*\»\V«K*!kAV LIBRAiyd OF CONGRESS. /— T-^ Cliap...^.../ Coirjnrighf No., Shell oim-ight'NOj^ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. // «^ (Brcat Commanbers EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON GENERAL SHERMAN ®l)e ®rcat €ommaubcr6 Scrici Edited by General James Grant Wilson. Admiral Farragut. By Captain A. T, Mahan, U. S. N. General Taylor. By General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. General Jackson. By James Parton. General Greene. By General Francis V. Greene. General J. E. Johnston. By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia. General Thomas. By Henry Coppee, LL. D. General Scott. By General Marcus J. Wright. General Washington. By General Bradley T. Johnson. General Lee. By General Fitzhugh Lee. General Hancock. By General Francis J. Walker. General Sheridan. By General Henry E. Davies. General Grant. By General James Grant Wilson. General Sherman. By General Manning F. Force. IN PREPARATION. Admiral Porter. By James R. Soley, late Assist. Sec. of Navy. General McClellan. By General Peter S. Michie. Commodore Paul Jones. By S. Nicholson Kane. D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. loi: f< coMEAiry y GREAT COMMANDERS * • • • GENERAL SHERMAN BY General MANNING F. FORCE * ,»•'. NEW YORK D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 1899 1 < / 28551 Copyright, 1899, By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. A// r lights reserved. TWOeOPIfu .:£-CEIVED. PREFACE General Sherman was the most picturesque figure in the civil war. His character was abso- lutely pure and spotless. He had a vigorous and penetrating intellect, prompt and clear in compre- hension and in decisio". While steadfast in his opinions, he was subordinate in conduct ; he held to his judgment in issue against President Lincoln, but yielded as unquestioning obedience to Mc- Clernand as to Grant. He was an omnivorous reader, and was a storehouse of felicitous anecdote. His cheerful disposition and inexhaustible fund of conversation made him always a delightful com- panion. Frank as a child and outspoken in his likes and dislikes, Sherman was often engaged in controversy. The war filled only a few years of his life, but comprised most of hi§^.at:*t"ivity '.and achievements. Accordingly, his bj^Vaphy naturally grcu-ips itself into these parts — beiore,*(^PWk-#iTig^,jfmd after *!he war, and so it is written''jn..the following ^p.agp's. The efifort in this narrative^'has been to..gi^e,uperintcndcnt. The governor accepted the resignation wdth regret and with warm expressions of friendship and esteem. The Board of Supervisors passed resolu- tions of- regret at his leaving and thanks for his past service. Every one spoke kindly and regret- fully. While he was settling his accounts and turn- ing over property, Bragg, Beauregard, and other officers of the army were abandoning the service of the United States, and General Twiggs, on duty in Texas, sitrrendered all the troops in the State, comprising a large part of the regular army, to- gether with all the military posts, their armament, and all Government stores to an improvised colonel of militia. . CHAPTER II. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. Sherman, while disapproving of the institution of slavery, opposing its spread, and objecting to some of Its features, was not excited over its con- tinuance within existing limits, and objected to interference with it within those limits. But he was intensely loyal to the United States and the main- tenance of the Union; was shocked and pained at the desertion of his brother officers from their flag; was outraged at the seizure of Government forts and buildings and stores; and was bewildered by the apparent acquiescence of the Government at Washington. While the South was seething with excitement, breaking away from the Union, seizing the forts and other public buildings and property of the United States, forming a new nation, erect- ing a new government, and preparing for war, Sherman was arranging his affairs, settling up his accounts, and turning over the property belong- ing to the seminary. He was again adrift, without employment, and left New Orleans about the ist of March to rejoin his family and find means of supporting them. He thankfully accepted the of- fice of president of a street railway company at St. Louis, offered to him through the influence of his friends in that city. The people of the North were slow in attaining to a realizing sense of the state of affairs in the South. They knew little of war. and were incredu- lous of its near presence. To Sherman this seemed 21 22 GENERAL SHERMAN. the apathy of indifference. Upon the request of his brother, then in the House of Representatives, he went to Washington, and with him called on the President. When in the conversation Sherman said that the people of the South were preparing for war, Lincoln replied, " I guess we'll manage to keep house." Sherman said no more, and soon left. The two men, who did not yet know each other, parted — Lincoln, troubled undoubtedly by the statement, but veiling his feeling with a flash of levity; Sherman, disappointed, disheartened, de- pressed, angry. He entered upon his duty as president of the railway company on the ist of April. A few days later he was asked to accept the office of chief clerk of the War Department, with promise of early pro- motion to assistant secretary of war. He had just entered upon his new engagement, and had not yet recovered from the effect of what he considered a rebuff in Washington, and declined. Beauregard opened fire upon Fort Sumter on the 1 2th of April. This was act of open war upon the United States, and the loyal nation, roused like a strong man from his slumber, sprang to its feet. On the 15th the President called for seventy- five thousand volunteers to serve three months, and then added ten regiments to the regular army. A force of Virginia troops seized upon Harper's Ferry. A Massachusetts regiment, responding promptly to the President's call, was attacked while passing through Baltimore. Travel upon both the roads leading to Washington was stopped, and the capi- tal was cut off from all communication with the North and W^est. The blockade lasted till General Butler landed at Annapolis and opened the way to the city. Sherman, notwithstanding his signal proof of loyalty, found his friends becoming troubled about him, and undoubtedly became dissatisfied with his THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 23 position. On the 8th of May he wrote to the Secre- tary of War: " I hold myself now, as always, pre- pared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for three months, because I can not throw my family upon the cold charity of the world. But for the three years' call made by the President an officer can prepare his command and do good service. I will not volunteer as a soldier, because, rightfully or wrongfully, I feel unwilling to take a mere pri- vate's place, and, having for many years lived in Louisiana and California, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my ap- propriate place. Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render most service." On the 14th of May Sherman was appointed colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry in the regular army, and, on reporting at Washington, was as- signed to duty with Lieutenant-General Scott. Ai soon as the road to Washington was opened troops from the North and West poured in. Massachu- setts, New York, and Pennsylvania sent organized and drilled regiments. Most of the troops were men who enlisted full of ardor, but wholly without military instruction. Thev came to march to vic- tory and return home in triumph before the end of their enlistment. The Governor of Rhode Island came as colonel of one of his regiments. The Seventh New York camped on Mr. Stone's place, with wall tents for privates as well as officers, and comforted by a shipload of special supplies. When the troops with their multifarious baggage were moved across the river and organized into brigades and divisions, Sherman was assigned to command a brigade of four New York and one Wisconsin regiments, with a regular battery attached, being the Third Brigade of Tyler's division. 2A GENERAL SHERMAN. It is an easy matter to make paper org-aniza- tions, but it is slow work to make actual soldiers. The people, thoughtless of the want of preparation, ignorant of the need of preparation, persisted in the demand for an onward movement, till General Scott, in July, ordered General McDowell, with the force about Washington, to advance and attack General Beauregard in his position on Bull Run, while Gen- eral Patterson, of Pennsylvania, with a large com- mand in the Shenandoah Valley, should watch and hold there General Joseph E. Johnston, and prevent his marching to aid Beauregard. Sherman went up to visit his brother, John Sherman, who was a volunteer aid-de-camp to Gen- eral Patterson. George H. Thomas was there, com- manding a brigade in Patterson's army. The Sher- mans and Thomas, being in a room together, dis- cussed the possibilities of the war. W. T. Sherman and Thomas spread a map of the United States upon the floor, and, kneeling down, tracing campaigns, designated Richmond, Nashville, Vicksburg, Chat- tanooga, and Atlanta as vital points to be taken. In their service it so happened that they, one or both, were immediately concerned in the capture of all of these but Richmond, and in repulsing at- tempted recapture of two of them. McDowell moved out from the camps on the 1 6th of July, and on the 17th had his force in hand at Centerville. On the i8th, in a reconnoissance in force to Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Run, Sher- man for the first time heard artillery in actual con- flict. At 2 A. M. the army marched out to battle. General McDowell, with the great part of his com- mand, made a detour to the right to gain the left of Beauregard before crossing Bull Run. He crossed easily, and was successful at first in driving the enemy. But Johnston had succeeded in eluding Patterson, and had already joined Beauregard. The Confederate left, which had gradually fallen back. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 25 was largely re-enforced, and made a stand in a favorable position on the edge of a commanding plateau. Successive portions of the national line made successive assaults, but failed to drive the enemy from his position. No longer incited by success, and not held together by the cohesion of discipline, the irregular line broke in places, and streams of fugitives poured to the rear. By 3 p. m. the battle was lost. Tyler's division was left near Bull Run. in the neighborhood of the Stone Bridge, to guard against any attempt of the enemy to cross there and deliver a counter-attack. The sound of IVIcDoweH's attack could be heard advancing till about noon. The roar of battle then became stationary. General Tyler then sent Sherman with his brigade to support. Crossing by a ford which he had discovered, he marched toward the sound of the gims, and reported to General McDowell on the field. It was his place to march to attack over ground swept by artillery and musketry. He put in his regiments successive- ly, one at a time, and each in turn, after a gallant advance, broke and retired. About half past three the brigade crumbled. Many men had left the field. The loss in killed and wounded was severe. Sherman formed what was left into as good a square against cavalry as could be formed under the cir- cumstances, and retreated across the Stone Bridge, and followed the panic rout to Centerville. There he gathered enough of each regiment to put them into bivouac in regimental lines. In obedience to an order given by General Tyler, he resumed the re- treat at midnight, and reached his camp near the defenses of Washington about noon next day. Here he at once rendered the important service of making the guards at the aqueduct and neighbor- ing ferries strong enough to stem the multitudinous rout and turn the demoralized fugitives back to their camps. Of General McDowell's total loss of 26 GENERAL SHERMAN. 481 killed and 1,1 11 wounded, Sherman's brigade lost III killed and 205 wounded. When the news spread through the land that, instead of the expected victory, the National troops were defeated and had returned to Washington in disorder, the first feeling was bitter disappointment and mortification. Then came a general recogni- tion of the fact that war was a more serious matter than had been supposed, and then came the fixed resolve to carry the war through to successful issue, whatever might be the cost in toil or money or sacrifice. The soldiers were roused from their dream of easy conquest. Excepting men who had served in the Mexican War and some members of uniformed regiments in the older States, we were so profoundly ignorant of military matters that we were not aware that we were ignorant. It was commonly supposed that a knowledge of company drill made a man a soldier. It was now perceived that men who would carry on war must learn the business of war, as a man must learn any business if he would succeed in it. They set to work to learn through instruction and by practice the ways of marching, camping, picket duty, reconnoitering, skirmishing, and fighting battles; the repair and building of roads and bridges; the collection, trans- portation, and distribution of supplies; the function and conduct of courts-martial; the multifarious paper business of reports, returns, and correspond- ence; and, above all, the necessity for discipline and prompt, unquestioning obedience of orders. It was not easy for citizens of a republic, who know no superior but the law, to constrain themselves to obey a man without asking why. But when they discovered that military law is part of the law of the land; that military officers are officers of the law, and obedience to their authority is obedience to the law, it became easy to obey without lowering their self-respect. And as the war continued they THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 27 found that their own safety depended upon the en- forcement of discipHne, and that an unorganized mob of men differs from the same men transformed into a discipHned army, just as a pile of iron ore differs from the same ore smelted and wrought into a working engine. Immediately after Bull Run Sherman found his command scattered, restless, disorderly, and, to some extent, mutmous. He had made considerable progress in the training of his men when, on the 17th of May, he was appointed brigadier general of volunteers, and was, August 24th, assigned to duty under Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, com- mander of the Department of the Cumberland. George H. Thomas, by the same order, received the same appointment and assignment. All the States south of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri were in open insurrection and war against the United States. Maryland was safe; Missouri was reasonably safe; Kentucky was quiv- ering between insurrection and loyalty. Sympathy with the South was common, especially among men having property and among the young men. But among the men of stanch loyalty were the names of Clay, Crittenden, Breckenridge, Anderson, Ham- ilton Pope, Guthrie, Speed, Harlan, Rousseau, Goodloe, Woolford, Landrum, and other well- known families. Among mechanics and men of moderate means loyalty to the National Government prevailed. Affinity of institutions allied Kentucky to the South, but the spirit of Henry Clay and John J. Crittenden bound a large part of the population by stronger tie to the United States. Governor Beriah McGoffin called the Legisla- ture into extra session in January, 1861, and recom- mended to it the convening of a sovereignty State convention, the purchase of arms, and the mobiliza- tion of the State militia. He did not succeed in having any of these measures adopted. When the 28 GENERAL SHERMAN. governor issued his call, a great meeting of la- boring men was held in Louisville, which declared, without qualification, in favor of remaining in the Union and of sustaining the Government, and is- sued an address to the workingmen of the country as the class particularly concerned in the preserva- tion of the Union. At an election held shortly after- ward in Louisville to fill a vacancy in the Legis- lature, the new party secured the election of an uncompromising Union man, and in April elected another such mayor of the city. When President Lincoln issued his call for troops after the firing upon Fort Sumter, Gov- ernor McGoffin called the Legislature again into session to force the State out of the Union and into the Confederacy. Thereupon the Union Club, a se- cret society, was formed in Louisville to bring ear- nest Unionists together, and numbered six thousand members. This society was instrumental in the raising of two regiments and a battery of municipal troops, or home guards, which under the law were subject, not to the governor, but only to the mayor. The object of the society being secured before the summer was over, and its existence being no longer necessary, it died out in the autumn. When the Legislature, convened in April by the governor, met, it passed a joint resolution de- claring Kentucky neutral in the war. This was not a surrender, and was not a compromise, so much as a truce. It prevented secession for the present, and enabled parties to ripen their plans. Subse- quently, at the same session, laws were passed pro- viding for the purchase of arms to be distributed to the militia, not by the governor, but by a board of LTnion men; to provide for the raising of home guards for local defense ; and requiring the enlisted men, as well as the officers of the militia, to take an oath of allegiance to the United States as well as to the State of Kentuckv. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 29 The Legislature adjourned about the close of May. A special election of members of Congress was held in June, and nine of the ten members elected were pronounced Union men. A new Legis- lature was elected in August, and three fourths of the members elected were Union men. Recruiting soldiers for the National Government became open through the State, and General Buckner moved his Confederate recniiting camp across the State line into Tennessee. Squads of recruits united and were formed into regiments, which rendezvoused at Camp Dick Robinson, south of the Kentucky River, forming a brigade under the command of General William Nelson. General Sherman and General Thomas reported to General Anderson in Cincinnati on the ist of September at the house of Lars Anderson, where they met a group of trusty Kentucky gentlemen as- sembled for advice and consultation. A Confed- erate force under General ZollicofTer, near Cum- berland Gap, another under General Buckner, near Clarksville, and a third under General Pillow, on the Mississippi River, were just beyond the State line in Tennessee waiting for the decision of Ken- tucky, while General Anderson had under his com- mand Nelson's brigade and a recruiting force under General Rousseau in Indiana, across the river from Louisville. Sherman was sent to solicit re-enforce- ments. He found Governor Morton, of Indiana, busy raising regiments, which as fast as they were mustered in were assigned to the Army of the Potomac, then commanded l)y General McClel- lan. At Springfield he found the Governor of Illi- nois equally busy raising regiments, which were ordered from Washington to report to McClellan or else to General Fremont, who commanded in Missouri. He went to St. Louis, and succeeded in obtaining audience of General Fremont through the intervention of an old California friend, who 30 GENERAL SHERMAN. was in some capacity on General Fremont's staff. Here again he met refusal, General P'remont say- ing he must first drive the enemy out of Missouri, and he could not give aid to other fields until this should be accomplished. Sherman returned to Louisville. On the 3d of September General Pillow ad- vanced into Kentucky by an order of General Polk, and seized Hickman and Columbus. On the 6th General Grant entered Kentucky and occupied Paducah. There was much correspondence by telegraph and otherwise between the Confederate authorities, civil and military, as to whether or not General Polk's breach of the neutrality of Kentucky was a justifiable act of necessity. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, acquiesced, and the troops remained in possession of Columbus. On the 1 2th of September the Legislature of Kentucky passed a joint resolution requiring the governor to order the Confederate troops to leave the State. President Davis appointed General A. S. Johnston to the command of all the forces in Tennessee. General Johnston assumed command, and on the 17th sent General Buckner to Bowling Green, Ky. General ZoUicoffer advanced his force to Cumber- land Ford a few days earlier. The dream of neu- trality was ended. When Buckner moved to Bowling Green a de- tachment pushed forward and burned a railroad bridge within thirty miles of Louisville. The news reached Louisville at night. General Anderson sent General Sherman across the river, and in an hour Rousseau had his men, one thousand, in line. The Home Guard of Louisville, under command of Hamilton Pope, volunteered, and at midnight, on a train secured by Mr. James Guthrie, General Sherman moved to the front with his extemporized command. It was ascertained that Buckner was not advancing. Sherman placed his troops upon THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 31 Muldrauglis Hill. Troops began to arrive, and by the ist of October Sherman had there the equiva- lent of two brigades. General Anderson, worn out in his enfeebled health by the anxieties of the situation, relinquished command on the 8th of October, and Sherman, by seniority, assumed command. But in assuming command he wrote to the War Department, as he had stated orally to the President in Washington, that he wished to hold a subordinate command, and was assured that General Buell, then on his way from California, would, on arriving, relieve him. General Thomas superseded General Nelson at Camp Dick Robinson. General A. McD. McCook was put in command of the force pushed forward from Muldraugh's Hill to Nolin Creek. The en- tire force under Sherman's command was eighteen thousand men. He was confronted by more than double that number, and Johnston could at any time force his way to the Ohio River. Sherman was anxious, and with his impetuous frankness did not fail to express his anxiety. On the evening of the i6th of October Secretary- of-War Simon Cameron, with Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, accompanied by some friends, arrived at Louisville on their return to Washing- ton from St. Louis, and had an interview with Gen- eral Sherman. General T. J. Wood and Mr. Guthrie were present. Sherman gave to the Secretarv a full statement of the political condition of Ken- tucky, the probability of recruiting troops from the inhabitants, the force already in the field and its distribution, the numbers and position of the enemy, and pointed out the scanty means at hand to defend a line extending from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi, and the ease with which the enemy could select his route and penetrate to the Ohio before any adequate force could be concentrated to oppose him. According to Adjutant-General Thom- 32 GENERAL SHERMAN. as, " on being asked the question what force he deemed necessary, he promptly rephed two hundred thousand men." According to the statement of General T. J. Wood, written August 24, 1866: " For the purpose of expelling the rebels from Kentucky, General Sherman said that at least sixty thousand soldiers were necessary. . . . General Sherman ex- pressed the opinion that to carry on the war to the Gulf of Mexico and destroy all armed opposi- tion to the Government in the entire Mississippi Valley at least two hundred thousand troops were absolutely requisite." General Sherman says his remark was: " I argued that for the purpose of de- fense we should have sixty thousand men at once, and for ofifense would need two hundred thousand before we were done." While this estimate was largely in excess of what was commonly supposed to be sufficient, subsequent experience showed that his judgment was correct. But newspapers getting news of it, spoke of his insane demand, and then callea him insane, and demanded his release from command. It was the fate of Cassandra, treated with contumely by the people for giving true but unwelcome warning. Secretary Cameron ordered by telegraph re-en- forcements and arms, and Sherman diligently or- ganized his command, watched the enemy, and made dispositions to resist any advance. General McClellan required from him daily reports, and such as are published are model reports, full of in- formation, svtccinct and clear in statement, and sa- gacious in suggestion. General Buell arrived and assumed command on the 15th of November, and General Sherman was ordered to report for duty to General H. W. Halleck, commanding the De- partment of the Missouri. General Sherman, on reporting at St. Louis, was ordered on the 23d of November to visit the different stations and inspect troops, camps, equip- THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 33 ment, supplies, and transportation and routes for supplies. He reported on the 27th that he had ordered the whole force from Lexington forward to check the advancing enemy. This order was coun- termanded by General Halleck on the same day. Sherman telegraphed on the 28th that he had or- dered Pope's and Turner's divisions to advance. On the same day General Halleck telegraphed that Mrs. Sherman was in St. Louis, and directed Sher- man to return to the city at once. On the 2d of December Halleck wrote to General McClellan : " As stated in a former communication, General W. T. Sherman, on reporting here for duty, was or- dered to inspect troops (three divisions at Sedalia and vicinity), and if, in the absence of General Pope, he deemed there was danger of an immedi- ate attack, he was authorized to assume command. He did so, and commenced the movement of the troops in a manner which I did not approve and covmtermanded. I also received information from officers there that General Sherman was completely ' stampeded,' and was stampeding the army. I therefore yesterday gave him a leave of absence for twenty days to visit his family in Ohio. I am satis- fied that General Sherman's physical and mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as to render him for the present entirely unfit for duty. Perhaps a few weeks' rest may restore him. I am satisfied that in his present condition it would be dangerous to give him a command here." General Sherman being greatly annoved and Mrs. Sherman distressed at the newspaper discus- sion of his alleged insanity, he asked for a twenty days' leave of absence, and made a visit to Lan- caster. He wrote from Lancaster to General Hal- leck on December 12th: " I believe you will be frank enough to answer me if you deem the steps I took at Sedalia as evi- dence of a want of mind. They may have been 34 GENERAL SHERMAN. the result of an excess of caution on my part, but I do think the troops were too much strung out, and should be concentrated, with more men left along to guard the track. The animals, cattle especially, will be much exposed this winter. I set a much higher danger on the acts of unfriendly inhabitants than most ofBcers do, because I have lived in Missouri and the South, and know that in their individual characters they w'ill do more acts of hostility than Northern farmers or people could bring themselves to perpetrate. In my judgment. Price's army in the aggregate is less to be feared than when in scattered bands. " I write to you because a Cincinnati paper, whose reporter I imprisoned in Louisville for visit- ing our camps after I had forbidden him leave to go, has announced that I am insane, and alleges as a reason that my acts at Sedalia were so mad that subordinate of^cers refused to obey. I know of no order that I gave that was not obeyed, except General Pope's to advance his division to Sedalia, which order was countermanded by you, and the fact communicated to me. These newspapers have us in their power, and can destroy us as they please, and this one can destroy my usefulness by depriv- ing me of the confidence of ofBcers and men. I will be in St. Louis next week, and will be guided by your commands and judgment." General Halleck wrote on the 17th of December to P. B. Ewing, who had written to him inclosing some newspaper clippings: " I hope General Sher- man will not let these squibs trouble him in the least. They can do him no serious injury. When the general came here his health was much broken by long and severe labor, and his nervous system somewhat shaken by continuous excitement and responsibility. Those who saw him here may have drawn wrong inferences from his broken-down ap- pearance and rather imprudent remarks, but no THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 35 one who was personally acquainted with him thought anything- was the matter with him except a want of rest. I have no doubt but that the quiet of home will in a short time enable him to resume his duties and silence all these scandalous and slanderous attacks." On the 1 8th Halleck wrote in answer to Sher- man's letter of the 12th: "Your movement of troops was not countermanded by me because I thought it an unwise one in itself, but because I was not then ready for it. I had better informa- tion of Price's movements than you had, and I had no apprehension of an attack. I intended to concentrate the forces on that line, but I wished the movement delayed until I could determine on a better position. After receiving Lieutenant-Colo- nel McPherson's report, I made precisely the loca- tion you had ordered. I was desirous at the time not to prevent the advance of Price by any move- ment on our part, hoping that he would move on Lexington; but finding that he had determined to remain at Osceola for some time at least, I made the movement you proposed." On returning to St. Louis, Sherman was as- signed to command the camp of instruction and post at Benton Barracks, and was, on the 13th of February, directed to proceed at once to Paducah, Ky., and on the 14th was assigned to command the district of Cairo. CHAPTER III. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. General Halleck now began his advance down the Mississippi and up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. General Curtis, with about ten thousand men in southwest Missouri, was ad- vanced into Arkansas, where, in battle at Pea Ridge, on the 7th and 8th of March, he routed and dispersed the greatly superior forces of Price and McCullough, united under the command of Van Dorn. General Grant, after much importunity, finally succeeded in obtaining, on the 30th of Janu- ary, permission and order from General Halleck to proceed up the Tennessee and attack Fort Henry. The next day he moved on transports, accompanied by Commodore Foote with his fleet, and on the 6th of February the fort, after a short but destructive bombardment, surrendered to the fleet. On the nth Commodore Foote sailed down the river to return up the Cumberland, and Grant moved by land next day to Fort Donelson. The fort surrendered on the morning of the i6th. On the 1 8th General Halleck pointed out to General Pope the situation of Madrid Bend, and directed him to organize an expedition to reduce this ap- parently impregnable bar to passage down the Mississippi. Upon the surrender of Fort Donelson the Con- federate Government ordered the evacuation of Columbus, on the Mississippi, and General A. S. Johnston withdrew from Bowling Green and re- 36 Battlefield of Shiloh. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 37 treated through Nashville to Murfreesboro. Gen- eral Buell occupied Nashville. General Halleck immediately began preparation for further advance up the Tennessee. On the ist of March he dis- patched to Sherman at Paducah, to be forwarded to Grant : " Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move your column up the Tennes- see River. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the railroad connec- tions at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river with- out serious opposition. Avoid any general engage- ments with strong forces. It will be better to re- treat than to risk a serious battle. This should be strongly impressed on the officers selected for expeditions from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some very discreet officer, should be selected for such commands." On the 4th of March Halleck telegraphed to General Grant : " You will place Major-General Smith in command of expedition, and remain your- self at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my or- ders to report strength and position of your com- mand? " On the 15th of March he reported to the adjutant general of the army : " In accordance with your instructions of the loth instant, I report Gen- eral Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville without any authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from in- vestigation that General Grant did this from good intentions, and from a desire to subserve the pub- lic interests. " Not being advised of General Buell's move- ments, and learning that General Buell had ordered 38 GENERAL SHERMAN. Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nash- ville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant and a part of his general officers numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of the orders issued by General Grant before his departure, and probably, under the circumstances, were unavoidable. " General Grant has made the proper explana- tions, and has been directed to resume his com- mand in the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy though mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nashville and leaving his command, I re- spectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of mili- tary subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from the failure of colonels to report to him on their arrival and partly from an interruption of telegraphic com- munication. All these irregularities have now been remedied." In all subsequent orders referring to movements the injunction to avoid getting into a serious engagement was repeated. General Grant remained at Fort Henry in quasi arrest while the troops of his district were assem- bling, under the command of General Smith, for the expedition up the Tennessee, and forwarded re-enforcements after the expedition had sailed. General Sherman, on arriving at Paducah, was busy forwarding troops, supplies, and dispatches, and in organizing a division for his own command. He left Paducah March loth, and Smith, with five divisions — McClernand's, Plurlbut's, Lewis Wal- lace's, Sherman's, and his own, commanded by W. H. L. Wallace — arrived at Savannah on the 13th. By order of General Smith, General Sherman sailed with his division up the river to Yellow Creek on the 14th to send out a force to break the THE RATTLE OF SHILOH. 39 railroad, if that could be done without bringing on a serious engagement. Before starting he sug- gested to General Smith that another division be sent to Pittsburg Landing to await there his re- turn. A heavy rain, flooding the country, had swollen the streams and submerged the roads, so that the attempt was ineffectual, and he dropped down the river to Pittsburg Landing on the 15th, where he found Hurlbut's division still on their boats. Sherman landed his division on the i6th to make a reconnoissance in force, and reported to General Smith, on the 17th, that Hurlbut's division would be landed that day. General Grant reported to General Halleck on the i8th: "I arrived here last evening, and found that General Sherman and Hurlbut's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially de- barked ; General Wallace, at Crump's Landing, six miles below, same side of the river; General Mc- Clernand's division at this place encamped ; and General Smith's, with unattached regiments on board transports, also here. I inmiediately ordered all troops, except McClernand's command, to Pitts- burg, and to debark there at once and discharge the steamers, to report at Paducah for further or- ders. ... I shall go to-morrow to Crump's Land- ing and Pittsburg, and if I think any change of po- sition for any of the troops needed I will make the change. Having full faith, however, in the judg- ment of General Smith, who located the present points of debarkation, I do not expect any change will be made." On the 26th of March General B. M. Prentiss re- ported for duty, and was assigned to command the unattached troops at Pittsburg Landing and others as they should arrive, and to organize them into a division, to be called the Sixth. Hickenlooper's battery, that arrived on the 5th of April, and regi- ments that arrived on the 5th and 6th, reported to Prentiss, and fought in his command on the 6th. 4 40 GENERAL SHERMAN. On the 26th of March Pittsburg Landing was made a mihtary post, and General C. F. Smith, senior officer, was assigned to the command. On the 31st Grant changed district headquarters by order from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing, leaving an office at Savannah, but did not move his personal quarters to the landing till after April 6th. On the nth of March General McClellan, hav- ing taken command of the Army of the Potomac in the field, was relieved from command of all mili- tary departments except the Potomac, and the two departments under the command of Generals Hal- leck and Hunter, together with so much of that of General fjuell as lay west of the meridian of Knoxville, were consolidated as the Department of the Mississippi, under the command of General Plalleck. For some time Halleck had been urging Buell to join him at Savannah ; now, on the i6th of March, he ordered Buell to move his forces as rapidly as possible to Savannah. The road from Memphis to Chattanooga gave through railroad communication between the Mis- sissippi and the East. A parallel line from Vicks- burg through Jackson, Miss., was not continuous, there being a gap from Selma to Montgomery, in Alabama. The Memphis road was intersected at Corinth by the road from Mobile to Columbus, Ky., and at Grand Junction by the New Orleans, Jackson and Northern. General Johnston deter- mined to gather his forces at Corinth to save that important line of communication, and strive to achieve a victory there by which he could regain the territory lost in Tennessee and Kentucky. Sum- moning thither Bragg from Florida, Polk and Beauregard from Mississippi and West Tennessee, and new levies supplied by the governors of the Southern States, and moving thither the force gath- ered at Murfreesboro, he assembled at Corinth by the beginning of April something over fifty thou- THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 41 sand effectives. This number probably included officers as well as armed men, though later in the war the Confederate reports of eft'ectives included only armed enlisted men. Among the officers, be- sides Beauregard, Bragg, and Polk, were Hardee, Cheatham, and Cleburne. General Grant had six divisions : Lewis Wal- lace at Crump's Landing was encamped, one bri- gade at the landing, one at Stony Lonesome, two miles out from the landing, and the third at Adams- ville, three miles beyond Stony Lonesome. The other divisions were at Pittsburg Landing, five miles farther up the river. The camping ground was bounded on the east by the Tennessee, on the north by Snake Creek, and on the northwest and west by Owl Creek, an affluent of Snake Creek. All these were bordered by precipitous bluff banks. The western portion of the south front was pro- tected by a small affluent of Owl Creek, called by different names — Oak, Rea, and Shiloh Creek — and in some of the reports called Owl Creek. The eastern portion of the south front was covered by Locust Creek, which empties into Lick Creek near the river. A line of well-constructed earthworks along this front would have been impregnable against assault at that stage of the war. General Halleck, while he does not appear to have ordered the erection of defensive works, sent forward in- trenching tools, and supposed that the position w-as fortified. McPherson, the only engineer offi- cer, by direction laid out a line for intrenchment. This was back from the creeks, inconvenient for water supply, and would require the front line of camps — Sherman and Prentiss — to move their camps. As the place was to be held only until General Halleck should come to the front and begin the forward movement, such work seemed to be a waste of labor. And it was felt that a large portion of troops, new regiments of men fresh from 42 GENERAL SHERMAN. their farms and workshops, who had come to the field to do deeds of war, would be disconcerted and discouraged if they were set to work digging, and were directed to fence themselves in from attack by the foe, whom they expected to march against and overcome. It was only after they found the value of earthworks by actual experience that the volunteers willingly performed the labor of erect- ing them. So, instead of fortifying the ground, the time was spent in giving the men instruction and practice in drill. The divisions of Sherman and Prentiss occu- pied the front. One of Sherman's brigades, Stu- art's, formed the extreme left of the line, being close to the river and facing Locust Creek. His other three brigades formed the right of the line — McDowell, on a ridge overlooking the bridge by which the road to Purdy crossed Owl Creek ; Buckland, to the front and left of McDowell, and separated from him by a ravine, and a little back from the valley of Oak Creek, which stream there wound through a morass tangled with thickets and decayed fallen timber. Two of Plildebrand's regi- ments extended Buckland's line up along the bank of Oak Creek, while his third regiment, Appier's, was apart, some hundred yards to the left, by a spring which v/as the source of one branch of Oak Creek. The right of Prentiss was a full half mile to the front of Sherman's left, and hidden from view ; his left was a greater distance to the front and right of Stuart's right, but in sight from it. McClernand was to the rear and left of Sherman ; Hurlbut, a mile out from the landing, across the Corinth road ; and W. H. L. Wallace on the plateau at the angle between the river and Snake Creek. Neither General Grant nor his subordinates had any apprehension of being attacked in this position by Johnston's army. It was proposed to put General Buell into camp at Hamburg, several THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 43 miles up the river, on his arrivah Reconnoitering parties, always cramped by instructions not to bring on an engagement, reported the presence of parties of the enemy's cavalry on the roads. Gen- eral Buckland, on Thursday, April 3d, by direction of General Sherman, marched his brigade out three miles, and thence sent out small parties. Nothing was found but small detachments of hostile cav- alry. Taylor's cavalry had gone out at midnight by Sherman's order, and, halting till daybreak when four miles out toward Corinth, advanced until they struck the enemy's cavalry pickets and captured one of them. General Chalmers, by a dispatch dated " Headquarters Advance," reported this at- tack upon the pickets of his cavalry. Friday, the 4th, Clauton's Confederate cavalry swooped down on Buckland's picket line and captured and car- ried off a lieutenant and six men. Two companies of infantry were sent out in pursuit. Later Colonel Buckland followed with three more companies, and charged upon a large party of cavalry which had surrounded one of the missing companies and drove it. A battalion of cavalry sent by General Sher- man then came up and drove the enemy till they came in full view and under -the fire of a line of infantry and artillery. Colonel Buckland reported, " We ascertained the enemy was in force." Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, reported " three or four pieces of artillery, at least two regiments of infantry, and a large cavalry force." General Sherman reported that he inferred the force was a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regi- ment of cavalry, and one battery of artillery, sent to a point on the ridge road, about five miles in ad- vance of his camp, forwarded from a consider- able force at Pea Ridge or Monterey. General Grant reported to General Halleck that there were " three pieces of artillery and cavalry and infantry. How much can not, of course, be estimated. I 44 GENERAL SHERMAN. have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (gen- eral one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." General Hardee reported : " Camp near Mickey's, April 4, 1862. The cavalry and infantry of the enemy attacked Colonel Clanton's regiment, which was posted, as I before informed you, about five hundred or six hundred yards in advance of my lines. Colonel Clanton retired, and the enemy's cavalry followed until they came near our infantry and artillery, when they were gallantly repulsed with slight loss." In his subsequent full report he states that Mickey's was sixteen miles from Corinth and eight from Pittsburg Landing ; that he arrived there in the morning of the 4th ; that it was General Cleburne's command that was attacked ; and that they biv- ouacked there for the night. Saturday, General Grant changed the assignment of the cavalry, and the regiments moved to their new positions. Otherwise the National camp was quiet. The pick- ets of the Seventy-seventh Ohio noticed rabbits and squirrels in great numbers coming from the woods in front and passing through their line. Buckland's pickets observed cavalry to the front, and Sherman being advised, and having no cavalry to send out, ordered the pickets to be strengthened and to be vigilant. Prentiss sent out a party in the after- noon which advanced three miles obliquely in ad- vance of his front, and returned without having seen anything. General Johnston selected forty thousand of his efifectives for attack upon Grant. This force was organized into three corps, commanded respective- ly by Generals Hardee, Bragg, and Polk, and a re- serve under General Breckenridge. General Beau- regard had no corps, but was second in general command. Hardee's corps comprised Hindman's division and a separate brigade, commanded by Cle- burne. Bragg's corps was composed of two di- THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 45 visions — Ruggles and Withers. Polk's corps also was constituted of two divisions — Clark's and Cheatham's. The reserve embraced three brigades, commanded respectively by General Bowen and Colonels Trabne and Statham. General Johnston, receiving information in the night of Wednesday, April 2d, that Buell was advancing rapidly toward the Tennessee, moved out from his camp at Cor- inth Thursday afternoon. General Hardee, having the advance, reached Mickey's, eight miles from Pittsburg Landing, Friday morning, was encoun- tered there by General Buckland's detachment, bivouacked there that afternoon, and moved into position and deployed about lO a. m. Saturday. The remaining troops struggled along through in- adequate roads made miry by rain, impeded by mud and by misunderstandings, and finally reached their respective positions about 4 p. m. The at- tack intended to be made at eight o'clock Saturday morning was postponed to daybreak Sunday. As the long columns were all day sweeping through the forest, stretching into long parallel lines, the squirrels and rabbits, startled from their homes, scudding past the National pickets, were the only messengers who brought news of the movement to the national camp. At 3 A. M. Sunday, the 6th, three companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, of Peabody's brigade of Prentiss's division, moved out to the front, and about half past five o'clock encountered the ene- my's cavalry and forced them back to a line of infantry concealed behind a fence. A sharp en- gagement ensued, and then the party withdrew. Major Hardcastle, of the Third Mississippi, re- ports that on the night of the 5th, being sent out to picket the front of Wood's brigade, he deployed his battalion a quarter of a mile to the front of the brigade, and posted small parties one hundred and two hundred yards farther to the front, cavalry 46 GENERAL SHERMAN. videttes being advanced still farther to the front ; that about dawn the videttes fired on an advancing force and retired. The infantry posts successively did the same, and a sharp engagement followed, which lasted an hour, in which he lost four killed and twenty wounded before the attacking party withdrew, and, seeing his brigade form in line at half past six o'clock, he fell back and took his place in line. The three companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri, returning to camp, met Colonel Moore with five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri half a mile out from the brigade camp, who dis- patched the wounded to camp, retained the others, and sent for the remainder of his regiment. When his other five companies arrived, he marched by the flank about three hundred yards to the north- west corner of a cotton field, which was the See farm, and there came under fire. General Johnston, instead of placing his corps one in the center and the others in wings or re- serve, formed each corps in line of regiments doubled on the center at intervals that permitted them to deploy into line before going into action. Hardee's corps, so deployed, with the addition of Gladden's brigade extending his right, made a front of two miles. Bragg's corps formed in like manner one thousand yards in the rear of Hardee, Polk in the rear of Bragg's left, and Breckenridge in rear of Bragg's right. It is impossible to reconcile the discrepant statements as to distance and time. But it is rea- sonably certain that the distance between Hardee's line and Prentiss's camp was three miles or more, and that Johnston's army was not in motion before six o'clock. As the long lines pressed forward through forest, over ground broken by ridges and ravines, the rate of advance was determined by the rate of the slowest portion, and at times the second line would overtake the first. Batteries had to THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 47 swerve from their direct course to find practicable passage. It was impossible for brigades to main- tain the prescribed intervals or preserve the gen- eral alignment. About seven o'clock Shaver's brigade struck the Twenty-fifth Missouri in See's cotton field, and recoiled from a heavy fire deliv- ered from a rising ground in the field. Colonel Moore, re-enforced by the remainder of the Twen- ty-first, fell back behind a ridge, which shielded his men, and stubbornly held his ground. As Johnston's army advanced, his line of skirmishers met the National pickets, who fell back fighting. The line of sputtering fire along the front, by its continuance and increasing nearness, was heard in the National camp, and aroused surmise and sjiecu- lation in some, excited uneasiness in others. \Vhen the infantry engagement (for Shaver's battery had been detached from him) resounded, the whole camp was startled. Prentiss marched his division out a quarter of a mile from his camp. Colonel Moore, falling back to his left and rear, connected with Prentiss and formed the right of the line. Gladden's brigade attacked. General Gladden was killed, and his command fell back in confusion, carrying with it the two right regiments of Shaver's brigade. Chalmers's brigade came up with Jackson in reserve, and the attack was renewed with such vigor that Prentiss's entire division gave way, but rallied just in front of their camp. After another fierce contest the division gave way, fell back through the camp, and retreated in disorder to rally On the summit of rising ground half a mile in rear of their camp. Meanwhile the battle had joined along the front of two miles. General Bragg says in his report that, after encountering the National pickets and brvishing them away, " in about one mile more we encountered him in strong force along almost the entire line. His batteries were posted on emi- 48 GENERAL SHERMAN. nences, with strong infantry supports. Finding the first Hne now nnequal to the work before it, being weakened by extension and necessarily broken by the nature of the ground, I ordered my whole force to move up steadily and promptly to its support. From this time — about 7.30 o'clock — until night the battle raged with little intermis- sion." Colonel Thompson, aid-de-camp to General Beauregard, in his report to the general says : " At 6.30 o'clock 1 l)rought an order from you to Gen- eral Breckcnridge, who commanded the reserve, that he must hurry up his troops, as General Polk was moving forward, which was promptly delivered and promptly obeyed. About 7.30 o'clock I rode forward with Colonel Jordan to the front to ascer- tain how the battle was going. There I learned from General Jolmston that General Hardee's line was within half a mile of the enemy's camps. About ten o'clock you moved forward with your staff and halted within about half a mile of their camps, at which time our troops were reported to be in full possession of the enemy's camps." A squadron of Georgia cavalry felt along the National picket line Saturday. General Buckland strengtliened his pickets Saturday night, and Gen- eral Sherman ordered the Seventy-seventh Ohio of Hildcl)rand's brigade to go out early Simday morning to See's farm. General Buckland was wakeful through the night, and, receiving word while at breakfast Sunday morning that his pickets were attacked in force, had the long roll sounded, formed his brigade in line, and reported to General Sherman. The division was soon formed. The Fifty-third ( )hio was on the left. Four guns of Waterhouse's battery on its right, the other two guns advanced a hundred yards to the front, be- yond Oak Creek ; Hildebrand to its right ; Tay- lor's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Barrett (Captain Taylor serving as cliief of artillery of the THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 49 division), on rising ground, commanding the front of both Hildebrand and Bnckland, Buckland form- ing the right of the hne, McDoweh being to the right and rear of Buckland on a separate ridge, overlooking Owl Creek, where it was crossed by a bridge, and having Behr's battery with him. General Cleburne's brigade, forming the left of Hardee's corps, impeded by crossing ravines and ridges through woods, and by the obstinate re- sistance of the National pickets, reached the farther side of Oak Creek about eight o'clock. General Patton Anderson's brigade was in reserve and two hundred and seventy yards in rear of the other two brigades of Ruggles's division, which were one thousand yards in rear of Hardee. General Ander- son speaks of the difficulty of the ground and the persistence of the National skirmish line, but in the inequalities of the advance he pushed into the front line of Ruggles's division, and then into Hardee's line, on Cleburne's right, and in front of Hilde- brand's brigade. The muskets of the Forty-third Illinois of Mc- Clernand's division being still, Sunday morning, loaded since Friday evening, permission was ob- tained to proceed to the front and fire them oflf. Distant report of firearms was heard, and was re- ported to General McClernand. He sent word to Colonel Reardon, commanding the Third Brigade, to form his command. Colonel Reardon, being ill in bed, sent word to Colonel Raith, of the Forty- third Illinois, to assume command. The colonel of the Forty-ninth refused to believe that the dis- tant firing was from the enemy, and delayed call- ing out his regiment. The brigade was finally formed and, moving forward, took position on the left of Sherman's division, sending a skirmish line out to the front. Colonel Marsh, of the Twentieth Illinois, commanding tlie Second Brigade, heard firing off to the front. This continuing some time, 50 GENERAL SHERMAN. being, in fact, the musketry engagement between General Shaver and the Missouri regiments, or- dered his regimental commanders to be in readi- ness to form. And soon, in pursuance of order received, he advanced and formed on the left of the Third Brigade. About eight o'clock the First Brigade was ordered to form on the left of the Second with three regiments, and detach the fourth regiment to the riglit of the Second Brigade. Wood's brigade of Hardee's corps, containing six regiments and two battalions, pressed forward against McClernand. Gibson's brigade of Bragg's corps, filling the interval between Wood and Patton Anderson, confronted the Fifty-third Ohio and the right of McClernand. A part of Russell's brigade of Polk's corps acted on the right of Wood against McClernand's left, and was soon supported by Bushrod Johnson's brigade of the same corps. General Hurlbut, receiving word about half past seven o'clock from General Sherman that he was attacked, directed General \'eatch to form his bri- gade and march to General Sherman's line. Veatch had just gone when word came from General Pren- tiss asking for aid. Forming his two remaining brigades, Williams's and Lauman's, he advanced, and met Prentiss's command falling back in dis- order. Continuing his advance to the south of the peach orchard, he met the enemy and came under fire a little after nine o'clock. General Prentiss ral- lied and reformed his command and formed in line, his left joining liurlbut's right. General W. H. L. Wallace, commanding Smith's division, moved from his camp at nine o'clock. General McAr- thur, having sent one regiment — Thirteenth Mis- souri — to General Sherman and two regiments to guard the bridge over Snake Creek, where the road to Crump's Landing crossed, advanced with his two remaining regiments to General Hurlbut's left and extended Hurlbut's line toward the river. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 51 Wallace took his two other brigades to the aid of Prentiss, resting his left on Prentiss's right. The right of Wallace's line rested fixed all day on the edge of a broad and deep ravine, filled with woods and dense thickets, which served as an impassable barrier, dividing the National line into two por- tions. Wallace's right rested against it all day, McClernand's left touched and skirted it, but these two divisions were at no time in touch with each other. Colonel Stuart, at his isolated camp of three regiments, received w^ord at about half past seven o'clock from General Prentiss that the enemy was in force in his front. Shortly after Stuart's pickets sent in word that a force was advancing on the Bark road. Before long a battery was seen going into position on the heights beyond Locust Creek, eleven hundred yards distant. Stuart formed his brigade in front of his camp, facing south, a quar- ter of a mile to the front and left of Hurlbut's left. In consequence of the formation of A. S. John- ston's three corps into three long parallel lines, and also owing to the broken and wooded ground over which they advanced, the front line, by the time it delivered its attack, was pierced in places by portions of the other two lines ; the brigades of some divisions were separated from each other by portions of other commands pushed between, and even some brigades were severed, the different regi- ments being sent to re-enforce different portions of the line. In the course of the battle division and brigade commanders received orders directly from General Johnston, General Beauregard, and all the corps commanders. All orders were obeyed with alacrity and without question, except some in front of the Hornet's Nest, in the eager desire to press forward to victory. Before nine o'clock the whole of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions, as well as Prentiss's, was fully engaged. Colonel Thompson, aid-de-camp 52 GENERAL SHERMAN. to General Beauregard, in his report, made imme- diately after the battle, states, " From eight to half past eight o'clock the cannonading was very heavy along the whole line." Hildebrand was attacked about eight o'clock. B. R. Johnson's brigade came under artillery fire at half past eight o'clock, and about fifteen minutes later made attack upon the left brigade, Hare's, of McClernand's division. The little stream which flowed through the val- ley or ravine bordering the front of Sherman's camp was fed by springs, and, spreading over the loamy bottom, turned it into a marsh. Being ob- structed by fallen timber and clumps of under- growth, it was a serious impediment to troops ad- vancing across it under fire. Bushrod Johnson's brigade was broken in wading through the mud of the valley, and his battery was taken over with great difficulty. When the crossing was efifected, two of the regiments were missing, and it was learned, after inquiry by the brigade commander, that they had been detached by order of General Bragg. Advancing with his battery and his three remaining regiments, he fell upon Hare's brigade, the left of McClernand's line, just after it had got into position. After a sharp conflict, Johnson's command broke and fell back. He renewed the at- tack, with the same result. He tried in vain to move his men forward again. His battery lost its commander and half the men, and all the guns were silenced but one. Johnson himself was wounded, and then drew what was left of his com- mand out of lire. Wood's brigade fell upon McClernand's second brigade, commanded by Colonel Marsh, with a furious onset and deadly fire. When Marsh had lost five field officers and many company officers killed and wounded, his command became disor- ganized and fell back in disorder. Marsh rallied and reformed them about two hundred vards in THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 53 the rear. Wood wheeled his brigade to the left, against the flank of McClernand's right brigade, commanded by Colonel Reardon, who refused his left and confronted Wood. Meanwhile Colonel Preston Smith, assuming command of Johnson's brigade, regained the two detached regiments and reformed his conmiand ; then joining A. P. Stew- art's brigade, w-hich had just come to the front, they fell upon Hare's brigade, and compelled it to fall back to the line formed by Colonel Marsh. The three regiments of Russell's brigade strug- gled with difficulty through the swamp and briers of the little valley, under a destructive fire from Waterhouse's battery, and as they began to ascend the farther slope the Fifty-third poured additional volleys, which they could not endure, and they fell back through the swamp. After they were ral- lied, reassembled, and formed, another attempt was made, with the same result. Then Colonel Appier called out to his men to fall back and save them- selves. The Fifty-third, hearing the command, and not knowing what danger threatened, fled to the rear in confusion. The adjutant, E. C. Dawes, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, rallied the regi- ment and returned with it to its post. Colonel Appier returned and again gave the order, *' Fall back and save yourselves ! " Two companies re- mained firm and attached themselves, with Adju- tant Dawes, to the Seventeenth Illinois. The re- maining eight companies drifted to the rear, and, becoming separated from their colonel, took posi- tion near the landing, and afterward returned to the front with the lieutenant colonel. Patton Anderson, reaching for Hildebrand's brigade lower down the little valley, found it a greater obstacle than it offered to the troops on his right. Barrett's battery, crowning the blufif on the farther side, nearly on a line with the left of Anderson's brigade, poured merciless volleys upon 54 GENERAL SHERMAN. the unresisting- battalions toiling through the morass and thickets. Fragments of regiments, ad- vancing as they emerged and reached solid ground, charged up the slope gallantly, but without cohe- sion and without impetus, and were swept back by the fire of the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh Ohio. Hildebrand repelled two such assaults upon these two regiments before the Fifty-third Ohio finally gave way. Buckland's brigade was on the blufif overlook- ing the little stream near its junction with Owl Creek. The little valley there was wider, the morass deeper, and fallen timber massed the tangle of vines and briers. Barrett's battery swept its whole front, and a projecting spur near the right of the line served as a bastion, whence a company en- filaded the assaulting enemy. General Cleburne, with his large brigade and Trigg's battery, consti- tuting the extreme left of the Confederate army, was brought by its position to the front of Buck- land. Trigg's battery did not descend into the val- ley, but in an artillery duel with Barrett's battery was soon silenced and withdrawn. Cleburne's regiments pertinaciously forced their way over and through the obstacles, but, separated and broken, the concentric fire from front and both flanks rolled them back at every essay. Cleburne rode from one wing to another to encourage his dashing but disrupted battalions, only to impel his ranks to fresh slaughter. The Sixth Mississippi, having lost three hundred killed and wounded, including both field officers, out of an aggregate of four hundred and twenty-five, withdrew and took no subsequent part in the battle. The Second Tennessee, having its colonel severely and its major mortally wound- ed and its ranks sorely thinned, withdrew from the field for the rest of the day. The Twenty-third Tennessee drifted to another part of the field. In the rush which ensued when Sherman drew his THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 55 division back Cleburne was separated from his command until, at 2 p. :\i., he found his remaining three regiments halted under the brow of an abrupt hill. Of the twenty-seven hundred and fifty mus- kets which he carried into the assault on Sherman Sunday morning, he was able to assemble only eight hundred for the contest on Monday. When the Fifty-third Ohio broke. Colonel Raith's brigade was exposed on both flanks, and was ordered by General ]\IcClernand to fall back and join his other brigades. Sherman had tena- ciously held his line two hours ; but now, ten o'clock, the enemy having passed to his rear, or- dered it to fall back and form on the Purdy road. When Waterhouse had traversed half the distance he halted and w^ent into action, trying to stem the pursuit by firing at short range ; but the tumultuous rush overran his battery and captured three guns, while he barely escaped with the other three. Hil- debrand's two remaining regiments w^ere thrown into disorder and partly dispersed. He served as a volunteer on General AlcClernand's stafif the rest of the day, while Major Fearing and the greater part of the Seventy-seventh and a portion of the Fifty-seventh formed on the Purdy road, on the left of the Thirteenth Missouri, which was incor- porated into Sherman's command during the rest of the battle. Buckland withdrew in order, cover- ing his wagons, which retired before him. Mc- Dowell, who had not yet been attacked or dis- turbed, moved along the Purdy road, which passed through his camp, to the position assigned. Mc- Dowell's wagon train proceeded along the road, and his battery (Behr's), galloping to its place, in- terfered with the formation of the line. Captain Behr being quickly killed, his men scampered ofif with their caissons, leaving a break in the line. Sherman drew' his maimed division back to the left and rear, connecting with McClernand's right, and 5 56 GENERAL SHERMAN. these two commanders operated together during the rest of the day. Sherman and McClernand together kept a co- herent Hne through the day. There were charges and countercharges, repulses alternately on both sides. Confederate charges were sometimes re- pulsed with serious loss. At one time the national line, surging back with a great impulse, regained half a mile of lost ground, and reoccupied a greater part of McClernand's camp. A rally, a re-enforced mass, an impetuous countercharge, checked the na- tional divisions, and pushed them back farther than before. The Confederate columns were continual- ly re-enforced by brigades or regiments coming to the front from the second and third lines and the reserve corps, while Lewis Wallace expected on one flank, and Nelson expected on the other, failed to appear, and the National line was thin- ning, crumbling, contracting. About 4.30 p. m. what was left of the two divisions was on the east side of Tillman or Brier Creek, on the ground where they rested for the night, so far back from the woods that the force which they had engaged passed between and so around to the rear of Pren- tiss and W. H. L. Wallace. But the weary bat- talions were still fresh enough to promptly repulse with disastrous loss an attack made by Pond's bri- gade, the closing operation of the day on that part of the field. In falling back from the position taken on the Purdy road, McDowell's brigade was separated from the rest of the division by the Confederate troops pouring through the gap made by the de- fection of Behr's battery. By prompt and rapid use of one gun that remained manned he saved his brigade from being surrounded and wholly cut off. In falling back through woods and tents, and over ridges and ravines, the Fortieth Illinois be- came separated, was attacked by and repelled a ■^ THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 57 Confederate regiment, found its way to the rear of McClernand's division, and remained there for the night. Trabue's brigade, brought forward from the reserve corps after a regiment and two bat- tahons of infantry and two batteries and a squadron of cavalry had been detached from it to aid some other hard-pressed brigade, was reduced to four regiments. At about half past twelve o'clock Tra- bue found McDowell's two regiments in line with- in the edge of timber bordering a field. As he moved into position to attack the Forty-sixth Ohio promptly opened fire. A destructive fight at close quarters ensued. McDowell was re-enforced by the Forty-sixth Illinois from Veatch's brigade ; Trabue, by General A. P. Stewart, with part of his brigade and a portion of Patton Anderson's bri- gade. McDowell was forced to give way. The Forty-sixth Ohio was completely dispersed, and did not reassemble till after the battle. The Sixth Iowa, commanded by Captain Williams, retired to the artillery near the landing. In the hour and a half that this contest lasted, the Forty-sixth Ohio lost thirty-seven killed and one hundred and eighty-five wounded ; the Sixth Iowa lost fifty-two killed and ninety-four wounded. Of Trabue's re- ported casualties in the two days — eight hundred and forty-four — the much greater portion hap- pened in this engagement. Bouton's brigade, which had just arrived and had not been assigned, and the Fifty-third Ohio were ordered by General Sherman's assistant adju- tant general and his chief of artillery to leave the landing and aid McAllister's battery in repelling the final attack on Sherman and McClernand. Pond's brigade was ordered by General Hardee to advance and silence the batteries. He proceeded north along the bottom of the ravine of Tillman's or Brier Creek, then to the east up a lateral ravine to take the batteries on the flank. When he drew 58 GENERAL SHERMAN. near the batteries withdrew, and the supporting infantry poured in such a destructive fire that Pond's brigade precipitately withdrew, the Eight- eenth Louisiana, the advance regiment, leaving two hundred and seven dead and wounded in the ravine. That ended the battle for the day on that part of the field. When Prentiss fell back through his camp and rallied and reformed behind Plurlbut, Chalmers made an ineffective attack, which must have been on General Hurlbut's right, and was by order re- called and sent to the extreme right of the Con- federate army. Delaying half an hour for a guide, then marching south and crossing Locust Creek before proceeding toward the river, he finally reached high land, facing Stuart's camp. Some skirmishers, whom Stuart had sent across Locust Creek, fired into the Fifty-second Tennessee, and threw it into such disorder that General Chalmers was able to rally only two companies, and sent the remainder of the regiment to the rear, where it remained during the rest of the battle. As Chal- mers crossed Locust Creek with his remaining five regiments and Gage's battery, his right being on the river blulT, Stuart fell back behind his camp, across a ravine, and took position on a wooded ridge with a field in front, his command being re- duced to two regiments by the defection of the Seventy-first Ohio. The Fifty-fourth and Fifty- fifth Illinois on the one side, and Chalmers's bri- gade and Gage's battery on the other, fired at each other across this open field until Chalmers's am- munition was exhausted. After his ammunition was replenished he found Stuart posted on another ridge farther to the rear. Another stubborn fight ensued, and when Stuart retired again Chalmers found himself near and then mingled with the surge of troops that rolled up to envelop the rear of Prentiss and Wallace. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 59 Jackson's brigade was in rear of and was not engaged with Gladden and Chalmers in the attack upon Prentiss, but joined them after Prentiss had broken and retired, and was ordered to follow Chalmers to the extreme right. With his four regi- ments and Girardy's battery, he formed on the left of Chalmers on the south side of Locust Creek. Crossing this " deep and almost impassable ra- vine," as Jackson calls it, he fell upon General ]\Ic- Arthur and his two regiments. In a series of ob- stinate struggles McArthur, forced successively from position after position, only to seize new vantage where he could renew the fight, was even- tually obliged to retire with Stuart to the north bank of the ravine near the landing, and join the force gathering there to make a final stand. Gladden's brigade, now commanded by Colonel Adams, after resting some time in Prentiss's camp, moved to the right and attacked Hurlbut, whose line was then advanced beyond the peach orchard and along the south side of the large field. A shell exploded amid the Thirteenth Ohio Battery ; of- ficers and men abandoned their guns and fled. The remainder of the division was steady, and, after a sharp struggle, Adams drew his command off, and Hurlbut shifted his line back to the north side of the field behind the fence. Two regiments — the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky — were left along the west side of the field. General Cheat- ham, having sent Bushrod Johnson's brigade to the front of McClernand's, was ordered by General Beauregard to go with his other brigade to the extreme right of the battle and go in where he found the fighting hottest. About ten o'clock he reached the south side of the field and engaged Hurlbut, firing across the field. When General Breckenridge arrived with Bowen and Statham's brigades, and formed on Cheatham's right, Cheat- ham was ordered to charsre. His men advanced 6o GENERAL SHERMAN, steadily under a galling lire till they had crossed half of the field, when the Kentucky regiments, rising upon their flank, poured in an unexpected enfilading fire, which shattered their ranks and drove them from the field in confusion. General Johnston was resolved to break the Na- tional left and push forward and interpose between General Grant and the river. He had now massed twenty-eight regiments and six batteries against the twelve regiments and two batteries of Hurlbut, McArthur, and Stuart. Hurlbut's men, replenish- ing their exhausted cartridge boxes and caissons, steadily repelled every assault. His right kept con- nected with Prentiss, but, as Stuart and McArthur were gradually forced back, his left swung back to keep in contact with them, and he had to weaken his right to fill and strengthen his attenuated left. At half past two o'clock General Johnston, person- ally leading the Forty-fifth Tennessee to a charge against the Forty-first Illinois, which Breckenridge was unable to induce it to make, received a wound from which he cjuickly bled to death. General Bragg, who had been sending successive conmiands in fruitless charges against Prentiss and Wallace, hearing of the death of A. S. Johnston, repaired to that portion of the field, where he " found a strong force, consisting of three parts without a common head — Brigadier-General Breckenridge, with his reserve division pressing the enemy ; Brigadier-General Withers, with his splendid di- vision greatly exhausted and taking a temporary rest ; and Major-General Cheatham, with his divi- sion of Major-General Polk's corps to their left and rear." This was toward four o'clock. He assembled all into a coherent body and advanced against the exhausted defenders. At about half past four o'clock General Hurlbut notified Pren- tiss he would have to let go and retire. Sullenly withdrawing, he made one vain effort to form and THE BATTLE OF SHILOII. 6l renew the fight. He then fell back behind the deep ravine running into the river just above the land- ing. Colonel Webster, of General Grant's staff, had here gathered nearly fifty guns and planted them along the crest of ground. Hurlbut added what was left of his two fighting batteries, and proceeded at once to organize the regiments and detachments and unorganized men into a force to support the batteries. He estimated the number of men so ranged in ranks at about four thousand. The rem- nants of his brigades were deployed in order, their right resting on the left of the artillery. Other de- tachments were gathered up and placed in continu- ation of the line to the left, and a battery was sta- tioned still farther to the left, near the river, pro- tected by the backwater which there covered the bottom of the ravine, but without other support. Several of Prentiss's regiments were irretriev- ably broken by passing through their camp, at 9 A. M., and drifted to the rear. Two were placed in reserve to Hurlbut. Tlie remaining five filled the space between Hurlbut's right and the main Cor- inth road. They lay down in a sunken road, or an old road washed and gullied by rain, making a natu- ral trench. Wallace's two brigades, or ten regi- ments, extended from the road to the great, densely crowded ravine, filled with tangled growth, and lay on the ground. Hickenlooper, with four guns of his battery, two having been left on the field of action because all their horses were killed, was posted by Prentiss at the Corinth road, which led directly to the landing. The line was slightly re- fused on both sides, leaving Hickenlooper at the apex of a salient. The land to the front fell away by a gentle slope, and was partially covered by dense and matted thickets. An assailing force, struggling upward through the thickets, could see only the battery, but was exposed not alone to its fire, but also to the fire of six thousand invisible in- 62 GENERAL SHERMAN. fantry. General Grant, having just visited Sherman a Httle before his Hne gave way and sent word to Lewis Wallace to come to the field, visited Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace, approved their dispositions, and charged them to hold this ground at all haz- ards to the last extremity. Colonel Webster estab- lished lines of ordnance wagons to supply the fight- ing troops, and through the day of constant firing on this ground the store of ammunition was con- tinually replenished as soon as it was exhausted. After several desultory attacks had been re- pulsed Colonel Randall L. Gibson was ordered to carry the position with his Louisiana brigade about noon. The regiments struggled through the en- tanglement of thickets and approached undisturbed till they were near the battery, wdien a sheet of flame poured from the whole length of the Na- tional line, and the assailants who were able broke in confusion and hastened out of reach of the fire. The brigade was assembled and again charged, and again rolled back in fragments. A third trial was made, with the same result. A stinging order from General Bragg sent the discouraged regi- ments the fourth time up the slope, to be hurled back the fourth time. General Hindman made a gallant assault, and met with a sore repulse. When he was wounded, A. P. Stewart took his place and made a persistent attack with his brigade and two of Pond's regiments, and finally drew of¥ his com- mand, as he says, for a supply of ammunition. Shortly after 2 p. m. Shaver's brigade made a sturdy efifort and failed, and renewed and failed again. General Bragg, then hearing of General A. S. Johnston's death, moved around to the extreme right, near the river, and there was a lull in front of the Hornet's Nest for an hour. About four o'clock General Ruggles ordered Patton Ander- son to make the attempt with his brigade. Vet- eranized by its experience in Sherman's front in THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 63 the morning and its success in subsequent en- gagements, the brigade marched boldly to the en- counter. Before long its shattered fragments came streaming back, driven by the resistless fire which they provoked. General Ruggles dispatched his stafif to gather in all the batteries they could find. He succeeded in planting eleven batteries in line. General Polk massed behind them all the serviceable infantry that he could find. Hickenlooper withdrew his four guns, falling back along the road toward the land- ing till he reached the Hamburg and Savannah road, then turning to the left upon it, found him- self with General Sherman, near the intersection of the Hamburg and Savannah road with the road from the landing to Purdy. By five o'clock Bragg, with his composite command following Hurlbut, was arriving in rear of Prentiss. About the same time Hardee, with an aggregate of disconnected brigades, was rounding the impassable wood which protected W. H. L. Wallace's right, and was reach- ing his rear. And at the same time Polk ordered forward his massed infantry against the front of Wallace and Prentiss, after a bombardment by Ruggles's batteries. W^allace ordered his division to cut their way out through the forces closing upon their rear. He was killed while leading them. Five of his regiments, accompanied by portions of Prentiss's command, fought their way through and reached the landing. The rest were caught and surrounded by the closing together of the masses. Prentiss bent his left wing aroimd till his com- mand formed an elongated ellipse open at one end, two lines back to back, joined at one end by a sharp curve. The conflict was desperate and san- guinary. It became a useless slaughter, and Pren- tiss surrendered. The Fourteenth Iowa, of Wal- lace's division, was the last to surrender. Colonel Shaw compared watches with his captor, and noted 64 GENERAL SHERMAN. that the time was a quarter to six o'clock. About twenty-two hundred surrendered. The battle was ended for the day. The meeting of the forces under Bragg and Hardee covered the river bluffs with a tumultuous and elated multitude. The gunboats began to throw large shells into their midst, and there was a scurrying to find shelter in hollows and moving out of range. But General Bragg proposed to push the advantage to a finish. He ordered his division commanders to form and charge upon the long line of guns and the force assembled by Hurl- but on the farther side of the deep ravine. Rug- gles set about to collect his scattered regiments. Withers found of Gladden's brigade only a colonel and two hundred and twenty-four men, and let them alone. Chalmers's brigade, with Gage's bat- tery, was quickly ready. The men of Jackson's brigade were filling their empty cartridge boxes, but quit and formed at command. Gage's battery, halting on the hither side of the ravine, undertook to engage the National batteries on the farther side, but was quickly silenced and dismantled, and with- drew to the rear, where it remained out of the fight during the battle of the next day. Chalmers and Jackson descended into the ra- vine and reached the farther side, but the roar of the massed artillery, the shells from the gunboats, which had moved to the mouth of the ravine, and the fire of Hurlbut's infantry prevented the auda- cious brigades from ascending the steep bank. Jackson's men, without ammunition, refused to make the attempt. Chalmers's men m^de some abortive attempts to charge up the slope. General Beauregard, receiving a dispatch that General Buell was not marching toward Pittsburg Land- ing, but was aiming for Florence, and feeling con- fident of early victory in the morning, sent staff ofificers to recall the exhausted and hungry troops THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 65 to quarters for the night. The order was given directly to division, brigade, and even regimental commanders. Jackson's brigade withdrew, and so scattered that he did not see any one or part of any one of his regiments the next day. Chalmers did not receive the order, but soon finding that he was alone and waging an idle contest, followed Jackson. General Nelson, of General Buell's army, was ferried across the river with two regiments of Am- men's brigade, while Chalmers's men, who could not be induced to charge up the slope of the ravine, were still firing. The Thirty-sixth Indiana was marched out in front of Chalmers's front, and the Sixth Ohio in support. The Thirty-sixth had two men killed and one wounded. The whole of Nel- son's division was on the ground by nine o'clock, and bivouacked in line a few hundred yards in front of Hurlbut's men. Late in the night General Crittenden arrived with his division, and formed on the right of Nelson. After Chalmers had with- drawn and all firing had ceased the head of Lewis Wallace's division reached the bridge across Snake Creek. It was dark before the last regiment, the Twentieth Ohio, reached the bridge. The division bivouacked on the eastern slope of the ravine of Brier or Tillman's Creek. General Sherman formed on the road leading to the landing, his right being near its intersection with the road on which Wallace arrived, and so having Wallace to his right and rear. Buckland with his regiment was on the right, and Colonel Cockerill's was next. Colonel Buckland's third regiment, the Forty- eighth* Ohio, was detained for the night at the land- ing, where it had gone for ammunition. Next to Buckland was Colonel Hildebrand, with the Sev- enty-seventh Ohio and a part of the Fifty-seventh. His third regiment, the Fifty-third (Dhio, biv- ouacked to the rear, in front of the camp of the 66 GENERAL SHERMAN. Second Iowa. The Sixth Iowa, of McDowell's brigade, spent the night at the landing, commanded by Captain Walden. The regiments of McCler- nand's division gathered together, but not formed in their brigades, extended from Sherman's left to Hurlbut's camp. Hurlbut's aggregation of com- mands and detachments extended from McCler- nand to the landing. The men slept in ranks on the ground, without fires and in a heavy rain. The Confederates occupied the camps of McClernand, Sherman, and Prentiss for the most part, while many slept on the ground without shelter. Gen- eral Cheatham, with a portion of each of his bri- gades, withdrew to the camp of Saturday night, and Colonel Pond, with his battery and all of the regiments of his brigade but one, bivouacked, in company with Wharton's Texas rangers, on the west side of Brier or Tillman's Creek, opposite Lewis Wallace. The formation of corps had dis- appeared. No complete division bivouacked in a body. It does not appear that there was a single brigade, excepting one in Breckenridge's corps, that held all its regiments together. Beauregard's encampment of Sunday night was an aggregation of disintegrated commands. With the first dawn Monday morning, the 7th, Colonel Pond to his dismay found that the troops had fallen back in the night, leaving him exposed alone a mile from support, and separated only by the ravine from the National line, which lay four hundred yards to his front. He made the battery (Ketchum's) open fire while he drew ofT his infan- try and the Texas cavalry. Wallace's batteries en- gaged Ketchum, and the battle was resumetl. General Nelson about six o'clock marched out south, along the Hamburg road. He proceeded more than a mile before he began to come upon fragmentary detachments of the enemy. Near Stuart's camp he came upon a force which General THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 6/ Withers had gathered up and organized, partly of battered brigades, partly of disconnected regiments thrown into improvised brigades with temporary commanders. After a sharp engagement he fell back to the north side of the peach orchard, his line crossing the Hamburg road and being at right angles to it. Crittenden's division connected with Nelson's right. McCook put Rousseau's brigade on the right of Crittenden, but facing to the left. Kirk's brigade was placed to the rear of Rousseau's right. When W. H. Gibson's brigade arrived later in the forenoon, a portion of it was placed on the right, extending it to the wooded ravine separating General Buell's command from Grant's. Buell's line when formed was almost identical with the line of Wallace, Prentiss, Hurlbut, and McArthur at eleven o'clock Sunday morning. Lewis Wallace, sweeping around by Owl Creek, formed the right of Grant's attack. Sherman, as- sembling Buckland's brigade, Stuart with two of his regiments and the Thirteenth Missouri in line, and Hildebrand with his Seventy-seventh and part of the Fifty-seventh Ohio in reserve, was next to Wallace. The Fortieth Illinois followed McCook, and formed on the left of his line when he parted from Crittenden. A detachment of the Sixth Iowa marched in reserve to McCook. The Fifty-third Ohio, commanded by the lieutenant colonel, served with McClernand. McClernand, marching directly to his camp, came there upon the left of Sherman. Hurlbut's first brigade, much attenuated, formed on the left of McClernand's line, and constituted part of it. Colonel Veatch marched in reserve to General McCook's division till McCook parted from Crit- tenden, and then by General McCook's order formed on his left, extending his line. Colonel Tuttle took command of what was left of W. H. L. Wallace's division, and moved in reserve to Gen- eral Buell, where he was joined by Colonel Crocker 68 ' GENERAL SHERMAN. with three res-inients of McCleniancrs division. He sent tlie Second Iowa to General Nelson when there was a break in his line ; the Seventh Iowa t(~» (iencral C^rittenden to aid in a cdinri^^e upon a ballery; the Tliirtcenth lalir in llie day joined (leneral McCook ; and the Kij>hth and hLij.,diteenth Illinois formed on the left of Crittenden's line when he i^arted from Nelson. General IJra^g com- manded the Confederate left. Hardee on the riq-ht, and IN ilk and lireckenrid^e helweon (lie two. Jhere was no defmite boundary of cijunnands, and some brigades and some separate regiments re- ceived direct commands from each of them in suc- cession. General Beauregard took his station near Shiloh church. 1die most C()m])act body of troops was there in the beginning of the day, and through the cond)at connnands that were forced to give Avay retired tcnvard tliat ])oint. (leneral Lewis Wallace, marching along the upland bordering Owl Creek after the retreat of I'ond's brigade and battery, had an encounter with Wharton's 'Pexas cavalry and forced it back, and then, after an engagement with Trabue's brigade, forced it soiUli of the I'urdy road. I'atton Ander- son coming u]), engaged \\'allace's first brigade, while the second and third continued the contest wiili 'Trabue. Sherman mcn'cd out to McCler- nand's cam]-) ami waited till he heard beyond the intervening woods the advance of lUiell's troops against the yielding enemy. Moving forward with lUickland and .Stuart, he joined Wallace's left, and, after souie iireliminary skirmishes with detach- ments, came upon the consolitlated U)vcc mider IJeauregard's innnediate connnand. and i-»hmged into the raging fight. McClernand. moving di- rectly from his bivouac to his camp, brushing be- fore him some batteries and their supports, joined the left of Sherman. While the conflict raged Mc- Cook's division, in ranks well aligned, was seen THE BATTLE OF SHILOII. 69 a(lvancin( i\\ I'll's I'.iiiii), inoir lluiii .1 iiiiK- di- rcclly ill i"(\ir ol llu' loirc wliirli was pri'ssinj; Slior- iiiaii ami i\lr( Icniaiid low.nd tlu> river. Wallace couiilcniiarclicd iiis coliiiuii and found a lillle crossroad wliicli led to \]\c rivi-r road, and on uliirli lie was overtal^rn at hall past (luce hv ( oioncl ]\awliiis and (aplain Mi riursdii, ol' ( iraiU's stalV, who wtir \cy\ iinpalicnl al ihr delav. The head ol llu- division irarhcd tlu' hridqi' over Snake C'liH'k allcr sinisrt, ahoiil sc\(ai o\dork, having;' marched lilleeii miles, and hixouaeked on the east- ern slope ol the \alley ol' I'.rier or rillman (, 'reek. Tlu- conleiilion has heen that Wallace was in fault (i) in lakiii!^- the outer road when he was ex- [>ressly ordered to take the river road ; ( .:) in coiin- tcrmarchini; his eolunin instead ol' kuin^ to (he n-ar and marehiii;; K-lt in I'ront ; (j,) in IaL;i;iii;;' on the wav when nlinost si)iH"d was ;iii obvious im- perati\e iieeessil\. ( i ) The order was to advance and siii)porl (he ri_L;li( ol' the line. Ihree of ( ii'iu-ral (M'ant's staff say that the order was to ad\anre by the river road. ( iencral \\ .illaet- and six of his of- ficers, who heard and read the order, say that no road was naiiu-d. If thei\> were no (eslimony, the antecedent probability would bc> that no ro.id was mentioned. l'"oi" in orderiii!; \\ .ill.iee to luaiih up from (, rimip's l.,indinL; ( iiant would not think of nnv road but the one fidin ('rump's 1 ..indin^ to I'illsbiii!.;- I.andiii!.;. .and naturally would not think o{ naming' the road. W'h.ilcwer th(" f.iel w.is. eer- tainlv Wallace and his oflicers understood that no road was mentioned, and thereupon, beiiii' ;i( die second bri^.adi^ camp. \\\o miles ti-om thi- ri\-er, thev nalurallv took tlu- ."^axann.ih and ('oriiilh road, which w.is the direct road to Sherman's rii^lit. ;ind was the rv>.id b\ which W .illace had sent IcttiMS lo Sherman. (._') It was .i mistake to lose time bv Tin: IJATTLK OI' SillLOif. 75 a countermarch, instearl of simply facing to the rear, when time was so j)reciotis. (3) It is difficult to fix the route of Wallace's march with the evi- dence now attainable, including the provision- al charts of the Shiloh iiattlefield Commission. Progress over the deep and slippery mud of the river bottom, being the last part of the journey, was so toilsome that the field officers of the rear regiment dismounterl and let exhausted men who fell out of the ranks take turns in riding. The charge or intimation that Wallace willfully lin- gered soimrls strange indeed to those who remem- t)er that this was the same Wallace who retrieved the disaster on the right at J-'ort I>)onelson, opened the battle Monday morning at Shiloh, and with a small force, by desperate fighting, delayed Early a vital day in his march on to Washington. (jeneral I'ragg said some time after the battle, and it has been repeated by many, that the fire of the gtmboats Sunday evening was noisy but harm- less. The reports of brigade and regimental com- manders made at the time quite generally men- tion being ordered to mrjve out of range of the gunboat fire ; some specify the loss so suffered. Some examples of these reports are as follows : General Clark, commanding a division, says that at the close of the rlay he was about to aid in fol- Imving up the National troops, but was checked by the fire of the gunboats. General Gibson says he was f>rflered to retire his brigade from the fire of the gunboats, in which movement consirlerable disorder enstu-d. General f'atton Anderson took his brigade into a hollow for shelter, in moving frr^m which he lost several killed and many wcjund- ed. Colonel John C. Moore, Seconrl Texas, re- ports that two of his men were mortally wounded by a shell. Captain l^oole, commanding a Florida battalion, says : " One or two of my command were either killed or mortallv wounded while imder this fire." General S.A. M.Wood, coming unrler the fire 76 GENERAL SHERMAN. of the gunboats, " pressed forward to a position most secure from the shelHng," in which position he had ten kihed and m»ny wounded by the shells. General Trabue says : " We endured a most ter- rific cannonade and shelling from the enemy's gun- boats. My command, however, had seen too much hard fighting to be alarmed, and the Fourth Ken- tucky stood firm, while some of our troops to the front fell back through their lines in confusion. In Company D of this regiment I lost at this place eleven men, and Lieutenant Keller, of the Fifth Regiment, was wounded." Colonel Venable, of the Fifth Tennessee, says that the gunboat fire was un- bearable, killing and wounding several of his men. There has been much controversy as to the re- sponsibility for establishing the troops on the west bank of the river, and for the position of the camps. Sherman, receiving from General Smith, in the forenoon of March 14th, an order to go on the ex- pedition to Yellow Creek, wrote to him : " I would suggest as a precautionary measure, after I pass up the river with one gunboat and my division, that the other gunboat and one division — say Hurl- but's or Wallace's — move up to Pittsburg Landing and there await my return. ... If the force at Corinth be already large, Cheatham may remain at or near Pittsburg Landing and embarrass our re- turn." Returning to Pittsburg Landing on the i6th, he wrote to General Smith's assistant adju- tant general on the 17th: " I will be governed by your orders of yesterday to occupy Pittsburg strongly." On the same day Sherman made an order that " General Hurlbut will disembark and establish his camp on a line perpendicular to the road about a mile from the river." Sherman's di- vision did not move out to occupy the ground which he had designated for it till the 19th, and, as two of his brigades temporarily occupied the ground designated by him to Hurlbut, the latter did not move till the 20th. THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 77 General Grant, being reinstated, arrived at Sa- vannah the evening of the 17th, and next day sent thence to Pittsburg Landing all the steamboats, to debark there all the troops on them, including Smith's division, and return at once to Paducah. General Smith being in command at Pittsburg Landing, Sherman on the 20th wrote to General Lauman, temporarily in command of Hurlbut's di- vision : " General Smith is on the Hiawatha unwell, and requests that I should give the necessary di- rections for camping the troops as they arrive. I direct that you select a line parallel to the river, or nearly so, about one mile distant from the river, and encamp them by brigades, so that they can promptly form into line of battle and move out as such by the road leading into the interior." On the 1 8th General Grant wrote to General Halleck from Savannah : " I arrived here last even- ing, and found that Generals Sherman's and Hurl- but's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially de- barked ; General Wallace at Crump's Landing, six miles below, same side of the river ; General Mc- Clernand's division at this place encamped ; and General Smith's division, with unattached regi- ments, on board transports also here. ... I shall go to-morrow to Crump's Landing and Pittsburg, and if I think any change of position for any of the troops needed I will make the change. Having full faith, however, in the judgment of General Smith, who selected the present points of debarka- tion, I do not expect any change will be made. There are no intermediate points where a steamer can land at the present stage of water." General Smith ordered the occupation of Pittsburg Land- ing and Crump's Landing ; General Sherman, under authority from General Smith, selected there the camp grounds of Sherman's and Hurlbut's di- visions. General Grant, as well as Smith and Sher- man, approved such occupation and selection. CHAPTER IV. FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. Tuesday morning, April 8th, General Sher- man, with the brigades of Buckland and Hilde- brand, all the regiments being present and ranks well filled, and accompanied by the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, went out by order of General Grant to examine the roads. General T. J. Wood, of Gen- eral Buell's army, went out by another road with two brigades of his division. Four or five miles out the Confederate cavalry by a sudden charge stampeded the Seventy-seventh Ohio, but was in turn driven back and followed up more than a mile. General Sherman found much property and stores, wagons and gun carriages, and a hospital camp, but did not penetrate to or gain knowledge of Breckenridge's camp at Mickey's, where he re- mained until Thursday. It is agreed on both sides that the reported number of missing includes many killed and wounded. This is especially true of the Confed- erate reports, as they could not be verified by in- spection of the field of battle. The number of men buried there within a few days must have been quite four thousand, and this number was rapidly increased by ensuing deaths. About five hundred horses were interred. Constant rains saturated the soil. The earth, the streams, the air, were filled with poison. The hospitals were moved out be- yond the old picket line, and the camps were trans- ferred bevond the hospitals. The entire territory •78 FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 79 of the battlefield was uninhabited except by a small force at the landing and the Twentieth Ohio on a spur overlooking the crossing of Owl Creek, near the site of the old camp of Sherman's first brigade. Immediately after the battle General Halleck ordered General Pope to abandon the expedition against Fort Pillow and proceed up the Tennessee, called strenuously upon the Government for re- enforcements, and went himself to Pittsburg Land- ing to take command in person. General Halleck reached reached the landing April nth; General Pope reported to him there April 21st, and was ordered to disembark his command at Hamburg Landing. The force collected under Halleck amounted to one hundred thousand men, and was organized with right, center, left, and reserve. The Army of the Mississippi constituted the left. The Army of the Ohio, except General Thomas's di- vision, formed the center. Sherman's and Hurl- but's divisions, with two new divisions commanded by Generals Davies and McKean, made up of the remains of the divisions of Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace, filled up by newly arrived regiments, to- gether with Thomas's division, commanded by General T. W. Sherman, composed the right, under the command of General Thomas. General Mc- Clernand had the reserve, being his own and Lewis Wallace's divisions. General Pope divided his command into two wings, commanded respectively by General Rosecrans and Schuyler Hamilton. General Grant was second in command to the col- lective army, without any specific command. Of the ofificers subordinate to General Halleck, nine were already, or afterward became, army com- manders — Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Buell, Pope, Thomas, Rosecrans, McPherson, and Logan. Gen- eral Beauregard, re-enforced immediately after his return to Corinth by Van Dorn and Price with a force containing seventeen thousand effectives, 3o GENERAL SHERMAN. summoned from Arkansas after their disastrous de- feat at Pea Ridge by Curtis, and by all the troops and new levies which the Confederate Government could raise, mustered an army of one hundred and twelve thousand men on the rolls on the 28th of May, while by reason of sickness, caused by " bad food, neglect of police duty, inaction, and labor, and especially the water, insufficient and charged with magnesia and rotten limestone," the effective total was reduced to fifty-two thousand seven hun- dred and six. General Buell states that the average distance of the National lines from Corinth was fifteen miles. The soft ground from the camps to the landing was cut and churned by trains into a morass almost impassable for saddle horses and a despair to wagon teams. The army was absor.bed in the prob- lem of getting supplies to the front, and paralyzed by the order reiterated by General Halleck to avoid being drawn into a general engagement. The Con- federate outposts and patrols covered the country up to the National picket line. On the 27th of April General Pope moved about five miles out from the river. Next day a recon- noitering party discovered that Monterey was held in force l)y the enemy. On the 29th an expedition commanded by General Stanley found Monterey evacuated ; destroyed the tents and stores left be- hind, followed General Anderson some miles south to the farther side of a creek, and returned to camp. On the 2d and 3d of May General Buell crossed Lick Creek and advanced to within twelve miles of Corinth. On the 4th General Thomas moved and intrenched. On the 7th Buell and Thomas made another advance and intrenched. General Pope sent a reconnoissance to Farmington on the 3d of May, leading to a sharp engagement, wliich resulted in the enemy being driven with loss into Corinth, and next day moved his command to a FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 8 1 strong position within five miles of Corinth. On the 9th of May two of his brigades had a hot en- counter with a large force near Farmington, but were recalled to camp to avoid the necessity for a general engagement. The army advanced, mov- ing, halting, intrenching, and remaining in posi- tion while building roads and bridges for another advance. General Sherman, on the extreme right, in some well-planned movements, executed with spirit, carried successively several commanding positions. On the evening of the 17th Buell and Pope advanced to a road running parallel with the enemy's works, and two miles distant from them, and intrenched. Two creeks, a marshy valley, and thick woods intervened between this line and Beau- regard's works. Every day some force skirmished forward and fortified, until by the 28th some points were so held within one thousand yards of them. General Beauregard made an order on the 26th preparing for evacuation, and began moving his sick and his stores. His troops left on the night ni the 29th. The field batteries marched a mile to the rear on the various roads at sunset. The heavy guns were taken out from the fortifications at 8 p. M. and loaded upon cars. Besides the traveled roads, numerous ways had been cut through the woods, anrl by means of all the infantry, moving out at 10 p. M., quickly evacuated the place. The rear guard followed at midnight, and the cavalry pickets remained on post imtil morning. Loco- motives whistled at times through the night, and the troops remaining cheered, as if welcoming ar- riving re-enforcements. But little of value was left undcstroyed. The smoke and explosions toward morning of stores set on fire and abandoned ex- cited suspicion in the besiegers, and by seven o'clock Corinth was entered by parties from the right, center, and left. As soon as it was ascertained that Corinth was 82 GENERAL SHERMAN. abandoned, General Pope started in pursuit. Beau- regard halted at Baldwin, nine miles south of Booneville. Preparation was completed, and a de- tailed order was issued on the 5th of June for at- tack on the next day, but was countermanded by General Halleck by telegraph. Beauregard re- sumed his retreat on the 7th, and went into camp at Tupelo ; the pursuing force returned to camps in the neighborhood of Corinth. General Hal- leck's march of fourteen miles in twenty-five days seemed more like the practice of a military school than an actual campaign. Of^cers and men learned much of discipline, making of reports and returns, picket duty, and the construction of earthworks, roads, and bridges. They became soldiers in fact as well as in name. And the capture of Corinth, permanently depriving the Confederacy of the route to the east from Memphis to Chattanooga, confining communication to the southern route by Vicksburg, Meridian, and Mobile, isolated Mem- phis and determined its fall. Fort Pillow was aban- doned on the 1st of June. The Confederate fleet was annihilated in an engagement with the na- tional gunboats and rams in front of Memphis on the 6th, and on the same day the detachment left by General Pope with the fleet entered Memphis and took possession. General Pope telegraphed to General Halleck on June 3d : " The roads for miles are full of strag- glers from the enemy. Not less than ten thousand men are thus scattered about who will come in within a day or two." On the 8th he reported : " They have lost by desertion of Tennessee, Ken- tucky, and Arkansas regiments near twenty thou- sand men since they left Corinth." General Buell reported on the 9th : " The loss of the enemy in the retreat has undoubtedlv been very great from disasters, sickness, etc. The deserters all esti- mate at from twenty to thirty thousand." General FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 83 Halleck, on receiving General Pope's first report, dispatched to the Secretary of War : " General Pope with forty thousand men is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms cap- tured." This was understood to mean that Pope had captured ten thousand armed men. Secretary Stanton telegraphed it as such to every State, and it was published in the newspapers all over the country. It was soon known that the number of men captured was inconsiderable, and Pope suf- fered in public opinion, being believed to have made a statement which he never made or author- ized or contemplated. General Grant, reprimanded and put in quasi arrest after the capture of Fort Donelson, and de- prived of active command and ignored after the battle of Shiloh, was entirely disheartened, and found the situation unbearable. He obtained leave of absence and resolved to get away. General Sherman, hearing of it, went immediately to him, and, telling first his own experience, remonstrated so earnestly and effectively that Grant reconsidered his purpose and remained. General Halleck had about Corinth over one hundred thousand men present for duty, besides Mitchell's division of sixty-five hundred marching toward Chattanooga, all ably officered, elated with success, and ready to undertake any enterprise. General Beauregard had in cantonment at Tupelo less than sixty thousand effectives, dispirited by repeated loss and successive retreats, and encum- bered by eighteen thousand sick. If Halleck had followed up with his army, embracing Grant, Sher- man, Sheridan, Pope, Buell, Thomas, Rosecrans, McPherson, and Logan, Beauregard would have given battle and been crushed and destroyed, or would have continued his retreat until his army 84 GENERAL SHERMAN. melted away, scattered and dissipated. But a vig- orous protracted pursuit of a defeated army was the last lesson learned in the war, and Halleck was the person least ready to undertake to learn the lesson. At that time, when the South was strain- ing every nerve to recuperate and re-enforce its debilitated corps, and in the early summer months, the most favorable season for a campaign, the very worst thing that could be done with the National army was to keep it idle in camp. And that is what General Halleck did. But on the 3d of June McClernand with his own and Lewis Wallace's division was ordered to Bolivar and Jackson, and, a little later, Wal- lace's division was sent to Arkansas ; on the 9th Sherman with his own and Hurlbut's divisions was sent along the railroad toward Memphis ; and Buell with his army, including Thomas and his division, was ordered to advance along the rail- road to Chattanooga. Pope was called East to serve in Virginia, leaving his command to Rose- crans, and then two of the divisions were sent to Buell, leaving three with Rosecrans. On the i8th of July Halleck went to Washington to take com- mand of the armies of the United States. Meanwhile after a thorough inspection, together with an investigation, had been made into the con- dition of the Confederate troops at Tupelo by order of President Davis, General Beauregard was relieved and General Bragg was appointed in his place. Bragg was a very able soldier, sagacious, prompt, resolute, and a rigid disciplinarian. But he was unpopular, and had few intimate acquaint- ances. He was reserved, positive, and uncompro- mising in disposition, and abrupt and brusque in manner. It has been said, however, that he was not unpopular with the rank and file, and was so with the superior offtcers because he was as im- perious to them as he was to enlisted men. He FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 85 quickly improved the health, tone, and discipline of the army at Tupelo, and on the 22d of July he rapidly moved by rail about thirty-five thousand of the troops via Mobile to Chattanooga. After securing re-enforcements, he started about the middle of August for the Ohio River, and Gen- eral Buell, who was still toiling, repairing railroad, and rebuilding bridges from Corinth toward Chat- tanooga, was obliged to quit this work and march with all possible diligence to save Cincinnati and Louisville from capture. General Grant was left in command of the troops in West Tennessee, about forty-two thou- sand for duty. The Memphis and Chattanooga Railroad, running along his front two hundred miles, was ruined beyond repair by any resources at his command between Chewalla and Grand Junc- tion, and exposed to incessant raids throughout its whole extent, and could not be used. Communica- tion betw^een Memphis and Corinth was through Jackson, a railroad intersection far to the rear. General Bragg left about sixteen thousand men, under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, guarding the Mississippi River, and about the same number under General Price at Tupelo. Van Dorn was skillful and enterprising ; Price was a pertinacious fighter. The position of the small posts along the rail- road became so precarious that in August all west of Grand Junction were withdrawn by General Sherman to Memphis ; the post at Grand Junction was withdrawn to Bolivar, and by the middle of September all detachments to the eastward of Cor- inth retired to that point, except that Colonel Mur- phy remained with his regiment at luka to protect the shipment thence of the depot of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance supplies. At the end of August General Armstrong with two brigades of cavalry, numbering four thousand men, ad- 86 GENERAL SHERMAN. vanced into Tennessee. Colonel Leggett, with two regiments of infantry, two guns, and four com- panies of cavalry, met them five miles from Bolivar, and opposed them so audaciously that Armstrong, having sufifered considerable loss, withdrew from the field after a contest of seven hours. General Armstrong came upon Colonel Dennis marching on Britton's Lane with two regiments, two guns, and two companies of cavalry ; Colonel Dennis took position on a wooded hill commanding the lane. General Armstrong made repeated charges upon the hill, suffering repulse each time, and finally withdrew, leaving one hundred and sixty- nine killed and many wounded on the field. He returned to Mississippi after doing some trifling injury to the railroad. Colonel Leggett and Colo- nel Dennis, as w^ell as Colonel Crocker, commander of the post at Bolivar, were promoted to the rank of brigadier general for their success. General Grant was anxiously watching for in- dications of the design of the enemy, and by the nth of September became satisfied that an attack would be made on Corinth by Van Dorn and Price. He at once had the garrisons of Tuscumbia and luka called into Corinth, the troops at Bolivar moved to Corinth, and a force transferred from Memphis to Bolivar. Price and Van Dorn, in fact, proposed to capture Corinth and force Grant back into Kentucky, but Van Dorn was not ready. Gen- eral Price occupied luka, which Colonel Murphy abandoned without making any attempt to destroy the great store of supplies remaining there. Con- fident that he could retake luka and get back to Corinth before Van Dorn could appear before it. Grant dispatched Rosecrans to approach luka from the south, occupying both of the roads running from the town to the south, while Ord with an- other column should reach the town from the northwest. Ord was in place on time. Rosecrans. FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 8/ delayed at first by difificnlties in the road, made up by forced marching, so that late in the afternoon of the 19th his advance division, Hamilton's, en- countered one of Price's divisions. Little's, within two miles of luka. A fierce fight ensued. Hamil- ton lost one fourth of his command in killed and wounded — seven hundred out of twenty-eight hun- dred. Price reported eighty-six killed and four hundred and eight wounded ; while Rosecrans's provost marshal certified that he had buried two hundred and sixty-five of Price's men who were found dead on the field of battle, and a hundred and twenty more, being a portion of the wounded whom Price had left behind and who died in hos- pital. In the course of the night Rosecrans ad- vised Grant, who was with Ord, of the engage- ment, and of his intention to attack Price in the morning. When morning came it was discovered that the bird had flown. Rosecrans had .occupied only one of the roads, and Price had moved out through the night by the other and was already beyond pursuit. The troops immediately moved back to their respective cjuarters at Corinth, Jack- son, and Bolivar. General Price, reaching Baldwin on the 23d, reported by letter to Van Dorn at Holly Springs. Five days later they joined forces at Ripley, num- bering together twenty-three thousand muskets. Van Dorn assumed command, and, moving next day, reached Pocahontas on the ist of October, and was near Corinth on the 2d. On the morning of the 3d Van Dorn advanced, skirmishing with the National outposts, and at ten o'clock came upon Rosecrans's four divisions in line about two miles in advance of the works recently constructed on the outskirts of the town. Attack was made with vigor, and was met with equal courage. A hot engagement ensued, which lasted without inter- mission through the day. When it ceased, at nearly 7 88 GENERAL SHERMAN. .6 p. M., the National troops were within the new works, and the assailants were halted a few hun- dred yards from them. Assault upon the works was made at nine o'clock next morning". The assault was made with great determination. The National line was pierced, and 1 lattery I'owell was carried, but after a hand- to-hand fight the assailants were driven out and the redoubt reoccupied. Later Fort Robinett was entered. After a conflict of fury and desperation it too was regained, and the temporary captors — what was left of them — withdrew in disorder. Far- ther to the National left a portion of Maury's di- vision of Price's corps overcame Davies's division and forced their way into the town. There they were subjected to fire in front and both flanks, with artillery and musketry, and retired with heavy loss. The attack on Corinth had been planned with skill and deliAiered with special gallantry. It had been met with indomitable resolution and had failed. By noon (ieneral V^an Dorn with his Confederates had left the field and was in full retreat, spending the night at Chewalla. The National loss was three hundred and fif- teen killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two missing ; total, twenty-three hundred and fifty-nine. The Confed- erate returns make their loss five hundred and five killed, twenty-one hundred and fifty wounded, twenty-one hundred and eighty-three missing ; total, forty-eight hundred and thirty-eight. Gen- eral Rosecrans's medical director reported that after the battle fourteen hundred and twenty-three Confederate soldiers were buried on the field. Among the killed were Brigadier-General Hackle- man and Colonel Kirby Smith, of the Forty-third Ohio, a young oflficer of the regular army of most brilliant promise. On the Confederate side. Colo- nel Rogers, of the Second Texas, a notably gal- FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 89 lant officer, was killed in the bloody struggle within Fort Robinett. General Rosecrans, from consideration of the fatigue of his command, decided not to begin pursuit till next morning. General McPherson, who arrived at Corinth in the afternoon, was or- dered to lead in the pursuit in the morning. Gen- eral Ord, who had been sent by General Grant with his own division and General Hurlbut's to intercept the expected retreat of Van Dorn, ar- rived at the north bank of the Hatchie, at the bridge near Pocahontas, on the morning of the 4th. On the morning of the 5th Van Dorn left Chewalla and marched to Pocahontas. His ad- vance obtained possession of the bridge. Ord drove them from it, and, following closely, gained the other bank. He attacked with spirit the more numerous but fatigued and somewhat disordered Confederate force, and repelled them from the bridge. Van Dorn turned south, found another crossing six miles below, where he took his com- mand over the river in the night and then con- tinued to Holly Springs. Rosecrans left Corinth the morning of the 5th, and only reached Chevvalla that night. He joined Hurlbut next day, (Jrd being wounded, and traveled as far as Ripley over the road by which Van Dorn had escaped. The Confederate force in Mississippi was too much crippled by these repeated disasters to think of resuming the ofifensive. President Davis sent Lieutenant-General Pemberton to take command, and his active command was largely re-enforced by returned prisoners of war and new levies. Grant, relieved from apprehension of attack, immediately began to project plans for invading Mississippi. General Sherman, while engaged in his strictly military functions, keeping advised of the position of General Van Dorn and ascertaining his plans, and carrying on the erection of Fort Pickering, 90 GENERAL SHERMAN. was also occupied with the more trying task of regulating the civil administration of Memphis. Arriving there in July, he found all civil adminis- tration suspended and the population disloyal. He restored the mayor to his ofBce, defining with precision his jurisdiction and authority; suggested the re-establishment of courts, prescribing what jurisdiction they should exercise, and stating in what cases the military would aid in the enforce- ment of civic authority. He permitted the publi- cation of newspapers, but defined the manner in which the publication should be conducted. He regulated in great detail the manner in which the use of land and houses belonging to disloyal per- sons should be appropriated. He corresponded with the Secretary of the Treasury, combating the policy of the Government in permitting dealers to purchase cotton from within the enemy's lines. In all these communications his grasp of the subject in hand and his directness and precision of state- ment are very notable. His argument to the Secre- tary of the Treasury as a statement of the military question was unanswerable ; the Government could not deny that, but avoided it by consideration of the pressing need of some means of paying the ob- ligations of the United States to Europe. Headquarters Fifth Division, Memphis, T-k^-h., July 27, 1862. John Park, Mayor of Mejupkzs, Present. Sir : Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civil law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to restore them to their proper use — viz., the protec- tion of life, liberty, and property. Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, and necessarily the mili- tary, for the time bein^f, must be superior to the civil au- thority, but it does not therefore destrov it.. Civil courts and executive officers should still exist and perform duties, FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 9T without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass into disrespect — an end to be avoided. I am glad to find in Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence, but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neither the time nor the inclination to in- terfere with. Among these, first in importance is the main- tenance of order, peace, and quiet within the jurisdiction ot Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strong provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding public prop- erty held or claimed by the United States, and for the arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guard ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. This should be done by the city police. I under- stand that the city police is too weak in numbers to accom- plish this perfectly, and I therefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps to increase this force to a number which, in their judgment, day and night can enforce your ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order, so that any change in our military dispositions will not have a tendency to leave your people unguarded. I am willing to instruct the provost guard to assist the police force when any combination is made too strong for them to overcome, but the city police should be strong enough for any probable contingency. The cost of maintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon all citizens equitably. I am not willing, nor do I think it good policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to the State and county, as you recommend ; for these would have to be refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on all interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper municipal body, will frame a good bill for the in- crease of your police force and for raising the necessary means for their support and maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of the tax. Of course I can not sugge'^t how this tax should be laid, but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real estate, and personal property, including money and merchandise. All who are protecterl should share the expenses in proportion to the in- terests involved. 1 am, with respect, your ol^edient servant, W. T. Sherman, Major-Gencral commatiding. 92 GENERAL SHERMAN. Headquarters Fifth Division, Memphis, Tenn., Attgust ii, 1862. Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury. Sir : Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion ot the cotton question. I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to listen to trifles. This is no trifle : when one nation is at war with another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other ; then the rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most unfortu- nately, the war in which we are now engaged has been com- plicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other are not enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, this mistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to be misled by it. The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on the proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in the North ; and not only are they un- friendly, but all who can procure arms now bear them as organized regiments or as guerrillas. There is not a gar- rison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight of the flagstaff without being shot or captured. It so happened that these people had cotton, and, whenever they appre- hended our large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the belief that, of course, we would seize it and convert it to our use. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it. It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged government, and was therefore lost to their people ; and could have been, without injustice, taken by us and sent away, either as abso- lute prize of war or for future compensation. But the com- mercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents would buy a pound of cotton behind our army, that four cents would take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold. The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire when here they discovered that salt, bacon, powder, firearms, percussion caps, etc., were worth as much as gold ; and, strange to say, this traffic was not only permitted but encouraged. Before we in the interior could know it hun- dreds, yea thousands, of barrels of salt and millions of dollars had been disbursed, and I have no doubt that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved their armies in mass, and from ten to twenty thou- sand fresh arms and a due supply of cartridges have also been got, I am equally satisfied. As soon as I got to Mem- phis, having seen the effect in the interior, I ordered (only as FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 93 to my command) that gold, silver, and Treasury notes were contraband of war, and should not go into the interior, where all were hostile. It is idle to talk about Union men here : many want peace, and fear war and its results, but all prefer a Southern, independent government, and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that was spent for cotton was sent to the seaboard to be exchanged for banknotes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here and are taken in ordinary transactions. 1 therefore required cotton to be paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end ot the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee — viz., the United States quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is being obtained about as fast as by any other pro- cess, and yet the enemy receives no " aid or comfort." Un- der the " gold " rule the country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries ; but now that trade is to be encouraged and gold paid out, I admit that cotton will be sent in by our own open enemies, who can make better use of gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton. I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my views on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens war because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't employ and feed her own people to send them here, where they can not only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence by moderate labor. We are not bound to furnish her cotton. She has more reason to fight the South for burning that cotton than us for not ship- ping it. To aid the South on this ground would be hypoc- risy which the world would detect at once. Let her make her ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that will counteract in the balance. Of course her motive is to cripple a power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures that threaten even to usurp her history. In twenty more years of prosperity it will require a close calcu- lation to determine whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the continent of America or the isle of Britain. Therefore, finding us in a death struggle for exist- ence, she seems to seek a quarrel to destroy both parts in de- tail. Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the alliance of England in order to get arms and manufac- tures in exchange for their cotton. The Southern Confed- eracy will accept no other mediation, because she knows full well that in old England her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in Nenu Encrland. France 94 GENERAL SHERxMAN. certainly does not need our' cotton enough to disturb her equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respectful consideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feel assured the French will not encourage rebellion and secession anywhere as a political doctrine. Certainly all the German states must be our ardent friends, and, in case of European intervention, they could not be kept down. With great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. Sherman, Major-Gencral. On the 24th of October the War Department by order transferred General Rosecrans to super- sede General Buell in the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and transmuted the force under General Grant's command into an army corps, en- titled Thirteenth Army Corps. The force at that time numbered about forty-eight thousand five hundred men. On the 4th of November General Grant assembled at Grand Junction and La Grange two divisions from Bolivar, under command of General J. B. McPherson, and three divisions from Corinth, under General C. S. Hamilton, prepara- tory to making an advance into Mississippi. Two weeks later, by order of General Grant, General Sherman met him at Columbus, Ky., and they con- ferred upon the mode of carrying out the move- ment, the ultimate object of which. General Grant said, was the capture of Vicksburg. Grant moved south through Holly Springs with the force which he had assembled, Sherman advanced from Mem- phis with three divisions, and General Steele, with a division from the troops stationed at Helena, Ark., advanced from the Mississippi toward Gren- ada. Pemberton, finding his rear threatened by Steele, abandoned his fortified line along the Tal- lahatchie, fell back to Grenada, and took up a new line along the Yallabusha. General Grant reached the Tallahatchie at the railroad crossing on the ist of December, and General Sherman arrived at a point a few miles west next day, to find the cross- insfs undefended. FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 95 On the 8th General Sherman, in obedience to a letter from General Grant, met ^ him at Oxford, and again conferred upon the plan of campaign. After Grant had fully stated his plans, and before Sherman left. Grant sent to General Halleck by telegraph : " General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand men, will land above Vicksburg (up the Yazoo if practicable), and cut the Mississippi road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they cross Black River. I will co-operate from here, my movements depending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Talla- hatchie and Yallabusha, and when an opportunity occurs make a real attack. After cutting the two roads. General Sherman's movements to secure the end desired will necessarily be left to his judg- ment. I will occupy this road to Coffeeville." To this Halleck replied at once, approving the plan, but adding, " The President may insist upon designating a separate commander." Sherman left for Memphis next day, taking with him one divi- sion, Morgan L. Smith's, and hastened prepara- tions for the expedition down the Mississippi. The situation in Mississippi was becoming so serious that General Joseph E. Johnston was appointed to supreme command between the Alleghany Moun- tains and the Mississippi River, and he hardly reached Chattanooga to confer with General Bragg before Jefferson Davis arrived and accompanied General Johnston to Mississippi, having first or- dered Bragg to send re-enforcements, numbering nine thousand men, to Pemberton. By order of General Bragg, General Forrest, on the nth of December, left Columbia, Tenn., and, crossing the Tennessee at Clifton on the 14th and 15th by means of an old fiatboat, succeeded 96 GENERAL SHERMAN. in substantially wrecking the railroad and telegraph between Columbus and Humboldt, and eluding or defeating all troops sent to meet him, except in the fight at Parker's Cross Roads, where he was de- feated with severe loss by General Sullivan. On the 1st of January he raised the old fiatboat, which had been sunk, and recrossed to Clifton. On the 19th of December, while General Grant's cavalry were absent on an expedition to destroy the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Tupelo, General Van Dorn, having assembled all the cavalry of the Confederate army, started upon a raid upon the roads in General Grant's rear. General Grant ad- vised by telegraph the commanders of posts along the railroad, and ordered them to be prepared to resist attack. Colonel Robert C. Murphy, who had abandoned the stores at luka to Price, was com- manding at Holly Springs, where the supplies for General Grant for the winter were accumulated. He received the warning, paid no heed to it, gave no information of it to his command, but permitted Van Dorn with his troops to enter and occupy the town, unmolested save by the sporadic, spontane- ous fire of some of the men who saw the columns in gray marching by their tents. Van Dorn spent a day burning up the vast stores, and then pro- ceeded to feel the roads at other points — Bolivar, Middleburg, Grand Junction, and Davis's Mills — ■ but was repelled at every attack. Murphy was court-martialed and cashiered. An investigation was made, which brought to light such a taint of treasonable disloyalty in several regiments that other courts-martial followed, more officers were dismissed from the service, and non-commissioned officers were transferred to other regiments and surrounded by more wholesome influences. General Grant had advanced to the Yokana- patafa River, with Colonel Leggett's brigade at Water \"alley as advanced post. Upon learning FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 97 of the disaster at Holly Springs, he immediately put the army on short rations and fell back behind the Tallahatchie, leaving Leggett south of the river as rear guard. Part of the force was withdrawn in December to repair the railroad from Memphis to Corinth. McPherson's command remained till General Grant was advised by General Halleck of the repulse of Sherman near Vicksburg, and was ordered to re-enforce the river expedition with all disposable troops at his command. CHAPTER V. THE MISSISSIPPI. General Sherman went ener^^ctically to work on reaching- ]\leni])his. He organized the new troops sent forward by General McGlernand into two (Hvisions, nnder command of General A. J. Smith and General G. W. Morgan, and added them to the division of M. L. Smith and the division at Helena, commanded by General F. Steele. The fleet of transports arriving on the 19th, he began embarking on the same day. He sailed next day, and, stopping on the way to take up Steele's di- vision, reached iMillikcn's Rend on the 25th. Gen- eral Halleck notified General Grant by telegraph on the 18th that the President had apjjointcd Gen- eral McClernand to command the expedition down the river. General Grant sent copies of the dis- patch to both Sherman and McClernand via Co- lumbus, the only telegraph route ; but Forrest hav- ing just cut the line, the copies never reached their destination. The fortification of \'icksburg was begun by direction of General P)eauregard in April, 1862. After the surrender of New Orleans, General Mar- tin L. Smith, an accomplished engineer officer, was put in charge, and, pushing the work day and night, had six batteries completed with their arma- ment when the advance of Farragut's fleet ap- peared in the latter part of May. General Wil- liams, commanding the detachment of troops with the fleet, deciding that nothing could be done 98 THE MISSISSIPPI. 99 against the completed works with his command, Farragut returned, reaching New Orleans about the ist of June. Here he found urgent orders fnjm the Navy Department to capture Vickslnirg, and so clear the Mississippi River. C(jmmodore h^ar- ragut arrived before Vicksburg on the 25th of June with his fleet, accompanied by Commodore Por- ter and his mortar fleet, and carrying General Wil- liams with four thousand men. Commodore Davis arrived at the same time from Memphis with his fleet. General Williams set some twelve hundred negroes to work attemjiting to cut a canal across the neck of the peninsula opjjosite Vicksburg. The fleets bombarded with their guns and mortars, and General Williams with his fieldpieces. All the ten batteries originally designed by General Beaure- gard had now been completed, and their guns on the summit of the lofty blufifs fired composedly on the vessels far below. The damage to the batteries and their defenders was slight; the injury to the fleet was not serious. The 27th of July Farragut sailed down the river and Davis left for Mempliis. On the 26th of December (jeneral Sherman, leaving A. J. Smith's division at Milliken's i>end to destroy the railroad leading to the West from Vicksburg, proceeded with the other three divi- sions thirteen miles up the Yazoo to attack the batteries above Vicksburg and gain the plateau be- hind the city. The land between the Yazoo at that i)lace and the blufi's which were to be assailed was low, flat, subject to overflow, intersected with ponds, bayous, and morasses, covered with forest, undergrowth, and fallen timber, and under full view throughout from the bluffs. The ground chosen was bordered on the westerly side, on Sher- man's right as he faced the enemy, by a large arm of the Yazoo, or a bayou, called Old River; on the left, and about four miles distant, Chickasaw Bayou extended from the Yazoo to the front ; while along lOO GENERAL SHERMAN. the front stretched a chain of ponds, constituting an ancient abandoned bed of the river. On the 27th and 28th the command advanced to the chain of ponds and reconnoitered. Steele's division was on the left, beyond Chickasaw Bayou ; Morgan next, toward the right, separated from Steele by Chickasaw Bayou ; on Morgan's right was Morgan L. Smith ; and on the extreme right was A. J. Smith, who had rejoined the command the night of the i6th. Steele's route was blocked by a large pond, which communicated at one end with the Yazoo and at the other with Chickasaw Bayou. He was marched back to the Yazoo, fer- ried down stream, landed, and sent to the front, still forming the extreme left, but now between Chickasaw Bayou and G. W. Morgan. Morgan L. Smith was severely wounded, and General D. Stuart succeeded to the command of the division. The road to Vicksburg in front of A. J. Smith was found to be obstructed by unfordable waterways, from which the bridges had been removed, and by impassable swamps. Morgan used the only pon- toon train in the expedition to cross a small pond, supposing it to be the main chain of ponds in front, but, on arriving at the main pond, called " The Lake," he was so fortunate as to find a prac- ticable crossing. A narrow sandbar extended across " The Lake " in front cf M. L. Smith's di- vision, but beyond it was a high levee, above which on the slope of the bluff was a battery. A. J. Smith with the greater part of his division was moved up to M. L. Smith's division, now commanded by General David Stuart. The troops bivouacked in the assigned position during the night of the 28th. The enemy's batteries were near the foot of the blufif, from three to five hundred yards from Sher- man's line. About noon of the 2Qth General Sherman opened with artillery along his line. A. J. Smith's THE MISSISSIPPI. lOI division on the extreme right made a demonstra- tion out on the Vicksburg road. The Sixth Mis- souri, of M. L. Smith's division, temporarily com- manded by D. Stuart, crossed the narrow sand bar and reached the high levee. Unable to sur- mount this, and subjected to a vertical fire to which they could make no return, they scooped hollows into the face of the levee and squatted in this con- strained shelter until night gave them opportunity to slip back to camp one by one. De Courcv's brigade from Morgan's division and Blair's brigade, together with the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's bri- gade, made their way through a wilting fire to the Confederate works. Morgan and Steele with the rest of their respective divisions failed to follow, and the crippled brigades, unsupported, made no effec- tive lodgment, and returned with shattered ranks. The assault failed. It was a desperate assault to un- dertake, but General Sherman thought that if Mor- gan had heartily supported Blair a lodgment could have been made which would have opened the way for the rest of the force and insured success. Gen- eral Sherman's loss was nineteen hundred and twenty-nine, of which number one hundred and ninety-one were killed, nine himdred and eighty- two wounded, and seven hundred and fifty-six missing. The loss of Blair's brigade was seven hundred and forty-three. The Confederate loss during the two days of skirmishing and the as- sault on the 29th was fifty-seven killed, one hun- dred and twenty wounded, and ten missing. General Sherman, failing here, determined to attempt an assault at Haines's Bluft', farther up the Yazoo, and on the night of the 30th General Steele was sent with his division and a brigade to make the attack under cover of Porter's fleet. General Sherman was to resume the assault by Chickasaw Bayou when he should hear the guns of Steele's •attack. Steele sent word before night that a fog I02 GENERAL SHERMAN. prevented movement by the boats. Next day word was received that the moon would be shining all night and disclose the landing. Meanwhile it being obvious that the Confederates were receiving re- enforcements, General Sherman re-embarked the expedition on the 2d of January, 1863. He went immediately to the mouth of the river on learning that General McClernand was there. McClernand showed the order of the .Secretary of War, with the approval of the President endorsed, appointing him to command the expedition. Sher- man turned over the command, made report of what had been done, learned of the loss of Holly Springs and the retreat of Grant, and, by direction of McClernand, brought the transports with the troops to Milliken's Bend. On the 4th of Janu- ary General McClernand issued his order organ- izing the expeditionary force into two army corps, the first comprising the divisions of G. W. Mor- gan and A. J. Smith, and commanded by General Morgan ; the second commanded by General Sher- man, and comprising the division of Stuart, for- merly of M. L. Smith, and that of Steele. On the same day General Sherman called upon General McClernand on his boat and urged that an expedi- tion be sent to capture Fort Hindman, or Arkan- sas Post, on a bend of the Arkansas, about forty miles from its mouth. They visited the admiral on his boat in the night, and it was finally agreed that McClernand would take the whole of his command and that Porter would go with his fleet. The fort, a square work, with a bastion at each corner, surrounded by a ditch, stood on a bluff at the head of a sharp bend of the Arkansas, and commanded the river with its guns for more than a mile along each arm of the bend. It was armed with seventeen guns and defended by five thou- sand troops, commanded by General T. J. Church- THE MISSISSIPPI. 