 
 by a party exclusively sectional in organization, and upon a 
 platform, vv^hich virtually declared the Union, as then consti- 
 tuted, in opposition to justice, humanity, and civilization. 
 
 The real danger to the South, involved in this election, 
 was that it was a sectional triumph — a victory of North 
 over South, in a contest where the South risked every thing, 
 the North nothing. From time immemorial sincere patriots 
 of both sections had deprecated the formation of sectional par- 
 ties, organized upon geographical interests, or upon ideas con- 
 fined to limited portions of the Union. Washington, in his 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF LINCOLN'S ELECTION. 207 
 
 farewell injunction, admonished his countrymen of the de- 
 plorable results which must follow the presentation of such 
 issues. 
 
 The Chicago platform was more than a menace to the 
 South ; it was a defiance of law, a declaration of war upon the 
 Constitution. The election of Lincoln was both a legal and 
 moral severance of the bonds of Union. While he received 
 the united vote of the North, save New Jersey, he did not 
 receive one electoral vote from the South. His shaping of his 
 administration was consistent with the character of the party 
 which elected him. All his constitutional advisers were North- 
 ern men or Southern Abolitionists; social outlaws in their own 
 section, in consequence of their notorious personal depravity, 
 and infidelity to their immediate fellow-citizens. Of like char- 
 acter were the subordinate appointments of the Federal Gov- 
 ernment in Southern communities. 
 
 Nor was there reason to doubt the policy of the Govern- 
 ment under its new management. Mr. Lincoln had been suf- 
 ficiently communicative of his own bitter hostility to Southern 
 institutions. In fact, with much show of justice, his admirers 
 claimed for him the original suggestion of the idea of an "irre- 
 pressible conflict," afterwards so elaborately pronounced by 
 William 11. Seward,. Public announcements, from prominent 
 speakers of the successful party, amply revealed the feast to 
 which the South was invited. Wendell Phillips, the most 
 able, eloquent, and sagacious of the original Abolitionists, thus 
 pointedly defined the situation : " No man has a right to be 
 surj^rised at this state of things. It is just M'hat we have at- 
 ♦ tempted to bring about. It is the first sectional party ever 
 organized in this country. It does not know its own face, and 
 calls itself national ; but it is not national — it is sectional. 
 
208 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The Republican party is a party of the Nortli pledged against 
 the South." 
 
 Such was the complexion to which political affairs were 
 brought by the election of Abraham Lincoln. There remained 
 hardly a hope, even for future security or domestic tranquillity 
 to the South, except in withdrawal from an association, in which 
 she had become an inferior and an outcast — an object of op- 
 pression, outrage, and contumely. From a relentless Abolition 
 majority she could expect no favors ; and the Northern Democ- 
 racy, so long her ally, for common purposes of party, had 
 cowered before the storm of fanaticism, and repudiated the 
 first demand made upon its fidelity to principle. 
 
 Congress assembled on the first Monday of December, 1860, 
 a few weeks subsequent to the Presidential election. Never 
 had that body met under circumstances of such gravity. Uni- 
 versal foreboding of peril to the nation was mingled with hope 
 of such action, as would avert the impending calamities of dis- 
 union and civil war. There were few indications, at the open- 
 ing of the session, of conciliatory sentiments ; from the repre- 
 sentatives of both sections came open defiance, and Northern 
 members of both houses were more than ever bold in the utter- 
 ance of insult and menace. Before the opening of the session. 
 President Buchanan received from Mr. Davis the most satis- 
 factory assurances of his cooperation with the administration 
 in a pacific policy, having for its object the settlement of the 
 national difficulties upon terms promotive of the peace of the 
 country, and assuring the security of the South,* To such a 
 
 * It is not to be understood that Mr. Davis approved Mr. Buchanan's pol- 
 icy in the winter of 1861. The message of the President disappointed the 
 South, and was offensive to many of his most attached supportei's, in con- 
 sequence of its denial of tlie right of secession. Denying the right of 
 
rATKIOTKJ COURSE OF MR. DAVIS. 209 
 
 settlement the eiforts of Mr. Davis were addressed so long as 
 there was the slightest ground for the indulgence of hope. 
 
 This session of Congress, the last which was held previous 
 to the commencement of civil war, is chiefly interesting as the 
 historical record of tliose patriotic elibrts which were made to 
 save the Union, and as furnishing incoutestible proof of the 
 guilt of those who, by their persistent refusal of all coneiUa- 
 tory propositions, are justly responsible for the calamities which 
 were to befall the country. Happily for the reputation of Mr. 
 Davis, the proof is authentic and conclusive in his favor upon 
 these important questions. There is no portion of his career 
 in which statesmanship, patriotism, and a noble appreciation 
 of the claims of humanity shine forth more conspicuously. So 
 overwhelming is the evidence that, in these last days of the 
 Union, he was false to none of these high considerations, that 
 the most mendacious assailants of himself and the cause he 
 lately represented have not yet ventured to call it in question. 
 
 A disposition is frequently evinced to plead for him immu- 
 nity from the responsibility of his position, as the leader of the 
 Confederate movement, upon the score of his consistent Union- 
 ism, manifested in the prevailing conservatism of his course as 
 a politician. He needs no such palliation. His devotion to 
 the Union of the American fathers was as unquestionable as 
 was that of Washington. His patriotism was illustrated by 
 every mode of exemplification in the service of country. To 
 secession, Mr. Buchanan yet denied, also, the power of coercing the States, 
 but subsequently lent himself to the latter policy. Mr. Davis freely tes- 
 tified his disappointment at certain positions taken in the Message, and 
 criticised them with emphasis, but great courtesy. Mr. Buchanan indi- 
 cates the special message of January, 1861, as the occasion of the termi- 
 nation of all friendly relations between himself and those whom he terms 
 the " secession Senators." 
 14 
 
210 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 substantiate his attachment to that association of States, de- 
 signed by the fathers, sublime in its objects of mutual fidelity, 
 generous sympathies, justice, and equality, no elaborate state- 
 ment is required, nor could formal vindication strengthen its 
 defenses.* He never arrayed himself against such a Union, 
 but, abhorring that perverted instrument of sectional aggres- 
 sion, which the Government had become, he did accompany 
 and lead his fellow-citizens in their exercise of the highest 
 privilege of freemen. 
 
 He was always prepared to follow the principles of States' 
 Rights to their logical consequences, and was yet consistent jn 
 his attachment to the Union. Thus he was a firm believer in 
 the absolute sovereignty of the States, and of the enjoyment, 
 by the States, of all the attributes of sovereignty, including, 
 necessarily, the right of secession. He had never urged the 
 expediency of secession, though, upon repeated occasions, he 
 had foreshadowed its probable necessity in the future, as the 
 only remedy remaining to the South in certain contingencies. 
 In the Senate, in 1850, he thus alluded to the possibility of a 
 successful organization of a sectional party : " The danger is 
 one of our own times, and it is that sectional division of the 
 people which has created the necessity of looking to the ques- 
 tion of the balance of power, and which carries with it, when 
 disturbed, the danger of disunion." 
 
 In 1859, again; he proclaimed, in unequivocal terms, his 
 course in the event of the success of a party indorsing the 
 Eo^'li^sler pronunciamento of Mr. Seward. Yet his course, 
 
 * It it, a notable fact that, years ago, the strono; and avowed attachment 
 of Mr. Davis for the Union, was habitually sneered at by some Southern 
 men, who are now seeking to gratify their lust for place by "crooking 
 the pregnant hinges of the knee," to those who persecute him and his 
 countrymen. 
 
SEEKS TO AVERT AVAR. 211 
 
 subsequent to the election of Mr. Lincoln, was directed entirely 
 in the interest of moderation. Having little hope of conces- 
 sion from the enemies of the South, in the moment of their 
 overwhelming victory, he yet anxiously, earnestly entered that 
 last struggle for the Constitution, before it passed into the 
 keeping of iconoclasts, who were pledged to its destruction. 
 
 His zeal in behalf of pacification was actuated by consider- 
 ations of humanity, no less ennobling than his impulse of 
 disinterested patriotism. Regarding a long and bloody war 
 as the certain result of dissolution, he anxiously sought to 
 avert that calamitous result, and stood pledged to the accept- 
 ance of any basis of settlement which should guarantee the 
 safety and honor of the South. At no time, however, did he 
 advocate submission. His language in the Senate is explicit. 
 Speaking of the secession of Mississippi, he said : " I, how- 
 ever, may be permitted to say, that I do think she has justi- j 
 fiable cause, and I approve of her act. I conferred with her 
 people before that act was taken, counseled them then that, if 
 the state of things which they apprehended should exist when 
 the convention met, they should take the action which they 
 have now adopted." 
 
 During the session, numerous efforts at compromise were 
 made, in every instance emanating from Southern Represent- 
 atives or Northern Democrats, the dominant party of the 
 North declining all tenders of pacification, and offering no 
 terms of conciliation in return. It is unnecessary to trace the 
 progress of these abortive efforts, which, in the mai"^! i^etetved 
 the support of feeble minorities, and had, from their inception, 
 no prospect of adoption. 
 
 There was one proposition, and probably only one, which 
 embodied a competent basis of settlement, and was entitled to 
 
212 lifp: of jp:ffkkson davis. 
 
 favor. This was called the " Crittenden Compromise/' and 
 originated with the venerable Kentucky Senator, by whose 
 name it is designated. For a time it seemed that the demon- 
 strations of popular sentiment in its favor, especially the well- 
 ascertained readiness of a large majority of the Southern people 
 to accept it, and its exceedingly practical nature, as a final 
 settlement of the slavery question, would eventually secure its 
 adoption by Congress. The result was a disappointment of 
 this patriotic expectation, and a conclusive demonstration of 
 the purpose of the Republican party to consent to no settle- 
 ment which the South could accept. 
 
 An examination of the Crittenden proposition will reveal a 
 most striking illustration of the ever-present spirit of accom- 
 modation, in matters aifecting the safety of the Union, which, 
 even in its last hours, was characteristic of the leaders and 
 people of the South, and of the narrow, selfish, and exacting 
 sectionalism of the North. In reality, it was little short of a 
 surrender, in its ample concessions, to the encroachments of 
 Abolitionism. 
 
 The resolutions introduced by Mr. Crittenden, in the Sen- 
 ate, on the 18th of December, 1860, contemplated amendments 
 to the Constitution having the following objects : The prohib- 
 ition of slavery in all Territories north of the old Missouri 
 Compromise line, and providing protection for it south of that 
 line; a denial of the power of Congress to abolish slavery in 
 the District of Columbia, or in ports, arsenels, dock-yards, or 
 wherever else the Federal Government exercised jurisdiction; 
 remuneration to owners of escaped slaves by communities in 
 which the Federal laws, providing rendition of slaves, might 
 be violently obstructed. Such were the material features of 
 the "Crittenden Compromise." 
 
THE CRirfENDEN COMPROMISE. 213 
 
 It will be seen at a glance how absurd was the misnomer 
 of " compromise " applied to so one-sided a settlement. The 
 South was required, by its provisions, to abandon the sacred 
 right of protection to her property, guaranteed by the Consti- 
 tution and unequivocally re-affirmed by the highest judicial 
 tribunal in the land. The Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott 
 case, had already decided the right to take slaves into all the 
 Territories, while the Crittenden proposition prohibited it en- 
 tirely in the major portion of the common Territory, and 
 merely tolerated it in the residue. The Constitution, as ex- 
 pounded by the Supreme Court, guaranteed the right of intro- 
 duction and protection of slavery in all the Territories, in 
 whatever latitude, as the common property of the States. The 
 Crittenden amendment proposed to confine this right to Ter- 
 ritory south of 36° 30', prohibiting, in the meanwhile, slavery 
 forever north of that line, and in regions where its legal exist- 
 ence had been emphatically affirmed by that august tribunal, 
 the Supreme Court. If adopted, it would have yielded every 
 thing to Abolition rapacity, save a mere abstraction. Of all 
 the vast territory yet remaining to be hereafter divided into 
 States, only in New Mexico did it propose even to tolerate 
 slavery, and in that locality the laws of nature precluded its 
 permanent establishment. 
 
 A few days after its introdution in the Senate, the Critten- 
 den amendment was proposed by its author to a special com- 
 mittee of thirteen, created on motion of Senator Powell, of 
 Kentucky, for the consideration of all questions pertaining to 
 the p(5nding national difficulties. This committee M'as com- 
 posed of the most eminent and influential Senators, embracing 
 five leading Republicans, five Southern Senators, and Messrs. 
 Bright, Bigler, and Douglas, on behalf of the Northern De- 
 
214 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 mocracy. Mr. Davis, originally api^ointed, at first declined to 
 serve, but finally consented, in compliance with the urgent 
 requests of other Senators. At the first meeting of the com- 
 mittee, 21st December, it was " resolved that no proposition 
 shall be reported as adopted, unless sustained by a majority 
 of each of the classes of the committee ; Senators of the Repub- 
 lican party to constitute one class, and Senators of the other 
 parties to constitute the other class." 
 
 This resolution was necessary, in consequence of the obvious 
 futility of any settlement which did not meet the approval of 
 a majority of the Republican Senators. In this Committee 
 the Crittenden proposition was defeated. Not one of the Re- 
 publican Senators voted for it, and Messrs. Davis and Toombs 
 likewise voted against it when it was ascertained that it would 
 not receive the sanction of a majority of the Republican Sen- 
 ators. 
 
 Despite its unfairness as a measure of settlement, and its 
 great injustice to the South, Mr. Davis would have accepted 
 it, as would a large majority of Southern Senators, as a final- 
 ity, if the Republican Senators had tendered it. This, how- 
 ever, the latter Avere determined not to do, nor did a single 
 Republican Senator, at any time during the session, express 
 even a desire that any action, conciliatory to the South, should 
 be adopted.* Insolent, dictatorial, and defiant, they pro- 
 claimed their purpose, at all hazards, to assert the authority 
 of the Government, and their acts clearly indicated their stern 
 
 * Mr. Crittenden, whose supreme devotion to the Union, can not be 
 called in question, since he continued to cling to the shadow long after 
 the substance had departed, and in the midst of actual war continued to 
 hope for a final pacific settlement, was greatly incensed at the unpatriotic 
 course of the Republican Senators. His gray hairs, his eloquence, his 
 
THE CLARKE AMENDMENT. 216 
 
 purpose to refuse every proposition contemplating concession 
 or compromise. In substitution of the Crittenden adjustment, 
 they voted solidly for the amendment of Senator Clarke, of 
 New Hampshire, which denied the necessity of amendments 
 to the Constitution, which ought to be obeyed rather than 
 amended, and declared that the remedy for present difficulties 
 was to be sought in a stern enforcement of the laws, rather 
 than in assurances to peculiar ideas and guarantees to peculiar 
 interests. This palpable defiance, and emphatic avowal of a 
 purpose to concede nothing to Southern demands, was in- 
 dorsed by the action of Eepublican caucusses of both houses 
 of Congress, by resolutions of State Legislatures, and by 
 tenders of men and means to compel the submission of the 
 South. The entire Republican j^arty were clearly committed 
 to the purpose, avowed by Mr. Salmon P. Chase, in a letter 
 from the Peace Congress, to Portsmouth, Ohio, to " use the 
 power while they had it, and prevent a settlement."* 
 
 On the 31st December, 1860, the Committee of Thirteen 
 reported to the Senate their inability to "agree upon any 
 general plan of adjustment," and thus, with the arrival of the 
 new year, had vanished the last hope of preserving the peace 
 of the country. The failure of the Crittenden proposition was 
 decisive of the question of pacification ; no other plan of ad- 
 justment, that was presented, having either its merits or its 
 practical features. 
 
 Southern resistance came none too soon for Northern power, 
 
 unquestioned Unionism, were all unavailing. He was frequently hotly 
 denunciatory, of what, equally with Mr. Davis, he regarded a purpose 
 to prevent any adjustment which could have a pacifying effect upon the 
 country. 
 
 * Statement of Hon. S. S. Cox. 
 
216 LIFE OP JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 hate, and lust, but far too late for the precious goal of inde- 
 pendence. Delay had been fatal, and the golden opportunity- 
 long since lost. But there was still time to emulate the 
 glorious examples of the past. With marvelous calmness and 
 dauntless intrepidity, a heroic race j^repared an exhibition of 
 noble devotion and willing sacrifice, the contemplation of 
 which revives the memories of Thermopylfe. 
 
 Comparatively of little moment, now, is the question, 
 whether the acceptance of this basis of adjustment by the 
 South would have been consistent with discretion. In the 
 end the result, in all likelihood, would have been the same. 
 Had a settlement been reached in 1861, Southern liberties 
 must eventually have perished, through the influences of cor- 
 ruption and the demoralization engendered by continued sub- 
 mission to Avrong, no less effectually than by their overthrow 
 in that gallant struggle of arms, which terminated with such 
 fatal results. But there still remains the question of respon- 
 sibility for those horrors of civil strife, which the failure of 
 the Crittenden amendment soon precipitated upon the country. 
 Those crimson spots which stain the subsequent history of the 
 Republic, are traceable to no parricidal hand raised by the 
 South. No historical question has received more satisfactory 
 decision than this; and the South is acquitted even by the 
 testimony of her enemies. It is unnecessary to give the evi- 
 dence of Southern men, when there is such ample testimony 
 from those who deprecated and condemned the subsequent 
 course of the South. 
 
 Senator Douglas, on the 3d January, 1861, only three days 
 after the report of the Committee of Thirteen had been sub- 
 mitted, and within hearing of its members, thus expressed 
 himself in the course of an address to the Senate : 
 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOUGLAS. 217 
 
 " If you of the Republican side are not willing to accept this 
 [a proposition of his own] nor the proposition of the Senator from 
 Kentucky [Mr. Crittenden,] pray tell us what are you willing to 
 do? I address the inquiry to the Republicans alone, for the 
 reason, that in the Committee of Thirteen, a few days ago, every 
 member from the South, including those from the Cotton States 
 [3Iessrs. Toombs and Davis,] expressed their readiness to accept 
 the proposition of my venerable friend from Kentucky [Mr. Crit- 
 tenden] as a final settlement of the controversy, if tendered and 
 sustained by the Republican members. Hence, the sole responsi- 
 bility of our disagreement, and the only difficulty in the way of an 
 amicable adjustment, is with the Republican party." 
 
 Again, on the 2d March, 1861, Mr. Douglas re-affirmed 
 this important statement. Said he: 
 
 "The Senator has said that if the Crittenden proposition could 
 have been passed early in the session, it would have saved all the 
 States except South Carolina. I firmly believe it would. While 
 the Crittenden proposition was not in accordance with my cherished 
 views, I avowed my readiness and eagerness to accept it, in order 
 to save the Union, if we could unite upon it. No man has labored 
 harder than I have to get it passed. I can confirm the Senator's 
 declaration that Senator Davis himself, when on the Committee of 
 Thirteen, was ready at all times to compromise on the Crittenden 
 proposition, I will go further, and say that Mr. Toombs was also 
 ready to do so." 
 
 Hon. S. S. Cox, for several years an able and eloquent 
 member of Congress from Ohio, has made a most intere;?ting 
 statement upon this subject: 
 
 The vote on the Crittenden proposition was well defined, but is 
 not so well understood. From the frequency of inquiries since the 
 war as to this latter vote, the people were eager to know upon 
 
218 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 whom to fix the responsibility of its failure. It may as well be 
 stated that all other propositions, whether of the Peace Convention 
 or the Border State project, or the measures of the committees, 
 were comparatively of no moment; for the Crittenden proposition 
 was the only one which could have arrested the struggle. It would 
 have received a larger vote than any other. It would have had 
 more effect in moderating Southern excitement. Even Davis, 
 Toombs, and others of the Gulf States, would have accepted it. I 
 have talked with Mr. Crittenden frequently on this point. Not 
 only has he confirmed the public declarations of Douglas and Pugh, 
 and the speech of Toombs himself, to this effect, but he said it was 
 so understood in committee. At one time, while the committee 
 was in session, he said : " Mr. Toombs, will this compromise, as a 
 remedy for all wrongs and apprehensions, be acceptable to you?" 
 Mr. Toombs, with some profanity, replied: "Not by a good deal; 
 
 but my State will accept it, and I will follow my State to ." 
 
 And he did. 
 
 I will not open the question whether it was wise then to offer 
 accommodations. It may not be profitable now to ask whether the 
 millions of young men whose bodies are maimed, or whose bones 
 are decaying under the sod of the South, and the heavy load of 
 public debt under which we sweat and toil, have their compensation 
 in black liberty. Nor will I discuss whether the blacks have been 
 bettered by their precipitate freedom, passing, as so many have, 
 from slavery, through starvation and suffering, to death. There is 
 no comfort in the reflection that the negroes will be exterminated 
 with the extermination of slavery. The real point is, could not 
 this Union have been made permanent by timely settlement, instead 
 of cemented by fraternal blood and military rule? By an equitable 
 partition of the territory this was possible. We had then 1,200,000 
 square miles. The Crittenden proposition would have given the 
 North 900,000 of these square miles, and applied the Chicago doc- 
 trines to that quantity. It would have left the remaining fourth 
 
STATEMENT OF MR. COX. 219 
 
 substantially to be carved out as free or slave States, at the option 
 of the people when the States were admitted. This proposition 
 the radicals denounced. It has been stated, to rid the Republicans 
 of the odium of not averting the war when that was possible, that 
 the Northern members tendered to the Southern the Crittenden 
 compromise, which the South rejected. This is untrue. It was 
 tendered by Southern Senators and Northern Democrats to the 
 Republicans. It was voted upon but once in the House, when it 
 received eighty votes against one hundred and thirteen. These 
 eighty votes were exclusively Democrats and Southern Americans, 
 like Gilmer, Vance, and others. Mr. Briggs, of New York, was 
 the only one not a Democrat who voted for it. He had been an 
 old Whig, and never a Republican. The Republican roll, begin- 
 ning with Adams and ending with Woodruff, was a unit against 
 it. Intermingled with them was one Southern extremist (General 
 Hindman) who desired no settlement. There were many Southern 
 men who did not vote, believing that unless the Republicans, who 
 were just acceding to power, favored it, its adoption would be a 
 delusion. 
 
 The plan adopted by the Republican Senators to defeat it was 
 by amendment and postponement. On the 1-ith and 15th of Janu- 
 ary they cast all their votes against its being taken up ; and on the 
 16th, when it came up, Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, moved to 
 strike it out, and insert something which he knew would neither 
 be successful nor acceptable. The vote on Clark's amendment 
 was 25 to 23; every "aye" being a Republican, and every "no," 
 except Kennedy and Crittenden (Americans), being Democrats. 
 
 When this result was announced universal gloom prevailed. 
 The people favored this compromise. Petitions by thousands of 
 citizens were showered upon Congress for its passage. Had it 
 received a majority only, they would have rallied and sustained 
 those who desired peace and union. One more earnest appeal was 
 made to the Republicans. General Cameron answered it by moving 
 
220 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 a reconsideration. His motion came up on the 18th, when he voted 
 acainst his own motion. It was carried, however, over the votes 
 of the Kepublicans, although Wigfall voted with them. When it 
 was again up on the second of March, 1861, the Southern States 
 were nearly all gone. Even then it was lost by one vote only. 
 But on that occasion all the Democrats were for, and all the Re- 
 publicans against it. The truth is, there was nothing but sneers 
 and skepticism from the Republicans at any settlement. They 
 broke down every proposition. They took the elements of con- 
 ciliation out of the Peace Convention before it assembled. Sena- 
 tors Harlan and Chandler were especially active in preparing that 
 convention for a failure. If every Southern man and every 
 Northern Democrat had voted for this proposition, it would have 
 required some nine Republicans for the requisite two-thirds. 
 Where were they? Dreaming with Mr. Seward of a sixty days' 
 struggle, or arranging for the division of the patronage of adminis- 
 tration. The only Southern Senators who seemed against any 
 settlement were Iverson and Wigfall; that no man will challenge 
 if he will refer to the Glohe (1st part, Thirty-fifth Congress, page 
 270) for the testimony of Douglas and Pugh, and to Mr. Bigler's 
 Bucks County speech, September 17, 1863. The latter knew it to 
 be true when he said that — 
 
 " When the struggle was at its height in Greorgia, between Robert 
 Toombs for secession, and A. H. Stephens against it, had those 
 men in the Committee of Thirteen, who are now so blameless in 
 their own estimation, given us their votes, or even three of them, 
 Stephens would have defeated Toombs, and secession would have 
 been prostrated. I heard Mr. Toombs say to Mr. Douglas that 
 the result in Georgia was staked on the action of the Committee 
 of Thirteen. If it accepted the Crittenden proposition, Stephens 
 would defeat him; if not, he would carry the State out by 40,000 
 majority. The three votes from the Republican side would have 
 carried it at any time ; but union and peace in the balance against 
 the Chicago platform were sure to be found wanting." 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA SECEDES. 221 
 
 If other testimony were wanting, I would ask a suspension of 
 judgment until those facts, better known to Southern men, trans- 
 pire. The intercourse about to be reestablished between the 
 sections will cumulate the proof. It will also bring to the light 
 many facts showing that, while President Buchanan was working 
 for the Peace Conference, while Virginia had been gained to our 
 side with her ablest men, there were even then in the Cabinet those 
 who not only encouraged revolt, but foiled by letter and speech 
 the efforts of the Unionists at "Washington and Richmond. These 
 letters and acts are referred to in the recent speech of General 
 Blair. They will be, and should be brought into the sunshine, if 
 only to vindicate the true Union men of that dark hour, and to 
 condemn those who have since made so much pretension with so 
 much zealotry, coupled with unexampled cruelty and tyranny. 
 
 In the light of subsequent events that policy was developed. 
 It was the destruction of slavery at the peril of war and disunion ; 
 or, as Senator Douglas expressed it, " a disruption of the Union, 
 believing it would draw after it, as an inevitable consequence, civil 
 war, servile insurrections, and finally the utter extermination of 
 slavery in all the Southern States." 
 
 While these fruitless efforts at compromise were in progress 
 at Washington, public sentiment in the South, especially in 
 the Cotton States, was rapidly reaching a point of exasperation, 
 which refused to brook longer delay in the vain hope of justice 
 from the exultant and unyielding North. In several of the 
 States, so excited was popular feeling, that within a few weeks 
 what was originally merely a purpose of resistance, intensified 
 into a determination of absolute national independence and 
 jxTmanent separation. South Carolina, on the 20th December, 
 18(j0, adopted her ordinance of secession, and thus bravely 
 gave the example, which other States speedily followed. 
 
 The work of secession, so thoroughly started by the opening 
 
222 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of the new year, was not accomplished without a severe 
 .struggle in several of the Cotton States, in which contest, 
 those who advocated unconditional separation were greatly 
 assisted by the defiant position of the Republican party. The 
 more sagacious Southern leaders foresaw the inevitable failure 
 of the movement of separation, unless it should be sustained 
 by an extensive cooperation among the Southern States. To 
 secure the united action of the Cotton States, at least, was 
 essential to give the movement strength and dignity. Mr. 
 Davis, who advocated secession only in the event of the failure 
 to obtain reasonable guarantees, and had never proposed to 
 abandon the Union without an effort to save it, was a most 
 earnest and influential advocate of the policy of cooperation. 
 Of great historical importance is the fact, that the counsels of 
 himself and those who acted with him, were adopted in pref- 
 erence to a more hasty policy, which, however ample the 
 provocation to immediate action, would have deprived the 
 South of the potent justification of having forborne until 
 "endurance ceased to be a virtue." 
 
 In a letter written a few days after the election of Mr. 
 Lincoln, he thus expressed his views : 
 
 "Warren County, Miss., Nov. 10, 1860. 
 
 Hon. E.. B. Rhett, Jr. — Dear Sir: I had the honor to receive, 
 last night, yours of the 27th ult., and hasten to reply to the in- 
 quiries propounded. Reports of the election leave little doubt 
 that the event you anticipated has occurred, that electors have 
 been chosen, securing the election of Lincoln, and I ■will answer 
 on that supposition. 
 
 My home is so isolated that I have had no intercourse with 
 those who might have aided me in forming an opinion as to the 
 effect produced on the mind of our people by the result of the 
 
LETTER TO R. B. RIIETT. 223 
 
 recent election, and the impressions which I communicate are 
 founded upon antecedent expressions. 
 
 1. I doubt not that the Governor of Mississippi has convoked 
 the Legislature to assemble within the present month, to decide 
 upon the course which the State should adopt in the present emer- 
 gency. Whether the Legislature will direct the call of a conven- 
 tion of the State, or appoint delegates to a convention of such 
 Southern States as may be willing to consult together for the 
 adoption of a Southern plan of action, is doubtful. 
 
 2. If a convention of the State were assembled, the proposition 
 to secede from the Union, independently of support from neigh- 
 boring States, would probably fail. 
 
 3. If South Carolina should first secede, and she alone should 
 take such action, the position of Mississippi would not probably 
 be changed by that fact. A powerful obstacle to the separate 
 action of Mississippi is the want of a port; from which follows 
 the consequence that her trade, being still conducted through the 
 ports of the Union, her revenue would be diverted from her own 
 support to that of a foreign government; and being geographi- 
 cally unconnected with South Carolina, an alliance with her would 
 not vary that state of the case. [/Sic.] 
 
 4. The propriety of separate secession by South Carolina de- 
 pends so much upon collateral questions that I find it diflicult to 
 respond to your last inquiry, for the want of knowledge which 
 would enable me to estimate the value of the elements involved 
 in the issue, though exterior to your State. Georgia is necessary 
 to connect you with Alabama, and thus to make eiFectual the co- 
 operation of Mississippi. If Georgia would be lost by immediate 
 action, but could be gained by delay, it seems clear to me that 
 you should wait. If the secession of South Carolina should be 
 followed by an attempt to coerce her back into the Union, that act 
 of usurpation, folly, and wickedness would enlist every true South- 
 ern man for her defense. If it were attempted to blockade her 
 
224 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ports and destroy her trade, a like result would be produced, and 
 the commercial world would probably be added to her allies. It 
 is probable that neither of those measures would be adopted by 
 any administration, but that Federal ships would be sent to col- 
 lect the duties on imports outside of the bar ; that the commer- 
 cial nations would feel little interest in that; and the Southern 
 States would have little power to counteract it. 
 
 The planting States have a common interest of such magnitude, 
 that their union, sooner or later, for the protection of that interest, 
 is certain. United they will have ample power for their own pro- 
 tection, and their exports will make for them allies of all com- 
 mercial and manufacturing powers. 
 
 The new States have a heterogeneous population, and will be 
 slower and less unanimous than those in which there is less of 
 the Northern element in the body politic, but interest controls 
 the policy of States, and finally all the planting communities must 
 reach the same conclusion. My opijiion ts, therefore, as it has been, 
 in favor of seeking to bring those States into cooperation before ask- 
 ing for a popular decision upon a new policy and relation to the 
 nations of the earth. If South Carolina should resolve to secede 
 before that cooperation can be obtained, to go out leaving Georgia, 
 and Alabama, and Louisiana in the Union, and without any reason 
 to suppose they will follow her, there appears to me to be no 
 advantage in waiting until the Government has passed into hostile 
 hands, and men have become familiarized to that injurious and 
 offensive perversion of the General Government from the ends for 
 which it was established. I have written with the freedom and 
 carelessness of private correspondence, and regret that I could 
 not give more precise information. 
 
 Very respectfully, yours, etc., 
 
 JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Mr. Davis remained in the Senate, a friend of peace, and, 
 
FARinVET.T. TO THE SENATE. 225 
 
 until the last moment, laboring for adjustment, when he 
 received the summons of Mississippi, forbidding the longer 
 exercise of the trust which she had given to his keeping. 
 Mississippi seceded on the 9th of January, 1861. Mr. Davis, 
 receiving formal announcement of the event, withdrew on the 
 21st, after pronouncing an impressive valedictory to the Sen- 
 ate. Its dignified, courteous, and statesman-like character has 
 challenged the unqualified eulogy of the enlightened world. 
 
 SPEECH OF HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, OX WITHDRAWING 
 FROM THE U. S. SENATE. JAN. 21, 1861. 
 
 Mr. Davis. I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announc- 
 ing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State 
 of Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in conveutioa 
 assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. 
 Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are terminated 
 here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I should appear 
 in the Senate to announce that fact to my associates, and I will say 
 but very little more. The occasion does not invite me to go into 
 argument; and my physical condition would not permit me to do 
 so, if otherwise; and yet it seems to become me to say something 
 on the part of a State I here represent, on an occasion so solemn 
 as this. 
 
 It is known to Senators who have served with me here, that I 
 have, for many years, advocated, as an essential attribute of State 
 sovereignty, the right of a State to secede from the Union. There- 
 fore, if I had not believed there was justifiable cause; if I had 
 thought that Mississippi was acting without sufficient provocation, 
 or without an existing necessity, I should still, under my theory 
 of the Government, because of my allegiance to the State of which 
 I am a citizen, have been bound by her action. I, however, may 
 be permitted to say that I do think she has justifiable cause, and I 
 15 
 
226 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 approve of h.er act. I conferred with her people before that act 
 was taken, counseled them then that if the state of things which 
 they apprehended should exist when the convention met, they 
 should take the action which they have now adopted. 
 
 I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine 
 with the advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the Union, 
 and to disregard its constitutional obligations by the nullification 
 of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification and secession, 
 so often confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic principles. Nullifi- 
 cation is a remedy which it is sought to apply within the Union, 
 and against the agent of the States. It is only to be justified 
 when the agent has violated his constitutional obligations, and a 
 State, assuming to judge for itself, denies the right of the agent 
 thus to act, and appeals to the other States of the Union for a 
 decision ; but when the States themselves, and when the people 
 of the States, have so acted as to convince us that they will not 
 regard our constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, 
 arises the doctrine of secession in its practical application. 
 
 A great man, who now reposes with his fathers, and who has 
 often been arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated 
 the doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It 
 was because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union — his de- 
 termination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a sever- 
 ance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other States, 
 that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he 
 proclaimed to be peaceful — to be within the limits of State power, 
 not to disturb the Union, but only to be a means of bringing the 
 agent before the tribunal of the States for their judgment. 
 
 Secession belongs to a diff'erent class of remedies. It is to be 
 justified upon the basis that'the States are sovereign. There was 
 a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again, 
 when a better comprehension of the theory of our Government, 
 and the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent 
 
FAUKWKLL TO THE SENATE. 227 
 
 any oik; I'roiii deiiyiiij^ that eacli State is a hovereij^ii, aii<J thus may 
 reclaim the grauta which it has made to any agent whomboever. 
 
 I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of MihssiH- 
 eippi, believing it to be necesHary and pr(jper, and hliould liave 
 been Ixiund by their action if niy bclii-f had been otherwiHC ; and 
 thirt brings me to the important point which I wish, on this last 
 occaHion, to present to the Senate. It in by this confounding of 
 nullification and seceHsion, that the name of a great man, whose 
 ashcH now mingle with his mother earth, has been evoked to jus- 
 tify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase, " to execute the 
 laws," was au expression which General Jackson applied to the 
 case of a State refusing to obey the laws while yet a member of 
 the Union. That is not the case which is n<jw presented. The 
 laws are to be executed over the United States, and upon the 
 people of the United States. They have no relation to any for- 
 eign country. It is a perversion of terms — at least it is a great 
 misapprehension of the case — which cites that expression for ap- 
 plication to a State which has withdrawn from the Unioa. You 
 may make war on a foreign State. If it be the purpose of gen- 
 tlemen, they may make war against a State wliich has withdrawn 
 from the Union ; but there are no laws of the United States to be 
 executed within the limits of a seceded State. A State, finding 
 herself in the condition in which Mississippi has judged she is — 
 in which her safety requires that she should provide for the main- 
 tenance of her rights out of the Union — surrenders all the bene- 
 fits (and they are known to be mariyj, deprives herself of the 
 advantages (and they are known to be great^, severs all the ties 
 of affection (and they are close and enduring), which have bound 
 her to the Union ; and thus divesting herself of every benefit — 
 taking upon herself every burden — she claims to be exempt from 
 any power to execute the laws of the United States within her 
 limits. 
 
 I well remember au occa.'^iou when Massachusetts was arraigned 
 
228 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 before the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion 
 was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue of a 
 fugitive slave in Boston. My opinion then was the same that it 
 is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not 
 influenced, in my opinion, because the case is my own, I refer to 
 that time and that occasion, as containing the opinion which I 
 then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I 
 then said that if Massachusetts, following her through a stated 
 line of conduct, choose to take the last step which separates her 
 from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will neither vote one 
 dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but will say to her, God 
 speed, in memory of the kind associations which once existed be- 
 tween her and the other States. 
 
 It has been a conviction of pressing necessity — it has been a 
 belief that we are to be deprived, in the Union, of the rights which 
 our fathers bequeathed to us — which has brought Mississippi into 
 her present decision. She has heard proclaimed the theory that 
 all men are created free and equal, and this made the basis of an 
 attack upon her social institutions; and the sacred Declaration of 
 Independence has been invoked to maintain the position of the 
 equality of the races. The Declaration of Independence is to be 
 construed by the circumstances and purposes for which it was made. 
 The communities were declaring their independence; the people of 
 those communities were asserting that no man was born, to use the 
 language of Mr. JeiFerson, booted and spurred, to ride over the 
 rest of mankind ; that men wei'c created equal — meaning the men 
 of the political community; that there was no divine right to rule; 
 that no man inherited the right to govern ; that there were no 
 classes by which power and place descended to families ; but that 
 all stations were equally within the grasp of each member of the 
 body politic. These were the great principles they anaounced; 
 these were the purposes for which they made their declaration ; 
 these were the ends to which their enunciation was directed. They 
 
FAKEWELL TO THE SENATE. 229 
 
 liave no reference to the slave; else, how happened it, that, among 
 the items of arraignment against George III, was, that he endeav- 
 ored to do just what the North has been endeavoring of late to do, 
 to stir up insurrection among our slaves. Had the Declaration 
 announced that the negroes were free and equal, how was the 
 prince to be arraigned for raising up insurrection among them? 
 And how was this to be enumerated among the high crimes which 
 caused the colonies to sever their connection with the mother 
 country? When our Constitution was formed, the same idea was 
 rendered more palpable ; for there we find provision made for that 
 very class of persons as property ; they were not put upon the foot- 
 ing of equality with white men — not even upon that of paupers 
 and convicts; but, so far as representation was concerned, were 
 discriminated against as a lower caste, only to be represented in 
 the numerical proportion of three-fifths. 
 
 Then, Senators, we recur to the compact which binds us to- 
 gether; we recur to the principles upon which our Government 
 was founded ; and when you deny them, and when you deny to us 
 the right to withdraw from a government, which, thus perverted, 
 threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but tread in the path 
 of our fathers when we proclaim our independence, and take the 
 hazard. This is done, not in hostility to others — not to injure any 
 section of the country — not even for our own pecuniary benefit; 
 but from the high and solemn motive of defending and protecting 
 the rights we inherited, and which it is our duty to transmit un- 
 shorn to our children. 
 
 I find in myself, perhaps, a type of the general feeling of my 
 constituents toward yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward 
 you. Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you, 
 whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to whom 
 I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well ; 
 and such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I repre- 
 sent toward those whom you represent. I, therefore, feel that I 
 
230 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 but express their desire, when I say I hope, and they hope, for 
 peaceable relations with you, though we must part. They may be 
 mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they have been in the 
 past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring disaster on every 
 portion of the country ; and if you will have it thus, we will in- 
 voke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from the power 
 of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and thus, 
 putting our trust in God, and in our firm hearts and strong arms, 
 we will vindicate the right as best we may. 
 
 In the course of my service here, associated, at different times, 
 with a great variety of Senators, I see now around me some with 
 whom I have served long; there have been points of collision, but 
 whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here — I carry 
 with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever oflFense I have given, 
 which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction has not 
 been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our parting, to 
 ofi"er you my apology for any pain which, in the heat of discussion, 
 I have inflicted. I go hence unincumbered of the remembrance 
 of any injury received, and having discharged the duty of making 
 the only reparation in my power for any injury offered. 
 
 Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement 
 which the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for 
 me to bid you a final adieu. 
 
 A frequent acensation alleged against Mr. Davis and other 
 Southern Senators who adopted his course of a formal with- 
 drawal from the Senate, is that they thus gave the Republican 
 ]>arty control of the Senate, and voluntarily surrendered its 
 ])Ower to the hostile administration soon to be inaugurated. 
 ]t is a sufficient answer to this statement that the mere admis- 
 sion that the administration was hostile to Southern interests, and 
 menacing to Southern safety and honor, or even that the South 
 
UIS WITIIDKAWAL JUSTIPUED. 231 
 
 lind good reason for so believing, is to fix the rcsponsiljility of 
 disunion elsewhere than upon the Soutliern leaders. 
 
 To have retained his seat under such circumstances would 
 have been altogether inconsistent with Mr. Davis' conception 
 of tlio nature of the position. He was committed, by public 
 announcement, to a very different view of the obligations of 
 the representative of a State in the Federal Congress. Hold- 
 ing it to be a point of honor not to occupy such a relation, 
 with the object of hostility to the Government, years ago lie 
 announced, in connection with an allusion to a calumnious 
 insinuation, that he would answer in monosyllables the man 
 who would charge him with being a disi|pionist. 
 
 Entertaining his view of the character of the American 
 political system, of which the foundation was the doctrine of a 
 paramount allegiance of the citizen to his State, when Missis- 
 sippi withdrew from the Union, he had no other alternative than 
 to vacate the position which he held by her commission, and which 
 wa.s, at once, the sign of the equality and sovereignty of the 
 States, and of the adherence of each to the league by which she 
 was united to the others. To represent a State adhering to tlie 
 Union, and ase the position to make war upon the Govern- 
 ment, or to retain a seat in Congress when the State had, by 
 its sovereign fiat, revoked its grants, and withdrawn from tlie 
 league, were offenses belonging to the last stage of decadence 
 in political morality and personal honor. 
 
 Retiring from the Senate, Mr. Davis returned, Avithin a few 
 days thereaflor, to his residence in Mississippi. The State was 
 not unmindful of the necessity of preparations for a war which, 
 though not deemed inevitable, was yet extremely probable 
 Mr. Davis was honored by an appointment to the command of 
 the militia of the State, with the rank of Major-Gencral. His 
 
232 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 retirement upon his plantation thus jjromised to be of short 
 duration, but before he could assume the responsibilities which 
 Mississippi, in this reiteration of her confidence, had conferred, 
 the voice of millions invoked his guidance of their destinies in 
 the hazardous experiment of independent national existence. 
 
 Secession, in its rapid progress, confirmed the threadbare 
 theory of the progressive tendency of revolutionary move- 
 ments. Acquiring impetus as it advanced, before the first 
 of February, 1861, six States had declared themselves no 
 longer members of the Union.* Representatives from these 
 States met, in convention, at Montgomery, Alabama, on 4th 
 February, 1861, for the purpose of forming a provisional gov- 
 ernment. On the 8th February, this body adopted a constitu- 
 tion, and proclaimed an addition to the family of nations, under 
 the title of The Confederate States of America. 
 
 The next day the Congress of the Confederate States an- 
 nounced its choice of the two highest constitutional officers of 
 the new Government : 
 
 President, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi. 
 Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia. 
 
 , * Acts of secession were adopted by the various States as follows : 
 South Carolina, December 20, 1860. 
 Florida, January 7, 1861. 
 Mississippi, January 9, 1861. 
 Alabama, January 11, 1861. 
 Georgia, January 20, 1861. 
 Louisiana, January 26, 1861. 
 Texas, February 1, 1861. 
 
CONFEDERACY ESTABLLSHED. 233 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE CONFEDERACY ESTABLISHED AND IN OPERATION — CALMNESS AND MODERA- 
 TION OF THE SOUTH — THE MONTGOMERY CONSTITUTION — THE IMPROVEMENTS 
 UPON THE FEDERAL INSTRUMENT — POPULAR DELIGHT AT THE SELECTION OF 
 MR. DAVIS AS PRESIDENT — MOTIVES OF HIS ACCEPTANCE — HIS PREFERENCE 
 
 FOR THE ARMY DAVIS THE SYMBOL OK SOLTHEKX CHARACTER AND HOPES 
 
 ON HIS WAV TO MONTGOMEKV A CONTRAST INAUGURATION AND INAUGURAL 
 
 ADDRESS — THE CONFEDERATE CAIUNET TOOJIBS WALKER MEMJIINGER 
 
 BENJAillN — MALLORY — REAGAN — HISTORICAL POSITION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS 
 — THE TWO POWERS — EXTREME DEMOCRACY OF THE NORTH — NOBLE IDEAL 
 OF REPUBLICANISM CHERISHED BY THE SOUTH — DAVIs' REPRESENTATIVE 
 QUALITIES AND DISTINGUISHED SERVICES — THE HISTORIC REPRESENTATIVE OF 
 THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE EARLY HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT MONT- 
 GOMERY CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS UNLLMITED PRESIDENT DAVIs' 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY — HIS MILITARY ADMINISTRATION — THE CONFED- 
 ERATE ARMY — WEST POINT — NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER OF FORTS SUM- 
 TER AND PICKENS — MR. BUCHANAN's PITIABLE POLICY ^THE ISSUE OF PEACE 
 
 OR WAR PERFIDIOUS COURSE OF THE LINCOLN ADMINISTRATION — MR. SE- 
 
 WARd's DALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS — HIS DECEP- 
 TIONS — THE EXPEDITION TO PROVISION THE GARRISON OF SUMTER — REDUC- 
 TION OF THE FORT — WAR — GUILT OF THE NORTH — ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
 THE WAR. 
 
 THUS, without the disorder of anarchy, and without the 
 violence of armed conflict, a new and imposing structure 
 of state was speedily erected from the separated fragments. 
 Tlie event was indeed unparalleled, and, to the mind of the 
 world, unused to the novel spectacle of the dismemberment of 
 an empire, except as the consummation of years of bloodshed, 
 its philosophy was difficult of comprehension. 
 
234 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The sixth of November, 1860, was the ominous day upon 
 which the revolution, so long threatened, and so often deferred 
 by Southern concession and sacrifice, was inaugurated. Upon 
 that day, with the election of Abraham Lincoln, was opened a 
 new volume in American history. . Upon that day, the Amer- 
 ican Union, "formed to establish justice," resting upon the 
 ])rinciple of equality as its foundation-stone, passed under the 
 control of an arrogant majority, pledged to its perversion, to 
 the oppression of nearly one-half its members. From the pro- 
 fession of fraternity, and the outward pretense of comity, it 
 passed under the domination of principles whose origin was 
 discord and whose logical result was dissolution. 
 
 The answer of those who were threatened most seriously by 
 this subversion of the Government of their fathers, though 
 well considered, neither debated with passion, nor concluded 
 with rashness, was worthy of men — the descendants of the 
 authors of American Independence, and educated in that po- 
 litical school which teaches the assertion of the rights of the 
 few against the power of the many. A manly resistance, such 
 as only threatened degradation inspires in the bosoms of free- 
 men, which the insolence of faction had long defied and a 
 conscious physical superiority had haughtily derided, was, at 
 length, thoroughly aroused. Within a few months, the revo- 
 lutionary movement, begun in November, and pressed, by its 
 authors, to its inevitable consequences, had reached the im- 
 portant result of a withdrawal of nearly one-fourth of the States 
 constituting the American Union. 
 
 The new government, in the incidents attending its con- 
 struction and setting in operation, fully vindicated the earnest 
 and conscientious convictions of the people who hud called it 
 into existence. The absence of tumult and of all passionate 
 
MODERATION OF THE SOUTH. 233 
 
 display, at ^rontgonioiy, was in marked contrast "witli the in- 
 decent exultation witnessed at AVashington from the adher- 
 ents of the incoming administration. The calmness, moder- 
 ation, and evident earnestness of purpose which prevailed at 
 the South, and was thus manifested by those who were in- 
 trusted with the framing of the new government, impressed 
 the world to an extent that prepared it to entertain a sympa- 
 thy for the Southern cause not to have been expected from 
 the prevalent, though erroneous, impressions of foreigners re- 
 specting the merits of the sectional quarrel in America. 
 
 That secession was not a revolutionary movement, but 
 merely the necessary defense of a people threatened with ma- 
 terial ruin and political degradation, by a revolution which 
 had already been consummated, was amply demonstrated by its 
 immediate consequences. The Confederate leaders, at Mont- 
 gomery, exhibited an almost religious veneration for the spirit, 
 forms, and associations of the government which they had 
 abandoned. The strict adherence of the Montgomery Con- 
 stitution to the features of the Federal instrument, indicates 
 the absurdity of the impression that it was a proclamation of 
 revolution ; and the circumstances of its adoption are totally 
 inconsistent with a correct conception of the conduct of an in- 
 surgent body. 
 
 It was a signal improvement upon the original American 
 Constitution, and the few alterations made were commended 
 by enlightened and conservative intellects every-where, as 
 necessary changes in the perfection of the American polity. 
 ""J'he object sought, and successfully consummated, was to em- 
 l)ody every valuable principle of the old Constitution with cer- 
 tain remedial provisions for the correction of obvious evils, 
 which experience had fully indicate. Among these changes, 
 
236 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 which were universally recognized as of the utmost value, 
 were provisions making the Presidential term six years, in- 
 stead of four, as under the old system, and precluding reelec- 
 tion ; permitting cabinet ministers to participate in the de- 
 bates of Congress, and the virtual abolition of the pernicious 
 system of removing all officials, of whatever degree, upon each 
 advent of a new administration. The Confederate Constitu- 
 tion positively prohibited the African slave-trade, which the 
 Federal Constitution had failed to do. A striking provision, 
 and one never before avowed in any similar instrument, was 
 the prohibition of duties for the purpose of protection. There 
 was, indeed, nothing whatever in the Montgomery instrument 
 which a candid and enlightened public sentiment, even at the 
 North, might not have fully approved, excepting the ample 
 and avowed protection to property in slaves. This, it was 
 claimed, was not an alteration of the old Constitution, but 
 merely a formal interpretation of its obvious purpose. 
 
 In no respect was the action of the new Confederacy deemed 
 more fortunate than in the selection of its leader. That, in the 
 choice of Mr. Davis as President, the Congress only responded 
 to the preconceived choice of the Southern people, was attested 
 by the spontaneous acclamation with which the announcement 
 was received. Even those who had been in doubt as to the 
 proper personage to endow with the po^wers and responsibili- 
 ties of a position, at once the most onerous, and, looking to 
 the contingencies of the early future, a long and sanguinary 
 war, with the chances of a disastrous termination, the most 
 precarious of modern times, yielded hearty recognition of the 
 wise selection of the Congress. 
 
 The responsibilities and difficulties of the trust, did not 
 suggest to Mr. Davis hesitation as to its acceptance. If this, 
 
PRE-EMINENT FITNESS OF DAVIS. 237 
 
 the highest distinction which public appreciation had yet ten- 
 dered him should prove a forlorn hope, his sense of duty would 
 no more permit hesitation than in the assumption of more 
 cheaply-earned honors. Entertaining no purpose of inglorious 
 ease, amid the trials and perils, which, with a prevision, rare, 
 indeed, at that period, he already anticipated, his own prefer- 
 rence was for a different station of public service. Months sub- 
 sequently he indicated the post of danger as the post of duty to 
 which he had aspired in that gigantic struggle through which 
 his country must pass to the assurance of independence. " I 
 then imagined," said he, " that it might be my fortune again to 
 lead Mississippians in the field, and to be with them where dan- 
 ger was to be braved and glory won. I thought to find that 
 place which I believed to be suited to my capacity — that of 
 an officer in the service of the State of Mississippi."* 
 
 Of the public conviction as to his preeminent fitness, there 
 could not be a question. His character, his abilities, his 
 military education and experience, had long been recognized 
 throughout the Union, and his exalted reputation was a source 
 of just pride to the South. No Southern statesman presented 
 so admirable a combination of purity, dignity, firmneas, devo- 
 tion, and skill — qualities for which there is an inexorable de- 
 mand in revolutionary periods. William Tell, with his cross- 
 bow and apple, to the rustic simplicity of the Swiss, was the 
 very embodiment of the genius of liberty. Far beyond any 
 influence of fiction was the magic potency of the red shirt and 
 felt hat of Garibaldi to imaginative Italy; and Washington, as 
 Lamartine said, with his sword and the law, was the symbol 
 standing erect at the cradle of American liberty. Equally with 
 
 * Extract from President Davis' address before the Mississippi Legis- 
 lature, Docctnber, 18G2. 
 
238 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 the greatest of these prototypes was Jefferson Davis, the symbol 
 of the noble aspirations of the proud, impulsive, chivalrous race 
 which confided to him the conduct of its destinies through the 
 wilderness of revolution to the goal of independence and na- 
 tionality beyond. He did not seek the position; had not 
 been conspicuous in flaming exhortations to popular assemblies ; 
 had not employed any of the arts of the demagogue — of flattery 
 or cajolery of the masses into a false and extravagant estimate 
 of his qualities; but before the world were his character, fame, 
 and services, in unadorned simplicity, painted only in the severe 
 colors of truth. It was the tribute to virtue, most to be valued 
 when unsought; the award of honor, only appropriate when 
 merited and becomingly worn. 
 
 Mr. Davis' assumption of his trust was characterized by a 
 dignity, absence of ostentation, and profound appreciation of 
 its delicate nature, in the highest degree imposing. From it 
 was augured such a worthy administration of public affairs as 
 would secure for the Confederacy, if permitted the blessings of 
 peace, an enviable position among the nations of the earth. 
 But his first announcement of its policy indicated his appre- 
 ciation of the danger of war, in which its utmost exertions 
 would be required to vindicate the independence which the 
 States had declared. To the heroic maintenance of that posi- 
 tion he committed himself by the most emphatic avowals; and 
 in whatever contingency, whether of peace or war, his purpose 
 was one of deathless resistence to any denial of the right of 
 self-government, which his fellow-citizens had exercised. 
 
 Informed of his election, Mr. Davis immediately left his 
 home for the seat of government. Along the route to Mont- 
 gomery he was greeted, by the people, with every possible 
 demonstration of patriotic enthusiasm and personal regard. 
 
ARRIVES AT MONTGOMERY. 239 
 
 In response to these denionstrations, he at several points ad- 
 dressed the people in terms of characteristic eloquence, dignity 
 and moderation. 
 
 ' Proud, indeed, must ever be, to the Southern people, the 
 contrast of the noble bearing of their chosen ruler with the 
 display of vulgarity attending the journey of Mr. Lincoln from 
 Springfield to Washington. These two men — the one wdth the 
 calm dignity of the statesman and the polished bearing of the 
 gentleman; the other with coarse jests and buifoonery, upon 
 the eve of the most important event in their individual history, 
 and pregnant with significance to millions — Avere no bad indices 
 of the civilization of their respective sections. 
 
 Arriving in Montgomery, Mr. Davis was inaugurated on 
 the 18th February, with a simplicity of ceremony, an absence 
 of personal inflation, and a degree of popular enthusiasm, 
 which well befitted the formal assertion of true republican 
 liberty, equally protected against the license of mobs and. the 
 usurpations of tyrants. The ceremonies of inauguration were 
 little more than the taking of the oath of office and the deliv- 
 ery of the inaugural address. The inaugural of President 
 Davis is unquestionably of the highest order of state papers. 
 As a model of composition, it is rarely equaled ; and its 
 statement of the position of the South, the grievances which 
 had led to the assumption of that position, her hopes, aspira- 
 tions, and purposes, has never been surpassed in power and 
 perspicuity, by any similar document. 
 
240 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT DAVIS, DELIVERED AT 
 THE CAPITOL, MONDAY, FEB. 18, 1861. 
 
 Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America ; 
 Friends and Fellow-Citizens : 
 
 Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Executive 
 of the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I ap- 
 proach the discharge of the duties assigned to me with an humble 
 distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the 
 wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in the administration 
 of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism 
 of the people. 
 
 Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent 
 government to take the place of this, and which, by its greater 
 moral and physical power, will be better able to combat with the 
 many difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of sep- 
 arate nations, I enter upon the duties of the office, to which I have 
 been chosen, with the hope that the beginning of our career, as a 
 Confederacy, may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our 
 enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which we 
 have asserted, and, with the blessing of Providence, intend to 
 maintain. Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprece- 
 dented in the history of nations, illustrates the American idea that 
 governments rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is 
 the right of the people to alter or abolish governments whenever they 
 become destructive of the ends for which they were established. 
 
 The declared purpose of the compact of union from which we 
 have withdi'awn, was "to establish justice, insure domestic tran- 
 quillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general 
 welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and pos- 
 terity;" and when, in the judgment of the sovereign States now 
 composing this Confederacy, it had been perverted from the pur- 
 
INAUGUEAL ADDRESS. 241 
 
 poses for •wliich it was ordained, and had ceased to answer the ends 
 for which it was established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box, 
 declared, that so far as they were concerned, the government 
 created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they 
 merely asserted a right which the Declaration of Independence of 
 1776 had defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion for 
 its exercise, they, as sovereigns, were the final judges, each for 
 itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will 
 vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He, who knows the 
 hearts of men, will judge of the sincerity with which we labored 
 to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit. The right 
 solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the States, and which has been 
 affirmed and re-affirmed in the bills of rights of States subsequently 
 admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the 
 people the power to resume the authority delegated for the pur- 
 poses of government. Thus the sovereign States, here represented, 
 proceeded to form this Confederacy, and it is by abuse of language 
 that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a 
 new alliance, but within each State its government has remained, 
 and the rights of person and property have not been disturbed. 
 The agent, through whom they communicated with foreign nations, 
 is changed; but this does not necessarily interrupt their interna- 
 tional relations. 
 
 Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the for- 
 mer Union to the present Confederacy, has not proceeded from a 
 disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform 
 any constitutional duty; moved by no interest or passion to invade 
 the rights of others; anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with 
 all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least ex- 
 pect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in 
 it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by 
 wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to 
 doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Coufed- 
 16 
 
242 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 erate States will be found equal to any measures of defense whicli 
 honor and security may require. 
 
 An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a 
 commodity required in every manufacturing country, our true 
 policy is peace and the freest trade which our necessities will per- 
 mit. It is alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we 
 would sell and from whom we would buy, that there should be the 
 fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. 
 There can be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing 
 or navigating community, such as the North-eastern States of the 
 American Union. It must follow, therefore, that a mutual interest 
 would invite good will and kind offices. If, however, passion or 
 the lust of dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the 
 ambition of those States, we must prepare to meet the emergency, 
 and to maintain, by the final arbitrament of the sword, the position 
 which we have assumed among the nations of the earth. Wc have 
 entered upon the career of indej^endence, and it must be inflexibly 
 pursued. Through many years of controversy with our late asso- 
 ciates, the Northern States, we have vainly endeavored to secure 
 tranquillity, and to obtain respect for the rights to which wc were 
 entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the 
 remedy of separation ; and henceforth our energies must be directed 
 to the conduct of our own aff":iirs, and the perpetuity of the Con- 
 federacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual 
 interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political 
 career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled; but if this 
 be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdic- 
 tion be assailed, it will but remain for us, with firm resolve, to 
 appeal to arms and invoke the blessings of Providence on a just 
 cause. 
 
 As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet 
 anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide for the speedy 
 and efficient organization of branches of the Executive Depart- 
 
INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 243 
 
 ment, having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military 
 affairs, and the postal service. 
 
 For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under 
 ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is 
 deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there 
 should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous 
 than would usually be required on a peace establishment. I also 
 suggest that, for the protection of our harbors and commerce on 
 the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. 
 These necessities have doubtless engaged the attention of Congress. 
 
 With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers, in 
 so fiir as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from 
 the sectional conflicts which have interfered with the pursuit of 
 the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that States, 
 from which we have recently parted, may seek to unite their for- 
 tunes with ours under the government which we have instituted. 
 For this your Constitution makes adequate provision ; but beyond 
 this, if I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a re- 
 union with the States from wliich we have separated is neither 
 practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the 
 resources, and promote the happiness of the Confederacy, it is 
 requisite that there should be so much of homogeneity that the 
 welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the whole. "Where 
 this does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which must and 
 should result in separation. 
 
 Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights and 
 promote our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States 
 has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no 
 domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no 
 check; the cultivation of our fields has progressed as heretofore; 
 and even should we be involved in war, there would be no consid- 
 erable diminution in the production of the staples which have 
 constituted our exports, and in which the commercial world has 
 
24-i LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of 
 the producer and consumer can only be interrupted by an exterior 
 force, which should obstruct its transmission to foreign markets — 
 a course of conduct which would be as unjust toward us as it would 
 be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad. 
 Should reason guide the action of the Government from which we 
 have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the 
 Northern States included, could not be dictated by even the 
 strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but if otherwise, a ter- 
 rible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions 
 will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. 
 In the meantime, there will remain to us, besides the ordinary 
 means before suggested, the well-known resources for retaliation 
 upon the commerce of an enemy. 
 
 Esperience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this which 
 your kindness has conferred, has taught me that care, and toil, 
 and disappointment, are the price of official elevation. You will 
 see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate, but you 
 shall not find in me either a want of zeal or fidelity to the cause 
 that is to me highest in hope and of most enduring affection. 
 Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction — 
 one which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance 
 of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely to 
 direct and support me in the performance of the duty required at 
 my hands. 
 
 We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of 
 our Government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that 
 of these Confederate States, in their exposition of it; and, in the 
 judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals 
 its true meaning. 
 
 Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of the instrument, 
 and ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the 
 people, and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I 
 
CABINET APPOINTMENTS. 245 
 
 ^vill hope, by due diligciico in the performance of my duties, 
 though I may disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when 
 retiring, something of the good-will and confidence which welcomed 
 my entrance into office. 
 
 It is joyous, in the midst of perilous times, to look around upon 
 a people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve ani- 
 mates and actuates the whole — where the sacrifices to be made are 
 not weighed in the balance against honor, and right, and liberty, 
 and equality. Obstacles may retard — they can not long prevent — 
 the progress of a movement sanctified by its justice, and sustained 
 by a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our 
 fathers to guide and protect us in our efi'orts to perpetuate the 
 principles which, by his blessing, they were able to vindicate, 
 establish, and transmit to their posterity, and with a continuance 
 of His favor, ever gratefully acknowledged, we may hopefully look 
 forward to success, to peace, and to prosperity. 
 
 "Working in great harmony between its executive and legis- 
 lative departments, the new government, within a very lew 
 weeks, presented an extraordinary spectacle of compact organ- 
 ization, though in all its parts it was yet purely provisional. 
 The Cabinet announced by the President, embraced, for the 
 most part, names well known to the country in connection 
 with important public trusts. It may not be inappropriate to 
 speak briefly here of those who sustained to President Davis 
 the close relations of constitutional advisers. 
 
 ]Mr. Robert Toombs, the Secretary of State, was indebted 
 for his appointment not less to the position of his State, the 
 first in rank in the Confederacy, than to the public apprecia- 
 tion of his abilities. For several years he had represented 
 Georgia in the United States Senate, and in that body his 
 reputation was very high as a debater and orator. His ora- 
 
246 "LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 toiy, however, was a good index of his mind and disposition, 
 strong and impassioned, but desultory, vehement and bhister- 
 ing. Mr. Toombs had contributed largely to prepare the 
 people of Georgia for secession, and his fierce and persistent 
 eloquence had greatly accelerated the movement. His ca- 
 pacity for agitation and destruction was indeed immeasurably 
 superior to any qualification that he may have had for recon- 
 structing the broken and scattered fragments of the govern- 
 mental column. Restless, arrogant, and intolerant — a born 
 destructive and inveterate agitator — Mr. Toombs speedily de- 
 monstrated his deficiency in statesmanship. His connection 
 with the Confederate Cabinet was of brief duration, and his 
 subsequent military service undistinguished. The War De- 
 partment — the second post of distinction in the Cabinet — was 
 given to Alabama, the second State of the Confederacy, in the per- 
 son of Mr. Leroy P. Walker. His connection with the Govern- 
 ment, like that of Mr. Toombs, was brief, and wholly unmarked 
 by evidence of fitness. Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, 
 the Secretary of the Treasury, made an exceedingly unpopular 
 officer, and, as the sequel demonstrated, was incompetent to 
 the delicate task of financial management. The Attorney- 
 General, Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, an eminent lawyer and 
 a prominent Senator, was, beyond all question, the ablest of 
 ]Mr. Davis' Cabinet. He was a man of marvelous intel- 
 lectual resources, an orator, a lawyer, and gifted, to an unex- 
 ampled degree, in the varied attributes, entering into the 
 savior /aire of politics and diplomacy. Mr. Benjamin con- 
 tinued the trusted counselor of President Davis during the 
 whole period of his authority. Mr. Mallory, of Florida, was 
 the Secretary of the Navy — a gentleman of excellent sense, 
 unpretending manners, who probably conducted his depart- 
 
DAVIS' HISTORICAL POSITION. 247 
 
 ment as successfully as was possible, with the limited naval 
 resources of the South. The Post-office Department was 
 given to Mr. Reagan, of Texas, noted for his fidelity, industry, 
 and good sense. 
 
 The Cabinet of President Davis was destined to many changes 
 in the progress of subsequent events. Of those originally 
 appointed, Messrs. Benjamin, Mallory, and Reagan continued 
 their connection with the Confederate Government during the 
 entire period of its existence. The brief experiment of Con- 
 federate independence was fruitful in illustrations of the im- 
 portant truth that political distinction achieved in the ordinary 
 struggles of parties, in times of profound peace, is not the sure 
 guarantee of the possession of those especial and peculiar quali- 
 fications which befit the circumstances of revolution. That 
 President Davis, in the selection of some of his advisers, was 
 at fault, is to be ascribed rather to the novelty and necessities 
 of the public situation than to errors of his judgment. Not 
 only must public sentiment respecting men be to some extent 
 consulted, but the test of experience must, necessarily, after 
 all, determine the question of fitness, where all were untried. 
 
 Jefferson Davis now occupied a position in the highest 
 sense historical. It was plain that his name was destined to be 
 indelil)ly associated with a series of incidents forming a most 
 thrilling and instructive episode in political history. As 
 the exponent of a theory of constitutional principles never 
 asserted, and unknown save through the inspiration of the 
 genius of American Liberty, and as the head of a Govern- 
 ment whose birth and destiny must enter conspicuously into 
 all future questions of popular government, he stood, in a 
 double sense, the central figure in a most striking phase of the 
 drama of human progress. Splendid as had been American 
 
248 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 history until that day, it was now to contribute, still more 
 generously, to the illumination of the great truths, of political 
 science. 
 
 The issue was again to be joined between constitutional 
 freedom and the odious despotism of an enthroned mob. 
 On the one side were asserted the principles of regulated lib- 
 erty, without which free government can never be stable — 
 order, allegiance, and reverence for law and authority. On 
 the other, the wild passions of an infuriated populace, hurling 
 down the restraints of law, shattering constitutions; and when 
 its frenzied lust had been satiated by the destruction of every 
 accessible image of virtue and order, transferring supreme 
 power from its polluted grasp to the hands of demagogues — 
 capable agents of the depraved will which invests them with 
 authority. 
 
 Such y/as really a faithful contrast of the two powers which 
 were now inaugurated in what had been the United States. 
 It Avas still the old Greek question of the " few or the many," 
 the "King Numbers" of the North against the conservatism 
 of the South. The old contest Avas to be revived, of Cleon 
 and Nicias, in the Athenian Agora, and struggling on through 
 the political battle-fields of free governments in all ages. 
 
 It is not an abuse of language to characterize the North as 
 realizing the ultra theory of popular government. Its politi- 
 cal fabric rests exclusively upon the Utopian conception of an 
 intelligence and integrity in the masses which they have never 
 been known to possess. Carrying out its pernicious construc- 
 tion of the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, that 
 "all men are born free and equal," it professes to hold in 
 light esteem the obvious distinctions of race, property, and 
 color. Earnestly devoted to the successful illustration of the 
 
SOUTHERN IDEAL OF REPUBLICANISM. 249 
 
 experiment of Democracy, it has sedulously directed its social 
 and political development to the overthrow of caste, the oblit- 
 eration of necessary social distinctions, and the practical asser- 
 tion of the principle of absolute social, political, and personal 
 equality among all men. The election of Lincoln was the 
 grand, decisive triumph of these tendencies. He went into 
 power as the avowed champion of the interests of the poor 
 and laboring classes, which he declared to be in conflict with 
 those of the slave-holding aristocrats of the South. Entirely 
 undistinguished, with no political record, his popularity was 
 based upon his vulgar antecedents — no slight recommendation 
 to the populace, gratified at the prospective promotion of one 
 of its own class. 
 
 A free society, politically, in which wealth and distinction 
 were debarred to none, t he a ristocratic influences of slavery 
 were the propitious inducements in the South, to the cultiva- 
 tion of that personal dignity which marks the refinement of 
 rank, in contradistinction to the vulgar pretensions and affecta- 
 tion of a mere aristocracy of money. The patrician society of 
 the South sought the noblest type of republicanism — regulated 
 liberty — beyond the influence of ignorant and fanatical mobs, 
 that perfect order which reposes securely upon virtue, intelli- 
 gence, and interested attachment, which all human experience 
 teaches are the only reliable safeguards of freedom. 
 
 The noblest achievement of constitutional liberty would 
 have been the realization of the Southern ideal of republican- 
 ism. The success and beneficence of such a government would 
 have been in perfect accord with the philosophy of history. 
 Every nation to which has been guaranteed a free constitution 
 is indebted for its liberal features to its educated, patrician 
 classes, while all the decayed republics of history owed their 
 
250 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 dowufull to the corruption and excesses of an "unbridled 
 Democracy." 
 
 Of such a government, Jefferson Davis was the appropriately 
 chosen head. An ardent republican, in the truest and noblest 
 sense of that abused term, a foe to absolutism and radicalism 
 in every shape, he was the noblest product of a conservatism 
 in which the elements of distinction were ability, intelligence, 
 refinement, and social position. When, added to this repre- 
 sentative quality, are considered his splendid career of public 
 service, and his varied talents, exemplified on almost every 
 field of exertion, it must be conceded that no ruler was ever 
 more worthily invited to the head of a nation, and assuredly 
 none ever was invited with such unanimity of popular ac- 
 claim. 
 
 We have said that Jeiferson Davis must ever appear to the 
 eye of mankind the historic representative of the Confederate 
 cause. The North can not, assuredly, reject this decision, 
 since it made him the vicarious sufferer for what it affected to 
 consider the sins of a nation. Through him, it actually ac- 
 complished that from which the great abilities of Edmund 
 Burke recoiled in confession of impotent endeavor, the indict- 
 ment of an entire people. Those Southern men who have rashly 
 and ungenerously assailed him as responsible for the failure of 
 the South to win its independence, can not complain if the 
 verdict of history shall be that the genius of its leader was 
 worthy of a noble cause, whose fate the laws of nature, not 
 the resources or the impotence of one man, determiued. The star 
 of Napoleon went down upon the disastrous field of Waterloo, 
 and the millions that he had liberated passed again under the 
 domination of tyrants whom they despised. But would the 
 most stupid Bourbon partisan, therefore, call in question the 
 
EARLY HISTORY OF THE CONFEDERACY. 251 
 
 mighty genius of Napoleon ? It is a glorious memory to 
 France, that her illustrious sovereign, aided by the valor of 
 her children, defied for twenty years, the arms of combined 
 Europe, but she has no blush that those energies were not 
 equal to an indefinite resistance. That the South, struggling 
 against mortal odds, with her comparatively feeble resources 
 constantly diminishing with each prodigious effort, finally suc- 
 cumbed to an enemy inexhaustible in strength and reinforced 
 by the world, is no testimony against either the valor or the 
 skill with which her struggle was directed. Like Washington, 
 Davis was embarrassed, in a hazardous cause, with defec- 
 tion, distrust, and discontent. But, unlike Washington, Davis 
 did not receive the assistance of a powerful ally at the moment 
 when aid could be most scrviceably employed. 
 
 Recurring to the early history of the Confederacy, during 
 the brief season when Montgomery was its seat of government, 
 and especially to its unwritten details, there seems wanting no 
 auspicious omen to presage for it future security and renown. 
 The cause and its leader equally challenged the enthused sym- 
 pathies of a patriotic people, and all that patriotism was ready 
 to sacrifice for the one was cheerfully confided to the other. 
 Hopefully, almost joyously, the young Confederacy began its 
 short-lived career. Those were the halcyon days of that cheap 
 patriotism and ferocious valor Avhich delights to vaunt itself 
 beyond the sound of "war's rude alarms." Every aspect of 
 the situation appears tinged with the coulcnr de rose. In fan- 
 cied security of certain independence, achieved without the 
 harsh resort of arms, demagogues boasted that they courted a 
 trial of strength with the North, as an opportunity for the 
 disjilay of Southern prowess. ]\Ien wdio subsequently were 
 noted for unscrupulous assaults upon the Confederate admin- 
 
252 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 istration, and, since the war, for their ready prostration before 
 the Northern juggernaut, were then loud in "never surrender" 
 proclamations of eternal separation from the North. 
 
 Such was not an appropriate season for expressing grave and 
 painful doubts of the President's fitness for his high trust. 
 No whisper was then heard of his want of appreciation of his 
 situation. There was no intimation then that he failed to 
 discern the future, or refused to provide against the perils that 
 menaced the Confederacy, and were so obvious to more saga- 
 cious minds. Sensational newspaper correspondents, professing 
 to base their accounts upon reliable hints from the executive 
 quarter, were profuse in their panegyrics upon his indefatigable 
 industry, his vigilance, penetration, and marvelous intuition 
 of Yankee designs. They vied with each other in telling the 
 Avorld, especially the North, of the stupendous preparations 
 which the Government was making in anticipation of a pos- 
 sible attempt at coercion by the Lincoln government. It was 
 evident, from the outgivings of every source of opinion, that 
 the Confederates trusting much to the merits of their cause and 
 their own valor, yet largely depended for the successful issue 
 of their assertion of independence upon the soldier-statesman, 
 who, charged with many public duties, had never proven either 
 unwilling or incapable in any trust. The time for censure was 
 not yet at hand. Incompetent generals and recreant politicians 
 were not yet in want of a scape-goat upon which to throw their 
 own delinquencies. Harsh and censorious criticism was re- 
 served for a more opportune period, when the Confederacy, 
 like a wearied gladiator, whose spirit was invincible, reeled 
 under the exhaustion of a dozen successive combats, with as 
 many fresh adversaries. 
 
 The high administrative capacity of Mr. Davis liad received 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE QUALITIES. 253 
 
 a most fortunate discipline in his brilliant conduct of the Fed- 
 eral War Department. That service was a valuaole auxiliary 
 to his efficiency as the executive head of a new government, 
 whose safety was, from its incipiency, to depend upon the re- 
 sources of that rarest phase of genius, the combined capacity 
 for civil and military administration. The complex machinery 
 of government, even when moving smoothly in the accustomed 
 grooves, imposes not only severe labor, but is frequently a 
 painful tax upon the faculties of those most familiar with its 
 workings. When to the labor of comprehension is added the 
 task of construction and organization from comparative chaos, 
 such as prevailed at Montgomery, and as prevails every-where, 
 as the result of political change, the difficulties are increased 
 tenfold. Creation must then precede order. Organization is 
 to be perfected before administration can be successfully at- 
 tempted. It is this task of organization which has invoked 
 some of the most splendid displays of genius, and interposed 
 the obstacles which have occasioned its severest disapjjoint- 
 ments. Universal testimony awards to Najsoleon, for his won- 
 derful ingenuity in penetrating social necessities and meeting 
 civil emergencies, a merit not inferior to his unrivaled genius 
 for war. Frederick the Great, in times of peace, exhibited a 
 vicious pragmatism which rendered his civil rule contemptible 
 when contrasted with his military success. 
 
 The underlying secret of all successful administration is the 
 union of the advantages flowing from unity of purpose, and 
 those resulting from division of labor — so necessary to exact 
 and intelligent execution. President Davis, throughout his 
 administration, sought the attainment of this aim. Confiding 
 the various departments to men of at least reputed talents and 
 integrity, he yet exercised that constant supervision which 
 
254 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 was inseparable from his responsibilities, and exacted by public 
 expectation, and this without arrogance or dictation. Disin- 
 genuous criticism has alleged that, by an assumption of auto- 
 cracy, he united in himself all the powers and prerogatives of 
 government, and thus professes to hold him alone responsible 
 for the loss of his country's liberties. A score of years, or 
 even a decade hence, and he will be exalted as the all-Informing 
 mind which directed, vitalized, and inspired the noblest strug- 
 gle of republicanism known to ancient or modern story. 
 
 At the organization of the Confederate Government, his 
 Individual taste, capacity and experience, were fortunately co- 
 incident with the necessities of the situation In urging upon 
 President Davis a thorough and efficient military establishment 
 upon a war footing. The necessity of thorough preparation 
 for war with the United States was never lost sight of by him. 
 "Whatever his efforts to avert that calamity, its probabilities 
 were too menacing not to challenge unremitting precautions. 
 In the War Department and military legislation of the Con- 
 federacy was felt the infusion of his energy and system, and 
 were realized the fruits of his labors. There can be no more 
 splendid monument of his genius than that superb specimen 
 of scientific mechanism, the army of the Confederate States. 
 Its nucleus was prepared In those few weeks' respite from 
 actual war, passed by the Confederate Government, at 
 Montgomery; and tlie framework then established was subse- 
 quently enlarged upon, until it was developed into a model of 
 military anatomy — of complex, yet harmonious organism — 
 seldom rivaled and never surpassed In the history of war. 
 Whatever may be said of defective features exhibited In the 
 Confederate military organization, In the numerous and varied 
 campaigns of the war, those defects arc not to be attributed to 
 
PEEFERS EDUCATED SOLDIERS. 255 
 
 the original system. Whatever may be alleged against its lax 
 discipline — that morbid influence which so fearfully enervated 
 its efficiency, neutralized valor and strategy, and made the 
 war a series of magnificent but valueless successes, the shadow, 
 without the substance of victory — the fault was in the execu-w 
 tion, not in the original conception. However admirably tcm-* 
 pered the blade, that must be a skillful hand which woukl 
 efficiently w^ield it. 
 
 A graduate of West Point and a practical as well as 
 theoretical soldier. President Davis naturally and, as the war 
 demonstrated^ wisely inclined in his military administration to 
 those theories which regard war as a science difficult and labo- 
 rious of mastery. His marked and judicious partiality for 
 educated soldiers was often the ground of censorious comment 
 during the war, but this will hardly be adjudged a fault now. 
 "West Point" was amply vindicated by the experience of both 
 armies, against the sneers of those who affected such extreme 
 admiration for the "native genius" of citizen-soldiers. With 
 a few notable exceptions in the Confederate army (and here is 
 to be considered the peculiar genius for war of the South), 
 and scarcely one worth mention in the armies of the Xortli, 
 the achievements of educated officers, and those of officers 
 from civil life, are so utterly disproportionate as to forbid 
 comparison. 
 
 The paramount object of all Confederate diplomacy was to 
 secure a recognition of the new Government by the Govern- 
 ment of the United States. If war with the United States 
 could be averted, the Confederacy was, for all time, a fixed 
 fact. At an early period President Davis instituted efforts to 
 secure by negotiation possession of certain fortifications and 
 other property of the Federal Government located within the 
 
256 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 limits of the seceded States. Arsenals, located in the interior, had, 
 in many instances, been seized by the State trooj^s previous to the 
 formation of the Confederate Government. Hapj^ily, those in 
 authority at these places, appreciating the folly of resistance in 
 a situation utterly helpless, had avoided a needless shedding 
 of blood, by a prompt compliance with the demands of the 
 State authorities. 
 
 When the Confederate Government went into operation, 
 there were but two fortifications within the limits of its juris- 
 diction in the possession of Federal garrisons: Fort Sumter, 
 in Charleston Harbor, and Fort Pickens, off Pensacola, Florida. 
 These two positions were of the utmost value to the Confed- 
 eracy, viewed as to location, and their peaceable acquisition 
 was of increased importance in consideration of the obstinate 
 defense of which they were capable. The continued oc- 
 cupation of these positions by Federal forces was, in the 
 highest degree, inconsistent with the dignity of the Con- 
 federacy after it had proclaimed a distinct and independent 
 natiouality. Moreover, in the present temper of the dom- 
 inant party in the United States, a large mhjority of which 
 favored coercion of the South back into the Union, Federal 
 occupancy of these forts was a menace to the safety of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 It is easy to appreciate the delicate character of the diplo- 
 macy now required by the situation of the Confederacy. 
 Without at all acquiescing in the Federal possession of Sum- 
 ter and Pickens — on the contrary, asserting the right of the 
 Confederacy to those places, and avowing its willingness to 
 give adequate compensation whenever they should be surren- 
 dered — it was yet necessary to avoid affront to a respectable 
 minority at the North, influenced, aj^parently, by pacific inten- 
 
IMBECILITY OF MR. BUCHANAN. 257 
 
 tlons. In short, it became the settled policy of the Confed- 
 erate Government to postpone collision with the Federal 
 Government until the latest possible moment — until obvious 
 considerations of public safety should impel a resort to hostile 
 measures. 
 
 President Buchanan, whose term of office expired March 4, 
 1861, after numerous badly disguised attempts at duplicity 
 with the Confederate authorities, or more properly, with the 
 authorities of some of the States constituting the Confederacy, 
 and after a contemptibly weak and driveling policy of eva- 
 sion, had left the negotiations between the two Governments 
 in a most unsatisfactory and confused condition. A brief 
 summary of Mr. Buchanan's conduct affijrds a most singular 
 exhibition of mingled imbecility, timidity, and disingenuous- 
 ness. His course, until the meeting of Congress, in December, 
 1860, was understood to be in thorough accord with that of 
 the States' Rights party of the South. In that party were his 
 most trusted advisers, both in and out of the Cabinet, and it 
 had given to his administration a consistent and cordial sup- 
 port. Like them, he was pledged to the preservation of a 
 constitutional Union, and also to a full recognition of the perils 
 which menaced the South, resulting from the late sectional 
 triumph. In his opening message he condemned the exercise 
 of secession as unauthorized and illegal, but denied emphat- 
 ically the right of coercion. Yet, in the sequel, he proved, 
 equally with the Republican party, an enemy to peaceable se- 
 cession. 
 
 When South Carolina was preparing for secession, !Mr. 
 
 Buchanan entered into a solemn understanding with a delegation 
 
 of several of her most prominent citizens, that, upon condition 
 
 that the people and authorities of that State should refrain from 
 17 
 
258 LTFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 hostile demonstrations, no reinforcements should be sent to the 
 forts in Charleston harbor, and that "their relative militai^y 
 status should remain as at j^reseiit." Yet, when Major Ander- 
 son, in positive violation of this agreement, removed his forces 
 from the weaker forts to Fort Sumter, Mr. Buchanan refused 
 to order him back. Having broken one stijiulation, he now 
 determined to disregard the other, and, under the pretense of 
 "provisioning a starving garrison," Mr. Buchanan attempted 
 to send troops to Sumter.* 
 
 But the conduct of Mr. Buchanan, Aveak, offensive, and 
 disgusting, as it was to both North and South, becomes simply 
 pitiable, when contrasted with the greater magnitude of the 
 perfidy of the Lincoln government. 
 
 The two Presidents, Davis and Lincoln, were inaugurated 
 within a fortnight of each other — the first on the 18th of 
 February, the latter on the 4th of March. Between them 
 the question of peace or war must, after all, depend — for, 
 however pacific might have been Mr. Buchanan's policy, it 
 would fail, should Lincoln adopt a belligerent course. Con- 
 siderable hope was, at times, indulged, that the negotiations 
 with Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet would at least be marked 
 with a better display of candor than had commemorated the 
 policy of his predecessor. These negotiations, as fruitless as 
 those attempted in Congress during the preceding winter, for 
 the prevention of secession, were to involve a question of even 
 more moment. The direct issue of peace or war was now 
 pending. It is confidently and successfully maintained by the 
 South, that in the grave question of responsibility for actual 
 bloodshed, her vindication is as clear and incontestable as 
 
 * By the steamer "Star of the West," which was driven back by the 
 
 South Carolina batteries. 
 
EFFORTS TO PREVENT WAR. 259 
 
 must ever be her acquittal of the resjDonsibility of disunion. 
 War with the United States was deprecated by official declara- 
 tion of the Confederate States as " a policy detrimental to the 
 civilized world." Most impressive is the declaration of Presi- 
 dent Davis' inaugural : " Sustained by the consciousness that 
 the transition from the former Union to the present Confed- 
 eracy has not proceeded from a disregard, on our part, of just 
 obligations, or any failure to perform any constitutional duty — 
 moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others — 
 anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if 
 we may not hope to avoid war, loe may at least expect that pos- 
 terity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it." 
 
 President Davis was at all times most solicitous for peace, 
 and adopted every expedient of negotiation that could pro- 
 mote that end. Heartily responding to the wishes of the 
 Congress and people of the Confederacy, he appointed, in Feb- 
 ruary, an embassy to the Government at Washington. The 
 resolution of Congress, asking that the embassy should be 
 sent, explains its object to be the " negotiating friendly relations 
 between that Government and the Confederate States of 
 America, and for the settlement of all questions of disagree- 
 ment between the two governments upon principles of right, 
 justice, equity, and good faith." 
 
 Two of these commissioners, ISIessrs. Crawford and Forsyth, 
 arrived in Washington on the 5th of March, the day succeed- 
 ing Mr. Lincoln's inauguration. Wishing to allow the Presi- 
 dent abundant opportunity for the discharge of the urgent 
 official duties necessarily crowding upon him at such a season, 
 the Confederate commissioners did not immediately press 
 their mission upon his attention. At first giving merely an 
 informal announcement of their arrival, they waited until the 
 
260 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 12th of March before making an official presentation of their 
 mission. On that day they addressed a formal communica- 
 tion to the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, announcing their 
 authority to settle with the Federal Government all claims of 
 public property arising from the separation of the States from 
 the Union, and to negotiate for the withdrawal of the Federal 
 forces from Forts Sumter and Pickens. 
 
 Here begins a record of perfidy, the parallel of which is not 
 to be found in the history of the world. Mr. Seward, while 
 declining to recognize the Confederate commissioners officially, 
 yet frequently held confidential communication with them, by 
 which the faith of the t^vo Governments was fully pledged to 
 a line of policy, by what should certainly be the strongest form 
 of assurance — the personal honor of their representatives. In 
 verbal interviews, the commissioners were frequently assured 
 of a pacific policy by the Federal Government, that Fort 
 Sumter would be evacuated, that the status at Fort Pickens 
 should not be changed, and that no departure from these 
 pacific intentions would be made without due notice to the 
 Confederate Government. 
 
 The commissioners, conformably to the spirit of their Gov- 
 ernment, to avoid, if possible, collision with the United States, 
 made an important concession in these interviews in consenting 
 to waive all questions of form. It was alleged that formal 
 negotiations with them, in an official capacity, would seriously 
 jeopardize the success of Mr. Lincoln's manipulation of public 
 sentiment at the North, which, it was further confidentially 
 alleged, he was sedulously educating to concurrence with his 
 own friendly purposes toward the Confederates. By this cun- 
 ning device and the unscrupulous employment of deception 
 and falsehood in his interviews with the commissioners, Mr. 
 
FEDERAL DUPLICITY. 261 
 
 Seward accomplished the double purpose of successful imposi- 
 tion upon the credulity of the commissioners and evasion of 
 official recognition of the Confederate embassy. 
 
 In the meantime, while these negotiations were pending, and 
 in the midst of these friendly assurances, the Lincoln adminis- 
 tration was secretly preparing hostile measures, and, as was 
 clearly demonstrated by subsequent revelations, had never se- 
 riously entertained any of the jDropositions submitted by the 
 Confederate Government. Resolved not to evacuate Fort Sum- 
 ter, the Federal Government, while amusing the Confederate 
 commissioners with cunning dalliance, had for weeks been 
 meditating the feasibility of reenforcing it. To pass the 
 numerous batteries erected by the Confederates in Charleston 
 harbor was clearly a task of the utmost difficulty, if, indeed, 
 possible. So complete was the cordon of Confederate batteries 
 w^hich had been in course of preparation for many weeks, that 
 the beleaguered fortress was evidently doomed whenever the 
 Confederates were provoked to fire upon it. The evacuation 
 of Fort Sumter was clearly a military necessity, so pronounced 
 by the highest military authority in the United States, and so 
 regarded by the intelligent public of the North. Never had a 
 Government so auspicious an opportunity to save the needless 
 effusion of blood, and to avert indefinitely, if not finally, the 
 calamity of war. 
 
 Such a result was, however, farthest from the wishes of 
 Mr. Lincoln and the majority of his Cabinet. Reinforcement 
 of Fort Sumter being out of the question, it became the study 
 of the Federal authorities to devise a convenient and effective 
 pretext by which the North could be united in a war of subju- 
 gation against the South, and for the extermination of slavery. 
 To this end an expedition was ordered to Charleston, for the 
 
262 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 purpose of supplying the garrison of Sumter with provisions, 
 peaceably or forcibly, as events might decide. As it was well 
 known that the Confederate authorities would not permit the 
 execution of the object of this expedition, it was clearly a 
 measure of hostility, prepared and conducted, too, under the 
 most dishonorable circumstances of secrecy and falsehood as to 
 its destination. 
 
 In the meantime the Federal authorities continued to prac- 
 tice the base policy of deception with the Confederate commis- 
 sioners. Upon one occasion Mr. Seward declared that Fort 
 Sumter would be evacuated before a letter, then ready to be 
 mailed, could reach President Davis at Montgomery. Five days 
 afterward, General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate 
 forces in Charleston harbor, telegraphed the commissioners at 
 Washington the ominous intelligence that the Federal com- 
 mandant was actively strengthening Fort Sumter. The com- 
 missioners were again soothed with Mr. Seward's renewed 
 assurances of the positive intention of his government to evacu- 
 ate the fort. As late as the 7th of April Mr. Seward gave the 
 emphatic assurance : " Faith as to Sumter fully kept : wait and 
 see." TJiis was the date of the sailing of the Federal fleet with a 
 strong military force on board.^ The just characterization, by 
 
 *It was not until the 8th of April that the commissioners obtained a 
 reply to their official communication of March 12th. From this reply, it 
 appeared that "during the whole interval while the commissioners were 
 receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mis- 
 sion, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had 
 already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever ; to refuse 
 even to listen to any proposals they had to. make, and had profited by the 
 delay created by their own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the 
 means for effective hostile operations." — President Davis Message^ April 
 2Wi, 1861. 
 
