P 101 .T65R4 m -nX'l* •*t^o< < 5> i '%-o'i ^^ A <^. ^^^°* *^^ ^ > y • « r;^ C\> , s • • /• :-l°o ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AN EXPOSITION OF " THE DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY." ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AN EXPOSITION OF "EHEA HTEPOENTA, OR THE DIVERSIONS OF PURLEY, BY JOHN HORNE TOOKE." BY CHARLES RICHARDSON, LL.D. AUTHOR OF A NEW DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. " What an epoch in many a student's intellectual life has been his first acquaintance with ' The Diversions of Ptirley.' " — Trench, on The Study of fVords. " Nor did any one ever take up ' The Diversions of Purley' and lay it down, till some other avocation tore it from his hands." — Lord Brougham, Statesitien of George III. LONDON: GEORGE BELL, 186, FLEET STREET. 1854. fh CONTENTS. Page PKEFACE vii Introduction to the Diversions of Parley 1 Chap. I. — Of the Division or Distribution of Language . . 5 II. — Some Considerations of Mr. Locke's Essay . . 8 III.— Of the Parts of Speech 13 Remarks on the three first Chapters 14 IV.-Of the Noun 25 V. — The Article and Interjection 26 VL— Of the word " That." 28 VII.— Of Conjunctions 33 VIII. — Etymology of English Conjunctions .... 40 IX. — Of Prepositions 52 X.— Of Adverbs . 78 VOL. II. Chap. I.— Of the Eights of Man 86 II.— Of Abstraction 101 III. — On Abstraction {continued) 118 IV. — Change of Characteristic. Of Abstraction (conti- nued) 124 V. — On Abstraction (co??ii?me(i) 172 VL— Of Adjectives 196 VIL— Of Participles . . . • 202 VIII. — Participles (continued) 206 What is the Verb ? 213 Substance and Accident . 225 PEEFACE. I HAVE thought it would be a fitting, and might prove a useful, employment of these last days of my life, if I were to prepare for publica- tion some papers which have for many years been lying by me ; — having for their object. An Expo- sition of the Grand Doctrines of " The Diversions of Purley," — by a plain, concise statement of those doctrines, accompanied by such notes and commen- taries as to me seemed requisite and proper for the purpose. The greater portion of these papers was written before the commencement of that happy cessation from war, and those horrors of war, into which a ruthless and most faithless despot has at this moment plunged us. Others have been written at different and less distant intervals. Yet all will lay claim to the weight that may be thought due to long and deliberate conviction, with the ad- ditional advantage of a careful revisal. That the Avork itself — to use the Author's own emphatic expression on a different occasion — " will live for ever,"* there can be no doubt; and it is, and has long been, my ambition to spread the * On Erskine's Speech in Defence of Hardy. See Lord Camp- bell's Lives of the Chancellors, vol. vi. p. 477, note. vm PEEFACE. knowledge of such its unquestionable title to im- mortality. It is unfortunately too true that the Author, by his vigorous attacks on all parties, and his bitter personalities against individual members of those parties, whether Whigs or Tories, or supposed fa- vourites of the Court, brought upon himself (and it is not a matter of surprise that such should be the consequence) the severe punishment which the spirit of retaliation is never slow to inflict. Much, undoubtedly, may be alleged in his ex- cuse, and Lord Brougham generously steps in, not, I think, as the partial advocate, but as a fair and enlightened judge.* The sum of his Lord- ship's apology is, that Home Tooke had been com- pelled to pay a heavy fine, and suiFer an imprison- ment of twelve months ; and those twelve months destined to be among the most active of his Kfe, for having written, and set his name to, a just and, as it would nowadays be considered, a mild de- nunciation of an attack by the king's troops on our American bretlu^en.f For his peaceful exertions to obtain Parliamentary Reform and good govern- ment for the country, he had, under many aggra- vating circumstances, when bent down with griev- ous infirmities, been hurried away in the night, subjected to an inquisitorial examination before a secret council; again flung into prison, and only released, after months of confinement, and after having his life put in jeopardy by a trial for high * See Statesmen in the Time of George III.— Mr. Home Tooke. t At Lexington, in MassachusettSj on the 19th April, 1775. 1 PEEFACE. IX treason. " These," his Lordship feelingly observes, , " are sufferings, which fair weather politicians know nothing of."* It is to be regretted that the passions thus ex- cited in the hotbed of politics, should be carried into the retreats of literary life ; though here again it may be urged in mitigation, that something po- litical was mingled with the literary character of those with whom he came principally in contact ; Harris, who was a Lord of the Treasury, and Dr. Johnson, who enjoyed a pension, and had written three pamphlets in defence of the measures of the Government. As far as the former, with Lord Monboddo, and Doctors Oswald, Reid, and Beattie are concerned, he pleads, in his own defence of his asperity, the manner in which they treat the " vulgar, un- learned, and atheistical Mr. Locke " (for such are the imputations they cast upon that benefactor of his country) ; on Locke, " whom (as Ben Jonson says of Shakespeare) I reverence on this side of Idolatry." It was during the first imprisonment that he wrote his Letter to Mr. Dunning, afterwards Lord Ashburtonf (who was not. Lord Chatham * Another circumstance vitally affecting Tooke's prospects in life, must not be omitted. The refusal of the Benchers of the Inner Temple to admit him to the Bar, after quitting the Order of Clergy. This Lord Brougham ascribes to " the indelible nature of English Orders ; " but the suffei*er himself to political perse- cution. The question seems likely to be revived. t Dunning married a sister of Sir Francis Baring, in whose sbn, Alexander, the extinct title wsm revived. X PREFACE. affirmed, a lawyer, but law itself); in which he appeared for the first time before the public as a philosophical grammarian, and in which is to be found all that he had ever afterwards to say on the conjunctions. The Author tells us that at the time of writinsr o the letter,* he was in the King's Bench Prison, " the miserable victim of two prepositions and a conjunction." The expression has often been quoted, and deserves to be explained. The information filed against him, charged that he, John Home, did write and publish, &c., a cer- tain false, wicked and seditious libel of and concern- ing his Majesty's Government, and the employ- ment of his troops, according to the tenor, &c. On the trial a verdict of Guilty was returned ; and a question was raised by Home — first on motion in arrest of Judgment, and afterAvards on Writ of Error in the House of Lords ; whether the writing contained in the information, was, in point of law, sufficiently charged to be a libel upon his Majesty's Government. And it was in both Courts decided in favour of the Crown. In the meantime the pe- riod of imprisonment had expired, to which the miserable victim of the two prepositions and con- junction, " of and concerning," had been con- demned. And thus he had suffered the full penalty of the sentence before it had been determined that he had been guilty of any crime. It was on this first trial that, as Lord Campbell * It is dated, April 21, 1778. PEEFACE. XI candidly and not, I hope, inadvertently, acknow- ledges that his countryman, the noble earl, the ve- nerable judge, " confident in the anti- Yankee feel- ings " of the jury, so framed his charge as to secure from them a verdict of Guilty ! ! And it is in introducing the event of the second trial (referred to by Lord Brougham), that Lord Campbell declares himself wholly at a loss to ac- count for the infatuated obstinacy exhibited by the Crown lawyers, after the trial and acquittal of the first of the number charged with treasonable conspiracy. " To the amazement of the public," says his Lordship, " it was announced that another prisoner was to be tried on the same charge and the same evidence, and that this prisoner was John Hokne Tooke, a man popular by his agreeable manners, admired for his literary acquire- ments, who had ever conducted himself with cau- tion and discretion (and), knoAvn to be aristocratic in his inclinations . . . Yes ! John Hokne Tooke, with a constitution broken by age and disease, but with a mind as alert and youthful as when he wrote against Junius, and spoke against Thurlow, was next called upon to hold up his hand at the Bar of the Old Bailey." * Thus much I have felt it incumbent upon me to introduce, with a view to make the reader ac- quainted with the true character of our Author; and surely it is now high time that angry feelings should subside, and that the offences of the man, * Lives of the Chancellors, vol. vi. p. 485. XU PREFACE. whatever thej may have been, should no longer have an influence in estimating the value of his work ; and yet it unhappily must be acknowledged that such feelings, even at the present day, are some- times suffered to burst forth with all their early virulence. It is full forty years, be it remembered, since Chantrey laid the foundations of his own fame and fortune, by immortalizing the features of " the old man, wasted by sickness, with a night-cap on his head, totally unlike his former self, but fearfully like him at the present moment."* The old man survived about fourteen months. I am willing to believe, however, though pre- possessions and prejudices are long preserved aa traditionary mischiefs, that in various quarters, among scholars, and philosophers also, " The Diver- sions of Purley " is a work which does now receive a more candid and impartial, and consequently a more enlightened consideration, than has been al- lowed to it in times past. Hence I derive some encouragement to believe also that this my contri- bution to the diffusion of the doctrines it inculcates, will be welcomed as an acceptable addition to our stock of philosophical philology. It has been under * Stephens' Life of Tooke, v. ii. p. 412. Chantrey 's bust of Home Tooke was exhibited at Somerset House in 1811. Tooke died in March, 1812. Such and so great were the acknowledged merits of this bust, that it obtained for the artist commissions to the amount of d£' 10,000. Nollekens was so pleased with this pro- duction of a young artist, that he desired one of his own busts to be removed, and Chantrey 's put in its place.— See Jones' Eecol- leciions, and Holland's Memorial, of Sir F. Chantrey. PEEFACE. Xm this persuasion, and conceiving it to be an official dutj entirely within my province, that I have un- dertaken the publication of this little book. My familiarity with the great work itself, and the con- stant, and I trust not unsuccessful, use I have made of its principles in the composition of the English DiCTiONAEY, may justify a presumption that I am, at least not ill, prepared for the performance ; and especially so since, as I have already observed, the materials have been so long in manuscript before me. There is one circumstance which I must not omit to notice ; that modern philologers have far too singly directed their own researches, and di- verted the views of the student in language, to other channels, — those of affinities or ethnological resem- blances, — and, in pursuing their own course, have somewhat ungratefully ignored the very existence of the work of their great teacher. But writers less confined, or I would say, much more enlarged in their speculations,* have arisen among us ; and the attention of scholars in every class of society has recently been aroused to the peculiar and exclusive merits of " The Diversions of Purley ; " particularly by Mr. Trench, in the Pre- face to his popular lectures " On the Study of Words, "f He there declares his opinion, that " the first acquaintance with ' The Diversions of Purley ' * See hereafter the quotations from " Guesses at Truth," &c. p. 95. f Addressed (originally) to the Pupils at the Diocesan Training School, Winchester, XIV PEEPACE. must have formed an epocli in the life of many a student." In this opinion I most cordially agree. But Lord Brougham bears more ample and decisive testimony both as to the intrinsic merits and at- tractive qualities of the work. " The simple gran- deur," says his Lordship, " of the leading idea which runs through the whole of Mr. Tooke's sys- tem, at once recommends it to our acceptation. But the details of the theory are its great merit, for he followed it into every minute particular of our language, and only left it imperfect in confining his speculations to the English tongue, wliile doubtless the doctrine is of universal application. He had great resources for the performance of the task which he thus set himself. A master of the old Saxon, the root of our noble language ; tho- roughly and familiarly acquainted with our best writers; sufficiently skilled in other tongues, an- cient and modern,* ... he could trace with a clear and steady eye the relations and derivations of all our parts of speech, and in delivering his remarks, whether to illustrate his own principles, or to ex- pose the errors of other theories, or to controvert and expose to ridicule his predecessors, his never- failing ingenuity and ready wit stood him in such constant stead, that he has made one of the dryest subjects in the whole range of literature or science, one of the most amusing and lively of books ; nor did any one ever take it up and lay it down till some other avocation tore it from his hands." — * In old and modern French and Italian, not only sufnciently skilled, but deeply learned. PEEFACE. XV " And, as every thing which had been done before was superseded by it, so nothing has since been effected, unless in pursuing its views and building upon its solid foundations."* The names of Brougham and Trench (to which that of Mackintosh may be added f) are the names of no common men, not indeed of learned linguists and grammarians, but of enlightened philosophers, and I must confess give me additional encouragement in this my long deferred attempt to extend the utility of the work by a full and fair exposition of its principles, and by an endeavour to illustrate " the simple grandeur of its leading idea," and also, as I proceed, to remove -some wrong impressions, which have been received by writers of great ability and authority in those branches of philosophy not only most intimately connected with, but moreover in- deed ultimately dependent on, the Philosophy of Language. To these objects I shall strictly con- fine myself. Much of the spirit, which the form of dialogue occasionally gives to the original, espe- cially at the outset, must be necessarily lost, and those sallies of wit against some, and pungent sar- casms against others, by whom the author thought himself (and not unnaturally) both maligned and injured, are entirely witliheld. * Statesmen in the Time of George III. — Mr. Home Tooke. t See infra, p. 36. Note, p. 154. I owe it to the great Names of Grimm, Pott and Bopp, to supply an omission in the text. I ought not to have passed unnoticed (and I regret that I did), that these opinions of our Author with respect to the origin of the Latin from the Greek and Gothic, and to the higher antiquity of the Gothic above the Latin — " That the Latin is " (in fact) " a mere modern Language compared with the Anglo-Saxon," are contended by these eminent Scholars to be altogether erroneous. But to their respective works I must refer those, whose course of study is directed to the pursuit of such curious and learned inquiries. INTEODUCTION TO THE DIVERSIONS OF PUELEY. THE scene of the dialogue is laid at Purley, in the neighbourhood of Croydon, a seat there in the occupation of Mr. Tooke.* There Home is found domesticated by the then Bishop of Glou- cester, Dr. Richard Beadon, a friend of both host and guest, and who was called as a witness in de- fence of the latter, when arraigned as a traitor at the bar of the Old Bailey. The conversation com- mences by the Bishop's bantering Home on his partiality to the spot ; for it was formerly the seat of the noted Bradshaw, who sat as president at the trial of Charles the First ; and very probably the place had its attractions on that account. Politics, however, are said to be strangers there ; and the Doctor is informed, that the last topic of discussion had been an opinion advanced by Home (an opinion at this time very likely to find favour with numerous zealous advocates for the extension of Education among the middle, and to the hum- bler classes of society), " that all sorts of wisdom * From the place the book received its title, and from the oc- cupier the author received his second name. B 2 INTEODUCTION TO THE and useful knowledge may be attained by a man of plain sense without what is commonly called learning." Grammar, is, to the surprise of the Host and the Doctor, excepted by Home ; who thinks Grammar (meaning Philosophical Grammar) diffi- cult ; yet, though difficult, " to be absolutely ne- cessary in the search after philosophical truth, which, if not the most useful, is at least the most pleasing employment of the human mind — ^and to be no less necessary in the most important ques- tions concerning religion and ci\Tl society." Our Enghsh Grammar, the Doctor replies, may be suf- ficiently and easily learnt from Dr. Lowth, or from the^r^^* (as well as best) English Grammar, by B. Jonson. And when not grammar in the common acceptation, but the causes and reasons of grammar are stated to be the points on which satisfactory information is required, the Doctor with an air of triumph refers to the Heemes of Haeeis, a work which Lowth had pronounced to be " the most beautiful and perfect analysis that had been exlii- bited since the days of Aristotle." And if the skill of the workmanship (Mulciber iUic) be alone considered, the praise may not be much exagge- rated. That book, however, is rejected by Tooke and Home; the former asserting that he could not " boast of any acqidsition from its perusal, except. * This is a mistake. Gill and Butler preceded Jonson. His grammar was posthumous; and not published till the year 1640, three years after the author's death. Gill's appeared in 1621, 2nd Ed. Butlers in 1633. DIVEESIONS OF PURLEY. 3 indeed, of hard words and frivolous or unintelligi- ble distinctions."* And tlie latter subsequently describes it to be " an improved compilation of almost all the errours, which grammarians have been accumulating from the time of Aristotle down to our present days of technical and learned aifec- tation."t The introductory dialogue ends with Home un- dertaking to attempt (though at the risk of expo- sing hunself) an investigation into the principles of Philosophical Grammar: a subject J not entirely new to liis thoughts; for he observes, " I very early found it or thought I found it, impossible to make many steps in the search after truth, and the nature of human understanding, of good and evil, of right and wrong ; without well considering the nature of language, which appeared to me to be inseparably connected with them."§ " You will begin then," says the Bishop, " either with things or ideas : for it is impossible we should ever thoroughly understand the nature of the sigjis, unless we first properly consider and arrange the things signified.^'' Our author acknowledges this to be true: but nevertheless determines to commence with " The Distribution of Language^'' for as Hermes is re- * D. of P. Introduction, p. 7, 4to. Ed. t C. 7, p. 120. X It appears from the evidence of Dr. Beadon on Tooke's trial in 1794, that Home, when at Cambridge, had directed and was eagerly pursuing his researches into this subject. § Introduction, p. 12. 4 DIVEESIONS OF PUELEY. corded to liave put out tlie eyes of Argus, and as it may be suspected lie has likewise blinded phi- losophy, it is to language we must resort with a view to detect by what means the delusion has been effected, I CHAP. I. or THE DIVISION OR DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGE. THE author starts with the first purpose of language — to communicate our thoughts. The ancient grammarians, confining themselves to this principle, reasoned thus : — words are the signs of things : — there must, therefore, be as many sorts of words or parts of speech as there are sorts of things. How many, then, are the sorts of things, and consequently the sorts of words ? Of the former it was agreed that there are two : 1. Res, qujB per- manent; 2. Res, quae fluunt. Therefore, there must be two of the latter: 1. Notee rerum, quse permanent, (or the noun); 2. Notae rerum, quae fluunt, (or the verb).* But still there are words, neither Not^ rerum * Sanctius, in illustration of these expressions, " Res, qu£e permanent," and " res quae fluunt," observes, that whatever is spoken of, is either permanent ; as arbor, a tree ; durum, hard : or fluent ; as currit, he runs 5 dormit, he sleeps. That is, a tree is (by nature) always a tree ; but he (any man) does not (by na- ture) always run or always sleep. "Quod Grseci, bv vocant : — id partim significat res perma- nentes : — partim _y?«enfes. In hac partitione tota vis orationis nos- trse consistit : — Constantium igitur rerum notam, nomen dixere : earum vero, quae fluunt, verbum.^^ Scaliger de Causis, Cap, 72. And Sanctius : — " Quidquid enunciatur, aut est permanens, ut 6 OF THE DIVISION OR permanentium ; nor, Not£e rerum fluentium: call them all particles or inferior parts of speech : or, as, by their constant interposition between nouns and verbs, they seem in a manner to hold speech together, call them conjunctions or connexives. Here then were three parts of speech. About the time of Aristotle, a fourth, the article or definitive, was added.* Here the search for different sorts of words from difference of things ended. The difficulty then was, under which of these four classes each word should be placed ; and the method of proceeding became reversed ; and still allowing that there must be as many sorts of words as of things, these learned grammarians adopted the converse — that there must be as many differences of things as of signs ; and many laborious grammarians confined them- Arbor, Durum : aut fluens, ut currit, dormit. Ees permanentes sh'^e constaBtes vocamus, quarum natura diu perstat : harum no- tam NoMEN dixere. Muentes dicimtis, quarum natura est, esse tamdiu, quamdiu fiunt. Harum nota Verbum est. Rursus ver- bis et nominibus deerat Modus, per quern causarum ratio explica- retur. Hie in nominibus dicitur pr^positio : ut versatur in te- nebris propter ignorantiam. In verbis est Adverbium : Nam si qualitatem innuas, dices ; bene currit : si tempus, hodie legam. Postremo orationes ipse inter se indigebant ligaturis : quare coji- junctio fuit excogitata, Hsec Plato. Lib. de Ente. Sanctii Mi- nerva, Lib. 1, c. 2. * Veteres enim, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles atque Theodecles, verba modo, et nomina, et convinctiones tradiderunt. Videlicet quod in verbis, vim sermonis, in nominibus, materiam, (quia alteram est quod loquimur, alterum de quo,) in convinctionibus autem complexum eorum esse judicaverunt : — Paulatim a philo- sophis ac maxime Stoicis auctus est numerus, ac primum con- vinctionibus articuli adjecti, i^ost prepositiones, &c. Quint. Lib. 1. c. 4. I DISTRIBUTION OF LANGUAGE. 7 selves to the differences observable in words, with- out any regard to the things signified. Hence the parts of speech have varied in number ; and at last eight became usually acknowledged, though many did not include the same parts in their list.* Though modern grammarians (after Aristotle) assert words to be the signs — not of things, but of ideas, thus approaching so far nearer to the truth ; the nature of language has not become much better understood, for they now supposed different opera- tions of mind to enable them to account for what different things were to account before: adding operation after operation as they imagined a ne- cessity to do so. It has been said that the ancient grammarians confined themselves to the principle, that the first purpose of language was to communicate our thoughts ; they neglected the second ; viz. to com- municate those thoughts with despatch. | And hence the course of error into which they have been misled. Proceeding upon the definition that words are the signs of things or ideas, they have assumed * For instance, Gill distinguishes the parts of speech into noun, verb, and consignificative ; including the adjective and pro- noun w^ithin the noun : and in the consignificatives, the article, ad- verb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection. Butler ; — into noun and verb, preposition and adverb, including, as Gill does, the adjective and pronoun vi^ithin the noun ; and the conjunction he considers to be a sort of adverb. B. Jonson classes the article with the pronoun, the adjective with the noun (substantive) the interjection and preposition with the adverb, and distributes the conjunctions under several heads. f Locke lays down distinctly these two obvious purposes, and yet he is guilty of the same neglect. 8 SOME CONSIDERATIONS that all words are immediately so ; whereas many- are abbreviations employed for despatch, and are the signs of other words. The invention of all ages has been upon the stretch to add such wings to their conversation as might enable it, if possible, to keep pace in some measure with then* minds. ISTot, then, from difference of things, not from dif- ferent operations of the mind : but hence, — from abbreviations for despatch (those wings of Mercury) arises the variety of words. Abbre^aations are employed in language. 1. In terms. 2. In sorts of words. 3. In construction. Upon the two former the respective excellence of every language depends. To the first Locke's Essay is the best guide. The second is the subject of the Diversions of Purley. CHAP. 11. THOUGH Locke hhnself had not the least thought when he first began his discourse of the understanding, nor a good Avhile after, that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it,* yet is the whole of his essay a philosophical ac- count of the first sort of abbreviations, that is, in terms. Inquiry into the origin of ideas is a proper commencement for a grammarian who is to treat * Essay, Book 3, Chap. 9, § 22. OF ME. LOCKE'S ESSAY. \) of their signs ; but he was not singular in referring them to the senses, nor in so beginning an account of language.* Had he sooner been aware of the inseparable connexion between words and know- ledge, he might have discerned that there was no composition in ideas, but only in terms ; that it was as improper to speak of a complex idea, as to call a constellation a complex star ; that not ideas, but terms, are general and abstract. He would have weighed not alone the imperfections, but the per- fections of language ; these perfections not properly understood being one of the chief causes of the im- perfections of our philosophy. He himself remarks in his last chapter, speaking of the doctrine of signs, ^* The consideration, then, of ideas and words, as the great instruments of knowledge, makes no des- picable part of their contemplation, who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole ex- tent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic than what we have hitherto been acquainted with." Further he ac- * " Philosophers that highten Stoiciens wende that the soule had bee naked of hymself, as a mirrour, or a cleane perchemine^' (parch- ment), " so that all figures musten comen for thynges fro without in to soules, and been emprinted in to soules right as we been wonte, some tyme by a swifte pointen to fixen letters emprinted in the smothnesse or in the plainesse of the parchemine that hath no figure, ne note in it." Chaucer Boetius, B. 5, Met. 4. Du- tens, in his very curious work. On the Origin of the Discoveries attributed to the moderns, refers to the authors from whom we may trace the axiom falsely ascribed to Aristotle — " That there is nothing in the understanding, but what entered into it by the senses." 10 SOME CONSIDERATIONS knowledges tliat " when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas,* I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so intimate a connection with words, that unless the force and manner of signification of words are first well observed, there can be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning know- ledge." But though this is the declared reason of writing his 3rd Book, concerning language as dis- tinct from ideas ^ yet he continues to treat singly as before, concerning the force of words, " names of ideas in the mind," (which force depends on the number of ideas of which that word is the sign,) and has not advanced one syllable concerning the man- ner of signification : he had not settled his opinion on the subject; it remained with him a desidera- tum, as it did with our great Bacon before him. The argument used by Locke against innate ideas, viz. that the supposition of them is unneces- sary, is equally valid against the composition of ideas — their supposition is unnecessary. Every purpose for which it was imagined may be more easily and naturally answered by the composition r?/* terms; while at the same time the latter does, likewise, clear up many difficulties in which the former in- volves us. * Tooke asserting that all in Locke's Essay, which relates to what he calls the composition, abstraction, &c. of ideas, does in- deed merely concern language, observes, " It may appear pre- sumptuous, but it is necessary here to declare my opinion, that Mr. Locke in his Essay never did advance one step beyond the origin of ideas and the composition of terms." OF MR. Locke's essay. 11 Locke must be allowed to give his own expla- nation of that operation of the mind which he calls the Composition of Ideas : it is that " whereby it puts together those simple ideas it has received from sensation and reflection^ and combines them into complex ideas."* Though he would say that the word man was the sign of a collection of ideas, (and it is greatly to be regretted that he did not see the difference between the terms collection and composition,) and the word army to be the sign of a larger collection ; he would compound these col- lections of ideas — of ideas of sensible qualities, con- sisting of an indescribable variety of forms and colours, into one complex idea of form and colour."! But if the essay be read with attention and the composition of terms, &c. be substituted wherever a composition of ideas, &c. is supposed, the con- clusions of the author will be equally true and clear, and no other argument will be needed against the composition of ideas. Further, it is an easy matter upon Locke's own principles, and a physical consideration of the senses and the mind, to prove the impossibility of the composition of ideas. " Though the qualities," he tells us, " that affect our senses, are in themselves so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them : yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses, simple and unmixed. * Essay, Book 2, Chap. 11, § 6. t See hereafter Locke's Notions of Substance. 12 MR. Locke's essay. The hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax, yet the simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses." It is true they are distinct, and must remain so : the mind must ever preserve them so; it has no internal sense wherewith to compound them. Locke's internal sense of reflection has no such power, and indeed no such power is ascribed to it by him. But the argument applied by Tooke is of itself sufficient, — their supposition is unnecessary.* Locke, in his 3rd Book, Chap. 7, on Language in General, divides words into nouns and particles; the latter should then have comprized all the other parts of speech, not excepting the verb : he de- clares these particles to be all marks of some action or inclination of the mind : and adopting the opi- nion of Aristotle, Scaliger and Port Boyal, that " is\ and is not, are also the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying :" that thus affirming and denying are operations of the mind, he referred all the sorts of words classed by hhn under the name of particle, to the same source, namely, the operations of the mind : though if they had been so to be accounted for, it was almost impossible they could have escaped his penetration. * Essay, Book 2, Chap. 2, § 1. t As to this copula, see Hobbes' Works, folio Edition, p. 400. Kingdom of Darkness, Part 4, Chap. 6. 13 CHAP. III. OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH. THE difference of things, the difference of ideas, the different operations of the human mind being rejected, as guides to the division of lan- guage into parts of speech, the two great purposes of speech, namely, communication and despatch, lead to the only principles upon which to proceed : First, to words necessary for the communication of thoughts : namely, the noun and verb. Secondly, to abbreviations employed for the sake of despatch, and which abbreviations are strictly parts of speech because they are all useful in language, and each has a different manner of signification. The dis- tinction between the two classes should however still be observed. The necessary words are not signs of different sort of ideas, nor of different operations of the mind ; such operations (so called) are merely the ope- rations of language. The business of the mind, as far as it concerns language, extends no further than to receive impressions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. A consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or of things (relative to the parts of speech,) will lead us no further than to nouns, that is, to the signs of those impressions or names of ideas. The verb must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication. It is, in fact, the com- 14 REMARKS ON THE munication itself, and therefore well called Pr//za, dictum. For the verb is quod loquimur ; the noun, de quo. REMARKS ON THE THREE FIRST CHAPTERS. WE are now arrived at the conclusion of the three first chapters, through which I have thought it advisable to continue in direct progress without interruption. Oiu' Author has laid clearly before us the branch of Philosophical Grammar on which he has undertaken to treat; distinguishing it precisely from that to which he considers Locke to have confined himself. He has further, on the way, uisisted that terms, and not ideas, are complex, general, and abstract ; and that all in Locke's Essay which relates to such supposed ideas, merely concern language. Further still, he has put himself boldly at issue with the logician and metaphysician, (who have been, and I fear still are, too prone to undervalue his labours,) with respect to the operations of the mind: a stmnbling-block, most undoubtedly, that usually encounters us at the commencement of trea- tises on lo^ic. Our Author asserts these operations to be merely operations of language. " What," says Dr. Stoddart, " can be meant by operations of lan- guage ? Every operation must have an operator. It is the operator that causes the operation, and not the contrary. It is not the amputation that causes THREE FIRST CHAPTERS. 15 the surgeon, but the surgeon* that performs the amputation. It is not the furrow that directs the ploughman, but the ploughman who, guiding his plough, gives shape to the furrow, "f These are truisms, correctly understood. The plough of the plouglnnan could not perform the operation of ploughing without his guiding hand ; nor could the hand perform it without his guiding will. Neither could the plouglnnan himself perform the operation without the hand, nor the hand with- out the plough. Each has its office : the physical or material operation demands and employs physical or material agents. The will of the man sets those agents in motion, and guides the operation as they progressively perform it. The grand truth on which the position of Home Tooke rests is, not expressly indeed, but impliedly, as being manifest and unquestionable, — ^that the mind wills the whole operation : volition is its power, and by that power it puts in action, it actuates, guides and governs the physical organs of speech ; and by them are the operations of speech performed. But before I proceed with a more particular re- * Consistency requires, " The surgeon guiding his instrument^ who." f Philosophy of Language, p. 22. This work, which displays very extensive reading, is an entire reconstruction of the Grammar published upwards of thirty -five years ago, in the first vol. of the 4to. Ed, of the Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. The objections there urged against this doctrine of Tooke differ from those quoted above, and were replied to in the Gentleman's Magazine for May, 1841, p. 477, and that reply may perhaps have occasioned the change. 16 REMARKS ON THE ply to the objections of Dr. Stoddart, it seems ex- pedient to direct attention to the operations of the mind as they are taught by our logical professors at Oxford : Logic is^ I believe, the pride of that noble University, and it is scarcely a matter of choice, that I should adopt as a text-book on which to ground the ensuing commentaries, " The Com- pendivim of the Art of Logic,"* stUl used as a ma- nual (with which no rival is permitted to interfere) by those students who are ambitious to include that art within the cu'cle of their acquirements. The Author of this highly-prized little bookf avows himself a disciple of Aristotle, and he evi- dences a great mastery over all the forms of his art, and great subtlety in arranging and expounding them. It is worthy of remark, in passing, that, though in almost every branch of science great changes have taken place, and great advancement effected, yet in these chapters in the Oxford Logic (on the operations of the mind,) scarcely has an at- tempt been made beyond the simplification of some forms and the correction of some incongruities in the detail of rules, which deserve no higher title than that of technical. | * Artis Logicse Compendium ; first published 1692. t Dr. Henry Aldrich, Dean of Christ Church. J The Rev. H. L. Mansell has lately published '' Artis Rudi- menta Logicae, from the Text of Aldrich, with Notes and Mar- ginal References." The notes are at continual variance with the text, so that the Oxford student has the double duty of learning and unlearning. And yet Aldrich is declared to stand without a rival. These notes, however, have no bearing on the points at issue. THREE FIRST CHAPTERS. 17 The Compendium commences with enumerating the operations of the mind to be in the whole three. 1. Simplex apprehensio. 2. Judicium. 3. Dis- cursus. Simple apprehension is again divided into incomplex and complex. Simplex apprehensio, or Simple apprehension, that is to say, the operation of simple apprehension or of apprehending simply, is defined by Aldrich to be " Nudus rei conceptus in- tellectivus, similis quodam modo perceptioni sensi- tivae." " Apprehensio simplex incomplexa, est unius objecti, ut calami; vel etiam plurium, confuse, ut calami, manus, etc. Complexa, plurium, sed cum ordine quodam et respectu ; ut calami in manu."