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THE FIRST DAY 
 
 QP THE 
 
 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 DELIVEUEI) BEFORE THE 
 
 HISTOKICAL SOCIETY OF I^ENNSYLVANIA, 
 
 On the 8th of March. 1880. 
 
 CHAPMAN BIDDLE, 
 
 (Formerly Colonel of the One Hundred and Twenty-First, Pennsylvaniu Volunteer?. 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., PHILADELPHIA. 
 
 188 0. 
 
THE FIRST DAY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
 
 HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
 
 On THE Sth of March, 1880. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHAPMAN BIDDLE, 
 
 (Formerly Colonel of the One Hundred and Twenty-First Pennsylvania Volunteers.) 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO., PHILADELPHIA. 
 
 188 0. 
 
THE FIRST DAY 
 
 OP THE 
 
 BATTLE OK GETTYSBURG. 
 
 The failure of Hooker in the early part of the month of May of 
 the year 1863 at Chancellorsville, following within a few^ short months 
 the repulse of the Army of the Potomac at Frederickshurg, produced 
 a profoundly painful impression on the public mind in the Northern 
 States. For a second time it became necessary for the Army of the 
 Potomac to recross the Rappahannock, and to seek security on the com- 
 manding heights of Staiford, while it prepared itself for a renewal of 
 the contest which every lover of the Union most earnestly hoped might 
 lead to favorable results. Notwithstanding his recent and signal suc- 
 cess, Lee fully realized the fact that it had been achieved, to use the 
 language of Longstreet, "at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen 
 such victories would have ruined" him ; or as I^ee himself subsequently 
 stated in conversation to IMajor Seddon, "At Chancellorsville we gained 
 another victory ; our people were wild with delight. I, on the contrary, 
 was more depressed than after Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, 
 and again we had gained not an inch of ground, and the enemy could 
 not be pursued." ..." I considered the })roblem in every possible 
 phase, and to my mind it resolved itself into the choice of one of two 
 things, — either to retire on Richmond and stand a siege, which must 
 ultimately have ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsylvania. I 
 chose the latter." For in his judgment sound military policy required 
 that he should not only assume the aggressive, but that he should trans- 
 fer the theatre of the war to the north of the Potomac, where the country 
 had been almost entirely exempt from its devastation and horrors. 
 
 3 
 
Other coiisidcrations, too, of even greater importance were intimately 
 coiinecteil with tlie military ones. The material resonrces of the South 
 had already snllenHl ^really, and were scarcely a<le(jnate to the uninter- 
 mittent demands which had Ixcn, and which were still Iil<<|y to he, 
 made upon them if the stru<j:<;Ie were mu<h longer protracted, and a 
 successful termination of the war on their j)art seemed to the relleeting 
 ]M)rtion of the Southern peoj)li- to 1m' somewhat probh'matical without 
 either the support <»r the countenance of lOn^rland and France. For 
 this latter object the recognition of the independence of the Confederacy 
 wa.s vital, hut it had from one cause or other, however, l)een postiwned 
 from time to time, chiefly, as was commonly suj)posed, by the appre- 
 hension of the governments of those countries of rashly committing 
 themselves to an act which might in the future involve them in inter- 
 national eompliaitions with the United States of a serious nature. A 
 successful invasion of the North, however, would be succeeded by con- 
 sequences which the Cabinet of Richmond not unreasonably believed 
 would lead to the realization of their earnest (lc>ircs. Hence under 
 these combined i)oliticaI and military considerations a plan of campaign 
 was prepared without delay and speedily put in execution. In his tirst 
 or preliminary official report of the battle of Gettysburg, General Lee 
 thus outlines his views upon the subject: '' The corresponding move- 
 ments on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us 
 would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow 
 at the army" of General Hooker, — that in any event that army would 
 be compelled to leave Virginia, that the enemy's plan of campaign 
 be broken up, and that " in addition to these advantages it was hoped 
 that other valuable results might be attained by military success." As 
 one of these other results it has been stated with a certain degree of 
 ])ositiveness in some of the Southern newsj)apers that it was part of 
 Lee's purpose to fire and in this manner destroy the anthracite mines of 
 Pennsylvania. But be this as it may, Lee in his final report, of Jan- 
 uary, 1864, of the Pennsylvania campaign, etc., makes no allusion to 
 any anticipated additional valuable results. General Early, \vlio has 
 since, with a number of others, discussed the subject of the propriety of 
 the invasion, considers that it was, at the time it was undertaken, " a wise 
 and judicious movement, notwithstanding the fate that attende<l it."' 
 
 The first step towards the execution of the new plan was the reor- 
 ganization of the Army of Northern Virginia, which was then formed 
 into three coi'ps d^aiinre, each under the command of a lieutenant-gen- 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 56. 
 
eral. Longstreet was assigned to the first corps, composed of the di- 
 visions of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood; the second, comprising the 
 divisions of Early, Rodes, and Johnson, was placed under the command 
 of Ewcll, in accordance with a request made by Stonewall Jackson, on 
 his death-bed, out of solicitude for the welfare of his veterans;^ and 
 the third, whose divisions were under Anderson, Ileth, and Pender, 
 was assigned to A. P. Hill. The cavalry, Avhich had also been strength- 
 ened by several new brigades from the South, was formed into a separate 
 corps of three divisions, commanded by Hampton, Fitz-Hugh Lee, and 
 William H. F. Lee.- Major Von Borcke, a Prussian officer, who was 
 the assistant adjutant and inspector-general of General J. E. B. Stuart, 
 in referring to this body of cavalry, remarks that " the magnificent 
 spectacle of so many thousand troopers splendidly mounted made the 
 heart swell M'ith pride, and impressed one with the conviction that 
 nothing could resist the attack of such a body of troops."^ In the 
 opinion of General Lee's military secretary, the recent victories of the 
 Confederate army, " with the care bestowed on its reorganization, equip- 
 ment, and discipline," rendered "its spirit and efficiency unsurpassed 
 by any army of modern times."* 
 
 Longstreet, one of Lee's best lieutenants, and on whom great re- 
 liance was placed, doubted, hoAvever, from the first the wisdom of the 
 proposed invasion from a military point of view, and urged upon his 
 chief that the campaign could only be brought to a successful issue pro- 
 vided it M'cre made " offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics." 
 Indeed, he went so far as to })resent, as a substitute, an entirely different 
 plan, one which contemplated " the idea of a Western forward move- 
 ment." However just or otherwise Longstreet's views may have been, 
 it is not important now to discuss them, though it may be mentioned 
 that Early has declared Longstreet's plan of a tactical defense to be " a 
 simple absurdity." "^ At all events, Lee remained fixed in and acted 
 upon his opinion, and when recurring to the subject a short time before 
 Grant cro&sed the Rapidan, in the spring of 1864, said to General 
 Heth, in the course of conversation, "If I could do so, — unfortunately 
 I cannot, — I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. 
 I believe it to be our true policy notwithstanding tiie failure of last 
 year. An invasion of tiie enemy's country breaks up all of his pre- 
 conceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist 
 
 1 Von Borcke, p. 399. ^ idem, p. 399. s idem, p. 402. 
 
 * Southern Historical Society l^apers, vol. iv. p. 119. 
 ^ Idem, vol. iv. p. 281, note. 
 
6 
 
 wliilc llicic on Ills rosourocs. The (HKistion i^^ food for this ni'my ^ivcs 
 inc iiKtrc tn)iil>lf ami iiiioasincss tliaii crrriftliint/ r/.sr romhiiwil ; i\w. al>- 
 sciHH! (if the army rioin \'iij;iiiia i^ivcs our j)co|»I(' an oj)j»(»rtimity to 
 collect supplies ahead. The ie<j;itiinate fruits of" a victory if gjiincil in 
 I*eniisvlvaiiia could he more r«'adily reajx-d than on <»iir own soil. We 
 would have heen in a few days' march of I'iiiladelphia, and the occu- 
 pation of thai city would have ^iven us peace.'" 
 
 When the reorganization of the army and other preliminaries had 
 lu'cn comi)leted, Lee, on the od of June, commenced his Northern 
 movement. The division of McLaws marchin<r out of Frederickshurg 
 for Cnli>ej)per Court-House, followed by Ewell's cori)S on the 4th and 
 5th; Hood's division and Stuart's cavalry moving at the same time. 
 iSo that by the 8th of that month two of the corj)s and .Stuart's cavalry 
 had concentrated at Cul})epper Court-House. 
 
 Karlv in June, Hooker had obtained information that Lee was grad- 
 ually withdrawing his forces from Fredericksburg in the direction of 
 Culpepper Court-House. To test the accuracy of this intelligence, 
 which, if true, was most important in its relation to the camj)aign then 
 about opening, he directed a rcconnoissance in force to be made by the 
 cavalry, sup})orted by two small brigades of infantry. The result of 
 this reconnoissance, which, if its objects are kept in view, was altogether 
 favorable, has not only been magnified into a severe repulse on the part 
 of the Union forces by General Lee, but Longstreet has even censured 
 Ijee for failing to pursue his advantage by hurling the heavy Confed- 
 erate corps then at Culpe[)per Court-House u})ou the Federal detach- 
 ment. Assuredly the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac have no 
 reason to regret the issue of the engagement at Beverly Ford, or, as it 
 is sometimes termed, that of Brandy Station, It was the first occasion 
 when as a body it went into action, and whilst perhaps, if the divisions 
 of Buford and (iregg had been connected from the first, instead of 
 having been separated by an interval of five or six miles, when crossing 
 the Rappahannock on the 9th of June at Beverly and Kelly's Fords, 
 still greater results might have been achieved, yet their work wa.s both 
 faithfully and well done. Stuart's headquarters were captured, and from 
 them was su|)plied information which enabled Hooker to keep pace 
 with the invading army; Stuart's march was thereby delayi'd ; the 
 direction of Ixje's army was changed and prevented from attempting 
 to cross the Potomac near Washington, and Stuart held in check by the 
 subsequent bvilliant engagements of Aldie, Middleburg, and Ujiix-rville, 
 
 ■ Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 163. 
 
on the 17th, 19th, and 21st clays of June, until the Union army had 
 moved into Maryland. At Uppcrvillc, "very many charges were made 
 and the sabre used freely, but always with great advantage to"^ the 
 Federal troops. The valuable services rendered by the cavalry will 
 again appear when the events connected with the great battle of Gettys- 
 burg arc brought to notice. 
 
 Quick to comprehend the significance- of the intelligence thus im- 
 parted to him by the reconnoissance, Hooker became at once convinced 
 that the movement northward on the part of Lee was the commence- 
 ment of a real campaign, and, as a preparatory measure, placed General 
 Reynolds, on the 12th of June, in command of the right wing of the 
 army, consisting of his own (the First), the Third, and the Eleventh 
 Corps, which, after it faced about and commenced its northward march, 
 became the left wing, together with the cavalry, directing him to pro- 
 ceed along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to Manassas. 
 The remaining four corps of the Federal army followed on the succeed- 
 ing day. As soon as it was known to Hill that Hooker had withdrawn 
 his forces from the heights in front of Fredericksburg, the former com- 
 menced his march in the direction of Ewell, who, under his instructions, 
 had proceeded down the Valley of Virginia. Before Ewell reached 
 the Potomac, Lee notified Stuart that the former would cross that river 
 on a certain day and at a certain point, that Hill was to follow, and 
 that Longstreet would hold the gaps in the mountains and protect the 
 crossing of those two corps. After Hill had crossed Longstreet was to 
 vacate the gaps and follow Hill. When this had been accomplished 
 Stuart WAS to seize the gaps and protect Longstreet's crossing; later he 
 was to throw himself on the right flank of the army, watch the enemy, 
 furnish information, and collect supplies. To cover the two corps in 
 their march through the valley, Longstreet left Culpepper Court-House 
 on the 15th, pursuing the route along the easterly side of the Blue 
 Ridge, occupying the gaps as occasion required, whilst Stuart, under 
 his discretionary powers from Lee, moved in front and on the right 
 flank of Longstreet. Meanwhile, Hooker, closely watching the move- 
 ments of his adversary, skillfully manoeuvred so as to guard the ap- 
 proaches to Washington, keeping himself at the same time in a position 
 instantly to assail Lee whenever a fitting opportunity might offer. The 
 intended act of invasion, however, in a dispatch of the 15th to the 
 President, Hooker characterized as one of desperation on the part of 
 Lee, "no matter in what force he moves." 
 
 Ueiioit on the Conduct of the War, Part T., p. 280. 
 
8 
 
 Aftcronc or two allliir.-" in the v:illfy, l)y wliicli Milr<»y was brushed 
 awav, the First and Tliird ('()r|)s of llic ( 'niircdoratc army, on reaching 
 the J'otonuie, crosseil it, the former at Williamspoil and the hitter at 
 SlR'pherdstown, and uniting at Ilagcrstown, from there marclied up 
 tlio ('und)erhind Valk'y to Chamhersburg, arriving at the hitter i)lae(!on 
 the evening of the 27th. Ewell had entered I'ennsylvania on the 22<1 
 with two of his (bvisions, preceded by Jenkins's cjivalry, which num- 
 bered, aec(»rding to General Stuart's estimate, about three thousand eight 
 hun(b"ed' (but which iHiml)er Fitz-TIugh Lee regards as a misj)rint for 
 sixteen hiin(bvd-), anil from Chamber.sbiirg had sent one of his divisions, 
 that midcr the command of General Early, through Gettysburg to York, 
 and the other to Carlisle. On the 2i')i\\ of .Inne, Early entered Gettys- 
 burg with live thousand infantry and a scpiadron of cavalry, and whilst 
 there endeavored, in execution of one of Lee's general objects, to levy 
 contributions on the town. His requisition for suj)j)]ies, including shoe's, 
 amounted in the aggregate to about six thousand dollars. To this, how- 
 ever, the town was altogether unable to respond, and being satisfied 
 that such was the fact he made no cifort to enforce his demand. The 
 next day he resumed his march to Hanover Junction and York, intend- 
 ing to advance from the latter place upon llarrisburg, in obedience to 
 orders which had been issued upon the supposition that Hooker was 
 still on the other side of the Potomac. Early's advance upon Harrisburg 
 was, however, arrested in consequence of intelligence having been re- 
 ceived by General Lee on the night of the 28th, from a scout, to the 
 effect that the Federal army had not only crossed the Potomac, but that 
 the head of the column was then at Frederick City. The communica- 
 tions of the Confederate forces being thus threatened, it became, in I^e's 
 opinion, absolutely necessary — and it may be in consequence of a sug- 
 gestion from Longstreet that the order was given — to concentrate the 
 army to the east of the mountains, and thereby check any farther 
 movement on the part of Hooker to the west. 
 
 Throughout his entire march the vigilance of Hooker had been 
 unceasiiitr so that at the moment he became convinced that his adver- 
 sary had either crossed or was about to cross the Pot(»inac he commenced 
 the j)assage of the river some thirty-five or forty miles below Shep- 
 herdstown, on the 25th and 2Gth, at Edward's Ferry. Without at all 
 intending to enter into a discussion of Hooker's plan of campaign after 
 his army reached Maryland, it is nevertheless proj)er to refer briefly to 
 its leading features, which contemplated confining the enemy to a single 
 
 ' Suutlicni Ilistoriial Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 70. - Idem. vol. v. p. Hio. 
 