BOMBARDMENT OP FORT SUMTER. 263 
 
 President Davis, of these deceptions, was, that "the crooked 
 paths of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting 
 in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the course of the 
 United States Government toward our commissioners in Wash- 
 ington."'*^ 
 
 The expedition was some hours on its way,t when its pur- 
 pose to provision the fort was announced to the Governor of 
 South Carolina by an agent of the United States. This 
 announcement was telegraphed to Montgomery by General 
 Beauregard, who also asked for instructions. His government 
 replied, that if the message was authentic, a demand should be 
 made for the surrender of the fort to the Confederate forces ; 
 and in the event of refusal, its reduction should be undertaken. 
 On the 11th of April the demand was made and refused, j In 
 obedience to the orders of his government General Beauregard 
 
 * Message to Confederate Congress. 
 
 fThis expedition, ostensibly "for the relief of a starving garrison," 
 consisted of eleven vessels, Avith two hundred and eighty-five guns and 
 twenty-four hundred men. 
 
 t Before instructing General Beauregard to fire upon the fort, President 
 Davis made another effort to prevent hostilities, which he thus explains: 
 "Even then" (after Beauregard had applied for instructions), "under all 
 the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our com- 
 missioners, and the treacherous course of the Government of the United 
 States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and directed 
 a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed 
 himself to be nearly out of provisions, that wc would abstain from direct- 
 ing our fire at Fort Sumter, if he would promise not to open fire on our 
 forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused. The conclusion 
 was, that the design of the United States was to place the besieging force 
 at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fleet and fort. The 
 fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was executed by 
 General Beauregard with skill and success." — Message, 29th Avril, 1861. 
 
264 • LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 opened fire upon Fort Sumter early on the morning of the 
 12th April. On the 13th the fort surrendered. 
 
 The calculations of Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet, as to the 
 result to be produced by the attack on Fort Sumter, pro- 
 voked t)y their deliberate and dishonest design, were not dis- 
 appointed. A furious and instantaneous rush to arms by the 
 North followed the intelligence of the surrender of the fort, 
 and revealed the ferocious lust with which it had awaited the 
 signal to begin the crusade against the liberties and property 
 of the South. As no possible trait of guilt had been wanting 
 in the means employed to precipitate hostilities, so no conceiv- 
 able feature of atrocity was to be wanting in the conduct of a 
 war by the North, produced by its own avarice, perfidy, and 
 lust of dominion. 
 
 The brief recapitulation which we have given sufficiently 
 exposes the pretexts upon which the North began the war of 
 coercion. Assuming that the national dignity had been in- 
 sulted, and the national honor violated, by an attack upon the 
 flag of the Union, under the impious profession of vindicating 
 the law, the North drew its sword against the sovereignty of 
 the States. It had procured the assault ujjon Sumter — that 
 essential step to the desired frenzy of the masses. By a shal- 
 low device, the South had been provoked to initiate resistance 
 — that long-sought pretext which should justify the most 
 barbaric invasion of modern times. Yet, under this flimsy 
 imposition, tlie North cloaks its crime, and exults in its antic- 
 ipated immunity from those execrations which have been the 
 reward of similar examples of turpitude. The spirit of inquiry 
 is not to be thus deftly eluded, nor the avenging sentence of 
 history so easily perverted. The question shall not be, w'ho 
 fired the first shot? but, loho offered the first aggression'? ivlio 
 
THE .SOUTH JUSTIFIED. • 265 
 
 first indicated the purpose of hostUUy ? AVc are not required to 
 await tlie bur.stiiif5 forth of the flumes over our heudw, wlieu 
 the fell intent of tiie ineendiiiry is revealed to our sight. The 
 menace of the murderer justifies his intended victim in eluding 
 the blow while the steel is uplifted. 
 
 Jefferson Davis signed the order for the reduction of Fort 
 Sumter, but he did not thereljy invoke the calamities of war. 
 That act was simply the patriot's defiance to the menace of 
 tyranny. It was the choice of the freemuu between resistance 
 and shame. 
 
266 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 EVENTS CONSEQUENT UPON THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORT STJJITER — WR. LINCOLN 
 BEGINS THE WAR BY USURPATION — THE BORDER STATES — CONTINUED DU- 
 PLICITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — VIRGINIA JOINS THE COTTON 
 
 STATES AFFAIRS IN MARYLAND, MISSOURI, AND KENTUCKY UNPROMISING 
 
 PHASES OF THE SITUATION, AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS OF THE SOUTH 
 
 DIVISIONS IN SOUTHERN SENTIMENT — THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY — PRESI- 
 DENT DAVIs' ANTICIPATIONS REALIZED — HIS RESPONSE TO MR. LINCOLN'S 
 PROCLAMATION OF WAR — PUBLIC ENTHUSIASM IN THE SOUTH — PRESIDENT 
 DAVIs' MESSAGE — VIRGINIA THE FLANDERS OF THE WAR — REMOVAL OF THE 
 CONFEDERATE CAPITAL TO RICHMOND — POLICY OF THAT STEP CONSIDERED — 
 POPULAR REGARD FOR MR. DAVIS IN VIRGINIA — ACTION OF THE VIRGINIAN 
 AUTHORITIES — NORTH CAROLINA; HER NOBLE CONDUCT, AND EFFICIENT AID 
 TO THE CONFEDERACY — MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN VIRGINIA — GENERAL 
 LEE — HIS SERVICES IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR — MINOR ENGAGE- 
 MENTS — PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLE IN VIRGINIA — AN IM- 
 PORTANT HISTORICAL QUESTION — CHARGES AGAINST MR. DAVIS CONSIDERED — 
 HIS STATESMAN-LIKE PREVISION — DID HE ANTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FOR 
 WAR? — WHEN MR. DAVIs' RESPONSIBILITY BEGAN — HIS ENERGETIC PREPAR- " 
 ATION — THE PREVAILING SENTIMENT AT MONTGOMERY AS TO THE WAR — 
 QUOTATIONS FROM GENERAL EARLY AND GENERAL VON MOLKTE. 
 
 |j1 VENTS quickly followed the surrender of Fort Sumter, 
 -■-^ foreshadowing the violence and magnitude of the strife 
 about to be joined between the sundered sections of America. 
 If the North showed itself prompt and enthusiastic to recog- 
 nize the signal of conquest and spoliation, the South was 
 tenfold more resolute and confident in its tri|)le armor of 
 right. If the adroit appeals of Mr. Lincoln's adherents, in 
 behalf of an " insulted flag," and an " outraged national dig- 
 
MR. Lincoln's proclamation. 207 
 
 nity," broke down the barriers of party, and united the 
 Northern masses in an imagined crusade of patriotism for the 
 rescue of the Union, the occasion brought' to the Confederacy 
 accessions of strength, which, if they did not ensure a success- 
 ful defense, established the fact of protracted resistance. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln and his advisers promptly seized upon the 
 favorable opportunity presented by the fanatical excitement 
 prevalent throughout the North. Within forty-eight hours 
 after the intelligence of the bloodless encounter of Sumter was 
 flashed over the land, his proclamation of war against the 
 seceded States was read by thousands of excited people.* A 
 flimsy and indefensible perversion of an act, passed by Con- 
 gress, in 1795, which simply provided the raising of armed 
 posses " in aid of the civil authorities," was the shallow pre- 
 text, under which was masked the real design of a war Avhich 
 was to terminate in the destruction of the sovereignty of tlie 
 States. Beginning with this clear usurpation of the power 
 of Congress, which is alone authorized to declare war, and 
 proclaiming a purpose to "maintain the honor, the integrity, 
 and existence " of the Union, " and the perpetuity of popular 
 government," the work of conquest was begun. 
 
 The role undertaken by the Federal government was em- 
 barrassed by many difficulties. It had not yet relinquished 
 the hope of retaining the Border States firm in their adhesion 
 to the Union. As yet the action of those States had indicated 
 no purpose of separation from the North, unless in the event 
 of direct interference by the Federal authorities with their 
 domestic concerns, or in the event of a war of subjugation 
 against the seceded States. Popular feeling in all the Border 
 States was unmistakably resolved against the policy of coer- 
 *Mr. Lincoln's proclamation was dated April 15, 1861. 
 
268 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 cion, and in several instances State Legislatures had declared 
 a purpose to make common cause with the seceded States, 
 whenever the Federal authorities should appeal to force against 
 them. It was difficult indeed for the latter to reconcile their 
 hostile purposes against the Confederate States with the pro- 
 fessions of peaceful intentions which they so freely tendered 
 to the Border States. Well pleased, however, with the uniform 
 success of its policy of duplicity, the Federal administration 
 adhered to its " treacherous amusement of double and triple 
 negotiations," hoping to amuse the Border States, by pacifying 
 assurances, until its schemes of coercion could be thoroughly 
 prepared.* But the sham was too transparent to deceive. 
 Friendly assurances and protestations of a desire to avoid the 
 effusion of blood were not to be accej^ted in the face of 
 gigantic martial preparations. 
 
 An immediate consequence of Mr. Lincoln's proclamation 
 of war, and invocation of an army of seventy-five thousand 
 men, for the subjugation of the Cotton States, was to throw 
 the mighty energies and hei-oic spirit of Virginia, hitherto 
 neutral and hesitating, into hearty sympathy with the Con- 
 federacy. The sublime courage and devotion of this noble 
 State, manifested by the circumstances of her accession to the 
 cause of her sister States, have been the theme of repeated, 
 but not extravagant eulogy. With a full conviction of her 
 own peculiar perils in a war which she had zealously striven 
 to prevent; from which, whatever its eventualities, she had 
 
 * On the day of the surrender of Fort Sumter, Mr. Lincoln j^rotested 
 to the Vh-ginia commissioners the pacific purposes of his government. 
 When giving these assurances to Virginia he had heard of the surrender 
 of the fort, and knew that for two days Beauregard had been firing upon 
 the "sacred flag." 
 
ACTION OF BORDER STATES. 2G9 
 
 little to hope, and with a perfect prevision of the ruin wliich 
 was to ravage her bosom, Virginia proudly assumed the post 
 of leadership and of peril in the struggle for those immortal 
 principles, of which her soil was the nursery and her illustrious 
 sons the foremost champions. The historic prestige of Virginia 
 was heightened by this act of supreme devotion, and the value 
 of her influence was speedily demonstrated by the enthusiastic 
 accession of other States to the cause which she had esjioused. 
 The ordinance of secession, adopted by the Virginia Con- 
 vention, was followed immediately by a temporary alliance* 
 with the Confederate States, and in a few weeks afterward 
 the Confederacy embraced, in addition to its original members, 
 Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, each of 
 which, by formal State action, ratified the Confederate con- 
 stitution. 
 
 The arbitrary acts of the Federal government, in Maryland 
 and Missouri, not only vindicated the course of those States 
 which had interpreted its policy as one of subjugation, but 
 greatly strengthened the already preponderant Southern sym- 
 pathies of those two commonwealths. Increasing by consecu- 
 tive proclamations his demands for troops, Mr. Lincoln soon 
 had' nearly two hundred thousand men under arms. These 
 troops assembled under filse pretenses at different points, were 
 used for purposes of glaring despotism; overawing the pro- 
 nounced Southern feeling of the people by military arrests, by 
 licentious and violent demonstrations of the soldiery. Missouri 
 was soon in open revolt against the Federal authorities, and 
 in Maryland a general uprising was prevented by the thorough 
 precautions which had been adopted, rendering clearly hopeless 
 
 * April 24, 1861. Vh-ginia joined the Confederacy as a uu'nibcr 
 May 6, 1861. 
 
270 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 such an undertaking. The Legislature of Missouri, unques- 
 tionably representing a large majority of her citizens, event- 
 ually adopted an ordinance of secession and ratified the 
 constitution of the Confederate States. Kentucky, vainly 
 attempting a policy of neutrality, was divided in sentiment 
 and in strength between the contestants. A portion of her 
 citizens, residing within the Confederate lines, several months 
 after the beginning of the war, declared the State out of the 
 Union, and associated Kentucky with the Confederacy. 
 
 Such were the immediate consequences resulting from the 
 capture of Fort Sumter. All hopes of peace vanished in the 
 rush of events which daily contributed new elements to the 
 incipient strife, and with constant reinforcements of strength 
 and feeling to each of the contending parties, there was want- 
 ing no omen of a struggle bloody and exhaustive beyond all 
 previous example. 
 
 There were phases of the situation not to be lightly appre- 
 ciated by so thoughtful a statesman as President Davis, which 
 did not encourage that sanguine conviction, so extravagantly 
 indulged in by many popular leaders, of an overwhelming and 
 immediate triumph of the Southern cause. The immense 
 disparity of physical resources, as was abundantly shown by 
 the lessons of history, could be neutralized by a wise public 
 administration, by superior valor, and by that high sense of 
 public virtue, in its original Roman sense of fortitude, endur- 
 ance, and willing sacrifice in the cause of country, which is the 
 last and sure defense of a nation's liberties. Nor were those 
 important advantages of the South, to the value of which his- 
 torical precedents have so conclusively testified — a conscious 
 rectitude of purpose — a supreme conviction that theirs was 
 the better cause, and that, besides, it was a war for home and 
 
ELEMENT OF WEAKNESS IN THE SOUTH. 271 
 
 family, to be fought maiuly upon their own soil — to be over- 
 looked in an intelligent estimate of the relative strength of 
 the belligerents. 
 
 It was not a failure to recognize these great advantages 
 which forbade wise and reflective Southern statesmen to indulge 
 in those grotesque exhibitions of braggadocio, with which 
 demagogues amused excited crowds at railway stations and 
 upon street-corners. There was an element of weakness in the 
 South, which, looking to the contingencies of the future, and 
 remembering the incertitude of war, might prove the source 
 of serious danger. This was the absence of that unity in the 
 South, to which all her statesmen had looked forward, when- 
 ever actual battle should be joined between the defenders and 
 assailants of Southern liberties. To see a " United South," 
 had been for years the dream of Calhoun's noble intellect. 
 Davis, with equal energy and ability, had striven for such 
 united action by the South as would command peace and se- 
 curity in the Union, or independence beyond its limits. But 
 now the battle was joined, and the dream was not to be realized. 
 
 Kentucky was hopelessly divided, and though, from the 
 overwhelming majority of her people in sympathy with the 
 South, were to come thousands of gallant soldiers, the Confed- 
 eracy was to be denied the powerful aid which the brave heart 
 and mighty resources of united Kentucky should have thrown 
 into the scale. Missouri, in consequence of her geographical po- 
 sition, peculiarly assailable by the North-western States, and by 
 divisions among her population, was similarly situated ; while 
 Maryland, a gallant and patriotic State, not less than South 
 Carolina devoted to the independence of the South, was se- 
 curely shackled at the first demonstration, by her people, of 
 sympathy with their invaded countrymen. 
 
272 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 But not only was there a failure to realize united action by 
 those States, which, by geographical contiguity, no less than by 
 identity of political institutions, constituted what was desig- 
 nated as The South. There was by no means a thoroughly 
 harmonious sentiment among the people of those States which 
 had joined the Southern alliance. This was conspicuously the 
 case in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee.* Though ap- 
 parently insignificant in the midst of the general enthusiasm 
 which 25revailed in the early months of the war, these and 
 other instances of local disaffection were to prove, at more than 
 one critical period, fruitful of embarrassment. Intelligence of 
 Confederate disasters was always the signal for exhibitions of 
 that covert disloyalty which Confederate success compelled to 
 concealment. Always ready to assist the invaders of their 
 country, the so-called " Union men " of the South were valu- 
 able auxiliaries to the Federal armies as spies, and as secret 
 enemies to the cause of the patriots ; but they were not more 
 hurtful and insidious in these capacities than as the nucleus 
 around which crystallized, under the direction of disappointed 
 demagogues, the various elements of discontent which were 
 subsequently developed. 
 
 Yet in both sections was the outward seeming at least of an 
 undivided war sentiment. The Union party of the South, as 
 it had previously existed — a powerful political organization, 
 embracing a majority of the people of the Border States — did 
 not more immediately disappear, as the certainty of war was 
 developed, than did the party of peace at the North. The 
 Northern Democracy did not, for a moment, strive to breast 
 the popular current, but its leaders, the life-long allies of the 
 
 *"East Tennessee" was a perpetual "fire in the rear" to the Con- 
 federacy. 
 
PEESIDENT DAVIS RESPONDS. 273 
 
 South, committed, by a thousand declarations to the cause of 
 States' Rights, eagerly vied with the Republican leaders in 
 threats of vengeance against the South. The Dickinsons, 
 Everetts, Cochran es, Logans, and Butlers — hitherto the pro- 
 fessed friends and advocates of the South — with that pliant 
 accommodation to circumstances, so befitting the instincts of 
 the demagogue, in their harangues to howling mobs, pro- 
 claimed themselves the advocates of a ruthless and indiscrim- 
 inate warfare upon a people who had been driven, by intolerable 
 wrongs, into patriotic resistance. 
 
 We have already described the attitude and condition of the 
 Confederate Government at Montgomery previous to the at- 
 tack upon Fort Sumter. The honorable exertions of President 
 Davis, cordially approved by Congress and the people, to 
 avoid a collision of arms, were disappointed, and events had 
 now verified his life-long conviction, that the exercise of their 
 sovereignty, by the States, would be attended by a war in- 
 volving their existence. Sustained by an unlimited j)opular 
 confidence, with a comparatively perfected organization, and 
 with every possible preparation that the difficulties of its sit- 
 uation would permit, the Government met, with commendable 
 composure, the shock of arms which its chief had foreseen to 
 be inevitable. 
 
 The proclamation of President Lincoln, declaring war upon 
 the Confederate States, was promptly responded to by Presi- 
 dent Davis, in official announcements, appropriately recognizing 
 the condition of public affiiirs, and inviting energetic prepara- 
 tions for immediate hostilities. He at once called upon the 
 various States for quotas of volunteers for the public defense. 
 By public proclamation, he invited applications for privateer- 
 ing service, in which armed vessels might assist in the public 
 18 
 
274 "LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 defense on the high seas, under letters of marque and reprisal 
 granted by Congress.* 
 
 In every instance, and by all classes of citizens, an enthusi- 
 astic response was given to the demands of the Government. 
 Individuals and corporations entered into a generous and 
 patriotic rivalry in the tender of aid to the cause. Wealthy 
 citizens donated large sums of money or supplies, while rail- 
 road and transportation companies tendered valuable assistance 
 in the conveyance of troops and stores. An enthusiastic desire 
 to enter the public service was manifested in every community. 
 Men decrepit from age, or infirm from disease, were impor- 
 tunate in demanding any service suitable to their condition. 
 Volunteering progressed so actively that a few weeks only suf- 
 ficed to show that the Confederacy — for the present at least — 
 would not want soldiers. In all the States the responses to 
 the call for volunteers exceeded the quotas. 
 
 Congress assembled in special session, in obedience to a 
 
 * President Davis appreciated the immense value to the South of priva- 
 teering. The Federal Government employed all the naval foi'ce at their 
 command to blockade the South, recalled the squadrons stationed in foreign 
 waters, and made extensive purchases of vessels for purposes of war. 
 The South, of course, had no navy, since there had been no time to pre- 
 pare or purchase one within the brief space between the organization of 
 the Confederate Government and the beginning of hostilities. Under 
 these circumstances there remained only the resort to private armed ships, 
 under letters of marque, to assault the floating commerce of the enemy, 
 and, to some extent, neutralize the blockade. Doubting the constitutional 
 power of the executive in the premises, he, with characteristic regard for 
 law, determined not to commission privateers until duly authorized by the 
 legislation of Congress. The authority to issue commissions, and letters 
 of marque and general reprisal, to privateers, was given by act of Congress, 
 passed 6th of May. 
 
PRESIDENT DAVIS' MESSAGE. 275 
 
 proclamation of the President, on the 29th of April. The 
 message was an eminently characteristic document, and made a 
 profound impression both in Europe and the United States. 
 Its calm and clear statements were in marked contrast with 
 the wild elements of war convulsing the country. Europe 
 was not less amazed and delighted with its dignity and force, 
 than was the North impressed with the earnest terms in which 
 the purpose of resistance was announced. He reviewed and 
 established the doctrine of secession, detailed the facts showing 
 the bad faith of the Northern government about Fort Sumter, 
 and the necessity for its capture; spoke in terms of keen, yet 
 dignified satire of Lincoln's proclamation, which attempted to 
 treat seven sovereign States united in a confederacy, and hold- 
 ing five millions of people and a half million of square miles 
 of territory, as " combinations," which he proposed to suppress 
 by a posse comitatus of seventy-five thousand men ; congratu- 
 lated the Congress on the probable accession of other slave 
 States; informed them that the State Department had sent 
 three commissioners to England, France, Russia and Belgium, 
 to seek the recognition of the Confederate States; advised 
 legislation for the employment of privateers for measures of 
 defense, and for perfecting the government organization; and 
 concluded with these impressive words: "We feel that our 
 cause is just and holy; we protest solemnly in the face of 
 mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor 
 and independence; we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, 
 no concession of any kind from the States with whom we were 
 lately confederated. All we seek is to be let alone; that those 
 who never held power over us shall not now attempt our sub- 
 jugation by arms. This we will, this we must resist to the 
 direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is aban- 
 
276 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 doned^ the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be 
 ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can 
 not but be materially beneficial. So long as this pretension is 
 maintained, with firm reliance on that divine power which 
 covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue the 
 struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and 
 self-government." 
 
 The geographical position of Virginia clearly indicated that 
 State as the Flanders of the war. Within her boundaries was 
 necessarily to be located the first line of Confederate defense, 
 and also to be found more than one favorable point cUappui 
 for the invading forces. To the aid of important geographical 
 and physical considerations, moral and political necessities 
 were superadded, to urge a prompt and vigorous assistance to 
 Virginia, in the heroic effort which she was preparing for her 
 deliverance. With the eye of the soldier and the appreciation 
 of the statesman. President Davis urged the immediate removal 
 of the seat of government to the neighborhood of the seat of 
 war. On the 20th of May the seat of the Confederate Gov- 
 ernment was transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, the 
 capital of Virginia, and within a few days afterward Mr. Davis 
 reached the latter city.* 
 
 * A recent work {^Richmond During the War') thus mentions the arrival 
 of Mr. Davis in Richmond : 
 
 " He was received with an outburst of enthusiasm. A suite of hand- 
 some apartments had been provided for him at the Spotswood Hotel, until 
 arrangements could be made for supplying him with more elegant and 
 suitable accommodations. Over the hotel, and from the various windows 
 of the guests, waved numerous Confederate flags, and the rooms destined 
 for his use were gorgeously draped in the Confederate colors. In honor 
 of his arrival, almost every house in the city was decorated with the ' Stars 
 and Bars.' 
 
RICHMOND THE CAPITAL. 277 
 
 The transfer of the Confederate capital to Richmond was an 
 event affecting the direction, character, and destinies of the 
 war to sudi an extent as entitles it to be considered one of its 
 salient incidents. As a measure of policy, it has been variously- 
 viewed, and has involved some interesting discussion of mili- 
 tary and strategic considerations. In the progress of events 
 during the war, its wisdom was generally recognized, and in 
 the calmer judgment of the present there is scarcely a dissent- 
 ing voice to the prevailing opinion that it was a master-stroke 
 of political sagacity and military forecast. 
 
 High military authority has been quoted in support of the 
 opinion oj)posed to locating the Confederate capital at Rich- 
 mond. Ingeniously enough it was alleged that such a step 
 involved fighting on the exterior of the circle instead of the 
 centre, and that thus the great advantage to the party conduct- 
 ing operations upon an interior line would be surrendered. 
 It was also tolerably certain that the North would aim, in its 
 invasion, at the Confederate capital as the vital objective point 
 of its campaigns ; and to transfer the capital to a point so far 
 
 "An elegant residence for the use of Mr. Davis was soon procured. It 
 was situated in the western part of the city, on a hill, overlooking a land- 
 scape of romantic beauty. This establishment was luxuriantly furnished, 
 and there Mr. and ^Irs. Davis dispensed the elegant hospitalities for 
 which they were ever distinguished. Mrs. Davis is a tall, commanding 
 figure, with dark hair, eyes and complexion, and strongly -marked expres- 
 sion, which lies chiefly in the mouth. With firmly-set yet flexible lips, 
 there is indicated much energy of purpose and will, but beautifully 
 softened by the usually sad expression of her dark, earnest eyes. Her 
 manners are kind, graceful, easy, and affable, and her receptions were 
 characterized by the dignity and suavity which should very properly dis- 
 tinguish the drawing room entertainments of the Chief Magistrate of a 
 Republic." 
 
278 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 north as Richmond, greatly diminished the enemy's difficulties 
 — first, as to space; and secondly, by shortening his line of 
 transportation and supply. 
 
 But these views were the conclusions of a purely strategic 
 judgment, overlooking entirely moral and political considera- 
 tions involved, nor are they by any means exhaustive of the 
 argument as to the military aspects of the situation. The 
 courageous and unselfish action of Virginia deserved a response 
 of similar spirit from the Confederacy. Virginia had volun- 
 tarily become the outpost of the South, and her people needed 
 the presence among them of that authority which was to wield 
 her great resources, organize her energies, and give counsel to 
 her courage. Her people invited the Government to join 
 them and make the battle for the common deliverance of the 
 South around theu' homesteads. To accept this invitation was 
 a step no less characteristic of President Davis than was his 
 prompt, decisive action in the crisis at Buena Vista. It had 
 the combined advantage of bold defiance and prudent calcula- 
 tion. This bold courting of the issue by the infant power, 
 at the very outset of hostilities, was the foundation of that 
 brilliant prestige which marked its earlier historj^. To an ad- 
 versary intoxicated w*ith an overweening sense of numerical 
 superiority, and a brutal reliance upon his superior strength, 
 this defiant planting of the standard in front of his first line 
 was a significant warning of the difficulties of the task which 
 he had undertaken. 
 
 President Davis has never seen reason to regret the trans- 
 fer of the Government to Richmond. It bound Virginia, by 
 indissoluble ties to the fortunes of the Confederacy, and was 
 the beginning of an affection for himself, among her citizens, 
 which it was their pride to exhibit in the face of calamities 
 
EVENTS IN VIRGINIA. 279 
 
 common to him and to themselves. Not even in his own 
 gallant State of Mississippi are the genius, virtues, and fame 
 of Jefferson Davis cherished with a more tender .association 
 than in Virginia. 
 
 A brief resume of events will now assist to a clear under- 
 standing of the situation of affairs when President Davis 
 reached Richmond in the latter part of May. Virginia, a 
 week previously, had, by formal vote of her people, ratified 
 the ordinance of secession adopted by her convention. When 
 the convention passed the ordinance of secession on the 17th 
 of April, the State authorities, with commendable discretion, 
 prepared to make important seizures of arms, stores, etc., the 
 property of the Federal Government within the limits of the 
 State. Governor Letcher — well known for his steadfast de- 
 votion to the Union, and for his honorable zeal to preserve 
 it — in this trying crisis of the State, was nobly faithful to his 
 Virginian instincts, and mindful of the honorable part which 
 devolved upon Virginia's Governor. 
 
 The capture of two places of special importance was sought 
 by expeditions arranged with secrecy and ingenuity, but re- 
 sulting, in both instances, in only partial success. These 
 places were Gosport Navy-yard — famous for its dry-dock, 
 shops, ammunition, arms, timber, rope-walks, and other ap- 
 purtenances of an extensive naval establishment — and Har- 
 per's Ferry, on the Potomac, with its extensive armory and 
 arsenal, large collection of arms, and valuable machinery. At 
 the latter place, the Federal commander, by an unworthy sub- 
 terfuge, obtained a delay in the attack which the Virginians 
 were about to make, and took advantage of a parley, to at- 
 tempt the destruction, by fire, of the buildings and machinery. 
 Much valuable property was destroyed, but the State secured 
 
280 lAFF. OP JEKFKllSON J>AVIS. 
 
 machinery, whicli was afterward turned to most important 
 account, and many excellent arms for her rapidly gathering 
 volunteers. The attempted destruction, by the Federals, at 
 Gosport, was imperfectly executed. Among the prizes cap- 
 tured here was the steam frigate Merrimac, nearly finished, 
 but greatly damaged by fire. Within a very few months this 
 vessel was destined to a performance, conspicuous for all time 
 in the annals of naval warfare. 
 
 The authorities of North Carolina — a State which had clung 
 with unsurpassed fidelity to the Federal Union — acted with a 
 vigor which well befitted a community conspicuous, in the 
 first American revolution, for the fidelity of its patriotism. 
 Slow to reach her conclusions. North Carolina was fully ujd to 
 the demands of the occasion, in her preparation for a struggle, 
 during which her revolutionary fame was to be excelled by a 
 second dedication of her blood and energies to the cause of 
 liberty. On the 21st of May, North Carolina, by unanimous 
 vote of her convention, adopted an ordinance of secession. 
 Her brave Governor (Ellis) whose services were too soon lost 
 to his State and country, had previously caused the seizure of 
 Forts Macon and Caswell, and the arsenal at Fayetteville, 
 with nearly sixty thousand arms, of which half were of the 
 most approved construction. 
 
 On the 19th of April occurred a collision between citizens 
 of Baltimore and Massachusetts soldiers, en route to the Fed- 
 eral capital, followed by such a stringent policy as made 
 clearly hopeless the open cooperation of Maryland, unless by 
 successful invasion of the Confederate forces. 
 
 Missouri, under the guidance of Jackson, Price, and other 
 able and resolute leaders, was preparing a heroic resistance, 
 but under difficulties greater than were experienced in any 
 
GENERAL LEE. 281 
 
 other Southern State, against the domination established upon 
 her soil. 
 
 When President Davis reached Richmond he found Vir- 
 ginia in an advanced state of preparation. Thirty thousand 
 troops were in camps of instruction, or upon duty at Norfolk, 
 upon the peninsula of James and York Rivers, and at differ- 
 ent points upon the northern boundary of the State. In su- 
 preme command was General Robert E. Lee, the friend and 
 former classmate of the President at West Point ; and, under 
 him. Colonel John B. Magruder, also his associate at West 
 Point, and other officers of promise and ability, seeking ser- 
 vice in defense of their native State and the South. As the 
 several States acceded to the Confederacy, their troops, arms, 
 stores, etc., were turned over to the Confederate authorities, 
 and officers were assigned rank in the Confederate service by 
 a rule, regulated by the rank which they had held in the Fed- 
 eral army. 
 
 In accordance with this rule, General Lee was third on the 
 list of full generals appointed by President Davis — General 
 Cooper being first, and General Albert Sydney Johnston being 
 second. General Lee had been first commissioned, after the 
 tender of his resignation in the Federal service, a Major- 
 General of Virginia forces. Until he was commissioned full 
 general, by President Davis, in June, 1861, he continued 
 to act as the general commanding the Virginia forces, and was 
 invested also with the direction of the Confederate troops 
 which were arriving daily from the States south. His author- 
 ity was as follows : 
 
 "Montgomery, May 10, 1S61. 
 
 "To 3Iajor- General R. E. Lee: To prevent confusion, you 
 will assume control of the forces of the Confederate States in 
 
282 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Virginia, and assign them to such duties as you may in- 
 dicate, until further orders; for which this will be your 
 
 authority. 
 
 " L. P. Walkee, Secretary of War." 
 
 It would be impossible to overestimate the services of Gen- 
 eral Lee in the preparation of the Virginia troops for the 
 field, and in preparing the general defense of the State by the 
 location and disposition of the Confederate forces as they ar- 
 rived in Virginia. His distinguished services afterwards are 
 hardly better evidence of his genius as a soldier, than the 
 results of his arduous labor at this trying period, and in a 
 position of comparative obscurity. President Davis fully in- 
 dicated his confidence in the counsels of Lee by his constant 
 retention of him at his side. The South has probably not yet 
 appreciated the extent to which the genius of Lee, in coopera- 
 tion with that of Davis, aided in those earlier achieve- 
 ments of the war, which secured the immediate preservation 
 of the Confederacy, and earned so flattering a reputation for 
 
 others. 
 
 With the establishment of the Confederate authority in 
 Virginia, reinforcements from other States were constantly 
 added to her own levies, and by the middle of June, more 
 than fifty thousand men were in arms for her defense. As 
 yet, collisions between the opjjosing forces had been rare, and 
 totally indecisive. A force of raw volunteers, unorganized 
 and imperfectly armed, was surprised in Western Virginia, by 
 a movement of considerable vigor on the part of the Federal 
 commander, and the patriots, under Colonel Porterfield, com- 
 pelled to retreat. At Great Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a 
 few hundred Virginians and North Carolinians, under Colonel 
 
mageuder's victory. 283 
 
 Magriider, handsomely repulsed a large column of Federal 
 troops, attempting to advance up the peninsula. In the then 
 uneducated popular idea of military operations, the fight at 
 Bethel was magnified to an extent greatly beyond its real 
 importance. It had, nevertheless, a timely significance, in its 
 evidence of the spirit of the Confederate soldiery. President 
 Davis was pleased to recognize this fact in a congratulatory 
 letter to Governor Ellis, commending the conduct of the jS^orth 
 Carolinians who were engaged in the fight. 
 
 These minor affairs were preliminary incidents to the 
 thrilling events, upon a more extended scale of operations, and 
 upon a more important theatre, which were to make mem- 
 orable the approaching midsummer. Pending the preparations, 
 active and extensive on both sides, for the coming grand 
 encounter, there was a marked pause in military operations, 
 attended by an agreeable subsidence of the feverish excitement 
 of wliich war is so productive. The struggle for the mastery 
 in Virginia, which it was plain would decide the present fate 
 of the Southern movement, was destined also to decide, in a 
 large measure, the extent and duration of the war. Viewed 
 in its historical significance, it becomes chiefly important as a 
 stage of the revolution indicating a new departure, and an 
 altered direction of events. Preparation was now to be dis- 
 placed by action. Skirmishes were to be followed by heavy 
 engagements, and the high prestige of the South was now to 
 be subjected to its first j:est, in that long series of cruel en- 
 counters, between valor and endurance on one side, and mere 
 weight of numbers on the other. 
 
 Preliminary to the narrative of these important events, ap- 
 propriately arises one phase of that historical question Avliieh 
 involves the statesmanship!, the forecast, and the general fitness 
 
284 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 of Jefferson Davis in the position which he now occupied, 
 and under the circumstances by which he was surrounded. 
 
 It would be a superfluous and unprofitable task to consider 
 in detail the numerous allegations, trivial and serious, made 
 against President Davis by his assailants, in support of their 
 professed belief in his responsibility for the failure of the 
 Confederate cause. When facts are perverted, history dis- 
 torted, and prejudice, rather than truth, is the governing in- 
 fluence, such allegations will be sufficiently numerous, even 
 though they be not well sustained. Nor yet is it maintained 
 that President Davis committed no errors in the long and 
 trying term of his administration. It is very certain that no 
 such defense, asserting his infallibility, would be approved 
 by him. But the real historical significance of the ques- 
 tion of Mr. Davis' capacity for his office may be reduced 
 to very simple dimensions. Conceding him to be mor- 
 tal, we concede that he is fallible. Then the question arises, 
 Were his errors sufficiently numerous and serious, unaided by 
 other and greater causes, to have occasioned the failure of the 
 South in the late war ? Again, conceding still more liberally 
 to his assailants, were those errors the chief causes of a failure, 
 which might have been avoided, despite all other adverse in- 
 fluences, disadvantages, and obstacles, if a different adminis- 
 trative policy had prevailed? 
 
 The subject now has no value, save in its historical sense, 
 and in that sense its value must be determined from the stand- 
 point just indicated. At least it is in that aspect that we 
 propose to consider it, whenever its discussion shall be appro- 
 priate in these pages. The consideration will be modified by 
 many collateral questions which must incidentally arise. It 
 may be necessary to ask if no other Southern leader, entrusted 
 
AN I.^r^OIlTANT question. 285 
 
 with great responsibilities, and enjoying uninterrupted popular 
 favor, during and since the war, coniinittcd mistakes quite as 
 serious and f'recpient as did the President, in proportion to the 
 multiplicity of his cares? It may be appropriate, too, to con- 
 sider the influence that these mistakes of others exerted upon 
 those final disasters for which he alone is held responsible. 
 These rpiestions we propose to consider, each in its approj)riate 
 place, and with becoming candor. If we shall not meet the 
 arguments and allegations employed against Mr. Davis with 
 a spirit more ingenuous than has seemed to actuate his assail- 
 ants, our success must be poor, indeed. 
 
 Those who j)rofess to consider President Davis wanting in 
 the necessary qualifications for his position, dwell with especial 
 emj)hasis upon what they are pleased to characterize his fail- 
 ui'c in tlic early months of the war, to foresee its character, 
 duration and magnitude, and the consequent imperfect prepara- 
 tion of the Confederate Government. It is asserted that he 
 was utterly blind to all the indications of a long and obstinate 
 struggle, urged upon his attention by a more sagacious states- 
 manship than his own ; that he was persistent and arrogant 
 in his prophecies of a struggle, short, brilliant, and over- 
 whelming in favor of the South, even after the war had com- 
 menced; and that before the bombardment of Sumter he was 
 no less positive in his convictions that there would be no war; 
 that he was, in short, stupidly unreasoning and inactive, deaf 
 alike to entreaties, arguments, and facts. 
 
 If, indeed, it could be established that during the era of 
 secession (the interval between November, 1860, and April, 
 18G1), Mr. Davis had cherished expectations of peaceable sepa- 
 ration, and that during that portion of his presidential term 
 embraced before the assault upon Sumter, relying upon this 
 
286 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 prospect of peace, he had failed to prepare for war, then, in- 
 deed, would his responsibility be great ; but it would be shared 
 by every contemporary statesman of the South, almost, if not 
 quite, without an exception. History may palliate the amaz- 
 ing infatuation of the Southern masses at this period, but 
 surely its verdict must be a contemptuous condemnation of 
 that vaunted statesmanship which scouted war as the result of 
 secession, as an impossibility, and its anticipation as the pro- 
 duct of timidity. But President Davis is not driven to the 
 extremity of seeking so poor a refuge as the common and 
 universal blindness and weakness of that critical period. Re- 
 cognizing the justice of that test which demands of the true 
 statesman a" prescience beyond the average vision, it is believed 
 that his defense may be made easy and triumphant. 
 
 Candid investigation will demonstrate the fact that Davis, 
 among Southern statesmen, was an almost solitary exception 
 in his rejection of the dominant sentiment of the times. The 
 remarkable consistency of his public life is in no respect better 
 sustained than in his oft-repeated apprehensions of eventual 
 war between the sections. His dread of disunion arose from 
 his dread of civil war, and the latter he always urged to be 
 the necessary consequence of the former. Striving to save the 
 Union upon a just and constitutional basis, he yet habitually 
 admonished the South of the inevitable result of disunion, and 
 coupled his admonitions with earnest exhortations of thorough 
 preparation for the most serious emergency in its history. 
 His speeches, addresses, and letters, furnish irrefutable testi- 
 mony of his apprehension of civil war as an inevitable con- 
 comitant of disunion. Not one line, or one sentence, written or 
 uttered by him in the entire period of his public career, can be so 
 construed as to indicate a different conviction. Believing that 
 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 287 
 
 he foresaw the impending conflict, he strove with indefatigable 
 energy and incomparable ability, in company with Calhoun, 
 in 1850, to place the South in a position which would then 
 have rescued her liberties. If the warning voice of the South, 
 proclaiming the inexorable decree of disunion, unless her con- 
 stitutional rights were fully and forever secured, had then been 
 disregarded, at least her resistance must have been more effect- 
 ual than it could become by postponement. In innumerable 
 passages of rare eloquence, he has left an imperishable record 
 of patriotic devotion to a constitutional union, and touching 
 proofs of the emotion with which he contemplated the evils 
 which were to follow its destruction. The words of his fare- 
 well address to the Senate, (" putting our trust in God, and in 
 our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right 
 as best we may") do not more clearly indicate the calm de- 
 termination with which he would meet the peril, than his 
 af»preciation of its serious nature. 
 
 When it is alleged that the inadequate preparation of the 
 South, during the period which we have characterized as the 
 era of secession, enters as a most important feature in the 
 explanation of her failure, a proposition is boldly asserted, 
 which is, at least, debatable; but its discussion does not 
 devolve upon us.* Mr. Davis is assuredly not to be held 
 
 ■^ We intentionally waive the discussion of this question as to the extent 
 of the preparation made by the States, severally, for actual war. It is not 
 incumbent upon us here to examine the action of the individual States. 
 ^Vo do not desire to be understood, however, as assenting to the proposi- 
 tion that all the States were inadequately prepared. It is a singular 
 commentary upon the wisdom and sagacity of the leaders of secession in 
 its earlier stages (by the various States), that Virginia and North Caro- 
 lina were each Vjetter able to arm their troops than were some of the 
 Cotton States. The latter may have made as much preparation as was 
 
288 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 justly accountable for what the various States failed to do while 
 he was at his post of duty in the Senate, and in no manner 
 controlling their action. No responsibility can attach to him 
 beyond the action of the Confederate Government, save in the 
 case of his own State, and whatever preparation Mississippi 
 made was at his instance. By what law of justice or logic 
 can Mr. Davis be made accountable for the inadequate prepa- 
 ration of Georgia, (assuming that Georgia was unprepared, or 
 had omitted any preparation that was possible under the cir- 
 cumstances), which then had the full benefit of the counsels of 
 reputed statesmen like Messrs. Toombs, Stephens, and Brown? 
 or of South Carolina, under the counsels of Messrs. Rhett and 
 Orr, and the Charleston Mercury ? Of Alabama, led by the bril- 
 liant genius of Mr. Yancey ? Yet, upon the aggregate resources 
 and means of defense of these and the other States must depend 
 the safety of the Confederacy. While Mr. Davis was yet in 
 Washington, striving against hope to avert the dreaded issue, 
 many of the States, under the guidance of their leading men, 
 were passing ordinances of secession. Assuredly, then, he is 
 not to be censured for any lack of preparation at this period. 
 Yet no very close examination of the record is necessary to 
 establish the fact, that those who have since been most forward 
 in denying the prevision of statesmanship to Davis, were then, 
 by their own showing, precipitating their several States into 
 
 possible under the circumstances. When Mr. Davis reached Mississippi, 
 after his withdrawal from the Senate, the Legislature had appropriated 
 $150,000 for military purposes. As Major-General commanding the forces 
 of the State, he was consulted as to additional appropriations. He imme- 
 diately recommended an appropriation of three millions of dollars. It is 
 needless to say that such a recommendation, at that period, was deemed 
 little less than extravagant folly. 
 
MR. DAVls' UKSl'ONSIHII.lTY. 289 
 
 secession, totally unprepared for a war, the very possibility of 
 which they derided. 
 
 The respon.sibility of Mr. Davis can date only from his in- 
 auguration as President of the Confederate States, on February 
 18, 1861. Between that date and the actual breaking out of 
 war was an interval of less than two months. Within this 
 period the results accomplished were certainly all that could 
 have been anticipated, and all that ever were accomplished by 
 any government yet in its infancy, within the same space of 
 time. The organization of the Government had been perfected, 
 efforts made to secure intercourse with foreign nations, and the 
 civil administration completed in all important features. With 
 the aid of that master genius for organization. General Samuel 
 Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Confederate 
 army, the basis of a military organization, upon which the 
 most splendid armies of modern history were speedily created, 
 was prepared; troops were called into the field; and the Con- 
 federacy, in proportion to its means, was actually placed, in two 
 months, upon a war footing, not inferior to that of the enemy 
 at the outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 The unprejudiced Northern or European reader, whose ad- 
 miration has been freely expressed for the valor and endurance 
 of the South, and for the skillful use of its comparatively 
 limited resources, may well be amazed at the censures of Mr. 
 Davis, from Southern sources. 
 
 But what was his error after assumption of the Presidency ? 
 !More important still, what is the evidence ? So far as we have 
 been able to gather the evidence, it consists in the fact that 
 President Davis did not urge the indiscriminate purcluise of 
 arms in Europe, or wherever else they might have been ob- 
 tained. The intelligent foreign reader can only be amazed 
 19 
 
290 LiTFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 that, upon this single fact — for it is the only fact alleged — rests 
 the charge that President Davis did not make adequate prep- 
 aration for war. Tlie answer is very simple, and indisputable. 
 First, the Confederate Government, from the date of its organ- 
 ization, endeavored constantly to purchase serviceable arms 
 wherever they could be obtained. Second, the Confederate 
 Government had given extensive orders to ID^orthern manu- 
 factories (because they were nearest) at Chickopee and elsewhere, 
 some of which were filled and the arms received, while, in 
 other cases, they were seized by the Federal authorities after 
 the commencement of hostilities while en route South. Third, 
 there were very few serviceable arms to, be purchased in Eu- 
 rope ; and in support of this assertion we have only to recall 
 the enormous swindles practised on the Federal Government 
 in its purchase of arms in Europe at this period. Arms were 
 oifered, in some instances, to the Government, and rejected, 
 because President Davis, while Secretary of War, had become 
 acquainted with their worthlessness ; and thus, while certain 
 speculations were disappointed, the means of the Government 
 were not squandered. An examination of the records will 
 demonstrate the fact that the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, 
 under Colonel Gorgas, was conducted with signal judgment 
 and ability. From the beginning to the end, it was managed 
 with a success which entitles it to be considered probably the 
 most ably conducted bureau of the Government. 
 
 But not only do the recorded events of the period vindicate . 
 Mr. Davis from the accusations of a tardy and delinquent pol- 
 icy in providing for the threatened emergency of war ; they 
 are fully conclusive as to the energetic provision made when 
 hostilities were opened. Nothing can be more emphatic in 
 its enunciation of a bold, vigorous policy than President Da- 
 
VIGOROUS POLICY OF PRESIDENT DAVIS. 291 
 
 vis' message to the Confederate Congress, assembled by special 
 convocation, on the 29th of April :* " There are now in the 
 field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. 
 Philip, and Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen 
 thousand are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to 
 organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of 
 the present exigencies of the country, an army of one hundred 
 Viousand meny Surely we must look elsewhere than to such 
 an announcement as this, for evidence in support of this pre- 
 tended absence of foresight, and inappreciation of the extent 
 and character of the approaching struggle. This, be it re- 
 membered, was in Davis' first response to the Federal declara- 
 tion of war, only tw^o weeks after the fall of Sumter, and when 
 President Lincoln had, as yet, called for but seventy-five 
 thousand men. This was the spirit in which President Davis 
 began the contest, and the results which immediately followed, 
 in months of brilliant and consecutive triumphs, demonstrated 
 the ample provision made for the emergency. f 
 
 In marked contrast with this vigorous policy were the silly 
 vaporings of demagogues, prating of Southern invincibility 
 against a world in arms, protesting that the North, under no 
 circumstances, could be induced to fight, and scouting a longer 
 
 * It should be observed that Mr. Lincoln did not call upon the Federal 
 Congress to assemble until July 4th, two months after the meeting of the 
 Confederate Congress. 
 
 f In this connection, we quote from a remarkably faithful and careful 
 chronicle of events during a portion of the war : " On the morning of 
 
 the 29th of May, President Davis arrived in Richmond 
 
 He found the military preparations in a state requiring instant energy, 
 and, within a few hours after his arrival, he telegraphed and wrote mes- 
 sages to every State in the South, urging that troops should be sent for- 
 ward with increased speed." — Howisons History of the War. 
 
292 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 duration of a war with " Yankees," than six months at the 
 farthest. That such was the dominant conviction at Mont- 
 gomery, no contemporary authority will deny. An eminent 
 Virginian, a commissioner from his own State to the Confed- 
 erate Congress, was amazed to hear laughed at as an excellent 
 joke, his congratulations to that, body, upon the wise de- 
 termination to locate the seat of government at Richmond, in 
 close proximity to the seat of war. The grave legislators at 
 Montgomery, at least, had not yet comprehended that there 
 "was to be war. 
 
 But perhaps we are in fault, in thus offering the evidence 
 of uncontradicted facts and obvious conclusions, where only 
 vague inferences and unsupported allegations are urged to the 
 contrary. There are graver questions yet to be encountered, 
 far better justifying difference of opinion, and affording better 
 ground for discussion of the philosophy of the Southern fail- 
 ure. Censure of those who have had the conduct of a ruined 
 cause is as inevitable as the criticism which ever waits upon 
 history; but it is not, therefore, always just. A great 
 soldier,* who has but recently contributed a chapter to his- 
 tory, thrilling in interest and inestimable in importance, when 
 congratulated since upon his brilliant triumphs, touchingly 
 replied : " How would it have been if success — this unexam- 
 pled success — had not crowned our undertaking? Would not 
 this undeserved exaltation have been so much unreasonable 
 criticism and undeserved blame ? " 
 
 To a certain class of Southern critics, we commend the 
 magnanimous sentiment of an illustrious fellow-country man, f 
 
 * General Von Molkte, who planned tlie Prussian campaign in Bo- 
 hemia. 
 
 f General Jubal A. Early. 
 
GENERAL EAET.y's OPINION. 293 
 
 now mourning, in exile, the afflictions of his country: "As 
 for myself, I have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes 
 of our failure, as I have seen abundant reason for it in the 
 tremendous odds brought against us. Having had some 
 means of judging, I will, however, say that, in my opinion, 
 both President Davis and General Lee, in their respective 
 spheres, did all for the success of our cause which it was pos- 
 sible for mortal men to do ; and it is a great privilege and 
 comfort for me so to believe, and to have been able to bring 
 with me, into exile, a profound love and veneration for those 
 great men." 
 
294 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 8HARACTERISTICS OP THE WAR IX 1861 — THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DI- 
 RECTLY CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT 
 PERIODS — MR. DAVIs' CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE 
 CONFEDERACY — THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE 
 DEFENSIVE POLICY OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES — FEDERAL PREPARATIONS 
 — GENERAL SCOTT — DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES — DISTRIBUTION 
 OF THEIR FORCES THE CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OP 1861 JUSTIFIED DIS- 
 TRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN GENERALS 
 
 PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON — JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON — 
 MANASSAS — PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE BATTLE-FIELD — HIS DISPATCH — HIS 
 KETURN TO RICHMOND — A SPEECH NEVER PUBLISHED BEFORE — REFLECTIONS 
 UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS — MR. DAVIS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THB 
 ABSENCE OF PURSUIT — STONEWALL JACKSOn's VIEWS — DAVIS IN FAVOR OP 
 
 PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS MISREPRESENTATIONS MILITARY MOVEMENTS 
 
 IN VARIOUS QUARTERS — THE "TRENT AFFAIR " — RESULTS OF THE FIRST 
 TEAR OF THE WAR. 
 
 "VT WHATEVER crudities may appear in the general plans 
 ' ' of warfare, adopted by the American belligerents in 
 1861, when tested by the maxims which have obtained in 
 other wars, waged upon different theatres of action, and for 
 different purposes, at least there was not wanting a palpable 
 and definitive shape. With remarkable rapidity and precision, 
 the military situation was adjusted to the attainment of certain 
 general objects, which continued, during the successive stages 
 of the war, to be pursued, with varying fortune, by the re- 
 spective contestants. 
 
 The incipient campaign of the war was peculiarly regulated 
 
DAVIS' CONNECTION WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS. 295 
 
 and deterniined by the paramount aims which had impelled 
 the respective parties to arms. Of necessity, the campaign, on 
 the part of the North, nmst be offensive, while the South, in 
 a defensive attitude, must prepare to parry the blows of her 
 assailant. The pretext of the North was to assert the " na- 
 tional authority" over what it was pleased to term "rebellious" 
 territory. The animus of the South was to repel an invasion 
 which menaced her liberties and firesides. "Whatever advan- 
 tages may have belonged to the position of the South were not 
 overlooked by those who were charged with her defense; and 
 it may safely be claimed, in view of the immediate and over- 
 whelming result in her favor, that whatever compensation, for 
 obvious disadvantages, she had anticipated from the resources 
 of skillful leadership, was fairly rendered. 
 
 The two Governments, at AVashington and at Richmond, 
 were then more directly chargeable with the actual results in 
 the field than at subsequent periods. The army had then 
 become less independent of the Government. Its organic 
 structure was undeveloped, and it had not yet become identi- 
 fied with those commanders whose history was hereafter to be 
 so interwoven with its own. In a general sense, it may h» 
 remarked, that the connection of President Davis with all the 
 campaigns of the Confederate arniy, was that which the country 
 designed it should be, when, in consequence of his military 
 aptitude and experience, it placed him in charge of the public 
 administration. Moreover, it was consistent with that inevi- 
 table responsibility which attached to the office of chief execu- 
 tive. Ignorant and intemperate partisans have labored to 
 prove his responsibility for those casualties of war, -wliieh are 
 utterly beyond human calculations, and to trace to his influence 
 disasters of the battle-field, with which he could by no possi- 
 
296 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 bility have been connected. As is usual in such cases, these 
 criticisms are made with a total forgetfalness of the uninten- 
 tional tribute, which is accorded to Mr. Davis, in ascribing to 
 him the chief responsibility for a military administration, which 
 the world declares to have had few parallels in its history. 
 
 When President Davis reached Richmond, from Montgom- 
 ery, the military situation had already assumed a well-defined 
 shape. The plans of defense, adopted by the Virginian au- 
 thorities, mainly under the direction of General Lee, and car- 
 ried into partial execution before the alliance with the Confed- 
 eracy had been formally consummated, were adhered to by the 
 Confederate Government. President Davis, as we have seen, 
 fully impressed with the demands of the exigency, immediately 
 upon his arrival, addressed himself, with characteristic vigor 
 and promptitude, to such measures as would secure a successful 
 campaign. In the meantime, the preparations of the Federal 
 Government were equally vigorous, and by no means indefinite 
 in their aims. 
 
 Whatever may be the comparative merits, when placed in 
 antithetical juxtaposition, of the plans of campaign adopted by 
 |he two Governments in 1861, or whatever may be alleged of 
 the blunders and mishaps of the Federal scheme of warfare, 
 there could be no question of the full comprehension of the 
 necessities of the situation by the veteran commander of the 
 Federal armies. We are not called upon here to give an 
 opinion of General Scott in his personal or political relations, 
 but that combination of sagacious military minds, upon which 
 devolved the defense of Southern liberties, was not likely to 
 commit the error of a disparaging estimate of his abilities. 
 
 General Scott, far in advance of the prevailing opinion at 
 the North, dreamed of no holiday enterprise. He -svell knew 
 
DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE OF THE COXFEDERACY. 297 
 
 that Southern valor, directed by leaders whose names were 
 idontilied with the proudest prestige of America, and enlisted 
 in the defense of principles which were the dearest convictions 
 and traditions of the Southern heart, was not to be crushed in 
 a " three-months' " wrestle of arms. Accordingly, his prepara- 
 tions were for war in its broadest and most terrible sense; a 
 war between powerful nationalities; a war in which, though 
 sustained by inexhaustible resources and popular enthusiasm, 
 he had yet to contend with a race essentially military in its 
 instincts, earnest in conviction, led by men whose capacities he 
 had amply tested, and aided by defensive position, vast extent 
 of territory, and by those numerous obstacles in the way of 
 conquest, which must have been apparent to the eye of an 
 experienced soldier. 
 
 The attitude of the Confederate Government was necessarily 
 defensive. History would be searched in vain for examples 
 justifying an invasion by a people entirely agricultural in 
 habits and resources, weak in numbers, and with a govern- 
 ment not yet organized three months, of a powerful manufac- 
 turing and commercial nation, of dense population, and great 
 wealth and resources. Without supplies, equijiment and trans- 
 portation, and without the time or opportunity to obtain them, 
 successful invasion of the North, however attractive to the 
 popular imagination, was clearly impossible. Viewed from 
 the more educated stand-point, furnished by the later develop- 
 ments of the war, the crude ideas, from which arose the popu- 
 lar aspiration of at once "carrying the war into Africa," are 
 ludicrous in the extreme. Indeed, there can be little doubt 
 that the defensive, subjected to such modifications as the casual- 
 ties of war render proper and necessary in all plans, whether 
 ofi'ensive or defensive, was at all times the true policy of the 
 
298 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 South. Certain it is, that, upon two occasions, essaying the 
 oiFensive under the most favorable circumstances, and under 
 their greatest commander, the Confederates were overtaken by 
 disaster. Tliere can be no just criterion, furnished by Euro- 
 pean wars, by which to test the Confederate military policy in 
 the main. Parallels between the American civil war and those 
 waged by Frederick the Great and Napoleon are inadmissable. 
 Not only were circumstances entirely dissimilar, but able mili- 
 tary critics have indicated physical peculiarities, forbidding the 
 unexceptional application to American warfare, of maxims 
 which, elsewhere, are undisputed. 
 
 Nevertheless, war as a science must be worse than useless, 
 unless its underlying principles have universal application. 
 Nor is it maintained that there were no circumstances which 
 would have justified a departure from the usually defensive 
 policy of the Confederates. Upon two occasions the main 
 army of the South, having successfully encountered upon its 
 own soil the most prodigious efforts of the enemy's strength, 
 sought to follow him in the moment of his recoil. The Con- 
 federate invasion of 1862, culminating at Antietam, and that 
 of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, were undertaken with the 
 purpose of destroying, upon his own soil, an enemy already 
 defeated. Each of these endeavors was based upon sound 
 principles; and there is no little palliation for the disaster, in 
 either case, in reflecting how great would have been the results 
 of success. Much of the philosophy of the war in Virginia is 
 to be explained by the fact of the thoroughly aggressive char- 
 acter, as soldiers, of President Davis and General Lee. These 
 two directing minds, by whose combined genius and will, the 
 fortunes of the Confederacy were so long upheld, in full and 
 cordial cooperation during the entire war, were in nothing 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF TUE CONFEDERATE FORCES. 299 
 
 more harmonious, than in the desire for an aggressive cam- 
 paign, whenever it could be undertaken with a reasonable 
 promise of success. Hence, the history of the army of North- 
 ern Virginia develops, throughout, that military policy which 
 is known as the "defensive with ofiensive returns." 
 
 After the conclusion of the alliance between Virginia and 
 the Confederate States, which placed all "military opera- 
 tions, offensive and defensive, in Virginia," under the control 
 of the Confederate President, troops from the other SoutL- 
 ern States had been thrown northward with astonishing 
 rapidity. As rapidly as they arrived, regiments were sent to 
 the various localities where it had been thought expedient to 
 establish a defensive force. These posts were distributed with 
 a view to their strategic bearing upon particular sections of 
 territory, which it was deemed necessary to defend, and also 
 "with reference to their strategic connection with each other, 
 and with the chain of combinations making the general plan 
 of defense. 
 
 In the early summer, the distribution of the Southern forces 
 in Virginia was as follows : At Manassas Junction, thirty-five 
 miles south-west from Washington, and the point of intersec- 
 tion of the lines of railroad running southward to Ilichmond, 
 and to the Shenandoah Valley, was a force, to the command 
 of which General Beauregard was transferred from the charge 
 of the defenses of Charleston. Manassas Junction was ob- 
 viously a strategic point of the first importance, as the centre 
 of the railroad system of Northern Virginia, and as a base of 
 operations threatening Washington, and immediately across 
 the path of any overland expedition against Richmond. The 
 favorable estimate of General Beauregard's abilities enter- 
 tained by the President, added to the popularity which fol- 
 
300 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 lowed his services at Charleston, occasioned his assignment to 
 what was obviously to be the most important theatre of 
 operations. 
 
 Auxiliary to the command of Beauregard, but operating 
 independently of that officer, Avas a force at Harper's Ferry, 
 on tlie Potomac, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, 
 an officer of reputed skill, who had earned honorable distinc- 
 tion in Mexico, and enjoyed high rank and reputation in the 
 Federal service. This force had a mission second in value 
 only to that of the army at Manassas. It was charged with 
 the defense of the rich and populous Shenandoah Valley, teem- 
 ing with supplies, and inhabited by a hardy and patriotic 
 population. Its position was intermediate between the forces 
 operating in Western Virginia, and those in front of Wash- 
 ington, and threatening to the enemy's line of communication 
 westward via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
 
 In Western Virginia were the commands of Generals Wise 
 and Garnett, respectively, in the Kanawha Valley, and upon 
 the main line of communication between the sections east and 
 west of the Alleghany mountains. The forces of Wise and 
 Garnett were designed for the double purpose of defending the 
 sections of territory in which they were respectively located, 
 and for the aid and encouragement of the patriotic portion of 
 the population, then under the joint domination of the Union 
 men and Federal soldiers. 
 
 Under Magruder, promoted for his victory at Bethel, was a 
 comparatively small force, holding the peninsula of James 
 and York Rivers, the direct route to Richmond from the 
 coast ; and at Norfolk were several thousand men, under com- 
 mand of General Hu^er. 
 
 No very acute analysis is required to penetrate the motives 
 
OBJECTS OF THESE DISPOSITIONS. 301 
 
 of this distribution of forces in the face of the plain necessities of 
 the situation. Yet a vast amount of conceit has been expended 
 in glittering verbiage, aiming to exhibit the early partiality 
 of President Davis for the weak policy of dispersion, and that 
 aversion to the "concentration" of troops, for overwhelming 
 victories, to be followed by decisive results, which, it is al- 
 leged, adhered to his military policy to the last. To this cant 
 about "concentration," a sufficient answer relative to this dispo- 
 sition of troops is, that it has the sanction of Lee's great name, 
 to say nothing of the complete success that followed it. There 
 was no phase of the situation, either then or for months after- 
 ward, which could have justified for any result, then attainable 
 by "concentration," the surrendering to the enemy of vast sec- 
 tions of country, which, then and subsequently, fed the army 
 and supplied thousands of soldiers. Popular confidence, so 
 indispensable to a government under such circumstances, Mas 
 not to be won by such a policy, at the very incipiency of the 
 contest. Were the patriots of Western Virginia, thousands 
 of whom made heroic sacrifices, to be abandoned without an 
 effort for their rescue ? Magruder and Huger, too, had duties 
 of no insignificant character to perform. Fortress Moni'oe, 
 commanding the tributaries of the Chesapeake — the avenues' 
 leading to the very heart of Virginia, to the doors of Rich- 
 mond, and the rear of the armies upon the northern borders — 
 presented, during the entire war, an insuperable difficulty in 
 the defense of Virginia. More than once it was the impreg- 
 nable asylum for discomfited Federal hosts ; and as a base of 
 operations for the enemy, there was no period of the war when 
 it did not challenge a vigilant observation from Richmond. 
 To the efficient, bold, and skillful defense of the peninsula, by 
 Magruder, the Confederate capital owed its safety for twelve 
 
302 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 months, not less than to the successful defense made upon the 
 Potomac border. Dependent upon the command of Huger 
 was the defense, not only of Norfolk and Portsmouth, but of 
 an extensive back country, besides the naval defenses then in 
 preparation at Gosport. 
 
 But in addition to these important objects, is to be remem- 
 bered the inexperience of both officers and men, totally dis- 
 qualifying them for those prompt and vigorous movements 
 for which they were subsequently distinguished. Discipline 
 and organization were yet to be supplied. The army at 
 Manassas in July, 1861, at Centreville, in the ensuing autumn, 
 or even in front of Richmond, in the summer of 1862, was 
 altogether a different instrument from that compact force, 
 which the genius of Lee had welded, when he threw it, with 
 crushing impetus, upon the columns of Hooker at Chancel- 
 lorsville. But, after all, as will be abundantly exhibited 
 hereafter, concentration was preeminently the characteristic of 
 the Confederate military policy. Especially did the present 
 campaign, in all its parts, hinge upon the successful execution 
 of this principle. 
 
 Confronting the command of Beauregard, at Manassas, was 
 a considerable Federal army, under General McDowell, cover- 
 ing Washington, and threatening an advance along the line of 
 the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central Railroads. 
 Under General Patterson another large Federal force confronted 
 General Johnston, and threatened the Shenandoah Valley. 
 General McClellan, with a force greatly outnumbering the 
 small commands opposed to him, operated in Western Vir- 
 ginia — the common name of the section of country embraced 
 between the Ohio and Cheat Rivers, and the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Railroad and the Great Kanawha and Gauley Rivers. 
 
STEATEGIC DESIGNS. 303 
 
 A heavy force at Fortress Monroe, threatening, with incursions, 
 the entire tide-water section of the State, sufficiently occupied 
 the commands of Magruder and Huger. 
 
 The Confederate plan of campaign, approved in the early 
 summer, in its leading features was adhered to with perti- 
 nacity and success. This plan, jointly approved by the Gov- 
 ernment and the two commanders upon whom its execution 
 devolved, contemplated defensive operations, and the union, 
 at the critical moment, of the forces of Beauregard and John- 
 ston, for the destruction of McDowell's command, whenever it 
 should begin its march southward. President Davis and Gen- 
 eral Lee, at Richmond, were in regular communication with 
 the two commanders in the field, and all operations were 
 directed with a view to the destruction of the main body of 
 the enemy. < 
 
 General Scott, upon the Federal side, also looked to the co- 
 operation of Patterson with McDowell, and expected him either 
 to defeat Johnston, or to so employ him as to prevent his re- 
 inforcement of Beauregard, when the latter should be assailed 
 by the overwhelming force of McDowell. The remoteness 
 of Magruder and Huger, and the impossibility of sufficient 
 secrecy in the transfer of any portion of their commands to 
 the theatre of operations, placed them outside of the calcula- 
 tion. The same may be said of the Confederate forces in 
 Western Virginia. Apprehension of danger from the com- 
 mand of McClellan was experienced by the Confederate au- 
 thorities, especially after the disastrous defeat of General Gar- 
 nett. There can be little doubt, however, that the Government 
 and people of the North considered their army, immediately 
 upon the ground, ample for the contemplated work, and did 
 not feel the necessity of looking elsewhere for reinforcements. 
 
304 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The small force at Manassas, when General Beauregard as- 
 sumed command, was increased by subsequent accessions, until, 
 b}^ the niiddle of July, it numbered about twenty thousand 
 men. His duties wei-e a vigilant observation of the enemy 
 and such defensive preparations as were necessary. The pivot 
 of the campaign was elsewhere. If Patterson could success- 
 fully occupy Johnston until the crisis at Manassas was passed, 
 the result was doubtful, at least ; but if Johnston, at the re- 
 quired moment, could elude his adversary, and reinforce Beau- 
 regard, the probabilities were most promising to the Confed- 
 erates. In the sequel, this proved a result far more easily 
 attained than had been hoped for. The camjiaign thus be- 
 came a series of maneuvres, with the Confederates in posses- 
 sion of the decided advantage of an interior line. 
 
 General Patterson, apparently imbcpile or bewildered, com- 
 mitted a series of blunders, to be accounted for upon no pos- 
 sible hypothesis accrediting to him even ordinary acquaintance 
 with the palpable principles of the science of war. What his 
 repeated advances, retreats, and flank movements could have 
 been designed to accomplish, it is difficult to imagine, as his 
 situation plainly prevented his escape from Johnston and rein- 
 forcement of McDowell, before Johnston could reach Beaure- 
 gard. General Patterson's failure to attack Johnston pre- 
 ordained the disaster to McDowell on tlie 21st of July. 
 Johnston, aided by the vigilance and daring of the " indefati- 
 gable " Stuart, was fully apprised of every movement of his 
 adversary. With comparatively little difficulty he escaped 
 from his front, and, in accordance with the plan previously 
 indicated, reinforced Beauregard with the greater portion of 
 his force. 
 
 With the details of the overwhelming disaster to the Feb- 
 
BATTLE OF MAXA.SBAS. 305 
 
 oral nnns, at INIanassas, on the 21st of July, \vc are not here 
 interested. Our aim lias been to glance briefly at the relations 
 sustained by President Davis to the preliminary campaign 
 \vhieh culminated in success so brilliant and valuable. lu 
 aec<n*dance with his preconceived purpose to be present, if 
 p()ssil)l(>, at the consummation of plans in which he fit 
 so profound an interest, President Davis left Richmond on 
 Sunday mornini::, July 21st, for the scene of the expected 
 battle. Peaching the battle-field while the struggle was 
 still in progress, it was his privilege; to witness the Hight, in 
 utter confusion aud dismay, of the Federal hosts in their lirst 
 serious conflict with the patrit)t army. Ilis presence upon the 
 field was the inspiration of unbounded enthusiasm among the 
 troops, to whom his name and bearing were the symbols of 
 victory. His dispatch from the battle-field, on Sunday night, 
 Avill long b(! remembered by those who gathered from it their 
 first intelligence of the great victory: 
 
 " Maxassas .Tcn'ctiox, Sunday Night. 
 " Night ha'5 closo<l upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were 
 victorious. The enemy were routed, and precipitately fled, aban- 
 doning a large amount of arms, knnpsacks, and baggnge. Tlie 
 ground was strewn for miles with those killed, and the farm- 
 houses and ground around were filled with the; wounded. Pursuit 
 was continued along several routes towards Lcesburg aud Ccntre- 
 villo, until darkness covered the fugitives. We have caj)tured 
 many field batteries and stands of arms, and one of the United 
 States flags. Many prisoners have been taken. Too high praise 
 f;in not be bestowed, whether for the skill of the principal ofiTuers, 
 nr the gallantry of all our troops. The battle was mainly fought 
 !i our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy estimated 
 at 35,000. Jeff'.n Davis." 
 
 20 
 
306 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Ho remained at Manassas, in consultation with Generals 
 Beauregard and Johnston, until the morning of Tuesday, July 
 23J. The return of the President to Richmond was the oc- 
 casion of renewed patriotic rejoicings. An immense crowd 
 awaited at the railroad depot, in expectancy of his arrival, 
 and both there ami at his hotel occurred most enthusiastic 
 demonstrations of popular delight at the success of the army, 
 and of public regard for himself.* At night Mr. Davis ad- 
 dre^s'^d, with thrilling effect, an immense audience, from a 
 window of the Spottswood Hotel, recounting some of the in- 
 
 *The speech made by Mr. Davis at the depot of the Virginia Central 
 Raih'oad was not reported in the nowppapers. The writer, in company 
 with two friends, was in the crowd which greeted the return of Mr. Davis 
 to the capital, and such was the effect of the scene and the glowing words 
 of tlie speaker, that neither can ever he forgotten. A few hours subse- 
 quently to the scene at the' depot, the words, as given below, were re- 
 peated, in the presence of several jjersons who heard Mr. Davis, and were 
 pronounced by them the identical language used by him. They were 
 preserved in writing, and are now published for the first time. Apart 
 from its historical interest, the speech is a remarkable specimen of 
 spontaneous, sententious eloquence, eminently appropriate to the oc- 
 casion : 
 
 ^^Fellow-citizens of the Covfederatc States : 
 
 " I rejoice with you, this evening, in those better and happier feelings 
 which Ave all experience, as compared with the anxiety of three days ago. 
 Your little army — derided for its want of numljers — derided for its want 
 of arms — derided for its lack of all the essential material of war — lias 
 met the grand army of the enemy, routed it at every point, and it now 
 flies, in inglorious retreat, before our victorious columns. We have 
 taught them a lesson in their invasion of the sacred soil of Virginia; wo 
 have taught them that the grand old mother of Washington still nurtures 
 a band of heroes ; and a yet bloodier and far more fatal lesson awaits 
 them, unless they speedily acknowledge that freedom to which you were 
 boru." 
 
RESULTS OF THE VICTORY. 307 
 
 cidents of the buttle, which he declared to be a decisive victory, 
 if followed by energetic measures, * and counseled moderation 
 and forbearance in victory, with unrelaxed preparations ibr 
 future trials. It was upon this occasion that he uttered tlie 
 memorable injunction, " Never be haughty to the humble, or 
 humble to the haughty." 
 
 The immediate and palpable consequence of the victory of Man- 
 assas was the rescue of the Confederacy from the peril by wliich, 
 for weeks, it had been threatened. Tlie South was now plainly a 
 power, capable of fighting ably and vigorously, and with greatly 
 improved prospects of success, for the independence which it 
 had asserted. Time was to develop a far greater value in this 
 wonderful success than was then made available. A few days 
 only were required to exhibit, what at first appeared merely a 
 thorough repulse of the Federal army, as an overwhelming 
 rout, capable of being followed to such results as might have 
 changed even the fate of a nation. Not many weeks sufficed 
 to convince the Southern people of the fact which must ever 
 dwell among their saddest associations, that an opportunity, in- 
 estimable in value, and almost unparalleled in its flattering 
 inducements to a people situated as they were, had been ut- 
 terly unappreciated and irrevocably lost. 
 
 In the numerous accounts which have been written, repre- 
 senting all shades of opinion from different stand-points on 
 both sides, and from the wide discussion which has resulted, 
 history can be at no loss for material upon whicli to base an 
 intelligent estimate of this battle, and of the extent to which 
 the victors reaped the advantages of success. Differences of 
 0])inion have prevailed, and will, in all probability, continue 
 to prevail, respecting the purely military questions involved 
 in the discussion of the absence of such a vigorous, porti- 
 
308 LTFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 nacion?, and unrelenting pursuit by the Confederates as was 
 necessary to secure the fruits of a decisive victory. But the 
 stubborn conviction, nevertheless, remains, and will never be 
 eradicated from the Southern mind — that, barring the imme- 
 diate security to the Confederate capital, Manassas was but a 
 barren victory, where results of a most decisive character were 
 within easy reach. Nor is this popular impression unsus- 
 tained by such competent military authority, as will command 
 respect for its judgment, upon those aspects of the question, 
 upon which a military judgment is alone valuable. 
 
 So emphatic became the public condemnation of the inac- 
 tivity of the army, and especially when, by subsequent infor- 
 mation, was revealed the real condition of the enemy after his 
 overwhelming disaster, that inquiry was naturally made as to 
 the authorship of such an erroneous policy. The presence of 
 President Davis, both during a portion of the battle and dur- 
 ing the day following, was promptly seized upon as affording 
 a clue to the mystery. For months he rested under the sus- 
 picion of having, by peremptory order, stopped the pursuit of 
 the enemy, in the face of the protestations of his generals, who 
 would have pressed it to the extent of attainable results. 
 
 How such an impression — so utterly in conflict with the facts — 
 could have obtained, by whom, or for what purpose it was 
 disseminated, it is now needless to inquire. The slander was, 
 at length, after having been circulated to the injury of Mr. 
 Davis throughout the country, so conclusively answered as to 
 receive not even the pi'etense of belief, save from an unscrup- 
 ulous partisanship, at all times deaf to facts which could not 
 be perverted injuriously to the President. It nevertheless had 
 served a purpose, in preparing the popular mind for those con- 
 stantly iterated charges of " executive interference," in the 
 
MISREPRESENTATIONS REFUTED. 309 
 
 plans and dispositions of the armies of the Confederacy, which 
 foUowed at subsequent stages of the war. 
 
 It may be asked, Why did Mr. Davis suffer this suspicion, 
 when the proof of its injustice might have been so easily ad- 
 duced? This inquiry would indicate an imperfect acquaint- 
 ance with that devoted patriotism and knightly magnanimity 
 which belong to his character. Any explanation acquitting 
 himself, must have thrown the responsibility upon Generals 
 Johnston and Beauregard, and he preferred rather to suffer an 
 undeserved reproach, than to excite distrust of two officers, 
 then enjoying the largest degree of popular confidence. With 
 him, selfish considerations were never permitted to outweigh 
 the interests of the country. Actuated by this impulse, he, in 
 more than one instance, where the names of men high in pub- 
 lic favor were used in his disparagement, refused, even in self- 
 defense, that retaliation, which must have hurt the cause in 
 proportion as it diminished confidence in its prominent repre- 
 sentatives. Mr. Davis, with that decorum which has equally 
 illustrated his public and private life, recognized the special 
 propriety of a denial of these injurious rumors from other 
 sources, fully apprized of their falsity, and fi-om which such 
 an acquittal of himself M'ould have come with becoming can- 
 dor and grace. 
 
 Justice, proverbially slow, has been tardy indeed in its 
 awards to Mr. Davis; but in this instance, as it must inevi- 
 tably in others, it has come time enough for liis historical 
 vindication. The reader, unitiformed as to the merits of this 
 question, will be content with a limited statement from the 
 mass of testimony, which has ultimately acquitted Mr. Davis 
 of having prevented the pureuit of the Federal army after its 
 overthrow upon the field of Manasscs. In a publication, pre- 
 
310 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 senting an elaborate indictment against Mr. Davis, as the main 
 instrument of the downfall of the Confederacy, written since 
 the war, is found the following admission : " As is known, lie 
 (President Davis) was at Manasses the evening of the 21st 
 July, 1861. Until a late hour that night he was engaged 
 with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, at the quarters of 
 the latter, in discussing the momentous achievements of the 
 day, the extent of which was not as yet recognized at all by 
 him or his generals. Much gratified with knowm results, 
 his bearing was eminently proper. He certainly expressed no 
 opposition to any forward movement; nor at the time dis- 
 played a disposition to interpose his opinion or authority 
 touching operations and plans of campaign."* 
 
 General Johnston, in a communication published since the 
 w^ar, assumes the responsibility of the failure to pursue, and, 
 with the advantage of retrospect, defends that course with co- 
 gent reasoning and an interesting statement of facts. Says 
 General Johnston: "'The substantial fruit' of this victory 
 was the preservation of the Confederacy. No more could have 
 been hoped for. The pursuit of the enemy was not continued 
 because our cavalry (a very small force) was driven back by 
 the 'solid resistance' of the .United States infantry. Its rear- 
 guard was an entire division, which had not been engaged, and 
 was twelve or fifteeen times more numerous than our two little 
 bodies of cavalry. The infantry was not required to continue 
 the pursuit, because it would have been harassing it to no 
 purpose. It is well known that infmtry, unencumbered by 
 baggage trains, can easily escape pursuing cavalry." 
 
 That no farther results were to be hoped for than the arrest 
 of the Federal advance toward Richmond, he endeavors to de- 
 * The Harper s Magazine article of General Jordan. 
 
GENERAL. JOIIXSTOX's STATEMENTS. 311 
 
 monstrate as follows: "A movement upon Washington was 
 out of the question. "We could not have carried the intrcnch- 
 ments by assault, and had none of the means to besiege them. 
 Our assault would have been repulsed, and ti)e enemy, then 
 become the victorious party, would have resumed tlieir march 
 to Richmond; but if we had captured the intrenehments, a 
 river, a mile wide, lay between tliem and Washington, com- 
 manded by the guns of a Federal fleet. If we had taken 
 Alexandria, which stands on low and level ground, those guns 
 would have driven us out in a few hours, at the same time 
 killing our friends, the inhabitants. We could not cross the 
 Potomac, and therefore it was impracticable to conquer the 
 hostile capital, or emancipate oppressed Maryland." 
 
 But these statements, ample, as far as they go, in the vindi- 
 cation of jNIr. Davis, only partially tell the story of Manassas. 
 They do not fully describe his real relation to the question, 
 though we are far from imputing to General Johnston an in- 
 tentional omission. A statement of Mr. Davis' views was not 
 necessarily germane to General Johnston's explanation of his 
 own conduct. His purpose is to establish the reasons which 
 induced him to decline pursuit of the enemy, or rather, which, 
 in his judgment, made pursuit impracticable. Nor is it 
 germane to our purpose to discuss these reasons; to attempt 
 either a demonstration of their fallacy or an argument in their 
 support. They have not been accepted as conclusive either by 
 the public, or by unanimous military judgment. 
 
 The great name of Stonewall Jackson, himself an actor 
 in the most thrilling scenes of that wonderful triumph of 
 Southern valor, and dating from that day his record upon the 
 " bead-roll of fame," is authoritatively given in opposition to 
 the policy which General Johnston approves. In this connec- 
 
312 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 tion, we can not forbear to quote the biographer of that illus- 
 trious man, in passages showing tliat wondrous intuition of 
 great soldiership, more distinctive, perhaps, of Jackson, than 
 of any commander of the present century, excepting only Na- 
 poleon. Professor Dabney says: "Jackson, describing the 
 manifest rout of the enemy, remarked to the physicians, that 
 he believed ' with ten thousand fresh men he could go into the 
 city of Washington.' " Again, after a most graphic picture of 
 the condition of the Federal army, its demoralization, panic, 
 and utter incapacity to meet an attack by the victorious Con- 
 federates, and an able statement of the inducements to a vig- 
 orous pursuit, the biographer of General Jackson makes this 
 impressive statement: "With tliese views of the campaign,^ 
 General Jackson earnestly concurred. His sense of official 
 propriety sealed his lips; and when the more impatient spirits 
 inquired, day after day, why they were not led after the 
 enemy, his only answer was to say : ' That is the affair of the 
 commanding generals.' But to his confidential friends he 
 afterward declared, when no longer under the orders of those 
 officers, that their inaction was a deplorable blunder; and this 
 opinion he was subsequently accustomed to assert with a 
 warmth and emphasis unusual in his guarded manner."* 
 
 Mr. Davis was far from approving the inaction which fol- 
 lowed Manassas. He confidently expected a diffi^rent use of 
 the victory. When called away by the pressing nature of his 
 official duties at Richmond, he left the army with a heart 
 elastic with hope, at what he considered the certainty of even 
 
 * The Federal official reports are overwhelminiily in confirmation of 
 these vie-\vs of General Jackson. General ]\IcClellan stated that " in no 
 quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer resistance to a 
 respectable body of the enemy." 
 
DAVIS FAVORS PURSUIT. 313 
 
 more glorious and valuable achievements. His speech at the 
 depot iu Richmond, which we have given elsewhere, is evi- 
 dence of his exultant anticipations. The speech at the Spotts- 
 wood, entering more into detiiils, still better authenticates his 
 hopes of" an immediate and successful advance.* There could 
 be no misinterpretation of the ardor with wiiich, in "glowing 
 sentences, lie })redicted the immediate and consecutive tri- 
 umphs of what he proudly termed the "gallant little army." 
 
 Indeed, before leaving Manassas, President Davis favored 
 the most vigorous pursuit practicable. On the evening of the 
 battle, while the victory was assured, but by no means com- 
 plete, he urged that the enemy, still on the field, (Heintzcl- 
 man's troops, as subsequently ajjpearcd,) be warmly pressed, as 
 was successfully done. During the night following the en- 
 gagement he made a disposition of a portion of the troops, 
 with a view to an advance in the morning. These troops were 
 removed, but not by himself, to meet an apprehended attack 
 upon the head-quarters of the army. An advance on Monday, 
 the 22d July, was out of the question, in consequence of the 
 heavy rain. 
 
 It is not to be understood that President Davis fully ap- 
 preciated, on Sunday night, the 21st, the overwhelming rout 
 of the Federal army, nor that he advocated, as practicable, an 
 immediate movement in pursuit, by the entire army. No one 
 could have anticipated the utter disorganization attending the 
 flight of the Federals. He had, too, positive evidence of the 
 confusion prevailing among portions of the Southern troops. 
 
 *The writer heard thia speech of Mr. Davis, and his recollection is 
 positive of the encouragement extended by the President to the hope of 
 an immediate forward movement. The recollection of the author of ''The 
 Diary of a Rebel War Clerk" scorns to be substantially the same. 
 
314 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Summoned by a message from a youthful connection, who was 
 mortally wounded, IMr. Davis rode over a large portion of the 
 field, in a vain search for the regiment to which the young 
 man was attached. Upon his return, he accidentally met an 
 officer who directed him to the locality of the regiment, where 
 he found the corpse of his relative. The evidences of disor- 
 ganization, upon which General Johnston dwells with so much 
 force and emphasis, were indeed palpable, but Mr! Davis con- 
 fidently believed that an efficient pursuit might be made by 
 such commands as were in comparatively good condition. 
 Such were his impressions then, and that he contemplated 
 immediate activity as the sequel of Manassas, is a matter of 
 indisputable record. 
 
 That Mr. Davis did not insist upon th.e undeferred execu- 
 tion of his own views, is proof less of his approval of the 
 course pursued, than of an absence of that pragmatic disposi- 
 tion with which he was afterwards so persistently charged. 
 His subsequent hearty tributes to Beauregard and Johnston, 
 and prompt recognition of their services, show how far he was 
 elevated above that mean intolerance, which would have made 
 him incapable of according merit to the opinions and actions 
 of others, wdien averse to his own conclusions. 
 
 This determined spirit of misrepresentation of the motives 
 and conduct of the President, beginning thus early — respecting 
 the origin of which we shall have more to say hereafter — was 
 to prove productive of the most serious embarrassments to the 
 Confederate cause. The first great success in arms achieved 
 by the South, was to originate questions tending to excite dis- 
 trust in the capacity of the Executive, and subsequently dis- 
 trust of his treatment of those who were under his authority. 
 Misrepresentation was not to cease with the attempt already 
 
TRIVIAL ACCUSATIONS. 315 
 
 mentioned to impair public confidence in Mr. Davis. A prag- 
 matic interference with the plans of his generals was persistently- 
 charged upon him. The almost uninterrupted inactivity of the 
 main army in Virginia, following the battle of Manassas, by 
 which the enemy was permitted, without molestation, to or- 
 ganize a new army — a subject of constant and exasperated 
 censure by the public — was falsely attributed to Mr. Davis' 
 interference with Generals Johnston and Beauregard. It is a 
 sad evidence of the license characteristic of a purely partisan 
 criticism, that this falsely alleged interference has even been 
 ascribed to the instigations of a mean envy of the popularity 
 of those officers. 
 
 The purely personal differences of public men are not the 
 proper subject-matter of historical discussion. In the prose- 
 cution of our endeavor to give an intelligent and candid 
 narrative of the events of the war, in so far as President Davis 
 was connected with them, we shall have occasion to dwell upon 
 those difPerences between himself and others respecting im- 
 portant questions of policy which are known to have existed. 
 We do not see that the personal relations of President Davis 
 with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, are here a subject of 
 appropriate inquiry. Nor are those minor questions of detail 
 as to the organization of the army, which arose between them, 
 of such significance as to justify elaborate discussion here. 
 That President Davis chose to exercise those plain privileges 
 with which the Constitution invested him; that he should 
 have consulted that military knowledge which his education 
 and service had taught him ; that he should make available 
 his valuable experience as Minister of War; and that he should 
 have failed to interpret the acts of Congress agreeablv to the 
 tastes of generals in the field, rather than according to his 
 
316 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 own judgment, is certainly singular evidence upon wliich to 
 base charges of " pragmatism/' " persecution/' and " envy " 
 of those generals.* 
 
 * One evidence of this "persecution" would appear to consist in the fact 
 that the President, having rekictantly commissioned Generals Lovell and 
 G. W. Smith, upon the recommendations of Generals Beauregard and 
 Johnston, chose also to commission, at the same time, with a similar 
 rank, General Van Dorn, giving the latter a senior commission. Smith 
 and Lovell had but recently come to the South, both being residents of 
 New York, before the war, while Van Dorn had promptly sought service 
 in the Confederate army before hostilities commenced, had done excellent 
 service, and been constantly in front of the enemy. Another proof of 
 " persecution " is that the President refused to permit such an organ- 
 ization of the army as he believed to be in conflict with the laws of 
 Congress. 
 
 The commonly assigned origin of the difference between President 
 Davis and General Beauregard, which gave rise to so much scandal and 
 falsehood during the war, was the suppression of the preliminary por- 
 tion of General B.'s report of the battle of Manassas. The correct 
 version of that matter is now well known. President Davis did not 
 suppress any portion of Beauregard's report. He did object to cer- 
 tain preliminary statements of the report, and requested that they should 
 be altered or omitted. When this was declined, the President sent the 
 report to Congress, accompanied by an indoi-sement of his own, correct- 
 ing what he conceived to be errors. General Beauregard's friends in 
 Congress, unwilling that these comments of the President should be 
 published, suppressed both the objectionable passages and the executive 
 indorsement. So that they, and not the President, occasioned that 
 "suppression," from which arose much gossip and mystery. A sufficient 
 answer to these charges of personal antagonism by the President to these 
 two officers, should be the fact that he retained them in command of the 
 two largest armies of the Confederacy, until relinquished by them, in the 
 one case, because of sickness, and in the other, in consequence of a wound 
 which caused disability. 
 
M'CLELLAN's victory in western VIRGINIA. 317 
 
 While the ni:un struggle in Virginia was yet undecided, the 
 Confederate force, under General Garnett, in Western Vir- 
 ginia, had been disastrously defeated by the Federal army of 
 General McClellan. The Confederate commander, a brave 
 and promising officer, was killed, in a gallant endeavor to 
 protect the retreat of his command. This achievement of Gen- 
 eral McClellan, though attributable mainly to his vastly superior 
 force, M'as attended by evidences of skill, which indicated him 
 as a prominent figure in the events of the immediate future. 
 In the midst of the gloom and disappointment consequent 
 upon the disaster at Manassas, General McClellan appeared to 
 the Northern Government and masses to be an officer specially 
 recommended, by his late success, for the important charge of 
 the army designed to protect the capital. He was imme- 
 diately summoned to Washington, and placed in charge of its 
 defenses. With rare capacity for general military administra- 
 tion, and with especial aptitude for organization, General 
 McClellan addressed himself with vigor and success to the 
 work assigned him. Under his direction, the defenses of 
 Washington were speedily put in admirable condition, and 
 within a few months, he had created an army which, in disci- 
 pline, organization, and equipment, would have compared 
 favorably with the best armies of the world. 
 
 General ^McClellan was too sagacious and prudent a com- 
 mander to repeat the errors of his predecessor. He was evi- 
 (Icntly determined not to undertake an aggressive campaign 
 until his preparations were completed. During the progress 
 of those preparations, he endeavored also to provide against 
 those aggressive movements which he evidently anticipated 
 fi-om his adversaries. But the autumn and winter were to 
 piiss away without any serious demonstration by the Confeder- 
 
318 LIFE OF JEFFICRSON DAVIS, 
 
 ate commanders, and with but one important movement of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In the early fall, Generals Johnston and Beauregard ad- 
 vanced to a position in close proximity to the Federal capital. 
 Unable, however, to provoke an engagement with the Federal 
 commander, whose present purposes were purely defensive and 
 preparatory, the Confederate army withdrew from the front of 
 Washington, and retired within its former lines about IManas- 
 sas and Centreville. 
 
 In the latter part of October, an engagement of some im- 
 portance occurred near Leesburg, occasioned by an attempt of 
 General McClellan to throw a force across the Potomac, 
 doubtless with the view of an advance on the Confederate 
 left wing. The numbers engaged in this engagement were 
 comparatively small, which rendered more remarkable its san- 
 guinary character. Nearly the entire Federal force, though 
 outnumbering more than two to one the Confederate force, 
 was captured or destroyed. There was good reason to regard 
 this movement as preliminary to a general advance of the 
 Federal army. The battle of Leesburg was very dispiriting 
 in its effects upon ihe North, and equally re-assuring to the 
 Southern Government and people. No other operations of 
 note occurred during the autumn and winter upon the lines 
 of the Lower Potomac. 
 
 General Jackson, who by a circumstance which is now well 
 known to the world, had acquired at Manassas the sobriquet 
 of " Stonewall," in September, 1861, was made a Major-Gen- 
 eral. Late in December, in charge of a considerable force, he 
 executed, with indifferent success, a movement against detach- 
 ments of the enemy in the neighborhood of Romney, and 
 other points along the Upper Potomac. 
 
