LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 
 
 7 
 
 PRESBN^D BY 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
GENERAL POPE'S 
 
 Virginia Campaign 
 
 OS A S^ ^ . 
 
 LEWIS ESTE MILLS. 
 
</1 
 
 (^. A^^%^^ 
 
 w^ 
 
 GENERAL POPE*S 
 
 VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 
 
 Of 1862 . 
 
 READ BEFORE 
 
 t 
 
 THE CINCINNATI LITERARY CLUB, 
 
 FEBRUARY 5, 1870, 
 By lewis ESTE mills. 
 
 / ^^.. 
 
 DETROIT: 
 
 TRIBUNE BOOK AND JOB OFFICB 
 1870. 
 

GENERAL POPE'S 
 
 VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1862. 
 
 The summer of 1862 was creeping away. The army 
 which had slowly advanced from the Quaker guns of Ma- 
 nassas, through Yorktown, toward Richmond, had been 
 bearing witness with its blood of its willingness, its ability, 
 and its desire to destroy the army of the rebels and occupy 
 their capital, and was now slowly diminishing by sickness, 
 while its commander slept and the enemy gathered strength. 
 
 For a year had the Eepublic wearily waited for the 
 promised success of the Army of the Potomac — wearily 
 waited, and wondered why. 
 
 It was determined to unite all the forces north of the 
 Peninsula under one command, in order, by threatening 
 the enemy from the north, and thus diverting their atten- 
 tion, to enable McCMlan to accomplish the object of his 
 campaign. 
 
 In consequence of this determination, the Government 
 sent for General John Pope, who had greatly distinguished 
 himself by his operations in the West, and on the 26th of 
 June assigned him to the command of the Army of Vir- 
 ginia, numbering in all about 40,000 men. 
 
G ener al P ope' s 
 
 The objects of the campaign were to be: First, The 
 protection of Washington ; and, Secondly, The relief of the 
 Army of the Potomac by operations upon the enemy's Hnes 
 of commnnication in the direction of Gordonsville and 
 Charlottesville. 
 
 Two days afterward McOlellan commenced his retreat 
 to the James River, thus placing the whole rebel army 
 between his own and the small force of Pope, and, of 
 course, rendering different plans necessary. 
 
 General Pope proceeded immediately to concentrate his 
 forces, stationing Sigel ( in command of Fremont's corps ) 
 at Sperryville; Banks, six or eight miles east of him, and 
 McDowell at Waterloo Bridge, on the pike leading from 
 Sperryville to Warrenton, General King's division of 
 McDowell's corps being left, by orders from Washington, 
 at Fredericksburg. 
 
 He wrote to General McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, 
 asking his views and offering cordial co-operation. The 
 former were not given nor the latter promised. It became 
 apparent that the appointment of an officer superior to the 
 leaders of both armies was advisable, and General Halleck 
 was placed in general command. 
 
 Appreciating the absolute necessity that the leaders of 
 the two armies should act in concert, and made to fear, 
 by the reception of the advances before mentioned to 
 McClellan, that danger might ensue from the continuance 
 of both in command. General Pope asked to be relieved 
 and returned to the West. His request was not granted* 
 however. 
 
 In the meantime various expeditions were sent out to 
 operate upon the enemy's lines. Orders had been also 
 
Virginia Campaign. 
 
 issued that the residents upon the lines of the railroads 
 should be responsible for the safety of the roads; that the 
 troops should subsist upon the country in which their 
 operations should be carried on, furnishing vouchers, pay- 
 able to loyal owners at the conclusion of the war ; and for 
 the arrest and sending within the rebel lines of all who 
 refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. 
 
 The necessity and propriety of these orders will be well 
 understood by any one who has read of the difficulty of 
 carrying on our operations in the midst of a disafl'ected 
 population, and are attested by the bitterness of the retalia- 
 tory orders of the enemy thus deprived of the aid of its 
 friends in our rear. 
 
 July 29. General Pope left Washington to take com- 
 mand in the field, and on the 7th of August all the infantry 
 and artillery, except King's division of McDowell's corps, 
 which was left at Fredericksburg by orders from Washing- 
 ton, were posted along the turnpike from Sperryville, num- 
 bering about 28,500 men, and the next day, on the receipt 
 of rumors of the enemy's crossing the Eapidan, were con- 
 centrated at Culpepper. 
 
 August 9. Banks was sent forward to Cedar Mountain 
 to hold the enemy in check ; but, advancing beyond the 
 strong position he at first took, he engaged Jackson's force, 
 bringing on a severe battle, in which we lost about 1,800 
 men. Jackson withdrew before daylight of the 10th, and 
 on the next night (11th) retreated across the Eapidan to- 
 ward Gordonsville, leaving dead and wounded on his line 
 of march. 
 
 In the meantime King's division came up. On the 14th 
 Reno joined with the Ninth Corps (Burnside's), numbering 
 
General Pope's 
 
 about 8,000 men, and tlie army was formed in line as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 Right — Sigel, on Robertson's River, at the crossing of 
 the road fi'om Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-house. 
 
 Center — McDowell, covering both flanks of Cedar 
 Mountain. 
 
 Left — Reno, near Raccoon Ford, covering road to Stevens- 
 burg and Culpepper. 
 
 On the IGth of August a letter of Lee, dated the pre- 
 ceding day at Gordonsville, to General J. E. B. Stuart, was 
 captured, stating the position of the enemy and their design 
 to overwhelm Pope before McClellan could come up. This 
 caused Pope to withdraw behind the Rappahaimock, and 
 post his forces with his left at Kelly's Ford and his right 
 about three miles above Rappahannock Station. 
 
 In the meantime, August 3d, General McClellan had 
 been ordered to withdraw immediately from the Peninsula 
 to Acquia Creek. Against this order he remonstrated, and 
 begged for reinforcements to enable liim to take Richmond, 
 to which General Halleck responded, on the Stli of August, 
 with a repetition of the order, and subsequently the move- 
 ment began. 
 
 Pope had fought his first battle, and was now lying 
 behind the Rappahannock, with the full rebel force advanc- 
 ing for the purpose of overwhelming him. 
 
 On the 20th, 21st and 22d of August the rebel army made 
 various unsuccessful attempts to cross the river, and then 
 determined to turn his right flank. He was disabled from 
 moving so as to oppose them in front by his orders to hold 
 on to his communication with Fredericksburg. 
 