9 
 
 line of invasion by seizing Turner's and Crampton's Passes of the 
 South Mountain ; the cutting of their communication at Williamsport, 
 and abandoning the indefensil)le post at Harper's Ferry, together with 
 Maryland Heights opposite, which was at that time a strategic point of 
 no consequence, which defended no ford in the river, and which was 
 not a defense to the Cumberland Valley/ To secure the first object 
 General Reynolds was directed to send detachments to seize those passes 
 in the mountain near Boonsboro', and to take position in the valley at 
 Middletown with the left wing.- In connection with the second, the 
 left wing at Middletown would be available for an attack upon Lee, in 
 flank, in case he should attemjit to turn upon the corps sent by Hooker 
 from below to operate against the Confederate rear.-' Captain Chesney, 
 of the Royal Engineers, professor of military history, Sandhurst Col- 
 lege, a military critic of some reputation, in referring to this plan, says, 
 " We may search the history of modern campaigns in vain to find a 
 more striking example of the effect produced by operating on the 
 enemy's communications than that of this movement of Hooker's." 
 . . . "A glance at the map will show why the little town of Gettys- 
 burg" was chosen by Lee, "as the most convenient point whereon to 
 assemble his scattered divisions; lying, as it does, nearly equidistant 
 from the stations they occupied at Hagerstown, Chambersburg, Carlisle, 
 and York."* General Halleck, however, then general-in-chief of the 
 Union army, declined to approve the abandonment of Harper's Ferry 
 and Maryland Heights, although in less than two days thereafter he 
 reversed his decision on this point at the request of General Meade, 
 who, in the mean time, had been appointed to the command of the 
 Army of the Potomac. Hooker felt, and by no means unnaturally, 
 that to have his plans thus interfered with on the eve of the important 
 operations about to commence was calling in question his military ca- 
 pacity in such a manner as to leave him no alternative but to request to 
 be at once relieved from his command. Accordingly, on the afternoon 
 of the 27th he telegraphed to Washington his desire, and on the fol- 
 lowing morning, Sunday, he received by the hands of a special mes- 
 senger official notification of his having been relieved, together with an 
 order directing him to turn over the command to General Meade, then 
 in charge of the Fifth Corps, "a brave and accomplished officer, who," 
 
 1 Keport on the Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 174. 
 
 2 Idem, Part I., p. 169. 3 laem. Part T., p. 174. 
 ••Campaigns in Virginia, MaryUmd, etc., hy Captain Chernov, R.E., vol. ii. 
 
 p. 31. 
 
10 
 
 ju-^ Hooker, in his farewell order to tlic army, adds, " had nobly earned 
 thi' oonHdoiKv and ostocni of this army on many a well-foiifrht field.'" 
 Thns was tcrniinalcd the connection ofCiencral Hooker with the Army 
 of the Potomac. Whatever opinions in regard ia his ability as a chief 
 on (he (iehi of batlh' may be entertained in conse<juence of the nnfor- 
 tnnate issue of ( 'hanceUorsvilh-, he is nevertheless justly entitled io 
 hii^h commendation for strategic skill, zeal, and vigilance while con- 
 ducting that portion of th(M'amj)aign of 1.S03 commencing on the re- 
 turn of (he army to the heights of Statfortl, antl terminating upon his 
 withdrawal from that army at Frederick City. 
 
 ( )m assuming his most responsible trust, (General Meade, in a short 
 and manly order to his army, gave expression to the almost universal 
 sentiment of the pe(»ple of the North by declaring that "the country 
 looks to tills army (o relieve it from the deviLStation and disgrace of a 
 hostile invasion." In ignorance of the exact condition of his own 
 forces, as well as of the position of the enemy, he could only at the 
 moment indicate a general purpose of at once moving in the dire<'tion 
 of the Susfjuehanna, " keeping AVashington and Baltimore well covered ; 
 and if the eneniy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or 
 if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle." Late in the even- 
 ing of the same day he communicated to Hallcck his intention of moving 
 on the following day on three lines to Emmetsburg and Westminster. 
 His headquarters at 4 P.^r. on the 30th were at Taneytown, about 
 eighteen miles in a southeasterly direction from Gettysburg, the left 
 wing of his army, again under the command of Reynolds, in advance, 
 in a northwesterly course from general headipiartcrs, and considerably 
 nearer to Gettysburg, whilst his right wing was to his east, two of its 
 corps to the south, and the remaining two to the north of Pipe Creek, — 
 his entire force consisting of scvi^n corps d'armcc of infantry and one of 
 cavalry. Buford, with the First Division of the cavalry, was covering 
 the left flank of the army, having boon ordered for the pin-pose to move 
 from Middletown by the way of Emmetsburg to Gettysburg, and, as 
 appears from one authority, to hold Gettysburg " at all hazards until 
 the .army could support him." 
 
 The strategic value of Gettysburg had evidently neither been over- 
 looketl by Lee and some of his lieutenants, nor by some of the Union 
 commanders, although Major Daniel, of Early's staff", believes that I^ee 
 liimself had no idea of the great strategic importance of the place.^ It 
 
 1 Conduct of the War, Pnrt I., p. 294. 
 
 * Address of ^fajor Diinicl licforo the Virj^iniii Division of the Army of Xorth- 
 cni \' iri^inia. <)ct"l)cr. 1S7'>, |t. 17. 
 
11 
 
 certainly offered to Lee far greater advantages for concentrating his 
 troops tlian Cliambersburg, which, under the idea of a certain immunity 
 from attack, he had first selected, as supposed by some, in pursuance of 
 his defensive tactical policy. General Long, Lee's military secretary, 
 reports the following as the substance of his chief's remarks when the 
 subject of the Northern invasion Avas under consideration: "Should we 
 defeat General Hooker in a general engagement south of the Potomac, 
 anywhere in the vicinity of Washington, his shattered army would find 
 refuge within the defenses of that city, as two Federal armies have pre- 
 viously done, and the fruits of victory would again be lost. But should 
 we draw him far away from the defenses of his capital, and defeat him 
 on a field of our own choosing, his army would be irretrievably lost, and 
 the victory would be attended with results of the utmost importance. 
 Gettysburg and York were designated as points suitable for such a 
 battle." ^ Gettysburg was, moreover, a position of vast natural strength 
 for defensive operations in the opinion of General Meade,^ his assistant 
 adjutant-general. General Williams,^ of General Fitz-Hugh Lee,* and 
 of many other officers both of experience and ability, whilst at the same 
 time it afforded ready access not only to Cliambersburg, but also to 
 Hagerstown, Frederick, Taneytown, Baltimore, Hanover, York, Har- 
 risburg, Carlisle, and Shippensburg, thus seeming to fulfill all the con- 
 ditions which the Confederate chief needed for the realization of his 
 general plan of campaign. Eleven roads, several of them well mac- 
 adamized, centre at Gettysburg, so that by means of some one or more 
 of them he might have maintained a direct communication with his 
 base at Williamsport far more easily than from Cliambersburg, whilst 
 for defensive battle the line from and including Wolf Hill, situate to 
 the southeast of the town, and separated from Gulp's Hill by Rock 
 Creek, thence pursuing a northerly direction across the de]:)ression made 
 by the creek to and along the summit of Gulp's Hill to its junction with 
 Cemetery Hill, thence following the crest of the latter for a short dis- 
 tance in a westerly course, and from thence in a southerly direction, so 
 as to embrace a part of Cemetery Ridge, and include liittle Round Top 
 as well as Round Top itself, is one rarely equaled and not often ex- 
 celled. Hence it may readily be inferred that when, on the night of 
 the 28th, Lee was first informed in regard to the position of the Federal 
 army his whole plan of campaign was suddenly changed, and in the 
 
 ^ Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 120. 
 
 2 Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 438. ^ xdem, Part T., p. 405. 
 
 * Southern Historical Societj' Papers, vol. iv. p. 7o. 
 
12 
 
 language of his linal report " it was determined to concentrate the army 
 cjLst of" (ho m»iiii)(ains, as" had boon stilted in his j)reliminary report, 
 "our communications with the I*otoma(r were thus mcna<cd." . . . 
 "Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from 
 ("hamhershurg to (Jettyshurg, to which point General l^well was also 
 instructed to march from ( arlisle." In mentioning the 2.sth as the date 
 when Ia'C first obtained information in reference to the Union army, it 
 is not to be lost sight of that in his first report lie states that the intelli- 
 gence was received from a scout " on the night of the 20tli," and that in 
 this Longstreet concurs,' — the latter adding that early on the morning 
 of the succeeding day he had sought his chief for the purpose of sug- 
 gesting, if necessary, whether this rcj)ort ought not to produce a change 
 of direction of" the head of" their column to the right. l>ut Lee was in 
 error as to its being the 29tli, and in his final report he so admits by 
 declaring that "the advance against llarrisburg was arrested by intelli- 
 gence received from a scout on the night of the 28tli," and in the same 
 connection remarking that "Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to 
 move towards Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next 
 day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until 
 relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and 
 directed to join the array at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances 
 might require." And again, " Heth's division reached Cashtown on 
 the 2ytli." As to the earlier date Lee is corroborated first by Hctli, 
 who says, " On the 29th of June, 1863, General Lee's army was dis- 
 posed as follows: Longstreet's corps at or near Chambersburg; Ewell's 
 corps, which had been pushed east as far as York, had received orders 
 to countermarch and concentrate on Hill's corps, which lay on and at 
 the base of South Mountain ; the leading division (Heth's) occupying 
 Cashtown, at the base of the mountain."- Secondly, by General Fitz- 
 Hiigh Lee, who, when mentioning in his " reply to (xeneral Long- 
 street" the date upon which the Federal army crossed the Potomac, is 
 careful to add, " General Lee heard it on the night of the 28th from a 
 scout, and not from his cavalry commander."' Thirdly, by General 
 Wilcox;^ and, fourthly, by General Early, who distinctly says that 
 " Lee received information on the night of the 28th of June that the 
 Federal army, then under J looker, had crossed the Potomac;"'' and 
 more pointedly still in his supplement or further " reply to General 
 
 ' Annals of the War, p. 419. 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 157. 
 
 ^ Idem, vol. v. p. 166; see idem, vol. iv. p. 74. * Idem, vol. iv. p. ll'J. 
 
 ^ Idem, vol. iv. p. 242, and also p. 288; Major DaiiieV.s Address, p. i;j. 
 
13 
 
 Longstreet," in which he says that the statement of Longstreet, "that 
 the information of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal army 
 was received from a scout on the night of the 29th of June, is errone- 
 ous. General Longstreet's own report, as well as General Lee's detailed 
 one, show that the information was received on tlie night of the 28th. 
 If it had not been received until the night of the 29th it would have 
 been impossible for the order to return to reach me at York by the 
 way of Carlisle in time for me to begin my march back early enough 
 on the 30th to reach Gettysburg in time for the fight on the 1st of July. 
 The fact was that I received the order on the morning of the 29th, at 
 York, with the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac 
 and was moving north." Longstreet has rather recently admitted, in a 
 second article on " The Mistakes of Gettysburg," that " there were two 
 or three trifling inaccuracies in his first account of this battle which need 
 correction," and in regard to the important date adds, " The scout upon 
 whose information the head of our column was turned to the right 
 reported at Chambersburg on the night of the 28th of June. It is 
 printed the 29th." ^ 
 
 Tiie suggestion on the part of Longstreet was received by Lee with 
 a ready acquiescence, as at the time the Confederate army was well in 
 hand, with the exception of Stuart's cavalry. A movement towards 
 Meade's army was commenced immediately. Hill's corps, tlien lying 
 between Chambersburg and Cashtown, west of the mountain, was ad- 
 vanced without delay; the divisions of McLaws and Hood, of Long- 
 street's corps, following, while the division of Pickett, of the latter 
 corps, remained by order of Lee at Chambersburg as a rear-guard. 
 Kodes and Johnson's divisions, of Swell's corps, were recalled from 
 Carlisle, and directed to unite with the remainder of the army at or 
 near Cashtown, notwithstanding they had, according to Rodes, " con- 
 templated with eagerness" an advance upon Harrisburg, which was to 
 have been executed on the 30th. These last divisions bivouacked on the 
 night of the 30th at Heidlersburg, a small village, distant some ten or 
 twelve miles to the north and east of Gettysburg. Longstreet's two 
 divisions were, however, only able to march as far as the village of 
 Greenwood, ten miles east of Chambersburg, on the Cashtown Road, 
 in consequence of the wagon-trains of Ewell and Hill's corps blocking 
 the road, and there encamped on the 30th. Hill's corps, consisting of 
 the divisions of Anderson, Heth, and Pender, and five battalions of 
 artillery, was encamped on the morning of the 29th near Fayetteville, 
 
 » Annals of the War, p. G32. 
 
11 
 
 on the road from CljainlKM*sl)iirg to Gettysburg. Ilill had been directed 
 to move on thisroa<l in the direetion ot" York, to cross the Sns(|n('haiina, 
 and thns threaten the eommnnications of" llarrishnrg with IMiihuh-lphia, 
 and further to eo-operair with Kwcll ae(rording to cireumstanees. In 
 eonse<jnen('e, Ilrth's division was moved on the same day to ('asht<»wn, 
 the division of I*en<ler foHowing (»n the morning of the 30th, and 
 Anderson ordered to march in the same direction on the morning of 
 the 1st of July. On arriving at Caslitown, Iletli sent forwai-d Petti- 
 grcw's brigade to Gettysburg, wliich there encountered Buford's eav- 
 aby. Intelligence of this was at once dispatched by a courier to 
 Ixje, and Anderson directed to make an early start ; Ewell at the 
 same time was notified by Hill that he '' intended to advance the next 
 m(»rning and discover what was in his front.'" The statement pub- 
 lished by Iletli of the encounter with Buford's cavalry is interesting 
 in this connection ;- he says, ''Hearing that a supply of shoes was to 
 be obtained in (iettysburg," . . . "and greatly needing shoes for my 
 men, I directed General Pettigrew to go to Gettysburg and get these sup- 
 plies, (leneral Pettigrew, on the 30th of June, with his brigade, went 
 near Gettysburg, but did not enter the tow'u, returning the same evening 
 to CjLshtown, reporting that he had not carried out my orders, as Gettys- 
 burg was occupied by the enemy's cavalry, and that some of his officers 
 reported hearing drums beating on the farther side of the town ; that 
 under these circumstances he did not deem it advisable to enter Gettys- 
 burg. About this time General Hill rode up, and this information was 
 given him. He remarked, 'The only force at Gettysburg is cavalry, 
 probai)ly a detachment of observation. I am Just from General IjCC, 
 and the information he has from his scouts corroborates that I have re- 
 ceived from mine, — that is, the enemy are still at ]\[iddlel)urg, and have 
 not yet struck their tents.' I then said, ' If there is no objection, J will 
 take my division to-morrow and go to Gettysburg and get those shoes !' 
 Hill re|)lied, ' Xone in the world.'" General Long (Lee's military sec- 
 retary) states, how'cver, that the first intelligence which his chief received 
 of the movements of the enemy was his arrival at Enimetsburg, which 
 is several miles northwest of Middlcburg.^ Such in brief was the gen- 
 eral military situation of the Confederate forces on the night of the 
 30th (»f June, as has been gathered from the various official reports of 
 their princi[)al generals and from other sources. As has already been 
 mentioned, Hill was aware on the 30th that Gettysburg was occupietl 
 
 ' Sdiithern Historical Society Papers, vol. ii. ]>. 222. 
 
 - Iilciii, v>'l. iv. p. I'lT. ^ Idem, vol. i\ . p. r_"_'. 
 
15 
 
 by a cavalry force of the Federal army, and had not only promptly 
 reported the fact to his commander-in-chief, but had also notified Ewell, 
 wlio had been recalled from Carlisle, of his intention to advance the 
 next morning to ascertain what was in his front. The main, perhaps 
 the only, object he had in view in thus communicating with Ewell, 
 was to obtain the latter's assistance in his contemplated movement upon 
 Gettysburg. In thus seeking to consolidate the strength of the two 
 corps of the Confederate army at that point, it is not unreasonable to 
 suppose that Hill anticipated something more than the resistance which 
 a mere cavalry detachment was capable of offering, and that conse- 
 quently he did not implicitly rely upon the reports of his scouts that 
 the enemy were still stationed at Middleburg. But be this as it may, 
 the purpose of Lee, as disclosed in his first report, was to concentrate 
 his army east of the mountains at Gettysburg. His language is : "Ac- 
 cordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Cham- 
 bersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed 
 to march from Carlisle," and which seems to admit of no other interpre- 
 tation. It is nevertheless true that in his detailed report of January, 
 1 864, prepared six months after the battle, the order to Ewell is put 
 quite differently, and that officer is there given the alternative of join- 
 ing the army either at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might 
 require.^ But, at all events, it can hardly be dented that concentration 
 meant and could mean but one of three things, that is, either an offer 
 of battle, or the acceptance of battle, or a retreat. In the opinion of 
 General Alexander, the chief of artillery of Longstreet's corps, " the 
 concentration which was ordered at Gettysburg was intended as an offer of 
 battle."^ General Early goes farther, and says expressly that when Meade 
 moved his army near enough to Lee's to render concentration necessary, 
 " the only alternative left the latter was a battle or a retreat."^ General 
 Fitz-Hugh Lee, in considering this subject, remarks, "The truth is, Gen- 
 eral Lee and his army were full of fight, their 'objective-point' was 
 the Federal army of the Potomac, and ' those people' the Confederate 
 chief had resolved to strike whenever and wherever the best opportu- 
 nity occurred, ' strategically offensive and tactically defensive' to the 
 contrary notwithstanding. An army of invasion is naturally an offen- 
 sive one in strategy and tactics, and history rarely points to an instance 
 where it has been concentrated on a given point to })atiently await an 
 attack. The distance from its base making supplies a difficult matter 
 
 1 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 39. 
 
 ^ Idem, vol. iv. p. 99. * Idem, vol. iv. p. 281, note. 
 
to procure, in itself rcj^ii I atos tlic whole (jiicstioii. An army so situatfKl 
 must move or (ij;ht."' Iletli lully eoneiii-s with J*'it/.-lIiigli I^ee lus to 
 tlu; H<j;htin<; (|ualities of their chief, sjiying that " Lee, not even ex- 
 ceptinj; Jackson, was the most aggressive man in his army," and that 
 "had he seen fit could have assumed a defensive position, and popular 
 opinion in tUe Northern States would have forced the commander of 
 the Federal army to attacU."- Whilst JIeth,:us has already been men- 
 tioned, rcuanls the battle of (ictlysburg as "the residt purely of an 
 accident, lor which he was probably in<tre than any one else accountable," 
 yet as he is sometimes in error upon inij)orlant points, as, for example, 
 in rejmrting a conversation of (Jeneral Lee respecting the fight at Get- 
 tysburg on the third day, the general is made to say, " I shall ever 
 believe if General Pender had remained on his horse hall' an hour 
 longer we would have carried the enemy's position,"^ whereas if 
 CJeneral Lane, of North Carolina, is to be relied on, — " Pender was 
 mortally wounded on the right of his line by an artillery shot on the 
 afternoon of the 2d of Jnhj, and was taken to the rear, where lie was on 
 the .')d of July, and could not even mount his horse,"* — care must be 
 exercised in accepting his narrative in all its particulars. Finally, in 
 his detailed report, Lee admits that he was " unable to wait an attack," 
 and that a battle had therefore become "in a measure unavoidable," 
 although it had not been intended to deliver one " so far from his base 
 unless attacked." 
 
 A careful comparison between the LTnion and Confederate accounts 
 of some of the occurrences in the resi)cctive armies shortly {)rior to the 
 night of the 30th of June will, as miglit be expected, disclose points of 
 difference more or less material to l)c considered. IJuford, as previously 
 mentioned, had been directed to move with his division of cavalry from 
 Middletown, by the way (»f Eininctsburg, to Gettysburg. In obedience 
 to his order, but pursuing a more westerly course than the direct road 
 between ]Middletown and JMnmetsburg, he had reached lM>untain Dale, 
 a village on the South Mountain, a few miles northwest of Enimets- 
 burg, on the night of the 29th, when from there observing the camp- 
 fires of some of Heth's division near Fairfield in the valley below, got 
 his men in the saddle early the next morning and sur})rised the Con- 
 federate detachment, which hastily fell back towards Cashtown. He 
 declined, however, to press them, for the reason that the noise of the en- 
 gagement might be heard at army headquarters, where "it might cause 
 
 1 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. v. p. 178. - Idem, vol. iv. p. 156. 
 3 Idem, vol. iv. p. 154. ♦ Idem, vol. v. p. 3S7. 
 
17 
 
 delay, uncertainty, and derangement of plans." There had also been a 
 slio-lit skirmish at Fairfield on the 28th between the Confederates and 
 the Union cavalry,^ information respecting both of which had no doubt 
 been immediately reported to Lee at Chambersburg. After his dash 
 Buford at once countermarched to Fountain Dale, and then resumed his 
 ■way through Emmetsburg to Gettysburg, entering the latter town to- 
 wards noon,^ as, according to one version, two of Hill's brigades Avere 
 about to occupy Seminary Ridge ;^ but according to another and probably 
 the more accurate one,* about an hour after the Confederates had with- 
 drawn to Marsh Creek in consequence of their learning of the near ap- 
 proach of the Federal cavalry. That afternoon Buford encamped on high 
 ground, a mile and a half northwest from the town, between Seminary 
 Ridge and Willoughby Run, and there placed his artillery in position ; 
 Gamble's brigade of his division going to the Chambersburg. Pike, and 
 Devin's brigade to the east, on the Mummasburg Road, covering the ap- 
 proaches from those directions. From prisoners captured by scouting par- 
 ties sent from those brigades towards Cashtown and Hunterstown, as 
 well as from other sources, it became evident that an almost immediate 
 movement on the part of the Confederates towards Gettysburg was in con- 
 templation. During the day Buford had informed Genei-al Reynolds 
 that " the enemy in his front was increased," and on that night, between 
 ten and eleven o'clock, he further notified the latter fhat he was "satisfied 
 that A. P. Hill's corps" was "massed just back of Cashtown, about nine 
 miles from this place. Pender's division of this corps came up to-day, 
 of which I advised you." ..." The enemy's pickets (infantry and 
 artillery) are within four miles of this place, at the Cashtown Road." 
 . . . "A captured scout says, 'Ewell's corps is crossing the moun- 
 tains from Carlisle, Roach's division being at Petersburg, in advance. 
 Longstreet, from all I can learn, is still behind Hill." . . . "Should 
 I have to fall back, advise me by what route." * In reporting to General 
 Halleck at Washington, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon 
 of the 30th, General Meade states that "information seems to place 
 Longstreet at Chambersburg, and A. P. Hill moving between Cham- 
 bersburg and York," and that " our cavalry drove a regiment out of 
 Gettysburg this A.M.^ 
 
 ^ Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, etc., by Jacobs, 
 I'j. 
 
 2 Idem, p. 22. 
 
 3 The Decisive Conflicts of the hite Civil War, by De Peyster, p. 27. 
 * Notes on the Rebel Invasion, by Jacobs, p. 22. 
 
 ' Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 352. 6 Idem, Part I., p. 483. 
 
18 
 
 In liis circiilMr of Jmic .'Wdi (o liis corps coniinaiKlci's, General 
 Meade announces that he " has received inforniation that the enemy are 
 advancinji", |)rohal)ly in strong force, on GcttyHburg." ..." Three 
 corps, First, Third, and Eleventh, are under the command of Major-(jen- 
 eral Jieynohls in the vicinity of Knjmetsburg, the Third Corps heing 
 ordered up to that point." And in his order, issued the same day, for the 
 march of the army on the 1st of July, whilst directing the First Corps 
 to move to Gettysburg, the Eleventh to Gettysburg (i>r supporting dis- 
 tance), and the Third to Kmmetsburg, Meade repeats that from present 
 inforniation Longstreet and 1 1 11 1 are at Chambersburg, partly towards 
 Gettvsburg; Kwell at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a dis- 
 position to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg," and being 
 satisfied that he has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, he "desires 
 to look to his own army and assume position for offensive or defensive 
 as occiLsion requires." ' In consequence of Bulbrd's report from Gettys- 
 burg of "the a])pearance of the enemy on the Cashtown Road in some 
 force, General Reynolds was directed to occupy Gettysburg,"- whither 
 the enemy were moving, "and where it was not im])robable they would 
 reach before the command of Reynolds," ..." then on its way, could 
 arrive." General Reynolds had, moreover, been instructed, "in the event 
 of finding himself confronted by a superior force," to hold it "in check, 
 if he was able, and to fall slowly back."^ On the judgment of no 
 other officer did Meade rest greater dependence than on that of Rey- 
 nolds; he was the officer upon whom he "had relied under his instruc- 
 tions."* Indeed, Reynolds was to him as he, atlectionately as well as 
 eloquently, expressed himself of his comrade, " not only a lieutenant of 
 the utmost importance," but a friend, a brother, and " the noblest Jis 
 well as the bravest gentleman in the army."* Amidst the confusion 
 of the reports which crowdtil u])on him respecting the position and the 
 objects of the enemy, the commander-in-chief sought from this able 
 lieutenant and trusted friend advice to determine whether it was "his 
 best policy to move to attack," for as he states in his communication of 
 the 1st of July to Reynolds, " If the enemy is concentrated to the 
 right of Gettysburg, that point would not at first glance seem to be a 
 proper strategic point of concentration for this army. If the enemy is 
 concentrating in front of Gettysburg or to the left of it, the general is 
 
 1 Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 421. 
 
 2 Meade's official report, Battle of Gettj-sburg, by Bates, p. 237. 
 
 » Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 3'>G. * Idem, Part I., p. ;14S. 
 
 5 Meade's address to the Pennsylvania Reserves, History of tlie Pemisylvjiniii 
 P»eservcs, by Sypher, p. 493. 
 
19 
 
 not sufficiently well iufornied of the nature of the country to judge of 
 its character either for an offensive or defensive position." . . . "The 
 general having just assumed command in obedience to orders," 
 " would gladly receive from you any suggestions as to the points laid 
 down in this note. He feels that you know more of the condition of 
 the troops in your vicinity and the country than he does." ..." You 
 have all the information which the general has received, and the gen- 
 eral would like to have your views. The movement of your corps to 
 Gettysburg was ordered before the positive knowledge of the enemy's 
 withdrawal from Harrisburg and concentration was received."^ 
 
 On his route to Gettysburg Reynolds iiad on the afternoon of the 
 30th encamped in the vicinity of a tavern near Marsh Creek, about 
 five miles south and west of the town. At the same time the Eleventh 
 Corps wjxs to the left of Emmetsburg, and the Third between that place 
 and Taney town. At night, General Howard, the commander of the 
 Eleventh Corps, was requested to report at Reynolds's headquarters, 
 where immediately on his arrival Reynolds showed him Meade's "Con- 
 fidential address, just issued, in which he required the officers in com- 
 mand fitly to address the troops," and to appeal " to every patriotic 
 sentiment to stimulate his command on the approach of a great battle." 
 He also showed him "in a bundle of dispatches — the information brought 
 to him during the day — evidence of the nearness, position, and designs 
 of the enemy. He sat down with" Howard " to study the maps of 
 the country, and consulted" with him " upon these matters till eleven 
 o'clock at night, the last night of his life."- The notice of this inter- 
 esting interview is altogether too slight and incomplete on the part of 
 (xeneral Howard, for it is highly important to be able to determine 
 what bearing it had on the operations of the succeeding day. A pro- 
 tracted discussion of the probable designs of the enemy from the evi- 
 dence before them must have led to some conclusion, for so accomplished 
 a soldier as Reynoltls was evidently during that night's study and con- 
 ference considering the possibilities of the morrow, and most probably 
 was preparing himself to carry into successful execution the discretionary 
 powers with which he had been invested by his commander-in-chief. 
 He had been made aware by Buford that the enemy had increased in 
 immbers ; that Hill's corps was massed innnediately behind Cashtown ; 
 that Ewell was crossing the mountains from Carlisle, and that their 
 
 1 Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 355. 
 
 2 Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg, by O. O. Howard, Atlantic Monthly, 
 July, 1876, p. 52. 
 
 2 
 
20 
 
 inftiiitry ami artilK'rv pickrts won* within four miles of Gottysbiirj;. 
 His views Ix'sidos had Ik'cii freely ex))ress<*<l, ami it was known that he 
 favored ollerin;; the enemy Itattleat the earliest suitaide m<»ment. Gen- 
 eral Douhleilay intiitions a eonveixition on this -id/|ect with ll(!ynolds, 
 which took place just after the Union arnjy had crussiHl the Potomac, 
 in which the latter nrj^ed as a I'eason that if we pive the enemy "time 
 1)V dilatory measnres or i)y taking uj) -defensive |>ositi(»ns they wmdd 
 strip" PeiMisylvania "of everythinf^. llenee he was in favor <»f striking 
 them ;us soon as j)ossible. He wjts really eager to get at them."' On 
 the same night, close by Gettysburg, Bnford was also considering with 
 one of his brig-ade commanders the chances of the next day ; his opinion 
 was clear that the battle would be fought at that point, but he w;us 
 apprehensive that "it would be commenced in the morning before the 
 infantry would get uj). These," adds the otticer who made the state- 
 ment, "are his own words."- Buford further remarked that "the 
 enemy must know the importance of this position, and will strain ever}' 
 nerve to secure it, and if we are able to hold it wc will do well." 
 Reynolds was perfectly wi-ll aware that the enemy was concentrating to 
 the left of (xettysburg, and that a <'ollision was imminent; his corps 
 had been ordered to occu|>v the town which Buford had l)een instructed 
 to hold, and beyond doubt, in answer to the inquiry of the latter by 
 what route, in ca.se of necessity, he should fall back, he readily prom- 
 ised promj)t support so that he might strike the enemy without delay. 
 
 There were encamped on the night of the 30th within a radius of 
 eight miles from Gettysburg four of the nine divisions of the Confed- 
 erate army, numbering with the cavalry and artillery not less than 
 thirty-five thousand men, and one corps of the left wing of the Fed- 
 eral army, besides two of the three brigades of Buford 's division of 
 cavalry (the other brigade being at Mechanicstown with the trains), 
 aggregating about ten thoasand four hundred ; most of the remaining 
 corps of the I nion army being at a greater distance, namely, two near 
 Kmmetsburg, one at Taneytown, one at Hanover, and one at Manches- 
 ter. As to the estimate here made of the opposing forces in close prox- 
 imity to (Gettysburg at this time, it seems sciircely necessary to remark 
 that writers on both sides have given not only the actual but the rela- 
 tive numbers widely different from those now presented. In his letter 
 on the relative strength of" the two armies. Early insists that as there 
 
 • Buttlf of (ifttysliiirt:, bv Kate-, ]>. s4. :m<l ('..iiiliict of tli.- \\jir, I'art 1.. ]>. 
 306. 
 
 ■■' Statoriieiit of Buford 's sigiml-otiicer, Uis l\^.yst^ir, p. lAl. 
 
21 
 
 were no regular monthly returns for June, 1863, on account of Lee's 
 army being engaged on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July at Gettysburg, the 
 estimates made of the Confederate force at the commencement of the 
 battle are unreliable/ Lee's military secretary says, "Shortly after 
 the battle of C'hancellorsville the xVrmy of Northern Virginia had, by 
 the return of absentees and the divisions of Longstreet, been increased 
 to sixty-five thousand men."- The statement made by Colonel Allan 
 is that " frequently the Confederate reports included more than the 
 effective fighting men. Thus Rodes's ' return' at Carlisle, a few days 
 before Gettysburg, makes his total strength of officers and enlisted 
 men ' eight thousand and fifty-two.' Xow Rodes had about six thou- 
 sand muskets, or less than seven thousand effectives."^ Heth says his 
 division " numbered some seven thousand muskets." * Hooker testified 
 before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that " with regard to 
 the enemy's force 1 had reliable information. Two L^nion men had 
 counted them as they passed through Hagerstown, and in order that 
 there might be no mistake they compared notes every night, and if their 
 counts differed they were satisfactorily adjusted by compromise. In 
 round numbers I^ee had ninety-one thousand infantry and two hundred 
 and eighty pieces of artillery ; marching with that column were about 
 six thousand cavalry. It will be remembered that a portion of the 
 enemy's cavalry crossed the Potomac below Edwards's Ferry, and went 
 into Maryland to join Ewell, between me and Washington ; this column 
 numbered about five thousand men."^ The Comte de Paris in giving 
 his conclusions as to the numerical strength of both armies at Gettys- 
 burg expresses himself thus : " I reckon, therefore, the whole strength 
 of the Army of Northern Virginia in Pennsylvania at about seventy- 
 six thousand present, out of which at least sixty-six thousand were 
 present for duty, and two hundred and sixty-eight guns.'"* Colonel 
 Taylor, of Lee's staff, in reply to the count, admits that " the three arms 
 of service then numbered as follows: infantry, fifty-three thousand five 
 hundred ; cavalry, nine thousand ; artillery, four thousand five hundred. 
 Total effectives of all arms, sixty-seven thousand." "^ 8o that the estimate 
 of the Confederate force encamped within a radius of eight miles from 
 Gettysburg at not less than thirty-five thousand, on the night of the 30th, 
 may be regarded as being substantially correct. 
 
 1 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 17. * Idem, vol. iv. p. 119. 
 
 3 Idem, vol. iv. p. 39. * Idem, vol. iv. p. 158. 
 
 5 Conduct of the AVar, Part I., p. 173. 
 
 6 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. v. p. 205. ' Idem, vol. v. p. 245. 
 
22 
 
 The durutioii <»( llic action wliirli \va> ll^ll(■n•(| in on tin- rnoriiinjx 
 of tlic 1st of" .Tulv — an action of" sndi inoincntoiis consccjueiiccs to civil 
 lilwrty, and in some aspects tlic most imj»ortant of the series »»f the eon- 
 fliets comprehended under the genend desij^nation oi' the battle of Gettys- 
 hurji; — was altoircther less than seven hours, dnrin^ the greater part of 
 whieh time the struggle was wagetl on both sides with unusual tenacity 
 and severity. From a military point of view the operations of that 
 day may be divided into four })arts, — first, the engagement between 
 Heth and Buford ; second, that between the divisions of ileth and 
 Pender on the one side and the Fii-st Corps on the other ; thiril, that 
 between the divisions of Heth, Pentler, Rotles, and Early and the 
 First and Kleventh Corps; and, fourth, from the repulse of the Faleral 
 forces to their occupation ol" Cemetery Hill. 
 
 With the (law II of Wednesday, July the 1st, or even later,' Ibili 
 and Pender advanced with their <livisions from ( "ashtown to attack the 
 Fedei-al force in their front; at about the same time the divisions of 
 Rodes and Early started from Heidlersburg, where they had encjunpetl 
 the night before, for Cashtown. Two divisions of Longstreet's corps, 
 near Chambersburg, followed after Hill. Pickett in obedience to an 
 order remained at ( 'hambersburg as a rear-guard. J..ongstreet's two 
 divisions did not arrive on the field during the first day's battle, whilst 
 the remaining divisions of Anderson and Johnson, of the other two 
 corps, reached it when the action was over. Some of the Confederate 
 cavalry were observed at an early hour reconnoitring Buford's force 
 from the Chambersburg Pike, and towaivls nine o'clock Ileth's division 
 of Hill's corps, consisting of four brigades of infantry and five bat- 
 teries of artillery,^ reached the ridge just west of Willoughby Run, a 
 mile or more from Gettysburg. Several of these l)atteries were at once 
 placed in position near the turnpike, Marye firing the opening gun in 
 shelling the woods in his front. Two brigades of infantry were then 
 deployed to the right and left of the unfinished railroad, part of which 
 was embankment and ])art deej) cut, immediately north of the turn- 
 pike, and with this railroad for their line of direction were afterwards 
 ordered to advance and occupy the town. Between half after nine and 
 ten o'clock' skirmishing commenced, — the first discharge, — a musket- 
 shot, having been fired Jigainst some ot" Gamble's brigade, of ]3uford's 
 dismounted cavalry. Such was the commencement of the great conflict 
 
 ' S(»iitliorii Ilislorical Society I'uper.^, vol. ii. ji. '22il, and vol. iv. ji. 113. 
 
 -' Idem, Confederate Koster, vol. iii. ]>. ll'.»; vol. v. p. l!i>5, and vol. ii. p. 223. 
 
 ' liebel Invasion, etc., l>v .laeob-s, ji. 2.3, and De Peyster, p. .34. 
 
23 
 
 which the troops on both sides had been eager to wage. Ahiiost at once 
 the artillery fire was replied to by Buford's light batteries, one of which 
 was admirably directed by Lieutenant Calif, and the engagement be- 
 came quite severe. When Buford's men were nearly overpowered, the 
 signal-officer observed from the seminary steeple, in sweeping his glass 
 over the field, the flag of the First Corps, and upon reporting the fact, 
 l^uford exclaimed, " Now we can hold the place !" 
 
 Leaving his camp near Marsh Creek, some five miles distant from 
 Gettysburg, in a southwesterly direction, early on the same morning, 
 Reynolds hastened along the Emmetsburg Road with Wadsworth's 
 division, of the First Corps, and Hall's battery, directing General Dou- 
 bleday to bring up the other divisions and the remaining batteries, ex- 
 cept the First Brigade, of the Third Division, which had been detailed 
 for picket duty, on the previous afternoon, from Marsh Creek in a 
 Avesterly direction to Middle Creek, and Cooper's battery of four pieces, 
 which brigade and battery followed independently, under my command, 
 from the cross-roads at Ross White's along a road between the Emmets- 
 burg and Hagerstown Roads, commonly known as the Gettysburg and 
 Nunemaker's Mill Road. Before starting to Buford's assistance Rey- 
 nolds read to Doubleday his telegrams showing the position of the 
 Federal troops and what they were doing.^ From various casualties 
 the total effective strength of the First Corps had at the end of June 
 shrunk to a number not exceeding eight thousand two hundred. Rey- 
 nolds, from recent information, had most probably anticipated an early 
 collision, and being thoroughly self-reliant as well ius full of dash, did 
 not in the emergency await additional instructions. Usually riding 
 some distance beyond his corps, he was on this day with his staff con- 
 siderably in advance of the troops. Whilst thus reconnoitring the 
 different positions which might soon become the theatre of a conflict, a 
 dispatch from Buford was handed to him, when less than three miles 
 from the town, announcing that the enemy were then sorely pressing 
 the cavalry. On the instant Reynolds sent an aide to Wadsworth with 
 a characteristic order "to close up and come on," and dispatched other 
 staff-officers to Howard and Sickles, who were then not far from 
 Emmetsburg, to hasten the movements of the former and to direct the 
 latter to advance without delay. A few minutes later Reynolds, on 
 meeting and inquiring of Buford if he "could hold out until his corps 
 came up?" received from him a brief assurance in the words "I reckon 
 I can."- Hall gives a different account of the interview between Rey- 
 
 ' Conduct of the War, Part 1., p. 305. 
 
 - Statement of Buford's sigfnal-oflScer, De Peyster, 153. 
 
24 
 
 jiolils Miitl I'lilnitl, as lulIdNvs: " lieyiiolds ami stall' wert' (lisinountwl 
 and siitiii;; near my fjims heforo we hitclicd uj) lor iiiarcliiii^, when 
 liufortl, with a small escort of ravalry, came along, and I heard Hnlord 
 aiiy to Reynolds, ' I have iim ii|i(iii a c(nij>Ie of re<^iments of infantry 
 near riettyshurir, which, owini: to their heinj; in the woods, I am nnahle 
 to dislodi^e, and 1 think you liad better move up and leel them.' Rey- 
 nolds, in my hearing, dictated a message to Meade something like this: 
 'Buford just now reports that he finds a small foree of the enemy's 
 infantry in a j)oint of wockIs near (Tettysburg, which he is unable to 
 dislodge; and wiiile I am aware that it is not your desire to foree an 
 engagement at that point, still, from the scope of instructions I have 
 all the time had from you since commanding this wing of the army, J 
 feel at liberty to advance to Gettysburg and develop the strength of the 
 enemy at that point.' " ' 
 
 Howard had been ordered by Reviiolds, earlv on the morning of the 
 1st of July, to advance from Emmetsburg with the Eleventh Corps. 
 This order was received at 8.30 a.m., and having been expected in con- 
 sequence of Meade's order of march for the 1st of July, Howard at 
 once commenced to move in two columns; Barlow's division, with a 
 battery, being put on the direct road to Gettysburg, and the other two 
 divisions, with the remaining four batteries, on a road leading across to 
 the Taneytown Road, and thence by that road to the town. The direct 
 road being obstructed by artillery carriages and trains, Howard supposed 
 that Barlow's division would not reach Gettysburg until shortly after 
 1 P.M., and that the other divisions would be there about the same hour. 
 As soon as the columns were started Howard, accompanied by his staff, 
 taking the shortest route, and riding rapidly, occasionally in the woods 
 and fields, reached, as he states, the vicinity of Gettysburg about 10.30 
 A.M.,- but as to this being the hour of liis arrival he is most probably 
 in error, for the evidence on the subject almost certainly fixes it from a 
 half to three-quarters of an hour earlier. Indeed, he himself admits 
 noticing variations in the time that "different officers have recorded the 
 same event," of from a half to three-quarters of an hour from that of 
 his own watch. His chief of artillery, moreover, remarks in his nar- 
 rative that "at 10 A.M. General Howard received notice from General 
 Reynolds that he had engaged the enemy, and was met by largely 
 superior numbers, and urged General Howard to hurry his corps for- 
 
 ' Brookline Chronicle, February 16, 1878. 
 
 * Campaign of Gettysburg, by O. O. Howard, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1870, 
 ■)3. 
 
25 
 
 ward as rapidly as po-ssible." ..." I was with General Howard when he 
 received this notice from General Reynolds, but the batteries were back." 
 . . . "General Howard directing me to bring the batteries forward as 
 rapidly as possible rode to the front." ^ Before this, however, when 
 near Gettysburg, one of General Howard's aides reported to Reynolds 
 the expected early arrival of the Eleventh Corps, upon which, and 
 before leaving for the front, Reynolds desired the aide to return to his 
 commanding officer " with orders to move on rapidly to Cemetery Hill, 
 where he would be put in position."" After Reynolds had reached 
 Seminary Ridge and observed the critical situation of his troops, he 
 sent word to Howard to urge his corps forward, which was the message 
 referred to by Howard as well as by his chief of artillery. Subse- 
 quently to the receipt of the order to hasten forward his corps Howard 
 entered the town, and from Fahnestock's observatory had a partial 
 view of what was passing on the field to the north and west in the dis- 
 tance. He there got glimpses, as he says, of AVadsworth's division of 
 infantry fighting near the railroad cut at Seminary Ridge. "Success," 
 he adds, "was then attending him, and prisoners in gray were being 
 conducted into the town." A few minutes later (by his watch about 
 11.30 A.M.) intelligence was received by him of the death of Reynolds, 
 and that the command of the troo})S had, in consequence, devolved upon 
 him. As he had previously sent the earnest request from Reynolds 
 back to the columns of Schurz and Barlow, he then, with a full knowl- 
 edge of what was transpiring and what had transpired at the front, 
 " rode slowly" to the rear, near the cemetery gate, where he soon met 
 Schurz, who had hastened on to see him.^ 
 
 The area of the field upon which the most important operations of 
 the 1st of July took place scarcely exceeds two square miles. This 
 small parallelogram embraces part of Willoughby Run, which flows in 
 a southerly course, of a ridge between Seminary Ridge and the run, of 
 Seminary Ridge, as well as parts of the Hagerstown, Chambersburg, 
 and Mummasburg Roads, all converging to the town. The two ridges 
 extend nearly north and south. The Hagerstown Road runs in a west- 
 southwesterly direction from Gettysburg, the Chambersburg Pike a 
 little north of west-northwest, and the Mummasburg Road about north- 
 west. The line of the First Corps, extending on its left to near the 
 
 1 Philadelphia Weekly Times, May 31, 1870. 
 1 2 Battle of Gettysburg, by Bates, p. 68. 
 
 * Campaign of Gettysburg, by O. 0. Howard, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1876, 
 p. 54. 
 
20 
 
 Hagerstown Road and <»ii its right to the Mmiunasburg Road, did not 
 greatly, if at all, oxcci-d a mile and a half in length. 
 
 Leaving the lOniinctshurg Road n(»t fai' from ('otlori's house, near 
 the town, and (hushing across the fields to the west at a doiil)l«'-«juiek. 
 Cutler's brigade (with the ex('e|)tion of the Seventh Indiana, whieh ha«l 
 been detached for special duty), of \\ adsworth's division, reache<l the 
 crest of Seminary Ridge just tus Buford's men were lx!ginning to yield to 
 the severe ])ressure of the enemy. Buford had, however, faithfully dis- 
 charged his whole duty in the face of heavy (kUIs. He had tena(;iously 
 kept his position, and thus rendered it possible for the Union, in its hour 
 of peril, to find its deliverance through the Army of the Potomac. To 
 the boldness, persistence, and gallantry of John Buford, on this and other 
 fields, his country owes his memory a vast debt of gratitude, llaidly 
 had the first regiment of Cutler's brigade arrived on the ground, and 
 taken position to the rightof the Chanibersburg Pike, before the Confed- 
 erates advanced in strong force along and upon both sides of that r<»a<l, 
 and became engaged with the Federal line. The last instructions which 
 General Donbleday had from Reynolds in r-eference to the battle were, 
 "I will hold on to this road," the Chambersburg Pike, "and you hold 
 on to the other," or the Mummasburg Road.' Jn defending this main 
 highway, leading from Chambersburg to Baltimore through (lettysburg, 
 Reynolds directed the troops of Meredith's brigade, of the First Di- 
 vision, which inuuediately reached the ridge after Cutler, as they were 
 deploying to the left of the pike, to hurry forward to the parallel ridge 
 in front, and there attack the enemy as they came up its western slope. 
 Meredith's regiments, rapidly forming line of battle as they came suc- 
 cessively on the ground, charged the enemy, and drove them precipi- 
 tately down the slope, back to and across Willonghbv Run. lieynolds, 
 who, with the instinct of a soldier, had from the first grasped the im- 
 portant features of the entire field, and who by his ]>rorapt and resolute 
 course of action had fixed the site for the greater battle yet to be 
 fought, observed whilst near these troops an advance to the left of a 
 portion of the enemy through the wood : one of Meredith's regiments, 
 the Nineteenth Indiana, just then appearing, he ordered it to charge, — 
 leading the charge in person.- Almost immediately after, and shortly 
 before 11 a.m., a minie-ball, from one of Archer's sharpshooters, ent(>r- 
 ing the back of his neck as he turned to look in the direction of the 
 seminary, caused him to fall from his horse apparently lifeless. Pollard, 
 in liis "Southern History of the War," gives an altogether ditierent 
 
 » Conduct of the "War, Part I., p. 306. « De Pjeyster, p. 37 
 
27 
 
 version of the occurrence, stating that "the Confederates, distingnishing 
 him from his uniform to be an officer of high rank, opened upon him 
 with heavy volleys of infantry fire. He was struck by several balls, 
 and died instantly without uttering a word."' In the vigor of his 
 manhood, and in the fullness of a well-earned military fame, perished 
 this hero upon a field which his genins had fixed for the determination 
 of one of the great and decisive conflicts of tiie world. "Yet," in the 
 language of another, "where could man meet better the inevitable hour 
 than in defense of his native State, his life-blood mingling Avith the 
 soil on which he first drew breath ?"- 
 
 The Twenty-fourth Michigan and the Nineteenth Indiana, two 
 regiments of Meredith's brigade, pursuing the enemy across the run, 
 enfiladed Archer's brigade, and succeeded in capturing Archer, together 
 with the greater part of his troops. Cutler's brigade, which had gone 
 to the right of the Chambersbnrg Pike, and which was extended in 
 prolongation of the line of Meredith's brigade, became engaged with 
 the enemy a little earlier, the opening infantry fire on the Federal side 
 having come from the Fifty-Sixth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volun- 
 teers. This brigade, however, meeting with a force greatly superior 
 to its own numerically, had been compelled to fall back at first on the 
 right, and then along its whole line to a position nearly perpendicular 
 to the one which it had originally assnmed, thus not only exposing 
 itself greatly, but also the right flank and rear of the other brigade. 
 The Sixth Wisconsin, Meredith's brigade, which had been held in re- 
 serve at the time of the charge against Archer's troops, was at once 
 sent to the assistance of Cutler. Promptly changing front to the north, 
 it, together with the Ninety-Fifth New York and the Fonrteenth Brook- 
 lyn, of Cntler's brigade, impetuously charged the advancing and vic- 
 torious line of Davis's Mississippi brigade, forced it back at the point 
 of the bayonet to the railroad cut, and there, after a short but sharp 
 resistance, captured the Second Mississi})pi Regiment, and portions of 
 the Forty-Second Mississippi and another regiment of the same brigade. 
 This brlHiant achievement on the part of the Union arms held the 
 enemy in check for a time. Shortly before 11 a.m. Doubleday's 
 division arrived on the ground, and a little after Robinson's division, 
 of the First Corps, — Robinson's division being at first "kept in reserve 
 behind the seminary;"^ Baxter's, one of its two brigades, going into 
 
 1 Southern History of the War, Third Year, by Polhird, p. 24. 
 •^ Oration on General Meade and the battle of Gettysburg before the Society of 
 the Army of the Potomac, May, 1873, p. 13. 
 » Conduct of th& War, Part I., p. 307. 
 
28 
 
 position later on Scniinarv Ri(lp> to the right f)f the Chainhcrshnrj; Pike, 
 north of the raihoad cut, and cxtemling a.s Car as the MuninuLsburg 
 Road, — the Khventh Pennsylvania lorniing on the immediate right of 
 Cutler; the Ninety-Seventh New York, the Eighty-Third New York, 
 the Eighty-Eighth l*ennsylvania,and theTwelfth Massachusetts success- 
 ively to the I'ight, all facing west, and the Ninetieth Pennsylvania, the 
 extreme right of the line, being refused, facing to the north, and 
 stretching along the Mummashurg Road. 'J'owards half alter twelve 
 o'clock a general tiring was renewed, and some of the enemv ad- 
 vancing against Jiaxter were driven hack by a portion (»f ins brigade, 
 including the Eleventh Pennsylvania, in the face of a heavy fire, across 
 an open lieUl,with the loss, notwithstanding repeated reinforcements, of 
 about tive hundred prisoners from Iverson's North Carolina brigade, of 
 Rodes's division, of Ewell's corps, the Eighty-Eighth Pennsylvania 
 capturing the colors of the Twenty -Third North Carolina I^egiment. 
 General Rodes, describing in his rejjort tliis part of his engagement, 
 says, "Ivei'son's left being exposed thus, heavy loss was inflicted upon 
 his brigade. His men fought and died like heroes. His dead lav in 
 a distinctly-marked line of battle. His left was overj)owered, and 
 many of liis men being surrounded were captured.'" Pollard states 
 that Rodes, in "riding along behind where their line had been, thought 
 lie observed a regiment lying down as if to esca})e the Yankee tire. On 
 going up, however, to force them into the tight he found they were all 
 corpses."- ,V heavy skirmish line of the enemy then appearing, suj)- 
 ported by lines of battle, caused the Federal brigade, its ammunition 
 being nearly exhausted, to fall back to its original position. Paul's, 
 the other brigade of the division, was moved from the rear of the semi- 
 nary, where it had been massed, across the railroad cut towards 2 p.m., 
 the troops loading as they advanced, and when they had reached the foot 
 of the ridge pushed up the next slope at the double-(piick, encountering 
 at the summit of that ridge the first line of the enemy, who at once 
 threw down their arms and surrendered. But the second line coming 
 up quickly to the support of the first, and reinforcements being also 
 steadily jwured in, caused a dcsjierate struggle to ensue, in which the 
 slaughter was not only terrible, but the Union forces, suffering severely, 
 were driven back. Paul's brigade consisted of the Sixteenth Maine, 
 the Thirteenth Massachusetts, the Ninety-Fourth New York, the One 
 Hundred and Fourth New York, and the (^ne Hundred and Seventh 
 Pennsylvania Volunteers. 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 147. 
 
 - South(3rn History of tho War, Tliird Year, ]>y Pollard, p. 25. 
 
29 
 
 Stone's brigade, of Doubleday's division, composed of three Penn- 
 sylvania regiments, namely, the One Hundred and Forty-Third, the 
 One Hundred and Forty-Ninth, and the One Hundred and Fiftieth, 
 after it came upon the field took position at a little before noon on the 
 ridge immediately beyond Seminary Ridge, under a heavy fire, with 
 the right resting on the Chambersburg Pike, and the left almost reach- 
 ing the wood occupied by Meredith's brigade, — its skirmishers thrown 
 forward down the next slope, the pike behig held by a number of sharp- 
 shooters. This disposition continued unchanged until between twelve 
 and one o'clock, when an enfilading fire from a Confederate battery 
 compelled its right regiment (the One Hundred and Forty-Third) to 
 fall back to Seminary Ridge. Immediately the One Hundred and 
 Forty-Ninth was faced to the north, and thrown out on the pike, and 
 between half after one and two o'clock, as the enemy's infantry moved 
 forward in force, the One Hundred and Forty-Third was ordered to 
 take position on the pike to the right of the former regiment, thus dis- 
 playing these two regiments at right angles with the One Hundred and 
 Fiftieth, which remained to the right of and near Meredith's brigade, 
 facing west. It was to one of the officers of the One Hundred and 
 Fiftieth Pennsylvania Volunteers that John Burns, of Gettysburg, 
 then an old man of seventy years of age, first applied for permission to 
 fight with the Union troops, and obtaining that permission, fought 
 chiefly with the Seventh Wisconsin until the Federal forces were driven 
 back in the afternoon. As he was falling back with the rest, having 
 already received three wounds, one of them through the arm, a final 
 wound in the leg disabled him. Helpless, and almost bleeding to death, 
 he lay upon the field until early the next morning, when his wounds were 
 dressed by a Confederate surgeon. His heroic conduct met with a suitable 
 recognition both by the United States Congress and the Legislature of 
 Pennsylvania, and the pensions which his valor won iiim he lived to 
 enjoy until the month of February, 1872. An instance of the bravery 
 of an Emmetsburg lad, akin to that of Burns, is recorded by one of 
 the soldiers of the Twelfth Massachusetts Volunteers. As Baxter's 
 brigade was marching through Emmetsburg it was followed by the 
 village boys, one of whom continued to the camp at Marsh Creek, 
 where he offered to enlist. His offer, however, was ridiculed, and he 
 was sent away. On the morning of the 1st of July he reappeared, 
 and so earnestly entreated the colonel of the Twelfth Massachusetts to 
 be allowed to join his regiment, that a captain of one of the companies 
 was instructed to take him on trial for a day or two. When the regi- 
 ment lialted near the seminary, the boy was hastily dressed in a suit of 
 
30 
 
 blue. Aftorwjirds, during the action, he fought bravely until a bullet 
 striking his musket sj)lit it in two pieces, one (»f" which hnlged in his 
 han<l and the other in his thigh. The unknown boy was taken to the 
 brick church in the town to be cared for, but nothing was afterwards 
 seen or heard of him.' As the enemy pressed forward to attack, the 
 One Hundred and Forty-Third and the One Hundred and lM)rtv- 
 Niiith i't'Miisylvania N'nhintccrs, on the |)ik(', were sent to oceuj)y the 
 railroad <'Ut, about one hundred yai-ds distant to the north. The ad- 
 vance of the enemy from the north having, after a spirited contest, been 
 repulsed, the attack was resumed in I'orcc fr<»nj tlic wrst, which was also 
 successfully resisted, — a vigorous bayonet charge driving them back. 
 After retreating a short distance, however, they moved by thc-ir right 
 flank and occupied, towards a quarter to three p.m., a wood in front of 
 Meredith's brigade. Not long after three o'clock, Meredith's troops 
 having retired to the crest of the next ridge, the brigade, then under 
 the command of Colonel Langhorne Wister, in danger of being sur- 
 rounded, gradually fell back to Seminary Kidge, where a new position 
 was taken, and for a time stubbornly maintained. But finally being 
 outHanked by vastly superior numbers, it fell back through the town 
 to Seminary Hill, where it was reformed, and rested in line during the 
 night. 
 
 The First Brigade, of Doubleday's division, wius under my com- 
 mand, and consisted of the One Hundred and Twenty-First, One 
 Hundred and Forty-Second, and One Hundred and Fifty-First Kegi- 
 ments of Pemisylvania Volunteers, and the Twentieth Xew York State 
 Militia. Cooper's Battery B, First Pennsylvania Artillery, had on the 
 morning of the 1st of July been attached to the brigade. On that 
 morning, as soon as the pickets of the One Hundred and Twenty-First 
 could be withdrawn, the infantry and artillery were marched from the 
 cross-roads at Ross White's, which lie between Mai-sh and Middle 
 Creeks, along the Xunemaker Mill Road to Gettysburg, a distance of 
 about seven miles. 
 
 When within a mile of the town the sound of heavy firing to the 
 northwest indicated that a sharp engagement was already in progress. 
 The brigade was in consequence rapidly pushed across the tields to o|)en 
 ground, a short distance north of the Hagerstown Road, and about a 
 third of a mile west of the seminary, and there formed, a little before 
 11 A.M., on the extreme left of the general line of battle. The battery 
 was immediately j)laced in position, and its fire directed towards the 
 
 ' Brookline Chronicle, February 10. 1878. 
 
31 
 
 northwest, to the left of the woods in which the First Division was 
 then engaged. Upwards of three-quarters of a mile in front were 
 woods nearly parallel with the line of battle and between, somewhat to 
 the left, a house and large stone barn, the latter of which was after- 
 wards used as a cover for the enemy's shar[)shooters. To protect the 
 battery from tiie annoyance which the siiarpshooters occasioned a 
 company of skirmishers was sent from the Twentieth New York, 
 who, readily driving tiie men off, occupied their shelter. Later in 
 the day, towards 3 p.m., Pettigrew's brigade of North Carolina troops, 
 Heth's division, Hill's corps, advancing in two lines and in perfect 
 order, commenced a vigorous attack on the extreme left of the 
 Federal line held l)y the First Brigade. Of the four small regi- 
 ments composing the latter brigade, one — the One Hundred and 
 Fifty-First — had been detached about half after two o'clock to be 
 held in reserve, and was posted near the seminary grove until it 
 was subsequently sent forward to occupy the gaj) between Mere- 
 dith's and my brigade. Notwithstanding the great disparity in 
 numbers between the contending forces, and that tlie left of the 
 Federal line was greatly outflanked, the position was maintained 
 with spirit for a considerable time under a severe direct and oblique 
 fire, and until, being without support, the fragments of the four 
 regiments were compelled to retire — towards 4 p.m. — to a partial 
 cover on the edge of the town, close to and west of the seminary, 
 where they continued to resist the progress of the enemy until the bat- 
 teries and most of the Union troops imd withdrawn to Cemetery Hill ; 
 then, as the enemy were swarming in on the left, they fell back to the 
 same point, reforming in the rear of its crest. The admirable behavior 
 of the men and officers of the brigade may to some extent be inferred 
 from the fact that out of twelve hundred and eighty-seven officers and 
 men who went into action as the First Brigade of the Third Division, 
 of the First Corps, four hundred and forty were either killed or 
 \vounded and four hundred and fifty-seven missing, leaving as its effec- 
 tive strength at the close of the first day's battle three hundred and 
 ninety officers and men. 
 
 The various official reports and unofficial published statements of 
 prominent Confederate generals respecting the occurrences on the first 
 day between the contending forces of the corps of Reynolds and Hill 
 are in many respects so essentially different from that which has been 
 here detailed, that it seems but proper to present the material ])ortions 
 of those statements, without, however, undertaking to reconcile the 
 many points of difference between the two accounts. General Hill 
 
32 
 
 re|)orts otticiallv' that " alxMit tlii(H' miles from (Jettysbiirg his advaiu-c 
 bridle, Archer's, eiicouutercd theadvanre of the enemy. Archer and 
 Davis were thrown into line, and with some j)iece« of artillery from 
 Pegrani, the enemy were steadily driven back to the womietl hills this 
 side of ( lettysbnrg, where their j)rincii)al force (since ascertained to be 
 the First and lOleventh Corps) was disposed to dispute our farther 
 advance. Ilcth's whole division was ntnv thrown into line; Davis on 
 the left of the road ; Archer, Petti^rcw, and ]irokcid)roii<rh on the \'\',i\\t, 
 and I'ender tornied in his rear; Thomas on the left, and Lane, Scales, 
 and l*errin on the right. Pegram's and Mcintosh's battalions of 
 artillery were put in position on the crest of a hill overlo(>king the 
 town of (lettysburg. Heth's division drove the enemy, encountering 
 a determined resistance. About half-})ast two o'clock the right wing of 
 Ewell's corps made its appearance on my left, and thus formed a right 
 angle with my line. Pender's division was then ordered forward, 
 Thomas's brigade being retained in reserve, and the rout of the enemy 
 was complete, Perrin's brigade taking position after position of the 
 enemy and driving him through the town of Gettysburg. The want 
 of cavalry had been and w:is again seriously felt. Under the ini[)res- 
 sion that the enemy were entirely routed, — my own two divisions ex- 
 hausted by somcsix hours' hard fighting, — prudence led me to be content 
 with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and 
 necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy." 
 ..." Brigadier-Cjleneral Archer was taken prisoner by the enemy." 
 ..." Pettigrew's brigade, under its gallant leader, fought most admi- 
 rably and sustained heavy loss." Three things in this report will not 
 escape observation. First, that the Federal forces offered a " deter- 
 mined resistance;" second, that the want of cavalry " was again ser- 
 iously felt ;" and, third, that no mention is made either of the capture 
 of Archer's or of the larger part of Davis's brigades. In connection 
 with the first point, it may be well to consider the comj)aratively re(X?nt 
 account of Cieneral Heth, in which, after mentioning that u})on his 
 first advance, meeting with no opj)osition, when within a mile or so of 
 the town two of his brigades (Archer's and Davis's) were then deployed 
 to the right and left of the railroad leading into (xcttysburg, and with 
 the railroad as a ])oint of direction were ordered to advance and occupy 
 Gettysburg. " These brigades on moving forward soon struck the 
 enemy, which proved to be Keynolds's corps of the Federal army, and 
 were driven back with some loss." ..." My division was then formed 
 
 ' Southern Historiciil Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 'J23. 
 V 
 
33 
 
 in a wooded ravine to the right of the raih'oad, the ground rising in 
 front and rear. The enemy was evidently in force in my front. General 
 Rodes, commanding a division of Ewell's corps, en route to Cashtown, 
 was following a road running north of Gettysburg. Rodes hearing the 
 firing at Gettysburg, faced by the left Hank and approached the town. 
 He soon became heavily engaged, and seeing this I sougiit for and 
 found General Lee, saying to the general, ' Rodes is very heavily en- 
 gaged; had I not better attack ?' General Lee replied, 'Xo; I am not 
 prepared to bring on a general engagement to-day ; Longstreet is not 
 up.' Returning to my division, I soon discovered that the enemy were 
 moving troops from my front and pushing them against Rodes. I re- 
 ]wrted this fact to General Lee, and again requested to be permitted to 
 attack. Permission was given. My division numbered some seven 
 thousand muskets. I found in my front a heavy skirmish line and two 
 lines of battle. My division swept over these without halting. My 
 loss was severe. In twenty-five minutes I lost two thousand seven hun- 
 dred men killed and wounded." Certainly no idea of a "determined 
 resistance," such as is spoken of by Hill, is conveyed by the language 
 of Heth ; in fact, the reverse is fairly inferrible from it, and yet Hill's 
 version is altogether the more likely to be accurate, as it is not onlv 
 confirmed by the testimony of Federal officers, but, moreover, appears 
 to be corroborated by the fact mentioned by Pleth himself, that he lost 
 two thousand seven hundred men killed and Avounded, out of a division 
 of seven thousand, in twenty-five minutes ; a loss of over one-third in so 
 short a space of time is quite calculated to check tlie ardor of even the 
 most dashing troops. And lastly. General Lee, in his final report on 
 the (campaign in Pennsylvania, puts it thus : General Heth, when 
 within a mile of the town, sent two brigades forward to reconnoitre. 
 " They drove in the advance of the enemy very gallantly, but subse- 
 quently encountered largely su}>erior numbers, and were compelled to 
 retire with loss, Brigadier-General Archer, commanding one of the 
 brigades, being taken prisoner. General Heth then prepared for action, 
 and as soon as Pender arrived to support him, Avas ordered by General 
 Hill to advance. The artillery was placed in position, and the engage- 
 ment opened with vigor. General Heth pressed the enemy steadily 
 back, breaking his first and second lines and attacking his third 
 with great resolution. About 2J p.m. the advance of Ewell's corps, 
 consisting of Rodes's division, with Carter's battalion of artillery, ar- 
 rived by the Middletown Road, and forming on Heth's left, nearly at 
 right angles with his line, became warmly engaged with fresh numbers 
 of the enemy. Heth's troops having suffered heavily in their pro- 
 
34 
 
 tnu'tetl contest with a suptrior force, were relieved by Pender's, and 
 Harly coniinf; up In- the Ilcidlorshurg Road soon afterwards, took 
 |)osition on the left of Kodcs, when a p:eneral advance was made. The 
 enemy uave way (tii all sides, and were driven through (Jettysburg 
 with ^reat loss. Major-C leneral Reynolds, who was in <-omnian(l, was 
 killed." ' This tinal report, it should be borne in mind, was writt(.'n in 
 .lanuary, 18<j4, six months after the battle. It is consequently a matter 
 of surprise th:it ( Jeneral Lee should display such a want of atruracy in 
 an important otlieial document respecting a fact, then of such general 
 notoriety, as that of the time of the death of Reynolds. The general 
 advance of the Confederate troops is stated to have been subsequent to 
 '2\ P.M., and after that hour that " Major-( Jeneral Reynolds" . . . 
 " was killed," as it would apjjcar from the report, in (Jettysbnrg. But 
 passing this over, what becomes of Heth's account if Lee is right, 
 when the latter asserts that Heth's troops were relieved by Pender's 
 before the general advance was made".' 
 
 General Lee, as well as a large number of Confederate officers of 
 high rank, attribute in a measure their want of success at Gettysburg 
 to the absence of cavalry. The oidy reference on the part of Lee to 
 the subject is that in his final report, in which the embarriussment, con- 
 sidered to be due to such cause, is limited to the movements of his 
 army "preceding the battle of Gettysburg."- General Hill goes fur- 
 ther, saying that " the want of cavalry was again seriously felt." Col- 
 onel Taylor, of J^ee's staff, remarks, '*Xow as to the battle itself The 
 first great disadvantage experienced by f General Lee was the unexpectal 
 absence of his cavalry."^ (ieneral Alexander, chief of artillery of 
 Longstreet's coi-ps, declares that their "information of the enemy's 
 movements was incom|)lete on account of the absence of all of the cav- 
 alry, or nearly all, with (ieneral Stuart, who, instead of being between 
 us and the enemy, was on a raid around him."* General Wilcox, of 
 Hill's corps, expresses himself to the same effect, observing that a scout 
 rejwrted that Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was moving north. 
 " Without his cavalry General Lee could not divine the purj)ose of the 
 enemy, but he determined, with the view of guarding his communica- 
 tions with Virginia and to check the advance west, to concentrate his 
 forces east of the mountains."'' General L«»ng, military secretary to 
 General Lee, says, " When, however," Lee " had crossed the Potomac, 
 the absence of his cavalry, caused by the fatal blunder of Stuart, which 
 
 ' Soutliern Historical Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 40. ' Ideni, vol. ii. j.. 44. 
 
 ■ Idem, vol. iv. p. 8*2. ♦ Idem, vol. iv. p. 99. * Idem, vol. iv. p. 112 
 
35 
 
 separated it from the army at the most critical time, obliged him to 
 grope his way in the dark, and precipitated him, by the want of timely 
 notice, into a jirematurc engagement with the enemy." ^ General Heth 
 is the most emphatic, saying, "The failure to crush the Federal army 
 in Pennsylvania in 1863, in tiic opinion of almost all the officers of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia," can be expressed in five words, — ihe 
 absence of our cavalry."'- These extracts sufficiently indicate the pre- 
 vailing impression among a very numerous class of Confederate officers, 
 namely, that the cavalry arm of the service was actually wanting to the 
 Confederate chief. And yet on this point the statements of Generals 
 J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz-Hugh Lee are diametrically in opposition to 
 those which have just been cited. Stuart, in the draft of his report on 
 the Gettysburg campaign, refers to this subject, and replies to the un- 
 favorable criticism of his fellow-officers in the following manner: "It 
 was thought by many that my command could have rendered more 
 service had it been in advance of the army the first day at Gettysburg, 
 and the commanding general complains of a want of cavalry on that 
 occasion ; but it must be remembered that the cavalry (Jenkins's bri- 
 gade) specially selected for advance-guard to the army by the com- 
 manding general on account of its geographical location at the time was 
 available for this purpose, and had two batteries of horse artillery 
 serving with it. If, therefore, the peculiar functions of cavalry with 
 the array were not satisfactorily performed in the absence of ray com- 
 mand, it should rather be attributed to the fact that Jenkins's brigade 
 was not as efficient as it ought to have been, and as its numbers (three 
 thousand eight hundred) on leaving Virginia warranted us in expecting. 
 Even at that time, by its reduction incident to the campaign, it numbered 
 far more than the cavalry which successfully covered Jackson's flank 
 movement at Cliancellorsville, turned back Stoneman from the James, 
 and drove three thousand five hundred cavalry, under Averill, across the 
 Rappahannock. Properly handled, such a command should have done 
 everything requisite, and left nothing to detract by the remotest impli- 
 cation from the brilliant exploits of their comrades achieved under cir- 
 cumstances of great hardship and danger." ' General Fitz-Hugh Lee, 
 in his review of the first two days' operations at Gettysburg, is quite as 
 emphatic. " The much-abused cavalry," he says, " is lifted into great 
 prominence, and is constrained to feel complimented by the statement 
 of many of these critics, that the failure to crush the Federal army in 
 
 1 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 122. 
 
 2 Idem, vol. iv. p. 155. ' Idem, vol. ii. p. 
 
 3 
 
36 
 
 Pennsylvania in ISCui can he expreased * in five words,' viz., * the ab- 
 sence of (»nr eavah'v' ; hut such lan^iiajrc implies an ae<nsation against 
 (lenenil .1. E. H. Stuart, its conjiiiandiT, who has heen diarjied with a 
 neglect of duty in not reporting; the passage of the Potomac hv J looker's 
 army (afterwards Mca<lt''s), and with disohcdicncc <»f «»rdcr>, which re- 
 snhctl in placing tin- Federal army hctwc<.'n his command and the force 
 of Genend Lee, thereby putting out the eyes of his own 'giant.'" . . . 
 "From the 2oth of June to July 2, (Jeneral Lee deplored Stuart's 
 absence, and almost hourly wished for him, and yet it was bv his per- 
 mission his daring chief of cavalry was away. <ieneral Stuart cannot, 
 therefore, be charged with the resj)onsil)ility of the failure at Gettys- 
 burg."' And elsewhere Fit/.-Hugh Lee remarks, '* hi justice to Stuart, 
 it may be said that he had calculated upon the brigade of Jenkins, and 
 White's battalion of cavalry, which aa-ompanied CJenerals Eweil and 
 Early, and Jones's and Robertson's brigades, which were left to guard 
 the |)asses of the Blue Ividge, and Mere to rejoin General Lee as soon 
 as the enemy crossed the river, to do all that was necessary."- On the 
 other hand, (Jeneral Early, in reviewing the causes of Lee's defeat, ex- 
 jiresses his opinion in the following manner: "J have never thought 
 that our failure at Gettysburg was due to the absence of Stuart's cav- 
 alry, though I can well understand the perj)lexity and annoyance it 
 caused (ieneral Lee before the enemy was found. He was found, how- 
 ever, without the aid of cavalry, and when found, though by accident, 
 he furnished us the opportunity to strike him a fatiil blow." . . . " Jt 
 is difficult"' . . . "to perceive of what more avail in ascertaining and 
 reporting the movements of the Federal army Stuart's cavalry could 
 have been if it had moved on the west of South Mountain than indi- 
 vidual scouts employed for that purpose, while it is very certain that 
 his movement on the other ffaidv greatly perplexed and l)ewil(lered the 
 Federal eoiiinianders, and compelled them to move slower. It is not 
 iniprobal)le, however, that it would have been better for him to hurry 
 on and not meddle with the wagon-train he captured ; but then the 
 temptation was so great to a poor Confederate." "* Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Fremantle, of the Coldstream Guards, who was |)resent with I^ee's 
 army at (lettysl)urg, and who has expressed great admiration for the 
 gallantry and determination of the Southern people in his "Three 
 Months in the Southern States," writes, under date of June 30, as fol- 
 lows : " I had a long talk with matiy officers about the approaching 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. v. p. 1G2. 
 
 ■'' Idem, vol. iv. p. ?■'>. ^ Idem, vol. iv. p. 2G'.t. 
 
37 
 
 battle, which evidently cannot now be delayed long, and will take place 
 on this road" (the one towards Gettysburg) " instead of in the direction 
 of Harrisburg, as we had supposed. Ewell, who has laid York as 
 well as Carlisle under contribution, has been ordered to reunite. Every 
 one, of course, speaks with confidence. I remarked that it would be a 
 good thing for them if on this occasion they had cavalry to follow up 
 the broken infantry in the event of their succeeding in beating them. 
 But to my surprise they all spoke of their cavalry as not efficient for 
 that purpose. In fact, Stuart's men, though excellent at making raids, 
 capturing wagons and stores, and cutting off communications, seem to 
 have no idea of charging infantry under any circumstances. Unlike 
 the cavalry with Bragg's army, they wear swords, but seem to have 
 little idea of using them ; they hanker after their carbines and revolvers. 
 They constantly ride with their swords between their left leg and the 
 saddle, which has a very funny appearance ; but their horses are gen- 
 erally good, and they ride well. The infantry and artillery of this 
 army do not seem to respect the cavalry very much, and often jeer at 
 them."^ In his account of the operations of General Gregg's division 
 of Federal cavalry, on the right flank of the army at Gettysburg, Col- 
 onel Brooke-Rawle notices this disinclination of Stuart's cavalry to make 
 use of the sabre. His description of Gregg's brilliant charge on the af- 
 ternoon of the 3d of July, which foiled Stuart's attempt to surprise the 
 rear of our main line of battle, which was to have been executed simul- 
 taneously with Pickett's assault in front, is so much in point that an 
 extract from it is here given : " As Town ordered sabres to be drawn 
 and the column to advance, Custer dashed up with similar orders, and 
 placed himself at its head. The two columns drew nearer and nearer, 
 the Confederates, outnumbering their opponents as three or four to one. 
 The gait increased, — first the trot, then the gallop. Hampton's battle- 
 flag floated in the van of the brigade. The orders of the Confederate 
 officers could be heard by those in the woods on their left, — ' Keep to 
 your sabres, men ! Keep to your sabres !' for the lessons they had 
 learned at Brandy Station and at Aldie had been severe. There the 
 cry had been, ' Put up your sabres ! Draw your pistols and fight like 
 gentlemen !' But the sabre was never a favorite weapon with the Con- 
 federate cavalry, and now, in spite of the lessons of the past, the warn- 
 ings of the present were not heeded by all."^ . . . "The successful re- 
 
 1 Three Months in the Southern States, by Lieutenant-Colonel Premantle, Am. 
 Ed., p. 250. 
 
 ^ Annals of the War, p. 481, and note to p. 483. 
 
38 
 
 suit of tlii> mii<^iiiflf('iil cavalrv cliar^e was attributed l)y iIh- vidors to 
 tlu' stcailiucss and cnicicucy with wliicli tlicy used the sihie, ni imuixc, 
 against givatlv superior numbers of the enemy, many of whom luid 
 exclian<j:ed that weapon for the revolver." 
 
 The main features of the determined resistanee offered by the First 
 Corps having thus at some length been presented, the part taken in the 
 battle of the 1st of duly by the Eleventh Corps remains to i)e deserilK?d. 
 Slinrilv after the death of Reynolds, General Schurz, who ha<l assumed 
 the command of the Eleventh Corps, met the Third Division, the head 
 of that part of his enlumn which had moved by the Taneytown Road, 
 near Ccmetciv Mill. This was j>r<)bably a little after 1 I'.M., although 
 (icnei-al Jloward suggests that it may have been as early as 12.45 P.M.,' 
 whilst his chief of artillery states that at 10 a.m. "the head of the 
 Eleventh Corps had" . . . "just come in sight of Gettysburg."- The 
 narrative oi" this last-mentioned officer does not, however, agree in 
 several important particulars with the reports of other officers. For 
 instance, both Howartl and Sduirz speak of Barlow's tlivision (the 
 First) as marching on the direct road from Emmetsburg, and the otiier 
 two bv cross-roads leading into the Taneytown Road, Howard adding 
 that one battery was with the First I)ivisi(m and the remaining four 
 batteries with the other two divisions; whereas the chief of artillery 
 represents it that one battery was marching with Schurz's division (the 
 Third) and one with Stcinwehr's (the Second), and that " the remaining 
 three were together between the two rear divisions."' It would cer- 
 tainly have been (juite easy to arrange these five batteries so that one 
 should have been at the head of the Third, one at the rear of the Second, 
 and the remaining three between those two divisions, but such an 
 arrangement would not have allowed a battery to the First Division, of 
 which Schurz sj)eaks. Be this as it may, however, his statement as to 
 the time when the batteries reached the town, and which is of far more 
 consequence, is by no means clear. After mentioning that Howard had 
 intelligence of the death of Reynolds at 11.30 a.m., he remarks, " I 
 reached Gettysburg in an hour after receiving (Jeneral Howard's order 
 with the batteries, and as the infantry moved through the town to the 
 IVont I sent with them four batteries, — Wheeler and Heckman to the 
 left, on the Seminary Road, and Dilger and ^^'ilkinson to the right, 
 with Gen. Barlow's division. The remaining battery, Captain Wei- 
 
 ' Campaign of Gettysburg, bv «). <». Jlowanl, Atlantic Muntliiv, .Inly, 1876, 
 p. 55. 
 
 » Philadelphia Weekly Times, May 31, 187!t. •' Id.ni. May :!!, 1879. 
 
39 
 
 drich, T left at Cemetery Hill, with General Steinwehr." Schurz ad- 
 vanced the Third, now become Sehimmelpfennig's division, directing it 
 to be deployed on the right of the First Corps in two lines. Shortly 
 afterwards Barlow's division, arriving by the Emnietsbnrg Road, passed 
 through the town to the north at half after one o'clock, and, halting at 
 the Almshouse, on the Harrisburg Road, to remove knapsacks, was 
 then ordered to form at the double-quick on the right of the Third 
 Division, in order to dislodge the enemy from a piece of woods to the 
 right of the Eleventh Corps. Meanwhile, says Howard, as Schurz 
 " was conductina; his Third Division to battle I left orders for Stein- 
 wehr and Osborne" (his chief of artillery) "to halt and form upon 
 Cemetery Ridge." Accompanying Barlow's division, Howard, upon 
 reaching the right of the Eleventh Corps, turned and rode along the 
 line to Doubleday's division on the left, and there seeing General 
 Wads worth, about two o'clock gave him orders to hold the position as 
 long as he could and then retire. The rest of Howard's description, 
 namely, that part of it respecting the disposition of the troops on the 
 left of the line, differs so radically from all the other accounts and from 
 the fact, that it seems to be a creation of the imagination. He says, " The 
 left of Doubleday's line, resting on a small stream, called Willoughby's 
 Run, extended to an elevation north of the Chambersburg Road, and 
 was then refused. Then there was an interval occupied after 1 p.m. by 
 Wheeler's and Dilger's batteries, belonging to the Eleventh Corps. 
 From this place to Rock Creek, almost at right angles with the First 
 Corps line, were the two divisions of the Eleventh Corps, — Barlow's 
 land Sehimmelpfennig's. Such was the position of the troops."^ The 
 account of the disposition of the troops on the right is also very inac- 
 curate, for it will be remembered that the Ninetieth Pennsylvania, of 
 Baxter's brigade, which was the flanking regiment at the right of tiie 
 line when Robinson's division took position on Seminary Ridge, was 
 refused and stretched along the Mummasburg Road. Sehimmelpfen- 
 nig's division went to the right of the Ninetieth Pennsylvania in pro- 
 longation of its line, but, not connecting with it, left a dangerous break 
 between. The Second Brigade, of Sehimmelpfennig's division, was in 
 a field farther to the right, near to and east of the Carlisle Road. Schurz 
 was directed to move forward and seize a wooded height in front of his 
 left, but before he had advanced any distance, information having been 
 brought shortly before three o'clock that part of E well's corps was 
 
 ^ Campaign of Gettysburg, by O. O. Howard, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1876, 
 p. 56. 
 
40 
 
 coming in towards llic ri^dit of" the l-'c*!! ral line, iK'twwn llu' Harris- 
 hurj; and York Roads, tlieonlcr was (•(niiit('riiiaii(lc<l l)y ITdward. Tlio 
 enemy was thus enabled to o('<'iij)v this inijM»rtant hciirht in t'oi-cc with- 
 out material opposition. Hill li\»'^ the liinr that the ri<:lit win<:; <»r 
 Ewell's corps (Kodes's division) made it.s ap|>earanee on his left, and 
 was formed at right angles with his line, at ahout half after two o'eI<x;k.' 
 The ct)rreet time was probably sooner, for Early states that liodes 
 "came down on the road from Mummasburg about 2 o'clock P.M., and 
 became eiigage<l on Heth's left," and tiuit he "arrived al)out an hour 
 after RckIcs got up,'"- or at 3 P.M. Heth, on seeing Kodes thus engaged, 
 "sought for and found General Lee, saying," as he narrates, " to the 
 general, 'RcKles is very heavily engaged; had I not Ix'tter attack*." 
 General Lee replied, 'No; I am not j)repared to bring on a general 
 engagement to-day; Longstreet is not up.' Returning to my division, 
 I soon discovered that the enemy were moving troops from my front 
 and pushing them against Rodes. 1 reported this fact to General Lee, 
 and again requeste<l to be permitted to attack. Permission was given."' 
 Whilst Rmles was thus engaged Early's division had been brought into 
 action on his left with great success. The movements of his brigades 
 had been very prompt and rapid, which brought his troojis in the rear 
 and flank of the force then confronting Rodes.* Early's batteries, 
 posted on a slope between the Carlisle and Harrisbm-g Roads, were 
 replied to by three of the batteries of the Eleventh Corps at the front, 
 and by Weidrich's 3-inch riflal guns on Cemetery Hill. The shot from 
 the latter, however, only reaching the line of the cavalry, Buford com- 
 plained of the firing ; but, as Howard naively remarks, " fortunately 
 nobody on our side was killed by this fire." The attack of the enemy- 
 was at this time proceeding simultaneously along the whole line. 
 Schimmelpfennig's division speedily gave way, falling back most prob- 
 ably before three o'clock. Wadsworth, in his report, says about half- 
 j)ast two;* and according to the testimony of some, retreating " before 
 the enemy's skirmishers."^ Barlow's division, on the extreme right, 
 forming l)ehind Rw^k Creek to meet a charge from Gordon's, Hays's, and 
 Avery's brigades, of Early's division, was next struck. In a moment 
 the open fields beyond were filled with the disordered troops of Howard's 
 corps flving in confusion. "Where Barlow was aligninl lay a line of 
 wounded and dead men who had fallen as they stood, and in their midst 
 
 1 Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. ii. p. 22.^?. ' Idem, vol. iv. p. 258. 
 » Idem, vol. iv. p. 158. ♦ Idem, vol. iv. p. 254. 
 
 6 Conduct of the War, Part I., p. -SOT. • Idem, Part I., p. 308. 
 
41 
 
 lay Barlow himself, sorely stricken."^ Major Brady, of the Seven- 
 teenth Connecticut, Barlow's division, speaks of " the rush to the rear 
 of troops directly in advance" of part of his regiment,- " The Federal 
 flank," according to Major Daniel, of Early's staff, " had been shriveled 
 up as a scroll, and the whole force gave way."^ The troops from 
 Rodes's front moved towards the town, followed by Early's division ; 
 Hays's brigade, of the latter division, alone entering it.^ Howard 
 himself corroborates the general features of the foregoing account by 
 stating that "soon tlie division of the Eleventli Corps nearest Double- 
 day was flying to the shelter of the town, widening the gap there, and 
 the enemy in line ])ressed rapidly through the interval. Of course Rob- 
 inson and Wadsworth had to give way.'"^ After the Eleventh Corps 
 had been driven from the field but one alternative remained to the 
 First. It had been successfully resisting the heavy shocks directed 
 against its front by a force twofold greater than its own, but now there 
 were superadded the blows on its flank from another force at least 
 numerically equal to the first. The limit of human endurance had 
 been reached, and it fell back, fighting as it went. 
 
 Howard was already on Cemetery Hill when Von Amsburg's regi- 
 ment, of his corps, the first to arrive, reached there. Leading the way 
 with his corps flag, he placed the regiment on the right of Steiuwehr's 
 line. General Ames, who succeeded Barlow after the latter had been 
 severely wounded, came to him about the same time and said, " * I have 
 no division; it is all cut to pieces,' to which Howard replied, ' Do what 
 you can, Ames, to gather the fragments and extend the line to the 
 right.' He did so, and succeeded better than he had feared."^ Yet it 
 has been asserted that about fifteen hundred men of this corps were 
 collected some miles in the rear of the field by the provost guard of 
 the Twelfth Corps. The First Corps, compelled to yield to the severe 
 pressure on their front and flanks, were still maintaining a position near 
 the seminary, as they had received no orders to withdraw altogether, "al- 
 though the enemy were marching on the town, and something had to 
 be done immediately."' The line of the Second Brigade, of the Third 
 
 1 Address by Major Daniel, p. 20. - Rebellion Record, vol. x. p. 181. 
 
 * Address by 3Iajor Daniel, p. 20. 
 
 * Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 2-54. 
 
 5 Campaign of Gettysburg, by 0. 0. Howard, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1876, 
 p. 58. 
 
 6 Campaign of Gettysburg, by O. O. Howard, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1876, 
 p. 58. 
 
 T Conduct of the War, Part I., p. 310. 
 
42 
 
 Division, had lM't::iin lo ^ivi- way imt Icitijr after 3 p.m., and had fallen 
 iiack slowly iin(h'r a sever*- fire to a position which Meredith's hrigjulu 
 liud taken siiortly before, but the new line havin;.^ been foreed to give 
 way on all sides, the whole of it shortly after withdrew to Cemetery 
 Hill. The First Brigade, of the Third I )ivisioii, forming the left of the 
 corps line, was in like manner obliged, about 4 p.m., to retire from the 
 field to the slight eover imme<liately west of the seminary, where it re- 
 mained for a short time, until the batteries and most of the troops 
 had moved through the town, when it retreated to ( V-metery Hill. 
 
 In reference to the time when the first troo|)s reached Cemetery Hill 
 there is again a conflict of statement. I Toward assert ing that, according 
 to the time which he "had gone by all day," it was half after four 
 o'clock when (Jeneral Hancock first met him there.' This Hancock 
 contradicts, saying that he arrived u|»on the field about 3 P.M., or Ije- 
 tween that and 3.30, when he found the fighting about over, and when 
 " there had been an attempt to reform some of the Eleventh Corjjs 
 as they passed over Cemetery Hill, but it had not been very success- 
 ful;" . . . " there may have been one thousand to twelve hundred at 
 most organized troops of that corjis in position on the hill,"- . . . 
 "and these were a i)ortion of Steinwehr's division, which, with the 
 artillery of the corps, was left there by Howard when he marched up in 
 the morning."'' In the s])irited account of the battle by Bates it is 
 stated * that Steinwehr saw that " however powerful and effective his own 
 guns might ])rove while unassailed," . . . " they would be unable to live 
 long when att^icked unless protected." ..." He accordingly threw up 
 lunettes around each gun;" ..." not mere heaps of stubble and turf, 
 but solid works, of such height and thickness as to defy the most power- 
 ful bolts which the enemy could throw against them, with smooth and 
 perfectly level jilatforms on which the guns could be worked." Upon 
 whose authority this statement is based does not a])peiir, but Hancock* 
 characterizes it as "a great error ; there were no works of the kind above 
 described on that field when" he "arrived there, and all that" he "saw in 
 the way of 'works' were some holes (not deep) dug to sink the wheels and 
 trains of the pieces." Three regiments of the First Brigade, of Stein- 
 wehr's division, under the command of Colonel Costar, which had been 
 
 > Campaign c.f Gettysburg, by O. O. Ildwanl, Atlantic :Nrontlilv, Julv, 187*3, 
 p. 58. 
 
 '■' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. v. p. 1G9. 
 
 ' Idem, vol. v. p. 171. 
 
 * Battle of Gettysburg, by Bates, p. 7G. 
 
 ' Soutliprn Historical Society Papers, vol. v. p. 172. 
 
43 
 
 ordered forward to the support of Schimnielpfennig's and Barlow's di- 
 visions, and were posted on tlie right of the Harrisburg Road, just north 
 of the town, were borne down by Early's advancing troo])S, and most of 
 them taken prisoners. The remaining regiment of that brigade, as the 
 Federal soldiers were retiring through the town, occupied the houses on 
 either side of the Baltimore Pike, near its junction with the Emmets- 
 burg Road and a stone wall just below the cemetery. From their cover 
 they checked the advance of the enemy and protet^ted the cannoniers 
 on the heights above.' The retreat, while trying to the trooi)S of the 
 First Corps, in consequence of their becoming entangled with the 
 Eleventh in the streets of the town, was yet conducted by the former 
 with some regard to order, the men frequently making a stand, until 
 they finally reached the heights. Early's troops, flushed with success, 
 " exclaimed as their officers passed along their lines, ' Let us go on !' "^ 
 Lee, too, then shared the enthusiasm of his men, although afterwards, 
 in his first report, he alleges that " the attack was not pressed that after- 
 noon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advis- 
 able to await the arrival of the rest of our troops." "General Lee," 
 says Colonel Taylor, of his staff, ^ " witnessed the flight of the Federals 
 through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to 
 go to General Ewell and to say to him that from the ])osition which he 
 occupied he could see the enemy retreating over those hills without or- 
 ganization and in great confusion ; that it was only necessary to press 
 ' those people' in order to secure possession of the heights, and that if 
 possible lie wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions 
 I proceeded immediately to General Ewell and delivered the order of 
 General Lee, and after receiving from him some message for the com- 
 manding general in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the 
 latter and reported that his order had been delivered. General Ewell 
 did not express any objection or indicate the existence of any impedi- 
 ment to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the im- 
 pression on my mind that it would be executed." ..." The troops 
 were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify 
 the position wliich it was designed that General Ewell should seize. 
 Major-Gcneral Edward Johnson, whose division reached the field after 
 the engagement and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had 
 with rae since the war about this circumstance, in which I sought an 
 explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that there was no 
 
 ^ History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, vol. ii. pp. 865-66. 
 
 * Address by Major Daniel, p. 20. * Annals of the War, p. 308. 
 
44 
 
 liin<1ran<v to his moving forward, but that aftor jijettinj^ his coniiiiiitKl 
 ill line of haUh*, and iK'fore it hecaino seriously oii}j^a<;od or had advanced 
 any great distance, for some unexphiined reason he had received orders 
 to halt. This wjus aft<T (Jenerul IxHi's message \v:ls delivered to General 
 Kwell." Lee and stall' had reached the field in the afternoon, near the 
 close of" the i)attle. Si>on after Anderson's division arrived, \mt heing 
 too late to participate in the action wa-^ halted on the ground licid by 
 Pender when the battle began,' and at about the same time Longstreet 
 came in |>erson, his troops being a few miles behind. - 
 
 riiu- practically terminated the first day's battle; l)ut what were 
 the fruits of the victory to (jcncral Ijee? Defeated by overwhelming 
 nnmbei-s, the men of the Fii-st Corps, who had borne the brunt of the 
 fight, were again in jjosition, and determinwl to contest the ground they 
 now ocx'upied. Buford was near by to assist. But why did the victors 
 pause in their pursuit? A pause which was to ])rove fatal to their 
 anticipations of a favoral)le issue to their aj)peal to arms. Kwell had 
 been ordered to seize the heights, and the belief was that the order 
 could and would have l)e(>n obeyed, as, in the opinion of fieneral John- 
 son, there wjis no hindrance to his moving forward. Indeed, there 
 would api)ear to be no justification for his disobedience if Colonel Fre- 
 mantle, of the (niards, is correct in his report of the " universal feeling 
 in the Confederate army," which "was one of profound contempt for an 
 enemy whom they had beaten so constantly and under so many disad- 
 vantages." ' Naturally, the question whether the Confederates should 
 have followed up their success on the afternoon of the first day has 
 been the occiision of much animate<l discussion both among military 
 men and civilians. South and Xorth. As the legitimate result of these 
 discussions, making due allowance for the considerable element of per- 
 sonal feeling exhibited by many of the Southern officers and civilians, 
 it mav be stated that the failure to pursue was fatal to Lee's army. On 
 this point of controversy Longstreet is most emphatic in the expression 
 of his views :^ "The crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the 
 Federal army in the casual encounter of the 1st at Willoughby's Run 
 should have been pushed to extremities, that occasion furnishing one 
 of the few opportunities ever furnished for ' pursuit pell-mell.' " Ewell, 
 as has already been mentioned, not only received the order to pursue, 
 but expressed no objection to, or difficulty in the way of, its execution. 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 113. ^ Idem, vol. iv. p. 66. 
 
 • Three Months in the Southern States, by Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle, p. 
 256. 
 
 * Annals of the War, p. 620. 
 
45 
 
 The " hunt was uj)," and in Jhe language of Lee, as applied to the 
 third day, some of " his people" seemed simply to desire to be "turned 
 loose"' at their enemy. EwelP assigns as reasons, however, in his re- 
 port, for not carrying out the order, that lie could not bring artillery to 
 bear on the hill, and that the troops with him " were jaded by twelve 
 hours' marching and fighting." . . . " Cemetery Hill was not assailable 
 from the town," and in consequence he determined with Johnson's di- 
 vision to take possession of a wooded hill which commanded Cemetery 
 Hill, but before -lohnson got up the enemy was reported to be moving 
 on his left flank, and by the time that report could be investigated and 
 "Johnson placed in position the night was far advanced."- The report 
 of Ewell, and the memorandum of Colonel Taylor, need only to be 
 compared in order that a conclusion may be drawn. The other corps 
 commander. Hill, being " under the impression that the enemy were 
 entirely routed, — his own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' 
 hard fighting, — prudence led him to be content with what had been 
 gained, and not j^ush forward troops exhausted and necessarily disor- 
 dered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy." ^ In review- 
 ing the operations of the first two days. General Fitz-Hugh Lee con- 
 siders that the Confederates were ' Mnthin a stone's throw of peace' at 
 Gettysburg;" and although in numbers as sixty-two thousand is to one 
 hundred and five thousand (which latter, however, he thinks is an over- 
 estimate) before any portion of either army had become engaged, yet 
 the advantages were so manifestly on General Tice's side, in consequence 
 of the more rapid concentration of his troops upon a common point, 
 that the heart of every Southern soldier beat with the lofty confidence 
 of certain victory."* ... In referring to the first day, he puts the 
 question,^ "Did such failure at Gettysburg arise from Ewell and Hill 
 not pushing their success on the 1st of July?" And he answers it 
 thus : " I have always been one of those who regarded it a great mis- 
 fortune that these two corps commanders did not continue to force the 
 fighting upon that day. Each had two divisions of their corps engaged, 
 thus leaving one division to each corps, viz., Johnson, of Ewell's, and 
 Anderson, of Hill's, at their service for further work, — something over 
 ten thousand men." ..." Estimating those four divisions at the 
 close of the action at an average of four thousand five hundred men 
 a piece, we had eighteen thousand men ; add the ten thousand of the 
 
 ^ Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 261. 
 
 2 Idem, vol. iv. p. 262. ' Idem, vol. ii. p. 223. 
 
 * Idem, vol. v. p. 163. ^ Idem, vol. v. p. 167, 
 
46 
 
 two divisions not engaged, and there wiJI Ik? found twenty-eight thou- 
 sand men ready to move on, Hushed with vict<)ry and confident (»!' suc- 
 cess." in March, 1.S77, he had expressed the opiniitu in writing' that 
 "a little more marcliing, perhajo a little more fighting, would have 
 given us the coveted position, and (hat in such an event the hattle of 
 Gettyshurg would have had another name, and possibly another result, 
 — who knows V" ]n .\|>ril, 1878,- he asserts, after fairly presenting the 
 evidence before him, " I am authorized in reaflirming that ' a little more 
 marching, pei;Jiaps a little more fighting,' would have gained for us the 
 possession of the lieights on the evening of the 1st of July." General 
 Heth, in his published account, already referred to, makes no allusion 
 to this subject ; regarding the fight on the 1st a>^ being without order 
 or system on their part, — at the same time considering a systematic 
 plan of battle impossible from the fact that they had "accidentally 
 sfuiiih/cd into the fight."-' General Rodes contents himself bv remark- 
 ing that his trooj)s were "greatly exhausted by their march, and some- 
 what disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit," but that 
 though they " were halted and prepared for further action," yet the 
 attack was not ordered for two reasons : first, because Ewell, in the 
 midst of the engagement which had then just taken place, had informed 
 him through one of his officers that General I^ee did not wish a gen- 
 eral engagement brought on; and, second, because, "before the comple- 
 tion of his defeat," . . . "the enemy had begun to establish a line of 
 battle on the heights back of the town, and seeing no Confederate troops 
 on his right, and that Early, who was on his left, was awaiting orders, 
 although his superiors were upon the ground, he concluded that the order 
 not to bring on a general engagement was still in force." ^ How do these 
 reasons harmonize with Colonel Taylor's stiitement that he delivered 
 the order of General ]>ee to Ewell to press "those people," in order t« 
 secure possession of the heights? Moreover, the opinion of Colonel 
 Allan, of Ewell's staff, is, that'^ " the Confederates would probably have 
 been successful, first, had Ewell and Hill pushed Howard's broken troops 
 over the top of Cemetery Hill on the first day." Early, however, takes 
 issue, in a well-prepared defense, with those of his brother officers who 
 have thus criticised the failure of the Confederate commanders to follow 
 up their success on that day, and arrives at the conclusion that "it was 
 not, therefore, a mere question of a little more marching, nor of a little 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 75. 
 
 ■' Idem, vol. v. p. 175. » Idem, vol. iv. p. 159. 
 
 * Idem, vol. ii. p. 14!«. 6 iJem, vol. iv. p. 80. 
 
47 
 
 more fighting, either, which was involved. If we had made an assault 
 on Cemetery Hill and occupied it, it would have involved a bloody 
 struggle." ..." Before Johnson arrived all thought of moving on 
 Cemetery Hill that afternoon had been abandoned, as it was then evi- 
 dent that the enemy had rallied from the dismay of his defeat.'" Gen- 
 eral Hancock has expressed the opinion that "if the Confederates had 
 continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the 1st 
 of July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond 
 Cemetery Hill."- But after he had made his dispositions for defend- 
 ing it, he did not think " the Confederate force then present could have 
 carried it." It was the remnant of the First Corps, however, that at 
 once gave stability to the new line. Wadsworth's division, with a bat- 
 tery of artillery, was posted on Gulp's Hill, and the remainder of the 
 corps on the right and left of the Taneytown lioad connecting with 
 the left of the Eleventh Corps. When these dispositions had about 
 been completed, one division of the Twelfth Corps came up, and later 
 another division of the same corps arrived. Sickles, it seeiiTs, had re- 
 ceived word at Emmetsburg, between two and three o'clock in the 
 afternoon,^ from Howard, that the First and Eleventh Corps were en- 
 gaged with a superior force; that Reynolds had fallen, and urging him 
 to come to their relief. In consequence he made a forced marcli with 
 a })art of his corps, and arrived, with about a division, shortly after the 
 troops had been posted on Cemetery Hill. But whilst it nowhere dis- 
 tinctly appears that Sickles had received the earlier order of Reynolds, 
 yet Bates declares that he was " morally culpable for not going to the 
 assistance of the forces engaged at Gettysburg on the first day," . . . 
 " he having early in the day been ordered up by Reynolds and having 
 no valid excuse for disregarding the summons." ^ 
 
 The extracts from the various reports and narratives which have 
 been made use of are perhaps too copious; but, at all events, it is 
 unnecessary to multiply the opinions of military men on the subject. 
 Public sentiment, with almost unanijuity, has become settled in the 
 conviction that the Confederates surrendered their " golden opportunity" 
 when they abandoned the immediate pursuit of the Federal forces on 
 the afternoon of the 1st of July. The view of the Southern people 
 may be gathered from Pollard's " History of the War" : ^ " The result 
 
 ^ Soutbern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 260. 
 
 ^ Idem, vol. v. p. 168. 3 Conduct of the War, Part 1., p. 296. 
 
 ^ Battle of Gettysburg, by Bates, p. 186. 
 
 5 Southern History of the "War, Third Year, by Pollard, p. 26. 
 
48 
 
 of tin- (lay's fi^ht may Ix,- suinrned up thus : we had attackwl a consider- 
 al)lo force, had (h-iveii it over three miles, captured five thousand pris- 
 oners, and kilUnl and \V(»nnde<l many thunsjinds. Our own h »ss was 
 not heavy, thoufjh a lew brigades suttered severely. If the attach had 
 hei'u pressed in the afternoon of that dav there is little doulit that our 
 forces could have got the heights and captured this entire detaciunent 
 of Meade's army." Colonel Bachelder, whose " long study of the 
 field'' of (iettysl)urg has given him, as has justly been remarked by 
 General Hancock,' "a fund of accurate information in great detail, 
 which" ..." is not possessetl by any one else," in a letter to General 
 Fitz-Iiugh Lee presents the prevailing Union conviction in the following 
 words: - " There is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetcrv 
 Hill, made within an hour, would have been suceessf'id." . . . "Un- 
 questionably the (/rcaf niidahc of the battle was the failure to follow the 
 Union forces through the t<»wn and attack them before they could re- 
 form on Cemetery Hill. J^ane's and Thomas's brigades, of Pender's 
 division, and Smith's, of Early's division, were at hand for such a j)ur- 
 pose and had fired scarcely a shot. Dole's, Hoke's, and Havs's bri- 
 gades were in good fighting condition, and several othei-s would have 
 <lone good service. The artillery was up and in an admirable jHjsition 
 to have covered an a.ssault, which could have been pu.she<l, under cover 
 of the houses, to within a few rods of the Union position." Finally 
 Swinton says,* " Never was pau.se at the tloor of victory more fatal t<i 
 the hopes of a commander. Had the enemy followed u|) his advantage 
 by seizing the crest of Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill there would have 
 been no Gettysburg, and indeed it is difficult to foreca.st what in this 
 case they might not have done, for the Union corps were much scattered 
 and no place of concentration had been secured.'' 
 
 In view of all the evidence which luis been presenteil, i.s not the 
 conclusion fairly warranted that to the stubborn resistance of the First 
 Corps of the Army of the Potomac on the first day of July, 1863, the 
 ultimate; defeat of Lee's invading army is, in a very large measure, to 
 be attributed ? A defeat which carried with it the utter destruction of 
 the high hopes formed at the moment Lee commenced the execution of 
 his plan. 80 terminates the story of the first day's conflict, — a struggle 
 marked with more than ordinary bravery, coolne.s.s, and endurance on 
 the part of a large number of the troops engaged, and whose valor 
 rendered po.ssible the .splendid victory which finally crowned the Union 
 arms. An achievement, the moral eflect of which was instantaneous; 
 
 ' Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. v. p. KiS. - Idem, vol. v. p. 172. 
 
 3 Thf. Twelve Decisive Battles of the War, by Swinton, p. 332. 
 
49 
 
 for men at once realized that at length a decisive victory had been won, 
 and that thenceforth the days of the Confederacy were numbered. 
 
 Impartial critics of the operations of the succeeding days consider 
 that several grave mistakes were committed by the Confederates both 
 as to a portion of their plan and to much of its execution. These 
 errors have been the subject of acriuionious discussion on the part of 
 some of the officei's of high rank in the late Confederate service. The 
 mistakes may be summed up as follows : want of co-operation or har- 
 mony of action on the 2d of July, it being asserted by Early and others 
 that Longstreet was to commence the attack on the right at an early 
 hour ill the morning, and that he failed to make it until late in the 
 afternoon. That on tiie 3d the attack was to have been renewed at an 
 early hour by Pickett and the other two divisions of Lougstreet's corps, 
 while a simultaneous assault was to have been made from the left by 
 Ewell. That Longstreet again delayed until the afteruDon, although 
 the advance on the left had been begun at the proper time. Again, 
 that tiie Federal position should have been turned by the South on the 
 third day by extending the Confederate right so as to endanger Meade's 
 communications with Washington. Again, that the tactical offensive 
 course of Lee on the 2d of July was at variance with the plan of cam- 
 paign settled upon before leaving Fredericksburg.' And again, that 
 the assault of Pickett on the third day should not have been attempted, 
 ^' the hopelessness" of which had been foreseen by Longstreet,- The 
 repulse of this " hopeless" assault is thus graphically described by 
 Longstreet:^ Pickett ''swept past our artillery in splendid style, and 
 the men marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they 
 started up the ridge over one hundred cannon from the breastworks of 
 the Federals hurled a rain of canister, grape, and shell down upon 
 them ; still they pressed on until half-way up the slope, when the crest 
 of the hill was lit witii a solid sheet of flame as the masses of infantry 
 rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away, Pickett's division was 
 gone. Nearly two-thirds of his men lay dead on the held, and the 
 survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. Mortal man could 
 not have stood that Are. Li half an hour the contested field was cleared 
 and the battle of Gettysburg was over." The grand part which the 
 Union artillery took " in this death-struggle with the Confederacy" is 
 here recognized. Hunt, its chief, and Tyler, his able assistant, opened 
 upon Pickett's magnificent assaulting colunni with their guns from 
 Cemetery Hill to the Round Tops, " tearing vast gaps in the advancing 
 
 1 Annals of the War, p. 421. , ^ i^em, p. 429. ' Idem, p. 431. 
 
.50 
 
 ranks and almost annihilating that proud array of" ci^hto<'n thousan«l 
 of (li«' I >t«t Southern infantry."' Whilst I'icUctt's nitii were lallin|^ 
 back within the Conlederate lines Ix'e rode towards them, and upon 
 nicetirjg (Jeneral Wilcox, who was almost in tears at the condition of 
 his hrijfade, said, '* Never mind, genend, <ill this hoM hvcn m v Jduli, — it 
 is /that have lost this light, and you must help me out ol" it the l)est 
 way yon <'an." - 
 
 Thus the great battle was ended. Brilliant success had n-warded 
 the valor of" the men ol" the Army <»t" the Potomac, directf^l by the 
 heroism and skill <»!" its chief". Then when the loud cheers of" the vic- 
 torious troops pioclaimed the work accom|)lishcd, the good and gallant 
 Meade, reverently uncovering his head, gave utterance in the solemn 
 words " Thank God!" to the profound gratitude which filled his heart. 
 
 ' Memoir v'i (Juiieral Kobort O. Tvlur, j). 1"). 
 
 ' Tliree .Months in the Southern States, by Lieut.-Col. Frcrnaiitli', p. 'JOlt. Si-e 
 also Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. iv. p. 109. 
 
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