EVENTS IN WESTERN VIRGINIA AND MISSOURI. 319 
 
 The disasters sustained by the Confederates in "Western Vir- 
 ginia, in the early summer, were not repaired by the transfer 
 of General Lee to that quarter. A large and valuable sec- 
 tion of country remained as the enemy's trophy, almost un- 
 disputed at the termination of the campaign. The reputation 
 of General Lee sulfered severely I'roni the absence of that suc- 
 cess which was anticipated from liis presence in command.- It 
 is a noteworthy circumstance that when, a few months after- 
 ■\vard, the President placed Lee in command of the main army 
 of Virginia, his ill-success in AVestern Vii'ginia was alleged 
 as conclusive evidence of his unfitness for the position to 
 which " executive partiality " had assigned him. 
 
 In the meantime, upon the distant theatre of Missouri, the 
 war had assumed a most interesting phase. Many months 
 before the legally-elected legislature of that State adopted an 
 ordinance of secession, Missouri was contributing valuable aid 
 to the struggling Confederacy. Driven by the oppressive 
 course of the Federal Government into resistance, in spite of 
 their efforts to save their State from the destructive presence 
 of war, the Southern men of Missouri organized under the 
 leadership of General Sterling Price and Governor Jackson. 
 Accessions of men from all portions of the State were con- 
 stantly made to the patriot forces, and, within a few weeks, a 
 large force was upon the southern border, animated by an 
 enthusiastic desire to undertake the redemption of their homes. 
 But the Missourians, though sufficiently numerous to 
 constitute an effective army, were confronted by difficulties 
 which would have aj"»palled men of less heroic ]>ui'pose, or 
 enlisted in an inferior cause. Hostilities l.ad been precipitated 
 upon them while they were entirely unprepared — wanting 
 arms, ammunition, and other indispensable material of war. 
 
320 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVTS. 
 
 The remotenefs of Missouri from the seat of government, and 
 the inadequate transj)ortation, prevented that prompt and 
 efficient aid by the Confederate authorities which it was 
 equally their interest and inclination to afford. Nevertheless, 
 with almost miraculous rapidity, the army of General Price 
 was organized, and supplied with such material as he could 
 obtain. 
 
 The Federal commander, in his march southward from St. 
 Louis, pursued, with considerable vigor, the various detach- 
 ments of the patriots who were hastening to the standards of 
 Price. After several minor engagements, in which the ISIis- 
 sourians displayed the most devoted heroism, a considerable 
 battle was fought, early in August, near Springfield, in the 
 south-western corner of the State, in which the Federal army 
 was disastrously defeated, and its commander killed. In this 
 battle, the Missouri forces were aided by a Confederate force, 
 under General ISIcCulloch, which had advanced northward 
 from Arkansas. Later in the year, General Price advanced 
 thwngh the central portion of the State, receiving large addi- 
 tions to his army, and captured the largest garrison of Fed- 
 eral troops in Northern Missouri. Plaving accomplished these 
 valuable aims, he, with great skill and daring, eifcctcd a safe 
 retreat to the south-western frontier. President Davis, in a 
 message to Congress, echoed the hearty appreciation of the 
 Southern })eople, in a special tribute to the valor and'devotion 
 of the southern population of Missouri. 
 
 Kentucky also had become the theatre of hostilities. The 
 Federal Government, recognizing the neutrality of Kentucky 
 so long as was necessary to mature their plans for her sul)j li- 
 gation, finally insisted upon making her a party to the war, 
 and invaded her territory vrith a view to operations against 
 
EVKNTS IN KENTUCKY. 321 
 
 the Confedoraov. President Davis thus stated the motives of 
 the })()licy adopted by the Confederate Government respecting 
 Kentucky : 
 
 '' Finding that the Confederate States were about to be invaded 
 through Kentucky, and that her people, after being deceived into 
 a mistaken security, were unarmed, and in danger of being subju- 
 gated by the Federal forces, our armies were marched into that 
 State to repel the enemy, and prevent their occupation of certain 
 strategic points, which would have given them great advantages in 
 the contest — a step which was justified, not only by the necessities 
 of self-defense on the part of the Confederate States, but also by 
 a desire to aid the people of Kentucky. It was never intended by 
 the Confederate Government to conquer or coerce the people of 
 that State ; but, on the contrary, it was declared by our Generals 
 that they would withdraw their troops if the Federal Government 
 would do likewise. Proclamation was also made of the desire to 
 respect the neutrality of Kentucky, and the intention, by the wishes 
 of her people, as soon as thej'^ were free to express their opinions. 
 
 " These declarations were approved by me ; and I should regard 
 it as one of the best efi"ects of the march of our troops into Ken- 
 tucky, if it should end in giving to her people liberty of choice, 
 and a free opportunity to decide their own destiny, according to 
 their own will." 
 
 Xot long after the occupation of various points in Kentucky, 
 by the respective armies, an engagement occurred at Belmont, 
 on the Missouri shore, near Cokimbus, resulting in the defeat 
 of the Federal force engaged. The Confederate forces engaged 
 were a })ortion of the conmiand of General Polk, and the de- 
 feated Federal conunander was General U. S. Grant. 
 
 Before the first year of the war terminated, the Confederates 
 experienced reverses resulting from the naval .^superiority of 
 21 
 
322 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 the enemy. Expeditions were undertaken against the Caro- 
 lina coast, and were successful to the extent of securing a per- 
 manent lodgment of the Federal forces. 
 
 In the month of November the forcible seizure, by a Fede- 
 ral naval officer, of the persons of Messrs. John Slidell and 
 James M. Mason, commissioners, respectively, from the Confed- 
 erate States to France and England, and, at the time, passen- 
 gers on an English steamer, excited strong hope of those com- 
 plications between the United States and European powers 
 which were reasonably anticipated by the South. This act 
 was a palpable outrage and violation alike of international law 
 and comity. It was, nevertheless, indorsed by public senti- 
 ment at the North, in manifold forms of expression. 
 
 In England, the intelligence of an outrage upon the national 
 flag was received with outbursts of popular indignation, which 
 compelled the Government to make a resentful demand upon 
 the United States. The course of the English Government 
 was characteristic of the nation which it represented. There 
 was neither discussion nor parley, but a simple imperative de- 
 mand for the surrender of the commissioners and their at- 
 taches. 
 
 Never was so deep a humiliation imposed upon a people as that 
 imposed by the course of the Federal authorities upon the North. 
 The prisoners, over whose capture the whole North had but re- 
 cently exulted, as at the realization of the fruits of a brilliant 
 victory, were surrendered immediately. Mr. Seward even de- 
 clared that they were surrendered " cheerfully," and in accord- 
 ance with the " most cherished principles of American states- 
 manship," and advanced an argument in favor of complying 
 with the demands of the British Government, far more to have 
 been expected from a British diplomatist, than from the lead- 
 
THE ^' TRENT AFFAIR." 323 
 
 ing statesman of a people who had promptly indorsed the 
 outrage. 
 
 This concession of the Federal Government was the first of 
 numerous disappointments in store for the Southern people, in 
 the hope, so universally indulged, of foreign intervention. Ex- 
 pectation of immediate complications between England and 
 the United States, received great encouragement from the ear- 
 lier phase of the "Trent affair," as was called the seizure of 
 Messrs. Mason and Slidell. Consequent upon the correspond- 
 ence between the Governments of England and the United 
 States, growing out of the "Trent affair," were announce- 
 ments in Parliament, which should have discouraged the an- 
 ticipation of interference by England, at least with the cabinet 
 then in power. Lord John Russell declared that the blockade 
 of the Southern ports was effective, in spite of abundant evi- 
 dence, and in spite, even, of the declarations of the British 
 consul at Charleston to the contrary. This concession was 
 intended, doubtless, as a salvo to the North for its deep hu- 
 miliation, and was, indeed, rightly construed as an evidence 
 of the real sympathies of the British cabinet in the American 
 struggle. In this aspect, it was an assurance of no little sig- 
 nificance. 
 
 At the election, in November, Mr. Davis, without opposi- 
 tion, was chosen the first President of the Confederacy, under 
 the permanent government, which was soon to succeed the 
 provisional organization. Mr. Stephens was reelected Vice- 
 President. 
 
 In his message to the provisional Congress, at the begin- 
 ning of its last session, the President thus sketched the situa- 
 tion at the close of the first vcar of the war: 
 
324 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 " To the Congress of the Confederate Sates : 
 
 "The few weeks which have elapsed since your adjournment 
 have brought us so near the close of the year, that we are now 
 able to sum up its general results. The retrospect is such as 
 should fill the hearts of our people with gratitude to Providence 
 for his kind interposition in their behalf. Abundant yields have 
 rewarded the labor of the agriculturist, whilst the mauuiacturing 
 interest of the Confederate States was never so prosperous as now. 
 The necessities of the times have called into existence new branches 
 of manufactures, and given a fresh impulse to the activity of those 
 heretofore in operation. The means of the Confederate States for 
 manufacturing the necessaries and comforts of life, with inthem- 
 selves, increase as the conflict continues, and we are rapidly becom- 
 ing independent of the rest of the world, for the supply of such 
 military stores and munitions as are indispensable for war. 
 
 " The operations of the army, soon to be partially interrupted 
 by the approaching winter, have aff"orded a protection to the 
 country, and shed a lustre upon its arms, through the trying vicis- 
 situdes of more than one arduous campaign, which entitle our 
 brave volunteers to our praise and our gratitude. 
 
 " From its commencement up to the present period, the war has 
 been enlarging its proportions and extending its boundaries, so as 
 to include new fields. The conflict now extends from the shores 
 of the Chesapeake to the confines of Missouri and Arizona ; yet 
 sudden calls from the remotest points for military aid have been 
 met with promptness enough, not only to avert disaster in the face 
 of superior numbers, but also to roll back the tide of invasion from 
 the border. 
 
 " When the war commenced, the enemy were possessed of cer- 
 tain strategic points and strong places within the Confederate 
 States. They greatly exceeded us in numbers, in available re- 
 sources, and in the supplies necessary for war. Military estab- 
 lisUmcuts had been long organized, and were complete ; the navy, 
 
mESIDEXT's MESSAGE. 325 
 
 and, for the most part, the army, oiu-c (•oiiiiiioii to hotli, were in 
 their possession. To meet all tliis, we liad to create, not only an 
 army in the face of war itself, but also military establishments 
 necessary to equip aud place it in the field. It ought, indeed, to 
 be a subject of gratulation that the sjjirit of the volunteers and 
 the patriotism of the people have enabled us, under Providence, 
 to grapple successfully with these difficulties. 
 
 "A succession of glorious victories at Bethel, Bull Run, Man- 
 assas, Springfield, Lexington, Leesburg, and Belmont, has clicckcd 
 the wicked invasion which greed of gain, and the unliallowcd lust 
 of power, brought upon our soil, and has proved that numbers 
 cease to avail, when directed against a people fighting for the sacred 
 right of self-government and the privileges of freemen. After 
 seven months of war, the enemy have not only failed to extend 
 their occupancy of our soil, but new States and Territories have 
 been added to our Confederacy; while, instead of their threatened 
 inarch of unchecked conquest, they have been driven, at more 
 than one point, to assume the defensive; and, upon a fair com- 
 parison between the two belligerents, as to men, milita means, 
 and financial condition, the Confederate States are relatively much 
 stronger now than when the struggle commenced." 
 
326 LIFE OF JEFFEESO-N DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 PROSPECTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1862 — EXTREME CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH 
 
 EXTRAVAGANT EXPECTATIONS — THE RICHMOND EXAMINER ON CONFEDERATE 
 
 PROSPECTS WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES PREDICTED 
 
 THE BLOCKADE TO BE RAISED — THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY DECREED BY 
 HEAVEN — RESULT OF THE BOASTFUL TONE OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS — THE 
 
 CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISASTERS OF 1862 
 
 PRESIDENT DAVIS URGES PREPARATION FOR A LONG WAR HIS WISE OPPOSI- 
 TION TO SHORT ENLISTMENTS OF TROOPS — PREMONITIONS OF MISFORTUNES 
 
 IN THE WEST THE CONFEDERATE FORCES IN KENTUCKY GENERAL ALBERT 
 
 SIDNEY JOHNSTON — HIS CAREER BEFORE THE WAR — CHARACTER — ^APPEAR- 
 ANCE — THE FRIEND OP JEFFERSON DAVIS — MUTUAL ESTEEM — SIDNEY JOHN- 
 STON IN KENTUCKY — HIS PLANS — HIS DIFFICULTIES — THE FORCES OF GRANT 
 
 AND BUELL CRUEL DILEMMA OF GENERAL SIDNEY JOHNSTON A REVERSE 
 
 GRANT CAPTURES FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON — LOSS OF KENTUCKY AND 
 TENNESSEE FEDERAL DESIGNS IN THE EAST BURNSIDE CAPTURES ROAN- 
 OKE ISLAND SERIOUS NATURE OF THESE REVERSES POPULAR DISAPPOINT- 
 MENT ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION 
 
 CHARACTER AND MOTIVES OF THIS OPPOSITION AN EFFORT TO REVOLUTIONIZE 
 
 PRESIDENT DAVIs' CABINET ASSAULTS UPON SECRETARIES BENJAMIN AND 
 
 MALLORY — CORRECT EXPLANATION OF THE CONFEDERATE REVERSES CON- 
 GRESSIONAL CENSURE OF MR. BENJ.iMIN SECRETARY MALLORY — CHARAC- 
 TERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN MIND THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT SECOND 
 
 INAUGURATION OF MR. DAVIS — SEVERITY OF THE SEASON THE CEREMONIES 
 
 APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS — HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS — ITS EFFECT 
 
 POPULAR RE-ASSURANCE — MESSAGE TO CONGRESS — COMMENTS OP RICHMOND 
 PRESS. 
 
 "YjiTHEN President Davis held his first New -Year's recep- 
 
 * * tion, as the chief magistrate of the infant Confederacy, 
 
 there were not wanting signs of the approaching shadows, 
 
OVKR-CONFIDENCE OF TUE SOUTH. 327 
 
 "which were to throw in temporary eclipse the brilliant fore- 
 ground of the first year of the war. RiehuioiicI was then in 
 its exultant spirit, its gayety, festivity, and show, the type of 
 that fatal confidence in Southern invincibility, which, in a few 
 weeks of disaster, M^as brought to grief and humiliation. 
 
 In that numerous and brilliant assemblage, representing the 
 various branches of the new government, civil, naval, and 
 military, members of Congress and of State Legislatures, and 
 admiring citizens, eager to make formal tender of their esteem 
 to the first President of the South, there were few who dis- 
 cerned the omens of the coming storm, which was to shake its 
 foundation, the power of which that occasion was an imposing 
 symbol. Perhaps there were as few who could penetrate his 
 assuring exterior of grace, gentleness, and dignity, and share 
 the anxiety wdth which, even in the midst of popular adula- 
 tion, he contemplated the approach of that stern trial for which 
 the country was so deficient in preparation. 
 
 AYith singular accord of opinion, writers, who had an inside 
 view of the Southern conduct of the war, have commented upon 
 the disasters consequent upon the period of fancied security 
 and relaxed exertions which followed the battle of Manassas. 
 We can not share, however, the shallow and unphilosophical 
 conclusion which pronounces the glorious triumph of Manassas 
 a calamity to the South. The temporary salvation of the 
 Confederacy, guaranteed by that victory, was not its only 
 fruit. Manassas gave a stamp of prestige to Southern valor 
 and soldiership, which not even a deluge of subsequent disas- 
 ters could eflftice. It gave an imperishable record and an un- 
 dying incentive to resolution. 
 
 Yet it is not to be questioned that the public apathy, en- 
 gendered by an exaggerated estimate of the value of the 
 
328 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 numerons and consecutive triumphs of the preceding summer 
 and autumn, was measurably productive of evil consequences. 
 Encouraged by the press, in many instances, the Southern 
 ])eo[)le saw, in the comparatively easy triumphs of their supe- 
 rior valor over undisciplined Northern mobs — for which Ma- 
 nassas, Belmont, Leesburg, and similar engagements constituted 
 the mere apprenticeship of war — the auguries significant of a 
 speedy attainment of their independence. Inflated orators and 
 boastful editorials proclaimed the absolute certainty of early 
 interference of foreign powers, in behalf of tlie South, as the 
 source of the indispensable staples of cotton and tobacco. In 
 the face of the enormous preparations of the enemy, his mon- 
 ster armies, numbering, in December, 1861, more than six 
 hundred thousand men ; his numerous fleets for sea-board oper- 
 ations, and iron-clad floating batteries for the interior streams, 
 comparatively insignificant successes were pointed to as suffi- 
 cient proofs of the inability of the enemy to make any serious 
 impression upon Southern territory. 
 
 The Richmond Examiner, which had early evinced a dispo- 
 sition hostile to President Davis and his administration, the 
 ablest and most influential journal of the South, destined to 
 furnish both the brains and inspiration in support of future 
 opposition, was conspicuous in its contempt for the fighting 
 qualities of the North, and vehement in its prophesies of good 
 fortune for the Confederacy. Late in December, the Examiner, 
 commenting upon recent intelligence from the North, said : 
 " All other topics become trifles beside the tidings of England 
 Avhich occupies this journal, and all commentary that diverts 
 public attention from that single point is impertinence. The 
 effect of the outrage of the Trent on the public sentiment of 
 Great Britain more than fulfills the prophesy that we made 
 
VIEWS OF THE KTCIIMOND EXAMINER. 329 
 
 when the arrest of the Confederate ministers was a fresh event. 
 All legal quibbling and selfish calculation has been consumed 
 like straw in the burning sense of incredible insult. The 
 Palmerston cabin€t has been forced to immediate and decisive 
 measures ; and a peremptory order to Lord Lyons comes with 
 the steamer that brings the news to the American shore. He 
 is directed to demand the unconditional surrender of Messrs. 
 IMason and Slidell, to place them in the jwsition they were 
 found beneath the British flag, and a complete disavowal of 
 their seizure as an authorized act. Now, the Northern Govern- 
 ment has placed itself in such a position that it can do none of these 
 things. The Abolitionist element of the Northern States woidd go 
 straight to revolution at the least movement toioard a surrender 
 of the captives; the arrest was made by the deliberately -writ- 
 ten orders of the Government, already avowed and published 
 beyond the hope of apology or possibility of retraction. 
 
 "The United States can do absolutely nothing but refuse the 
 demands of Great Britain, and abide the consequences of that 
 refusal. "What they will be can be clearly foretold : first, there 
 will he the diplomatic rupture; Lord Lyons will demand his 
 passports, and Mr. Adams will be sent array from I^ondon; 
 then will follow an immediate recognition of the Southern Con- 
 federacy, with encouragement and aid in fitting out its vessels, 
 and supplying their wants in the British ports and islands. 
 Lastly, a war will be evolved from these two extents." 
 
 Continuing its comments upon what it terms the "raving 
 madness " of the North, the Examiner says : " Then came the 
 ])roclamation of Lincoln. Nothing but insanity could have 
 dictated it; and without it the secession of Virginia was impos- 
 sible. Then their crazy attempt to subdue a country not less diffi- 
 cult to conquer than Russia itself, with an amied mob of loafers." 
 
330 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 In the contemplation of the pleasing sketch which its imagi- 
 nation had executed, the Examiner asks: "Spectators of these 
 events, who can doubt that the Aiiuighty fiat has gone forth 
 against the American Union, or that tlie Southern Confederacy 
 is decreed by the Divine Wisdom f It declares that the "dull- 
 est worldling, the coolest Atheist, the most hardened cynic, 
 might be struck with awe by the startling and continued 
 interposition of a power beyond the control or cognizance of 
 men in these affairs;" and triumphantly asks: "Who thought, 
 when the Trent was announced to sail, that on its deck, and in 
 the trough of the weltering Atlantic, the key of the blockade 
 M'ould be lost?" 
 
 The natural and inevitable result of the assurances tendered 
 to the people, was to lull the patriotic ardor which marked the 
 first great uprising for defense, when two hundred thousand 
 men sprung to arms. There can be no justice in holding the 
 Confederate Government responsible for the popular apathy, 
 which it had no agency in producing, or for the weakness of 
 the armies, which, next to the naval weakness of the South, 
 was the immediate cause of the disasters of the early months 
 of 1862. 
 
 Since the commencement of hostilities, the Government had 
 been indefatigable in its efforts to promote enlistments of vol- 
 unteers for the war, instead of the twelve-months' system, 
 which could be adequate for the demands of a temporary exi- 
 gency only, and not for such a terrific struggle as must result 
 froui the temper and resources of the two contestants. Vol- 
 unteering was as yet the only method of raising troops sanc- 
 tioned by law, or likely to meet popular approval. The 
 country was not yet prepared for an enforced levy of troops; 
 and it is only necessary to remember the opposition, in certain 
 
MR. DAVIS' IDEAS OF THE WAR. 331 
 
 quarters, to the execution of the subsequent conscription law, 
 adopted under the pressure of disasters which made its neces- 
 sity plain and inevitable, to conjecture the temper in which 
 such a measure would have been met, in the over-confident 
 and foolishly exultant tone of the press and public in the 
 winter of 1861. 
 
 Mr. Davis especially sought to disabuse the public mind of 
 its fallacious hope of a short contest, by his efforts to place the 
 military resources of the South upon a footing capable of indef- 
 inite resistance to an attempt at conquest, which was to end 
 only with the success or exhaustion of the North. Conscious 
 of the perpetual disorganization and decimation of the armies 
 which must result from the system of short enlistments, he 
 had, early in the war, attracted unfriendly criticism by his 
 refusal of any more six or twelve- months' volunteers than were 
 necessary to meet the shock of the enemy's first advance. It 
 was clear to his mind that, under the wretched system of short 
 enlistments, which he characterized as a " frightful cause of 
 disaster," the country must, at some period of the war, be vir- 
 tually without an army. Such was the case in January and 
 February, 1862, when the enemy eagerly pressed his immense 
 advantage while the process of furloughs and reenlistments 
 was in progress, and the army almost completely disorganized. 
 
 Such a crisis was inevitable, and had it not occurred then, 
 it would merely have been deferred, to be encountered at a 
 period when the capacity of the Confederacy was even less 
 adequate for its perils. The lesson was not without its value, 
 since it drove the country and the press to a recognition of 
 the fact that independence was not to be won by shifts and 
 dalliance, by temporary expedients, and by spasmodic popular 
 uprisings for temporary exigencies. 
 
332 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAYIS. 
 
 The efforts of the Government were unceasing to prepare for 
 the tremendous onset of the enemy in ahnost every quarter of 
 the Confederacy, which it must have been blind, indeed, not to 
 anticipate. The responses to the calls of the Government were 
 neither in numbers nor enthusiasm encouraging. The people 
 were blind in their confidence, and deaf to appeals admon- 
 ishing them of perils which, in their fancied security, they 
 believed impossible of realization. But this soothing sense of 
 security was soon to have a terrible awakening. The Confed- 
 erate Government had recognized the peculiar perils menacing 
 the western section of its territory. There for weeks rested the 
 anxious gaze of President Davis, and thence were to come the 
 first notes of alarm — the immediate premonitions of disaster. 
 
 Immediately, upon the occupation of Kentucky by the 
 Confederate forces, had begun the development of a plan of 
 defense by the Southern generals. The command of General 
 Polk, constituting the Confederate left, was at Columbus. On 
 the upper waters of the Cumberland River, in South-eastern 
 Kentucky, was a small force constituting the Confederate right, 
 commanded first by General Zollicoifer, and afterward by 
 General Crittenden. At Bowling Green, with Green River in 
 front, and communicating by railway with Nashville and the 
 South, was the main Confederate force in Kentucky, com- 
 manded by General Buckner until the arrival of General 
 Albert Sidney Johnston, whom President Davis had commis- 
 sioned a full general in the Confederate service, and assigned 
 to the command of the Western Department. 
 
 Apart from the historical interest which belongs to the 
 name of Albert Sidney Johnston, and from the dramatic inci- 
 dent of his death at the very climax of a splendid victory, 
 which immediately paled into disaster upon his fall, as the 
 
ALBKKT SIDNEY JOHXSTOX, 333 
 
 long and valued friend of Jefferson Davis, he is entitled to 
 Si)eeial mention in the biography of the latter. 
 
 Albert Sidney Johnston was born in Mason County, Ken- 
 tueky, in 1803. He graduated at West Point in 1826; Was 
 commissioned as Lieutenant of infantry ; served in the Black 
 Hawk war with distinetion ; resigned and settled in Texas in 
 1836. He volunteered as a private in her armies soon afier 
 the battle of San Jacinto. His merit soon raised him from 
 the ranks, and he was appointed senior Brigadier-General, and 
 succeeded General Houston in the command of the Texan 
 army. In 1838 he was appointed Texan Secretary of V>'ar, 
 and in 1839 organized an expedition against the hostile Chero- 
 kees, in which he routed them completely in a battle on the 
 river Neches. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas 
 to the United States, and after this union was effected, he took 
 jiart in the Mexican war. His services at the siege of Mon- 
 terey drew upon him the public favor and the thanks of Gen- 
 eral Butler. He continued in the army, and in 1857, Mas 
 sent by President Buchanan as Commander-in-Chief of the 
 United States Army to subdue the Mormons. His successful 
 advance in the Great Salt Lake City, and the skill and address 
 with which he conducted a difficult enterprise, largely increased 
 his fame. When the war commenced between the North and 
 South, he was in California, but when he learned the progress 
 of the revolution, he resigned his commission and set out from 
 San Francisco, to penetrate by land to Richmond, a distance 
 of two thousand three hundred miles. 
 
 The safe arrival of General Albert Sidney Johnston, within 
 tlie lines of the Confederacy, was greeted with a degree of 
 public acclamation hardly loss enthusiastic than would have 
 signalized the intelligence of a great victory. It was known 
 
334 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 that the Federal authorities, anxious to prevent so distinguished 
 and valuable an accession to the generalship of the South, were 
 intent upon his capture. For weeks j^opular expectation had 
 been strained, in eager gaze, for tidings of the distinguished 
 commander, who, beset by innumerable perils and obstacles, 
 was making his way across the continent, not less eager to join 
 his countrymen, than were they to feel the weight of his noble 
 blade in tlie unequal combat. 
 
 Few of the eminent soldiers, who had sought service under 
 the banners of the Confederacy, had a more brilliant record of 
 actual service ; and to the advantages of reputation, General 
 Johnston added those graces and distinctions of person with 
 which the imagination invests the ideal commander. He was 
 considerably past middle age ; his height exceeded six feet, his 
 frame was large and sinewy ; his every movement and posture 
 indicated vigorous and athletic manhood. The general expre- 
 sion of his striking face was grave and composed, but inviting 
 rather than austere. 
 
 The arrival of General Johnston in Richmond, early in 
 September, was a source of peculiar congratulation to Presi- 
 dent Davis. Between these illustrious men had existed, for 
 many years, an endearment, born of close association, common 
 trials and triumphs, and mutual confidence, which rendered 
 most auspicious their cooperation in the cause of Southern in- 
 dependence. 
 
 " Albert Sidney Johnston," says Professor Bledsoe, in a 
 recent publication, " who, take him all in all, was the simplest, 
 bravest, grandest man we have ever known, once said to the 
 present writer: 'There is no measuring such a man as Davis;' 
 and this high tribute had a fitting counterpart in that which 
 Davis paid Johnston, when discussing, in the Federal Senate, 
 
PLANS OF GENERAL JOHNSTON. 335 
 
 the Utah expedition. Said he 'I hold that 
 
 the country is indebted to the administration for having se- 
 lected the man who is at the head of the ex})edition ; who, as 
 a soldier, has not a superior in the army or out of it; and 
 whose judgment, whose art, whose knowledge is equal to this 
 or any other emergency ; a man of such decision, such resolu- 
 tion that his country's honor can never be tarnished in his 
 hands ; a man of such calmness, such kindness, that a deluded 
 people can never suffer by harshness from him,'" 
 
 President Davis immediately tendered to General Johnston 
 the command of one of the two grand military divisions of 
 the Confederacy, and he as promptly repaired to the scene of 
 his duties. 
 
 The general features of General Johnston's policy contem- 
 plated a line of defense running from the Mississippi through 
 the region immediately covering Nashville to Cumberland 
 Gap — the key to the defense of East Tennessee and South- 
 western Virginia, and thus to the most vital line of commu- 
 nication in the South. It is easy to conceive the large force 
 requisite for so important and difficult a task, against the im- 
 mense armies of Grant and Buell, numbering, in the aggregate, 
 more than one hundred thousand men. Despite the earnest 
 appeals of General Johnston, and notwithstanding that upon 
 the successful maintenance of his position depended the suc- 
 cessful defense of the entire southern and south-western sec- 
 tions of the Confederacy, his force, at the last of January, 1862, 
 did not exceed twenty-six thousand men. Informed of his 
 perilous situation, the Confederate Government could do no 
 more than second the appeals and remonstrances of General 
 Johnston. Slight accessions were made to his force from tl>e 
 States which were menaced, but, as results speedily demon- 
 
336 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 strated, he was unable to meet the enemy with an adequate 
 force at any one of the vital points of his defensive line. 
 
 In the immediate front of General Johnston's position was 
 the army of Buell, estimated at forty thousand men, which, 
 during the entire winter, was in training for its meditated ad- 
 vance along the line of the railroad in the direction of Nash- 
 ville. Under Grant, at Cairo, was an army of nioi'e than fifty 
 thousand men, which, in cooperation with a formidable naval 
 force, was designed to operate against Nashville, and, by se- 
 curing possession of the line of the Tennessee and Cumberland 
 Rivers, to hold Kentucky and West Tennessee. General John- 
 ston's position was indeed a cruel dilemma, and was sufficiently 
 explained in a letter to President Davis, representing th*e inad- 
 equacy of his force, for either front of attack, upon a line whose 
 every point demanded ample defense. Only a self-denying 
 patriotism could have induced General Johnston to occupy his 
 false position before the public, which accredited to him an army 
 ample even for aggressive warfare. With an almost certain 
 prospect of disaster, he nevertheless resolved to make the su- 
 preme effort which alone could avert it. 
 
 His plan was to meet Grant's attack upon Nashville with 
 sixteen thousand men, hoping, in the meanwhile, by boldly 
 confronting Buell wdth the residue of his forces, to hold in 
 check the enemy in his immediate front. During the winter, 
 by a skillful disposition of his forces and adroit maneuvers, he 
 deceived the enemy as to his real strength, and thus deferred 
 the threatened advance until the month of February. 
 
 The month of January, 18G2, was to witness the first check 
 to the arms of the Confederacy, after seven months of uninter- 
 rupted victory. The scene of the disaster was near Somerset, 
 Kentucky. The forces engaged were inconsiderable as com- 
 
A TRAIN OF DIRASTEES. 337 
 
 pared with the conflicts of a few weeks later, but the result 
 was disheartening to the impatient temper of the South, not 
 yet chastened by the severe trials of adversity. General Crit- 
 tenden was badly defeated, though, as is probable, through no 
 erroneous calculation or defective generalship on his part. A 
 melancholy feature of the disaster was the death of General 
 Zollicoffer. With the repulse and retreat of the Confederate 
 forces after the battle of Fishing Creek, as the action was called, 
 followed the virtual possession of South-eastern Kentucky by 
 the Federal army. The Confederate line of defense in Ken- 
 tucky was thus broken, and the value of other positions ma- 
 terially impaired. 
 
 Early in February the infantry columns of Grant and the 
 gunboats of Commodore Foote commenced the ascent of the 
 Tennessee E-iver. The immediate object of assault was Fort 
 Henry, an imperfectly constructed fortification, on the east 
 bank of the river, near the dividing line of Kentucky and 
 Tennessee. After a signal display of gallantry by its com- 
 mander. General Tilghman, the fort w^as surrendered, the main 
 body of the forces defending it having been previously sent 
 to Fort Donelson, the principal defense of the Cumberland 
 River. The capture of Fort Henry opened the Tennessee 
 River, penetrating the States of Tennessee and Alabama, and 
 navigable for steamers for more than two hundred miles, to 
 the unchecked advance of the enemy. 
 
 General Grant promptly advanced to attack Fort Donel- 
 son. After a series of bloody engagements and a siege of 
 several days, Fort Donelson was surrendered, with the gar- 
 rison of more than nine thousand men. This result was in- 
 deed a heavy blow to the Confederacy, and produced a most 
 alarming crisis in the military affairs of the Western Depart- 
 22 
 
338 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAYTS. 
 
 ment. General Johnston was near Nashville, with the force 
 which had lately held Bowling Green, the latter place having 
 been evacuated during the progress of the fight at Fort Don- 
 elson. Nashville was immediately evacuated, and the rem- 
 nant of General Johnston's army retreated southward, first to 
 Murfreesboro', Tennessee, and afterwards crossed the Tennes- 
 see, at Decatur, Alabama. 
 
 In January, General Beauregard had been transferred from 
 Virginia to Kentucky, and, at the time of the surrender of 
 Nashville, was in command of the forces in the neighborhood 
 of Columbus, Kentucky, which protected the passage of the 
 Mississippi. The entire Confederate line of defense in Ken- 
 tucky and Tennessee having been lost with the surrender of 
 Forts Henry and Donelson, its various posts became unten- 
 able. In a subsequent portion of this narrative, we shall trace 
 the results of the Confederate endeavor to establish a new line 
 of defense in the AVest by a judicious and masterly combina- 
 tion of forces. 
 
 Meanwhile, the preparations of the enemy in the East were 
 even more formidable and threatening than in the West. It 
 was in Virginia that the "elastic spirit" of the North, as the 
 Richmond Examiner termed the alacrity of the consecutive pop- 
 ular uprisings in favor of the war at the North, was chiefly am- 
 bitious and hopeful of decisive results in favor of the Union. 
 Here was to be sought retrieval of the national honor lost at 
 Manassas ; here was the capital of the Confederacy, which, once 
 taken, the "rebellion would collapse." The energy and ad- 
 ministrative ability of General McClellan had accomplished 
 great results in the creation of a fine army and the security 
 of the capital. But, with the opening of the season favorable 
 to military operations, he was expected to accomplish far more 
 
EXTENT OF THE REVERSES. 339 
 
 decisive results — nothing less than the capture of Richmond, 
 the expulsion of the Confederate authority from Virginia, and 
 the destruction of the Confederate army at Manassas. 
 
 Until the opening of spring, military operations in Virginia 
 were attended by no events of importance. But the East was 
 not to be without its contribution to the unvarying tide of 
 Confederate disaster. In the month of February, Roanoke 
 Island, upon the sea-line of North Carolina, defended by Gen- 
 eral Wise, with a single brigade, was assaulted ])y a powerful 
 combined naval and military expedition, under General Burn- 
 side, and surrendered, with its garrison. This success opened 
 to the enemy the sounds and inlets of that region, with their 
 tributary streams, and gave him easy access to a productive 
 country and important communications. 
 
 It was not difficult to estimate correctly the serious nature 
 of these successive reverses covering nearly every field of im- 
 portant operations. They were of a character alarming, in- 
 deed, in immediate consequences, and, necessarily, largely af- 
 fecting the destiny of the war in its future stages. Retreat, 
 evacuation, and surrender seemed the irremediable tendency 
 of affairs every-where. Thousands of prisoners were in the 
 hands of the enemy, the capital of the most important State 
 in the West occupied, the Confederate centre was broken, the 
 great water-avenues of the south-west open to the enemy, the 
 campaign transferred from the heart of Kentucky to the north- 
 ern borders of the Gulf States, and hardly an available line was 
 left for the recovery of the lost territory. 
 
 Within a few weeks the extravagant hopes of the South were 
 brought to the verge of extreme apprehension. The public 
 mind was not to be soothed by the affected indifference of the 
 press to calamities, the magnitude of which was too palpable, 
 
340 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 in the presence of actual invasion of nearly one half the South- 
 ern territory, and of imminent perils threatening the speedy 
 culmination of adverse fortune to the Confederacy. Richmond, 
 which, during the war, was at all times the reflex of the hopes 
 and aspirations of the South, was the scene of gloom and de- 
 spondency, in painful contrast with the ardent and gratulatory 
 tone so lately prevalent. 
 
 Popular disappointment rarely fails in its search for scape- 
 goats upon which to visit responsibility for misfortunes. A 
 noticeable result of the Confederate reverses in the beginning of 
 1862 was the speedy evolution of an organized hostility to the 
 administration of President Davis. The season was eminently 
 propitious for outward demonstrations of feeling, heretofore 
 suppressed, in consequence of the brilliant success, until re- 
 cently, attending the movement for Southern independence. 
 The universal and characteristic disposition of the masses to 
 receive, with favor, censure of their rulers, and to charge 
 public calamities to official failure and maladministration, was 
 an inviting inducement, in this period of public gloom, to the 
 indulgence of partisan aspirations and personal spleen. 
 
 To one familiar with the political history of the South dur- 
 ing the decade previous to secession, there could be no diffi- 
 culty in penetrating the various motives, instigating to uuion, 
 for a common purpose, the heterogeneous elements of this op- 
 position. Prominent among its leaders were men, the life-long 
 opponents of the President, notorious for their want of adhe- 
 sion to any principle or object for its own sake, and especially 
 lukewarm, at all times, upon issues vitally affecting the safety 
 of the South. These men could not forget, even when their 
 allegiance had been avowed to the sacred cause of country and 
 liberty, the rancor engendered in the old contests of party. 
 
THE ADMIXISTRATIOX ASSAILED. 341 
 
 Some, in additiou to disappointed political ambition, arising 
 from the failure of the President to tender them the foremost 
 places in the Government, had personal resentments to gratify. 
 Much the larger portion of the opposition, which continued, 
 until the last moments of the Confederacy, to assail the Gov- 
 ernment, had its origin in these influences, and they speedily 
 attracted all restless and impracticable characters — born Jaco- 
 bins, malcontents by the decree of nature, and others of the 
 class who are " never at home save in the attitude of contra- 
 diction." 
 
 At first feeble in influence, this faction, by pertinacious and un- 
 scrupulous efforts, eventually became a source of embarrassment, 
 and promoted the wide-spread division and distrust which, in 
 the latter days of the Confederacy, were so ominous of the 
 approaching catastrophe. Its earliest shafts were ostensibly not 
 aimed at the President, since there was no evidence that the 
 popular affection for Mr. Davis would brook assaults upon 
 him, but assumed the shape of accusations against his consti- 
 tutional advisers. A deliberate movement, cloaked in the 
 disguise of respectful remonstrance and petition, sustained by 
 demagogical speeches — which, though artfully designed, in 
 many instances revealed the secret venom — was arranged, 
 upon the assembling of the First Congress under the per- 
 manent Government, to revolutionize the cabinet of President 
 Davis. 
 
 Mr. Benjamin, the Secretary of War, and Mr. Mallory, 
 Secretary of the Navy, were the objects of especial and most 
 envenomed assault. They were assailed in Congress, and by a 
 portion of the Richmond press, as directly chargeable with the 
 late reverses. Yet it should have been plain that the most 
 serious of these disasters were attributable chiefly to the over- 
 
342 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 whelming naval preponderance of the enemy — an advantage 
 not to have been obviated entirely by any degree of foresight 
 on the part of the Confederate naval secretary — and by a 
 deficiency of soldiers, for which the country itself, and not Mr. 
 Benjamin, was to be censured. 
 
 The indisputable facts in the case were ample in the vindi- 
 cation of Mr. Mallory, as to the insufl&cient defenses of the 
 Western rivers, now in Federal possession. The obvious 
 dangers of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, as an 
 avenue of access to the heart of the South, were not over- 
 looked by the Government. The channels of these rivers 
 are navigable during a large portion of the year, and the two 
 streams gradually approach each other, as they j^ass from Ten- 
 nessee into Kentucky, on their course to the Ohio, coming at 
 one point within less than three miles of each other, and 
 emptying their waters only ten miles apart. The facilities 
 afforded by their proximity for combined military and naval 
 operations, were necessarily apparent. The Government con- 
 templated the defense of these streams by floating defenses 
 the only means by which they could be debarred to the enemy. 
 The Provisional Congress, however, by a most singular and 
 fatal oversight of the recommendation of the Government, 
 made no appropriation for floating defenses on the Tennessee 
 and Cumberland, until the opportunity to prepare them had 
 passed. 
 
 It authorized the President to cause to be constructed thir- 
 teen steam gunboats for sea-coast defense, and such floating 
 defenses for the Mississippi River as he might deem best 
 adapted to the purpose ; but no provision was made for armed 
 steamers on the large Western interior rivers until the month 
 of January, 1862, when an act was approved appropriating 
 
SECRETARIES MALLORY AND BENJAMIN. 343 
 
 one million of dollars, to be expended for this purpose, at the 
 discretion of the President, by the Secretary of War, or of the 
 Navy, as he might direct. This was less than four weeks 
 before the actlial advance of the Federal gunboats, and was, 
 of course, too late for the needed armaments. The appropria- 
 tion of one hundred thousand dollars, for equipment and re- 
 pairs of vessels of the Confederate navy, hardly sufficed to 
 enable the Secretary of that department to maintain a few frail 
 steamers on the Tennessee, hastily prepared from commercial 
 or passenger boats, and very imperfectly armed. 
 
 A congressional investigating committee censured Mr. Ben- 
 jamin and General Huger as responsible for the capture of 
 Roanoke Island and its garrison. The latter affiiir was indeed 
 a disaster not to be lightly palliated, and was one of those in- 
 explicable mishaps, which, U]3on retrospection, we see should 
 have been avoided, though it is at least doubtful who is justly 
 censurable. It is, however, only just to state that no view of 
 the Roanoke Island disaster has ever been presented to the 
 writer, which did not acquit General Wise of all blame. 
 His exculpation was complete before every tribunal of 
 opinion. 
 
 Whatever may have been the real merit of these issues made 
 against Secretaries Mallory and Benjamin, it is very certain 
 that those two gentlemen continued to be the objects of marked 
 disflivor from those members of Congress, and that portion of 
 the Richmond press known to be hostile to the administration 
 of Mr. Davis. Popular prejudice is proverbially unreasoning, 
 and it was indeed singular to note how promptly the public 
 echoed the assaults of the hostile press against these officials, 
 upon subsequent occasions, when they were held account- 
 
344 LIFE O^ JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 able for disasters with which they had no possible connec- 
 tion.* 
 
 This period of Confederate misfortunes gave the first verifi- 
 cation of a fact which afterward had frequent illustration, that 
 the resolution of the South, so indomitable in actual contest, 
 staggered under the weight of reverses. The history of the 
 war was a record of the variations of the Southern mind be- 
 tween extreme elation and immoderate depression. Extrava- 
 gant exultation over success, and immoderate despondency over 
 disaster, usually followed each other in prompt succession. Over- 
 estimating, in many instances, the importance of its own vic- 
 tories, the South quite as frequently exaggerated the value of 
 those won by the 'enemy. There was thus a constant de- 
 parture from the middle ground of dispassionate judgment, 
 which would have accurately measured the real situation; 
 making available its opportunities, by a vigorous prosecution 
 of advantage, and overcoming difficulties by energetic pre^jara- 
 tiou. 
 
 But this despondency happily gave place to renewed de- 
 termination, as the success of the enemy brought him nearer 
 the homes of the South, and made more imminent the evils 
 of subjugation. A grand and noble popular reanimation was 
 the response to the renewed vigor and resolution of the Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 When the Confederate Government was organized at Mont- 
 gomery, the operation of the provisional constitution was 
 
 * The frieucls of Mr. Mallory, in illustration of this unreasoning preju- 
 dice, were accustomed to declare that, "were a Confederate vessel to 
 sink in a storm, in the middle of the ocean, the Richmond Examiner and 
 Mr. Foote would advocate the censure of the Secretary of the Navy, as 
 responsible for her loss." 
 
THE "permanent" GOVERNMENT. 345 
 
 limited to the period of one year, to be superseded by the per- 
 manent government. No material alteration of the political 
 organism was found necessary, nor was there any change in 
 the personnel of the administration — Mr. Davis having been 
 unanimously chosen President at the election in November, 
 and retaining his administration as it existed at the close of 
 the functions of the provisional constitution. Though the 
 change was thus merely nominal, the occasion was replete with 
 historic interest to the people whose liberties were involved in 
 the fate of the government, now declared "permanent." It 
 was,- indeed, an assumption of a new character — a declaration, 
 with renewed emphasis, of the high and peerless enterprise of 
 independent national existence; an introduction to a future, 
 promising a speedy fulfillment of inestimable blessings or 
 " woes unnumbered." 
 
 On the 18th of February, 1862, the first Congress, under the 
 permanent constitution of the Confederate States, assembled in 
 the capitol at Eichraond. On the 22d occurred the ceremony 
 of the inauguration of President Davis. 
 
 To the citizens of Richmond and others who were spectators, 
 the scene in Capitol Square, on that memorable morning, was 
 marked by gloomy surroundings, the recollection of which re- 
 calls, with sad interest, suggestive omens, which then seemed 
 to betoken the adverse fate of the Confederacy. The season 
 was one of unusual rigor, and the preceding month of public 
 calamity and distress had been fitly commemorated by a pro- 
 tracted series of dark and cheerless days. Never, within 
 the recollection of the writer, had there been a day in Rich- 
 mond so severe, uncomfortable, and gloomy, as the day ap- 
 pointed for the ceremony of inauguration. For days previous 
 heavy clouds had foreshadowed the rain, which fell contin- 
 
346 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 uously during the preceding night, and which seemed to 
 increase in vokime on the morning of the ceremony. The 
 occasion was in singular contrast with that which, a year pre- 
 vious, had witnessed the installment of the provisional govern- 
 ment — upon a day whose genial sunshine seemed prophetic of 
 a bright future for the infant power then launched upon its 
 voyage. 
 
 But however w^anting in composure may have been the 
 public mind, and whatever the perils of the situation, the voice 
 of their twice-chosen chief quickly infused into the heart of 
 the people, that unabated zeal and unconquerable resolution, 
 with which he proclaimed himself devoted anew to the deliver- 
 ance of his country. The inaugural address was a noble and 
 inspiring appeal to the patriotism of the land. Its eloquent, 
 candid, and patriotic tone won all hearts; and even the un- 
 friendly press and politicians accorded commendation to the 
 dignity and candor with which the President avowed his 
 official responsibility; the manly frankness with which he de- 
 fended dejjartments of the government unjustly assailed; and 
 the assurino;, defiant courasje, with which he invited all classes 
 of his countrymen to join him in the sujDreme sacrifice, should 
 it become necessary. 
 
 The inaugural ceremonies were as simple and appropriate as 
 those witnessed at Montgomery a year previous. The mem- 
 bers of the Confederate Senate and House of Representatives, 
 with the members of the Virginia Legislature, awaited in the 
 hall of the House of Delegates the arrival of the President. 
 In consequence of the limited capacity of the hall, compara- 
 tively few spectators — a majority of them ladies — witnessed the 
 proceedings there. Immediately fronting the chair of the 
 speaker were the ladies of Mr. Davis' household, attended by 
 
CEREMONIES OF INAUGUEATION. 347 
 
 relatives and frieucls. In close proximity were members of 
 the cabinet. 
 
 A contemporary account thus mentions this scene : " It was 
 a grave and great assemblage. Time-honored men were there, 
 who had witnessed ceremony after ceremony of inauguration 
 in the palmiest days of the old confederation; those who had 
 been at the inauguration of the iron-willed Jackson ; men who, 
 in their fiery Southern ardor, had thrown down the gauntlet 
 of defiance in the halls of Federal legislation, and in the face 
 of the enemy avowed their determination to be free; and 
 finally witnessed the enthroning of a republican despot in 
 their country's chair of state. All were there; and silent tears 
 were seen coursing down the cheeks of gray-haired men, while 
 the determined will stood out in every feature." 
 
 The appearance of the President was singularly imposing, 
 though there were visible traces of his profound emotion, and 
 a pallor, painful to look upon, reminded the spectator of his 
 recent severe indisposition. His dress was a plain citizen's 
 suit of black. Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, temporary President 
 of the Confederate Senate, occupied the right of the platform ; 
 INIr. Bocock, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the left. 
 When President Davis, accompanied by Mr. Orr, of South 
 Carolina, Chairman of the Committee of Arrangements, on the 
 part of the Senate, reached the hall and passed to the chair of 
 the Speaker, subdued applause, becoming the place and the 
 occasion, greeted him. A short time sufficed to carry into 
 effect the previously arranged programme, and the dis- 
 tinguished procession moved to the Washington monument, 
 where a stand was prepared for the occasion. 
 
 Hon. James Lyons, of Virginia, Chairman of the House 
 Committee of Arrangements, called the assemblage to order, 
 
348 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 and an eloquent and appropriate prayer was offered by Bishop 
 Johns, of the Diocese of Virginia. The President, having re- 
 ceived a most enthusiastic welcome from the assemblage, with 
 a clear and measured accent, delivered his inaugural address : 
 
 Fellow-citizens : On this, the birthday of the man most iden- 
 tified with the estabhshment of American independence, and be- 
 neath the monument erected to commemorate his heroic virtues 
 and those of his compatriots, we have assembled, to usher into 
 existence the permanent government of the Confederate States. 
 Through this instrumentality, under the favor of Divine Provi- 
 dence, we hope to perpetuate the principles of our revolutionary 
 fathers. The day, the memory, and the purpose seem fitly asso- 
 ciated. 
 
 It is with mingled feelings of humility and pride that I appear 
 to take, in the presence of the people, and before high Heaven, 
 the oath prescribed as a qualification for the exalted station to 
 which the unanimous voice of the people has called me. Deeply 
 sensible of all that is implied by this manifestation of the people's 
 confidence, I am yet more profoundly impressed by the vast re- 
 sponsibility of the ofl&ce, and humbly feel my own uuworthiness. 
 
 In return for their kindness, I can only offer assurances of the 
 gratitude with which it is received, and can but pledge a zealous 
 devotion of every faculty to the service of those who have chosen 
 me as their Chief Magistrate. 
 
 When a long course of class legislation, directed not to the gen- 
 eral welfare, but to the aggrandizement of the Northern section 
 of the Union, culminated in a warfare on the domestic institutions 
 of the Southern States ; when the dogmas of a sectional party, sub- 
 stituted for the provisions of the constitutional compact, threatened 
 to destroy the sovereign rights of the States, six of those States, 
 withdrawing from the Union, confederated together to exercise the 
 right and perform the duty of instituting a government which 
 
INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 349 
 
 would better secure tte liberties for the preservation of -wliicli 
 that Union was established. 
 
 TThatever of hope some may have entertained that a returning 
 sense of justice would remove the danger with which our rights 
 were threatened, and render it possible to preserve the Union of 
 the Constitution, must have been dispelled by the malignity and 
 barbarity of the Northern States in the prosecution of the exist- 
 ing war. The confidence of the most hopeful among us must have 
 been destroyed by the disregard they have recently exhibited for 
 all the time-honored bulwarks of civil and religious liberty. Bas- 
 tiles filled with prisoners, arrested without civil process, or indict- 
 ment duly found ; the writ of habeas corpus suspended by execu- 
 tive mandate ; a State Legislature controlled by the imprisonment 
 of members whose avowed principles suggested to the Federal ex- 
 ecutive that there might be another added to the list of seceded 
 States; elections held under threats of a military power; civil offi- 
 cers, peaceful citizens, and gentle women incarcerated for opinion's 
 sake, proclaimed the incapacity of our late associates to administer 
 a government as free, liberal, and humane as that established for 
 our common use. 
 
 For proof of the sincerity of our purpose to maintain our ancient 
 institutions, we may point to the Constitution of the Confederacy 
 and the laws enacted under it, as well as to the fact that, through 
 all the necessities of an unequal struggle, there has been no act, 
 on our part, to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, 
 of thought, or of the press. The courts have been open, the ju- 
 dicial functions fully executed, and every right of the peaceful 
 citizen maintained as securely as if a war of invasion had not dis- 
 turbed the land. 
 
 The people of the States now confederated became convinced 
 that the Government of the United States had ftillen into the 
 hands of a sectional majority, who would pervert the most sa- 
 cred of all trusts to the destruction of the rights which it was 
 
350 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 pledged to protect. They believed tliat to remain longer in the 
 Union would subject them to a continuance of a disparaging dis- 
 crimination, submission to which would be inconsistent to their 
 welfare and intolerable to a proud people. They, therefore, de- 
 termined to sever its bonds, and establish a new confederacy for 
 themselves. 
 
 The experiment, instituted by our revolutionary fathers, of a 
 voluntary union of sovereign States, for jDurposes specified in a 
 solemn compact, had been prevented by those who, feeling power 
 and forgetting right, were determined to respect no law but their 
 own will. The Government had ceased to answer the ends for 
 which it had been ordained and established. To save ourselves 
 from a revolution which, in its silent but rapid progress, was 
 about to place us under the despotism of numbers, and to pre- 
 serve, in spirit as well as in form, a system of government 
 we believed to be peculiarly fitted to our condition and full of 
 promise for mankind, we determined to make a new association, 
 composed of States homogeneous in interest, in policy, and in 
 feeling. 
 
 True to our traditions of peace and love of justice, we sent 
 commissioners to the United States to propose a fair and amica- 
 ble settlement of all questions of public debt or property which 
 might be in dispute. But the Government at Washington, deny- 
 ing our right to self-government, refused even to listen to any 
 proposals for a peaceful separation. Nothing was then left to us 
 but to prepare for war. 
 
 The first year in our history has been the most eventful in the 
 annals of this continent, A new government has been established, 
 and its machinery put in operation, over an area exceeding seven 
 hundred thousand square miles. The great principles upon which 
 we have been willing to hazard every thing that is dear to man 
 have made conquests for us which could never have been achieved 
 by the sword. Our Confederacy has grown from six to thirteen 
 
INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 351 
 
 States ; and Maryland, already united to us by hallowed mem- 
 ories and material interests, will, I believe, when able to speak 
 with unstifled voice, connect her destiny with the South. Our 
 people have rallied, with unexampled unanimity, to the support 
 of the great principles of constitutional government, with firm 
 resolve to perpetuate by arms the rights which they could not 
 peacefully secure. A million of men, it is estimated, are now 
 standing in hostile array, and waging war along a frontier of thou- 
 sands of miles; battles have been fought, sieges have been con- 
 ducted, and, although the contest is not ended, and the tide for 
 the moment is against us, the final result in our favor is not 
 doubtful. 
 
 The period is near at hand when our foes must sink under the 
 immense load of debt which they have incurred — a debt which, 
 in their efi'orts to subjugate us, has already attained such fearful 
 dimensions as will subject them to burdens which must coutinv.e 
 to oppress them for generations to come. 
 
 We, too, have had our trials and difiiculties. That we are to 
 escape them in the future is not to be hoped. It was to be ex- 
 pected, when we entered upon this war, that it would expose our 
 people to sacrifices, and cost them much both of money and blood. 
 But we knew the value of the object for which we struggled, and 
 understood the nature of the war in which we were engaged. Noth- 
 ing could be so bad as failure, and any sacrifice would be cheap as 
 the price of success in such a contest. 
 
 But the picture has its lights as well as its shadows. This great 
 strife has awakened in the people the highest emotions and qual- 
 ities of the human soul. It is cultivating feelings of patriotism, 
 virtue, and courage. Instances of self-sacrifice and of generous 
 devotion to the noble cause for which we are contending are rife 
 throughout the land. Never has a people evinced a more deter- 
 mined spirit than that now animating men, women, and children 
 in every part of our country. Upon the first call, the men fly to 
 
352 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 arms ; and wives and mothers send their husbands and sons to 
 battle without a murmur of regret. 
 
 It was, perhaps, in the ordination of Providence that we were 
 to be taught the value of our liberties by the price which we pay 
 for them. 
 
 The recollections of this great contest, with all its common tra- 
 ditions of glory, of sacrifices, and of blood, will be the bond of 
 harmony and enduring aflPection amongst the people, producing 
 unity in policy, fraternity in sentiment, and joint effort in war. 
 
 Nor have the material sacrifices of the past year been made 
 without some corresponding benefits. If the acquiescence of 
 foreign nations in a pretended blockade has deprived us of our 
 commerce with them, it is fast making us a self-supporting and 
 an independent people. The blockade, if effectual and perma- 
 nent, could only serve to divert our industry from the production 
 of articles for export, and employ it in supplying commodities 
 for domestic use. 
 
 It is a satisfaction that we have maintained the war by our un- 
 aided exertions. We have neither asked nor received assistance 
 from any quarter. Yet the interest involved is not wholly our 
 own. The world at large is concerned in opening our markets to 
 its commerce. When the independence of the Confederate States 
 is recognized by the nations of the earth, and we are free to fol- 
 low our interests and inclinations by cultivating foreign trade, the 
 Southern States will offer to manufacturing nations the most favor- 
 able markets which ever invited their commerce. Cotton, sugar, 
 rice, tobacco, provisions, timber, and naval stores will furnish at- 
 tractive exchanges. Nor would the constancy of these supplies be 
 likely to be disturbed by war. Our confederate strength will be 
 too great to attempt aggression; and never was there a people 
 whose interests and principles committed them so fully to a peace- 
 ful policy as those of the Confederate States. By the character 
 of their productions, they are too deeply interested in foreign 
 
INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 353 
 
 commerce wantonly to disturb it. War of conquest tliey can not 
 wage, because the Constitution of their Confederacy admits of no 
 coerced association. Civil war there can not be between States 
 held together by their volition only. This rule of voluntary as- 
 sociation, which can not fail to be conservative, by securing just 
 and impartial government at home, does not diminish the security 
 of the obligations by which the Confederate States may be bound 
 to foreign nations. In proof of this, it is to be remembered that, 
 at the first moment of asserting their right of secession, these 
 States proposed a settlement on the basis of a common liability 
 for the obligations of the General Government. 
 
 Fellow-citizens, after the struggles of ages had consecrated the 
 right of the Englishman to constitutional representative govern- 
 ment, our colonial ancestors were forced to vindicate that birth- 
 right by an appeal to arms. Success crowned their efforts, and 
 they provided for their posterity a peaceful remedy against future 
 aggression. 
 
 The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most odious and least 
 responsible form of despotism, has denied us both the right and 
 the remedy. Therefore we are in arms to renew such sacrifices 
 as our fathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty. 
 At the darkest hour of our struggle, the provisional gives place 
 to the permanent government. After a series of successes and 
 victories, which covered our arms with glory, we have recently 
 met with serious disasters. But, in the heart of a people resolved 
 to be free, these disasters tend but to stimulate to increased re- 
 sistance. 
 
 To show ourselves worthy of the inheritance bequeathed to us 
 by the patriots of the Revolution, we must emulate that heroic 
 devotion which made reverse to them but the crucible in which 
 their patriotism was refined. 
 
 With confidence in the wisdom and virtue of those who will 
 share with me the responsibility, and aid me in the conduct of 
 23 
 
354 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 public affairs; securely relying on the patriotism and courage of 
 the people, of which the present war has furnished so many ex- 
 amples, I deeply feel the weight of the responsibilities I now, with 
 unaffected diffidence, am about to assume ; and, fully realizing the 
 inadequacy of human power to guide and to sustain, my hope is 
 reverently fixed on Him, whose favor is ever vouchsafed to the 
 cause which is just. With humble gratitude and adoration, ac- 
 knowledging the Providence which has so visibly protected the 
 Confederacy during its brief but eventful career, to Thee, 
 Grod! I trustingly commit myself, and prayerfully invoke Thy 
 blessing on my country and its cause. 
 
 The effect of this address upon the public was electrical. 
 The anxious and dispirited assemblage, which, for more than an 
 hour previous to the arrival of the President, had braved the 
 inclement sky and traversed the almost impassable avenues of 
 Capitol Square, in eager longing for re-assuring words from 
 liim upon whose courage and will so much depended, was not 
 disappointed. A consciousness of a burden removed, of 
 doubts dispelled, of the re-assured feeling, which comes with 
 strengthened conviction that confidence has not been misplaced, 
 animated and thrilled the crowd as it caught the impressive 
 tones and gestures of the speaker. In the memory of every 
 beholder must forever dwell the imposing presence of Mr. 
 Davis, as, with uplifted hands, he pronounced the beautiful 
 and appropriate petition to Providence, which forms the pero- 
 ration. 
 
 The message sent by President Davis to Congress, a few 
 days after the inauguration, is hardly inferior in importance, 
 as a historical document, to the inaugural address. In view 
 of its explanations of the earlier policy of the Confederate 
 
MESSAGE. 355 
 
 Government, of the causes of recent disasters, and indications 
 of important changes in the future conduct of the war, we 
 present entire this first message of Mr. Davis to the First 
 Congress assembled under the permanent Constitution : 
 
 To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate States — 
 
 In obedience to the constitutional provision, requiring the 
 President, from time to time, to give to the Congress information 
 of the state of the Confederacy, and recommend to their consid- 
 eration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, 
 I have to communicate that, since my message at the last session of 
 the Provisional Congress, events have demonstrated that the Gov- 
 ernment had attempted more than it had power successfully to 
 achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect, by our arms, the whole 
 of the territory of the Confederate States, sea-board and inland, we 
 have been so exposed as recently to encounter serious disasters. 
 When the Confederacy was formed, the States composing it were, 
 by the peculiar character of their pursuits, and a misplaced confi- 
 dence in their former associates, to a great extent, destitute of the 
 means for the prosecution of the war on so gigantic a scale as that 
 which it has attained. The workshops and artisans were mainly 
 to be found in the Northern States, and one of the first duties 
 which devolved upon this Government was to establish the necessary 
 manufactories, and in the meantime to obtain, by purchase from 
 abroad, as far as practicable, whatever was required for the public 
 defense. No effort has been spared to effect both these ends, 
 and though the results have not equaled our hopes, it is believed 
 that an impartial judgment will, upon full investigation, award to 
 the various departments of the Government credit for having done 
 all which human power and foresight enabled them to accom- 
 plish. 
 
 The valor and devotion of the people have not only sustained 
 
356 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 the efforts of the Government, but have gone far to supply its 
 
 deficiencies. 
 
 The active state of military preparations among the nations of 
 Europe, in April last, the date when our agents first went abroad, 
 interposed unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and the 
 want of a navy has greatly impeded our efforts to import military 
 supplies of all sorts. 
 
 I have hoped for several days to receive official reports in re- 
 lation to our discomfiture at Roanoke Island, and the fall of Fort 
 Donelson. They have not yet reached me, and I am, therefore, 
 unable to communicate to you such information of those events, 
 and the consequences resulting from them, as would enable me to 
 make recommendations founded upon the changed condition which 
 they have produced. Enough is known of the surrender of 
 Roanoke Island to make us feel that it was deeply humiliating, 
 however imperfect may have been the preparations for defense. 
 The hope is still entertained that our reported losses at Fort 
 Donelson have been greatly exaggerated, inasmuch as I am not 
 only unwilling, but unable to believe that a large army of our 
 people have surrendered without a desperate effort to cut their 
 way through investing forces, whatever may have been their num- 
 ber, and to endeavor to make a junction with other divisions of 
 the army. But in the absence of that exact information which 
 can only be afforded by official reports, it would be premature to 
 pass judgment, and my own is reserved, as I trust yours will be, 
 until that information is received. In the meantime, strenuous 
 efforts have been made to throw forward reinforcements to the 
 armies at the positions threatened, and I can not doubt that the 
 bitter disappointments we have borne, by nerving the people to 
 still greater exertions, will speedily secure results more accordant 
 with our just expectation, and as favorable to our cause as those 
 which marked the earlier periods of the war. 
 
 The reports of the Secretaries of War and the Navy will ex- 
 
MESSAGE. 357 
 
 hibit tlie mass of resources for the conduct of the war -which we 
 have been enabled to accumulate, notwithstanding the very serious 
 difficulties against which we have contended. 
 
 They afford the cheering hope that our resources, limited as 
 they were at the beginning of the contest, will, during its pro- 
 gress, become developed to such an extent as fully to meet our 
 future wants. 
 
 The policy of enlistment for short terms, against which I have 
 steadily contended from the commencement of the war, has, in my 
 judgment, contributed, in no immaterial degree, to the recent re- 
 verses which we have suffered, and even now renders it difficult to 
 furnish you an accurate statement of the army. When the war 
 first broke out, many of our people could with difficulty be per- 
 suaded that it would be long or serious. It was not deemed 
 possible that any thing so insane as a persistent attempt to subju- 
 gate these States could be made — still less that the delusion 
 would so far prevail as to give to the war the vast proportions 
 which it has assumed. The people, incredulous of a long war, 
 were naturally averse to long enlistment, and the early legislation 
 of Congress rendered it impracticable to obtain volunteers for a 
 greater period than twelve months. Now, that it has become 
 probable that the war will be continued through a series of years, 
 our high-spirited and gallant soldiers, while generally reenlisting, 
 are, from the fact of having entered the service for a short term, 
 compelled, in many instances, to go home to make the necessary 
 arrangements for their families during their prolonged absence. 
 
 The quotas of new regiments for the war, called for from the 
 different States, are in rapid progress of organization. The whole 
 body of our new levies and reenlisted men will probably be ready 
 in the ranks within the next thirty days. But, in the meantime, 
 it is exceedingly difficult to give an accurate statement of the 
 number of our forces in the field. They may, in general terms, 
 be stated at four hundred regiments of infantry, with a proper- 
 
358 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 tionate force of cavalry and artillery, the details of which will be 
 shown by the report of the Secretary of War. I deem it proper to 
 advert to the fact that the process of furloughs and reenlistment iu 
 progress for the last month had so far disorganized and weakened 
 our forces as to impair our ability for successful defense ; but I 
 heartily congratulate you that this evil, which I had foreseen and 
 was powerless to prevent, may now be said to be substantially at 
 an end, and that we shall not again, during the war, be exposed to 
 seeing our strength diminished by this fruitful cause of disaster — 
 short enlistments. 
 
 The people of the Confederate States, being principally en- 
 gaged in agricultural pursuits, were unprovided at the commence- 
 ment of hostilities with ships, ship-yards, materials for ship-building, 
 or skilled mechanics and seamen, in sufficient numbers to make the 
 prompt creation of the navy a practicable task, even if the required 
 appropriations had been made for the purpose. Notwithstanding 
 our very limited resources, however, the report of the Secretary 
 will exhibit to you a satisfactory progress in preparation, and 
 a certainty of early completion of vessels of a number and class 
 on which we may confidently rely for contesting the vaunted 
 control of the enemy over our waters. 
 
 The financial system, devised by the wisdom of your predeces- 
 sors, has proved adequate to supplying all the wants of the Gov- 
 ernment, notwithstanding the unexpected and very large increase 
 of expenditures resulting from the great augmentation in the 
 necessary means of defense. The report of the Secretary of the 
 Treasury will exhibit the gratifying fact that we have no floating 
 debt ; that the credit of the Government is unimpaired, and that 
 the total expenditure of the Government for the year has been, in 
 round numbers, one hundred and seventy millions of dollars — less 
 than one-third the sum wasted by the enemy in his vain efi"ort to 
 conquer us — less than the value of a single article of export — the 
 cotton crop of the year. 
 
MESSAGE. 359 
 
 The report of the Postmaster-General will show the condition 
 of that department to be steadily improving — its revenue increas- 
 ing, and already affording the assurance that it will be self-sus- 
 taining at the date required by the Constitution, while affording 
 ample mail facilities for the people. 
 
 In the Department of Justice, which includes the Patent OflSce 
 and Public Printing, some legislative provision will be required, 
 which will be specifically stated in the report of the head of that 
 department. 
 
 I invite the attention of Congress to the duty of organizing a 
 Supreme Court of the Confederate States, in accordance with the 
 mandate ofthe Constitution. 
 
 I refer you to my message communicated to the Provisional 
 Congress in November last, for such further information touching 
 the condition of public affairs, as it might be useful to lay before 
 you; the short interval which has since elapsed not having produced 
 any material changes in that condition, other than those to which 
 reference has already been made. 
 
 In conclusion, I cordially welcome representatives who, recently 
 chosen by the people, are fully imbued with their views and feel- 
 ings, and can so ably advise me as to the needful provisions for 
 the public service. I assure you of my hearty cooperation in all 
 your efforts for the common welfare of the country. 
 
 JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The message, not less than the inaugural address, was re- 
 ceived with many evidences of public reanimation. The 
 following extracts indicate the state of feeling in Richmond at 
 this period : 
 
 THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. 
 
 (From the Richmond Whig, Feb. 26, 1802.) 
 
 The President makes a candid and frank confession of our 
 recent reverses. Very justly, he does not regard them as vital to 
 
360 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 our cause ; but they will entail a long war upon us. That long 
 war ensures our independence, and the ultimate confusion and 
 ruin of the Yankees 
 
 The Examiner, of the same date, in the opening paragraph 
 of its leader, said : 
 
 The President's Message is a manly and dignified document, 
 hut, like the inaugural, it contains not a solitary word indicating 
 the plan or policy of the Grovernment. Far from objecting to this 
 characteristic, we think it eminently proper that the executive 
 should keep its counsels from the public eye, and that the Con- 
 gress should withdraw its deliberations from the public ear. What 
 is wanted from the one is distinct and peremptory orders; and 
 from the other, decisive and adequate provisions for the public 
 safety. The duty of the country is unhesitating obedience ; of 
 the soldiers, the courage that prefers death in glory, like Jennings 
 Wise 
 
REANIMATION OF THE SOUTH. 361 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 POPULAR DELUSIONS IN THE EARLY STAGES OP THE WAR — A FEW CONFLICTS 
 AND SACRIFICES NOT SUFFICIENT — MORE POSITIVE RECOGNITION OF MR. DAVIs' 
 
 VIEWS — HIS CANDID AND PROPHETIC ANNOUNCEMENTS — MILITARY REFORMS 
 
 CONSCRIPTION LAW OP THE CONFEDERACY — THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS AND 
 COURSE AS TO THIS LAW — HIS CONSISTENT REGARD FOR CIVIL LIBERTY AND 
 OPPOSITION TO CENTRALIZATION — RECOMMENDS CONSCRIPTION — BENEFICIAL 
 
 RESULTS OP THE LAW GENERAL LEE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, " UNDER THE 
 
 president" NATURE OP THE APPOINTMENT FALSE IMPRESSIONS COR- 
 RECTED — MR. DAVIs' CONFIDENCE IN LEE, DESPITE POPULAR CENSURE OF THE 
 LATTER — CHANGES IN THE CABINET — MR. BENJAMIN* S MANAGEMENT OF THE 
 WAR OFFICE — DIFFICULTIES OP THAT POSITION — THE CHARGE OF FAVORITISM 
 AGAINST MR. DAVIS IN THE SELECTION OF HIS CABINET — HIS PERSONAL RE- 
 LATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OP HIS CABINET — ACTIVITY IN MILI- 
 TARY OPERATIONS — THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI — BATTLE OF ELK HORN — OPERA- 
 TIONS EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI GENERALS SIDNEY JOHNSTON AND BEAURE- 
 GARD — ISLAND NO. 10 — CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS BY THE CONFEDERATE 
 AUTHORITIES — FAVORABLE SITUATION — SHILOH — A DISAPPOINTMENT — DEATH 
 OP SIDNEY JOHNSTON — TRIBUTE OP PRESIDENT DAVIS — POPULAR VERDICT 
 
 UPON THE BATTLE OP SHILOH GENERALS BEAUREGARD, BRAGG, AND POLK 
 
 ON THE BATTLE THE PRESIDENT AGAIN CHARGED WITH "INJUSTICE" TO 
 
 BEAUREGARD — THE CHARGE ANSWERED — FALL OF NEW ORLEANS — ^NAVAL 
 BATTLE IN HAMPTON ROADS — NAVAL SUCCESSES OF THE ENEMY, 
 
 AlTE have briefly indicated the causes which now elevated 
 ' ^ the Southern people to a more intelligent aj)preciation 
 of the nature and necessities of the struggle in which they 
 were engaged. There was reason for the congratulation which 
 President Davis experienced at the unmistakable evidences of 
 the awakening of the public mind to the stern duties which, 
 from the beginning, he had sedulously inculcated. 
 
362 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 The progress of the war had already developed the existence 
 of numerous errors upon both sides, and had exploded many 
 cherished theories having possession of the popular mind of 
 each section, with reference to the power, resources, and spirit 
 of its antagonist. Both parties had entered into the contest 
 with the firm conviction of certain triumph, and with the pur- 
 pose to make the struggle as short as possible. The war-cry 
 of the North was "Let it be short, sharp, and decisive;" and 
 they appealed to their numbers, wealth, and sectional hatred, 
 as elements of superiority, which would inevitably end the war 
 in their favor in a few months. The South was equally dis- 
 posed to a speedy conclusion. With the masses of the South 
 and the majority of their advisers, the predominant idea and 
 aspiration was to teach the enemy, by prompt and heavy blows, 
 the impossibility of successful invasion, and thus shorten the 
 period of bloodshed. Thus both, from a necessity which nei- 
 ther was able to avoid, began with gigantic preparations, 
 hoping, by a few mighty conflicts of arras, and one lavish sac- 
 rifice of life and treasure, to bring to prompt arbitrament an 
 issue which was the growth of a century. 
 
 But the aroused spirit of sectional strife was not to be ap- 
 peased by a single holocaust. The American people, a youth- 
 ful giant, totally uneducated in the experience of war, having 
 never yet tested their strength and dimensions, would not 
 consent that the game of empire should be decided by a single 
 dramatic denouement, a Waterloo, a Solferino, or Sadowa. 
 Manassas had been the bitter but beneficent chastisement of 
 the North, and the reproof was accepted with that wonderful 
 elasticity, which afterwards amazed the world with its manifest- 
 ations after the most disheartening failures. A rebuke no less 
 signal waited upon the South, and its correcting influence im- 
 
POPULAR RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT. 363 
 
 mediately exhibited a temper which was the temporary salvation 
 of the Confederacy, and the inspiration to a series of cam- 
 paigns among the most memorable in the annals of warfare. 
 
 With the inauguration of the permanent government came 
 not only renewed resolution in the prosecution of the war, but 
 a more positive recognition and adoption of the views of Presi- 
 dent Davis. We have elsewhere described the antagonism 
 between those views and the theory of the leaders at Mont- 
 gomery, shared by the press and people of the South, which 
 derided any other hypothesis than a six-months' war, with 
 the certainty of independence. Whatever weight may be ac- 
 credited to the statements which we have made in demonstra- 
 tion of Mr. Davis' conviction, that the war would be one of 
 unexampled magnitude and long duration ; whatever may be 
 the rational inference from his opposition to a military system 
 contemplating a war lasting six or twelve months; whatever 
 the credence extended to his own subsequent declarations of 
 the difficulties preventing the complete preparation for the 
 emergency, which he contemplated,* at least there was no 
 
 * The careful reader will hardly have overlooked the passage, in the 
 Message to Congress, in the preceding chapter, in vrhich Mr. Davis thus 
 alludes to this subject: "The active state of military preparation among 
 the nations of Europe, in April last, the date when our agents first went 
 abroad, interposed unavoidable delays in the procurement of arms, and 
 the want of a navy has greatly impeded our efforts to obtain military 
 supplies of all sorts." 
 
 A few months later, he said, speaking with characteristic candor: "I 
 was among those who, from the beginning, predicted war as the conse- 
 quences of secession, although I must admit that the contest has assumed 
 proportions more gigantic than I had anticipated. I predicted war, not 
 because our right to secede and to form a government of our own was 
 not indisputable and clearly defined in the spirit of that declaration, 
 
364 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 room for misconception of his expectations as to the war in its 
 future stages. 
 
 Congratulating the Confederate Congress upon the auspicious 
 awakening of the popular mind from dangerous delusions, even 
 through the hard experience of adversity, he admonishes Con- 
 
 which rests the right to govern on the consent of the governed, but saw 
 that the wickedness of the North would precipitate a war upon us." — 
 Address before Mississippi Legislature, December, 1862. 
 
 Mr. Davis here candidly admits that the "gigantic proportions" of the 
 war exceeded his expectations, as they did also the expectations of the 
 whole country and of the world. He did foresee a great war, and pre- 
 pared for it ; but he was not guilty of the foolish pretension that the war 
 simply realized his expectations, when every statesman of Europe and 
 America was deceived, both as to its duration and magnitude. Who 
 believes that Napoleon the First, equally the unrivaled master of war and 
 diplomacy, would pretend that he foresaw the extent and duration, or the 
 results, of the wars of the empire? that he realized the inextinguishable 
 nature of English hostility, or anticipated the numerous perfidies of 
 Austria? Mr. Seward, who is likely to be remembered, with some dis- 
 tinction, in connection with the diplomacy and statesmanship of the late 
 war, constantly predicted its termination in "ninety days." No opinion 
 can be truthfully ascribed to Mr. Davis indicating a light estimate of the 
 struggle either before or during the war. Yet there is a retrospective 
 statesmanship in the South which now claims that he should have been 
 lifted to its own preternatural powers, and from the fii-st have seen every 
 phase and incident. How absurd must this pretension appear to the 
 sober judgment of fifty years hence. 
 
 Mr. Davis was even accredited in Richmond, by an extravagant and 
 unfounded popular report, with the prophecy that "children then (1862) 
 unborn would be soldiers in the war between the North and South." 
 People in those days saw nothing in the action of the Government indi- 
 cating its faith in a short war. Their only consolation was found in the 
 editorials of Richmond newspapers predicting foreign intervention should 
 McClellan be defeated. 
 
MILITARY EEFOEMS. 365 
 
 gress and the country to prepare for a ^^war lasting through a 
 term of years.'' But a few weeks later and he invited the 
 Legislature of Virginia to contemplate a possible duration of 
 the war for twenty years upon the soil of that State. In 
 all his declarations, public and private, was evidenced the 
 adherence to that original conviction of a struggle long, 
 bloody, and exhaustive, and with varying fortune, which had 
 prompted the heroic assurance, at his first inauguration at 
 INIontgomery, of an " inflexible " pursuit of the object of inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 President Davis sufficiently exposed, in his first message to 
 the new Congress, the evil consequences of the pernicious mili- 
 tary system under which the war had thus far been conducted. 
 Indeed, its evils were apparent, and the country responded to 
 the urgent appeals of the President for a more efficient organ- 
 ization of the armies of the Confederacy — one that should 
 insure a force sufficient to meet the present exigency and to 
 provide for future defense. It was with considerable reluc- 
 tance that he finally recommended the adoption of the act of 
 conscription. Constitutional scruples were at least debatable, 
 but there could be no question as to the appearance of bad 
 faith by the Government, with the patriotic volunteers, who 
 had responded at the first call to arms, and who were now 
 compelled to remain in the field, by a law adopted, just as 
 their term of service was expiring. Yet this was the class 
 necessarily constituting the majority of those who would 
 be subject to the operation of the law, as they were a ma- 
 jority, or an approximate majority, of the arms-bearing popu- 
 lation. 
 
 To one so peculiarly jealous of encroachments by the central 
 power upon the privileges of the States, the proposition had 
 
366 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 additional objections. Mr. Davis had hoped to avoid the 
 necessity of a measure, so much after the manner of military 
 despotism, and sought to take advantage of the patriotic ardor 
 exhibited upon the first rush to arms, by inducing enlistments 
 for the war. Especially distasteful was a resort to compulsion 
 into the ranks, in a war the success of which necessarily de- 
 pended upon the voluntary and patriotic aid of the people, 
 while the enemy, without difficulty, raised a half million of 
 men for their schemes of conquest. 
 
 Second to the object of independence only, the controlling 
 aspiration of President Davis was, that the war might not 
 terminate in the destruction of civil liberty. With evident 
 pride, he proclaimed the honorable fact that, " through all the 
 necessities of an unequal struggle, there has been no act on 
 our part to impair personal liberty or the freedom of speech, 
 of thought, or of the press."* His consistent regard for civil 
 liberty was preserved even in instances where additions to the 
 executive authority would result. The role of Louis Qua- 
 torze, of Frankenstein, or of Caesar, presented no attractions 
 to the republican executive, whose position and authority were, 
 themselves, a protest against the exercise of arbitrary and un- 
 granted powers. 
 
 It is a striking evidence of the contempt for consistency, 
 manifested by Mr. Davis' assailants, that these virtues, so com- 
 mendable in the executive of a free people, should then have 
 actually constituted the ground of accusation, by those M^ho 
 subsequently charged him with an ambition to unite in himself 
 all the departments of the Government. There arose, at this 
 time, a demagogical demand for a " Dictator " — that morbid 
 aspiration characteristic of men of weak nerve and deficient 
 * Inaugural Address, February 22, 1862. 
 
THE CONSCRIPTION LAW. 367 
 
 fortitude, which vainly seeks to make Government more pow- 
 erful for good purposes, by removing all restraints upon its 
 power to do evil. 
 
 Emphatic in the assertion of the authority conferred by the 
 Constitution upon his position. President Davis was no less 
 persistent in his refusal to countenance the investiture of him- 
 self with dictatorial powers. 
 
 But the stern and pressing exigencies of the times out- 
 weighed considerations of even the gravest import, and induced 
 a resort to that measure which the President had hoped to 
 avoid, but upon which now depended the salvation of the 
 country. In accordance with the recommendation of the 
 President, Congress, on the 16th of April, 1862, adopted the 
 conscription law, which was thenceforward, with many ma- 
 terial modifications rendered necessary by circumstances, the 
 basis of the military system of the Confederacy. This law 
 placed at the disposal of the President, during the war, every 
 citizen not belonging to a class exempted, between the ages 
 of eighteen and thirty -five, thus annulling all contracts made 
 with volunteers for short terms. By this act, the States sur- 
 rendered their control over such of their citizens as came 
 within the terms of the act, and in each State were located 
 camps of instruction, for the reception and training of con- 
 scripts. There were other features* of the conscription law, 
 having in view an increased solidity and harmony of the army 
 organization. 
 
 It is impossible to overestimate the immediate benefits real- 
 ized to the Confederacy from this legislation. The incipient 
 disorganization of the army, consequent upon the numerous 
 furloughs granted to such of the men as would reenlist for 
 the war, was instantly checked ; large additions were made to 
 
368 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 commands already in the field, and the discipline and general 
 frame-work of the army greatly improved. 
 
 Second in importance to the adoption of the act of con- 
 scription only, among the accessions of strength to the military 
 system of the Confederacy at this period, was the appointment 
 of General Lee to the general command of the armies, " under 
 the direction of the President."* 
 
 The nature of the position thus assigned to one whom the 
 concurrent criticism of his age pronounces the most eminent 
 of American commanders, has been much misunderstood, and 
 with its discussion has been associated much injurious misrep- 
 resentation of President Davis. 
 
 General Lee, after the failure of his campaign in North- 
 western Virginia, in the autumn of 1861, became the object 
 of a vast amount of disparaging criticism. His case was, 
 indeed, in marked coincidence with that of Sidney Johnston. 
 Both were distinguished in the Federal service; previous to 
 the war they were generally conceded to be the ablest officers 
 of that service; both were known to have been the class- 
 mates of Jefferson Davis and his intimate friends. In their 
 first campaigns, both were adjudged, by the hot and impulsive 
 temper of the time, to have committed gross and signal fail- 
 
 •1 
 
 * The order was in these terms : 
 
 " War Department, 
 "Adjutant and his Inspector-General's Office, 
 
 " March 13. 1862. 
 General Ordsrs, 
 
 No. 14. 
 
 "General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat of Government; 
 
 and, under the direction of the President, is charged with the conduct 
 
 of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy. 
 
 " By command of the Secretary of War. 
 
 "S. COOPER, 
 
 '■'■Adjutant and Inspector-General." 
 
LEE COMMANDING GENERAL. 369 
 
 urc. Neither had many apologists. Johnston was declared an 
 imbecile — a mere martinet, without any of the qualities of 
 true generalship ; and Lee was pronounced incompetent for 
 higher duties than the clerical performances of the War Office. 
 
 President Davis alone remained firm in behalf of these two 
 men, whom a few months sufficed to triumphantly vindicate. 
 What nobler vindication should he himself claim than that, 
 through his firmness and discernment, was given the needed 
 opportunity to the three great soldiers — Lee, Sidney Johnston, 
 and Stonewall Jackson — who, above all others, have illustrated 
 American warfare.* 
 
 It has been erroneously supposed and asserted, that General 
 Lee was assigned the position of commanding general at the 
 special instance of Congress, and in obedience to the pro- 
 claimed will of the people. Whatever may have been the 
 concurrence of the Confederate Congress in the selection made 
 by President Davis of Lee for that position, there is no ground 
 for the hypothesis that the Southern people welcomed this pro- 
 motion of General Lee as an assurance of good fortune in the 
 future conduct of the war. 
 
 Indeed, the act of Congress, creating the office of command- 
 ing general, was adopted at the special suggestion of the Pres- 
 ident, who immediately assigned Lee to the discharge of its 
 duties. Congress designed General Lee to be Minister of War, 
 and, with a view to the promotion of that purpose, repealed a 
 provision which deprived of his rank in the army, a general 
 
 * The fact is not generally known that the President was, upon two 
 occasions, assailed with urgent petitions for the removal of Stonewall 
 Jackson, which he peremptorily rejected on both occasions; first, after 
 the campaign about Romney, in December, 1861, and again, after the 
 battle of Kernstown. March, 1862. 
 
 24 
 
370 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 assigned to the control of the War Office. But President 
 Davis clearly understood the broad and palpable distinction, 
 between the talents requisite for successful administration of 
 that department of the Government, and the genius of a great 
 soldier. He had too just an appreciation of the high military 
 qualities of Lee, to consent to their virtual entombment in a 
 civil position. In accordance with these suggestions, the Pres- 
 ident obtained the adoption of the necessary legislation, and 
 conPrred upon General Lee the control and supervision of the 
 purely military affairs and operations of the war administra- 
 tion. Thus it was neither in compliance with the action of 
 Congress, nor in deference to the popular will, that President 
 Davis selected an appropriate sphere for the genius of Lee, 
 where it " soon dawned upon the admiration of mankind, and 
 retained its effulgence undimmed to the last."* 
 
 The terms of the order assigning General Lee to duty, " un- 
 der the direction of the President," have been construed to 
 signify, that it was not designed that he should exercise those 
 appropriate functions which obviously appertain to the posi- 
 tion of commanding-general. It has been argued that the 
 President thus created Lee a sort of " chief of staff," or orna- 
 mental attache of his military household, with a purely com- 
 plimentary and meaningless title. The selections made by Mr. 
 Davis, of Lee first, and, subsequently, of Bragg, as incumbents 
 of the position, sufficiently repel this absurd conclusion. It 
 is true that the President did not delegate to these officers his 
 constitutional functions as commander-in-chief, but to assist 
 and advise him, in the discharge of those ai'duous and labori- 
 ous functions, required no ordinary skill and experience. The 
 
 * I am mainly indebted for these facts to a recent publication by Pro- 
 fessor Bledsoe, late Assistant Secretary of War of the Confederate States. 
 
CHANGES IN THE CABINET. 371 
 
 well-known confidence, reposed by the President in General 
 Lee, may accurately measure the influence of the latter, upon 
 the Confederate military administration. 
 
 In the progress of those events, Avhich have thus far en- 
 grossed our attention, notable changes had occurred in the 
 cabinet. Early in the summer of 1861, Mr. Toombs had 
 surrendered the portfolio of State, and Mr. Hunter, a former 
 United States Senator from Virginia, whose name was prom- 
 inently associated with the political history of the Union for 
 more than twenty years, was placed at the head of the Con- 
 federate administration. During the ensuing winter, Mr. 
 Hunter retired from the cabinet, and was transferred to the 
 Confederate Senate. 
 
 Mr. Benjamin, originally Attorney-General, had been tem- 
 porarily assigned to the War Department, upon the resignation 
 of Mr. Walker, who was the first incumbent. The connection 
 of Mr. Benjamin with the War Office continued for several 
 months, when he was transferred to the Department of State, 
 where he remained until the overthrow of the Confederacy. 
 The period of his administration of the War De})artment 
 measures an important space in the history of the Confeder- 
 acy. It was a period marked by numerous, consecutive, and 
 appalling disasters, and, as has been already seen, Mr. Benja- 
 min did not escape the penalty of official position during a 
 season of public calamity. We have glanced briefly at the 
 question of his official responsibility, not Avith a view of his 
 vindication, though wc have denied the justice of the unlim- 
 ited reproach, which pursued both himself and Secretary Mal- 
 lory, long after even the pretext had disappeared. 
 
 The censure of Mr. Benjamin was based upon the assump- 
 tion that he was responsible for reverses, which a more skillful 
 
372 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 and attentive management would have avoided. Yet the facts 
 establish the declaration of Mr. Davis that those reverses were 
 unavoidable. They, indeed, simply foreshadowed the fact, 
 which the country soon after realized, of the immense disad- 
 vantage of the Confederate forces in all cases where the naval 
 facilities of the enemy could be made available. Can it be 
 successfully maintained that another in the place of Mr. Ben- 
 jamin would have prevented the fall of Forts Henry and 
 Donelson, of Roanoke Island, of Newbern, of Memphis, of 
 Island No. 10, and of New Orleans? General Randolph, the 
 successor of Mr. Benjamin, is universally conceded to have 
 made a competent secretary of war during his brief term ; yet 
 will it be maintained that had General Randolph, instead of 
 Mr. Benjamin, been the successor of Mr. Walker, that all, or 
 any of those disasters would have been prevented? 
 
 Mr. Benjamin can hardly be deemed less fortunate than his 
 successors. Messrs. Randolph and Breckinridge were, perhaps, 
 fortunate in the brief period of their responsibility, or they, 
 too, might have shared the public censure so freely lavished 
 n}>on Messrs. Walker, Benjamin, and Seddon. 
 
 Perhaps no more thankless position was ever assumed by 
 an official than the management of the War Department of 
 the Confederate States. The difficult problem propounded by 
 Themistocles — "to make a small state a great one" — was of 
 easy solution, compared to that presented the luckless incum- 
 bent of an office, in which the abundance of responsibilities 
 and embarrassments was commensurate only with the poverty 
 of resources with which to meet them. To create an army 
 from a population of between five and six millions, able to 
 successfully cope with an adversary supported by a home 
 population of twenty-five millions, aided by the inexhaustible 
 
THE CHAltGE OF FAVORITISM. 373 
 
 reserves of Europe; with blockaded ports, a newly-organized 
 Government, and a country of limited manufacturing means; 
 to match in the material of war the wealthiest and most 
 j^roductive nation in the world; to maintain the strength and 
 efficiency of an army decimated by its own unnumbered vic- 
 tories, and from a population depleted by successive conscrip- 
 tions, was the encouraging task devolving upon President 
 Davis and his Secretary of War. It is, at least, reasonable to 
 doubt whether even the genius of Napoleon, or of Carnot, was 
 ever summoned to such an enterprise. 
 
 No allegation was made more freely and persistently against 
 Mr. Davis than that of favoritism. At times he was repre- 
 sented as a merciless, inexorable, capricious master, who would 
 tolerate neither intelligence nor indejicndence in his subordi- 
 nates, who were required to be the subservient agents of his 
 will. Again, he was declared an imbecile puppet in the hands 
 of Mr. Benjamin, who, with an amazing protean adaptability, 
 assumed the character of Richelieu, Mazarin, Wolsey, or Jef- 
 freys, as might meet the convenience of the censors. At all 
 times, however, the public was urged to believe Mr. Davis 
 was engaged in devising rewards for unworthy favorites, who, 
 while obsequious to his whims, insolent in the enjoyment of 
 his bounty, and secure under the executive segis, were surely 
 carrying the cause to perdition. 
 