103 ill. It could be approached from the Mississippi either by entering the Arkansas at its mouth, or, by a shorter route, entering the White River at its mouth and passing thence by a cut-off to the Arkansas. The fleet reached the mouth of White River on the 8th ; the troops disembarked on the morning of the loth, about three miles below the fort, and advanced toward it, Sherman having the right and Morgan the left. The opposing troops fell back slowly, halting toward evening in a line with the north face, extending from the northwest bastion to an impassable swamp and bayou. Sher- man and Morgan followed, and formed a line ex- tending from the bayou to the river below the fort. General Sherman in person during the night cau- tiously advanced under cover of timber till he was near enough to hear the hum of voices, with the sound of tearing down wooden buildings, ham- rrrering, and other noises indicating the construc- tion of works, and remained listening till the bugle call of reveille in the Confederate camp notified him it was time to withdraw. While McClernand's force was getting into position. Porter moved his fleet close to the fort and opened a fire so heavy and destructive that the garrison could not reply, but could only seek shelter. Next morning the National line moved forward to about four hundred yards from the fort and the line of infantry intrenchments, about a mile in length, which the Confederates had thrown up in the night. At noon Porter opened with his whole fleet at a few hundred yards' distance ; his heavy ordnance plowed deep furrows in the ramparts, broke up the guns, and tore open the bombproofs. The garrison had to take refuge in the ditch of the fort. At the same time the forty-five field- pieces disposed along McClernand's line bom- barded the new works thrown up in the night. When they ceased, Sherman's and Morgan's men 104 GENERAL SHERMAN. Sprang forward to the assault, and the Confederate artillery and infantry met them with continuous volleys at short range and over bad ground. When the assaulting line had reached to about one hun- dred yards of the works, a large white flag and sundry small ones were raised above the works, and a cry ran along the Confederate line, " Run up the white flag, by order of General Churchill ! " One of the Confederate brigade commanders re- fused to stack arms, and held his men to the para- pet in position to defend it. He said he had re- ceived no order to surrender. Steele's division, facing the front of the parapet, were held halted by Major Hammond, of General Sherman's stafi, till General Churchill came up with General Sher- man and gave the order to surrender. General Churchill denied having given any previous order to surrender, while Colonel Garland, who surren- dered first, told General Churchill that he received the order to surrender from one of General Church- ill's staff. The question who first gave the order was never settled. The Confederates lost about one hundred killed and a greater number wounded ; prisoners number- ing forty-seven hundred and ninety-one were sent North next day. This number includes an Arkan- sas regiment which marched into the fort some hours after the surrender, unaware of the fact. The National loss, killed, w^ounded, and missing, was ten hundred and sixty-one. Seventeen guns, more or less damaged, and a large amount of stores — quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance — was captured. General McClernand remained three days shipping the captured stores and leveling the fort. General McClernand received on the 15th an order from General Grant to return to Milli- ken's Bend unless he had some object not visible from a distance. The expedition was all at Napo- leon by the 17th. General Grant made a visit of THE MISSISSIPPI. 105 two days and returned to Memphis, and the expe- dition proceeded to MilHken's Bend. When the first rumor was heard of a separate expedition down the Mississippi, General Halleck telegraphed in reply to a dispatch of inquiry from General Grant, November 6, 1862: "You have command of all troops sent to your department." General McClernand, on the 8th of January, 1863, while proceeding to Arkansas Post, sent a letter to General Grant, in which he said something about going beyond and co-operating with General Cur- tis's force in Arkansas. General Grant wrote in reply, ordering him to return to the Mississippi unless he was acting under orders of superior au- thority. He telegraphed to General Halleck, and received reply : *' You are hereby authorized to re- lieve General McClernand from command of the expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next in rank or taking it yourself." An order of the War Department, dated December 18, 1862, di- rected all the troops in General Grant's command to be organized into four army corps, to be num- bered Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth,.and Seven- teenth, to be commanded respectively by McCler- nand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. The new organization of the Army of the Ten- nessee gave to General McClernand the command of the corps which had been Morgan's, with the addition of the troops at Helena. Sherman con- tinued in command of his corps, increased by a brigade commanded by Hugh Ewing. The corps of McPherson comprised the divisions of McAr- thur, Logan, and Quinby. All the remaining troops in northern Mississippi, West Tennessee, and west Kentucky in General Grant's department composed Hurlbut's command, and were classified as Sixteenth Corps. The result of General Grant's inquiries during the visit at Napoleon impressed him more clearly I06 GENERAL SHERMAN. with the difficulty of his undertaking and the neces- sity for a large and well-equipped force. To at- tack Vicksburg from the front was impossible. The land north of the city, the low tract between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, was under water. The land to the south was dry, the bluffs of Vicks- burg continuing down the river. The only visible chance was to cross the Mississippi below the city and its fortifications, and a canal across the tongue of land in Louisiana running out toward Vicksburg seemed the most available means of getting the army below the city. When Grant so reported in a letter written on the 20th of January, the Presi- dent and Halleck cordially approved the scheme. Some years before the war the State of Louisi- ana began to cut a canal across this peninsula. General Beauregard, in drafting his scheme for the defense of Vicksburg, laid stress upon the erection of batteries placed so as to prevent the construc- tion of such a canal. And General Williams, com- manding the land force with Farragut's second ex- pedition, excavated the entire length of the canal, though not to an available depth. When General Grant arrived on the 30th of January, and found the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps at work on a canal beginning in an eddy above the point and ending in an eddy below, where there would be no aid from the river current, he saw the task was hopeless, but allowed the work to continue as giv- ing occupation to the men. Work continued till the 7th of March, when high water broke bounds and flooded the peninsula, making further work, except by dredge boats, impracticable. Soon after the batteries at Warrenton were armed with heavy guns, and reached with their fire the whole length of the canal, and it was definitely abandoned. Another project was to make a way by means of Lake Providence, an ancient abandoned chan- nel of the Mississippi, and separated from it by THE MISSISSIPPI. 107 the river levee. A little thread of a stream led from the end of the lake through a forest for six miles, most of the way being obstructed by stand- ing timber, and part of the way being lost in a marsh. But at the end of six miles it connected with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream. Having once reached this point, a boat, by dcxtrously fol- lowing the meshes of a network of bayous for two hundred miles, would reach the Mississippi, one hundred and fifty miles below Vicksburg. This work of cleaning out Baxter Bayou, and making a navigable channel from Lake Providence to Bayou Macon, was assigned to General McPherson. On the 1 8th of March he cut the levee which separated the lake from the river to fill up the little Bayou Baxter, so that proper implements could be floated to accomplish certain work which could be suc- cessfully done only by machinery, and reported that the passage would be ready for use by the end of the month. Before that time arrived, however, it had become unnecessary. The great levee of the Mississippi filled and blocked, nearly opposite Helena, the entrance to a bayou which had been a navigable channel, and had been used as a portion of an inland waterway from Memphis via the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, and the Yazoo Rivers. On the 23d of January the Confederates sent troops to obstruct this channel, which was easily done, as the bayou called Yazoo Pass was narrow and flowed through a thick for- est. General Grant, learning of this route, sent Colonel James H. Wilson of his stafT to cut through the levee, which was accomplished two days later by exploding a mine. The Confederates con- structed a work called Fort Pemberton, filling the space between the Tallahatchie and the Yallabusha, where they approach within five hundred yards of each other, five miles above the point where their junction forms the Yazoo. Levees were cut and I08 GENERAL SHERMAN. the land in front of the fort Hooded, niakinj^ it in- accessible to infantry. After vexatious delays, owing- to the difficulty of obtaining steamboats small enough to navigate the narrow and tortuous streams, it was the 23d of February by the time that General Ross left Helena with the first detachment ; and it was the 2d of March when his battered boats emerged from Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater. ten miles in a di- rect line from the Mississippi; and the nth of March when the expedition arrived before Fort Pemberton. After a futile bombardment, the ex- pedition withdrew. Cjcneral Grant, on receiving report of the actual finding of a navigable water- way to the highland in rear of Vicksburg. ordered General McPherson to gather up his corps from Lake Providence. Memphis, and afloat on trans- ports movmg with his whole command as fast as suitable boats could be procured. General Quinby. pushing forward with the first detach- ment, met Ross retreating, and took him back to participate in another attempt. After a vain search for dry land on which his men could camp, he pro- posed to march over to the Yallabusha. farther back, cross the Yallabusha on a bridge, and pass down the farther bank to the rear of Fort Pember- ton. The boat, returning to Helena for necessary supplies and material, met on the ist of April a messenger bringing an order for the abandon- ment of the expedition. General Sherman received a letter from General Grant on the morning of the i6th of March, stat- ing that he had just returned from a reconnois- sance up Steele's Bayou with Admiral Porter, and directing Sherman to have at the landing his pioneer corps and one regiment to cut aAvay trees, and to report in person for further instruction. In an hour General Giles A. Smith with the required detail was at the landinq:, and General Sherman THE MISSISSIPPI. 109 took the tug sent for him. After a conference Gen- eral Grant directed General Sherman to " proceed as nearly as practicable up Steele's Bayou through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with the gunboats there by any route they may take to get nito the Yazoo River, for the purpose of determin- ing the feasibility of getting an army through that to the east bank of that river, and at a point from which they can act advantageously against Vicks- burg," and added some detailed instructions. The proposed route by Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Deer Creek, Rolling Fork, Sun Flower River, and Yazoo River was two hundred miles, and was tortuous beyond description. Up to Deer Creek the thin rim of bordering bank hardly sepa- rated it from the expanse of water and swamp, dotted with clumps of dry earth and covered by thick forest and undergrowth. Admiral Porter, with his fleet of five ironclads, four mortar boats, and two tugs, found that the waterway was so nar- row that his boats could not turn ; some of the bends were so sharp that steering was not prac- ticable, and the bow and stern of the boats had to be controlled by hawsers from the shore ; the water in places was so filled with a growing plant that, the propellers became clogged and useless, and could be released only by backing and partially unwinding the impediment ; overhanging trees swept off smokestacks, pilot houses, and all ex- posed woodwork; and felled trees floating in the river were such obstructions that the boats were used as rams and butted them against the bank. General Sherman sent Giles A. Smith's brigade and Kirby Smith's brigade up the Mississippi to Gwin's plantation, where Steele's Bayou, making a bend, approaches within a mile of the Missis- sippi, and proceeded himself on the 17th with his stafif up the bayou. He overtook Porter just as the fleet was emerging from the difificulties of Black no GENERAL SHERMAN. Bayou into the broader stream of Deer Creek, which llovved through land mostly solid and par- tially occupied by plantations. Sherman continued with Porter a few miles, and returned in a tug loaned to him by the admiral to comply with the admiral's recpiest to have Jilack JJayou cleared. Setting the Eighth Missouri to work, he sent the two small steamboats which had brought up this regiment and the pioneers back to G win's ])lanta- tion, and brought up Cules A. Smith with two more regiments. During the 19th Porter's heavy guns were heard, and in the night a messenger arrived with a letter from Porter stating that he was blocked and beset, and asking for speedy aid. Sherman immediately sent Giles A. Smith forward with all the force at hand, and proceded himself in a canoe down stream in the night for re-enforce- ments. Pie met one of the steamboats coming up with a second load of soldiers. He filled an empty coal barge with others who were detailed to work on the bayou, and, towing it with a navy tug, re- turned up stream. When the boats could ])rocee(l no farther in the darkness, he landed and marched through canebrake and swamp with the troops, carrying lighted candles, till they reached open land by Deer Creek, and there lay down to rest. Resuming the march at daylight, stimulated by the nearer sound of the navy guns, they hurried on till they met a party of Giles A. Smith's com- mand sent down to prevent the enemy from ob- structing the channel in the rear of the gunboats. General Sherman came just in time to encounter a Confederate detachment arriving for that pur- pose, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove them off. Admiral Porter, after Sherman left him, had continued pushing slowly up Deer Creek until he arrived, on the 18th, nearly to Rolling Fork, en- countering obstacles, but seeing no enemy. On the 19th a field battery opened upon his boats, and THE MISSISSIPPL III sharpshooters, dispersed everywhere under cover, shot every man on them who ojjpeared outside of sheher. Unable to get his men out to remove obstructions while the enemy sunk a coal boat in rear of the fleet, he thought of blowing up his ves- sels, but first sent to Sherman for relief. When the relief came the sunk coal boat v/as removed, and the vessels, backing dov.n stream with slow, toilsome, and aided progress, made thirty miles in three days and escaped the toils. The expe- dition failed, and was so reported to Grant on the 27th. These futile eflforts demonstrated that the army could not be conveyed across the submerged low- land that lay between the Yazf^x) and the Missis- sippi, extending from Vicksburg nearly to Mem- phis, and that Vicksburg could not be turned by the north. To attack it in front was impossible. It only remained to march o\'erland to the .south and find some crossing below, or else to abandon the expedition, return to Memphis, rebuild the rail- road, and march down Central Mississippi, keep- ing his line of communication and supply pro- tected. General .Sherman preferred the latter plan. Militar}' authorities generally agree, at least that, considering the great risk of defeat and the disas- trous consequences of defeat below Vicksburg, the approach by land from Memphis should have been made in the first place. General Grant, always te- nacious of purpose, thought it better to take the risk than demoralize his army and shock the peo- ple by confession of failure. And he trusted some- thing to disconcerting the enemy by the boldness of an attack from the south. General Sherman wrote General Grant a letter giving his view. Gen- eral Grant made no reply, pursued his own plan, and long after the campaign was completed re- turned the letter without comment. General Sher- man, having done his part by giving his views. 112 GENERAL SHERMAN. supported his chief as loyally and as heartily as if his own suggestion had been accepted. Headquarters Fifteenth Army Corps, Camp near Vicksburg, April 8, i86j. Colonel]. A. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Grant. Sir: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons which I will not name) that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of a campaign. Unless this be done, there are men who will, in any result falling below the popular standard, claim that tlieir advice was unheeded, and that fatal consecjuence resulted therefrom. My own opinions are : 1. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of the other grand armies of the United States. 2. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St. Louis to the vicinity ot Little Rock, Ark., supplies collected there while the river is full, and land communica- tion with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White and Madison on the St. Francis River. 3. That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchie rivers as can be gained and fortified, be held, and the main army be transported thither by land and water ; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry. 4. That the line of the Yallabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Canton ; and lastly, where the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crosses the same river (Big Black). The capture of Vicksburg would result. 5. That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to ex- ceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point ; this force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg — Haines's Bluff, or Yazoo City. 6. I do not doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) as a mili- tary channel to supply an army large enough to operate against Jackson, Miss., or the Black River Bridge ; and such a channel will be very vulnerable to a force coming from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a THE MISSISSIPPI. 113 fleet that should navigate the lower reach of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River. 7. The chief reason for operating solely by water was the season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha Rivers. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to hold it and make crops this year. I make these suggestions with the request that General Grant will read them, and give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. 1 would prefer that he should not answer this letter, but merely give it as much or little weight as it deserves. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic sup- port as though conceived by myself. I do not beheve that General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson this spring. I am, etc., W. T. Sherman, Major -General. General Sherman had trouble again with the newspapers. Thomas W. Knox, correspondent of the New York Herald, accompanied Sherman's expedition to Helena, knowing it was against or- ders, and published in his correspondence a state- ment of the organization of the expedition and personal abuse of the general. In conversation he said he had no personal ill will, but that he had tried to break General Sherman down because he was opposed to newspaper men. A court-martial in February found that Knox had willfully dis- obeyed orders in accompanying the expedition, but the court attached no criminality thereto ; found that he had published the organization of the ex- pedition, but also found that he had not thereby given information to the enemy ; found that he was guilty of violation of orders of the War De- partment by publishing correspondence concern- ing the operations of the army without sanction by the general in command, and sentenced him to be removed beyond the lines of the army, not to re- turn again under pain of imprisonment. On ap- 114 GENERAL SHERMAN. peal, President Lincoln, on the 20th of March, revoked the sentence so far as to permit Knox to return and to stay if General Grant should con- sent ; otherwise to leave. General Grant, on the 6th of April, refused to give permission unless Gen- eral Sherman would first consent ; and Knox, hav- ing made neither retraction nor apology, nor ex- pressed regret, Sherman refused. General Sherman did not, perhaps, recognize a difference between a government carrying on a war on behalf of a people and a people aroused carrying on a war through the instrumentality of the government. He did not appreciate the crav- ing for information of a people wrought to a fever of enthusiasm. He was military in every fiber. His care was to make his army efificient. He saw that the presence of any non-combatant was, to some extent, an incumbrance, and the presence of a stirrer up of disaffection was a mischief. When clearly satisfied as to what his duty was, no oppo- sition, no fear of consequences, would deter him from performing it. The letters of Lincoln, Grant, and Sherman in this case are characteristic. Executive Mansion, Washington, March 20, i86j. Whom it may concern : Whereas it appears to my satisfaction that Thomas W. Knox, a correspondent of the New York Herald, has been, by the sentence of a court-martial, excluded from the military department under command of Major-(ieneral Grant, and also that General Thayer, president of the court-martial which rendered the sentence, and Major-General McCler- nand, in command of a corps of that department, and many other respectable persons, are of opinion that Mr. Knox's of- fense was technical rather than willfully wrong, and that the sentence should be revoked ; now, therefore, said sentence is hereby so far revoked as to allow Mr. Knox to return to General Grant's headquarters, and to remain if General Grant shall s^ive his express assent, and to again leave the department if General Grant shall refuse such assent. A. Lincoln. THE MISSISSIPPI. 115 Before Vicks^vrg, A/>n7 6, iS6j. Thomas W. Knox, Correspondent Nexv York Herald : The letter of the President of the United States author- izing you to return to these headquarters, and to remain with my consent, or leave if such consent is withheld, has been shown me. You came here first in positive violation of an order from General Sherman. Because you were not pleased with his treatment of army followers who had violated his order, you attempted to break down his influence with his command and to blast his reputation with the public. You made insinuations against his sanity, and said many things which were untrue, and, so far as your letter had influence, calculated to affect the public service unfavorably. Gen- eral Sherman is one of the ablest soldiers and purest men in the country. You have attacked him and been sen- tenced to expulsion from this department for the offense. While I would conform to the slightest wish of the President where it is formed upon a fair representation of both sides of any question, my respect for General Sherman is such that in this case I must decline, unless General Sherman first gives his consent to your remaining. U. S. (iRANT, Major-General. Headquarters Fifteenth Army Corps, Camp near Vicksburg, Ap)il S, i86j. Major-General (]iRANT : Dear Sir : I received last night the copy of your answer to Mr. Knox's application to reside near your headquarters. I thank you for the manner and substance of that reply. Many regard Knox as unworthy the notice he has received. This is true, but I send you his letter to me and my answer. Observe in his letter to me, sent long before I could have heard the result of his application to you, he makes the as- sertion that you had no objection, but rather wanted him back, and only as a matter of form required my assent. He regretted a difference between a " portion of the army and the press." The insolence of these fellows is insupport- able. I know they are encouraged, but I know human na- ture well enough, and that they will be the first to turn against their patrons. Mr. Lincoln, of course, fears to incur the enmity of the Herald, but he must rule the Herald or the Herald will rule him ; he can take his choice. I have been foolish and unskillful in drawing on me the shafts of the press. By opposing mob law in California I once before drew down the press, but after the smoke Il5 GENERAL SHERMAN. cleared off, and the people saw where they were drifting to, they admitted I was right. If the press be allowed to run riof and write up and write down at their pleasure, there is an end to a constitutional government in America and an- archy must result. Even now the real people of our country begin to fear and tremble at it, and look to our armies as the anchor of safety, of order, submission to authority, bound together by a real government, and not by the clamor of a demoralized press and crowd of demagogues. As ever, your friend, W. T. Sherman. TURNING OPERATION TICKSBUKG CAMPAIGIS^ 1863 CHAPTER VI. VICKSBURG. The plan to attack Vicksburg from the south had no possible chance of success except by first obtaining control of the river below the city and then by veiling in some degree the point of real attack. The Confederates had on the 25th of Feb- ruary in their fleet below, the Queen of the West, the most powerful ram on the Mississippi, and the Indianola, which had the heaviest armament, both of them captured from the National command. The Indianola, captured on the 24th, was sunk near the Mississippi shore, being repaired from the in- juries received at the time of capture. Admiral Porter had an imitation monitor constructed — a flatboat covered with a deck, having a slight frame turret with a huge wooden gun projecting from it. Some barrels, placed one above another, made a stack, whence issued smoke from burning wet straw ; all was painted black. It was set adrift just before dawn on the morning of the 26th of February. All the batteries along the river poured their hottest fire into the little craft as it seemed to steam leisurely by, contemptuously secure in its own invulnerability. Telegrams were sent down the river and to Richmond, excitedly announcing the passage down stream of a monitor. As it turned the point, the Queen of the West was just rounding the bend below, ascending. At the sight of the strange vessel emerging unharmed from the furious cannonade, the Queen of the West fled 117 Il8 GENERAL SHERMAN. clown stream, joined by her consorts, entered one of the western affluents of the river, and took no further part in the war. The mock monitor was carried by an eddy to the right bank, and, lying there with the stern ashore, seemed to be survey- ing the Indianola opposite and lower down. Then pushed out by some of General McClernand's men who were bivouacking near by, it was carried by the current directly toward the Indianola. The workmen wrecked the guns and set fire to the hull, and the Confederate fleet vexed the river no more. About lo p. M., April i6th, Admiral Porter started with seven gunboats and three loaded trans- ports. The enemy illumined the river with bon- fires on both shores. The batteries maintained continuous cannonade, while the passing fleet raked the shore batteries at short range. Every vessel was hit, but little serious damage was done except the loss of one transport and several coal barges. On the 22d of April six transports loaded with sup- plies, and towing twelve barges, all manned by volunteers from the army, chiefly from Logan's di- vision, passed down, losing only one transport. Toward the end of March Steele's division of Sherman's corps was sent to the Deer Creek coun- try, about one hundred and fifty miles north of Vicksburg, to subsist his command on the coun- try and destroy what he could not use. On the 9th of April General Pcmberton telegraphed to Richmond that Grant's real movement appeared to be through Deer Creek, while there were rumors of a movement across the Mississippi, below Vicks- burg, which he did not credit. He was ordered by General Joseph Johnston to send some of his troops to Chattanooga. Toward the end of April, when Grant was about to cross the river. Pember- ton directed five thousand men in Vicksburg to be held in readiness to move to Grand Gulf ; but, being perplexed by a demonstration which Sher- VICKSBURG. 119 man made up the Yazoo against Haines's Bluff, and uncertain which was the real movement and which was the demonstration, he was holding the men in Vicksburg when Grand Gulf was evacuated. About the middle of April detachments sent from Memphis and La Grange advanced slowly into northwestern Mississippi. The Confederate troops in northern Mississippi concentrated to op- pose them. The northeastern portion of the State being left bare, General Grierson, with seventeen hundred cavalry, dashed across the boundary and was destroying railroad far within the State before there was any suspicion of his movement. By rap- idly moving from place to place, sending out de- tachments in diverse directions to destroy special objects, he distracted General Pemberton, who, having but a scanty amount of cavalry, was in con- stant receipt of messages reporting the presence of National troops at points remote from each other at the same time. He wore out brigades, dispatch- ing and recalling them, and hurrying them to points where they were too late or were never needed. Grierson reached the National force at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May with slight loss, having destroyed much railroad and other property, and withdrawn General Pemberton's attention from Grant at the very time that Grant was pushing for the passage of the Mississippi. On the 20th of April the first order to march was issued. At that time McClernand's four di- visions were assembled near New Carthage ; two of McPherson's divisions at Milliken's Bend, with third on the way thither from Lake Providence ; two of Sherman's divisions just below Milliken's Bend, and the third, Steele's, in the northern Yazoo country, but under orders to rejoin the corps. Portions of the route lay through saturated ooze, in which wheels sunk to the hub, and which gave no purchase to the struggling teams. In 9 I20 GENERAL SHERMAN. places doubled teams barely moved a single field- piece, and the way was strewn with fragments of wagons and their contents. A futile effort was made by the fleet on the 29th of April to disman- tle the works which crowned the summit of the bluf¥ at Grand Gulf, which was there over one hundred feet high, and the army continued to march to a point opposite Bruinsburg, an imagi- nary village at the mouth of Bayou Pierre. Mc- Clernand began moving his corps across the river at daylight of April 30th, and finished at noon. Four hours were then taken for issue of rations before the march began. The bottom land at Bruinsburg is but little above high water. The blufT is a hundred feet high. The ascent was by a roadway cut into the bluff. The tenacious soil preserved the perpen- dicularity of the side walls of the cut, so that the roadway was, in fact, a narrow trench with lofty vertical sides. A small party could have prevented an army from ascending by it. Fortunately no de- fender was present or near. McClernand's corps, once in motion, advanced with vigor till after mid- night, when the advance encountered the enemy within four miles of Port Gibson. After a slight skirmish, the troops lay down to wait for daylight. Green's brigade (Confederate) was just arriv- ing at Port Gibson when it encountered McCler- nand's advance. When Tracy's brigade arrived, a little before break of day of the ist of May, they took position about three miles from Port Gibson, across the two roads into which the road from Bruinsburg forks. Green taking the southern fork and Tracy the northern. The country was a con- fused jumble of sharp ridges, with deep intervening valleys filled with impenetrable thickets of cane and brush, through which it was difficult for a man to force his way, and over which it was impossible to preserve alignment or formation. General Mc- VICKSBURG. 121 Clernand early in the morning led the attack on Green's brigade with Hovey's and Carr's divisions, and sent Osterhaus to assault Tracy. About nine o'clock a persistent charge carried the hill, cap- turing two guns and four hundred prisoners. Just then Baldwin arrived and posted his brigade ad- vantageously on a ridge a mile in the rear, and Green fell back and joined him. Osterhaus early had a slight success, and was able to make no far- ther advance. About noon Colonel Cockerell ar- rived with three regiments, two of which were assigned to Baldwin and one to Tracy. In the afternoon Logan arrived with two brigades, ac- companied by Grant and McPherson. Stevenson was sent to McClernand upon his demand for aid, and J. E. Smith was sent to strengthen Osterhaus. The Confederates fought with judgment and gal- lantry. Forced from one position, they retired to another and continued the conflict. It was sunset before they gave up the field, and dark before Grant entered Port Gibson. The Confederate force was eighty-five hundred ; the National army numbered twenty-three thousand. According to the Confed- erate reports, their loss was four hundred and forty- eight killed and wounded and three hundred and eighty-seven missing. The National loss was eight hundred and fifty killed and wounded and twenty- five missing. General Grant reported five hun- dred prisoners taken, besides the wounded. On the morning of the 3d of May General Mc- Pherson moved for Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big Black River. At the same time General Bowen, having evacuated Grand Gulf, was pushing for the same point. McPherson arrived in time to drive away a rear guard who were beginning the de- struction of the frail bridge over which the Con- federate troops had just crossed. Stevenson's di- vision, which had been held in Vicksburg by fear that Sherman's demonstration at Haines's Bluf¥ 122 GENERAL SHERMAN. was the real attack, had finally reached the ferry, tired and worn, only in time to be ordered to re- trace their steps in haste. While McPherson rested three days at the ferry, and McClernand at Willow Springs, army wagons were sent back for ammunition and captured wag- ons for rations. Officers' blankets were carried on captured mules, and officers and men slept with- out tents. Sherman received on the 30th of April an order from Grant to cease his demonstration before Haines's Bluff and follow McPherson, leav- ing one division to guard trains and supplies. Leaving General Blair to convoy the supply trains when they should be ready, he pushed along the road obstructed by wagons of the Seventeenth Corps, and crossed the river at Grand Gulf on the 7th of May. According to information received, Pemberton had drawn his detachments into Vicksburg, and General Joe Johnston was assembling a new force at Jackson. On the 7th General McClernand moved by the direct road toward Edwards' Sta- tion, on the railroad between Vicksburg and Jack- son, to be followed by Sherman, and McPherson proceeded toward Jackson by Utica and Raymond. In the morning of the 12th Logan, having the ad- vance of McPherson's corps, met parties of mount- ed men, who fell back firing, compelling him to de- ploy two regiments, one on each side of the road, to push them back. Gregg's brigade, just arrived from Port Hudson, was discovered on the farther side of a small creek supporting two batteries. Both lines advanced. The Eighth Michigan Bat- tery was run forward to the bridge over which the road crossed the creek ; the Second Brigade rushed to the creek, using the farther bank as a breast- work, while on its right the Confederates took pos- session of the creek, using it as a cover against the First Brigade. The Third Brigade, on the right VICKSBURG. 123 of the First, crossed the creek and turned the flank of the enemy. Crocker's division beginning to come up, Gregg withdrew his command and re- treated. McPherson advanced to Raymond and beyond before going into bivouac for the night. The National loss was sixty-six killed, three hun- dred and thirty-nine wounded, thirty-seven miss- ing; total, four hundred and forty-two. Of these, four hundred and forty were in Logan's division and two in Crocker's. Gregg's loss, according to his reported statement, was seventy-three killed, two hundred and fifty-one wounded, and one hun- dred and ninety missing. Randall W. McGavock, colonel of Tenth Tennessee, is mentioned in this statement as mortally wounded. Gregg in his re- port of the battle says McGavock was killed. Finding that a force was gathering in Jackson, Grant ordered McPherson to approach Jackson by way of Clinton, and Sherman to march thither through Raymond and Mississippi Springs. Gen- eral Joseph Johnston, who had just arrived from Chattanooga to take supreme command, learning in the night of the 13th that a force was approaching from Mississippi Springs, in addition to the col- umn approaching from Clinton, put General John Adams in command of the army trains, and di- rected him to move them out on the road toward Canton. He placed General Gregg in command of the troops who were to hold the National force in check until the trains should be out on the road. Gregg's command comprised his own brigade, commanded by Colonel Farcjuharson ; Gist's bri- gade, commanded by Colonel Cokjuit, General Gist being detained east of Pearl River with other troops ; Walker's l^rigade ; two field batteries ; and Third Kentucky mounted infantry. General Gregg moved Colquit out beyond the fortifications of the city, three miles toward Clinton, and planted his brigade on the summit of rising ground which 124 GENERAL SHERMAN. sloped down to a swampy hollow. The open ground extended in undulating meadow for a mile to the front. Both his flanks were protected by woods. Farquharson was posted off to the right of Colquit, and Walker in reserve. The Third Kentucky, with a regiment and a battery from Walker's brigade, was sent to guard the road from Mississippi Springs. Sherman, advancing after a brief conflict, forced his antagonist back into the fortifications ; while General Sherman engaged the works in front, Cap- tain Pitman, engineer, and the Ninety-fifth Ohio found an unoccupied space on the flank. Steele's division, rapidly moving to this point, came upon the Confederates from the rear, and took two hun- dred and fifty prisoners. The rest escaped and joined the trains on the Canton road, McPherson sent Crocker's division against Colquit. The di- vision was deployed at nine o'clock, but a heavy downpour of rain delayed the movement till nearly eleven. Then the deployed line advanced as if on parade, under fire while on rising ground, and pausing in the hollows to close up gaps made by casualties and dress the line. When the steady ap- proach neared the works, Colquit drew out his command, and, falling back, was joined by Walker. Farquharson, being already north of the Clinton road, marched across the country to the Canton road, and all retreated with the wagon train seven miles to the north. Sherman's loss was six killed, twenty-two wounded, and four missing; McPher- son's, thirty-six killed, two hundred and twenty- nine wounded, and three missing. The casualties in Gist's brigade, as reported by Colonel Colquit. were seventeen killed, sixty-four wounded, and one hundred and eighteen missing. There are no reports from the rest of Gregg's command. Gen- eral McPherson estimated the Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and missing at eight hundred and VICKSBURG. 125 forty-five. The armament of the fortifications — thirty-five guns and their ammunition — besides large stores of pubhc property, were captured. General Grant learned in Jackson that Johnston had sent an order to Pemberton to attack Grant's rear. McPherson was ordered to move early next morning, the 15th, back through Clinton, leaving Sherman in Jackson to destroy public property. McClernand, whose divisions were on the roads converging toward Edwards's Station, was ordered to advance cautiously. Pemberton, who for sev- eral days had been making a brilliant display of in- capacity, had finally resolved to move to the south and cut Grant's communications, unaware that Grant had cut loose from the Mississippi and had no communications, but fully aware that this move- ment was in flat disobedience of Johnston's order directing Pemberton to move north and efifect a junction with him. On the morning of the i6th Pemberton, lying on a crossroad just south of Champion's Hill, re- ceived from Johnston a reiteration of the order to join him, and proceeded to obey, first sending his wagons by the road over Champion's Hill, and ordering the troops to follow. Champion's Hill is an aljrupt elevation in the plain a little to the east of Baker's Creek ; it is less than one hun- dred feet high, is over one mile in length from east to west, terminates in a point toward the west, and has a width of more than half a mile at its eastern face. The road running west from Clinton to Vicksburg, instead of continuing in the lowland around the northern and west slopes of the hill to the bridge over Baker's Creek, turns directly to the south, making a right angle, ascends the northeast corner to the summit, and there, turn- ing again to the west, follows the summit of the ridge and continues west to the bridge. Hovev, commanding one of McClernand's di- 126 GENERAL SHERMAN. visions, bivouacked for the night at Bolton, on the Chnton road, about four miles in advance of McPherson. A crossroad led south to Osterhaus and Carr, who were on the Middle road to Ed- wards's Station. A. J. Smith was more than a mile farther south of them, on the direct road from Raymond to Edwards's Station, and Blair was in their rear in Raymond. Pemberton lay in line facing to the east, his left at the base of the south- east corner of Champion's Hill, where a crossroad ascended that joined the Clinton road on the sum- mit, and his right across the southern or direct Raymond road to Edwards. Early in the morning Pemberton sent his train to cross Baker's Creek on the way to join John- ston. When his column was about to march, Lor- ing's pickets were attacked by A. J. Smith's skir- mishers, and Bowen's by Osterhaus's, and Pember- ton found he had a battle on his hands. Hovey's skirmishers met Stevenson's pickets not far from Champion's house about ten o'clock, and pushed them back to the northeast base of the hill. About eleven o'clock McPherson arrived with General Grant. Hovey charged up the long slope, and after a fierce and stubborn fight drove back the right wing of Stevenson's division, carried the sum- mit, and captured eleven guns. Meanwhile two of Logan's brigades, J. E. Smith's and Leggett's, were brought against the steep and rugged north- ern face of the hill, on Hovey's right, and forced the left of Stevenson's division back up the slopes. Logan brought his Third Brigade up in extension of his right, and by a quick charge broke Steven- son's line and captured a complete battery. Ste- venson, finding the National troops were working their way dangerously near the road to Baker's Creek bridge, shifted his line to the left to cover the line of retreat. Pemberton ordered Bowen to close up to connect with Stevenson. Bowen found VICKSBURG. 127 Hovey in possession of the summit, and fell upon him with a furious assault. The struggle was se- vere, but Hovey was forced back and, still fight- ing, pushed down the hill, losing all the captured guns but two. Crocker soon appearing with his division, joined Hovey's jaded but plucky men ; together they surged up the hill with irresistible onset. Bowen was overcome, routed, scattered. Loring, still in the lowland south of the hill, was hastening to Bowen's relief when the broken division, pouring down the hill, disordered his ranks. The artillery of the pursuers opened upon him, and Osterhaus attacked him in force. Bowen escaped across Baker's Creek by the ford. One brigade of Stevenson's division reached the bridge. Carr's division of McClernand's corps by a rapid movement then seized the bridge, forcing the re- mainder of Stevenson's command to the ford. Bowen remained at the ford to hold it for Loring till forced by the approach of the National troops to let go. Loring's wagons had gone forward with the train. Wandering in the night to find a lower ford, he lost his battery in a swamp. Late in the night he reached the ford, but there learned that Edwards's Station was already occupied by Grant. The National loss was four hundred and ten killed, eighteen hundred and forty-four wounded, and one hundred and eighty-seven missing, mak- ing a total of twenty-four hundred and forty-one. Of this loss, one hundred and fifty was sustained by the four divisions under McClernand's com- mand, and twenty-two hundred and ninety-one by the divisions under the immediate command of Grant and McPherson. The Confederate loss, ac- cording to division and brigade reports, was : Killed, three hundred and eighty ; wounded, ten hundred and eighteen ; missing, twenty-four hun- dred and forty-one ; total, thirty-eight hundred and thirty-nine. General Pemberton in his report of 128 GENERAL SHERMAN. casualties omits Loring's division, and differs from Stevenson as to the loss in his division. Where a victory was so vital and so crushing, it seems un- gracious to suggest that it might have been more complete. Yet the suggestion forces itself that if the four divisions with McClernand had fought with the same alacrity and ardor as the other three, the result would have been the capture of Pem- berton and his entire command, and the immediate completion of the campaign. Pemberton's shattered legions trudged wearily to the Big Black and crossed through the night. The high bluff which formed the west bank of the river and dominated the plain in front was left va- cant, to be occupied by Loring's division in sup- port of the troops holding the bridge head on the lowland east of the river. But Loring was wander- ing about east of Baker's Creek, and never came. Bowen's division did not cross, but remained to aid Vaughan's brigade, fresh from Vicksburg, in holding the bridge head. The Big Black there forms a deep re-entrant curve. The bridge head was a line of earthwork a mile in length, running north and south, the northern end resting upon the river and the southern end touching a cypress swamp which bordered on the river below. Twenty gims were in position ; along the front of the works and parallel to them was a bayou extending from the river above to the swamp below. Trees and boughs had been thrown into the slough, making it at once a ditch and abattis. Early on the morning of the 17th McClernand moved from Edwards's Station. Osterhaus in front, followed by A. J. Smith, advanced over the rolling, cultivated land along the south side of the road, and deployed when near the Confederate intrench- ments. Smith deployed on his left. Artillery opened fire, and skirmishers pushed forward and engaged. While this mild combat was going on. VICKSBURG. 129 Carr's division advanced through woods that bor- dered the north side of the road, extending to the river, near the northern extremity of the intrench- nients. While the defenders of the works were engaged with the force in their front, Carr's com- mand, leaping from the woods, rushed over the intervening ground, plunged through the bayou, clambered over the works, and was within them. The Confederate troops were dismayed. The fear of being cut off from retreat made a panic. There was a mad rush for the bridges. Osterhaus and Smith hastened up. Eighteen of the twenty guns, with their ammunition, fourteen hundred muskets, and seventeen hundred and fifty-one prisoners were captured. The bridges prepared for combustion were fired, and the battle was over by nine o'clock. McClernand's loss was thirty-nine killed, two hun- dred and thirty-seven wounded, and three missing ; all but ten killed, twenty-one wounded, and two missing were of Carr's division. Neither Bowen nor Vaughan made reports, and the number of killed, wounded, and drowned is not known. General Sherman, in Jackson, on the morning of the 16th, received order from General Grant to send forward one division immediately, and to fol- low with the other as soon as his work of destroy- ing railroad and other public property should be accomplished. In pursuance of this order, Sher- man arrived at Bolton after dark, and was there informed by one of General Grant's stafif that he was to go to Bridgeport and there cross the Big Black. Sherman reached Bridgeport at noon next day. General Blair, who had arrived with the sup- ply train at Raymond on the 15th, and been at- tached to McClernand's command on the i6th, ar- rived at Bridgeport a few hours earlier. Sherman having the only pontoon train in the army, his bridge was laid by night, and two divisions of his corps were over by daybreak of the i8th. Captain I30 GENERAL SHERMAN. llickenloopcr, chief engineer of the Seventeenth Corps, and Captain Tresilian, chief engineer of Logan's division, constructed a bridge for the Sev- enteenth Corps. A framework of stout timbers, filled with cotton bales standing on end and tightly compressed, and the whole covered by a Hooring, was built on the shore, launched, and held in place by cables. A twenty-pound J'arrott gun sank the structure fourteen inches, _ leaving an excess of buoyancy of sixteen inches. General Sherman, starting early in the morning of the 1 8th, approached the northeast corner of the defenses of Vicksburg, and, by order of General Grant, moved into position facing the north front of the works, from the Grave Yard road to the river. lYMuberton, finding the line occupied by his command too extended for his force, withdrew his troops, in the night of the i8th, to his inner line, being not only shorter but also much stronger. In the morning of the 19th Sherman occupied the abandoned line, and sent a cavalry regiment out to Haines's IMuff. The works were found aban- doned, fourteen heavy guns in position uninjured, and the magazines full of ammunition and stores. The cavalry colonel signaled to a gunboat in the Yazoo River, turned over the place to the com- mander, and, having opened conmiunication with the fleet, returned to camp. McClernand and McPhcrson began to arrive toward evening of the i8th, and were placed facing the east front of the Confederate line, McPherson next to Sherman and McClernand on McPherson's left. The works were attacked the afternoon of the iQth. Assault was made at the Grave Yard road by Blair's division of the Thirteenth Corps. The road was swept by a crossfire of artillery and musketry. Tuttle's brigade was held in reserve by the road, while Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades charged on the right of the road and Kilby Smith's VICKSBURG, 131 on the left. The charging hnes descended the gul- lied bank of the ravine, pushed through thickets and entanglement of felled trees, clambered up the farther side, and reached the base of the parapet, but could get no farther. They remained tiiere till night, and were then withdrawn. The Tlfteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps advanced toward the works and engaged them with musketry and field artillery, but did not assault. The loss of the as- sailants in killed and wounded was nine hundred and thirty-four. Of these, seven hundred and five were in Sherman's corps. The defensive line of Vicksburg was a continu- ous ridge, forming a natural rampart encircling the city, resting upon the river aljove the city, and three miles below it. The ridge was of uniform height, making a level summit, narrow except where projecting spurs added width. General Pemberton said the length of the line was eight miles. General Grant's engineers after the siege estimated it at five and a half miles. Beginning at Fort Hill, tlie site of an early Spanish fort, a high point overlooking the river north of the city, it ran due east for a mile, then turning abruptly to the south, and continuing in that direction to the Jackson Railway, it there began to curve west- ward, and finally ran west before reaching the river below the city. The front of the first mile, facing the north, was precipitous, in places vertical, mak- ing a wall one hundred feet high, rising from the sloping bottom of a deep valley. Along the east fr(jnt ran a deej) ravine, crossed in three places by ridges forming natural causeways, over which ran three roads leading fjut frfjm the city. The Grave Yard road was a little distance south of the north- east angle, the Baldwin road was close by the Jackson Railway, and the Jackson road nearly mid- w^ay between the other two. Opposed to the north front was a ridge of very irregular contour, the 132 GENERAL SHERMAN. summit being from four hundred to six hundred yards from the Confederate works. The land to the east of the city was a labyrinth of ridges and ravines, preventing any movements in line, but protecting the camps of the investing army from the fire of the besieged. Batteries, mostly open to the rear, but some inclosed, were erected on commanding points, and were connected by massive infantry intrenchments, continuous along the entire line except at one place. Just south of the railroad Waul's Texas Legion occupied a wooded portion of the main ridge, un- fortified until after the 22d of May, which was pro- tected by a fortified spur projecting to the east along the railroad and then turning to the south, forming a valley between it and Waul's line. Smith's division held the northern front, and around the angle to and across the Grave Yard road. Forney's division, with the battery of Waul's Legion, and re-enforced in case of attack by Bow- en's reserve division, extended from Smith to the railroad. S. D. Lee's brigade of Stevenson's di- vision, with the Texas Legion, filled the line from the railroad to Garrett's Fort, and Stevenson's other three brigades continued from Garrett's Fort to the river. Sherman covered Smith's front, Steele's division beginning at the river, Blair's con- tinuing around across the Grave Yard road, and Tuttle in reserve. McPherson was opposed to Forney. Ransom's brigade, detached from McAr- thur's division, was next to Blair ; Logan's division next to Ransom, crossing the Jackson turnpike road ; and Quinby, who had resumed command of his division, temporarily commanded by Crocker, between Logan and McClernand's right. Logan and Quinby held each one brigade in reserve. Mc- Clernand had one brigade north of the railroad, in front of Forney's right. The rest of his com- mand was in front of S. D. Lee, extending from VICKSBURG. 133 the railroad to Garrett's Fort. From McClernand to the river, a distance of more than two miles, the ground was unoccupied. When casualties and sickness diminished the number of defenders, For- ney contracted his division toward the south and Smith his to the west, leaving a vacant space about the Grave Yard road. Green's brigade of Bowen's reserve division filled the vacancy. The day on which General Green moved in he raised his head to look over the parapet and see the ground in front. A rifle ball passed through his head, killing him instantly. The experience of the 19th showed that the de- fenses could not be carried by a dash, and that the veteran troops within the works had recovered their accustomed spirit. General Grant ordered a prepared assault to be made at 10 a. m. on the 22d. All the guns in position opened fire in the morn- ing. At ten o'clock the bombardment ceased, and the assaulting parties w'ith their supports leaped forward. A spur with rugged surface, projecting from the north face of the defensive line, gave a possible though hardly practicable approach to the works. Wood's brigade of Steele's division at- tempted the ascent. As they toiled up, clambering over the rough ascent, exposed to fire from the whole line, the ranks were thinned at every step. A detachment made their way to the base of the works, but finally the rest had to seek shelter in hollows and behind fallen timber. Blair again at- tacked by the Grave Yard road. A way had been cut down into and across the ravine below the road. The division charged in column of fours. When the troops emerged from the ravine on to open ground, a fire blazed from the parapet of the fort and the infantry intrenchments. A portion of Ewing's brigade rushed on to the right and gained the ditch of the fort, and planted their colors in the face of the parapet. Giles Smith moved his 134 GENERAL SHERMAN. brigade along the main ravine to the left, and from cover engaged the intrenchments. Kilby Smith found a ridge, from behind which he supported Ewing by firing at the defenders who showed them- selves above the parapet. Ransom, whose brigade formed the right of McPherson's corps, pushed through the tangle which filled the lower part of the main ravine and ascended till they met a fire through which they could not advance. He fell back behind a swell of ground, where the brigade returned the fire of the enemy. Logan assailed the massive work at the Jackson road and the intrenchments to the south of it. The fort stood upon a rising ground, and so dominated the vicinage that the Seventeenth Corps called it Fort Hill, making some confusion in the reports. The hill was too steep to afford room for a ditch. The face was scarped a depth of twenty feet from the summit and surmounted by a rampart ten feet high, presenting a front thirty feet high. A portion of the assaulting force reached the base of the fort ; the rest were driven by the murderous fire to halt in sheltered hollows. Ste- venson, having more open ground to pass over, was unable to reach the long line of mtrenchments in his front, and, placing his command under cover in a ravine, fired at heads that appeared above the works. Of Ouinby's division there is but scanty report. He lay in front of a long line of intrench- ments, protected by heavy abattis. The slope was open and cut up by ravines. His troops advanced steadily, hewed their way through the abattis, but met a withering fire which prevented their reaching the works. Finding shelter, they maintained their position, returning the fire of the enemy. Benton's brigade, the right of McClernand's corps, was immediately north of the railroad, facing the right of Forney's division. In their front was a redan, having two heavy guns and manned by VICKSBURG. 135 the Second Texas, besides artillerists. One gun was disabled by the bombardment. Benton, sup- ported by Burbridge's brigade, made a vigorous charge and reached the front of the fort. The assailants poured such a fire through the torn and widened embrasures that the Texans lay on the ground, except one rank that stood close against the parapet. Two regiments came to re-enforce the defenders. A fieldpiece was dragged up the hill by the assailants. The Texans drew their gun back into the fort, loaded it, and ran it to an em- brasure, but the gunners were killed before they could fire. More re-enforcements came to the fort, and Boomer's brigade of Quinby's division, with- drawn from AlcPherson's front, arrived to aid Ben- ton and Burbridge. Colonel Boomer was killed while moving into position. The assailants could not be driven away; but the ditch was ten feet deep and the parapet rose ten feet above the escarp, and they could not effect an entrance. So the combat raged till dark, when the assailants with- drew. Boomer's brigade taking down the gun which McClernand's men had left behind. Lawler's brigade, supported by Landrum's, as- saulted the redoubt immediately south of the rail- road on the projecting spur, defended by the Twen- tieth and Thirtieth Alabama. The bombardment had battered away the upper part of an angle of the parapet, making a breach. The Twenty-second Iowa, taking advantage of favorable depressions, gained the front of the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Graham and most of the regiment occupied the ditch, while two sergeants and fifteen men clam- bered over the breach into an inclosed space formed by the parapets and a traverse. An officer and thirteen men were in this confined space ; the rest of the garrison fied, abandoning the adjoining in- fantry intrenchments as well as the forts. Sergeant Griffith took the captured party to General McCler- 136 GENERAL SHERMAN. naiul. while Sergeant Messeng-er and the men re- mained in the fort. General Lee ctnnnianded, urged, entreated the two fugitive regiments to re- possess the work. lUit nothing could move them. If Lawler and Landrum could have assembled their brigades just then and pushed forward, noth- ing could have prevented their piercing the Con- federate line. l>ut Colonel Stone, of the Twenty- second Iowa, while standing on the sununit, look- ing across the little valley at the wootled ridge held by Waul's Legion, was wounded and left the field, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap. of the Twenty-first Iowa, standing with him was killed. The assault- ing troops were dispersed over the slopes and in the hollows. Two companies of Waul's Legion volunteered to retake the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Pettus. who was in temporary connnand of the Twentieth Alabama, taking a musket, went with them as a volunteer. After a short confiict, the Iowa men were killed. The redoubt was recap- tured at twelve o'clock, an hour after it had been abandoned, and the chance of piercing the line was lost. Lighted shells thrown over the parapet killed many of those who were in the ditch. At nightfall some escajKHl. The rest, including Colonel Graham, were taken prisoners. About noon it was manifest that the assault along the line had failed. General McClernand, unaware of the fact that Sherman's men were in the ditch of the fort at Grave Yard road, with their colors planted on the slope of the parapets and INIcPherson's men at the base of the rampart on the Jackson road, also that Blair. Ransom, and Logan were waging desperate conflict, began at 1 1. 15 A.M.. and continued through the day. send- ing to General Grant sanguine accounts of his suc- cess, and urgent appeal to push the attack at other points and send re-enforcements to him. As late as 3.15 P. M. he reported, " My men are in two of VICKSBURG. 137 the enemy's forts." Grant directed McPherson to send him two of Quin?jy's brigades, and, yielding his own judgment, ordered the assault to be re- newed at three o'clock. Re-enforcements were sent to the front from the reserves. There w^as another rush and another repulse ; a useless at- tack, a fruitless slaughter. The troops could not retreat, and lay where shelter could be found till night, and then withdrew. The National loss in the day was five hundred and two killed, twenty- five hundred and fifty wounded, and one hundred and forty-seven captured ; total, thirty-one hun- dred and ninety-nine. The Confederate loss is not reported. In Forney's division it was forty-two killed and one hundred and seventeen wounded. In Cockrell's brigade of Bowen's division, twenty- eight killed and ninety-five wounded. The total probably did not much exceed five hundred. Sherman and McPherson were sorely aggrieved by the insistence of McClernand in causing the dis- astrous assault in the afternoon. They, as well as Rawlins and Logan, had frequently before com- plained to General Grant of his absorption of the achievements of the army and insubordinate con- duct. On the 30th of ^lay he made a congratu- latory order to his corps, filled with extravagant laudation of his own command, and ungratefully as well as unjustly reflecting on the conduct of the other corps on the 22d. In violation of orders, this was published in the newspapers without being first submitted to headquarters. Grant relieved him of his command, and ordered him to repair to Springfield, 111., and there report to the adjutant general of the army by letter. McClernand, dis- regarding party ties, had promptly insisted on the validity of the election of Lincoln as President, and offered his services to the country at the first outbreak of the war. He had been constantly on dutv, and was ambitious of distinction. President 138 GENERAL SHERMAN. Lincoln, grateful for bis stand at the be.^inninp^, appointed him by a personal (;r(ler c(jmmander i)i the expedition down the Mississippi River. When General Grant, with the a])proval of General lial- leck, exercising his authority as commander of the military department within which the exi)editi(jn was to operate, made McClernand's command an integral part of the army which (irant organized against Vicksburg, and McGlernand found himself a subordinate instead of a separate commander, and the President refused to interfere further in his behalf, he was exasperated and restive. But, after all, as is manifest from McClernand's reports, the trouble was largely due to his exuberant egotism, which exaggerated his own exploits and belittled the achievements of others. The night of the 22d was a night of toil along the Confeflerate lines. The entire force of engi- neers, with large working parties, strove through the night, repairing the battered works, strengthen- ing weak points, filling up and obliterating the em- brasures in the lunette north of the railroad, re- moving disabled guns, and bringing other pieces in their place. As long as the siege lasted the nights were employed in repairing damage done through the day and constructing new works in rear of exposed points. The assailants, satisfied that Vicksburg could not be carried by storm, settled down cheerfully to the task of regular siege. Regular approaches by sap, wide enough for the passage of artillery, were begun in front of all the works assaulted on the 22d. The saps by the Grave Yard road and the Jackson road were pushed with special vigor. The besieging batteries bombarded every day. Sharp- shooters on both sides watched through loopholes for every head that appeared above the opposing parapets. At times a general fire of musketry sheeted the Confederate parapets with their mis- VICKSF'.URG. 139 siles. Un^lcr this continued hail of fire the guns of the Confederates were gradually disabled or si- lenced, till few continued to reply. The National batteries were advanced from riflge to ridge till they were planted close to the line of defense. When the sa]>s came near, the Confederates fired turpentine balls, that set fire to the saj; rollers and stopi>ed the work till new rollers were con- structed so covered as to be protected from fire. When the base of the works was reached, lighted shells were thrown over, killing the men of the working party. John VV. J-riend, of the Twentieth <'>ihio, in General Logan's pioneer corps, devised wooflen mortars from a section of a tree trunk, bored and strapped with iron. They were easily carried to the front, and, with a small charge of powder, would lift a shell over the enemy's parapet and drop it within the work. Countermines were started, and one was successfully exploded, blow- ing up the sap by the Grave Yard road. Meanwhile batteries were established on the peninsula in front o£^ the city. Sharpshooters hid- den in the brush fired across the river. Admiral I'orter placed a battery of heavy mortars behind the peninsula, which exploded their huge shells over the city. A hundred-pounder gun was planted, which General Pemberton and the commander of the river batteries reported to be " very destruc- tive." Gunboats guarded the river above and below the city. General Lauman's division arrived on the 25th of May and occupied a portion of the space between McClernand and the river. General Her- ron reported with his flivision on the 15th of June; Lauman shifted to the right, and connected with McClernand ; Herron extended from Lauman to the river. The investment of the city was com- plete. About the 1st of June the meat ration was reduced one half, and the ration of sugar, rice, and beans v/as largely increased. About the ist of I40 GENERAL SHERMAN. July General Pemberton reports : " Our stock of bacon having been about exhausted, the experi- ment of eating mule meat as a substitute was tried, it being issued only to those who desired to use it, and I am gratified to say it was found by both officers and men not only nutritious, but very pal- atable, and every way preferable to poor beef." He states in his report that at the time of the sur- render the commissary had in store forty thou- sand pounds of pork and bacon, fifty-one thousand two hundred and forty-one pounds of rice, five thousand bushels of peas, ninety-two thousand two hundred and thirty-four pounds of sugar. He also says, " There was at no time any absolute suffer- ing for want of food. . . . The question of subsist- ence, therefore, had nothing whatever to do Avith the surrender of Vicksburg." But the surrender or capture of Vicksburg was only a question of time, unless some exterior force should compel the rais- ing of the siege. General Johnston, learning on the night of the 17th of May that Pemberton ^lad fallen back into Vicksburg, immediately sent to him : " If you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately sur- render. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both place and troops, we must if pos- sible save the troops. If it is not too late, evacu- ate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march to the northeast." To this Pemberton replied, with the unanimous concurrence of his general officers, it was impossible to withdraw the army with such morale and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy, and that he decided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible. It was impossible, for while the council was considering Grant's army was moving into position around the city. General Johnston was now confronted with the task of raising the siege or by attack or maneuver VICKSBURG. 