 August 20. Halleck telegraphs Pope : " Every effort 
 
Virginia G am'paign. 
 
 must be made to hold the Eappahaimock. Large forces 
 will be in to-morrow." And on the 21st: "General Cox's 
 forces are coming on from Parkersbnrg, and will be here 
 to-morrow and the next day. Dispute every inch of gronnd, 
 and fight like the devil till we can reinforce you. Forty- 
 eight hours more, and we can make you strong enough. 
 Don't yield an inch if you can help it." 
 
 General Pope's dispatches are continuous duriug these 
 trying days, showing his endeavors to hold the line of the 
 Rappahannock, and his knowledge that the enemy was 
 flanking his right. 
 
 A movement across the river, to attack the enemy's flank 
 and rear, was stopped by a storm and consequent rise of 
 the stream. 
 
 The enemy moving on by Sulphur Springs toward 
 Waterloo, it became necessary for General Pope, in order 
 to protect himself against the flanking movement, to move 
 also in that direction. 
 
 News came from General Halleck that the reinforce- 
 ments so needed by this small army, already depleted by 
 fighting and straggling (which latter was the cause of great 
 anxiety and of complaint to headquarters even so early as 
 that), would begin to arrive at Warrenton on the 24th ; 
 that 30,000 were en route, and more expected. 
 
 Moreover, finding that holding on to the line of the 
 Rappahannock longer, meant the abandonment of the road 
 from Warrenton to Washington, and leaving open the route 
 through Thoroughfare Gap, toward which Jackson was 
 pushing, as well as all other roads north of the Orange and 
 Alexandria Railroad, Pope determined to form along the 
 pike between Warrenton and Gainesville. 
 
General P op e* 8 
 
 It was now the night of the 2oth, and no reinforcements 
 had reached him except General Reynolds, with 2,500 Penn- 
 sylvania Reserves, and General Kearney, with 4.500 of 
 Heintzelman's corps. 
 
 Expecting the reinforcements stated would have been 
 already at Gainesville, Warrenton, and Mannassas Junction, 
 Jackson's threatened movement through Thoroughfare Gap 
 was not a cause for uneasiness, but the reinforcements had 
 not arrived and Jackson was coming upon our rear. 
 
 Keeping in mind the necessity of covering Washington, 
 immediately it v\^as determined to abandon the line of the 
 Rappahannock, turn our whole force in the direction of 
 Gainesville and Mannassas Junction, and interposing between 
 Jackson and Lee, "crush the former, and then turn upon 
 Lee's front beyond Bull Run. 
 
 For nine days the troops had been incessantly marching 
 and fighting, were worn with loss of sleep and irregular and 
 insufficient food, and reduced by losses, by sickness and 
 by straggling, so that they numbered only about 36,500, 
 besides the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, numbering about 
 18,000, which had reached Warrenton Junction, ill provided 
 with material or ammunition. 
 
 In this condition began the march to capture Jackson, 
 which contuiued through the 27th and 28th. On the 
 evening of the latter, McDowell, marcliing towards Centre- 
 ville, came upon Jackson's advance retreating to Thorough- 
 fare Gap, and a severe action took place. On the 29th, 
 attack was made at daylight by Sigel, assisted by Hooker 
 and Kearney, and Jackson, closely pursued, fell back to a 
 strong position, covered by an unfinished railroad embank- 
 ment. Severe skirmishing went on all day. McDowell and 
 
Virginia Campaign. 
 
 Porter had been ordered to come up and fall upon the 
 enemy's flank. 
 
 At 3 A. M. Porter had been ordered to move at dawn 
 and report immediately, as " a severe engagement is likely 
 to take place, and your presence is necessary." 
 
 At 4:\ p. M. Porter not having moved, a peremptory 
 order was sent him to " push forward into action at once 
 on the enemy's (right) flank." Abont 5^ p. m. Heintzelman 
 and Reno, assaulting tlie enemy's left, doubled it upon the 
 center, and continued to push Jackson back iintil about 8 
 o'clock in the evening, but Porter failed to appear. The 
 forces of Jackson were being rapidly reinforced, and the 
 battle which General Reno described as one of the best 
 planned of the war failed of its desired result of capturing 
 the enemy's force on account of want of assistance. 
 
 Retreat was rendered necessary. One more fierce attack 
 upon the rapidly recruited enemy, one more bloody check 
 to their advance, one more well-fought battle by the worn- 
 out troops, and on the night of the yOth the army retreated 
 in good order and unpursned to Centreville. 
 
 In the mean time the trains had retreated, under the 
 charge of General Banks, to Centreville, without loss. 
 
 On the 31st, the men were rested and refreshed. 
 
 On September 1st, one more severe attack was made by 
 the enemy and repulsed, and on the 2d the army was 
 withdrawn without interruption by the enemy, to Washing- 
 ton, and thus ended the campaign, after which General 
 Pope was relieved at his own request. 
 
 In order to clearly understand this episode of the war, 
 
10 Gener al Pope's 
 
 wliicli has been so little understood and so shamefully 
 misrepresented, it is necessary to comprehend: 
 
 1st. What were the objects of the campaign. 
 
 2d. What was the force provided for accomplishing these 
 objects. 
 
 3d. How it was that Jackson, who had separated him- 
 self from Lee, was not crushed before succor could arrive. 
 
 4th. Why the aid promised was not cordially and promptly 
 afforded. 
 
 It has been repeatedly stated and widely credited that 
 the object of the campaign was the capture of Kichmond, 
 and that to enable Pope to accomplish this, reinforcements 
 were offered as freely to him as McClellan claimed they 
 had been persistently denied to the army of the Peninsula — 
 but that outflanked, surprised, confused, unable to manage 
 his unwieldy forces, he had been compelled by an inferior 
 force to retreat until his retreat became a rout, and with 
 loss of baggage and of discipline, the army of Virginia, 
 reinforced by the whole Potomac army of 90,000, rushed, a 
 disorderly mass, behind the entrenchments of Washington, 
 whence in a few days they were led to victory by General 
 McClellan. 
 