 This allegation of favoritism was assumed to have a con- 
 spicuous illustration in the case of Mr. Benjamin, for whom 
 the President retained his partiality even after he had been 
 censured by Congress, and when his unpopularity was not to 
 be concealed. The same motive was affirmed, however, in the 
 selection of his other advisers ; and to obviate the necessity of 
 detail hereafter, we will dispose of this subject at once. 
 
374 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 Despite the persistent assertion to the contrary, tlie fact is 
 indisputable, that, in the selection of no single member of his 
 cabinet, did Jefferson Davis make use of the opportunity to 
 reward either a friend or a partisan. In no case did personal 
 favor even remotely influence his choice, save in the a})point- 
 nient of Mr. Seddon as Secretary of War — an appointment 
 made with the universal acclaim of the public and the news- 
 papers. James A. Seddon and Jefferson Davis were, indeed, 
 friends of twenty years' standing; but, besides, Mr. Seddon 
 M'as recommended not more by the confidence of the President, 
 than by the unlimited confidence of the country in his intellect, 
 integrity, and patriotism. 
 
 Personal details are frequently not to be denied an impor- 
 tant historical bearing, and the motives of Mr. Davis, in the 
 choice of his cabinet, claim no insignificant page in his official 
 history. We have briefly adverted elsewhere to some of these 
 considerations. 
 
 When the Confederate cabinet was organized at Montgom- 
 ery, Robert Toombs was placed at its head ; yet between Davis 
 and Toombs there had not been close intimacy, hardly mutual 
 confidence — certainly nothing like ardent friendship. But 
 Mr. Toombs represented an overwhelming majority of the 
 people of Georgia, the wealthiest and largest State of the Con- 
 federacy at that period, as determined at their last election. 
 He was peculiarly the representative public man of Georgia ; 
 the most prominent citizen of his State, repeatedly selected 
 for its highest honors, and then a reputed statesman. When 
 Mr. Toombs resigned, his successor was Mr. Hunter, who had 
 served with Mr. Davis in the Senate, and in whose qualifica- 
 tions the President had confidence. They had both been 
 friends of Mr. Calhoun, and disciples of his political school. 
 
DELATIONS AVITII HIS CARINET. 375 
 
 Political accord by no means signifies personal intimacy, and 
 while Mr. Hunter has many admirers, and was greatly re- 
 spected in Virginia and in the Senate, he has not been gener- 
 ally accredited with marked sympathetic tendencies. 
 
 Mr. Benjamin was originally made Attorney-General, because 
 of his high legal reputation, and because Louisiana was en- 
 titled to a representative in the cabinet, but not because of 
 personal considerations, since his relations with Mr. Davis 
 were neither intimate nor cordial. The partiality of the Presi- 
 dent for Mr. Benjamin was, indeed, an after-thought — the 
 result of observation of his wonderful mental resources, his 
 unequal capacity for labor and zealous devotion to the cause. 
 
 Mr. Mallory was recommended for the Navy Department 
 by his previous experience. There had been mutual kind feel- 
 ing between himself and Mr. Davis as Senators, but nothing 
 like close association. Mr. Davis had never seen Mr. Walker 
 until he was appointed Secretary of War, in accordance with 
 the emj)]iatic choice of Alabama. General Randolpli was ap- 
 pointed solely in consequence of Mr. Davis' convictions of his 
 fitness. Previous to the war General Randolph was undistin- 
 guished, save in Virginia, where his fine capacity and exalted 
 worth were becomingly appreciated. General Breckinridge, 
 the last Confederate Secretary of War, was sufficiently recom- 
 mended by his talents and position. Mr. Memmingcr was 
 made Secretary of the Treasury, not as the friend of Mr. 
 Davis, but as the choice of South Carolina. With Mr. Tren- 
 holm, his successor, the President had no personal acquaint- 
 ance, until he became a member of the cabinet. Mr. Davis, 
 tlie last Attorney-General, was originally neither a personal 
 friend nor a party associate of the President; nor was Mr. 
 Watts, his predecessor. 
 
376 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 With the favorable response of Congress and the people to 
 the vigorous and timely suggestions of the President, began a 
 more spirited prosecution of the war, though the season of 
 peril was not yet tided over, nor the current of adversity ex- 
 hausted. Already there were numerous indications of the in- 
 creased scale, and enlarged theatre of operations, which the war 
 now demanded. 
 
 At the conclusion of active operations in the Trans-Missis- 
 sippi district, in the autumn of 1861, the State forces of Mis- 
 souri, still retaining their separate organization, under General 
 Price, and the Confederate forces of McCulloch, were located 
 south of Springfield, near the Arkansas line. An unfortunate 
 phase of the Southern conduct of the war in this quarter, and 
 one from which arose no little apprehension, was the appar- 
 ently irreconcilable difference between Generals Price and 
 McCulloch. With a view to secure the indispensable element 
 of harmony. President Davis, during the winter, appointed 
 Major-General Earl Van Dorn, an able and gallant officer, 
 to the supreme command of military operations in the Trans- 
 Mississippi department. General Van Dorn was a favorite 
 with the President, and his services had already been of a 
 character to justify the high expectations, indulged not less by 
 himself than by the public, of fortunate results of the unan- 
 imity, at last secured in a quarter where its absence had been 
 severely felt. 
 
 The result of the enemy's movements, begun early in Janu- 
 ary, 1862, was the retreat of the weak column of Price to the 
 Boston Mountains, in Arkansas, where McCulloch was en- 
 camped. This junction of the two commands did not result in 
 cooperation until the arrival of General Van Dorn, early in 
 March. With a vigor characteristic of this officer's career, 
 
EVENTS IN THE WEST. 377 
 
 Van Dorn advanced against the enemy, advantageously posted, 
 and with numbers superior to his own force. The result was 
 the battle of Elk Horn, a brilliant but fruitless engagement, 
 in whicii the Southern commander, in consequence of the want 
 of discipline among his soldiers, and partially through the 
 effects of those earlier dissensions with which he had no con- 
 nection, failed to realize the ends at which he aimed.* 
 
 Elk Horn was probably the most considerable engagement, 
 in point of the numbers engaged, fought during the war, west 
 of the Mississippi. Unimportant in its bearing upon the 
 general character of the war, it was a decided check upon the 
 aspiration of the Confederate Government to recover Missouri, 
 and to give its authority a solid establishment in the Trans- 
 Mississippi region. This was afterward the least important 
 theatre of the war, though subsequent events there were by no 
 means unworthy of record. Even at this early stage, the war 
 was rapidly tending to a concentration of the energies of both 
 parties, upon the more vital points of conflict in Virginia, and 
 the central zone of the Confederacy. A few weeks later Gen- 
 erals Van Dorn and Price, with the major portion of the 
 Trans-Mississippi army, were transferred to the scene of oper- 
 ations east of the great river. 
 
 General Albert Sidney Johnston, after his retreat from 
 Nashville, consequent upon the fall of Fort Donelson, paused 
 at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, for a sufficient period to receive 
 accessions to his force, which increased it to the neighborhood 
 of twenty thousand men. These accessions were portions of 
 the command lately operating in South-eastern Kentucky, and 
 remnants of the forces lately defending Fort Donelson. Gen- 
 
 * In this engagement General Benjamin McCuUoch, of Texan fame, a 
 brave and efficient soldier, was killed. 
 
378 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 eral Beauregard, having evacuated Columbus, which, in com- 
 mon with the other posts of the former Confederate line of 
 defense in Kentucky and Tennessee, became untenable with 
 the loss of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, concentrated 
 his forces at Corinth, in the northern part of Mississippi. 
 
 Tiie evacuation of Columbus did not necessarily give the 
 enemy control of the Mississippi above Memphis. A strong 
 po;>ition was taken by the Confederate forces at Island No. 10, 
 forty-five miles below Columbus. Considerable anticipation 
 was indulged by the Southern public, of a successful stand at 
 this point for the control of the Mississippi. It was, however, 
 captured by the enemy ; and in the loss of two thousand men 
 and important material of war by its surrender, the Confeder- 
 acy sustained another severe blow, and the Federal Secretary 
 of the Navy justly congratulated the North, upon a "triumph 
 not the less appreciated because it was protracted and finally 
 bloodless." 
 
 The retirement of the forces of General Albert Sidney John- 
 ston south of the Tennessee River, and the location of General 
 Beauregard's command at Corinth, readily suggested the prac- 
 ticability of a cooperation, by those two commanders, for the 
 defense of the valley of the Mississippi, and the extensive rail- 
 road system, of which Corinth is the centre. With the ap- 
 probation of President Davis, a concentration of troops, from 
 various quarters, ensued, and, about the first of April, an ad- 
 mirable army of forty thousand men was assembled in the 
 neighborhood of Corinth, and upon the railroads leading to 
 that point. There was no situation during the war more as- 
 suring of good fortune to the Confederates, than that presented 
 in Northern Mississippi in the early days of April, 1862. Pres- 
 ident Davis indulged the highest anticipations from this grand 
 
A CHEERING rROMTSE DISAPPOINTED. 379 
 
 combinatiou of forces which he so cortlially approved. He 
 confidently expected a victory from the Western army, led by 
 that officer whose capacity he trusted above all others, which 
 should more than compensate for the heavy losses of the pre- 
 vious campaign. General Johnston was no less hopeful of the 
 situation. The conjuncture was indeed rare in its opportuni- 
 ties. The exposed situation of General Grant, whose command 
 lay upon the west bank of the Tennessee River, witli a most 
 remarkable want of appreciation of its precarious position by 
 its commander, and a total absence of provision for its safety, 
 invited an immediate attack by the Confederate commander, 
 before the Federal column could be reinforced by Buell, then 
 making rapid marches from Nashville. 
 
 The incidents of the battle of Shiloh are familiar to the 
 world. It constitutes, perhaps, the most melancholy of that 
 series of " lost opportunities" in the Confederate conduct of 
 the war, upon which history will dwell with sad interest. The 
 first day's victory promised fruits the most brilliant and en- 
 during. The action of the second day can only be construed 
 as a Confederate disaster. Such was the sentiment of the 
 South, and such must be the verdict of history. 
 
 Shiloh was, perhaps, the sorest disappointment experienced by 
 the South, until the loss of Vicksburg, and the defeat of Gettys- 
 burg threatened the approaching climacteric of the Confederacy. 
 The public grief at the death of General Johnston was tinged 
 with remorse, for the unmerited censure with which the popu- 
 lar voice, encouraged by the press, had previously assailed him. 
 Not until his death did the South appreciate the worth of this 
 great soldier. Never, perhaps, had there been a more sublime 
 instance of self-abnegation than was displayed by Sidney John- 
 ston. 
 
380 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 All through the autumn and winter of 1861 he had main- 
 tained his perilous position in Kentucky, confronted by forces 
 quadruple his own, and yet assailed by an impatient and ig- 
 norant public, for not essaying invasion, with a force which 
 subsequent events proved inadequate for defense. But not 
 even the hideous array of facts following the reverses of Feb- 
 ruary secured his vindication; still he was assailed by an un- 
 reasoning public, instigated by a carping, partisan press. He 
 was ridiculed as incompetent — as one who had traversed the 
 curriculum of West Point, only to become educated in the frip- 
 pery of military etiquette. For the first time. President Davis 
 was charged with a desire to reward favorites, even at the risk 
 of the public welfare, as illustrated by his retention in high 
 command, of one whom actual trial had proven incapable, and 
 undeserving of his previous reputation. 
 
 But President Davis, happily for his own fame, not less 
 than for the fame of this illustrious victim of popular clamor, 
 was unmoved by the censures of the public, and the invectives 
 of the newspapers. He did not permit the confidence which, 
 upon deliberate judgment, and upon a long and intimate ac- 
 quaintance, he had reposed in General Johnston, to be shaken, 
 and sternly repelled the clamor against him, as he afterwards 
 did in the case of Lee, and even of Stonewall Jackson. His 
 habitual reply to importunate petitions for the removal of 
 Johnston was : " If Sidney Johnston is incompetent to com- 
 mand an army, then the Confederacy has no general fit for 
 that position." 
 
 Humanity rejoices in no attribute more noble than the ca- 
 pacity for warm and enduring friendship ; and there is nothing 
 more exalted in the character of Jefferson Davis than his de- 
 votion to his friends. At all times as true as steel to those 
 
TRIBUTE TO SIDNEY JOHNSTON. 381 
 
 for whom he professes attachment, he knows no cold medium, 
 cherishes no feeling of indiiference, but his nature kindles re- 
 sponsively to the warmth in the bosom of others. A like 
 enthusiasm towards himself has usually been the reward of his 
 heroic constancy. In Sidney Johnston there was that touching 
 union of chivalric generosity and tender sympathy, which pe- 
 culiarly qualified him for fellowship with Jefferson Davis. Such 
 friendship, as that which united them, rises to the sublimity of 
 the noblest virtue, and presents a spectacle honorable to human 
 nature. 
 
 President Davis commemorated the death of General John- 
 ston in a communication to Congress, and in terms of touch- 
 ing and appropriate feeling. Said he: 
 
 " But an all-wise Creator has been pleased, while vouchsafing to 
 us His countenance in battle, to afflict us with a severe dispensa- 
 tion, to which we must bow in humble submission. The last, 
 long, lingering hope has disappeared, and it is but too true that 
 General Albert Sidney Johnston is no more. My long and close 
 friendship with this departed chieftain and patriot forbid me to 
 trust myself in giving vent to the feelings, which this intelligence 
 has evoked. Without doing injustice to the living, it may safely 
 bo said that our loss is irreparable. Among the shining hosts of 
 the great and good who now cluster around the banner of our 
 country, there exists no purer spirit, no more heroic soul, than 
 that of the illustrious man whose death I join you in lamenting. 
 In his death he has illustrated the character for which, through 
 life, he was conspicuous — that of singleness of purpose and de- 
 votion to duty with his whole energies. Bent on obtaining the 
 victory which he deemed essential to his country's cause, he rode 
 on to the accomplishment of his object, forgetful of self, while 
 his very life-blood was fast ebbing away. His last breath cheered 
 
382 LIFE OF JEFFEKSON DAVIS. 
 
 his comrades on to victory. The last sound he heard was their 
 shout of victory. His last thought was his country, and long and 
 deeply will his country mourn his loss." 
 
 The battle of Sliiloh was an incident of the war justifying 
 more than a passing notice. Never since Manassas, and never 
 upon any subsequent occasion, had the Confederacy an oppor- 
 tunity so abundant in promise. The utmost exertions of the 
 Government had been employed to make the Western army 
 competent for the great enterprise proposed by its commander. 
 The situation of Grant's army absolutely courted the tremendous 
 blovs^ with which Johnston sought its destruction, a result which, 
 in all human calculation, he would have achieved had his life 
 been spared. At the moment of his death a peerless victory 
 was already won ; the heavy masses of Grant were swept from 
 their positions; before nightfall his last reserve had been 
 broken, and his army lay, a cowering, shrunken, defeated 
 rabble, upon the banks of the Tennessee. That, at such a 
 moment, the army should have been recalled from j)ursuit, 
 especially when it was known that a powerful reinforcement, 
 ample to enable the enemy to restore his fortunes, was hasten- 
 ing, by forced marches, to the scene, must ever remain a source 
 of profound amazement. 
 
 It was the story of Manassas repeated, but with a far more 
 mournful significance. It was not the failure to gather the 
 fruits of the most complete victory of the war, nor the irre- 
 parable loss of Sidney Johnston, wliich filled the cup of the 
 public sorrow. Superadded to these was the alarming discov- 
 ery that the second great army of the Confederacy, in the 
 death of its commander, was deprived of the genius which 
 alone had been proven capable of its successful direction. 
 Johnston had no worthy successor, and the AYesteru army 
 
COMMENTS UPON SHII.OH. 383 
 
 discovered no leader capable of conducting it to the goal 
 which its splendid valor deserved. 
 
 A very perceptible diminution of what had hitherto been 
 unlimited confidence, not only in the genius, but even in the 
 good fortune of Beauregard, was the result of his declared 
 failure at Shiloh. Not even his distinguished services, subse- 
 quently, were sufficient to entirely effiice that unfortunate rec- 
 ord. Military blunders, perhaps the most excusable of human 
 errors, are those which popular criticism is the least disposed 
 to extenuate. The reputation of the soldier, so sacred to him- 
 self, and which should be so jealously guarded by his country, 
 is often mercilessly mutilated by that public, upon whose grat- 
 itude and iudulgence he should have an uulimited demand. 
 We shall not undertake to establish the justice of the public 
 verdict, which has been unanimous, that the course of Gen- 
 eral Beauregard involved, at least, an " extraordinary aban- 
 donment of a great victory." It only remains to state the 
 material from which a candid and intelligent estimate is to be 
 reached. 
 
 General Beauregard has explained his course, in terms 
 which, it is to be presumed, were at least satisfactory to him- 
 self. His official report says : " Darkness was close at hand ; 
 officers and men were exhausted by a combat of over twelve 
 hours without food, and jaded by the march of the preceding 
 day through mud and water." 
 
 General Bragg, who conspicuously shared the laurels of the 
 first day's action, has recorded a memorable protest against 
 the course adopted at its close. Says General Bragg. . . . 
 " It was now probably past four o'clock, the descending sun 
 warning us to press our advantage and finish the work before 
 night should compel us to desist. Fairly in motion, these 
 
384 LIFE OF JEFFER?;OX DAVIS. 
 
 comman<l,s again, with a common head and a common pur- 
 pose, swept all before them. Neither battery nor battalion 
 could withstand their onslaught. Passing through camp after 
 camp, rich in military spoils of every kind, the enemy was 
 driven headlong from every position, and thrown in confused 
 masses upon the river bank, behind his heavy artillery, and 
 under cover of his gunboats at the landing. He had left nearly 
 
 the whole of his light artillery in our hands." 
 
 Tlie enemy had fallen back in much confusion, and vms croioded, 
 in unorganized masses, upon the river banlc, vainly striving to 
 cross. They were covered by a battery of heavy guns, well 
 served, and their two gunboats, now poured a heavy fire 
 upon our supposed position, for we were entirely hid by the 
 forest. Their fire, though terrific in sound, and producing some 
 consternation at first, did us no damage, as the shells all passed 
 
 over, and, exploded far beyond our position The 
 
 sun was about disappearing, so that little time was left us to 
 
 finish the glorious work of the day Our troops, 
 
 greatly exhausted by twelve hours' incessant fighting, without 
 food, mostly responded to the order with alacrity, and the move- 
 
 ment commenced with every prospect of success 
 
 Just at this time, an order was received from the commanding 
 general to withdraw the forces beyond the enemy's fire. 
 
 The testimony of General Polk, also a distinguished partici- 
 pant in the battle, was concurrent with that of General Bragg, 
 and no less emphatic iji its suggestions. In his report is to 
 be found the following passage : 
 
 "The troops under my command were joined by those of Gen- 
 erals Bragg and Breckinridge, and my fourth brigade, under 
 General Cheatham, from the right. The field was clear. The 
 
COMMENTS UrOX SHILOII. 385 
 
 rest of the forces of the enemy were driven to the river and under 
 its bank. We had one hour or more of daylight still left ; were 
 within from one hundred and fifty to four hundred yards of the 
 enemy's position, and nothing seemed wanting to complete the 
 most brilliant victory of the war, but to press forward and make a 
 vigorous assault on the demoralized remnant of his forces. 
 
 "At this juncture his gunboats dropped down the river, near 
 the landing, where his troops were collected, and opened a tre- 
 mendous cannonade of shot and shell over the bank, in the direc- 
 tion from which our forces were approaching. The height of the 
 plain on which we were, above the level of the water, was about 
 one hundred feet, so that it was necessary to give great elevation 
 to his guns, to enable him to fire over the bank. The consequence 
 was that shot could take efi'ect only at points remote from the 
 river's edge. They were comparatively harmless to our troops 
 nearest the bank, and became increasingly so to us as we drew near 
 the enemy and placed him between us and his boats. 
 
 "Here the impression arose that our forces were waging an 
 unequal contest — that they were exhausted, and suffering from a 
 murderous fire, and by an order from the commanding general 
 they were withdrawn from the field." 
 
 President Davis could only share the universal dissatisfac- 
 tion with the unfortunate termination of the battle of Shiloh. 
 A conclusive evidence of his forbearance and justice is seen 
 in the fact, that Ixe did not avail himself of the opportunity to 
 displace an officer, toward whom he was charged with enter- 
 taining such bitter and implacable animosity, when public 
 sentiment would, in all probability, have approved the expe- 
 diency of that step. But General Beauregard was in no danger 
 of mean resentment from President Davis, who so frequently 
 
 braved the anger of the public against its distinguished serv- 
 25 
 
386 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ants. General Beauregard retained the control of the Western 
 army, without interference from the executive, and within 
 a few weeks, by the successful execution of his admirable 
 retreat from Corinth, which he justly declared "equivalent to 
 a brilliant victory," did much to repair his damaged reputa- 
 tion.* So eminent, in its perfection and success, was the 
 
 *When General Beauregard had eluded Halleck at Corinth, and 
 brought his army to Tupelo, he turned over the command to General 
 Bragg, and sought repose and recuperation at Bladon Springs, Alabama. 
 Those who assume to be the friends and admirers of General Beauregard, 
 but who are far more anxious to establish a mean malignity in the 
 character of Mr. Davis, than to exalt their favorite, have laid great stress 
 upon the fact, that the President then placed Bragg in command of the 
 army for the ensuing campaign, thus placing Beauregard in retirement. 
 There can be little difficulty in comprehending the commendable motives 
 which prompted Mr. Davis to this course. The period of General Beau- 
 regard's absence from his command (three weeks, it is understood) would 
 protract the period of inactivity until midsummer. Time was precious. 
 The Western army had done nothing but lose ground all the current 
 year, and, meanwhile, Lee was preparing his part of the operations, by 
 which the Government hoped to throw the enemy back upon the frontier. 
 Was, then, the Western army to lie idle, awaiting the disposition and 
 convenience of one man? With the approval of the army and the 
 country, the President appointed to the vacated command, an able and 
 devoted soldier, whose reputation and service justified the trust. The 
 writer has seen nothing from General Beauregard approving the assaults 
 of his pretended admirers upon Mr. Davis, and it is not unreasonable to 
 suppose that he does not indorse them. 
 
 It is also urged that Mr. Davis, when pressed to remove Bragg and 
 replace Beauregard, declared that he would not, though the whole world 
 should unite in the petition. Very likely, and altogether proper that he 
 should not remove an officer while in the actual execution of his plans 
 of campaign. But there can be no better explanation than that given by 
 Mr. Davis : " The President remarked, that so far as giving Beauregard 
 
FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 387 
 
 retreat of Beauregard with his little army from the front of 
 Halleck, who had more than one hundred thousand men, that 
 a portion of the Northern press admitted that while Shiloh 
 made Grant ridiculous, Corinth made a corpse of Halkck's 
 military reputation. 
 
 As yet there had been no compensating advantage gained by 
 the Confederacy to repair the disasters sustained in the carlv 
 part of the year. Indeed, the train of reverses had hardly 
 been more than temporarily interrupted, when a calamity hardly 
 less serions than the loss of Tennessee happened in the loss of 
 New Orleans, the largest, most populous, and most wealthy 
 city of the Confederacy. This event was speedily followed by 
 the calamitous results- which were to be expected. It was the 
 virtual destruction of Confederate rule in Louisiana. It cut 
 off the available routes to Texas, so inestimable in its impor- 
 
 command of Bragg's army is concerned, that was out of the question. 
 Bragg had arranged all his plans, and had co-intelligence with the De- 
 partment, with Kirby Smith, and Humphrey Marshall ; and to put a neio 
 commander at the head of the army would be so prejudicial to the public 
 interests, he would not do it if the whole world united in the petition." 
 
 But President Davis never designed that General Beauregard should be 
 without a command. With that just appreciation of the real merits of his 
 generals, apart from the cheap applause or unmerited censure of the 
 crowd, which distinguished most of his selections, he placed General 
 Beauregard in charge of the coast defenses, where his reputation Avas 
 certainly much enhanced. In this oft-repeated and unfounded charge of 
 "injustice" and "persecution," in the case of General Joseph E. John- 
 ston, as in that of General Beauregard, there is no specification, more 
 awkwardly sustained, than that which denies the abundant opportunity 
 enjoyed by each of those officers, for the display of the superior genius 
 asserted for them by their admirers. The slightest acquaintance with 
 the history of the war will verify this statement. 
 
388 T.TFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 tance as a source of grain and cattle; gave the enemy a base of 
 operations against the entire gulf region, and was altogetlier 
 disheartening to the South.* 
 
 Some time previous to the fall of New Orleans, which 
 occurred in the latter days of April, the Confederacy had made 
 its most serious effort to dispute the hitherto absolute naval 
 supremacy of the North. On the 8th of March, 1862, oc- 
 curred the famous naval engagement in Hamjiton Roads, be- 
 tween the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, and the Federal 
 Monitor. Ever since the summer of 1861, the Navy Depart- 
 ment had been preparing, at Gosport Navy-yard, a formidable 
 naval contrivance — a shot-proof, iron-plated steam battery. 
 The result of the experiment was a success, which did much 
 to relieve the Navy Department of undeserved reproach, and 
 to produce a revolution in theories relating to naval science 
 and architecture all over the world. 
 
 About this period the activity of the naval forces of the 
 enemy was rewarded by additional successes. The towns of 
 
 * Much crimination and reci'imination followed the fall of New Oi'leans. 
 It is, at least, safe to say, that public opinion in the South was much 
 divided, as to where the burden of censure for this dire and unexpected 
 calamitjr should properly rest. The intelligence of the capture of the city 
 was an appalling surprise, not only to the public in Richmond, but to the 
 Government. President Davis declared that the event was totally unex- 
 pected by him. The fall of New Orleans was one of those instances, in 
 ■which the Confederates had decided for them, in a most unsatisfactory 
 manner, the long disputed question as to the efficiency of shore batteries 
 against vessels of war. Precedents established, when sailing vessels were 
 used in warfare, were overthrown by the experience of steam vessels, 
 especially when iron-plated. Commodore Farragut, with perfect success 
 and comparative ease, passed the forts below New Orleans, after the 
 chief of the naval force had despaired of their reduction. 
 
FEDERAL ^'AVAL SUCCESSES. 389 
 
 Newbcrii, AYashingtou, and other places of less note in Korth 
 Carolina, were captured by naval expeditions in conjunction 
 with detachments from the army of General Burnside. The 
 successes of the Burnside expedition, which had been prepared 
 by the North with such large expectations, were by no means 
 inconsiderable; but they were soon lost sight of in the presence 
 of the more absorbing operations in the interior. The naval 
 resistance of the South had thus far necessarily been feeble. 
 In the subsequent progress of the vvar, except in rare instances, 
 it disappeared altogether as an element in the calculation of 
 means of defense. 
 
 The vulnerability of the South upon the sea-coast, and along 
 the lines of her navigable rivers, measured the extent of the 
 good fortune of the enemy. The North was shortly to yield 
 a reluctant recognition of the comparatively insignificant influ- 
 ence of its long train of triumphs in the promotion of subju- 
 gation. Upon the soil of Virginia— classic in its memories of 
 contests for freedom, the chosen battle-ground of the Confed- 
 eracy—was soon to be shed the effulgence of the proudest 
 achievements of Southern genius and valor— a radiance as 
 splendid as ever shone upon the blazing crest of war. 
 
390 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE "anaconda SYSTEM — HOW FAR IT WAS SUCCESSFUL — TERRITORIAL CON- 
 FIGURATION OF THE SOUTH FAVORABLE TO THE ENEMY — ONE THEATRE OP 
 
 WAR FAVORABLE TO THE CONFEDERATES THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINIA 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE FORCES — THE POTOMAC LINES CRITICAL SITUATION IN 
 
 VIRGINIA — EVACUATION OP MANASSAS — TRANSFER OP OPERATIONS TO THE 
 PENINSULA — MAGRUDER's LINES — EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN — STRENGTH 
 OF THE OPPOSING FORCES BEFORE RICHMOND — DESTRUCTION OF THE "VIR- 
 GINIA" — PANIC IN RICHMOND — MR. DAVIs' CALMNESS AND CONFIDENCE — 
 HE AVOWS HIMSELF " READY TO LEAVE HIS BONES IN THE CAPITAL OF THE 
 
 confederacy" — REPULSE OF THE GUNBOATS — "MEMENTOES OF HEROISM" 
 
 JACKSON's valley campaign — A SERIES OF VICTORIES, WITH IMPORTANT 
 RESULTS — BATTLE OP " SEVEN PINES — A FAILURE — GENERAL JOHNSTON 
 WOUNDED — PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE FIELD — PRESIDENT DAVIS AND GEN- 
 ERAL JOHNSTON — AN ATTEMPT TO FORESTALL THE DECISION OP HISTORY — 
 RESULTS OF LEe's ACCESSION TO COMMAND — JOHNSTON's GENERALSHIP — 
 MR. DAVIs' ESTIMATE OP LEE — LEE's PLANS — THE ADVISORY RELATION BE- 
 TWEEN DAVIS AND LEE — THEIR MUTUAL CONFIDENCE NEVER INTERRUPTED — 
 CONFEDERATE STRATEGY AFTER m'cLELLAN's DEFEAT BEFORE RICHMOND — 
 
 MAGICAL CHANGE IN THE FORTUNES OF THE CONFEDERACY THE INVASION 
 
 OP MARYLAND ANTIETAM TANGIBLE PROOFS OF CONFEDERATE SUCCESS 
 
 GENERAL BRAGG HIS KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN CONFEDERATE HOPES BATTLE 
 
 OP PERRYVILLE BRAGG RETREATS ESTIMATE OF THE KENTUCKY CAJIPAIGN 
 
 OF 1862 — OTHER INCIDENTS OP THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN — REMOVAL OF 
 M'cLELLAN — A SOUTHERN OPINION OP m'cLELLAN — BATTLE OF FREDERICKS- 
 BURG — BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO' — BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE — THE SITUA- 
 TION AT THE CLOSE OP 1862 — PRESIDENT DAVIs' RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
 CONGRESS — HIS VISIT TO THE SOUTH-WEST — ADDRESS BEFORE THE MISSISSIPPI 
 LEGISLATURE. 
 
 T 
 
 HE Federal Government frankly accepted the true 
 teachings of the war in its earlier stages, and no feature 
 
THE "anaconda SYSTEM." 391 
 
 of the lesson was more palpable than the inferiority of the 
 North in the art of war and military administration. No 
 longer trusting, to any extent whatever, to a contest of prowess 
 with an enemy whose incomparable su])eriority was already 
 established, Mr. Lincoln, his cabinet, and his military advisers, 
 were concurrent in their convictions of the necessity of a policy 
 which should make available the numerical superiority of the 
 North. The " anaconda system " of General Scott, adhered to 
 by General McClellan, and sanctioned by the Government and 
 the people, though by no means new in the theory and prac- 
 tice of war, was based upon a just and sagacious view of the 
 situation. 
 
 To overwhelm the South by mere material weight, to crush 
 the smaller body by the momentum of a larger force, compre- 
 hends the Federal design of the war, undertaken at the incep- 
 tion of operations in 1862. The success attending the execu- 
 tion of this design we have described in preceding pages. We 
 have accredited to the enemy the full extent of his successes, 
 and endeavored to demonstrate that they resulted not from 
 Confederate maladministration, but from a vigorous and timely 
 use of his advantages and opportunity by the enemy. But 
 while according to the North unexampled energy in prepara- 
 tion, and an unstinted donation of its means to the purpose, 
 Avhich it pursued with indomitable resolution, no concession of 
 an improved military capacity is demanded, from the fact that 
 use was made of obvious advantages not to be overlooked even 
 by the stupidity of an Aulic council. 
 
 We have shown that the preponderating influence in the 
 achievement of the enemy's victories in the winter and spring 
 of 1862, was his naval supremacy. Even at that period it 
 was palpable that, without his navy, his scheme of invasion 
 
392 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 would be the veriest abortion ever exposed to the ridicule of 
 mankind. The maritime facilities of the enemy were, in the 
 end, decisive of the contest in his favor. 
 
 Upon those fields of military operations which have thus far 
 occupied our attention, we have seen how propitious to the 
 enemy's plans, in every instance, was the geographical config- 
 uration. Wherever a navigable river emptied into the sea, 
 wdiich was the undisputed domain of the North, or intersected 
 its territory, a short and, in many instances, almost bloodless 
 struggle had ended in the expulsion or capture of the Con- 
 federates defending its passage. Yet, in many instances, these 
 results had a most serious bearing upon the decision of the 
 war. It was impossible for Sidney Johnston to hold Ken- 
 tucky and Tennessee unless the Mississippi, running parallel 
 with his communications, and the Cumberland and Tennessee, 
 running in their rear, should remain sealed to the enemy. It 
 Avas equally impracticable to hold the region bordering upon 
 the North Carolina sounds after the fall of Roanoke Island. 
 After the fall of New Orleans, the entire avenue of the Mis- 
 sissippi, except the limited section between Vicksburg and 
 Port Hudson, was open to the enemy, giving him bases of 
 operations upon both its banks, and opening to his ravages 
 vast sections of the Confederacy. 
 
 Thus had the naval supremacy of the enemy brought him, 
 in a few days, to the very heart of extensive sections of terri- 
 tory, which never could have been reduced to his sway, had he 
 been compelled to fight his way overland from his frontiers. 
 Thus was the great element of space, usually so potent in the 
 defense of an invaded people, annihilated, almost before the 
 struggle had been fairly begun. 
 
 The upper regions of Eastern Virginia, remote from the 
 
THE FEDEEAL ARMIES IN VIRGINIA. 393 
 
 navigable tributaries of the Atlantic and the larger rivers, 
 was the only theatre of war, where the superior valor and skill 
 of the Confederates could claim success from the Federal hosts, 
 deprived of their gunboats and water communications. Here, 
 though not entirely neutralized, his water facilities did not at 
 all times avail the enemy ; here the struggle was more equal, 
 and here was demonstrated that sujaerior manhood and sol- 
 diership of the South, which, not even an enemy, if candid, 
 will deny. 
 
 Of the seven hundred thousand men, which were claimed as 
 under arms for the preservation of the Union, in the begin- 
 ning of 1862, it is reasonably certain that more than a half 
 million were actually in the field, and of these at least one- 
 half, were operating in Virginia, with Richmond as the com- 
 mon goal of their eager and expectant gaze. The army of 
 McClellan, numbering little less than two hundred thousand 
 men, in the vicinity of Washington, was entitled to the lavish 
 praise, which he bestowed upon it, in his declaration, that it 
 was "magnificent in material, admirable in discipline and in- 
 struction, excellently equipped and armed." In the valley 
 of the Shenondoah was the army of Banks, more than fifteen 
 thousand strong. General Fremont, with about the same 
 force, commanded the "Mountain Department," embracing 
 the highland region of AVestern Virginia. By the first of 
 March these various commands, with other detachments, had 
 reached an aggregate of quite two hundred and fifty thousand 
 men. 
 
 AVe have sufficiently described those causes, by which the 
 already disproportionate strength of the Confederates, previous 
 to the adoption of the conscription act, and the inception of 
 the more vigorous and stringent military policy of the Con- 
 
394 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 federate Government, was reduced to a condition in most 
 alarming contrast with the enormous preparations of the 
 enemy. 
 
 General Joseph E. Johnston still held his position, with a 
 force which, on the first of March, barely exceeded forty thou- 
 sand men. The command of General Stonewall Jackson, in 
 the Shenandoah Valley, did not exceed thirty-five hundred, 
 embracing all arms. General Magruder held the Peninsula 
 of York and James Rivers, covering the approaches to Rich- 
 mond in that direction, with eleven thousand men, and General 
 Huger had at Norfolk and in the vicinity not more than ten 
 thousand. The Confederate force in Western Virginia was 
 altogether too feeble for successful defense, and indeed, the 
 Government had some months previous abandoned the hope 
 of a permanent occupation of that region. 
 
 The Confederate authorities had long since ceased to cherish 
 hope of offensive movements upon the line of the Potomac. 
 Circumstances imposed a defensive attitude, attended with 
 many causes of peculiar apprehension for the fate of the issue 
 in Virginia. Weeks of critical suspense, and vigilant observa- 
 tion of the threatening movements of the Federal forces, were 
 followed by the transfer of the principal scene of operations to 
 the Peninsula. 
 
 The evacuation of the position so long held by General 
 Johnston at Manassas, executed with many evidences of skill, 
 but attended with much destruction of valuable material, was 
 followed immediately by an advance of General McClellan to 
 that place. The necessity of a retirement by General Johnston 
 to an interior line had been duly appreciated by the Confed- 
 erate Government, though there were circumstances attending 
 the immediate execution of the movement, which detracted 
 
EVACUATION OF MANASSAS. 395 
 
 from its otherwise complete success. The destruction of valu- 
 able material, including an extensive meat-curing establish- 
 ment, containing large supplies of meat, and established by 
 the Government, which ensued upon the evacuation of Manas- 
 sas, elicited much exasperated censure. Similar occurrences at 
 the evacuation of Yorktown, a few weeks later, revived a 
 most unpleasant recollection of scenes incident to the retreat 
 from Manassas. The extravagant destruction of property, in 
 many instances apparently reckless and wanton, marking the 
 movements of the Confederate armies at this period, was a 
 bitter sarcasm upon the practice, by many of its prominent 
 officers, of that economy of resources which the necessities of 
 the Confederacy so imperatively demanded. 
 
 Not only the weakness of his forces indicated to General 
 Johnston the perils of his position, but the territorial config- 
 uration again came to the aid of the enemy, and gave to Gen- 
 eral McClellan the option of several avenues to the rear of the 
 Confederate army. It is not improbable that McClellan ap- 
 preciated the extremity of Johnston's situation, and has, indeed, 
 assigned other reasons for his advance upon Manassas than the 
 expectation of an engagement, where the chances would have 
 been overwhelmingly in his favor. At all events, the retire- 
 ment of General Johnston to the line of the Rapidan, imposed 
 upon the Federal general an immediate choice of a base from 
 which to assail the Confederate capital. Originally opposed to 
 an overland movement via Manassas, McClellan was now 
 compelled to abandon his favorite plan of a movement from 
 Urbanna, on the Rappahanock, by which he hoped to cut off 
 the Confederate retreat to Richmond, in consequence of John- 
 ston's retirement behind the Rappahanock. General McClellan 
 promptly adopted the movement to the peninsula, a plan which 
 
39 G LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 he had previously considered, but which he regarded "as less 
 brilliant and less promising decisive results." * 
 
 When General Johnston left Manassas, it is probable that 
 he was not fully decided as to the position which he should 
 select. Eeceiving a dispatch f from President Davis, he halted 
 the army, and immediately the President left Richmond for 
 Johnston's head- quarters, for the purpose of consultation. 
 General Johnston's position now was simply observatory of 
 the enemy. It was yet possible that McClellan might under- 
 take an overland movement; and, indeed, a portion of his 
 force had followed the retreating Confederates. In that event 
 Johnston would occupy the line upon which Lee subsequently 
 foiled so many formidable Federal demonstrations. From his 
 central position he could also promptly meet a serious demon- 
 stration against Richmond from the Chesapeake waters or the 
 Shenandoah Valley. When the numerous transports at Fort- 
 ress Monroe, debarking troops for the peninsula, revealed the 
 enemy's real purpose, the army of General Johnston was 
 carried to the lines of Magruder, at Yorktown. Johnston 
 was, however, decidedly opposed to the movement to the Pen- 
 insula, declaring it untenable, and urging views as to the 
 requirements of the situation, which competent criticism has 
 repeatedly commended. 
 
 * These revelations of the designs of McClellan are derived from the 
 admirable vs^ork of Mr. Svrinton — the ' ' History of the A rmy of the Poto- 
 mac" — perhaps the ablest and most impartial contribution yet made to 
 the history of the late war. 
 
 It is noteworthy that General Grant attempted nearly the same approach 
 to Richmond and was signally foiled — a fact which he promptly recog- 
 nized, by his change of plan, after his bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, 
 June 3, 1864. 
 
 J This dispatch was in substance : " Halt the army where it is." 
 
FEDERAL DESIGNS. 397 
 
 "While the transfer of Johnston's army to the Peninsula was 
 in process of execution, the situation in Virginia was, in the 
 highest degree, critical. The strength of Magruder was neces- 
 sarily so divided, that the actual force, defending the line 
 threatened by McClellan with eighty thousand men, was less 
 than six thousand Confederates. Meanwhile the various Fed- 
 eral detachments in other quarters were cooperating with the 
 main movement of McClellan. Banks and Shields were ex- 
 pected, by their overwhelming numbers, to crush Jackson in 
 the Shenandoah Valley, and then, forming a junction with the 
 large force of Fremont, who was required to capture Staunton, 
 it was designed that these combined forces should unite with 
 the army of McDowell, advancing from the direction of Fred- 
 ericksburg, at some point east of the Blue Ridge. Thus a. 
 force, aggregating more than seventy thousand men, threatening 
 Richmond from the north, was to unite with McClellan ad- 
 vancing from the east. Such was, in brief, the Federal plan 
 of campaign, which tha North expected to accomplish the re- 
 duction of Richmond and the total destruction of the Confed- 
 erate power in Virginia. It does not devolve upon us to 
 discuss, in detail, the defects of this faulty combination, but 
 the sequel will show how promptly and triumphantly the 
 Confederate leaders availed themselves of the opportunity 
 presented by this crude arrangement of their adversaries. 
 
 Happily the bold attitude and skillful dispositions of Ma- 
 gruder were aided by the over-tentative action of his antagon- 
 ist. The latter, greatly exaggerating the force in his front, 
 and convinced of the hopelessness of an assault upon the 
 Confederate works, permitted the escape of the golden moment, 
 and prepared for a regular siege of Yorktown. In the mean- 
 time General Magruder describes his situation to have been as 
 
398 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 follows: "Through the energetic action of the Government, 
 reenforcements began to pour in, and each hour the Army of 
 the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed 
 from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us." 
 
 The untenability of the Peninsula was very soon made a\)- 
 parent, and the important advantage of ti7ne having been 
 gained, and the escape of General Huger's command from its 
 precarious position at Norfolk secured, General Johnston aban- 
 doned the works at Yorktown, retreating to the Hue of the 
 Chickahominy, near Richmond. This movement was made 
 in obedience to the necessities of the situation, and was in 
 accordance with his original desire for a decisive engagement 
 with McClellan, at an interior point, where a concentration of 
 the Confederate forces would be more practicable. General 
 McClellan did not pursue the retreating column with much 
 energy after the decisive blow given his advance at Williams- 
 burg, by Longstreet. 
 
 With the arrival of Johnston upon the Richmond lines, the 
 Confederate Government began, with energy and rapidity, the 
 concentration of its forces. The superb command of Huger 
 was promptly transferred to Johnston, and troops from the 
 Carolinas were thrown forward to Richmond as rapidly as 
 transportation facilities would permit. By the last of May the 
 Confederate forces in front of Richmond reached an aggregate 
 of seventy-five thousand men. McClellan had sustained losses 
 on the Peninsula which reduced his strength to the neighbor- 
 hood of one hundred and twenty thousand. 
 
 A cruel necessity of the evacuation of Norfolk and Ports- 
 mouth was the destruction of the Confederate iron-clad 
 " Virginia," which had so long prevented the ascent of James 
 River by the Federal gunboats. So invaluable was this vessel 
 
ALARM IN RICHMOND. 399 
 
 in the defense of Richmond, that McClellan had named, as an 
 essential condition of a successful campaign on the Peninsula, 
 that she should be " neutralized." It was found impossible to 
 convey the Virginia to a point unoccupied on either shore of 
 the river by the enemy's forces, and, by order of her com- 
 mander, the vessel was destroyed. Immediately a fleet as- 
 cended the river for the purpose of opening the water highway 
 to the Confederate capital. 
 
 The intelligence of the destruction of the " Virginia," and 
 the advance of the Federal fleet, was received, in Richmond, 
 with profound consternation. No one, unless at that time in 
 Richmond, can realize the sense of extreme peril experienced 
 by the public. There were few who dared indulge the hope 
 of a successful defense of the city against the dreaded "gun- 
 boats " and " monitors " of the enemy, which, the people then 
 believed, were alike invulnerable and irresistible. 
 
 The wise precautionary measures of the Government, in pre- 
 paring its archives for removal, in case of emergency, to a 
 point of safety, greatly increased the panic of the public. Ru- 
 mors of a precipitate evacuation of the city, by the Confederate 
 authorities, were circulated, and there M^as wanting no possible 
 element which could aggravate the public alarm, save the calm 
 demeanor of President Davis, and the deliberate efforts of the 
 authorities — Confederate, State, and municipal — to assure the 
 safety of the city. The courage and confidence of the Presi- 
 dent, in the midst of this almost universal alarm, in which 
 many officers of the Government participated, quickly aroused 
 an enthusiastic and determined spirit in the hearts of a brave 
 people. Knowing the critical nature of the emergency, he 
 was nevertheless resolved to exhaust every expedient in the 
 defense of Richmond, and then to abide the issue. His noble 
 
400 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 and defiant declaration was : " I am ready and willing to leave 
 my bones in the capital of the Confederacy." In response to 
 resolutions from the Virginia Legislature, urging the defense 
 of the city to the last extremity, he avowed his predetermined 
 resolution to hold Richmond until driven out by the enemy, 
 and animated his hearers by an assurance of his conviction, 
 that, even in that contingency, " the war could be successfully 
 maintained, upon Virginia soil, for twenty years."* 
 
 The accounts of the enemy were required to demonstrate 
 to the citizens of Richmond, that, by the obstructions in the 
 channel of the river, and the erection of the impregnable bat- 
 teries at Drewry's Bluff, their homes were again secured from 
 
 *The incidents of this trying period, when Richmond was doubly 
 threatened by the hosts of McClellan, and the gunboats in the river, are 
 •'mementoes of heroism," proudly illustrating the unconquerable spirit of 
 that devoted city and its rulers. We give the resolution passed by the 
 Legislature on the occasion referred to — May 14, 1862: 
 
 ^^Mesolved by the General Assembly^ That this General Assembly ex- 
 presses its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last 
 extremity, if such defense is in accordance with the views of the Presi- 
 dent of the Confederate States; and that the President be assured, that 
 whatever destruction or loss of property, of the State, or individuals shall 
 hereby result, will be cheerfully submitted to." 
 
 Two days after, at a public meeting of the citizens of Richmond, Gov- 
 ernor Letcher said, that under no circumstances would he approve the 
 surrender of the city, and avowed his readiness to endure bombardment, 
 if necessary. In the same stout spirit spoke Mayor Mayo: 
 
 "I say now — and I will abide by it — when the citizens of Richmond 
 demand of me to surrender the capital of Virginia, and of the Confeder- 
 acy, to the enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will 
 resign the mayoralty. And when that other man elected in my stead 
 shall deliver up the city, 1 hope I may have physical courage and strength 
 enough left to shoulder a musket and go into tlae ranks." 
 
Jackson's valley campaign. 401 
 
 tlic presence of the invaders. The significance of that brief 
 engagement, during which the guns were distinctly audible in 
 Richmond, was very soon made evident in the loss of their 
 terrors by the Federal gunboats. President Davis was a spec- 
 tator of the engagement, by which the Coi\federate capital was 
 rescued from imminent peril of capture. 
 
 But the repulse of the gunboats in James River, with its 
 assuring and significant incidents, was the precursor of far 
 more brilliant successes, which, it was evident, would largely 
 affect the decision of the general issue in Virginia. In the 
 months of. May and June, 1862, was enacted the memorable 
 " Valley campaign " of Stonewall Jackson — a campaign which, 
 never excelled, has no parallel in brilliant and accurate con- 
 ception, celerity, and perfection of execution, save the Italian 
 campaign of Napoleon in 1796, General Jackson's exploits in 
 the Valley of the Shenandoah present an aggregate of military 
 achievements unrivaled by any record in American history. 
 
 On the 23d of March, Jackson fought the battle of Kerns- 
 town, near Winchester, with three thousand Virginians against" 
 eighteen full Federal regiments, sustaining, throughout an 
 entire day, an audacious assault upon Shields' force, and 
 at dark leisurely retiring with his command, after having 
 inflicted upon the enemy a loss nearly equal to his own 
 strength. Elsewhere has been mentioned the effort made to 
 induce President Davis to remove Jackson, in compliance with 
 tlie popular dissatisfaction at his failure to achieve, against 
 such overwhelming odds, more palpable fruits of victory. The 
 immediate consequence of Kernstown was the check of Banks' 
 advance in the Valley, and the recall of a large force, then on 
 the way from Banks to aid McClellan's designs against 
 Johnston. 
 
 26 
 
402 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Leaving General Ewell, whose division had been detached 
 from Johnston, to intercept any demonstration by Bunks in 
 the Valley, or across the Blue Ridge, Jackson united his com- 
 mand with that of General Edward Johnson, a full brigade, 
 and defeating the advance of Fremont, under Milroy, at Mc- 
 Dowell, compelled a disorderly retreat by Fremont through 
 the mountains of Western Virginia. Returning to the Valley, 
 he assaulted, with his united foi'ce, the column of Banks, 
 annihilated an entire division of the enemy, pursued its fugi- 
 tive remnants to the Potomac, and threatened the safety of 
 the Federal capital. Alarmed for Washington, Mr. Lincoln 
 halted McDowell in his plans of cooperation with McClellan, 
 and for weeks the efforts of the Federal Government were 
 addressed to the paramount purpose of "catching Jackson." 
 Eluding the enemy's combinations, Jackson turned upon his 
 pursuers, again defeated Fremont at Cross Keys, and imme- 
 diately crossing tlie Shenandoah, secured his rear, and destroyed 
 the advance of Shields within sight of its powerless confed- 
 erate. Resuming the retreat, Jackson paused at Wqj'cr's Cave, 
 and awaited the summons of his superiors to enact his thrill- 
 ing role in the absorbing drama at Richmond. Within the 
 short period of seventy days, Jackson achieved at Kernstown, 
 IMcDowell's, Front Royal, Winchester, Stra.sburg, Harrison- 
 burg, Cross Keys, and Port Rei)ublic, eight tactical victories, 
 besides innumerable successful combats. But he had done 
 more. He had wrought the incomparable strategic achieve- 
 ment of neutralizing sixty thousand men with fifteen thou- 
 sand ; he had recalled McDowell, when, with outstretched 
 arm, McClellan had already planted his right wing, under 
 Porter, at Hanover Court-house, to receive the advance of 
 the cooperating column from Fredericksburg. 
 
"seven pines." 403 
 
 Meanwhile the lines of Richmond had been the scene of 
 no incident of special interest until the battle of "Seven 
 Pines," on the 31st of May. After his arrival upon the 
 Chickahominy, MeClellan had been steadily fortifying his 
 lines, and wherever an advance was practicable, preparing 
 approaches to Richmond. His line, extending over a space 
 of several miles, was accurately described by the course of the 
 Chickahominy, from the village of Mechauicsville, five miles 
 north of Richmouil, to a point about four miles from the citv, 
 in an easterly direction. Having partially executed his design 
 of bridging the Chickahominy, MeClellan had crossed that 
 stream, and in the last days of May, his left wing was forti- 
 fied near the locality designated the " Seven Pines." This 
 initiative demonstration by MeClellan, which placed his army 
 astride a variable stream, was sufficiently provocative of the 
 enterprise of his antagonist. To increase the peril of the 
 isolated wing of the Federal army, a thunder-storm, occurring 
 on the night of the 29th of IMay, had so swollen the Chicka- 
 hominy as to render difficult the accession of reenforcements 
 from the main body. 
 
 Such was the situation which invited the Confederate com- 
 mander to undertake the destruction of the exposed column 
 of his adversary — a movement which, if successful, might have 
 resulted in the rout of the entire left wing of the enemy, open- 
 ing a way to his rear, and securing his utter overthrow. Seven 
 Pines was an action, in which the color of victory was entirely 
 with the Confederates, but it was the least fruiUil engage 
 ment fought by the two armies in Virginia. There was no 
 engagement of the war in which the valor of the Confederate 
 soldier was more splendidly illustrated, though happily that 
 quality then did not require so conspicuous a test. However 
 
 / 
 
404 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 able in design, it was in execution a signal failure — a series 
 of loose, indefinite and disjointed movements, wanting in co- 
 operation, and apparently in able executive management. 
 
 President Davis, in company with General Lee, was present 
 during most of the engagement. Frequently under fire, and 
 in consultation with his generals in exposed positions, he was 
 conspicuous chiefly by his efforts to animate the troops, and 
 his' presence was greeted with evidences of the enthusiasm and 
 confidence which it inspired. 
 
 The battle of " Seven Pines," in itself barren of influence 
 upon the decision of the campaign, was nevertheless attended 
 by an incident — the painful and disabling wound received by 
 General Johnston, in all probability decisive of the future 
 history of the Army of Northern Virginia. Leading to an 
 immediate and positive change of policy, it is hardly a bold 
 declaration that this incident determined the future of the war 
 in Virginia. 
 
 A disposition has been freely indulged to influence the sen- 
 tence of history, by placing President Davis and General 
 Johnston in a sort of antithetical juxtaposition, as exponents 
 of different theories as to the proper conduct of the war by 
 the South. In view of the failure of the Confederacy, it has 
 been ingeniously contended that the result vindicated the wis- 
 dom of General Johnston's views. But besides its evident un- 
 fairness to Mr. Davis, no criticism could be founded less upon 
 the intrinsic merits of the case. Overzealous and intemperate 
 partisans generally evince aptitude in the exaggeration of 
 miiTor diTOrences between the leaders, whose interests they 
 profess to have at heart. Such results are not unfrequent in 
 the lives of eminent public men. In the case of General 
 Beauregard, the unhappy effects of officious intermeddling and 
 
LEE IN COMMAND. 405 
 
 misrepresentation, from such sources, between the President 
 and that distinguished officer, are especially notable. 
 
 But the assumption that events have indicated the wisdom 
 of General Johnston's views, in their declared antagonism to 
 those of Mr. Davis, is altogether unsustained. The immediate 
 results of a change of commanders, and a consequent inaugu- 
 ration of a different policy* — a policy in accordance with Mr. 
 Davis' own views, may, with far more reason, be alleged in sup- 
 port of a contrary theory. The vigorous and aggressive policy 
 adopted and executed by Lee not only accorded with the wishes 
 of the President, but fulfilled the long-deferred popular expec- 
 tation, and agreeably disappointed the public in Lee's capacity. 
 For despite' the general disappointment at the absence of de- 
 cisive achievements by the Army of Northern Virginia, Gen- 
 eral Johnston commanded far more of public confidence, than 
 did General Lee at the period of the latter's accession to 
 command. 
 
 Nothing could have been more disadvantageous to Lee, than 
 the contrast so freely indicated between himself and other 
 officers. Johnston was criticised merely because of the absence 
 of brilliant and decisive achievements. Lee was assumed to 
 have proven his incompetency by egregious failure. He was 
 ridiculed as a closet general. His campaigns were said to 
 exist only on paper — to consist of slow methodical tactics, and 
 incessant industry with the spade, and he was pronounced 
 
 * It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations, 
 similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not there- 
 fore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston's 
 ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely and 
 intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to his 
 aggressive qualities, though in this respect, results were not in his favor. 
 
406 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 totally deficient in aggressive qualities. A prominent Ricli- 
 mond editor, criticising his North-western Virginia campaign, 
 asserted that the unvarying intelligence from Lee was that he 
 was "hopelessly stuck in the mud," and an officer was heard 
 to compare him to a terrapin, needing the application of a hot 
 coal to his back to compel him to action. But with the 
 lapse of a fortnight that army, which received the intelligence 
 of Lee's appointment to command with misgiving and distrust, 
 began to experience renewed life and hope. It was not the 
 few additional brigades given to that army which so soon 
 started it upon its irresistible career of victory. A mighty 
 hand projected its impetus, and directed its magnificent valor 
 against those miles of intrenchments which it had seen grow 
 more and more formidable, itself meanwhile an inactive spec- 
 tator. 
 
 Lee found the army within sight of Richmond ; he lifted 
 it from the mud of the Chickahominy, defeated an enemy in- 
 trenched and in superior force ; pursued the panting and dis- 
 heartened fugitives to the shelter of their shipping ; defeated a 
 second army — then both together — within hearing of the Fed- 
 eral capital ; fought an indecisive battle upon the enemy's soil, 
 and reestablished the Confederate line upon the frontier. Is it a 
 matter of wonder that the President, the army, and the people 
 recognized the significance of these results, and ajiplauded the 
 substitution of the new system and the new status for the old ? 
 A better explanation of so pronounced a contrast is needed 
 than that the "prejudice" or "injustice" of Davis withheld 
 from Johnston, five or even ten thousand men, which he gave 
 to Lee. 
 
 Yet there could be no hypothesis more presumptuous, in 
 view of the abundant testimony of competent military judg- 
 
JOHNSTON S GENERALSHIP. 407 
 
 ment, and none more palpably untenable, than that whicli 
 would deny greatness as a soldier to Johnston. As a eonsuru- 
 mate master of strategy, in that sense which eontenij>hitcs the 
 movements of heavy masses, and looks to grand ultimate 
 results, Johnston has probably few equals. His sagacity in 
 the divination of an enemy's designs is remarkable ; and if 
 he be considered as having marked deficiencies, they must be 
 counted as a lack of Jackson's audacity, of Lee's confident 
 calculation and executive perfection. The South regards 
 Lee as beyond criticism. Jefferson Davis is accustomed to 
 say "the world has rarely produced a man to be compared 
 with Lee." Yet in mere intellectuality, it is at least 
 questionable whether Johnston had his superior among the 
 Southern leaders. 
 
 But it often haj)pens that qualities, however great, are not 
 those which the occasion demands. That marvelous union of 
 qualities in Lee, which has j)laced him almost above parallel, 
 probably made him alone adequate to the hazardous posture 
 of affairs at Richmond in the summer of 1862. The result, 
 at least, made evident to the world, the wisdom of the Presi- 
 dent, in that choice, wliicli was at first declared the undeserved 
 reward of an incompetent favorite. 
 
 Whatever may be alleged to the contrary, President Davis 
 at all times, to the full extent of his power, aided General 
 Johnston in the consummation of his desio:ns. To assert that, 
 upon any occasion, he either interposed obstacles to Johnston's 
 success, or denied him any means in his power to confer, is 
 to question tliat personal fidelity of Jefferson Davis, which his 
 bitterest enemy should be ashamed to deny. Few Southern 
 men, at least, have yet attained that measure of malignity, or 
 that hardihood of mendacity. 
 
408 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 General Lee was not dilatory in his preparations to gratify- 
 that longing aspiration which the President, on his .own be- 
 half, and in the name of the country, briefly expressed, that 
 " something should be done." Lee had a carte blanche, but 
 frequent and anxious were the consultations between the Pres- 
 ident and himself. The world now knows what followed those 
 days and nights of anxious conference, in which were weighed 
 the chances of success, the cost of victory, and the possibilities 
 of defeat. The plan executed by General Lee was one of the 
 most hazardous ever attempted in war, but it was- not less 
 brilliant than bold, and at least one precedent had been fur- 
 nished by the great master of the art of war at Austerlitz. 
 Its perils were obvious, but the sublime confidence of Lee in 
 the success of his combinations went far to secure its own jus- 
 tification. 
 
 During the week of engagements which followed, the Pres- 
 ident was constantly with the army and fully advised of its 
 movements.* The cordial recognition of this advisory rela- 
 tion between himself and Lee, is indicated by the natural 
 pride, and becoming sense of justice, with which the latter, in 
 the report of his operations against McClellan, mentions the 
 approving presence of the President, during the execution of 
 
 * Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this circum- 
 stance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing the 
 army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted, 
 was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the 
 battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The 
 President, in company with General Magruder and other ofl5cers, was at 
 a farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to 
 open. General Lee, apprised of the President's whereabouts, sent a cou- 
 rier to warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped with- 
 out injury, just as the Federal battery opened fire. 
 
DAVIS AND LEE. 409 
 
 his plans. Tliis noble harmony between Davis and Lee, 
 equally creditable to each, was never interrupted by one sin- 
 gle moment of discord. It was never marred by dictation on 
 one side, or complaint on the other. Unlike other command- 
 ers, Lee never complained of want of means, or of opportunity 
 for the execution of his plans. Satisfied that the Government 
 was extending all the aid in its power, he used, to the best 
 advantage, the means at hand and created his opportunities. 
 Lee never charged the President with improper interference 
 with the army, but freely counseled with his constitutional 
 commander-in-chief, whom he knew to be worthy of the trust 
 conferred by the country in the control of its armies. Presi- 
 dent Davis fully comprehended and respected the jealous func- 
 tions of military command, and in the exercise of that trust 
 no one would have more quickly resented unauthorized official 
 interference. A soldier himself, he recognized freedom of ac- 
 tion as the privilege of the commander; as a statesman, he 
 rendered that cordial cociperation, which is the duty of gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 When Lee had driven McClellan from his position along 
 the Chickahominy, he had raised the siege of Richmond. The 
 retreat of McClellan to the James River, conducted with such 
 admirable skill, and aided by good fortune, placed the Federal 
 army in a position where, secure itself, another offensive move- 
 ment against the Confederate capital might, in time, be un- 
 dertaken. Confederate strategy, however, soon relieved Rich- 
 mond from the apprehension of attack, and in less than two 
 months from the termination of the pursuit of McClellan, Lee, 
 by a series of masterly strokes, demolished the armies under 
 Pope, united for the defense of Washington, and was prepar- 
 ing an invasion of Maryland. 
 
410 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 An almost magical change in the fortunes of the Confeder- 
 acv was wrought by these active and brilliant operations, em- 
 bracing so short a period, and marked by results of such mag- 
 nitude. 
 
 Not only were the two main armies of the enemy defeated, 
 but the entire Federal campaign in the East had been entirely 
 disconcerted. Richmond was saved, Washington menaced, 
 and McClellan forced back to the initial point of his cam- 
 paign. Western Virginia, the Carolina coast, and other local- 
 ities, for months past in Federal occupation, were almost 
 divested of troops to swell the hosts gathering for the rescue 
 of Washington, and to meet the dreaded advance, northward, 
 of Lee's invincible columns. From the heart of Virginia the 
 cloud of war was again lifted to the Potomac frontier ; the 
 munificent harvests of the valley counties, of Fauquier, Lou- 
 don, and the fertile contiguous territory, were again in Con- 
 federate possession, and a numerous and victorious army Avas 
 now anxious to be led across the Rubicon of the warring 
 sections. 
 
 From harrowing apprehension, from vague dread of inde- 
 finable but imminent peril, the South was transported to the 
 highest round of confident expectation. The North, which, in 
 the last days of June, eagerly awaited intelligence of McClel- 
 lan's capture of Richmond, now regarded its own capital as 
 doomed, and did not permit itself to breathe freely until 
 McClellan announced the safety of Pennsylvania, when Lee 
 had retired to Virginia. 
 
 The inducements which invited a movement of the Con- 
 federate forces across the Potomac were manifold. Whatever 
 judgment the result may now suggest, the invasion of Mary- 
 land was alike dictated by sound military policy and justi- 
 
INVASION OF MATIYT>AND. 411 
 
 fied by those moral considerations which are ever weighty in 
 war. The overwhehning defeat of Pope more than realized 
 the hope of President Davis and General Lee, when the stra- 
 tegic design of a movement northward was put in execution, 
 by which was sought the double purpose of withdrawing 
 McClellan from James. River and effectually checking the 
 advance of Pope. The successive and decisive defeats of Pope 
 offered the prospect of an offensive by which the splendid 
 successes of the campaign might be crowned with even more 
 valuable achievements. Demoralized, disheartened, in every 
 way disqualified for effectual resistance, the remnants of the 
 armies which Lee had beaten, each in succession, and then 
 combined, would be an easy prey to his victorious legions, 
 could they be brought to a decisive field engagement. There 
 yet remained time, before the end of the season of active oper- 
 ations, for crushing blows at the enemy, which would finish 
 the work thus far triumphantly successful. 
 
 To inflict still greater damage upon the enemy — to so oc- 
 cupy him upon the frontier as to prevent another demon- 
 stration against Richmond during the present year— ^to indi- 
 cate friendship and sympathy for the oppressed people of 
 Maryland — to derive such aid from them as their condition 
 would enable them to extend, were the potent inducements 
 inviting the approbation of the Confederate authorities to a 
 movement across the Potomac. President Davis was pledged 
 to an invasion of the enemy's country whenever it should 
 prove practicable. Now, if ever, that policy was to be ini- 
 tiated. Hitherto the enemy's power, not the will of the 
 Confederate Government, had prevented. Now that power 
 was shattered. The mighty fabric trembled to its base, and 
 who would now venture to estimate the consequences of a 
 
412 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 brilliant victory by Lee, on Maryland soil, in September, 
 1862? What supjwrter of the Union can now dwell, without 
 a shudder, upon the imagination, even, of a repetition, at Autie- 
 tam, of the story of the Chickahominy, or Second Manassas? 
 
 The climax of the Maryland campaign was the battle of 
 Antietam — a drawn battle, but followed by the early with- 
 drawal of the Confederate army into Virginia. It is unneces- 
 sary to dwell upon the causes conspiring to give this portion 
 of the campaign many of the features of failure. With a force 
 greatly reduced by the straggling of his weary and exhausted 
 troops, Lee was unable to administer the crushing blow which 
 he had hoped to deliver.* As a consequence, the people of 
 Maryland, of whom a large majority were thoroughly patriotic 
 and warm in their Southern sympathies, were not encouraged 
 to make that effective demonstration which would inevitably 
 have followed a defeat of McClellan. 
 
 Nevertheless, there was some compensation in the terrible 
 punishment inflicted upon the enemy at Antietam; and there 
 was the heightened prestige, so greatly valued by the South at 
 this period, in the eyes of Europe, arising from the temper 
 and capacity of the weaker combatant to undertake so bold an 
 enterprise. In the tangible evidences of success afforded by the 
 caj)ture of Harper's Ferry, with its numerous garrison su})plies 
 of arms and military stoi-es, was seen additional compensation 
 for the abandonment of the scheme of invasion. 
 
 * A serious disadvantaire suffered by General Lee was the capture of hie 
 plan of l^attle by (General McClellan. Completely informed as to his ad- 
 versivry's movements, and Avith ninety thousand men against thirty-three 
 thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confeder- 
 ate anny. The means Ijy which tlie enemy obtained this important paper 
 was a subject of much j^ossip iu the Confederacy. 
 
THE KENTUCKY CAMrATGN. 413 
 
 An interval of repose was permitted the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, after its return from Maryland, in its encampments 
 near "Winchester, during wliich it was actively strengthened 
 and recruited to the point of adequate preparation for ex- 
 pected demonstrations of the enemy. 
 
 The operations of the Western army, in many respects, were 
 a brilliant counterpart to the campaign in Virginia, though 
 lacking its brilliant fruits. We have mentioned the circum- 
 stance which placed General Braxton Bragg in command of 
 the Western army, after its successful evacuation of Corinth. 
 General Bragg was equally high in the confidence of the 
 President and the Southern people. Greatly distinguished by 
 his services in Mexico, his skillful handling, at Shiloh, of the 
 magnificent corps of troops, which his discipline had made a 
 model of efficiency, more than confirmed his Mexican fame. 
 
 Space does not permit us to follow, in detail, the execution 
 of the able and comprehensive strategy, by which General 
 Bragg relieved large sections of Tennessee and Alabama from 
 the presence of the enemy, penetrated the heart of Kentucky, 
 maintained an active offensive during the summer, and trans- 
 ferred the seat of war to the Federal frontier. A part of these 
 operations was the hurried retreat of Buell's immense army, 
 from its posts in Alabama and Tennessee, for the defense of 
 Louisville and Cincinnati ; large captures of prisoners, horses, 
 arms and military stores; and the brilliant progress and 
 successive victories of Kirby Smith and Morgan. For weeks 
 the situation in Kentucky seemed to promise the unqualified 
 success of the entire Western campaign. There was, indeed, 
 reasonable hope of a permanent occupation of the larger 
 portion of Kentucky and Tennessee by the Confederate 
 forces. 
 
414 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 But the battle of Periyvilie — an engagement not unlike 
 Antietam in its doubtiiil claim as a Federal victory — was fol- 
 lowed by the retreat of General Bragg, which was executed 
 witli skill, and with results going far to relieve the disappoint- 
 ment of tlie [)opular hope of a permanent occupation of Ken- 
 tucky. Bucll, on his arrival at Louisville, whither he had re- 
 treated, received heavy reenforccments, which greatly increased 
 his already superior numbers; and Perryviile, a battle which 
 General Bragg fought, rather to secure his retreat than with 
 the expectation of a decisive victory, would have been an over- 
 whelming Confederate success, had Bragg been sufficiently 
 strong to follow up his advantage. 
 
 No Confederate commander, save Lee and Jackson, was ever 
 able to present a claim of a successful campaign so well grounded 
 as the Kentucky campaign of Bragg. With a force of forty 
 thousand men, he killed, wounded, and captured more than 
 twenty thousand of the enemy ; took thirty pieces of artillery, 
 thousands of small arms ; a large supply of wagons, harness, 
 and horses ; and an immense amount of subsistence, ample not 
 only for the sui^nort of his own army, but of other forces of 
 the Confederacy! ^ During the succeeding autumn and winter, 
 Bragg's army was conspicuous for its superior organization, 
 admirable condition and tone ; was abundantly supplied with 
 food and clothing, and in larger numbers than when it started 
 upon its campaign in August. Moreover, General Bragg re- 
 deemed North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, and recovered 
 possession of Cumberland Gap, the doorway, through the 
 mountains, to Knoxville and the Virginia and Tennessee Rail- 
 road — the main avenue from Richmond to the heart of the 
 Confederacy. Evincing his determination to hold the recov- 
 ered territory, General Bragg, within a mouth from his return 
 
GENERAL m'CLELLAX. 415 
 
 from Kentucky, was confronting the principal army of the 
 enemy, in the West, before Nashville. 
 
 Incidental to the movement of Bragg into Kentucky, and 
 constituting a part of the programme, attempted upon the 
 large theatre of the Western campaign, were the repulse of 
 the first attack of the enemy upon Vicksburg, the partial fail- 
 ure of General Breckinridge's expedition to Baton Rouge, and 
 the serious reverse sustained by Van Dorn at Corinth. In 
 connection with the more important demonstration into Ken- 
 tucky, these incidents of the Western campaign may be briefly 
 aggregated as the recovery of the country between Nashville 
 and Chattanooga, and the important advantage of a secure 
 occupation of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, thus closing the 
 Mississippi to the enemy for two hundred miles. 
 
 Subsequent operations in Virginia, at the close of 1862, 
 were entirely favorable to the Confederacy. While the two 
 armies were confronting each other, with the imminent pros- 
 pect of active and important operations. General McClellan 
 was relieved, and one of his corps commanders. General Burn- 
 side, assigned to the command of the Federal army of the 
 Potomac. As is now universally acknowle^.^v.d, General jSIc- 
 Clellan was sacrificed to the clamor oi a political faction. By 
 this act Mr. Lincoln became responsible for much of the ill- 
 fortune which awaited the Federal arms in Virginia. 
 
 Perhaps among his countrymen, a Southern tribute to Gen- 
 eral McClellan may constitute but feeble praise. He was un- 
 questionably the ablest and most accomplished soldier exhib- 
 ited by the war on the Northern side. " Had there been no 
 IMcClellan," General Meade is reported to have said, "there 
 would have been no Grant." In retirement, if not exile, 
 General McClellan saw the armies which his genius created, 
 
416 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 achieve undeserved distinction for men, his inferiors in all that 
 constitutes true generalship. He saw the feeble and wasted 
 remnant of an army, with which he had grappled in the day 
 of its glory and strength, surrender to a multitudinous host, 
 doubly as large as the army with which he had given Lee his 
 first check at Antietam. A true soldier, McClellan was also 
 a true gentleman, an enemy whose talents the South respects 
 none the less, because he did not wantonly ravage its homes, 
 nor make war upon the helpless, the aged, and infirm. Presi- 
 dent Davis, who, while Federal Secretary of War, conferred 
 upon McClellan a special distinction, held his genius and at- 
 tainments in high estimation. He received the intelligence of 
 his removal with profound satisfaction. 
 
 The North was not required to wait long for a competent 
 test of the new commander's capacity. Foiled and deceived 
 by Lee, in a series of maneuvres, the results of which made 
 him only less ridiculous than the gasconading Pope among 
 Federal commanders, Burnside finally assailed Lee, on the 
 13th December, at Fredericksburg. The result was a bloody 
 slaughter, unequaled in previous annals of the war, an over- 
 whelming repulse, and a demoralized retreat across the Rap- 
 pahannock. 
 
 The Western campaign terminated with the battle of Mur- 
 freesboro'. The Federal commander, Rosecrans, the successor 
 of Buell, advanced from Nashville to drive Bragg from his 
 position. A brilliant and vigorous attack by Bragg, on the 
 31st December, routed an entire wing of the Federal army; 
 on the second day the action was more favorable to Bosecrans, 
 who had retreated, after his reverse on the first day, to stronger 
 positions. Receiving information that the enemy was strongly 
 
IMPEOVED PEOSPECTS OF THE CONFEDEEACY. 417 
 
 reenforcing, General Bragg fell back to Tullahoma, a position 
 more favorable for strategic and defensive purposes. 
 
 The transfer, after the battle of Shiloh, of the troops of 
 Price and Van Dorn to the army east of the Mississippi, had 
 almost divested the Trans-Mississippi Department of interest in 
 the public mind. After Elk Horn, there was but one consid- 
 erable engagement, in 1862, west of the Mississippi. This was 
 the battle of Prairie Grove, a fruitless victory, won by Gen- 
 eral Hindman, about the middle of December. The country 
 north of the Arkansas River continued to be nominally held 
 by the Federal forces. 
 
 Thus, in nearly every quarter, the second year of the war 
 terminated with events favorable to the prospects of Southern 
 independence. Though the territorial jurisdiction of the Con- 
 federacy was contracted, the world was not far from regarding 
 the task of subjugation as already a demonstrated and hope- 
 less failure. All the invasive campaigns of the enemy, save 
 the first shock of his overwhelming onsets against weak and 
 untenable posts, in the winter and early spring, had been 
 brought to grief, and nowhere had he maintained himself away 
 fi'om his water facilities. An unexampled prestige among 
 nations now belonged to the infant power, which had carried 
 its arms from the Tennessee to the Ohio, had achieved a week 
 of victories before its own capital, and carried the w^ar back 
 to its threshold. After such achievements the Southern Con- 
 federacy rightly claimed from those powers which have assumed 
 to be the arbiters of international right an instant recognition 
 upon the list of declared and established nationalities. 
 
 In our brief and cursory glance at military operations, 
 we have omitted to mention the action of the Government 
 designed to promote the successful prosecution of the war. 
 27 
 
418 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 This action is mainly comprehended by the various sug- 
 gestions of the President's messages to Congress. These rec- 
 ommendations related chiefly to measures having in view the 
 increased efficiency of the service. He invited the attention 
 of Congress, especially, to the necessity of measures securing 
 the proper execution of the conscription law, and the consoli- 
 dation of companies, battalions and regiments, when so reduced 
 in strength as to impair that uniformity of organization, 
 which was necessary in the army. Legislation was urged, 
 having in view a better control of military transportation on 
 the railroads, and the improvement of their defective condi- 
 tion. The President also recommended various propositions 
 relating to organization of the army, and an extension of the 
 provisions of the conscription law, embracing persons between 
 the ages of thirty-five and forty-five years. 
 
 About the middle of December President Davis visited the 
 camps of the Western Department, spending several weeks in 
 obtaining information as to the condition and wants of that 
 section of the Confederacy, and devising expedients for a more 
 successful defense in a quarter where the Confederate cause 
 was always seriously menaced. His presence was highly bene- 
 ficial in allaying popular distrust, founded upon the supposi- 
 tion that Virginia and the Atlantic region engrossed the at- 
 tention of the Government to the exclusion of concern for the 
 West and the Mississippi Valley. When the President re- 
 turned to Richmond, there were signs of popular animation 
 in the South-west, which justified a more confident hope of 
 the cause, than the South was permitted to indulge at any 
 other period of the struggle. 
 
 An incident of this visit was the address of the President 
 before the Mississippi Legislature. The warm affection of 
 
MR. DAVIS IN MISSISSIPPI. 419 
 
 Mr. Davis for Mississippi is more than reciprocated by the 
 noble and chivalrous people of that State. He was always 
 proud of the confidence reposed in him by such a community, 
 and Mississippi can never abate her affection for one who so 
 illustrated her name in the council chamber and upon the field 
 of battle. In this address he alluded, with much tenderness, 
 to this reciprocal attachment, declaring, that though "as 
 President of the Confederate States, he had determined to 
 make no distinction between the various parts of the country — 
 to know no separate State — yet his heart always beat more 
 warmly for Mississippi, and he had looked on Mississippi 
 soldiers with a pride and emotion, such as no others inspired." 
 Declaring that his course had been dictated by the sincere 
 purpose of promoting the cause of independence, he admon- 
 ished the country to prepare for a desperate contest, with a 
 power armed for the purposes of conquest and subjugation. 
 He characterized severely the conduct of the war by the 
 North. Reviewing its progress, and recounting the immense 
 disadvantages, with which the South contended, he maintained 
 that the South should congratulate itself on its achievements, 
 and not complain that more had not been aceomi3lished. The 
 conscription law was explained and defended as to many of 
 its features not clearly understood by the people. We give 
 an extract from Mr. Davis' remarks as to the Confederate 
 conscription, a subject of vast misrepresentation during the 
 war, and of much ignorant censure since : 
 
 " I am told that this act has excited some discontentmeut, and 
 that it has provoked censure far more severe, I believe, tlui^ it 
 deserves. It has been said that it exempts the rich from miUtary 
 service, and forces the poor to fight the battles of the country. 
 The poor do, indeed, fight the battles of the country. It is the 
 
420 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 poor who save nations and make revolutions. But is it true that, 
 in this war, the men of property have shrunk from the ordeal of 
 the battle-field ? Look through the army ; cast your eyes upon 
 the maimed heroes of the war whom you meet in your streets and 
 in the hospitals ; remember the martyrs of the conflict ; and I am 
 sure you will find among them more than a fair proportion drawn 
 from the ranks of men of property. The object of that portion 
 of the act which exempts those having charge of twenty or more 
 negroes, was not to draw any distinction of classes, but simply to 
 provide a force, in the nature of a police force, sufl&cient to keep 
 our negroes in control. This was the sole object of the clause. 
 Had it been otherwise, it would never have received my signature. 
 As I have already said, we have no cause to complain of the 
 rich. All our people have done well ; and, while the poor have 
 nobly discharged their duties, most of the wealthiest and most 
 distinguished families of the South have representatives in the 
 ranks. I take, as an example, the case of one of your own repre- 
 sentatives in Congress, who was nominated for Congress and 
 elected, but still did a sentinel's duty until Congress met. Nor 
 is this a solitary instance, for men of largest fortune in Mississippi 
 are now serving in the ranks." 
 
 The President strongly and eloquently recommended the 
 provision by the Legislature for the families of the absent 
 soldiers of Mississippi. Said he : " Let this provision be made 
 for the objects of his affection and his .solicitude, and the sol- 
 dier, engaged in fighting the battles of his country, will no 
 longer be disturbed in his slumbers by dreams of an unpro- 
 tect(jd and neglected family at home. Let him know that his 
 mother Mississippi has spread her protecting mantle over those 
 he loves, and he will be ready to fight your battles, to protect 
 your honor, and in your cause to die." 
 
MR. DAVIS' VIEW OF THE SITUATION. 421 
 
 The address concluded with an earnest appeal for unrelaxed 
 exertion, and the declaration that, "in all respects, moral as 
 well as physical, the Confederacy was better prepared than it 
 was a year previous" — a declaration verified not less by the 
 favorable situation than by the evident apprehension of the 
 North and the expectations of Europe. 
 
422 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 RESPECT OP MANKIND FOR THE SOUTH — THE MOST PROSPEROUS PERIOD OP THE 
 WAR — HOW MR. DAVIS CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISTINCTION OF THE SOUTH — 
 FACTION SILENCED — THE EUROPEAN ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS — HOW 
 HE DIGNIFIED THE CAUSE OF THE SOUTH — HIS STATE PAPERS — HIS ADMINIS- 
 TRATION OF CIVIL MATTERS — THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS 
 — MR. DAVIs' OBSERVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS — ARBITRARY AD- 
 MINISTRATION OF MR. LINCOLN — MR. DAVIs' MODERATION — HE SEEKS TO CON- 
 DUCT THE WAR UPON CIVILIZED IDEAS — AN ENGLISH CHARACTERIZATION OP 
 DAVIS — COLONEL FREEMANTLE's INTERVIEW WITH HIM — MR. GLADSTONE'S 
 OPINION — THE PURELY PERSONAL AND SENTIMENTAL ADMIRATION OF EUROPE 
 FOR THE SOUTH — INCONSISTENT CONDUCT OF THE EUROPEAN GREAT POWERS — 
 THE LONDON " TIMES " BEFORE m'cLELLAn's DEFEAT — THE CONFEDERACY EN- 
 TITLED TO RECOGNITION BY EUROPE — ENGLAND'S SYMPATHY WITH THE NORTH 
 — DIGNIFIED ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS UPON THE SUBJECT OF RECOGNI- 
 TION — HIS EARLY PREDICTION UPON THE SUBJECT — FRANCE AND ENGLAND 
 EXPOSED TO INJURIOUS SUSPICIONS — TERGIVERSATIONS OP THE PALMERSTON 
 CABINET THE BROAD FARCE OF "BRITISH NEUTRALITY" — ENGLAND DE- 
 CLINES TO UNITE WITH FRANCE IN AN OFFER OF MEDIATION BETWEEN THE 
 AMERICAN BELLIGERENTS— England's "policy" — SHE SOUGHT THE RUIN OF 
 BOTH SECTIONS OF AJIERICA — CULMINATION OF THE ANTISLAVERY POLICY OP 
 THE NORTH — MR. LINCOLN'S CONVERSATION WITH A KENTUCKY MEMBER OP 
 CONGRESS — THE WAR A " CRIME " BY MR. LINCOLN'S OWN SHOWING — VIOLA- 
 . TION OP PLEDGES AND ARBITRARY ACTS OP THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — THE 
 MASK REMOVED AFTER THE BATTLE OP ANTIETAM — THE REAL PURPOSE OP 
 EMANCIPATION — MR. DAVIs' ALLUSION TO THE SUBJECT — INDIGNATION OF THE 
 
 SOUTH AT THE MEASURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TEXAS AND MISSISSIPPI 
 
 VICKSBURG PORT HUDSON LOSS OF ARKANSAS POST FEDERAL FLEET RE- 
 PULSED AT CHARLESTON PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN — UNITY AND 
 
 CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH — MR. DAVIs' ADDRESS TO THE COUNTRY — IMPOR- 
 TANT EXTRACTS GENERAL LEE PREPARES FOR BATTLE — HIS CONFIDENCE — 
 
 CONDITION OF HIS ARMY — BATTLE OP CHANCELLORSVILLE — JEFFERSON DAVIs' 
 TRIBUTE TO STONEWALL JACKSON. 
 
 T 
 
 HERE is much justice in the sentiment that declares 
 that there can be maojnificence even in failure. Men 
 
THE EUROPEAN ESTIMATE OF MR. DAVIS. 423 
 
 often turn to the contemplation of roles enacted in historv, 
 ending in disaster and utter disappointment of the originating 
 and vitalizing aspiration, with flir more of interest than has 
 been felt in following records marked by the palpable tokens 
 of complete success. 
 
 It may. well be doubted, whether the Confederate States of 
 America, even had victory crowned their prolonged struggle 
 of superhuman valor and unstinted sacrifice, could have corn- 
 manded more of the esteem of mankind, than will be awarded 
 them in the years to come. Retrospect of the most prosperous 
 period of the fortunes of the Confederacy — the interval be- 
 tween the battle of Fredericksburg, December, 1862, and the 
 ensuing midsummer — reveals a period in which there was 
 wanting no element of glory, of pride, or of hope. Many a 
 people, now proudly boasting an honored recognition at the 
 council-board of nations, might envy the fame of the meteor 
 power which flashed across the firmament, with a glorious 
 radiance that made more mournful its final extinguishment. 
 
 A notable feature of the distinction which the South, at that 
 time especially, commanded in the eyes of the world, was the 
 enthusiastic and universal tribute of mankind to the leader, 
 whose genius, purity, dignity, and eloquence so adorned the 
 cause of his country. The North sought to console its wounded 
 national pride by accounting for the crushing and humiliating 
 defeats of the recent campaign, by contrasts between the 
 able leadership of its antagonist, and its own imbecile admin- 
 istration. At the South faction was silenced, in the presence 
 of the wondrous results achieved in spite of its own outcries 
 and prophecies of failure. Demagogues, in such a season of 
 good fortune, ceased their charges of narrowness, of rash 
 zealotry, of favoritism, of incompetency, seemingly conscious, 
 
424 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 for once, of the praise which they bestowed upon the Exec- 
 utive, whom they accused of usurping all the authority of 
 the Government, in ascribing such results to his unaided ca- 
 pacity. 
 
 From Europe, in the beginning, so prejudiced against the 
 South and its cause, so misinformed of Southern motives, and 
 unacquainted with Southern history, came the tribute of dis- 
 interested eulogy, the more to be valued, because reluctantly 
 accorded, to the Confederacy and its ruler. To Europe the 
 South was now known not only through a series of unparal- 
 leled victories ; as a people who had successfully asserted their 
 independence for nearly two years, against such odds as had 
 never been seen before ; as a land of valiant soldiers, of great 
 generals, and of large material resources. If possible, above 
 these, the statesmen and politicians of Europe admired the 
 administrative capacity, which, they declared, had given a su- 
 perior model and a new dignity to the science of statesman- 
 ship. To the educated circles of Europe the new power was 
 introduced by State papers, which were declared to be models, 
 not less of skilled political narration and exposition, than of 
 literary purity and excellence. Accustomed to hear the South 
 twitted as a people dwarfed and debased by the demoralization 
 of African slavery, the educated classes of England acknowl- 
 edged the surprise and delight they experienced from the power- 
 ful and splendid vindications of the cause of the Confederacy, in 
 the messages of Mr. Davis. It has been truthfully remarked 
 that there could be no better history of the war than that con- 
 tained in his numerous state papers. They are the exhaust- 
 ive summary, and unanswerable statement of the imperishable 
 truths which justify the South, and overwhelm her enemies with 
 the proof of their own acts of wrong and violence. 
 
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. 425 
 
 Under the new light given to mankind, as to the origin, 
 nature, and purposes of the American Union, which Mr. Davis 
 so lucidly explained, Europe soon recognized his position as 
 something else than that of a ruler of an insurgent district. 
 But not only as the chosen Executive of eleven separate 
 communities, several of which European governments had 
 previously recognized as sovereign ; as one who had organized 
 great armies, maintained them in the field, and selected lead- 
 ers for their command already illustrious in the annals of war; 
 not for these and other features of enduring fame, alone, was 
 JefPerson Davis admired in Europe. The contrast between 
 the civil administrations of the hostile sections was viewed as, 
 perhaps, the chiefly remarkable phase of the struggle. 
 , President Lincoln, beginning the war with usurpation, had 
 committed, in its progress, every possible trespass upon the 
 Federal Constitution, and was now under the influence of a 
 faction whose every aim contemplated the overthrow of that 
 instrument. President Davis, supported by a confiding peo- 
 ple, and an overwhelming majority of every Southern com- 
 munity, ruled in strict conformity with the laws of the land 
 and its Constitution. In the midst of a revolution, unexam- 
 pled in magnitude, in fierceness, and vindictiveness on the part 
 of the enemy, and of difficulties in his own administration, he 
 furnished an example of courage, humanity, and magnanimity, 
 together with the observance of order, civil freedom, and legal 
 and constitutional restraints unexampled in histor}^ In the 
 Confederacy, the Roman maxim. Inter arma silent leges, uni- 
 versally recognized and practiced among nations, had an em- 
 phatic repudiation, so far as concerned the exercise of power 
 by the executive department. "Whatever may have been the 
 exceptional cases of unauthorized oppression or violence, there 
 
426 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 was always redress in the judiciary department of the Govern- 
 ment, which continued in pure and dignified existence until 
 the end. 
 
 The President, obeying the dictates of exalted patriotism — 
 acting always for the public good, if not always with unim- 
 peachable wisdom, at least with incorruptible integrity— made 
 no attempt at improper interference with Congress, nor sought 
 to exercise undue influence over its deliberations. The press, 
 usually the first bulwark of the public liberties to attract the 
 exercise of depotism, so trammeled at the North, was free in 
 the South every- where; in some instances, to the extent of 
 licentiousness, and to the positive injury of the cause. 
 
 In marked contrast with these exhibitions were the evi- 
 dences of coming despotism at the North. The Federal ju- 
 diciary was rapidly declining from its exalted purity, before 
 the exactions of military power; the Federal Congress was 
 charged by the press with open and notorious corruption, and 
 was aiding Mr. Lincoln in usurpations which startled the des- 
 potisms of Europe, and have since led to the annihilation of 
 the republican character of the Government. 
 
 Conspicuous, too, was the desire of Mr. Davis to conduct 
 the war upon a civilized and Christian basis. His forbearance, 
 his moderation, and stern refusal to resort to retaliation, under 
 circumstances such as would have justified its exercise in re- 
 sponse to the cruelties and outrages of the enemy, amazed the 
 European spectator, and at times dissatisfied his own coun- 
 trymen. " Retaliation is not justice," was his habitual reply 
 to urgent demands, and again and again did he decline to 
 " shed one drop of blood except on the field of battle." Never 
 forgetting the dignity of the contest, he, up to the last mo- 
 ment of his authority, redeemed the pledge which he had made 
 
ENGLISH OPINIONS OF DAVIS. 427 
 
 in the first weeks of the war : " to smite the smiter with manly 
 arms, as did our fathers before us." 
 
 There have been few spectacles presented to the admirino* 
 gaze of mankind, more worthily depicted than that union of 
 capacities and virtues in Jefferson Davis, which so eminently 
 qualified him, in the opinion of foreigners, for the position he 
 held. An English writer has eloquently sketched him as " one 
 of the world's foremost men, admired as a statesman, respected 
 as an earnest Christian, the Washington of another generation 
 of the same race. A resolute statesman, calm, dignified, sway- 
 ing with commanding intellect the able men that surrounded 
 him ; eloquent as a speaker, and as a writer giving state papers 
 to the world which are among the finest compositions in our 
 time; of warm domestic affections in his inner life, and strong 
 religious convictions; held up by vigor of the spirit that 
 nerved an exhausted and feeble frame — such was the chosen 
 constitutional ruler of one-fourth of the American people." 
 