* Dr. Whately says that Logical writers define the operation (or state) of mind called Simple appre- hension, to be " that act or condition of mind in which it receives a notion of any object, and which is analagous to the perception of the senses." f And * Mr. Mansell observes, ' That this confused apprehension of many objects (said by Aldrich to be simplex incomplex) is in truth only a succession of single apprehensions : ' surely not a succession, unless the objects are presented, not simultaneously, but succes- sively. He condemns the distinction between incomplex and com- plex as inaccurate. It is really absurd to suppose any different operation of the mind employed ; but, I would ask, does not Mr. Mansell himself use this word, apprehension, somewhat confuse. Such is no uncommon case. It is sometimes applied as the name of a faculty : sometimes as that of an operation : and again, as that of a thought, an opinion, a notion, or concept, (a favourite word with Sir W. Hamilton.) f In editions of his logic previous to the year 1841, Dr.Whate- ly's definition was, simple apprehension is " The notion (or con- ception) of any object in the mind analagous to the perception of the senses." This confusion of an operation with the notion (or conception) received by such operation, was pointed out in the C 18 REMARKS ON THE lie preserves Aldrich's division of Simple into In- complex and Complex, and illustrates in a similar manner. There is something very offensive to the common sense of common understanding in the distinction asserted : That, when the objects are several, the simplex incomplexa is a sunple apprehension of these objects " confuse!^ according to Aldrich, or " with- out any relation being perceived between them," as Dr. ^Vhately expresses it; and that the simplex complexa is a simple apprehension of these same ob- jects, " sed cum ordine quodam et respectu," or " with a relation between them." To proceed to the next operation — Judgment. " Judicium," says Aldrich, "est, quo mens non solum percipit duo objecta, sed, quasi pro tribunali sedens, expresse apud se pronuntiat, ilia inter se convenire aut dissidere." And adds, it is affirmative or nega- tive. Dr. TYhately, " Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the notions (or ideas) which are the objects of apprehension, whether complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree with each other ; (or that one of them belongs or does not belong to each other)." And he also adds, " Judgment, therefore, is either affirmative or negative,"* Let us now retrace our steps. By the operation — simple apprehension incomj^lex, we apprehend a Gent. Mag. for May, 1841. And hence, it may be presumed, the change from Notion (or conception) to the Act or condition of the mind in which it receives a Notion. * The reader will observe a strange want of uniformity in the generic terms of all these definitions. THREE FIRST CHAPTERS. 19 pen, a hand — or, a man, a horse, cards: by the operation — simple apprehension complex, we appre- hend the pen in the hand or the man on the horse, or the cards in a pack. By Judgment the mind compares the pen and the hand, the man and the horse, the cards and the pack ; and pronounces that the pen is not the hand, nor the hand the pen ; that the hand holds the pen, not the pen the hand; that the horse carries the man, and not the man the horse. Now, in the first place, it is quite clear that the mind pronounces no such thing ; and in the second, that in the whole process, instead of this shifting of operations, one power or faculty, and one alone, ex- ists in act, and that from simple apprehension to final judgment, its persistence in act is described, and nothing more. The mind perceives (by the faculty of apprehen- sion or the operation, if it please the learned logi- cians so to name it) the hand, the pen, the man, the horse. It receives different sensations or ideas : it is conscious (or to use a word from the philosophy of Leibnitz, has an apperception) that these sensa- tions differ, and this decides the whole matter — that the pen and man are not the hand and horse ; that the pen holds the hand and the man rides the horse. The mind perceives this, and this is all that per se it can do. It pronounces nothing, it affirms or de- nies nothing to itself about agreement or disagree- ment ; it recognises (or apperceives) differ erit sen- sations, and there ends all that takes place in the mind. 20 KEMAEKS ON THE But tlie faculty of speecli enables it to commu- nicate these different sensations or ideas existing in itself to others ; to pronounce, to affirm or deny to others the agreement or disagreement (that is, the different sensations) recognized within itself: in other words, it is by speech that this operation is performed. The ancient Epicureans went so far in their phi- losophy as to maintain that the senses neither affirm nor deny ; that to perform this operation was the office of a superior faculty,* the mind. In this, — the supposition that affirming and denying are ope- rations of the mind, they are in unison with the Aristotelians. But I think it may be shown that, though the perception of what ought to be affirmed or denied is the province of the mind, the operation itself is performed by words. The contrary dogma has been assumed as unquestionable by the follow- ers of the ancient philosophers, and has been taken for granted from their days to the present time without any discussion. The question from its novelty and importance deserves to be stated and illustrated with every possible degree of perspicuity; and what I have * Non falli autem sensum ideb asserit : quod falsitas omnis in affirmatione aut negatione sita sit (quatenus nempe aliqua res aut talis affirmat, qualis non est, talis negatur qualis est). Sensixs autem neque affirmet neque neget, sed solum in se speciem sensi- bili, rei excipiat, nudeque apprehendat rem eujusmodi sibi per speciem apparet. Px'onunciare autem, sive judicare, talis ne re- vera sit aut non sit eujusmodi apparet, hoc sensus ipsius non est, sed superioris facultatis cui proinde, non vero sensui, subesse possit falsitas. — Gassendi Opera, N. 1, p. 53. THREE riEST CHAPTERS. 21 now to say will complete my reply to Sir John Stoddart. Let me endeavour to illustrate my meaning : — " Will you," says Hamlet, " play upon this pipe ? Govern these ventages with your fingers and thumb, give it breath with your mouth, and it will dis- course most eloquent music." The recorder will speak ; not by an operation of the mind, but by the operations prescribed by the poet. We never say the mind amputates a limb,, ex- tracts a tooth, or couches a cataract. We never ascribe the dissection of a human body to an operation of the human mind. We call it, — properly call this, chirurgery (or surgery) a ma- nual operation, an operation of the hand ; the hand and the knife are the instruments ; they move, they act, they operate. There is in all such operations instrumentality governing subordinate instrumen- tality ; the hand, itself a material instrument, guides in each case an appropriate subordinate instrument, and thus the operation is performed. The mind, the ruler of every voluntary motion, wills the move- ments of the hand; perceives, superintends, and di- rects them. Mastication, deglutition follow, the one the other, as voluntary motions, and we duly attribute them to their peculiar organs. The mind does not infuse volition into the hand, the jaws, and the throat ; neither do they impart operation to the mind. But the mind by volition can put these re- spective organs into act, into operation ; and they in return can perform its will. So also is it with regard to affirmation or denial : 22 REMARKS ON THE they are no eloquent music discoursed by an ope- ration of the mind. The mind perceives or appre- hends ; it does no more. It perceives, or appre- hends, that a pen is in the hand, that a pen is not the hand ; it does no more — it can do no more. Nor is it necessary that it should. Language can do all that remains to be done ; but to this source philo- sophers have never looked. Certain effects were to be accounted for, certain acts or operations to be traced to their origin ; and they cast their eyes upon the power that rules every organ, by which the vo- luntary motions of our frame are performed, — ^the power that wills every action or operation, and to it assigned the various offices of its subordinate agents ; yet in no one instance, except this of pro- ducing articulate sounds, have they so done. Language, we repeat, can do all that remains to be done ; it can expressly pronounce that any two things agree or disagree ; it can affirm or deny, or in one word assert* their agreement or disagreement. ^^Tiat share, it may be asked, has the mind in the performance of all this ? not a lip is opened, not a breath conformed into intelligible sound without its assenting power. Agreed ; the mind wills the ac- tion or operation of those organs, by which audible sounds, speech, language, are produced ; it directs and guides them, but the organs operate. Of these audible intelligible sounds, signs of thought, visible representatives, written characters, letters and com- binations of letters have in succession of time been * See WalliSj Institutio Logicse, L. 2, cap. 1. THKEE FIRST CHAPTERS. 23 invented. But we never identify the act of wri- ting with an operation of the mind. To superficial enquirers all that has been here advanced will seem little better than a dispute of words. Verba obstrepunt.* But Dr. Whately is well aware that " Logic is entirely conversant about language, — that it is an indispensable instrument of all reasoning." It is indeed its province to teach the use of terms in general reasoning ; and if it has been shown, as I presume it has, that the founda- tions of our systems of logic are falsely laid, that they rest upon an abuse of words, an essential ser- vice has been rendered to the future logician, and smoothed his way to what Locke calls " a very dif- ferent sort of Logic and Critic" from any with which he has hitherto been made acquainted. There is another consideration which must not be omitted. The difference which has been enlarged upon, perhaps to an unnecessary extent, is one be- tween volitive and operative power — it marks a boundary, an hitherto, as far as my reading extends, undiscriminated boundary between mental power or faculty and the action of organized matter. And I press the establishment of this difference very earnestly upon those who participate in the appre- hensions of Professor Stewart with regard to " the tendency of some late philological speculations." This train of reasoning may be pursued and suc- cessfully applied to the observations of Mr. Smart. f * Bacon, Novum Organum, L. 1, § 59. f Manual of Logic, p. 255, 24 REMARKS ON THE He urges it to be among the " egregious errors" of Home Tooke, that " he attributes every thing to language ; that he is a decided sensationalist^* who, admitting Locke's foundation, that our know- ledge begins with sensation, admits nothing except language, which is more than sensation ; and while he argues justly against Locke's doctrine of com- plex ideas, sees notliing beyond the instrumentality of language in all beyond sensation." But it has not occurred to Mr. Smart, that as- serting the instrumentality of language would be perfectly nugatory, unless powers or faculties in the mind to make use of that instrumentality were assumed and granted. ]\ir. Smart should also have inquired, what is this every thing that is attributed to language ? what purposes are to be effected by its instrumentality ? It has been shown, I think, that one purpose is that of affirming and denying. And a reference to the various modes and figures under which these operations of language are represented by logi- cians, will illustrate very fully and very clearly the uses for which it is adapted and to which it is ap- plied. Let us take the old and valuable " Logic" of Port Koyal, and the first Book of the Analytics of Aristotle, we shall find that the subject and predi- cate in the latter are expressed by letters ; in the former, by words. The purposes in both cases are * That Tooke himself had no respect for the master of this sect, Condillac, is plain enough. See Div. of Pur. Vol. 1, p. 389. THREE FIRST CHAPTERS. 25 the same, and are answered as effectually by the one as by the other. Collections of ideas are com- pared in both ; the changes in the " modes and fi- gm-es" of the syllogism manifest the changes in which different collections of ideas may be pre- sented to the mind by a sign, whether that sign be a letter or a word. So also of any particular ideas of which any abstract or general term may be the sign. And thus, to adopt the expressions of the elo- quent historian, we may " severely reason with Aristotle ;" and escaping awhile from the rigid trammels of logic into those where the mind may find more ample room to expand itself, " we may sublimely speculate with Plato."* CHAP. IV. OF THE NOUN. THE 7ioun is defined to be " the simple or complex, the particular or general sign or name of one or 7nore ideas." And at this stage, an inquiry into the force of terms (which depends on the number of ideas of which any term is the sign) should commence ; but this branch Locke has preoccupied. And he, per- haps intending to confine himself to the considera- tion of the mind only^ did not advance to the man- * Gibbon. 26 OF THE NOUN. ner of signification, to which that consideration could never lead him. Of the declension, number, case, and gender of nouns there is no painsworthy difficulty or dispute. In our lano'uao^e the names of tilings without sex, (figure apart) are also without gender; because with us the relation of words to each other is de- noted by the place or by prepositions ; which de- notation, in the Greek and Roman languages, made a part of the words themselves, and was shown by cases or terminations. CHAP. Y. THE AETICLE AND INTERJECTION. THEIR claims to the rank of parts of speech are next examined, and those of the latter are roughly rejected; the dominion of speech is erected on their downfall. The parts of speech, ex instituto non natura de- bent constare.* The cries of animals, signa tris- titiae, aut Isetiti^e, qualia in avibus, qualia in quad- rupedibus;* every involuntary convulsion with oral sound has almost as good a title to be called a part of speech as interjections have. " Voluntary interjections are only employed when the sudden- ness or vehemence of some affection or passion re- turns men to their natural state, and makes them * Sanctii Minerva, Lib. 1, c. 1. THE ARTICLE AND INTERJECTION. 27 forget the use of speech ; or when, from some cir- cmnstance, the shortness of time will not permit them to exercise it."* The Article is declared to be a necessary^ instrument of speech; so necessary, that no lan- guage can do without it, or some equivalent in- ventio7i. Let this expression be remarked, — some equivalent invention; for it has been disregarded by various opponents of Home Tooke. The necessity of the article follows immediately from the necessity of general terms, and their ne- cessity is sufficiently proved by Locke. " The use of words," he observes, " being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas ; and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea should have a distinct name, names would be endless." I " The far greatest part of words that make all languages, are general terms. ''^ § " General and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but concern only signs; signs of things, which are all of them particular in their existence : the general nature" (of those creatures of our own making — general ideas) " being nothing more but * Dr. Stoddart labours hard in behalf of interjections, and makes sad confusion between interjections, properly so-called, and verbal exclamations. t Scaliger, (de Causis, Chap. 131,) says that the Greek ar- ticle is superfluous ; for it may be supplied in Latin by is, or ille : these, if not called articles, are the equivalents. He also plainly shows that the Latin has an article in the pronouns qui and quis; the former being Kai 'o, and the latter Kat'og; and the Latin terminations us, a, xim, are the Greek article, 'Og, ?j, bv. X Essay, B. 2, c. 11, § 9. § Id. B. 3, c. 3. 28 THE ARTICLE AND INTERJECTIONT. the capacity they are put into of signifying or re- presenting many particulars."* The generality of terms is reduced by the article, which thus ena- bles us to employ general terms for particulars ; so that the article in combination with a general term is merely a substitute (for a particular term) dif- ferent from the substitutes ranked under the gene- ral head of abbreviations, because it is necessary for the communication of our thoughts, and sup- plies the place of words which are not in the lan- guage ; whereas abbreviations are not necessary for communication, and supply the place of words which are in the language. CHAP. VI. OF THE WOED " THAT." THE word THATf appropriately foUows the article. The question started is, what is the conjunction that? the answer is, it is the same word, with one and the same signification as the article or pronoun. Unnoticed abbreviation in con- struction (which ought always to be carefully distin- guished from the manner of signification of words) and difference in position have caused this appear- ance of fluctuation, and misled the granunarians of * Essay, B. 3, c. 3, § 11. t The Chapter " Of the word that,'^ with the 7th, " Of conjunc- tions," and 8th, " Of English conjunctions," formed the subject of the Letter to Dunning. OF THE WORD " THAT." 29 all languages, both ancient and modern ; for in all they make the same mistake. It seems expedient here to anticipate a little, and explain whence we have derived these two words, THE and THAT, and to add to them for the same purpose the so-called neuter pronoun, It, or, as an- ciently written, hit. The reader will thus be put into possession of a foretaste of the entertainment and instruction that await him. The English article the, is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon the-an, to get, to take, assume ;* the Anglo-Saxon article se, is the imperative of the verb se-on, to see ; and that is the Anglo-Saxon thcet, that is, thead, theat, and means taken, as- sumed, the past participle of the same Anglo-Saxon verb. It or hit is the past participle of the An- glo-Saxon hcet-an, nominare, and means nominatum, the said. It and that are used plurally and singu- larly, and in the masculine and feminine, as well as neuter gender: they may be illustrated thus (as article or pronoun) : — The man that hath not music in himself is fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils, that is, take man, or see man : taken man hath not music, &c. ; said man, or taken man is fit for treasons, &;c. That is used in the plural by Sir Thomas More and others, " that days," " that angels." It is so used by Piers Plouhman, and in mascuKne and feminine by Chaucer and others. Custance says, " It am I, * Piers Plouhman and Chaucer both use the expression, " so thee ik," i. e. so get I ; so may I get, take, or (as Mr. Tyrwhitt) thrive. 30 OF THE WORD " THAT." that is, I am she, your daughter." " Quod he; It am I, frend, that is, I am he, frend." It and that ahvays refer to some thing or things, person or persons, taken, assumed or spoken of before ; such only being the meaning of those two words. They may therefore well supply each other's place, as we say indifferently, and with the same meaning, of any action mentioned in discourse ; either, *^ It is a good action," or, " That is a good action," that is, " The said (action) is a good action;" or, " the assumed (action) is a good action;" or, " the action received in discourse is a good action." In replying to the question, what is the conjunc- tion that? — the Latin ut (or uti); the Greek 'on; the Latin (qu'otti, quodde) quod; the Greek /cat *oTTi, KOTTi (Latin que, from which the e was cut, as the ai in Greek), are produced to show that in those two languages the conjunctions ut and quod come within the same conditions as the Enghsh that* Thieves rise by night that they may cut men's throats. Ut jugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones. Resolution. Thieves may cut men's tlu^oats ; (for) that (purpose) they rise by night. Latrones jugulent homines, (§i) 6ri surgunt de nocte. * So the French preposition car (anciently quhar), corresponding to our preposition /or, is qua re or que, (that is, Kai) ea re. (See Menage.) The reader will find by referring to the Port Royal Logic, Part 2, Ch. 1, and to their Grammar Supplement to Ch. 9, a remarkable coincidence with our author as to the French con- junction que. OF THE WORD ^' THAT." 31 Dryden, writing to Walsh, says, " I find that you do not make a due distinction between that and who.'^'' Res. " You do not make a proper distinction between that and who." I find that (fact.)* I wish you to beKeve that I would not wilfully hurt a fly. Res. I would not wilfully hurt a fly ; I wish you to believe that (assertion). And here, as Tooke's general remarks on the in- terchange of letters will have particular applications in the succeeding pages, it is expedient to subjoin them. It is, moreover, but an act of justice that they should be put prominently forward, as they evidently lay the foundation for Grimm's Law ; and to this it may be added, that he was well aware of the value of what it is usual to call the " crude" form in ety- mological researches. Thus in tracing the Latin ros and mors to an Anglo-Saxon origin, he writes ror-is, ros ; mor^~is, mors. Qu in Latin was sounded not as the English, but as the French pronounce qu (that is as the Greek k) and it is thus he ac- counts for the change of /cat 'on into quod, so far as the k and q are concerned; and the perpetual change of t into d is familiar to all, and there is an organical cause for these and other changes ; of b into P ; V into r ; G into K ; z into S ; J into SH ; * Dryden's Works, Bell's Edition, 1853. Dry den proceeds to say, " A man, that — is not proper; the relative who is proper. That ought always to signify a thing; who, a person." Dryden may be supposed well acquainted with the grammatical usage of his day. 32 OF THE WORD " THAT." and the Anglo-Saxon D, tliat is, th, as pronounced in that, into their 6, that is, th, as pronounced in thin^. The first of each pair (including D into t) differs from its partner " by no variation whatever of articulation, but simply by a certain unnoticed and almost imperceptible motion or compression of or near the larynx, which causes what Wilkins calls, " some kind of murmure." This compression the Welsh never use, as those acquainted with Sir Hugh Evans and the "/alorous gentleman" in Henry the Fifth, well know. Tooke illustrates the whole series of these or- ganic changes in a single line, in which his soreness to the quick as a politician is manifested. When a Welshman, instead of " I vow, by God, Dat Jenkin* iz a wizzard," pronounces it thus : " I fow, py Cot, to Shenkin iss a wissart ; " he articulates exactly as we dof ; but, failing in the compression, he changes seven of our consonants : to which compression we owe seven additional letters (that is, seven additional sounds in our language). The following changes are purely organic. Kobbed Robb'd Snapped Braced Pleased Snap't Bra9'd (c z= s) Pleas'd (szzz) Lapsed Amazed Laps't Amaz'd * By Jenkin was intended Jenkinson, the first Lord Liverpool. f i. e. uses the same organs of articulation. OF THE WORD " THAT." Girded Girt StufFed Stutf't Heaved Heav'd Eagged Eagg'd Cracked Crackt 3 termination es Thinge^ Thingz Thinkes Thinks Leafes Leafs Leav-es Leaves 33 CHAP. VIL OF COXJUJS^CTIONS. TO proceed now to a survey of the remaining chapters of this voKnne, on the conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs. It will be incumbent upon me not only to pre- sent a full detail of the etymologies proposed by our Author, but to state clearly and illustrate suf- ficiently his general principles ; and also, as an act of justice, to say a word on his claim to originality. I will dispose of the last, though in itself least important, topic, first. I believe that his claim re- mained undisputed from the year 1778 to 1790, when it was questioned by a writer who, under the signature of J. Cassander, addressed a letter to H. Tooke, Esq. containing " Criticisms on the Diver- 34 OF CONJUNCTIONS. sions of Purley."* It may be safely affirmed, that if Tooke liad himself allowed this slight pamphlet to pass unnoticed, the pubhc would have done the same.f And it seems highly probable that Tooke would have permitted this to be the case, had he been able to resist the temptation which invited him to vent his acrimony against Mr. Windham, the then member for Norwich, in return for that gentleman's acrimony against Mmself.:]: Him the angry politician treats as the abettor, if not the co- adjutor, of Cassander in his attack : him he accuses of having assiduously and invidiously endeavoured to detract from his claim to originality, and to have very unjustly transferred that honour to Professor Schultens. That Schultens had not, and did not make any pretensions to the honour asserted in his behalf, — of teaching that all particles are nouns or verbs, — is very manifest from the entire passages, which are quoted from his work in the Diversions of Purley. He carefully adopts the qualifying ex- pressions used by grammarians, and especially by Latin grammarians long before he wrote, and many of whom Tooke had quoted for the purpose of re- * Ee7. J. Bruckner, of Norwich, who died 12th May, 1804. See Taylor's Edition of Diversions of Purley, p. 12. f One thing is clear, that Cassander so little understood the work he undertook to criticise, as to suppose, " that among the abbreviations employed for despatch," (Diversions of Purley, p. 45,) or, as he improperly terms them, words necessary (Criticisms, pp. 7, 8, 25) for despatch, articles, prepositions, and conjunctions were comprised. J In a second edition of his first volume, published 1798, i. e. eight years after the offence was committed by Cassander. OF CONJUNCTIONS. 35 commending by the partial authority of their par- tial hints and suspicions his own general doctrine. In 1818, six years after Tooke's death. Dr. Stod- dart* (now Sir John Stoddart) started a new candi- date for priority of discovery, — C. Koerber, who, so long ago as 1712, published at Jena a little vo- lume, called " Lexicon Particularum Ebraearum, vel potius nominum et verborum, vulgo pro parti- culis habitorum." Dr. Stoddart gives us very scanty information of the contents of this very rare volume,! certainly not sufficient to enable us to form a judgment as to the full extent of the prin- ciple upon which Koerber's Lexicon is constructed. The Author's tutor, Danzius, it appears, in the preface to the work taught " that most, if not all, the separate particles were in their own nature nouns ; '* that this was indeed " a new and unheard of hypo- thesis," but that on investigation, the reader would find reason to conclude universally (in respect to the Hebrew language at least) that all the separate par- ticles are either nouns or verbs. His own words (Dr. Stoddart adds) are these : " Particulae sepa- ratee si non omnes, certe plerceque sua natura sunt nomina." " Hanc thesin hactenus novam et inau- ditam," and again, " Omnes omnino Ebraeorum particulas separatas aut nomina esse aut verba." It is quite clear that Koerber piqued himself upon laying before the public a discovery, and it is but just that his title should be better known than it * See Encyclopsedia Metropolitana, V. 1, p, 19, and repeated in the Philosophy of Language, p. 43. f It is not in the Library of the British Museum. 36 OF COXJ UNCTIONS. yet is, as far as that title extends ; for lie uses the limiting expression, " si non omnes, plerseque ;" nor does it appear that he reasoned on any general principles. Dr. Stoddart admits that Tooke very probably made (what he. Dr. S. calls) a honajide discovery, so far as re<2:arded his own reflections, though not one entirely new to the world.* What then was this discovery ? " Home Tooke's," says Sh* James Mackintosh, " is certainly a won- derful work; but the great merit is the original thought." What was this thought, so highly prized by one so able to appreciate its worth ? Tliat words are the signs of ideas (o-i»/ij3oXa TraOrjjuLaTwv), and that all are nouns significant (kql avfJiaivei ti), are positions that had long been acknowledged in the schools, and taught there upon the express autho- rity of Aristotle. As an undeniable consequence, Tooke inferred that those classes of words com- prized under the general head of particles Avere also nouns or verbs, and had of course a signification. The whole system is founded on general reason- ing. In the letter to Dmmingf he had pronounced that, " there is not, nor is it possible there should be, a word in anv language which has not a com- * Dr. Stoddart (Philosophy of Language, p. 43) has the merit of starting another candidate for ■priority of discovery, in the per- son of J. D. Van Lennep, whose work, De Analogia, was not published till the 3'ear 1790, i.e. twelve years after the letter to Dunning, and four after the 8vo. Edition of the 1st Pt. ofDiversions of Purley. Coleridge had previousl}^ asserted, " That aR that is good in Tooke's book is taken from Lennep." Lennep reasons on no principle, and limits his dictum to " omnia fere." (Len- nep, De Analogia, c. 3, p. 38.) t Page 23, note. OF CONJUNCTIONS. 37 plete meaning and signification, even when taken by itself. Adjectives, prepositions, adverbs, &c. have all complete separate meanings, not difficult to be discovered." This Avas the grand principle, thus early em- braced and declared; and the subsequent thought then was, " that if this reasoning is well founded, there must be in the original language from which the English (and so of all other languages) is de- rived, such and such Avords bearing precisely such and such meanings."* And he was the more pleased with this suo^orestion, because he was iornorant of the characters even of the Anglo-Saxon and Gotliic languages ; and he had to learn those languages as a mean to ascertain whether he had made a disco- very ; and the event exceeded his expectation. It may be as well here to observe that he sub- sequently offers as a general rule, " That where different languages use the same particle, that language ought to be considered as its legitimate parent, in which the true meaning of the word can be found, and where its use is as common and fa- miliar as that of any other verbs or substantives."! I do not know that this rule has anywhere been directly questioned, but it is certainly in practice wholly disregarded, and etymologists still continue " by unnatural forced conceits to derive the Eng- lish and all other lano-uao-es from the Greek or the Hebrew, or some imaginary primaeval tongue." J * Diversions of Purley, 1, 125. t lb. V. 1, p. 300, note *. + To. 1, 147. 38 OF CONJUNCTIONS. '' That word/' lie says in another place, "is always sufficiently original for me in that language where its meaning, which is the cause of the application, can be found."* Bearing these unportant preliminaries in mind, the reader is now prepared for our Author's chapters on those parts of speech, which (according to Mr. Harrisjf " appear in grammar, like zoc^ihytes in nature ; a kind of middle beings, of amphibious character, which, by sliaring the attributes of the higher and the lower, conduce to link the whole together." In the distribution of the parts of speech, the name of conjunction is given to words connecting sentences, and of preposition to those connecting words ; and the same word may (and it is not at all extraordinary that it should) be used both as con- junction and preposition, as it is the apparently dif- ferent application to single words or to sentences that constitutes the difference between them. And the distinction is useful on account of the cases which they govern when applied to words, and which they cannot govern when applied to sentences. Conjunctions are not in their nature a separate sort of word, or part of speech, by themselves ; they have not a separate manner of signification, although not devoid of signification. There is not one in any language, which may not, by a skilful herald, be traced home to its own family and origin. Ab- breviation and corruption are always busiest with * Diversions of Purley, Vol. 2, p. 204. f Hermes, B. 2, c. 2. OF CONJUNCTIONS. 39 the words which are most frequently in use; yet the words most frequently used are least liable to be laid aside. The conjunctions, then, may thus be reduced to one general scheme of explication ; though John- son declared it to be a task which no man, however learned or sagacious, had been able to perform. If ^ fGif ^ rGifan To give An Xn w 'S^nan To grant Unless Onles 'S Onlesan To dismiss Eke > Eac > Eacan To add Yet "cl Get 1 Getan To get Still 1. Stell ■^ Stellan To put Else >i< Xles )> Bh-<: 'S'lesan To dismiss Tho' or Though 1 Thaf or Thafig 0) Thafian or ) Thafigan 5 To allow But g Bot 'B Botan To boot But eS Be-utan r4 Beon-utan To be-out Without Wyrth-utan o Wyrthan-utan To be-out And J ^Xn-ad J ^Anan-ad Dare congeriem Lest is the past participle Lesed of Lesan, to dismiss : from Les (the imperative of the same verb) placed at the end of nouns and coalescing with them, we have such words as hopeless, fearless, &c. fSithan ^ I Syne j Since the place of beginning < to fall Ceiling J [to hang. * From innuit terminum a quo. Wallis' Gram. p. 84. OF PREPOSITIONS. 57 From relates to every thing to whicli beginning relates ; and therefore to time as well as to motion, without which there can be no time. Ex, From morn till night th' eternal larum rings. The larum rang, beginning morning ; or morn- ing being the time of its beginning to ring. In Mr. Harris's example it is plain the characters of detachment, motion and rest, belong to the words came and fall, and not to the word jfrom. [It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in their interpretation of words, Lexicographers, fol- lowing the same course with Harris, transfer to the word they are explaining the signification of some other word in the sentence ; and this they do, not only in the case of prepositions, but of every other part of speech. Johnson has seventy interpretations of this pre- position ; the two first stand opposed to each other. 1. Privation. 2. Reception; and the words in the sentences are : 1. Take, dreiv from; 2. Heceive from. Afterwards we have. Out of, noting emission. Th' Eternal Father jfrom his secret cloud Amidst, in thunder lettered thus his voice. The emission is expressed by the verb uttered; and the beginning, whence the utterance or emission came, was the midst of the cloud. 10. Out of; noting extraction. From high Maeonia's shores I came. Of poor descent. The extraction is expressed by, or rather implied from, the verb came, connected with, of poor de- scent ; and the beginning of it was, the shores of Maeonia. 58 or PREPOSITIONS. 12. Out of; noting tlie ground, or cause of any- thing. 'Tis true, from force the strongest title springs ; I therefore holdyrom that which first made kings. The ground or cause is expressed by the sub- stantive ^brce; and the beginning, whence the title springs, was /brce; and is expressed hj from.'] To. " The preposition to (in Dutch, written toe and tot, a little nearer to the original) is the Gothic taui or tauhts, that is, act, effect, result, consumma- tion ; which Gothic substantive is, indeed, in itself no other than the past participle tauid, of the verb taujan, agere ; and what is done, is terminated, ended, finished.'''^ To ^' has not perhaps (for I am not sure that it has not) precisely the signification of end or termination, but of something tantamount or equivalent."* " In the Teutonic the verb is written tuan or tuon, whence the modern German thun ; and its preposi- tion (varying like its verb) tu. In the Anglo-Saxon the verb is teog-an, and the preposition TO. The Latin preposition ad, to, is also merely the past participle of agere ; and that past participle is like wise a Latin substantive." Agitum, agtum, agdum, agd, ad or or or actum, act, at. To return to Mr. Harris's instances : These figs cameyrom Turkey to England. ^ • To vel unto, innuit terminura ad quern, atque idem terminum relationis. Wallis' Gram. p. 84. OF PKEPOSITIONS. 59 The lamp falls /rom tlie ceiling to the ground. The lamp hangs /rom the ceiling to the floor. As>from denotes the commencement of the mo- tion, so does to the end or termination ; which is, England, or ground, or floor. In From morn to night th' eternal larum rings — From is 023posed to to, and if we read, from morn till night, it is still so opposed; till being com- pounded of to and while, that is, time. From morn to time night.* Foe. As from and to are as opposite as hegin- ning and end ; so are for and of as cause and conse- quence. Foe, I believe (says Tooke) to be no other than the Gothic substantive yazVzw«, cause, f He imagines, also, that of (in the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon af or of) is a fragment of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon afar a, posteritas, &c. ; of or a, proles, &c. ; that it is a noun substantive, and * Common people say, I will stay while evening. Till is, in our older writers, applied to fluce as well as time : as, he fled till Ireland ; they go till Athens 5 and it is still in use in the north of England in that sense. See Richardson's Dictionary. f For innuit finem cui, vel pro quo. Wallis' Gram. p. 84. Sir John Stoddart thinks it most extraordinary, that Tooke, who asserts universally that prepositions are the names of real objects, should say of the preposition for, " I believe it to be no other than the Gothic substantive /a i//na, cause." What real object is cause 1 How is causation to be apprehended by sense ? That we have a conception of cause is certain ; but it is equally certain that we come at it by means of our mind, and that it is in truth " a pwre idea oi intellect, ^^ which sense alone never did and never can give." Philosophy of Language, p. 174. Surely it is nothing extraordinary that Tooke should be consistent. He con- signed all " pure ideas of intellect " to the same limbo with Locke's Triangle, and Crambe's Lord Mayor. See infra, On Abstraction. 60 OF PREPOSITIONS. means always consequence, offspring, successor, fol- lower, &c. It is remarked tliat the Russian patronymic ter- mination was of; now Vitch, that is, Jitz, fils, or films ; that of the English, son ; as in Peterhof, Petervitch, or Petrowitz, Peterson. Fitz is also a common patronymic prefix in English. In the Welsh ap, son, coalesces with many names, as in Ap, Rhys, Price, ^jt?-Howel, Powel. * Johnson has forty-six meanings of the preposition for, and two hundred instances in proof of them. Greenwood has eighteen meanings with above forty instances. A single instance is selected from each of these, and explained by our author ; in which cause takes the place oi for, and a slight change is made in the form of expression. Greenwood's general expla- nation is : I " The preposition for has many sig- nifications, and denotes chiefly for what purpose, end, or use ; or for whose benefit or damage any thing is done : as, ^ Christ died/br us.' " Res. Christ died cause us ; or we being the cause of his dying. He then subdivides this general explanation into eighteen specific ones. 1. It serves to denote the end or object which one proposes in any action ; as, to fight for the public good (that is, cause the public good ; or, the public good being the cause of fighting). * De Brosses. Mech. du Langage, Cli. 12, § 5, observes that the Latin termination ius, in proper names (CEmiliMs), is very probably from the Greek vioq, filius. f English Gram. p. 95. ^!W OF PREPOSITIONS. 