141 aiding Pemberton to break out and escape. He at once demanded re-enforcements, and the authori- ties in Richmond promptly sent all troops that could be taken from Bragg's army in Tennessee and from South Carolina and Georgia. There was controversy between him and Richmond as to the numbers under his command. Finally, he reported that from actual returns his efifective force was twenty-four thousand and fifty-three. This did not include Jackson's cavalry, which did not reach him till the 4th of June, nor did it include some irregu- lar cavalry, a few hundred in number. His regu- lar field return sent to Richmond on the 25th of June includes the force present on the 2d of June, and also Jackson's command and the irregulars — present for duty, thirty-one thousand two hundred and twenty-six ; total present, thirty-six thousand three hundred and fifteen. Deducting Jackson and the irregulars, leaves the force present on the 2d of June : Present for duty, twenty-seven thousand one hundred and eleven ; total present, thirty-one thousand three hundred and forty-eight, and at the same time the " effective present " was twenty- four thousand and fifty-three. On the 29th of May Pemberton dispatched to Johnston, " I have eight- een thousand men to man the lines and river front ; no reserves," meaning, of course, " efifectives." At that time he had over thirty thousand officers and men present. After making the largest allowance for sick, special duty, and detached service, the residue present for duty must have exceeded eight- een thousand by several thousand. When the Con- federate reports name the force engaged in a cam- paign, whether or not expressly stating " effec- tive," it appears that the number intended is the number of muskets present for duty, counting artil- lerists as muskets, or the number of armed enlisted men prepared for action, excluding officers. Gen- eral J. D. Cox and Colonel E. C. Dawes, after a 142 GENERAL SHERMAN. thorough study of the Atlanta campaign, arrived at the same conckision. Earnest as Johnston was to collect a force to raise the siege. Grant was equally diligent in ob- taining re-enforcements to resist the attempt. Hurlbut having already sent Lauman's division, now early in June added two divisions, under Gen- eral Washburne ; Burnside sent from Ohio two di- visions of the Ninth Gorps under General i'arke ; and Schofield sent Herron's division from Mis- souri. Johnston having sent a division to Yazoo City, Parke and Washburne were retained at Haines's BlufY. Johnston's accumulation of force becoming formidable, an army of observation was formed under the command of General Sherman, comprising the force at Haines's Blufif and three other divisions, one from the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Gorps each. The Big Black south of the railroad was bor- dered on both shores from the railroad to the Mis- sissippi by dense forest. There was neither bridge nor ford, and the roads leading to the three ferries, miles apart, were rough and narrow ways through the woods. An army which should lay bridges at the ferries, and cross over into the angle formed by the Mississippi and the r>ig Black, would have to conquer or be captured. Sherman accordingly traced his line of defense from the railroad cross- ing of the Big Black to Haines's BlufT, on the Yazoo. Osterhaus with his division at the rail- road crossing fortified the high bluff which rises vertically from the shore of the river and dominated the country beyond ; very strong and extensive fortification was constructed at Haines's Bluff, and works thrown up at key points along the line. The roads leading from this line to the Big Black ran for the most part upon narrow ridges, separated by valleys filled with impassable thickets. Recon- noitering parties sent up the country between the VICKSBURG. 143 Yazoo and the Big Black, and across the Big Black toward Jackson, kept Sherman advised as to the dispositions of Johnston. During the entire siege Johnston and Pember- ton were in constant communication by messen- gers. On the 29th of May Johnston wrote : " I am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and your gar- rison." Again on the 14th of June, " All that we can attempt is to save yoti and your garrison." On the 22d of June he sent word, " If I can do nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the last moment if you and General Taylor com- municate." On the 25th of June the mine under the work on the north side of the Jackson road was ex- ploded, blowing out a portion of the parapet. Six men working in a countermine, besides others in the fort, were buried and killed. Legget's brigade was standing by under cover. The Forty-fifth Illi- nois rushed into the breach and scrambled upon the loose earth before the smoke cleared away. The garrison retired behind an inner parapet wdiich had been constructed fifteen feet in rear of the salient. The colonel of the Sixth Missouri, bringing his regiment up in re-enforcement, was instantly killed. The Confederates from behind the new line poured down volleys, and threw down lighted shells upon the Illinois men crowded in the cavity. A wooden barricade was erected for their shelter, but was soon shattered by a gun brought into play by the Missourians. After two hours of desperate fight- ing without gaining the inner defense, the Forty- fifth was relieved by the Twentieth Illinois. Through the night the regiments were relieved every two hours, and at daylight the attempt to scale was given up and the assaulting party with- drawn. The Confederate loss by the explosion and 144 GENERAL SHERMAN. the subsequent fighting was twenty-one killed and seventy-three wounded. On the I St of July a larger mine was sprung under the fort on the south side of the road, mak- ing a cavity fifty by thirty feet across and twenty feet deep, almost destroying the redan and badly shattering the inner defense. A large number of the men manning the work were killed or wounded. Inmiediately after the explosion a heavy fire of artillery and musketry and a mortar was opened upon the breach. Engineer-in-Chief Lockett says that, in the hour that he spent there after the ex- plosion, " at least a dozen of its garrison were killed or wounded by the mortar alone." Seven men were thrown within the National lines. Six were killed, but the seventh, a negro, was only stunned. He went to General Logan's headquar- ters as a servant, and remained there until the di- vision left Vicksburg. The same day Pemberton asked the general officers for their opinion as to the practicability of an evacuation. The agreeing response was, the men were so debilitated that there was no chance of an evacuation. Thereupon he wrote to General Grant, proposing surrender, and the garrison stacked arms on the 4th of July. The National loss in killed and wounded was : Killed. Wounded. Aggregate. Assault on 19th of May 43 502 147 194 2,550 613 Assault on 22d of May May i8th to July 4th 692 3,357 4.047 The loss from the ist of May to July 4th; in- cluding skirmishes by Sherman's force, was: Killed, fifteen hundred and fourteen ; wounded, seventy-three hundred and ninety-five; aggregate, VICKSBURG. 145 eighty-nine hundred and nine. The surrender com- prised twenty-one hundred and sixty-six officers, twenty-seven thousand two hundred and thirty en- hsted men, and one hundred and hfteen citizen em- ployees ; in all, twenty-nine thousand five hundred and eleven. General i^eniljerton gives the totals of killed, wounded, and missing during the siege of two divisions, but nothing of the others or the river batteries. The compilers of the war records have made a computation of the loss so far as can be found in the reports that are preserved, making the number of killed eight hundred and five. But the materials are incomplete. The report of Ste- venson's division comes down only to the 13th of June, two weeks after Lauman appeared in his front and before Herron arrived. No report is included of two of the brigades in Smith's division or of the river batteries. The number of killed must have been over four hundred, making loss by death over fifteen hundred. The morning report of the medi- cal director for the 4th of July shows under medi- cal treatment that day twenty-one hundred and thirteen wounded and thirty-seven hundred and sixty-five sick ; total, fifty-eight hundred and sev- enty-eight. While the above is the number of killed as calculated from the reports now on file, two observations may fairly be made : One is, the brigade and division reports, supported by regi- mental returns, have larger numbers reported killed than those which give only lumping sums for a division or brigade. The other is, that General Pemberton during the siege understood his loss to be much greater than what is given above. He dispatched to General Johnston on the 29th of May : " Since investment we have lost about one thousand men — many officers." And he added, June TOth, " We are losing many officers and men." The report of one hundred and twenty-nine total missing is obviously incorrect. Moore's bri- 146 GENERAL SHERMAN. gade is reported as losing none, while one of his regiments — Second Texas — reports fifteen. Lee's brigade reports seven up to the 13th of June, while one regiment lost fourteen captured on the 22d of May. Herron's division, in skirmishes after the 13th of June, the date of Stevenson's report, cap- tured thirty-eight from Stevenson's division. The number of deserters was large. Assistant-Secre- tary-of-War Dana, in his daily reports to Secretary Stanton, continually mentions the arrival of de- serters. Sometimes he speaks of a party of them coming, and once he mentions the arrival of two parties. There seems to have been a stream of them along the river bank to the south, until stopped by Colonel Clark, Thirty-fourth Iowa, moving his regiment to the bank of the river. He reports, " Rebel deserters were brought in every day in large numbers by the pickets." General Osterhaus, stationed at the Big Black bridge, says, in his report of the 30th of May, the Eighth Ken- tucky " left Vicksburg six hundred strong on May 19th, and marched by way of Cayuga and Chrystal Springs to Meridian, where it was mounted and marched back by Jackson." The Eighth Kentucky belonged to Loring's division. At all events, Pem- berton must have had about thirty-two thousand officers and men present when Grant undertook to invest the place with about forty thousand. In compliance with a request from General Johnston, General Taylor, commanding a district in Louisiana, sent a division to attack the National troops encamped on the west bank of the Missis- sippi, near Vicksburg. The attack was made on the 7th of June, entirely failed, and the defeated assailants were pursued to the interior of the State. Later it was determined to capture Helena and strongly fortify it, with the view of aiding John- ston \o prevent the capture of Vicksburg; or, if that failed, to block the navigation of the Missis- VICKSBURG. 147 sippi, and so neutralize the loss of Vicksbiirg. Gen- eral Price assaulted the defenses of Helena on July 4th, and was repulsed with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and captured. Port Hudson, besieged by General Banks since the 21st of May, capitulated on the 8th of July. General Gardner's return for the 30th of June was : Present for duty, twenty- eight hundred and three; aggregate present, four thousand and ninety-eight; yet upon the surren- der fifty-nine hundred and fifty-three officers and men gave individual paroles, each one counter- signed by General Gardner, besides several hundred sick in hospital who gave no parole. The Missis- sippi was regained. Its navigation was free from its source to its mouth. The Confederate armies east of the river could no longer draw re-enforce- ments or supplies from the region to the west. Lee abandoned the field of Gettysburg and began his retreat to Virginia on the 4th of July. The daw^n of final victory illumined the horizon. Johnston gave orders to his army on the 28th of June to advance and concentrate opposite the fords above the railroad bridge. On the night of the 3d of July he sent a messenger to advise Pem- berton that he would make a diversion by attack on the 7th. He learned in the night of the 4th of the surrender, and started forthwith for Jackson. Sher- man, advised by Grant on the 3d of the probable surrender next day, put his force in motion on the afternoon of the 4th. Bridges were constructed across the Big Black. Ord with the Thirteenth Corps and Steele with the Fifteenth completed their crossing on the 6th ; Parke with the Ninth fol- lowed. Johnston reached Jackson on the evening of the 7th. Sherman arrived on the 9th, and made his investment on the lOth. The fortifications inclosed the city, resting upon the river above and below. Sherman's line was formed with Ord on the right, Steele in the cen- 148 GENERAL SHERMAN. ter, and Parke on the left, the flanks resting upon the river. Moving into position on the 12th, Lau- nian incautiously advanced close to the enemy's works, and in such direction as to uncover and ex- pose his flank. A crossfire from the batteries in- flicted severe loss before he could extricate his di- vision. General Ord, commanding the Thirteenth Corps, relieved General Lauman from his command next day. General Sherman approved the order relieving him, giving as his reason his policy of sustaining the authority of his corps commanders. General Sherman was not willing to waste the lives of his men in open assault over level ground upon formidable works, well constructed and well armed. His supply of ammunition was inadequate for a siege, and a train of empty wagons was sent back to Vicksburg for more. Meanwhile the troops were employed in constructing batteries and in- trenchments and keeping up a moderate fire. At the same time parties were sent out daily to gather subsistence and forage, and expeditions to thor- oughly destroy the railroad as far north as Canton and as far south as Brookhaven. Johnston's bat- teries returned the fire, and the skirmishers kept up the rattle of small arms. In all this racket the besiegers could not hear the constant rumble of wagons carrying sick and wounded and stores from the beleagviered city across the river to the rail- way on the farther side. Sherman's ammunition arrived in the night of the i6th. Men with spades and picks could be heard at work strengthening the defenses till midnight. But when morning came it was found that Johnston's army was gone and the bridges destroyed. Sherman's loss during the siege was one hundred and twenty-nine killed, seven hundred and sixty-two wounded, two hun- dred and thirty-one missing ; total, eleven hundred and twenty-two. Of these, five hundred and nine- teen were in Lauman's division. Johnston reported VICKSBURG. 149 his loss as " estimated at seventy-one killed, five hundred and four wounded, and about twenty-five missing." But Sherman captured and took to Vicksburg seven hundred and sixty-five prisoners. General Steele, having- repaired a bridge, crossed, and with three brigades advanced to Brandon, thirteen miles, pushing Jackson's jaded cavalry be- fore him. Johnston had set fire to a building filled with commissary stores which he could not carry away. The country tramped over by both armies for two months was stripped and desolate. Citizens of Jackson and Canton appealed to General Sherman to afford relief and save the people from famine. He obtained authority from General Grant to give two hundred barrels of flour and one hundred bar- rels of pork to Jackson, and fifteen thousand rations to Canton. These were delivered at Big Black River to committees, who gave their pledge that the supplies should be distributed equitably to the needy, and that no part of them should be applied to any other purpose. The committees were taken from the best men in the two cities. Among those constituting the Jackson committee were Chief- Justice Sharkey and William Yerger, men of rare excellence. The railroad running north and south through Jackson was utterh' destroyed for a distance of one hundred miles, and Jackson ceased to be a strategic point for the rest of the war. The men, worn out with fatigue, loss of sleep, and nervous strain for two months, now that the campaign was over and the fervid heat of summer had come, lost their strength and yearned for home. Sherman returned across the Big Black by easy marches. Herron's division returned to Missouri, and Parke to Gen- eral Banks. The Thirteenth Corps was sent to Texas. Grant was made major general,. and Sher- man and McPherson brigadier generals in the regu- ISO GENERAL SHERMAN. lar army, and promotions were freely given to of- ficers of the volunteers. Leaves of absence and furloughs thinned the camps. Sherman with the four divisions of his corps occupied the west bank of the Big Black, while Armstrong's division of Confederate cavalry watched on the opposite side. CHAPTER VII. CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. The city of Chattanooga lay in a bend of the Tennessee River on its southern bank. The river above the city flows to the west of south, then turn- ing to the north of west, around the city, turns again to the south, continuing beyond tlie Hniits of the city, till it strikes the northern point of Look- out Mountain, and again turns sharply to the north. This sharp bend of the river enfolds a long, narrow point, called Moccasin Point. At the neck of this point is Brown's Ferry, nine miles from the city by water, while it is little more than a mile overland from the ferry to the northern bank of the river opposite the city. The river continues to the north till it strikes the base of Walden's Ridge, turns again to the southwest, between Walden's Ridge and Raccoon Mountain, and passes Kelly's Ferry. By land it is nine miles from Kelly's to Brown's Ferry. Missionary Ridge and the range of Lookout Mountain, running south from the river, about four miles apart, inclose Chattanooga Valley between them. The northern extremity of Missionary Ridge does not strike the river, but, passing by the bend which is immediately above the city, it con- tinues to the north of east, parallel to the river, and about a mile and a half distant from it. The northern end of the ridge is intersected by cuts, making a group of precipitous hills ; thence south- ward it is a continuous ridge, with a narrow crest II 151 152 GENERAL SHERMAN. rising a little over four hundred feet above the plain. The northern extremity of Lookout Moun- tain rises steeply from the river five hundred feet to a broad plateau, then occupied as a farm. The plateau extends back to a cliff which rises vertically to the level summit of the range, fifteen hundred feet above the plain. A road scarped along the eastern face of the mountain descended toward the north till it nearly reached the plateau, and there, turning abruptly toward the south, continued to the valley below. Lookout Creek flows north to the river along the western base of Lookout Moun- tain, making a deep, narrow valley between the mountain and high hills rising from its western bank. Chickamauga River flows to the north, near the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, till, curving around the northern end of the ridge, it flows due west to the river. When General Rosecrans fell back to Chatta- nooga after the battle of Chickamauga, he removed the troops posted on Lookout Mountain down into the city, and began at once to fortify. A strongly intrenched line was constructed in the form of an arc of a circle, covering the city, the flanks rest- ing upon the river, and the curved front extending out into the valley. In the eastern portion of the line was a commanding eminence projecting like a great bastion, and crowned by Fort Wood. Gen- eral Bragg followed closely up and constructed a line of connected batteries along the crest of Mis- sionary Ridge, together with a secondary line of intrenchment along its base. A curved line of w^orks, parallel to the National defense and two miles distant from it, stretched across the valley from Missionary Ridge to Lookout. Opposite to Fort Wood, and about halfway between it and the base of Missionary Ridge, was a high, rocky hill, with a rough ridge extending to the south, called Orchard Knob, and also Indian Hill. This Bragg CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 153 occupied and planted a battery upon it. He placed troops, batteries, and a signal station on the sum- mit of Lookout, and constructed a line of intrench- ments and rifle-pits along the western face of the mountain, down on the slope below the clif¥. The principal camp and important defensive works were upon the plateau at the northern extremity. The railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga crosses the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, and thence, passing around the southern base of Rac- coon Mountain and down Lookout Valley, skirts the base of the north extremity of Lookout Moun- tain, and so enters the city. When Bragg occu- pied Lookout, he cut Chattanooga off from rail- road communication with the north. There was a road along the northern bank of the river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Bragg posted a line of sharpshooters along the southern bank from Lookout Mountain to a point opposite Walden's Ridge, who commanded the road and prevented its use. The only access from Bridgeport to Chatta- nooga remaining was by wagons over a road up the Sequachie Valley to Anderson's crossroads, thence by an almost impracticable route over the rocks and through the forest of Walden's Ridge, and then down to the city, a distance of sixty miles. Over this route, even if it were unmolested and the weather continued dry, it would be utterly im- possible tQ convey supplies sufficient to subsist Rosecrans's command. Bragg, well aware of the fact, sat in grim quiet within his works, refusing to waste the lives of his men in needless conflict while famine was doing his work for him. A large amount of supplies in wagon trains ac- cumulated at Anderson's. General Bragg, to hasten the period of starvation, directed General Wheeler to destroy the stores at Anderson's, and then, in conjunction with Roddy and Lee. who were to cross the river at points below Bridgeport, 154 GENERAL SHERMAN. to destroy thoroughly the railroad from Bridgeport as far toward Nashville as practicable. On the ist of October General Wheeler crossed the Tennessee below Washington, about fifty miles above Chatta- nooga, moved rapidly over to Anderson's cross- roads, and next day fell upon the parked trains. The little train guard made a gallant defense, but were soon overcome. Wheeler burned three hun- dred loaded wagons and killed many mules. Leav- ing a detachment to complete the destruction, he moved up the valley with one division and sent the other to destroy the railroad. Colonel E. M. Mc- Cook, leaving Bridgeport early in the morning of the 2d, came upon the burning trains in the after- noon, drove the Confederate force, rescued eight hundred mules, and saved a remnant of the train. Pressing on, he overtook Wheeler's rear guard, and v/ith a saber charge drove them upon the main body. Wheeler, dividing his force into detach- ments, approached many points at the same time, and succeeded in sacking and burning McMinn- ville, Shelbyville, and some smaller settlements, and hastily damaging the railroad. Mitchell, Morgan, and Crook, with separate commands, as well as McCook, followed the marauding parties night and day, and gave them no rest. Mitchell severely routed Wheeler near Shelbyville, as Crook did at Farmington, and there were encounters every day. Wheeler lost all his captures, four of his guns, and most of his command. The worn-out remnant escaped across the river, near Rogersville, on the 9th of October. General Roddy crossed the Ten- nessee near Guntersville, but accomplished noth- ing, and Lee did not cross the river. The rainy season set in. The diminished sup- ply trains were still diminishing, as the half-fed mules toiled wearily, hauling loaded wagons slowly over the slippery rocks of Walden's Ridge, and died in their traces. Rations in Chattanooga were CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 155 cut down till hunger was a pain. But the feeble bodies inclosed stout hearts, and the resolve to hold the place never wavered. General Thomas telegraphed to Grant on the 19th of October that he had two hundred and four thousand rations in store and expected ninety thousand more next day, and to General Halleck on the 22d, " We are get- ting supplies enough, notwithstanding the bad con- dition of the roads." In the Army of the Potomac out in \'irginia the Eleventh Corps, commanded by General Howard, lay in camp, and the Twelfth Corps, General Slo- cum, was out on picket, on the 24th of September, w^hen orders came from Washington that the two corps should be ready to embark on trains of cars next day. On the same day General Hooker was assigned to command the two corps, and dispatches were sent to quartermaster generals, masters of transportation, and railroad presidents from Wash- ington. Baltimore, and Philadelphia to St. Louis and Xashville for organization, equipment, and movement of trains from \*irginia to Bridgeport, on the Tennessee. Over five hundred cars carried the troops to Bellaire, where the soldiers marched over a bridge constructed after they had begun the journey, and found other trains awaiting them on the Ohio shore. At Indianapolis they again dis- embarked, marched across the city to another relay, and, on reaching the Ohio River, they were fer- ried over and found the fourth provision of cars ready for them. The Government took possession of the road from Louisville to Bridgeport and the entire equipment, and changed the gauge of the road from Louisville to Nashville, and of all its rolling stock. The Eleventh Corps was at Bridge- port on the 2d of October, and the Twelfth Corps halted at Stevenson immediately after. On the i6th of October the President made an order combining the Departments of the Cumber- 156 GENERAL SHERMAN. land and the Tennessee into a military division — the Military Division of the Mississippi — appointing General Grant commander of the division, reliev- ing General Rosecrans from command of the De- partment of the Cumberland, and appointing Gen- eral Thomas in his place. On the 19th Grant and Thomas assumed their respective commands. General Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d of October. At midnight of the 27th the bri- gades of Generals Hazen and Turchin were roused. General Hazen with eighteen hundred men em- barked in sixty boats, thirty in each boat, and at 3 A. M. cast loose and floated down the river, while the rest of the brigade marched across the neck of Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, carrying ma- terials for a bridge. The floating party, keeping close to the right bank of the river, and maintain- ing absolute silence, escaped notice by the Con- federate pickets who lined the left bank. At about 4.30 A. M. the head of the flotilla reached the left bank where the road to Brown's Ferry comes down to the river. The men were fired on by the pickets as they landed, but dashed up the high and steep hills on each side of the road and gained posses- sion. The boats ferried over the other troops. An attack by a force called by the firing was repulsed, and the position fortified. The boats were floated into position, and before noon a bridge was con- structed. General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on the 27tli with the Eleventh Corps and part of Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps. Early in the morning of the 28th he marched toward Look- out Valley. The Eleventh Corps halted at 5 p. m. near the mouth of Lookout Creek. Geary, form- ing the rear of the column, halted at Wauhatchie, three miles up the valley. At midnight Longstreet made a fierce attack upon Geary. The opposing lines fired at the flashes of each other's cams. The CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 157 conflict lasted three hours, when the enemy with- drew. A brig-ade sent by General Howard to Geary's aid came upon another detachment and de- feated it. Longstreet recalled his troops across the creek and burned the bridge, leaving Hooker in possession of all west of the creek. Geary re- ported that his parties buried one hundred and fifty-three Confederates in his front, captured fifty- two wounded and fifty unhurt prisoners, and three hundred and fifty muskets. A road was constructed from Kelly's F"erry to Brown's, eight or nine miles. The stores accumu- lated at Stevenson were transported on two steam- boats to Kelly's, and carried thence by the short haul to Chattanooga. The blockade was raised. Abundant supplies had easy access to the be- leaguered city. General Sherman, seated with his family in his pleasant quarters on a plantation near the Big Black River, was startled by receiving from Gen- eral Grant on the 22d of September an order to send a division to Chattanooga immediately. Os- terhaus's division Isroke camp, marched to Vicks- burg, arriving the same evening, and embarked for Memphis. Next day Sherman, summoned to Vicksburg. found Grant still in bed ill, and learned from him that on the previous day dispatches had arrived from Washington, and that he had sent orders to Hurlbut at Memphis to organize two di- visions from the troops in his district and send them to Rosecrans; had sent an order to General John E. Smith, who with his division of the Sev- enteenth Corps had gone to Arkansas to aid Gen- eral Steele, to abandon that design and hasten to Chattanooga ; to General Banks, who was impor- tuning for re-enforcements, that none could be sent, for he could make no disposition of troops that could endanger the success of Rosecrans ; and that he had ordered the seizure of all boats on the 158 GENERAL SHERMAN. river to facilitate transportation. Finally, Grant told Sherman to go in person, taking his corps, leaving one of his divisions at Vicksburg, and tak- ing in its place John E. Smith's division, which was already on the way. General Sherman returned to camp on the 25th, and selected the divisions of Giles A. Smith and John M. Corse to go and Gen- eral Tuttle to remain. The last of the command was in Vicksburg for embarkation on the 28th. The general's daughter Minnie had been very ill. but was convalescent. On the boat his son Willie, the darling of his heart, was seen to be un- well. On the way up the river he grew worse, and the disease was found to be typhoid fever. The best medical aid in Memphis was called, but the boy died soon after landing. When the boat left for Ohio, bearing the dear corpse and the pros- trate family, Sherman's grief was agony. But the pressing duty of the hour required instant action. General Halleck dispatched that the road from Nashville must be reserved absolutely to carry sup- plies to Rosecrans, and Sherman must repair the road from Memphis as he advanced, and rely on it till a rise in the Ohio and Tennessee would allow boats to ascend the river. . The railroad was in good condition as far as Corinth, though ill supplied with rolling stock. When Sherman left Memphis on the nth of Octo- ber on a train with his headquarters and a battalion of the Thirteenth regular infantry, Osterhaus and John E. Smith were already at Corinth, Giles Smith well on his way, and General Corse's division had just started on foot. Arriving at Colliersville, twenty-six miles from Memphis, about noon, he learned that a large cavalry force with artillery was approaching the post. The clerks and orderlies were armed, and with the Thirteenth Infantry and the garrison manned the works. All preparations were completed before the advance of the enemy CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 159 appeared. A brisk skirmish began and lasted through the afternoon, till the approach of Corse's division, hastened by telegrams sent by Sherman on the first news of the danger, caused the enemy to withdraw. The locomotive and train, damaged by artillery fire, were repaired next day, and pro- ceeded to Corinth. Here General Ewing, who ac- companied Sherman, superseded Corse in the com- mand of the fourth division. S. D. Lee, joined by Wheeler, commanded a large cavalry force. Tearing up the railroad and continually skirmishing with the head of the col- umn impeded the advance. Osterhaus and Smith, repairing the road and pushing back the cavalry, continued their slow advance, and reached Tus- cumbia on the 27th. Sherman reached luka on the 19th, and learned next day of the arrival of two gunboats at Eastport, and a few days later received news of Grant's appointment to command the mili- tary division and his own appointment to command the Department and the Army of the Tennessee. General Blair was placed in command of the Fif- teenth Corps. General Hurlbut was ordered to select eight thousand men to form two divisions, to be called Sixteenth Corps, to be commanded by Dodge, and to march as far east as Athens. General Ewing crossed the river by the aid of the gunboats on the 24th, and moved east on the north side of the river. On the 27th Sherman re- ceived orders from Grant to drop all work on the railroad and hurry eastward with all possible dis- patch toward Bridgeport. General Blair, having just reached Tuscumbia on the 27th, began his re- turn to Eastport on the 28th. General Roddy — who had been on the north of the Tennessee unmolested for two weeks, whose locality was a mysterv and whose personality almost a myth ; who was always in no particular place, but just somewhere else ; whom many had heard of, but no one had seen — l6o GENERAL SHERMAN. finally recrossed the Tennessee in time to join S. D. Lee on the 27th, and worry General Blair's flank on the march on the 28th. The three remain- ing divisions crossed by boat at Eastport and hastened to overtake Ewing. Sherman crossed on the I St of November. Elk River being found to be swollen by rain and not fordable, the command marched up stream to the stone bridge at Fayette- ville. Here Sherman received another dispatch from Grant to push his advance. Dividing the troops over three roads to expedite the march, he rode to Bridgeport with his staff, arriving on the 13th of November. At Bridgeport he found an order to leave his troops and report in person immediately at Chatta- nooga. Taking a little steamboat, he went up the river in the night to Kelly's Ferry, where he found an orderly and horses awaiting him. A ride over the road to Brown's Ferry and to Chattanooga brought him into the city in the morning. He walked out with Grant and Thomas to Fort Wood, and from that commanding height surveyed the situation. Grant told him that he had proposed to assault Missionary Ridge with the force then in hand, but that a thorough reconnoissance showed that to be impracticable. And it appears in the records that General Grant dispatched to General Burnside on the 7th of November, " I have ordered an immediate movement from here to carry Mis- sionary Ridge " ; and on the 8th, " Thomas will not be able to make the attack of which I tele- graphed you until Sherman gets up." Sherman went then to the north side of the river to see the part allotted to him. General W. F. Smith, known as Baldy Smith, chief of engineers to the Army of the Cumberland, who had planned the capture of Brown's Ferry, was of the party. He was making a large number of pontoons in Chattanooga, which were to be carried over the CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. i6l river, and hidden from view by a range of hills, to a creek emptying into the river from the north, four miles above the mouth of the Chickamauga. The boats were to be kept hid some miles up the creek until the time for attack. Sherman's com- mand was to cross by the bridge at Brown's Ferry and bivouac out of view behind the hills. When the attack was to be delivered a detachment would fill the boats and in the night float down the creek and the river and disembark. The boats would then bring the rest of the troops across the river, and be immediately built into a pontoon bridge. The route was explored. The secret harbor in the creek, the points of embarkation, and the site of the bridge were visited, and from cover of shrub- bery on the river bank the place of landing on the farther shore and the point proposed for assault were reconnoitered. General Sherman remounted his horse and rode back to Kelly's Ferry. The steamboat was gone. He took a .rough boat with some soldiers to pull the oars. They were unused to the work, and Sher- man from time to time relieved one or another of the inexperienced oarsmen by taking a pull him- self. Reaching Shellmound at midnight, a good crew was obtained, and Bridgeport was reached by daylight. Ewing's division was immediately put in motion and directed to approach Lookout Moun- tain by the road leading to Trenton, threatening to gain or cross the mountain far to the rear of the force which held the summit. The movement caused some anxiety to the Confederate com- mander, and parties were sent out to reconnoiter the country about Trenton after Ewing had passed down Lookout Valley and reached Brown's Ferry. The hastily constructed bridge at Bridgeport gave only impeded passage to the troops, and the worn- out road, encumbered by slow-moving trains, made the march toilsome and difficult. The other three l62 GENERAL SHERMAN. divisions of the corps were strung along the poad from Wauhatchie to Bridgeport. Friday, the 20th, General Grant's order issued Wednesday, the i8th, for a combined attack on Missionary Ridge by Sherman and Thomas early Saturday morning, the 21 st, was found to be impossible of execution. Sherman finally had three divisions in place hidden behind the hills on the 23d, and when night came he sent Giles Smith with his brigade (for Morgan L. Smith had reported and taken command of the division) to the secreted pontoon boats. General Osterhaus not being able to cross at Brown's, the bridge being carried away by the freshet, Jeff C. Davis's division of Palmer's corps was temporarily assigned to Sherman's command and Osterhaus's to General Hooker's. Reports that Bragg was evacuating were so positive and direct that General Grant, early on the 23d, ordered General Thomas to make a dem- onstration to test the report. Granger's corps, two divisions, formed in line with skirmishers in front, and Howard's two divisions massed in reserve in the rear, stood on the plain as if on parade, while Generals Grant and Thomas, the Assistant-Secre- tary-of-War Dana, Quartermaster-General Meigs, and a brilliant array of officers viewed the spectacle from Fort Wood, and a more numerous body, the Confederate army, leaned upon their intrenchments and gazed with complacent interest, as if the dis- play were for their entertainment. At command the array moved forward with precision, captured the advanced pickets, and while the enemy, now aroused, poured a fire of artillery and musketry from all the intrenchments, pushed with greater speed and with one great rush surmounted and captured the fortified high rugged hill. Orchard Knob, and the long rocky ridge extending from it to the south, about halfway between Fort Wood and the base of Missionary Ridge. A battery of CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 163 six guns was taken to the summit, and the hill and ridge intrenched and occupied by General Gran- ger's corps, the divisions of Thomas J. Wood and Sheridan. In the morning General Cleburne was at Chick- amauga station, getting on to trains his own di- vision and Buckner's division, then commanded by Bushrod Johnson, under orders to proceed to re-enforce General Longstreet in front of Knox- villc. All of Johnson's division except Reynolds's brigade had embarked when order was received from General Bragg : " The general commanding desires that you will halt such portions of your command as have not left Chickamauga ; such as may have left halt at Charleston." Two of John- son's brigades had gone ; one, Reynolds's, re- mained with Cleburne. The arrangements had hardly been made and dispatch to Johnson sent be- fore another dispatch came : " Order Johnson's troops at Charleston back here. Move up rapid. y to these headquarters." And a few minvites later : " We are heavily engaged. Move rapidly to these headquarters." Reynolds's brigade was put into the intrenchment at the base of Missionary Ridge just south of Bragg's headquarters, and Cleburne's division went into bivouac in rear of the ridge. At dawn of the 24th Cleburne set his division erect- ing new intrenchments and batteries along the crest of the ridge from Bragg's headquarters toward the south. Before this work was completed he was informed that the national troops had crossed the Tennessee above and below the mouth of the Chickamauga, and was ordered to send a brigade and a battery to the bridge over the Chickamauga. At midnight of the 23d Giles Smith embarked his brigade, floated silently down the creek and down the river, landed two regiments above the mouth of Chickamauga River to gather up the Confederate pickets, and construct a bridge across 104 l.FNKUAl SHKRMAN. tluit slroani near iis mouth, and hiiulod the rest ot his brigade below. The boats, aided hiter in the day by a steamboat, used such expedition imder the inmiediate supervision of Cieneral \\\ F. Smith that by noon (.reneral Sherman w ith tlie three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps with the batteries were aeross. and (.lenoral Jell C Pavis followini;- elose upon them. Fhe landing was upoui a square plain, about a mile and a half to a side. The northern end of Missionary Ridge runs parallel to the Tennessee River, and about a mile and half from it. the course of both being nearly north and south. The Chicka- mauga. which with many ctu'ves has a general course to the north along the eastern base of the ridge, turns sharp to the west around its northern terminus, and continues west to the Tennessee. A short spur extends east from the northern extrem- ity of the ridge to the Chickamauga, its perpen- dicular face of rock rising sheer from the water of the stream, securing the position from risk of being turned. The railroad turned, pierced the ridge about a mile and a half south of the northern ex- tremity, passing under a depression or valley, atid just north of this depression is Tmmel Hill, the highest point in the locality. Standing aloof in front of the main ridge is an isolated hill, long and narrow, parallel to the main ridge aitd sepa- rated from it by a deep hollow. A cleft in the main ridge, wide enough to give passage to a road, gave communication from the exterior to a small valley inclosed by the main ridge and spurs extending from its rear. Gt?neral Sherman reports his advance with the three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps: "A light drizzling rain prevailed and the cloutls hung low, cloaking our movements from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gained the foothills : our skirmishers crept up the CIIATTANDrxlA AND Ml'.KIDIAN. 165 face of the liills, followed by their supports, and at 2.30 I'. M. we had ^'ained, with no hjss, the de- sired jKjint. A ]jri,:;ade of each division was pushed rapidly to the to]) of the hill, and the enemy for the first time seemed to realize the movement, hut loo late; \vi- vNcre in ])ossession. lie opened with artillery, hnt I'Avini;- soon j^ot some of ('ajjtain Jxichardson's Lnins np the stee]) hill anrl ^ave hadc artillerv. and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at General i.ij^hthtn-n, who had swei)t around and p^ot a farther hill, which was the real continuation of the ridj^e. I'Voni studying the maps, J had inferred that Missionary J'iidge was a continuous hill, but we found ourselves on two high p(jints, with a deep depression between us and the fjne immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective ])oint. 'J'he ground we had gained, however, was so inijxjrtant that I coidd leave nothing to chance, and ordered it to be forti- fied during the night. One brigade of each divi- sion was left on the hill, one oi Cleneral Morgan L. wSmith's closed up the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John i'^. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus cross- ing the ridge in a general line, facing sfjutheast." (jeneral Howard reported to General Sherman in the evening with two lirigades, and, leaving one to take part in the assault, and the other to make connection between the annies of Sherman and I'hfjmas, returned to his corj)s. The brigades of Jeff C. Davis were disj)osed to i)rotect connnunica- tion between the assaulting force and the bridge. Word was received from Grant that .Sherman was to attack at dawn and Thomas would attack early in the day. General T'ragg had not apprehenrled attack on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. iJut perceiving indications of some movement in that 1 66 GENERAL SHERMAN. direction, he took General Hardee from Lookout Mountain on the afternoon of the 23d and trans- ferred him to the extreme right of his army, at the same time transferring Walker's division from Lookout with him. In the night Polk's brigade and a battery were detached from Cleburne's divi- sion on Missionary Ridge and reported to Hardee. In the morning of the 24th Wright's brigade of Cheatham's division, summoned from Charleston by telegraph, arrived, was sent to the mouth of the Chickamauga to see if any National troops were attempting to cross, and, if so, to prevent them. He found an unexpected number already across and withdrew, retiring to the hills. At 2 p. m. Cle- burne's division was taken from Missionary Ridge and hurried to Hardee, and placed on his rip^ht, next to the Chickamauga. At midnight LevVis's brigade was taken from Bate's division on Mis- sionary Ridge and sent to'*report to Cleburne. A little later Stevenson's division, evacuating Look- out Mountain, marched to the right and reported to Hardee, and Cheatham with his three brigades from Lookout Mountain reported to Hardee in the morning of the 25th, and was placed in line between the force engaged about Tunnel Hill and Ander- son's division on Missionary Ridge. While Bragg was hurrying troops to meet Sherman's attack, he was sustaming a sore defeat at the other extremity of his line. Longstreet soon after his night attack on Hooker had been sent by General Bragg up into East Tennessee to capture or defeat General Burnside. General Hardee be- came commander of the point with three divisions. When General Hardee was transferred to confront Sherman, and took one division with him, the com- mand at Lookout Mountain devolved upon Gen- eral Stevenson, with his own division and three brigades of Cheatham's division. General Howard having moved by Brown's Ferry over into Chat- CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN, 167 tanooga. General Hooker's command in Lookout, Valley consisted of General Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, two brigades of General Cruft's di- vision of the Fourth Corps, and Osterhaus's divi- sion of two brigades from the Fifteenth Corps. About dawn Osterhaus, having the extreme left of the command, drove off the Confederate pickets near the partially destroyed bridges across Lookout Creek and repaired them. Cruft with one brigade moved up the stream and built another bridge. His other brigade reported to Geary, who marched some miles up the valley and built bridges there for his crossing. The enemy, occupied with Osterhaus and Cruft, did not perceive the move- ment of Geary. An observer on the high summit of Lookout heard the sound of Geary's pioneers chopping down trees, but noticed that the pickets paid no attention. Geary's command passed over the completed bridges and formed a line stretch- ing from the palisade, the vertical cliff of rock, down toward the creek. The troops of the ex- tended Confederate line posted along the west slope of the mountain, finding themselves unexpectedly assailed on the flank and in rear, fell back in con- fusion. The fire of Hooker's batteries planted on the heights west of the creek prevented their at- tempting to rally. The guns on the summit of the mountain could not be sufificiently depressed to reach the pursuers, and the heavy clouds of mist that settled on the summit prevented the sharp- shooters from taking any part. Cruft crossed his bridges as Geary approached, and joined him in gathering up prisoners and pushing back those who were not captured. The guns of the heavy batterv on Moccasin Point and a battery near Gen- eral Hooker's headquarters with their crossfire en- filaded all the w^orks upon the plateau and slopes of the northern point of the mountain, and made them untenable. Osterhaus crossed and mounted l68 GENERAL SHERMAN. to the plateau in time to join Geary as he arrived. On the plateau opposing lii;es were formed and the Confederates forced back, till about 2 p. m., when the cloud of mist settling down from the summit, enveloping the combatants, closed the con- test. There was some irregular firing into the fog, but the battle was over. Hooker had pushed his way dangerously near to the road which descended from the mountain to the Chattanooga Valley, and Carlin, who with his brigade had crossed Chatta- nooga Creek near the city, and was engaged with the Confederate troops near the base of the east- ern slope of the point, was also approaching the road. General Bragg ordered evacuation. Through the night until after midnight the defenders were descending the winding road to the plain and mov- ing on their way to Bragg's extreme right to op- pose the assault of Sherman. The troops in the intrenchments in the valley, the divisions of Stew- art and Bate, constituting Breckenridge's corps, moved to Missionary Ridge. A detachment of the Eighth Kentucky climbed to the summit of Look- out Mountain, and at dawn planted their colors in view of the valley below. At sunrise of the 25th both armies caw the Na- tional flag floating over the summit of Lookout, and the long line of Confederate intrenchments traversing the valley and encircling the city aban- doned. General Bragg, who five weeks before held Thomas's army in his grip, and grimly refused to waste the lives of his men in useless attack, pre- ferring to let famine surely do the work without loss to him, now saw his grip shaken off, his be- sieging works captured, his whole force contracted on to Missionary Ridge, and more than one half of it congested on the northern extremity, not to threaten his antagonist, but to defend a vital point from assault. In the forenoon of the 25th Hardee assembled CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 169 and placed his command : Cleburne with his four brigades and Wright's brigade, brought down from Charleston, and Lewis's brigade of Bate's division occupied from the tunnel to the northern ex- tremity of the ridge. Stevenson with his four bri- gades was on Cleburne's left ; next was Walker with three brigades ; and finally Cheatham with three brigades, reaching nearly to the right of the line facing Chattanooga. Here Anderson's four brigades occupied all the space north of Bragg's headquarters, except an interval left vacant im- mediately north of Bragg's headquarters, upon re- quest of General Anderson, in order that Reynolds's brigade, when obliged to leave the works at the base of the ridge, might take position there. Im- mediately south of Bragg's headquarters was Adams's brigade of Stewart's division temporarily assigned to and constituting part of Anderson's command. Next was General Bate with his own brigade, commanded by Colonel Tyler and two regiments of his Florida brigade, and on his left Stewart with two of his brigades. In the trenches at the base were Reynolds's brigade, one of Stew- art's, three regiments of Bate's Florida brigade and details from Anderson's division. General Sherman had eight brigades in his own three divi- sions — five brigades in General Howard's two di- visions and three in General Jeff C. Davis's divi- sion. General Thomas had in his line Baird's di- vision, three brigades, and Johnson's division, two brigades of the Fourteenth Corps, and the divisions of T. J. Wood and Sheridan of the Fourth Corps, three brigades each. Hooker was on the way from Lookout Mountain around by the way of Ross- ville Gap to take the southern extremity of the ridge with the three divisions of Osterhaus, Geary, and Cruft. Early in the morning of the 25th General Sher- man disposed his force. His own three divisions, lyo GENERAL SHERMAN. Buschbeck's brigade of the Eleventh Corps, and Plant's battery from Jeff C. Davis's division consti- tuted the attacking force ; Davis continued pro- tecting communication with the Tennessee River, and General Howard, who arrived in the morning with the rest of his corps, guarded the rear toward the Chickamauga. Batteries were hauled up to the summits of the isolated ridge held by Ewing and the hill held by Lightburn. While these two points were held in force. Colonel Loomis adv-anced to assault the tunnel gorge. Corse the northern slope of Tunnel Hill, and Morgan L. Smith's di- vision the ridge north of Tunnel Hill. Corse passed across the deep hollow, carrying a line of intrenchments thrown up by Smith's Texas brigade, climbing the steep hillside, almost gaining the summit. A persistent and obstinate engagement ensued. Corse was wounded and car- ried ofif. Walcutt took his place and continued the struggle. He could not get his men over the edge of the crest, and the defenders could not dislodge them from the slope. The National batteries on the two hills played upon Swett's battery on the summit of Tunnel Hill, so that no defensive work could be thrown up for its protection ; the officers of the battery were disabled, and command de- volved upon a corporal, and so many of the gun- ners were killed or wounded that infantry had to be detailed to work the guns, and finally the bat- tery was relieved by another and retired. Colonel Loomis, out in the open plain, w^as ordered to ad- vance and take position in front of the tunnel gorge. Brushing away the hostile skirmishers, he advanced under heavy fire, and taking the position assigned in face of the opposing line, which extended along beyond his right as far as he "bould discern the ridge, made his command throw up such cover as was practicable, and maintained his position. His left fiank being threatened bv a force issuing CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 171 from the tunnel gorge, he procured re-enforce- ments from Buschbeck's brigade and drove back the assailants. Being still pressed, General John E. Smith sent two brigades, Mathias and Raum. These joined in the assault upon Tunnel Hill, and, aided by a fire from troops in the works captured from the Texans, succeeded in pressing nearly to the summit of the hill. Hardee sent a brigade in aid, but it retired after an ineffective effort. Colo- nel McConnell led his Georgia regiment up to take part ; McConnell was shot through the head and his regiment withdrew. A brigade from Steven- son's division and from Walker's reported in sup- port. General Cummings with two Georgia regi- ments made two abortive charges. Finally, a force suddenly appearing upon the flank took the gal- lant brigades in flank and rear. The surprise broke their order, and they fell back in confusion, pur- sued by their assailants down into the plain. The Confederates in their ardor followed them past the isolated hill held by Ewing. Being now in turn taken in flank and rear by Ewing and Loomis, they hastily returned to the ridge, followed by the ral- lied brigades of Mathias and Raum, though Raum was too severely wounded to return with them. General Sherman had been anxiously waiting for the attack by the Army of the Cumberland, promised by General Grant to be made early in the day. At half past two o'clock he saw, far off down the ridge, puffs of white smoke ; then the distant roar of artillery, and he knew that the assault was begun. Grant's order of the i8th for a joint as- sault on Missionary Ridge on the 23d had not been revoked, but only postponed to the 25th ; and on the evening of the 24th General Thomas directed his command to " have everything ready for an of- fensive movement early to-morrow morning." News coming on the morning of the 25th of the evacuation of Lookout Mountain, leaving Hooker 172 GENERAL SHERMAN. free, he was ordered to march up the valley, cross Chattanooga Creek, proceed to Rossville Gap, the southern terminus of the ridge, and sweep up the ridge upon Bragg's left flank. The time of Thom- as's assault was held for Hooker's co-operation. It was learned that the destruction of the bridge across the creek delayed his march. To build a new one took three hours. Word came that the bridge was finished and Hooker was crossing. His approach was assured, and the time for attack had come. Grant and Thomas, with a splendid group of generals and dignitaries, were on Orchard Knob, whence a complete survey was enjoyed of the val- ley, the heights, and of the plain on which Sher- man had formed his command. The four divisions, comprising eleven brigades, had been deployed, Baird's division on the left, T. J. Wood on his right, then Sheridan, and Johnson on the extreme right. Each brigade had a front of two to four regi- ments in line, with skirmishers in front, and the remaining regiments in column in support, mak- ing a battle array three miles in front. The mag- nificent splendor of the spectacle impressed both friend and foe. General Bate says in his report : " The enemy, like a huge serpent, uncoiled his massive folds into shapely lines in our immediate front," and " seemed confidently resting, as a giant in his strength." The eight brigades and two regi- ments in the works on the summit being deployed in line without reserves, extended on both flanks beyond the line of assault. The order to deliver the assault was verbal. General Grant says in his report that Hooker's " approach was intended as the signal for storming the center in strong col- lunns," and, on being satisfied that Hooker was on his way from Rossville, " Thomas was accord- ingly directed to move forward his troops . . . and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 173 Ridge, and when carried to reform his Hnes on the rifle-pits, with a view to carry the top of the ridge." General Thomas says only that as soon as Baird got into position " orders were then given him to move forward on Granger's left and within sup- porting distance against the enemy's rifle-pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. General Baird says : " A staff officer from General Thomas brought me verbal orders to move for- ward to the edge of the open ground which bor- dered the foot of Missionary Ridge, within striking distance of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be ready at a signal, which would be the firing of six guns from Orchard Knob, to dash forward and take those pits. He added : This was intended as preparatory to a general assault on the moun- tain, and that it was doubtless designed by the major general commanding that I should take part in the movement, so I would be following his wishes were I to push to the summit." The order re- ceived by General Johnson was " to form my com- mand in two lines, resting my left on the right of General Sheridan's division, and to conform to his movements." The order reached the Fourth Corps in a different form. General Granger says : " General Sherman was unable to make any prog- ress in moving along the ridge during the day, as vihe enemy had massed in his front ; therefore, in or- der to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demon- stration on the works of the enemy directly in my front, at the base of Missionary Ridge." And being ordered to make a demonstration upon the rifle- pits, " I accordingly directed Major-General Sheri- dan and Brigadier-General Wood to advance their divisions at a given signal, moving directly forward simultaneously and briskly to attack the enemy, and, dd-iving him from his rifle-pits, to take pos- session of them." Upon the signal, the firing of six guns on Or- 174 GENERAL SHERMAN. chard Knob, the entire Hne moved forward with precision and brushed away the Confederate skirmishers. The furious fire of all the batteries of the ridge incited the line to a double-quick ; as they neared the intrenchments, musketry was added. But the charge continued so solid and bal- anced that the works were reached by unbroken ranks, that swept as an avalanche over the barriers. A staff officer sent by General Sheridan brought back answer from General Granger that it was the works at the base of the ridge that were to be car- ried. This answer brought back some who were on their way to the summit. But immediately Cap- tain W. L. Avery. Granger's aid, brought word to Sheridan to carry the works on the summit if he thought he could. Granger sent all his staff to Wood and Sheridan with the same order, fearing some might miscarry. There was no need to reform. There were no broken ranks ; there were no laggards. There was no need of order to advance. Some with order, some without order, some against order, but all in unison, all aflame, in one mighty upheaval surged up the mountain side. The ascent was steep, rugged, and encumbered. The stout color bearers mostly pushed foremost. The stronger gathered about them ; the weaker followed as they could, till regiments assumed the form of wedges, apex in front. Clambering up over works and gullies, through the murderous fire from above, they ap- proached the crest, panting and jaded. It seems that the fresh defenders of the ridge might have fixed bayonets, and with an impetuous charge have swept the exhausted assailants down the slope. But dazed by the audacity and unexpectedness of the assault, unnerved by the impressive mass covering the mountain side, depleted by the large detach- ments sent to re-enforce the right against Sher- man's persistent attack, and discouraged by the CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 175 sight of Lookout Mountain and the sweep of in- vestment works across the valley, abandoned and captured, they stood irresolute till the bold assail- ants were in their midst. Hazen's brigade, or perhaps the two brigades of Hazen and Willich, first climbed over the works in Anderson's division, just north of Dent's bat- tery, and north of Bragg's headquarters. Facing to the right and left, and turning Dent's guns upon their late support, they drove the Confederate troops along and down the eastern slope of the ridge. General Bate, ordered by General Bragg to go to Anderson's aid, gathered up the frag- ments of Reynolds's brigade, which had streamed up from the captured works at the base, formed them in his rear, led them as far as they could ad- vance north of Bragg's headquarters, and, leaving them, returned to his own hard-pressed command. The line was breaking farther south and farther north, as brigade after brigade impetuously rushed over the works. The end had come. Bragg or- dered Bate, who had the only coherent force within reach, to cover the retreat to the bridge over the Chickamauga. General Bragg says in his report : " A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed struggling for his personal safety, re- gardless of his duty or character. . . . Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaus- tion from the great physical exertion in climbing which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them." General Turchin, commanding the right bri- gade of Baird's division, reached the summit first in the division. Part of the Confederate troops es- caped down the eastern slope, part retired toward the north, over a depression in the ridge, to a forti- fied position still held in front of A^anderveer's bri- gade, which was approaching it. There was a short i;6 GEXKKAI. SHKRMAN. contlicr. another retreat. The forces on both sides cotitiuually increased as the Confederates fell back upon supports, and finally Phelps's brig-ade com- pleted the ascent. Hardee, alarmed at the steady approach toward his position, made Cheatham changV front of his division, so as to face to the south, striding* the ridge. Hrowu's brigade and Cummings's were brought up to support Cheat- ham, and the struggle contiiuied at this point till dark. This line remained m position while Hardee was drawing the rest of his conuuand across the Chickamauga, and then followed. General Hooker, having constructed his bridge and crossed, Osterhaus in advance, found a consid- erable force with artillery posted in Rossville Gap, and quickly routed it. Osterhaus was sent through the gap, then north along the eastern base of ]Mis- sionary Ridge. Cruft north along the crest of the ridge, and Geary by the western base. They en- countered and surprised a portion of Stewart's di- visiott on its way to escape by Rossville Gajv and captured substantially the whole force. Sherman's army went into bivouac where they lay. and Thomas on Missionary Ridge, except that Sheridan with a portion of his command followed Bate, who was covering the retreat from Rragg's headquarters, and having combats, when Hate found opportunity to stand, until dark. At mid- night he resumed pursuit, and pressed Bate to and across the Chickamauga, saving the bridge and capttiring a large quat\tity of stores. The Con- federates trudged wearily through the night, aided by the full light of the moon, dropping, as they trudged, guns, caissons, wagons, small anus, and all the debris of a rout. In the night General Grant ordered pursuit by all the forces of both armies, except the portion de- tailed to march to the relief of Knoxville. Hooker marched in the morning with Palmer's corps added CIIATTANOOCJA AND MERIDIAN. 177 to his coinniand, and, delayed by destroyed bridges and occasional skirmishes, halted lor the night about five miles from Ringgold. Next day he over- took Cleburne at Ringgold, ])osted in a very deep and narrow gorge, a cleft in the mountain, and on the heights on each side, lie charged, Osterhaus leading, and after a severe engagement, with heavy loss on both sides, Cleburne retired to Dalton. Hooker, in pursuance of orders, remained in ob- servation toward Tunnel Hill till the 30th of No- vember, and then retm-ned to Chattanooga. Cencral Davis, of Sherman's command, crossed the Chickamauga near its mouth before dawn of the 26th, and was followed liy Howard and lUair. Next morning, after a brisk skirmish, a Confed- erate force that was destroying the stores of the depot at Chickamauga station was driven off and a portion of the stores saved. On the 27th Gen- eral Sherman sent Howard to Red Clay to destroy the railroad there, and the next day l)lair per- formed the same work on the track from below (iraysville north to the State line. On the 2()th Howard, lUair, and Davis moved from Graysville by different roads to Cleveland, and there com- pleted the destruction of railroad which had already been extensively wrought by General Long and his cavalry brigade. The trains and artillery hav- ing gone direct to Chattanooga, the conunand reached Charleston, on the Hiawassee, on the 30th, without liains or tents. pr(,)visions or baggage. The Confederate troops ])osted there left too hastilv to destroy the bridges comi)letely, and leaviuj.