 Colonel Freemantle, a distinguished English officer, whose 
 faithful and impartial narrative of his extended observations 
 of the American war, commended him to the esteem of both 
 parties, thus concludes an account of an interview with Presi- 
 dent Davis, in the spring of 1863: 
 
 "During my travels many people have remarked to me that 
 Jefferson Davis seems, in a peculiar manner, adapted to his office. 
 His military education at West Point rendered him intimately 
 acquainted with the higher officers of the army; and his post of 
 Secretary of War, under the old Government, brought officers of 
 all ranks under his immediate personal knowledge and supervision. 
 No man could have formed a more accurate estimate of their 
 respective merits. This is one of the reasons which gave the 
 Confederates such an immense start in the way of generals ; for, 
 
428 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 having formed his opinion with regard to appointing an officer, 
 Mr. Davis is always most determined to carry out his intention 
 in spite of every obstacle. His services in the Mexican war gave 
 him the prestige of a brave man and a good soldier. His services 
 as a statesman pointed him out as the only man who, by his un- 
 flinching determination and administrative talent, was able to con- 
 trol the popular will. People speak of any misfortune happening 
 to him as an irreparable evil too dreadful to contemplate." 
 
 Mr. Gladstone, a member of the British cabinet, the emi- 
 nent 'leader of a party in English politics, and a sympathizer 
 with the objects of the war as waged by the North, avowed his 
 enthusiastic appreciation of the lustre reflected upon the new 
 Government, by its able administration, in the assertion that 
 "Mr. Jeiferson Davis had created a nation." 
 
 But the admiration of Europe was to prove a mere senti- 
 ment, unaccompanied by any practical demonstration of sym- 
 pathy. In view of the course so persistently adhered to by 
 the great powers of Europe, it is curious to note the purely 
 sentimental and personal character of their professed sympathy 
 for the South. The earliest expression of foreign opinion indi- 
 cated a reluctant recognition of the valor and devotion of a 
 people, from whom they had not expected the exhibition of 
 such qualities. When, by the protraction of the struggle, the 
 brilliant feats of arms executed by the Southern armies, the 
 indomitable resolution of the South, and its evident purpose 
 to encounter every possible sacrifice for sake of independence, 
 there was no longer ground for misapprehension, they still 
 disregarded all the precedents and principles which had gov- 
 erend their course respecting new nationalities. 
 
 Applauding the valor of the Southern soldiery, the heroism, 
 endurance, and self-denial of a j^eople whom they repeatedly 
 
THE LONDON " TIMES " ON RECOGNITION. 429 
 
 declared to have already established their invincibility ; rapt- 
 urous in their panegyrics upon the genius, zeal, and Christian 
 virtues of the Confederate leaders ; they never interposed their 
 boasted potentiality in behalf of justice, right, and humanity. 
 English writers were eloquent in acknowledgment of the addi- 
 tional distinction conferred upon Anglo-Saxon statesmanship 
 and literature by Davis; diligent in tracing the honorable 
 English lineage of Lee, and establishing the consanguinity of 
 Jackson; but English statesmen persistently disregarded those 
 elevated considerations of humanity and philanthropy, which 
 they have so much vaunted as prompting their intercourse with 
 nations. Confessing a new enlightenment from the expositions 
 of Mr. Davis, and from diligent inquiry into the nature of the 
 Federal Government, Europe soon avowed its convictions in 
 favor of the legal and constitutional right of secession asserted 
 by the South. It declared that it but awaited the exhibition 
 of that earnestness of purpose, and that capacity for resistance, 
 which should establish the " force and consistency " which are 
 the requisite conditions of recognized nationality. 
 
 The London Times, while the army of McClellan was still 
 investing Richmond, used language which the North and the 
 South accepted as significant and prophetic. Said the Times: 
 
 " It can not be doubted that we are approaching a time when a 
 more important question even than that of an oflFer of mediation 
 may have to be considered by England and France. The Southern 
 Confederacy has constituted itself a nation for nearly a year and a 
 half During that time the attachment of the people to the new 
 Government has been indubitably shown ; immense armies have 
 been raised ; the greatest sacrifices have been endured ; the persist- 
 ence of the South in the war, through a long series of battles — 
 some victories, some defeats — has shown the ' force and consist- 
 
430 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ency ' which are looked upon as tests of nationality. Wherever 
 the Government is unmolested, the laws are administered regularly 
 as in time of peace ; and wherever the Federals have penetrated, 
 they are received with an animosity which they resent, as at New 
 Orleans, by a military rule of intolerable brutality. The vision of 
 a Union party in the South has been dispelled, as the Northerners 
 themselves are compelled, with bitterness and mortification, to 
 admit. 
 
 " All these circumstances point but to one conclusion : Either 
 this war must be brought to an end, or the time will at last come 
 when the South may claim its own recognition by foreign nations 
 as an independent power. The precedents of the American colo- 
 nies, of the Spanish colonies, of Belgium, and of Tuscany, and of 
 Naples the other day, forbid us to question this right when asserted 
 by the Confederate States. It is our duty to anticipate this pos- 
 sible event, and it may be wise, as well as generous, for statesmen 
 on this side of the ocean to approach the American Government 
 in a friendly spirit, with the offer of their good oflSces, at this 
 great crisis of its fortunes." 
 
 If such a statement of the question was just and truthful, 
 when a numerous and confident army, under a leader of proven 
 skill, was engaged in close siege of the capital of the Confed- 
 eracy, how much more unanswerable were its conclusions when 
 McClellan was defeated ? What were the evidences of " force 
 and consistency" demanded after the combined armies of 
 McClellan and Pope were hurled back upon the Potomac; 
 after Bragg had forced Buell to the Ohio; and when Freder- 
 icksburg had crowned six months of success with a victory 
 tliat inevitably imposed a defensive attitude upon the North 
 during the entire winter? 
 
 When Chancellorsville inflicted a defeat, the most decisive 
 
DIGNIFIED ATTITUDE OF MR. DAVIS. 431 
 
 and humiliating of the war, upon the North, there was indeed 
 no longer even a pretext, by whicn could be disguised the 
 evident purpose of England not to interfere in behalf of a 
 cause with which she had no sympathy, whatever her con- 
 strained respect for its champions and defenders. The loss 
 of Vicksburg and Gettysburg in the ensuing summer, so pro- 
 ductive of distrust in Europe of the Confederate cause, was 
 quickly followed by developments which dispelled nearly all 
 remaining hope of that recognition which it was equally the 
 right of the Confederacy to hope, and the duty of Europe to 
 render. 
 
 The attitude of the Confederate Government, in its relations 
 with European governments, was ever one of imposing dignity. 
 President Davis contented himself with calm and statesman- 
 like presentation of the claims of the cause which he repre- 
 sented. His unanswerable exposition of the jDOsition of the 
 Confederacy, and lucid discussions of international jurispru- 
 dence, never took the semblance of supplication, and were 
 accompanied by dignified remonstrance, even, only when it 
 became evident that the Confederacy was excluded from the 
 benefits of that policy which the laws of nations and every 
 precedent demanded. Hope of foreign assistance unquestion- 
 ably constituted a large share of that confidence of success 
 which, until the later stages of the war, continued to animate 
 the South. Her people hoped for foreign aid in some shape, 
 because they were confident of their ability to demonstrate 
 their right to it; and they expected it only when they had de- 
 monstrated that right. But never was there any abatement 
 or relaxation of effort by the Confederate Government because 
 of this just right and expectation. In the midst of the most 
 cheering events, and when recognition appeared certain, Pres- 
 
432 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ident Davis declared his conviction of the necessity of such 
 effort as should secure independence without aid from any 
 quarter. In his address to the Mississippi Legislature, De- 
 cember, 1862, from which we have already quoted, he said: 
 
 "In the course of this war our eyes have been often turned 
 abroad. We have expected sometimes recognition and sometimes 
 intervention at the hands of foreign nations, and we had a right 
 to expect it. Never before, in the history of the workl, had a 
 people so long a time maintained their ground, and showed them- 
 selves capable of maintaining their national existence, without 
 securing the recognition of commercial nations. I know not why 
 this has been so, but this I say, ' Put not your trust in princes,' 
 and rest not your hopes on foreign nations. This war is ours ; 
 we must fight it out ourselves; and I feel some pride in knowing 
 that, so far, we have done it without the good-will of any body." 
 
 It seems, indeed, difficult to explain the cour.se of Europe, 
 especially of England and France, in the American war, upon 
 any hypothesis consistent with either courage, humanity, or 
 the usages of nations. Delay, caution, and attendance upon 
 results were becoming in the beginning; but, after the defeat 
 of McClellan upon the Chickahominy, and, still more, at the 
 close of operations in 1862, they were no longer exacted by 
 moral obligation or international comity. Having all the 
 attributes of an independent power — a power at war with a 
 neighbor, assailed by its armies, blockaded by its fleets, as had 
 been numerous other independent powers — there was nothing 
 whatever anomalous in the situation of the Confederate States 
 forbidding the practice of plain justice towards them. Recog- 
 nition was not only warranted by the facts of the case, but by 
 immemorial usage in Europe, especially by the apposite prece- 
 dent of the separation of Belgium from Holland. The exist- 
 
INJUSTICE OF ENGLAND. 433 
 
 ence of slavery in the South, even though sanctioned by law 
 and the religious convictions of her people, is an altogether 
 insufficient explanation of a policy which has exposed the 
 European great powers to the suspicion of having been actu- 
 ated by the most unworthy motives. 
 
 Especially does the course of England seem indefensible 
 towards a people, with whom the war developed so much of 
 common instinct, so many appeals of sympathy and evidences 
 of identity with herself — a people whose ancestors were the 
 uncompromising enemies of regicides, and had maintained 
 their loyalty to the crown of England in spite of the power 
 and threats of Cromwell, whose Puritan dominion New Eng- 
 land acknowledged. 
 
 The injustice of England did not end with her refusal of 
 recognition. In the beginning she promptly proclaimed " strict 
 neutrality," and her Premier declared the Confederates ''bel- 
 ligerents." This phrase, apparently a just concession of the 
 declared independence of the South, was gratefully acknowl- 
 edged by a struggling people, and evoked the fierce indigna- 
 tion of the North. It was, however, designedly ambiguous, 
 and to be interpreted, philologically and practically, as the 
 prospects of the controversy or the wishes of the Palmerston 
 cabinet might dictate. The English cabinet did not neces- 
 sarily mean a recognition of a divided sovereignty, justifying 
 suspension of relations with both sections, until the question 
 of sovereignty should be settled. The phrase "belligerents" 
 was subsequently declared to mean, merely, that the " two 
 sections were at war" — a fact which the participants felt to 
 have already had ocular demonstration. ^Meanwhile, relations 
 between London and Washington were not interrupted, and 
 commercial intercourse continued as before. But England not 
 28 
 
434 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 only ignored the South, and denied the Confederate commis- 
 sioners a formal and official audience — her vessels respected 
 the Federal blockade, while Confederate vessels were warned 
 from her coasts. Such is only a limited statement of features 
 which made " English neutrality " the broadest farce and se- 
 verest irony of the age.* 
 
 Early in 1863, or late in 1862, the Emperor Napoleon pro- 
 posed to England to join France and other powers in a joint 
 mediation, to sugscest an armistice and a conference. This hu- 
 mane proposition England refused, declining to take any step 
 which might aid pacification, and thus did both North and 
 South finally comprehend what was meant by the "duty and 
 policy " of that power, which had so industriously propagated 
 American dissensions for her own aggrandizement. An edi- 
 torial in the Richmond Enquirer, written, probably, by John 
 Mitchel, pithily described the motives of England in the re- 
 mark : " In short, the North is not yet bankrupt enough, the 
 South not yet desolated enough, to suit the ' policy ' of Eng- 
 land." France saved her reputation, upon the score of humanity 
 and justice, by evincing at least a right disposition, though it is 
 difficult to reconcile her continued dalliance upon England, re- 
 specting the American question, with that bold policy, which 
 usually characterizes the great master of European diplomacy. 
 France had, however, less of interest and of expectation than 
 England, from the dissolution of the Union ; less motive for 
 desiring its downfall, aud the exhaustion of both combatants. 
 
 *A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended neu- 
 trality of Enghmd was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary. 
 ^;;iid he : " Tiie impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Maj- 
 esty's Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause 
 of the more powerful of the two contending parties." 
 
ANTISLAVERY LEGISLATION. 435 
 
 Such, however, was the policy, adhered to by England and 
 France, in defiance of legal and moral obligation, and to the 
 mortal injury of the South, in her brave and defiant struggle 
 with that power, wiiich history may yet declare, the " great 
 powers" of Europe dared not defy. 
 
 An interesting phase of the war, in the beginning of 1863, 
 was the culmination of the policy of the Federal Government 
 respecting the subject of slavery. A brief space will suffice to 
 exhibit a record of violated pledges, of constitutional infrac- 
 tions, and abuse of power by the Federal Government, alto- 
 gether unexampled in a war to be hereafter noted for its arbi- 
 trary measures. 
 
 In the early stages of the war the North assumed, as the 
 justification of coercive measures, not only the purpose of pre- 
 serving the Union, but the relief of a " loyal party " in the 
 South, who were oppressed by a violent minority having 
 "command of the situation." Of this theory of the war, as 
 waged by the North, the conversation of President Lincoln 
 with a Kentucky member of Congress, in the presence of Sen- 
 ator Crittenden, was sufficiently declaratory: 
 
 "'Mr. Mallory, this war, so far as I have any thing to do with 
 it, is carried ou on the idea that there is a Union sentiment in 
 those States, which, set free from the control now held over it by 
 the presence of the Confederate or rebel power, will be sufficient 
 to replace those States in the Union. If I am mistaken in this, 
 if there is no such sentiment there, if the people of those States 
 are dctcrmiued with unanimity, or with a feeling approaching 
 unanimity, that their States shall not be members of this Confed- 
 eracy, it is beyond the power of the people of the other States to 
 force them to remain in the Union ; and,' said he, ' in that con- 
 tingency — in the contingency that there is not that sentiment 
 
436 LIFE OF JEFFERSON PA VIS. 
 
 there— THIS WAR IS NOT ONLY AN ERROR, IT IS A 
 CRIME.' " 
 
 Mr. Lincoln was probably not a very close student of the 
 philosophy of history, or he would hardly have thus emphat- 
 ically committed himself to a pledge, which, if observed, would 
 have inevitably ended the war in a few weeks. The teachings 
 of history were valueless, without their unvarying testimony to 
 the potency of the sword of the common enemy in healing the 
 divisions of an invaded country. It would be difficult, too, 
 to imagine what he would have deemed that approximation 
 to unity in the South, which would render a further prosecu- 
 tion of the w&r a crime. A faction of " Union men," trucu- 
 lent, treacherous, and insidious, in their hostility to the Con- 
 federate Government, unquestionably existed in the South 
 during the entire progress of the war, but they were few in 
 numbers, and their recognized leaders were, with hardly a sin- 
 gle exception, men of abandoned character, notoriously without 
 influence, save with their ignorant and unpatriotic followers. 
 But this pretense of a Union party in the South, which the 
 North, at first, declared a majority, was conveniently abandoned, 
 when other pretexts were sought. In the face of evidence not 
 to be denied, of the profound and sincere purpose of separa- 
 tion, entertained by more than seven-eighths of the citizens of 
 the seceded States, the Northern conscience easily overcame 
 its scruples as to a war which the Northern President had, by 
 anticipation, pronounced a " Crime." 
 
 Palpable violations of vows were, indeed, marked character- 
 istics of the conduct of the war as justified by the facile and 
 pliant conscience of the North. The paramount purpose of 
 coercion was to maintain tlic authority and dignity of the Con- 
 stitution, assailed by " rebels in arms." No theory was avowed 
 
VIOLATIONS OF VOWS. 437 
 
 contemplatiug any other termination of the war, than a sim- 
 ple restoration of the " Union under the Constitution," The 
 assertions of the Northern press, and the resolutions of mass 
 meetings were re-affirmed by the most solemn enactments of 
 the Federal Congress, and public declarations of Mr. Lincoln, 
 that the North sought merely to save the Union, with the 
 form and spirit of the Constitution unimpaired. In view of 
 subsequent events, it is almost incredible that in Mr. Lincoln's 
 first inaugural address should be found this passage : 
 
 " I declare that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to in- 
 terfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. 
 I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclina- 
 tion to do so The right of each State to order and 
 
 control its own domestic institutions according to its own judi^- 
 ment exclusively, is essential to the balance of power on which 
 the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depended." 
 
 Then, after the defeat at Bull Run, Congress passed the 
 following resolution, which was signed by Mr. Lincoln as 
 President : 
 
 " Resolved, That this war is not waged upon our part with any 
 purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or estab- 
 lished institutions of these States, but to defend and maintain the 
 supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union, with all 
 the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired ; 
 that, as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to 
 cease." 
 
 As if to give every possible form of assurance of the legiti- 
 mate and constitutional objects of the war, and leaving no 
 room for doubt in the mind of posterity, of complete and un- 
 
438 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 redeemed perfidy, the Federal authorities were at especial 
 pains to declare their policy to foreign governments. 
 
 Mr. Seward, as Mr. Lincoln's Secretary of State, in his in- 
 structions to ]Mr. Dayton, Minister to France, says : 
 
 " The condition of slavery in the several States will remain just 
 the same, whether it (the rebellion) succeed or fail. There is not 
 even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected States are 
 to be conquered by the United States, if the revolution fail ; for 
 the rights of the States, and the condition of every human being 
 in them, will remain subject to exactly the same laws and form 
 of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether 
 it shall fail." 
 
 There was little room to doubt the purpose of the North to 
 emancipate the slaves of the South, if at any period of the war 
 such action could be advantageously taken. Mr. Lincoln al- 
 ways manifested great timidity and reluctance in approaching 
 the subject, and it was observable that, at critical moments of 
 the w^ar, he courted the sympathy of the Democratic party, 
 which was opposed to the policy of emancipation, so impor- 
 tunately urged upon him by the radical wing of the Republi- 
 can party. 
 
 General McClellan had, with noble firmness, refused to 
 countenance the revolutionary designs of the radical faction, 
 and his removal from command after his repulse at Richmond 
 was the palpable and decisive triumph of the emancipation 
 policy in the sympathies of Mr. Lincoln. Restored to com- 
 mand, in order that he might save Washington from capture, 
 no other officer being deemed to have the requisite ability and 
 confidence of the array, he retained his position but a few 
 weeks after that object was accomplished. By successive steps, 
 
THE EJHANCIPATION PROCLAMATIOX. 439 
 
 ]\Ir. Lincoln was finally brouglit to issue a preliminary procla- 
 mation of emancipation, in September, 1862, which went into 
 effect January 1, 18G3. After the battle of Antietam, no 
 farther necessity for concealment was deemed necessary, and 
 to the design of subjugation was now added the proclaimed 
 purpose to destroy the organic existence of the States and two 
 thousand millions of Southern capital. 
 
 Emancipation was justified by the Federal administration 
 as a " military necessity " — a wretched explanation from those 
 who had boasted their ability to "exterminate the South" in 
 a few months. Since the war, a claim of philanthropy, as the 
 motive of emancipation, has been falsely asserted. Reckless 
 of the fate of the slave, the North sought only vengeance 
 against his master. In the sequel, each step of despotism be- 
 coming easier than its predecessor, malice against the master 
 has been still the motive which instigated the enfranchisement 
 of his former slave. 
 
 The New -Year's proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, reaching the 
 Confederacy at the most auspicious period of its fortunes, was 
 received with evidences of just indignation, and of a more 
 stern purpose in the conduct of the war. President Davis 
 thus referred to the subject in his message to Congress : 
 
 " The public journals of the North have been received, contain- 
 ing a proclamation, dated on the first day of the present month, 
 signed by the President of the United States, in which he orders 
 and declares all slaves within ten of the States of the Confederacy 
 to be free, except such as are found within certain districts now 
 occupied in part by the armed forces of the enemy. We may well 
 leave it to the instincts of that common humanity which a benefi- 
 cent Creator has implanted in the breasts of our fellow-men of all 
 countries to pass judgment on a measure by which several millions 
 
440 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of human beings of an inferior race — peaceful and contented la- 
 borers in their sphere — are doomed to extermination, while, at the 
 same time, they are encouraged to a general assassination of their 
 masters by the insidious recommendation ' to abstain from violence 
 unless in necessary self-defense.' Our own detestation of those 
 who have attempted the most execrable measure recorded in the 
 history of guilty man, is tempered by profound contempt for the 
 impotent rage which it discloses. So far as regards the action of 
 this Government on such criminals as may attempt its execution, 
 I confine myself to informing you that I shall — unless in your 
 wisdom you deem some other course moi'e expedient — deliver to 
 the several State authorities all commissioned officers of the United 
 States that may hereafter be captured by our forces, in any of the 
 States embraced in the proclamation, that they may be dealt with 
 in accordance with the laws of those States providing for the pun- 
 ishment of criminals engaged in exciting servile insurrection. 
 The enlisted soldiers I shall continue to treat as unwilling instru- 
 ments in the commission of these crimes, and shall direct their 
 discharge and return to their homes on the proper and usual pa- 
 role." 
 
 Mr. Davis urged upon the people the evidence, given by 
 this measure, of the utterly ruthless and unscrupulous character 
 of the war waged upon the South, and counseled the resolution 
 of " absolute and total separation of these States from tha 
 United States." The eloquent appeals of Mr. Davis were 
 sustained by the united press of the Confederacy, and by un- 
 mistakable indications of a tliorouglily aroused popular indig- 
 nation. 
 
 The results of military operations, in the winter months of 
 1863, were of a character altogether favorable and re-assuring 
 to the Confederates. Movements on a large scale were pre- 
 vented by the heavy rains and extreme rigor of the season, 
 
ATTEMPTS UPON VICKSBURG. 441 
 
 though there were many ineideuts evincing activity and enter- 
 prise on both sides. Early in January occurred the recapture 
 of Galveston, Texas, by General Magruder. This exploit, 
 marked by a display of energy, daring, and skill, was a hand- 
 some vindication of a most meritorious officer, who, for some 
 months previous, had suffered unmerited censure. General 
 ISIagruder had commanded a portion of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, in the assault upon McClellan, at Malvern Hill. 
 The partial failure of the attack secured the Federal retreat, 
 and the public, impatient at the check sustained at a moment 
 of so much promise, visited an unwarranted censure upon 
 Magruder. President Davis acknowledged, in a most flutter- 
 ing letter to his former classmate, the brilliant achievement 
 of his command at Galveston. 
 
 After the battle of Murfreesboro', the more important oper- 
 ations, in the West, were enacted in the State of Mississippi. 
 The successful defense of Vicksburg, in the summer of 1862, 
 effectually closed the Mississippi to the Federal fleets. To 
 reduce this stronghold became an object of prime importance 
 to the Federal Government, the North-western States being 
 especially interested in securing the unobstructed navigation 
 of the great river. The Confederate Government, equally ap- 
 prized of the value of Vicksburg, concentrated forces for its 
 defense, and made the maintenance of that position one of the 
 leading features of its designs in the West. 
 
 A second attempt, under the auspices of General Sherman, 
 was made against Vicksburg, in December, 1862. The signal 
 failure attending this expedition brought upon Sherman a de- 
 gree of reproach, at the North, in singular contrast with the 
 applause which he received twelve months later. A few weeks 
 later, the third attempt against Vicksburg was undertaken by 
 
442 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 General Grant, who sought to turn the Confederate defenses, 
 tlirouo'h the smaller rivers connecting the Yazoo and Missis- 
 sippi. This attempt was doomed to a failure no less decided 
 and humiliating than that of its predecessor. On the 14th of 
 March the Confederate batteries at Port Hudson, the lower 
 defense of the Mississippi, repulsed the fleet of Farragut, who 
 sought, by passing the batteries, to cooporate with Porter's 
 fleet above. 
 
 These repeated failures of the Federal demonstrations 
 against the Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi, were 
 accepted as auspicious indications of continued successful de- 
 fense in a vital quarter of the Confederacy. The loss of Ar- 
 kansas Post, with a garrison of three thousand men, somewhat 
 diminished the ardor of the congratulations experienced by the 
 South from the successes on the Mississippi, and General Beau- 
 reo-ard's signal defeat of the Federal fleet at Charleston. 
 
 At the opening of spring, there was wanting no indication 
 of the gigantic struggle which was to make memorable the 
 third year of the war. By common consent it was declared that 
 this, if not the last, would, at least, be the decisive year of 
 the struggle. An imperative necessity impelled the Federal 
 administration to the most powerful efforts. Without bril- 
 liant and decided military results, the party in opposition to 
 the war would inevitably gain possession of a sufficient num- 
 ber of States, to enable them to enter tlie next Presidential 
 contest with fair prospects of success. The approaching ex- 
 piration of the terras of service of large numbers of his vet- 
 eran troops, also impelled the enemy to early activity. 
 
 On the part of the Confederates, there was apparently 
 nothing left undone which could increase the chances of suc- 
 cess. This period is remarkable in the history of the war, 
 
ACTIVITY OF THE CONFEDERATKR. 443 
 
 not less for Its auspicious signs for the Confederacy, than for 
 the union and cooperation every-whcre observable. It was 
 equally a period encouraging hope and inviting effort to wrino- 
 from the reluctant North confession of final defeat, and to 
 inflict a just punishment upon an enemy, who had but lately 
 proclaimed his purpose to use even the slaves of the South for 
 the subjugation of her citizens. Extraordinary activity was 
 displayed, during the winter and spring, in strengthening the 
 army and adding to its efficiency, by the execution of the re- 
 cent legislation of Congress recommended by President Davis. 
 The utmost exertions of the Government were, of course, in- 
 sufficient to strengthen the armies to the point of equality 
 with the enormous array presented by the enemy on every 
 theatre of operations. Yet the Governmeiit, the people, and 
 the army, with calmness and confidence, awaited the issue, in 
 the conviction that every preparation had been made which 
 the resources of the country admitted. 
 
 Early in April, President Davis, in compliance with a request 
 of Congress, addressed an eloquent invocation to the coun- 
 try, in behalf of the duties of jiatriotism at so critical a moment 
 of the struggle. Stating his concurrence in the views of Con- 
 gress, he declared his confidence in the patriotic disposition of 
 the people to carry into effisct the measures devised for the 
 deliverance of the country. 
 
 "Alone, unaided," said he, " we have met and overthrown 
 the most formidable combinations of naval and military arma- 
 ments that the lust of conquest ever gathered together for the 
 conquest of a free people. We began this struggle without a 
 single gun afloat, while the resources of our enemy enabled 
 them to gather fleets which, according to their official list, 
 published in August last, consisted of four hundred and thirty- 
 
444 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 seven vessels, measuring eiglit hundred and forty thousand 
 and eighty-six tons, and carrying three thousand and twenty- 
 six guns To oppose invading forces composed 
 
 of levies which have already exceeded thirteen hundred thou- 
 sand men, we had no resources but the unconquerable valor 
 of a people determined to be free." 
 
 Mr. Davis alluded encouragingly to the immediate prospects 
 of the war : 
 
 " Your devotion and patriotism have triumphed over all these 
 obstacles, and calling into existence the munitions of war, the 
 clothing and the subsistence, which have enabled our soldiers to 
 illustrate their valor on numerous battle-fields, and to inflict crush- 
 ing defeats on successive armies, each of which our arrogant foe 
 fondly imagined to be invincible. 
 
 " The contrast between our past and present condition is well 
 calculated to inspire full confidence in the triumph of our arms. 
 At no previous period of the war have our forces been so numer- 
 ous, so well organized, and so thoroughly disciplined, armed, and 
 equipped, as at present. The season of high water, on which our 
 enemies relied to enable their fleet of gunboats to penetrate into 
 our country and devastate our homes, is fast passing away ; yet 
 our strongholds on the Mississippi still bid defiance to the foe, and 
 months of costly preparation for their reduction have been spent 
 in vain. Disaster has been the result of their every eff'ort to turn 
 or storm Vicksburg and Port Hudson, as well as every attack on 
 our batteries on the Red River, the Tallahatchie, and other navi- 
 gable streams." 
 
 In this address President Davis did not fail to rebuke that 
 tendency to excessive confidence from which relaxed exertion is 
 ever apt to follow. Albeit he has been so freely charged 
 with entertaining excessive confidence liimself, and encouraging 
 
THE QUESTION OF FOOD. 445 
 
 others to share his over-sanguine and exaggerated hopes, he 
 yet never hxst an ojiportunity of rebuking it as a dangerous 
 error. 
 
 The most important feature of the address is the earnest 
 and admonitory appeal, for immediate exertion, to obviate 
 the difficulty of obtaining supplies for the army, already 
 becoming a question of alarming concern. Mr. Davis even 
 then avowed his conviction that, in such a contest as the war 
 had then become, the question of food was the " one danger 
 which the Government of your choice regards with apprehen- 
 sion." Earnestly appealing to the " never- failing patriotism " 
 of the land, he said : " Your country, therefore, appeals to you 
 to lay aside all thought of gain, and to devote yourselves to 
 securing your liberties, wdthout which these gains would be 
 valueless." 
 
 Reminding the country of embarrassments, already encoun- 
 tered, he indicated the only method of avoiding similar diffi- 
 culties in future : 
 
 " Let your fields be devoted exclusively to the production of 
 corn, oats, beans, peas, potatoes, and other food for man and beast. 
 Let corn be sowed broadcast, for fodder, in immediate proximity 
 to railroads, rivers and canals ; and let all your efforts be directed 
 to the prompt supply of these articles in the districts where our 
 armies are operating. You will then add greatly to their efficiency, 
 and furnish the means without which it is impossible to make 
 those prompt and active movements which have hitherto stricken 
 terror into our enemies and secured our most brilliant triumphs." 
 
 Those who witnessed the operation of causes which event- 
 ually brought the country to the verge of starvation, and made 
 Lee's army — whose proud array of "tattered uniforms and 
 
446 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 bright muskets" had never yet yielded to the onset of the 
 enemy — the victim of famine, can attest the fidelity of this 
 grapliic and prophetic sketch : 
 
 " It is kuowa that the supply of meat throughout the country 
 is sufficient for the support of ail ; but the distances are so great, 
 the condition of the roads has been so bad during the five mouths 
 of winter weather, through which we have just passed, and the 
 attempt of groveliug speculators to forestall the market, and make 
 money out of the life-blood of our defenders, have so much in- 
 fluenced the withdrawal from sale of the surplus in hands of the 
 producers, that the Government has been unable to gather full 
 fcupplies, 
 
 " The Secretary of War has prepared a plan, which is appended 
 to this address, by the aid of which, or some similar means to be 
 adopted by yourselves, you can assist the officers of the Govern- 
 ment in the purchase of the corn, the bacon, the pork, and the 
 beef known to exist in large quantities in different parts of the 
 country. Even if the surplus be less than believed, is it not a 
 bitter and iiumiliating reflection that those who remain at home, 
 secure from hardship, and protected from danger, should be in the 
 enjoyment of abundance, and that their slaves also should have a 
 full supply of food, while their sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers 
 are stinted in the rations upon which their health and efficiency 
 depend?" 
 
 The concluding paragraph of this address, so remarkable for 
 its eloquence, and for its frank and powerful statement of the 
 condition and necessities of the Confederacy, in one of the 
 most thrilling moments of its fate, is as follows ; 
 
 " Entertaining no fear that you will either misconstrue the mo- 
 tives of this address, or fail to ret^poud to the call of patriotism, I 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE. 447 
 
 have placed the facts fully and frankly before you. Let us all 
 unite in the performance of our duty, each in his sphere; and with 
 concerted, persistent, and well directed effort, there seems little 
 reason to doubt that, under the blessings of Him to whom we 
 look for guidance, and who has been to us our shield and strensth. 
 we shall maintain the sovereignty and independence of the Confed- 
 erate States, and transmit to our posterity the heritage bequeathed 
 to us by our fathers." 
 
 Late in March, General Lee intimated his convictions, to 
 the Government, of an early resumption of active movements 
 by the enemy. The disparity between the main armies in 
 Virginia was even greater than in previous campaigns. Gen- 
 eral Hooker, the Federal commander, had, under his immediate 
 direction, more than one hundred thousand men, while General 
 Lee — in consequence of the necessary withdrawal of Longstrcet, 
 with two divisions, to meet a threatened movement by the 
 enemy from the south of James River, and to secure the sup- 
 plies of an abundant section, open to Federal incursions — had 
 less than fitly thousand.* But Lee manifested his character- 
 istic confidence and self-possession in the presence of the per- 
 ilous crisis. Having adequately represented the situation to 
 
 * General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own 
 as ten to three. Mr. Swinton states Hooker's force at one hundred and 
 twenty thousand inftintry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred 
 guns. Lee's effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand. 
 
 The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his 
 operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely in- 
 dispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to 
 meet the formidable Federal force in the neitrhborhood of Suffolk. An 
 impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet's de- 
 tention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President event- 
 U.1II3' ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond. 
 
448 LIFE OF JEFFKRSON DAVIS. 
 
 his Government, he was aware of the cordial cooperation, to 
 the extent of its ability, which had been extended. During 
 the suspension of active hostilities, his every wish for the in- 
 creased efficiency of his command was promptly fulfilled, and 
 at the opening of the campaign he lacked no element of read- 
 iness, save numbers, that which the country could not supply, 
 and of the absence of which, Lee, therefore, never complained. 
 In every other element of efficiency, the army of Northern 
 Virginia was never in better condition, than when it eagerly 
 awaited the advance of Hooker across the Rappahannock. 
 
 The battle of Chancellorsville is memorable as the most 
 decisive triumph of the Army of Northern Virginia, and 
 from the mournful incident of the extinction of that noble life 
 which was identified with its highest glory. The culmination 
 of Lee's superb strategy, the most splendid illustration of his 
 master-genius, was sadly emphasized by the irreparable loss 
 of Stonewall Jackson. 
 
 Commemorating, by a letter of special thanks to the army, 
 a victory which baffled the most perilous and boastful attempt 
 yet made upon the Confederate capital, President Davis shared 
 the grief of a stricken country for the loss of one of its most 
 illustrious champions. In that procession of mourners which 
 followed, through the streets of Richmond, the bier of the 
 fallen hero, there was not one who felt anguish more acute 
 than that of the chief who had so honored and sustained 
 Jackson when living.* 
 
 * " Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness, 
 and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and 
 pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive 
 officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all 
 duties He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and 
 
DA vis' tribute TO JACKSOX. 449 
 
 holding the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even 
 though the character of his campaigning imposed on them more hard- 
 ships than on any other troops in tlie service. Good soldiers care not for 
 their individual sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these 
 
 General Jackson never lacked 'For glory he lived long 
 
 enough,' continued Mr. Davis, with much emotion; 'and if this result had 
 to come, it was the Divine mercy tliat removed him. He fell like the eagle, 
 his own feather on the shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his 
 death, the Confederacy lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being 
 that the final summons could have reached no soldier more prepared to 
 accept it joyfully.'" — Cravens Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 180, 181. 
 
 29 
 
450 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTEE XV. 
 
 CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLCRSVILLE — THE MIL- 
 ITARY SITUATION PRIMARY OBJECTS OF THE CONFEDERATES AFFAIRS IN 
 
 THE WEST — A BRIEF CONSIDERATJON OF SEVERAL PLANS OF CAMPAIGN SUG- 
 GESTED TO THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES — VISIONARY STRATEGY — AN OF- 
 FENSIVE CAMPAIGN ADOPTED THE INVASION OP PENNSYLVANIA JUSTIFIED 
 
 CONDITION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA AT THIS PERIOD THE 
 
 MOVEMENT FROM THE RAPPAHANNOCK — LEADING FEATURES OF THE CONFED- 
 ERATE PLAN lee's STRATEGY AGAIN ILLUSTRATED GETTYSBURG A FATAL 
 
 BLOW TO THE SOUTH LEE RETURNS TO VIRGINIA THE SURRENDER OF VICKS- 
 
 BURG — OTHER REVERSES — EXULTATION OF THE NORTH — THE CONFEDERATE 
 ADMINISTRATION AGAIN ARRAIGNED BY ITS OPPONENTS — THE CASE OF GEN- 
 ERAL PEMBERTON — POPULAR INJUSTICE TO A GALLANT OFFICER — A BRIEF 
 REVIEW OF THE SUBJECT — PEMBERTON's APPOINTMENT RECOMMENDED BY 
 
 DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS HIS ABLE ADMINISTRATION IN MISSISSIPPI HIS 
 
 RESOLUTION TO HOLD VICKSBURG, AS THE GREAT END OF THE CAMPAIGN 
 
 HIS GALLANTRY AND RESOURCES — NOBLE CONDUCT OP THIS PERSECUTED OF- 
 FICER A FURTHER STATEMENT THE MISSION OF VICE-PRESIDENT STEPHENS 
 
 ITS OBJECTS PRESIDENT DAVIS SEEKS TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS OP 
 
 WAR MAGNANIMITY AND HUMANITY OF THE OFFER PROUD POSITION IN 
 
 THIS MATTER OF THE SOUTH AND HER RULER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 DECLINES INTERCOURSE WITH MR. STEPHENS EXPLANATION OF ITS MOTIVES 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. DAVIS AND STEPHENS. 
 
 THE situation of affairs, so eminently favorable to the Con- 
 federacy, after the victory of Chancellorsville, admitted no 
 doubt that the opportune occasion would be promptly seized, 
 for the delivery of a telling blow, which should hasten an ac- 
 knowledgment of Southern independence. A brief summary 
 of the military situation^ at the opening of summer, 1863, will 
 
A FAVORABLE SITUATION. 451 
 
 show the simple and judicious policy, by which the Confed- 
 erate administration proposed to make efficient use of its ad- 
 vantages. 
 
 The battle of Chancellorsville, followed by the disorganized 
 retreat of the largest force yet consolidated for the capture of. 
 Richmond, and the signal failure of an attempt, which, at its 
 outset, the North declared to be conclusive of the fate of the 
 Confederacy, secured the safety of the Confederate capital, at 
 least, until another campaign could be organized. Moreover, 
 it tendered to the Confederate authorities the choice of 'a vis:- 
 orous offensive, holding out tempting inducements; or a de- 
 tachment of a portion of Lee's army for the relief of other 
 sections of the Confederacy. With two-thirds of his own 
 force, Lee had repulsed and crippled the enormous army of 
 Hooker, and it appeared reasonably certain, that the same 
 force could maintain a successful defensive, while the segment, 
 or its equivalent, wdiich was absent at Chancellorsville, might 
 be sent, for a temporary purpose, to Bragg, in Tennessee, or 
 to the relief of Pemberton in Vicksburg. 
 
 At the opening of spring the primary lobjects of the Con- 
 federacy were the safety of Richmond, the safety of Vicks- 
 burg — the key to its tenure of the Mississippi Valley — and 
 the holding of its defensive line in Middle and East Tennes- 
 see, the barrier between the enemy and the vitals of the Con- 
 federacy. The first of these objects was amply secured by the 
 victory of Chancellorsville, leaving to the main Confederate 
 army, its own choice of the field of future operations. 
 
 In the Western Department, commanded since ^December, 
 1862, by General Joseph E. Johnston, the situation was less 
 promising, though by no means forbidding hope of a favora- 
 ble solution. General Bragg maintained a somewhat precari- 
 
452 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ous defensive against Rosecrans, who confronted the- Confed- 
 erate commander, with an army much larger than that with 
 which he had fought the battle of Murfreesboro'. General 
 Pemberton, after a series of actions, had retired within the 
 , lines of Vicksburg, where he was closely besieged by General 
 Grant with a numerous army — the Federal fleet in the river, 
 meanAvhile, continuing its bombardment. The characteristic 
 stubbornness of Grant, aided by his ample force, made evident 
 the ultimate fate of Vicksburg and Pemberton's army, either 
 by fafhine, or the assaults of the enemy, unless succor should 
 come in the shape of a demonstration against the besieging 
 army, with which the garrison might be expected to cooperate. 
 Not long after Pemberton's retirement into Vicksburg, Gen- 
 eral Johnston reached Mississippi and began the collection of 
 a force, by which it was expected that the besieged stronghold 
 and its garrison would be relieved. 
 
 But while the situation in the West thus seemed to Invite 
 the presence of a portion of the army of Northern Virginia, 
 relieved of any immediate danger from its antagonist, there 
 were cogent considerations in behalf of another policy which 
 was adopted. Two weeks, at least, would have been required, 
 in the indifferent condition of the Southern railroads, for the 
 transportation of a force from Virginia, competent to enable 
 Bragg to assume the aggressive. A much longer period would 
 have been required to transfer to Jackson, such a force as 
 General Johnston would have deemed sufficient to justify an 
 attack upon Grant. Besides, the government was fully satis- 
 fied, that the reenforcements sent to Johnston would soon ena- 
 ble him to make an effective demonstration against the be- 
 sieging army, which, sustained by a simultaneous attack by 
 Pemberton in front, would have a reasonable prospect of success. 
 
PLANS OF CAMPAIGN. 453 
 
 The project of a direct reenforcement to Johnston, from Lee's 
 army, was speedily abandoned, and the more practicable plan 
 of rcenforcing Bragg was also dismissed. Nothing whatever 
 was to be expected from a victory by Bragg over Rosecrans, 
 unless it could be made a decisive victory, ensuring either the 
 destruction of the Federal army, or the complete abandonment 
 of its advanced line in Tennessee, for which it had paid such 
 heavy toll. Such a result, necessitating the reenforcement of 
 Rosecrans ,from Grant, meanwhile, after the victory had been 
 won, troops being sent to Johnston from Bragg, was indeed 
 brilliant to contemplate. Or there was another prospect 
 equally agreeable. When Rosecrans had been defeated troops 
 might be sent to capture Fort Pillow, on the Mississippi, 
 which, cutting off Grant's supplies from the North, as did Port 
 Hudson from the South, would compel the Federal army at 
 Vicksburg to fight for its subsistence, and under most discour- 
 aging circumstances. In addition to these prospects, there was 
 also the choice of a movement for the complete redemption of 
 Kentucky and Tennessee. 
 
 These brilliant designs of a visionary and vaporing strategy, 
 abundant in the Confederacy during the war, and now osten- 
 tatiously paraded by the cheap wisdom of retrospection, lacked, 
 however, the essential feature of practicability. To have reen- 
 forced Bragg sufficiently from Lee's army, to have enabled him 
 to undertake the offensive, with any prospect of the complete 
 success necessary, would have weakened the army in Virginia 
 to such an extent, as to seriously endanger Richmond. Even 
 though Bragg were thus sufficiently recnforced to defeat a nu- 
 merous army, led by an able commander, and occupying a po- 
 sition of great strength, a full month would have been required 
 to accomplish the results indicated. Waiving all consideration 
 
454 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of the incertitude of battle, and assuming that success would 
 attend every movement of the Confederate army, what reason- 
 able calculation would enable Bragg to have gotten his forces 
 in readiness, and marched them either into Kentucky to Fort 
 Pillow, or to Jackson, in time to have saved Vicksburg? But, 
 apart from the folly of so weakening Lee, as to endanger Rich- 
 mond (which would have been immediately assailed by Hooker, 
 with his command of ninety thousand men, in cooperation with 
 the forces at Suffolk, Fortress Monroe, and Winchester — an ag- 
 gregate of more than forty thousand more), to undertake oper- 
 ations so doubtful and hazardous, was the consideration of the 
 promising inducements for an offensive campaign in the East. 
 
 President Davis and General Lee were concurrent in their 
 convictions of the wisdom of a campaign which should drive 
 the enemy from Virginia, locate the army in an abundant and 
 hostile country, and compensate for any disasters which might 
 be sustained in the West, by an overwhelming defeat in the 
 enemy's country of his main army, which at once covered his 
 capital, and the approaches to his large cities. 
 
 This bold and brilliant conception was equally justified by 
 the situation, and consistent with that able military policy 
 which was throughout characteristic of the Confederate au- 
 thorities, and based upon the only theory on which a weak 
 power can be successfully defended against invasion. 
 
 The strategic theory which dictated the invasion of Penn- 
 sylvania was that of the "defensive, with offensive returns," 
 made forever famous by its triumphant practice by Frederick 
 the Great — the favorite theory of Napoleon — not less signally 
 illustrated by Jackson's Valley campaign, and grandly exe- 
 cuted by Lee in his irresistible onset upon Pope. 
 
 Twitted by the newspapers for their infatuation with the 
 
AN OFFENSIVE DEMANDED. 455 
 
 defensive attitude, and condemned by the voice of the public, 
 for the maintenance of a policy which continually subjected 
 the soil of the South to the devastations of the enemy, the 
 Confederate authorities, neither in the invasion of Maryland, 
 in 1862, nor in the invasion of Pennsylvania, yielded merely 
 to public clamor. In both instances President Davis and 
 General Lee were governed by the sound military considera- 
 tions, which in each case justified the assumption of the offen- 
 sive. Nothing is more universally conceded than the ultimate 
 subjection of a people who permit themselves to be forced 
 always on the defensive. On the other hand, no blows have 
 been so telling in warfare, as those delivered by an antagonist 
 who, lately on the defensive, at the opportune moment, when 
 the foe is stunned by defeat, assumes a skillful and vigorous 
 offensive. 
 
 It was now the third year of the war, and for more than 
 twelve months no considerable success had rewarded the enor- 
 mous sacrifices and expenditures of the North. The fluctuating 
 sentiment, characteristic of that section, had settled down into 
 a feeling of indifference and distrust, beyond which there was 
 but one step to the abandonment of the war as a hopeless ex- 
 periment. The evident apprehension, by the Federal Govern- 
 ment, of an invasion of Pennsylvania, attended by a ruinous 
 defeat of Hooker's army, a result which both sides considered 
 probable, plainly demonstrated, that the virtual termination of 
 the war would be the reward of a successful assumption of the 
 offensive by the Confederates. 
 
 A more favorable conjuncture, for a final trial with its old 
 antagonist, could not have been desired by the Army of North- 
 ern Virginia. The invincible veterans of Longstreet, oftener 
 victors than the Tenth Legion of Ceesar, had rejoined their 
 
456 -LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 companions, who boasted the additional honors of Chancellors- 
 ville. Reenforcements from other quarters were added,* and 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, a compact and puissant force, 
 seventy thousand strong, which had never yet known defeat, 
 instinctively expected the order for advance into the enemy's 
 country. Never was the morale of the army so high, never 
 had it such confidence in its own prowess, and in the resources 
 of its great commander, and never was intrusted to its valor a 
 mission so grateful to its desires, as that tendered by President 
 Davis, " to force the enemy to fight for their own capital and 
 homes." 
 
 Under Lee were trusted lieutenants, whose fame, like that 
 of their followers, was world-wide, and whose laurels were a 
 part of the unnumbered triumphs of the matchless valor of 
 that noble army. Longstreet, the Lannes of the South, was 
 again at the head of his trained corps — the assembled chivalry 
 of the South, in whose exploits every State of the Confederacy 
 claimed a glory peculiarly its own. The bronzed veterans of 
 Jackson, who had shared the glory of their immortal leader 
 from Manassas to Chancellorsville, now followed Ewell, the 
 maimed hero, whom Jackson had named as his successor. 
 Under Hill, the youngest of the corps commanders, were men 
 worthy of a leader who, in twelve months, had filled the suc- 
 cessive grades from Colonel to Lieutenant General. The cav- 
 alry was still intrusted to Stuart, that bold, able chief, and 
 " rarely gallant and noble gentleman, well supporting by his 
 character the tradition that royal blood flowed in his veins." 
 With such leaders, and with thoroughly tried and efficient 
 subordinate officers, improved transportation, equipment and 
 clothing, and with numbers approaching nearer an equality 
 * Chiefly conscripts. 
 
CONFEDEEATE DESIGNS. 457 
 
 with the Federal army, than at any other period, the Army of 
 Northern Virginia no more doubted, than did its cornmander 
 and the Government, that it was at the outset of a campaign 
 brilliant and decisive beyond parallel in its history. 
 
 About the middle of May, General Lee visited Richmond, 
 when the general features of the campaign were determined. 
 The movement from the camps near Fredericksburg and the 
 Rapidan, commenced early in June. The incipient feature of 
 General Lee's plan was a flank movement, while still con- 
 fronted by the array of the enemy — perhaps the most delicate 
 and difficult problem in war — by which, leaving the south 
 bank of the Rappahannock, he sought to draw the Federal 
 army away from its position. To meet the contingency of a 
 movement by the enemy in the direction of Richmond, A. P. 
 Hill, with his corps d^ armee, was left near Fredericksburg. 
 That skillful officer ably executed his instructions, checking 
 the Federal demonstrations near his lines, and concealing the 
 absence of the main body of the army until the advance was 
 well under way. General Stuart fully performed his impor- 
 tant part of covering the movements of the infantry, by seiz- 
 ing the mountain passes, and detaining the advance of the 
 enemy, in the execution of which he fought several fierce cav- 
 alry engagements, winning them all with inferior forces. The 
 army was marched through an abundant country, not deso- 
 lated by war, and affijrding good roads. Important incidents 
 of the advance were the capture of Winchester, Berryville, and 
 Martinsburg, by the forces of Ewell, with their garrisons, aggre- 
 gating seven thousand men, and considerable material of war. 
 
 These brilliant results of Lee's strategy were accomplished 
 with wonderful regularity and promptitude, and were attended 
 with inconsiderable loss. 
 
J 
 
 458 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Crossing the Potomac, the second stage of the campaign was ' 
 the occupation of Western Maryland — the least friendly section 
 of the State — where the army could be abundantly supplied, 
 and the important objects of destroying the Baltimore and Ohio 
 Railroad, and the Cumberland Canal, so valuable to the ene- 
 my, could be accomplished. The next step was to advance 
 into Pennsylvania, capturing large supplies much needed by 
 the army, occupying several large towns of that State, and 
 destroying communications — meanwhile the army living on 
 the enemy, and kept well in hand for a general engagement, 
 whenever battle could he advantageously offered. In the execu- 
 tion of this portion of the plan, an extensive and fertile section 
 of Pennsylvania was occupied, strong detachments were pushed 
 far into the interior, and a movement against Harrisburg was 
 in preparation, when the advance of the Federal army induced 
 General Lee to concentrate his forces for battle. 
 
 The consummate strategy of Lee had now made him appa- 
 rently master of the situation, and gave him the option of ten- 
 dering or declining a grand and decisive engagement. It is 
 impossible to overestimate the generalship, which, within twen- 
 ty-five days, had transferred an army, in the presence of the 
 enemy, from the Rappahannock to the interior of Pennsyl- 
 vania, making large captures en route, and inflicting heavy 
 damage upon the Federal communications, without being even 
 momentarily arrested. Never once had been relaxed the grasp 
 of that master-hand which controlled the army in all its move- 
 ments. Its various parts, within easy supporting distance, 
 were clearly so disposed, as to be readily assembled, to meet 
 the exigency that was inevitable. When Lee drew in his 
 several columns around Gettysburg, the South confident in the 
 invincibility of the army, and in the genius of its leader, never 
 
GETTYSBURG. 459 
 
 'doubted the issue of the grand trial of arms which was at hand. 
 With more than apprehension the North awaited the fate of 
 the army, upon which its last hope of security rested. A de- 
 feat of the Army of the Potomac now would signify, not a 
 check in a boastful advance upon Richmond, but the capture 
 of Washington, the presence of the avenging columns of Lee 
 upon the banks of the Delaware — perhaps of the dreaded 
 Stuart upon the Hudson. 
 
 It was contemplated that the invasion of Pennsylvania 
 would result in a decisive battle. Indeed, that result was in- 
 evitable, unless the Federal authorities should unresistingly 
 submit to the invasion — an event not for a moment to be an- 
 ticipated. But a vital feature in the theory of the invasion 
 was that the position of Lee would necessitate an advance 
 against him by the Federal commander, leaving to Lee the 
 choice of time and place for giving battle. The calculation 
 was that Lee would be master of the situation at all times, 
 as indeed he undoubtedly was until the engagement of Gettys- 
 burg was joined. We are not here at liberty to discuss the 
 details of that battle, or to consider how far it was a depart- 
 ure from, or in pursuance of the original design of the Confed- 
 erate campaign.* If competent criticism shall condenmn the 
 
 *It has been generally assumed that General Lee committed grave er- 
 rors at Gettysburg. The following explanation by Lee shows the extreme 
 caution with which such a judgment should be pronounced: "/d had not 
 been intended to fight a general battle at such distance frorn our base unless 
 attacked by the enemy ; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by 
 the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through 
 tlie mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was 
 unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy's 
 main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occu- 
 pying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troopst A bat- 
 
460 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 tactics of Lee at Gettysburg, he has yet disarmed censure by 
 the surpassing magnanimity with which he assumed the re- 
 sponsibility. 
 
 The great joy of the North did not exaggerate the terrible 
 blow sustained by the Confederacy in the failure of the Penn- 
 sylvania campaign. It was the last serious demonstration upon 
 Federal soil undertaken by the South — all movements of an 
 offensive character subsequently undertaken being merely raids 
 or diversions, designed to give relief to the sorely-pressed Con- 
 federate capital. It imposed upon the South the cruel neces- 
 sity of a continuation of the war upon its own soil — a preca- 
 rious defensive, with a capacity of resistance greatly diminished. 
 
 Gettysburg marked the most serious step in that decline of 
 Confederate fortunes which the fall of Jackson, in the moment 
 of his greatest triumph, so ominously presaged.* 
 
 Yet the condition of Lee's army was far from desperate on 
 the morning of the 4th of July, when it still confronted its 
 
 tie thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the success- 
 ful issue of the first day, and in view of the valuable results which would 
 ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought ad- 
 visable to renew the attack." 
 
 Mr. Swinton, who derived his information from General Longstreet, 
 makes a statement which throws much light upon the theory with which 
 this campaign was undertaken : " Indeed, in entering upon the campaign, 
 General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he loould not 
 assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attach him." — Cam- 
 paigns of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 * Major John Esten Cooke justly says: "Gettysburg was the Waterloo 
 — Cemetery Hill the Mount St. Jean of the war Not with- 
 out good reason is the anniversary of this great battle celebrated at the 
 North with addresses and rejoicings — with crowds, and brass bands, and 
 congratulations. The American Watei-loo is worth making that noise 
 over; and the monument proposed there is a natural conception. 
 
VICIiSBURG. 461 
 
 antagonist, neither evincing a disposition to attack. Retiring 
 in perfect order, and bringing oif his extensive trains and 
 seven thousand prisoners, he tendered the enemy battle at 
 Hagerstown, while making preparations to recross the Poto- 
 mac. General Meade, an able and prudent soldier, made as 
 vigorous a pursuit as the crippled condition of his army would 
 permit. In a short time General Lee was once more uj)on the 
 lines of the Rapidan, and General Meade soon took position 
 upon the Rappahannock. Here the campaign terminated, and 
 the two armies, like giants exhausted by a mighty wrestle, 
 gladly availed themselves of a season of repose. 
 
 But Gettysburg did not complete the agony of the South. 
 •The disastrous failure of the most prodigious and promising 
 enterprise, undertaken by its largest, and heretofore invincible 
 army, was simultaneous with an event hardly less fearful in its 
 consequences. On the fourth of July, the garrison of Vicks- 
 burg, reduced to the point of starvation, surrendered to the 
 persevering and indomitable Grant. This event signified the 
 loss of an army of twenty -five thousand men, the possession 
 by the enemy of the Confederate Gibraltar of the Mississippi 
 "Valley, the loss of all tenure upon the great river by the 
 South, and the severance of the Confederacy. Port Hudson, 
 with its garrison of five thousand men, being no longer ten- 
 able, after the fall of Vicksburg, Avas immediately surrendered 
 to the besieging army of General Banks. The sum of Con- 
 federate disasters in the summer of 1863, was completed by the 
 failure of the attempt to capture Helena, Arkansas, followed 
 by the capture of Little Rock, and Federal control of the im- 
 portant valley in which it is situated. 
 
 Within ninety days the South was brought from the hope 
 of almost instant independence to the certainty of a long. 
 
462 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 bitter, and doubtful struggle. Its armies terribly shattered, 
 its resources in men and means apparently almost exhausted, 
 it seemed for a time doubtful whether the Confederacy was 
 capable of longer endurance of the terrible ordeal. The exult- 
 ation of the North was proportionate to the extent of its vic- 
 tories. A new lease was given to the war. Confidence was 
 fully restored, and the Federal Government could now make 
 no demand, that would be thought extravagant, upon the 
 energies of the North, for the promotion of the object it had 
 so much at heart. But a few months sufficed to show that 
 the constancy and fortitude of the South was still cajjable of 
 a desperate struggle with the power and determination of the 
 North. 
 
 This period of misfortune and apprehension was signalized 
 by a most determined arraignment of the Confederate ad- 
 ministration. It is worthy of remark, however, that in all 
 the embittered censure visited upon President Davis, for his 
 alleged responsibility for the crushing reverses of the summer 
 campaign, there was avowed but little censure of the most 
 fatal of those disasters — the failure of the movement into Penn- 
 sylvania. The privilege of assailing Mr. Davis with or with- 
 out reason, did not include the privilege to condemn Lee and 
 his army. 
 
 In the case of Vicksburg circumstances were assumed to be 
 different. Without even waiting for the facts, or for any ex- 
 planation of that terrible calamity. General Pemberton was 
 accused of having betrayed his command. He was of North- 
 ern birth, and he had surrendered on the fourth of July — 
 such was the evidence of Pemberton's treason. Despite the 
 fact that Johnston was known to be in the neighborhood with 
 a force collected for the relief of Vicksburg, and though it had 
 
GENERAL PEMBERTON. 463 
 
 been plain to the country for weeks, that Yicksburg coukl 
 not be saved, except by a successful demonstration by that 
 force, it was not admitted among the possibilities of the case, 
 that Johnston* shared the responsibility for the disaster. 
 
 When, however, the Federal accounts revealed the gallant 
 defense made by Pemberton, and thus put to shame the un- 
 worthy insinuation of treachery, the censure of that unfortu- 
 nate commander and the President assumed another direction. 
 Pemberton, it was asserted, was notoriously incompetent, so 
 proven, and so represented to the President before his assign- 
 ment to command in Mississippi ; and the indignation of the 
 country was invoked upon the most signal instance of favoritism 
 yet exhibited. The extent to which this censure of Mr. Davis 
 was successful, may be estimated, when it is stated that no 
 act of his administration so imperiled his popularity as did the 
 appointment of General Pemberton. Yet it is undeniable that 
 this was the result of the unfortunate sequel at Yicksburg, 
 and dictated by popular passion in a moment of terrible dis- 
 appointment, rather than by any sufficient reason ever urged 
 to show that the appointment was unwise and undeserved. 
 
 Sustained by the recommendations of several of the first 
 officers in the Confederate army. President Davis made Pem- 
 berton a Lieutenant-General, and assigned him to the com- 
 mand of the Department of Mississippi. The command was 
 
 * General Johnston, whether willingly or unwillingly, it is not neces- 
 sary for us to inquire, was the favorite of the anti-administration faotion. 
 His name and opinions were, upon all occasions, quoted to aid in the 
 disparagement of the administration. This faction was as blind in its 
 zealotry in favor of Johnston, as in its prejudice against Davis. The 
 motive of this zealous championship of Johnston was, however, to ofl- 
 set the well-known confidence of General Lee in the President. 
 
464 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 one of vital importance to the country, and within Its lim- 
 its were the home and all the possessions of Mr. Davis. 
 In October, 1862, General Pemberton took charge of his de- 
 partment, finding it in a most disordered and embarrassing 
 condition. His administration was of a character to give 
 great satisfaction to the Government, and its fruits were speed- 
 ily realized in the thorough and efficient reorganization of an 
 army, but lately defeated, the improved efficiency of its vari- 
 ous departments, and the successful defense of an extensive 
 district, with forty thousand men, against the armies of Grant 
 and Banks, the smallest of which nearly equaled the entire 
 force of Pemberton. Indeed, it can hardly be alleged that 
 the administration of General Pemberton, previous to the 
 siege of Vicksburg, was faulty or unsatisfactory. "With what 
 justice, then, can it be charged that Mr. Davis retained in 
 command an officer proven to be incompetent? 
 
 In the reports of Generals Johnston and Pemberton, written 
 from different stand-points, and each with the object of vindi- 
 cating its author, the operations which led to the retirement 
 of the latter within the lines of Vicksburg were elaborately 
 discussed. It is at least safe to state that General Pemberton's 
 reasons are as forcibly stated in explanation of his own con- 
 duct, as are General Johnston's in demonstration of the errors 
 of his subortlinate. Pemberton was controlled in all his move- 
 ments by the paramount purpose of holding Vicksburg, the 
 last obstruction to the enemy's free navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi, and the connecting link between the two great divisions 
 of the Confederacy. If he had abandoned Vicksburg, with a 
 view to save his army, and refused to stand a siege, can it be 
 reasonably supposed that his assailants would have been more 
 merciful? His mission was to save Vicksburg and the Valley 
 
GENERAL PEMBERTON. 465 
 
 of the Mississippi, and, when forced back by the overwhelm- 
 ing ntimbei's of Grant, he preferred even to risk his army, 
 rather than to surrender the objects of the whole campaign 
 without an effort. 
 
 During the siege, the engineering skill of General Pember- 
 ton, and his fertility of expedients were conspicuously dis- 
 played. Works, which, under the unceasing and concentrated 
 fire of hundreds of guns, were demolished, re-appeared, in im- 
 proved forms, which only consummate ingenuity could liave 
 devised. AVorks built to withstand guns used in ordinary 
 warfare were found wholly inadequate to resist the heavy 
 metal of the enemy; and, subjected to the incessant and gall- 
 ing fire of musketry, the artillery could with difficulty be 
 W'orked. But the energy and resources of General Pemberton 
 met even these difficulties. The position of the pieces was 
 constantly changing; embankments disappeared under the 
 enemy's fire; but the Confederate artillery would still be 
 found in position, and stronger than before. 
 
 But the skill of the commander and the heroic endurance 
 of the garrison were unavailing. From the first, relief from 
 without was expected. For forty-eight days this hope stimu- 
 lated the commander and the garrison, and General Pemberton 
 subsequently declared that he " would have lived upon an 
 ounce a day, and have continued to meet the assaults of all 
 Grant's array, rather than have surrendered the city, until 
 General Johnston had realized or relinquished that hope." 
 AVhen the hope of aid was finally abandoned, the surrender of 
 Vieksburg M'as simply a question of time and honor. The 
 alternative was either to capitulate or attempt to cut through 
 the enemy's lines. In a council of his officers, Pemberton fa- 
 vored the latter plan, but yielded to the views of the majority. 
 30 
 
466 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The case of General Pemberton was a striking instance of 
 public ingratitude. Vindicating his devotion to the cause of 
 the South, by surrendering his commission in the Federal 
 service, turning his back upon his kindred, and leaving a large 
 property in the country of the enemy, he was stigmatized by 
 the very people in whose cause he had made these sacrifices. 
 His loyalty, capacity, and fidelity were questioned, even while 
 he was in the front of death. His noble reply to these accusa- 
 tions can never be forgotten. Said he to his troops : " You 
 have been told that I was disloyal and incompetent, and that 
 I would sell Vicksburg. Follow me, and you shall see at what 
 price I shall sell it." The story of the devotion shown at 
 Vicksburg is no mean one in the history of the Confederacy. 
 But the great qualities of this abused man have even a nobler 
 testimony than the gallantry of that defense. Convinced that 
 the cloud of prejudice and misrepresentation which followed 
 him, rendered useless to the cause his services in high position, 
 he tendered his resignation as a Lieutenant-General, and 
 requested to be ordered to duty with his original rank of 
 Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery.* 
 
 When the facts belonging to the unfortunate campaign in 
 Mississippi were made known, the censure of Pemberton was 
 rather for what he failed to do, than what he had done. But 
 suppose the same test should be applied to General Johnston ; 
 would there not be found an equal wanting of results? If 
 Jolinston was powerless to make even a diversion with more 
 than twenty thousand men, (his force at the time of Pember- 
 
 * The President ordered a Court of Inquiry for investigation of the facts 
 of the campaign in Mississippi. General Pemberton requested that the 
 most searching inquiry should be made, and that the court be allowed to 
 invite all attainable testimony against him. 
 
GENERAL PEMBERTON. 467 
 
 ton's surrender,) how much more helpless was Pemberton to 
 cheek Grant? 
 
 A dispas-sionatc and careful inquiry will demonstrate that 
 the operations of General Pemberton, antecedent to the siege 
 of Vieksburg, are far less censurable than was assumed by his 
 assailants. There can be no manner of doubt, that if worthy 
 of blame, he should not be visited with the whole responsi- 
 bility. It is difficult to imagine how Pemberton could have 
 adopted a different course, consistently with the main purpose 
 of the campaign — which was to prevent the capture of Vieks- 
 burg. It is certain that he would have been doubly con- 
 demned, if he had executed a safe retreat, and abandoned the 
 stronghold without an efibrt to save it. 
 
 A sufficient reply to the statement that Pemberton was ap- 
 pointed without the desirable evidence of fitness, is that the 
 occasion was one precluding the employment of any officer 
 whose capacity for such a command had been proven by ample 
 trial. Every officer of established merit w^as then in a position 
 from which he could not be spared. The presence of Lee in 
 Virginia was deemed necessary by the whole country. The 
 most popular of his lieutenants (Longstreet) was then freely 
 criticised for an assumed failure in a recent independent com- 
 mand ; and, besides, he was obviously needed in the Pennsyl- 
 vania campaign. Beauregard was also thought to be in his 
 appropriate place, in charge of the coast defenses ; and, indeed, 
 it was next to impossible to avoid the employment of a com- 
 paratively untried commander in some important position. 
 The confidence of Mr. Davis in Pemberton, too, was amply 
 sustained by the testimony of officers, in whose judgment the 
 country confided. 
 
 But Pemberton failed, and it was the misfortune of the 
 
468 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 President to have conferred distinction upon an unsuccessful 
 commander. AVaiving all discussion of the extent to which 
 Peniberton may be justified, and even conceding the appoint- 
 ment to have been a bad one, let us remember how few really- 
 capable commanders are produced by even the greatest wars. 
 Was President Davis to call twenty into existence, fit to com- 
 mand armies, when Napoleon declared his armies did not afford 
 half a dozen? Let it be remembered, too, that it was his 
 penetration that sustained Lee, Sidney Johnston and Jackson, 
 in the face of popular clamor ; that he rewarded, with suitable 
 acknowledgment, the skill and gallantry of Ewell, Early, 
 Stuart, Gordon, Longstreet, and Hood ; of Breckinridge, Cle- 
 burne, Magruder, Morgan, and others Avhose names make up 
 the brilliant galaxy of Confederate heroes.* 
 
 That President Davis was tenacious of his opinions is un- 
 questionably true, and his firm grasp of his purposes was the 
 explanation of his ascendancy over other minds, and a leading 
 attribute of his fitness for his position. But this strenuous 
 
 * It is noteworthy that when trial vindicated the confidence of Mr. 
 Davis in an officer, of whose capacity the critics were doubtful (as was the 
 case in numberless instances), they made no acknowledgment of error. 
 For example, the President was accused of the most unworthy nepotism 
 in his appointment of General " Dick " Taylor, who was a brother of 
 Mr. Davis' first wife. Yet that appointment was insisted upon l)y Stone- 
 wall Jackson, in whose army Taylor commanded a brigade. The Presi- 
 dent made Taylor a Brigadier, because he thought him competent; and 
 afterward a Major-General, because Jackson kyieiv him to be worthy of it. 
 Did Taylor's subsequent career vindicate the President or the critics? 
 
 The case of the brave and efficient Early was another instance in which 
 Mr. Davis was at variance with the newspaper and congressional censors, 
 and in which, as usual, the President was sustained by Lee. It is needless 
 to multiply examples. 
 
MR. STEPHENS' MISSION. 469 
 
 adhesion to a settled aim, characteristic of all men born for in- 
 fluence, is a very different quality from that unreasoning zeal- 
 otry which belongs to weak minds. If, indeed, the favoritism 
 of Mr. Davis lost Vicksburg, with equal justice, it may be 
 claimed that it won the Seven Days' victories, Manassas, Fred- 
 ericksburg, and Chancellor.sville. 
 
 An interesting event in the history of this period of the 
 war, was the unsuccessful mission of Vice-President Stephens, 
 to the Federal authorities, designed, as explained by President 
 Davis, "to place the war upon the footing of such as are 
 waged by civilized people in modern times." The annexed 
 correspondence requires hardly a word of explanation. Con- 
 sistent with the forbearance and humanity, with which Mr. 
 Davis had endeavored to prevent war, by negotiation, was this 
 effort to soften its rigors and to abate the bitterness which it 
 had then assumed. 
 
 Recent atrocities of the Federal authorities * had compelled 
 
 *One of the worst of these proceedings of the enemy, was the execu- 
 tion of Captains Corbin and McGraw. On hearing of their fate, the Con- 
 federate Government inquired of the Federal authorities the reason of 
 their actions. The response was, that they were executed as spies. The 
 record of their trial was then demanded. In answer to this request, the 
 Federal Government furnished a copy of the chai'ges and specifications 
 against them, and of the sentence of the court which condemned them, 
 lid none of the evidence. 
 
 From the papers thus furnished, it appears that it was not true that 
 they had been accused or tried as spies — that the sole charge against 
 these unfortunate gentlemen was, that they had recruited soldiers for the 
 Confederacy in Kentucky, a State embraced in our political system and 
 represented regularly in the Confederate Congress by Senators and Kep- 
 resentatives. Nor was the evidence of this charge supplied. Not a scin- 
 tilla of proof appeared that these men were spies. The sole pretext for 
 their execution was the technical one that these officers were recruiting ia 
 
470 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 the Confederate Government to seriously entertain the purpose 
 of retaliation. Reluctant to adopt a course which would re- 
 move the last restraint upon the spirit of cruelty and revenge, 
 making the war a system of unmitigated barbarism upon both 
 sides, President Davis determined to make an earnest appeal 
 to the humanity of the Federal authorities. In addition to 
 this object the mission of Mr. Stephens sought the arrange- 
 ment of all disputes between the governments, respecting the 
 cartel of exchange, upon a permanent and humane basis, by 
 which the soldiers of the two armies should be sent to their 
 homes, instead of being confined in military prisons. 
 
 To make the mission more acceptable to the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, President Davis removed every obstacle to inter- 
 course upon terms of equality, and selected a gentleman of 
 high position, of known philanthropy and moderation, and 
 from several reasons likely to obtain an audience of the Fed- 
 eral authorities. The choice of time was not less indicative 
 of the magnanimity of Mr. Davis. The Confederate army was 
 then in Pennsylvania, apparently upon the eve of a victory 
 already assured, and which, if gained, would have placed it in 
 possession of the Federal capital and the richest sections of the 
 North. At such a moment, so promising in opportunity of 
 ample vengeance for the ravages and desolation, which every- 
 where marked the presence of the Federal armies, the Confed- 
 erate President tendered his noble plea in behalf of civilization 
 and humanity. With rare justice has it been said, that this 
 
 one of the States claimed by the enemy, as one of the United States, a 
 principle which applies equally to Virginia or South Carolina, and which 
 would, if carried out, sentence to the gallows every officer and private we 
 had in our service. 
 
PROUD rOSITIOX OF MR. DAVIS. 471 
 
 position of Mr. Davis " merited the aj)plause of the Christian 
 world." 
 
 Mr. Stephens was contemptuously denied even a hearing. 
 The sequel soon revealed the explanation of the conduct of 
 the Federal Government, by which it became doubl}' charge- 
 able for the sufferings of a protracted war, in declining to aid 
 in the abatement of its horrors, and by abruptly closing the 
 door against all attempts at negotiation. General Meade had 
 repulsed General Lee at Gettysburg, while Mr. Stephens was 
 near Fortress Monroe. Flushed with triumph and insolent 
 in the belief that Lee's army could not escape destruction, the 
 Federal authorities declared such intercourse with "rebels" to 
 be " inadmissable." In other words, detention of the Confed- 
 erate prisoners, and outrages upon the Southern people, were 
 part of a political and military system at Washington, and 
 would be persisted in. At subsequent stages of tlic Avar were 
 seen the objects of this policy, which the Federal Government 
 virtually proclaimed, and which it persistently adhere.! to. 
 
 The correspondence between President Davis and Vice- 
 President Stephens proudly vindicates the humanity and mag- 
 nanimity of the South. It is alone a sufficient reply to the 
 cant of demagogues and the ravings of conscience-stricken 
 fanatics, over the falsely-called " Rebel barbarities." 
 
 OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 RiCHMOXD, July 2, 1863. 
 Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, JRichmond, Va. — 
 
 Sir : Having accepted your patriotic offer to proceed, as a mil- 
 itary commissioner, under flag of truce, to Washington, you will 
 receive herewith your letter of authority to the Comraauder-in- 
 chief of the army and navy of the United States. 
 
472 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 This letter is signed by me as Commander-in-chief of the Con- 
 federate land and naval forces. 
 
 You will perceive, from the terms of the letter, that it is so 
 worded as to avoid any political difficulties in its reception. In- 
 tended exclusively as one of those communications between bel- 
 ligerents, which public law recognizes as necessary and proper 
 between hostile forces, care has been taken to give no pretext for 
 refusing to receive it, on the ground that it would involve a tacit 
 recognition of the independence of the Confederacy. 
 
 Your mission is simply one of humanity, and has no political 
 aspect. 
 
 If objection is made to receiving your letter, on the ground that 
 it is not addressed to Abraham Lincoln, as President, instead of 
 Commander-in-chief, etc., then you will present the duplicate let- 
 ter, which is addressed to him us President, and signed by me, as 
 President. To this latter, objection may be made, on the ground 
 that I am not recognized to be President of the Confederacy. lu 
 this event, you will decline any further attempt to confer on the 
 subject of your mission, as such conference is admissable only on 
 the footing of perfect equality. My recent interviews with you 
 have put you so fully in possession of my views, that it is scarcely 
 necessary to give you any detailed instructions, even were I, at 
 this moment, well enough to attempt it. 
 
 My whole purpose is, in one word, to place this war on the foot- 
 ing of such as are waged by civilized people in modern times ; 
 and to divest it of the savage character which has been impressed 
 on it by our enemies, in spite of all our eiforts and protests. 
 
 War is full enough of unavoidable horrors, under all its aspects, 
 to justify, and even to demand, of any Christian rulers who may 
 be unhappily engaged in carrying it on, to seek to restrict its 
 calamities, and to divest it of all unnecessary severities. 
 
 You will endeavor to establish the cartel for the exchange of 
 prisoners on such a basis as to avoid the constant difficulties and 
 
MK. DA vis' letter. 473 
 
 complaints which arise, and to prevent, for the future, what we 
 deem the unfair conduct of our enemies, in evading the delivery 
 of the prisoners who fall into their hands j in retarding it by send- 
 ing them on circuitous routes, and by detaining them, sometimes 
 for months, in camps and prisons ; and in persisting in taking 
 captives non-combatants. 
 
 Your attention is also called to th-e unheard-of conduct of Fed- 
 eral ofl&cers, in driving from their homes entire communities of 
 women and children, as well as of men, whom they find in districts 
 occupied by their troops, for no other reason than because these 
 unfortunates are faithful to the allegiance due to their States, and 
 refuse to take an oath of fidelity to their enemies. 
 
 The putting to death of unarmed prisoners has been a ground 
 of just complaint in more than one instance, and the recent exe- 
 cution of officers of our army in Kentucky, for the sole cause that 
 they were engaged in recruiting service in a State which is claimed 
 as still one of the United States, but is also claimed by us as one 
 of the Confederate States, must be repressed by retaliation, if not 
 unconditionally abandoned, because it would justify the like execu- 
 tion in every other State of the Confederacy ; and the practice is 
 barbarous, uselessly cruel, and can only lead to the slaughter of 
 prisoners on both sides — a result too horrible to contemplate, with- 
 out making every efi"ort to avoid it. 
 
 On these and all kindred subjects, you will consider your author- 
 ity full and ample to make such arrangements as will temper the 
 present cruel character of the contest; and full confidence is placed 
 in your judgment, patriotism, and discretion, that while carrying 
 out the objects of your mission, you will take care that the equal 
 rights of the Confederacy be always preserved. 
 Very respectfully, 
 [Signed] JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
474 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Richmond, 8fch July, 1863. 
 His Excellency Jefferson Davis — 
 
 Sir : Under the authority and instructions of your letter to me 
 of the 2d instant, I proceeded on the mission therein assigned, 
 without delay. The steamer Torpedo, commanded by Lieutenant 
 Hunter Davidson, of the navy, was put in readiness, as soon as 
 possible, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, and tendered for 
 the service. At noon, on the 3d, she started down James River, 
 hoisting and bearing a flag of truce after passing City Point. The 
 next day, the 4th, at about one o'clock P. M., when within a few 
 miles of Newport News, we were met by a small boat of the enemy, 
 carrying two guns, which also raised a white flag before approach- 
 ing us. The officer in command informed Lieutenant Davidson 
 that he had orders from Admiral Lee, on board the United States 
 flag-ship Minnesota, lying below, and then in view, not to allow 
 any boat or vessel to pass the point near which he was stationed, 
 without his permission. By this officer, I sent to Admiral Lee a 
 note, stating my objects and wishes, a copy of which is hereto an- 
 nexed, marked A. I also sent to the admiral, to be forwarded, 
 another note, in the same language, addressed to the officer in 
 command of the United States forces at Fort Monroe. The gun- 
 boat proceeded immediately to the Minnesota with these dispatches, 
 while the Torpedo remained at anchor. Between three and four 
 o'clock P. M., another boat came up to us, bearing the admiral's 
 answer, which is hereunto annexed, marked B. We remained at 
 or about this point in the river until the 6th instant, when, having 
 heard nothing further from the admiral, at 12 o'clock M., on that 
 day, I directed Lieutenant Davidson again to speak the gunboat 
 on guard, and to hand the officer in command another note to the 
 admiral. This was done. A copy of this note is appended, 
 marked C. At half past two o'clock P. M., two boats approached 
 us from below, one bearing an answer from' the admiral to my 
 note to him of the 4th. This answer is annexed, marked D. The 
 
MR. Stephen's reply. 475 
 
 other boat bore the answer of Lieutenaut-Colonel William H. 
 Ludlow, to my note of the 4th, addressed to the officer in com- 
 mand at Fort Monroe. A copy of this is annexed, marked E. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Ludlow also came up in person in the boat 
 that brought his answer to me, and conferred with Colonel Ould, 
 on board the Toi'pedo, upon some matters he desired to see him 
 about in connection with the exchange of prisoners. 
 
 From the papers appended, embracing the correspondence re- 
 ferred to, it will be seen that the mission failed from the refusal 
 of the enemy to receive or entertain it, holding the propositioa 
 for such a conference " inadmissable." 
 
 The influences and views that led to this determination, after 
 so long a consideration of the subject, must be left to conjecture. 
 The reason assigned for the refusal by the United States Secretary 
 of War, to wit : " that the customary agents and channels are 
 considered adequate for needful military communications and con- 
 ferences," to one acquainted with the facts, seems not only unsat- 
 isfactory, but very singular and unaccountable, for it is certainly 
 known to him that these very agents, to whom he evidently al- 
 ludes, heretofore agreed upon in a former conference, in reference 
 to the exchange t)f prisoners, (one of the subjects embraced in 
 your letter to me,) are now, and have been for some time, dis- 
 tinctly at issue on several important points. The existing cartel, 
 owing to these disagreements, is virtually suspended, so far as the 
 exchange of officers on either side is- concerned. Notices of re- 
 taliation have been given on both sides. 
 
 The efforts, therefore, for the very many and cogent reasons set 
 forth in your letter of instructions to me, to see if these differ- 
 ences could not be removed, and if a clearer understanding be- 
 twcen the parties, as to the general conduct of the war, could not 
 be arrived at, before this extreme measure should be resorted to 
 by either party, was no less in accordance with the dictates of 
 humanity than in strict conformity with the usages of belligerents 
 
476 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 in modern- times. Deeply impressed as I was with ttese views 
 and feelings, in undertaking the mission, and asking the confer- 
 ence, I can but express my profound regret at the result of the 
 effort made to obtain it; and I can but entertain the belief, that 
 if the conference sought had been granted, mutual good could 
 have been effected by it; and if this war, so unnatural, so unjust, 
 so unchristian, and so inconsistent with every fundamental prin- 
 ciple of American constitutional liberty, " must needs " continue 
 to be waged against us, that at least some of its severer horrors, 
 which now so eminently, threaten, might have been avoided. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. 
 
DECLINE OF THE CONFEDERACY. 477 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 OPERATIOXS OF GENERAL TAYLOR IN LOUISL\NA — THE MISSLSSIPPI VALLEY IR- 
 RECOVERABLY LOST TO THE CONFEDERACY FEDERALS FOILED AT CHARLES- 
 TON THE DIMINISHED CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH FINANCIAL DERANGE- 
 MENT DEFECTIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF THE SOUTH MR. DAVIs' LIMITED 
 
 CONNECTION WITH IT THE REASONS FOR THE FINANCIAL FAILURE OF THE 
 
 CONFEDERACY INFLUENCE OF SPECULATION ANOMALOUS SITUATION OF THE 
 
 SOUTH MR. DAVIs' VIEWS OF THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE SOUTH AT THE 
 
 BEGINNING OF THE WAR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE BRAGG 
 
 RETREATS TO CHATTANOOGA MORGAN's EXPEDITION SURRENDER OF CUM- 
 BERLAND GAP FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF CHATTANOOGA BATTLE OF CHICKA- 
 
 MAUGA — BRAGG's EXPECTATIONS — GRANt's OPERATIONS — BRAGG BADLY DE- 
 FEATED PRESIDENT DAVIs' VIEW OF THE DISASTER GENERAL BRAGG RE- 
 LIEVED FROM COMMAND OF THE WESTERN ARMY CENSURE OF THIS OFFICER 
 
 HIS MERITS AND SERVICES THE UNJUST CENSURE OF MR. DAVIS AND GEN- 
 ERAL BRAGG FOR THE REVERSES IN THE WEST OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA 
 
 IN THE LATTER PART OF 1863 CONDITION OF THE SOUTH AT THE CLOSE OF 
 
 THE YEAR SIGNS OF EXHAUSTION PRESIDENT D.WIs' RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 PUBLIC DESPONDENCY THE WORK OF FACTION ABUSE OF MR. DAVIS. IN 
 
 CONGRESS THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS ASSAILANTS DEFI- 
 CIENCY OF FOOD — HOW CAUSED — THE CONFEDERACY EVENTUALLY CONQUERED 
 BY STARVATION, 
 
 nnHOUGH indicating that stage of the war, when began the 
 -*- steady decline of the Confederacy, the summer of 1863 
 was not wholly unredeemed bv successes, which, however tran- 
 sient in significance, threw no mean lustre upon Southern arms. 
 A series of brilliant operations marked the career of General 
 Richard Taylor in Lower Louisiana. Preceded by a succcs.sful 
 campaign in the Lafourche region, an expedition was under- 
 
478 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 taken by General Taylor against Brasliear City, in the latter 
 davs of June. A strong and important position was carried, 
 and eighteen hundred prisoners, with over five millions of 
 dollars worth of stores, were captured. For some time the 
 hope was indulged, that this success of General Taylor would 
 compel the abandonment of the Federal siege of Port Hud- 
 son, and that Taylor could also make a successful diversion in 
 favor of Vicksburg. This hope was disappointed, and Taylor, 
 not having the strength to cope with the large force of the 
 enemy sent against him, after the fall of the ISIississippi strong- 
 holds, was forced to abandon the country which he had so 
 gallantly won. The valley of the Mississippi was irrecover- 
 ably in Federal possession, and the Confederacy was able at no 
 subsequent stage of the war, to undertake any serious enter- 
 prise for its redemption. 
 
 At Charleston the Federal fleet and land forces continued, 
 during the summer, their fruitless and expensive attacks. The 
 skill of General Beauregard, and the firmness of his small 
 command, made memorable the siege of that devoted city, so 
 hated and coveted by the North, yet among the last prizes to 
 fall into its hands. 
 
 But momentary gleams of hope were insufficient to dispel 
 the shadow of disaster, which, by midsummer, seemed to have 
 settled upon the fate of the Confederacy. The violent blow 
 dealt the material capacity of the South by the surrender of 
 Vicksburg ; the diminished prestige, from the serious check at 
 Gettysburg, in its wondrous career of victory, and the fright- 
 ful losses of the Army of Northern Virginia, were immediately 
 followed by a marked abatement of that unwavering confidence 
 in the ultimate result, which had previously so stimulated the 
 energy of the South. 
 
CONFEDERATE FINANCES. 479 
 
 The material disability and embarrassment resulting from 
 the possession, by the enemy, of large sections of the Confed- 
 eracy, and conse(;[uent contraction of its territorial area; the 
 destruction of property ; the serious disturbance of the whole 
 commercial system of the South, by the loss of Vicksburg ; 
 and the diminished confidence of the public, were attended by 
 a fatal derangement of the already failing Confederate system 
 of finance. 
 
 In the American war, as in all wars, the question of finance 
 entered largely into the decision of the result. At an early 
 period many sagacious minds declared that the contest would 
 finally be resolved into a question as to which of the belliger- 
 ents " had the longer purse." In acceptance of this view, the 
 belief was largely entertained that the financial distress in the 
 South, consequent upon the heavy reverses of this period, 
 clearly portended the failure of the Confederacy. 
 
 President Davis, since the war, has avowed his appreciation 
 of the financial difficulties of the South, as a controlling influ- 
 ence in the failure of the cause. By unanimous consent, the 
 management of the Confederate finances has been declared to 
 have been defective. The universal distress attendant upon a 
 depreciated currency, which rarely improved in seasons of 
 military success, and grew rapidly worse with each disaster, 
 rendered the financial feature of Mr. Davis' administration, 
 peculiarly vulnerable to the industry of a class ever on the 
 alert for a pretext available to excite po]>ular distrust of the 
 President. With entire justice, we might dismiss this subject, 
 claiming for Mr. Davis the benefit of the plea which always 
 allows a ruler some exemption from responsibility for the 
 errors of a subordinate. We have rarely sought to fasten cul- 
 pability upon those who differed with him, in some instances, 
 
480 LIFE OF JEFFERSOX DAVIS. 
 
 perhaps where it would have more clearly established his own 
 exculpation. No act or utterance of Mr. Davis could be urged 
 to show that he ever claimed for himself the benefit of such a 
 plea. Fidelity to his friends is a trait in his character, not 
 less worthy of admiration thau magnanimity and forbearance 
 to his foes. His ardent and sympathetic nature doubtless often 
 condoned the errors of those whose motives he knew to be 
 good ; but his friends can testify that he far more frequently 
 overlooked the asperities of his enemies.* 
 
 * General D. H. Hill has given a most manly exhibition of feeling 
 toward Mr. Davis, in an article published, some months since, in his 
 magazine. We quote from General Hill, who alludes, at length, to the 
 alleged rancor of Mr. Davis toward his opponents. General Hill prefaces 
 his remarks with the declaration, that he ''has never been among the 
 personal friends of Mr. Davis;" that he was "at no time an admirer of 
 his executive abilities;" and further declares himself to have been the re- 
 cipient of an "unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable wrong," at the 
 hands of Mr. Davis. Says this gallant soldier : 
 
 " It was said of Mr. Davis that he could see no good in his enemies and 
 no evil in his friends. I know of one instance, at least, of incorrectness 
 of the former statement. I was present when a discussion took place in 
 regard to the suppression of a newspaper because of the disloyal character 
 of its articles, which were producing desertion in the army, and disaffec- 
 tion among the people at home. The editor had been converted to Union- 
 ism by the battle of Gettysburg and fall of Vicksburg, and, like all new- 
 born proselytes, was fiery in his zeal. A cabinet officer present said: 
 
 ' This man is not more disloyal than ' (naming a well-known editor, 
 
 whose assaults upon Mr. Davis at this time were very virulent.) 'I don't 
 see how one paper can be suppressed without suppressing the other.' To 
 
 this a gentleman replied: 'You are unjust. Mr. , though an enemy 
 
 of the President, yet shows by his abuse of the Yankees that he has no 
 love for them. The other editor betrays hatred of the President and of 
 his own people.' ^Ir. Davis immediately assented to this, saying: 'You 
 have exactly described the difference between the two men.' But 
 
SECRETARY MEMMINGER. 481 
 
 We have elsewhere explained the appointment of Mr. Mem- 
 minger, as having been dictated by other considerations than 
 that of a reliance upon his special fitness. But while doubting 
 his capacity for his difficult and anomalous situation, we are 
 not so sure that he exhibited such marked unfitness as should 
 have forbidden his retention in office, and called for the a])- 
 pointment of another, with the expectation of a more satisfac- 
 tory administration. In the end, yielding to the vast pressure 
 against lum, Mr. Memrainger left the cabinet, and Mr. Davis 
 appointed, as his successor, a gentleman unknown to himself, 
 but recommended as the possessor of financial talents of a high 
 order. When Mr. Trenholm became Secretary of the Treas- 
 ury, the opportunity for reform had long since passed, if, in- 
 deed, such an opportunity existed after the repulse at Gettys- 
 burg and the surrender of Vicksburg. It is hardly within the 
 range of probability, that, after those reverses, any conceivable 
 ingenuity could have arrested the downward tendency of Con- 
 federate finances. In the history of Confederate finance, before 
 those disasters, is to be found much extenuation, if not ample 
 
 it is not true that he could see no good in his enemies, and that he pur- 
 sued them with rancorous hate. I do not doubt that in the comparison 
 with his supposed friends, they were in his estifnation both intellectually 
 weak and morally perverse. But, apart from this, he could be just and 
 appreciative of their merits. I saw him several times during the session 
 of a Confederate Congress in which he had been harshly assailed. Once 
 he alluded incidentally to his troubles, but without the least resentment 
 in language or manner. I think that there was no instance of the supres- 
 sion of a newspaper, though several editors wei*e notoriously disloyal to 
 the Confederate cause, and still more of them intensely hostile to the Con- 
 federate President. Like Washington, Mr. Davis held 'error to be the 
 poi-tion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that 
 public character, to be the prerogative of a freeman.' " 
 31 
 
482 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 apology, for a system which was imposed by the force of cir- 
 cumstances and the novelty of the situation, rather than by 
 the errors of one man, or a number of men. 
 
 In his message of December, 1863, Mr. Davis reviewed the 
 subject in all its phases, as it had been presented up to that 
 period, and sketched the plan, afterwards adopted by Congress, 
 but without the result hoped for of increasing the value of 
 the currency, by compulsory funding and large taxation. His 
 discussion of this subject was always characterized by perspi- 
 cuity and force, but finance was that branch of administration 
 with which he affected the least familiarity, and which he 
 least assumed to direct. Knowing the profound and unremit- 
 ting attention which the subject required, he sought the aid of 
 others competent for the inquiry, which he had little leisure to 
 pursue. 
 
