THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 
 
 MOVEMENT FOR THE ANNEX 
 
 ATI ON OF TEXAS 
 
 GEORGE P. GARRISON 
 
 REPRINTED FROM THE 
 
 gimetmtt |ii^twal ^mnv 
 
 Vol. X No. 
 
 OCTOBER, i()04 
 
THE FIRST STAGE OF THE 
 
 MOVEMENT FOR THE ANNEX 
 
 ATION OF TEXAS 
 
 BY 
 
 GEORGE P. GARRISON 
 
 REPRINTED FROM THE 
 
 gimcriati |ifet(inal §txUw 
 
 Vol. X NO. I 
 
 OCTOBER, 1904 
 
Glass. 
 Book. 
 
[Reprinted from The American Historical Review, Vol. X., No. i, Oct., 1904.] 
 
 THE FIRST STAGE OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE 
 ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 
 
 It is but a truism that the greatest value of history lies in the 
 lesson, intellectual and moral, to be learned therefrom ; and in all 
 history there is perhaps no movement which is more profoundly in- 
 structive in both these aspects than the annexation of Texas. No 
 clash of opposing political and social forces, no melee of antagonistic 
 human impulses, within the record has given better opportunity to 
 distinguish the wisdom of the ages from the imperious conviction of 
 the moment. But it is unsafe to consider any historical question 
 primarily from the didactic standpoint. In such case, as experience 
 has shown, insight is too often dulled by belief, and investigation 
 misled by prejudice. The first concern, therefore, of every student 
 of history should be the fact ; from that alone can the true lesson 
 be obtained. In accordance with this principle, I shall give atten- 
 tion, within the limits assigned me, mainly to the actual happenings 
 of the annexation movement, only now and then touching upon 
 their deep significance. 
 
 The subject of this paper is best approached by a brief summary 
 of the events which led to the movement under consideration. This 
 movement was begun by Texas^ and was, it seems to me, a natural 
 result of the Anglo-American occupation of that country and of the 
 revolution which separated it from Mexico. 
 
 The Anglo-American influx into Texas began while the western 
 boundary of the expanding United States yet rested on the Missis- 
 sippi. The Louisiana purchase made this line coterminous on the 
 southwest with the northeastern limit of Mexico, but the common 
 boundary was not determined till 1819, when, for the sake of Florida, 
 whatever claims the United States may have had to Texas were 
 definitely given up. The intruders, however, continued to cross the 
 Sabine without permission until the eve of the revolution which made 
 Mexico independent of Spain. From that time forward the move- 
 ment changed its nature and took on a colonizing aspect. The 
 Anglo-Americans were allowed to enter freely as immigrants, and 
 'inducements to come were ofifered them in the shape of liberal allot- 
 ments of land. By 1830 the Mexican government had become un- 
 easy concerning the growth of an essentially alien population in 
 
 1 Of course the suggestion is much older than the movement. I have not under- 
 taken to trace the beginnings of the idea. 
 
 (72) 
 
 »v » ^. *j^ 4 ;^ . if '> 
 
J^ G. p. Garrison 
 
 Texas and issued a decree forbidding further immigration from the 
 United States. Nevertheless the immigrants continued to come, in 
 considerable numbers at least. Finally in 1835 occurred the in- 
 evitable clash, which resulted in the expulsion of the Mexicans in 
 1836 and the independence of Texas. ^ 
 
 The Texas revolution passed, in its development, through two 
 states. In its first phase it was a struggle for the Mexican Consti- 
 tution of 1824. in which Texas alone held out against the centralizing 
 policy of Santa Anna after a similar resistance on the part of 
 Zacatecas and Coahuila had been crushed by force. But after the 
 colonists had definitely refused, in November, 1835, to claim inde- 
 pendence, and after they had captured Cos's army at San Antonio 
 and had cleared their soil of Mexican troops, it became evident that 
 there was no hope of cooperation from the Liberals in Mexico, and 
 that Texas must either submit or abandon the confederation. These 
 alternatives had made themselves clear by January i, 1836, and from 
 that time forward the aim of the struggle was for independence. 
 
 Meanwhile a commission consisting of Stephen F. Austin, Wil- 
 liam H. Wharton, and Branch T. Archer had been sent to the 
 United States to do Texas such service as it could. The principal 
 work of the commissioners lay in stirring up public sentiment on 
 behalf of the Texans and securing aid for them in men and money ; 
 but their letters indicate that they considered themselves instructed 
 to negotiate for the recognition of the new republic, and, under cer- 
 tain contingencies, also for its annexation to the United States. 
 
 While the commissioners were in New Orleans in January, 1836, 
 they prepared a design for a Texas flag, which was peculiarly sug- 
 gestive of the importance they attached to the relations connected 
 with the idea of annexation. It had — or was meant to have — the 
 thirteen stripes of the United States flag, with the red changed to 
 blue, and in the upper left-hand corner, instead of the stars, was the 
 British union with red stripes on a white field. On the fly was a 
 sun encircled by the motto Lux Libcrfatis, and on the face of the 
 sun was the head of Washington, underneath which were the words, 
 " In his example there is safety ". The whole would undoubtedly 
 have taken the first prize for complication at any world's fair ever 
 held. The meaning of it is partly explained in Austin's own words : 
 
 'The assertion made by John Quincy Adams in Congress, December 12, 1S37, 
 based on statements in Mayo's Political Sketdies of Eight Yea>s in IVashington ( Ailis 
 Register, LIII, 266), to the effect that the revokitionizing of Texas was the result of 
 a conspiracy planned by Sam Houston, was incorrect. Von Hoist apparently credits the 
 story (^Constitutional History of the United States, H, 562), and Schouler definitely 
 accepts it ( History of the United States, IV, 251 ) ; but the Texan revolution cannot be 
 explained in thrs way. See The Nation for August 13, 1903, 133-134. 
 
 Gift. 
 
 4 Ja 03 ^ 
 
Movement for the Aimexation of Texas 
 
 74 
 
 " The shape of the English jack indicates the origin of the North 
 American people. The stripes indicate the immediate descent of the 
 most of the Texans "} It would seem that the design was intended 
 especially as an appeal for recognition both by the United States 
 and by England, but it was doubtless intended to suggest annexation 
 as well. 
 
 Annexation, in fact, appears to have been the irresistible con- 
 clusion of the Texan logic from the moment that the colonists deter- 
 mined to break away from Mexico. The independence that necessity 
 had forced them to assert was not desired for its own sake. It in- 
 volved many problems that they were ill prepared to face, and from 
 which admission to the United States would be a happy escape. 
 Nearly aU of them had been born and reared in that country,^ and 
 they were much attached to it and desirous, to the point of eager- 
 ness, to renew their citizenship therein. It is evident that they ''did 
 not appreciate the difficulties connected with annexation. If' they 
 themselves were willing freely to offer the rich gift of Texas to the 
 American Union, how could it, in any rational spirit, be declined? 
 To them the idea was one not easily comprehended. Even the com- 
 missioners did not discover the strength of the anti-Texas feeling in 
 the United States. They wrote home from Washington, April 6, 
 1836, while Houston was still retreating before the Mexican army,' 
 and while the outlook for Texas— though the commissioners did not 
 then know it— was darkest, that they thought the United States 
 government was ready to recognize Texas and, if it so desired, to 
 admit it into the Union on liberal terms. The want, however,' of 
 official news from their government and of proper credentials ' for 
 themselves prevented them from giving their judgment any test. 
 
 The commissioners already named were replaced in March, 1836. 
 by Messrs. George C. Childress and Robert Hamilton ; and these two,' 
 in June following, by James Collinsworth and P. W. Grayson.' 
 Meanwhile the Mexicans had been utterly defeated and driven from 
 Texas, leaving their general, Santa Anna, and several hundred of 
 his men prisoners. In September the permanent government of 
 Texas was organized by a general election at which the question of 
 annexation was submitted to the people, and a practically unanimous 
 vote was cast in favor of the measure.'' At this election Sam Hous- 
 
 1 The Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association, III, 172. The design 
 did not commend itself to the Texas authorities ; but their objection, I think it can be 
 shown, was not to its significance. 
 
 2 See the address of the General Council of Texas to the Citizens of the United 
 States, October 26, 1835. Mies' Register, XLIX, 234-235. 
 
 3 There were 3,277 for, and 91 against it. 
 
75 G. P. Garj^ison 
 
 ton was chosen president. He appointed Stephen F. Austin secre- 
 tary of state, and WilHam H. Wharton minister to the United States. 
 A Httle later Memucan Hunt was sent to act in conjunction with 
 Wharton, and Fairfax Catlett was appointed secretary of legation 
 with the authority of charge when the ministers should be absent 
 from Washington. 
 
 The negotiations that went on between the two governments from 
 the expulsion of the Mexicans up to the end of the Jackson adminis- 
 tration, March 4, 1837, referred primarily to the question of recog- 
 nition ; but the subject was always considered with that of annexa- 
 tion, to which recognition was prerequisite, more or less in view. 
 Recognition came at length in the closing days of that administration 
 by legislative action that was virtually final. It is impossible to 
 detail here the whole course of the negotiation, but it may be worth 
 while to note some features of the correspondence relating more 
 directly to annexation, because of the light it afifords as to the situa- 
 tion on both sides. 
 
 In regard to the attitude of the United States authorities, the 
 letters of the Texan commissioners to their government serve to 
 indicate that they were, on the whole, assured of sympathy. To 
 President Burnet, Austin wrote from New Orleans, June 10, 1836, 
 that he believed that if he had been furnished with the necessary 
 official documents, he could have secured recognition before leaving 
 Washington. The feeling there was decidedly ardent in favor of 
 Texas. On July 16 Collinsworth and Grayson wrote President 
 Burnet that they had had two interviews with Secretary Forsyth 
 and had found him uncommunicative ; but he had stated that he 
 knew the annexation of Texas was a favorite measure — when it 
 could be accomplished with propriety — of President Jackson's.^ 
 Again, August 11, Grayson wrote W. H. Jack, then secretary of 
 state under Houston, as follows : " As I have said before, there is 
 in my mind no doubt that the present Administration, can carry the 
 measure of Annexation, — General Jackson feels the utmost solicitude 
 for it and we know how much that will count." ^ November 13, 
 Collinsworth wrote that he had secured an interview with President 
 Jackson and had been informed that nothing could be done until 
 after a report from the United States agent that had been sent to 
 Texas ; and he added that, without pretending to have official infor- 
 
 1 Diplomatic, Consular, and Domestic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, 
 file 295. This collection, of which the full title is given in this instance, will be cited 
 hereafter simply as Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas. 
 
 ^Il>id., file 618. 
 
Movement for the Annexatio7i of Texas 76 
 
 mation, he thought it safe to hazard the opinion that Jackson was in 
 favor of the measures contained in their instructions. 
 
 Now and then a note of doubt brings discord into this cheerful 
 song of diplomacy. For example, Fairfax Catlett writes to Austin 
 from Mobile, January 11, 1837, after having read Jackson's message 
 of December 21 : 
 
 You have doubtless by this time received President Jackson's message 
 in relation to Texas affairs. I cannot express the regret, with which I 
 gradually awoke to the unwelcome truth, that he is opposed to the imme- 
 diate recognition of Texian independence. I did not anticipate so cold- 
 blooded a policy from him. 
 
 Such fears and depressing speculations, however, are only for a 
 moment. So long as Jackson is President, the general tone of the 
 correspondence is sometimes impatient, but almost invariably hope- 
 ful. Catlett himself continues in the same letter as follows : 
 
 There is something within me however, that whispers that the mes- 
 sage was a message of expediency not intended to sway the Congress 
 from a just and generous measure, but to lull the jealousy of foreign 
 powers, and gull the national vanity of miserable Mexico, while the work 
 goes not the less surely on, and approaches the culmination of all that 
 you most desire ; — not only recognition but annexation likewise. 
 
 On the Texas side appears a strong and practically unanimous 
 desire for annexation, and confidence that it will not be long delayed. 
 In his letter of September 12, 1836, from Velasco, Henry M. Morfit, 
 the agent whom Jackson had sent to Texas, informed Forsyth, after 
 summarizing the conditions on which Burnet's cabinet had agreed 
 to offer the new-born republic to the United States, that 
 
 the desire of the people to be admitted into our confederacy is so 
 prevailing, that any conditions will be acceptable which will include the 
 guaranty of a republican form of government, and will not impair the 
 obligations of contracts. The old settlers are composed, for the most 
 part, of. industrious farmers, who are tired of the toils of war, and are' 
 anxious to raise up their families under the auspices of good laws, and 
 leave them the inheritance of a safe'' and free government.^ 
 
 Austin's instructions to Wharton, which are dated November 18, 
 1836, advise him that he is to make every effort to accomplish the 
 second great object of his mission — annexation, and they give a 
 lengthy and moderate discussion of the subject in almost every 
 aspect.'^ December 10, Austin wrote Wharton "*: 
 
 ^ Ibid., file 279. 
 
 2 House Ex. Doc. 35, Vol. 2, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 26-27. 
 '^Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 52. 
 ^Ibid., file 58. 
 
']'] G. p. Garrison 
 
 Public anxiety is unabated on the subject of annexation to the U. S. 
 The opinion in favor of that measure is much more decisive, if possible, 
 than when you left. It is therefore expected that you will press that 
 matter with as much earnestness as prudence will permit. 
 
 Nor did the Texans appear to be over-solicitous about the condi- 
 tions on which annexation was to be secured. Morfit's expression 
 on this point has been quoted already. The instructions to Wharton 
 state, in general terms, that he must guard the right of Texas to 
 become a state without delay on an equal footing with the others ; to 
 subdivide its territory into other states as might suit itself, the limit 
 of the number being fixed ; to retain possession of the public domain, 
 unless the United States assumed the Texas debt ; to have the acts 
 of its government held valid ; to be free from restrictions on slavery 
 not imposed on the other slaveholding states ; etc. One of the most 
 interesting features of the instructions is that which authorizes the 
 minister, in case the Rio Grande is seriously objected to as the bound- 
 ary line with Mexico, to agree to a line much farther north, which, 
 had it been adopted, would have left in possession of that country all 
 the Mexican settlements over which Texas had not fully established 
 jurisdiction. Another despatch dated December lo,^ and apparently 
 written subsequent to the one for that day already mentioned, adds 
 the following: 
 
 It is certainly desirable that Texas should enter the x^merican Union 
 at once, and undivided ; but should you discover that this condition, if 
 positively insisted upon, is likely materially to affect the main object, 
 which is annexation ; I am directed by the President to say, that you are 
 at liberty to waive it, and agree to a territorial Government, with the 
 necessary guarantees as to a state Govt., as soon as it is petitioned for. 
 This Govt, has too much confidence in the just and liberal principles by 
 which the United States are governed, to doubt that full and ample jus- 
 tice will not be done us in every respect. 
 
 The additional instructions given at the time of Hunt's appoint- 
 ment, which are dated December 31, 1836, and signed by J. P. Hen- 
 derson, acting secretary of state, inform him that the second main 
 object of his mission is : 
 
 The annexation of this Country to the United States either as a 
 seperate State to be on equal footing with the other States of the Union 
 or as a Territory with the right to admission into the Union as a State 
 when she can number a sufficient amount of population to entitle her to 
 admission according to the Laws of the United States ^ 
 
 It is easy to see that the complications of the afifair, which were 
 serious enough at the outset, but which grew rapidly as the negotia- 
 
 !//'/</., file 58. 
 '^ ihid., file 701. 
 
Movement for the Amiexation of Texas -]% 
 
 tions progressed, were such as to invite diplomatic chess play, and it 
 soon began. If the mother-country of Texas would not cultivate 
 sufficiently cordial relations with her runaway children, England and 
 France might ; and if the guards of the treaty portal refused to open 
 at their request, some other entrance to the old home might be found. 
 It may have been that the Texas diplomatists were not as smooth and 
 wary as Van Buren and Forsyth, but they soon showed themselves to 
 be resourceful. In the instructions by Acting Secretary of State 
 Henderson to Minister Hunt, quoted in the last paragraph, the argu- 
 ment is suggested to Mr. Hunt that 
 
 ii! the event of [the refusal of (?)] that Government to receive 
 this country mto the Union either as a State or as a Territory it may 
 beconie necessary for Texas to form a Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
 with England or some other European power which would forever and 
 entirely preclude the people of the United States from enjoying any of 
 the benefits resulting to Texas from the richness of her soil, commerce 
 etc etc These reasons may be very forcibly impressed particularly 
 upon the Representatives of the Northern States from whom we may 
 expect to meet the greatest opposition, because should Texas be attached 
 to the United States the immense consumption of those articles principallv 
 nianufactured in the Northern States will more than compensate for the 
 additional strength which its annexation will add to the political influence 
 of the south. 
 
 A little further along in the same document Henderson advises 
 Hunt as follows : 
 
 In the event that there should be doubts entertained whether a treaty 
 made with this Government for its annexation to the United States would 
 be ratified by a constitutional majority of the Senate of the United 
 States you are instructed to call the attention of the authorities of that 
 Government to the propriety and the practacability of passing a law by 
 both houses (in which it would require a bare majority) taking in this 
 Country as a part of her Territory, this' law could be passed, (provided 
 Congress has the power to do so) based upon the vote of the people of 
 lexas at the last election but in framing such an act great care should be 
 used in order to secure all of the rights of Texas and its citizens as fully 
 as you are instructed to have them attended to in any treaty which may 
 be made, if such an act is passed you can give that Government the 
 fullest assurance that it will be approved by this Government and people 
 But inasmuch as this is rather a novel position you will speak of it with 
 great prudence and caution. 
 
 This is the first definite suggestion which I have been able to 
 find of the expedient made so familiar by its later use in securing 
 annexation when the method by treaty had failed. The instructions 
 of Austin to Wharton, November i8, 1836, indicate the possibility 
 of a second available string for the annexation bow, but it is only 
 
 1 So in the original, but this word should have begun a new sentence. 
 
79 G. P. Gari'ison 
 
 by a somewhat uncertain implication. Wharton is to use his " dis- 
 cretion as to the proper mode of bringing . . . [the subject] before 
 the executive or Congress ". It may be that the use of the word 
 " Congress " is inadvertent, and that the meaning is that Wharton 
 shall simply use his discretion in seeking to secure favorable action 
 by the United States Senate. This construction, however, appears 
 improbable. It is more likely that the alternative form of Austin's 
 expression reflects the idea of a real alternative in the method by 
 which annexation may be obtained. His statement implies that the 
 subject may be laid either before the executive or before Congress, 
 and in either case Wharton is to use his discretion as to the w^y in 
 which he shall proceed. It is true that whenever Austin, in the 
 same instructions and in other documents, mentions the contem- 
 plated contract of annexation, he calls it a " treaty ", and in one 
 place he even says that annexation " must be effected by a formal 
 treaty which must be ratified by the Senate of Texas, in conformity 
 with the Constitution " ; but it seems likely that in most cases he is 
 using the word " treaty " rather in the general sense of an inter- 
 national agreement than in its technical significance in the United 
 States or the Republic of Texas. 
 
 The idea of annexation by act of Congress is found also in 
 another document originating in a quarter far distant from Texas, 
 and so nearly contemporaneous with Austin's letter to Wharton as 
 to preclude the likelihood of any direct connection between them. 
 This is the message of Governor McDuffie of South Carolina to the 
 legislature of that state on his retirement from office in 1836.^ He 
 said: 
 
 You are doubtless aware that the people of Texas, by an almost unan- 
 imous vote, have expressed their desire to be admitted into our confeder- 
 acy, and application will probably be made to congress for that purpose. 
 In my opinion, congress ought riot even to entertain such a proposition, 
 in the present state of the controversy. 
 
 The report made by the Senate Committee- on Federal Relations, 
 to which this part of the message was referred, expresses the convic- 
 tion that when Texas has established a de facto government clothed 
 with all the attributes of sovereignty and independence, the questions 
 of recognition and of annexation may safely be confided to Congress. 
 
 The recognition of the independence of Texas cleared the way for 
 the direct effort to secure annexation ; but the struggle involved had 
 shown the Texans how many and how great were the difficulties to 
 
 "^ Niles" Register, LI, 229-230. 
 
 2 Ibid., 277. The House report is ibid., 242. 
 
Movemejit for the Annexation of Texas 80 
 
 be overcome. Their desire was unchanged ; but enthusiasm was giv- 
 ing way to circumspection, and they were learning to curb their 
 eagerness. Five months were suffered to elapse before Hunt, who 
 was now sole minister of Texas at Washington,^ took up the matter 
 officially with the United States government. But, before this phase 
 of the movement can be considered, it becomes necessary to explain 
 the difficulties I have mentioned; and the most serious of them, I 
 need hardly say, arose from the growing opposition of the North to 
 slavery. 
 
 Up to the time of the Texan revolution, the influence of slavery 
 in the political and social development of Texas had been of some 
 importance, but it had not had the effect which historians have 
 usually represented. The colonization of Texas was but another 
 wave of the same tide of expansion that had already carried Anglo- 
 American civilization westward over the Alleghenies and across the 
 Mississippi. The causes of it had little connection with slavery. 
 The friction with Mexico brought about by the antislavery legisla- 
 tion of the Mexican government served for one or two brief periods 
 to retard the growth of the colonies, but it disappeared before 1830 
 and played no appreciable part in bringing on the revolution. Neither 
 was the material help given Texas from the United States in the 
 course of the revolution the result, in my opinion, of any systematic 
 thought for the expansion of slavery. The principal motive that 
 carried " volunteer immigrants ", as they were called, to Texas dur- 
 ing the latter part of 1835 and the first part of the following year is 
 well illustrated by an anecdote published in the Texas Almanac for 
 1861 (p. 75) and attributed to General H. D. McLeod. It is to the 
 effect that when Ward's battalion, which had been raised in Georgia, 
 was passing through Montgomery, Alabama, on its way to Texas in 
 the winter of 1835, it paraded for recruiting purposes. A flag at the 
 head of the column bore the motto " Texas and Liberty " ; but, as 
 the battalion marched along the street, a wit among the bystanders 
 suggested that the words be changed to " Texas, Liberty, and Land ". 
 This joke puts the matter in a nutshell. I am aware that some will 
 differ from me in the opinion just stated ; and, while my aims are 
 expository and not polemic, I regret that the limits of this paper 
 forbid any defense of my position. It is my intention to publish ere 
 long a statement of the evidence by which it is determined; but the 
 subject is too large for adequate treatment here and must therefore 
 be passed over for the present. 
 
 The struggle for annexation, however, centers about the slavery 
 issue ; but here again the point of view of our historians, it seems 
 
 1 Wharton had left the United States soon after recognition was secured. 
 
8 1 G. P. Gar7'ison 
 
 to me, has often been incorrect. Slavery is not to be charged with 
 the success of the movement. On the contrary, it alone roused an 
 opposition which came perilously near preventing, for a period that 
 no one can estimate, the acquisition of Texas and leaving it a barrier 
 to the westward extension of the United States, an agency for the 
 promotion of foreign interests, and a menace to our national unity. 
 That the slaveholding interest alone could not have accomplished 
 annexation goes without saying. The states it controlled did not 
 have votes enough for that in either house of Congress. The result 
 can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a triumph of the impulse 
 toward expansion which has so often manifested itself in our history 
 and against which the brave energy of John Quincy Adams and the 
 matchless eloquence of Clay and Webster were arrayed in vain. Had 
 there been no slavery in Texas, the triumph would have been 
 achieved with less than half the struggle. Had there been none in 
 either country, there would have been no struggle at all. If the 
 application of Texas had but come a few years earlier, it is probable 
 that recognition and annexation would have been secured in quick 
 succession and with comparative ease. The slavery issue would not 
 then have so compUcated the process ; nor is it to be supposed that 
 the risk of war with Mexico would have proved to be any effectual 
 hindrance. The recent Panama episode is teaching us a great deal 
 about ourselves, and I cannot believe that in the twenties and thirties 
 of the nineteenth century we were essentially different. 
 
 As the hands pointed, however, on the clock of destiny, the 
 annexation movement was ill-timed. While the quarrel of Texas 
 with Mexico was passing from difference and recrimination to de- 
 fiance and the rude arbitrament of war, the genius of Occidental 
 civilization had girded itself for mighty work on both sides of the 
 Atlantic. A broadening conception of the rights of man had begun to 
 threaten privilege in every quarter. The rising of the American 
 demos had overthrown the political aristocrats of the seaboard and 
 seated in the presidential chair the king of the western commonalty. 
 The July revolution had brought France a faint reminder of the 
 days of '89, and, as it spread, had given the throne of continental 
 Europe a warning shake. In England Parliamentary reform had 
 relieved the abuses of five hundred years, and the new philanthropy 
 had abolished slavery in all the colonies of Great Britain, and had 
 paid the bill. Finally, just at the time when Texas was engaged in 
 its desperate struggle against the Mexican invaders, the trumpet- 
 call to the " irrepressible conflict " was sounded by both sides on the 
 floor of the American Congress, where issue was joined concerning 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 82 
 
 the right of petition relative to slavery. The personality of Adams 
 and Calhoun, the two great leaders who stood over against each other 
 in this opening fight/ is a sufficient guaranty of the honesty and 
 strength of the convictions that clashed. It is, in fact, devotion to 
 their faith, religious, political, and social, that has given the Teutonic 
 stock world-wide supremacy. Though it has often inspired the de- 
 termined champions of error, in the long run it has always made for 
 truth and right. 
 
 The issue of annexation was thus involved from the outset with 
 that of the nationalization and expansion of slavery. The occasion 
 brought the most extensive use of the right that had been challenged 
 — so far as it applied to this distinctive Southern institution — that 
 our history has ever witnessed ; and when the stream of petitions 
 relative to Texas began to pour in upon Congress, it mingled with 
 a similar stream of those praying for the abolition of slavery in 
 the District of Columbia. Along with the petitions came legislative 
 resolutions from various states relating to the same subjects. The 
 people were becoming profoundly stirred ; and this sudden mani- 
 festation of unfamiliar forces threw most of the political leaders into 
 a state of absolute terror. Even Jackson adopted an attitude of 
 caution entirely foreign to his nature, while Van Buren studied the 
 situation and trimmed>^nd Clay, " thinking too precisely on the 
 event ", was driven to fatal irresolution. 
 
 Those who have gathered their knowledge of the relations of the 
 Republic of Texas with the United States from the standard his- 
 tories rather than from the sources will probably have the impression 
 that a harmonious outcry for recognition and annexation went up 
 from the slaveholding states as soon as the question was presented. 
 There was, however, one notable exception. In his message to the 
 South Carolina legislature near the end of the year 1836,^ the retir- 
 ing governor, George JMcDuffie, protested strongly against any action 
 on behalf of Texas. After a ringing argument in favor of guard- 
 ing the domestic institutions of the state against outside interference, 
 he went on to extend the doctrine to the case of Texas. The ex- 
 pressions in his message most in point are as follows : 
 
 I have looked with very deep concern, not unmingled with regret, 
 upon the occurrences which have taken place during the present year, in 
 various parts of the United States, relative to the civil war which is still 
 in progress, between the republic of Mexico and one of her revolted 
 
 1 I have not forgotten tlie Missouri Compromise, but I am inclined to tliink students 
 of American history will agree that the real beginning of the " irrepressible conflict '' 
 was in the struggle over the right of petition with reference to slavery. 
 
 '^ Ntles^ Registei-, LI, 229-230. 
 
S;^ G. P. Garrison 
 
 provinces. It is true that no country can be responsible for the sympa- 
 thies of its citizens ; but I am nevertheless utterly at a loss to perceive what 
 title either of the parties to this controversy can have to the sympathies of 
 the American people. If it be alleged that the insurgents of Texas are emi- 
 grants from the United States, it is obvious to reply that, by their voluntary 
 expatriation, under whatever circumstances of adventure, of speculation, 
 of honor, or of infamy, they have forfeited all claim to our fraternal 
 regard. . . . There is but too much reason to believe that many of them 
 have gone as mere adventurers, speculating upon the chances of estab- 
 lishing an independent government in Texas, and of seizing that im- 
 mense and fertile domain by the title of the sword. But be this as it 
 may, when they became citizens of Mexico, they became subject to the 
 constitution and laws of that country ; and whatever changes the Mexi- 
 can people may have since made in that constitution and those laws, they 
 are matters with which foreign states can have no concern, and of which 
 they have no right to take cognizance. I trust, therefore, that the state 
 of South Carolina will give no countenance, direct or indirect, open or 
 concealed, to ani^ acts which may compromit the neutrality of the United 
 States, or bring into question their plighted faith. . . . If we admit 
 Texas into our union, while Mexico in still waging war against that 
 province, with a view to re-establish her supremacy over it, we shall, by 
 the very «<:/ itself, make ouselves a party to the war. Nor can we take tl is 
 step, without incurring this heavy responsibility, until Mexico herself 
 shall recognize the independence of her revolted province. 
 
 The part of the message relative to Texas was referred to the 
 Committee on Foreign Relations in both the House and the Senate. 
 The House committee brought in a favorable report, which was 
 adopted,^ and the nature of which is sufficiently indicated by the 
 following extract : 
 
 The committee fully agree with his excellency on the propriety and 
 sound policy of the government of the United States maintaining a strict 
 neutrality with all foreign nations, and especially with Mexico in her 
 contest with Texas ; and that we are the last people who should set an 
 example of impertinent interference with the internal; concerns of other 
 states. . . . South Carolina cannot consent, under a supposed idea of 
 self-interest, to violate the sanctity of the law of nations, or that neutrality 
 which should always be guarded by the United States towards a foreign 
 nation engaged in an internal struggle. Under the present circumstances, 
 to acknowledge the independence of Texas and receive her into this 
 union, could be no less than a declaration of war against Mexico, and of 
 doubtful policy to the older slave-holding states. 
 
 These documents have been referred to thus at length because, 
 among other reasons, of the exceptional nature of the argument as 
 coming from Calhoun's own state, the very citadel of the slavery 
 interest, and especially from such a champion of that interest as 
 
 1 Niles' Register, LI, 242, 273. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 84 
 
 George McDuffie.^ To those who believe that annexation was due to 
 slavery alone, it should be profoundly instructive. 
 
 The Senate committee made an unfavorable report, which was 
 adopted " by nearly a unanimous vote "-. The report was presented 
 by Ex-governor James Hamilton, who soon became identified with 
 Texas ; but it contains nothing that stands out sufficiently for repro- 
 duction here. 
 
 In the interval between the act of recognition and the proffer 
 of annexation, the Texas minister at Washington, like Van Buren, 
 studied the situation, and made voluminous reports. These are of 
 great interest and value in following the tortuous course of the 
 administration as it sought to make up its mind. April 15, 1837, 
 Hunt wrote to Henderson from Vicksburg, Mississippi^, that he 
 thought a secret agent should be sent to England to purchase a 
 treaty there with valuable commercial concessions. Recognition by 
 England, he thought, would guarantee annexation. The South was 
 so ardent therefor that failure would dissolve the Union, and the 
 Northern politicians would yield before going to that extremity. He 
 went on to say that nothing had so increased the zeal of Southern 
 politicians for Texas as the question of John Quincy Adams in the 
 House whether it would be in order to present a petition from slaves. 
 By this act one of their worst enemies had helped them more than 
 " the most studied movements " of their best friends. Open negotia- 
 tions with Great Britain would probably prevent annexation by 
 provoking a paper issue with the Abolitionists, and action should be 
 taken in a way that would cause as little excitement as possible ; for 
 fanaticism would temporarily overrule the wisest measures. But 
 the Northerners were a law-abiding people ; and if a treaty of annex- 
 ation could be secured, the trouble would all be over. He added, 
 by the way, that, having secured recognition, and not expecting 
 favorable action as to annexation for the time, he thought it might 
 be best for him to visit Thomas H. Benton, who could do Texas 
 more service in that respect perhaps than any one else in the United 
 States. 
 
 ' McDuffie afterward became an ardent annexationist. As senator from South 
 Carolina, he voted for the joint resolution in 1S45 and made one of the strongest argu- 
 ments in its favor that the occasion called forth. Relative to this, Daniel Webster 
 remarked, in the course of a controversial tilt with McDuffie in the Senate, July 28, 
 1846 : " I think the most powerful argument ever addressed to the people of the United 
 States against the annexation of Texas was from the Governor of South Carolina ; and I 
 think the greatest speech in favor of it was made by the Senator from South Carolina — 
 idem peisoneni \sic'\ !" See Congressioual Globe, 29 Cong., i sess., 1 1 54. 
 
 2 Niles' Register, LI, 277. 
 
 8 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 714. 
 
85 G. P. Gar 7' is on 
 
 Two much more interesting letters than this were written by 
 Catlett to Henderson during Hunt's absence from Washington in 
 the spring of 1837. The first is dated April 29^ In it Catlett tells 
 a curious tale of how he had been suddenly summoned to the office 
 of the Secretary of State and informed by the chief clerk — by direc- 
 tion, of course, of the Secretary himself — that the department had 
 just received some important information from the United States 
 consul in the City of Mexico. It was to the effect that a resolu- 
 tion to sell Texas, " and as far south as might be deemed expedient ", 
 to the British government at twenty-five cents an acre had been 
 introduced at a secret session of the Mexican congress and would cer- 
 tainly be adopted. A question as to whether the consul's letter indi- 
 cated that the British government had offered to make the purchase, 
 or would agree to it, was answered in the negative. Extracts from 
 the letter including the most essential parts were requested and 
 obtained. They showed that the sale was proposed in order to 
 pay off the debt of sixty-eight million dollars due from Mexico to 
 English subjects. These extracts were despatched in a lengthy com- 
 munication dated May 7-, and containing matter of peculiar interest. 
 Catlett sent a copy of a letter which he had written to Forsyth on 
 May 2, and which serves to show that he had not neglected his 
 opportunity for an important move in the diplomatic game. He 
 thanked the Secretary very heartily for the information that had 
 been given, and said that this regard for the welfare of Texas would 
 " doubtless strengthen the filial feeling which it has always cherished 
 for its parent commonwealth ". He then inquired whether the 
 United States government thought Mexico's offer to Great Britain 
 would be accepted, and whether it w^ml^^take any steps to prevent 
 such an undesirable consummation. He went on to suggest the 
 danger that the British government might have made secret over- 
 tures to Mexico and that, in spite of the apparent unreasonableness 
 of the thing, it might be really seeking to possess itself of Texas. 
 He excused himself for asking such questions as the letter contained 
 by setting forth the deep solicitude the government of Texas would 
 naturally feel concerning the subject, and the impossibility of its 
 obtaining any direct information. In a paragraph following the 
 copy of this letter Catlett explained to Henderson that he wrote the 
 letter to call the attention of Forsyth to the fact that the subject was 
 as important to the United States as to Texas, and that their interests 
 in respect to it were identical. He wished also, of course, to elicit 
 such information as he could. 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 284. 
 
 '^ Ibid., file 285. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 86 
 
 Forsyth was doubtless sorry that he had allowed the cat to peep 
 at all from the bag- he was holding, and the letter of the Texas 
 charge must have cost the Secretary of State at least one sleepless 
 night. Catlett went on to recount, in his despatch of May 7 detailing 
 the course of the affair, that the next day (May 3) he had a note 
 from the chief clerk of the Department of State asking him to call 
 at his convenience, and that he presented himself at the office the 
 same morning. As he entered, Mr. Forsyth, who was just leaving 
 the room, saw him and invited him to an interview, which had evi- 
 dently not been intended for that morning, and a very interesting 
 colloquy ensued. Forsyth said he thought Catlett had better take 
 back his letter ; that some expressions in it, though their use was 
 justified, might lead to future misunderstanding. He referred espe- 
 cially to "Parent Commonwealth''. Catlett replied that the ex- 
 pression was not meant to indicate that Texas owed its origin to the 
 United States government, but was intended only in compliment, 
 since the Texans were nearly all natives of the United States, and 
 since they had adopted the same form of government and the same 
 institutions as those of that country. But Forsyth " said that it was 
 an expression which would still be made use of by the enemies of the 
 administration and by all such as were inimical to the United States 
 and to Texas;- — that all correspondence in relation to Texas would 
 probably be called for next winter by congress, and that, while the 
 best feeling and wishes for the prosperity of Texas were cherished, 
 it behooved him to be careful to make no admissions, which might 
 be interpreted as showing an undue interest in the success of our 
 revolutionary struggle ". To this Catlett answered that he knew 
 " the situation of the United States was a delicate and embarrassing 
 one, and that it was by no means . . . [his] desire to render it 
 more so, but that the identity of interests between the countries was 
 so striking and apparent, and pointed so clearly to the United States 
 preventing Great Britain from negotiating for the purchase of 
 Texas, that . . . [he] could not but encourage the hope, that some 
 assurance would be given to ... [his] Government, that if any 
 negotiations were opened between Great Britain and Mexico, the 
 United States would immediately interfere ". " In what way could 
 we interfere?", asked Forsyth. " By distinctly intimating", replied 
 Catlett, " to the British Govt that the United States could never 
 consent to Great Britain's obtaining possession of Texas ". Forsyth 
 suggested, " Great Britain in return might say the same to us " ; the 
 answer to which was, " If she did, it would be easy to reply that the 
 United States would make no such atten-,pt, that she had already 
 
8; O. P. Garrison 
 
 acknowledged the separate existence of Texas as an Independent 
 Republic, but that if it were the unequivocal desire of the people 
 of Texas to be admitted into this Union, that their wishes would be 
 properly respected and listened to ". At this point the exchange of 
 argument ended, and Forsyth went on to say that, while the subject 
 was one of common interest, he had no idea that Great Britain would 
 accept the Mexican offer or that any overtures for the purchase of 
 Texas had come from that country ; that he would cheerfully com- 
 municate all information he could give that might be of interest to 
 Texas, but he could express no opinion as to the policy that would 
 be pursued by the United States ; " that notwithstanding the numer- 
 ous ties by \\(hich the people of the two countries were virtually 
 bound together, it was necessary that the intercourse between their 
 Governments should be carried on as if there was no peculiar rela- 
 tionship between them ; — that some of the expressions in . . . 
 [Catlett's] letter might be referred to on some future occasion as 
 showing that an undue interest had been taken by the Government 
 of the United States in t-he affairs of Texas and that he would prefer 
 returning it to . . . [him]". Catlett then took back the letter, be- 
 cause, as he explained, its purpose had been accomplished. He 
 assured Forsyth, with a refreshing assumption of innocence, that 
 inexperience alone had prompted the writing, and the conference 
 was at an end. In his letter to Henderson Catlett added that he had 
 obtained information from Mr. Cralle, on which he relied as correct, 
 that Great Britain had been approached by Mexico some time before 
 on the subject of purchasing Texas and had given a decided refusal. 
 Another communication from Catlett to Henderson, written May 
 25 and 3o\ reported that he thought the administration would use 
 every exertion to keep down the question of annexation, but that a 
 strong effort would be made by the South to have the matter decided 
 by the ensuing Congress. He said Forsyth had told him that if 
 Congress had not tied the hands of the executive, Mexico would 
 already have been taught to respect the rights of American com- 
 merce. The despatch closed with the statement that, while many 
 persons in the United States regarded the issue as doubtful, it was 
 clear " to the sagacious and intelligent " that the government of 
 that country had so far compromised itself by the act of recognition 
 as to have made common cause with Texas ; that only the imprudence 
 of Texas could prevent the ties between them from increasing " in 
 strength and holiness " ; and that it was impossible that the deport- 
 ment of Texas " should be regulated by too scrupulous an adherence 
 to the established principles of international law "'. 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence of 'I'exas, file 306. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 88 
 
 As to the delay in proposing annexation, the correspondence goes 
 to show that it was due to the refusal of the United States authorities 
 to entertain the proposition so long as Mexico persisted in attempting 
 to reconquer Texas. A despatch from Hunt to Henderson, dated 
 Vicksburg, May 30. 1837^, states that Forsyth had distinctly so de- 
 scribed the attitude of the administration. It can scarcely be 
 doubted, however, that the refusal was due still more to the fear of 
 a divided and uncertain public sentiment in the United States. 
 
 On July II, Hunt reported from Washington- that he had been 
 accorded an interview with President Van Buren, and had expressed 
 to him the hope of nearer relations between the United States and 
 Texas than mere diplomatic intercourse The President had replied 
 warmly, with dignity, and at length, but the letter reveals in what he 
 said only " glittering . . . generalities ". Hunt remarked that, in 
 accordance with his instructions from the government of Texas, he 
 . would commit himself to no treaty stipulations until he was advised 
 further. 
 
 In the same communication Hunt said that, while he had first 
 urged a secret mission to Great Britain, he had finally become con- 
 vinced that the appointment of a minister was wise.'^ The mere 
 announcement had so aroused the Southern states to the danger of 
 losing Texas that they would present an unbroken line of resistance 
 to any anti-Texas administration. He thought the people south of 
 the Potomac would prefer the dissolution of the Union to the loss of 
 Texas. They and the people of Texas had common interests, origin, 
 and history, and " in this age of fanaticism on the subject of slavery " 
 they would force their government to adopt the Texans, or would 
 create a new order of things. He was sanguine that the administra- 
 tion would be compelled to make annexation a " leading issue ". 
 
 Hunt then proceeded to define the attitude of certain prominent 
 men and to describe, in general terms, the whole situation. Webster 
 had entered the field for the presidency. He and his friends were 
 expected to be decidedly hostile to Texas. He had raised the cry 
 of Southern preponderance in the councils of the Union. His in- 
 fluence was in the northern and middle states, but was dominant only 
 in Massachusetts and Vermont; his opposition had solidified the 
 South warmly for Texas. The Cabinet was said to be sectionally 
 divided on the question of annexation, but Hunt had it on good 
 authority that Woodbury would support the views of the President, 
 which would give Texas a majority of one. Clamor about financial 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 718. 
 
 •^ Ibid., file 719. 
 
 * Henderson had been appointed. 
 
89 G. P. Garrison 
 
 troubles had been weakening the Jackson party, and in New York 
 and Pennsylvania, where the President was considered invincible, 
 recent events seemed ominous of defeat. In the south everything 
 depended on his course as to slavery, and nothing else would help him 
 there so much as hearty support of annexation. Hunt had thought 
 it not unwise to encourage the idea that Texas would stand by the 
 administration under whose auspices it entered the Union. He sug- 
 gested also the propriety of his being duly authorized, if the subject 
 of annexation should come before the next Congress, " to employ 
 some efficient and able person, having influence with the members of 
 the non-slaveholding states, to counteract the intrigues of Mr. Web- 
 ster and the enemies of Texas ". He repeated that " a well paid, 
 efficient, and if you please, secret agent, acting under my direction 
 and having influence with the members of the non-slaveholding 
 States, would be a most important enablement unto the success of our 
 cause ". He advised against an attempt at conciliation of the party 
 " known ... as Northern fanatics " ; for that might impair " that 
 firm, devoted and enthusiastic unanimity of the South, which is, 
 indeed, our main support ". 
 
 August 4, 1837,^ came the long-delayed proposal of annexation 
 in a formal communication from Hunt to Forsyth. The Texas min- 
 ister sketched the history of that country and said that it sought 
 annexation because of its kinship in blood, language, and institutions 
 with the United States. He gave its estimated area and population, 
 and a brief statement of its resources. Texas, he said, neither feared 
 reconquest by Mexico, nor sought protection against European in- 
 terference. It offered a market for all agricultural products of the 
 United States except sugar and -cotton. Delay might be fatal to 
 annexation, for Texas was establishing relations with foreign powers 
 that might develop insurmountable obstacles ; and it might, by means 
 of commercial treaties having special relation to the two states men- 
 tioned, and because of its better adapted soil, rival the United States 
 in the production of both and drain away the population from that 
 country. If Texas remained independent, the very similarity be- 
 tween the two countries would bring about a conflict of interests. 
 Annexation would insure the United States control of the Gulf of 
 Mexico, and might contribute to peace with the Indians on the 
 frontier of the two countries. The question was asked " in the name 
 of national honor, humanity, and justice " if a nation whose career 
 had been marked by constant violation of treaty obligations, by 
 licentious revolutions, and by shameful mistreatment of its people 
 
 1 House Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., I scss., pp. 2-1 1. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 90 
 
 had not " thereby forfeited all claims to the respect of the Govern- 
 ments of civilized nations ". 
 
 A letter from Hunt to R. A. Irion^ written the same day reported 
 this formal opening of negotiations to the government of Texas. 
 The minister said that he still hoped for annexation, but the course 
 of the official newspaper (the Globe) had not been encouraging. 
 Hunt's friend and relative, John C. Jones of North Carolina, who 
 was intimate with the editor, Mr. Blair, had sought to influence him 
 to support annexation, but had failed. Blair's private opinions were 
 in favor of it, but the President had instructed him to be neutral for 
 a time. Van Buren would favor the most popular course as soon as 
 he ascertained what it was. 
 
 August 10, Hunt wrote Irion^ concerning the proposal made six 
 days before : " I thought it best to say nothing of the slave question, 
 which as you know is more important than any other connected with 
 the subject of annexation ". The President of the United States 
 seemed anxious to suppress the desire which Hunt had shown to 
 push on the movement; and one of Van Buren's intimate friends 
 had urged the deferring of the project so strongly that a show of 
 resentment had been required in order to get rid of him. This 
 gentleman was told bv Hunt that, if annexation failed, the President 
 and his advisers would be responsible for the result, which might be 
 fatal to the Union. The Texas minister remarked in passing that he 
 himself was ardently attached to the Union, and that he thought 
 annexation would prolong, if not perpetuate it. His fears concern- 
 ing Van Buren's attitude led him to suggest that Irion should address 
 a proposal for annexation to some member of Congress to be pre- 
 sented to that body. The name was to be left blank for Hunt to fill 
 in when the occasion came for the use of the document. A postscript 
 dated August 11 said that Hunt had just ascertained Forsyth to be 
 violently opposed to annexation. 
 
 Not till August 25, did Forsyth reply to the proposal of annexa- 
 tion. His answer^ disclaimed at the outset any unfriendly spirit 
 toward Texas. This was followed up by declining to look into the 
 historical facts recited by Hunt and by expressing the hope that the 
 act of recognition would lead Texas to cherish close relations with 
 the United States and abstain from connections detrimental to that 
 country. The proposed acquisition of territory would be different 
 
 ' Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 726. Irion had succeeded J. P. Hen- 
 derson as secretary of state. 
 
 ■^/6id., file 728. 
 
 ^ House Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., pp. 11-13. The refusal of the proposition, 
 while perfectly clear, was not in direct terms, but only by implication. 
 
91 G. P. Garrison 
 
 from any the United States had ever made, inasmuch as it involved 
 the absorption of an independent sovereignty. It involved also a 
 question of a war with Mexico, to which country the United States 
 was under treaty obligations that precluded even reserving the pro- 
 posal for future consideration. 
 
 The rejoinder of Hunt,^ which was dated September 12, argued 
 that the negotiations for the purchase of Texas from Mexico before 
 Mexican independence had been acknowledged by Spain involved 
 as great a breach of treaty obligations, if the principle on which the 
 United States claimed to act could be allowed, as the acceptance of 
 the proffered annexation. Undeniably, he thought, a sovereign 
 power had as much right to dispose of the whole of itself to another 
 as to dispose of a part. Texas did not feel under obligations to fol- 
 low any special foreign policy because it had been recognized first 
 by the United States ; and if its relations should become such as 
 seriously to affect the interests of that country, he thought complaint 
 would be unreasonable after the offer of all it had to give had been 
 declined. But he assured the Secretary of State, and through him 
 the President of the United States, that the prompt and decisive 
 rejection of the proposal would not be charged to unfriendliness. 
 Six days later Hunt wrote Irion ^ that he hoped a resolution would 
 be introduced in one of the houses of Congress at the approaching 
 regular session that would request the Texas minister to state the 
 terms on which Texas sought admission into the Union, and that a 
 motion to accept the terms would be adopted by both houses. The 
 President would add his approval. 
 
 For about a year from this time forward the despatches tell a 
 tale of daily alternating hopes and fears, with the prospect of annex- 
 ation gradually on the decline. October 20, 1837, Hunt wrote Irion-^ 
 that the state of the question was " delicate and precarious ". Suc- 
 cess seemed to depend on war between the United States and Mexico. 
 The friends of the measure, taking their cue from the President and 
 the Cabinet, were begging for time to save the party in the north, 
 while Hunt himself was urging the danger of alienating the South 
 by delay. He had threatened, in conversation with an influential 
 friend of Van Buren's, to ask the Texas government for a recall; 
 but a communication so hedged about with secrecy that he could not 
 even state its substance in the despatch induced him to remain. On 
 the next day, October 21, P. W. Grayson, who had just come from 
 Texas to the assistance of Hunt, wrote President Houston a sup- 
 
 1 House Ex. Doc. 40, 25 Cong., i sess., pp. 14-18. 
 
 2 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 732. 
 ^Ibid., file 736. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 92 
 
 plementary note, in which he said that the annexationists were then 
 depending much on Clay to lead the fight for the measure if the 
 Cabinet continued its equivocal course; and he made the interesting 
 observation by the way that Hunt's letters would show " that even 
 the old fanatic J. O. Adams is committed for the acquisition of 
 Texas". Hunt, in a letter of November 15 to Irion,^ represents 
 Forsyth as being then " a warm advocate for the measure of annexa- 
 tion and for having it accomplished as early as possible ". The 
 friends of the measure were increasing very fast in the west. Hunt 
 was informed that there was -not a single dissentient in the IlHnois 
 delegation. Senator Allen of Ohio favored the measure. So did 
 both the senators from Michigan personally, and they promised to 
 do so officially if their constituents could be reconciled to it. But 
 December 7, Grayson reports to Houston that " there is no solid 
 foundation on luhich to build a hope that the measure can now 
 he carried . . . both parties here are afraid to move in the matter 
 for fear of losing popularity in the North ". 
 
 On January 4, 1838, was initiated the attempt, so often suggested 
 in the letters of Hunt and Grayson, to accomplish annexation by Con- 
 gressional action. Naturally the work began in the Senate. There 
 were found the most determined and aggressive champions of the 
 measure ; and initiative by that body would not seem too great a 
 departure from the well-trodden paths of diplomacy. It should be 
 observed, in fact, that the plan does not seem, for the time, to have 
 contemplated action by the legislative "independently of the treaty- 
 making power, but only such a step as would force the hand of the 
 unwilling executive and push him into negotiations. On the day 
 named, Preston of South Carolina introduced in the Senate a resolu- 
 tion sounding the now famous political war-cry of " reannexation " 
 and asserting the desirability and expediency of resuming possession 
 of Texas, which was declared to have been " surrendered " in 1819. 
 Three months later he spoke for two hours in support of his resolu- 
 tion. The paralyzing effect of the subject is sufficiently illustrated 
 by the fact that, though the Senate has never been famous for 
 " dumb sittings ", when he sat down there seemed to be no one else 
 that wished to say a word. Walker, however, was not present. 
 June 14, the resolution was taken up again and tabled by the decisive 
 vote of 24 to 14." How the question of annexation was raised dur- 
 ing the same session in the House, and how it was dealt with will 
 appear further on. 
 
 ^ Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 735. 
 ^JVi/ts' Register, LIV, 255. 
 
93 G. P. Garrison 
 
 By the end of January, 1838, Hunt began to consider the outlook 
 for annexation hopeless. On the thirty-first of that month he sent 
 Irion a long communication' describing the contemporaneous aspect 
 of the movement in detail. He was confident that he had fully 
 ascertained the views of the administration and the general feeling 
 in Congress, and he wrote, " I can no longer repel the conviction that 
 the measure is utterly impracticable under existing circumstances ". 
 His despatch is a confidentially frank, searching, and faithful review 
 of the situation. After remarking that the acquisition of Texas had 
 been the settled policy of the United States for twelve years, as the 
 instructions of Secretaries of State Clay, Van Buren, McLane, and 
 Forsyth to ministers in Mexico showed clearly, and after stating that 
 the President and several of the Cabinet still wished it, he continues : 
 
 But hampered as they are by their party trammels on the one hand, 
 and their treaty obligations with Mexico on the other, by the furious 
 opposition of all the free States, by the fear of incurring the charge of 
 false dealing and injustice, and of involving this country in a war in 
 which they are now doubtful whether they would even be supported by a 
 majority of their own citizens, and which would be at once branded by 
 their enemies at home and abroad as an unjust war, instigated for the 
 very purpose of gaining possession of Texas and for no other, they dare 
 not and will not come out openly for the measure, so long as the relative 
 position of the three parties continues the same as it is at present. 
 
 Hunt then goes on to say that he had relied for success on a 
 declaration of war by the United States against Mexico, which had 
 finally become altogether improbable. " If the United States desire 
 Texas ", he says, " the proposition should now come from them. Our 
 true policy now, in every aspect of view, is to appear indififerent upon 
 the subject, and leave it for this government to solicit of us the 
 consummation of a measure which, I am well assured will be the 
 more desired by them, the less solicitous we appear about it our- 
 selves." Describing the situation in Congress, he expresses the fear 
 that Preston's resolutions will be tabled, and then adds : 
 
 In the course of a confidential conversation, which I had with Mr. 
 Clay, a few days since, he assured me that he was friendly to the annexa- 
 tion of Texas, but that in his opinion, the time had not yet arrived when 
 the question could be taken up in congress with any probability of suc- 
 cess. Petitions upon petitions still continue daily pouring in against us 
 from the North and East. 
 
 Finally, some lines written later say that the hopes of the annex- 
 ationists have just been revived by a report of prospective changes 
 in the Cabinet and the recently developed uneasiness of the adminis- 
 
 ' Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 743. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 94 
 
 tration over the probability of a treaty between Texas and Great 
 Britain. 
 
 Early in February Hunt writes again/ this time in a most hopeful 
 strain. He has been led to believe that the United States govern- 
 ment is on the point of taking active steps toward annexation. In a 
 strictly confidential interview with Calhoun, saving the privilege of 
 communication with the Texas government, he has learned that the 
 administration is considering the policy of despatching a private mis- 
 sion to Mexico to secure the acquiescence of that country in the 
 annexation movement. Calhoun has just received a note from a 
 member of the Cabinet which leaves little doubt that the mission 
 would result favorably, as information lately obtained would prove. 
 Hunt is of the opinion that the unusual energy of the government is 
 due mainly to the fact that he has informed Forsyth of his intention 
 to ask to be recalled. 
 
 But the prospect of a revival of the movement was not realized. 
 In March Hunt wrote- that he was gratified to receive instructions 
 from President Lamar to show no further solicitude for annexation, 
 and a few days later he reported^ that several members of Congress 
 from the south had expressed their intention, if Texas was not 
 annexed to the Union, to " advocate its annexation to the slave 
 holding states ". March 12, he wrote* that, in his opinion and " that 
 of many distinguished gentlemen from the South ", unless Texas was 
 annexed, the Union would soon be dissolved because of Northern 
 interference with slavery in the south, which annexation would pre- 
 vent by giving the South preponderance in the Senate. " Domestic 
 slavery ", he said, " in the United States and Texas, must, from 
 various circumstances, stand or fall together." The failure of 
 annexation would be at the risk of civil war in the Union, " for the 
 fanatical spirit of abolition is unquestionably on the increase " ; but 
 the' success of the measure would so check that spirit as to give the 
 slaveholding states " perfect security ". 
 
 Meanwhile the House was engaged in a vain struggle to keep 
 back the question, which was seeking entry by the door of petition. 
 This door to legislative consideration it had been sought practically 
 to close against whatever might serve to promote the agitation of 
 the slavery issue, but this could not be efifectually done with men like 
 John Quincy Adams in the House. The recognition of the inde- 
 pendence of Texas in March, 1837, had brought the subject of 
 
 1 February 3, Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 744. 
 
 2 March 3, ibid., file 745. 
 
 3 March 9, ibid. , file 746. 
 ^'Ibid., file 747. 
 
95 G. F. Garrison 
 
 annexation, hitherto in the background, now openly to the front. 
 The proposal made in August and its prompt rejection have been 
 referred to already, and the claim of the conservatives and the peace 
 makers now was that the question had been disposed of ; but Adams 
 refused to believe it. During the special session of the Twenty-fifth 
 Congress, which met in September, 1837, and the regular session 
 following, memorials and petitions against the annexation of Texas 
 signed by multiplied thousands poured in and grew upon the table 
 of the House into a mass that Howard of Maryland, chairman of 
 the Committee on Foreign Relations, said might be measured by 
 cubic feet. They seem to have come mainly from Massachusetts, 
 Pennsylvania, and Ohio. A few counter-petitions from the South 
 came in, but they were evidently intended to bring that method of 
 dealing with the subject into contempt; for the Southern members 
 of Congress had set their faces sternly against it. But Carter of 
 Tennessee, who doubted the expediency of annexation, stated in the 
 House on July 13, 1838, that it had been difficult to restrain the 
 masses in the south from petitioning Congress in its favor. The 
 House, on December 12, 1837, had by a vote of 127 to 68 laid the 
 whole subject of annexation, with the papers relating to it, on the 
 table without reference ; but through an inadvertence, as was after- 
 ward claimed, the petitions on the subject had been subsequently 
 allowed to go to the Committee on Foreign Relations. On June 13, 
 1838, a resolution was reported in the House from that committee 
 discharging it from further consideration of the subject. The next 
 day Waddy Thompson, from South Carolina, offered an amend- 
 ment directing the President to take the proper steps for the annex- 
 ation of Texas as soon as it could be done " consistently with the 
 treaty stipulations of this government ". On the fifteenth Adams 
 moved to recommit the report with instructions to bring in a resolu- 
 tion containing the declaration " That any attempt by act of con- 
 gress or by treaty to annex the republic of Texas to this union would 
 be a usurpation of power, unlawful and void, and which it would be 
 the right and the duty of the free people of the union to resist and 
 annul ". On the sixteenth he took the floor in support of his motion 
 and consumed the morning hour from then till July 7, the last work- 
 ing-day of the session but one. This made any action on the matter, 
 and any answer to his argument, meanwhile alike impossible.^ 
 
 By this time the ardor of Texas itself was abating. President 
 Houston instructed Anson Jones, who took the place of Hunt as min- 
 ister to the United States in the summer of 1838, formally to with- 
 
 1 Niks' Register, LIV, 256, 332, passim. 
 
Movement for the Annexation of Texas 96 
 
 draw the proposal for annexation, and this was done October 12.* 
 At the end of the year the presidency of Texas passed from Houston 
 to Lamar, who was strongly opposed to annexation, and who so ex- 
 pressed himself in his first message to the Texan congress. A joint 
 resolution of that body, approved January 23, 1839,^ ratified the 
 withdrawal of the proposition. The people of Texas gave consent 
 by silence, and the first stage of the movement was over. 
 
 George P. Garrison. 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, file 947. 
 
 2 La7vs of the Republic of Texas, passed the First Session of Third Congress, iSjg 
 (Houston, 1839), 75. 
 
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