 Indeed, the latter says in his official report " that I lost 
 no time that could be avoided in moving the army of the 
 Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the army of 
 Virginia ; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarkation 
 of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and York- 
 town, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of 
 my army had sailed; and that after my arrival at Alex- 
 andria, I left nothing in 7ny power undone to forward supplies 
 and rei7iforcements to General Pope. I sent with the troops 
 
Vir ginia Campaign. 11 
 
 that moved, all ^ the cavalry that I could get hold of. Even 
 my personal escort was sent out on the line of the railway 
 as a guard with the provost and camp guard at headquar- 
 ters, retaining less than one hundred men, many of whom 
 were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, etc.; all the 
 headquarters' teams that arrived were sent out with supplies 
 and ammunition, none being retained even to move the 
 headquarters' camp." 
 
 This subject I propose to examine, and first to show the 
 objects of the campaign. 
 
 I have already stated these to be the protection of Wash- 
 ington and the Shenandoah valley, and the attraction of the 
 attention of the Rebel army from the army of the Potomac. 
 Fortunately we have clear and undeniable testimony to the 
 truth of this in the sworn evidence of General Pope before 
 the committee on the Conduct of the War, given on the 
 8tli July, 1862, twelve days after he was assigned to the 
 command, and twenty- one days before he took personal 
 command in the field. 
 
 In this he states his intention to constantly attack and 
 harass the enemy upon any advance, and his conviction 
 that he could prevent them from coming to Washington, 
 and that he did not feel justified in attempting to march 
 upon Richmond under the circumstances, because he was 
 "made responsible for the security of the city, and the 
 enemy would be able to come out and overwhelm the small 
 force I have before General McClellan's army would be able 
 to hear or know anything about it." 
 
 So much for the objects of the campaign. Next, as to 
 the forces under his command. The consolidated morning 
 
13 General Pope's 
 
 report of July 31st, 1862, shows a total force of 47,878; 
 from this, however, must be deducted 0,500, as it appears 
 from the report of General Bajiks, made after the battle of 
 Ceder Mountain, that his corj^s, instead of about 14,500, as 
 reported, numbered but about 8,000. This would leave 
 about 41,000 troops. Of these. King's division of McDow- 
 ell's corps was Ipft at Fredericksburg, and did not come up 
 until the 12th of August. The campaign begun, therefore, 
 Avith (in round numbers) 30,000 men, including cavalry 
 and artillery. 
 
 If General McClellan at the head of the 90,000 left after 
 the retreat to Harrison's Landing, could not advance upon 
 Kichmond without 30,000 to 35,000 fresh troops (Halleck's 
 letter to McClellan, August 6tli), it could not be expected 
 that General PojDe, at the head of only that 30,000 could 
 successfully resist the Eebel forces, much less take Rich- 
 mond, unless he were reinforced by the whole of McClellan's 
 90,000. This, as we have seen, the latter says was done, 
 and as rapidly as possible. Let us see. 
 
 August 3. The order to McClellan to move to Acquia 
 Creek was issued. 
 
 August 4. It was repeated. 
 
 August 9. (The day on which the battle of Cedar 
 Mountain was fought.) Halleck telegraiihs McClellan : " I 
 am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in 
 front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects 
 to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must 
 send reinforcements instantly to Acquia Creek. Consider- 
 ing the amount of transportation at your disposal, your 
 delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible 
 dispatch." 
 
Virginia Campaign. 13 
 
 August 10. Again: "The enemy is crossing the Rap- 
 idan in large force. Tiiey are fighting General Pope to-day. 
 There mnst be no further delay in your movements." 
 
 On the 30th July orders had been sent to McClellan to 
 remove his sick as quickly as possible. General McClellan's 
 dispatches complain of Halleck's injustice and impossibility of 
 moving faster. On the 7th August he reports 3,740 sick 
 moved (in eight days), ''including some that are embarked 
 to-night, and will leave to-morrow morning," leaving about 
 5,700 still on hand. 
 
 August 7. Five batteries of artillery were embarked. 
 
 August 10. One regiment of cavalry. 
 
 August 11. One brigade of infantry. 
 
 August 12. McClellan telegraphs Halleck : "It is not 
 possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, 
 ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in 
 danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save 
 it; it is in much better position to do so from here than 
 from Acquia. Our material can only he saved hy rising the 
 whole army to cover it if we are pressed. If sensibly weak- 
 ened by detachments, the result might be the loss of much 
 material and many men." 
 
 Take the captial of the country if you must, and destroy 
 the army that defends it, but spare my baggage, which I 
 need my whole army to protect! 
 
 At last, " on the 14th and 15th, two army corps were 
 put in motion toward Fort Monroe," and a dispatch was 
 sent, " Movement has commenced by land and water. 
 * * * I don't like Jackson's movements." 
 
 August 21. Halleck telegraphs again : " The forces of 
 liurnside and Pope are hard pushe^ and require aid as 
 
14 General Pojje's 
 
 rapidly as yon can send it. Come yonrself, as soon as you 
 can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of 
 ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. 
 Moreover they may have to fight as soon as they land." 
 
 Same day McClellan answers: "Franklin is here. * * 
 / had already ordered all the ammunition forward.^'' 
 
 Same day: "I have ample supplies of ammunition for 
 infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. / can 
 supply any deficiencies that may exist in General Pope's army.'" 
 
 August 23. Franklin's corps sailed. 
 
 August 27. Halleck telegraphs: "Porter is marching 
 on Warrenton Junction, to reinforce Pope. Nothing said 
 of Heintzehnan. Porter reports a general battle imminent. 
 Franklin's corps should move out by forced inarches." 
 
 Whereupon McClellan ordered Franklin to march at 
 once to the imminent battle reported by Porter ? No, but 
 to prepare to march, and report in person to him at Alex- 
 andria, concerning his transiwrtation ; and two hours later 
 telegraphs : " My aid has just returned from Franklin's 
 camp. Reports that G-enerals Franklin, Smith and Slocum 
 are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in 
 rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once." 
 
 One hour later : " Can Franklin, without his artillery or 
 cavalry, effect any useful pui'pose in front ? / do not see 
 that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with 
 Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe 
 
 IN THE DIRECTION OF THE VaLLEY ?" 
 
 Again, at 6 r. m. : " I have just received the copy of a 
 dispatch from General Pope to you, dated at 10 a. m. 
 to-day, in which he says : ' All forces now sent forward 
 should be sent to my right at Gainesville.' I have now at 
 
Vi r (J I n ?' a C a mj) aign. 15 
 
 my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, 
 abont 2,800 of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's 
 First Connecticut Artillery. * * * * jf jq^^ 
 loisli 7ne to order any jjorfdon of this force to the front (eight 
 hours after the order that Franklin should move out by 
 
 forced marches), it is in readiness to march at a moment's 
 notice" 
 
 August 28. Halleck ordered Franklin, by direct dispatch 
 to him, to move toward Manassas. 
 