 This subject, during the entire war, was a fruitful theme for 
 the disquisitions of charlatans. Finance is a subject confessedly 
 intricate, and but few men in any country are capable of able 
 administration of this branch of government. Yet the Con- 
 federacy swarmed with pretenders, advocating opposing theo- 
 ries, which their authors, in every case, declared to be infallible. 
 The Confederate administration neither wanted for advisers, 
 nor did it fail to seek the advice of those who were reputed 
 to have financial abilities. Its errors were, to a large degree, 
 shared by the ablest statesmen of the South. 
 
 Criticism is proverbially easy and cheap, after the result is 
 ascertained, and we now readily see the leading causes of the 
 depreciation of Confederate money. In the last twelve months 
 of the war, the rapid and uninterrupted depreciation was oc- 
 casioned by the want of confidence in the success of the cause, 
 on the part of those who controlled the value of the money. 
 
FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES. 483 
 
 Such was the alarm and distrust consequent upon the disasters 
 of July, 1863, that the Confederate currency is stated to have 
 declined a thousand per cent., within a few weeks. Previous 
 to that period the decline was gradual, but far less alarming 
 in its indications. The plan adopted by the Government, 
 partly in deference to popular prejudice against direct taxation 
 by the general Government, and partly as a necessity of the 
 situation — that of credit in the form of paper issues, followed 
 by the enormous issues necessary to meet the expenses of a 
 war, increasing daily in magnitude — pampered the spirit of 
 speculation, which, by the close of the second year, had become 
 almost universal. This latter influence may safely be declared 
 to have greatly accelerated the unfortunate result, and the ex- 
 tent of its prevalence reflects an unpleasant shadow upon the 
 otherwise unmarred fame of the South for self-denying pa- 
 triotism. 
 
 It is customary to speak of the financial management of the 
 Confederacy in especial disparagement, when contrasted with 
 that of the North. The injustice of this contrast, however, is 
 palpable. We are not required to disparage the Federal finan- 
 cial system — which was, indeed, conducted with consummate 
 tact and ingenuity — to extenuate the errors, in this respect, of 
 the Confederacy. The circumstances of the antagonists were 
 altogether diiferent ; the position of the South financially, as 
 in other respects, was peculiar and anomalous. Completely 
 isolated, with a large territory, with virtually no specie circu- 
 lation,* hastily summoned to meet the exigencies of the most 
 gigantic war of modern times, the South had no alternative 
 but to resort to an entirely artificial, and, to some extent, un- 
 
 *At the beginning of the war, the South had only fifty millions of coin, 
 and had a paper circulation of about the same amouni. 
 
484 IJFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 tried system of finance. From tlie outset, the basis of the 
 Confederate system was the patriotism and the confidence of 
 the people. The first was nobly steadfast, but the second was 
 necessarily dependent upon military success. When at last the 
 virtual collapse of the credit indicated the increasing public 
 dos]iondcncy, it was plain that a catastrophe was near at hand. 
 
 It has been generally agreed that the only scheme by which 
 the South could have assured her credit, was to have sent large 
 amounts of cotton to Europe, during tlic first year of the war, 
 while the blockade was not effective. This plan, if successfully 
 carried out, would have given the Confederacy a cash basis in 
 Europe of several hundred millions in gold, in consequence of 
 the high prices commanded by cotton afterwards. With even 
 tolerable management, the Confederacy would thus have been 
 assured means to meet the necessities of the war. The merit of 
 this plan depended largely upon its practicability. Mr. Davis 
 approved it, but it is easy to imagine how — engrossed with 
 his multifarious cares, and occupied in meeting the pressing 
 exigencies of each day — he lacked opportunity to mature and 
 execute a measure of so much responsibility. 
 
 While the campaign in Mississippi, which terminated so 
 disastrously, was still pending, General Bragg continued to 
 occupy his position in Southern Tennessee. Too weak to 
 attack Eosecrans, because of the reduction of his army, by the 
 reenforcements sent to the Mississippi, Bragg was able merely 
 t^) maintain a vigilant observation of his adversary. After the 
 fall of Vicksburg General Rosecrans received reenforcements 
 sufficient to justify an advance against the Confederates. After 
 an obstinate resistance the Confederate comnumder was flanked 
 by a force, which the superior strength of his antagonist en- 
 abled him to detach, and abandoned a line of great natural 
 
MILTTATIY REVERSES. 485 
 
 strength, and strongly forlillcd. This wiis an important suc- 
 cess to the enemy, "who wen; hercMftcr able, with much better 
 prospects, to undertake expeditions against tiie heart of the 
 Confederacy. General l>)'agg extricated his army from a 
 perilous position, and made a successful retreat to Chattanooga. 
 Auxiliary to the retreat of Bragg was the diversion made by 
 General John Morgiin, which occasioned the detachment of a 
 portion of Burnside's forces from East Tennessee, which 
 threatened Bi-agg's rear. The expedition of Morgan was 
 pushed by that daring officer through Kentu(;lvy and across 
 the Ohio, to the great alarm of the States upon the border of 
 that river, but ended in the capture of Morgan and nearly all 
 his command. 
 
 A most painful surprise to the South was the surrender of 
 Cumberland Gap, early in September. This was a serious 
 blow at the whole system of defense in Tennessee and the ad- 
 jacent States. A Richmond newspaper declared that the pos- 
 session of Cumberland Gap gave the enemy the "key to the 
 back-door of Virginia and the Confederacy." The officer in 
 command of the position was severely censured by the country, 
 and though he has since explained his conduct in terms, which 
 appear to be satisfactory, the impression prevailed until the 
 end of the war, that the loss of this most important position 
 was caused by gross misconduct. The comment of President 
 Davis explains the serious nature of this affair: "The entire 
 garrison, including the commander, being still held prisoners 
 by the enemy, I am unable to suggest any explanation of this 
 disaster, which laid open Eastern Tennessee and South-western 
 Virginia to hostile operations, and broke the line of communi- 
 cation between the seat of government and Middle Tennessee. 
 This easy success of the enemy was followed by the advance 
 
486 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of General Eosccrans into Georgia, and our army evacuated 
 Chattanooga." 
 
 Thus the cooperating movements of Rosecrans in Middle 
 Tennessee, and of Burnside in East Tennessee, had the ample 
 reward of expelling the Confederates from their strong lines 
 of defense in the mountains. Cumberland Gap controlled the 
 most important line of communication in the Confederacy. 
 Chattanooga was the portal from which the enemy could 
 debouch upon the level country of the Gulf and Atlantic 
 States. The capture of Vicksburg and seizure of the Missis- 
 sippi Valley, by which the Confederacy was sundered, was the 
 first stage of conquest. Chattanooga was now the base from 
 which was to be attempted the next great step of Federal am- 
 bition — the second bisection of the Confederacy. 
 
 When Rosecrans advanced into Georgia, after his occupation 
 of Chattanooga, the aspect of affairs was exceedingly threaten- 
 ing, and it became necessary to strengthen Bragg sufficiently 
 to enable him to give battle, and thus check the advance of the 
 enterprising Federal commander. With this view the corps 
 of Longstreet was temporarily detached from Lee, and sent to 
 Bragg, This accession to his forces gave General Bragg the 
 opportunity of winning one of the most brilliant victories of 
 the war. The signal defeat of Rosecrans was followed by his 
 precipitate retreat into Chattanooga, closely pressed by Bragg. 
 
 For weeks the Federal army was besieged with a good pros- 
 pect for its ultimate surrender. The imperiled position of 
 Rosecrans had the effect of relieving the pressure of invasion 
 at other points, forcing the concentration, for his relief, of 
 large bodies of troops withdrawn from the armies in the Mis- 
 sissippi Valley and in Northern Virginia. General Bragg 
 made an able disposition of his forces in the neighborhood of 
 
EVENTS NEAR CHATTANOOGA. 487 
 
 Chattanooga, and awaited with confidence the surrender of 
 Rosecraus. He subsequently said : " Tliese dispositions, faith- 
 fully sustained, ensured the enemy's sj^eedy evacuation of 
 Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the 
 shortest road to his depot, and the one hij which reenforcements 
 must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction 
 was only a question of time." 
 
 The situation fully justified this statement. So crippled was 
 Rosecrans by his defeat at Chickamauga, that an attack upon 
 Bragg was out of the question. The alternative of starvation, 
 or retreat, seemed forced upon the Federal army. The roads 
 in its rear were in a terrible condition, and the distance over 
 which its supplies had to be drawn, was sixty miles. At this 
 critical moment. General Grant, whose command had been en- 
 larged, after his success at Vicksburg, and now embraced the 
 three main Federal armies in the West, reached the field of 
 operations. Grant immediately executed a plan of character- 
 istic boldness, by which he effected a lodgment on the south 
 side of the Tennessee River, and secured new lines of com- 
 munication, thus relieving the beleaguered army. General 
 Longstreet, to whom the holding of this all-important route 
 was confided, made an unsuccessful night attack designed to 
 defeat Grant's movement. 
 
 Having relieved the Federal army of the apprehension of 
 starvation or a disastrous retreat. Grant now meditated opera- 
 tions, which, however hazardous, or however in violation of 
 probability may have been their success, were fully vindicated 
 by the result. Waiting until he thought his accumulation of 
 forces sufficient to justify an assault upon the strong positions 
 of the Confederates, Grant finally made a vigorous and well- 
 planned attack with nearly his entire force. The result was 
 
488 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 a disastrous defeat and retreat of Bragg's army. General 
 Grant claimed, as the fruits of his victory, seven thousand 
 prisoners and nearly fifty pieces of artillery. 
 
 There were circumstances attending this battle peculiarly 
 discouraging to the South. These circumstances were thus 
 commented upon by President Davis: 
 
 " After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was 
 iuflicted on him, some of our troops inexplicably abandoned posi- 
 tions of great strength, and, by a disorderly retreat, compelled the 
 commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally 
 to retire with his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty 
 miles to the rear. It is believed that if the troops who yielded to 
 the assault had fought with the valor which they had displayed on 
 previous occasions, and which was manifested in this battle on the 
 other parts of the line, the enemy would have been repulsed with 
 very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the mis- 
 fortune, and the army the mortification of the first defeat that has 
 resulted from misconduct by the troops. 
 
 With this disastrous battle terminated the connection of 
 General Bragg with the army, which he commanded during 
 a large jwrtioii of its varied career. Fully acknowledging his 
 defeat, General Bragg candidly avowed to the Government the 
 extent of a reverse, which he declared disabled him from any 
 serious resistance, should the Federal commander press his 
 success. At his own request he M^as relieved, and, seeking 
 recuperation for his shattered health, Mas not assigned to duty 
 until February, 1864, when President Davis ordered him to 
 the discharge of the duties of " C^)ninianding General," at 
 Richmond, the position held by General Lee before his trans- 
 fer to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
GENERAL BKAGG. 489 
 
 No commander was more harshly criticised than Bragg, and 
 the unfortunate career of the Western army, under his com- 
 mand, was an inexhaustible theme for diatribe and invective 
 from the opponents of the Confederate administration. Bragg 
 was often declared to be, at once the most incompetent and 
 unlucky of the " President's favorites." Yet nothing is more 
 certain than that an impartial review of his military career 
 will demonstrate General Bragg to have been a soldier of 
 rare and superior merit. It certainly can not be claimed that 
 his campaigns exhibited the brilliant and solid achievements 
 of several of those conducted by Lee, or of the Valley cam- 
 paigns of Jackson. The great disparity of numbers and 
 means of the two sections, enabled few Confederate command- 
 ers to achieve the distinction of unmarred success, even before 
 that period of decline when disaster was the rule, and victory 
 the exception with the Confederate forces. 
 
 But Bragg can not justly be denied the merit of having, 
 with most inadequate means, long deferred the execution of 
 the Federal conquest of the West. At the time of his as- 
 sumption of command, in June, 1862, the armies of Grant 
 and Buell, nearly double his own aggregate of forces, were 
 overrunning the northern borders of the Gulf States, and 
 threatening the very heart of the Confederacy. His masterly 
 combinations, attended by loss altogether disproportioncd to 
 the results accomplished, recovered large sections of territory, 
 which had been for months the easy prey of the enemy, and 
 transferred the seat of war to Middle Tennessee. Here he 
 maintained his position for nearly a year, vigorously assailing 
 the enemy at every opportunity, constantly menacing his com- 
 munications, and firmly holding his important line, in the face 
 of overwhelming odds, while the Confederate armies in every 
 
490 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 other quarter were losing ground. Finally, when forced back 
 by the concentration of Federal forces, released by their suc- 
 cesses elsewhere, Bragg skillfully eluded the combinations for 
 his destruction, and, at an opportune moment, delivered E.ose- 
 crans one of the most timely and stunning blows inflicted dur- 
 ing the war. No fact of the war is more clearly established 
 than Bragg's exculpation from any responsibility for the escape 
 of the Federal army from the field of Chickamauga. His posi- 
 tive commands were disobeyed, his plan of battle threatened 
 with entire derangement by the errors of subordinates, and the 
 escape of Rosecrans secured by the same causes. But still more 
 cruel was the disappointment of Bragg's well-grounded expec- 
 tation of a successful siege of Chattanooga. So clear is his 
 exculpation in this case, that no investigation of facts, severely 
 reflecting upon others, is required. 
 
 While the controversy between Bragg and Longstreet was 
 pending, some disposition was manifested to censure the former 
 for his rejection of a plan of campaign proposed by Longstreet 
 after the victory of Chickamauga. The latter officer suggested 
 crossing the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and then moving 
 upon the enemy's rear, with a view to force him back upon 
 Nashville. The pregnant criticism of General Bragg quickly 
 disposes of the suggestion. Said he : " The suggestion of a 
 movement by our right, immediately after the battle, to the 
 north of the Tennessee, and thence upon Nashville, requires 
 notice only because it will find a place on the files of the de- 
 partment. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want 
 of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reen- 
 forcements just before the battle, without a wagon or an artil- 
 lery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery 
 horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too. 
 
GENERAL BRAGG. 491 
 
 had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and on all 
 the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmount- 
 able difficulties were added the entire absence of means to 
 cross the river, except by fording at a few precarious points 
 too deep for artillery, and the well-known danger of sudden 
 rises, by which all communication would be cut oif, a con- 
 tingency which did actually happen a few days after the 
 visionary scheme was abandoned." General Bragg continues 
 a recitation of cogent considerations in support of his objec- 
 tions to a plan which he declares utterly wanting in " military 
 propriety." 
 
 The culmination of Bragg's unpojiularity was his defeat at 
 Missionary Ridge. No officer, save Lee, could, by any possi- 
 bility, have hoped for a dispassionate judgment by the public, 
 at this desperate stage of the war, of an affair so calamitous. 
 The real explanation of that battle was unquestionably con- 
 tained in the extract from President Davis' message previously 
 given. Although Bragg could oppose but little more than 
 thirty thousand troops to the eighty thousand which Grant 
 threw against him, the strength of his position would have 
 compensated for this disparity, had his troops fought with the 
 usual spirit of Confederate soldiers. 
 
 It was not to be anticipated that the enemies of the Presi- 
 dent in Congress and the hostile press would fail to find a 
 pretext upon whicli to throw the responsibility upon Mr. 
 Davis. The disaster was declared to have resulted from the 
 detachment of Longstrcet for an expedition into East Ten- 
 nessee. It is only necessary to state the facts of the case to 
 show the flilsity and injustice of tliis criticism. In the first 
 place, as we have already stated, Bragg's force was sufficient 
 to hold his tremendously strong position without Longstreet, 
 
492 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 should his array fight with its usual spirit. Secondly, Long- 
 street's corps was a part of Lee's army, detached for a purely 
 temporary purpose with Bragg, and its absence was a source 
 of constant anxiety to General Lee. This temporary purpose 
 was well served at the battle of Chickamauga, which Bragg 
 designed to be a destructive blow, and which failed in a part 
 of its purpose, through no fault of that commander. 
 
 It was never intended to leave Longstreet in the West any 
 longer than was necessary to relieve Bragg in his great exi- 
 gency after the evacuation of Chattanooga. That result being 
 accomplished, Longstreet was detained for a few weeks, in the 
 expectation that Rosecrans, driven to desperation by his ne- 
 cessities, would attempt to retreat, in which event. Long- 
 street could perform valuable service in aiding to destroy 
 the Federal army. When Grant, however, opened the Fed- 
 eral communications, and Longstreet was foiled in his effort 
 to prevent it, there was no longer a sufficient reason for his 
 detention so far from Lee. Accordingly, he was sent through 
 East Tennessee, with the double design of opening communi- 
 cation with Virginia, where, at any moment, he might be 
 needed, and of clearing East Tennessee of the forces of Burn- 
 side. 
 
 Had Longstreet's expedition been successful, it can not be 
 doubted that the pressure against Bragg would have been im- 
 mediately relieved, and a vital section restored to the Confed- 
 eracy. We can not pause, however, to review the incidents 
 of General Longstreet's movement, nor to revive the contro- 
 versy between himself and a subordinate, evoked by an expe- 
 dition whose results exhibited few features of success. 
 
 President Davis, better acquainted with the facts of the war 
 than the critics who so often mislead the public, held General 
 
OPERATIOXS IN VIRGINIA. 493 
 
 Bragg in tliat high estimation to which his unquestioned pa- 
 triotism and his military qualities entitled him. Of General 
 Bragg it may be fairly said that he made the most of his 
 opportunities and his means. If he made retreats, they were 
 always preceded by bloody fights, and marked by obstinate 
 resistance. If his constrained and sullen retreats lost terri- 
 tory, they were not comparable in that respect with that 
 mysterious "strategy" of other commanders in high favor 
 with the opponents of Mr. Davis, which eventually threatened 
 to "toll" the enemy to the Atlantic coast, or the Gulf of 
 Mexico, without once bringing him to a general engagement. 
 
 Bragg never feared to stake his fame on the gage of battle, 
 and, if he sustained reverses, he won many more victories. 
 An educated soldier, he was also a rigid disciplinarian, and 
 had little toleration for the demagogism so conspicuous in 
 volunteer armies. This was the occasion of much of the per- 
 sonal enmity by which he was embarrassed both in and out 
 of the army. But, whatever the justice of the public condem- 
 nation of Bragg, his period of usefulness in the Western army 
 was at an end. Very soon afterwards General Joseph E. John- 
 ston took command of the army in Northern Georgia. 
 
 The two armies in Virginia, weakened by the detachments 
 from each sent to the West, continued inactive until autumn. 
 In October, General Lee prepared a brilliant campaign, the 
 object of which was to place his army between General Meade 
 and Washington. Meade, though forced back to the neigh- 
 borhood of Manassas and Centreville, had become apprized 
 of Lee's movement in time to prevent the consummation of 
 the strategy of the Confederate commander. An incident of 
 the expedition was the severe repulse of a part of General Hill's 
 command, attended with considerable loss. Meanwhile, General 
 
494 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 Imboden, cooperating with the movemeuts of the main army, 
 captured several hundred prisoners and valuable stores in the 
 Shenandoah Valley. Early in November, nearly two thousand 
 Confederates were captured at Rappahannock Station by a 
 movement marked by skill and gallantry on the part of Gen- 
 eral Sedgwick. The campaign in Northern Virginia terminated 
 with a handsome success by the division of General Edward 
 Johnson over a large detachment from INIeade's army at Mine 
 Run. In December, General Averill, with a force of Federal 
 cavalry, made a destructive raid into South-western Virginia, 
 and destroyed portions of the Virginia and Tennessee Rail- 
 road. 
 
 At the close of 1863, there were many signs of the ap- 
 proaching exhaustion of the South, yet there was good reason 
 to hope that, by a vigorous use of means yet remaining, the 
 war might be brought to a favorable conclusion. The peace 
 party of the North, despite the increased strength and popu- 
 larity of Mr. Lincoln's administration, resulting from the Fed- 
 eral successes of the summer, was evidently becoming more 
 bold and defiant. The whole North, too, was disappointed at 
 the prospect of an indefinite resistance by the South. Gettys- 
 burg and Viclvsburg were not followed, as had been antici- 
 pated, by the immediate collapse of the Confederacy. Under 
 such circumstances, the South had much to anticipate from a 
 bold and defiant front at the opening of the next campaign. 
 Unquestionably its resources were less adequate than before, 
 but there was evidently capacity to prolong the war for an 
 almost indefinite period. Thus, while the Confederacy could 
 not cherish the hope of daring exploits at the opening of the 
 campaign, which should again make the enemy apprehensive 
 for his own homes, there was a well-grounded anticipation of 
 
WANING STRENGTH OF THE SOUTH. 495 
 
 a successful defensive, which should wear out the enemy's ar- 
 dor, and again present opportunities for bold entcrj^rise. 
 
 The message of President Davis to Congress, which met 
 early in December, was one of his ablest productions. Re- 
 viewing the entire field of the war, in its more important 
 phases, it was equally remarkable for its frank statement of 
 the situation, and for the energetic policy recommended. 
 
 There could be no difficulty in comprehending the needs of 
 the Confederacy at this distressing period. The three great 
 elements of war — men, money, and subsistence — were now de- 
 manded to a greatly increased extent. In nothing was the cam- 
 paign of 1863 more fatal, than in the terrible losses inflicted on 
 the armies of the Confederacy. At the close of the year, the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, including the absent corps of 
 Longstreet, was weaker, by more than a third of the force carried 
 into Pennsylvania. The losses of the Western army had fear- 
 fully diminished its strength, and its frequent disasters had 
 greatly impaired its morale. Measures were now required 
 which should repair the losses, and, if possible, increase the 
 army beyond its strength at the opening of the previous cam- 
 paign, in order to meet the enormous conscription preparing 
 at the North. 
 
 President Davis indicated the following methods of adding 
 to the army : " Restoring to the army all who are improp- 
 erly absent, putting an end to substitution, modifying the 
 exemption law, restricting details, and placing in the ranks 
 such of the able-bodied men now employed as wagoners, nurses, 
 cooks, and other employes as are doing service, for which the 
 negroes may be found competent." 
 
 These were evidently the last expedients by which the Con- 
 federate armies could be recruited from the white population. 
 
496 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 By successive enactments Congress had empowered the Presi- 
 dent to call into the field all persons between the ages of 
 eighteen and forty-five. The exigency consequent upon the 
 reverses of the summer had necessitated the requisition of the 
 last reserves provided by Congress — the class between forty 
 and forty-five. . Conscription had failed to give the effective 
 strength calculated upon. Each extension of the law exhib- 
 ited, in the result, an accession of numbers greatly below the 
 estimate upon which it was based. This was largely due to 
 the inefficient execution of the law, and to the opposition which 
 it encountered in many localities. But the results also indi- 
 cated a most exaggerated estimate of the available arms-bear- 
 ing population of the South. In the latter part of 1863, the 
 rolls of the Adjutant-General's office in Richmond showed a 
 little more than four hundred thousand men under arms ; and 
 Secretary Seddon stated that, from desertions and other causes, 
 " not more than a half — never two-thirds — of the soldiers were 
 in the ranks." 
 
 The message of Mr. Davis indicated defective features in 
 the system of conscription, and suggested improvements as 
 follows : 
 
 "On the subject of exemptions, it is believed that abuses can 
 not be checked unless the system is placed on a basis entirely 
 different from that now provided by law. The object of your legis- 
 lation has been, not to confer privileges on classes, but to exon- 
 erate from military duty such number of persons skilled in the 
 various trades, professions, and mechanical pursuits, as could ren- 
 der more valuable service to their country by laboring in their 
 present occupation than by going into the ranks of the army. The 
 policy is unquestionable, but the rfesult would, it is thought, be 
 better obtained by enrolling all such persons, and allowing details 
 
EXECUTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS. 497 
 
 to be made of the number necessary to meet the wants of the 
 country. Considerable numbers are believed to be now exempted 
 from the military service who are not needful to the public in their 
 civil vocation. 
 
 " Certain duties are now performed throughout the country by 
 details from the army, which could be as well executed by persons 
 above the present conscript age. An extension of the limit, so 
 as to embrace persons over forty-five years, and physically fit for 
 service in guarding posts, railroads, and bridges, in apprehending 
 deserters, and, where practicable, assuming the place of younger 
 men detailed for duty with the nitre, ordnance, commissary, and 
 quartermaster's bureaus of the War Department, would, it is hoped, 
 add largely to the effective force in the field, without an undue 
 burden on the population." 
 
 The message further recommended legislation replacing 
 " not only enlisted cooks, but wagoners, and other employes 
 in the army, by negroes." From these measures the President 
 expected that the army would be " so strengthened, for the 
 ensuing campaign, as to put at defiance the utmost efforts of 
 the enemy." 
 
 But the meagre results of conscription revealed not only an 
 excessive calculation of the numerical strength of the Confed- 
 eracy ; they indicated the reluctance with which the harsh ne- 
 cessities of the war, in its later stages, were met. As the war 
 was protracted, popular ardor naturally waned, and in the pres- 
 ence of losses and reverses, the spirit of voluntary sacrifice 
 gradually disappeared. Draft and impressment were now re- 
 quired to obtain the services and the means, which, in the be- 
 ginning, were lavishly proffered. 
 
 Partially the result of a natural popular weariness of the in- 
 creasing exactions of a long and exhaustive struggle, these were 
 32 
 
498 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 also the legitimate fruits of the distrust so assiduously inculca- 
 ted by the fault-finders. When reverses to their armies came 
 with appalling rapidity, and, in many instances, in spite of the 
 exertions of their ablest and most popular leaders, the people 
 saw confidence and industry only in their Government, and 
 that Government they were constantly taught to believe grossly 
 incompetent and unworthy. Under such circumstances, how 
 could there be that unity and cooperation, without which the 
 cause was preordained to failure? In that industry which 
 sought every possible occasion for censure, that ingenuity which 
 exaggerated every error, that intemperance which filled the 
 halls of Congress with denunciation, and the land with clamor 
 and discontent, the North at last found allies which ably as- 
 sisted its armies. 
 
 More violent, intemperate, and unscrupulous than ever, were 
 the assaults upon the administration, in that long period of 
 agony which followed the disasters in Mississippi and Penn- 
 sylvania. Such was an appropriate occasion, when a grief- 
 stricken country implored the unanimity which alone could 
 bring relief, for agitation, revenge, and invective. In Congress 
 Mr. Davis was assailed with furious vituperation, because he 
 had refused, at the instance of a member, to remove Bragg, and 
 place Johnston in command of the Western army. Yet Gen- 
 eral Johnston, after a visit to Tennessee, earnestly advised the 
 President not to remove Bragg, as the public interests would 
 suffer by that step. Almost daily Mr. Davis was assailed for 
 not having properly estimated the war, in the diatribes of an 
 able editor, who himself, but a few weeks before hostilities 
 opened, declared there would be no war. Of such a character 
 were the accusers and the accusations. 
 
 If Jeiferson Davis courted revenge, he could find ample sat- 
 
DEFICIENCY OF SUPPLIES. 499 
 
 isfaction in the contrast between himself and some of his fore- 
 most accusers, which the sequel has drawn. He fell at last, 
 but only when that cause was lost, which he unselfishly loved, 
 and which his heart followed to its glorious grave. His name 
 is already immortal — the embodiment of the heroism, the vir- 
 tues, the sufferings, the glory of a people who revere him and 
 scorn his persecutors. Nor can the South forget that many, 
 who, during her arduous struggle, constantly assailed her 
 chosen ruler, have since taken refuge in the camp of those 
 who first conquered, and now seek to degrade her people. 
 
 A source of universal alarm in the South, at this period, was 
 the deficiency of food. We have elsewhere quoted freely the 
 admonitions of President Davis respecting the question of sup- 
 plies, and indicating the cause which led to so much suffering 
 in the armies of the Confederacy. Ever since the loss of large 
 sections of Tennessee, in the spring of 1862, this subject had 
 occasioned anxiety. Without entering into details, it may be 
 briefly stated, that, with the loss of Kentucky and the larger 
 portion of Tennessee, the Confederacy lost the main source of 
 its supj)lies of meat. As other sections were occupied by the 
 enemy, and communications were destroyed, the area of the 
 Confederacy became more and more contracted, and its sources 
 of supply still more limited. Even when supplies were abun- 
 dant in many quarters, the armies in the field suffered actual 
 want, in consequence of the want of transportation, and of the 
 remoteness of the supplies from the lines of the railroads. 
 
 But while the meat in the Confederacy was rapidly dimin- 
 ishing in quantity, as the Federal armies advanced, and seized 
 or destroyed every thing in the shape of subsistence, the army 
 was still deprived of supplies which should have been made 
 available. The unpatriotic practice of hoarding supplies — a 
 
500 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 temptation suggested by the rife spirit of speculation, arising 
 from a redundant and depreciated currency — necessitated the 
 passage of impressment laws. These laws were practically 
 rendered nugatory by the inadequate provisions for their exe- 
 cution. In no respect was the timid and demagogical legisla- 
 tion of the Confederate Congress, so illustrated as by its adop- 
 tion of a system of impressment, which aggravated the very 
 evil it was designed to remedy. 
 
 Various expedients were attempted, with partial success, for 
 obtaining subsistence beyond the limits of the Confederacy. 
 It will be readily seen, however, how precarious was this de- 
 pendence. It was impossible for the Confederacy to maintain 
 its armies, while its resources in every other respect were rap- 
 idly reaching the point of exhaustion. In the end the want of 
 food proved the most efficient adversary of the South, The 
 final military catastrophe made the Federal army master of a 
 country already half conquered by starvation.* 
 
 * My limited space has prevented the extended account of the Confed- 
 erate Commissary Department, which was originally designed. The his- 
 tory of its commissariat is an important chapter in the history of the 
 Confederacy. President Davis was much abused for his retention of Col- 
 onel Northrop, who has been charged, both during and since the war, with 
 incompetency, corruption, and every conceivable abuse of his office. The 
 amount of truth, in the charge of corruption against Colonel Northrop, 
 may be estimated, when we state a fact known almost universally in Rich- 
 mond, that few persons suffered the privations of the war more severely 
 than he. Hundreds of the most respectable gentlemen in the South will- 
 ingly testify to the unimpeachable patriotism and purity of Colonel Nor- 
 throp. Equally false was the statement that Mr. Davis gratified merely 
 his personal partiality in appointing Commissary-General a man who had 
 given no previous evidence of fitness. Colonel Northrop, when in the 
 regular Federal army, had seen extensive service in that department, 
 where he was detailed, after having been disabled. His services were 
 
COLONEL NORTHROP. 501 
 
 amply testified to by his superiors, who regarded him as having peculiar 
 qualifications for the duties of the commissariat. Of these facts Mr. Davis 
 had personal knowledge, though, when he placed Colonel Northrop at the 
 head of the Confederate commissariat, they had not met for more than 
 twenty years. 
 
 Again, when commissioned by Mr. Davis, Colonel Northi-op was the 
 Commissary-General of South Carolina — a position to which he would 
 hardly have been invited, without at least some conviction, by the authori- 
 ties of that State, of his fitness. It is well known, too, that a committee 
 of the Confederate Congress investigated the afi'airs of the Commissary 
 Department, and made a report which amply and honorably vindicated 
 Colonel Northrop. Indeed, a member of that committee, one of the ablest 
 men in Virginia, and not friendly to Mr. Davis, declared it to be the best 
 managed department of the Confederate Government. 
 
 Editors perpetually clamored against Colonel Noi'throp for issuing half 
 rations to the army, who daily issued half sheets to their subscribers — re- 
 fusing to understand that in each case the cause was the same, viz., an 
 exhaustion of supply, resulting from the depletion of the resources of the 
 country. 
 
502 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 AN EFFORT TO BLACKEN THE CHARACTER OP THE SOUTH — THE PERSECUTION OP 
 MR. DAVIS AS THE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ASSUMED OFFENSES OP THE SOUTH — 
 REPUTATION OF THE SOUTH FOR HUMANITY — TREATMENT OP PRISONERS OP 
 WAR — EARLY ACTION OP THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT UPON THE SUBJECT 
 — MR. DAVIs' LETTER TO MR. LINCOLN — THE COBB-WOOL NEGOTIATIONS — PER- 
 FIDIOUS CONDUCT OF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES A CARTEL ARRANGED BY 
 
 GENERALS DIX AND HILL — COMMISSIONER OULD — HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH 
 
 THE FEDERAL AGENT OF EXCHANGE REPEATED PERFIDY OF THE FEDERAL 
 
 GOVERNMENT — SUSPENSION OP THE CARTEL CAUSED BY THE BAD FAITH OF 
 THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION, AND THE SUFFERING WHICH IT CAUSED — 
 EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES TO RENEW THE OPERATION OF 
 THE CARTEL — HUMANE OFFER OF COMMISSIONER OULD — JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
 CONFEDERATE AUTHORITIES — GUILT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT — MR. 
 DAVIs' STATEMENT OP THE MATTER — COLONEL OULd's LETTER TO MR. ELD- 
 RIDGE — NORTHERN STATEMENTS : GENERAL BUTLER, NEW YORK TRIBUNE, 
 ETC. — THE CHARGE OF CRUELTY AGAINST THE SOUTH — A CONTRAST BETWEEN 
 ANDERSONVILLE AND ELMIRA — IMPOVERISHMENT OP THE SOUTH — DISREPU- 
 TABLE MEANS EMPLOYED TO AROUSE RESENTMENT OP THE NORTH — THE VIN- 
 DICATION OF THE SOUTH AND OF MR DAVIS HIS STAINLESS CHARACTER, HIS 
 
 HUMANITY AND FORBEARANCE — AN INQUIRY OP HISTORY. 
 
 TT is in vain to invoke the admiration of mankind for qnal- 
 ■^ ities of greatness, displayed either in the history of a nation 
 or the life of an individual, unless those qualities shall have 
 been adorned by the practice of humanity and the observance 
 of high moral obligation. Since the political fabric of the South 
 has been overthrown, a brave and virtuous people cherish with 
 a more tenacious aifection than ever, that honorable reputation 
 which was their birthright, and which they worthily illus- 
 
AN INFAMOUS DESIGN. 503 
 
 trated during the late war. The violent commotion with 
 M'hich the American Union was but lately convulsed has re- 
 newed the historical analogy of revolutions, not less in the 
 sequel than in its progress. When the strife of arms was 
 ended, and the two great armies ceased their death struggles, 
 and parted with that mutual respect which is characteristic 
 of brave antagonists, events were far from encouraging the 
 cessation of sectional bitterness which was to be hoped for. 
 
 The dominant party at the North, apparently not satisfied 
 with the political overthrow of the South, and the complete 
 extinction of its social system, has followed up the triumphs 
 of the Federal armies with a persistent and implacable war 
 upon the character and reputation of the South. To affix a 
 stigma upon a conquered foe, to brand with infamy a class of 
 their own countrymen — the descendants of the compatriots of 
 Franklin, Hancock, and Adams — and to consign to perpetual 
 obloquy a cause which enlisted the sympathies of five millions 
 of peojjle, are the aims of a malignant and remorseless fac- 
 tion. These are the motives which have instigated the effort 
 to frame an indictment against the Christianity, the morality, 
 and the humanity of the South, and to visit every form of 
 degradation, to practice every refinement of cruelty upon its 
 most distinguished representative. 
 
 It is impossible to explain, upon any other theory, the ex- 
 ceptional rigor with which, since the termination of the war, 
 Mr. Davis has been pursued. As the most honored by the 
 South, he has been selected as the proper substitute upon 
 whom to visit the offenses of his people. To convict Jeffer- 
 son Davis of heinous offenses against humanity is to blacken 
 the cause which he represented — to degrade the people of 
 whom he was the chosen ruler. The North should have been 
 
504 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 admonished, by previous examples, of the futility of its at- 
 tempts to prejudge historical questions of such moment. Of 
 what avail were the malignity, the misrepresentation, and the 
 unrelenting vindictiveness of England against Napoleon? 
 
 As yet, the North has been unable, even by ex parte evi- 
 dence, to obtain a pretext for the arraignment of Jefferson 
 Davis for those atrocious crimes of which it was pretended 
 he was guilty. Even perjury has proven inadequate to the 
 invention of material with which to sustain a complicity in 
 guilt, from which his previous character alone should have 
 vindicated him. Who can doubt the inevitable recoil when 
 the investigations of history, unobstructed by prejudice and 
 passion, shall lay bare the facts upon which posterity will 
 render its verdict? History, in such a question, will know 
 neither North nor South, nor will it accept all testimony as 
 truth which comes under the guise of " loyalty/' nor reject as 
 falsehood all upon which has been placed the odium of " dis- 
 loyalty." 
 
 In this volume, we could not, even if so disposed, avoid 
 reference to that question which so involves the honor and 
 humanity of the South — the extent of her regard, in the con- 
 duct of the late war, for those moral obligations which are rec- 
 ognized by all Christian and civilized communities. The course 
 of her enemies has left the South no alternative, and she can 
 not be apprehensive of the result when the record is fairly 
 consulted. 
 
 "VVe have now reached, with a due regard for chronological 
 order, a point where naturally arises the subject of the treat- 
 ment of prisoners, which, in the later months of 1863, assumed 
 its most interesting phase. We approach the subject not with 
 any expectation of enlightenment of the Northern mind. Upon 
 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS. 505 
 
 this subject a large portion of the Northern people have res- 
 olutely turned their backs upon all statements which do not 
 favor their sectional prejudices. Calumnies are often believed 
 by mere force of iteration; and so persistent has been the effort 
 to poison the Northern mind with falsehood that at least a 
 generation must pass away before the South can expect an im- 
 partial hearing. Nevertheless, by grouping together, in these 
 pages, important testimony from various sources, and confined 
 to neither section, we hope to promote, however feebly, the 
 great end of historic truth. 
 
 At an early period of the contest, the Confederate Govern- 
 ment recognized its obligation to treat prisoners of war with 
 humanity and consideration. Before any action was taken by 
 Congress upon the subject, the executive authorities provided 
 prisoners with proper quarters and barracks, and witli rations 
 — the same in quantity and quality as those furnished to the 
 Confederate soldiers who guarded them. The first action of 
 Congress with reference to prisoners was taken on the 21st of 
 May, 1861. Congress then provided that "all prisoners of 
 war taken, whether on land or at sea, during the pending hos- 
 tilities with the United States, shall be transferred by the cap- 
 tors from time to time, and as often as convenient, to the De- 
 partment of War; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary 
 of War, with the approval of the President, to issue such in- 
 structions to the Quartermaster-General and his subordinat€s 
 as shall provide for the safe custody and sustenance of pris- 
 oners of war; and the rations furnised prisoners of loar shall be 
 the same in quantity and quality as those furnished to enlisted 
 men in the army of the Confederacy." This declared policy of 
 the Confederate authorities was adhered to, not only in the 
 earlier months of the war, when provisions were abundant, 
 
506 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 but was afterwards pursued as far as possible under the pecm- 
 liar style of warfare waged by the North. Even amid the 
 losses and privations to which the enemy subjected them, they 
 sought to carry out the humane purpose of this solemn dec- 
 laration. 
 
 The first public announcement by President Davis, with 
 respect to prisoners, was made in a letter to President Lin- 
 coln, dated July 6th, 1861. This letter was called forth by 
 the alleged harsh treatment of the crew of the Confederate 
 vessel Savannah, then prisoners in the hands of the enemy. 
 , We extract a paragraph of this letter : 
 
 " It is the desire of this Government so to conduct the war now 
 existing, as to mitigate its horrors as far as may be possible ; and, 
 with this intent, its treatment of the prisoners captured by its 
 forces has been marked by the greatest humanity and leniency 
 consistent with public obligation; some have been permitted to 
 return home on parole, others to remain at large under similar 
 condition within this Confederacy, and all have been furnished 
 with rations for their subsistence, such as are allowed to our own 
 troops. It is only since the news has been received of the treat- 
 ment of the prisoners taken on the Savannah, that I have been 
 compelled to withdraw these indulgences, and to hold the prisoners 
 taken by us in strict confinement." 
 
 In his message, dated July 20th, 1861, he mentioned this 
 letter, and thus alluded to the expected reply from President 
 Lincoln : 
 
 " I earnestly hope this promised reply (which has not yet been 
 received) will convey the assurance that prisoners of war will be 
 treated, in this unhappy contest, with that regard for humanity, 
 which has made such conspicuous progress in the conduct of 
 modern warfare." 
 
THE WOOL-COBB CARTEL. 507 
 
 Several months elapsed, after the beginning of hostilities, 
 before the captures on either side were sufficiently numerous 
 to demand much consideration. A proposition was even made 
 in the Confederate Congress, to return the Federal prisoners, 
 taken at the first battle of Manassas, without any formality 
 whatever. 
 
 In February, 1862, negotiations occurred between the two 
 governments, with a view to the arrangement of a system of • 
 exchange. In these negotiations Generals Howell Cobb and 
 Wool represented their respective Governments. The result 
 was a cartel, by which prisoners of either side should be 
 paroled within ten days after their capture, and delivered on 
 the frontier of their own country. A point of difference was, 
 however, raised, as to a provision requiring each party to pay 
 the expense of transporting their prisoners to the frontier. 
 This difference General Wool reported to the Federal Govern- 
 ment, which refused to pay these expenses. At a second in- 
 terview, March 1st, 1862, this action of the Federal author- 
 ities being made known to General Cobb, the latter immedi- 
 ately conceded the point, and proposed to make the cartel con- 
 form in all its features to the wishes of General Wool. The 
 latter declined any arrangement, declaring "that his Govern- 
 ment had changed his instructions," and abruptly terminated 
 the negotiations. 
 
 The explanation of this conduct was apparent. While the 
 negotiations between Generals Wool and Cobb were pending. 
 Fort Donelson had fallen, reversing the previous state of 
 things, and giving the North an excess of prisoners. These 
 prisoners, instead of being sent South on parole, were carried 
 into the interior of the North, and treated with severity and 
 indignity. Repudiating this agreement, just as soon as it was 
 
508 LIFE OF JFFFKRSON DAVIS. 
 
 ascertained that their captures at Donelson placed the South at 
 disadvantage, the Federal authorities foreshadowed that " con- 
 sistently perfidious conduct," which President Davis declared 
 to be characteristic of their entire course upon the subject. 
 
 It was im230ssible to bring the Federal Government to any 
 arrangement, until the fortune of war again placed the Con- 
 federates in possession of the larger number of prisoners. An 
 immediate consequence of the Confederate successes in the 
 summer of 1862, was the indication of a more accommodating 
 spirit by the enemy. Negotiations between General D. H. Hill, 
 on behalf of the Confederate authorities, and General John A. 
 Dix, on behalf of his Government, resulted in the adoption 
 of a new cartel of a completely satisfactory and humane char- 
 acter. Under this cartel, which continued in operation for 
 twelve months, the Confederate authorities restored to the 
 enemy many thousands of prisoners in excess of those whom 
 they held for exchange, and encampments of the surplus pa- 
 roled prisoners were established in the United States, where 
 the men were able to receive the comforts and solace of con- 
 stant communication with their homes and families. In July, 
 1863, the fortune of war again favored the enemy, and they 
 were enabled to exchange for duty the men previously de- 
 livered to them, against those captured and paroled at Vicks- 
 burg and Port Hudson. The prisoners taken at Gettysburg, 
 however, remained in their hands, and should have been at 
 once returned to the Confederate lines on parole, to await ex- 
 change. Instead of executing a duty imposed by the plainest 
 dictates of justice and good faith, pretexts were instantly 
 sought for holding them in permanent captivity. General 
 orders rapidly succeeded each other from the bureau at Wash- 
 ington, placing new constructions on an agreement which had 
 
PERFIDY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 509 
 
 given rise to no dispute while the Confederates retained the 
 advantage in the number of prisoners. With a disregard of 
 honorable obligations, almost unexampled, the Federal au- 
 thorities did not hesitate, in addition to retaining the prisoners 
 captured by them, to declare null the paroles given by the 
 prisoners captured by the Confederates in the same series of 
 engagements, and liberated on condition of not again serving 
 until exchanged. They then openly insisted on treating the 
 paroles given by their own soldiers as invalid, and those of 
 Confederate soldiers, given under precisely similar circum- 
 stances, as binding. A succession of similar unjust pretensions 
 was maintained in a correspondence tediously prolonged, and 
 every device employed, to cover the disregard of an obliga- 
 tion, which, between belligerent nations, is only to be enforced 
 by a sense of honor. 
 
 We have not space sufficient for even a sketch of the pro- 
 tracted correspondence, which ensued between the commission- 
 ers of exchange, respecting the suspension of the cartel. In 
 its progress Commissioner Ould triumphantly vindicated the 
 action of the Confederate Government, in every instance 
 meeting in an unanswerable manner, the counter-charges of 
 the Federal authorities. The South can require no better re- 
 cord of its honorable and humane conduct, than is furnished 
 by this correspondence. The Confederate Government was 
 singularly fortunate in the selection of Mr. Ould, who unites 
 to a most honorable and amiable character, an intellect of un- 
 usual vigor and astuteness, as was abundantly shown in his 
 conclusive demonstrations of the perfidious conduct of the 
 authorities at Washington. 
 
 For twelve months after the date of the cartel (that is, until 
 after the battle of Gettysburg), the Confederates held a con- 
 
LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 siderable excess of prisoners. It has never been alleged, amid 
 all the calumny which has assailed the South, that during this 
 period, the Federal prisoners (unless held on serious charges), 
 were not promptly delivered. Commissioner Ould several 
 times urged the Federal authorities to send increased trans- 
 portation for their prisoners. On the other hand, numbers of 
 Confederate officers and soldiers were kept in irons and dun- 
 geons, in many instances without even having charges pre- 
 ferred against them. 
 
 On the 26th July, 1863, Commissioner Ould said- in a let- 
 ter to the Federal Agent of Exchange : "Now that our official 
 connection is being terminated, I say to you in the fear of 
 God — and I appeal to him for the truth of the declaration — 
 that there has been no single moment, from the time we were 
 first brought together in connection with the matter of ex- 
 change, to the present hour, during which there has not been 
 an open and notorious violation of the cartel, by your author- 
 ities. Officers and men, numbering over hundreds, have been, 
 during your whole connection with the cartel, kept in cruel 
 confinement, sometimes in irons, or doomed to cells, without 
 
 charges or trial The last phase of the enormity, 
 
 however, exceeds all others. Although you have many thou- 
 sands of our soldiers now in confinement in your prisons, and 
 especially in that horrible hold of death. Fort Delaware, you 
 
 have not, for several weeks, sent us any prisoners 
 
 For the first two or three times some sort of an excuse was 
 attempted. None is given at this present arrival. I do not 
 mean to be offensive when I say that effrontery could not give 
 one." 
 
 In reply to these and similar charges by Commissioner 
 Ould, which he, in repeated instances, substantiated by naming 
 
COLONEL OULD'S CHARGES. 511 
 
 the Confederate officers and soldiers thus shamefully treated, 
 the enemy retorted with a charge of similar treatment of Fed- 
 eral prisoners. Yet the prison records of the Confederacy, in 
 no instance, show the detention of prisoners while the cartel 
 was in operation, unless held under grave charges. Commis- 
 sioner Ould, in his letter of August 1, 1863, effectually silenced 
 this replication. Said he : " You have claimed and exercised 
 the right to retain officers and men indefinitely, not only upon 
 charges actually preferred, but upon mere suspicion. You 
 have now in custody officers who were in confinement when 
 the cartel was framed, and who have since been declared ex- 
 changed. Some of them have been tried, but most of them 
 have languished in prison all the weary time without trial or 
 charges. / stand prepared to prove these assertions. This 
 course was pursued, too, in the face not only of notice, but of 
 protest. Do you deny to us the right to detain officers and 
 men for trial upon grave charges, while you claim the right 
 to keep in confinement any who may be the object of your 
 suspicion or special enmity?" 
 
 The paroles issued after capture were respected by both 
 parties, until, about the middle of 1863, the Federal authori- 
 ties declared void the paroles of thousands of their soldiers, 
 who had been sent North by the Confederate Government. 
 At that time, it is noteworthy, the Federal Government had 
 no lists of paroled prisoners to be charged against the Confed- 
 eracy. The latter had previously discharged all its obligations 
 from its large excess of prisoners, leaving still a large balance 
 in their favor unsatisfied. In this condition of affairs. Com- 
 missioner Ould was notified that " exchanges will be confined 
 to such equivalents as are held in confinement on either side." 
 After such a display of perfidy, no surprise should be occa- 
 
512 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 sioned by the subsequent action of the Federal authorities. 
 This announcement, in unmistakable phraseology, meant sim- 
 ply that, as the Confederates had returned equivalents for all 
 paroles held against them, and the Federals held no paroles 
 to be charged against the Confederacy, hereafter no exchange 
 would be made except for men actually in captivity. In other 
 words, having received all the benefits which they could from 
 the observance of the cartel, the Federal Government openly 
 repudiated it, the moment that. its operation would favor their 
 antagonists. Commissioner Ould promptly declined the per- 
 fidious proposition of the enemy, which would have continued 
 thousands of Confederate soldiers in prison, after their Govern- 
 ment had returned all prisoners in their possession, and yet 
 held the paroles of Federal soldiers, largely exceeding in num- 
 ber the Confederate soldiers held captive by the enemy. Sub- 
 sequently the Federal officers and soldiers, in violation of their 
 paroles, and without being declared exchanged, were ordered 
 back to their commands. Commissioner Ould then very prop- 
 erly declared exchanged an equal number of Confederate officers 
 and men, who had been paroled by the enemy at Vicksburg. 
 With these transactions ended all exchanges under that 
 provision of the cartel which provided the delivery of prison- 
 ers within ten days. All subsequent deliveries of prisoners 
 were made by special agreement. The facts which we have 
 stated, showing the suspension of the cartel to have been oc- 
 casioned by the had faith of the Federal Government, are upon 
 record, and can not be disputed. They are accessible to every 
 Northern reader, who may feel disposed to satisfy his judg- 
 ment, hy fads, rather than to foster prejudices based upon the 
 most monstrous falsehoods, ever invented in the interest of 
 fanaticism and hate. The suspension of the cartel was the 
 
THE CARTEL SUSPENDED. 513 
 
 direct cause of those terrible sufferings which were afterwards ^ 
 
 endured by the true men of both sides. It led directly to the \ / 
 hardships, the exposure, and hunger of Andcrsonville, the 
 cruelties of Camp Douglas, the freezing of Confederate soldiers 
 upon the bleak shores of the Northern lakes, and those count- 
 less woes which are endured by the occupants of military pris- 
 ons, even when conducted upon the most humane system. 
 Having been guilty of a shameful violation of faith, the Fed- 
 eral Government persisted in a policy, which was not only 
 cruel to the South, but brought upon the brave men who were 
 fighting its battles, the sufferings which the North has falsely 
 pictured with every conceivable feature of horror and atrocity. 
 
 Until the end of the war, the Confederate Government con- 
 tinued its efforts to secure the renewed operations of the car- 
 tel — a policy which humanity to its own defenders demanded. 
 Why it was not renewed, the motives which dictated a policy 
 which occasioned an almost unexampled degree of human suf- 
 fering, is a question abundantly answered in the testimony here 
 adduced, the most conclusive portions of which comes from 
 Northern sources. 
 
 In January, 1864, it was plain from the disposition of the 
 enemy that the majority of the prisoners of both sides were 
 doomed to confinement for many weary months, if not until 
 the end of the war. Under this impression. Commissioner 
 Ould wrote the following letter, which was promptly delivered 
 to the Federal Agent of Exchange : 
 
 " Confederate States op America, War Department, 1 
 "Richmond, Va., January 24, 1864. I 
 '■'Major-General E. A. Hitchcock, Agent of Exchange — 
 
 " Sir: Iu view of the present difficulties attending the exchange 
 and release of prisoners, I propose that all such on either side 
 33 
 
514 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 shall be attended by a proper number of their own surgeons, who, 
 under rules to be established, shall be permitted to take charge 
 of their health and comfort. I also propose that these surgeons 
 shall act as commissaries, with power to receive and distribute 
 such contributions of money, food, clothing, and medicines as may 
 be forwarded for the relief of the prisoners. I further propose 
 that these surgeons shall be selected by their own Government, 
 and that they shall have full liberty, at any and all times, through 
 the Agents of Exchange, to make reports not only of their own 
 acts, but of any matters relating to the welfare of the prisoners. 
 "Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "ROBERT OULD, 
 
 ^^ Agent of Exchange." 
 
 To this humane proposition no answer was ever made. It is 
 needless to depict the alleviation of misery which its adoption 
 would have secured. Can there be but one interpretation of 
 the motives of those who rejected this noble offer? These 
 propositions are indeed extraordinary, in view of the obloquy 
 heaped upon the Confederate authorities for their alleged in- 
 difference to the health and comfort of their prisoners. Most 
 noticeable, however, is the invitation extended to the Fed- 
 eral authorities to investigate, and report to the world, the 
 treatment and condition of Federal soldiers in Southern 
 prisons. 
 
 But this is far from completing the evidence which convicts 
 tlie Federal Government of a purpose to trade upon the suf- 
 ferings of their prisoners, and thus inflame the resentment of 
 the N"orth during the war, and shows the malignant purpose 
 of a faction to establish a foul libel upon the South in the 
 mind of posterity. On the 10th of August, 1864, Commis- 
 sioner Ould wrote as follows : 
 
HUMANE EFFORTS OF COLONEL OULD. 515 
 
 "Major John E. Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange — 
 
 "Sir: You have several times proposed to me to exchange the 
 prisoners respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for offi- 
 cer, and man for man. The same offer has also been made by 
 other officials having charge of matters connected with the ex- 
 change of prisoners. This proposal has heretofore been declined 
 by the Confederate authorities, they insisting upon the terms of 
 the cartel, which required the delivery of the excess on either 
 side upon parole. In view, however, of the very large number 
 of prisoners now held by each party, and the suffering consequent 
 upon their continued confinement, I now consent to the above 
 proposal, and agree to deliver to you the prisoners held in cap- 
 tivity by the Confederate authorities, provided you agree to de- 
 liver an equal number of Confederate officers and men. As 
 equal numbers are delivered from time to time, they will be de- 
 clared exchanged. This proposal is made with the understanding 
 that the officers and men, on both sides, who have been longest 
 in captivity, will be first delivered, where it is practicable. I 
 shall be happy to hear from you as speedily as possible, whether 
 this arrangement can be carried out. 
 
 " Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "ROBERT OULD, 
 
 ^^ Agent of Exchange." . 
 
 It will be seen that the Confederate authorities, by this 
 proposition, consented to waive all previous questions, to con- 
 cede every point to the enemy, that could facilitate the release 
 from captivity of its own soldiers and those of the North. As 
 an inducement to action by the Federal authorities, this letter 
 was accompanied by a statement exhibiting the mortality among \f 
 
 the prisoners at Andersonville. Receiving no reply. Commis- 
 sioner Ould made the same proposition to General Hitchcock, 
 
516 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 in Washington. The latter making no response, application 
 was made again to Major Mulford, who rej)lied as follows : 
 
 ^^Hon. R. Ould, Agent of Exchange — 
 
 "Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 favor of to-day, requesting answer, etc., to your communication of 
 the 10th inst., on the question of the exchange of prisoners, to 
 which, in reply, I would say, I have no communication on the 
 suhjeet from our authorities, nor am I yet authorized to make 
 any. 
 
 "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 "JOHN E. MULFORD, 
 
 "Assistant Agent of Exchange." 
 
 Nothing could exceed the generosity of this offer. When it 
 was made, the North had a large excess of prisoners. By this 
 arrangement every Federal soldier would have been released 
 from captivity, while a large surplus of Confederates would 
 have remained in the enemy's hands. The brutal calculation 
 of the Federal authorities was that an exchange would add so 
 many thousands of muskets to the depleted ranks of the Con- 
 federacy, and would, besides, deprive them of every pretext for 
 the manufacture of chapters of " rebel barbarities." 
 
 It was known to the world that the means of subsistence 
 in the South was so reduced — chiefly through the cruel warfare 
 waged by the North — that Confederate soldiers were then sub- 
 sisting upon a third of a pound of meat, and a pound of indiffer- 
 ent meal or flour each day. Upon such rations, half naked, 
 thousands of them barefooted, Confederate soldiers were ex- 
 posed to sufferings unexampled in history. How could it be 
 possible, under such circumstances, to prevent suffering among 
 the prisoners? Military prisons, under the most favorable 
 
MR. DAVIs' STATEMENT OF THE MATTER. 517 
 
 circumstances, are miserable enough, but the Federal prisoners 
 in the South were compelled to endure multiplied and aggra- 
 vated miseries, imposed by the condition of the South — shared 
 by their captors, and by the women and children of the country 
 which they invaded. But what possible palliation can there 
 be for the guilt of a Government which willfully subjected its 
 defenders to horrors which it so blazoned to the world ? De- 
 claring that "rebel pens" were worse than Neapolitan prisons 
 and Austrian dungeons, the Federal authorities yet persistently 
 rejected oifers of exchange. 
 
 There could be no more forci))le presentation of the question 
 than that made by President Davis : 
 
 " In the meantime a systematic and concerted effort has been 
 made to quiet the complaints in the United States of those rela- 
 tives and friends of the prisoners in our hands, who are unable to 
 understand why the cartel is not executed in their favor, by the 
 groundless assertion that we are the parties who refuse compUance. 
 Attempts are also made to shield themselves from the execration 
 excited by their own odious treatment of our officers and soldiers 
 now captive in their hands, by misstatements, such as that the 
 prisoners held by us are deprived of food. To this last accusation 
 the conclusive answer has been made, that, in accordance with our 
 laws and the general orders of the department, the rations of the 
 prisoners are precisely the same, in quantity and quality, as those 
 served out to our own gallant soldiers in the field, and which have 
 been found sufficient to support them in their arduous campaign, 
 while it is not pretended by the enemy that they treat prisoners 
 by the same generous rule. By an indulgence, perhaps unprece- 
 dented, we have even allowed the prisoners in our hands to be 
 supplied by their friends at home with comforts not enjoyed by the 
 men who captured them in battle. In contrast to this treatment, 
 
518 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 the most revolting inhumanity has characterized the conduct of 
 the United States towards prisoners held by them. One prom- 
 inent fact, which admits no denial nor palliation, must suffice as a 
 test : The officers of our army — natives of southern and semi- 
 tropical climates, and unprepared for the cold of a northern win- 
 ter — have been conveyed for imprisonment, during the rigors of 
 the present season, to the most northern and exposed situation 
 that could be selected by the enemy. There, beyond the reach 
 of comforts, and often even of news from home and family, exposed 
 to the piercing cold of the northern lakes, they are held by men 
 who can not be ignorant of — even if they do not design — the 
 probable result. How many of our unfortunate friends and com- 
 rades, who have passed unscathed through numerous battles, will 
 perish on Johnston's Island, under the cruel trial to which they 
 are subjected, none but the Omniscient can foretell. That they 
 will endure this barbarous treatment with the same stern fortitude 
 that they have ever evinced in their country's service, we can not 
 doubt. But who can be found to believe the assertion that it is 
 our refusal to execute the cartel, and not the malignity of the foe, 
 which has caused the infliction of such intolerable cruelty on our 
 own loved and honored defenders?" 
 
 Since the war, Commissioner Ould lias given testimony of 
 the most conclusive character. While the subject of the treat- 
 ment of prisoners was pending in Congress, during the past 
 summer, he wrote the following letter. It will be observed 
 that he offers to prove his statements by the testimony of Federal 
 officers. 
 
 " Washington, July 23, 18G7. 
 " Jb the Editors of the National Intelligencer — 
 
 " I respectfully request the publication of the following letter, 
 received by me from Colonel Robert Ould, of Richmond. It will 
 
COLONEL OULD'S LETTER. 519 
 
 be perceived that it fully sustains my statement in the House, 
 with the unimportant exception of the number of prisoners offered 
 to be exchanged, without equivalent, by the Confederate authori- 
 ties. Very respectfully, 
 
 "CHARLES A. ELDRIDGE." 
 
 "Richmond, July 19, 1867. 
 ^^Hon. Charles A. Eldridge — 
 
 *' My Dear Sir : I have seen your remarks as published. They 
 are substantially correct. Every word that I said to you in Rich- 
 mond is not only true, but can be proved by Federal officers. I 
 did offer, in August, to deliver the Federal sick and wounded, 
 without requiring equivalents, and urged the necessity of haste in 
 sending for them, as the mortality was terrible. I did offer to de- 
 liver from ten to fifteen thousand at Savannah without delay. 
 Although this offer was made in August, transportation was not 
 sent for them until December, and during the interval, the mor- 
 tality was perhaps at its greatest height. If I had not made the 
 offer, why did the Federal authorities send transportation to Savan- 
 nah for ten or fifteen thousand men ? If I made the offer, based 
 only on equivalents, why did the same transportation carry down 
 for delivery only three thousand men ? 
 
 *' Butler says the offer was made in the fall (according to the 
 newspaper report), and that seven thousand were delivered. The 
 offer was made in August, and they were sent for in December. I 
 then delivered more than thirteen thousand, and would have gone 
 to the fifteen thousand if the Federal transportation had been 
 sufficient. My instructions to my agents were to deliver fifteen 
 thousand sick and wounded, and if that number of that class were 
 not on hand, to make up the number by well men. The offer was 
 made by me in pursuance of instructions from the Confederate 
 Secretary of War. I was ready to keep up the arrangement until 
 every sick and wounded man had been returned. 
 
520 L.IFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 " The three thousand men sent to Savannah by the Federals were 
 in as wretched a condition as any detachment of prisoners ever sent 
 from a Confederate prison. 
 
 "All these things are susceptible of proof, and I am much mis- 
 taken if I can not prove them by Federal authority. I am quite 
 sure that General Mulford will sustain every allegation here made. 
 " Yours truly, R. OULD. 
 
 " P. S. — General Butler's correspondence is all on one side, as I 
 was instructed, at the date of his letters, to hold no correspond- 
 ence with him. I corresponded with Mulford or General Hitch- 
 cock. "R. OULD." 
 
 In another letter, written about the same time, Colonel 
 Ould thus invites investigation : 
 
 "General Mulford will sustain every thing I have herein writ- 
 ten. He is a man of honor and courage, and I do not think will 
 hesitate to tell the truth. I think it would be well for you to 
 make the appeal to him, as it has become a question of veracity." 
 
 But though President Davis and Colonel Ould are known 
 by thousands of people, North and South, to be men of unim- 
 peachable truthfulness, and though no honorable enemy would 
 question their statements, we can not hope that their testimony 
 will make headway against the intolerant prejudices and pas- 
 sions of faction. General B. F. Butler is doubtless sufficiently 
 orthodox, and, besides, his testimony is voluntary. Says this 
 exponent of latter-day " loyalty : " 
 
 " The great importance of the question ; the fearful responsibil- 
 ity for the many thousands of lives which, by the refusal to ex- 
 change, were sacrificed by the most cruel forms of death ; from 
 cold, starvation, and pestilence of the prison -pens of Raleigh and 
 Andersonville, being more than all the British soldiers killed in 
 
GENERAL BUTLER AND THE "TRIBUNE." 521 
 
 the wars of Napoleon ; the anxiety of fathers, brothers, sisters, 
 mothers, wive^, to know the exigency which caused this terrible — 
 and perhaps as it may have seemed to them useless and unneces- 
 sary — destruction of those dear to them, by horrible deaths, each 
 and all have compelled me to this exposition, so that it may be 
 seen that these lives were spent as a part of the system of attack 
 upon the rebellion, devised by the wisdom of the (xeueral-in-Chief 
 of the armies, to destroy it by depletion, depending upon our si»- 
 perior numbers to win the victory at last. 
 
 " The loyal mourners will doubtless derive solace from this fact, 
 and appreciate all the more highly the genius which conceived the 
 plan and the success won at so great a cost." 
 
 The New York Tribune will also be accepted as competent 
 authority. Referring to the occurrences of 1864, the Tribune 
 editorially says: 
 
 " In August the rebels offered to renew the exchange, man for 
 man. General Grant then telegraphed the following important 
 order: 'It is hard on our men, held in Southern prisons, not to 
 exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to 
 fight our battles. Every man released on parole or otherwise be- 
 comes an active soldier against us at once, either directly or indi- 
 rectly. If we commence a si/stem of exchange which liberates all 
 prisoners taken, we will have to fight on till the whole South is 
 exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more 
 than dead men. At this particular time, to release all rebel pris- 
 oners North would insure Sherman's defeat, and would compro- 
 mise our safety here.'" 
 
 Here is even a stronger statement from a Northern source : 
 
 "New York, August 8, 1865. 
 " Moreover, General Butler, in Ms speech at Lowell, Massachusetts, 
 stated positively that he had been ordered by Mr. Stanton to put for- 
 
522 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 ward the negro question to complicate and prevent the exchange. 
 
 Every one is aware that, when the exchange did 
 
 take place, not the slightest alteration had occurred in the ques- 
 tion, and that our prisoners might as well have leen released twelve 
 or eighteen months before as at the resumption of the cartel, which 
 would have saved to the Republic at least twelve or fifteen thousand 
 heroic lives. That they were not saved is due alone to Mr. Edwin 
 M. Stanton s peculiar policy and dogged obstinacy; and, as I have 
 
 REMARKED BEFORE, HE IS UNQUESTIONABLY THE DIGGER OF THE 
 UNNAMED GRAVES THAT CROWD THE VICINITY OP EVERY SOUTH- 
 ERN PRISON WITH HISTORIC AND NEVER-TO-BE-FORGOTTEN HOR- 
 RORS. 
 
 " I regret the revival of this painful subject, but the gratuitous 
 eflFort of Mr. Dana to relieve the Secretary of War from a respon- 
 sibility he seems willing to bear, and which merely as a question 
 of policy, independent of all considerations of humanity, must be 
 regarded as of great weight, has compelled me to vindicate myself 
 from the charge of making grave statements without due consid- 
 eration. 
 
 " Once for all, let me declare that I have never found fault with 
 any one because I was detained in prison, for I am well aware that 
 that was a matter in which no one but myself, and possibly a few 
 personal friends, would feel any interest ; that my sole motive for 
 impeaching the Secretary of War was that the people of the loyal 
 North might hnow to whom they were indebted for the cold-blooded 
 and needless sacrifice of their fathers and brothers, their husbands 
 and their sons. 
 
 "JUNIUS HENRI BROWNE." 
 
 Now, what is the " inexorable logic " of this train of evi- 
 dence? Either the calumnies against the South stand self- 
 couvicted, or those who have uttered them show themselves 
 
THE SOUTH ACQUITTED. 523 
 
 to have been worse fiends than they pretend to believe the 
 Confederate authorities to have been. 
 
 But can a candid world credit the charge of cruelty against 
 the South ? Honorable enemies, even, will scorn the allegation 
 of torture, of designedly inflicting suffering upon helpless men, 
 against a people who, within the past six years, have so hon- 
 orably illustrated the American name. Brave men are never 
 cruel — cowards only delight in torture of the helpless. Cru- 
 elty to prisoners would be inconsistent not only with the known 
 generosity of the Southern character, but with that splendid 
 courage which the North will not dishonor itself by calling in 
 question. 
 
 Until the suspension of the cartel, the Federal prisoners, 
 even at the risk of their recapture, were kept in Richmond 
 convenient for exchange. Confederate prisoners, on the other 
 hand, were hurried to the Northern frontier, where the rigor 
 of the climate alone subjected them to the most cruel suffer- 
 ings. Driven by the course of the Federal Government, re- 
 specting the subject of exchange, the Confederate authorities 
 selected a site for the quartering of prisoners, whom it was 
 impossible to subsist in Richmond or its neighborhood. An- 
 dersonville was selected, in accordance with an official order 
 contemplating the following objects : "A healthy locality, plenty 
 of pure, good water, a running stream, and, if possible, shade 
 trees, and in the immediate neighborhood of grist and saw- 
 mills." Such were the " horrors of Andersonville," which the 
 world has been urged to believe the Confederate Government 
 selected with special view to the torment and death of pris- 
 oners. 
 
 The terrible mortality among the prisoners at Andersonville 
 was not due either to starvation or to the unhealthiness of the 
 
524 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 locality. Federal soldiers were unaccustomed to the scanty 
 and indifferent diet upon which the Confederates were fed, and 
 which caused the death of thousands of delicate youths in the 
 Southern armies. By this single fact may be explained much 
 of the mortality at Andersonville. When to scurvy and other 
 fatal forms of disease, produced by inadequate and unwholesome 
 diet, are added the mental sufferings, which are peculiarly the 
 lot of a prisoner, the despondency, and, in the case of the An- 
 dersonville prisoners, the despair occasioned by the refusal of 
 their own Government to relieve them, we have abundant ex- 
 planation of the most shocking mortality. 
 
 But the statement that the mortality of Andersonville was 
 in excess of that of all other military prisons, is a Avillful false- 
 hood. 'We present the following extracts from a letter to the 
 New York World, by a gentleman, whose integrity will be 
 vouched for by thousands of the best people in Virginia : 
 
 PRISON MORTALITY— ANDERSONVILLE AND ELMIRA. 
 
 "Richmond, Va., August 14. 
 "To the Editor of the World— 
 
 "Sir: I have just seen, in a city paper, a paragraph, credited to 
 the World, alleging that among the Confederate prisoners at El- 
 mira, during the last four or five months of the use of that prison, 
 the deaths only amounted to a few individuals out of many thou- 
 sand prisoners. I am not able to contro\'^ert that fact, as I left 
 there on the 11th of October, 1864 ; but if the impression desired 
 to be produced is that the general mortality at that pen was slight, 
 I can contradict it from the record. During a portion of the period 
 of my incarceration in the Elmira pen, it was my duty to receive, 
 from the surgeon's office, each morning, the reports of the deaths 
 of the preceding day, and embody them in an official report, to be 
 signed by the commandant of the prison, and forwarded to the 
 
ELMIRA AND ANDERSONVILLE. 525 
 
 commandant of the post. I entered, each morning, in a diary, 
 which now lies before me, the number of reported deaths ; and the 
 facts demonstrate that, in as healthy a location as there is in New 
 York, with every remedial appliance in abundance, with no epidemic, 
 and with a great boast of humanity, the deaths were relatively 
 larger than among the Federal prisoners at Andersonville among a 
 famished people, whose quartermaster could not furnish shelter to 
 its soldiers, and whose surgeons were without the commonest medi- 
 cines for the sick. The record shows that at Andersonville, be- 
 tween the 1st of February and 1st of August, 1864, out of thirty- 
 six thousand prisoners, six thousand, or one-sixth, died — a fearful 
 rate unquestionably. But the official report of the Elmira pen 
 shows, that during the month of September, 1864, which was the 
 first month after the quota of that prison was made up, out of less 
 than nine thousand Jive hundred prisoners, the deaths were THREE 
 HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIX. lu Other words, the average mortality 
 at x^ndersonville, during that period, was one thirty-sixth of the 
 whole per month, while at Elmira it was one twenty-fifth of the 
 whole. At Elmira it was four per cent.; at Andersonville, less 
 than three per cent 
 
 "Another item, which I gather from my diary, will indicate the 
 manner in which the medical officer at Elmira discharged his func- 
 tions. The hospitals began to be filled, in the latter part of Au- 
 gust, with obstinate cases of scurvy. Men became covered with 
 fearful sores, many lost their teeth, and many others became crip- 
 ples, and will die cripples from that cause. The commandant of 
 the post ordered a report to he made of all the scorbutic cases in 
 prison, grave and trifling ; and on the morning of Sunday, Septem- 
 ber 11, the lists were added up, when it was found that of nine 
 thousand three hundred prisoners examined, eighteen hundred and 
 seventy were tainted with scurvy. 
 
 " The Federal Government, as one of its measures of reconstruc- 
 tion, is officially and expensively engaged in traducing the South- 
 
526 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ern people, and the facility with which it procures all necessary 
 evidence, whether the object be to hang or to calumniate, warrants 
 the belief that we shall have a couple of volumes a year for the 
 rest of the century, demonstrating the barbarity of the rebels. 
 Against so admirable a system of manufacturing evidence, it is, of 
 course, idle to oppose the feeble efforts of individuals, but I regard 
 the duty none the less binding on such of us as know the truth to 
 declare it ; and I hope that, throughout the Southern States, intel- 
 ligent and credible men are now putting into authentic form, the 
 evidences of Federal outrages, the exploits of the Shermans and 
 Sheridans, and Milroys and Butlers, one day to be published by 
 general subscription of our people, that the world may judge be- 
 tween us and the spoon thieves, the furniture thieves, the barn- 
 burners, the bummers, and the brutes who too often wore the uni- 
 form of the Federal army. 
 
 «'A. M. K." 
 
 Can the North expect impartial history to accept its miser- 
 able subterfuge of " disloyalty/' by which such testimony as 
 this is now excluded ? 
 
 Any reference to this subject must be wholly inadequate 
 which does not describe the condition of the South at the pe- 
 riod when she is alleged to have been guilty of unexampled 
 atrocities. The blockade of the South by the North was strin- 
 gent beyond any precedent in modern warfare, lledicines were 
 held as contraband. Southern hospitals were not supplied, for 
 that reason, with all the medicaments that were needed by sick 
 and wounded soldiers; and those who were prisoners in our 
 hands necessarily shared, in this respeet, the privations of the 
 Confederate soldiers. But if there was any thing " cruel and 
 inhuman " in this deficiency, whose fault was it ? Of whom is 
 the cruelty and inhumanity to be alleged ? The South searched 
 
DEVASTATION OF THE SOUTH. 527 
 
 her forests and meadows for restoratives. She ran in medi- 
 cines, as far as practicable, at great cost and hazard. We 
 shared our stores with our prisoners. If the supply was inad- 
 equate or ill-assorted, we again ask, arc we to be charged with 
 cruelty and inhumanity? 
 
 The same observations are applicable as to supplies of food 
 and clothing. The war was waged, by the North, on the 
 policy of unsparing devastation. Mills were burnt, factories 
 demolished, barns given to the flames, and the means of com- 
 fort and of living destroyed on system. What the South was 
 able to save, she shared with her prisoners. We gave them 
 such rations as we gave our own soldiers. Does any one sus- 
 pect the Confederate Government of deliberately stinting its 
 own soldiers? How, then, can it be pretended that it was 
 " cruel and inhuman " to prisoners whom it fed as well ? If 
 we could not maintain them as well as we wished, it was 
 through the success of those who wasted our subsistence, for 
 the purpose of reducing us to that precise condition of inability. 
 It is obviously monstrous to charge •the fact, and to charge it 
 as blame, upon us — to accuse the South of " cruelty and inhu- 
 manity." * 
 
 *"We present two resolutions of a series adopted by Federal prisoners 
 of war : 
 
 ^'■Resolved, That whilst allowing the Confederate authorities all due 
 praise for the attention paid to our prisoners, numbers of our men are 
 daily consigned to early graves in the prime of manhood, far from home 
 and kindred, and this is not caused intentionally by the Confederate 
 Government, but by the force of circumstances ; the prisoner is obliged 
 to go without shelter, and, in a great portion of cases, without medicine. 
 
 ^^ Resolved, That whereas, in the fortune of war, it was our lot to become 
 prisoners, we have suffered patiently, and are still willing to suffer, if by 
 
528 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 But there is still another revelation to be added to the over- 
 whelming evidence which demonstrates the murderous purpose 
 of the Federal authorities, equally toward their ov/n men and 
 toward Confederate soldiers, by which they adroitly sought to 
 cover the Confederate Government with accusing blood. ; A 
 marked feature in the policy of the Lincoln cabinet was, at 
 concerted intervals, to inflame the heart of the North by ap- 
 peals to passion and resentment. The supreme excellence of 
 the Federal administration, in this respect, was, indeed, its 
 substitute for statesmanship. To conceal its own iniquitous 
 course, with reference to the exchange of prisoners, the admin- 
 istration successfully sought to frenzy the Northern masses by 
 the most ingenious misrepresentations of the condition of their 
 men in the Southern prisons. 
 
 To this end the foul brood of pictorial falsifiers — the Har- 
 pers, Leslies, etc. — gave willing and effective aid. Men in the 
 most horrible conditions of human suffering — ghastly skele- 
 tons, creatures demented from sheer misery — a set of wretched, 
 raving, and dying creatui^s — were photographed, the pictures 
 reduplicated to an unlimited extent, and scattered broadcast 
 over the North, as evidence of the brutality practiced upon 
 
 so doing we can benefit the country, but we would most respectfully beg to 
 
 say that we are not willing to suffer to further the ends of any party or 
 
 clique, to the detriment of our own honor, our families, and our country ; 
 
 and we would beg this affair be explained to us, that we may continue to 
 
 hold the Government in the respect which is necessary to make a good 
 
 citizen and a soldier. 
 
 BRADLEY, 
 
 ^^ Chairman of Committee, on behalf of Prisoners." 
 
 These resolutions were adopted at a meeting of prisoners in Savannah, 
 September 28, 1864, and sent to President Lincoln. 
 
RENEWED PERFIDY. 529 
 
 Federal prisoners in the South. In view of the well-known and 
 designed influence of these appeals upon Northern sentiment, 
 ^liat must be the scorn of the civilized world for the perfidy 
 which used the means which we here relate, to accomplish its 
 iniquitous ends? 
 
 Immediately preceding the return of these prisoners, the 
 Federal Agent applied for the delivery of the icorst cases of 
 sick Federal prisoners. Said he: "Even in cases where your 
 surgeons think the men too ill to be moved, and not strong 
 enough to survive the trip, if they express a desire to come, 
 let them come." At this time, it should be remembered, reg- 
 ular exchanges were intermitted. Commissioner Ould, con- 
 sistently with his known humanity and the humane disposi- 
 tion of his Government, consented to send the loorst cases of 
 their prisoners, provided that they would not be accepted as 
 representatives of the average condition of the Federal pris- 
 oners in the South, and used as a means to inflame Northern 
 sentiment. This condition was sacredly pledged. 
 
 With this understanding. Commissioner Ould prepared a 
 barge adapted specially to the purpose, and, with the aid of 
 the Richmond Ambulance Committee, carefully and tenderly 
 delivered the prisoners. The Federal vessel that received 
 them sailed immediately to Annapolis, where, instead of re- 
 ceiving the tender treatment that their pitiable condition re- 
 quired, they were made a spectacle of for an obvious purpose. 
 Photographic artists made portraits of them ; a committee of 
 Congress was sent to report upon their condition ; in short, 
 they had been obtained for a purpose; and, how well that 
 ]iurpose was subserved, the South, at least, well knows. These 
 miserable wrecks of humanity, specially asked for, specially 
 selected as the worst cases, were pointed to as representatives 
 34 
 
530 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 of the average state of Federal prisoners in the South, although 
 the most sacred assurances had been given that they would be 
 used for no such purpose. 
 
 History will be searched in vain for such an example of 
 mingled wickedness, perfidy, and cruelty. Yet the faction 
 that could practice such treachery and barbarity has dared 
 to impeach the honor and humanity of the South. Through 
 such means, it, of course, can easily be proven that the South 
 "starved and tortured" thousands of Union prisoners. Nor 
 can Stanton, Holt, and Conover have difficulty in proving 
 that these cruelties were by direct order of President Davis. 
 
 Need we pursue this subject further? We have not ad- 
 duced one-tenth of the evidence which completes the record 
 of Southern justice and humanity, yet Vvdiat candid mind will 
 deny that this testimony is ample? The vindication of the 
 South, too, is the assured defense of Jefferson Davis. Nay, 
 more : the exceptional victim of Northern malice is known to 
 his countrymen to have a special record of humanity which 
 should have claimed a special consideration from the enemy. 
 Upon no subject was President Davis more censured in the 
 South than for what was termed his "ill-timed tenderness" 
 for the enemy. Stung to madness by the devastations and 
 cruelties attending the invasion of their country, the people 
 often responded to the clamor of the newspapers for retaliation 
 against the harsh measures of the enemy. Before the writer is 
 a Richmond newspaper, of date during the war, in which the 
 leading editorial begins with the assertion that " The chivalry 
 and humanity of Mr. Jefferson Davis will inevitably ruin this 
 Confederacy," and the editor continues to reproach Mr. Davis 
 for culpable leniency. 
 
 To the same alletjed cause the Examiner was accustomed to 
 
HUMANITY OF ME. DAVIS. 531 
 
 attribute what it described as the " humiliating attitude of the 
 Confederacy. Said the Examiner: "The enemy have gone 
 from one unmanly cruelty to another, encouraged by their im- 
 punity, till they are now, and have for some time, been inflict- 
 ing on the people of this country the worst horrors of barbar- 
 ous and uncivilized war." Yet, in spite of all this, the Ex- 
 aminer alleged, that Mr. Davis, in his dealings with the enemy, 
 was "as gentle as the sucking dove." The same paper pub- 
 lished a "bill of fare" provided for one of the prisons, and 
 invoked the indignation of the country upon a policy which 
 fed the prisoners of the enemy better than the soldiers of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 Never, indeed, did the ruler of an invaded people exhibit 
 such forbearance in the face of so much provocation. When 
 reminded of the relentless warfare of the enemy, which spared 
 neither age, sex, nor condition, of his devastation, rapine and 
 violence, Davis' invariable reply was : " The crimes of our 
 enemies can not justify us in a disregard of the duties of 
 humanity and Christianity." There can be little doubt that 
 Mr. Davis occasionally erred in his extreme generosity to the 
 foe. Yet, how noble must be that fame, which is marred only 
 by such a fault. History has canonized Lamartine for pre- 
 venting the re-raising of the red flag in 1848. What will be 
 its award to the heroic firmness of Jefferson Davis, in pre- 
 venting the raising of the black flag, among a people, whose 
 dearest rights were assailed, whose homes were destroyed, and 
 themselves subjected to the most ruthless persecutions known 
 in modern warfare? 
 
 But apart from the perjured testimony, which has been ut- 
 terly inadequate to establish the charge of " cruelty to prison- 
 ers," has the time passed, when the honorable character of a 
 
532 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 people and of an individual can be j)roperly considered ? The 
 whole history of the United States does not exhibit a public 
 career more stainless than that of Jefferson Davis, while in the 
 service of the Union. Occupying almost every position of 
 honor and trust, in both houses of Congress, member of the 
 cabinet, and as a gallant soldier, the breath of slander never 
 once tarnished his name. To his incorruptible official and 
 private integrity, to the sincerity of his convictions, and the 
 rectitude and honesty of his intentions, no men could better 
 testify than those Republican Senators, who were, for years, 
 his associates. Indeed, Mr. Davis has been peculiar in his 
 complete exemption from that personal defamation, which is 
 almost a necessity of political life. 
 
 But, impartial history will ask, whence come these calumnies 
 against the great, pure, and pious leader of a brave people, in 
 a struggle for liberty ? Then must come that inevitable re- 
 coil, which shall bring to just judgment, a government, which 
 destroyed the houses and the food of non-combatants; the 
 fruits of the earth and the implements of tillage ; which con- 
 demned its own defenders to imprisonment and death ; which 
 imprisoned without charges, gray-haired men, and doomed 
 them to tortures, which brought them to premature graves ; 
 exposed helpless women and children to starvation, by depriv- 
 ing them of their natural protectors ; which declared medicines 
 contraband of war, and finally sought, by perjury, to justify 
 cruelty to a helpless captive, because his people, in the midst 
 of starvation, could not adequately feed and nurture the cap- 
 tive soldiers of the enemy. 
 
POrULAll FEELING. 633 
 
 CHAPTER XYIII. 
 
 DICATIONS OP POPULAR FEELIXG AT THE BEGIXXIXG OF 1864 — .VPATHV AND 
 
 DESPONDENCY OF THE NORTH IMPROVED FEELING IN THE CONFEDERACY 
 
 THE PROBLE.M OF ENDURANCE PREPARATIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOV- 
 ERNMENT — MILITARY SUCCESS THE GREAT DESIDERATUM — A SERIES OF SUC- 
 CESSES — FINNEGAn's VICTORY IN FLORIDA — SHERMAN' S EXPEDITION — FOR- 
 EEST's VICTORY — THE RAID OF DAIILGREN — TAYLOR DEFEATS BANKS — 
 
 Forrest's Tennessee campaign — hoke's victory — the value of these 
 
 MINOR victories CONCENTRATION FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLES IN VIRGINIA 
 
 AND GEORGIA FEDERAL PREPARATIONS — GENERAL GRANT — HIS THEORY OP 
 
 WAR — HIS PLANS — THE FEDERAL FORCES IN VIRGINLV — SHERMAN — FEEBLE 
 RESOURCES OP THE CONFEDERACY — THE " ON TO RICHMOND" AND " ON TO 
 ATLANTA" — GENERAL GRANT BAFFLED — HE NARROWLY ESCAPES RUIN — HIS 
 OVERLAND MOVEMENT A TOTAL FAILURE — SHERIDAN THREATENS RICHMOND 
 — DEATH OF STUART — BUTLER's ADVANCE UPON RICHMOND — THE CITY IN 
 
 GREAT PERIL BEAUREGARd's PLAN OF OPERATIONS —VIEWS OF MR. DAVIS 
 
 DEFEAT OF BUTLER, "^VND HIS CONFINEMENT IN A "CUL DE SAC " — FAILURE OP 
 
 grant's COMBINATIONS CONSTANTLY B.VFFLED BY LEE — TERRIBLE LOSSES 
 
 OF THE FEDERAL ARMY GRANT CROSSES THE JAMES — HIS FAILURES RE- 
 PEATED HIS NEW COMBINATIONS — EARLY's OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY 
 
 AND ACROSS THE POTOMAC — THE FEDERAL COMBINATIONS AGAIN BROKEN 
 DOWN — FAVORABLE SITUATION IN VIRGINIA — THE MISSION OF MESSRS. CLAY, 
 THOMPSON, AND HOLCOMBE — CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. LINCOLN — THE AR- 
 ROGANT AND MOCKING REPLY OP THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT. 
 
 1~\ESPITE the solid advantages obtained by the North in 
 -^-^ the campaign just ended, the close of the winter devel- 
 oped the existence of great apprehension at "Washington, and 
 a correspondingly improved feeling in the South. It was in- 
 deed remarkable that the conviction entertained by both sides, 
 that the struggle was now about to assume its latest and de- 
 
534 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 cisive phase, should have evoked such different manifestations 
 of feeling at Washington and Richmond. 
 
 At the North was seen a singular apathy, which temporarily 
 checked overwrought displays of popular exultation, and a 
 mutual distrust of the Government and the public, not at all 
 encouraging of success in designs demanding zealous coopera- 
 tion. The thoughtful observer of Northern sentiment readily 
 detected the presence of depression and suspicion — a general 
 apprehension that the restoration of the Union was an enter- 
 prise developing new and unseen obstacles at each step, and 
 a confusion of views as to the management of the war. But, 
 in the violent exhibitions of party spirit, the North realized 
 its chief cause of alarm. The peace party increased in num- 
 bers and influence with the prolongation of the war, and the 
 preservation of power by the Government party was clearly 
 dependent upon such military results, as should foreshadow 
 the speedy "collapse of the rebellion." In short, the North 
 saw that the culmination of the momentous struggle was to 
 be reached, while it was in the throes of an embittered Pres- 
 idential contest. 
 
 There was another explanation of the altered feeling in the 
 two sections developed during the winter. Throughout the 
 war, the Northern mind was singularly accessible to the in- 
 fluence of sensation and "clap-trap;" hence were always to 
 be expected periodical galvanic excitements, followed by revul- 
 sion of feehng. The conservative instincts of the South sought 
 repose rather than excitement; and the crippled condition of 
 the enemy, after his achievements of the summer and fall, 
 gave the South a sufficient respite for the recovery of much 
 of its lost confidence. Nor was the transition of the South- 
 ern mind, within a few weeks, from depression to something 
 
CONFEDERATE HOPES. 535 
 
 like hopeful anticipation, based upon a mere presentiment of 
 prosperous fortune. The lessons of the war, not less than the 
 teachings of previous history, encouraged reauimation. It Avas 
 contended that the conquest of a territory so extensive, and 
 the subjection of a people numerically as strong and as cou- 
 rageous as those of the South, was physically impossible. It 
 was urged that the Federal successes of the preceding summer 
 had only placed the enemy upon the threshold of his enter- 
 prise, and that, in surmounting the resolute resistance which 
 had almost defeated his earliest movements, he had vainly 
 wasted the spirit and the strength which were now needed 
 for his further progress. 
 
 From such a condition of feeling, the logical conclusion was 
 that the war had now become a question of endurance, and 
 that the Confederacy must now depend upon its capacity to 
 resist until the North should abandon the war in sheer dis- 
 gust. The Richmond journals pithily stated the problem as 
 one of "Southern fortitude and endurance against Yankee 
 perseverance." 
 
 In the meantime, the enforced quiet of the enemy was dili- 
 gently improved by the Government. Probably at no period 
 of the war did the Confederate administration exhibit more 
 energy and skill in the employment of its limited resources, 
 than in its preparations for the campaign of 1864. The vig- 
 orous measures of the President were, in the main, seconded 
 by Congress, though this session was not wanting in those 
 displays of demagogism which, throughout the war, dimin- 
 ished the influence and efficiency of that body. In the sequel, 
 tlie expedients adopted did not realize the large results antici- 
 pated. The financial legislation of Congress did not imjn-ove 
 the value of the currency, nor did the various expedients re- 
 
536 LIFE OF JEFFEKSON DAVIS. 
 
 sorted to for strengthening the army obtain the desired num- 
 bers. It was calculated that the Confederate armies would aof- 
 gregate, by the opening of spring, something like four hundred 
 thousand men, of which the repeal of the substitute law alone 
 was expected to furnish seventy thousand. The real strength 
 of all the Confederate armies, however, did not exceed two 
 hundred thousand men when the campaign was entered upon. 
 The execution of the conscription law was a subject of sore 
 perplexity to the administration, and, though President Davis 
 made strenuous exertions to remedy the difficulty, the system 
 continued defective until the end. 
 
 The army was, nevertheless, strengthened both in numbers 
 and material, while its spirit, as shown in the alacrity and 
 unanimity of reenlistment, was never surpassed. Military suc- 
 cess was now the end to which the Government devoted its 
 whole energies, as the real and only solution of its difficulties. 
 In time of war military success is the sole nepenthe for na- 
 tional afflictions. Without victories the Confederacy would 
 seek in vain a restoration of its finances through the expedients 
 of legislation. Equally necessary were victories for relief of 
 the difficulty as to food. Should the spring campaign be suc- 
 cessful, the Confederacy would recover the country upon which 
 it had been mainly dependent for supplies, and such additional 
 territory as was required to put at rest the alarming difficulty 
 of scarcity. 
 
 The expectation of the South' was much encouraged by a 
 series of successes upon minor theatres of the war, during the 
 suspension of operations by the main armies. A signal victory 
 was won late in February, by General Finnegan, at Ocean 
 Pond, Florida, the important event of which was the decisive 
 failure of a Federal design to possess that State. 
 
