■.-.^^ -^^ ,0 c i '^V .v^- ^^ .^^' ■^ -T*^. >/ ,V ^>' -r. ^.S^' .^^ .•-^ vV 'c^- .^^^' '"-.. v^' V y ^t*o, •- _ <* - V' V, :^^ .'^^ s^-^L!* '^o .0 o. ,#^. ,> ,0c> ■^-^ ,.\ (--. o 0^ 'L ^>■, .a\"' -.. ..'^^ e^ * . s ^ A^^ H A' jamerican J^ttftorical ^eriesf GENERAL EDITOR CHARLES H. HASKINS Professor of History in Harvard University american Distorical Series Under the Editorship of Charles H. Haskinb, Professor of History in Harvard University A series of text-books intended, like the American Science Series, to be comprehensive, systematic, and authoritative. Ready Europe Since 1816. By Charles D. Hazen, formerly Professor in Smith College. Historical Atlas. By William R. Shepherd, Professor in Columbia University. Atlas of Ancient History. By W. II. Shepherd. History of England, By L. M. Larson, Professor in the University of Illinois. History of American Diplomacy. By Carl Russell Fish, Professor in the University of Wisconsin. In preparaiion Medieval and Modem Europe. By Charles W. Colby, Professor in McGiU University. The Reformation. By Preserved Smith. The Renaissance. By Ferdinand Schevill, Professor in the University of Chicago. Europe in the XVH. and XVm, Centuries. By Sidney B. Fay, Professor in Smith College. History of Greece. By Paul Shorey, Professor in the University of Chicago. History of Rome. By Jesse B. Carter, Director of the American School of Classical Studies at Rome. History of Germany. By Guy Stanton Ford, Professor in the University of Minnesota. History of the United States. By Frederick J. Turner, Professor in Harvard University. AMERICAN DIPLOMACY BY CARL RUSSELL FISH PROFESSOR OF HISTORT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN WITH SIXTEEN MAPS NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 1915 Elts ,1 COPTBIOBT, 1915 BT HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY /f TO MY MOTHER AND SISTER PREFACE This book is intended as a comprehensive and balanced, though brief, review of the history of American diplomacy. It is hoped that it will prove useful both to the student in the classroom and to the general reader, and will help to diflFuse a knowledge of our diplomacy at a time when it is becoming increasingly important that public opinion should be internationally minded. While it is for the most part based upon an independent study of the sources, it is not presented as a contribution to knowledge but rather as a condensation of ascertained conclusions. The footnotes, therefore, contain few specific references to support the text, but rather suggest to the reader material for further study; either the more important sources, which in the case of dip- lomatic history are exceptionally readable, or those accounts and monographs which are most useful. CONTENTS Chapter Page I. Phases and Problems op American Diplomacy . . 1 II. Pre-Revolutionary Boundaries . 10 III. Recognition 21 IV. Spain and Holland .... . 31 V. Peace 40 VI. Religion and Commerce . 51 VII. The West . 63 VIII. Old Problems in New Hands . 79 IX. The Establishment op Neutrauty . . 94 X. The Jay Treaty . . . . 108 XI. War and Peace with France . 126 XII. The Louislana Purchase . . 140 XIII. The Embargo ..... . 152 XIV. War with England .... 163 XV. Peace ...... 176 XVI. Commerce and Boundaries 188 XVII. The Monroe Doctrine 203 XVIII. Reciprocity, Claims, Boundaries, and Trade the Slavi 220 XIX. Expansion ..... 243 XX. Annexation ..... 260 XXI. Diplomacy and Politics 280 XXII. The Civil War .... 304 XXIII. The Civil War and the Monroe Doctrine 324 XXIV. The Aftermath op the Civil War 336 XXV. Routine, 1861 to 1877 .... 349 XXVI. Baiting the Lion, 1877-1897 370 XXVII. Blaine, Olney and the Monroe Doctrine 384 XXVIII. Growth op American Inpluence in the Pacific . 396 ix X CONTENTS Chapter Page XXIX. The Spanish Wab 408 XXX. Impebiausm and Great Britain 423 XXXI. Spanish America .... 439 XXXII. The Pacific 454 XXXIII. Routine and Arbitration 464 XXXIV. Mexico 480 XXXV. The Great War .... 491 XXXVI. Success and its Causes 497 MAPS IN COLOR Page Establishment of Diplomatic Posts by the United States, 1776-1914 Inside front cover West Indies, 1776 to 1898 20 United States, 1783 to 1790 70 Changes on Southeast, 1760 to final establishment of United States ownership ......... 218 Possessions and Dependencies of the United States and other great Powers in the Pacific ........ tGO Development of United States Consular Service, 1876-1891 Inside back IN TEXT Boundary Discussions, 1763 to 1783 Northeastern Boundary Controversies Northwesternmost Head of Connecticut River Rouse's Point Controversy Oregon Boundary Controversies Texan Boundary . Central America, 1850 to 1860 Alaska Boundary Controversy West Indies, 1898 to 1915 Territorial Expansion of the United States 47 229 231 232 268 272 294 433 445 488 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY CHAPTER I PHASES AND PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Before the Spanish war most Americans regarded diplo- macy as a foreign luxury. Some thought that we should import a little of it; others regarded it as a deleterious appendage of effete civilizations erican dipio- which we, in our young strength, had forever 178^/' ^^^^ *** cast aside. Not that this had always been our attitude. During the Revolution and the Confederation diplomacy was recognized by the intelligent to be as essential to the establishment of our national existence as arms, dip- lomats were as carefully chosen as generals; the news of the negotiations of Franklin, Adams, and Jay was as anxiously awaited as that from the army, and their successes brought almost as great a reward of popular acclaim as did those of commanders in the field. By 1789 the joint efforts of our soldiers, diplomats, and constitution-builders had assured our national existence, but the broader question as to whether we 1 1 . 1 i> 1 , , • 1 Development could gam real freedom to pursue our national of the Mon- development in our own way remained. Euro- 1789^0 'law' pean statesmen regarded us but as a weight to be used in fixing or unfixing the balance of power. The strong wind of the French Revolution swept across the Atlantic and divided our own citizens. Foreign affairs absorbed attention that was needed for domestic problems, the fate of administrations came to hang upon their foreign 1 2 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY policy. Dissertations on diplomatic problems created polit- ical reputations. Of the five presidents who succeeded Washington all had had diplomatic experience and four had served as secretaries of state. Practically devoid of a I; permanent army or na\'y, we relied for defence upon our diplomats and the ocean. The Treaty of Ghent in 1814, followed by the peace of Europe in 1815, gave us real free- dom, and our struggle left as its by-products an intelligent public opinion, and a staff so well trained that the period from 1815 to 1829 may in many ways be regarded as the golden age of American diplomacy. As Marshall was during those years codifying the constitutional practices of the past in form to serve as a guide for a considerable future, so John Quincy Adams was codifying our diplomatic opinions. By 1829 we had not only shaken ourselves loose from the entanglements of European international politics, but we i-r»i ii ^ • ^' \ of diplomacy Van l5uren and Uuchanan, had served m diplo- i829*t'o m4 rusi^xc posts. Between 1829 and 1844 a few episodes gained a momentary attention; but not many persons took the trouble to connect them with one another and with the past, or to free their vision from the blurring mist of internal politics. Between 1844 and Expansion, 1860 a consciousness of our growing strength 1844 to I860 jj^j^j "manifest destiny" began to arouse a new interest in diplomacy not as a protective art but as a weapon of acquisition. Fearless, often shameless, and with little deference for the feelings or conventions of others, our diplomats helped to extend the boundaries of the re- public; but they were unable to win for their labors much applause from a people absorbed in its home concerns and the coming storm of civil war. PHASES AND PROBLEMS 3 By the war the work of diplomacy was once more rendered vital. If our diplomatic policy had failed then, the country would inevitably have been divided, and the ^ system of equipoise which causes all Europe construction, to vibrate to the slightest international hap- pening, that balance of power to which we had by such earnest effort avoided becoming a party, would have been established in America. Again we were successful; but the clang of battle for the most part deafened the public ear to the diplomatic struggle, while the political, social, and economic reconstruction of the next few years gave the public time for only an occasional glance at the diplomatic reconstruction, which was satisfactorily completed in 1872. The period from Reconstruction to the Spanish war marked the lowest point in the quality of our diplomacy and in the amount of public attention devoted to it. -^ ^ , . The nadir of With no fear of foreign powers and with no diplomacy, J /J ... , 4.- 1 • i- A. e 1872 to 1898 dennite international aspirations, most oi our leading men ignored foreign affairs. Some to be sure, used them to add ginger to their public speeches, but only a hand- ful devoted any gray matter to their management. The situation, however, was gradually changing, the world was growing closer together; nations were actually becoming more intimate than English counties were a century ago; isolation was no longer possible, at least to the degree in which it had existed when the Monroe Doctrine was an- nounced. During the nineties there was a growing apprecia- tion that our national life must become less secluded, and in 1898 the Spanish war brought us suddenly n t d and dramatically upon the world stage. Our States a world policies, no longer those of the anxious pigmy ^°'^^^' of a hundred years before, but of a great power seeking in- fluence and opportunity, became of moment to the world and to ourselves. In an atmosphere of growing intelligence, statesmen with a broader grasp of international relations than had been held for three-quarters of a century emerged to 4 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY undertake the readjustment, with the result that the Unit States has become a world power and an international : fluence, though without losing its tradition of living mair to itself and letting others do the same. Never again in t future, however, can we ignore our international relatic as we did from 1829 to 1898. The popular interest aroused by the questions of poli of the last fifteen years has furnished incentive for a wic Study of diplo- spread study of our diplomatic activity in t ^^'^^ past. Monographs, essays, and books diplomatic history and international law have been rapic multiplying, and it is upon these studies that this book is large part based. It is hoped that its brief outline will supplemented by the intensive works to which reference made, and that it may thus serve to broaden the basis public opinion upon which the usefulness and ultimate safe of the United States must depend. It is, of course, apparent that popular interest alone 1: not been the measure of our diplomatic activity. At Continuity of time have we lived wholly to ourselves. Wh( diplomacy ^y^j. ^^ American citizen or an American pre uct crosses a neighbor's border, or whenever foreigners a their goods cross ours, there is material for diplomacy. Pre lems, some perennial, some transient, have at all times ce fronted our administrations, however ill-manned, howcA feebly supported. When in 1783 we won recognition of our independen( we possessed scarcely one undisputed boundary line, ar Boundaries even had every contention been decided in o and expansion f.^^.^j.^ ^j^^ territory enclosed would not ha sufficed for a well-rounded and self-sufiicient national growl Our boundaries have only just been adjusted, and wheth the limits of our national expansion have been reached mi still be regarded as an open question. At no time in our h tory have these problems been absent, and at no time ha they failed to influence other nations in their attitude towa PHASES AND PROBLEMS 5 us; in some periods they have been the very pivots upon which our national policy has turned. American citizens have never been content with the re- sources of their own land; to protect them, therefore, in the pursuit of the cod and mackerel of the north- gj^ra terri- east coast, of the seal of Behring sea, of the *°"^ ^^- ^ . sources and oceanic whale, and of the guano deposits of the international islands of the sea, has been an unending task. Of greater difficulty, however, has been the effort to free the paths of intercourse. For many years the products of our lower Middle West were bottled up by Spain's hold on the Mississippi, till the nation itself was in peril of disruption on that account. Then, too, many of our northern water out- lets east of the Rockies run through Canada, while west of the mountains the Canadian outlets run through our terri- tories; and, further, the most tempting road between our Atlantic and Pacific coast lies far south of our own bound- aries. From problems such as these we have never been free, and with regard to no others have we changed our mind so often. Generally favoring liberality, we have done much to free the lanes of commerce in which our interest is only general, such as the international rivers of South America, the Danish straits, the Scheldt, and many other paths. More important and more varied have been the problems of our trafficking. The direct exchange of our own products for those of other countries has in itself occasioned 1-1 -11 • 11 Commerce little controversy with other nations, and nas been steady and increasing; but whether these exchanges should be carried in our own vessels or in those of other countries has always been a matter of concern and difficulty. Mainly a question of diplomacy in the beginning, it has become more and more one of economic conditions and in- ternal policy. In the matter of opening up the colonies of other nations to our ships and exports, however, diplomacy has found no respite; the situation in the foreign spheres of in- fluence in China to-day is as knotty as was that of West 6 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Indian trade in the early years of the last century. Our merchants, moreover, have not always been satisfied with handling our own business. They have acted as carriers for others, sometimes in open competition, sometimes by seeking to make a profit from our neutrality. For no other nation has neutrality assumed such protean shapes as for the United States. For more than half of our national existence we have been either a neutral or else a belligerent interested in the neutrality of others. After independence had been established the vital question was whether we could remain neutral in the struggle that divided Europe. From our effort to remain so grew our positive policy of isolation, which, designed to guard our weak- ness, still governs the use of our strength. Coincident with this problem was that of the protection of our rights as a neutral, in behalf of which we were in 1812 stirred to war. As soon as the general peace in Europe in 1815 assured us that our earthen jar had floated safely through the contest of the iron pots, we became concerned in the problem of our duty as a neutral in the strife of weaker neighbors, and from that time to this the question has presented itself in every con- ceivable form, — in the struggle of Spain with her colonies, in which the latter so much engaged our sympathies; in the later struggle between Spain and the Cubans, where desire was added to sympathy; in revolutions and petty wars in which our only interest as a people was in peace but into which many of our citizens entered on one or the other or on both sides. The protection of lives and property during these conflicts, the securing of damages for the loss of the one or the other after peace was reestablished, has been the unending task of our diplomats and foreign office. Then in the Civil War we were violently confronted with the reverse side of the proposition, — with questions as to the duties which neutral nations owed to us as belligerents. The ex- periences of the United States in handling neutrality have been uniquely varied, its record on the whole is honorable, PHASES AND PROBLEMS 7 and the experience of the past has been a growing force to guide the future. More unique still has been our experience in affording pro- tection to our citizens. A nation made up of emigrants, we have not always found other countries as willing ,, . , . 11 • Naturalization to give up their claims to allegiance as we are to welcome the newcomers. Since we achieved independence the whole question of naturalization and change of nationality has been completely reviewed, and, largely by our insistence, the conclusions of international and municipal law have been almost directly reversed. New phases have lately arisen, however, from our wish to discriminate in our wel- come between the various races; hence, while the problems of emigration — that is, the relationship of the individual to the country he is leaving — are fairly well settled, those of the immigrant with the country to which he desires to shift, remain uncertain. Besides establishing our national identity and making elbow room for the activities of our citizens, we have been obliged to assume a social position in the world, international Since the rise of the Spanish-American nations association our policy of individualism has been modified by a feeling of special interest in their welfare. While avoiding entangling alliances with them, as with others, we have always desired a close association from which the nations of other continents should be excluded; and over the states that lie between us and the equator we have increasingly exhibited a tendency to assume a modified guardianship. Moreover, we have never been able to avoid connections with the nations out- side the American continents. Deeply concerned in the formulation of international law, we have been forced to recognize the weight of international opinion, and have con- tributed not a little to give it its present form. At first a matter of separate treaties and of diplomatic and judicial precedents, it has in the last thirty years exhibited a striking tendency to codify results by general agreements reached by 8 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY international congresses. From these developments we have not stood aloof, and we have shared fully in the still more recent establishment of an international judiciary. Whether international law as interpreted by the Hague court will ul- timately be provided with a police to carry out its decisions, and whether we will cooperate in this extension, are ques- tions that will inevitably concern us in the future. The diplomatic problems of the United States have always had more than an intrinsic interest for the rest of the world. The method of their handling has been more unique than their quality. To those who, whether with approval or with apprehension, believe that civilization is tending more and more toward democracy, the experience of this country, which has been more democratic than any other in the control of its diplomacy, has the value of an experiment. To the casual observer, as to the close student, it is obvious that our democracy has not abolished personality. More than in any other branch of our activity has Pcrsoii&litv the personal element counted in determining our diplomatic controversies. Great figures like Franklin, John Quincy Adams, and Hay stand out by their achievements more conspicuously than do any of our legislators and than all but a few of our administrators; and the encounters of Madi- son and Napoleon, Adams and Canning, Charles Francis Adams and Russell, Blaine, Olney, and Lord Salisbury have all the fascination of the days of the tournament and the duel. Personality has perhaps shone all the more conspicuously because our democracy has not chosen permanently to equip Diplomatic itself with a trained staff. In selecting our ^**^ champions we have been governed at best by opportunism. When great crises have arisen we have usually sent great men, who have in most cases outclassed their op- ponents; when the stake has been or has seemed to be of minor importance, we have allowed the exigencies of internal PHASES AND PROBLEMS 9 politics to dictate the choice. The result has been represent- ative perhaps, but representative of the worst as well as of the best that was in us. Quite as disturbing a factor as the motley composition of our foreign corps has been the unfor- tunate circumstance that our foreign minister, the secretary of state, is expected, under the President, to be the poUtical head of the administration. Insuring, as this fact does, the hand- ling of foreign affairs by a man of ability and power, it does not always involve special fitness for the task. Although some selections have been ideal, others have been seriously bad, — seriously, but not impossibly so, for the permanent force of the state department has been able to guide the willing but untutored secretary and to modify the eccentricities of the obdurate. More fundamental than differences in the choice of the protagonists has been the difference in the location of the power that has determined the policies upon Control by the which they have acted. Has the broadening p®°p'« of the basis upon which the expression of the national will rests meant loss or increase of power, fluctuation or steadi- ness of purpose? On this point all sorts of opinions have been held. It has been said that the people, without ability to acquire the information necessary to form intelligent opinions on questions so remote from their daily life, would be at the mercy of every whiff of opinion which a designing or a shifting press might express; that, swept away by sud- den passions, they would rush into wars from which the sage reticence of experienced men of affairs had previously saved them; or, on the other hand, that if those who suffered the pains of war could control it, there would come an era of peace on earth from which universal good will might ultimately flow. At all events, the controlling element in our diplomacy has been the people at large; and if our policy has on the whole secured us what we wanted, and done so without un- necessary friction, it is a justification of our democracy and an argument in favor of democracy in general. CHAPTER II PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES The return of Columbus in 1493 at once brought his dis- coveries before the forum of the world's diplomacy, Rome; The papal for the first thought of his "Most Catholic" ^^^^ sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella, was to secure a title to these new lands from the pope. Alexander VI was a Spaniard by birth and feeling, and at the instance of the royal ambassadors he promptlj'^ issued two bulls giv- ing to Spain "all and singular the aforesaid countries and islands thus unknown and hitherto discovered by your en- voys and to be discovered hereafter, providing however they at no time have been in the actual temporal possession of any Christian owner." These bulls were issued almost as a matter of course, as the confirmation of a miner's claim would be granted by the United States government to-day; but they were unsatisfactory to Spain in that they did not prohibit discoveries and the establishment of claims by others. To meet these wishes a third bull was accordingly issued, May 4, 1493, which fixed a meridian one hundred leagues westward of "any" of the Azores or Cape Verde islands beyond which all other nations were prohibited from voyaging for the purposes of fishing and discovery.^ The general bearing of these bulls upon American diplo- macy seems to have been greatly exaggerated. They did not prevent that good Catholic, Henry VII of England, from Their general sending out John Cabot to emulate Colum- significance ^^^ ^^ ^^()q ^^^ j^jg - ^^^^ Christian " Majesty, Francis I of France, from attempting to found a French colonial empire thirty years later. The most peremptory ' E. H. Blair and J. A. Robertson, The Philippine Islands (55 vols., Cleve- land, 1903-09), i. 97-129. 10 PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 11 challenge to Spain's claim, moreover, was to come from Prot- estants, to whom the pope's grant was rather an incitement than a restraint. As a matter of fact the bulls were not much relied upon by Spanish diplomats in their general negotia- tions, although they may have contributed to the feeling on their part, remarked in 1565 by one of the Venetian am- bassadors, that like Israel of old, the Spaniards were a people chosen of God to occupy a promised land.^ In determining the relations between the two great oceanic powers of that day, Spain and Portugal, however, the third bull proved to have a great and lasting influ- Demarcation ence. Accepting its principle, the two countries ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ agreed in the treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 to make the merid- ian fixed by the pope, or rather one somewhat to the west of it, the dividing line between their "spheres of influence," each respecting the rights of the other to the exclusive enjoyment of everything discovered within its sphere, Spain taking what lay to the west, Portugal to the east. As the drawing of the line was beyond the scientific abilities of the day, its exact location was never determined. Nevertheless, to the surprise of both nations it soon became evident that, even allowing the most easterly position possible for the bound- ary, a portion of South America projected beyond it into the Portuguese sphere. To this line of demarcation laid down by Alexander VI in 1493 and modified by the treaty of Torde- sillas in 1494 the existence of the Portuguese language and civilization in Brazil to-day is distinctly traceable, and the first event in American diplomacy is thus still a factor in our daily life.^ When Magellan circumnavigated the world and made "east" and "west" relative terms, it was at once realized that if the demarcation line were to remain useful it must 1 C. R. Fish, Guide to the Materials for American History in Roman and other Italian Archives (Washington, 1911), 239. ' Henry Harrisse, The Diplomatic History of America, its first Chapter, U52-UH, London, 1897. 12 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY girdle the globe. The matter was one of great scientific difficulty, and national interests did not leave science to work unfettered, but by the treaties of Vic- Demarcation . . • , /^^ 1 1 1 line and the toria in 1524 and Zaragoza in 1529 the bound- ppmes ^^y ^^^ reduced to terms. In point of fact the line was incorrectly drawn, but, as is often the case when an accident occurs in times of flux and uncertainty, the error has become embedded in history. The Philippines, properly Portuguese, became Spanish, and, being Spanish, ultimately became American. This second permanent result of Pope Alexander's demarcation line can, of course, hardly be at- tributed to its influence alone; for Spain by discovery and occupation, and by her actual power, helped produce the error in location. In spite of inaccuracies, however, the existence of the principle of a dividing line, aided in the early and peaceful settlement of the question.^ In America the effect of the treaty of Tordesillas was to leave Spain a free hand west of Brazil. By voyages of dis- Spanish em- covery, followed up by conquests and settle- P"^ ments, she speedily established a firm hold on all the territory as far north as Mexico and Florida, and presently came to regard the entire continent and adjacent seas as hers by all rights divine and human. In 1555 Charles V on relinquishing his authority to his son Philip II drew up a set of instructions to guide him in his government, in which, among the problems relating to the various portions of his vast territories, he discussed the situation in the Indies. In 1558 he issued another instruction, dealing for the first time with the subject of the defence of the Indies.^ We may, therefore, believe that during this interval the Spanish government first became seriously alarmed for the safety of its American possessions. Although the attacks » Blair and Robertson. Philippine Islands, i. 159-164, 222-239; Justin Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America (8 vols., Boston, 1884-89), ii. 441. »Fish, Guide, 113. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 13 upon them which excited the apprehension of the dying states- man were not at that time such as to test the strength of his son's empire, yet the enormous extent of Rise of the Spanish dominions rendered defence difficult, p*''**®^ and its riches attracted the hardy adventurer. The assail- ants, moreover, — Mohammedans from Barbary, French Huguenots, and, a little later, Dutch and English Protest- ants, — were in a position to give to their plundering expedi- tions the sanction of religion. But although they rendered property unsafe, they were not powerful enough to cope with the organized forces of Spain, their only serious attempt upon the integrity of the empire being thwarted in the awe- inspiring massacre of the French Huguenots on the river St. John in 1563. With the defeat of the Spanish Armada by England in 1588 the situation changed. Fear of Spain was almost for- gotten, and information spread as to the pos- sibilities of the vast areas to the north of French,' and Spanish settlement. To these regions Eng- ^"^^g ^®*^®" land, France, and Holland set up rival claims, based on the discoveries of the Cabots, Verrazzano and Cartier, and Hendrik Hudson respectively ; and each country began permanent settlements. By 1625 the English were es- tablished in Virginia and New England, the French in Canada and Acadia, or Nova Scotia, and the Dutch on the Hudson ; but there was as yet no mutual recognition of each other's rights, and no recognition of any alien rights by Spain. The first treaty after Tordesillas which referred to America was that of St. Germain in 1632, according to the terms of which England restored to France ^ , ^. , ^ . Intemational the post of Quebec and other American forts recognition of taken in the preceding war, and which may therefore be taken as a recognition by each country that the other had American possessions.^ By royal patent of 1645 1 Thomas Rymer, Foedera, etc. (3d ed., 10 vols., The Hague, 1739-45), viii. pt. iii. 228-229. 14 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Spain tacitly acknowledged the presence of the English in America by permitting them to import into Spain certain products peculiar to America;^ in the famous treaty of Munster, in 1648, she recognized the American possessions of the Dutch; ^ and by the treaty of Madrid in 1670 she form- ally acknowledged the existence of the English colonies.^ By 1670, therefore, the colonial empires of these four rival countries had acquired international standing, but no defi- nite boundary line in North America had international recognition. Of these rivals the Dutch were the first to disappear. Al- ready by the treaty of Breda in 1667 Holland had ceded to , England not only her own settlements about Elimination of ° " p i r. i Dutch from the Hudson but also those oi the Swedes on o menca ^j^^ Delaware which she had seized in 1655.^ Recaptured by the Dutch a few years later, these were finally ceded by the treaty of Westminster, in 1674, to remain united forever with their English neighbors.^ Almost more important was the fusion of Dutch and English interests in 1688 on the accession of the stadtholder of Holland to the throne of England as William III. United by strict treaties, by which the Dutch practically conceded naval supremacy to England in return for the profits to be derived from a liberal grant of rights to their neutral vessels when England was at war,^ the latter rose to world power, while Holland sank into a desuetude which was innocuous to all except her own citizens. ' George Chalmers, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and other Powers (2 vols., London, 1790), ii. 27. 2 P. J. Blok, Geschiedenis van het N ederlandsche Volk (8 vols., Groningen, etc., 1892-1908), iv. 444; translated by O. A. Bierstadt, History of the People of the Netherlands (5 vols.. New York, etc., 1898-1912). iv. 148. » Cambridge Modem History (1908), v. 105. * Comte dc Garden, Histoire generale des traites de paix (15 vols., Paris, 1848-87), ii. 52. ' Cambridge Modern History, v. 161. * Garden, Traites de pair, ii. 129, iii. 9-10; Charles Jenkinson, Collection of . . . Treaties (3 vols., London, 1785), i. 190, 279, 364. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 15 Of the rivals that remained Spain was on the defensive. To the effort to fortify and defend that which she had already occupied she devoted great energy, and, with Spanish de- the assistance of Rome, was in the main sue- ^^^^^^ cessful for over a hundred years. It was not so easy to monop- olize the commerce of her possessions in the face of the per- sistent intrusions of Dutch and English merchants; but by concentrating it in certain ports and confining ocean traffic to the regular passage of great protected fleets, she went far toward accomplishing her purpose. France and England confronted the situation in a dif- ferent spirit. The conspicuously great powers of the day both aimed at world empire, and regarded France and America as a field for contest and a prize E^e^^^ for the victor. Between 1688 and 1815 they seven times engaged in war, and for sixty-three years out of the one hundred and twenty-seven they were in open conflict. All these wars involved America, and out of them emerged American boundaries, American foreign policies, and to a considerable extent the spirit of American nationality. The first two of these wars grew out of European causes, and the third from Spanish- American trade; but in each case the French and English colonists of North America ^ , • 1 n • All II Colonial wars were drawn into the conflict. Although the two groups were still separated by hundreds of miles of wil- derness, the Indians constituted a medium by which the shock of hostility was communicated : the burning of Schenec- tady in 1690 by the French and Indians caused a first thrill of mutual dependence and helpfulness to run through the north- ern group of English colonies. The point of closest contact, however, was in the northeast, where ever since 1613 the absence of a boundary between the French and English spheres of influence had given rise to occasional encounters. In particular the depredations of the French privateers, first from Port Royal, later from Louisburg, made the possession of those ports a practical question to the New England 16 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY merchants, who in each war, and mainly by their own efforts, captured the offensive seaport but were foiled in their designs on the seat of French power, Quebec. Peace treaties, or more properly truce agreements, however, were made in Europe and in accordance with European European trea- conditions. The first, that of Ryswick in 1697, *i^s restored Port Royal to France.^ The second, that of Utrecht in 1713, marked a defeat for France as well as the first attempt to define by treaty North American boundaries.^ France gave up all claim to Newfoundland and to the Hudson Bay country, and a commission was ap- pointed to draw a boundary for the latter region. Of more immediate interest was the cession to England of Acadia or Nova Scotia, including Port Royal ; but in this case a bound- ary controversy resulted instead of a boundary, for the country was granted "with its ancient boundaries," which can scarcely be said to have existed. In 1745 the colonists captured Louisburg, the French substitute for Port Royal, but by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, they had to return it to France.^ The disadvantages of their European connection were beginning to unfold themselves to the British settlers. With this peace a new condition began to develop, which resulted in the first American war fought for American causes. The centre of interest was now shifted for the Ohio to the Ohio valley. This region the French ' *^ claimed on three grounds, — because by their settlement at New Orleans they held the mouth of the Mis- sissippi which drained it, because in 1749 they officially ex- plored it and left formal evidences of their claims, and because they had at Vincennes the only actual white settle- ment in the main valley. For three reasons, too, they were » William MacDonald, Select Charters (New York, 1899), 223. 2 Ibid., 229-232. * R. G. Thwaites, "France in America" (American Nation, vol. vifi.), 122. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 17 willing to fight to maintain their claims, — because of the value of the fur trade of the region, because the valley was necessary if they were to weld Canada and Louisiana into one imperial colony, and because by holding it they would restrict the English to the seacoast. They prepared, there- fore, to establish a chain of forts from the lakes to the gulf. The English colonists, on the other hand, desired the valley in order to thwart the plans of the French, and because the far-sighted were already anticipating that the westward push of American settlement would at no distant period turn its rich lands into pioneer farms. Their claims they based partly upon the right of a nation occupying a coast to possession of the back country, — a view of international law early incorporated into the colonial charters, — partly upon what would to-day be called a protectorate over the Iroquois Indians, whose visionary claims extended over nearly all the Northwest, and partly upon their trade rela- tions with the valley Indians. Not by such arguments but by arms alone could so great a controversy be decided. In 1754 the French secured the strategic point, the junction at which the An American Monongahela and the Allegheny unite to ^" form the Ohio. A body of Virginia militia advanced against them. The French awaited them in ambush without the fort. Warned by an Indian, the Virginians surprised the French, and the first battle of the war took place. As Vol- taire said: "A torch lighted in the forests of America set all Europe in conflagration." How essentially this was an American war is illustrated by the fact that, although hos- tilities began here in 1754, it was not till 1756 that France and England officially broke off diplomatic relations. It is not without significance that the command for the first shot was given by Major George Washington. In William Pitt, the great English war minister, the colo- nists found a leader who brought out their comparatively great resources. By 1760 Canada was conquered. In this 18 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY emergency France called upon Spain for assistance. These two monarchies had since 1702 been united dynastically by The " Family the succession of a French prince to the Spanish Alliance" throne, and in 1761 they became by treaty diplomatically bound together in what is known as the Family Alliance.^ In accordance with this agreement either country might, if engaged in a defensive war, call for the assistance of the other, but in such case it must make good any losses which the succoring party should sustain. This union, though unable to check the progress of English arms, yet brought Spain and her possessions into the peace negotia- tions and caused readjustments of fundamental importance., The war resulted in four documents which together con- stituted the basis of American territorial diplomacy till well The cession of into the nineteenth century. First came the Canada treaty between England and France, made at Paris in 1763.^ For a long time the English government hung in uncertainty as to whether it should take as part of the spoils of war the rich sugar island of Guadaloupe in the West Indies, or Canada. Fortunately for the colonies, how- ever, they were at this crisis represented in London by an agent of exceptional force and adroitness, Benjamin Frank- lin of Pennsylvania, who made it clear that they would be greatly dissatisfied if they should again be deprived of their conquests. The English government therefore concluded to hold Canada, but not without some misgiving that it might have been safer to face discontented colonists than to free them from the continual menace of French hostility, a point of view which gave some consolation to the French states- men, who confidently predicted that England could not long hold colonies to whose safety she was not necessary. ' Comte de Flassan, Histoire generale et raisonnee de la diplomatic fran- gaise (2d ed., 7 vols., Paris, 1811), vi. 314-320. ^ From this point all treaties mentioned to which the United States was not a party may be found in G. F. de Martens's Recueil de traites des puii- sances et etats de iEurope, which begins with 17G1 and is continued by sup- plements and new editions to 1913. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOUNDARIES 19 In addition to Canada, France ceded all her claims to the Ohio valley and all of the province of Louisiana east of the Mississippi and north of the little river Iber- ville, which ran from the Mississippi to the iana and gulf, retaining to the east of the Mississippi fj^f^a^ only the He d'Orleans, which contained the city now called New Orleans. The eastern limit of this French cession was not defined by treaty, but by custom had been established at the river Perdido, halfway between the French Mobile and the Spanish Pensacola. This boundary was for the present, however, obliterated by the second docu- ment in the series, the treaty between Spain and England, by which the former ceded to England all of Florida, thus absorbing also the boundary disputes between that province and its northern neighbor, Georgia. By a third document France gave to Spain what remained of Louisiana, the He d'Orleans and an undefined territory west of the Mississippi, to indemnify her for Spanish the loss of Florida. 1 Thus the whole mainland Louisiana of North America came to be divided between Spain and England by the waters of the Mississippi and the Iberville. The far-sighted, however, realized that, with the French navy in existence, with a French population in Canada and Louisiana, and with so wide a difference in the relative strength of Spain and France, the latter was not yet elimi- nated as a factor in American development. The fourth document was an English royal proclamation, issued October 7, 1763, dividing the new conquests into ad- ministrative provinces.^ Florida was extended The English to include the portion of French Louisiana *"londas ceded to England, and was divided into east and west prov- inces by the Appalachicola river, Pensacola thus falling to 1 B. A. Hinsaale, The Establishment of the First Southern Boundary of the United States, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1893, pp. 329-366. "William MacDonald, Documentary Source Book of American History (New York, 1908), 113-116, see also C. E. Carter, "Some Aspects of British Admin- istration in West Florida," Mississippi Valley Hist. Review, 1914, i. 364-375. 20 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the western province. The boundary between East Florida and Georgia was fixed as it stands to-day; the northern bound- ary of West Florida was set at the thirty-first parallel. In 1764 this boundary was shifted to a line running from the mouth of the Yazoo, or 32' 28". To the north the province of Quebec was created, with a southern boundary extending from the "South end of lake Nipissing." Thence the said line, crossing the river St. Lawrence and the lake Champlain in 45 degrees of north latitude, passed along the "High Lands, which divide the rivers which empty themselves into the river St. LawTence, from those which fall into the sea, and also along the North coast of the Bayes^es Chaleurs." In 1774, by the Quebec Act, the province was enlarged by the inclusion of the region north of the Ohio river. The area between Quebec and Florida, bounded on the east by a line connecting the head waters of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic, was left unorganized, a preserve for Indians and fur-bearing animals.^ With this settlement the ground plan of American diplo- macy was laid. Indians, English, French, and Spanish colo- Factors and nists, as well as the mother countries with their problems rivalry of interests and traditions, were all alert to their positions. Nor may one overlook the situation in the West Indies, so much more important at that day than at this, and so much more closely connected with the con- tinent by ties of business and of government. There all the rival nations had footholds, and there the fate of European and American wars was sometimes determined. Under these circumstances were to be settled such great questions as the direction of English and Spanish- American commerce, the governmental relationshij) of Europe and America, and the racial ownership of the Mississippi valley and the region of the great lakes. ' C. E. Carter, Great Britain and the Illinoin Country (Washington, 1910), 13-26. CHAPTER III RECOGNITION * The early diplomatic successes of the Americans are often enhanced by the commentary that the first representatives of the new country faced, as untrained novices, _.. , . ^ ' » Diplomacy and Europeans who were masters of their art. international This lack of preparation, however, extended only to lack of practice in the formal art of diplomatic inter- course and to lack of acquaintance with international law. Of these apparent defects the first was a distinct advantage, for the diplomatic code of the eighteenth century had be- come rigid and formal to the point of breaking, and the directness of the Americans was like a fresh breeze under which it began to totter to a fall. International law, on the other hand, was then so far from being the formal and in- clusive system which it is to-day that it was not beyond the comprehension of amateurs. Of men trained in the more essential elements of diplomacy, the colonies had a greater proportion than any other country of the time. They had been engaged in con- cojoniai ex- tinual negotiations, almost independently of perience Great Britain, with the Indian tribes, and frequently with the French and Spaniards. Every colony had had semi- diplomatic disputes with its neighbors, and all had supported agents in England whose functions included virtually all the elements of a diplomatic mission. Almost continuously from 1758 to 1774 Benjamin Franklin, as general agent, had occupied a post in England essentially equivalent to minister ^ For a general bibliography of American diplomacy to 1901, see A. B. Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1905), 241-293; also Channing, Hart, and Turner, Guide to the Study of American History (Boston, etc., 1912), which has special sections on diplomacy to 1912. 21 22 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY to that government. Moreover, the whole movement toward union between the colonies was diplomatic in its character, and constantly involved the most delicate questions of management. The colonists had therefore had experience with alliances, with treaties of peace, of boundary, and of cession, with the conduct of joint military expeditions, and with Arbitration i i- • , p !•«• • i i • i dealmg with men ol dmermg habits and customs. They were thoroughly at home with the great American ques- tions of boundary, fisheries, Indians, and foreign trade. They were accustomed to discuss difficult problems with able men, and to recognize the necessity of compromise. In one re- spect their peculiar experience as colonists prepared them even to take the lead in a new departure in international law, — the science of international arbitration. Accustomed as they were to see intercolonial disputes ultimately settled by judicial process in England, they thought of arbitration as a natural expedient. Further, having no trained diplomatic staff, they sent over their ablest men of affairs, who usually overmatched in ability the men with whom they had to deal. This diplomatic readiness was indeed an essential resource, for without foreign aid the cause of the colonists would have Necessity for been well-nigh hopeless. In the final event foreign aid ^^le French army was a decisive factor at York- town; but the French army was less significant than the French navy, which rendered the situation at Yorktown pos- sible.^ Still more important, however, was the fact that the colonies were not self-sufficing industrially, and so could not have withstood the first shock of war without the supplies of arms and other manufactured goods which from the be- ginning of the conflict found their way into the country through the lax neutrality of Holland, Spain, and France.'^ > A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-17 83 (Bos- ton, 1890), 382-400. * J. F. Jamoson, "Saint Eustatius in the American Revolution," Amer. Hist. Review. 1903, viii. 683-708. RECOGNITION 23 From the meeting of the Continental Congress, Septem- ber 5, 1774, until the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, the position of the colonists was extremely Groping for delicate. Professing loyalty to George III, ^^ they realized more and more the necessity of foreign assist- ance, for which, however, it would have been treason to apply. Groping for support, Congress on October 21, 1774, sent an address to the other continental British colonies, on June 3, 1775, it addressed the people of Ireland, and on June 16 it appointed a committee to secure the friendship of the Indian nations. On November 29, 1775, though veiling its design in ambiguity of language, it took a more decisive step by appointing a committee of five to correspond with friends of the colonies in Great Britain, Ireland, "and other parts of the world"; and finally, in the spring of 1776 it sent Silas Deane as agent to France, his mission, however, dis- guised under a pretence of private business.^ Before following Deane in his delicate task it is de- sirable to have some understanding of the general conditions under which diplomatic intercourse was con- Diplomatic or- ducted during the Revolution. In general the ganization development of diplomatic organization resembled that of other departments. The committee of correspondence lasted till April, 1777. It was succeeded by a committee on foreign affairs, which gave way in October, 1781 to a secre- tary of foreign affairs, Robert Livingston. Under all these successive regimes, however, the main questions were de- bated in Congress itself, which received foreign ministers, and whose president sometimes acted as the national repre- sentative before the world. Communication Communica- between the directing body and its agents *'°° abroad was slow and uncertain. Even in summer two months was considered good time between Philadelphia and ^ The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, ed. Francis Wharton, 6 vols., Washington, 1889; also Secret Journals of Congress, 1775-1788, 4 vols., Boston, 1821. 24 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Paris, and in winter there were few opportunities to send letters; moreover, if they escaped the constant peril of cap- ture by the English, they were liable to be read by the foreign postal authorities. Months often passed without the successful exchange of a letter, and some of the most important papers fell into the hands of the enemy. Under such circumstances the American representatives abroad were to a remarkable degree thrown upon their own respon- sibility, and might well feel that the fate of a nation de- pended upon their wisdom.^ More important than such facts was the attitude in which Deane would find Europe waiting. Primarily that at- European in- titude was one of intense interest. From the terest gj.^^. moment that the Revolution took form the chancelleries of Europe watched with minute attention. The press of Amsterdam teemed with translations of Amer- ican pamphlets and original discussions of the American situation. From 1774 half the bulk of the Paris and London correspondence of every court of Europe consisted of Amer- ican news; the ministry of Naples knew in detail of every happening in Philadelphia; at Rome Mgr, Lazzari began a diary of the American Revolution. Never since then, unless possibly in 1900, has this country absorbed so much of the attention of continental Europe.^ The vogue of America rested largely on the belief that in that far-off non-contagious land the vision of Rousseau was Sentimental being materialized. The American leaders, sympathy gj^^^j^ g^g Patrick Henry and Samuel Adams, were picturesque and appealing in their sentiments and elo- quence; in one section of French society liberalism was fashionable; if one may judge from the conduct of the no- bility early in the French Revolution it was more than fash- ionable. Even to those to whom it did not appeal, the liberal experiment was compelling in its possibilities. Sympathy ' See page 23, note 1. 2 Fish, Guide, 74, 15. 118, 233-235, 240-241, 246, 250. RECOGNITION 25 hung in the balance, but the audience was on tiptoe follow- ing the action.^ If America seemed less picturesque to the men of affairs, it seemed also less remote. For a hundred years every war had tended to become a general war. Since Hatred of 1763 England had been regarded as the bully England of Europe, and the strength of England was believed to lie in her commerce and her colonies. The possible disintegra- tion of the British empire was a subject that nearly touched that holy of holies of the European statesman, the balance of power. To France the situation came not entirely as a surprise. Choiseul had predicted it in 1763, France had maintained secret agents in the colonies from that time, and the king himself had attended to their reports. Toward France, therefore, the eyes of the nations were directed as closely as toward London and America. In France Louis XVI, "the Good," had succeeded to the throne in 1774. Neither he nor the prime minister, Maurepas, was the driving force; the energy of the govern- Vergennes and ment lay with Turgot, the minister of finance, '^"'■6°* and Vergennes, the minister of foreign affairs. Both intent upon revenge on England, Turgot wished for a longer period of recuperation, whereas Vergennes was eager to take advan- tage of this unique opportunity. In two papers entitled "Reflexions" and "Considerations," the latter urged his views. The colonists, he said, must be supported. If they were conquered, England would turn her armies in America upon the French and Spanish West Indies. It was more likely, however, that the war would cause the overthrow of the existing British ministry and the recall of William Pitt, now earl of Chatham. That sinister genius, the idol of the colonies, would probably effect a reconciliation, and, with ^ For a running account, see J. B. Perkins, France in the American Revolu- tion, Boston, etc., 1911; for the documents, Henri Doniol, Histoire de la participation de la France d V etablissement des Etats Unis d'Amerique, 5 vols., Paris, 1886-92. 26 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the combined forces of England and America, "une epfee nue dans les mains d'un furieux," would devastate the world. ^ France, however, could not well act openly without Spain, Their fleets together might hope to meet that of England, Spain delays but that of France alone could not. Spain, French action under Charles III and his minister Florida Blanca, was somewhat more energetic than usual. She was still united with France in the Family Alliance, and she de- sired to regain Florida and Gibraltar. On the other hand, it seemed rash for the greatest colonial power to encourage revolting colonies; besides, she was not fully readj^ for war, and again the habitual Spanish procrastination stood in the way of prompt action. While goading Spain into activity, Vergennes advised Louis XVI to await her decision before going to war, but meantime by secret succor to prevent the colonies from falling before British arms or promises. It was possibly the opening of this middle way, rendering unnecessary a definite decision, from which Louis XVI Tentative as- shrank almost as nervously as did Charles III, sistance ^j^^^^ secured for Vergennes his victory over Turgot and the direction of French policy. On May 2, 1776, he was authorized to use a million francs for the colonies, to which Spain soon added another million. To employ these sums for the colonists, without the knowledge, or at any rate without the proved knowledge, of England, Ver- gennes had recourse to Pierre de Beaumarchais, a playwright and litterateur, who escaped being a charlatan by being some- thing of a genius, and who had served as a special agent for Vergennes in England.^ Beaumarchais organized a commercial company, under the name of Rodriguez Hortalie and Company, to deal in American products. Through Dumas, a Dutch friend of ' Charlemagne Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1895). i. 74, 92-97, 108-113. 2 C. J. Stille, Beaumarchais and " The Lost Million," (Philadelphia, 1886). RECOGNITION 27 Franklin, he was put in touch with Arthur Lee, an Ameri- can just then in Paris. When, therefore, Deane arrived in France he found everything prepared for him. Beaumarchais The initiative came from neither side alone, but *°*^ Lafayette each putting forth its antennte encountered the other. Nor was the preparation confined to that of the government. In that military age war anywhere attracted the adventurous. Soldiers of fortune looked to America as a field for possible glory and emolument, while some men, like the young Mar- quis de Lafayette, burned to baptize their swords in the cause of liberty. Deane was overwhelmed with offers of assistance, as well as with requests for commissions in the American army; and he sent home not only a number of officers, good and bad, but, what was still more necessary, arms from French arsenals, paid for by the French and Spanish millions or to be paid for by cargoes of tobacco. Beaumarchais wrote to Congress, "Your deputies, gentlemen, will find in me a sure friend, an asylum in my house, money in my coffers, and every means of prosecuting their operations whether of a public or a secret nature." Meantime the Declaration of Independence had been issued and the new United States could reveal its policy. Its repre- sentatives need no longer be inconspicuous; ,. , . r. , . T^ . Franklin accordmgly, m September it sent to Jb ranee its most illustrious citizen, Benjamin Franklin. From his arrival in 1776 till his departure in 1785, sometimes as one of several commissioners, sometimes as sole minister to France, Frank- lin was universally thought of as the representative of the American cause in Europe. Arriving in Paris at the age of seventy, and preceded by his reputation as a statesman, but still better known as the author of Poor Richard's Almanac and by his discoveries in electricity, he presented to the curious gaze of those who thought to see for the first time in the flesh one of those Arcadians who were becoming the sup- port of conversation, a benignant countenance with gray locks "appearing under a martin fur cap." His lack of ac- 28 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY quaintance with French court etiquette he concealed under a cloak of agreeable eccentricity, which he knew how to render interesting and not too strange, just as he kept his costume simple but not too simple. Honesty had so long been his policy that it shone from his face, and he captured at once, and contrived to deserve, the complete confidence of the entire diplomatic corps. Perhaps only those who had business with him realized that his disarming ingenuousness of appearance was not unaccompanied by a subtlety based upon a knowledge of human nature more comprehensive than that of Lincoln, though not so profound. All, however, came to realize that the intellect under the fur cap was unique, and that of all great minds produced by America his was the most nearly akin to the Gallic. His pregnant wit passed rapidly from mouth to mouth. His satiric skits were expressed with an artistic delicacy as pleasing to the Parisian as unusual among Americans. Moreover, his artistic sense for language seems but to have reflected his mastery of the art of living. His tact and sympathetic consideration won those who associated intimately with him, while he did not disdain to employ a nicely calculated breadth of acting which gained the remote spectators of the gallery.^ Franklin took Paris by storm. His piquant sayings and writings caught the public attention, his shoe buckles be- Frankiin cap- came the fashion, his pictures were everywhere tures Paris j^j. ^^^e. The best Latin verse since the Augus- tan age was forged in his honor: "Eripuit cselo fulmen, sceptrumque tyrannis," "He snatched from Heaven the thunderbolt, the scepter also from tyrants." Hesitant soci- ety swung to the American side, and society was at that period the public in France. That Franklin enjoyed himself is clear, and that he liked the French, who liked him, was only natural. It is true that he became very close to those ' E. E. Hale and E. E. Hale, Jr., Franklin in France, 2 vols., Boston, 1887-88; and, more particularly, Franklin's Works (cd. John Bigeiow, 10 vols., New York, 1887-88), vols, vi.-ix. RECOGNITION 29 in authority, but that the glamor bhnded in any way his clear view of American interests may well be doubted. In December, 1776, it was said of him, "That popular man be- came more powerful than power itself;" and Jefferson wrote later, "He possessed the confidence of that government in the highest degree, insomuch that it may truly be said that they were more under his influence than he under theirs." Franklin's success rendered the triumph of Vergennes's policy comparatively easy. American merchant ships, priva- teers, and war vessels found harborage in Friendship and French ports; and finally, when the news of the ^li^^^e surrender of Burgoyne reached France, early in 1778, the king consented to act without waiting upon Spain. On February 6 of that year two treaties were signed between France and the United States, — one of amity and commerce, and, in case England should resent that, one of alliance. The treaty of amity was framed upon principles of free mutual intercourse which were somewhat in advance of the time, and incorporated certain rules of international law, as that free ships make free goods, long laid down by the Dutch and French writers but denied by the English, The treaty of alliance guaranteed, on the part of France, the independence of the United States; on the part of the latter the existing possessions of France in America. To the United States it gave a free hand in the conquest of British continental possessions and of the Bermudas ; to France it granted similar rights in the West Indies. "Neither of the two parties," it ran, "shall conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained; and they mutually engage not to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States shall have been formally or tacitly assured by the treaty or treaties that shall ter- minate the war." ^ 1 For these and all subsequent treaties to which the United States was a party, see Treaties, Conventions, etc., ed., W. M. Malloy and Charles Gar- field, 2 vols, to 1909, and supplement to 1913 (Senate Doc, 61 Con. 2 sess.. No. 357). 30 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY England, on hearing of the recognition of American inde- pendence by France, did not accept the view of Louis XVI, France enters who wrote to George III that he was assured the war ^]^q^ ^^^ latter would regard it as one more manifestation of his friendly disposition; and in April war between France and England began. Thanks largely to the tact of Franklin, the alliance worked smoothly. The French government loaned money and guaranteed other loans; it sent ships and troops to America. As the chief American authority in Europe, Franklin was financial and purchasing agent for the states; he directed the emyjloyment of the American na^^^ under Commodore John Paul Jones; and, through his friends, the Foxes of Falmouth, he looked after the welfare of the American prisoners in England. American trade was legitimatized, and the final independence of the United States became a reasonable certainty. CHAPTER IV SPAIN AND HOLLAND Two parties arose in Congress. One, which came to be known as the Gallican, or French, party, favored the en- trusting of American interests in Europe to Diplomatic France, advised by Frankhn. The other, skirmishing sometimes known as the party of the Lees and Adamses, distrusted French sincerity and Franklin's abihty and wished to preserve an independent course. The friends of Frankhn, who in domestic affairs were also in general the supporters of Washington, succeeded in maintaining him at Paris, but their rivals obtained the appointment of a swarm of agents commissioned to other countries. Silas Deane was recalled in 1778, and in 1779 Franklin was appointed sole minister to France; but from time to time Ralph Izard was sent to Tuscany, Arthur Lee was for a time co-commissioner to France and was appointed to undertake missions to Spain and Prussia, William Lee was sent to Berlin and Vienna, Francis Dana to Russia, Henry Laurens to the Netherlands. None of these were received at their posts, but at Paris and in their wanderings about Europe they now and again touched wires in a manner disturbing to the controlling authorities. It was, however, at Paris, and by Franklin and Vergennes, that the international status of the alliance had to be determined.^ The first essential was the Spanish fleet, and the Spanish negotiation at once became the central point of diplomatic interest. Charles III was annoyed at the in- spain enters dependent action of France; the Spanish gov- *^® ^" ernment was irritated at the persistent attempts of Arthur Lee to gain admission to the Spanish court, and vacillated with the success or the failure of American arms. Spain ^ Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence, introduction. 31 32 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY was still unready; she asserted that France was the oflFending party and that the Family Alliance did not compel her to assist France in an offensive war. Instead she offered media- tion, in return for which she was to receive the cession of the Floridas and a considerable proportion of the territory be- tween the Floridas and the Ohio, a proposal which was vir- tually an offer to accept a bribe from England for her inac- tivity. The offer was refused, but European opinion still believed that she would remain at peace, when rather un- expectedly, in 1779, she declared war on Great Britain. Thus united, the French and Spanish fleets for some years neutralized British naval supremacy. Since Spain, however, though allied with France, had not as yet even recognized the United States, in the autumn of 1779 Congress sent John Jay to treat with her. Jay was thirty-four years old, a man of decided talent and great energy. Although a gentleman in the conventional sense and descended from French Huguenots, he was provincial in experience and point of view and retained no spark of appreciation for French civilization. Given to self-confidence, he was alert to American interests up to the point of being suspicious of all who opposed his view of them. He was in- structed to offer Spain permission to take the Floridas from Great Britain and to hold them; but in return he was to insist on the right of the Americans to navigate the Missis- sippi to the sea, — a right in respect to which he declared in 1780, "The Americans, almost to a man, believed that God Almighty had made that river a higlnvay for the people of the upper country to go to the sea by," — and he was to re- quest permission to use similarly the rivers flowing into the Gulf of Mexico to the eastward. In 1781 under tlie pressure of accumulated woes, Congress released him from that part of his instructions relating to the Mississippi; but he disre- garded the modification.^ ' John Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers (ed. H. P. Johnston, 4 vols.. New York, 1800-9.S), i. 248-4G1, ii. 1-296. SPAIN AND HOLLAND 33 Jay was not officially received in Spain, but he was put in touch with Don Diego de Gardoqui, a Spanish merchant versed in American affairs, who represented Spanish the Spanish government. It soon appeared Policies that Spain was as insistent on closing the Mississippi as Jay was on opening it. One great boon which she expected to obtain from the war was the banishment of all foreign com- merce from the Gulf of Mexico. Ever timid as to her Amer- ican possessions, she wished to hold all neighbors at arm's length. Indeed, she was not satisfied with the narrow fringe of coast afforded by the Floridas; but in the project of a treaty presented in her behalf to Congress by Luzerne, the French minister at Philadelphia, she renewed the suggestion contained in her mediating offer to England, that she receive a portion of the region between the Floridas and the Ohio.^ Money she was willing to offer; vital concession she would not make. Fully cognizant of Spanish views, and with his suspicions excited by an outside view of a negotiation with England which took place at Madrid during his stay, „ • u ^ , . *= . Spanish nego- Jay, having obtained nothing but some slight tiation in pecuniary aid, returned to Paris, where in 1782 he renewed negotiations with the Spanish minister at that capital. Count d'Aranda. To assist in these negotia- tions Vergennes delegated his secretary Rayneval, who seemed to Jay to support the Spanish contentions. Meantime the question was not left to diplomatic con- troversy alone. In 1778 and 1779, the American, George Rogers Clark had captured Kaskaskia on the war in the Mississippi and Vincennes on the Wabash, * within the territory added to Quebec by the act of 1774. Between 1779 and 1781 Spain captured the British forts in West Florida. At Natchez on the Mississippi between the parallels of 31' and 32' 28", in or out of West Florida as one might view it, the Spaniards and Americans almost ^ Secret Journals of Congress, ii. 310, etc. 34 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY came to blows. In the winter of 1781 • , • • • a brief period in 1778 as co-commissioner, and had now returned as commissioner to secure the peace with England which as yet was only a hope. On April 6, 1781, vols., Washington, 1886), iii. 262-264; Paul Fauchille, La diplomatie fran- Qaise et la ligue des neutres dc 1780, Paris, 1893. SPAIN AND HOLLAND 39 he received a further commission to treat with Holland. Of Puritan breeding and ideas, he was American to the back- bone. With a fund of solid information and a penetration and sound judgment which marked him out among his con- temporaries, he was also conceited, obstinate, and disagree- able. His disapproval of the frivolities of Philadelphia when he attended Congress there foreshadowed his opinion of Paris, and indeed of Franklin. Referring to the latter, he wrote, "Congress will not be put to any expense for my family, for my coaches and retinues of servants." July 13, 1780, he wrote to Vergennes, "The United States are a great and powerful people, whatever European statesmen may think." On August 9, 1780, Franklin wrote to the president of Congress, " M. de Vergennes, who appears much offended, told me yesterday that he would enter into no further dis- cussions with Mr. Adams." Happy in the thought that an understanding with Holland might render the United States "less dependent on France," Adams was also happy in the quieter atmos- Treaty with phere of the Dutch capital and the substantial Holland methods of her statesmen, who on their part appreciated his qualities. On October 8, 1782, therefore, an admirable treaty of amity and commerce was signed, and an American loan was floated on the Dutch market. In his diary he records the remark made to him, "Sir, you have struck the greatest blow in the American cause, and the most decisive." ^ 1 John Adams, Works (ed. C. F. Adams, 10 vols., Boston, 1850-56), iii. 94-304. CHAPTER V PEACE During the spring of 1779 Congress devoted much of its time to a consideration of the terms upon which it would American de- consent to make peace. It decided that the ""^ recognition of independence must precede ne- gotiation and not form part of the treaty. On the subject of boundaries it determined to make the cession of the un- organized Indian country between the Floridas, the moun- tains, the Ohio, and the Mississippi an ultimatum. To the north it wanted the 1763 boundary of Quebec, that is. Lake Nipissing to the point where the forty-fifth parallel crosses the St. Lawrence, then along that parallel to the highlands, and then along the highlands, giving us the country from Lake Nipissing westward to the source of the Mississippi; but the whole portion of the line west of the St. LawTence it was willing to leave subject to negotiation. To the northeast, the line was to descend from the highlands along the river St. John, but some more western river might be chosen if thereby the war could be shortened. Congress expressed its readiness to take Nova Scotia and the Bermudas, and made other in- teresting suggestions which were, however, not to be insisted upon.^ In the discussions two points of dispute arose. New Eng- land could not conceive of happiness without the Newfound- Fisheries and land fisheries. Her representatives demanded the Mississippi tj^g j.jgj^^ ^Q g^j^ ^^ ^l^g "Banks," and in addi- tion the privilege of landing on unoccupied coasts to dry fish and for other purposes. The southern states, on the con- ^ Secret Journals of Congress, ii. 132-261; Diplomatic Correspondence oj the United States, from 1783 to 1789, 3 vols., Washington, 1837. 40 PEACE 41 trary, were unwilling to prolong the war for such ends, but demanded on their part that the free navigation of the Mississippi be an ultimatum, a grant for which the New Englanders were not prepared to fight. When Congress voted to include in the ultimatum merely the common right of fishing on the "Banks" without the in-shore privileges, Samuel Adams was heard to say that one saw more and more that the separation of the East and the South was in- evitable.^ The French minister, Gerard, not unnaturally urged that the fixed points in the instructions be as few as possible, and the final draft, August 14, 1779, left out both Final instruc- fisheries and Mississippi. Two years more of **°°^ war, with the disasters in the South, still further broke the spirit of Congress, and June 15, 1781, the commissioners were informed that, although the desires of Congress re- mained the same they were not to be insisted upon. "We think it unsafe at this distance," ran the instructions, "to tie you up by absolute and peremptory directions upon any other subject than the two essential articles [independence and the observance of the French treaties]. . . . You are therefore at liberty to secure the interest of the United States in such manner as circumstances may direct, and as the state of the belligerent and disposition of the mediating powers [Russia and Austria were offering their mediation] may require. For this purpose, you are to make the most candid and confidential communications, upon all subjects, to the ministers of our generous ally the king of France; to under- take nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce, without their knowledge and concurrence; and ultimately to govern yourself by their advice and opinion." ^ John Adams was in 1779 appointed to carry out the negotiations, and in 1781 four other commissioners were added, — Franklin, Jay, Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson. Of these Jefferson did not cross the 1 Doniol, La participation de la France, iv. 105-107. - Secret Journals of Congress, ii. 424-439. 42 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ocean, and Laurens was in the Tower of London until just before the signing of the preliminary articles. From the beginning of the war till the end of 1778 Great Britain was continually and increasingly anxious to negotiate . T, -^ ■ with the colonies on some basis less than that Great Bntam « . , opens negotia- of mdependence. These attempts were a con- stant source of anxiety to France, and were in fact given by Louis XVI to Charles III as his excuse for recog- nizing our independence without waiting for action by Spain. The attempt of 1778 was earnestly undertaken but was un- successful, and after that date such negotiations were not seriously renewed. The surrender of Cornwallis at York- town, October 14, 1781, brought England to the point of acknowledging independence. On March 20, 1782, Lord North resigned, and was succeeded by the marquis of Rock- ingham, whose program was peace. The new ministry, how- ever, was divided as to method. Lord Shelburne, secretary of state for the colonies, held that the Americans were still colonists, that independence should be granted as a valuable concession, and that the negotiations should be conducted by his department. Charles James Fox, secretary of foreign af- fairs, the friend of the colonists and the avowed enemy of Shel- burne, wished to recognize independence at once, to make the terms so generous as to reconcile America to England and alien- ate her from France, and desired to conduct the negotiation himself. In this deadlock, in the spring of 1782, Thomas Gren- ville appeared in France from the English foreign oflSce being known as Mr. Fox's minister, and Richard Oswald from the colonial office being known as Lord Shelburne's minister.- 1 For negotiations in the field, see Washington's Works (ed. W. C. Ford, 14 vols.. New York, etc., 1889-93), iii. 77, 79, 90, ilH, iHi. For peace ne- gotiations with Howe, see ibid., iv. 249, 26.'J, 309; Wharton's Diplomatic Correspondence, ii. 98, 103; Franklin's ]Vork\i (ed. Bigelow), vi. 28; Secret Journals of Congress. For negotiations of 1778, see Secret Journals, vol. ii. 13; Franklin's Worh.i, vi. 124-238. * Win.sor, America, vii. 89-184; Lord Fitzmaurice, Life of William Earl of Shelburne (2d ed., 2 vols., London, 1912), ii. 111-223. PEACE 43 The central figure in the diplomatic situation was the Count de Vergennes. The pivot of European affairs from 1776 to 1783, leader of France in her only sue- The objects of cessful war with England during the long Vergennes struggle between 1688 and 1815, master of a distinctly noble style of correspondence, active, and successful in the choice of agents, he has failed to impress history as has Necker, who was less able, or Turgot, who was less powerful. Possibly his failure in half of his main conception has blurred his im- press on our memory: in separating the American colonies from England he succeeded, in binding them to France he failed. To accomplish the latter purpose he counted on a gratitude that was not forthcoming, on a trade that did not develop, on a dependent weakness that was avoided.^ Certainly his position in 1782 must command our sym- pathy. The ally of Spain and of the United States, who were not on terms with each other and who had dif- Vergennes's ferent and conflicting purposes, he felt also P^'og''^™ responsibility for the Netherlands, whom he had incited to enter the war. On the side of the United States he was bound to conclude no treaty without her consent, to obtain independence "formally or tacitly," and also to secure her possessions and conquests; moreover, the United States would not be content with the territory actually occupied nor without further stipulations, such as those concerning the Mississippi and the fisheries. On the side of Spain he was bound to conclude a simultaneous treaty, and Spain would not be satisfied without Gibraltar, which the allies had been for years besieging, and the Floridas. His policy was to compel England to offer terms. To Oswald he wrote: "There are four nations engaged in the war against you, who cannot, till they have consulted and know each other's minds, be ready to make propositions. Your court being without allies and alone, knowing its own mind, can express it im- mediately; it is, therefore, more natural to expect the first ^ For Franklin's opinion of Vergennes, see his Works, viii. 305-307. 44 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY proposition from you." To Franklin he wrote, May 28: " You will treat for yourselves and every one of the powers at war with England will make its own treaty. All that is necessary for our common security is that the treaties go hand in hand, and be signed all on the same day." As to the necessity of standing together Franklin agreed with him. He wrote Congress, "The firm united resolution of France, Spain and Holland, joined with ours, not to treat of a par- ticular, but a general peace, notwithstanding the separate tempting offers to each, will in the end give us command of peace." The first commission to Grenville having been to France alone, Vergennes refused to treat with him; where- upon, June 15, Gren\nlle was invested with additional power to treat with any other prince of state that might be con- cerned. This seemed sufiicient to Vergennes, and the final negotiations appeared about to begin. ^ Kaleidoscopically the situation changed. On June 23 Jay arrived from Spain, and at about the same time Franklin Jay's suspi- became to a considerable degree incapacitated """^ by an attack of gout. Jay's suspicions of France, already aroused, were rapidly augmented. He in- sisted that Grenville's new commission was still unsatisfac- tory, that it must acknowledge the independence of the United States, but Vergennes argued that this was not neces- sary. Early in September the same Rayneval who was de- fending the views of Spain in the negotiation between Jay and d'Aranda was despatched on a secret mission to Eng- land. Actually sent over to test the English views about Gibraltar, he refused to discuss the affairs of the United States; ^ but Jay not unnaturally suspected that he was sent to bargain for a peace on the terms of dividing the West between England and Spain. At about the same time Jay received from British sources the translation of a memoire 1 For the opening negotiations, see particularly Franklin's Works, viii. 1-119. » Doniol, La participation de la France, v. 132-133, 255-256, 603-626. PEACE 45 of Barbe Marbois, French secretary of legation at Philadel- phia, which, like the Dutch treaty, had been rescued from the waves into which it had been thrown from a captured ship, and which presented an argument against the American claim to share in the Newfoundland fisheries. Jay concluded that France was planning to buy a peace from England favorable to Spain and at the expense of the United States. He believed that his country must depend upon itself alone, and that, in the illness and pro-French weakness of Franklin, the responsibility rested on him. Accordingly, on Septem- ber 11, without consulting Franklin, he sent Vaughan, one of the English agents in Paris, on a secret mission to the English government. The cooperation between France and the United States was no longer complete.^ In England, also, the situation had changed. The death of the Marquis of Rockingham in June left no Whig leader who could manage Fox and Shelburne together, shelbume Fox retired, and the control of the ministry treats with Jay fell to Shelburne on July 2. Grenville was recalled from France and AUeyne Fitzherbert was sent in his place. A master of finesse, Shelburne, who had been seeking an oppor- tunity to separate England's enemies, welcomed the news brought by Vaughan, and accepted the suggestion of Jay. Independence was recognized in a new commission to Oswald, and instructions were given as to terms which seemed to in- sure success. The negotiation was to be secret from France. Shelburne told Oswald, September 23, "We have put the greatest confidence, I believe, ever placed in man in the American commissioners. It is now to be seen how far they or America are to be depended upon. ... I hope the public will be the gainer, else our heads must answer for it, and de- servedly." On September 27 Vaughan returned to Paris, and the American commissioners had to decide whether to accept the offer. To do so involved the breaking of their instructions 1 Jay, Papers, ii. 366-452. 46 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY from Congress, which authorized them to treat only with the full knowledge of the French ministers and to govern themselves by their advice. The very form of gotiate sepa- these instructions seemed to Jay to confirm his rately from suspicions of a malign and pervasive French in- fluence in Congress itself, and he hesitated not a moment. On October 26 John Adams arrived from his successful mission in Holland, and proved to be, as Jay wrote, "a very able and agreeable coadjutor." He sided with Jay, and together they outvoted Franklin. The negotiations therefore began, their progress being kept secret from Ver- gennes.^ In the conduct of the negotiations the American had the advantage over the British representatives both in ability and in local knowledge. They might have obtained even better terms than they did, had not the British government from time to time braced the backbone of its commissioners. The boundaries agreed upon were almost identical with those described by Congress. On the north- east the St. Croix was substituted for the St. John, a change that somewhat curtailed the limits of Massachusetts. West of the St. Lawrence it was agreed to compromise between the 1763 and 1774' boundaries of Quebec. The American com- missioners offered to accept either the extension of the forty- fifth parallel to the Mississippi, or a line through lakes On- tario, Erie, Huron, Superior, and the Lake of the Woods, to the northwestern point of the latter, and thence due west- ward to the Mississippi. Fortunately the British chose the latter, a selection which ultimately proved even more ad- vantageous to the United States than the line from Lake Nipissing would have been. The western boundary was the Mississippi, the southern was the northern boundaries of the Floridas, that of West Florida being considered as the thirty- first parallel. By a secret article, however, it was agreed that, should Great Britain retain West Florida, the northern 1 John Adams, Works, iii. 300-387. PEACE 47 48 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY boundary of that province should run eastward from the mouth of the Yazoo, or in other words along the parallel of 32' 28". The question of the fisheries fell to the lot of John Adams, who had special instructions on that subject from the legisla- . . ture of Massachusetts. Master of the facts, he Fisheries, i i • • • • debts, and succeeded in mcorporatmg mto the treaty a °^ ^ ^ recognition of American rights to fish on the "Banks," and sufiicient in-shore privileges to make fishing profitable. The navigation of the Mississippi was also ob- tained. The American commissioners readily agreed to an article that creditors on either side should "meet with no lawful impediment to the reco^'e^y of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted," a pro- vision which had special reference to debts due by Americans to British merchants when hostilities began. The most troublesome question was that concerning the loyalists, whose property had been confiscated and who had been sub- jected to various persecutions. Naturally, the British govern- ment felt a proper regard for their interests; but, since the laws against them had been made by the states. Congress could not promise restitution. A compromise was finally reached by the agreement that Congress would "earnestly recommend" restitution and the repeal of all laws not in harmony with "that spirit of conciliation which, on the return of the blessings of peace, should universally prevail." With a provision for the mutual restoration of property the preliminary articles were concluded and signed, November 30, 1782. Triumphant in their negotiations with England, the com- missioners had now to face France. Although they had , ^ broken their instructions from Congress, they Effect of the . , , , i ^ i t^ i treaty on had not Violated the letter of the 1^ rench com- pact, for they had not signed a definitive treaty. In spirit and in effect, however, they had done so. When the news of the articles reached London, the British PEACE 49 cabinet was on the point of exchanging Gibraltar for Guada- loupe, a transfer ardently desired by Spain, and by France in behalf of Spain. ^ From this proposal it immediately withdrew and gave orders for an amnesty with the United States in order that the British troops there might be em- ployed in the West Indies. Upon Franklin, who disagreed with his colleagues as to the sinister designs of the French, and who believed that by cooperation with Vergennes he could have Franklin and obtained terms equally good, fell the burden Vergennes of reconciliation. When the question of forwarding the articles to America came up, the commissioners again acted with secrecy, hastening to send the good news although Vergennes wished delay. The latter wrote to Franklin in terms of surprise and of dignified reproach. The letter of Franklin in reply, December 17, was a masterpiece of diplo- matic art, even to the adoption of a certain touch of pathos in its slightly rambling quality, natural to his age but not characteristic of his writing even later. "But," he explained, "as this was not from want of respect for the king, whom we all love and honor, we hope it will be excused, and that the great work, which has hitherto been so happily conducted, is so nearly brought to perfection, and is so glorious to his reign, will not be ruined by a single indiscretion of ours. And certainly the whole edifice sinks to the ground immediately if you refuse on that account to give us any further assist- ance." He lays down his pen, but taking it up again, adds: "The English, I just now learn, flatter themselves they have already divided us. I hope this little misunderstanding will therefore be kept a secret, and that they will find them- selves totally mistaken." ^ It was indeed true that if Vergennes stood in the way of this generous treaty, his whole work would turn to ashes in his hands: England and America would again unite against 1 Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, ii. 214. * Franklin, Works, viii. 228-230. 50 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY France. Accordingly, on December 21 he wrote to his representative in Philadelphia, Luzanne, not to complain Vergennes's to Congress of the action of the American conclusions commissioners, and he arranged a new loan of six million francs to the United States. Meantime the French and Spanish treaties gradually progressed, till on September 3, 1783, definitive treaties of The end of the peace were signed between Great Britain and ^" France, Spain and the United States. The latter was identical with the provisional articles, except for the secret article, which was left out as no longer neces- sary, since the status of the Floridas was determined by their cession to Spain. France gained Tobago. The Nether- lands, after a long negotiation, made their peace in 1784, accepting the loss of their mercantile privileges and of several colonies. The peace meant that our national existence, announced to the world by the Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776, had been established. Further, the treaty What had . • i i i • i j been accom- gave US a territory, not mdeed logical and ^^^^^^ satisfactory, but ample for present needs. We had not won our independence and our field for growth by the force of arms alone, but by our success in manipulat- ing the divisions of Europe to our advantage, a success largely due to our diplomats. Elate though they were, their task was by no means finished; for the boundaries of our territories were nearly all vague or questionable, and we were still a weak nation among the strong. Until we could develop our own strength it would continue to be necessary to take wise advantage of the divisions of Europe in order to insure our safety and our winnings. CHAPTER VI RELIGION AND COMMERCE Independent and at peace, the United States faced the diplomatic problems of national existence. One of these, which still continues to vex some nations, was ^^ „ . ^ . 1 1 mi ^^® United at once and definitively settled. The connec- States and the tion of a portion of their subjects with a non- ^ ^^ resident religious authority had always been a matter of national concern. Expecting that such would be the policy of the new government, and that it would wish to free its Catholic citizens from English control, the papal nuncio at Paris addressed Franklin, July 28, 1783, with the proposal that Congress consent to the establishment in some city of the United States of "one of its Catholic subjects" with ecclesiastical authority as bishop or apostolic prefect. Frank- lin properly informed the nuncio that neither Congress nor any state could take action on such a matter, but that a dignitary thus appointed by Rome would nevertheless be cordially welcomed, a position in which he was upheld by Congress. Less wisely he recommended that Roman con- trol be exercised through the medium of some French ec- clesiastic, who would thus replace the vicar-general at Lon- don. This latter plan was heartily embraced by the French government, which hoped by French education and connec- tion to render the Catholic element a weapon of French in- fluence, and possibly had in mind the prestige accruing to France from the French protectorate of Catholics in the Orient. The Roman Propaganda investigated the question, however, and, after testing the sentiment of the American Catholics, decided to appoint an American bishop, John 51 52 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Carroll, and thus deal with its members without the media tion of any foreign nation.^ These two wise decisions were paralleled in what was per haps the more trying case of the American adherents of th( ^, , ,. Church of England. They at once assumec The Anglican . . '^ . / Church in the position that national independence shoulc be reflected in a national church organization but to secure a continuation of the apostolic succession il was necessary to have recourse to the mother country, sinc( there were no bishops in America. In order to obtain con secration, moreover, a bishop must swear allegiance to th( English crown, and the colonial opposition to the appoint ment of a bishop before the Revolution caused England tc doubt the reception of one now. Samuel Seabury, the firsi applicant, was forced to accept his consecration from a smal independent branch of the church in Scotland. The attitude of Congress, however, and a declaration to the same eflFecl by Connecticut soon removed apprehension as to Americar opposition; and John Adams while minister in England exerted himself unofficially, as Franklin had done in Paris, to make matters smooth. The result was the consecration, in 1787, and by English bishops, of two additional American bishops without the hampering oath.