 To this McClellan, not Franklin, answers : " I think the 
 enemy is in so much force near Manassas as to make it 
 necessary for us to move in force." 
 
 Again, on same day, Halleck telegraphs : "Not a moment 
 must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible toward 
 Manassas, so as to communicate witli Pope before the 
 enemy is reinforced." 
 
 Same day, 4:10 p. m. (thirty hours after the order for 
 forced marching, and twenty-two hours after stating that 
 13,000 men were in readiness to march at a moment's 
 notice), McClellan telegraphs : " G-eneral Franklin is with 
 me here. We are not yet in a condition to move ; may be 
 by to-morrow morning" 
 
 Same day, 4:45 p. m., he telegraphs: "Neither Franklin's 
 nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight 
 a battle." 
 
 To which Halleck replies : " They must go to-morrow 
 morning, ready or not ready." 
 
 August 29. 10:30 a. m. McClellan telegraphs : " Frank- 
 lin's corps is in motion. Started about G A. m. * * 
 / should not have moved him but for your pressing order 
 of last night." 
 
16 General Pope's 
 
 August 29, 12 m. McClellau telegraphs: "Franklin has 
 only between 10,000 and 11,000 for duty. How far do you 
 wish this force to advance ? " 
 
 Unable to correctly resolve this in his own mind, and 
 concluding, to use the language of his official report, that 
 "it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Frank- 
 lin's small force beyond Aunandale," and probably still 
 uncertain whether it was safe in the direction of the Valley, 
 he halted them at that place, and asked at 1 p. m. : "Shall 
 I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, 
 including Franklin ?" 
 
 At 3 P. M. Halleck replied : " I want Franklin's corps 
 to go far enough to find out something about the enemy." 
 
 At 8 P. M. McClellan says : '^It was not safe for 
 Franklin to move beyond Annandale under the circum- 
 stances. * * * Please give distinct orders in reference 
 to Franklin's movements to-morrow." 
 
 At 10 P. M. : "I have sent orders to Franklin to place 
 himself in communication with General Pope as soon as 
 possible." 
 
 Thus, Franklin on the night of the third day, after 
 orders to move by forced marches, had advanced as far as 
 Annandale, six miles from Alexandria. 
 
 Why he did not move on the 27th, 28th and 29th was, 
 McClellan says, because he was without transportation for 
 supplies and ammunition. Gen. Halleck's dispatch of August 
 30th says: "The quartermaster's department would have 
 given him plenty of transportation if he had appHed for it 
 any time since his arrival at Alexandria." 
 
 August 30. McClellan again asks concerning the route 
 for the troops to .take, and Halleck answers: "Send the 
 troops where the fighting is;" and two hours later — "they 
 
Virginia Campaig n, 17 
 
 must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is 
 everything." 
 
 Eeahzing this fact, by superhuman exertions, the corps 
 of Franklin and Sumner were forwarded at last and reached 
 Centreville, but a few miles from Alexandria, on the night 
 of the 30th August, after the campaign was over, the 
 enemy reinforced with all his army, and the opportunity 
 for giving a blow to the enemy, from which he not only 
 could not have easily recovered, but would have enabled us 
 to follow up the advantage, in all probability, with the 
 speedy capture of Richmond. 
 
 By this time the sole reinforcements received from the 
 Army of the Potomac were: Reynolds' Pennsylvania 
 Reserves, 2,500 : Heintzelman's and Porter's corps, numbering 
 together, say 18,000. In all 20,500. 
 
 Of these, Porter's corps refused to fight until the 30th, 
 so that from the 4th August until that day, Pope's army 
 fought the whole campaign unsupported, except by Reynolds 
 and Heintzelman, and on that day by Porter. The only 
 fighting after that was on the 1st of September, which was 
 carried on entirely by the forces he had before Porter 
 assisted him. 
 
 Ninety thousand men made up the Army of the 
 Potomac. Wheee weee the remaining seventy thou- 
 sand? 
 
 I have said that Porter refused to fight his corps until 
 the 30th. At 3 a. m., on the 29th, as I have before stated, 
 he was ordered to move at dawn, but did not do so. 
 
 On the morning of the 29th he received the order to 
 
 move to Gainesville direct. He had then been reinforced 
 2 
 
18 General P o p e'' s 
 
 by Piatt's brigade of Sturgis' division, and had about 
 13,000 men, containing nearly all the regular army, and 
 eight batteries of artillery. Its march that day and the 
 day previous had been but a few miles. He and McDow- 
 ell marched together toward the scene of action. The 
 latter pushed on and took part. The former halted and 
 stacked arms, and sometime later in the day wrote to 
 McDowell and King: "The enemy are in strong force on 
 this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces 
 back, the firing of the enemy having advanced, and ours 
 retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. The 
 advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in 
 force." 
 
 At this time, against orders, knowing, as he says, that 
 our army of worn out men, not three times the number of 
 his own corps, was being worsted in the battle, which was 
 raging in his front, he deemed it safe to retire to Manas- 
 sas. 
 
 At 4:30 p. M. the order for him to ."push forward into 
 action at once on the enemy's flank and if possible on his 
 rear" was sent, and received by him at 5 p. m. The effect 
 of the order upon him was to make him stay for very 
 shame, but not to obey. It was not sufficient to make 
 him fling himself like a soldier into the fray where his 
 friends were falling fast, and turn the tide of battle with 
 his splendid fresh reserve of nearly one-third of the army. 
 It was not enough to rouse him to action — it simply 
 caused him to sit down by the wayside and wish the 
 enemy had not been strong enough to drive our men back. 
 If they had been retreating it would have been safe to 
 
Virginia Campair] n . 19 
 
 advance. Halt, then, and reflect — "the advancing masses 
 of dust show the enemy coming in force." 
 
 But the orders — they are disobeyed ah'eady — and how 
 do I know that they are judicious if obeyed ? Tlie duty 
 of a soldeir — it has been forgotten so long that a few hours 
 will make no difference. The duty of a citizen of the 
 Republic — that is forgotten. 
 