61 To proceed more briefly : 2. He does all things for the love of virtue. Greenwood includes cause in his explanation. 3. It marks the use for which a thing is done : as, Chelsea Hospital was builtybr disabled soldiers; disabled soldiers (or the use of disabled soldiers) being the cause of its being built. 4. It denotes profit, advantage, interest: as, I write ybr your satisfaction. 5. It denotes for what a thing is proper or not : as. It is a good remedy /or (the cure of) a fever. 6. It denotes agreement or help : as. The soldier fights /br the king. There can be no difficulty in explaining these examples. Others there are, which require to be stated more at length. 8. It denotes retribution, or requital and pay- ment : hither we refer the phrases. Eye for eye, &c. (that is, an eye destroyed by malicious violence being the cause of an eye taken from the convict in punishment). ,11. It denotes the condition of persons, things, and times : as. He was a learned man for those times (that is, the darkness or ignorance of those times being the cause why he may be considered as a learned man). I hope the number of examples that have been presented to the reader, will suffice to enable him to put the remainder of Greenwood's, and the whole of Johnson's, to a fair trial. Dr. Lowth conceiving FOE, in its primary sense, to be loco alterius, in the stead or place of another, 62 OF PREPOSITIONS. censures our two greatest masters of the Englisli language. — Dryden, for saying. You accuse Ovid for luxuriancy of verse ; and Swift, for saying. Accused the ministers /b?- betraying the Dutch. The meaning of the passages plainly is, Betrayino' the Dutchi ^ ^ , T -^ . ^ f, > Cause 01 the accusation. ijuxuriancy oi verse J Both Greenwood and Johnson give. Instead of, in the place of, as one of their explanations: I subjoin them with the example from each, with Tooke's explanation. Greenwood. It is used to denote instead of, in the place of; as, I wiU grind /br him (that is, he being the cause of my grinding). Johnson. In the place of, instead of: as. To make him copious is to alter his character ; and to translate him line for line is impossible (that is, line cause of line : or each line of the original beino^ the cause of each line in the translation). [It may be worth while to produce some old usages of the expression ^or to, now deemed a vul- And led hir unto France, spoused /()r to be. R. Brunne. What wenten ye out for to se. Wiclif. For he was late ycome fro his viage. And went ybr to don his pilgrimage. Chaucer. To be spoused, cause of her being led to France. To see what, was the cause that ye wenten out. To do his pilgrimage, the cause he went.] But/br and ofdiiFering so widely as cause and consequence, it remains to account for the indifferent n OF PREPOSITIONS. 63 use of them in the following passage from Wych- erley's Country Wife : Well! 'tis e'en so; I have caught the London disease they call Love. I am sick of my husband, andybr my gallant. So also we have, sick of hunger ; sick for hun- ger ; sickness of hunger ; sickness for hunger. Here are, sickness o/"love; sickness /br love. Between the respective terms, — sickness, hunger — sickness, love, — it matters not w^hich of the two prepositions is inserted ; the only difference is, that if of be inserted, it is put in apposition to sickness , and sickness is announced as the consequence ; \ifor is inserted, it is put in apposition to hunger or to love, and hunger or love is announced the cause. Scaliger, in his Chap.* entitled Appositio, says truly, " Causa propter quam duo suhstantiva non ponuntur sine copula, e philosophia petenda est. — Si qua substantia ejusmodi est, ut ex ea et alia, unum intelligi queat ; earum duarum substantiarum toti- dem notae (id est nomina^ in oratione sine injunc- tione cohgerere poterunt." " And this," says Tooke, " is the case with all those prepositions (as they are called) which are really substantives. Each of these ejusmodi est, ut ex ea et alia (to which it is jorefixed, joosrfixed, or by any manner attached) unum intelligi potest." In illustration of this doctrine of Apposition, it is important to add, that " the Dutch are supposed to use van in two meanings, because it supplies in- * Cap. 127, De Causis, L. L. 64 OF PREPOSITIONSi differently the places both of our of and from ; not- withstanding which, van has always one and the same meaning: namely, heginnirig. And its use, both for of and from, is to be explained by its dif- ferent apposition. When it supplies the place of FROM, van is put in apposition to the same term to which, from is put in apposition. But when it sup- plies the place of of, it is not put in apposition to the same term to which of is put in apposition, but to its correlative. And between two correlatives, it is totally indifferent to the meaning which of the two correlations is expressed.* £Jx, Comen van Amsterdam. To come from Amsterdam. Motion and place are the correlations ; van and from are in apposition to the place where motion began. £x. Hy is van goed geslacht. He is of a noble stock. Van is in apposition to noble stock ; (one corre- lative ;) the beginning, whence, he is (what he is) begins. But OF is in apposition to he is, (the other corre- lative,) as consequence or offspring of noble stock. Of. It is now necessary to return to the pre- position of, and first, as to its etymology. * It is worthy of note, that Sir John Stoddart quotes this with approbation, which shows that he understood and embraced Tooke's Doctrine of the effect of apposition and also of correla- tion. And yet in the last sentence of his elaborate Chapter on Prepositions, seems to insinuate that Tooke knew as little of the nature of a preposition, as those whom he censures for their igno- rance of it. OF PEEPOSITIONS. 65 " Af, from rtf-ara or q/*-ora," (says a critic in the Quarterly Review, September, 1835, and an Alter idem probably in Blackwood's Magazine, April, 1840,) " no more than the Latin post from the English, posterity.'''' He would have been nearer the chance of a truth, if he had said, " As much as the Latin po5jf, from. positum." He proceeds to as- sert that the Gothic noun ofar, is from the par- ticle afar, post, and this evidently from af. What then is af? It is Sanscrit apa, Greek dwo, Latin ab, Old German aba, apa, English of. And thus we are driven back to the old scheme of etymo- logy, deducing a noun from a particle, and leading us through a variety of synonymous affinities, and ending in, " True no meaning — puzzling more than wit." Tooke's doctrine required that he should look into our own language or its immediate parent for some noun substantive from which the prepo- sition, that is, the prepositive or rather appositive noun, might have derived to us. And he says, he imagines the Gothic afara to be that substantive. The corruption is slight, and the meaning clear. A few instances selected from Johnson will serve to illustrate this meaning, and at the same time to show further his practice (or rather the general practice) of imputing, as a meaning to the word he has to explain, a meaning that pertains to some other word in the sentence. 9. Noting power, ability, choice. Some soils put forth odorate flowers of them- selves. — Odorate flowers are the consequence or offspring ; soils, the cause. F 66 OF PREPOSITIONS. 10. !N^oting properties, qualities, or conditions. " Its (the eglantine's) odours were of power to raise from death." That is, the odours of the eg- lantine were odours of power to raise from death. In the first case, odours were consequence and eg- lantine cause. In the second, odours (their being such odours as they loere) the consequence, and the power to raise from death the cause (of their being such), 11. He was a man of ancient family. A man; consequence or oiFspring; — ancient fa- mily ; cause, source. 13. Noting the matter of the thing. The chariot Avas of cedar, and borders of gold, &c. &c. need no explanation. By is the next important word : it is written hi or he. By cause, Z'z-cause, he cause, hy right, hi right, he right (in Anglo-Saxon hi, he, hig). It is the imperfect Byth of the Anglo-Saxon Be-on, to he.* It Infrequently used with an abbreviation of construction, or sub-audition of instrument, cause, agent, &c. and the meaning of the omitted word is often attributed to it. With, the imperative of icyrthan, is used indifferently for hy (when the im- perative of heoii), and with the same sub-audition and unplied meaning, f By was also used (not im- properly and with the same meaning) where now are used/br, in, during, through. One quotation * Hence hy-an^ to continue to be, to dwell. f Yet custom has established a difference in the usage. Though we say, " he was slain hy a sword or with a sword," we should not say, " he was slain with me by a sword," but " 63/ me with a OF PKEPOSITIONS. 67 from the old cliromcler Fabyan will exemplify these usages. " ^VTien he (the holy Byshop Aldelme) was styred hy his gostly enymy to the synne of the flesh, he, to do more torment to himselfe and of hy s Body, wolde holde witliin his bed hy hym a faire may den hy so long a tyme as he myght say over a holy sauter." Fahyan, Ixxvi. By his gostly enymy (his ghostly enemy heing so. the agent). Wolde holde hy hym. Hym heing the cause of holding. Wolde holde hy so long a time ; so long a time heing, continuing, during. He might have written for so long a time as ; so long a time as to perform a certain act, being the cause of his so holding her. He might also have Avritten through so long a time ; so long a time heing the passage or medium to the performance of the act. " Sleynge the people without mercy hy all the wayes that they passed." Fahyan, Ixxviii. In all the ways, &c. Johnson in his four first explanations accords very well with Tooke : in the subsequent twenty, a meaning implied from some other word in each quotation is introduced. sword," hy being connected with the agent^ and with connected with the instrument. Again we may say. He was killed by {agent) me. He was killed by ov with {instrument) a sword. He was killed by or with {cause or means) sensual indulgences. Witlt, seems never to be connected with the principal agent. 68 OF PEEPOSITIONS. 5. It shows tlie manner of an action. ^^ Seize her by force. ''^ 7. The quantity. " Sell hy the ounce^ 8. Place. " Battle hy sea." 12. Noting ground of judgment. " Judge the event hy what has passed." It is clear that in these instances ybrce expresses the manner; ounce, the quantity; sea, theplace; and what has passed, the ground of judgment. Sans, formerly, sometimes used instead of with- out, is a substantive, and means absence (Italian As- senza). It is from the Itahan preposition senza. So the Greek preposition y^ojpig, asunder, is the corrupted imperative of ^wpi^£iv,to sunder, to sever, disjoin, separate. The German preposition sonder, Dutch zonder, are the imperative of the respective verbs sondern, zonderen, with the same meaning as the Greek ^w- The Latin preposition sine, that is, sit ne, be not. The Spanish siyi, from the Latin sine. FuETHEE. The Greek %^a became the Doric ^opa,and the Latinyb?'a,whenceybre5,ybn5, whence the ltdulmiLifuo?'a,fuore,fuori, and the Yrenchfors, which in the prepositive and conjunctive state, the French have latterly changed to hors ; but they have not so changed it when in composition, as forshourg. From the French we still have, and once had many more English words preceded by for in this meaning, asybrfeit,/b?Tclose, &c. [Our law-writers (I may remark) were quite aware of this origin of for ; they TQudiQY forfeit by OF PKEPOSITIONS. 69 foris-facere, q. extraneum facere.* To these two I will add a few in very common u^q, forbear , for- bid, forget, forgive, forsake. FoR-BEAE, V. to abstain, says Mr. Tyrwhitt, that is, to hold or keep away from ; and so to forbear is forth-hQ2iY, that is, to bear forth or away from, to hold off or away. FOR-BID, V. to hidi forth or away from; sc. any thino* doinff or to be done. Forget, v. to get forth; to cause or suffer to get or go forth, pass out, or escape ; sc. from the mind or memory. Forgive, v. to give forth, out or away ; to remit or release, and consequentially, to pardon (^per do- nare). Forlore, E-obert of Gloucester writes Yer- LORE. Chaucer, Gower, Spenser write forlore, which Tyrwhitt properly interprets, utterly lost. YLoncQ forlorn, which Latham interprets lost only, omitting the force of for. Forsake, v. to seek forth, out or away from ; and thus, to go away or depart from. There is another old law term, which will serve for further illustration : FORIS-FAMILIATE, V. in Law JjSitin f oris fami- liare, to put, drive, or expel {f oris familiani) forth from hisfamilg. A son is said to he foris familiate (foris familiatus) when he has received from his • To do or cause to be out or away from, to do amiss or misdo. Chaucer writes : " All this suffred our Lord Jesu Crist, who never /orfaited." Parsones Tale. And also, to do away or lose his property, sc. for some crime. 70 OF PEEPOSITIOKS. father a share or portion of the inheritance, and is to expect no more. Spelman.'] Betweej^. Betivixt, between, (formerly written twene, atwene, hytwene^ is a dual preposition, having no word correspondent in the Greek, Latin, Italian, French, &c. and being almost peculiar to ourselves. Between is the Anglo-Saxon imperative he and tweg- €71, twain. Betwixt is the same imperative, and the Gothic tioos or two. It is written by Chaucer by- twyt. ^^-fore, ^i^-hind, BE-Iow, BiE-side can require no explanation. Be-keath. Neath, now obsolete, has left nether, nethermost in common use. The House of Com- mons was anciently (in the time of Henry YIII.) called the nether house of Parliament : and the word occurs several times seriously used in Paradise Lost, though now used otherwise. The Gothic nadr, Anglo- Saxon nedre, applied to the whole serpentine class, is much more ancient in the northern lan- guages than the introduction of astronomy among them, and with that their word nadir. The Anglo- Saxon neothan, neothe, (in Dutch neden, Danish ned, German niedere, and the Swedish nedre and neder,) is as much a substantive, and has the same meaning as this nadir. From the top to the bottom is in the collateral Dutch, " Van bovan tot beneden^ and in both the nouns are at once acknowledged. Undek, in Dutch onder, is on neder, though by the sound seeming to have so little connection with beneath. OF PREPOSITIOIirS. 71 Beyond^ (in Anglo-Saxon not only bi^eond, be- geond^ but with^eond,^ is be and geond, the past par- ticiple of the verb Gan^ gan^an, or gongan, to go^ to pass. So that " beyond any place," means be passed that place, or be that place passed. [ Obs. Yon, Yondee, Ben Jonson classes among the pronouns.] Ward, in Anglo-Saxon ward or iceard^ is the imperative of wardian or weardian, to look at, to direct the view, and is the same word as the French garder. Our word reward, usually by help of other words in the sentence, conveys to recompense, to benefit, for some good action done ; and by the same help it conveys the notion of punishment, but is no other than the French regarder, to regard, to look again, that is, to re-member, to re-consider, the natu- ral consequence of which will be either the appor- tionment of benefit or the contrary, according to the action or conduct reviewed. It is in a figurative or secondary sense that garder means to protect, to keep, to watch, to ward, to guard. It is the same in Latin : Tutus, guarded, looked after, safe, is the past participle of tueor, tui- tus, tutus. So tutor, he who looks after. So we say either guard him well, or look well after him. And a looker, a warden, a warder, an overseer, a keeper, a guard or a guardian, is a name for the same agent or officer. Ward may be joined to any place, person, or thing, as in our old poets and divines, to Bome- ward, to G^odward, to (jY2iQ,e,iuard. In totoard and fromward we direct to look at or 72 OF PREPOSITIONS. regard either the end or beginning of any action or motion or time. Ward always in composition retains the same meaning, namely, regard, look at, see, direct your view. The Latin preposition versus, (French vers, Ita- lian verso,) from the Latin verb vertere, to turn, is equivalent to the English ward, as ad-versus is to toward; it is versus, the past participle, turned, namely, in order to look at, to regard. Athwart, that is, athweort or athweoried, wrest- ed, twisted, curved, is the past participle of thweo- rian, to wrest, to twist. Thwart or athwart has corresponding prepositions in German, Dutch, Da- nish and Swedish, and from the same source are the English swerve and veer. Among. Emonge, Amonge, Amonges, Amongest, Amongst, Among, is the past parti- ciple gemoencged, gemencged (the Dutch gemengd, gemengt. Old English meynt*), of the Anglo-Saxon verb gemoRucgan, and the Gothic verb tamainga.n ; or rather the ipveterperf ect,gemang,gemong,gemung, or amang, among, amung, (of the same verb wcew- gan, mengan,) used as a participle, without the ter- mination od, ad, or ed, and meaning mixed, mingled. The Anglo-Saxons usually prefixed X. JE. be. for, ge. especially to their past participles. Ymell, with the same omission of termination, means y-medled, that is, mixed, mingled. Medley is still common. To medle, mydle, mell, merely to mix, are as common in old writers. • See infra. Many. OF PREPOSITIONS. 73 Against. Mr. Tooke knows not the verb, of which this must be the past participle. Amid or Amidst. The Anglo-Saxon is On- middan, on-midder, in medio : Mid, middle (that is, mid-dael) midst. Along. On long or on length ; the Anglo-Sax- ons used Andlang or Endlong. Along. (It was along of you). The Anglo- Saxons used Gelang, the past participle of len3ian, and means produced. Our most ancient writers observed the same distinction.* It is along of you ; it is produced by you ; " I long for his return." We express a moderate de- sire for any thirig by saying we incline, that is, bend ourselves to it ; and an eager desire by saying that we long for it, that is, make long, lengthen, or stretch ourselves out after it or for it : observe, we say, inchne to or towards. Long for or after, Len^ian is also written lan^ian, and " Lan^^ath the awuht, Adam, up to Gode," Lye renders ; (est quod) elevabit te aliquid, Adam, sursum ad Deum : and Tooke, " longeth you, lengtheneth. you, stretch- eth you up to God." During is the participle of the verb dure, for- merly common in our language. Pending, op- posite, need no explanation. * Belong, Y. on the meaning of the verb lenzian, to long, thsit is, to make long, to lengthen, to stretch out, to produce, I have founded my explanation of to belong, " to reach, to attain, to per- tain, to appertain," an explanation which leads to and accounts for that consequential usage w^hich Johnson and Webster concur in giving as the primary meaning, " to be the property of," (rather to be or become). 74 OF PREPOSITIONS. Save is tlie imperative of the verb. OuTCEPT is whimsically composed of out and capere, instead of ex and capere. Out-take and out- taken were formerly in very common use. Nigh, I^ear, is the Anglo-Saxon adjective nih, neh, neah, nealig, vicinus ; and Next, the Anglo- Saxon superlative neahgest, nehst. Instead, in Anglo-Saxon is on or in stede, that is, in place. Hence Step or sted-father , Anglo-Saxon steop-fseder ; in Latin vice or loco, Italian in luogo, in Spanish en lugar, French au lieu, in Dutch in stede or in plaats, German on statt, Danish istceden, in Swedish (as we use either \\oni^stead or home- stalT) it is istaellet. [Wachter had so far anticipated the etymology of 5^e^-father, &c. as to write, " Vide annon stief-vater, sit vice-pater ; stief -muter , vice- mater ; stief-son, vice-filius, sc. representatione aut substitutione." But he refers both the German stief 2ixA the Anglo-Saxon steop to the Anglo-Sax- on stow of the same meaning, namely, place. In Danish the compounds are all written stied-fader, moder, broder, &c. ; and "at vasre een ifader^s stied,^'' is " to be one in a father^ s stead.'''' And our OAvn Miles Coverdale thus feehngly writes: " Haue compassio, oh, christen woman, upon those yonge innocent Orphans, which know not, nor have any confort nor hel23e upon erthe, save only the. Con- sider that God the Lord hath ordeyned the (in steede of their own mother) to be to the a right true mother, and requireth the to lone the and to do the good. The Christen State of Matrimony, Ixx.] About is from the Anglo-Saxon hoda (whence OF PKEPOSITIOlSrS. 75 our English word to bode ; See but, abut ;) which means \hQ Jirst outward extremity or boundary of any thing. Aftek is the comparative of the noun aft, still used by our sailors: Gothic aftaro, Anglo-Saxon cefter, Dutch agter, achter, Danish efter, Swedish efter, atra, achter ; After is used as a noun ad- jective in Anglo-Saxon, in English, and in most northern languages. Hind, aft, and back, have all originally the same meaning. In Danish jTor og bag is owe fore and aft, or before and behind. DowisT. Adoion, Anglo-Saxon dun, 75?dun, of dune, deorsum. Camden and Bishop Gibson consider the rivers Dan or Daven (whence Da7i^ori or Davenport) the Don or Doven, the Dun, Dune, or Duven, to be so called, because carried in a channel, low, sunk in the ground, and to be from Duffen, — Britannice, sunk or low (depressum). Tooke agrees that duffen is the origin not only of the names of the rivers, but also of our word down (as perhaps Camden), but he is of opinion that duf-en is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb duf-ian, dof-ian, daf-ian ; and also dyfian, to dive, mergere, to sink, to plunge, to dive, to dip. [The Anglo-Saxon dun, dune, Somner explains to be mons, a hill or mountain, a doicn.* A Down is a place {dofferi) sunk or lov) (locus * Mr. Taylor (8vo. edition) suggests that down, adown, is a con- traction of of -dune, off or from hill, downhill, proclivis, and adds that the Latin pronus is rendered from Boethius, by Alfred of -dune, and by Chaucer adowne. 76 OF PREPOSITIONS. tnersus, depressusy To be on the down or downs is to be on a place sunk or low. To go or come to the down or downs is to go or come to the place sunk or low. To go or come down is to go or come, place or to place, sunk or low, and, with relation to those on the top, to descend. The Downs are the hills dipping down to the sea along the coast of Kent, under which our ships ride in safety. Of the same description are the Dunes on the coast of Holland, whence £)zmkirk. Down is sometimes used as a verb, or with the sub-audition of a verb, as " down with him ! " Locke writes, " If he be hungry, more than wan- ton bread alone will down.''^ Again, " I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of de- monstration, and probably it will hardly dow7i with any body at first hearing." Johnson supposes an ellipsis of go, to go down, and he explains Locke's usages thus : " to be re- ceived, to be digested :" he should have added, ^' to be swallowed." This, be it observed, is his first explanation ; his second is ^^ to descend." The first affords a remarkable illustration of his method of interpretation, namely, to transfer to the word he is explaining a signification implied from the context. Mr. Trench observes that the great fault in Johnson's Dictionary is the non-recognition that a word has originally but one meaning, and that all the applications may be deduced from it. It is indeed the great fault, inasmuch as it is the fruitful parent of nameless others. Dr. Webster, OF PREPOSITIONS. 77 it IS to be regretted, treads in Johnson's footsteps, and follows his mode of interpretation, and goes so far as to say that eye means — direct opposition ; and that mouth means — desires, necessities, re- proaches, calumnies, &c. &c.] Upon, Up, Over, Boye, Above, have a com- mon origin and signification. It is not necessary to trace these particles farther than to some noun or verb of a determinate signification, and this noun is the Anglo-Saxon ufa^ ufera, ufamoest ; altus, altior, altissimus; up, upon; upper, over: up- most, uppermost ; upperest, over est. Bove is Beufan, bufan ; above is on-bufan, " but I believe that ufon, ufa, upon, up, means the same as top or head, and is originally derived from the same source." Head* is in Anglo-Saxon heafod, heafd, the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon heaf- an or heof-an, to heave or lift up, whence uf-on, with the same signification, may easily be derived. '^ And I believe the names of all abstract relation (as it is called) are taken either from the adjectived names of common objects, or from the participles of common verbs. The relations of place are more com- monly from the names of some parts of our body." Under this, or some such impression, Wilkins constructed his diagram, to explain the local pre- positions, by the help of a man's figure ; and from Wilkins the Abbe de I'Epee borrowed his method of teaching the prepositions to his deaf and dumb scholars. * See infra, Heave, head, &c. 78 OF PEEPOSITIONS. Ix, Out, On, Off, At. Tooke cannot satisfy himself about these words. In the Gothic and An- glo-Saxon there is the substantive inna, meaning uterus, viscera, venter, interior pars corporis (and in a secondary sense the Anglo-Saxon, inn, inne, is used for cave, cell, cavern). Out, not improbably from a word originally meaning skin, and thus in and out would come from two nouns meaning those parts of the body. CHAP. X. OF ADVERBS. ALL the indeclinables, except the adverbs, are now considered, and they are no more a se- parate part of speech than conjimctions and prepo- sitions. They will give little trouble. All adverbs in ly (the most prolific branch of the family) receive their termination from the corrup- tion of like, which word " like''' is at this day in Scotland frequently used instead of the Enghsh ly; e. g. A goo^like figm-e. Adrift is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Drifan, TTdrifan, to drive. Aghast, Agast. Tooke is inclined to tliink that the Gothic Xgids, territus, the past participle Qiagjan,tivfiere, may have become agisd, agist, agast. But the constant application of the word to that, which is Gazed, agazed, agaz'd (agast) upon with terror or consternation, seems sufficient to account OF ADVERBS. 79 for its restriction to denote those feelings. A^ue is from the Gothic apis, fear, trembling. Go, Ago, Ygo, Goj^, Agon, Gone, Agone, are used indiscriminately by our old English wri- ters, as the past participle of the verb to go. Asunder (originally from the Anglo-Saxon sond, that is, sand) is the past participle 'Ksundren, or X5M?2(frec?, separated (as the particles oi sand are), of the verb sondrian, &c. to separate. Astray is the past participle T^strceged, of the Anglo-Saxon verb strosgan, to stray, to scatter. Hence straw, strow, strew, straggle, stroll, and also the straw (that is, straw-d, stray)-berry. Atwist is the past participle Ge-twised, 'Xtivised, 'Ktwisd, of the verb tivisan, &c. torquere ; twisan, from tiva, twee, twi, twy, tweo, two. Awry is the past participle T^wrythed, 'Kwrythd, of the verb lorythan, writhan, to writhe. AsKEWj in the Danish skicev, is wry, crooked, oblique. Skiever, to twist, to wrest. Skiajvt, twisted, wrested. Askant, Askance, probably are the participles aschuined, aschuins. In Dutch schuin, wry, oblique ; schuinen, to cut avjry ; schuins, sloping, wry, not straight. Asw^OON is the past participle asuond, of the An- glo-Saxon verb Suanian, 'Kswunan, dejicere animo. Astound is the past participle estonned, of the French verb estonner, etonner, to astonish. Enough, in Anglo-Saxon genoT^ or genoh, ap- pears to be the past participle genoged, multiplica- tum, manifold, of the Anglo-Saxon verb genogan, 80 OF ADVERBS. multiplicare. In Dutch genoeg, from genoegen, to content, to satisfy. Fain is the past ipsirticyple fcegened^fcBgen, fcegn, IcBtits, of the Anglo-Saxon YerhfcBgemanyfcegnian, gaudere, Icetari (to be glad, to rejoice, to fain.) Somner, Lief, Lieyer, Lievest, leof, leofre, leofest. Leof (for leofed or lufad, or lufod or luf ) is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb lufian, to love, and always means beloved. Tooke considers this word lief, &c. to be a vulgarity which no mo- dern author would use. Yet Junius (his victim as he imagined) had written, " Though I use terms of art, do not injure me so much as to suppose I am a lawyer : I had as lief he a Scotchman." Let- ters, Y. i. p. 312. WoodfaU's Edition. Adieu, Farewell. The former is from the French a dieu, from the Italian addio. The latter is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb far an, to go or to fare. How goes it? hoy^ fares it? Halt is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb healdan, to hold. Hence also to hold, formerly written to halt. In German still halten, Dutch still houden, to halt or stop, German halten^ Dutch hou- den, to hold. Lo is the imperative of Look. " Lo, you there." Needs. Need is, used parenthetically, and an- ciently written nedes and nede is. So certes for cer- tain is. Prithee, I pray thee. To wit is the infinitive of the Anglo-Saxon verb witaji, and means to be known, sciendum; — rather OF ADVERBS. 81 from the second infinitive to-witanne (as Mr. E. Taylor suggests). Perchance. Par-escheant, par-escheance, the participle of escheoir, echeoir, echoir, to fall. Percase (anciently parcas, parcaas) is per ca- surrif participle of cadere. Perad venture, anciently ^gr«w72fer,joar«W7z^er. Maybe, Mayhap. In "Westmoreland and other parts they use mappen, that is, may happen. Perhaps, Uphap. By or through haps ; Upon a hap. Hab-NAB. Hap 7ie hap ; happen or not happen. Be-like, perpetually occurring in our best old writers, is in Danish lykke, in Swedish lycka, and means luck, that is, chance, hazard, 'RAP, fortune, adventure. A-FOOT, On foot. 1^ oot-h.ot m^Q2iiiB immediately, instantaneously, without giving time for the foot to cool. So our court of Pie poudre, pied poudre, in which matters are determined before one can wipe the dust from one's feet. So E vestigio. Aloft, on loft, on luffc, on lyffc ; that is, in the luft or lyft (or the article omitted as superfluous, as in Anglo-Saxon and old English), in lyft, &c. In Anglo-Saxon lyft is the air or clouds; in Danish and Swedish luft is air; in Dutch, de loefhehhen, to sail before the wind ; loeven, to ply to windward ; loef the weather-gage. And from the same root are loft, lofty, to luff, lee, leeward, to lift, &c. Awhile, Atime. Whilst is a . corruption of whiles — time, that or Avhich. Aught or Ought is the Anglo-Saxon Hwit, a whit, whit. O was formerly written for the ar- G 82 OF ADVERBS. tide a and tlie numeral one. So naught or nought, na wliit, or no whit. Forth, from the Latin foris ; the French had fors (their modern hors), and hence/b/'fA, — whence the old adverbs outforth, inforth, &c. See ante For in composition. Much, More, Most. Mow or mowe, is the preterperfect, and mowen or meowen, the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon mawan, metere. Drop (as is customary) the ter- mination en, and there is left mowe or mow, mean- ing simply that which is mowed or mown ; and as this Avas put together in 2iheapf hence, figm-atively, mowe was used in the Anglo-Saxon to denote Awr heap,'\ though we now confine it to a heap of coun- try produce ; as a harley-mow, a hay-mow, &c. The past participle or substantive was variously written, ma, mcB, mo, mowe, mow, which when regularly compared, give ma, ma-er (that is, mare), ma-est, (that is, m^st). Mcb, m^e-er (that is, msere), maa-est (that is, mgest). Mowe, mow-er (that is, more), mow- est (that is, most). 3Io, mo-er (that is, more), mo-est (that is, most). Much has taken the place of mo, which was con- stantly used by our old writers, and is the diminu- tive of mo, passing through the gradual changes of moAel, my^el, moclil, mucheh, moche, MUCH. J The interchange of k and h is common. [It is objected to this etymology (first I think by * Cockeram explains the verb to mow to acervate. t Gr. Douglas uses it for a heap of wood, or a funeral pile. (Dido's) ^n. B. 4. p. 117. :j: See Stoddart, Philosophy of Language, p. 233. OF ADVERBS. 83 the learned Dr. Jamleson, who always treats Tooke with the respect and courtesy so becoming from one scholar to another), that ma is as really a com- parative as mare, both being used adverbially in the sense oi plus, magis. But this is not the only instance in which words expressing a positive state, affording a standard of comparison, have been used to denote a comparative degree. This has been so with less and worse. To less is to loose or put away, and the remainder of that from which any part has been lest or lost is an object of comparison with the original whole. And thus less, sufficiently denoting comparison, the grammatical form of lesser, used by our old writers, has fallen into disuse as unneces- sary. The same has been the fate of worser. To worse is to wear or waste ; and worse, worsen (as the Latin deterior, from de-terere^ is worn, loasted, and admits of comparison with that which is not. With mo the process has been eventually differ- ent. Mo or mow, that is, a heap (acervus), is a po- sitive object, formed by accumulation of parts, and affording a standard of comparison in relation to those parts. Successive accumulations or coacer- vations of mow upon mow, afforded other standards of comparison, requiring successively the termina- tions of er and est to express their relative degrees of comparison in the progress of increase. And this increase, commencing with that of mo or mow into mo-er or more, and not of the constituent parts of mo, — mo or mowe has not maintained its groimd as a comparative, but is used simply to express the positive object.] Kathee. Rath, rather, rathest, are in most com- 84 OF ADVERBS. mon use, both as adjectives and adverbs, in our older English writers, and are simply the Anglo-Saxon Rath, Rathor, Rathost, celer, velox. The Italians have received the word from our JSforthern ances- tors, and pronounce it ratio, Chaucer writes, " Why ryse ye so rathe .?" Mil- ton, " Bring the rathe primrose that forsaken dies." Chaucer, " Come the rather out." " Thou Ian- guy shest for desyre of thy rather fortune." *^ The werst speche is the rathest herde." Fie is the imperative of the Gothic and Anglo- Saxon verb flan, to hate. Quickly is Gwic,the past participle of gwiccian, vivificare, and like, and means life-like or lively. Scarce, in Dutch Skaears, is rare, unfrequent. Seldom. The Dutch have also the adjective zelden, selden ; the Germans selten, the Danes seld- som, the Swedes sellsynt, rare, unusual, uncommon. Stark in Anglo-Saxon is strong. German Starck, Dutch Sterk, Danish Staerk, Swiss Stark. Yery means true, and is from the French adjec- tive Vrai ; anciently written by them and us, veray. (^Chaucer, Gower, &c.) Once, At oxce, Twice, Thrice, are merely the genitives, anes, &c. of T^ne, Xn, twai, twa, twe3, twi3, tliri, thry, &c. (the substantive time, turn, &c. omitted). In a trice ; in the time in which we can count three ; one, two, three, and away. [Gower writes treis.'] Atwo, Athree, are on twa, on thry ; in two, in three. Alone, Only, are all-one (or one being alt), one-like. OF ADVERBS. 85 Anon, in Anglo-Saxon On-an, is in one, instant, moment, &c. subaudition. Spick and Span new. Spyker in Dutch means a warehouse or magazine ; in German spange means any thing shirting. Spick and Span-new means shining new from the warehouse. In Anglo-Saxon an means one, and on means in, which word on we have in English corrupted to an before a vowel, and to a before a consonant, and in writing and speaking have connected it with the subsequent words ; and from this double corruption has sprung a numerous race of adverbs, which (only because there has not been a similar corruption) have no correspondent adverbs in other languages. Aside, on side; Ablaze, on Maze; Aboaed, on hoard; Alive, on live, in life: and numerous others needing no explanation. Aye or Yea is the imperative of a verb of north- ern extraction, and means, have it, possess it, enjoy it ; and yes is ay-es, have, possess, or enjoy that. No and Not have the same extraction. In the Da^nish nodig, in the Swedish nodig, and in the Dutch noode, node, and no, mean averse, unwilling. Thus is the reader put into possession of Mr. Tooke's Etymology of English conjunctions, pre- positions, and adverbs, which are traced (the reader will perceive) with the most scrupulous minuteness, and, in general, supported by a great variety of well- chosen authorities, from which I have made, I hope, selections to a sufficient extent. And thus termi- nates the first volume of the ETrca IlrfpcEvra. 86 VOL. II. THE second volume opens upon us with the announcement of topics of more attractive importance than the distribution of the parts of speech, and the etymologies of conjunctions and prepositions : for, though these in the hands of Home Tooke bear a very different character from that with which any other grammarian has con- trived to invest them, yet it must be allowed that chapters on the rights of man and on abstraction are far better calculated to arrest and engage the attention of the philosophical enquirer. CHAP. I. or THE EIGHTS OF MAN^. THE words to which we are first introduced are right, just, and law ; also wrong and left: and on these it is necessary that our Author should be heard somewhat at large : — Eight, etymologically, is " rect-um (regit-um), the past participle of the Latin verb reg-ere." Just, is (juss-voai), the past participle of. the verb jub-ere.* * Whence the Italian Eitto ; and from the past participle Di- rectum,^ of the compound Di-rigere, — Diritto, Dritto, the ancient French Droict, and modern Droit. OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. 87 Law (or as anciently written, lagK), " is the past participle of ~L^'^, or Lge3h, of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb lag j -an, Lecg-an ; ponere," to lay down. Right, is that which is ruled or ordered. Just : that which is ordered or commanded. Law : that which is laid down, as a rule, order, or command. ^^ When a man demands his right ; he asks only that which it is ordered he shall have : " (that which is just, which is laid down, as a rule, that he should have). A claim of Rights by the people, " is the strongest avowal of their subjection (to the law). Nothing can more evidently show the natural dis- position of mankind to obedience than their in- variable use of this word right, and their perpetual application of it to all which they desire, and to everything which they deem excellent. ** A right conduct, a right reckoning, is that which is ordered. " A right line, is that which is ordered or directed to be pursued, not a random extension, but the shortest between two points. " A right road is, that ordered or directed to be pursued (for the object you have in view). " To do right is to do that which is ordered to be done. " To be in the right is to be in such situation or circumstances as are ordered. *^ To have right or law on one's side, is, to have in one's favour that which is ordered or laid down. 88 OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. " A rnght or just action is, such a one as is or- dered and commanded. " A JUST man is, such as he is commanded to be — qui leges juraque servat — who observes and obeys the things laid down and commanded. But that which is laid down, may be different by dif- ferent authorities ; and it is the authority that lays down, orders or commands, which must decide the question of obedience. " The right I revere is not the right adored by sycophants: the jus vagum, the capricious com- mand of princes or ministers. I follow the laio of God (what is laid down by him for the rule of my conduct) when I follow the laws of human nature;* which without any human testimony we know must proceed from God; and upon these are founded the rights of man, or what is ordered for man. I revere the constitution or constitutional laws of England ; because they are in conformity with the laws of God and nature, and on these are founded the rational rio-hts of Ens^lishmen." The other party to the dialogue commences the second chapter in the same strain: bringing us back to the etymology : — * Jus naturale est quod Natura omnia animalia docuit (he might have ssiid, jussit), H. T. Ulpian. Dig. book 1. tit. 1. law 1. parag. 