Sherman's expeditiox. 537 
 
 The most serious demonstration by the enemy, during the 
 winter months, was the expedition of Sherman across the State 
 of Mississippi. This movement, undertaken with all the vigor 
 and daring of that commander, was designed to capture Mobile 
 and to secure the Federal occupation of nearly the whole of 
 Alabama and Mississippi. It was the second experiment, un- 
 dertaken by Federal commanders, during the war, of leaving 
 a regular base of operations, and seeking the conquest of a 
 large section of territory, by penetrating boldly into the in- 
 terior. The first similar attempt was made by Grant, from 
 Memphis into the interior of Mississippi. It is notable that 
 both these expeditions were marked by shameful failure. They 
 signally illustrated the military principle of the impossibility 
 of successful penetration of hostile territory, even when held by 
 a greatly inferior force, and, moreover, clearly indicate the fate 
 that would inevitably have overtaken Sherman, in his " march 
 to the sea," had there been an opposing army to meet him. 
 When Van Dorn captured Grant's supplies at Holly Springs, in 
 the autumn of 1862, the Federal commander had no alternative 
 but to make a rapid retreat to his base. A similar experience 
 awaited Sherman, who, leaving Vicksburg with thirty thousand 
 men, marched without opposition through Mississippi — General 
 Polk, with his corps of ten thousand men, falling back before 
 him. Cooperating with Sherman was a large cavalry force, 
 which, leaving North Mississippi, was to unite with him at 
 Meridian, and upon this junction of forces depended the success 
 of the entire expedition. But General Forrest, a remarkably 
 skillful and energetic cavalry leader, attacked the Federal col- 
 umn, utterly routing and dispersing it, though not having 
 more than one-third the force of the enemy. This neces- 
 sitated the retreat of Sherman, with many circumstances in- 
 
538 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 dicating demoralization among his troops. His expedition 
 terminated with no results sufficient to give it more dignity, 
 than properly belonged to at least a dozen other plundering 
 and incendiary enterprises, undertaken by Federal officers who 
 are comparatively without reputation. The exploits of Sher- 
 man in Mississippi gave him a "bad eminence," which he 
 afterwards well sustained by the burning of Rome and At- 
 lanta, the sack of Columbia, and his career of pillage and 
 incendiarism in the Carolinas. 
 
 A notable event of the winter was the raid of Dahlgren, an 
 expedition marked by every dastardly and atrocious feature 
 imaginable. When this expedition of " 2)icked " Federal cav- 
 alry had been put to ignominious flight by the departmental 
 clerks at Richmond, its retreat was harassed by local and 
 temporary organizations of farmers, school-boys, and furloughed 
 men from Lee's army. Not until its leader was killed, how- 
 ever, was revealed the fiendish errand which he had under- 
 taken. Upon his person was found ample documentary evi- 
 dence of the objects of the expedition, viz. : to burn and sack 
 the city of Richmond, and to assasshiate President Davis and 
 his cabinet.^ Yet this ma», killed in honorable combat, after 
 
 * Upon the person of Dahlgren was found the addi'oss, fi-om which ex- 
 tracts relative to the purpose of the expedition are given. The portions 
 which we omit are mainly exhortations to the courage of the men in a 
 desperate enterprise : 
 
 '■'■ Officers and men — 
 
 "You have been selected from brigades and regiments, as a picked 
 command, to attempt a desperate undertaking — an undertaking, which, if 
 successful, will write your names on the hearts of your countrj'iucn in 
 letters that can never be erased, and which will cause the praj-ers of 
 your fellow-soldiers, now confined in loathsome prisons, to follow you 
 wherever you may go. 
 
THE DAHLGREN PAPERS. 539 
 
 his cut-throat mission had failed, was apotheosized by the 
 North as a " hero," who had been " assassinated " while on 
 au errand of patriotism and philanthropy. The shocking 
 details of this diabolical scheme, substantiated by every neces- 
 sary proof of authenticity, were published in the Richmond 
 journals, and instead of provoking the condemnation of the 
 
 ''We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Island first, and, having 
 seen them fairly started, v/e will cross the James River into Kichmond, 
 destroying the bridges after us, and exhorting the released prisoners to 
 destroy and burn the hateful city; and do not allow the rebel leader, 
 Davis, and his traitoi'ous crew to escape," etc. The conclusion of this 
 remarkable order is, "Ask the blessing of the Almighty, and do not fear 
 the enemy." 
 
 "We have not space for the indisputable testimony which has estab- 
 lished the authenticity of the " Dahlgren Papers " — a subject upon which 
 there is no longer room for doubt. The writer, at the time of this raid, 
 had full descrij^tions of them from persons who saw the originals. They 
 were found upon Dalilgren's body by a school-boy thirteen years old, who 
 could not write, and were immediately placed in the hands of his teacher. 
 Tlie soiled folds of the paper were plainly visible. The words referring 
 to the murder of President Davis were a part of the regular test of the 
 manuscript. Additional proof of the authenticity of the papers was fur- 
 nished by the note-ljook, also found upon the person of Dahlgren, con- 
 taining a rough draft of the address to the troops, and various memoranda. 
 The address was written in pencil in the note-book, and differs very 
 slightly from the copy, containing, however, the injunction that the Con- 
 federate authorities be " killed on the spot." The statement of ^Ir. Hal- 
 bach, who is still living, supported by the testimony of a number of 
 persons, must be deemed conclusive of the genuineness of the documents 
 pu1)lished in the Richmond journals. 
 
 I Ion. Stephen R. ]\Iallory, late Confederate Secretary of the Xavy, has 
 recently made the following statement of Mr. Davis' course concerning 
 this matter: 
 
 "An expedition directed avowedly against the lives of the heads of the 
 
540 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 hypocritical " humanity " of the North^ with characteristic ef- 
 frontery were ridiculed as " rebel forgeries." 
 
 The Trans-Mississippi region was, in the early spring, the 
 scene of brilliant and important Confederate successes. About 
 the middle of March, the famous "Red River Expedition" of 
 General Banks, contemplating the complete subjugation of 
 Louisiana, and the occupation of Western Texas, was under- 
 taken. The result was, perhaps, the most ignominious flulure 
 of the war. Defeated by General Taylor, in a decisive en- 
 gagement at Mansfield, General Banks, with great difficulty, 
 effected his retreat down Red River, and abandoned the en- 
 terprise, which he had undertaken with such extravagant an- 
 ticipations of fame and wealth. 
 
 In the month of April, Forrest executed a brilliant cam- 
 paign among the Federal garrisons in Tennessee, capturing 
 
 Government, and aiming at firing an entire city, was deemed so violative 
 of the rules of vs^ar as to demand a retribution of death upon all con- 
 cerned in it. 
 
 "The subject was one of universal discussion in Richmond; excitement 
 increased with what it fed upon ; Congress participated in it ; and a pres- 
 sure was brought to bear upon Mr. Davis to order the execution of some 
 of the captured. 
 
 "He entertained no doubt that justice, humanity, and policy equally 
 forbade this cruel measure, and refused to sanction it; and at the same 
 time referred the subject to General Lee, then near Petersburg, for im- 
 mediate attention. The General's answer promptly came, asserting, 
 without having been apprized of them, the views already presented by 
 Mr. Davis; and the chief of which was, that the men, having surren- 
 dered with arms in their hands, and been accepted and treated as pris- 
 oners of war, could not, in retaliation for the unexecuted designs of their 
 leader, be treated otherwise. This disposed of the case, and satisfied the 
 people, who were ever ready to recognize the wisdom and policy of Gen- 
 eral Lee's judgment." 
 
CONFEDERATE SUCCESSES. 541 
 
 several thousand prisoners and adding large numbers of re- 
 cruits to his forces. With a force mainly organized within 
 three months, this dashing officer penetrated the interior of 
 Tennessee, which the enemy had already declared " con- 
 quered," capturing garrisons and stores, and concluded his 
 campaign by penetrating to the Mississippi River, and suc- 
 cessfully storming Fort Pillow.* The most encouraging event 
 of the spring was the capture of Plymouth, North Carolina, 
 by General Hoke. This enterprise, executed with great gal- 
 lantry and skill, had the tangible reward of a large number 
 of prisoners, many cannon, and an important position with 
 reference to the question of supplies.f 
 
 The aggregate of these Confederate successes was not incon- 
 siderable. Expectation was strengthened by them at the 
 South, and proportionately disappointed at the North. It 
 was chiefly in their influence upon public feeling that these 
 minor victories were valuable, as they in no way affected the 
 main current of the war, and were speedily overlooked at 
 the first sound of the mighty shock of arms along the Rapi- 
 dan and in Northern Georgia. Indeed, the actors in these 
 
 *Thc "Fort Pillow massacre " was a fruitful themo for new chapters 
 of " rebel barbarities." Forrest was charged with indiscriminate slaughter 
 of a captive garrison, when, in fact, he only continued to fight a garrison 
 which had not surrendered. After the Confederates had forced their way 
 into the fort, the flag was not taken down, nor did the garrison offer to 
 surrender. The explanation obviously was that the enemy relied upon 
 their gunboats in the river to destroy Forrest's forces after they had en- 
 tered the fort. 
 
 fin the last two years of the war, there were few more promising 
 officers than General Hoke. Mr. Davis thought very highly of his capac- 
 ity, and, upon one occasion, alluded to him as " that gallant North Caro- 
 linian, who alwaj's did his duty, and did it thoroughly." 
 
542 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 preliminary events were, in most instances, themselves shifted 
 to these two main theatres, upon which the concentrated 
 power of each contestant was preparing its most desperate 
 exertions. Troops on both sides were recalled from South 
 Carolina, and even Florida, to participate in the great wrestle 
 for the Confederate capital, and the impending struggle in 
 Georgia absorbed nearly all the forces hitherto operating west 
 of the Alleghanies and east of the Mississippi. 
 
 However discouraged may have been the public mind of the 
 North at the beginning of the year, the preparations of the 
 Federal Government, for the spring campaign, indicated no 
 abatement of energy or determination. Well aware of the di- 
 minished resources of the South, and of the political necessities 
 which imperatively demanded speedy and decisive successes, 
 the Federal administration prepared a more vigorous use of 
 its great means than had yet been attempted. The draft was 
 energetically enforced, and volunteering was stimulated by 
 high bounties. At no period of the Avar were the Federal 
 armies so numerous, so well equipped and provided with every 
 means that tends to make war successful. Their morale was 
 better than at the outset of any previous campaign. The 
 Federal armies were now inured to war, composed mainly of 
 seasoned veterans, and commanded by officers whose capacity 
 had been amply tested in battle. 
 
 The agents selected by the Federal Government, to carry out 
 its designs, were men whose previous career justified their se- 
 lection. The sagacity of the North had, at length, realized the 
 one essential object, to the accomplishment of which all its 
 efforts must contribute. This object was the destruction of 
 Lee's army. Virginia was justly declared the "backbone" of 
 Confederate power ; Lee's army was the pedestal of the edifice. 
 
GENERAL GRANT. 543 
 
 It was in the clearer appreciation of this object, and in the de- 
 termination to subordinate every concern of the war to its ac- 
 complishment, that Northern sentiment made a step forward, 
 that was, of itself, no insignificant auxiliary to ultimate suc- 
 cess. The blows which Sherman prepared to deliver upon the 
 distant fields of Georgia, were aimed at Lee's army, not less 
 than were those of Grant. While the latter " hammered away 
 continuously " in Virginia, to pulverize, as it were, the column 
 from which so many Federal endeavors had been forced to re- 
 coil, Sherman was expected to pierce the very centre of the 
 Confederacy, and seize or destroy every remaining source of 
 sustenance. 
 
 The presence in Virginia of the General commanding all the 
 Federal forces, was sufficiently indicative of his recognition of 
 the supreme object of the campaign. The successful career of 
 this officer was the recommendation which secured for him the 
 high position of Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the 
 Union. He was the most fortunate officer produced by the 
 war — fortunate not less in having won nearly every victory 
 which could promote the successful conclusion of the war, but 
 fortunate in having won victories where defeat was the result 
 to be logically expected. 
 
 It is not at all necessary to weigh, in detail, the merits of 
 General Grant as a soldier. With the overwhelming argument 
 of results in his favor, there would be little encouragement, 
 even if there could be strict justice, in denying superior ability 
 to Grant. His campaigns have contributed nothing to mili- 
 tary science, in its correct sense, and the military student will 
 find in his operations few incidents that illustrate the art or 
 economy of war. In discarding the formulas of the schools, and 
 condemning the theories upon which the best of his predeces- 
 
544 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 sors had conducted the war, Grant, by no means, proved that 
 he was not a good soldier. But his independence in this re- 
 spect did not establish his claim to genius, since his contempt 
 for military rules and theories was not followed by the display 
 of any original features of true generalship. His name was 
 coupled with a great disaster at Shiloh, where he was rescued 
 from absolute destruction by the energy of Buell, and the de- 
 lay of his adversary. At Donelson, at Vicksburg, and at 
 Missionary Ridge, he had succeeded by mere weight of num- 
 bers ; and, indeed, in no instance had he exhibited any other 
 quality of worth, than boldness and perseverance. But his 
 success was a sufficient recommendation to the material mind 
 of the N^orth, which did not once pause to consider how far 
 Grant's victories were due to his military merit. 
 
 But whatever the defects of Grant in the higher qualities of 
 generalship, he was preeminently the man for the present emer- 
 gency. If the Federal Government saw the necessity of vigor- 
 ous warfare, looking to speedy and final results, General Grant 
 knew how to conduct the campaign upon that idea, provided 
 the Government would give him unlimited means, and the 
 Northern people would consent to the unstinted sacrifice. 
 Grant knew no other than an aggressive system of warfare, 
 and contemplated no other method of destroying the Confeder- 
 acy, than by the momentum of superior weight — by heavy, 
 simultaneous and continuous blows. The plans of Grant were 
 remarkable for their simplicity, and contemplated merely the 
 employment of the maximum of force against the two main 
 armies of the Confederacy, keeping the entire force of the South 
 in constant and unrelieved strain. By "continuous hammer- 
 ing " he thus hoped eventually to destroy or exhaust it. 
 
 General Grant was again fortunate in having the unlimited 
 
HIS THEORY OF WAR. 545 
 
 confidence of his Government, which placed at his disposal a 
 million of soldiers, and was prepared to accede to his every 
 demand. To the most trusted of his lieutenants — Sherman — 
 Grant intrusted the conduct of operations against the centre 
 of the Confederacy, reserving for himself the control of the 
 campaign against Richmond, and Lee's army. His plan of 
 operation was to destroy, not to defeat, an army which he 
 knew could not be conquered, so long as its vitality remained. 
 The military talent of the North had been already exhausted 
 against Lee, and its largest army too often baffled by the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, to admit the hope of defeating 
 it in battle. To outgeneral Lee, Grant well knew required a 
 greater master of the art of war than himself. To conquer 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, he, not less than his army, 
 knew to be impossible. His calculation was to wear it out by 
 the "attrition" of successive and remorseless blows. This 
 theory was based upon the plain calculation that the North 
 could furnish a greater mass of humanity for the shambles, 
 (as was aftersvard calculated it could spare a greater mass 
 for the prisons,) than the South, and that thus w'hen the 
 latter should be exhausted, the former would still have left 
 abundant material for an army. Such was Grant's theory of 
 the war. Whatever may be thought of it as a military con- 
 ception, the theory was one that must succeed in the end, 
 provided the perseverance of the North should hold out. 
 
 General Grant determined upon a direct advance with the 
 Army of the Potomac against Richmond, by the overland 
 route from the Rapidan. The frame-work of his plan, how- 
 ever, embraced cooperating movements in other quarters, 
 which should, at the same time, occupy every man that 
 might be available for the reenforcement of Lee. Grant was 
 35 
 
546 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 embarrassed by no lack of the men who were needed to make 
 each one of these movements formidable. The most impor- 
 tant of these was that designed to occupy the southern com- 
 munications of Richmond, thus at once making the Confed- 
 erate capital untenable, and cutting off the retreat of Lee. 
 This operation was intrusted to General Butler, who, with 
 thirty thousand men, was to ascend ^Jamcs River, establish 
 himself in a fortified position near City Point, and invest 
 Richmond on its south side. The other auxiUary movements 
 were designed against the westward communications of Rich- 
 mond, and were to be undertaken by Generals Sigel and 
 Crook — the former, with seven thousand men, moving up the 
 Shenandoah Valley, and the latter, with ten thousand, moving 
 against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The force im- 
 mediately under General Grant was one hundred and forty 
 thousand men of all arms. Thus the grand aggregate of the 
 Federal armies now threatening Richmond reached the neigh- 
 borhood of one hundred and ninety thousand men. In addi- 
 tion to these was a force at Washington, equal in strength to 
 the whole of Lee's army. 
 
 The Federal Government was hardly less lavish in the dis- 
 tribution of its enormous resources to Sherman than to Grant. 
 Sherman had proven himself an officer of much enterprise. 
 Intellectually he was the superior of Grant, but not less than 
 other Federal commanders he relied upon superior numbers 
 to overcome the skill and valor of the Confederate armies. 
 Physical momentum was needed to overwhelm Johnston, and 
 was amply supplied. Sherman demanded one hundred thou- 
 sand men to capture Atlanta, and, by the consolidation of tlie 
 various armies which had hitherto operated independently in the 
 West, his force attained within a few hundreds of that number. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OPENS. 547 
 
 In painful contrast with this enormous outlay of forces, 
 "were the feeble means of the Confederacy. When the season 
 favorable for military o[)erations opened, General Lee con- 
 fronted Grant upon the Rupidan, and General Johnston faced 
 Sherman near Dalton, In Northern Georgia. Neither of these 
 armies reached fifty thousand men. The undaunted aspect and 
 mien of firm resistance, with which both awaited the perilous 
 onset of the enemy, were, however, assuring of the steady de- 
 termination which still defended the Confederacy. Critical as 
 was the emergency, the Government and the country yet be- 
 lieved the strength of these two armies equal to the great test 
 of endurance, at least beyond the perils of the present cam- 
 paign. To hold its own was the primary hope of the Confed- 
 eracy. If autumn could be reached without decisive victories 
 by the North, and the great Federal sacrifices of spring and 
 summer should then have proven In vain, there was ample 
 ground for hope of those dissensions among the enemy, which, 
 throughout the struggle, constituted so large a share of Con- 
 federate expectation. 
 
 On the 3d of ^lay,' 1864, General Grant Initiated the cam- 
 paign in Virginia, by crossing the Rapldan with his advanced 
 forces ; on the 5th, the correspondent movement of Sherman, a 
 thousand miles away, was begun. By the morning of the 5th, 
 one hundred thousand Federal soldiers were across the Rap- 
 ldan, and on the same day, the first round of the great wrestle 
 occurred. Entertaining no doubt of his capacity to destroy 
 Lee, Grant Imagined that his adversary would seek to escape. 
 Having, In advance, proclaimed his contempt for " maneuvres," 
 he was solicitous only for an opportunity to strike the Con- 
 federate army before It should elude his grasp. But Hooker 
 had made the same calculation a year before, and was dis- 
 
548 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 appointed, and a like disappointment was now in store for 
 Grant. 
 
 Lee had no power either to prevent the Federal crossing of 
 the Rapidan, nor to prevent the turning of his right. Instead 
 of retreating, he immediately assumed the aggressive, and 
 dealt the assailant one of the most effective blows ever aimed 
 by that powerful arm. Three days sufficed to reveal to the 
 Federal commander his miscalculations of his adversary's de- 
 signs, and, baffled in all his operations, he already indicated 
 distrust of his system of warfare, and was compelled to at- 
 tempt by " maneuvre," what he had failed to effect by brute 
 force. The events of the 5th and 6th of May clearly demon- 
 strated that strategy could not yet be dispensed with in war- 
 fare. Indeed, nothing but Lee's extreme weakness and the 
 untoward wounding of Longstreet, in just such a crisis, and 
 in exactly the same manner as marked the fall of Jackson, 
 prevented the defeat of the Federal campaign in its incipiency. 
 But for these circumstances the Federal Agamemnon would 
 have been completely unhorsed on the 6th of May, and would 
 have added another name to the list of decapitated command- 
 ers whom Lee had successively brought to grief. But the luck 
 of Grant did not forsake him, and he still had numbers suf- 
 ficient to attempt the " hammering " process again. Grant's 
 first attempt at "maneuvre" was a movement upon Spottsyl- 
 vania Court-house, a point south-east of the late battle-fields, 
 by which he sought to throw his army between Lee and Rich- 
 mond. Again he was to be disappointed, and again did the 
 Confederate commander prove himself the master of his antag- 
 onist, in every thing that constitutes generalship. The Confed- 
 erate forces were already at Spottsylvania, when the Federal 
 column reached the neighborhood, and Lee, so cautious in his 
 
Sheridan's raid, 549 
 
 words, announced to his Government that the enemy had been 
 "repulsed with heavy slaughter." 
 
 But Lee had done fur more than foil Grant. He had se- 
 cured an impregnable position upon the Spottsylvania heights, 
 against which Grant remorselessly, but vainly, dashed his 
 huge columns for twelve days. At the end of that period Lee's 
 lines were still intact, his mien of resistance still preserved, 
 and the "hammering" generalship of Grant had cost the North 
 nearly fifty thousand veteran soldiers. Men already began to 
 ask the question, to which history will find a ready answer: 
 " What would be the result if the resources of the two commanders 
 were reversed?" Not even the North could fail to see how 
 entirely barren of advantage was all this horrible slaughter. 
 The "shambles of the Wilderness" became the popular phrase 
 descriptive of Grant's operations, and the Northern public was 
 rapidly reaching the conclusion that the " hammer would itself 
 break on the anvil." 
 
 While the dead-lock at Spottsylvania continued, and Lee 
 held Grant at bay, Richmond was seriously threatened by co- 
 operating movements of the enemy. General Grant had, or- 
 ganized a powerful cavalry force under Sheridan, for operations 
 against the Confederate communications. Sheridan struck out 
 boldly in the direction of Richmond, followed closely by the 
 Confederate cavalry. For several days he hovered in the 
 neighborhood of the city, unable to penetrate the line of 
 fortifications, and eventually retired in the direction of James 
 River. 
 
 A melancholy incident of this raid of Sheridan was the death, 
 in an engagement near Richmond, of General J. E. B. Stuart, 
 the renowned cavalry leader of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 This was a severe bereavement to the South, and a serious 
 
550 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 loss to the army. Stuart's exploits fill a brilliairt chapter of 
 the war in Virginia, and he was probably the ablest cavalry 
 chieftain in the Confederate army. President Davis, who was 
 constantly on the field during the presence of Sheridan near 
 Richmond, deeply deplored the loss of Stuart. The President, 
 not less than General Lee, reposed great confidence in Stuart's 
 capacity for cavalry command, and the noble character and 
 gallant bearing of Stuart enlisted the warm personal regard of 
 Mr. Davis — a feeling which was heartily reciprocated. Upon 
 the day of his death, Mr. Davis visited the bedside of the dy- 
 ing chief, and remained with him some time. In reply to the 
 question of Mr. Davis, " General, how do you feel ? " Stuart 
 replied : " Easy, but willing to die, if God and my country 
 think I have fulfilled my destiny and done my duty." 
 
 The important correspondent movement of Butler upon the 
 south side of James River, began early in May. Ascending 
 the river with numerous transports, Butler landed at Bermuda 
 Hundreds, and advanced against the southern communications 
 of Richmond. The force near the city was altogether inade- 
 quate to check the army of Butler, and almost without opposi- 
 tion he laid hold of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and 
 advanced within a few miles of Drewry's Bluff, the fortifica- 
 tions of which commanded the passage of the river to the Con- 
 federate capital. Troops were rapidly thrown forward from 
 the South, and by the 14th May, General Beauregard had 
 reached the neighborliood of Richmond, from Charleston. 
 
 Probably at no previous moment of the war was Richmond 
 so seriously threatened, as pending the arrival of Beauregard's 
 forces. Mr. Davis Nvas, however, resolved to hold the city to 
 the last extremity. Though much indisposed at the time, he 
 was every morning to be seen, accompanied by his staff, riding 
 
Beauregard's plan. 551 
 
 in the direction of the military lines. Siipcrintencling, to a 
 large extent, the disposition of the small force defending the 
 city, he was fully aware of the extreme peril of the situation, 
 but nevertheless determined to share the dangers of the hour. 
 When Beauregard reached the scene the crisis had by no means 
 passed. Unless Butler should be dislodged, not only was Rich- 
 mond untenable, but it was impossible to maintain Lee's army 
 north of James River. Yet the force available seemed very 
 inadequate to any thing like a decisive defeat of the enemy. 
 The aggregate of commands from the Carolinas, added to the 
 force previously at Richmond, did not exceed fifteen thousand 
 men, while Butler, with thirty thousand, held a strongly in- 
 trenched position. 
 
 Immediately upon his arrival, General Beauregard suggested 
 a plan of operations, by which he hoped to destroy Butler, and, 
 without pausing, to inflict a decisive defeat upon Grant. The 
 plan he proposed was that Lee should fall back to the defensive 
 lines of the Chickahominy, even to the intermediate lines of 
 Richmond, temporarily sending fifteen thousand men to the 
 south side of the James, and with this accession of force he pro- 
 posed to take the offensive against Butler. Pointing out the 
 isolated situation of Butler, he urged the opportunity for his 
 destruction by the concentration of a superior force. Under 
 the circumstances General Beauregard thought the capture of 
 Butler's force inevitable, and the occupation of iiis depot of 
 supplies at Bermuda Hundreds a necessary consequence. When 
 these results should be accomplished, he proposed, at a con- 
 certed moment, to throw his whole force upon Grant's flank, 
 while Lee attacked in front. General Beauregard was confi- 
 dent of his ability to make the attack upon Butler, in two days 
 after receiving the desired reenforcements, and was equally con- 
 
552 LIFE OF JEFFEESOX DAVIS. 
 
 fident of the result both against Butler and Grant. His prop- 
 osition concluded with the declaration that Grant's fate could 
 not be doubtful if the proposed concentration should be made, 
 and indicated the following gratifying results: "The destruc- 
 tion of Grant's forces would open the way for the recovery of 
 most of our lost territory." 
 
 Whatever his views as to its feasibility, the President could 
 not refuse a careful consideration of a plan, whose author, in 
 advance, claimed such momentous results. Upon reflection 
 President Davis declined the plan as involving too great a 
 risk, not only of the safety of Richmond, but of the very exist- 
 ence of Lee's army. The proposition of Beauregard was sub- 
 mitted on the 14th ISIay. At that time the grapple between 
 Grant and Lee was still unrelaxed. Twelve days of battle had 
 cost Lee fifteen thousand men. Meanwhile he had not received 
 a single additional mushd, while Grant had nearly supplied his 
 losses by reenforcements from Washington. Thus, while Lee's 
 force did not reach forty thousand. Grant's still approximated 
 one hundred and thirty thousand. The President also knew 
 that Grant was at that moment closely pressing Lee, moving 
 toward his left, and seeking either to overlap or break in upon 
 the right flank of Lee. 
 
 The proposed detachment of fifteen thousand men from Lee, 
 leaving him not more than twenty-five thousand, in such a 
 crisis, would have been simply madness. Butler, it is possible, 
 might have been destroyed, but the end of the Confederacy 
 would have been hastened twelve months. It is questionable 
 whether, at any moment after Grant crossed the Rapidan, the 
 overmatched army of Lee could have been diminished without 
 fatal disaster. The timely arrival of Longstreet had prevented 
 a serious reverse on the 6th May. Is it reasonable to su^jpose 
 
MR. DA vis' views. 553 
 
 that Lee could have detached one-third of his army, without 
 Grant's knowledge, or that the energy of the Federal com- 
 mander would have permitted an hour's respite to his sorely- 
 pressed adversary after the discovery? The case would have 
 been altogether different, had Lee been already safe within his 
 works at Richmond. Under the circumstances proposed, he 
 had before him a perilous retrograde, followed by a force four 
 times his own strength, and commanded by the most unrelent- 
 ing and persistent of officers. 
 
 But there was another view of the proposition not to be 
 overlooked by the President in his perilous responsibility. It 
 is true Beauregard promised grand results — nothing less than 
 the total destruction of nearly all the Federal forces in Vir- 
 ginia. In brief, his plan proposed to destroy two hundred 
 thousand men with less than sixty thousand. Again it was 
 true the enemy was to be destroyed in detail — Butler first, 
 and Grant afterwards. There were precedents in history for 
 such achievements. But it should be remembered that if But- 
 ler should be immediately destroyed, and if Lee should be 
 guaranteed a safe retrograde, Beauregard would still be able 
 to aid Lee to the extent of but little more than twenty thou- 
 sand men. This would give Lee less than fifty thousand with 
 which to take the offensive against more than twice that num- 
 ber. Against just such odds Lee had already tried the offen- 
 sive, and failed because of his weakness. He had assailed 
 Grant under the most favorable circumstances, effecting a 
 complete surprise when the Federal commander believed him 
 already retreating, but was unable to follow up his advantage. 
 Was there reason to believe that any better result would follow 
 from a repetition of the off'ensive? 
 
 Believing himself not justified in hazarding the safety of 
 
554 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 the Confederacy upon such a train of doubtful conditions, and 
 asreeino: with General Beauregard, that Butler could be dis- 
 lodged from his advanced positions, so menacing to Kichmond, 
 Mr, Davis rejected a plan which, under different circumstances, 
 he would have heartily and confidently adopted. 
 
 With remarkable promptitude, Beauregard conceived a bril- 
 liant plan of battle, and within twenty-four hours had already 
 put it in virtual execution. With fifteen thousand men, he 
 drove Butler from all his advanced works, and confined him 
 securely in the cul de sac of Bermuda Hundreds, where, in a 
 few months, ended the inglorious military career of a man 
 who, in every possible manner, dishonored the sword M^iich 
 he wore, and disgraced the Government which he served. The 
 brilliant conception of Beauregard merited even better results, 
 which were prevented not less by untoward circumstances than 
 by the weakness of his command. 
 
 While Beauregard thus effectually neutralized Butler, Grant's 
 combinations, elsewhere, were brought to signal discomfiture. 
 The expedition from the Kanawha Valley had been, in a meas- 
 ure, successful in its designs against the communications of 
 South-western Virginia, but did not obtain the cooperation de- 
 signed, by the column moving up the Shenandoah Valley. Si- 
 gel, in his advance up the Valley, was encountered at New- 
 market by General Breckinridge, who signally defeated him, 
 capturing artillery and stores, and inflicting a heavy loss upon 
 the enemy. Sigel retreated hastily down the Valley. 
 
 General Grant, on the 11th of ^lay, proclaimed to his Gov- 
 ernment his purpose " to fight it out on this line if it takes 
 all summer," yet, within a week afterwards, he was already 
 meditating another plan of operations. Forty thousand of the 
 bravest soldiers of the Federal army had been vainly sacrificed, 
 
geant's failures. 555 
 
 and yet the Confederate line remained intact upon the impreg- 
 nable hills of Spottsylvania. A week was consumed in fruitless 
 search for a weak point in the breastplate of Lee. Grant was 
 again driven to " maneuvre." Foiled again and again by the 
 great exemplar of* strategy, with whom he contended, Grant at 
 no point turned his face towards Richmond without finding Lee 
 across his path. Moving constantly to the left, the 3d of June 
 — exactly one month from the crossing of the Rapidan — found 
 Grant near the Chickahominy, and Lee still facing him. The 
 fortune of war again brought the belligerents upon the old 
 battle-ground of the Peninsula. Just before Lee reached the 
 defenses of Richmond, for the first time during the campaign, 
 he received reenforcements.* Grant also was strengthened, draw- 
 ing sixteen thousand men from Butler at Bermuda Hundreds. 
 On the 3d of June occurred the second battle of Cold Har- 
 bor. It was the last experiment of the strictly "hammering" 
 system, unaided by the resources of strategy. It cost Grant 
 thirteen thousand men, and Lee a few hundred. Such was 
 a fitting finale of a campaign avowedly undertaken upon the 
 brutal principle of the mere consumption of life, and in con- 
 tempt of every sound military precept. Cold Harbor termi- 
 nated the overland movement of Grant, and he speedily aban- 
 doned the line upon which he had proposed " to fight all 
 summer." Not that he willingly abandoned his "hammering" 
 principle after this additional sacrifice of lives, for he would 
 still have dashed his army against the impregnable wall in 
 
 * At Hanover Junction, on the 23d of IMay, General Lee was joined by 
 Breckinridge's division, numbering less than three thousand muskets, and 
 by Pickett's division of perhaps three thousand five hundred muskets. 
 General Lee was compelled, very shortly afterwards, to send Breckin- 
 ridge's division back to the Valley. 
 
656 LIFE OF JliJFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 his front, but his men recoiled, in the consciousness of an 
 impotent endeavor. They had done all that troops could ac- 
 complish, and shrank from that which their own experience 
 told them was impossible. And there should be no wonder 
 that the Federal army was reluctant to be vdinly led to slaugh- 
 ter again. For forty days its proven mettle had been subjected 
 to a cruel test, such as even Napoleon, reckless of his men's 
 lives as he was, had never imposed upon an army. It is safe to 
 say that no troops but Americans could have been held so long 
 to such an enterprise as that attempted by Grant in May, 1864, 
 and none but Americans could have withstood such desperate 
 assaults as were sustained by Lee's army. 
 
 In one month, from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, 
 more than sixty thousand of the flower of the Federal army 
 had been put hors du combat, and many of the best of its 
 officers, men identified with its whole history, M^ere lost for- 
 ever. In one month Lee had inflicted a loss greater than the 
 whole of the force which he commanded during the last year 
 of the war ! Yet this was the " generalship " of Grant, for 
 which a meeting of twenty-five thousand men in New York 
 returned the " thanks of the nation." The world was invited, 
 by the sensational press of the North, to admire the " strategy " 
 which had carried the Federal army from the Rapidan to the 
 James, a position which it might have reached by transports 
 without the loss of a man. 
 
 For a brief season, hope, positive and well-defined, dawned 
 upon the South. Thus far the problem of endurance was in 
 favor of the Confederacy. Grant's stupendous combinations 
 against Richmond had broken down. The spirit of the North 
 seemed to be yielding, and again the Federal Government en- 
 countered the danger of a collapse of the war. 
 
GRANT CROSSES THE JAMES. 557 
 
 The battle of Cold Harbor convinced General Grant of the 
 futility of operations against Richmond from the north side of 
 James River. He therefore determined to transfer liis army 
 to the south side of the river, and seek to possess himself of 
 the communications southward, and to employ cooperative 
 forces to destroy or occupy the communications of Richmond 
 with Lynchburg and the Shenandoah Valley. This involved 
 new combinations, and Grant still had abundant means to 
 execute them. If successful, this plan would completely 
 isolate Richmond, leaving no avenue of supplies except by 
 the James River Canal, which also would be easily access- 
 ible. 
 
 Lee could not prevent the transfer of Grant's army to the 
 south side. Petersburg and Richmond were both to be de- 
 fended, and his strength was too limited to be divided. Grant 
 made a vigorous dash against Petersburg. He had anticipated 
 an easy capture of that city by a coup de main, but in this he 
 was disappointed. Petersburg was found to be well fortified, 
 and the desperate assaults made by the Federal advanced forces 
 were repulsed. In a few days Lee's army again confronted 
 Grant, and Richmond and Petersburg were safe. 
 
 Thus the system of rushing men upon fortifications failed 
 on the south side not less signally than in the overland cam- 
 paign. The Federal commander had no alternative but a 
 formal siege of Petersburg. Driven by circumstances beyond 
 his control, General Grant thus assumed a position which, in 
 the end, proved fatal to the Confederacy, and the results of 
 M-hich hi^ve exalted him, in the view of millions, to rank 
 among the illustrious generals of history. The south side of 
 James River was always the real key to the possession of 
 Richmond. Sooner or later the Confederate capital must fall, 
 
558 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 if assailed from that direction with pertinacity, and with such 
 ample means as were given to Grant. 
 
 The new Federal combination was in process of execution 
 by the middle of June. After the defeat of Sigel, a large 
 force was organized in the lower valley, and intrusted to the 
 direction of General Hunter, an officer distinguished by fanat- 
 ical zeal against the section of which he was a native, and by 
 the peculiar cruelty of a renegade. Breckinridge had been 
 withdrawn from the Valley, to Lee's lines, immediately after 
 his defeat of Sigel, and Hunter without difficulty overwhelmed 
 the small force left under General Jones. Forming a junction 
 with Crook and Averill from North-western Virginia, at 
 Staunton, Hunter advanced upon Lynchburg, meanwhile 
 destroying public and private property indiscriminately, and 
 practicing a system of incendiarism and petty oppression 
 against which even Federal officers protested. 
 
 It was necessary to detach a portion of the army from the 
 lines of Richmond to check the demonstration of Hunter. 
 Accordingly, General Early, who had acquired great reputa- 
 tion in the battles upon the E,apidan, was sent with eight 
 thousand men to the Valley, Uniting his forces to those 
 already on the ground. General E-.irly made a vigorous pursuit 
 of Hunter, whose flight was as dastardly as his conduct had 
 been despicable. Retreating with great precipitation through 
 the mountains of Western Virginia, Hunter's force, for several 
 weeks, bore no relation to operations in Virginia. With the 
 Shenandoah Valley thus denuded of invaders. Early rapidly 
 executed a movement of his forces down the Valley^ with a 
 view to a demonstration beyond the Potomac frontier, which 
 was entirely uncovered by Hunter's retreat. The movement 
 of Early into Maryland caused, as was anticipated, a detach- 
 
grant's campaign a failuPwE. 659 
 
 ment from Grant's forces, for the defense of tlie Federal 
 capital. Advancing with extraordinary vigor, General Early 
 pursued the retreating enemy, defeating them in an engage- 
 ment near Frederick City, and arrived near AVashington on 
 the 10th of July. "Warned of the approach of heavy reenforce- 
 ments from Grant, which must arrive before the works could 
 be carried, Early abandoned his design of an attack upon 
 "Washington, and retired across the Potomac, with his exten- 
 sive and valuable captures. 
 
 Signal failure attended the cavalry expeditions sent by Grant 
 against the railroads. Sheridan, while moving northward 
 against Gordonsville and Charlottesville, from which points, 
 after inflicting all possible damage upon the railroads to Rich- 
 mond, he was to join Hunter at Lynchburg, was intercepted 
 by Wade Hampton, the worthy successor of Stuart, and com- 
 pelled to abandon his part of the campaign. An extended 
 raid, under "Wilson and Kautz, on the south side, also ter- 
 minated in disaster. The expedition of Burbridge against 
 South-western Virginia was baffled by a counter-movement 
 of ISIorgan with his cavalry, into Kentucky, the Federal forces 
 following him into that State. 
 
 Thus again were all of General Grant's plans disappointed, 
 and by midsummer the situation in "Virginia was altogether 
 favorable to the Confederacy. There was indeed good reason 
 for the evident apprehension of the Xorth, that, after all, 
 Grant's mighty campaign was a failure. His mere proximity 
 to the Confederate capital signified nothing. All his attempts 
 against both Petersburg and Richmond, whether by strategy 
 or coups de main, had ended in disaster; the Confederate lines 
 were pronounced impregnable by the ablest Federal engineers, 
 and after the ridiculous fiasco of " Burnside's mine," the cap- 
 
660 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ture of Richmond seemed as remote as ever. To increase 
 public alarm at the North, was added the activity of Lee, Jiis 
 evident confidence in his ability to hold his own, with a di- 
 minished force, and even to threaten the enemy with invasion. 
 
 The Confederate Government, fully apprized of the mo- 
 mentous results, with which the present year was pregnant, 
 and of the increased peril which assailed the Confederacy, in 
 consequence of its diminished resources, depended upon other 
 influences, than an exhibition of military strength, to promote 
 its designs. The cause of the South could no longer be sub- 
 mitted, unaided, to the arbitrament of battle. At other peri- 
 ods, while freely avowing his desire for peace, and offering 
 to the Federal authorities, opportunity for negotiation, Presi- 
 dent Davis had relied almost solely upon the sword, as the 
 agency of Southern independence. The opening of the spring 
 campaign of 1864 was deemed a favorable conjuncture for the 
 employment of the resources of diplomacy. To approach the 
 Federal Government directly would be in vain. Repeated ef- 
 forts had already demonstrated its inflexible purpose not to 
 negotiate with the Confederate authorities. Political develop- 
 ments at the North, however, favored the adoption of some 
 action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile 
 section. The aspect of the peace party was especially encour- 
 aging, and it was evident that the real issue to be decided in 
 the Presidential election, was the continuance or cessation of 
 the war. 
 
 A commission of three gentlemen, eminent in position and 
 intelligence, was accordingly appointed by Mr. Davis to visit 
 Canada, with a view to negotiation with such persons in the 
 North, as might be relied upon, to facilitate the attainment 
 of peace. This commission was designed to facilitate such 
 
ATTEMl'S AT NEGOTIATION. 561 
 
 preliminary conditions, as might lead to formal negotiation 
 between the two governments, and their intelligence was fully 
 relied upon to make judicious use of any political opportuni- 
 ti^es that might be presented in the progress of military opera- 
 tions 
 
 The Confederate commissioners, Messrs. -Clay, of Alabama, 
 Holcombe, of Virginia, and Thompson, of Mississippi, sailed 
 from Wilmington at the incipiency of the campaign on the 
 Rapidan. Within a few weeks thereafter they were upon the 
 Canada frontier, in the execution of their mission. A cor- 
 respondence with Horace Greeley commenced on the 12th of 
 July. Through Mr. Greeley the commissioners sought a safe 
 conduct to the Federal capital. For a few days Mr. Lincoln 
 appeared to favor an interview with the commissioners, but 
 finally rejected their application, on the ground that they 
 were not authorized to treat for peace. In his final communi- 
 cation, addressed "To whom it may concern," Mr. Lincoln 
 ofiered safe conduct to any person or persons having authority 
 to control the armies then at war with the United States, and 
 authorized to treat upon the following basis of negotiation : 
 " the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and 
 the abandonment of slavery.'^ 
 
 Upon this basis, negotiation was, of course, precluded, and 
 peace impossible. Mr. Lincoln was perfectly aware that the 
 commissioners had no control of the Confederate armies, and 
 that the Confederate Government alone was empowered to 
 negotiate. He therefore did not expect the acceptance of his 
 passport, and added to the mockery an arrogant statement, in 
 advance, of the conditions upon which he would consent to 
 treat. Even if the commissioners had been empowered to 
 treat, Mr, Lincoln's terms dictated the surrender of every 
 .36 
 
562 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAA'IS. 
 
 thing for which the South was fighting, and more than the 
 North professed to demand at the outset. Abolition was now 
 added to the conditions of re-admission to the Union. Mr. 
 Lincoln's proposition was a cruel mockery, an unworthy insult 
 to the manhood of a people, whom his armies, at least, had 
 learned to respect. 
 
GENERAL JOHNSTON. 5G3 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 DISAPPOINTMENT AT RESULTS OF THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN — HOW PAR IT WAS 
 PARALLEL WITH THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN — DIFFERENT TACTICS ON BOTH 
 SIDES — REMOVAL OF GENERAL JOHNSTON — THE EXPLANATION OF THAT 
 STEP — A QUESTION FOR MILITARY JUDGMENT — THE NEGATIVE VINDICATION 
 OF GENERAL JOHNSTON — DIFFERENT THEORIES OF WAR — THE REAL PHILOS- 
 OPHY OF THE SOUTHERN FAILURE — THE ODDS IN NUMBERS AND RESOURCES 
 AGAINST THE SOUTH — WATER FACILITIES OP THE ENEMY — STRATEGIC DIFFI- 
 CULTIES OF THE SOUTH — THE BLOCKADE — INSIGNIFICANCE OF MINOR QUES- 
 TIONS — JEFFERSON DAVIS THE WASHINGTON OF THE SOUTH GENERAL JOHN 
 
 B. HOOD — HIS DISTINGUISHED CAREER — HOPE OF THE SOUTH RENEWED — 
 
 hood's OPERATIONS — LOSS OF ATLANTA — IMPORTANT QUESTIONS PRESIDENT 
 
 DAVIS IN GEORGIA — PERVERSE CONDUCT OF GOVERNOR BROWN — MR. DAVIS 
 IN MACON — AT HOOD's HEAD-QUARTERS — HOW HOOd's TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN 
 VARIED FROM MR. DAVIs' INTENTIONS — SHERMAN's PROMPT AND BOLD CON- 
 DUCT — hood's MAGNANIMOUS ACKNOWLEDGMENT — DESTRUCTION OF THE CON- 
 FEDERATE POWER IN THE SOUTH-WEST. 
 
 /^ ENERAL JOHNSTON had failed to realize either the 
 ^^ expectations of the public, or the hope of the Govern- 
 ment, in his direction of the campaign in Georgia. His tac- 
 tics were those uniformly illustrated by this officer in all his 
 operations, of falling back before the enemy, and seeking to 
 obviate the disadvantage of inferior numbers by partial en- 
 gagements in positions favorable to himself There was, in- 
 deed, some parallel between his campaign and that of Lee, 
 between the Rapidan and James, but the results in Virginia 
 and Georgia were altogether disproportionate. The advance 
 of Sherman was slow and cautious, but nevertheless steady; 
 
564 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 and when the campaign had lasted seventy days, he was be- 
 fore Atlanta, the objective point of his designs, and in secure 
 occupation of an extensive and important section of country, 
 heretofore inaccessible to the Federal armies. Not only were 
 Sherman's losses small, as compared with those of Grant, but 
 his force was relatively much weaker. 
 
 There can be no just comparison of these two campaigns, 
 either as illustrating the same system of tactics, or as yielding 
 the same results. The aggregate of Federal forces in Georgia 
 did not exceed, at the beginning of the campaign, one hun- 
 dred thousand men, if indeed it reached that figure. To 
 oppose this, Johnston had forty-five thousand. We have al- 
 ready stated the aggregate of Federal forces in Virginia to 
 have been at least four times the force that, under any cir- 
 cumstances, Lee could have made available. The public did 
 not interpret as retreats, the parallel movements by which Lee 
 successively threw himself in the front of Grant, wherever the 
 latter made a demonstration. Not once had Lee turned his 
 back upon the enemy, nor abandoned a position, save when 
 the baffled foe, after enormous losses, sought a new field of 
 operations. At its conclusion, Grant had sustained losses in 
 excess of the whole of Lee's army, abandoned altogether his 
 original design, and sought a base of operations, which he 
 might have reached in the beginning, not only without loss, 
 but without even opposition. 
 
 Some explanation of the widely disproportionate results 
 achieved in Virginia and Georgia, is to be found in the dif- 
 ferent tactics of the Federal commanders. Sherman, whose 
 nature is thoroughly aggressive, yet developed great skill and 
 caution. Instead of fruitlessly dashing his army against for- 
 tifications, upon ground of the enemy's choosing, he treated 
 
JOHNSTON CENSURED. 565 
 
 the positions of Johnston as fortresses, from which his antag- 
 onist was to be flanked. 
 
 But while this explanation was appreciated, the public was 
 much disposed to accept the two camjjaigns as illustrations of 
 the different systems of tactics accredited to the two Confed- 
 erate commanders. It was seen that in Virginia the enemy 
 occupied no new territory, and, at the end of three months, 
 was upon ground which he might easily have occupied at 
 the beginning of the campaign, but to reach which, by the 
 means selected, had cost him nearly eighty thousand men.* 
 In Georgia, on the other hand, Sherman had advanced one 
 hundred miles upon soil heretofore firmly held by the Con- 
 federacy, and without a general engagement of the oppos- 
 ing forces. In Virginia, the enemy had no difficulty as to 
 his transportation, and the farther Grant advanced towards 
 James River, the more secure and abundant became his means 
 of supply. In Georgia, Sherman drew his supplies over miles 
 of hostile territory, and was nowhere aided by the proximity 
 of navigable streams. 
 
 When in a censorious mood, the popular mind is not over- 
 careful of the aptness of the parallels and analogies, wherewith 
 to justify its carping judgments. Without denying his skill, 
 or questioning his possession of the higher qualities of gener- 
 alship, people complained that " Johnston was a retreating 
 general." Whatever judgment may have arisen from subse- 
 quent events, it can not be fairly denied that when Johnston 
 
 * This estimate includes Grant's losses in his assaults upon the fortifi- 
 cations of Petersburg, immediately after his passage of the James River 
 I have seen his total losses from the Rapidan, until the siege of Peters- 
 burg was regularly begun, estimated by Northern writers, at over ninety 
 thousand. 
 
566 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 reached Atlanta, there was a very perceptible loss of popular 
 confidence, not less in the issue of the campaign than in Gen- 
 eral Johnston himself. It was in deference to popular senti- 
 ment, as much as in accordance with his views of the necessity 
 of the military situation, that President Davis, about the 
 middle of July, relieved General Johnston from command. 
 Sympathizing largely with the popular aspiration for a more 
 bold, ample, and comprehensive policy, and appreciating the 
 value of unlimited public confidence, Mr. Davis had lost much 
 of his hope of those decisive results, which he believed the 
 Western army competent to achieve. 
 
 The dispatch relieving General Johnston was as follows : 
 
 "Richmond, Va., July 17, 1864. 
 
 'To General J. E. Johnston: 
 
 " Lieutenaut-General J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the 
 temporary rank of General, under the law of Congress. I am 
 directed by the Secretary of War to inform you, that as you have 
 failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of At- 
 lanta, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, 
 you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and De- 
 partment of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to 
 
 General Hood. 
 
 "S. COOPER, 
 
 "Adjutant and Inspector-General." 
 
 This order sufficiently explains the immediate motive of 
 Johnston's removal, but there was a train of circumstances 
 which, at length, brought the President reluctantly to this 
 conclusion. The progress of events in Georgia, from the be- 
 ginning of spring, had developed a marked difference in the 
 views of General Johnston and the President. Early in the 
 year "Mv. Davis had warmly approved an offensive campaign 
 
THE GEORGIA CAMPAIGN. 567 
 
 against the Federal army, while its various wings were not 
 yet united. The Federal force, then in the neighborhood of 
 Dalton, did not greatly exceed the Confederate strength, and 
 Mr. Davis, foreseeing the concentration of forces for the cap- 
 ture of Atlanta, believed the opportunity for a decisive stroke 
 to exist before this concentration should ensue. General Hood 
 likewise favored this view of the situation. He urged that 
 the enemy would certainly concentrate forces to such an ex- 
 tent, if permitted, as would gradually force the Southern army 
 back into the interior, where a defeat would be irreparable, 
 with no new defensive line, and without the hope of rallying 
 either the army or the people. General Johnston opposed 
 these views, on the ground that the enemy, if defeated, had 
 strong positions where they could take refuge, while a defeat 
 of the Confederate force would be fatal. This diiference of 
 opinion is to be appropriately decided only by military criti- 
 cism, but it can not be fairly adjudged that an offensive in 
 the spring would not have succeeded, because it failed in the 
 following autumn. Circumstances were altogether different. 
 
 General Johnston's operations between Dalton and Atlanta 
 were unsatisfactory to Mr, Davis. Here again arises a mili- 
 tary question, which we shall not seek to decide, in the evi- 
 dent difference as to the capacity of the Army of Tennessee, 
 for any other than purely defensive operations. It was, in- 
 deed, not so much an opposition on the part of the President, 
 to Johnston's operations, as the apprehension of a want of 
 ultimate aim in his movements. "Whatever the plans of Gen- 
 eral Johnston may have been, they were not communicated to 
 Mr. Davis, at least in such a shape as to indicate the hope of 
 early and decisive execution. Alarmed for the results of a 
 policy having seemingly the characteristics of drifting, of wait- 
 
568 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ing upon events, and of hoping for, instead of creating oppor- 
 tunity, Mr. Davis yet felt the necessity of giving General 
 Johnston an ample trial. During all this period strong influ- 
 ences were brought to bear against Johnston, and upon the 
 other hand, he was warmly sustained by influences friendly 
 both to himself and the President. 
 
 For weeks the President was importuned by these conflict- 
 ing counsels, the natural effect of which was to aggravate his 
 grave doubts as to the existence of any matured ultimate ob- 
 ject in General Johnston's movements. Upon one occasion, 
 while still anxiously deliberating the subject, an eminent poli- 
 tician, a thorough patriot, a supporter of Mr. Davis, and 
 having to an unlimited extent his confidence, called at the 
 office of the President, with a view to explain the situation 
 in Georgia, whence he had just arrived. This gentleman had 
 been with the army, knew its condition, its enthusiasm and 
 confidence. He was confident that General Johnston would 
 destroy Sherman, and did not believe that the Federal army 
 would ever be permitted to reach even the neighborhood of 
 Atlanta. Mr. Davis, having quietly heard this explanation, 
 replied by handing to his visitor a dispatch just received from 
 Johnston, and dated at Atlanta. The army had already 
 reached Atlanta, before the gentleman could reach Richmond, 
 and he acknowledged himself equally amazed and disap- 
 pointed. 
 
 Despite his doubts and apprehensions, however, Mr. Davis 
 resisted the applications of members of Congress and leading 
 politicians from the section in which General Johnston was 
 operating, for a change of commanders, until he felt himself 
 no longer justified in hazarding the loss of Atlanta without a 
 struggle. There appeared little ground for the belief that 
 
JOHNSTON RELIEVED. 5G9 
 
 Johnston would hold Atlanta, nor did there appear any reason 
 why his arrival there should occasion a dej^arture from his 
 previous retrograde policy. Of the purpose of General John- 
 ston to evacuate Atlanta the President felt that he had abun- 
 dant evidence. Not until he felt fully satisfied upon this 
 point, was the removal of that officer determined upon. In- 
 deed, .the order removing Johnston sets forth as its justifica- 
 tion, that he had expressed no confidence in his ability to 
 " repel the enemy." If Atlanta should be surrendered, where 
 would General Johnston expect to give battle?* 
 
 Subsequently to his removal, General Johnston avowed that 
 his purpose was to hold Atlanta; and, therefore, we are not at 
 liberty to question his purpose. But this does not alter the 
 
 *Pi-esident Davis regarded the security of Atlanta as an object of the 
 utmost consequence, for which, if necessary, even great hazards must be 
 run. His frequent declaration was that the Confederacy '■'■had no vital 
 points." This theory was correct, as there was certainly no one point, 
 the loss of which necessarily involved the loss of the cause. Yet it was . 
 obvious in the beginning that certain sections, either for strategic reasons, 
 or as sources of supply, were of vast importance for the prosecution of 
 the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The value of Richmond 
 and Virginia was obvious. Equally important was a secure foothold in the 
 Mississippi Valley, and the possession of the great mountainous range 
 from Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the "backbone region" of the South. 
 Mr. Davis regarded each one of these three objects as justifying almost 
 any hazard or sacrifice. Under no circumstances could he approve a 
 military policy which contemplated the surrender of either of these ob- 
 jects, without a desperate struggle. He had wanted Vicksburg defended 
 to the last extremity, and now desired equal tenacity as to Atlanta. This 
 city was a great manufacturing centre ; the centre of the system of rail- 
 roads diverging in all directions through the Gulf States, and it was the 
 last remaining outpost in the defense of the central section of the Con- 
 federacy. 
 
570 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 legitimate inference drawn by Mr. Davis at the time of his 
 removal. Can it be believed that the President would have 
 taken that step, if satisfied of Johnston's purpose to deliver 
 battle for Atlanta? 
 
 This entire subject belongs appropriately only to military 
 discussion, and no decision from other sources can possibly 
 affect the ultimate sentence of that tribunal. Yet the most se- 
 rious disparagement of Mr. Davis, by civilian writers, has been 
 based upon the removal of Johnston from the command of the 
 Western army. Granting that General Johnston would have 
 sought to hold Atlanta, can it be believed that the ultimate 
 result would have been different? When Sherman invested 
 Atlanta, the North found some compensation for Grant's fail- 
 ures in Virginia; and even though his force should have been 
 inadequate for a siege, can it now be doubted that he would 
 have been reenforced to any needed extent? The mere pres- 
 ence of Sherman at Atlanta was justly viewed by the North as 
 an important success. He had followed his antagonist to the 
 very heart of the Confederacy, and was master of innumerable 
 strong positions held by the Confederates at the outset of the 
 campaign. To suppose that he would, at such a moment, be 
 permitted to fail from a lack of means, is a hypothesis at va- 
 riance with the conduct of the North throughout the war. 
 
 General Johnston has that sort of negative vindication which 
 arises from the disasters of his successor, though, as we shall 
 presently show, Mr. Davis was nowise responsible for the mis- 
 fortunes of General Hood.* The question is one which must 
 
 * Yet the argument that General Hood's errors establish the wisdom of 
 General Johnston's policy, can hardly be deemed fair by an intelligent and 
 impartial judgment. A more competent commander than Hood might 
 have more ably executed an offensive campaign, even after the fall of 
 
ANTAGONISTIC THEORIES. 571 
 
 some day arise as between the general military policy of the 
 Confederacy, and the antagonistic views which have been so 
 freely ascribed to General Johnston by his admirers. We have 
 no desire to pursue that antagonism, which, if it really existed, 
 can hardly yet be a theme for impartial discussion. Towards 
 the close of the war, it was usual to accredit Johnston with the 
 theory that the Confederacy could better aiford to fo.se territory 
 than men, and that hence the true policy of the South was to 
 avoid general engagements, unless under such circumstances as 
 should totally neutralize the enemy's advantage in numbers. 
 We are not prepared to say to what extent these announcements 
 of his views were authorized by General Johnston, or to what 
 extent they were based upon retrospection. Some confirmation 
 of their authenticity would seem to be deducible from General 
 Johnston's declaration since the war, that the "Confederacy 
 was too weak for offensive war." Certainly there could be no 
 theory more utterly antagonistic to the genius of the Southern 
 people, and that is a consideration, to which the great com- 
 manders of history have not usually been indifferent. Nor was 
 it the theory which inspired those achievements of Southern 
 valor, which will ring through the centuries. It was not the 
 
 Atlanta; or, again, other tactics than those of Johnston, from Dalton to 
 Atlanta, might have had better results. 
 
 After Johnston's removal, the President received numerous letters from 
 prominent individuals in the Cotton States, heartily applauding that step. 
 The condemnation of the President, for the removal of Johnston, came 
 only after Hood's disasters; and it must be remembered that Hood's later 
 operations were not in accordance with Mr. Davis' views. 
 
 The writer remembers a pithy summary of the Georgia campaign, made 
 by a Confederate officer, shortly before the end of the war. Said he: 
 "While Johnston was in command there were no results at all; when 
 Hood took command, results came very rapidly." 
 
572 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 theory which Lee and Jackson adopted, nor, we need hard!/ 
 add, that which Jefferson Davis approved. 
 
 Indeed, the philosophy of the Southern faihire is not to be 
 sought in the discussion of opposing theories among Confeder- 
 ate leaders. The conclusion of history will be, not that the 
 South accomplished less than was to be anticipated, but far 
 more than have any other people under similar circumstances. 
 Southern men hardly yet comprehend the real odds in numbers 
 and resources which for four years they successfully resisted. 
 Other questions than those merely of aggregate populations and 
 material wealth, enter into the solution of the problem. 
 
 By the census of 1860, the aggregate fi-ee population of the 
 thirteen States, which the Confederacy claimed, was 7,500,000, 
 leaving in the remaining States of the Union a free population 
 of over twenty millions. This statement includes Kentucky 
 and Missouri as members of the Confederacy ; yet, by the com- 
 pulsion of Federal bayonets, these States, not less than Mary- 
 land and Delaware, were virtually on the side of the North. 
 Kentucky proclaimed neutrality, but during the whole war was 
 overrun by the Federal armies, and, with her State govern- 
 ment and large numbers of her people favoring the North, 
 despite the Southern sympathies of the majority, her moral in- 
 fluence, as well as her physical strength, sustained the Union. 
 The legitimate government of Missouri, and a majority of her 
 people, sided with the South ; but early occupied and held by 
 the Federal army, her legitimate government was subverted, 
 and her moral and physical resources were thrown into the 
 scale against the Confederacy. 
 
 To say nothing of the large numbers of recruits obtained by 
 the Federal armies from Kentucky, Maryland and Missouri, 
 (chiefly from their large foreign populations,) their contributions' 
 
THE NUMERICAL DISPARITY. 573 
 
 to the Confederate army were nearly, if not quite, compensa- 
 ted by the accessions to Federal strength from East Tennessee, 
 Western Virginia, and other portions of the seceded States. It 
 would be fair, therefore, to deduct the jjopulation of these two 
 States from that of the South, and this would leave the Con- 
 federacy five and one-half millions. Dividing their free popu- 
 lations between the two sections, and the odds were six and a 
 half millions against twenty and a half millions. This is a lib- 
 eral statement for the North, and embraces only the original 
 populations of the two sections at the beginning of hostilities. 
 There can hardly be a reasonable doubt, that had the struggle 
 been confined to these numerical forces, the South would have 
 triumphed. But hordes of foreign mercenaries, incited by high 
 bounty and the promise of booty, flocked to the Federal army, 
 and thus was the North enabled to recruit its armies to any 
 needed standard, while the South depended solely upon its orig- 
 inal population. As the South was overrun, too, negroes were 
 forced or enticed into the Federal service, and thus, by these 
 inexhaustible reserves of foreign mercenaries and negro re- 
 cruits, the Confederate army was finally exhausted. 
 
 The following exhibition of the strength of the Federal 
 armies is from the report of the Secretary of War, at the be- 
 ginning of the session of Congress in December, 1865 : 
 
 Official reports show that oa the 1st of May, ISGl, the aggre- 
 gate national military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine 
 hundred and seventy thousand seven hundred and ten, to-wit : 
 
 Available force present for duty 662,345 
 
 Ou detached service in (he different military departments 10!i,o48 
 
 In field hospitals or unfit for duty 41,2()6 
 
 In general hospitals or on side leave at home 75,978 
 
 Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war ()6,2!)0 
 
 Absent without leave 15,183 
 
 Grand aggregate 970,710 
 
574 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 The aggregate available force present for duty May 1st, 1864, 
 was distributed in the diflPerent commands as follows : 
 
 Department of Washington 42,124 
 
 Army of the Potomac 120,386 
 
 Department of Virginia and North Carolina 59,139 
 
 Department of the South 18,165 
 
 Department of the Gulf 61,866 
 
 Department of Arkansas 23,666 
 
 Department of the Tennessee 74,174 
 
 Department of the Missouri 15,770 
 
 Department of the North-west 5,295 
 
 Department of Kansas 4,798 
 
 Head-quarters Militarj' Division of tlie Mississippi 476 
 
 Department of the Cumberland 119,948 
 
 Department of the Ohio 35,416 
 
 Northern Department 9,540 
 
 Department of West Virginia 30,782 
 
 Department of the East 2,828 
 
 Department of the Susquehanna 2,970 
 
 Middle Department 5,627 
 
 Ninth Army Corps 20,780 
 
 Department of New Mexico 3,454 
 
 Department of the Pacific 5,141 
 
 Total 662,345 
 
 And again : 
 
 Official reports show that on the 1st of March, 18G5, the aggre- 
 gate military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred 
 and sixty-five thousand five hundred and ninety-one, to-wit : 
 
 Available forces present for duty 602,598 
 
 On detached service in the diflferent military departments lo2,5;iS 
 
 In field hospitals and unfit for duty 35,628 
 
 In general hospitals or on sick leave 143,-119 
 
 Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 31,6!t5 
 
 Absent without leave 19,683 
 
 Grand aggregate 965,591 
 
 This force was augmented on the 1st of May, 1865, by enlist- 
 ments, to the number of one million five hundred and sixteen, of 
 all arms, officers and men (1,000,516). 
 
 And again he says ; 
 
THE NUMERICAL DISPARITY. 575 
 
 The aggregate quotas charged against the several States under all 
 calls made by the President of the United States, from the loth 
 day of April, 1861, to the 1-ltli day of April, 1SC5, at which time 
 drafting and recruiting ceased, was 2,759,049 
 
 The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, and put 
 into service of the United States, in the army, navy, and marine 
 corps, during the above period, was 2,656,553 
 
 Leaving a deficiency on all calls, when the war closed, of 102,596 
 
 This statement does not include the regular army, nor the 
 negro troops raised in the Southern States, which were not 
 raised by calls on the States. It may be safely asserted that 
 the "available force present for duty," of the Federal armies 
 at the beginning or close of the last year of the war, exceeded 
 the entire force called into the service of the Confederacy dur- 
 ing the four years. The aggregate of Federal forces raised 
 during the war numbered more than one-third of the free pop- 
 ulation of the Confederate States, including men, women, and 
 children.* 
 
 *It has been contended that the odds against the South in numbers 
 and resources were compensated by the advantages of her defensive posi- 
 tion, and by the strong incentives of a war for her homes and liberties. 
 An ingenious argument in demonstration of the assumed defective admin- 
 istration of the Confederacy has been deduced from various historical 
 examples of successful resistance against overwhelming odds. The most 
 plausible citation has been the success of Frederick the Great, in his de- 
 fense of Prussia against the coalition of Russia, Austria, and France. 
 This illustration has no value, as it does not at all meet the case. 
 
 Waiving all consideration of the peculiar strategic difficulties of the 
 South, Frederick first had the advantage of his English alliance. Fred- 
 erick never fought odds greater than two to one, while the South fought 
 three, four, sometimes five to one — but never equal numbers. Again, 
 Prussia was inaccessible except by overland marches — not penetrated, 
 like the South, in every direction by navigable i-ivers, and nearly sur- 
 rounded by the sea. Frederick, too, was absolute in Prussia, and had 
 the lives and property of all his subjects at his control. Mr. Davis, on 
 the other hand, never could consolidate the resources of the South as he 
 
576 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 But this disparity of numbers, apparently sufficient of itself 
 to decide the issue against the South, was by no means the 
 greatest advantage of the North. When it is asserted that the 
 naval superiority of the North decided the contest in its favor, 
 we are not limited to the consideration merely of that absolute 
 command of the water, which prevented the South from im- 
 porting munitions of war, except at enormous expense and 
 hazard, which made the defense of the sea-coast and contigu- 
 ous territory impossible, and which so disorganized the Con- 
 federate finances. The Confederacy encountered strategic dif- 
 ficulties, by reason of the naval superiority of the North, 
 which, at an early period of the war, counter-balanced the ad- 
 vantages of its defensive position. 
 
 In the beginning the enemy had easy, speedy, and secure 
 access to the Southern coast, and wherever there was a harbor 
 or inlet, was to be found a base of operations for a Federal 
 army. Thus, at the outset, the Confederacy presented on 
 every side an exposed frontier. In every quarter, the Federal 
 armies had bases of operations at right angles, each to the 
 other, and thus, wherever the Confederate army established a 
 
 desired, being constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which 
 could at all times be coerced by the press hostile to the administration, 
 or influenced by the slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending 
 to place the whole means of the country at the disposal of the President, 
 Congress yet invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculat- 
 ing clauses providing exemptions and immunities of every description. 
 President Davis was too sincere a republican, and had too much re- 
 gard for the restraints of the Constitution to violently usurp ungranted 
 powers. 
 
 It is to be remembered, too, that the South received no foreign aid, 
 while Frederick was at last saved by the accession of Peter to the Rus- 
 sian throne, which event dissolved the coalition against Prussia. 
 
STRATEGIC DIFFICULTIES. 577 
 
 defensive line, it was assailable by a second Federal army ad- 
 vancing from a second base. The advantage of rapid concen- 
 tration of forces, usually belonging to an interior line, was 
 obviated by the easy and rapid conveyance of large masses by 
 water. 
 
 Probably the most serious strategic disadvantage of the South 
 was its territorial configuration, through the intersection of its 
 soil in nearly every quarter by navigable rivers, either empty- 
 ing into the ocean, of which the North, at all times, had un- 
 disputed control, or opening upon the Federal frontier. In all 
 the Atlantic States of the Confederacy navigable streams pen- 
 etrate far into the interior, and empty into the sea. The Mis- 
 sissippi, aptly termed an "inland sea," flowing through the 
 Confederacy, was, both in its upper waters and at its mouth, 
 held by the North. The Tennessee and Cumberland Riv^ers, 
 with their mouths upon the Federal frontiers, navigable in 
 winter for transports and gunboats, in the first twelve months 
 of the war, brought the Federal armies to the centre of the 
 South-west. In the Trans-Mississippi region, the Arkansas 
 and Red Rivers gave the enemy convenient and secure bases 
 of operations along their margins. Each one of these streams 
 having inevitably, sooner or later, become subject to the con- 
 trol of the Federal navy, afforded bases of operations against 
 the interior of the South, while it was likewise threatened from 
 the Northern frontier. 
 
 The difficulty of space, M'hich defeated Napoleon in his in- 
 vasion of Russia, and which has baffled the largest armies led 
 by the ablest commanders, had an easy solution for the North. 
 Remarkable illustrations of the extent to which these water 
 facilities aided the North, were afforded by the signal failure 
 attending every overland advance of the Federal armies so 
 37 
 
578 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 loner as the Confederates could raise even the semblance of 
 
 o 
 
 an opposing force. Besides the innumerable Federal failures 
 in the Appalachian region of Virginia, Sherman and Grant, 
 the most successful of Northern commanders, illustrated this 
 military principle in instances already noted. When Sherman 
 finally marched from the Confederate frontier to the ocean. 
 General Grant's policy of " attrition " had virtually destroyed 
 the military strength of the South, and Sherman simply ac- 
 complished an unopposed march through an undefended coun- 
 try. There can be no better illustration of these strategic 
 difficulties of the Confederacy, than that afibrded by the train 
 of disasters in the beginning of 1862, each of which was di- 
 rectly and mainly attributable to the naval advantages of the 
 enemy and the geographical configuration. 
 
 A candid review of the events of the first two years of the 
 war will demonstrate the inevitable failure of subjugation of 
 the South, but for these advantages of her invaders. Not only 
 are the facilities of transportation possessed by the North to 
 be considered, but the further advantage extended by its fleet 
 in the event of military reverse. The shipping constituted an 
 invulnerable defense and convenient shelter for the fugitive 
 Federals. Upon at least two occasions, the two main Federal 
 armies were rescued from destruction by the gunboats — in the 
 case of Grant at Shiloh, and of McClellan on James River. 
 
 Nor was it possible for the South to make adequate pro- 
 vision to meet the naval advantages of the North. The Fed- 
 eral Government retained the whole of the navy. The North 
 was manufacturing and commercial, while the South was purely 
 agricultural in its means; hence the incomparable rapidity with 
 which the Federal Government accumulated shipping of every 
 character. The initial superiority of the North in naval re- 
 
THE BLOCKADE. 579 
 
 sources prevented the South from obtaining from foreign sources 
 the men and the material for the equipment of vessels of war. 
 Then, again, the disputed question of the capacity of shore 
 batteries to resist vessels of war, had a most inopportune solu- 
 tion for the South, and in cases where great interests were 
 involved. We have already noted one instance where this 
 question had a fatal solution — that of New Orleans. And in 
 this instance, too, the want of time for preparation was a fatal 
 difficulty. But for the unfinished condition of the iron-clads 
 at New Orleans, the possession of the Mississippi by the enemy 
 would have been greatly deferred, though, with the head-waters 
 and mouth of the great river in Federal control, it was hardly 
 more than a question of time, should the North skillfully em- 
 ploy its superior manufacturing resources and preponderant 
 population. 
 
 The special weapon of the North, from which no amount 
 of victories ever brought the Confederacy one moment's re- 
 lief, was the blockade — a weapon which the injustice of for- 
 eign powers placed in the grasp of our adversaries. The 
 blockade ruined the Confederate finances and, by preventing 
 the importation of military material, weakened the Confeder- 
 ate armies to the extent of thousands of men who were de- 
 tailed for manufacturing and other purposes. It was the 
 blockade, too, which caused the derangement of the internal 
 economy of the South, creating the painful contrast in the 
 effects of the war upon the two sections. The North, with 
 its ports open, the abundant gold of California, and petroleum 
 stimulating speculation, found in the war a mine of wealth. 
 Patriotism and profit went hand in hand. The vast expendi- 
 tures of Government created a lucrative market; the enormous 
 transportation demanded made the railroads prosperous beyond 
 
680 TAFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 parallel; and the sources of popular prosperity and exhilara- 
 tion were inexhaustible. The condition of the South was the 
 exact reverse. With its commerce almost totally suspended ; 
 frequently in peril of famine ; whole States, one after another, 
 occupied or devastated by the enemy, so that when the Confed- 
 erate armies expelled the enemy they could not maintain them- 
 selves, and were compelled to retreat; deprived of every comfort, 
 and nearly of all the necessaries of life, the history of the war 
 in the South is a record of universal and unrelieved suffering. 
 It must be apparent that we have here given but a superfi- 
 cial review and imperfect statement of the obstacles with which 
 the South contended. But, assuredly, before even this array 
 of odds, such minor questions as the removal of one officer and 
 the retention of another sink into utter insignificance. As we 
 have before intimated, many of the most important incidents 
 in the conduct of the war must be reserved for the decision of 
 impartial military judgment. AYhat if it should be granted 
 that the appointment of Pemberton and the removal of John- 
 ston were fatal blunders, were they compensated by no acts of 
 judicious selection of other officers for promotion and reward? 
 Is the firm and constant support of Lee, of Sidney Johnston, 
 of Jackson, and of Early to be accounted as nothing? Are 
 we to accept the imputation of error to Mr. Davis alone ? We 
 need not pursue the career of General Johnston much farther 
 than its beginning to discover what his countrymen unani- 
 mously deplored as an error, what Stonewall Jackson declared 
 a fatal blunder. General Lee confessed his error at Gettys- 
 l)urg. Beauregard, too, has been generally adjudged to have 
 seriously erred at Shiloh. Yet how easy Avould it be to con- 
 struct a plausible theory, demonstrating the seriously adverse 
 influence upon the fortunes of the Confederacy, from each one 
 
GENERAL 1KX;D. 581 
 
 of those errors. And we could extend the parallel much 
 farther. Napoleon estimated the merits of diiferent generals 
 by the comparative number of their faults and virtues. Per- 
 haps that is even a better philosophy which urges us to 
 measure the reputations of men, " not by their exemption from 
 fault, but by the size of the virtues of which they are pos- 
 sessed." Assuredly, the South can never demur to the appli- 
 cation of this test either to herself or her late leader. Judged 
 by such a standard of merit, neither can be apprehensive for 
 the award of posterity. Two generations hence, if not sooner, 
 Jeiferson Davis, not less for his. wisdom than for his virtues, 
 will be commemorated as the Washington of the South. 
 
 With a view to dramatic unity, we shall disregard somewhat 
 of chronological order, and follow, with a rapid summary, the 
 movements of the ill-starred Western army of the Confederacy, 
 to the point where its existence virtually terminated. The 
 successor of General Johnston, General John B. Hood, em- 
 bodied a rare union of the characteristics of the popular ideal 
 of a soldier. He was the noblest contribution of Kentucky 
 chivalry to the armies of the South, and his record throughout 
 the war, even though ending in terrible disaster, was that of a 
 gallant, dashing, and skillful leader. Identified with the Army 
 of Northern Virginia from an early period of its history, he 
 shared its dangers, its trials, and its most thrilling triumphs. 
 " Hood and his Texans " were household words in the Con- 
 federacy, and the bulletins from every battle-field in Virginia 
 were emblazoned with their exploits. Few commanders have 
 possessed to a greater extent than Hood that magnetic mastery 
 over troops, which imbues them with the consciousness of irre- 
 sistible resolution. Of conspicuous personal gallantry and com- 
 manding physique, he united to fiery energy, consummate self- 
 
582 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 possession and excellent tactical ability. A favorite with 
 General Lee and President Davis, he had also received the 
 ■warm commendation of Stonewall Jackson for his distin- 
 guished services at Cold Harbor, in 1862. 
 
 Painfully wounded and disabled at Gettysburg, he accom- 
 panied his old division to Georgia, and, while his previous 
 wound was yet unhealed, he lost a leg at Chickamauga. 
 After months of painful confinement, he was again in Rich- 
 mond, soliciting the privilege of additional service to his 
 country. His conspicuous devotion challenged equally the 
 admiration of the people and the Government, and President 
 Davis was universally declared never to have conferred a more 
 deserved promotion than that by which he made Hood a 
 Lieutenant-General. General Hood was assigned to the com- 
 mand of a corps under Johnston, and accompanied the army 
 in its movements from Dal ton to Atlanta. 
 
 The appointment of Hood as the successor of Johnston was 
 the occasion of renewed anticipation to the South. His ag- 
 gressive qualities, it was thought, would supply that bold and 
 energetic policy which the country believed to be the great 
 need of the situation in Georgia. Nor was there any thing 
 in the record of Hood, to cause apprehension that his posses- 
 .sion of these qualities excluded such an equipoise of mental 
 faculties, as should ensure a sound and discreet system of 
 operations. 
 
 We shall not discuss in detail the operations which General 
 Hood so speedily inaugurated. They were necessitated, to a 
 large extent, by a situation of affairs for which he was not re- 
 sponsible. The one object of Hood, and the one hope and 
 necessity of the Confederacy, was the expulsion of Sherman 
 from a vital section. Sherman had not delayed an hour in 
 
FALL OF ATLANTA. 583 
 
 his purpose of securing possession of the Macon road, and sev- 
 ering the communications of Atlanta. Ah-eady he was pre- 
 paring operations similar to those by which Grant sought the 
 isolation of Petersburg ; and if his strength was not then ade- 
 quate, there could be no question of his capacity to obtain ample 
 means from his Government to secure the great results of his 
 skillfully conducted and successful campaign. The situation 
 required precisely that immediate execution of a vigorous 
 policy by which Lee had relieved Richmond of the presence 
 of McClellan. 
 
 AVhile thus foreseeing the fatal result of permitting himself 
 to be besieged in Atlanta, General Hood did not rashly assail 
 the enemy. A favorable opportunity was presented, by a gap 
 between two of Sherman's columns, for a concentrated assault 
 upon that which was most exposed. Though the Confederate 
 forces were admirably massed and skillfully led, they were 
 eventually repulsed by the murderous fire of the Federal 
 artillery, which was concentrated with signal promptitude and 
 served with rare ability. This demonstration was a failure, 
 though it had promised favorably, and, for a time, exposed the 
 entire Federal army to serious danger. A series of subsequent 
 engagements, fought by Hood to prevent the consummation of 
 Sherman's design to Isolate Atlanta, left the enemy in possession 
 of the Confederate line of supply, and Atlanta was evacuated 
 on the 1st of September. 
 
 Such was the melancholy conclusion, for the Confederacy, 
 of the first stage of the Georgia campaign. Military judg- 
 ment must decide, how far an able offensive policy, at the out- 
 set of the campaign would have delayed, if not entirely checked 
 the march of Sherman to Atlanta ; how far an offensive was 
 then practicable ; to what extent Hood's course was imposed 
 
584 T.IFE OF JKFFKUSON DAVIS. 
 
 upon lilm by a situation wliicli he did not create, and whether 
 his accession to command, either altered or hastened the ulti- 
 mate fate of Atlanta. 
 
 The emergency consequent upon the fall of Atlanta, sum- 
 moned President Davis to Georgia. His visit was dictated 
 by the double purpose, of healing dissensions in that State, 
 and of devising measures for the restoration of the campaign. 
 The perverse course of Governor Brown had proven successful 
 in the dissemination of disaffection, and his teachings were 
 beginning to mature those fruits of demoralization in Georgia, 
 which the subsequent march of Sherman abundantly developed. 
 It would be impossible to characterize the conduct of this of- 
 ficial in terms of extravagant severity. Capricious and per- 
 verse in his hostility to the Confederate Government, while yet 
 professing fealty to the cause, he contrived, in the most dis- 
 tressing exigencies, to paralyze the energies of Georgia, and 
 finally to create a feeling bordering closely upon open disaf- 
 fection. 
 
 The conduct of Governor Brown, acceptable only to the 
 clique of malcontents who followed him, w'as the subject of 
 criticism throughout the Confederacy, and of suspicion by a 
 large portion of the public. It is a matter of record that 
 after tlie fall of Atlanta he refused to cooperate with the Con- 
 federate authorities for the defense of Georgia, and demanded 
 the return of the Georgia troops in Virginia, unless the Presi- 
 dent would send reenforcements. Yet he was perfectly aware 
 that the Confederate Government then, had not one man to 
 spare in any quarter, and was in a crisis, produced solely by 
 the want of numbers. His communications to the Confederate 
 Government were usually splenetic assaults upon the Presi- 
 dent, Avhose military administration he offensively criticised, 
 
GOVERNOR BROWN". 585 
 
 and whom he charged with an ambition to destroy every pro- 
 tection to the reserved rights of the States. There is no point 
 of view in which the course of Governor Brown is not equally 
 incomprehensible and indefensible. It was freighted with 
 disaster and defeat to the cause which he professed to serve. 
 Considered in the aspect of partisan administration, or the in- 
 dulgence of personal spleen, its inconsistency was paralleled 
 only by its folly. It demoralized public sentiment, and tended 
 largely to that corruption of the public and the army which, 
 in the last stage of the war, was so palpable. Not the least 
 injurious feature of Governor Brown's official policy was the 
 unpropitious seasons which he selected for the indulgence of 
 his capricious and splenetic moods. Upon the heels of crush- 
 ing military disasters, and when the Confederate authorities 
 were most helpless. Governor Brown was most exacting. 
 
 The purposes of his persistent and vindictive impeachments 
 of the Confederate Government, at such periods, must remain 
 a subject of speculation. Certainly he did not exalt his dig- 
 nity as a statesman, nor approve his earnestness as a patriot, 
 by giving precedence to his personal animoj^ities over his of- 
 ficial duties, and by substituting for cooperation in support of 
 a cause to which he protested his devotion, a system of malig- 
 nant controversy with the national authorities. 
 
 The interviews of President Davis, with Governor Brown, 
 during his visit to Georgia, in Sejitember, failed, as had all 
 previous efforts to that end, to effect an accommodation of 
 differences. Governor Brown was determined not to be satis- 
 fied, and though ]\Ir. Davis, having made nearly every conces- 
 sion demanded, left him under the impression that Brown was 
 at last prepared to cooperate with him heartily and zealously, 
 he was speedily convinced of the error of such a calculation. 
 
58G LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 While on his way to Hood's army Mr. Davis addressed the 
 citizens of Macon, and spoke with great candor, concerning 
 the perils of the situation, which, though serious, he believed, 
 might be repaired. Alluding to the demand made upon him 
 for reenforcements from Virginia, he said that the disparity 
 in Virginia was greater than in Georgia; the army under 
 Early had been sent to the Valley, because the enemy had 
 penetrated to Lynchburg; and now should Early be with- 
 drawn, there would be nothing to prevent the Federal army 
 from forming a complete cordon of men around Richmond. 
 He had counseled with General Lee upon all these points ; 
 his mind had sought to embrace the entire field, and the 
 necessities of every quarter, and his conclusion was, that "if 
 one-half of the men now absent from the field, would return 
 to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that hope, I am 
 now going to the front. I may not realize this hope, but I 
 know that there are men there, who have looked death too 
 often in the face to despond now." 
 
 On the 18th September, the President reached Hood's head- 
 quarters, and on the following day reviewed the whole army. 
 He addressed the troops in terms of encouragement, and his 
 promise to them of an advance northward, was received with 
 unbounded enthusiasm. The situation in Georgia admitted a 
 very limited consideration of expedients, by which to obtain 
 compensation for the loss of Atlanta. Sherman's presence, un- 
 molested, in the interior of Georgia, during the autumn and 
 winter, would be fatal. He would then be in a position to 
 assail, at leisure, the only remaining source of supplies for the 
 Confederate armies. His cavalry could safely penetrate in 
 every direction, destroying communications and suj^plies, and 
 producing universal demoralization. 
 
THE TENNESSEE CAMrAIGN. 587 
 
 Hood was confident that his army was capable of better 
 fighting than it had performed against Sherman, provided it 
 could meet the enemy under such circumstances as should 
 promise the recovery of the ground lost, in the event of vic- 
 tory. To attack Sherman in Atlanta was not to be considered, 
 and to await the development of the enemy's plan would be 
 dangerous. Sherman had already announced his purpose to 
 rest his army at Atlanta, with a view to its preparation for the 
 arduous enterprises yet before it. Hence, it became necessary 
 to adopt a plan, which should draw him away from his de- 
 fenses, and compel him to fight upon equal ground. 
 
 It may be briefly stated that the subsequent operations of 
 General Hood, when they ceased to menace the enemy's flank, 
 and assumed the character of a mere detachment upon the Fed- 
 eral rear, was not the plan of campaign which Mr. Davis 
 expected to be carried into execution. He approved a con- 
 centration upon the Federal flank, which it was not likely 
 Sherman would permit to be endangered. Seeing, however, 
 the exposed situation of the country south of Atlanta, in con- 
 sequence of the movement into Alabama, Mr. Davis opposed 
 any operations which should place Hood's army beyond striking 
 distance of Sherman, should the latter move southicard from At- 
 lanta. 
 
 It is remarkable to what extent the movements of Sherman 
 demonstrated the judicious character of the Confederate move- 
 ment, so long as it was in conformity with these views of Mr. 
 Davis. Puzzled, at first, as to Hood's purposes, Sherman was 
 no longer perplexed as to what his own course should be, when 
 it was evident that Hood was making a serious demonstration 
 for the recovery of Tennessee, meanwhile giving up Georgia 
 entirely to Federal possession. When these larger and more 
 
588 LIFE OF JEFFKRSOX DAVIS. 
 
 doubtful enterprises were added to the original scope of the 
 Confederate movement, Mr. Davis was too remote from the 
 scene to assume the responsibility of recalling the army from 
 an enterprise which he felt assured would not be attempted 
 without justifying information by the commander.* 
 
 But, after all, the disastrous consequences, following the un- 
 covering of Georgia, are to be attributed less to the intrinsic- 
 ally erroneous strategy of Hood, than to the consummate vigor 
 and promptitude of Sherman. Odious to the South as Sher- 
 man is, by reason of his cruelties and barbarities, he can not 
 be denied the merit of an immediate grasp of the critical situ- 
 ation, and a no less prompt execution. A commander of less 
 self-possession, and less audacity, would have been bewildered 
 by the transfer of an army from his immediate front to his 
 rear, and placed astride his communications. The " march to 
 the sea " was no military exploit, and only a brazen charlatan- 
 ism could exalt it as an illustration of genius. The proof of 
 
 * General Hood's magnanimous acknowledgment is sufficient for the 
 acquittal of Mr. Davis from any responsibility for this ill-starred move- 
 ment. On taking leave of his army, in January, 1865, Hood said, speak- 
 ing of the late campaign : "/ a??i alone responsible for its conception, and 
 strove hard to do my duty in its execution." 
 
 But in addition to this, there was a coiTespondence, between Mr. Davis 
 and a Confederate officer of high rank, which completely exculpated Mr. 
 Davis. In accordance with Mr. Davis' accustomed magnanimity and re- 
 gard for the public welfare, this correspondence was never published. 
 The facts in this matter conspicuously illustrate the persistent and reck- 
 less misrepresentation, which has not ceased with the termination of the 
 war. With a class of writers, the facts regarding jMr. Davis are things 
 least to be desired. In many instances, their attacks upon his fame are 
 puerile, but in others, where facts are either distorted or wantonly dis- 
 regarded, the object seems to be merely to gratify a wicked spirit of de- 
 traction. 
 
hood's defeat. 589 
 
 Sherman's merit is to be seen in the quick determination and 
 execution of his purpose, when the real significance of Hood's 
 operations was revealed. His telegram to Washington fully 
 described the situation and prophesied the sequel : " Hood has 
 crossed the Tennessee. Thomas will take care of him and 
 Nashville, while Schofield will not let him into Chattanooga 
 or Knoxville. Georgia and South Carolina are at my mercy, 
 and I shall strilce. Do not be anxious about me. I am all 
 right." 
 
 We are not permitted to trace the unfortunate Tennessee 
 campaign of General Hood, culminating in his disastrous de- 
 feat at Nashville, in December, and in the virtual destruction 
 of the gallant but ill-starred army, upon whose bayonets the 
 Confederate power, west of the Alleghanies, was so long up- 
 held. It was the final campaign of the Confederacy in that 
 quarter, and, with its failure, perished forever the hope of de- 
 fending the western and central sections of the South.* Mean- 
 while, Sherman, unopposed, had marched like Fate through 
 Georgia, to Savannah, realizing Grant's assertion that the Con- 
 federacy was a mere shell, and revealing a flict, until then not 
 clearly appreciated, of the exhaustion and demoralization of its 
 people. 
 
 ''"In the autumn of 1864, General Price advanced into Missouri, pro- 
 claiming his purpose to be a permanent occupation. The expedition 
 ended in disaster. Defeated in an engagement on the Big Blue, Price 
 retreated into Kansas, and finally into Southern Arkansas. The cam- 
 paign did not affect the current of the war elsewhere, and was a failure. 
 
590 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 INCIDENTS ON THE LINES OF RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG DURING THE SUMMER 
 
 AND AUTUMN CAPTURE OF FORT HARRISON OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS BY 
 
 GRANT THE SITUATION NEAR THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL EARLy's VALLEY 
 
 CAMPAIGN POPULAR CENSURE OF EARLY INFLUENCE OF THE VALLEY CAM- 
 PAIGN UPON THE SITUATION NEAR RICHMOND — WHAT THE AGGREGATE OP 
 CONFEDERATE DISASTERS SIGNIFIED — DESPONDENCY OF THE SOUTH — THE IN- 
 JURIOUS EXAMPLES OF PROMINENT MEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL LEE 
 
 MR. DAVIs' POPULARITY AVHY HE DID NOT FULLY COMPREHEND THE DE- 
 MORALIZATION OF THE PEOPLE HE HOPES FOR POPULAR REANIMATION WAS 
 
 THE CASE OF THE CONFEDERACY HOPELESS ? — VACILLATING CONDUCT OF CON- 
 GRESS — THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS A WEAK BODY — MR. DAVIs' RELATIONS 
 WITH CONGRESS:r-PROPOSED CONSCRIPTION OF SLAVES — FAVORED BY DAVIS 
 AND LEE — DEFEATED BY CONGRESS — LEGISLATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE 
 
 PRESIDENT DAVIs' OPINION OF LEE RUMORS OP PEACE HAMPTON ROADS 
 
 CONFERENCE THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM THE ABSURD CHARGE AGAINST 
 
 MR. DAVIS OF OBSTRUCTING NEGOTIATIONS HIS RECORD ON THE SUBJECT OP 
 
 PEACE A RICHMOND NEWSPAPER ON THE FEDERAL ULTIMATUM DELUSIVE 
 
 SIGNS OF PUBLIC SPIRIT NO ALTERNATIVE BUT CONTINUED RESISTANCE 
 
 REPORT OF THE HAMPTON ROADS CONFERENCE. 
 
 "I /TEANWHITiE the siege of Petersburg had progressed 
 -*-'-■- drearily through the months of summer and autumn. 
 The "hammering" principle was abandoned by General Grant, 
 for a series of maneuvres having in view the possession of the 
 railroads extending southward and eastward. 
 