 Honor. — " What is lionor ? A word. What is that 
 word — honor? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? 
 He that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it ? No. Doth 
 he hear it ? No. Is it insensi])le, then ? Yea, to the dead. 
 But will it not live with the living ? No. Why ? Detrac- 
 tion will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honor's 
 a mere escutcheon, and so ends my catechism." 
 
 Catechism said, what hinders sound sleep until the 
 morrow ? Not the crime committed, nor the battle lost in 
 consequeuce thereof. 
 
 Before closing this portion of the subject I beg to call 
 attention to the following extracts from an article by Gen- 
 eral Strother, {Porte Crayon) in Harper^s Magazine for No- 
 vember, 1867 : 
 
 August 27. Messengers had been dispatched to hasten the march 
 of Fitz John Porter, who was behind with his fresh and veteran 
 corps. These troops are expected to reach us by daylight, to replace 
 Hooker, in case the enemy attack in that direction. McDowell, with 
 his own and Sigel's command, over 30,000 men, are to move from 
 Warrenton in the morning and fall upon Jackson, before Lee with 
 the main body of the Rebel army can support him. These orders 
 carried out, and we will make Jackson pay dearly for his dinner 
 and night's frolic at Manassas. 
 
 August 28. General Porter, who was expected to be up during 
 the night, did not arrive until 10 A. m. There is much indignant 
 comment among the staff officers on this dangerous delay. * * I 
 was sent back with a message to Generals Porter, Hooker and 
 Heintzelman, ordering them to move their commands on Manassas 
 without delay. I found Porter at Bristoe and delivered the message. 
 
20 General Pope's 
 
 August 29. At three o'clock this morning I was aroused by- 
 Colonel Ruggles in person to carry written orders to General Fitz 
 John Porter, supposed to be lying at Manassas Junction, or alternately 
 at Bristoe. The combat we had witnessed last evening was between 
 King's division of McDowell's corps, and a portion of Jackson's com- 
 mand. The fight was sharp and sanguinary, but without decisive 
 results. Kearney, having driven out the enemy's rear guard, occu- 
 pied Centreville. It was understood that McDowell's command occu- 
 pied a position which cut Jackson off from the main body of the 
 rebel army. There will doubtless be a sanguinary battle to-day. 
 Porter's orders are to move on Centreville without delay. * * It 
 was broad daylight when I reached Porter's quarters at Bristoe. 
 While he cooly read it over — (the dispatch) — I noted the time by 
 his watch, which marked five o'clock and twenty minutes precisely. 
 
 And after the close of the clay he adds : 
 
 Porter, who received the order, carried by myself this morning, 
 at sunrise to move on Centreville, and a second order at Manassas, 
 turning his course toward Groveton, has shown no disposition to 
 assist in the fight at all, but has lain quietly in the sight and 
 hearing of the battle all the afternoon. 
 
 A jury of his peers tried and condemned him to be 
 cashiered and forever forbidden to hold any office of trust 
 or profit under the United States Government. 
 
 It is generally asserted, and the impression is sedulously 
 cultivated by Porter and his friends, that he was cashiered 
 for disobedience of orders simply, and that it was a hard 
 sentence for doing only as so many others did without any 
 punishment therefor. 
 
 But this is entirely incorrect, lie was indeed found 
 
 guilty of disobedience of orders, but the chief charge against 
 
 him was as follows: 
 
 Charge 2. Violation of the Fifty-Second Article of War. 
 
 Specification 1. In this : That the said Major General Fitz John 
 Porter, during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th of August, 1862. 
 while within sight of the field and in full hearing of its artillery, 
 did receive from Major General Pope, his superior and commanding 
 
Vir ginia Campaign, 21 
 
 officer, a lawful order to attack the enemy in the following figure 
 and letters, to-wit: 
 
 Headquarters in the Field, Aug. 29, 1862—4 : 30 p. m. 
 Major General Porter: 
 
 " Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. 
 I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's 
 flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in communica- 
 tion with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods 
 in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage his 
 flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well 
 closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall 
 back, do so to your right and rear so as to keep you in close com- 
 munication with the right wing. 
 
 ( Signed ) JOHN POPE, 
 
 Major General Commanding. 
 
 Which said order the said Major General Porter did then and 
 there shamefully disobey, and did retreat from advancing forces of 
 the enemy without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops 
 that were already fighting greatly superior numbers and were rely- 
 ing on the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to secure a 
 decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army, a result which 
 must have followed from said flank attack, had it been made by the 
 said General Porter, in compliance with the said order which he so 
 shamefully disobeyed. This at or near Manassas, in the State of 
 Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862. 
 
 Specification 2. In this: That the said Major General Fitz John 
 Porter, being with his army corps, on the 29th of August, 1862, be- 
 tween Manassas Station and the field of battle then pending between 
 the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and within 
 sound of the guns, and in presence of the enemy, and knowing that 
 a severe action was being fought, and that the aid of his corps was 
 greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on the field, and did 
 shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy with- 
 out any attempt to give them battle, and without knowing the forces 
 from which he shamefully retreated. This near Manassas Station, 
 in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862. 
 
 Specification 3. In this : That the said Major General Fitz John 
 Porter, being with his army corps near the field of battle at Man- 
 assas, on the 29th of August 1862, while a severe action was being 
 fought by the troops of Major General Pope's command, and being 
 in the belief that the troops of the said General Pope were sustaining 
 
Gen 6 7' a I Fo2)e's 
 
 defeat and retiring from the field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid 
 of the said troops and General, and did shamefully retreat away and 
 fall back with his army to the Manassas Junction and leave to the 
 disasters of a presumed defeat the said army, and did fail by any 
 attempt to attack the enemy to aid in averting the misfortunes of a 
 disaster that would have endangered the safety of the capital of the 
 country. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, 
 on the 29tli of August, 1862. 
 
 The second and third specifications leave out of view 
 all orders received, and try him, and convict him, and 
 condemn him for nnsoldierly, cowardly, or treasonable 
 condttct in the presence of the enemy, which, as I have 
 shown you, he himself admits. 
 
 From that sentence he is now seeking to be relieved 
 and restored to his rank in the army. 
 