3. " The general and perpetual voice of men is the sentence of God himself. For that which aU men have at all times learned, Nature herself must needs have taught ; and God being the Au- thor of Nature, her voice is but his instrument. By her from him, we receive whatsoever in such sort we learn." Hooker, Ecc. Pol. b. 1, § 8. OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. 89 " Before," he says, " there can be any thing recf-um., there must be reff-ens, Teg's, rex^ that is, qui or quod reg-\\j.\ And I admire (continues the speaker) more than ever the maxim of — rex, lex loquens ; lex, rex mutus. I acknowledge the senses he has given us, the experience of those senses, and reason (the effect and result of those senses and that experience), to be the assured testimony of God ; against which no human testimony ever can prevail. And I think I can discover, by the help of his etymology, a shorter method of deter- mining disputes between well-meaning men, con- cerning questions of right ; for if right and just mean ordered and commandQ^, we must at once refet" to the order and command; and to the autho- rity which ordered and commanded.^'' [And what that authority should be is (I may add) most emphatically, yet with admirable sim- plicity, declared by the Apostles Peter and John : — '^ And they called them, and commanded them not to speak at all nor teach in the name of Jesus. But Peter and John answered and said unto them ; Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye." And again, by Peter and the other Apostles, " Did not we straitly command you that you should not teach in his name? . . . Then Peter and the other * In the same way are formed judex, dux, vindex, index, sim- plex, from the present participle, judicans, ducens, &c. Some one judicating, leading, &c. \ " Effects are produced by power, not by laws. A law cannot execute itself, A law refers us to an agent." Paley, Nat. Theol. c. 24, 90 OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. Apostles answered and said; We ought to obey God rather than me?2."*] \Iliglit Sindjust, consistently with what has pre- ceded, I have thus explained, f " Bight implies a rector or ruler — over man as a created being ; God, or the laws of God, his Crea- tor : — over man, as a member of a particular state or society ; the laws of the land or of the society according or consistent with those of God. ^^ Right also unplies a correlative Duty: if there be no such duty, the right or rule is a mere unauthorized order or command." Just. Commanded (sc.) by the laws of God ; by the laws of human authorities acting in con- formity to those of God, as manifested in the na- ture of man : and, consequently, our notions of jus- tice depending upon our interpretation of those laws. A just man is one who acts in a manner — and a just action, that which is — obedient and conformable (in the words of Hooker, b. 1, § 16) to the law, " which He (God) hath made for His creatures to keepe : The Law whereunto by the light of reason men finde themselves bound in that they are men : the law which they make by composition for mul- titudes and politique societies of men to be guided by ; the law, which belongeth to each nation ; the law that concerneth the fellowship of all; and lastly, the law which God himself hath superna- turaUy revealed." Law. Tooke's etymology is not original. The * Acts iv. 19j and v. 29. f ^ew English Dictionary, in w. OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. 91 very learned Wachter had adopted the opinion of a still older lexicographer,* who asks, " What is law, but that which is laid down, or imposed by God or nature, or by a people binding themselves, or by a prince governing a people ?"t Wachter goes farther, and observes, that if we were to de- rive the Latin lex from the same source, we should not wander far, — nee a sensu vocis nee a ratione temporis ; since Scythian words are far more ancient than the Latin, and increased the Latin with many additions.] Wro7ig (written Wrang, wrong, or wrung), like the Italian torto, and the French tort, is the past tense or past participle of the verb, to wring, wring- an, torquQVQ ; and means merely wrung or wrested, from the right or ordered line of conduct. Wiclif gives an amusing instance of this literal sense ; he renders the Yulgate Latin, tortus nasus, a wrong nose ; and Tooke produces the following remarkable example of the literal usage of the two opposite words. Bight and wrong (that is, straight and wrested). " The dome of God is lykened to a bowe, for the bowe is made of two thinges, of a wronge tree and ryghte strynge, &c. And as the archer in the stretynge taketh the loronge tree in hys lyfte honde, and the ryght strynge in his ryght lionde, and draweth them atwynne, &c." — Dives and Pauper, 8th Comm. cap. 15. * Stiernliielmius. t Servius on Virg. -^n. i. 507, Jura dabat legesque viris, makes this distinction in usage between jws and lex. Jus generale est ; sed lex est juris species. Jus ad non scripta etiam pertinet. Leges ad JUS scriptum. 92 OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. [ Wrong, used a substantive, in a figurative sense, I find as early as Robert of Gloucester, " Gret wrong, thou woldest don us." And of the verb, formed on the past participle of to loring, Gower has this striking instance : " For whan that H0I7 Churche wrongeth, I not (know not) what other thyng shall right."] And this brings me back to account for the op- position of 7'ight and left The right hand is that which custom and those who have brought us up have ordered or directed us to use in preference, when only one hand is em- ployed ; and the left hand is that which is leaved, leaved, left, or which we are taught to leave out of use on such occasion. Though the people of Melinda use as their right hand that which with us is the left, yet the people of Melinda are right handed, in as much as they obey the order established by the usages of their country. In the following quotation from Spenser, the left arm is that which we so call : — ^* And whiles he (the Giant) strove his combred clubbe to quight Out of the earth, with blade all burning bright. He (Arthur) smott ofi'his left arme." Faerie Queene, c. 8, § 10. In the following, the left is the right, but the only one left, or the giant would be presmned to have had two left arms : " In force, which wont in two to be disperst. In one alone left hand, he now unites, OF THE EIGHTS OF MAN, 93 Which is, through rage, more strong than both were erst." — Ibid. c. 8, § 18. [It would have been more agreeable to Tooke's principles and practice, and exemplified in the op- posite, Wrong, to have given his explanations of riffht line and ri^ht road the priority, since they include the literal meaning of the word, on which all the others depend. " The voice of a crier in desert. Make ^e redi the weie of the Lord, Make 3e hise pathis 773^. (r^c^as facite semitas ejus)." — Wiclif, Luke iii. 4. The transference of this literal to the figurative meaning is thus happily illustrated by Hooker : — " As they, which travel from city to city, en- quire ever for the streightest way, because the streightest is that which soonest bringeth them to their journey's end; so we, having here, as the Apostle speaketh, no abiding city, but being always in travel towards that place of joy, immortality and rest, cannot but in every of our deeds, words, and thoughts, think that to be best, which with most expedition leadeth thereunto, and is for that very cause termed right. '^^ — Sermon on Pride. " Goodnesse in actions is like unto straightnesse : wherefore that which is done well we terme right : for as the strait way is most acceptable to him that trauaileth, because by it he commeth soonest to his journey es end: so in action, that which doth lye euenest between us and the end wee desu^e, must be the fittest for our use." — Secies. Pol. b. i. § 8. Having thus the true meanings of the words, right, just and wrong, traced to their source, and 94 OF THE RIGHTS OP MAN. tlie foundation of their various applications laid before us, I shall proceed to present the reader with my own views, as to the meaning of two words of equal importance, due and ought, the correlatives or reciprocals of right, just and wrong. The latter of the two {oughi), the ro ^£ov, in the neoteric compound, deontology, has figured very conspicuously in some modern works on morals. Due, is from the French deu, past participle of the verb dehvoir, devoir ; the Latin deh-ere, that is, de-habere (which is to say, de alio habere), to have or hold of or from another : and thus a due or debt (debit-urn, debt) is " Any thing had or held of or from another : his right or property ; that which is owed to him." The identity of meaning conveyed by our own word ought is well worthy of consideration from the student in philology. Ought is the past tense of the verb, to owe, owed, ow'd, owt or ought; fr'om the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb aig-an, ag-an, to have or hold. Own is also the past participle owen, own, from the same verb. And both ought and own are used as verbs, formed on the respective past participles. To owe, in our older writers, is constantly em- ployed in its primitive meaning, to have, hold, or possess ; and is so explained by the commentators of our dramatic writers. Bishop Hall uses oicer and owner as equivalent : he speaks of God, in one place as Ower, and in another as Owner, of Heaven. " And Oon (debtor) ought 500 pens," is Wiclif 's rendering of — imus debehdii. And Tyndale employs the same word. OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. 95 " For neither sones owen : Nee enim filii de- hent:''^ "quantuni dehes domino, (that is, de-habes domino,) How much oivist thou my Lord?" is, " How much hast thou, holdest or retainest thou, that belongs to, which is the property of, is due {dehitnm) to my lord, which ought at some time to be delivered or paid to him." I am afraid I may have in some degree sub- jected myself to the charge of prolixity by writing so copiously on these few words ; but their mean- ing and usage are so essential in every question of morals and system of morality, that I cannot think any apology required. I have dedicated a long period of my life to the task of endeavouring " to draw out the stores of thought, which are latent in our native language, and to give distinctness and precision to whatever is confused or dimly seen." And it is a great re- tributory satisfaction to me to find that the value of such employment is rising in the estimation of some of the most distinguished of those who have felt " an inward call to teach and enlighten their countrymen." I do not hesitate to claim the thanks of my read- ers for the following quotations. " A language will often be wiser, not merely than the vulgar, but even than the wisest of those who speak it. Being lil^e amber in its efficacy to circulate the electric spirit of truth, it is also like amber in embalming and preserving the relics of ancient wisdom, although one is not seldom puzzled to decipher its contents. Sometimes it locks up truths which were once well known, but which in 96 OF THE EIGHTS OF MAN. the course of ages have passed out of sight and been forgotten. In other cases it holds the germs of truth, of which, though they were never plainly discerned, the genius of its framers caught a glimpse in a happy moment of divination. A meditative man cannot refrain from wonder, when he digs down to the deep thought lying at the root of many a metaphorical term employed for the designation of spiritual things, even of those with regard to which professing philosophers have blundered gross- ly; and often it would seem as though rays of truths, which were still below the intellectual ho- rizon, had dawned upon the imagination as it was looking up to heaven. Hence they who feel an inward call to teach and enlighten their country- men, should deem it an important part of their duty to draw out the stores of thought which are already latent in their native language, to purify it from the corruptions which Time brings upon all things, and from which language has no exemption, and to endeavour to give distinctness and precision to whatever in it is confused, or obscure, or dimly seen." — Guesses at Truth. First Series, p. 295. " I would urge on you how well it will repay you to study the words which you are in the habit of using or of meeting, be they such as relate to the highest spiritual things, or our common words of the shop and the market and all the familiar inter- course of life. It will indeed repay you far better than you can easily believe. -I am sure, at least, that for many a young man his first discovery of the fact that words are living powers, has been like OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN. 97 dropping scales from liis eyes, like the acquiring of another sense, or the introduction into a new world ; he is never able to cease wondering at the moral marvels that surround him on every side, and ever reveal themselves more and more to his gaze." — Trench. Study of Words, pp. 1, 2. " Language may be considered as the outward vesture of thought; thought as a body which is contained within this clothing ; and we may attend especially to the one or the other ; to the body or to the garment. But further, language includes within its folds, not merely thought, the result of the reason operating purely and simply, but thought excited, unfolded, and swayed by the various feel- ings which belong to man." " The body of which language is the clothing, is not the reason merely, but the whole nature of man.^'' — Wheioell. Liberal Education, Sec. 2, § 11, I repeat that I think myself entitled to the thanks of my readers for laying the above quotations be- fore them. They point out to them very precisely the great advantages that will result to them from the study of words ; from a diligent search for the rehcs of ancient wisdom, the germs of truth, some forgotten, some never plainly discerned, which they contain. They are promised that scenes scarcely short of exciting wonder will open upon them, when they dig down to the deep thought that lies con- cealed below. That they will be introduced to a new world with moral marvels surrounding them on every side, and ever revealing themselves more and more to their gaze. H 98 or THE RIGHTS OF MAN. They are told in few but comprehensive words, that language includes within its folds thought, not merely mental or the result of reason, but thought however affected by our feelings. In short, that language being the vesture of the whole nature of man, must be unfolded to enable us to discover that nature. I close these quotations on the grand acquisitions that may be expected from the study of language, with repeating the plain and simple words of the author, whose principles I am endeavouring to un- fold and illustrate. " I very early found it, or thought I found it, impossible to make many steps after truth and the nature of human understanding, oi good and evil, of right and wrong, without well considering the na- ture of language, Avhich appeared to me to be inse- parably connected with them."] But I have yet a few words more to say, on Right and Just, as they mean ordered or com- manded. The expression of Locke, " God has a right,"* and the common one, " God is just," appear to be improper, as inapplicable to the Deity, con- cerning whom nothing is ordered or commanded. "They are applicable only to man, to whom alone language belongs, and of whose sensations only words are the representatives." [The expressions are certainly improper, but they are perhaps unavoidable in our well-meant attempts to bring the attributes of God more familiarly * Essay, b. 2, c. 28, § 8. OF THE EIGHTS OF MAN". 99 within our apprehension by supposed analogies to ourselves, and our conformity to the rules or laws to which we acknowledge our subjection. The use of such expressions is of the nature of that anthro- pomorphism which was the consequence of a too literal interpretation of the text of Scripture, " So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him."* From this error of applying words so inapplicable to the Deity, our moralists and divines have found themselves plunged into difficulties without any means of escape. Among the most deservedly ce- lebrated of the latter is Dr. Samuel Clarke. If he, so famed among the famous for his reasoning pow- ers, both as divine and metaphysician, had been aware of the meaning of the words he was employ- ing and of the source of that meaning in the nature of man, he would not have involved himself and his readers in such verbal entanglements as unfortu- nately he has done. He is assuredly correct in as- serting " that whatever God does, we are sure it is right, because he does it;" for the proposition is purely identical. But he proceeds to say, in ex- planation, " yet the meaning of this is not that God's willing or doing a thing makes it right ^^ (that is, makes it the thing ruled or commanded), " but that his wisdom and goodness is such that we may depend upon it even without understanding it, that whatever he wills was in itself right, antecedent to * For Paley's solution, see Moral and Political Philosophy, B. 1. c. 9. 100 OF THE EIGHTS OF MAlf. his willing it, and that therefore he willed it because it was righty* We must undoubtedly rely on our own under- standings and the best exercise of the faculties wdth which our Creator has endowed us, to attain a knowledge of what is eight, that is, of what are the laws willed by him for securing our " being's end and aim," the happiness of our kind. And ac- cording to the conclusions at which we arrive, so should we order and direct our conduct. " What is written in the Law ? How readest thou?" " Understandest thou what thou readest." These are the solemn questions that we have all to answer, and well is it with those who enter on the enquiry with eyes not blinded and with hearts not hardened. " Kight," I may be allowed to continue in the words of one of our most sensible and sagacious moralists,! " Right is consistency with the will of God. And, as the will of God is oui' rule, to en- quire what is our duty or what we are obliged to do in any instance, is in effect to enquire what is the will of God in that instance, which consequently becomes the whole business of morality." And he further very justly observes, on ^'^ the absurdity of separating natural and revealed religion from each other. The object of both is the same, to discover the will of God, and provided we do but discover it, it matters nothing by what means." * Serm. 9, and to the same effect, Ser. 10. f Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, B. 2. c. 9. and 4, OF THE EIGHTS OF MAN. 101 It will now, I think, be a matter of little diffi- culty to dispose of the unjust remark of Professor Stewart* (bordering more closely on sarcasm than is usual with that agreeable writer), that Tooke at- tempts to found a theory of morals on a philological nostrum of past participles. The very reverse is the fact. The nostrum of past participles is the re- sort of language to express those principles of mo- rals (and these w^hen combined constitute a theory of morals) which are written in the heart and mind of man, "in the whole nature of man" by the hand of his Maker.] ¥ CHAP. 11. OF ABSTRACTION. THE enquiry now proposed is. Will this man- ner of explaining right, just, law, droit and dritto, extended to other words of the same charac- ter, enable us to account for what is called abstrac- tion and abstract ideas. The answer is, " I think it will, and if it must have a name, it should rather be called subaudition than abstraction, thou2:h I mean not to quarrel about a title." [This then is the proper stage, before proceeding with the etymologies, to come to an understanding of the doctrine of abstraction and of abstract ideas, * The accomplished Professor is said by no unfriendly critic to have been " not a little susceptible of hasty but inveterate pre- judices." Hallam, Literature of Europe, Pt. 3, c. 4. 102 or ABSTRACTION. as we find it taugtt by Locke and rejected by Berkeley^ as it is with this doctrine pecuHarly that onr author has to encounter ; and then it may be both expedient and appropriate to subjoin some changes that have been made in the usage of those terms by modern philosophers and logicians. " The use of words," says Locke, " being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To j^re- vent this, the mind makes the particular ideas re- ceived from particular objects to become general^ which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existences, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called Abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representa- tives of all of the same kind, and their names gene- ral names, applicable to whatever exists conform- able to such abstract ideas. Such precise naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they come there, the understanding lays up, witli names commonly an- nexed to them, as the standards to rank real exis- tences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly." B. 2. c. 11, § 9. " General ideas," he afterwards writes, " are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry dif- ficulty with them, and do not so easily ofier them- selves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does OF ABSTKACTIOIT. 103 it not require some pains and skill to form the idea of a triangle, which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult, for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicru- ral nor scalenon, but all and none at the same time." B. 4. c. 7. § 9.* Had Locke been labouring to cast ridicule upon the doctrines of an antagonist, he could scarcely have fixed upon a more happy circumstance than this same triangle. It is barely exceeded by the universal Lord Mayor of Crambe, a Lord Mayor " not only without his horse, gown, and gold chain, but even without stature, feature, colour, hands, head, feet, or any body;"! and this Crambe sup- posed was the abstract of a Lord Mayor. In about five years after the death of Locke, his doctrine of abstraction and of abstract ideas met with an opponent in Bishop Berkeley, who ex- presses himself thus : " I own myself able to ab- stract in one sense, as when I consider some parti- cular part or parts separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. J * Gassendi had the palm of priority, and he ought not to be deprived of it. " At difficile quidem est ne dicam impossibile ita pure hominem in commune imaginari ; ut neque magnus, neque parvus, neque mediocris staturse sit ; ut neque senex, neque in- fans, neque intermedise aetatis ; ut neque albus neque niger, neque alterius specialis coloris. At mente saltem tenere oportet, homi- nem, quern communiter consideratum volumus, debere esse his om- nibus discriminibus absolutum." Gassendi, Op. V. 1. p. 95. Lo- gica, P. 1. Can. 8. f Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, eh. 7. X See the quotation from Stewart infra. 104 OF ABSTRACTION. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated, or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particu- lars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper acceptations of abstraction ?^^^ Locke advances it to be his opinion, that the fa- culties of brutes cannot attain to abstraction, and Berkeley agrees with him. But the reason given by Locke is, that they have no use of words or other general signs, on the " supposition," says Berkeley,! " that the making use of words impUes the having general ideas, from which it follows, that men who use language are able to abstract or generalise their ideas." For " since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms ? " Thus : " words become general by being made the signs oi general ideas. "^^X To which the Bishop answers : " But It seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind." To the same effect, Hume : " All general ideas are in reality particular ones attached to a general term, which recalls upon occasion other particular ones that resemble in certain circumstances the idea present to the mind."§ And still further to the purpose the Bishop ob- * Principles of Knowledge, Introd. § 10. f Introd. § 11. + B. 3. c. 3. §6. § Enquiry, Note P. And see Hobbes' Leviathan, P. 1, Ch. 1 . OF ABSTK ACTION. 105 serves : " A little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) sig- nificant names which stand for ideas should, every time they are iised, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is. not requisite that in every step each let- ter* suggest to your thoughts that particular quan- tity it was appointed to stand for." § xix. The complete solution of the difficulty awaited the aid of the philosophical grammarian ; for even the very acute Bishop, who clearly saw how much the nature and abuse of language were involved in the question, and that for the purpose of communi- cation the supposition of abstract ideas was unne- cessary, did not embrace the whole truth, and that merely because he mistook the general sign to be a general idea. He says, " I do not deny absolutely that there are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas ; we shall acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geo- metrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line into two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length, — this, which in * This letter or sign is in the language of modern philosophers, " the idea objectified." Morell, Elements of Psychology, Ch. 5. §3. 106 OF ABSTRACTION. itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification, general ; since, as it is there used, it represents aU particular lines whatsoever ; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of aU lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name line, which taken abso- lutely is particular, by being a sign, is made gene- rar"" Now this is the whole of the matter ; the sign is general, but that is all, and when Locke affirms that " general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind," and Dr. Whately, ^' that genus and species are creatures of the mind," the same sort of answer may be given,= — that the only fiction or contrivance or creature is the name, the sign. Professor Stewart's view of abstraction (" if it can be properly called abstraction")! is not far dif- ferent from Berkeley's. " The power of consider- ing certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest ; or, as I would rather choose to de- fine it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it, is distinguished by logicians by the name of ah~ str action.'''' X " ^Yhen we draiu offP says Dr. Whately, " and contemplate separately, any part of an object pre- sented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part." " Thus a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind, * Principles of Knowledge, Introd. § 12. t Id. ib. P. 1. § 5. + On the Mind, C. 4. § 1. OF ABSTRACTION. 107 make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thoughts of colour, form, &c. And thus, though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of abstraction,^^* The Abstraction of Professor Stewart and Arch- bishop Whately is not the Abstraction of Locke. It simply represents, according to the illustration of the Archbishop, a matter of fact, that when va- rious qualities centered in one object are presented at the same time to our senses, we may indulge one sense in preference to another: and this explana- tion of the word conveys in itself a harmless truth, but metaphysicians and logicians contrive to invest it with great and perplexing importance ; thus Mr. Mansell tells us that " in the sense" (of withdraw- ing the attention from one portion of certain phas- nomena given in combination to fix it on the rest) *^ Geometrical magnitudes are called by Aristotle, ra 8^ a<^atpfcr£wc5 because the geometer considers only the properties of the figure" (that is, I presume, objectifies the figure, and that alone) " separate from those of the material in which it is found. On si- milar grounds, he continues, is formed the scholas- tic distinction of abstract and concrete terms, since in the former the attribute is considered apart from the subject in which it is perceived by the senses, e. g, sight presents us only «ZZ>«" (the attri- bute) ; " the mind forms the conception albedo^ (the subject or sub-stratum). And so universals are gained by abstraction, that is, by separating the ♦ Logic, B. l.§ 9. 108 OF ABSTRACTION. phaenomena in which a group of individuals* re- semble each other from those in which they differ." I cannot undertake, and it is not necessary, to enter further into the doctrines of abstraction and generalization as they are taught by contemporary writers on logic and metaphysics, f Some of these writers seem busily employed in disinterring Aris- totle and searching among his remains to discover doctrines that have not reached their understand- ings ; they have yet to satisfy themselves whether he was realist, nominalist, or conceptionalist. It is gratifying, however, to observe that they are pay- ing the same tribute of respect to the merits of our immortal countryman, Locke. Mr. Morell, who seems so thoroughly acquainted with all that has been written abroad and at home towards the ad- vancement of mental philosophy, has the great good sense to recommend that " the whole chapter on words and language in general, should be well studied by every student of mental science." He should not have omitted to recommend the " Diver- sions of Purley," and he should particularly have directed their attention to the positions laid down in the first chapter of the first volume of the work, that " the errors of grammarians have arisen from supposing all words to be immediately either the * Meaning " the individuals of a group." Artis Logicse Eudi- menta, p. 21, Note o. f I must refer them to the larger works of Sir William Hamil- ton and the smaller of Mr. Mansell, and of Mr. Morell (Laws of Thought), and the Chapter on Objects, &c. in Mr. De Morgan's Formal Logic. OF ABSTRACTION". 109 signs of things or the signs of ideas,* whereas in fact many words are merely abbreviations employed for despatch, and are the signs of other words;" and that these are " the artificial wings of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes of Philosophy have been cheated." Such words, I may add, contribute to those "perfections of language, which, not being properly understood, have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy."! But not only the Latin past participle, but the Latin present, has supplied us with a stock of words of this description. The termination ence and ance, so rich in the names of qualities, being merely the neuters plural in entia from the present participle in ens.\ On this termination I will pause for a moment, as I am here again supplied with an oppor- tunity of presenting some views to my readers which I trust will have the effect of throwing a little light on the theory of language. " Every body will allow," say the sagacious au- thors of the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus, " that if you debar a metaphysician from ens, essentia, and ejititas, &c. there is an end of him." There is one word of this class, of much use with metaphysicians and logicians, which to me appears * Other names are the names of names. Hobbes. Leviathan, p. 4. c. 46. f So also negative terms, from which arose the doctrine of no- gaiive ideas. + Ence is in old v^riters not uncommonly written ent, ents, as consequent, consequents, by Frith, Hobbes, J. Taylor, and Stil- lingfleet. 110 OF ABSTRACTION. peculiarly obnoxious to remark, and that is the word diiFerence. On difference and its opposite re- semblance all scientific classification depends. Let us consider whence the origin and common application of this word, and we shall at the same time learn the origin and application of aU words of the same description. The Latin differentia, the neuter plural of defer- ens, means (things) which are different, differing, or which differ: and when we say, for instance, that A and B are different, or A and B differ, we say- no more than that they cause different impressions or ideas. From this, the true meaning of the word differ- entia, it became applied specifically to that, by or in which A and B for instance, differ from each other. Thus then the word difference has acquired an established usage in the comparison of greater or less in number and quantity : a greater number being eleven and a less ten, we see and say they differ ; and we further see and say they differ by one, and we call one the difference. Hence the expressions that two numbers difier by one, and the difference between two numbers is one, are precisely equivalent. But it must be manifest that this equi- valence can only subsist in cases which contain within them a sj)ecific quantity or number in or by which A and b, for instance, differ, and to which the word difference may be applied. Let us call this difference c. Then the expressions — A and b differ or are different by c, and — there is a difference c, between A and B are completely equivalent. OF ABSTRACTION. Ill But there are cases of a very dissimilar nature. Let us take two colours or two shades of what we call the same colour ; a darker or greater blue, a, and a lighter or less blue, b. They differ or are different, and by common usage we are allowed to say we perceive the difference. Call this difference C, and a moment's consideration will convince us of our error. We receive two different impres- sions; one called a darker, A, and the other a lighter blue, B, but we have no third impression of difference, c, as we had in our first supposed case of number. We may say with entire truth, that the darker colour. A, and the lighter, b, differ, but we cannot add by c. And unless we can include this last term, by 0, in our proposition, we are curtailed of a portion necessary to constitute the equivalence of Avhich we have spoken. A second illustration may be borrowed from sound. We hear a higher A, and a lower key, B ; we feel that they differ ; we receive two different impressions, but we do not receive a third impres- sion, c, that is, we do not hear the difference. Custom, however, permits us to say — we perceive the difference between two colours or two sounds, when the fact is we receive impressions that dif- fer, and nothing more. Let us now subject to the same investigation a word opposed to that which has just been dismissed, and see to what conclusion it will lead us; that word is resemblance. Upon this word Dr. Brown rests a whole theory of generalization, the theory of a sect, to which he would give the name of 112 or ABSTE ACTION". " notionist or relationist" in preference to tliat of " conceptionalist" bestowed upon Dr. Reid and his followers. Let the very elegant lecturer be allowed to speak in his own words : * " We perceive two or more objects ; this is one state of mind ; we are struck with the feeling of their resemblance in certain re- spects. This is a second state of the mind. We then in a third stage give a name to these circiun- stances of felt remembrance, a name which is of course applied afterwards only where this relation of similarity is felt. It is unquestionably not the name which produces the feeling of resemblance, but the feeling of resemblance which leads to the invention or application of the name."! In other places this feeling is called a general notion. Dr. Brown is equally anxious to disclaim Crambe's universal Lord Mayor and Locke's abstract idea of a triangle, but if the mind can form one single ge- neral or abstract idea or notion, it surely is not so limited in its faculty as to be unable to form more, and it would have tried the ingenuity of the Doctor to fix a boundary at which it must cease to act. Locke seemed to be quite aware of the extremes to which his doctrine must necessarily extend, and he had the candour to display them fully without the least attempt to evade or even to palliate. * Brown on the Philosophy of the Mind, Lee. 47. f So Locke ; " Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas.'' B. 3. C. 3, § 6. And does the negative idea give rise to the negative term? And see the quotation from Locke, supra, p. 54 n. OF ABSTK ACTION. 113 And this unequivocating honesty is one of the great charms of the Essay of Human Understanding. Successive writers have endeavoured to refine upon the principles of Locke, but they are still the same, however varied may be their guise, nor can any subtle change of phraseology strip them of the ex- travagant consequences with which he himself has invested them. He triumphs, it is true, in the dis- covery that the " whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools, and are with justice so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas." Yet, perplexing as this whole mystery undoubtedly was, the ab- stract idea of a triangle, as expounded in the Essay, is a very fair match to it. Without entering into any further account of the gradations by which this doctrine of abstraction has been step by step reduced into the form in which Dr. Brown endeavours to preserve it from that disregard into which the genera and species of the schools have so long fallen, let us proceed at once to his feeling or general notion of resemblance.* He says, " We are struck with the feeling of their resemblance. This is the second state of the mind." To perceive the objects themselves, the different objects, is the first. Is it possible to per- ceive different objects, and not perceive that they are different, not be conscious of different impressions. To resume the instances of colour and sound : — * Locke was quite sensible of the influence of resemblance and difference upon the construction of general terms. B. 3. c. 3, § 7, 8. I 114 OF ABSTRACTION. We perceive two objects ; we see two pictures ; we hear two voices: we say that the colours of the two pictures, the sounds of the two voices, are similar or alike ; that they resemble. In conformity with the usages of speech, we say that we perceive a similarity or likeness. Pursuing the former il- lustration (of the usage of the word. Difference), calling the colours of the first picture A, and of the second b, there is nothing to represent a resem- blance c. We received in the former case a number of different impressions, or of impressions which we were conscious differed. In the latter we receive a number of like, shnilar, resembling hnpressions, or impressions which we are conscious resemble ; and of these we employ the complex and general term resemblance as the sign or name. And thus, I think, I may conclude, that the Doctor's hypothe- sis of a second state of mind in the process of gene- ralization is a mere fiction or contrivance, creature or illusion, of his own imagination.] To return to the question from which this di- gression has been made : — Will this manner of ex- plaining right, &c. extended to other words, enable us to account for what is called Abstraction and ab- stract ideas ? These other -words (included in the question) are generally participles or adjectives, used with- out any substantive — any name of person or thing — expressed in the sentence, to which they can be joined; and are therefore, in construction, con- sidered as substantives. Such words form the bulk of every language. In English, those bor- OF ABSTRACTION. 