^- five carloads of subsistence. ( )n the same day Bragg was relieved from conunand by President Davis upon his own request. The campaign was ended. The casualties in the five days — 23d to tlie 27th of November, both inclusive — were: In Sherman's force, killed, one hmidred and twenty; wounded, eight hundred and fifty-three ; missing, one hun- 178 GENERAL SHERMAN. dred and thirty-nine ; total, eleven hundred and twelve. In Thomas's immediate command, killed, five hundred and five ; wounded, thirty-one hun- dred and twenty-three ; missing, one hundred and sixty-five ; total, thirty-seven hundred and ninety- three. Hooker, killed, one hundred and twenty- eight ; wounded, seven hundred and forty-six ; missing, forty-five ; total, nine hundred and nine- teen. Total killed, seven hundred and fifty-three ; wounded, forty-seven hundred and twenty-two ; missing, three hundred and forty-nine ; aggregate, fifty-eight hundred and twenty-four. The Confed- erate loss reported by General Hardee : Killed, three hundred and sixty-one ; wounded, twenty-one hundred and eighty ; missing, forty-one hundred and forty-six ; total, sixty-six hundred and eighty- seven. But General Grant states in his report the number of prisoners captured was sixty-one hun- dred and forty-two, of whom two hundred and thirty-nine were officers, and in his indorsement upon General Hookers report objects to the state- ment therein that Hooker's command captured sixty-five hundred and forty-seven prisoners. Be- sides forty pieces of artillery, sixty-nine gun car- riages, and seven thousand small arms, wagons, and supplies captured, there was a vast loss by burning, breaking up, and casting away of every- thing pertaining to the equipment of an army. The camps and all the roads from Missionary Ridge to Ringgold, and as far beyond as reconnoissance was pushed, were a pitiful chaos of wreck. In one of General Cleburne's reports — the re- port of his fight with Hooker at Ringgold — is a sentence which throws some light upon what is meant by the statement in Confederate reports of the number of men in a command. The statement is : "I took into the fight in Polk's brigade, five hundred and forty-five ; Lowry's brigade, thirteen hundred and thirty; Smith's (Texas) brigade, CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 179 twelve hundred and sixty-six ; Liddell's brigade, ten hundred and sixteen effective men, making a total of forty-one hundred and fifty-seven bayo- nets." " Effectives," then, means men who carry bayonets, and, unless the contrary is stated, the number of men given means the number of bayo- nets. The same appears from abstracts of returns of the army. The abstract of returns of the 31st of October shows sixteen officers and no enlisted men present for duty at army headquarters, and shows no effectives. It is the same for corps headquar- ters. In the return of effectives, all headquarters report none, there being only officers and detailed men at headquarters. The returns of divisions go further. The first division in the abstract gives, present for duty, four hundred and forty-two offi- cers and forty-six hundred and fifty-three men, and gives effective total present, forty-five hundred and thirty-one. Deducting all the officers and one hun- dred and twenty-two men from the present for duty, gives the total effective present. The same appears in the other divisions, and in the abstract of returns of the loth of December. There is no objection to such report ; it has some advantages ; but as it is different from the mode of stating the nvmibers used in the National army, it is worth bearing in mind. From the beginning President Lincoln had been solicitous about East Tennessee, Abdiel of the se- ceding States. He required military considera- tions to bend before the sacred duty of guarding the loyal mountaineers from rapine. After the cap- ture of Corinth by Halleck, he insisted that the security of East Tennessee must be a feature of whatever plan of campaign was adopted. When Grant repaired to Chattanooga, he seldom received a telegram from the President or General Halleck which did not contain a reminder of Knoxville and Burnside. Accordinglv, when the assault of Mis- l8o GENERAL SHERMAN. sionary Ridge was about to be delivered, Grant directed General Thomas to send a force, consist- ing of Granger's corps and enough other troops to make twenty thousand men, to the relief of Burn- side, then closely besieged in Knoxville. In the order for the pursuit of Bragg, made in the night of the 25th, this relieving column was excepted from the order to march in the pursuit. Grant returned to Chattanooga in the night of the 28th, and found that Granger had not started and was not ready. He made an order requiring General Sherman to go with his command, in ad- dition to Granger's column, and take command of the expedition. He sent a copy of Granger's in- structions, and also stated that the latest informa- tion from Burnside was that his provisions would last only until the 3d of December. General Wil- son arrived at Charleston and delivered the papers on the 30th of November. Colonel Orlando Smith, under direction of General Howard, began imme- diately the repair and reconstruction of the bridges. Before dawn of the ist of December the troops began to cross, and marched to Athens before halt- ing for the night. Next day Howard pushed for Loudon and its environs by night ; Blair marched to Philadelphia. In the night Sherman ordered General Long to select the best of his cavalry and make all speed to Knoxville, forty miles away, regardless of dif- ficulty or opposition, and reach Knoxville with his command or a fragment of it, and communicate with General Burnside by night. General Howard made a bridge supported by wrecked wagon beds repaired, and General Wilson with General Blair made a bridge some miles farther up. The river was crossed on the 4th, and Granger's force met Sherman's command at Marysville on the 5th. Here an oi^cer of General Burnside's stafT ap- peared and announced that Longstreet had aban- CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. igl doned the siege and withdrawn from Knoxville the previous night. He brought an invitation from General Burnside to General Sherman for a per- sonal interview. General Granger's corps, the original relieving force, was ordered to continue to Knoxville, the rest to remain at Marysville. General Sherman rode to Knoxville on the 6th. General Burnside said he would not require more than Granger's corps to aid him in the pursuit of Longstreet. Sherman marched the rest of his command back to Chattanooga, where the tired men returned to their proper commands, enjoyed with the relish of long abstinence, food, clothing, shelter, and rest. General Grant established his headquarters at Nashville ; General Thomas remained at Chatta- nooga ; General Sherman distributed the Fifteenth Corps, now commanded by General Logan, along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and the portions of the Sixteenth Corps, under the com- mand of General Dodge, from Decatur to Nash- ville, to prepare the roads for the heavy draught that was to be made upon their capacity. The Seventeenth Corps at Vicksburg, commanded by General McPherson, and the large body of troops in Memphis and West Tennessee, under command of General Hurlbut, called the Sixteenth Corps, were on garrison duty, protecting the navigation of the Mississippi from incursions by the Confed- erate force in Mississippi. The railroads running east and west through Jackson and Meridian to Mobile, and north and south the length of the State through Jackson and also through Meridian, gave the Confederates facilities for rapid transporta- tion of infantry and supplies, and constituted a continual menace. The destruction of the rail- roads would be such a relief that a large part of the garrisons of Vicksburg and Memphis could l82 GENERAL SHERMAN. be removed to fields where they were needed for active operations. General Sherman went to Nashville to consult with General Grant, and then took a leave to spend Christmas with his family at Lancaster. The visit was as brief as it was happy, and on the 3d of Jan- uary he was at Cairo on his way down the Missis- sippi. It was the famous cold January of 1864. As low down the river as Vicksburg ice floated in the river. Many Northern ladies were then vis- iting their husbands, officers in the army. They received calls on New Year's Day, as was then their usage at home, and one of the mots of the day was, " Even the climate is putting on North- ern airs." General McArthur and his stafif gave a ball New Year's night. The supper was served in a suite of hospital tents adjoining headquarters, and another suite was floored for dancing. The cold was so extreme that guests made brief visits to the supper tents, and the dancers quickly ad- journed to the headquarters building. It was the determined purpose of the Govern- ment and General Grant to make the ensuing cam- paign decisive. But they were confronted by the appalling fact that the term of service of the men who in the first half of 1861 enlisted for three years, and who not only constituted numerically a large proportion of the troops in the field, but were also the seasoned, disciplined corps d'clite of the army, would expire in the coming sunmier, in the mid- dle of the campaign. It was clearly better to have a temporary disbandment of the army before the campaign than risk a total disbandment in the mid- dle of it. Accordingly, the Government offered a furlough of thirty days and a bounty of three hun- dred dollars to every man who, having enlisted for three years, and having only ten months or less to serve, should re-enlist for the remainder of the war. The mass of those who were entitled re-enlisted. CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 183 The main stimulus was a sober, relentless purpose to carry the war to a successful termination ; but the proposed visit home made it easier, and various motives co-operated. A rep;^iment in a brigade en- camped on the Big Black River held back. A ser- geant, vigorous, handsome, a born leader, but will- ful, took umbrage at something and refused. The other men generally followed his example. An order was made in the brigade that men who had re-enlisted as veterans might be permitted to shoot at wild ducks on a pond beyond the river, and just outside of the picket line. The sergeant, not know- ing the limitation, asked for leave and was refused, and told the reason. He would not submit to see- ing others enjoy a privilege from which he was debarred, and at once re-enlisted. The rest of the regiment with great satisfaction did the same. General Sherman put General William Sooy Smith in command of all the cavalry in the De- partment of the Tennessee, and directed him with a selected force, which he estimated would be seven thousand men, to start from Memphis the ist of February, crush Forrest, tear up the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and join Sherman at Meridian about the loth of February. General Hurlbut was sent to Vicksburg with two divisions. With these, and General McPherson with two divisions of the Sev- enteenth Corps and Winslow's cavalry, Sherman left Vicksburg on the 3d and crossed the Big Black the same day. A brigade of Armstrong's cavalry hovered about the front in observation. On the morning of the 5th a well-served battery posted upon a hill in front fired fatally upon the advance of McPherson's corps as it moved out from biv- ouac, and falling back, but halting and firing from each successive vantage ground, scarcely impeded the steady march. Hurlbut came up on the flank of the Confederates, and they summarily withdrew. A brigade of the Seventeenth Corps pushed on to 13 l84 GENERAL SHERMAN. Jackson and occupied it in the night. The roads beyond Jackson were execrable. Swamps, quag- mires, holes, gullies, and rocks often kept the rear of the. column till after midnight before going into tentless bivouac. The reports of the Confederate cavalry officers especially complain of the difficulty of the roads. General Sherman was again near being cap- tured. Halting at a house by the wayside at a crossroads as the rear of the Sixteenth Corps was passing, he detached the rear regiment to remain until the Seventeenth Corps should come up. The colonel of the regiment, seeing some of General McPherson's staff coming up the road, took for granted that the corps was at hand, and resumed his march. General Armstrong, who was on the crossroad with part of his force, seeing the oppor- tunity, charged upon the wagons and the nmles. The sound of the firing and of bullets startled Sher- man and his attendants. They gathered what fire- arms they could find and barricaded themselves in an outbuilding, while an aid-de-camp scurried down the road and brought back the regiment upon a full run. On the 14th of February there was an interest- ing encounter between infantry and cavalry. Gen- eral McPherson on the afternoon of the 13th or- dered General Leggett to leave his first brigade at a point four miles in rear of the corps, to proceed at daylight next morning to the railroad crossing over Chunky River, eight miles to the south, and destroy the bridge. At 6 a. m. the brigade, re- enforced by two companies of cavalry, began the march. On the way information was received from inhabitants that General S. D. Lee was at the sta- tion with the cavalry brigades of Wirt Adams and P. B. Starke. This information is shown by the records to be correct, except that General Lee had left the command about daylight, summoned to a CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 185 personal interview with General Polk at Meridian. A mile and a half from the station a heavy, fresh trail came into the road from the west, cut so deep into the earth as to show that a large body of cav- alry had passed. There was no chance for any suc- cess except by surprise. The command loaded, and were ordered to move with absolute silence. The captain commanding the cavalry reported that his advance had discovered a picket on post with- out being observed, and stated that his men had no sabers and could not make a charge. Without pausing in their march, the first two regiments of infantry deployed on a double-quick, one on each side of the road, while skirmishers were thrown out to the front on a full run. The line, advancing at double-quick, emerged from the timber and saw the hostile cavalry at hand along the bank of the river. The Confederates, startled at seeing with- out warning the long ranks, perfectly aligned and rapidly advancing, sounded their bugles ; but be- fore they could form the charging line was upon them, and drove them in confusion across the stream. A quick fire scattered them, and then the other two regiments, left behind by the rapid movement of the deployed line, appeared in col- umn of fours debouching from the woods. The enemy, supposing a large force was at hand, with- drew. Starke with his brigade reached the out- skirts of Meridian in time to engage Sherman's advance on the eastern environs of the city, his ar- tillery went to the south, toward Enterprise, with the other brigade. Seven loaded baggage wagons, which were not harnessed, were captured, and the railroad bridge was burned. General Smith, obeying what' he says was the express verbal order of General Sherman, waited in Memphis for the brigade of Colonel Waring, which was detained up the Mississippi by ice, and did not reach Memphis till the nth. The plan of 1 86 GENERAL SHERMAN. his campaign was deranged. He did not crush Forrest, did not destroy the railroad, and did not join Sherman at Meridian. He had an unsuccess- ful engagement with Jackson at West Point, and retreated, followed by Jackson with daily combats, in which both lost men, and Smith lost artillery. General Polk evacuated Meridian on the morn- ing of the 14th of February. Sherman entered later in the day, and immediately spread his forces out along the railroads in all directions, and prose- cuted the work of destruction until the 20th. Tracks, culverts, and bridges were so largely extir- pated that to a large extent the roads were not used again for military purposes during the war. Meanwhile nothing was heard of General Smith. After anxious waiting and inquiry, the expedition, having accomplished its purpose, turned home- ward, the Seventeenth Corps taking the most di- rect route to Canton, Hurlbut coming farther to the north, and the cavalry swinging still farther northward, in the hope of joining Smith or getting news of him. All converged at Canton on the 26th, without having gained any information. Gen- eral Sherman left Canton for Vicksburg on the 27th of February. Hurlbut brought the expedition in on the 3d of March. The re-enlisted veterans left Vicksburg to spend their thirty days' furlough in visiting home, and then go to new fields. CHAPTER VIII. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. General Sherman reached Vicksburg at the end of his Meridian campaign on the last day of February, and, finding there letters from Grant di- recting him to co-operate in an expedition up the Red River, to be conducted by General Banks, in whose Department of the Gulf the theater of opera- tions lay, he took steamer at once for New Orleans. Reaching that city on the 2d of March, he spent a couple of days in consultation with Banks, and, with his usual restless energy, was on his way back to Vicksburg on the 4th, not waiting for the cere- monies which w^ere to inaugurate on that day a loyal State government for Louisiana. The plan arranged with Banks included a loan for thirty days from the 7th of March of two divi- sions from the Department of the Tennessee — one, under General Mower, from the Sixteenth Corps, and one from the Seventeenth Corps, under Gen- eral Kilby Smith, the two constituting a temporary corps, under General A. J. Smith. The expedition was to be a mixed military and naval one, a fleet of gunboats under Admiral Porter co-operating with the land forces, and convoying the numerous transports. It was expected that a column under General Steele, commanding the Department of Arkansas, should meet Banks at Shreveport, some three hundred miles up the Red River, and that this junction of forces should release Smith's corps, 187 1 88 GENERAL SHERMAN. which would then immediately return to Shermart, who was hurrying his preparations to have the Army of the Tennessee in North Alabama ready to open the general campaign under Grant before the 1st of May. With fullest confidence in the good faith and right purposes of General Banks, Sherman knew so well the difficulty of reclaiming a detachment once committed to a distant expedition, that he sought by most explicit written arrangements with Banks and directions to Smith to secure the prompt return of his two divisions at the appointed time.* But the expedition did not turn out successfully, the junction with Steele at Shreveport was not made, and upon his retreat Banks could not spare Smith's corps until the army reached the Missis- sippi again. The Atlanta campaign had then opened, and through the whole of it the Army of the Tennessee was weaker by the two divisions than Sherman had meant to have it. Still greater changes were in store for him. On his way to Memphis he was met, on the loth of March, by a letter from Grant announcing his own promotion to the rank of lieutenant general. Four days later Grant, on his return from a rapid journey to Washington, summoned Sherman to meet him at Nashville. The visit of the lieutenant general to Washington was followed by his assign- ment, on March 12th, to the command of the armies of the United States under the President. General Halleck was announced as chief of staff in Wash- ington, Sherman succeeded to the Military Division of the Mississippi, and McPherson to the Depart- ment and Army of the Tennessee. f The same day Grant started westward again to meet Sherman at Nashville, and to have his final consultations with his subordinates before taking the field with the * O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 494, 514. f Id., pt. 7, p. 5S. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 189 Army of the Potomac, as he had resolved to do. Grant's order assuming command of all the Na- tional armies was not issued until the 17th, from Nashville, and Sherman's was dated the 18th, from the same place.''' The possibility of this change had, of course, been known, for the bill to revive the rank of lieu- tenant general had been introduced by Mr. Wash- burne on the 14th of December, and passed the House of Representatives on the ist of February, with a recommendation to the President to give the appointment to Grant. Although it did not pass the Senate and become a law till nearly a month later, it was a foregone conclusion, and General Grant had planned the spring campaign in the West with a view to this contingency. With his habitual reticence, he kept his own counsels as to his personal part in the next year's work, though there is little doubt that his predilection was to remain in the West. The only thing he was fully resolved on was, as he said in his letter of March 4th to Sherman, that he would accept no appointment which would require him to make Washington his own headquarters. Pie was de- termined to remain in the field. During most of the winter the discussion of the organization of the principal Western army and its component parts had gone on, therefore, with a more or less clearly acknowledged reference to what became the actual situation at the beginning of March. At first Grant seems to have thought it possible that he might lead the Western army without any intermediate commander between him- self and the three department commanders of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio. While this point of view prevailed, he thought of Mc- Pherson for the command of the Army of the Ohio, * O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 83, 87. 190 GENERAL SHERMAN. from which General Foster asked to be relieved on account of his health. He had also thought of General W. F. Smith for the place, and as early as November had asked to have him booked for the first vacancy in the rank of major general.* Toward the end of December Halleck had sug- gested General John M. Schofield for the Depart- ment of the Ohio. Grant reserved his response to this till the middle of January, after a personal visit to Foster at Knoxville, when he renewed the recom- mendation of General Smith, if the latter might be given the appropriate rank, to date so as to be senior to other major generals in the department. He added that, if it were contemplated to give Gen- eral Smith a still higher command, he would be content with either of the other general officers named, or with General J. G. Parke, who was with the Ninth Corps in Tennessee. f The reference to a " still higher command " for General Smith is understood to mean that his appointment to com- mand the Army of the Potomac had been under consideration. To date back a commission so as to give an officer formal seniority over others already in serv- ice was several times done, notably in the case of General Rosecrans, who was thus made to outrank Thomas in the Army of the Cumberland, but the irritation it caused did not commend it for repeated use. It shows that Grant shared the current mis- apprehension among army officers in regard to the effect of the date of a general's commission when the officer was assigned to special duty by the President. It was frequently claimed that such as- signment could not override mere seniority in com- mission, and the question was several times raised before it was officially settled, in accordance with the plain meaning of the statute, that the assign- * O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, pp. 122, 277. f Id., pp. 529, 571. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 191 nieiit by the President to a department, an army, or a corps gave precedence over all officers of the same grade not themselves thus specially assigned. When once this principle was settled, our army system acquired an admirable flexibility, for it en- abled the President to select any major general to command an army, giving to such officer what amounted to a temporary grade so long as his com- mand actually lasted. This was a better system than that of the Confederates, and would have left nothing to desire if the temporary power had been accompanied by the temporary title of lieutenant general or general. By the end of January Grant found the arrange- ment as to the commanders of departments and armies easy to settle. A plan was on foot to trans- fer the Ninth Corps to the East, where Burnside should resume the command of it, and it should be enlarged to a strength of twenty-five or thirty thou- sand men, with the prospect of becoming a separate army on the Carolina coast, where it had first won renown. General Parke went with it, and resumed his old relations to Burnside as chief of stafif. Gen- eral W. F. Smith was also indicated for transfer to the East. The probability that McPherson would soon be promoted to the head of the Army of the Tennessee was so great that Grant no longer hesitated as to the Army of the Ohio, and on Janu- ary 27th he telegraphed a request that General Schofield be assigned to the Department of the Ohio, which was promptly done.* Schofield's serv- ice had been in Missouri, where he had been upon the stafif of General Lyon at the battle of Wilson's Creek, and had been on active duty from the first organization of Union troops in that State. Since May, 1863, he had been in command of that de- partment, and had established a high character for * O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 229, 230. 192 GENERAL SHERMAN. judgment and ability in administering its affairs. His full sympathy with the President's conciliatory policy toward conservative Union men had brought upon him the strenuous opposition of radical lead- ers in Missouri and Kansas, and these had pre- vented the confirmation of his promotion to the rank of major general. Mr. Lincoln, well know- ing that the contest was rather with himself than with Schofield, had renewed the nomination, but was not unwilling to find a way of conciliating op- position by sending General Rosecrans to Missouri and transferring Schofield to the Department of the Ohio. The Department and Army of the Cumberland was by far the larger part of the combined forces in the Military Division of the Mississippi. It was reckoned that it would put into the field sixty thou- sand soldiers of the hundred thousand with which the active campaign would be opened. From a purely military point of view this great dispropor- tion between the three organizations of equal grade in the grand army was very objectionable, but there were other considerations wdiich overrode the ob- jections. Each of the armies had its history and its strong esprit dc corps. Such pride in its organiza- tion is so powerful a stimulus to every soldier, from the ranks upward, that the morale of an army may be seriously impaired by discouraging it. The whole country had gloried in Thomas's stubborn courage at Chickamauga, and in his assurance afterward that he would hold Chattanooga till the army starved. A general public sentiment, which no prudent administration or commander could af- ford to ignore, demanded that the Army of the Cumberland, with Thomas at its head, should re- main intact as the preponderant unit m the Army of the West. With this sentiment Grant was in full accord. His strong, practical sense in military mat- ters made him always averse to meddling unneces- MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 193 sarily with existing organizations, and he instinc- tively felt that the best way to avoid dissensions and remove the jealousies which always spring up when one army is merged in another, is to avoid every change in form which would wound the pride of the soldier. Thomas was a noble and patriotic man, but he felt as keenly as any one his personal dignity, and resented as warmly as any a slight to it. Grant respected and sympathized with this feel- ing, and does not seem to have debated even the necessity of leaving the organization of the Cum- berland army as it was. Sherman fully agreed with him in this, and received the chief command with this question of organization definitively settled. The War Department at this time made an at- tempt to relieve the army of a congestion in the upper grades, which gave little hope of promo- tion to meritorious officers in the field. General officers who for any cause had dropped out of active employment and were awaiting orders were as- signed to the different armies, to take any service suitable to their rank. Major generals could claim no command greater than a division, and briga- diers must be content with a brigade if divisions were not vacant. A few resigned rather than take a command of less importance than that which they had last exercised. In the West the most promi- nent officer in this situation was General Buell, who had been relieved from the command of the Army of the Cumberland at his own request, under a pressure which was much more political than mili- tary. A court of inquiry had, in substance, justified his conduct of the campaign of 1862, and, though he had declined some overtures looking to active service. Grant and Sherman were both disposed to find an acceptable position for him. Sherman, with the assent of Thomas, had suggested that he be assigned to the Fourteenth Army Corps in the Cumberland army ; but, on hearing the rumor that 194 GENERAL SHERMAN. Buell was to be employed, Andrew Johnson, as military governor of Tennessee, protested. This, joined with the strong hostility of Governor Mor- ton, of Indiana, made an array of political influence quite strong enough to account for the order of the War Department mustering him out of service a few weeks later.* The difhculty growing out of the general order assigning olificers to active duty was complicated by the fact that a number who had been relieved from duty in the Eastern armies were ordered to the West, and reported to army commanders who had been sifting their own organizations to make them more efificient, and were anything but pleased to assign to brigades and divisions men who were strangers to them, and against whom was the pre- sumption arising out of the fact that they were not retained in the army where they had served and were known. When, therefore, a number of gen- eral ofBcers were sent out to Grant, and he asked Thomas whether he wanted any of them, the latter very frankly said he must first know who and what they were — some men he would be very glad to get, others he would not choose to have at all. " The colonels I have in command of brigades," he said, " are all efficient men, and I would not care to exchange them for worthless brigadiers." He afterward emphasized this by giving his reasons for objecting to some who were suggested to him.f Several changes were made among the corps commanders also. General Hooker was in com- mand of two corps — the Eleventh, under Howard, and the Twelfth, under Slocum — which he had brought to the West from the Army of the Po- tomac. The anomaly of having an intermediate commander between the army commander and the * O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 221, 278, 292, 304, 306, 320, 323. f Id., pt. 2, pp. 131, 142. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 195 heads of the corps was a fruitful cause of cUafing, and, after some correspondence with Washington on the subject, it was finally adjusted by consolidat- ing the two corps into one, commanded by Hooker, and known as the Twentieth. Howard was trans- ferred to the Fourth, which General Gordon Gran- ger vacated, taking a leave of absence, and Slocum was sent to take command at Vicksburg.'*" Sheri- dan would have been the natural successor to Granger in the Fourth Corps, where he command- ed a division, but Grant had already determined to give him the command of the cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. In the Army of the Tennessee the promotion of McPherson and the wide separation of the column in Georgia from the troops left in the Mississippi Valley led to a partial reorganiza- tion, in which General Logan was assigned to the Fifteenth and General Blair to the Seventeenth Corps. In the Army of the Ohio, General Scho- field retained the immediate command of the Twenty-third Corps in the field, as well as that of the army, and General Stoneman was transferred to the cavalry corps of that army. These changes completed the larger organization of the forces before Grant went East, or were made in pursu- ance of arrangements settled with him. Sherman retained the organization as he found it, till the progress of the campaign naturally caused some modifications. When Sherman met Grant at Nashville on the 17th of March, he learned authoritatively the pur- pose of the lieutenant general to take the field with the Army of the Potomac, and that the independent command of the western army would fall upon his shoulders. To save time for consultation, he ac- companied Grant to Cincinnati, as the latter was * O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, p. 397 ; xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 313-315 ; Id., pt. 3. P- 253. 196 GENERAL SHERMAN. in haste to get back to Washington. Far from showing any wish to assume the higher position, Sherman had urged that Grant should stay with the army at Chattanooga and personally lead it. The letters which passed between them when Grant sent the news of his promotion (so often quoted) reveal their close relations of friendship and confi- dence as nothing else can do.* Grant's departure from his habitual reticence to speak of his indebt- edness to Sherman and McPherson was a remark- able exhibition of feeling on his part. The warmth of Sherman's reply does not surprise us or seem so unexpected, but it was no less sincere. He opened a window into tlie recesses of his heart and mind when he said, " Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point, but that admitted the ray of light which I have foUow^ed since." His wishes for the future he puts in frankest and strongest form, and the vehemence of feeling grows as he writes : " Don't stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualiiied than you to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come West; take to yourself the w^hole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and the Pa- cific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. . . . For God's sake and your country's sake, come out of Washington ! I foretold to General Halleck before he left Corinth the inevitable result, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the seat of the coming empire, and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic." Grant's impulses urged him in the same direc- * O. R., x.xxii, pt. 3, pp. 18, 49. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE xMISSISSIPPI. 197 tion. but his visit to Washington had given him conchisive pubHc reasons why he should lead the great army in X'irginia. It was the logical result of tliis that Sherman should command the com- bined armies of the West. The time had passed when he shrunk from responsibility. A laudable ambition would prompt him to rejoice at the op- portunity to conduct the western campaign. But he was not even consulted. Friendship and a high estimate of Sherman's capacity united to fix Grant's choice. There was neither hesitation nor second thought. At his request the appointment was made, and the notice of it was the of^cial order promulgated by the War Department on the 12th of March. Sherman and General George H. Thomas were old friends and classmates. Thomas's appointment as brigadier general of volunteers had been decided by Sherman's influence. He served in Kentucky, in 1861, under Sherman's command. The fortunes of war reversed the relation, and put Sherman sub- ordinate to Thomas after the battle of Shiloh. They had again been equal department commanders under Grant at Alissionary Ridge, and now Sher- man was again to become the commanding officer over his friend. Sherman often said that, had such been the order, he would have served with com- pletest content and cheerfulness under Thomas in these final campaigns. In their private intercourse they were the schoolmates of boyhood, and the cadet nicknames were those they used to each other. Their friendship was ended only by death. There were not wanting to Thomas admiring friends who thought he was " overslaughed " in the new assignments to duty, and these were not al- ways judicious in expressing themselves. They found a mouthpiece in Andrew Johnson, wdio tele- graphed to the President his opinion that Thomas ought to be independent in his command and re- 198 GENERAL SHERMAN. port direct to Washington.* This would mean, of course, a scheme of separate small campaigns, such as had so often been disastrous in the past, instead of the strong combined effort which Grant had planned, There is no evidence that Thomas fa- vored such folly for a moment. The two men, both very able, were very un- like in temperament. Sherman was impulsive and demonstrative ; Thomas was impassive and phleg- matic. Sherman was lithe and wiry ; Thomas was massive and slow of motion. Sherman was fest- less and aggressive ; Thomas was deliberate and inclined to the defensive. Sherman grew more cjuiet when the excitement of a crisis in battle gave vent to his nervous strain, as escaping steam stops when the engine begins its motion ; Thomas was quickened by such a crisis into more active move- ment of mind and body. They supplemented each other admirably, but there can now be little doubt that Sherman's restless energy, his physical in- ability to tolerate a standstill, was the quality which made it possible to continue the advance in Georgia, where the army was dependent on a single line of communications reaching to the Ohio River, four hundred miles away. It is not worth while to dis- cuss the possible results of a different choice of commanders. Sherman's selection was justified by the best of all possible military tests — a glorious ending of the campaign and of the war. The plan of campaign which Grant had outlined for himself before his transfer to the East was com- municated to Thomas as early as the 19th of Janu- ary, in a letter which said, *' I look upon the line for this army to secure in its next campaign to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile. Atlanta and Montgomery being the important intermediate * O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 105. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 199 points." * This had been fully discussed by Grant and Sherman, and, when the latter succeeded to the command, Atlanta remained the goal to be first reached, though Grant was explicit in saying that, beyond indicating Johnston's army as the true ob- jective, he left his subordinate free to execute his work in his own way.f Sherman had been ex- pected to concentrate the Army of the Tennessee at Huntsville, Ala., Thomas that of the Cumber- land at Chattanooga, and Schofield to bring the Army of the Ohio to Cleveland, Tenn., still farther to the east. A converging advance upon Rome, Ga., had been indicated as the opening movement. In writing to General Robert Allen, chief quarter- master at Louisville, Ky., Sherman had said, on March 24th, that his principal depots would be at Nashville, Chattanooga, Huntsville, and Decatur, the first two the principal ones. In the same letter he said, " We are on the offensive, and should not think of any defensive measure;" J an expression very like one which brought upon General Pope unmeasured and unmerited criticism in 1862. Could the army be supplied by the line of rail- road? That was the burning question. From Louisville on the Ohio to Chattanooga through Nashville was three hundred and thirty-seven miles. From Chattanooga to Atlanta would be a hundred and thirty-five more — four hundred and seventy- two in all, a single track, and every mile of it liable to raids by the enemy's cavalry. Of course, Nash- ville and Chattanooga, the principal depots, must be fortified and garrisoned, so that supplies and munitions could be accumulated there as a reserve in case of any interruption of communication be- tween these places and the base. Colonel D. C. McCallum, the general manager of military rail- * O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, p. 143. f Id., pt. 3, p. 246. X Id., pt. 3, p. 142. 200 GENERAL SHERMAN. ways, had come West in January to study the situ- ation, and great improvements had been made in the railway management before the mihtary divi- sion was turned over to Sherman.* But the best estimates of the number of cars and locomotives lacking were so great that the problem seemed al- most insoluble. More than a hundred locomotives and twenty-five hundred cars, in addition to the ex- isting rolling stock, were necessary, the experts said, to insure the delivery at the front of the one hundred and fifty carloads per day, which were the measure of the wants of an army of a hundred thou- sand men. The purchase or construction of the extra equipment during the winter and spring was out of the question. Sherman took the matter in hand with char- acteristic vigor. The management of the railways was connected directly with his own headquarters. He limited the use of the trains to the absolute necessities of the army. Private trade and trans- portation must find other channels. Passenger trafBc was strictly limited. Strangers and visitors were not permitted to come to the front. The full motive power and the car space were devoted to military work. The issue of army rations to citi- zens at military posts had grown into a great abuse. This was stopped. Colonel Adna Anderson, mas- ter of railway transportation, zealously and untir- ingly enforced Sherman's orders, but it was not yet enough. The general then quietly arranged with Mr. Guthrie, the president of the Louisville and Nashville Railway, to keep on the line south of the Ohio the rolling stock received from North- ern railways, and, while the " car accountants " were gradually finding out that their equipment did not come back to their roads, and were fuming over the delay, the depots at Nashville and Chatta- * O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, p. 143. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 20I nooga were accumulating rations and ammunition. No one enjoyed the humorous side of a situation more than Sherman, and his eyes twinkled with fun as he reckoned up the profits of his ruse in the growing possibihties of an early opening of the spring campaign. Of course, there was an outcry. " Imploring appeals " to Mr. Lincoln moved his kind heart to ask Sherman whether he could not modify his order. The latter answered : " It is demonstrated that the railroad can not supply the army and the people too. One or the other must quit, and the army don't intend to unless Joe Johnston makes us." * Sherman was stoutly backed at Washing- ton by General Meigs, the quartermaster general, and was allowed to have his way.f He foresaw, what turned out to be true, that the private busi- ness of the country could accommodate itself to the situation with but little individual suffering if his system was firmly and honestly carried out. The supply problem was solved if the army itself could be kept from overburdening itself with impedimenta, as every army is prone to do. Writing to General Thomas on this subject, Sherman said: "When we move we will take no tents or baggage, but one change of clothing on our horses or to be carried by the men, and on pack animals by company of- ficers, with five days' bacon, twenty days' bread, and thirty days' salt, sugar, and cofifee ; nothing else but arms and ammunition proportioned to our ability." X As the campaign lengthened, this scale had to be modified, but it was the standard for use in the frequent instances when the railway had to be left for some turning or flanking movement. On the Confederate side, General Joseph E. Johnston had been in command since the middle * O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 25, 33. f Id., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 434. X Id., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 323. 202 GENERAL SHERMAN. of December, and his troops were in the strong intrenched camp in front of Dahon, about forty miles from Chattanooga. General Polk had a small army in Alabama and Mississippi, and Longstreet another on the confines of Virginia and East Ten- nessee. President Davis began urging an aggres- sive winter campaign as soon as Johnston assumed command, and indicated his preference for a plan by which Johnston should turn Thomas's position at Chattanooga by moving to the eastward of it by way of Cleveland, Tenn., while Longstreet came down the Holston Valley and united with him for a dash through the mountains into middle Tennes- see. There were strong reasons in favor of this plan, and it was supported by the authority of General Lee. It was reckoned that by re-enforce- ments from Polk and from Beauregard's forces on the Atlantic seacoast Johnston's column could start seventy-live thousand strong, and be increased to nearly a hundred thousand by the junction with Longstreet.* Johnston's real preference was for the defensive policy, tempting Sherman to assault his impreg- nable position at Dalton, and watching for a favor- able opportunity for a decisive return blow when his opponent's impetuosity should have led to some disaster to the National army. He presented with force the objections to the plan proposed to him, the need of assured supplies for the opening steps of such a campaign, and expressed a preference for a line of operations by Rome, Guntersville, and Huntsville, by which he should turn Thomas's position by the south and west, instead of the east and north. His own choice, however, would have been to go still farther west and make northern Mississippi his base of operations if he must aban- * O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, pp. 843, 856 ; xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 592, 594, 614. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 203 don the waiting and defensive strategy which he thought wisest of all.* The strained relations which notoriously ex- isted between Davis and Johnston gave to this cor- respondence a very formal air on the part of the general at least, and one is impressed in reading it with the conviction that the latter was willing to gain time by the discussion, and let the delay bring about the adoption of his own plan. Anyhow, this was what happened, and Grant and Sherman were allowed to use the winter for the Meridian expedition and in the preparations for a spring campaign. Johnston remained cjuietly within his formidable lines at Dalton, only sending Hardee with re-enforcements for Polk when Sherman threatened to march from Meridian into Alabama. As the spring approached, Longstreet was ordered to join Lee in Virginia, and any thought of his again uniting with Johnston was given up. Polk prepared to carry a corps of fourteen thousand men to Johnston as soon as active operations should begin. Regiments and brigades were carefully culled out from garrisons on the Gulf coast, and within the fifst week from the beginning of Sher- man's operations in May, Johnston had in hand the seventy-five thousand men which the Richmond government had calculated upon as the maximun force that could be furnished him.f Sherman had estimated very accurately the numbers under the Confederate colors in April, but was not fully aware of the extent to which re-enforcements were ready to reach his adversary in the first weeks of May. He was entirely free from the too common fault of exaggerating the forces of an opponent. He did not magnify his task for the sake of greater glory in success, nor did he see lions in his path. * O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 510, 559, 644. f Id., pt. 3, p. 866 ; xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 670, 737, 740. CHAPTER IX. CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. General Grant had planned a simultaneous advance of the National armies early in May, and on the 4th of the month, as the Army of the Po- tomac was crossing the Rapidan, Schofield's Army of the Ohio was crossing the boundary of Georgia, coming out of Tennessee to become, at Red Clay, the left of Sherman's line. Thomas was concen- trating the Army of the Cumberland with his cen- ter at Ringgold, some twenty miles in front of Chattanooga, his left at Catoosa Springs, and his right feeling its way southward toward Trickum. The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, was moving from Chattanooga by the rear of Thomas's army, to come into position as Sherman's right wing near Villanow. Several parallel mountain ridges, running from northeast to southwest, lay between Chattanooga and Dalton, a small town in the valley of the Con- nasauga River, where the Confederate forces under Johnston lay. The last of these ridges, Rocky Face, was an almost perpendicular barrier, cleft by the deep gorge of Mill Creek, down which ran the Atlanta Railroad after piercing the ridge of Tunnel Hill. On the 7th Thomas demonstrated against Tunnel Hill with Palmer's corps (Four- teenth), while his left, under Howard (Fourth Corps), turned the position on the north and forced the enemy to retire within their Rocky Face lines through the crooked and fortihed gorge, with the 204 CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 205 precipitous heights of Buzzard's Roost looking down upon it. For two days Sherman tested the strength of his adversary's position from the west and north in sharp combats, in which only small bodies could find foothold. He was convinced that he could not carry Johnston's lines from this side witliout very great loss of life, and pressed the march of McPherson's army in a flanking movement by his right, according to the general plan which he had announced to Grant on taking the field.* McPher- son was sent through Villanow to Snake Creek Gap, an almost unknown pass and ravine turning the south end of Rocky Face ridge, twelve or fif- teen miles below Dalton. and leading to the town of Resaca, in the angle at the junction of the Con- nasauga with the Oostanaula River. Sherman hoped that McPlierson would be able to reach and disable the railroad, but Resaca was found in- trenched and garrisoned by four thousand men under General Cantey, and, after a strong recon- noissance, McPherson retired and went into posi- tion at the eastern mouth of the gap in Sugar Valley. Without wasting time in regrets, Sherman has- tened the transfer of his whole army to McPher- son's position, leaving Howard's corps and the cavalry of the Army of the Ohio under Stoneman to cover the communications with Chattanooga. Johnston meanwhile was equally busy in retreating from Dalton on Resaca by the shorter interior route, and in throwing up fieldworks on lines pre- viously marked out by his engineer, extending the Resaca intrenchments northward on the line of hills between the Connasauga River and Camp Creek. The passage of a large army through a narrow * O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, p. 25. CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA, 207 road and trestle bridges. Hooker's corps was taken from the center and passed to the extreme left. Howard stretched his line so as to relieve the Twenty-third Corps troops on his right, and these were marched to Hooker's support on the flank, together with Schofield's reserve division. Step by step this flank pushed forward, till near night it gained advantages which threatened the enemy's rear. Threatened now on both flanks, with a river behind him, Johnston was again forced to retreat. He had laid a pontoon bridge in the night of the 14th above the others, and out of McPherson's range. All these were put to use in the night of the 15th, and next morning the National troops entered the place. A thousand prisoners and two batteries of artillery were among the trophies, but the lists of Sherman's killed and wounded approxi- mated four thousand.* The railway bridge at Resaca had been burned, but the wagon bridge was uninjured, and Sherman had laid two pontoon bridges across the Oostanaula below the mouth of Snake Creek. He pressed the pursuit in several columns, first sending a division of the Fourteenth Corps to support the cavalry far on the right in a direct movement on Rome. He saw with unwillingness his long line of com- munications growing longer, and ordered his sub- ordinates to attack without delay if Johnston any- where made a stand, trusting to his ability to con- centrate in time to make a success of any battle when once it was opened. The country between the Oostanaula and the Etowah was an open one compared with the mountainous region north of Resaca, and, though Johnston had thought of of- fering battle at Adairsville, about halfway between the streams, he found on inspection that it was too open a situation, and continued his retreat to * O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 201, 202. 2o8 GENERAL SHERMAN. Cassville, where he issued formal orders for battle on the 19th. Sherman's center, under Thomas, had followed the " broad trail " of the enemy along the railroad to Kingston, where it turned sharply to the east. Schofield's line of march, four or five miles east- ward, led more nearly in the direction of Cassville, and he was ordered to move straight on that place. McPherson, equally far away on the west, was called in to Kingston, while the center took roads which would meet Schofield in front of the enemy. Johnston's position at Cassville was on a com- manding ridge behind the town, but Polk and Hood, who held the center and right of his line, protested so vigorously that the center was en- filaded by the artillery of Sherman's left that John- ston yielded his opinion, and ordered a continua- tion of the retreat across the Etowah, where the railway passes through the defile of Allatoona. Johnston tells us that he never ceased to regret that he did not give battle as he first intended.* Sher- man also regretted it, for his policy was to bring the campaign to a decisive issue as soon as possible. Sherman followed the enemy through Carters- ville with a division of Schofield's corps, and when the railway bridge was found to be burned he quickly turned his columns toward Kingston, and secured crossings of the river above and below that place. The Resaca bridge was already rebuilt, and Kingston was made the field depot of supplies. Twenty days' rations were in the wagons, herds of cattle were driven near the columns, and the army plunged into the wild and tangled country between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee. The gorge of Allatoona, Kennesaw Mountain, and Lost Slountain made a group of strong positions around the town of Marietta, and Johnston planned to * O. R., xxxviii, pt. 3, p. 616. CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 2C9 make of them a new intrenched camp, while he would meet Sherman on advanced lines westward, near Dallas and along Pumpkin \'ine Creek. On the 25th of ]^Iay the National columns were converging on Dallas, intending to follow the main road from that place to Marietta. Johnston was also in motion for the same place. At the crossing of the Pumpkin \'ine near Owen's Mills, Hooker, who had the advance in the center, found the bridge burning, and indications of a strong force on the road to New Hope Church. The lire was put out. the bridge quickly repaired, and his head of column turned in that direction from the Dallas road. It was Hood's corps of the Confed- erates which was going into position around the church on the heights east of the valley. Hooker made a headlong attack, but was met with a wither- ing fire, which checked his advanced division. The rest of the corps went in to the support of their comrades, but it was already late in the afternoon. a heavy downpour of rain delayed the approaching columns, and the affair was limited to a bloody combat between the two corps. During the night Sherman hurried forward his troops, while Johnston was doing the same, and the next day found the two armies facing each other across a narrow valley from Dallas north- east in the direction of Ackworth on the railroad. Then began a systematic warfare of intrenched lines, with only occasional serious efforts at direct attack, in which the assailing party pretty uniformly got the worst of it. Sherman steadily pushed for- ward and extended his left, seeking to renew his connection with the railroad at Ackworth. Each day the cavalry would feel for the end of the ene- my's line in the dense forest and thickets, and the infantry would advance to a brisk skirmishing at- tack, pushing the Confederates back and intrench- ing every foot that was gained. For six weeks, 2IO GENERAL SHERMAN. amid the constant rains of an unusually wet season, this work continued. On the 27th of May Howard's corps tried the fortunes of a direct attack upon a projectnig angle of the Confederate line near Pickett's Mill, but was repulsed. On the 28th Johnston sought to check the movement toward the left by an attack upon McPherson's right at Dallas, made by Hardee's corps. He in turn suffered a bloody repulse, and Sherman's transfer of troops from right fiank to left went steadily on. On June ist Stoneman's cavalry corps occupied the Allatoona pass, and the rebuilding of the Etowah railway bridge was im- mediately begun. By the 4th Sherman's lines had advanced so far as to threaten Johnston's connec- tion with Marietta, and the latter retreated to a new line previously laid out within the old, and ex- tending from Kennesaw Mountain west to Pine Mountain, and thence south to Lost Mountain. A strip of country several miles wide was thus given up, but Johnston's new position was wonderfully strong, and admirably covered the railroad from Kennesaw to the Chattahoochee. Sherman now made Schofield's Army of the Ohio his pivot on the left, and passed around it successively Thomas's and McPherson's armies. McPherson covered the Ackworth station on the railroad on the 7th of June, and the next day Gen- eral Frank P. Blair joined him with the Seven- teenth Corps, coming from the north by the way of Rome, the only considerable re-enforcement Sherman received during the campaign. A new field depot of supplies was soon established on the railroad, McPherson's lines were advanced close to Kennesaw on the north, and a new swinging movement by the right now began, Thomas being the center as usual, but Schofield being the extreme right and traversing the outer arc of the circle. Day by day the sharp combats went on, mile CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 21I by mile the right flank swung southward, till the old Sandtown road was occupied to the crossing of the highway from Marietta to Powder Springs. On the 14th of June Johnston found his position at Pine Mountain untenable, and in the last recon- noissance he made from its summit General Polk was killed at his side by a cannon ball. In him Johnston lost not only a stanch subordinate, but a friend who had been the peacemaker with Presi- dent Davis. The corps passed for a time to the command of General Stephen D. Lee. In a day or two Lost Mountain had to be left to the Confederate cavalry to defend it, the infan- try line not reaching beyond the Powder Springs road, and the flank being near the upper waters of OUey's Creek, which runs southwestward into the Chattahoochee. These movements had been hastened by the aggressive vigor of Sherman's troops, pushing from hill to hill, fording stream after stream all flooded by the constant rains, get- ting artillery positions w'hich enfiladed portions of the intrenchments, and making rushes for any point which seemed weakened. Although no gen- eral engagement took place, these daily combats often became considerable affairs, in which a di- vision or a corps was involved. Hardee's corps was the left of Johnston's line till the 2 1 St, when the extension of Sherman's right threatened to outflank the position at the Powder Springs road, and Johnston ordered Hood to march his corps in the night from the e.xtreme right to the left. In the morning of the 22d Hooker's corps was extending the right of Thomas's army southward, and Schofield, passing still farther be- yond, planted his right at Cheney's house, where the old Sandtown road crossed that running from Marietta to Powder Springs. In the afternoon, without orders from Johnston, Hood made an im- petuous attack with his whole corps upon the right 212 GENERAL SHERMAN. of Hooker and left of Schofield at Gulp's farm, on the ridge between Noyes's (commonly called Nose's) Creek and Olley's. The vigor and per- sistence of the attack seemed to indicate that John- ston was taking the aggressive with his whole army, but it was not followed up by any other than Hood's troops, which were repulsed with heavy loss. Sherman had hoped to advance his left wing when his adversary stretched so far in the opposite direction, but the enemy's positions on Kennesaw Mountain and Brush Mountain were so strong that a small force could hold them, and Johnston seemed able to keep pace with the National army in stretch- ing to the southwest. He had received consider- able re-enforcements, and the Georgia militia had been called out and were joining him ; but Sher- man still felt himself superior in force, and sure that the enemy must be drawn out in a very thin line without reserves. The truth was that the least assailable parts of Johnston's fieldworks were held with strong skirmish lines, while reserves were made of the troops thus saved, and these were placed at central positions in support, so that they could be quickly hurried to any point which might be attacked. It had seemed to Sherman, there- fore, that by combined attacks along the line he ought to be able to find the weak points and break through. He chafed at the growing unwillingness to assault, knowing that it is when one's adversary is broken that the advantages are obtained which pay for the losses in the attack. He had steadily kept in mind that the Confederate army was his principal objective, and was not content with the prospect of following it up in slow and indefinite retreat. In deference, however, to the opinions of his subordinates, he had arranged to transfer Mc- Pherson's army from the left to the extreme right, so as still more to threaten Johnston's connection CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 213 with Atlanta and force him to retreat. This in- volved the accumulation of supplies enough to leave the railroad temporarily, as he had done at Dalton and at the Etowah, but the persistent rains had foundered the whole country, and the wagon trains could hardly supply the troops in their present camps. Such a deadlock was intolerable, and he reverted to the plan of a direct assault of John- ston's lines. Orders were issued for an attack on points to be selected by army commanders, one from Mc- Pherson's front and two from Thomas's. Schofield was to make a demonstration with his left, while his right made an effort to find a way to turn the enemy's extreme flank. The tactics of the assaults were left to the corps commanders. On Monday, June 27th, the advance was made with splendid courage by the brigades detailed for the purpose, who pushed their way through the abattis close to the enemy's parapets, and, though they were not able to break through, they held the ground they gained, and did not allow a head to show itself above the breastworks. Sherman thought that a second line charging over the first would have en- tered the works, and this was the opinion of some of the best officers who took part in the attack ; but it was not done, and the brave men in the ad- vance made cover for themselves where they lay, and their positions w^ere connected with the lines on right and left. From the right Schofield had advanced one of his divisions over Olley's Creek, had carried an intrenched hill held by the Confederate cavalry, and seized a strong position commanding the Nickajack Valley, where the direct highway from Marietta joins the Sandtown road. From this po- sition the topography showed that Johnston's left could not be easily extended in that direction, and that a promising flanking movement there would 214 GENERAL SHERMAN. be a much shorter one than had been supposed. Sherman acted upon it at once. Hooker's hne was stretched so as to relieve part of Schoiield's corps, and the whole of this was used to make strong the new position on the flank. Johnston saw that the time had come to let go his hold on Kennesaw, and had marked out new lines beyond the Nickajack. Into these he marched on the night of the 2d of July, while McPherson was transferring the Army of the Tennessee to Schofield's right. The attack upon Kennesaw had cost Sherman twenty-five hun- dred casualties, a much larger number than the enemy had sufifered, sheltered as they were behind strong works, but the general result had been the retreat of Johnston's army, and the moral elifect on the National forces was that of victory. Sher- man had shown that he was not discouraged at any obstacles, but that on being checked in one direction he would find a way to his object in an- other. On the 4th of July McPherson's advance drove the enemy from a line of rifle pits on the Sandtown road, Thomas's columns pushed through Marietta along the railroad, and Johnston retired within his new line of works, carefully prepared to cover the crossing of the Chattahoochee River. These in- trenchments began at the river about a mile above the railway bridge, and followed the trend of the heights bordering the stream, continued about six miles to the southwestward, the lower part being along the Nickajack Creek, which for the last two or three miles of its course is nearly parallel to the Chattahoochee. Within this line was a shorter one, a bridge-head covering the peninsula at the crossing, and protecting the transfer of the army to the south side whenever it should become neces- sary. These works were too formidable for a direct assault ; their extension along the river toward CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA, 215 Sandtown would make difficult any attempt to turn them on that side, involving the uncovering of the railway line and long journeys of wagon trains. After careful reconnoitering, Sherman decided to make his crossing by his left, but kept up lively cavalry demonstrations on both flanks of his army to hide his purpose. On the 7th of July the rail- way had been repaired, so that supplies were deliv- ered at the army lines, Schofield's corps was at Smyrna camp ground, and he had selected the mouth of Soap Creek, about six miles above the railway bridge, as a favorable place to force the passage of the river. The next day the enemy's outpost there was surprised, two pontoon bridges were laid before night, and Schofield held the hills beyond in force. In the night of the 9th Johnston retreated across the river and burned the railway bridge, taking up a line along Peach Tree Creek to cover Atlanta. Some days were now used in getting up sup- plies and loading wagon trains for another sepa- ration from the railway. Schofield was re-enforced by Howard's corps, McPherson took position at Roswell, some ten miles farther up stream, while threats of crossing below, near Sandtown, were also kept up. On the 17th of July everything was ready for the advance by Sherman, when the Con- federate commander was more grievously sur- prised than by the crossing of the Chattahoochee. He received telegraphic orders to turn over the command of his army to General John B. Hood. Dissatisfaction with his defensive policy and con- tinued retreat was the reason assigned. Hood was known as a sharp critic of his commander's meth- ods, and was himself regarded as a type of aggres- sive generalship. General Cheatham took Hood's corps, and General A. P. Stewart succeeded S. D. Lee in command of Polk's. Johnston had himself planned to take the ag- 2i6 GENERAL SHERMAN. gressive as soon as Sherman should advance south of the river, and gave Hood the benefit of his in- formation and purposes. These were, in substance, adopted by the latter. On the i8th Sherman's col- umns advanced. Thomas had laid a pontoon bridge at Pace's Ferry, only two or three miles above the railway bridge, and Schofield replaced his canvas pontoons with a wooden trestle. The whole army was to execute a wheel to the right on Palmer's corps of the Cumberland army, Hooker's keeping touch with his right, Howard's marching on Buckhead, Schofield passing through Cross Keys toward Decatur, and McPherson taking the still longer circuit toward Stone Mountain and the Augusta railroad, which he cut before evening. On the 19th the wheeling movement continued, Thomas getting the heads of each of his three corps across Peach Tree Creek, with a stubborn opposi- tion which indicated that the enemy's position was not far away. The movement had opened a con- siderable gap between Sherman's wings. Hood ordered Cheatham to hold fast a salient in this in- terval, near Jones's Mill, on Clear Creek, and his other two corps to attack Thomas's army obliquely on its left flank. Schofield's march that day brought him over the south fork of Peach Tree, about two miles from Decatur, and one of McPherson's corps (Dodge's) connected with his left. Wheeler's cav- alry had tried in vain to check their advance. On the 20th Sherman continued the movement of his left wing, threatening Cheatham's flank, and the whole Confederate army had to take ground to the right. The attack which Hood had ordered for one o'clock was thus delayed, but soon after three it fell with great fury on the left of one of Howard's divisions, and progressed along the front of this and Hooker's divisions in succession. The battle was persistently renewed and stubbornly continued till nightfall, but Thomas's men held CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 21/ their ground and repulsed Hood with great loss to him. Meanwhile Sherman was hurrying forward Schofield and McPherson, and they were rattling Wheeler's cavalry back beyond Cheatham's flank so fast that, although the latter was stretched al- most to the breaking point, he could not reach far enough to check the National troops, and Hood was forced to order away a division from Hardee to support the cavalry and hold the commanding hills at the very gates of Atlanta. The engagement on the Confederate side was a general one, intended by Hood as a decisive ef- fort to drive Sherman back, and it had failed with a loss to the Confederates of five or six thousand men. As usual, the attacking columns suffered most, and Sherman's casualties did not exceed two thousand, of which by far the greater part was in Hooker's corps. On the 2 1st Sherman closed in upon the ene- my's positions in front of Thomas and Schofield, while he brought forward McPherson's men on the left. Blair's corps carried a bald hill, which was the extreme right of the Confederate line south of the Augusta Railway, and intrenched it. Gar- rard's cavalry was sent to destroy this railway more thoroughly for some distance eastward, as there were constant rumors of re-enforcements coming to Hood that way. Hood retired within the fortifications of Atlanta in the night, sending Hardee's corps through the city and out by roads leading to the southeast to turn and attack McPherson in flank and rear. Cheatham's corps he held ready to attack McPher- son from the city side when Hardee's battle should be joined. Stewart's corps, with the Georgia mili- tia, held and strengthened the works on the north- east and north of the place. In the early morning of the 22d of July the National army advanced in line over the abandoned MAP No. II ATLANTA CAMPAIG:N^ 1 2 3 4 5 SCALE OF MILES EXPLANATION; I Union norl-s /''^ '° Confederate H'orks '>V\ Army of the Ohio " '^ Tennessee " Cumberland .J ■ \ /'Rcd Bua( ; / ■Sy"',9y-^0Staii' / /Si,nnj:town^\//' \ / / P.O. / /' Ar^ r ' //~'^\ Adai,sviliy(i '. yT -/ I ^^/ '^Nauirit P.O. VS; I CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 219 be taken to support him and of his confidence that he would make the Army of the Tennessee victori- ous. A division of Schofield's was ordered to re- enforce Logan, part of it going to cover and pro- tect the army trains. Schofield's Hne was thinned out to fill the gaps thus made in it, and Thomas was directed to seize any opportunity to turn the tables on the enemy's left. About three o'clock Hood sent Cheatham's corps forward to strike Blair's and Logan's corps in rear as they were engaged with Hardee in front. He w^as a little too late. Hardee had been beaten off, and the invincible troops in the trenches leaped back to the other side and met Cheatham as they had met Hardee. A momentary break occurred at the railroad, but Sherman was looking down upon the spot from the Howard house, and, calling for Schofield's artillery to mass there, he personally directed an overwhelming fire of canister, which drove back the assailants and enabled Logan to restore his line. Before nightfall Hardee retired, and Hood's decimated corps were withdrawn into the city. The second costly effort to take the ag- gressive had failed. The penalty was a casualtv list of ten thousand for Hood, of which over three thousand were killed and two thousand were pris- oners. On the National side the loss was thirty- five hundred killed, wounded, and missing.* A great part of the enemy's loss was verified by Logan's formal delivery of the dead under a flag of truce. As it became evident that Hood meant to hold fast at Atlanta, considerations of protecting the line of communications with the rear, and reach- ing by shortest direction the railways southwest of the place, determined Sherman to extend his line by the right rather than the left. The x\ugusta * O. R., xxxviii, pt. 3, p. 21. 220 GENERAL SHERMAN. Railroad was broken up for thirty miles eastward, and the cavalry on both flanks were set to work to reach the railways beyond the city. General Howard had succeeded IVIcPherson in command of the Army of the Tennessee, and was ordered to transfer it to the extreme right. The three corps passed behind the rest of the army on the 27th, coming successively into line on the extension around the city of the works of the Cumberland army. Schofiield was ordered to stretch the Army of the Ohio so as to make a show of holding the ground to the Decatur road and the battlefield of the 22d. Anticipating such a movement. Hood's engineers were already laying out a new defensive line, leaving the old at a salient in the western suburbs of the city on the Lickskillet road, and running thence southwest, parallel to the Atlanta and Western Railway, and about a mile from it. The intention of this was, of course, to protect the railroads and prevent the complete investment of the place. Howard's movement was not completed on the 27th, but next morning it was still in progress, and Logan's corps was just reaching the crossroads at Ezra Church when it was violently attacked. Hood had sent General S. D. Lee (now the commandant of Hood's own corps) with his own and part of Stewart's corps to make another fierce effort to roll back the flank of the National army. The battle lasted through the afternoon, but Logan held his position without difiiculty, and Howard's artillery and reserves completed the bloody repulse of the enemy. Toward sunset the discouragement of tjie Confederate troops was such that regiments doggedly refused to follow their officers in the hopeless and destructive charges. Sherman and Howard were both on the ground, and the com- mander had planned a return blow on the flanks of the disheartened enemy, but the detached troops CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 221 missed the road and did not arrive. Again Hood had lost more than five thousand men, while How- ard's casualties were less than six hundred. The Union troops were grimly exultant at the outcome of the change of tactics by the enemy, and proud of the ability shown by Sherman in forcing the abandonment of position after position with losses that had been small in comparison. Jefferson Davis began to doubt the wisdom of his change of Johnston for Hood, and telegraphed, " The loss consequent upon attacking him (Sherman) in his intrenchments requires you to avoid that if prac- ticable." * The cavalry expeditions had disappointed Sher- man, and the infantry operations, patiently and persistently pushed forward, were his sole reliance. Schofield's corps was transferred from left to right, Howard's recurved right fiank was swung forward, and on the new line Schofield reached the north fork of Utoy Creek. Sherman thought that two corps operating as a unit might seize the railroad, and directed Palmer to report to Schofield for th's purpose. Palmer disputed Schofield's seniority in rank, and, when Sherman decided against him, de- manded leave to retire from the army. The at- tempted movement was balked in consequence, the enemy had time to intrench an advanced line on the Sandtown road, and one of Schofield's brigades lost three hundred men in a forced reconnoissance of the new position on the 6th of August. Sherman now realized, as at Marietta, that the stretching of his lines had gone about as far as it could. A fortnight was spent in rectifying posi- tions, pushing back Hood's outposts, and bring- ing our trenches as close as possible to the forti- fications of the place. Provisions were accumu- lated in the camps, and everything indicated prepa- * O. R., xxxviii, pt. 5, p. 946. 222 GENERAL SHERMAN. ration for some decisive movement. For several days the place was cannonaded with heavy guns. Schofield cautiously but steadily advanced his flanking division to the crossing of the Campbell- town and East Point roads, and on the i8th pushed it three quarters of a mile still farther forward to- ward East Point, where it intrenched in a half circle, and became, a week later, the pivot on which the army was swung to the south of At- lanta. Hood's cavalry under Wheeler was operating on Sherman's communications in northern Georgia, annoying small posts and making mo- mentary breaks in the railroad ; but Wheeler now marched into East Tennessee, and his absence gave Sherman the desired opportunity to move with some secrecy. Hooker's corps (now under General Slocum) was marched into works covering the Chattahoochee railway bridge on the night of the 25th, and the rest of the army swung in a great wheeling march behind Schofield toward Jones- boro. Hood thought Wheeler had seriously broken our communications, and that want of food was forcing Sherman to retreat by way of Sandtown. He persisted in this illusion till the 30th, when, instead of making an attack on Schofield's corps, which was that day three miles from any supports, he hurried off Hardee with his and Lee's corps to Jonesboro, and ordered an attack there upon the outer flank of Sherman's army. On that day Howard had got Logan's corps over Flint River after a sharp affair with the Con- federate outposts, and it was intrenched on the high ground between the river and the railroad. The other two corps under Howard were in support on right and left, having bridges over the river. On the 31st Hardee's troops had assembled at Jonesboro and marched against Howard. Lee's corps had the brunt of the attack and Logan's of CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 223 the defense, and the Confederates were repulsed, leaving four hundred dead upon the field, and hav- ing probably two thousand wounded. Sherman was marching with Thomas's columns, and did not get the news of the enemy's being in force at Jonesboro till late in the afternoon. Schofield had been pushing the left flank of the army forward that day toward Rough and Ready station on the railway by the road through Morrow's Mills, and carried an intrenched posi- tion a little south of the station in a sharp combat. Thinking Atlanta was now to be attacked from the south. Hood ordered Lee's corps to march back from Jonesboro that night. As two corps were known to be in Jonesboro at nightfall, the strange recall of Lee was not foreseen, and Sherman bent all his efforts to concentrate upon them. Hood's movements of Lee's and Stewart's corps in the night and next day were thus unknown, and it was not till Sherman joined Howard in the after- noon of the 1st of September that the mysterious disappearance of Lee's corps was learned. Then he pressed everything to envelop and destroy Hardee, who was isolated. Thomas's Fourteenth Corps (now under General J. C. Davis) was first up, and made a brilliant attack about sunset, carry- ing a salient of the enemy's works, killing over three hundred and capturing nearly two thousand, including the wounded prisoners. The National loss was one thousand. Getting better knowledge in the course of the day,. Hood halted Lee's corps between Jonesboro and Atlanta to cover the evacuation of the city and the concentration at Lovejoy's station on the Macon road, which he had now determined on. His trains of ordnance stores and supplies were de- stroyed, and, marching hard, he passed to the east- ward of Sherman's army in the night and reunited with Hardee at Lovejoy's on the 2d of Septem- 224 GENERAL SHERMAN. ber. His curious changes of purpose which grew out of his misconception of Sherman's movements had served him better than any ruse, and the time necessarily lost by Sherman in trying to find out what his adversary was about had finally enabled the latter to make his hasty retreat beyond Jones- boro. The explosions of the ammunition in the night had been heard by Slocum as well as Sherman, and the Twentieth Corps, approaching the city from the north, was met by the mayor, who sur- rendered Atlanta to him in form. Sherman fol- lowed Hood to Lovejoy's station, and recon- noitered the position there. The task which had been definitely allotted him was accomplished by the capture of Atlanta and the disjointing of the Southern system of railway connections, and he felt the need of mature study of a new campaign and of full understanding with General Grant in regard to it. He therefore determined to give his army a little rest, and concentrated his forces about Atlanta — the Cumberland army in the fortifications of the city, that of the Tennessee about East Point, and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur. His success was hailed with popular exultation throughout the North, and Congress vied with the President and the general in chief in thanks and congratulations to Sherman and his army. '• / ,- "^ / "' .»}h^>9\f iC^fijJ a-^Vr^Jr^^ ~^^^ A^-Vw,>t,.< .^ / ^"ZT" ,/?- K ;, ^ ■.-C^-^y .a^^wJvi -vijC^.^ J ty^^^ i^*^ /^"fCtn^t^-)^ ^ i^^^i&:> i^/-3»-j,-^i-6/ /-928 Total 65,371 Deduct those sent back, fit for garrison duty (O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 40S) 5,000 Leaving the marching column 60,371 But when Schofield's 10,788 (infantry and artillery) were taken out, the aggregate was a little under 50,000, as Sherman said to 240 GENERAL GHERMAN. estimates for supplies to enough for fifty thousand men, though the unexpectedly rapid return of fur- loughed men crowding forward enthusiastically on the rumor of great things to happen raised the force again nearly to the former point. He re- iterated to Thomas the strong advice to abandon minor points, concentrate his troops about Colum- bia, get together the largest possible army from his department, and take the field in person.* Once more for a moment Grant hesitated to say the word " Go," but, upon Sherman giving him another succinct analysis of the situation, he came back to his original sound judgment and said, " Go as you propose." f Finally, on the 12th of November, the wires were cut, and the march to the sea was begun be- yond the possibility of a recall. The conception of the plan was hardly grander than the faith which had clung to it for two months in the face of op- position, of doubt, and of discouragement from quarters worthy of respect. In arguing the mat- ter with the authorities, civil and military, he care- fully confined himself to the first part of his task — that of reaching the Atlantic and establishing a base upon the coast. To his immediate subordi- nates, however, he opened also the final campaign of the march northward upon Columbia and Raleigh, and the decisive results which it involved. Military history is full of proofs that the responsi- Colonel Beckwith. The fine eagerness of men absent on their " veteran furlough " to join their regiments is shown by the returns, which were, for November loth, 59,545 ; for November 30th, 62,- 204; for December 20tl), 60,598. (O. R., xliv, p. 16.) As com- munications were cut on November 12th, the increase in the three days from the loth to the I2tli inclusive was that which appears in the return for the 30th. Comparing the aggregates of infantry and artillery, in which alone the reduction was made by sending back Schofield's divisions, the totals were, for November lOth, 54.584, and for November 30th, 57,141. * O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 468, 476, 497, 498. f Id., pp. 576, 594. CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 24I ble commander in the field sees more clearly than any spectator the difficulties of his enterprise and the obstacles to be overcome. Nothing is more common than to have daring plans thus " sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." The rare thing, the signal proof of highest soldierly quality, is the steadfast resolution which, weighing all the risks, still sees, the prize worth the venture, and goes forward without swerving. Sherman had based his purpose on sound and broad military principles. He must retain the ag- gressive. He must not allow his adversary to lead him back to Tennessee and begin over again the work of the past year. If possible, he must find a more decisive return blow for the audacity of Hood, providing reasonably for hindering the lat- ter from doing fatal mischief meanwhile. All these are strictly military considerations, and placing himself on the line of communications of Lee's army was, by common assent of military experts the world over, a masterpiece of strategy. As a subordinate consideration, he added to all this what he rightly called " statesmanship " — the moral effect to be produced upon the Confederacy by the demonstration of the resistless power of the National Government.* Leading Southern ofihcers saw clearly that a mortal blow had been struck when, with the rail- ways of Georgia destroyed behind him, Sherman, two months later, was preparing to resume his march northward from Savannah, and there was no army that could cope with him between Georgia and Virginia. General Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor, and brother-in-law of Davis, thought " the game was over." f General Johnston says that " the Southern cause must have appeared hopeless then to all intelligent and dis- * O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 659, 660. f Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 218. 242 GENERAL SHERMAN. passionate Southern men." * General Lee, speak- ing of his own judgment at the time, said of Sher- man's movements, " It was easy to see that unless they were interrupted I should be compelled to abandon the defense of Richmond." f The view of competent critics across the ocean was embodied in the editorial statement of the London Times, on getting the first news of his start from Atlanta : " That it is a most momentous enterprise can not be denied. ... It may either make Sherman the most famous general of the North, or it may prove the ruin of his reputation, his army, and even his cause together." J * Narrative, p. 372. f Letter of July 27, 1868, quoted in Sherman's Memoirs, 2d ed., ii, p. 467. $ London Times, December 3, 1864. CHAPTER XI. THE MARCH TO THE SEA. The Twentieth Corps being still at Atlanta and the Fourteenth about Kingston, the Fifteenth Corps began march from Gaylesville for Kings- ton, the Seventeenth leaving the same clay for the railroad about Marietta. The march was delib- erate and easy. The Confederate cavalry hovered about the flanks, picking up many foragers and making an occasional dash at some unguarded wagon. There was nothing to call for more than ordinary discipline. There was an. incident which is worth mentioning only as bearing on the remark that used to be made. " The western army can march and fight, but has no discipline." Every night an order was sent from division to brigade headquarters prescribing the order of march next day. On the morning of the 2d of November the advance brigade of Leggett's division moved out on time, but the brigade which was to follow next was not ready. An aid-de-camp notified the com- mander to move in five minutes or fall to the rear; at the expiration of five minutes the tardy brigade was still not ready, and the one which was to have formed the rear took its place. On reaching camp in the evening, an order was issued relieving the commander and returning him to his regiment, disbanding the brigade, and assigning the regi- ments to one of the other brigades, and directing the headquarters' records and furniture to be packed in a wagon in the division train. 243 244 GENERAL SHERMAN. By the 2d of November Colonel Wright with fifteen hundred men had repaired the break of fifteen miles extending north from Dalton, and the road was open for trains from Atlanta to Chatta- nooga. On that day Sherman received the tele- gram from Grant which closed with " I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to fol- low Hood without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose." Immediately the work began of dismantling At- lanta and all posts to the north of it, and shipping to Chattanooga garrisons and all munitions and property that were not to be carried along in the proposed campaign. The soldiers now became aware that they were about to go upon an expedition, away from all sup- port and to an unknown destination. Pay was many months in arrears. Men were harrowed by letters from their wives, who were without means of support in the approaching winter. The pay- masters who arrived on the 6th of November were welcomed with extravagant joy. The work of paying was continued day and night, and was bare- ly finished when the last train left for the North. The Methodist chaplain of the Thirty-first Illinois and the Roman Catholic chaplain of the Seven- teenth Wisconsin undertook to carry home the pay of their men, and many others availed them- selves of the opportunity. They carried a very large sum of money in multitudinous small pack- ages, and all reached their destination, bringing unimagined relief to households in every corner of the two States. The presidential election was held in camp on the 8th, under provision made for it by the States, and was regular and orderly as those held at home. The paymasters with all their diligence had not yet paid all. Some few of the disappointed ones imputed their ill fortune to the Government, and in despite voted against Mr. Lin- THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 245 coin. They were paid in time, and repented sorely their impatience. The following order was issued to corps and division heackiuarters on the 8th of November, but was not i)ublished till the JOth: Hkauquarters Military Uivisio.m of the Mississippi, In the Field, Kin(;ston, Ga., Nov. 8, 1864. The general commanding deems it proper, at this time, to inform the officers and men of the P'(jurteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps that he has organized them into an army for a special purpose, well known to the War Department and to General Grant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves a departure from our present base, and a long and difficult march to a new one. AH the chances of war have been considered and provided for, as far as human agency can. All he asks of you is to maintain that tliscipline, patience, and courage that has characterized you in the past ; and he hopes, and through you, to strike a blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in pro- ducing what we all so much desire — his overthrow. Of all things, the most important is that the men, during marches and in camp, keep their places, and do not scatter about as stragglers and foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It is also of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loaded with anything but provisions and ammunition. Ail surplus servants, noncombatants, and refugees should now go to the rear, and none should be en- couraged to encumber us on the march. At some future time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are now suffering. With these few sinii)le cautions, he hopes to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those ot the past. pjy order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN. L. M. Dayton, Aid-de-canip. On the loth General Corse, who still com- manded the post at Rome, evacuated and moved to his position on the railroad. He destroyed all foundries, machine shops, depots, and such, and ordered the provost marshal and officers of the rear guard to exercise the severest and most sum- mary means to prevent disorder, and not hesitate 246 GENERAL SHERMAN. to shoot any one caught firing private houses or pillaging helpless and inoffensive families. General Thomas sent a dispatch on the 12th, in which he said : " I have no fears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and believe I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." Sherman answered, " Dispatch re- ceived ; all right," and then the telegraph wire was severed. All communication between him and the North ceased utterly. No Southern newspaper that went North made mention of him. He was not heard of again for a month. He was as if the earth had opened and swallowed his command. The four corps strung along the railroad began at once the work of destruction. The bridge at Allatoona was taken apart in sections and shipped North ; the road from the Etowah to Allatoona was thoroughly wrecked. Road ties were piled up and burned ; rails laid across the burning piles were heated in the middle, were seized at both ends, and bent till the ends lapped ; some, instead, were bent spirally. By the 14th the work was done, and the general and his army were assem- bled at Allatoona. The army comprised four corps — the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth, commanded by Gen- erals Osterhaus and Blair, constituted the Army of the Tennessee, or the right wing, which was com- manded by General O. O. Howard. The Four- teenth (General Jef¥ C. Davis) and Twentieth (Gen- eral Williams) formed the Army of Georgia, or the left wing, commanded by General H. W. Slo- cum. All invalids, all superfluous employees, all personal baggage, and all artillery except one bat- tery to each division, had been sent to the rear. THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 247 The vacancy left by the invahds was fully made up by men returning- from furlough and by recruits. The cavalry, one division, comprising two brigades, was commanded by General Judson Kilpatrick. He was daring, enterprising, untiring ; but he was a man of questionable personal habits, and his reck- lessness or negligence brought upon him some dis- astrous surprises. The Northern army was an ath- lete stripped for contest. Before starting on the march. General Sherman published the following order. In connection with it are given here two letters : one the well-known letter to the mayor of Atlanta, the other to a lady whom Sherman knew when, as a young lieutenant, he was on duty at Charleston, S. C. The three to- gether present a full explanation of his conception of the mode of carrying on war and concluding peace : Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, In the Field, Kingston, Ga., No7>. g, 1S64. 1. For the purpose of military operations the army is divided into two wings, viz : The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard command- ing, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, com- posed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps. 2. The habitual order of march will be, whenever prac- ticable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and con- verging at points hereinafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigndier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will re- ceive special orders from the commander in chief. 3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition train and provision train, distributed habitually as follows : Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wag- ons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger each corps commander should change his order of march by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A. M., and make about fifteen miles per day unless otherwise fixed in orders. 17 248 GENERAL SHERMAN. 4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end each brigade commander will or- ganize a good and sufficient foraging party under the com- mand of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route of travel, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhab- itants or commit any trespass, but during the halt or camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the roads traveled. 5. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to de- stroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down. In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted ; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges or obstruct roads or otherwise manifest local hostility, the army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. 6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit ; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack mules for the regiments or brigades. In all forag- ing, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts, and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance. 7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to the several columns may be taken along ; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms. 8. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion for each army corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance guard, repair roads, and double them, if possil^le, so that the colunnis will not be delayed after reaching bad places. THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 249 Also, army commanders should practice the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on the side, and instruct their troops to assist the wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams. 9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon train, fully equipped and organized, and the commanders thereof will see to their being properly protected at all times. Bj order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. L. M. Dayton, Aid-dc-camp. Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, In the Field, Atlanta, Sept. 12, 1S64. James M. Calhoun, Mayor, E. E. Rawson, and S. C. Wells, representing City Council of Atlanta. Gentlemen: I have your letter of the nth, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta, i have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare tor the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions, of good people outside ot Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only in Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all ' must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military opera- tions from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and pru- dent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for a warlike purpose is inconsistent with its character as a home for fami- lies. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agricul- ture here for the maintenance of families, and, sooner or later, want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now when all the arrangements are completed for the trans- fer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending ar- mies will renew the scenes of the past month } Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, btit you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I can not discuss this subject with you fairly, because I can not impart to you what I propose to do ; but I assert that 250 GENERAL SHERMAN. my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as pos- sible. You can not qualify war in harsher terms than 1 will. War is cruelty, and you can not refine it, and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and male- dictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know that I will make more sacri- fices than any of you to-day to secure peace. But you can not have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; ifjt relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, and I know that such is not the National feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of de- voting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army at once become your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals can not resist a torrent of error and passion such as swept the South into rebellion, but you can point out, so we may know, those who desire a government and those who insist on war and its desolation. You might as well appeal against the thunderstorms as against the terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope to live in peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is per- petuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your land, or anything you have ; but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we can not help it. You have here- tofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek the truth in other quarters the better for you. I repeat, then, that by the original compact of Govern- ment the United States held certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished, and never will be ; that the South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom- houses, etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I my- self have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mis- THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 25 1 sissippi hundreds and thousands of women and children flee- ing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, V'icksburg, and Mississippi we fed thousands upon thousands of families of rebel soldiers lett on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you, you feel very different ; you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent carloads of soldiers and ammunition and molded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and deso- late the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and 1 will conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success. But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then I will share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and fami- lies against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble ; feed and nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta. Yours in haste, W. T. Sherman, Major-Gcncral. Headquarters Military Divisio:i of the Mississippi, In the Field, near Marietta, Ga., June ^o 1S64. Mrs. Annie Oilman Bower, Baltimore, Md. Dear Madam: Your welcome letter of June i8th came to me amid the sound ot battle, and, as you say, little did I dream when I knew you, playing as a schoolgirl on Sullivan's Island beach, that I should control a vast army pointing, like the swarm of Alaric, toward the plains of the South. Why, oh why, is this .'' If I know my own heart, it beats as warmly as ever toward those kind and generous families that greeted us with such warm hospitality in days long past but still present in memoiy ; and to-day were Frank and Mrs. Porcher, or Eliza Oilman, or Mary Lamb, or Mar- garet Blake, the Barksdales, the Ouarles, the Poyas, indeed, any and all our cherished circle, their children, or even their children's children, to come to me as of old, the stern feelings of duty would melt as snow before a genial sun, and I be- lieve 1 would strip my own children that they might be shel- tered. And yet they call me barbarian, vandal, a monster, 252 GENERAL SHERMAN. and all the epithets that language can invent that are sig- nificant of malignity and hate ! All 1 pretend to say, on earth as in heaven, man must submit to some arbiter. He must not throw off his allegiance to his Government or his God without just reason or cause. The South has no cause, not even a pretext. Indeed, l)y her unjustifiable course siie has thrown away the proud history of the i)ast, and laid open her fair country to the tread of devastating war. She has l)antered and l)ulHed us to the conflict. Had we declined battle America would have sunk back coward and craven, meriting the contempt of all mankind. As a nation we were forced to accept battle, and that once begun it has gone on till the war has assumed proportions at which we, in the hurly-burly, sometimes stand aghast. I would not subjugate the South in the sense so offensively assumed, but 1 would make every citizen of the land obey the common law, sul)mit to the same that we do — no more, no less — our ecjuals and not our su]:)eriors. I know and you know that there were young men in our day, men no longer young but who control their fellows, who assumed to the gentlemen of the South a superiority of courage, and boastingly defied us of Northern birth to arms. God only knows how reluctantly we accepted the issue, but once the issue joined, like in other ages, the Northern races, though slow to anger, once aroused are more terrible than the more inflammable of the South. Even yet my heart bleeds when I see the carnage of battle, the deso- lation of homes, the bitter anguish of families ; but the very moment the men of the South say that instead of appealing to war they should have appealed to reason, to our Congress, to our courts, to religion, and to the experience of history, then will I say peace, peace. Go back to your points of error and resume your places as American citizens, with all their |)roud heritages. Whether I shall live to see this period is problem- atical, but you may, and may tell your mother and sisters that I never forget one kind look or greeting, or ever wished to efface its remembrance, but putting on the armor of war I did it that our common country should not perish in infamy and disgrace. I am married — have a wife and six childn n living in Lancaster, Ohio. My career has been an eventful one, but I hope when the clouds of anger and passion an; dispersed, and truth emerges bright anci clear, you and all who knew me in early years will not blush that we were once close friends. Tell Eliza for me that I hope she will live to realize that the doctrine of secession is as monstrous in our civil code as disobedience was in the divine law. And should the fortunes of war ever bring your mother or sisters THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 253 or any of llic:; old clique under the shelter of my authority, I do not believe they will have cause to regret it. Give my love to your children, and the assurance of my respect to your honored husband. Truly, W. T. Sherman, Major-Ccncral. These together repeat the ancient maxim, De- bellare snpcrbus, parccrc victis — relentless war was against the armed foe, grace and mercy to the con- quered who submit. On the 14th Colonel i'oe, with a working party, destroyed the railroad depot, machine shops, and other structures that would aid the operations of war, leaving untouched dwellings, stores, churches, municipal buildings. Next day the army moved. The numijcr of men in the command, commis- sioned officers and enlisted, on detail or present for duty was : In the Army of the Tennessee, 28,365 ; in the Army of Georgia, 28,708 ; in Kilpatrick's com- mand, including a four-gun battery, 5,130; total, 62,204. These numbers are taken from the report of the 30th of November. The troops took the road, ignorant whither they were going, but buoyant, confident, expect- ing to reach the sea at some point, sure of dimin- ishing the territory from which Lee could draw recruits and supplies, and some sanguine of reach- ing Richmond in time to take part in an engage- ment which would end the war. The Army of Georgia moved to the east, apparently striking for Augusta ; the Army of the Tennessee to the south, in the direction of Macon, with its right flank cov- ered by Kilpatrick. The Fourteenth Corps thoroughly destroyed the railroad at Madison, and a division was sent beyond to the Oconee to destroy the "railroad bridge there. Turning south, all reached Milledge- ville on the 23d. The Fourteenth Corps moved eastward as far as Covington, and thence south- east to Milledgeville, arriving there on the 23d. 254 GENERAL SHERMAN. The Seventeenth Corps marched sonthcast by Jonesboro and McDonough to the crossinjj^ of the Ockmuli^ee, at Planter's J'^actory, and the I'^ifteenth, taking" at iirst a more southerly course, changed direction so as to join the Seventeenth at the cross- ing. Kilpatrick, covering the right flank of the army, continued south to Lovejoy's, where a por- tion of Wheeler's conmiand held the old works. Dividing his force into two columns, one dis- mounted, charged upon and carried the works, while the other jjursued the artillery and captured two guns, lie then turned and reached I'lanter's Factory, while the infantry were still crossing. 'Jlie farther bank of the river was high, steep, and of clay, made slippery by rain. The troops had to help the mules to get wagons up the ascent. The Seventeenth Corps reached Cordon, on the Macon and Savannah Railroad, twelve miles south of Mil- ledgeville. Part of the Fifteenth Corps was guard- ing and aiding trains over the im])assable road, while C. R. Woods's division moved to guard the rear toward Macon. Hardee had been relieved of the command of a corps in 1 Food's army and ap- pointed to command a department comprising Savannah and adjacent territory in Georgia and South Carolina. When Sherman left Atlanta the whole field of operations in Georgia was added to the department. Hardee was in Macon on the 2ist with Governor IJrown, of Georgia, and learned that the only force in his department besides Mc- Law's division, which was the garrison of Savan- nah, was Wheeler's cavalry and Smith's division of Georgia militia. Feeling sure that Macon was not threatened, he ordered Smith to vVugusta, and at once returned to Savannah. On the 22d Kilpatrick made a dash upon the railroad near Macon. Wolcutt's brigade, sent out by General Woods to reconnoiter toward Macon, pushed back a detachment of Wheeler's cavalry, THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 2; 33 and fell back to Griswold. Wolcutt placed his com- mand in the edge of the timber, with swampy land on each flank, and awaited the advance of Smith's division, which approached supported by Wheel- er's cavalry. The Confederate infantry advanced in three lines, and reached with little loss a ravine or depression parallel with Wolcutt's line, and only seventy-five yards from it. When the Confederate lines appeared cmerj^ing from the hollow, so deadly a fire at short range met them that they fell back in disorder to shelter. Three times the assault was made, and every time Vvith disastrous loss. They withdrew, leaving, the reports say, three hundred dead on the field. Detailed foraging parties brought in abundant supplies of corn and fodder for the animals, and sv»'eet potatoes, corn meal, bacon, and poultry for the men. Fine mules took the place of the jaded animals in the teams, and horses were found to replenish the cavalry and artillery. Napoleon says, in his maxims, there are two ways of maintaining an army in the enemy's country — one, by requisi- tion on municipal authorities ; the other, by direct seizure. In Georgia there was no choice; direct seizure was the only resource. But pillaging from dwellings was prohibited, and an order prescribed death as the penalty for any one convicted by court- martial of such offense. A soldier of the first divi- sion of the Seventeenth Corps was charged with stealing a quilt from a dwelling near Gordon. The court-martial found him guilty, and sentenced him " to be shot to death by musketry, at such time and place as the commanding general may direct." The proceedings and findings were approved, but Gen- eral Howard commuted the sentence to imprison- ment during the war at Drv Tortugas, Fla. The prisoner was taken by guards to Tortugas, and re- mained imprisoned there until released by order of the adjutant general of the army, dated May 27, 1865. 256 GENERAL SHERMAN. The army assembled at Milledgeville and Gor- don on the 23d, and resumed the march on the 24th. The right wing followed the Savannah Rail- road, destroymg it on the way. The left wing moved by roads north of the railroad, and generally parallel to it. The Oconee was swollen, and with a rapid current. General H. C. Wayne with a small force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery held the railroad crossing of the Oconee and fortified it. But General Howard succeeded in laying two pon- toon bridges, one four miles above and the other below, while engaging Wayne in his works, and crossed one corps on each bridge. Kilpatrick was sent to destroy the important railroad bridge over Brier Creek, on the branch road to Augusta. Wheeler, with the Confederate cavalry, a large body, started in pursuit, overtook in the night Kilpatrick's rear guard of two regiments, ran over them, and drove them on to the mam body. Kil- patrick was so pushed that he barely set lire to the bridge, and had to turn to the south. He was reck- less enough to sleep one night in a house distant from his camp, having one regiment for guard. Wheeler, learning the fact, dashed in the night upon the little camp so suddenly that commander and men rushed from their sleep, and ran to the woods in rout. After this Kilpatrick brought his men, jaded and thinned by loss, to the lines of the army. Gen- eral Sherman ordered captured horses to be turned over to him. After a few days' rest, the cavalry set out again to burn the bridge and to fight Wheel- er. Coming upon him near Waynesboro, Kil- patrick broke his line, put him to retreat, and drove him through Waynesboro. Wheeler took position beyond and awaited attack. Kilpatrick, coming up on the 5th of December, finding that Wheeler's line outreached his on both flanks, massed, and with a rush broke through Wheeler's center, and forced him to retreat. Kilpatrick this time de- THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 257 stroyed the railroad bridge and smaller bridge over Brier Creek. He returned to the route of the army, and there was no more fighting till Savannah was reached. Kilpatrick had been expected to reach Millen in time to release the prisoners of war confined there. But his protracted engage- ments with Wheeler gave opportunity to the Con- federate authorities to remove the ten thousand National soldiers confined there to Florence, in South Carolina, and when the Seventeenth Corps reached Millen, on the 3d of December, the prison was empty. Up to this date the Confederate authorities were uncertain as to Sherman's destination. When Augusta seemed to be his objective point. Presi- dent Davis sent Bragg thither, and gave him com- mand to the coast, including Savannah and Hood. When the probability inclined to Savannah, Beau- regard's jurisdiction was extended to the Atlan- tic, embracing Bragg and Hood, so that his au- thority extended from the coast of Georgia to the western boundary of Texas. Beauregard insisted that Sherman's ultimate design was to Ee-enforce Grant before Richmond. He ordered Hood to move into Tennessee to make a diversion in relief of Lee, and when he learned that A. J. Smith was leaving Missouri to report to Thomas, he ordered Kirby Smith, who was in command west of the Mis- sissippi, to send two divisions to the aid of Hood, or else to invade Missouri himself and compel the return of A. J. Smith in Missouri. The four corps were abreast at Millen, the Fif- teenth Corps south of the Ogeechee,the Seventeenth north of and near to the river, and the Twentieth and Fourteenth four and ten miles to the north, presenting a front of twenty miles. From Millen onward the two rivers Savannah and Ogeechee ap- proach each other, restricting the field for forag- ing, and the substitution of rice fields in place of 258 GENERAL SHERMAN. corn and potatoes very largely cut off the supply of subsistence. The roads passed at times through fragrant pine forest, whose tall trunks stood far apart, though the dense foliage far overhead inter- laced and shut out the sun. At other times the struggle to wade through and get the trains through deep and tangled swamps kept weary columns on the march till late in the night. On the 5th of De- cember the Seventeenth Corps came upon some fieldworks thrown up by McLaws's division, but abandoned. On the 7th and 8th the roads were found obstructed by felled trees. The men who did the work were ascertained, and their houses were burned by order. On the 8th a newspaper was found which gave in one paragraph a brief account of Hood's bloody repulse at Franklin, and of the loss of thirteen of his general olBcers killed or wounded. With the rejoicing over the victory was regret at the death of some familiar names, especially General Cleburne, commander of " Cleburne's Fighting Division." On the 9th a torpedo exploded in the road, kill- ing a staff officer and his horse. General Sherman sent the prisoners to the front with spades to dig up any more that might be found. But there were no more. In the afternoon, the head of the col- umn having advanced into a swamp, found that a battery at the exit on the other side commanded the road. The troops, diverging from the road to right and left, protected from view by the dense growth, emerged on the flanks of the works, and found them abandoned. Warned by the plashing and crackling, the defenders had evacuated and taken a waiting train for Savannah. On the loth the army was deployed in front of the defenses of the city, and on the 12th was in position. The sources of a small creek which, flowing north, emptied into the Savannah River about three miles above the citv. interlaced the head of a still THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 259 smaller stream, which, flowing south through a swamp, formed the Little Ogeechee. The low flat of land on each side had been turned into rice fields, and a system of embankments kept the water in the creek about seven feet, and on the sub- merged land about four feet deep. The water sur- face varied from two hundred to five hundred yards in width, and was crossed only by a few roads, each built upon an embankment, and having a bridge over the channel of the creek. The shore toward Savannah was lined with infantry intrenchments, and batteries crowning every rising ground and every jutting point swept with cross fire the roads and the water surface. The batteries were armed with eighty-one siege guns and forty-eight field- pieces, and the force that defended this line num- bered something over twelve thousand officers and men. The besiegers were not in a continuous line, but encamped in groves of timber adjoining the water, out of view, and with trenches for shelter during cannonade. Batteries mounting fifty-six guns were placed at convenient points to engage the batteries across the water. The Twentieth Corps, on the extreme left, threw some troops upon the islands in the river. On its right was the Four- teenth, then the Seventeenth and Fifteenth, which stretched to Kings Bridge over the Ogeechee, twelve miles from Savannah. Subsistence was nearly exhausted, animals were living partly and men almost wholly upon rice. The first necessity was to open communication with the fleet, which had already been advised of Sherman's arrival, and which was supposed to be in Ossabaw Sound, the mouth of the Ogeechee. The passage down the river was obstructed by Fort McAllister on its bank, just below the great bend. General Sherman promptly on arriving directed General Howard to repair Kings Bridge, which had been partially destroyed, and send a division to 26o GENERAL SHERMAN. capture the fort. The repairs were finished by the night of the I2th, and General Hazen's division marched over at sunrise on the 13th to the right bank of the river. The fort was an irregular quadrilateral, stand- ing upon the river bank. The front and the flanks were solid ramparts, armed with heavy guns. The gorge was closed by lighter intrenchment, with fieldpieces in barbette. The armament was eleven siege guns, one ten-inch mortar, and twelve field- pieces. The work was surrounded by a ditch, with a stout palisade along the middle. The adjoining ground had been covered by a forest of live oaks. The branches of those near the fort had been cut and used in constructing a heavy abattis, while the stumps were left standing. The ground was thickly planted with torpedoes. The garrison comprised over two hundred men, commanded by Major Anderson. Hazen formed his three brigades in three sepa- rate lines," facing respectively the rear and the flanks of the fort. General Sherman, who had ridden in the saddle down the left bank of the river and taken a position upon a lookout on the Cheves planta- tion, across the big bend, getting anxious when the sun had declined till it was only an hour high, sig- naled to Hazen to attack at once. The three lines issued simultaneously from the surrounding woods, each preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, and advanced rapidly, converging upon the fort. Artil- lery and musketry fire poured from the ramparts, and as the assailants approached torpedoes ex- ploded beneath their tread. The skirmishers, tak- ing shelter behind the standing trunks, drove the artillerists from their guns and silenced the mus- ketry. The lines rushed into the ditch, tore down the palisades, and clambered over the walls. Anderson refused to surrender, and the fight- ing continued till the defenders separately surren- THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 26 1 dered. Hazen lost twenty-four killed and one hun- dred and ten wounded ; the loss of the garrison was forty-eight. General Sherman found a row- boat and was rowed down to General Hazen's tem- porary headquarters, then walked to the fort, and was rowed six miles down the windings of the river until he came upon a small steamer, the Dan- delion, which had been sent up from the fleet for news. After writing hasty dispatches to the Secre- tary of War, General Grant, Admiral Dahlgren, and General Foster, he returned to the fort and to General Hazen's headquarters. He took his place on the floor, where Hazen and his staff were lying asleep, but before long was roused by a messenger from General Foster, who was an invalid on a steamer below, and begged an interview. While hearing Foster's report, he continued the voyage till Admiral Dahlgren was found on his flagship in Wassabaw Sound. Arrangements were made by General Foster to forward the supplies accumu- lated at Port Royal in anticipation of Sherman's arrival, and adding to them some siege guns. The admiral undertook to provide light-draught steam- ers for their transport, and Sherman returned, ar- riving at the lines by noon of the 15th. On the i6th steamboats began to arrive with supplies. One of them brought mail. Colonel Markland, special mail agent for Sherman's army, had been at Baltimore gathering in mail matter for all members of the army, and took the accumula- tion to Port Royal on the first intimation of Sher- man's approach to the coast. Ambulances carried the assorted mails to every brigade headquarters. Few men received nothing. Over fifty thousand sat by the evening camp fires poring over their letters, transported for the time to their homes and families. Sherman received two letters from Gen- eral Grant, one dated the 3d, the other the 6th of December. In the latter Grant said : " My idea 2^2 GENERAL SHERMAN. now is that you establish a base on the seacoast, fortify and leave it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantry to protect them, and at the same time so threaten their interior that the militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With the balance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want in person unless you see objections to this plan which I can not see. Use every vessel going to you for the purpose of transportation." This letter was a crushing dis- appointment to Sherman. He felt that the march to Savannah was only the preliminary step to his plan. The main achievement was to be a march across the Carolinas, abbreviating day by day, by every day's march, the field of supplies for Lee, gradually isolating him from support, and bring- ing in re-enforcement to Grant an army complete, compact, inured to fatigue, and exultant. To give up this, to dismember his command, and take a fragment, jaded by a sea voyage, to join the disci- plmed and equipped Army of the Potomac, seemed a poor exchange. But a soldier has only to obey. Immediately on reading Grant's letter, Sherman began to carry out its directions. Before the day was over he had selected Fort McAllister as the site of his fortified base, determined its general design, and ordered Colonel Poe, his chief engineer, to reconnoiter the ground for the purpose. On the same day he wrote to General Grant a report in brief of his march, with a full statement of his present situation and the steps he had already taken to carry out the plan of operations as indicated by General Grant. Of the campaign of which he had proposed for him- self, he said : " Indeed, with my present command I had expected, after reducing Savannah", instantly to march to Columbia, S. C, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 263 it may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savan- nah, whereas by sea I can probably meet you with my men and arms before the middle of January." Meanwhile there was no relaxation in the siege. He distributed and mounted siege guns that he ob- tained from General Foster, and made incessant reconnoissance to find some practicable passage over to the enemy's lines. On the morning of the 17th, he sent by flag of truce to General Hardee a summons to surrender. Next morning came the answer, a refusal. An assault must be made. But first he deter- mined that a road by which Hardee could escape should be occupied. Hardee could lay a pontoon bridge from the city across the river, and by a mud road for twelve miles gain the railroad. General Slocum desired to take from his army sufificient force — an entire corps, if needed — cross the river, and seize the road. He had captured two of the gunboats which Hardee had in the river, one of which was burned and the other disabled, had oc- cupied the islands opposite his flank, and planted a brigade on the farther shore. But the enemy still had four gunboats, and Sherman preferred to get General Foster to land a force from seaward and occupy the road. On the evening of the i8th he left for Hilton Head, when General Foster heartily promised to give the co-operation desired. Late in the evening of the 20th the pickets of Geary's di- vision of the Twentieth Corps and of Leggett's di- vision of the Seventeenth Corps heard sounds of evacuation, and the two divisions, starting at day- light, found the city abandoned by Hardee, who had left with his garrison and light artillery. Geary having but three miles to march, while Leggett had six, entered first. General Sherman, returning in the evening of the 21st, was met on the way by a messenger with the news of the occupation of the Southern city. 264 GENERAL SHERMAN. To the damage done in the march by the de- struction of two hundred miles of railway, with bridges, trestles, depots, and auxiliary structures, and the capture of thousands of horses, mules, and cattle, as well as enormous quantities of subsistence, was now added in the capture of Savannah the cap- ture of two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, with large stores of ammunition and locomotives and cars, and four steamboats, besides the destruc- tion of an ironclad gunboat and a ram, destroyed by Hardee to prevent their capture. General Sher- man's dispatch to the President, " I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of am- munition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton," reached Mr. Lincoln Christmas Day, and spread joy through the land. Savannah was under military laws. General Geary was the first commander. Subject to mili- tary law, the mayor and council resumed their func- tions, the municipal courts were opened, schools and churches were fdled, customers thronged the shops, and the streets, enlivened by soldiers in uni- form, had the appearance of a holiday. All was peace, harmony, and ease. General Sherman pub- lished an order prescribing the limits of privilege, and the city resumed a share of prosperity. On the nth of January the Secretary of War arrived, accompanied by the quartermaster general and the adjutant general of the army, and by a retinue of civilians, who came to take possession of the cap- tured property and to administer the affairs of the Confederate city. CHAPTER XII. THE CAROLINAS. General Grant's letter to Sherman, notifying him to bring his army by sea to Richmond, was written on the 6th of December, four days before Sherman reached the defenses of Savannah. On the i8th he wrote that it would take too long to move the army by sea by obtainable transporta- tion, and it seemed better that Sherman should, after capturing Savannah and its garrison, operate in South Carolina. Receiving Sherman's sugges- tion of a march across the Carolinas, he at once, on the 27th of December, wrote in hearty concurrence, and on the 21st of January advised Sherman of his co-operation, ordering General Schofield's entire corps to the East, to advance up the Neuse River by Newbern to Goldsboro, and General Alfred H. Terry, who had already captured Fort Fisher, to take Wilmington, and to proceed thence to the same rendezvous. Recruits came from the North, and men re- turning from furlough and from hospitals. The morning report of the ist of February showed in the command fifty-eight thousand nine hundred and twenty-three infantry, forty-four hundred and thirty-eight cavalry, and seventeen hundred and eighteen artillery; total, sixty thousand and sev- enty-nine. The six-mule wagons numbered about twenty-five hundred ; there were six hundred two- mule ambulances, sixty-eight guns, with six horses to each, and sixty-eight four-horse caissons. No tents were carried but one office tent to each head- 265 266 GENERAL SHERMAN, quarters. On the march each corps was to move by a separate road, and only artillery, ambulances, and wagons were to use roads ; troops were to make their way alongside. Each division had its own supply train. As nearly as practicable, twenty days' rations of bread and about twenty days' of coffee, sugar, and salt were taken. But little meat was carried in the wagons ; some divisions carried none. Reliance was placed on cattle driven and on foraging. The wagons were loaded very light, the strongest carrying little more than a ton. The roads in lower South Carolina were known to be miserable, but it was impossible to form a concep- tion of their indescribable execrableness without actual experience. The advance of the Seventeenth Corps left Sa- vannah on the 4th of January, 1865, embarked in the night at Thunderbolt, and reached Beaufort next evening. The whole of the corps was on the island by the evening of the 6th. On the 14th the corps crossed by a pontoon bridge from the north- ern end of the island, and pushed out toward Poco- taligo. The Confederate cavalry made a gallant resistance, and were aided by defensive works strongly placed, as well as by the natural difiticulties of morass and lagoons. By sunset the enemy was pushed into a strong work with massive ramparts, armed with seventeen guns, some of them of heavy caliber, and protected by a very wide and deep wet ditch. The work was evacuated after mid- night and the armament carried off. Next morn- ing the corps occupied Pocotaligo station on the railroad. General Logan returned from leave and resumed command of the Fifteenth Corps. This corps pro- posed to join the Seventeenth by marching from the bank of the river opposite Savannah over a strip of ground bordered by swamp on both sides. John E. Smith had hardly started when a continu- THE CAROLINAS. 267 ous deluging rain turned the soil to ooze. The rising water broke the dikes, flooded the road near the river, and threatened to sweep away the divi- sion ; they barely succeeded in struggling to solid ground. Corse's division marched up the bank of the Savannah to Sisterville with the left wing and Kilpatrick. The other two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps proceeded by boat to Beaufort, and joined General J. E. Smith at Coosawhatchie, near Pocotaligo. General Blair, while filling his trains and con- structing fortifications and intrenchments to be oc- cupied by General Foster's troops, made demon- strations from time to time at points on the Salkie- hatchie River, to keep up the impression that Charleston was the point aimed at. Meanwhile General JefT C. Davis was toiling at the task of building a pontoon bridge over the Savannah, a large river, whose banks v>-ere several feet deep under the overflow, and, after the flood subsided, clearing out miles of road filled with a mass of drift, compacted with artificial obstructions and planted with torpedoes. Part of the left wing was across the river by the 4th of February, and ready to march on the 5th. Order to move on the 5th of February was issued, and the campaign for Columbia was begun while the Confederates were speculating whether Au- gusta or Charleston was the objective point. Blair marched northwest along the swamp of the Salkie- hatchie, while Logan, with three divisions of his corps, moved by parallel courses, about fifteen miles away, along the swamp of the Coosawhatchie. The troops plunged and staggered through the mud, pausing to remove the felled trees that obstructed the way, and sku-mishing all the while with the cavalry that pertinaciously opposed their progress. Blair reached Whippy Swamp where it joins the Salkiehatchie at 8 p. m. 268 GENERAL SHERMAN. Next morning the first and fourth divisions crossed Whippy Swamp and proceeded to Rivers's Bridge over the Salkiehatchie. The third division continued along the outer border of Whippy Swamp, with directions to cross at Anglesea Post Office, and hold the bridge at that point till the Fifteenth Corps should arrive on its way to Bu- ford's Bridge. At Rivers's Bridge the Salkiehatchie spreads in winter into a number of streams, wind- ing between bars of mud, supporting a thick growth of trees, making a tangle of swamp and water a mile and a half across. The only passage was a straight causeway, with bridges over the streams, which was commanded its whole length by a bat- tery erected on the farther bank. The cavalry which had doggedly contested Blair's progress was so closely followed by Blair's advance that all the bridges, except the main one close under the battery, were saved. The guns of the battery opened fire, and killed and wounded some of the pursuers before they could leap from the causeway down into the swamp. Colonel Wager Swayne, a most valuable officer and most estimable man, was severely wounded. Mower's division above the bridge and Giles A. Smith's below, by wading, cutting ways through the woods, and building bridges, forced their way over on the 3d of February, and emerged on dry land. The works, being entirely open at the rear, were flanked and abandoned. The forces holding works defend- ing Buford's Bridge above and Broxton's Bridge below at the same time evacuated and withdrew. General Howard reports the loss, all of which was in Mower's division, as ten or twelve killed and about seventy wounded. Colonel Harrison, who commanded the Confederate troops, reported his loss as eight killed, forty-four wounded, and fifteen missing. General Logan, reaching the bridge over Whip- THE CAROLINAS. 269 py Swamp held by the third division, passed on to Buford's Bridge over the Salkiehatchie, and found it destroyed and the works guarding it aban- doned. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps moved on the 6th, through rain and mud and swamp, to the crossings of the Little Salkiehatchie. Both corps found the bridges destroyed. Logan pushed his troops through the streams and swamp, and, emerging from them in front of a long line of intrenchment, charged upon the works and car- ] ried them. The Seventeenth Corps found the * bridge in its front destroyed and abandoned. On the 7th both corps reached the railroad running from Branchville to Augusta, making the connec- tion between Charleston and Augusta. General Corse, who had left the Savannah River in rear of the Twentieth Corps, and for part of the way had dragged through swampy road, made deep quag- mire by the heavy rains and the passage of two j army corps, did not overtake Logan until the nth. The Twentieth Corps, diverging to the left from the Fifteenth at Buford's Bridge, struck the rail- road at Blackville on the 9th ; Kilpatrick reached it at Barnwell on the same day. The Fourteenth Corps, after crossing the Savannah at Sister's Ferry, and moving out to solid ground, marched up the river, approaching Augusta, reached the railroad at Williston on the 12th. The railroad was thoroughly destroyed for a distance of forty miles. It was apprehended that this important road might not be yielded without a battle. General Howard, when he had approached within five miles of it, began to deploy. Just then a horseman in tattered clothing, one of the foragers, came galloping from the front and called to him : " Hurry up, general ; we have got the railroad." It had been learned that rails merely bent could be put through a rolling mill and straightened, while if they were given a spiral twist they would have to 270 GENERAL SHERMAN. be melted and run out again. Accordingly, in this campaign the twist was required. In one case a brigade failed to observe the order, and was re- quired to return and do the work over. To collect fuel to straighten the rails after heating them, and then give them the required twist, was a very dif- ficult task. The engineer regiment had implements made for the purpose. The soldiers fastened rail- road chairs with telegraph wire to poles ; clamping one to each end of a heated rail, and pulling them around in opposite directions, gave the required twist. While Sherman's army was at work destroying the communications of the State as it advanced, the Confederate commanders were taking account of their resources. Generals Beauregard, Hardee, and D. H. Hill held a conference in Georgia, near Augusta, on the 2d of February. They estimated Hardee's available " effective " in South Carolina at fourteen thousand five hundred ; Georgia militia, fourteen hundred and fifty ; the Army of the Ten- nessee, ten thousand eight hundred ; and Wheeler's cavalry, sixty-seven hundred ; aggregate, thirty- three thousand four hundred and fifty. But the wreckage of Hood's army was drifting across north- ern Georgia, to be finally stranded in North Caro- lina. Each corps commander still bore his flag, and, gathering his remaining followers under it, main- tained the name and organization of a corps. At the time of the conference only Lee's corps had arrived. Generals Cheatham's and Stewart's came in detachments from time to time, the last report- ing at Bentonville. Having completed the destruction of the road, and impressed the defenders of Augusta that they were Sherman's aim, he set out definitely for Co- lumbia. Kilpatrick, to continue the impression, was sent to Aiken, close to Augusta, and General Howard turned eastward to Orangeburg, also to THE CAROLINAS. 271 break up the railroad at that point, and destroy the communication between Cokmibia and Charleston. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps resumed the march on the 9th. They found the bridges over the south fork of the Edisto destroyed, and troops in intrenchments defending the crossings. Logan's men waded the streams ; Blair found a place where solid land extended to the river confined to one stream. Mower laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed after nightfall. On the farther side the land was covered with thick timber and flooded with the overflow. The division marched through icy water, w^aist deep, and the darkness till solid ground was reached. The gleam of moonlight upon their rifles disclosed their presence, and while they plodded on with frozen clothing the enemy withdrew. Both corps started for the north fork of the Edisto on the morning of the nth, the Seventeenth Corps taking the direct road to Orangeburg. The foragers in advance came soon upon the enemy's mounted scouts, forced them back upon the main body of cavalry, and sent back for re-enforcements. The Ninth Illinois mounted infantry went to the front and pushed the cavalry to the shelter of a light intrenchment. The infantry column then coming up, the cavalry broke into retreat. The Twentieth Ohio infantry was detached, and, pur- suing at a double quick, saved the small bridges over the smaller currents of the river till, coming to a bend in the road, the men found themselves near to the main stream and its bridge, with a bat- tery on rising ground beyond. A skirmish line was pushed forward in the overflowed forest to the edge of the main stream, and, standing in the cold water, skirmished with the Confederate line across the river, and prevented parties from approaching the bridge to burn it. General Giles A. Smith com- ing up with his division, placed a battery in a field where it could command the bridge and reach the 272 GENERAL SHERMAN, Confederate works. But after dark a small party made a hasty dash to the bridge and lighted a fire, which burned some of the planking, but did not injure the timbers. An exploring party from the third division found, less than a mile below the bridge* a place where solid ground extended to the river, while a swamp covered the farther shore. A road was made in the night to the spot. Next morning the third division crossed by pontoons, and waded through the swamp to a great field which extended to the high ground near the bridge. A squad with one gun was firing across the bridge at Smith's di- vision. One brigade was sent by a crossroad di- rectly to the railroad and began its destruction. The first brigade in column of regiments marched to the heights. The gun squad then, perceiving the approaching column, fired a few wild shots at it, and quickly withdrew. Colonel Proudfit, of the Tv/elfth Wisconsin, was appointed provost marshal, and his regiment detailed as police, and the rest of the brigade proceeded to destroy the railroad. Smith quickly repaired the bridge, and the rest of the corps and the trains passed over it by evening. The force defending Orangeburg comprised John- son's (formerly Stowall's), Palmer's, and Pettus's brigade of Lee's corps, and a portion of Young's cavalry. The loss of the third division was two wounded ; the known loss of the Confederates was six killed, fourteen wounded, and twenty-six taken prisoners. At the same time General Logan forced a cross- ing a few miles farther up the river. The bridge being destroyed, one division forced its way across above the bridgeway and the other below. The Confederates were driven from their works at 2.30 p. M., many throwing their arms away in their haste. General Logan's loss was one man killed and five wounded ; the Confederates, three killed, THE CAROLINAS. 273 wounded unknown, and eighty prisoners. About two hundred stand of arms were taken. General Howard marched easily on the 13th and 14th, destroying the railroad between Orangeburg and Columbia. On the 15th General Logan, hav- ing the advance, found his progress stoutly con- tested, but pushed his opponents steadily back to Congaree Creek, which empties into Congaree River, about six miles below Columbia. Hampton's cavalry crossed the creek, destroyed the bridge over it, and took post behind a line of intrench- ment, with artillery. Logan sent a brigade up the creek far enough to cross beyond the extremity of the intrenchment, and when the enemy with- drew to another line nearer the city the Fifteenth followed, and drew up before it by nightfall. The Confederates abandoned this line in the night, crossed the river, and burned the bridges. Next morning an artillery fire, ineffective, opened from the city across the river. A few responsive guns replied. Soldiers could be seen loitering by the river bank, and smoke rising in portions of the city. The Congaree was quite too wide and rapid to be bridged by resources within reach of the army. The Fifteenth Corps moved up above the junction of the Saluda and Broad, the confiuents of the Congaree, built with ease a bridge across the Saluda, and afterward constructed another over the Broad with great dilftculty and under sharp opposi- tion. The troops on the way to the crossing passed by Camp Sorghum, where twelve hundred ofificers, prisoners of war, had marched to an open field, and then, without shelter, lay on the ground, under the burning sun and dews of night, and rain and wind, except a few who were able to scratch holes in the ground and cover them with brush. The bridge over the Broad was completed in the night of the 1 6th, and early next morning the troops began to cross. Stone's brigade of Woods's division leading. 274 GENERAL SHERMAN. The mayor of Columbia met General Woods and surrendered the city to him ; Stone's brigade was put on duty to preserve order. Cotton was burning in piles in the streets. A violent wind- storm whirled flaming bunches through the air. People to ingratiate the guards supplied them with whisky. Houses caught fire. Undoubtedly men who had been prisoners of war and escaped aided the spread of the flames. It is not unlikely that in Sherman's army there were some soldiers who did the same. Stone's brigade was relieved ; the rest of Woods's division and Hazen's finely disciplined di- vision were brought into the city. General Sher- man, General Howard, General Logan, and his division commanders personally directed and super- intended the efforts to stay the spread of the con- flagration and to remove furniture from houses. But all efforts were futile against the great sheets of flame driven by the blast, until after midnight the windstorm lulled. The greater part of the city was a mass of cinder. General Sherman gave up his own quarters to homeless families, and divided his own provisions with them and others. A preposterous story was started that General Sherman ordered the burning of the city ; the order that he made is the following : Special Field Orders, No. 26. I. General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near their mouth as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildint^s, railroad properties, manufactur- ing- and machine shops, but will spare libraries and asylums and private dwellings. He will then move to Winnsboro, destroying en roi/fe utterly that section of the railroad. He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water tanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to accomplish consistent with the proper celerity. For move- ments of his armv, he will select roads that cross the Wateree to the south of Lancaster. THE CAROLINAS. 275 General Slocuni with the head of the left wing reached the Saluda a few miles higher up. He crossed the Saluda and the Broad on the 20th, and destroyed the railroad down nearly to Columbia. He moved next day to Winnsboro, and destroyed thence northward the Charlotte and South Caro- lina Railroad, and on the 22d began crossing the Catawba at Rock Mount Ferry. The river was swollen and rapid and filled with drift, and when the Twentieth Corps, the cavalry, and one division of the Fourteenth Corps had crossed, the bridge gave way, and much of it was swept ofif by the current. General Williams, commanding the Twentieth Corps, continued on his route, and, being obliged to corduroy the impassable road most of the way, made only sixteen miles by the 26th. General Slocum, learning here of the de- tention of the Fourteenth Corps, halted the Twen- tieth and returned to the river. Fortunately the river fell, the bridge was repaired, and the water- bound divisions crossed. The two corps. Four- teenth and Twentieth, marching by dififerent roads over oozy soil, saturated by continuous rain, im- peded by creeks swollen to torrents, with banks submerged, reached Sneedsboro on the Great Pedee, above Cheraw, on the 4th of March. One day the Twentieth Corps advanced only five miles, being obliged to corduroy the entire distance. The Seventeenth Corps left Columbia on the 1 8th and reached Winnsboro on the 22d, having destroyed the railroad the entire distance, and on the 23d reached the Wateree. The progress to Winnsboro was stubbornly contested by Wade Hampton's cavalry and Lee's corps. Most of the prisoners taken belonged to Lee's corps. The Fif- teenth Corps, leaving Columbia, proceeded down the river, destroying the railroad for twenty miles, then turning to the north, joined the Seventeenth Corps, on the river called there the Wateree, but 276 GENERAL SHERMAN. named the Catawba farther up. The river was swollen by heavy rains ; the pontoons of both corps were required to bridge it. The troops began to cross before noon, and the rear was over by nine o'clock next morning. The third division of the Seventeenth Corps waited till the pontoons were taken up and packed, and camped at night at Rus- sell Corner, eight miles in rear of corps headquar- ters, and the bridge train three miles in rear of the division. Next day the road was worse. One bri- gade was ordered to give aid where wagons were mired beyond the power of the teams to pull them out ; the other brigade was required to repair impassable places in the road. Four miles of cor- duroy were made. The division camped at night ten miles in rear of corps headquarters, and the bridge train five miles in rear of the division. The division went into camp next night at Little Lynch's Creek, and was there overtaken by the bridge train. The men worked until 1.30 a. m. constructing causeway and bridge, and resumed march before daylight, having made fires to light the wagons over the narrow track in the dark and fog, and overtook the corps at Lynch's Creek in the after- noon. General Giles A. Smith with the advance of the corps reached Lynch's Creek by noon of the 26th of February, and found the bridge standing in the middle of a great expanse of water a mile wide. A regiment waded over the submerged roadway to solid ground. The First Michigan engineer regi- ment, working all night, constructed a footway for troops by next morning, and Mower's division crossed. Working from both shores during the whole of the 27th, about twenty-five hundred ofili- cers and men, standing in water waist deep in places, completed by 5 p. m. eight hundred and fifty feet of bridging and seven thousand feet of corduroy road laid on stringers. Next day, the THE CAROLINAS. 277 28th, the remainder of the corps crossed, and, after marching nineteen miles, the corps went into camp thirteen miles from Cheraw. Tidings came that Hardee evacuated Charles- ton when he learned of Sherman's entry into Co- lumbia, and was now in Cheraw with his whole command. General Sherman was with Slocum and the left wing. General Howard was with Logan, whose corps was struggling to effect a crossing over Lynch's Creek farther down. Blair in- trenched, reconnoitered, and waited ; Logan crossed on the 2d of March, and Blair moved on the 3d. The rear of Hardee's command crossed the Pedee and set fire to the bridge saturated with combusti- bles as the head of Blair's column drew near. The railroad from Charleston ended at Cheraw, and, as it was impossible to move stores by wagon as fast as they were brought by rail, a great amount accumulated. The capture included twenty-five pieces of artillery, five thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, twenty thousand rounds of infantry ammunition, two thousand stand of small arms, one thousand sabers, thirty-six hundred barrels of powder, and a great store of C. S. A. cotton. All was destroyed except three guns carried off as trophies. The Fourteenth Corps, constructed a bridge ten miles above Cheraw, and crossed on the 7th of March. The Twentieth Corps moved down to Cheraw, and crossed on the bridge of the right wing. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth crossed in detachments, and, moving a few miles each day, assembled about Bennettsville on the 6th. The country between Columbia and Cheraw was scanti- ly supplied with subsistence, and the foragers gath- ered little. The supplies in the wagons were nearly exhausted. Coffee and sugar remained, and a small amount of bread reserved for emergency. The men were hungry. The country from Cheraw to 278 GENERAL SHERMAN. Bennettsville and a day's march beyond abounded with subsistence. It was a feast at the end of each day's march. The foragers consisted regularly of parties of an officer and a dozen men or less from each regiment, who reported to the provost marshal of the divi- sion before setting out in the morning. At first they were on foot, and visited only plantations near the road. But soon they all had horses, and their explorations extended ten miles off from the flanks. They brought in ham, bacon, and poultry, sweet potatoes and corn meal, horses and mules, and sometimes impressed vehicles to convey their cap- tures to camp. Occasionally a grist-mill was found. The party would proceed to grind corn and send to camp for wagons to take the meal. They seemed to have instinctive perception of the selection of camping ground, and never failed to report with their spoils. Sometimes they reached the ground along with the staff officers, who rode in advance to select the ground and assign place to the divi- sions. When ground was designated for each bri- gade, the forage parties, knowing the relative posi- tion of the regiments in the brigade, would repair each to the line of its own regiment. The weary troops, dragging in through the night, would find fires glowing with cheer^ and piles of food giving welcome. The foragers often came upon parties of Con- federate cavalry miles away from the line of march. Whether it was a solitary forager or a party, every one fired at the enemy before falling back. Every forager within hearing of the report galloped to re- enforce. As the noise of the skirmish grew, the number of combatants increased, and so increased that the Confederate cavalry was never able to pene- trate within sight of Sherman's column. Taking articles not needed for the subsistence of the army was prohibited. There were, of course, THE CAROLINAS. 279 violations of this order, bat violations when re- ported were punished. A man who was convicted of taking a watch from the person of a citizen was drummed out of the army. In another case, where a man was court-martialed for stealing some article from a house, his captain was put in arrest for hav- ing failed to report the case promptly. The irregularity in reaching camp all through the night gave rise to a practice that was adopted in some divisions. Before breaking camp in the morning, the detail for picket for the ensuing night was made, and marched at the head of the division for the day. There it was ready to serve as a skir- mish detail if needed. In the afternoon, when the stafT ofificers rode forward to select ground for camp, the picket detail followed them and went on post by daylight, while the troops arriving late had no concern about being called for duty. A few days through a series of swamps in con- stant rain brought the army to Fayetteville, N. C, on the Cape Fear River. The foragers entered first, but were driven back by Wade Hampton and his cavalry rear guard. Hampton crossed the bridge and burned it just before the Fourteenth Corps arrived. The other corps followed, coming in by different roads ; finally Kilpatrick appeared, and General Sherman's army was assembled on the nth of March. Kilpatrick had not been in view on the march, but had rendered important service. His persist- ent advance and attacks close to Augusta kept troops held there under apprehension that Sherman was behind him advancing upon the city. During the march to Columbia, and thence to the crossing of the Catawba, he interposed between the left wing and the cavalry of Butler and Hampton, cov- ering the rear as well as the flank. The encounters were daily, and serious engagements not infrequent. His impetuosity seemed reckless, but was always 19 . 280 GENERAL SHERMAN. carefully calculated. His men caught his spirit, and were always ready to charge upon any force, no matter what the disparity in numbers might be. On the night of the loth Kilpatrick again slept in a house away from his camp. Hampton broke into his camp after midnight, captured his artillery and headquarters, and swept in many prisoners. Kilpatrick escaped into the swamp. Many of his men did the same, taking their arms with them. The men rallied, formed, and charged upon the Confederates, who were busy gathering horses and other booty. Taken by surprise, the Confederates gave way. The recaptured battery was turned upon them at close quarters. Hampton withdrew, carry- ing one hundred and three prisoners and a number of horses. He left behind eighty killed, a consid- erable number wounded, and thirty men captured. Kilpatrick lost nineteen killed, sixty-eight severely wounded. A party from the third division of Blair's corps captured a small steamboat a few miles below the city. The value of the capture dropped next day, the 1 2th, just after noon, when a steamboat arrived bearing dispatches from General Terry, at Wil- mington, in response to notice sent to him by Sherman by courier. The words " News from home " ran like wild fire through the camp. Men who had opportunity to see a newspaper were ora- cles of intelligence to the rest. The boat was sent back at six o'clock with dispatches from General Sherman. He wrote to the Secretary of War, Gen- eral Grant, and General Halleck, and also to Gen- eral Schofield in North Carolina, and General Fos- ter in South Carolina, now department command- ers under him : and also to his quartermaster and commissary ofificers. There was need of clothing, as well as of rations. The men, marching outside of the road and late into the night, lost their shoes in the mire, their hats were brushed ofT and lost in THE CAROLINAS. 28 1 the thickets, and their clothing tattered. They were a sorry sight. On the 14th a tug boat came up with a supply of oats, a little coffee and sugar, no bread, an inadequate supply of shoes, and no cloth- ing, there being none in Wilmington. One divi- sion received and issued four hundred and ninety- four pairs of shoes, leaving still one hundred and seventy-two men barefoot. Four hundred and fifty refugees having been sent down the river on boats on the 13th, the re- maining multitude, comprising the army of colored people who had accumulated on the march, went down to Wilmington by land with a cavalry escort. On the 15th the advance was resumed. It became known that General Joseph E. Johnston was now in command of the entire force in front. There was a visible bracing up. a watchful readiness in the troops, in recognition of the ability of their an- tagonist in the Atlanta campaign. General Sher- man took notice also of the fact that General Bragg had reported to Johnston with the army that had contested Schofield's advance from the coast, and sent an order to Schofield to meet him at Goldsboro on the 20th. Each corps being on a separate road, the Twen- tieth was on the left and the Seventeenth on the right. The enemy encountered by the Seventeenth was bad roads. This may be appreciated by tak- ing a few extracts from a pocket diary kept at the time : 15th of March, marched via Blockersville to South River. Thunderstorms at noon killed one and hurt two men of the Seventy-ei.o-hth Ohio. Rained after that all day and night. Soil melted like sugar. Laid three miles of corduroy, and repaired much. Wagons kept sticking. Men toiled terribly. I came to camp and went to bed at 2 A. M. None of the second brigade or of their section of the train in yet. i6th. At 5 A. M. I sent two regiments, that had had some sleep, to help the second brigade. All in by 9 A. M. Then sent Twelfth Wisconsin to help pontoon train in. Rained 282 GENERAL SHERMAN. all day. Train packed and awaiting completion of a bridge. Pulled into road at 2 p. M. Bridge extended. Crossed at 7 P. M. Marched six miles. Crossed a creek, bridge not burned. Went to bed at 3 A. M. ; hall" of the section of train guarded by first brigade not in. 17th. Rear of train and Twelfth Wisconsin in camp at 6 A. M. Marched at 7 A. M. via Owenville, crossed Cohena on a bridge built by fourth division. Marched within five miles of Clinton and turned to Beaman's Crossroads. Marched nineteen miles. Last part of train now coming in — 2.30 A. M. 1 8th. Last wagon of supply train came in just as head ot column moved. P'ine weather. Organized two large bri- gade pioneer parties. They with the division pioneers, col- ored pieneer battalion, and from two to four regiments at work ; got along very well. Expecting to find resistance on his left, General Sherman directed General Slocum to put four di- visions, two from each corps, on the outer road, the extreme left, and the rest of the troops, as well as the trains, on a road to the right. On the i6th the advance met the Confederates where North River approaches to the Cape Fear. With a some- what sttiliborn resistance they fell back fighting till they reached a line of intrenchment. Here they made a stand. Slocum brought up his artillery, and a brisk combat ensued. Upon the suggestion of General Sherman, a brigade was moved to the left to look for Hardee's flank. It was found that the intrenchment did not extend to the river. The bri- gade passed to the rear, and Hardee fell back to another fortified line. Slocum followed, but did not press the attack that night. Next morning the works were found evacuated. The National loss was ninety-five killed, five hundred and thirty-three wounded, and fifty-four missing. Of the Confed- erates, one htmdred and twenty-eight dead were buried on the battlefield, one hundred and seventy- five prisoners were taken, and three guns captured. General Hardee's report is : " My loss is between four hundred and five hundred. Among the miss- THE CAROLINAS. 283 ing is Colonel Rhett, commanding brigade, and among the killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert de Treville. Two pieces of artillery were abandoned." The march of the i8th brought the head of Slocum's column so near to Bentonville that Gen- eral Sherman, satisfied that there would be no seri- ous opposition, crossed over at night to the other wing and joined General Howard. Next day the resistance to the advance was so obstinate that General Slocum was ready to believe the statement of a captured Confederate that Johnston was pres- ent with his entire army concentrated. In fact, Johnston at Raleigh was kept advised every day of the position of every part of Sherman's army, and had recalled Bragg, who was opposing the ad- vance of Schofield up the Cape Fear and the Neuse Rivers. He resolved to strike while Sherman's corps were apart on different roads, and crush them separately before they could concentrate. At the rate at which Slocum was advancing, he should make a junction with Howard in the neighl^orhood of Cox's bridge over the Neuse by the night of the 19th. Johnston moved rapidly south from Smith- field, crossed the Neuse, and took the road which crossed Mill Creek at Bentonville, and. continuing south, crossed the Averysboro road nearly at a right angle. He had Bragg, Hardee, and Stuart, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand " effectives," besides the cavalry of Hampton and Wheeler. On the 19th, in the forenoon, General Bragg took po- sition across the Averysboro road at right angles with it, about half a mile west of the Bentonville road, interposing between it and the advancing National columns. General Stewart formed on Bragg's right, along the north side of Cole's farm. Hardee, who did not get into position till 3 p. m., joined his left to Stewart's right. The general formation was a re-entrant angle, Stewart at the apex, Bragg and Hardee along the sides, and the 284 GENERAL SHERMAN. extreme flanks refused. Except the road and Cole's farm, the ground was mostly covered by forest and dense thickets of scrub oak, very difficult to move through. General Sherman, satisfied that the danger point was passed, left Slocum early in the morning of the 19th, and rode across the country to join Gen- eral Howard. The Confederate cavalry disputed even more obstinately than on the precedmg day the advance of the two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps. A strong skirmish line pushed them stead- ily back, though slowly. Toward noon Hobart's brigade of Carlin's division was deployed and came upon a line of intrenchment across the road. The hne could be seen extended along the farther boundary of Cole's farm toward the north and west, while Hobart's skirmishers found it in the woods, reaching to the south. Carlin, still satisfied it was only cavalry in his front, deployed his division and charged. He was met by volleys immediately from infantry rifles. Buell's brigade, sent to find and turn the flank of the works on the farther side of Cole's farm, was charged by the Confederate force and driven across the field. Stewart suffered severely from the fire of a battery as he crossed the field, but prevailed in pushing Hobart back nearly a mile, and captured the battery on the way. Davis called on Fearing's brigade, and Fearing, by an impetuous charge, rolled up General Stewart's left and pressed him into the swamp. There was a lull on the field. A brigade of Jackson's division of the Twentieth Corps (Robin- son's) took position on the Morris farm about a mile south and west from the Cole house, on rising ground covered with pines, and with a marsh in front. The batteries of the corps joined the bri- gade. Carlin's brigades — Buel, Hobart, and Miles — assembled on the left, and Fearing, of Morgan's THE CAROLINAS. 285 division, on the right, and all intrenched. Morgan drew back his two remaining brigades and in- trenched, leaving a gap between the left of this line and the right of Fearing. Two brigades of Jack- son's division — Hawley and Selfridge — coming up later, were posted in rear and to the left of Robin- son, and Cogswell's brigade of Ward's division was added to the right of Morgan's line, but did not sufitice to fill the gap between it and Fearing. John- ston ordered attack along the whole line. Bragg, getting partially into the rear of Morgan, com- pelled successive regiments to refuse, until the whole line was gradually wheeled to the rear. Hardee gained temporary advantage, but was re- pelled in repeated assaults by the well-posted and well-served artillery of the Twentieth Corps. It was dark when assaults ceased. In the night John- ston fell back to a new line. The apex was north of Cole's house, and the flanks, curving back, were continued nearly to Mill Creek. Slocum adjusted his line. Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee heard the sound of Slocum's guns. But he had heard much the same when only cavalry with their artil- lery had doggedly attempted to delay the left wing. So late as 5 p. m. he received a dispatch from Slo- cum stating that only cavalry with their artillery was in his front. He received in the night a sec- ond dispatch, announcing that Johnston with his whole army had been encountered. Hazen's divi- sion was nearest to Slocum. Sherman's order to march at once in relief reached him on the road about midnight. He reported to Slocum at dawn, having marched twenty miles since sunset, and took position on Slocum's right. General Sher- man joined Logan, and the Fifteenth Corps arrived on the ground in the morning and connected with Hazen. Later in the day General Howard brought up the Seventeenth, the most remote of the corps, 286 GENERAL SHERMAN. placed the fourth division on Logan's right, and put the first and third in camp in reserve. The Army of the Tennessee and Johnston's left wing, facing each other, occupied with their works the bluff banks of a marshy valley, along which flowed to the north a brook that joined Mill Creek near Bentonville. General Blair, about noon of the 2ist, directed the first and third divisions to form on the right of his fourth division. General Mower, command- ing the first division, always eager for fight, and seeing a chance for turning Johnston's flank, pushed on. The marsh was impassable for horses ; officers dismounted, and all waded through. As- cending the bluff, and taking a line of rifle pits, he was, without knowing it, in rear of the Confed- erate line, about two hundred yards from John- ston's headquarters, and within musket shot of the bridge over Mill Creek, which constituted the only line of retreat. The sound of a skirmish in that quarter created a panic among the teamsters, and the wagons dashed pell-mell for the bridge. John- ston gathered up his reserves and cavalry and at- tacked. Just at that moment General Cheatham, with two divisions which had left Meridian, Miss., on the 24th of January, and had been striving to make a junction, arrived and reported at Johnston's headquarters. Sherman, hearing of Mower's peril, and having given notice that he would not have an engagement, but would only force Johnston across the Neuse, and not aware of Mower's actual situation, sent orders of recall, opened fire along his whole line, and pushed his skirmishers close up to the enemy's works to make a diversion in Mow- er's favor. Fighting with a bold front, and at the same time moving by the left flank, brigades pass- ing alternately in rear of those at halt and en- gaged, he reached his assigned position without disaster. THE CAROLINAS. 287 Johnston withdrew in the night, and crossed the Neuse to Smithfield. The reported National loss in the three days was : Killed, one hundred and ninety-four ; wounded, eleven hundred and twelve ; missing, two hundred and twenty-one ; total, fif- teen hundred and twenty-seven. The reported Con- federate loss was : Killed, two hundred and thirty- nine ; wounded, sixteen hundred and ninety-four; missing, six hundred and seventy-three ; total, twenty-six hundred and six. The Confederate reports state that nine hundred and three prisoners were captured. The National reports do not give the number of Confederates captured. While the National reports of casual- ties were, as a rule, certainly made out with greater care and accuracy than the Confederate, they were by no means infallible. General Sherman in his report says that General Howard reported twelve hundred and eighty-seven prisoners captured by his command at Bentonville. General Howard's report gives twelve hundred and eighty-seven as the number captured by his command from Savan- nah to Goldsboro, while Logan and Blair, the corps commanders, give the number of prisoners taken bv their respective corps as : By Logan, six hun- dred and forty ; by Blair, three hundred and eighty, in the entire campaign. Easy marches brought the army to Goldsboro on the 24th, where General Schofield had just ar- rived with Generals J. D. Cox and Terry, com- manding the Twenty-third and the Tenth Corps. When the Army of the Tennessee approached the city. General Sherman sent an order for trains to move aside and troops to close up, and stood by the roadside, accompanied by Schofield, Cox, and Terry. As the trooi^s passed in columns of fours, an embryo review. General Howard and the corps and division commanders took their places as their commands passed. Many being barefoot, some 288 GENERAL SHERMAN. with bare legs, most with clothes torn, and heads covered with a grotesque variety of gear, they made a sorry array of apparel, but they marched jubilant, stalwart, masterful. The Tenth and Twenty-third Corps were in Goldsboro as a part of General Grant's co-opera- tion with Sherman's plans. He sent General Terry with a land force to capture Fort Fisher, a strong fortress commanding the mouth of Cape Fear River. Admiral Porter, with a fleet of sixty vessels, assisted. On the 15th of January a terrific bom- bardment by the fleet, followed by a rushing charge by the troops and a fierce fight within the fortress, captured the works with the garrison and arma- ment. The other forts about the mouth of the river were evacuated, and the river was open to the National fleet. General Schofield in Tennessee received orders to repair to the east to proceed against Wilming- ton and Newbern, and effect a junction with Sher- man. He was with his corps in Washington and Alexandria on the ist of February ready to embark, but detained by ice in the river and lack of trans- portation. He embarked on the 4th with Cox's division, leaving the rest to follow, and landed at Fort Fisher on the 9th. Terry was in front of Gen- eral Hoke, whose intrenchments extended from the east or left bank of the Cape Fear River to a large lagoon. After ineffectual efforts to reach Hoke's rear, Schofield took Cox to the west or right bank, to proceed against a force posted farther up the river. Placing part of his command in front of the works, which extended from the river to a large pond, he made a detour of fifteen miles around the pond. The Confederate commander, finding his rear threatened, abandoned the fort, leaving the armament, and retreated eight miles up the river to a position behind Town Creek. Hoke at the same time retreated to a new position on a line SAVANJ^AII TO COLIMBIA EXPLANATION lithArmy Corps fSlh ' ' /7(A " " ■ 20tk " " , Cavalry SCALE OF MILES 5 10 15 PO THE CAROLINAS. 289 with Town Creek, on the opposite side of the river, having his front protected by a creek, his right by the river, and his left by a swamp. Terry followed and intrenched. Colonel Simonson, who in the absence of Gen- eral Hagood commanded the Confederate force on the right bank of the river, took position on the north bank of Town Creek, a few miles from the river, upon a blnff, where he had a battery with artillery. A bridge crossed the creek at this point, approached by a causeway through a swamp. Cox posted his artillery on the nearest firm ground in front of the Confederate works, and, leaving Colo- nel Henderson with a brigade at this point, led his other three brigades lower down the stream. Early in the morning of the 20th Henderson opened fire with his guns upon Simonson's battery, and advanced a heavy line of skirmishers wading through the swamp to the shore of the creek, dis- abling Simonson's heaviest gun, and compelled his men to keep covered behind the shelter of his works. Cox meanwhile, with a flatboat able to carry fifty men at a load, was diligently passing his command over, without exciting alarm or sus- picion. By the middle of the afternoon the three brigades were over. Cox pushed through the swamp to Simonson's rear and captured him, three hundred and seventy-five of his men, and his guns. Next day Cox marched up the river, and, re- constructing a partially destroyed pontoon bridge, occupied the marshy island in the river in front of Wilmington. Soon heavy columns of smoke were seen rising, indicating preparations for evacu- ation. Next morning, the 22d of February, Gen- eral Cox completed the crossing and entered the abandoned city. The next step was to capture Kinston, a point accessible both by water and rail from the sea, lying farther inland, and nearer than Wilmington to 290 GENERAL SHERMAN. Goldsboro. Three divisions were added to the force under Schofield, and Cox was called from Wilmington to take immediate command of the expedition. The railroad from Newbern to Kins- ton ran from Newbern to Southwest Creek, three miles from Kinston, through a continuous swamp. West of Southwest Creek was solid ground. About two miles east of the creek, and parallel to it, a ridge of firm ground extended into the swamp from the bank of Neuse River. Halfway between the creek and this ridge a dirt road, called the British road, ran across the swamp from north to south. On the 7th Cox rapidly moved the divisions of Carter and Palmer out to the ridge, where they threw up works facing west about a mile apart, Palmer at the north covering the railroad, and Car- ter at the south, crossing and covering the Dover road. This road leaving Kinston ran east, cross- ing Southwest Creek on a bridge, and crossing British road, continued through the swamp toward Newbern. Colonel Upham was posted with two regiments at the crossing of the Dover and British roads, and a regiment of New York cavalry was detached to watch the crossings of Southwest Creek, which was not fordable. General Ruger with his division was stationed about three miles in rear of Palmer, where he could protect the work- ing party repairing the railroad, and also be in readiness to go to the support of Palmer or Carter if needed. On the morning of the 8th Bragg crossed Southwest Creek with Hoke's division and the fragment of Hood's army, still styled the Army of the Tennessee. The cavalry disappeared without giving warning. Bragg fell upon Upham's two regiments of fresh recruits. Upham got away with his own regiment; the other was almost wholly captured. Bragg then advanced against Carter, who, being intrenched, made defense. Cox, who THE CAROLINAS. 29I was at the time in consultation with General Scho- fielcl, sent Rnger forward in support. Palmer was ordered to send one brigade rapidly to aid Carter, and with the rest of his division to make a demon- stration toward Southwest Creek. Ruger filled the space between Palmer and Carter, and quickly threw up defensive works of logs. Bragg reformed his lines, made assault, and was repulsed. There was skirmishing on the 9th, and extension and strengthening of the National lines. Bragg made repeated assaults on the loth, and was repulsed at every attempt. Colonel McQuiston made a sally from General Cox's left, fell upon Bragg's right, routed it, and returned with two hundred and sixty- six prisoners captured, in time to aid in repelling an assault upon the center and right. Bragg found it was impracticable to advance through the swamp and thickets and attack intrenchments with success. The re-enforcements sent by Johnston had come with orders to hold the railroad trains ready to bring them back immediately after the fighting was over to participate in his concentration before Sherman. Bragg withdrew in the night with the entire force, and joined Johnston in time to take part in the battle at Bentonville. The casualties on the National side, as shown by the revised consolidation of the returns, were : Killed, sixty-five ; wounded, three hundred and nineteen ; missing, nine hundred and fifty-three ; total, thirteen hundred and thirty-seven. The Con- federate reports consist of a few brief telegrams from Bragg to Johnston, which give no informa- tion as to casualties, and the report of D. H. Hill, temporary commander of Lee's corps, which is too spiteful to be quite trustworthy. He reports that the corps, comprising five brigades, numbered thirteen hundred and twenty-eight " effectives, " and that the casualties were eleven killed, one hun- dred and seven wounded, and sixteen missing. . In 292 GENERAL SHERMAN. his report of the battle of Bentonville, he states that the corps went into battle on the 19th num- bering twenty-six hundred and eighty-seven " ef- fectives." Johnston, in a report to General Lee, dated nth of March, said that General Bragg's loss in the recent engagement was about five hundred. Hoke's command was larger than Hill's. Its re- turn for the 17th of March, after the battles of Wil- mington, Kinston, and the first day of Benton- ville, was : " Effectives," forty-seven hundred and seventy-five infantry ; artillery, seven hundred and eighty-two ; total, fifty-five hundred and fifty-seven. Schofield repaired the railroad to Kinston. He ordered Terry to advance from Wilmington by the railroad to Goldsboro, to which point he proceeded in person with Cox's command, arriving there on the 2 1 St. The campaign of the Carolinas was defi- nitely concluded on the 24th of March, when the six corps — the Tenth, Fourteenth. Fifteenth, Sev- enteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third — assembled there about their leader. CHAPTER XIII. THE END OF THE WAR. At Goldsboro Sherman came into full com- munication with the world. He found there Gen- eral Grant's aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Dunn, with letters. In one Grant, mentioning the co-operative movement on foot, said : " Wilson started on Monday with twelve thousand cavalry from East- port. Stoneman started on the same day from East Tennessee toward Lynchburg. Thomas is mov- ing the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interior of Alabama. I ordered Gillmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, to hold all important posts on the seacoast, and to send to Wilmington all surplus forces. Thomas was also directed to forward to Newbern all troops be- longing to the corps with you. I understand this will give you about five thousand men, besides those brought East with Meagher. I have been telegraphing Meigs to hasten up locomotives and cars for you." General Sherman determined to have personal consultation with General Grant while his army grouped around Goldsboro was getting supplied. As soon as the last rail was laid in repairs, leav- ing General Schofield in command, he started on the evening of the 25th on a locomotive for New- bern. At Moorhead City he took boat to General Grant's headquarters at City Point. When he en- tered Grant's quarters, they grasped hands and 293 294 THE END OF THE WAR. 295 Stood in silence, eye to eye, soul to soul, in closer communion than words could utter. Sherman had two long interviews with Presi- dent Lincoln on his boat. Admiral Porter was present at one. Both Sherman and Porter have made record of the conversation. Both mention the tender earnestness with which the President pressed and repeated his hope that there w^ould be no more slaughter, his wish that the war might close without another battle, and the disbanded soldiers return home to their farms and work- shops. General Sherman also relates that the Presi- dent, by telling a story, intimated that he would be glad if Jefferson Davis should get away, pro- vided he escaped " unbeknownst." Arrangements being made for the organization and supply of his army, Sherman undertook to be ready to move on the loth of April, and returned to Goldsboro, ar- riving there on the 30th of March. The army, as in the Atlanta campaign, com- prised a center and right and left wings. General Schofleld commanded the center, or the Army of the Ohio ; General Howard, the right wing, or the Army of the Tennessee ; and General Slocimi, the left wing, which had heretofore been called, but was now regularly constituted, the Army of Georgia, a separate army in the field. The Army of the Tennessee comprised the Fifteenth Corps, commanded by General Logan, and the Seventeenth, commanded by General Blair, and numbered twenty-eight thousand one hundred and seventeen infantry, fifty-three cavalry, and six hundred and sixty-four artillery. The Army of the Ohio com- prised the Tenth Corps, commanded by General Terry, and the Twenty-third, commanded by Gen- eral Cox, and numbered twenty-five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven infantry and six hun- dred and sixty-five artillery. The Army of Georgia comprised the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by 20 296 GENERAL SHERMAN. General Davis, and the Twentieth, commanded by General Mower, and numbered twenty-seven thou- sand one hundred and twenty-four infantry and nine hundred and thirty-nine artillery. In addi- tion, General Kilpatrick's cavalry division con- tained fifty-four hundred and eighty-four cavalry and one hundred and seventy-five artillery. The aggregate was, on the loth of April : Infantry, eighty thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight ; cavalry, fifty-five hundred and thirty-seven ; artil- lery, twenty-four hundred and forty-three; aggre- gate, eighty-eight thousand nine hundred and forty- eight. The artillery had ninety-one guns. News came to Goldsboro on the 6th of April that Lee had evacuated Richmond and was hurry- ing away with his army and the Confederate Gov- ernment. A dispatch was received from Grant on the 8th, ending, " Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at." Throwing up the plan of campaign published in field orders on the 5th, he started on the loth direct for Johnston in his camp at Smithfield, which was found the next day abandoned, and the bridge across the Neuse burned. In the night Sherman received news of the surrender of Lee. On the march next day the tidings was given to the columns on the march. The men were wild with joy. The universal shout was, " Lee has surrendered, and we are going home ! " An ambitious desire to have one fight with Lee's army had been quite generally felt, but it was agreed about the camp fires that night that it was better that the Army of the Potomac should have achieved its final victory without extrane- ous aid. On the 14th a flag of truce came from General Johnston proposing a suppression of hostilities, and that General Grant be requested to " take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the THE END OF THE WAR. 297 needful arrangement to terminate the. existing war." Sherman replied : " That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Courthouse on the 9th instant relative to our two armies ; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend any movement of our troops in the direction of Virginia." On the morning of the 17th, as General Sher- man was entering the car to go out and meet Gen- eral Johnston, the telegraph operator asked him to wait till he received an important cipher dispatch from Mr. Stanton. It was the announcement of the murder of Lincoln. When the two generals met and withdrew to a little farmhouse which was vacated for them, Sherman showed the dispatch ; Johnston was shocked, and did not attempt to con- ceal his distress, and denounced the act as a dis- grace to the age. There was much serious con- versation upon the horrible deed before the busi- ness of the interview was reached. Then Sherman urged that Johnston could with propriety do what Lee had already done ; Johnston agreed to this, but thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, terms might be arranged which would embrace all the Confederate armies, and, upon his undertaking to procure authority from Jefferson Davis, the conference was adjudged till noon next day. Next morning the tidings of the murder of the President was promulgated in orders. The men sat all day, each in front of his shelter tent, somber, brooding, silent. The stillness was appalling. A word would have sent eighty thousand furious men, a whirling tornado, desolating the land. Sherman, accompanied by a party of officers, went on his er- rand of peace to negotiate the surrender of the Confederate armies. When the two generals met, Johnston proposed that General Breckinridge 298 GENERAL SHERMAN. should be admitted to the conference, not as a member of the Confederate Government, but as an otificer in the Confederate army. Breckinridge was an adroit poHtician, and as he presented the propo- sition of making- terms of an immediate termina- tion of the war and the spread of universal peace, General Sherman's imagination so took fire at the prospect of such a boon to the weary nation that he drafted the following articles to be sub- mitted to the Government at Washington. They were at once accepted : 1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the sfiitii quo until notice is given by the commanding gen- eral of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time — say, forty-eight hours — allowed. 2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be dis- banded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal, and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington city, subject to the future action of the Con- gress ofthe United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively. 3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States of the several State governments on their officers and legis- latures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. 4. The re-establishment ol all the Federal courts of the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively. 5. The people and the inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively. 6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain THE END OF THE WAR. 299 from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence. 7. In general terms — the war to cease ; a general am- nesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can com- mand, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing the armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above programme. General Sherman was at fault ; of course he, only the commander of one of the armies in the field, had no authority to make any such an ar- rangement or enter into any such negotiation, and the terms were not such as should have been made. But it was in accord with his uniform declarations through the war. While prosecuting war with rigor, he said on every occasion that he was ready to give fullest amnesty to all who should surrender and submit to the National Government. He was confident that he was only carrying out the earnest wish and purpose of President Lincoln as ex- pressed in the conversation at City Point. He had received no such warning as was sent to Grant — to restrict his action to the surrender of Lee's army, and to leave all other matters to the Executive. He knew that after Lee's surrender General Weit- zcl had convened the Confederate Legislature in Richmond, and had not heard that Weitzel's order had been disapproved and rescinded. And, finally, he acted the more freely because his action was only provisional, and without effect unless ratified. But he was sure that he was right, and elated that he was the instrument of bringing such a boon to the country. He sent Alajor Hitchcock with the articles of agreement to General Grant on the 20th. When Grant read them he sent the paper with his disapproval to the Secretary of Vv'ar, with 30O GENERAL SHERMAN, recommendation to submit it at once to President Johnson and the whole Cabinet. Grant was or- dered to proceed at once to Sherman's headquar- ters, terminate the truce, and direct the move- ments of the army. Early in the morning of the 24th Major Hitch- cock appeared on his return, and with him was General Grant. The general directed General Sherman to give at once notice to terminate the truce at the end of forty-eight hours, and then resume hostilities and press pursuit. The notice was immediately sent, and at the same time a de- mand for surrender of Johnston's army on the same terms as were given to General Lee at Appomat- tox. At the same time orders were issued to be ready to move on the expiration of forty-eight hours. Message was sent to the same effect to General Gillmore in South Carolina, with instruc- tions to send the same to General Wilson in Georgia. On the 25th word came from Johnston requesting another interview next day. On the 26th Johnston surrendered the troops under his command upon the terms granted by Grant to Lee. General Grant approved, and took the agreement of capitulation with him to Washington on the 27th. Sherman made the necessary orders to carry out the terms of the capitulation, appointed Gen- eral Schofield to superintend the details, and started for Savannah to insure communication with Gen- eral Wilson. The incident was closed. The murder of Lincoln, the attempted assassina- tion of Seward, and the purposed murder of other high ofificials horrified the people and unnerved the Cabinet. Vice-President Johnson, who succeeded to the presidency, was known to be loyal to the Union, but otherwise was, to the people, an un- known quantity. Doubt and distrust and vague apprehension prevailed. Stanton, with his intense loyalty to the nation, could be arbitrary and cruel, THE END OF THE WAR. 301 and could trample on plans and persons whom he deemed inimical to the nation. He seems, all at once, to have lost faith in Sherman's loyalty, as well as his discretion. He immediately dispatched to General Dix, who gave it to the New York papers, the following communication : Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hos- tilities, and a memorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been entered into on the i8th inst. by General Sherman, with the rebel General Johnston. Brigadier-Gen- eral Breckinridge was present at the conference. A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the even- ing, at which the action of General Sherman was disap- proved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by every member of the Cabinet. General Sher- man was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructions given by the late President in the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself at the Capitol on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders. On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his Cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee had requested an interview or conference to make an arrangement for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a letter to Davis and to the rebel Congress. General Grant's telegram vv-as submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretary of War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant : Washington, March 3, 1863 — 12 p. m. Lteutennnt-General Grant : The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political ques- tions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or convcn- 302 GENERAL SHERMAN. tions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your mili- tary advantages. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman, to withdraw from Salisbury and join him, will probably open the way for Davis to escape to New Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accu- mulations. A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says : " It is stated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specie taken South by Jeff Davis and his par- tisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with General Sherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston's negotiations looked to this end." After the Cabinet meeting last night General Grant started for North Carolina to direct operations against John- ston's army. The reasons for disapproval were : 1. It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and on its face shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrangement. 2. It was a practical acknowledgment of the rebel gov- ernment. 3. It undertook to re-establish the rebel State govern- ment that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousand loyal lives and an immense treasury, and placed the arms and munitions of war in the hands of the rebels at their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue the loyal States. 4. By the restoration of the rebel authority in their re- spective Stales, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery. 5. It might furnish a ground of responsibility for the Federal Government to pay the rebel debts, and certainly subject the loyal citizens of rebel States to debts contracted by rebels in the States. 6. It would put in dispute the existence of loyal State governments and the new State of West Virginia, which had been recognized by every department of the United States Government. 7. It practically abolished the confiscation laws and re- THE END OF THE WAR. 303 lieved the rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes. 8. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly retused by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous conditions. 9. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but re- lieved the rebels from the presence of our victories, and left them in condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the United States Government, and subdue the loyal States whenever their strength was recruited and any opportunity was offered. General Halleck was relieved from his position as chief of staff and appointed commander of the MiHtary Division of the James, comprising the State of Virginia and so much of North Carohna as was not occupied by Sherman. Generals Meade and Sheridan came under his command. General Grant dispatched to Halleck on the 22d of April from Fortress Monroe : " The truce entered into by General Sherman will be ended as soon as I can reach Raleigh. Move Sheridan w^ith his cavalry toward Greensboro as soon as possible. I think it will be well to send one corps of infantry with the cavalry. The infantry need not go farther than Danville unless they receive orders hereafter." Johnston was at Greensboro and Sherman at Raleigh, with their respective commands disposed in front of each. General Halleck on the same day ordered Sheri- dan : " You will move with your cavalry immedi- ately on Greensboro. You will then act as circum- stances seem to require, unless you receive instruc- tions from General Grant, who is on his way to Raleigh. General Meade has been directed to place i an infantry corps under your direction. It is said here that there is a large amount of specie on the road between here and Charlotte. It is supposed to hnve been taken at different points from the rail- road. . . . While pushing sotith with all possible 304 GENERAL SHERMAN. dispatch, look into these things." Sheridan prom- ised to be ready to move on the 25th. On the 23d Halleck dispatched to Sheridan : " Pay no attention to the Sherman and Johnston truce. It has been disapproved by the President. Try to cut off Jefif Davis's specie." Plallcck being advised that CJeneral Meade had received notice from the Confederate commander that a second truce had been arranged between Johnston and Sherman, dispatched to him on the 26th : " To avoid all misunderstanding, telegraph again to General Wright to observe no truce not made by General Grant, but do all in his power to cut off the enemy's retreat. General Grant has reached Ra- leigh, and ordered an immediate resumption of hos- tilities. The enemy's ol^ject now is to permit the leaders to escape South l)y their dilatory negotia- tions." On the 27th Meade telegraphed to Gen- eral Wright that he was not to pay any attention to dispatches concerning truces without official instruction from General Grant or General Sher- man, and informed General Plalleck that he had sent such instructions. Halleck replied to Meade the same day : " Impress upon General Wright and General Sheridan that they are not to regard any dispatches from General Sherman, direct or through rebel authorities. They will obey only the orders from General Grant or myself. They will push on with all possible dispatch and carry out their original orders without regard to General Sherman's arrangements." General Sheridan found obstacles which prevented his reaching Danville, and Wright claimed that if he was to advance against Johnston at Greensboro he should do so only in connection with a simultaneous movement by Sher- man. In the night of the same day Meade sent Hal- leck's last dispatch to Wright, and next morning, the 28th, Halleck notified Meade of the surrender, recalled Sheridan, and stayed Wright at Danville. THE END OF THE WAR. 305 On the 27th Secretary Stanton sent a second letter to General Dix, which was also published in the papers. It reads : The department has received the following dispatch from Major-General Halleck, commanding the Military Divi- sion of tiie James. Generals Canby and Thomas were in- structed some days ago that Sherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by the President, and they were ordered to disregard it, imd push the enemy in every direc- tion : Richmond, Va., April 2b — 9.30 p. M. Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright are acting under orders to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respecting hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind his command only, and no other. They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from any one except from General Grant, and cut off Gen- eral Johnston's retreat. Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new ar- rangement has been made with Sherman, and that the ad- vance of the Sixth Corps was to be suspended until further orders. I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to push forward as rapidly as possible. The bankers have information to-day that Jeff Davis's specie is moving south from Goldsboro in wagons as fast as possible. 1 suggest that orders be telegraphed through General Thomas that Wilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mis- sissippi, to take measures to intercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder. The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six to thirteen million dollars. General Sherman on the 28th appointed Gen- eral Schofield, with the aid of General Cox, to take charge of paroling the surrendered troops and make arrangements for their departure, and di- rected General Howard to take the right and left wings by easy marches to Richmond, where he could rejoin them on his return from the South. Next day he left for Charleston and Savannah. He 3o6 GENERAL SHERMAN. read in the newspapers with amazement the com- munications of Stanton and Halleck, and the in- flammatory editorials in the newspapers. He did not heed the shameful insinuation of personal in- terest in the phantom treasure of the fleeing Presi- dent, but to be denounced by authority and vilified by the press as a military outcast, incapacitated to make a valid order, stung him to the quick. The paroling of Johnston's army and detach- ments occasioned some relaxation of the terms of the surrender. Enlisted men, as well as olBcers, were allowed by General Schofield to take home horses and other property belonging to them. The total number of paroles, as ascertained by revision of the rolls, is thirty-nine thousand and twelve. The march from Petersburg, beginning on the 1st and arriving on the 7th of May, was a contrast with the march across South Carolina. Good roads and fine weather made easy marching and early camps. There was absolutely no foraging, either authorized or illicit. There was no straggling. At every halt the men stacked arms and remained by their stacks. They had marched far and toiled and suffered much to reach Richmond, and at last they were to meet their comrades of the Army of the Potomac. General Howard, on reaching Peters- burg, reported his arrival to General Halleck. Halleck's greeting came promptly : " Your com- mand will be encamped at or near Manchester, and not be permitted to enter Richmond until prepared to march through the city." The command went into camp about Manchester, across the river from Richmond, and found guards posted across every road to prevent any member of Sherman's army from going into the city. When General Sherman returned from the South, he was met by a note from General Halleck professing friendship, and asking him to be his guest while in Richmond. Sherman declined both THE END OF THE WAR. 307 the invitation and the friendship. On the nth. General Logan having been appointed commander of the Army of the 1 ennessee in place of General Howard, who had been called to Washington to organize the Freedman's Bureau, the army passed through Richmond on its way to Washington, with colors furled, equipped for march, at route step, and with trains in the column. The army reached the neighborhood of Alex- andria on the 19th of May, and went into camp. Orders had been sent from Raleigh for uniforms, hats, equipment, headquarter colors, and every- thing required to make the troops presentable for the final review. The supplies were arriving, and all was busy preparation. General Sherman was invited to the city by many friends. General Grant met him. The President and members of the Cabi- net received him cordially, and voluntarily assured him that they knew nothing of Stanton's mem- oranda before they were seen in the newspapers. On the 23d, the day of the review of the Army of the Potomac, Sherman's army moved nearer to the city, and went into bivouac between Four Mile Run and the Long Bridge. Early the next morning the troops crossed the bridge and massed in open ground north and east of the Capitol. At nine o'clock General Sherman, accompanied by General Howard and followed by his staff, moved, leading the column of the Fif- teenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Corps, marching division front, two companies abreast. As they turned the Capitol grounds into Pennsylvania Avenue a thrilling spectacle came into view. As far as the eye could reach toward the Treasury Building the sidewalks were packed with a dense multitude, which the lines of cavalry stationed along the sides to keep the roadway clear could hardly prevent from bulging into the street. Every step and porch and doorway, every balcony 3o8 GENERAL SHERMAN. and window, the roofs where parapets made it prac- ticable, were mosaic of human heads. The men were inspired by the view. Elate, erect, eyes steady to the front, they moved with alert and vigorous step, lines dressed with abso- lute precision, and intervals perfectly preserved. The reviewing stand was in front of the White House, where the President stood with his Cabi- net and other high officials, and Mrs. Sherman and other ladies. Facing this, on the other side of the avenue, were long ranks of seats, filled with the diplomatic corps and other notabilities, and thou- sands of others. The steady tide passed between for six hours and a half without a flaw. When Gen- eral Sherman took his place the President, the members of the Cabinet, and others pressed for- ward to welcome him. He had hearty greeting from all, till Mr. Stanton approached with out- stretched hand. Sherman declined and refused to recognize him. The army passed by. Armies, corps, and divisions filed off as guided to designated camp grounds in the outskirts of the city. Gen- eral Sherman's " bummers " reposed in the grounds and groves of the country seats surrounding the Capitol, and there read the farewell address of their great commander : The g^eneral commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and Georgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to your homes, and others will be retained in military service till further orders. And now that we are about to separate, to mingle with the civil world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of National affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty. Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate histories, yet bound by one common cause — the union of our country and the perpetuation of the Govern- ment of our inheritance. There is no need to recall to your THE END OF THE WAR. 309 memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky Face Mountain and Buz- zard Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind. We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but dashed through Snake Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on the Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesavv ; and the heats of summer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home and dependent on a single road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the problem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christ- mas found us at Savannah. Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a march which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with any ever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the " high hills " and rocks of the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of an accumulating enemy ; and, after the battles of Averys- boro and Bentonville, we once more came out of the wilder- ness to meet our friends at Goldsboro. Even then we paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, again pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing for peace instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold had checked us ; but when he who had fought us hard and persistently offered submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in his surrender. How far the operations of this army contributed to the final overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us ; but that you have done all that men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and we have a right to join in the uni- versal joy that fills our land because the war is over, and our Government stands vindicated before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies and navies of the United States. To such as remain in the ser\'ice, your general need only remind you that success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, and that the same work and discipline are 3IO GENERAL SHERMAN. equally important in the future. To such as go home, he will only say that our favored country is so grand, so exten- sive, so diversihed in climate, soil, and productions, that every man may hnd a home and occupation suited to his taste ; none should yield to the natural impatience sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. You will be invited to seek new adventures abroad ; do not yield to the temptation, for it will lead only to death and disap- pointment. Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good citizens ; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our country, " Sherman's army " will be the first to buckle on its old armor, and come forth to defend and main- tain the Government of our inheritance. By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. L. M. Dayton, Assista?ii Adjutant-General. CHAPTER XIV. POST BELLUM. The great review at Washington was hardly over when Sherman took advantage of the oppor- tunity to throw off the harness and enjoy the " twen- ty days' leave of absence to see the young folks," which, in September of the preceding year, he had jocularly written to Grant they might hope for after the one had received Lee's surrender and the other had marched to the Atlantic. It was barely more than twenty days, for on the 27th of June the peace establishment of departments was an- nounced, and under the same title as his last glori- ous war command, the West and Northwest, to the Rocky Mountains, was organized as the Mili- tary Division of the Mississippi, and assigned to him, with his headquarters at St. Louis. He settled his family there, with bright hopes of happiness in the home life which would be per- mitted him by the routine duties of a time of peace. His house was a solid square mansion, with its pleasant garden, and in a bright working room with cheerful outlook, with books, maps, and papers about him, he was soon making his leisure hours profitable by systematizing the files of his private papers, and arranging the material out of which afterward came his Memoirs. The inspection of the frontier posts, visits to the Indian tribes under his care, and to the Union Pa- cific Railway, as its construction was vigorously pushed toward the mountains, gave him enough 21 3" 312 GENERAL SHERMAN. outdoor work to satisfy his active habit of body, and left him still time " to rest, study, and make the acquaintance of my family," which he naively told the President he really wanted. A year of thorough enjoyment of this uneventful though quietly busy life passed, when he found himself in- voluntarily drawn into the vortex of turbulent political conflict which marked the administration of President Johnson. In September, 1866, he was summoned in haste from the mountains of New Mexico to Washington for the purpose, as it turned out, of being put in command of the whole army for a time, while General Grant should go upon a special mission to escort the minister (Mr. Camp- bell) accredited to President Juarez, of Mexico, who was keeping up a show of resistance to the P'rench occupation and the rule of Maximilian. The grade of general had been conferred on Grant by law, and Sherman had succeeded to that of lieutenant general, and, had the temporary change been made with Grant's consent, there would have been noth- ing noteworthy in the matter. But Sherman found Grant full of the conviction that some sinister purpose was at the bottom of what he considered an improper effort to send him out of the country. Supposed intrigues with re- gard to the next term of the presidency were more or less involved, and Grant was resolved that he would take the consequences of a refusal to obey the President's order, on the ostensible ground that such a personal escort, without troops, was not a military duty of the general in chief. While Sher- man thought it a mistake on Grant's part to enter- tain the idea of being a presidential candidate, their friendship was such that he placed himself by Grant's side the moment an issue was joined. He went to the President, and so strongly opposed the idea of forcing upon the general an unwelcome duty of questionable legality that Johnson yielded on POST BELLUM. 313 condition that Sherman himself would go with Mr. Campbell. The result was an official promenade to Cuba, and thence to Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Brazos Santiago, without finding the Mexican President. The demonstration was part of the diplomatic pressure upon Louis Napoleon which constrained him to withdraw his army and caused Maximilian's downfall. Grant and Sherman had both been regarded as friendly to President Johnson's theory of restora- tion of the rebellious States, and in the first stages of the quarrel between the President and Secretary Stanton both sided with the President. They strongly resented Stanton's concentration of all military power in the War Office, and his habit of ignoring the general in the peace administration of army affairs. Both were strong advocates of the plan of having all stafif bureaus report through the general, so that he might not only have knowledge of whatever affected the army, but might be regu- larly heard upon all important matters of adminis- tration before they were decided upon. Every of- ficer in turn who has commanded the army, from General Scott downward, has protested against a system which has practically resulted in making the staff bureaus independent of the military head of the army, and in allowing an adjutant general, who might have the ambition to do so, to use the whole power of the Secretary and reduce the gen- eral in chief to a nullity.* The antagonism between Grant and Stanton was such that when the latter abandoned the President's policy and went into op- position but still refused to resign his place in the Cabinet. Grant was quite willing to assist Mr. John- son in testing the constitutionality of the Tenure of Office Act in the courts. He accepted the position * For a full discussion of this subject, see General Schofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, chapters xxii and xxvi. 314 GENERAL SHERMAN. of Secretary of War in the interim when the Presi- dent removed Mr. Stanton, but, on more carefully studying the law when the Senate refused to consent to the removal, he declined to carry resistance to Stanton's return as far as Mr. Johnson thought he had agreed to do. Differences between him and the President began here, which grew rapidly larger as events more and more indicated Grant to be the almost inevitable candidate of the Republican party for the presidency if he avoided open quarrel with the party leaders in Congress. He believed the Tenure of Office Act to be impolitic, if not un- constitutional, and when he became President he was not long in compassing its repeal ; but he saw no reason for making himself a champion of oppo- sition to it in the peculiar condition of affairs which then existed. He believed that Stanton was under moral, if not legal, obligation to relieve the Presi- dent of the embarrassment of his presence in the Cabinet after the rupture between them, but he declined to defy the law and make himself liable to its penalties. He and his advisers thought there was the same kind of political finesse in this matter that they had seen in the plan of sending him to Mexico, and their distrust of Johnson soon over- shadowed that which they had felt toward Stanton. Many circumstances tended to make General Sherman influential with President Johnson and a useful peacemaker. Their opinions on the solution of the great political problem of the day were not far apart. The President had assured the general that he had known nothing of Mr. Stanton's pub- lished strictures on the Johnston convention till he saw them in print.* Sherman had as early as No- vember, 1865. called his brother's attention to the drift of Mr. Johnson toward the basis of settlement indicated in the terms he offered to the Confederate general. f He had, with characteristic point, put * Memoirs, ii, 375. f Sherman Letters, p. 257. POST BELLUM. 315 the situation tersely in the same correspondence. " We can not keep the South out long," he had said, " and it is a physical impossibility for us to guard the entire South by armies ; nor can we change opinions by force, . . . and for some time the marching of State governments must be controlled by the same class of whites as went into the rebellion against us." * " It is surely unfortunate," he said again, " that the President is thus thrown seem- ingly on the old mischievous anti-war Democrats, but from his standpoint he had no alternative. To outsiders it looks as though he was purposely forced into that category." f When, therefore, President Johnson found him- self in strained relations to Grant, it was almost in- evitable that he should turn to General Sherman for aid in breaking the deadlock in the War Depart- ment. The resolution of the Senate refusing con- sent to Johnson's removal of Stanton was passed on January 13, 1868. Sherman, who was in Wash- ington attending meetings of his commission to revise the army regulations, had known of Grant's opinion that he must not be put in antagonism to Congress by continuing to exercise the office of Secretary, had prompted Grant to have an under- standing with the President on the subject, and was present at a subsequent interview between them when their conversation indicated a fair mutual un- derstanding. Grant had expected that Stanton would notify him a couple of days in advance of his demand for restoration to his office, according to the precedent Stanton himself had set in yielding the office to Grant, ad iiitcriiii, in the previous August. This would have allowed time for the attorney general to take the case into court upon application for an injlmction, or, if that could have been arranged, for Mr. Stanton to apply for a man- * Sherman Letters, p. 254. f Id., p. 264. 3l6 GENERAL SHERMAN. damns. But the course actually taken was to serve upon General Grant a copy of the resolution of the Senate as soon as passed ; and he, having been per- suaded that he should incur the penalties of a law- breaker if he delayed acquiescence, turned over the keys of the office to the adjutant general at once.* Sherman was strong in the conviction that only mischief to the country and to the army could re- sult from the effort to nullify the authority of the President over the army or to force into intimate Cabinet relations to him one who was personally hostile. He was earnestly active in trying to find some solution of the difficulty. His own relations to Stanton had become pleasant, they having tacitly agreed to ignore the incidents attending the con- vention with Johnston, and he offered to go to Stanton, either with Grant or alone, and to say to him that he ought to resign. He suggested to Grant, and they both urged upon the President, that he should send to the Senate the name of a person to be Secretary of War who, as they thought, would be acceptable, and whose confirmation would effect a change without the rougher form of re- moval. They did not know that the person they named had been engaged in a friendly correspond- ence with Mr. Johnson, urging him to find some reasonable method of avoiding sharp antagonism with Congress, and had perhaps given offense in that way. That they did not know this was good evidence of their avoidance of even usual personal conferences, as was also the fact that he they named never knew of it till their correspondence found its way into print nearly twenty years afterward, f The well-meant effort at conciliation failed, and affairs drifted on to the attempted impeachment of Mr. Johnson — to intelligent lovers of their coun- * General E. D. Townsend's Anecdotes of the Civil War, p. 124. f North American Review, July, 1886, p. 83. POST EELLUM. 317 try the nightmare period of our politics. Sherman found it hard to overcome his aversion to meddhng v/ith poUtics at all ; but the army was so directly in- volved in the controversy that he thought it a sort of oflficial duty to do what he could to make decent administration possible, and this, with his friend- ship for Grant, overcame his scruples. He wrote to the latter : " I'm afraid that acting as a go-be- tween for three persons I may share the usual fate of meddlers, and at last get kicks from all. We ought not to be involved in politics, but for the sake of the army we are justified in trying at least to cut this Gordian knot."* The efforts were not wholly without fruit. A little later Mr. Evarts re- newed them, and a compromise was arranged by which General Schofield became Secretary of War and Mr. Stanton retired.f One phase of the estrangement between the President and General Grant disturbed him more than all the rest. In his irritation at finding the War Department and the army taken practically out of his executive control, Mr. Johnson conceived the idea of making Sherman brevet general, and assigning to him the duties of general in chief. Sherman met this wnth the refusal of the promo- tion, and even wrote to his brother, the Senator, asking him earnestly to oppose the confirmation if his name should be sent to the Senate. He was resolved not to suffer himself to be put in antag- onism or rivalry to Grant, and declared with reso- lute purpose that he would resign his commission in the army and retire to a life of poverty rather than allow himself to be made use of to humiliate his friend. J He had taken this position early, for no sooner had he completed his march to the sea * Memoirs, ii, 424. + Schofield, Forty-six Years in the Army, p. 413. j^ Sherman Letters, pp. 282, 297, 303. 