 About the middle of August a portion of Grant's army was 
 established upon the Wcldon road. This w^as by no means a 
 line of communication vital to General Lee, though several 
 heavy engagements ensued from its disputed possession. The 
 
INCIDENTS ON THE RICHMOND LINES. 591 
 
 Federal losses in these engagements were very heavy, and were 
 hardly compensated by any immediate advantage following the 
 permanent acquisition, by General Grant, of the Weldon Rail- 
 road. The location of the Federal army gave ample opportu- 
 nity for the transfer of forces to either side of the river, and 
 General Grant did not fail to avail himself of his facilities, for 
 aiding the more important operations before Petersburg, by 
 numerous diversions in the direction of Richmond. One of 
 these movements upon the north side of James River, in the 
 last days of September, resulted disastrously to the Confeder- 
 ates, in the loss of Fort Harrison, a position of great impor- 
 tance in the defense of that portion of the Confederate line. 
 Efforts to recapture it were unavailing, and attended with 
 heavy loss. The enemy was left in secure possession of a posi- 
 tion from which Richmond could be seriously menaced. The 
 last serious demonstration by General Grant, before winter, was 
 the movement of a heavy force, w^ith the view of turning the 
 Confederate position, and obtaining the possession of Lee's 
 communications with Lynchburg and Danville. Though sus- 
 tained by a strong diversion on other portions of the line, this 
 demonstration was barren of results. 
 
 Thus, the beginning of winter found the Confederate forces 
 still safely holding the lines of Richmond and Petersburg. 
 The situation near the Confederate capital was encouraging, 
 and indicated an almost indefinite resistance. But nearly every 
 other quarter of the Confederacy was darkened by the shadow 
 of disaster. 
 
 The campaign of Hood in Tennessee had its counterpart in 
 the Valley campaign of General Early. This campaign, the 
 original design of which was the expulsion of Hunter, was 
 doubly important afterwards in the design to secure the harvests 
 
592 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 of the Shenandoali Valley, and to continue the diversion of a 
 large Federal force from the front of Kichmond. The earlier 
 movements of General Early were attended with success, and 
 the Confederacy had the promise of a campaign, which should 
 renew the glories of Stonewall Jackson, in a district which his 
 exploits had made forever famous. In its conclusion was re- 
 vealed, perhaps more strikingly than upon any other theatre of 
 the M'ar, the overwhelming odds and obstacles, with which the 
 Confederacy contended in this desperate stage of its history. 
 The activity of General Early in the summer months, and his 
 w'ell-earned reputation as an officer of skill and daring, induced 
 the enemy to concentrate a heavy force to protect the Potomac 
 frontier, and, if possible, to overwhelm the Confederate army in 
 the Valley. In the months of September and October, several 
 engagements occurred, in which General Early was badly de- 
 feated, and his army at the close of autumn exhibited so many 
 evidences of demoralization, as to occasion apprehension for its 
 future efficiency. 
 
 The censure of General Early by the public and the news- 
 papers was unsparing. Most unworthy allegations, totally un- 
 supported, were circulated in explanation of his disasters. 
 That such a man as Early, whose every promotion had been 
 won by a heroism and efficiency inferior to those of none of 
 Lee's subordinates, should have been recklessly condemned for 
 reverses, which were clearly the results of no errors or mis- 
 conduct of his own, is now a striking commentary upon that 
 sullen despondency into which the Southern mind was fast 
 settling. A victory, in any quarter, was now almost the last 
 expectation of the public, and still Early was recklessly abused 
 for not winning victories, wdth a demoralized army, against . 
 forces having four times his own strength. Neither President 
 
THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 593 
 
 Davis nor General Lee ever doubted General Early's effieienoy ; 
 and the letter of the commanding general to Early, written in 
 the last hours of the Confederacy, constitutes a tribute to patri- 
 otic and distinguished services, which the old licro may well 
 cherish in his exile, as a worthy title to the esteem of posterity. 
 
 The defeat of Early at Cedar Creek, late in Octobei-, was the 
 decisive event of the last campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. 
 In December nearly all Early's forces were transferred to 
 General Lee's lines, and the bulk of the Federal array in the 
 Valley returned to General Grant. General Early remained in 
 the Valley with a fragmentary command, which Sheridan easily 
 overran on his march from Winchester to the front of Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 Events in the Valley had a marked influence upon the situa- 
 tion near Richmond. The Confederate authorities had hoped 
 for such a successful issue in the Valley as should relieve Rich- 
 mond of much of Grant's pressure. The disappointment of 
 this hope left the Federal frontier secure, and gave Grant a 
 large accession of strength, for which Lee had no compensation, 
 except the debris of a defeated and dispirited army. 
 
 The aggregate of military disasters with which the year 18G-1 
 terminated, established the inevitable failure of the Confeder- 
 acy, unless more vigorous measures- than the Government had 
 ever yet attempted should be adopted, and unless the jieople 
 were prepared for sacrifices which had not yet been exacted. 
 The reserves of men, which the various acts of conscription 
 were designed to place in the field, were exhausted, or beyond 
 the reach of the Government, and the supplies of the army 
 became more and more precarious each day. There was, in- 
 deed, nothing fatal as affecting the ultimate decision of the 
 contest, in the military events of the past year, if unattended 
 38 
 
594 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 by a decay of public spirit. It was not until the winter of 
 1864-1865 that any considerable body of the Southern people 
 were brought to the conviction that their struggle was a hope- 
 less one. The waste of war is in nothing more continuous than 
 in its test of the moral energy of communities. In the last 
 winter of the war the distrust of the popular mind was 
 painfully apparent. The South began to read its fate when 
 it saw that the North had converted warfare into universal 
 destruction and desolation, and when it exchanged the code 
 of civilized war for the grim butchery of Grant, and the savage 
 measures of Sherman and Sheridan. It was plain that while 
 the losses of the Federal army were shocking, and were suffi- 
 cient to have unnerved the army and the people of the North, 
 the "attrition" of General Grant had caused a fearful dimi- 
 nution of the Confederate armies. 
 
 The facility of the Federal Government in repairing its 
 losses of men, baffled all previous calculation in the Confeder- 
 acy, and it had long since become evident that the resources 
 of the North, in all other respects, Avere equal to an indefinite 
 endurance. Indeed, it has been justly said that the material 
 resources of the North were not seriously tested, but merely 
 developed by the war. Peculiarly disheartening to the South 
 was the triumph of the Republican party in the reelection of 
 Mr. Lincoln — an event plainly portending a protraction of the 
 war upon a scale, M'hich should adequately employ the in- 
 exhaustible means at the command of the Federal Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 It would be needless to speculate now as to the material 
 capacity of the South to have met the demands of another 
 campaign. The military capacity of the Confederacy in the 
 last months of the war, is not to be measured by the number 
 
DESPONDENCY OF THE SOUTH. 595 
 
 of men that still might have been brought to the field, or by 
 the material means which yet survived the consumption and 
 waste of war. These considerations are admissible only in 
 connection with that moral condition of the public, which 
 fitted or disqualified it for longer enduranoo of the privations 
 and sacrifices of the war. Long before the close of winter, 
 popular feeling assumed a phase of sullen indifference which, 
 w^hile yet averse to unconditional submission to the North, 
 manifestly despaired of* ultimate success, viewed additional 
 sacrifices as hopeless, and anticipated the worst. 
 
 Only a hasty and ill-informed judgment could condemn the 
 Southern people for the decay of its spirit in this last stage 
 of the war. No people ever endured with more heroism the 
 trials and privations incidental to their situation. Yet these 
 sacrifices appeared to have been to no purpose; a cruel and 
 inexorable fate seemed to pursue them, and to taunt them with 
 the futility of exertion to escape its decree. Victories, which 
 had amazed the world, and again and again stunned a powerful 
 adversary, and which the South felt that, under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances, should have secured the reward of independence, 
 W'Cre recurred to only as making more bitter the chagrin of 
 the present. Previous defeats, at the time seeming fatal, had 
 been patiently encountered, and bravely surmounted, so long 
 as victory appeared to offer a reward which should compen- 
 sate for the sacrifice necessary to obtain it. But, now, even 
 the hope of victory had almost ceased to be a source of en- 
 couragement, since any probable success would only tend to 
 a postponement of the inevitable catastrophe, which, perhaps, 
 it would be better to invite than to defer. 
 
 It must be confessed, too, that the people and the army of 
 the Confederacy, in this crisis, found but little source of re- 
 
596 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 animation in the example of a majority of its public men. 
 Long before the taint of demoralization reached the heart of 
 the masses, the Confederate cause had been despaired of by 
 men whose influence and position determined the convictions 
 of whole communities. In President Davis and General Lee 
 the South saw conspicuous examples of resolution, fortitude, 
 and self-abnegation. It is not to be denied that the impatient 
 and almost despairing temper of the public was visibly influ- 
 enced by the persistent crimination of Mr. Davis, by the fac- 
 tion which sought to thwart him even at the hazard of the 
 public welfire. But when it was discovered that the unity of 
 counsel and purpose which had animated the President and 
 General Lee at every stage of the struggle, was still main- 
 tained, popular sympathy still clung to the leader, whose un- 
 selfish devotion and unshaken fortitude should have been a 
 sufficient rebuke to his accusers. 
 
 A vast deal of misrepresentation has been indulged to show 
 that Mr. Davis had become unpopular in the last stage of the 
 war, and that he was the object of popular reproach as chiefly 
 responsible for the condition of the country. To the contrary, 
 there were many evidences of the sympathy which embraced 
 INIr. Davis as probably the chief sufferer from apprehended 
 calamities. His appearance in public in Eichmond, was al- 
 ways the occasion of unrestrained popular enthusiasm. Even 
 but a few weeks before the final catastrophe, there were signal 
 instances of the popular affection for him, and it was painfully 
 evident to those who knew his character, that these demon- 
 strations were accepted by him as an exhibition of popular 
 confidence in the success of the cause. Indeed, the very con- 
 fidence which these exhibitions of popular sympathy produced 
 in the mind of Mr. Davis, has been urged as an evidence of 
 
MR. DAVIS' HOPES. 597 
 
 a want of sagacity, which disqualified him for a clear apprecia- 
 tion of the situation of affairs. 
 
 Perhaps with more color of truth than usual, this view of 
 Mr. Davis' character has been presented. That he did not 
 fully comprehend the wide-spread demoralization of the South 
 in the last months of the war, is hardly to be questioned. 
 Judging men by his own exalted nature, he conceived it im- 
 possible that the South could ever abandon its hope of inde- 
 pendence. He did not realize how men could cherish an aspi- 
 ration for the future, which did not embrace the liberty of 
 their country. JSTo sacrifice of personal interests or hopes 
 were, in his view, too great to be demanded of the country 
 in behalf of a cause, for which he was at all times ready to 
 surrender his life. Of such devotion and self-abnegation, a 
 sanguine and resolute spirit was the natural product, and it is 
 a paltry view of such qualities to characterize them as the 
 proof of defective intellect. Just such qualities have won the 
 battles of liberty in all ages. Washington, at Valley Forge, 
 with a wretched remnant of an army, which was yet the last 
 hope of the country, and with even a more gloomy future im- 
 mediately before him, declared that in the last emergency he 
 would retreat to the mountains of Virginia, and there continue 
 the struggle in the hope that he would "yet lift the flag of 
 his bleeding country from the dust." In the same spirit Jef- 
 ferson Davis would never have abandoned the Confederate 
 cause so long as it had even a semblance of popular supp(jrt. 
 
 Almost to the last moment of the Confederacy, he continued 
 to cherish the hope of a reaction in the public mind, which he 
 believed would be immediately kindled to its old enthusiasm by 
 a decided success. It was in recognition of this quality of in- 
 flexible purpose, as much as of any other trait of his character. 
 
598 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 that the South originally intrusted Davis with leadershijj. 
 Fit leaders .of revolutions are not usually found in men of 
 half-hearted purpose, wanting in resolution themselves, and 
 doubting the fidelity of those whom they govern. Desperate 
 trial is the occasion which calls forth the courage of those truly 
 great men, who, while ordinary men despair, confront agony 
 itself with sublime resolution. 
 
 If ingenuity and malignity have combined to exaggerate 
 the faults of Mr. Davis, the love of his countrymen, the can- 
 dor of honorable enemies, and the intelligence of mankind have 
 recognized his intellectual and moral greatness. The world 
 to-day does not aflPord such an example of those blended qual- 
 ities which constitute the title to universal excellence. For 
 one in his position, the leader of a bold, warlike, intelligent, 
 and discerning people, there was demanded that union of ardor 
 and deliberation which he so peculiarly illustrated. Revolu- 
 tionary periods imperatively demand this union of capacities 
 for thought and action. The peculiar charm of Mr. Davis is 
 the perfect poise of his faculities ; an almost exact adjustment 
 of qualities; of indomitable energy and winning grace; heroic 
 courage and tender affection ; strength of character, and almost 
 excessive compassion ; of calculating judgment and knightly 
 sentiment ; acute penetration and analysis ; comprehensive per- 
 ception; laborious habits, and almost universal knowledge. 
 Of him it may be said as of Hamilton : " He wore the blended 
 wreath of arms, of law, of statesmanship, of oratory, of letters, 
 of scholarship, of practical affairs;" and in most of these fields 
 of distinction, Mr. Davis has few rivals among the public 
 men of America. 
 
 But it is altogether a fallacious supposition that the mili- 
 tary situation of the Confederacy, in the last winter of the 
 
THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS. 599 
 
 "war, -was beyond reclamation. The most liasty glance at the 
 situation revealed the feasibility of destroying Sherman, when 
 he turned northward from Savannah, with a proper concen- 
 tration of the forces yet available. President Davis anxiously 
 sought to secure this concentration, but was disappointed by 
 causes which need not here be related. With Sherman de- 
 feated, the Confederacy must have obtained a new lease of 
 life, as all the territory which he had overrun, would immedi- 
 ately be recovered, and the worthless title of his conquests 
 would be apparent, even to the North. There were indeed 
 many aspects of the situation encouraging to enterprise, could 
 an adequate army be obtained, and the heart of the country 
 reanimated. President Davis was not alone in the indulgence 
 of hope of better fortune. Again he had the sanction of Lee's 
 name in confirmation of his hopes, and in support of the meas- 
 ures which he recommended. 
 
 But the resolution of the President was not sustained by the 
 cooperation of Congress. The last session of that body was 
 commemorated by a signal display of timidity and vacillation. 
 Congress assembled in November, and at the beginning of its 
 session its nerve was visibly shaken. Before its adjournment 
 in March, there was no longer even a pretense of organized 
 opinion and systematic legislation. Its occupation during the 
 winter was mainly crimination of the President, and a con- 
 temptible frivolity, which at last provoked the hearty disgust 
 of the public. The calibre of the last Confederate Congress 
 may be correctly estimated, when it is stated that as late as 
 the 22d of February, 1865, less than sixty days before the fldl 
 of Richmond, that body was earnestly engaged in devising a 
 new flag for the Confederacy. 
 
 Not a single measure of importance was adopted without 
 
600 LIFE OF JEFFEKSON DAVIS. 
 
 some emasculating clause, or without such postponement as 
 made it practically inoperative. Of all the vigorous sug- 
 gestions of Mr. Davis for recruiting the army, mobilizing the 
 subsistence, and renovating the material condition of the coun- 
 try, hardly one was adopted in a practicable shape. Congress 
 had clearly despaired of the cause. It had not the courage to 
 counsel the submission, of which it secretly felt the necessity, 
 and left the capital with a declaration that the " conquest of 
 the Confederacy was geographically impossible," yet clearly 
 attesting by its flight a very different view of the situation. 
 
 The history of the Congress of the Confederate States is a 
 record of singular imbecility and irresolution. It was a body 
 without leaders, without po^^ular sympathy, without a single 
 one of those heroic attributes which are usually evoked in peri- 
 ods of revolution. It may safely be asserted that in the history 
 of no other great revolution does the statesmanship of its legis- 
 lators appear so contemptible, when compared with the military 
 administration which guided its armies. Whatever may be 
 the estimate of the executive ability of the Confederate admin- 
 istration, it can not be denied that its courage was abundant ; 
 nor can it be questioned that the courage of Congress often 
 required the spur of popular sentiment. In the wholesale 
 condemnation of Mr. Davis by a class of writers, it is remark- 
 able that the defective legislation of the Confederacy should be 
 accredited with so little influence in producing its failure. If 
 he was so grossly incompetent, what must be the verdict of his- 
 tory upon a body which, for four years, submitted to a ruinous 
 administration when the corrective means were in its own 
 hands ? 
 
 Of Mr. Davis' relations with Congress, Ex-Secretary Mal- 
 lory writes as follows : 
 
MK. DAVIS' RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS. 601 
 
 " I have said that his relations with members of Congress were 
 not what they should have been, nor were they what they might 
 have been. Towards them, as towards the world generally, he wore 
 his personal opinions very openly. Position and opportunity pre- 
 sented him every means of cultivating the personal good-will of 
 members by little acts of attention, courtesy, or deference, which 
 no man, however high in his position, who has to work by means 
 of his fellows, can dispense with. Grreat minds can, in spite of 
 the absence of these demonstrations towards them in a leader — 
 nay, in the face of neglect or apparent disrespect — go on steadily 
 and bravely, with a single eye to the public welfare ; but the 
 number of these in comparison to those who are more or less 
 governed by personal considerations in the discharge of their 
 public duties is small. While he was ever frank and cordial to 
 his friends, and to all whom he believed to be embarked heart 
 and soul in the cause of Southern independence, he would not, 
 and, we think, could not, sacrifice a smile, an inflection of the 
 voice, or a demonstration of attention to flatter the self-love of 
 any man, in or out of Congress, who did not stand in this relation. 
 Acting himself for the public welfare, regardless of self or the opin- 
 ions of others, he placed too light a value upon the thousand nameless 
 influences by which he might have brought others up, apparently, 
 to his own high moral standard. By members of Congress, who 
 had to see him on business, his reception of them was frequently 
 complained of as ungracious. They frequently, in their anxiety 
 amidst public disaster, called upon him to urge plans, suggestions, 
 or views on the conduct of the war, or for the attainment of peace, 
 and often pressed matters upoQ him which he had very carefully 
 considered, and for which he alone was responsible. 
 
 "Often, in such cases, though he listened to all they had to say — 
 why, for example, some man should be made a brigadier, major 
 or lieutenant-general, or placed at the head of an army, etc. — and 
 in return calmly and precisely stated his reasons against the 
 
602 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 measure, he at times failed to satisfy or convince them, simply 
 because, in his manner and language combined, there was just an 
 indescribable something which oifended their self-esteem. Some 
 of his best friends left him at times with feelings bordering 
 closely upon anger from this cause, and with a determination, 
 hastily formed, of calling no more upon him ; and some of the 
 most sensible and patriotic men of both Houses were alienated 
 from him more or less from this cause. The counsel of judicious 
 friends upon this subject, and as to more unrestrained intercourse 
 between him and the members of the Senate and the House, was 
 vainly exerted. His manly, fearless, true, and noble nature turned 
 from what to him wore the faintest approach to seeking popularity, 
 and he scorned to believe it necessary to coax men to do their 
 duty to their country in her darkest hour of need," 
 
 "When Congress assembled in November it was plain that 
 the army must have other means of recruiting than from the 
 remnant yet left by the conscription. There was but one 
 measure by which the requisite numbers could be supplied, 
 and that was the extension of the conscription to the slave 
 population. Public sentiment was at first much divided upon 
 this subject, but gradually the propriety of the measure was 
 made evident, and something like a renewal of hope was man- 
 ifested at the prospect of making use of an element which the 
 enemy so efficiently employed. President Davis had, for months 
 previous, contemplated the enlistment of the slaves for service 
 in various capacities in the field. In the last winter of the 
 war he strongly urged a negro enrollment, as did General Lee, 
 whose letter to a member of Congress eventually convinced the 
 country of its necessity. 
 
 Whatever may have been the merits of the proposition to 
 arm the slaves, as a means of renovating the military condition 
 
VACILLATING COURSE OF CONGRESS. G03 
 
 of the Confederacy, the dilatory action of Congress left no hope 
 of its practical execution. The discussion upon this subject 
 continued during the entire session, and was at last terminated 
 by the adoption of a bill providing for the reception of such 
 slaves into the service as might be tendered by their masters. 
 Mr. Davis and General Lee both advocated the extension of 
 freedom to such of the slaves as would volunteer, and this was 
 clearly the only system of enrollment upon which they could 
 be efficiently employed. But even though the slave-holding 
 interest had not thus emasculated the measure, by refusing 
 emancipation, it was too late to hope for any results of impor- 
 tance. The bill was not passed until three weeks before the 
 fall of Richmond. 
 
 But Congress found congenial employment in giving vent 
 to its partisan malignity, by the adoption of measures plainly 
 designed to humiliate the Executive, and with no expectation 
 of improving the condition of the Confederacy, which most 
 of its members believed to be already beyond reclamation. 
 In this spirit was dictated the measure making General Lee 
 virtually a military dictator, and that expressing want of con- 
 fidence in the cabinet. All of this action of Congress was 
 extra-official, and subversive of the constitutional authority 
 of the Executive, but it utterly failed in its obvious design. 
 
 President Davis never made a more noble display of feeling, 
 than in his response to the resolution of the Virginia Legisla- 
 ture recommending the appointment of General Lee to the 
 command of the armies of the Confederacy. Said he : " The 
 opinion expressed by the General Assembly in regard to Gen- 
 eral R. E. Lee has my full concurrence. Virginia can not 
 have a higher regard for him, or greater confidence in his 
 character and ability, than is entertained by me. When Gen- 
 
604 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 eral Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he 
 was in command of all the armies of the Confederate States 
 by my order of assignment. He continued in this general 
 command, as well as in the immediate command of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia, as long as I could resist his opinion 
 that it was necessary for him to be relieved from one of these 
 two duties. Ready as he has ever shown himself to be to per- 
 form any service that I desired him to render to his country, 
 he left it for me to choose between his withdrawal from the 
 command of the army in the field, and relieving him of the 
 general command of all the armies of the Confederate States. 
 It was only when satisfied of this necessity that I came to the 
 conclusion to relieve him from the general command, believ- 
 ing that the safety of the capital and the success of our cause 
 depended, in a great measure, on then retaining him in the 
 command in the field of the Army of Northern Virginia. On 
 several subsequent occasions, the desire, on my part to enlarge 
 the sphere of General Lee's usefulness, has led to renewed 
 consideration of the subject, and he has always expressed his 
 inability to assun\e command of other armies than those now 
 confided to him, unless relieved of the immediate command in 
 the field of that now opposed to General Grant." 
 
 A striking indication of the feverish condition of the pub- 
 lic mind of both sections, during the last winter of the war, 
 was the ready credence given to the most extravagant and im- 
 probable rumors. Washington correspondents of Northern 
 newspapers declared that the air of the Federal capital was 
 " thick with rumors of negotiation." At Richmond this cred- 
 ulous disposition was even more marked. Men were found as 
 late as the middle of March, who believed that President Da- 
 vis had actually formed an alliance, offensive and defensive, 
 
THE "blaie mission." 605 
 
 ■with the French Emperor. In the month of January the 
 rumors as to peace negotiations assumed a more definite shape, 
 in the arrival of Mr. Francis P. Blair at the Confederate 
 capital. 
 
 It is remarkable that the "Blair mission" and its sequel, 
 the Hampton Roads conference, though palpably contemplat- 
 ing only the discussion of such mere generalities as belong to 
 other efforts at peace at different stages of the war, and, indeed, 
 introducing nothing in the shape of formal negotiation, should 
 have been dignified as a most important episode. Equally 
 remarkable, in view of the published proceedings of the Hamp- 
 ton Roads conference, is the disposition to censure President 
 Davis for having designedly interposed obstacles to the con- 
 summation of peace. Mr. Blair visited Richmond by the 
 permission of President Lincoln, but without any official au- 
 thority, and without having the objects of his mission com- 
 mitted to paper. In short, Mr. Blair's mission had no official 
 character, and he came to Richmond to prevail upon Mr. 
 Davis to encourage, in some manner, preliminary steps to 
 negotiation. In his interviews with the Confederate President, 
 IMr. Blair disclaimed the official countenance of the Federal 
 authorities for the objects of his visit. It was known to the 
 world, that Mr. Davis, upon repeated occasions, had avowed 
 his desire for peace upon any terms consistent with the honor 
 of his country, and that he would not present difficulties as 
 to forms in the attainment of that object, at this critical pe- 
 riod. Hence, despite the unauthorized nature of Mr. Blair's 
 conciliatory efforts, Mr. Davis gave him a letter, addressed 
 to himself, avowing the willingness of the Confederate authori- 
 ties to begin negotiations, to send or receive commissioners 
 authorized to treat, and to "renew the effort to enter into a 
 
606 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 conference, with a view to secure peace between the two coun- 
 tries." 
 
 Mr. Lincoln, in a letter to Mr. Blair, acknowledged having 
 read Mr. Davis' note, and avowed his readiness to receive an 
 agent from Mr. Davis, or from the authority resisting the 
 Federal Government, to confer with him informally, with the 
 view of restoring peace to the people of " our common coun- 
 try." 
 
 The commissioners appointed by Mr. Davis, after this notifi- 
 cation, were Vice-President Stephens, Senator Hunter, and 
 Judge Campbell. The conference was held on a steamer lying 
 in Hampton Roads, between the three Confederate commission- 
 ers and Messrs. Lincoln and Seward. By both sides the inter- 
 view was treated as informal ; there were neither notes nor 
 secretaries, nor did the interview assume any other shape than 
 an irregular conversation. During the four hours of desul- 
 tory discussion, there was developed no basis of negotiation, 
 no ground of possible agreement. Mr. Lincoln declared that 
 he would consent to no truce or suspension of hostilities, ex- 
 cept upon the single condition of the disbandment of the Con- 
 federate forces, and the submission of the revolted States to the 
 authority of the Union. The result was simply the assertion, 
 in a more arrogant form, of the Federal ultimatum — the un- 
 conditional submission of the South, its acquiescence in all the 
 unconstitutional legislation of the Federal Congress respecting 
 slavery, including emancipation, and the right to legislate upon 
 the-subject of the relations between the white and black pop- 
 ulations of each State. Mr. Lincoln, moreover, refused to treat 
 with the authorities of the Confederate States, or with the 
 States separately ; declared that the consequences of the estab- 
 lishment of the Federal authority would have to be accepted, 
 
THE " BLAIR MISSION." 607 
 
 and declined giving any guarantee whatever, except an in- 
 definite assurance of a liberal use of the pardoning power, 
 towards those who were assumed to have made themselves 
 liable to the pains and penalties of the laws of tlic United 
 States. 
 
 The statement of the Confederate commissioners, and all the 
 known facts of the transaction, demonstrate, without argument, 
 the injustice of holding Mr. Davis responsible, to any extent, 
 for the results of the Hampton Roads conference. With one 
 voice the South accepted the result as establishing the purpose 
 of the Federal Government to exact "unconditional submis- 
 sion," as the only condition of peace, and scorned the insolent 
 demand of the enemy. If the South had shown itself willing 
 to accept the terms of the Federal Government, or if Mr. 
 Lincoln had suggested other propositions than that of uncon- 
 ditional submission, then only could Mr. Davis be charged 
 with having presented obstacles to the termination of the war. 
 
 Nor is it to be assumed that the terms of his letter to Mr. 
 Blair, referring to his desire for peace between the " two coun- 
 tries," precluded negotiation upon the basis of reunion. His lan- 
 guage was that of a proper diplomacy, which should not com- 
 mit the error of yielding in advance to the demands of an 
 enemy, then insolent in what he regarded as the assurance of 
 certain victory. Tlie period was opportune for magnanimity 
 on the part of the North, but not propitious for the display of 
 over-anxious concession by the South. Mr. DaVis was at this 
 time anxious for propositions from the Federal Government, 
 for, while he had not despaired of the Confederacy, he was 
 deeply impressed with the increasing obstacles to its success. 
 His frequent declaration, at this time, was : " I am solicitous 
 only for the good of the people, and am indifferent as to the 
 
608 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 forms by which the public interests are to be subserved/' 
 Indeed, the Federal authorities had ample assurance that Mr. 
 Davis would present any basis of settlement, Avhicli might be 
 offered, to the several States of the Confederacy for their indi- 
 vidual action. Nor did he doubt the acceptance of reconstruc- 
 tion, without slavery even, by several of the States — an event 
 which would have left the Confederacy too weak for further 
 resistance. 
 
 In view of the consistent record of INIr. Davis, during the 
 entire period of the war, to promote the attainment of peace, 
 it is remarkable that there should ever have been an allega- 
 tion of a contrary disposition. In a letter, written in 1864, 
 to Governor Vance, of North Carolina, he conclusively stated 
 his course upon the subject of peace. Said Mr. Davis, in this 
 letter: 
 
 " We have made three distinct efforts to communicate with the 
 authorities at Washington, and have been invariably unsuccessful. 
 Commissioners were sent before hostilities were begun, and the 
 Washington Government refused to receive them or hear what 
 they had to say. A second time, I sent a military officer with a 
 communication addressed by myself to President Lincoln. The 
 letter was received by General Scott, who did not permit the offi- 
 cer to see Mr, Lincoln, but promised that an answer would be 
 sent. No answer has ever been received. The third time, a few 
 months ago, a gentleman was sent, whose position, character, and 
 reputation were such as to ensure his reception, if the enemy 
 were not determined to receive no proposals whatever from the 
 Government. Vice-President Stephens made a patriotic tender 
 of his services in the hope of being able to promote the cause 
 of humanity, and, although little belief was entertained of his suc- 
 cess, I cheerfully yielded to his suggestions, that the experiment 
 
MR. DAVIS' VIEWS AS TO PEACE. 609 
 
 stould be tried. The enemy refused to let him pass through 
 their lines or hold any conference with them. He was stopped 
 before he ever reached Fortress Monroe, on his way to Wash- 
 ington. . ... 
 
 " If we will break up our Government, dissolve the Confederacy, 
 disband our armies, emancipate our slaves, take an oath of alle- 
 giance, binding ourselves to obedience to him and of disloyalty to 
 our own States, he proposes to pardon us, and not to plunder us of 
 any thing more than the property already stolen from us, and such 
 slaves as still remain. In order to render his proposals so insulting 
 as to secure their rejection, he joins to them a promise to support 
 with his army one-tenth of the people of any State who will at- 
 tempt to set up a government over the other nine-tenths, thus 
 seeking to sow discord and suspicion among the people of the sev- 
 eral States, and to excite them to civil war in furtherance of his 
 ends. I know well it would be impossible to get your people, if 
 they possessed full knowledge of these facts, to consent that propo- 
 sals should now be made by us to those who control the Govern- 
 ment at Washington. Your own well-known devotion to the great 
 cause of liberty and independence, to which we have all committed 
 whatever we have of earthly possessions, would induce you to take 
 the lead in repelling the bare thought of abject submission to the 
 enemy. Yet peace on other terms is now impossible." 
 
 The spirit in which the South received the results of the 
 Hampton Roads conference is to be correctly Cbtiniated by the 
 following extract from a Richmond newspaper, of date Feb- 
 ruary 15, 1865 : 
 
 " The world can again, for the hundredth time, see conclusive 
 
 evidence in the history and sequel of the ' Blair mission,' the 
 
 blood-guiltiness of the enemy, and their responsibility for the 
 
 ruin, desolation, and suffering which have followed, and will yet 
 
 39 
 
610 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 follow, their heartless attempts to subjugate and destroy an inno- 
 cent people. The South again wins honor from the good, the 
 magnanimous, the truly brave every-where by her efforts to stop 
 the effusion of blood, save the lives and the property of her own 
 citizens, and to stop, too, the slaughter of the victims of the 
 enemy's cruelty, which has forced or deceived them into the ranks 
 of his armies. We have lost nothing by our efforts in behalf of 
 peace; for, waiving all consideration of the reanimation and re- 
 union of our people, occasioned by Lincoln's haughty rejection of 
 our commissioners, we have added new claims upon the sympathy 
 and respect of the world and posterity, which will not fail to be 
 remembered to our honor, in the history of this struggle, even 
 though we should finally perish in it. The position of the South 
 at this moment is indeed one which should stamp her as the 
 champion, not only of popular rights and self-government, which 
 Americans have so much cherished, but as the champion of the 
 spirit of humanity in both sections ; for it can not be supposed 
 that we have all the sorrows as well as sufferings of this war to 
 endure, and that there are no desolate homes, no widows and or- 
 phans, no weeds nor cypress in the enemy's country 
 
 "One fact is certain, that whatever Seward's design may have 
 been, and whatever its success may be, the Confederacy has derived 
 an immediate advantage from the visit of our commissioners to 
 Fortress Monroe. Nothing could have so served to reanimate the 
 courage and patriotism of our people, as his attempted imposition 
 of humiliation upon us. Lincoln will hear no more talk of 
 ' peace ' and ' negotiation ' from the Southern side, for now we are 
 united as one man in the purpose of self-preservation and venge- 
 ance, and it may not be long before his people, now rioting in 
 excessive exultation over successes really valueless, and easily 
 counter-balanced by one week of prosperous fortune for the South, 
 will tremble at the manifestation of the spirit which they have 
 aroused." 
 
DELUSIVE INDICATIONS. 611 
 
 But the evidences of popular reanimation in the South were 
 delusive. For a brief moment there was a spirit of fierce and 
 almost desperate resolution. At a meeting held in the African 
 church, in Richmond, President Davis delivered one of his most 
 eloquent popular orations, and the enthusiasm was perhaps 
 greater than upon any similar occasion during the war. But 
 popular feeling soon lapsed into the sullen despondency, from 
 which it had been temporarily aroused by the unparalleled 
 insult of the enemy. Yet the ulthnatum of Mr. Lincoln, and 
 the declared will of the South, left President Davis no other 
 policy than a continuation of the struggle, with a view to the 
 best attainable results. Upon this course he was now fully 
 resolved, looking to the future with serious apprehension, not 
 altogether unrelieved by hope. 
 
 The report of the Hampton Roads conference and its results, 
 was made by President Davis, to Congress, on the 5th Feb- 
 ruary : 
 
 " To the Senate and House of Representatives 
 
 of the Confederate States of America : 
 
 " Having recently received a written notification, vrhieh satisfied 
 me that the President of the United States was disposed to confer, 
 informally, with unofficial agents that might be sent by me, with a 
 view to the restoration of peace, I requested Hon. Alexander H. 
 Stephens, Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, and Hon. Jobn A. Campbell, to 
 proceed through our lines, to hold a conference with Mr. Lincoln, 
 or such persons as he might depute to represent him. 
 
 " I herewith submit, for the information of Congress, the report 
 of the eminent citizens above named, showing that the enemy re- 
 fuse to enter into negotiations with the Confederate States, or any 
 one of them separately, or to give our people any other terms or 
 guarantees than those which a conqueror may grant, or permit us 
 
612 LIFE OP JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 to have peace on any other basis than our unconditional submission 
 to their rule, coupled with the acceptance of their recent legisla- 
 tion, including an amendment to the Constitution for the emancipa- 
 tion of negro slaves, and with the right, on the part of the Federal 
 Congress, to legislate on the subject of the relations between the 
 white and black population of each State. 
 
 "Such is, as I understand, the effect of the amendment to the 
 Constitution, which has been adopted by the Congress of the United 
 
 States. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 " Executive Office, Feb. 5, 1865." 
 
 "Richmond, Va., February 5, 1865. 
 *' To the President of the Confederate States — 
 
 "Sir: Under your letter of appointment of 28th ult., we pro- 
 ceeded to seek an informal conference with Abraham Lincoln, 
 President of the United States, upon the subject mentioned in 
 your letter. 
 
 " The conference was granted, and took place on the 3d inst., 
 on board a steamer anchored in Hampton Roads, where we met 
 President Lincoln and Hon. Mr. Seward, Secretary of State of the 
 United States. It continued for several hours, and was both full 
 and explicit. 
 
 " We learned from them that the Message of President Lincoln 
 to the Congress of the United States, in December last, explains 
 clearly and distinctly, his sentiments as to terms, conditions, and 
 method of proceeding by which peace can be secured to the peo- 
 ple, and we were not informed that they would be modified or 
 altered to obtain that end. We understood from him that no 
 terms or proposals of any treaty or agreement looking to an ulti- 
 mate settlement would be entertained or made by him with the 
 authorities of the Confederate States, because that would be a rec- 
 ognition of their existence as a separate power, which, under no 
 
OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE. 613 
 
 circumstances, would be done; aud, for like reasons, that no such 
 terms would be entertained by him from States separately ; that no 
 extended truce or armistice, as at present advised, would be granted 
 or allowed without satisfactory assurance, in advance, of complete 
 restoration of the authority of the Constitution and laws of the 
 United States over all places within the States of the Confederacy ; 
 that whatever consequences may follow from the reestablishmeut 
 of that authority must be accepted, but the individuals subject to 
 pains and penalties, under the laws of the United States, might 
 rely upon a very liberal use of the power confided to him to remit 
 those pains and penalties if peace be restored. 
 
 " During the conference the proposed amendments to the Con- 
 stitution of the United States, adopted by Congress on the 31st 
 ult., wei'e brought to our notice. These amendments provide that 
 neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except for crime, should 
 exist within the United States or any place within their jurisdic- 
 tion, and that Congress should have the power to enforce this 
 amendment by appropriate legislation. 
 
 " Of all the correspondence that preceded the conference herein 
 mentioned, and leading to the same, you have heretofore been in- 
 formed. Very respectfully, your obedient servants, 
 
 "ALEX. H. STEPHENS, 
 "R. M. T. HUNTER, 
 "J. A. CAMPBELL." 
 
614 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EARLY PART OF 1865 — LAST PHASE OF THE MILI- 
 TARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY — THE PLAN TO CRUSH SHERMAN — CALM 
 
 DEMEANOR OF PRESIDENT DAVIS CHEERFULNESS OF GENERAL LEE THE 
 
 QUESTION AS TO THE SAFETY OF RICHMOND WEAKNESS OF GENERAL LEE^S 
 
 ARMY PREPARATIONS TO EVACUATE RICHMOND BEFORE THE CAJIPAIGN 
 
 OPENED A NEW BASIS OF HOPE WHAT WAS TO BE REASONABLY ANTICI- 
 PATED — THE CONTRACTED THEATRE OF WAR THE FATAL DISASTERS AT 
 
 PETERSBURG MR. DAVIS RECEIVES THE INTELLIGENCE WHILE IN CHURCH — 
 
 RICHMOND EVACUATED — PRESIDENT DAVIS AT DANVILLE — HIS PROCLAMATION 
 — SURRENDER OP LEE — DANVILLE EVACUATED — THE LAST OFFICIAL INTER- 
 VIEW OF MR. DAVIS WITH GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD — HIS AR- 
 RIVAL AT CHARLOTTE — INCIDENTS AT CHARLOTTE — REJECTION OF THE SHER- 
 MAN-JOHNSTON SETTLEMENT MR. DAVIs' INTENTIONS AFTER THAT EVESTT 
 
 HIS MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD — INTERESTING DETAILS CAPTURE OF MR. DA- 
 VIS AND HIS IMPRISONMENT AT FORTRESS MONROE. * 
 
 MILITARY operations in the first three months of 1865 
 tended to the concentration of forces upon the greatly-re- 
 duced theatre of war, which was now confined mainly to Virginia 
 and North Carolina. The developments of each day indicated 
 the near approach of critical and decisive events. With Sher- 
 man sweeping through the Carolinas, and the Confederate 
 forces retiring before him ; with Wilmington, the last port of 
 the Confederacy, captured, and a new base thus secured for a 
 column auxiliary to Sherman, it was evident that but a short 
 time would develope a grand struggle, which should not only 
 decide the fate of Richmond, but which should involve nearly 
 the entire force at the command of the Confederacy^ 
 
COXFEDERATE PLANS. 615 
 
 The last definite phase of the military policy of the Confed- 
 erate authorities, previous to the fall of the capital, was the 
 design of concentration for the destruction of Sherman, who 
 was rapidly approaching the Virginia border. This would, of 
 course, necessitate the abandonment of Richmond, with a view 
 to the junction of the armies of Lee and Johnston. The latter 
 officer, with the remnant of Hood's army, and other fragment- 
 ^ary commands, confronted Sherman's array — forty thousand 
 strong — with a force of about twenty-five thousand men. 
 When Lee's army should unite with Johnston's, the Confed- 
 erate strength would approximate sixty thousand — a force 
 ample to overwhelm Sherman. 
 
 The success of this design was mainly dependent upon the 
 question of the time of its execution. If the concentration 
 against Sherman should be attempted prematurely, that Fed- 
 eral commander would be warned of his danger in time to 
 escape to the coast, or to retire until reenforcements from 
 Grant should reach him. It was thus highly important that 
 Sherman should advance sufficiently far to preclude his safe 
 retreat, while, at the same time, the distance between Lee and 
 Johnston should be shortened. On the other hand, if the 
 concentration should be delayed too long, General Grant might, 
 by a vigorous assault upon Lee, either hold the latter in his 
 works at Petersburg, or cut off his retreat, either of which 
 events would defeat the proposed concentration. In the se- 
 quel, the activity of Grant, his overwhelming numbers, and 
 the timely arrival of Sheridan's cavalry, after the latter had 
 failed in his original design against Lynchburg and the Con- 
 federate communications, precipitated a catastrophe, which not 
 only prevented the consummation of this design, but speedily 
 proved fatal to the Confederacy. 
 
616 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 There was nothing in the cahn exterior of President Davis, 
 during the days of early spring, to indicate that he was then 
 meditating an abandonment of that capital, for the safety of 
 which he had striven during four years of solicitude, and in 
 the defense of which the flower of Southern chivalry had been 
 sacrificed. There was no abatement of that self-possession, 
 which had so often proven invulnerable to the most trying ex- 
 igencies ; no alteration of that commanding mien, so typical of 
 resolution and self-reliance. To the despondent citizens of 
 Richmond, there was something of re-assurance in the firm and 
 elastic step of their President, as he walked, usually unattended, 
 through the Capitol Square to his office. His responses to the 
 respectful salutations of the children, who never failed to testify 
 their affection for him, were as genial and playful as ever, and 
 the slaves still boasted of the cordiality with which he ac- 
 knowledged their civility. 
 
 A similar cheerfulness was observed in General Lee. In 
 the last months of the war, it was a frequent observation that 
 General Lee appeared more cheerful in manner than upon 
 many occasions, when his army was engaged in its most suc- 
 cessful campaigns. Hon. William C Rives was quoted in the 
 Confederate Congress, as having said that General Lee " had 
 but a single thing to fear, and that was the spreading of a 
 causeless despondency among the people. Prevent this, and 
 all will be well. We have strength enough left to win our 
 independence, and we are certain to win it, if people do not 
 give way to foolish despair." --n^ 
 
 From the beginning of winter, the possibility of holding 
 Richmond was a matter of grave doubt to President Davis. 
 He had announced to the Confederate Congress that the cap- 
 ital was now menaced by greater perils than ever. Yet a 
 
PEEPAEATIONS TO EVACUATE RICHMOND. 617 
 
 proper consideration of the moral consequences of a loss of the 
 capital, not less than of the material injury which must result 
 from the loss of the manufacturing facilities of Richmond, dic- 
 tated the contemplation of its evacuation only as a measure 
 of necessity. When, however, the dilatory and vacillating ac- 
 tion of Congress baffled the President in all his vigorous and 
 timely measures, there was hardly room to doubt that the al- 
 ternative was forced upon General Lee of an early retreat or 
 an eventual surrender. When spring opened, the Army of 
 Northern Virginia was reduced to less than thirty-five thou- 
 sand men. With this inadequate force. General Lee was hold- 
 ing a line of forty miles, against an array nearly one hundred 
 and seventy-five thousand strong. A prompt conscription of 
 the slaves, upon the basis of emancipation, the President and 
 General Lee believed would have put at rest all anxiety for 
 the safety" of Richmond. But when the threadbare discus- 
 sions and timid spirit of Congress foretold the failure of this 
 measure, preparations were quietly begun for a retirement to 
 an interior line of defense. 
 
 These preparations were commenced early in February, and 
 were conducted with great caution. Mr. Davis did not believe 
 that the capture of Richmond entailed the loss of the Confed- 
 erate cause should Lee's and Johnston's armies remain intact. 
 That it diminished the probability of ultimate success was ob- 
 vious, but there was the anticipation of a new basis of hope, 
 in events not improbable, could Lee's army be successfully 
 carried from Petersburg. A thorough defeat of Sherman 
 would obviously recover at once the Carolinas and Georgia, 
 and give to the Confederacy a more enlarged jurisdiction and 
 more easy subsistence, than it had controlled for more than a 
 year. A reasonable anticipation was the re-awakening of the 
 
618 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 patriotic spirit of the people, and the return of thousands of 
 absentees to the army, as the immediate results of a decisive 
 defeat of Sherman. Then, even if it should prove that the 
 Confederacy could not cope with the remaining armies of the 
 enemy, it was confidently believed that the North, rather than 
 endure the sacrifices and doubts of another campaign, would 
 offer some terms not inconsistent with the honor of the South 
 to accept. At all events, resistance must continue until the 
 enemy abated his haughty demand of unconditional submis- 
 sion. 
 
 The movements of Sherman and Johnston reduced the the- 
 atre upon which the crisis was enacting to very contracted 
 limits. The fate of the Confederacy was to be decided in the 
 district between the Roanoke and James Rivers, and the At- 
 lantic Ocean and the Alleghanies. General Grant, fully ap- 
 prised of the extremities to which Lee was reduced, for weeks 
 kept his army in readiness to intercept the Confederate re- 
 treat. It was greatly to the interest of the Federal com- 
 mander that Lee should be held at Petersburg, since his su- 
 perior numbers must eventually give him possession of the 
 Southside Railroad, which was vital to Lee not only as a 
 means of subsistence, but as an avenue of escape. But Gen- 
 eral Grant, sooner than he anticipated, found an opportunity 
 for a successful detachment of a competent force against the 
 Southside Railroad by the arrival of Sheridan's cavalry, ten 
 thousand strong — as splendid a body of cavalry as ever took 
 the field. The swollen condition of James River had pre- 
 vented the consummation of Sheridan's original mission, which 
 was, after he had effectually destroyed all Lee's communica- 
 tions northward and westward, to capture Lynchburg, and 
 thence to pass rapidly southward to Sherman. Finding the 
 
lee's defeat. 619 
 
 river impassable, Sheridan retired in the direction of Rich- 
 mond, passed Lee's left wing, crossed the Pamunkey River, 
 and, by the 25th of March, had joined Grant before Peters- 
 burg. General Grant was not slow in the employment of this 
 timely accession. 
 
 The fatal disaster of Lee's defeat at Petersburg was the 
 battle of Five Forks, on the 1st of April, by which the enemy 
 secured the direct line of retreat to Danville. For, without 
 that event, the fate of Petersburg and Richmond was deter- 
 mined by the result of Grant's attack upon the Confederate 
 centre on the 2d of April. With all the roads on the south- 
 ern bank of the Appomattox in the possession of the enemy, 
 there remained only the line of retreat upon the northern side, 
 which was the longer route, while the pursuing enemy had all 
 the advantage of the interior line. But for that disadvantage, 
 Lee's escape would have been assured, and the Confederate 
 line of defense reestablished near the Roanoke River. 
 
 President Davis received the intelligence of the disasters 
 while seated in his pew in St. Paul's Church, where he had 
 been a communicant for nearly three years. The momentous 
 intelligence was conveyed to him by a brief note from the 
 War Department. General Lee's dispatch stated that his lines 
 had been broken, and that all eiforts to restore them had 
 proven unsuccessful. He advised preparations for the evacu- 
 ation of the city during the night, unless, in the meantime, 
 he should advise to the contrary. Mr. Davis immediately left 
 the church with his usual calm manner and measured tread.* 
 The tranquil demeanor of the President conveyed no indica- 
 
 * The author has seen an absurd statement, made without any inquiry 
 into the facts, that Mr. Davis was seen to turn "ghastly white" at the 
 moment of receivinff the intelligence of the disaster at Petersburg. It is 
 
620 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 tion of the nature of the communication. But the incident 
 was an unusual one, and, by the congregation, most of whom 
 had for days been burdened with the anticipations of disaster, 
 the unspoken intelligence was, to some extent, correctly in- 
 terpreted. 
 
 The family of Mr. Davis had been sent southward some days 
 before, and he was, therefore, under the necessity of little prepa- 
 ration for departure. Though his concern was obvious, his calm- 
 ness was remarkable. In this trying exigency in his personal 
 fortunes, he showed anxiety only for the fate of the country, 
 and sympathy for that devoted community from which he was 
 now compelled to separate 
 
 On the night of Sunday, April 2d, 1865, Mr. Davis, at- 
 tended by liis personal staff, members of his cabinet, and 
 attaches of the several departments, left Richmond, which 
 then ceased forever to be the capital of the Southern Confed- 
 eracy. In a few hours after, that city, whose defense will be 
 more famous than that of Saragossa, whose capture was for 
 four years the aspiration of armies aggregating more than a 
 million of men, became the spoil of a conqueror, and the 
 scene of a conflagration, in which " all the hopes of the South- 
 ern Confederacy were consumed in one day, as a scroll in the 
 fire." 
 
 In accordance with his original design of making a new 
 defensive line near the Roanoke River, Mr. Davis jDroceeded 
 
 simply one of a thousand other reckless calumnies, with as little founda- 
 tion as the rest. 
 
 We do not feel called upon here to relate the details of the evacuation 
 of Richmond and the occupation of the city by the Federal army. They 
 are, doubtless, known to every intelligent reader, and we are here spe- 
 cially concerned only in the movements of Mr. Davis. 
 
PROCLAMATION. 621 
 
 directly to Danville. His determination was to maintain the 
 Confederate authority upon the soil of Virginia, until driven 
 from it by force of arms. Reaching Danville on the 3d of 
 April, he issued, two days afterwards, the following proclama- 
 tion: 
 
 "D.VNVILLE, Va., April 5, 1865. 
 
 " The General-in-Chief found it necessary to make such move- 
 ments of his troops as to uncover the capital. It would be un- 
 wise to conceal the moral and material injury to our cause result- 
 ing from the occupation of our capital by the enemy. It is equally 
 unwise and unworthy of us to allow our own energies to falter, 
 and our eflForts to become relaxed under reverses, however calami- 
 tous they may be. For many months the largest and finest army 
 of the Confederacy, under a leader whose presence inspires equal 
 confidence in the troops and the people, has been greatly tram- 
 meled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over the ap- 
 proaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more 
 than one opportunity for promising enterprise. It is for us, my 
 countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses, how wretched 
 has been the self-deception of those who have believed us less 
 able to endure misfortune with fortitude than to encounter danger 
 with courage. 
 
 "We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Re- 
 lieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army 
 will be free to move from point to point, to strike the enemy in 
 detail far from his base. Let us but will it, and we are free. 
 
 " Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fortitude which 
 never yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that 
 it is my purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and 
 soul ; that I will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot 
 of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia — 
 noble State — whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still 
 
622 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 more glorious recent history ; whose bosom has been bared to re- 
 ceive the main shock of this war; whose sons and daughters have 
 exhibited heroism so sublime as to render her illustrious in all 
 time to come — that Virginia, with the help of the people, and by 
 the blessing of Providence, shall be held and defended, and no 
 peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of her terri- 
 tory. 
 
 " If, by the stress of numbers, we should be compelled to a tem- 
 porary withdrawal from her limits, or those of any other border 
 State, we will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall 
 abandon in despair his endless and impossible task of making 
 slaves of a people resolved to be free. 
 
 " Let us, then, not despond, my countrymen, but, relying on God, 
 meet the foe with fresh defiance, and with unconquered and uncon- 
 querable hearts. 
 
 "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 
 
 Meanvt^hile, some semblance of order in several of the de- 
 partments of government was established, though, of course, 
 the continued occupation of Danville was dependent upon the 
 safety of Lee's army. Days of anxious suspense, during which 
 there was no intelligence from Lee, were passed, until on Mon- 
 day, the 10th of April, it was announced that the Army of 
 Northern Virginia had surrendered. 
 
 Leaving Danville, Mr. Davis and his party went by railroad 
 to Greensboro', North Carolina. Here Mr. Davis met Gen- 
 erals Johnston and Beauregard. Consultation with these two 
 officers soon revealed to Mr. Davis their convictions of the 
 hopelessness of a farther protraction of the struggle. 
 
 Ex-Secretary Mallory gives the following narrative of the 
 last official interview of President Davis with Generals John- 
 ston and Beauregard : 
 
DAVIS' INTERVIEW WITH JOHNSTON. 623 
 
 "At 8 o'clock that evening the cabinet, with the exception of 
 Mr. Trenholm, whose illness prevented his attendance, joined the 
 President at his room. It was a small apartment, some twelve by 
 sixteen feet, containing a bed, a few chairs, and a table, with writ- 
 ing materials, on the second floor of the small dwelling of Mrs. 
 John Taylor Wood ; and a few minutes after eight the two 
 generals entered. 
 
 " The uniform habit of President Davis, in cabinet meetings, 
 was to consume some little time in general conversation before 
 entering upon the business of the occasion, not unfrequently in- 
 troducing some anecdote or interesting episode, generally some 
 reminiscence of the early life of himself or others in the army, 
 the Mexican war, or his Washington experiences ; and his manner 
 of relating and his application of them were at all times very 
 happy and pleasing. 
 
 " Few men seized more readily upon the sprightly aspects of any 
 transaction, or turned them to better account; and his powers of 
 mimicry, whenever he condescended to exercise them, were irre- 
 sistible. Upon this occasion, at a time when the cause of the 
 Confederacy was hopeless, when its soldiers were throwing away 
 their arms and flying to their homes, when its Government, 
 sti'ipped of nearly all power, could not hope to exist beyond a 
 few days more, and when the enemy, more powerful and exultant 
 than ever, was advancing upon all sides, true to his habit, he in- 
 troduced several subjects of conversation, not connected with the 
 condition of the country, and discussed them as if at some pleasant 
 ordinary meeting. After a brief time thus spent, turning to Gen- 
 eral Johnston, he said, in his usual quiet, grave way, when enter- 
 ing upon matters of business : ' I have requested you and General 
 Beauregard, General Johnston, to join us this evening, that we 
 might have the benefit of your views upon the situation of the 
 country. Of course, we all feel the magnitude of the moment. 
 Our late disasters are terrible, but I do not think we should regard 
 
624 LIFE OF JEFFEESON DAVIS. 
 
 them as fatal. I think we can whip the enemy yet, if our people 
 will turn out. We must look at matters calmly, however, and see 
 what is left for us to do. Whatever can be done must be done at 
 once. We have not a day to lose.' A pause ensued, General 
 Johnston not seeming to deem himself expected to speak, when 
 the President said : ' We should like to hear your views. General 
 Johnston.' Upon this the General, without preface or introduc- 
 tion — his words translating the expression which his face had worn 
 since he entered the room — said, in his terse, concise, demonstrative 
 way, as if seeking to condense thoughts that were crowding for 
 utterance : ' My views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war, 
 feel themselves whipped, and will not fight.'l^ Our country is over- 
 run, its military resources greatly diminished, while the enemy's 
 military power and resources were never greater, and may be in- 
 creased to any desired extent. We can not place another large 
 army in the field ; and, cut off as we are from foreign intercourse, 
 I do not see how we could maintain it in fighting condition if we 
 had it. My men are daily deserting in large numbers, and are 
 taking my artillery teams to aid their escape to their homes. 
 Since Lee's defeat they regard the war as at an end. If I march 
 out of North Carolina, her people will all leave my ranks. It will 
 be the same as I proceed south through South Carolina and Georgia, 
 and I shall expect to retain no man beyond the by-road or cow- 
 path that leads to his house. My small force is melting away like 
 snow before the sun, and I am hopeless of recruiting it. We may, 
 perhaps, obtain terms which we ought to accept.' 
 
 " The tone and manner, almost spiteful, in which the General 
 jerked out these brief, decisive sentences, pausing at every para- 
 graph, left no doubt as to his own convictions. When he ceased 
 speaking, whatever was thought of his statements — and their im- 
 portance was fully understood — they elicited neither comment nor 
 inquiry. The President, who, during their delivery, had sat with 
 his eyes fixed upon a scrap of paper which he was folding and re- 
 
DAVLS' INTERVIEW WITH JOHNSTON. 625 
 
 folding abstractedly, and wlio liad listened without a change of 
 position or expression, broke the silence by saying, in a low, even 
 tone : ' What do you say, General Beauregard ? ' 
 
 "'I concur in all General Johnston has said,' he replied. 
 
 " Another silence, more eloquent of the full appreciation of the 
 condition of the country than words could have been, succeeded, 
 during which the President's manner was unchanged. 
 
 " After a brief pause he said, without a variation of tone or 
 expression, and without raising his eyes from the slip of paper 
 between his fingers : ' Well, General Johnston, what do you pro- 
 pose? You speak of obtaining terms. You know, of course, that 
 the enemy refuses to treat with us. How do you propose to ob- 
 tain terms?' 
 
 " ' I think the opposing Generals in the field may arrange 
 them.' 
 
 "'Do you think Sherman will treat with you?' 
 
 " ' I have no reason to think otherwise. Such a course would 
 be in accordance with military usage, and legitimate.' 
 
 " ' We can easily try it, sir. If we can accomplish any good for 
 the country, Heaven knows I am not particular as to foi*ms. How 
 will you reach Sherman?' 
 
 " ' I would address him a brief note, proposing an interview to 
 arrange terms of surrender and peace, embracing, of course, a ces- 
 sation of hostilities during the negotiations.' 
 
 " ' Well, sir, you can adopt this course, though I confess I am 
 not sanguine as to ultimate results.' 
 
 "The member of the cabinet before referred to as conversing 
 with General Johnston, and who was anxious that his views should 
 be promptly carried out, immediately seated himself at the writing- 
 table, and, taking up a pen, ofiered to act as the General's aman- 
 uensis. At the request of the latter, however, the President dic- 
 tated the letter to General Sherman, which was written at once 
 upon a half sheet of letter folded as note paper, and signed by 
 40 
 
626 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 General Jolinston, who took it, and said he ■would send it to 
 General Sherman early in the morning, and in a few minutes the 
 conference broke up. This note, which was a brief proposition for 
 a suspension of hostilities, and a conference with a view to agree- 
 ing upon terms of peace, has been published with other letters 
 which passed between the two Generals. 
 
 "On or about the 16th of April, the President, his staflF, and 
 cabinet left Greensboro' to proceed still further south, with plans 
 unformed, clinging to the hope that Johnston and Sherman would 
 secure peace and the quiet of the country, but still all doubtful 
 of the result, and still more doubtful as to consequences of failure." 
 
 Pendino; the negotiations between Generals Johnston and 
 Sherman, Mr. Davis was earnestly appealed to by his attend- 
 ants to provide for his own safety, in the event of the failure 
 to obtain terms from Sherman. There would have been no 
 difficulty in his escaping either across the Mississippi into 
 Mexico, or from the Florida coast to the West Indies. Ap- 
 parently regardless of his personal safety, he was reluctant to 
 contemplate leaving the country under any circumstances. It 
 is certain that he would not have entertained the idea of an 
 abandonment of any organized body of men yet willing to 
 continue in arms for the cause. 
 
 Accompanied by the members of his cabinet. General Cooper, 
 and other officers, some of whom were in ambulances, and others 
 on horseback, Mr. Davis went from Greensboro' to Lexington. 
 Here he spent the night at the residence of an eminent citizen 
 of North Carolina. Continuing their journey, the party reached 
 Charlotte during the morning of the 18th of April. At this place 
 were extensive establishments of the Confederate Government, 
 and arrangements had already been made for the accommoda- 
 tion of Mr. Davis and his cabinet. During the day of his 
 
MR. DAVIS AT CHARF.OTTE. 627 
 
 arrival at Charlotte, Mr. Davis received a dispatch from Gen- 
 eral Breckinridge — who, in company with Mr. Reagan, had 
 returned to Greensboro' to aid the negotiations between John- 
 ston and Sherman — announcing the assassination of President 
 Lincoln. 
 
 In connection with this event, Mr. Mallory writes as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 " To a friend who met him a few minutes after he had received 
 it, and who expressed his incredulity as to its truthfulness, Mr. 
 Davis replied that, true, it sounded like a canard, but, in such a 
 condition of public affairs as the country then presented, a crime 
 of this kind might be perpetrated. His friend remarked that the 
 news was very disastrous for the South, for such an event would 
 substitute for the known humanity and benevolence of Mr. Lin- 
 coln a feeling of vindictiveness in his successor and in Congress, 
 and that an attempt would doubtless be made to connect the Gov- 
 ernment or the people of the South with the assassination. To this 
 Mr. Davis replied, sadly : ' I certainly have no special regard for 
 Mr. Lincoln, but there are a great many men of whose end I would 
 much rather hear than his. I fear it will be disastrous to our 
 people, and I regret it deeply.'" 
 
 Mr. Davis remained at Charlotte nearly a week. Meanwhile 
 the terms of agreement between Johnston and Sherman were 
 received, and by Mr. Davis submitted to the cabinet. At a 
 meeting of the cabinet, held on the morning after the propo- 
 sitions were received, the written opinions of the various mem- 
 bers were concurrent in favor of the acceptance of the Sher- 
 man-Johnston settlement. Three days afterwards, Mr. Davis 
 was informed by General Johnston of the rejection, by the 
 Federal Government, of the proposed settlement, and that he 
 could obtain no other terms than those accorded by General 
 
628 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 Grant to General Lee. The surrender of General Johnston 
 was, of course, conclusive of the Confederate cause east of the 
 Mississippi. Whatever Mr. Davis' hopes might have been 
 previous to that event, and whatever his determination had 
 been in case of disapproval by the Federal Government of 
 Sherman's course (a contingency which he anticipated), it was 
 plain that Johnston's surrender made resistance to the Federal 
 Government east of the Mississippi impracticable. 
 
 Fully recognizing this fact, Mr. Davis was yet far from con- 
 templating surrender at discretion. His hope now was to cross 
 the Mississippi, carrying with him such bodies of troops as 
 were willing to accompany him; these, added to the force of 
 Kirby Smith, would make an army respectable in numbers, 
 and occupying a country of abundant supplies. In the Trans- 
 Mississippi region Mr. Davis would have continued the struggle, 
 in the hope of obtaining more acceptable terms than had yet 
 been offered. In this expectation he was greatly strengthened 
 by the spirit of resistance indicated by bodies of men who had 
 refused to lay down their arms with the surrendered armies 
 of Lee and Johnston. 
 
 We again quote from the account of Mr. Mallory : 
 
 "No other course now seemed open to Mr. Davis but to leave 
 the country, and his immediate advisers urged him to do so with 
 the utmost promptitude. Troops began to come into Charlotte, 
 however, escaping from Johnston's surrender, and there was much 
 talk amongst them of crossing the Mississippi, and continuing the 
 war. Portions of Hampton's, Debrell's, Duke's, and Ferguson's 
 commands of cavah'j were hourly coming in. They seemed de- 
 termined to get across the river, and fight it out ; and, wherever 
 they encountered 3Ir. Davis, they cheered, and sought to encour- 
 age him. It was evident that he was greatly afibcted by the con- 
 
MR. mallory's account. 629 
 
 stancy and spirit of these men, find that, regardless of his own 
 safety, his thoughts dwelt upon the possibility of gathering to- 
 gether a body of troops to make head against the foe and to arouse 
 the people to arms. 
 
 " His friends, however, saw the urgent expediency of getting 
 further south as rapidly as possible, and, after a week's stay at 
 Charlotte, they left, with an escort of some two or three hundred 
 cavalry, and, two days afterwards, reached Yorkville, South Caro- 
 lina, traveling slowly, and not at all like men escaping from the 
 country. 
 
 " In pursuing this route, the party met, near the Catawba River, 
 a gentleman, whose plantation and homestead lay about half a mile 
 from its banks, and who had come out to meet Mr. Davis, and to 
 offer him the hospitality of his house. 
 
 "His dwelling, beautifully situated, and surrounded by ornate 
 and cultivated grounds, was reached about 4 o'clock P. M., and 
 the charming lady of the mansion, with that earnest sympathy and 
 generous kindness which Mr. Davis, in misfortune, never failed to 
 receive from Southern women, soon made every man of the party 
 forget his cares, and feel, for a time at least, 'o'er all the ills 
 of life victorious.' 
 
 "At Yorkville, Colonel Preston and other gentlemen had arranged 
 for the accommodation of Mr. Davis and his party at private houses, 
 and here they remained one night and part of the next day. 
 
 "A small cavalry escort scouted extensively, and kept Mr. Davis 
 advised of the positions of the enemy's forces — to avoid which was 
 a matter of some difficulty. With this view, the party from York- 
 ville rode over to a point below Clinton, on the Lawrenceville and 
 Columbus Railroad, and thence struck off to Cokesboro', on the 
 Greenville Railroad. 
 
 "Here the party received the kindest attention at private houses. 
 On the evening of his arrival, Mr. Davis received news by a scout 
 
630 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 that the enemy's cavalry, in considerable force, was but ten miles 
 off, and that he was pressing stock upon all sides; and it was 
 deemed advisable to make but a brief stay. 
 
 "At 2 o'clock in the morning Mr. Davis was aroused by another 
 scout, who declared that he had left the enemy only ten miles off, 
 and that they would be in the town in two or three hours. This 
 intelligence infused energy throughout the little party. It was 
 composed of men, however, familiar with real, no less than with 
 rumored perils; men who had faced danger in too many forms to 
 be readily started from their propriety ; and preparations were very 
 deliberately made with such force as could be mustered to pay due 
 honor to his enterprise. 
 
 " Several hours elapsed without further intelligence of the enemy's 
 movements, and at half-past six in the morning the party rode out 
 of Cokesboro' toward Abbeville, expecting an encounter at any 
 moment, but Abbeville was reached without seeing an enemy. 
 
 " At Abbeville the fragments of disorganized cavalry commands, 
 which had thus far performed, in some respects, an escort's duty, 
 were found to be reduced to a handful of men anxious only to reach 
 their homes as early as practicable, and whose services could not 
 further be relied ou. They had not surrendered nor given a parole, 
 but they regarded the struggle as terminated, and themselves re- 
 lieved from further duty to their officers or the Confederate States, 
 and, with a few exceptions, determined to fight no more. They 
 rode in couples or in small squads through the country, occasion- 
 ally 'impressing' mules and horses, or exchanging their wretched 
 beasts for others in better condition; and, outside of a deep and 
 universal regret for the failure of their cause, usually expressed by 
 the remark that ' The old Confederacy has gone up,' they were as 
 gleeful and careless as boys released from school. Almost every 
 cross-road witnessed the separation of comrades in arms, who had 
 long shared the perils and privations of a terrific struggle, now 
 seeking their several homes to resume their duties as peaceful citi- 
 
MR. malloey's account. 631 
 
 zens. Endeared to each other by their ardent love for a commoa 
 cause — a cause which they deemed unquestionably right and just, 
 and which, surrendered not to convictions of error, but to the logic 
 of arms, was still as true and just as ever — their words of parting, 
 few and brief, were words of warm, fraternal affection ; pledges of 
 endless regard, and mutual promises to meet again. 
 
 " From information gained here, it was evident that his cavalry 
 was making a demonstration; but whether to capture Mr. Davis, or 
 simply to expedite his departure from the country, could not be 
 determined. The country, or at least those familiar with military 
 movements at this period, have doubtless long since satisfied them- 
 selves upon this point. 
 
 "To suppose that Mr. Davis and his staff, embracing some eight 
 or ten gentlemen, all superbly mounted, and with led horses, could 
 ride from Charlotte, N. C, to Washington, Ga., by daylight, over 
 the highroads of the country, their coming heralded miles in ad- 
 vance by returning Confederate soldiers, without the cognizance 
 and consent of the Federal commanders, whose cavalry covered 
 the country, would be to detract from all that was known of their 
 activity and vigilance. 
 
 " Political considerations, adequate to account for this unmolested 
 progress, may readily be imagined. Whether they influenced it is 
 only known to those who had the direction of public affairs at the 
 time. But be this as it may, Mr. Davis' progress could not well 
 have been more public and conspicuous. 
 
 " Mr. Davis, who was more generally known by the soldiers than 
 any other man in the Confederacy, was never passed by them with- 
 out a cheer, or some warm or kindly recognition or mark of respect. 
 The fallen chief of a cause for which they had risked their lives 
 and fortunes, and lost every thing but honor, his presence never 
 failed to command their respect, and to add a tone of sympathy and 
 sadness to the expression of their good wishes for his future. They 
 knew not his plans for the future, nor could they conjecture what 
 
632 LIFE OF JEFFJJRSOX DAVIS. 
 
 fate might have in store for him; but their hearts were with him, 
 go where he might. 
 
 " Bronzed and weather-beaten veterans, who, when other hearts 
 were sore afraid, still hoped on and fought 'while gleamed the 
 sword of noble Robert Lee,' grasped his hand, without the power 
 of giving voice to thoughts which their tear-glistening eyes revealed. 
 Of such men were the gi'eat masses of the Confederate armies com- 
 posed. Firm and inflexible in their convictions of right, and yield- 
 ing not their convictions, but their armed maintenance of them 
 only, to the stern arbitrament of war, they may be relied upon to 
 observe with inviolable faith every pledge and duty to the United 
 States, assumed or implied, by their submission or parole. 
 
 " At Abbeville Mr. Davis was again urged by his friends to 
 leave the country, either from the southern shores of Florida or 
 by crossing the Mississippi and going to Mexico through Texas ; 
 but though he listened quietly to all they had to say upon the 
 subject, and seemed to acquiesce in their views, he never expressed 
 a decided willingness or readiness to do so. 
 
 " To some of his friends it was apparent that his capture was not 
 specially sought by the military authorities, and that he had but to 
 change his dress and his horse, and to travel with a single friend, 
 to pass unrecognized and in safety to the sea-shore, and there 
 embark. Hitherto, as has been already said, his coming along his 
 selected route was known to the people miles in advance. Schools 
 were dismissed that the children might, upon the road-side, greet 
 him. Ladies, with fruits and flowers, presented with tears of sym- 
 pathy, were seen at the gates of every homestead, far in advance, 
 awaiting his approach ; and it was hardly supposable that the gen- 
 eral in command, whose spies, and scouts, and cavalry covered the 
 country, and were heard of upon all sides, was the only person 
 uninformed of Mr. Davis' movements. 
 
 "The assertion that General Sherman, aware of this journey, 
 permitted it to facilitate the departure of Mr. Davis and his friends 
 
ME. mallory's account. 633 
 
 from the country, is not made or designed ; for it is possible that 
 his capture was desired and attempted; but the facts are matters 
 of history, and are given regardless of the speculations which they 
 may justify. 
 
 " The party left Abbeville at 11 o'clock the same night for Wash- 
 ington, Geoi'gia, a distance of some forty-five miles, and by riding 
 briskly they reached the Savannah River at daylight, crossing it 
 upon a pontoon bridge, and rode into "Washington at about 10 
 o'clock A. M. Just before leaving Abbeville they learned that a 
 body of Federal cavalry was en route to destroy this bridge, and 
 might reach it before them, and hence they pushed on vigorously, 
 meeting no enemy, but delayed about an hour by mistaking the 
 right road. 
 
 " The night was intensely dark, the weather stormy. In approach- 
 ing the bridge through the river swamp the guide and Colonel 
 Preston Johnston, and another of the party, rode a half mile in 
 advance, and the latter encountered a mounted Federal officer. 
 The rays of blazing lightwood within a wood-cutter's small cabin 
 , fell upon him as he stood motionless beneath a tree, and revealed 
 his water-proof riding-coat and the gold band upon his cap. He 
 hurriedly inquired, as he listened to the tramp of the coming 
 horsemen : 
 
 " ' What troops are these ? ' 
 
 "'What force is this?' 
 
 "'Is this Jeff. Davis' party?' 
 
 "'Yes,' replied the party addressed, while revolving in his mind 
 the best course to pursue, ' this is Jeff. Davis' escort of five thou- 
 sand men.' 
 
 " The officer vanished in the darkness, and no others were en- 
 countered. 
 
 "At Washington it was found that squads of Federal cavalry 
 scouts were there. A few were in the town at the time, and Mr. 
 Davis was again urged to consult his safety. His family and serv- 
 
634 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ants, with a small train of ambulances, accompanied by his private 
 Secretary, Mr. Burton Harrison, had passed through Washington 
 twenty-four hours before, and the enemy then only some twenty 
 miles distant, and Mr. Davis ascertained that he might readily 
 overtake them ; and before adopting any plan to leave the country, 
 he desired to see and confer with them. 
 
 " Oil the following morning, with his party somewhat reduced in 
 numbers, he left Washington and joined his family. 
 
 '' The circumstance of the capture of Mr. Davis, as given offi- 
 cially by General Wilson, were in harmony with that system of 
 misrepresentation by which the popular mind was perverted as to 
 all he said, and did, and designed. His alleged attempt to escape, 
 disguised in female apparel — a naked fiction — served well enough 
 for the moment to gratify and amuse the popular mind. Baruum, 
 the showman, true to his proclivity for practical falsehood, pre- 
 sented to the eyes of Broadway a graphic life-size representation 
 of Mr. Davis, thus habited, resisting arrest by Federal soldiers ; 
 and many thousands of children, whose wondering eyes beheld it 
 will grow to maturity and pass into the grave, retaining the ideas 
 thus created as the truth of history. Fortunately, however, his- 
 tory rarely leaves her verification wholly to the testimony of envy, 
 hatred, malice, or falsehood, but contrives, in her own time and 
 method, ways and means to bring truth to her exposition. 
 
 " It has been seen that before the President's proclamation con- 
 necting him with the assassination, with every desired opportunity, 
 and with every means of escape from the country at his command, 
 Mr. Davis refrained from leaving it; and it is very doubtful 
 whether, in face of the charge of complicity with this great crime, 
 any power on earth could have induced him to leave. 
 
 " The sentiment to which the noble Clement Clay, of Alabama, 
 gave utterance, upon learning that he was charged as particeps 
 criminis in the assassination doubtless actuated Mr. Davis. Clay 
 was able to escape from the country, and was prepared to do so; 
 
MR. mallory's account. 635 
 
 but when his heroic and loveable wife made known to him this 
 charge, with indignation and scorn at its base falsehood breatliiug 
 in every tone, he rose quietly, and said : ' Well, my dear wife, 
 that puts an end to all my plans of leaving the country. I must 
 meet this calumny at once, and will go to Atlanta and surrender 
 myself and demand its investigation.' 
 
 " Had Mr. Davis left the country, falsehood and malignity would 
 have multiplied asserted proofs of this black charge against him ; 
 and the shortcomings, errors, and crimes, perhaps, of others, would 
 have been conveniently attributed to the faults of his head or 
 heart. But his long captivity, his cruel treatment, the patient, 
 passive heroism with which, when powerless otherwise, and strong 
 only in honor and integrity, he met his fate, have combined, not 
 only to seal the lips of those of his Confederate associates who 
 had wrongs, real or fancied, to resent, but to concentrate upon 
 him the heartfelt sympathy of the Southern people, and no little 
 interest and sympathy wherever heroic endurance of misfortune 
 gains consideration among men, 
 
 " His escape from the country and a secure refuge in a foreign 
 land, sustained by the respect and affection of the Southern peo- 
 ple, were within his own control ; and he might have reasonably 
 looked forward to a return to his native State, as a result of a 
 change in her political status, at no distant day. But he refrained 
 from embracing the opportunities of escape which were his by for- 
 tune or by Federal permission. 
 
 " The suggestions of friends as to his personal safety were heard 
 with all due consideration, and he manifested none of the airs of 
 a would-be political martyr ; and yet it was evident that captivity 
 and death had lost with him their terrors in comparison with the 
 crushing calamity of a defeat of a cause for whose triumph he had 
 been ever ready to lay down his life. 
 
 " The general language and bearing of the people of the country 
 through which he passed, their ardent loyalty to the South, their 
 
636 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 profound sorrow at tlie failure of her cause, and tlieir warm ex- 
 pressions of regard for himself — all confirmatory of the conviction 
 that, notwithstanding the odds against her, a thorough and hearty 
 union of the people and leaders would have secured her triumph, 
 affected him deeply. 
 
 "Throughout his journey he greatly enjoyed the exercise of rid- 
 ing and the open air, and decidedly preferred the bivouac to the 
 bed-room ; and at such times, reclining against a tree, or stretched 
 upon a blanket, with his head, pillowed upon his saddle, and under 
 the inspiration of a good cigar, he talked very pleasantly of stir- 
 ring scenes of other days, and forgot, for a time, the engrossing 
 anxieties of the situation." 
 
 The solicitude of Mr. Davis for the safety of his family led 
 to his capture. Several weeks had elapsed since he had parted 
 with them, and almost the first positive information that he 
 received, made him apprehensive for their safety. In the 
 then disorganized condition of the coimtry through which he 
 was passing, the inducements to violence and robbery by des- 
 perate characters were numerous. Hearing that the route 
 which Mrs. Davis was pursuing was infested by marauders, 
 he determined to see that his family was out of danger, before 
 putting into execution his design of crossing the Mississippi. 
 While with his family, INIr. Davis was surprised by a body 
 of Federal cavalry, and at the time being unarmed and unat- 
 tended by any force competent for resistance, he was made a 
 prisoner. On the 19th INIay, 1865, he was j)laced in solitary 
 confinement at Fortress Monroe. 
 
MOTIVE OF ME. DAYIS' ARREST. 637 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 MOTIVE OF MR. DAVIs' ARKEST — AJT AFTER-THOUGHT OF STANTON AND THE 
 BUREAU OP MILITARY JUSTICE — THE EMBARRASSMENT PRODUCED BY HIS CAP- 
 TURE THE INFAMOUS CHARGES AGAINST HIM WHY MR. DAVIS WAS TREATED 
 
 WITH EXCEPTIONAL CRUELTY THE OUTRAGES AND INDIGNITIES OFFERED 
 
 HIM — HIS PATIENT AND HEROIC ENDURANCE OF PERSECUTION — HIS RELEASE 
 FROM FORTRESS MONROE — BAILED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AT RICHMOND — 
 
 JOY OF THE COMMUNITY IN CANADA— RE-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE FEDERAL 
 
 COURT — HIS TRIAL AGAIN POSTPONED CONCLUSION. 
 
 4 LL doubt has long since been dispelled as to the motive 
 -^-*- of the pursuit and arrest of Mr. Davis- His arrest and 
 imprisonment were the after- thought of the saturnine Secre- 
 tary of War, and his associate inquisitors of the Bureau of 
 Military Justice, at Washington. The details given by Mr. 
 Mallory, of the circumstances of Mr. Davis' progress through 
 North Carolina, South Carolina, and a part of Georgia, added 
 to facts which are yet fresh in the public memory, fully justify 
 the conclusion that the Federal authorities connived at his 
 supposed purpose to escape the country. The reputation of 
 IMr. Lincoln among his countrymen, for humanity as well as 
 good sense, renders it extremely probable that such would have 
 been his method of avoiding the perplexity which must arise 
 from the capture of Mr. Davis. 
 
 Well understanding that the inflamed public sentiment of 
 the North, regarding Mr. Davis as a political oifendcr of the 
 
638 L,IFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 worst possible character, would not tolerate his immediate re- 
 lease, the Federal Government would have served the ends of 
 humanity and sound policy by encouraging his escape. On 
 the other hand the laws of the United States tolerate pro- 
 longed imprisonment only after trial and sentence. Hence 
 the arrest of INIr. Davis must open an endless perspective of 
 embarrassments. He could not be tried simply as an indi- 
 vidual, nor could his punishment for any alleged crime of his 
 own, be the sole object to be sought. His arraignment before 
 a judicial tribunal, would be the arraignment of the principle 
 of State Sovereignty, of the States which had sought to put 
 that principle in practice, of the five millions of American 
 citizens who had supported it, and who had cheerfully risked 
 their lives and earthly possessions 'for its maintenance. 
 
 Nay, more, the trial of Jefferson Davis, upon a charge of 
 treason, meant the trial of the North also. Should all efforts 
 to convict the South in the person of Mr. Davis, of treason, 
 fail, the recoil might well be dreaded by those who instigated 
 the war upon the rights and existence of the States. It was 
 not to be safely assumed that the legal decision of a constitu- 
 tional question, which divided the framers of the Federal Con- 
 stitution, would necessarily affirm the party and sectional dog- 
 mas upon which the North waged the war. Should secession 
 be legally justified, what justification could the North claim, 
 that is rightfully denied to Russia in her conduct towards 
 Poland? What plea should England need for her outrages 
 upon Ireland? With Jefferson Davis acquitted of treason, 
 what could the conduct of the North for four years have been, 
 but a revelry in blood — the wanton perpetration of a monstrous 
 crime? 
 
 In this dilemma the industry of the Bureau of INIilitary 
 
CALUMNIES. (^ 639 
 
 Justice, which afterwards achieved an immortality of infamy, 
 by its record of judicial murders, aided by the ingenuity of 
 Stanton, devised a scheme for the arrest of Mr. Davis, upon 
 charges designed to cover him and the cause which he repre- 
 sented, with everlasting obloquy. Not content with having 
 triumphed by superior numbers, in a war of political opinions, 
 which in the beginning was declared not to be waged for social 
 or political subversion; not content with having settled a 
 grave constitutional question, by brute force, in a government 
 founded upon the idea of popular consent, the Federal author- 
 ities were now made a party to infamous falsehoods, the cir- 
 cumstances and results of which have fixed a stigma upon the 
 American name. 
 
 Contemporary with the announcement of events, which pro- 
 claimed the irretrievable downfall of the Confederacy, were 
 the calumnies of the Northern press, under the alleged insi)i- 
 ration of Stanton, representing that Mr. Davis was escaping 
 with wagons filled with plunder, and with the gold of the 
 Richmond banks; and that he had endeavored to escape in the 
 concealment of female apparel. No one knew better than those 
 who promulgated this paltry defamation, its utter falsity, and 
 we would not insult INIr. Davis and the Southern people by 
 bestowing consideration upon such palpable calumnies. It 
 was not calculated that such a portraiture of one, whose per- 
 sonal honor, courage, and manhood had triumphantly endured 
 every test, would be accepted by the intelligence even of the 
 North. But it nevertheless had an obvious purpose, which 
 was well answered. It imposed upon the weak and credulous. 
 The besotted and cowardly mobs of the Northern cities, who 
 filled the air with clamor for the ''blood of traitors," while the 
 men who had conquered the South, were touched with sym- 
 
^ 
 
 / 
 
 6.A(K LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 patliy for the misfortunes of foes whom they respected, of 
 course eagerly accepted any caricature of Mr. Davis agreeable 
 to their own vulgar imaginations. In this manner was con- 
 sumTnated the first step in the object of delaying the feeling 
 of personal respect, and of sympathy for misfortunes, which 
 eventually assert themselves in the masses, for a fallen foe, 
 whom it was already resolved to persecute with oppression 
 and cruelty previously unknown under the American political 
 system. 
 
 /Next came the atrocious proclamation charging Mr. Davis 
 with complicity in the assassination of President Lincoln. It 
 is safe to say that incidents hitherto prominent by their in- 
 famy, will be forgotten by history, in comparison with the 
 dastardly criminal intent which instigated that document. 
 Circumstances warrant the belief that not one of the conspir- 
 ators against the life and honor of Mr. Davis, believed either 
 then or now, that the charge had one atom of truth. Had the 
 charge been honestly made, it would have been disavowed, 
 when its falsity became apparent. But this would not have 
 subserved the end of the conspirators, and the poison was per- 
 mitted to circulate and rankle, long after the calumny had 
 been exploded during the investigations of the military com- 
 mission, in the cases of Mrs. Surratt and Captain Wirz. At 
 length justice was vindicated by the publication of the con- 
 fidential correspondence between Holt and Conover, which dis- 
 closed the unparalleled subornation and perjury upon which 
 the conspirators relied. Well has it been said that the world 
 Avill yet wonder "how it was that a people, passing for civil- 
 ized and Christian, should have consigned Jefferson Davis to 
 a cell, while they tolerated Edwin M. Stanton as a Cabinet 
 IMinister." 
 
MR. DAVIS' ANTECEDENTS. 641 
 
 We have no desire to dwell upon the details of Mr. Davis' 
 long and cruel imprisonment. The story is one over which 
 the South has wept tears of agony, at whose recital the civil- 
 ized world revolted, and which, in years to come, will mantle 
 with shame the cheek of every American citizen who values 
 the good name of his country. In a time of profound peace, 
 when the last vestige of resistance to Federal authority had 
 disappeared in the South, Mr. Davis, wrecked in fortune and 
 in health, in violation of every fundamental principle of Amer- 
 ican liberty, of justice and humanity, was detained for two 
 years, without trial, in close confinement, and, during a large 
 portion of this period, treated with all the rigor of a sentenced 
 convict. 
 
 But if indeed Mr. Davis was thus to be prejudged as the 
 "traitor" and "conspirator" which the Stantons, and Holts, 
 and Forneys declared him to be, why should he be selected 
 from the millions of his advisers and followers, voluntary par- 
 ticipants in his assumed " treason," as the single victim of cru- 
 elty, outrage, and indignity? What is there in his antecedents 
 inconsistent with the character of a patriotic statesman devoted 
 to the promotion of union, fraternity, harmony, and faithful 
 allegiance to the Constitution and laws of his country? We 
 have endeavored faithfully to trace his distinguished career as 
 a statesman and soldier, and at no stage of his life is there to 
 be found, either in his conduct or declared opinions, the evi- 
 dence of infidelity to the Union as its character and objects 
 were revealed to his understanding. Nor is there to be found 
 in his personal character any support of that moral turpitude 
 which a thousand oracles of falsehood have declared to have 
 peculiarly characterized his commission of " treason." 
 
 No tongue and pen were more eloquent than his in describ- 
 41 
 
642 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 ing the grandeur, glory, and blessings of the Union, and in 
 invoking for its perpetuation the aspirations and jjrayers of 
 his fellow-citizens. In the midst of passion and tumult, in 
 1861, he was conspicuous by his zeal for compromise, and 
 for a pacific solution of difficulties. No Southern Senator 
 abandoned his seat with so pathetic and regretful an announce- 
 ment of the necessity which compelled the step. The sorrow- 
 ful tone of his valedictory moistened the eye of every listener, 
 and convinced even political adversaries of the sincerity and 
 purity of his motives. His elevation to the Presidency of the 
 Confederacy was not dictated by the recognition of any sup- 
 posed title to leadership in the secession movement. His elec- 
 tion was indeed a triumph over the extreme sentiment of the 
 South, and was declared by those who opposed it to involve 
 a compromise of the exclusive sectionalism which was the 
 basis of the new government. His administration of the 
 Confederate Government exhibited the same unswerving loy- 
 alty to duty, to justice and humanity, which his previous life 
 so nobly exemplified. The people of the South alone know 
 how steadfastly he opposed the indulgence of vengeance ; how 
 he strove, until the last moments of the struggle, to restrain 
 the rancor and bitterness so naturally engendered under the 
 circumstances. Yet, when Jefferson Davis lay a helpless j^ris- 
 oner in the strongest fortress of the Union, with " broad patches 
 of skin abraded" by the irons upon his limbs, men were prac- 
 tically pardoned who had devoted years of labor to the pur- 
 pose of disunion, and had reproached him for not unfurling 
 the " black flag." Is not the inference, then, justified that all 
 of these tortures and indignities were aimed at the people and 
 the cause which his dignity, purity, and genius had so exalted 
 in the eyes of mankind? 
 
EELEASE. 643 
 
 But how impotent are falsehood and malignity to obstruct 
 the illumination of truth ! As subornation and perjury proved 
 unavailing to convict him of atrocious guilt, so equally has 
 persecution failed to accomplish its purpose. To all that shame- 
 ful picture of barbarous violence and gratuitous insult ; of in- 
 solent espionage and vulgar curiosity ; of the illustrious leader 
 of a brave people, whose whole life does not exhibit one act 
 of meanness or shame, or one word of untruth, crushed by dis- 
 aster, and prostrate with disease, fettered as if he were a des- 
 perate felon ; restricted in his diet, and not even permitted a 
 change of linen, except by the authority of a military jailer ; 
 an object of unrelaxed scrutiny, often driven to his cell by the 
 peering curiosity of vulgar men and unsexed women — to all 
 this there was but one relief — the patient and constant heroism 
 of the sufferer, giving heart to his despairing countrymen, and 
 ennobling his own captivity. History furnishes no similar 
 instance of patient and dignified endurance of adversity and 
 persecution. 
 
 The incidents of Mr. Davis' history since his release from 
 Fortress Monroe, do not require detailed narration. For the 
 most part they are confined to that domain of privacy which 
 decency holds to be inviolable. When two years — wanting a 
 few days — from the date of his incarceration had elapsed, Mr. 
 Davis was transferred by the military authorities to the cus- 
 tody of the Federal civil authorities at Richmond. Here, 
 amid the congratulations of friends, and the rejoicings of the 
 community, which loves him as it loves but one other — his 
 constant friend and compeer in fame — he was released from 
 custody under circumstances which are well known. The in- 
 terval between his release in May, ^ 1867, and his re-appear- 
 ance before the Federal court, at Richmond, in the ensuing 
 
644 LIFE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
 November, was passed by Mr. Davis in Canada. There he 
 was the recipient of the respect and sympathy which his charac- 
 ter and his sufferings might have been expected to elicit from a 
 humane people. At the November term of the Federal court, 
 Mr. Davis was again present, with his eminent counsel, await- 
 ing trial, and was again released upon recognizance to appear 
 on the 25th March, 1868. 
 
 In the face of the close proximity of the event, it would be 
 unprofitable to speculate as to the sequel of this third appear- 
 ance of Jefferson Davis before a judicial tribunal, to answer 
 the charge of tr>.ason. Nor do we propose to add to the brief 
 consideration, which has already been given in this volume, 
 of the legal and historical question involved in the case of 
 Mr. Davis. The subject has been exhausted. The masterly 
 expositions by Mr. Davis of the theory of the Federal Govern- 
 ment (some of which we have given), are at once the complete 
 vindications of himself and his countrymen, and the sufficient 
 monuments of his fame. 
 
 But are the issues of the war to be subjected to candid and 
 impartial legal adjudication? Will the North approve this 
 raising of a doubt as to its own justification, merely in the 
 hope of vengeance upon one who is powerless for injury? But 
 if there is to be admitted another jurisdiction than that of 
 War; if the arbitrament of battle is to be carried to the higher 
 tribunal of Law and Public Opinion ; if there is to be a 
 trial and not a judicial farce, with a foregone conclusion and a 
 prejudged sentence, the South and its late leader will not 
 shrink from the verdict. Of this, the world requires no more 
 emphatic iteration than that furnished by past events. 
 
 But the decision of this question, whatever it may be, can 
 not recover the wager which the South gallantly staked and 
 
coNcr.usiox. 645 
 
 irretrievably lost. Time will show, however, the amount of 
 truth in the prophecy of Jefferson Davis, made in reply to the 
 remark that the cause of the Confederacy was lost : "It ap- 
 pears so. But the principle for which %oe contended is bound 
 to re-assert itself, though it may be at another time and in an- 
 other form."