115 rowed from the Latin, FrencL and Italian, we easily recognise : those from the Greek are more striking. Those which are original in our own language have been almost wholly overlooked, and are quite unsus- pected. These words, participles and adjectives, have been coined into moral deities, moral causes and qualities ; and having been poetically embodied and substantiated, have caused a metaphysical jargon, and a false morality, which can only be dissipated by etymology. To this etymology, the second, and also the third, fourth and fifth chapters are devoted, for the pur- pose of accounting for this so-called Abstraction. The second contains a miscellaneous assortment, the greater portion from the Latin, with a few through the French and Italian, from which it will be sufficient to select only such as present anything worthy of the distinction ; and among these the substantive post, from its various applications, first presents itself. Post is aliquid posit-mn.* used in English as substantive, adjective or verb, as ; — A post in the ground. A military post. To take post. A post under government. The post for letters. P(95^-chaise. Po^^-horses. To travel post. * Observe that in Englisli we use our article precedent to the verb. In Latin it is sequent. 116 OF ABSTEACTION. and is always merely the past participle of ponere. And tlins in our present situation, intelligence of " the horrors of war/' will be probably conveyed by post ; but whether by positis equis, or positis hominibus, or positis ignibus, or positis telegraphis, or beacons of any kind, all will be by posit or post:'"" Then follows a list of upwards of fifty Latin verbs, whose past participles, with those of their compounds, have enriched our language with an abundant stock of abstract terms. Some of these have come to us (together with an immediate Latin progeny) not immediately from the Latin, but the French. For instance : — Feat, defeat ; Jit, benefit, comfit, profit, coun- terfeit, forfeit, sm^feit ; from the French, faict, fait, f aire I Latin, factum, y^cer^. Teait, portrait (formerly traict and portraict), treat, treaty, retreat, entreat ; French, traict, trait, traire ; Latin, tract-um, trahere, Yenue, avenue, revenue ; French, mnir ; Latin, venire. Suit, suite, pursuit, lawsuit; French, suivre. View, review, interview, counterview, purview, purvey, survey ; French, voir. Prize, price, from the French prendocQ. Latin, pre-Aewc^-ere, prend-QXQ, prens-um. [The history of this word is remarkable. The Anglo-Saxon hent-sm, to hold or take (as the hand does), is the Latin hend-ere, used only in composi- * See Trench, Lecture YI. OF ABSTRACTION. 117 tion. From the Latin past participle prensum, came the old French prins, modern pris, on which latter is formed the verb prizer, to take, with not a letter of its Anglo-Saxon root remaining. From this verb, and past participle, we have prize, and its compounds Apprize, comprize, em- and enter- prize, mainprize, misprize, reprize, sur-prize : pri- son, misprision, culprit, reprieve.] To these I wiU add a few scattered etymologies, not appearing so intimately connected with the rest. Alert, is the Italian all'erecta, all'ercta, all'erta, from the Italian verb ergere. Latin erigere, to erect. To cucol (not cucolf/), from the Italian cucolo, a cuckow, is to do as the cuckow does : and cwcoZ-ed, cucol'd, cucold, its past participle, means cuckow- ed : served as the cuckow serves other birds. Poltroon", is pollice truncus. Multi prae ig- navia jooZlices ^rw^zcabant, ne militarent. And such by Yalentinian and Valens were condemned to be burnt. Hence Suho pal fr 7/. " Those sham deities. Fate and Destiny, sliquid fat-UTUf quelque chose destinee, are merely the past participles oifari and destiner.''^ Chance (high arbiter). Accident, and Es- cheat are from escheoir, cheoir, and cadere, to fall. 118 CHAP. TIL ON ABSTRACTION (^continued), ABSTRACT terms formed from past parti- ciples of verbs ; terminations ed, en, Braxd, brened, bren'd, brend, from tbe verb to hren, now written bum (by a common transposition of R ; see infra. Brawn). Hence a fire-brand, a brand of infamy; (that is, stigma;) itself a parti- ciple of SriJ uvi to prick, to burn, a mark (on run- away slaves). Brand-JiQ^ , newly burned. Blind, blin-ed, blin'd. Old English to hlin, An- glo-Saxon blinn-an, to stop; blind of one eye, of both eyes, stopped of one or both eyes, the sight totally stopped. The French have borgne for the first, and aveugle for the second. Braid, Bread. Brayed, bray'd, bread. To bray, (formerly a very common word,) French broyer, to pound, to beat to pieces. The subauditum (in our present use of the word bread) is com or grain, &c. Pounding or beating to pieces (now grinding) was the first step in the process of making bread. [He to braide his clothes {Gower). To beat his clothes. The devel to brayde hym. JViclif. MS. Tare him.] See infra. Dough, Loai\ Coward, that is, cowred, cowered, cowQr^ ; one who has coicer'^d before an enemy. To cowre or coicer is still in common use. Supplex, suppHcant, is of the same import. So suppHant and supple. OF ABSTRACTION. 119 Cud. To chew the cud is to chew the chewed {ch to k, or k to ch, common changes). Anglo- Saxon ceow-ed, from ceow-an. [Hence perhaps cow, the animal which ceoweth, or chews, sc. the cudr\ Dastard^ dastriged, dastriyed, dastried, dastred, dastr^d, territus. Anglo-Saxon dastri^-siia., terrere. [On this past participle Dryden formed the verb, "And dastards manly souls." — Conquest of Mexico.'] Field, anciently written/eZcf, felled, fel'd, to fell; Anglo-Saxon fcell-an, be-faell-an, to cause to fall. Field land is constantly opposed to wood-lajid, and means land where the wood has been felled. In the collateral languages the same correspondence subsists between the equivalent verb and the sup- posed substantive. [Chaucer writes, " The felde hath eyen, and the wood hath eares ; " a very intel- ligible contrast. Gower also, " In woodde, m. felde, or in citee."] Flood, Loud; merely flowed, flow'd, and lowed, low'd. Head, heaved, heav'd, ^e«c?. Anglo-Saxon heaf- od, from heaf-Mv, to heave. Head, anciently writ- ten heved, is that part (of the body or anything else) which is heav'd, raised, or lifted up, above the rest.* Odd, owed, ow'd. When we are counting by couples or pairs we say one pair, two pairs, &c. and one owed or ow'd to make up another pair. It has the same meaning when we say, an odd man, an odd action ; it still relates to pairing (or matching), ♦ See infra, p. 125. 120 OF ABSTRACTION. and we mean without a fellow, unmatched, not such another, one owed to make up a couple. Sir Tho- mas More writes, " God in soveraine dignity is odde,^'' that is, unmatch'd. Shred, Sherd. Shered, sh'red, or shered, sher'd. Anglo-Saxon 5c?/r-an, to sheer. See infra, to sheer, &c. Whinid, Vinew'd, Fenowed, vinny or finie, past participle of Anglo- Saxon^wz^-ean, to corrupt, to decay, to wither, to fade, to pass away, to spoil in any manner. Finie hlaf is, in Anglo-Saxon, a cor- rupted or spoiled loaf, whether by mould or any other means. Hence the Latin van-u^ and van- esco, and a numerous issue in Italian and French, And see mhsi, faint, fen. [Grose says vinied, fenny, mouldy. Exm.'] Wild is Avilled, will'd (or self-willed), in opposi- tion to animals, &c. tamed or subdued to the will of others or of Societies. Fiend and Friend are not past participles, but from the so-called present participle. Fiend, (joihicflands, Anglo- Saxon ^«7?^, from fi-an, to hate (subaud. some one, any one) ; hating. Friend, Anglo-Saxon friand, freond; from frian, freon, to love (subaud. some one, any one); loving. Bent. A person's hent or inclination. Bended, bend'd, hent. Draught, Anglo-Saxon drag-^co., to draugh, (now draw) ; draugh-ed, draugh'd, draught. Gaunt. Ge-wan-ed, gewan'd, gewant, g'want, gaunt ; past participle of ge-wan-iaji, to wane, to OF ABSTRACTION. 121 decrease, fall away. Ge is a very common prefix to Anglo-Saxon verbs. See infra. Want. Haft, haved, hav'd, haft, by which the knife, &c. is haved or held. Heft, heved, hev'd, heft " He cracks his sides with violent hefts.'''' — The Wiytters Tale. Hilt, held, helt, hilt, by which the sword is held. Malt, Mould ; French mouilU, past participle of mouiller, to wet, to moisten, becomes in English mouilled, mouill'd, mould; then moult, mault, malt. The wetting or moistening of the grain is the first and necessary part of the process in making malt. Tight, tied, ti'd, tight. " He halt him taied,^^ that is, he held him tight. — Gower. " A great long chaine he tight.''"' — Spenser. Tilt, to till ; Anglo-Saxon ifz'Z-ian, to raise, to lift up, to turn up (the ground). Tilt of a boat or waggon, the cover raised over it. To tilt (more properly to till) a vessel. See Tall, &c. infra. Twist, twiced, twic'd, ticist ; Anglo-Saxon ge- twgs-'dR, torquere. Want, waned, wan'd, tvant ; Anglo-Saxon wart" ian, decrescere, to wane, to fall away (sc. as the moon). See infra, wane, wan. Such words as cleft, clift, or cliif, drift, desert, feint, gift, joint, quilt, rent, rift, theft, thrift ; from the respective verbs cleave, drive, deserve, feign, give, join, quiU, rend (to tear), rive, rift, theft, thrift ; speak for themselves. Bacon, swine's flesh haken or dried by heat, Anglo-Saxon Z>«c-an. Barr-en, that is, barred^, stopped, strongly closed 122 OF ABSTEACTIOK. up; wMcli cannot be opened^ from whicli can be no fruit or issue. See Bae, infra. Bearn or Beaexe, boren^ borne, born. A hearn or hariie (still common in northern counties) is a child bear-eTi or bar-ew. Born is, borne into life. ChueJs^, chyr-en, chjr'n, chyrn or churn; An- glo-Saxon cyr-an, to move backwards and forwards. See infra, Chae, Chaie, &c. Ceaven; one who has crav-ec? or crav-ew his life from his antagonist; dextramque precantem protendens. [On this word Shakespeare has formed the verb, to craven. " A prohibition so divine cravens my weak hand." — Cymbeline.'] Dawn", daw-en, daw'n, dawn; Anglo-Saxon, dag-\2iTi, to daiD ; lucescere, to grow light. [There daweth me no daie. — Chaucer.'] See infra. Day. Heaven (some place, any place). Heav-ew or heav-e^. See infra, to heave. Leave2^; that by which the dough is raised, French lever. The Anglo-Saxons called it haf-en, from heaf-an, to raise. SteeIs^, ster-en, ster^Ji, that is, stirred. A stern countenance is a moved countenance, moved by some passion. The stern of a ship is the moved part of a ship, or that part of a ship by which the ship is moved. Anglo-Saxon styr-sai, stu'-an, movere (to stir or steer). [The early version of the Bible by Wiclif and his followers, renders the Yulgate Latin austerus, austerne, or hausterne; the later version, sterne. And the Glossarist to G. Douglas says asterne, austere, fierce ; Latin austerus. The Anglo-Saxon OF ABSTRACTION. 123 stir-BJi, a-stir-mn, will give an intelligible origin to both the Latin austerus and Greek Avtrrrjpoc.] Yaen, yare, yaren, yarn; prepared (subaud. cotton^ silk, or wool) by spinning. See infra^ Yare. Ed and en are qualified by their meaning, for adjective as well as participial terminations; as gold-en, brazen, wooden, &c., and formerly silver- en, ston-en, treen-en, &c. Br A WIST is an adjective, and means hoar-en, or hoards (subaudition) flesh. Our English word hoar is the Anglo-Saxon har, pronounced bawr, of which bar-en or bawr-en, bawrn, was the adjective ; and by the common transposition of r, hawrn has be- come hrawn. By the same transposition the Anglo-Saxon ggers has become grass ; byrht, bright ; wyrht, wright ; thersc-ian, thresh. Nostril (Avritten by Wiclif and Chaucer, nose-thirles ; by Sir Thomas Elyot, nos- thrilles) is in Anglo-Saxon neis-thyrl. [Anglo- Saxon ^AzVZ-ian, to drill, to bore.] And see ante, hrand. The broad pronunciation of a, as in hawr, is still common in northern counties. Thus Anglo-Saxon hat, a boat, is pronounced bawt; han^ a bone, bawn ; ham, home, hawm, &c. &g. 124 CHANGE OF CHARACTERISTIC. CHAP. ly. or ABSTRACTION (continued), THIS chapter is devoted to sucli substantives as are received from the past tense of verbs, formed by the various changes of the characteristic vowel, or vowel or diphthong, which in Anglo-Sax- on immediately precedes the infinitive terminations an, gan, &c. Those from i or y are most numerous, but some from a, e, &c. will be found intermixed in the following alphabetical arrangement. And these will be interesting not only as curious speci- mens of etymological sagacity, but as furnishing further and less familiar instances in illustration of our Author's doctrine, that a great multitude of abstract terms existing in our language have been supplied by past participles used substantively, that is, with a substantive (an aliquid) always under- stood. In selecting from the great number pro- duced, I shall prefer first those which assign a com- mon origin to a large family of words, most remote in their customary applications, and whose rela- tionship was before undetermined, and then a few less extensively related, but entitled to regard from the novelty they claim. Though much that is here presented has been I OF ABSTEACTIOK, 125 transferred to our grammars of the better class, it will be necessary to lay before the reader sufficient to facilitate his apprehension of the apparently strange changes that have taken place in the mode of writing and speaking the same word, when taking a different direction in its usage; preserving to each mode its different usage, without losing sight of its one original meaning. It will also be necessary to premise a brief state- ment of the mode pursued or rules adopted by our ancestors in forming the past participle. The only mode they had was to add ed or en, either to the indicative mood of the verb or to the past tense. But the most usual method of speech was to em- ploy the past tense itself, without participializing it by the addition of ed or en. And so they commonly used their substantives without adjectiving them, in imitation of some other languages, and by adoption from them. As an instance, take the verb to heave, Anglo- Saxon heaf-an. By adding ed to the indicative they had the participle heaved. By changing d to t, and v to/, heaft By adding en they had the participle heaven. Their regular past tense was (Anglo- Saxon haf, hof ) hove. By adding ed to it, they had the parti- ciple hoved. By adding en, they had the participle hoven. And aU these they used indifferently. The ship or any thing else was 126 OF ABSTRACTION. Heaved Heaft Heaven Hove Hoved Hoven And these have left behind them in our modern lan- i> guage the supposed substantives, but reaUy unsuspected participles. r Head (1) Heft (2) Heaven Hoof, Huff, and the diminutive Hovel Howve or hood Hat, Hut Haven, Oven The past tense, Anglo-Saxon haf, hof, English hove, was variously written heff, hafe, howve. The hoof of an animal was written hove or howve. And so was a hood for woman's or monk^s-head. Huff, now applied to raised displeasure. Hovel and also hict, a small raised building. Haven, a place raised for security (embanked at a river's mouth). Oven, a place — for fire or furnace — raised. To huff, to raise, is used by our old writers. To hove or hoove, is used by Chaucer, Gower, and others, as we now use to hover. Returning to the word lorong, which has been called a past participle. It is not a past participle, but the regular past tense of the verb to wring. Our ancestors used a past tense where the lan- guages we are most acquainted with used a past participle ; and as from the grammars of the latter (or distribution of their languages) our present grammatical notions are taken, this word and others are considered and called past participles. In English or Anglo-Saxon (being the same language) the past tense is formed by change of OF ABSTKACTION. 127 the characteristic letter, that is, of the vowel or diphthong immediately preceding the infinitive ter- mination an, gan, &c. To form the past tense of wrhig-an, to wring (as of other words), the charac- teristic vowel i or y was changed first into a broad, and this, from difference of pronunciation, was writ- ten either a broad or o or m ; as from wrmg, wrang, wrong, wrung. O from Alfred to Shakespeare prevailed in the South ; a in the North. During the former part of that period " so greate diuersite" was in use, that Chaucer complains of it. Since that time the fashion has changed to ou and u, and in some instances to oa, oo, and ai. Many, as the common grammars teach whose characteristic is i, continue to give the past tense in 0, from some of which we have substantives, as abode, drove, Shrove-tide, road (formerly rode), from the verbs abide, drive, shrive, ride. Many now written with a, u, ou, i, formerly were written with o : as gove, gave ; dronk, drunk ; fond, found ; slode, slid. These specimens must suffice and be borne in mind in reading the following pages.* Addle becomes ail, and idle becomes ill, by sliding over the d in pronunciation. Idle and ill are both applied to weeds. An addle egg, an ad- dle pate or brains, an idle head, are common ex- pressions. Wiclif ; the erthe was idel and voide. * Dr. Latham says, " Verbs may be said to fall into two con- jugations. Words like sang are called strong, because they are formed independently of any addition. Words like Jitl-ed are called weak, because they require the addition of the sound d." 128 OF ABSTKACTION". Inanis et vacua. Feitli withouten workis is ideh Mortua. Anglo-Saxon aidlian ; to be weak or sick inert, useless, or fruitless ; to spoil or corrupt. Bar ; Gothic baijy-Sin, Anglo-Saxon Z>yr^-an. A Bar, in all its uses, is a defence ; that by which any thing is fortified, strengthened, or defended. [A bar to secure a door, &c. ; bar of an inn ; bar of a court of justice.] A Barn (bar-en, bar'n) is a covered enclosure in which grain, &c. is protected from weather, &c. A Baroi^, an armed, defenceful, or powerful man. A Barge, a Bark, a strong boat, a stout vessel. A Bargaiist ; a confirmed, strengthened agree- ment. The Bark of a tree is its defence from weather, &c. ; of a dog, defends us from harm. A Barken ; an enclosure (near the house from the open fields). [A Barton. A strong, secure enclosure.] A Barrack. A strong, defended building (com- pared with tents). A Barrier ; to keep off a mob ; to secure against inroad or invasion. A Burgh or Borough; formerly a fortified toivn. See Town. A Burrow for rabbits; to defend or protect them. A BoROWE ; a security ; any person or thing by which repayment is secured. [To borrow ; to take or receive, on pledge or security to repay or re- turn]. Burt ; to deposit in a secure, protected place. OF ABSTRACTION. 129 So the Latin sepelire ; from seps^ a hedge, a fence. Haubeek or habergeon ; armour to protect the neck and breast ; from hals, the halse or neck, and berg-en, to protect, to defend. The French changed hals into hau, and made the word hpuberg, and the Italian made it usher go. Bough, Bow, Bay ; in Anglo-Saxon written hogh, hug, heah; past tense of byg-an, to bend or curve. Buxom. Anglo-Saxon bog-sum, boc-sum, buh- some ; Old English bough-some, easily bended or bowed to one's will; obedient (easily moved to good fellowship). BoTV, an inclination of the body, an instrument of war, of music ; a kind of knot ; the curved part of a saddle; the arc-en-ciel; curved or bended legs ; branches of trees, now written boughs ; a re- cess of the sea-shore (a ba}^, Latin sinus) ; also in buildings, barns, or windows (now a bow w^indow). In all these applications the word means bended or curved. [From the same source we have the hosom. So the Latin sinus and Greek Kokiroq, a bay, a bosom.*] Brook or Broke. " The struggling water breaks out in a Brook.'^ — Faithful Shepherdess. [A Broach ; any thing hroken or split off, so as to pierce. A broach of eels is a stick of eels ; so many eels hroched or stuck through a spit, a pin, are also so called; by which meat is stuck or pierced * And I may refer to the word hug in the additions to my 8vo. Edition, where I have enumerated many words not noticed by Tooke. K 130 OF ABSTK ACTION. through ; by which ornaments of dress are stuck on. To hroach a vessel ; to break into it, by boring or piercing through. To broach a doctrine ; to break it open ; to dis- close it. A Beak or Break ; for a horse ; that by which his unruliness is broken : by which he is tamed or subjected to use.] A Breach or Break. "Is it no breahe of duetie to withstande your kinge ?" — Cheke. Breeches : to cover those parts where there is a breach in the body, or where the body is broken into two parts. Hence also the Lat. bracca : and, as TVachter, with Tooke, believes, (Bpa-^iujv, brachium. All from the Gothic Brikan: Anglo-Saxon Brecan, brascan, to break. Brown. All colours in all languages must have their denominations from some common object, or from some circumstances that produce those colours. Brown is the past participle of the verb to Bren, or to brin, now to burn (Fr. brun, Italian bruno, and also bronze, bronzo). Brown is merely burned (subaudition, colour). It has the colour of things burned. The brunt (bront, brount) of the battle is the heat of it. Green : gren-ian, virescere, viridis, verdant, from virere (and so Wachter). Grey : geregn-an, inficere, to stain. Yellow : Italian Giallo, French gialne, jaune, Anglo-Saxon ge-selged, ge-selg, ge-9elgen: past participle of ge-?elan, accendere, to kindle. As Latin flammeus, flavus, from ^Xe-yw, (fKzyiia, flanmia, OF ABSTRACTION. 131 flame. See infra, ch. v. Ale. Hence also Yolk, Gold. White : Gothic Hwath-an, spumare, to foam. Cage ; a place shut in and fastened, in which birds are confined. Also a place in which male- factors are confined. Gage ; that by which a man is bound to certain fulfilments. Wages ; by which servants are bound to per- form certain duties. Gag; by which the mouth is confined from speaking. Keg ; in which fish or liquors are shut in and confined. Key; by which doors, &c. are confined and fastened. Quay ; by which water is confined and shut out. All from the Anglo- Saxon verb Caegg-ian, obserare; and hence also the French cage, gage, &c. the Italian gaggia, &c. and ancient Latin caiare. Char. A char or chare is a turn: a chare- woman, a woman who does not abide in the house where she works, as a constant servant, but returns home to her own place of abode, and returns again to her work when required. [(Qy ?) One who has a turn at work. It is my turn now; that is, it comes to me by rotation among others. When the post-chaise was in fashion, the drivers were called first or second turn boys. And this agrees with Tooke's explanation of char, a turn or bout ; that char is char'd ; that turn is turned : one good turn deserves another.] 132 OF ABSTRACTION^. Chaie, is a species of seat, not fixed, but move- able — turnedi about, and returned at pleasure; a turn-seat. Car, Cart, Chariot, and the Latin Carrus [a \yord wbich Ihre and Wacbter bad previously- agreed was introduced into tbe Roman language by Julius Cassar, and wbieb is never used eitber by bim or Livy except wben speaking of tbe mi- litary vebicles of tbe Gauls]. Such vebieles were so called, in contradistinction to tbe sledge [tbe traba or trabea of Virgil]. AcHAR or Ajar : a door on tbe turn or return to sbut or open furtber on tbe binge, or car-do, on wbicb tbe door is turned and returned. Char, tbe fisb ; because (as Skinner) it so ra- pidly turns itself in tbe water. A c^wr-worm ; so called, for tbe same reason. A Chur'x. [A vessel, in wbicb, by constant turning of milk, butter is made.] Charcoal [called by Cbapman, tbe cole-turned wood. HoM. Od. b. 3]. All from tbe same verb, Cyran, acyran; and meaning something turned, turned about, back- wards and forwards. Deal, or as anciently, dell, or dole, is a part, piece or portion of any tbing : to deal tbe cards ; to give eacb bis part or portion : bis dole or dowle (bis part distributed), as tbe attendant beggars at tbe gate. [Tbe stones also wbicb are used in boundaries to divide land from land are bence also called dowle-stones — Somner. in v. Dtelan.] " He wolde bun tere every doule " ( Chaucer), every piece of bim, aU to pieces : piecemeaL Skin- OF ABSTRACTION. 133 ner reasonably thinks that dollar also belongs to dal, a part or portion, because it is the half part of the golden ducat. All from the Gothic Dailjan, Anglo-Saxon deelan, to deal, to divide, to distribute. Dam ; from the Anglo-Saxon Dsem-an, demman, obturare, obstruere. That by which any thing, for example, a current, is stopped. A Dumb (formerly also written dum, or dome) person; one whose hearing is stopped. Three words, barren, bhnd, and dumb, are now applied respectively to the womb, the eyes, and mouth: but they were as the verbs, to bar, to blen, to dam, now are generally applicable : having one common meanino^ — obstruction^ and might have changed places. When Ben Jonson says, " This 'tis to have your ears dammed up to good counsell ;" he might have said, *^ This 'tis to have dumb ears, or ears dumb to good counsell." [In Dutch, dom is surdus, that is, deaf: the Greek tv^Xoq, is applied not only to eyes, but to ears and soul. Surdus is applied to scent by Per- sius, and to colour by Pliny. Deaf corn, is barren corn. A deaf nut ; the kernel of which has been stopped in its growth.] Our Winds are named by their distinguishing qualities. Our ancestors knowing the meaning of the words they employed, applied to the four winds the past participles of the four common verbs — ?/r5-ian, wes-an, nyrw-an, and seoth-an: iras-oi, macerare, coarctare, coquere. 134 OF ABSTRACTIOJT. East is yrs-ed, yrsd, yrst (dropping the r), yst. Those who cannot pronounce r, supply its place by a ; and hence east, meaning angry, enraged. [In the early version of the Wiclif Bible, we find " The wind TifFonyk, that is cleped north-eest, or wind of tempest,"^^ — Deeds, 27, 14.] West, is wes-ed, wes'd, west, past participle of tces-Qji, to wet. Our North (see infra, ch. v.) is the third person singular of the Anglo-Saxon verb, nyrw-an, but the nord and norr (as our own sailors pronounce it) of the other European languages is the past par- ticiple of the same word, and means narrowed, con- strained. South is the past tense and past participle of seoth-an, to seethe. " Some (fysh) they sold, and some they soth, and so they lined." — Piers Plough- man^ s Vision. Hence also the French sud; and our sod, sodden, suds. And the yesty waves, are the angry, stormy waves: Anglo-Saxon Ystig, lestig, procellosus. Geave. Grove : the Anglo-Saxon graf, grasf, serve for either. They and also groove are past tense, and therefore past participles of Graf-axi, to dig, to excavate, to cut or carve into. Grove : cut through a thicket of trees. Graft (sometimes graff) is graf-ed, graPd, graft. Grot, from graft (a broad) with / suppressed. Italian grotto, grotta. Green, Grey. See Brown^, supra. Hank, Haunch, Hinge, are the same word, with the common interchange of k, ch, or ye, from Anglo-Saxon Hang-an, to hang. OF ABSTRACTION. 135 To have a hank, is to have something hank, hankyd, hanged or hung, on any person or thing. Haunch ; the part by which the lower limbs are hankyd or hanged to the body. French hanche, Italian anca. Hinge ; that on which the door is hung, heng, hyng, or hynge ; so variously is the word written in our old language. " The body hankyd on the cross." " He hyng down his head." " He henge on the lefte syde of our Lord." " He hynge on the ryght syde." [To Hanker is to hang about ; loitering as un- willing to quit; desirous to keep or get]. Harlot is merely horelet, diminutive of hore or whore. So the Latin meretrix, a merendo. Variety* and modern valet for hireling, are believed to be the same word ; the aspirate being changed to V and the r dropped ; as Lord is now frequently pronounced, especially at the Bar, Lod or Lud. Harlot is in old authors constantly applied to a hired servant, a hireling, without any imputation. Heal. Past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Hel-an, tegere ; to cover, to conceal. In old English, to hele, and to hil, are very common both literally and metaphorically — to cover, to recover. " Nile ye be bisy with what ye shulen be hilid.^^ —Matt. vi. 31. " We women can no thing hele,^'' — Wife of Bath. " The child was heeled (sanatus est) fro that our.''— Matt. 8. * " Thou hast not been, as an harlot, in that thou scornest hire." ■Ezek. xvi. 31. 138 OF ABSTRACTION. Ray says, " To heal, to cover. Suss. As to heal the fire, to heal a house ; to heal a person in bed, that is, to cover them, from the Anglo-Saxon hel-2in, to hide, cover, or heal. Hence in the west, he that covers a house with slates, is called a healer, or hillier." South and East country words. [And in his North-country words, A bed-AeaZ- 272^ is a coverlet ; or absolutely a hyUing.] Hell. Any place, or some place covered over ; [Who shal go doun to depnesse or helle (in abys- sum.) — Rom. x. 7.] [Hell has various applications, namely, to 1. An obscure place in any of our prisons. 2. The place under the shopboard into which a tailor throws his shreds. 3. A place under the Exchequer Chamber, where the king's debtors were confined. Also the place or hole to which those who were caught in the game of Barley-Break were brought.] Heel ; that part of the foot that is covered by the leg. Hill ; any heap of earth or stone, &c. by which the plain or level surface of the earth is covered. " Thei shulen bigynne to seie to litil hillis, hile ye us." — Luke xxiii. 30.* Hale, that is, healed or whole. Whole ; formerly written hole. A wound or sore is healed or whole, that is covered by the skin. [Hence whole-some, or hole-some]. To re-cover is our ordinary expression. * The learned Swedish etymologist, Ihre, says, " Angl. hilly ab hssla, tegere." OF ABSTKACTION. 137 Hall ; a covered building, where persons as- semble, or wliere goods are protected from the weather. Hull of a nut, &c. ; that by which the nut is covered. And see Serenius. Hull of a ship ; that part which is covered in the water. Hole : some place covered over [a place for con- cealment or protection]. " You shall seek for holes to hide your heads in." Holt, holed, hol'd, holt ; a rising ground or knoll covered with trees. (And see Serenius.) Hold of a ship ; in which things are covered, or the covered part of a ship. (Ubi penus navis con- ditur. — Skinner.) Lace and Latch : past tense and past participle of Anglo-Saxon Lsecc-an, Lsecgan, Lasccean, prehen- dere, apprehendere, to hold, to take hold, to catch. " His hatte hinge at his backe by a laceJ'^ (Some ed. las.) a T. v. 16042. The latch of a door, or that by which a door is caught, latched or held, is often called a catch. [The latchet of whose shoes, is in AViclif, the thwong, that is, thong.] Tooke is persuaded that the Latin laqueus, and Italian laccio, are from the same Anglo-Saxon verb. Luck (good or bad) is (something, any thing) caught. He has had good luck; that is, he has had a good catch. L(Ecc-an is also written with the common prefix ge; as ge-lcBcc-an, and ge-latch (the g into c combining easily in rapid pronunciation with the 138 OF ABSTRACTION. liquid Z) becomes clutch, with the same meaning, to catch, to seize ; and so Clutches, that is, clutch- ers (ge-latchers), 2^^ fangs 2indi Jingers fvoia fang-sna., and hand from hent-Sin. Lid and Lot, in Anglo-Saxon Mid, and hlot, though seemingly of such different significations, have but one meaning — covered, hidden. By- change of characteristic letter T, to i short, and to (as writ, wrote), they are the regular past tense and past participle of Anglo-Saxon hlid-an, to cover. And the English lid is that by which any thing (box, vessel, &c.) is covered. Lot is (any thing, something) covered, hidden. Witches were in foretime named lot-teUers, that is, tellers of covered or hidden things. [From the Greek K\y]ooQ, — a fragment of any thing (sc.) cast into the urn or vessel, — (rendered by our translators Lot^ the clergy are called. On choosing an apostle in lieu of Judas, and the choice was between Barnabas and Matthias; "they (the other apostles) gave forth theyr lottes (kXtj- ^ovq), and the lot (o kXyi^oq) fell on Matthias." — Acts i. 26.] Hlid-an (as Lasccan) was also written with the prefix ge, and the no less common prefix he ; both of which easily united in pronunciation with the liquid I. Be-hlod or he-hlot (from be-hliden) became our English hlot, and a hlot on any thing extends as far as the thing is covered and no farther. Ge-hlyd, ge-hlod, ^e-AZ^c? (ge-hled-an), is become our glade ; applied to a spot covered or hidden with trees. In like manner as lot and hlot. OF ABSTKACTION". 139 Cloud: from the same participle (it is supposed), thus : gehlod, or gehloud, gloud, cloud. So the Latin nuhes, from nubere ; " Nubes coelum ob- nubit ; a nuptu, that is, opertione : i quo nuptias nuptusque dictus." — Varro, 1. 4. [The bride (nu- bita, nubta, nupta) was so called, because when led to be married she was covered with a veil. ^' A married woman in our law, French, is called a ^QvaQ-covert, foemina viro co-operta ; and is said to be covert-h^iYOTi, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or Lord." — Black, i. c. 15.] Lock and Block : Anglo-Saxon loc, he-loc are the regular past participles of Lyc-an, he-lyc-an, to shut up, close up, obstruct. [A block-head; having a head like a block (of wood) ; or whose faculties are blocked up.] Loaf, Dough, Bread. These words are ap- plied to the same material substance in different states. Bread has been explained to be brayed grain (ante, p. 118). Dough is the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb deaw-i2in., to moisten, to wet; and means wetted (dewed or bedewed). Loaf (in Anglo-Saxon hlaf, a broad) is the past participle of hlifian, to raise (to lift). Bread wet- ted becomes dough, and by the addition of the leaven it becomes loaf. This leaven is in Anglo- Saxon called hcef and haf-en. [Anglo-Saxon hcsf, fermentum, leaven ; so called from its quality of heaving or rising. — Somner.~\ 140 or ABSTRACTIOIf. Loaf is in Mgeso-Gothic, hlaihs ; past participle of hleibyan, to raise. LoED, anciently written Uaf-ord, composed of tlie same hlaf, raised; and ord, ortus, source, origin, birth ; and means therefore high-hor7i, or of an ex- alted origin. Lofty and Lady are the same word, and mean merely raised, elevated. The two words are thus traced : The Anglo-Saxon hlaf, hlafod, hlafd, hlafdig, are in Enghsh, (omitting the /*,) laf, lafed, lafd, llafd-y (the Anglo-Saxon termination ig softened into y). Retaining the f, pronunciation requires the d to be changed into t, and the word becomes lofty (a broad, that is, aiu) or lofty. Suppress the f, the d may remain unchanged, and the word be- comes lady. Lady, then, in Anglo-Saxon hlafd or hlafd-ig, is merely lofty, that is, raised or exalted ; following the condition of her husband. Lift is hfed (Anglo-Saxon hlifod), lif 'd, lift; ob- tained by adding the termination od or ed to past tense ; Lf, Anglo-Saxon hlif. Loft is lafed (that is, lawfed), laf 'd, loft, by the same addition to the past tense, Hlcsf lawf. Many is called a strange word, and its history is certainly singular. Lowth observes that many is used " chiefly with the word great before it ; " and Johnson supposes feio and many to be opposite terms, and so indeed in usage they are. But G. Douglas writes, they were in number " ane few men3e, but quyk and i OF ABSTRACTION. 141 val3eaiit in war." " A much more many." — Spen- ser, On Ireland. " How lie might find a moost meynee." — Piers Ploughman, Y. 5789. [In the translation of the Bible by Wiclif and his followers, " His household meynee," is in the Latin, " domestici ejus;" and "his meyneal church," domestica ecclesia; and meyneals, " domestici." And it is perhaps from this limited application of the word to those employed about the house, that our old lawyers have long derived it from intra mosnia, and this etymology was lately given by a learned Baron in the Court of Exchequer. But in not one of the above instances from P. Plough- man, Douglas, and Spenser, did the meynee consist of persons " intra m^nia." The Meynee, or many, of our ancestors consisted of a company of knights, esquires, and gentlemen, who accompanied their king or liege not only on occasions of ceremony, but to the field of battle. These also had their manye or menials ; and so in descending succession, till at length the word me- nial became restricted to the lowest class ; to those who performed household services, servile offices. Cotgrave writes the old French word mesnie, and Rochefort gives nearly forty different ways of writing it. The French etymologists derive it from maison, mansio, but it is an old Gothic word com- mon to the Northern languages : and our own lexi- cographer. Skinner, decided on the German men- gen, to mix, to mingle, as its true source ; in Anglo- Saxon Meng-an.] Of this last, the Anglo-Saxon meng-an, Tooke concludes it (our menye or many) 142 OF ABSTRACTION. to be tlie past participle, and to mean mixed or as- sociated (for that is the effect of mixing), subaud. company, or any uncertain and unspecified number of things. " Many a message, many a youth, and many a maid," are corrupt usages. They should be, " a many of messages, o/* youths, o/* maids." " Multos sanctorum," Wiclif writes, " Manye of seyntes." — Acts i. 26. Bishop Gardner ; " A many o/* words." The word was, no doubt, very early applied as Lowth and Johnson explain. MoEROW, Morn, Morning, are traced back to the old English morewe, morewn, and more- wende. In the next stage back, the Anglo-Saxon, the words were written Merien, merg-en, merne, or margen, marne, or morr, morgen, morn : " And I believe them to be the past tense and past parti- ciple of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb Meryan, merr-an, mirran, myrran, to dissipate, to disperse, to spread abroad, to scatter." By the customary change of z or y to o, morr is the regular past tense of myrran ; and morr (in order to express the latter r) might well be pro- nounced and written morwe, morewe. And it was so written by Wiclif; afterwards morowe and morrow.* By adding the participial termination, en, to the past tense morr or morew, we have more- wen, morewn, mor'n, according to the accustomed contraction. Morrow without, and Morn with, the participial * Such change, as morwe in morrow, is not uncommon ; thus, arwe, arrow ; narwe, narrow ; sorwe, sorrow, &c. &c. OF ABSTRACTION. 143 termination ^w^have both the same meaning, namely, dissipated, dispersed, with clouds or darkness un- derstood; whose dispersion (or the time of their dispersion) it expresses. Anglo-Saxon myrrende is the regular present participle of myrran ; in old English, morewende, and so written in Wiclif; where is also found morwe-tid, that is, tide or time of dispersing dark- ness, which was anciently supposed to be some- thing positive. By the constant change of the Anglo-Saxon participial termination ende into ing, morewende became morewing, morwing, morning. Such expressions as the following are cited in con- firmation of this being the meaning : — " In the morning, afore day, he mette his horse, and rode till it was day." " You shall rise earely in the morne, or the day begin." " The morning dawes or dawns," (lucescit) — ^^ scatters the rear of darkness." And see infra. Mirth, quod dissipat (subaud. mcEstitiarrt) and murther (quod dissipat), what mars (subaud. vitam.) Notch, nocke, nook, niche, nick, though so va- riously written, present at once a common mean- ing, from the verb to nick, incidere. Ope, by change of characteristic y into o, is the regular past tense of ypp-an, aperire, pandere ; and open, by adding the termination en, is the past par- ticiple. Gap and Gape are the past tense and past parti- ciple of ge-yppan (by change of y into a). 