- With religion thus freed from foreign governmental con- trol and not interfered with by the home government, reli- gious questions were practically removed from religious prob- diplomacy until, with the beginning of the 'diplomacy missionary movement, they reappeared in the form of demands for the protection of Amer- ican religious workers and projjcrty in foreign countries. Meanwhile popular interest in diplomacy was chiefly di- rected toward commercial affairs. One reason why the ' C. R. Fish, "Docuraentii relative to the Adjustment of the Roman Catholic Organization in the United States to the Conditions of National Independence, 1783-1789," Amer. Hist. Review, 1910, xv. 800-829. ^ Richard Hildreth, History of the United States of America (6 vols.. New York, 1880-82), iii. 479-481. RELIGION AND COMMERCE 53 colonies had chafed against dependence on England was the fact that their trade had for the most part been cur- tailed by the limits of the British empire, and, ^ . . . Commercial worse still, had been regulated within those necessity for limits by an authority in which they did not share. One of the chief advantages of independence was to be the opening of new channels of trade. International trade, however, is as dependent upon legalized relationships as is domestic trade upon the preservation of law and order; and in the eighteenth century such legal basis must depend, even more than in the twentieth, upon special treaty agreements; for general international law was at that time less uniform and less pervasive than it is to-day, besides including many rules and regulations discriminating against foreigners which lingered on from the middle ages. At the commencement of peace such treaties existed only with France and the Netherlands. It did not, however, seem diflBcult to extend the series, for every nation of Europe was intent on diverting to itself the sire°for°treat- golden current of American trade to which so ^^1^°^ '^°°^' much of England's prosperity was attributed. No sooner was American independence assured than Frank- lin was besieged with requests to enter into negotiation. On December 24, 1782, he wrote to Livingston, "The Swedish ambassador has exchanged full powers with me." In Feb- ruary, 1783, the Danish minister was instructed to arrange a treaty similar to that between the United States and Hol- land. In July Franklin wrote that the electors of Saxony and Bavaria, the king of Prussia, and the emperor were thinking of treaties, and in September that Russia wanted trade. April 15 of the same year he wrote to Livingston that he had received offers to serve as consul for America from merchants in every port of France and from most of those of Europe.^ Not all these projects materialized into treaties; but in 1 Franklin, Works, viii. 172-313. 54 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1783 Franklin concluded one with Sweden, and in 1785 Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson made one with Prussia. These compacts, like those with France and Character of tt n i i- i-i i • i • our early Holland, were exceedmg liberal in their pro- visions. They granted freedom of religion to the citizens of one country who were occupied in the other, and abolished the droit d'aubaine, or tax on the estates of deceased foreigners. With regard to trade during time of war, these treaties aligned the United States with the Dutch, or continental, views rather than with those of the English. The interests of most European nations were similar to those of the United States in opposition to those of Great Britain, they were the interests of nations weak at sea against the strong. In the end the continental views for the most part triumphed, but they can scarcely be regarded as accepted international law in the eighteenth century. They expressed desires rather than accomplished facts. Among the provi- sions bearing on the subject were those by which the belliger- ent right of search was strictly limited, contraband was nar- rowly interpreted, neutral ships were allowed to carry enemies' goods, and in the case of Prussia privateering was prohibited between the two powers. The French treaty, however, allowed the capture of neutral goods on enemies' ships. In 1788 Jefferson, then serving as minister to France, concluded an elaborate treaty with that country regulating the rights of consuls. Meanwhile, not waiting for treaties, adventurous Amer- ican merchants were striking out for trade beyond the limits Trade in Asia of Europe in the Far East, which had beckoned and Africa Columbus, and whose most cherished jjroduct, tea, had caused one of the dramatic preludes of the Revolu- tion. Previously debarred from this trade by the monopoly granted to the East India Company, the colonists were nevertheless somewhat familiar with it, and had long used Asiatic commodities. Once free, they hastened to make use of their opportunities. In 1784 the first American vessel RELIGION AND COMMERCE 55 reached Canton, In 1786 an American commercial agent was in residence there, and soon American vessels were fre- quenting the northwest coast of America in search of the furs and ginseng which the Chinese wished in exchange for their tea and silk. Moreover, on the coming of peace, Amer- icans had resumed their traffic on the slave coast of Africa, where there were no governments with which they must come to terms. ^ In the Mediterranean, however, no progress was made. This was not due to a neglect on the part of the Italian powers to cultivate the United States. The Mediterranean papal nuncio, while writing of religion in be- ^^^^ half of the church, had also mentioned trade in behalf of the states of the church; and Naples, Venice, and Malta all made similar advances. Nor was it because the United States was unfamiliar with trade conditions in that inland sea; for as colonists the Puritan New Englanders had con- stantly supplied the Mediterranean countries with salted cod for fast-day fare, and wheat and rice, and had smuggled away ribbons, silks, Leghorn hats, and other commodities. The difficulty lay in the fact that here was encountered one of the disadvantages of separation from England. The English navy no longer protected American ships from the Barbary pirates.^ The North African states, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, constituted an anachronism that was a blot upon the civilization of Europe. Their official navies The Barbary consisted of pirate craft, which swept down s***^^ upon peaceful trading- vessels and sold, with ship and goods, the sailors and passengers into captivity. So well recognized was their activity that there existed an active "Society of the Holy Trinity for the Redemption of Captives," whose work 1 Katharine Coman, The Industrial History of the United States (New York, 1910), 135-137; Hildreth, United States, iii. 510. 2 Eugene Schuyler, American Diplomacy (New York, 1886), 193-208; E. Dupuy, Americains et Barharesques, Paris, 1910. 56 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY went on from century to century. At the time of the Revo- lution these pirates respected the flags of certain countries, as England, France, and Spain, in return for heavy pay- ments. That these nations, whose fleets could have cleared the sea as Pompey's did in 67 B. C, failed to do so, was for reasons similar to those which cause the police of some large cities to tolerate "gunmen" and vice. Franklin wrote, July 22, 1783, that it was a maxim among English merchants that, "if there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to build one." By preventing the smaller nations from competing in trade, the pirates increased the employment of the protected merchant marines. In July, 1785, an American schooner, Maria, and the ship Dauphin were captured, and American trade in the Mediter- ^ ., , ranean ceased. The United States had hoped Failure to open • i i • the Mediter- to substitute the French na^^ as protector in place of the English, but France would prom- ise nothing except assistance in making a treaty. In May, 1784, Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson were empowered to negotiate with them; but negotiation was expensive and the agents themselves were not agreed as to method. Adams favored the European practice of buying peace, whereas Jefferson was opposed to such a policy, and broached the impractical scheme of forming a general confederation to put the pirates down. In July, 1787, Thomas Barclay, being specially delegated by Adams and Jefferson, had the as- tonishing good luck to conclude a treaty with Morocco without tribute. Success, however, failed to attend the negotiations with the other powers, and at the close of the Confederation trade in the Mediterranean was still closed to American vessels and a number of Americans still remained as slaves in Algerian households. Spain and Portugal, however, were accessible. To these countries had always gone the best of the colonial fish, and when fishing was resumed after the war it was again sent there for sale. Meal, lumber products, rice, and some other RELIGION AND COMMERCE 57 goods also sought these markets. With independence it was hoped that this trade might be made more profitable by the securing of return cargoes, which had for the most part previously been prohibited by Spain and the English navigation acts. Both countries ° ^ permitted trade, but American merchants and sea-captains found themselves under disadvantages due to the absence of the treaty protection which they had enjoyed as English sub- jects. Rates and regulations were now arbitrarily changed, and religious difficulties kept arising. It was hoped to settle these discords by negotiation, and also to induce Spain to open up, in some degree, a direct trade with her colonies, for much of what Americans sold in Spain was reexported to the Spanish settlements. In 1784 Jay succeeded Livingston as secretary of foreign affairs, and Spain sent over Gardoqui to continue the negotia- tions which had been begun in 1779. They » 1 . • 1 . 1 Failure of ne- lound agreement on commercial matters easy ; gotiations with but the old difficulty of the Mississippi per- f^fg^^ ^'^'^ P"""' sisted, and Spain's ambitions with regard to the West assumed a new phase, so that no treaty was con- summated. As none was made with Portugal either, the Confederation government thus failed to satisfy the demand of the commercial community that trade with these two nations be put upon a solid basis. However great might be the future development of the new channels of trade opened up by independence, the great- est present change felt by the people of the United States was that concerning their rela- the British tions with the British empire. Heretofore they ^' had been free of the empire, but debarred from the rest of the world; now they had the world before them, but were stran- gers within the empire. Unless diplomacy could secure them some of their old advantages, the new might not suffice to make good their losses. Trade with Great Britain itself was still allowed, and afforded a market for tobacco, tar and 68 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY turpentine, and some other products; but our exports to that country had never paid for our imports, and did not bid fair to do so in the future. The balance had been paid by the excess in our favor resulting from the trade with the British West India islands.^ This trade had been the most important of all branches of colonial commerce. Those islands were devoted to raising British West staple products, such as sugar, and they relied ^^'^^^ in large measure on the continental colonies for food, including wheat, cheese, and salt pork; for lumber, including barrel staves and framed houses ready to set up; for horses, and for many of their slaves; and particularly they bought for their slaves the poorer qualities of cod and mackerel which, indiscriminately with the good, were caught by the fisherman but which could not be sold in Europe. This trade had not only afforded a market for our farms and industries, but had also given employment to our ships, and thereby fostered ship-building and all the gamut of subsidiary occupations. It had been the corner stone of American commerce, and its preservation was a primary object of American diplomacy. As soon as the preliminary articles of peace were signed in November, 1782, work upon a treaty of commerce was „, ,, , begun. The Duke of Manchester and David Shelburne's '^ plans and de- Hartly were commissioned by the English government for "opening, promoting, and rendering perpetual the mutual intercourse of trade and commerce between our kingdom and the dominions of the United States." Lord Shelburne was deeply influenced by the views of Adam Smith. He was inclined to continue the policy which he had adopted in response to Jay's offer, and by liberal arrangements with America to prevent the per- ^ Edward Channing, History of the United States (vols, i.-iii. New York, 1905-12), iii. 412-424; Phineas Bond, Letters, Anier. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1896, i. 513-659; Stephen Higginson, Letters, ibid., 711-841; Marquis of Buckingliain, Letters to Sir John Temple, Mass. Hist. Soc, Proceedings, 1866, pp. 69-80. RELIGION AND COMMERCE 59 manent alignment of the United States with France. His power, however, was hmited. To some degree, it may be said, his ministry was tolerated by Parliament for the sole purpose of performing the disagreeable task of sanctioning the partition of the empire. On February 24, 1783, he was forced to resign, and was succeeded by an incongruous com- bination headed jointly by the inveterate contestants, Fox and North. Vaughan wrote to Franklin the next day, "But the overthrow of parties is nothing to the overthrow of sys- tems relative to English commerce, which was intended to be placed on a footing that would have been an example to all mankind, and probably have restored England to her pinnacle again." ^ The new government was to a considerable extent influ- enced by Lord Sheffield, whose "Observations on the Com- merce of the United States," published in change of 1783, set forth the long-established view of ^"^^^ P°"*=y England's policy with regard to trade and navigation. On July 2, 1783, a royal proclamation confined the West Indian trade to British ships; July 27, the commissioners found "it best to drop all commercial articles in our definitive treaty." The subject, however, was one which the United States could not afford to drop, and John Adams was sent as minis- ter to England to renew negotiations. Arriving in February, 1785, as first representative from America to the British crown, himself a leading figure in the struggle for independ- ence, he was in a position of some delicacy, but nevertheless he found his new post eminently congenial. The ponderous seriousness of English public life sufficiently resembled re- spectability to win his lively approbation. On examining the library of George III., he felt that it contained every book which a king should have and no other. His sturdy Americanism, however, asserted itself. When the king some- what jocularly remarked upon Adams's well known dislike of the French, the latter replied, " I must avow to your ma- 1 Franklin, Works, viii. 261. 60 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY jesty, I have no attachment but to my own country." The king responded, "quick as Hghtning," "An honest man will never have any other." ^ In spite of this auspicious opening Adams's mission failed of its main object. In fact, in 1788 an act of Parliament Adams's mis- made permanent the policy of the proclama- "°^ tion of 1783, and this in spite of the succession to the premiership of William Pitt, who in 1783 had shared Lord Shelburne's liberal convictions. Not only were Amer- ican ships prohibited from engaging in the West Indian trade, but the policy of encouraging Canada to supply the islands with the goods they needed was adopted, with the result that British ships were allowed to carry United States goods to the islands only at such times and to such a degree as was absolutely necessary. One reason for this policy was explained in the following words by the Duke of Dorset, with whom Adams was treat- „ . . ing: "The apparent determination of the re- Great Britam ° . ^ ^ distrusts the spective states to regulate their own separate on e era ion interests, renders it absolutely necessary, towards forming a permanent system of commerce, that my court should be informed how far the commissioners can be duly authorized to enter into any engagement with Great Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one of the states to render totally useless and inefficient." This point was well taken to the extent that the sole power over com- merce given to Congress by the Articles of Confederation was that of preventing the states from levying discriminating duties against nations with which the country was in treaty relations. Moreover, England had practical demonstration of the inefficiency of Congress in the fact that, in spite of the treaty of peace, various states still put obstacles in the way of the collection of British debts and refused to heed the recommendation of Congress for a greater leniency toward loyalists. This impotence of Congress not only • J. Q. and C. F. Adams, John Adams, vol. ii. RELIGION AND COMMERCE 61 caused the British government to doubt the eflScacy of a treaty on commercial subjects with the United States, but relieved it from any apprehension of effective retaliation. Congress could not pass retaliatory laws; and although some of the states, as Virginia and Georgia, did so, the English statesmen correctly judged that any universal agreement to such an end was not within the realm of practical politics.^ Still more conclusive to the English mind was the fact that Great Britain, without a treaty, was nevertheless enjoy- ing the most essential advantages of American _ „ . . 1 rrii * • r •^• -it-. Great Bntain trade. The Americans were lamiliar with Eng- holds Amer- lish goods, liked them, and found them on the whole the cheapest in the world. The British merchants more easily resumed American connections than other nations established them ; and particularly they were willing to grant the long credits which the Americans desired. London, moreover, was actually the most convenient distributing centre of the world, and its merchants continued to handle many articles, such as German linens, which the Americans desired from the continent. In 1789 probably three quarters of our imports came from Great Britain, who in turn re- ceived perhaps half of our exports. France, although coax- ing our trade by liberal concessions to our whale oil, fish, grains, and such products in 1787, and seeking earnestly to develop in the United States a taste for French brandy, secured but a small and not increasing portion of the Amer- ican traffic. Naturally, therefore, England saw no neces- sity for granting favors, when without them she continued to enjoy that market for her factories and employment for her vessels of which Vergennes had thought to deprive her. Thus the government under the Confederation was not able to reopen the British West Indies to trade. Although the trade of the French islands was open to small Amer- ^ Secret Journals of Congress, iv. 185-286; W. C. Fisher, American Trade Regulations before 1789, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Papers, 1889, iii. 467-493. 62 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ican vessels trading directly there and back, yet it was sub- ject to such disadvantages that it by no means took the Failures of the place of what we had lost. In fact this was not Confederation entirely a gain after all, for the colonies had to some degree engaged in it before the Revolution, albeit ille- gally. With the loss of the Mediterranean traflac and the un- certainties in Spain and Portugal, the total effect of the Rev- olution on commerce could in 1789 hardly be said to have been satisfactory, and the failure of negotiations was rightly felt to have been due in large measure to the lack of a strong national government capable of making itself re- spected abroad. CHAPTER VII THE WEST The failure of the negotiations with Great Britain and Spain on the question of commerce was not by any means due entirely to the intrinsic difficulties of the Conditions on subject. Both nations were our neighbors, and *^® frontier the problems of territorial propinquity were in both cases more complicated and disturbing than those of oceanic traffic. The cession to the United States of the region bounded by the Appalachian mountains, the Great Lakes, the Missis- sippi, and the Floridas was not regarded by European states- men as finally determining the future. As it stood, more- over, this area did not constitute a satisfactory territorial unit; for, as conditions of transportation then were, its com- mercial outlets fell to the control, not of the United States, but, as to the southern half, to Spain, who held the mouth of the Mississippi, and as to the northern half to Great Britain, who held the St. Lawrence. Its population was during the period of the Confederation about equally divided between Indians, who held themselves to be independent, and frontiersmen, whose loyalty to the central government of the United States was yet to be created and would depend upon the ability of that government to solve their problems. Thus, as Washington said, the western settlers "stood upon a pivot, the touch of a feather would turn them any way." At the close of hostilities Great Britain still held important posts in the ceded area, at such strategic positions as De- troit, Michilimackinac, Niagara, and Oswego. „ „ ,, In July, 1783, Washington sent Baron Steuben " debts," and ** lov&lists " to General Haldiman, the governor-general of Canada, to accept the surrender of these forts. The latter said that he had received no instructions on the point and 63 64 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY refused to discuss the question. In June, 1784, instructions did indeed reach him, but they were to the effect that the posts should be held, a position that was later justified by the British minister, Hammond, on the ground that the United States had failed to live up to the terms of the treaty as to the payment of British debts and the treatment of the loyalists. The balance of evidence would seem to indicate that the refusal to give up the posts preceded any definite information as to the disregard by the states of the injunc- tions of the treaty and the requests of Congress. If this excuse had not been afforded, however, it is possible that the British might later have yielded the point; in fact, the British foreign office carefully framed its own dispatches on this view of the matter. But the first refusal was based on other grounds.^ One of these was the complaint of the British fur-traders, who protested as soon as the terms of the provisional articles were announced. Their trade made London The fur-trade . „ i <» i i i i the most nnportant lur-marketoi the world; the carrying out of the treaty, they claimed, would practically destroy their occupation; for half their furs came from the forests and streams allotted to the Americans, and the best trails, portages, and river channels were on the American side of the boundary. More important than the fur-traders were the Indians, who, though in many tribes, comprised only two main groups. One of these was the Iroquois, who had so long maintained themselves in the fair valleys of central New York, exercising by their valor and their shrewd- ness in diplomacy a potent influence on the struggles between the French, Dutch, English, and Americans. Although the real power of the Iroquois confederacy had been broken by the expedition of the American army under General Sullivan in 1779, they still retained the title to their lands and a great * A. C. McLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the British Debts," Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1894, pp. 413-444. THE WEST 65 name. During the period of the Confederation they divided into two groups, one of which made friends with the Amer- icans and retained their homes, while the other and larger band preferred their traditional friendship with the British and removed to a grant given to them by the British government west of the Niagara river. The leader of this portion was the famous Joseph Brant, a man of ability and distinction who stood high in the councils of the English. 1 The other main group, consisting of the Delaware, Wyan- dot, Shawanee, Miami, and other tribes, and comprising about five thousand warriors, was known col- ^^ „ ^ 1-1 11 11 1 1-1 ^^® North- lectively, although there was but slight co- western In- hesion among the several tribes, as the North- western Indians. They occupied, geographically, the region which is to-day Ohio and Indiana, and politically held the same strategic relation to boundaries and settlements which the Iroquois had formerly held. By the British they were regarded as still under the influence of the Iroquois, but as a matter of fact, being less civilized and more independent, they were no longer inclined to accept the leadership of that confederation or of Brant. When the tribes heard of the treaty of peace their anger against the British was intense, because they were not in- cluded in its terms. They had for the most The Indian part been engaged in the war as allies of the p®"^ British, the treaty left them at the mercy of the Americans. So violent was their tone that the British feared some such general and concerted movement among them as had taken place under Pontiac in 1764, when the Indians had been similarly deserted by the French. Against such an attack the feeble British garrisons along the lakes would be but a frail defence; but, should these be withdrawn, the little settle- ments of French about the trading centres, and of American ^ I. J. Cox, "The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor in the History of the Old Northwest," Ohio Archwol. and Hist. Quarterly, 1909, xviii. 542-565. 66 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY loyalists who were beginning to occupy what is now Ontario, would fall like brush before the fire. To prevent such a catastrophe, the British commissioners in Paris had suggested that Great Britain retain the forts for three years, or until American garrisons arrived; but this proposition had been rejected.^ Angry as the tribes were with the British, they felt a more fundamental hostility to the "Long Knives" or Americans, Indians and whose advancing settlements drove wild life Amencans before them. They were loath to make peace with them particularly because to the Americans a treaty with Indians meant acquisition of territory. The Indians continued to trade with the British agents, to frequent the British forts, to speak of George III, the great chief with the red coat, as father; but if they were to be obedient children they wished protection from their enemies. The Indians were, therefore, a weapon for the British, but one which re- quired careful handling. The policy of the British government was one of peace and pacification, but it could not command the Indians to The British accept American terms without the danger of Indian pohcy ^ great uprising. Nor could it entirely control its own agents so far away on the frontier and necessarily invested with large personal responsibility. Many of these were American loyalists, as bitter against their former coun- trymen as were the Indians. Guns and ammunition were sold, indiscreet utterances were made, ardent young Eng- lishmen and Canadians occasionally joined the Indian forays; and the Americans interpreted British policy as a careful nursing of the tribes to be used as a lash to castigate the United States frontier when occasion should arise. ^ The most important European settlement in the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence, except for the French Canadian ' Papers drawn from the Canadian archives, the Simcoe papers, and the British Public Record OflSce, by Miss Orpha Leavitt, for use in a Wisconsin doctor's thesis as yet unpublished. THE WEST 67 farmers along the main river, was that of the "Green Mountain Boys" in the valley of Lake Champlain. Their position was a peculiar one. Although they were organized as a separate state, their lands were claimed by both New Hampshire and New York and their government was not recognized by Congress. During the Revolution they had fought on the American side, but they had negotiated with Great Britain independently. With peace, their great desire was incorporation into the American Union, within whose boundaries they were living; and yet they realized that Great Britain held their welfare in her hands, for the only outlet for their lumber and grain was down the Richelieu, or Sorrel, river to Montreal.^ ■"^To obtain the privilege of this route they determined to negotiate on their own account, and in 1786 sent three com- missioners to frame a treaty of commerce with , „ Influence of Lord Dorchester, then governor-general of the St. Law- Canada. In 1787 and 1788, the British govern- ment granted them certain privileges by proclamation and ordinance; but the Vermonters, wishing a formal treaty, continued negotiations through 1790. On April 17, 1790, Cattrell, in behalf of the Canadian government, wrote to W. W. Grenville of the British foreign office: "It belongs not to the Committee to decide how far any article in the late Treaty of Peace, by which the Independence of the United States was acknowledged and the extent of their Territories defined, may make it improper for the government of this Country to form a separate Treaty with the State of Ver- mont, or whether it may be politically prudent all circum- stances considered, to risk giving offence to the Congress of the United States, by such a measure." He thought, how- ever, that it would certainly be of commercial benefit to Great Britain "to prevent Vermont and Kentuck and all the other settlements now forming in the Interior parts of ^ F. J. Turner, "English policy toward America in 1790-1791," Amer. Hist. Review, 1902, viii. 78-86. 68 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the great Continent of North America, from becoming de- pendent on the Government of the United States or on that of any Foreign Country, and to preserve them on the con- trary in a state of Independence, and to induce them to form Treaties of Commerce and Friendship with Great Britai n/^ Great Britain had less to offer Kentucky than she could give to Vermont; moreover, her relations with the Indians , caused the settlers there to be, some of them Kentucky and . . . . i • i i the St. Law- suspicious, and an mcreasmg number violently '®°''® hostile. Yet the portages between the northern branches of the Ohio and the Great Lakes might be used as an outlet for Kentucky products, and in 1788, according to the report of John Connolly, a British agent in that region, the people were thinking of bargaining for this outlet down the St. Lawrence.^ It is not necessary to suppose that the Vermonters and Kentuckians were actually planning local independence, in Possibilities of order to realize that the continued failure of British control ^^le United States to open a channel for their commerce, combined with the possibility of accomplishing such a result by their own endeavors, was calculated speedily to develop a desire and a purpose for independence. Furthor- more, while the British government had no direct policy for bringing about a dissolution of the Union, it is evident that it was closely observing conditions in the West and was not inclined to relinquish anything that it held. With its con- trol of the Indians and of the St. Lawrence, it remained a factor in the development of the whole Northwest, irrespec- tive of boundaries. The future of the valley of the Great Lakes and of the northern part of the Ohio valley might yet prove to lie with Great Britain rather than with the United States. Of more immediate interest was the problem of the South- west, where the situation was similar to that in the north, 1 Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West (4 vols.. New York, etc., 1889-96), vol. iii. chs. iv.-v. THE WEST 69 although the various factors differed in their relative weight and the need for a solution was more urgent. The future of the Mississippi valley probably lay in the Kentucky and hands of the American pioneers who were pour- Cumberland ing into that region. Their settlements constituted two oases in the wilderness. The more important, consisting of Scotch- Irish mountaineers and Revolutionary veterans largely from Virginia, was in the blue-grass district of Kentucky. In- creasing with great rapidity throughout the Confederation, it had in 1790 about 70,000 inhabitants. The other settle- ment, one hundred and fifty miles to the southwest, was in the Tennessee blue grass, about Nashville, and was known as the Cumberland district. Settled more exclusively by the mountaineer type, it had in 1790 less than half as large a pop- ulation as Kentucky, and was also more exposed, being sur- rounded by the powerful tribes of the southwestern Indians. Like the Vermonters, these invaders of the wilderness had shown their patriotism during the Revolution by fighting against the British; they had assisted George spirit of in- Rogers Clark in the capture of Kaskaskia and dependence Vincennes, and had themselves delivered the great blow at King's Mountain of which the story in ballad and fireside tale enlivened many a forest cabin for years to come. Like the Vermonters, however, it was independence that fired them, and not particularly loyalty to the American Union or even to their states. Tennessee had a government, headed by John Sevier, which claimed separation from the parent state of North Carolina; and Kentucky was anxious to or- ganize separately from Virginia. Their virgin farms produced abundant crops, and nearly all \7ere on the banks of rivers hurrying to meet the Mississippi and the sea. The forests furnished ready ma- terial for rafts and rude boats, and all nature invited to this easy path of export. It was only necessary to obtain the permission of the Spaniards to drift down to some point near the gulf, there tranship their goods at some place 70 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY of deposit, and to return with the proceeds, either by sea to Philadelphia and thence home across the mountains, or buying a horse at New Orleans or Natchez ride home through the forests. During the Revolution, when we were to some extent cooperating with Spain, they had tested the advan- tages of this traflBc; but in 1786 Spain closed the route. To reopen it was the work of Congress.^ Jay, treating with Gardoqui at Philadelphia, pointed to the treaty of peace with England, which specifically declared The " right " that the navigation of the Mississippi should of navigation ^^ ^^qq from its source to the ocean, and to the treaty of 1763 between Great Britain and Spain, which had given England this right. Gardoqui claimed that the con- cession to England was a specific grant, which she had no power to transfer to another country. He refused to accept Jay's argument that the United States had a natural right to follow to the ocean all rivers on which any of its territory bordered; as a matter of fact, moreover, free navigation was of comparatively little use unless accompanied by the privilege of a place of deposit where rafts could be broken up and transhipment to ocean-going vessels made.^ Spain was the more tenacious of her position because of a misunderstanding regarding the Florida boundary. The The Florida treaty of 1783 between England and Spain boundary ^.^^j^ "jjj^ Britannic Majesty likewise cedes and guarantees, in full right, to His Catholic Majesty East Florida, as also West Florida." In the treaty of even date between England and the United States the northern bound- ary of West Florida was fixed at the thirty-first parallel. As between these two documents, the one indefinite, the other definite, the latter would naturally govern. Spain, however, claimed that "West Florida" was a definite term, that England had in 1764 extended the province to a line running through the mouth of the Yazoo. Moreover, her * Winsor, Westward Movement, 247-256. 2 Secret Journals of Congress, iv. 42-132. 110° 100' 5tf 45' 40' 3? r.^^ -^ fe__ _\A° (- <, '/= lufTf^ " -^ K* J 1^1 \ -.' Is, tf °\ ll\ > \ ..,j.._ r 1 "^ ) Vc: 1^ (-4 / :r^^ ^~-^- i^2^^ '%^. ] P^ } 2 iZT^ 0^ skasl. (^ € 30' 2? F{ ^>'. L r M E A / UNITED STATES 1783-1790 Scale of Miles 100 200 300 400 ;^ American settled Territory and Posts \f | British settled Territory and Posts Spanish settled Territory and Posts | I Disputed or unsettled Boundaries Names of Indian Tribes are printed in Red THE WEST 71 claim in equity is improved by a study of the preliminary articles of both treaties; for those of the American treaty agreed to the Yazoo boundary in case England remained in possession of West Florida, whereas the agreement with Spain was that she should "continue" to hold West Florida. Now, she actually did hold Natchez, the only important post in the disputed region. Technically the arguments balanced, but Spain "continued" to hold Natchez, which not only was a Spanish garrison town, but was peopled for the most part with American loyalists, who were averse to a transfer of authority. Congress was, therefore as unable to clear the national territory of foreign control to the south- west as to the northwest. Meantime the commercial interests of the coast were im- patient at having an agreement held up because of these western questions, which they felt to be of Uttle «« East " and concern. Not all, moreover, favored the open- " ing of the Mississippi. In addition to a feeling that western emigration weakened the older parts of the country, there was a distinct fear, voiced by such men as Rufus King, that, should the West learn to face down the Mississippi, the country would be divided into two spheres so distinct that union would cease to be possible. He believed that the de- velopment of the West had best wait on the slow process of creating transportation routes across the mountains. The position of Congress had been vacillating. In 1779 it had made the navigation of the Mississippi an ultimatum in any treaty with Spain; in 1781 it had withdrawn , . , . , . . . • 1 1 1 • J^y s proposal this condition; in 1784 it had returned to it. In 1786 Jay, who had ignored the instructions of 1781, con- cluded that he could not carry out those of 1784, and arranged a treaty with Gardoqui on the basis that the United States should forego the navigation for twenty-five years, without prejudicing her rights. This plan he recommended to Con- gress, with whom the question assumed a sectional aspect. The commercial regions, New England and the middle states. 72 AMERICAN DIPLOISL\CY were in favor of it, the southern states, less interested in general commerce and more closely in touch with the West, were opposed. On one vote seven states out of the thirteen favored the proposal, but the decision was ultimately left over to the new government under the constitution. It was not till 1788, in the discussion of the Virginia con- vention over the ratification of the constitution, that the Western dis- West learned of this proposed betrayal of its content birthright. For several years, however, its inhabitants had been growing restless at the protracted failure of Congress to meet their wishes, a restiveness that was aggravated by the similar failure of Congress to deal effectually with their Indian enemies. The Southwestern Indians were more numerous than the Northwestern, and better organized; the five great tribes, Cherokee, Creeks, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and states and the Chicamauga, could together furnish perhaps fndl^s^'*^"" twenty thousand warriors. The close of the war found these tribes at enmity with the Americans. In 1785 commissioners arranged a treaty with the Cherokee, but the boundary provided was not satisfac- tory to the frontiersmen, and North Carolina stood by her citizens. The articles of Confederation gave Congress con- trol of Indian affairs only in the case of tribes not living within the limits of a single state. North Carolina, therefore, claim- ing to comprehend the Cherokee, denied the validity of the treaty. To the failure of Congress to open the Mississippi was thus added the failure to quiet the Indians upon satis- factory terms, and the people of the West came to believe that their happiness must depend on their own exertions. Under these circumstances the West became fertile ground for the development of plans and plots and conspiracies. Western proj- They grew up, withered, and revived again; ®^*^ they adjusted themselves to times and condi- tions; they flourished now successively, and now sinmlta- neously even in the same mind. They stretched their threads THE WEST 73 to Congress and the coast, and across the ocean to Madrid, Paris, and London; they connected themselves with the general history of the age. At times secret and unobserved, at times the central objects of attention, they together form one of the two leading themes of our diplomatic history until after 1803. During the Confederation they were practically all directed to the solution of western problems by some one of the following four methods, — by the self-reliant seizure of New Orleans, a task somewhat beyond existing resources; by submission to the control of Spain; by independence and alliance with Spain; or by independence and alliance with Great Britain. It is probable that the majority of the in- habitants were at most times disposed to follow a fifth course, — the obvious and legal one of urging their grievances upon the government of the United States in the hope that it would acquire the power to redress them. The supporters of this view, however, were often discouraged, for they were not sustained by any such deep-seated loyalty as developed when the nation had proved itself deserving of their de- votion. Fully aware of the situation, Spain was disposed to pull every string of intrigue in order to manipulate it to her own advantage. Her Indian policy was well con- xhe Spanish ceived and well executed. The government ^^^^ policy encouraged the great Scotch firm of Panton, Leslie and Company, whose American headquarters were at Pensacola. It saw to it that traders frequented the Indian villages, and that their rates for goods were moderate. It allowed a secret trade in firearms. It distributed generous presents. To the great chief of the Creeks, the most powerful man among the Indians, Alexander McGillivray, it paid a yearly pension. Of this man, Navarro, intendant or civil officer of Louisiana, wrote, April 15, 1786: "So long as we shall have this chief on our side, we may rely on having established, between the Floridas and Georgia, a barrier which it will not be easy to break through. The Indians are now fully convinced of 74 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the ambition of the Americans; the recollection of past in- juries still dwells on their minds, and, with it, the fear that these greedy neighbors may one day seize upon their lands, and strip them of a property to which they consider them- selves as having a right derived from nature herself. It ought to be one of the chief points in the policy of this Gov- ernment to keep this sentiment alive in their breasts." Upon these Indians, with the Creole population, the Spanish gov- ernment placed its greatest dependence for the defence of Louisiana, and through Louisiana of the mines of Mexico.^ It hoped, however, by intrigue with the western settlers to create a still more advanced barrier, namely, to acquire The coloniza- or to control the region which it had endeavored tion plan ^^ obtain in the negotiation of 1779 with Eng- land and of 1782 with Jay. Alert and eager as it was, how- ever, the Spanish government lacked unity of purpose. One of the plans considered was that of Navarro, who wrote, December 19, 1787: "It is necessary to keep in mind that, between this province and the territories of New Spain, there is nothing but the feeble barrier of the Mississippi, which it is as easy to pass as it is impossible to protect, and that, if it be good policy to fortify this province by drawing a large population within its limits, there are no other means than that of granting certain franchises to commerce, leaving aside, as much as possible, all restrictions and shackles, or at least postponing them to a future time, if they must exist. In addition, the government must distinguish itself by the equity of its administration, the suavity of its relations with the people, and the disinterestedness of its officers in their dealings with the foreigners who may resort to the colony. This is the only way to form, in a short time, a solid rampart for the protection of the kingdom of Mexico." ' ' Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana (3d ed., 4 vols.. New Orleans, 1885), iii. 175 and passim; Rcxjsevelt, Winning of the West, vol. iii.; Winsor, Westward Movement. * Gayarre, Louisiana, iii. 189. THE WEST 75 This plan was fostered by Gardoqui, who at Philadelphia entered into relations with Colonel George Morgan and ar- ranged a deal with him. Morgan received a grant of land and undertook to establish a colony, New Madrid, at the strategic point in what is now Missouri, opposite the mouth of the Ohio. George Rogers Clark was interested in a scheme to organize a similar colony on the Yazoo, and joined with him were James Wilkinson, John Brown, a delegate in Con- gress, Harry Inness, the attorney-general of the Kentucky district, and other men of influence and ambition. To make settlement in these new grants desirable it was proposed to allow emigrants to bring in their property free of duty and to enjoy religious tolerance; but of course the main induce- ment would be freedom to use the Mississippi. The essential point was to keep the river tight closed to those living in the American districts.^ With regard to the wisdom of this plan it may be remarked that, as immigrants of this kind would change their flag only for their personal advantage, the durability of james Wilkin- their loyalty to the Spanish crown might well be ^°° suspected. It was like asking the fox to guard the chickens. Something like this was felt by Miro, the governor of Louis- iana, to whom the tempter came in the form of James Wilkin- son. During the winter of 1775 a few hundred Americans, suffering sickness, icy cold, and want, had besieged Quebec. That little group must have possessed distinguished courage and a spirit of high adventure, but it contained also the three well-known traitors of our history, Benedict Arnold, Aaron Burr, and James Wilkinson. One can hardly refrain from supposing that over their camp-fires conversation often ran to the fascinating possibilities of Spanish America, to the mines of Mexico and Peru. Of the three, Wilkinson was the least, but the most enduring. Settling in Kentucky, this man no sooner won confidence 1 C. H. Haskins, The Yazoo Land Companies, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Papers, 1891, V. 395-437. 76 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY by a successful raid against the Indians than he began to tread the shady paths of forest diplomacy. In 1786 he Independence visited Natchez and established relations with and alliance Gayoso, the Spanish commandant. The next year he descended the river with a cargo of tobacco, flour, butter, and bacon. He secured an interview with Miro, to whom he presented a plan for allowing a few prominent men of the American settlements the privileges of commerce, in return for which they would devote themselves to persuad- ing the whole region to declare its independence and form an alliance with Spain. Miro wrote, January 8, 1788: "The delivery of Kentucky into his Majesty's hands, which is the main object to which Wilkinson has promised to devote himself entirely, would forever constitute this province a rampart for the protection of New Spain." Wilkinson was allowed to complete his transactions, and with such of his profits as he did not hand over to Miro he went home by way of Philadelphia.^ It is obvious that this project was somewhat at variance with the colonization scheme, for it would furnish relief to Kentucky un- some at least of the inhabitants of Kentucky, decided Instead of deciding definitively upon one plan or the other, however, the Spanish authorities tried to ride both. They somewhat distrusted Wilkinson, as they did the proposed colonizers, and by limiting trading privileges to a few they hoped still to attract immigration. Wilkinson, meantime, whatever his ultimate intentions may have been, pushed his plans. He hoped to secure the consent of Vir- ginia to the organization of Kentucky as a separate state, and tlien to apply the process later known as secession. In July, 1788, he made his proposals to the Kentucky constitu- tional convention, and, although he did not win their adop- tion, he secured a postponement of the final decision. In June, Miro had written home that he heard from Kentucky that in various conversations " among the most distinguished ^ T. M. Green, Spanish Conspiracy, Cincinnati, 1891. THE WEST 77 citizens of that State," it had been said "that the direction of the current of the rivers which run in front of their dwell- ings points clearly to the power to which they ought to ally themselves." Miro did not neglect Tennessee. Of the settlers in the Nashville region the most prominent was James Robertson. Restless under the restraint of trade, but even Miro and more under the Indian attacks, he at any rate Tennessee coquetted with the Spaniards. McGillivray wrote, April 25, 1788, that the Cumberland settlers had asked for terms, "and added that they would throw themselves into the arms of his Majesty as subjects, and that Cumberland and Kentucky are determined to free themselves from their dependence on Congress, because that body cannot protect either their persons or their property, or favor their commerce. They therefore, believe that they owe no obedience to a power which is incapable of benefiting them." Even in the valleys of East Tennessee, John Sevier, foremost man of the dis- trict, in 1788 offered his services to Miro and Gardoqui, although he subsequently withdrew from the connec- tion.^ The government under the Confederation, therefore, not only failed to open up commerce with the Mediterranean and the West Indies, and to put that with Diplomatic Spain upon a desirable basis, but it was unable ^^^^^ to occupy the territory granted to the United States by the treaty of 1783, either in the northwest or on the Florida border. It was unable to quiet the Indians of north or south, or to provide commercial outlets for the trans-Appalachian settlers. Its failure was causing not only discontent but disloyalty, and to such a degree that, although the racial control of the great valley was probably determined by the character of the aggressive population already on the spot, its governmental future was still uncertain. ^ Roosevelt, Winning of the West, iii. chs. iii.-v. ; Winsor, Westward Move- ment, 334. 78 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY While the western situation was not widely appreciated in the older portion of the country, the financial plight was The danger of fully realized. Owing to the lack of national the debt resources, the interest on our foreign debt was met only by occasional sales of such portions of the Dutch loan arranged by Adams as had not been immediately taken up.^ The loans from France were still unprovided for, and it was the gossip of diplomatic circles that France might take the island of Rhode Island as her payment." To the public mind of Europe in 1789, the acquisition of a French naval base on the United States coast seemed no more improbable than the acquisition of a United States naval base in Cuba seems to-day. It was by no means an accepted opinion that the United States would prove to be more than what we call to-day a protectorate, under French or English influence. The public debt was one of the weapons of France, as it has since so often been the key to European interference in the weaker countries of the world. Even though we were not actually in danger of being forced into jjolitical dependency, Europe had yet to be convinced that we were not. The fu- ture independence as well as the future limits of the country were in 1789 felt to be undetermined. * John Adams, Works, see index under loans. 2 For the French position, see "Correspondence of the Comte de Moustier [French Minister in the United States] with the Comte de Montmorin," Amer. Hist. Review, 1903, viii. 709-733; for rumors, see Buckingham's letter to Temple, Mass. Hist. Soc, Proceedings, 1866, p. 75. CHAPTER VIII OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS * Under the Articles of Confederation the administration had proved too weak to perform the duties of a national government in maintaining the rights and interests of its citizens among the nations powers of the of the world. This failure in diplomacy was e^g^t ^°^' one of the causes for the formation of a stronger central authority. Naturally, therefore, the constitution gave the new government a freer hand in dealing with inter- national affairs. The states conceded to the nation almost complete control of war, peace, treaty-making, army and navy, commerce, naturalization, and Indian affairs; and treaties were made the law of the land, enforceable by the national supreme court. The only limitations were that the importation of slaves was not to be prohibited for twenty years, that no taxes should be levied on exports, and no prefer- ence given to the ports of one state over those of another. In actual practice, these limitations proved to give rise to little controversy and to hamper the national government 1 J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 10 vols., to 1899, with continuations by other editors (contains valuable summaries and discussions); Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, 1789- 1901, 32 vols, in 34, Washington, 1828-1911 (contains votes on treaties and appointments) ; Compilation of Reports of [Senate] Committee on Foreign Relations, 1789-1901, 8 vols., Washington, 1901 (Senate Doc, 56 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 231); American State Papers, Foreign Relations, 6 vols., Washing- ton, 1832-59 (gives such correspondence as was submitted to Congress from 1789 to 1828; that between 1828 and 1860 is not collected [see Hart, Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 281-283]; since 1800 selected material has been published each year, although further papers are still presented to Congress on call from time to time); J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law as embodied . . . especially in Documents . . . of the United States, 8 vols., Washington, 1906 (House Doc, 56 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 551; an invaluable aid, discussing all points involving questions of law). 79 80 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY very little in its negotiations; but the failure to give the government full control of aliens within the limits of the states, coupled with the fact that foreign nations have held it to be responsible for them, has occasionally caused trouble. Within the government, the direction of foreign affairs was given to the President, but the appointment of "ambas- The executive sadors, other public ministers, and consuls" and Congress requires the confirmation of the Senate, and treaties must be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the same body. The relation of the House of Representatives to diplomacy has proved one of the most baflfling ambiguities of the constitution. A minister appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate is an official of the United States. He can, however, draw no salary unless one is pro- vided for by Congress as a whole. In the same way a treaty confirmed by the Senate is the law of the land and enforceable by the supreme court; but if it provides for the expenditure of money it cannot be executed unless the House consents. A treaty, moreover, often fixes rates to be paid on imported articles and on the vessels carrying them; but of no power are the representatives more jealous than that of regulating customs duties, a function clearly granted by the constitu- tion to Congress as a whole. Although these questions have never been authoritatively adjudicated upon, and perhaps never can be, it may be said that Congress as a body has directed the expansion of the diplomatic service, that the House, although it has sometimes delayed discharging finan- cial obligations laid upon the nation by treaties, has never failed to do so eventually, and that, on the other hand, it has never yielded its direction of commercial policy. When Washington took office in April, 1789, he found no organization by means of which he could execute his diplo- The determin- niatic powers. Congress, however, speedily ation of policy provided for a department of state, charged chiefly with that function, its secretary becoming in effect foreign minister. The natural selection for this office was OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 81 John Jay, but he preferred the position of chief justice, Washington therefore appointed Thomas Jefferson, who had served on the committee of correspondence of the Continental Congress and since 1784 had been minister to France. For- eign afiFairs were, however, of such critical moment through- out the Federalist period that all questions of policy were discussed by the whole cabinet, together with Jay and the vice- president John Adams. As a matter of fact, Jefferson's opin- ion was seldom followed; his influence was modifying rather than directing. The responsibility and the credit belong primarily to the presidents, Washington and, later, Adams.^ Although conditions of intercourse were better than dur- ing the Revolution, they were still poor, and a close-knit policy was impossible. It was very difficult, „ . moreover, to induce fit men to accept appoint- diplomatic ments in the regular diplomatic service. Sala- ries, while perhaps more adequate than they are to-day, were smaller than during the Revolution. The social allure which now renders so many patriots willing to spend abroad for their country was not strong enough to cross the Atlantic in the cheerless barks of that day. Old men feared the voy- age; young men like John Quincy Adams disliked to aban- don their professions for positions of "nominal respecta- bility and real insignificance." Consequently it was found impossible to keep first-class ministers except at London and Paris. Spain was ill-supplied, and the missions to Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Prussia were only occasionally filled. In this situation the government resorted to the expedient of sending special missions in important crises, and at such times it was well served. The consular service was still less satisfactory. The only positions that carried salaries were those to the Barbary states, which were semi-diplomatic in character. In all ^ On organization, see Schuyler, American Diplomacy, chs. i-iii; J. W. Foster, The Practice of Diplomacy, Boston, 1910; Gaillard Hunt, Depart- ment of State, New Haven, 1914. 82 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY other cases compensation came from fees alone. The result was that consuls usually had to be chosen from merchants The consular trading at the ports, who in many cases were service jjq|- Americans. The whole idea of using con- suls as a means of advancing national commercial interests was of later growth in the United States. At that time their services were purely those of trade regulation and registration. The strength of the new government was first apparent at home, and next appeared in the handling of those diplomatic Financial problems which were also in part domestic, strength -pj^^ financial resources developed by Hamil- ton's management at once settled the question of credit, and never since that time has the United States offered an excuse for foreign interference by failing to meet its financial obligations, or even by being in danger of such failure. The repudiation of portions of their debts by some of the in- dividual states, however, has at times caused trouble, though never danger. Wliile settling its finances, the new government took a first step toward developing the loyalty of the frontier by admitting Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee R,6pr6S6nt&- tin • tionofthe to statehood, the first two m 1791 and 1792 respectively, the last in 1796. Thus recog- nized, the new states were inclined to await somewhat more loyally, if not more patiently, the solution of their special problems. The Indian question was taken up vigorously, though not with entire success. Various laws were passed to diminish the friction between the savages and the pioneers and traders; and finally Washington, in his fifth annual message, recommended the establishment of govern- ment trading-houses among them "to conciliate their attach- ment." In 1796 this system was adopted, in the hope thereby to detach them from the Spaniards and English. Tackle wrote to Lord Bathurst, November 24, 1812: "Of all the OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 83 projects of Genl. Washington, after effecting the separation of those Colonies from the mother country; I apprehend this of the Trading houses, best calculated to undermine the influence of Great Britain, with the Indians." ^ While this general policy was being worked out, negotia- tions were carried on with the various tribes. McGillivray and other chiefs were brought to New York, feted, and bribed. In spite of obstacles which the Spaniards were sup- posed to, and probably did, interpose, a treaty was arranged with the Creeks in 1790; ^ and in the same year orders were given that the treaty of Hopewell, made in 1785 with the Cherokee, be observed by the white settlers. Peace was thus established in the southwest, although the situation was not conducive to slumber. In the northwest, negotiation proved futile, and Washing- ton advised that economy would "point to prompt and deci- sive effort rather than to defensive and linger- Iiicli&ii wflxs ing operations." The means at his disposal were, however, insufficient. In 1790 General Harmer was sent against the Indians and disastrously defeated, and the fol- lowing year a more formidable expedition under St. Clair, governor of Northwest Territory, went down in utter rout. General Wayne, whose nickname "Mad Anthony" is appro- priate only if it is considered as implying the presence of dash and not the absence of judgment, was then appointed to the command of the western department. It was the spring of 1794 before he moved against the Indians. In February they had been encouraged by an injudicious speech of Lord Dorchester, and they now took their stand near a newly-established British fort at the rapids of the Maumee, twenty miles within American territory. General Knox, secretary of war, wrote to Wayne: "If, therefore, in the 1 Wisconsin Hist. Soc., Collections, 1911, xx. 4-5; Washington, Works (ed. Ford), xi. 465. ^ John Marshall, Life of Washington (5 vols., Philadelphia, 1804-07), V. 274. 84 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY course of your operations against the Indian enemy, it should become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of the Miami, [sic] you are hereby authorized, in the name of the President of the United States, to do it." Wayne, however, succeeded in inflicting a decisive defeat upon the Indians in the battle of Fallen Timbers, without becoming oflBcially in- volved with the British, though he notified General Knox, "It is with infinite pleasure that I announce to you the bril- liant success of the Federal army under my command, in a general action with the combined force of the hostile Indians, and a considerable number of the volunteers and militia of Detroit." Peace with the Indians, however, did not come until the next year, 1795, after the Jay treaty had been framed and continued peace between Great Britain and America seemed assured. Defeated and deserted, the In- dians agreed to the treaty of Greenville, which granted the Americans a large portion of what is now Ohio and a part of Indiana. By 1795, therefore, the new government had ac- complished one of its tasks in restoring peace to the frontier and making itself respected by the Indians. It could not, however, put an end to the inevitable conflict between the onward-pushing forces of American civilization and the inhabitants of the forest, who continued to lean for support upon the less aggressive Spaniards and English. This peace constituted merely a truce, but a truce which allowed tens of thousands of American pioneers to establish themselves in the wilderness and to tip the balance substantially in favor of the United States before the hostile forces closed in final struggle.^ One problem did not wait upon another, and during these same years the questions of commerce were being discussed. With regard to the Barbary states the administration adopted the European practice of purchasing peace. Yet, even with ' H. A. Hinsdale, Old Northwest (New York. 1888), 184ff.; also unpub- lished theses by Shong and Groves in the library of the University of Wis- consin. OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 85 money and a willingness to use it, the difficulties remained serious. It was not till 1795 that a treaty was arranged with Algiers, to be followed in 1796 by a Mediterranean similar one with Tripoli, and finally, in 1799, *^^^® by one with Tunis. Then the coast seemed clear. In spite of these treaties and the expenditure of nearly two million dollars, however, there continued to be such constant trouble that the Federalist administration can hardly be said to have made the Mediterranean a safe route for American commerce.^ But far more important was the question of general com- mercial policy, the source which was expected not merely to provide the government with most of its reve- The merchant nue, but also to advance the interests of Amer- ™^"°® ican merchants and ship-owners. It was a question which lay with Congress rather than with the administration. The first point, after the imposition of a customs tariflF, was whether there should be discrimination in favor of American as opposed to foreign vessels, a policy that was opposed by the agricultural interests on the ground that it would inevi- tably mean higher freight rates. By the commercial interests it was of course strongly urged, and with them sided what we may call the nationalists. Jefferson, although from an agricultural state, argued: "In times of general peace, it multiplies competition for employment in transportation, and so keeps it at its proper level, and in times of war, that is to say, when those nations who may be our principal car- riers, shall be at war with each other, if we have not within ourselves the means of transportation, our products must be exported in belligerent vessels, at the increased expense of war freights and insurance, and the articles which will not bear it, must perish on our hands." It was finally voted that American vessels should pay six cents duty per ton on entering a port, and foreign vessels fifty cents. To encourage American ship-building, American-built, foreign-owned ves- * J. B. Moore, American Diplomacy (New York, etc., 1905), 63-7i2. 86 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY sels were to pay a middle rate, thirty cents. In addition, American vessels were to receive ten per cent rebate from the duties imposed on their cargoes. Keener discussion raged on a second point, — whether there should be discrimination between the vessels of various Discrimina- foreign countries according to their treatment ^°^ of our vessels. The strongest advocate of this policy was Jefferson, who in December, 1793, submitted to Congress a remarkably able report setting forth his views. "Our commerce," he declared, "is certainly of a character to entitle it to favor in most countries. The commodities we offer are either necessaries of life, or materials for manu- facture, or convenient subjects of revenue; and we take in exchange, either manufactures, when they have received the last finish of art and industry, or mere luxuries." He thought that by discrimination we could force the nations of the world, and Great Britain in particular, to throw open their ports on our own terms. ^ By the commercial classes this plan was opposed as imprac- ticable. They realized that trade is seldom much more profit- able to one nation than to another, that actually Retaliation i n p • i /~i the greater bulk oi our commerce was with (jrreat Britain, and that she might retaliate. Fisher Ames wrote, July 2, 1789: "But arc we Yankees invulnerable, if a war of regulations should be waged with Britain.? Are they not able to retaliate? Are they not rich enough to bear some loss and inconvenience? Would not their pride spurn at the idea of being forced into a treaty?"^ Jefferson's plan, there- fore, although supported warmly by Madison in the House of Representatives, was defeated, and he was forced to pigeon-hole it among those policies which were await- ing the day, which he believed certain to come, when the people would confide their welfare to his willing hands. 1 Amcr. State Papers, Foreign, i. 300-304. 2 Fisher .\iiics, IVorka (ed. Seth Ames, 2 vols., Boston, 1854), i. 57-60. OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 87 These measures for fostering the American merchant ma- rine actually worked, and, in combination with circumstance, worked marvellously. American ships rapidly Diplomatic secured not only our whole coasting trade ^*i^"^es but about eighty per cent of our foreign trade, and held it for many years. The commercial classes became enthusias- tic for a government that could do so much by its own regulations. In matters which required the mutual con- sent of other governments, however, success was not so immediate. Spain could not be persuaded to open the Mississippi, and Great Britain allowed the use of the St. Lawrence only by highly exceptionable special agree- ments with Vermont. The British West Indies remained closed. While these essential matters were still unsettled, we did force from Great Britain an important courtesy. That country had steadily refused to commission a First minister minister to the United States, her commercial ^'■°'° England interests being well attended to by a consul-general. Sir John Temple, and the active Phineas Bond, consul at Phila- delphia. With the return of Adams in 1788 we were equally unrepresented in England, nor could we, consistently with our self-respect, again appoint a minister until Great Britain was willing to reciprocate. To meet the situation, which was not only inconvenient but, considering all conditions, dangerous as well, Washington sent Gouverneur Morris unofficially to England. He succeeded in impressing the English ministry with the friendliness of the American administration, and the probability of hostile commercial legislation by Congress if England remained obdurate, with the result that in 1791 George Hammond was appointed minister just in time, as Lord Grenville was informed, to prevent the passage of an act discriminating against English commerce. The next year Thomas Pinckney was sent as American minister to Great Britain. Although neither Pinckney nor Hammond accomplished definite results, the 88 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY exchange of ministers somewhat enhanced the prestige of the United States.^ Wliile formulating these general policies, the government found itself confronted by an episode which for a moment pulled taut all the strings of American diplo- macy. The situation quickly relaxed, it is true, but in that moment were brought to view motives and forces which were to play a vital part in the history of the United States for many years to come. In the same month in which Washington was inaugurated, two Spanish war vessels, un- authorized by their government, seized some goods left by an English company which intended upon its own responsibility to form a permanent commercial settlement at Nootka Sound, on what is now called the island of Vancouver, at that time one of the most remote spots on the sea-washed earth. As fast as the wind could carry the ships of the day, the news was brought to the courts of England and Spain. ^ The affair was accidental, but it involved the fundamental interests and the long-established views of both countries. The verge of England could not let the seizure go unnoticed ^" without recognizing the Spanish claim to the unoccupied coast of North America, a claim resting entirely upon a questioned discovery. A virile growing power, she had for two hundred years denied such prescriptive rights. Spain, on the other hand, could not make amends without either giving up her claims to ownership or acknowledging the breakdown of her policy of commercial exclusion. Both nations prepared for war. Spain called on France, who, although the Revolution had begun, was still bound to her by the Family Alliance. Pitt made ready to regain the * E. D. Adams, The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 1787- 1798, Washington, 1904; Dropmorc Papers (British Hist. Mss. Commission, Report, 1894, xiv. pt. v.), ii. 228, 250, 263, 444. * W. R. Manning, The Nootka Sound Controversy, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1904, pp. 279-478; W. E. H. Lecky, England in the Eighteenth Cen- tury (8 vols., London, 1878-90), v. 206-209; H. H. Bancroft, Northwest Coast (2 vols., San Francisco, 1884), i. 180-225. OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 89 golden colonies of Spain won by his father but lost through the policy of George III. To Pitt's hand lay many strange instruments. Among them was William A. Bowles, a fantastic American loyalist, a portrait-painter, an actor, a soldier, who was pitt and the at this time adventuring for a fortune in trade ^"^^^^^ with the southwestern Indians. A rival of the Spanish- sympathizing McGillivray, he offered to organize among the Indians a force to capture the mines of Mexico. "I should inform your Lordship," he wrote to Lord Grenville, January 13, 1791, "that these Speculations would meet with other support than the force of the Creek and Cherokee Nation. There are now settled in the Cumberland Country [a] set of men, who are the Relicts of the American Army; These people are weary of their Situation. ... I have had a request from . . . [them] to lead them on an expedition to the Spanish settlements, that being the object of adventure now most thought of, in that part of the world. . . . These people are desirous on any terms, of coming to settle amongst us, as well for the objects of peace as those of War, For, at present, they are shut out from the sea. They feel no attachment to the Americans and would be glad to abandon everything for a situation near the Sea in our Country [the Indian lands]." ^ More formidable than Bowles was the mysterious Francisco de Miranda. A native of that hive of revolution, Caracas of Venezuela, he left a Spanish post in 1782 and ,.. . devoted his life to the cause of freeing Spanish America. Had he directed his efforts toward internal prepara- tion rather than to securing foreign assistance, he might perhaps have anticipated Bolivar as the successful leader of that movement; but, again, he might have been shot sooner than he was. From 1790 till 1810 he is always to be found hovering about the courts of whatever powers seemed most ^ F. J. Turner, "English Policy toward America in 1790-1791," Amer. Hist. Review, 1902, vii. 706-735. 90 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY likely to welcome a project against Spain, A man of ability and with an unusual capacity for winning confidence, he was successively in close contact with England, France, Eng- land again, and at times with Russia and the United States. His plan at this time was the formation of a great independent Spanish-American constitutional monarchy in commercial alliance with Great Britain.^ It is obvious that such proposals touched the United States very nearly, and would have much disturbed its ^ . ^ government had it known of them. Still more Spam, Eng- f land, and the nnportant, however, and more apparent was the prevalent feeling that, should a general war break out, the United States would necessarily become involved in it. Spain sought American favor by failing to seize two American ships that were at Nootka Sound. She also began to speak soft on the Mississippi question. Pitt, however, brought the subject up in more concrete form. Influenced by Miranda or by his own designs, he made ar- rangements for a descent upon New Spain. He had agents at Charleston and New York; he considered the advisability of sending troops from India against the west coast of Mexico; and particularly he thought it possible to use the troops at Detroit against New Orleans. As this project involved cross- ing American territory, he sent an agent to sound the Amer- ican government as to its attitude. This agent, Major Beck- with, met Hamilton in July, 1790, and requested permission thus to use American territory should it prove desirable. He spoke of the cause of the expected rupture, observing that "it was one in which all commercial nations must be sup- posed to favor the views of Great Britain, that it was there- fore presumed, should war take place, that the United States ' F. J. Turner, "English Policy toward America in 1790-1791," Amer. Hist. Review, 1902, vii. 706-735; also W. S. Robertson, Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1907, i. 189-539; Hubert Hall, "Pitt and General Miranda," Athenwum. April 19, 1902, pp. 498-499. OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 91 would find it to their interest to take part with Great Britain rather than with Spain." This was the first question of high diplomacy presented to the new government. Our two neighbors were apparently about to go to war. Should we side with Spain, united states or with Great Britain, or remain neutral.'* Policy What would be the obligations of neutrality? what its rights.'' On August 27 Washington asked his advisers for their opin- ions on the crisis. They discussed it broadly. Jefferson feared an English conquest of Florida and Louisiana. "Em- braced from the St. Croix to the St. Mary on Jefferson's the one side by their possessions," he wrote, ^^'^^^ " on the other by their fleet, we need not hesitate to say that they would soon find means to unite to them all the territory covered by the ramifications of the Mississippi." Under such circumstances he looked forward to "bloody and eternal war or indissoluble confederacy" with her. "In my opinion," he said, "we ought to make ourselves parties in the general war expected to take place, should this be the only means of preventing the calamity." He hoped that by way of compromise England might allow us Florida and New Orleans; and on the immediate question of permission to cross our territory he advised delay. ^ Hamilton inclined toward England. "It is not to be doubted," he wrote, September 15, 1790, "that the part which the courts of France and Spain took in Hamilton's our quarrel with Great Britain, is to be attrib- ^^^^^ uted, not to an attachment to our independence or liberty, but to a desire of diminishing the power of Great Britain by severing the British empire," a view in which Jay naturally agreed with him. Although Hamilton recognized the danger of permitting Great Britain to take Florida and Louisiana, he felt that our refusal to allow the expedition would not prevent it, but would involve us in the war on the ^ Thomas Jefferson, Writings (ed. P. L. Ford, 10 vols., New York, etc., 1892-99), V. 228, 238, August 28, 1790. 92 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY side of Spain, who was sure to lose. He too would delay, but would grant the permission if the issue were forced.^ John Adams alone struck the note of absolute neutrality which was to characterize American diplomacy. Already Adams and in 1782 he had written Livingston: "America neutrality ^iSis been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, that France and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce." He therefore advised refusal. Should the troops be sent with- out permission, we could remonstrate.^ Fortunately the real issue had already been decided by the defeat of Mirabeau in the debate of May 20-22 in the _ ^ National Assembly of France. Louis XVI and War averted . . his advisers had hoped by war to turn the rismg tide of revolution into patriotism. In that case the King needed to retain the right of making peace and war, and to this end Mirabeau exerted himself. When, however, the Assembly voted that it alone possessed the right, the chance that France might join Spain passed, and Spain was forced to seek terms of England.^ The treaty between them, signed October 28, 1790, was of importance to the United States both immediately and Nootka Sound subsequently. The third and sixth articles *'®**y allowed freedom of trade and settlement on the coasts of the Pacific, "in places not already occupied," north of "the parts occupied by Spain," that is, practically above San Francisco bay. Although this relaxation of ^ Alexander Hamilton, Works (ed. J. C. Hamilton, 7 vols., New York, 1850-51), iv. 48-69, September 15, 1790. 2 John Adams. Works, viii. 9, 497-500, August 29, 1790. 3 F. M. Fling, Mirabeau and the French Revolution, N. Y., 1908. Albert Sorel, L Europe cl la revolution Jrangaisc (8 vols., Paris, 1885-1904) ii. 61, 84-95. OLD PROBLEMS IN NEW HANDS 93 Spanish control applied specifically to England, the Ameri- cans profited by it. Already frequenting the coast for its furs and gingseng, they would in the long run at least have been annoyed by Spanish interference, had it not been for this treaty. As it was, in the next year Captain Gray sailed, the first white man, into the great river of the region and named it after his ship, the Columbia, thus establishing the first link in the chain of claims which was to bring Oregon to the United States. It is plain that, when the end of Washington's first term approached in 1793, the diplomatic situation did not warrant his withdrawal with the sense of leaving a task Uncompleted accomplished. Nearly everything was still *^^^^ unsettled, and he consented to serve again in hope of carrying the various problems to solution. Nevertheless, the govern- ment was feeling the good influence of improved stability, the administration had determined its policy on some im- portant questions, and on most others its individual mem- bers had begun to find themselves. CHAPTER IX THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY Thus prepared, the United States was in the spring of 1793 overtaken by a hurricane of diplomatic disturbance which _ . . was to blow with increasing violence for twenty- French two years. The revolution which began to take form in 1789 was, in the minds of its leaders, only accidentally French. Its ideals were equally applicable to all nations in which the people were oppressed by their rulers. This international character of its profes- sions, which it retained to the end, was at the beginning in some degree actually true. It was welcomed by liberals in all countries. It crossed the channel into England. As Wordsworth wrote, " Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive. But to be young was very heaven." When the Bastile fell Lafayette sent its keys to Washing- ton, a recognition of the indebtedness which the cause of revolution owed to America. French fashions for the first time invaded our country; and civic feasts, liberty caps, and the salutation of "citizen" and "citizeness" became common in our streets. As one wave of radicalism succeeded another in France, each raising the tide of revolution higher toward the final fury of the Terror, the enthusiasm of the more France and moderate cooled, died, and turned to opposi- "*■ tion. By 1793 England had become in effect a unit in resisting the spread of Revolution, and for the ma- jority of Englishmen Revolution had come to be embodied in France. The inoculation of humanity was not able to cope with the traditional antipathies of French and English. 94 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 95 France continued to fight for the ideal of "Liberty," but England had come to personify for her the forces of oppress sion. In February, 1793, she anticipated a declaration of war on the part of England by declaring war with that country herself. In America sentiment divided. Jefferson liked the French, as had Franklin. He had played a part in the beginning of their revolution and knew many of their American leaders. He had a French cook, and he intro- sympathies duced from France the revival of classic forms of architec- ture. Himself as peaceful as a Quaker, he was not troubled over a little blood-letting. He had said at the time of the Shays Rebellion that the tree of liberty must from time to time be watered by the blood of patriots and tyrants; " it is its natural manure." Serene in his belief in the ultimate triumph of right and reason, he looked without flinching upon the excesses of the Terror, and maintained his sympathy with the fundamental purpose of the movement. Hamil- ton, on the other hand, to whom civilization seemed based upon the slow and precarious triumph of informed intelli- gence over brutish ignorance, saw the whole structure totter- ing in France with the successes of the sans culottes, and imperilled in the world at large. Between the two was every shade of opinion, and in fact many were more radical than either. To the danger that would inevitably come to the United States of being drawn into the vortex of any war between France and Great Britain was added the peril of being divided within itself over the issue. It was probably fortunate that at this crisis both opinions were represented in the cabinet, and it was incalculably advantageous that the government was presided over by Washington's force, prestige, and balance.^ France, taking arms against the "impious hand of tyrants," — the governments of England, Prussia, Austria, Holland, 1 C. D. Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, Baltimore, 1897. 96 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY and Spain, — did not lose sight of America. Even in the kaleidoscopic whirl of Paris Americans were conspicuous. ^ . Thomas Paine sought to become the essayist French hopes f "^ of the United of the new revolution, as he had been of the American; John Paul Jones was ready to repeat his naval triumphs in its behalf; the poet, Joel Barlow, dab- bled now in land speculation, now in politics. Brissot de Warville, "who ruled the council," had in 1788 completed a voyage through America. When, therefore, the French republic was proclaimed, September 22, 1792, there was a reasonable hope on the part of its leaders that it would find sympathy and support from the sister republic across the ocean. The two countries were bound together by the inti- mate treaties of 1778 and 1788; the United States owed France money, the hastened payment of which would ease her finances; the American merchant marine could be use- ful to France in many ways and would find such occupation profitable. To announce the new republic, to realize these advantages, to replace the existing treaties by a still closer one, by "a true family compact" on a "liberal and fraternal basis," Edmund C. Genet, an enthusiastic patriot, only twenty-eight years of age and yet trained for many years in the foreign office under Vergennes, was sent as minister to the United States.^ But Genet was not to be a mere diplomatic representative, as that term is now understood. French ministers during the Revolution felt themselves commissioned, not from government to government, but from people to people. They embodied revolution; their functions were unlimited; and in this case Genet's instructions definitely launched him into colossal enterprises. All America was his province. Miranda was now high in the counsels of the French; Dumouriez wrote to Lebrun, November 30, 1792, of the "superb project of General Miranda" for revolu- 1 McMaster, History of the People of the United States (8 vols.. New York, 1883-1913), ii. 89-141. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 97 tionizing Spanish America. The foreign oflBce, however, was somewhat more conservative and more French: "To embrace all at once the immense country which stretches from New Mexico to Chili to make revolutions, is to be will- ing to lose realities, to occupy oneself with Chimeras. With- out doubt these immense possessions will not remain always under the yoke of Spain, but it does not depend upon us to-day to deliver them." Permanent national interests, however, survive all changes in the form of government. The recovery of Louisiana had been constantly in the mind of the French France and ever since its loss in 1763. No longer ago than l^*"siana 1787, indeed, a project for the accomplishment of this end had been presented to the French government. With the new vigor of the Revolution throbbing in her veins France was not likely to forget that she had once had a vast American empire, that tens of thousands of French were living in Louisiana, to say nothing of Canada. On the contrary, the old end was sought with new energy. The recovery of Louisiana was among the duties assigned to Genet. His means were to be found in the United States: first, money, which Hamilton was to give in repayment of the French loans; second, an army, which was to Genfit's in- consist of the American frontiersmen, spurred structions by promise of abundant loot and by that persistent motive, the navigation of the Mississippi. The foremost of the frontiersmen, George Rogers Clark, anticipated the desires of France by offering his services. His letter probably reached France before Genet sailed; at any rate, the latter counted upon him. Even to the French enthusiasts of 1792 it occurred that this plan of organizing within the United States, and by the resources of the United States, forces to attack Gen6t and the Spain, with whom the nation was at peace, ^'"*®^ states involved delicate questions. Nor were they unaware that a reaction had taken place in this country, for the foreign 98 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY oflBce took care to inform Genet, "The enjoyment of liberty has rendered them [the Americans] more calm, they no longer treat it as lovers but as husbands." He was to be cautious, therefore, in revealing his plans, and the more so in view of the possibilities of the future. Was Louisiana to become free, French, or part of the United States? France was concerned with the future, not of Louisiana alone, but of all the rest of the West as well. "Nature," France and Genet was instructed, "has traced the future the West revolutions of North America." It is divided into two parts by the Appalachian Mountains. "The East part is peopled, that of the West is almost not. The climates of the two countries offer as many differences as are found in the interests of the inhabitants. The one direct their speculations toward New Orleans, which will be their only outlet, the other toward the cities established on the borders of the Atlantic sea. . . . This liberty of navigation and the independence of Louisiana will draw into this country an immense population at the expense of the United States. By the progressive growth of this population the schism between the Atlantic states and those of the West will be inevitable. The Americans know it and do their best to delay the epoch." The question might, therefore, he was told, be safely left to time. Louisiana would need French aid, and the West would ultimately join her; but naturally such plans were not for the ears of the American cabinet. On April 8, 1793, Genet arrived at Charleston. Welcomed with oflBcial sympathy by Governor Moultrie and by popular Genet's ar- demonstration, he devoted himself, perhaps "^^ more openly than was intended, to the or- ganization of operations against the enemies of France. Against English commerce he issued a number of privateer- ing commissions (of which he was said to have brought three hundred) to American vessels manned by Americans; and in accordance with a decree of the National Convention, he authorized the French consuls in American ports to act THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 99 as courts of admiralty for the trial, condemnation, and sale of prizes. The business of these courts was not long in be- ginning, for unwarned British vessels promptly fell into the hands of the French-commissioned American privateers. Against Spain, he arranged an expedition of southeastern American frontiersmen to attack St. Augustine. To pro- mote the cause of Revolution, he also organized a Jacobin club. Leaving these affairs at Charleston in the hands of the consul, Mangourit, he then started north. In an atmos- phere warm with popular sympathy, to which he knew how to respond in a manner piquant and provocative, he rode to Philadelphia, which he reached May 16, prepared to repeat the part which Franklin had sustained in Paris. ^ On April 8, the day on which Genet made Charleston, the American cabinet, chilled by the news of the proscrip- tion of Lafayette and the beheading of Louis Cabinet dis- XVI, heard of the war between France and <="ssions England. They had five weeks for consultation before Genet would reach the capital. The questions which Wash- ington presented to the members included the following: Whether Genet should be received; whether the republican authorities should be recognized as the government of France; whether the treaties were still binding, and, if they were, whether the guarantee of the French West Indies was still obligatory; and exactly what the favors granted to the French consuls, war vessels, and privateers involved. The primary question, however, was whether a proclamation of neutrality should be issued, and, if so, what Jefferson ver- form should be given to it. The answers to ^"= Hamilton these questions brought out clearly the opposing views of Jefferson and Hamilton. Over the validity of the French treaties they were particularly at odds. Jay had already, ^ F. J. Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," Amer. Hist, Review, 1898, iii. 650-671; Correspondence of Clark and Genet, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1896, i. 930-1107; Mangourit Correspondence, ibid., 1897, pp. 569-679. 100 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY in 1788, maintained that the treaty of alHance terminated with the war, that is in 1783, and Hamilton had supported him. The latter now held that the treaty had been made with the government of Louis XVI, and could not be re- garded as binding with the new government of France. JefiFerson more correctly maintained that a treaty was the action of a nation, not of a government, and therefore sur- vived all changes of form. Madison expressed the same idea in the words, "A nation, by exercising the right of changing the organ of its will, can neither disengage itself from the obligations, nor forfeit the benefit of its treaties." A more promising lever, however, for releasing us from the uncom- fortable obligations resulting from the warmth of our rela- tions with France during our own Revolution lay in the disregard, by the new French government, of some of its corresponding obligations; but the facts were not yet suflS- ciently well ascertained to justify more than a protest. On neutrality all were agreed; nor did its preservation seem to them so difficult as it had at the time of the Nootka Sound affair, for they were as yet in ignorance of the territorial am- bitions of France.^ In this case it seemed to be a problem of the sea alone. The final decision lay with Washington, and his first step was to issue, on April 19, a proclamation of neutrality. In Proclamation deference to Jefferson's wish, however, the of neutrality word neutrality was omitted, as it was thought that some uncertainty in regard to our position might be of advantage. This document, announcing "a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent powers," and warning all citizens of the United States to avoid hostilities and not to trade with the powers at war in any of "those articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of na- tions," has assumed unique position in the development of American diplomacy. It really represented not merely an > Hamilton, Works (ed. H. C. Lodge, 9 vols.. New York, etc., 1885-86), iv. 20-135; Jefferson, Writings (ed. Ford), vi. £19-231. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 101 intention to keep out of the war then in progress, but also the national determination to resist the centripetal forces of European pohtics and to be left free to work out our na- tional development. As the first public announcement of this determination, it forms the basis of our most characteris- tic diplomatic policy.^ It was further resolved to receive Genet, a step which ultimately meant recognition of the French republic. This instance became a precedent, which the United Recognition of States has nearly always followed, for promptly ^^ republic recognizing accomplished changes of government in foreign countries. It is a policy equally consistent with our pro- fessed belief in the right of revolution and with the practical common sense which has usually been found in American diplomacy. The other questions at issue were left for future decision. That of the West India guarantee, which Hamil- ton claimed could not hold in case of an offensive war such as France was then waging against Great Britain even if the treaties were still in force, was soon happily settled by the decision of France not to insist upon it. The validity of the treaties, and their exact bearing upon the neutral rights and duties of the United States, remained topics of controversy until Napoleon cut the knot in 1801. Genet was probably more incensed than disappointed by the proclamation, and he was still further angered by his official greeting at Philadelphia, where he was Reception of received by Washington in a room decorated *^®°^t with medallions of Louis Capet and Marie Antoinette, and with a rather frigid bow in place of the fraternal embrace and kiss symbolic of the Revolution. Hamilton, moreover, courteously explained the impossibility of anticipating in any large way the payment of the French loans, and Genet was thus left without the financial resources upon which he had relied. Nevertheless, he proceeded with his plans. He ^ Washington, Writings (ed. Ford), xii. 281-282; Moore, American Diplo- macy, 33-62. 102 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY forwarded a commission of commander-in-chief to George Rogers Clark, and stirred the Kentucky settlements on the Ohio and those of Tennessee on the Cumberland with the preparation of flat boats and provisions. On June 19, he wrote to Lebrun that he was provisioning the West Indies, inciting the Canadians, arming Kentucky, and preparing an expedition by sea to assist in the attack on New Orleans. On July 5 Genet discreetly unfolded his Louisiana project to Jefferson. The latter, understanding that the rendezvous Jefferson and was to be outside of the United States and Genet ^j^^^ Louisiana was to be independent, ex- pressed indifference, but warned him that the halter would be the fate of the participants in such an expedition. Never- theless, he gave a letter to Michaux, who under the guise of an explorer was to act as French agent in the West, com- mending him to Governor Shelby of Kentucky. Meantime Genet was involved with Jefferson in constant discussion on questions of neutrality. The treaty with France declared that in time of war it should not be lawful for citizens of other countries " to fit their ships in the ports of either the one or the other of the afore- said parties." This certainly forbade the fitting out of British war vessels in American ports, but Genet claimed that by implication it allowed that privilege to the French. This Jefferson denied; indeed, to have held otherwise would have meant immediate war with England. Again, the seven- teenth article of the treaty of commerce provided that prizes should not "be arrested or seized when they come to or enter the ports of either party." Genet claimed that this conceded complete jurisdiction over prizes to the French consular courts, Jefferson, that the United States retained in full the rights necessary to enforce her own neutrality regulations in case of captures in violation thereof. Jefferson held that Americans enlisting in French privateers, were violating our declared neutrality and should be punished. On this charge Henfield and Singleterry, Americans enlisted on one of THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 103 Genet's Charleston privateers, were arrested. Genet pro- tested, "The crime laid to their charge, the crime which my pen almost refuses to state, is the serving of France, and the defending, with her children, the common and glorious cause of liberty." The inevitable crisis came in July, when V Ambuscade, the French frigate which had brought Genet, captured within the capes of the Delaware, and hence clearly The Little illegally because within American waters, the Democrat British vessel Little Sarah, and brought her to Philadelphia. The government ordered her surrender, but instead of complying. Genet renamed her the Little Democrat and fitted her out for a privateer. Brought to task for this by Jefferson, he promised that she should not sail until the matter was adjusted. Nevertheless, she secretly dropped down the river and put to sea, whereupon the government, in a letter of August 23, demanded of France the recall of Genet. Pending an answer. Genet remained in the country. A large portion of the press sympathized with France, and attacked the government for its lack of sym- Genet's appeal pathy. Particularly Freneau's National Gazette ^° ^^ p«°p^® lashed Washington with scorpions, until he doubted whether free government and free speech could coexist. Thus spurred. Genet resolved to turn from the government to the people, and straightway addressed the President in a letter of bom- bastic insult which found its way into the newspapers. When Congress came together in December the whole correspond- ence was submitted to it, and then Genet found that the Americans had indeed cooled to the passions of liberty. He received some applause but no effective support; even the Democratic societies formed upon the model of the Jacobin club were unwilling to push to extremes. In February his mission ended. His friends, the Girondists had fallen; and their successors the Jacobins, Danton and Robespierre, were anxious for his head and did not hesitate to recaU him. He failed to respond, however, remaining to 104 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY become a citizen of the United States; but he ceased to be minister and to figure in the national life. As a balm to the Recall of pride of the republic, France asked the cor- ^^^^^ responding recall of Gouverneur Morris, since 1792 our minister there. An aristocrat to the finger-tips, Morris had on the whole maintained a commendable im- partiality during those two dreadful years in Paris; but his Recall of sympathies with the king and the nobility Morris were well known, and he was not persona grata to the French government. The United States, therefore, properly acceded to the request and withdrew him. On December 31, 1793, Jefferson resigned from the cab- inet. The strain of acting as a spokesman of a policy which Retirement of camc steadily to be directed more and more Jefferson j^y Washington in accordance with Hamilton's advice was too great for him, and he was also torn within himself between his sympathy for France and his belief in neutrality. Genet complained, perhaps not unjustly, that he had an ofiicial and a confidential language which widely differed. His service in remaining throughout the Genet affair, however, cannot be overestimated. The majority still sympathized w^ith France, and the fact that the position of the government had been expounded by a known French sympathizer did much to maintain confidence at home and to present to foreign nations an appearance of national solidarity. Jefferson was succeeded by Edmund Randolph of Virginia, who as attorney-general had, on the whole, supported him, Randolph and although he was somcwhat aptly described by Monroe John Quincy Adams as "a body devoid of weight dragged along by the current of events." To succeed Morris, Washington appointed James Monroe, another friend of Jefferson and an avowed sympathizer with France. He had desired to send Jefferson's leading supporter, Madi- son, who declined; the pro-French senators had urged Aaron Burr; yet Monroe's appointment was regarded as conciliatory THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 105 both at home and abroad, and it was hoped that he would inaugurate an era of friendly understanding with France on the basis of absolute neutrality. Meantime the government was developing the details of its system. News of the still active western preparations reached it, and in March Washington issued a Enforcement supplementary proclamation dealing with this °* neutrality phase of the situation. Governor Shelby expressed his un- willingness to act under a proclamation against "men whom he considered as friends and brethren," in behalf of the king of Spain, whom he viewed as "an enemy and a tyrrant"; but General Wayne, by occupying a strategic position at the junction of the Cumberland and the Ohio, succeeded in separating Clark's Kentucky and Tennessee forces. Whether the government could have held its own had the issue been forced, is a question; but at least it showed vigor and purpose. In regard to the ocean still greater energy was exhibited. The only advantage allowed to the French over the English, as a result of the treaties, was that the former were allowed to sell prizes in American ports and the latter were not. Thus far the enforcement of neutrality had been wholly by executive discretion; but there was some criticism that this had been stretched too far, and the courts had in some instances refused to enforce executive orders. The government's position was therefore strengthened when, June 5, 1794, Congress passed our first neutrality act. This law made all persons entering the service of any foreign state, or enlisting others in such service, liable to a fine of $1,000 and three years' imprisonment; Neutrality law it likewise made punishable the fitting out, °^ ^^^* or increasing the armament, of any foreign ship or cruiser. The government's good faith was further indicated by the appropriation of eighty thousand dollars for the purposes of enforcement. This act, taken in connection with the president's proclamations and the rules adopted by the cab- 106 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY inet on August 3, 1793, "as to the equipment of vessels in the ports of the United States by belHgerent powers," was important not only in establishing the American policy, but also in developing the general principles of international law. The American position represented the most advanced views of the day in regard to the obligations of neutrals, and its practice far exceeded that of any other nation up to that time. Fortunately, the attitude of France was for the moment complaisant. Genet was succeeded by a commission of which Fauchet's J- A. J. Fauchet was chief with the title of mission minister, its instructions being dated No- vember 25, 1793, at the very abyss of French fortunes. Hostile armies, insurrections, and famine were pressing in upon the new republic. Genet's actions were disavowed, the western plans were given up, and American neutrality was recognized. France was, in short, coming to an appreciation of the fact that American neutrality was one of her strongest assets. The chief need was food, and the carrying of provi- sions in neutral American vessels was the chief concern of the commissioners. Desirable as such provisions were for the famine-stricken capital, they were a matter of absolute necessity for the West Indian colonies of France. Fauchet wrote, February 4, 1795: "You recall. Citizen, that when the legation was sent, the Republic was in danger. We saw in the United States a point useful for our provisioning which caused us not a little alarm, and other political interests were entirely subordinated to this powerful consideration." In the same letter he wrote: "'The force of things,' said Mr. Jefferson, 'delivers the French colonies to us; France enjoys the sovereignty, we the profit.' Mr. Jefferson thought justly," he went on. "Colonies which America can cast into famine in time of war . . . must form close bonds with a people which can from fortnight to fortnight satisfy their needs. . . . France has to fear for her colonies." To assist in this emergency Hamilton did advance some money not yet THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEUTRALITY 107 due. Monroe was welcomed in France with lively satisfac- tion, and for the moment cordiality reigned.^ The Genet episode, therefore, passed. It had threatened to drag the United States into the general war of Europe either directly through sympathetic attraction close of the for France, or indirectly by the use of her soil, ep»sode citizens, and waters for the military purposes of that country. It had threatened to divide the United States into two war- ring factions. Instead, it left her resolute in the possession of a well-developed policy, and still presenting a united front to a divided Europe. * F. J. Turner, Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1903, vol. ii. CHAPTER X THE JAY TREATY While relations with France were thus assuming a quiet tone, a new episode was taking shape. In 1793 it seemed that Changed con- we might be stampeded into war with England ditions \yy q^j, French sympathies; in 1794 it looked as if England might force us into war by her aggressions. In 1793 it was a question of our obligations as neutrals, in 1794 of our rights as neutrals. The trade between France and her West India colonies constituted perhaps two-thirds of her sea-borne commerce. The French It provided France with her breakfast, — coffee. West Indies sugar, and chocolate. In return, France sup- plied not only manufactured goods, but also, until the de- moralization of agriculture in 1793, grain. The French fishermen of Brittany, moreover, caught on the banks of Newfoundland the short cod and mackerel which fed the slaves of San Domingo, Guadaloupe, and Martinique, while the best were taken across the ocean to serve the lenten fare of the French at home. Should these branches of trade be cut off, it would cause financial loss and inconvenience in France, it would cause starvation in the colonies. In fact, the Revolution increased the needs of trade, since for a time France ceased to be able to feed herself and so became an importer of foodstuffs. The protection of this trade was the underlying function of the French navy. ^Vllile, however, the French fleet was strong and efficient, it was less powerful than that of England. Except in the war of the American Revolution, when it joined forces with Spain, it proved un- equal to the task, and direct trade in French vessels was 108 THE JAY TREATY 109 generally in time of war so insecure as to be impracticable. To meet this situation, it had been the custom of France in such emergencies to open the colonial trade to neutral nations, and the Dutch, protected by their English treaties, had en- joyed the lion's share. The natural convenience of the Ameri- can granaries, however, the hunger of San Domingo, and the seamanship and commercial spirit of the American colonists often overcame the obstacles of legality and enmity. During the Seven Years' war colonial vessels laden with grain often dropped down to the vicinity of the French islands, and, by collusion with the authorities, allowed themselves to be cap- tured, their cargoes being ostensibly seized but actually paid for.i For these precarious advantages the new war promised to substitute a legal and extensive trade. Almost simultane- ously with the declaration of hostilities France opened her colonial ports. The Dutch no states and the longer had their treaties with England; in fact, J^lf^^ ^^^* they may scarcely be said to have had a mer- chant marine. To the Americans, therefore, possessing as they did the world's most important neutral marine, was offered the opportunity not only of provisioning the islands, but of serving as intermediaries between the colonies and the mother country, in addition to supplying the latter with provisions. Our merchants were quick to take advantage of the situation. They carried our products to the islands, exchanged them for island products, and carried the latter to France, or brought them back to the United States and then took or sent them to France. In 1791 we exported 2,000,000 pounds of coffee and 1,200,000 pounds of sugar; in 1793, 34,000,000 pounds of coffee and 18,000,000 pounds of sugar. Merchants throve, ship-owners turned their capital with unprecedented rapidity, shipyards were pressed to complete ^ T. L. Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo (Boston, 1914); A. T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Poioer tipon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 (10th ed., 2 vols., Boston, 1898), vol. i. ch. iv., vol. ii. chs. vii.-viii. 110 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY new vessels, sailmakers and ropemakers were busy; farmers opened new fields to supply the demand for grain, salt pork, hemp, butter, and other staple articles; fishermen enlarged their ventures and their catches to supply what the Bretons could no longer furnish. In part, but not mainly, the sym- pathy for France was due to the general prosperity which resulted from the outbreak of hostilities. To England the situation was doubly distasteful, first because it was of advantage to France, and second because English atti- it served to build up the American merchant *"*^® marine, the only one, since the fall of the Dutch, which endangered the supremacy of her commercial fleet, upon which rested her naval power, her colonies, and her wealth. Her na\'y was of little use to her if American vessels, in an impenetrable armor of neutrality, could serve all the customarj'^ routes of French commerce. It was not thus that the first Pitt had made commerce flourish by means of war. England had never shown a disposition to stand passive before an international opinion, which had been formulated by Dutch publicists, was without the backing of effective force, and could hardly be dignified by the name of interna- tional law. She had rather, as a result of her experience, devised a variety of practices which furnished her navy with weapons as effective against neutrals as against enemies, and she was prepared to use them. The first of these was the principle that enemies' goods at sea might be seized and confiscated even when carried in " Free ships, neutral ships. There was a growing sentiment free goods" ' ^^at "free ships" should make "free goods." This had been one of the declarations of the Armed Neutral- ity, and was embodied in all the commercial treaties of the United States. England's practice, however, was the older, and she refused to recognize the new idea as having the force of law. Neutrals could escape the consequences of her rule by becoming the actual owners of the cargo, but to do so involved a large capital. Such a purchase, moreover, was THE JAY TREATY 111 looked upon as collusive; hence, being subject to examina- tion in the English admiralty courts, the practice involved no little risk. A second difference in England's policy had reference to contraband. It was universally admitted that for a neutral to carry war material to a belligerent was law- less, and justified the seizure of the material in question, the freight, and possibly the ship itself. There was, however, disagreement as to what constituted war material. The weaker maritime powers thought that the term should be narrowly interpreted; England, on the contrary, except when bound by treaty, as in the case of Russia, held for a broad interpretation. On June 8, 1793, she issued an order in council authorizing the seizure of "all ships laden with corn, flour, or meal." This measure she defended as being not only within her rights but in retaliation for a similar French decree of May. The French claimed that their decree had been of a special rather than a general character and had already been withdrawn when the British order had been issued. Failing to secure the withdrawal of the latter, the French in July renewed their decree, and provisions be- came seizable by both parties. In September, however, the British ordered that provisions so seized be paid for and the vessels released. The provision trade continued to grow, but its fortunes were checkered and its success a gamble. It should be observed that while Great Britain and France were ostensibly pursuing the same policy, it was, of course, the British navy which made the most seizures and won the most hatred. Another point upon which England maintained a position at variance with that of most nations was regarding blockade. All nations recognized that a vessel endeavor- -,, , , ° . . Blockade ing to enter a port publicly blockaded incurred the risk of capture and confiscation. The continental school of international law held that in such cases the blockade must be properly announced, and that it must be effectively main- 112 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY tained off the actual port. England upheld what her enemies derisively called the "Paper Blockade," to the effect that a considerable area of coast might be blockaded by a single fleet cruising along it, and that the rule might be enforced upon any vessel, anywhere, whose papers indicated that it was destined for one of the blockaded harbors. In accord- ance with this policy, England in 1793 blockaded numerous West Indian ports. In addition to these interpretations of general principles, England had another rule adapted to meet the special case " Rule of of the French West India islands. Announced 1756" ^y j^j^ order in council of 1756, it is known as the "Rule of 1756." Briefly, it meant that, when a nation closed its colonies to other nations in time of peace, it had no right to open them in time of war, and that, if it did, all such commerce was liable to seizure. English instructions of November 6, 1793, ordered naval officers to "stay and de- tain all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to France, or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony, and" to "bring the same, with their cargoes, to legal adjudication in our courts of ad- miralty." This instruction was modified January 8, 1794, in such a way as to leave open the trade between the United States and unblockaded ports in the West Indies, in articles not contraband and not of French ownership. The goods thus introduced into the United States might then be shipped to unblockaded ports in France. The West Indian trade was thus not destroyed, but it was hampered. Moreover, one hundred and fifty American vessels had been seized under the first instruction, and in the spring of 1794 were condemned by the admiralty courts of various British West India Islands. It is obvious that a British war vessel cruising in the open sea had many questions to ask of any merchantman it met. The display of a flag was not sufficient answer; in fact, the standard of morality concerning the use of national emblems THE JAY TREATY 113 at sea has never been high. In such cases international law permits the war vessel to "visit" the merchantman to ex- amine her papers. It was unquestionably true « visit " and that these papers often failed to tell the whole * search " story: the port of destination was frequently given falsely, and the captain often took on questionable cargo after the clearance papers had been made out. The British, therefore, claimed the right to "search" the cargo. This privilege the United States and most other powers strenuously denied. On this point America was perhaps in worse case than other countries, for their merchant vessels often sailed in fleets under convoy of a war vessel, which assumed responsibility, whereas we had no na\'y, and our commerce was too scat- tered to allow such concentration.^ Such searches, moreover, brought up another vexed point of dispute which was peculiarly our own, and which waxed con- stantly in importance until it overshadowed all T • 1 1 • • p 1 Impressments the rest. It is only by an appreciation oi the rock-bottomed belief of Englishmen that everything which they held sacred rested upon their fleet, that we can com- prehend the spectacle of a people, on the verge of the nine- teenth century, submitting to the "press." Every British- born subject was bound to serve the nation, if the fleet needed men. British war vessels, if short-handed, might stop any British vessel and take off such sailors as it needed, leaving only the absolute minimum number required for naviga- tion. In their searches of American vessels, British officers often saw British subjects aiding to build up a merchant marine which, if not indeed belligerent, was, they beheved, sapping the strength of Great Britain. In such cases they took them off. Misled by similarities of language and ap- pearance, they sometimes took native Americans. Such in- stances were more annoying than serious, for the Americans were returned when nationality was proved, — a matter, to ^ Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812 (2 vols., Boston, 1905), i. 42-99. 114 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY be sure, of delay and sometimes of diflSculty, owing to our lax methods of registration. More often they took British- born subjects who had been naturalized in the United States, In such instances the chasm of misunderstanding was un- bridgable. England claimed that a man British-born could never expatriate himself; whereas the United States held that all her citizens, native and naturalized, stood upon the same basis and were equally entitled to protection. When one remembers that the British naval oflficers were spurred in the performance of their duties by the distribu- tion among them of the major portion of the Prize money i f i • i i i i proceeds ot the prizes they captured, and that nearly every little British West India island had its own prize court, often incompetent and sometimes venal, at least to the extent of preferring a condemnation with fees to an acquittal without them, one sees that the opportunities for friction were countless. Added to all these considerations was a maladroit action of the British government, as a result of which the Portuguese fleet, which customarily guarded the straits of Gibraltar, was in the summer of 1793 with- drawn from that duty. Algerian corsairs now dashed out into the Atlantic, and by the end of the year ten American vessels had fallen into their hands. The final pitch of excite- ment was reached when, in March, 1794, came the reports of the speech of Lord Dorchester, the governor general of Canada and just back from London, to the Canadian Indians, predicting war with the United States and bidding them prepare. As news of one unfriendly act after another reached Amer- ica, excitement increased day by day. Congress was in ses- United States sion, and in the spring of 1794 came to be di- P°^'*^y vided between those who hoped for and those who dreaded a war with Great Britain. Fisher Ames, an ardent sympathizer with England, wrote, March 26: "The English are absolutely madmen. Order in this country is endangered by their hostility, no less than by the French THE JAY TREATY 115 friendship. They act, on almost every point, against their interests and their real wishes." The House voted to suspend commercial intercourse with Great Britain until restitution should be made, but by the assistance of the Senate, the administration was enabled to carry out its own less bellig- erent policy. A general embargo was passed, on the ground that the seas were unsafe for American shipping; the first steps were taken in the construction of a navy ; and, most im- portant of all, a final solemn embassy was sent to Great Britain to present the case of the United States and demand satisfaction.^ For this task the chief justice, John Jay, was chosen. It seems to have been felt that, since in Monroe a friendly minister had been sent to France, so an Eng- 1-1 1 • 1111 T^ 1 1 Jay's mission lish sympathizer should be sent to England. Hamilton was distrusted by the Republicans. Jay had more experience than any other American except Adams, who was disliked by many Federalists; but even Jay was attacked because of his Mississippi proposal of 1786. He was now instructed to adjust all the multifarious difficulties growing out of the treaty of 1783, particularly the continued occupation of the posts by the British. He was to arrange a treaty of commerce. He was to secure compensation for seizures of American vessels, and agreements concerning impressments, blockades, and other points of international law. On these latter points he was to accept no settlement except along the line of his instructions, which in each case laid down the American view of the matter. With this heavy burden, and weighted down with the sense of his re- sponsibility to prevent a war which he felt to be almost in- evitable. Jay set sail for England. The "madness" of England was twofold. In so far as it related to her principles of maritime conduct, it was basic, four-square with her conceptions of national safety. From 1 Trescot, W. H., The Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Wash- ington and Adams (Boston, 1857), chs. ii.-iv. 116 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY these she would not move while a war-ship was afloat, Her vexatious conduct in other matters, however, was very England's largely connected with her belief that war with " madness " ^.j^g United States was sure to come. Equally unable with France to understand the American desire for isolation, she felt that France would ultimately win our alliance. Her greatest anxiety was in regard to the West. The Northwestern Indians still called upon her for support against English appre- the Americans, and threatened to turn on hensions Qj.gj^|. Britain if aid was refused. The fur- traders were more distressed than before, because of the discovery that the source of the Mississippi probably lay south of the Lake of the Woods, a circumstance that rendered the British right to navigate that river worthless. To meet both difficulties, Hammond had in 1792 urged the formation of an Indian buffer state to stretch everywhere between the United States and Canada, or at least to include the country northwest of the Ohio. This means of settlement was then rejected by the Americans, even in spite of the sting of St. Clair's recent defeat; and now, in 1794, the situa- tion was in their favor. Wayne's army, which seemed to the Americans a valiant David going into the wilderness to meet the Goliath of Indians and British, was known by the latter to be larger than the combined British forces in all the posts, and seemed to loom menacingly over all British America. England's real efforts to bring about peace between the Indians and the Americans had caused both to be suspicious; and the mistake of a subordinate had furnished the United States with a new grievance by the establishment of the fort on the Maumee. Finally, Lord Dorchester's speech to the Canadian Indians, which had been made public, had roused the hope of the Indians on American soil, while hardening the American distrust into conviction. In the early summer of 1794, therefore, Pitt and his foreign minister. Lord Gren- ville, feared that there could be no escape from a clash on THE JAY TREATY 117 the frontier which would bring the United States into the war.^ Nor did England want war. From the abyss of No- vember, 1793, France was emerging triumphant; her armies and Revolution were everywhere advancing. The first coalition against her was falling to pieces. Jay, therefore, was warmly welcomed when he reached England. In estimating his chances of success, one feels that he was under some psychological dis- jay and Gren- advantage. His mere arrival reassured Lord "^^® Grenville, who was at once convinced that a treaty could be made, and who even anticipated that the United States, recoiling from France, might actually join England. Jay, on the other hand, was to the end fearful lest no treaty could be arranged and that war would result. Throughout the negotiations the fortunes of France rose higher, and in the midst of them came news of Wayne's victory over the In- dians. Of this international situation Jay, trembling for his treaty, seems to have taken no advantage. The treaty which was signed on November 19, 1794, was most comprehensive. It embodied for the first time two principles since then common in American „ ^, ^ , 1-1 9 rr«i <■ Settlement of diplomacy."' The settlement of many vexed the treaty of points it left to commissions authorized to determine results by judicial or semi-judicial process, and it provided for the mutual extradition of persons "charged with murder and forgery." The difficulties arising out of the treaty of 1783 were compromised, but to the advantage of the United States. Great Britain agreed to evacuate the posts on or before June 1, 1796. A commission provided to determine what river was intended to be described as the "St. Croix" on the northeast boundary ultimately accepted ^ Unpublished thesis on the Jay treaty, by Orpha Leavitt; also Dropmore Papers, ii. ^ For this and all subsequent instances of arbitration, to 1897, see J. B. Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations, 6 vols., Washington, 1898 (House Misc. Doc, 53 Cong. 2 sess.. No. 212). In every case this work gives an admirable sketch of the origin and settlement of the dispute. 118 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the river now known by that name, although an additional convention of 1798 was required to determine its source. A commission was to ascertain the source of the Mississippi, which, however, failed in its object. Another commission was to adjudicate on the question of the pre-revolutionary debts due to British merchants, of which the United States was to assume the obligation. Difficulties arising on this subject, a new convention became necessary in 1802, and ultimately we had to pay something over two million and a half dollars. The question of compensation by the United States to loyalists was dropped, and also that of indemnity by Great Britain for slaves carried away in 1783, a demand which we based on the general provision for the mutual restoration of property. It is probable that Jay might have obtained the latter point, had he forced the issue. ^ A commission was also charged with the settlement of claims by British merchants because of the failure of the g ^ . United States to perform properly her neutral violations of duties during 1793, and of those by American merchants because of "irregular or illegal cap- tures or condemnations" by the British in violation of our neutral rights. After many delays, this commission awarded American claimants nearly six million dollars and British claimants about one hundred and fifty thousand. A permanent commercial provision in the treaty allowed trade from Vermont to Montreal and Quebec, and freedom Commercial of trade with the Indian tribes across the clauses border, except in the Hudson Bay region, — reciprocal advantages. For a limited time the British East Indian trade was opened to Americans. That of the West Indies, so long and earnestly desired, was made free to Amer- ican vessels of seventy tons' burden, — that is, those that were too small to cross the ocean and so were confined to direct voyages. This provision, however, was bound up with a ^ F. A. Ogg, Jay's Treaty and the Slavery Interests of the United States, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1901, i. 273-298. THE JAY TREATY 119 promise on the part of the United States to refrain from "carrying any molasses, sugar, cofiFee, cocoa, or cotton in American vessels, either from His Majesty's islands or from the United States" to any country except the United States, a promise that was an utterly inexcusable error on the part of Jay, for in the case of cotton it forbade us to export our own products in our own vessels. The Senate cut this article from the treaty, and trade with the British West Indies re- mained subject to temporary regulations. Between England herself and the United States commerce and navigation were to be for twelve years on the basis of the most favored nation. Jay was soon and properly convinced that he could not obtain a recognition of the American position on any points of international law. In the event of such an international emergency he had been instructed to conclude P^'^ctices nothing on the subject. He felt, however, that minor modi- fications of the English position and definite understandings would be advantageous; and he had always been accustomed to break instructions. He therefore concluded articles, to last twelve years, admitting that provisions might in some cases be contraband although they should be paid for, and that enemies' goods on neutral vessels might be seized. Article xvii. provided that due notice of blockade should be given, but said nothing of "paper" blockades; article xxiv. forbade "foreign" privateers to sell prizes in the ports of either party ; article xxv. admitted British prizes to American harbors; but these articles were not to be construed in such a way as to violate any previous treaty, the fact being that they apparently clashed with our treaties with France. Once signed, the Jay treaty began a series of adventures that remind one of a Baron Munchausen tale. Not till June, 1795, did it reach America. The Senate, Acceptance by promptly called in special session, ratified it *® Senate June 24, with the exception of the West Indian article. For a time it was doubtful what the effect of such partial ratifica- tion would be; but in the end England accepted the change, 120 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY and a precedent was established which has many times been followed. Meanwhile the treaty itself had been kept secret, but a copy was presently furnished to the press by Senator Mason of Virginia. Instantly there followed an outburst of popular indignation which swept from one end of the coun- try to the other, and for a moment united all classes of the population. Jay, according to the cheerful custom of the day, was burned in eflSgy, and Hamilton, who attempted to defend him, was stoned. While the popular tumult was raging, Washington was at Mount Vernon, deferring his signature. He chafed at Randolph and Jay's disregard for his instructions, and was Fauchet disturbed over a new British order for the seizure of provisions, which, the United States claimed, was not warranted by circumstances. Randolph, the secretary of state, was urging that he withhold his signature altogether. At this juncture the sea once more gave up its prey, this time dispatches of Fauchet thrown overboard to avoid cap- ture by the British but secured by their sailors. One of these. No. 10, which Hammond handed to Hamilton, referred to the "precious confessions" of Randolph disclosed in a previous letter, No. 6, Despite the subsequent publication of the latter, with a letter of explanation by Fauchet and a Vindica- tion by Randolph, the exact nature of these precious confes- sions remains unproved. Randolph and Fauchet claimed that they had to do with internal affairs, the Whiskey Rebel- lion in particular. From the internal evidence, however, John Quincy Adams concluded, and not without some force, that they had reference to the enforcement of neutrality. At all events, that there was revealed an amazing condition of confidential intercourse between the secretary of state and a foreign minister, is undoubted. This circumstance, to be sure, appears less remarkable in view of later revela- tions of the astonishing intimacy of Hamilton, secretary of the treasury, and other Federalists, with the British minister; but there is this difiFerence, that Randolph en- THE JAY TREATY 121 deavored to obtain money from Fauchet, a fact which turns his indiscretion into moral obhquity.^ At any rate, Washington considered that the new situa- tion demanded immediate action, and decided to sign the treaty in spite of his dissatisfaction with it. w h' st With a grimness closely allied with humor, he signs the ordered Randolph to complete a protest to Great Britain at the seizure of provisions, and, when it was completed, showed him the dispatch. Randolph at once re- signed, and, after a succession of attempts to bring in some notable personage, was replaced by Timothy Pickering, a de- cided partisan of England, a man able and honest, but with- out poise. Not even yet was the treaty safe. It called for the appoint- ment of commissioners and the appropriation of money, and the latter must come by vote of the House of ^, „ •^ _ _ The House ac- Representatives. Should the appropriation cepts the fail, the treaty could not be executed. All the forces hostile to England, favorable to France, and opposed to the administration and the treaty, rallied for a final strug- gle. The year before Fisher Ames had said of certain resolu- tions that they had French stamped on their face, and Parker of Virginia had replied that he wished everybody had a stamp on his forehead to show whether he was for France or Great Britain. Now the feeling was even more intense. The House, led by Edward Livingston, demanded that it be furnished with copies of the papers in the case. This request Washing- ton refused. It could not force him, nor could he force it. He could refuse the papers, but it was more important that the House could refuse the money. The debate became the leading question of the session. On the whole the treaty gained support as the commercial classes came to accept Washington's view, that, although the treaty was not a * Edmund Randolph, Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation, Phila- delphia, 1795; M. D. Conway, Omitted Chapters of History, disclosed in the Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph, New York, etc., 1888. hZ^2 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY good one, the existing choice lay not between it and a better one, but between it and war. This view was most forcibly ex- pressed by Fisher Ames in the greatest speech till then made in Congress; and at length, on April 30, 1796, the appropria- tion was passed and the treaty became an established fact.^ The Jay treaty worked more satisfactorily than was ex- pected. Grenville had promised Jay some concessions not Working of formally mentioned, and these were fulfilled, the treaty 'pj^g admiralty courts in the West Indies were reorganized and made respectable. Hammond was replaced by Liston, who proved to be somewhat more pleasing personally. From 1796, moreover, in spite of the excision of the West Indian article from the treaty, that trade was thrown open to American vessels under certain lim- itations. Best of all was the quieting effect on the north- ern frontier. Vermont was relieved by the opening of trade to Montreal, the national power was vindicated by the oc- cupation of the whole national territory, and with the Jay treaty added to Wayne's treaty of 1795 came sixteen years of comparative peace with the Indians. On September 8, 1796, the British consul, Bond, wrote to Lord Grenville that the treaty had a "tendency to retain this infant country in a state of peace with the most powerful empire in the universe." The effect of the Jay treaty was not confined to the rela- tions between the United States and Great Britain. The European document was observed by all the cabinets of opinion Europe with varying emotions, but everywhere from the point of view of the obsession that the United States must be upon one side or the other. If she had rejected the overtures of France and made a treaty with England, it must mean that she was to be counted on the side of England. Nowhere, was the effect so immediate and pronounced as in Spain. ^ ' S. B. Crandall, Treaties, their Making and Enforcement, New York, 1904. * C. C. Pinckney, Thomas Pinckney, Boston, etc., 1895; Schuyler, American Diplomacy. 271-281. THE JAY TREATY 123 Important as were the questions at issue with that coun- try, no progress had been made in solving them. In part this was due to the inadequacy, nearly always Relations with characteristic, of our representation at that ^P^° court. Carmichael exhibited a nonchalance that excites suspicions as to his good intent. His industrious successor. Short, was persona non grata. At length, in August, 1794, Spain distinctly declared that "at least His Majesty ex- pected that the ministers appointed by the United States should be persons of such character, distinction, and temper as would become a residence near his royal person." Meantime Spain had continued her various policies, keep- ing on good terms with the Indians and bribing Wilkinson. In 1794 Gayoso had hopes of Kentucky, but Spanish poll- feared that, if the settlers there knew of the "®^ Spanish relations with the Indians, they would, instead of continuing their negotiations, "become our most cruel ene- mies." Washington wrote in September, 1794: "Spain by a similar conduct to that of Great Britain has imposed the necessity of sending an envoy extraordinary to her. They cooperate; cordial in their hatred, they have agreed to em- ploy the Indians against us." The envoy selected was Thomas Pinckney, the resident minister at London, whose position was perhaps rendered slightly invidious in consequence of Jay's mis- Pinckney's sion. The attitude of Spain always varied °"ssion with the changes in European conditions. By her defeats of 1794 she had been forced to turn from England to France; the treaty of Basle, July 22, 1795, revived the old "family " alliance, although the dynastic situation had so tragically changed. It was in this new condition that news of the Jay treaty found Spain. Her court, believing that it meant the alliance of the United States and Great Britain, saw in imagination irresistible forces descending upon her frail de- fences in Louisiana and attacking the mines of Mexico. Although convinced of the necessity of coming to terms, her 124 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ministers could not shake off their constitutional habits of delay, until on October 24, 1795, Pinckney announced his immediate departure for London. His bluff was successful, and on October 27 the treaty of San Lorenzo was signed. As the first treaty between United States and Spain, it laid down the general rules of intercourse upon liberal terms. Treaty of San In regard to neutral rights it provided that Lorenzo provisions should not be contraband of war, and that free ships make free goods. Until 1794 the Spanish fleet had cooperated with that of Great Britain, and had acted upon somewhat the same principles. To settle ques- tions arising from this conduct, a commission was arranged for, which came to an end in 1800 after having awarded over three hundred thousand dollars to American claimants. But these questions were of less interest than those relating to boundaries and the use of the Mississippi. As to the former, Spain accepted the American contention, the thirty- first parallel, and agreed to evacuate her posts in the disputed region. She opened the navigation of the Mississippi to the Americans, and engaged that for three years New Orleans was to serve them as a "place of deposit" with the right to export their goods therefrom free of duty. "And His Maj- esty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them on another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establishment." With the prompt ratification of this favorable treaty, Washington could indeed feel that the new government had justified itself to the people as their representa- Success of the . , „ ,, Vr,, i- i • national gov- tive before the world. The diplomatic prob- lems that had helped cause the fall of the Confederation had all been solved. Commercial treaties had been made with Spain and Great Britain. If the latter had not permanently opened her West India islands, at any rate they were open now. The Indians north and south had THE JAY TREATY 125 been quieted. Outlets had been obtained down the St. Lawrence to Montreal and Quebec, and down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico. The occupation of the entire national territory had been provided for. In addition, the policy of national independence from European disputes had been effectively laid down, the worst irregularities of belligerent interference with our commerce had been done away with, and compensation for our losses provided for. If these settle- ments were not all to prove permanent, at least they estab- lished precedents which we were steadily gaining added strength to enforce. For many of these sue- Washington's cesses Washington could take personal credit, in^^ence over and above that of choosing the men who accomplished them. The Indian policy was peculiarly his own. His selec- tion from the various alternatives proposed by Hamilton and Jefferson for handling the Genet affair made the policy adopted essentially his. In view of the conflicting forces within him and without, his decision to sign the Jay treaty was a great act which proved to be a wise one. Finally in his farewell address he gave the policy of neutrality a con- secration in the minds of the people which still persists. The points on which he might have done better were compara- tively minor. He was able to retire in March, 1797, not, to be sure, leaving all problems solved, but having settled all those, except the opening of the Mediterranean, that he was chosen to deal with, and more. CHAPTER XI WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE The Jay treaty, which settled so many of our difficulties, served to intensify those with France. That country, in Permanent addition to a continued insistence on the execu- FrenchpoUcies ^^^^ ^f ^j^g treaties of 1778 and 1788, was press- ing two lines of policy which animated her diplomacy through- out the period of her final struggle with England. One was the claim, which gradually took clearer and clearer form, that the rights of the neutral were the possession of the bel- ligerent. She held that it was the duty of the United States to maintain in full her neutral rights against England, that the failure to do so constituted practical alliance with Eng- land and justified retaliatory disregard of neutral rights by France. Her second policy was the attempt to destroy Eng- lish trade by attacking her commerce, "to force the English to a shameful bankruptcy." John Quincy Adams wrote, August 21, 1796: "But the French Government are evi- dently making their preparations to put in execution their singular plan of war against Britain, the season ensuing. That they will succeed in cutting off the communication between that island and all the' rest of Europe, is not at all impossible." ^ The mission of Monroe had been accepted as an indica- tion of regard for France. He had been publicly and en- Monroe in thusiastically received by the convention in France August, 1794, and had pleased it by his re- sponse. "America and France," he said in effect, "have the same interests and principles, the recollection of common ^ Volume ii. of his Writings (ed. W. C. Ford, New York, 1913, etc.) throws much light on this period. 126 WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 127 dangers and difficulties will cement the union. The United States is sincerely attached to the liberty, prosperity, and happiness of the French Republic. I know that in perpetuat- ing the harmony between the two republics, I shall promote the interests of both." Nor had the mission of Jay as ex- plained by Monroe caused any alarm, for he was sent to assert American neutral rights.^ The French believed that he would be unsuccessful and that his mission would result in war with England. Under these circumstances Monroe had been successful in obtaining some useful concessions. In July, 1795, the retaliatory decree of France making English French friend- goods in American vessels seizable was re- ^^^^^s pealed. "It is amidst her triumphs that the Republic loves to give this striking mark of its fidelity. Victorious France knows no other concern than that of justice; no other diplo- matic language than that of truth." P. A. Adet, who arrived in America in June, 1795, to replace Fauchet, had received most amicable instructions. Monroe had even encouraged France to hope for a loan from the United States, and had urged it on our government alleging that France was fighting our battles. The news of the signature of the Jay treaty alarmed France, and the Committee of Public Safety turned to Monroe for information as to its details; but The Jay treaty since, as the result of a policy rather difficult ^° France to account for, he had been left uninformed by Jay and by the United States government, he could give only vague as- surances that the compact was not inconsistent with our obligations to France. Confident rumor, however, speedily detailed its terms, and a copy of the treaty itself, sent by Adet, reached France in the summer of 1795. Monroe and the French leaders equally were stunned. Instead of vindi- cating the status of neutrality laid down in our treaties with ' James Monroe, A View of the Conduct of the Executive in the Foreign Af' fairs of the United States, Philadelphia, 1797. 128 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY France, it accepted a totally different status, permitting to England practices against which we had protested in the case of France. The English had just touched France to the quick by their second order for the seizure of provisions as contraband, and it was seen that they were justified by the new treaty. Monroe was unable to meet the situation. In February, 1796, France declared her alliance with the United States at an end. On July 2, 1796, a decree of the French executive Directory announced that France would treat neutrals as England did, and actually went further by de- claring all goods destined for England contraband. In No- vember, Adet announced to the American government that he had been ordered to terminate his mission. On August 22, 1796, the American government had re- called Monroe and appointed in his place Charles Cotes- Recall of worth Pinckney. Monroe's recall was due Monroe partly to his failure to press American claims in all cases to the satisfaction of the government; particularly the claim for compensation for captures under the decrees ordering the seizure of English goods in American vessels and making provisions contraband, both of them in violation of the treaty of 1778, but defended by France on the basis of retaliation. Still more was his recall due to the general tone of his correspondence, which constituted a protest against the policy of his own country and a defence of France. It may be said, however, that he did secure more concessions from France than Jay could obtain from England, and that he had been instructed to cultivate French friendship. He was undoubtedly indiscreet, but part of the blame must be laid to the policy of sending in such a delicate crisis a minister known to be out of touch with his superiors. The most serious fault of Monroe was his conduct after he became ac- quainted with the details of Jay's treaty, and still more after his own recall. In close touch with the French leaders, he impressed upon them the difference, which they were only too prone to believe, between the government of the WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 129 United States and the people. He acknowledged that the government was hostile to France, but he urged them to wait for justice until after the next presidential election, which he was sure would bring Jefferson into the presidency. He assisted in destroying that impression of national solidarity for which Washington had labored so hard, and which Jeffer- son himself had confirmed by his correspondence with Genet. France and Mom-oe were not without some justification for believing that the existing American government was not only anti-French but to some degree pro- p^ .£ v u English. Washington, indeed, remained im- policy in the partially American, but he had been forced to give up his vision of an administration comprehending all parties. His assistants were Federalists, and they sympa- thized with England. In 1796 Thomas Pinckney was re- placed at London by an ardent English partisan, Rufus King. In 1797 John Quincy Adams was commissioned to reframe our treaties with Prussia and Sweden, of which the first had expired and the other was about to expire. He was instructed by Pickering to leave out the former provisions regarding free ships, free goods. "It is a principle," wrote Pickering, "that the United States have adopted in all their treaties (except that with Great Britain), and which they sincerely desire might become universal: but treaties formed for this object they find to be of little or no avail, because the prin- ciple is not universally admitted among the maritime na- tions." He was also to enlarge the definition of contraband. Against these changes in the American policy, showing so marked a leaning to the English practice, Adams vigorously protested, but his instructions remained unchanged. Al- though such details were not generally known, the atmos- phere of the administration became increasingly hostile to France. Under these circumstances the French government took occasion to show its friendliness for Monroe upon his with- drawal as minister. It refused to receive his successor. 130 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Pinckney, and on February 3, 1797, ordered him to leave the country. Although it withdrew Adet from his mission, it al- , lowed him to remain in the United States in the France and , , , , the •lection of hope that he might influence the presidential election of 1796. Adet announced his with- drawal in a letter which he published in the press, explaining it not as "a rupture between France and the United States, but as a mark of just discontent, which was to last until the government of the United States returned to sentiments and to measures more conformable to the interests of the alliance; and to the sworn friendship between the two nations." His interference was perhaps not without some weight, but it did not secure the election of Jefferson. John Adams was chosen to the presidency, and the officials as well as the policy of the old administration bade fair to be continued for at least four years more.^ Hopeless of American friendship, France turned with more energy toward other plans. In February, 1795, Fauchet France and bad in a long letter advised that the only way Louisiana ^^ offsetting the effects of the Jay treaty, of which he did not then know the details, was by the acquisi- tion of Louisiana. That colony could feed the islands and so wrench them free from their dependence on the United States. This familiar policy France determined to pursue. With Spain as an ally, cession and not capture must be the method. Accordingly, the French commissioners for the treaty of Basle were instructed, "The restitution of Louisiana is of all the conditions we have proposed the one to which we attach the greatest importance." Failing at that time, France instructed General Pcrignon, her ambassador at Madrid, March 16, 1796, to urge the point: "Our possession of Louisiana would give us the means to offset the marked predilection of the Federal government for our enemy and keep it within the line of duty by the fear of a dismember- ment, we might cause." » McMaster, People of the United States, ii. 209-416, 429-476. WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 131 This dismemberment of the United States, so clearly fore- shadowed in the instructions to Genet, continued to haunt the minds of the French ministers. Adet, New French while striving to excite the French Canadians i°t"gues against England,^ sent his ablest agent, General Collot, into the American West. He was to nourish sentiments of dissen- sion among the leaders "by observing that the interests of the eastern and western parts of the United States were in collision, that the period was not distant when a separation must take place, and the range of mountains on this side of the Ohio was the natural boundary of the new government, and that in the event of separation the western people ought to look to France as their natural ally and protector." On July 15, 1797, Talleyrand became French minister of foreign affairs. Just returned from banishment in the United States, he had recently read before the Institute papers on "The Commercial Relations of the United States" and "The Colonial Interests of France." Although primarily con- cerned at the moment with Bonaparte's plan to divert at- tention to Africa, he maintained that the eastern part of the United States was irrevocably bound to England by lan- guage, habits, and trade, but that the country beyond the mountains would in time separate and need France.^ The American government only suspected these western designs; but the official insult involved in the treatment of Pinckney was patent, and the constant seiz- Adams's com- ure and condemnation of American vessels un- mission to der successive decrees, unjustifiable and often contradictory, demanded attention. As experiments with Monroe, a Republican, and Pinckney, a Federalist, had proved unsatisfactory, Adams, with general approval, de- cided to send a joint commission of three, — to Pinckney, 1 Canadian Archives, 1891, pp. 63-79; 1894. p. 527. * A. Cans, "Les idees de Talleyrand sur la politique coloniale de la France au lendemain de la Revolution," Revue d'Histoire Moderne, 1900, ii. 58-63; F. J. Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley," Amer. Hist. Review, 1905, x. 249-279. 132 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY were added John Marshall, a Federalist, and Elbridge Gerry, a Republican. On the day on which Talleyrand took oflSce they received their instructions. Arriving in Paris at the very crest of the Revolution, they found themselves confronting a situation unparalleled since the last century of the Roman republic. French revolu- ^ . , ,-, 111 tionary diplo- Tnumphant France was surrounded by na- ^^^^ tions buying peace; the dazzling private ex- penditure which betokened the coming empire tempted pub- lic oflBcials to demand private douceurs for the favor of their nod. The world seemed melting into new shapes at the whim of those who from moment to moment dominated Paris. America was a minor consideration; she was treated as were other powers. Even the astute Talleyrand, master of finesse, could see the need of no more subtile weapon than the threat, to be parried by the bribe. He refused to receive the commissioners until redress of grievances was made and the President's message of May 16, Secret negotia- 1797, dealing with the French situation, atoned *^°°^ for. Privately, however, he met them, and introduced them to certain individuals as possessing his con- fidence. These persons explained that as a preliminary to negotiation France expected the United States to buy from her, at par, certain Dutch bonds worth about fifty cents on tlie dollar, — two satellite republics were to combine to feed the great one. To set the whole in motion, a million francs, it was hinted, would be expected by the proper of- ficials. This proposal was not so likely to surprise a trained diplomat at that time as now, if indeed anything in the Paris of 1798 could have surprised a trained diplomat. It was in effect a renewal in a different form of the loan prop- osition of 1794 so warmly endorsed by Monroe. We had not hesitated to buy peace from the Barbary pirates, and there was really no need of being more scrupulous about corrupting Talleyrand's morals than theirs. Pitt himself was at this very time seriously considering the purchase of WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 133 peace on similar, but dearer, terms. ^ I believe, however, that Americans remain glad that their commissioners were shocked, and that Pinckney replied, "No! no! no! not a sixpence!" Pinckney and Marshall at once broke off nego- tiations. Gerry lingered for three months more, but with- out being trapped into any concessions by Talleyrand; then he too left France, in August, 1798. Meanwhile the commissioners' dispatches had been re- ceived in America. On March 19 Adams announced that they rendered peace no longer possible. In _ v y z April they were published, the letters X, Y and con-espond- Z being used to designate the intermediaries; and their contents convinced a large majority of Americans that Adams was right. Congress authorized an increase in army and navy, and on June 21 Adams was widely applauded for his announcement that he would "never send another minister to France without assurances that he will [would] be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and independent nation." Although peace was at an end, war was not begun. It was hoped that we might hang between the two. On July 7 Adams declared our treaties with France sus- American re- pended. An act of June 12 had already sus- p"^^^ pended all commercial intercourse with her, and on June 15 merchant vessels were authorized to arm and to defend themselves against search, seizure, or interference by French vessels. On July 8 authority was given to naval vessels to capture any armed French vessels, and the president was empowered to commission privateers to do the same. As practically all French merchantmen sailed armed, this licence offered a wide field. Three hundred and sixty -five privateers were commissioned, France lost ninety ships, and several naval duels were fought.- ^ Adams, Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 67. 2 G. W. Allen, Our Naval War vnth France, Boston, etc., 1909; G. N. Tricoche, "Une page peu connue de Fhistoire de France, la guerre franco- americaine (1798-1801)," Revue Historique, 1904, Ixxxv. 288-Sd99. 13i AMERICAN DIPLOMACY In order to avoid the losses to American merchants which would come from a closing of the trade with the West Indies, West Indian Adams, June 26, 1799, declared suspended the *^*^® suspension of French commerce in the case of certain ports of San Domingo. That colony was then under the control of Toussaint L'Ouverture, and its political con- nection with France was but slight. It is probable, also, that American merchants even continued to supply the more loyal islands of Guadaloupe and Martinique by means of collusive captures. Hostilities therefore brought little inconvenience to the United States, and, as for danger, Adams said that he no more expected to see a French army in America, than in heaven.^ Although we did not consider ourselves at war with France, we were fighting her. The policy of isolation had been in The Blount part deviated from. Were we going to give it conspiracy ^p ^yholly by becoming the ally of England, and so be enmeshed in the general European conflict.' There were many circumstances that rendered such an event prob- able and many men who desired it. The new British minis- ter, Liston, proved pleasing. He won confidence at once, in 1797, by helping to disclose a project of William Blount, senator from Tennessee, for a joint expedition of frontiers- men and the British fleet to seize Louisiana and put it under the control of Great Britain. Impeached by the House of Representatives, Blount resigned to escape conviction, and was promptly elected governor of his state; his plan serves to show how minds in the West were turning. Since Spain was loath to live up to the treaty of 1795, it was becoming doubtful whether that settlement would prove permanent; Great Britain, therefore, in becoming the enemy of Spain, became the natural friend of the frontiersman. For similar reasons Miranda left France, now the ally of Spain, and sought England, where in 1797 he was once more deep in the confidence of Pitt. His plans resembled those » Hildreth, United States, v. 267-270. WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 135 of 1790, except that the United States had swum into his ken. He would now give the Floridas and New Orleans to that country, "the Mississippi being in every re- Miranda's spect the best and most solid barrier that one ^^^ can establish between the two great nations which occupy the American continent." England was to have Porto Rico and other islands. To all these nations — England, the United States, and Spanish America — the use of the isthmuses of Panama and Nicaragua was to be guaranteed. The instru- ments to secure all this were to be the United States army, the English navy, and Spanish- American discontent.^ These plans were accepted with enthusiasm by Rufus King, who communicated them to Pickering, our secretary of state, and to Hamilton, who under Washing- Federalists' ton commanded the new army. The plan ^'^^ ^°^ ^" pleased Hamilton. He wrote to Senator Gunn of Georgia, December 22, 1798: "This, you perceive, looks to offensive operations. If we are to engage in war, our game will be to attack where we can. France is not to be considered as separated from her ally. Tempting objects will be within our grasp." King wrote, October 20, 1798, "Things are here, as we could desire: there will be precisely such a co- operation as we wish the moment we are ready;" and again, on January 21, 1799: "For God's sake, attend to the very interesting subject treated of in my ciphered dispatches to the Secretary of State of the 10th, 18th, & 19th instant. Connect it, as it should be, with the main object, the time to accomplish which has arrived. Without superstition. Providence seems to have prepared the way, and to have pointed out the instruments of its will. Our children will reproach us if we neglect our duty, and humanity will escape many scourges if we act with wisdom and decision." On March 22 he wrote less hopefully to the secretary of state, " one is tired with beholding, and with endeavoring in vain to account for the blindness that even yet prevents an honest ^ Robertson, Miranda, Amer. Hist. Assoc., Report, 1907, i. 189-539. 136 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY and general confederacy against the overbearing Power of France." On March 12, 1799, Dr. Edward Stevens was ap- pointed consul-general to San Domingo, to enter into rela- tions with Toussaint L'Ouverture, and to cooperate with the English consul in encouraging the independence of the island. It is significant that Hamilton was at this time in touch with Wilkinson.^ Whatever advantages this plan might have secured to the United States, it certainly involved the abandon- , ment of the policy of neutrality. It involved mission for also the risk of internal disunion. How widely ^^^"^^ apart the opposing factions in the nation were already leaning is indicated by the mission of Dr. Logan, a Philadelphia Quaker, who went to France in 1798 to treat for peace upon his own account. Instead of passports he carried letters from Jefferson and from Thomas McKean, chief justice of Pennsylvania. In 1799 such private missions were prohibited by law, but his action is symptomatic of the way in which a war with France would have divided the nation. Talleyrand had intended by his bullying to produce, not war, but money. American hostility was inconvenient to „ „ J , France; actual war and alliance with England Talleyrand of- . . fers to nego- on the part of the United States might be dan- gerous to her. Moreover, the French expedition to Egypt had proved disappointing, and in his brain were re- volving American projects which required, for the time, peace with the United States. On September 28, 1798, therefore, he informed William Vans Murray, our minister at The Hague, that any minister whom the United States might send would * George Gibbs, Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams, 2 vols.. New York, 1846; J. Q. and C. F. Adams, John Adams, i. 516 ff.; John Adams, Works, vols, iii., viii., app.; C. R. King, Life and Corre- spondence of Riifus King (6 vols., New York, 1894-1900), vol. ii.; Hamilton, Works (ed. Lodge), vol. viii. (ed. Hamilton), vol. v.; "Letters of Toussaint Louverture and of Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," Amer. Hist. Review, 1910, xvi. 64-101. WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 137 be received with the respect due to the "representative of a free, independent, and powerful nation." This letter was at once seized upon by Adams as complying with the condi- tions that he had laid down in his message of June 21, His sturdy and persistent Americanism had accepted hostility, not from preference, but as necessary to the national honor and prestige. He was anxious to return to neutrality and diplomatic isolation, and on February 18, 1799, he nomi- nated Murray to the Senate, as minister to France. Of all personal decisions in American diplomacy, this was the most important, unless it be that Jay was justified in his suspicions of Vergennes in 1782 and . , 1/1,1 <. 1 • Adams accepts so denected the course oi history at that the opportu- point. Of the wisdom and justice of Adams's °^ ^^^^^ course there can be no doubt. He could, however, be counted upon to be as disagreeable as he was right. He sent in the nomination without consulting even his secre- tary of state. For this unusual discourtesy it is, how- ever, possible that there was some excuse. Had the prop- osition been submitted to his cabinet, dominated as it was by Hamilton, it would undoubtedly have been rejected and further action would have been difficult. Once Talleyrand's offer became public, however, an overwhelming public opin- ion, all Republicans and the moderate Federalists, demanded its acceptance. Pickering, Hamilton, and their associates were aghast, but did not dare oppose the mission. Yet they succeeded in substituting for a minister a commission, com- prising, in addition to Murray, the chief justice Oliver Ells- worth, and Patrick Henry, upon whose refusal Governor Davie of North Carolina was substituted. Concerning the instructions to this commission, Pinckney wrote to King, March 12, 1799: "These terms are what we have a clear right to, and our interest and honor oblige us to insist on. Yet I very much doubt whether France will yield them. I am morally sure she will not; and this has put us all much at our ease." 138 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY In spite of this confidence, however, Adams had personally to intervene to secure the departure of the envoys. Pickering Cabinet dis- did not choose to take the course of resignation, sensions which his difference of purpose and his personal relations with Adams made obvious. He clung to his position until May 12, 1800, when Adams removed him. With him went also Hamilton's influence over diplomacy, which since 1789 had largely controlled details. Yet none of the great decisions or policies of the period had been Hamilton's, although in some such cases his view had coincided with that followed and had often helped to shape it. In this final clash, however brilliant and fascinating were his ideas and however great his capacity to realize them, it cannot be doubted that Adams, bred of the soil, stood for the desires John Marshall and best interests of his country, Pickering secretary ^^^ replaced by John Marshall, whose term was too short and quiet to test his diplomatic abilities. In Paris the negotiations, having the good will of Talley- rand and of the rising Bonaparte, progressed rapidly. On Convention of September 30, 1800, a convention was con- eluded. This agreement was generally satis- factory on points relating to navigation. It laid down the French view, which was also the American, with regard to free ships making free goods, and also with regard to con- traband. In one point, however, we were obliged to accept the French view, as Jay had accepted the English, — namely, the provision that neutral goods on enemies' vessels might be seized. The chief diflSculty lay in the American demand that indemnity be paid for illegal condemnations by the French, on which were based nearly twenty-three hundred sound claims, and the French demand for the execution of the treaties of 1778 and 1788. The commissioners fuially decided to leave these questions for future negotiation "at a convenient time," the treaties meanwhile to be inoper- ative. This proposal the United States Senate amended by the provision that the convention should remain in force WAR AND PEACE WITH FRANCE 139 for eight years. Bonaparte, by this time Napoleon and consul, with his usual clear headedness accepted this amend- ment, "provided that by this retrenchment the two States renounce the respective pretensions which are the object of the said article." Thus were disposed of forever the treaties which consti- tuted our first "entangling alliance." The advantage that accrued to the nation is obvious. The justice v a r of thus exchanging private claims for national " French trea- gain has since then many times engaged the attention of Congress, but these particular "French Spolia- tion Claims" became henceforth a domestic problem. The end thus arrived at is to be attributed not only to Adams's decision to make peace, but to his willingness, pre- viously shown, to make war. The brief brush ^ . . , with France had, moreover, brought other " French spoli- results. Fearing some such scheme as Miranda was elaborating, Spain at length, and reluctantly, in March, 1798, evacuated her posts between the Yazoo and the thirty- first parallel, and the United States for the first time actually possessed in full the boundaries awarded her by the peace of 1783. To the achievements noted at the close of Washington's administration, therefore, the Adams administration added that of meeting the most acute crisis that had yet confronted the nation, and of emerging eralist period' from it with the fundamental policy of neu- trality still intact, and relieved from treaty complications. It left the affairs of the nation in a condition superficially satisfactory and actually strong. CHAPTER XII THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE The succession of Jefferson to the presidency made less im- mediate change in the current of American diplomacy than A change of was expected, much less than in domestic af- regime fairs. The formal etiquette with which Wash- ington had surrounded himself was modified and its neg- lect caused some friction with the foreign ministers at Wash- ington; but the essential practice of having all governmental intercourse with them pass through the hands of the secre- tary of state was retained. Jefferson, moreover, was a gen- tleman and of cosmopolitan experience; and on the whole the administration was well-mannered. Jefferson had long held that ministers should not be retained abroad more than six or eight years, for fear that they would cease to be true repre- sentatives of Americanism, a principle for which there was much to be said in those days, when foreign politics tended so to engage American sympathies and antipathies and com- munication was so scant. Charles Pinckney was therefore nominated minister at Madrid, "vice David Humphreys, recalled on account of long absence from the United States," and Robert Livingston was substituted for Short, in France, for the same reason ; but comparatively little more was heard of the practice.^ In the interests of economy the missions to Prussia, Holland, and Portugal were discontinued, a step which John Quincy Adams considered a mistake, as it left us at the mercy of the two great belligerent powers by putting us out of touch with our natural friends, the neutral maritime nations; but the neutral nations were so weak that the loss cannot be considered great. Most of the men appointed by * C. R. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (New York, etc., 1905), 88. 140 THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 141 JeflFerson were of ability and training, though his leading agent, Monroe, seems to have been framed for other tasks than diplomacy. Jefferson's most important advisers were James Madison, secretary of state, and Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury; but his own power, ability, and experience served to give him control.^ The first question which confronted the administration resulted from a tangle in that particular thread of diplomacy which the Federalists had failed to unravel. Mediterranean Our treaties with the Barbary states were not ^ highly regarded by those powers. The Dey of Algiers had objected to making one. "If I were to make peace with every body," said he, "what should I do with my corsairs .^^ What should I do with my soldiers? They would take off my head for the want of other prizes, not being able to live upon their miserable allowance." Nor did the treaty once made lie very heavily upon him; it seemed in fact to offer him some amusement. In 1800 Captain Bainbridge, arriv- ing at Algiers with the usual tribute, was ordered to carry dispatches to Constantinople. "You pay me tribute," ex- plained the Dey, "by which you become my slaves, and there- fore I have a right to order you as I think proper." Jefferson had long been familiar with the situation, and had always opposed the policy of tribute. Now he proposed to use force to exact respect. Inconsistent as this policy seems to be with his general belief in the supremacy of reason, it was probably based upon a still more fundamental sense of honor, and a somewhat emotional reaction from so barbaric an anachronism as the Barbary coast. At any rate, he sent a squadron to the Mediterranean, where for several years American ships and men, captains and consuls, performed their parts in romantic adventures which smack of the ^Jefiferson, Writings, ed. Ford, 10 vols.; James Madison, Writings, ed. Gaillard Hunt, 9 vols.. New York, 1900-1910; Albert Gallatin, Writings, ed. Henry Adams, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1879; James Monroe, Writings, ed. S. M. HamUton. 9 vols.. New York, etc., 1898-1903. 142 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Arabian Nights rather than of the nineteenth century. Inde- pendent of home support, as only sailing-vessels can be, they so successfully impressed the rulers of the several states that by 1805 the sea was comparatively safe for American traders.^ Even at JeflPerson's inauguration the great event of his ad- ministration was taking shape behind carefully closed doors. There was no novelty in what was being rand and Na- planned; except what lay in the ability of the actors and the strength of the forces at their command. Talleyrand and Napoleon had definitely taken up the plans for dominating the Mississippi valley, and through it the western world, with which so many men had been playing now for fifty years. At their back they liad the virility and enthusiasm of revolutionary France, now disci- plined into military effectiveness; they had the defeated and demoralized, but still powerful, French navy.^ The first step was to get Louisiana, to get it quickly and undamaged. Talleyrand wrote to his representative at _ . , Madrid in the summer of 1798: "The Court of Cession of Louisiana to Madrid, ever blind to its own interests, and never docile to the lessons of experience, has again recently adopted a measure which cannot fail to pro- duce the worst effects upon its political existence and on the preservation of its colonies. The United States has been put in possession of the forts situated along the Mississippi, which the Spaniards had occupied as posts essential to arrest the progress of the Americans in those countries." The Americans, he said, must be shut up within "the limits which nature seems to have traced for them," — the same limits, of course, which Rayncval had traced for d'Aranda and Jay in 1782. Spain, continued Talleyrand, should "yield a small part of her immense domain to preserve the ^ G. W. Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs, Boston, etc., 1905. ^ Giistav Roloff, Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleons I, Munich, etc., 1899; Henry Ad;ims, "Napoleon ler et Saint Domingue," Revue Historique, 1884, xxiv. 92-130. THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 143 rest." Let Spain cede the Floridas and Louisiana to France, "and from that moment the power of the United States is bounded by the limits which it may suit the interests and tranquillity of France and Spain to assign her." Spain still resisted the inevitable, but at length on October 1, 1800, the treaty of San Ildefonso was signed, " retroceding " Louisiana to France in exchange for some Italian provinces. With a persistence worthy of a more hopeful cause Spain still clung to the Floridas.^ Twenty-four hours before, the convention bringing about the necessary truce with the United States had been signed. There remained necessary, peace with Great Reduction of Britain to free the ocean for French operations. ^^ Domingo On October 1, 1801, preliminary articles were signed with that country, and on March 27, 1802, the peace of Amiens was concluded. One detail was still incomplete, but it seemed to offer small difficulty. The key to the new colonial empire of France must be the island of San Domingo, still dominated by the negro Toussaint L'Ouverture, whose loyalty to France was insufficient for the purposes in view. In January, 1802, Napoleon's brother-in-law, Leclerc, with ten thousand men and a large fleet, arrived off the island to restore it to its dependence. His military successes paved the way for the reestablishment of slavery, and Toussaint L'Ouverture was sent prisoner to France. Napoleon then prepared his expedi- tion to Louisiana, and drew up instructions to General Victor, who was to command it. The central feature of this plan, the cession of Louisiana, was still a secret; Talleyrand even denied it, yet rumor spread. In April, 1801, John Quincy Adams ^j^^ ^^^^ had heard of it at Berlin. In 1802 Godoy, reaches A.iii6ric& "Prince of the Peace " and the leading figure in Spain, being pressed by France for the Floridas, seems to have allowed a copy of the treaty to fall into our hands. In 1 See F. L. Riley, Spanish Policy in Mississippi after the Treaty of San Lorenzo, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report. 1897, 175-192. 144 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY November, 1802, a premonition was given of what might happen should the transfer take place. The Spanish intend- ant at New Orleans, at French instigation, as it was believed, forbade the Americans the use of that city as a place of de- posit, and refused to designate another. The first action was in accordance with our treaty with Spain, more than the three years specified having elapsed ; but the refusal to assign a new port was a violation of that treaty. It again clogged the Mississippi and stirred all the forces of the restless West.^ Fortunately, Jefferson was familiar with every factor of this new combination of long-existing conditions. He flour- JefiFerson ished before France the danger of an alliance threatens between the United States and England. In a letter intended to be read by the French leaders he wrote: "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations, which in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." He showed marked favoritism to the British representative, Thornton, and scared the French minister, Pinchon, into a promise to endeavor to secure the opening of the Mississippi from France. Yrujo, the Spanish minister, did obtain a temporary restoration of the right of deposit at New Orleans. For the serious handling of the question Jefferson reverted to the method thrice employed by the Federalists, a special Jefferson's mission; and he chose Monroe for the office, policy rpj^g latter was instructed to purchase New Orleans and the Floridas, being allowed to bid anything up to ten million dollars. Congress had just appropriated two million for the purpose. If the purchase could not be made, ^ Henry Adams, History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, 9 vols., New York, 1889-91 (gives an incomparable account of the diplomacy of the period). See also F. A. Ogg, The Opening of the Mississippi, New York, 1904. THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 145 he was to secure an acknowledgment of the right of deposit. If this could not be obtained, he was to await new instruc- tions. The cabinet decided that in such case negotiations should be protracted until the next inevitable war between England and France broke out, and then cooperation should be arranged with England. In accordance with this policy of delay the departure of Monroe was not hurried, and he did not leave till March 8, 1803. Jefferson's policy was exactly adapted to the situation. The only criticism is, that he ought to have overcome his scruples against a navy and have strengthened „ ... , , . . Napoleon's our position m order that we might be in change of readiness for the war which was so definite a possibility. The event, however, was in no wise dependent upon him, and had practically been consummated before Monroe reached Paris. In January, 1803, news reached France of the death, from disease, of Leclerc and a large part of the French army in San Domingo and of the revival of revolt. Napoleon, while steadfast in the pursuit of funda- mental purposes, never shot a second arrow to recover one lost in a side issue. He was already interesting himself in the prospect of a new European war. On March 12, 1803, he practically broke with England. Under such circum- stances he was not so foolish as to squander another army on America. The colonial empire was dropped. Napoleon was too able an economist to keep intact ma- chinery for which he now had no use: he would scrap it for what it would bring. On April 10 he spoke of j. . Louisiana to Barbe Marbois, who, familiar scraps Louis- with American affairs from our own Revolu- tion, was negotiating with Livingston. England, he said, would seize it at the first moment of war, and added: "I think of ceding it to the United States. I can hardly say that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose 146 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY friendship I seek. . . . Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in reason; I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I cede, it is the whole colony, without reserve. I know the price of what I abandon." Marbois was to get at least fifty million francs for the cession. On April 11 this proposal was broached to Livingston, and the next day Monroe arrived. Negotiations proceeded with the rapidity customary when Napoleon was in Negotiations , , * -, „^ , • , command, and on April 30 the treaty was signed. In return for the cession we agreed to pay sixty million francs, and we assumed the payment to our own citizens of claims against France to the extent of not over twenty million francs. That Napoleon made a good bargain must be conceded. He received more money than the minimum he had set; Napoleon's he won, too, some of that feeling of friendship bargain which he had mentioned ; and he kept Louisiana out of the hands of England. Moreover, there seems to be no reason to believe that he had any idea that he was re- nouncing Louisiana. Perhaps his mind saw things too simply: his struggle was with England; once England was downed, the world was his to command. The very difficulty in disposing of Louisiana which even he had with his ad- visers and with public opinion illustrates the hold which the vision of America had on the French mind. Actually with the delivery of New Orleans to the United States, De- cember 20, 1803, and the independence of Hayti, or western San Domingo, proclaimed November 29 of the same year, France was eliminated as a territorial factor in our history; but although the crisis had passed, her policies and ambi- tions continued to be of moment. In America the news of the treaty was confounding. It was more than had been hoped for; it was not exactly what Problem of the was desired. It raised a score of opportunities ^^^^ for dispute and distraction. In the first place, there was no specific power to annex territory granted in the constitution, although it was easily inferred from the power THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 147 to make treaties. More seriously discussed was the clause of the treaty providing that the inhabitants of the ceded territory should be "incorporated in the Union." The Fed- eralists were willing to annex territories to govern, but not to give them a share in the government. By the acceptance of the treaty, however, this question was at least quieted. The treaty also provided that France and Spain be exempted from discriminating duties in the ports of Louisiana for twelve years, and that France remain forever after that on the basis of the most favored nation. The first of these provisions was of doubtful constitutionality, while the second was long a source of dispute with France. These were problems that could be settled at leisure, and they were but pin-pricks compared with those which the purchase solved. The navigation of the Mis- Results of the sissippi was now completely freed, and its ^^^*y future was not dependent upon the continued favor of any foreign nation. All the interests which had drawn the fron- tiersmen toward Spain or Great Britain, dividing their allegiance, now were added ties to strengthen their natural bonds of race and sympathy with the American government. The completeness of the change was shown by the utter collapse of Burr's conspiracy in 1806. What his plans were is not entirely clear; probably he himself changed them so often that they lost their definite- ness. At any rate, he played on all the cus- Burr's con- tomary strings of western adventure. His ^piracy objective was Spanish America. England's cooperation he sought, offering through the British minister. Merry, in 1804 "to effect a separation of the western part of the United States from that which lies between the Atlantic and the mountains, in its whole extent." While still vice-president he journeyed through the West and collected material for an expedition; he was also in touch with Wilkinson, now in command of the western department. The latter, however, was more weatherwise than Burr, and, bribed by Spain, he 148 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY betrayed Burr, and the whole bubble burst. In fact, it never had any semblance of real strength, for there was no motive for disloyalty, or even lack of loyalty, in the West. The government of the United States had obtained for it its most conspicuous desire.^ So much the purchase of Louisiana had accomplished, while it was not yet clear just what Louisiana was. To Western limits the westward it had never had a boundary; of Louisiana even sucli boundary agreements as had once existed had been absorbed by the Spanish annexation of 1763, and were lost to memory. Napoleon had ordered Victor to occupy to the Rio Grande, but this fact was un- known to the American government. Jefferson's imagina- tion, however, stretched to the uttermost limits of the op- portunity. Even before he had acquired Louisiana he had planned its exploration, and in 1804 started the Lewis and Clark expedition westward, up the Missouri, across the mountains, and beyond any conceivable limits of the pur- chase, to the Pacific. In 1805 the expedition descended the Columbia and thus added a link to the chain of our claims to the Oregon country, the first of which had been forged when Captain Gray in 1791 had entered the mouth of that river. The record of the expedition, put in popular form by Nicholas Biddle on its return, engaged the imagina- tion of the far-seeing in dreams which made the purchase of Louisiana seem but a step in our progress. In 1805 and 1807 Captain Zebulon Pike was sent into the region south of the Missouri, where he felt the Spaniards, and gained an idea of the actual limits of what we had acquired.^ To the eastward the situation was more definite, in fact it was definite. Our treaty of cession recited as its definition of Louisiana the description given in the treaty of San ^ W. F. McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, New York, 1903. * Henry Gannett, Boundaries of the United States and of the several States and Territories, id edition, 1900 (V. S. Geological Survey, Bulletin, No. 171); H. E. Chambers. West Florida, Baltimore. 1898. THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 149 Ildefonso between France and Spain: "The Colony or Prov- ince of Louisiana with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France ,, , y . Eastern possessed it, and such as it should be after boundary of the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other states." This definition was obviously self-contradictory. Louisiana, when France possessed it, stretched eastward to the Perdido river and included Mobile; the province as it was in the hands of Spain ex- tended only to the Iberville. The meaning, however, was clear enough. The treaty was entitled one of "retrocession." Spain could retrocede to France only what she had received from France; that is the region from the Iberville westward given her in 1763. Although in 1800 she held that between the Iberville and the Perdido, it was by cession from England in 1783, and was separately organized as part of the province of West Florida. This was well understood by the French. Berthier wrote, "After the general peace, the King might decide to cede a part of the Floridas between the Mississippi and the Mobile, on the special demand which the First Consul might make of it." Talleyrand wrote to Napoleon, November 18, 1802, "West Florida suffices for the desired enlargement of Louisiana, it completes the retrocession of the French Colony, such as it was given to Spain." The instructions to General Victor ordered him to take posses- sion only to the Iberville. Madison, Livingston, and Monroe, however, seized upon the ambiguity. In a small way each of the rivers flowing into the gulf presented the same problem as united states the Mississippi. Population was occupying <=l"™s their upper banks, and desired to use them as outlets for their products. So far as immediate utility was concerned, the securing of the territory beyond the Mississippi, which no one had thought of buying, was not a compensation for the gulf fringe of West Florida, which Livingston and Monroe had been instructed to purchase. Our relations with Spain, 150 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY moreover, were sure to be unpleasant whether we pressed this additional claim or not, for Napoleon had promised Spain never to give Louisiana to a foreign power. This promise, to be sure, was not incorporated in the treaty of San Ildefonso and did not impair our title, but it afforded a starting-point of disagreement. Under these circumstances the government decided that we had actually purchased the territory to the Perdido, the wish having a very close rela- tion to the thought. The dispute, of course, was with Spain, but as a matter of fact Napoleon controlled Spain. Except for a brief and un- Napoleon's successful mission of Monroe to Madrid, the game American government recognized the logic of the situation, and directed its efforts to the fountain head at Paris. Though claiming title, it was nevertheless willing to pay for the recognition of it, and to purchase other por- tions of the derelict Spanish empire. Napoleon might have settled the question as to the boundary by opening his records. He preferred, however, mystery and confusion. Talleyrand said to Livingston, "You have made a noble bargain and I suppose you will make the most of it," From 1804 to 1812, indeed, the Florida question became a barometer of European conditions. When pressure was heavy. Napoleon was ready to treat for a money consideration: December 24, 1804, Armstrong wrote to Madison, "This country has deter- mined to convert the negotiation into a job, and to draw from it advantages merely pecuniary to herself." \Vlien pressure was light. Napoleon was shocked at the assumption that he might sell property belonging to his ally. When by the ac- cession of his brother Joseph to the throne of Spain the pos- sessions of that crown became part of the estate of the house of Bonaparte, he warned the United States against interference. On the whole, it may be said that Napoleon used the Florida question as a bait to keep the United States in the vicinity of his hook, and that he was not without some THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 151 success. In the end, however, fate and Madison got the better of him. That portion of the disputed region on the east bank of the Mississippi between the thirty- ^^^ ^^.^^ ^^ first parallel and the Iberville was being oc- disputed teni- cupied by American settlers, regardless of its international status. In September, 1810, these people proclaimed their independence and asked for annexation to the United States. October 27, 1810, Madison, acting on the supposition that it was already United States territory, ordered its occupation, whereupon Claiborne, governor of Orleans territory, took possession to the Pearl river, the present boundary between the states of Louisiana and Mis- sissippi. In 1813 General Wilkinson occupied Mobile and the region eastward to the Perdido. From that time the United States remained in possession of its utmost claims as to the eastern boundary of Louisiana, but its title to that part of it between the Iberville and the Perdido had yet to be determined. CHAPTER XIII THE EMBARGO The war renewed between France and England in 1803, the shadow of which brought us Louisiana, had many other Change of con- things in store for us, both pleasant and un- ditions pleasant. The course of the struggle from 1803 to 1815 parallels in many ways that between 1793 and 1802. Some of the factors, however, had changed. Our own West had become strong enough to master its own destiny; it was now so firmly attached to the government that it ceased for the present to enter into the plans of European states. The policy of our government continued to be that of neu- trality, but its sympathies were now French instead of Eng- lish. Its methods of preserving neutrality, moreover, were so decidedly different as to change the whole character of our diplomacy. In the case of both France and England, the preceding war had witnessed experiments; the new one found determined policies. The defeat of Napoleon's navies at Trafalgar in 1805 gave England a more complete control of the sea than she had ever had before, while his victories by land isolated her from the continent in a manner new and menacing. With the diplomatic elimination of the West, American commerce with the belligerents became the focus of attention. American com- Its steady-going element consisted in the ex- ™®''*^® change of our raw products for England's manufactures. Carried on largely in our own vessels, it was safe, fairly unvarying in quantity, and brought in reasonable profits to respectable established firms. Less important was that carried on with the British colonies under temporary suspensions of the navigation laws and by special licences. 152 THE EMBARGO 153 Part of this trade, it is true, was practically regular and suited to the conservative temperament. As however, the permis- sions were based on the needs of the moment, there was a fluc- tuating margin, which gave opportunity to those with a keen scent for special venture and quick turnovers. News of crops and markets was eagerly read, and the British govern- ment was besieged with special applications. In 1809 it refused a licence to export ice and snow from the United States to the West Indies ; those were commodities sufficiently abundant in the loyal colony of Canada. More adventurous, and after 1805 partaking somewhat of the nature of speculation, was the continued attempt to supply France with her breakfast of West American car- Indian coffee, sugar, and cocoa. Hayti was rymg-trade now practically free, but its market continued to be France; and the other islands furnished their quota. In return the islands wanted provisions, which we ourselves could furnish, and manufactured goods, which should have come from France but which we often secured for them from England. This trade demanded high freight rates and protected itself by insurance. It produced both fortunes and bankruptcies. By 1805 it overshadowed the safer trade with England. Between 1803 and 1806 our exports of domestic goods sank from $42,206,000 to $41,253,000; those of foreign goods rose from $13,594,000 to $60,283,000.^ Still choicer titbits invited those who frankly disregarded business principles and resorted to speculation pure and sim- ple. To add to their lading of French colonial Speculative products some of the manufactures of England ^«°tures so eagerly desired and so highly priced on the continent, and, protected by licences from England and France, to carry on trade between the enemies, or to carry it on unprotected, induced many to risk ships and liberty. To disregard the ^ Mathew Carey, The Olive Branch, Philadelphia, 1815 (contains many original documents and statistics); British and Foreign State Papers (an annual series). 154 AMERICAN DIPLOIVIACY restrictive laws framed with such rapidity by the United States government, to gamble on a change of regulation before reaching port or on the possibility of bribing officials, to coast from one French port to another, to rove at will over the ocean using whatever flag and papers were con- venient at the moment, involved serious risks, but not suf- ficient danger to exclude such practices. Everywhere the Americans found and made business. Gallatin estimated that our merchant marine grew seventy thousand tons a year and called for over four thousand additional men; and Phineas Bond had already in 1796 referred to the enter- prising spirit of so many of our traders in "forcing the pre- scribed channels of commerce." To shepherd such a reckless crew was no easy task for an administration so firmly based on the idea of self-government, but at heart so paternalistic, as was that of Jefferson. The attitude of Great Britain toward this trade was not a simple one. Underlying all her actions was a sensitive Great Britain's national jealousy at the growth of a rival mer- P°^'*^y chant marine, and a constant purpose to give every possible advantage to her own. She did not wish to cut off all trade with the enemy; she was especially anxious to sell all the manufactured goods possible. She tried, there- fore, to confine trade to channels favorable to herself, and to cause it to pass under her watchful eye. Agricultural conditions had so readjusted themselves on the continent that there was less chance of starving France into submis- sion; hence the question of regarding provisions as contra- band of war was not so important as in the previous war. In the execution of her policy she showed an arrogance and a carelessness of others that often caused her to persist in practices not essential to her general policy and yet provoca- tive of retaliation. England's policy cannot be considered apart from her bad manners. The policy of Napoleon toward neutral trade was based on the ideas of the Directory. It was subsidiary to his cen- THE EMBARGO 155 tral idea of destroying England by destroying her commerce. He would close all the ports of the world to British trade, he would cause her ships to be idle and her Napoleon's factories to be glutted with unsalable goods; P^^^y then bankruptcy and submission would be inevitable. This was the fundamental purpose which underlay his entire foreign policy from 1805, and which resulted in the climatic tragedy of the Russian invasion. While he undoubtedly miscalculated the tenacity of the British will, and thought that less pressure would be necessary to bring a nation of shopkeepers to terms than proved to be the case, his plan was not fantastic and he may have come within sight of success. He himself, when at Elba, reviewing and magnifying, like so many lesser of the fallen, the turns of fortune against him, said that he should have succeeded had not the Spanish revolt opened up to England, after 1808, the trade of Spanish America which she had so long desired and which gave a new market for her surplus products.^ It should not be held against him as an inconsistency, or as an evidence of the im- possibility of his plan, that his armies were often clothed in British goods. He realized the temporary necessity, but under the protection of his system he expected to develop self-sufficing industry on the continent. Indeed, one of the most permanent results of his rule has been found to be pre- cisely this development. With such a policy Napoleon knew no neutrals: trade with his enemy was vital assistance to his enemy. This policy, however, was diplomatically veiled so as to enable him to employ neutral vessels for his own pur- poses. The details of his regulations therefore change from time to time. Without a navy, he was driven to such meas- ures as could be enforced in his own ports. In the United States the policy formulated to defend our trade was emphatically Jefferson's, although it so closely resembled Napoleon's that it was attributed to French in- ^ T. B. Richards, " An Unpublished Talk with Napoleon," Harper's Maga- zine, January 1911, pp. 165-175. 156 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY fluence. If there was any connection, however, it was Jeffer- son who originated the plan. Even as a youth he had Jefferson's been much impressed with the rapidity with policy which the colonial non-importation agreements had brought England to terms, and he believed that similar pressure would be as effective between nations as it had proved between colony and mother country. He may well have discussed the matter with the French revolutionary leaders during his residence in France. Certainly on his re- turn he urged it upon Congress in his report of 1793. Now as president he intended to use it as the bulwark of defence for our commerce and our merchant marine. The first serious difficulty arose with England over the trade of the French West Indies. As a result of decisions ^ , J .of Sir William Scott in the cases of the Emanuel England and the French in 1799 and the Polly m 1800, that trade had been allowed to the Americans if carried on from the colonies to the United States and from the United States to France. July 23, 1805, in the case of the Essex, Scott practically reversed himself, declaring that on an inno- cent voyage between the United States and Europe the neutral owner of such colonial goods must be able to prove by something more than evidence of a custom-house entry that his original intention had been to terminate his venture in an American port. Upon this theory several American vessels were condemned, and the trade, while not prohibited, was rendered uncertain and difficult; for it was, of course, almost never the intention of the American owner to ter- minate his venture in the United States, and he was actually in most cases owner merely in form and not in substance, a situation that might be revealed by the British courts which it was framed to deceive. This trade, as well as other branches of traffic, was soon additionally hampered by a British order in council of May 16, 1806, blockading the coast from Havre to Ostend and prohibiting the coast trade to neutrals from Havre to the Elbe. THE EMBARGO 157 Another source of difficulty arose from the discovery by the British that this blockade could be more effectively and conveniently enforced off the American „, , . . '' . Blockade of than the French coast. For years, it became American customary for every American vessel leaving New York, the Chesapeake, and other harbors to heave to, and submit to a vigorous search. If the result created sus- picion, the vessel was put in charge of a British officer and sent to Halifax for adjudication by the admiralty court there. In 1806, in the execution of this police duty, the British accidentally shot and killed an American sea-captain. Usually the vessel was allowed to proceed, but in a large number of cases with the loss of members of its crew. The impressment problem gave in- creasing trouble. Of the four thousand new seamen demanded each year by the merchant marine twenty-five hundred, it was reckoned, were British born, most of them sailors who preferred the better wages, food, and treatment to be found on American vessels. Such transfer of allegiance in the heat of the national life-and-death struggle was regarded by British public opin- ion as no less than desertion; hence the navy vigorously resorted to impressment to redress the balance. It is esti- mated that there were a thousand cases annually. It was in this state of affairs that the clauses of the Jay treaty relating to neutral rights expired. Jefferson pre- pared to substitute for them a new and better j^j^^j^g ^^^ treaty. To bring pressure to bear upon Eng- Pinkney in land, he had Congress pass a non-importation act, prohibiting the entry of certain British goods which he esteemed not necessary to our happiness. Its operation was not to be immediate, but it was to hang like a sword of Damocles over the negotiations. Many doubted its effi- ciency. John Randolph derided it as "a milk and water bill, a dose of chicken broth to be taken nine months hence." To bring it to the attention of England, Jefferson appointed 158 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY a commission consisting of Monroe, who had succeeded King as minister, and William Pinkney. Their instructions, drawn up by Madison, insisted upon three ultimata, — namely, an agreement regarding impressments, indemnity for American vessels and cargoes condemned, as we held, unjustly, and a satisfactory provision regarding the trade of the French West Indies. "We begin to broach the idea that we consider the whole Gulf stream as our waters," said Madison, a remark which reminds one of Fauchet's comment in 1795, that America "puffs itself up with its position and the future power to which it can pretend." Happy in beginning their negotiations under the auspices of Charles James Fox, always the friend of America and now foreign minister, they found their hopes soon dashed by his death. It is probable, however, that this made little differ- ence, for on the subjects upon which they desired acquies- cence no British minister would have dared offer even com- promise. Unable to obtain a single important concession they nevertheless signed a treaty on December 31, 1806, which was as unsatisfactory as that of Jay on matters of international law, besides affording none of the compensa- tions which that treaty offered, for there were no outstanding matters at issue of a character not thought to be necessary to England's national existence. The treaty was not con- summated ; Jefferson never presented it to the Senate. With the failure of the treaty, the lightning began to play in dead earnest. In November, 1806, Napoleon had Napoleon's de- issued his Berlin decree declaring the British "** isles blockaded, with the result, as concerned neutrals, that no vessel coming from England or her colonies should after a nine months' notice be admitted into any French port. This was followed by the Milan decree of December 17, 1807, which declared that any vessel submit- ting to search by a British ship, paying duty to the British government, or coming from or destined for a British port should be good prize. THE EMBARGO 159 Meantime an English order in council of January 7, 1807, known as Lord Howick's order, forbade neutral vessels to engage in the French coasting trade, even British orders between unblockaded ports. The British at- i^ ^ouncU titude is indicated in a dispatch from Lord Howick to Erskine, the British minister to the United States: "His Majesty, with that forbearance and moderation which has at all times distinguished his conduct, has determined for the present to confine himself to the exercise of the powers given him by his decided naval superiority in such manner only as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the law of nations." On November 11, 1807, an order known as Spencer Perceval's established a "paper" blockade of the whole European coast from Trieste to Copenhagen. No neutral vessel could enter any port from which British ves- sels were excluded, unless clearing from a British port and under British regulations, including the payment of duties, a condition which ipso facto rendered it liable to seizure by France. While this clash of decrees and orders sounded but dimly in the ears of most Americans, uncertain as yet as to what they portended, an episode on the coast of ^^^ Leopard- America roused the nation, so observers said, Chesapeake more than anything had done since Lexington. The Chesapeake, an American frigate fitting for the Mediter- ranean, enrolled a number of men whom the British ad- miral off the coast claimed as deserters. Commodore Barron satisfied himself that such was not the case, and on June 22, 1807, set sail. The Chesapeake was followed by the Leopard, one of the vessels enforcing the blockade of Europe off Chesa- peake Bay, and was ordered to heave to. After a formal resistance, she lowered her flag, officers from the Leopard took off the men in question, and left the Chesapeake, which promptly returned to Norfolk. This extension of the practice of impressment to national naval vessels found no support even in the elastic interna- 160 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY tional law of the day. The British government did not at- tempt to defend it, but it handled the matter with so un- popular indig- pardonable a stupidity that the episode re- nation mained an open sore for four years. Jefferson expressed his indignation in a proclamation of July 2, which forbade the use of American harbors to British war vessels, and on July 30 he called a special session of Congress. The measure that he recommended was not war, but it no less reflected the seriousness of his view of the situation. War he believed a barbarism; for it he would substi- The embargo . * i i i- i i tute the appeal to mterest. As he believed that under normal conditions commercial discrimination was an ef- fective instrument, so he believed that under abnormal condi- tions a total cessation of trade would exert all the compulsive efforts of war without its horrors. In other words, he would have us withdraw from the commerce of the world, in the belief that it would not be long before the nations would be clamoring for us to reopen our ports on our own terms. As a result of his recommendation, on December 21, 1807, a general and indefinite embargo was established. No vessel was to leave port, except (1) foreign vessels in ballast, or with such cargo as they had laded before the passage of the act, and (2) vessels engaged in the coasting trade. This embargo seemed to resemble that established at the time of Jay's mission to England; but it is to be differentiated from that because it was regarded by those who adopted it, not as a temporary expedient providing for the safety of our shipping, but as a weapon to conquer favorable terms from our adversaries. So it happened that, before our merchants could be sure what effect the rival orders and decrees might have upon __ ^ - ^, their business, — although thev felt certain that Effect of the . ' embargo on there would be loopholes in both the French and English systems, — their own government laid a restraining hand on all their ventures. It was the steady-going merchants who suffered most, those who were THE EMBARGO 161 engaged in the regular trade with England and her colonies, and so were comparatively untouched by the regulations either of that country or of France. The more adventurous could always find opportunities for traffic by evading or dis- regarding the law. Until stopped by a supplementary act, many vessels cleared for an American port but found them- selves driven by stress of weather to the West Indies. Once there, they sold their goods. Even when this practice was stopped, some preserved freedom by remaining away from home. April 11, 1808, an English order in council forbade the seizure of American vessels in the West Indies and South America, even if without papers. In March, April, and May sixteen American vessels were allowed to enter English ports. Although numbers of American vessels thus found employ- ment it was, however, in carrying on the business of others, not in supplying the United States with what she desired and taking from her ports what she had for sale. Our com- merce was dead. Whether or not Jefferson was right in claiming that Amer- ican commerce was more essential to other nations than to ourselves, at any rate we had a governmental Failure of the organization more sensitive to public distress embargo than other nations. The embargo did cause suffering in the British empire: Newfoundland was on the point of starva- tion, and English mills shut down, with all the attendant woes. England, however, remained firm. In the United States opposition swept down the coast. In New England the criticism of the commercial classes, unappreciative of this attempt to clear the Repeal of the seas by forbidding the use of them, rose to ^^^bargo fury. New England statesmen talked of disunion. In the middle states the farmer, for whose crops the home market was inadequate, added his voice to that of the merchant of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Washington Irving, in his Knickerbocker history of New York, ridiculed the embargo: "Never was a more comprehensive, a more ex- 162 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY peditious, or, what is still better, a more economical measure devised, than this of defeating the Yankees by proclama- tion — an expedient, likewise, so gentle and humane, there were ten chances to one in favor of its succeeding, — but then there was one chance to ten that it would not succeed, — as the ill-natured fates would have it, that single chance car- ried the day." Even the Virginia planters, groaning under the burden of supporting their slaves, whose products re- mained unsold on the plantation, protested. On February 28, 1809, the embargo was repealed, having brought about no amelioration of our international position. CHAPTER XIV WAR WITH ENGLAND The succession of Madison to the presidency on March 4, 1809, meant no change of ideas. In fact, it hardly involved a change of personnel; for Jefferson was still Non-inter- consulted, and the new secretary of state, ^°^^^ Robert Smith, was scarcely more than a figure-head, Madi- son himself often writing his dispatches. The embargo had failed, but a substitute had been provided. This took the form of a non-intercourse act, which opened up commerce to the rest of the world but prohibited it with France, Eng- land, and their colonies. To them America remained tight closed. The law set forth, however, that should England withdraw her orders, or France her decrees, the President could resume intercourse with the complaisant power. In spite of the importance of the restrictions that remained, the merchant marine soon found unparalleled opportunities for employment. That of Massachusetts in- Prosperity of creased from 310,000 tons in 1807 to 352,000 con^n^erce tons in 1810. The British armies in Spain and Portugal needed provisions, and those countries were open to our trade. To the north, Russia was free to neutrals after De- cember 31, 1810, and we were practically the only neutrals. This opportunity was not too far afield for our enterprize. By way of the Baltic and the port of Riga, and even by the Arctic port of Archangel, the route to which had the ad- vantage of lying far from the haunts of the British navy, we sent to Russia, in 1810, $3,975,000 worth of goods, in 1811, $6,137,000 worth. To guard this new trade, we exchanged ministers with that country in 1809, sending thither John Quincy Adams, who had now affiliated with the dominant ;ie3 164 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY party, Holland and Naples, moreover, and other stretches of European coast, though actually under Napoleonic con- trol, were not legally French and did not fall within our prohibition. To them we could send such things as Napoleon wished and England did not object to. Fish and oil were permitted, but cotton England banned as tending to build up French manufactures. Nor did prohibition by law ac- tually prevent American vessels from dropping into the harbors of France herself, when the way was open. In addi- tion, our ships were licensed by the belligerents to carry on some of that exchange between them which was so beneficial that it defied the dictates of policy. Increasingly, however, this trade was given to their own vessels, and it never was so large as the unlicensed smuggling carried on by the boatmen of the Channel in the teeth of the authorities of both coun- tries. If by this description the ocean may seem to have been a smooth road to the Americans, it must be borne in mind that there were always the perils of search and im- pressment, and the chances of sudden changes in regulations, involving delay, seizure, and confiscation. Worse still, the standard trade of bringing English manufactures into the United States, and of exporting tobacco and other goods to England and provisions to her colonies, was practically ended. ^ It was under these circumstances that George Canning, now British minister of foreign affairs, resolved to take ad- Erskine ar- vantage of the offer contained in the non- rangement intercourse act in order to reopen the American market to British manufactures. This negotiation was to take place in America, and he instructed his minister at Washington to announce that the orders would be recalled on condition that we withdraw non-intercourse with Eng- ^ For the study of the actual course of commerce during these years the Guide to the Material in London Archives for the History of the United States since 1783, by C. O. I'aullin and F. L. Paxson, is useful. It describes the papers to the period of the Civil War. The records of the Board of Trade are found to contain the most novel material. WAR WITH ENGLAND 165 land, that we forego trade with the French West Indies, and that we allow England to enforce our non-intercourse act with France. The British minister at this time was David Montague Erskine, a young Whig appointed by Fox in 1806, very friendly toward America and married to an Amer- ican wife. With him an agreement was made which dealt with the Chesapeake affair and the recall of the orders, and looked to the formation of a general treaty of commerce between the United States and Great Britain, but which left out Canning's last two conditions. In accordance with this arrangement, Madison, on June 10, 1809, declared inter- course with Great Britain restored. Canning at once rejected the agreement, recalled Erskine, and sent in his place Francis James Jackson, who was not expected to repeat Erskine's mistake of over- Canning dis- friendliness to America, and who lived up to *^°^s Erskine his reputation. After five weeks' exchange of notes, which grew increasingly unpleasant, the American government re- fused to deal further with him. Canning, however, had promised him a year in America, and he was not recalled until the end of it. Until the autumn of 1810, therefore, the United States and Great Britain were provided with a burr under the saddle which the tact of Pinkney, our minister at London, could scarcely be expected to make comfortable. Meanwhile Napoleon had not been unconscious of the United States, though he had not needed to give her much of his attention, since her policy conformed Napoleon and to his own, and he seemed to be reaping *^® embargo the reward for the sale of Louisiana. As if in accordance with his desires, — but in reality because of the southern objection to recognizing a republic founded on a slave in- surrection, — intercourse had in 1806 been prohibited with his revolted colony of Hayti, in which he took a fleeting in- terest. The embargo again, though a measure based on Jefferson's philosophy, exactly fitted into Napoleon's con- tinental system. Although he objected to it as regarded 166 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY France, he could not have devised a plan better suited to his purposes had he been dictator of America. "The Em- peror applauds the embargo," said Turreau, French minister at Washington. On April 5, 1808, Napoleon issued from Bayonne a decree ordering the sequestration of all American vessels arriving in France, as presumably British property sailing under false papers, no American vessels being legally afloat. The repeal of the embargo was therefore a rebuff, and its form, by grouping England and France together and differ- _, , J entiating between France and her dependent Napoleon and ° . ^ non-inter- states, was still more so. Moreover, the pro- hibition of Haytian trade, which had never been effective, lapsed about the same time. Napoleon there- fore ordered his minister to withdraw from Washington. On August 4, 1809, after Canning's disavowal of the Erskine agreement had assured a return to non-intercourse and a period of aggravation between England and the United States, while the battle of Wagram gave him command of Europe, he issued the decree of Vienna, ordering the seizure and confiscation of "every American ship which shall enter the ports of France, Spain, or Italy." This step he justified by the arguments that those entering French ports were violating the law of the United States, and that the other countries under French control should not be allowed to enjoy trade forbidden to France. The decree was kept secret, apparently in order to induce American vessels to enter. Thiers says: "To admit false neutrals in order to confiscate them afterwards, greatly pleased his astute mind, little scrupulous in the choice of means, especially in regard to shameless smugglers who violated at once the laws of their own country and those of the country that consented to admit them." ^ Napoleon himself wrote to Danzig: "Let the American ships enter your ports ! Seize them afterwards. ' M. J. L. A. Thiers, Histoire du consulat et de Vemyire (21 vols., Paris, etc., 1845-69), vol. xii. WAR WITH ENGLAND 167 You shall deliver the cargoes to me, and I will take them in part payment of the Prussian war debt." On March 25, 1810, he published the Rambouillet decree, which was prac- tically a public announcement of that of Vienna, but with this difference, that it merely sequestered the American vessels instead of confiscating them. He thus held in his hands over eight million dollars' worth of American property as hostage for our behavior. The number of vessels seized in the various countries indicated the state of trade: 51 in France, 44 in Spain, 28 in Naples, and 11 in Holland. To carry out this vigorous policy he was forced to depose his brother Louis, king of Holland, and annex that country to France, as well as to drive from the cabinet his valuable assistant, Fouche. He still continued, however, to license American vessels to import specified goods, and they con- tinued to pay high for such licences. In spite of the attention that he devoted to it, American trade can hardly be said to have been a leading consideration with Napoleon at this time; his main desire, „ , / . . . Napoleon and the closmg of the American market to British Macon Bill goods, was still fulfilled. Very different, how- ever, was the situation created by the next change in the American system. Restive under our own regulations, public sentiment, after a hard struggle, at length. May 1, 1810, ob- tained a practical abandonment of the restrictive system by means of an act popularly known as "Macon Bill No. 2," which allowed trade with all the world. The only continu- ance of the policy of using commercial regulation as a weapon of diplomacy is found in the provision authorizing the Presi- dent, in case either Great Britain or France should, before the third day of March following, "so revoke or modify her edicts" as to "cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States," and the other country should not do so, to renew the non-intercourse act against the obdurate power. This was indeed a blow to Napoleon's continental system, for it reopened to England her most valuable single market. 168 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY It is said that he devoted three days to a consideration of the situation. The result was a letter from his foreign minis- ter, Cadore, of August 5, 1810: "In this new state of things, I am authorized to declare to you, sir, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after the 1st of No- vember they will cease to have effect; it being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the new prin- ciples of blockade which they have wished to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the act you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English. It is with the most particular satisfaction, sir, that I make known to you this determination of the Emperor. His majesty loves the Americans. Their pros- perity and their commerce are within the scope of his policy." But Napoleon's purpose was not the abandonment of his system. "It is evident," said he, "that we commit ourselves to nothing." He explained to his council that, should the English withdraw their orders, he could achieve his results by customs regulation. What he hoped was that by the ambiguity of his letter he might once more embroil England and the United States. Meantime, to clean the slate of the past, he ordered the American vessels sequestered by the Rambouillet decree to be confiscated. This order was not published; but, when its effects became evident, Cadore explained that it did not affect the future, that it was in reprisal for our non-intercourse act, and that the law of reprisal was final. Madison seized upon this letter with avidity. He at once demanded that Great Britain withdraw her orders, including Napoleon and the blockade of 1806, and threatened non- Madison intercourse should she fail to do so. The Mar- quis of Wellesley, who had succeeded Canning, was more favorably disposed toward the United States; but as he read the Cadore letter it contained a conditional offer, not a state- ment of fact. He thought it meant that, if Great Britain WAR WITH ENGLAND 169 should withdraw her orders, Napoleon would withdraw his decrees; that if she should not do so the decrees would also remain in force unless the United States made her neutrality respected, that is, unless she forced England to recall her orders. In this impasse the United States would not, he believed, be justified in differentiating between the belliger- ents until she received evidence of the withdrawal of the decrees. He also found in the letter an additional condition, — namely, that Great Britain must renounce her principle of blockade. Madison, however, understanding that the decrees were actually withdrawn, — for Napoleon failed to answer the riddle which he had set, — declared non-intercourse with England reestablished after February 2, 1811. He was sustained by an act of Congress of March 2, 1811, and in April, as an expression of his discontent, he withdrew Pinkney from London. Once more, therefore. Napoleon closed the American market to England. His wall, however, was crumbling at its opposite extremity. It has been noted that on December 31, 1810, Russia opened her ports to neutral vessels. American ship- Napoleon and ping straightway crowded her ports, and much ^"^sia that they brought was British. Of our exports to Russia in 1811, amounting to over $6,000,000, only $1,630,499 were of our own products. Nor did the total amount given in our figures include cargoes taken in England and admitted by Russia because of the American flag borne by the ship carrying them, a flag which in many cases it had no right to fly. Napoleon called upon the czar to close this breach. The Russian court was divided, torn by factions. Curiously, Romanzoff, who was sympathetic with France, wished to encourage the American merchant marine in order to release Russia from her former dependence on England ; Nesselrode, whose inclinations were English, objected to extending privi- leges to the United States not granted to Great Britain. He wished alliance with the latter power. American trade, long torn by the dogs of war, thus became the bone of contention 170 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY to set them fighting among themselves. John Quincy Adams found himself at St. Petersburg, — familiar to him as a boy- hood memory from his stay there while secretary to Francis Dana, our first minister, — more vitally involved in European entanglements than had been any American minister since Franklin. Napoleon would assent to no compromise, the czar would not close his ports, and events marched rapidly toward war and Napoleon's invasion.^ In behalf of our commerce, Russia was preparing for war with France and alliance with England; Napoleon was pre- paring to force Russia to close her ports to neutral trade. Could we still preserve our neutrality in this supreme mo- ment of struggle? To which side did our interests ally us? To Russia, fighting to defend our rights but allied with Eng- land, our great commercial rival? or to Napoleon, endeavoring to shut us out of Europe, but professing himself, if he won and brought England to terms, willing to establish peace on earth and freedom on the seas? Even if these professions were not to be accepted at their face value, at any rate it was probable that a victorious Napoleon would not be lenient, should one have stirred his wrath. During the spring of 1811 Madison and Monroe, the latter of whom had just replaced Smith at the state department, Napoleonic debated over the question. The immediate triumph issue was whether we should send a minister to France to take the place of Armstrong, who had returned to America. Evidence accumulated that Napoleon's decrees still operated and that the sequestered American vessels were actually confiscated. The balance turned against France. At this critical moment, however, Napoleon once more proved himself equal to the emergency. His foreign minister, the Duke of Bassano, informed Jonathan Russell, our secretary of legation, that the emperor had authorized "the admission of the American cargoes which had been » J. Q. Adams, Memoirs (12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-77), ii. 491-662, iii. 1-144. WAR WITH ENGLAND 171 provisionally placed on deposit." This turned the scale; Joel Barlow was appointed minister, and relations were con- tinued. The administration still hoped for peace, although lean- ing toward France; but its plans were set at naught by the entrance into national politics of two new The "War factors. The first was a general fighting spirit ^^^^^ " brought to Congress, when it met in the autumn of 1811, by a number of young men who soon began to act together and to be known as the "War Hawks." The aroma of war had for twenty years floated across the Atlantic, but it had brought only its glories and not its sorrows. To the younger genera- tion war seemed to be almost the normal condition, and to offer opportunities of distinction and advancement which peace denied. If, however, the wars of Europe had an effect on American youth, the effect was general. No longer, as in 1793, did the particular issues of European politics divide the majority of Americans into partisans of France and of England. The new war leaders were nationalists; they wished to fight to vindicate the honor of their country, smirched, they believed, by her long supine submission to the whacks and blows of the belligerents. Isolation they accepted, but they did not believe that it must necessarily be passive. Many of the leaders were indifferent as to whom they fought; Calhoun, the logical, with the enthusiasm of youth, would fight both.^ Direction was given to this warlike spirit by the second fac- tor. Once more western problems became vital : they were to determine the issue. This time it was primarily _. „, ^ a question of the northwest, though its views were voiced in Congress by Henry Clay of Kentucky, speaker of the new House of Representatives.^ The most obvious 1 J. C. Calhoun, Works (ed. R. K. Cralle, 6 vols., New York, 1853-55), vol. ii. 2 Henry Clay, Works (ed. C. Colton, 7 vols., New York, 1897), vol. i. eh. ix. 172 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY motive for discontent resulted from the Indian situation. Steadily since 1796 the pioneer had pressed into the wilder- ness, steadily the government had made broad his way by contriving one purchase of Indian land after another. The Indians, grumbling, had yielded to necessity; but dissatisfac- tion grew among them, and recently had resulted in com- bination to resist encroachment. Under the leadership of two brothers, Tecumseh, the war chief, and Olliwochica, the prophet, the beginnings of a confederacy were formed, the leaders conceiving of a union not only of the northern tribes but also between the northern and southern groups. In 1811 war began in the battle of Tippecanoe, near the Wabash. That the Indian hostility was encouraged by the British, and that the latter would aid the savages in the coming war, British and In- was firmly believed by the sanest heads on ^^^^ the frontier, William Henry Harrison, gover- nor of Indiana territory and in command at Tippecanoe, said that he could always tell the state of relations between United States and Great Britain by the behavior of the Indians. Great Britain's policy was actually not different from that pursued during Washington's administration. There was on the part of the government no incitement to hostility; rather, the effort was to keep the peace. On the other hand, it maintained, though not entirely of its own choice, relations with the Indians which, considering the fact that these tribes were within the limits of the United States, were not compatible with any principle of international comity. Moreover, as was natural on so wild a frontier, its control over its own agents and subjects was so lax that it was sometimes involved by their acts in complications for which it was not directly responsible but which it was by its international duty required to prevent. The British subjects concerned in these relations were nearly all fur-traders. Scotch, French-Canadians, English, and half-breeds, they led lives of the most unfettered free- WAR WITH ENGLAND 173 dom, with the exception of an almost complete economic dependence upon the two great British companies, the Hud- son Bay, and the Northwestern. Together these Fur-trade ri- companies dominated the whole region west- ^^"^^ ward from Lake Michigan, including what is now Wisconsin and the upper reaches of the Mississippi and the Missouri. Wide as was the area, its paths, the rivers and trails, were none too numerous, and the traders of the two companies were continually encountering each other, as well as the rivals of both, the Americans. The latter had hitherto not been so well organized as the British subjects; but of late the American Fur Company, of which John Jacob Astor was the leading spirit, had been bringing order out of chaos. Astor's imperial plans were now taking the form of estab- lishing a permanent settlement on the Pacific coast. He engaged experts from the Northwestern Company, and in 1811 founded the post of Astoria on the Columbia. This distant enterprise did not, however, diminish the rivalry nearer home. From St. Louis and Michilimackinac went forth better and better equipped bands of American traders, who competed with those sent out by the British companies. The emulation in the forests and plains was transmitted, with the skins, to Montreal and to New York, which sup- plied the capital for the expeditions and for the establish- ment of the posts, and which competed in the disposal of the furs. Relatively the British were losing ground; they asked for government support; they bemoaned the influence of the United States government factories which had been estab- lished at Washington's behest. To the American frontiers- men, their own government seemed inert and spineless as compared with that of Great Britain, and particularly they protested at the free use of American soil which the British companies enjoyed under the Jay treaty. This growing rivalry was temporarily embittered by the fall in the price of furs as a result of the European wars. The pressure for assistance was equally strong upon both governments, but 174 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY it was most effective at this time in strengthening the call for war from the American frontier.^ It is not to be supposed that the purpose of the virile West was purely self-defence. To north, to west, to south. Conquest of it felt nothing stronger than itself, except the Canada bonds of the United States government which held it in. It strained at the leash. It felt competent, if left alone, to settle all its difficulties in the completest man- ner by wiping out opposition. It wished merely permission to use its strength. February 22, 1810, Henry Clay said to the Senate: "The conquest of Canada is in your power, I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state that I verily believe that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet." The new national spirit, thus directed by the West, swept the administration fluttering before it. The breeze was fanned, „, , . , to be sure, by some new episodes, such as the War declared . . encounter in 1811 of the President and the Little Belt, in which the former avenged our navy for the maltreat- ment of the Chesapeake by the Leopard, and the publication by Congress in 1812 of the papers of John Henry, a British secret agent; but these things counted little. On April 1, 1812, in a secret message, Madison recommended an em- bargo preparatory to war. On June 1 he recommended war, and on July 1 8 Congress accepted the recommendation. England at the eleventh hour sought to preserve peace. She sent over the comparatively agreeable Augustus John England's ef- Foster. Apology and reparation for the fort for peace Leopard-Chesapeake affair were at length ar- ranged. On June 16 the recall of the orders was voted by Parliament. Madison, however, deemed this insufficient. He demanded assurance that blockades should not be made ' Washington Irving, Astoria, 1 vols., Philadelphia, 1836; H. M. Chitten- den, The American Fur Trade of the Far West, 3 vols.. New York, 1902; The Fur-trade in Wisconsin, Wisconsin Hist. Soc, Collections, 1911, vol. xx. WAR WITH ENGLAND 175 to do the duty of the orders, that the enforcement of English blockades off the American coast should cease, and that the impressment of seamen should be suspended, pending a treaty which should settle the matter definitively. In the election of 1812 the country supported Madison by reelecting him. It is noticeable that the commercial states voted ^ , . . 1 • f» 1 c Causes of war agamst him, protestmg at this nnal attempt oi an administration of agriculturists to protect our commercial interests. The West solidly supported him. The causes of the war were not Great Britain's failure to agree with us as to the position of neutrals, nor did they spring from the jockeying of Napoleon; they lay rather in the national anger roused by twenty years' disregard of our neutral rights. It was not detailed arguments, but accumulated woes, that moved the "War Hawks" of the East, while those of the West felt the added impulse to obtain a free hand for the settlement of their own problems. CHAPTER XV PEACE Until the spring of 1814 Great Britain did not blockade the coast north of Cape Cod. In part this forbearance may p t R t • hs^ve been due to a hope, based upon the re- and New Eng- ports of secret agents Hke John Henry and John Howe, her consuls, and Jackson her minister, that the discontent of that region might find ex- pression in separation from the United States,^ It was true that its leading men doubted whether they could forever endure a government so distasteful in its policies; and their anger mounted higher when, in this supreme moment of the contest between Napoleon representing the forces of revolu- tion, and England the supporter of order, the administration threw its weight into what they believed was the wrong scale. Their view was expressed by Pickering's toast to Jackson in 1810, "The world's last hope, — Britain's fast- anchored isle." This feeling extended to heckling the govern- ment, and later to action looking toward a break-up of the Union; but it did not reach the point of treating with the national enemy, nor did it prevent New England from doing its fair share in the war.^ Great Britain did not lose by her leniency, however, and probably her motive was less political than commercial. The „, , West Indies and the armies in Canada needed War trade supplies, and New England could furnish them, and did. As, in the wars between England and France when we were colonies, our ship-captains helped supply the French ^ "Secret Reports of .John Howe, 1808," Amer. Hist. Review, 1911-12, xvii. 70-102, 332-3.54; see also Paullin and Paxson, Guide,'"hiniy Jackson Papers." 2 Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy (Boston, 1867), 242-306. 176 PEACE 177 West India islands/ so now, under one disguise or another, the New England ships brought to Halifax and other ports the needed provisions, and from one point or another gath- ered cargoes to import into Boston and other open ports. In fact, war proved to have less effect on New England com- merce than the embargo had had. South of Cape Cod the blockade was so far from being of the "paper" variety that practically no trade could go on without the assent of Great Britain. Her armies in Spain, however, must be fed, and they continued to draw their supplies from the ample gran- aries about the Chesapeake, brought to them in American vessels equipped with special licences. Privateering, more- over, was not much more hazardous than were many other branches of the trade which Americans had been pursuing. Many merchants strengthened their craft, enlarged their crews, and scoured the seas for British merchantmen. The national balance of captures and losses was not very unequal, about seventeen hundred captures of merchant vessels being credited to the Americans as against about fourteen hundred losses; but wealth changed hands rapidly. Fortunes running over a million were won. The losses made less impression because, owing to various kinds of insurance, they actually did not fall with corresponding heaviness upon individuals. Most avenues of trade, however, were closed, and par- ticularly the ordinary unromantic routes. The severest blow was the cutting-off of the coast trade, changed con- which had been steadily growing since the end ^^^^°^^ ^ ^814 of the Revolution, and which alone had escaped the dead hand of the embargo. The Newfoundland fisheries also were closed. With the fall of Napoleon in the spring of 1814, England, on the day after her final peace with France, shut up the United States so completely that during that summer her commerce was represented on the ocean by nothing but some forty or fifty privateers. 1 G. S. Kimball, Correspondence of WiUiam Pitt . . . vyith Colonial Gov- ernors, 2 vols.. New York, etc., 1906. 178 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY To the West, which had wanted the war, it brought both satisfaction and disappointment. The Indians were thor- Westem cam- oughly and, as it proved, finally overwhelmed, paigns both to the south in the battle of Horseshoe Bend, and to the north in the battle of Thames. This latter result, however, was not due to the unassisted efforts of the frontiersmen themselves, as Clay had boasted that it would be. The navy, which after a brilliant and important struggle had been driven from the ocean, sent of its personnel to the lakes, where, in the battles of Lake Erie and Lake Cham- plain, it established a control, which it continued to main- tain, over all the border lakes except Ontario, where neither side obtained supremacy. Even with this assistance Upper Canada remained unconquered. The western leaders had overlooked one element in the situation, — the people of the region which is now Ontario. The nucleus of this sturdy population consisted of American loyalists and their de- scendants. Hearty in their hatred of the United States, they were situated nearer the strategic points than were the Amer- icans, and they afforded a substantial support to the British troops, which until 1814 were none too numerous. After the release of Wellington's veterans by the closing of the European wars, conquest by the Americans was of course out of question. In fact, in that year the British held points on American soil all along the northern boundary. ^ While these events were taking place negotiations for peace were in progress.^ It was displeasing to the czar that, Russia offers just when Napoleon was invading Russia to mediation ^j^^^ ^ler ports to American trade, the United States should go to war with Great Britain, his friend and leading ally. He, therefore, September 21, 1812, offered 1 C. P. Lucas, The Canadian War of 1812. Oxford, 1906. ' For the peace negotiations, the Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, and the Writ- ings of Gallatin are the most valuable and interesting sources, taken, of course, in connection with the official dispatches in the American State Papers, Foreign Relations. The best historical account is that in the last chapter of Mahan's Sea Power in its Rdatiotis to the War of 1812. PEACE 179 mediation, and Adams at once sent word of the offer to Washington. It reached there with the news of Napoleon's reverses. We had bet on the wrong horse. We had care- fully refrained from allying ourselves with Napoleon, but the fact that he too was fighting England had undoubtedly lent us courage. Madison did not relish the idea of carrying on the war alone. Indeed, there was no reason why he should not negotiate, or why he should not accept the mediation of Russia, whose useful friendship our commerce had experi- enced. The offer was therefore accepted, March 11, 1813, and a mission was appointed consisting of Albert Gallatin and Adams of the administration party, and James A. Bayard, a Federalist. When Gallatin and Bayard reached Europe they found the offer of mediation rejected by England. Although Great Britain and Russia were united in fighting Russia versus Napoleon, their ideas did not harmonize on ^'■^** Britain many other subjects. Particularly on those involved in the dispute between Great Britain and the United States were they poles apart, Russia clinging to the pronouncements of Catharine's Armed Neutrality, England to the principles that had so long controlled her conduct. "Maritime law!" said Lord Walpole at one time to Adams. "Why, Russia may fight us till she sinks, and she will get no maritime law from us; that is no change in the maritime law. Maritime law submitted to the Congress! What can there be upon earth more absurd?" Alexander, moreover, became less intent upon pressing the matter as the allies became more successful and it was seen that the weight of America was not sufficient to prevent the balance tipping against Na- poleon. Mediation failed. On July 13, 1813, Castlereagh offered to negotiate directly. This offer, made while victory in Europe was still undeter- mined, was eagerly accepted by Madison after the defeat of Napoleon in the campaigns of that year had become pat- ent. He added to the American commission Henry Clay to 180 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY represent the West, and Jonathan Russell, who had served in France. After some troublesome preliminaries it was ar- Opening of ne- ranged that the negotiations take place at Ghent, gotiations ^^le two commissions were well chosen and rep- resentative. On the British side Lord Gambler was an ad- miral, Henry Goulburn was member of Parliament and under- secretary for the colonies, and William Adams was a doctor of law. Expert and skilful as they were, however, they were no match for the American commissioners. Three of these, Gallatin, Bayard, and Clay, were without diplomatic ex- perience, but Gallatin and Clay, with Adams, were among the ablest half-dozen men of our country. They were thor- oughly at home in handling American questions; they were used to dealing with men; and they had an intellectual power and a driving force which utterly overshadowed that of their opponents. England was at the disadvantage of having her best talent diverted to the more important Congress of Vienna, but even her delegation there could not have over- matched the Americans at Ghent. Though Adams was the head of the American commission, Gallatin was its most influential member. A French Swiss by birth and education, and of noble family, he was regarded by Europeans as one of themselves, familiar with their standards and mode of life, a solace in their intercourse with the, if not untutored at least differently tutored, Americans. At the most critical moment of the negotiation the duke of Wellington did not hesitate to write to him privately of his wish for peace. Gallatin acted as mediator between the members of the commission and between the commission as a whole and European public men.^ Our best efforts were indeed needed. England was at her pinnacle. The Times, in June, 1814, when Gallatin and Bayard were in London, said: "Having disposed of all our enemies in Europe, let us have no cant of moderation. There ' A Great Peace Maker, the Diary of James Gallatin, New York, 1914, 34-35. PEACE 181 is no public feeling in the country stronger than that of indignation against the Americans. As we urged the principle of no peace with Bonaparte, so we English opin- must maintain the doctrine of no peace with '°° James Madison." The same paper, announcing the American victory at Plattsburg, said, October 14, 1814: "This is a lamentable event to the civilized world. The subversion of the whole system of the Jeffersonian school . . . was an event to which we should have bent and yet must bend all our energies. The present American government must be displaced, or it will sooner or later plant its poisoned dagger in the heart of the parent state." Again it declared, "Mr. Madison's dirty swindling manoeuvers in respect to Louisiana and the Floridas remain to be punished." The British were at this time in Spanish Florida; they threatened Mobile; and throughout the negotiations news was awaited of the fleet and the army under Pakenham which was advancing upon New Orleans. Louisiana had as yet but a small American population, it was isolated from the settled West, and the loyalty of its Creoles was in doubt. It seemed possible, therefore, that the mouth of the Mississippi might be lost and all the attendant problems once more arise. More definite was the danger to the northward. The Canadian Gazette insisted that the United States surrender the northern part of New York State, so as The "buffer to give Canada both banks of the St. Lawrence ^***® and of the Niagara. It insisted also on a guaranteed buffer Indian country, bounded toward the United States by a line from Sandusky to Kaskaskia. This old idea, which Hammond had been instructed to act upon in 1792, was now being continually urged upon the British ministry. Tackle wrote to Lord Bathurst, November 24, 1812, suggest- ing that the Indian territory extend to the Maumee and the Wabash. "It would be, in my feeble judgment," he urged, "if occupied exclusively by Indians, an all important barrier to the designs of the United States against the influence, 182 AMERICAN DIPLOIVIACY and intercourse of the British, with the immense regions extending Westerly even to the Pacific Ocean." The fur- traders and the Indians had fought well during the war, the latter especially had suffered; now both demanded that protection which they had persistently been claiming from the British government since 1783. Under these circumstances, Castlereagh issued his in- structions, July 28, 1814. Maritime law was not to be The rival in- touched. The boundary should be "rectified" structions ^^ ^^ gj^^ ^^^ British a road from Halifax to Quebec, with Sackett's harbor to command the St. Lawrence, Fort Niagara to command the river of the same name, and Moose island and Eastport to command the mouth of the St. Croix. The Indians should be included in the treaty, and should be assured of a mutually guaranteed boundary, — that fixed by Wayne's treaty of 1795. The United States must give up its privileges in the fisheries, and the naviga- tion of the lakes; England, having access to the Mississippi through the Indian country, must continue to enjoy its navigation. The American instructions, prepared by Mon- roe, January 14, 1814, were to obtain first of all an acknowl- edgment of the American position on points of maritime law, though a compromise was suggested on the subject of im- pressment whereby Great Britain was to yield the right and the United States was to forbid British born sailors to serve in American vessels. Indemnity was to be secured for illegal captures. The commissioners were to urge "the ad- vantages to both countries which arc promised by a transfer of the upi)er parts and even the whole of Canada to the United States," and were to point out that experience had shown that Great Britain could not "participate in the dominion and navigation of the lakes without incurring the danger of an early renewal of the war." These differences seemed to preclude the possibility of agreement, especially since the British terms were presented in the form of an ultimatum. On August 24, the American PEACE 183 commissioners returned a " unanimous and decided negative," in a very able vote setting forth that the English claims were "founded neither on reciprocity, nor any of the usual bases of negotiation, neither that of uti possedetis nor of status quo ante helium." Openly, but not hastily, they prepared to leave Ghent. While thus delaying they talked much with the British commissioners, par- ticularly in regard to the buffer state. Gallatin asked what would become of the hundred thousand Americans already living within the boundary proposed. Goulburn, perhaps hearing of them for the first time, thought that the line might be slightly changed, but that on the whole the Ameri- cans could shift for themselves : the Indians would treat them well; he knew an Indian who was very intelligent. Adams said that such a treaty provision was opposing a feather to a torrent. Population, he declared, was increasing: "As it continued to increase in such proportions, was it in human experience, or in human power, to check its progress by a bond of paper purporting to exclude posterity from the natural means of subsistence?" Bayard, the Federalist, told Goulburn that, when it became known that the negotiation had broken off on such terms, the Federalist party in the United States would be overwhelmed. In the end the Americans succeeded in making an impres- sion on the British commissioners, and through them on the ministry. Since England had been put _ . in the position of continuing the war for con- peace in Eng- quest, the ministry became satisfied that if the negotiations ended at this point the war would become "quite popular" in America. "It is very material," they said, "to throw the rupture of the negotiations, if it take place, upon the Americans." It was, indeed, feared that the war might become unpopular in England: the Times did not represent the whole nation. The same elements of distress which, anxious for the American market, had all too late forced the recall of the orders in council, would be 184 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY little inclined to forego their trade much longer for remote accessions of territory in the wilds of America. The minis- try, moreover, was full of anxiety over the wrangles of the late allies at the Congress of Vienna, where events were rapidly shaping themselves for a new European alignment, — England, France, and Austria against Russia and Prussia — and a new war. Moved by these considerations, it sent new instructions to Ghent, September 1. Far from satisfactory in themselves, these new terms put the British in the awk- ward position of having retreated from an ultimatum. The American commissioners were quick to take advantage of this weakness. They refused to treat on the proposed new basis of uii possedetis, that is to say the situation then exist- ing. Under these circumstances the duke of Wellington was asked if he would go to America. He expressed his willingness, but declared that nothing could be accomplished whUe the Americans held the lakes, and said that England was not justified by the military situation in demanding any territory. The ministry once more receded, and offered to negotiate on the basis of status quo ante helium, or the con- dition before the war. Indeed, it is diflScult to see how they could do anything else. If they doubted the support of public opinion in demanding important posts and a buffer state, they could scarcely expect it in fighting for the ap- parently trivial bits of American territory which they were holding in 1814. On the other hand, the American commissioners found that in insisting on an adjustment of maritime law they ran into the stone-wall of British determination. For- Mantime law , . , tunately, however, they were mstructed from America, where Madison was oppressed by the impending British attack on New Orleans, the harrying of the coast and burning of Washington, and the prospect of the Hart- ford convention, to omit such clauses from the treaty if necessary. With these points out of the way, negotiations progressed PEACE 185 rapidly. On the question of fisheries, it is true, the Amer- ican commission divided. Adams and Russell wished to re- state the terms of 1783, which meant that the ^. , . Fishenes ver- British right to navigate the Mississippi must sus the Mis- be conceded also. Clay, mindful of the use- fulness of that river to the British fur-traders, and afraid that such a right would be used by Great Britain to back a claim for territorial access to the Mississippi by pushing south the northern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, was unwilling to admit the privilege. Finally, at Gallatin's suggestion, both points were omitted, and on December 24, 1814, the treaty was signed. Great triumph of American diplomacy as the treaty was in the light of the British instructions, yet, considered from the point of view that the Americans began the Gains and war to obtain satisfaction for what they con- ^°sses sidered infractions of maritime law, it registered a defeat. It is more important, however, to note that from 1815 until the present year (1914), Great Britain was at war with European powers for only three years (1853 to 1856), and so the treaty marked the end of our suffering as neutrals from her exactions for a hundred years. The West more nearly obtained what it wanted. The treaty provided: "The United States engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians," on the basis of 1812, if they should agree. No provision guaranteed these bound- aries, however, and though the United States continued to press- them westward, Great Britain never after meddled in the matter. The Indian power east of the Mississippi was broken, and never again within the United States did any Indians play a part as a factor in American diplomacy. The general restoration of property, moreover, included the rais- ing of the United States flag over the post of Astoria, al- though the property title to it had passed into the hands of the British Northwestern Company, to be absorbed later 186 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY into the Great, or Hudson Bay, Company. By this recogni- tion was added a third link to our claim to Oregon, The treaty provided also for the settlement of the numer- ous points of dispute that had arisen regarding the exact Boundary location of the boundary between Canada and commissions ^^^ United States. Once more, as in the case of the Jay treaty, these questions were to be determined by semi-judicial process, — that is, by commissions of two mem- bers each, or, if the commissions failed to agree, by arbitra- tion. Four such commissions were arranged for. The first one was to divide the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, in submitting one of which, Moose island, to question, the Americans suffered the only defeat, so far as details were concerned, in the framing of the treaty. This commission worked satisfactorily on the whole, although the final water boundary was not determined until an arbitration of 1908. Another commission ultimately fixed the boundary from the crossing of the forty -fifth parallel and the St. Lawrence through Lake Huron. The problems of the boundary from the St. Croix to the St. Lawrence and from Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods proved too complicated; the com- missions charged with them failed to agree, and subsequent arbitration was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, another long step had been taken in clearing up the ambiguities and vagueness of the treaty of 1783. From the peace of Ghent the United States emerged, not a "great power" in the conventional sense, but a n.ation of Our position in assured position. Thereafter our strengtli was ^®^^ sufficient for our defence, and our safety ceased to depend on the oscillations of the European balance of power. The way was open for us to enter into the European ai • t system as a participating member, or to pursue ence and terri- our owTi path without serious molestation. °^ There were just as many unsettled stretches of our boundary as in 1783, but their vagueness was now an ad- vantage to our growing power rather than a danger. The PEACE 187 area of dispute, moreover, had been pushed back and our ter- ritory was much more self-sufficing than it had been. We had secured the outlet of our greatest river, and we actually pos- sessed the mouths of nearly all those flowing from our terri- tory into the Gulf of Mexico. The great western expanse of the Louisiana Purchase assured us that the Mississippi was destined to become what a river should be, a magnet to unite and not a boundary to divide. Had we rested where we were in 1815 our destiny as a great nation would have been cer- tain; but we were already pushing our claims across the mountains to the Pacific, and it required no great prophetic power to foresee that our forty-five degrees of longitude would irresistibly grasp the almost uninhabited ten degrees of the Pacific slope. Our commerce for years had been abnormal, and was for the moment almost swept from the seas; international law had been so strained and broken by twenty commerce and years of ceaseless strife that one might have international feared that two centuries of development in the regulation of international relationships would be lost and anarchy return. A world-wide readjustment must fol- low the overthrow of Napoleon, and we must share in it. Fortunately, we were increasingly producing things that other nations needed, besides affording a growing market for their products. Fortunately, too, we entered into the new era of negotiation free from entangling agreements, and with a remarkably consistent record of action in the past from which we could develop policies for the future. CHAPTER XVI COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES The period from the treaty of Ghent to the inauguration of Jackson is notable for the continuity and the brilliancy of The diplomat- our diplomatic service. In 1817 Monroe, hav- ic service -j^g j^ggjj secretary of state, became President. Unsuccessful in all his early diplomatic undertakings except the purchase of Louisiana, which was in no wise due to him, he had nevertheless an experience dating back to 1793, and he showed improvement.^ But, although the responsibility was Monroe's, the burden fortunately fell on John Quincy Adams. As a boy Adams had Characteristics known the diplomatic circles of Paris and St. of Adams Petersburg. From 1795 to 1801 he had con- ducted negotiations with England, Holland, Prussia, and Sweden. At the close of his work at Ghent, he became minis- ter to Great Britain, to return home in 1817 as secretary of state, an office which he retained until his elevation to the presidency in 1825. Although perhaps not intended by nature for a career in diplomacy, by intellect and industry he forced himself ahead of all his contemporaries and made fundamental contributions to American diplomacy on n I)ar with those of Franklin, Washington, his father John Adams, and Hay. Unprofitably obstinate and exacting, and without personal charm, he had a more comprehensive view of our national future than any of his associates, a view somewhat obscured in later life, it is true, when his emotions were stirred by his opposition to slavery and his imagination by his fear of the slavocracy. His chief opponent » Monroe, Writings, 7 vols, N. Y., 1898-1903. 188 COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 189 was George Canning, after 1822 foreign minister of Great Britain. Both players of consummate ability, Adams showed perhaps more genius. Canning more adaptability. If neither definitely triumphed over the other, at least neither lost tricks; each won when he held the cards. '^ Of subordinates, Gallatin gained golden opinions during his mission to France from 1816 to 1823, and served as minister to England in 1826 and 1827.^ Clay, as Adams remarks, had been much influenced by his residence abroad on the peace commission. With his ready adaptability he had added a polish of manner to his natural magnetism, and had acquired interest in foreign affairs and a broad, if somewhat superficial, knowledge of them. Disappointed at not re- ceiving the state department in 1817, he was for years a thorn in the side of the administration; but during his service as secretary of state, from 1825 to 1829, he was a sympathetic coadjutor of Adams. Richard Rush and Rufus King, ministers to England . ,„,_, -.^^^ 1-11 Rush and King irom 1817 to 1825, were highly competent representatives of the country.^ In general, indeed, the service had begun to attract men of a high class, and the administration was willing to employ them. This condition was both a cause and a result of the higher standing which the United States had taken in the world's estimation. Perhaps no one thing had con- Enhanced tributed more to this added prestige than the P^'^stige glorious, though apparently futile, record of our navy in the war. Not since the French Revolution beheaded the naval officers of the old regime had the British found rivals able to stand before them on any basis approaching equality. The 1 J. Q. Adams, Memoirs, 12 vols., Phila., 1874-77. H. W. V. Temperley, Life of Canning, London, 1905. 2 Gallatin, Writings, 3 vols., Phila., 1879. ' Richard Rush, Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, Phila- delphia, 1833; C. R. King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 6 vols. 190 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY successful naval duels fought by the Constitution, the Wasp, and the United States, to say nothing of the battles on the lakes, amazed Europe. England sought to minimize this impression by pointing to inequalities in the strength of the vessels, and by claiming the crews as renegade Englishmen; but she failed to shake their effect. The potential strength of the American navy, and the actual strength of the mer- chant marine on which it rested, gained us a hearing at every court. ^ The problems that engaged the attention of the govern- ment during this period were less vital than those which Decline of occupied our diplomacy before 1815, and conse- Commerce quently attracted less public interest. To a large degree our long-sought isolation had been attained. The European situation was also less absorbing, and our growth had rendered us less malleable to European intrigues. Moreover, Jefferson's restrictive policy had hastened the same natural process here which Napoleon's continental system had brought about in Europe. Manufacturing had developed. We were less dependent upon foreign imports, and our own markets consumed a greater proportion of our agricultural products. We were approaching more nearly to an economic equilibrium, and commerce was not so im- portant to us as it had been. Our diplomacy was less in- teresting and less vital, and it was conducted under less pressure. The treaty of Ghent had so rigidly excluded contentious matters that many subjects were left to the future. This Continuation was on the whole to the advantage of the ^th"^ G«at°" United States. In fact, the statesmen of the Britain rising generation, conscious of our steadily growing power and not confronted by the pressing necessity of the Confederation and early constitutional periods, were usually ready to let issues drag, confidently believing that ' C. F. Adams, "Wednesday. August 19, 1812, 6:30 p. M. the Birth of a World Power," Amer. Ilist. Review, 1913, xviii. 513-521. COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 191 time was working with them. The settlement of many of these problems, however, was not long delayed; for the treaty proved to be not the end of agreement, but merely the first step toward it. In 1817 Bagot, the British minister at Washington, and Richard Rush, the acting secretary of state, exchanged notes dealing with the navigation of the Great use of the Lakes. This simple arrangement provided for ^^^^ the maintenance of small and equal armed forces by the two j)owers. Although revocable at six months' notice, it has, adjusted to meet the changing conditions of ship-construction and revenue patrol, lasted to the present time.^ A disagreement arose over the interpretation of the treaty of Ghent. The Americans claimed that its provision for the return of property of all kinds included slaves, indemnity for many of whom had been taken on board by s^*^®^ British war vessels in the Chesapeake and elsewhere; Great Britain, on the contrary, maintained that they ceased to be slaves on entering a British war vessel and so could not be returned. By a convention of 1818 this question was sub- mitted to a true arbitration by the emperor of Russia, who decided that we could claim indemnification but not restitu- tion. In accordance with this decision, a new claims conven- tion was framed in 1822, by which we ultimately received nearly a million and a quarter dollars in compensation. The demand for the restitution of slaves taken at the close of the Revolution was not pressed. A more disturbing question was that of the status of previous agreements between the two nations. The eflfect of a war upon earlier treaties is a subject which Effect of war had not then, and indeed has not yet, been o^^ treaties reduced to rule. The courts of this country and of others have continued to enforce provisions respecting individual rights established under earlier treaties, though this does not ^ J. M. Callahan, Agreement of 1817; Reduction of Naval Forces upon the American Lakes, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1895, pp. 369-392. 192 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY include a recognition of the power to create fresh rights from the provisions of an earlier treaty after a war has intervened. Again, many treaties contain provisions relating to conduct during hostilities which would be meaningless were they supposed to lapse with a declaration of war. Special priv- ileges and arrangements, on the other hand, are commonly un- derstood so to lapse. In discussing this problem, Adams was particularly anxious to obtain recognition of the rights and privileges accorded to American fishermen on the coast of British America by the treaty of 1783. The British held that these clauses had ceased to operate; consequently fifteen hundred New England vessels previously employed in this occupation were now barred from it. Adams could not press his point as he might have wished; for we on our part treated as void the permanent clause of the Jay treaty giving mutual privileges in the fur trade, by passing, April 29, 1816, an act forbidding licences for trade with the Indians to any except United States citizens, unless by special permission of the President. Adams attempted to draw a distinction between the two treaties, on the ground that the first "was not, in the general provisions, one of those which, by the common understanding and usage of civilized nations, is or can be considered as annulled by a subsequent war." This Lord Bathurst denied; but he admitted that this treaty, "like many others, contained provisions of different charac- ter — some in their own nature irrevocable, and others of a temporary character." Upon this basis the convention of 1818 dealt with the question. The "right" of Americans to fish off the Banks of _, . Newfoundland, " acknowledged " by the treaty 1818 and the of 1783, remained acknowledged; the "liber- ties," however, were treated as void, and a substitute arrangement was entered into. This contract gave us the right to take fish within the three-mile limit on the coast of Labrador and certain specified coasts of New- foundland, and to use for drying fish the same shores so long COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 193 as they remained unsettled. Our fishermen might also use the settled harbors "for the purpose of shelter and of repair- ing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever." But, runs the treaty, "they shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the priv- ileges hereby reserved to them." Under this convention, which is still in force, the American fishermen at once resumed their occupation. In spite of its apparently hberal provisions, however, the document proved to be a Pandora's box of lems of the discords, and its ambiguities have been sources of dispute almost to the present day. There were stretches of coast where we wished to fish which were not included in the treaty definition. Here we certainly could not encroach within the three-mile limit, but it was not certain what the three-mile limit meant. Great Britain insisted that a number of bays, even though their mouths exceeded six miles across, were closed waters; and we desired to use the Gut of Canso, separating Nova Scotia from the island of Cape Breton, although it was less than six miles broad. The important, almost necessary, privilege of purchasing bait was not men- tioned in the treaty and was often denied, as was that also of using the harbors for transshipment of fish from one vessel to another. The local port regulations admitted of being made very burdensome, and the spirit to make them so developed, for the rivalry between American and Canadian Fishermen's fishermen became constantly keener. Hereto- "^*^«s fore the Canadians had had the best of it, for the most important common market for both countries, the British West Indies, had been regulated to their advantage. Now the United States was developing into the most important market, and here the Americans had the aid of tariff protec- tion. They also received bounties from the national govern- 194 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ment, as an offset to the duty on the salt they used and in recognition of the fisheries as a "nursery of seamen." The less fortunate Canadians were eager to embarrass the Ameri- cans by disagreeable regulations, but they were not unwilling to sell them fish, upon which many Americans unblushingly collected bounties and which they sold at prices enhanced by the tariff.^ A somewhat similar question, which can hardly be said ever to have risen to the surface of diplomacy, related to the annuities granted by the United States, in Indian claims i. x t i i . • . -i payment lor Indian lands, to certam tribes which subsequently removed to Canada. Although paid before the war, the annuities were discontinued afterwards, and are now (1914) the subject of arbitration. The most important unsettled question, however, though not of so immediate concern as the fisheries, was that of Northwestern boundary. At the "most northwestern point boundary ^f ^^le Lake of the Woods" the dividing line between the two nations vanished into thin air. The direc- tion of the treaty of 1783 to continue a line westward until it struck the Mississippi could not be carried out, as such a line would not strike the Mississippi. Perhaps the most logical thing would have been to draw the shortest line to that point, but there was no entirely obvious course. Moreover, the matter had been further complicated by our purchase of Louisiana, which had no northern boundary. Finally, how- ever, the two questions were combined and settled in the convention of 1818, by the dropping of a line due south from the termination of the boundary to the forty-ninth parallel, along which it continued westward to the "Stony," or, as we say, Rocky Mountains. This adjustment was eminently satisfactory, as it gave us almost exactly the natural drainage basin of the Mississippi, which practically constituted our claim by the Louisiana purchase. Although some commun- * Raymond McFarland, A History of the New England Fitheriet, New York, 1911. COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 195 ities along the northern border might to-day be somewhat better accommodated had the natural line been followed, the national area would not be noticeably different, and the national temper would have been many times tried, and might have been lost, in the attempt to locate it. Astro- nomical boundaries have the advantage of being ascer- tained by mechanical rather than by human instruments, although, as we shall discover, astronomers may themselves go wrong. The obscuration of the Mississippi by this line, which left it entirely within United States territory, gave a curious and final twist to the problem of its navigation, _, until then a perennial question. Had the tion of the Mississippi taken its rise in British territory, ' *^ '^^* the clause of the treaty of 1783 giving Great Britain its free use must probably have been interpreted as on a par with that giving us the "right" to fish on the Banks. As the river lay wholly in our territory, however, we successfully asserted that the clause in question lapsed with the one that gave us fishing "liberties." Subsequent discovery, it is true, has shown that the Milk river and a few other branches of the Missouri do rise in Canada; but their navigation will scarcely serve to revive the question, although their use for irrigation is perhaps not without diplomatic significance. In the same convention a fourth link was added to our claim to the Oregon country by Great Britain's recognition of our pretensions to it. Neither side ac- joint occupa- knowledged more than the fact that the other *^°° °^ ^''^eon had a claim, and it was agreed that the subjects of both might for ten years jointly use the whole region. With the convention of 1818 practically all the immediate and special questions between the United States and Great Britain had been put in process of settlement. Permanent The issues that remained were for the most part 's^"®^ in the nature of permanent conflicts of interest and opinion, which do not admit of final determination. 