 The court which tried him was composed of such men as 
 Generals Hunter, Hitchcock, King, Eicketts, and Garfield? 
 and the trial was conducted by Judge-Advocate General 
 Holt, and we learn from the official report of the trial 
 that "Major General Fitz John Porter, having heard the 
 order appointing the court read, was asked if he had any 
 objection to any member named in the detail, and replied 
 that he had no objection." 
 
 And, before the trial. General Porter's counsel, Reverdy 
 Johnson, said to a high officer of the government : " We 
 have seen the detail of the court, and General Porter is 
 perfectly satisfied with it. He regards them all as men of 
 the highest honor and integrity." After the trial, and 
 before the verdict of the court was known, Mr Johnson 
 said to General Halleck : Wliatever may be the result, 
 neither General Porter nor his friends can have any 
 ground of complaint against the court. I consider the 
 trial to have been perfectly fair. 
 
Virginia Camjiaign. 23 
 
 He has since published a pamphlet at Morristown, N. 
 J., entitled " Appeal to the President of the United States," 
 in which he bitterly attacks the report of the trial by Gen- 
 eral Holt, charges that President Lincoln was by that 
 misled to confirmation of the unanimous sentence of the 
 court, and endeavors to excuse his conduct by attempting 
 to show that if he had engaged the enemy he would have 
 been defeated — or in other words, that it was not safe to 
 do so. It is scarcely worth while to say more of this pro- 
 duction than that it opens with an opinion of George B. 
 McClellan, and ends with a letter from W. B. Franklin, 
 and that both are quite as sure that Porter was clearly 
 right, and Pope as clearly wrong, as they were before the 
 campaign commenced. United in desire, in action they are 
 not divided. 
 
 It is charged against General Sherman that he recom- 
 mends the granting of Porter's request. The truth of the 
 matter is, that, as traitors and rebels are now relieved from 
 political disabilities, so he is willing that Porter should be 
 relieved to that extent and no further. Indeed, no officer 
 who regards the honor or efficiency of the army can, as it 
 seems to me, recommend any thing more than that, or call 
 the sentence other than light. His alternative is cowardice 
 or treason on the field of battle. Fit punishment for either 
 is death. 
 
 But tvere the " enemy coming in force ?" Pope and 
 McDowell both testified that his obedience of orders would 
 have gained the day, because the flank of the enemy was 
 ill protected. But Porter saw " advancing masses of dust." 
 Listen to General J. E. B. Stuart's report. He says that on 
 the 29th of August, he was on that flank with his cavalry 
 
M General P op e* s 
 
 and foHiid our troops approaching. " I waited his (our) 
 approach long enough to ascertain that tliere was at least 
 an army corps, at the same time Iceeping detachments of cav- 
 alry dragging brush down the road from the direction of 
 Gainesville, so as to deceive the enemy, a ruse which Porter's 
 report shows was successful, and notified the Commanding 
 General then opposite me on the turnpike, that Longstreet's 
 flank and rear were seriously threatened, and of the impor- 
 tance to us of the ridge I held. Immediately upon receipt 
 of that intelligence, Jenkins', Kemper's, and D. R. Jones' 
 brigades, and several pieces of artillery, were ordered to me 
 by General Longstreet, and being placed in position fronting 
 Bristoe awaited the enemy's advance. After exchanging a 
 few shots with rifle pieces, this corps withdrew toward 
 Manassas." 
 
 Longstreet reports that his right being threatened he 
 sent reinforcements, but " after some few shots the enemy 
 withdrew his forces," and the brigades sent were returned 
 to resist the attack of our men which was doubling his left 
 on his centre. Stonewall Jackson in his ofiicial report cor- 
 roborating both Stuart and Longstreet, sums up the whole 
 matter thus: "After some desultory skirmishing and heavy 
 cannonading during the day, the Federal infantry, about 
 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the 
 wood and advanced in several lines, first engaging the 
 right, but soon extending its attack to the center and left* 
 In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce 
 and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was 
 repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if 
 determined by force of numbers and fury of assault, to 
 drive us from our position. So impetuous and well sua- 
 
Virginia Campaign. 25 
 
 tained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the 
 Commanding General for reinforcements, iut the timely aoid 
 gallant advance of General Longstreet on tlie rigid relieved 
 my troops from pressure of overwhelming numbers." 
 
 The aid then afforded by Longstreet, which Porter's 
 desertion enabled him to send, prevented Pope from gaining 
 the victory. 
 
 This General was he to whom McClellan telegraphed, 
 on September 1st, after the army was at Centreville, and 
 all operations were over : " Major General Porter, I ask you, 
 for my sake, and that of the country, and the old Army of 
 the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the 
 fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in 
 all the operations now going on." 
 
 To which the reply was perfect : " You may rest assured 
 that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, 
 will ever give, as they have given to General Pope, their 
 cordial co-operation and constant support, in the execution 
 of all orders and plans." 
 
 Now let me call your attention to only a few more 
 dispatches, and I have done. 
 
 On the fatal 29th of August, General Pope telegraphed 
 for supplies for his exhausted troops. To this General 
 Franklin replies : " I have been instructed by General 
 McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available 
 wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, 
 and all of the cars also, as soon as you will send in a cav- 
 alry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train." 
 
 Wresthng with death on the field of battle. Pope must 
 send away his worn-out cavalry to guard a train which 
 would be loaded for him as soon as the cavalry should 
 arrive ! 
 
36 General Pope's 
 
 Again : August 30, to a request for ammunition, comes 
 the reply from General McClellau (who had telegraphed on 
 the 21st that he had enough to supply any deficiencies in 
 Pope's army ), " I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's 
 artillery." 
 
 Again: August 29, 2:45 p. m. McClellan telegraphs 
 President Lincoln : " I am clear that one of two courses 
 should be adopted : First, to concentrate all our available 
 forces to open communication with Pope ( which, as we 
 have seen, he resolutely and persistently failed to do); 
 Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once to 
 use all our means to make the capital safe." 
 
 Eecall the circumstances of the case. Pope's army, 
 fighting day and night, day after day, against overwhelming 
 forces, refused the promised reinforcements; the nation 
 aching for comfort; the soldier of the forlorn hope of the 
 Republic bravely accomplishing his thankless duty, and the 
 commander of seventy thousand untouched men, who had 
 not smelled powder for weeks, sits quietly in his tent, with 
 the sound of battle filling the air, wondering whether it is 
 safe toward the valley, and suggesting to the President to 
 '* leave Pope to get out of his scrape ! " 
 
 Now, hot from the reading of all these official records 
 turn back and read again McClellan's report : " After my 
 arrival in Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone 
 to forward supplies and reinforcements to General Pope." 
 
 And then a little further on he says : " It will be remem- 
 bered that at the time I was assigned to the command of 
 the forces for the defense of the National Capital, on the 
 2d day of September, 1802, the greater part of all the avail- 
 able troops were suffering under the disheartening influence 
 of the serious defeat they had encountered during the brief 
 and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers 
 
Virginia Campaign. ^"^ 
 
 were greatly reduced by casualties- their confidence was 
 ZcV shaken, and they had lost son.ething of that e^rU 
 du corps which is indispensable to the efficiency of an 
 army. Moreover they had left behind, lost, or worn out the 
 greater part of their clothing and camp equipage, which 
 required renewal before they could be in proper condition 
 
 to take the field again." , .n • n i 
 
 As a comment on the latter portion of this, Geneial 
 Banks reported September 2d that all the trains had been 
 brought in by him without loss. 
 
 Ao-iin • " The army of the Potomac was recalled from 
 within sight of Richmond "-after a retreat of thirty miles, 
 and confessed inability to proceed -" and incorporated wih 
 the army of Virginia." * * * ''They fought well, faith^ 
 fully, gallantly under General Pope, yet were compel ed to 
 fall back on Washington, defeated and almost demoralized, 
 whence he led them to victory. 
 
 Have we need of comment here? No words of mine 
 can strongly enough characterize the conduct which pre- 
 ceded the report, or the report which covered up the 
 conduct. 
 
 If we look for the cause of the conduct of McClellan, 
 Porter, and Franklin excusing them from charges of cow- 
 ardice'or treason, we can discover but two: 
 
 First. Jealousy at the appointment of a successful 
 soldier to command. 
 
 Second. An order issued by General Pope on taking 
 command of the army in which were the following expres- 
 Zs "I h^^ve come to you from the West where we have 
 always seen the backs of our enemies, from an army whose 
 b "siuess it has been to seek the adversary and beat him 
 w fonnd, whose policy has been attack, and not 
 
 defense I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain 
 
88 Ge7ieral P op e' s 
 
 phrases which I am sorry to find so much in vogue among 
 you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and 
 hokling them, and lines of retreat, and bases of supplies. 
 Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier 
 should desire to occupy is one from which he can most 
 easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the prob- 
 able lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own 
 to take care of themselves. Let us look before and not 
 behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster 
 and shame lurk in the rear." 
 
 General Pope disclaims any intention to reflect upon 
 General McClellan in this, and if there be any sting in it, 
 it is to be found only in the truth of its statements, and 
 the excellence of its advice heard with rejoicing by the 
 nation, which was weary with Avaiting and sick at the heart 
 with hope deferred. Viewed in the light of the attendant 
 facts, and the objects of the campaign, it was certainly well 
 said, but even if it had been intended as a bitter jibe — 
 even if it had been, was the proper payment to be made in 
 lost battles, falling fellow-soldiers, the Aveeping of strong 
 men, and the wan faces of widows — in danger to the Republic 
 and encouragement to its foes ? 
 
 I can not sum up the campaign better than has been 
 done by General Strother, {Porte Crayon) who speaks 
 from personal knowledge and with authority, and, therefore, 
 I quote his words : 
 
 " From this point (Cedar Mountain) until we readied the banks 
 of the Potomac in front of Washington the campaign presents a 
 series of dashing and audacious manoeuvres and sanguinary combats, 
 in which the National army lost neither honor nor advantage, until 
 it closed with its powerful adversary in the culminating fight at 
 Groveton. Up to this point our affairs wore an encouraging aspect, 
 and it seemed as if General Pope's intelligent and energetic measures 
 were about to be crowned with success. Jackson had made a rash 
 adventure, and was caught in it. We had brought him to a stand 
 
Virginia Cam2>ciign. 
 
 29 
 
 with not over twenty -five thousand men, while we had sixty thousand 
 in position to fall upon and crush him before his supports could 
 possibly aiTive. Thus, on the morning of Friday, the 29th, Lee, with 
 the main body of the Southern army, was separated from Jackson by 
 a full day's march, while the National troops all lay within two or 
 three hours, at most, of the decisive field, with direct and open roads 
 to move upon, and it must be conceded that in the contest of 
 manoeuvres the Union commander had fairly out-generaled his 
 adversary. Without hesitation or delay all the troops immediately 
 under General Pope's eye were thrown upon the enemy. All day long 
 the roar of musketry and cannon, like the sounding of a mighty 
 gong, invited the absent to share in the feast of death and glory ; all 
 day long the white battle-cloud, visible from hill and plain for 
 twenty miles around, beckoned to laggard and skulker, to the 
 exhausted soldier who had dropped behind his regiment, to the 
 starred chieftain who may have mistaken his way or misunderstood 
 his orders ; all day long the anxious commander counted the minutes, 
 and 'u-ged his faithful legions to a succession of brilliant but exhausting 
 attacks* vainly listening for the burst upon the enemy's right and rear 
 which was to give us victory. 
 
 Thus passed the day, and the hour, and the decisive opportunity. 
 Sunset on the 29th still found us with the light columns of 
 Sigel, Heintzelman, and Reno dashing against the strong and stub- 
 bornly-defended position of the enemy. Some of these indeed we 
 had carried, doubling back Jackson's left, and holding a great por- 
 tion of the contested field, with the enemy's dead and woimded in 
 our hands ; but the combatants were too equally matched in numbers, 
 pluck, and condition to admit of our pushing this advantage to a 
 decisive conclusion. Then, long expected but too late, McDowell 
 appeared, and reported his column coming into position on our left. 
 Then came darkness, followed by a sharp but indecisive bickering 
 of musketry between King's division of McDowell's and Hood's com- 
 mand of Longstreet's corps, the leading division of the enemy's rein- 
 forcing column at the same hour coming into position on Jackson's right. 
 Porter, with his splendid corps, had never appeared on the field 
 at all. Thus it was that the hopes of victory and the prestige of 
 successful generalship passed from the Union commander to his ad- 
 versaries. To complete the views of this day's operations I make a 
 note of the enemy's movements, obtained from the most authentic 
 ' sources. My principal imformant, the chief engineer of Lee's staflF, 
 
30 O 6 71 er al P o p e^ s 
 
 says: 'On the mornin;? of the 39tli General Lee took breakfast at a 
 house west of Thoroughfare Gap. RicUng forward rapidly they passed 
 Longstreet moving through the Gap, the head of the column some 
 short distance on the eastern side. They marched left in front, 
 Hood's division leading. This division reached the field and formed 
 on Jackson's right after sunset on the 29th, and immediately there- 
 after became engaged with a portion of McDowell's command, as 
 before stated. Other portions of Lougstreet's command arrived and 
 took position during the night. On the morning of the 30th ( Sat" 
 urday), Lougstreet's command was all up except Anderson's division > 
 which had not yet reached the field. The absence of this division' 
 and a feeling of uncertainty as to Porter's forces and intentions, in- 
 duced General Lee to remain on the defensive during the afternoon 
 of Saturday. About one o'clock p. m, Anderson arrived and the 
 Rebel commander immediately commenced his preparations for an 
 aggressive movement. He was anticipated by Porter's attack, which, 
 being but feebly urged, soon failed, and afforded the golden oppor- 
 tunity for the grand counter-attack, wliose progress and results have 
 been detailed.' " 
 
 This statement fully confirms my own observations and sus- 
 tains General Pope's theory of the situation on Friday, the 29th. 
 
 What followed after the retreat to Washington, on the 
 2d of September, I quote from the Life of Lincoln, by Mr. 
 Arnold, formerly a Member of Congress from Illinois: 
 
 " Two courses were suggested and discussed in the Cabinet of 
 Mr. Lincoln, One was to place McClellan in command of all the 
 forces, including both the Army of Virginia and of the Potomac, 
 and the other to arrest and try him and some of his subordinates 
 for disobedience and insub(jrdination. General Halleck and the 
 Secretary of War charged him with disobedience of orders, and with 
 being responsible for the disasters under Pope, and tliey were clearly right. 
 
 " It was stated by at least one member of the Cabinet that Mc- 
 Clellan deserved death for his repeated disobedience of orders and 
 failure to reinforce Pope. He and Fitz John Porter must go down 
 to posterity as responsible for the sacrifice of Pope and his army. 
 
 " The President said to Pope, when he came to Washington, that 
 he had no fault to find with him ; he had faithfully performed his 
 duty; yet, yielding to the real or supposed necessities of the hour, 
 he relieved him of his command, and placed the person most respon- 
 sible for his disasters again at the head of the army. 
 
Virginia Campaigii. 31 
 
 " On the trial of Fitz John Porter for disobedience, his guilt was 
 clearly established, and the evidence of the complicity of his supe- 
 rior ( McClellan ) was scarcely less clear. General McClellan was 
 never placed on trial, because the Government, with a knowledge of 
 the facts, gave him a new command, and the gallant Army of the 
 Potomac fought and won the battle of Autietam, and this, to some 
 extent, condoned his great offense." 
 
 Why General McClellan was re-instated has heen thus 
 told by Dr. Draper, in his able History of the Civil War : 
 "Though there was never purer patriotism than that which 
 animated the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, that 
 army had been brought, through the influence of officers 
 who surrounded General McClellan, into a most dangerous 
 condition — dangerous to the best interests of the nation — 
 of having a wish of its own, and that wish in opposition 
 to the convictions of the Government. In armies it is but 
 a short step from the possession of a wish to the expression 
 of a will. Perhaps at no period of the war were thoughtful 
 men more deeply alarmed for the future of the nation 
 than when they heard of the restoration of McClellan to 
 command, and recognized the unmistakable constraint 
 under which the Government had acted. * * * 
 Lincoln was ostensibly reconciled to the re-instating of 
 McClellan, by the circumstances that he, of all the Gener- 
 als, was most familiar with the defenses of Washington. 
 What, with fatigue, disappointment and anxiety, Halleck's 
 health was almost broken down." 
 
 I have shown you, entirely from official records Avbat 
 were the objects of the campaign, viz: To protect Wash- 
 ington and bring in safely the Army of the Potomac; and 
 that these were accomplished without the rout and loss of 
 baggage, of which reports were as industriously circulated, and 
 astrnttrely untrue, as that of the intention to take Richmond. 
 ■ I have shown you that the forces he set out with were 
 but about the number that McClellan required to reinforce 
 his army of 90,000 men, in order to advance on Richmond ; 
 that, with the exception of about 10,000 men, none reached 
 
32 Qeneral Pope^s Virginia Campai g n. 
 
 him from the Army of the Potomac, before the end of the 
 campaign, except Porter's superb corps, which its comman- 
 der says he marched to the rear to the sound of the 
 victorious enemy's cannon, and (having defeated the great 
 opportunity offered of cutting off Jackson) only consented 
 to allow to take part in the battle of the 30th, and even 
 then but feebly. 
 
 I have shown you that by the delay, which can hardly 
 be otherwise construed than as willfully criminal, of 
 McOlellan, Porter, and Franklin, not only the opportunity 
 of the 29th was lost, but that the advance of Lee, who 
 without Jackson's aid would have been compelled to retreat, 
 was rendered possible, and the bloody battles of South 
 Mountain and Antietam were made necessary. 
 
 In a word I have shown you that a campaign under- 
 taken for a purpose likely to be misunderstood, was entirely 
 successful in its accomplishment, and missed of brilliant 
 success simply by the withholding of assistance which can 
 only be accounted for upon the theory of, first, cowardice 
 and incompetency; secondly, either personal ambition or 
 petty jealousy, Avhicli, for the attainment of its ends, was 
 willing to risk the safety of the Republic and sacrifice its 
 army ; or, lastly, premeditated treason. 
 
 It has been a pleasure to me to thus prove to the Club, 
 by indisputable facts, that the record of our fellow member, 
 who gave us our first drill when at its first meeting after 
 the fall of Fort Sumpter the Club resolved itself into a 
 military company, a record so widely known by his brilliant 
 capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10, has in no 
 respect suffered by the much -abused, much-misrepresented, 
 but successful and Ijrilliant Virginia campaign. 
 
 In order to confine my essay within reasonable limits, 
 I have necessarily abridged far beyond my wish the state- 
 ment of facts, but after careful examination I have endeav- 
 ored to lay before you those which are the most prominent 
 and important, withholding nothing knowingly that would 
 diminish their force.