144 OF ABSTRACTION. Chap and Chaps differ merely by pronouncing ch instead of ^. Pack, Patch, and Page. Patch, in both its applications, namely, to men or to clothes, are af- firmed to be the same past participle pac (differ- ently pronounced and written, with k, ch, or ge) of the Anglo- Saxon Pcec-an, pcecc-ean, to deceive by false appearances, imitation, resemblance, sem- blance, or representation ; to counterfeit, to delude, to illude, to dissemble, to unpose upon. (A pri- mary meaning is not given ; Lye merely says, de- cipere, mentiri.) Pageant is (by a small change of pronunciation) merely the present participle paecceande, pacheand, pacheant, pageant. Pish and Pshaw are the Anglo- Saxon pasc, p^cca, pronounced pesh, pesha {a broad), and are equivalent to trumpery, that is, tromperie, from tromper, to deceive. As Patch was applied to men, so was patchery applied to their conduct ; and as servants were con- temptuously called harlot, varlet, valet, or knave, so were they also called pack, patch, and page. Shakespeare writes, " Thou scurvy patch;" "A crew of jDatches ; " " You hear him, coz, see him dissemble, know his gross patchevj.'^ And Fabian, who wrote earlier, " Noughty packes, disguised in Byshoppes Apparel." They who put patches on a little breach, to hide it, are careful that the colour shall as nearly as possible resemble that upon which they put it. A Page of honour, comparatively with other OP ABSTRACTION. 145 pages, was no doubt a post of honour, but in Dives and Pauper it is written, " The Kyng hath power and fredom of a page to make a yoman, of a yoman a gentylman, of a gentylman a knight;" placing the page at the bottom of all. Even now, it may be observed, a gentleman's valet, among servants, is comparatively, as the page of honour, looked upon as of higher rank than some others. Pond, Pound. To pin or to pen (a common English word) is the Anglo-Saxon pyndan, inclu- dere, to close in, and the past participle is pond, pound, pen, pin, bin (and the old Latin henna, a close carriage). A Pond, in which water, and in it, fishes are enclosed. A Pound, in which beasts, trespassing, are en- closed or shut in. A Pen or Pin, in which sheep, fowls, &c. are shut in ; any thing which encloses ; a pin or web in the eye, because it closes the eye. A merry pin, from the custom of drinking in mugs with a pin fixed, as a measure of the exact quantity to be drunk. A pin is still used for a small barrel, hold- ing or enclosing so much beer — (four-and-a-half gallons). Bin (by change of p into h), for corn, wine, &c. Rack is the past tense and past participle of the Anglo- SaxonRec-an, exhalare, to reek ; and whether written rak, wraich, reck, rock (as in G. Douglas), or reeke (as in Shakespeare), is the same word, with the same meaning ; that which is reeked, exhaled, 146 OF ABSTEACTION. evaporated. A reek with us (says Mr. Kay) signi- fies not a smoak, but a steam, arising from liquor or moist thing heated (for example, a dunghill). " The winds in the upper regions which move the clouds (which we call the racK) and are not per- ceived below, pass without noise." — Bacon, Nat, Hist. § 115. " According to Bacon (says Dr. Jamieson), the rack denotes the thin vapours in the higher region of the air, which may either be moved by the winds, or stand still." " They must needs conceit that (in death) our substance is in a manner wet, and nothing but a tenuous reek remains." — H. More, On the Soul, b. 3. c. 2. Rack or Reek denotes vapours in the lower, — in any region. A reek or racke, from a newly- ploughed field, from a meadow, a pond or river, are common expressions in the Northern counties. The commentators, I fear, are not yet unani- mous that racke in the Tempest (iv. 1.) means vapour ; yet Avith such meaning it " is surely the most appropriate term that could be employed by Shakespeare in that passage, to represent to us that the dissolution and anniliilation of the globe and aU which it inherit, should be so total and complete, that they should so ' melt into ayre, into thin ayre,^ as not to leave behind them even [a tenuous reek], a vapour, a steam, an exhalation, to give the slightest notice that such things had ever been." Some would read wreck, which cannot be appli- cable to any thing " melted into ayre.^"* OF ABSTKACTIOX. 147 Rack, Rake, Reck, a rack or rick of hay, and a rake, the tool or instrument by which the hay is collected, are the past participles Gothic of Ricjan, to draw together. Rich and Riches {k as usual into ch) are the same past participles ; the French Riche and rich- esse, and Italian Ricco and richezza (our ifc A, changed in pronunciation to sh and K), The word applies equally to any thing collected, accumulated, heaped, or, as we frequently express it, raked together. Rogue, Rook, Ray, &c. The Anglo-Saxon Wrig-an, to wrine, to wrie (not uncommon in Chaucer), to cover, to cloak, by change, in forming the past tense, of i into o and also into a, has furnished us with a variety of words very differently applied. The verb itself still sur- vives in to Rig. Rogue means covered, cloaked, applied to one who has cloaked or covered designs; and Tooke says that Ray, used by Gr. Douglas, is in this sense, but Dr. Jamieson remains in doubt. Rock, the part of the machine used by spin- sters covered by the wool. Rock in the sea, so called because covered or hid- den by the water [masses of like substance on the coast, left uncovered by the secession of waters, or of similar substance and appearance on land, have the same name]. Rocket or Rochet, the diminutive of rock; that with which women or bishops are covered. [On the past participle rock was formed the old Enghsh verb to rock, rook, rouk, or rack. Chau- 148 or ABSTRACTIOISJ'. cer writes, " O false murdered, rucking In tliy den." " The sliepe that rouketh in the fold." Covering, lying close in concealment, — under protection; and Gower, " But now they rucken in her nest, and resten." RoKETT in Berner's Froissart, " To ran with ro- liettes!^ "speares, either sharp or rokettes,^^ appears to have been a spear, with its point or head covered, to prevent injury, as the point of a fencing foil now is. To Rook is also to rogue, to play the rogue. Bug, Anglo-Saxon Booc {oo into u), is that with which a bed, a horse, &c. are covered. Buck is commonly used when some part of silk, linen, &c. is folded over or covers some other part, when the whole should lie smooth or even. Bay, or, with the common prefix a, array, means covered, dressed, and is applied both to the dressing of the body of an individual, and to the dressing of a body of armed men. Surrey, address- ing Virtue, asks, " Why art thou poorely raide ? " that is, rigged, clothed, dressed. Bail, Anglo-Saxon Bseg-el, is the diminutive of rcEg. [Wiciif writes it loriel, in the Latin Vulgate, velamen.] As a woman's night-r^zY, with which she is thinly covered. Bails ; by which any area, court-yard, or other place is thinly (that is, not closely, but with small intervals) covered. Bail or Bally ; to jest with a covert meaning, and hence raillery. To rail is now by custom ex- tended to abuse coarsely and violently. To Big a ship, and the riggen (now rigging), An- glo-Saxon wriggen. The latter is that with which OF ABSTEACTION. 149 a ship or any thing else is rigged or covered. [Rig- gish (Shakespeare) is roguish. A rig, a roguish trick.] Room, Rim, and Brim, are the past participles of Anglo-Saxon Rym-an, be-rym-an, to extend. Room, Anglo-Saxon Rum, is extended, place, space, extent. " There was no room for them in the Inn." Luke ii. 7. In Wiclif 's Bible the earlier version has, " there was not place to hym in the comyn stable." The Anglo-Saxon is rum and Gothic rumis. [Hence our common word rummage, formerly written roomage ; we should now say stowage. The old usage is well shown in the following pas- sages from Hackluyt. *^ And that the masters of ships do look well to the romaging''"' (^placing the cargo), "for they might bring away a great deale more than they doe, if they would take paine in the romaging.^'' — Voyages, V. i. p. 308. " Now whilest the mariners were romaging the shippes, and mending that which was amisse, the miners, &c." Id. lb. v. 3, p. 88. ^^ The master must provide a perfect mariner, called romager, to raunge and bestow the merchaun- dize in such place as is convenient." — Id. lb. v. 3, p. 862. To rummage now is to search into any room or place, with little regard for arrangement.] Rim is the utmost extent in breadth of any thing. Brim (be-rym-an) ; the extent of the capacity of any vessel. 150 OF ABSTEACTIOX. A large-brim^d lake (Drayton) is widely ex- tended in breadth (Anglo-Saxon be-rynuned). Sheer, Sheed, Shred, &c. Sberd and sbred have already been explained among the past parti- ciples formed by the addition of ed to the verb to sheer, Anglo-Saxon Scyran.* The following are past particij)les of the same verb, by change of characteristic. Sheer, as we now use it, means separated; ^' Sheer ignorance," that is, separated from any the smallest mixture of information. In Beaumont and Flet- cher, " I had my feather shot shaer (that is, sheer) away;" so se^^arated by the shot as not to leave the smallest particle behind. [And in Dibdin's memo- rable song, " Here, a sheer hulk, lies poor Tom Bowling."] Shore, as the sea-shore or shore of a river, re- lates merely to the separation of land from the sea or river ; not a determined spot of any size or shape. Short is shored, shor'd, short, cut off; opposed to long, which means extended, and is the past par- ticiple of the Anglo-Saxon verb Leiig-mn, to extend or stretch out. Shirt and skirt (thsd is, scired^ is the same parti- ciple differently written and applied. Shower (Anglo-Saxon Scyur and scur) means broken, divided, separated (clouds). [Junius, Skin- ner and Wachter agree that a shower consists of drops of water broken from the clouds.] Score, a piece cut off (a talley) containing twice ten notches; and thus a reckoning by scores or * Supra, p. 120. OF ABSTKACTION". I5l pieces cut off; a score or account kept by cuts or notches in pieces of wood or stick. Such is the etymology of Skinner. Shake ; any part or portion separated. Shire ; a separated part or portion of this realm. Scar, though now applied only to the cicatrix or remaining mark of the separation, was formerly appHed to any separated part. Ray informs us, that the " cliffe of a rocke (that is, the cleaved part of it) is still called a scarred And in the proverb, *^ Slander leaves a score behind it," score is scar. Tot-sherds or -pot-shards are likewise called the ■pot-scars or pot-shreds. Share -BONE ; the bone where the body is sepa- rated or divided. It is written schere by G. Douglas. Sheers and plow^-share ; contracted from sheerer, to avoid the repetition er. The German, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, share this past participle in common with ourselves, and to the Italian scerre, sciarrare and schiera, and to the French a I'ecart and dechirer, the same North- ern origin is ascribed. ■ Shot, Shotten. Here we have a very nume- rous family, all from the Anglo-Saxon sceat, past participle of the Anglo-Saxon and English verb Scytan, scit-an, to shete or shut ; variously written with a or a broad, ou, oo, or u, or i short (jacere, projicere, dejicere, to throw, cast forth, throw out). A Shot from a gun, bow, or other machine; something cast or thrown forth. A Shot window; a window thrown out, pro- jected beyond the rest of the front. Shot or Scot; "A shot of five pence," that is. 152 OF ABSTRACTION". five pence cast or thrown down, Scot and shot are intercliano-eable. A Shotted herring ; a herring that has cast or thrown forth its spawn. Shoot of a tree (Italian schiatta) ; that which a tree has cast or thrown forth. Shout, a sound thrown forth from the mouth. [And see Tell in yv. tall, &c.) Shut, pronounced by the common people shet, and anciently written also with the vowels i and y. To shet the door is merely to thi^ow or cast the door to. To get shut of a thing means, to get a thing thrown off or cast from us. Shuttle or Shittle (shut-del, shit-del) means a small instrument shot, that is, thrown or cast. A SnuTTLE-cork or SniTTLE-cork is a cork thrown or cast (backward smd forward). Sheet, of a bed, of water, of lightning, of paper ; thrown or cast or spread. A sheet was formerly written shote anchor, an anchor throicn for security ; it is applied metaphorically to our main stay or se- curity. The Anglo-Saxon sc, being pronounced both as sh and sc, we have thus, scot (ante), scoat, scate, and skit. A Scout ; one sent out before an army to collect intelligence by any means; at cricket, to return the ball. [To Scout ; to cast off, to reject] A Skit ; a familiar word in speech for a jibe or jeer thrown or cast on any one. To the same effect, 2i fling. OF ABSTRACTION. 153 Sketch (Dutch schefs), thrown off; requn-ing to be afterwards finished. Sagitta (pronounced Sag-hitta), skit, skita, sa- kita, sagita ; something cast, thrown, that is, shot. To Itahan Scotto, schiatta, schizzo ; French es- cot, ecot, esquisse ; Dutch schets ; the same origin is ascribed. Our Author enlarges on the fruitless efforts of the Italian and French etymologists to discover the origin of these words, and the following observa- tions well describe the causes to which he attri- buted their failure. Our modern etymologists become surrounded with difficulties, because they direct their attention to the East and not to the North. " They seem to foro-et that the Latin is a mere modern lano;uao;e, compared with the Anglo-Saxon. The Roman beginning (even their fable) is not, comparatively, at a great distance. The beginning of the Roman language we know, and can trace its formation step by step. But the Northern origin is totally out of sight, is entirely and completely lost in its deep antiquity." " The bulk and foundation of the Latin language most assuredly is Greek, but great part of the Latin is the language of our Northern ancestors grafted upon the Greek.* And to our northern language the etymologist must go for that part of the Latin which the Greek will not furnish ; and there, without any twisting or turn- * We find in the Latin, as nouiis, many of our past participles, and yet not the verbs to which those participles belong. 154 OF ABSTRACTION". ing or ridiculous forcing and torturing of words, lie wiU easily and clearly find it. We want, there- fore, tlie testimony of no historians to conclude, that the founders of the Roman State and the La- tin tongues came not from Asia, but from the north of Europe. For the language cannot lie. And from the language of every country we may with certainty collect its origin. In the same manner, even though no history of the fact had remained, and though another Virgil and another Dionysius had again, in verse and prose, brought another ^neas from another Troy to settle modern Italy, after the destruction of the Roman Government; yet, in spite of such false history or silence of his- tory, we should be able, from the modern lan- guage of the country (which cannot possibly lie), to conclude with certainty that our Northern an- cestors had again made another successful irrup- tion into Italy, and again grafted their own lan- guage upon the Latin, as before upon the Greek. For all the Italian which cannot be easily shown to be Latin, can be easily shown to be our north- ern language."* It would indeed have been in an incalculable degree useful to the learned world, guiding the steps and saving the labour of succeeding philolo- gers, if the author of the ETrea UrepoEVTa, and Mr. Gilbert Wakefield, had accomphshed what they had agreed to undertake in conjunction, namely, a division and separation of the Latin tongue into two parts, placing together in one division all that * See Diversions of Purley, v. pp. 140, 270. OF ABSTRACTION. 155 could be clearly shown to be Greek, and in the other division all that could be clearly shown to be of northern extraction. Skill, Scale ; another long list, with the same changes of characteristic and interchange of sc and sh, as in shot, scot, and seeming to have little in sound and less in meaning common with each other, yet all are the past participles of the Anglo-Saxon verb Sci/l-siii, to divide, to separate, to make a dif- ference, to discern, to skill, and have one common meaning. The verb to skill was in common use down to the reign of Charles the First : " It skills not ; that is, it makes no difference." Skill is discernment ; the faculty by which things are ^ro^Qvlj divided and separated one from another. Scale, shale, shell, shoal or shole, scowl, scull, are different forms of the same word. We have Scale, a ladder, and thence scale, of a besieged place [by mounting the separate steps; and to scale, generally to climb, to mount]. A pair of Scales [for the separation of portions by weight]. A Scale of degrees. Scale of a fish, or of our own diseased skin. Scale of a bone. ScALL and scaled (or scald) head. Shale or shell of a nut, &c. Shoal, shole, or skul of fishes. Scull of the head. Scowl of the eyes. Shoulder (formerly written shoulde) [where arm is separated from the body or trunk]. 156 OF ABSTRACTION. Skill, sMlling, slate. Fishes come in shoals, sholes, or sTtuls ; that is, in separate divisions or parts divided from the main body ; and any one of these divisions (these shoals or sculs) may be again scaled ; that is, divided or separated by the belching whale. " And there they flye or dye, like scaled sculs before the belching whale." — Troylus and Cressida. In Measure for Measure, " The corrupt deputy was scaled, by separating from him, or stripping off his covering of hypocrisy." In Coriolanus, the tale of Menenius was " scaled a little more, by being divided more into particulars and degrees told more circumstantially." In the same play ; " Scaling his present bearing with the past," separating or looking separately, distinguishing the one from the other. An old sack is always skailing, that is, parting, dividing, separating, breaking. To Sheal milk ; to separate the parts, to curdle it. — Ray. To Scale ; to spread as manure, &c. Used in the North. — Grose. To Skale or Skail; to scatter and throw abroad, as mole-hills are when levelled. — Id. Scowl. Our ancestors said Sceol-eage ; we say only sceol, that is, scoiol, subaud. eyes ; that is, se- parated eyes, or eyes looking different ways. Shilling ; one of the (twenty) parts into which a pound is divided or separated. Slate, formerly written sclat, skalit, sklait, eklate, slate ; Scotch schelbzis, Dutch schalien. OF ABSTRACTION. 157 " And by the sclattis (tegulas) they letten him down." — Wic. Luke v. 19. The Italian Scala, scaglia, scalogna, the French eschelle, escaille, eschalotte, and also their chaloir, nonchalance, and the Italian non cale, with the La- tin calliduSj are referred to the same origin. Slack, Slouch ; In Anglo-Saxon Slcec, sleac, slog, slcew, sleaw, slaw, same past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb sleac-ian, sleacg-ian, slac-ian (« broad), tardare, remittere, relaxare, pigrescere. " The Greekes caryed the here with slake pace." — Chaucer, Knlghtes Tale, Slouch, sl^c {ch for k), a slow (pace). [A slouch : " A foul great stooping slouch, with heavie eyes and hanging lip." — H, More.'] Slough, slog (^gh for ch^, slow water. Slug, slog (^ for A), slow reptile. Slow, slaw (^w for ^). [" Reise ye slow hondis and knees unboundeen." — WiC. Heb. xii. 12, re- missas manus.] Slow-en, slouen, sloven, [" Some sluggish slovens that sleepe day and night. " — Skelton.~\ Slow-ed, slowed, slut Slut is applied by Gower and Chaucer to males, and it is so by Lord Berners also : — *^ Among these other of sloutes kinde .... There is yet one, whiche Idelness Is cleped." — Gower. «f Why is thy lorde so slotelyche, I the pray?" (Tyrw. sluttish.) — Chaucer, " He showed them all the nature of the Span- 158 OF ABSTRACTION. yardes, how they be sluttish and lousy, and enuy- ous of other mannes welthe." — Berners, A Slow is used by Chaucer as we now use Sluggard. Sloio was used as a verb, for example, " Aqua vitae moderately given sloweth age; it str engtheneth youth. " — Holinshed. The Slough of an animal, the slough of a wound, that which (skin, scurf) sloweth, slacketh, looseth. Sloth is sloweth, slowth, sloth ; the third person indicative of the Anglo-Saxon Slaw-ian, to slow. SoEROW, Sorry, are by change of the charac- teristic y to 0, the past participle of the Anglo- Saxon verb Syrw-an, syrewan, syrewian, to vex, to molest, to cause mischief to. This past participle in Anglo-Saxon was very variously written sorw, sorice, &c. and in old English sorice, soreice, soor, &c.* It was and is the general name for any ma- lady or disease, or mischief or suffering ; any thing generally by which one is molested, vexed, grieved or mischieved. [In the later version of the Wiclif Bible (Matt. iv. 23), the Yulgate Latin, " omnem languorem," is rendered " every languor ; " but in the earlier, " al soroio or ache," and in v. 25, we have " dyuerse languores," and " dyuers soroAvis" (var. reading, soores") from " diversis languoribus."] " Judas was sorowe therof, and grutched." — Dives and Pauper. [" I am sorrow for thee." — Cymheline. We should now use sorry; and as Shakespeare * See ante, Morkow, p. 142, note. OF ABSTRACTION. 159 writes " I am sorry" only a few lines above, it is very likely that he did so here, sorrow in such usage being obsolete.] Spenser uses sore as a verb ; to grieve, to lament. A sory maid, in Spenser, a grieved maid; a sory plight ; a plight in which he (Malbecco) was grieved, mischieved. Shrewd, not by change of characteristic, but by addino; ed to the indicative. It is An2:lo- Saxon syrw-ed, syrew-ed ; and syrwe, syrewe, is our mo- dern shrewe or shrew (by an easy corruption of y into h, as also in syrop, shrub), the indicative of shrew-Sin, and meaning one who vexes or molests. Shrew Avas formerly applied to males as well as females. [In Chaucer's translation of Boethius, pessimi, improbi, are rendered shrewde folke. In Wiclif " prava" is rendered " schrewed thingis, schrewed generation." " Nay then, quod she, I shrew us both two."— Wife of Bath, N. 6644. ^^ And yet he was to me the most shrew. ''^ — Id. V, 6087.] Be-shrew thee; be thou (Anglo-Saxon) syrwe, syrewe, that is, vexed; or mayst thou be vexed, molested, mischieved, or grieved, in some manner. [" Now elles, frere, I will beshrewe thy face." — Id. 6426. Shrewed or shrewd; vexed, troubled, provoked ; and consequentially angry, ill-tempered, bitter or biting; and hence further, keen, cunning, saga- cious. A Sorry fellow, a sorry tale, case, or condition ; 160 OF ABSTRACTION". a sorry fellow, tale, case, or condition, so mischieved as to appear of little worth ; contemptible or piti- able.] Stage, Stag. The Anglo-Saxon Stig-an, as- cendere, by usual change of characteristic vowel and cognate consonants, gives us these following words, so apparently unconnected. The verb, to stie^ now disused, was common with our best writers, from Piers Ploughman to Spenser. It was variously written steige, steye, sty or stie. 1. Stage ; any elevated place, for comedians or other perfonners to exhibit: to scaffoldings or buildings raised for many other purposes. 2. The word is applied to corporeal progress ; as at this stage of my journey — of the business — of my life. Travelling was called steigynge. 3. It is also applied to degrees of mental ad- vancement in or towards any knowledge, talent or excellence. 4. It was also used as we now use story. (French estage, etage). " Sleping he fell down fro the thridde stage.'^' (Modern Version loft.) Stag ; so called from his raised and lofty head ; his " high-palm'd head " being the most striking circumstance at the first sight of him. Stack; ofhay, of wood, of chimneys; chimneys raised (above the roof) ; hay or wood raised or piled up. Stalk (a broad). Spenser describes the pro- gress of seed to green grass, from green grass to the stalk, from stalk to ear, and thence the grain ; and, after mowing or reaping, binding into sheaves, and rearincr into stalks. OF ABSTRACTION. 161 Stay; in Scotch^ a stay brae is a high bank. Rocbis full stay — very bigb rocks: stay, merely meaning steig, raised, high, lofty. Stair; Anglo-Saxon Sta3g-er; Dutch steiger; means merely an Ascender. Chaucer and Fabian wrote steyer, and stey. Fabian writes steyer for stager. Story, stag-ery, stay-ery (a broad), stawry or story ; a set of stairs. Sty, on the eye ; called by Skinner a tumour, from the Anglo- Saxon verb to stie. Sty, for hogs ; Anglo- Saxon stige, a raised pen, to keep hogs in cleanliness. A Stile; Anglo-Saxon stig-el, a diminutive of sty. Stirrup (etymologists concur), a mounting- rope, a rope by which to mount or stye ; Anglo- Saxon stig-rap. The low Latin Astraba, and strepa, and Span^ ish Estribo, are referred to the same origin. Stock, Stockings. The Anglo-Saxon Stoc, stak, sticce ; English Stok, stok-en, stuk, stak, stik, stich, are the differently spelled, pronounced and applied past tense, and past participle of the Anglo- Saxon verb Stic-an; stic-can,to5^zcA, figere, pungere. Om- modern custom acknowledges stuck only as the past tense and past participle; and con- siders all the others as so many distinct and un- connected substantives. « Take," says Mr. Trench,* '' the word ' stock;' * Lect. 6, on the Study of Words. M 162 OF ABSTKACTION. in wliat an almost infinite number of senses it is employed. What point in common can we find between them all ? This : — that they are all de- rived from, and were originally, the past participle of ^ to stick,' which, as it now makes ^ stuck,' made formerly ^ stock,' and they cohere in the idea of Jixedness, which is common to every one." Stock, truncus, stipes, that is, stuck; to stand like a stock. See ante. Lock, Post. Stock, metaphorically; a stupid or blockish person. Stock, of a tree, itself stuck in the ground; from which branches proceed. Stock, metaphorically, stirps, family, race; [hence 5^oc^-dove, the stock or stirps of the domestic kinds.] Stock ; fixed quantity, or store of any thing. Stock in trade ; fixed sum of money, or goods, capital, fund. STOCK-lock ; a lock stuck in. Stock, of a gun; in which the barrel infixed or stuck. Stock, handle ; in which a tool or instrument is stuck. Stock, for the neck (or legs, see infra). Stockij^g, for the leg; corruptly written for stock-en ; because it was stuck pr made with stick- ing pins, now called knitting needles. Stock ; in which hands and legs are stuck, as a punishment. Stocks ; in which ships are stuck or fixed. Stocks ; where the money of persons is fixed; the public funds. OF ABSTEACTION. 163 Stucco ; for houses, &c. a composition stuck or fixed upon walls, &c. Stake, in a hedge ; stak or stuck there. • [" I too have a stake (in the country) and a deep stake, nor stolen from the public hedge to be sure, for I planted it myself." — Home Tooke, in the House of Commons.] Stake ; any thing stuck or fixed in the ground, to which beasts may be fastened to be baited. Stake; a deposit, paid down, orjixed, to answer the event. And thus — Stake, metaphorically, a risk ; any ikmg fixed or eno-ao-ed to answer the event. Steak ; a piece or portion of flesh so small as that it may be taken up and carried, stuck upon a fork, or any other sticking instrument. Stick (formerly written Stoc) ; carried in the hand, or otherwise, but sufiiciently slender to be stuck or thrust into the ground or other soft sub- stances. Stick ; a thrust. Stitch (ch for k) ; a thrust or push with a needle, also that which is performed by such thrust or push. Stitch ; metaphorically, a pain resembling the sensation produced by a stitch, or by being stuck or pierced by any pointed instrument. Besides the above, still remaining in common use, there were formerly — Stock, for the leg ; now Stocking. " She can knit him a stocke.^^ — Two Gentlemen of Verona, 164 OF ABSTRACTION. Stock ; a sword or rapier, or any weapon tliat might be tkrust or stuck. Also Stock and Stuck ; a thrust or push. " He gives me the stucke in with such a mortal motion, that it is eneuitable." — Twelfth Night, [Stoccado ; a thrust or push. Stoccade ; a fence of sharp stakes.] Stoker; one who sticks, — that which pushes and consequently stirs (the fire), a poker. ^TiTC^-fallen cheek; metaphorically, from a stitch of needlework y«ZZe72. To the Italian stocco, stoccada, and French estoc, the same origin are ascribed. [ Chapman writes, " And many men at plow he made, and drave earth here and there, " And turn'd up stitches orderly." — Hiad, 18. These stitches were performed, made, effected, by the driving or pushing of the plough. ^^ You have gone a good stitch ; you may well be aweary." — Bunyan. That is, a good way at one stitch or j)ush.] Store, Stour, as well as Stern,* are the past participles of the same Anglo-Saxon verb, Stir-an, to steer, to move. Store is a collective term for any quantity or number of things stirred or moved into some one place together. Stour (Anglo-Saxon Stur), formerly in much use, means moved, stirred, and was applied equally to dust, to water, and to men; all things easily moved. It is commonly so written in G, Douglas, * Ante, p. 122. OF ABSTRACTION-. 165 is found in Chaucer and Spenser, and so late as Drayton. [ Ascliam writes stoorer, the comparative, more austere or harsh.] Sturt in G. Douglas, is stured, stur^d, sturt. A Start, and a Stir, or Stur, need no ex- planation. Sturdy (ig into y, and the French estourdi, etourdi) ; stirred, moved, sc. to exertion, endur- ance, resistance. Strain^, Stride : Strain is past tense and past participle, strined, strind, of the Anglo-Saxon Stryn~an, to get, gignere, procreare, acquirere. Chaucer and Spenser write streen or strene. (Tyr- whitt, stren.^ " For God it wote, that children ofte been Unlyke her worthy elders, hem before : Bounte cometh all of God, and not of the streen Of which they ben engendred and ibore." Clerkes Tale, v. 8033. Stride (the n dropped), called in Lincolnshire, says Skinner, a cock's S trine — Anglo-Saxon strynd. G. Douglas writes get, that is, begotten, in the same manner. The father of Camilla is said to have ofttimes pressed the milk of mares " Within the tender lippis of his get."^^ Yester-day is the Anglo-Saxon Gestran-dgeg, and gestran is the past tense and past participle of Gestrinan, to get, to acquire, to obtain. But a day is not gotten or obtained till it is passed, therefore gestran-dddg, is equivalent to the passed day. Ges- tran, Yestran, yestern (in German, gestern, Dutch gisteren), y ester. 166 OF ABSTRACTIOlSr. Gestraii-di2dg, is Hesterna dies (Lye), and tlie Latin hestern-i\s is ghestern. [Whatever may be thought of the justice of this etymology, its ex- treme ingenuity is undeniable.] Hester n. [The modern Latin etymologists say hes, whence hesternus, and hesternus is analogous with Hodiernus. Hes they consider to be kindred with )(0£c j the old source of Hesternus.] Tall, Toll, are the past participles of the An- glo-Saxon verb, Til-ian, to lift up, to till (toll-ere). Tall and the French Taille, mean raised, lifted up. [Tall is applied metaphorically to men of high spirit, lofty courage. " I know your spirit to be tall ; pray be not vexed." — Beaumont and Fletcher. " Boadicea and her daughter ride about in a chariot telling the tall champeons as a great encou- ragement, that Avith the Britons it was usual for woemen to be their leaders." — Milton, History of England, b. 2.] Toll and the French Taille (which is taken of goods) differ only in pronunciation and spelling. It is a part lifted up ; as a tax, levied, raised. Toll of a bell is the bell lifted, and apphed to the sound thus caused. Tool, is (some, any instrument) lifted up, or taken up, to work with. Toil (for labour), applied perhaps at first prin- cipally to having tilled {lifted up) the earth, and then to other sorts of labour. Tooke produces two instances from a MS. version of the New Testa- OF ABSTRACTIOlSr. 167 ment in Lis possession of the verb to toil, written in old English^ to tueill, and tuail. In the Wiclif Bible the word is trauil. Toil (for a snare) is any thing lifted up or raised for a snare. A spider's web is a toil (some- thing lifted up) to catch flies ; springes and nets, toils for other animals. [And I know no better etymology for the verb to tell, than this Anglo-Saxon tilian, or tal-ian, the Dutch taelen, numerare, narrare ; and I thus explain the word : — To lift or raise, sc. the articles to be counted, or calculated (the calculi), tossed or thrown, on the counter : and hence to count them, to number or enumerate, to reckon them. Also — To raise or lift, sc. the voice, the sound of the voice : and thus to utter, to narrate, &c. &c. What more common expression, when the speaker does not make himself heard, than " Tell it out;" " raise your voice." Hence tale and talk.'\ Towis^, Tun, Ten. Anglo-Saxon Ton, tone, tun, tyne, past tense, and past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb Tynan, to enclose, to encompass, to tyne. (Somner, to teen.^ Town ; any number of houses enclosed together. Formerly the English subaudition was more ex- tensive, and embraced also any enclosure; any quantity of land, &c. enclosed. Dr. Beddoes wrote to Tooke that " in the west of Cornwall every cluster of trees is called a town of trees ; " that is, trees encompassed or within a certain compass. He adds, that " to tyne is still a provincialism." 168 OF ABSTEACTION. [In tlie early version of the Wiclif Bible, " oc- cludens ostinm " is rendered " tyndynge to the dore;" in the latter, " closide the dore." And the Latin Villa, is usually rendered a toun ; " yillam emi — I have bougt a toun.''^ — Luke xiv. 18.] A tun (Anglo-Saxon Tunne) ; and its diminutive tunnel (Anglo-Saxon Tsenel) ; the former appUed to an enclosure of fluids, to the fluid enclosed, to a certain weight closed or packed together. [A Tui^N'EL ; any smaller enclosure, for smoke, in its passage out ; for liquor in its passage into a tun or other vessel. And some foreign birds are described by Derham as tunnelling their nests ; and suspending them from trees to keep them out of the reach of rapacious animals,] Ten (Anglo-Saxon Tyn, tin, ten) is the same past participle. The names of colours and winds have been shown to have a meaning, and the names of numerals have one also. The number of the fingers is the utmost extent of numeration ; and by them all numeration was performed. The hands doubled, closed or shut in, include and conclude all number. In counting more, you begin again, ten and one; ten and two, &c. to twain-ten^, &c. on to tioain-tens and one, &c. The Latin decern, Greek ^sKa, have been de- rived from ^e^EdOai, comprehendere : and Tooke approves. See Yossius, and Scheid in Lennep. Wile, Guile . . . The Anglo-Saxon Wigl-ian, ge-wigl-ian, be-wigl-ian, means to conjure, to di- vine, consequently to practise cheat, imposture, and enchantment. OF ABSTKACTION". 169 Wile (from Wigl-ian), and ^we7e (from ge-wigl- ian), are that by which any one is deceived. Guilt, is Ge-wigled, guiled, guil'd, guilt; the past participle of ge-wigl-ian. To find guilt in any one, is to find that he has been guiled, or, as we now say, beguiled ; " that is," says Mr. Trench, " instigante diabolo — as it is inserted in all indict- ments for murder, the forms of which come down to us from a time when men were not ashamed of tracing evil to his inspiration." * Wicked means witched, or bewitched; and to pronounce guilt is to pronounce wicked. Gull is merely a person Guiled or beguiled. In gull there is no allusion to witchcraft. But guilt, being a technical law term, keeps its place in our legal proceedings, as the instigation of the devil does ; and with the same meaning. Wroth, Wrath, Wreath, are the past tense and past participles of the Anglo-Saxon Writh- an, torquere, to writhe, and speak for themselves. Raddle (supposed to be so pronounced for wrath- el, the diminutive of wrath) ; a raddle hedge, is a hedge of pleached or plashed, twisted or wreathed, twigs or boughs. So riddle, metaphorically ; and wrg so pro- nounced for writh. I here conclude my selection from the plentiful abundance of this chapter. The whole number of instances produced in it and the preceding chapters to establish the doctrine of past participles used * On the Study of Words, Lee, 6. 170 OF ABSTRACTION. substantively^ that is, with a substantive (an ali~ quid) understood, amounts, as the author himself informs us, to about 1,000 words. But my selec- tion will present to the reader enough (and per- haps more than enough) to stimulate his curiosity to pursue, as far as his means and opportunities will enable him, the study at least of his own lan- guage, on the principles which it has been my task and my endeavour to explain and confirm. Mr. Trench enlarges, with great energy, on the advantages that will result from such pursuit, es- pecially by analysing groups of words with a view to detect their bond of relationship, and the one root Qut of which they grow ; and when one single word is found to be used in various senses, seem- ingly far removed from each other, of seeking out the bond which there certainly is between these several uses. This can only be done by getting to the seminal meaning of the word, from which, as from a fruitful seed, all the different usages unfold themselves. " From this," he proceeds, " we may start with, as lifted above all doubt (and the non-recognition of it is the ! great fault in Johnson's Dictionary,) that a word has originally but one meaning, and that all the others, however widely they may di- verge from one another, and seem to recede from this one, may yet be affiliated upon it, may be brought back to the one central meaning, which grasps and knits them altogether."* ♦ On the Study of Words. Lee. 6. OF ABSTEACTION. 171 He unhesitatingly entertains the doctrine of past participles, as leading to the accomplishment of the purposes above insisted upon as so desirable. *' What a multitude," he observes, " of our nouns, substantive and adjective, are, in fact, unsuspected participles, or are otherwise most closely connected with verbs, with which, notwithstanding, until some one points out the fact to us, we probably never think of putting them in any relation. And yet with how lively an interest shall we discover words to be of closest kin, which we had never considered till now but as entire strangers to one another. What a real increase it will be in our acquaintance with, and mastery of, English, to be- come aware of such relationship."* But the views of Home Tooke extended far beyond those which Mr. Trench has described. He concludes this chapter, so full of novelty, with saying — " On this subject of subaudition, I wiU exercise your patience no further; . . . But I trust these (words) are sufficient to discard that imagined operation of the mind, which has been termed abstraction, and to prove, that what we call by that name is merely one of the contrivances of language, for the purpose of more speedy com- munication." I now proceed to another class of words " most closely connected with verbs," indeed so closely as to form a part of them. * And see ante. Stock. 