318 GENERAL SHERMAN. than suggestions were made of giving him addi- tional rank as evidence of popular appreciation. He wrote to John Sherman from Savannah, in Jan- uary, 1865 : " I deem it unwise to make another lieutenant general, or to create the rank of gen- eral. I will accept no commission that would tend to create a rivalry with Grant. I want him to hold what he has earned and got. I have all the rank I want. ... Of military titles I have now the maximum, and it makes no difference whether that be major general or marshal. It means the same thing. I have commanded a hundred thousand men in battle and on the march, successfully, and that is enough for reputation."* As to political ofifices, he desired it to be known that he would be offended by any mooting of his name in connection with them. General Sherman had been summoned to Wash- ington when he was at a council with the chiefs of the tribes of Indians who had been making des- ultory war on the frontier, but who had been induced to meet the peace commission of the United States, at the head of which the general was. The meeting was at North Platte, in Nebraska, and the leading men of the Ogallala, Brule Sioux, and the Cheyennes met them there. The great and burn- ing question was the demand of the Indians that the construction of the Powder River and Smoky Hill Railroads be abandoned because they broke up and frightened away the bufYalo herds. The meeting was a noteworthy one for the importance of the personages, red and white ; for Spotted Tail, Man-afraid-of-his-horses, Swift Bear, Big Mouth, Pawnee-killer, and others represented the Indians, while Generals Sherman, Harney, Terry, and Augur of the army were there, with Senator Henderson, Commissioner Taylor, and other noted civilians. * Shemian Letters, p. 245. POST BELLUM. 319 Henry M. Stanley was there, beginning his travels and adventures, and giving us a picture of the ne- gotiations, which is one of the best extant repre- sentations of an Indian council.* There was plain talk on both sides. The In- dians seemed to realize that the time had come when they must perish along with the wild game unless they could stop the progress of the whites. Their first speaker said : " Ever since I've been born I have eaten wild meat. My father and grandfather ate wild meat before me. We can not give up quickly the customs of our fathers." This was the keynote. The conditions of Indian life could not be preserved unless the building of railroads was stopped. Sherman told them frankly that it was vain to hope to stop the spread of the white people. They should be paid damages for the loss to them, but the only hope for their future was in learning to till the earth and to raise cattle. He pointed to the increased travel across the country which they themselves had seen, and told them they could see for themselves that " the slow ox wagon will not answer the white man. We build iron roads, and you can not stop the locomotive any more than you can stop the sun or moon." He urged them to agree upon reservations of good land at once. " You see for yourselves that the white men are collecting in all directions in spite of all you can do. The white men are taking all the good land. If you don't choose your homes now, it will be too late next year." It was a pathetic, hopeless sort of discussion, in which these children of wild Nature and of the boundless prairies argued for their right to remain what they were, and to bid a resistless tide of change to stand still. * My Early Travels and Adventures. By Henry M. Stanley, vol. i, p. 197, etc. 320 GENERAL SHERMAN. The characteristics of the general were never more clearly shown. His honest, square dealing sought no subterfuge. He tried to make them realize the truth, unwelcome as it might be, that their only salvation was in getting into some sort of harmony with the civilization of the white men. Stanley has gone back with evident interest to this his first close contact with uncivilized man, after his romantic explorations of darkest Africa had opened the way for still more vast experiments in the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest between the progressive and the unprogressive races. It is safe to say that in all his wanderings he nowhere saw franker dealing with the weaker peo- ples or heard more sincere warning of the destruc- tion which must inevitably follow their brave but hopeless efforts to stop the progress of a world. The summer of 1868 brought the nomination of Grant for the presidency, and his election in the autumn was a notice to Sherman that his quiet home life in St. Louis must soon be broken up. He had been kept busy with the perplexing strife at the National capital, and had not had the full measure of rest which he had wished for ; but it was always a relief to him to feel that when the duty that summoned him to Washington was done he could get away from the intrigue and turmoil of the capital to the peace of his family circle, and to the healthful ranging of the great plains, visiting his military posts, where the moral tone was the wholesome one begot by plain living and the hon- est performance of the soldier's duty. The thing which most chafed him at Washington was the constant urgency of selfish personal reasons to override the discipline, system, and order which are the essence of good military administration. The social life of the place was attractive to him, and intercourse with statesmen and diplo- matists gave delightful stimulus to his own powers POST BELLUM. 32I of thought and conversation, especially as he could not be insensible to the fact that his society was eagerly sought by the ablest and most brilliant people. His unreserved freedom of expression and his racy way of hitting off the point of discussion had a never-failing charm and freshness. It was the same originality of view and power of reach- ing the heart of things by a happy phrase which is found abundantly in his familiar correspondence, as when he said, apropos to the notion that legisla- tion accomplishes everything, that " as long as cases have to be tried by juries, all laws counter to the prejudices of the whole people are waste paper " ; or, again, when speaking of conflicts be- tween principle and prejudice, he said, " A voter has as much right to his prejudices as to his vote." * In Washington, however, he found it impossible to apply his working hours to the efficient perform- ance of duty. He was constantly besieged by all sorts of people to let some pressure of personal favor overcome his ideas of right system. The resistance to importunity vexed him, and left his mind too much disturbed to resume the calm con- sideration of large questions. He was very loath, therefore, to consider the necessity of making his residence in Washington when General Grant should become president, as it was evident he would have to do. Shortly after the November election a meeting of soldiers of the Western volunteer armies was held at Chicago, which was the most notable re- union of the sort ever held. It was, in fact, a great celebration of the elevation to the presidency of the general who had built up his renown in leading them to victories from Donelson to Missionary Ridge, and yet everything which could be called politics was carefully excluded. Sherman himself * Sherman Letters, pp. 288, 298. 322 GENERAL SHERMAN. had originated the plan, and had fixed the joint anniversary of the battle of Nashville and the oc- cupation of Savannah as the time for the renewal of comradeship, while Grant was still the general of the army. The invited guests included the army and corps commanders of the Eastern armies, the general officers of the regular army, and civil of- ficials of the nation and of the States which had given their quotas to the National defense. Gen-- eral Thomas was made the chairman of the public meeting, and was supported by Grant on his right and Sherman on his left. The latter presided at the banquet. Nearly every soldier of distinction in the rosters of the civil war was there. Sherman's address of welcome struck nobly the keynote of patriotic devotion, of the citizenship of the Ameri- can soldier, and the perpetuation of the National union. It was a great love-feast of the men who had saved the country, and most of whom had put off the uniform and resumed the industries of civil life. They now met again to hail with boundless enthusiasm the great commanders who had led them to victory. In the moments of private conversation which Grant and Sherman could snatch from the festivi- ties of the occasion, the President-elect outlined his purpose as to army organization, and informed Sher- man that he would be called to Washington to suc- ceed to the office of general, and to carry into ef- fect changes which Grant had urged since 1866 aflfecting the scope of the general's authority. He also indicated his purpose to give Sheridan the position of lieutenant general, to become vacant by Sherman's promotion. This last was a matter fruit- ful in heartburnings. Halleck and Meade were Sheridan's seniors as major generals in the regular army, and Thomas had many friends who claimed that injustice had been done him when Sheridan had been promoted first to this rank. They urged POST BELLUM. 323 that the appointment of Thomas as lieutenant gen- eral would be but the correction of an old injus- tice. In this matter Thomas had the sympathies and good wishes of most of theofifiicers and men who had served under Sherman ; but Grant seems to have decided the question according to his candid judgment as to the power of prompt initiative and vigorous aggressive action which the general in chief ought to have. He had reached the settled conviction that, next to Sherman, Sheridan of all tjie generals, tested by large responsibilities, had shown the highest qualities for supreme command. There was room for honest difference of opinion among those competent to judge, but Grant can not be blamed for acting on his own judgment, the law having cast on him the responsibility. In the organization of his Cabinet, President Grant retained General Schofield for a time in the War Department, where he was serving under the arrangement negotiated for Mr. Johnson by Mr. Evarts. This was for the purpose of getting fairly launched the plan for rearranging the relations of the general of the army with the Secretary of War, which Schofield thoroughly approved. On the day after the President's inauguration an order was pre- pared and issued under his instructions by General Schofield, which briefly and comprehensively gave to Sherman " command of the army of the United States," and directed the chiefs of staff corps, de- partments, and bureaus to report to and act under his orders ; business requiring the action of the President or Secretary would be submitted by the general to the Secretary, and all orders from them would be transmitted through the general.* Sherman, of course, issued his own formal order assuming the command and directing the method * Schofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, p. 421. Sherman's Memoirs, ii, 441. 324 GENERAL SHERMAN. of action under the presidential order. As the plan was Grant's own, the result of his experience both as general and as acting Secretary — a plan he had for years wished to see in operation, and believed to be necessary for the public interests, as well as those of the army — it certainly looked as if a re- form in administration had never been introduced with a better prospect of permanence. Eight years of Grant's incumbency would smooth difficulties, remove obstacles, educate a class of stafY and bureau officers, who would be habituated to the system and know its value. Sherman settled himself to his work with the feeling that his strong desire to make our little army a model of efficiency and in- telligent organization was in the way of speedy ac- complishment. The reform lasted just three weeks. Within that time General Rawlins, Grant's confidential staff officer through the whole war, was appointed to the Cabinet place, and was at once surrounded by interested persons, military and civil, in Con- gress and in the army, who dinned into his ears the assertion that his office had been emasculated, and that the War Department had lost all its power and dignity. No one knew better than Rawlins the intolerable position in which Grant had found him- self under the peace establishment as a general without real command, but he was a sick man, soon to drop into his grave, and did not meet the in- sidious suggestions as he would have done when in healthy vigor. On the 27th of March another order was is- sued from the War Department, made like that of the 5th, " by direction of the President," rescinding the whole of the earlier one except the personal assignment of Sherman to the command of the army, and restoring the old system of independent staff bureaus dealing directly with the Secretary of War. It need not be said that Sherman was as- POST BELLUM. 325 tounded and distressed beyond expression. The sudden wreck of his hopes of improvement of the army was accompanied by a wound to his personal feeHngs which seemed incredible. To the country he seemed to be exhibited as a man who had by some indirect means grasped a power which the President never intended to confer, and who was so quickly made to lay it down again with utter humiliation. A painful interview with the President followed. It began as an informal conversational discussion between intimate friends. The President repeated the familiar complaints of congressmen, that their personal requests and desires could not be pre- sented to a military officer guided by military rules as they were to civil heads of departments, and that doubts might exist as to the legal right thus to control the bureaus. Sherman reminded him that all those things had been considered and dis- posed of long ago — as early, indeed, as January, 1866, when Grant had written a clear and strong communication to Mr. Stanton on the subject. The points had been talked over many times since then, and always with the strong reiteration of Grant's conviction that what he had now done on the 5th of March ought to be done. This was in- disputable, and brought out other reasons. " Raw- lins," said Grant, " feels badly about it ; it worries him, and he is not well." " But, Grant," replied Sherman, " ought a public measure that you have advocated for years, and which he has known you were determined upon, to be set aside for such a reason? Ought he not to acquiesce in what he knew was your fixed purpose, and what was done before he entered the War Department?" " Yes," said Grant, " it would ordinarily be so, but I don't like to give him pain now ; so, Sherman, you'll have to publish the rescinding order." " But, Grant, it's your own order that you revoke, not mine, and 326 GENERAL SHERMAN, think how it will look to the whole world ! " In the dire strait between judgment and feeling, Grant became a little testy, and replied, " Well, if it's my own order, I can rescind it, can't I ? " Sadly, Sher- man dropped the familiarity of comradeship, and, rising, bowed formally, saying: "Yes, Mr. Presi- dent, you have the power to revoke your own order ; you shall be obeyed. Good morning, sir." Such was the interview as Sherman told it to a friend within a few hours, while he was still deeply agi- tated by it. During the few weeks that Rawlins was able to attend to business, he strove to make Sherman's position more tolerable by voluntarily sending through army headquarters the orders and com- munications which affected discipline and organiza- tion, and, no doubt. Grant urged this mode of soft- ening the effect of what had been done ; but Raw- lins died early in September. General Belknap, his successor, had commanded a brigade in the Army of the Tennessee, and had been distinguished for bravery in the field, but it must be said that he was spoiled by his elevation to the War Department. The old method of ignoring the general in chief and consulting only with bureau subordinates was soon in vogue again, and Sherman found himself in the humiliating position of learning from the news- papers of orders and decisions relating to the dis- cipline of the army issued without his knowledge, though sometimes in his name. After less formal protests had failed, Sherman put the whole subject before the Secretary of War in a formal communication on the 7th of August, 1870, and transmitted a copy to the President. The latter replied, promising to bring the Secretary and general together, and at least to define clearly the duties of each. Admitting that his views as gen- eral had been essentially the same as Sherman's, he still urged that it was supposed that some recent POST BELLUM, 327 acts of Congress were partially inconsistent with these, and must control, even if they were wrong.* But such recent acts had been made at the instance of the Secretary, and with the presumed assent of the President. Nothing was, in fact, done to meet the general's views, and matters went from bad to worse, till near the close of Grant's second term, in 1876, when the country was shocked by Gen- eral Belknap's downfall and his confession of mal- versation in office. In July, 1871, Sherman wrote to his brother: " My office has been by law stripped of all the in- fluence and prestige it possessed under Grant, and even in matters of discipline and army control I am neglected, overlooked, or snubbed." f Later, he wrote to another friend : " There is, in fact, no use for a general now, provided the law and cus- tom sanction the issuance of orders direct by the adjutant general in the name of the Secretary of War, and, should a fair opportunity offer, I would save Congress the trouble of abolishing my office." Vexatious as all this was personally, the real grief to him, as his whole correspondence shows, was that all his hopes of improving the army itself in the ways Grant and he had so often discussed and so thoroughly agreed upon, were dashed to the ground. He resolved that he would ask leave to remove his personal headquarters again to St. Louis, unless the coming year should show a marked change for the better. An opportunity to visit Europe under attract- ive circumstances offered in the fall of 1871, and he took a leave of absence for a year, making the tour of the Continent. His reception was so cor- dial and appreciative that the journey was every way most enjoyable. He returned in September, * Sherman's Memoirs, ii, 446, 450. f Sherman Letters, p. 331. 22 328 GENERAL SHERMAN. 1872, refreshed and invigorated, and hopeful that in the second term of his administration President Grant would revert to the good principles of army organization which he really believed in. When he had heard abroad of the curious turn of events in the candidacy of Greeley, he had, in a letter to Senator Sherman, hit ofif the situation with char- acteristic wit and penetration. " Grant, who never was a Republican," he said, " is your candidate, and Greeley, who never was a Democrat, but quite the reverse, is the Democratic candidate." * Finding even less prospect of satisfactory defi- nition of his duties than when he went away, his purpose took shape to cut loose, as far as possible, from apparent responsibility for what he condemned and could not control. He arranged to dispose of his Washington house, and in the summer of 1874 applied for leave to remove his headquarters to St. Louis, which was granted. The first months of Sherman's return to the quiet life of his St. Louis home gave him the op-, portunity for a final revision of his Memoirs, and at the beginning of 1875 he yielded to a very gen- eral wish that its publication might not be delayed. He wrote to his brother on the 23d of January, " You will be surprised, and maybe alarmed, that I have at last agreed to publish in book form my Memoirs." His career had given rise to so much discussion, and his breach with the Secretary of War and a knot of ofBcers who affected to repre- sent the President was so pronounced, that it would not have been strange if the Senator had been alarmed at the inevitable storm of criticism and controversy which would follow the printing. In the same letter the general said that he had " care- fully eliminated everything calculated to raise con- troversy, except where sustained by documents em- * Sherman Letters, p. 337. POST BELLUM. 329 braced in the work itself, and then only with minor parties." * Reading this in the light of the fuller knowledge we now have, we can see that it showed the rule which he had sincerely followed. He meant to be frank in his judgments and honest in his revelations of his own heart and intellect in his great career, but he aimed at waiving discus- sion over all matters in which he could not pro- duce written evidence for his conclusions. The book was originally written for posthumous publication, and was designed, as it should be, to give that intimate view of his career and of the events in which he had an important part, which he wished to leave behind him as the authoritative exposition of his own actions, purposes, and mo- tives. Had it been written with a view to present publication, it would naturally have been more guarded in its trenchant passages, and therefore less valuable as a revelation of his own opinions, though it would have avoided much controversy. Speak- ing of this in a letter to a friend, written in the height of the din of criticism, he adhered to his judgment that a true history of the war must needs cause some chafing. He illustrated it by a refer- ence to Van Home's History of the Army of the Cumberland, then just published, saying : " Van Home has done well, but his universal praise and evident partiality for the Army of the Cumberland makes too smooth a tale for one of war and con- flict ; still, for his comfort it was the best course." The class of criticisms which stung him most were those which seemed ingeniously contrived to put him in antagonism to Grant and Thomas, and he was fully convinced that there was something very like a conspiracy in the circle already men- tioned to estrange the President from him by in- sinuations that he had arrogated to himself credit * Sherman Letters, p. 343. 330 GENERAL SHERMAN. which had belonged to the general in chief. Such efforts, however, failed, and General Grant was frankly explicit in praise of the candor and ac- curacy of the Memoirs. Sherman did not allow himself to be seriously disturbed by criticism which he knew to be unfair, saying that the common sense of the people would dispose of that. He brushed it aside with a humorous contempt, as when he said of one of the most persistent assailants, " is a most pestiferous newspaper bee, and has the perseverance of the ant." Candid efforts to cor- rect him he took with perfect kindness, and soon announced that he should revise the work in a sec- ond edition and add an appendix, in which he would give opportunity for explanation to some whom he had been obliged to blame, and supply some omissions which had been inadvertently left in the first writing. " In the text," he said, " I would omit some personal expressions which I ought not to have used, but would leave the narra- tive substantially unchanged, save where manifest errors have been proved." In the unpublished let- ter from which this is quoted, he explained the general purpose of his appendix by a reference to the 1823 edition of Napoleon's Memoirs, of which " several volumes contain letters of parties who took issue with him on certain points, written subse- quent to the publication, and simply embodied for what they are worth. It occurred to me," he added, " that forty to sixty pages of fine print might be added which would satisfy parties." It will give unity to the effort to understand his character to pass on to some of his latest expres- sions of his judgment in regard to men and events which had been brought into controversy after the publication of the Memoirs, and his frankness in discussing his own qualities. In 1882 the volume Atlanta, in the Scribners' series of Campaign His- tories, appeared, and led to renewed correspondence POST BELLUM. 331 between him and its author. " As to your per- sonal description of myself," * he said, " it is suf- ficiently flattering to gratify a reasonable pride, but I would prefer to go down in history not as irritable, but impatient of restraint or contradiction. After I have laid awake all night thinking of some- thing to be done, and have resolved on the steps, I admit that it ruffles me to have suggestions some- times from parties not in possession of all the facts." In the description referred to he had not been called irritable, but a nervous temperament, with a tendency to irritability, had been ascribed to him, and used to heighten the efifcct of his calm and equable self-control in the crisis of really great events.f Few, if any, great soldiers could be named whose bearing toward subordinates was more truly considerate and personally kind. In the same volume the statement of his action in supplying the vacancy made by McPherson's death, J had suggested to those who could read between the lines that the whole story of that change had not been told, and this drew out from Sherman an explanation more full than he has else- where given : " I don't know that I ever revealed to you what transpired at the time I recommended that Howard should succeed McPherson. When I suc- ceeded Grant at Nashville, I found that consider- able feeling existed between the Armies of the Ten- nessee and Cumberland — an old feud, probably be- ginning at Shiloh, when the Cumberland claimed to have saved us from destruction, and did not give us credit for the hard fighting of that first day. * Atlanta, p. 21. •f The suggestion quoted from his letter was simply a bit of candid introspection on his part, and not a complaint at impartial judgment by another. In the same letter he said : "Asa matter of course I had to be a central figure, and you have drawn a por- trait more to my liking than others I have seen." X Id., p. 178. 332 GENERAL SHERMAN. While I was down the Mississippi (Meridian ex- pedition), and before McPherson had joined at Huntsville, Logan was in command of that part of the Army of the Tennessee which was posted along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, about Pulas- ki, Huntsville, etc., and claimed with a show of jus- tice that in the matter of supplies and railroad facili- ties his men and officers were discriminated against in favor of the Cumberland, who claimed to own the Nashville road. That was the reason of my order assuming to myself absolute control of railroads, and putting all army and corps commanders on a perfect equality in the matter of passes or orders for supplies. Thomas was very angry with Logan, accused him of meddling and of bitter jealousy. When McPherson was dead, and another com- mander was indispensable, I was disposed to leave Logan in command of the Army of the Tennessee, and called Thomas and Schofield for consultation to Thomas J. Wood's camp, near the left of Thom- as's army. When I told Thomas, he was unusually emphatic that he never could or would act in unison with Logan ; indeed, that he would not stay if he was to be brought in contact with him as an equal. Thomas, instead of being so equable as his reputa- tion makes him, had a good many crotchets, and his army was so large, so compact, and had in him justly such faith that I could not risk his displeas- ure. The result was as you know, and I had to stand the brunt of Logan's anger and hatred, which has been constant, and may be eternal. I first thought of calling on the President for a successor, leaving him to act ; but there was no time for delay, and, as Howard fell under my personal observation on the Knoxville march and afterward, I knew that he was skillful, and would obey orders as to the nice marches which I knew lay before us, so I recommended him. On this point, however, I am well satisfied with your text." POST BELLUM. 333 The bill for retiring army officers was then be- fore Congress, and so evident was the advantage to the country to be found in the tested abilities of the general, his great prestige with the whole civi- lized world, and his hold upon the nation's confi- dence, that there was a widespread feeling that an ordinary rule for retiring officers should not apply to him. It was for the public advantage that his genius should continue to direct the army if we should be again involved in war. Especially did this seem true in view of the recent example of Moltke, past seventy, conducting the great h'ranco- German campaign. Physical strength and activity were doubtless needed in subordinate places, but wisdom and experience combined with such force of will as Sherman's was of inestimable value at the head of the army. In these circumstances he was urged to allow the truth to be made known to Logan, whose influence in the Senate on military matters was properly large, so that he might not be affected by old irritations. In his very prompt reply he said : " I have never told Logan about Thomas, for when an order is made I assume all the responsibility, and have too much pride to explain the reasons to one who feels aggrieved. The order was made by President Lin- coln as the consequence of a telegraphic dispatch from me, simply advising that Howard should succeed McPherson ; and I hold, as Howard ful- filled well my purpose, and my purpose worked great good, that I am bound to apologize to no man on earth. ... I have not asked a favor of a man in Congress, and scorn to do it, for I believe they should make just and fair laws for all alike." The final form of the law was one in which Sherman acquiesced, and it should also be said that when the collisions and cross-purposes of active public life were over, his genial and placable 334 GENERAL SHERMAN. spirit found satisfaction in burying differences, and his last years witnessed a cordial understand- ing with General Logan and a renewal of their early friendship. The correspondence of the same season drew from him some emphatic statements of his object and aim in his march to the sea, which ought to be preserved in his own words, though they are in accord with the account given in an earlier chap- ter. " Howard can tell you," he wrote, " that I informed him long before we left Atlanta that if I could place our army at Columbia, S. C, the war would be substantially concluded, because Lee could not remain longer in Richmond, and preced- ing events had demonstrated that the Southern Army of Virginia had lost confidence in its ability to fight the Army of the Potomac outside of in- trenchments, in the same ratio that the latter had gained confidence. Therefore I believe that moral- ly the war zuas over when I reached Columbia free to follow up to Virginia Lee's only line of supply. This was my firm belief from the day Hood began his desperate attempt to force me to retreat from Atlanta by getting on our railroad. Having this grand purpose in mind, the details are as you know them. I did not and could not foresee the thou- sand things that might happen, but I did tenacious- ly hold fast to the purpose to reach Lee's line of supply and follow it up to a conclusion. Halleck may, in his mind, have contemplated such a possi- bility, so may Buell, so may Rosecrans, so may Grant, but I did it, and chose the time, place, and manner. This is all I claim as to the origin of the march to the sea. . . . The process of condensing history has begun, and will proceed even further, till chapters become paragraphs, and paragraphs mere sentences. The results clearly stated, with the causes which produced those results, will be all the next generation will ask. The fame or gen- POST BELLUM. 335 eral reputation of the leaders will not be much changed." The same season witnessed the publication of the second volume of Badeau's Military History of Gfant and Van Home's Life of Thomas, and, as these were nearly coincident with the appearance of another volume in the Scribners' series of cam- paigns narrating his March to the Sea, it very natu- rally drew from Sherman a letter commenting on the claims made by the several writers for the sub- jects of their memoirs. He had expressed his grati- fication that his actions, fully explained as to mo- tives, had been allowed to speak for themselves, without adulation, and the letter is so sincere a bit of autobiography that its value will warrant its quotation at length : " In Washington the wise men say, ' Don't hurry, let your letters remain a week, and they an- swer themselves.' But for better or worse, my hab- its are fixed, and I find that when I enact my own part it harmonizes with the past and connects the fu- ture. . . . With emphasis and without qualification I re-echo your sentiment that both Grant and Thomas will be damaged by the fulsome flattery of their eulogists and historians Badeau and Van Home. Man is mortal and full of infirmity. To paint him as unerring, as perfect in judgment, tem- per, and action, at all times and under all circum- stances, must with the wise raise doubts. Such a man is too good for this world, and the reader gets palled with adulation and flattery. Many a good man felt a sense of relief when he learned that Wash- ington swore at Lee at Monmouth, and I have been more moved to attempt great things by drop ex- pressions of a common soldier. ' I'll be glad to live on rice chafif if LTncle Billy can only take Savannah,' than by the declaration of the London Times, ' The act, if a failure, will be adjudged the act of a mad- man ; if successful, it will take rank with the deeds of 336 GENERAL SHERMAN. great men ' — this before the event of my coming out of the wilderness at Savannah.* I know how I felt in October, 1864, when I pleaded for the privilege * The editorial of the Times wliich Sherman briefly p»ra- phrases was in the issue of December 3, 1864, upon the report of his cutting loose from Atlanta. It has been already referred to {vide p. 242), and began with a statement of the fact. " It is commonly believed that Sherman has plunged either into Alabama or Georgia, and that he will appear on the coast of one of those States in due time. In this case, however, how will it fare with him ? ... lie would be throwing himself headlong into a hostile country of immense extent without any line of communications. He has cut himself off from his base so completely and deliber- ately that he can not even send intelligence of his movements. He has converted his entire army into a flying column for an ex- pedition involving most formidable distances. . . . The roads may be broken up, bridges destroyed, and provisions carried away, while it is certain that even if the Federal commander should ul- timately appear before Charleston, a hard siege would still await him at the end of his unparalleled march. Nevertheless, he is beyond doubt both an able and a resolute soldier, and he may know better than any of his countrymen what are the real chances of his enterprise. That it is a most momentous enterprise can not be denied ; but it is exactly one of those enterprises which are judged by the event. It may either make Sherman the most famous general of the North or it may prove the ruin of his repu- tation, his aiTny, and even his cause together." When the news came that he had reached the sea, the Times of January 5, 1865, said : " General Sherman's campaign in Geor- gia will undoubtedly rank hereafter with the most memorable operations of modern war. ... It speaks well for Sherman's dis- cernment and resolution that he could plunge into such a region with unwavering confidence. . . . Still, the great fact that after marching nearly a hundred miles — from Chattanooga to Atlanta — he should then have marched two hundred and fifty more, and brought his army, after all, in good condition and efficiency to the seacoast, is a testimonial to professional qualities of no com- mon order." Returning to the subject on January 9th, the Times said: " The capture of Savannah completes the history of Sherman's march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of the most singular, militai-y achievements of the war. . . . The march through the whole of Georgia, ending in the capture of the chief city of the State, is an exception to nearly all the events of the previous campaigns that keep any place in the memory. . . . The most remarkable exploit during four years of conflict has been achieved by a comparatively small army with a loss of only a fiftieth part of its numbers." POST BELLUM. 337 of marching a thousand miles through an enemy's country to help the Army of the Potomac, then checkmated at Petersburg, and I know how I felt when Badeau demonstrated long afterward that I was only doing what I was bid to do at the divine inspiration of a superior. Grant says nothing; there is wisdom in this. I spoke out and recorded my thoughts over my own signature. This may have been impolitic, but a hundred years hence it will seem very different. The truth is mighty and will prevail. Your two books are links in the chain which will be strengthened by every line and para- graph written at that day. I thank you for not in- dulging in flattery, for that is not only obnoxious to me, but must be to all thoughtful men. " Grant had his qualities ; Thomas had his. Each is entitled to high honor for their deeds in aiding to put down a rebellion which, if successful, would have been horrible in its after results. But when the historian comes to paint the portraits of the general actors, he errs quite as much in overcolor- ing as in neglecting important incidents. " I knew Thomas as a boy at West Point. We recited together four years in the same section, served as lieutenants in the same regiment ten years, and for Van Home to paint him for vie seems an arrant piece of presumption. I am glad of the fame and hold his memory has on the public, for this is a bond of union, a piece of valuable property to every American ; but when Van H. intimates that Grant and I did not do him full justice, he simply is ridiculous. Thomas leaned on me, and never to the hour of his death did he have reason to believe that his memory was less precious to me than my own. Never since the world began did such absolute confidence exist between commander and commanded, and among the many mistakes I made I trace some to his earnest, vehement advice. . . . Those who attributed to Thomas that calm. 338 GENERAL SHERMAN. gentle, yet forcible character, entirely miscon- ceived the man. No man in my army had more little causes of grievance ; none chafed more over little things. When Sheridan was made lieutenant general, I was the peacemaker between him and Grant. Thomas was vehement, abusive, and vio- lent. Grant was kind, firm, and conciliatory. But I am sure in your studies you have hit on episodes which prove what I write. Thomas was too slow in his combinations at Nashville, and the impatience of Grant, Lincoln, and all in the East was natural. The glorious result at Nashville was partly the re- sult of accident and partly of design — a truth that may be said of ah collisions. But Nashville was not as conclusive as Van Home thinks he has proved. The final result was Richmond, and there I think Grant is entitled to all honor. Whether Appomattox would have been had I stayed at At- lanta or followed Hood westward, I do not believe ; but I leave that to those who study cause and effect. I think you have given a clear, impartial narrative of events, and those who come after us and reap the fruits of our labors must in time settle the rela- tive merits of each. I know that Thomas had he been in my place would never have gone beyond Atlanta, had he gone that far. I know that Grant had no faith that I could reach Goldsboro in time to co-operate with his spring campaign. What in- fluence my personal action had on the grand final result I have my own thoughts and convictions, but I do not ask anybody to adopt them. The deeds are in the past, the record is sufficiently clear, and I am willing to abide the final judgment of man- kind." General Sherman's quiet life in St. Louis was rudely interrupted by the impeachment and resig- nation of the Secretary of War in March, 1876, as Grant's administration was entering upon the last year of his second term. As a matter of politics, POST BELLUM. 339 the embarrassment of the situation was compHcated with the approach of the presidential election, pre- ceeded by nominating conventions. It was not only known that a tliird term was desired by the Presi- dent, but it was matter of common fame that mem- bers of the " whisky ring " excused their frauds on the plea that they were expending much money to organize the movement for a renomination. The embezzlements involved the reputation of more than one in close relations to the President besides Secre- tary Belknap. So far as the War Office was con- cerned, the opportunity for wrongdoing had grown directly out of legislation obtained by administra- tive influence, which had taken from the general of the army the right to be the medium of the trans- mission of orders to the army, and the appointment of post traders. The sale of these traderships had been the particular crime which ruined the Secre- tary of War. The air was full of rumors that Congress would pass some act or resolution compelling Sherman's return to Washington. Had this been done as part of a policy of correcting the blunder that had been committed, and of returning to the general by law the rights and responsibilities that had been taken from him. it would have been right. He, however, very naturally demurred to being called to a posi- tion where the public would assume that he was a check upon actions over which he had no control and of which he was not even informed. He wrote to his brother : " I will not go to Washington unless ordered, and it would be an outrage if Congress, under a temporary excitement, should compel my removal back. I came out at my own expense, and never charged a cent for transportation, which I could have done. I can better command the army from here than from there. The causes that made a Belknap remain and will remain." * * Sherman Letters, p. 349. 340 GENERAL SHERMAN. The appointment of Judge Taft, of Ohio, to fill the vacancy in the War Department, however, did everything which personal selection could do to smooth the relations between the Secretary and the general. Mr. Taft was a gentleman of large mind and scholarly training, an able jurist, and a broad, judicial character, with the highest standards of public integrity and disinterestedness. He was, be- sides, fully appreciative of the great qualities of General Sherman, and sincerely desirous of having the benefit of his advice in performing the duties of his office. When such a man, With characteristic suavity and sincerity, asked Sherman to come back and try what mutual efforts to promote the public interests could do to remove the reproach from army administration, the general yielded at once to the appeal. A conference secured a cordial good understanding, and on the 6th of April Secretary Taft published a presidential order re-establish- ing the headquarters of tlie army at Washing- ton, and directing that all orders and instruc- tions relative to military operations or afifecting the military control and discipline of the army should be promulgated through the general, while the departments of the adjutant general and the inspector general should also report to him and be under his control in all matters re- lating thereto. This order included all that General Sherman desired, and put his personal and official relations to the War Department on a footing of unbroken cordiality during the whole of his service on the active list. But it must not be forgotten that, as the order was a voluntary concession of the Presi- dent and Secretary, it could be modified or revoked, openly or tacitly. Sherman's successors found that the tendency to ignore it and to return under one pretext or another to the former methods was too strong for them, so that the old troubles became POST BELLUM. 341 perennial for lack of legislative definition of au- thority.* In the unpublished private correspondence be- fore quoted Sherman spoke out his heartfelt satis- faction at the prospect of reform. Writing on April 15th, he said: "I hope in recent events you will derive consolation and assurance that a better era is dawning on the country. If I can, you may be assured that everything like rorr^-'ption and the false glitter given by wealth basely acquired shall be punished in the army. Now the tongue of scan- dal is so loose that there is danger of even the best reputations suffering. Babcock is still so far de- tached from the army, being on civil duty, responsi- ble only to the President and Congress, that I could not if I would cause his arraignment and trial by a court-martial. A court of inquiry can only be or- dered by the President, or by a department or army commander on the demand of the accused. . . . We are all pleased with Judge Taft, who is a man of probity and learning. It is a pleasure to confer with such a man, who does not fear to seek advice of others in a sphere where he has had no experi- ence. Schofield's going to West Point will elevate the academy, and silence the little jealousies that have endangered its safety." The last sentence refers to the general's almost parental interest in the young men entering the army. His sympathy also with the junior grades of officers was of the same spirit, and his pride in them and faith in their patriotism and high ideal was very great. Returning to the subject on Octo- ber 24th, he wrote : " Our friend General Schofield has laid hold of his new charge, the Militarv Acad- emy, with his usual force, and I doubt not that in- stitution will receive a new impulse from his prac- tical sense and knowledge of the wants of our pro- • See Schofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, chapter xxii. 342 GENERAL SHERMAN. fession. I also believe the army, especially in the junior branches, is as pure and honorable, as zeal- ous to do right, as in the brightest days of the republic. Surely it can not be, it must not be, that our young republic is declining in morals. Still, we are incident to human infirmities, and it may be that since the war our public men have not risen to the occasion or been equal to the emergency." It was, of course, inevitable that General Sher- man should be often approached with the sugges- tion that he should consent to be a candidate for the presidency. His real unwillingness to accept any political office was known to his close friends, but most people were disposed to think it might be overcome, or that, like the proverbial nolo cpiscopari, it might even cover a disposition to coquet with the idea. The better acquainted one becomes with his character, the more certain it is that his strong ex- pressions on this subject were, without exaggera- tion, the index of his inmost feelings and most fixed rule of life. As early as January, 1865, when his march to the sea was just completed, the quidnuncs began to talk of a political career for him when the war should be ended. " If you ever hear anybody use my name in connection with a political ofifice," he wrote to John Sherman, " tell them you know me well enough to assure them that I would be offended by any such association." * Again, in November, 1866, he said, " I am determined to keep out of political or even quasi-political office." f When the end of Grant's first term approached, the question of his renomination was warmly discussed, and General Sherman, far out on the frontier of Texas, got copies of the New York Herald strongly advo- cating his own nomination. Once more he wrote to his brother (May 18, 1871), " You may say for * Sherman Letters, p. 245, f Id,, p. 28 2. POST BELLUM. 343 me, and publish it too, that in no event and under no circumstances will I ever be a candidate for President or any other political ofifice, and I mean every word of it." * Similar stptements which were published were interpreted by many to mean only that he would not allow himself to be used in rivalry to Grant, and the persistent recurrence of the elTort to bring him forward as a candidate drew from him, in 1874, the emphatic repetition of his decision that " no matter what the temptation, I will never allow my name to be used by any party." f He coupled this with the opinion that the obligation of the coun- try- to the army had been sufficiently recognized, " and the time has come to return to the civil list." X The topic came up with a sort of periodicity, drawing out from him always the same blunt, de- cisive negative, but in 1884 circumstances combined to make the effort to change his resolution a strong- er and much more determined one than ever be- fore. Though he had always refused to be regarded as a party man, his strong sympathy with all who had been most active in carrying the country through the civil war made him feel drawn toward the public men of the Republican party. The great prominence of his brother the Senator naturally counted for much in such circumstances. Without departing from the habitual rule of refusing to med- dle in politics, he would have been glad, no doubt, to see the highest civil honors fall to his brother, as he himself had reaped the military ones. But though this impulse would strengthen his fixed de- cision to refuse political ofifice, that decision was based on other reasons, and the event showed that it was set beyond reconsideration. As the time approached when nominations must be made, the fact that the general was now on the retired list of the army, while his mental and phys- * Sherman LeUers, p. 330. f Id., p. 340. :}: Id., p. 341. 23 344 GENERAL SHERMAN. ical vigor was unimpaired, led to a widespread dis- position to call upon him to complete the series of public stations in which he had, one by one, suc- ceeded to Grant. Mr. Blaine had the largest fol- lowing, but he was not certain of nomination, and frankly preferred General Sherman if he were him- self to be disappointed in the nomination. By the beginning of May matters had so far taken shape that Senator Sherman wrote to his brother: " It is certain that if Blaine is not nominated in the early ballots a movement will be made for your nomina- tion, and if entered upon will go like wild fire. . . . My own opinion is still that, while you ought not to seek, or even beforehand consent to accept a nomination, yet if it comes unsought and with cor- dial unanimity you ought to acquiesce. ... I see no prospect or possibility of my nomination, and not much of my election if nominated, but yours is easy. Blaine could readily turn his strength to you if he can not get a majority, and I think means to do so." The general replied : " The more I reflect, the more convinced I am that I was wise and pru- dent in taking the exact course I have, and that it would be the height of folly to yield to any false ambition to allow the use of my name for any politi- cal office. ... If you count yourself out, I will be absolutely neutral, and honestly believe we are ap- proaching that epoch in our history when King Log is about as good as King Stork." * The general was at this time in possession of a confidential letter from Mr. Blaine (afterward pub- lished by the consent of the latter) saying that, in the event of a break in the nominating convention, it was inevitable that his name would be used, and that he ought to regard a nomination in such a case as he would a soldier's detail to duty, which he must not decline. But General Sherman had taken ■* Sherman Letters, pp. 359, 360. POST BELLUM. 345 the most effective mode to prevent the offer, in de- claring that he would respectfully refuse it if made. As soon as the nomination of Blaine and Logan was announced, he wrote, " I feel such a sense of relief that I would approve of anything." Telling his brother the steps he had taken, and his forecast of what might happen, he added with unmistakable emphasis, " Anyhow, I escaped, and that to me was salvation." * He recognized the distinction be- tween his own position and that of Mr. Blaine and his brother, who had been long trained in political life, and said that their ambition to reach the high- est round of the ladder in their chosen career was legitimate and right. His decision of character was never better shown than in the unwavering confi- dence with which he adhered to a line of action he had resolved upon long years before. His bearing and action in the final decisive moment were ec|ually characteristic. The convention was in session, and he was in his study at St. Louis, smoking and chat- ting with his son Thomas. A telegraph messenger came in with a dispatch from the friend (Senator Henderson) who was his authorized representative in the convention. It was the announcement that the critical moment had come when his nomination would be carried by storm unless he peremptorily forbade. Without a change of coimtenance, he dashed off the prompt reply that if in spite of his declination he should be nominated, he would de- cline with an emphasis which might be construed as disrespectful. He passed the dispatch and his answer to his son to read, and without a comment resumed his cigar and the conversation, as if it were a matter of no consequence. Such was his final leave-taking of the fretting cares of public life. Some six years of retirement followed, in which he found enjoyment in the re- * Sherman Letters, p. 361. 346 GENERAL SHERMAN. unions of his old comrades and in the public anni- versaries and functions for which he was always in great demand. His racy and trenchant style of ex- temporaneous dis(^ussion of every subject suggested by the occasion, or which was of current popular interest, offered a remarkable example of unreserved disclosure of a great man's heart and motives, and it became plainly apparent that the whole country felt honored at being thus taken into his confidence. In his most unguarded words his principles were always clear, noble, intensely patriotic, and his care- less colloquial expressions often covered a practi- cal wisdom and insight of a most striking kind. Every year added to the proof of his having chosen the better part in avoiding the conflicts of partisan politics, for he was right in his judgment that it mattered little whether King Log or King Stork were on the throne. The exuberant manifestations of popular good will were ahvays grateful to him, if sometimes a little fatiguing, and he could not be insensible to the proofs that his place was a warm and a safe one in the hearts of his countrymen. He had moved his home from St. Louis to New York in 1886, and gave a great deal of labor to the systematic filing and labeling of his voluminous papers and correspondence. He used to tell his friends that everything was there in order, every letter he had received and its answer, and every document that had any historical value. The same system and thrift marked all his private business. He enjoyed with his family and friends the full so- cial advantages that his means allowed, but he was one who had a horror of debt and of laxity in meet- ing business obligations, and was never tempted into pecuniary embarrassments or dangerous risks. Mrs. Sherman died in 1888, and though he had fully expected to precede her to the grave, and the loss of the good woman who had been the faithful companion of his whole career from the day when Tomb of Cieneral Sherman in St. Louis cemetery. POST BELLUM. 347 his father's death left him an orphaned child, whom she at first welcomed as a brother in the Ewing home, was a loss that sadly bereaved him, yet he received the blow with patience, finding content; as he said, in the knowledge that " no mortal was ever better prepared to put on immortality," and that in due time he would resume his place by her side. Through the closing years he kept up his philo- sophic cheerfulness, often at the dinner table of de- voted friends, and cordially welcoming all who knew him to his own home. Only a week before his last illness he wrote to John Zherman, " I am drifting along in the old rut, in good strength, at- tending about four dinners a week at public or pri- vate houses, and generally wind up for gossip at the Union League Club." * The members of the club still love to point out his favorite corner where he sat nearly every evening in witty chat or wise discussion of things past and present, surrounded by an eager group of younger men, learning devo- tion to country by the best of all instruction, in word and in illustrious example. Returning home in the evening of February 4, 1891, from a dramatic performance, he caught cold, and in a day or two erysipelas of the face and throat appeared, and he rapidly became very ill. his age, of course, telling against him. His seventieth birth- day came on the 8th, and, after several days of par- tial or complete unconsciousness, he died on the 14th, having fully and greatly rounded out the nor- mal allotment of the years of man's life. He was modestly laid in the grave beside his wife's resting place at St. Louis, according to the directions he had minutely given, and the mourning of the whole land was heartfelt and deep. ■■■■ Sherman Letters, p. 38 1. INDEX. Adams, John Quincy, 3. Adams, General Wirt, i84. AUatoona, battle of, 233. AUatoona Pass, 210. Allen, General Robert, 199. Anderson, Lars, 2g. Anderson, General Patton, 49, 53. 57- Anderson, General Robert, 27, 29. 31- Appomattox, surrender at, 296. Arkansas Post, 102. Armstrong, General, 150. Army of the Cumberland, 329, 331. 332. Army of the Potomac, 307. Army of the Tennessee, 105, 219, 2S5-287, 331, 332. Atlanta campaign, 204, 330. Atlanta captured, 224. Augusta captured, 269. Baird, General Absalom, 169. Banks, General N. P., 147, 157, 187, 188. Bate, General W. B., 169, 172. Baton Rouge arsenal, ig. Baxter, Captain A. S., 73. Beauregard, General, 20, 22, 24, 40, 51, 52, 59, 64, 66, 99, 232, 270. Belknap, General, 326, 327, 339. Benton, Thomas H., 3, 9. Bentonville, battle of, 283. Biddle, Commodore, 9, 10. Blaine, James G., 344, 345. Blair, General F. P., 100, 159, 195, 267. Bowen, General, 45. Bowling Green, Ky., 30, 36. Bragg, General Braxton, 14, 20, 40, 62, 64, 75, 153, 163, 175. Breckenridge, General, 44, 59, 60, 297. Buckland, General, 42, 43, 48, 49- 54, 65. Buckner, Simon B., 29, 30. Buell, General Don Carlos, 14, 18, 32, 37, 40, 65, 68, 80, 193- Bull Run, battle of, 24, 25. Burnside, General, 160, 166, 179, 180. Calhoun, John C, 3. Cameron, Simon, 31, 32. Camp Dick Robinson, 29. Chalmers, General, 43, 47, 58, 59- 64, 65. Champion's Hill, 125, 126. Charleston evacuated, 277. Chattanooga, victory of, 175. Cheatham, General, 41, 45, 59, 60, 176, 215, 216. Chickasaw Bayou, 99, 100. Churchill, General T. J., 102, 103. Clark, General, 45. Clay, Henry, 3, 13, 27. Cleburne, General, 41, 44, 49, 54, 163, 166, 178, 258. Columbia captured, 273. Corinth, capture of, 81. Corse, General, 158, 170, 233, 245- Corwin, Thomas, 13. 349 350 GENERAL SHERMAN. Cox, General J. D., 2S7, 289, 290-292, 305. Crittenden, General, 65, 67, 69. Crittenden, John J., 27. Crump's Landing, 37, 50, 73, Curtis, General, 36. ]^ahlgren, Admiral, 261. Dana, Charles A., 162. Davies, General Thomas A., 88. Davis, Jefferson, 30, 95, 164, 221, 223, 267, 295, 297. Dix, General John A., 301, 305. Dodge, General G. M., 181, 206. Edwards Station, 128, 129. Evarts, William M., i, 317. Ewing, General Hugh, 105, 159, 161. Ewing, Miss Ellen B., 6, 13. Ewing, Thomas, 2, 3, 13, 17. Ezra Church, battle of, 220. Farragut, Admiral, gS, 99. Fayetteville falls, 279. Floyd, John B., 18. Foote, Admiral, 36. Forrest, General, 95, 183. Fort Donelson, 36, 38. Fort Fisher, 28S. Fort Henry, 37, 38. Fort Hindman, 102. Fort McAllister, 262, Fort Moultrie, 6. Fort Pickering, 89. Fort Robinet, 88. Foster, General John G , igo, 261, 263, 280. Fremont, General John C, 8, 29, 30. Gardner, General Frank, 147. Geary, General, 157, 167, 264. Gettysburg, battle of, 147. Gibson, General R. L., 50, 62. Gladden, General, 64. Grand Gulf, 120. Granger, General Gordon, 163, 195. Grant, General U. S., 30, 36-39, 41-44, 60-62, 72, 73, 76, 77, 94, 96-9S, 104, 105, 115, 143, 156, 160, 162, 171-173, 181, 188, 189, 195, ig6, 231, 240, 261, 2S0, 293, 294, 299, 300, 312, 313, 315, 316, 320, 322, 324-326, 328, 335, 337. Grierson, General, 119. Guthrie, James, 30, 32, 200. Haines's Bluff, loi, 129. Halleck, General Henry W,, 32- 37, 39-41, 43, 79, 179. 232, 2S0, 303, 322. Hamilton, General C. S., 94. Hampton, General Wade, 275, 279, 283. Hancock, General Winfield S., 14. Hankinson's Ferry, 121. Hardee, General, 45, 57, 63, 166, 176, 218, 223, 263, 270, 277, 282. Harper's Ferry seized, 22. Harrison, General William H., 2, 5- Harvard graduates, 12. Havre de Grace, 4. Hazen, General W. B., 156,260, 261. Henderson, Senator, 345. Herron, General, 142, 146. Hickenlooper, Capt. A., 61, 130. Hildebrand, 42, 53, 54, 65. Hill, General D. IL, 270, 291, Hilton Head, 262. Hindman, General, 44, 62. Hoke, General, 2gO, 292. Holly Springs, 87, 8g, g6. Hood, General, 2og, 211, 215, 216, 2ig, 221, 223, 224, 232. Hooker, General Joseph, 11, 156, 167, 195. 207. Howard, General O. O., 155, 170, 195, 206, 268, 269. Hunter, Hocking, 3. Hurlbut, General S., 38, 50, 59- 61, 183, 1S5. INDEX. 351 Jackson captured, 125. Jackson, General Andrew, 3, 59. Johnson, Andrew, 194, 197, 300, 308, 312, 313, 315, 31b. Johnson, General Bushrod, 50, 52, 59, 163, Johnston, General Albert Sid- ney, 5, 36, 40, 44, 46, 48, 60. Johnston, General Joseph E., 24. 94, Q5- 118, 140, 143, 201, 211, 212, 281, 297. Kearny, General, 8, 9. Kilpatrick, General, 269, 270, 279, 296. King, James, 15. Knox, Thomas W., 113. Lancaster, Ohio, 2, 6. Lauman, General, 50, 77. Lee, General Robert E., 147, 242, 292, 296, 297. Lee, General Stephen D., 159, 160, 184, 211, 220. Leggett, General, 263. Lightburn, General, 165. Lincoln, Abraham, 22, 28, 114, 179, 192, 294, 295, 299, 303. Little Ogeechee, 259. Logan, General, S3, 181, 195, 218, 266, 332, 345. Long, General, 180. Longstreet, General, 157, 166. Lookout Mountain taken, 168. Lovejoy's station, 224. Mangum, Willie P., 3. March to the sea, 334. Mason, Colonel R. B., g, 10, II. McArthur, General, 50, 60, 182. McClellan, General George B., 29, 32. McClemand, General John A., 38, 49-52, 55, 67, 102-104. McCook, General Alexander McD., 31, 67-69. McDowell, General Irwin, 24, 25, 55- McGofiin, Beriah, 27, 2S. McLaws, General, 25S. McPherson, General James B., 35, 41, 83, iSi, 191, 205, 212, 218, 331. Meade, General, 303, 322. Medill, Governor, 3. Meigs, General M., 14, 15, 162, 201. Mexican War, 26. Mdliken's Bend, 98. Missionary Ridge, 168. Mitchell, General, 83. Monterey, Gal., 8. Morgan, General C. W., 98, 154- Morton, Oliver P., 29. Mower, General, 187, 26S. Napoleon, Louis, 313. Nelson, General William, 29, 31, 56, 65, 66, 69. New Hope Church, 209. Ord, General, 8g. Osterhaus, General, 167. 157, 159, Palmer, General John M., 205, 221, 2go, 291. Parke, General J. G., 142, igo, 191. Patterson, General Robert, 24. Pemberton, General, Sg, 118, 125, 140, 143. Pillow, General Gideon J., 30. Pittsburg Landing, 39, 76. Polk, General L., 40, 48, 60, 63, 185, 211. Pope, General John, 33, 34, 36, 79, 199- Port Gibson, 120. Port Hudson, 147. Porter, Admiral, 103, 108, log, no, 118, 187, 288, 294, 2g5. Prentiss, General B. M., 3g, 41, 50, 58-60. Price, General, 86, 87. Queen of the West, 117. Quimby, General, 105, io3. 352 GENERAL SHERMAN. Rawlins, General, 324, 326. Roddy, General, 153. Rosecrans, General, 83, 86, 151, igo-192. Rousseau, General Lovell A., 29. Ruger, General, 290, 291. Ruggles, General, 45, 62. Savannah captured, 263. Schofield, General, 190, 191, 195, 206, 265, 280, 2S1, 292, 317, 341. Scott, General Winfield, 8, 12, 23, 24, 313. Seminole Indians, 5. Seward, William H., 300. Sheridan, General, 172, 173, 303, 304, 322 Sherman, Charles R., 1,3. Sherman, Edmund, i. Sherman, John, 22, 24, 318, 327, 328, 342, 343, 347. Sherman, Mrs. W. T., 33, 308, 34O. Sherman, Roger, i. Sherman, Taylor, i. Sherman, William Tecumseh, ancestors, i ; birth, 2 ; ap- pointed a cadet, 3 ; appears at West Point, 4 ; graduates, 5 ; appointed lieutenant, 5 ; engaged, 6 ; at Fort Moultrie, 6 ; at Marietta, Ga., 7 ; sails for California, 8 ; adjutant general, 9 ; arrests Nash, 10 ; sails for New York, 12 ; mar- riage, 13 ; appointed captain, 14 ; sails for California, 14 ; returns to the East, 17; super- intendent of military school, iS ; resignation, 19; appointed colonel, 23 ; Bull Run, 24 ; brigadier general, 27 ; in Kentucky, 30 ; takes com- mand, 31 ; relieved, 32 ; in Missouri, 32 ; at Paducah, 35; at Pittsburg Landing, 39 ; at Shiloh, 41 ; his position. 42 ; engaged, 51 ; falls back, 55 ; meets Grant, 62 ; new posi- tion, 65 ; moves forward, 68 ; new command, 79 ; advises Grant, S3 ; at Memphis, 85 ; letter to mayor, 90 ; to Sec- retary Chase, 92; to the Yazoo 98 ; defeated, loi ; falls back, 102 ; commands Fifteenth Corps, 105 ; aids Porter, 110 ; writes to Rawlins, 112 ; in trouble with Knox, 113; writes to Grant, 115 ; moves on Jackson, 123 ; destroys public property, 125 ; moves against Vicksburg, 131 ; moves on Jackson, 147 ; pro- moted, 149 ; ordered to Chat- tanooga, 158 ; sent to relieve Burnside, 180 ; at home, 182 ; nearly captured, 184 ; in Vicksburg, 187 ; goes to Nev/ Orleans, 187 ; promotion, 188; at Nashville, 195 ; writes to Grant, 196 ; his character, I9S ; prepares for spring campaign, 200 ; Atlanta cam- paign, 204; Kennesaw, 213 ; Peach Tree Creek, 216 ; de- feats Hood, 217 ; Atlanta captured, 224 ; congratula- tions, 224 ; march to the sea, 231 ; his order, 245 ; letter to mayor, 249 ; letter to Mrs. Bower, 251 ; arrives near Sa- vannah, 261 ; captures the city, 263 ; Christmas gift, 264; through the Carolinas, 265 ; capturing Columbia, 273 ; Fayetteville taken, 279 ; news from home, 280 ; battle of Bentonville, 283 ; meets Grant, 293 ; Healy's picture of 294 ; learns of Lee's sur- render, 296 ; hears of Lin- coln's death, 297 ; Sherman's mistake, 299 ; treaty revoked, 300 ; marches to Virginia, 305 ; review of his army, 307 ; address to his troops, 308 ; a new command, 311 ; INDEX. 353 visits Mexico, 312 ; as a peace- maker, 314 ; Indian treaty, 318 ; at Chicago meeting, 322 ; becomes general, 323 ; pain- ful interview, 325 ; visits Europe, 327 ; removes to -St. Louis, 328 ; publishes mem- oirs, 329 ; returns to Wash- ington, 340 ; declines civil office, 342 ; retirement, 346 ; New York home, 346 ; his death and burial, 347. Sloat, Commodore, 8. Slocum, General, 155, 195. Smith, General A. J., 14,98, 187. Smith, General Charles ¥., 37-40, 77. Smith, General Giles A., 271. Smith, General John E., 158, 266. Smith, General Kilby, 187. Smith, General Morgan L., 170. Smith, General P. F., 11. Stanbery, Henry, 3. Stanley, Henry M., 319. Stanton, Edwin M., 297, 301, 302, 308, 313, 314, 315- Steele, General, 157, 187. Steele's Bayou, 109. Stevenson, General, 166. Stewart, General A. P., 57, 62, 169, 176, 215, 270. Stockton, Commodore, 8. Stoneman, General, 293. Stuart, Colonel David, 5, 42, 58, 60. Sutter, Captain, 10, 12. Taft, Judge, 340, 341. Taylor, General Richard, 146, 241. Taylor, General Zachary, 2, 7, 8, 13, 241- Tenure of Office Act, 314. Terry, General, 265, 280, 287. Thirteenth Army Corps, 94. Thomas, General George H., 24, 27, 31, 80, 155, 162, 192-194, 197, 198, 201, 207, 322, 332, 337, 338. Thomas, General Lorenzo, 31. Turchin, General, 156, 175. Tuttle, General, 157. Twiggs, General David E., 20. Tyler, General Robert O., 23, 25- Union League Club, 347. United States Military Acade- my, 341. Van Buren, Martin, 3. Van Dom, General Earl, 85, 87, 96. Van Vliet, General Stewart, 14. Veatch, General, 50, 57. Vicksburg assaulted, 131. Vicksburg besieged, 138. Vicksburg campaign, 117. Vigilance Committee, 15, 16. Von Moltke, Marshal, 333. Wallace, General Lewis, 38, 72, 73- Wallace, W. H. L., 38, 56, C)3- Webster, Daniel, 2, 3, 13. Weilzel, General, 299. Wheeler, General Joseph, 153, 154, 216, 217, 222, 270, 283. Williams, General, 98, 99, 275. Wilson. General J. G., 294. Wilson's Creek, 191. Winslow, General, 184. Withers, General, 45, 60, 64. Wood, General Thomas J., 31, 32, 70, 163. Wood, John E., 16. W^right, Silas, 8, 304. Verba Buena, 11. Zollicoffer, Felix K., 29, 30. THE END. D. APPLETON AND COMPANY'S PUBLICATIONS. A NEW EDITION, REVISED TO MAY i, 189S. HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES A^AFV, from ly-j^ to i8gS. By Edgar Stanton Maclay, A. M. 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It is a solid and dignified acquisition to the romantic literature of our own coun- try, built around facts and real persons." — diicago Times- Herald " In a style that is strong and broad, the author of this timely novel takes up a nascent period of our national history and founds upon it a story of absorbmg interest." — Philadelphia Item. " Mr, Altsheler has given us an accurate as well as picturesque portrayal of the social and political conditions which prevailed in the republic in the era made famous by the second war with Great Britain." — Brooklyn Eagle. D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. D. APPLETON AND COMPANY'S PUBLICATIONS. D ''A BOOK THAT WILL LIVE:' AVID HARUM. A Story of American Life. By Edward Noyes Westcott. i2mo. Cloth, $1.50. "Mr Westcott has done for central New York what Mr. Cable, !\Ir. Page, and Mr Harris have done for different parts of the South, and what Miss Jewett and Miss Wilkins are doing for New England, and Mr. Hamlin Garland for the West. . . . 'David Harum' is a masterly delineation of an American type. . . . Here is life with all its joys and sorrows. . . . David Kanim lives in these pages as he will live in the mind of the reader. . . . He deserves to be known by all good Americans; he is one of them in boundless energy, in large-heartedness, in shrewdness, and in humor." — T/ie Critic. " Thoroughly a pure, original, and fresh American type. David Harum is a character whose qualities of mind and heart, eccentricuies, and dry humor will win for his creator notable distinction. Buoyancy, life, and cheerfulness are dominant notes. In its vividness and force the story is a strung, fresh picture of American life. Original and true, it is worth the same distinction which is accorded the genre pictures of peculiar types and places sketched by Mr. George W. Cable, Mr. Joel Chandler Harris, Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, Miss Wilkins, Miss Jewett, Mr. Garland, Miss French, Miss Murfree, Mr. Gilbert Parker, Mr. Owen Wister, and Bret Harte. . . . A pretty love story also adds to the attractiveness of the book, that will be appreciated at once by every one who enjoys real humor, strong character, true pictures oi life, and work that is ' racy of the soil.' " — Boston He raid. " Mr. Westcott has created a new and interesting type. . . . The character sketch- ing and building, so far as David Hartim is concerned, is well-nigh perfect. The book is wonderfully bright, readable, and graphic." — Nem I'ori Times. "The main character ought to become familiar to thousands of readers, and will probably take his place in time beside Joel Chandler Harris's and Thomas Nelson Page's and Miss Wilkins's creations." — Chicago Times-Herald. " We give Edward Noyes Westcott his true place in American letters— placing him as a humorist ne.xt to Mark Twain, as a master of dialect above Lowell, as a descriptive writer equal to Eret Harte, and, on the whole, as a novelist on a par with the best of those who live and have their being in the heart of hearts of American readers. If the author is dead — lamentable fact — his book will live." — Philadelphia Item. " True, strong, and thoroughly alive, with a humor like that of Abraham Lincoln and a nature as sweet at the core. The spirit of the book is genial and wholesome, and the love story is in keeping with it. . . . The book adds one more to the interesting list of native fiction destined to live, portraying certain localities and types of American life and manners." — .fifii'^;?: Literary World. "A notable contribution to those sectional studies of American life by which our literature has been so greatly enriched in the past generation. ... A work of unusual meiit." — Philadelphia Press. " One of the few distinct and living types in the American gallery." — St. Louis Globe- Dejnoc rat . "The quaint character of ' David Harum ' proves to be an inexhaustible source oi amusement. — Chicago Evening Post. " It would be hard to say wherein the author could have bettered the portrait he sets before us." —Providence yournal. " Full of wit and sweetness." — Baltimore Herald. " Merits the heartiest and most unequivocal praise. ... It is a pleasure to call the reader's attention to this strong and most original novel, a novel that is a decided and most enduring addition to American literature." — Boston Saturday Evening Gazette. D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 6«RI 91 HviM ^!««$&J^: B »,'?:.?' °^ CONGRESS 007 586 99,5 ' S