196 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Of these, commercial intercourse was the most important. The commercial problem of diplomacy was now less than Commercial previously one of opening up markets for our conditions goods. Our fish, that bone of contention, we were coming to eat ourselves; most of the rest were raw materials eminently desired by other countries. England had a small duty on our cotton, but it was soon removed because of internal policy. The foreign products that we handled, as tea from Asia, occasioned more difficulty. The main problem, however, was to protect and encourage the employment of our vessels. For years Great Britain and the United States, the former under the protection of her navy, the latter as the sole important neutral, had almost monop- olized the world's shipping. Both suffered from the peace. The neutral trade had been a constant source of embarrass- ment, but now there was no neutral trade. Our feelings were relieved, but we suffered in pocket. The vessels of other countries came out of their seclusion, and their governments sought to encourage and favor them. One result of this general revival of interest in navigation was that at length, and with difficulty, international cooperation was brought to bear on the Barbary states, till by degrees that pest was wiped out and the Mediterranean was opened to all nations. We did not join in the cooperation, which was under the direction of the quadruple alliance; but we sent a squadron there, and we shared the advantages.^ Our method of favoring the merchant marine rested on Jefferson's idea of commercial discrimination. It was em- Commercial bodied in what was called a policy of reciprocity policy ^,}^jp}^ ^j^g ^5j^j,gj Qj^ ^^ j^Pl- Qf March 3, 1815, providing for the abolition of all discriminations against foreign vessels in our ports in the case of those nations who would reciprocally abolish their discriminating duties. The execution of this policy was to be by means of diplomacy. On this basis, a convention was in the same year arranged with ^ Moore, American Diplomacy, 63-130. COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 197 Great Britain which included her European possessions and enumerated ports in the East Indies, but which applied only to goods that were the produce of the respective countries or colonies involved. In 1822 a somewhat similar conven- tion was arranged with France. In 1826 a treaty with Den- mark, in 1827 treaties with the Hanse towns, Hamburg, Liibeck, and Bremen, and with the kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, and in 1828 a treaty with Prussia opened up com- plete reciprocity in all kinds of goods. By an act of 1828 the President was authorized to abolish such discriminating dues by proclamation alone in the case of any country where he should become convinced that a similar freedom was offered to American vessels. Under this law successive proc- lamations gradually admitted one country after another to reciprocity. The discriminations of 1789 disappeared, but with them disappeared also the countervailing discrimina- tions of other countries. One demand was for an agreement concerning British North America. With the extinction of the permanent clauses of the Jay treaty vanished the right The St. Law- which it gave to Vermont and northern New ^^^^^ York to take their goods to Montreal and Quebec.^ The loss of this privilege did not destroy the trade, which con- tinued to be allowed under British regulations till 1822; but no permanent agreement could be reached. Great Britain wished to blend the matter with the general question of colonial trade; the United States insisted on our natural right to navigate to the sea a river on which we bordered. We were as unable to obtain a recognition of this principle from Great Britain as we had been to secure the assent of Spain in the case of the Mississippi, and a deadlock ensued. Fortunately, the completion of canals from Lake Champlain to the Hudson and from Lake Erie to the Erie canal un- bottled those districts, and so diminished the importance of the question. ^ Schuyler, American Diplomacy, 282-291. 198 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY The old question of trade with the West Indies continued to be the most vexing issue between the two governments. The British Here again it was our shipping and not our West Indies exports that caused trouble. Under the reci- procity convention of 1815 British vessels brought British goods to the United States, took aboard United States prod- ucts needed in the West Indies, and there exchanged them for island products which they took to England. The Amer- ican ships, on the contrary, were in general barred from the islands, and even in the direct trade with England they felt the competition of the British vessels, which in the greater flexibility of their opportunity enjoyed a substantial ad- vantage. Though loath to do so, the United States submitted to the exclusion from the trade between the colonies and Great Policy of the Britain, but she insisted on the privilege of United States carrying on trade between the colonies and countries mutually foreign. Believing that her products were so essential to the existence of the West Indian colonies that she could force her own terms by prohibiting trade there entirely, she passed acts to that effect in 1818 and 1820, with the qualification that the President was to suspend them when he was convinced that their object had been attained. In 1822 they were in part suspended pending further nego- tiations under a new British act. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Pluskisson, who in 1823 became president of the Board of Trade, Great Britain Change in Brit- was undergoing a change of heart, or at least ish pohcy qJ mind, on the subject of the navigation Uim's. The old system was breaking down, but, like all other British institutions, it did not break down suddenly. The ultimate result, ultimate that is for this period, of the change in British policy was reached in the acts of June 27 and July 5, 1825, which opened the colonies to the direct trade of all nations, that is, to trade in the products of the colony and of the na- tion to which the vessel employed belonged. The traffic COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 199 between the colonies and Great Britain was retained as "coasting trade" for British vessels, as was all indirect trade, as for instance, that in China tea by way of New York. Enjoyment of the benefits of the acts was to depend upon reciprocal advantages granted to Great Britain within the year. These terms seemed to offer an opportunity for a final settlement, but the United States would not take them as they stood, insisting on the right to take British West Indian goods to all countries ex- cept Great Britain. Accordingly, the year having expired before an agreement was reached. Great Britain withdrew her offer. Adams thereupon let the acts of 1818 and 1820 go once more into operation. The West Indian trade was therefore again absolutely closed, as to both products and shipping. Moreover, with the greater efficiency of governmental action, the laws were now so vigorously enforced that there was less commercial intercourse between the United States and the islands than ever before, whether in peace or in war. More important than these negotiations with Great Brit- ain concerning commerce were those with Spain in regard to boundaries. When in 1815 the Spanish Disputes with monarchy reemerged from the blanket of ^p*"^ French and English control, it found itself confronted by issues with the United States which would have excused a war had it been in a position to undertake one. Although Spain held title to West Florida, we occupied most of the province; furthermore, though Spain now accepted the validity of the Louisiana Purchase, its western limits were still undetermined. We, on our part, insisted upon the execution of a claims convention framed in 1802, we were fully of a mind to keep West Florida, and were equally de- termined to obtain East Florida. Our claim to the latter territory was inherently grounded in that "Manifest Destiny" which was to play so important a part in our history. More concretely, it was based on the 200 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY argument that Spain was not able to take care of the coun- try, — on the self-constituted right of the stronger nations United States of the world to demand and enforce the claims elimination of international nuisances, an idea which succeeded "Manifest Destiny" as the chief diplomatic slogan of "imperial" statesmen. This argument found its justification in the use of East Florida by the British during the war of 1812, the use of Amelia island just south of Georgia by Spanish American privateers until a later period, and the mcursions of Florida Indians into the United States after cattle and slaves. The negotiations were conducted at Washington by Adams with Don Luis de Onis, whose titles fill nine lines of the treaty. They were assisted by the French minister, Baron Hyde de Neuville to whose tact success was in part due. The United States em- phasized its views in 1817 by ordering the temporary occupa- tion, for the suppression of piratical privateering, of Amelia island on the one side and Galveston on the other. More important were the orders given to General Andrew Jackson, commanding the southern department, to follow across the border, and chastise in their homes, any Indians marauding United States territory. Jackson, misconceiving the scope of his orders, invaded Florida in the winter of 1818, and not only dealt with the Indians but seized the Spanish forts of St. Marks and Pensacola, and hanged, after a court-martial, two Englishmen, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, who were ac- cused of assisting the Indians.^ This episode, which under other circumstances might have embroiled us with both Spain and England, Adams used to quicken the negotiation. Knowing that the latter country did not care to trouble itself over two cosmopolitan adven- ^ H. B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida, its History and Diplomacy, Cleve- land, 1906; James Schouler, Historical Briefs (New York, 1896), "Monroe and the Rhea Letter"; R. C. H. Catterall, A French Diplomat and the Treaty with Spain, 1819, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1905, i. 21; Frances Jackson, Memoir of Baron Hyde de Neuville, St. Louis, 1913. COMMERCE AND BOUNDARIES 201 turers, he set up the claim that they had expatriated them- selves by their activities. To De Onis he wrote: "If, as the commanders both at Pensacola and St. Marks Adams de- have alleged, this has been the result of their *®°^^ Jackson weakness rather than their will; if they have assisted the Indians against the United States to avert their hostilities from the province which they have not sufficient force to defend against them, it may serve in some measure to ex- culpate, individually, those officers; but it must carry demon- stration irresistible to the Spanish government, that the right of the United States can as little compound with impotence as with perfidy, and that Spain must immediately make her election, either to place a force in Florida adequate at once to the protection of her territory, and to the fulfillment of her engagements, or cede to the United States a province, of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession, but which is, in fact, a derelict, open to the occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage, of the United States, and serving no other earthly purpose than as a post of annoyance to them." Meantime the settlement of the western boundary was under discussion. We claimed to the Rio Grande, on the basis of French exploration under La Salle. The Texas Since, however. La Salle went there by mis- William Kingsford, History of Canada (10 vols., London. 1888-98), x. 430-457; Shcpard, Van Buren, 350-356; House Exec. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 74. The Caroline RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 233 drifting and afire over the falls. In the scrimmage one Amer- ican was killed. The excitement which this violation of our territory caused among the border population, already afire with sympathy for the Canadian movement, was intensified by a new episode which grew out of it. In 1840 Alexander McLeod, a Canadian, boasted in a New York saloon that he had been of the boarding party and had killed the American. He was at once arrested and put on trial for murder. The British government demanded that he be released on the ground that whatever he had done had been done under orders. The United States replied that he was being tried in a state court and that the national gov- ernment could not interfere. Webster, who became secretary of state in March, 1841, wrote to President Tyler in July, that "Hunters' Lodges" were organized along the border from Maine to Wisconsin, that they were said to number ten thousand members and to desire war with Great Britain, that they were likely to attempt violence against McLeod, and that, if a " mob should kill him, war would be inevitable in ten days." ^ The coming in of Webster at this juncture was fortunate, and it happily coincided with the new British ministry of Sir Robert Peel, favorably inclined to a settle- „, . . Webster ment with the United States. Webster was well known to the ministry, which sent Lord Ashburton over to treat with him. The latter was a member of the firm of Baring Brothers, his wife was an American, and he personally knew Webster, to whom he wrote truly, January 2, 1842, " The principal aim and object of that part of my life devoted to public objects during the thirty-five years that I have had a seat in one or the other House of Parliament, has been to impress on others the necessity of, and to promote myself, peace and harmony between our countries." Under such pleasing auspices the settlement was undertaken, but the mutual friendliness and good fellowship did not prevent either 1 Daniel Webster, Letters (ed. C. H. Van Tyne, New York, 1902), 233. 234 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY party from sturdily maintaining his case, or from withholding from the other evidence which he believed to be damaging to his own position.^ The McLeod affair was for Webster to arrange. Great Britain was right about it, but our national government Settlement of was without authority to interfere. Webster ^d ^ Carol^e followed the trial with great interest, used his ^^^^ influence with the state government, and was not uninfluential in obtaining the final discharge of McLeod, although he w^as dissatisfied with the form which it took — the acceptance of an alibi. He also saw to it that precisely such cases should not arise in the future, by securing an act of Congress providing that a subject of a foreign power on trial in a state court might be brought into a United States court on a writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed if the latter court judged proper.^ The Caroline affair was settled by an exchange of notes. Webster admitted that such a violation of our territory was permissible if necessary for self-defence, — we could not well take the opposite view considering our several invasions of Spanish Florida, — but he denied the necessity in this case. Lord Ashburton maintained that the necessity had existed, but nevertheless apologized. The boundary controversies were settled by a treaty of August 9, 1842. Webster and Ashburton abandoned the Webster-Ash- attempt to discover the boundary intended in burton treaty j-^gg^ ^^^^j agreed to follow the suggestion of the king of the Netherlands and compromise. To compro- mise, however, meant the giving up of territory without first ascertaining whether we had title to it or not. It is conceiv- able that, when the territory in question is part of a state, this exceeds the constitutional power of the national gov- ernment. It was at any rate necessary to recognize Maine, ^ E. D. Adams, "Lord Ashburton and the Treaty of Washington," Amer. Ilist. Review, 1912, xvii. 764-782; J. W. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy (Boston, etc., 1901), 282-286. ^ Daniel Webster, Writings and Speeches (National edition, 18 vols., Boston, 1903), xi. 247-269; United States Statutes, il Cong., 2 sess., ch. 257. RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 235 which was officially represented at the conference and of- ficially compensated by a provision of the treaty. Although Maine assented to the terms, it is possible that her dislike for the settlement cost Webster his last chance for the presi- dency in 1852. Massachusetts was also involved, having retained, when she permitted the erection of Mame into a separate state, the ownership of certain lands. She too was represented and recognized.^ The compromise divided the region disputed between Maine and New Brunswick in such a way as to give the former the valley of the Aroostook and the southern part of the valley of the upper St. John. Both nations were admitted to equal use of the St. John for the purpose of logging. This arrangement gave the' United States 7,015 miles and Great Britain 5,012, a settlement a little less favorable to us than that suggested by the king of the Netherlands. Our contention as to the head of the Connecticut river was allowed, and the old incorrect loca- tion of the parallel of 45 was allowed to stand, as so many vested rights would be disturbed by moving it. The line of the boundary from Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods, which the Ghent commission had not completed, was also drawn. Thus at length, in 1842, the northern boundary provided by the treaty of 1783 was reduced to intelligible terms, except where it was frankly departed from. The few disputes that have since arisen have been of a minor char- acter and seem now all to be settled. The treaty also revived and expanded the extradition article of the Jay treaty, which had expired with the war of 1812. As it did not vet, however, cover em- ^ *L Extradition bezzlement, gone to Canada was for many years the epitaph of the dishonest American who had been found out. On one subject with which it dealt the treaty proved un- satisfactory. This was the slave trade, which had been 1 Report and Resolves in relation to the North-eastern Boundary (Massachu- setts General Court; Senate Doc., No. 67), Boston, [1838]. 236 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the subject of a dispute that for a quarter of a century had been growing more acute. In 1807 Great Britain, as the result of a long philanthropic agitation, abolished Slave trade the trade as respected her own subjects. Once having repudiated it herself, she was moved by every motive, philanthropic and philistine, to secure its abolition elsewhere. While it continued anywhere, not only were her citizens de- prived of its profits, but her colonies were hampered by the competition of other regions where the slave supply was plentiful and cheap. Thus the wily Castlereagh and the beneficent Clarkson together urged abolition before Euro- pean congresses. Civilized public sentiment was ready for the movement, at least when unaffected by special considerations. Den- Difficulty of mark had preceded Great Britain in 1802, the suppression United States followed in 1808, Sweden in 1813, France in 1815; Spain and Portugal yielded to financial and other inducements in 1817. The trade soon became illegal among all so-called Christian powers. Sub rosa, however, it continued to exist. It was necessary for a na- tion to possess a navy and the will to achieve, if she were to prevent adventurers, either of her own or of other nation- alities, from misusing her flag. So long as slavery existed in Brazil, Cuba, and Porto Rico, and the southern states of our country, the rewards of the trade were sufficient to induce men to engage in it despite the law and even in the face of considerable risk. During the last years of the Napoleonic wars England had almost stopped the trade by using her belligerent right of Great Brit- search. With peace, however, this right van- ain's policy ished, and her navy saw the flags of other na- tions fraudulently used to protect a fraudulent traffic and were impotent to interfere. Her great admiralty judge. Sir William Scott, declared in the case of Le Louis, 1817, that the slave trade was not piracy, and that no right of search existed. Great Britain, therefore, sought to obtain a RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 237 general agreement to a mutual right of search or visit in times of peace; but although she succeeded in making such arrangements with Spain and Portugal, she failed to obtain them from the Holy Alliance in 1818 and again in 1822. As the greatest naval power, she would obviously profit much by a regulation that would give her navy in time of peace almost as effective a police power over the ocean as it exer- cised in time of war, including a rich harvest of prize money. Interest combined with the highest ideals of patriotism and altruism to press her to the attainment of her goal. In the United States these ideals stood in a rivalry which grew year by year more bitter. We had agreed in the treaty of Ghent that both the contracting parties Attitude of the should use "their best endeavors to accom- United States plish" the abolition of the slave trade. An act of Congress of May 15, 1820, declared the slave trade piracy, and a growing element among the people of the North urged a continuation of this policy of exterminating a trade which had already been branded by all the European world. The nationalist spirit, however, was not prepared to permit Great Britain to police our flag, to renew in time of peace those practices which had in time of war driven us to fight. In the case of the Antelope, in 1825, John Marshall denied that our law of 1820 made the trade piracy in the interna- tional sense, or gave other nations any rights over our vessels, however employed. Between 1823 and 1825 Congress dis- cussed the subject of cooperating with Great Britain on the subject. Adams, though forced by a resolution of Congress to negotiate on the basis of a mutual right of search, was personally opposed. He wrote to Gallatin: "The admission of a right for the oflBcers of foreign ships of war to enter and search the vessels of the United States in time of peace, under any circumstances whatever, would meet with universal repugnance m the public opinion of the country." The con- vention drawn up bj' Rush and Canning in 1824 was rejected as unsatisfactory, and when Webster and Ashburton met 238 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY we had not yet come to an understanding with Great Britain. The United States was so lax in the enforcement of her own law that much of the trade was carried on under the protec- tion of her flag, and some of it in American vessels. This main difficulty was augmented by questions arising from our domestic maritime slave trade. Vessels carrying Domestic slave slaves from one of our Atlantic ports to the ^^^^ gulf states were often forced by stress of weather or other circumstances into British West Indian ports. In 1831 and 1833 slaves from the Comet and Encomium were released and freed by the British authorities there. During the Van Buren administration indemnity was paid in these cases, on the ground that, as slavery was permitted in the islands the principle of British law that slaves on reaching British territory or war vessels became free did not apply there. When, however, in August, 1834, the British West Indian slaves were freed, the application of the principle was extended to those islands. New cases occurred, as those of the Enterprise and Hermosa, and satisfaction was refused. The most important was that of the big Creole, in 1841, whose cargo of slaves arose, killed a passenger, took possession of the ship, and made the port of Nassau. Those guilty of the murder were executed and the remainder freed. These cases aroused great excitement in the United States. In 1840 Calhoun secured the passage by the Senate of resolu- Calhoun's tions declaring that a vessel "in time of peace, propositions engaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the laws of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state to which her flag belongs," and that, if forced "by stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause" into the port of another friendly power, "she could, under the same laws, lose none of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas." In his speech defending these resolutions he laid down the doctrine that the constitution made it the duty of the national govern- ment, solely charged with the foreign relations of every state, to defend before the world the institutions of every state; RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 239 that the protection of the domestic slave trade was a matter of national obligation, and not of choice. These positions would seem so reasonable and clear as hardly to need statement, but public opinion was blurred by an apparent similarity with another case which L'Amistad during 1840 was being argued by John Quincy ^^^^ Adams in the supreme court. This case concerned the Spanish vessel, rAmistad, engaged in the Spanish domestic slave trade, whose cargo revolted and which was brought into a United States port. As it developed that these negroes had been recently and illegally captured, it was held that they were not properly slaves, but free persons kidnapped, and they were restored to Africa. It is possible that in strictness we should have turned the whole case over to the Spanish authorities; but the distinction between these facts and those involved in the Creole case, in which the negroes were without doubt legal slaves by the laws of Virginia and of the United States, was suflficient to bar its use as a precedent.^ Webster entered upon the discussion of these problems with little apparent enthusiasm. In a letter to Lord Ash- burton enclosing his statement of the Creole case, he said " Using the words of Walter Scott when he sent one of his works to his pubhsher — I send you my settlement of Creole — D — n her." No agreement was reached the Creole as to this and the other vessels, until after his return to oflSce under Fillmore; then, in 1853, a claims convention submitted the matter to arbitration, and Great Britain paid indemnity. More important was the question of making arrangements for the more effectual suppression of the slave trade. Great Britain was as insistent as ever on some such provision. The United States was as loath as it had been under Adams to permit the British navy to search our vessels. Finally, at the suggestion of President Tyler there was incorporated into the treaty a plan for the main- 1 W. E. B. DuBois, Suppression of the African Slave-trade (New York, etc., 1896), 131-146, 162-167; Schuyler, American Diplomacy, ch. v. 240 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY tenance by the two powers of a joint squadron off the coast of Africa. This agreement was promptly attacked by Lewis Cass, our minister to France, on the ground that Great Britain had not definitely admitted that she did not ^aSS uCIcHlS the quintuple possess the right of search, and hence that she would in all probability actually exercise it. His fears had been excited by the attempt of that power in 1842 to effect a quintuple agreement by joining with her Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia for such a mutual right. On the basis of this powerful support he believed that Great Britain would assert the right as established inter- national law. Cass therefore wrote a pamphlet attacking the proposal, and, acting without instructions, protested to the French prime minister, Guizot, and secured the defeat of the British plan, France finalh^ adopting the American scheme of a joint squadron. In this action he was endorsed by Webster, and was supported by an article written by Henry Wheaton, entitled "An Inquiry into the Validity of the British Claim to a Right of Visitation and Search." ^ Nevertheless, by 1849 Great Britain had secured treaties with twenty-four nations, all, except those with the United _ t B t ■ States and France, permitting a mutual right of yields visita- search. With this great weight of international support behind her, she justified Cass's fears by acting upon a claim, not indeed to search, but to visit any vessel suspected of the traffic in order to ascertain its na- tionality, a course to which she was provoked by the facts that otherwise any vessel flying the American flag was immune, and that most vessels used that flag in places where American war-ships were not to be found. If the vessel visited was not American, we did not suffer; but when, as often happened, it was ours, we, with our special sensitiveness to such liberties taken with our flag, resented the visit and » Daniel Webster, Works (cd. Edward Everett, 6 vols., Boston, 1851), V. 78-150; A. C. McLaughlin, Life of Lewis Cass (Boston, 1891), 174-192. RECIPROCITY, CLAIMS, BOUNDARIES, ETC. 241 became increasingly angry. Finally in 1858, Cass himself having become secretary of state, the issue was forced, and the British government, with the advice of its law officers, admitted that no right of visitation existed.^ The American government thus successfully met the attempt of Great Britain to continue in time of peace a practice which we had unsuccessfully resisted The conflict of in time of war. It is uncontestably true that ^^^^^ in accomplishing this object we delayed the abolition of the slave trade to which we stood committed. It was a question of conflict between the national ideal of the freedom of our flag, strengthened later by the rising pro-slavery movement, and the ideal of humanitarianism. With the outburst of the Civil War the latter element got the upper hand in the national government, and in 1862 Seward ar- _ . , ranged a treaty providing for a limited mutual manitarian right of search, but protecting American interests by a provision for mixed courts to try the cases. Seward said that, had such a treaty been made in 1808, there would have been no Civil War; but Seward was apt to be hyperbolic in expression. The achievements of the period from 1829 to 1844 were the final settlement of the difficulties growing out of the Na- poleonic wars, and the passing of another mile- The period stone in the adjustment of our relationships ^^^^ *° ^^* with Great Britain. The latter transaction was a conven- tional agreement, in which it is doubtful if Webster did as well as John Quincy Adams would have done. The former was the work of Jackson, whose fearless, mannerless method of procedure marks the dominance of the frontier element in political life; it was not in accordance with rule, but it was characteristic and it was effective. More was done for the furtherance of commerce than one would have expected from the ruling elements in the United States at that time. To no small extent this progress must be considered as due to the 1 McLaughlin, Leuns Cass, 323-330. 242 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY presence on our staff of a man of Henry Wheaton's pre- eminent ability; but a factor still more important lay in the character of the commerce itself, now almost wholly non- competitive and universally desired. The period as a whole, however, would be barren were it considered in relation to actual achievements alone. Its chief interest lies in the rise of new problems which it left for the future to solve. CHAPTER XIX EXPANSION In a report to the Mexican Congress in 1830, the secretary of foreign affairs, Lucas Alaman, analyzed the process of American expansion: ^ Alaman's "The United States of the North have been TmlAn °L. going on successfully acquiring, without awak- pansion ening public attention, all the territories adjoining theirs. Thus we find that, in less than fifty years, they have suc- ceeded in making themselves masters of extensive colonies belonging to various European Powers, and of districts, still more extensive, formerly in the possession of Indian tribes, which have disappeared from the face of the earth; proceed- ing in these transactions, not with the noisy pomp of con- quest, but with such silence, such constancy, and such uni- formity, that they have always succeeded in accomplishing their views. Instead of armies, battles, and invasions, which raise such uproar, and generally prove abortive, they use means which, considered separately, seem slow, ineffectual, and sometimes palpably absurd, but which united, and in the course of time, are certain and irresistible. "They commence by introducing themselves into the territory which they covet, upon pretence of commercial negotiations, or of the establishment of colonies, with or without the assent of the Government to which it belongs. These colonies grow, multiply, become the predominant party in the population, and as soon as a support is found in this manner, they begin to set up rights which it is impos- sible to sustain in a serious discussion, and to bring forward ridiculous pretensions, founded upon historical facts which 1 House Exec. Docs.. 25 Cong., 2 sess.. No. 351, pp. 312-322. 243 244 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY are admitted by nobody. . . . These extravagant opinions are, for the first time, presented to the world by unknown writers; and the labor which is employed by others, in offer- ing proofs and reasonings, is spent by them in repetitions and multiplied allegations, for the purpose of drawing the attention of their fellow-citizens, not upon the justice of the proposition, but upon the advantages and interests to be obtained or subserved by their admission. "Their machinations in the country they wish to acquire are then brought to light by the appearance of explorers, some of whom settle on the soil, alleging that their presence does not affect the question of the right of sovereignty or possession to the land. These pioneers excite, by degrees, movements which disturb the political state of the country in dispute. . . . When things have come to this pass, which is precisely the present state of things in Texas, the diplo- matic management commences: the inquietude they have excited in the territory in dispute, the interests of the colo- nists therein established, the insurrections of adventurers and savages instigated by them, and the pertinacity with which the opinion is set up as to their right of possession, become the subjects of notes, full of expressions of justice and moderation, until, with the aid of other incidents, which are never wanting in the course of diplomatic relations, the desired end is attained of concluding an arrangement as onerous for one party as it is advantageous to the other." In the History Teachers^ Magazine for February, 1914, Dr. Jameson of the Carnegie Institution analyzed the Process of ex- natural history of American expansion. He pansion omitted the stage of diplomatic claim-making by the United States and added the final step, — that of popularizing annexation by arousing our fears that some other power would annex if we did not. Otherwise these two analyses harmonize completely, except that Alaman finds the motive force in the malevolent scheming of the govern- ment, Dr. Jameson in the working of natural forces. Al- EXPANSION 245 though the process described is not entirely realized in every case, and has not always been crowned with success, it may well be used as a basis for the study of the development of our interests in the territory of the Indian tribes, in the Natchez district, West Florida and East Florida, Texas, Oregon, California, Nicaragua, Cuba, Hawaii, Samoa, the Philippines, Panama, and even Mexico. From the time of the Florida treaty, in 1819, germination began which was to result in the addition of several of these branches to the mother trunk. The imagina- Frontier char- tion of the pioneer had already passed the ^ctenstics limits of the Louisiana Purchase, and, unrestrained by its western bounds, had begun to busy itself with the lands be- yond. The Americans engaged in these movements were sim- ilar to those who took the field in the long struggle for the Ohio valley, except that unlike them they were character- ized by a loyalty to the United States that at times over- rode their immediate material interest. At this period the diplomatic problem never took the form of defending our own undisputed territory, as it had from 1783 to 1815; rather, it was a matter of struggling for disputed regions, as in the ease of Oregon, or for those undeniably belonging to other nations, as in the case of Texas and California. The issue was never so vital to our existence as was the struggle for the mouth of the Mississippi, and it only intermittently held the attention of the public or of most political leaders. The signing of the Florida treaty was immediately fol- lowed by the rush of far-sighted speculators into Texas. Linking the old order with the new. General Texan colon- Wilkinson joined the number. These men were ^^*^ attracted by the fact that now for the first time could secure land titles be obtained in that region of which the ownership had previously been so uncertain. They were attracted, too, by the Spanish land system, which was based on the principle of granting favors to managers, or empresarios, who on their part guaranteed to introduce a specified number of colonists. 246 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Nothing, except possibly bribes, had to be paid down, and the terms were such that land could be offered to the in- dividual settler at twelve and a half cents an acre, as against the United States price of a dollar and a quarter.^ Mexico, succeeding Spain, continued the same liberal policy. No less anxious than Spain had been during the Con- Mexico's federation to people her frontiers, she encour- liberaiity aged the incoming settler by an absence of curiosity concerning his religion, by allowing the importa- tion of slaves from the United States, and by an almost entire governmental neglect. In return for his land the settler had only to accept Mexican citizenship. This halcyon period did not last long, for Great Britain was pressing upon Mexico an anti-slavery policy. In 1823 gradual emancipation was adopted, in 1824 Omens . . „ , i m • i t ■«<->/-»» importation oi slaves was prohibited. In 182o and 1827 Adams, who as secretary of state had resented the failure to insist on our claim to Texas, now as President at- tempted to cover the error by purchasing the country. He urged Mexico to sell all or part of the region between the Sabine and the Rio Grande, using the same line of argument he had employed with Goulburn in 1815 concerning the Indian buffer state, and with de Onis in 1819 concerning Florida. He pointed out that the American settlers would never submit to Mexican authority, that the natural progress of American settlement could not be stopped by paper bonds. "These immigrants," said he, "will carry with them our principles of law, liberty, and religion, and, however much it may be hoped they might be disposed to amalgamate with the ancient inhabitants of Mexico, so far as political freedom is concerned, it would be almost too much to expect that all collisions would be avoided on other subjects. . . . These collisions may insensibly enlist the sympathies and feelings of the two Republics and lead to misunderstandings." Mexico had better now, he urged, accept compensation for territory ' G. P. Garrison, Texas; a Contest of Civilizations, Boston, etc., 1903. EXPANSION 247 which she would soon lose without it. Adams's arguments were emphasized by the proclamation of the "Fredonian republic" in 1826. Although this proved to be a premature movement, since the Americans were not yet "the predomi- nant party in the population," it nevertheless foreshadowed what their grumblings at the anti-slavery policy of the gov- ernment, which was as yet unenforced in Texas, would lead to when the settlers became strong.^ Impelled by these facts, by the warnings of Ward, the British minister, and by its Cassandra, Alaman, the Mexican government changed its policy. In 1826 it Alarms and forbade the importation of colonists from coter- excursions minous nations; after 1828 it encouraged the formation of colonies on the border composed of persons not from the United States; in 1827 it joined the territory of Texas to the state of Coahuila to keep the former under better con- trol; in 1829 it declared the immediate emancipation of slaves; and finally, in 1830, it prohibited immigration from the United States. The first actual manifestation of this policy in Texas itself was the establishment of Mexican military posts in 1831. Immediate revolt followed, and separation would probably have resulted, had not the re- volting Texans combined with Santa Anna, who was con- ducting a simultaneous revolution in another part of Mexico to defend the constitution against President Bustamante. The two movements triumphed in 1832, and for a moment the Texans posed as Mexican patriots, defenders of the Mexican constitution. Meantime the colonists began to be succeeded by the "explorers" mentioned by Alaman, men drawn to Texas not only by the cheapness and richness of the soil, but by the prospect of military glory and political advancement in the » Sir H. G. Ward, Mexico in 1825-7; L. G. Bngbee, "Slavery in Early Texas," Political Science Quarterly, 1898, xiii. 389-413, 648-668; John and Henry Sayles, A Treatise on the Laws of Texas relating to Real Estate, 2 vols., St. Louis, 1890-92. 248 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY conflict which it did not require great acumen to foresee. Foremost among them was Samuel Houston, the picturesque Houston and governor of Tennessee, who in 1829 had pictur- Jackson esquely vanished from that position, to be dis- covered later living among the Indians on the Texan border. A friend and protege of Jackson, he occasionally visited Washington. Undoubtedly the two talked of the future of Texas, which both expected to become part of the United States. There is no evidence or probability that there was collusion between them to hasten that movement, or in- deed that Houston himseK did hasten it. Nevertheless, his appointment by Jackson, in 1833, to negotiate with certain Indian tribes in the region introduced him commandingly to the Texans when, in 1835, they felt the imperative need of a leader. Santa Anna tired of the constitution that he had revived, and overthrew it. In the civil war which followed, the Tex- Texas declares ans took the losing side, and soon found them- independence selves the sole armed supporters of the Mexican constitution. Thrown thus upon their own responsibility, they could draw upon the experience of scores of groups of Americans similarly situated. Their first step was to or- ganize a committee of safety, then they called a convention, and finally, in 1835, after halting for a moment with a dec- laration of independence from the state of Coahuila, they declared their entire separation from Mexico, established a republic, and chose Houston as commander-in-chief. Ever since 1830 "unknown" writers had been exciting the interest of the people of the United States in the affairs ,^ . of Texas, and now the first and ablest of the Sympathy in • ^ , * • , the United empresarios, Stephen Austm, came as ambas- States ... sador to the people to solicit aid. The tragic and heroic stories of the Alamo and Goliad, with the death of David Crockett, the ideal frontier hero of the time, roused sympathy for the Texans and hatred for the Mexicans. During this period there were always thousands of Americans EXPANSION 249 spoiling for a fight, and in this instance, as in most other cases, sympathy was not the only fuel relied on to kindle the flames. Those who came to the rescue were promised not glory and gratitude alone, but land as well, — three hun- dred and twenty acres for three months' service, twice that amount for six months, four times as much for a year. The war fever spread over the southern states, and with decreas- ing violence as far north as New York. Thousands volun- teered to assist their late fellow-countrymen, whom, after an interval of Mexican citizenship and one of independence, they expected to welcome into what was now the "Old " Union. ^ As individuals, companies, regiments, and even fleets left the country, either crossing the frontier on the road from Natchatoches to Nacogdoches or sailing from _, , . , ° . ° Popular Viola- New Orleans, their departure was triumphantly tion of neu- heralded by the press. Yet, when the collectors of customs were asked to enforce the neutrality act, they explained that they could discover no organized expeditions, but only ships with individual passengers and cargoes of arms. It was not, indeed, till 1838 that the law authorizing them to detain vessels on "probable cause" was enacted. Still, a nation is responsible if its laws are not sufiicient, and Mexico had good reason to complain. The record of the administration, however, was clear, its orders were correct, and probably no administration could have repressed the determination of the people to aid Texas. If the responsibility for this volunteer assistance rested fundamentally upon the people, the executive was more directly responsible for the action of its agents. Gaines and the In the spring of 1836, when Santa Anna was ^^^^ sweeping northward over Texas and Houston was retreating before him, the frontier of the United States was disturbed by rumors of impending Indian outrages to the southeast 1 G. L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, i vols.. New York, 1913. 250 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY among the Seminole, and to the west along the Mexican or Texan border. General Gaines was authorized to call out militia to aid the regular army, and to take proper measures to defend our citizens on both frontiers, even to occupying Nacogdoches, a Mexican town, but within territory to which the United States maintained a rather fantastic claim. This , town occupied an important strategic position, for it was at I the junction of the coast and inland roads through Texas. Gaines so far deviated from his instructions as to concentrate on the Texan border, paying little attention to Florida, and in July he occupied Nacogdoches.^ This occupation had no actual effect on the Texan move- ment, for the crucial and final battle of independence had been Jackson and won by Houston at San Jacinta on April 20. Gaines Nevertheless, the Mexican minister withdrew from Washington by way of protest. Here again the ad- ministration was able to show a clear record. It repri- manded Gaines for calling more militia than was needed to the western frontier; and, although it justified the occupa- tion of Nacogdoches as necessary for self-defence, it ordered the town to be evacuated now that danger from the Indians had passed. When we remember, however, that Gaines knew he was acting under a President who had been elected, if not because of, at any rate in spite of, a similar over-interpretation of orders to defend the frontier by entering foreign territory, and that Jackson knew that Gaines had that knowledge, it is hard to escape the belief that an excess of zeal was expected of him. Gaines's misfortune was that his action came too late to be significant. As the Nacogdoches episode reminds one of the invasions of Florida before annexation, so the whole conduct of the Texan affair seems like a less able imitation of Adams's han- dling of that question. Jackson's administration had for years ^ H. von Hoist, Constitutional and Political History of the United States (8 vols., Chicago, 1879-92), ii. i548-7U; T. M. Marshall, A Ilislonj of the Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 1S19-1841, Berkeley, 1914. EXPANSION 251 been carrying hand in hand negotiations for the purchase of Texas and for the settlement of American private claims against Mexico. Adams had secured acknowl- jackson and edgment of the claims in the first place, and ^^^^^ had paid for the territory by assuming them; during the negotiations he had preserved neutrality between Spain and her revolting colonies. On December 21, 1836, Jackson, having received the report of a special agent sent to in- vestigate the condition of Texas, left the question of the recognition of the new republic to Congress with the words, "Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof ... at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty." On February 6, 1837, he sought to bring the question of claims to an issue by a message one stage more advanced than that which led to trouble with France — that is, by recommending reprisals. At the same time he was discussing unofiicially with Santa Anna, who was at Washington, and with the Texan representatives, a re- newed proposal of purchase. The plan was too delicate for its originators to carry out and broke down altogether. Mexico, with a persistent de- termination to reconquer Texas, refused to sell. Congress decided that one more solemn demand for jus- Policy of Con- tice be made upon Mexico for our claims before ^^^^ reprisals should be authorized, but voted recognition of the Texan republic. With the strings thus tangled, the proposal to secure Texas from Mexico became impracticable. Promptly upon recognition the new republic made formal a request for annexation which had already been in- formally presented. This request at once Annexation revealed those fundamental differences which '^^"^^^^ were threatening the United States with disunion. Monroe had in 1819 refused to press our claims to the region because of the effect which such action might have upon our national 252 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY existence at a time when passions were inflamed by the struggle of pro- and anti-slavery forces over the Missouri question. Those forces were in 1837 and 1838 more bitter than ever before. Webster wrote, May 7, 1836 : " We are in a peck of troubles here, and I hardly see our way through. My greatest fear at present, is of a war about Texas. , . . This whole subject appears to me to be likely to bring into our politics new causes of embarrassment, and new tendencies to dismemberment." John Quincy Adams, who in 1819 had been unwilling to give up our chance to Texas, now, in a speech running from June 15 to July 8, 1838, put all his powers into opposition to the acceptance of annexation. He believed as firmly as Alaman did that our whole move- ment into the region was a conspiracy; the only difference was that Alaman believed it a conspiracy of the government and included Adams among the conspirators, whereas Adams believed it a conspiracy of the "Slavocracy" supported by Jackson. Van Buren, to whom the decision came upon his succession to the presidency in 1837, was not inclined, in the face of a divided opinion at home, to press the question of annexing territory still claimed by Mexico; and the party managers were unwilling to take up an issue that was sure to divide their organizations. The question of annexation was dropped.^ Texas was therefore left to shift for herself, a juvenile republic with American frontier energy and a dash of Spanish braggadocio. She quickly accumulated a navy 1 6X&S flS all ^ ^ independent and a debt. Always at war with Mexico, hostilities were intermittent. Her soldiers when unfortunate, as when captured in an expedition against Santa Fe, remembered their United States origin and sought protection as citizens. At other times they threatened to plant their banners in the halls of the Montezumas, to annex ' G. P. Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Reports, 1907, vol. ii., 1908, vol. ii.; also his "First Stage of the Movement for the Annexation of Texas," Amer. Hist. Review, 1904, x. 72-96. EXPANSION 253 California, and become a transcontinental nation. Though ever prepared for and expecting annexation to the United States, they nevertheless grew contented with independence. Indeed, the actual disadvantages were not great; when the history of Texas is compared with that of one of our states at the same stage, as Arkansas, the difference is not apprecia- ble.i Internationally there were even advantages in her position. In 1837 France recognized her independence and Great Britain accorded trading privileges to her. Texas and The latter country delayed recognition until ^''®^* Bntain 1842, but negotiation was constant. Texas and Great Britain were commercially complementary : the one produced cotton, the other manufactured it. Great Britain, while anxious for political reasons to prevent the United States from acquiring the long Texan coast line which would give command of the gulf of Mexico, was equally unwilling to see Texas fall under the United States tariff system, again after 1842 dominated by the manufacturing interests of the North. She also wanted to secure an independent source of cotton supply. The Texans, on their part, realized that Great Britain's influence in Mexico was potent, and that she might exert it to secure Mexican recognition of the new republic. It was, indeed, largely by her good offices that an amnesty was in 1843 arranged between the two countries. The element of discord was slavery. Texas assented to a treaty on the maritime .Uive trade which granted a mutual right of search, but she maintained slavery and slavery in the overland slave trade with the United "^^^^^ States. A strong English public opinion resented the crea- tion of a new slave-holding republic out of the free territory of Mexico. Lord Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign affairs, July 31, 1843, instructed his representative in Mexico to urge the Mexican government to make the "absolute ^ E. D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1888-18^6, Balti- more, 1910; J. H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas, New York, 1911. 254 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY abolition of the principle of slavery " a condition of her final recognition of Texan independence. In August, 1843, in reply to a question by Lord Brougham as to the attitude of the government toward slavery in Texas, he said that his unwillingness to tell what was being done "did not arise from indifference, but from quite a contrary reason." This reply naturally aroused interest in the United States. The retention of slavery might prevent a harmonious understand- ing between Great Britain and Texas; but, should slavery be abolished, their interests would be cemented together, as against the United States, by the strongest ties. The fear of British influence was spurring the United States to renewed interest in annexation. Texas was not the only fruit that hung ripe, unpicked, and threatened by alien hands in 1843. In 1795 Fauchet had written of the explorations of Alexander Joint OCCU- T • • 1 r~w » .• 1 « X lished in America, no transfer of territory from Practical efifect . '' of the Monroe one European nation to another, and no con- trolling intervention by European powers in American affairs. This inactivity had not been due to any unwillingness to interfere, or even to a lack of desire, but to a recognition of the fact that owing to its position, the United States was actually stronger over most of the continental area than any European power could be, and that her friend- ship was more valuable than the spoils that might be snatched in a general scramble for plunder. In answering questions as to the national policy asked by the governments of Argentina and Brazil in 1825, Clay had . ^ ^ ^. been careful to state that "our declaration Interpretation of the Monroe must be regarded as having been voluntarily Doctrine i i . • i i made, and not as conveymg any pledge or obligation the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand." Until the Mexican war our policy was negative, and we avoided entanglements in the ever-changing complications of Spanish-American politics. This left a field open for the exercise of European influence, and by mediation and advice European governments sought to gain a hold without actually coming into collision with us. In 1827, for instance, Austria and Great Britain sought to arrange peace between Brazil and Portugal, and Great Britain did actively intervene. After 1845, our ministers are often found taking a mediating part in South American disputes, 3U CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 325 but without any strong insistence in our exclusive right to tender such good oflSces. The centre of European interest was the mouth of La Plata, the bone of contention between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. In the latter country French ^ ,. . ^ . n , „ French rnflu- innuence was strong, and irom 1838 to 1849 ence in Uru- was constantly on the alert. This foothold ^^^ was seized upon with vigor by the second French republic in 1848, and Eugene Guillemot was sent to represent her. He reported, December 12, 1848, "Two opposed elements contend at present in all South America, the local element and the European. . . . Around the first group all the tendencies, stationary and retrograde . . . ; around the other, colonization, expansion, in all good senses, agricultural, in- dustrial, and commercial. But let the local element prevail, and a new element, influence, and perhaps control, the Anglo-American, will not be long in appearing in the midst of the social torpor, if not anarchy, and will produce a complete and without doubt violent renovation, and more or less our exclusion as well as that of Europe." March 19, 1849, Guillemot advised that France send six thousand troops to Montevideo: "It is not a conquest that France will make for herself, it will be only a Second Re- vast rendezvous of emigration for the use of momoc" Doc- Europe that she will open. . . . South Amer- *^® ica is occupied nearly entirely by natives of Iberian descent. A fruitful germ of our nation ought to be deposited among them, and if some day the Anglo-Americans pretend to pass over Panama and descend towards Cape Horn, it is well that they find at least on the route a people of our race, not less hardy than theirs, which may serve to head the column of the others." He was not unmindful of the Monroe Doc- trine, just then being insisted upon by Polk; but he put too much stress upon its temporary, humanistic element of opposition to monarchy, and too little on the fundamental opposition to European influence. April 10, 1849, he wrote. 326 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY "Let France declare her disinterested views in the matter, and the Americans of the North will find nothing to say, especially as republican France has rights other than those of monarchical France, they know it and they say it." No permanent establishment of French power or population came from this program; but its formulation at a period when the French people, released from administrative con- trol, found opportunity to express their national enthusiasms, shows that the vision of an American empire had not died.^ The division of the United States in 1861, and the conse- quent paralysis of her forces, therefore released European Seward's ad- ambitions and projects which her power had justable poUcy repressed. The first country to take ad- vantage of the new situation was Spain. In 1861 either Spain or the Spanish authorities in Cuba managed by some method to receive from the Dominican Republic, the eastern and formerly Spanish portion of the island of Santo Domingo, a request for annexation. This voluntary reincorporation of a former colony raised a delicate question with reference to the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine; and the dif- ficulty was increased by the fact that, owing to southern opposition to the recognition of a negro republic, we had never been on terms of diplomatic intercourse with the island government which thus determined on suicide, although we had maintained a consul there for most of the period since 1800. Nevertheless, Seward hesitated not a moment as to the applicability of our traditional policy. April 2, 1861, he wrote to the Spanish minister at Washington that, should Spain sustain this action, the President would "be obliged to regard" her "as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to cither the Dominican Republic or any part of the American continent or islands ' Eugene Guillomot, La politique et Vavenir de la France dans V Amerique du Sud: also British Public Record OflBce, Foreign Office Records, Buenot Ayres. 1846. CIVIL WAR AND IMONROE DOCTRINE 327 with a prompt, persistent, and, if possible, effective resist- ance." Spain disregarded the threat, and on July 1, 1861, the Spanish minister announced to Seward the annexation of Dominica. Carl Schurz, our new minister in Spain, asked for instructions, and in August, 1861, Seward wrote to him that circumstances prevented him from giving a def- inite answer. This change of tone needed no explanation, but it illustrates the influence of the Civil war on the Monroe Doctrine. In refraining from answering Schurz's question, Seward alike saved himself from offending Spain when he had not the power to awe or oppose her, and left open the door for future protest. Meanwhile, by an indirection of statement, he attempted to lead Spain to suppose that this tolerance of a situation which we had so often declared in- tolerable, was due to her "observance of the blockade and the closing of Spanish ports to the insurgent privateers." The supreme test of our passivity came when, in 1863, war broke out between the Spanish government and the islanders. Seward promptly declared our neutrality.^ Although Spain was interested in this undertaking to the extent of sending more than thirty thousand troops to the island, the task of maintaining her local hold, Spain leaves in spite of the neutrality of the United States, Dominica was so exhausting that in 1865 she voluntarily surrendered her claim. Spain's reoccupation of Dominica seems to have been part of a general, though vacillating, purpose on her part to take advantage of our weakness in order to inaugurate an active American policy. In 1864 she went Spain and to war with Peru, and some of her representa- ^^^ tives claimed that, as she had never recognized Peru's inde- pendence, she might without violation of any established sovereignty recover the Chincha islands. Seward, more at ease than in 1861, ordered our minister at Madrid, now G. Koerner, to make known to the Spanish government that 1 Carl Schurz, Speeches, Correspondence, and Political Papers (6 vols. New York, etc., 1913), i. 185-205. 328 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY we could not accept such an argument or "regard with in- difference" an attempt at re-annexation. The Spanish gov- ernment disclaimed any idea of encroachment, but occupied the islands, and in 1866 announced that it might take posses- sion of them without any intention of acquiring territory, but merely to reimburse itself for the expense of the war by the sale of guano. It was now too late. Our new minister in Spain, J. P. Hale, was instructed that, in case of even such a temporary occupation, the United States could not be expected "to remain in their present attitude of neutrality." The Civil war was over, and Spain withdrew. The same successive adjustment of our policy to circum- stance that has been observed in the case of Spain is to be . ^ found in the more important issue of the ac- Second Em- . . • T»/r • mi i pire and tivity of France m Mexico. The latter coun- try was the scene of constant revolution and guerrilla warfare. The claims of United States citizens that in Buchanan's administration had seemed to him to warrant our interference were paralleled by those of the citizens of all other foreign nations doing business there, particularly those of Great Britain, France and Spain. These nations were in 1800 moving toward interposition, and Buchanan, in his message of December 3, 1860, regretted that we had not taken action earlier. "We should thus," he said, "have been relieved from the obligation of resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any attempt by these Govern- ments to deprive our neighboring Republic of portions of her territory — a duty from which we could not shrink without abandoning the traditional and established policy of the American people." In 1861 the Mexican Congress voted to defer the payment of interest on foreign bonds; whereupon Great Britain, Convention of France, and Spain decided that action must be London taken. They invited the United States to join them, but she refused. In a convention signed at London, October 31, 1861, they decided forcibly to demand "more ef- CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 329 ficacious protection for the persons and the properties of their subjects, as well as the fulfillment of obligations." The high contracting parties engaged "not to seek for themselves . . . any acquisition of territory ... or any special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influ- ence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its govern- ment." Nevertheless, Schurz wrote to Seward, November 16, 1861, of the intriguing rivalries for the throne of Mexico. The importance of the movement of the allies was indicated by the choice of General Prim, the leading man in Spain, to head it. He assured Schurz, before embarking, of his sym- pathy with the United States. Once in Mexico, the allies occupied a number of customs- houses and collected the duties, but in April, 1862, Spain and England made an arrangement with the gov- j.^ . ernment and withdrew.^ France was left. French ques- This was the opportunity for which Napoleon had been working. His basis for interference was not so much the French claims, which consisted chiefly of bonds with a face value of fifteen million dollars, purchased by the firm of Jecker for seven hundred and fifty thousand from an ephemeral revolutionary government, as the hope that the Second Empire might, by carrying out the French national aspirations, successfully fulfill the colonial vision of the First. Morny, Napoleon's relative and confidential adviser, believed that the United States was a menace to Europe, and wished to create in Mexico an empire that would become the protector of all the Latin republics and with them con- stitute a power capable of resisting us. With such views in mind, Napoleon, on the withdrawal of the other powers, presented an ultimatum and ordered his army on to the city of Mexico. Finding no stable govern- ment with which to treat, the French commander called an * H. L^ondaron, "L'Espagne et la question du Mexique, 1861-1862," Annales des Sciences Politiques, 1901, xvi. 59-95. 330 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY , assembly of Mexican notables to deal with the situation. Amid the confusion of local factions and personal rivalries ^ that divided the land there ran one main Formation of . the Mexican line of division, — that between the Church empire party and the Liberal party. The latter, under Juarez, was in the field fighting the French; the other Na- poleon hoped to use as the local basis for French influence. His notables were chosen with that end in view, and they proved docile to his leading. Under his tutelage they de- cided that an empire on the Napoleonic plan afforded the best basis for security, and asked the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, to rule over them. Napoleon calculated on estab- lishing in America an empire that would be strong and yet dependent upon his support, and on gaining in Europe the gratitude of the pope and of Austria.^ The situation thus presented to us was, both technically and practically, more difficult than that produced by Spain Danger of our iw Dominica. Technically it was so because situation ^jjjg ^,^g j^Qj. ^ question of annexation, but prima facie an exhibition of popular sovereignty. Napoleon's was plainly the guiding hand, yet to the eye the marionette notables moved of their own volition. Practically it was more dangerous because of the greater strength of France. Spain was simply no longer afraid of us, of France we our- selves were fearful. We could not acquiesce in such a way as to find our hands tied after the war was over; on the other hand, if we protested too vigorously we should not only be making useless threats, but might give Napoleon an excuse for breaking from England's lead and interfering in our Civil war. On February 3, 18G3, he offered to act as mediator between the North and South, and, when the North firmly rejected that offer, it was only England's influence that pre- vented his recognition of the Confederacy. Napoleon and the Confederacy mutually cultivated each other; Slidell was con- ^ Lellre d M. Durhon Doris; Bordeiiux, 1864; "Mme. Adam's Reminis- cencea," Nation, 1905, Ixxxi. 521-5W, CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 331 cerned in the Napoleonic attempt to influence the British Parliament through Roebuck; Benjamin attempted to bribe Napoleon by a million bales of cotton. Almost to the day of Lee's surrender the hope of Napoleon's intervention per- sisted in the South. Of Seward's first dispatch on the subject, in which he assured France of our neu- Seward and trality in her war with Mexico, and with refer- Napoleon ence to the new empire said that it would be neither easily established nor useful, his friend Weed wrote to him: "Your dispatch on Mexican matters breaks no eggs. It makes a record, and there, I hope, you are at rest." Napoleon, on hearing that Seward's dispatch had arrived, eagerly asked if there had been a protest. Rather annoyed than relieved by its mild indefiniteness, he asked that we follow the ex- ample of the powers of Europe except Russia, by recognizing Maximilian as emperor. Seward replied that he understood there was still opposition to the Austrian, and that he should prefer to err on the side of neutrality. Seward's policy of avoiding offence to France and yet of leaving the future unpledged, was undoubtedly wise, but in pursuing it he was forced to deal not only Seward and with Napoleon but with our own newspapers Congress and with Congress. In April, 1864, the House of Representa- tives unanimously resolved that it could not accord with United States policy to acknowledge a monarchical govern- ment established under the auspices of any European power on the ruins of an American Republic. The French foreign minister, Drouyn de I'Huys, learning of the resolution, greeted our minister, Dayton, with the question, "Do you bring us peace or bring us war?" He brought Seward's explanation that the foreign policy of our country was di- rected by the President. The close of our war left us masters of the situation; but the task of getting rid of Maximilian was a delicate one, for there was the chance that our aroused and militant pub- lic sentiment would force Napoleon into war to defend his 332 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY prestige. General Grant looked on the whole movement as a "direct act of war," and it was proposed that an army Seward and of our volunteers, Union and Confederate, be the army reenlisted across the Mexican border to serve under Juarez in driving out the French. General Schofield was detached for twelve months to head this organiza- tion. Seward met this dangerous proposition by finesse. He called Schofield to him and asked him to go to France in- Seward aDows stead. "I want you to get your legs under diplomatic * Napoleon's mahogany," said he, "and tell him victory lie must get out of Mexico." Schofield did not happen to dine with Napoleon, but Seward informed France that peace would be put in "imminent jeopardy" by the further retention of French troops in Mexico. Realiz- ing, however, that Napoleon, by reason of the domestic sit- uation in France, could face war more easily than a confessed defeat, Seward gave him a seeming victory by assuring him, February 12, 1866, that after the French evacuation the United States would continue the same neutrality between Juarez and Maximilian that she had previously preserved between Juarez and the French. This recognition constituted a triumph of French diplomacy, though a triumph that every one knew was hollow, for Maximilian could not stand a year unsupported by France. Accepting this way out, so wisely prepared for him, de I'Huys replied. " We receive this as- surance with entire confidence and we find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of our army." ^ Hearing of the probable abandonment of Maximilian by the French, his countrymen of Austria prepared to enlist an army for his defence. Seward promptly directed John * C. A. Duniway, Reasons for the Withdrawal of the French from Mexico, Amer. Hist. Assoc, Report, 1902, i. 312-328; Latane, Diplomatic Relations of the Ignited States and Spanish America, 221-265; Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th edition by R. H. Dana, London, etc., 1866. CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 333 Lothrop Motley, our minister at Vienna, to challenge such an attempt peremptorily. Motley, the least satisfactory of our literary appointments, raised many diffi- seward and culties in carrying out this policy, among others Austria that it did not harmonize with the earlier tone which we had adopted. Seward replied, "I refrain from discussing the question you have raised, whether the recent instruc- tions of this department harmonize entirely with the policy which it pursued at an earlier period of the European in- tervention in Mexico." Europe understood, if Motley did not, that the close of our war had changed the situation. Austria promised to prevent the departure of the volun- teers. The American residuum of European interference soon vanished with the withdrawal of the support which had brought it into being. Maximilian's native Fate of Maxi- Mexican forces yielded to those of Juarez, and °""*^ he himself was captured. Upon learning that he was con- demned to be shot in the back as a traitor, Austria, France, and Great Britain appealed to the United States to save him. We expressed sympathy and recommended clemency to Juarez, but we would not intervene in a matter domes- tically Mexican. Maximilian was shot. The Monroe Doc- trine was once more established, and more firmly established than it was in 1860, for it had practically been recognized by France, Spain, and Austria. The Austrian court, however, has never since been an altogether pleasant residence for an American minister. That Great Britain does not appear in this crisis of the Monroe Doctrine seems strange to many critics. Bernhardi wrote in 1901: "Since England committed the _ t B t ' unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, and the Mon- of not supporting the Southern States in the American war of Secession, a rival to England's world-wide empire has appeared ... in the form of the United States of North America." In part this apparent neglect of oppor- 334 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY tunity was due to the fact that, although her prime minister was jingoistic, there was in England at this time a strong sentiment that colonies were unprofitable, and that it was the universal tendency for them to ripen and drop from the parent tree. Still, Canning himself would probably not have acted otherwise. What Great Britain wanted was commercial opportunity, and of that the independence of Spanish America was sufficient guarantee to the cheapest producer in the world. The only portions of America that England might desire were Cuba and the Isthmus; but the first was Spain's, the second was protected by the Clayton- Bulwer treaty. If Great Britain showed a lack of enterprise in not pushing her interests during the Civil war, at least she was spared recognizing the Monroe Doctrine at its close. It was probably more nearly a deviation from British policy to allow other European powers, like Spain and France, . to acquire permanent interests in America, and European On that point England had been in agreement with us since 1823; the conflicts between us had arisen when we were endeavoring to extend our interests. Her acquiescence in this case was due to her practical alliance with Napoleon, and perhaps to a well-justified cynical belief that nothing would come of it. Just after the war, in 1867, the House of Representatives endeavored to hoist Great Britain on our favorite petard by ^^ „ declaring that the organization of the Domin- The Monroe . ° • <• i i t> • • i Doctrine and ion of Canada, the union of the several British provinces, constituted such a change of status in American affairs as to constitute a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The failure of the administration to urge this forced interpretation upon Great Britain deprived her of an opportunity of replying to it. In 1870 Grant gave expression to a corollary of the Doc- trine which had for some time been recognized: "Hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject to CIVIL WAR AND MONROE DOCTRINE 335 transfer to a European power;" that is even by one European power to another. In fact, from 1823 to the present day the only violation of this principle has been Grant's corol- the unimportant cession of the islanji of Saint Monroe Doc- Bartholomew by Sweden to France in 1878.^ ^^^ ^ Coolidge, The United States as a World Power, 113. CHAPTER XXIV THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR The resolution protesting against the formation of the Do- minion of Canada was indicative of a feeling of hostility to Anti-British Great Britain which was the most absorbing sentiment factor in our diplomacy from 1865 until 1871. Based primarily upon our disappointment at England's lack of sympathy with the national government during that struggle, nourished by the frank unfriendliness of a large section of the English press and much of her literature, it found many substantial issues which gave occasion for its expression. The direct loss that we sustained by the depredations of the Confederate commerce-destroyers, which Great Britain's - . lax interpretation of neutrality allowed to merchant range the ocean to the very end of the war, was less than the indirect loss which they caused by imperilling all vessels bearing the American flag. Eight hundred thousand tons of American shipping were transferred to foreign flags, chiefly that of Great Britain, and what was left to us found itself hampered by almost prohib- itory insurance rates. Both these sores were kept open and irritated by the failure of the American merchant marine to rise again. Its decline, which was due to a variety of causes unrelated to the war, had begun about 1857. The most im- portant was the introduction of iron ships, which could be more cheaply constructed in Great Britain. To the natural advantages which that country possessed was added our protective tariff system, which increased the cost of our ship-building without being able to offer any compensatory protection to the ship-owners, engaged as they were in a free 336 THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 337 international competition. Quite as important, too, was the terrific drain upon our resources of capital, credit, and labor produced by the era of internal expansion which the close of the war ushered in. The rewards coming from the development and exploitation of our own country were in- comparably greater than those from any industry competing directly with that of foreign nations. The transfer of his fortune from shipping to railroads, made at this time by Commodore Vanderbilt, was the act of a far-seeing business man. His example was followed by many other Americans concerned in shipping, whether as owners or sailors, and few natives now embarked in the old profession. These considerations, however, did not at the time sink into the national consciousness, which perceived merely that until the Civil war our merchant marine _ . t, x • . . Great Bntain had been a leading American interest, and that held responsi- . ble after it our flag had almost disappeared from competitive trade routes. The events of the war afforded a simple explanation, and anger was hot against Great Britain as the instrument of the change.^ Other subjects of dispute naturally arose with a nation with which our connections were so numerous. It became a question, for instance, whether the main Boundary and channel of the strait of Juan de Fuca ran north ^^ fisheries or south of the archipelago of San Juan, whether the islands fell to us or to Great Britain. The activities of the American and British representatives on the spot might at any time cause an explosion.^ Then, too, in 1866 Marcy's reciprocity treaty with Canada ran through its prescribed course, and we notified Great Britain that we did not care to continue it. This reopened the wasp's nest of the fisheries question in an atmosphere provoking irritation. * W. L. Marvin, The American Merchant Marine, New York, 1902. * This is one of the questions that might have afforded a basis for Seward's foreign-war panacea. See Mrs. G. E. Pickett's "Wartime Story of General Kckett," Cosmopolitan, vol. Iv, pp. 752-760. 338 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY To these problems was added that of the Fenian agitation. An Irish nationalistic and republican movement, its leaders Fenian move- planned to make the United States the basis ™®°* for their effort to invade Canada, spread terror in England, and force the independence of Ireland. Archbishop Hughes had visited Ireland during the Civil war, and had successfully stimulated the emigration of young men to the United States for the purpose of enlisting in the Union armies. As an additional motive he urged that they would secure military training that would prove useful for "ulterior" purposes. He meant the defence of the Papal States ; but he was supposed to refer to the freeing of Ireland, and that was the hope that fired thousands of Irish volunteers. In 1866 the Fenians invaded Canada across the Niagara river, but accomplished nothing. In April of the same year an attempt was made to seize the island of Campo Bello, just across the New Brunswick border from Maine, to pro- claim a republic, and to secure recognition from the United States; but this expedition also came to nothing.^ It is not without significance that in July the House of Representa- tives passed a bill to allow the sale of ships and munitions of war to foreign citizens and governments at peace with the United States though at war with other countries. The chief danger of the Irish movement arose from the fact that many of the Fenians were naturalized American citizens, , . . . „ and many were veterans of our Civil war. When Insh influence • i-m i • i <• i i i they got mto diniculties, therefore, they appealed to an American public sentiment already alert to take offence against the British government. The political influence of the Irish leaders, moreover, was so potent that few politicians dared oppose them. In 1868 the House passed by 104 to 4 a bill authorizing the President, in case American citizens were arrested for political reasons by a foreign power, to suspend commercial relations and detain a corresponding • John Rutherford, The Secret History of the Fenian Conspiracy, i vols. London, 1877. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 339 number of the citizens of the offending government, indiscrim- inately selected. This bill Sumner succeeded in modifying in the Senate, but still it passed in good round terms. Seward, always on close terms with the Irish leaders, in this case found any temptation that he may have had to play up to them checked by the weightiest of balancing considerations. Just when we were urgently pressing upon Great Britain our claims for damages based on her failure to perform her neutral duties, we could not permit ourselves to be lax. The government, while protecting as far as possible the rights of American citizens, vigorously enforced the laws that pre- vented the use of our territory as a base of hostile operations. The crux of the negotiations between the two govern- ments was our demand for damages arising from what we claimed to be Great Britain's violation of „ . t, •. Great Bnt- neutrality. Her statutory provision for the ain's practice performance of her neutral duties was found ^" ^ in her foreign enlistment act of 1819. Although this forbade the fitting out of armed vessels, the Confederate commis- sioners were legally advised that the purchase of vessels and the purchase of arms were both legal, but that the two could not be combined in British waters. Acting on this advice, Captain Bullock, the Confederate naval representative, con- tracted for several vessels, of which the Florida, the Shenan- doah, and most important, the Alabama got to sea in the manner suggested. Although in April, 1863, the British government prevented the Alexandria from being similarly handed over, the courts sustained the Confederate agents. In this latter case the lord chief baron instructed the jury: "If you think the object was to build a ship in obedience to an order, and in compliance with a contract, leaving those who bought it to make w^hat use they thought fit of it, then it appears to me the Foreign enlistment act has not been in any degree broken." The American claims for damages rested not only on the construction of these vessels, but also upon the fact that, by a liberal interpretation of the 340 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY right of belligerent vessels to take on enough provisions to reach a home port, they were allowed to use British ports as bases for their operations. On October 23, 1863, the detention of the Laird rams hav- ing shown that the British government had changed its Futile negotia- practice with regard to the building of hostile *^°°^ warships, Adams offered to submit to arbitra- tion our claims for damages caused by those already built. Lord Russell said that the construction of British statutes could never be submitted to arbitration, that the question involved the honor of the country and so was not appro- priate for arbitration. It was, of course, obvious that the question was not the construction of British statutes, but the adequacy of those statutes, as interpreted by the British courts, to the maintenance of neutrality; but the negotiation dropped. It was renewed under Russell's successor. Lord Stanley, but agreement was at first prevented by the ques- tion as to the limits of the arbitration, — whether it should be confined to claims for damages directly inflicted, or should be extended to include those suffered indirectly, such as in- surance, cost of pursuit, and the commercial loss of our merchant marine. In 1868 Reverdy Johnson, who succeeded Adams, ar- ranged a convention with Lord Stanley dealing with this and other subjects. It gave up our claims for Clarendon indirect damages, and so was not entirely satis- factory to Seward; nevertheless it was sub- mitted to the Senate. February 10, 1869, Seward wrote to Johnson: "The confused light of the incoming administration is already spreading itself over the country. , . . With your experience in legislative life, you will be able to judge for yourself of the prospects of definite action upon the treaties during the remainder of the present session." The confused light broke in a lightening flash when, on April 13, 1869, Sumner reported the convention unfavorably from the committee on foreign affairs. In one of his most THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 341 carefully prepared orations he denounced the agreement and proclaimed his policy. Our direct claims, he contended, were no compensation for our losses; the in- Sumner's direct claims, particularly those based on the T^°^^y substitution of the British merchant marine for our own, were greater and must be made good. Fundamentally, however, our grievance against Great Britain rested on the fact that by her premature and injurious proclamation of belligerency she had prolonged the war for at least two years ; and for the cost she should pay. Sumner's total bill amounted to two and a half billion dollars. "Whatever may be the final set- tlement of these great accounts," he declared, "such must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case." ^ The explanation of this preposterous demand is revealed in a memorandum of Sumner's of January 17, 1871: "The greatest trouble, if not peril, being a constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is from the Fenians, which is ex- cited by the proximity of the British flag in Canada. There- fore the withdrawal of the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition preliminary of such a settlement as is now pro- posed. To make the settlement complete the withdrawal should be from this hemisphere, including provinces and islands." As Adams had purchased Florida and Polk New Mexico with our claims, as Jackson had proposed to buy Texas, so Sumner would purchase all British America. Fantastic as was his proposition, it was the result of thought, it rested on facts, and to its execution he devoted his utmost skill; as much may be said of any Sumner's vi- conscientiously constructed house of cards. ^'°° He knew that his English friends, many of them highly placed and whom he regarded as the real men of that coun- try, believed colonies to be a burden, that they would in time become free, that Canada would ultimately become part of the United States. Cobden had written to him in 1 Sumner, Works. Boston, 1874-1883, 53-93. 342 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1849: "I agree with you that nature has decided that Canada and the United States must become one for all purposes of intercommunication. Whether they also shall be united in the same Federal Government must depend upon the two parties to the union. I can assure you that there will be no repetition of the policy of 1776, on our part, to prevent our North American colonies from pursuing their interests in their own way. If the people of Canada are tolerably unanimous in wishing to sever the very slight thread which now binds them to this country, I see no reason why, if good faith and ordinary temper be observed, it should not be done amicably." As a matter of fact, Gladstone, who be- came prime minister in 1869, fifteen years later surrendered British authority in the Transvaal and withdrew from the Soudan. Sumner's plan to remove all causes for dispute with Great Britain, to take another step in our inevitable expansion over the continent without a drop of blood, to assure the dominance in the United States of northern views by thus adding to the northern element, was fitted together from the best thought of his generation. As Calhoun in his absorption over the Texas question failed to see the fallacy in his syllogistic argument for annexa- Sumner's mad- tion, SO Sumner, rapt in his vision, utterly °®^^ failed to take cognizance of human nature. To inaugurate an era of brotherly love and lavish exchanges of brotherly favors by presenting a bill for two billion and a half dollars, was not tactful. To suppose that his friends in England would cooperate in fixing everlasting stigma upon the name of Great Britain by acknowledging that she had injured us to that extent, was to lose sight of realities. To imagine that a people strong and dominant as the Eng- lish would leave those friends in power one minute after they made such a proposition was to display inexcusable ignorance. The only palliation of Sumner's conduct was that he lived in a generation which saw such visions, and that even the more conservative often yielded to them, as Seward had THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL WAR 343 done when he evolved his foreign-war panacea at the opening of the Civil war. One would more readily grant him excuse if he had not regarded with such self-nghteous horror others who had been or were endeavoring to carry out such visions, as Jackson, Calhoun, Polk, and Grant. The importance of Sumner's speech was enhanced by its popular reception and by the fact that it might be presumed to voice the sentiments of the new administra- closing of ne- tion. The Johnson-Clarendon convention was gouations rejected by a vote of 54 to 1 ; Grant, the new President, being a military hero, was expected by many to favor an aggres- sive policy; and Motley was sent to England as distinctly of Sumner's choice. When the latter, in his first interview, told Lord Clarendon that the belligerency proclamation was "the fountain head" of all the woes caused "to the American people, both individually and collectively, by the hands of Englishmen," the British government concluded that we would insist on Sumner's views, and put an end to the negotiation. This result was unfortunate, for as a matter of fact the two governments were just approaching an understanding. Not only was the Gladstone ministry friendly v • di tti- to the United States, but British public senti- tude of the two ... • ii, 4. -4. J governments ment was begmnmg to perceive that it was ad- vantageous for Great Britain to yield. Sir Thomas Baring, inheriting the friendly sentiments of his house, argued that Great Britain, with her immense commerce and her prepared navy, was the last power to admit the extemporizing of com- merce-destroyers in neutral ports. In time of war, even with a land-girt power, every neutral harbor, he urged, would be a safe lurking-place for her enemies; the only method of prevention would be universal war.^ The American ad- ministration, also, was inclined to agreement. The new secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, had actually instructed Motley to speak of the belligerency proclamation merely as ^ John Morley, Life of Gladstone, 3 vols., London, etc., 1903. 344 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY indicating "the beginning and the animus of that course of conduct which resulted so disastrously to the United States;" and even this clause was inserted only because of the violent insistence of Sumner. In spite of this approach in the views of the two govern- ments, it was a delicate task to reopen the negotiation as Reopening of neither government wished to take the first negotiations g^^p Fortunately it happened that Caleb Cushing, for the United States, and John Rose, for Great Britain, two able and accomplished diplomats, were in Wash- ington negotiating in regard to certain claims of the Hudson Bay Company recognized by the treaty of 1846 and by a convention of 1867. Finding by informal conversations that the ground was secure, Rose on January 11, 1871, presented a memorandum suggesting that all questions in dispute be made the subject of a general negotiation and treaty. It was at this time that Sumner, being invited as chairman of the committee on foreign affairs to read Rose's note, revealed his plan for securing Canada. It was obvious that he stood in the way of any settlement. Grant had already been incensed by Motley's disregard of his instructions and by Sumner's opposition to his own favorite project, the annexa- tion of Santo Domingo, an irritation which became mutual when Grant requested Motley to resign, and, on his refusal, removed him. The climax was now reached, and Grant successfully used his influence with the Senate to secure Sumner's removal from his chairmanship. The ground w^as ready for another of our great clearing-house agreements with Great Britain.^ The negotiation was conducted at Washington by a com- mission of marked distinction. On the American side were Fish, secretary of state, Schenck, minister to Great Britain, ' This whole negotiation has been the subject of much controversy. In addition to Moore's Arbitrations and the forthcoming life of C. F. Adams, see D. H. Chaml>crlain, Charles Sumrier and the Treaty of Washington, Cambridge, Mass., 1902; Caleb Cushing, The Treaty of Washington, New York, 1873; and Rhodes, United States, vi. 337-368. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVIL W.AR 345 Justice Nelson of the supreme court, E. R. Hoar of Massa- chusetts as interested in the fisheries, and G. H. Wilhams of Oregon to present the San Juan controversy, xhe commis- Although certainly less able than our dele- ^*°" gations at Paris in 1783 or at Ghent in 1815, the body was skilled and representative. The British commission far exceeded in dignity, as probably in ability, any previously sent to us by a foreign power; its makeup was significant of our growth in international importance. The chairman was Earl de Grey, and with him were Viscount Goderich, president of the privy council, Sir Stafford Northcote, Sir Edward Thornton, British minister at Washington, Sir John Alexander Macdonald, minister of justice for Canada, and Montague Bernard, professor of international law at Oxford. After thirty-seven sittings the treaty was signed, May 8, 1871. It dealt first with claims for damage done by the Alabama and other British-built commerce- «« Alabama destroyers. This question was to be submitted ^^^"^^ to a tribunal of five arbitrators, one each to be selected by the president of the United States, the queen of Great Britain, the king of Italy, the president of the Swiss confederation, and the emperor of Brazil. This tribunal was to meet at Geneva, and was to base its decisions on three rules for the conduct of neutral nations: "First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out . . . within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise . . . against a Power with which it is at peace . . . ; secondly, not to permit . . . either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations . . .; thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters ... to prevent any violation of the foregoing obli- gations and duties." The insertion of "reasonable ground to believe," taken from our neutrality act of 1838, was a distinct American triumph. Great Britain would not ac- knowledge that this had been the rule during the Civil war. 346 AMERICAN DIPLOJMACY but was now willing to have the cases decided on that basis, in order to establish it as the rule for the future. Another but less elaborate tribunal, of one commissioner appointed by each country and one by both together, was Other Civil to decide upon all other claims, British and war claims American, that had arisen during the Civil war. Articles xviii to xxi of the treaty dealt with the fisheries. The principle of reciprocity was again applied. Great Britain _, . , . granting us the privileges necessary for the con- The nshenes r« i • • i i i tt • i duct oi our nshmg industry, and the United States conceding free entry of fish oil, and sea fish. Upon the contention by the British government that the privileges granted to us were more valuable than those which its sub- jects received, it was left to a commission, the third and arbi- trating member of which was to be appointed by the Austrian minister at London, to investigate the matter and assess the compensatory sum, if any, that we should pay. Article xxvii gave the United States the free navigation of the St. Lawrence forever, and Great Britain similar use Border ques- of the Yukon, Porcupine, and Stikine. With ^°^^ England's free use of the Columbia estab- lished in 1846, this agreement opened up all the important international rivers with which the two countries were con- cerned. By the same article the government of Great Bri- tain agreed to urge the Dominion of Canada, and that of the United States promised to use its influence with those of the states concerned, to open up all tlieir respective canals connected with the navigation of the Great Lakes on terms of equality to both nations; and by article xxviii the United States allowed the free navigation of Lake Michigan. Ar- ticles xxix and xxx provided for the shipping of goods in bond across the border and back under regulation. By ar- ticle xxxi Great Britain engaged to urge the Canadian gov- ernment to imj)ose no export duly on Maine lumber floated down the St. Johns under the provisions of the treaty of 1846. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIVH. WAR 347 By article xxiv the question of the San Juan channel was submitted to the decision of the emperor , ^ Boimdary oi (jrermany. Comprehensive as was this treaty, and unique in calling the direct attention of most of the crowned heads of Europe to our affairs, it was overshadowed in interest Geneva arbi- by the Geneva arbitration which it evoked. ^^^°°^ Never before had such important and irritating international disputes voluntarily been submitted to judicial settlement. The commission was equal to the significance of its task. Grant appointed Charles Francis Adams, who became its president, and Queen Victoria chose Sir Alexander Cockburn, lord chief justice of England; the commissioners from Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil were also men of note. The Amer- ican case was presented by William Evarts, M. R. Waite, B. R. Curtis, and Caleb Cushing, the first the leader of the bar, the second later to be chief justice, and the third a former member of the supreme court. The case which they were to present was prepared by J. C. Bancroft Davis. At this time the American public sentiment that had ap- plauded Sumner was still in existence, Sumner himself, a power of unknown strength, was still watch- Arbitration in ful, the Fenian agitation was again attracting ^^^&^^ attention, and a presidential campaign was coming on. The administration, therefore, did not venture to admit that it had surrendered all our indirect claims in the treaty of Wash- ington. It instructed our counsel to insist, not indeed on those for the cost of two years of war, but for compensation for the transfer of our commerce to the British merchant marine, as covered by the clause of the treaty that read, "acts committed by the several vessels which have given rise to the claims generally known as the ^Alabama Claims.'" British public opinion considered this instruction an act of bad faith, and the Gladstone government proposed to with- draw from the arbitration, knowing that, if it consented to submit the consideration of this question to the tribunal. 348 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY it would itself be instantly overthrown. There was no pos- sibility that these claims would be allow^ed by the tribunal; 3'et the United States would not give over presenting them, nor Great Britain allow their presentation. A point of honor in each case, backed by a public senti- ment vociferously led, and in our case at least certainly not Adams's solu- representative, seemed likely to wreck the *^°° work. Such factors, however, seldom have decisive weight in controversies between Anglo-Saxons. The solution in this case was found by Adams. At his suggestion the arbitration tribunal itself announced, June 19, 1872, that it would not consider such claims. Great Britain was satisfied, and the United States acquiesced; we could at least assert that they had been considered. Our direct claims were granted, and bj' the final decision of September 14, 1872, the sum of fifteen and a half million dollars was awarded us. The commission on other Civil war claims granted British sub- jects about two million dollars for illegal imprisonment and other such losses incidental to war. The emperor of Ger- many decided in our favor in the case of the channel through the strait of Juan de Fuca, giving us the islands in dispute.^ Thus the difficulties between the United States and Great Britain growing out of the Civil war were settled, the treaty of 1846 was clarified, some standard ques- Accomphsn- , ••cot mentsof the tions, such as the navigation of the St. Lawr- ence, were settled "forever," and some, like the fisheries, were settled for a period of years. The terms of the treaty itself reveal a new factor in the relations of the two countries that was liable to be a disturbing element in the future, namely, the deference of the government of Great Britain to the Dominion of Canada. On the other hand, and most important of all, the form of the treaty marked it as the longest step yet taken by any two nations toward the settlement of their disputes by judicial process. »T. W. Balch, The Alabama Arbitration, Philadelphia, 1900. CHAPTER XXV ROUTINE, 1861-1877 While the problems peculiar to the war received most of the attention that the public had to spare for diplomatic affairs, between 1861 and 1877, they did not relieve the administration from the necessity of handling routine busi- ness and continuous policies. One immediate result of the passing of governmental con- trol to the North was the recognition and establishment of diplomatic intercourse with the negro gov- The negro ernments of Hayti, now a republic after a sue- ^^^^^^ cession of empires, and of Liberia. The latter had been a protege of the United States ever since it was founded in 1819 to serve as a home for our emancipated slaves; we had protected it from foreign interference, but had not so to speak, recognized it socially. The other American negro na- tion, Dominica, we recognized as soon as Spanish control was withdrawn, and we have never since refused recognition to any nation because of its race. We made a first treaty with Liberia in 1862, with Hayti in 1864, with the Dominican Republic in 1867; and possibly our first treaty with the king- dom of Madagascar in 1867 should come under this head. A similar change is to be found in our policy toward the slave trade. Seward's convention of 1862, allowing mu- tual search in certain specified parts of the The slave ocean, with trial by mixed courts, has been *^^^® mentioned. The area of ocean subject to this arrangement was extended in 1863, and in 1870 the provision with regard to mixed courts was dropped. In 1890 we joined in a general international act for the suppression of the trade, and in 1904 in a similar act for the suppression of the trade in white women. After our own abolition of slavery we readily co- 349 350 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY operated in stamping it out everywhere. It is of course to be noted that the danger of an arbitrary and dangerous use of the mutual right of search in times of peace, of which there were grounds to justify fear in the earUer period, had disappeared by 1870, owing to the change in our relative strength and the development of international law. The sweep of our treaty relations was already so compre- hensive that the only first treaty we made with any nation aside from the negro governments was that with Orange Free State in 1871 . The formation of the kingdom of Italy in 1861 and of the German empire in 1871 did not require special attention, for they inherited treaty obligations from their controlling or constituent states; but, as new questions arose, treaties were made, with Italy in 1868 and with Germany in 1871. Even during the Civil war we did not drop our pursuit of claims, and we hotly renewed the chase when the war was over. In 1863 and 1868 Peru and the United States submitted their mutual claims to arbitra- tion, the balance in both cases being in our favor. In 1866 the American claims against Venezuela were arbitrated, and about a million and a quarter dollars were awarded to us. A mutual arbitration with Mexico, begun by a treaty of 1868, gave a balance of about four million to our citizens. In 1871 our claims against Spain based on the revolution in Cuba were started on their long history by the consummation of a treaty. Finally during the Franco-Prussian war we came near becoming liable for a violation of neutrality by our own government in the sale of arms owned l)y the nation to France,^ but the episode resulted in no ill consequences. The area covered by our extradition treaties was increased by the addition of Belgium, Ecuador, Italy, Nicaragua, the Ottoman empire, Salvador, and Spain. Where treaties did not exist, the surrender of fugitives from justice by virtue ' Adolf Hepner, America's Aid to Germany in 1S70-71, St. Louis, 1905; Schurz, Speeches, etc., v. 33-37. ROUTINE, 1861-1877 351 of international courtesy was a delicate matter for us. We would not surrender those fleeing from punishment for politi- cal offences or from military service, and so we „ , , , , . » , Extradition were loath to ask other nations tor the return of our own fugitives. The action of the Spanish government in turning over to us the notorious Boss Tweed, in 1876, be- fore the formation of our treaty with her, was therefore much appreciated. A new line of diplomatic activity was represented by trea- ties for the protection of trademarks, made with Russia and Belgium in 1868, France in 1869, and Trademarks, Austria in 1871. A still more remarkable ex- meSIres?and tension of the scope of diplomacy and of our copyrights acceptance of the principle of international cooperation was our participation, in 1875, in an international convention for the establishment at Paris of a bureau of weights and measures to be maintained at the joint expense of the con- tracting nations. Diplomacy, however, was not allowed to take any steps toward similar protection for authors by means of international copyrights. As the most conspicuous example of the use of the same language by two great na- tions, Great Britain and the United States really occupied a unique position with reference to this question, and the latter was the greatest pirate in that form of theft. The matter had long been urged upon us by Dickens, the greatest sufferer, and by many of our own authors and public men. Collectively, however, we showed no more disposition to surrender our profits than had the pirates of Barbary. The sums involved were greater than those at stake in our relations with the North African states, and the moral delinquency must probably be judged to be about the same.^ Continuing the policy of freeing the navigation of great international rivers, the United States, acting in agreement but not in formal cooperation with other powers, made ^ R. R. Bowker, Copyright, its History and its Law, Boston, etc., 1912. 352 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY a treaty with Hanover in 1861, opening the Elbe, and one with Belgium in 1863, opening the Scheldt. In each case Freeing river we paid a proportional part of a capital sum navigation which was divided among various nations "pro rata to their navigation." Although the definite undertaking of the first transcon- tinental railroad through our territory in 1862 diminished Transcon- ^^^ interest in the isthmus routes, and its tinentai com- completion in 1869 lessened their importance, munication . . ... we continued our policy of obtaining the right of free use and the guarantee of their neutrality. In a treaty with Honduras in 1864 we undertook a guarantee of the proposed " Interoceanic railroad" through that country in return for the establishment of free terminal ports for trade and commerce, but we made the agreement conditional upon our right to withdraw on six months' notice if dissatisfied with our treatment by the company. A treaty with Nicara- gua in 1867 gave us free use of her isthmus even for troops, in return for a guarantee of neutrality in which we agreed to ask other nations to join. Now, with the change in the conditions of transportation, it was a question whether such treaties might not be more of a burden than an advantage. Fish wrote to Baxter, our representative in Honduras, May 12, 1871, "The guarantee to Honduras of neutrality of interoceanic communication does not imply that the United States is to maintain a police or other force in Hon- duras for the purpose of keeping petty trespassers from the railway." Although we made numbers of commercial treaties during this j)eriod, we pressed the policy of reciprocity less con- Hawaiian red- spicuously than heretofore. In the treaty of procity Washington the fisheries were dealt with on that basis, but in much more restricted form than in Marcy's treaty on the same subject. The treaty with the Hawaiian islands in 1875 was a conspicuous exception. This was the most thorough application of the principle into which we ROUTINE, 1861-1877 353 had ever entered. It was on the basis of entry customs free, and included practically all articles of exchange, the most important being Hawaiian-grown sugar. It amounted prac- tically to a customs union, and represented not so much a general commercial policy as our growing conception that Hawaii was another of our special interests. Although in the Pacific, Hawaii is for purposes of our policy to be regarded as connected with the American continents. With the further side of that ocean we continued , Japan to develop our diplomatic relations, although with the passing of our merchant marine and the substitution of petroleum for whale oil, our material interests declined. With Japan we entered into a convention in 1864, fixing her duties on certain of our exports; but this agreement cannot be considered as an example of reciprocity, for we made no corresponding concessions. The most interesting point in our Japanese relations, however, was our apparently uncon- scious adoption of a new practice with regard to interna- tional relations. In America we refused to admit European interference; in Europe we refrained from interfering; in Asia we began to show a willingness actively to cooperate with European powers. In 1864 we took part with Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands in "chastising" Mori Daizen, feudatory prince of Najato and Suwo, who, in de- fiance of the Tycoon, closed the straits of Shimonoseki; and we united also in demanding compensation from the Tycoon, receiving our fourth share of the three million dollars that he paid. In 1866 we joined the same powers in exacting from Japan a revision of her tariff, the rates being fixed by the treaty. This regulation proved burdensome to Japan after the revolution and the establishment of the power of the Mikado, and in 1872 a Japanese embassy made a cir- cular tour to secure its reconsideration, as well as that of the earlier treaties which excepted foreigners from the jurisdic- tion of the native courts and gave the various consuls judi- cial power over their respective citizens. Secretary Fish 354 AMERICAN DIPLOIVIACY wrote, September 14, 1874, "The President is impressed with the importance of continued concert between the treaty powers in Japan, at least until after the revision of the trea- ties, and until the government of Japan shall have exhibited a degree of power and capacity to adopt and to enforce a system of jurisprudence and of judicial administration, in harmony with that of the Christian powers, equal to their evident desire to be relieved from the enforced duties of extraterritoriality . ' ' With China our relations were particularly pleasant. An- son Burlingame, whom Lincoln sent as minister, was so highly regarded there that in 1868 he returned to the United States accredited Chinese minister to her and other western powers. Representing China, he con- cluded a treaty with us in 1868. This granted China the right to appoint consuls to reside in the United States, but without such extraterritorial powers as our consuls exercised in China. We agreed, in case China wished aid in internal improve- ments, to designate suitable engineers and to recommend other nations to do the same. The most important clause was that prohibiting the importation of coolies or forced emigrants. This precaution was called for by the bringing into this country of thousands of laborers who were prac- tically slaves, many of whom were employed in the con- struction of the Pacific railroads. The prohibition is prob- ably more to be connected with the attempt to stamp out the last remnants of slavery than with the feeling against Chinese labor. The latter sentiment, however, was daily growing stronger on the Pacific coast, and the Burlingame treaty was violently attacked because of its failure to deal with the broader question.^ By far the most important routine duty of diplomacy, ^ M. R. Coolidge, Chinese Immigration, New York, 1909; G. F. Seward, Chinese Imniif/ration in its Social and Economical Aspects, New York, 1, , • i. i • i i i against ex- earned (jrrant s enmity, a tact which largely pansion accounted for the latter's willingness to depose him when he stood, next winter, in the way of the treaty of Washington. The debate, too, was the only exhaustive one on expansion between the Mexican and the Spanish wars. In a great speech in the Senate, January 11, 1871, Carl Schurz summed up the reasons that defeated, in this period, the dream of expansion which Seward and others had brought over from the last. He feared that this was but a step in a general campaign of expansion that would stretch us through the West Indies and Mexico to the isthmus. He feared the incorporation into the Union of these tropic territories, where self-government had never flourished, where free labor was never successful. Our true expansion had been west- ward, migration followed isothermal lines, and we now em- braced the habitat suited to the nations from whom we had drawn and should continue to draw our people ; San Domingo was not a proper home for them. He believed that the pro- tection of a naval station so far away would raise more prob- lems than it would solve. The irregularities of the Presi- dent's conduct he condemned, foreign ambitions he scouted, and he made easy fun of "manifest destiny." He did not, however, call attention to a fact which undoubtedly had much to do with the popular sentiment against expansion, namely, that the movement had just before the war become so identified with southern interests that the North was suspicious of every such suggestion.^ Meanwhile, from 1868 to 1878 insurrection in Cuba the ^ Schurz, Speeches, etc., ii. 71-122. ROUTINE, 1861-1877 365 desired invited our attention. As Grant made San Domingo his specialty, so his secretary of state assumed direction of the Cuban question. Although Grant first ap- Grant and pointed Elihu Washburne to this position, it ^^^^ was merely with the idea of honoring an old friend. After five days' service Washburne resigned and was promptly appointed minister to France, where he played a useful and distinguished part during the Franco-German war and the Commune. He was succeeded as secretary by Hamilton Fish, who outserved Grant three days. A less aggressive man than Seward, serving under a more interfering President than either Lincoln or Johnson, he achieved less and deserved no particular fame for originality. He was, however, trained, skilled, dignified, and wise. He played somewhat the same role with Grant that Marcy had with Pierce.-^ The Cuban situation was particularly complicated by reason of the rapid change of governments in Spain,— the overthrow of Isabella in 1870, the formation Cuban insur- of a constitutional monarchy under Amedeo ^^^^^°°^ of Savoy in 1871, the proclamation of a republic in 1873, and the return of the Bourbons under Alfonso in 1874. In Cuba also the population was divided, the native "volun- teers" fighting the insurrectionists even more bitterly than did the Spanish troops. Sympathy for the insurgents was keen in the United States, and the presence of native Cu- bans in our country and of American naturalized Cubans in the island led to constant agitation for us to take a hand in the conflict. To these considerations were added the tradi- tional, though not then dominant, belief that Cuba was eventually destined to become part of the United States. The three questions which we had to consider were neu- trality, mediation, and intervention. On the first one our policy was to some extent dictated by our contemporary dis- pute with England. Criticizing her issuance of the bellig- 1 F. E. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain — Diplomacy (New York, 1909), chs. xlv-xix. 366 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY erency proclamation, Fish desired to restrain us from taking similar action, particularly as the insurgents possessed no ports or marine. In this object he was suc- cessful, although the President and Congress were restive. Grant, it is said, had for a long time a proc- lamation ready to sign, in his desk. The fact that we did not recognize belligerency did not, however, reliev^e us of our neutral duties, which we vigorously performed, although we were not able entirely to prevent aid from this country reaching Cuba. Mediation was offered by Fish in 1869, Marshal Prim hav- ing expressed his willingness to consent even to Cuban inde- pendence. The exigencies of Spanish politics, Mediation f , , . . •, i V i however rendered it impossible lor her govern- ment to agree to any terms upon which we would act. In 1874, we made another offer, in which, a year later, we asked Great Britain, Germany, Prussia, Italy, and Austria to join. The United States "neither sought nor desired any physical force or pressure, but simply the moral influence of concurrence of opinion as to the protraction of the contest." Italy did act, but again there was no result. Intervention by force we did not try, though Fish used the possibility of it as a goad to move Spain to activity in meeting our demands. Peaceably, however, we Interventioii . . t i • were constantly intervening. In the instruc- tions to Caleb Cushing, who was sent to Spain in 1874, — the situation having at length convinced the government that we needed a minister of ability there, — Fish explained our Cuban j)olicy and our special interest in the island. Commercially as well as geographically, he argued, it was more closely con- nected with us than with Spain; civil dissension there pro- duced an effect on us second only to that produced in Spain; the local Spanish government was able to injure our citizens, but we could obtain reparation only by the slow and cum- brous method of applying to Spain. The United States had no desire for annexation; but "the desire for independence ROUTINE, 1861-1877 367 on the part of the Cubans" "is a natural and legitimate aspiration of theirs, because they are Americans, and while such independence is the manifest exigency of the political interests of the Cubans themselves, it is equally so that of the rest of America, including the United States." With these special interests as a reason and the possibility of intervention as a motive force, we successfully insisted on maintaining a certain supervision of the con- influence in test. Partly at our instance, Spain finally ^^^^ adopted a system of gradual emancipation of slaves, a step which Buchanan had so feared she would take at the in- stance of Great Britain. Spain also promised us reform in local government, and modified her methods of conducting the war. In 1871 a convention was signed submitting to arbitration the claims of our citizens growing out of the hostilities in Cuba. Spain, however, would not admit her responsibility for losses by act of the insurgents, though we claimed that, since we had not recognized a state of war, her responsibility was complete. In 1873 the seizure on the high seas of the Virginius, flying an American flag and with American papers, caused an out- burst of popular indignation that seemed likely „. . . _ . to drive us from our policy of watchful peace. The incident was rendered still more acute by the summary trial and condemnation to death of the crew. The fact that the Spanish government ordered a suspension of the sentences illustrated Fish's point with regard to the diplomatic incon- venience of the situation; for many executions took place before the reprieve was delivered in Cuba. Our attorney- general decided that the Virginius was improperly using our flag, and that she was engaged in filibustering contrary to our law, but that Spain had no right to seize her while flying our flag on the high seas, belligerency not being recog- nized. We demanded indemnity, the return of the Virginius, a salute to our flag, and the punishment of the officers guilty of the execution of the crew, an act "inhuman and in viola- 368 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY tion of the civilization of the age." Spain called attention to the fact that in the case of VAviistad our supreme court had exercised the right of going behind the official papers and examining the actual status of the vessel. On this point we yielded, omitting our demand for a salute. Our other conditions were accepted. In carrying them out, however, Spain almost drove us into war. The trial of her oflBcers was not pressed, and the general responsible for the execu- tions was promoted. On being returned, moreover, the Virginius straightway sank, by the machinations, it was be- lieved, of the Spanish officers in charge. The administra- End of insur- tion, however, kept its hand on the situation, rection ^^^ Grant in his annual message of December, 1875, announced that our relations with Spain were friendly. General Martinez de Campos, the new governor-general of Cuba, proved tactful and efficient, and the insurrection gradually died out. The diplomatic problems of the Civil war had practically been solved by 1872, but the continuity of personnel and of Significance of domestic conditions serve to give a unity to the CivU war ^j^^ ^j^^j^ period froj^ 1861 to 1877. The most important in our diplomatic history since independence, its record was marked not so much by progress as by our suc- cess in outriding a storm. Our stake was not independence but unity, and our success in preserving unity was not solely and perhaps not mainly of domestic importance. Division meant not only the severing of established ties, but increased liability to quarrel. Peaceful acceptance of secession in 1861 would have been followed, not by perpetual peace between North and South, but by perpetual imminence of war, un- ceasing preparation for war, and ultimately not by one war but by many. The freedom to expend all our resources upon our own internal development would have been sacrificed, and the military system of Euroj)e would have been trans- ferred to America. And not the system only. Our pre- dominance in America once lost, there were abundant in- ROUTINE, 1861-1877 369 dications that the powers of Europe would have extended the scope of their poHtics to our continents; foreign armies and navies would have been within striking distance. Amer- ica would no longer have escaped that dualism of European politics, that tricky balance, in which every domestic con- cern of European royalty, every street broil in a European capital, becomes a makeweight which, if not instantly ad- justed, may upset the whole. Our escape was due to a partly unconscious but wholly determined national will which em- ployed our armies, our navies, and our statesmen for the purpose. Diplomacy was not our savior, but it performed its full duty, and those who shaped it deserve eternal gratitude. Devoted primarily to this great task, the period was not barren of routine progress. The most notable advance lay in the defining of the relationships of our Progress, 1861 naturalized citizens to the countries of their *° ^^^"^ birth; the most interesting new policy was that of interna- tional cooperation in the Pacific. Our various accepted policies were adjusted to meet the needs of the time, and current matters were kept well in hand. The continual agi- tation for expansion resulted in nothing but the addition of Alaska, and that was one of the most nearly accidental hap- penings of our history. The people were satisfied with their territory, and by 1877 the idea had developed that expan- sion was contrary to our national policy and our indisposi- tion to expand had become almost a passion. CHAPTER XXVI BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 The period between 1877 and 1897 marks the lowest point in the conduct of our diplomacy. The long and able services Break in con- of Seward and Fish had given dignity and con- ^^'^^y tinuity to the period from 1861 to 1877, and their previous experience in public life had reduced to a minimum the deflection from policies previously developed. In the new period, administrations of short duration reversed each other and paid little attention to the past. There was some continuity between the policies of Evarts, secretary under Hayes from 1877 to 1881, and those of Blaine, who served under Garfield in 1881, though Evarts would not have admitted it. Frelinghuysen, coming in under Arthur in December, 1881, changed Blaine's policies, only to have his own reversed by Bayard, whom Cleveland appointed in 1885. Bayard was inclined to conform to the traditions of our his- tory, but he was seriously hampered by Congress. Harrison brought in Blaine again in 1889, and the two united in dis- carding what their predecessors had done, but otherwise for the most part pulled different ways, until Blaine resigned in 1892, to be succeeded by John W. Foster, who was well equipped but served too short a time to make himself felt. In 1893 Cleveland and his party effectually checked what the Republicans had set in train. Never before had diplomacy been so much at the mercy of politics. In the fifties the attempt was to arouse national Politics and interest in general policies; in this period par- diplomacy ticular questions of diplomacy were thrown into the balance to turn a few votes. Particularly popular was the diversion of twisting the tail of the British lion, which 370 BAITING THE LION, 1877-1897 371 animal proved to be peaceable, though not easily led by this method to any useful end. During these years we did not put into office any really great diplomat. The secretaries of state were all excep- tionally able men, but the position had become Lack of great primarily political. James G. Blaine seems to an agent . . . lor commerce and seamen, and in the same year the first of our missionaries arrived there. The latter was particularly well received by the King Kamamaha, the Napoleon of the Pacific, who had consoli- dated the whole group of islands into a strong kingdom. The missionaries aided him in establishing a civilized govern- ment, reduced the language to writing, and codified the laws; their children became land-owners and sugar-planters, an * Schurz, Speeches, etc., v. 1-10. OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 403 opulent and fascinating aristocracy, preserving their Amer- icanism of race and education. Our interests there were still further advanced by the establishment of reciprocity in 1875, and our commerce offered a substantial basis for a claim to priority.^ This we had put forth as early as 1842, when Webster said that the government of Hawaii should not be the object of interference by foreign powers. In 1843 _^. . a British naval officer made one of those un- protection of authorized seizures of the islands which so often result in the permanent extension of British territory. Legare instructed Everett to protest, and declared that, if Great Britain persisted, we might be justified even in using force, a warning which practically included Hawaii within the American continents and under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. The British withdrew. An appearance of interest by France in 1851 led Fillmore to reiterate our views. Although Blaine, or some subordinate, forgot to invite her to the Pan-American Congress in 1889, it may be said to have been the American contention from the time of Webster that Hawaii was constructively and in the general sense American. Because of the priority of our interests, Bayard in 1888 refused to join with England and France in a joint guarantee of the government. Our protection was several times asked, and while any such formal arrangement was refused, it was practically extended. Marcy and Seward were anxious for annexa- Discussion of tion. Fish summed up the situation well in a^^^e^atio^ 1873: "There seems to be a strong desire on the part of many persons in the islands, representing large interests and great wealth, to become annexed to the United States. And while there are, as I have already said, many and influential 1 W. F. Blackman, The MaUng of Haimii, New York, etc., 1899; L. A. Thurston, A Hand-book on the Annexation of Hawaii, [St. Joseph, Mich., 1897]; M. H. Krout, Hawaii and a Revolution, New York, 1898; Liliuokalani, Hawaii's Story by Hawaii's Queen, Boston, 1898; Chalfant Robinson, History of two Reciprocity Treaties, 404 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY persons in this country who question the policy of ;iny insular acquisitions, perhaps even any extension of territorial limits, there are also those of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation, and that will require a resting spot in the mid- ocean, between the Pacific coast and the vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to commerce and Christian civilization." The feeling against expansion was too strong to be overcome, however, especially since the advantage of reciprocity made it seem unnecessary. Without annexation, even the navy was provided for : by a Senate amendment to a renewal of the reciprocity treaty in 1884, which was accepted by the Hawaiian government, we were to have the exclusive right to use Pearl harbor as a coaling and repair station. Nevertheless, Blaine in 1881 seriously considered annexa- tion, for the bogy of foreign influence was appearing. In a Blaine and confidential dispatch to our minister, Comly, he Hawaii gg^jj ^j^^^^^ ^g must take the islands if the native population continued to decline. "Throughout the con- tinent, north and south," he wrote, "wherever a foothold is found for American enterprize, it is quickly occupied, and this spirit of adventure, which seeks its outlet in the mines of South America and the railroads of Mexico, would not be slow to avail itself of openings of assured and profitable enter- prize even in mid-ocean." Before Blaine came in again foreign influence had taken on a definite fornix The king had died, and had been suc- British influ- ceeded by Queen Liliuokalani, who had married enceinHawau ^ Scotchman, and whose successor, the crowm princess Kaiulani, was the daughter of an Englishman and had been educated in England. Blaine appointed a personal friend, J. L. Stevens, as minister. On February 8, 1892, Stevens wrote: "At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall be ratified, I shall give you a more elaborate statement of facts and reasons why a 'new departure' by the United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity, that a OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 405 protectorate is impracticable, and that annexation must be the future remedy or else Great Britain vnll he furnished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment to the United States. iVt this time there seems to be no immediate pros- pect of its being safe to have the harbor of Honolulu left without an American vessel of war. Last week a British gunboat arrived here, and it is said will remain here for an indefinite period." Foster, succeeding Blaine, June 29, 1892, asked Stevens for two series of reports, one public and one confidential. On November 20, 1892, Stevens in one of the latter discussed the terms of annexation. Scenting a revolu- tion, he asked how to use the United States naval force which had been sent to the harbor. On January 14, 1893, the queen abolished the constitution drawn up and administered largely by the American element, and proclaimed a new one based on absolutism „ , ^ ^ . Revolution and native home rule. At 2 p. m., January 16, and annexa- the American element organized a committee of safety ; at 4 :30 p. m. the United States forces landed at the request of Stevens. The next day a provisional government was organized and was at once recognized by Stevens; the queen surrendered under protest. Envoys of the new govern- ment were sent to the United States by the next steamer, and passage was refused to the envoy of the queen. Febru- ary 14 a treaty of annexation was drawn up at Washington. On March 9 President Cleveland withdrew this treaty from the consideration of the Senate and soon after sent a commissioner to investigate the facts of the _. . , revolt. The latter could not obtain evidence jects annexa- that Stevens was in collusion with the men who held the very quiet meeting at 2 p. m,, January 16, although the landing of our troops at 4:30 p. M., seemed to indicate his complicity. It was clear, however, that the only solid force behind the revolt was the presence of United States marines, and that the leaders had counted upon them. More- 406 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY over, although the only proper pretext for the landing of the seamen was the protection of American citizens and property, yet they were stationed in a portion of the city where there was nothing American to protect. Cleveland recalled Stev- ens, and December 19 requested the new government to re- store the queen. This it refused to do; and even if the ma- jority of the population preferred the native dynasty, their preference was not strong enough, at any rate, to drive them to serious revolt, nor did Cleveland venture to use force. The provisional government became permanent, waiting for a return of Republican control in the United States and a renewed opportunity for annexation,^ Even if Hawaii was theoretically part of the American continent, practically it was far out in the Pacific, and even Our position in if it was still independent, its government was ^^^^ as American as that of Texas between 1836 and 1845. With Alaska and Midway island in our possession, with Hawaii American, and Samoa under our joint control, we were by 1897 halfway across to Asia. The period from 1877 to 1898 was one of flux. No strong current of popular interest or purpose was apparent, and 1877 1898 a the surface of diplomacy was choppy with the period of flux ^ind of circumstance, but some eddies in the stream indicated new conditions not fully understood. The most important development was that of our interests in the Pacific, a process which had gone on for the most part independently of diplomacy, but which must before many years involve diplomatic action. Similarly, the impending changes in our commercial position arising from the growth of an export trade in manufactures was sure to concern the diplomat sooner or later. Of more immediate moment was the oscillation of our opinions as to the status of the isthmian canal which had become an imminent possibility. Our in- terest in Spanish America was increasing; there were some signs of a more special interest in the Caribbean, but no one ' Senate Reports, 53 Cong. 2 sess., ii. No. 227. OUR INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC 407 felt certain what our policy there would be. In a general way, also, it was evident that international associations w^ere becoming closer ; but whether we should be a dog in the manger or a gracious participant, and whether participation would mean the abandonment of our policy of self-contained ab- stinence from European politics, no one could tell. CHAPTER XXIX THE SPANISH WAR When William McKinley became President in 1897, he shared with an overwhelming majority of Americans the view that our destiny was peace and our in- heritance complete. The fact that we had, without becoming involved in war, passed through a period when diplomatic leadership was vacillating when it was not weak, and when the virile manhood of the country had been trained to battle, seemed to assure the future. It is possible, however, that the spiritual impulse to war is strongest when the horrors of past struggles have had time to become blurred, when the veteran, respected and reminiscent, embroiders its glories and its satisfactions. Neither the war of 1812 nor the Spanish war was necessary. Those responsible for both jus- tified themselves by referring to causes which had long been in existence. The development of the crisis in each case was in large measure due to the rise of a new spirit. The pugnacity and nationalism of Blaine and OIney were due in part to an apprehension, in part to a reflection, of a -J general militancy and a demonstrative pa- tions of pa- triotism. During the later eighties and nine- ties public schools began to teach respect for the flag, assemblies began to rise at the playing of the na- tional anthem or to be chidden for not rising, the comic opera began to exhibit the national emblems and to be condemned for so doing. American history and military drill came to be commonly taught in schools and colleges. A new genera- tion of historians dedicated themselves to the study of our past ; patriotic societies awakened the popular interest in the deeds of their ancestors. In a material way this sentiment 408 THE SPANISH WAR 409 found expression in the regeneration of our navy, which, from its Civil war bulk and eflBciency, had sunk to such a point that in 1891 the prospect of war with Chili caused not entirely unjustifiable panic on the Pacific coast. The occasion that gave point to this national assertive- ness was the outbreak of a new revolt against Spanish rule in Cuba. This began in 1895, and in character Cuban insur- resembled the ten years' insurrection of 1868 section to 1878. Cubans themselves were divided, hence the strug- gle took on the nature of a civil war. The Spanish troops and volunteers were able to drive the insurrectionists to the mountains; but these, running in a long ridge from one end of the island to the other, offered countless fastnesses for refuge and for use as posts from which to attack the plan- tations in the plains at their foot.^ Innumerable causes of friction between the United States and Spain were inherent in the situation. The Cubans planned to conduct the war from the United American as- States as a base. Many Cubans of wealth distance resided in the United States, and that sympathy for revolu- tion which has never failed among us promised assistance. A Cuban committee headed by the inspiring name of Ethan Allen raised the Cuban fiag over its headquarters in New York. Cuban bonds were sold, and the press generally ex- pressed its hope for the success of the movement. Irritating as all this was to Spain, she had no cause to complain unless words were transmuted into action. This Cleveland tried to prevent, by ordering our neutrality laws to be enforced. In spite, however, of an administration that seemed to be con- scientiously rigid, aid did reach Cuba. The Spanish govern- ' Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy; Louis Le Fur, Etude sur la guerre hispano-americaine de 1898, Paris, 1899; J. H. Latane, America as a World Power 1897-1907. {American Nation, vol. xxv.), chs. i.-iv; E. J. Benton, International Laio and Diplomacy of the Spanish- American War, Baltimore, 1908; Achille Viallate, Les preliminaires de la guerre hispano-americaine et V annexation des Philippines par les Etats-Unis, Revue Historique, 1903, Ixxxii. 242-291. 410 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ment asserted that its delay in quelling the insurrection was due to this assistance. The causes for irritation on the part of the United States were numerous. American capital was invested in the American in- island, particularly in the tobacco industry, terests ^^j^^^ ^^g therefore subject to loss. Many of our citizens, particularly natives of Cuba naturalized in the United States, were residents and were doing business there, and these were continually in trouble. Official complaints and inquiries by our government include such subjects as the maltreatment of naturalized iVmericans, their irregular trial and condemnation for participation in the revolt, the destruction of American property, the expropriation of prop- erty of United States citizens for military use, the methods of dealing with American vessels thought to be running the blockade, the Spanish prohibition of the export of leaf to- bacco to the injury of American interests, the withdrawal of Spanish protection from American plantations and other property, to say nothing of the harsh treatment of the cor- respondents of the American press recklessly seeking news in the dungeon's mouth. The fact that Spain had not yet settled our claims arising out of the last war did not diminish our insistence. These Disputes be- claims were actually paid in 1898, but we were and^United^" ^t odds not only over Spanish delay but also States over theory. Since we had recognized no state of war, we still held her responsible for the acts of the insur- gents, such as the destruction of some property and the levy of assessments to secure the exemption of still more, a respon- sibility which Spain continued to deny, as she had done in 1871. This conflict of opinion was, however, less provocative of bad feeling than the annoyance to which we were con- stantly subjected in the delay caused by the necessity of dealing with every petty case through Madrid. Complaints came to our consul-general at Havana, from him went to Washington, and thence to Madrid; Madrid sought the THE SPANISH WAR 411 facts from Havana, and on receiving them, if there were no controversy, sent its orders to Havana. While such calls by the hundreds almost clogged our state department, the people did not confine their attention to the sufferings of our own citizens. The conduct American of the war itself was the leading topic of their sympathy comment. After Martinez de Campos had driven the in- surgents from the fields but failed to dislodge them from the mountains, he was succeeded by General Weyler, the " Butcher," as he came to be known in America. He adopted two methods of subduing the rebels. One was that of the corral, a system of wire fences and blockhouses stretched across the island, and gradually pushed forward with the hope of penning the insurgents up in one end. The other method was that of starving them out by destroying every- thing eatable within their reach. To accomplish this ob- ject, Weyler caused the population of infected areas to be brought together in reconcentrado camps, and crops and granaries to be burned. This policy involved the virtual imprisonment of many American citizens and the giving over of their property to destruction. Executed with all the Spanish indifference to suffering, the prevailing lack of sanitary knowledge, and the inadequacy of Spain's financial resources, the reconcentrado camps became pest-holes filled with starving unfortunates. The horror of the American public at these atrocities so near their own territory was inflamed, as the pressure of their opinion upon tlie government was con- influence of stantly increased, by the attention which the ^® ^^^^^ press devoted to Cuban affairs. The boast of an important American journalist that it cost him three millions to bring on the war need not be taken seriously. In spite of the bril- liancy of his sensational strokes, it was upon other papers than his that the solid elements which pushed Congress to action based their opinion. It was by no particular design that the press as a whole exploited the Cuban question; it 412 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY was the question of the day upon which Americans wanted news. It was on the reports of such men as Consul-General Lee and Senator Proctor, and of reliable and known corre- spondents, that the effective majority formed its views. If, however, the American people had not possessed such an instrument as their press to circulate the opinions of Lee and Proctor, to ascertain the facts that they wished to know, their interest might have remained dormant and the war might not have occurred. Cleveland, intent on peace, enforced neutrality, refused to recognize belligerency, but offered mediation and threatened Development intervention. Sherman, McKinley's secretary of policy q£ state, followed the example of Fish by as- serting our right to oversee the conduct of the war. June 26, 1897, he wrote: "The inclusion of a thousand or more of our own citizens among the victims of this [the reconcentrado] policy, the wanton destruction of the legitimate investments of Americans to the amount of millions of dollars, and the stoppage of avenues of normal trade — all these give the President the right of specific remonstrance, but in the just fulfillment of his duty he cannot limit himself to these formal grounds of complaint. He is bound by the higher obligations of his representative office to protest against the uncivilized and inhuman conduct of the campaign in the Island of Cuba. He conceives that he has a right to demand that a war, con- ducted almost within sight of our shores and grievously af- fecting American citizens and their interests throughout the length and breadth of the land, shall at least be conducted according to the military codes of civilization." In a later dispatch he called attention to the fact that conditions in the camps imperilled our own health. On July 16 he wrote to Woodford, our minister in Spain, that public opinion strongly demanded recognition, and that beyond recognition lay intervention. He asked whether Spain could offer a solution. The death of the Spanish prime minister, the conservative THE SPANISH WAR 413 Canovas, in the following fall, and the appointment of the liberal Sagasta, seemed to promise alleviation. In November, Spain promised to break up the reconcentrado Change of camps; the queen regent issued decrees for the Sp^'^sh policy establishment of legislative autonomy in Cuba and sub- stituting Blanco for Weyler; and on December 6, McKinley told Congress that we must allow time enough to determine the success of the new system. Our government, however, more and more earnestly urged upon Spain that the struggle in Cuba could not be indefinitely prolonged without necessity for action on our part; and in March it began to grow restive. During this watchful pause in the development of our policy two episodes inflamed the public mind. Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister at Washington, in De Lome epi- a private letter to a Madrid editor visiting ^°^^ Havana, characterized McKinley as a vacillating and time- serving politician. This letter fell into the hands of the American press. On the same day on which it was published, February 9, 1898, Woodford was instructed to demand his recall. De Lome, upon seeing the facsimile of his letter in a newspaper, cabled his resignation. It was accepted, and he thus escaped the punishment he should have received. Although our state department expressed satisfaction, it would have been more conducive to peace had he been re- called. On January 24, 1898, we expressed our intention of send- ing a warship on a friendly visit to Havana, the Maine was sent, and on February 15, in Havana harbor, _.. , . . an explosion utterly wrecked the ship and up of the killed 266 of the crew, besides wounding 60. A large portion of the American public at once attributed this catastrophe to the action of Spain, the more conserva- tive laid it to the individual action of Spanish oflBcers. T. B. Reed, speaker of the House of Representatives and an oppo- nent of war, suggested, but not openly, that the insurgents blew up the vessel in order to bring on war. Spain naturally 414 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY urged internal combustion as the cause. Among these con- flicting theories, that of Spanish responsibility was the most general in the United States, and "Remember the Maine" became a popular call to action. Responding to the new impulse, Congress could no longer be held in check. March 9 J. G. Cannon introduced a bill granting fifty million to the President for w^ar preparations; and still more definite action was inevitable unless it were prevented by some decided change in the situation. The administration exerted itself to change the situation. In the age and infirmity of Secretary Sherman, the manage- Last effort for ment of the negotiation at Washington was P^^^^ undertaken by the assistant secretary of state, President McKinley's close friend, William R. Day. The cable was kept hot with messages between him and Wood- ford, who was in constant touch with the Spanish adminis- tration. The latter did not want war any more than we did, but feared humiliation. It regarded Cuba as already lost, but it must save its face with the Spanish public. March 27, 1895, Day enumerated our demands to Wood- ford: anmesty until October 1, during which negotiations United States should be conducted through the President of demands ^j^^ United States; immediate abolition of the reconcentrado policy, and admission, which had heretofore been refused, of relief from the United States for the suffering; should the negotiations prove unsuccessful, the President was to act as arbiter. The demand for facilities to examine the Maine in order to ascertain the cause of the explosion had already been made. Under these terms the Spanish government writhed, fearing to yield completely, and yet realizing the necessity of yielding in substance. March 31 it abrogated the reconcentrado system in the western prov- inces and offered to refer the question of the Maine to arbi- tration. April 3, Woodford cabled that, should the President ask the Pope to intervene, the hitter's suggestion for an im- mediate amnesty would be accepted. Spain would also, he THE SPANISH WAR 415 intimated, feel less humiliated in yielding, if we withdrew our fleet now in Cuban waters. "I can get the peace that you have worked so hard for," he protested. Day replied, "Would the peace you are so confident of securing mean the independence of Cuba? The President cannot hold his mes- sage longer than Tuesday." On April 5 Day was informed that the reconcentrado policy was abolished over the entire island, and Woodford cabled asking if an amnesty by the queen regent, o • . t. • opRin s ncsi* dated April 6, and prefaced, "at the request tating accept- of the Holy Father, and in sincere hope and belief that during this suspension permanent and honorable peace may be obtained," would be sufficient. "Please read this," he added, "in the light of all my previous telegrams and letters. I believe that this means peace, which the sober judgment of our people will approve long before next Novem- ber, and which must be approved at the bar of final history." Day said that the President would lay the whole matter before Congress. On April 6 a joint note of the powers was pre- sented, appealing "to the feelings of humanity and modera- tion of the President and of the American people." A similar note was presented to Spain, and at length, on April 9, an amnesty based on this appeal was granted and negotiation with the insurgents authorized. On April 10 Woodford cabled that the negotiation would result in autonomy, independence, or cession to us, according to our wishes. By this time, so far as our government knew, there re- mained no American citizen in a Cuban prison, the recon- centrado policy had been stopped, American d' 1 - relief had been admitted, most questions arising matic status, in Cuba could be settled directly through our consul at Havana, Fitzhugh Lee, arbitration on the Maine controversy had been offered, and amnesty had been granted. In two respects our terms had not been exactly met, that the negotiation during the amnesty be conducted officially through the President, and that the President be arbi- 416 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ter if the negotiation failed. Our minister, howev^er, as- sured the government that its decision would govern the result. This solution McKinley seems to have been content to accept; yet it may be well questioned how valuable was the assurance of a government that dared not announce its decision to its own people. Spanish public opinion was as excited as our own. The less educated believed that war would be successful; and many of those who realized that it would not, preferred war to the revolution which they feared if the crown should yield to the United States. However sincere the government of Sagasta, there was no guarantee that Sagasta could remain in office. Under these circum- stances the President would not have been justified in resist- ing the sentiment of Congress that war was necessary. On April 11 he sent in his message, already delayed a few days in order to allow Americans to leave Cuba and to permit McKinley and the completion of war preparations. He Congress recommended forcible intervention, but recog- nition of neither belligerency nor independence; whereupon Congress, entirely out of hand, adopted joint resolutions, on April 17, calling upon Spain to withdraw from Cuba and authorizing the President to use our forces to compel her to do so. It was further resolved that the United States did not desire Cuba, and "that the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." In this last resolution vanished, apparently forever, the cherished hope and frequently expressed conviction of our statesmen from Jefferson to the Civil war, that Cuba must inevitably become part of the United States. Since neither Spain nor the United States had adhered to the Declaration of Paris, they were free to practice pri- „ . , vateering. On April 26, 1898, however, the Rules of war . ..... President of his own initiative proclaimed the principles of that declaration, and on May 7 a proclamation of the queen regent announced that practically the same rules would be observed by Spain. THE SPANISH WAR 417 The administration had already determined, in the event of war, to attack the Spanish empire not only in Cuba but also at its other extremity, the Philippines. Those The Philip- far-away islands had appeared in our diplomacy ^"^^^ as early as 1786, when Rufus King suggested that trade con- cessions there might be obtained from Spain in part payment for Jay's proposed surrender of the navigation of the Missis- sippi for a term of years. ^ Historically they might have been supposed to fall under the wing of the Monroe Doctrine, for the Spaniards regarded them as part of the western hemi- sphere; in fact it was the supposition that they fell within the continuance of Alexander VI 's demarcation line that gave Spain her first title to them. Actually, moreover, their con- nection with Europe had been westward until the independ- ence of Spanish America barred the way. But it is not probable that such considerations as these influenced young Captain Dewey when, at the time of the Virginius affair, he proposed, in case war should break out, to take the ves- sel which he was commanding on the west coast of Mexico across the Pacific and attack Manila.^ To him it was merely that Manila was a vulnerable point; and it was probably the same reason that moved the administration in 1898 to order Commodore Dewey and his fleet to attack that port. It is also to be observed that for a belligerent American fleet in Asia there were but three alternatives, — to return home, to be interned in a neutral port, or to occupy an enemy's harbor. Moreover, it was doubtless felt that a natural result of peace might be the concession to us of a harbor of our own in the East, which would prevent the recurrence of a simi- lar situation. On May 1, by the battle of Manila Bay, Dewey made good his position in the best harbor of the archipelago. The war having gone against her, Spain, on July 22, 1898, through the French ambassador Cambon, made the first ^ King to Gerry, June 4, 1786, Mass. Hist. Soc, Proceedings, 1866, pp. 9-12. * George Dewey, Autobiography, New York, 1913. 418 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY approach for peace. On July 30 Day replied, stating our general terms; Spain was to relinquish all her claim to Cuba . and immediately to withdraw; she was to grant peace negotia- us as indemnity all her remaining West India islands and a selected island in the Ladrone group, in the mid-Pacific; "the United States," he declared, "will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall de- termine the control, disposition, and government of the Phil- ippines." These terms Spain accepted, August 7, with the statement that she did not ipso facto relinquish the Philip- pines; and on August 12 a protocol of agreement was signed. The treaty of peace was to be drawn at Paris. The Presi- dent appointed as president of the commission Day, who had The peace succeeded Sherman as secretary of state on commission ^pj.j| ^6, and who on September 16 resigned that post to undertake this new service. With him were sen- ators Davis, Frye, and Gray, and Whitelaw Reid. The commission was conspicuously fortunate in having as its sec- retary the publicist John Bassett Moore, who had been con- nected with the state department from 1885 to 1891, thus overlapping the long tenure of Hunter, and who had just now been serving as assistant secretary of state. The Spanish commissioner least unknown to America was Don Eugenio Montero Rlos. The negotiations from our point of view were the simplest in which we had ever been engaged, for we stood in a position to demand what we wanted. The trouble was, we were not entirely certain what we did want. The Spanish delegates were particularly disturbed over the debt secured by Cuban revenues. The other Spanish-American States had, on re- ceiving recognition from Spain, assumed their debts; but, as this one had been incurred in the effort to subdue Cuba rather than in an attempt to improve her condition, our commissioners would not consent that the new island govern- ment should be saddled with it. The United States, never THE SPANISH WAR 419 avaricious of money from a defeated enemy, released Spain from all claims resulting from the insurrection, and agreed to adjudge and pay them herself. It is interesting to note that the domestic commission appointed for their settlement adopted the Spanish contention that Spain was not responsi- ble for the acts of the insurgents and that " concentration and devastation are legitimate war measures." On one point we yielded to the desires of Spain. She was unwilling, on abandoning Cuba, to deliver it to the insurgents, a sense of honor and prudence combining to urge her to this position. We therefore agreed to receive the island in trust. The island which we selected in the Ladrone group, Guam, was ceded to us. By far the chief feature of the negotiation, however, was the disposition of the Philippines. McKinley stated in August: "I do not want any ambiguity to be status of the allowed to remain on this point. The negotia- P^^i^PPuies tors of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the permanent advantages which we shall ask in Ihe archipelago, and decide upon the intervention, disposition, and govern- ment of the Philippines." On October 31 the American commissioners formally suggested the cession of the whole group to the United States. Apparently the chief evidence before the commission to lead to this decision was the report of General Merritt, who brought directly from Manila the views of Admiral Dewey. He pointed out that we wanted one of the islands as a coaling station, and that what we left some other nation, stronger than Spain, would take. He felt that the actual situation in the islands was bad, and that in some way we were responsible for its cure. The foreign bogy in this case was Germany. It is quite possible that Germany, on the lookout for colonies, had before our war considered the acquisition of the „. Minor points islands. The action of her Pacific fleet during our occupation of Manila harbor was calculated to excite such suspicion, and, her prompt purchase, in 1899, of everything 420 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY that we left to Spain in that ocean is further evidence of her desires. As the Philippines were not in America, our non-transfer corollary of the Monroe Doctrine did not apply to them; but it was obvious that the value of a naval station there would be much diminished if sur- rounded by the possessions of a strong naval power like Germany. That the question of the disposition of the islands was not more complicated was due to Admiral Dewey's knowledge of Conditions in international law and his tact. He found an the islands insurrection going on there similar to that which we had found in Cuba; but, while maintaining friendly relations with the insurrectionists and cooperating with them, he refrained from recognition. It was evident that, should the forces of Spain be withdrawn, widespread murder and de- struction of property would take place; on the other hand, should we leave the islands in the hands of Spain, we would leave civil war, and would abandon the islanders, who under their leader Aguinaldo had been cooperating with us. The suggestion of Carl Schurz, that we turn the islands over to Belgium or Holland, was hardly within the cognizance of practical international politics, if indeed it was consistent with international morality. It was this situation which seemed to Admiral Dewey to involve us in some responsi- bility. It can hardly be that a question of this magnitude was left to the commissioners, particularly under a President so American pub- notably characterized by keeping his ear to the he opinion ground as was McKinley. It is impossible to believe that the decision was not made at Washington, and in accordance with the pressure of what the administration believed to be public opmion. When Dewey won the battle of Manila Bay, the idea of expansion so far afield was novel to the great majority of Americans. As the sentiment for "all Mexico" developed during our war with that country, so an expansionist feeling developed in the United States dur- THE SPANISH WAR 421 ing the summer and fall of 1898. Engendered by the reasons already given, it received direction from two forces par- ticularly powerful at the White House — the influence of capital seeking new fields for exploitation, and the enthu- siasm of the missionary element filled with the idea of the good that we might do there. With many to whom the diffusion of Christianity by the organized work of religious bodies was not a leading purpose, a general belief in the civilizing function of our race, just then set forth in Kipling's White Man's Burden, was a deciding con- sideration.^ The Spanish commissioners were forced to accept the American proposition, sugared as it was by the payment of twenty millions. The annexation of territory Terms of the not a part of the American continents, thickly *^®**y populated by a foreign race, and not likely ever to become predominantly American constituted in each particular a departure from our previous policy. The last two differences the Philippines shared with Porto Rico, included in the same treaty.^ An additional divergence was made in the provision that the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants " of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." Their religious freedom only was secured by the treaty. In all previous annexations provi- sion had been made for incorporation into the United States, except in case of Alaska, and there all except the native Indians were to have the rights of citizens of the United States.^ For the first time we were acquiring colonies. What 1 Herbert Croly, M. A. Hanna (New York, 1912), 279-280, attributes much influence to Senator Orville Piatt. ^ Whitelaw Reid, Problems of Expansion, New York, 1912; H. von Hoist, The Annexation of our Spanish Conquests, Chicago, 1898. 'The Russian treaty provided: "The inhabitants of the ceded terri- tory . . . with the exception of uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights ... of citizens of the United States." The Spanish treaty declared of native Spaniards that, if they did not assert their Spanish citizenship, they should be considered "to have adopted the nationality" of the territory in which they might reside; and it added. 422 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the Federalists had contended for in the Louisiana debate was now the national policy. The treaty was signed on December 10, 1898. "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the ter- ritories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Con- gress." CHAPTER XXX IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN The Spanish war brought to light, and accelerated in progress, a spirit which may properly be called imperialism. That democratic regard for simplicity which , . . Impenalism had prevented the appointment of foreign rep- resentatives of the highest official rank yielded, in 1893, to the appointment of ambassadors, though not so far as to provide for their maintenance on an equality with those of other nations. The attempt to give a similar titular prece- dence to our naval officers, who often perform semi-diplomatic functions, made slower progress; Dewey, as a special re- ward, was made admiral (1899), and the grade of vice-admiral has just (1915) been created. After the war, moreover, the regular army was increased to double its previous size. Although this enlargement had special reference to the occupation of the Philippines, the steady and very much greater increase of the navy has been based on more general grounds. This spirit was voiced by Rear-admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, and by Theodore Roosevelt. Both trained histori- ans, and with a wide knowledge of other peo- Mahan, pies and of world politics, they were able to avoid many of the errors and inconsistencies which had marred the programs of Blaine and Olney. Mahan in a series of studies of naval history published between 1883 and 1913, pointed out the importance of sea power in the world's history, its relations to the future of the United States, and the necessity of our maintaining a large navy and securing strategic bases for naval operations. He tried to bring public sentiment to a realization of the fact that the United 423 424 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY States could not safely remain forever aloof, and that it should not confide too trustingly in the hope for universal peace. His books received even more attention abroad than at home, and belong as much to the international literature of the discussion of peace and war, which now began to divide the world of thought, as to the literature of American history. These views were shared by Roosevelt, who from his return from Cuba at the close of the Spanish war for a dozen years rode a wave of popularity whose crest seemed ever to mount higher. As President from 1901 to 1909, he was able to give them effect. The navy, whose record against Spain had made a profound impression on international opinion, was increased until it eventually ranked just after those of Great Britain and Germany; its efiiciency was tested and at the same time thrust upon the attention of the world by its circumnavigation of the globe by order of the President in 1907. The impression which this latter event made whether at home or abroad, was scarcely so great as that created by the brilliant and dashing personality of President Roosevelt himself. It seemed evident that a nation so equipped and so led, and that of its own choice, would play a larger part in world movements than the United States had done in the past. The war probably had no effect on the fact or the form of Hawaiian annexation. McKinley, to be sure, shortly after .. his inauguration, conveyed to Carl Schurz the impression that the subject would not be pressed; ^ but those best informed realized that the return of the Republican party meant annexation. The war, neverthe- less, hastened the process. July 7, 1898, a treaty negotiation was cut short by the passage of a joint resolution providing for annexation on the old terms of incorporation into the United States. A new note was struck, however, by the pro- test of the Japanese government, based on the disturbance of the balance of power in the Pacific, and on the possible effect 1 Schurz, Speeches, etc., vi. 270, 271. IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 425 upon the large number of its citizens who were laborers and merchants in the islands.^ Of the influence of the Spanish treaty on the final settle- ment of the Samoan question, on the other hand, there can be no doubt. Constant difficulties having arisen under the General Act of Berlin, and our scruples at the extinction of native rule having become deadened, we agreed, on December 4, 1899, to a treaty of division. This gave us the island of Tutuila, whose fine harbor of Pagopago we had had the right to use since 1878. Germany took the other islands, and Great Britain received compensation elsewhere. This treaty contained no provision for incorporation or civil rights. While this negotiation, with the reassertion of our claim to Midway island, or rather islands, and the occupation of the neighboring Wake island in 1900, completed the Midway and tale of our acquisitions, it does not indicate the ^^^^ islands extent to which the colonial policy was applied. A treaty was once more negotiated for the purchase of the Danish islands, but it was rejected by the Danish parliament. As there was some doubt whether the Isle of Pines, to the south- west of Cuba, belonged to that government, the matter was left open in our treaty with the new nation in 1903. Negotia- tion, however, resulted in giving it to her. More important than all the rest was the action of Congress. That body made use of the discretion left it by the treaty with Spain to establish the Spanish cessions colonial gov- upon a basis definitely colonial, without refer- ^^nments ence to their future incorporation into the United States. In the case of Cuba we conscientiously carried out our ob- ligations both to Spain and to the islanders, by handing its government over to the latter as soon as they were organized to receive it and competent to protect persons and property. In so doing, however, we insisted on certain permanent con- ditions prescribed by Congress and known as the "Piatt ^ Moore, Digest, i. 504. 426 AMERICAN DIPLO^IACY amendment." These conditions provided that Cuba should never allow any foreign power or powers to impair its inde- Platt amend- pendence in any way; that the government ™®°* should contract no debt which could not be paid by a sinking fund from the ordinary revenues; that the United States should have the right to intervene in Cuba "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations" with respect to the rights and property of Spanish subjects under the treaty of Paris; that Cuba should provide for the sanitation of her cities, and should grant the United States "lands necessary for coaling or naval stations" and for cog- nate purposes. By the treaty embodying these provisions we practically added a protectorate to our colonies. The change involved in the sudden extension of our terri- tory almost to the Asiatic coast, and still more in our new Attitude of spirit, did not escape the attention of Europe. Europe The general sentiment was at first one of dis- approval. In France, Spanish bondholders were at first alarmed by the war, and then were indignant France . at our refusal to impose the Cuban debt on the island government. German opinion was influenced by the _ fact that we apparently had forestalled its gov- Gennany ... .... ernment m takmg over the Phihppuies, and it was kept excited by the exchange of discourtesies between the officers of the two fleets. Austria, never friendly, remember- ing the fate of Maximilian, was distressed at the losses of the queen regent of Spain, a member of the Hapsburg house. The feeling of Italy had been con- tinually aggravated by repeated lynchings of Italian subjects in the United States. In afl'airs of that kind the United States government was unable to af- ford the protection of its courts, as the punishment for such offences fell within the jurisdiction of the states, whose courts often failed to do their duty. The most important case was IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 427 that at New Orleans in 1891, but others occurred in Colorado in 1896, at Hahnville, Louisiana, in 1896, and at Tallulah in the same state in 1899. In each of these instances. Congress voted indemnity, but this wergeld did not entirely assuage the national ill-feeling. To these special sources of discontent was added a general resentment at the sudden apparition of a new world power which might upset the nicely adjusted balance of international politics. More immediately power and bal- alarming was the fact that the balance of trade ^^ ° * ^ seemed already upset. In 1895 we had exported less than fifty millions more than we imported, in 1900 over five hundred million more; and much of the surplus consisted of manufactured goods. Credits accumulated at New York, which seemed likely to become the financial centre of the world. ^ Our bankers began to talk of the financing of the loans of foreign governments, an industry which had pre- viously been monopolized by London, Paris, and Berlin, and which carried with it a vast influence in world politics. This condition was in part temporary, due to the "dump- ing " by our trusts, at under-cost prices, of the accumulated supplies of overproduction, a practice very unpopular at home where prices were kept up behind the protection of our tariff wall, but equally unpopular abroad, where it was feared that these low prices would undermine established industries. Joined with the fear of German competition, it formed the basis of Joseph Chamberlain's somewhat later campaign for protection in England. The United States loomed so gigantic on the horizon of industrial and diplomatic competition, which are always closely connected, that during the years im- mediately following the Spanish war, talk of European com- bination to oppose her advance was in the air. Great Britain was the one great power who, in spite of her industrial fears, welcomed the rise of the United States. Her population had more appreciation of the humanitarian 1 Coman, Industrial History, 327-331. 428 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY impulse that lay behind our intervention in Cuba. Her states- men hoped much from our moral assistance. She was at that time diplomatically in a position which Lord Salisbury described as one of "spendid isola- tion," but which was not without its dangers, particularly in view of the impending Boer war. Somewhat exaggerating the Anglo-Saxon character of our population, her orators called attention to the ties of blood and the world destiny of our common race. For the first time in our national history there was a real cordiality between the two peoples, though it was most demonstrative on the part of the English. An alliance, formal or informal, with the United States they would have greeted with enthusiasm. The task of adapting American foreign policy to these new conditions raised our diplomacy to an importance equal to Diplomatic that which it had possessed in the early days of **^^ the republic and during the Civil war. To adjust the nation to its new position without sacrificing the principles developed in the past was an operation of a deli- cacy hardly exceeded by that of preserving our neutrality during the French revolutionary wars, or of keeping Europe neutral while we ourselves were fighting. It was the more difficult because of the divided tones in wliich the voice of the past came down through the confusion of the eighties and nineties. That its importance was appreciated is evident from the struggle for control which was almost continuously waged between the administration and the Senate. In the Executive latter the leadership was generally with Sen- versus Senate ^^^^ Lodge, long a member of the committee on foreign affairs; but his leadership did not mean control. Except in one case, in which it acted alone and in one other in which it joined with the House, namely, in ordering the ab- rogation of the Russian treaty, the power of the Senate has been confined to checking or modifying the policy of the ad- ministration. The direction of policy has been with the executive. IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 429 Fortunately, at this time the main burden fell upon John Hay, secretary of state from September, 1898, to June, 1905. Beginning public life as private secretary to President Lincoln, he had passed the years since that time in minor diplomatic posts, in journalistic and lit- erary work, and in an advantageously placed social position at home and abroad, until his appointment by President Mc- Kinley as ambassador to Great Britain in 1897. Somewhat predisposed by his European associations to think in the terms of the great powers, he was least successful in his deal- ings with the Spanish-American nations. His knowledge of international law, of historic tendencies, and of men was, how- ever, in its combination unsurpassed in his day. He pos- sessed such an Americanism as can exist only when based on a complete knowledge of American development. Most of all, during his tenure he divorced the office of secretary of state from politics. Under McKinley he was left with a free hand in his own department, and he himself did not interfere in others; under Roosevelt the latter 's vigorous personality asserted itself on particular questions, but the general policy remained Hay's. In diplomatic ability and accomplish- ment he is to be ranked with Franklin and John Quincy Adams. His successor, Elihu Root, who served „. Ml X ,^^/^ 11 1 rr. Elihu Root till January, 1909, brought to the oiface an un- rivalled legal knowledge and a compelling geniality of ap- proach. From 1897 to 1913 there was an unusual degree of conti- nuity in the diplomatic service, accompanied by some reg- ularity of promotion. Thus Henry White, Diplomatic employed in minor but responsible posts from service 1879 until Cleveland's second term, was again called into service and appointed successively as secretary of the London embassy, as ambassador to Italy and later to France, and to many special missions and international conferences. David Jayne Hill, an eminent student of diplomatic history, served in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany. John 430 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Barrett was minister to Spain in 1894, and later to Argentina, to Panama, and to Colombia; he took part in many inter- national conferences, and became director-general of the Pan-American Union in 1905. C. P. Bryan was minister successively in China, Brazil, Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium, and was ambassador to Japan; Charlemagne Tower was ambassador to Austria, Russia, and Germany; J. G. A. Leishman was minister to Switzerland and Turkey, and ambassador to Italy and Germany. The triple embassy of Oscar Straus to Turkey, 1887-1889, 1898-1901, and 1909- 1910, and the long service of Whitelaw Reid in England, 1905 to 1913, are noticeable. All these were men of ability, and they had an opportunity to acquire diplomatic experience of which most of them took advantage. If some of them in- dulged in an ostentation of extravagance a bit offensive to good taste, at least they were representative of an important element among their countrymen, and they spent their money on the whole with grace. The action of President Wilson, in 1913, in removing nearly all the heads of missions shows that the elements of . continuity and promotion found between the diplomatic 1897 and 1913 were due to the maintenance in power of one political party, and that it is still our policy, as it always has been, to have the ministers represent the administration rather than constitute the cul- minating rank of a permanent staff. Wilson's attempt to appoint men of training and experience to certain significant posts however, indicates a desire to recognize merit. The consular service has still more markedly improved. In 1864 the proposition of 1856 for the appointment of a per- Consuiar manent staff was revived in a very modified service form. Thirteen consular clerks or pupils, removable only with the consent of the Senate, were there- after to be appointed. The substitution of salaries for fees also made gradual progress, until it was made complete in 1906, with the unimportant exception of consular agents. IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 431 Meantime the development of civil-service reform led to a continuous attempt to include the consular service under its provisions. Although this attempt has failed, it has not been without its results. President Cleveland announced a system of appointment by examination and promotion. Although McKinley was hardly rigid in adhering to this, President Roosevelt returned to it with emphasis, and tlie decision of President Wilson to treat the service as out of politics promises permanence.^ This administrative systematization has fortunately been accompanied by an effective backing of popular support. The industrial interests of the country have . , •^ . Interest m urged improvement, and have cooperated in consular bringing it about. Educational institutions have also responded to the national need, especially in the at- tention devoted to the study of modern languages, Spanish in particular, and in the offering of courses designed to equip students for consular positions. With the promise of a con- tinuous career, it has become possible to advise many young men to take up the service as a life work, and at the same time the position by becoming businesslike has become less attractive as a vacation for the exhausted politician. Working under these conditions, Secretary Hay under- took to achieve a new settlement of outstanding disputes with Great Britain, such as had been accom- Relations with plished in 1794, 1815 to 1818, 1842, and 1871. ^^^^^ ^"*^° The friendship of Great Britain for the United States, still represented at Washington by the veteran Sir Julian Paunce- fote, was an advantage, though it required some caution to prevent that friendship from becoming entangling. This situation became particularly delicate during the Boer war, but our experience in the art of neutrality prevented any real difficulties. The main obstacles were the now definite decision of the American people to have an American canal, and the fact that, since many of our disputes were between ^ Civil Service Commission, Reports, annual. 432 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the United States and Canada, Great Britain was obliged to defer in large measure to that powerful colony. A commission appointed in 1898 to agree upon questions at issue between the United States and Canada found twelve Canadian dis- topics for discussion: seals, fishing, the Alaskan P"*®^ boundary, transit of goods through each other's territory back to the original country, or to a third country, transit of criminals, wreckage and salvage, alien labor, — particularly the importation of Chinese into the United States across the Canadian boundary, — reciprocity, mining rights, the navigation of the Great Lakes, and the marking of the boundary line. These matters the commission failed to settle outright, but negotiation was continuous. In 1908 the transit of criminals, the question of wreckage and salvage, and the marking of the frontier were provided for. The more exciting question of the Alaskan boundary had already been settled. This had first assumed importance Alaskan with the discovery of gold on the Yukon in boundary |gQg r^j^^ dispute grew out of the treaty of 1825 between Russia and Great Britain, and chiefly out of the provision that the boundary was to follow the crest of the mountains parallel to the coast from the parallel of latitude of 56 to the intersection of that line with the parallel of longitude of 141 , but was never to be more than ten marine leagues from the coast following its sinuosities. This arrange- ment was sufficiently complicated, but it was rendered more so by the deep and irregular indentations of the Alaskan coast line. Great Britain claimed that the line ran along the crests nearest the ocean, from peak to peak, crossing the bays, giving her the heads of several of them and thus access to the sea. The United States held that the line must be everywhere ten leagues from sea water, thus entirely cutting off a great part of Canada from the ocean. A inodus Vivendi was agreed upon in 1899, and in 1903 the question was sub- mitted to arbitration, but by a commission composed of three members from each nation, without an umpire. The IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 433 7 ALASKA BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY United States Claim 1903 British Claim 1903 — Accepted Boundary 434 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY American commissioners were Senator Lodge, Elihu Root, and Senator Turner to represent the Northwest. Maintain- ing the American position in all except a few minor points, they were supported by Chief Justice Alverstone of England; and so the boundary was fixed according to our views. ^ The question of fishing was threefold, involving the pro- tection of the Alaskan seals, the securing of privileges from the Dominion of Canada, and the securing of privileges from the separate jurisdiction of Newfoundland. In case of the seals, the British legislation resulting from the Behring sea arbitration lapsed in 1899, at the end of the prescribed five-year period, and the sea was thus open to Canadians to within three miles of the Pribilof islands, with no limitation as to methods. In 1897 we had prohibited our own citizens from engaging in open-sea killing, but Canadian opinion would not permit Great Britain to re- ciprocate in any way. In the United States the feeling among those interested was so strong that at one time it was pro- posed that we kill off all the herds. It was not until the ad- ministration of President Taft, in 1911, that the matter was settled by a joint treaty with Japan, Russia, and Great Britain, whereby pelagic killing was for the time being alto- gether prohibited and these countries were to have pro rata shares of the kill on land. An act of Congress of 1912 pro- hibited all killing whatsoever on land for a term of years. Our fishing difficulties with Canada were settled by a treaty of 1908, which provided a permanent international Canada and fisheries commission. It was with Newfound- Newfoundland ij^j^^j ^jjg^^ ^he most trying situation existed, rendering negotiation and fresh causes of irritation constant. In 1902, in accordance with a new diplomatic method ac- cepted by Great Britain, Hay negotiated a treaty with Premier Bond of Newfoundland on the familiar basis of ad- mitting fish from the Banks to our markets free of duty in return for the privileges that we desired. Again, however, as 1 George Davidson, The Alaska Boundary, San Francisco, 1903. IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 435 in 1888, the fishing interests in the Senate were strong enough to defeat the treaty, by insisting that it was the national duty both to afford economic protection to the industry and to obtain such international advantages as might be necessary. The final defeat of this treaty in 1904 led to retaliatory legislation by Newfoundland in 1905 and 1906, in which every possible port regulation that could distress our fishermen was resorted to. While the governments of Great Britain and the United States temporarily quieted matters by an annual modus Vivendi, they sought agreement. Great Britain maintained the right of Newfoundland to make any port regulations which ostensibly applied to both nations equally, and which were in its judgment, necessary to the preservation of the fishing or to the maintenance of order and morals. The United States admitted that there must be such port regulations as were necessary for the pres- ervation of the fishing, but claimed that, as these determined the conditions under which she was to enjoy the privileges accorded to her by the treaties of 1783 and 1818, her assent to them was necessary. In 1909 the matter was submitted to a tribunal composed of members of the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was, in addition, to recommend rules for the conduct of the fishing. The decision was mainly in favor of Newfoundland, but in accordance with the recom- mendations an agreement between Great Britain and the United States was reached. It seems probable that this century-old dispute is happily ended. The Americans are to enjoy such privileges as the right to buy bait and take on necessary water, without suffering undue annoyance from local laws.^ The all-important subject of trade relations with Canada reached no special crisis until, in 1911, a reciprocity treaty was concluded under Taft's administration and largely by his personal influence. The rejection of this treaty as the ^ P. T. McGrath, "The Atlantic Fisheries Dispute," Review of Reviews, 1910, xli. 718-724. 436 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY result of a nationalistic uprising in Canada and the defeat of the Laurier government, seemed to presage a period of still greater strain than in the past. Some of the things aimed at by reciprocity, however, the new United States tariff bill of 1913 accomplished without the exaction of specific compensation, and it may lead to a better understanding. Only five of the twelve questions of 1898 remain to be settled, but in regard to all of them except alien labor and mining rights the existing agreements are not unsatisfactory. The new questions that have arisen, such as the use of international rivers for irrigation, seem not to be serious. The other important British interest in America has been the interoceanic canal. It had finally become obvious Clayton- that such a canal would be constructed, and Buiwer treaty ^Jther by, or under the auspices of, the United States government. Yet the Clayton-Bulwer treaty still held. In 1900, therefore. Hay and Pauncefote arranged a compact to meet these conditions. This new treaty, like that of Clayton and Buiwer, was based on the prin- ciple of international neutralization, and it asked other nations to join in the guarantee. As this arrangement was unsatisfactory to public opinion in the United States, the Senate amended it by specifically abrogating the Clayton- Bulwer treaty, by allowing the United States to fortify the canal, and by leaving out the general invitation to adhere to the agreement. In consequence of these amendments. Hay and Pauncefote drew up, in 1901, a new treaty providing for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. In return for this concession bj^ Great Britain, which allowed the United States to acquire territory in Central America, the last- named power adopted certain prescribed rules. The second of these forbade the blockade of the canal, but allowed the United States to "maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder." Under a rather liberal interpretation of this IMPERIALISM AND GREAT BRITAIN 437 permission, the United States plans to fortify the canal in the hope of rendering it impregnable to attack. Rules three to six regulated the use of the canal in time of war. Rule one ran: "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these Rules, on terms of entire equalit^^ so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic, or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable." This last rule became the subject of much controversy after 1912, when Congress, in fixing the rates of traffic, exempted from all charge vessels engaging ^ , „ , . ,. , ® , & t. & Canal tolls under certam conditions in the coastwise, or rather coast-to-coast, trade of the United States. Primarily intended to decrease the cost of transcontinental freight, and to have its effect on the rates of the transcontinental rail- roads, the law plainly violated the provisions of the treaty. Great Britain promptly protested, and President Wilson in 1914 recommended that Congress repeal the discriminating exemption. The acceptance of the recommendation by Con- gress was a notable manifestation of our intention of rec- ognizing treaty rights. It is not only in thus preventing our carrying out of a domestic policy that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty has proved a stumbling-block in our way. The purpose Military use of of our change of canal policy was not so much ® "^^ commercial as military. A canal internationally guaranteed would need no fortification, but would be equally available to all nations. The policy of making the canal American involved the expense of fortifying it and of maintaining a garrison there, the compensation being that our fleet could do double duty, could be available for use in either ocean. By the terms of the treaty, however, it is probable that the value of any other fleet with which we may be contending will equally be doubled, as the canal is open to the war 438 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY vessels of other nations even when at war with us, if those nations observe the rules laid down in the treaty. This being the case, it might seem that, since we are not allowed to exclude their war vessels, we need not be at the expense of fortification. In the absence of the international guarantee arranged for in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and in the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty, however, it is obvious that the only means we have of seeing that the rules are observed is the ability to enforce them on the spot. By the terms of agree- ment all we have secured by our canal diplomacy is the obligation to maintain by our own power, and without any compensating exclusive use, a neutrality which the nations of the world would have been glad to guarantee. The canal has become a vulnerable spot, at the mercy of any power able to seize it, except Great Britain which is bound by the treaty. Authority and power are of course not synonymous. Having made use of our right to acquire territory and to fortify the canal, we have acquired the power to exclude other nations, if we care to disregard our treaty obligations. Such disregard, however, is always provocative of trouble, and may be dangerous. The experience of the United States with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should emphasize the ad- vice of Washington and Jefferson, to avoid entangling alli- ances, if we wish to maintain our freedom to change our mind. It is apparent that the questions at issue between Great Britain and the United States have since the Spanish war been much less critical than those of earlier periods, that most of them have been settled, and that the difficulties of the future are likely to be of diminishing significance. CHAPTER XXXI SPANISH AMERICA In clarifying her relations with Great Britain, the United States removed only one diplomatic obstacle from the path of the canal. It remained for her to decide Nicaragua ver- whether she wished a canal by way of Nicaragua ^"^ Panama or of Panama, and then to make arrangements with the nation that owned the chosen isthmus. In Congress there was a strong sentiment in favor of the former way, and Nicaragua was willing to grant us such conditions as we con- sidered necessary. By the Spooner act of 1902, however, the President was authorized to proceed with the Panama route, which he preferred, if he could make satisfactory ar- rangements within a reasonable time. President Roosevelt determined to build the canal by Panama, and he at once made the enterprise his particular policy. The first step was to obtain the concession which was still legally held by the successor of de Lesseps's company. This was bought for forty million dollars, and title to the Panama railroad was sub- sequently purchased. More difiicult was the negotiation with the republic of Co- lombia, of which Panama was one of the constituent states. We regarded as essential to the construction Position of and operation of the canal full possession of a Colombia strip of territory on each side, with ample rights of fortifica- tion and police, and for this we were willing to pay. Hay ac- cordingly arranged a satisfactory treaty with Herran, the Co- lombian minister, giving us, not sovereignty, but control for ninety-nine years, with privileges of renewal, of a six-mile strip. After four months' debate, however, this treaty was rejected by the Colombian senate in July, 1903. Although 439 440 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Colombia had a perfect right to do this, and though her motives were not properly open to question, President Roose- velt prepared to act without her assent. He ordered our minister to leave Bogota, and prepared a message proposing to Congress that we begin to dig the canal. He argued, or at least asserted, that Colombia, in rejecting a reasonable and generous offer, had violated the treaty of 1846. He believed that her motive was to obtain more money, and de- clared that the world could wait no longer on her sloth and avarice. An agreement, he believed, might be made with the state of Panama.^ To those who are ready for the fray weapons are sent. Like Polk, Roosevelt was able, when Congress met, to present a The state of simpler course, for which, however, unlike Panama Polk, he did not have to incur the direct re- sponsibility. Not unnaturally, the citizens of Panama were deeply incensed that their only prospect for future greatness was likely to be blocked, perhaps forever if the Nicaraguan route should be chosen. The situation was attractive to adventurers, and offered all the possibilities of intrigue famil- iar to the readers of Richard Harding Davis. WTien in August, 1903, it was announced that Panama would revolt, the attitude of the United States government was not such as to discourage action. October 10, 1903, President Roosevelt wrote to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews: "I enclose you, purely Roosevelt's for your own information, a copy of a letter of P°^*^y September 5th, from our minister to Colombia. I think it might interest you to see that there was absolutely not the slightest chance of securing by treaty any more than we endeavored to secure. The alternatives were to go to Nicaragua against the advice of the great majority of com- petent engineers — some of the most competent saying that ^ W. L. Scruggs, The Colombian and Venezuelan Repjiblics, Boston, 1900; Achille Viallate, Leu Etats-Unis ct le canal interoceanique, in his Essaia d'histoire diplomatique amSricaine (Paris, 1905), 57-206. SPANISH AMERICA 441 we had better have no canal at this time than go there — or else to take the territory by force without any attempt at getting a treaty. I cast aside the proposition made at this time to foment the secession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do, the United States cannot go into the securing by such underhand means the cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state; or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore I cannot say it." ^ Fully alert to the possibilities, the administration watched the Isthmus. November 2 the naval oflBcer commanding our observation squadron was ordered: "Main- „. j • • ^ , The adminis- tain free and uninterrupted transit. . . . Pre- tration and the vent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point." At 3.40 p. m., November 3, the acting secretary of state telegraphed to the Isthmus that an uprising was reported to be taking place there. A repty of 8.15 p. M. stated that there had been none yet, but that it was rumored that there would be one during the night. On Nov- ember 4 independence was proclaimed. The only active hos- tility was in the city of Panama, on the Pacific, beyond our reach, where the Colombian gunboat Bogota dropped a few shells on the morning of the 4th and killed a Chinaman. At noon we warned the commander to shell no more. At 11.55 A. M. on November 6, the state department was in- formed: "The situation is peaceful. Isthmian movement has obtained so far success. Colon and interior provinces have enthusiastically joined independence. Not any Colombian soldiers known on isthmian soil at present. Padillo equipped to pursue Bogota. Bunau Varilla has been appointed officially confidential agent of the Republic of Panama at Washington." At 12.51 p. M. Hay acknowledged the receipt of this note.^ 1 Nation, 1904, Ixxix. 328. 2 Senate Docs., 58 Cong. 2 sess., No. 51. 442 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY On the same day Hay instructed our acting consul on the spot to negotiate with the new government. November 13 Recognition of Bunau VariUa was received at Washington; Panama December 7 a treaty, drawn up by Hay, was signed; December 12 a minister was appointed. This quick recognition of the new repubhc was contrary to our consistent practice of waiting till independence was soundly established, as illustrated by our conduct in relation to the Spanish- American revolutions from Spain, the Texan revolution, and the government of Maximilian, and as emphasized by our attitude toward the contemplated recognition of the Con- federacy. To be sure, the Isthmus was quiet; but it was because we had prevented the Colombian forces, amply able to restore order, from intervening. Such interposition on our part was not, as President Roosevelt subsequently claimed it was, in accordance with local precedents.^ We had a number of times, under the treaty of 1846, landed troops to protect the railroad, but we had successfully protected it without occupying the whole Isthmus. Senator Hoar seems to have been justified in his statement of December 17, 1903, that no revolution had up to that date interfered with the isthmian traffic.^ Such previous interventions, more- over, had been to carry out the treaty; in this case the pur- pose was to overthrow it. In compensation for the right of free transit we had guaranteed the Isthmus to Colombia, we now intervened to prevent Colombia from enforcing her sovereignty. These points were cleverly met by Roosevelt in his message to Congress, and by Hay in his correspondence relating to the episode. They urged among other things that the validity of the union of the several states of the Colom- bian republic, and particularly of Panama, was extremely complicated from a constitutional point of view. The rela- tion of Panama to Colombia had actually varied from inde- pendence to incorporation as a department. To suggest that ^ House Docs., 58 Cong. 2 sess., No. 1. 2 Congressional Record, 58 Cong. 2 sess., pp. 316-318; 2191-2000. SPANISH AMERICA 443 an outside power might take cognizance of such internal con- ditions was of course obviously inconsistent with our policy, and before the Civil War cemented our own union would have been dangerous. It was not, however, the real defense upon which the administration relied. Its real excuse was, rather, the plea by which Jefferson justified to himself the Louisiana purchase, a transaction so contrary to his constitutional scru- ples, — the plea that the situation was one which never could happen again, and was of such unparalleled importance as to exempt it from the ordinary laws of morality and of nations. The new republic met our needs more completely than Senor Herran had done. The United States received full rights, as "if it were the sovereign," of "a zone The repubUc five miles on each side" of the canal; she Se^TrSed°** also secured the right to fortify the canal, and States to obtain additional naval stations within the republic. In return she paid ten million dollars down, and agreed to pay a quarter of a million a year, beginning nine years from date. The United States guaranteed the independence of Panama. The constitution of Panama contains the following clause: "The Government of the United States of America may intervene anywhere in the Republic of Panama for the re- establishment of constitutional peace and order if this should be disturbed, provided that by virtue of public treaty said nation should assume or have assumed to guarantee the in- dependence and sovereignty of this Republic." Though our guarantee was made in the light of this clause, intervention is merely a right that has been granted to us, not a duty that we have assumed. Yet it can hardly be denied that by the events of 1903 we acquired in the canal zone a colony, and in Panama a protectorate. It is worth noting that between 1846 and 1903 there were fifty-three riots and revolutions on the isthmus, and since then, peace. ^ ^ Aragon, Republica de Panama y la diplomacia contemporanea, Revista Positivista (Mexico), 1904; Schurz, Speeches, etc., vi. 389-403, 434-436; Rafael Reyes, The Two Americas, New York, 1914. 444 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Until the Spanish war it had been one of our unreaHzed ambitions to dominate the Gulf of Mexico, and thus secure Control of the the outlet of the Mississippi. Although we Caribbean Sea failed to win Cuba in that war, we obtained enough hold on that island to give us the control we wished, a control which has recently been strengthened by the com- pletion of the railroad to Key West. With the undertaking of the canal as a national enterprise, the control of the Car- ibbean became equally necessary. By 1903 we had already, with our naval station at Guantanamo in Cuba, in addition to Porto Rico and Panama, a strategic preponderance in that sea which it has been the apparent intention of the government to maintain and strengthen. The only danger lies in the possibility of European influence over some of the republics situated about it, a peril that has involved a careful consideration of the exact bearing of the Monroe Doctrine upon the situation. European interference with the political affairs of those states it obviously remains our intention to prevent, and European this policy doubtless extends to the exclusion mediation q£ European mediation in the case of a revolu- tionary contest in any one of them, a policy underlying our present (1915) attitude with respect to Mexico. Other pos- sible avenues of European approach would be mediation between two warring republics, and the collection of claims. With regard to the first, no case has yet arisen clearly indi- cating whether the administration would follow the earlier practice of allowing mediation, or whether it would adopt Blaine's policy of discouraging it, or whether we would ab- solutely prevent it. There can be no doubt, however, that in any such case our own good offices would be promptly offered, and that we should resent their rejection in favor of any other country. The existence of the Permanent Court at The Hague, estabHshed in 1899, has simpHfied this problem by providing a recourse equally acceptable to Europe and America. ■fe ^^ ^ CO (M -1 \ \ \ 1 s ..-.-.-. 1\ f^:^^ °s' \ '. i & ^ . . s * ,£V, y;^^^^ ' \ r.^--^ ' — \ \ ^''i^'^^y ^*-""'^^^ll i s '-"^^ \ \ r-^"! ^Bii ^ M \ ^ ^ Sr- \ 1 ^p\^m I 1 m~ '"' ^x^^\ ^ 1 ^ 1 "^ o ^ Ji '; ,,^J W ,^i o . 2 i '^ sy^ w ^^ O s V'Vli ^ ^K, \ M ]y ^ I ^^ <^^^^^^ w^ \\ N ; ^ y/z^^f^^/y^'^f^^ 7^ Iw u* u H ; • ^^^ < ^h^ ? R 1 ^ij"-M^x g § li- *— L___B ^^^S^. l§ o >'^.. C^ p c i '^^ i^:^ ~ — Z'^~ / ^ J i =^K^ * \ j Q t) ; o Vi ^^[ 1 - / ^ J "1 ^^ ! 1 ^^^'\ 1 Q ) r^ f lll^^s.™_i7UHal«^:^^^^^^ / <=> o o V___f-^^^y / ' / '— ench) / (U.S.) S^iet Is. Is.-' , /' ISO' POSSESSIONS AND DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER GREAT POWERS IN the PACIFIC iti f_ it) » Tglanrlc / e n *cf fh^ / 1^ /: Uniteci States.. ROPIC OFCAPRICq i-- British,. Dutch.. French. .CZU German Japanese Spanish America 90° THE PACIFIC 461 treaty. Finally, the use of a portion of the Boxer indemnity fund to aid Chinese students to study in this country bids fair to increase the friendliness between the two peoples. With Japan the situation has been very different. With that country we now have more points of contact than with any other nation except Great Britain. United States The fact is, though it is not yet recognized ^'^ J*P*° politically, that this embassy has taken the position held by that of Spain until 1898, as the second in importance. In addi- tion to the direct questions involved by a large trade and an unpopular immigration, we have to deal with Japan as oc- cupying Chinese territory in Manchuria, as well as in her relations to Spanish America, which are founded on a large and increasing immigration to nearly all of those republics. The situation is further complicated in the United States by the belief that Japan desires Hawaii and the Philippines, and in Japan by a disappointment, to say the least, that we secured the latter islands, as well as by resentment at our attitude toward Japanese emigrants. The first difficulty lay in the objection on the part of a large element of American public opinion, particularly on the Pacific coast, to Japanese immigration. Japanese This objection was partly racial and partly ™°"eration due to the fear of competition in the labor market with the overflowing populations of the Orient. The position and the self-conscious pride of Japan made impossible any such treaty arrangement as was made with China. In fact the treaties of 1894 and 1911 both granted a mutual right of immigration. Under these trying circumstances Secretary Root succeeded in putting the question at rest, by an agree- ment, expressed in a series of notes exchanged in 1907 and 1908, whereby the Japanese government itself undertook to prohibit the emigration of laborers to the United States. A similar understanding between Japan and Canada prevents the danger of the smuggling of coolies across the border, and a United States law prevents Japanese labor already resident 462 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY in Hawaii from migrating to the states. In this way Japanese pride was saved, and the desire of American opinion was for the time being met. The problem of the position of Japanese now resident in the United States has proved more perplexing. By treaty they are secured the rights of citizens of the most Japanese in . ° the United favored nation, but they are ineligible to citizen- States • . ship. In the case of the Italians, who were un- popular in the nineties, the securing of the franchise has, politically at any rate, secured them full acceptance. The Japanese, being politically negligible, are at the mercy of leg- islation in so far as they are not protected by treaty rights. Their privileges have been interfered with by legislation in several states, in such a way, the Japanese government claims, as to violate our treaty obligation. The chief complaint has been of California. In 1913 the legislature of that state, after many years of agitation with regard to their use of schools and other privileges, adopted a small measure of discrimination by prohibiting leases of agricultural land for more than three years to persons "ineligible to citizen- ship." In the actual situation this restriction applies almost entirely to the Japanese. The qualifications for citizenship are of course a purely domestic affair; but the making of the standard of eligibility a rule for granting further favors, when that standard applies almost wholly to one nation, certainly raises a delicate question under the most favored nation clause. This dispute still persists, but otherwise our relations have been exceptionally friendly. The floating of a Japanese , loan in the United States at the time of the Japanese- American un- war with Russia established a tie, and our derstanding •• .• • /^i • ii j • cooperation m Chma was generally conducive to good feeling. In 1908 Secretary Root and the Japanese ambassador exchanged notes to the effect that their wish was for the peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific; that "the policy of both governments, uninfluenced THE PACIFIC 463 by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region above mentioned, and to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China;" that they both stood for the independence and integrity of China; and that, should any event threaten the existing conditions, "it remains for the two governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it useful to take." In thus defending our interests in the Pacific, and at the same time exerting a decided influence on international policy, even to the point of having possibly prevented the dismemberment of China, with entangling al- so little resulting international bad feeling and that of a character practically inevitable and without becoming involved in any entangling alliance, American diplomacy has shown itself at its best and worthy of the early traditions of the republic.^ ^W. R. Thayer, "John Hay," Harper s Magazine, 1915, especially 836- 842, throws much liglit on Hay's personality and on diplomatic problems, particularly the Alaska boundary and the canal problem. His life of Hay will appear in 1915. CHAPTER XXXIII ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION^ With our policy of dominance in the Caribbean, of exclu- sion of foreign influence throughout Spanish America, of equal compromise with Great Britain in British North America, of participation in Eastern Asia, of non-interference in Europe, Africa remains open. Our joining in an international receivership for Liberia in 1912, must, of course, be attributed to a special parental in- terest in that little republic; but our participation in the Algeciras conference in 1906 was merely an accidental result of our signing the act of 1880 concerning Morocco, and led to no entangling consequences. The Senate ratified the " Gen- eral Act" of the conference with the distinct assertion that it was not to be deemed a departure on our part from our traditional policy of having nothing to do with "the settle- ment of questions which are entirely European in their scope." We have no African policy. With Turkey, a power partly European and partly Asiatic, the United States has also assumed no special attitude. It „ has followed the example of European nations in Turkey . . ,,..,.. reservmg to its own consuls the jurisdiction over its own citizens. This matter has been the subject of peren- nial dispute, as diflFering texts have been found of our treaty of 1830, upon which our claim to the privileges of extraterri- toriality have been chiefly based. Our insistence upon the practice, however, was placed by Hay in 1900 on the most favored nation clause, and we have maintained it. What action will be taken now that Turkey has (1914) abrogated ^ American Year Book, 1910. This annual and the International Year Book give good accounts of the diplomacy of each year. 464 ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 465 the privilege in the case of all nations, is uncertain; the most favored nation clause ceases to have any significance in the connection, and our treaty is abrogated with the rest. We have taken no part in the concert of powers which has so often intervened and remonstrated as a result of condi- tions within the Turkish empire. In 1894 the Senate passed resolutions looking to expostulation because of reported "atrocities;" but President Cleveland stated that, since the European powers were bound together in the matter by the treaty of Berlin, we could not take action without inconvenience, and that he had already declined an in- vitation of the Turkish government to investigate con- ditions. The protection of our citizens there has, however, been a perpetual source of annoyance and dispute. These con- troversies have been chiefly of two classes, those „. . . Missions relating to missionaries, and those havmg to do with naturalized citizens of Turkish origin. Our missions, particularly numerous in Syria and including the important Roberts College at Constantinople, have been permitted, and have enjoyed protection. By an agreement of 1874, definitely interpreted in 1910, they have even been allowed to hold property. Our whole position has been simplified by the fact that united Europe demands the fullest freedom in such matters, and that we have since 1903 claimed and have not been denied, equal treatment. Our position has been that whatever concessions of this character have been granted European nations, become automatically ours by right. In the case of injury to missions or to other American property during the disorders so frequent in Turkey, we have never succeeded in making the Sublime Porte ac- knowledge our claims by formal treaty. In one instance, however, indemnity was virtually granted by an agreed overpayment for the construction of a Turkish war vessel by an American firm. The situation of our naturalized natives of Turkey is 466 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY extremely disagreeable, and, owing to the increased immi- gration of Armenians and Syrians to this country, the matter has been of growing importance. Turkey problem with allows expatriation only by permission and on condition of renewing Turkish citizenship immediately upon return to the empire. European nations, having no large interchange of population with Turkey, have acquiesced in this position; and the United States has been obliged to follow their example. Natives of Turkey who have become naturalized in the United States, therefore, whether with or without the permission of the Turkish government, cannot expect from the United States that full protection afforded to native American citizens or natural- ized citizens born elsewhere than Turkey. This does not, however, mean that they are neglected. The United States embassy and consular officials are always on the alert, and have actually afiForded a protection sufficiently efficacious to make it worth while to forge American passports. It is this lack of definite agreement and the possibility of ac- complishing so much by personal effort, that makes the embassy at Constantinople so important. It is generally given to a man of personality, and it was here that Oscar S. Straus did so much to ameliorate conditions. Legally the conditions with regard to naturalization are similar in Russia, but there the subject has been handled on the basis of general understandings, which for a long time worked fairly satisfactorially. The dangers inherent in the situation „ ^ ,. ,. however, are illustrated by the dispute over Naturalization ... . problem with Russia's decision to exclude entirely Russian Jews naturalized in America, which led in 1912 to the denunciation of our treaty of commerce with that country by Congress. In Europe itself the shadow of the profound and united animosity, which succeeded the Spanish War, quickly van- ished with the realization that our new policy was not aggres- sive in fields particularly interesting to that continent, — that ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 467 we did not threaten the equipoise of European power, that our gigantic trade balances were not eternal, that New York did not take the place of European capitals as ^^^ ^ ^ ^^_ the center for foreign loans. Perhaps, too, titude of .,.,.- . Europe there was a feeling that, if we were strong, it would be good policy to cultivate us. Quick to perceive these facts, the Kaiser became demonstrative in his friendliness, sending his brother Prince Henry to visit us, presenting the nation with a statute of Frederick the Great and Harvard University with the material to fill a Germanic museum, leading the way in the cultivation of international good will by the establishment of exchange professorships, and asking President Roosevelt's daughter to christen his new racing yacht, the building of which in America was a compliment to a national industry of which we are justly proud. France, less successful in engaging the popular attention, followed in his wake with a statue of Rochambeau, which recalled to our people when reading one morning newspaper, the aid that she had given us under his leadership during our Revolution. She too provided exchange professorships. This effusive friendship was harmless, and, if it did not much affect the stand taken by Germany on Ameri- can pork, it at least provided a pleasanter atmosphere for negotiation. With Europe, the question of immigration to the United States has far-reaching possibilities. The floods of immi- grants that have lately come to our shores European from that continent have excited the appre- i°i°"gration hension of widely differing classes of our population. Senator Lodge has made himself spokesman of the movement toward exclusion, and the labor element has complained of being exposed to the competition of newcomers satisfied with a low standard of living. This agitation has taken form in the exclusion of persons with disease, with criminal records, or those likely to become dependent upon the public for sup- port. As a further precaution, Congress in 1912 and twice 468 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY in 1914 passed acts establishing a literary test. The first of these was vetoed by President Taf t, and the other two met a like fate from President Wilson. Nevertheless some further legislation is probable in the near future. While such action would not necessarily lead to foreign complications, yet the laws that we already have give rise Roumanian to many minor diplomatic problems, and in °°*® 1902 Secretary Hay took a new stand with many potentialities. On July 17 of that year he wrote to our minister accredited to Roumania concerning a proposed convention in regard to naturalization. After discussing our general policy, he added : " It behooves the State to scrutinize most jealously the character of the immigration from a foreign land, and, if it be obnoxious to objection, to examine the causes which render it so. Should those causes originate in the act of another sovereign State, to the detriment of its neighbors, it is the prerogative of an injured State, to point out the evil and to make remonstrance; for with na- tions, as with individuals, the social law holds good that the right of each is bounded by the right of the neighbor." He found that the action of Roumania made life intolerable to the Jews. "Removal under such conditions is not and can- not be the healthy, intelligent emigration of a free and self- reliant being. It must be, in most cases, the mere trans- plantation of an artifically produced diseased growlh to a new place." Our opposition was not to Jews, but to out- casts and paupers. We would make no treaty by which, under existing conditions, we were forced to take them, or by which they were to be prevented from returning to Roumania.^ Our action in this matter was limited to our remonstrance and our refusal to make a treaty. The suggestion of Secre- tary Bryan, in 1913, to tlio Bucharest conference of the Bal- kan states, that it permit full religious liberty, seems to have ' Cyrus Adler, Jews in the Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Amer. Jewish Hist. Soc, Publications, No. 15 (1906). ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 469 been in accordance with this poHcy. Our national annoy- ance at the forced immigration due to the artificial stimula- tion caused by the advertisements and solicita- „ . *' . . Undue stimu- tions of steamship lines, has not reached lation of immi- the point of definite diplomatic action; but we have called the attention of the nations concerned to the subject, and have met with sympathetic response from Italy. The prospective opening of the Panama canal, with the possibility of water transit to the Pacific Coast, caused the subject to receive special attention in 1914. The routine problems of diplomacy did not require quite so much attention during this period as in that from the Civil to the Spanish war, although the number First treaties, n . 1 J? , TXT J n 1. extradition, ol actual cases was tar greater. We made nrst and trade- treaties only with Ethiopia, more commonly ™arks known as Abyssinia, and with San Marino. The area of extradition practically covered the globe, and the protection of our trademarks, patents, and copyrights became almost world-wide. Claims we arranged with Brazil, Chili, Great Britain, Guatemala, Hayti, Peru, Russia, Salvador, and Venezuela. These were all submitted to some form of ar- bitration. Although our ocean merchant marine remained relatively small, we took no steps to improve it that involved our rela- tions with other countries. The era of maritime Merchant discrimination, except in regard to coasting "^"'^^ trade, had passed. For the maintenance of their commercial flags at sea, nations had come to rely on subsidies and on the creation of conditions favorable to ship-building and em- ployment. Congress was continually and earnestly urged to adopt a subsidy policy, but refused to do so. Such legis- lation as was adopted from time to time rather repressed than encouraged the development of a marine under our flag. The laws concerning the registration of vessels, granting the right to carry the American flag, made it difficult to register foreign built vessels, the intention being to encourage 470 AMERICAN DIPLOIVIACY domestic ship-building. The various tariffs, however, by protecting the materials for ship-building, increased its cost. While thus making American built ships more costly, the government was not able to afford them compensating protection, for the competition of the ocean marine is in- ternational, and equality is the most that can be obtained by international agreement. It was hoped that the tariff law of 1913 would remove some of the disadvantages under which we labored, but conditions since its passage have been so unusual as to render it impossible to estimate its effect. The outbreak of the great war of 1914, therefore, found us in the position that Jefferson described in his report of 1793; chiefly dependent for our foreign intercourse upon the marines of warring foreign nations. The situation thus created led to a widespread interest in the problem, from which some consistent and effective national policy may result. Already (March, 1915) the opening of American registry to foreign built vessels has brought us half a million tons of shipping. President Wilson's proposal for a nation- owned marine suggests interesting possibilities. The attempt to create openings for our commerce was con- stant and more successful. In 1903 a special reciprocity treaty was made with Cuba. The Dingley tariff act of 1897, authorized the President to negoti- ate, within two years, reciprocity treaties providing for a twenty per cent reduction of duties, such agreement to be subject in every case to the ratification of the Senate and the approval of Congress. J. A. Kasson was appointed special commissioner to secure such treaties, and obtained them with Great Britain in behalf of Barbadoes, Bermuda, British Guiana, Turk island and Caicos, and Jamaica, also with the Argentine Republic, France, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Denmark. Although Senator CuUom, chair- man of the senate committee on foreign affairs, strongly urged that the treaties should go into effect immediately upon their ratification by the Senate, that view was not ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 471 pressed, and at the suggestion of Senator Spooner each of them was amended by the addition of the clause "not to take effect until the same shall have been approved by the Congress." This admission of the power of Congress as a whole in these particular cases left open the general ques- tion of the rights of the President and Senate to make such treaties. Under these circumstances, only the treaty with France was accepted, in 1898, with an amendment in 1902.^ In addition, the Dingley act gave the President power to apply by proclamation varying fixed minimum and maxi- mum tariffs to different countries according Maximum and to their treatment of us. This measure proved minimum to be a powerful weapon in preventing retalia- tory and discriminating tariffs. It became the constant business of our diplomats to watch the commercial policies of foreign governments, and with the threat of high or the offer of low rates to secure favorable treatment for our merchants. Such agreements were made in 1900 with Italy, Germany, and Portugal, and in 1902 an additional one was arranged with Portugal; in 1906 one was made with Spain and a substitute one with Germany; and in 1908 the treaty with France was supplemented by such an agreement. In 1906 the President, without formal compact, but in con- sideration of tariff changes in Switzerland, proclaimed a low rate on our imports of her products. With the passage of the Payne-Aldrich tariff act in 1910, all these agreements fell. A similar minimum and maximum provision in the latter act, however, afforded opportunity for similar agreements, and a tariff mission was able promptly to make arrangements with most of the countries with which we trade heavily. These again ceased to be of force with the passage of the Underwood tariff of 1913, which nevertheless authorized the President "to negotiate trade agreements with foreign nations," providing for mutual concessions "looking toward free trade relations and further reciprocal expansion of trade ^ S. M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service, Chicago, 1911. 472 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY and commerce." These are to be ratified in each case by both houses of Congress. It was only natural that, with our new and wider interna- tional relationships and the constant progress of international International agreement, the scope of our international acts agreements should expand also. In 1898 we adopted as a modus vivcndi during our war with Spain, articles re- lating to the conduct of hostilities drawn up at a Geneva convention of 1864. In 1899 we adhered to a Convention regulating the Importation of Spirituous Liquors into Africa, and in 1906 to a new agreement on the same subject. In 1900 we were parties to an additional Act for the Protection of Industrial Property, in 1902 to a Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyrights, in 1903 to an International Sani- tary Convention. In 1902 we united with most of the American powers in a Convention for the Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims, and in 1905 in an International Sanitary Convention of which the other signatories were Central and South American states. In 1904 we joined in an inter- national exemption of hospital ships from the payment of dues. In 1905 we shared in the establishment of an Inter- national Institute of Agriculture at Rome, of which the first director was an American. In 1906 we were signatory to an International Red Cross Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded of the armies in the field, in the same year to an agreement for the unification of the Pharmacopoeial Formulas for Potent Drugs, and in 1907 to the establishment of an International OflSce of Public Health. During the whole of this period one of the most absorbing subjects of our diplomacy, as well as of popular interest Peace move- in diplomacy, was the movement for the im- ™*°* provement of the conditions of war and for the customary settlement of international disputes by judicial process. Arbitration in special cases has been a historic policy of the United States. Blaine's attempt to establish it as a ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 473 general practice for all America showed, as did so many of his policies, a premonition of the coming movement. In the period following the Spanish war many of our leaders welcomed it with enthusiasm. President Roosevelt endorsed it, and Secretaries Hay, Root, and Bryan, as well as President Taft, made it a leading purpose. The education of public sentiment in the direction of universal peace was organized on a colossal scale as a result of the munificence of Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn, and of the activity of A. K. Smiley, who since 1882 has called the believers in peace to an- nual conferences at Lake Mohonk. The pressure of always- impending war in Spanish America, however, excited those countries to a somewhat earlier application of arbitration as a general practice, and the tremendous cost of war ar- maments in Europe, combined with the militant patriotism of its great powers, have given the question a greater popular vitality there than with us. The first important step in the direction of peace was the calling by the Czar of the first Hague conference, which met in 1899. This body adopted certain principles Hague con- to govern the conduct of war on land and sea, Terences and established a permanent court of arbitration to sit at the Hagnie. The second conference, held in 1907, adopted addi- tional rules with regard to the conduct of war, reorganized the court, and declared the principle that the contract debts of one government to another should not be collected by force. Andrew Carnegie gave funds for the building of a palace for the work of the court, to the furnishing of which various nations presented evidences of their regard for peace. ^ The formation of a permanent court stimulated the resort to arbitration. The United States joined in sending many ^ W. I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences, Boston, 1908; Moore, American Diplomacy, ch. viii.; J. W. Foster, Arbitration and the Hague Court, Boston, 1904; Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, Reports, 1895, etc., Assoc, for International Conciliation, International Conciliation, 1907, etc. (issued monthly). 474 AMERICAN DIPLOJMACY cases to it, particularly its long-standing claim against Mexico for the "Pious fund," and suggested the court as a recourse General ar- agreeable to us for the settlement of Spanish- bitration American disputes with European powers. More important was the impetus which it gave to the adop- tion of general arbitration treaties providing for future cases. In 1902, for instance, Spain and Mexico came to a ten years' agreement for the compulsory reference to the Hague court of all their troubles that could not be settled by diplomacy. A model treaty knowm as the mondel, or world treaty, was devised by the Conference. This provided that all differences The model ^^ ^ legal nature as well as all those relating to treaties ^he interpretation of treaties, which could not be settled by diplomacy, and which did not affect vital interests, independence, or honor, should be referred to the Hague Court. This reference was not to be automatic, but every dis- pute which arose between the contracting nations was to be made the subject of a special protocol or agreement. The point gained for judicial settlement, was that the contracting nations bound themselves to make such arrangements. The treaty itself was to be of five years' duration. It was a very tentative step, but it was hoped that if generally accepted, it would land mankind somewhat nearer the goal of universal peace. Secretary Hay concluded treaties in general accord with this model with a number of nations, and President Roosevelt referred them to the Senate. In that body there was general approval, tempered by fear that they might lead to cases involving the bonds which Attitude of have been repudiated by a number of our states. Senate rpj^^ Senate was also alarmed because no pro- vision was made that the special protocols in each case should be submitted to it for approval. If all such international disputes were simjily to be sent by the President to the Hague, the prestige of the Senate would be decidedly diminished. President Roosevelt wrote Senator Cullom, chairman of the ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 475 committee on foreign affairs, that it was "absurd and prob- ably mischievous to treat" the question of state debts " as possible to be raised." On the subject of reference, however, both he and Hay were emphatic that it was intended to be kept in the hands of the President, and that it should be kept there; whereupon the Senate straightway amended the treaties by substituting the word "treaty" for "special agreement," thus removing the doubt and keeping the matter in its own hands. ^ President Roosevelt was so deeply incensed at this action that he refused to go on with the treaties. Secretary Root, with the approval of President Taft, however, Acceptance of renewed the project and secured a large number *^® treaties in the amended form. In 1908 and 1909 we made them with Austria-Hungary, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Hayti, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 1913 Secretary Bryan sought to extend the scope of arbitration still farther by carrying out one of the recom- mendations of the second Hague conference „ „, .,. . p Bryan's policy looking to the postponement of hostilities, from whatever cause, pending an investigation of the facts. This suggestion, reminding one of the "pause twenty minutes before you spank" principle, which has done so much to reduce the corporal punishment of children, would help offset the exciting effect of the telegraph and the cable, which have enabled the popular excitement in two countries to react so quickly and so constantly. Secretary Bryan's pro- posal met with so prompt a response from most of the coun- tries with which we have habitual dealings, that in the summer of 1914 twenty such treaties were submitted to the Senate. The years from 1898 to 1913 may be regarded as a period by themselves, partly because of the continuity of personnel in the diplomatic staff, and partly from the fact that prac- ^ CuUom, Fifty Years of Public Service. 476 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY tically all terminable difficulties had been settled by the latter year. It was a period replete with new policies and with Period 1898 the development of old ones to suit new con- to 1913 ditions, and over the whole period hung the un- certainty as to whether, should the opposing party come to power, these new departures would be confirmed, or dropped or changed. The administration of President Wilson does indeed bid fair to mark a turning point in international rela- tionships, and to usher in a new period. Mainly, however, this diplomatic change has been the result of new factors introduced from the outside, of the great calamity of the present (1915) world war. The situation has altered, but American policy has remained comparatively unchanged. The traditional American policies have been maintained and the most of the new ideas introduced under McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft, having been endorsed by the opposing party, are in fair way to become traditions. Those few which were reversed, as Secretary Knox's " dollar diplomacy " may be considered as still subjects of domestic controversy. In many respects the outstanding feature of this period was, as for that from 1815 to 1829, the clearing of the board of minor Routine and questions of all kinds, — boundaries, fisheries, cit- commerce izcnship, claims, and treaty interpretations, — some of them old problems, some new, but all interfering with cordial international relationships. Never before had we been quite so free from such food for quarrelling as we were by 1913. In this period, as in all others, diplomacy sought to aid commerce, its attempts were perhaps somewhat more positive than before, but were of such a character that it is difficult to estimate their effect. Much more spectacular was the expansion of territory. The new acquisitions were more remarkable for the novelty Expansion of of their characteristics than for their extent, territory p^^. ^j^^ ^^^^ time we violated Jefferson's in- junction to make no annexations that would require a navy for their defense. In the case of the Philippines there was ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 477 the further novelty that we professed an intention of holding them only until they should be ready for independence. In reality far more important than the exten- Expansion of sion of our dominions was our entrance into "^"^^^ce the diplomacy of eastern Asia. Although still avoiding en- tangling alliances, we nevertheless engaged in the problems of the Far East as an equal participant with the great powers of Europe. Our purposes were limited to the preservation of the integrity of China and the open door for trade, ideas that appealed to the ideals of our own people, and were calculated to command the acquiescence if not the heartfelt approval of foreign nations. At the same time we cordially cooperated with other nations in general measures for the protection of commerce, for the peaceful settlement of international dis- putes, and for the humane conduct of war, if war must be. Our most striking single achievement was the settlement on a new basis, in accordance with our changed opinion, of the status of isthmian transit. Although isthmian this determination of the question has proved P<'"'^y its worth by allowing the actual construction of the long- planned canal, it can hardly be regarded as diplomatically satisfactory, or as likely to withstand the strain of a war to which we ourselves should be a party. In connection with the canal we have developed a distinct Caribbean policy, which has not been thoroughly differentiated from what we call the Monroe Doctrine, but which is actually different. The Monroe Doctrine itself has continued its growth by accretion; even more than the Constitution has it been adjusted to meet new wants, while preserving p • ^ f the sanctity of an established and revered the Monroe name. Although monarchy and republicanism cease to stand in such striking opposition as they did in 1823, the European system of alliances and balance of power is still a real something which we wish to avoid, and have thus far successfully avoided. Though our relations have grown, and will continue to grow, increasingly intimate, 478 AMERICAN DIPLOIVIACY we have not become a part of the European system. It is, however, still a possibility, as it was in 1823, that we may by our own action or by the force of circumstances, become a member of it. It is still the wish of some European states- men that this may become the case, and some Americans are not adverse to the idea. The fact that for ninety years, ever since our declaration against further colonization, there has been no establishment of new European colonies in America decidedly strengthens our continued insistence on that point. On the other hand, the fact that in the same ninety years the only colonies in America from which Euro- pean authority has been removed are Alaska, Cuba, and Porto Rico somewhat deadens the force of Secretary Olney's declaration that all the colonies are destined to break off their dependence. Fortunately he set no date. If any new case should occur, we should probably still maintain the position announced by Polk in the case of Yucatan, that we could not with equanimity see even the voluntary passing of any American territory under European jurisdiction; and probably, we should also hold the position taken by Grant, that we should object to the transfer of any colony from one European power to another, at least where such transfer was likely to change the status of American affairs. The development of an American unity to confront the dual- ity of Europe, which Adams and Clay planned, which Blaine did so much to promote, was pressed in this period with vigor and with some success, but must be held to be a long way from accomplishment. Our American policy is still the policy of the United States. The most important new features or corollaries of our policy were our announcements that, with a view to reducing New corol- the opportunity for European interference, Monroe*^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ willing, by mediation, advice, guardian- Doctrine ship, and practical protectorates, to insure the carrying out by American governments of their general obligations to Europeans. To what extent we are ready to ROUTINE AND ARBITRATION 479 push this supervision is a matter to be determined in each case, but there can be no doubt that we would go farther within the region of our special interest, the Caribbean, than elsewhere. It is significant that the new corollary of the Wilson administration, to the effect that we will recognize only governments founded on justice and law, was not applied in the case of Peru, where a military government was promptly recognized at the very time when we were protesting against the government of Huerta in Mexico. CHAPTER XXXIV MEXICO When Woodrow Wilson became President, March 4, 1913, he found himself in a position somewhat similar to that of Wilson ad- Jefferson in 1801, of Jackson in 1829, and of ministration Lincoln in 1861. Most of the diplomatic problems of the time had been set at rest, and pol- icies for dealing with routine affairs had been adopted and were running smoothly. He called to the position of secretary of state William Jennings Bryan, who, being with- out experience in matters of state, would naturally be ex- pected to be chiefly interested in the general politics of the administration. In selecting John Bassett Moore as counsellor of the state department, however, he secured the promise of sound judgment and continuity of action.^ Wilson at once reversed one policy of the previous admin- istration by withdrawing the assistance of diplomacy to Change of Americans seeking concessions in China, and P°^'*^^ announced a new extension of the Monroe Doctrine by opposing concessions to foreign corporations by American nations. The second of these new departures promised to make up to the state department the loss of labor which the first might cause. Of the three unsettled and exciting questions left to him, two were the dispute with Great Britain concerning the canal toll, and that relating to the position of Japanese residents in this country. Both these matters he endeavored to settle by domestic action. In the interest of the second one, Secretary Bryan visited California and attempted to forestall action by her legis- lature, but this attempt failed, and the controversy con- • Resigned March 4, 1914. 480 MEXICO 481 tinues. In the matter of tolls, the President recommended Congress to revoke its action. This it did, and that question has vanished. The third and most important problem was that of Mexico. Contiguous, within the range of our Caribbean policy, and powerful, Mexico had always demanded Relations with a large share of our diplomatic attention. To ^^^co these causes of interest have usually been added those arising from her internal disorder; but that factor had come to be excluded from our consideration during the long presi- dency of Porfirio Diaz, which had given a peace that seemed established. The intimacy of our relationship is indicated by forty agreements, treaties, and conventions made in the forty years between 1868 and 1908. These included, besides the usual subjects of international negotiation, arrangements with regard to boundary, the pursuit of Indians, provision for the navigation of the Rio Grande, and the equitable dis- tribution of the waters of that river. The agreements finally culminated in a general treaty of arbitration and the meeting of Taft and Diaz in 1910. While the governments were thus intimate, and in general friendly, the citizens of the United States were infiltrating Mexico. This infiltration, however, was dif- _ . ' Foreign in- ferent from that which Alaman saw and feared terests in in Texas, it was most largely an infiltration of capital. Peace had opened up enormous possibilities of development, for which Mexico could furnish the oppor- tunity and the labor, but not the accumulated capital nec- essary to combine the two. The rewards promised to capital were correspondingly great and it was furnished in large amounts. Mining companies and railroad corporations invested enormous sums, and ranching companies, rub- ber plantation companies, and municipal utility companies scattered their shares broadcast. Private individuals en- gaged in great undertakings, and to hasten development the Mexican government itself borrowed heavily. This cap- 482 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY ital came from all the investing countries of the world, but chiefly from the United States. In 1912, President Taft esti- mated that a billion dollars had been invested by Americans. This capital did not go unaccompanied. It sent its rep- resentatives to Mexico, and in addition, organizing ability _ . and expert service were needed. Thousands Foreign ^ . . population in of Americans, with many English, French, and Germans, found employment there. Span- iards continued, as always, to be numerous. Although the foreign colony at the City of Mexico was large, the majority of these foreigners were not to be found in compact settle- ments, but scattered about the country, managing mines, ranches, and plantations, and living in the midst of a pop- ulation overwhelmingly native. The one important excep- tion was an agricultural colony of American Mormons in the north. When, therefore, in November, 1910, Francisco Madero inaugurated a revolution, the event became at once a matter Revolution of of high concern for the United States and for Madero other foreign powers. While France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were all interested in the protection of the lives and property of their citizens, the United States was additionally disturbed over the relation of the revolt to the Monroe Doctrine, as well as over the possibility of frontier disturbances. The latter question was the more immediately alarming, as the revolu- tion was to some extent sectional in character and in the beginning was localized in the north, the strategic points being those at which the railroads ran out of Mexico into United States territory. Juarez, Porfirio Diaz, and Larado ultimately became the scene of fighting, and stray bullets sometimes crossed the frontier and killed Americans upon American soil. In March, 1911, therefore, President Taft ordered the mobilization of twenty thousand United States troops on the frontier, with a fleet at Galveston. The rumors that these forces were intended to take part in a MEXICO 483 forcible intervention, however. Secretary Knox dismissed as "foolish stories." We did, in point of fact preserve our neutrality according to our customary principles. The speedy collapse of the Diaz government was a sur- prise to most Americans, who were unaware of the general unrest and dissatisfaction which his failure to Madero's broaden the limits of popular government and s"*^<=®ss relieve the distress of the agricultural laborers had excited. While those with financial interests in Mexico regretted the passing of a government apparently strong and sympathetic with their aims, the general public in America came to sym- pathize with Madero, as the press spread the complaints of the revolutionists. There was, therefore, general satisfaction in the United States when, in May, 1911, Diaz resigned and left the country and, in October, Madero was elected president. The government of the latter was at once recognized, but was never able to establish peace. Even in 1911 the United States warned him that fighting was not to United states take place where American lives and property ^^ Madero would be endangered; and our army was kept ready for action. Nevertheless, while favoring the new government, we preserved strict neutrality, and in 1912 Congress took an additional step in the development of our neutral system by the passage of an act authorizing the President, whenever he should "find that in any American country conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms and munitions of war procured from the United States," to prohibit trade in such articles. Taft acted at once upon this authority, but he exempted purchases by the govern- ment of Madero. In February, 1913, however, Madero was overthrown by Felix Diaz and General Huerta. Madero and his vice- president, Suarez, were killed under circum- Revolution of stances which strongly indicated official assas- •^"®'^* sination, and on February 27 Huerta was proclaimed presi- dent. His authority was at once rejected by Governor 484 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Carranza of the state of Coahuila, who denied its constitu- tionahty and insisted upon a return to the governmental methods prescribed by the constitution. It was under these circumstances that Wilson became President and undertook the management of the problem. Wilson and Before his policy \yas developed, Great Britain, Huerta ^j^ May 3, and France, Germany, and other countries in quick succession, recognized Huerta. This Wilson refused to do, and in explaming his action he formu- lated a new policy which remains the latest extension of the Monroe Doctrine, His purpose was to use non-recognition as a means of discouraging the establishment of governments in Spanish America that were based on violence, and on vio- lation of the constitution of the country involved and of the laws of morality. "We dare not," he declared, "turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that is to guide us and that we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so." This is a departure from our traditional policy of recognizing de facto govern- ments, although there exists one precedent in the threat of the Roosevelt administration not to acknowledge a revolu- tionary leader in the Dominican Republic even if he suc- ceeded. Our practical protectorate over that country however, together with its size, constituted important differences. President Wilson's attitude of non-recognition is by all odds the most aggressive turn that has ever been given to our Spanish-American policy, as it involves The policy of . , . • • i i • a • " non-recognl- practical mtervcntion in the domestic artairs of those republics. To ascertain the facts obviously means investigation. In actual operation the force created by such a policy of non-recognition consists in the lack of stability which it gives to the government under our disapprobation, and the consequent inability of the latter to borrow money. It is plainly President Wilson's belief that a government not founded on the popular will consti- MEXICO 485 tutionally expressed, and without our recognition, is a house built upon the sands. Should such a government estabhsh itself, however, the situation might be inconvenient. In accordance with this policy, Wilson in August, 1913, sent a special but informal agent, John Lind, to convey his terms to Huerta. These were immediate "Watchftil amnesty, security for an early and a free elec- ^^t"^g tion, and the assurance that Huerta would not be candidate for the presidency and that all parties would agree to abide by the results. These terms were rejected; when, therefore, on October 9, 1913, Huerta "purged" the Mexican Congress by imprisoning over a hundred of its members, Wilson in- formed him that the United States would not accept the result of the election which was soon to be held. Already in August the United States had warned Americans to leave Mexico, the administration had sent war-vessels to assist their departure, and Congress had appropriated money for the same purpose. On December 2, the President informed Congress that his policy was one of "watchful waiting." Hoping for the success of the insurrectionists, he soon after- ward withdrew the embargo on arms. Meantime the administration vigorously, and with some degree of success, held both the Huerta government and the insurrectionists to a respect for the lives and p * « < property of Americans. It could not, however, life and ; . . . 1 . , . . property msist on restitution and indemnity, since there was no recognized government to approach on these subjects. The powers of Europe, having recognized Huerta, were in a different position, and it was feared that they might pursue a different policy. This fear was in part re- moved by a speech of Prime Minister Asquith, on Novem- ber 10, 1913, in which he announced that, so far as Great Britain was concerned, there was "not a vestige of founda- tion for such a rumor;" and other nations assured the administration of their intention to respect American policy. 48G AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Nevertheless, the presence of British, German, and French war-vessels on the Mexican coast created alarm lest they should feel called upon to land troops to pro- United States .... „ „ 1 • and European tect their Citizens. Senator Bacon, chairman ^^^'^ of the Senate committee on foreign affairs, admitted that we could not deny their right to do so, but said he considered "it far better that a request be made to the United States to land marines " when protection was necessary, "so as to avoid the possibility of the slightest conflict between the United States and the European Pow- ers." The killing of Benton, an Englishman, by the rev- olutionary forces of General Villa in March, 1914, brought this question of protection to a head. Secretary Bryan as- serted that, since Great Britain, having recognized Huerta and not recognized belligerency, could in no way treat with the Constitutionalists, and yet could not be expected to let the matter pass unnoticed, we should be allowed to serve as intermediary, with the understanding, however, that we thereby assumed no responsibilitj'. This policy was acqui- esced in by both Great Britain and, after some hesitation, by Villa's superior officer. General Carranza. Should another case occur, therefore, the United States will undoubtedly handle it as next friend of both parties. The question arose whether the condition in Mexico con- stituted another of the traditional opportunities for Ameri- can expansion. The infiltration of American Expansion ver- . , , . . sus annexa- capital and Citizens, and the subsequent de- velopment of occasions for interference, were already there; the governor of Texas encouraged Texan citizens to cross the frontier in self-defence, the governor of Oregon prepared his militia for war with Mexico, and a bill for the annexation of northern Mexico was introduced into Congress. Even the final symptom, the fear of the intrusion of foreign influence in case we did not intervene, appeared. Japan had for some time been supposed to be seeking an entrance into Mexico. In 1912 the proposed purchase of MEXICO 487 Magdalena bay for a Japanese colony excited the Senate to its adoption of Senator Lodge's resolution on the subject of concessions to a syndicate that might lead to the establish- ment of a foreign power on American territory. The send- ing of Felix Diaz by Huerta on a special mission to Japan in 1913 seemed to confirm the suspicion of undue intimacy, but the refusal of that government to receive him somewhat quieted our apprehension. In March, 1914, Senator Fall of New Mexico called for immediate intervention to prevent Germany from taking action in Mexico. On the other hand, the process of expansion by the growth of American interests in foreign countries and the subse- quent adhesion of these countries to the United States seems, except in case of Hawaii, to have been completed in 1845. The acquisition of the Philippines, although it gave evidence of our desire to anticipate other countries, was ex- ceptional. It has been the theory, moreover, that our occupa- tion of those islands is to last only until they shall obtain the capacity for self-government, an idea which the Wilson administration has endeavored to make the basis of its Philip- pine policy. Alaska was an instance of happy and largely accidental anticipation; annexation promoted expansion rather than the reverse. Our other acquisitions belong to the category of naval stations, and are to be attributed rather to our imperialistic tendencies than to our traditional expansive habits. In spite of the dreams of a continental republic that Seward reflected, and in spite of our confident expectations of Cuba, the only settled portion of Spanish character of America that we have secured is Porto Rico, spaidsh"^ "* That island we took possession of because it Amenca was obviously foolish to have fought the Spanish war without putting an end to our century and a quarter of difficulties with Spain by excluding her, as Sumner said of Great Brit- ain, from the "hemisphere"; and, having taken it from Spain, we could do nothing but annex it. In no settled portion of MEXICO 489 Spanish America have we ever established a concentrated population, or acquired a preponderance of numbers or of in- fluence, or established a likelihood of such a preponderance; nor has any Spanish-American population shown an inclina- tion to become incorporated into the United States. There has always been lacking, therefore, that local germ which has been the moving cause of annexation in each natural case. Financial interests and the temporary residence of our citizens in a foreign country have never yet led us to acquire that country. Had Buchanan taken northern Mexico in pledge for our claims in 1858, it is possible that such a germ might have developed there; but the possibility of it now seems remote. It is evident that we will not allow Mexico to become the seat of a power threatening our control of the Caribbean; but there is no probability that we shall ever The Vera receive from Mexico, or even from a part of episode Mexico, any authentic request for annexation, or that we shall in this case depart from President Wilson's pronounce- ment that "the United States will never again seek one foot of territory by conquest." In fact the very act which seemed to Spanish-American opinion most indicative of an intention on our part to conquer Mexico, was turned by President Wilson into the most convincing demonstration it has re- ceived of the sincerity of our constant protestation to the contrary. While our government refused to recognize either Huerta or Carranza as officially representative of Mexico, it was in constant relationship with both. In April, 1914 its relations with Huerta became so strained that it was decided to undertake a military occupation of Vera Cruz. This was accomplished not without bloodshed. Although the administration announced that hostilities would not be carried farther, the opinion was widespread that war and at least temporary conquest would result. The people of the United States were strongly divided as to the probability and wisdom of such action, Europe was deeply interested. 490 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY Spanish America was still more intensely aroused, and its press and public men were very generally convinced of the ambitions of the United States. In this crisis Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, known as the ABC powers, offered their mediation. This the Wilson administration promptly ac- cepted, subject to certain restrictions, and a conference was The ABC arranged at Niagara. The Mexican factions mediation showed themselves less amenable to suggestion than the United States, and practically nothing was done towards solving the internal problems of Mexico. The at- titude of the United States, however, was made clear to Spanish America, and the subsequent withdrawal of the American troops from Vera Cruz confirmed the impression, that it was guided by no motives of territorial aggrandize- ment. CHAPTER XXXV THE GREAT WAR The shadow which impending war had for some years cast over Europe, had not reached America, and the events of August, 1914, took almost everyone in the United States by complete surprise. They cannot be said, however, to have found the country un- prepared. The teachings of Washington, the reverence for the Monroe Doctrine, the consistent practice of a century and a quarter, had furnished a policy and a general under- standing of the requirements of that policy. The al- most universal desire was for neutrality, and both govern- ment and people realized that neutrality was not merely a passive state but involved active duties. It was realized also that neutrality could not save the nation from all the consequences of war, and that the utmost vigilance would be required to protect the national interests. History seemed to be repeating itself, and as nation after nation joined in the conflict, the conditions obtaining be- tween 1793 and 1815 seemed to reappear. But ^ actually history never repeats, and differences between 1793 as important as the resemblances were soon evident. The first worry to which the country was sub- jected was the flight of the tens of thousands of American travellers who found themselves for a time, stranded, money- less and without means of transportation, in the belligerent countries. The world had grown so much smaller in the hundred years, so many new strands of connection united the nations of the world, that war was bound to touch neutral individuals more intimately than ever before. On the other hand, the settlement of the naturalization question 491 492 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY rendered a revival of the impressment problem impossible. The sympathies of the American people were divided as they had been before, but now the basis for this division was not political theory but racial kinship. Still more im- portant was the change in the relative weight of the United States among the nations of the world. While national interests were involved by the conflict and apt to be affected by its results, no sane opinion could suppose that the in- tegrity of the national territory or what could properly be called vital interests were endangered. The greatest disturbance was in commerce. In 1793, war had found the nation with a merchant marine ready Dislocation of ^^ot only to do its own carrying, but also to un- commerce dertake much of that of the nations at war; in 1914, the country was largely dependent upon the marines of the belligerents, and the immediate tying up of the Ger- man marine left it for a time ill supplied. It followed that the United States was more interested than before in the rules and practices of war as they affected the treatment of belligerent vessels by belligerents. This interest, however, did not carry with it very extensive rights, and the main activity of the government was, as it previously had been, with the protection of American vessels. The policy of the Allies, that is of the powers allied against Germany, Austria, and Turkey, was similar to that which r, ^ ^ ^ Great Britain had pursued in the conflict with Contraband i • i z-v i and continuous Napoleon, but somewhat snnpler. On the one ^°^^^^ hand they wished to kcei) the oceans open for their commerce, on the other, to cut off Germany and Austria from all connection with tlie outside world. By the early months of 1915 the first object had been practically accomplished in all seas except those within the radius of action of submarines having their bases on the German or Belgian coasts. The accomplishment of the second was rendered difficult by the fact that several neutral countries, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark, abutted on Ger- THE GREAT WAR 493 man or Austrian territory, and that the Baltic remained in the control of the German fleet, thus protecting intercourse with the outside world through Norway and Sweden. To close these channels, the Allies resorted to the doctrines of contraband and of continuous voyage. The attitude which the United States had assumed in the Civil War, rendered it difficult for her to protest against a rather rigorous inter- pretation of the latter doctrine. With regard to contra- band, the most serious question arose in connection with cotton. The decreased demand for this article constituted the most serious economic effect of the war on the United States. When it was proposed in addition to class it as contraband, thus checking its export to Germany, a vigorous and effective protest was made and it was left as a legitimate article of neutral trade. That the Allies were slow in resorting to blockade was due to the changed conditions of naval warfare, which made it more dangerous than before to patrol a hostile coast line. Their inability to control the Baltic, moreover, rendered the effect of a regular blockade doubt- ful. In February, 1915, however, Germany, on the ground that the Allies were exceeding their rights as belligerents by declaring all foodstuffs contraband regardless of whether they were intended for combatants or non-combatants, announced a quasi-blockade of the British Isles by sub- marines. The Allies responded by declaring, first a virtual blockade of Germany and Austria, and then, on our complaint at its unusual nature, a real blockade. They argued that they were in a position to carry out the spirit of the law of blockade, though not its letter. This clash of decrees called to mind that between Napoleon and Great Britain, each power defending its position, not in law, but on the ground of retaliation. The effort of both to conciliate American opinion, however, marked a decided change. The German policy was directed only against belligerent ships, though neutrals were warned that they might incur danger; 494 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY the Allies promised compensation for all financial losses under the operation of their system. Analogous to these questions were those with regard to the use of mines. Although the Hague Conference had drawTi up rules regulating their employment, whether of the floating or anchored variety, actual warfare produced situations which were unpro- vided for, and which involved the security of neutral commerce. The desire of the United States to improvise as rapidly as possible a merchant marine, led to a revival of the question Transfer of of the transfer of merchant vessels from bellig- vessels erent to neutral powers, which had so much angered the American public during the Civil War. The Declaration of London of 1910 had prohibited such transfer, and to this the United States had adhered, but doubtful cases remained. In 1915 the Dacia, sailing from the United States to Germany, was seized by France on the ground of illegal change of o^Tiership, and became the occasion for a test case. A matter which attracted even more attention was the sale of contraband to belligerents. There was no question Trade in that international law sanctioned such trade; contraband j^ ^j^g merely subject to the risk of interference by the opposing belhgerent. The supplying of the demands for such articles, moreover, did much to offset the industrial distress caused by the dislocation of customary occupations. On the other hand, in the actual conditions of the war, such trade was confined to the Allies and was of substantial assist- ance to them. The act of Congress, moreover, authorizing the President to suspend such trade in the case of conflicts in America, had created a disposition to regard such pro- hibition as a step in international progress. Consequently a strong demand arose in the United States, backed by the elements favorable to Germany and by many of those op- posed to all war, that the government put a stop to the traffic. The administration, however, refrained in this ciuse THE GREAT WAR 495 as in others from deviating in any way from the estabHshed practices of neutraHty. The United States government, indeed, followed a policy strictly conservative. It refused to act on the protests re- ceived from the various countries based on al- „ ,. . , . .... Policy or leged acts of their opponents m violation of the United States laws of war. It followed established practice in 8°^^™™®° all cases where precedent existed, and where it did not, based its policy on reasoned implications from previous cases of a similar nature. When the practices of the belligerents seemed to it to constitute violations of the laws of nations and at the same time to infringe the rights of Americans, it did not have recourse to bombastic complaint, but expressed its views in carefully drawn protests which might serve as bases for reclamations at the return of peace. The predica- ment of Americans caught abroad at the beginning of the war was handled with energy. Congress voted money to assist them, the government undertook the forwarding of private funds during the time that private exchange was suspended, and naval vessels were sent to bring home those who could not secure other accommodation. To encourage the development of the merchant marine the administration proposed a national corporation in which the government should be a stockholder, but Congress failed to approve this suggestion. Congress equally failed to change its policy with regard to national defense. The support of the navy was continued upon the scale previously fixed, but neither it 1 e 1 • 1 T. 1 !• Public opinion nor the army were lurther increased, rublic opinion took up this question, but divided upon it. On the one hand it was urged that the United States was ill prepared to face contingencies which the continuance of war or the conclusion of peace might very possibly produce. Many believed that the new conditions resulting from the war would inevitably detach the United States from so much of its policy of isolation as still remained, and that it must be 49G AMERICAN DIPLOMACY prepared to play its peart as a world power. On the other hand, the movement for disarmament, supported by those who believed that judicial settlement might be substituted for war, received new impulse from the horrors of modern warfare. Many of the leaders of this movement were as dissatisfied with the government as were those favoring greater armaments. They wished the President to take the lead in bringing about peace by offering mediation. The great majority of the people, however, accepted the lead of the administration. Although extreme utterances on every side of every question attested the existence of free speech, the press and conversation alike reflected a very general following of President Wilson's advice that the spirit as well as the letter of neutrality be kept, and as yet (April, 1915) the war has not become in any way a party question. CHAPTER XXXVI SUCCESS AND ITS CAUSES Our diplomacy has, on the whole, served the national needs and purposes exceptionally well. No other nation has been confronted so continually by the problem of neu- trality, and for none has it assumed such protean shapes; yet it is impossible to see how we could, with foreknowledge, have improved our handling of it in any large way. For no other nation has the problem of protecting its citizens abroad been so difficult, owing to the great numbers of our naturalized citizens and the variety of their origin; but at the present day, and for a long time past, an American pass- port is nowhere inferior to any other certificate of nationality. Although our merchant flag was ill-treated during the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic period, we won for it later, in the teeth of Great Britain, a freedom al- most unique. The policies for the building up of our merchant marine and the furtherance of our commerce have been chiefly de- termined by internal considerations, but diplomacy has in all cases eventually, though with difficulty, laid open the path for the execution of those policies internationally. The government has been able to offer our people as great op- portunities for the exercise of their activities beyond the national boundaries as any other nation has enjoyed; our Newfoundland fisheries, for example, have been even more caressingly watched over than have those of France. It has also successfully protected them in the enjoyment of their national resources, the only important exception being the practical destruction of the seal herd of Behring sea. The territory desired by our people for their expansion has 497 498 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY been obtained, excepting to the north. There, meeting the equal force of Great Britain, we are left with a straight line as the result of the impact. The study of the measuring of each stretch of that line, however, reveals the fact that we obtained all that we had the power to demand. Erratic and experimental divergencies in our diplomacy have been few. Of these, Jefferson's embargo must be consid- ered the greatest, and it was diplomatically unsuccessful and disastrous. To err with Napoleon, however, does not indicate lightness of mind; and the embargo in the United States, like the continental system in Europe, hastened an internal devel- opment that was sure to come. Our many and varied attempts at an unnatural expansion failed because they were unnatural, and left no serious effects. Our foreign wars have all been turned to account — even that of 1812, which was saved from being a national calamity only by the skill of our diplomats at Ghent. This success has rested upon a continuity, both of detail and of general policy, which is remarkable in a nation that in a hundred and fifty years has gone through all the stages of evolution from a second-rate colony to a great power. This continuity must in a considerable degree be attributed to that juristic tone which until very recently has been a predominating factor in our public life. Well advised in the beginning, particularly by Franklin, we accepted a system of international law which appealed to our ethical sense and fitted our position and interests. To this we clung with an unequaled persistence and exactitude, and it is in large part through our efforts that this system has become the basis of the accepted international law of to-day. That in handling innumerable petty cases and frequent pressing crises we were able to preserve an impressive con- sistency of practice, was not primarily due to the efforts of our diplomatic staff in foreign countries. Efficient as it was at some periods, and brilliant as have been some of the men composing it at every stage, it had after 1829 no element of SUCCESS AND ITS CAUSES 499 cohesion, unless between 1897 and 1913, and it has at all times been marred by the presence of incompetent or unsuit- able individuals. The home administration of diplomacy, however, has exhibited a continuity of service and a conspic- uous ability which give it rank with our supreme court. John Jay, John Quincy Adams, William Hunter, and John Bassett Moore cover the whole period of our diplomacy, and repre- sent an almost constant service within the state department or easy availability for advice to it. Other series equally striking may be named. Jefferson and Buchanan were al- ways powerful, and for much of the time in control, from the beginning of independence to Civil war; Seward and Hay, from 1849 to 1905. William Hunter and A. A. Adee together served in the state department from 1829 to the present day (1915); counting the years when they over- lapped, their combined service falls just six years short of a century. Such personal oversight has meant a growth from precedent to precedent which has gradually resulted in a self-carrying tradition for those minor matters that do not reach the public ear.^ The consistency with which general policies have been applied in the greater episodes, as such have arisen, is due to the force of a governing public opinion. It is probably true that the growth of democracy has made diplomacy more difficult in most countries than it previously had been. That the reverse has been true in the United States has been due, in the first place, to the juristic habit of mind already mentioned. The Monroe Doctrine has been popularly re- garded as a law; its successive extensions have been looked upon in the same light as the new powers which the courts have successively found by implication in the constitution. More important has been the simplicity of our leading and essential policy. The harmonizing of conflicting ideas, when they have presented themselves, has proved beyond our grasp. The one deliberate purpose which our diplomacy has ^ Gaillard Hunt, Department of State of the United States, N. H., 1914. 500 AMERICAN DIPLOMACY completely failed to bring about has been that of winning the sympathy and acquiring the leadership of Spanish Amer- ica. The reason is obvious; not the sentiment of Pan-Amer- icanism, but the deep-seated nationalistic conception of United States dominance, has primarily moved us. From the day in 1794 when Wayne rode round the British fort at the rapids of the Maumee and dared its commander to fire, we have, with the exception of brief periods after the first abdication of Napoleon and during the Civil war, been the dominant American power. In 1823 we announced the fact to the world, and at the same time first became generally conscious of it ourselves. Every corollary added to the Mon- roe Doctrine has been a renewed assertion of the fact, and has presented an added means of maintaining it. Dominance is not a policy but a talent: the responsibility is for its use. Our employment of our position has rested upon a feeling that long antedated it, that even antedated our ancestors' migration to America. They wanted to be let alone, the colonies in 1776 wanted to be let alone, to seek their future in their own way. In return they were willing, not exactly to let every one else alone, but at least to confine their activities to the limits within which they were actually in control. Franklin rejected the idea of colonial representa- tion in the English Parliament; he wished not legislative participation in the empire, but legislative independence within the colonial area. This was the reverse side of the Monroe Doctrine. In America we were dominant; by con- fining our activities to America we could be dominant wherever we were active. It is this simple and fundamental idea that has impressed itself on the American mind, and has become the touchstone by which public opinion judges all diplomatic questions. With such a task as keeping ad- justed a balance of j)ovver, democracy is j)robably incomjic- tent to deal, with its accustomed practicality the democracy of America has determined that it will have no balance of power in America, and will not meddle with it where it exists. INDEX INDEX Aberdeen, Lord, Mexican policy, 253, 262, 270; Oregon, 267. Abyssinia, treaty with United States, 469. Acadia, French, boundary dispute, 230. Adams, Charles F., minister to England, 8, 306, 316, 321, 372; instructions, 319; protests deliv- ery of Confederate rams, 322, 340; successor, 340; in Geneva board, 347; characterized, 306; cited, 322, 382. Adams, David J., fishing- vessel, seized, 376. Adams, John, diplomat, 1, 115, 188; commissioner to France, 38; Hol- land, 38; peace commissioner, 41, 46, 48; minister to England, 52, 59, 60, 83, 372; commercial treaties, 54; treats with Barbary States, 56; arranges Dutch loan, 78; vice-president, 81; president, 130; appointments, 131, 138; French policy, 133, 134, 137-139; views on neutrality, 92; on isola- tion, 211; characterized, 38, 39; cited, 34, 39, 59, 60, 92, 133. Adams, John Q., diplomat, 2, 8, 241, 306, 429. 499; mission to Prussia and Sweden, 129; at Ber- lin, 143; minister to Russia, 163, 170, 179, 188; on commission to England, 179; on Ghent commis- sion, 180, 183, 185; secretary of state, 188; president, 188, 214; fisheries policy, 192; trade, 199; Florida, 199-202, 208, 341; Span- ish-American, 207-218, 297; slave- trade, 237; objects to British co- operation, 210-214, 293; Pan- American policy, 214, 215, 284, 478; slave-trade, 237; Texas policy, 246, 247, 250-252; member of Congress, 227, 256; supports Jack- son, 228; argues VAviisted case, 239; minister to England, 372; characterized, 188, 222; opinions cited, 81, 104, 120, 126, 140, 189. Adams, Samuel, gains foreign sym- pathy, 24; predicts separation of East and South, 41. Adams, William, peace commission- er, 180. Adee, A. A., service in state depart- ment, 499. Adet, P. A., minister to United States, 127; recall, 128, 130; Canadian intrigues, 131; western, 131. Adler, German warship, 400. Admiralty Courts, organized by Genet, 99; British, 111, 112, 114. 122, 156, 157. 236, 339. Africa, trade with United States, 55, 85; Napoleon's dealings with, 131; slaves returned to, 239; pirates of, 351; international relations, 464. Aguinaldo, Emilio, Philippine leader, 420. Aix-la-Chapelle, treaty of, 16. Alabama, Confederate cruiser, 339; claims against, 345; commission on, 347. Alaman, Louis, Mexican secretary, cited, 243; warnings heeded, 247; Texan views, 252; views on Amer- ican expansion, 481. Alamo, story of, 248. Alaska, Russian fur-trade, 209; purchase of, 358, 398, 406, 478, 487; seal industry, 377, 434; boundary dispute, 432; settled, 434; status of inhabitants, 421. Alaska Commercial Company, seal- ing monopoly, 377. Albert, Prince, labors for peace, 317, 503 504 INDEX Aldrich, Sen. Nelson, on reciprocity, 388, 471. Alexander I, of Russia, fosters Holy Alliance, 204; foreign policy, 179. Alexander II, of Russia, emancipa- tor. 312. Alexander VI, Pope, confirms Span- ish claims, 10; demarcation line, 11, 12. 391. 417. Alexis. Grand Duke, visits Amer- ica. 3G0. Alfonso XII, king of Spain, 365. Algcciras, conference at. 402; United States takes part. 464. Algiers, official piracy, 55. 56; holds Americans as slaves. 56; treaty with. 85; raids Atlantic, 114; American expedition against, 141; French capture, 223; Dey of, cited, 141. Aliens, control of, 80. Allegheny River. 17. Allen, Ethan, head of Cuban com- mittee, 409. Alvcrstone, Lord Chief Justice, on Alaskan boundary commission, 434. Amazon River, navigation of, 287. Ambrister, R. C, hanged. 200. I' Ambuscade, captures LitUe Sarah, 103. Amelia Island, privateers use, 200. American Fur Co., rivals. 173. American Revolution, diplomacy during, 1, 23; causes, 35; Euro- pean interest in, 24, 25; piracy. 56; after effects on commerce, 62; frontier loyalty, 67, 69; trade during. 70, 81. 108. Americans, relations with Indians. 64-06. 72. 74. 116; sympathies in French Revolution, 95, 9(i; man French privateers, 98. 102. Ames, Fisher, supports Jay treaty, 122; cited, 86, 144, 121. Amiens, treaty of, 143. VAminted, slave carrier, case tried, 239; as precedent, 368. Amoy, port opened, 223. Am.sterdam, printing centre, 24; financial, 34; market, 35; burgo- master, 36. Amy Wartvick, admiralty case, 307. Andrew, Gov. J. M., Trent affair pleases, 316. Angell, J. B., on Chinese commission, 398. Anglican Church, position in United States, 52. Antelope, admiralty case, 237. Apia (Samoa), consular intrigues in, 399, 401. Appalachian Mountains, as bound- ary, 98. Appalachicola River, as bound- ary, 19. d'Aranda, Count, Spanish minister, 33; treats with Jay, 44, 142. Arbitration, familiar to English colonists, 22; of boundaries, 186; of slave indemnity, 191; Indian annuities, 194; northeast bound- ary, 228, 234; Creole case, 239; northwest boundary, 270; seizure of fishing vessels, 287; idea of permanent, 279; fisheries, 285; Civil war claims, 344-347; Geneva court. 347, 348; of Spanish-.\mer- ican claims, 350; Cuban claims, 367; Portuguese, 375; French, 375; fisheries, 375; sealing rights, 378; between American powers, 385, 386; proposed in Venezuelan dis- pute, 392, 393; in Maine affair, 414; of Alaska boundary, 432. 434; of fisheries. 435; Pan-American court of. 451; Venezuelan claims, 447; other claims, 469; "Pious fund" claims, 474; scope, 340, 474, 475; American advocates of, 472, 473; treaties, 474, 475, 481; Spanish- American practice of. 473, 474. Arbuthnot, Alexander, hanged, 200. Archangel, port open. 16,'). Argentine Republic, commercial treaty with, 285. 287; later rela- tions, 324; European relations, 32.5; competition with, 373; lUd- ian immigration, 384; diplomatic service to, 430; foreign minister, 446; dispute with Chile, mediated, 451; attitude toward United States, 452; recipnx-ity treaty with, 470; offers mediation, 490. Arizona, New Mexico includes, 279. INDEX 505 Arkansas, early history, 253; emi- grants, 257. Armed Neutrality. See Neutrality. Armenians, status in United States, 466. Armstrong, Gen. John, letter cited, 150; minister to France, 170. Arnold, Benedict, at siege of Que- bec, 75. Aroostook River, trouble in valley, 230, 235. Arthur, C. A., president, 370; ap- pointments, 370; reciprocity policy, 388. Ashburton, Lord, treats with Web- ster, 233, 234, 237; views cited, 233; letter to, 239. Asia, trade with United States, 54, 196, 223; diplomatic activity in, 353, 477; American interests, 464. Asquith, H. H., premier, Mexican policy, 485. Astor, J. J., plans for Northwest, 173. Astoria (Ore.), founded, 173, 254; American flag over, 185; prop- erty title, 185; Americans lose, 265. Atlantic cable, effect on diplomatic intercourse, 300, 316, 371. Austin, Stephen, rouses sympathy for Texas, 248. Austria, offers mediation, 41; war with France, 95; signs Holy Alliance, 204; quells Italian re- volt, 204; England seeks alliance, 240; extradition treaty, 284 returns Kotzka to United States 289; mediator, 324, 375, 383 policy toward Maximilian, 333 irritation against United States 333, 426; trade-mark treaty, 351 naturalization, 356; Russian re- lations, 359; Cuban, 366; reciproc- ity with, 389; diplomatic service to, 430; policy in Far East, 458; war policies {1915), 492. Azores, Islands, as boundary, 10. B Babcock, Gen. O. E., San Domingo mission, 362, 363. Bacon, Sen. A. C, Mexican pol- icy, 486. Baden, naturalization treaty with, 356. Baez, Pres. Buenaventura, annexa- tion policy, 361-363. Bagot, Sir Charles, minister to United States, 191. Bahamas, British, trade, 308; posi- tion threatens Gulf trade, 360. Bainbridge, Capt. William, brings "tribute" to Algiers, 141. Balkan states, conference of, 468. Baltic Sea, control of, 493. Baltimore (Md.), trade centre, 161. Baltimore, marines from, killed, 390. Bancroft, George, minister to Ger- many, 355; ability, 255; makes treaty, 356; mission to Spain, 361; England, 372; cited, 278. Banks, Gen. N. P., member of Con- gress, 362. "The Banks." See Newfoundland. Barbados, reciprocity with, 470. Barbary States, pirates, 13, 55; consular service to, 81; United States pays " tribute," 84, 132; treaties with, 85, 141, 222; piracy stopped, 196, 204, 223; profits of pirates, 351. Barclay, Thomas, concludes Mo- rocco treaty, 56. Baring, Sir Thomas, American pol- icy, 343. Baring Brothers, firm of, 233. Barlow, Joel, French sympathy, 96; minister to France, 171. Barrett, John, diplomatic service, 430. Barron, Commodore James, com- mands Chesapeake, 159. Basle, treaty of, terms, 123, 130. Bassano, Due de, French foreign minister, 170. Bastile, fall of, 94. Bathurst, Lord, treaty interpreta- tion, 192; letters to, cited, 82, 181. Bavaria, desires commercial treaty, 53; naturalization treaty with, 356. Baxter, Henry, agent in Hondu- ras, 352. Bayard, J. A., peace commissioner, 179, 180, 183. Bayard, T. F., secretary of state, 370, 378, 391, 400, 403; minister .506 INDEX to England, 373; Samoan pol- icy, 400. Buyonne, trade decree, 166. Hcaumurchais, Pierre de, agent of Vergennes, 26; cited, tl. Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., Engliah sympathy for, 314. Bockwith, Maj. George, British agent, 90; cited, 90. Beecher, H. W., English inQu- ence, 322. Behring Sea, fisheries, 5, 434, 497; jurisdiction disputed, 377, 378, 387. Behring Straits, boundary through, 358. Belgium, commercial treaty with, 285; extradition, 350; trade-mark, 351; navigation, 352; naturaliza- tion, 356; diplomatic service to, 430; export trade, 452. Belize, British settlement, 292, 293; boundaries, 295, 381, 382. Benjamin, J. P., Confederate secre- tary, 311; French policy, 331. Benton, W. S., British subject, killed in Mexico, 446, 486. Benton, Sen. T. H., Oregon views, 256. Berlin, American commissioner to, 31; Samoan conference at, 401; General Act of, 401, 425. 454; financial centre, 427; diplomatic service to, 455; treaty of, 465. Berlin Decree, terms, 158; revoked, 168. Bermuda Islands, ownership, 29; American acquisition suggested, 40; reciprocity with, 470. Bermuda, admiralty case, 308. Bernard, Montague, on claims com- mission, 345. Bernhardi, Gen. von, on British policy, cited, 333. Berthier, Alexandre, cited, 149. Biddle, Nicholas, author, 148. Bigelow, John, in France, 321. Bismarck, Prince Otto von, relations with Bancroft, 355; Samoan pol- icy, 401. liUick Warrior, seized by Spain, 300, 301. Blaine, J. G., diplomat, 8; secretary of state, 370, 403; reciprocity ad- vocate. 373, 388, 389; arbitration, 472; Behring Sea contention, 378, 379; Panama policy, 381, 383; Spanish- American. 384-386, 391, 394, 444; Pan-Americanism, 386, 478; trouble with Chili, 390; presidential ambition, 390; Ha- waiian policy, 404; " Elder Sister," 448; characterized, 371. 387, 390, 391; cited. 381, 385. 388. 404; The Foreign Policy of the Garfield Administration, cited. 387. Blanca, Florida, Spanish minister, 26. Blockade. See International Law. Blount, William, conspirator, 134. Bluefields (Nicaragua), British ma- rines land at, 383. Boer War. impending, 428; diplo- matic diflSculties. 431. Bogota, American minister recalled, 440. Bogota, Colombian gunboat, 441. Bolivar. Gen. Simon, revolutionary leader, 89. 203. 206. Bolivia, commercial treaty with, 223, 285, 287; Peru-Chili war, 386. Bonaparte, Joseph, King of Spain, 150, 203. Bonaparte, Louis, King of Holland, 167. Bonaparte, Napoleon, dealings with United SUites, 8, 101, 138, 139, 142-146. 148-150. 154, 155, 164- 170. 175. 178. 201, 209; Africa, 131; navy defeated, 152; on Louis- iana, cited. 145, 146; orders to Dantzig, 166; English policy, 155, 158; at Elba, 155; Russian policy, 169, 170, 179; fall of, 177, 179; continental system, 165, 167, 190, 493, 498. Bond, Sir Robert, Newfoundland premier, 434. Bond, Phineas. British consul. 87; letter cited, 122. 154. Borneo, commercial treaty with, 286. Boston, i)ort of, 177. 316. Boundaries. Northeast, 15, 16. 117, 186. 228-232. 234; Hudson Bay region, 16; Florida, 19, 20, 124; Continental Congress discusses, 40, 46; peace commissioners dis- cuss {17S2). 46. 48; {ISllf), 182; INDEX 507 Cherokee, 72; Northwestern, 194; Western, 201, 202; Louisiana, 148- 151; Canadian-American, 186; 498; commissions appointed, 186, defined, 218; Texas, 266, 271; between islands, 337, 347. Bounties, to American fishermen, 193, 194. Bowles, W. A., adventurer, 89; letter cited, 89. "Boxer" troubles, 455, 461. Brandy, trade in French, 61. Brant, Joseph, Iroquois leader, 65. Brazil, settled by Portuguese, 11, 12; Portugal loses, 203; empire of, 204; slavery m, 236; commercial treat- ies, 216, navigation question, 287; relations with United States, 324, 452; Europe, 325; German immi- gration, 384; war with Portugal, 324; represented on Geneva board, 347; reciprocity with, 389; Brit- ish dispute, arbitrated, 394; dip- lomatic service to, 430; ofiFers me- diation, 490. Breda, Treaty of, 14. Bremen, commercial treaty with, 197. Bright, John, favors North, 315. British America, fisheries, 192; trade with, 197; Sumner's pol- icy, 341. British Guiana, reciprocity treaty with, 470. Brittany, fishermen of, 108, 110. Brougham, Lord, questions British policy, 254. Brown, John, colonizing schemes, 75. Bruni, treaty with, 286. Bryan, C. P., diplomatic service, 430. Bryan, W. J., secretary of state, 448, 480; draws up Colombian treaty, 453; note to Balkan States, 468; arbitration advocate, 473, 475; Japanese policy, 480; Mex- ican, 486. Buchanan, James, secretary of state, 268, 282; minister to England, 282, 294, 300, 372; mission to Spain, 301; president, 282; expan- sionist, 281, 282, 297, 300; dip- lomatic policy, 304; Calif ornian, 275; Mexican, 277. 278, 297, 328, 489; Central American, 295, 296; Cuban, 299, 367; opinion of Clay- ton-Bulwer treaty, 293; diplomat- ic service, 2, 499; characterized, 282; cited, 278, 297, 328. Bucharest, conference of Balkan states at, 468. Buenos Ay res, revolt in, 203; United States envoy to, 206; English in- vestments, 215; commercial treat- ies, 216. Buifalo (N. Y.), Pan-American Exposition at, 451. Buffer State, of Indians, proposed, 181, 183, 184, 246. Bullock, Capt. J. D., makes ship contracts, 339. Bulwer, Sir H. L., makes treaty, 282, 293. Bunau Varilla, Panama agent, 441, 442. Bureau of American Republics established, 388. Burgoyne, Gen. John, surrender, 29. Burke, Edmund, friend of America, 314. Burlingame, Anson, mission from China, 354. Burr, Aaron, at siege of Quebec, 75; French sympathies, 104; vice- president, 147; conspiracy, 147, 148. Burton, A. A., commission secre- tary, 364. Bustamante, Anastasio, Mexican president, 247. Butler, Anthony, minister to Mexico, 221. Butter, trade in, 76, 110. Cabot, John, explorer, 10, 13. Cadore, Due de, French foreign minister, letter, cited, 168. Caicos, reciprocity with, 470. Calhoun, J. C, a "War Hawk," 171; secretary of state, 221, 225, 261, 268; on maritime law ques- tion, 238; Texas policy, 261-266, 272, 298, 342, 363; Oregon, 267- 269; diplomatic ability, 221, 261; letter to, cited, 259; opinions, 261. California, Spain holds, 205, 209, 508 INDEX 257; Russian fort in, 209; Russia gives up claim to, 213; American interests. 2-45. 253, 257-259. 274; British, 257-259; Mexico, 274. 278; gained from Mexico, 279; gold discovered, 286. 291; Alaskan interest, 358; coast line impor- tant, 398; Chinese problem. 397, 398; Japanese, 462, 480. California, Lower, ownership, 275. Calvo. Carlos, collection of claims theory, 446. Cambon, J. M., French ambassa- dor, 417. Campo Bello Island, Fenians at- tack, 338. Campos. Gen. Martinez de. Cuban governor, 368; campaign, 411. Canada, French colony. 13, 17; English conquer, 17; ceded, 18; trade encouraged, 60; governor- generals, 63, 67, 114, 230; French sympathies in, 97, 102, 131, 232; British loyalty, 153, 178; American trade, 176; desires northern New York, 181; annexation proposed, 174, 182, 232, 299; Sumner's view. 342, 344; Cobden's, 342; fishing regulations, 194, 285, 370, 434. 435; revolts in, 232; reciprocity treaty. 285; expires, 376; (1911). rejected, 435, 436; Dominion organized, 334; Americans pro- tost, 336; Fenians invade, 338; minister of justice, 345; relations with England, 346, 43K 435; extradition act, 374; Alaska seal interests, 377, 378, 434. Canadian Gazette, policy, 181. Canals, Hudson-Ljike Champlain, 197; Erie Canal, 197; Isthmian, 290. 291. 380. 382. 436-444, 469, 480, 481. Canning, George, dealings with J. Q. Adams, 8, 293; minister of foreign affairs. 164, 188, 206, 237, 293, 334, 382; rejects Erskine's agreement, 105. 166; Spanish- .\merican policy, 210-217; ability, 189. 215; cited.' 214. Cannon. J. (J., introduces war prep- aration bill. 413. Canovas. del Castillo, Antonio, Spanish prime minister, death, 413. Canso. Gut of. waters closed, 193. Canton, trade with, 55, 286. Cape Cod, blockade south of, 176; north of. 177. Cape Horn, route via, 286. Cape Verde Islands, as boundary, 10. Caracas (Venezuela), intrigues in, 89; American agent at, 385. Caribbean Sea. privateers, 207; commerce, 286. 360; American interests, 444. 448, 450-452, 464, 477, 479. 481, 489. Carmichael. William. American min- ister to Spain. 123. Carnegie. Andrew, presents arbi- tration palace, 451; peace palace. 473; pacifist. 473. Carnegie Institution. historical study, 244. Caroline, Canadians seize, 232, 233; case settled. 234. Carranza, Gen. Vincenzio, denies authority of Hucrta, 484; consti- tutionalist leader, 486; not recog- nized, 489. Carroll, John, appointed bishop. 52. Cartier, Jacques, American discover- ies, 13. Cass, Lewis, minister to France, 240; secretary of state. 241. 282. Castlcreagh, Lord, in peace negotia- tions, 179; instructs commis- sioners. 182; slave-trade policy, 236. Catherine II of Russia, doctrine of armed neutrality. 37, 179. Cattrell. Stephen. Canadian official, cited, 67. Central America, commercial treaty with, 216, 285; route via, 290; neutrality guaranteetl, 293; Amer- ican immigration, 296; status of British Honduras, 382; United States acquires territory in, 436; arbitration court, 451. Civil service reform, development, 431. Civil war, diplomacy during, 3; neutral rights, 6; encourages hu- manitarianism, 241; diplomatic ctTi'cts, 331, 368; Irish enlistments, 3,'{8; commercial straits. 360; claims against England. 3:^9-348. Chalcurs, Bay of, boundary, 20, 230. INDEX 509 Chamberlain, Joseph, protection advocate, 427. Champlain, Lake, as boundary, 20; settlements along, 67; battle on, 178; outlet, 231. Charles III, of Spain, vacillation, 26, 31. 42. Charles V, of Germany, colonial policy, 12; foresight, 290. Charleston (S. C.) British agents at, 90, 310; Genet reaches, 98; schemes in, 99; French privateers at, 103; British Consul at, 310. Chatham, Earl of. See William Pitt. Cheese, trade in, 58. Chesapeake, affair with Leopard, 159, 165, 174. Chile, commercial treaty with, 223; relations strained, 375, 390, 409; accepts mediation, 385, 451; Boll via- Peru war, 386; president, cited, 387; civil war, 390; resents United States arrogance, 452; offers mediation, 490. China, trade with United States, 55; commercial treaty with, 223, 286; five ports opened, 223; open to missions, 286; Burlingame treaty, 354; missionary interests, 396, 455, 460; Boxer troubles, 455-457; emigration question, 397, 398, 449, 460; diplomatic service to, 430; international interests in, 454, 455; relations with Japan, 455, 461; United States, 432; integrity of, 456-458, 459, 463, 477; neutrality recognized, 458; "six power" loan, 460; revolution, 459; arbi- tration, 475. Chinese, employed in Pacific coast, 286; exclusion of, 397, 398. Canadian problem, 432. Chincha Island, Spain's claims, 327. Ching, Prince, represents China, 457. Choate, Rufus, Senator, report cited, 225. Chocolate, trade in, 108. Choiseul, Due de, predicts American Revolution, 25. Christopher Island, ownership, 35. Church of England. See Anglican Church. Claiborne, W. C. C, governor of Orleans territory, 151. Claims, Spanish-American, 226, 284, 350, 375, 469; French spoliation, 226-228, 375; Mexican, 251, 274, 328, 350, 375, 474; Civil war, 339-348; British, 344, 469; Rus- sian, 469; Portuguese, 375; against Tycoon, 353; Spanish, 410; prob- lems under Monroe Doctrine, 446; Treaties, 226, 345, 375. Clarendon, Lord, British minister, 295; convention with Johnson, rejected, 343. Clark, G. R., takes western forts, 33, 69; colonizing schemes, 75; French sympathy, 97; PVench commission, 102; forces separa- ted, 105. Clark, William, explorer, 148. Clarkson, Thomas, opposes slave- trade, 236. Clay, Henry, a "War Hawk," 174, 178; peace commissioner, 179. 180, 185, 189; attacks administra- tion, 189, 206; secretary of state, 189, 214, 291; Pan-American pol- icy, 214, 284, 478; conciliates France, 228; influence of, 371; characterized, 189; cited, 291. Clayton, J. M., secretary of state, 282; English treaty, 282, 292, 293. Cleveland, Grover, appointments, 370, 372, 389; free trade advocate, 373; fisheries policy, 376; canal, 382; Pan-American, 387; Vene- zuela, 391; opposes reciprocity, 388; conception of Monroe Doc- trine, 392, 394; Hawaiian policy, 405, 406; Cuban, 409, 412; Turk- ish, 465; civil service under, 431; cited, 382, 394. Coahuiia, Texas joined to, 247, 248; governor, 484. Coasting trade, embargo not applica- ble, 160, 177; cut off by war, 177; canal tolls exemption, 437. Cobden, Richard, American views, cited, 341, 342. Cochrane, Admiral Thomas, aids Spanish-America, 206. Cockburn, Sir Alexander, on Geneva board, 347. Cocoa, trade in, 119, 153. 510 INDEX Coffee, trade in, 108, 109, 119, 153, iJ8-t; in McKinley tariff, 388. Collol-d'Hcrbois, Jean M., French agent, 134; instruclioos, cited, 131. Colombia, commercial treaty with, 216; United Stales influence, 217, 385; extradition, 285; Panama neutrality treaty (/S//6), 291, 295, 379, 380, 385, 439, 440; grants de Lesseps canal concession, 379; boundary dispute, 385; affected by reciprocity, 389; diplomatic service to, 430, 440; rejects Her- ran-Hay treaty, 439; Pearson syndicate, 450; treaty {1915), 450; resentment against United States, 452. Colon (Panama), revolt in, 441. Colonial wars, causes, 15, 16. Colorado, Italians lynched in, 427. Colorado River, free navigation, 279. Columbia River, first white man enters, 93; Lewis and Clark, 148; Americans settle on, 173; claim, 253, 267; navigation free, 346. Columbus, Christopher, effect of discoveries, 10. Comet, carries slaves, 238. Comly, J. M., minister to Hawaii, 404. Commerce, relations with diplomacy, 5, 54-57, 77, 85-87, 222, 497; pi- rates menace, 55; defence meas- ures, 156, 281; non-importation agreements, 156, 157; non-inter- course, 163, 164. 166, 167; em- bargoes, 115, 160, 161; prospers, 163, 283; declines, 190; war of 1S12 affects, 187, 196; encourage- ment of, 241, 283; consular aid, 373, 476; balance of trade, 58, 284, 427. 467; special licenses, 153, 164, 167, 177; open door policy, 455; in war of 1915, 492; via Scheldt, 5; Danish Straits, 5; Spanish colonial 15, 57; Amer- ican. 53, 62. 109; Dutch, 109; with Uritish North .\merica, 5, 67. 68, IIH, 197; Firitish Kmpire. 57-62. 119. 152; Latin-America, 5, 161, 286, 287, 452; Asia. 5. 54, 55. 199. 223, 4.55; Africa, 54, 55; Europe, 61. 62. 152-154, 156, 159, 163. 164, 224, 225; West Indies, 5, 6, 77, 118, 119, 156, 161, 198, 222, 298; Pacific, 92, 93, 118, 197, 285, 396, 398, 403. 461, 462; Mediter- ranean, 55, 56, 62, 77. 85. 125, 141, 196. See also Reciprocity and Merchant Marine. Confederacy, blockade runners, 308, 309; commerce destroyers. 319, 336; rams. 322; diplomacy of. 310. 311. 321, 330; British relations, 316-319, 321-323, 339; recogni- tion of, 442. Confederation, diplomacy of, 1; British distrust, 60; failures of, 02, 68. 71, 72, 77, 79, 124; diplo- matic problems, 64, 67, 190; growth of poi)ulation, 69; West- ern problems, 73. Conger, E. H., commissioner to China. 457. Congo Free State, treaty with, 375. Congress, creates departments, 80; discusses merchant marine. 85-87; resentment against England, 87; considers Jay treaty, 122; increases army and navy, 133; reports to, 156; non-importation agreement, 157; special session, 160; passes embargo, 100; non-intercourse act, 169; war sentiment, 171; de- clares war, 174; S[)anish-Aiuerican resolutions, 206; neutrality acts, 207, 232; calls out militia, 230; abolishes slave-trade, 237; rtx-og- nizes Texan republic, 251; debates annexation, 265; annexes, 274; Oregon question, 269; receives Polk's war message, 276; military policy, 281; Mexican policy, 297; Cuban, 302; passes Morrill Tar- iff, 314; opposes Maximilian's empire, 331; refuses Denmark treaty, 361; relations to di[)!(>- macy, 370; authorizes interna- tional copyright, 374; Panama canal action, 380, 439: Pan- American, 387; Chinese exclusion acts, 397. 398; Cuban action, 416. 425; Phili()|)ine, 425; seal fisheries, 434; votes lynching indeninities. 427; canal tolls. 437; abrogates Russian treaty, 466; immigration policy, 467, 408; refuses ship sub- INDEX 511 sidies, 469; powers over treaties, 471; acts on sale of munitions, 483; Mexican policy, 485, 48G; aids Americans in Europe, 495. Connecticut River, source, 231, 235. Connolly, John, British agent, 68. Constantinople, American college at, 465. Constitution, strengthens central authority, 79; executive under, 80, 105; Congress, powers, 80, 225; ambiguities, 80, 471. Constitution, wins fight, 190. Consular service, early organization, 81, 82; growth, 221; "pupils," 283, 430; commercial importance increases, 373; politics dominates, 373; bill of ISSi, amended, 387; improvement in, 430, 431; pop- ular interest, 431. Continental Congress, first meeting, 23; measures adopted, 23; mes- sage from Beaumarchais, 27; parties in, 31, 46; appoints com- missioners, 32, 33, 41; members, 39, 81; considers peace terms, 40, 41, 44; instructs peace commis- sioners, 46; treatment of Loyalists, 48, 64; relations with Papacy, 51; relations with Anglican Church, 52. Contraband. See International Law. Convention of 1802, renewed, 202. Convention of 1818, terms, 192-195; ambiguities, 193. Convention of 18^8, terms, 269. Convention of 1831, terms, 223. Convention for the Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims, parties to, 472. Convention on Artistic and Literary Copyrights, parties to, 472. Convention regulating the Importa- tion of Spirituous Liquors into Africa, United States adheres to, 472. Convention of London, terms, 328, 329; United States does not sign, 328. Coolies, importation of Chinese, 354; smuggling of, 461. Cooper, J. F., diplomatic service, 221. Copyrights, international, 351, 374, 469. Corea, treat j' with, 375; separated from China, 455. Cornwallis, Lord, surrenders, 42. Convin, seizes British vessels, 377. Costa Rica, commercial treaty, 285; boundary dispute, 385; arbitra- tion, 475. Cotton, trade in, 119, 164, 196, 224, 225, 253, 262, 284; as "King," 310, 311, 315, 316, 321; contra- band {1915), 493. Coudert, F. R., on seal-fisheries commission, 379. Crampton, Sir J. F. T., British min- ister, dismissed, 288. Creole, slave mutiny on, 238; case settled, 239. Crimean war, neutral problems, 288. Crockett, David, frontier hero, 248. Cuba, United States reversionary in- terest, 6, 78, 208-210, 245; owner- ship, 203, 205, 206; England's relations, 217; seeks independence, 217; European interest, 282; slavery in, 236, 297, 301, 302; revolution in, 350; position threat- ens Gulf commerce, 360; Santo Domingo relations, 326; reciproc- ity with, 389, 470; insurrection of 1895, 409, 420; methods of war, 409, 411, 412; American sympathy, 409; interests, 410; policy, 297-302, 365, 368, 413- 419, 425, 426, 427, 444, 449, 478. 487; Spain promises autonomy, 413; Roosevelt's service in, 424; owns Isle of Pines, 425. Culebra Island, sale refused, 361, Culebrita Island, sale refused, 1, 361. CuUom, Sen. Shelby, in foreign affairs committee, 474; views in reciprocity treaties, 470. Cumberland River, settlements in, 69, 102; intrigues of settlers, 77, 89; junction, 105. Curtis, B. R., on Geneva board, 347. Gushing, Caleb, diplomat, 344; on Geneva board, 347; minister to Spain, 366; instructions, cited, 366, 367. 512 INDEX D Dacia, seizure of, 494. Dallas, G. M., minister to England, 295. Dana, Francis, commissioner to Russia, 31, 170; policy, 264. Dana, R. H., Trent capture pleases, 31G. Danelson, A. J., United States agent in Texas, 273. Danish Islands, sale refused, 360, 361, 425. Danish sound, right of free passage, 5, 287. Danton, G. J., French leader, 103. Dantzig, Napoleon's orders to, 166. Darien, colonists, 205. Dauphin, pirates capture, 56. Davie, Gov. W. R., on French com- mission, 137. Davis, Sen. C. K., Spanish treaty commissioner, 418. Davis, J. C. IJ., prepares American claims case, 347. Davis, Jefferson, commissions pri- vateers, 309, 312, 315; as diploma- tist, 310, 312; appointments, 310, 311 ; message to his Congress, 323; IJritish policy, 311; neutral pol- icy, 312; Lowell satirizes, 318. Davis. R. H., author, 440. Day, \V. R., conducts Spanish nego- tiations, 414, 415, 418; terms cited, 418; secretary of state, 418. Dayton, W. L., minister to France, 331. Deane, Silas, agent to France, 23, 24; reaches Paris, 27; recall, 31. Debt, foreign, source of danger, 78. Debts, collection of British, 48, 60, 64, 118. Declaration of Independence, effect on American policy, 23, 27. Declaration of London {1910), terms, 494. Declaration of Paris, terms, 288, 309; not signed by United Stiites, 288, 410; Seward' and. 309; atti- tude of Confederacy, 312. Delaware River, Swedes settle on, 14. Democracy, American experience in, 8. 499, 500. Democrats, platform of 1856, cited, 360. Denmark, armed neutrality, 37; commercial treaty, 197; claims, 226; forbids slave-trade, 236; Danish sound question, 287; Civil war policy, 313; proposed cession of St. Thomas, 360, 361; reciprocity, 470, 475; neutrality problems *( 79/5), 492. Detroit (Mich.), British fort, 63; garrison, 90; militia, 84. Deutsche Handels-und-Plantagen- gesell-schaft fiir Sudseeinsein zu Hamburg, intersets in Samoa, 399. Dewey, George, Mexican coast service, 417; capture of Manila. 417, 420; Philippine views, 419, 420; made admiral, 423. Diaz, Felix, aids Huerta, 483; Japan mission, 487. Diaz, Pres. Porfirio, length of serv- ice, 481; meets Taft, 481; over- throw, 483. Dickens, Charles, urges international copyright, 351. Diplomacy, American, birth of, 1; golden age, 2; aids expansion, 2; politics dominates, 2, 220, 259, 264, 281, 283, 304, 370; Civil war problems, 3; nadir of, 3; study of, 4; protects fisheries, 5; international routes, 5; popular control of, 8; first event in, 11, 12; basic documents, 18, 19; early problems, 20; colonial experience, 21, 22; direct metho, 66, 114, 116, 118, 172, 182, 185; Americans, 65, 66, 69, 72, 172; Cherokee, treaty, 72, 83; intrigues, 89; Chickamauga, 72; Chickasaw, 72; ChocUiw, 72; Creeks. 72; chief, 73, 83, 89; treaty, 83; intrigues, 89; Delaware, 65; Florida, 200, 201, 250; Iroquois, relations with English, 17; colonial negotiations with, 21; power of confederacy, 64, 65; Miami, 65; Mosquito, British relations, 292, 294, 295, INDEX 521 383; Northwestern tribes, 65; Oregon, missions to, 255, 256; Texas, 248-250; Shawnee, 65; Southwestern, 72; Spanish trade with. 73, 74, 123; raid against, 76; Wyandot, 65; Yucatan, 296; wars with, 83, 84, 117; treaty, 122, 182. Industrial Property, Act for Pro- tection of parties to, 472. Industrial Property, Convention for International Protection of, 374. Inness, Harry, colonizing schemes, 75. International co-operation, 374, 378. International Institute of Agricul- ture, 472. International law, tendencies, 7; affecting colonial claims, 17; in- formal system, 21; continental views, 54, 111; rights of foreign- ers, 53; strain of Napoleonic wars, 187; armed neutrality, 37, 110, 179; blockade. 111, 119, 159, 168, 169, 174, 175, 177, 288, 307- 312, 315, 493; building enemies' ships, 340, 342; collection of debts, 446, 447; continuous voy- age, 308, 309, 318, 492, 493; con- traband. 36, 54. 100. 111. 119, 124, 128, 129, 138, 154, 288, 318, 442, 493, 494; embezzlement, 235; expatriation, see naturalization; extradition, 117, 235, 284, 350, 351, 374, 388, 469; flag, use of, 240, 312, 367; free ships, free goods, 29, 36, 54, 110, 119, 124, 129, 138, 207, 288; hospital ships, 472; impressment, 113, 157-159, 164, 175, 182, 289, 356, 492; in- demnity. 182, 191, 238, 239; marine territorial jurisdiction, 287; mines, 494; most favored nation, 224, 464, 465; naturaliza- tion, 7, 114, 289, 355-357, 466, 468, 491; navigation, right of, 70, 71, 119, 197. 285, 287, 378, 380, 388; neutral goods in enemies' ships, 288; privateering, 54, 102, 103, 105, 106, 119, 288, 309, 416; prizes, 102, 105. 118, 119, 124; recognition of governments, 442, 484; "Rule of 1756." terms, 112; validity of treaties, 99-101, 191; violation of territory, 234; visit and search, 54, 113, 157, 159, 164, 236, 237, 239, 241, 282, 309, 316, 318, 349, 350; waterways, 5, 70, 197, 287, 291; wounded, treat- ment of, 288, 472. International office of Public Health, parties to, 472. International Red Cross Conven- tion, signatories, 472. International Sanitary Convention, parties to, 472. Ireland, colonies appeal to, 23; Fenians plan to free, 338. Irish, political power in United States, 338, 390. Isabella, Queen, of Castile, 10. Isabella, Queen of Spain, over- thrown, 365. Isle of Pines, given to Cuba, 425. Italy, United States trade, 166; commercial treaty, 471; revolt in, 204; Civil War policy, 313; represented in Geneva board, 347; Kingdom of, 350; extradition treaty, 350; offers mediation in Cuba, 366; emigration to Argen- tina, 384; United States, 469; irritation over lynchings, 426, 427; American ambassador to, 429, 430; interests in Far East, 455, 458; arbitration treaty. 475; neu- trality problems 1915, 492. Itata, seized, 390. Izard, Ralph, commissioner to Tus- cany, 31; dislikes French, 34. Jackson, Andrew, deals with Flor- ida Indians, 200; seizes Spanish forts, 200, 201; diplomatic serv- ice under, 220, 304; methods, 241; problems of policy, 480; ap- pointments, 221, 248. 250; Brit- ish policy, 222; French, 226-228; Texas, 250, 252, 265, 341; mes- sages cited, 227, 228, 251. Jackson, F. J., minister to United States, 165, 176. Jacobins, American club, 99. 103. Jamaica, position threatens Gulf trade, 360; reciprocity with, 470. 523 INDEX Jameson, J. F., views on American expansion, 243, 244. Japan, commerce with, 286; Perry's expedition, 286, 303; American relations, 353, 396, 461-463, 480; European, 353, 402; commercial treaty with, 397, 454; arbitration, 475; seal fisheries, 434; protests Hawaiian annexation, 424; dip- lomatic service to, 430; affected by Monroe Doctrine, 449, 450; world-power, 454, 459; relations with China, 455, 458; war with Russia, 458; Manchurian policy, 459, 461; Canadian, 461; Mex- ican, 486, 487. Jay, John, diplomat, 1; commis- sioner to Spain, 32, 33; distrusts Spain, 34; France, 34, 44-46, 91, 137; in peace negotiations, 44-46, 58, 74, 142; secretary of foreign affairs, 57, 70, 71; mission to England, 115, 126, 128, 372; in- structions, 115; welcome, 116; concludes treaty, 84, 117-119; error in, 119; burned in effigy, 120; views on French treaty, 99; chief justice, 81, 115; Mississippi proposal, 417; independent action 371; length of service, 499; char- acterized, 32; cited, 32, 34. Jecker and Company, firm of, buys bonds, 329. Jefferson, Thomas, peace commis- sioner, 41; makes commercial treaty, 54; treats with IJarljary sbites, 56; minister to France, 54, 81; secretary of state, 81; resigns, 104; views on merchant marine, 85, 86, 196; on validity of treaties, 99, 100; on expansion, 476; on neutrality, 102. 103, 100; on iso- lation, 211, 438; French sympa- thies, 95, 136; fears Kngli.sh, 91 differs with Hamilton, 99, 125 presidential candidate, 129, 130 president, 140; ap|)ointments, 141 157, 158; problems of policy, 480 Barbary states policy. 141, 222 Cuban, 208, 209; Louisiana, 144 145. 148; trade, 155-157, 190, 498; closes American harbors 160; Madison consults, 163 length of public service, 499 theories, 140, 154, 160, 165, 181; justifies Louisiana purchase, 442; cited, 28, 85, 86, 91, 95, 106, 208, 209, 470. Jews, protest against persecution of, 357; treatment by Roumania, 468. Johnson, Andrew, president, 362, 365; message, cited, 362. Johnson, Reverdy, treats with Eng- land, 340, 373; convention re- jected, 343. Jones, Anson, president of Texas, 266, 272. Jones, J. P., American commodore, 30; enters Texel, 36; French sym- pathies, 96. Juan de Fuca, Straits of, channel, 337, 348. Juarez, Gen. B. P., resists French in Mexico, 332; captures Maxi- milian, 333. Juarez (Mex.), fighting at, 482. K Kaiulani. Hawaiian princess, 404. Kamamaha, King of Hawaii, 402. Kanakas, employed on Pacific coast, 286. Kaskaskia (III.), Clark captures, 33, 69. Kasson, J. A., on Samoan commis- sion, 401; reciprocity treaty com- missioner, 470. Kentucky, relations with England, 67, 68; pioneers, 09; governor, 102; intrigues with Spain, 76, 123; France, 102, 105; constilutional convention, 76; admitted to Union, 82; militia praised, 174. Key West, position isolated, 300; importance of railroad to, 444. Kiauciiau, port leased, 455. King, Rufus, minister to England, 129, 135, 189. 372; successor, 158; suggests Philippine trade con- cessions, 417; fears loss of West, 71; cited, 13.-); letter to, cited, 137. King's Mountain, battle of, 69. Kipling, Uudyard, White Man's Burden, cited, 421. Knox. (ien. Henry, secretary of war, cited, 83; letter to, cited, 84. INDEX 523 Knox, P. C, secretary of state, 448, 459, 483; visits Caribbean states, 452; proposes Colombian treaty, 453; Chinese policy, 459; " dollar diplomacy," 476. Koerner, G., minister to Spain, in- structions, 327. Kossuth, Louis, visits America, 280, 281. Kossta, Martin, case of, 282, 289. Kwangchau Bay, port opened, 223; port leased, 455. Kwang-Chow. See Kwangchau. Labrador, fisheries, 192. Ladrone Islands, American inter- ests, 418, 419. Lafayette, Marquis de, American sympathy, 27, 94; proscribed, 99. Laird, William, British ship-builder, 322, 340. Lakes, Great, trade route, 68; navi- gation rights on, 182, 191, 346. La Plata River, navigation of, 287; dispute over mouth of, 325. Lard, trade in, 225. Laredo (Mex.), fighting at, 482. Larkin, T. O., consul at Monterey, 274. La Salle, Robert Cavalier, Sieur de, explorer, 201. Laurens, Henry, commissioner to Netherlands, 31, 38; captured on ocean, 38; peace commissioner, 41; imprisoned, 42. Laurier, Sir Wilfred, government defeated, 436. Lazzari, Mgr., diary of American Revolution, 24. Leather goods, trade in, 373. Lebrun, C. F., letters to, cited, 96, 102. Leclerc, Gen. V. E., San Domingo expedition, 143; death, 145. Lee, Arthur, deals with Beaumar- chais, 27; commissioner to France, 31; irritates Spain, 31; dislikes French, 34. Lee, Fitzhugh, consul-general at Havana, 412, 415. Lee, R. E., surrender, 331. Lee, William, commissioner to Ber- lin, 31; meets de Neufville, 37; drafts treaty, 37, 38. Legare, H. S., secretary of state, 221; Hawaiian policy, 403; death, 260. Leishman, J. G. A., diplomatic service, 430. Le Louis, admiralty case, 236. Leo XHI, proposed as Cuban me- diator, 414, 415. Leonard, aflFair with Chesapeake, 159, 174. Leslie. See Panton, Leslie and Co. Lesseps, Ferdinand de, head of canal company, 380, 439. Lew Chew Islands, commercial treaty with, 286. Lewis, Sir G. C, American views, 320. Lewis, Meriwether, explorer, 148. Lexington, Battle of, rouses America, 159. Liberia, American relations, 349; international receivership, 464. Li Hung Chang, represents China, 457. Liliuokalani, Queen of Hawaii, 404; abolishes constitution, 405. Lincoln, Abraham, compared with Franklin, 28; diplomatic influence, 305, 306, 310, 317, 322; appoint- ments, 304-306, 354; proclaims blockade, 307, 315; English opin- ion of, 314; Emancipation proc- lamation, 321; effects, 321; letter to London working-men, 322; private secretary, 429; political wisdom, 457; problems of policy, 480; cited, 304. Lincoln, Robert, minister to Eng- land, 373, 392. Lind, John, mission to Mexico, 485. Linn, L. F., Missouri senator, 255; Oregon bill, 256. Liston, Robert, British minister, 122, 134. Little Belt, fights President, 174. Little Democrat, French privateer, 103. Little Sarah, captured, 103. Livingston, Edward, House leader, 121; diplomatic ability, 220; death, 220. Livingston, Robert, secretary of 524 INDEX foreign affairs, 23, 57; minister to France, 140, 146, 149, 150, 226, 227; letters to, cited, 34, 53, 92. Lodge, H. C, Senate leader, 428; on Alaskan boundary commis- sion, 434; seal 6sheries, 379; Mag- dalena Bay resolution, 450, 487; immigration views, 4G7. Logan, Dr. George, peace mission, 136. L6me, Dupuy de, Spanish minister, indiscretion, 413. London, 73, 81, 123, 129, 165, 180, 210, 262, 429, 455; interest in American Revolution, 24; loses American trade, 35; distributing centre, 61; financial, 362, 427; fur- market, 64. Lopez, Gen. Narcisco, Cuban leader, 298; death, 299. Louis XVI, interest in America, 25; adopts middle course, 260; recog- nizes American Independence, 30, 42; powers, 92; beheaded, 99; American treaty, 100. Louis Napoleon, Civil War policy, 313, 330, 331; colonial plans, 313; Mexican, 329-333; offers media- lion, 330; British relations, 334. Louis Philippe, American policy, 227. Louisburg, English capture, 15, 16; give back, 16. Louisiana, French possession, 17; ceded to England and Spain, 19; England desires, 91, 134; France, 97, 98, 102, 130; Spanish policy, 73, 74, 123, 124; governor. 75; cedes to France, 142, 143; France to United States, 145, 146, 165, 188, 199, 224; problems, 147; boundaries, 148-151, 185, 194, 202; loyalty doubtful, 181; effect of purchase, 187; justification of, 443. Lourengo Marques Railroad, seized by Portugal, 375. L'Ouverture, Toussaint, rules San Domingo, 134, 136; captured, 143. Lowell, J. R., diplomatic service, 221, 373; "Bigelow Papers," cited, 318. Loyalists, interests safeguarded, 48; leniency recommended, 60; treat- ment of, 64; settle in Ontario, 66; in Natchez, 71; bitter feeling, 66; in War of 1812, 178; compensation refused, 118. Liibeck, commercial treaty with, 197. Lumber, trade in, 58, 67, 346. Luzerne, Anne Cesar de la, French minister to United States, 33; in- structions, 50. Lyons, Lord, British minister, 317. M Macdonald, Sir J. A., on claims commission, 345. McGillivray, Alexander, Creek chief, 73; visits New York, 83; rival, 89; cited, 77. Machinery, farm, trade in, 373. McClellan, Gen. G. B., fails before Richmond, 320. McKean, Thomas, Pennsylvania judge, 136. McKenzie, Alexander, explorer, 254. MacKenzie, A. S., confers with Santa Anna, 276. Mackerel, trade in, 58, 108; desert Canadian waters, 375. McKinley, W'illiam, elected presi- dent, 408; appointments, 412, 429; Cuban policy, 413; Hawaiian, 424; Philippine,"^ 419, 420; de Lome's opinion of, 413; forbids privateering, 416; civil service under, 431; proposes Pan-Amer- ican Congress, 451; foreign policy, 476; cited, 419. McLane, Louis, secretary of state, 220; minister to England, instruc- tions, 222. McLaughlin, Dr. John, Hudson Bay Co., factor, 255. McLeod, Alexander, case of, 233, 234. Macon Bill, No. 2, provisions, 167. Madagascar, treaty with, 349. Madawaska, French fief, 230. Madero, Francisco, leads revolution, 482; elected president, 483; over- thrown, 483. Madison, James, diplomat, 8; mem- ber of Congress, 80; declines office, 104; secretary of state, 141; Flor- ida policy, 149-151; minister to INDEX 525 England, 158; president, 163; re-election, 175; foreign policy, 163, 211; British, 165, 168-170, 174, 179, 184; English resent- ment, 181; views, cited, 100, 158; letter to, 209. Madison Island, annexation, 398. Madrid, 33, 73, 130, 150, 327, 361, 410. Madrid, Treaty of, 14. Magdalena Bay, Japanese interest in. 449, 487. Magellan, Ferdinand, circumnavi- gates world, 11. Mahan, Rear Adm. A. T., naval au- thority, 423. Maine, boundary dispute, 230, 234, 235, 272; lumber trade, 346. Maine, destruction of, 413; cause disputed, 413, 414; arbitration offered, 415. Malietoa, King of Samoa, 400. Malmesbury, Earl of. Southern sympathy, 314. Malta, desires United States trade, 55. Manchester, Duke of, commission, 58. Manchuria, relations with Japan, 459. 461. Mangouret, M. A., French consul, 99. " Manifest Destiny," theory of, 199, 200, 296, 301; scouted by Carl Schurz, 364. Manila, captured by Dewev, 417, 419; held by United States, 418; German attitude, 419. Manila Bay, battle of, 417, 420. Manufactures, growth of, 284. Marbois, Barbe, French agent, 145, 146; Memoire, captured, 45. Marcy, W. L., dispatch on Koszta case, 282, 289; secretary of state, 282, 283, 285, 288, 297, 300, 302; reciprocity treaty, 337; fisheries, 352; relations with Pierce, 365; Hawaiian policy, 403. Maria, pirates capture, 56. Marshall, John, constitutional au- thority, 2; commissioner to France, 131, 132; secretary of state, 138; court decisions, 237. Martinique, trade, 108, 134. Mason, G. T., Virginia senator, 120. Mason, J. M., Confederate com- missioner, 311; captured, 316; released, 318. Mason, J. Y., minister to France, 301; special Spanish mission, 301. Massachusetts, limits curtailed, 46; interest in fisheries, 48; merchant marine, 163; whigs control, 227; boundary dispute, 230, 235. Mataafa, Samoan leader, 400, 401. Matamoras (Mex.), port, 308, 309. Maumee River, British fort on, 83, 84, 116, 500. Maurepas, Comte de, French prime minister, 25. Maximilian, Archduke, Mexican em- peror, 330, 331; United States policy toward, 332, 442; death, 333, 427. Meade, Gen. George, in Civil War, 322. Mecklenburg-Schwerin, commercial treaty with, 285. Mediation, offered, in American Revolution, 41; in War of 1812, 178; Spanish-American, 208, 324; French claims dispute, 228; Civil War, 330; Cuban insurrections, 366, 412; Hayti-Dominican dis- pute, 384, 390; European, in American disputes, 384-386, 444; offered by A. B. C. powers, 490. Mediterranean Sea, piracy on, 55, 56; abolished, 196; commerce, 85, 141, 159. Merchant marine, development, 85- 87, 109, 110, 152-154, 157, 163, 169, 190, 284; risks, 154, 156, 161, 164, 177; reciprocity aids, 196, 197; subsidies, 284, 469; regis- tration rules, 470, 494; in Civil War, 309, 312; decline after war, 336, 337, 353, 359, 469, 492. Merrimac, Monitor defeats, 319. Merritt, Gen. Wesley, advises peace commission (1898), 419. Merry, Anthony, British minister, 147. Mexico, as boundary, 12; mines, 74, 75, 89, 123; revolts from Spain, 203; independence, 213; France desires, 205; Napoleon's views on, 209; Russian relations, 213; seeks 526 INDEX alliances, 214; English relations, 90, 215, 216, 253, 270, 271. 275, 276, 278, 328, 329; plans of Con- gress, 216, 276; land policy, 246; commercial treaties, 216, 223, 224, 279; slavery in, 246, 247; dip- lomatic service to, 221, 258, 273; claims trciity, 226, 375; report to Congress of, cited, 243; American interests in, 245, 248, 297, 452, 481; defers payment, 328; Texjis question, 248-254, 260, 263, 265, 271-276; California, 257-259, 274, 275, 279; war with United States, 277, 278; terms of peace, 279; Gadsden treaty, 290; Yucatan revolt, 296; revolution chronic, 297, 328, 481; trade with Con- federacy, 309; relations with Second Empire, 328-333; dis- courages American settlers, 247; Spanish relations, 328, 329; allies colled duties in, 329; Empire founded, 320; arbitration of claims, 350, 474; naturalization treaty, 356; arbitration, 475, 481; bound- ary dispute, 385, 386; minister, cited, 387; favors arbitration court, 451; relations with United States 1915, 444, 479, 481; foreign interests in, 481, 486; American, 482, 485-487; Madcro govern- ment, 482; Huerta, 483, 484, 486, Mexico, City of, Americans take, 277; French, 329; Second Pan- American Congress, 451; foreign colony in, 482. Mexico, Gulf of, tributaries, 32, 187; commerce on, 33; control of, 253, 360, 444. Mirhaux, Andre, French agent, 102. Michilimackinac (Mich.), British fort, 63; trade-centre, 173. Michigan, Ltike, right of navigation, 285, 346. Middle West, demands open Mis- sissippi, 5. Midway Islands, annexation, 399, 406, 425. Milan decree, terms, 158; revoked, 168. Military service, liability of natural- ized citizens, 357. Milk Iliver, source, 195. Mines, Mexican, 74, 75, 89, 90, 123; foreign interests in, 481, 482; nitrate, 386. Mirabeau, Corate de, defeat in Assembly, 92. Miranda, Francisco de, adventurer, 89; revolutionary plans, 90, 96, 134, 135, 139, 203, 290; death, 203. Miro, Estevern, Louisiana governor, 75; intrigues, 70, 77; cited, 76. Mirs Bay, port leased, 455. Missionaries, American, in Oregon, 255, 256; in Pacific, 396; China, 286, 455, 460; Hawaii, 402; Turkey, 465; desire Philippines as field, 421. Mississippi River, as boundary, 19, 40, 4 1 , 46, 74, 1 35, 1 5 1 , 20 1 ; source, 116, 118; Spain holds, 5, 32, 33, 63, 70, 75, 87, 90; French hold mouth, 16; Americans, 181; free navigation demanded, 41, 43, 48, 57, 70, 72, 97, 197, 245; opposed by East, 71; granted, 124, 125, 147; English demand, 182, 185, 195; French designs in valley, 142; America secures, 194; fur-trade on upper, 173; outlet for commerce of, 360, 444. Missouri, Spanish intrigues in, 75; slavery struggle in, 252; emigrants, 257; senator, 255. Missouri River, as boundary, 148; source, 195; fur-trade on, 173. Mobile (Ala.), French colony, 19, 149; Americans occupy, 151; British threaten, 181. Mohammedans, plunder Spanish colonies, 13. Mohonk, Lake, conferences at, 473. Molasses, trade in, 119. Mongolia, independence recognized, 459. Monitor, defeats Merrimac, 319. Monongahela River, joins Allegheny, 17. Monnx', James, minister to France, 104; welcome, 107, 115, 126; mis- sion, 127; recall, 128; indiscretion, 128, 129, 131, 132; p(K)r diplomat, 141, 188; Louisiana purchase, 144- 146, 149, 150; minister to Eng- land, 158, 372; special mission, 158; INDEX 527 secretary of state, 170, 188; in- structs peace commissioners, 182; president, 188; Spanish-American policy, 201, 210, 211, 251; Oregon, 255; states "doctrine," 211, 212, 324. Monroe Doctrine, development, 1, 2; basis, 211; stated, 212, 213; Canning's opinion of, 214, 215, 382; influence on. national policy, 217, 218, 353, 359; extensions of, 218, 296, 334, 403, 417, 420, 448, 450, 477-479, 484, 499, 500; real author, 218; Polk revives, 268, 281, 325; Polk's corollary, 296; effect of Clayton-Bulwer treaty, 293, 382; practiced effects, 324, 326; during Civil War, 324-334; in Maximilian affairs, 333; Grant's corollary, 334; base of Panama policy (ISSO), 380; Blaine and Olney's conception of, 384-395; affects Caribbean situation, 444, 450, 477; question of claims, 446, 448; Roosevelt's corollary, 448; Lodge's corollary, 450; Wilson's corollaries, 450, 478, 484; Spanish- America resents, 452; Mexican problems, 482. Monterey (Cal.), American consul, instructions, 274; British consul, 257; Americans seize, 258. Montevideo, French relations, 325. Montreal, trade centre, 67, 118, 122, 125, 173, 197; Americans desire, 174. Moore, J. B., Spanish treaty com- mission secretary, 418; state de- partment counsellor, 480, 499. Moose Island, British demand, 182, 186. Morgan, Col. George, Western schemes, 75. Morgan, J. P., interests in Honduras, 459. Mori Daizen, chastised by Europe, 353. Mormons, American, in Mexico, 482. Morny, Due de, Mexican policy, 329. Morocco, official piracy, 55; treaty with, 56, 85; international agree- ment with, 402; Algeciras con- ference, 402, 464. Morris, Gouverneur, mission to England, 87; minister to France, 104; recall, 104. Morton, L. P., diplomatic expe- rience, 304. Mosquitoes (Indian tribe), 292, 295, 383. See Nicaragua. Motley, J. L., minister to England, 343, 373; instructions, 344; re- moval, 344; to Austria, 333; con- cludes treaty with England, 356. Moultrie, Gov. William, receives Genet, 98. Mount Vernon, Washington at, 120. Munster, treaty of, 14. Murray, W. V., minister to Holland, 136; on French commission, 137. Muscat, commercial treaty with, 223. N Nacodoches, Spanish fort, 202; Americans occupy, 250. Najato, prince of, 353. Naples, interest in American Revo- lution, 24; American trade, 55, 164, 167; insurrection in, 204; com- mercial treaty, 223; claims treaty, 226; extradition, 285. Nashville (Tenn.), pioneers, 69. Nassau, port of, 238, 308. Natchez (Miss.), possession dis- puted, 33, 71; American interests, 245; trade centre, 70; command- ant, 76. Natchitoches, French fort, 202. National Era, Mexican policy, 278. National Gazette, policy, 103. Naturalization. See International Law. Navarro, Martin, Spanish intendant, cited, 73, 74. Navigation. See International Law. Navy, in War of 1812, 178; in Civil War, 409; rebuilding, 409. Navy, steady increase in, 423; efficiency tested, 424; rank, 424; increase refused, 495. 528 INDEX Navy Island, militia rendezvous, 232. Necker, Jacques, French statesman, 43. Nelson, Hugh, minister to Spain, 209, 210; instructions, cited, 297. Nelson, Justice Samuel, on British Claims commission, 345. Nesselrode, Count Karl Robert, English sympathy, 169. Netherlands, King of, arbitrates, 230, 235; interests in Asia, 353; diplomatic service to, 429; arbi- tration treaty, 475. See Holland. Neutrality, position of Holland (1688), 14, 22, (1776), 35, 36, (1779), 38; lax enforcement, 22; doctrine of armed, 37, 38; John Adams's views, 92; Jefferson's, 102, 104; Washington's, 125; cabinet discusses, 99; proclamation issued, 100, 105; law of 179i, 105; prob- lems (17S9-1S13), 6, 90-92,95, 100, 107, 127-129, 136, 152, 169, 170;ob- ligations (1789-1813), 106, 118, 169; rights (1789-1812), 14, 108, 110-114, 118, 124, 126, 127, 156, 159, 167, 170, 175; indemnity for violations, 118, 124; England pro- claims, 206; United States, 207; problems (1812-1829), 196, 207, 208; Great Britain's interpretation lax, 336, 338; American ixcioilSSS, 345; problems (1829-1872), 232, 249-251, 288, 299, 327, 330, 332. 339; obligations (1829-1872), 288. 309, 339, 345; rights (1829-1872), 288, 308, 309, 312, 342, 345, 390. 493; in Franco-Prussian war, 350; of Isthmian routes, 352, 380; in Cuban insurrection, 365, 409, 412; in Boer war, 431 ; of China, in Rus- sian-Japanese war, 458; in Mex- ican revolutions, 483; in Euro- pean war, 491, 493-496. Neufville, Jean de, drafts treaty, 36. Neuville, Baron Hyde de, minister to United States," 200, 201. New Brunswick, boundarv dispute, 230, 235. New England, .settlement of, 13 captures Canadian i)orts, 15 fishing interests, 40. 41. 192, 377 commercial, 71; embargo hurts, 161; carrying trade, 55, 177. New England Society, of New York, address to, cited, 305. New Granada. See Colombia. New Hampshire, claims Vermont lands, 67. New Madrid (Mo.), proposed col- ony, 75. New Mexico, United States claims, 274; obtains, 279, 341. New Orleans (La.), French settle, 16; ceded to England, 19; trade centre, 70, 98; Americans desire, 73; English designs against, 90; French, 102; place of deposit, 124, 144, 145; Pitt's plan for, 135; Spanish intendant, 144; ceded to United States, 146; Pakenham's expedition against, 181, 184; filibustering expeditions from, 298; Italian lynched at, 427. New York, Indian tribes, 64; claims Vermont lands, 67; Canada de- sires northern, 181; Canadian trade, 197; mihtia equip in. 232. New York City, Indian chiefs visit, 83; British \agent at, 90; trade centre, 161, 173, 199, 285, 427, 452, 467; filibustering expeditions, 298; Russian fleet visits, 359; Cu- ban head-quarters, 409. Newfoundland, ceded to England, 16; fisheries, 40, 41, 45, 48, 108, 192, 285, 434. 435, 497; embargo hurts, 161; War of 1812, 177; not a part of Canada, 434. Niagara (N. Y.), fort, 63, 182; media- tion conference at, 490. Niagara River, Iroquois on, 65; in- ternational waterway, 181; Fe- nians cross, 338. Nicaragua, international route, 135. 290; rival of Panama, 291, 292. 295, 440; Indians, 292; British relations, 292, 383; American. 296, 297; extradition treaty with. 350; right of way through, 352; proposed canal treaty, 382. 383; reciprocity with, 389; canal pol- icy, 439; protectorate over, 448; forcible intervention, 449; treaty (1915), 450. INDEX 529 Nicholas II of Russia, calls first Hague Conference, 473. Ningpo, port opened, 223. Nipissing, Lake, as boundary, 20, 40, 46. Nitrate mines. South American, 386. Non-importation, colonial agree- ments, 156; law of 1S06, 157. Non-intercourse act, terms, 163; effects, 164, 166, 167; renewed, 169. Nootka Sound, English settlement, 88; Spanish ships raid, 88; con- troversy over, 89-92; neutrality difficult, 100; Treaty of, 92. North, Lord, resigns, 42; return to office, 59. North Carolina, settles Tennessee, 69; Indian relations, 72; governor, 137. Northcote, Sir Stafford, in claims commission, 345. North German Union, naturaliza- tion treaty, 355. Northwest, British policy in, 68, 116, 172; Indian tribes, 172; north- west coast, Russian advance, 205, 206, 209, 212. Northwest Territory, governor, 83. Northwestern Fur Co., rival, 173; title to Astoria, 185; absorbed, 185. Norway, commercial treaty with, 197; extradition, 285; natural- ization, 356; arbitration, 475; neutrality (1915), 492. Nova Scotia, desired by United States, 40. Nueces River, as boundary, 271. O Ohio, Indian tribes, 65, 84. Ohio River, claims to valley, 16, 17; ceded to England, 19; as bound- ary, 20, 40, 116; branches, 68; junction, 105; pioneers in valley, 245. Oil, trade in, 164, 285; free entry conceded, 346. Oldenburg, commercial treaty with, 285. Olliwochica, Indian leader, 172. Olney, Richard, secretary of state. 8, 391, 392; Venezuela policy, 391; conception of Monroe Doctrine, 392-395, 478; characterized, 391, 395; cited, 392, 395. Onis, Don Luis de, negotiates with Adams, 200, 201, 246. Ontario, loyalists settle in, 66; re- lations with England, 178. Ontario, Lake, as boundary, 46; naval fights in, 178, 190. Orange Free State, treaty with, 350. Oregon, American claims, 93, 148, 186, 195, 202, 214, 245, 205, 267, 269, 278; joint occupation, 195, 254-257, 269, 271; treaty signed, 270; fur-trade in, 255; mission- aries, 255, 256; rush of settlers, 257, 291; importance of coast line, 398; attitude toward Mexico (1915), 486. Orinoco River, Spanish on, 391; Venezuelan control of, 394. Ostend Manifesto, terms cited, 301. Oswald, Richard, British minister to France, 42, 43; new commis- sion, 45. Oswego (N. Y.), British fort, 63. Ottoman Empire, commercial treaty with, 223; in Crimean war, 288; diplomatic service to, 430; extra- dition treaty, 350; relations with United States, 464-466; war policies (1915), 492. Pacific Ocean, commerce, 92, 93; international co-operation on, 353, 354, 369; interpretation of term, 379; growth of American influence, 396, 402, 463; territorial expansion on, 398, 454; islands acquired, 398, 399, 404, 418, 425. Padillo, Panama gunboat, 441. Pagopago, naval station, 400, 425. Paine, Thomas, French sympathy, 96. Pakenham, Sir Richard, British minister, 262; correspondence with, 263, 267. Pakenham, Gen. Sir Edward M., New Orleans expedition, 181. Palmerston, Lord, Central Amer- 530 INDEX ican policy, 294; Civil War, 313, 317, 319; cited, 317. Panama, international route, 135, 286, 290; Spanish- American con- gress, 214, 291 ; United States dele- gates, 216; American interests in, 245; neutrality guaranteed (treaty of 18i6), 291, 385, 442; Nicaragua a rival, 291, 439, 440; railroad built, 295; de Lesseps canal, 380; title bought by United States, 439; relations with Colombia, 439- 442, 453; United States recognizes, 442; guarantees independence, 443; constitution, cited, 443; re- lations with United States, 443. Panama Canal, fortifications, 436- 438; tolls, 437, 480, 481; strategic importance, 444; opening, 469. Panama City, revolt in, 441. Pan-American Congress, success of first, 388; Hawaii not included, 403; sessions, 451. Pan-American Exposition, at Buf- falo, 451. Pan-American Union, director-gen- eral, 430. Pan-Americanism, policy of Adams and Clay, 214; of Blaine, 386; action of Congress, 387; later, 451. Panton, Leslie & Co., Indian trade, 73. Papacy, relations with United States, 51, 55. Papal bulls, confirm Spanish claims, 10; importance, 10, 11. Papal States, diplomatic service to, 280; plan to defend, 338. Paraguay, commercial treaty with, 285, 287; arbitration, 475. Parana River, navigation of, opened, 287. Paredes y A., Gen. M., Mexican president, policv. 275, 276. Paris, 73, 81, 138, 150, 204, 311, 418; interest in American Revolution, 24; American representatives in, 27, 28, 33, 96, 99, 104, 132, 145, 188, 345; international bureau, weights and measures, .351; seal fisheries arbitration court, 379; Venezuelan, 394; engineering con- gress, 380; financial centre, 427. Paris, treaty of (1781-3), 18; discus- sion of terms, 40-50, 66; Indians angry at, 65; interpretation, 67,70, 115, 117, 139, 186, 192, 194, 195; (1898), 418-422. Parker, Josiah, V^irginia Member of Congress, 121. Parliament, toleration of Lord Shel- burne, 59; passes navigation act; (1788), 60. Parrott, W. S., United States agent in Mexico, 273. Passamaquoddy Bay, islands, 186. Patriotism, demonstrations of, cul- tivated, 408. Pauncefote, Sir Julian, discusses Venezuelan dispute, 393; friendly to America, 431; Hay treaty, 436. Peace movement, growth of, 472, 473, 496. Pearl Harbor, coaling station, 404. Pearl River, as boundary, 151. Pearson syndicate, Colombian plans, 450. Peel, Sir Robert, American policy, 233, 269, 270. Peking, foreign embassies besieged, 455, 456; relieved, 457. Pensacoia (Fla.), Spanish colony, 19; trading-post, 73; Jackson seizes, 200, 201. Perceval, Spencer, issues order in council, 159. Perdido River, as boundary, 19, 149-159. Perignon, Gen. Marquis de, minister to Spain, 130. Perry, Commodore Matthew, Jap- an treaty, 286. Persia, commercial treaty with, 285. Peru, mines, 75; revolution in, 203; commercial treaty with, 223, 285; claims, 226; war with Spain, 327; arbitration of claims, 350; Ho- livia-Chili war, 386; arbitration treaty, 475; new government rec- ognized, 479. Peterhof, admiralty case, 309. Petroleum, supersedes whale-oil, 353. Pharmacopoeal Formulas for Po- tent Drugs, agreement to unify, 472. Phelps, E. J., on seal-fisheries com- mission, 379. INDEX 531 Philadelphia, seat of Continental Congress. 23, 24, 33, 45, 70, 75; frivolity of, 39; port, 70, 76, 87, 103; trade centre, 161; GenSt at, 99, 101. Philip II, of Spain, succeeds to throne, 12. Philippines, ownership, 12; relations with United States, 245; reciproc- ity with, 389; early history, 417; negotiations for, 418; American sentiment concerning, 420, 421, 476, 487; army of occupation, 423; Japanese relations, 461. Pickering, Timothy, secretary of state, 121, 135, 288; maritime law policy, 129; English sympathies, 121, 137; successor, 138; cited, 129, 176. Pierce, Franklin, president, 281; first message, 281; expansionist, 282; appointments, 282, 292, 300, 365; Cuban policy, 300; cited, 300. Pike, Capt. Zebulon, explorer, 148. Pinchon, L. A., French minister, 144. Pinckney, Charles, minister to Spain, 140. Pinckney, C. C, minister to France, 128; not received, 129-131; one of commission, 131, 137; reply to Talleyrand, 132; cited, 137. Pinckney, Thomas, minister to England, 87, 123; envoy to Spain, 123; concludes treaty, 124; re- placed, 129. Pinkney, William, mission to Eng- land, 158, 372; tact, 165; recall, 169. Piracy, menace to colonies, 13; of Barbary States, 55, 114, 132; slave-trade question, 237. Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, friend of colonies, 17, 25; trade policy, 110. Pitt, William, premier, 60, 88, 89; fears frontier clash, 116; French policy, 132; Louisiana, 134. Pius IX, assumes pontificate, 280. Piatt Amendment, terms, 425, 426; enforced, 449. Plattsburg, battle of, 181. Poinsett, Joel, mission to Buenos Ayres, 206, Poles, treatment by Russia, 359. Polk, James K., elected president, 265; appointments, 273, 282; Texas policy, 266, 267, 278, 440; Oregon, 267-271, 393; Mexican, 271-279, 341; California, 267, 274, 277; extends Monroe Doctrine, 296, 325, 478; characterized, 267. 279; cited, 276, 277. Polly, admiralty case, 156. Pompey the Great, destroys pirates, 56. Pontiac, conspiracy of, 65. Poor Richard's Almanac, author, 27. Porcupine River, navigation free, 346. Porfirio Diaz (Mex.), fighting at, 482. Pork, trade in, 58, 76, 110, 467; in McKinley tariff, 388. Port Arthur, leased to Russia, 455. Port Royal. See Louisburg. Porter, Admiral David, annexes Madison island, 398. Porter, Admiral David D., inspec- tion cruise, 361. Porto Bello, Panama town, 441. Porto Rico, ownership, 35, 135, 203; effort to free, 217; slavery in, 236; reciprocity with, 389; United States acquires, 421; strategic im- portance, 444; change of owners, 478, 487. Portugal, colonial relations with Spain, 11, 12; United States trade with, 56, 57, 163; diplomatic ser- vice to, 81, 140, 430; guards Gib- raltar, 114; loses Brazil, 203; commercial treaty, 223, 471; claims, 226; forbids slave-trade, 236; war with Brazil, 324; pays American claims, 375; arbitra- tion treaty, 475. President, fights Little Belt, 174. Press, influence in causing Spanish war, 411. Pribilof Islands, sealing industry, 377, 379, 434. Prim, Juan, Count de Reus, Mex- ican expedition, 329; Cuban pol- icy, 366. Privateering. See International Law. Privateers, French, 15, 98, 102, 103; American, 29; in war with France, 532 INDEX 133; of 1812, 177; Spanish-Amer- ican, iOO, 207; Confederacy, 309, 312, 315. Prizes. See International Law. Proctor, Sen. Redfield, report on Cuba, 412. Provisions, contraband, 111, 119- 121, 124, 128, 154, 164, 493; com- petition in trade, 373. Prussia, American commissioner to, 31; commercial treaties with, 53, 54, 129, 197; privateering pro- hibited, 54; diplomatic service to, 81, 140, 188; war with France, 95; war debt, 167; signs Holy Alli- ance, 204; head of Zollverein, 224; England seeks alliance with, 240; Cuban relations, 366. Puget Sound, ownership, 267, 270; coast importance, 398. Q Quebec, province created, 20; bound- aries, 33, 40, 46, 228. Quebec Act, provisions, 20. Quebec, City of, French stronghold, 13, 16; Americans besiege, 75; trade centre, 118, 125, 197; route via, 182, 230. Quitman, Gen. J. A., Cuban filibus- tering, 298; Member of Congress, 300. R Railroads. See Transportation. Rambouillet, decree of, 167, 168. Randolph, Edmund, secretary of state, 104; indiscretion, 120, 121; Vindication, 120. Randolph, John, opinion of non- importation, cited, 157; minister to Russia, 221. Rayneval, Gerard, secretary to Vergennes, 33; mission to Eng- land, 44. Reciprocity, {1815-1829). 196-199; (1830-1860), treaties, 223-225, 285, 337, 346, 352, 376, 389, 403. 404; "most favored nation" dis- pute, 224; policy of Hlaine. 373, 388; endorsed by Pan-.\mcrican Congress, 388; with Canada, 432, 435, 436; under Dingley tariflf, 470; Payne-Aldrich, 471; Under- wood, 471. Reed, T. B., opposes Spanish war, 413. Reid, Whitelaw, Spanish treaty commissioner, 418; ambassador to England, 430. "Restook," 230. Review of Reviews, editor, 440, 450. Rhett, R. B., Southern leader, 310. Rhode Island, France said to desire, 78. Rice, trade in, 55, 57, 225. Richelieu River, trade route, 67. Richmond (Va.), Confederate cap- ital, 320. Riga, port open, 163. Right of search. See International Law. Rio Grande, boundary, 148, 201, 246, 277, 279; source, 272, 274; as American troops on, 273, 276; navigation of, 481. Rio Janeiro, Pan-American Con- gress, 451. Rios, Don E. M., Spanish treaty commissioner, 418. Roberts College, protected by Tur- key, 465. Robertson, James, intrigues with Spain, 77. Robespierre, M. M. I., French leader, 103. Rochambeau, Comte de, statue of, presented, 467. Rockhill, W. W., commissioner to China, report cited, 457. Rockingham, Marquis of, favors peace, 42; death, 45. Rocky Mountains, as boundary, 194, 271. Rodney, Adm. G. B., seizes St. Eustatius, 38. Roebuck, J. A., member of Parlia- ment, 320, 322, 331. Roman Catholic Church, aids Spain, 15; first American bishop, 51, .'52; political sympathies, 207; mis- sions in Oregon, 256; Far East, 455. Romanzoff, Count, French sympa- thy, 169. Rome, diplomatic centre, 10. INDEX 533 Romero, Senor Matias, Mexican minister, cited, 387. Roosevelt, Alice, christens German yacht, 467. Roosevelt, Theodore, voices impe- rialist spirit, 423; navy policy, 424; relations with Hay, 429; civil service under, 431 ; Panama policy, 439-443; doctrine of police power, 447-450, 452; Santo Domingo in- tervention, 448; Spanish-American fears, 452; South American trip, 453; mediator, 458; arbitration attitude, 473-475; foreign policy, 476, 484; cited, 440, 441, 451. Root, Elihu, secretary of state, on Alaska boundary commission, 434; visits South America, 452; Japa- nese policy, 461, 462; arbitration advocate, 473, 475; ability, 429. Rose, John, English diplomat, 344. Roumania, relations with United States, 468. Rouse's Point, in dispute, 231. Rousseau, J. J., influence in Amer- ica, 24. "Rule of 1756." See International Law. Rush, Richard, minister to England, 189, 191, 210, 237, 372; instruc- tions cited, 210. Russell, Lord John, foreign secre- tary, 8, 313, 322, 323, 340; Civil War papers, 317, 320. Russell, Jonathan, legation secre- tary, 170; peace commissioner, 180, 185. Russell, William, Times correspond- ent, cited, 310. Russia, international relations, 37, 178, 179, 209, 213, 240, 313, 331, 357, 359, 379, 432; ofiFers media- tion, 41, 178, 179; American trade, 53, 163, 169; diplomatic service to, 81, 163, 221, 430; dealings with Miranda, 89; British treaty, 111; French invasion, 155, 170, 178; arbitrator, 191, signs Holy Alliance, 204; policy in northwest, 205, 206, 209, 211-214, 218, 254, 281; Crimean war, 288; neutrality treaty, 288; Civil War policy, 313, 359, 360; frees serfs, 313; Alaska treaty. 358, 359; treat- ment of Jews, 357, 466; Poles, 359; treaty with England, 432; seal fisheries treaty, 434; policy in Far East, 454, 455, 458, 459; Con- gress abrogates treaty with, 428, 466; war with Japan, 458, 462. Russian American Company, com- pensation, 358. Ryswick, Treaty of, 16. Sabine River, as boundary, 201, 202, 246. Sackett's harbor, British demand, 182. Sagasta, P. M., Spanish prime min- ister, 413, 416. St. Augustine (Fla.), French designs on, 99. St. Bartholomew Island, ownership, 35; ceded to France, 335. St. Clair, Gov. Arthur, Indians de- feat, 83, 116. St. Croix Island, ownership, 35. St. Croix River, as boundary, 46, 117, 186; source, 228; command of, 182. St. Eustatius Island, entrep6t, 35; governor, 36; British seize, 38. St. Germain, treaty of, 13. St. John Island, cession proposed, 360. St. John River (Florida), Huguenot massacre on, 13. St. John river (New Brunswick), as boundary, 40, 46; valley in dis- pute, 228; international waterway, 235, 346. St. Joseph (Mich.), British fort burned, 33. St. Lawrence river, as boundary, 20, 40, 46, 186, 228; British hold, 63, 68, 87, 197; settlements in basin, 66, 67; opened to United States, 125; international water- way, 181; right of navigation, 197, 285; granted. 346, 348; trib- utaries, 228. St. Louis (Mo.), trade-centre, 173, St. Marks (Fla.), Spanish fort, 200, 201. St. Nicholas, port leased, 360. St Petersburg (Petrograd), American minister at, 170, 188, 455. 534 INDEX St. Thomas Island, cession proposed, 360. Saligny, Alphonso de, French agent in Texas, 265. Salisburj', Lord, dealings with Amer- ica, 8; in scal-flsheries dispute, 378, 379; in Clayton-Bulwer treaty dispute, 382; Venezuelan, 393; cited, 428. Samana Bav, desirable naval station, 361, 363,'^401. Samoa, international interests in, 399-401, 406, 425; American re- lations, 245, 399-401, 406, 425; in- dependence recognized, 401, 402; division of islands, 425, 454. San Francisco, Russian fleet visits, 359; collector of port, 377; San Francisco, bay as boundary, 92; importance, 275, 398. San Jose (Costa Rica), arbitration court palace, 451. San Ildefonso, treaty of, 143. San Jacinto, battle of, 250. San Jacinto, stops Trent, 316. San Juan archipelago, ownership, 337, 345, 347, 348. San Juan river, mouth of, 292, 383. San Marino, treaty with United States, 469. Sanmun, port leased, 455. San Salvador, commercial treaty with, 285; extradition, 350; arbi- tration, 475. Santa Anna, Gen. Antonio Lopez de, revolutionary leader, 247-249, 251; exiled, 276; Polk's negotia- tions with, 276; intrigues, 277. Santa Fe, Texan expedition against, 252; Mexican post, 272. Santiago of Chili, Pan-American Congress at, 451. Santo Domingo, divisions of, 326; trade, 108, 109, 134, 165, 166; leader, 134, 136; Lc Clerc's ex- pedition to, 143, 145; freedom, 153. Sardinia, commercial treaty with, 223; insurrection in, 204; in Cri- mean war, 288. Savov, Amadeo de, king of Spain, 30.5. Saxony, desires commercial treaty, 63. Scheldt River, commerce via, 5; navigation opened, 352. Schenck, R. C., minister to Eng- land, 344. Schenectady, burned, 15. Schofield, Gen. J. M., on Mexican duty, 332; mission to Napoleon, 332. SchuTZ, Carl, diplomatic experience, 304; minister to Spain, 327, 329; speech on expansion, 364; Phil- ippine views, 420; cited, 424. Scotch-Irish, in Kentucky, 69. Scott, Sir Walter, cited, 239. Scott, Sir William, admiralty deci- sions, 156, 236, 308. Scott, Gen. Winfield, on North- eastern frontier, 230. Seabury, Samuel, consecration as bishop, 52. Seals, fisheries problem, 377, 432, 434, 497. Sectionalism, influences diplomacy, 71, 282. Senate, relation to diplomacy, 80; acts on Jay treaty, 119; members, 174, 222, 225, 364, 428; relation to House, 225, 428; to executive, 428; acts on Zollverein treaty, 225; Oregon, 270; San Domingo, 363; Canadian reciprocity, 376, 378, 435; Algeciras " General Act," 464; Turkish atrocities, 465; ar- bitration, 474, 475; treaty making power, 471. Servia, treaty with, 375. Sevastopol, in Crimean War, 288. Seven Years' War, trade during, 109. Servier, John, Tennessee leader, 69, 77. Sewall, H. M., consul at Samoa, 400. Seward, W. H., dealings with Eng- land, 241, 318, 319, 321, 339, 340, 382; France. 331-333; Mexico, 329; Spain, 326, 327; privateering policy, 309; slave-trade, 349; naturalization, 355; views on ex- pansion, 281, 305, 306, 326, 333, 358-362, 403, 487; length of pub- lic service, 370, 499; indiscretion, 305, 317, 342; characterized, 305, 306; cited, 340, 355, 362, 382. Shanghai, port opened, 223. INDEX 535 Shaw, Albert, letter to, cited, 440; editorial, cited, 450. Shefl5eld, Lord, "Observations on the Commerce of the United States," influence, 59. Shelburne, Lord, liberal opinions, 42, 60; controls ministry, 45; re- signs, 58; cited, 45. Shelby, Isaac, Kentucky governor, 102; cited, 105. Shenandoah, Confederate cruiser, 339. Sherman, John, secretary of state, 414; Cuban policy, 412; successor, 418; cited, 412. Shimonoseki, indemnity returned, 397, 454. Shimonoseki Straits, closed, 353. Ship-building, American industry, 58; government policy toward, 85, 469, 470; growth, 109; de- cline, 336. Short, William, American minister to Spain, 123, 140. Siam, commercial treaty with, 223, 286. Silks, trade in, 55, 284. Singleterry, John, arrested, 102. Sitka (Alaska), United States court at, 378. Slavery, Missouri question, 252; Texas, 253, 254, 262; in Cuba, 298, 301, 302, 367; growth of opposition, 321, 354; Alex. H. Stephens views, 323. Slave trade, African, 55, 58; pro- hibited, 79; English opposition to, 191, 216, 236; European, 236; American, 236, 237; Mexican, 246; suppression difficult, 236, 238, 239, 241; declared piracy, 237; legislation after 1862, 349, 374. Slidell, John, minister to Mexico, 273-275; Confederate commis- sioner, 311; captured, 316; re- leased, 318; agent in France, 331. Smiley, A. K., paciBst, 473. Smith, Adam, influences Lord Shel- burne, 58. Smith, Ashabel, Texas representa- tive, 264. Smith, J. F., on Chinese commis- sion, 398. Smith, Robert, secretary of state, 163; successor, 170. Smuggling, by Dutch, 35, 36; be- tween England and France, 164. Society of Holy Trinity for Re- demption of Captives, activity, 55, 56. Sorrel River, trade route, 67. Soudan, British withdrawal, 342. Soule, Pierre, minister to Spain, 283, 300; independence in office, 371. South, in diplomatic service, 304. South America, commerce, 5. South Sea Bubble, speculation, 205. Southwest, character of settlers, 69; trade, 69; relations with Indians, 83, 89. Spain, holds Mississippi River, 5; trouble with colonies, 6; papal aid, 10, 15; colonial relations with Portugal, 11, 12; extends empire, 12; pirates molest col- onies, 13; Armada defeated, 13; recognizes rival colonies, 14, 21; colonial commerce, 15; aids France, 18; cedes Florida, 19; ac- quires Louisiana, 19; neutrality lax, 22; aids American Revolution, 26, 27, 108; offers mediation, 32; war with England, 32, 37; Am- erican commissioner to, 31, 32, 34; American policy, 33, 91; seizes British forts in Florida, 33; Michigan, 34; neutral trade, 38; in American peace negotiations, 43-45, 49, 50; gains Floridas, 50; payments to Barbary, 56; United States trade, 57, 63, 77, 163, 166, 167, 177; controls Mississippi, 69, 70, 71, 87, 147, 197; treaties with England, 70; Western in- trigues, 73-77, 123; Indian pol- icy, 73, 74, 83, 123; diplomatic service to, 81, 123, 209, 283, 300. 301, 327, 366, 385, 412, 430; m Nootka Sound affair, 88-93; Fam- ily alliance, 88; effect of Jay treaty, 122; vacillation, 123; war with France, 95, 97, 99; treaty with United States, 124, 134; international law position, 124, 237; evacuates disputed 536 INDEX ports, 139, 142; cedes Louisiana, 143, 147, 150; Bonaparte regime, 150, 203; disputed boundary, 199-202; cedes Floridas, 202, 207; insurrection in, 204; mon- archy restored, 204; relations with Spanish-Americji, 203, 210- 213, 251, 29C, 326-329, 361, 384, 387, 391; claims trejity, 226, 350, 375; forbids slave trade, 236; gives up Oregon claim, 254; Cuban relations, 298, 326, 330, 365-368; domestic situation, 365; emancipation policy, 367; in Virginius affair, 366, 367; reci- procity with, 389; commercial treaty, 471; war with America, 409-417; peace terms, 418-421, 487; Cuban debt problem, 418, 426; arbitration with Mexico, 474; United States, 475; inter- ests in Mexico, 482. Spanish-America, mines, 75; rev- olutionary leaders, 89, 96, 97, 203; discontent in, 135; European relations, 385; Burr's designs on, 147; trade valuable, 155; revo- lutions, 203, 205, 226; United States trade with, 206; interest in, 7, 208, 209; relations with, 210-219, 226, 284, 319, 384, 390, 406, 442, 464, 484, 489, 490, 500; England's relations with, 206, 209- 217, 319, 334; calls a congress, 214; Pan- American attitude, 387, 390, 451; foreign concessions in, 450, 460; relations with Japan, 461; joins in Sanitary Conven- tions, 472. Spooner, Sen. J. C, amends reci- procity treaties, 471. Spooner Act, provisions, 439. Springbok; admiralty case, 308. Stanley, Lord, foreign i)olicy, 340. Staples, loan to Mexico, 215. Steinbcrger, A. B., German agent, 400. Stephens, A. IL, favors fleet, 311. Steuben, Baron Friedrich von, de- mands surrender of frontier posts, 63. Stevens, Edward, American consul 136. Stevens, J. L., minister to Hawaii, cited, 404; favors annexation, 405; recalled, 406. Stevenson, R. L., interest in Samoa, 399. Stickine River, na\'igation free, 346. Stockton, Admiral R. F., sent to Monterey, 274. Stoeckl, Baron, Russian minister, sale of Alaska, 358. Straus, Oscar, minister to Turkey, 430, 466; betters conditions, 466. Suarez, Pino, Mexican vice-presi- dent, killed, 483. Suez Canal, director of, 380. Sugar, trade in, 108, 109, 119, 153; Hawaiian, 353; in McKinley tariff, 388. Sullivan, Gen. John, expedition against Iroquois, 64. Sumner, Charles, senator, 306, 339, 340, 364; views in foreign policy, 317, 340-344, 347; removed from chairmanship, 344, 364; works for Alaska treaty, 358, 359; char- acterized, 306, '307, 342; cited, 341. Superior, Lake, as boundary, 46. Supreme Court, powers over treat- ies, 80. Suwo, prince of, 353. Sweden, American colonists, 14; armed neutralitv, 37; treaties with, 54, 129, 197, 285, 356, 475; American minister to, 188; for- bids slave-trade, 236; cedes St. Bartholomew to France, 335; American cession refused, 362; neutrality (IDJo), 492. Switzerland, commercial treaty with, 285; represented in Geneva board, 347; diplomatic service to, 429, 430; trade agreement with United States, 471; arbitration, 475; neu- trality problems {191')), 492. Syria, missions in, 465. Syrians, status in United States, 466. Tackle, T.. British agent, cited, 82, 181. Taft, W. H., president, 435; seal fisheries treaty, 434; reciprocity. INDEX 537 435; immigration policy, 468; Japan, 450; arbitration, 475; Mexican, 481, 482. Talien-wan, port leased, 455. Talleyrand, C. M. de, American policy, 131-133, 136-138, 142, 143; cited, 142, 143, 149, 150. Tallulah (La.), Italian lynched at, 427. Tamasese, King of Samoa, 400. Tar, trade in, 57. TarifiP, customs, 85; protects fish- eries, 193, 194; affects ship-build- ing, 336, 470; Morrill, 314; McKinley, 388; Wilson, 389; Dingley, 470, 471; Payne-Aldrich, 471; Underwood, 471. Taylor, Zachary, Mexican cam- paigns, 273, 276; diplomatic serv- ice under, 304; instructions to, cited, 273; president, 304. Tea, commercial importance of, 54, 55, 196, 199, 284. Tecumseh, forms confederacy, 172. Tehuantepec, Isthmus of, canal pro- posed, 216, 290, 295. Temple, Sir John, British consul- general, 87. Tennessee, offshoot of North Caro- lina, 69; Spanish intrigues, 77; admitted to Union, 82; French intrigues, 102, 105; English. 134; governors, 134, 248. Tepic (Cal.), British consul, 257. Texas, Spanish boundaries, 201, 202; United States reversionary interest, 208, 209, 245, 246; claims treaty, 226: rush of settlers, 245, 481; land titles, 245; "Fredonian republic," 247; joined to Coahuila, 247; Mexican forts in, 247; Amer- ican leaders, 248; Indian negotia- tions, 248; declares independence, 248; gained American aid, 249; annexation question, 250, 251- 254, 259-266, 272, 274, 341; slavery, 253, 262-266, 298, 301; boundary, 271, 279; truce with Mexico, 273; United States gains, 279; attitude toward Mexico (1915). 486. Texel, John Paul Jones at, 36. Thames, battle of, 178. Thiers, M. J. L. A., cited, 166. Thompson, Waddy, minister to Mex- ico, cited, 258, 274. Thornton, Sir Edward, British agent, 144; on claims commission, 345. Tibet, relations to Great Britain, 459. Tiger Island, naval station sought, 382. Tippecanoe, battle of, 172. Tobacco, trade, 57, 76, 164, 225; Cuban plantations, 410. Tobago, France acquires, 50. Tordesillas, treaty of, 11, 13. Tower, Charlemagne, diplomatic service, 430. Trade-mark treaties, 351, 469. Trafalgar, battle at, 152. Transportation, ocean, 63, 70, 289, 317; trans-continental railroads, 289, 290, 352, 382, 437; canals, 290-293, 295, 346, 380-383; Isth- mian railroad, 295, 303, 352. Transvaal, British withdrawal, 342. Treaties, arbitration, 474, 475, 481; claims, 226, 345, 375; commercial, 14, 29, 39, 53, 54, 118, 119, 124, 129, 197, 216, 223, 279, 285-287, 352, 397; extradition, 350, 374; model, 474; naturalization, 355, 356; reciprocity, 223-225, 285, 337, 346, 352, 376, 389, 403, 404, 470; seal fisheries, 434; trade- marks, 351, 374; of Aix-la-Cha- pelle, 16; Alaska Purchase, 358- 361; Amiens, 143; Basle, 123, 130; Berlin, 465; Breda, 14; Clayton- Bulwer, terms, 293, 295, 334, 438; interpretation, 282, 293, 381-383; abrogated, 436; Family AlHance, 18, 26, 32; Florida Purchase, 202; Gadsden Purchase, 290, 295; of Ghent, 2, 70; negotiated, 178- 185, 235; terms, 185, 186, 190, 237; interpretation, 191; error in sur- vey, 231; Greenville, 84, 122; Guadaloupe Hidalgo, 277-279; Hay-Pauncefote, 436-438; Holy Alliance, 88, 123, 204; failures, 208; manifesto, 209; Hopewell, 83; Jay's, provisions, 117, 119, 173, 192, 197, 235; adventures, 119- 122; effects, 122, 123, 126, 127, 130; neutral clause expires, 157; Louisiana Purchase, 146, 147; 538 INDEX Madrid, 14; Munster, 14; Nootka Sound, 92, 267; Oregon, 270; Paris (1763), 18, 19, 40-50, 77, 115; Paris (IS'JS), 426; Portsmouth, 458; Quadruple Alliance, stops Barbary piracy, 196, 204; Spanish- American attitude, 212; Ryswick 16; St. Germain, 13; San Ildefonso 143, 149, 150; San Lorenzo, 124 Tordesillas, 11, 13; Utrecht, 16 Victoria, 12; Washington, 345 352, 364, 375; Wayne's, 122, 182 Webster-Ashburton, 234, 235, 269 Westminster, 14; Zaragoza, 12. See names of countries. Trenf, affair of, 316-318. Trescott, W. H., South American mission, 386, 387; on Chinese commission, 398; ability, 401. Trevelyan, Sir G. O., upholds Amer- ican Revolution, 314. Tripoli, official piracy, 55. Trist, N. P., peace commissioner, 277, 278. Troppau, meeting of allies, 204. Tuhl, Baron de, Russian minister, 209. Tunis, oflBcial piracy, 55; treaty, 85. Turgot, A. R. J., attitude toward America, 25, 26; reputation, 43. Turk Island, reciprocity with, 470. Turner, Sen. George, in Alaskan boundary commission, 434. Turpentine, trade in, 58. Turreau, L. M., minister to United States, 166. Tuscany, American commissioner to, 31. Tutuila Island, naval station, 400; ceded to Unitetl States, 425. Tyler, John, president, 225; foreign policy, 225, 233, 239, 256; Texas, 260, 264, 266; unpopularity, 225, 264. Tweed, Boss, surrendered by Spain, 351. Two Sicilies, commercial treaty with, 223; extradition, 285; neu- trality, 288. U United States, isolation policy, 1, 2, 125, 134, 137, 139, 171, 187, 190, 211, 212, 220, 324, 375, 407, 438, 463, 477, 495; world-power, 3, 4; problems of neutrality, 6, 90-92, 100, 152, 154, 156, 169, 170, 175, 207, 208, 232, 249-251, 288, 330, 332, 339, 350, 352, 409, 483; treaty with France, 29; seeks recognition by Spain, 32; England, 44; in peace negotiations, 43-46; English trade, 57; foreign debt, 77; treaties with England, 70, 77; direction of foreign policy, 81; financial strength, 82; Indian pol- icy, 82-84, 172, 194, 245; rela- tions with Barbary States, 84, 85; in Nootka Sound affair, 90-93; French diplomacy in, 96; recog- nizes French republic, 101; recalls Morris, 104; neutral claims, 109, 110, 113, 158, 288; England in- jures trade, 112; naturalization policy, 114, 289, 355-357; treaty with Spain, 124; resents British aggressions, 114, 158, 160, 166; passes embargo, 115; sends em- bassy, 115; compromises treaty difficulties, 117-119; friction with France, 128, 133, 136, 226-228; foreign intrigues in, 131; Conven- tion of 1800, 138, 143; buys Louisi- ana, 146; carrying trade, 156, 157, 161, 167, 169, 196, 198, 222; in War of 1S12-H, 174-178; peace negotiations, 178-185; effect on neutral trade, 185; position in 1815, 186; European prestige, 189; growth of navy, 189, 190, 424; in Florida dispute, 199-202; rec- ognizes de facto governments. 212, 280; Spanish- American sym- pathy, 206, 207; problems, 210- 219; trade, 223; slavery sentiment, 217, 237; claims treaties, 226-228 Northeastern boundary dispute, 228-235; abolishes slave-trade, 236; enforcement lax, 238, 247 public land policy, 246; Texas sympathy, 248; recognition, 251 annexation question, 253-254 260-266, 271-276; Missouri ques tion, 252; Oregon, 255-2,57. 267, 270, 271; California, 257-259, 274 Mexican War sentiment, 277, 278 increase of territory, 279; expan- INDEX 539 sion process, Mexican view, 243, 244; historical, 244, 245; theory of, 280, 281; sympathy with European revolutions, 280, 281; Isthmian policy, 290-295, 390, 406, 436- 438, 450, 477, 481 ; Cuban, 299-302, 365-368; Southern blockade, 307- 312, 315; irritation at England, 316, 322, 336, 337; Spanish-Amer- ican policy, 324, 327, 350, 385, 489; dealings with Second Empire, in Mexico, 329-333; Irish immi- gration, 338; enlistments, 338; war claims against England, 339- 348; seal-fisheries dispute, 378, 379; interest in de Lesseps canal, 380; interpretation of Clayton- Bulwer treaty, 381, 382; proposed Nicaragua canal treaty, 382; Venezuela dispute, 391-394; re- lations with China, 397, 398; Samoa, 399-401; Hawaii, 402- 406, 424; isolation policy violated, 402; in Spanish war, 409-417; peace terms, 418-422; changes in policy, 421, 422, 425; imperialist spirit in, 424; colonial policy, 425, 443; Chinese immigration ques- tion, 397, 398, 432; Alaska bound- ary, 432, 434; fisheries, 435; Pan- ama treaty, 443; Santo Domingo protectorate, 448; intervention doctrine, 449; continental co- operation, 451; Spanish- American distrust of, 452, 489, 490, 500; in- terest in Far East, 455; Chinese policy, 456-462; relations with Japan, 461-463, 481; Africa, 464; Turkey, 464-466; Mexico, 481- 490; international agreements, 472; neutrality problems {1915), 491, 493-496. United States, wins fight, 190. Upshur, A. P., secretary of state, 220, 260, 262; killed, 260. Uruguay, European relations, 325. Uruguay River, navigation of, opened, 287. Utrecht, treaty of, 16. Valparaiso (Chili), killing of marines at. 390. Van Alen, J. J., appointment to Italy, criticized, 372. Van Berkel, E. T., Amsterdam bur- gomaster, 36. Van Bibber, Abraham, American agent, cited, 36. Van Buren, Martin, secretary of state, 2, 220, 222; president, 252; minister to England, 372; Texas policy, 252. Vancouver Island, English settle- ment, 88, 270; American claim, 267, 271. Vanderbilt, Commodore Cornelius, promoter, 292, 337. Vaughan, Benjamin, secret mission, 45; returns to France, 45; letter, cited, 59. Venezuela, revolution, 203; com- mercial treaty, 223; arbitration of claims, 350; convention with, 375; French claims, 385; reciproc- ity afiFects, 389; British contro- versy, 391, 393, 394; American interests, 391, 393-395; inter- vention threatened, 449; inter- national blockade, 447. Venice, desires United States trade, 55. Vera Cruz (Mex.), United States occupies, 489; leaves, 490. Vergennes, Count de, urges aid to America, 25; directs French pol- icy, 26, 28, 31, 33, 36, 39; subor- dinates, 96; in peace negotiations, 43, 44, 46, 49, 61, 137; difficult position, 43; characterized, 43; cited, 25. Vermont, in Revolution, 67, 69; sends commissioners to Canada, 67; British control possible, 68; not recognized by Congress, 67; admitted to Union, 82; trade agreements with England, 87, 118, 122, 197. Verona, Congress of, 204; principles, cited, 204. Verrazano, Giovanni de, explorer, 13. Vicksburg, moral effects of capture, 322. Victor, Gen. C. P., on Louisiana ex- pedition, 143; instructions, 148, 149. 201. 540 INDEX Victoria, Queen, appointments, 347. Victoria, treaty of, 12. Vienna, American commissioner to, 31. Vienna, Congress of, 180; wrangles, 184. Vienna, Decree of, 166, 167. Villa, Gen., revolutionary leader, 486. Vincennes (Ind.), French settle, 16; Clark captures, 33, 69. Virginia, English colony, 13; in French and Indian war, 17; re- taliatory laws, 61; emigrants, 69; Kentucky part of, 76; convention of, 1788, 72; hurt by embargo, 162. Virginius, affair of, 367, 368. "Visit and Search." See Interna- tional Law. Voltaire, F. M. A. de, cited, 17. W Wade, B. F., on San Domingo com- mission, 363. Wagram, battle of, effects, 166. Waite, M. R., on Geneva board, 347. Wake Island, United States occupies, 425. Walker, William, Nicaragua in- trigues, 296, 297. Walpole, Lord, on maritime law, cited, 179. War of 1812, causes, 6, 175; effects, 2. War Hawks, beliefs, 171, 175. Ward, H. G., British minister, 247. Warville, Brissot de, American voyage, 96. Washburne, Elihu, secretary of state, 365; minister to France, 365. Washington, George, president, 1 ; in French and Indian war, 17; sup- porters, 31; appointments, 80, 81, 87, 104; foreign. 63, 91, 99-101, 104, 123, 129, 188, 211; success of, 124; Indian policy. 82, 83, 125, 173; task unfinished, 93, 125; accepts Bastile Key, 94; neutrality proc- lamation, 100; supplementary, 105; receives Genfit, 101; press attacks, 103; disapproves Jay treaty, 120; signs, 120; contest with House, 121; farewell address. 125, 438; commander-in-chief, 135; formality of, 140; strength of character, 95, 125; cited 63, 123. Washington (D. C), 179, 191, 200, 210, 227, 250, 256, 262, 294, 307, 326, 344, 345, 358, 387, 400, 401, 413, 441, 442; burned, 184; seat of government, 276; Bureau of American Republics at, 388. Wasp, wins fight, 190. Waterways, international, 5, 70, 197, 287, 291, 346, 351. Wayne, Gen. Anthony, moves against Indians, 83, 116; defeats them, 84, 117; treaty, 122; Cum- berland manoeuvers, 105; on Maumee, 500. Webster, Daniel, oration for Greece, 207; secretary of state, 222, 233; Ashburton treatv, 234, 237; Brit- ish policy, 234, 239-241, 294, 403; Oregon, 269; California, 274; Me-xico, 258, 260, 278; presiden- tial ambitions, 235; characterized, 221; letters cited, 233, 252, 271, 282. Weed, Thurlow, in England, 321; letter cited, 331. Weights and measures, joint bu- reau of, 351. Wei-hai-wei, port leased, 455. Welles, Gideon, blockade policy, 307; confidence in navy, 319. Wellesley, Marquis of, minister of foreign affairs, 168. Wellington, Duke of, victory over French, 178; desires American peace, 180; American campaign proposed, 184; aids Spain, 205. West, development, 71; sectional- ism, 71, 72; discontent, 72, 77, 82, 144, 172-175; foreign intrigues, 72-77, 98, 102, 116, 131; loyalty, 148, 152; in War of 1812, 178. West Indies, Spanish, 12; owner- ship, 25; diplomatic importance, 20; England sends troops to, 49; Spanish claims relinquished, 418; British, 29; trade important to America, 58. 77, 161, 176, 193, 198, 199; forbidden, 59-61, 87, 153, 198, 199, 218; temporarily open, 122, 124; direct trade open, 222; admiralty courts, 112, 114, INDEX 541 122; slave-trade forbidden. 238; slaves freed, 238; French, trade with America, 61, 134, 156, 158, 165, 176, 308; with France, 108; with England, 156; guarantee, 99, 101; ready for war, 102; need neutral trade, 106; England block- ades, 112. Westminster, Treaty of, 14. Weyler y Nicolau, Gen. Valeriano, Cuban campaign, 411. Whale oil, trade in, 61, 396; petro- leum supersedes, 353. Wharton, Francis, letter to, cited, 261. Wheat. See Grain. Wheaton, Henry, diplomatic ability, 221; German negotiations, 224, 225; An Inquiry into the Va- lidity of the British Claim to a Right of Visitation and Search, cited, 240. Whiskey Rebellion, "confessions" of Randolph, 120. White, A. D., on San Domingo com- mission, 364. White, Henry, diplomatic promo- tion, 429. Wilkes, Capt. Charles, visits Oregon coast, 256; stops Trent, 316; exceeds powers, 318. Wilkinson, James, colonizing scheme, 75; at siege of Quebec, 75; in- trigues with Spain, 76, 123, 136; Burr, 147; occupies Mobile, 151; Texas speculations, 245. Willamette River, American settlers on, 267. William HI, of England, 14, 36. Williams, G. H., on British claims commission, 345. Wilson, Woodrow, president, 430; diplomatic policy, 430; civil ser- vice, 431; canal tolls, 437, 481; European claims, 446; opposes for- eign " concessions," 450, 460, 480; Spanish-American attitude, 452; Chinese policy, 460; vetoes lit- eracy test, 468; merchant marine policy, 470; foreign, 476, 479, 480, 489, 496; Japanese, 480; Mexican, 484, 489; Philippine, 487. Wine, trade in, 223. Wisconsin, fur-trade, 173. Woodford, S. L., minister to Spain, 412-415. 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