172 CHAP. Y. ON ABSTRACTION (continued). \_Ahstract terms formed from the third person sin- gular of the indicative'^, ALE ; in Anglo- Saxon AlofA, tliat is, quod ac- cendit^inflammat ; from Q\i\ 1 bethought mj self ; that is, cause yourself to think ; I caused myself to think. And Surrey — " ^neas full minded to de- part ; " that is, having it fully minted on his mind. And the Scotch say, " I never mind sermons ; " not as Ave should mean — I never heed sermons; but I never mint, or cause myself to mint or im- press them on my mind; or sermons never mint or impress themselves on my mind. To conclude what I trow on these words True and Truth. If a man tells me what he thinks, he tells me the truth ; if I believe him, his truth becomes my truth. If he proclaims it at market crosses, and the surrounding multitude believes him, his truth J OF ABSTEACTIOIS^. 187 becomes the truth of the surrounding multitude. If he tells it to the world, and the world believes him, his truth becomes the world's truth. And thus we reach to a general or universal truth, or a thought, a belief generally or universally received ; and it is thus, probably, that, forgetting our nature, we arrive at the conclusion that what is so generally, so universally believed, must be immutahle truth. And, further, as there are truths that have been accepted from generation to generation, through successive ages, from time immemorial, we con- clude also that there must be everlasting, eternal truth. A remarkable instance has lately occurred (and in our Courts of Justice remarkable instances are constantly recurring) of the truth of honest men being opposed to the truth of others equally ho- nest, and in which the truth of a jury was to decide by their true verdict, to which of the truth- ful parties credit was to be given, for thinhing (or being thinged), for trowing rightly and speaking accordingly. The cause was tried at Edinburgh; and the point at issue was — Whether a certain mineral found on certain lands was or was not COAL ? On one side there appeared as witnesses, gen- tlemen whose scientific knowledge Avas undoubted, and whose integrity of character was equally so^ who deposed their truth, their firm persuasion, that this mineral was not coal ; and that such was their belief, because they could not, by the help of most powerful microscopes, discern the slightest 188 OF ABSTRACTION^. traces of vegetable tissue in the sections, frag- ments, or any sensible parts of tbe mineral. On the other side appeared as witnesses, gentle- men, equally credible on all accounts, who de- posed their truth, their firm persuasion and belief, that this mineral was coal, and that such was their belief, because they could and did, by the help of similar microscopes, discern the plainest traces of vegetable tissue in the same portions of this same mineral. And the jury believed those whose evidence was positive ; not those whose evidence was negative. It is my belief that the witnesses on both sides saw the same things ; and that these things were recognized by the one party, but were not so re- cognized by the other, as forming that tissue or texture of parts, the existence of which in this mine- ral was to be decided by their testimony, and on which decision the verdict of " Coal or no Coal," entirely depended. All, witnesses and jurymen, spoke the truth, Boswell tells us, that Johnson distinguished between physical and moral truth (as many had done before him) thus : " Physical truth is, when you tell a thing exactly as it is ; moral truth is, when you tell a thing sincerely and precisely as it appears to you. I say, such a one walked across the street : if he really did so, I told a physical truth. If I thought so, though I should have been mistaken, I told a moral truth." * Common sense, and our common law, recognize * Boswell, V. iv. p. 338, 8vo. ed. OF ABSTEACTION. 189 the distinction intended by Johnson (and which would be now expressed by the terms objective and subjective). To constitute the crime of per- jury, the false truth (to use the words of Piers Ploughman), the false swearing " must be corrupt (that is, committed malo animo), wilful, positive, and absolute, not upon surprise, or the ZzAe."* And what are the conditions of the instances stated by Johnson ? Simply these — That in what he calls a Physical Truth — The Truth is as the fact is — they coincide. In what he calls a Moral Truth — The Truth is not as the fact is ; they do not coincide. The application of the word differs, but the mean- ing is the same : coincidence, or no coincidence, forms no part of it. We cannot divest it of its meaning. We may, as the poet says of Nature, toss it out with a pitch-fork, but incontinently it will return. And now, I hope I may indulge myself in the satisfaction of believing that I have so represented, so illustrated the doctrine of the " Diversions of Purley " on this grand word, truth, as at least, to place the composers of systems, and their disciples, on their guard in their manner of employing it. And I further hope another result may be antici- pated ; that by an extension of mutual charity, in the intercourse of the world we may be induced to allow that men may tell their truth, on occasions when it is quite at variance with our own. * Blackstone, iv. 137. 190 OF ABSTRACTION. I have, I trust, already disposed of tlie " Philo- logical Nostrum of past participles" imputed to our Author by Professor Stewart ; and I now, as I also trust, have performed the same service to Dr. Whately's " Fallacy Founded on Etymology." And it does not appear to me that I could find a better opportunity than the present, while the pre- ceding etymologies are fresh in the memory of the reader, for noticing another, and that most impor- tant error, and consequent misconception, in which these two distinguished writers equally participate. " Mr. Tooke," says the Professor, " assumes as a principle, that in order to ascertain with precision the philosophical import of any word, it is neces- sary to trace its progress historically through all the successive meanings, which it has been em- ployed to convey from the moment that it was first introduced into our language ; and if the word be of foreign growth, that we should prosecute the research till we ascertain the literal and primitive sense of the root from whence it sprang. It is in this literal and primitive sense alone, that ac- cording to him, a philosopher is entitled to employ it even in the present advanced state of science, and whenever he annexes to it a meaning at all difierent, he imposes equally upon himself and others."* To the Professor I reply, that Tooke's doctrine IS simply this : That from the etymology of the word we should fix the intrinsic meaning; that that meaning should always furnish the cause of * Philosophical Essays, pp. 165 and 190, 4to. ed. OF ABSTRACTION. 191 the application, and that no application of any word is justifiable for whicli that meaning will not supply a reason ; but that the usage of any application so supported is not only allowable but indispensable. Indeed, in endeavouring to establish the origin of a very numerous class of words, he assumed, and was forced to assume, a diversity of application, and it was solely for a meaning to justify this di- versity that he pursued these terms to their source. And those are not the least curious parts of his book, in Avhich he shows the same words to be differently written — a difference introduced and confirmed merely for the sake of preserving a dis- tinct difference of application in usage. I say usage, from a conviction that these different modes of writing might hy usage have interchanged their different applications, and it would be a matter of no great difl&culty to produce instances in which an interchange has actually occurred. The mean- ing, nevertheless, remains uniform, unvarying, and invariable ; the application and subaudition as un- limited as the numberless necessities of speech. Dr. Whately represents that Tooke's principle is this : " That the meaning and force of a word, now and for ever, must be that which it or its root originally bore." And this, he asserts, is absolutely false. If Dr. AVhately intends that Tooke insists " the radical intrinsic meaning to be now and for ever the same," he is right in so doing ; and Tooke is right also. If Dr. Whately intends that Tooke insists ^^ the 192 OF ABSTEACTIOIsr. application of the word, that is, our meaning in applying it, must be in the radical, intrinsic mean- ing, the literal, primitive sense, and in no other," he is wrong in so doing; Tooke insists upon no such absurdity. Dr. TVTiately supplies an instance, which pre- sents an easy explanation of what it is that Tooke actually does insist upon ; and I hope by its aid to remove the misapprehension under which he la- bours, as I hope to have removed that, under which the eminent Professor had unfortunately laboured before him. The two, indeed, are substantially the same. " He might as well," exclaims the Doctor, " have insisted that sycophant can never mean any thing but Jig-shower.''^ There is no doubt that Tooke would so have insisted; and there is as httle doubt that he would have insisted upon no more than an obvious fact : and one I hope, very briefly, so to represent as to ensure the conviction of the Right Reverend Archbishop himself. It matters little to the purpose, whether the original application of the compound word, syco^ phant, adopted by Dr. T\niately, or the common one* be correct. A syco-phant, or Jig-shower , might be originally applied to him, philosopher or not, who showed his fig — in token of a challenge to a contest ; and thence might its application to any challenger be deduced, whether showing his token or not, to any one provoking strife, or litigation, or quarrel ; and • See Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16. OF ABSTKACTIOIT. 193 hence applied to what the English law denominates a common Barrator : then, 1. to an informer ; 2. to an informer of any thing pleasing, gratifying, flat- tering to the hearer ; to a flatterer, to a parasite. Or it might be originally applied to him who showed, gave evidence, — informed that figs were (contrary to law) carried out of Attica ; and thence the same applications be deduced as above set forth. The word syco-phant still retains its meaning ; challenger, informer, parasite, flatterer, never enter into it, never become whole or part of it; that word still means, that is, means etymologically, and ever must so mean, a fig-shower, and nothing else; but in any application founded upon this meaning, and inferred from it, (as in the above ex- planation, every application is inferred,) the word may be used to denote the meaning of the speaker, and is so used with propriety. The meaning or intention of the speaker in using the word, may be very diflerent from the meaning of the word itself; but there must be some inference or deduction in the mind of the speaker, known to the hearer, which will warrant the usage. And such is the clear and decided doctrine of Home Tooke. The misconceptions of Professor Stewart, and Dr. Whately, originate in this: that they have not distinguished the application or customary usages from the intrinsic meaning so strongly and repeat- edly insisted upon in the " Diversions of Purley." As rationally indeed might it be asserted, that the thing — a fig shown, when intended to signify a o 194 OF ABSTRACTION. challenge to disputation, changed its nature, and was no longer a fig shown, as that the word, syco^ •pliant^ when intended to signify a challenger, no longer meant a fig-shower. The thing was a vi- sible sign of a purpose intended, by one party, and so understood by another — and the word, an au- dible sign of equivalent, intent, and import. Lord Brougham charges our Author with main- taining that which, without abandoning his own principles, he could not maintain ; namely, that he would hold the law of Libel to be absurd and un- just, because the word libel means a little book. We have I think Tooke's own testimony, that he would hold no such thing ; nor can it be maintained that he ought, as a consequence from his own principles, to hold such a doctrine. As he well understood so he would strictly observe, the dis- tinction between the legal application and the in- trinsic meaning of the word. He made no com- plaint, when the opportunity was before him, and invited him so to do, against the law of libel ; his complaint was, that in the information against him the law was not complied with ; that the crime, for which he was prosecuted, was not described in that plain language, which, by the law relating to libel, he had a right to expect.* I will put together a few general remarks, scat- tered through the pages of his work, which ought to remove all misapprehensions of our Author's principles. * Diversions of Purley, v. 1. Advertisement, Note. OF ABSTRACTION". 195 Of great importance it surely is, "that we should have a clear understanding of the words we use in discourse. For as far as we know not our own meaning ; as far as our purposes are not en- dowed with Avords to make them known — so far ' we gabble like things most brutish.' But the im- portance rises higher, when we reflect upon the application of words to metaphysics ; and all gene- ral reasoning, all politics, law, morality, and divi- nity are merely metaphysic." It is however " a trifling etymology, that barely refers us to some word in another language, either the same or similar ; — nor is it sufficient to produce instances of the use of a doubtful word, from which to conjecture its meaning ; though instances are fit to be produced in order, by the use of the word, to justify the oflered etymology. Interpre- ters, who thus seek the meaning of a word singly from the passages in which it is found, usually connect with it the meaning of some other word or words in the sentence. A regard to the indi- vidual etymology of the word would secure them from this error, and conduct them to the intrinsic meaning of the word, and the cause of its applica- tion. — All etymological pursuit beyond this, is merely for the gratification of a childish curiosity, in which the understanding takes no share, and from which it can derive no advantage. That " word is always sufficiently original in that lan- guage where its meaning, which is the cause of its application, can be found. — Nor should it oc- casion surprise or discouragement, that words so 196 OF ABSTKACTIOIS'. different in their present application, should be traced to the same origm ; for it is the necessary condition of all languages ; it is the lot of man, as of all other animals, to have few different ideas (and there is a good physical reason for it), though we have many words ; and yet even of them we have by no means so many, of different significa- tions, as we are supposed to have," CHAP. YI. [ The three remaining chapters are devoted to adjectives and participle s,'\ OY ADJECTIVES. THEY and the Participles, it must be remem- bered, were originally assumed as the pecu- liar province of this work. Prepositions, conjunc- tions and adverbs have been resolved, in the first volume, into one or the other of the two necessary parts of speech ; into nouns or verbs. Adjectives and participles are useful for despatch ; and, having a different manner of signification, are properly in- cluded in the arrangement of the parts of speech in our grammars. But what, it is asked, are these adjectives and participles by which the doctrine of abstraction has in the preceding chapters been set aside ? What is an adjective ? Lowth tells us, that it OF ADJECTIVES. 197 is not a noun ; it is not tlie name of a thing ; and Harris, that it should not have been ranged with nouns, as it never denotes substances ; but with verbs, as both denote attributes : that is, accidents and qualities. Some of their ablest predecessors* differ from Lowth and Harris ; and our own coun- trymen, Wilkins and Wallis, among the number. Wallis asserts, that the Adjectivurn respectivum is nothing else than the very substantive word itself, adjective posita ; that is to say, it is a substantive put in apposition with another substantive. Gold and brass are names of things, and denote sub- stances. If Ave say a gold-ring, a brass-tube, here are substantives, adjective posita, yet names of things, and denoting substances. If we say a golden ring, a brazen tube, the ter- mination couples the two words instead of the hyphen ; and the adjectives golden, brazen, denote the same things as gold, brass. Nothing is taken away from, nothing is added to, their signification, but what is contained in the termination en. The three adjective terminations en, ed, and ig (our modern y), mean give, add, join, and thus designate this added circumstance, that the substantives, to which they are added as terminations, are to be joined to some other substantive : and this single added circumstance (called by Wilkins that oi per- taining to) is the only difference between a sub- stantive and an adjective ; between gold and golden. Wallis proposes to call our possessive case, * Scaliger, Sanctius, Scioppius, Yossius. 198 OF ADJECTIVES. formed by tlie termination '5 or es — Adjectwmn possessivum; and the common grammatical rule tliat an adjective cannot stand alone in a sentence, might induce Wallis so to call it, for man^s cannot stand alone any more than human. In both cases we expect another name of a thing. No oblique cases stand alone ; so that this circumstance of not standing alone, is not confined to the adjective. Grammarians have maintained that adjectives represent only accidental qualities ; that substan- tive and accident were the foundation of the differ- ence between the substantive and adjective ; yet human goodness, and marHs goodness, have pre- cisely the same meaning ; and if the adjective hu- man represent an accidental quality, so must the oblique case mavL§. In the expression a good man ; good represents all the ideas signified by the term goodness ; all the difference between the substantive and adjective is, that by the latter part of speech we are by " some small difference in termination, enabled, when we employ the sign of an idea, to communi- cate at the same time that such sign is then meant to be added to another sign, in such a manner as that the two signs together may answer the pur- pose of one complex term. This contrivance is merely an abbreviation in the sorts of words to supply the want of an abbreviation in terms," which latter abbreviation we can sometimes effect ; as though we have no complex term for good man, we have for holy man. The hyphen supplies a deficiency in our lan« OF ADJECTIVES. 199 guage : it is not a word or letter because it is not the sign of a sound ; but it is, what every word should be, the sign of an idea ; with this difference, that it is conveyed to the eye only, and not to the ear. In our language we are sometimes obliged to have recourse to it; thus, sea-weed, shell-fish, hail-storm, &c. are necessary compounds; as we have not any complex term to express these collec- tions of ideas, nor any termination to indicate our intention of adjecting. Such words as sea, shell, hail, our old grammarian. Gill, calls by the name of substantiva sterilia, because they produce no ad- jective.* The adjective is therefore well called Noun-ad- jective ; for it is the name of a thing, which may coalesce with another name of a thing. Were it true that adjectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjec- tives, for you cannot attribute nothing. They must, as substantives do, denote substances, and substance is attributed to substance by the adjective contri- vance of language. Substances, essences, accidents, are equally indifferently denoted, sometimes by grammatical substantives, and sometimes by gram- matical adjectives. [It is this doctrine that our Author has so ela- borately and effectually exerted himself to estab- lish : and the value of his exertions will be the more * For the various offices of the hyphen, see my English Dic- tionary. Also Mr. Guest's paper in the " Proceedings of the PhUological Society," No. 113. 200 OF ADJECTIVES. higlily estimated by tliose wlio are acquainted with the monstrous consequences that were introduced by metaphysical theologians ; one most eminently conspicuous, was no less than this, that in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper there was a con- version of the substance of the bread and wine into the substance of the body and blood of Christ ; of the bread into the body, and of the wine into the blood; but that the accidents or qualities re- mained unchanged. The Komish Church was driven to this subtlety, in order to evade, what it could not resist, the evidence of the senses. ^^ These ever plainly witness that even after the supposed change of the bread and wine in the Supper into the body and blood of Christ, yet nothing but the appearance, smell, taste, and other qualities of bread and wine are received. In op- position to this a distinction is made between sub- stance and qualities (^ or accidents'), it being main- tained that the former has undergone a change, while the latter remain as before ; however much this ran contrary to simple comprehension, which plainly teaches us that substance and qualities cannot be separated, since the former is known by the latter, and the latter are determined by the former."*] To return to our adjectives. We have adjec- tives ending in ly, ous, ful, some, les, ish, &c. ; all of which are compound words; the termination being originally a word added to those other * D'Aubigne, History of the Reformationj v. i. p. 147, note. OF ADJECTIVES. 201 words, of which it now seems merely the termina- tion, though it still retains its original and distinct signification. These terminations are now more numerous in our language than they were formerly; for our ancestors borrowed and incorporated many adjective terminations which we did not want ; so that in some words we have a choice; such as bountiful, bounteous, beautiful, beauteous. And we have not only borrowed terminations, but in- stead of adjectiving our own substantives, we have borrowed, in immense numbers, adjectived signs from other languages, without always borrowing the unadjectived signs of those same ideas ; and neg- lected to improve our own language by the same contrivance within itself- — Mind is our own word. Mental, magnanimous, &c. are from the Latin, and a list of about two hundred substantives, with their foreign adjectives, is given in the work. Adjectives, though convenient abbreviations, are not* necessary to language ; and are, therefore, not ranked amongst the parts of speech. In the misap- prehension of this useful and simple contrivance of language may be discovered one of the foundations of those heaps of false philosophy and obscure (be- cause mistaken) metaphysics, with which we have been bewildered. We may learn what to do with all the technical impertinence about qualities, ac- cidents, substrata, essence, the adjunct nature of things, &c. &c. And to proceed with our Author * An account is given of a tribe of North American Indians, who had no adjectives in their language. 202 OF ADJECTIYES. to '' a very different sort of logic and critic than what we have been hitherto acquainted with;" of which a knowledge of the nature of language and of the meaning of words is a necessary fore- runner. CHAP. YII. OF PARTICIPLES. WE had formerly but two of these participles ; the present (as it is called) and the past ; but our old translators borrowed from other lan- guages and incorporated with our own four other participles of equal value. As with the adjectives, so with the participles, they did not abbreviate their own language in imitation of the others, but took from other languages their abbreviations ready made. The elder Stoics called this word Modum verbi casualem ; they would have said better adjec- tivum, as the circumstance of having cases was only a consequence of adjection. Instead oi participle, then, let this word be called generally a verb adjec- tive. We have the same occasion to adjective the verb as to adjective the noun ; and, by means of a distinguishing termination, not only the simple verb itself, but every mood and every tense of the verb may be made adjective, as well as the noun. And accordingly some languages have adjectived more, and some languages have adjectived fewer, of these moods and tenses, which are themselves merely ab- OF PARTICIPLES. 203 breviations ; that is, nothing more than the circum- stances of manner and time added to the verb ; in some languages by distinguishing terminations. The greatest part of this modal and temporal abbre- viation we are forced to perform by auxiliaries ; that is, separate words signifying the added circum- stances. The verb adjective has all that the noun adjective has (as Perizonius had observed),* and something more, because the verb has something more than the noun. There are now six of these verb adjectives em- ployed in English, namely, the simple verb itself adjective ; two adjective tenses, and three adjective moods. 1. The verb adjective. 2. The past tense adjective. 3. The potential mood active adjective. 4. The potential mood passive adjective. 5. The official mood passive adjective. 6. The future tense active adjective. ( 1 . ) The simple verb adj ective formerly terminated in and; now in ing. As the noun adjective signi- fies all that the unadjectived noun signifies, and no more (except the circumstance of adjection), so must the verb adjective signify all that the unad- jectived verb signifies, and no more (except the circumstance of adjection), but neither does the in- dicative mood, present tense, nor the present parti- ciple, as they are called, contain any adsignification of manner or of time ; its proper name is merely * Vide Sanctii Minervam, cap. 15, n. 1. 204 OF PAETICIPLES. the verh. In this opinion, as to the adsignification of manner or time, there is nothing; new or singu- lar. Sanctius* both asserted and proved it by nu- merous instances in the Latin, from which a selec- tion is made : ^' Et ahfui (j)as£) prqficiscens in Groeciam." — Cic. Ep. " Sed postquam amans accepit (^past) pretium pollicejis.^^ — Terent, " Ultro ad eum venies (fut.) indicans te amare." — Terent. " Twcniim fuffientem hsec terra videMt.^^ — Vir^. " Turn apri inter se dimicant indm'antes attritu arborum costas." — Plin. In the same manner we say, " Truth is always one and the same, from the beginning of the world to the end of it." Perizonius is opposed to this ; " Animadver- tendum est," he savs, " prcesejis vere participium posse accedere omnibus omnino periodis, in quibus etiam de prceterita Qtfutura re agitur." And then, after this admission of the fact, he proceeds to say, " Quia in pr^territa ilia re, quum gesta est, prcs- sensfuit; et in futura, item prsesens erit."t This is denounced as a mere evasion, since " a common termination (that is, a coalesced word) like every other word must always convey the same distinct meaning, and can only then be properly used, quando distinctio requhitur." (2.) The past tense adjective does signify the cir- cumstance of time (or tense), in Latin by distinct • Lib, 1, cap. 15. f Id. ib. n. 2. OF PAKTICIPLES. 205 terminations, and in English by termination and auxiliaries. In English Ave sometimes add the ter- minations ed or en, and sometimes use the past tense itself, without any change of termination (though this latter custom has greatly decreased). The Latin makes an adjective of the past tense (as of the noun) by adding its article oc, i], ov, to the third person of the past tense — Amavit, amavitM5, amavtus, amatus. Docuit, docuitzz^, docitus, doctus. Legit, legitw5, legtus, lectus. AudiAat, audivitw5, audivtus, auditus. But as we often adject one substantive without any sign of adjection to another substantive, so are we accustomed to use the past time without any sign of adjection ; a practice which Lowth seriously condemns as " an abuse long growing upon us and continually making further encroachments," though he produces instances of this barbarism from many of our best writers. It is indeed the idiom of our language, though from greater familiarity with the Greek and Latin languages, we have yielded to their rules and customs. And since we can use our noun itself unaltered and our past tense itself unaltered, for the same purpose and with the same meaning, as the Greek and Latin use their adjec- tive and their participle ; it is manifest that their adjective and participle are merely their noun and past tense adjectived. The difference between the noun and past tense adjectived in our language, will be apparent enough on comparison of such words as the following : — 206 OF PAKTICIPLES. A golden salver A gildec? or gilt frame The landec? interest The troops have landed Fat and fleshy A well flesh^c? sword A loveZy child A loyed wife A iaWiOus man A fame^ exploit A dread/wZ storm A dreaded tyrant A loathZy toad 1 A loathed toad Loath/wZ idleness \ LoathecZ idleness Loathsome life LoathecZ life CHAP. VIIL PARTICIPLES (continued), , ^ I ^HE potential passive adjective; that is, ^ *^ JL having manner or mood adjectived. Under this new name we have our familiar ter- minations in able and ihle ; which Tooke, asserting that whatever the Latin has not from the Greek it has from the Gothic, believes to be originally the Anglo-Saxon or Gothic 'Khal, robur : and in this belief he is supported by Junius, who thinks it plain that we do not owe our own word able to the Romans, and refers to a passage in Caedmon, in which this word 'Kbal is used, in confirmation of his opinion. As a termination, however, together with the contraction He, we took it from the Latins, and took it very early to free ourselves from the periphrasis by which our oldest translators felt ob- liged to explain themselves. OF PARTICIPLES. 207 [In 2 Cor. ix. 15. the Latin inerrahilis is (I find) in one version rendered, " that may not he teldP and in another, supposed to be earlier, it is (as in the MS. quoted by Tooke) " unenarrahle, or that may not be told." And in the very next chap. V. 11. (as I also find), sermo contemptihilis is in the one, " the word worthi to be dispisid ;^^ and in the other, " the word contemptible, or worthi for to be dispysid." In James iii. 17, the Latin sua- dihilis is in the one version, "Able to be counseiled ; " and in the other (as in Tooke's MS.), " suadible^'' that is, " esy for to treete, or to be treetid." And in the fifth eh. v. 17, Elias homo erat similis nobis passibilis — is, in the one version, "Elye was a deedli man lyk us ; " and in the other, " Hely e was a man lijk us, passible, or able for to suffre,^^^ Again, in Acts xxvi. 23, si passibilis Christus, in the one ver- sion is, " If Crist is to suffre ; " and in the other, " If Crist passible or able to sufire."] The best classic authors used their termination, bills, passively ; some few examples to the contrary are produced, and after the corruption and decay of the Latin language they are found in abundance ; as they may also be found (and the fact seems re- markable) in the old comedian, Plautus. Though it appears that our early translators introduced the passive signification when the Yulgate Latin set them the example ; yet, as in the instance of passi^ hilis, they were occasionally misled. [Other such instances may be found ; the Latin, delectabile as- pectu, delectabile oculis, are rendered delitable. The Latin desiderabile is rendered both desiderable and 208 OF PAKTICIPLES. desireful.~\ And a large number of active usages soon followed, wMch Tooke proceeds to account for in the following (rather circuitous) manner: that they were taken from the French, who cor- rupted them from the Italian, thus, — our Anglo- Saxon /wZ/, in German voZ, became the Italian vole, — a sound pleasing to the Italian ear ; and they add- ed it to their words without sufficient regard to its signification, and where, I may add, our termination full would have been wholly inadmissible. Hence their abominei;oZe, amichei^oZe, capez;oZe, and many others, which the French by slovenly pronunciation, and not distinguishing between hile and vole, trans- formed into abomin^^Ze, amic«Z»Ze, capGZ>Ze, &c. &c. And thus our own y^oicdifull, passing through the German, Italian, and French, comes back to us in the corrupt shape of hie ; confounding those termi- nations whose distinct application and employment are so important to the different and distinct pur- poses of speech. We have various other corrupt terminations in hie, as double, treble, fable, table, syllable, dis- semble; from the Latin duplum, triplum, fabula, tabula, syllaba, dissimulare, etc. and tumble, grum- ble, crumble, etc. from the Dutch tumnelen, grom- melen, kruimelen, etc. (4.) The potential active adjective (that is, having manner or mood adjectived). For this we have two terminations ; ive, borrowed from the Latin, and corrupted from the substantive vis, and ic, from the Greek, corrupted from the substantive iayA)c. These terminations are thus contrasted by Scahger with the Latin His (hilis) : — OF PARTICIPLES. 209 '^ Duas autem habuere apud Latinos^ totidem apud Grgecos terminationes ; in ivus, activam : in His (bills) passivam : Sic Gr^ci, aidOriTiKoV) id quod sensu prasditum est, aiaOrjTov* quod sensu percipi potest." — De Causis, L. iii. cap. 98. Thus in English, sensitive (that which is), endued with sense, that can or may feel, and sensible, that can or may be felt. Yet this word sejisible we employ in three different meanings, though we have three distinct terminations for the purpose of expressing those meanings. We have sense-ful, sensit-ive, sens-ible, — full of sense ; which can feel ; which may be felt. And yet we talk of, " A sensible man, who is very sensible of the cold, and of any sensible change in the weather." I subjoin a few instances of Greek distinction: Akovgtikoq ; that can or may hear ; auditive. AKovGTog ; that can or may be heard ; midible. OoariKog \ that can or may be seen ; visive. Oparoq ; that can or may be seen ; visible. A.udiitive we have not in general use.f AudiZ>Ze is common enough, so is visible; and \imve is correctly used by Berkeley. All the ab- breviations which we have in ive are from the La- tin, and those in ic from the Greek. Tooke asserts that we have not one single word of Anglo-Saxon origin, whose potential mood active is adjectived. He had forgotten — " The Coxcomb Bird so talkative and grave." * Words with this termination are called by Greek gramma- rians verbals in roq. f It may be found in Cotgrave, in v. Auditif. P 210 OF PAETICIPLES. The word is common in our best writers and in our current speech. With the greater number of these abbreviations in ive we have not taken the unabbreviated verb : thus 2h\sitwe, aperitzi;^, crescw e. So with the Greek ic ; analytzc, apologetic, caustec. The French have immoderately abused these terminations, and we have in some instances fol- lowed their example. Thus missive is adopted by Shakespeare and others, and even by Dryden, who uses it for the contraction missile. He might have added by Swift and Pope ; the latter writes missile and missive with the same meaning. (5.) The official mood passive adjective is a name adopted from distress. It is intended to signify that mood or manner of using the verb by which we might couple the notion of duty with it; by which we might at the same time and in conjunc- tion with it, express ra ^tovTa, the things which ought, and the things which ought not, to be done. Most ancient grammarians called this the modum particijjialem. We have made little use of tliis mood: the words which we have adopted in it being barely these; Legend, reverend, dividend, prebend, memorandum; and several of these are abused in their application. Legend ; that which ought to be read. Reverend ; that which ought to be revered. Dividend; that which ought to be di"vdded, thouo'h the receiver means no such thino^. Peebend; that which ought to be afforded, OF PARTICIPLES. 211 tliougli not uncommonly applied to him who re- ceives it. Tooke omits our common words, stupend-ous, tremend-ous. These expressions, however, is to, or is to he, are all that we have of our own to supply the place of this adjective, of the potential passive adjective, and also of the future tense adjective. We use our own home-bred circumlocutory ex- pression is to he when translating from the Latin, and anciently is to; thus Chaucer renders sper- nendus from Boethius, is to dispise ; and I find in the Nonnes Prestes Tale (the Cock and Fox), Chaucer writing, " Many a dreme ful sone is for to drede ; " And Dryden, " Here may you see that visions are to dread.^^ To the present time too, we say " is to hlame^^ when speaking of a person or action that ought to he blamed ; Culpandum, (6.) The future tense adjective, in which we have only two words. Future, venture, or adventure. The awkwardness of our substitutions for this fu- ture tense adjective will be manifest upon examin- ing the ancient, and even the modern, versions of pas- sages where \kn^& future abbreviation is to be found. [This awkwardness, however, was transmitted to us from the Anglo-Saxon. In Matt. xi. 3. 14. the Latin venturus is in the Anglo-Saxon version ren- dered to GOTn.-enne, and in the early version of the Wiclif Bible, to cwmin-ynge : in the later. He that schal come. Ventura ira is also in the early ver- sion, Wraththe to Gom-gnge ; and in the later. That schal come : so also, He is to dein-gnge ; he 212 OF PAETICIPLES. is to idkynge : in the early, — is in the later. He that sclial cleme. He that schal take ; from Latin Jw6?2- caturus, accepturus. And Daeg to boTd-enne ; day to come. The participial termination ing seems formed from this Anglo-Saxon infinitive (which Hickes calls infinitivus derivatus) enne, or ig-enne. It is worthy of remark that the participial ter- mination end or and, is common in the early ver- sion of the Bible, and ynge in the later. Substantives in ung existed at the same time with this participle in and; it was a common termination in the North- ern languages. And hence probably our confusion of substantives in ing and participles in ing. See the Grammars of Walhs, Lowth, Crombie, &c. This future abbreviation ought at once to have been snatched immediately from the Latin, for these abbreviations are of great importance. A short, close, and compact method of speech answers the purpose of a map upon a reduced scale ; it as- sists greatly the comprehension of our understand- ing, and, in general reasoning, frequently enables us at one glance to take in very numerous and dis- tant important relations and conclusions, which would otherwise totally escape us. '^ And here," says our Author, ^' we conclude our discussion for the present. It is true that my evening is now fully come, and the night fast ap- proaching ; yet if we shall have a tolerably length- ened twilight, we may stiU perhaps find time enough for a farther conversation on this subject ; and finally (if the times will bear it) to apply this system of language to all the different systems of metaphysical (that is, verbal) imposture." OF PARTICIPLES. 213 That this twilight, which has now long sunk in darkness, should be so employed, was most devoutly to be wished; and, as Mr. Tooke declared in 1798, that all he had further to communicate upon the subject of language had then been amongst his loose papers for upwards of thirty years, I, for a long time, thought I might indulge a reasonable hope that we should be permitted to accompany him to the close of his speculations ; but that hope has sustained its disappointment. What is truth? said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. What is the verb? ex- claims the serious reader of the ETrea IlrfpoEvra, and cannot obtain one-. WHAT IS THE VEEB? TO this question it is now incumbent upon me to address myself, and I shall in the first place collect some remarks scattered through the work, in order to ascertain, if possible, what some- thing more it is, in the author''s conception, that belongs to the verb than belongs to the noun, and then to determine w^hat name, in consequence, it will be proper to impose upon that necessary part of speech.* * To the definitions of the verb, quoted by Tooke, add the two following : "Verbum est pars orationis attributum de subjectoaffirmans." — HiCKES, Gram. Franco-Theotisca, p. 62. Dalgarno, Ars Signorum, allows only one part of speech, the 7wun. Cceteras vero vulgatas sic habitas esse inter flexiones casus hujus numerabo. 214 WHAT IS THE TERB ? In tne first place, as to the use of the verb, it is necessary to repeat what we were early told, " That the business of the mind, as far as it concerns lan- guage,* extends no further than to receive impres- sions, that is, to have sensations or feelings. What are called its operations are merely the operations of language.! A consideration of ideas, or of the mind, or of things (relative to the parts of speech), will lead us no farther than to NoUNS, that is, the signs of these unpressions or names of ideas. The other part of speech, the verb, must be accounted for from the necessary use of it in communication. It is, in fact, the communication itself; [the com- munication, that is, of those ideas or impressions of which nouns are the signs;] and therefore well de- nominated Vr]fjia, dictum. For the verb is quod lo- quimur; the noun de quo,''^\ We are met at the outset with a declaration that the verb does not imply an assertion. How then, it is asked, is the verb Ibo to be accounted for ? By showing that Ibo is not the simple verb, but that, though containing only three letters, it consists of three words; two verbs and a pronoun. In the Greek verb \-^vai (from the ancient Ew, or modern Et^it); in the Latin, /-re, and the English verb, to hie, or to hi, Anglo-Saxon Hig-sm, the infinitive termination, evai, and re (and he might have in- cluded the Anglo-Saxon an), make no more a part of the Greek and Latin (and Anglo-Saxon) verbs, * Chap. 3. f See ante, ch. 2. I Veteres — in verbis vim sermonis, in nominibus materiam (quia alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo loquimur) esse judicaverunt,— Quint. 1. i. c. 4. WHAT IS THE VERB ? 215 than our infinitive prefix to makes a part of the English verb to Me. The pure and simple verbs are / (or Et) in the Greek ; / in the Latin ; and Hie or Hi in the English. Inverting our common order of speech, Icli wol (I will) Hie or Hi to suit the order of the Greek and Latin, the assertion in the three languages will stand thus : — Hi Wol Ich 1 Go I Vol O, that is. Ego i will I j3ot;X Ew, that is, Eyw J I In the Greek j3ouX only is the verb ; in the La- tin vol; in the English wol (will). O in the Latin, and Ew in the Greek, are the pronouns Eyw, Ego ; not far from our own old English pronoun Ich or A Latin and Italian verb, in the same future tense, are thus resolved : Audi-Z»o was the ancient form ; then audi-am. Audi-(re) Vol-o I will to hear Audi-(re) Am-o I desire to hear Udir-(e) H-o I have to hear. It is quite clear that our Author's process in the construction of words is that of adjection. 1, We have the simple noun (called substan- tive for the sake of distinction), the name of our impressions or ideas. Cases and numbers are formed by adjection of terminations having distinct meanings of their own. 2. Then we have the noun made adjective by the addition of a final syllable directing the adjec- tion of another noun, and from them in like manner some adverbs are formed. 216 WHAT IS THE VEEB ? 3. Then comes again the noun, the mere noun, which in English is made a verb by the adjection of to placed before it, and in the Greek, Latin, and other languages by their respective terminations, each with its distinct meaning. Our to supplanted the Anglo-Saxon an. In To, then, thus adjected or preposed to the noun, we are to find the difference between the mere iioun and the noun invested Avith the verbal character. We must therefore return to the preposition To, which is so important a word, that nothing said of it can be with propriety omitted. We must bear in mind our Author's derivation ; * for " After this derivation, it will not appear in the least myste- rious or wonderful that we should, in a peculiar manner in English, prefix this same word To to the infinitive of our verbs. For the verbs, in English, not being distinguished, as in other languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being sometimes im- possible to distinguish them by their place, when the old termination of the Anglo-Saxon verbs was dropped, this word to (that is, act) became neces- sary to be prefixed, in order to distinguish them from nouns, and to invest them with the verbal character; for there is no difference between the noun love and the verb to love but what must be comprised in the prefix To. The infinitive, there- fore, appears plainly to be what the Stoics called it, the very verb itself, pure and uncompounded with the various accidents of mood, of number, of * Tadi; act, effect, result, consummation. WHAT IS THE VERB ? 217 gender, of person, and^ in English, of tense ; which accidents are in some languages joined to the verb bj variety of termination, and in some by an addi- tional word signifying the added termination. And if our English Grammarians and Philosophers had trusted something less to their reading, and a little more to their own reflection, the very awkward- ness and imperfection of our own language in this particular of the infinitive, would have been a great benefit to them in all their difficulties about the verb, and would have led them to understand and explain that, which the perfection of more artificial and improved languages contributed to conceal from others. For it is a great advantage, which an English Philosopher has over those who are ac- quainted with such languages only which do this business by termination. For though there are good reasons to believe that all these terminations may likewise be traced to their respective origin, and that, however artificial they may now appear to us, they were not originally the effect of preme- ditated and deliberate art, but separate words, by length of time corrupted and coalescing with the words of which they are now considered as the terminations; yet this was less likely to be sus- pected by others. And if it had been suspected, they would have had much farther to travel to their journey's end, and through a road much more embarrassed ; as the corruption in those languages is of much longer standing than in ours, and more complex."* * Div. of Parley, vol. i. p. 350, et seq. 218 WHAT IS THE VERB ? The English grammarians " should not have re- peated the error that the infinitiye was a mere noun ; since it was found necessary in English to add another word (namely) to^ merely to distinguish the infinitive from the noun, after the infinitive had lost that distinguishing termination, which it had formerly." " There are certainly other parts of the Enoiish verb, undistino^uished from the noun by termination ; but the truth is, that to them also (and to those parts only which have not a distin- guishing termination) as well as to the infinitive, is this distinguishing sign equally necessary and equally prefixed. Do (the auxiliary verb, as it has been called) is derived from the same root, and is indeed the same word as to. The difference be- tween a T and a D is so very small, that an etymolo- gist knows by the practice of languages, and an anatomist by the reason of that practice, that in the derivation of words it is scarcely worth regarding.* And for the same reason that to is put before the infinitive, DO used formerly to be put before such other parts of the verb, which likewise were not distinguished from the noun by termination. And as we still say, I do love, instead of I love. And I jyoed or did love, instead of I loved. But it is worth while to observe, that if a distinguishing termination is used, then the distinguishing do or DID must be omitted, the termination fulfilling its ofl&ce. And therefore we never find — I did loved, or he DOTH loveth. But I did love. He doth love. * See ante, p. 31. WHAT IS THE VEKB ? 219 " It is not indeed an approved practice at pre- sent, to use DO before tliose parts of the verb, they being now by custom sufficiently distinguished by their place. And therefore the redundancy is now avoided, and DO is considered, in that case, as un- necessary and expletive. However it is still used, and is the common practice, and should be used, whenever the distin- guishing place is disturbed by interrogation, or by the insertion of a negation, or of some other words between the nominative case and the verb. As — He does not love the truth. Does he love the truth ? He does at the same time love the truth. And if we choose to avoid the use of this verbal sign, DO, Ave must supply its place by a distinguish- ing termination to the verb. As — He loyeth not the truth. JuOY eth he the truth? He at the same time loYeth the truth. Or where the verb has not a distinguishing ter- mination (as in plurals). They do not love the truth. Do they love the truth ? They do at the same time love the truth. Here if we wish to avoid the verbal sign, we must remove the negative, or other intervening word or words, from between the nominative case and the verb; and so restore the distinguishing place. As — They love not the truth. Love they the truth ? At the same time they love the truth : or — 220 What is the verb ? They, at the same time, love the truth."* And thus these methods of using To and Do, ^' arise from the peculiar method, which the English language has taken to arrive at the same necessary end, which other languages attain by distinguish- ing termination.^'' Case, gender, number, are no parts of the noun. Mood, tense, number, person, are no parts of the verb. But these same circumstances, frequently accompanying the noun and the verb, are then sig- nified by other words expressive of these circum- stances : and ao-ain, in some lano-uao-es, these latter words, by their perpetual recurrence, have coa- lesced with the noun and verb ; their separate sig- nification has been lost sight of (except in their proper a23plication), and these words have been considered as mere artificial terminations of the noun and verb. The proper application of these coalesced words, or terminations, to nouns, has been called declension; and to verbs, has been called conjugation. [From this discussion on the virtue of the pre- position to, it is clear that place has some claim to consideration ; since by it the verb may sometimes be distinguished, and in such cases the prefix to or do may be dispensed with. We have already been instructed in the efiect of place, that is of position or apposition, as it concerned the prepositions, when those prepositions are nouns, that each of them, ejusmodi est ut ex ed et alia substantia (to which it is prefixed, postfixed, or in any manner attached) — * Div. of Purley, v. i. p 355, et seq. WHAT IS THE VEEB ? 221 unum intelligi queat.* We have also seen that the apposition or adjection denoted by the hyphen has the full force of an adjective termination. It seems to follow that i£ place could always discrimi- nate with sufficient clearness and certainty the usage of a noun, as noun merely, as the " de quo" or the " materia sermonis," from its usage as the " quod loquimur," or the " vis sermonis," there would be no necessity for any established prefix or postfix to accomplish the purpose.] But as place was not found at all times adequate to the discrimination required, some additional word, as a constant prefix or postfix, was resorted to for the purpose. In our language when the Anglo-Saxon ter- mination was dropped, the additional word to or DO was employed as a prefix. And to, so pre- fixed, makes the noun to which it is prefixed a verb ; (such is our Author's homely expression,)^ invests it with a verbal character ; constitutes the infinitive or very verb itself; and thus at the same time shows that the infinitive is not a mere noun, as some grammarians have taught. When we write do before a noun, we call it an auxiliary verb ; we should call it an auxiliary noun; * Diversions of Purley, i. 194, et supra, p. 63. f Dr. Lowth says, " The preposition to before the verb makes the infinitive mood." Now this is manifestly not so, for to placed before the verb loveth, will not make the infinitive mood. He would have said more truly that to, placed before some nouns, makes verbs. (Diversions of Purley, vol. i. p. 352, note.) [Lowth's verb is no verb, until to is placed before it. Neither will to make all nouns verbs ; it will not make Lover, a verb, though it wiU make Love one.] 222 WHAT IS THE VERB ? and as, wlien preposed to a noun, it invests that noun with a verbal character, we thus arrive at the quod loquimur — Act, and the sensation conse- quent ; but as every act must have an agent, and every consequence a cause, we necessarily look for the noun, the name of the person or thing, de quo, that act is spoken; and, by virtue of the two, complete a sentence, or, as the logicians term it, proposition. It is the part of this proposition to affirm or deny, and it must, as the logicians also express themselves, consist of the subject (subjectum est id de quo) and the predicate (pr^dicatum est id quod de eo, affirmatur vel negatur). Neither to love or do love affirm or deny any thing of any thing ; both noun and verb, as gram- marians and logicians teach, are necessary for that purpose ; or some word, pro nomine, as / do love. But though to or do love affirm nothing, they are in a condition to do so ; they can or may do so, they form one complex term, and are affirmative f they are affirmative of act with agent, and being so affirmative of act, and of act alone, the title of NouisT Active may with significant propriety be applied to designate the something more, that the verb is than the mere noun, or noun substantive. * "We must bear in mind the important force of distinct termi- nations ; and of the difference on which our Author consequently insists between adjected, and adjectit e ; between that which ?s laid close, and that which may lie close. *' One word, or one ter- mination," our Author insists, " should be used with one signifi- cation, and for one purpose." It is worthy of remark that the names of moods terminate in ice. WHAT IS THE VEEB ? 223 In like manner, it has before appeared that the circumstance " can or may adject," is the some- thing more that the noun adjective is, than the noun substantive. But the verb is a noun affirmative ; a noun that can or may, by the help of another noun, affirm or complete an affirmation. And thus we arrive at that operation of language, commonly called an operation of the mind ; namely, that of affirming, or in one word (as Wallis suggests) of asserting ; of which I have spoken sufficiently at the begin- ning of this little book.* We may now complete our definition of a verb ; or description of its functions in the operations of lano;uao;e. A Verb, or noun active, or affirmative of act, is the complex name, affirmative of a mere noun, that is, the substantive noun, or its substitute, a pronoun ; (the de quo) with itself, the noun active, (the quod\o(^\m.Vix)\ and thus, when the affirmation is made, when the noun and verb are ad-firmed, a proposition is formed affirming what with that of which. And this affirmative power of our preposed TO or DO is denoted in the classical and other lan- guages by a termination or sequent word ; observ- ing an order the reverse of our own. Ought I not, to use the expression of Johnson, ought I not " to tremble at my own temerity," when I say, this is my answer to the long unan- * Remarks on the tbree first chapters. 224 WHAT IS THE YEEB ? swered question, " What is the verb ? What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added to the definition of the noun, constitutes the verb ? " But the matter does not end here. In what manner is the verb to contribute in the application of this system of language, of " this clothing of the whole nature of man,"* to the different systems of metaphysics, which our Author stigmatizes with the name of " Metaphysical (that is), of verbal im- posture." Quid valeaxt humeri is a fearful question for an octogenarian to answer ; one too who is very sensibly conscious that he is no Entellus to wield the gauntlets of Eryx. Nor would he indeed have been so bold, at a time of life when memory fails, and perception dims, as to attempt the labour of this little volume, if at this hour he had had to en- counter the difficulty of providing and preparing the materials for it.| The mantle of Home Tooke has long remained unhonoured by a claimant ; nor is it my ambition to aspire to that character. My views are less lofty ; and my exertions will be discreetly directed to illustrating the virtue (if I may so say) of the Verb, and to nothing more. Yet not without a hope to avail something by this restricted effort. I will begin with the often quoted words, TO love, or DO love. To or do, otherwise ACT or CAUSE is placed in apposition, with the name of the consequence or effect, the sensation Love : and so in all other cases. In to or do laugh, burn, * See ante, p. 97. f See ante. Pref. p. 1. WHAT IS THE VERB ? 225 lament, &c. the infinitives or very verbs them- selves; act or cause is placed in apposition with effect or consequence, — the sensation laugh, burn, lament, &c. and to or do laugh, burn, lament, mean respectively — cause sensations, laugh, burn, la- ment. And I DO love, consequently means, I do cause (to myself) the sensation — Love: that is, the sensation of which the mere or substantive noun Love, is the name. And so again in all the other cases, laugh, burn, lament, &c. To apply this interpretation to other common usages of speech : — The sun is hot. He is hot. The bell rings. He rings the bell. The rose smells sweet. I smell a rose. That horse walks well. I walked my horse home. That horse runs fast. I ran that horse at Ascot. He eats no bread. The bread eats stale. He driiiks no beer. The beer drinks sour, &c. And this exposition of the virtue or peculiar function of the verb, I shall further practically ex- emplify and enforce in the following remarks on the words SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. TO such of my younger readers (and of such I hope there will be many) who are not lost in the metaphysical distinction of Thing {Rei seu JEnt-is) into Substance and Accident, it may be 226 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. useful and sufficient for tliem to know, that Sub- stance was the Ens per se, and Accident the Entis ens (which I cannot undertake to trans- late into English). Those true, and truly saga- cious philosophers, the authors of the Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus,* to whom I have before been indebted, will illustrate the many Aristotelean accidents to wliich substance is exposed, as the Doctors of the Schools were accustomed to ex- pound them, and will at the same time acquaint them with the learned names by Avhich they are honoured in our treatises on Logic. " Cornehus," they tell us, " was forced to give Martin sensible images. Thus, calling up the coachman, he asked him what he had seen in the Bear-Garden? The man answered, he saw two men fight a prize ; one was 2, fair man, a Sergeant in the Guards; the other black, a butcher; the Sergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue ; they fought upon a stage, about four o'clock, and the Serjeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark (quoth Cornelius) how the fellow runs through the Predicaments, Men, substantia ; Two, quanti- ties; Fair and Black, qualitas ; Serjeant and Butcher, relatio ; Wounded the other, actio etpassio; YiG'H.TiNG, situs ; Stage, wZ'z; Two O'CLOCK, quando ; Blue and red Breeches, ha- bitus:' I do not know how these far-famed categories or predicaments of the great Father of logic can be more effectually or agreeably unpressed on the Chap. r SUBSTANCE AKD ACCIDENT. 227 minds of those for whom I intend them, than by the above lesson of Cornelius ; and for quoting it, I plead the authority of the most sensible of Roman poets : — Kidentem dicere verum Quid vetat ? It is unfortunate that our Author has left no exposition of any one word ending in ence or ance, from the Latin present participle. I will conclude with an attempt to apply his general principles to a word in ance, that has been, and is likely long to be, the cause of many a fierce debate — the word Substance. Substance is aliquid substans, id quod sub stat ; any thing understanding, or that which stands under, and thus sustains any thing that stands or is placed upon it ; as the foot sustains the leg ; the leg the thigh ; and the thigh the rest of the body. Everywhere indeed we observe substance; — above, beneath, around, there is substance support- ing substance : there is the great globe * itself for man and beast to rest and move upon ; there is the expanse of waters, on which leviathan may float ; there is the air aloft, on which the winged bird may sustain its flight. All this was obvious enough, but it did not satisfy the subtle perspicuity of the philosopher; and he unfortunately introduced the distinction between Substance and Accident, maintaining that accidents are not substances ; and seeing throughout the imiverse substance support- * Itself (the sacred historian tells us), ^wpported : " The pillars of the earth are the Lord's, and he hath set the world upon them." — 1 Sam. ii. 8; 228 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. ing substance, and that sucli support was a neces- sary condition, they supposed an equal necessity for a something, an aliquid substans or substratum, " to sustain, maintain, or hold together, the quali- ties or accidents of matter and spirit." This word will strikingly exemplify the assertion of our Author, that the main subject of Locke's Essay was the force of terms ; and if Locke had been aware of that, and had judiciously availed himself at the outset of the aid of etymology, and kept it faithfully in sight, as he proceeded in his enquiries, he would have kept clear of the confu- sion in which he is confessedly involved. Li his chapter on Innate Principles* he intro- duces us to this word Substance ; and all that he there or afterwards has to say concerning it relates to the meaning, of which it is the sign. He first tells us that, " we signify nothing by it, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what (that is, of something, whereof we have no particular distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the sub- stratum, or support, of those ideas we do know." And, subsequently, when treating of this uncertain supposition of Ave know not what, as a complex idea, he says, " It is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents.''''^ A more perfect description of a nonentity could scarcely be invented. * B. i. c. 4, § 18. f B. ii. c. 23, § 15. The whole of this chapter requires to be carefully perused. Such explanations as the above, of the word Substance, are frequently repeated. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 229 It is in this same chapter, " of the complex ideas of substances," that he so admirably illustrates his great difficulties in treating of such ^' creatures of the mind/' by a reference to the Indian, who fan- cied an elephant to be the support of the world ; a tortoise to be the support of the elephant, and this same " I know not what" of the tortoise. He then seems to catch a glimpse of the use of etymology, and to obtain a temporary relief from it. " Those qualities," he says, " we find existing ^ we imagine cannot subsist, ' sine re substante,' without something to support them, and we call that support substantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, " stand- ing under or upholding."* And thus it is that the meaning of the word substance, as a general term, comes within the scope of the reasoning which I have applied to the words difference and resemblance. Wherever these latter are used, and no sensible quality exists, it is not the immediate sign of an idea; and whenever the word substance is used, and no res or aliquid substans exists, it is not the sign of an idea, but both are the complex and ge- neral signs or names of a collection of ideas — of things differing, things resembling, things subsist- ing. And this of necessity, for " Our faculties," says Locke most truly, " carry us no farther to- wards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas (^ simple ideas co-existent together') f which we observe in them." J * B. ii. c. 23, § 2. j B. ii. c. 23, § 3. + B. iii. c. 6, § 9. 230 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDEKT. In other words, that our ideas of substances are nothing else than a collection of ideas, of sensible quahties or accidents united in one object; — of a variety of colours and forms, for instance, so united in one object, — a tree, a bird, — and each making its simple, single, distinct impression on the mind. And of these collections, as I have before expressed myself, we employ the complex and general term substance as the name or sign. In his letter to the Bishop of Worcester,* I must observe, Locke again makes a reference to etpnology ; " I suppose it will be true that suh~ stantia is derived from a suhstando, and that that shows the original import of the word." And that he was fully aware of the essential importance of knowing the original import of words, that is, of their intrinsic meaning — the impressions or ideas of which they are the sign — in writing concerning the human understanding, he thus plainly, in the same letter, tells us : "I have ever, my Lord, long been of opinion, as may be seen in my book,t that if we knew the original of all the words we meet with, we should thereby be very much helped to know the ideas they were first applied to, and made to stand for." " I doubt not," he says in another place,j: " but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names for things, that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas. By * Works, vol. i. p. 471* 4to. edition. t See, particularly, b. iii. c. 1. " Of Words or Language in general.'* % Id. ib. § 5. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 231 which we may give some kind of guess, what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds who were the first beginners of language; and how Nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge."* Locke saw the right course, but did not. pursue it, and the perplexing consequences to himself are mani- fest throughout the whole of his great work. As I am naturally carried on from the opinions of Locke to those of Berkeley, I shall be excused for repeating the trite observation, that the " Essay on the Human Understanding," prepared the way for " The Principles of Human Knowledge ; " for so, to some extent, it did. f The remarks I have already made, on the con- nection of language with the philosophy of the former, have obviously prepared the way for those I have now to make on some tenets maintained by the latter, with a logical subtlety to which it would be difi&cult to find a rival. Every acquisition of knowledge gains for us a footing for a further advance ; and that for which Locke is so justly famed, as I have before had oc- casion to observe, is by the reasoning which he employed to prove the truth of a position almost as old as philosophy itself. Of the same antiquity is the doctrine which Berkeley undertook to confirm * See ante, the quotation from " Guesses at Truth." f This work was published twenty years after the Essay ; five after the death of Locke 5 when Berkeley had just completed his twenty -fifth year. 232 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. by reasoning : but he was no sceptic ; he had no doubt of the soundness of his own conclusions as a philosopher, nor of his own knowledge, and means of acquiring it, as a man. Locke had proved that from our senses, and from them alone, we receive all our ideas ; Berke- ley endeavoured to mark the extent to which our senses can carry us in the acquisition of ideas, and in doing so effectually banished a substratum of material qualities: for this undoubtedly Locke had prepared the way ; he had reduced this sub- stratum to a nescio quid ; and maintained that our senses could not carry us to a knowledge of it. But Berkeley's object was not only to destroy but to establish : to destroy what he considered to be the main pillar and support of scepticism, atheism, fa- talism, and idolatry. And this was the doctrine " vulgarly held by philosophers : That the sensi- ble qualities exist* in an inert, extended unper- ceiving substance,! which they call matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence,:]: exte- rior to all thmking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, CA^en the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose — only ideas of the corporeal substances created by him ; if indeed they allow them to be at all created. "§ This was the doctrine he meant to destroy ; and * That is, cause a sensation of existence. f That is, in re substante. X The reader will find in Locke's Works (vol. i. p. 734) an amusing dialogue on subsistence between the Socia of Plautus, and a Countryman. § Principles, § 91. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 233 here he should have rested content with his suc- cess. That which he proposed to estabhsh was, ^^ That the unthinking beings (that is, sensible qualities) perceived by sense, have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance, than those unextended, indivisible substances, or spirits, which act, and think, and perceive them."* He coincides with Locke, that " all sensible qualities have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves." And he endeavours to relieve his theory from a strong prejudice against it, by declaring that " If there be any thing which makes the generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension! that I deny the reality of sensible things : " — Sensible things and sensible qualities are equivalent terms. And it is in the distinction between substances and sensible qualities (inasmuch as the latter re- quired the support of the former), that we are re- called to the distinction made by grammarians in their distribution of language into parts of speech,:]: and in so doing, of considering the noun substan- tive to be the name of substances, and the noun adjective to be the name of attributes, accidents, or qualities, " a word added to the substantive to express its quality," § or which " only implies an attribute." || * Principles, § 91. t Works, vol. i. p. 187. Third Dialogue. See also, p. 42. X See ante, chap. 1. § Lowth. 11 Harris, chap. 10. On this supposed difference between sub- 234 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. If our Author's doctrine* be true, that the noun adjective is a noun substantive, and something more, we approach the root of the matter. But I must here premise that these observations can only affect those who may be now satisfied that they can safely go so far with our Author, and with all who are not " dark with excess of bright," as to believe, in the first place, that they receive im- pressions or ideas from sensible objects, that is, from things, the causes of impressions ; and in the second, that words are the names or signs of those objects, as perceived by the mind. We speak, for instance, of a leaden bowl ; we at- tribute to the bowl, as accident or quahty, the tiling, objected before us, lead; the sensible object (called substance), with its ideas or impressions of colour and form are here ob\dous enough. But there are other adjectives which we cannot so easily trace to the thing, of which they include within their meaning the name or sign ; but if we are con^dnced that all nouns — substantive and adjective — are signs or names of things, and not of things alone, as causes of our ideas or impressions, but of these latter as the effect of those causes, it follows that all adjectives attribute substances to sub- stances " and modes and properties," or accidents, Dr. Watts could perceive that we were led into a mistake " by the gram- matical form and use of words.'' And that " perhaps our logi- cal way of thinking by substances and modes, as well as our gram- matical way of talking by substantives and adjectives, help to delude us into the supposition.'' Logic, part i. chap. 2, note. The errors of the Logician and of the Grammarian are alike. * Infra, chap. 6, on adjectives. SUBSTAl^CE AND ACCIDENT. 235 stances, whether under the name of substance, ac- cident, or quality. Substance, it has been said, is res suhstans, and is used with a subaudition of res. Accident, in like manner, is res accidens, and is also used with a subaudition of res. Quantitas, says Wallis, most truly, non differt a re (vel substantia) quanta ; qua- litas, it may be added, non differt a re (vel sub- stantia) quali. Sensible qualities, or qualities that may be felt, by which the mind may be acted or affected, I conclude are things or substances — quales. We cannot abstract or separate the quotes or the quanta, the accidens or substans, from the thing either in thought or speech. That these sensible qualities, that these things, says Berkeley, which " I see with mine eyes, and touch with my hands, do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. I do not argue against the exist- ence of any thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection."* He fully admits of sub- stances or things as combinations of sensible quali- ties, such as extension, solidity, &c., of which qua- lities we can have no idea but as of a thing ex- tended, solid, &c. It is against that thing — neither Substans, nor existens, nor accidens, quanta, nor qualis, of which we have no idea; this substra- tum or substance, imder the name of " Matter or material substance," as a support of accidents or qualities without the mind, that the ingenuity of Berkeley is aimed. For instance, I see with my * Principles J § 35. 236 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. ejes, and press witli my liand^ a table : I perceive its colour and figure, its solidity and smootlmess, but with tbis I am not content: I wish to go furtber tban my senses will carry me, — transcen- dentally out of my senses (to use a common and very appropriate pbrase) ; I require a substance, a substratum, an aliquid substans, wbicb shall sup- port these sensible qualities of the table, as the legs support its surface, and as its surface supports the pressure of my hand. And of this substance the Bishop continues to say, " If the word substance be taken," he further says, " in a philosophic sense for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind ; then, indeed, I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagina- tion."* Berkeley, admitting the existence of things, and external causes, as causes of ideas; of things, as combinations of sensible qualities, of which the mind receives impressions or ideas, admits that there is an occasional impropriety in his usage of the word idea; as the word idea is not used in common discourse to signify the several combina- tions of sensible qualities called things^ as it might be concluded that we eat and drink our ideas, and are clothed with our ideas, as the qualities that " constitute the several sorts of victuals and appa- rel exist only in the mind that perceives them."t If, from a knowledge of the causes and reasons of language, he had been aware that the verb, TO * Principles, § 37. f I^i^. § 38. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 237 EXIST, meant, " To cause the sensation, impression, or idea of existence, or of things existing," he would have given a more satisfactory reason than he has done for allowing " that as we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, things would have been the more proper word ;" although these objects, these res ohjectce, cannot exist, cannot cause the idea of existence, unperceived or without the mind. This is no more than to say, that they cannot cause a sensation, or impression, or idea of existence, where there is no percipient or mind to receive it : — And this coincides completely with the dictum of Tooke, " No man, no truth." And here I must request the reader to bear in mind what has been before said of affirmation and negation, difference and resemblance; right and truth — including thing. Also the few remarks ad- dressed to the objections of the late Professor Stew- art, to Dr. Whately and Mr. Smart. It would have been well for philosophy if phi- losophers had sometimes amused themselves with experiments in conformity with a rule proposed, but not observed, by Dr. Johnson, for his own direction, that " the explanation and the word ex- plained should always be reciprocal," and if they had in the prosecution of their inquiries sometimes made an interchange of word and explanation, they must soon have found themselves lost in a wilder- ness of words, pursuing fictions or creatures of their own minds ; such as existences and substances, or subsistencies, without a thing existent or subsistent; and as attributes, with nothing to attribute. 238 SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. It is not necessary for me to enter further into the very ingeniously profuse expenditure of words, with which our two iUustrious countrymen may both be justly charged, and from which a know- ledge of the causes and reasons of philosophical grammar would have preserved them. Yet I feel it due to them, and the Author of " The Diversions of Purley" also, to subjoin a few observations, or rather the materials for the reader to make his own observations, with respect to the advance that, it may be presumed, has been made beyond the Essay of Locke and the Principles of Berkeley. I think it will appear on examination into their works, that Kttle else has been presented to us hitherto by modern doctors of metaphysics than old tenets under new names : that names are still the great subjects of debate, and that such must continue to be the case, until the inseparable connection of thought and speech be investigated and understood, and acknowledged also, as the only safe foundation for further inquiries and further progress. ^^ In all German systems," says Mr. Carlyle,* " since the time of Kant, it is the first principle to deny the existence of matter ;" that is, as Berkeley denies it ; and so far, the German philosophers are just where Berkeley led and left them. The next step seems to have been to the Ego and NoN Ego — the subject and object — in other words (to borrow from Sir William Hamilton), ^^ the ideally known, as opposed to the really existent." * Miscellanies, vol. ii. SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 239 These correlations Sir William Hamilton* has detected in the expressions of Aristotle, the ra rifxiv, and the ra (^v; A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION ' •*^^my^^'^ f.^ ^ '''o » 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive