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INTRODUCTION 
 
 STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 J. H. W. STUCKENBERG, D.D. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 A. C. ARMSTRONG AND SON 
 
 3 & 5 West 18 th Street, near 5 th Avenue 
 
 1902 
 
Sfr1> 
 
 \ 
 
 Copyright, 1SS6, 
 By A. C. ARMSTRONG & SON, 
 
 Presswork by John Wilson and Son, 
 University Press. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The title indicates the specific aim of this volume. 
 It is not an encyclopaedia ; nor is it intended as an 
 introduction to any particular philosophical system, or 
 to the history of the various systems, but to the study 
 of philosophy itself. The book was not written for 
 philosophers, but for students and others who desire to 
 prepare themselves for philosophic pursuits. While 
 especially adapted to beginners in philosophy, maturer 
 students will find it helpful as a review. It may serve 
 to concentrate and crystallize the thoughts which have 
 been confused and bewildered by the perplexing prob- 
 lems of philosophy, and by the antagonistic views in 
 the different systems, and thus may prepare the thinker 
 for a new and more vigorous start in philosophic re- 
 search. The urgent need of such a work is the apology 
 for its existence, — a need evident to all who under- 
 stand the inherent difficulties of philosophy, the con- 
 flicting notions respecting its nature, aim, divisions, and 
 method, and the numerous mistakes of students, and 
 their failure to secure the best results from philosophic 
 
 inquiries. 
 
 iii 
 
iv PREFACE. 
 
 The specific aim has not merely determined the gen- 
 eral character of the volume, but also its particular 
 parts, so as to limit the contents strictly to the scope 
 of an introductory work. No labor has been spared to 
 present, in the clearest manner, such thoughts as are 
 regarded most essential for the beginner. The reader 
 who knows the difference between floundering in a 
 subject, and thinking through it, is in no danger of 
 mistaking obscurity as synonymous with philosophical 
 profundity. But even an elementary work in philos- 
 ophy is obliged to discuss subjects which require pro- 
 found study, and furnish food for the deepest thought. 
 Particularly is this the case with those great problems 
 which have enlisted the best energies of thinkers ever 
 since the birth of philosophy. The student who has 
 the acumen and thoroughness which adapt him to phil- 
 osophical investigations will appreciate the importance 
 of grappling early with themes which most severely 
 test his intellectual powers. While intent on securing 
 all possible help to put him into the right attitude to 
 philosophy, he will value all aids only as means for 
 becoming independent of foreign help. Philosophy is 
 not taught, but thought; and even an introductory 
 work presupposes that the student will do more for 
 himself than others can do for him. Particularly in 
 philosophy is it true, that what one gets depends on 
 what he brings. 
 
 The best introduction to philosophy is not so much 
 an accumulation of materials of thought, as the develop- 
 
PBEFACE. V 
 
 ment and proper direction of the energy of thought. 
 While the following chapters aim to give a clear state- 
 ment of problems, and hints for their solution, it is evi- 
 dent that their full discussion must be left to philosophy 
 itself. Where mere statements are all that the philoso- 
 pher requires, the beginner may need the processes 
 themselves which lead to the results attained by ma- 
 ture thinkers ; and here such processes are frequently 
 given, so that, by means of the genetic method, the 
 student may learn that only by thinking through a 
 thought can it be appropriated. At the end of each 
 chapter, hints are found under the head of Reflections, 
 intended partly as a review, but mainly as suggestions 
 for independent inquiry and for mental discipline. 
 
 Aside from the nature of the subject, the character 
 of the volume has been determined by the author's own 
 experience of the difficulties of philosophical studies, 
 and by extensive observations, in America and Ger- 
 many, of the perplexities and mistakes of students of 
 philosophy. Particularly have these observations been 
 valuable in Berlin, where students congregate from all 
 parts of the world. A careful consideration of the need 
 of beginners has led to the treatment of certain subjects 
 with greater fulness than required in ordinary philo- 
 sophical works ; while other topics have been only men- 
 tioned or briefly discussed, their full consideration being 
 left to a period of greater maturity. A clear view of 
 philosophy itself and its divisions, a definite statement 
 of the problems involved, and specific directions for 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 thorough and successful study, have been the constant 
 aim. While the views of philosophers in past ages may 
 be learned from their books, or from the history of phi- 
 losophy, the student generally finds it exceedingly diffi- 
 cult to form a comprehensive view of present tendencies 
 in philosophic thought, — tendencies which are the more 
 important because he is continually, though perhaps 
 unconsciously, subject to their influence. Frequent 
 reference is made to the present status of philosophy, 
 in order that the student may learn what special de- 
 mands the age makes on the philosophic thinker, and 
 against what dangers he must guard. Wisdom does not 
 lose itself in random thinking, but it selects timely and 
 useful subjects, which the historic development justi- 
 fies and the age makes urgent, and which are capable 
 of richest development and most fruitful application. 
 
 Much valuable help has been derived from the numer- 
 ous volumes consulted ; but as none of them has exactly 
 the same aim as this volume, they could not determine 
 the general plan and particular method of the book. 
 It is hoped that the student will find in the work that 
 independence respecting prevalent systems which the 
 book itself is intended to promote. So far as justice 
 required, special mention has been made of the authors 
 used. The student will be grateful for the views of emi- 
 nent philosophers on the most important problems ; and 
 he who makes reading subordinate to thinking will not 
 regret the opportunities for reflection furnished by the 
 interruptions occasioned by footnotes. The longer 
 
PREFACE. vii 
 
 notes are thrown into the Appendix, and to these the 
 numbers in the text refer. 
 
 In discussing the relation of philosophy to science, 
 it would have been easy to treat the subject wholly 
 from the philosophical standpoint. But this relation 
 has become so important, that both sides should be 
 heard; and for this reason the views of scientists, as 
 well as those of philosophers, are presented: hence 
 numerous references are made, both in the text and in 
 the Appendix, to leaders in science. 
 
 In addition to the works referred to in the text, a 
 list of books is given at the end of the first chapters, on 
 the subjects therein discussed. This list may be valu- 
 able as an introduction to the literature on philosophy, 
 particularly to the philosophical journals. Besides a 
 knowledge of current philosophical tendencies, these 
 journals furnish valuable aid to the student for the 
 selection of works on the general subject, and on the 
 various departments of philosophy. 
 
 J. H. W. STUCKENBERG. 
 
 Berlin, Dec. 21, 1887. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 Introduction < • . 1 
 
 I. Definition of Philosophy 11 
 
 II. Relation of Philosophy to Religion 57 
 
 III. Philosophy and Natural Science 93 
 
 IV. Philosophy and Empirical Psychology .... 129 
 V. Division of Philosophy 159 
 
 VI. Theory of Knowledge (Noetics) 175 
 
 VII. Metaphysics 242 
 
 VIII. Esthetics 268 
 
 IX. Ethics 310 
 
 X. The Spirit and the Method in the Study of 
 
 Philosophy 345 
 
 APPENDIX 399 
 
 INDEX 421 
 
 ix 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 If philosophy is the object of our search, the ques- 
 tion respecting the means for its attainment is funda- 
 mental. But not less important is an inquiry into the 
 state of the person who is to engage in this search, and 
 to use these means. The apprehension of the subject, 
 and the application of the means, depend on the stu- 
 dent's intellectual grasp and energy, his previous train- 
 ing and mental possessions. Since these vary so greatly, 
 their peculiarities in each individual case cannot be 
 taken into account here : only what must be required 
 of all can be indicated. Although we are obliged to 
 leave the matter mainly to himself, the greatest emphasis 
 must be placed on the state of the beginner in the study 
 of philosophy. Thrown upon his own resources more 
 than in any other pursuit, a fault in himself or in his 
 attitude toward philosophy may prove fatal to success. 
 
 Not only must philosophy in the abstract, and what 
 the student is in himself, be considered. The develop- 
 ment attained by philosophy and the general condition 
 of thought, particularly in his immediate surroundings, 
 are also important factors in determining his course. 
 Even mature philosophers cannot ignore the current 
 tendencies of their age ; still less can this be done 
 by beginners. The earnest student of philosophy, an 
 inquirer into deepest thought, is supposed to be exempt 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 from ordinary errors and prejudices respecting the 
 nature and value of his pursuit. The severe labor re- 
 quired of the philosophic thinker is evidence that the 
 best truth may lie farthest below the surface, and cannot 
 be received as a direct impression through the senses, or 
 as an inspiration. Other views calculated to embarrass 
 him may, however, be worthy of serious attention, — 
 views infecting the air we breathe, and unconsciously 
 becoming a part of our very being and intellectual life. 
 
 In every age opposite tendencies prevail, animated by 
 different spirits, pursuing methods which are in conflict, 
 and terminating in results which cannot be harmonized. 
 Frequently these antagonistic movements are extremes 
 which beget and develop one another. When the error 
 in an extreme is discovered, the mind is apt to reject 
 even the truth with which it is associated, and to adopt 
 one-sidedly the truth which was ignored or denied ; but 
 truth out of right relations, or developed in undue pro- 
 portion to other truths, is itself an error. It requires 
 rare breadth, depth, and impartiality, to discern, appro- 
 priate, and properly relate all that is true in a system, 
 while rejecting all that is erroneous. 
 
 Amid the numerous currents of our agitated age, there 
 are two fundamental tendencies which are radically 
 antagonistic. On the one hand, we discover the maxim 
 which confines thought to external objects, as the only 
 source of valid and valuable knowledge. Observation 
 and experiment are pronounced the only means of com- 
 municating with the real, and the mind is solely esteemed 
 as the agent which unites the materials thus gathered, 
 and which draws from them such laws as give the intel- 
 lect a comprehensive view of the facts, and enable it in 
 some measure to foretell coming natural events. Nature 
 being regarded as the chief object of investigation, 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 empiricism, aided by mathematics, domineers thought. 
 The mind is treated as the passive tool of the sense, 
 subject to its laws, run in its grooves, and limited by 
 its authority. The human interests receiving supreme 
 attention are those most closely connected with nature, 
 and with the animal creation at large. As the facts of 
 the natural world are made the germs of science, so the 
 facts of human history become the seeds of ethics, 
 sociology, and politics. A deep distrust of mind is fre- 
 quently revealed by minds controlled by this tendency, 
 and vigorous efforts are made to suppress aspiration be- 
 yond the limits of natural law. Much formerly regarded 
 as real, or at least as a mental representation of reality, 
 is now mercilessly assigned to poetry and fiction, while 
 the sense is endowed with an intuitive knoAvledge of 
 things as they are. To thought preferring the limits 
 of its own law to those of empirical realism, the region 
 of mythology is generously donated. Cherished ideals 
 are treated as pleasant and perhaps harmless illusions ; 
 faith is regarded as effete ; and theology and meta- 
 physics are interpreted as aberrations of mind on its 
 way to positivism, the Ultima Thule of reliable thought. 
 This tendency is not, however, confined to positivists. 
 Sacrificing depth to breadth, it is a widely diffused spirit 
 with various manifestations, agreeing in its negations 
 rather than in its positions. Thus experience may be 
 lauded as the sole guide, and yet the results obtained 
 may differ greatly. The theoretic rejection of faith does 
 not prevent assumptions which reveal astounding credu- 
 lity. Theology can be rejected as worthless, and then, 
 to meet the cravings of the mind, something termed 
 natural religion can be invented, or a cultus of reason, 
 genius, or humanity can be instituted. If a practical rest 
 can be found in a theoretical void, agnosticism may be 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 pronounced final. Facts may be regarded as most 
 valuable in their naked, unconnected reality, while a 
 system of them is viewed as suspicious because too 
 mental. Above all else, that is esteemed as having 
 worth which can be weighed and measured, and ex- 
 pressed in mathematical formulas. 
 
 Numerous evidences of this spirit are found in life 
 and literature. Socialism boldly proclaims that science 
 has abolished the spiritual world and the ideals, and that 
 consequently the most illiterate, by placing himself on 
 the conclusions of science, will be consistent with it if 
 he limits his desires and pursuits to the immediate inter- 
 ests of this life. Selfishness and passion have much to 
 do with determining these interests. Unless some altru- 
 istic notions can be communicated to him, he is freed 
 from the dominion of all authority outside of himself, 
 that of blind force or the penal laws of society alone 
 excepted. With the dominion of empiricism, new 
 methods of education are also to be introduced. Men- 
 tal science is treated as vague and unreliable, because 
 it does not submit to tape-lines and scales. Even history 
 is depreciated, because it does not square itself to the 
 rules of mathematics. Humanity has so meandering 
 a course, that it can be studied to best advantage in the 
 severer scientific regularity of brutes. The classics are 
 objectionable, because by promoting ideals they disturb 
 the mind's possession of the reals. 
 
 Not indeed all who cherish this spirit go to these 
 extremes ; but one need only be familiar with the press 
 of the day, to learn that potent factors in society tend 
 to destroy the ethical and spiritual basis, to interpret 
 what is termed mental by the mechanical, to deprive the 
 soul of confidence in its peculiarities and deepest inter- 
 ests, and to involve it in that pessimism which has 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 become so marked a feature of the most sensitive and 
 most cultured among those controlled by this spirit. 
 
 So general and so dominant is this spirit, that all who 
 eagerly enter the domain of science, to become masters 
 of its principles, are likely to come under its influence. 
 In proportion to the zeal with which an object is pur- 
 sued, does it abstract the attention from other objects. 
 Not in enthusiasm for a specialty is there danger for the 
 mind, but in affirmations respecting the reality or char- 
 acter of the territory lying outside of that specialty, 
 and not even entered by the intellect. It is a common 
 human failing to make the knowledge obtained in one 
 sphere of thought the light to illumine the darkness of 
 every other sphere. Not unfrequently has nature been 
 interpreted by the knowledge obtained of mind; and, 
 in our day, the reverse is common. 
 
 The correctness of the claims made by this spirit will 
 be considered later ; here we want only to contrast it 
 with another tendency. In science itself there are 
 numerous illustrations that the best scientists are not 
 exclusive. Not a few of them admit that science is 
 neither the measure of reality nor the limit of the intel- 
 lect. Tyndall, Huxley, Haeckel, Helmholtz, Du Bois- 
 Reymond, and many others, prove by their works that 
 science is but the basis for thought in its progress to 
 broader generalizations and higher flights. There are 
 even scientists who compensate for the absence of fancy 
 in their themes, by liberally supplying it themselves. 
 
 But it is outside of the domain of science that a spirit, 
 the opposite of that described, is most manifest. All 
 religion proves that the mind is unwilling to be confined 
 to the dogmatism of empiricism. But also in other 
 departments thought rebels against the prescribed limits, 
 strives to free itself from the trammels of gross objects, 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 revels in poetry and fiction, and thus proves that it 
 wants to supplement the known realities of nature with 
 creations of its own, in order that it may obtain satis- 
 faction. The age which seeks to curb thought has not 
 a few who hail even Emerson's poetry as philosophy, 
 failing to discriminate between the rational and imagin- 
 ative elements in his works. Plato has been subject to 
 the same treatment in all ages. And it looks as if in 
 realistic America an era of Hegelistic idealism were 
 about to be inaugurated, — an idealism farthest removed 
 from the dominion of facts, and blending the subtlest 
 fiction with the profoundest reason. Look where we 
 will in the most practical and most scientific lands, 
 thought proves by a fact, by its own energy, that it 
 cannot be buried under a mass of sensations. 
 
 It is not necessary to prove to the student of phi- 
 losophy, that there are aspirations which a cramped 
 knowledge cannot satisfy. Nor is it worth while further 
 to pursue this spirit in its efforts to move in a sphere 
 which transcends the phenomena of nature. One need 
 but understand himself, in order to know that the real 
 of the senses is not the limit of the real of reason. 
 Never has the intellect been limited to the former, ex- 
 cept by a theory not fully understood by its advocates. 
 
 Looking at these opposite tendencies, both equally 
 marked in our day, what is their lesson ? What posi- 
 tion respecting them shall we take? Empiricism is 
 liable to err in limiting thought to sensations, while 
 speculation is in danger of ignoring the data of the 
 senses. The one treats as final what is but a beginning ; 
 the other treats as the beginning what still requires a 
 solid basis. The mind cannot be content with the facts 
 of nature bound together in a rigid system of laws, 
 while all reality beyond the visible and the tactual is 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 denied. Nor can we build solid structures on creations 
 of the fancy. The mind conscious of itself demands 
 a certainty that is absolute, and at the same time the pur- 
 suit of thought to its utmost limits. This means the union 
 of what is good and reliable in both tendencies, without 
 the adoption of their extremes. It means actualism and 
 realism, whether found in the highest or lowest domains 
 of thought. The intellect can only be true to itself 
 while moving in a freedom whose sole law is the neces- 
 sity of reason. 
 
 The above result justifies the demand for philosophy. 
 Numerous other reflections lead to philosophy and illus- 
 trate its scope. 
 
 1. The concrete is endless. The mind cannot remem- 
 ber all individual objects ; if it did, they would only 
 prove a useless burden. But every step it takes from 
 the concrete toward the abstract, from percepts to 
 concepts, and from concepts to principles, decreases 
 the number but increases the comprehensiveness of the 
 objects before the mind. There is a strong innate 
 tendency to unite under as few heads as possible all 
 the objects of knowledge. However far separated at the 
 start, as they increase in depth, the thoughts converge 
 and tend to union in the ultimate principles. 
 
 2. Besides this tendency to seek the fundamental 
 thought which lies in many or all other thoughts, the 
 mind also wants to find the various relations of concepts. 
 It seeks so to unite fragmentary thoughts as to form 
 a system. Not content with the spontaneous association 
 of thoughts, it aims to discover their hidden relations, so 
 that it may construct an intellectual cosmos in which 
 nothing is isolated. 
 
 3. Numerous objects appear before consciousness, and 
 then vanish to return no more. In this way a fleeting 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 world is presented, and because continually vanishing 
 it fails to satisfy. Does the mind exist merely for the 
 sake of these ever-changing impressions, or has it a value 
 of its own ? It is hard to believe that the universe has 
 no other meaning than to furnish passing phenomena. 
 As the same underlying consciousness abides amid the 
 changes of its objects, so the mind seeks the eternal 
 substance behind the vanishing forms. It inquires into 
 the ultimate real ; asks whether its nature changes, or 
 whether in what we term phenomena there is seen only 
 the effect of changing the relations of the real. Can we 
 conceive of the substance as unchangeable, and yet as 
 the source of all changes ? 
 
 4. Our opinions vary. We make mistakes, and cor- 
 rect them. Much once held as established beyond all 
 question is now pronounced false. Its experiences may 
 lead the mind to question its ability to discover the 
 truth. The differences of opinion, the conflicts between 
 systems, and the numerous disputes on the most signifi- 
 cant and most trivial subjects, shake its confidence in 
 the ordinary thinking. As the intellect becomes critical, 
 it distinguishes between subjective views (opinions) of 
 truth, and the truth itself. Are there criteria which 
 furnish an absolute test of systems and an invariable 
 standard of truth ? 
 
 5. The greatest interests are attacked. The exist- 
 ence of spirit is questioned; the freedom and immor- 
 tality of the soul are denied ; reason is eliminated from 
 the universe, and blind force is thought to banish design ; 
 God being dethroned, atoms are made omnipotent. Is 
 there still a reliable basis for religion ? Or is faith an 
 empty vision, and hope a dream ? What are the objects 
 of supreme worth ? 
 
 6. Much that appears I condemn, and much that I 
 
INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 think desirable does not exist. How to destroy the one 
 and promote the other, thus becomes an important 
 problem. In one domain of values, taste rules; in 
 another, conscience. What is their authority? How 
 can they be satisfied ? 
 
 7. As soon as the intellect penetrates beyond the 
 surface of ordinary thought, numerous perplexing prob- 
 lems appear. The effort to solve them leads deeper and 
 deeper, and reveals a world formerly hid. Far away 
 from the phenomenal, the mind is thrown wholly on its 
 own resources, and depends on the penetrative energy 
 of its thoughts. How can it discover the laws of reason 
 and move safely in the realm of pure thinking ? 
 
 These hints give an idea of some of the ways which 
 lead to philosophic thought, and also indicate the sphere 
 in which the discussions of this book move. The logi- 
 cal arrangement of the chapters is seen at a glance. 
 First the Nature of philosophy is considered ; then its 
 Relation to adjacent subjects ; its general Divisions are 
 then given, and these are followed by an explanation of 
 each division ; and last of all the Spirit and Method in 
 the study of philosophy are discussed. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Intellect is energy, great equally in discovering as 
 in solving problems. The leading systems of thought 
 have revealed difficulties before unseen, and exposed 
 fallacies in reasoning before supposed to be perfect. 
 The works of Plato and Aristotle, of Hume, Kant, and 
 Hegel, teem with problems ; and some supposed solu- 
 tions given by them are found to contain greater prob- 
 lems than they themselves knew. Difficulties multiply 
 as we go deeper ; and whoever discovers a new unsolved 
 question proves that he has thought more correctly or 
 more profoundly than his predecessors. The discovery 
 of such problems, where the ordinary thinking sees 
 none, is the first step toward philosophical thought; 
 and the determination of their exact nature is a condi- 
 tion for all successful attempts at solution. The diffi- 
 culty which arrests thought tests the mind's quality, 
 and tends to develop its capacity. Resistance makes 
 the intellect conscious of itself, and arouses its greatest 
 energy. The supposed limits of the understanding, 
 for instance, provoke to almost superhuman efforts to 
 transcend them. Unless the tension is too great, it will 
 
 11 
 
12 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 develop the utmost strength. The spontaneous flow of 
 thought which we do not master, and are scarcely con- 
 scious of, may become so habitual as to unfit the mind 
 for riveted attention to profound themes, and for the 
 control of its own processes ; while problems requir- 
 ing penetrative thought, and long, absorbing investiga- 
 tion, are of inestimable value for intellectual discipline, 
 even if their study ends in no solutions. Only with 
 severe labor can we rise from a life lost amid sensations, 
 to a steady contemplation of concepts. These are at 
 first taken for what they seem to be, just like the im- 
 pressions through the senses ; only after severe training 
 to the task can the mind fathom their meaning, discover 
 their problems, discern their relations, and learn what 
 they imply, but do not explicitly state. This life in 
 the concepts, if deep and consistent, moves among the 
 problems which have enlisted the best energies of the first 
 thinkers for thousands of years, and have given birth 
 to philosophy. 
 
 All who use this term intelligently recognize it as 
 designating a sphere which lies far beyond the range 
 of ordinary thinking, though numerous avenues lead 
 from the one to the other. The profoundest efforts to 
 solve the mysteries of thought and being have usually 
 been regarded as characteristic of philosophers. The 
 first and final causes, and the great concepts lying 
 between them, are the realm of philosophy ; but such 
 statements are too general to convey any tangible 
 meaning. 
 
 It is a popular conviction, that the object of philo- 
 sophical contemplation lies beyond ordinary scholarship, 
 as well as beyond the search of the masses ; and hence 
 but few in any age, even when scholarship was not 
 unusual, have been honored with the illustrious name 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 13 
 
 of philosophers. But the reverence accorded to them 
 has been based on vague notions of the excellence of 
 their pursuit, rather than on a clear conception of its 
 exact nature. The recognition that depth characterizes 
 philosophy has not served to dispel the mysteries con- 
 nected with the term. The popular mind associates 
 with it wisdom and reason, — peculiar endowments and 
 a peculiar sphere of inquiry ; but however eminent 
 and solitary the position thus assigned to philosophy, 
 its real character has been but little understood by the 
 popular mind. All this becomes self-evident so soon 
 as we appreciate the truth, that we understand only 
 what we intellectually elaborate or work out for our- 
 selves. 
 
 The use of the term on the part of scholars is scarcely 
 less vague than in the popular mind. The proof is 
 found in works of scientists and philosophers, and in 
 general literature. The thoughtful reader is conse- 
 quently constrained to ask, What constitutes philoso- 
 phy? An inquiry into the mysteries of being? The 
 objects which philosophers contemplate ? The method 
 of inquiry ? The results attained by the investigation ? 
 Whoever seriously reflects on the word will apprehend 
 the difficulty of determining its exact sense. With the 
 prevailing vagueness in its use, what wonder if those 
 beginning the study of philosophy are puzzled by the 
 nature, aim, relations, and limits of the subject? 
 
 In many problems an exhaustive study is the condi- 
 tion of clear conception ; still it is evident that at the 
 very outset the exact place of a discipline in the whole 
 system of knowledge should be determined in order to 
 insure its successful investigation. Perhaps even this 
 can be done only after long inquiry ; in that case no 
 effort should be spared in the beginning to determine 
 
14 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the subject proximately and as clearly as possible. The 
 limitation given a subject by the definition is essential 
 to concentration and perspicuity of thought. We must 
 find a subject, must separate it from its attachments, and 
 possess it intellectually, before we can apply to it predi- 
 cates or use it effectively. The rational and successful 
 pursuit of a study, therefore, necessarily depends largely 
 on a clear conception of its nature. Only when an 
 object is in some measure known, can the way to it be 
 found; only then can it be recognized when discovered; 
 only then can its importance be appreciated, and direc- 
 tions for its pursuit be valuable. With no definite end 
 in view, the most diligent study is in danger of losing 
 itself in distractions, in fruitless searchings, and idle 
 wanderings. 
 
 Definitions are a mental necessity. In every defini- 
 tion, two things are to be distinguished; namely, an 
 object defined, and the mind giving the definition. 
 When two persons define the same word differently, 
 the reason is found in the knowledge, the needs, the 
 preferences, the prejudices, and perhaps the whims, of 
 the persons. An object may be viewed in two lights. 
 We can ask what it is in itself, or we can content our- 
 selves with the impression it makes on our minds or 
 what it is to us. In the latter case we consider only 
 what the object seems to be, or how it strikes us. We 
 do not go beyond this to inquire whether our impres- 
 sion is correct, but we take it as final. Superficial as 
 this is, it is the common way of viewing objects. An 
 inquisitive energy is required to lead the mind from the 
 naive to the critical standpoint, which demands an 
 investigation of the impression itself in order to deter- 
 mine its truth or falsity. So long as uncriticised impres- 
 sions or mere opinions are taken for real knowledge, we 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 15 
 
 must expect definitions to be personal and arbitrary, 
 with a flavor of the defining subject rather than the 
 characteristics of the object defined. 
 
 A sharp distinction between the mind as subject and 
 the object before it, and a discernment of the difference 
 between what seems to be and what is, are the best evi- 
 dences that the mind has passed from its spontaneous 
 to the critical and philosophical stage. By abstracting 
 (separating) the object from the subject, and by concen- 
 trating the attention on it, the mind seeks the (not a) 
 definition. It is an epoch in the history of intellect, 
 when it begins to make objective truth the standard 
 of subjective value. 
 
 We must not imagine that definitions alone change 
 while the objects remain the same. A word may be 
 variously defined ; but then the same word stands for 
 as many different objects as there are definitions. Both 
 Hegel and J. S. Mill wrote on logic, but they did not 
 discuss the same subject. We speak of the philosophy 
 of Plato and of Comte, but the latter rejected from phil- 
 osophical inquiry what in Plato's system is the essence. 
 And, as the same word may stand for different things, 
 so different words may stand for the same object. 
 There is thus much that is accidental and arbitrary in 
 the use of words ; and where clearness and exactness 
 are sought, it is of the first importance to come to an 
 agreement on the sense in which words are to be taken. 
 
 Aside from these general considerations, there is spe- 
 cial need of determining the meaning of philosophy. 
 It would be difficult to find another word of the same 
 prominence which has been subject to as many changes 
 and to such a variety of definitions. At different times it 
 has been made to include all that is possible and real on 
 earth, in heaven, and in imagination. It is no wonder, 
 
16 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 therefore, that teachers of philosophy and authors of 
 philosophical works find it extremely difficult to define 
 the term, and be consistent in its use. This is espe- 
 cially true of the historians of philosophy, who are 
 perplexed to know what to admit and what to exclude 
 of the materials regarded in the various ages as philo- 
 sophical. While some standards limit these to rational 
 speculation, others embrace science and a large part of 
 general literature. When we consider the heterogeneity 
 of objects designated by the term at present, we must 
 first define " system of philosophy," when used, if it is 
 to convey any definite meaning. Indeed, in the same 
 university, philosophical systems may be taught which 
 really exclude each other. 
 
 It is evident that this indefiniteness must interfere 
 both with the study and the progress of philosophy. 
 The stream flowing through history for thousands of 
 years has at last separated into so many rivulets that 
 it is in danger of losing itself in the sand. Philoso- 
 phers, therefore, recognize the necessity of coming to 
 an understanding on the use of the term, so that they 
 may concentrate their efforts, and also understand one 
 another. Consequently, in philosophical journals and 
 books, the definition of philosophy is one of the subjects 
 most frequently discussed. So long as those regarded 
 as philosophers cannot agree as to the object which 
 engrosses their attention, it is not surprising that phi- 
 losophy itself is regarded with suspicion, and treated 
 by many as unworthy of serious inquiry. Not a few 
 earnest thinkers are inquiring whether philosophy stands 
 for any thing definite and valuable ; whether it is pos- 
 sible as a distinct department of thought. If it is an 
 independent subject worthy of profound consideration, 
 why do not philosophers limit the word and their inves- 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 17 
 
 tigations to that subject? Some have become suspi- 
 cious that under cover of that attractive name men 
 have sought for something which is unattainable. May 
 it not be that the progress of knowledge shows that 
 philosophers have been dreaming, and that, being awake 
 now, they are searching in vain for the reality in their 
 dreams ? Some are ready to put philosophy on a level 
 with astrology and alchemy ; they accordingly assign 
 its place to the past wanderings of the human mind 
 in its progress toward knowledge. 
 
 This confusion discourages the beginner, and makes 
 the study difficult. The vague use of the term also 
 encourages looseness in thinking, and deceives the stu- 
 dent into the belief that he has attained something real 
 and precious, when he has nothing but a word that is 
 almost meaningless, and includes the most heterogene- 
 ous materials. Of the many who study what is called 
 philosophy, not a few at the end of their collegiate 
 course cannot define the word. It may even happen 
 that those who have studied the elements of psychology 
 or logic imagine that they have mastered philosophy ! 
 
 We might yield to the temptation either to drop the 
 term altogether, or to leave it in its present indefinite-' 
 ness, with no particular object and no peculiar sphere T 
 were it not for the treasures of the past which it holds, 
 and for the conviction that it stands for something too 
 precious to lose. Subjects are often difficult in propor- 
 tion to their intrinsic value, and the terms used vaguely 
 to designate them may only indicate the eagerness of 
 the mind to grasp the subjects themselves. There is 
 no other word to take the place of " philosophy ; " but 
 the concept for which it stands is so difficult, because 
 it lies beyond the usual objects of contemplation, and 
 this naturally contributes to the present confusion. 
 
18 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 But no one who forms and appreciates the concept will 
 begrudge the labor it costs. The student with patient 
 thoroughness in the beginning may discover a light 
 which shall illumine his course till the end. 
 
 PRINCIPLES WHICH DETERMINE THE DEFINITION. 
 
 In a definition we aim at a full and clear apprehen- 
 sion of an object. This is only possible by so limiting 
 that object as to be readily distinguishable from others, 
 especially from those most closely related. Brevity 
 being essential to clearness in definitions, we cannot 
 give a full description of an object by defining it ; the 
 characteristic marks by which it can at once be recog- 
 nized will meet all requirements. In order that an 
 object may be known, its own peculiarities, as well as 
 its relation to other objects, must be indicated. The 
 most essential elements are the determination of the 
 class or genus to which the object belongs, and its 
 peculiarities in that genus (the genus proximum and 
 the differentia specified). 
 
 Where a subject is complicated, it is more easy to 
 determine what the general requirements of a defini- 
 tion are than to fix the principles according to which it 
 is to be found. With all the learned and laborious 
 efforts to define philosophy, these principles have not 
 been sufficiently considered. We cannot expect agree- 
 ment respecting the definition, unless it is understood 
 with what conditions it must comply. Our first inquiry 
 must therefore be: What rules should be followed in 
 defining philosophy ? 
 
 Owing to the variety of objects at one time or 
 another included under this name, there may be a 
 strong temptation to let preference or prejudice or a 
 mere whim decide to which the term shall be applied. 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 19 
 
 Every arbitrary, merely subjective definition, must, 
 however, be rejected. Whatever its authority to the 
 mind giving it, objective value it cannot claim. We 
 are not seeking any one's opinion, but philosophy itself, 
 — an aim according to which the reader is expected to 
 accept or reject all presented in this chapter. 
 
 For the same reason we cannot let any existing sys- 
 tem determine the sense of the word, unless the system 
 itself has been proved the true philosophy. It is com- 
 mon to adopt a system taught at a university, and then 
 make it the test of other systems. Those pursuing 
 this method should remember that there is a difference 
 between philosophy and philosophical systems. Every 
 system is apt to have some peculiar views respecting 
 philosophy ; and it is to be regretted if the beginner 
 accepts these, and lets them determine the whole course 
 of his inquiries, instead of waiting until the mind can 
 compare and critically test the various systems, and can 
 either form its own or adopt one rationally. The philo- 
 sophic mind can wait. 
 
 Not a few define the term according to what they 
 think philosophy can and ought to accomplish, thus lim- 
 iting it to what they regard as most important or within 
 the reach of the mind. This, however, makes the sub- 
 jective state the principle of the definition, while the 
 historic use of the term is ignored. If this rule is 
 adopted, there may be as many definitions as definers. 
 Besides, it has by no means been determined what the 
 limits of the knowable are ; this, in fact, is one of the 
 most important problems of philosophy, and it would 
 be unreasonable to close the investigation by making 
 any one's opinion on the subject the last appeal. 
 
 Useful as the etymology may be in determining the 
 original sense of a word, it does not necessarily indicate 
 
20 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 its meaning afterwards. Words are but symbols of 
 thought, and their meaning is liable to change with the 
 concepts for which they stand. It sometimes happens 
 that in the course of time the sense of a word changes 
 to the very opposite of the original. The development 
 of a subject is also a development of the corresponding 
 term, which grows with it in definiteness and richness. 
 Yet the etymology may be useful, the original meaning 
 of a word being in many cases like the seed which 
 determines the future growth. As all development is 
 according to law, each stage of progress depending on 
 the preceding growth, the etymology is important in 
 giving the root of the meaning, the concept of those 
 Avho first used the term, and the nature of the subject 
 then designated by it. While, therefore, we do not 
 expect the etymology to give the use of the term " phi- 
 losophy " in the different ages and the various systems, 
 it will, nevertheless, be valuable in determining impor- 
 tant elements in the historic use of the word. 
 
 The history of the term is far more important than 
 its etymology. It gives the notions attached to the 
 word by the leading philosophers and in the prominent 
 systems. Even if the historical use has varied greatly, 
 there is in all probability something common, some 
 leading thought which underlies the various senses, at 
 least in the principal systems. If this common element 
 can be found, it will give the central thought of philos- 
 ophy in all ages, or that which makes an historical sys- 
 tem philosophical. Those who ignore this historical use 
 of the term must regard the standard histories of phi- 
 losophy misnomers, and must sever the word arbitrarily 
 from its past associations. The history of philosophy is 
 a summary of the thinking of all philosophers, even 
 the greatest of whom constitutes only a small part of the 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 21 
 
 whole course of philosophical development. If, then, 
 we prefer the whole to its parts, we must place the his- 
 toric use of the term higher than the conception of any 
 philosopher, unless that conception is either a legitimate 
 product of the historical development, or else proves 
 that development to be fundamentally wrong. 
 
 Useful as the historical development is in determining 
 the sense of the term, it has unfortunately terminated 
 in no generally accepted definition. We cannot there- 
 fore appeal to the present use of the word to determine 
 its sense, nor is any system so prominent as to make any 
 particular meaning generally prevalent. Still the con- 
 sciousness of the age, especially of its best thinkers, 
 must be taken into account. 
 
 A careful study of the subject will show that the con- 
 fusion is largely verbal. Philosophy really has a sphere 
 of its own, clearly defined, and very important ; and no 
 other subject can either take its place or make it un- 
 necessary. Its separate existence and continued study 
 are thereby justified. It will be found that there is a 
 sense which gives the essence of the etymology, as well 
 as of the historic use of the term ; which contains what 
 is common to the great systems ; which marks an impor- 
 tant and distinct department of thought; and which 
 also gives the idea on which the present intelligent use 
 of the word is based. 
 
 We shall now, under the guidance of these principles, 
 proceed to determine the meaning of the term. 
 
 ETYMOLOGY AND HISTORY OF THE WORD. 
 
 The etymology * primarily indicates a certain spirit 
 and tendency, namely the love of wisdom, and the striv- 
 ing to become wise. So long as wisdom was a pursuit 
 
 * <£iAos ail(I cro^c'a, 
 
22 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and not an attainment, its exact nature could not be 
 determined. The sphere of inquiry and the goal 
 reached were to each seeker the measure for his appre- 
 hension of the desired object. Thus wisdom as the 
 chief excellence of man might be differently appre- 
 hended according to the views, preferences, and results 
 of the inquirers. It might be viewed as the summit of 
 speculation in any particular department, or as the cul- 
 mination of all theoretical inquiry ; or it could be taken 
 as the practical guide of life or as skill for attaining par- 
 ticular ends, — a skill in which the highest theory and 
 best practice are united. It was not unusual to ascribe 
 wisdom to persons who excelled in an art or learning. 
 Pythagoras is said to have been the first who employed 
 " philosophy " to designate a particular subject ; and it is 
 claimed, that he called himself a philosopher rather than 
 wise,* because he thought God alone wise, while man is 
 merely a friend of wisdom, and strives to attain it.f 
 This sentiment, however, corresponds most fully with 
 the spirit of Socrates, and many think it should be at- 
 tributed to him rather than to Pythagoras. Plato also 
 repeatedly states that wisdom belongs only to God, 
 but that it becomes man to be a friend or lover of 
 wisdom. 
 
 In the historical use of the word, we behold a reflec- 
 tion of the various views of philosophy itself in the 
 course of its development. We must, however, distin- 
 guish between the popular and the technical use of the 
 term. In the former, some phase of philosophy is usually 
 
 * <j><.A6<ro(J>os rather than <ro<}>6<;. 
 
 t On the use of the term among the Greeks, I have found of special 
 value " Philosophic," hy R. Haym, in Ersch und Gruber's Encyklopaedie ; 
 Paulsen, " Ueber das Verhaltniss der Philosophic zur Wissenschaft," in 
 Vierteljahrsschrift fur loissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1877, first number; 
 and Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung. 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 23 
 
 seized, or a general characteristic designated ; but it is 
 of little service in determining the technical sense. 
 
 While originally the word indicated merely a mental 
 attitude toward wisdom, and the striving to which that 
 led, it was soon used also to designate the result of this 
 striving.* For a long time, however, the word was used 
 vaguely. Thus Herodotus employs it to designate the 
 desire for learning, while Thucydides uses it in the sense 
 of striving after intellectual culture. Among others, 
 sophists and rhetoricians were called philosophers, and 
 the contents of their instruction were designated phi- 
 losophy. Isocrates, for instance, uses the term for rheto- 
 ric. Even in the Socratic school the sense of the word 
 was by no means fixed. Plato employs it for study, for 
 learning, for love of learning; but the knowledge to 
 which he especially applies it is that sought for its own 
 sake and not for practical application. Thus he speaks 
 of himself as a philosopher, in distinction from the 
 sophist, who makes a trade of imparting instruction, 
 and from the politician, who seeks knowledge for practi- 
 cal ends. Like Plato, his pupil Aristotle also uses the 
 word in various senses. 
 
 Besides this general use of the term, we, however, 
 find that Plato and Aristotle also employ it in a techni- 
 cal sense. Thus Plato, as already intimated, uses it to 
 designate the purely theoretical activity of the mind, 
 aside from any practical application of the results 
 attained. While the artist seeks skill, and the rhetori- 
 cian and politician eloquence, in order to influence 
 popular assemblies, the philosopher seeks truth, simply 
 
 * The word larropia has heen subject to a simliar development as 
 (fKAoo-otfua. Both originally designated merely a subjective state or atti- 
 tude, and afterwards the results attained, namely histories and philoso- 
 phies. The same is true of many other terms. 
 
24 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 because it is the truth. The philosopher also differs 
 from the historian, who merely describes events. Plato 
 wants to get behind phenomena, and seeks to attain an 
 intellectual apprehension of existence ; and he holds that 
 " a philosopher is one who sees the essence of things, 
 the true things, the ideas." * Not satisfied with the tran- 
 sient and the particular, Plato sought the eternal and 
 the universal ; instead of what seems to be, he aimed to 
 get at reality itself. From the world of sense he with- 
 drew to the world of ideas, the archetypes of all exist- 
 ence, the contemplation of which he regarded as the true 
 philosophy. The term, however, is not confined to this 
 contemplation or to any mental attitude, but is also 
 applied to the knowledge or system which is the result. 
 But as a system philosophy was not distinguished from 
 mathematics and physics; and in one instance Plato 
 speaks of geometry as included in philosophy. 
 
 The verb " to philosophize " is used by Aristotle in 
 the sense of inquiring or searching after knowledge 
 or truth, and he pronounces philosophy the science of 
 truth. It is thus a general term for learning, especially 
 for deeper knowledge. Like his teacher, Aristotle did 
 not separate science from philosophy.! He, however, 
 makes a distinction in favor of what he calls the " first 
 philosophy," afterwards designated metaphysics. But 
 in philosophy he also includes physics, mathematics, 
 ethics, and politics. In its widest sense Aristotle, in 
 
 * Paulsen. 
 
 t <fuAoo-o(f>ia is at times used by him as synonymous with o-otfu'a, and 
 also with eTn<TT-nixr). Paulsen says of Aristotle's use of the term, " No 
 knowledge whatever is excluded. Aristotle thinks he philosophizes 
 when he investigates the natural history of animals or household 
 economy, as well as when he contemplates the nature of things in gen- 
 eral, or the essence of knowledge. He, however, manifests a tendency 
 to limit the term to a narrower sphere : he wants philosophy to con- 
 sider being in general, not any particular part of it." 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 25 
 
 fact, embraces within it all the knowledge which he 
 himself systematized. But in a more specific sense it 
 is the science of the first principles, and of the causes 
 of reality. Haym says that according to the Aristo- 
 telian conception, " the science of the philosopher is the 
 science of being, so far as it is being, — being in gen- 
 eral, not in particular." It thus comprehends all that 
 pertains to being, such as its matter, its form, its effi- 
 cient and its final cause. Philosophy is thus found 
 to consist in the ultimate explanation of all existence. 
 He also employs the term to designate particular sys- 
 tems, for instance that of Thales. 
 
 The character of the Greek mind, the state of learn- 
 ing, and the wanderings necessary in the search for 
 what above all other things entitles one to be desig- 
 nated wise, explain the variety of senses in which the 
 word was used. The various meanings were so many 
 hypotheses respecting its real nature, which were des- 
 tined to be confirmed or rejected by later investigations. 
 The term " philosophy " more than any other expressed 
 the deepest desire and highest aspiration of the Greek 
 mind. Wisdom was prized more than aught besides, 
 and philosophy was intended to embody the eagerness 
 and the striving of the mind for its attainment. All 
 the varied results thus attained were also designated 
 philosophy, a fact which accounts for the comprehen- 
 sion under this term of all that was supposed to make 
 men wise. But distinctions were made in these attain- 
 ments, some being regarded more excellent than others. 
 What philosophers of one age established, those of the 
 next generation tried to surpass; thus age after age 
 they strove to get nearer the goal of all thinking. 
 The highest attainments in any period were naturally 
 regarded as wisdom in the truest sense, and their pos- 
 
26 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sessor was emphatically the philosopher. It is evident 
 that a real desire for wisdom could not rest content 
 with inferior knowledge ; it was a restless impulse to 
 attain the most exalted. This enables us to understand 
 why, with all its varied applications, the term " philoso- 
 phy," in its most specific sense, should designate the 
 ultimate object of all search, namely the first princi- 
 ples. The only explanations with which eager inquiry 
 could stop are those which need none themselves, or 
 for which none can be found. While all that lay be- 
 tween the beginning and these final explanations might 
 be viewed as part of philosophy, it was nevertheless 
 but means to an end, its value consisting in that it 
 aided the mind in the discovery of the last thought. 
 As wisdom culminated in the first principles, they were 
 called philosophy par excellence. Thus both Plato's 
 ideas or archetypes, and Aristotle's " first philosophy," 
 regard as the essence of philosophy those principles 
 which are explanatory of all things, but which them- 
 selves require no explanation. 
 
 What the Greeks meant by philosophy, in its techni- 
 cal sense, may be inferred from the systems usually 
 designated by that name. In their methods and results 
 they vary greatly ; they, however, have this in common : 
 they aim to get beyond phenomena to their source and 
 final interpretation: The first Greek philosophers were 
 intent on finding the primitive substance, or the ele- 
 ments from which the universe was compounded, or out 
 of which the present order is developed. The inquiries 
 of the Ionian philosophers were cosmological. Thales 
 regards water as the source of all existence. Anaxi- 
 mander postulates an eternal, self-moving, indefinite 
 something,* as lying at the basis of the universe. Anax- 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 27 
 
 imenes makes air the primitive substance, while Hera- 
 clitus holds that fire is the original element. They all 
 viewed matter as the source and the sufficient explana- 
 tion of the cosmos, and hence they merely sought its 
 primitive form. 
 
 Pythagoras and his disciples made a specialty of math- 
 ematics, and viewed number as the principle of all exist- 
 ence. In the Eleatic school * the notion of being was 
 the absorbing theme, — being as one and eternal (God 
 and the universe are one), and its distinction from that 
 which merely appears and is not real (the distinction 
 between the real and the phenomenal world). The 
 inquiries of this school were therefore metaphysical, and 
 its principal subjects were : being and nothing ; the real 
 and the apparent ; the one and the many ; that which 
 is, and what seems to become and then vanishes again, 
 or the eternal and the transient; the stationary and 
 motion. 
 
 Some of the later Greek philosophers who inquired 
 into the origin of nature recognized the existence of 
 gods, while others ignored them. Empedocles believed 
 in their existence: nevertheless he explained nature by 
 making earth, water, air, and fire the first things, with 
 love and hatred as their ruling principles. Anaxagoras 
 held that originally there was a mixture of the primitive 
 elements, a chaos, from which the divine spirit con- 
 structed the universe. Leucippus and Democritus estab- 
 lished the atomic theory, and were pure materialists. 
 
 In all these cases, philosophy meant an inquiry into 
 the real nature and the cause of things ; but it also 
 included the result of this inquiry, or the explanation 
 found. Philosophers were those who sought to under- 
 stand the essence, the principles, the cause of existence, 
 
 * Xenophaues, Paruienides, Zeno, Melissus. 
 
28 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or the first substance from which every thing else sprang. 
 Wisdom thus meant for them the ultimate thoughts 
 obtained by inquiring into the nature and origin of the 
 universe. 
 
 However interesting and absorbing these problems, 
 they could not permanently limit the inquiries of the 
 mind. The failure or despair of a solution, as well as 
 the importance of other questions, served to direct 
 attention to a different class of objects. Problems them- 
 selves are evolved in the process of intellectual develop- 
 ment ; and an age may be better characterized by the 
 questions which occupy the attention of its best thinkers, 
 than by the solutions given. Philosophy began with 
 nature, but it could not be confined to nature. As if 
 exhausted by its fruitless attempts to unravel the mys- 
 teries of what was outside of itself, the mind now 
 directed its attention to itself. The sophists gave 
 prominence to the hitherto neglected subjective ele- 
 ment. In spite of their later degeneracy, which justly 
 subjected them to severe criticism, they had an impor- 
 tant share in the development of Greek philosophy, 
 and mediated the way from the naturalistic to the 
 Socratic school. Instead of permitting nature to absorb 
 the attention, they concentrated their thoughts on man, 
 and made him the measure of all things. This doctrine, 
 which is certainly, true, so far as it makes the laws of 
 our being the condition and measure of all our concep- 
 tions, was perverted to mean that truth itself is merely 
 a matter of opinion ; and even if something more than 
 this, it was held that the truth cannot be discovered. 
 Hence, instead of eternal principles, subjective prefer- 
 ences were made the rule of life. Knowledge and skill 
 were esteemed simply because useful in discussion, or 
 for the attainment of personal ends ; and dialectic was 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 29 
 
 valued as an instrument for selfish interests, without 
 regard to truth and right. So far as the later sophists 
 had any claim to philosophy, it was permeated with 
 sceptical, eclectic, and utilitarian elements. 
 
 The appearance of Socrates makes an epoch in phi- 
 losophy. He opposed the conceit, together with the 
 superficial and sceptical tendencies, of the sophists, and 
 directed attention from mere observation and opinion 
 to careful definitions and correct thinking. He esteemed 
 a knowledge of self as the essence of wisdom ; self- 
 knowledge was consequently the aim of his instruction. 
 While the sophists claimed to possess wisdom, he mod- 
 estly professed to be still a seeker. In the whole his- 
 tory of philosophy, Socrates is the best embodiment of 
 the etymological sense of the term. He thought, if 
 any thing could entitle him to claim wisdom, it was the 
 knowledge of his ignorance. Regarding virtue as the 
 highest good, he made truth its basis and correct 
 knowledge its source. Virtue had, indeed, been dis- 
 cussed by Pythagoras, Democritus, the sophists, and 
 others ; but Socrates made the moral element the essence 
 of philosophy, and is properly regarded as the founder 
 of philosophical ethics. 
 
 If, now, in connection with this hasty glance at the 
 early systems of philosophy, we inquire into the tech- 
 nical use of the term among the Greeks, what do we 
 find respecting its meaning? Although the inquiries 
 of the early philosophers were confined to nature, they 
 were not those pursued by the physicists of our day. 
 They were allied to what the Germans call Natur- 
 pkilosophie, being purely speculative and really a part 
 of metaphysics. The speculations of the Eleatics, as 
 we have seen, were also metaphysical. The essence 
 of Plato's philosophy and the " first philosophy" of 
 
30 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Aristotle belong to the same category. There can, 
 therefore, be no question that among the Greeks meta- 
 physics has peculiar claims to the title philosophy. In 
 it, as a rule, philosophical inquiry culminated. We 
 should, however, have to ignore not only the sophists, 
 but also Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, if we did not 
 include in philosophy dialectics (logic) and ethics. 
 In a still more general sense, as already intimated, 
 mathematics and other subjects were also included, 
 especially by Aristotle. 
 
 In Aristotle the development of Greek philosophy 
 and of the term itself culminated. However vaguely 
 the word was used at times, in its technical sense it 
 designated the aim to discover the final explanation of 
 things. It indeed included many reflections which do 
 not bear directly on this aim ; but they were generally 
 such as were supposed to aid in understanding the real 
 nature of things. 
 
 Among the successors of Aristotle, namely the Peri- 
 patetics, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, philosophy 
 lost the high standard it had attained; and the term 
 was again used indefinitely, frequently designating a 
 certain mental tendency rather than a special study. 
 Its use for particular systems, however, continued. 
 But it was also applied to any study regarded as spe- 
 cially important and as leading to wisdom.* Strabo 
 puts Homer among philosophers, and regards geography 
 as a part of philosophy. Josephus speaks of three phi- 
 losophies of the Jews, meaning Pharisaism, Sadducee- 
 ism, and Essenism. The Church fathers applied the 
 term to Christian doctrine, and in the early Christian 
 Church theologians were called philosophers. In the 
 
 eze 
 
 * Cicero, De Or., says, " Omnis rerum optimarum cognitio atque in lis 
 rcitutio philosophia nominata est." 
 
 , 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 31 
 
 Middle Ages the term was employed very much as 
 among the Greeks, except that, in distinction from the- 
 ology as the science of God and divine things, it was 
 used to designate worldly wisdom.* 
 
 In modern times the word has not only been taken 
 in previous senses, but new ones have also been added. 
 From the time of Bacon and Descartes it has frequently 
 been employed to designate inquiries into the causes of 
 things, as well as for systematized knowledge in general. 
 Until recently a clear distinction between philosophy 
 and the experimental sciences was not made. Indeed, 
 the Middle Ages handed the term down to modern 
 times in that general sense in which Aristotle some- 
 times uses it.f 
 
 In England, philosophy and science have been used 
 interchangeably, and to a considerable extent this tra- 
 ditional use still prevails. Bacon regards the results of 
 the experimental method as philosophy. Newton called 
 his great work, Philosophice Naturalis Principia Mathe- 
 matical and his scientific investigations are usually 
 spoken of as his philosophy. With Locke, philosophy 
 and science are synonymous. At the close of his work 
 on Human Understanding, he calls physics, which is 
 "the knowledge of things as they are in their own 
 proper beings, their constitutions, properties, and opera- 
 tions," natural philosophy. It is, in his sense, much 
 more metaphysical than like modern physics ; still he 
 regards it as the first part of science, of which the 
 second is ethics, the third logic. In the " Epistle to 
 
 * Sapientia scecularis or mundana. 
 
 f In Descartes' Principia Philosophice are found, among other things, 
 mechanics, astronomy, physics, and chemistry. In 1729 Bourguet pub- 
 lished his Lettres Philosophiqaes sur la Formation de Sels et Christeaux. 
 In the middle of the same century appeared the celebrated work of 
 Linnaeus, entitled Philosophia Botanica. 
 
32 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the Reader," he pronounces philosophy "nothing but the 
 true knowledge of things." The philosophical societies 
 of England, the Philosophical Transactions, and the Phil- 
 osophical Magazine, are chiefly devoted to scientific 
 investigations. 
 
 In England and America, philosophy is often taken 
 in a more comprehensive sense than science, but fre- 
 quently they are also made synonymous. Thus natural 
 philosophy is either the same as natural science, or one 
 of its branches. English writers in particular are in 
 the habit of using "philosophy" and "philosophical" 
 very loosely. Nor can an improvement be expected, 
 so long as the terms "philosophy" and "science" are 
 not more carefully distinguished. 1 * 
 
 In England there is now, however, a tendency to 
 make a clearer distinction in the application of the 
 terms. Scientists attack philosophy, and speak dis- 
 paragingly of its study, thus proving that, even if they 
 do not know exactly what it means, it is not science. 
 Present discussions excite the hope that the two will 
 eventually be recognized as occupying entirely distinct 
 spheres. But among English writers who recognize the 
 peculiarity of philosophy, there is no agreement as to 
 its proper sphere. Not unfrequently what has from the 
 first been regarded as its peculiar province is excluded. 
 From the time of- Bacon, English thought has been pre- 
 dominantly practical, and this has determined the char- 
 acter of its significant conquests. Instead of inquiring 
 into first principles, it has cherished an aversion to specu- 
 lation, and a horror of metaphysics. There is not in all 
 England a journal devoted exclusively to (speculative) 
 philosophy. When, in 1876, "Mind, A Quarterly Re- 
 view of Psychology and Philosophy," was begun, the 
 * See Appendix. 
 
 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 33 
 
 editor said, " That no such journal should hitherto have 
 existed, is hardly surprising. Long as English inquiry 
 has been turned on the things of mind, it has, till 
 quite lately, been distinguished from the philosophical 
 thought of other countries by what may be called its 
 unprofessional character. Except in Scotland (and 
 even there Hume was not a professor), few British 
 thinkers have been public teachers with philosophy for 
 the business of their lives. Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, 
 Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, did their philosoph- 
 ical work at the beginning or at the end or in the 
 pauses of lives otherwise active, and addressed for 
 the most part the common intelligence of their time. It 
 may not have been ill for their fame ; but their work 
 itself is not what it otherwise might have been, and 
 their manner of thinking has affected the whole charac- 
 ter and standing of philosophical inquiry in England. 
 If their work had been academic, it would probably 
 have been much more sustained, — better carried out 
 when it did not lack comprehension, more comprehen- 
 sive when it was well and carefully begun. The in- 
 formality of their thought has undoubtedly prevented 
 philosophy from obtaining the scientific consideration 
 which it holds elsewhere." Paulsen, in the article 
 already quoted, referring to English philosophy, says, 
 "Philosophy or science aims at a knowledge of the 
 laws of the real. Beyond this there are no objects for 
 scientific knowledge. There may be objects for faith, 
 but that is the concern of the Church. Metaphysical 
 or critical investigations like Hume's are received coldly, 
 and viewed with suspicion." 
 
 The practical character of the English mind, with its 
 tendency to observation and experiment, has given par- 
 ticular prominence to psychology; and it has been 
 
34 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 common to regard " mental science " as the whole of 
 philosophy. In the few sentences devoted to the article 
 " Philosophy," in the eighth edition of the Encyclopae- 
 dia Britannica (1859), this occurs: "Philosophy may 
 be denned as the science of first principles ; and the term 
 is now limited almost exclusively to the mental sci- 
 ences." An effort is, however, now made in England to 
 exclude psychology from philosophy, and to introduce 
 more speculative elements into the latter. German 
 philosophers, especially Kant and Hegel, have gained 
 considerable influence ; but this, instead of fixing the 
 sense of the term "philosophy," has added new mean- 
 ings to the word, and increased its indefiniteness. One 
 who studies its present use in English literature almost 
 despairs of attaching to the term any definite meaning ; 
 it is applied to subjects so heterogeneous, that it indi- 
 cates nothing in particular. Sometimes philosophy is 
 spoken of as a mere habit of mind. Thus one writer * 
 limits the term to a mental tendency, and regards phi- 
 losophy useful as a kind of literary training, "concerned 
 with moods of mind rather than with objective truth," 
 and declares " that it is as much beside the mark to 
 wrangle over the truth of a philosophy, as over the truth 
 of Paradise Lost." This view would consign the deep- 
 est thinking of the ages to the realm of fiction. Phi- 
 losophy, indeed, implies a certain habit of mind : it is 
 not, however, that habit, but its product, — the result 
 of the sincerest love and profoundest search for truth. 
 Others make it synonymous with metaphysics, or regard 
 it as a theory of knowledge. The editor of " Mind " f pro- 
 nounces metaphysics the same as " general philosophy." 
 In another place % he says that philosophy " is theory 
 of knowledge " (as that which is known), but declares 
 
 * Mind, vol. iii. 240. t i. 5. \ viii. 16. 
 
 — 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 35 
 
 metaphysics "the most widely accepted synonyme for 
 any thing that can be called philosophy." In replying 
 to the writer quoted above, he, however, regards phi- 
 losophy as a "rational interpretation of the universe 
 in relation to man," and says, " In philosophy we are 
 going to consider what may be said more or less deter- 
 minately concerning the whole frame of things and 
 man's relation thereto." In the same journal * we read 
 " that the term ' philosophy ' may fairly be applied to 
 what is primarily a doctrine of the criteria of knowl- 
 edge, without reference to any ontological conclusions 
 which such a doctrine may be held to establish." This 
 variety in the definition is a fair index of the prevalent 
 confusion of thought on the subject. 
 
 Not only does one look in vain for unanimity in the 
 use of the term in England ; but other interests so en- 
 gross the attention, that, with the exception of a few 
 eminent thinkers, there seems to be no serious effort 
 to come to an agreement. The influence of English 
 thought in America has promoted a similar state of 
 things in this land. Instead of agreement as to its 
 application, the narrowest as well as broadest use of the 
 term prevails, the definition, of course, depending largely 
 on the system adopted. Much more attention is paid to 
 philosophy in Scotland than in England ; but there, too, 
 the term lacks definiteness. Indeed, among the multi- 
 tude of current definitions, it might be difficult to find 
 one which in each of these three countries has not some 
 advocates. 
 
 For more than a century Germany has taken the 
 lead in philosophy. At the very beginning of its pre- 
 eminence, the foundation was laid for distinguishing it 
 from empirical inquiries. Kant held that philosophy 
 
 * vii. 533. 
 
36 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 starts with reason, natural science with experience. 
 The domain of philosophy is therefore the rational, that 
 of natural science the empirical.* His immediate fol- 
 lowers completed the work of separation begun by him. 
 They aimed to construct a purely speculative system of 
 a priori knowledge, and this they termed philosophy. 
 Since Kant it has, therefore, become common to dis- 
 tinguish sharply between speculative or philosophical, 
 and empirical systems. In the division of the faculties 
 in German universities, the traditional use of "philo- 
 sophical " is, however, still retained. The " Philosoph- 
 ical Faculty " includes all learned branches outside of 
 theology, law, and medicine. 
 
 Since Hegel's philosophy lost its supremacy (about 
 1840), no other system has gained such general influ- 
 ence as to determine the meaning of the term. Much 
 attention has been devoted to the history of philosophy, 
 as well as to psychology, logic, aesthetics, and ethics ; 
 but metaphysic has been viewed with suspicion. It is 
 a general conviction, that philosophy needs reconstruc- 
 tion, and that the first requirement is a new and immov- 
 able basis. But the tendencies indicate that the age is 
 critical, sceptical, and destructive, rather than favorable 
 to the construction of new systems. 
 
 We have inherited the ruins of the philosophical sys- 
 tems of former ages. Among them are fragments of 
 inestimable value ; but they cannot be used as they are 
 for the construction of new systems. Those who stum- 
 ble over these ruins, in search of a satisfactory definition 
 of philosophy, are apt to be bewildered and lost in the 
 confusion ; and yet, until that definition is found, they 
 have no criterion to judge which of the fragments are 
 
 * It seems that Kant was also the first on the Continent who separated 
 mathematics, as well as psychology and physics, from philosophy. 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 37 
 
 genuine and fit for use in the new structure. This phil- 
 osophical chaos is a characteristic of the age and of all 
 lands. It is generally supposed, at least in Germany, 
 that if the last dominant schools fairly represent its true 
 character, philosophy is not worthy of the best efforts 
 of serious minds. But while those who strive to re- 
 construct philosophy may have learned much from these 
 schools, they are not so unphilosophical as to identify 
 any existing system with the ideal or with philosophy 
 itself. 
 
 In the various lands in which considerable attention 
 is paid to philosophy (besides Germany, Great Britain, 
 and America, the principal ones are France, Italy, 
 Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Holland, and Scandi- 
 navia), the question is seriously asked, whether it desig- 
 nates a peculiar object, or sphere of thought. Some 
 regard its sphere the same as that of the natural sciences, 
 but hold that its method is peculiar, doing speculatively 
 what they do empirically. But if science does its work 
 successfully, what demand is there for performing the 
 same by another method ? Others assign to it the mind 
 as its special sphere, making it mental science (" Geistes- 
 wissenschaft "), so that, as nature is the sphere of natural 
 science, philosophy is essentially psychology. This, how- 
 ever, is too narrow, excluding much that has always 
 been regarded as belonging to it. Quite recently there 
 has been a disposition to make it synonymous with the 
 theory of knowledge ; but there already existed systems 
 of philosophy before this theory became a special object 
 of study, and it cannot be made to absorb the whole 
 subject. Not a few regard philosophy as the synonyme 
 of metaphysics, while others view it as giving the laws 
 of the sciences, or as drawing the conclusions from them 
 so as to constitute the unity of all knowledge. 
 
38 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 While the popular use of the term is altogether too 
 loose and general, some of the definitions given are 
 too partial, taking a particular element of philosophy 
 and regarding it as the whole, instead of seizing the 
 essence and making it the nucleus around which all 
 that belongs to the subject may be gathered. If any 
 historic element of philosophy is to be excluded, a suf- 
 ficient reason for doing so must be given. There may 
 be much in the historical development which was 
 merely temporal or accidental, and which can without 
 serious loss be now ignored. The sand carried along 
 by the current is not the stream. But if now we must 
 abandon the elements which from the very beginning 
 constituted what was called philosophy, then with its 
 sense let us also abandon the word. 
 
 THE MEANING OF THE TERM. 
 
 It has become evident that neither the etymology nor 
 the history of the term, nor the development of phi- 
 losophy itself, nor its present status, can give us the 
 true sense of the word. Yet they must all be taken 
 into account. If the essence of all can be found, it 
 will make philosophy, with all its variety, a unit, so 
 that its past, present, and future must constitute an 
 organism which always changes and yet is ever the 
 same. It is the same tree, whose bark, leaves, and fruit 
 differ with the seasons. Sometimes it grows vigorously ; 
 at others it produces only wild wood, which must be 
 lopped off in order to insure health and future growth. 
 It may be subject to many vicissitudes without losing 
 its essential character. Those, however, who take from 
 it a twig, and plant that so as to secure a new growth, 
 may have something valuable ; but they have not the 
 tree itself. Those who, on the other hand, root out the 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 
 
 tree in order to plant another in its place, sever their 
 connection with the past, have not the same tree, and 
 only mislead by calling the new organism by the old 
 name. Trimming may be necessary ; but if the future 
 is to grow from the past, the tree itself must be spared. 
 Its fruit may have become unpalatable, so that it is time 
 to change its products ; every limb may have to be cut 
 off in order to graft on new scions ; but they must be 
 ingrafted on the tree itself, if the fruit is still to be its 
 product. 
 
 The development of philosophy in the individual 
 mind is similar to the process in history ; and whoever 
 interprets aright his own philosophizing will obtain the 
 clearest knowledge of philosophy itself. In the genetic 
 method of denning a term, we do what we want to 
 know. Philosophy thus becomes a matter of experi- 
 ence. 
 
 Consciousness precedes self-consciousness ; percepts 
 precede concepts ; individual concepts precede systems ; 
 and for systems we seek the final thought which is the 
 bond of union for all systems, concepts, and percepts, — 
 a thought that is the seed from which all our thoughts 
 are developed. In its earliest processes the mind sim- 
 ply lets itself go, its operations being determined mainly 
 by objects of sense and by spontaneous reflection. 
 This naive stage may be called historical or psycho- 
 logical, but no one thinks of calling it philosophical. 
 The mere observation of phenomena cannot produce 
 philosophy, even in its shallowest sense. Those remain- 
 ing on this standpoint never give an account to them- 
 selves of their own operations and of the contents 
 of their minds, but accept the opinions of others as 
 thoughtlessly as the impressions through their senses. 
 When, however, the mind is checked in this course, and 
 
40 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 aroused to reflect on itself, it is impelled to seek an 
 explanation of what is given spontaneously. The mind 
 become conscious of itself is not merely receptive, but 
 also penetrative. It wants to know, but it soon learns 
 that it only truly knows what it interprets. The very 
 energy of the mind, when once aroused, leads to in- 
 quiries into the causes of phenomena. Much that 
 transpires is calculated to excite its curiosity ; it begins 
 to wonder, which Plato pronounces the beginning of 
 philosophy. In its efforts to explain mysteries, the 
 mind finds former views, which were naively adopted, 
 incorrect ; and with increasing efforts at explanation it 
 also finds the problems deepening and the difficulties 
 growing. Wonder increases, and doubt becomes its 
 constant companion. Doubt is developed by the dis- 
 covery that opinions have been held without sufficient 
 reason, and even contrary to reason ; and repeated fail- 
 ures may lead to questioning the possibility of solving 
 the riddles of mind and nature. But wonder and doubt, 
 unless the scepticism becomes absolute and induces de- 
 spair, are mighty impulses to seek an explanation of what 
 is obscure. They create and intensify an eagerness for 
 deeper knowledge, and the love of wisdom becomes the 
 inspiration of the most searching inquiries. This is 
 the spirit which is characteristic of all philosophy, and 
 is the essential element in the etymology of the word. 
 
 There is in this impulse a peculiarity which was par- 
 ticularly emphasized by Plato and Aristotle. It has its 
 birth directly in the energy and necessity of the mind 
 itself ; the impulse is wholly innate, a purely mental or 
 intellectual affection. The reason for philosophizing is 
 different from the impulse leading to studies undertaken 
 for a livelihood or ambitious ends. In a peculiar sense, 
 therefore, philosophy is free and human ; in it the 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 41 
 
 intellect most fully expresses its own nature, and follows 
 its own laws. Because so free, not a servant to attain 
 other ends, it has been called the " divinest and worthi- 
 est " of all studies. The fact that the impulse of the 
 mind itself is its creative energy, of course does not 
 imply that philosophy is not in the highest and best 
 sense useful ; but its use, aside from meeting the intel- 
 lectual needs, is secondary, and wholly conditioned by 
 what it does for the mind and makes that mind. 
 
 Impelled by wonder and doubt, the mind in its 
 search for the solution of problems is a law unto itself. 
 Behind the psychologic process and the transitory char- 
 acter of phenomena, it wants to discover the reason, the 
 underlying thought, the eternal principles. When 
 doubt has brought thought to the stage of the sophists, 
 where all is uncertain, the mind, with Socrates, inquires 
 for the permanent, and, with Plato, seeks the archetypes 
 and ideas. The laws of reason being the standard of 
 judgment, mere external authority loses its binding 
 character. Opinions, traditions, mythologies, and all 
 dogmas are subjected to the rational test. These, no 
 mind conscious of itself can adopt uncritically ; its aim 
 is purely and solely the truth, and it cannot rest short 
 of the highest truth, which is the most complete 
 embodiment of wisdom. It is therefore evident, that, 
 whilst it may use the descriptive and historical, the 
 reason cannot view them as final ; they may give what 
 transpires, but cannot furnish its ultimate explanation. 
 They do not constitute philosophy, though they may 
 furnish materials for philosophizing. Poetry and the 
 arts are also excluded from philosophy; they do not 
 explain what is, but are themselves subjects for expla- 
 nation ; they increase, instead of satisfying, intellectual 
 wonder and doubt. Nor is philomathy philosophy : it 
 
42 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 may be mere breadth, while the latter always demands 
 depth ; it may be mere learning, while the latter is 
 always the explanation of learning itself; it may be 
 the product of a mind predominantly receptive, while 
 in philosophy the energy of the mind is the essential 
 thing. 
 
 It is not strange that in history the philosophical 
 impulse first attempted an explanation of nature. The 
 same is true in the genesis of knowledge in the indi- 
 vidual mind. The natural phenomena are most striking, 
 and first arrested attention. But the mental facts could 
 not be permanently ignored, and in the course of time 
 both nature and the mind were subjected to philosophi- 
 cal inquiry. The ultimate principle or principles of nat- 
 ural and mental phenomena and being, therefore, early 
 formed the object of philosophy. 
 
 In history, as well as in the genesis of philosophic 
 thought in the individual mind, the usual objects of 
 attention and interest are the ones which demand an 
 explanation. Thought need not go out of its usual 
 path to discover mysteries ; it cannot go anywhere with- 
 out finding them. The early philosophers, besides 
 nature and the mind, found religious faith existing — a 
 belief in gods. This faith had to be explained. And 
 by the time Greek thought reached its climax, there 
 were three objects of supreme importance, namely 
 nature (cosmology), man (psychology), and God (theol 
 ogy). The investigation of these was an inquiry into 
 being itself, — the effort to discover its essence and 
 interpretation. We have already seen how to these 
 objects of inquiry the dialectical and ethical elements 
 were added. 
 
 In its efforts to explain what is, the mind always 
 depends on existing knowledge, at least for its starting 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 43 
 
 point. The way to the explanation may be but little 
 prepared. The first work in that case is of an element- 
 ary character, largely a groping in the dark, method and 
 means still obscure, and imagination, as well as reason, 
 active in the process of discovery. Originally the prog- 
 ress toward the wisdom sought required an examina- 
 tion of many things which the philosopher now finds 
 explained, just as the geologist or ethnologist may at 
 first be obliged to perform the work afterwards done 
 for him by the miner and the traveller. In seeking the 
 final explanation, philosophy took up one department 
 of knowledge after another as it needed them, but each 
 belonging to it only as means to an end. When suffi- 
 ciently developed to become independent, they no longer 
 needed the fostering care received in the past ; and it 
 was against the interest of the mother, as well as of 
 the son, to keep the man in childish subjection. This 
 explains the fact that at one time philosophical investi- 
 gations may include more subjects than at another. A 
 subject may also at one time be thought to lie within 
 the domain of philosophy, and afterwards be found to 
 belong to another department, when it is dropped. 
 
 We can thus be true to the Greek notion of philoso- 
 phy without including the same disciplines as Aristotle. 
 Although philosophical inquiry began with nature, we 
 do not include physics. Mathematics has long been 
 independent. 
 
 But after eliminating the natural sciences, what sphere 
 remains for philosophy? The fundamental and ulti- 
 mate problems. These have in all ages been assigned to 
 it, though their nature has at various times been differ- 
 ently apprehended. Whether it started with the inter- 
 ests uppermost at the time, or with concepts which 
 engrossed the attention of preceding thinkers, the final 
 
44 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 aim has always been the solution of the problems 
 regarded as ultimate. Many other themes have been 
 discussed in the name of philosophy ; but that was 
 merely incidental, or because they were supposed to 
 lie on the way to the last solution. They can, how- 
 ever, be consigned to other departments, or dropped 
 without serious loss. But those problems which per- 
 tain to the last things cannot be dropped without the 
 destruction of philosophy itself; they, as every one 
 who reflects on what is known as philosophical litera- 
 ture must admit, constitute its very essence. These 
 problems are the centre from which the whole circum- 
 ference of philosophical speculation is drawn. Their 
 solution has always been regarded as the highest intel- 
 lectual wisdom ; hence that solution is the most eager 
 and the last aim of the love of wisdom. That this is 
 a correct view of the distinctive characteristic of phi- 
 losophy, is proved by its entire history, and by the fun- 
 damental thoughts of its great systems. The elements 
 of the universe, sought by Thales and his successors ; 
 the principles of being, discussed hy the Eleatics ; the 
 atoms of Democritus ; the efforts of the sophists to 
 solve the final problems in mental phenomena; the 
 search of Socrates for the eternal reason underlying 
 thought and morals ; the ideas of Plato ; the " first phi- 
 losophy " of Aristotle ; the nominalistic and realistic 
 controversies of the Middle Ages, and the speculations 
 of the school-men respecting God and the universe ; the 
 innate ideas of Descartes ; the theory of knowledge 
 given by Locke ; the monads of Leibnitz, and his pre- 
 established harmony ; the substance of Spinoza ; the 
 absolute scepticism of Hume respecting the final prob- 
 lems ; the Kritik of Pure Reasons, by Kant ; the Ego 
 of Fichte, the subject-object of Schelling, and the 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 
 
 panlogism of Hegel ; common-sense or intuitionalism, as 
 the ultimate appeal, of the Scotch school; the rejection 
 of theology and metaphysics by Comte, and the claim 
 that the results of the positive sciences are the ultimate 
 of the intellect ; Schopenhauer's will as force, Spencer's 
 unknowable, and Hartmann's unconscious ; the conflicts 
 between idealism and realism in Germany ; and the 
 various efforts in different lands to determine the limits 
 of thought, and to get a safe method to reach these 
 limits ; the prevalent doubts respecting the solvability 
 of the ultimate problems, and the consequent suspicion of 
 philosophical solutions, — all furnish indubitable proof 
 that the final problems have been the peculiar domain 
 of philosophy from its origin till the present. 
 
 Having now found the sphere of philosophy, it 
 remains to be seen how it deals with its problems. 
 Mythology and theology largely move in the same 
 sphere ; and frequently mythological and religious views 
 are mixed with philosophical elements. But mythology 
 is the work of a creative fancy, and religion is the out- 
 growth of faith ; while philosophy is purely the product 
 of reason. Hence the test applied to a philosophical 
 system is always rational, history and external authority 
 having no weight in its final decisions. While the history 
 of thought shows what has been held as truth, philosophy 
 seeks to discover the truth itself. Reason as the instru- 
 ment and creator is also the sole test of philosophy. 
 
 In summing up all that has been said, we find that from 
 the first the most general characteristic of philosophy 
 is, that it is a rational inquiry into ultimate principles* 
 
 * As the student is an inquirer, and cannot be prepared to give the 
 content of the final system, it is of especial advantage to apprehend 
 distinctly the aim of all his inquiries. Only when he has found the 
 ultimate principles (in idealism, materialism, or something else), will 
 philosophy cease to be for him an inquiry. 
 
46 INTBODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This inquiry must not, however, be viewed as merely 
 a mental act, but as the product of the inquiring mind. 
 In this sense the word is frequently used in literature, 
 as in Hume's "Enquiry concerning Human Under- 
 standing." Every product of such rational investiga- 
 tion is philosophical. All the philosophies of the past 
 may be brought under this definition. Not one of 
 them can be pronounced the philosophy : they are but 
 attempts to construct it. Hence we treat them as ten- 
 tative, as essays and inquiries. This is no disparage- 
 ment of those systems : they are simply on a level with 
 all other systems produced by the human mind. 
 
 While the definition just given applies to all real 
 systems of philosophy, it does not give the ideal ; and 
 yet this is what we want when a subject is defined. 
 We must, therefore, go beyond this definition, in order 
 to learn what that idea is which philosophy, as an 
 inquiry, seeks to realize. Looking solely at the idea of 
 philosophy, not at the actual attainments, we define it 
 as follows : — 
 
 Philosophy is the rational system of fundamental prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 By Principles we here understand more than is usually 
 designated grounds, or reasons, or causes ; they include 
 all required to explain a subject. They involve the 
 nature, the grounds, and the design of objects. As the 
 word " principle " is frequently used for other than 
 the last explanation, it is qualified in the definition by 
 fundamental, to indicate that it is the last or ultimate 
 principles that are sought. When we speak of the prin- 
 ciples of science, we mean those first truths which inter- 
 pret science itself, constitute it what it is, and thus give 
 its essence. He who knows these principles has the 
 characteristic marks of all that is scientific, that which 
 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 47 
 
 is peculiar to all the details of science, and yet is not 
 these details. The ultimate principles are those which 
 lie behind all others, and yet are involved in all of them ; 
 they are the solutions from which all other solutions 
 spring, as plants from seeds. Philosophy wants to dis- 
 cover the last thought respecting what is, whence it is, 
 why it is ; or it seeks to learn the essence, the origin, 
 and the purpose of (real and ideal) being. It aims 
 to find the idea of that which is. Instead of merely 
 inquiring into the immediate causes of phenomena, it 
 wants to penetrate to the reason which manifests itself 
 in the universe. It therefore seeks that principiaut 
 truth which is the solution of all problems. The words 
 theism, atheism, pantheism, materialism, idealism, real- 
 ism, and numerous other terms which give the charac- 
 teristic marks of systems, all contain the idea of a 
 principle which is viewed as the ultimate of thought. 
 Philosophy is, accordingly, the highest possible demand 
 of the human mind, and marks the utmost limit of intel- 
 lectual aspiration ; it is reason objectified. 
 
 In philosophy we want System, not merely isolated 
 thoughts. If one principle, ultimate and all-embracing, 
 can be found, then the system may be deduced from 
 that ; but if this is not possible, the different principles 
 found must be put into proper relations, and the infer- 
 ences drawn from them must also be systematized. 
 With our imperfections and limitations, we may be 
 unable to form one system of fundamental principles, 
 a system containing the ultimate of all thought ; in that 
 case we must be content with a number of systems, 
 each controlled by a principle to us ultimate. 
 
 The system must be Rational ; that is, it must be the 
 product of reason, and in all its parts meet the require- 
 ments of reason. 2 As an impulse to truth, reason is also 
 
48 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY-. 
 
 the norm for its search, and the standard of its attain- 
 ment. The word "rational," therefore, indicates the 
 sphere and character of all philosophical investigation. 
 The inquiry may start with experience or history ; but 
 if limited to these, it cannot produce philosophy. There 
 may be other systems with principles professedly ulti- 
 mate ; but their basis is not the sole authority of reason. 
 Irrational elements may also be attached to philosophical 
 systems ; but they are to philosophy itself what dross is 
 to the gold to which it adheres. 
 
 As already intimated, our definition gives the ideal 
 of philosophy, indicating its aim, not an actual attain- 
 ment. In this there is nothing peculiar, but a charac- 
 teristic of all definitions. They want to give the idea 
 of the subject itself, without regard to the degree of 
 realization attained, unless they profess to be merely 
 descriptive. This is not only true of theology, philol- 
 ogy, history, and the like, but also of every one of the 
 natural sciences. Physics, chemistry, geology, biology, 
 are ideals, compared with which the real works, individ- 
 ually and collectively, are very defective. The ideal 
 science of nature has not yet found its way into books. 
 There are many attempts at science, but they are only 
 attempts. The same is true of philosophy. It repre- 
 sents the end sought, and the actual systems are but 
 efforts to attain that end. If, instead of the true idea 
 of philosophy itself, we want simply to indicate what 
 has been already attained, we shall have to go back to 
 the previous definition, and say that every system is 
 a rational inquiry into ultimate principles. 
 
 As a rational system of ultimate principles, philosophy 
 has a clearly defined sphere which distinguishes it from 
 all other departments of thought. It is neither descrip- 
 tive, nor historical, nor experimental; its province is 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 not the imaginative, nor the emotional, nor the artistic. 
 It does not come under the special sciences, each of 
 which is limited to a class of objects with whose expla- 
 nation it is satisfied ; nor is it a science of the sciences, 
 since it aims to explain more than can ever be made 
 a direct object of science as now technically used. 
 
 Looked at in every light, the definition meets all the 
 requirements of the case. The principles sought are 
 the highest wisdom; hence the definition harmonizes 
 with the etymology. It is also justified by the history 
 of the specific use of the term, and by the history of 
 philosophy itself. Every great system aims at these 
 principles. Trendelenburg, in fact, divides all the sys- 
 tems according to their first principles ; namely, those 
 which start with matter, with mind, or with a union 
 of both. This gives materialism, idealism, and pan- 
 theism. It would be difficult to get all the systems 
 under this classification ; nevertheless, it is true that 
 the character of a system is determined by its ultimate 
 principles. In many instances these were thought to 
 have been found, as in the case of the early Greek 
 philosophers and Plato, and also Spinoza, Leibnitz, 
 Berkeley, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and 
 Hartmann ; while other systems were rather an inquiry 
 into the possibility of discovering these principles, as 
 those of Locke, Hume, and Kant, which are essentially 
 a theory of knowledge. But in all systems the ulti- 
 mate principles were the object of inquiry. 
 
 While the definition gives the aim (namely, the fun- 
 damental principles) within the sphere (the rational) of 
 philosophical inquiry, it is not intended to intimate 
 that the principles sought are the only contents of phil- 
 osophical systems. These may also include whatever 
 is connected with the discovery of the principles, and 
 
50 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 likewise the rational inferences drawn from them. A 
 developed system of these principles embraces at least 
 the general ideas of all objects they comprehend. As 
 the search for the ultimate concepts implies a journey 
 over the road leading to them, so when discovered and 
 systematized they may be applied to the explanation 
 of whatever they include. Philosophy is thus both 
 inductive and deductive ; and both in its search and 
 application, its sphere is limited solely by reason. Phi- 
 losophies are consequently not mere skeletons of these 
 principles. Indeed, philosophy is the most comprehen- 
 sive of disciplines, including principiantly all that is 
 real and ideal. Its principles are the apex of a great 
 pyramid; but in passing toward the base, there is a 
 constant increase of space and content. 
 
 In spite of the present confusion in the definition of 
 philosophy, it will be found that the one given harmo- 
 nizes with the intelligent specific use of the word now, 
 containing the essence of what is sought but, perhaps, 
 not clearly expressed. By common consent, philosophy 
 aims at the highest and most universal truth, which 
 can be nothing short of the ultimate principles. This 
 is implied by those even who pronounce philosophy 
 itself impossible, for they regard these principles unat- 
 tainable. 
 
 That our definition largely agrees with the common 
 consciousness as to the specific sense of the word, is 
 evident from the application of the term to various 
 other subjects. Thus we speak of the philosophy of 
 law, of language, of religion, of history, and the like. 
 What is meant by philosophy when thus applied? 
 Simply the principles involved in these subjects, and 
 explanatory of them. Thus the philosophy of religion 
 contains the principles which underlie religion, and 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 51 
 
 explain its existence and character. If now, when 
 applied to other subjects, philosophy is an inquiry into 
 the principles involved in them, then taken by itself, 
 or absolutely, it must be an investigation of principles, 
 not indeed of any particular subject, but of all subjects, 
 — it must be an investigation into the absolute or final 
 principles ; and at its completion, it must be a system 
 of those principles. 
 
 Although the definition meets all the requirements, 
 the beginner will probably have difficulty in clearly 
 apprehending the subject. This arises partly from un- 
 familiarity with it, partly from its inherent difficulties. 
 It will, however, become clearer, the more he reflects 
 on the aim to attain the final explanation, and the far- 
 ther he progresses towards this goal. Such is the depth 
 of philosophy, that those who never attempt to follow 
 thought to its limits can form no conception of its real 
 character. But whoever rationally inquires into the 
 essence, the origin, and the purpose of all things, phi- 
 losophizes; and, as intimated, in the processes of his 
 own mind he will find the best interpretation of the 
 aim and the sphere of philosophy. 
 
 Every subject, unless purely rational, may be viewed 
 empirically, or historically, or rationally. We may 
 learn what a language is ; we can trace its history ; we 
 can investigate its principles. Instead of limiting our 
 researches to facts, we can also inquire into what must 
 or ought to be ; we can investigate particular phe- 
 nomena, and search for their laws ; but we can also seek 
 what is universal. In all such cases it is easy to recog- 
 nize the function of philosophy. In contrast with the 
 phenomenal, it seeks the substance ; instead of the em- 
 pirical, it seeks the rational ; in contrast with the acci- 
 dental, it seeks the necessary ; in distinction from the 
 
52 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 particular, it seeks the universal ; instead of the de- 
 scriptive, the historical, and mere classifications, it 
 seeks the principiant ; instead of the world of sense, 
 it seeks the idea, or the last thought ; and, in distinc- 
 tion from the derivative, it seeks what is primitive, or 
 the first principles. 
 
 Many of the current definitions agree essentially with 
 that given ; while there are others which are included 
 under it, as designating some part but not the whole of 
 philosophy. Ulrici says, " To philosophize is to seek 
 principles." Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, Intro- 
 duction) states that in the various systems, philosophy 
 is viewed as a science, and that, as a rule, it is distin- 
 guished from the other sciences in that its sphere is not 
 limited like theirs. It does not, however, include, to 
 their full extent, the sum of all the spheres of knowl- 
 edge ; but it seeks the essence, the laws, and the con- 
 nection of all that is real. He gives this definition: 
 " Philosophy is the science of principles." This might 
 be adopted without hesitation, were it not that "science " 
 is used almost as vaguely as the term it is intended to 
 define. " Principle " is also used in various senses. In 
 order to avoid ambiguity, I have used "system" and 
 " fundamental " or " ultimate " principles. In his Logik 
 (Introduction), Ueberweg defines philosophy "as the 
 science of the universe, not according to its details, 
 but according to the principles which condition all par- 
 ticulars ; or, as the science of the principles of what 
 is knowable by means of the special sciences." In 
 another place * he states that the various philosophical 
 systems are indeed not science, but that the aim of 
 
 * In Fichte's Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 
 1863. " Ueber den Beyriff der Philosophie." A valuable discussion of 
 the subject. 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 53 
 
 philosophy has all along been to become " science in the 
 strictest and highest sense." As science it is distin- 
 guished from art and practice. It is theoretical ; even 
 what is called practical philosophy is only a theory of 
 practice. 
 
 Whatever the differences in the definitions given, 
 they, as a rule, make the universal and the ultimate 
 the aim of philosophy. Trendelenburg regarded it as 
 aiming at the idea of the total and universal, which lies 
 at the basis of the parts and of all that is particular, in 
 distinction from the empirical sciences, which contem- 
 plate the individual as separated from the totality. 
 Lotze held that it is the aim of philosophy to bring 
 into unity and connection the scattered thoughts, to 
 follow them to their first presuppositions, and also to 
 their last consequences, and thus to secure a consistent 
 idea of the universe. It aims especially to subject to 
 new investigation those thoughts which, in life and in 
 the sciences, are the principles by which other thoughts 
 are judged, in order to determine their validity and 
 limits. He therefore viewed philosophy as fundamental, 
 examining the principles on which all the sciences rest, 
 and as going backward and forward to the utmost limits 
 of thought.* Harms QAbhandlungen zur systematisclien 
 Philo sophie) also regards it as fundamental, being that 
 general science which investigates and explains the 
 nature and the connection of the sciences. "Since 
 philosophy is the science of the fundamental principles 
 of knowledge, which include logical, ontological, ethi- 
 cal, and physical conceptions, it has a large sphere ; and, 
 by means of the fundamental principles of knowledge, 
 it is connected with all the sciences." Wirth defines 
 philosophy as " a striving after the principiant knowl- 
 
 * Grundziige der Logik und Encyclopaedie der Philosophie, 85. 
 
54 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 edge of all being, which knowledge must not, however, 
 be based on assumptions." He held that there is a law 
 of thought which impels the mind to seek the unity 
 in the variety of knowledge.* Joseph Beckf says: 
 " Philosophy is the rational knowledge of the truth of 
 the facts of human consciousness ; or the science of the 
 nature, the last principles, and the highest ends (design) 
 of things." Its aim is truth; its objects are man, the 
 world, and God. Its mission is to follow phenomena 
 to their ultimate grounds, in order to comprehend their 
 nature and connection, so that their relation as parts to 
 the whole may be understood. Stockl QLehrbuch der 
 Philosophic), an author whose works are used in Cath- 
 olic schools, defines philosophy as "the general, specu- 
 lative, rational science ; or, as the science of the last 
 and highest grounds of being, so far as they can be 
 known and proved by mere reason." Frohschammer, 
 professor of philosophy at Munich, regards truth, not 
 as found in history or experience, but ideal, perfect 
 truth, as the aim of philosophy. It seeks the ultimate 
 reason of being and of thought, and of the ideal; it 
 wants to explain the essence, and give the reason, of all 
 real and ideal being. SchmidJ says, "Philosophy is 
 a rational science of reality: namely, of the nature, 
 reason, and design of things, as well as of the means 
 for the accomplishment of the design." According to 
 Paulsen, "He is a philosopher whose inquiries are 
 
 * Fichte's Zeitschrift, of which he was one of the editors, 1863. 186.. 
 The original is : — 
 
 " Es gibt also ein im Wesen des Denkens, seiner nothwendigen Form 
 gegriindetes, nrithin apriorisches und allgemeingiiltiges Denkgesetz der 
 Totalitat oder des Ganzen, welches also lautet : strebe alle deine Er- 
 kenntnisse zur Einheit der Totalitat zu verknupfen." 
 
 t Encyclopaedic der theoretischen Philosophic, a hook for gymnasia. 
 
 X Philosophische Monatshefte , iii. 388. 
 
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 55 
 
 guided by the aim to attain the ultimate unity of all 
 knowledge ; while he who stops with isolated facts as 
 the final truth is an empiric." 
 
 LITERATURE. 
 
 The references made in the chapter will serve as a 
 general guide to the literature on the subject. For the 
 views of philosophy in the different systems, the various 
 histories can be consulted, particularly that of Ueber- 
 weg, translated by Professor G. S. Morris. The most 
 scholarly discussion of Greek philosophy is by Professor 
 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Grieehen. Some of the 
 best discussions of the definition of philosophy are to 
 be found in philosophical journals, which must also be 
 consulted if the student desires a survey of present tend- 
 encies in philosophy. In the following list of journals 
 the number of volumes in 1886 is indicated. The Jour- 
 nal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. 20. Williams T. 
 Harris : New York. — Mind : A Quarterly Review of 
 Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 11. George Croom 
 Robertson : London. — Revue Philosophique de la France 
 et de V Mr anger, vol. 11. Th. Ribot : Paris. — La Critique 
 Philosophique. Nouvelle serie, vol. 2. M. Renouvier : 
 Paris. — Revista de Filosofia Scientifica, vol. 5. Enrico 
 Morselli: Milan. — La Filosofia delle Scuole Italiane, 
 vol. 33. T. Mamiani : Rome. — Philosophische Monats- 
 hefte, vol. 23. C. Schaarschmidt : Heidelberg. — Zeit- 
 schrift fur Philosophie und philosophische KritiJc. Neue 
 Folge, vol. 87. Founded by J. H. Fichte and H. Ulrici. 
 A. Krohn and R. Falckenberg : Halle. — Vierteljahrs- 
 schrift fiir wissenschaftliche Philosophie, vol. 10. R. 
 Avenarius: Leipzig. — Philosophische Studien, vol. 4. 
 W. Wundt : Leipzig. — Zeitschrift filr exacte Philosophie, 
 im Sinne des neuern philosophischen Realismus, vol. 14. 
 
56 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 T. Allihn and O. Fliigel: Langensalza. — In the first 
 volumes of Mind, a series of valuable articles on phil- 
 osophy in England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Italy, 
 Sweden, America, and Germany, appeared, written by 
 prominent philosophical thinkers in these countries. 
 In a book entitled Einleitung in die Philosophie vom 
 Standpunkte der Geschichte der Philosophie, by Professor 
 L. Struempell, 1886, the definition and leading problems 
 of philosophy are discussed. The volume aims to 
 introduce the student into the historical systems of 
 philosophy. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 The significance of Definitions. Difference between 
 Definition and Description. Vague use of " Philoso- 
 phy." Reasons for this vagueness. Popular and tech- 
 nical sense. Principles determining the Definition. 
 Etymology, history, and present use of the term. How 
 used in leading systems. Distinction between Philoso- 
 phy and Systems of Philosophy. Is the gulf between 
 the ideal and real Philosophy peculiar to it ? Difficul- 
 ties in the Definition. Define Philosophy. Its Aim. 
 Its Objects. Its Sphere. Relation to Empiricism, 
 to the Practical, to History, to Art. Philosophy as a 
 mental habit, and as a product of this habit. Indicate 
 the agreement of -the Definition with the Etymology, 
 the History, and present Use of the term. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 57 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 
 
 The nature and sphere of philosophy will be better 
 apprehended by determining its relation to subjects 
 with which its connection is most intimate. Its distinc- 
 tion from history, poetry, and art, is too marked to 
 require discussion ; but its relation to religion, natural 
 science, and psychology, is worthy of special consider- 
 ation. While a subject is outlined by the definition, it 
 is brought into bold relief by comparison with adjacent 
 parts. Distinctness means distinction from what is most 
 similar. 
 
 When only their striking peculiarities ' are viewed, 
 philosophy and religion are as distinct as two peaks ; 
 but by going deeper, numerous points of contact are dis- 
 covered. They are, in fact, two circles which intersect. 
 Different in spirit and method, their objects are largely 
 the same. Both consider the origin, nature, relation, 
 and tendency of objects ; but they view them in differ- 
 ent lights, and each has a peculiar aim in their contem- 
 plation. Their intimate relation accounts for their 
 mutual influence, and the frequent efforts to control or 
 absorb each other. Their harmony respecting the cause 
 and design of the universe has always been signalized 
 by vigorous co-operation ; but in disagreement their very 
 intimacy makes the conflict between them one of life 
 and death. 
 
58 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The objects held in common by philosophy and reli- 
 gion are viewed from the standpoints of faith and reason. 
 Co-operation is consequently possible only in the union 
 of these two: namely, in a believing reason, or its 
 synonyme, a rational faith. This implies that both 
 coalesce so far as their objects are the same. If reason 
 and faith ignore each other, it must be at the sacrifice 
 of their perfection. But even in their union the pecu- 
 liarities of each must also be distinguished. Whatever 
 the beginning of the religious impulse, it reaches its 
 climax in faith, while philosophy always culminates in 
 pure reason. Psychologically religion is much broader 
 than philosophy, enlisting the whole spirit and affecting 
 intellect, heart, and will ; philosophy, on the other hand, 
 whatever object it contemplates, is always purely intel- 
 lectual, subjecting even the heart and will to theoretical 
 treatment. While religion, therefore, so apprehends its 
 objects with the spirit as fully to possess them and to 
 be possessed by them, philosophy speculates, it beholds 
 them intellectually; if it loses itself in them, as the 
 mystics did, it ceases to be philosophy. Philosophy is 
 always conscious of itself, keeps subject and object 
 apart, and is cold ; religion is feeling as well as intel- 
 lect, hence is capable of great enthusiasm. The state- 
 ment which dates from the Middle Ages, that philosophy 
 seeks the truth, theology finds it, and religion possesses 
 it, at least indicates the relation to the truth claimed by 
 each. In their origin they differ widely ; religion, being 
 more naive and more intuitive, is much earlier than phi- 
 losophy, which requires more maturity of intellect for 
 its origin. The objects of religion are usually given 
 historically, in sacred books or tradition, while philoso- 
 phy is required to search for its objects by a long and 
 laborious process of thought. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 59 
 
 But they differ somewhat respecting their objects, as 
 well as respecting their standpoints and methods. So 
 much of belief lies outside of its sphere, that religion 
 is far from including the whole domain of faith. But 
 even the range of religious faith may be much larger 
 than that of demonstration, and thus include many 
 objects which philosophy still seeks. The historical ele- 
 ment being a potent factor, religion may receive from 
 it objects which reason alone could never have dis- 
 covered. The impulse of the heart may also present to 
 religious faith objects beyond the sphere of demonstra- 
 tion. On the other hand, philosophy also deals with 
 subjects foreign to religion. Being thrown wholly on 
 itself for its method of research, philosophy must estab- 
 lish its authority ; reason must justify itself to itself, 
 and thought must prove thought. Consequently phi- 
 losophy deals largely with the processes of thought, 
 testing them so as to discover their validity, their laws, 
 and their limits. Why we think as we think ; why we 
 reach certain conclusions, and form certain systems ; why 
 we accept certain inferences as true, and reject others 
 as false ; these are problems of primary significance for 
 philosophy, while religion only considers them so far as 
 it becomes philosophic. Like all other subjects, religion 
 looks to philosophy to settle for it problems purely 
 rational. While religion is a relation of submission and 
 obedience to a will, person, or power, recognized as 
 supreme, philosophy is a purely theoretical (contempla- 
 tive, rational) relation to the same, and to all that per- 
 tains to principles and being. 
 
 When the relation of the two is here considered, it is 
 of course intended to discuss them only so far as the 
 circles intersect. Their agreement and conflict concern 
 us most, and these pertain entirely to objects and inter- 
 
60 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ests held in common. Religion is here taken in its most 
 general sense. Neither a particular system of theology, 
 nor the faith of a particular church, is taken into account. 
 Theologies are a product of development, and change 
 with their growth. Even when they are subject to 
 great changes, religion itself, at least its essence, may 
 not be affected thereby. If, however, the dogmas lying 
 at the basis of religion are overthrown, then the super- 
 structure must also fall. Usually theology is a union 
 of religious and philosophical elements, faith striving 
 to become rational, and reason seeking to become faith. 
 It is consequently in the domain of theology that the 
 fiercest conflicts between faith and reason occur. The 
 battle ranges around the dogmas of theology, they being 
 the border-land where philosophy and religion meet and 
 claim equal right to possession. 
 
 Lying wholly within reason, philosophy cannot tran- 
 scend this limit and still remain true to itself. Its 
 agreement and conflict with religion and theology there- 
 fore pertain to these so far only as they lie within the 
 domain of reason. Religion and theology are, conse- 
 quently, directly related to philosophy only in their 
 natural or rational elements. Speculative or rational 
 theology is, in fact, a part of philosophy. 
 
 Recognizing the rational element in religion as its 
 sole point of contact with philosophy, Kant entitled his 
 book on theology, " Religion within the Limits of Pure 
 Reason." 3 He did not, however, mean to indicate that 
 there are no objects beyond these limits, and that faith 
 in them is not valid. Kant repeatedly affirms that 
 there may be many things of which our limited reason 
 has no knowledge. This every profound philosopher 
 admits ; and this admission is the basis of hope that, 
 with all their differences, and even conflicts, philosophy 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 61 
 
 and religion can exist together. It is the narrow, shal- 
 low, and exclusive tendencies, on both sides, which 
 destroy the hope of final agreement. The usual limita- 
 tions of our thoughts, together with the tendency of 
 the mind to take one object, hold it before conscious- 
 ness to the exclusion of others, and to develop it by 
 itself, and therefore one-sidedly, is not only a great 
 barrier to final harmony, but prevents the very recogni- 
 tion of the differences, and the appreciation of the need 
 of agreement. All discussion is simply beating the air, 
 so long as there is a lack of depth and comprehensive- 
 ness, and of that modesty which is a requirement 
 equally of religion and philosophy. The two need 
 each other as complements. A religion that ignores 
 philosophy is in constant danger of superstition and 
 fanaticism ; while an exclusive philosophy attempts to 
 compress the whole of life into logical formulas, at 
 which the heart rebels. For the healthy development 
 of both, it is essential that their spheres be exactly 
 defined, that each be kept strictly in its sphere, and 
 that each recognize the just claims of the other. 
 
 While there is much in the emotions and the life of 
 religion which transcends the power of exact philo- 
 sophical expression, they are not wholly beyond the 
 influence of reason. If, for instance, it could be demon- 
 strated that the objects of faith are products of the 
 fancy, mere creations of the brain, as Feuerbach held, 
 all worship would necessarily cease. The very points 
 which philosophy and religion have in common are the 
 ones on which the latter depends ; namely, the ques- 
 tions respecting ultimate principles. 
 
 The origin of religion cannot be determined by specu- 
 lation. Recent ethnographical studies have led to vari- 
 ous theories, and it may also be impossible to determine 
 
62 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the matter historically, the given data being insufficient. 
 Whether the first religious impressions were the result 
 of a direct revelation, or came from dreams, the sight of 
 a corpse, or, as Max Miiller says, "from an incipient 
 perception of the infinite pressing upon us through the 
 great phenomena of nature, and not from sentiments 
 of surprise or fear called forth by such finite things 
 as shells or bones;" whether fetichism, polytheism, 
 or monotheism came first ; whether there were not in 
 reality different occasions for religion in different places, 
 and different emotions as its basis in different persons, 
 may never be absolutely settled by history. The phe- 
 nomena bearing on this subject are so various, often 
 so uncertain and contradictory, that there is abundant 
 room for different theories. But, whatever its origin 
 may have been, the philosophical value of religion can- 
 not be determined thereby. If the lowest fetichism 
 was its source, that is no more against it, than the 
 fact that all knowledge began in the crudest way is an 
 argument against science and philosophy. 
 
 There is dispute even as to whether there are or have 
 been peoples wholly devoid of religion. In some cases 
 the question was answered affirmatively, when after- 
 wards it was discovered to be a mistake, founded on 
 ignorance of the language and customs of the peoples.* 
 For philosophy this question is not essential. If a peo- 
 ple were found with no notion of general principles, it 
 would argue nothing against their validity. What pre- 
 vails in a higher stage of development, not in a lower 
 one, may only prove the superiority of the former. 
 
 * Thus far there is no satisfactory evidence that any people exists, or 
 has existed, wholly devoid of religion. It is often extremely difficult 
 for travellers to learn the religious views of savage peoples, and many 
 of their statements have to be taken with caution. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 63 
 
 Religion is established as a fact, and is so deeply rooted 
 in human nature, and so much a need of man, that we 
 may be sure it is here to remain. It is incredible that 
 from the earliest records till the present time religion 
 existed, and yet is nothing but the " baseless fabric of 
 a vision." While errors may be attached to it, religion 
 itself must have a true basis in the human heart. It 
 may need purification ; it cannot be exterminated. So 
 far as philosophy can draw religion within its circle, it 
 must consider the subject as one of the deepest and 
 worthiest problems of humanity, demanding explana- 
 tion. If originally a revelation, then the origin of 
 religion is of course removed beyond the domain of phi- 
 losophy. But whatever supernatural elements it may 
 possess, it must also be natural, and subject to evo- 
 lution, and therefore an object of philosophical inquiry. 
 
 Religion, indicating the personal relation of man to 
 God, implies that the spirit is both receptive and active, 
 so that it both receives and gives. Instead of putting 
 its seat in the intellectual, emotional, or volitional ele- 
 ment, religion lies behind the various faculties of the 
 mind, and gives coloring and direction to all of them. 
 Its seat is in the person or spirit, and indicates the 
 character of the heart in the scriptural sense, namely as 
 the centre of human nature and the source of all human 
 manifestations. Religion is a spiritual energy in thought 
 and feeling and volition, so that it has concepts, inspi- 
 rations, and acts. The intellectual elements, and the 
 conduct springing therefrom, are naturally more com- 
 pletely within the comprehension of philosophy than the 
 emotions. Yet these emotions are too essential an 
 element of religion to be ignored in the philosophy of 
 religion. 
 
 Nothing is more absurd than to claim that all views 
 
64 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 based on religious feeling are reliable. In this way 
 the most contradictory opinions and wildest fanaticism 
 might be established. Philosophy boasts that its logic 
 is heartless, and therefore not subject to influence by 
 feeling. But this does not mean that reason can neither 
 give light to the emotions nor learn lessons from them. 
 The religious feelings are as truly facts as those we 
 become aware of by means of the external senses, and 
 they reveal the human heart and our real nature with 
 at least as much perfection as external phenomena 
 reveal the nature of the substances which produce 
 them. We are undoubtedly more fully conscious of 
 self than we can be of any thing external. That our 
 emotions are a real, and apparently the most immedi- 
 ate, revelation of self, is a fact of deepest significance, 
 whose importance is not decreased because it is so gen- 
 erally ignored in our day. The philosopher Jacobi may 
 have gone too far in identifying reason so largely with 
 the higher emotions, and thus making it a kind of 
 intuitive faculty for the objects of religion ; but he was 
 evidently right in emphasizing the value of the emo- 
 tions beside the reflections of philosophy. To say with 
 a sneer, " It is nothing but feeling," and thus dismiss 
 summarily what concerns humanity most, is an insult 
 to human nature. There may be in emotion a depth of 
 reality which philosophy can neither fathom nor formu- 
 late. The religious feeling demands explanation ; and 
 reason confronted by it cannot but ask, What is its 
 meaning? What its source? What does it reveal 
 respecting man? What elements of truth does it 
 embody ? How is it to be intellectually apprehended ? 
 To what inferences does it lead? If religion is a senti- 
 ment, so is irreligion ; and the question still remains, 
 Which sentiment rests on the truth ? It is no wonder 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 65 
 
 that the deep mysticism of the middle ages — of Master 
 Eckhart, Tauler, Nicholas of Basle, Suso, and others — 
 arrested the attention of philosophers, and led to the 
 inquiry, " What must that nature be which is capable 
 of such things ? " The theosophy of Jacob Boehme may 
 be false, nevertheless its very possibility demands expla- 
 nation. Only when things are exalted, and personality 
 is depreciated, can this be questioned. All the great 
 teachers of religion and their doctrines, Jesus and his 
 gospel included, present problems to the philosopher : 
 if philosophy cannot explain them, it must give the 
 reasons for its inability ; if it could explain them as 
 natural phenomena, this very explanation would give 
 new revelations of nature, and wholly change our 
 views of its character. 
 
 We must recognize as proper the effort of philoso- 
 phy, particularly the Hegelian, to resolve emotion into 
 thought. The intellect is only true to itself when 
 its energy seeks to think what the heart feels. Yet not 
 strength but weakness of intellect ignores the limits of 
 thought, and frivolously rejects as frivolous what the 
 logical scales cannot balance. A healthy reason trans- 
 forms the emotional into the rational when possible, 
 and expresses feelings in concepts ; but whatever does 
 not submit to this transformation, it seeks to explain 
 as emotion. Philosophy may not be able to put the 
 substance of impulse and aspiration and longing into 
 rational equivalents, and yet may find in them an 
 important revelation of the nature of the seed from 
 which they grow and of the soil on which they flourish. 
 A system of human nature which destroys its mental 
 life, the emotions included, for the sake of gaining pure 
 abstractions, is as valuable as a botany and an anatomy 
 which exist for the destruction instead of the interpre- 
 
66 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tation of organisms. Life, spirit, freedom, God, may 
 contain more than can be limited philosophically, the 
 concrete necessarily being richer than our abstract for- 
 mulas. Our highest intellectual generalization is poorer 
 than reality, and we may put an abstraction or an un- 
 related absolute for what is the real source of the uni- 
 verse. We know that there is personality, but we may 
 not be able to find a single principle deep and broad 
 enough to comprehend personality. Perhaps in feeling, 
 a reality, a personality supplements the manifestation 
 of itself in thought. Even reason cannot free itself 
 wholly from the impulse of the emotions, and feeling 
 may become a mental guide when thought is bewildered. 
 
 No one questions the perfect harmony of truth with 
 itself: we are convinced of the existence of that har- 
 mony, even if we fail to discover it. This is a postu- 
 late on which all reasoning is based. But if there is 
 harmony in truth, then the establishment of one truth 
 means in some measure the establishment and support 
 of all other truth; and the advocacy of error means 
 hostility to all truth. Truths in science, philosophy, 
 religion, and history, are not destructive, but promotive 
 of each other ; and if there is antagonism, it is either 
 imaginary, or else between truth and error. Therefore 
 truth in one department always welcomes as an ally 
 truth in another,"so soon as it is recognized. And truth 
 alone can recognize truth. 
 
 The harmony claimed for the truth, we also claim for 
 reason. All logic, all the processes of thinking, rest on 
 this as a fact. It is a primary law of reasoning, that 
 two conflicting concepts cannot both be true. I may 
 hold as rational, views which are in reality destructive 
 of each other ; but this is only possible by mistaking as 
 rational what is not rational. Progress from error to 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 67 
 
 truth is simply the elimination of the irrational (which 
 was held as rational), and the apprehension of the 
 rational. There may be much error in what we re- 
 gard as rational : there can be none in what is rational. 
 As we distinguish between what is subjectively held 
 as truth, and objective truth, so we must distinguish 
 between what is subjectively regarded as rational, and 
 what is really or objectively rational. All true thought 
 tends to make the subjective the same as the objective : 
 to have the truth, not merely to think we have it. 
 
 These are axioms of thought to him who has not 
 merely moved in the forms, but has also grasped the 
 principles, of logic. Strange that those who accept 
 these axioms do not take the next step which they 
 really involve. If I can trust my intellectual nature 
 or reason when properly understood, why not the rest 
 of my nature properly interpreted ? The emotions, so 
 far as a correct expression of the true self, cannot be 
 in conflict with each other or with the truth. If the 
 true self is reliable when it expresses itself intellect- 
 ually, why not when it expresses itself emotionally? 
 There are false emotions, just as there is false reason- 
 ing ; but this is no more an argument for rejecting all 
 emotions than for rejecting all reasoning. We want to 
 eliminate the false ones in order to get those which 
 really express our true being. We may not always 
 interpret correctly the truth deposited in our feelings, 
 but there can be no doubt that there is much there 
 which cannot be revealed in any other way. And reli- 
 gious faith, as an expression of the true self, as a real 
 and legitimate demand of our nature, has as reliable a 
 basis as that reason which is an expression of the same 
 nature. True reason and true faith can no more con- 
 flict than a true thought and a true emotion. 
 
68 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We might go still farther, and show that there can 
 be no conflict between the real interests of our nature. 
 The conflicts which occur are only between supposed 
 interests. What my nature truly demands, it has a 
 right to demand; indeed, it is a necessity, and my 
 nature must demand it. Unless there is that which 
 my very constitution must demand, all ethics is over- 
 thrown, and all reasoning based on the final harmony 
 of thought and being rests on a false postulate. 
 
 These thoughts are fundamental for the investigation 
 of the rational basis of religion. It is an unjustifiable 
 one-sidedness to regard our nature as the ultimate 
 appeal intellectually, and then to reject the same appeal 
 when made with respect to the emotions. It is indeed 
 very difficult to get at the intellectual factor in our 
 emotional nature, and to draw the correct inferences, 
 particularly at a time when it is fashionable to regard 
 the mind as valuable in proportion as it studies things 
 and not itself. The time may, however, not be distant 
 when the truth revealed in and through ourselves shall 
 be prized as highly, at least, as that which comes to us 
 from a foreign source. 
 
 The thoughtful mind will not mistake the fool's 
 sneer at the most serious subjects, for an expression 
 of wisdom. The student who is tainted with that 
 frivolous tendency which regards the moral and reli- 
 gious problems as not worthy of his best efforts, lacks 
 the spirit which produced the greatest systems, and 
 animated men like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
 Fichte, Hegel, and Lotze. 4 
 
 Were philosophy and religion perfect, they of course 
 could not conflict. But both err, hence the strife ; both 
 are liable to claim infallibility, hence the dogmatism. 
 Each is apt to throw the entire blame on the other, 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 69 
 
 instead of revising its own status to discover whether 
 it may not itself be at fault. Sometimes the hostility 
 leads to a war intent on extermination ; at others, the 
 grounds of the conflict are only apparent. The first 
 thing required, therefore, is that they understand each 
 other perfectly, so as to learn whether really antago- 
 nistic. Thus certain forms of philosophical scepticism 
 are not unfavorable to religion ; the proof that a sphere 
 lies beyond the region of demonstration does not imply 
 that it is beyond the domain of valid faith. There may 
 be good reasons for believing in the existence of God, 
 though we know that no argument can leap from the 
 finite to the infinite. 5 In his Kritik of Pure Reason, 
 Kant examines thoroughly all supposed proofs of the 
 Divine existence, and claims to have overthrown them ; 
 yet he was too great a philosopher to think he had 
 proved that there is no God, or to imagine such a 
 proof possible even. True to his convictions of the 
 limit of human knowledge, he declared, "It is indeed 
 necessary to be convinced of the existence of God, but 
 it is not equally necessary to demonstrate it." In fact, 
 he went so far as to declare that he was obliged to 
 destroy knowledge in order that he might find room 
 for faith. He held that God, freedom, and immortality 
 are undemonstrable, and yet established beyond ques- 
 tion, by what he termed the practical, in distinction 
 from the speculative, reason. In the ultimate regions 
 of thought, Kant was obliged to resort to postulates; 
 but he chose such as the necessities of the case seemed 
 to require. When, in dealing with the final problems 
 in religion, philosophy passes from demonstration to 
 postulates, it naturally resorts to such as have potency 
 to account for what is and transpires, — feelings, ethics, 
 and religion included. Surely reason is not reprehen- 
 
70 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sible if it makes the First Cause rich enough to account 
 for all things, instead of an abstraction which has no 
 reality itself, and cannot be the source of any other 
 reality. And is the reason to be blamed if, in the First 
 Cause, it seeks something rational, in order that reason 
 may at least account for its own existence ? 
 
 Forms of agnosticism are possible which are not hos- 
 tile to religion. All depends on the sense and signifi- 
 cance attributed to knowledge and faith. All Christians 
 are agnostics if knowledge is limited to objects of sense 
 and to mathematical demonstrations. Agnosticism is 
 only destructive of religion when it claims that nothing 
 but absolute knowledge, in the scientific sense, is worthy 
 of assent, or when it denies the possibility of a valid 
 basis for faith. Not the proofs but the implications of 
 agnosticism endanger religion. 
 
 In grappling with the momentous problems of reli- 
 gion, the serious thinker maybecome involved in per- 
 plexities which ordinary minds cannot appreciate ; and 
 his faith may be affected just because his love of truth 
 is so deep as to induce him to attempt its pursuit to the 
 ultimate sources and final consequences. If such plod- 
 ders appreciate their ignorance, and hold in abeyance 
 their decision on the problems of the ages, nothing can 
 be gained for religion if, in its name, they are subjected 
 to flippant attacks by such as answer the profoundest 
 questions without even an effort at thought. 
 
 With the ages the problems have deepened, and the 
 attempts to solve them have only made the difficulties 
 of the solution the more apparent. Hume's despair of 
 knowledge is shared by many who are not his disciples. 
 One need but appreciate the difficulties of every theory 
 of knowledge, and the agnosticism, scepticism, together 
 with the despair of the age and its consequent pessi- 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 71 
 
 mism, in order to learn that it is most irrational and 
 irreligious to attack men on account of the results of 
 honest and deep thought, whatever those results may 
 be. The convincing power of the fury of passion has 
 vanished. It must be frankly admitted by the religious 
 that the philosopher and scientist may be perfectly 
 honest in their researches, and because of that very 
 honesty, and freedom from bias, may find their early 
 faith beset with difficulties. Under such circumstances, 
 if their view conflicts with the prevalent religious dog- 
 mas, they cannot but be repelled by theological abuse, 
 while they respect every honest defence of religion. 
 Philosophy, as well as religion, has its martyrs. 
 
 The philosopher must be free from all bias respecting 
 religious dogmas. So far as he is purely philosophical, 
 he must treat them as unfeelingly as he would a ques- 
 tion in logic. He can do this with the full consciousness 
 that there is much in religion which he cannot grasp in 
 this way, just as he is convinced that there are many 
 things which the chain of his logic cannot measure. 
 He begins his philosophical investigations solely as an 
 inquirer after truth so far as this is an object of rational 
 inquiry. If any thing else than philosophy determines 
 the truth for him, he can dispense with the aid of phi- 
 losophy, and should not profess to conduct his researches 
 under its guidance. Slow and cautious in accepting 
 statements, the philosopher is equally slow and cautious 
 in rejecting them. The names and catch-words of par- 
 ties have no significance for him, except so far as they 
 embody truth. For the beginner in philosophy, this 
 attitude of perfect freedom from prejudice is extremely 
 difficult, but of the utmost importance. He must learn 
 to estimate aright both the unthinking faith, and the 
 idiotic sneer at religion, fashionable in some quarters. 
 
72 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Nor must he be frightened by the terms " pantheism " 
 and "materialism." They are to him, like religion, 
 subjects for deep study. The most devout mystics had 
 pantheistic elements, and the Apostle Paul uses expres- 
 sions which border on pantheism : as when he says of 
 God, u For in him we live, and move, and have our 
 being ; " " For of him, and through him, and to him, are 
 all things." Who will draw the exact line between 
 theism and pantheism ? Indeed, it may be that much in 
 a philosophical pantheism only expresses intellectually 
 what is implied in the devout religious feeling, when 
 the soul loses itself in God. Even materialism has be- 
 come largely a bugbear. Although frequently claiming 
 to be scientific, it is not, and, from the nature of the case, 
 cannot be. Science never deals with the ultimate prob- 
 lems, unless it becomes philosophy. To the scientist, 
 materialism can never be any thing but a postulate or 
 a working hypothesis. Atoms and matter are symbols 
 to him, as those of algebra and chemistry ; and as such 
 they are useful, without leading to atomism or material- 
 ism as an interpretation of the universe. In its sphere, 
 science is absolute ; out of its sphere, it ceases to be 
 science. Thus science as science cannot recognize God, 
 unless it abandons the sphere of observation and its 
 laws. The terms " theism " and " atheism " have no 
 relevancy for science, simply because it limits itself to 
 objects which are affected neither by the one nor the 
 other, just as it is not affected by poetry, history, or 
 aesthetics. The questions which the scientist asks of 
 nature have nothing to do directly with his religion, 
 and this should not have the slightest effect on his 
 search for the answers. The only atheistic influences 
 which science can exert spring from the habit induced 
 by the constant study of subjects in which God is not 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 73 
 
 considered, and in the use of methods which can never 
 lead to Him, — a habit which may deaden the religious 
 sensibilities. Jacobi once said, " It is to the interest of 
 science, that there should be no God." He uses " sci- 
 ence " in a wider sense than the strictly technical one ; 
 but, if we put " empirical " before the term, we must 
 say that neither in its aims, nor in its methods, nor in 
 its results, is pure science concerned with the existence 
 or non-existence of God. The fact is, that the supposed 
 influence of science on religion is, as a rule, simply the in- 
 fluence of philosophical speculations, for which the defi- 
 niteness and exactness of science are claimed, though 
 without the least title to that claim. Although usually 
 termed scientific, materialism, dealing with the ultimate 
 problems, belongs to the domain of philosophy. It is 
 a word whose sense is apt to vanish in proportion as 
 the effort to fathom its meaning is deep. Whoever is 
 haunted by materialism can get no better advice than 
 to make clear to his mind what he means by it, and by 
 the term " matter," whose atoms are imagined to be the 
 seed of the universe. The vulgar materialism of the 
 day cannot bear the light of intellect. Expressions 
 which seem to involve the crassest materialism may be 
 harmless. Professor Huxley, in " Lay Sermons," has an 
 address on " The Physical Basis of Life," in which he 
 uses expressions, which, taken by themselves, might 
 lead to the conclusion that their author must be a ma- 
 terialist. Yet he holds that we are totally ignorant of 
 what matter is, and consequently he is not a materialist 
 in the ordinary sense. The same is true of Herbert 
 Spencer ; he claims to be neither a spiritualist nor a 
 materialist, because he thinks we can attach no intel- 
 ligent meaning to these terms. The suspicion with 
 which metaphysic is generally regarded has made 
 
74 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 scholars cautious in drawing inferences respecting the 
 nature of things, and especially of the substance which 
 lies behind all phenomena and is the ultimate source 
 of all. 
 
 In one aim philosophy and religion perfectly agree : 
 both want the truth respecting the origin and tendency 
 of things, and respecting our relation to this truth. Phi- 
 losophy, however, seeks this truth theoretically, while 
 religion also wants it for the heart and life. If now the 
 one can help the other in this aim, its aid should be wel- 
 comed exactly in proportion as it overthrows prejudice 
 and false notions, and leads to pure truth. This is 
 omnipotent, and nothing will be able to check its con- 
 quering march. Nothing else is eternal ; and only he 
 who resolutely attaches himself to the truth can hope 
 to do work which will abide. In this conviction the 
 philosopher and believer can unite in their labors, each 
 in his sphere doing his utmost to discover and promote 
 the truth, and cheerfully co-operating with the other to 
 attain this end. The best friend of the honest thinker 
 is the man who destroys his dearest errors, and substi- 
 tutes for them despised truth. 
 
 Since religion involves the deepest interests of man, 
 the defence of its fundamental dogmas, with intense 
 feeling, can easily be understood. This very fact is of 
 significance to the philosopher. Why is the spirit so 
 deeply attached to religion ? If not a demand of man's 
 nature, how can we explain the fact that religion is 
 adhered to so persistently, and defended so passion- 
 ately ? The inquiry into its psychological basis reveals 
 in religion elements so thoroughly human, that he who 
 would banish it from the world must first rob humanity 
 of its heart. Not only is religion older than philosophy, 
 but it has also at all times exerted a deeper and wider 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 75 
 
 influence.* Those who appreciate it as a necessity of 
 human nature, do not fear that its right to existence 
 will ever be successfully questioned, and are the last to 
 shield it from the severest tests. They cannot share the 
 fears of those who imagine that the development of 
 science and philosophy may weaken the religious sen- 
 timent. Such fears are apt to prevail most in times 
 when the agony of doubt is experienced, and in minds 
 where faith and criticism are in antagonism, and whose 
 confidence in religion has been shaken. They therefore 
 have a subjective rather than an objective basis. Jacobi, 
 who declared that with his head he was a heathen, but 
 with his heart a Christian, feared that philosophy tended 
 to Spinozism, and that with its progress its deleterious 
 influence on religion would increase. But such fears 
 can only be justified if philosophy perverts the truth, or 
 else if religion is not true and does not meet the real 
 needs of man. With a true philosophy, genuine religion 
 must also advance. " Every fresh advance of certain 
 knowledge apparently sweeps off a portion of (so-called) 
 religious belief, but only to leave the true religious ele- 
 ment more and more pure ; and in proportion to its 
 purity will be its influence for good, and for good 
 
 only."f 
 
 Whatever is really valuable must retain or even in- 
 crease its value after the most thorough investigation. 
 If, after such investigation, its value vanishes, it is con- 
 clusive proof that it is a delusion which ought to be 
 
 * Herbart, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 2d ed. 213, says that religion 
 " is much older than philosophy, and strikes its roots much deeper in 
 the human soul." He doubts whether religion loses from the fact that 
 it is a matter of faith instead of demonstration. This faith he regards 
 as a complement of our knowledge, a complement which theoretically 
 is a necessity. 
 
 t W. B. Carpenter: Contemporary Review, vol. xxvii. 
 
76 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 banished as soon as possible. A faith that fears 
 scrutiny is a very weak faith as far as its contents, or 
 else as far as its confidence in the power of truth, is 
 concerned. 
 
 To reject the claims of philosophy, respecting its right 
 to investigate religion, may spring from three motives : 
 either because religion is not thought worthy of philo- 
 sophical attention ; or because it does not need attention 
 from philosophy ; or because it is supposed that phi- 
 losophy can determine nothing respecting religion. The 
 first has already been disposed of as totally ignoring 
 the significance of religion, and the important part it 
 has played in human history. The second is based on 
 a false view of philosophy, and of the rights of reason, 
 and also ignores the fact that, whether religion wants 
 it or not, philosophy will examine its claims. The third 
 assumes what can be determined only by philosophy 
 itself; and, while philosophy may not solve the deepest 
 problems of religion, it will at least reveal their true 
 character, and expose the fallacies of false solutions, thus 
 performing an important work for religion. Philosophy 
 does not solve the problems involved in moral and 
 physical evil ; but while it cannot construct a satisfac- 
 tory theodicy, it may do much to show that atheism 
 meets with just as many difficulties as the religious view, 
 or with still more. 2 And if some philosophical systems 
 have been used against the very existence of religion, 
 the latest which is of special significance, that of Lotze, 
 has much which is in harmony with religion in general, 
 and with Christianity in particular. He declares that 
 faith in a personal God is not in conflict with any of the 
 metaphysical convictions he is obliged to maintain, and 
 rejects the supposition that the spiritual may have had 
 its origin in the material, or that anthropomorphism 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 77 
 
 necessarily vitiates the religious notions.* If for noth- 
 ing else, religion should hail with joy a true philosophy 
 as a corrective of the false prevalent systems. 
 
 Among the cardinal points in determining the rela- 
 tion of philosophy to religion are the following : Is 
 one supreme and the other subordinate? Or are they 
 co-ordinate? Or are they partly co-ordinate, partly 
 different in rank? A complete answer would settle 
 their relation, and avoid many difficulties common in 
 their disputes. Conflicts often arise because religion 
 and philosophy attempt to encroach on each other. 
 
 If religion arrogantly claims dominion over thought, 
 its tendency is to make philosophy in the true sense 
 impossible. Degraded to a tool of theology, it ceases 
 to be philosophy. Nor can it be expected to develop 
 freely, so long as it is limited to a sphere in which there 
 is no possibility of a conflict with theology. This was 
 its position in the Middle Ages. Philosophy was viewed 
 as the servant of religion, whose dogmas were regarded 
 as absolute, and therefore a norm for the philosopher. 
 Plato and Aristotle, especially the latter, were used to 
 form and prove the systems of theology. As soon as 
 philosophy came in conflict with the dogmas of the 
 Church, as in the case of Abelard and others, the de- 
 mand was made unconditionally that it should be aban- 
 doned or modified. Those to whom the works had to 
 be submitted were usually not the persons best able 
 to appreciate their contents. To save themselves from 
 the anathema of the Pope, some of the philosophers, or 
 rather philosophic theologians, invented the doctrine 
 
 * Grundzuge der Religionsphilosophie, 99. He pronounces foolish the 
 notion that the highest principle of the world is an unconscious, hlind 
 substance, whose conception is for us perfectly dark and impenetrable. 
 Thus his views antagonize the pantheistic systems, which strike their 
 roots in Spinoza, as well as the systems of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. 
 
78 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, 
 and vice versa. It is self-evident that a philosophy 
 which starts with the presuppositions of a Church, and 
 moves along the line marked out for it by that Church, 
 can have authority only for him who occupies the same 
 ecclesiastical standpoint; and it has authority for him 
 merely because it has no authority of its own, but only 
 that of the Church. A system that fetters the reason 
 cannot be rational. 
 
 In the Roman-Catholic Church this servile position 
 is still assigned to philosophy. Where the Church or a 
 council or the Pope is pronounced infallible, the final 
 appeal will always be to this infallibility ; and the su- 
 premacy of reason, as well as the freedom of philoso- 
 phy, is out of the question. A prominent teacher in 
 that Church says that there are truths which belong 
 both to theology and philosophy, but that the former 
 always treats them as truths of revelation, while the 
 latter regards them as truths of reason. He adds, " In 
 rank philosophy is not co-ordinate with theology, but 
 subordinate. For theology has, on the one hand, a much 
 higher source of knoivledge than philosophy, namely rev- 
 elation ; and on the other, it has a higher and more 
 extensive sphere of truth than philosophy, because it has 
 the Christian mysteries, which philosophy of itself can- 
 not attain." * This view is evidently the only one which 
 can consistently be held in that Church. The author 
 claims that philosophy is actually exalted, instead of 
 being degraded, by this position. " Philosophy stands 
 to theology in a certain relation of servitude, and that 
 in a twofold way. First, it gives to theology a scien- 
 tific basis, because it contains logic and methodology ; 
 
 * Lehrbuch der Philosophie, by Dr. A. Stockl, professor in Eichstadt, 
 4th ed., 1876, vol. i. 14. The Italics are in the original. 
 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 79 
 
 and, second, it furnishes those speculative results on 
 whose basis theology, so far as it is possible for the 
 human mind, attains a speculative knowledge of the 
 Christian mysteries. This is the sense and significance 
 of the well-known device : Philoso'pliia est ancilla iheo- 
 logicB. From this it is seen, that, in accepting such a 
 position of servitude in its relation to theology, the 
 dignity of philosophy is not lessened; for it surely is 
 no degradation of philosophy if, in the way indicated, 
 it can be and is used for the purposes of a higher 
 science." On such soil a pure philosophy cannot flour- 
 ish ; and it is not surprising, that of recent philosophers 
 not one of eminence has come from the Catholic Church. 
 It goes back to Thomas Aquinas, not forward. 
 
 If such views are still possible in Germany, we can- 
 not be surprised if in the countries of Southern Europe 
 philosophy is held in bondage. Barzellotti,* in speak- 
 ing of Gioberti and Rosmini, says of the latter, "He 
 never allows the freedom of his thought to go the length 
 of admitting that any thing can be true to a philoso- 
 pher which is incompatible with religious faith. That 
 is to say, Rosmini regards the agreement of the latter 
 with the results of philosophical investigation as a post- 
 ulate. Gioberti, in his earlier works, goes even farther 
 than this. Not only does he identify philosophy and 
 religion, but he recognizes in the spirit a faculty sui 
 generis, superior to reason, and having the supernatural 
 for its object. Viewing the doctrine of Rosmini and 
 Gioberti mainly from this point of view, Cousin, there- 
 fore, had ground for asserting that Italian thought was 
 still in the ' bonds of theology.' " 
 
 Only a Church which regards its dogmas as absolute 
 and final can degrade philosophy to a mere tool, and 
 
 * Philosophy in Italy, Mind, 1878. 
 
80 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 rob reason and conscience of their rights. That philos- 
 ophy in any worthy sense is thus destroyed, must be 
 evident to all who understand its character. If dogmas 
 are absolutely true, all possible antagonism cannot affect 
 them, and all thorough inquiry can only serve to make 
 their truth more evident. That mind must be strangely 
 constituted which holds that a force is so great as to 
 overcome all resistance, and yet claims that no one is 
 permitted to test that force or attempt resistance. 
 When both the dogmas and the infallibility of the 
 authority establishing them are questioned, as in our 
 day, such claims create the suspicion that the Church 
 lacks confidence in its own teachings. 
 
 But even in the Protestant Church philosophy has 
 not always enjoyed that freedom which enabled it fully 
 to express and develop its principles. Wolff, Kant, 
 Fichte, and others had their liberties restrained, or were 
 subjected to persecution.* Heusde, a recent Dutch 
 professor, said of his countrymen, " In philosophizing 
 we ask for simplicity, good sound sense, and especially 
 good principles, that should in no wise disagree with 
 those of our religious faith." Let any one in America 
 or Great Britain attempt to develop a philosophical sys- 
 tem in conflict with the prevailing faith, and he will 
 soon discover that there is a marked difference between 
 nominal and real freedom of thought. In these lands 
 the law may not interfere with freedom of expression ; 
 but there are other than legal restraints. There is a 
 constant growth of toleration ; but there are many who 
 still have to learn that the wounds made by philosophy 
 
 * "Wolff was banished from Halle, but was restored by Frederick II. ; 
 Kant received a reprimand from the Cultusminister for publishing a 
 certain article on religion ; and Fichte, being charged with atheism in 
 Jena, lost his professorship, and fled to Berlin. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 81 
 
 and science can only be healed by the same, while 
 abuse and passion only turn them into festering sores.* 
 Sometimes the question of toleration becomes in the 
 highest degree difficult. Can a state permit teachers in 
 its institutions, appointed and supported by itself, to 
 advocate views which tend to undermine the very 
 principles on which it is founded? Its first law is self- 
 protection. Communism will probably teach the states 
 which have not already learned the lesson, that a sharp 
 line must be drawn between liberty and licentiousness. 
 In an institution established by a religious denomina- 
 tion, for religious purposes, it cannot be expected that 
 instruction subversive of this end should be tolerated. 
 No honest philosopher would accept or retain a position 
 in which the perfect freedom necessary for a full devel- 
 opment and free expression of his views cannot be 
 maintained. This does not imply that a teacher must 
 express all he imagines or believes, no matter with what 
 consequences it may be fraught. The wise man is 
 reserved in the utterance of mere opinions on weighty 
 subjects, — opinions which may be false and injurious, 
 and which he himself may have occasion to change 
 afterwards. Freedom is not temerity ; and philosophy 
 is not contempt of authority, though it recognizes no 
 authority as not subject to its tests. 
 
 If religion has repeatedly attempted to make philoso- 
 phy subordinate, the latter has frequently tried to over- 
 throw religion, or, at least, to transform it into harmony 
 with itself. The Kantian rationalism, the use made of 
 Hegel's dialectics, and Hartmann's pessimism, are ex- 
 amples. Theologians have repeatedly tried to harmonize 
 
 * Julius Muller says in one of his sermons, "Wounds which have 
 been inflicted on humanity by knowledge, can be healed only by 
 knowledge." 
 
82 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 their doctrines with the prevalent school of philosophy, 
 often with indifferent results. Sometimes, when the 
 harmony was supposed to be complete, the philosophical 
 system itself changed, and then no one cared for the 
 reconciliation. Theologians may be obliged to pass 
 through many transformations in order to keep in har- 
 mony with the rapidly changing philosophies.* There 
 can hardly be a more absurd proposition than to claim 
 that religion must adapt itself to the current philosophy. 
 Even the disciples themselves are not always agreed as 
 to the religion most in harmony with their philosoph- 
 ical system. In the school of Kant, and still more in 
 that of Hegel, the followers have disputed fiercely about 
 the religious attitude of their philosophy ; and even on 
 the doctrines of God and immortality conflicting views 
 were held. Some philosophers modified their own sys- 
 tems (as Reinhold and Schelling), so that at different 
 periods of their lives different religious doctrines would 
 have found most favor. And what a time theologians 
 would have in our age to determine which philosophical 
 system shall fix their dogmas ! Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 
 Comte, Spencer, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, and 
 perhaps a score besides, would have to be taken into 
 account. Religion has been subject to many changes, 
 but it has been stability itself compared with the evo- 
 lutions and transformations of philosophical systems. 
 The failure to harmonize the two has repeatedly led 
 
 * Karl Daub, formerly theological professor at Heidelberg, is an inter- 
 esting illustration. He began his career as a Kantian, and his first 
 works are written from that standpoint. Then, after being under 
 Fichte's influence for a while, he adopted Schelling's system, and wrote 
 a number of dogmatic works in the spirit of that philosophy. Finally 
 he became a disciple of Hegel, and his latest works bear the impress of 
 that philosopher. His change of views cannot be attributed to lack 
 of character. He was thoroughly sincere, as well as scholarly and 
 speculative. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 83 
 
 to efforts to separate religion from philosophy.* That 
 this is impracticable, is frequently proved by its very 
 advocates. One might as well attempt to keep the two 
 elements apart in his own mind. A philosophical sys- 
 tem may influence the mind very deeply, yet uncon- 
 sciously. 
 
 Conflicts are inevitable. When they do arise, which 
 is the final appeal ? The fact that a religion claims to 
 be absolute has no significance for the philosopher. The 
 Catholic, the Protestant, the Jew, the Mohammedan, 
 the Buddhist, all claim to possess the truth ; but who 
 shall decide between them ? In order to be the crite- 
 rion, a faith must first legitimate itself ; it must prove 
 its authority before its claims can be recognized by phi- 
 losophy. The appeal to revelation or inspiration may be 
 made by any religion : the very thing to be established 
 is the genuineness of the claimed authority. A faith, 
 in order to gain the approval of reason, must be rational. 
 This implies that reason is the ultimate appeal in case 
 of conflict. Properly understood, there can be no ob- 
 jection to this on the part of faith. As the appeal to 
 reason as the final authority, even in religious faith, is 
 often perverted, it is worth while to determine exactly 
 what is meant by such an appeal. 
 
 The claim that faith must be rational does not mean 
 that all the objects of belief can be comprehended by 
 reason. If this were the sense, faith might as well be 
 abandoned at once. Reason neither comprehends itself 
 absolutely, nor the soul, nor the world, nor God. So 
 far as it understands its limits, it has the best grounds 
 
 * Schleiermacher attempted this at the beginning of the century. 
 Ritschl of Gottingen advocates the total exclusion of metaphysics 
 from theology. Me already has numerous followers, and his school is 
 growing. 
 
84 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for modesty. The deeper thought of the age tends to 
 despair rather than to arrogance. Much may be true 
 whose full meaning we cannot fathom. 
 
 Nor does it mean that faith is only to accept what 
 reason or the understanding demonstrates. If this were 
 done, faith would be superseded by knowledge. This is 
 the tendency of positivism and allied systems, though 
 they themselves, in the name of knowledge, usually start 
 with some supposition which itself needs proof, so that 
 their positive knowledge itself rests on faith. Such 
 tendencies, narrow, unconscious of their real character, 
 often conceited as well as exclusive, are opposed by a 
 philosophy which is broad as well as deep. A rational 
 faith means the continuance of faith as faith, and not 
 the foolish attempt to transform its emotional elements 
 into mathematical formulas. Faith may contain much 
 which reason cannot discover or demonstrate and com- 
 prehend, and yet be perfectly rational. It must not, how- 
 ever, contain any thing in itself contradictory ; and one 
 of the most important functions of philosophy in relation 
 to theology is the test of the consistency of theological 
 dogmas and systems. Not only does the reason claim 
 that doctrines must be consistent with themselves, but 
 also that they must not be in conflict with the estab- 
 lished laws of mind. When evidence is produced in 
 favor of facts or doctrines, it must be in accordance with 
 the laws of evidence. So far as its objects are subject 
 to demonstration, faith has only that logic whose appli- 
 cation is universal. The logic of faith, unless the ex- 
 pression is figurative, is exactly the same as that which 
 proves the revolution of the earth around the sun. The 
 data, indeed, differ greatly, but not the reasoning founded 
 on them. 
 
 So far as the doctrines of faith are comprehensible by 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 85 
 
 reason, they must be rational. But we go a step far- 
 ther, and claim that faith, whether its doctrines are com- 
 prehensible or not, must itself be rational ; that is, there 
 must be sufficient ground for the faith. The fact that 
 a doctrine is not self-contradictory is no evidence of its 
 truth. The ontological proof has lost its force, because 
 it is seen that a consistent idea of the Divine Being is 
 no proof that God really exists. Whether it is held 
 that faith is based on revelation, or on history, or on 
 the study of nature, or on the impulses, demands, and 
 experiences of man, or on all these combined, it can 
 only substantiate its claims by showing that its grounds 
 are rational. The objects of the claimed revelation may 
 transcend the limits of our minds ; but if I am to believe 
 in them, I must have reasonable grounds for the belief, 
 otherwise I might as well accept mythology, or make 
 some other arbitrary choice. For historic facts we 
 justly demand historic evidence. Philosophy, in spite 
 of the attempt of Hegelians, cannot determine a priori, 
 or according to any valid process, what the historical 
 development must have been, and what may have oc- 
 curred at a particular time. But reason has criteria 
 according to which historical events, whether sacred 
 or profane, must be tested. Faith in events which 
 stand this test is rational, while unbelief would be irra- 
 tional. It is certainly not rational to determine by 
 philosophy what belongs exclusively to history. A phL 
 losophy which decides a priori that providence, prophecy, 
 and miracle are impossible, disposes of these subjects 
 summarily, wholly regardless of the testimony of his- 
 tory. All in history which comes under these heads is 
 interpreted as mythology, or fiction, or deception, or 
 mistake. There is much construction of history where 
 there should be simply interpretation. We must judge 
 
86 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 experience by experience, not by any supposed philoso- 
 phy of experience which ignores experience itself; so 
 history must be judged by history, according to the 
 laws of historic criticism. 6 
 
 In affirming that reason is the last appeal, we mean 
 that reason is fundamental ; it determines the laws of 
 probability and certainty. It must not, however, be 
 expected that reason can reconcile all principles, or 
 explain all mysteries. If the accomplishment of this is 
 to be the rule, then the religion that is rational must 
 be barren, and will hardly rise above the level of rigid 
 morality. Philosophy cannot fully explain even its 
 own principles, or completely harmonize them ; and it 
 is too much to expect of it an explanation of all that 
 pertains to religion. Principles which are true may 
 form a union at a point which lies beyond the reach of 
 our intellects. Even Hume, with his empirical basis, 
 his clearness and acumen and scepticism, could not 
 limit his mind to what he could explain and demon- 
 strate. At the close of his Treatise he says, "There 
 are two principles which I cannot render consistent, 
 nor is it in my power to renounce either of them ; viz., 
 that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, 
 and that the mind never perceives any real connection 
 among distinct existences.'''' If these problems baffle the 
 power of the mind, is it any wonder that the deepest 
 may have much for faith and little for intellectual sight ? 
 
 The specific rules of reason as applicable to faith may 
 be thus summarized : — 
 
 1. The fact that a notion is perfectly consistent with 
 itself is no evidence that there is a corresponding reality. 
 
 2. No reality can correspond with a notion that is 
 self-contradictory. A cannot at the same time be B 
 and not-B. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 87 
 
 3. No doubt many objects exist of which reason has 
 no conception, and which it cannot comprehend. The 
 power of reason is not the measure of existence. 
 
 4. Faith in such objects must be based on sufficient 
 evidence ; that is, it must be rational. 
 
 To reject rules as evident as these, is simply to deter- 
 mine that faith shall be unreasonable ; that it shall rest 
 on grounds which the mind itself finds inadequate. 
 One need but understand what this means, in order to 
 see that it is in reality faith against faith; that it is 
 an effort to force the mind to assent to what it cannot 
 accept. Rejecting this negation of its own laws as 
 impossible, nothing remains but genuine rationalism, 
 as indicated in the rules given. But it is not what has 
 commonly been called rationalism. Heretofore this 
 name has usually been applied to the efforts to bring 
 all the objects of faith within the comprehension of 
 reason, or to admit as valid only those which reason 
 itself could discover and demonstrate. This rational- 
 ism was itself most irrational, because it ignored both 
 the reasonable claims of the heart and the limits of 
 reason. It viewed as rational only what was within 
 the grasp of reason, which reason was often used in a 
 low and narrow, not in an ideal, sense ; but it forgot 
 that there may be rational grounds in history and ex- 
 perience for a faith which is not limited by the powers 
 of the reason to comprehend. The rationalism which 
 the above rules establish simply claims that there should 
 be a reason for the faith in us, and that we should prove 
 all things, and hold fast that which is good. It is a 
 rationalism which religion demands as much as philoso- 
 phy ; which, in fact, faith demands if it is to be faith. 
 It admits that objects of faith may be above reason, but 
 insists that they cannot be against reason; it admits 
 
88 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 that reason may no more be able to discover them than 
 it can historic events, but claims that faith in them 
 must be reasonable. Whatever the ground of faith may- 
 be, whether in history, Scripture, nature, the heart, or 
 the will, it must have a rational basis. 
 
 If faith has at times sinned against reason by 
 ignoring the rational claims, philosophy has also sinned 
 against faith by ignoring its character and rights. But 
 the sins of faith against reason are against faith itself ; 
 and when philosophy sins against faith, it also does vio- 
 lence to its own nature. A philosophy which eagerly 
 interprets the phenomena of the external world, but 
 ignores those which are inner, which reveal man him- 
 self and concern him most, may ignore religion, but it 
 is not worthy of the name "philosophy." 7 
 
 It may be claimed that sin has so weakened reason, 
 that it cannot test the truth ; but this objection cuts 
 off the very limb on which the objector himself must 
 stand. If it is valid, how can we know whether we 
 have the truth ? How can we determine what to be- 
 lieve? The power of faith must also have been per- 
 verted by sin. The argument which robs man of the 
 ability to test the truth, also robs him of the possibility 
 of attaining a reliable faith. The man who wants an 
 ethical and spiritual basis of faith must, of course, him- 
 self be moral and religious. 
 
 A few more hints may be of service to the student. 
 By its attacks, philosophy may help to make religion 
 conscious of itself. The fact that certain views have 
 been held for ages, does not establish their truth. But 
 neither does it prove them false. Neither antiquity nor 
 novelty decides any thing in philosophy. An object 
 may be real, and yet our grounds for believing in it 
 may be irrational. A man, after discovering that he 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 89 
 
 has believed without sufficient reasons, may abandon 
 his faith ; but the fact that his faith was not well estab- 
 lished is no proof that the objects in which he believed 
 do not exist. Our belief and unbelief do not affect the 
 truth itself. The earth moved, though the whole world 
 denied it. It is necessary to distinguish between the 
 objects of faith and the psychological basis of faith. If 
 faith is not valid without sufficient grounds, neither 
 should it be rejected without sufficient reasons. "A 
 logical apparatus that is to overturn the deepest of 
 human beliefs, must have an extremely firm basis, and 
 must have these parts so firmly articulated that there 
 is no dislocating them." * 
 
 The conflict between reason and faith has probably 
 not yet reached its climax. Much as we may desire 
 peace, the mind cannot rest until it has fought the 
 battle to the end. No truce is possible until the com- 
 batants have learned thoroughly to understand each 
 other, and have become willing to give each other their 
 dues. He who enters the conflict must be prepared 
 for severe trials if he wants to make thorough work. 
 Whatever else may be destroyed, the truth cannot be 
 finally overthrown. If he has this confidence coupled 
 with modesty, deep sincerity, and a religious love for 
 truth, the student may safely enter the battle, assured 
 that truth will at last hold the field. 
 
 Confidence in the truth, and the resolute purpose to 
 seek it, and it only, may unite in the closest bonds 
 philosophy and religion. Both are free, but both are 
 bound by the truth. Co-ordination, union, and freedom 
 claimed by each for the other, as well as for itself, are 
 the conditions of success. The progress made in our 
 
 * Herbert Spencer uses these words with reference to Hume: Psy- 
 chology, 2d ed., ii. 350. 
 
90 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 age is a guaranty to the scholar that he shall enjoy 
 greater freedom in his inquiries than former ages 
 granted. That may, of course, be claimed as liberty, 
 which is really an abuse ; but if true freedom is op- 
 posed, progress cannot be permanently checked. The 
 triumphs of intellect may be somewhat more slow, but 
 they will eventually overthrow the last remains of 
 bigotry. Helmholtz attributes the superior success of 
 German investigators, in some departments of science, 
 to the fact that they are "more fearless than others 
 of the consequences of the entire and perfect truth. 
 Both in England and France we find excellent inves- 
 tigators, who are capable of working with thorough 
 energy in the proper sense of the scientific methods; 
 hitherto, however, they have always had to bend to 
 social or ecclesiastical prejudices, and could only openly 
 express their convictions at the expense of their social 
 influence and their usefulness. Germany has advanced 
 with bolder step : she has had the full confidence, which 
 has never been shaken, that truth fully known brings 
 with it its own remedy for the danger and disadvantage 
 that may here and there attend a limited recognition 
 of what is true. A labor-loving, frugal, and moral 
 people may exercise such boldness, may stand face to 
 face with truth ; it has nothing to fear though hasty 
 or partial theories be advocated, even if some appear to 
 trench upon the foundations of morality and society." * 
 Whatever else may be feared, we cannot abandon 
 our confidence in the beneficence of truth. The whole 
 truth will fit the heart as well as the head, and will be 
 promotive of pure religion as well as of sound philoso- 
 phy. "From science, modestly pursued, with a due 
 
 * Aim and Progress of Physical Science, in his Popular Scientific 
 Lectures. 
 
RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION. 91 
 
 consciousness of the extreme fmitude of our intellectual 
 powers, there can arise only nobler and wider notions 
 of the purpose of creation. Our philosophy will be an 
 affirmative one, not the false and negative dogmas of 
 August Comte, which have usurped the name and mis- 
 represented the tendencies of a true positive philosophy. 
 True science will not deny the existence of things 
 because they cannot be weighed and measured. It 
 will rather lead us to believe that the wonders and 
 subtleties of possible existence surpass all that our 
 mental powers allow us clearly to perceive." * 
 
 LITERATURE. 
 
 The subject of this chapter is frequently discussed in 
 philosophical and dogmatic works, but not always with 
 impartiality. Often it is too evident that there is more 
 concern about the claims of some system, than to give 
 an objective view of the relation of philosophy and 
 religion. Deism in England, and rationalism in Ger- 
 many, necessarily led to a discussion of the subject. 
 Under the influence of Lessing, Kant, and Hegel, special 
 attention was devoted to the relation. The works on 
 natural or rational theology all bear on the subject. 
 In works on the philosophy of religion (Kant, Fries, 
 Schelling, Hegel, Caird, Pfleiderer, Lotze), an effort is 
 usually made to determine what religious elements are 
 demanded by, or consistent with, certain philosophies. 
 On the Continent the recent efforts to harmonize reli- 
 gion are mostly based on the works of Kant, Herbart 
 (Drobisch : Religionsphilosophie ; Fliigel : Die specula- 
 tive Theologie der G-egenwart), Hegel (Biedermann: 
 Philosophie und Christenthum, also Dogmatik ; Lipsius : 
 two books on the same subjects as Biedermann V), and 
 
 * Jevons, 768. 
 
92 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Lotze. Ritschl's effort to exclude metaphysics from 
 theology has led to discussions, mostly among theolo- 
 gians, which have produced an extensive literature. 
 (Ritschl : Theoloyie und Metaphysik ; Herrmann : Die 
 Metaphysik in der Theologie ; Kaftan : Das Wesen der 
 Religion). It has also been attempted to construct 
 religions on the basis of positivism, evolutionism, and 
 pessimism (Hartmann). The religious questions com- 
 mon to philosophy and religion may be concentrated 
 under theism, and the doctrine of the soul or immortality ; 
 the former including, besides the existence and attri- 
 butes of God, such themes as creation, design, providence, 
 miracles, revelation (Flint, Ladd, Pressense's Origins). 
 On the relation of faith and knowledge QGlauben und 
 Wissen), there are numerous works in German, and the 
 subject is also frequently discussed in philosophical 
 journals. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Religion a personal relation to God. What basis and 
 objects has it in common with Philosophy ? Difference 
 between Philosophy and Religion. Between Religion 
 and Theology. Reason and Faith. Rational Faith. 
 Historical Rationalism and Deism. Reason and Com- 
 mon Sense. Philosophy and Mysticism. Arguments 
 for the existence of God. Views of Anselm, Descartes, 
 Kant. Significance of the emotional and volitional 
 elements in Religion. Philosophical and historical crit- 
 icism (Tubingen School). Limits of thought and of 
 being. Religion and Materialism, Pantheism, Positiv- 
 ism, Agnosticism. Science and Religion. Basis for 
 Religion in human nature. Moral argument for Reli- 
 gion. Does the psychological basis of Religion furnish 
 an argument in favor of the objects of Religion ? What 
 is meant by the self-evidencing power of truth ? 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATUBAL SCIENCE. 93 
 
 CHAPTER III, 
 
 PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 
 
 Philosophy and science, the two departments in 
 which modern intellect has attained its greatest achieve- 
 ments, are both coldly intellectual, and, in theory at 
 least, rigorous in method and absolute in the finality 
 of their results. The advocates of each usually claim 
 independence in their respective sphere, and contend 
 for the supremacy in the domain of thought. It is but 
 natural that with so great similarity they should often 
 be confounded, and that with so much to distinguish 
 them their hostility during rivalry and encroachments 
 should become intense. But while at times they severely 
 repel, they at others attract each other, and tend to 
 coalesce. That they interlace, or even amalgamate, is 
 evident from expressions like "scientific philosophy," 
 and " philosophy of science/' * 
 
 Under these circumstances it is peculiarly difficult to 
 determine their exact places and relations ; but it is as 
 important as difficult, particularly since they are the 
 departments in which the severest efforts of intellect 
 culminate. 
 
 * In the beginning of this century, it was common in Germany to 
 regard philosophy as science (Wissenschaft); the same is still the case, 
 but it meets with more opposition. A distinction is now made betweeti 
 philosophy which is scientific, and that which is not, as is evident from 
 the Quarterly for Scientific Philosophy (wissenschaftliche Philosophie), 
 and also from the Italian journal Revista de Filosofia Scientifica. 
 
94 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The student who watches the development of thought 
 in the growth of language, will observe that "philos- 
 ophy " and " science " are not so commonly as formerly 
 employed as synonymes. As a branch in its growth 
 may separate into two with different directions, so it has 
 been with intellect in developing philosophy and science 
 together and afterwards separating them into distinct 
 tendencies. While both terms are at times still used for 
 the same spheres, we shall see that the process of dis- 
 crimination and analysis is rapidly assigning to each a 
 peculiar class of objects, and a peculiar aim. The term 
 "natural science" of course implies that there is other 
 science also ; and for the present, for the sake of defi- 
 niteness, we shall distinguish between philosophy and 
 natural science, but with the conviction that the time 
 is not distant when philosophy and science itself shall 
 be generally admitted to have distinct spheres. 
 
 If a word with different senses is used, it will be found 
 that its leading or most apparent sense absorbs, as it 
 were, the others, and is ordinarily the only one present 
 to the mind. When used with a meaning different from 
 the leading one, it requires special discrimination to 
 discern it; so that we frequently get a meaning of a 
 word, but not the one intended. When a technical term 
 is popularized, some prominent shade of meaning is gen- 
 erally seized, and applied to many objects to which it is 
 not technically applicable. " Science " and " philosophy " 
 are thus employed and made vague. But this law is also 
 promotive of serious error, which can only be overcome 
 by carefully observing the exact sense of a word in its. 
 connections. To such use, or rather abuse, the word 
 " natural " is subject. In theology it has actually come 
 to mean unnatural (sinful, the opposite of man's origi- 
 nal, true nature). In science it is at times used in dis- 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 95 
 
 tinction from the supernatural, in which case it includes 
 the mental in man. When this is done, the mental is 
 apt to be assimilated to what is most prominent in 
 nature, namely the material and mechanical. But we 
 also use " natural " in distinction from " mental," in 
 which case man's peculiarities are most emphasized. 
 
 When natural science is here contrasted with phi- 
 losophy, we use " natural " as distinct both from the 
 mental and the supernatural. Natural science thus in- 
 cludes the whole domain of nature, but not psychology. 
 
 There are two leading meanings in the term " science " 
 which have led to confusion even in its technical use. 
 Thus it is employed on the one hand to designate sim- 
 ply certainty in systematized knowledge, whether that 
 knowledge be formal or material ; * and, on the other, it 
 designates systematized material knowledge that is cer- 
 tain. Thus, when the mere element of certainty is con- 
 sidered, there are two departments of thought which 
 have the strongest claim to the term " science," namely 
 mathematics and formal logic. They are both specula- 
 tive, mathematics being based on space and numbers, 
 logic on indisputable axioms, and both being developed 
 according to inexorable laws of miud, independent of 
 observation and experiment in the ordinary sense. That 
 tli is formal knowledge is the most certain of all, is evi- 
 dent from the fact that mathematics and logic are not 
 liable to the errors possible in observation and experi- 
 ment ; besides, all material knowledge, natural science 
 included, depends on formal knowledge for its construc- 
 tion, so that, even if its materials are absolutely certain, 
 material knowledge can at best but attain the absolute- 
 ness of the formal laws by which it is constructed. 
 
 * Material in the sense of containing objects as well as forms of 
 knowledge. 
 
98 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 If certainty, then, were the sole point of considera- 
 tion, we should not hesitate to pronounce the specu- 
 lative departments of mathematics and formal logic 
 pre-eminently science. But when we come to material 
 knowledge we find that the conditions for the strict 
 application of these formal systems are given only in 
 nature, so that in the domain of material knowledge the 
 term " science " is strictly applicable only to nature. If 
 we distinguish between formal and material science, 
 there can be no danger of confusion, since in that case 
 the former will include mathematics and logic, while the 
 latter will be limited to natural science. So promi- 
 nent, however, has natural science become, that it is 
 generally meant now when the term " science " is used ; 
 and to avoid confusion it would be well to confine the 
 term to that department. 
 
 Even among scholars the term is employed in various 
 senses. When used technically, they are apt to attach 
 to it what is only incidentally associated, and has no 
 claim to its exactness and severity, while when employed 
 popularly they designate by it systematized knowledge 
 of any kind. Thus heraldry is called " the science of 
 conventional distinctions impressed on shields, banners, 
 and other military accoutrements." History, jurispru- 
 dence, music, politics, theology, aesthetics, ethics, logic, 
 mathematics, chemistry, and many other subjects, have 
 been called sciences. Now, a glance shows that neither 
 in their objects, nor foundation, nor method, nor degree 
 of exactness and reliability, is there any agreement 
 between these heterogeneous subjects. No wonder, 
 then, that scholars are not agreed as to the meaning of 
 the term.* 
 
 * Different writers, having different conceptions of what constitutes 
 a science, have assigned different dates to the birth of geology and other 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 97 
 
 When we speak of natural science, we are apt to 
 think chiefly of a certain method and its results ; but 
 we also imply a particular class of objects. The phe- 
 nomena of nature are peculiar in that they cannot 
 merely be observed like other facts before the mind, but 
 they can also be tested so as to yield exact and definite 
 results not dependent on subjective states. The mind, 
 if viewed as a part of nature, cannot be subjected to 
 the same tests throughout. Even biology presents 
 greater obstacles than physics. The character of its 
 experiments, and the method of drawing and testing its 
 inferences, give natural science a peculiar severity and 
 exactness. The physicist subjects objects to various 
 modifications in order to discover the effect of different 
 relations. Something is added or subtracted, or differ- 
 ently placed, in order to discover new properties or 
 facts. Professor Tait says, "The essence of experi- 
 ment is to modify the circumstances of a physical phe- 
 nomenon so as to increase its value as a test." The 
 perfect uniformity, the absolute exactness, and the cer- 
 tainty attainable in these experiments, make them 
 peculiar ; and the laws to which they are subject deter- 
 mine what is technically called the scientific method. 
 
 Not more severe is natural science in its experiments 
 than in observing and recording phenomena, whether 
 occurring naturally or the result of experiment. The 
 same experiments can be repeated at will and by any 
 number of scientists, thus insuring greatest accuracy. 
 But observation and experiment furnish only the mate- 
 rials of science, not science itself. All the processes 
 
 sciences. Professor Huxley defines science as " organized common 
 sense : " and Mr. Spencer, as " partially unified knowledge." Science 
 has also been defined as systematized knowledge, rationalized knowl- 
 edge, verified knowledge, classified knowledge, etc. — H. M. Stanley, 
 Mind, 1884, 266. 
 
98 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 founded on them are mathematically exact. Whatever 
 suppositions may be tentatively adopted, science itself 
 is limited to demonstrations ; so that in the strict sense, 
 and according to its true idea, natural science is abso- 
 lute. For this reason the term " science " is so often 
 assumed to help along mere hypotheses and assumptions 
 which have no claim either to exactness or finality. 
 We must distinguish between the claims of science and 
 the claims of scientists. 
 
 Strict scientists are only consistent when they refuse 
 the application of the term " science " to objects which 
 will not submit to the tests of their method. If their 
 conditions are correct, music, theology, history, politics, 
 and similar subjects are not sciences. This of course 
 does not imply that they are neither valuable nor relia- 
 ble, but only that they do not comply with the condi- 
 tions necessary to constitute science in its technical 
 sense. When we speak of a man of science, we do not 
 mean a theologian, metaphysician, historian, mathemati- 
 cian, or logician, but one who devotes himself to natural 
 science. Such expressions as " student of science, scien- 
 tific study, scientific discovery, scientific progress," and 
 many similar ones, are generally used in the sense indi- 
 cated. From the more general meaning of systematized 
 knowledge, the term has thus come to be appropriated 
 for knowledge of a certain kind, obtained in a particu- 
 lar way, subject to definite tests, and absolutely exact 
 and reliable ; and nothing will be lost by limiting the 
 word to what is, in the strictest and most technical 
 sense, scientific. In doing this, science will not only 
 be different from philosophy, but will also have a pecul- 
 iar sphere, distinct in method and limitation, and clearly 
 separated from all other departments of learning. 
 
 Natural science seeks to discover the causes of physi- 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 99 
 
 cal events, and attempts to construct a system of the 
 laws of nature. " To find the law by which they are 
 regulated, is to understand phenomena. For law is 
 nothing more than the general conception in which a 
 series of similarly recurring natural processes may be 
 embraced." * 
 
 The declaration that natural science aims to discover 
 the laws of nature, is essentially the same as affirming 
 that it seeks the forces of nature. The laws are simply 
 statements of how the forces work, giving the formula 
 of the operations of natural causes.f "Force" and 
 " cause " are, however, words which seem to furnish 
 explanations of phenomena which they in reality do 
 not give. In using them, the mind should determine 
 whether they interpret facts otherwise than by the sub- 
 stitution of another fact. Do we know what a force is, 
 or how a cause works to produce an effect ? We are apt 
 to imagine that we have explained how a thing is done, 
 when we have only shown that it is done. It is a deep 
 inquiry to determine whether with what we call force 
 we ever get farther than from one fact to another. In 
 its last analysis a law gives only a method of procedure, 
 or a general fact which embraces all facts of the same 
 kind. The law of gravitation is itself a fact which 
 includes many others ; but neither Newton nor any 
 
 * Helmholtz, Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects (Appleton), 370. 
 P. 393 he says " that what physical science strives after is the knowl- 
 edge of laws; in other words, the knowledge how at different times, 
 under the same conditions, the same results are brought about." Pro- 
 fessor Tait states : " The object of all pure physical science is to en- 
 deavor to grasp more and more perfectly the nature and laws of the 
 external world." — Recent Advances in Physical Science, 347. 
 
 t " Our desire to comprehend natural phenomena, in other words, to 
 ascertain their laws, thus takes another form of expression, — that is, we 
 have to seek out the forces which are the causes of the phenomena." — 
 Helmholtz, 372. 
 
 LofC. 
 
100 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 other human mind conceived the explanation of the law 
 itself. 
 
 Its aim to reduce phenomena to laws attaches natural 
 science closely to the facts it attempts to formulate. 
 " Nothing can be learned as to the physical world, save 
 by observation and experiment, or by mathematical 
 deductions from data so obtained." * These deductions 
 of course include all the direct logical inferences from 
 the facts, and it is in these that scientists most of all 
 reveal their intellectual power. It would be trivial to 
 state that science demands the severest mental efforts, 
 were it not that in some quarters the view prevails that 
 science is the product of mechanical routine, as much 
 within the power of the shalloAvest as of the profoundest 
 minds. Then, pretenders so often obtain popularity by 
 palming off their thoughtless empiricism as science, that 
 beginners are liable to forget that mere observers and 
 experimenters are to the scientist what the hod-carrier 
 is to the mason. All phenomena are valuable in pro- 
 portion as they are elaborated and mastered by thought. 
 Newton's great discovery required few facts, but enor- 
 mous intellectual effort. Profound scientists recognize 
 the need of emphasizing the mental vigor essential in 
 scientific pursuits, for the reason that so many imagine 
 that science requires nothing but a registering and classi- 
 fying of facts. It- is forgotten that the facts observed 
 in nature can only be connected and related by the 
 mind, and that the laws of nature are mental products 
 from the given data. " Isolated facts and experiments 
 have in themselves no value, however great their num- 
 ber may be. They only become valuable in a theoret- 
 ical or practical point of view when they make us 
 acquainted with the law of a series of uniformly recur- 
 
 * Tait, 342. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 101 
 
 ring phenomena, or, it may be, only give a negative 
 result showing an incompleteness in our knowledge of 
 such a law, till then held to be perfect." * Science, in 
 dealing with facts for its highest purposes, is as purely 
 intellectual as is philosophy in relating and developing 
 concepts. 
 
 Not mere observers, but the thinkers, have made this 
 " the century of natural science." The victories ascribed 
 to the laboratory are really the triumphs of reason in 
 the laboratory. It might be misleading to speak of a 
 philosophic element in the profound scientists from New- 
 ton till the present ; and yet it would express their con- 
 stant tendency to pass from the concrete to the abstract, 
 and from facts to laws, principles, and system. The 
 materials with which science deals being more apparent 
 than its method, the sense has been honored with the 
 functions of the reason, and it has been overlooked that 
 the progress in physical studies has been due to a scien- 
 tific empiricism, mastered by a scientific rationalism.! 
 However unpopular speculation may be among empirics, 
 it can be healthy as well as sickly, and is too deep an 
 impulse of the mind to be ignored by real scientists. 
 But the difference between science and philosophy is, 
 that in the former the speculation is limited by facts 
 and their laws, while in philosophy the concepts and the 
 mental laws are the limit. Whoever has passed from 
 the facts of science to science itself will agree with 
 Whewell $ in emphasizing the need of facts and reason, 
 the " observation of things without, and an inward effort 
 
 * Helmholtz, 369. 
 
 t The indications given by the senses, unless interpreted by reason, 
 are utterly unmeaning. But when reason and the senses work harmo- 
 niously together, they open to us an absolutely illimitable prospect of 
 mysteries to be explored." — Tait, 342. 
 
 t History of the Inductive Sciences, Introduction, 
 
102 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of thought." He adds, "The impressions of sense, 
 unconnected by some rational and speculative principle, 
 can only end in a practical acquaintance with individual 
 objects ; the operations of the rational faculties, on the 
 other hand, if allowed to go on without a constant 
 reference to external things, can lead only to empty 
 abstraction and barren ingenuity. Real speculative 
 knowledge demands the combination of the two ingre- 
 dients, — right reason, and facts to reason upon. It has 
 been well said, that true knowledge is the interpretation 
 of nature : and thus it requires both the interpreting 
 mind, and nature for its object ; both the document, and 
 the ability to read it." 
 
 Nature does not write or impress its facts and laws 
 upon a passive mind, and it is no such immediateness 
 of scientific knowledge which distinguishes it from the 
 philosophic. Science is not the product of sensation- 
 alism, though the denial of the possibility of knowledge 
 anywhere else than in regions accessible to the senses 
 has led to the more exclusive study of the phenomenal 
 world. The merit of turning thought from scholastic 
 subtleties to empirical investigations belongs largely to 
 Bacon ; but those who regard his emphasis on the obser- 
 vation of facts, as giving the essence of the modern 
 scientific spirit and tendency, have failed to appreciate 
 the intellectual energy in science. Bacon's great ser- 
 vice to science consists rather in the general direction 
 he gave to thought, than in the introduction of a com- 
 plete method of scientific processes. He did much to 
 banish useless inquiries, and to substitute for them 
 researches which promise fruitful and certain results ; 
 but it was an impulse to a certain course of inquiry, 
 rather than a full indication of the route to be 
 taken. 8 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 103 
 
 In discussing the relation of philosophy to science, we 
 must distinguish the true scientist from mere empirics. 
 While the aim and method of the latter put all recon- 
 ciliation with philosophy out of the question, because 
 they depreciate thought and exalt the sense to the throne 
 of reason, the philosopher has much in common with the 
 former, and can easily come to an agreement with him 
 respecting many essential points in science and philoso- 
 phy. The purely intellectual element in his pursuit 
 brings the scientist into sympathy with the philosopher, 
 while the philosopher unhesitatingly admits all that the 
 scientist can justly claim for his method and its results ; 
 and if both the philosopher and scientist are deep and 
 broad, there can be little danger of conflict. 
 
 Although the advance of science is due to the intel- 
 lectual use of the facts, it is still the explanation of the 
 facts that is sought; and scientists are usually suspi- 
 cious of conclusions wholly beyond their reach. The 
 facts are held to be the test of all speculations respect- 
 ing nature. If scientists admit, that, in any department 
 of thought, there may be knowledge of objects which 
 cannot be subjected to the test of facts, they deny that 
 it is scientific. In natural science, therefore, thought 
 is limited, being tethered to the facts. Besides observa- 
 tion, experiment, and mathematics, it is found that spec- 
 ulation, hypotheses, and theories are indispensable; but 
 they must be based on facts and tested by them, and 
 their sole value consists in their ability to explain the 
 facts. In the strict sense, the work of natural science 
 is completed when the laws of nature have been dis- 
 covered and systematized ; inferences and generaliza- 
 tions transcending the test laid down by science cannot 
 be regarded as lying within its domain, however reliable 
 in themselves. 
 
104 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Our liability to error induces us to seek in sense and 
 reason a corrective of each other, and to regard the truth 
 as resulting from the harmonious action of both. Only 
 an unthinking sensationalism can claim that the last 
 appeal should be made to the immediateness of our per- 
 ceptions. Science has clearly demonstrated that our 
 sense-impressions need correction by the judgment. I 
 see light, and hear sound ; but no number of impressions 
 can convince me that, aside from eye and ear, light and 
 sound exist in nature. I touch a piece of iron and a 
 cloth in the same room, and find the one colder than the 
 other ; and yet I know that both have the same tempera- 
 ture, my sensations being determined by the power of 
 objects to conduct heat. Thus our intellect is the ulti- 
 mate appeal, not the sense. As in its inferences, so also 
 in its observations and experiments, natural science 
 makes the reason supreme. The difference between 
 ordinary and scientific observation and experiment is 
 simply this, — that the latter use the sense and its ob- 
 jects according to rational principles, while the former 
 do not. Instead of the usual assumption, therefore, 
 that sense and reason are to each other a corrective, we 
 shall be nearer the truth in saying that reason uses the 
 data of sense as aids in drawing legitimate conclusions. 
 And natural science must be viewed as the rational in- 
 terpretation of na'ture, based on a rational use of the 
 facts, and subjected to the rational test by facts. 9 
 
 So far there will probably be no dispute between the 
 philosopher and the scientist. Whoever objects to the 
 expressions "rational use" and "rational test," and to 
 the supremacy of reason and the subordination of sense 
 implied, need but substitute the word "irrational," to 
 see the absurdity of his position. By eliminating the 
 rational, he cuts off all dispute, for there is no basis left 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 105 
 
 on which the disputants can stand. The only contro- 
 versy possible between the philosopher and scientist 
 would be respecting the sense of the word " rational," 
 — a dispute which cannot be settled by science with its 
 appeal to the test of facts (where is the standard reason 
 given as a fact ?), but only by philosophy. 
 
 No one questions the reliability of the results obtained 
 by means of the scientific method. Formerly philos- 
 ophers, indeed, proposed to substitute speculation for 
 this method ; that is now, however, universally admitted 
 to be wrong. But a conflict begins so soon as the ques- 
 tion is proposed, whether the laws of nature established 
 by science are the limits of knowledge. This is the 
 same as the inquiry, whether there is other than scien- 
 tific knowledge. It seems almost absurd to ask the 
 question ; but some so exalt science that they not only 
 refuse to join Du Bois-Reymond and others in inscrib- 
 ing IgnorabimuH on their banner, but every other attain- 
 ment so dwindles in comparison with science, that they 
 call it knowledge only by courtesy. A scholar eminent 
 in one department may get into a narrow rut, and be 
 unable to see over its edges any thing worthy of notice. 
 Compared with the omnipotence of science, one may 
 hear philology, literature, history, and logic, to say 
 nothing of metaphysics, theology, aesthetics, and ethics, 
 spoken of with a degree of contempt. 
 
 The cause of science will not be retarded, but pro- 
 moted, by distinguishing between those who have really 
 caught its spirit, and such as are scientists only in name. 
 If the latter speak disparagingly of other pursuits in 
 order to magnify their own importance, they can work 
 mischief only if regarded as speaking in the name oi 
 science. The question, whether there is any thing be- 
 yond the limits of strict science, is answered by scien- 
 
106 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tists themselves in their efforts to get beyond. The 
 limits of science are evidently not the limit of thought, 
 and the mind cannot rest when it has reached them. 
 Scientific men construct cosmologies, and frequently 
 adopt materialistic or idealistic theories of the universe, 
 which are wholly extra-scientific. It may even happen, 
 that speculation is zealously denounced in the interest 
 of exact science, but this only serves to increase the 
 astonishment at finding so many winged speculations in 
 works of scientists. The imagination plays a much 
 more prominent part in constructing theories termed 
 scientific than is generally supposed. Herbart held that 
 imagination is essential to all discoveries, and that there 
 is as much of it in original thought in science as in 
 poetry. " It is very doubtful," he says, " whether New- 
 ton or Shakspeare possessed the greater imagination." 
 Surely our age need not abuse Kepler for his fancies, 
 nor pity Newton if he believed in alchemy.* The reli- 
 ability of what the mind imagines possible is to be deter- 
 mined by direct questions to nature, to be answered by 
 means of tentative experiment. The mere mental 
 combinations and theories of scientists must of course 
 be subjected, as far as possible, to scientific tests ; but 
 their very existence, to say nothing of their abundance 
 and utility, proves that the mind cannot be compressed 
 within the limits of exact science. 10 
 
 The confidence with which we speak of natural sci- 
 ence is justified so long as we remember that it confines 
 itself to phenomena, and that its observations are neces- 
 sarily limited. We enter the domain of mystery as soon 
 as we inquire into the essence of things, the nature of 
 forces and causes, and the totality of natural phenom- 
 ena. Both the progress of science and the division 
 
 * Jevons, 505. 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 107 
 
 of labor have increased the difficulty of generalizations 
 comprehending the total results of scientific inquiry. 11 
 While specialization, so marked a feature of our age, 
 greatly promotes the advance of the separate sciences, 
 it also has serious disadvantages. The rigid specialist 
 cannot get a comprehensive view of science even, still 
 less of knowledge in general ; he is also in danger of 
 becoming unjust to other branches, and of losing appre- 
 ciation for every thing but his specialty. The undue 
 exaltation of one department of thought destroys the 
 unity of knowledge, and the organism of all the sci- 
 ences. He who is supreme in a specialty may go far 
 astray when he makes it the standard of all intellectual 
 achievements, the criterion of all truth, the basis of all 
 generalizations, and the law for the interpretation of 
 the universe. Mere specialization, in exact proportion 
 to its perfection, makes knowledge fragmentary. For 
 systematic mental development, and for a complete and 
 comprehensive view of things, the mind must go beyond 
 these specializations. This is a demand of the special- 
 ties themselves. Sometimes the limits of their spheres 
 are in dispute ; who can settle it without rising above 
 the limitations of each ? Divisions are matters of men- 
 tal convenience, and analysis is but a preparation for 
 synthesis. But how can we form a correct synthesis of 
 all the sciences and their results ? In going beyond his 
 specialty, the specialist ceases to be a specialist ; and it 
 is no disparagement to his eminence in a particular 
 sphere to say that the exclusive training for and in his 
 specialty has probably unfitted him for the totally dif- 
 ferent problems which lie beyond. These problems are, 
 in many cases, the deepest, and involve the highest 
 interests. Shall they be ignored? Shall they be left 
 to the fancy? Or shall man be specially prepared to 
 
108 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 grapple with them ? The mind demands their solution, 
 or, at least, the most earnest effort, with the best means, 
 to solve them. If natural science could do the work, 
 no one would hesitate to consign to it these problems ; 
 but, lying far beyond the test of physical facts, science 
 cannot even attempt to solve them without becoming 
 philosophy. 
 
 The unity of nature is an axiom of science, and the 
 basis of all induction. But is this axiom given by 
 isolated facts, or by the special sciences ? No one ques- 
 tions that there must be unity in the final results of all 
 the sciences; but can a specialty teach us any thing 
 respecting the results of all investigation? There are 
 principles which are common to all thought, which de- 
 termine the character of all valid research, are the cri- 
 teria of all truth, and lie at the basis of all the sciences ; 
 now it is self-evident that what is common to all the 
 sciences, and constitutes the essence of science itself, 
 cannot be a specialty of any particular science. If any 
 one claimed it as a monopoly, the others would imme- 
 diately rebel. No natural science regards itself called 
 upon to make these principles a specialty ; each one, as 
 a rule, simply takes them for granted, and works on 
 them. Such, for instance, are the principles of knowl- 
 edge. Every science rests on these, and all its investi- 
 gations and cons'tructions must be determined by them ; 
 yet it might never get to nature itself if it had first to 
 answer the numerous questions pertaining to the theory 
 of knowledge. All that can be expected of a specialist 
 is that he master these principles ; and the failure to do 
 so is often fraught with serious consequences in scien- 
 tific investigations. 12 All inferences should be logical ; 
 but the specialist cannot be expected to prepare a logic 
 on the basis of his specialty, and then make that logic 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 109 
 
 the basis of reasoning in the specialty. Then there are 
 axioms, as in mathematics, which are taken for granted, 
 and yet the question of their validity involves the per- 
 plexing problems connected with the nature of what 
 are called necessary truths. So, too, there are such 
 notions as space, time, motion, change, substance and 
 accidence, being, cause, and many others, which are 
 commonly used as if perfectly clear, and yet they are 
 full of mystery.* They may, indeed, be so habitually 
 taken for granted that they hardly seem to involve 
 unsolved problems, and habit may lead one to regard 
 his assumptions as demonstrations. But the critical 
 mind, which does not run in a narrow groove, and is 
 not enslaved by dogmatism, sees that they involve the 
 deepest problems of the human intellect ; and it also 
 knows that every solution opens new fields of inquiry. 
 With all the brilliant discoveries of science, the sphere 
 of mystery has been enlarged and darkened. The 
 problems which arise out of the depths of science and 
 cannot be solved by it are philosophical, and must be 
 answered, if at all, by philosophy. 
 
 The study of the principles, organism, and final con- 
 sequences of science, has led scientists themselves to 
 connect philosophical speculations with their specialties. 
 In Descartes and Leibnitz, philosophy and science were 
 intimately connected. Kant passed from mathematics 
 and physics to metaphysics and ethics. Lotze and 
 Harms went from medical studies to philosophy. Hart- 
 
 * How are we to think matter ? Is it the unchangeable basis of phe- 
 nomena, or is it also changeable ? If it is itself changeable, is there any- 
 thing in the universe that is not subject to change ? If matter is re- 
 garded as an unchangeable substance, how can we account for the man- 
 ifold phenomena of the world ? To dismiss these subjects as irrelevant, 
 means that the mind's inquiries must be checked whenever they go 
 below the surface. 
 
110 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mann claims to base his speculations on the results of 
 natural science, according to the most approved scien- 
 tific method. Professor Wundt declares it was the 
 natural sciences which, " almost without my knowledge 
 and desire, led me toward philosophy ; " and also states 
 that now the sciences which lately seemed farthest 
 removed from philosophy have not been least affected 
 by it.* Helmholtz and others on the Continent adopt 
 fundamental principles of Kant's philosoplry. In Eng- 
 land, Locke, as developed by Hume and Mill, is the 
 leading authority among scientists. These philosophers, 
 not the sciences, are the source of the prevailing sensa- 
 tionalism and empiricism. In the doctrine of causation ; 
 in the hesitation to regard the uniformity of nature as 
 established beyond question ; in the substitution of 
 heredity, association, and experience, for the necessity 
 of reason ; in the suspicion with which thought, rising 
 above the impressions through the senses, is viewed, 
 we see the philosophy of Hume. The argument some- 
 times met with, that a miracle is possible because the 
 uniformity of nature is no necessity of reason, is simply 
 using Hume against Hume. And the view of Darwin 
 and the Darwinians, that the power to form abstractions 
 does not distinguish man from animals, is nothing but 
 Berkeley's argument against abstract ideas, adopted and 
 made current by Hume. Indeed, scientists usually place 
 themselves on some philosophical basis, on which they 
 construct their theories; and the conflicts among sci- 
 entists are usually philosophical, not scientific. Just 
 
 * " Nicbt am wenigsten sind aber diejenigen Wissenschaften von der 
 Philosophie beriihrt wordeu, die ibr vor nicbt langer Zeit vielleicht am 
 fernsten gestanden, diejenigen, die mich selbst — ieb darf wobl sagen 
 fast ohne mein Wissen und Wollen — der Pbilosopbie entgegengef iibrt 
 baben, die Naturwissenschaften." — Aufgabc der Philosophie in der Gegen- 
 voart, 5. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. Ill 
 
 because it is so absolute, and always appeals to facts, and 
 to demonstrations based directly on them, science cannot 
 be disputed. It does not dispute, it demonstrates. 
 
 We are consequently justified in affirming that sci- 
 ence, in proportion as it is deep, will recognize the 
 necessity of philosophy. The isolated thoughts or laws 
 furnished by the experimental sciences, instead of sat- 
 isfying the mind, impel it to form a union of the 
 fragments, and to draw from them the ultimate conse- 
 quences. It asks, What is the result of all the sciences? 
 Into what ocean do they pour their contents ? Starting 
 with the given data and their laws, what may be in- 
 ferred respecting the first and final causes? In these 
 queries are condensed some of the most important prob- 
 lems which experimental science suggests, but which 
 lie beyond its sphere, and in the domain of philosophy. 
 The mind continually strives to trace relations, to bring 
 remote objects together, and to unite the separated. 
 In this it is controlled by an impulse which may be 
 rudely checked, but which cannot be satisfied until 
 that ultimate unity is discovered whose existence is a 
 postulate of reason. 13 
 
 Much of the opposition of scientists to philosophy is 
 due to the spirit of positivism, which lauds experience, 
 but fails to see that the laws drawn therefrom involve 
 abstractions whose processes are subjected to philosophi- 
 cal, not scientific tests. Comte would ruthlessly banish 
 thought from the highest regions, and confine it to phe- 
 nomena. His system denies the rights of the mind 
 itself. Its author and some of his disciples (especially 
 Littre*) imagined that their positivism was allied to the 
 Kantian criticism ; but it is evident that they totally 
 failed to catch the spirit of the critical philosophy, 
 particularly of its earnest efforts to reach the limits of 
 
112 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thought, and to conserve the basis of morality. Posi- 
 tivism is not merely unhistorical, but also uncritical. 
 Without taking the trouble to examine thoroughly the 
 mental powers, it determines arbitrarily the limits of 
 thought ; and in this essential element its method 
 of procedure is the very opposite of the critical philoso- 
 phy. Positivism is dogmatism exalted to absolutism. 14 
 Positivism is not, however, the only source of antag- 
 onism between science and philosophy. Various philo- 
 sophical systems have been seriously at fault, and have 
 aroused opposition. In Germany the schism occurred 
 during the first decades of this century, when the influ- 
 ence of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel determined the 
 prevalent character of philosophic thought. The spec- 
 ulative tendencies were carried to such an extreme that 
 experiment was regarded beneath the dignity of philos- 
 ophers and scientists, who were expected to unravel all 
 mysteries a priori, and to spin the laws of nature, as 
 well as of mind, out of their own brains. For " phi- 
 losophy " Fichte attempted to substitute the term Wis- 
 senschaftslehre (the doctrine of science), which was 
 intended to give the laws of science. In the work with 
 this title he claims that the volume takes no account 
 of experience, and that its doctrines would be true even 
 if there were no experience. The same tone was 
 adopted by Schelling and Hegel. While experience 
 was spoken of disparagingly, speculation was made 
 supreme and regarded as containing all the treasures of 
 wisdom. But during the a priori frenzy (1790-1840) * 
 
 * A description of the beginning of this frenzy is given in my Life 
 of Immanuel Kant, chap. 11. 
 
 I am well aware that all of Hegel's disciples are not prepared to 
 admit that their master went to the extreme in speculation. There are 
 many points which are left obscure by Hegel himself, and the fierce 
 disputes in his school have only served to add to the confusion. Some 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 113 
 
 the natural sciences made rapid progress, and completely 
 emancipated themselves from the influence of specula- 
 tive philosophy. A great re-action came. The specu- 
 lative systems had prevailed in State and Church and 
 literature ; but before the middle of the present century 
 a different spirit became dominant. The a priori expla- 
 nations of nature were laughed at ; the speculations of 
 philosophers were viewed as air-castles ; and science, 
 based on the most pains-taking collection of facts and 
 the severest induction, became supreme. It seemed as 
 if an impassable gulf had been fixed between experi- 
 mental science and philosophy. With their extrava- 
 gance the really solid and grand achievements of the 
 speculative sj^stems were also rejected. Science became 
 haughty and exclusive. Experimentalists looked with 
 as much contempt on speculators as these had expressed 
 for the former ; and shallow empirics revealed their wis- 
 dom by an ignorant sneer at profound philosophers. 
 Science claimed the entire domain of the real, while the 
 realm of visions was assigned to philosophy. This 
 development since Kant's Kritik appeared enables us 
 to understand why in Germany philosophy and natural 
 science are more sharply distinguished than in other 
 lands. Naturphilosophie is not used like " natural phi- 
 losophy " in England and America to designate physics, 
 but speculations respecting nature ; hence it belongs to 
 philosophy, not to science. 
 
 Respecting the beginning of that conflict which 
 
 of his disciples claim that on the value of experiment, on the relation 
 of experience to reason, on the significance of the particular or indi- 
 vidual and the general, and of the concrete and the abstract, Hegel 
 had been misunderstood. This may be true ; but in that case both the 
 disciples and the master are to blame for contradictory statements, and 
 for the use of terms which seem to teach one thing when they mean 
 something different. 
 
114 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 drove philosophy and science into hostile camps, it will 
 be interesting to hear so eminent a scientist as Helm- 
 holtz.* " Certainly, at the end of last century, when 
 the Kantian philosophy reigned supreme, such a schism 
 had never been proclaimed ; on the contrary, Kant's 
 philosophy rested on exactly the same general ground 
 as the physical sciences, as is evident from his own 
 scientific works, especially from his Cosmogony." Of 
 Hegel's efforts to construct natural philosophy a priori, 
 he says, " His system of nature seemed, at least to nat- 
 ural philosophers, absolutely crazy. Of all the distin- 
 guished scientific men who were his contemporaries, not 
 one was found to stand up for his ideas. Accordingly, 
 Hegel himself, convinced of the importance of winning 
 for his philosophy in the field of physical science that 
 recognition which had been so freely accorded to it 
 elsewhere, launched out, with unusual vehemence and 
 acrimony, against the natural philosophers, and espe- 
 cially against Sir Isaac Newton, as the first and greatest 
 representative of physical investigation. The philoso- 
 phers accused the scientific men of narrowness ; the sci- 
 entific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. 
 And so it came about that men of science began to lay 
 some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influ- 
 ences from their work ; while some of them, including 
 men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to con- 
 demn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but 
 as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, 
 not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hege- 
 lian system to subordinate to itself all other studies 
 rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims 
 of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of 
 cognition, and the definition of the functions of the 
 intellect." 15 * 7-8. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 115 
 
 This feud has by no means been confined to Ger- 
 many, though it was most bitter there. The various 
 phases of the conflict need not be considered here ; but 
 the schism itself must be taken into account in order to 
 understand the relation now existing between scientists 
 and philosophers. It is not a conflict between philos- 
 ophy and science, which would imply that they are 
 incompatible and that the one or the other must there- 
 fore be destroyed ; but between historic systems, which 
 are imperfect and liable to change. There is scarcely a 
 doubt that in the controversy philosophers have been 
 the greatest gainers, perhaps because they were most to 
 blame originally and had most to learn. Not only have 
 they abandoned their a priori constructions respecting 
 natural phenomena, but many of them have also become 
 earnest students of science, so as to connect their phil- 
 osophical speculations as intimately as possible with the 
 results of exact research. Naturally they attend rather 
 to laws and principles than to the details of science, 
 though these have also received much attention. To 
 remove the charge of vagueness and uncertainty, they 
 have attempted to give philosophy as much of the sci- 
 entific basis and method as is consistent with its charac- 
 acter and aims. If a philosopher now placed himself on 
 the Naturphilosophie of Schelling or Hegel, he would in 
 his own fraternity be laughed at for his pains. The 
 conflict has made philosophy more modest, more criti- 
 cal, more solid, and consequently more reliable. 
 
 There are also scientists who have been gainers from 
 the conflict. The masters in science recognize their 
 limitations, admit the significance of the theoretical 
 element, encourage the study of the cognitive faculties 
 and of logic, while carefully excluding metaphysics from 
 science. The cry, "Return to Kant," came largely 
 
116 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 from scientists, who felt the need of supplementing 
 science with a critical philosophy. Such a prejudice 
 has, however, been excited against philosophy, that 
 many students of science have ignored even the study 
 of logic ; and their works also prove that they do not 
 distinguish clearly between sensation, experience, and 
 reason. 
 
 Herbart's words, uttered at the beginning of this cen- 
 tury, sound like a prophecy : " It cannot be otherwise 
 than that the neglect of philosophy should result in a 
 frivolous or perverted treatment of the fundamental 
 principles of all the sciences.*" So common has this 
 treatment become in certain quarters, that earnest voices 
 are heard among scientists, to say nothing of philoso- 
 phers and others, favoring more thorough discipline in 
 philosophical studies. Even the materialist, Dr. Louis 
 Buchner, holds that the riddles of life, if to be solved 
 at all, require philosophy. He declares that no special 
 science can give this solution ; the only hope is in the 
 results of all, developed according to logical principles.* 
 Professor Haeckel f also complains of " the lack of phil- 
 osophical culture, which characterizes most of the physi- 
 cists of the day." He claims that many of the errors 
 of scientists are due to their neglect of philosophy, and 
 to that " crude empiricism " which they laud as " exact 
 science." u The numerous errors of the speculative 
 natural philosophers in the first third of this century 
 have brought all philosophy into such disrepute among 
 exact scientists, that they cherish the strange illusion 
 that they can construct the edifice of natural science 
 from facts without a philosophical connection of the same ; 
 from mere observation without understanding. Only by 
 
 * Frankfurter Zeitung, 1871, No. 283. 
 t Natiiiiiche Schopfungsgeschichte. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 117 
 
 means of the most thorough permeation of philosophy 
 and empiricism can the indestructible edifice of true 
 monistic science arise." While Helmholtz throws the 
 weight of his influence in favor of the study of the cog- 
 nitive and logical elements of philosophy, his colleague, 
 Du Bois-Reymond, does not hesitate to make the charge, 
 that among scientists there is a lamentable lack of phil- 
 osophical training and dialectic acumen. In his " Seven 
 Riddles of the World, 1 ' he said that the manner in which 
 his address on " The Limits of Natural Science " had 
 been received proves that "the national philosophic 
 culture, of which we are accustomed to boast, does not 
 appear in a favorable light." So completely " has philoso- 
 phy been shoved aside, that even where natural science 
 itself has in many points reached the stage of philoso- 
 phizing, there often appears a great lack of preliminary 
 conceptions, and ignorance of what has really been 
 accomplished." It seems strange that scientists should 
 have found it necessary to defend logical studies and 
 deep thinking in science, but that has been the case. 
 Opposing the empirics, who want to make science super- 
 ficial, Liebig said, " In natural science all investigation is 
 deductive or a priori ; experiment is only for use by the 
 process of thought, just as arithmetical calculation; 
 thought must precede it in all cases if it is to have any 
 significance. An empirical investigation of nature, in 
 the usual sense, does not exist." * Fechner recognizes 
 the need of metaphysics ; and declares that while the 
 scientist stops with the atoms, these by no means satisfy 
 the mind, which strives to go beyond them. After a 
 war between natural science and philosophy, we now 
 see them " gradually coming to themselves and making 
 peace with each other, which promises to be the more 
 
 * Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. xi., quoted by Barutscbeck. 
 
118 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lasting, since the very problems which claim the atten- 
 tion of modern science are of such a character that their 
 solution is possible only on condition of co-operation 
 between natural science and philosophy." * 
 
 The antagonism between philosophy and science is 
 evidently drawing to a close. Both parties have erred ; 
 their approach now is on the basis of truth, of mutual 
 need, and mutual help. Professor Huxley holds that 
 " the reconciliation of physics and metaphysics lies in 
 the acknowledgment of faults upon both sides ; in the 
 confession by physics that all the phenomena of nature 
 are, in their ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of 
 consciousness ; in the admission by metaphysics, that 
 the facts of consciousness are practically interpretable 
 only by the methods and formulae of physics ; and, 
 finally, in the observance by both metaphysical and 
 physical thinkers of Descartes' maxim, — assent to no 
 proposition the matter of which is not so clear and 
 distinct that it cannot be doubted." f In his Logik, 
 Ueberweg says that "the so-called empirical sciences 
 would have to abandon their scientific character, if they 
 wanted to reject all thoughts transcending direct expe- 
 rience." J In 1873, the Academy of Sciences in Berlin 
 admitted to membership two philosophers, Professors 
 Zeller and Harms. The address of welcome contained 
 these sentences: "If the signs of the times do not 
 
 * Die Grundprincipien der Schellingschen Naturphilosophie, by Dr. R. 
 Koeber. See also Wundt's Einfluss der Philosophie auf die Naturwissen- 
 schaften, and Aufgabe der Philosophie in der Gegenwart. 
 
 t Lay Sermons, Descartes 'Discourse on Method. The only difficulty 
 is in the third condition. If all the phenomena of nature are, " in their 
 ultimate analysis, known to us as facts of consciousness," how can the 
 facts of consciousness be practically interpretable by the methods and 
 formulae of physics? This makes consciousness interpretable by 
 consciousness. 
 
 X At the close. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 119 
 
 deceive, the reconciliation of philosophy and the natural 
 sciences is gradually approaching. . . . The most impor- 
 tant discoveries in natural science shed their light over 
 connected phenomena of extensive spheres, and they 
 of themselves impel to seek a comprehension of the uni* 
 versaL Ingenious representatives of the natural sciences 
 approach philosophy, and admit that the mission and 
 method of both are not irreconcilably hostile. What- 
 ever is gained permanently by philosophy in historical 
 and scientific tendencies, will revive the consciousness 
 that all the sciences are one." 
 
 Objections to philosophy are still common ; they are 
 not, however, directed so much against philosophy per 
 se, as against certain historic systems and methods. To 
 lay their faults to the charge of philosophy itself, is as 
 rational as to blame science for the methods of mere 
 empirics. Certain philosophical systems have been vis- 
 ionary; but we are advocating sober, critical philoso- 
 phy, not wild speculation. The charge that philosophy 
 is not exact, may mean that its objects cannot be 
 weighed and measured. But this is the fault, if fault 
 at all, of the objects, not of philosophy. Does any one 
 blame science for determining only proximately the dis- 
 tance of a fixed star, or, perhaps, resorting to guesses 
 on the subject? Ideas cannot be put into scales, or 
 determined by inches ; there are no pints or pounds for 
 truth and morality. But this is no argument against 
 either philosophy or the existence and value of its 
 objects.* These may be real, though not tangible ; and 
 because so purely intellectual, it is difficult to define 
 
 * " The study of logical and mathematical forms has convinced me 
 that even space itself is no requisite condition of conceivable existence. 
 Every thing, we are told by materialists, must be here or there, nearer 
 or farther, before or after. I deny this, and point to logical relations aa 
 my proof." — Jevons, 768. 
 
120 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 them, and communicate the conception of them to other 
 minds. 
 
 The objection that philosophical systems have often 
 changed is no argument against philosophy itself. ■ The 
 charge that it has accomplished nothing is based on 
 ignorance of its own progress, and of its great service 
 in developing science, and promoting all departments 
 of intellect. Philosophy is fundamental ; and its value 
 is not diminished because the foundation itself was hid 
 from most men, while the superstructure it bore was 
 evident to all. 
 
 Many of the objections to philosophy may as cogently 
 be urged against science. That, too, has problems of 
 long standing, which are apparently no nearer solution 
 than when first proposed. Can it explain the origin of 
 life, or sensation, or consciousness, or the connection 
 of mind and body? Can it in sound, say in music, 
 sharply separate the physical, the physiological, and the 
 psychical elements? But questions like these are end- 
 less ; and if they do not arise, it may be because in 
 science men so often operate with symbols which are 
 taken for explanations, but in reality explain nothing. 
 Science, like philosophy, the deeper it goes, the more 
 fully it realizes that it exposes problems rather than 
 solves them. It should also be remembered that sci- 
 ence itself thrusts upon philosophy the deepest prob- 
 lems ; and if these are unsolvable, it proves that science 
 itself must remain a torso. 
 
 The definiteness and exactness of science also have 
 their limitations. Has it been determined where plants 
 end, and animals begin ? Has the limit of species, or 
 even their exact nature, been fixed ? Is there any thing 
 definite respecting the use of such important terms 
 as atoms, matter, force? What is the bond of union 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 121 
 
 between chemistry and physics ? What is ether ? What 
 are the connecting links between gravity, light, heat, 
 and electricity? * But it is useless to multiply instances. 
 Surely it is no argument against natural science, that 
 its deepest problems have thus far remained unsolved ; 
 but this makes it the more unaccountable that such an 
 objection should seriously be urged against philosophy. 
 
 The lack of agreement among philosophers has been 
 used against philosophy; but how is it with scientists? 
 Within the last decades the most bitter controversies 
 have been those of the latter. " Physical science itself, 
 as it becomes general, grows to be contested. . . . The 
 larger conceptions and principles of physical inquiry 
 are so notoriously under dispute at the present day, 
 that it is almost trivial to mention the fact." 16 Science 
 invites to deep research just because so much remains 
 to be done. " We have but to open a scientific book, 
 and read a page or two, and we shall come to some 
 recorded phenomenon of which no explanation can yet 
 be given." f Is it surprising, then, that philosophy has 
 unsolved problems ? The same author says, " It ought 
 to be added, that, wonderful as is the extent of physi- 
 cal phenomena open to our investigation, intellectual 
 phenomena are yet vastly more extensive." 
 
 Absolute as science is in its proper sphere, it is, as 
 
 * Wundt (Aufgabe) says that, within the memory of the present gen- 
 eration, gravity, light, heat, and electricity were each subjected to a 
 special method of explanation, and each in reality required a particular 
 theory of matter. Accordingly in different departments of science 
 different theories of matter prevailed ! 
 
 t Jevons, 75-t. Du Bois-Reymond gives the following as the seven 
 riddles of science, some of which he regards as beyond all hope of 
 solution: 1. The nature of matter and force. 2. The origin of motion. 
 3. The origin of life. 4. The apparent design in nature. 5. The origin 
 of sensation. 6. The origin of rational thought and of language, which 
 is intimately connected with it. 7. The freedom of the will. 
 
122 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we have seen, severely limited to that sphere ; and the 
 masters in science continually warn against transcend- 
 ing these limits, and treating philosophy as if lying 
 within the domain of science. The two departments 
 do not conflict. Instead of dictating them, philosophy 
 accepts and uses the facts and laws scientifically estab- 
 lished, making them factors in its inferences. Neither 
 does science encroach on philosophy; but gratefully 
 accepting its fundamental principles, science rejoices 
 if it takes up for solution the weightiest problems. All 
 the sciences press toward a unity attainable only with 
 the help of philosophy. To check philosophy proper 
 is to check thought itself. 
 
 If in its search for ultimate principles philosophy 
 takes up, for criticism, thoughts with which scientists 
 continually operate without making them subjects of 
 special reflection, that is no interference. Philosophers 
 who habitually deal with mental phenomena and ab- 
 stract terms are, in all probability, best prepared to 
 investigate them. Some of these terms have already 
 been indicated; as, substance, cause, being, time, 
 space, motion, matter, force. Philosophers may render 
 important service by elucidating the concepts for which 
 they are supposed to stand ; they can at least deter- 
 mine whether the concept is consistent with itself, or 
 contains contradictions. Thinkers recognize the obscu- 
 rity of these terms, though ordinary investigators are 
 apt to imagine that they have a definite knowledge 
 of the concepts, or the reality which they represent. 
 Investigators, as they go deeper and become conscious 
 of the fact that they use symbols for reality, learn 
 modesty. Balfour Stewart says, " It thus appears that 
 we know little or nothing about the shape or size of 
 molecules, or about the forces which actuate them; 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 123 
 
 and, moreover, the very largest masses of the universe 
 share with the very smallest this property of being 
 beyond the direct scrutiny of the human senses, — the 
 one set because they are so far away, and the other 
 because they are so small." * Therefore we are obliged 
 either to dismiss these subjects, or else to resort to 
 speculation. Since the deepest inquiries of science 
 alwaj^s impel to theoretical investigations, all that it 
 can ask is that philosophy base its speculations on 
 reliable data, and conduct them according to the most 
 rigid logic. 
 
 Healthy speculation, or the thorough elaboration of 
 concepts and their consequences, is essential to science. 
 The scientific method is possible only because there are 
 concepts and principles on which it rests, which them- 
 selves are not within the limits or under the necessity 
 of (empirical) scientific demonstration. And the scien- 
 tist does not hesitate to use notions which he cannot 
 test scientifically. What use could he make of atoms 
 and the theories founded on them, if he were limited 
 to his senses and the test of facts ? An atom may 
 be thought, but it cannot be perceived. " The limits 
 placed upon our senses, with respect to space and time, 
 equally preclude the possibility of our ever becoming 
 directly acquainted with these exceedingly minute 
 bodies, which are, nevertheless, the raw materials of 
 which the whole universe is built." f Another eminent 
 scientist says, " An atom in itself can no more become 
 an object of our investigation than a differential." f 
 
 * The Conservation of Energy (Appleton), 6. 
 
 t Balfour Stewart, 9. 
 
 t J. R. Mayer. See Correlation and Conservation of Forces, by W. 
 R. Grove (Appleton), 347. Tait says that the question of atoms is one 
 whose " solution seems to recede from our grasp as fast, at least, as we 
 attempt to approach it," 284. 
 
124 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The most various properties have been attributed to 
 them, and even their materiality has been questioned. 
 Yet, in spite of this, there are those who, in the name 
 of science, make atomism the explanation of mental as 
 well as of natural phenomena. Philosophers do not 
 question the right to use the notions of atoms and 
 matter, but they insist that these are only symbols 
 for an unknown something. So physicists speak of 
 force as the cause of phenomena. Faraday says, " What 
 I mean by the word ' force,' is the cause of a physical 
 action ; the source or sources of all possible changes 
 amongst the particles or materials of the universe." 
 Mayer says, " Force is something which is expended in 
 producing motion; and this something which is ex- 
 pended is to be looked upon as a cause equivalent 
 to the effect, namely, to the motion produced." * Tait 
 denies that force is a thing at all. "It is not to be 
 regarded as a thing, any more than the bank rate of 
 interest is to be looked upon as a sum of money. . . . 
 Force is the rate at which an agent does work per unit of 
 length." f Force, then, is cause, something, rate, — all 
 concepts that involve philosophical inquiries. Hume 
 was any thing but a scientist, yet his contribution to 
 thought consists chiefly in his discussion of causation. 
 And many scientists take their notion of cause from 
 Hume's philosophy. 
 
 Thus one need but take the concepts which all 
 scientists must use, in order to see the absurdity of 
 attempting to banish philosophy. Science and philos- 
 ophy have many notions in common, which can never 
 be the direct product of experience, and can be tested 
 only by critical thinking. All that lies behind bare 
 and isolated phenomena is a mental product. No 
 
 * Grove, 379, 335. t 357, 358. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 125 
 
 observation can discover substance, cause, or power; 
 and those who admit nothing but observation and its 
 direct results must, like Hume, deny their existence 
 in the external world. They are concepts, not per- 
 cepts. If philosophy is rejected because it deals with 
 such concepts, then science must also be rejected, for 
 its fundamental notions are of exactly the same charac- 
 ter. If philosophy does not speculate, then scientists 
 must do it. And it is remarkable how philosophers 
 and scientists may come to the same conclusions, in- 
 dependently of each other, and often by different 
 methods.* 
 
 The more fully the relation of philosophy and sci- 
 ence is considered, the deeper the conviction becomes 
 that they require each other. Both are necessary for 
 an intelligent consideration of the world-problem, and 
 for all rational attempts to solve it ; both are parts of 
 the same great system of knowledge. We may reject, 
 as too indefinite, the definition of Herbert Spencer: 
 " Philosophy is completely unified knowledge ; " f never- 
 theless, there is truth in it, since no knowledge, no 
 science, can be completed or unified without philosophy. 
 
 Besides the notions held in common by philosophy 
 and science, there are many in which scientists are 
 interested, which nevertheless belong chiefly or wholly 
 to philosophy. Among these are the problems of 
 
 * Schopenhauer reduces all force to will; not only the force in man, 
 but also in nature. A. R. Wallace (Contributions to the Theory of Natu- 
 ral Selection) holds a similar view. He says it seems probable that all 
 force is will-force. Matter, he holds, is force, and nothing but force. 
 Matter in the popular sense does not exist, and cannot be philosophi- 
 cally conceived. Zollner has placed the views of Schopenhauer and 
 Wallace in parallel columns, thus making their similarity the more 
 apparent. 
 
 t First Principles, 539. If knowledge is unified in its ultimate prin- 
 ciples, it becomes philosophy. 
 
126 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 monism, dualism, pluralism, materialism, idealism, pan- 
 theism, theism, the nature of freedom, the immortality 
 of the soul. Many other questions must remain unan- 
 swered, or be left to philosophers, or to them and 
 scientists conjointly. Science and philosophy must 
 co-operate. Each must find an inspiration, a correc- 
 tive, a help, and, in a measure, a limitation, in the 
 other. Antagonism means the destruction of self in 
 proportion as the antagonist is destroyed. Their free 
 and harmonious co-operation, while each remains per- 
 fectly independent, is the only ground of hope for the 
 best results both in science and philosophy. 
 
 It is surely a strange phenomenon, that the mind can 
 so lose itself in the contemplation of the objects of 
 nature as to forget itself, its processes, and its own 
 laws, which alone make a knowledge of nature possi- 
 ble. Is it not a species of infatuation or frenzy ? Not 
 a few seem even to forget that natural science has sig- 
 nificance only for the mind, not for nature, the object 
 of investigation. Unless some human interest is to be 
 promoted, it is difficult to understand why bugs should 
 be so diligently studied and classified. It can hardly 
 be claimed that any blessing is to accrue to them, or 
 that nature is thereby to be exalted. But if some 
 interest of humanity is to be subserved, and if all 
 study of inferior -objects is somehow to promote the 
 welfare of the highest of all, why not then regard also 
 the study of humanity, of mind itself, as of the utmost 
 importance, and all other knowledge as valuable in 
 proportion as it furthers a knowledge of self, and is 
 promotive of human interests? 
 
 There are already evidences of a decided re-action 
 against the tendency which would make the mind a 
 mere tool to work with in the quarries of nature, — a 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND NATURAL SCIENCE. 127 
 
 tool which can neither understand itself nor the purpose 
 of its work. Enough has been said to show that it is 
 not the real scientists who are guilty of thus inestimably 
 degrading the mind. The re-action is simply the rebel- 
 lion of the intellect against the attempted degradation ; 
 and the leaders in science are also leaders in the re- 
 action. Unfortunate would it be for human progress, if 
 the systematic ignoring of what concerns humanity most 
 on the part of empirics, should lead to a depreciation of 
 real science. Nature need not be less studied ; but the 
 mind, too, has claims, and will see to it that they are 
 not ignored. " Unmistakably the centre of gravity in 
 scientific inquiries is gradually being shifted. The nat- 
 ural sciences have passed their most flourishing period, 
 the mental sciences are approaching theirs." * How far 
 the prophecy of the eminent thinker who gives expres- 
 sion to this thought shall be fulfilled, must be left to the 
 future. But we cannot suppress the wish that there 
 may be before us not less of natural science, but more 
 philosophy, and more general attention to mental phe- 
 nomena. A healthy intellectual period cannot bury or 
 hide the mind under its possessions, but will appreciate 
 those possessions as the wealth of the mind; and all 
 attainments will be esteemed in proportion to their real 
 dignity and to their relation to the highest interests. 
 Unless indications deceive, the progress of thought 
 among the Greeks will be repeated in our day, namely, 
 from matter to mind, and from nature to humanity. 
 
 * Wundt, Logik, II. 516, 517: " Doch unverkennbar verscbiebt sicb all- 
 mablicb der Schwerpunkt der wissenschaftlichen Forscbungen. Die 
 Naturwissenscbaften baben ibre Bliithe binter sicb, die Geisteswissen- 
 schaften gehen ibr entgegen. Die Einflusse des Naturalismus auf die 
 letzteren, die nocb iiberall in gescbicbtspbilosopbischen Systemen, in 
 sociologiscben und naturrechtlicben Tbeorien zu spuren sind, werden 
 damit von selbst verscbwinden. 
 
128 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 May we not also expect, that, as Aristotle followed 
 Plato, so now rigid, rational philosophizing, uniting in- 
 duction and deduction, will follow an unbridled specu- 
 lation in philosophy ? 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Various senses in which " Science " is used. Its true 
 sense. Scientific method. Limits of Science. Rela- 
 tion of Hypotheses and Theories to Science. Relation 
 of Philosophy to Science. Hostility between them. 
 Historic reasons for the antagonism. Tendencies to- 
 ward Philosophy in Science. Philosophical elements 
 in scientific works. " Law " as used in Natural Science. 
 Does it refer to force? Does it explain the cause of 
 phenomena? Can Science get behind phenomena? 
 Does it determine quality, or only quantity ? What is 
 meant by " natural " ? Empiricism and the work of Sci- 
 ence. Relation of Philosophy to the basis of Science. 
 What problems does Science give Philosophy? Science 
 and the limits of knowledge. The scientific method, and 
 mental and historical phenomena. Objections to Phi- 
 losophy applicable to Science. Co-operation of Philoso- 
 phy and Science. Condition for this co-operation. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 129 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY AND EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 Psychology, the doctrine of the soul, treats of the 
 mental activities, seeking to analyze and interpret them, 
 so as to discover their laws, and to give a complete sys- 
 tem of the operations of the mind. A general view of 
 cognition may be obtained by regarding the mind as 
 subject, and all its knowledge as object. If, now, we 
 take up for consideration the mind as the subject to 
 which all knowledge is object, we can ask, What is that 
 mind? and what does it do? The first question per- 
 tains to essence, namely, the substance or nature of the 
 mind, and belongs to metaphysics. The second, pertain- 
 ing to the mind's activities, gives the sphere of psy- 
 chology. When we turn from the subject to the object, 
 we find that the latter includes all that comes before 
 the mind; it therefore includes the whole domain of 
 knowledge. 
 
 In psychology the mind, as activity, is both subject 
 and object. It reflects on itself, takes up for investiga- 
 tion its own operations, and seeks to understand its 
 method of dealing with the various objects engaging its 
 attention. When we demand of the mind that it make 
 itself the object of inquiry, it at first seems to be equal 
 to asking the eye to behold itself. But this is not the 
 case. We distinguish between the mind and its opera- 
 tions, and ask that the subject consider those operations 
 
130 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as objects of knowledge. Returning to the analogy of 
 the eye, we find that it is simply required to give an 
 account of what it sees. How the mind actually pro- 
 ceeds when it beholds its own activities and other objects 
 of inquiry, is a problem as insolvable as that of the 
 modus operandi of the eye in obtaining vision. That we 
 can watch our mental operations, is established as a fact, 
 as fully as that of seeing with the eye ; and it is the 
 given fact for which an explanation is sought. Psy- 
 chology therefore deals with facts. Not with facts in 
 general, however, but only with such as are a manifes- 
 tation and revelation of its own processes. 
 
 When psychology is defined as mental science, or sci- 
 ence of the mind, it must be explained in what sense the 
 term " science " is used. " Mind "also requires expla- 
 nation, in order to determine whether psychology con- 
 siders it metaphysically or phenomenally, or, perhaps, 
 in both senses. Besides, the term must not be taken in 
 the limited sense of intellect, but in that wider one, 
 including all the inner operations. It stands for soul, 
 and embraces all the psychic processes, whether intel- 
 lectual, emotional, or volitional. It is the more im- 
 portant to emphasize the breadth of the term " mind," 
 because there is a tendency to discuss most fully the 
 cognitive faculties, which are constantly employed in 
 describing the "psychic processes ; but in the careful 
 study of feeling and volition, and in determining their 
 relation to each other and to the intellect, much of the 
 future progress of psychology may be expected. All 
 ambiguity will be avoided by defining psychology as 
 the system of the soul's operations. It is a psychic 
 biology, aiming to explain the origin and movement of 
 the soul's life as revealed in its activities. 
 
 It is easy to form a general conception of this disci- 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 131 
 
 pline ; but its extent, the complication of its phenomena, 
 and its interweaving with other disciplines, make its 
 exact limitation difficult. Many works on psychology 
 furnish proof of this. As dealing solely with the mind, 
 it may seem to comprehend whatever we know, — all 
 knowledge being a possession of the mind, and a prod- 
 uct of mental processes. This is as true of natural 
 science as of the doctrine of the soul itself. There are 
 for us no facts but those of consciousness ; and if we 
 know aught, it is because we are conscious of it as pro- 
 duced according to the principles of knowledge. To 
 regard psychology, therefore, as including all data of 
 consciousness, makes it comprehend whatever exists for 
 the intellect. In that case it would be so comprehen- 
 sive as to be the only possible study. But conscious- 
 ness with its contents is not the subject-matter of this 
 discipline ; its peculiarity consists in the manner of 
 viewing these contents. Psychology does not consider 
 what they are in themselves, but only so far as related 
 to the soul, and as revealing its activities. The con- 
 tents of consciousness are objects contemplated solely 
 for the sake of seeing in them the subject. If I am 
 conscious of light, I can abstract the fact of conscious- 
 ness, and consider the light itself, inquiring, What con- 
 stitutes it ? With what velocity does it move ? How 
 does it affect plants, animals, and inorganic matter? 
 These and similar questions are not psychological, but 
 belong to natural science. I, however, enter the domain 
 of psychology when the consciousness itself, not the 
 light, is the object of inquiry ; as when I ask, How did 
 I become conscious of the light? What is meant by 
 the fact that I am conscious of it ? How does this fact 
 affect my thoughts, feelings, and volitions? In psy- 
 chology we therefore abstract from the contents of 
 
132 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 consciousness the psychic elements, and make them the 
 objects of inquiry. Thus all processes of the soul, from 
 the most elementary to the most complicated, are in- 
 cluded in the study, as sensation, experience, thinking, 
 the affections, the aesthetic impressions, and the action 
 of the will. We might call it a natural history of the 
 mind. While logic seeks the laws necessary to discover 
 the truth, psychology inquires into the actual processes 
 of the mind. The former is, therefore, normative ; the 
 latter, historical and descriptive. 
 
 From this definition of psychology it is easy to deter- 
 mine its relation to the other departments of knowledge. 
 In all of them the knowing subject is concerned ; they 
 consequently have a psychological basis. When I con- 
 sider the conservation of energy, I want to learn its 
 nature and working ; but the very words " I " and 
 " consider " have a psychological bearing. We cannot, 
 in fact, utter a sentence without implying psychology. 
 This shows the fundamental character of the discipline ; 
 it lies at the basis of every thing that is for us, because 
 we can know of it only through the mind, the object of 
 psychology. If we adopt the language of Fichte, and 
 hold that there is nothing but the Ego and the non-Ego, 
 we at once see that we can view all things only from 
 our standpoint, and as related to us. We can behold no 
 object except m the light of our soul ; or we can say 
 that the soul is the eye which sees all objects according 
 to its own structure. Now, what the study of the eye 
 is in optics, that is the study of psychology to all other 
 objects of learning. 
 
 It is, however, not definite enough to define psychology 
 as the doctrine of the soul. That soul, as we have seen, 
 may be considered according to its essence, the ques- 
 tions involved being such as these : What is its nature ? 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 133 
 
 Is it simple, or compound ? Is it material ? Or, we can 
 confine our attention to the operations of the soul, 
 inquiring, How does it act? The inquiry into the 
 operations of the soul is now commonly regarded as 
 the business of psychology. 
 
 The total separation of the two ways of viewing the 
 soul is the result of development. In the Socratic school 
 psychology was treated as a part of physics ; afterwards 
 it was connected with metaphysics. Even when treated 
 as a separate subject, it at first contained the whole doc- 
 trine of the soul, the metaphysical elements receiving 
 special prominence. Christian Wolff was the first to 
 divide psychology into empirical and rational. To the 
 former he assigned the task of describing the inner 
 (psychic) processes and arranging them systematically, 
 while the rational made the nature of the soul its 
 starting-point for the explanation of the psychological 
 phenomena. The empirical was accordingly to make 
 the facts of consciousness its basis, while the rational 
 was theoretical. His own example, however, illustrated 
 the difficulty of keeping the two wholly distinct. 
 
 In the division of psychology into empirical and 
 rational, Wolff still has followers, while some have 
 united both, and still others recognize only the empirical. 
 The searching criticism to which Kant subjected the 
 mind led him to reject rational psychology as impossible. 
 Herbart, who of all German writers gave the strongest 
 impulse to psychological studies, wanted in psychology 
 a description of the mental phenomena as learned by 
 observation, also metaphysics for the explanation of 
 their origin, and mathematics so far as quantitative ele- 
 ments enter into the operations of the mind. But his 
 contemporary Beneke, who also did excellent service in 
 promoting psychology, rejected both metaphysics and 
 
134 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mathematics from the study. He held that it should 
 be purely experimental, and adopt the method of the 
 natural sciences, beginning with experience, and ration- 
 ally developing the results thus obtained.* 
 
 In England there has been a strong tendency to 
 absorb the whole of philosophy in psychology. This 
 movement was begun by Locke, completed by Hume, 
 and imitated by their followers. In his " Treatise of 
 Human Nature," Hume discusses some of the pro- 
 foundest problems of philosophy, such as the nature of 
 abstract or general ideas, being and non-being, substance, 
 time, space, force, causality, and the like. In the Intro- 
 duction he says correctly, "that all the sciences have 
 a relation, greater or less, to human nature ; and that, 
 however wide any of them may seem to run from it, 
 they still return back by one passage or another." How 
 comprehensive he makes the system of human nature, 
 is evident from the following: "There is no question 
 of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the 
 science of man ; and there is none, which can be decided 
 with any certainty, before we become acquainted with 
 that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the 
 principles of human nature, we in effect propose a com- 
 pleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost 
 entirely new, and the only one upon which they can 
 stand with any security." If Hume's statement, that 
 " the principles of human nature " give " a compleat 
 system of the sciences," is taken literally, it results in 
 an idealism as perfect as that of Fichte. In that case 
 psychology includes philosophy, all science, and in fact 
 all knowledge. He does not distinguish between the 
 principles of human nature as the subjective condition 
 
 * Hence the title of his work : Lehrbuch der Psycholoyie als Natur- 
 ivissenschaft, 1845. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 135 
 
 of the sciences, and the sciences themselves: he con- 
 founds the soil with its products. 
 
 By reducing philosophy to psychology, Hume oblit- 
 erates the distinction between what is and what ought 
 to be, makes the mind a mere observer where it is called 
 to be a critic, and a passive recorder of phenomena 
 where it is called to be positive energy and a lawgiver. 
 Empiricism is thus made a law, when it only furnishes 
 materials for laws. Besides the other defects of his 
 psychology, he makes sensation and association the 
 norms of all thought, and in his philosophy of expe- 
 rience fails, with Locke, to do justice to the mental 
 factor in experience. The dread of innate ideas leads 
 him to reject what is innate in all mental processes; 
 namely, the subjective conditions for receiving and 
 elaborating impressions from the external world. In 
 reducing logic to psychology, he fails to discover the 
 very laws of thought, which he continually uses in order 
 to destroy the validity of thought as soon as it rises 
 above empiricism. His dogmatic scepticism is con- 
 tained in the first sentence of his Treatise, a sentence 
 not proved, but a pure supposition. The importance of 
 psychology, in its proper place, cannot be over-estimated ; 
 but out of its sphere it becomes the means of the most 
 serious perversions. 17 
 
 While Locke and Hume make psychology essentially 
 philosophy, the systems which consider it as both 
 rational and empirical must also assign it, or at least its 
 rational elements, to philosophy. That it was originally 
 taken up and developed by philosophy, just as physics, 
 is not surprising ; but when in the process of develop- 
 ment it becomes independent as an empirical subject, 
 with an aim distinct from that of philosophy, it of 
 course cannot retain its original place any more than 
 
136 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 physics. Present tendencies are intent on withdrawing 
 it from the metaphysical and rational to the empirical, 
 and thus to sever its connection with philosophy. 
 
 In his aim to describe, explain, and systematize the 
 phenomena of mind, the psychologist is an historian. 
 No more than a writer of human or natural history, can 
 he describe all that occurs in his special department ; 
 but he selects what is most valuable and characteristic. 
 This does not mean that only such phenomena are 
 chosen as can be fitted into what is known of the 
 organism of the mind ; for frequently the exceptional 
 is valuable for progress, in that it gives important prob- 
 lems for solution. Mysterious phenomena worthy of 
 scientific investigation are unfortunately left largely to 
 charlatans. That many supposed marvels are based on 
 trickery, is no evidence that this is the case with all. 
 So-called spiritualism, second sight, and numerous 
 strange phenomena well authenticated, lie wholly be- 
 yond our present powers of explanation ; but that does 
 not prove their mystery impenetrable. We no longer 
 believe in witchcraft ; yet under that name many things 
 occurred which are astounding revelations of mental 
 affections, and are of great interest to the student of 
 mind.* The true psychologist does not turn away 
 haughtily from things beyond his ken and such as can- 
 not be made to" fit into his theories, nor does he sneer 
 at what seems to savor of jugglery ; but he regards the 
 unusual and the marvellous as likely to contain revela- 
 tions of value. While formerly mysterious phenomena 
 absorbed too much attention, they are evidently too 
 much neglected now. The fact that superstition gives 
 interpretations which the psychologist cannot accept, is 
 
 * Many illustrations of this may be found in Horst's Zauber Biblio- 
 thek. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 137 
 
 a reason for seeking the correct explanation. Both the 
 facts and their meaning must be determined according 
 to the principles of the scientific method. The student 
 of psychology, while regarding as most important what 
 is most common and evidently within reach of the 
 interpreting mind, will learn in proportion as he enters 
 the depths that there are mysteries of absorbing inter- 
 est and worthy of efforts at solution. Particularly is it 
 essential to guard against hasty conclusions as to the 
 limits of the mind's operations, — conclusions calculated 
 to check inquiry and thus to hinder progress. Physi- 
 ognomy, phrenology, and so-called mind-reading (usually 
 a misnomer for determining mere locality according to 
 indications given to the mind through the body), and 
 similar misnamed sciences or phenomena, deserve study, 
 even if for no other purpose than to overthrow the 
 errors they promote. Not that certain mental phenom- 
 ena are mysterious is a reproach to psychology, for 
 they may involve insuperable difficulties ; but if it 
 ignores them it is seriously at fault. Even the expo- 
 sure and exact limitation of problems may be of great 
 service. The confessed ignorance of psychologists may 
 contain more wisdom than many of their elucidations. 
 Nevertheless, psychology would become unhealthy if it 
 made the abnormal and the mysterious the substance 
 of its inquiries. 
 
 In psychology, as in natural science, the discovery, 
 description, interpretation, and classification of mental 
 facts, are preparatory to the discovery of their causes 
 and the determination of their laws. The student of 
 mind aims to learn what is, how it is, and why it is, and 
 seeks to reduce his discoveries to a completely rounded 
 system, an organism in which facts are members, laws 
 are joints, and the soul's energy is the life. 
 
138 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Beginners in philosophy have usually studied psy- 
 chology, and it is here taken for granted that they are 
 acquainted with its general scope. Many students, 
 however, testify that the study has served rather to 
 arouse their minds, and impel their thoughts in a par- 
 ticular direction, than to give them sharply defined 
 concepts of the nature, aim, objects, and relations of 
 psychology. They consequently find it difficult to 
 determine its exact relation to philosophy. 18 
 
 While thus distinguishing between subject and object, 
 between the mental processes and their products, and 
 between psychology and philosophy, do we not force 
 psychology into the same category as the natural sci- 
 ences? When this is done by the materialistic and 
 positivistic schools, they are only consistent with their 
 principles. Nor can there be objection to classing psy- 
 chology with natural science, if science means simply 
 systematized knowledge and if "natural " is used in dis- 
 tinction only from the supernatural ; but it is differ- 
 ent when the aim is to wipe out the distinction between 
 matter and mind. Most of those, however, who speak 
 of psychology as a natural science, refer merely to the 
 method of treatment.* To this there can be no objec- 
 tion. All they mean is that it must be based wholly 
 on experience ; that it is " the science of mind worked 
 out in the way of the natural sciences." f 
 
 This is not the place to enter into the dispute between 
 spiritualists and materialists, whether the science of mind 
 can ever be reduced to a natural science as a part of 
 physics, or of physics and chemistry ; nevertheless, the 
 student should be warned against hasty conclusions, 
 
 * This is the case with Beneke, J. H. Fichte, Waitz, Wundt, and 
 others. 
 
 t Mind, 1883. 4. By the editor. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 139 
 
 and reminded that (empirical) psychology has nothing 
 to do with the question. The monistic tendency is apt 
 to conclude hastily in favor of whatever system may at 
 the time be in the ascendancy. When idealism pre- 
 vails, it is made the explanation of all things ; and 
 when materialism becomes predominant, every thing 
 must submit to be classed under matter. Instead of 
 fathoming the meaning of the terms " matter " and 
 " spirit," they are used, with all their indefiniteness and 
 obscurity, as if perfectly understood, — matter as the 
 only reality, spirit as the mere negation of matter. 
 Even "substance," with which Spinoza and his suc- 
 cessors operated so confidently, is becoming shadowy 
 in our day ; and a philosophy deeper and more serious 
 than that of Hume may question whether the mind can 
 conceive of the abiding reality underlying all phe- 
 nomena, which it is intended to represent. 
 
 Since psychology aims to describe the processes of the 
 soul, it must be evident that these should first of all be 
 considered ; and that, if any inference is to be drawn, 
 it should be done after they have been fully described, 
 not before. To begin the study with a theory of the 
 nature of the soul, particularly when that is so much 
 in dispute as in our day, is to begin with an unproved 
 hypothesis and with a prejudice. We must begin with 
 facts, operations, exactly as in nature : from what it 
 does and can do, we must try to discover what the soul 
 is ; but to make a theory of the essence of the soul the 
 principle for the explanation of its operations, is both 
 unphilosophical and unscientific. No more in mind 
 than in nature have we a knowledge of the substance 
 otherwise than from its operations. In no other way is 
 a manifestation of their character possible, unless it 
 were given by direct revelation from some other source 
 
140 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 than the mind and nature. What can a manifestation 
 of mind or nature mean, other than an operation of 
 mind or nature ? We need but make clear to our minds 
 what we mean by a manifestation, and that without a 
 manifestation of a thing we can have no knowledge of 
 it, in order to learn that only from their operations can 
 we judge of the essence of objects. Indeed, an exam- 
 ination of the terms we apply to objects will convince 
 us that, as a rule, these terms, so far as they have an 
 intelligible sense, only express what these objects can 
 do. We may imagine that we know the essence or 
 substance, when in truth we know only the powers 
 revealed in the operations ; but these are sufficient for 
 an intelligent apprehension of mental and material 
 processes. 
 
 Long before our minds are trained to critical intro- 
 spection or to reflection, we become familiar with words 
 in common use. The meanings attached to them un- 
 consciously, or at least uncritically, are apt to remain 
 after we have become more critical. Many terms are, 
 in fact, used with no definite sense. This is particularly 
 the case with such as are supposed to stand for funda- 
 mental concepts, and for principles which lie far beyond 
 observation. Words thus become symbols of ignorance 
 and emptiness, rather than of knowledge and real con- 
 tent. The use of some such terms may be necessary 
 as an indication of the object sought ; but the object 
 still sought must not be treated as if already found. 
 Thus the terms " mind " and " matter " may properly 
 be used to designate the object of psychological or 
 natural inquiry ; but if used metaphysically, as if they 
 explained the essence, they deceive us. 
 
 While careful to avoid empty phrases, and especially 
 to reject them from the foundation on which we build, 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 141 
 
 we must rigorously insist on investigating every thing 
 according to its own laws. In this respect both ideal- 
 ism and materialism have erred, and past experience 
 has taught that all reasoning per saltum, from one sphere 
 into another, is apt to lead to confusion and error. 
 Analogical reasoning must be closely watched, the more 
 so because it is often insidious, and asserts as final what 
 has not even been established as probable. In respect 
 to mental operations, analogical reasoning is frequently 
 applied. There are laws which are applicable to limited 
 spheres only, and their application to a different sphere 
 is a perversion. When the mind is familiar with a cer- 
 tain sphere, it is liable to form the habit of applying 
 the laws of that sphere to subjects with which it is less 
 familiar; perhaps it even makes their application uni- 
 versal. Materialism and idealism frequently depend 
 much less on facts or correct reasoning than on mental 
 habits, so that their strength is in association rather 
 than reason. 
 
 Physics and chemistry cannot explain life, much less 
 the mind. Trendelenburg thought he had discovered 
 in motion something common to matter and mind ; but, 
 aside from other difficulties in his explanation, he uses 
 motion as applied to material and mental phenomena 
 in different senses. At best there is only analogy, not 
 identity ; motion applied to the action of the mind is 
 used figuratively. 
 
 The most eminent scientists agree with philosophers 
 that, however intimate the relation of matter and mind, 
 it is impossible to explain the operations of the latter 
 by the known laws of the former. Respecting the sub- 
 stance or essence of mind, we are in the presence of 
 a mystery thus far inscrutable. This is, indeed, not 
 peculiar to mind ; matter, as we have seen, is equally 
 
142 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mysterious. Neither spiritualism, nor idealism, nor 
 Spinoza's "substance," nor Professor Bain's "double- 
 faced unity," helps us out of the difficulty, or throws 
 any light into the darkness. If matter really does 
 account for mental phenomena, it must certainly have 
 something never yet discovered in what is called matter. 
 Those who speak confidently of mind as material, evi- 
 dently use terms without considering their sense. Lotze 
 declares that "it is nothing but an empty popular phrase 
 to claim that the doctrine of the life of the soul is to 
 be transformed to a natural science, — a phrase which 
 either has no meaning, or else signifies that an attempt 
 is made to hear with the eyes, and see with the ears." * 
 Yet the "inveterate habit of confounding the psychi- 
 cal and the physical " has become quite common, and 
 is justly pronounced " the bane of modern psychology." f 
 While popular scientists frequently confound the two, 
 the profound are usually more careful ; though even 
 they are sometimes betrayed into transferring the laws 
 with which they are familiar, into regions where they 
 are less at home. Men like Helmholtz, Virchow, Du 
 Bois-Reymond, Tait, Huxley, are too cautious to endow 
 matter with properties never yet discovered in it. If 
 all of them, Helmholtz and Tait excepted, at times use 
 expressions with a materialistic flavor, they are careful 
 at other times to 'correct them, and to admit their igno- 
 rance of the mental substance. Wundt says, " I, too, re- 
 gard it improbable that purely psychological doctrines, 
 whether facts or theories, can ever be deduced from 
 physiological statements." $ Professor Tyndall makes 
 the following admission : " The passage from the physics 
 
 * Medicinische Psychologie, 32. 
 
 t James Ward, Mind, 1883. 481. 
 
 t Vierteljahrsschri/tfiir wiss. Philosophie, 1879. 357. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 143 
 
 of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness 
 is unthinkable. . . . Were our minds and senses so 
 expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable 
 us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain ; 
 were we capable of following all their motions, all their 
 groupings, all their electrical discharges, if there be 
 such ; and were we intimately acquainted with the cor- 
 responding states of thought and feeling, — we should 
 probably be as far as ever from the solution of the prob- 
 lem : How are these physical processes connected with 
 the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the 
 two classes of phenomena would still remain intel- 
 lectually impassable." 19 
 
 In the use of such adjectives as "mechanical" and 
 "vital," we are also in danger of taking imaginary for 
 real knowledge. They indicate certain methods of opera- 
 tion, but nothing respecting the essence of their sources. 
 What a substance must be in order to work mechani- 
 cally, is no more intelligible than the origin of vital, 
 mental, and spiritual phenomena. The laws of the 
 mechanical processes can be determined with more ex- 
 actness than the psychological ; but we deceive ourselves 
 if we imagine that we understand what is inorganic and 
 mechanical better than the organic and mental. Those 
 who think that the mental processes are made clearer 
 by calling them mechanical, need but attempt an ex- 
 planation of the latter term in order to learn that, in 
 essence, it is not a whit more intelligible than the other. 
 
 The despair of finding the real essence of mind has 
 been the most powerful motive for banishing metaphysic 
 from psychology. But has it really been banished? 
 Every step in psychological inquiry confronts us with 
 metaphysical problems; and however decidedly they 
 may be pronounced irrelevant, they are usually either 
 
144 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 actually discussed, or underlie the discussions. Hume 
 professes to be purely empirical ; but surely his empiri- 
 cism never discovered that "what we call a mind is 
 nothing but a heap or collection of different percep- 
 tions," or, that a " connected mass of perceptions . . . 
 constitute a thinking being," as he says in his Treatise. 
 Even the declaration, made by some modern writers, 
 that the mind is to be viewed, not as substance, but as 
 action, is metaphysical. If the natural sciences may 
 postulate matter, there is no reason why psychology 
 may not postulate mind as a peculiar entity.* It must, 
 however, be treated as a mere postulate, and the sup- 
 posed essence must not dominate the entire investiga- 
 tion, as if its nature were established. 
 
 Aside from the nature of the soul, how shall we view 
 its activity? Is the soul distinct from the activity, or 
 is it nothing but the action ? If it goes out wholly in 
 action, what is the basis for future activity? These 
 inquiries lead beyond empirical to rational psychology, 
 but it is almost impossible to ignore them ; and in psy- 
 chology, as in every other department, the deepest 
 problems lead to philosophy. The metaphysical factors 
 which enter into intellectual activity, whether external 
 and internal, or wholly mental, seem to find but a poor 
 analogy in the action of hydrogen and oxygen when 
 uniting to constitute water. It is more correct to say 
 that they become, than that they form, water. A better 
 analogy is apparently found in two bodies, which, by 
 affecting each other, excite electricity, the bodies them- 
 selves remaining distinct from their product. The con- 
 ception of mind, as cause, does not remove the difficulty 
 in the relation of the soul to its activity. Aside from 
 the other difficulties in the conception of cause, can any 
 
 * Discussed more fully in the chapter on Metaphysics. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 145 
 
 thing be called a cause unless it goes out wholly into 
 the effect? Probably the best view of mind is that 
 of force and energy, or (since the technical sense of 
 "force" in natural science might be objectionable) of 
 power and energy, the latter being merely the former 
 excited to activity.* Mind must not be made the syno- 
 nyme of consciousness ; it also exists during sleep. Con- 
 sciousness is but one of its modes of activity, much of 
 its most important working falling below consciousness. 
 Our unconscious mental activity lies at the basis and 
 accompanies much of that which is conscious. There 
 are degrees of wakefulness ; and when most fully awake, 
 and when its attention is most strained, the mind may 
 be conscious of processes which at other times are hid. 
 The unconscious mental activity is no doubt as rigidly 
 subject to law as is the conscious. Connected with our 
 emotions and volitions, as well as with our intellectual 
 operations, there are unconscious and, therefore, myste- 
 rious processes. As our unconscious activity influences 
 the conscious, so it seems that the unconscious may be 
 influenced by the conscious, as by discipline, volition, 
 the formation of habits, and by fixing the attention on 
 certain thoughts or objects. It may be that certain 
 activities are conscious at the time but not remembered, 
 and consequently are held to be unconscious. Thus, 
 our childhood is a blank to us now, not because we had 
 no consciousness then, but because we do not remem- 
 ber what then affected us.f It is an interesting query : 
 If an impression is forgotten, and then remembered 
 again, what becomes of it during the period of forget- 
 
 * For a discussion of the soul as substance and as action, see Wundt, 
 Logik, II. 502. 
 
 f Are not various occurrences during sleep to be explained in the 
 same way? We are conscious of them at the time, but forget them/ 
 that is, we do not remember the consciousness. 
 
146 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fulness ? There can be no question that the form and 
 the intensity of consciousness have much influence on the 
 memory. 
 
 Even when viewed as purely empirical, treating only 
 of the activity of the mind, psychology is beset with 
 difficulties. Those who want to place it in point of 
 experiment on a level with the natural sciences must 
 not forget that it does not admit of the same exactness. 
 The psychologist does not have the mind so completely 
 under control as the physicist or chemist the objects he 
 investigates ; besides, he cannot use the same instru- 
 ments to measure and weigh. His object is even more 
 complicated and difficult than that of the biologist. 
 From the very nature of the case, there is no hope of 
 ever making psychology as exact and definite as the 
 natural sciences. 
 
 The terminology also offers difficulties. Words are 
 used vaguely ; the same term is frequently employed 
 for different operations, and different ones for the same 
 activity. Then there is great diversity in the manner in 
 which thought, feeling, and volition follow one another, 
 in many cases putting invariable rules out of the ques- 
 tion. So much depends on individual peculiarities, on 
 training and surroundings, that an endless variety is 
 presented to the student of psychology. If he confines 
 his study to his -own mind and to those immediately 
 about him, he will be narrow. Exclusive attention to 
 his own people, or a special predilection for them, is 
 the source of the all but universally prevalent national 
 prejudice. Even by taking into account the enlight- 
 ened nations of a particular period, a comprehensive 
 view of man cannot be obtained. In order to over- 
 come narrowness and prejudice, a scholar must study all 
 nations, at all periods, and under all circumstances. 20 
 
 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 147 
 
 From this it is evident that the field whence psy- 
 chology draws its materials is exceedingly large. In 
 order fully to understand the mental operations, it must 
 observe them in all the departments entered by the 
 mind. The psychologist is naturally directed first of 
 all to his own mental processes. These are capable 
 of the most direct and most perfect study, though intro- 
 spection is at first extremely difficult. There is another 
 difficulty in the fact that the very effort to observe 
 the mental operations is apt to modify them. Most 
 of our experiences can be studied only in the form of 
 reminiscences ; when the experiences occur we are not 
 usually in a mood to study them. Those psychologists 
 err, however, who affirm that we cannot observe what 
 is directly before the mind, but only what has become 
 an object of memory. They forget that what memory 
 contains is always a presentation of what is actually 
 present, whatever its relation to the past may be. 
 
 Next to the study of self comes the observation of 
 others. That of children is especially valuable, their 
 processes being most simple. In the case of older per- 
 sons many things complicate the process of observation. 
 In watching them, alloAvance must be made for the 
 necessary imperfections in observation, and also for 
 the possibility of a disparity between the inner state 
 and its outward manifestations. In the latter respect 
 the emotions and volitions present peculiar difficulties. 
 
 Valuable materials may also be gathered from biog- 
 raphy, history, travels, linguistics, sociology, ethnology, 
 and from all subjects that treat of man either individu- 
 ally or socially. Asylums and courts of justice furnish 
 important subjects for study. The impulse given by 
 Darwin has led to the careful study of comparative 
 psychology — an important field if fact and fiction are 
 
148 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 distinguished, if analogical reasoning is kept in check, 
 and if human mental phenomena are not made to inter- 
 pret the action of brutes, in order, in turn, to use the 
 brutes to interpret man. There is, in fact, not a subject 
 of human interest from which the psychologist may not 
 learn important lessons. But it must not be forgotten 
 that the systematized general thoughts, mirrored in the 
 individual facts, constitute psychology. 
 
 So extensive is the field that, after a general survey, 
 the student may find it advisable to make a specialty of 
 some particular department. Not only is there need 
 of specialists, but there is also great encouragement for 
 them. There can be no thorough treatment of the 
 whole unless the various parts have been mastered. 
 The exhaustive work within narrow limits, whether 
 confined to a particular class of phenomena or persons, 
 must not be isolated, but made tributary to the whole. 
 There is not a department in which the need of this 
 special work is not felt. Even in England, where so 
 much attention has been given to psychology, and 
 whose philosophers are mainly psychologists, there is 
 a marked lack of specialists.* The same is true of 
 America, and indeed of all countries. There are, it is 
 true, tendencies to specialization now, but chiefly in the 
 relation of mind to body. 
 
 The distrust with which speculation is viewed has 
 served both to make the empirical method predominant 
 in psychology, and to make psychology itself a favorite 
 study. Not only does it receive an unusual amount of 
 attention in Germany, England, and America, but also 
 in France and Scandinavia, so that new and excellent 
 works on psychology abound. Psychological experi- 
 
 * " For all the name it has made in the world, English psychology 
 has never heen remarkable for its elaboration in detail." — Mind, 1883,2. 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 149 
 
 ments have also become common, chiefly through the 
 influence of those conducted in the University of Leip- 
 zig; but their sphere is necessarily limited. While 
 there has of late been much progress in psychologic 
 research, even the most thorough works * make the 
 impression that respecting some of the most important 
 functions of the mind only a faint beginning at inter- 
 pretation has been made. Even respecting the sphere, 
 the method, and the relations of psychology, there is so 
 much uncertainty, that the beginner is apt to be greatly 
 puzzled as to fundamental concepts of the study. Since 
 psychology is the necessary basis of philosophy, its own 
 imperfections will seriously affect the latter. 
 
 It would require a work on psychology itself to give 
 a full account of what is still required for the develop- 
 ment of the discipline ; but hints on the subject may 
 serve as a warning against most common errors, and 
 indicate what is most needed to insure future progress. 
 
 The beginning of conscious life is involved in mys- 
 tery ; perhaps it dates back to existence in the womb.f 
 In the observation of infants the subject is complicated 
 by the fact that it is impossible to determine exactly 
 what is conscious and what merely reflex activity. 
 
 The view has become general, that "we are only con- 
 scious as we are conscious of change," or, as Bain says, 
 "We do not know any one thing of itself, but only 
 the difference between it and another thing." Think- 
 ing is comparison ; and consciousness consists, mainly at 
 least, in the discrimination of objects. But if there is 
 
 * As that of Volkmann in German, and of Sully in English. 
 
 t On the conscious activity of infants at various periods after hirth, 
 see Kussmaul : Untersuchungen ueber das Seelenleben des neugebornen 
 Menschen. Hoeffding thinks it possible that the unborn child has a 
 sensation of touch and motion : Psychologie, translated into German by 
 Bendixen. 4. 
 
150 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PIIILOSOPIIY. 
 
 no consciousness without discrimination, then the gen- 
 esis of consciousness becomes impossible. With what 
 other conscious act shall the first one be compared, and 
 from what shall it be discriminated? It seems to be 
 more correct to say that a determination of the what of 
 consciousness requires comparison with other objects, 
 but that the fact of the mere consciousness of an 
 indefinite something, of a dark, undiscriminated impres- 
 sion, does not require such comparison. The first con- 
 scious act must therefore be indistinct, an unexplained 
 presence; and because so indistinct and uncompared 
 and unrelated, it is not remembered. 
 
 More important than speculations on the genesis of 
 consciousness is the resolution of abstract terms domi- 
 nating psychology into the concrete realities for which 
 they are supposed to stand. It is astonishing what 
 influence these abstractions have acquired in psychol- 
 ogy, where the concrete is supposed to rule. Among 
 these terms, " consciousness " itself is one of the most 
 important. It is commonly used as if a kind of faculty 
 underlying all the rest, something like a fiat surface on 
 which objects stand, or which reflects them like a mir- 
 ror. There is in the mind no real object answering to 
 the term ; but there are conscious objects or states of 
 which we are aware, and " consciousness " is simply an 
 abstraction from- these objects. By dropping all the 
 objects before the mind (all the real content), and 
 retaining solely the fact that we were aware of their 
 presence, we get the abstract notion of consciousness. 
 By treating it as a concrete reality, the term does not 
 merely become inexplicable, but also leads to confusion 
 and error. 
 
 The same kind of abstraction is found in thought, 
 feeling, volition, and numerous other instances. Just 
 
 — 
 
PniLOSOPIIY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 151 
 
 as there are conscious acts, but no reality which corre- 
 sponds with consciousness except in these acts, so there 
 is no thought in the abstract, but there are individual 
 thoughts. But another process of abstraction is here 
 found. Not only is the general term " thought " treated 
 as if something concrete, distinct from definite, individ- 
 ual mental acts, but it is also regarded as if it could be 
 abstracted from the mind itself and could exist inde- 
 pendent of that mind. Thus we speak of thought in 
 books, in institutions, in nature, forgetting that outside 
 of mental operations there can be only symbols of 
 thought, while thought itself is found only in the mind 
 possessing it. Thought can never be separated from 
 mind, as if it could have an independent existence. 
 Thoughts, feelings, and volitions are always definite, 
 concrete, with particular contents ; they are not some- 
 thing merely on the mind, but they are acts, states, 
 manifestations of that mind, and absolutely inseparable 
 from it. Thoughts cannot even be communicated ; 
 only symbols can be given, and thus other minds can 
 be led to construct the same or similar thoughts. 
 Instead of imparting thought, or reduplicating it as if 
 by some photographic process, every thought is formed 
 or elaborated by the mind that possesses it, so that, 
 whatever its suggestive symbol may have been, the 
 thought itself is a creation of the mind whose state 
 it is. 
 
 While it is impossible to banish abstractions, and 
 substitute for them the concrete, we should be careful 
 to use abstract terms for what they really are, and not 
 hypostatize them as if they had a substantial existence 
 of their own. Thus we cannot do without the term 
 u mental process ; " yet it is a mere abstraction, being 
 wholly empty and unmeaning, unless there is some 
 
152 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 content in the mind with which some process is con- 
 nected. We speak about such processes as if directly 
 exposed to view : yet we never observe a process itself, 
 or become conscious of it, but are aware only of cer- 
 tain objects with which processes are performed. In 
 that abstract term " process " we embody the thought 
 that something goes on in the mind : but take away that 
 concrete something, and nothing will go on ; that is, 
 there is no process, no going on, unless there is some 
 particular content passing through stages of develop- 
 ment. 
 
 While warning the student against taking mere 
 generalizations for the concrete, it is scarcely less 
 important to urge him to estimate aright the anatomi- 
 cal process to which the mind is so often subjected. 
 That it is a unity, a living organism, with members, 
 but without fragments, is not sufficiently considered. 
 Why not have a synthetic as well as an analytic 
 psychology ? 
 
 A law of vast importance, but heretofore overlooked 
 by psychologists, is that found in the process of forming 
 mental states, which become the condition and criteria 
 of all mental activity. According to this law, sensations 
 become perceptions, and percepts concepts. Thus I 
 receive certain impressions through the eye, and at 
 once say "tree," immediately and unconsciously pass- 
 ing from the impression to the concept. So we develop 
 ourselves into certain states which become permanent ; 
 and it is these states that are affected by impressions, 
 and it is these states that act. Thus our states are an 
 embodiment of our total past experience, a summary of 
 what we have thought, felt, and willed. Not all the 
 individual impressions received are before the mind, 
 but their effect is there. The law that prevails is this : 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 153 
 
 There is in the development of the mind itself a general- 
 izing process, just as there is in thought. Thus as a 
 general term includes under it all objects having the 
 marks of that term, so the mind itself passes through 
 a generalizing process ; and every stage of mental 
 development is the product of all the stages through 
 which the mind has passed, and contains in itself the 
 elements of all those stages. Our perceptions, our 
 judgments, our affections, always depend on the state 
 attained. Hence the differences in these respects at 
 different periods. What we think, feel, and do is 
 always a product and reflection of the state we are 
 in. For all our intellectual operations, for aesthetics 
 and religion, the law is of greatest significance. A man 
 always does what he is at the time. 
 
 There are many other points in pyschology which 
 deserve especial care on the part of the student; but 
 the above are of a more general character, and better 
 adapted to this volume than the details in psychologic 
 study which should receive particular attention. They 
 may also give a hint of what yet remains to be done in 
 psychology. 
 
 In the development of psychology itself, there has 
 been a process of specialization, so that it has been 
 differentiated from subjects with which it was formerly 
 identified. This is not only true of its former inclu- 
 sion in physics and metaphysics, but also of its relation 
 to physiology, logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Instead of 
 being amalgamated with allied subjects, they are now 
 grouped around it so as to form a circle of disciplines 
 by themselves. Being still in the process of this devel- 
 opment, we cannot determine the final results of the 
 various efforts at classification ; and the very terms 
 used for different subjects are continually undergoing 
 
154 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 changes. Psycho - physics (physiological psychology, 
 mental physiology, aestho-physiology) treats of the 
 relation of the mental to the physical or physiological 
 processes. There is no agreement as to how much of 
 this relation belongs to psychology, or whether any 
 of it falls within the domain of psychological inquiry. 
 It is admitted that the action of the body, particularly 
 of the nerves, has great influence on the mental states. 
 There is a preponderating tendency to consign the 
 whole subject of the relation of the mind to body, to 
 psycho-physics as a separate discipline. Highly impor- 
 tant as anatomy, physiology, and especially neurology, 
 are for the psychologist, they are preparatory studies, 
 and his special department begins with phenomena 
 distinctly mental. No motion, however essential to 
 sensation, can explain the fact of sensation or of the 
 conscious state. We do not doubt that there is more 
 than parallelism between the physiological and the 
 mental; but we can no more explain how the former 
 becomes psychical than we can explain how a volition 
 produces physical motion. Besides psycho-physics, we 
 have comparative psychology, treating of man's relation 
 to brutes ; also pathological psychology or psychiatry, 
 discussing the effect of diseases on the mind. Anthro- 
 pology has at times been treated as a science of man ; 
 but it has also" discussed the relation of the soul to 
 the body, and has been viewed as a history of human 
 nature. While physicians pay special attention to the 
 relation of physical to mental disorders, lawyers and 
 ethical writers discuss the relation of the physical state 
 to morals, especially the relation of diseases and insan- 
 ity to crime. Sociology, and in fact all studies con- 
 nected with human nature, are intimately related to 
 psychology. The applications of psychology are numer- 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 155 
 
 ous. A good beginning has been made in biblical 
 psychology (Delitzsch, Beck), and also in the psychol- 
 ogy of different peoples (Voelkerpsychologie, Lazarus 
 and Steinthal). So there may be a psychology of reli- 
 gion, of humor, of various classes of persons, and of 
 different professions. By specialization the subject can 
 be indefinitely enlarged. 
 
 Psychology thus finds its proper place between the 
 natural sciences and philosophy ; forming, as it were, 
 the connecting link between the two. On the one 
 hand, it is intimately connected with physiology and 
 the whole department of biology, while, on the other, 
 it leads directly to the various philosophical disciplines. 
 Owing to its intimate relation to other subjects, psy- 
 chologists have found it difficult to confine themselves 
 to the discussion of mental phenomena and their laws. 
 Some drop psychology too much into physiology, while 
 others exalt it too much into the domain of philosophy. 
 
 Viewed here in its relation to philosophy, this is not the 
 place to consider the practical value of psychology ; yet 
 it should be remembered, that, just as the psychic pro- 
 cesses construct philosophy, so they are also the means 
 for the practical application of its speculations. In 
 this respect its relation to ethics is peculiarly intimate. 
 Psychology gives a knowledge of conditions for master- 
 ing self and others ; and he who understands the asso- 
 ciation and sequence of the thoughts, affections, and 
 volitions, and the relation of thought and desire to the 
 will, has essential conditions of power. Comprehending 
 humanity, this discipline embodies more wisdom than 
 the Greek maxim, "Know thyself." For pedagogics, 
 or the application of the theory of knowledge, of ethics 
 and aesthetics, to mental training, psychology is of the 
 first significance. In order successfully to instruct and 
 
156 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 train others, the teacher must understand the mind and 
 its functions. It is not accidental that Herbart's school 
 developed psychology and pedagogics conjointly. The 
 two naturally go together. A healthy psychology would 
 banish some of the prevalent views of education. 
 
 But psychology must not be expected 'to do all the 
 mind requires ; it cannot take the place of philosophy.* 
 The tendency to confound the two spheres makes this 
 warning doubly necessary. In describing what transpires 
 in the mind, and in reducing this to laws and system, 
 psychology does not give the philosophy of the intellect, 
 of the emotions, or of the volitions. In order to discover 
 the norms of thought, of emotion, and of volition, we 
 must ascend from the phenomenal to the rational, from 
 psychology to philosophy. But for every study it is 
 fundamental, making us acquainted with the soil from 
 and in which every subject must grow. 
 
 Every serious study may be a preparation for philos- 
 ophy; but psychology is peculiarly its propaedeutics. 
 In the exact description of the origin and nature of 
 the facts of consciousness, in its careful observation 
 of the mental processes, and in its thorough analyses, psy- 
 chology not merely gives philosophy its practical basis 
 and legitimate sphere, but also promotes the introduc- 
 tion of scientific exactness into philosophical inquiries. 
 From what actually occurs in thought, feeling, and voli- 
 tion, we want to rise intellectually to what ought to be, 
 just as, volitionally, we want to proceed from the ideal 
 
 * Numerous efforts have been made to apply psychology to educa- 
 tion. But unless psychology is made philosophy, or at least includes 
 it, the ideal of education is not even made the aim in these efforts. 
 Psychology is not the law of mental development: this prerogative 
 belongs to philosophy, with its norms, ideals, and principles. But a 
 knowledge of psychology is a condition for their application in peda- 
 gogics,— the discipline for the psychological application of philosophy, 
 for the sake of mental development. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY. 157 
 
 as the law for the real. However the exclusive advo- 
 cates of either may protest, the problem to be solved 
 is the union of the empirical and the rational, of psy- 
 chology and philosophy, — a union which, however, 
 fully recognizes their differences. 
 
 It is evident that among scholars, the philosopher, 
 most of all, needs psychology. Unless he can distin- 
 guish clearly between the different objects and degrees, 
 and the various processes of consciousness, he will be 
 in constant danger of uniting what should be separated, 
 and vice versa. Psychology is the door to philosophy. 
 
 Enough has been said to indicate that this must not 
 be understood to mean that psychology is to be the law 
 for philosophy. Even if the process of sensation could 
 be perfectly described, with the causes, the conditions, 
 the manifestations, and the inter-action of thought, to- 
 gether with the relation of thought, feeling, and voli- 
 tion to one another, that would not determine what the 
 mind ought to be and do, any more than the manners 
 of an age give us ethics. We must look to the theory 
 of knowledge for the norms of thought. And even in 
 psychology, both in its construction and study, we find 
 a constant application of this theory necessary. To 
 view empiricism as the sole guide in psychological in- 
 quiry, is a serious mistake. It is not sufficient even in 
 considering the simplest elements of knowledge, because 
 so much is implied in them which can never become an 
 object of observation. Thus, the relation of mind and 
 body ; the mental and physical factors in the process of 
 sensation ; the conceptions of the Ego, of the mind, the 
 soul, and consciousness; the distinction between im- 
 pressions and the comparisons, abstractions, develop- 
 ment, and conclusions, of which they are the occasion, 
 — require, for a full understanding, much that is never 
 
158 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 given directly in experience. Indeed, much that is 
 considered in psychology requires the highest powers 
 of the mind, and the deepest processes of thought. He 
 who treats the mental process as a mere beholding of 
 what is directly reflected from consciousness, cannot 
 form a psychology worthy of the name. What is thus 
 beheld is but the material to be interpreted by thinking. 
 Psychology is not termed empirical because it is formed 
 by an empirical process, but because it is the description 
 and scientific interpretation of such a process. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Define Psychology. Difference between Empirical 
 and Rational Psychology. Relation of the former to 
 Natural Science. Scientific method in Psychology. Re- 
 lation of Empirical Psychology to Philosophy. Viewing 
 Mind as Subject and Object, wherein does Psychology 
 differ from other disciplines? Psychology as Propae- 
 deutic to Philosophy. Relation of Psychology to the 
 Theory of Knowledge. To Psycho-physics; Psychia- 
 try ; Anthropology ; Biology ; Physiology ; Sociology ; 
 Pedagogics. Distinction between the Soul and its 
 activity. Mind and Matter. Mental and mechanical 
 processes. Empirical Psychology and Metaphysics. 
 Psychology and Philosophy in England. The Psycho- 
 logical and the- Rational Process. Sources of Psy- 
 chology. Difficulties and Importance of the Study of 
 Psychology. 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 159 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 As the mind is one, so also is there unity in its 
 possessions. Every element of knowledge is indissolu- 
 bly connected with every other, either immediately or 
 through other elements. We cannot imagine a thought 
 as isolated. If it were, how could we ever attain, 
 understand, or remember it? Every concept necessa- 
 rily forms part of the intellectual cosmos, from which 
 nothing can be taken without disturbing the symmetry 
 of the whole, while the addition of a single foreign 
 element would mar its beauty. Fragmentary as our 
 attainments seem, they are really parts of a perfect 
 system, and need only be properly developed in order 
 that the mind may permeate the entire universe of 
 thought. We may, indeed, become so absorbed by a 
 single member of the intellectual organism as not to 
 observe other members, much less the complete system ; 
 but our limited view does not affect the vital union of 
 the members forming the organism. 
 
 Amid the infinite variety, we are in danger of losing 
 sight of the underlying unity, and of treating as frag- 
 ments what are in reality organs. While admitting 
 the advantages of specialization, we have also seen its 
 dangers ; and these admonish us to consider that, how- 
 ever extensive the particular field we cultivate, it is not 
 the world, but is connected with all the other fields 
 
160 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which constitute that world. " In view of the separa- 
 tion affected by the pursuit of specialties, and of the 
 depreciation of departments foreign to the specialist, so 
 often connected with specialties, it seems to me to be one 
 of the most important of philosophical duties to cherish 
 the conviction of the relationship of the sciences, and 
 to maintain that all the scientific interests have an 
 equal right to existence." * If, then, we distinguish 
 the various parts of knowledge, it is not our aim to 
 separate them, but we want to make each more distinct, 
 and to indicate its exact place in the system. Divisions 
 consequently give the intellect an advantage in under- 
 standing and elaborating a subject. They distinguish 
 and abstract, without parting. Just as a definition is 
 both an affirmation and a negation, — affirming what 
 an object is, and denying that it is something else, — 
 so divisions are both analytic and synthetic, analyzing 
 a subject, and forming the subject. We divide to 
 unite. 
 
 Owing to the universal character of its principles, 
 philosophy is best adapted to promote the conviction 
 of the unity of thought, though with our limitations 
 we may not be able to indicate all the connecting links. 
 In seeking the divisions of philosophy we do not want 
 to lose sight of the fact that it is, ideally at least, a 
 system, and that all distinctions have significance only 
 because they are coherent parts of a grand unity. 
 
 In dividing philosophy, therefore, we do not dissect 
 it so as to leave only dead parts of a dead system, but 
 we distinguish the various members which form the 
 living intellectual organism. Just as an organ is com- 
 plete only when attached to the body, so a division is 
 not perfect in its isolation, but in its connection with 
 * Wundt, Logik, II., Preface. 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 161 
 
 the whole system. Between the divisions there are 
 interfacings and numerous communications. Some of 
 the connections seem to belong equally to the divided 
 parts, and in their discussion no division can claim a 
 monopoly of them. With distinctions in the same 
 system rather than with mathematical separations as 
 characteristic of philosophical divisions, we are not 
 surprised to find that the different parts of philosophy 
 lead to each other, and tend to coalesce so as really to 
 form that unity which they are ideally. 
 
 The intimacy of the relation makes the distinction of 
 the parts the more difficult, and also explains the variety 
 found in the division of philosophy. As in anatomy 
 we can take any part of a finger, and consider it by 
 itself, or in relation to the other parts, or can take the 
 finger, and consider its relation to the hand or to the 
 arm or to the whole body; so in philosophy we can 
 make endless divisions, and for each some reason can be 
 advanced. But in the midst of this variety we do not 
 doubt that some are superior to others. Our search is 
 not merely for a division, but for the best. 
 
 We have found that the ultimate principles are the 
 objects of philosophy. In its system it must conse- 
 quently include all these principles. Until these have 
 been discovered, neither the system nor the divisions can 
 be perfected. So long as philosophy itself is an inquiry, 
 an object of search, we may have to form our divisions 
 with a view to the discovery of the principles, and can- 
 not make them as perfect as when the system itself is 
 completed. 
 
 In the various philosophical systems the divisions 
 have been determined by the views of philosophy, the 
 influence of preceding systems, the character of the 
 age, or the desire to give prominence to particular parts. 
 
162 INTBODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 With so many different grounds for divisions, it is not 
 surprising that there has been no uniformity. 
 
 The particular object to which the first philosophers 
 devoted attention was to them the whole of philosophy. 
 We have seen that their physics was not the same in 
 character and aim as ours. " The ancients were wholly 
 ignorant of the investigation of nature in our sense, 
 based on experience ; we find them occupied only with 
 philosophical speculations respecting the universe in 
 general, its origin and its primitive substance." * To 
 them the domain of philosophy consisted of theories 
 respecting nature. They had made considerable prog- 
 ress in metaphysical speculations about the cosmos when 
 attention was directed to the thinking subject, and the- 
 ories of knowledge were discussed, and when dialectics 
 and ethics were added to philosophy. Thus, instead of 
 taking philosophy and analyzing it in order to find its 
 divisions, the genesis of philosophy added one subject 
 after another, and these formed the various parts. 
 Plato seems to have been the first who had a compre- 
 hensive view of the proper domain of philosophy, and 
 Aristotle the first who attempted completely to system- 
 atize knowledge. 
 
 By one of his pupils, Plato's philosophy was divided 
 into ethics, physics, and dialectics. The last contains 
 his most characteristic views, namely, the doctrine of 
 the idea. His ethics includes politics ; his physics, 
 the discussion of the soul, or psychology. The subject 
 of aesthetics is not separately treated ; but discussions 
 of the beautiful are found in different books, particu- 
 larly in connection with the doctrine of ideas. In his 
 dialectics the discussions are essentially metaphysical 
 
 * Dr. J. Miiller : Grundriss der Physik und Meteorologie, 13th ed., 
 Introd. 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 163 
 
 and logical. It is, however, impossible to make a sharp 
 division of Plato's works according to subjects. He is 
 imaginative, speculative, brilliant, and suggestive, rather 
 than analytical and systematic, being a union of the 
 poet and the philosopher. 
 
 Aristotle was a logician and systematizer, being in 
 this respect the opposite of his teacher. But his efforts 
 to systematize knowledge had significance rather for 
 certain disciplines than for philosophy as a whole. For 
 the present stage of development, his division of philos- 
 ophy into theoretical, constructive, and practical, is of 
 no special importance. The first includes physics, math- 
 ematics, and metaphysics; the second -discusses the 
 laws of art; the third treats of ethics and politics. 
 Logic was regarded as introductory to the study of 
 philosophy.* 
 
 The division into theoretical and practical philosophy, 
 prevalent since Aristotle, is not based on inherent dis- 
 tinctions. Besides, this division is misleading. All 
 philosophy is theoretical ; even in ethics it gives the 
 theory or principles of conduct, and in aesthetics the 
 theory of art. That division also encourages the false 
 notion, already prevalent, that the theoretical is not 
 practical, whereas it may be intensely practical and the 
 
 * The condition of Aristotle's works is such that it is difficult, if not 
 impossible, to determine the exact nature of his division. The perplex- 
 ity is partly owing to the fact that he seems to have had no fixed 
 principle of division, and in different works he proposes different ones. 
 In the Topics he speaks of philosophical problems as ethical, physical, 
 and logical ; while in the Metaphysics he divides as indicated above. 
 He does not, however, always regard philosophy as the genus under 
 which the various philosophical disciplines come as species. Frequently 
 the view is found in his works, that there are different philosophies. 
 This is implied when he speaks of metaphysics as the " First Philoso- 
 phy," and when in his Ethics he speaks of another or a different phi- 
 losopli3 r . Zeller divides Aristotle's works into those devoted to logical, 
 metaphysical, physical, ethical, and aesthetic inquiries. 
 
164 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 basis of all conduct. It is a thoughtless popular preju- 
 dice, that the superficial and immediately apparent is 
 practical, while the deep and thorough is not, — a view 
 which philosophy is to combat, not to promote. 
 
 There has been much philosophizing which was not 
 completed by forming a system. Among the Greeks 
 this was true particularly of Socrates ; among the mod- 
 erns, of Leibnitz. Their thoughts were, however, full 
 of inspiration, gave impulses and germs for future sys- 
 tems, and became influential in giving direction to the 
 course of philosophic thinking. As Aristotle systema- 
 tized knowledge in the Socratic school, so Wolff in that 
 of Leibnitz. Even Kant left no complete system ; 
 nevertheless, his works have been the inspiration of the 
 entire process of philosophical development in G ermany 
 for a whole century, and have deeply affected thinking 
 in other countries. In point of comprehensiveness and 
 grandeur of aim, the system of Hegel, developed out 
 of Schelling's system of identity, must be placed in the 
 first rank. With an introduction (Phaenomenologie des 
 G-eistes) intended to prepare the mind for the highest 
 speculation, the system itself, consisting of logic and 
 metaphysics (not two, but one subject), natural philoso- 
 phy, and the philosophy of the spirit, aims at nothing 
 less than the unfolding of absolute knowledge. The 
 dispute as to the" merits of this system and its division 
 is not ended. It is not surprising that in this vast 
 repository of profound thought there should be much 
 to inspire the highest admiration, and also much to 
 meet decided opposition from those occupying a differ- 
 ent stand-point. That the system and its divisions are 
 not final, is generally admitted in Germany even by 
 those who are warm admirers of Hegel. The author 
 himself at different times made different divisions. 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 165 
 
 The various divisions of philosophy thus far preva- 
 lent no more determine the true division, than the vari- 
 ous systems determine the definition of philosophy. 
 Not all philosophers have aimed at a logical division 
 of the whole subject. When we consider the limits of 
 knowledge, and the tendency to make some specialty 
 supreme and absorb the attention, we cannot be sur- 
 prised if but few philosophers are able to treat the whole 
 of philosophy systematically and with equal ability. In 
 the entire course of philosophic thought, men like Kant 
 and Hegel have not been numerous ; and in our day, 
 partly owing to their labors, the demands made on 
 philosophy are greater than in their time. 
 
 At present there are writers who include but one 
 subject in philosophy, as metaphysics, psychology, or 
 the theory of knowledge. There are others who are 
 more true to the history of philosophy, and yet either 
 fail to exhaust the subject, or else include too much. 
 No one questions the right of philosophizing without 
 regard to definite system, or the right of taking any 
 one department and treating it separately, without 
 regard to the rest; indeed, the latter course is often 
 valuable for the sake of giving due prominence to a 
 neglected subject. But such procedure does not help 
 us to a proper division. 
 
 In the history of philosophy, the systems may be 
 treated chronologically, without regard to their inher- 
 ent connections ; in that case, the various methods of 
 division are considered as they arose or appear in the 
 systems. But even where the aim is to give the divis- 
 ion inherent in the subject, independent of the histor- 
 ical origin and development, a variety of divisions is 
 possible, just as in natural science, owing to the dif- 
 ferent stand-points from which the subject is viewed. 
 
166 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 A mere grouping or classification of subjects according 
 to external or superficial marks indicates that philoso- 
 phy itself has not been penetrated. For the distinction 
 of parts there must be an inner reason ; if we connect 
 them intimately, there must be inherent oneness, or 
 organic union. The divisions must exhaust the sub- 
 ject, but must include no more than it does. The prin- 
 ciple of division must be the same for all parts. Each 
 part must be unique, and none embrace the same class 
 of objects as another. 
 
 If the absolute beginning of philosophy could be 
 found, and the genesis of its development, we might 
 discover the divisions by following the process of the 
 unfolding. Hegel claimed to have found this begin- 
 ning in the abstract concept of being, and the process of 
 both thought and being in the dialectic method. But 
 neither the beginning nor the method has been estab- 
 lished as final. Some philosophers claim that a concept 
 or idea must be the start of philosophy, but there is 
 no agreement as to which the seed-thought is. Others 
 hold that some fact of consciousness, something given 
 as certain, must be the beginning ; but there is no con- 
 sensus respecting the experience which deserves the 
 preference. Other philosophers deny that there is any 
 absolute beginning for philosophy. Certain it is that 
 none has been established. The beginner is not in a 
 condition to discover or intelligently adopt one, and it 
 would defeat the very aim of philosophical instruction 
 to take such an absolute starting-point for granted, and 
 then let it determine his divisions and entire course in 
 philosophy. 
 
 Reluctantly, but necessarily, we abandon the hope of 
 giving the student the ideal principle which lies behind 
 all others, and is their source, and which need but be 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 167 
 
 analyzed to give the divisions, and developed to give 
 the absolute system of philosophy. If we imagine that 
 we have found what is still an object of search, we may 
 fail both to seek and to discover the desired object, and, 
 what is worse, we shall envelope ourselves in an illu- 
 sion. Under the circumstances, we can only take the 
 definition, and let that determine the division, the aim 
 being to discover by synthesis, rather than analysis, the 
 component parts. 
 
 We therefore ask, What must those principles be 
 which give the ultimate explanations? This question 
 can only be answered by finding the different classes of 
 objects whose principles are sought. An examination 
 of consciousness is thus required in order to discover the 
 various groups, including all possible objects of contem- 
 plation. The first class, which strikes us on account of 
 its prominence, is that included under the notion of the 
 real, that which exists. This leads to an inquiry into 
 being itself. What is meant by being ? What can we 
 learn of its nature, origin, and design ? The inquiry 
 into being in general leads to questions of concrete 
 being, the nature of various objects, their relations and 
 activities. By pursuing this thought, we should em- 
 brace in our investigation all real objects of knowledge. 
 We, however, exclude from philosophy all that pertains 
 to experiment, and is empirical; this leaves for our 
 department all purely rational questions respecting 
 being. 
 
 We, of course, do not contemplate being as abstracted 
 from thought, but as the object of our thought. This 
 at once puts us or our own being in relation to other 
 being ; and, aside from the inquiry into abstract being, 
 we inquire, What relation do we sustain to other 
 beings ? 
 
168 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The first question, What exists ? is thus supplemented 
 by another, What is my relation to existence? But 
 why make our relation to being specially prominent? 
 Why not consider our own relations and activities 
 under the general head of being ? Simply because we, 
 as inquirers into being, have a special interest in our 
 own relation to other objects, and therefore we make 
 it a point of special investigation. The two points of 
 our philosophy are therefore included under the ques- 
 tions of being and of our peculiar relation to objects. 
 
 Our conscious relation to reality cannot well be con- 
 sidered as a whole, because this relation itself is of a 
 threefold character, depending on our intellectual, emo- 
 tional, and volitional activities. This gives us, besides 
 the principles of being, those of thought, feeling, and 
 volition, as the divisions of philosophy. 
 
 But the same result will be obtained by taking from 
 consciousness the four groups which form all the sub- 
 jects of rational inquiry ; namely, we find in conscious- 
 ness the concepts of being, of thought, of feeling, and 
 of volition. Nothing can be conceived which is not 
 somehow included under these heads, or under a com- 
 bination of them. 
 
 The principles of being belong to metaphysics. Our 
 intellectual relations involve the question of cognitions, 
 and are includeji under the theory of knowledge. The 
 subject most fully developed under this head is logic. 
 Our emotional relations involve the general subject of 
 the feelings, and are included under the theory of the 
 feelings. This department has received less philosophi- 
 cal attention than the other elements of our psychic 
 nature, and is consequently less fully developed. The 
 emotions connected with the beautiful have received 
 most attention under the head of aesthetics. Our voli- 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 169 
 
 tional relations involve the inquiry respecting what 
 ought to be done, or the theory of conduct. This is 
 the department of ethics or morality. Leaving room 
 for the development of subjects under the third and 
 fourth heads, — now still incomplete, — we have the 
 following division of philosophy : — 
 
 1. Metaphysics. 
 
 2. Theory of knowledge. 
 
 3. ^Esthetics. 
 
 4. Ethics. 
 
 More important than the question, how we get this 
 division, is this : Is the division justifiable ? This in- 
 volves two others: Does it include all the ultimate 
 principles ? Can it be still further reduced ? 
 
 Philosophy deals with the real, not with the vision- 
 ary or imaginary. Now, as intimated, besides being, 
 thought, feeling, and action, we cannot think of any 
 other objects of inquiry. To beings with different or 
 more powers than ours, there might be other subjects 
 for investigation, just as the man with sight has a 
 sphere of inquiry which the blind cannot enter. But 
 we can form no conception of beings with powers 
 totally different from ours, and therefore cannot con- 
 sider relations peculiar to them. Rationally we can 
 inquire only into what is, including relation and activ- 
 ity ; and then, for the reason indicated, we can consider 
 specially our activity and relation as thinking, feeling, 
 and willing. The division, consequently, includes all 
 principles which can be subjects of inquiry for us. 
 
 The question, Can the division be still further re- 
 duced? must be answered in the negative. Nothing 
 would be gained by saying that philosophy is divided 
 into being and our relation to being, since the latter 
 is divided as indicated. 
 
170 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It is not intended to substitute, for the old division 
 of the mind into numerous faculties, the three powers 
 of the understanding, the heart, and the will. That 
 the mind has modes of action which can be distin- 
 guished in thought, however they may be united in 
 their source, is evident. There are serious objections 
 to the division into separate faculties, lying side by 
 side without organic union ; and it is no explanation 
 of mental operations, to postulate certain faculties, en- 
 dowed with certain powers, and then to regard all the 
 activities as but the product or working of these facul- 
 ties. In this way the very thing to be explained is 
 taken for granted; besides, the unity of mind, the 
 mental organism, is destroyed.* In its varied activities 
 it is the mind itself that is seen. Nevertheless we 
 cannot resolve thought, feeling, and volition into a 
 primary activity from which the other two are devel- 
 oped, or of which all three are but manifestations or 
 branches. Repeated efforts have been made to find 
 the seed from which all our mental activities grow; 
 but they have not proved successful. Is feeling the 
 original psychic state ? Or is there something distinct 
 from feeling, thought, and volition, containing them in 
 embryo ? We do not know what this something is ; 
 to call it the soul itself, throws no new light on the 
 subject. We cannot tell how these three activities 
 proceed from the soul. They are in operation long 
 
 * Herbart and Beneke rejected the usual division of the mind into 
 faculties as innate distinctions. Such an analysis had a show of knowl- 
 edge, but it was verbal rather than real. In all its activities the same 
 mind is seen, but in different lights; and if the faculties are regarded 
 as indicative only of these various activities, they may promote a clearer 
 apprehension of the mental operations without destroying the under- 
 lying unity. We do not view the faculties as distinct from the soul, but 
 as modes of the soul's activities, through which the character of the soul 
 reveals itself. 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 171 
 
 before we reflect on them, and we cannot get behind 
 these conscious activities to their unconscious origin. 
 Many hold that feeling comes first; and there seems 
 to be ground for letting it precede thought and volition. 
 But by taking any activity as primary, we cannot show 
 how the others grow out of it, or just how feeling and 
 thought develop into or produce volition. In all psychic 
 states, however much the one or the other may predom- 
 inate, we cannot absolutely separate feeling, thought, 
 and volition, any more than we can make one the germ 
 of the other. Their exact relation is, therefore, still 
 an unsolved problem. All we can say is, that they are 
 products of the same mind, and are so related that they 
 affect one another. We, however, separate them ideally 
 and consider each by itself. The question of their 
 relation really belongs to psychology. Psychology also 
 furnishes our division of philosophy, since it is an analy- 
 sis of consciousness which gives the objects of rational 
 inquiry. 
 
 Philosophy is rational knowledge, namely of princi- 
 ples ; or it is principiant knowledge. On first view it 
 may therefore seem as if the theory of knowledge, 
 instead of being a part of philosophy merely, is the 
 whole of it. This view has a number of advocates, and 
 is promoted by the prominence given to the theory of 
 knowledge or epistemology. This is, however, an error 
 based on a lack of proper distinctions, and would more 
 likely be avoided if for " theory of knowledge " we 
 substituted "theory of knowing." All principles are 
 elements of knowledge, but they are not all principles 
 explanatory of knowledge. We mean by these princi- 
 ples only such as are concerned with knowledge purely 
 as knowledge, giving the interpretation of the knowing, 
 and not of any particular kind of knowledge. As in 
 
172 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 psychology the soul's activities are considered, not their 
 products as distinguished or abstracted from the soul 
 itself (as the object from the subject), so in our search 
 for the principles of knowledge we abstract the content 
 of thought, and contemplate knowledge as knowledge, 
 not as this or that kind of knowledge. As after discuss- 
 ing psychology we still find certain contents of the soul 
 to consider, namely the notion of being, of thought, of 
 feeling, and of volition, as well as other departments 
 of knowledge, so after the theory of knowledge (know- 
 ing) or the principles of thinking, we still have the 
 content of knowledge to consider ; namely, the princi- 
 ples of being, feeling, and willing. 
 
 That a certain primacy thus belongs to the theory of 
 knowledge, is evident, and it deserves great prominence. 
 But even from this point of view we shall have the 
 same divisions, though not in the same order. Philoso- 
 phy deals purely with rational knowledge (genus) ; 
 and in rational knowledge it seeks the principles (spe- 
 cies, distinguishing it from other rational pursuits). 
 As rational knowledge of principles, philosophy must 
 explain knowledge itself, which gives the theory of 
 knowing or of knowledge. This is fundamental for all 
 intellectual operations. Having found the principles 
 of knowledge, we can view all other rational inquiries 
 as merely an application of these principles. But why 
 are these principles applied in philosophy? For the 
 purpose of finding the principles of being, feeling, and 
 acting. 
 
 I cannot see how complete principiant knowledge can 
 omit any of these, or can include more. They exhaust 
 our inquiries into ultimate principles, and each division 
 has a clearly marked field of its own. Other divisions 
 extant presuppose a different idea of philosophy, or do 
 
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY. 173 
 
 not exhaust the subject, or make subdivisions primary. 
 Our division intentionally omits the application of phi- 
 losophy to other objects, as law, language, religion, etc., 
 — applications which are endless, and do not belong to 
 philosophy proper. Under the four divisions all appli- 
 cations of philosophy may be classified, each being 
 placed under one or more of them. Thus there is no 
 inquiry which does not involve an application of the 
 principles of knowledge. Law, politics, and sociology 
 are largely ethical, and may be viewed as coming under 
 social ethics, or as an application of ethical principles 
 to society. 
 
 The theory of knowledge, and metaphysics, deserve 
 especial attention in an introductory work ; the former 
 on account of its fundamental character, the latter 
 because its inherent difficulties are so great. But aes- 
 thetics and ethics are also worthy of careful considera- 
 tion. Their spheres are more easily comprehended than 
 those of the other two subjects, and their discussion 
 lies more within the range of ordinary thinking ; their 
 ultimate principles are, however, beset with difficulties. 
 
 For the reasons given, the different departments of 
 philosophy will be discussed in the following order : — 
 
 First, The Theory of Knowledge (Noetics).* 
 
 Second, Metaphysics. 
 
 Third, JEsthetics. 
 
 Fourth, Ethics. 
 
 * In Germany this theory is called Erkenntnisslehre, Erkenntniss- 
 theorie, Wissenslehre, Wissenstheorie, and sometimes Noetik. The word 
 " epistemology " has gained limited currency in English for the same 
 subject. Since, however, we already use " noetic " as an adjective, the 
 same word or "noetics," analogous to "metaphysics," "aesthetics," 
 and " ethics," might be used to designate the theory of knowledge. 
 
174 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Why divide Knowledge if it is a unit? Principles 
 determining the Division. Can the analysis of any one 
 principle give the Divisions of Philosophy ? The Divis- 
 ion. The reason for this Division. Does it exhaust 
 the subject? Criticism of other Divisions. Why not 
 consider the Philosophy of Religion and Naturphiloso- 
 phie as also separate Divisions ? Does Philosophy be- 
 come psychological by going to consciousness for its 
 objects ? Where can Philosophy find its objects if not 
 in consciousness ? Difference between an empirical ob- 
 ject, and an object of consciousness. How does an 
 empirical become a rational object? Reason for dis- 
 cussing the Theory of Knowledge first. 
 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 175 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (NOETICS). 
 
 The infinite variety of being, thought, feeling, and 
 volition, comprehended in philosophical contemplation, 
 forms a unit in that all is considered only so far as 
 rational, and as leading to or included in the ultimate 
 principles. The intellectual threads, on which every 
 thing is strung in philosophy, are rational and princi- 
 piant, and objects are philosophically significant in pro- 
 portion as related to these threads. The philosophic 
 element, in the multiplicity of concepts, forms the bond 
 of unity; and that element is the object of search in 
 the effort to pass from the desire for wisdom to wisdom 
 itself. In philosophy, therefore, we do not seek knowl- 
 edge in general, but the knowing element in all that is 
 known. The aim to attain full and the highest intel- 
 lectual consciousness leads philosophy beyond the con- 
 sideration of a knowledge of particular things, to the 
 consideration of knowledge itself, making that the 
 object of rational and principiant inquiry. 
 
 The problem of knowing, or of knowledge, is funda- 
 mental. The mind which recognizes the responsibility 
 of giving to itself a full account of itself, knows that it 
 must consider the nature and conditions of knowledge, 
 before it can rationally discuss the various objects of 
 knowledge. An object of knowledge is meaningless, 
 unless the knowledge, of which it is the object, is under- 
 
176 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 stood. Our cognitions are a purely intellectual rela- 
 tion between the subject and the object ; and this 
 relation, being the fundamental conception of knowl- 
 edge, is the light in which all objects known must be 
 beheld. Not the soul (psychology), not the objects 
 to which it is related (reality, beauty, morality), form 
 the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge. This 
 subject-matter is nothing else than the correct thought- 
 relation between the knower and the known, neither of 
 which is considered alone, nor even at all, except so 
 far as they are necessary to bring out the idea of all 
 pure knowledge. The principles involved are those 
 which pertain to knowing as knowing ; therefore they 
 are general, and apply equally to all departments of 
 thought. The question, What must a mental product 
 be in order to be knowledge ? excludes from a content 
 of consciousness every thing that is peculiar, except 
 what constitutes the peculiarity of all knowledge. Be- 
 tween the knower and the known we want to discover 
 the knowing. For all intellections, the problem is con- 
 sequently fundamental ; and if we regard psychology 
 as the preface to philosophy, the theory of knowledge 
 is its introductory chapter. 
 
 In the haste to acquire objects of knowledge, this 
 introductory chapter is frequently skipped. More intent 
 on possessing than on giving an account to itself of the 
 character of its possessions, and the processes involved 
 in their acquisition, the mind overlooks the deepest 
 problems of the nature and criteria of knowledge. 
 Under these circumstances it is not strange that the 
 intellect fails to get the full mastery of itself and its 
 acquirements ; and with all its boasted wealth, it does 
 not so much possess as it is possessed. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 177 
 
 THE NEED OF SUCH A THEORY. 
 
 This theory becomes a mental necessity so soon as 
 the mind reflects on itself, and demands proof of the 
 validity of its processes, and of the reliability of their 
 results. Whenever we rise from the psychological view 
 to the critical inquiry into what must be in order that 
 our intellectual attainments may be true, we enter the 
 sphere of philosophy, and begin to construct a theory of 
 knowledge. The reason in the mind insists on rational 
 standards, and requires thought to justify itself. The 
 philosophic spirit cannot rest in consciousness or even 
 self-consciousness, but only in truth-consciousness. 
 
 Under the objects of knowledge lies the question, 
 What is knowledge ? The answer to this gives rise to 
 other questions : Is knowledge possible ? If so, under 
 what conditions? To what extent? How can it be 
 tested? Only those who have taken the answers for 
 granted can fail to see the difficulties and fundamental 
 character of these problems. None but the thoughtless, 
 who have never made clear to themselves the meaning 
 and foundation of knowing, will regard an inquiry into 
 the possibility of knowledge useless. This possibility 
 has repeatedly been denied, and all supposed knowl- 
 edge has been pronounced mere opinion. This scepti- 
 ticism was by no means confined to the ancient Greeks. 
 In modern times it has been quite common, particularly 
 in certain departments of thought. This is evident 
 from the philosophies of Hume, Kant, and Comte, and 
 also from agnosticism. This scepticism is not confined 
 to theology and philosophy, but extends also to science. 
 Ferrari, an Italian philosopher who died in 1877, even 
 denied the possibility of science, holding that " Logic 
 and Nature are contradictory in themselves and be- 
 
178 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tween themselves, and thought, which would dominate 
 facts by applying itself to their real elements, is of 
 necessity involved in error." * Even Descartes' Cogito 
 ergo sum is not final; and that eminent thinker was 
 unable to find any other proof that our minds do not 
 deceive us when they present clear and distinct concep- 
 tions, than the fact that God is truthful, and conse- 
 quently will not permit our minds to deceive us. But 
 we reason in a circle if the proof of God's existence 
 depends on our reason, and then the validity of reason 
 is made to depend on the existence of God. Our age 
 has not merely inherited the scepticism of previous 
 ages, but it has also overturned the dogmatism of the 
 past, has undermined arguments formerly supposed to 
 be irrefutable, and has thus deepened and broadened 
 doubt and suspicion. 
 
 Whoever understands the deeper undercurrents of 
 the age must appreciate the need of subjecting the 
 problems involved in cognition to the most thorough 
 examination ; and even a superficial view shows the 
 importance of critically determining the grounds of 
 certainty. These grounds will be valued in proportion 
 to the love of truth. The honest doubter, and the 
 anxious searcher for an immovable basis of knowledge, 
 know the difficulty of attaining certainty respecting 
 many of the most important subjects. On the same 
 points, conflicting views prevail among those who have 
 equal facilities for understanding them.f Marked dif- 
 
 * Mind, 1878. Barzellotti on Philosophy in Italy. 
 
 t Every discussion makes the need of reliable grounds of certainty 
 evident. The origin of Locke's celebrated work is an instructive ex- 
 ample. In " The Epistle to the Reader " he says, " Were it fit to trouble 
 thee with the history of this essay, I should tell thee that five or six 
 friends, meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very 
 remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficul- 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 179 
 
 ferences prevail respecting the inferences to be drawn 
 from the same scientific experiments ; and with all their 
 exactness and thoroughness, scientists are by no means 
 agreed respecting the principles and results of science. 
 One need but hear witnesses of the same occurrence 
 testify under oath, to learn how hard it is to determine 
 simple questions of fact; and even when the facts are 
 admitted, different and perhaps opposite inferences are 
 drawn from them. When we pass from facts to com- 
 plicated systems of thought, the difficulties are multi- 
 plied. In religion the conflicting views are innumerable, 
 and all must have some basis, valid or invalid. One 
 will affirm the doctrine of the Trinity as stoutly as 
 another denies it ; and an Athanasius may be as ready 
 as Servetus to die for what he regards as certain. In 
 philosophy the theories respecting the first principles 
 vary greatly, and thus the foundation is laid for diver- 
 gences throughout the entire domain of thought. The 
 theory of knowledge teems with unsolved problems per- 
 taining to the nature, the origin, the conditions, the 
 limits, the relations, and the value of knowledge. 
 
 So important has this theory become, that it threat- 
 ens, for the present, to absorb all philosophical inquiry. 
 Since it involves the questions on which all knowledge 
 depends, their fundamental character requires that they 
 be settled before others pertaining to cognition can be 
 determined. In America, Great Britain, France, and 
 Italy, the conflicts between empiricism and rationalism, 
 
 ties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, 
 without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which per- 
 plexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and 
 that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was 
 necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our under- 
 standings were or were not fitted to deal with." The attempt to solve 
 this problem resulted in the Essay on Human Understanding. 
 
180 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 materialism and idealism, theism and atheism, make the 
 significance of the theory evident. In Germany, philo- 
 sophical journals and books are full of the subject, and 
 the best thinkers devote their best efforts to the solution 
 of the problems involved.* 
 
 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LOGIC. 
 
 One of the principal difficulties in noetics consists 
 in determining the place of logic. The old lifeless 
 skeletons which formerly constituted this discipline do 
 not meet present demands ; and the numerous recent 
 works on logic in America, England, and Germany, 
 seek to give the study more life and greater practical 
 value. But unanimity respecting the nature, sphere, 
 and method of logic has not yet been attained. Some 
 hold with Kant that the laws of thought are its sub- 
 ject-matter ; others make it a discussion of the princi- 
 ples of induction, so that it becomes more directly the 
 propedeutic of the sciences ; and others want it to 
 include the whole theory of knowledge. This is the 
 case with Ueberweg, who defines it as " the science 
 of the normative laws of human knowledge." His 
 " Logic " discusses perception, space, and time, and the 
 relation of perception to reality, as well as the usual 
 topics of formal logic. Ulrici opposed Ueberweg's 
 method, and advocated logic as the basis of the theory 
 of knowledge, giving the norms of thought, while the 
 theory determines the nature and possibility of knowl- 
 edge. Sigwart regards logic as the doctrine of the art 
 
 * " Speculative philosophy has in modern times changed in charac- 
 ter from a theory of being into a theory of knowing." Mind, 1883, 21, 
 by the editor. " The theory of knowledge, besides being separately 
 treated, is included in all the newest expositions of logic, dominated 
 as these no longer are by the old formalistic conceptions." — Wundt, 
 Philosophy in Germany. Mind, 1877. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 181 
 
 of thinking, its aim being to establish reliable and 
 general rules for thought. Instead of including the 
 entire theory of knowledge, he wants logic to deter- 
 mine the correct method of thinking (methodology). 
 Among the most important of recent German works is 
 that of Wundt, whose title indicates its aim : " Logic : 
 An Inquiry into the Principles of Knowledge and of the 
 Methods of Scientific Investigation." The first large 
 volume is devoted to the theory of knowledge, the 
 second to the method of the sciences. Of the great 
 mass of learned material, comparatively a small propor- 
 tion belongs to what was formerly discussed in works 
 on logic. These are but a few samples of the variety 
 of opinions on the subject. 
 
 Logic, as giving the forms of correct thinking, can no 
 longer be isolated, but must be brought into organic 
 union with the other elements of knowing. This, how- 
 ever, does not require that it include the whole process 
 of obtaining knowledge, perception for instance, or that 
 it consider the material as well as the forms of thought. 
 The norms of thinking are sufficiently important for 
 separate treatment, and they constitute the peculiar 
 province of logic. Logic is thus part of the theory of 
 knowledge, and properly comes under the head of ori- 
 gin of knowledge, namely so far as that origin depends 
 on correct thinking. This place secures its immediate 
 connection with all the members in the organism of 
 knowledge. That it cannot exhaust the whole subject 
 of knowing, is evident, though it performs a most im- 
 portant part. Thinking is a method of knowing; in 
 order that the method may result in truth, it requires 
 the right beginning or a proper object. But if logic is 
 to begin with sensation, and to determine the correct- 
 ness of perception and the right apprehension of its 
 
182 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 object, — in other words, if all that precedes the act 
 of thinking is also to be considered, — then logic must 
 include a large domain of psychology. By making logic 
 the synonyme of the theory of knowledge, it must also 
 determine the relation of thought to reality. 21 The 
 form of thought must have some kind of content ; how 
 is that obtained ? What is its validity when obtained ? 
 These questions include much more than belongs to the 
 historically limited sphere of logic. There is no need 
 of changing this sphere. The laws of thought, or dis- 
 cursive thinking, can still be regarded as the domain of 
 logic, which the larger theory of knowledge includes as 
 one of its parts.* 
 
 The comprehensiveness of the theory of knowledge 
 makes divisions necessary even for a general view of 
 its multitude of important subjects. There being no 
 generally accepted division, one will here be made 
 which seems best calculated to give the student a clear 
 conception of the subject, and to prepare him for its 
 study. The divisions and their discussions in a pre- 
 paratory work must, however, be viewed as a mere 
 preface to the depth and breadth of tins profound and 
 extensive theme. Each of the three heads under which 
 we consider the general subject seems inexhaustible. 
 
 1. What is knowledge f 
 
 2. How is it obtained ? 
 S. How is it completed f 
 
 * Volkelt (Phil. Monatsh., 1881. 540): "It is my conviction that the 
 theory of knowledge should not he absorbed by logic, but that, on 
 the other hand, logic should be reduced to a part of this theory. This 
 theory is the more general, more comprehensive, science. In the course 
 of its investigations it unavoidably comes in contact with logical think- 
 ing, and must test it according to its objective worth. This task cannot 
 be performed without considering the most general forms and laws of 
 thought, which are usually discussed in logic." 
 
THEOBY OF KNOWLEDGE. 183 
 
 1. WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 
 
 The problem for solution is the exact meaning of 
 the expression, " I know." From the object known we 
 abstract for examination the knowing. The first glance 
 shows that knowledge is not co-extensive with the con- 
 tents of consciousness. In distinction from the emo- 
 tions and volitions, it is intellectual. But there are also 
 intellectual elements in imaginations, opinions, and be- 
 liefs ; yet we do not include these in knowledge. With 
 whatever tenacity held by the mind possessing them, 
 they are not authoritative for other minds. They are 
 recognized as having something peculiar, individual, 
 perhaps arbitrary, but not what is necessary and uni- 
 versal. Knowledge, on the other hand, is universal, and 
 has objective as well as subjective authority. If dis- 
 covered by one mind, it can also become a possession of 
 others, and the grounds on which it rests must be valid 
 for every intellect understanding them. It does not, 
 like so many of our mental products, depend on peculi- 
 arities of mind or training or experience, but on an in- 
 herent necessity. Our inclinations and will may effect 
 its recognition, not its reality. It is absolute and final ; 
 it dominates the intellect like a tyrant, and yet the 
 intellect itself is that tyrant. 
 
 The intellect does not create knowledge, but produces 
 it according to necessary laws. Just because it beholds 
 itself in this product, the mind cannot alter the knowl- 
 edge without changing itself. Intellect culminates in 
 knowledge, and recognizes it as an imperative. Knowl- 
 edge is power, but it is power which is absolute re- 
 straint. The mind is helpless in view of it, and there 
 is no freedom except in absolute submission. 
 
 Knowledge is truth apprehended, or truth become 
 
184 INTBOBUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 conscious. We ascribe objective reality to truth; it 
 exists even if we do not know it, and it remains un- 
 changed by our denial and rejection. We cannot make, 
 but may discover it ; and cognition is the process for 
 making the objective subjective. Whether we regard 
 the truth as consciously existing in any mind, as God's, 
 or not, we know that our mental attitude toward it has 
 no more effect on it than our recognition of the exter- 
 nal world affects its course. The truth is thus a realm 
 of its own, complete, perfect, absolute. By entering 
 this realm, our intellect appropriates its possessions and 
 is enriched, but the realm itself is not impoverished. 
 Knowledge is an individualization of truth, a mental 
 realization of an ideal existence. 
 
 We can define knowing as a perception of truth, — 
 a perception based on grounds evident and certain. A 
 man may dream the truth, or have a presentiment of it, 
 but that is not knowledge. Truth may be possessed 
 without being known as truth, while much that is 
 thought to be known is really a deception. Standards 
 vary; where many claim to know, the more critical 
 discover only prejudice or opinion. What a man re- 
 gards at one time as absolutely known, he may later 
 reject as false, or as beyond the limits of the knowable. 
 
 If such mistakes and self-deceptions are to be avoided, 
 knowledge must* be sharply defined, and its criteria 
 given. We speak of the absoluteness of reason, but 
 forget that in this sense reason is an abstraction, and 
 that our minds are fallible, still wrestling with the prob- 
 lem, how to attain the ideal reason. The same mind 
 that knows must also have the criteria of knowing. It 
 must determine for itself the standard of truth. But 
 this standard is not true, unless a universal standard for 
 all intellect. If peculiar, it is false. With itself, its 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 185 
 
 criteria, the mind should therefore be mercilessly criti- 
 cal in determining what to accept as knowledge. The 
 vast majority are satisfied with mere opinion, take it for 
 knowledge, and inquire no further; hence the impor- 
 tance of shaking these opinions by doubt, so that the 
 mind may become conscious of itself, and pass to knowl- 
 edge. But even after the mind has become conscious 
 of itself, and is willing to rest only in what is reliable 
 and can stand the severest test, it is extremely difficult 
 to determine the limits of the knowable. Particularly 
 hard is it so to draw the line between faith and knowl- 
 edge that they can in all cases be clearly distinguished. 
 Both have degrees, and at times they seem to merge 
 into each other. Faith may be based on knowledge, 
 and must be if reliable; but can knowledge ever be 
 based on faith ? If only that is known which is abso- 
 lutely demonstrated, then nothing is known. Some- 
 thing must ultimately be regarded as so certain that it 
 needs no demonstration, otherwise all reasoning is in a 
 circle. If every thing must be demonstrated, on what 
 does all demonstration finally rest ? With what can we 
 begin ? For instance, can we prove that our faculties 
 do not deceive us ? If any one attempts this, he must 
 do it with the very faculties he is testing ; that is, he 
 must take for granted that the faculties, whose reliabil- 
 ity he is testing, are reliable. Call it a belief, an as- 
 sumption, a postulate, a self-evident truth, or what yon 
 will, something must at last be taken as so certain, 
 that it needs no proof; and that must be made the 
 ultimate basis of knowledge, and the starting-point of 
 reasoning. 
 
 Nor do we ordinarily limit knowledge to such abso- 
 lute demonstrations. When we test such generally 
 accepted laws as causation, gravitation, the indestruc- 
 
186 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tibility of matter, the conservation of energy, we base 
 their universality on some undemonstrable postulate. 
 The direct observation of the working of any law is 
 necessarily limited, yet we do not hesitate to declare it 
 universal. Nothing is regarded as more certain than 
 the demonstrations of mathematics; yet they all rest 
 on self-evident truths, which are axioms just because 
 undemonstrable, though certain. 
 
 Knowledge presents four questions for consideration. 
 What is its object (subject-matter) ? What is our con- 
 ception of that object? How is the conception related 
 to the object ? What is the degree of certainty respecting 
 that relation ? 
 
 Let us suppose the object to be a man. If my con- 
 ception of him is correct, I have the truth, but I may 
 not have knowledge. That conception, while perfectly 
 true, may be a mere opinion ; I may only believe that 
 he has a certain character. What I opine may be true ; 
 what I hold as certain may be false. The difference 
 between knowledge and opinion need not be in their 
 object, since that may be the same in both ; but there 
 must always be a difference in the grounds on which 
 they rest. A correct opinion only becomes knowledge 
 when I know (not merely opine) that between my con- 
 ception and the object conceived there is harmony. 
 This psychological element of certainty is, therefore, 
 essential to knowledge. 
 
 The truth in a mind may consequently be far more 
 extensive than its knowledge. The former is simply 
 the agreement of a percept or concept with its object ; 
 the latter, however, implies that this agreement is 
 known. The difference between a true faith and 
 knowledge consists in the fact that in the one case the 
 truth is believed, in the other it is known; but both 
 
THEOBY OF KNOWLEDGE. 187 
 
 have the truth. A concept, opinion, or belief may be 
 true or false. Knowledge is always true. 
 
 Knowledge, then, is a conscious possession of truth : 
 a possession whose grounds are recognized as being in 
 harmony with reason, and, therefore, irrefutable ; or, 
 knowledge is the legitimately and certainly recognized 
 (conscious*) agreement of a percept or concept with its 
 object. Thus if we have a subject and predicate, knowl- 
 edge consists in the established certainty of the har- 
 mony between the two ; or, if we have a perception of 
 something real, knowledge will consist in the established 
 certainty that there is harmony between the mental 
 presentation and the thing for which it stands. 
 
 Percepts and concepts exist only in consciousness, 
 and always are, in themselves, what they appear to be. 
 It is not in beholding them that mistakes occur, but 
 only in passing judgment on what they stand for. I 
 commit no error in imagining a fictitious character ; 
 but I deviate from the truth as soon as I ascribe ex- 
 ternal reality to the fiction. I abide in the truth so 
 long as I take my concepts for what they really are. A 
 mind fully conscious of itself and of the nature of its 
 possessions cannot err. Viewed in this light, we can 
 define knowledge as perfected consciousness. 
 
 Taken in the widest sense, knowledge embraces all 
 that is known, irrespective of its character. Hence it 
 includes fiction, and numerous other things, which are 
 of little or no significance to the scholar. The only 
 knowledge worthy of philosophical investigation is val- 
 uable and real. Whatever its idealism, philosophy aims 
 to become absolutely realistic ; it therefore rejects every 
 concept regarded as the intellectual counterpart of some 
 reality, when, in truth, it is but a mental fiction. Not 
 only does the mind create such fictions, and then pro- 
 
188 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nounce them realities, but it also takes words for con- 
 cepts, and objectifies its own concepts, as if external 
 existences. We speak of accidents, for instance, as if 
 they occurred in nature ; but reflection teaches us that 
 they only represent our way of viewing certain occur- 
 rences. Chance and accident vanish when their causes 
 are understood. Perhaps these words are used only 
 to indicate that something occurred without intention 
 on our part. From this it is evident how essential to 
 knowledge is the correct interpretation of our concepts. 
 
 Where reason is made the supreme arbiter, there is 
 no danger of excluding ideals from knowledge. As 
 objects of search, or as the goal to be striven after, they 
 are the highest reality. The true man is an ideal ; but 
 he is the only real man, all others being imperfect 
 copies. When, therefore, we speak of the real as the 
 object of knowledge, it is taken in the twofold sense as 
 embracing what exists, and also what ought to be. It 
 includes whatever is true. Not only nature and mind, 
 but also their source, relations, activities, and products, 
 are its objects. In mathematics we have objects of 
 knowledge, even if there be no objective (extra-mental) 
 reality to correspond with its figures and demonstra- 
 tions. All that is real to the mind, and has significance 
 for it, is an object of knowledge ; otherwise, aesthetics 
 and ethics could never be objects of rational inquiry. 
 
 When we say that knowledge aims at an exhaustive 
 understanding of the real, what is meant ? We under- 
 stand a thing when we know its nature, its origin, its 
 relation to other things, and its purpose. A little re- 
 flection shows that nothing can be fully understood 
 unless every thing else is known. Aristotle says in his 
 Ethics that the philosopher must follow things in the 
 order of their orgin, and declares that the beginning is 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 189 
 
 half of the whole, — a proverb whose application to 
 knowledge is evident. But in order to comprehend 
 fully the origin of a thing, we must follow its near and 
 remote causes through all the processes by means of 
 which it has been developed, going from effect to cause, 
 until we reach the first cause. So, in order to compre- 
 hend the relations of an object, its connection with the 
 whole universe must be traced, since every thing is 
 somehow involved in these relations. The purpose or 
 design of a thing is fully understood only when all its 
 connections, from the nearest to the remotest, are con- 
 sidered. It is thus seen that the thorough study of any 
 one thing leads to inquiries which involve the whole 
 universe of being, and that to know one thing perfectly 
 means to know all absolutely. A deep and broad con- 
 ception of knowledge reveals our own attainments as 
 extremely limited. 
 
 This intimate relation of all objects, so that they 
 constitute a universe in which nothing is isolated, 
 greatly complicates knowledge. It is impossible to 
 know all individual objects, nor is it profitable to spend 
 one's strength in acquiring unconnected details. From 
 the philosophic point of view, the comprehension of 
 details under laws and principles is far more valuable. 
 That individual objects must also be studied, is a lesson 
 which science is constantly teaching. And every science 
 has its (material) logic to determine what shall be 
 regarded as scientific knowledge in its special depart- 
 ment. So there are laws of historic, literary, and lin- 
 guistic criticism, to determine what the conditions of 
 knowledge in their respective departments are. But 
 the facts in nature and mind thus learned become 
 means for induction and generalization. The intellect 
 itself impels us to pass from facts to laws, which are 
 
190 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the foci concentrating all the rays of knowledge. 
 Thinking condenses knowledge into its essence. 
 
 While all knowledge, even that of the most insignifi- 
 cant details, is truth known as such by the mind, the 
 variety in its objects is infinite. Only by classification 
 can we gain the intellectual mastery over the innumer- 
 able objects. Systematized knowledge is most available, 
 and in forming its attainments into system the mind 
 both develops and economizes strength. The best 
 methods of classification, as we have seen, are deter- 
 mined by inherent characteristics, not by incidental or 
 external marks. The nature of their union, and the 
 amount which objects have in common, determine the 
 intimacy of their relation, and the order of their 
 classification. 
 
 It is a general rule, that, the more objects have in 
 common, the smaller the class to which they belong, 
 and vice versa. The same thought may be expressed in 
 another way: A concept is rich in content, in propor- 
 tion as it is small in extent ; and the poorer in content, 
 the greater in extent. Intensively and extensively, con- 
 cepts are thus in inverse proportion. In the concepts 
 tree and organism, we find that the latter includes the 
 former, and all that can be predicated of the nature of 
 an organism is true of the tree ; but the concept tree 
 also contains much more than the more general concept 
 organism. In content the concept tree is much the 
 richer, but the concept organism embraces many more 
 individuals than tree. A tree is an organism only so 
 far as it has elements common to all organisms. The 
 last sentence implies that the concept organism is 
 poorer in content than tree, but richer in the number 
 of objects embraced. 
 
 However, then, we may classify an individual, it 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 191 
 
 always contains more than the class-name indicates. 
 This is merely saying that the concrete is richer than 
 the abstract. The object before me is a tree, but it is 
 something more ; it is an oak, a white oak, a particular 
 one, with a certain form and size, with a certain num- 
 ber of leaves and quantity of fruit, and with numerous 
 other peculiarities. When we assert that an object 
 belongs to a particular class, we only indicate that it 
 has the marks (notae) common to all the objects of that 
 class. Knowledge of this kind is general, abstract. 
 When I say, " This is a man," I indicate nothing that 
 is peculiar so as to distinguish him from mankind in 
 general. He may be any man. Yet our general notions 
 are indispensable for reasoning and for all thinking ; we 
 cannot even give a definition without them. 
 
 The most general (the most abstract and the empti- 
 est) of all notions, that of being, includes extensively 
 all that exists, but indicates nothing respecting exist- 
 ence except that it is. Can we predicate any thing else 
 of all being, except the empty fact of existence? Is 
 there any quality or property which belongs to all 
 things that are? Perhaps the very thought of being 
 implies something else. If this is so, and if we could 
 discover this something else, we should gain new knowl- 
 edge applicable to the whole universe of being. By 
 increasing the intensive content of a general term, we 
 increase our knowledge of all objects included under 
 that term. 
 
 The general concept, of course, has significance only 
 because there are concrete objects which it includes. 
 The concept man is useless unless there are men. Are 
 the universals purely mental, or do they represent real 
 existences? Aside from the conception there is noth- 
 ing that can be called absolutely tree, man, or moun- 
 
192 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tain ; but there are trees, men, and mountains. A still 
 more vital question is this: Have we really general 
 concepts, or have we instead only general terms to 
 which no concept corresponds? Berkeley and Hume 
 contended that what we call general or abstract ideas 
 or notions are pure fictions. An abstract idea they 
 declared an impossibility. By viewing a number of 
 similar things, say triangles, they held that we apply 
 the same term to all, but that to this general term noth- 
 ing in our mind corresponds. The term "triangle " does 
 not stand for a general notion, but it stands for each 
 particular triangle. We consequently have general 
 terms, but no notions. An inference has been drawn 
 from this view, especially by Hume, in favor of empiri- 
 cism and sensationalism, to the rejection of the higher 
 and more abstract activities of the mind. 
 
 Emphatically, however, as they reject all general 
 notions, Berkeley and Hume themselves give evidence 
 to prove that they are more than mere words. Thus 
 they institute comparisons between objects, and abstract 
 that wherein they agree from that wherein they differ. 
 What is the result of this process? The general con- 
 cept which is designated by the general term. From 
 a number of triangles I abstract that wherein they 
 agree. They all have three sides, so drawn as to en- 
 close space, and to-form three angles; but the peculiari- 
 ties of these triangles — the length of the sides, the 
 size of the angles, the amount of space included — are 
 not considered. The result of this process of abstrac- 
 tion is, that what all the triangles have in common is 
 obtained. The general term " triangle " does not indi- 
 cate the peculiarities of any particular triangle, but only 
 what every figure must have in order to be a triangle, 
 whatever else it may have. A general notion is conse- 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 193 
 
 quently real, and is the product of a most important 
 mental operation. We go a step farther, and declare 
 that the general notion is not merely a mental reality, 
 but, so far as it is a notion of things, something real 
 corresponds to it. There is no universal in nature ; 
 but we make the mistake of looking for some particular 
 object which corresponds with the general notion, when 
 it does not stand for a particular object at all. It stands 
 for what is found in all objects of that class, but which 
 cannot be exclusively concentrated in any one thing. 
 That which constitutes a mountain is found in all moun- 
 tains ; what makes a figure a triangle must be in every 
 triangle. 
 
 The difficulty with Berkeley, Hume, and their fol- 
 lowers, on this subject, is, that they do not distinguish 
 between perception and conception. Hume distinctly 
 rejects all that cannot be perceived ; it is either a fiction 
 of the mind, or a word without meaning. Now, we can 
 perceive only the concrete ; but by mentally elaborating 
 our percepts (by thinking), we form general notions. 
 We cannot perceive them as we do objects of sense, 
 but we conceive them ; we do not make an individual 
 presentation to the mind of what is general, but we 
 think it. What Hume wants to behold as an "im- 
 pression " or " image " of a thing, the mind wants to 
 contemplate as the intellectual counterpart of reality. 
 
 We study particulars to get a knowledge of all like 
 particulars, and we generalize to individualize. Knowl- 
 edge in any comprehensive sense is obtained by pro- 
 cesses of generalisation and individuation. Cognition 
 must attend to details, but general notions are equally 
 indispensable to knowledge. 
 
 The question, how far knowledge extends, may also 
 be considered both extensively and intensively. It 
 
194 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 would be presumptuous to claim that our cognition is 
 co-extensive with being. The unconscious processes of 
 our own minds lie wholly beyond the sphere of our 
 knowledge ; and there may be entire regions, wholly 
 different from those known, which we cannot enter, and 
 of whose very existence we cannot even form a concep- 
 tion. With other or different senses and intellectual 
 powers, regions might be revealed which must now re- 
 main hidden. The limit of knowledge is one of the most 
 interesting and most difficult problems in the theory of 
 knowledge. 
 
 The extent of knowledge intensively considered re- 
 fers to the limits of thought respecting the objects 
 within the sphere of cognition. How far does our 
 knowledge of things extend? The uncritical imagine 
 that through their senses they come into direct commu- 
 nication with things, and learn to know them immedi- 
 ately ; but, in reality, we know directly only what is in 
 our consciousness. Mentally we never come in contact 
 with things themselves. They reveal themselves to us 
 through their qualities or forces ; they are manifested 
 to us through the percepts we form of them. It is not 
 exact enough to say that we know a thing from what 
 it does, for it may do much of which we can know 
 nothing; but from what a thing does to us (how it 
 affects us), we infer what it is. We thus distinguish 
 between phenomena and things themselves. According 
 to Kant, we can know only the phenomenal ; the thing 
 per se ("das Ding an szcA"), we cannot know. That 
 things can only be known according to what they are 
 to us, is self-evident. It is but saying that things can 
 be to us intellectually only what they are to us intel- 
 lectually. The existence of a substance underlying the 
 qualities which appear to us is an inference, the cor- 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 195 
 
 rectness of which is much disputed at present. To our 
 minds a thing is always what it does, or is able to do. 
 Matter is to us simply the sum of its known forces. 
 If we are not satisfied with this view, we must make 
 it the dark something in which the forces inhere, and 
 from which they proceed ; its further definition is still 
 a problem. To define the soul as immaterial is, as we 
 have seen, purely negative, showing what it is not, but 
 giving nothing positive. Directly we know only its 
 activity ; all else is inference. Even the problem of 
 its immortality is a question of conscious activity. By 
 a critical examination of cognitions, we become con- 
 scious of our limitations ; and growth in the knowledge 
 of self is largely a growth in the consciousness of our 
 ignorance. 
 
 The relation of knowledge to reality has been in- 
 volved in much perplexity. We do not doubt that 
 things exist, whether we have any knowledge of them 
 or not. Our thinking does not affect the existence of 
 any thing except the thought itself. Nor is the thought 
 of an object identical with the object. What, then, is 
 their relation to each other ? Have we in our cogni- 
 tions a possession of reality, or of its copy? Or is 
 thought, perhaps, independent of external existence, 
 being wholly a mental creation ? So far as these ques- 
 tions belong to an introductory work, they can best be 
 considered under the next head. 
 
 2. ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 This subject might be relegated to psychology if 
 the process of the acquisition of knowledge could be 
 watched and exactly described. It is, however, per- 
 formed unconsciously (at least without being remem-* 
 bered) long before it becomes an object of attention 
 
196 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and reflection. We can still watch certain processes in 
 the formation of knowledge afterwards, and the ques- 
 tion of the origin of knowledge involves important 
 psychological elements ; but psychology cannot solve 
 the problem unless we are prepared so to enlarge its 
 sphere as to include the critical inquiries of Kant, as 
 well as the sceptical but dogmatic processes of Hume. 
 
 Since the time of Descartes, there has been much 
 dispute as to whether there are innate ideas. The 
 advocates of the doctrine regard as innate the ideas 
 called universal and necessary. It is not meant that 
 they are universal in the sense that every human being 
 has them, but that they are necessarily developed in 
 every mind attaining a certain stage of culture. The 
 dispute about innate ideas has in large part been 
 fruitless, because the terms were not sharply defined. 
 Descartes himself did not state the doctrine clearly. 
 Locke, in his attack on innate ideas, showed that chil- 
 dren, idiots, and savages do not possess them, and 
 therefore concluded that they cannot be innate. He 
 proved that these ideas are not born with us, but that 
 experience is necessary for their presence in conscious- 
 ness ; that is, he clearly established what probably no 
 philosopher ever questioned, namely that at birth the 
 mind has no ready-made notions lying about in con- 
 sciousness. His attack, however, made it necessary to 
 define more carefully what is designated by the ideas 
 pronounced innate. In answer to Locke, Leibnitz 
 admitted as true that to the intellect nothing is innate, 
 except the intellect itself.* He saw that the real question, 
 namely, whether there are not certain principles inher- 
 ent in the mind which determine what is necessary, was 
 
 * " Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse inteh 
 lectus." 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 197 
 
 not touched by Locke's arguments. He held that of 
 course there are no complete notions at birth, but that 
 the mind has certain tendencies or aptitudes, which, 
 with proper development, give necessary truth. These 
 innate aptitudes he uses as the synonyme of "innate 
 ideas." The meaning is that certain notions are impli- 
 cite, not explicite, in the mind at birth. Whether this 
 is true, is the real question at issue. 
 
 In this sense Locke himself would no doubt have 
 accepted the doctrine of innate ideas. His view of 
 reflection, besides sensation, as a source of knowledge, 
 really implies it.* But, as the expression is ambiguous, 
 and has often been misunderstood, it is better to avoid 
 the words "innate ideas," and substitute for them 
 inherent mental aptitudes or laws. 
 
 Kant rejected innate ideas, in the literal sense, as dis- 
 tinctly as Locke did, but taught that there are certain 
 innate conditions of knowledge, certain mental forms, 
 which are the mind's contributions to percepts and con- 
 cepts.! He held that all knowledge begins with experi- 
 ence, but that all is not the product of experience ; this is 
 the first thought of the Kritik. He taught that in per- 
 
 * That the mind acts according to innate laws, is not merely implied 
 throughout Locke's Essay, but also in his First Letter to the Bishop of 
 Worcester. 
 
 t In writing against Eberhard, Kant says: " The Kritik absolutely 
 admits no ideas ( Vorstellungen) which are created or born with us; all 
 without exception, whether belonging to perception or to conception, 
 the Kritik views as acquired." Respecting a priori conceptions, he, 
 however, adds, " But there must surely be a ground in the subject 
 which makes it possible for the ideas to arise in a particular way and 
 not otherwise, as well as possible to apply them to objects not yet 
 given; and this ground at least must be innate." He declares as innate 
 " the subjective conditions of the spontaneity of thought." Drobish 
 (" Zeits fiir exacte Phil." 1862. 6) in quoting these passages says, " Thus 
 Kant, also, does not regard his a priori forms as innate ideas, but as 
 acquired." 
 
198 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ception the mind furnishes time and space, which are 
 purely internal, as the mental forms into which all the 
 materials or contents furnished through the senses must 
 be put. For the concepts the understanding furnishes 
 certain categories, such as quantity, quality, relation, 
 and mode. These categories, however, do not appear 
 in the mind at birth. Sensation is necessary to arouse 
 the mind to activity; but when thus aroused, it fur- 
 nishes these various forms of knowledge spontaneously. 
 " No one would have the concept of cause if by means of 
 experience he had not perceived causes. No one would 
 have the idea of virtue if he always lived among those 
 who are nothing but thieves." Hegel also regarded 
 innate ideas as only implicite in the mind at birth : they 
 are there in the form of capacity.* Lotze held the same 
 view, declaring that the meaning of innate ideas is 
 " that the mind is so constituted, that, when manifold 
 impressions are made on it, its own nature " leads it to 
 what are called necessary truths. f Harms advocated 
 the same doctrine. J " Innate to the mind are neither 
 emotions, nor knowledge, nor strivings ; but it is innate 
 to it to feel, to know, to strive ; and in feeling, know- 
 ing, and striving, it is subject to a law which must be 
 there if we recognize it, and cannot be merely a product 
 and habit of knowing. It is innate to the eye to per- 
 ceive every impression as color; it cannot perceive 
 tones. It is innate to the feeling to perceive every 
 emotion as an agreeable or disagreeable state. But 
 neither feelings nor percepts are innate. Just as little 
 are concepts innate; but it is innate to us to know 
 
 * "Nur als an sich und in der Weise der Anlage im Menschen 
 vorhanden. "—Ency. I. 136. 
 t Nord und Slid, 1882, 340. 
 $ Abhandhinyen der system. Philosophic, 137. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 199 
 
 objects. It is no more a habit of consciousness to 
 know objects, than a stone has learned by habit to fall. 
 The laws of knowledge operate in knowing before they 
 themselves are recognized." 
 
 From the time of Leibnitz to the present, German 
 philosophy has been dominated by the thought — most 
 fully developed by Kant — that certain mental elements 
 which are innate determine the character of our think- 
 ing. Even the realism of Germany * which has lately 
 asserted itself is no exception to this rule. The one- 
 sided attention to this innate element has led to idealism, 
 just as its neglect in other lands has led to sensational- 
 ism and materialism. 
 
 Repeated efforts have been made by mysticism to 
 account for our highest notions by viewing them as 
 revelations. The mind is supposed somehow to be in 
 immediate communion with God, so that a knowledge 
 of Him is obtained directly (not through means). Mys- 
 ticism, though often intimately connected with philos- 
 ophy, is not a part thereof, but a problem for solution. 
 
 But even if the mystic's view of the direct communion 
 of the mind with God is rejected, there may be what is 
 termed intuitive knowledge, such, namely, which is not 
 dependent on logical demonstration. Some notions are 
 so self-evident that the mind at once, without any 
 media, sees their truth. It is a kind of intellectual be- 
 holding or contemplation of truth. That the mind has 
 this vision, as it may be called, is beyond dispute ; the 
 only question can be respecting the reason why the 
 mind immediately perceives truth in this way. 22 
 
 The hint given, while speaking of psychology, respect- 
 ing the state we form in the process of development, 
 may be of service to us in interpreting what we call 
 
 * As that of J. von Kirchmann. 
 
200 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 intuitive ideas. As a sensation is at once interpreted 
 into a percept, so certain concepts are at once pro- 
 nounced true. The recognition of their truth requires 
 no conscious effort on our part ; it is immediate. The 
 states in which we have these intuitions are the result 
 of culture, and the processes of this culture can un- 
 doubtedly be determined. That the beholding is by a 
 state which is not innate, but the product of develop- 
 ment, does not affect the value of the intuitions. They 
 may be based on innate conditions in the very nature of 
 our being, so that the ground of their necessity is in our 
 constitution. It would be proper, then, to speak of 
 certain ideas as necessary, and therefore universal. 
 
 We do not mistake, then, in pronouncing as a reality 
 the immediate beholding of certain ideas as true ; but 
 we mistake in supposing that this vision is a direct 
 state of nature rather than a result of development. 
 And we also mistake in supposing that such immediate 
 beholding pertains only to what are commonly called 
 intuitions. They are but the operation of a very com- 
 mon law of our being, — a law working in the formation 
 of all habits, and in all judgments, in which the mind 
 overleaps certain links in the process of reasoning. The 
 mind, after itself passing through certain processes of 
 generalization, generalizes unconsciously. The steps 
 originally conscious in forming a judgment are after- 
 wards omitted. The first and last link of the chain are 
 seen, and, without examining the rest, the mind knows 
 that they are all in their place. 
 
 The various efforts somehow to get a knowledge of 
 objects directly or otherwise than through sensation, 
 have been opposed by those who held that the mind is 
 wholly passive, or at least wholly dependent on exter- 
 nal objects for what it knows. The advocates of empiri* 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 201 
 
 cism have been no more careful in the use of terms 
 than those who taught the doctrine of innate ideas. 
 Whoever regards the mind as originally both empty 
 and passive, and always under the dominion of impres- 
 sions from the external world, must make sensation the 
 source and explanation of all cognition. 
 
 Locke's well-known figure of the mind as "white 
 paper," is frequently quoted as evidence that he re- 
 garded the mind as passive. " Let us, then, suppose 
 the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of charac- 
 ters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished? " * 
 .Locke, however, does not use this comparison to prove 
 the mind inactive, but merely to show that at birth it 
 has no ideas. When he says that it is like "white 
 paper," he only means to say what he adds, that it is 
 "void of all characters, without any ideas;" but the 
 inference so often drawn, that paper may be written on, 
 but cannot write on itself, is drawn by others, not by 
 Locke. That he does not regard the mind as passive, is 
 evident from the same section, when he says, "Our 
 observation, employed either about external sensible 
 objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, 
 perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which 
 supplies our understandings with all the materials of 
 thinking." To the question, Whence has the mind " all 
 the materials of reason and knowledge ? " he anwers, 
 " From experience ; in that all our knowledge is 
 founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself." 
 But this experience, he holds, consists of sensation and 
 reflection ; the external and internal factors co-operate. 
 After speaking of sensation, he says of reflection, " The 
 other fountain, from which experience furnisheth the 
 understanding with ideas, is the perception of the oper- 
 * Book II. l, 2. 
 
202 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ations of our own minds within us, as it is employed 
 about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when 
 the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the 
 understanding with another set of ideas which could 
 not be had from things without ; and such are percep- 
 tion, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 
 willing, and all the different actings of our own minds ; 
 which we, being conscious of, and observing in our- 
 selves, do from these receive into our understandings as 
 distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. 
 This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself." * 
 
 The hints given by Locke respecting reflection 
 were not fully developed by him. He says it might 
 with propriety be called "internal sense," thereby indi- 
 cating that he regards its function mainly as that of 
 an observer of the inner operations, and not as a power 
 that works over the impressions received. Even in his 
 view of reflection he does not rise above the psycholo- 
 gical to the rational activity of the mind. But some of 
 his followers neglected the hints he gave concerning the 
 mind's activity, and made the outer sense the only 
 source of knowledge. In France, Condillac taught that 
 the mind is passive ; through the senses the world 
 writes its figures, or photographs its images, on the soul, 
 which may view them, but has no active part in their 
 production. But even if the soul were passive in receiv- 
 ing impressions through the senses, it surely cannot be 
 so, as Condillac supposed, in working them over in 
 thinking. 
 
 Materialists go still farther than Condillac, who did 
 not hold that the soul is material. Epicurus regarded 
 the soul as not different from the body, and held that the 
 images in the mind are produced by the constant emis- 
 
 * Book II. 1, 4. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 203 
 
 sion of fine particles from the surfaces of bodies. Thus 
 material copies were thought to pass from things into 
 the mind.* Modern materialists regard thought as 
 merely a physiological function of the brain. Buech- 
 ner teaches that the soul itself is nothing but a special 
 endowment of the vital force, conditioned by the pecul- 
 iar construction of the material of the brain. He says 
 {Kraft u. Stoff), "The same power which digests by 
 means of the stomach, thinks by means of the brain." 
 Some materialists speak of thought as a phosphores- 
 cence of the brain ; but this figure throws no real light 
 on the mental processes. All such illustrations take 
 it for granted that we know body better than mind, 
 when the fact is " that we know more of mind than we 
 do of body ; that the immaterial world is a firmer reality 
 than the material." f 
 
 Respecting the origin of knowledge, conflicting views 
 are thus found to prevail. An idealism, which views all 
 cognition and its objects as a direct product of the soul, 
 has found advocates, as well as sensationalism and 
 materialism, which regard the external world or matter 
 as the only source of all that is known. We shall be 
 fortunate if amid this confusion we can give hints to the 
 beginner to direct him to the way in which the solu- 
 tion of the problem may be found. 
 
 It is universally admitted that knowledge begins with 
 experience ; by examining this, therefore, we may learn 
 something respecting the origin of knowledge, and the 
 factors it contains. Much as experience is discussed, it 
 is too often treated as if its exact nature were already 
 determined, and needed no further inquiry. The man- 
 ner in which the subject is frequently discussed makes 
 
 * Lange, Geschichte des Mater ialismus, first ed. 29. 
 t Huxley, Science and Culture. 
 
204 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the impression that even Locke has not been carefully 
 studied ; and in some instances his standpoint is treated 
 as if Berkeley, Hume, and Kant had written in vain. 
 The most evident things are reiterated, while the points 
 needing elucidation are overlooked. 
 
 In the sense now generally adopted, experience does 
 not primarily express the act of testing or trying, nor 
 any other act except the observation of what is in con- 
 sciousness. In the broadest sense we experience what- 
 ever we are conscious of. We may hesitate to say that 
 we experience a thought or an idea ; but it is certain 
 that we do not have an idea or a thought unless the 
 fact that we have it is a matter of experience. It is 
 true that it is more common to use the term " experi- 
 ence " with reference to sensations and feelings ; and in 
 proportion as intellectual activity enters into sensation, 
 the less apt we are to apply the term " experience " to it. 
 We experience the pain caused by a burn ; but in the 
 beauties we see, and in the music we hear, the intellect 
 is more active, and we do not speak of these as experi- 
 ence in the same sense as of pain or pleasure. We ex- 
 perience trials, but think thoughts and do deeds. When 
 we thus speak of thought and deeds, it is, however, the 
 active mental element (the producing factor) to which 
 attention is called, not to the fact of our conscious- 
 ness of that activity. What we thus distinguish from 
 experience is our own intellectual activity, and it is 
 thus seen that the term is used for a state in which we 
 are affected rather than active. When our attention is 
 directed absorbingly to intellectual or volitional efforts, 
 we experience little ; but when we yield ourselves more 
 to the spontaneous processes of our minds, to the imme- 
 diateness of our feelings, we experience in a peculiar 
 sense. Experience thus pertains to the psychological 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 205 
 
 rather than the rational processes. There is more of it 
 in the busy scenes of life than in mathematical demon- 
 strations. And by systems of experience, so termed in 
 philosophy, we mean those which have much immedi- 
 ateness, spontaneousness, depending much on direct 
 sensation and observation, not so much on the mental 
 elaboration of the material thus gained. An experien- 
 tialist is afraid to speculate, for fear of losing the bless- 
 ings of experience. No one thinks of calling Hegel's 
 system a philosophy of experience ; but Locke, Hume, 
 and their followers have produced systems which may 
 be so called with much greater propriety. Sensational- 
 ists stoutly oppose the intuitional ists, overlooking the 
 fact that in point of immediateness (absence of discur- 
 sive and inferential thought) they are really one. Sen- 
 sationalism affirms for the outer what intuitionalism 
 claims for the inner sense ; and there seems to be no 
 good reason for crediting the testimony of the one, and 
 rejecting that of the other. If extremes, they may serve 
 each other as correctives. 
 
 Experience is, as we have seen, an infallible guide so 
 far as a knowledge of what is in consciousness is con- 
 cerned ; it is in its explanation that errors arise. It is 
 itself purely subjective, and indicates nothing as to the 
 origin of its objects. They may come from within, or 
 from without, or from both. To appeal to experience, 
 therefore, as the source of all cognition, does not prove 
 that source to be either external or internal. Whether 
 consciously or unconsciously, " experience " is, unfortu- 
 nately, often used as synonymous with "sensation." 
 When men claim to have settled the origin of knowl- 
 edge by declaring that it comes through experience, 
 they have in reality indicated only one of its media, 
 not its origin. Many, besides confounding experience 
 
206 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and sensation, also confound mere impressions on the 
 senses with knowledge. By ignoring what Locke called 
 the "internal sense" or " reflection," the sensationalist 
 may imagine that he has succeeded in putting all his 
 mental operations outside of his mind and into things. 
 
 Let us begin with percepts (sight, sound, etc.), and 
 see whether they receive their character wholly from 
 external objects. In order that there may be percep- 
 tion, it is not enough that the organs of sense be af- 
 fected. If this takes place during sleep, or while the 
 attention is absorbed by something else, there is no per- 
 ception. This is only found where the mind receives, 
 or re-acts against, the impressions made on the organs. 
 In every perception of external objects we postulate 
 three factors, namely an external object, the tactual 
 impression on the senses, and the activity of the per- 
 ceiving mind. 
 
 Our percepts are not copies of what transpires in the 
 external world, which, consequently, cannot be the only 
 factor in their production. The man who is color-blind 
 sees objects in a light different from that of the man 
 who is not. Sound is also conditioned by the character 
 of the ear; and it is similar with reference to all sensa- 
 tions. But the third factor, the perceiving mind, must 
 also be taken into account. We see light, and hear 
 sounds, and yet -the external factor consists of vibra- 
 tions of ether or air. " It can at once be proved that 
 no kind and no degree of similarity exists between the 
 quality of a sensation and the quality of the agent in- 
 ducing it, and portrayed by it. ... Our sensations are, 
 as regards their quality, only signs of external objects, 
 and in no sense images of any degree of resemblance." * 
 
 * Helmholtz, Popular Lectures, 390, 391. In another place he states 
 that our sensations are only symbols of the objects of the external 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 207 
 
 Thus, even in the most elementary experience, we must 
 take account of other factors than the external world. 
 We make mistakes respecting sensation, and afterwards 
 correct them ; these mistakes and corrections are men- 
 tal acts. In our perceptions the judgment is active, 
 though perhaps unconsciously. 
 
 If now we take sensations as elements of all knowl- 
 edge, we have, from the very beginning, to deal with 
 a mental factor which sensationalism is apt to ignore. 
 When two objects, the external world and the mind, 
 co-operate, the result must be regarded as the product 
 of both factors. The motion resulting from the impact 
 of two moving bodies can be determined only by con- 
 sidering both bodies and their motions. This is simply 
 an illustration of the law of all activity, whether mate- 
 rial or mental : whenever objects affect each other, the 
 result is the product of both. 
 
 In knowledge itself there is absolutely no factor ex- 
 ternal to the mind. That the impression on the organs 
 of sense is a condition for a knowledge of external ob- 
 jects, is true ; but it is only a condition, and cannot 
 properly be called a factor of knowledge itself. Aside 
 from this, all that pertains to knowledge is purely the 
 product of mental activity, or of the intellectual elabo- 
 ration of what is given in sensation. Were the mind 
 passive, or had it nothing but consciousness, so as to 
 reflect objects as from a mirror, it would be impossible 
 to do any thing with a sensation except to view it. 
 The sensation even would be present to the mind only 
 so long as the impression itself continued; its longer 
 
 world, which correspond with these somewhat as written letters and 
 the sounds correspond with what they represent. They, indeed, give 
 us information respecting the peculiarities of the external world ; hut 
 not hetter than we can give a blind man information of color by means 
 of verbal description. 
 
208 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 retention or reproduction would require memory. But 
 even with memory, it would be impossible to change 
 the original form ; and, aside from isolated impressions, 
 all knowledge would be out of the question. A sensa- 
 tion cannot develop itself, and cannot attach itself to 
 other sensations ; it is nothing at all by itself, but only 
 something for the mind that has it. To ascribe to it 
 the power of developing itself, makes it an independent 
 substance. Whoever speaks of the energy of sensations 
 to develop, compare, analyze, or unite themselves, need 
 but know what the statement means, in order to see its 
 absurdity. A mathematical problem can as easily solve 
 itself, or separate points connect themselves to form a 
 line. 
 
 From the mind itself, as well as from the external 
 world, the understanding gets materials of knowledge. 
 Our emotions and volitions and thoughts are products 
 of the soul, and are as truly a revelation of reality as 
 are our presentations of external objects. The wildest 
 notion that ever entered the human mind has as real 
 a cause as the deepest truth, or the clearest perception. 
 A notion is not wild or false because uncaused, but be- 
 cause it itself, or its cause, is misunderstood. The appre- 
 hension of the cause of any mental phenomenon always 
 gives real knowledge. Frequently the material obtained 
 by watching the "mental operations is far more valuable 
 than that whose source is external, since it gives reve- 
 lations of self. 
 
 But whether the occasion of it is inner or outer, expe- 
 rience itself is always purely mental. It never occurs 
 outside of the mind, nor can we ever have a perception 
 of any thing not in the mind. Whoever has seriously' 
 reflected on the subject must see that nothing can be 
 more absurd than the statement that we have an expe 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 209 
 
 rience of the outer world. How can the mind get out- 
 side of itself and inside of that which is outside of itself? 
 All that we can experience respecting the outer world 
 is in the form of mental impressions, whose source or 
 occasion is in that world. 
 
 Those who try to reduce the mental activity in the 
 formation of knowledge to a minimum may claim that 
 the mind can do nothing but develop its sensations, and 
 that this is meant by the statement that all knowledge 
 is the product of experience. These persons, however, 
 usually forget that there are perceptions from within, 
 as well as from the outer world, and that the whole 
 process of developing the sensations and perceptions is 
 subjective ; it is done wholly by the mind. In this 
 process the mind does not proceed arbitrarily, but 
 according to laws. But these laws are its own. Of 
 its perceptions it can make only what, under the cir- 
 cumstances, its laws demand. The percept is a tool of 
 the mind. The mechanic uses the saw as he pleases, 
 but he cannot use it as a gun ; in its use he is limited 
 by the nature of the implement. The union of differ- 
 ent percepts, the formation of concepts by abstracting 
 elements common to the percepts, and all the processes 
 of reasoning and thinking, are purely mental, and are 
 determined by the object of thought and the laws of 
 mind. Even in the case of the experientialist, the 
 external factor, though absolutely necessary, dwindles 
 to a minimum in his investigations. 
 
 The purely mental element in these processes is not 
 observed, because it usually works spontaneously and 
 unconsciously, and because the attention is not directed 
 to it, but solely to the object under consideration. Just 
 because the intellect is not foreign to us, we do not 
 readily observe its operations. They are means to 
 
210 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 which we have become accustomed, and we lose sight 
 of them while intent only on the end they are to accom- 
 plish. It is altogether different with the impressions 
 received through the senses: we take them up con- 
 sciously, in order to work them over. Only by a special 
 effort of reflection can we learn the significance of the 
 processes usually performed unconsciously. 
 
 Besides ignoring what is taught respecting the mind 
 by its own operations, the cardinal error of sensational- 
 ism is based on the fact that it fixes the attention only 
 on the beginning or condition of our knowledge of 
 external objects; but the fact that all we know, what- 
 ever its external conditions may be, depends on the laws 
 of the mind, is overlooked. The nature of the mind 
 ultimately determines its own processes under given 
 conditions, so that we cannot otherwise perceive, expe- 
 rience, or think, than according to the principles im- 
 planted within us, or according to the constitution of 
 our being. The laws of thought that dominate our 
 intellectual life are our own nature. Their working is 
 involuntary, at least ordinarily, and they can be learned 
 only by watching their operations ; but when once dis- 
 covered, they are final for us. We may explain and 
 illustrate these laws, and give the principles involved 
 in them, and indicate the sphere of their operations; 
 but we cannot go" farther in our explanation of them, 
 than the statement that we are so constituted that we 
 cannot do otherwise. Whoever questions the validity 
 of his mental laws, thereby invalidates his own objec- 
 tions. It is more irrational to question the validity of 
 our mental laws than to question the validity of a law 
 of nature ; for the validity of a law of nature depends, 
 for us, on the validity of our mental laws, by means 
 of which the laws of nature are established. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 211 
 
 Observation furnishes nothing but isolated facts. 
 How, then, do we get general laws, — those of nature, 
 for instance ? An apple hangs on a tree ; I cut off the 
 stem, and the apple falls to the ground ; I connect the 
 change of location with the cutting of the stem, calling 
 the latter the cause of the change. Were this repeated 
 a million times, and always with the same result, it 
 would not teach me that every change must have a 
 cause, but only that, as far as I have observed, every 
 change has a cause. Observation gives us only facts, 
 but never the necessary and universal.* Whence, then, 
 the general law that every change must have a cause ? 
 Should we not substitute for it : Every observed change 
 had a cause ? 
 
 We experience the fact that we have the law, but no 
 amount of experience can give the law. Hume makes 
 the law of causation the product of a mere habit of 
 mind. We learn it, he claims, by observing that changes 
 have (what we call) causes, or we accustom ourselves 
 to assume a cause for every change. To this habit he 
 naturally denies the claim of establishing any necessity 
 or universality. Only in mathematics, dealing not with 
 reality but with the relations of ideas, does he recognize 
 absolute laws. 
 
 It is a fatal objection to this theory of habit, that it 
 does not account for the law it proposes to explain. 
 By observing the same act often repeated, and always 
 with the same result, I may form the habit of expect- 
 ing that result under the same circumstances ; but this 
 expectation is not at all the thing whose explanation is 
 demanded. What is to be explained is the fact, that 
 
 * "Necessity and strict universality are, therefore, sure signs of 
 knowledge a prion, and they are inseparably connected." — Kant, 
 Kritik, Introduction. 
 
212 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we have the notion that every change must have a cause. 
 This necessity is purely mental. I can change a mere 
 habit by setting a must against or over it ; but I cannot 
 alter the law that every change must have a cause. 
 But even if Hume's position is admitted, it confirms 
 the fact that we cannot get behind or beyond the laws 
 of the mind, for the theory of habit in the end amounts 
 to this: It is the law of mind to form the habit of 
 regarding every change as having a cause. And the 
 recent efforts to explain certain or all general notions 
 as hereditary amount to the same thing ; namely, that 
 it is a law of mind, in the process of development, to 
 transmit, by inheritance, general notions. Thus stated, 
 the doctrine is that of innate ideas in a literal sense, 
 and is liable to the same objections. The meaning in- 
 tended is, however, that a mental predisposition to form 
 certain general notions is inherited. But, supposing 
 that this is really hereditary, are the tests of the heredi- 
 tary also hereditary ? Are the rational criteria of truth 
 inherited ? Only so long as we move in the sphere of 
 psychology, can heredity have any significance \n inter- 
 preting mental phenomena. The grounds of truth and 
 the principles of knowledge, to be found only by pro- 
 found investigation^ cannot be hereditary ; no more than 
 hard-earned money is inherited. The fact is, that no 
 rational theory whatever can be framed whose ultimate 
 basis is not some law inherent in the mind itself. As 
 soon as we pass from the descriptive and historical to 
 the rational, we are wholly dependent on the unaltera- 
 ble laws of thought. These laws are, consequently, the 
 ultimate appeal in all questions pertaining to knowledge. 
 We are now prepared to inquire into the validity of 
 thought which rises above mere observation. We have 
 seen that all knowledge, however elementary in charac- 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 213 
 
 ter, and whatever its primary conditions (or source), 
 depends ultimately on our mental laws. Now, if the 
 normal action of the mind can be trusted in observa- 
 tion, why not in other respects ? The same mind forms 
 the percepts and the concepts ; and there is no reason 
 to regard its normal action a whit more reliable in 
 one case than in the other. We distinguish between 
 ordinary and scientific observation, the latter being 
 reliable because made according to critical methods 
 whose validity the mind has established; while the 
 former does not comply with rational demands, and is 
 consequently liable to mistakes. The same is true of 
 all mental activity ; if exact, critical, normal, it must 
 be reliable. And the burning question in the theory 
 of knowledge is not, What can be known by means of 
 observation and experiment? but this, What are the 
 laws of mind, or the norms of thought ? 
 
 Not merely is all thinking determined by these laws, 
 but it is also a revelation of them. We may direct 
 attention so exclusively to the objects before the mind 
 as to disregard the mental activity, or we can make the 
 latter the subject of study. In considering the law of 
 gravitation, we naturally inquire into its operations 
 throughout the universe ; but we can also inquire into 
 the activity of the mind in the formation of the law 
 itself. The scientist sees nature through the law, while 
 the mental philosopher sees the mind in the same law. 
 
 All these considerations lead us to change the ques- 
 tion, Is there a purely mental element in knowledge? 
 so as to read, Is there any knowledge without a purely 
 mental element? This must be answered in the nega- 
 tive. But this is different from the question, Is there 
 any knowledge whose source is purely mental? What- 
 ever may originally arouse the mind to activity, all that 
 
214 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 we know of the mind itself is learned only from its 
 operations. But the mind can create no knowledge of 
 real objects. All that we can know of reality must be 
 given either directly through the senses or through the 
 operations of the mind, or it must be an inference from 
 something thus known to exist. Hume saw correctly 
 that we infer from the existence of an object known, 
 the existence of another unknown object, on the prin- 
 ciple of causality. 
 
 But even if the mind can work only if some material 
 is given it from within or without, what it makes of 
 this material, or infers from it, is the product of its own 
 activity. While it cannot construct a real world of 
 objective existence, it does construct an ideal world 
 which to it is real; besides that which is, the mind 
 recognizes what ought to be. From habit we may at 
 first form the notion of what is becoming ; but when its 
 activity is properly aroused, the mind subjects it to a 
 higher, an absolute ought This imperative the under- 
 standing does not find in any thing given directly in 
 consciousness, but in it the mind objectifies itself. This, 
 of course, does not exclude the fact that the mind has 
 been trained by experience ; but experience gives no 
 ideals. In forming them, the mind is wholly a law unto 
 itself. In its ideals, it mirrors itself. 
 
 It has already been stated that our mental laws, 
 unless made the subject of special reflection, work un- 
 consciously. Thus our universal notions usually come, 
 we know not how. Necessity and universality are the 
 product of the mind ; that they are inferred from facts 
 given by observation, does not interfere with their 
 mental character. A particular fact or truth is nothing 
 but that particular fact or truth, and in itself implies 
 nothing except that and what it is. All that is implied, 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 215 
 
 or inferred, is put into it solely by the mind. But in 
 every particular fact the mind sees a necessary and uni- 
 versal truth. Whatever occurs once must always occur 
 again under the same conditions. The single occur- 
 rence is given by observation, the "always" and "must" 
 are added by the mind. 
 
 In order to discover the origin of the notions called 
 universal, necessary, self-evident, intuitional, we must 
 notice the process of their formation. This process is 
 determined according to our mental constitution, or a 
 law inherent in our being, and, aside from this, nothing 
 is innate. The process itself only takes place after the 
 mind has been aroused to activity, and has attained a 
 certain stage of progress. 
 
 Much of the embarrassment of philosophers, from 
 Hume to Mill, would have been avoided if the law 
 active in the formation of our universal notions had 
 been discovered; if instead of resting with custom, 
 habit, association, as final, these themselves had been 
 properly explained. The law of mind which produces 
 our general ideas is final for us, and with its discovery 
 our inquiries must end. What this law is, we can of 
 course learn only from its operation. 
 
 We have seen that notions called necessary and uni- 
 versal are the product of states formed in the process 
 of development, being generalizations of the mind's 
 own generalization. Let us now see whether we can 
 discover the law according to which what is pronounced 
 necessary and universal is formed. 
 
 Logicians usually regard it as a fundamental law of 
 mind that A is A; even with the sign of equality 
 (A = A) it is thus interpreted. Now, that A is A, is 
 undoubtedly true ; but it is empty tautology which 
 neither in itself nor in its application has any signifi- 
 
216 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cance. But the formula that A equals A, gives a law 
 of the mental operations very fruitful in its application. 
 In this formula, A is not the same A in both cases, but 
 the one is exactly like the other, and we interpret it to 
 mean : Every A is equal to every other A. Thus let 
 A = stone, then, according to the formula, every stone 
 is equal to every other stone ; a statement which at 
 first seems absurd, but which, properly understood, is 
 literally true. Every stone, as stone (without reference 
 to kind, quality, size, or other peculiarities, but simply 
 as stone), is really equal to every other stone con- 
 sidered merely as stone. Let A = power, or cause, or 
 any thing else, and it will be found that the formula is 
 always applicable. Power is always power, and as 
 power it equals all power as power. A, wherever found, 
 as A, always equals every other A. 
 
 A mental standard is a criterion for the mind only if 
 this law is correct. It in fact lies at the basis of every 
 comparison and of every judgment. Just because it is so 
 universal in its application, it is important to formulate 
 this fundamental law distinctly. It is but an applica- 
 tion of this law, when we affirm that what occurs at one 
 time will always occur when the same conditions are 
 given.* If fire burns to-day but not to-morrow, then 
 fire is not the same to-day and to-morrow ; that is, fire 
 is not fire, or A is not equal to A. If at one time an 
 unsupported object falls to the ground, a like object 
 under exactly the same circumstances will always do so. 
 A single event contains all the laws involved in all 
 equal events, just as completely as all the events con- 
 tain those laws, though it may require many experi- 
 
 * Time and space, whether regarded as purely subjective, or as both 
 subjective and objective, have no influence on occurrences; it is only 
 what is in time and space that can have such an influence. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 217 
 
 ments to discover with scientific exactness the nature 
 of the event, and of the laws involved. 
 
 The same fundamental law applies to the qualities of 
 things, and is active in all systematizing and classifica- 
 tion. If life is that mark of a single object which con- 
 stitutes it an organism, then it is necessary to constitute 
 any other object an organism. If a single change needs 
 a cause, then every change needs one. 
 
 From this law we readily learn the origin of the 
 truths held to be necessary and universal. The mind 
 finds them implicite in particulars, and from these infers 
 them. Experience is necessary for their discovery, but 
 it does not give them ; they are conclusions of the mind, 
 and in it they have an a priori basis. 
 
 All analysis and synthesis are performed according to 
 the law given. In all its processes the judgment acts 
 on the supposition that things are alike or unlike ; its 
 function is that of comparison, to determine whether an 
 object or a notion is like or unlike A. Since the mental 
 standards determine our judgments, we can see why 
 our knowledge is not limited by observation. The 
 general laws and axioms, according to which we judge 
 the material furnished by observation, are a mental 
 necessity, behind which we cannot go. All assertions 
 to the contrary are somehow contradictory. To limit 
 the law that every event must have a cause, by experi- 
 ence, is to destroy the law itself; it is a law only be- 
 cause it is not limited. J. S. Mill limits the law to 
 experience, and supposes a case which is really incon- 
 ceivable. "I am convinced that any one accustomed 
 to abstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his 
 faculties for the purpose, will, when his imagination has 
 once learnt to entertain the notion, find no difficulty in 
 conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many 
 
218 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides 
 the universe, events may succeed one another at ran- 
 dom, without any fixed law ; nor can any thing in our ex- 
 perience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, 
 or indeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere 
 the case. The grounds, therefore, which warrant us in 
 rejecting such a supposition with respect to any of the 
 phenomena of which we have experience, must be 
 sought elsewhere than in any supposed necessity of our 
 intellectual faculties." * We may observe events with- 
 out inquiring into their causes; but we cannot really 
 think or conceive them as succeeding one another at 
 random, without any fixed law. In order to do this, 
 we should have to think A as not equal to A ; that is, 
 we should have to conceive events, somewhere beyond 
 observation, as not events. Even if an event could 
 happen without law, the mind could not conceive it as 
 thus happening ; it can only think according to law, and 
 its law for conceiving events is according to the law of 
 causality. If anywhere a change needs no cause, then it 
 nowhere needs one ; if it has one, it is purely accidental. 
 Unconsciously, but with absolute reliability, the mind 
 draws conclusions according to its inherent laws. When 
 we become conscious of these laws, and make them the 
 object of reflection, we can do nothing but accept their 
 validity. All our- reasoning cannot alter them, for rea- 
 soning is itself but an exercise of these laws. If the 
 
 * Logic, II. 95. Mill is entirely consistent with the principles adopted 
 from Hume, when a few pages later he says, " The uniformity in the 
 succession of events, otherwise called the law of causation, must he 
 received not as a law of the universe, hut of that portion of it only 
 which is within the range of our means of sure observation, with a rea- 
 sonable degree of extension to adjacent cases. To extend it further, is 
 to make a supposition without evidence, and to which, in the absence 
 of any ground from experience for estimating its degree of probability, 
 It would be idle to attempt to assign any." 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 219 
 
 mind intuitively sees the truth of an axiom, that is final. 
 The only possible question could be whether it is really 
 an intuition. If a single real intuition could be over- 
 thrown, it would invalidate the reliability of all mental 
 processes. Whether, therefore, necessary and universal 
 notions are called inferences, axioms, intuitions, or any 
 thing else, they have their basis and absolute authority 
 in a mental necessity. 
 
 In answer to the question, What is the origin of 
 knowledge? we therefore answer, It is neither wholly 
 from within nor wholly from without, but both the 
 external and internal factors co-operate in its formation. 
 Knowledge is mental, and the external can never be 
 more than merely the occasion of it ; but there is no 
 knowledge of which the last analysis does not somehow 
 include, or lead to, both factors, though they are by no 
 means always equally prominent. 
 
 The hints given on the origin of knowledge have pre- 
 pared us for the question, What is the relation of knowl- 
 edge to the real world ? Whatever views may be held 
 respecting the nature of that world, no one doubts that 
 besides the thinking mind there must be other real ob- 
 jects. Every effort, however, to demonstrate the exist- 
 ence of a world external to us must fail, because we 
 never can get out of or beyond our subjective state.* 
 The usual argument to prove its existence is that we 
 become conscious of certain phenomena without any 
 effort on our part. They must consequently have their 
 
 * It is generally admitted that the existence of external reality can- 
 not be proved. "The reality of what is objective to us can never be 
 severed from its subjective basis ; therefore it can never be a matter of 
 absolute certainty, but at best only very probable." — Volkelt, Phil. 
 Monatsh., 1881, 534. Mill, Logic, I. 9, states that at present " it is univer- 
 sally allowed that the existence of matter or of spirit, of space or of 
 time, is in its nature unsusceptible of being proved; and that whatever 
 is known of them is known by immediate intuition." 
 
220 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 source in something else than ourselves. With eyes 
 and ears open we cannot help seeing objects and hear- 
 ing sounds. In ourselves we can discover no activity 
 which accounts for the appearance of these perceptions, 
 and we have no control over them ; they are apparently 
 forced upon us. It is, therefore, concluded that their 
 cause must be in something else than ourselves. 
 
 This reasoning is, however, based on the supposition 
 that we are conscious of all our activity, whose products 
 are manifest in consciousness. But this is not the case. 
 There must be in us, as we have seen, a sphere of great 
 activity lying wholly beyond consciousness; a sphere 
 whose existence must be postulated in order to account 
 for much that appears in consciousness. Many thoughts 
 arise unconsciously whose origin must be in ourselves. 
 Thus we try to recall a name, but fail after long effort ; 
 we dismiss the matter, and it comes without effort. 
 We think of one thing, and a thought altogether dif- 
 ferent enters the mind. Behind our conscious processes 
 there must be others of which we are unconscious ; and 
 it may be that our unconscious activity is much greater 
 than the conscious. It is consequently impossible to 
 prove that something must have entered the mind from 
 without, because we are not aware of having produced 
 it. But the fact that we cannot demonstrate the exist- 
 ence of an external world does not weaken the convic- 
 tion that it is a reality. Idealism cannot be refuted ; 
 neither, on the other hand, can it demonstrate the non- 
 existence of the world. Aside from absolute demon- 
 stration, there is the strongest ground for accepting its 
 existence. Indeed, we are tempted to declare the de- 
 monstration impossible, just because the existence is 
 self-evident. 
 
 Postulating, then, that there are objects external to 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 221 
 
 us, what is our intellectual relation to them? The 
 things themselves do not enter the mind, nor can the 
 mind enter the things. We receive impressions from 
 them through the senses ; but it has already been shown 
 that these impressions are not duplicates, or even photo- 
 graphs, of the things themselves. We have no way of 
 comparing our impressions with their sources, except by 
 means of impressions. Our minds never deal directly 
 with the objects, but only with the effects which they 
 produce. Our intellect cannot come in contact with 
 things ; directly we deal solely with phenomena, and 
 our world (that of which we are conscious) is purely 
 phenomenal. This conclusion has been regarded as 
 derogatory to the validity of knowledge, and the most 
 persistent efforts have been made to overthrow it ; but 
 reflection only proves that no other result is possible. 
 We can know things only as they are related to the in- 
 tellect. This relation is one of knowing, not of being. 
 From the very nature of the case, things can be to our 
 intellects only what they appear to us. Even if the 
 mind could somehow come in direct contact with them, 
 things could be known only from their relation to us 
 as knowing, or as they appear to the mind. Objects 
 manifest themselves to us by means of qualities or 
 forces ; but these are qualities of the things themselves. 
 Hence we can know things only through the relation of 
 their qualities to our intellects. 
 
 This conclusion does not in the least depreciate the 
 value of knowledge. Our knowledge is real as knowl- 
 edge ; it is not, however, any thing real outside of the 
 mind, nor does it profess to be. Do what we will, our 
 intellect can no more project its percepts outside of our 
 minds, than we can stand on our shoulders. We have 
 a real knowledge of real things, but of things as they 
 
222 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 manifest themselves by means of their properties to our 
 minds through the senses. In the intellect, we have 
 not things themselves, but a knowledge of them ; not 
 objective reality, but a conception of it. In knowledge, 
 therefore, we have symbols of things, intellectual views, 
 or mental representations of them ; and, as such, their 
 validity is beyond question. 
 
 Much of the discussion respecting the relativity of 
 knowledge leads to confusion, because the meaning of 
 this relativity is not fathomed. We can speak of knowl- 
 edge as the product of a relation, — as that of a subject 
 to its object, of the ego to the non-ego ; but knowledge 
 as knowledge is never relative. It is knowledge only 
 because it is absolute for all mind. If, however, the 
 meaning is that the objects of knowledge can be con- 
 ceived only as related, then there is no room for dis- 
 cussion, for the statement is self-evident. Things that 
 belong to the same universe are necessarily related ; 
 how else could they constitute one universe? In con- 
 ceiving objects as related, we consequently conceive 
 them as they are. The absolute, in the sense of some- 
 thing unrelated, is a pure abstraction; but even as 
 such, it is a contradiction in itself. As soon as you 
 think the absolute, you think it as related to the intel- 
 lect, and thus it ceases to be unrelated. The absolute 
 has become a bugbear in philosophy by treating it as 
 unrelated, whereas, in that sense, the absolute is incon- 
 ceivable. To affirm that we do not know things abso- 
 lutely in the sense of exhaustively, is, perhaps, too 
 evident to require serious discussion. 
 
 The affirmation, then, that we know things, means, 
 of course, that we know them as they appear to us 
 intellectually. If by thing per se we mean a thing as 
 it is in itself, but not to us, it necessarily lies beyond 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 223 
 
 our power of apprehension. If we conceive it at all, 
 we necessarily conceive it as it is to us, or appears to 
 us, not what it is independent of this relation to us. 
 Whatever I conceive must be related to my intellect ; 
 if, now, I should conceive it as not thus related, I should 
 conceive it, not as it is, but as it is not. The whole 
 discussion of the thing per se, begun by Kant, is an 
 attempt to discuss things as if there were no intellect ; 
 an attempt to apprehend things with the mind as if 
 there were no mind. Kant puts things per se (noumena) 
 and phenomena, or things as they appear, in opposition, 
 just as if they excluded each other. If for thing per se 
 we put the essence of a thing, which is really meant, 
 it becomes evident that the phenomena need not be 
 wholly foreign to the thing itself, but may be a reliable 
 manifestation of it. That things are to us only what 
 they appear, is no evidence that they do not, in some 
 measure, appear to us as they are. 
 
 That our knowledge of things is not synonymous 
 with the being of things, can only disappoint when the 
 nature and aim of knowledge are misunderstood. In 
 knowledge I do not seek real existence, but an intel- 
 lectual apprehension of it ; I do not want things, but I 
 want to understand them. There can be no confusion 
 unless we confound being with a knowledge of being. 
 
 These reflections make it seem strange that the theory 
 of knowledge should ever have been regarded as the 
 discipline which considers the relation of knowledge to 
 things. The latest German work on this theory says, 
 " The general aim of the theory of knowledge pertains 
 to the solution of the problem, whether and to what 
 extent objective knowledge is possible ; " * and the large 
 
 * Volkelt: Erfahrung und Denken. Kritische Grvndlegung der 
 Erkenntnistheorie, 1886; 545. 
 
224 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 volume is devoted to the question of the objective value 
 of subjective knowledge. This view of the subject has 
 become quite common. But why call it theory of 
 knowledge if its subject-matter is not knowledge itself, 
 but the relation of knowledge to things ? It considers 
 the relation of intellect to things, which is a relation of 
 knowledge ; and its sphere is the whole department 
 of knowing, whether that be subjective or objective, or 
 both. In the complete and thorough discussion of the 
 entire domain of knowledge, the objective value of 
 subjective percepts and concepts is included, but it does 
 not exhaust the subject. 
 
 It has already been intimated that we cannot compare 
 things as known with things as not known (or other 
 than as known) ; all we can do is to compare one con- 
 cept of external reality with other concepts of the same, 
 — a process by means of which we never get away from 
 our conceptions. If I could somehow compare a con- 
 cept with external reality, I should have for comparison 
 a concept which has ceased to be a concept, and has 
 become the reality external to it. That the intellect 
 moves only in the sphere of the intellectual, should 
 never be a question for the intellect. 
 
 Since all knowledge depends ultimately on the laws 
 of thought, the main thing is correct thinking. This is 
 the province of Logic. 
 
 LOGIC. 
 
 Logic, as one of the conditions for the attainment of 
 knowledge, is naturally placed under the general head : 
 Origin of Knowledge. Here the term is used in the 
 sense of pure or formal logic, not material or applied. 
 Its aim is to give the laws of thought (normative laws 
 of pure thought), without taking into account the 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 225 
 
 objects of thought. It seeks to answer the question, 
 How must we think in order to attain the truth? 
 What must the sequence of thought be in order that 
 truth may be the result? It thus deals simply and 
 purely with the thought-conditions of knowledge, — > 
 conditions which apply equally to all content.* 
 
 It is not definite enough to say that logic is the 
 science of "the necessary laws of thought." For, if 
 the laws sought are necessary, how can we do other- 
 wise than think according to them ? If necessary, they 
 must operate whether we know them or not. Yet, 
 properly understood, it is correct to say that logic treats 
 of the necessary laws of thought. 
 
 Thought is not lawless or arbitrary ; it is a rigid, per- 
 fect system, of which mathematics is but an illustration ; 
 it is an organism, in which part fits into part, and part 
 follows part, with perfect regularity and consistency. 
 As in the solution of a mathematical problem a single 
 mistake vitiates the entire process which follows, and 
 makes the result false, so it is with all our mental pro- 
 cesses ; one mistake vitiates the whole. It is common 
 to say that logic aims to prevent these mistakes by giv- 
 ing the laws of correct thinking, and the criteria by 
 which all thought must be tested. This will do if we 
 understand what is meant by correct thinking ; it evi- 
 dently means the proper sequence of thought. All real 
 thinking is correct ; if there are mistakes, it is because 
 there is a lack of thought. He who says 2+2=5, does 
 
 * Pure or formal logic thus differs from applied logic, which treats 
 of the laws of thought in relation to the material or content of thought. 
 Pure logic gives formal truth, applied gives material truth; the former 
 shows under what conditions thought harmonizes with itself, the latter 
 gives the laws which show the relation of thought to its content. By- 
 limiting logic to the laws of thought, we also distinguish it from Hegel's 
 view according to which the principles of thought are also those of 
 being. 
 
226 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not think 2+2, but 2+3. So he who says : Most men 
 die a natural death, therefore Socrates died a natural 
 death, does not think at all. Errors, then, do not spring 
 from thinking, but from the failure to think ; it is by 
 thinking that we discover errors, which are the product 
 of thoughtlessness somewhere. If thinking can err, 
 where is the corrective of thinking? We often use 
 words instead of thoughts, and thus make mistakes ; 
 but by thinking through a subject, and by putting 
 thoughts into the words, we correct the errors. Logic, 
 then, simply gives the laws of all thought, and these it 
 learns from thought itself ; it gives the laws according 
 to which men must think in order to get the truth, but 
 these are at the same time the laws which all men follow 
 who really think. 
 
 Viewed in this light, logic gives the deepest philos- 
 ophy of the mind. In its thought, the intellect mani- 
 fests itself, and in the laws of thought we have the laws 
 of the intellect. Those who see in pure logic only rules 
 for attaining a knowledge of other objects — not of the 
 mind itself — do not know what a revelation they miss. 
 Thus in the study of what is called formal logic, real 
 knowledge is gained, namely of the mind. In consider- 
 ing the forms of thought, these forms themselves are 
 the material of knowledge. 
 
 Logic deals with concepts, and with them exclusively. 
 With language it deals only so far as it embodies 
 thought; and with things it deals only through their 
 concepts. 23 Language is viewed in logic purely as a 
 symbol of thought. 
 
 The basis of all reasoning must be absolutely reliable 
 and universally applicable, namely axioms. The pri- 
 mary law is that of identity, or rather equality (being 
 in reality two laws), namely that A equals A. Its 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 227 
 
 converse is the law of contradiction. A is not equal 
 to non-A. From the law of equality we also get that 
 of excluded middle: Every thing equals either A or 
 non-A. 
 
 These three laws contain the principles of all com- 
 parison ; namely, that a thing is like or unlike the 
 standard, a third supposition being excluded. All 
 processes of syllogistic reasoning are comparisons or 
 determinations of likeness and unlikeness. 
 
 Abstraction also depends on the same laws : it is 
 comparison for the sake of discovering and abstracting 
 what is common to different objects. B, C, D, differ ; 
 but B = a, b, c, d ; C = a, e, f, g ; D = a, A, t, Jc ; that 
 is, they all agree in that they have a. We can express 
 the thought thus : B does not equal A except in so far 
 as it is the same as A. It is this A, or this element of 
 sameness or equality, which we want to find in abstrac- 
 tion. In this way the marks of things, which consti- 
 tute them classes, or arrange them under the same 
 concepts, are found. When we search for what is com- 
 mon to things, we call the process abstraction ; when 
 we search for what is common to events, we call the 
 process induction.* Deduction is the reverse, and may 
 be viewed as a concretion of the abstract. 
 
 For science, as well as philosophy, logic is fundamen- 
 tal, and has been regarded so since the days of Aristotle.f 
 It is so essential because it disciplines the mind for 
 every department of thought, and gives the normative 
 laws of all thinking. Within the last fifty years great 
 efforts have been made, both in Germany and England, 
 to develop logic beyond the bare skeleton which came 
 
 * Taine, History of English Literature, on Stuart Mill, says, " Ail 
 the methods of induction, therefore, are methods of abstraction." 
 t Cicero calls it Ars omnium artium maxima. 
 
228 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 down through the middle ages from Aristotle.* But 
 the much already done shows how much yet remains 
 to be done. 
 
 Since logic is usually treated more fully in our insti- 
 tutions of learning than any other department of phi- 
 losophy, it is not necessary to enter into details here. 
 It is, however, important to note that the correct 
 sequence of thought is by no means a guaranty that 
 truth will be the result. Only on the right basis, or 
 with truth as the starting-point, will correct thinking 
 end in truth. And it will generally be found, that, when 
 men disagree, their logic is less at variance than the 
 premises from which their reasoning starts. Before 
 entering upon an argument, the disputants should first 
 determine whether each does not start with a postulate 
 different from that of the other. The assumptions are 
 often of far greater significance than the proofs. 
 
 In the tendency to specialism, there is a twofold dan- 
 ger ; namely, of choosing a basis for reasoning without 
 a sufficiently broad induction, and of applying the re- 
 sults of our reasoning to spheres that really lie outside 
 of this application. In the one case our argument is 
 too narrow, in the other too broad. In determining the 
 basis from which reasoning starts, all that really per- 
 tains to it should be taken into account. By putting 
 into that basis more than belongs to it, we get results 
 that are not warranted. Thus some draw from their 
 notion of a substance inferences of the greatest impor- 
 tance without ever considering what the substance really 
 
 * In Germany numerous works on logic have appeared. Hegel gave 
 a new impulse to the study by his work on the subject. AmoDg the 
 more recent books are those of Ulrici, Lotze, Ueberweg, Sigwart, 
 Wundt, Schuppe, Bergmann. In England Whately revived an interest 
 in logic; and works on that subject have been published by Hamilton, 
 Mansel, Mill, De Morgan, Whewell, Boole, Venn, Jevons, and others. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 229 
 
 is, and not aware that what they infer from the sub- 
 stance is only that with which their own imagination 
 has endowed it. Hence the object of reasoning should 
 first of all be thoroughly mastered. Then the conclu- 
 sions should be rigorously confined to the objects to 
 which they have been found actually to apply. Rea- 
 soning that pertains to quantity does not explain quality. 
 What applies to material processes has significance only 
 for all that is known to be material. Physiological 
 demonstrations can determine psychological questions 
 only if it has been proved that physiology is psychology, 
 or that they have a sphere in common. Just because 
 it has become so customary to determine what is true 
 in one sphere by what has been established in another, 
 the student should train his mind severely to limit his 
 conclusions to the objects and spheres for which they 
 have been established. 
 
 Three rules, then, are essential for the attainment of 
 logical truth : master the object of thought so as to 
 know its content ; reason correctly respecting that which 
 is known of the subject; limit the conclusion to that 
 respecting which it has been established. 
 
 3. COMPLETION OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Not merely truth, but truth in greatest perfection, is 
 the aim of intellect. That restless impulse to know, 
 which the Germans call Wissensdrang, or Wissenstrieb, 
 may be the inspiration of but few ; among these, how- 
 ever, are all philosophic thinkers. Nothing short of 
 the deepest thought in the most perfectly developed 
 stage and in the best form can satisfy the aspiring 
 mind. 
 
 Hints on the development of knowledge itself (not 
 merely of an individual's attainments) are found in 
 
230 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 works on logic, psychology, and pedagogics; but the 
 subject is usually treated in a fragmentary manner. 
 Its importance justifies separate treatment, in order to 
 secure for it more thorough and more systematic dis- 
 cussion. The philosopher and educator find that it 
 teems with weighty problems; and the student, who 
 wants to become a thinker as well as a learner, and 
 who desires to increase knowledge as well as to master 
 what is already known, will seek principles so to guide 
 him in his researches as to develop the best results from 
 the thoughts already attained. 
 
 The very idea of developing something new from 
 what is known, implies that the new is somehow con- 
 nected with the old, or lies in it as in embryo. The 
 present rests on the past, and the future lies in the 
 present, and there are threads which lead from the one 
 to the other. So when we speak of the completion of 
 knowledge, we want to find the threads which lead 
 from the known to the unknown. Thought is a seed 
 with a certain degree of development at a particular 
 time ; and future progress consists in the development 
 of what is still undeveloped in the seed, or but imper- 
 fectly developed in the plant. 
 
 The completion of thought, therefore, implies abso- 
 lute dependence on the seed, but independence of the 
 development already attained, in the sense of not being 
 limited by it. Independent, original thought, guided 
 by the energy in the living seed, is the condition for 
 passing to what is new and yet old ; for developing, as 
 Hegel would say, the energy of the flower into the 
 fruit which it virtually contains. 
 
 For the increase of knowledge in any department it 
 is, therefore, essential to learn what stage of develop- 
 ment has been attained, otherwise there is danger of 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 231 
 
 wasting time in searching for what is already found. 
 A true philosophy does not undervalue history, but 
 assigns to it the proper place in intellectual training. 
 Historical study may not develop intellectual strength 
 as greatly as philosophy and science ; but only when 
 one has learned what others have done in his specialty 
 can he understand what yet remains to be done, or 
 work successfully to do what is still needed. In the 
 historical knowledge, seized by a philosophical mind, 
 there may be important hints and impulses for new 
 development. New problems may be suggested, the 
 failures of other thinkers will serve as warnings against 
 wrong methods, and all that has already been accom- 
 plished should be the starting-point for accomplishing 
 what is yet to be done. Even if it gives only this 
 starting-point, the historical knowledge is valuable, 
 since it may save from tedious wanderings over beaten 
 tracks. The methods of others may be fit for a help or 
 guide, but not for a tether. The student must avoid 
 ruts ; and with a safe compass, he must not fear to 
 launch out into the deep. A pupil may find a teacher's 
 method invaluable for disciplinary purposes ; but he 
 cannot hope to add any thing new to the stock of 
 knowledge by only repeating experiments performed 
 much better by some one else. The young mathema- 
 tician might learn much by repeating Newton's elab- 
 orate and intricate calculations, but he would not be 
 likely to add any thing to mathematical science by the 
 process. 
 
 There is scarcely any danger that philosophy will 
 repeat the mistake of under-estimating observation and 
 experiment ; but, from what has been said, it is evident 
 that there is danger of expecting from these themselves 
 what can be wrested from them only by the energy of 
 
232 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thought. Whatever may transpire outside of the mind, 
 and however necessary for knowledge it may be, intel- 
 lectual progress depends on the amount of thought put 
 into the results of observation and experiment. While 
 this is true in science, the need of great mental energy 
 in regions not so immediately connected with observa- 
 tion is still more apparent. 
 
 As no one can master or develop all subjects, the 
 student, after securing a liberal education, is obliged 
 to limit himself; he must choose something as a specialty 
 if he wants to become an authority in any thing. The 
 choice of the proper subject for special study is of the 
 first importance, and is by no means wholly determined 
 by the profession or general calling chosen. In order 
 that the choice may be rational, the student must not 
 merely take into account his ability, circumstances, and 
 opportunities, but also the importance and fruitfulness 
 of the subject. Inquiries may be of subordinate value 
 and not worth the time spent on them, or they may be 
 resultless because the subject itself is fruitless. Espe- 
 cially in philosophy, on which so much effort has been 
 spent in fruitless inquiries, is it important to select for 
 profound study important and fruitful problems. 
 
 Usually the progress of knowledge is regarded as a 
 growth in the comprehension of the causes of things. 
 Science is largely an inquiry into immediate causes, as 
 philosophy is an inquiry into ultimate principles, which 
 must include the first and final causes. All deeper 
 thought seeks the explanation of what occurs, by deter- 
 mining its origin (the genetic method). Here it is not 
 necessary to emphasize the investigation of causes, since 
 its importance is generally admitted ; it will be more 
 helpful to take up neglected elements. 
 
 Frequently causes lie wholly beyond our reach, or an 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 
 
 inquiry into cause may be irrelevant. Thus, to inquire 
 into the cause of being is the same as inquiring into the 
 being which existed before being. But in dealing with 
 objects there are numerous other problems than those 
 which pertain to cause, — problems which are concerned 
 with a full understanding of the thing itself. We can 
 ask what it is, how it compares with other objects, where 
 it is, and what it can do ; that is, instead of inquiring 
 how a thing became what it is, we concentrate our 
 investigations on the nature of the thing itself. 
 
 In philosophical inquiries we deal with ideas and 
 concepts, which are remote from concrete objects. The 
 region of pure thinking is peculiarly difficult, thought 
 itself being the sole guide and corrective of thought. 
 Unless here the mind is fully master of its concepts, it 
 is liable to take the flights of fancy for the process of 
 reason. Instead of taking the psychological standpoint, 
 and merely observing the movement of objects in the 
 mind, philosophy checks this movement in order to 
 enter the objects themselves, to think them exhaustively, 
 so as to leave nothing in them or pertaining to them 
 obscure. We thus pass, as it were, from physics to 
 chemistry ; from mere relations and conditions and 
 movements, to the nature of objects. Take, for in- 
 stance, the notion of substance. In common parlance 
 the word is used as if perfectly understood, but critical 
 reflection shows that there are depths in it which the 
 mind has not fathomed. We thus operate with the 
 word as a mere symbol, while the thought itself is lost. 
 The meaning of the term " substance " should be probed 
 until no further inquiries respecting it are possible, or 
 until the limit of thought has been reached. The more 
 comprehensive and abstract a term, the greater the 
 temptation to use it vaguely ; and this vagueness neces- 
 
234 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sarily extends to all objects included under the term. 
 Common among such vague terms are " being," " cause," 
 "matter," "spirit," "consciousness," "person." The 
 pronoun " I " is a rich subject for reflection. Does it 
 include all that is meant by soul or spirit ? Does it in- 
 clude the body ? Is it the representative of the whole 
 man, or only of the conscious self ? If it stands for the 
 personality, what is the exact meaning of that personal- 
 ity ? Does the " I " stand for a substance, or is it only 
 an aggregate of the various states of consciousness? 
 
 By thus taking up subjects, and giving to itself a full 
 account of them, the mind soon discovers that it is in 
 the habit of operating familiarly with concepts which 
 are full of mystery ; that it is prone to inquire into the 
 causes of things before understanding the things them- 
 selves; that it takes symbols for things and concepts; 
 and that in many, perhaps by far the most, of our men- 
 tal operations, we are only half awake. It is only by 
 deep and persistent reflection that we become sufficiently 
 conscious of ourselves to see that our intellectual life is 
 largely a dream, — a dream in which we dream that we 
 are awake. In being aroused to full consciousness, the 
 mind makes real progress, attaining a state which will 
 influence all its future operations. The result is not 
 merely a clearing of the understanding, but also a de- 
 velopment of our- knowledge. Even if no new objects 
 are discovered, the old ones are made more distinct, and 
 whatever is in them is unfolded. But this very process 
 may also lead to something else ; namely, to the discov- 
 ery of germs rich in the promise of new developments. 
 
 This method of taking a subject and holding it stead- 
 ily before the mind to let the light of the intellect illu- 
 mine every part of it, is wholly different from what is 
 called discursive thought. We do not proceed from 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 235 
 
 one thing to another, but abide by one subject. Our 
 thought moves, but around and through and in the 
 same object. Subject and predicate are not taken apart 
 and viewed separately, as sometimes seems to be the 
 case ; but the subject is seen in its predicates, so that 
 the mind, in considering them, consciously abides by the 
 subject. It does not enter on a process of syllogis- 
 tic reasoning to infer something else from the subject. 
 It indeed wants to make new discoveries, but those 
 which are to be found in the subject itself, not outside 
 of it. In comparison with the discursive, we can call 
 this the penetrative and exhaustive method of thought. 
 
 Let A be the object of this penetrative energy of 
 thought. Instead of making A simply a link in a 
 chain, so that I pass from it to B, thence to C, etc., I 
 make A the focus on which all possible light is steadily 
 concentrated. I want to know just what A is and con- 
 tains. I may already know that it contains the predi- 
 cates a, b, c, d, but these do not exhaust it. There is 
 an unknown x which I want to discover, and for that 
 reason I confine all my investigations to A. If I proceed 
 from the known to the unknown, it is from the known 
 to the unknown in the subject itself. In this process 
 thought, however, does not confine itself permanently 
 to one point. Hegel's dialectic process has at least 
 demonstrated this: that to think any subject exhaus- 
 tively, necessarily leads beyond the subject to something 
 else. Individual thoughts may, like islands of the sea, 
 not be connected superficially, but at their base. 
 
 This penetrative method, a characteristic of all philo- 
 sophical thinking, is so much insisted on here because its 
 neglect is so common, and its attainment so difficult. 
 Our modern life, with its endless distractions, and its 
 absorption by details, with much reading and little 
 
236 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thinking, tends to make thoughts the waves which 
 play on the surface, while the deep remains unfathomed. 
 Thus the habit is formed of using subjects and predi- 
 cates without thoroughly understanding them. That 
 men, even scholars, constantly use concepts which they 
 cannot define, is one of the worst and most common 
 vices of modern thought. 
 
 In order to pass from the subject itself to something 
 else, we must distinguish between what it contains, and 
 what the mind infers from it. The oil painting before 
 me is nothing but canvas with certain colors. Analyze 
 the picture as I will, I find nothing but these. But 
 how much more than these the mind infers from the 
 picture ! It was painted, it did not grow ; it is the 
 product of an artist ; he had a definite end in view, 
 embodied in the picture his ideal, and had skill in 
 execution. And these conclusions are just as reliable 
 as the fact that the painting consists of canvas and 
 colors. But every inference I draw respecting the 
 artist depends on a correct apprehension of the picture. 
 If it is a chromo, or a copy, or a poor picture, I make 
 serious blunders in my inferences by reasoning on the 
 supposition that it is a Raphael. 
 
 The same is true of all objects : they contain some- 
 thing, but may suggest more ; and what they suggest 
 depends on what' they contain. After exhausting the 
 real contents, we proceed to what is implied by them. 
 I want to learn from an object what it is, and what it 
 can teach me respecting other objects and the whole 
 universe. If what I infer from an object is really 
 implied by it (is really a necessity of thinking), then 
 it is as reliable knowledge as any other. In this way, 
 and not merely from observation, we get new subjects 
 for reflection. Why we draw these inferences, is one 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 237 
 
 of the important problems of philosophy ; how to draw 
 them correctly, is a question for logic. Because some- 
 thing is, therefore we infer that something else must 
 be. This is, and therefore that must be, really involve 
 all that can be known. And the development of knowl- 
 edge requires the mastering of the concepts of what is 
 known to be, and then the following to their utmost 
 limits the inferences legitimately drawn therefrom. 
 
 From this it is evident that real objects of knowledge 
 are not merely obtained through the senses, and by 
 watching our inner operations, but that they may also 
 be learned from correct inferences. In science this has 
 been proved by inferring the existence of objects, and 
 then afterwards confirming the inference by direct dis- 
 covery of the objects. 
 
 Besides this exhaustive method in treating separate 
 concepts, progress may also be expected by connecting 
 thoughts, and thus forming new combinations, and 
 making these combinations the source of new infer- 
 ences. New combinations of thoughts are new discov- 
 eries, and may furnish new germs for future progress. 
 Is not all inference in reality but a relating process? 
 Analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, are 
 but processes by means of which implied relations are 
 made explicit. All thinking is but explication of an 
 implication. 
 
 If knowledge is to be completed, it is evidently not 
 enough that separate concepts be mastered, that several 
 of them be combined, and that the implied be made 
 explicit by means of inferences. Disconnected thoughts, 
 lying around loose in fragments, do not constitute 
 knowledge in an exalted sense any more than stones 
 scattered about constitute a building. In order to be 
 completed, knowledge must be put into a systematic 
 
238 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 form. It is only in a system that a thought occupies 
 its proper place in relation to other thoughts, and 
 attains the highest perfection of which it is capable. 
 
 In order that there may be system, a subject must 
 be clearly denned, so as to determine its relation to the 
 subjects immediately above and below it. After its 
 place in the universe of knowledge has been determined 
 by the definition and necessary explanations, the sub- 
 ject must be separated into parts, according to the 
 logical principles of division ; that is, the divisions 
 must include the whole subject, but in such a way that 
 they do not include one another.* Various methods 
 of division are possible ; and the one adopted must be 
 determined by the nature of the subject, the stage of 
 development attained, and the aims of the author. 
 The divisions may be chronological or geographical; 
 they may be determined by external marks, or by 
 internal characteristics. The last is the most perfect, 
 since it arranges knowledge according to its inherent 
 relations and real connections. In every case the same 
 principle of division should be followed throughout. 
 If, for instance, a subject were to be divided partly 
 historically, partly geographically, partly according to 
 its inherent character, there would be confusion in- 
 stead of system, overlapping instead of division. 
 
 Under the main ones come the subdivisions, which 
 must also follow the same principles. A subject can 
 be divided and subdivided almost endlessly. The ana- 
 lytic process may be carried to such an extent that 
 the result is a lifeless skeleton. The scholasticism of the 
 middle ages was fond of nice and curious distinctions, 
 which became a kind of mania; but by this process 
 alone, however valuable for the study of a subject, 
 
 * See the chapter on the Division of Philosophy. 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 239 
 
 living systems, intellectual organisms, are not produced. 
 All separation is for the sake of forming the parts into 
 an articulated union, and every true system is a syn- 
 thesis of correlated parts. As nothing exists except 
 in relations, we cannot think a thing correctly if we 
 conceive it in isolation. There is no individual except 
 as part of the whole ; really and fully to comprehend a 
 thing means, as we have seen, that the universe, of 
 which it is a part, must be comprehended. But the 
 synthetic work is usually far more difficult than the 
 analytic. Many can take apart a watch, who cannot 
 put it together again ; and yet the pieces are valuable 
 only because they form the watch. The dissection of 
 the dead body is so important because it enables to 
 understand the living body as an organism. And in 
 mind as well as body we do not want pieces of a ruin, 
 but a perfect system. 
 
 It is an imperfect view of a system, to regard it as a 
 mere form which does not affect the truth itself. As 
 the arm is something very different on the body from 
 what it is when severed, so a thought is not the same 
 when seen by itself as when viewed in its proper con- 
 nections and relations. In the system, thought is given 
 in its completeness or totality, with all its interlacings. 
 All questions pertaining to relation, cause, and pur- 
 pose, have relevancy only to thought in an articulated 
 system. 
 
 The idea of system presupposes the connection of 
 thought so as to form a unity. But how can this unity 
 be established or rather discovered? By finding the 
 principles involved in a subject we get that wherein all 
 pertaining to it is united. A system consists in the 
 arrangement of all a subject involves under its princi- 
 ples according to their organic relations. Some idea is 
 
240 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the animating spirit of every true system, giving it life 
 and determining the various organs of the system. 
 
 From this it is evident that system is not merely of 
 aesthetic value, nor merely an expedient for remember- 
 ing and using and communicating knowledge: it is 
 necessary for the completion of thought itself. The 
 mind demands it. Much supposed to be well under- 
 stood is found to be in a crude state as soon as an effort 
 is made to put it into its proper place and articulations 
 in a system. Then it is found that a truth unsystema- 
 tized is only half truth ; it is completed truth when its 
 exact relation to other truth is determined. Thus the 
 very effort to systematize thought leads to its deeper 
 study and more perfect development. But it also 
 makes the mind conscious of its limitations. All our 
 systems are imperfect. Many of our thoughts, espe- 
 cially the highest, we cannot yet put into a system. 
 Even the effort to harmonize them is baffled. In their 
 isolation we do not see that they are in conflict, but 
 it becomes evident so soon as we attempt to articulate 
 them. Most painfully do we become conscious of limi- 
 tation in our efforts to complete all knowledge in unity 
 under its ultimate principles. This is the ideal of 
 philosophy in its search for those final explanations 
 which are the conditions of all systems. Only when 
 completed can the theory of knowledge determine abso- 
 lutely the limits of human thought. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Define Knowledge. Its Origin. Its external and in- 
 ternal factors. Relation to Imagination, Opinion, 
 Faith. Subjective views and objective Knowledge. 
 Not Certainty, but its grounds are the Criteria of 
 Knowledge. Reasons for believing in an external 
 
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 241 
 
 world. Kant's Ding an sieh. The unconscious basis of 
 conscious operations. Logic. Formal and applied. 
 Logic as a revelation of the nature of Mind. What is 
 meant by Norms of Thought ? Can real Thinking err ? 
 Laws of Thought discovered by Logic, as mental Pro- 
 cesses by Psychology. What is abstract thought ? Does 
 reasoning lead to the discovery of objects of existence ? 
 Explain Causation. Hume's view. Basis of universal 
 and necessary Truth. Law of Identity, and Law of 
 Equality. Doctrine of Innate Ideas. Views of Leib- 
 nitz and Kant on the subject. Relation of Thought 
 to Objects. Harmony of Idealism and Realism. Can 
 we identify the Laws of Thought and Being (Hegel) ? 
 Place of the Theory of Knowledge in Philosophy. 
 Brilliant and penetrative Thought. Exhausting a Sub- 
 ject, and discursive Thinking. What is System ? How 
 formed ? Its effect on Thought. Conditions for devel- 
 oping and increasing Knowledge. Limits of Thought. 
 Their relation to the Limits of the Real. Significance 
 of the Theory of Knowledge for the times. Is Reason- 
 ing more than comparison ? Basis of Reasoning. 
 Kant's analytic and synthetic Judgments. On what 
 grounds do we infer the unknown from the known ? 
 
242 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 By generalizing the various objects of profitable 
 thought, we can comprehend all of them under the real, 
 the possible, and the desirable. The first includes all that 
 actually is, the last embraces the ideals to be sought, 
 and the second gives the sphere in which their realiza- 
 tion may be expected. As the severe method of philos- 
 ophy eliminates from its inquiries whatever is fanciful, 
 it finds in the three groups all that can claim its atten- 
 tion. The realm of thought itself consists largely in 
 the determination of what is possible. Many of the 
 problems of the real can be answered only in terms of 
 logical possibility by our intellects. The third division, 
 the desirable, does not directly concern the theory of 
 knowledge, which deals primarily with what the intel- 
 lect regards as necessary or possible ; but in that divis- 
 ion are included aesthetics and ethics, which deal with 
 ideals and their realization. The problem of the first 
 division leads us into the darkest and most difficult 
 region of thought, namely metaphysics. 
 
 This much-abused term represents the highest aim of 
 philosophy, and the ultimate limit of intellectual aspira- 
 tion. The word itself originated in the title given by 
 one of his pupils to certain works of Aristotle. These 
 treated of the ultimate principles of being in general, 
 and constituted what Aristotle himself called " Wis- 
 
METAPHYSICS. 243 
 
 dom," or "First Philosophy," or "Theology." The 
 fourteen books under the title of " Metaphysics " were 
 placed after his works on Physics; and this circum- 
 stance is generally supposed to have determined the 
 title, its sense being that these books should follow 
 those on Physics. It may, however, be that the title 
 was intended to indicate the nature of the contents, 
 namely such as lie beyond physics.* 
 
 It is only of secondary importance what the original 
 import of the words of which " metaphysics " is com- 
 pounded may have been, or what sense was attached to 
 the compound itself by him who first used it to desig- 
 nate a particular subject. Aristotle himself did not 
 designate any part of his philosophy by this term, nor is 
 it certain that all the books placed under this title are 
 by him. The general contents of these books may, 
 however, be a valuable aid in understanding the 
 original meaning of the term ; but what his pupils or 
 successors called metaphysics, can no more be a law 
 for the sense of the term at present, than "physics," 
 as employed by the ancients, can determine its use by 
 scientists now. But the aim of Aristotle in his First 
 Philosophy indicates the aim of metaphysic in all ages, 
 being the thread running through all metaphysical 
 systems. 
 
 In this First Philosophy, Aristotle aimed to discover 
 the general principles of being, in distinction from the 
 special sciences, which are devoted to particular depart- 
 ments of being. f He sought to explain what lies 
 
 * Ta iieTa ra <f»v<nKa. The preposition may mean either after or beyond 
 (trans). 
 
 t " For Aristotle, metaphysic is the science which has to do with 
 being as such, being in general, as distinguished from the special 
 sciences which deal with special forms of being." — Ency. Brit.: Meta- 
 physics. 
 
244 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 behind all phenomena, and is their source. The main 
 points discussed were substance, form, cause, and de- 
 sign, which he regarded as involving the problems con- 
 nected with the essence of being. And at all times the 
 questions connected with being, with reality, in distinc- 
 tion from the phenomenal, and from our conceptions, 
 have occupied the attention of metaphysicians.* 
 
 While metaphysic has from the first dealt with being 
 or the absolutely real, it could of course treat this only 
 intellectually or as an object of knowledge. All ques- 
 tions involved might be resolved into this one, What 
 can be known respecting the ultimate nature of reality? 
 The principles of being are sought, the explanation of 
 it, an intellectual apprehension of what is. Thus meta- 
 physic of course involves the problems of knowledge, 
 especially that of the limits of the human faculties. 
 Does the power of thought extend to reality, or is it 
 limited to phenomena? It is not surprising that in 
 Hume, Kant, and others, the question of metaphysics led 
 to an inquiry into the limits of knowledge. But in 
 order to get a clear conception of metaphysic itself we 
 must distinguish it from the means necessary for mas- 
 tering it. Certain mental conditions are necessary for 
 discovering the laws of nature, yet we distinguish be- 
 tween these laws and those conditions. The same is 
 true in metaphysic- Its knowledge is the highest, and 
 requires the greatest mental efforts ; but it is the result 
 of these efforts which is to be viewed as metaphysic. 
 By keeping this in mind we shall avoid the mistake, 
 which is common, of confounding this subject with the 
 
 * " On the one hand, we see Plato and Aristotle striving to seize 
 absolute existence, and, on the other, to apprehend it as the cause of the 
 apparent reality. This is also undoubtedly the main purpose of metan 
 physics." — Flugel in Zeitschrift/ur exakte Philosophic. 1875, 15. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 245 
 
 theory of knowledge. This theory is related to meta- 
 physic, as the rules of science to the science formed by 
 their application. 
 
 Before the theory of knowledge had become a special 
 and prominent department of philosophy, it was natural 
 that questions concerning the power of thought should 
 be discussed in connection with metaphysical inquiries. 
 Even now the metaphysician may find it necessary to 
 discuss such questions, and indicate the conditions for 
 attaining a solution of the ultimate problems ; just as 
 the scientist, even after the principles of science are 
 separately treated, may find it necessary to discuss those 
 principles as he applies them. But for the metaphysi- 
 cian the main purpose is the solution of metaphysical 
 problems, and not to lose himself in the investigation of 
 the means ; though that solution can only be found by 
 using the proper means, they exist for the sake of the 
 end they are to attain. Kant's Kritik is an inquiry 
 whether metaphysic is possible ; and since he concludes 
 that it is not, it is absurd to speak of that work as itself 
 a system of metaphysics. 
 
 Questions respecting the powers of the human under 
 standing belong to the theory of knowledge ; yet every 
 subject can take from this theory whatever it may need 
 for its own development. But it leads to confusion to 
 make metaphysic partly an inquiry into the limits of 
 the understanding, and partly an explanation of abso, 
 lute being, two distinct subjects being mixed in this 
 way. We shall, therefore, distinguish metaphysic, or 
 the principles of being, — attempting to explain the 
 essence of what is, and giving the ground of what ap- 
 pears, — from the theory of knowledge, or from the 
 rules necessary for attaining these principles. 
 
 Where the naive view prevails that phenomena are 
 
246 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the things per se 9 or that by means of sensation we get 
 at the very heart of being, there will, of course, be no 
 deeper metaphysical inquiries. If common-sense is the 
 criterion of all knowledge, we need but interrogate it 
 in order to learn all that can be known about being. 
 Or, if our knowledge of being is regarded as intuitive, 
 we need but behold our intuitions to get our metaphys- 
 ics. So far as sensationalism has prevailed in England, 
 France, and other countries, the metaphysical problems 
 have not even been apprehended. If all the gold lies 
 loose on the surface, no one will be so foolish as to 
 quarry the hard rock to find it. If common-sense and 
 intuitionalism contain all the treasures of wisdom, the 
 philosophical problems lose their difficulty. In Scot- 
 land, where special stress has been laid on these two 
 sources of knowledge, they have been regarded as fur- 
 nishing the final solutions of metaphysics. Indeed, in 
 that country metaphysic has largely been identified with 
 an inquiry into the first principles of human knowledge. 
 Thus Stewart speaks of metaphysic as applicable to all 
 inquiries which aim " to trace the various branches of 
 human knowledge to their first principles in the consti- 
 tution of the human mind." President M'Cosh, in his 
 " Logic " says, " The science which treats of the intui- 
 tive operations of the mind is called metaphysics ; the 
 science which considers the discursive acts is logic." 
 Accordingly his work on u The Intuitions of the Mind" 
 is a system of metaphysics. This makes metaphysic 
 part of the theory of knowledge, that part namely 
 which pertains to intuitions.* But are not questions 
 
 * In the article " Metaphysics " in Ency. Brit., the suhject is defined 
 as that "which deals with the conditions of all knowing and heing." 
 In the article of Dr. M'Cosh, already quoted, he says of the principles 
 of the intuitions, " A system or systematized arrangement of such 
 principles constitutes metaphysics or mental philosophy. . . . All pro- 
 
METAPHYSICS. 247 
 
 respecting " the intuitive operations of the mind " psy- 
 chological and noetic rather than metaphysical ? It is 
 well known that scepticism has shaken the confidence 
 in these intuitive operations, so that inquiries respect- 
 ing them are of great importance. But such inquiries, 
 like those of Locke, Hume, and Kant, concern the nature 
 and the limits of human understanding. If it is once 
 established by the theory of knowledge that there are 
 such intuitive operations, and that they give a knowl- 
 edge of being, then this knowledge, the result of these 
 operations, will be metaphysics ; and then all the in- 
 quiries into these intuitive operations will be the propae- 
 deutic of metaphysics, but not the system itself. 
 
 We must hold fast the idea that metaphysic pertains 
 to being, its principles, its ultimate explanation, its 
 essence. Ueberweg pronounces it " the science of prin- 
 ciples in general, so far as they are common to all 
 being." * According to Lotze, " metaphysic is the sci- 
 ence of the real, not of the merely thinkable. Reality 
 is that by means of which an existing object is distin- 
 guished from the non-existing, a transpiring event from 
 the non-transpiring, an existing from a non-existing 
 relation." f One of the latest works on metaphysics 
 also regards the nature of being as the object of meta- 
 physical inquiry, and declares that it is the province of 
 metaphysic "to explain the notion of being and the 
 method of its attainment." % 
 
 Hegel, by identifying the principles of knowing with 
 
 fessed metaphysical principles are attempted generalizations of our 
 intuitive perceptions and judgments." (593-595.) 
 
 * " Die Wissenschaft von den Principien im Allgemeinen, sofern sie 
 allem Seienden gemeinsam smd." — Logik, 5 edit., 9. 
 
 t Grundziige der Metaphysik, 8. 
 
 t Teichmiiller: Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt. Neue Grujidlage 
 der Metaphysik. 1882, 3. 
 
248 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 those of being, made the laws of thought also the laws 
 of reality. The process of thought is the process of 
 the absolute or of being in the highest sense. His 
 pantheism is a panlogism. Where thought and being 
 are thus identified, it is necessary that one system, 
 metaphysics, should include both. But the confidence 
 in the discovery of this identity has been lost, and it is 
 now held to be safer to view thought as an explanation 
 of being than to imagine that the essence of being is 
 already given in thought itself. The present condition 
 of philosophy demands the separate investigation of the 
 principles of knowledge, and then the application of 
 these principles to the explanation of being. 
 
 When metaphysic is declared to deal with the " con- 
 ditions " of being, the meaning can only be the condi- 
 tions for the existence of particular objects. Let any 
 one inquire, for instance, Why is there being rather 
 than nothing ? and he will soon find himself in a region 
 in which thought is lost. Besides, that being which 
 has conditions is not the ultimate object of metaphysi- 
 cal investigation: it seeks, above all, a knowledge of 
 that being which is unconditioned. 
 
 The term " being " is the most abstract that can be 
 conceived. It includes all that is, and yet indicates 
 nothing peculiar to any kind of existence. So broad 
 in extension as to 'embrace every thing, it is so empty 
 of content (intensively) that Hegel identified it with 
 nothing. There is no pure being in existence, except 
 in thought ; that is, there is nothing of which it can be 
 said that it is being and nothing else. Instead of empty 
 being, which is absolutely nothing but the thought of 
 mere existence, all that is real is something particular. 
 The thought of " being " is so great an abstraction that 
 the mind at first finds difficulty in grasping it. Instead 
 
METAPHYSICS. 249 
 
 of defining metaphysic as dealing with being or the 
 notion of being, we can say that it treats of reality, of 
 real existence. By the real we understand that which 
 is not merely thought, but which exists, whether we 
 think it or not. 
 
 Professor Harms says : " Metaphysic treats of the 
 being of that which is thought, as it is outside of 
 thought Qpraeter notionem) ; logic, however, treats of the 
 being of that which is thought, as it is in thought. 
 As the latter is, however, only a thought, while the 
 former is called a reality, the one treats of being, the 
 other of thought. Both conceptions are fundamental 
 for knowledge, for there is no knowledge in which 
 there is no thought and being. The conception of 
 being applies to the known outside of thought, and 
 that of thought applies to that known in thought." 
 It is not, however, taken for granted by philosophy 
 that the real in this sense is self-evident ; some of the 
 deepest problems of philosophy are involved in the 
 notion of the real. Our consciousness informs us that 
 thought itself is real in the sense that it exists for us ; 
 but is the object of thought any thing real ? Does any 
 thing outside of the mind correspond with my thought 
 of an object? The import of this question will be 
 clear to every one who apprehends the fact that we 
 have an immediate knowledge only of what is before 
 consciousness. 
 
 We can define metaphysics as the philosophy of the 
 real, involving as it does all that is necessary to explain 
 reality. 24 Its aim being to explain the real, the charge 
 that it is visionary can have significance only when it 
 becomes false to itself. Its subjects are not arbitrarily 
 chosen ; their basis is found in consciousness, and in all 
 deeper inquiries they are forced on the mind. One 
 
250 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cannot think at all without coming to metaphysical 
 problems. Experience itself needs metaphysics as much 
 as a tree does roots. Behind the infinite variety mir- 
 rored in consciousness, the being and nature of mind 
 furnish deep metaphysical problems. Behind phenomena 
 there must be something that is not phenomenal, but 
 the ground of all phenomena ; this ground metaphysic 
 seeks. At the basis of the changeable there must be 
 something that is unchangeable ; the qualities suggest 
 a substance, and the apparent the real. Metaphysic 
 wants to discover and explain the eternal, the immu- 
 table, the uncaused cause, the substance. Every con- 
 sciousness assumes something as real; all experience 
 presupposes it; every science takes its existence for 
 granted ; all thought ultimately seeks it ; the ordinary 
 thinking claims to have it ; the metaphysician wants to 
 make sure that it is intellectually in his possession. 
 Experience is full of contradictions, which the mind 
 cannot tolerate ; in the ultimate source of all there can 
 be no contradiction, for in that case it would be self- 
 destructive. Hence the ultimate unity and harmony 
 are sought. Something appears, then vanishes ; but it 
 can only appear if something else is that makes it ap- 
 pear. There can be no light unless there is something 
 that shines. Now, what is this that is, and makes 
 something else appear, but does not itself appear ? Is 
 it matter? Is it spirit? Is it Plato's idea? Is it 
 Spinoza's substance, to or on which thought and ex- 
 tension are but attributes or modes? Is it the monad 
 of Leibnitz, or the Realien of Herbart ? 
 
 From this it is evident what the leading problems of 
 metaphysics are. In the ordinary consciousness, and 
 by the sciences, are given certain notions which are 
 supposed to be ultimate. These are taken up by the 
 
METAPHYSICS. 251 
 
 metaphysician, and subjected to the most rigorous test, 
 in order to determine their validity. His aim is always 
 to find what is, in distinction from that which becomes. 
 Such terms as " matter " and " spirit " are critically in- 
 vestigated, to learn just what they present to the mind. 
 When their exact sense is found, all sorts of questions 
 still remain to be answered. If matter is ultimate, how 
 does what we call spirit originate from it ? If spirit is 
 ultimate, how does it produce matter ? May there not 
 be something behind both matter and spirit, neither the 
 one nor the other, and yet the cause of both ? Perhaps 
 both can somehow be united, so that they are in reality 
 one, though to us they seem wholly dissimilar. Besides 
 the question of the nature of original being, there are 
 many others. Is this original being a unit, a duality, 
 or a plurality? Thus the questions of monism, of 
 dualism, and of pluralism are involved. Is the original 
 reality but one in nature and also a unit in itself, the 
 only one of its kind, as the God of theism ? Or is it 
 one in essence, but with many samples of the same, as 
 the atoms of Democritus? But the various conceptions 
 of original being are only the beginning of metaphysi- 
 cal inquiry, — a beginning which is yet endless. Were 
 the nature of the original known, other questions would 
 immediately arise. How is it related to the derived? 
 Is the process one of creation, or of evolution ? It is 
 thus seen that the problems are those of theism and 
 atheism, of pantheism, materialism, and idealism. In 
 order to understand the real, we must know how it is 
 connected so as to form a universe in which nothing 
 is isolated ; this involves the question of the relation of 
 things. In considering the difference between what is 
 and what becomes, we come to the questions of cause 
 and effect. These introduce some of the deepest prob- 
 
252 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lems discussed by Hume and Kant. We distinguish 
 between qualities, and the substances in which they 
 inhere. Is the substance distinct from its forces or 
 powers ? Are, perhaps, the transpiring events them- 
 selves the only realities, while force and substance are 
 mere mental creations ? Is the form distinct from the 
 substance ? Of what is called external reality we have 
 no conception except as existing in space ; and of all 
 that is external and internal we have no conception 
 except in time. What, then, are space and time ? But 
 there are still other problems which lie at the heart of 
 all reality. Is there design in the universe, or is the 
 cosmos wholly purposeless? What rules? Reason, 
 fate, or chance ? 
 
 These and the numerous problems connected with 
 them give the contents of metaphysics. It is evident 
 from them that all the inquiries pertain to being, and 
 that the ultimate aim always is to get the explanation 
 of reality. The old division, whether adopted or not, 
 gives a clear idea of the subjects of metaphysics ; namely, 
 ontology, cosmology, rational psychology, and rational 
 theology. Ontology considers the principles of all being, 
 whatever is common to all that is.* It asks what being 
 is. What must an object be in order that being may be 
 predicated of it ? What is the distinction between being 
 and reality ? The .relation of being to becoming (Sein 
 und Werden) also belongs to this division, thus introdu- 
 cing the subject of cause and effect. The notions of 
 substance and quality, of quantity and relation, are also 
 involved. The other three divisions take up the three 
 highest classes of being, or the realities contained in the 
 abstract notion of being. f Cosmology treats of the ma- 
 
 * It has been called Scientia entis in genere. 
 t " Scientia entis in specie." 
 
METAPHYSICS. 253 
 
 terial universe, and discusses matter, its connections and 
 relations, together with space, time, design, and the 
 other general problems involved in the existence of the 
 cosmos. Rational psychology (also called speculative 
 or metaphysical psychology) discusses the essence (na- 
 ture) of the soul, whether material or spiritual, whether 
 a unit or an aggregation, a simple or a compound sub- 
 stance ; whether free and immortal. Rational theology 
 is similar to what has been called natural theology, and 
 treats of God so far as an object of pure reason. It dis- 
 cusses the question of his existence, testing the various 
 proofs which have been adduced ; also his nature, attri- 
 butes, and relation to the world.* 
 
 If there is one subject which, more than any other, 
 arouses the deepest interest, and strains the mind to the 
 utmost, it is metaphysics. If in it speculation and ab- 
 straction culminate, it also absorbs and concentrates 
 enthusiasm. One need but apprehend the nature of its 
 problems in order to appreciate the deep devotion and 
 intense application of the profoundest philosophers to 
 metaphysical studies. Metaphysic seeks the first thought 
 of reality in order that it may derive all others from that 
 original, and discover the last thought ; it searches for 
 the basis (the presupposition) of all experience and all 
 science ; it attempts to solve the problems of the world, 
 of man, and of God ; it seeks the beginning of all begin- 
 nings. 
 
 The mind which understands the meaning of meta- 
 physic, and yet treats the subject frivolously, must be 
 essentially profane. " The anti-metaphysical twaddle of 
 
 * Lotze, who holds that metaphysic aims to discover the laws of the 
 connection "between the separate elements of reality, divides the subject 
 into three parts ; namely, ontology, cosmology, and phaenomenology, 
 or rational psychology. Rational theology, also a part of the old meta- 
 physic, is treated separately, under the head of Philosophy of Religion. 
 
254 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 many persons reveals great levity and gross ignorance 
 respecting the most weighty problems." * The intellect 
 cannot accept as final the words of M. Renan : " God, 
 providence, immortality, are so many good words, per- 
 haps a little lumbering, which philosophy will interpret 
 in senses more and more refined, but which it will never 
 replace to advantage. Under one form or another God 
 will always be the summary of our supernatural needs, 
 the category of the ideal." This writer gives a significant 
 insight into his own mind, rather than into metaphysics, 
 when he says, " Metaphysic is nothing but a most ele- 
 vated and noble manner of conceiving and grouping 
 things ; it is to every thinker whatever pleases him." f 
 
 It is a work of supererogation to plead for the contin- 
 uance of metaphysics. Some kind or other will exist 
 as long as the human mind ; the only question is, what 
 kind? It is a mental necessity, and if the intellect 
 cannot get a rational metaphysic, it will, perhaps un- 
 consciously, adopt one based on mere opinion. Kant 
 despaired of the final solution of the highest problems 
 by the speculative reason, but he understood human 
 nature too well to question the continuance of meta- 
 physics. He said, " In all persons, as soon as their rea- 
 son rose to speculation, there has always been some kind 
 of metaphysics, and there always will be." A shallow 
 empiricism attempts to flee from metaphysic as if it were 
 a ghost ; it, however, invents its own, but of the crudest 
 sort. " Its metaphysic consists in this, that it returns 
 to the metaphysical prejudices of the common conscious- 
 ness, which it enriches with some contradictions intro- 
 duced by science." J Its superficial character alone 
 
 * Schilling: Zeitschrift fur exacte Philosophie, 1863. 
 f Ribot: Mind, 1877, 381. 
 J Wundt: Mnfluss, 24. 
 
METAPHYSICS. 255 
 
 makes it questionable whether it is worthy of being 
 called metaphysics. Positivism relegates the subject to 
 the antiquated vagaries of the past, but it has a sort of 
 metaphysic made to order for its own private use. " It 
 requires little subtlety to read metaphysics between the 
 lines of the positive philosophy. The difference lies be- 
 tween the metaphysic which recognizes itself as such, 
 and that which does not ; between the metaphysic which, 
 because it understands the distinctive nature of its prob- 
 lem, does not seek the solution of it from the sciences 
 which themselves form the problem to be solved, and 
 that which, unaware of its own office, though unable to 
 discard it, interpolates itself into the sciences and then 
 extracts from them, under the guise of a scientific theory 
 of mental phenomena, what are, after all, but the first 
 thoughts of metaphysic clothing themselves in a new set 
 of mechanical or physiological metaphors." * Even in 
 England, where an abhorrence of metaphysics is often 
 expressed, it cannot be banished from natural science 
 and psychology, to say nothing of philosophy.! 
 
 The most serious opposition, based largely on Kant's 
 Kritik, regards a speculative metaphysical system im- 
 possible. The failure of the ruling systems at the 
 
 * T. H. Green: Contemp. Rev., vol. 31, 26. 
 
 t Vigorous thinkers in England, not dominated by sensationalism, 
 are making an earnest effort to promote a deeper study of metaphysical 
 questions. Philosophers affected by the movement begun by Kant, as 
 well as by that which Locke inaugurated, keenly feel the neglect or 
 superficial treatment of the profoundest problems. The late Mr. Green 
 declared that Englishmen have not taken the first step to solve the 
 metaphysical problem left by Hume; that, in fact, in England the prob- 
 lem had not even been put in " its true and distinctive form." Respect- 
 ing the claim of English writers to substitute psychology for metaphysics, 
 Mr. Green said, " It is not really, nor can be, the case that our psychology 
 has cleared itself of metaphysics, but that, being metaphysical still, it 
 is so with the metaphysics of a pre-Kantian, or even of a pre-Berkeleian, 
 age." 
 
258 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 beginning of this century has promoted this view ; 
 but their failure must not be identified with that of 
 philosophy. Kant's Kritik is not final ; it is the begin- 
 ning, not the completion, of the critical method. Every 
 theory of the limits of the human understanding is 
 liable to be negatived by that understanding itself, and 
 the intellect is likely to take its own achievements as 
 the limit of its powers. Metaphysic is one of the ideals 
 of philosophy, even the greatest. All the highest aims 
 are ideals, but that is no valid reason for abandoning 
 their pursuit. In dealing with the most difficult of all 
 problems, it is not surprising that the intellect has wan- 
 dered much in its search for the right road. Has it 
 been otherwise in any other department ? The critical 
 philosopher is not so presumptuous as to claim that he 
 has the explanation of the universe ; but, strange as it 
 may seem, those who most vigorously denounce meta- 
 physics, presumptuously claim to have solved the mys- 
 tery. There is an impudent materialism which is too 
 conceited to recognize itself as metaphysic reduced to 
 a guess and an assumption. Paulsen says, "Aside 
 from frivolous materialists, who find some sense in the 
 statement that perception is motion, there is to-day 
 probably not a metaphysician who believes that he has 
 the key to unlock the mysteries of the world." 
 
 In the various -systems of metaphysics, we see how 
 the world-problem has been mirrored in different minds, 
 and how they have attempted its solution. Around 
 this problem has been concentrated the deepest think- 
 ing of the ages. Although we cannot yet think the 
 universe, this does not imply that the inquiry into 
 its ultimate explanation has not taught valuable lessons. 
 We may not be able to explain the nature of electricity, 
 and yet the very effort to find the explanation may 
 
METAPHYSICS. 257 
 
 teach many important truths. He who has read in the 
 history of philosophy only the failure of metaphysics 
 to solve its problems, may have had his eyes open, but 
 his mind must have been closed. The problem has 
 been made clearer; its depth and difficulties have 
 been revealed ; popular fallacies have been exposed ; 
 cherished methods of handling the problem have 
 been proved false ; conditions for the solution have been 
 made plainer ; the search for the highest intellectual 
 attainments has led the mind into the sublimest regions 
 of thought ; and deep lessons, and numerous valuable 
 discoveries and truths, lie all along the path of meta- 
 physical inquiry. What one finds in the history of 
 metaphysics depends somewhat on the ability of the 
 seeker. 
 
 We are living in an era when metaphysic is viewed 
 with suspicion, and when its supposed solutions are 
 received with scepticism. There is no reason for regret- 
 ting this. Metaphysic needs thorough purging. The 
 time has come when dreams and visions and poetic 
 inspirations must cease to be viewed as the intellectual 
 counterpart of reality. Metaphysic has been too hasty 
 in its conclusions, has leaped over the necessary condi- 
 tions, has assumed what should have been demon- 
 strated, and has attempted to rear its structure without 
 properly laying the foundation. It is fortunate that 
 the day is past when it was blindly praised, and when 
 its wildest conclusions were accepted uncritically, — 
 fortunate, because now its vagueness must cease, it 
 must pass from promises to real solutions, and it must 
 prove its premises instead of constructing mythologies. 
 What it has lost in appearance, it will gain in sub- 
 stance and solidity. Metaphysic, through the very criti- 
 cism to which it has been subjected, has been made 
 
258 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 conscious of itself. The recognition and removal of 
 its diseases are the conditions of health. It tried to 
 soar instead of treading on solid ground. It has now 
 learned to creep, in order to be safe. There cannot 
 be too much healthy criticism and caution respecting 
 the profoundest inquiries. There is, it is true, no en- 
 couragement for pretenders, or the frivolous, to enter 
 the deep, dark mine in which metaphysicians labor, but 
 the loss will not be appreciable ; those called to that 
 sphere will feel an irresistible impulse to enter and 
 quarry. 
 
 So far is metaphysic from opposing inquiries into the 
 limits of the human mind, that it has actually given 
 birth to them. It wants to work wholly in the domain 
 of the possible and the real. To be metaphysical in the 
 true sense, does not, then, imply an abandonment of 
 reality, but rather absorption in its contemplation. It 
 is in the effort to pass from the phenomenal to the real, 
 that the mind is most of all led to consider the ques- 
 tion of its limitations, which is seen most strikingly in 
 the case of Kant. Locke was more a psychologist than 
 a metaphysician. Berkeley and Hume aimed to become 
 metaphysicians while remaining psychologists. Kant, 
 by far the most metaphysical of all, penetrated farthest 
 in considering the limits of the reason. His whole 
 investigation of the reason shows that metaphysic, in- 
 stead of fearing criticism, demands it. But while it 
 wants to determine the real limits of the mind, it opposes 
 all efforts to fix them arbitrarily. Nothing is more 
 deadening to intellect, or more destructive of progress, 
 than the thoughtless dismissal of the most serious prob- 
 lems, with the unproved dictum, — " unsolvable ! " In 
 many cases the possibility of a solution can only be 
 made evident by its discovery, as in the case of the law 
 
METAPHYSICS. 259 
 
 of gravitation, the power of steam, and the electric 
 telegraph. 
 
 Our age, critical, sceptical, and destructive, is more 
 intent on studying the history of philosophy than on 
 the production of great metaphysical systems. Under 
 these circumstances the course of the beginner cannot 
 be doubtful. Although a learner, all his learning 
 should be a discipline in thinking. His criticism should 
 be relentless but sound, and destructive for the sake 
 of becoming constructive. Digging is not laying the 
 foundation, and yet it is rational only when under- 
 taken for the sake of the foundation and the super- 
 structure. As the deepest of all studies, metaphysic is 
 worthy of the profoundest efforts. No question of the 
 limits of our faculties should be permitted to interfere 
 with the boldest grappling with the hardest problems. 
 It is presumptuous to fix hastily those limits, particularly 
 in an age in which all efforts to settle the matter have 
 signally failed ; and however highly we may esteem 
 noetic inquiries, it is foolish to claim that thought shall 
 suspend its operations until its limits have been deter- 
 mined. Whether the problems are solved or not, the 
 mind is exalted by seriously considering them, and is 
 disciplined by penetrating as far as possible toward a 
 solution. If the philosopher's stone is not found, 
 chemistry may be evolved in the search. 
 
 Since the student must have some kind of meta- 
 physic, the question is, whether it shall be rational or 
 superficial. " No one who has been aroused to reflec- 
 tion can dispense with the aid of metaphysics ; no 
 period in the history of culture has been able to with- 
 draw from co-operation in the effort to solve the great 
 riddle of existence ; and even modern natural science, 
 which would like to reject metaphysics, has its own 
 
260 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 metaphysic in materialism, although an extremely poor 
 and wretched kind." * The very impulse which leads 
 the thinker to seek unity, order, reason, in the universe, 
 is metaphysical. Anaxagoras already thought there 
 must be a Mind which orders the universe, and ac- 
 counts for the wisdom and power manifested; and 
 surely the progress, since his day, has not made the 
 mind less desirous of searching for its own similitude. 
 Why the restless impulse to seek the final solution of 
 the problem of being? Kant, although despairing of 
 the solution, deeply felt the significance of this ques- 
 tion. The mind most fully conscious of itself is in its 
 element only when it seeks what is deepest. To the 
 philosophic thinker the cosmos, the soul, and God will 
 always present numerous unsolved problems, — goads 
 to inquiry; solutions found will give birth to newer 
 and greater problems. Growth in knowledge deepens 
 and darkens mysteries, but it also solves mysteries. 
 
 Probably at first the result of metaphysical inquiries 
 will be of a negative character, proving supposed solu- 
 tions false. Everywhere the student finds that solutions 
 are claimed to have been made in regions where these 
 solutions are now declared impossible. It is no easy 
 task to test these solutions, — to clear the mind of the 
 fictions which are taken for reality. It may be discov- 
 
 * E. von Hartmarm (Phil. Monatsh. vii.). He thinks the view that 
 the great problem of being is unsolvable, rests solely on the fact that 
 heretofore it has not been solved; but this does not prove that it cannot 
 be solved, and is no reason for ceasing the efforts at solution. But he 
 holds it to be still more silly to regard the problem as so easy that any 
 journeyman can solve it, or any specialist, with no particular training 
 for the general problem. He adds: " The standpoint of modern investi- 
 gators of nature is not seldom the strangest and most contradictory 
 hash of materialistic metaphysic, of dogmatic denial of the possibility 
 of metaphysics in general, and of subjective pride of intellect, which 
 pronounces the metaphysical problems children's toys." 
 
METAPHYSICS. 261 
 
 ered that even scientists sometimes work by the light 
 of Aladdin's lamp. When mind is lost in matter, it is 
 its first task to find itself again, or all is lost. 
 
 The true metaphysician does not aim at that beyond 
 his reach, but to go as far as possible and grasp all within 
 reach. Only so far as it can move securely does meta- 
 physic want to go. And he who goes safely thus far will 
 find enough to do without attempting the impossible. 
 
 Of fundamental importance for the beginner is the 
 question, On what basis and by what means shall the 
 structure of metaphysics be reared? The master mason 
 must learn from the mistakes of former builders. There 
 must be no arbitrary principles, no assumed basis, no 
 fanciful method. Metaphysic must begin with what is 
 given, which exists, and has some good reason for its 
 existence. It begins with the facts of consciousness 
 and the results of science, and makes them the basis of 
 its inquiries.* It does not operate with these facts and 
 results in a method peculiar to itself, but simply accord- 
 ing to the laws of thought. It asks, With the given 
 facts of consciousness and the results of science, what 
 has reason to say respecting them? What inferences 
 must reason draw from them? All science operates 
 with the same laws of thought, and thus attests their 
 validity ; are they then less valid in their fullest devel- 
 opment and highest application ? 
 
 * Schopenhauer declares that metaphysic is based on experience, 
 and is its interpretation. He accordingly calls it the science of expe- 
 rience (Erfahrungswissenschaft), "not, however, the individual experi- 
 ences, but the total, the general sum of all experience, is its object 
 and its source." Another says that " metaphysic can, in the end, seek 
 nothing else than what the experimental sciences also seek: namely, 
 to know the connection of all experience." Siebeck, in Viertelj. fur 
 wiss. Philosophie, 1878. He claims that the mistake has been that it 
 attempted to find from a part of experience the principle lying beyond 
 the whole. 175. 
 
262 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The problem which metaphysic presents is therefore 
 simply this : With the knowledge that exists, what do 
 the laws of thought teach us respecting being in gene- 
 ral, and respecting the world, the soul, and God ? This 
 statement of the problem gives the specific character 
 of metaphysical inquiry. In the experimental sciences 
 the attention is directed solely to the thing experimented 
 with ; in metaphysics, however, the question is not 
 what the thing requires, but what the laws of thought 
 demand. The scientist is absorbed by the thing in hand, 
 and asks, What is it ? the metaphysician is not limited in 
 his inquiries by that in hand, but by that which pos- 
 sesses it, which contemplates and thinks it. Surely it 
 must be possible to determine what reason demands, 
 what it can demonstrate, what it must postulate, and 
 why it must postulate. If the mind makes mistakes in 
 its conclusions, it has the test of the conclusions and 
 the means of correction in itself. And when reason 
 reaches its limit, it will as surely stop as life does at 
 death. 
 
 There is growth in metaphysics. Depending on the 
 attainments in science and in general knowledge, and 
 on the application of the laws of thought to them, it will 
 grow as there is development in these respects. It 
 will gradually unfold its problems, and in their solution 
 will be seen a reflection of the knowledge, the views, 
 and the thinking of the age. Every period completes 
 itself in its metaphysics. 
 
 It is sometimes charged against metaphysics, that into 
 it enter other than purely intellectual elements — such 
 as religious, moral, and aesthetic interests. So far as 
 these dim the intellectual vision, they are disturbing 
 forces, and must be removed; but they never act as 
 such when metaphysic is true to itself. That it takes 
 
METAPHYSICS. 263 
 
 them into account, is in its favor, since it proves its 
 completeness. Whatever may be said of external 
 nature, it is evident that every account of man which 
 regards only his physical and intellectual condition is 
 sadly incomplete, and that all theories which ignore his 
 moral, religious, and aesthetic interests, are partial. 
 The latter need explanation as much as the physical and 
 the purely intellectual, and a system which ignores them 
 cannot be final. 
 
 Man is not a mere calculating machine ; he is a 
 mathematician, but also something besides. There are 
 legitimate spheres of thought where demonstrations 
 are out of the question. The scientist, as well as the 
 philosopher, forges chains of logic without being able 
 to find the hooks on which to hang the first and the last 
 links. No more in metaphysics than in science can we 
 do without the law of probability. But the probability 
 must be recognized as such, and not be made an axiom. 
 The mind may have to resort to postulates whose valid- 
 ity is unquestioned ; they may be a mental necessity, 
 and if they are, that is final. Such postulates even the 
 rigorous Kant admitted, and he placed them beyond the 
 reach of all sceptical attacks. The difference between 
 the man who admits and the man who rejects postulates 
 is that the one knows himself, while the other does not. 
 
 Hypotheses are not science, but scientists cannot do 
 without them ; neither are they metaphysic, but it needs 
 their help. Not in forming them are metaphysicians to 
 blame, but in forming them without sufficient reason, 
 or in failing to test them, or in pronouncing them final 
 principles. In forming hypotheses, metaphysic may err, 
 thus proving that it is human and on exactly the same 
 footing as all other pursuits. Science too, as we have 
 seen, has its long wanderings without positive results, 
 
264 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and its way to truth often lies through error. It has 
 been said of Kepler's laws, that they " were an outcome 
 of a lifetime of speculation, for the most part vain and 
 groundless." No less an authority than Faraday de- 
 clares : " The world little knows how many of the 
 thoughts and theories which have passed through the 
 mind of a scientific investigator have been crushed in 
 silence and secrecy by his own severe criticism and ad- 
 verse examination ; that in the most successful instances 
 not a tenth of the suggestions, the hopes, the wishes, 
 the preliminary conclusions, have been realized." 
 
 In considering psychology, we found the problems 
 connected with the essence of the mind beset with diffi- 
 culties. Even if their solution were possible, this would 
 not be the place to enter on a full discussion of them. 
 The reality of mind is, however, of such vital impor- 
 tance as to be worthy of attention, even in an intro- 
 ductory work. Besides removing false impressions, we 
 must aim to get a reliable and firm working basis. 
 
 We have seen that the intellect deals purely with 
 mental products in proportion as it rises above the 
 immediate impressions of sense. The sensations cannot 
 even reflect or see themselves, much less can they form 
 comparisons, contrasts, combinations, and inferences. 
 These require mind. There are only units in nature -, 
 but we can bring them into relations, and can think 
 large numbers. As far as we can discover, a stone in 
 Africa and a tree in America do not affect each other ; 
 but how numerous the relations of quality and quantity 
 which the mind can determine respecting them ! The 
 vast realm of thought, in distinction from sensation, is 
 a purely intellectual sphere. Not that the mind here 
 is creative, but it is determinative : it does not make 
 something that is not, but it discovers what is. Its 
 
METAPHYSICS. 265 
 
 discoveries are not, however, confined to what we call 
 matter : the most of them, in fact, have no direct rela- 
 tion to what is known as such, but have significance 
 only for mind. We can call the one external, the other 
 internal, reality ; and, if there is any difference in the 
 degree of validity, it is in favor of mind rather than of 
 matter. 
 
 By distinguishing between the impressions made by 
 external objects, and what thinking makes of them, we 
 postulate the existence of both the mental and the 
 physical world. All that we term concept, idea, logical 
 norms, and indeed the whole realm of the rational and 
 of philosophy, transcends the material. We judge of 
 nature itself according to the laws of our minds, and 
 subject to this test even the direct impressions received 
 from the outer world. The first hints from matter 
 already contain a mental element ; and in science, phi- 
 losophy, and art, the mind, in the use of the conditions 
 from the world of sense, is purely a law unto itself. 
 
 The deeper this line of thought is pursued, the more 
 are we forced to admit the existence of mind as distinct 
 from matter. The world of intellect is a reality, — a 
 world utterly without significance and explanation if 
 there is only what is known to be physical. The differ- 
 ence between the two is not a question of reality, but 
 solely of the kind of reality. To deny that reality 
 which is the only source of all knowledge of the real, 
 lands us in the abyss of nothing. It must also be con- 
 sidered, that our own mental acts are the only objects 
 of reflection of which we are immediately conscious. 
 
 We are thus warranted in asserting that the exist- 
 ence of mind is of all things the most certain. By no 
 processes of observation or thinking can we account for 
 the origin of mind from matter. As far as we can now 
 
266 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 see, such an origin is wholly inconceivable. The last 
 results of physiology, as well as of psychology, recog- 
 nize mind as sui generis ; and we are obliged to postu- 
 late it to account for our intellectual operations, just as 
 much as we are obliged to postulate matter in accounting 
 for physical processes. 
 
 We may call the mind a substance, if we mean by it 
 only that it is the reality which stands under, and is the 
 source of, our mental activity ; but the term has been 
 employed in such various senses and so obscurely, that 
 its use may add new confusion, instead of serving as 
 a real explanation. Less objectionable is the term 
 "entity" indicating a real existence, the source and 
 centre of activity, without attempting to indicate its 
 essence. Mind, then, we affirm, is an entity distinct 
 from other objects, with a peculiar activity, and moving 
 in a world of its own. While thus obliged to distin- 
 guish it from matter, we do not claim that it is foreign 
 to the external reality. They are not identical, but 
 correlated, forming one universe, just as soul and body 
 one person. Partly they form a parallelism or a corre- 
 spondence ; partly each may have a sphere peculiar to 
 itself. The difference between the two is not suffi- 
 ciently marked by ascribing to the one consciousness, 
 and denying it to the other. The character of the 
 thought in consciousness must also be taken into ac- 
 count. The mental world is not a negation of the 
 material, nor, on the other hand, does it find in that 
 its limits. Thought moves in a sphere which encloses, 
 but also transcends, the outer world. 
 
 By basing our inferences strictly on the facts of mind, 
 we shall be true to the scientific method, and at the 
 same time have a solid basis for philosophy. Of mind, 
 just as of matter, we know only what it does ; and from 
 
METAPHYSICS. 267 
 
 this, we infer what it is. Rebel as we may against the 
 conclusion, to our intellects a thing is simply what it 
 can do. It is by interpreting action that we get what 
 we term substance, which is always an impenetrable 
 mystery, unless we mean by it merely the power to 
 account for certain activities. Mind as entity — as not 
 a mere relation, not a mere quality of something else, 
 not mere action without an actor — gives us the funda- 
 mental conception needed. 
 
 All the possible metaphysical conceptions respecting 
 mind and matter may be classified as follows : — 
 
 1. They are different manifestations of the same sub- 
 stance. The ground of their unity is behind both, — in 
 their common source. Pantheism. 
 
 2. The one is the product of the other. Theism, 
 Idealism, Materialism. 
 
 3. They are in no way united, but only correlated. 
 Dualism. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Origin of the Name Metaphysics. Aristotle's " First 
 Philosophy." Define Metaphysics. Different senses in 
 which used. Difficulties of the subject. Indicate its 
 exact sphere, and the character of its objects. Define 
 Ontology. Cosmology. Rational Psychology. Rational 
 Theology. Possibility of Metaphysics. Necessity. 
 Metaphysics of Materialism. Metaphysics and Theory 
 of Knowledge. Method of Metaphysics. Possible 
 Metaphysical Theories. Criticism of each. Hypothe- 
 ses in Metaphysics. Distinction between Being and 
 Action. Does Action imply Being as its Source? 
 Conception of Substance. Mind as Entity. 
 
268 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 AESTHETICS. 
 
 Reason in the form of feeling may be more difficult 
 to discover than in thought and conduct, but we do 
 not believe it to be less real. Its existence there is 
 admitted whenever we speak of feeling as reasonable 
 or unreasonable, — terms which indicate its quality as 
 well as its source. We may say that in emotion reason 
 is latent, unconscious, not sufficiently evolved to recog- 
 nize itself ; and that the problem for it is how to find 
 and express itself as reason. The solution of this prob- 
 lem would give a complete theory of the emotions, a 
 system of the rational principles involved, so great 
 a desideratum in philosophy. That without their expla- 
 nation a philosophical system is incomplete, becomes 
 evident on considering how large a part of our psychic 
 nature, not included in thought and volition, the feel- 
 ings constitute. 
 
 Compared with the other mental states the emotional 
 has received least attention, both in psychology and 
 philosophy. The full importance of the subject is evi- 
 dently not appreciated. An emotion does not obtrude 
 itself on the intellect, but rests in itself, and tends to 
 absorb in itself as emotion the whole soul. Knowledge 
 and conduct require effort, and demand or solicit reflec- 
 tion ; but feeling is supposed to take care of itself, 
 being regarded as a state little subject to direction or 
 
ESTHETICS. 269 
 
 control. This neglect is the more strange in view of the 
 fact that so many regard feeling as the soul's primitive 
 activity, giving birth to all the other psychic operations. 
 But even if without this fundamental significance, the 
 feelings exert a powerful influence on the other mental 
 states, play a prominent part in morals, and constitute 
 the happiness or misery of life. Nor are they so wholly 
 beyond our control as some imagine : all our volitions 
 and efforts at culture help to form a permanent state, 
 which becomes the source of our emotions as well as of 
 our other mental operations. 
 
 The difficulties connected with the nature, cause, and 
 relations of the feelings threaten to baffle all efforts to 
 obtain a rational explanation. The feelings can neither 
 describe themselves, nor does their course terminate in 
 their rational equivalents. The direct testimony of 
 consciousness merely states that they are, and that they 
 have a certain quality and quantity (intensity). All 
 attempts at explanation lead away from them into the 
 region of the intellect. By concentrating the attention 
 on them for the purpose of determining their character, 
 the feelings themselves are modified; and every attempt 
 to bring them under the focus of the intellect interferes 
 with their immediateness and purity, checks their spon- 
 taneity, and introduces a foreign element. Just because 
 feeling is immediate to consciousness, the intermediate 
 or producing processes being hid, it is so difficult to 
 give its philosophy. Only by a direct appeal to con- 
 sciousness can we learn what it is ; but even the psy- 
 chology of the feelings is attended with peculiar difficulty. 
 All explanations must be given in intellectual formulas ; 
 but it is no easy matter to find their intellectual equiva- 
 lents, if it can be said that they have any. They are 
 too volatile to be confined to the rigidity of concepts. 
 
270 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 They are not thoughts, and yet we want to express 
 them in thought. But we can no more transfer them 
 from one sphere of the soul into another than we can 
 make our intellectual apprehensions a direct counter- 
 part of external reality. The feelings we think, by 
 passing into thought cease to be feelings. Every defini- 
 tion is consequently imperfect, and comes far short of 
 what we experience in the feeling itself. We can give 
 descriptions of our emotional states ; but these indicate 
 how we felt, not what the feeling in itself was. 
 
 For the deepest and most fruitful study of this sub- 
 ject the student is necessarily referred to his own ex- 
 perience. The psychological view thus obtained will, 
 however, leave much unexplained. We want a full 
 intellectual apprehension, a complete rational interpre- 
 tation, of our emotional nature, which is only possible 
 by the farthest removal of feeling from its immediate- 
 ness ; it demands that the emotional be made rational. 
 In our feelings, more than in any other exercise, we are 
 passive, being subjected to their dominion; by taking 
 them into the domain of the intellect we make them 
 subject to ourselves, and master them. 
 
 The very passivity of the emotional state (implied by 
 the etymology of such words as "pathos," "passion," and 
 the German Leidenschaft) interferes with the intellectual 
 elaboration of the feelings ; and it is not surprising that 
 those who indulge this state most are least intent on 
 its explanation. On the other hand, the study of phi- 
 losophy, with its constant exercise of reason, and with 
 its effort to exalt every thing into the domain of the 
 rational, tends to neglect and suppress the emotions. 
 It is evident that the mind's passivity will be limited in 
 proportion as its voluntary activity is increased. Not 
 seldom philosophers fail to appreciate the significance 
 
.ESTHETICS. 271 
 
 of the feelings, because they cannot forge them into 
 logical chains. The critical philosophy is too cold and 
 stern to give them their deserved prominence, even in 
 the domain of morals. The system formed around the 
 categorical imperative is largely a skeleton, which lacks 
 the warmth and beauty of life. Hegel, still more than 
 Kant, depreciated the feelings, and sometimes spoke of 
 them contemptuously. But whatever claims a system 
 of philosophy may have to rationality and intellectual 
 absoluteness, serious defects will adhere to it so long as 
 the emotions do not receive their proper place and 
 deserved treatment. 
 
 In dividing philosophy into the principles of being, 
 of knowing, of feeling, and of acting, we naturally ex- 
 pect under the third head a complete theory of the feel- 
 ings. But instead of an exhaustive discussion of this 
 theory, only one department in its wide domain has 
 been taken out of psychology, and made the subject of 
 special philosophical inquiry ; namely, sesthetics.* This 
 term, commonly used in Germany for the theory of the 
 beautiful, is employed in various senses by English 
 writers. " ^Esthetics is the term now employed to des- 
 ignate the theory of the fine arts, — the science of the 
 beautiful with its allied conceptions and emotions. 
 
 * aiff0Tj<rt? signifies perception by means of the external senses. It 
 was used by Baumgarten (sEsthetica, 1750) to designate that discipline 
 which investigates the nature and use of the knowledge obtained 
 through the senses. Under the knowledge thus obtained is that of the 
 beautiful. But Baumgarten, the founder of aesthetics, neither indicates 
 the exact relation of the sensualistic and intellectual elements in 
 beauty, nor does he give a complete theory of the beautiful. In his 
 Kritik of Pure Reason, Kant uses the term " aesthetics " in its etymologi- 
 cal sense, and applies it to sensation in general. The first part of that 
 work he calls " Transcendental ^Esthetics," which he defines as " an a 
 priori science of the principles of sensation;" and he discusses, under 
 this head, space and time as the conditions of sensation. In his Kritik 
 of the Judgment, Kant uses it for the theory of the beautiful. 
 
272 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The province of the science is not, however, very defi- 
 nitely fixed; and there is still some ambiguity about the 
 meaning of the term, arising from its etymology and 
 various use." * The subject is popular, and has received 
 considerable attention in various languages; many 
 writers, however, give reflections on art and the stand- 
 ards of taste, rather than a rational inquiry into the 
 nature of the beautiful. Through the influence of 
 Kant (Kritik der Urtheihkraft) and Hegel (Aesthetik), 
 a large number of German works have appeared which 
 discuss the subject from a philosophical standpoint.! 
 
 The sphere of aesthetics is too limited if defined as 
 " the theory of the fine arts." The aim in such cases 
 is to make beauty the essence of the discussion ; but 
 then the beautiful in general should be considered, 
 whether found in mind, in nature, or in art. Valuable 
 and even indispensable as a propedeutic to art, the 
 essential element of aesthetics as a part of philosophy 
 will be lost by limiting it to art. It has a general sub- 
 ject, as well as special departments ; and, aside from its 
 practical application, it has a rational value. Even if 
 there were no art, we can well conceive that the mind 
 would take an interest in the speculative questions con- 
 nected with taste. ^Esthetics, even if limited to an in- 
 quiry into the principles of beauty, or to the search for 
 the reason in beauty, is a philosophical discipline. But 
 the effort to make it merely a theory of the fine arts 
 
 * Ency. Brit. : Esthetics. 
 
 t Among the numerous German works on {esthetics since Hegel, are 
 those of Weisse, Vischer, Carriere, Koestlin, Krause, Schasler, and Von 
 Hartmann. Vischer's work, in three volumes, is the most complete dis- 
 cussion of the subject in the whole range of literature. The history of 
 aesthetics has been written by Zimmermann and also by Lotze. On 
 special departments of the subject, the German literature is also exten- 
 sive and valuable. Of the older writers, Winckelmann, Lessing, and 
 Schiller deserve special mention. 
 
^ESTHETICS. 273 
 
 indicates the triumph of empiricism, and proves that 
 the rational is appreciated only as a preface to the tech- 
 nical and artistic. If appreciated at all, beauty must 
 be esteemed for its own sake ; but this means that it 
 must be prized wherever found. 
 
 In claiming that aesthetics is a rational discipline, 
 which discusses ultimate problems, we do not want to 
 ignore its psychological basis. Much remains to be 
 done by psychology in order to determine the distinc- 
 tion between beauty and allied emotions and concepts. 
 A complete scale of animal and human feelings, which 
 lead up to the beautiful, would be valuable. Instead 
 of antagonism, the most intimate co-operative relation 
 should be maintained between the rational or philo- 
 sophical and the psychological factors. 
 
 In order to introduce the student into aesthetics as 
 usually treated, it will here be considered as the phi- 
 losophy of the beautiful. Beauty is thus made the 
 subject-matter. Other subjects are also discussed by 
 writers on aesthetics; but these subjects are loosely 
 grouped around beauty, not so connected with it as to 
 form a distinct organism. At the close of the chapter, 
 it will be shown that the sphere of aesthetics should 
 be enlarged, so as to form a rational system of beauty 
 and of allied objects. The aim of aesthetics will then 
 be to discover the peculiar marks of all objects termed 
 aesthetic, and to bring them into organic connection. 
 
 By examining the various works on aesthetics, we are 
 struck with the difficulties connected with the question, 
 What is beauty ? Every one has an answer in his con- 
 sciousness in the form of an impression, but not in terms 
 of rational interpretation, which is the very aim of 
 aesthetics. Familiar as all seem with the beautiful, its 
 mystery becomes apparent so soon as we attempt to 
 
274 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 define the term. The result always teaches that the 
 impression itself is far more distinct and vivid than 
 any interpretation we can give of it. After all that 
 has been written on the subject, one need but examine 
 the current definitions of beauty in order to learn how 
 little has been accomplished for the attainment of defi- 
 niteness. Much of the confusion arises from the fact 
 that the term is applied to entirely different spheres. 
 Thus we speak of beauty as purely subjective, namely, 
 as an emotion, but also as in external objects. We are 
 apt to transfer our aesthetic emotions, as well as the 
 impressions on the senses, to the objects occasioning 
 them. But by naming these objects we do not define 
 beauty itself. Nor can the definition be found by in- 
 dicating the characteristic marks of objects pronounced 
 beautiful, such as grace, or an assemblage of graces, har- 
 mony, symmetry, proportion, the adaptation of means 
 to end, and unity amid variety. 
 
 This vagueness characterized the discussion of the 
 subject of beauty from the very beginning.* Although 
 a favorite theme with Plato, he fails to distinguish it 
 sharply from the true, the righteous, the good, and the 
 wise ; and different views of it are given in different 
 books. In "Phsedros," Socrates speaks eloquently of 
 beauty ; but a better discussion of the subject is found 
 in the " Symposium," in the discourse of Diotema, re- 
 lated by Socrates. But instead of an analysis of beauty, 
 we find here rather a description of the lover's ecstasy 
 in beholding the beautiful. Plato describes beauty here 
 as the eternal, unchangeable, divine idea, or beauty per 
 
 t In Philosophische Monatshefte, vol. 4, p. 199, Conrad Hermann 
 states that the history of aesthetics among the ancients must consider 
 chiefly the views of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of the 
 Neo-Platonists. He regards Pythagoras as the first who entered upon 
 philosophical inquiries into the beautiful. 
 
ESTHETICS. 275 
 
 se, not as embodied in any thing else. Plotinus in his 
 essay " On the Beautiful " follows his master Plato in 
 exalting the ideal far above all its visible manifestations. 
 The subject received little attention during the scholas- 
 ticism of the Middle Ages ; and in comparison with the 
 themes that usually engrossed the attention of thinkers, 
 it was probably not thought worthy of serious inquiry. 
 Locke does not discuss beauty ; Hume mentions it in a 
 few places, but confounds it with the agreeable. The 
 result of English inquiries is indicated in the article on 
 ^Esthetics in the " Encyclopaedia Britannica : " " What 
 strikes one most, perhaps, in these discussions, is the 
 vagueness due to the great diversity of conception as to 
 the extent of the beautiful in the number of objects it 
 may be supposed to denote. . . . There is certainly a 
 great want of definiteness as to the legitimate scope of 
 aesthetic theory." * 
 
 We pronounce objects beautiful because they excite 
 in us the emotion of beauty. But, whatever its occasion, 
 beauty itself exists only for and in the mind. It is as 
 purely ours as sight and hearing; and all definitions 
 must deal with it primarily as a mental state or as an 
 emotion. That for its existence, at least for its origin, 
 the notion of the beautiful depends on something exter- 
 nal to us, must be admitted as freely as in the case of 
 
 * For a theory of art among the ancients, see Eduard Mueller: Ge- 
 schichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alien, 2 vols. A brilliant rather 
 than a profound discussion of the beautiful is given by Cousin in his 
 Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. The latest German 
 works on aesthetics are by E. Von Hartmann: Die deutsche sEsthetik 
 Kit Kant, and Die Philosophie des Schoenen. In Preussische Jahrbuecher, 
 August and September, 1887, A. Doering has two excellent articles on 
 the history of aesthetics. The discussion of the subject of aesthetics is 
 usually so unsatisfactory that it is difficult to recommend any particular 
 book to the student. A brief history of Theories of the Beautiful is 
 given by Bain in Mental and Moral Science, 304. For the English liter- 
 ature on the subject the student is referred to ^Esthetics in Ency. Brit. 
 
276 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 vision ; but it can never be conceived as any thing exist- 
 ing independent of mind. A metaphysical consideration 
 of the subject would undoubtedly conclude that the emo- 
 tion itself has its basis in the harmony of the inner and 
 the outer being, so that it is a product of their harmo- 
 nious action and re-action. 
 
 We speak of beauty as an emotion, a characteristic 
 which distinguishes aesthetics from the sphere of logic, 
 as well as from that of ethics. When we speak of our- 
 selves as aesthetical, we do not refer to our purely intel- 
 lectual activities ; it indicates a state which no amount 
 of mere theoretical contemplation and no mere volition 
 can express. 
 
 ^Esthetics can be placed under the general head of 
 values. In this point of view it considers the subjective 
 significance of a certain class of emotions and of the 
 objects which excite them. By this method of classifi- 
 cation we should have to include under values aesthetics 
 and ethics, both beauty and right having worth for our 
 feelings. The prominence given by Herbart and Lotze 
 to this view of the subject makes us feel more deeply 
 the need of a general theory of the feelings, and particu- 
 larly their consideration in the light of values. Such 
 a theory would indicate the relation of both aesthetics 
 and ethics to our emotional nature. But even if such 
 a theory were completed, it would not include both sub- 
 jects under emotions in the same sense or degree, since 
 in ethics the feeling is not the essence, as in aesthetics, 
 but conduct or the will is the controlling factor. 
 
 In thus giving aesthetics a peculiar relation to the 
 emotions, we, of course, do not so isolate it as to make 
 it independent of our other mental operations ; we 
 only indicate its general psychological sphere. In the 
 division of the emotions into those of pleasure and 
 
ESTHETICS. 277 
 
 displeasure, beauty is included under the former. Amid 
 the prevailing indefiniteness, it is, however, frequently 
 confounded with the agreeable, without indicating its 
 peculiar pleasurable elements. The sharp analysis of 
 the emotions, — an analysis psychological in character, 
 and yet essential as a basis for philosophical treatment, 
 — which determines the exact quality of beauty, is too 
 much neglected. Many things please, and are pro- 
 nounced agreeable or interesting, which we do not term 
 beautiful. A companion may have all these qualities 
 without any claim to beauty. Pleasurable impressions 
 may be received through any sense, but only from the 
 higher do we receive impressions of beauty. When 
 Burke speaks of this impression as obtained also through 
 lower senses, he confounds the beautiful and the pleas- 
 urable. 
 
 The emotion of the beautiful is not to be classed with 
 animal passion, though this emotion may become so 
 strong that we can speak of a passion for the beautiful. 
 This emotion cannot, however, be put on the ordinary 
 level of mere gratification. There is in beauty an intel- 
 lectual element which exalts it far above mere sen- 
 tiency ; and we can call it an intellectual emotion or a 
 sentiment, in which there is a union of intellectual and 
 emotional factors. 
 
 ^Esthetic pleasure springs directly from the beholding 
 of the beautiful object. The beauty strikes us at once, 
 though continued and absorbing contemplation may be 
 necessary for its full appreciation. The immediate, in- 
 tuitive element makes its effect akin to inspiration, and 
 gives beauty the character of a percept rather than of 
 a concept. If the soul is absorbed by mere reflection 
 on beauty, without permitting a re-action of the feelings, 
 the impression itself is weakened, or perhaps wholly 
 
278 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 obliterated. Neither the possession of an object, nor 
 reflection on its use, increases its beauty : this being in- 
 dependent of all extraneous circumstances.* It is also 
 different in character from the ethical, which involves 
 duty, implies choice, and cannot be appreciated unless 
 it is regarded as involving freedom. Beauty is sponta- 
 neous ; it is simply beautiful, and nothing more. Thus, 
 in contemplating the highest works of art, we do not 
 lose ourselves in considering their purpose : to do so 
 would substitute reflection for the impression. On the 
 other hand, the emotion must not be disturbed by the 
 conviction that the purpose of the artist was not accom- 
 plished. The art must be such that all reflection, con- 
 sciously or unconsciously, heightens the impression. 
 Our consciousness is so limited that it carries on but 
 one main process at a time, to which all else becomes 
 tributary. The more absorbing and intense an emo- 
 tion, the less room for reflection. 
 
 The reason why beauty pleases may be as difficult as 
 the question why certain things are agreeable to the 
 palate. Taste, whether used figuratively or literally, 
 is hard to explain. When we affirm that beauty pleases 
 for its own sake, we mean that its value to the mind 
 consists in its direct contemplation, not in the fact 
 that it gratifies an appetite or any animal craving, nor 
 because it involves an imperative. But by thus giving 
 it the immediateness of intuition, we only indicate the 
 more clearly that it must have its basis in the soul 
 itself. The capacity, at least, must be innate ; which, 
 of course, does not imply that the taste is not suscepti- 
 ble of cultivation, or that it must, in every respect, be 
 the same in all persons. Its ground is innate, as much 
 
 * In his Kritik of the Judgment, Kant particularly emphasizes the 
 fact, that the mere contemplation of an object produces the impression. 
 
ESTHETICS. 279 
 
 so as the power to think and choose, so that we can say 
 that the conditions of the beautiful are found in all 
 men. The same is true of reason, though considerable 
 mental development is required before its exercise by 
 the child. The taste for the beautiful, like reason, is, 
 in a certain sense, the same in all men, and yet may be 
 differently developed and exercised. Just because it is 
 innate, — say as ability, or instinct, or as a germ, — and 
 so far the same in all, we can give laws for the appre- 
 ciation of the beautiful, and rules of taste and criti- 
 cism ; and just because so much of the individual 
 appreciation depends on the degree of culture, the stage 
 of civilization, the training and the surroundings, — all 
 variable elements, — we find that there are different 
 views of beauty. In all such cases we must distin- 
 guish between the rational or essential element, which 
 is necessary and universal, and the accidental, which is 
 local and temporal. Persons may be in such a state as 
 not to be able to appreciate the beautiful, but that does 
 not prove that there is no beauty. At different times 
 there have been different standards of right : that, how- 
 ever, does not prove that there is no absolute standard, 
 but only that the standard adopted may be false. The 
 same is true respecting beauty. With the same sur- 
 roundings and the same degree of culture, there will 
 also be agreement respecting the essentials of beauty, 
 thus giving its laws objective reality, and making 
 aesthetics possible. 
 
 In vindicating for the beautiful the same eternal 
 basis as for the true and the good, we cannot ignore the 
 fact that the opinions respecting aesthetics differ greatly. 
 This is partly owing to the fact that the subject, the 
 newest department of philosophy, is but imperfectly 
 developed; partly to inherent difficulties. Persons may 
 
280 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 imagine that they differ respecting the beautiful, when 
 they judge only respecting the agreeable, which depends 
 so largely on subjective conditions. While beauty 
 always pleases, we do not always discern between the 
 beauty and other characteristics which please. In the 
 same individual the taste may vary at different times. 
 We are continually cultivating our souls, but are by no 
 means fully conscious of the process or its results ; 
 perhaps the most marked effect of the development is 
 on the unconscious basis and background of our con- 
 scious activity. We may, therefore, know what pleases 
 us, though unable to give the reason for the pleasure. 
 Indeed, the pleasure itself is apt to be so engrossing as 
 to leave no inclination to enter upon reflections respect- 
 ing its nature ; and we usually pronounce an object 
 pleasing or beautiful, without even attempting an 
 analysis of its pleasing or beautiful qualities. 
 
 Modern German writers, especially in Hegel's school, 
 have made much of the union of the idea with its sen- 
 sible symbol as the essential element of beauty. Thus 
 in art, an object is regarded as beautiful in proportion 
 as it embodies and realizes an idea or ideal. 25 That cer- 
 tain ideals consciously or unconsciously form our stand- 
 ards of taste, is no doubt true. These standards or 
 norms may change with our culture ; but we cannot 
 arbitrarily determine them, they must have their basis 
 in necessary laws. They are always in the mind, and 
 active there, though we may not be aware of their exist- 
 ence. The fancy is continually cultivated, and uncon- 
 sciously determines the manifestations of taste as they 
 appear in consciousness. There are no doubt numerous 
 operations below consciousness whose influence is made 
 manifest in impressions of pleasure and displeasure. 
 The fancy darkly throws its spell over an object, and 
 
ESTHETICS. 281 
 
 heightens its beauty, we know not how. The object 
 itself may be viewed in the light of a symbol, and is, 
 perhaps, seen rather in what it suggests than really is. 
 It thus becomes the occasion for fancy to exercise its 
 creative power, and to put into the object its own ideal 
 forms. Those who lack fancy, prosaic natures living 
 wholly in matters of fact, of course fail to appreciate 
 the most exquisite beauty. Those subtile elements 
 which are indescribable, but appeal directly, instinc- 
 tively as it were, to the soul, and form the essence of 
 beauty, escape their notice. There are many who cannot 
 appreciate the beauty of Raphael's Madonnas, because 
 they do not see the ideas veiled in or shining through 
 them : they see the pictures, but not what they repre- 
 sent. 
 
 This intellectual element in beauty, exercised con- 
 sciously or unconsciously, raises it far above the im- 
 pressions which come through the lower senses. More 
 intellect enters into the appreciation of a beautiful 
 landscape than into the pleasures of a meal, though we 
 may be as little conscious of thought in the one as in 
 the other. Beauty comes without effort, and suggests 
 none: it simply presents beauty, and that intuitively. 
 In contemplating it the soul has the standard of beauty 
 in itself; indeed, it may be said to see with this stand- 
 ard, and to apprehend immediately the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of an object with this norm. In all aesthetic 
 appreciation an intellectual perception of harmony is 
 mirrored in the emotion of the beautiful. While in the 
 domain of logic, as well as of ethics, the soul labors, 
 being impelled by the necessity of truth or the ought 
 of duty, in aesthetics it is free, controlled only by its 
 own impulses. This freedom is play for the spirit, the 
 paradise of the most delightful spontaneity. This is 
 
282 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the domain in which genius revels and creates, because 
 it cannot do otherwise. Just because it is play, the 
 contemplation of beauty is not the business of life, but 
 its relaxation and recreation. It is accessory to life, 
 rather than its substance ; and he who makes it his 
 mission to behold only beauty, cannot hope to drift into 
 the higher realms of truth and duty. Indeed, the con- 
 templation of nothing but beauty, at last wearies and 
 enervates. That its admiration is not devotion to the 
 good, and that the substitution of aesthetics for ethics 
 as the rule of life is not an exaltation of character, is 
 proved by numerous examples of genius, — artists, musi- 
 cians, and poets. We must distinguish between the 
 adornment of life, and that life itself which is to be 
 adorned. It is with beauty pursued for its own sake as 
 life's highest calling, as with pleasure : it cannot satisfy. 
 As the sole object sought in marriage, beauty soon loses 
 its charm ; or, rather, other considerations interfere with 
 its appreciation. The speech whose essence is its adorn- 
 ment soon wearies, and is pronounced insipid. We pity 
 the man who cannot leave his diamonds for fear they 
 might be stolen, — pity him even if a duke. But in its 
 proper place, aesthetics exalts the soul above life's vulgar 
 associations, to the contemplation of its own ideals, and 
 receives inspiration even from ethics. If our ideas are 
 expressed at all, they ought to be expressed in the most 
 perfect form. 
 
 But is beauty when ascribed to objects mere form ? 
 Is it never the substance, but merely something acces- 
 sory? The question involves the extremely difficult 
 concepts of substance and form, and of their relation. 
 When we speak of a soul, a character, or an idea, as 
 beautiful, the language implies that beauty is more 
 than a form. Aside from the more purely intellectual 
 
ESTHETICS. 283 
 
 objects of beauty (ideas, poetry), we are, however, jus- 
 tified in attributing the beautiful to the form ; but this 
 form must always be conceived as the form of some- 
 thing, so that it is never any thing of itself. In this 
 sense we can speak of form as constituting beauty in 
 painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Is it not 
 likewise the case with beauty in nature? The same 
 face may be beautiful in repose, and ugly when dis- 
 torted ; in which case there is evidently no change of 
 substance except in its form. It is the harmoDious 
 arrangement of colors or of sounds which we pronounce 
 beautiful. The highest truth may be expressed in an 
 abstract form, which can lay no claim to beauty, and 
 the deed prompted by the noblest impulse may be done 
 awkwardly; but when something in itself worthy is 
 expressed or embodied in the manner most in harmony 
 with the object, and most pleasing to the spirit, so that 
 this recognizes its own ideals in the form, we have 
 beauty. Besides the love of truth and goodness, an 
 appeal is thus made to the imagination. 
 
 The general term " form " is a mere abstraction, while 
 the realm of beauty is in the concrete. In every beau- 
 tiful object the form is definite, as well as the form of 
 some substance : it is always a particular form. We 
 must therefore regard beauty as form, not as separated 
 from the substance, but as that substance itself in a 
 certain stage of perfection. And those substances 
 which are capable of the most perfect form are the ones 
 susceptible of greatest beauty. 
 
 Just as we cannot separate quality from the thing in 
 which it inheres, so it is with form and substance. 
 Indeed, we can say that beauty is a certain quality in 
 objects ; and the term " quality " expresses the general 
 nature of beauty better than the term " form," particu- 
 
284 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 larly when we speak of beauty in ideas, in poetry, and 
 generally in intellectual elements. 
 
 We thus find the sensible and the rational, the sub- 
 stance and the form, harmoniously blended in the beau- 
 tiful. Idealists are apt to see the aesthetic element too 
 exclusively in the idea, while empiricists and sensualists 
 see it too exclusively in the external forms which excite 
 the emotion. The latter is seen especially in English 
 writers on the subject. Empiricists are also apt to de- 
 grade it to the level of sense impressions, and to over- 
 look the associated intellectual elements. Instead of 
 this one-sided view, whether too exclusively idea or 
 sense, we have in the contemplation of the beautiful a 
 union and concentration of all the powers, but in an 
 unrestrained manner. In the most beautiful objects 
 the soul sees itself at its best. Beauty interprets the 
 soul's mysterious longings and aspirations. The person- 
 ality finds itself in the beautiful, and puts itself into it. 
 The soul is interpreted in the form, and recognizes it as 
 its appropriate body. In beauty there is something 
 peculiarly human and soulful; it is the mirror of the 
 spirit's ideals. 
 
 In the preceding, reference has been made repeatedly 
 to beauty in objects. This will not be misunderstood 
 if it is remembered that the meaning is, that there is 
 something in them which excites the emotion of beauty. 
 Things are not beautiful in the sense in which they 
 have forces or are extended. The forces work, whether 
 seen or not ; but there is no beauty where there is no 
 contemplating mind. It is not a force ; it is not in 
 objects any more than there is thought in them. But 
 objects may be the occasion of that emotion, and we 
 want to learn what it is that excites the emotion. 
 
 To determine what is called beauty in objects, consti- 
 
^ESTHETICS. 285 
 
 tutes the aim of aesthetic criticism, and is an exercise of 
 the judgment. There may be taste without criticism, 
 because that taste acts unconsciously, immediately, be- 
 ing itself unaware, as a rule, of its principles of action. 
 In criticism we seek the laws winch determine its 
 activity ; we want to make the taste conscious of itself. 
 
 Beauty in objects is divided into the beautiful in 
 nature and in art. The beautiful objects are numerous 
 and widely different, the essential elements of beauty 
 being the unity in the infinite variety. However abso- 
 lute the aesthetic norms may be, their application in 
 criticism depends very materially on our subjective 
 state, as is evident from our different judgments at 
 different times respecting the same object. There may 
 be disturbing influences which interfere materially with 
 the purity of the judgment. However beautiful an ob- 
 ject seen alone, when very common it may fail to excite 
 any emotion. The surrounding of things, or their set- 
 ting, has much influence on their effect : a fact the more 
 easily understood when it is remembered that beauty is 
 essentially an order, arrangement, form, not the sub- 
 stance by itself. A beautiful woman among many plain 
 ones makes a deeper impression than among a thousand 
 equally beautiful. She is as beautiful in herself in one 
 case as in the other ; but the frame or setting differs, 
 in one instance the power of contrast being absent. 
 It is always necessary to distinguish between beauty 
 in objects, and the psychological conditions for its 
 appreciation. 
 
 An ideal, when embodied either in nature or in a work 
 of art, is the concrete form of an abstract idea : it is an 
 individual object in which the general idea is realized. 
 The ideal woman is a specimen of the idea of woman- 
 hood, and the soul finds every thing beautiful in which 
 
286 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it discovers the ideal of its idea of perfection. Hence 
 Hegel defines beauty as " the sensible manifestation of the 
 idea." * Not the marble, as marble, is beautiful, but 
 the marble with a certain form, so that the suggestion is 
 not that of marble, but of some mental idea. But as 
 the mind must at times be aroused in order to discover the 
 thoughts hidden in nature, so it may have to be awak- 
 ened to full consciousness in order to discover the ideals 
 veiled in objects of beauty. When some other faculty 
 is predominantly active, the fancy may not be able to 
 throw its spell over an object, or to follow the sugges- 
 tions hinted at. The spirit must freely lose itself in the 
 contemplation of beauty if the aesthetic emotion is to 
 prevail. There are in music no charms unless the soul's 
 dream of harmony, of unity, and of sweetness is realized 
 in the sounds : a scientific analysis of the notes destroys 
 the beauty. Even if we adopt Wagner's theory that all 
 thoughts can be expressed in sound, we must admit that 
 we are neither able to find sounds for all concepts, nor 
 to interpret the meaning of all sounds. Music appeals 
 to the emotions, and it is impossible to interpret it as if 
 every sound had a definite sense. It may be full of 
 ideas, but they are in the form of emotions : it is thought 
 struggling through sound and entangled in feeling. For 
 the appreciation of music, the mood of the spirit is, 
 consequently, of special significance. The charm of a 
 symphony may consist chiefly in what of memory, or 
 aspiration, or prophecy the imagination interprets into 
 it. Night, stillness, moonlight, water, the historic asso- 
 ciations of a place, the poetry or romance thrown over 
 a scene, have much to do with the effect of a melody. 
 As Kant observes, the nightingale heard in the dark 
 forest makes a different impression from the perfectly 
 * " Das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee." 
 
ESTHETICS. 287 
 
 imitated sounds when the fact of the imitation is known. 
 The same is true of beauty in visible objects : its effect 
 is due to our own ideas and associations. Symmetry 
 and harmony, the agreeable blending of colors, the unity 
 in variety, are of themselves not enough to constitute 
 beauty : they must somehow excite the fancy, and allure 
 the soul to attach its ideals to them. The object must 
 not overwhelm the imagination, but give it opportunity 
 for free and full play. If it overwhelms or stuns, the 
 emotion is that of the sublime. This includes all that 
 suggests the incomprehensible and the infinite. Hence 
 the awe it excites. In the stormy ocean, in the vast 
 expanse of the starry heavens, and in the high moun- 
 tain, there is more than the mind can grasp. But while 
 the mind is overwhelmed by sublimity, and is lost in the 
 very effort to find itself, it is at home in beauty, and 
 finds itself in the contemplation. The realm of the 
 beautiful lies between the neat and the sublime. 
 
 The fact that our first aesthetic impressions are some- 
 times reversed, particularly respecting persons, is no 
 argument against the immediateness of beauty. The 
 change may not be a reversal of opinion respecting the 
 same elements, but is, perhaps, owing to the discovery 
 of something hidden before. Thus the charm in the 
 expression of sentiment and in the varied play of fea- 
 tures may be discovered only on nearer acquaintance. 
 Grace of motion and poetic beauty of mind transcend 
 the attraction of mere regularity or symmetry of fea- 
 tures, or may amply compensate for their absence. 
 
 While the contemplation of beauty opens to us the 
 whole domain of nature as well as of art, its production, 
 of course, limits us wholly to the consideration of the 
 latter. Is art an imitation of nature ? Does it surpass 
 nature? These are old questions, and will probably 
 
288 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cause discussion in the future as in the past ; but they 
 are really irrelevant, for as they stand they can be 
 answered both affirmatively and negatively. However 
 much the mind may depend on nature for the means of 
 culture, its norms of beauty must be found in its own 
 ideals. In producing these ideals, the external or natu- 
 ral element is a factor, and it would be erroneous to 
 pronounce them otherwise than potentially innate. If 
 art aims, in some instances, at a perfect imitation of 
 nature, that does not circumscribe its limits: it may 
 also produce what can nowhere be found in nature, 
 putting in one object an assemblage of graces or excel- 
 lences which are not found in such perfection in any 
 real object. Here comes the distinction between the 
 ideal and the real. The mind has its own standard of 
 beauty. Suggestions, hints, and various aids may be 
 given by external nature ; but these can never do more 
 than develop a power already in the mind. The highest 
 art is not imitative, but the product of genius, which 
 is a law unto itself. In a certain sense, all true art is 
 natural. The laws of nature are simply the laws of 
 our own minds ; hence the creations of the mind that 
 follow its own laws are in harmony with the laws of 
 nature. The unnatural in art is objectionable, because 
 it violates the laws of mind. But art, while natural in 
 the sense of being in harmony with natural and mental 
 laws, is not limited to the objects of nature, but pro- 
 duces ideals not found in nature, and yet doing no 
 violence to it. These ideals fulfil what is given in 
 nature only in the form of types and prophecies. The 
 ideal man is not found in reality, but he is not un- 
 natural ; indeed, we do not hesitate to pronounce him 
 the only true man. In its relation to nature, art is the 
 ideal perfection of hints discovered therein. We thus 
 
ESTHETICS. 289 
 
 vindicate for art a sphere for creative energy. Its 
 greatest productions transcend nature, just as mind 
 does. This is true of the great works of art, from the 
 masterpieces of Greek genius down to Thorwaldsen. 
 Nature must be reflected in the highest creations, other- 
 wise they are abortions ; but the mind must be their 
 soul, otherwise they are not creations. In art the mind 
 rises in a peculiar sense into its own element; and in 
 its harmony with nature, which is nevertheless a con- 
 trast, it can be original. It is as vain to hunt for 
 Guido's Aurora in nature as to search for Milton's 
 descriptions in history. So exalted is the true artist 
 that we never think of classing him with the mechani- 
 cal imitator or the slavish copyist. His art expresses 
 nature, but it is his nature. 
 
 The term " fine arts " does not really express what 
 is intended to be designated. The term " useful arts " 
 shows the aim of the objects included; and when we 
 contrast fine arts therewith, we expect the adjective to 
 be the counterpart of " useful." Why may not the use- 
 ful arts also be fine ? It would be no improvement to 
 substitute "beautiful" for "fine," since in the arts 
 thereby designated there is much that can be termed 
 neither beautiful nor fine. They would be more fully 
 designated by calling them representative arts ; their aim 
 being to represent some object or ideal, and their value 
 consisting in this representative element. Or they 
 might be called contemplative arts, to indicate their 
 purpose as intended solely for contemplation. 
 
 In all the arts called fine, there may be many things 
 which increase the interest without heightening the 
 beauty. Sometimes the accessories to beauty, or the 
 associated considerations, are very prominent, and at 
 times something else than beauty is the chief aim of the 
 
290 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 artist. Thus the value of a picture may consist in the 
 truthfulness with which it represents an object or his- 
 torical scene. While the Laocoon was evidently in- 
 tended not to offend the taste, mere beauty was certainly 
 not its main object. It is probably an effort to put a 
 description into marble, and the artist wanted to make 
 it as true as possible to the description, or to the idea 
 to be represented. One need but study the best gal- 
 leries to learn how small a proportion of the art makes 
 beauty its sole aim ; very frequently it is only accessory 
 to some other aim of the artist. The Greeks were 
 especially successful in making their art the embodi- 
 ment of particular ideas. In their statues of the gods, 
 as Jupiter, Mercury, Minerva, Venus, some special 
 characteristic is to be represented. The exact represen- 
 tation of that idea is the aim ; but this is to be done as 
 perfectly as possible, and it is in this perfection that the 
 beauty is to be found. The beautiful is intended to 
 bring out the truth, or the idea, in the best manner. 
 In many works of art, beauty is, therefore, merely 
 incidental, not the first aim. Where the direct aim, it 
 must of course appear as the representation of a con- 
 cept which is in itself pleasing. If Satan is represented 
 as beautiful, it must be at the expense of truth. Much 
 of Michael Angelo's Last Judgment is so full of horror 
 as to suppress the emotion of the beautiful. 
 
 Some regard the characteristic, the peculiar, and the 
 individual as the essential element of beauty in art. 
 Artists have peculiarities, and the works of a master or 
 even of a school may be recognized by certain charac- 
 teristics of style. Generally it is easy to pick out the 
 works of Titian, Rembrandt, and Rubens in a gallery. 
 However broad and varied an artist's range of subjects, 
 in all of them the characteristic marks of his mind and 
 
^ESTHETICS. 291 
 
 skill must appear : he cannot deny himself in his works. 
 Perhaps his most marked peculiarity is a mere manner- 
 ism. Its originality may make it interesting, or there 
 may be other qualities which commend it ; but in itself, 
 as a mere mannerism, it is a defect. This becomes 
 evident so soon as it is imitated ; and it is most likely 
 to be imitated just because it is individual and striking. 
 Hegel, in distinction from what is peculiar, emphasized 
 the rational and universal in art. He viewed objects as 
 defective in proportion as they are peculiar, but perfect 
 in proportion as they are universal. That is not beauty 
 which pleases me only, but which commends itself as 
 beautiful to all capable of its appreciation. The more 
 art accordingly rises above the individual and peculiar 
 — above mannerism especially — into the rational and 
 universal, the more perfect it becomes, because the 
 more ideal. But while this is true, there need be no 
 irreconcilable conflict between the characteristic and the 
 universal. That which is not a characteristic (manner- 
 ism) of an artist, but a peculiarity or characteristic of 
 the object represented, becomes a source of beauty in 
 proportion as it is brought out properly. An ideal has 
 characteristic elements which distinguish it from all 
 other ideals; and it cannot be represented correctly 
 without those elements. If female beauty is to be 
 painted, that which distinguishes it from all other 
 beauty must be brought out ; the elaborate details of 
 dress become offensive if they hide the loveliness of the 
 face, or receive more attention than the characteristics 
 of female beauty. If the frame is more beautiful than 
 the picture, the artist's aim is defeated. A discord is 
 in itself always disagreeable ; but if it serves to bring 
 out more fully any characteristic harmony, it has an 
 aesthetic value ; it heightens the impression of beauty. 
 
292 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This is, it seems to me, the true place of the charac- 
 teristic in art : it is an excellence so far as it heightens 
 what constitutes the essence of beauty in an object. In 
 this sense the characteristic is co-extensive with the 
 ideal, and is in reality universal, while mannerism de- 
 tracts from the ideal in that it attracts the attention 
 from ideals themselves to the peculiarities of the artist. 
 Raphael's ideals of beauty have merely psychological or 
 historical interest, except so far as they approach the 
 universal ideals. When we find that in his pictures of 
 the Infant Christ and the Virgin Mary he makes every 
 thing tend to present what is most characteristic in the 
 beauty of the objects represented, we admire the charac- 
 teristic just because it is universal. He makes the 
 characteristic of beuaty itself his peculiarity, so as to 
 exalt his individual taste to that of the universal con- 
 sciousness. That characteristic in art is valuable which 
 represents a universal ideal. This is the harmony be- 
 tween the characteristic and the universal, — it is a 
 universal characteristic. 
 
 These general remarks are only intended as an intro- 
 duction to the central thought of aesthetics. Details 
 are of course out of the question. Numerous subjects 
 grouped around the centre must be omitted ; their treat- 
 ment belongs to works on aesthetics. The student will 
 soon find, that, much as has been written on this branch 
 of philosophy, much more remains to be done. The 
 agreeable, the sublime, the tragic, the comical, and re- 
 lated subjects, need careful consideration, as well as 
 beauty itself. The theme is fruitful and fascinating; 
 but its proper treatment requires a union of qualities 
 rarely found in one man. It still waits for its master. 
 
 Besides the general work yet to be done in deter- 
 mining the nature of beauty and its relations, much also 
 
ESTHETICS. 293 
 
 remains to be determined respecting the several arts. 
 u But comparatively little has been done in a purely 
 scientific manner to determine the nature and functions 
 of art so as to fix the relations of the different arts to 
 simple or natural beauty. . . . There seems even now 
 no consensus of opinion as to the precise aims of art, 
 how far it has simply to reproduce and constructively 
 vary the beauties of nature, or how far to seek modes 
 of pleasurable effect wider than those supplied by 
 natural objects. A theory of art at all comparable in 
 scientific precision to existing theories of morals has yet 
 to be constructed. The few attempts to establish a 
 basis for art of a non-metaphysical kind are charac- 
 terized by great one-sidedness." * There is not even 
 agreement as to the division of the representative arts. 
 Architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry are 
 the main divisions ; but this classification is not com- 
 plete.! Shall rhetoric be added ? There may be beauty 
 in gardening, in furniture, in dress, in oratory, in style. 
 It will not do to dismiss these with the statement that 
 in them beauty is not the sole or main object ; neither 
 is that always the case in the divisions given above. 
 How about theatrical and operatic representations? 
 The most complete union of all the arts is found in the 
 opera, with its poetry, music, acting, and scenic effects, 
 
 * Ency. Brit. 
 
 t Cousin divides the arts into " two great classes: arts addressed to 
 hearing, arts addressed to sight; on the one hand, music and poetry; on 
 the other, painting, with engraving, sculpture, architecture, gardening." 
 167. This division according to the senses addressed seems to be too 
 external. Is there no internal relation between the arts themselves 
 to determine their connection and division? 
 
 Schasler also divides the fine arts into two classes, namely those 
 viewed simultaneously and those viewed successively. Under the first 
 head he places architecture, sculpture, and painting; under the second, 
 music, mimicry (pantomine), and poetry. 
 
294 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 giving opportunity to introduce all the departments of 
 art. This variety, with an idea as the bond of union in 
 the various elements, adds much to the attractiveness 
 of the opera. But, at the same time, the opera is un- 
 natural, and this mars its beauty ; it is art that is not 
 true, and this makes it artificial. The opera wants to 
 represent life, but in life comedies and tragedies are not 
 sung, and men do not die with an orchestral accompani- 
 ment. The opera is not the perfection of the real, nor 
 the ideal fulfilment of any prophecy veiled in life. The 
 charm of music in the opera, which gives it the advan- 
 tage over the drama, is also, as far as nature is con- 
 cerned, its disadvantage. One must often suppress 
 reflection if the most touching scenes are not to become 
 supremely ludicrous. Art, whose essence is truth, may 
 be developed into harmony with nature ; but if its 
 essence is or contains a falsehood, it never can harmonize 
 with nature or with an ideal. The opera contains the 
 elements of destruction in itself ; and, to say the least, it 
 is very doubtful whether a cultivated taste can perma- 
 nently endure any thing so thoroughly artificial. No 
 doubt every sentiment and emotion may somehow be 
 expressed or interpreted in sound ; but to sing the most 
 trivial and the most solemn emotions and descriptions, 
 — to sing household affairs, mechanical labor, historic 
 scenes, remorse, all that pertains to life and death, to 
 self and the world, — is ridiculous. It turns tragedy 
 into comedy, and life into caricature. And the time 
 may yet come when the degree of true culture attained 
 by certain ages will be estimated by their enthusiasm 
 for the opera. The proper sphere of the opera is in 
 romance rather than real life. 
 
 ^Esthetics as accessory to life and thought, not their 
 essence, is subordinate. As such its value is, however, 
 
ESTHETICS. 295 
 
 very great. Its mission is to bring to the most pleasing 
 perfection something really worthy of supreme excel- 
 lence. Art is degraded whenever it represents a debas- 
 ing object as pure, beautiful, and attractive. To pursue 
 beauty — a pure abstraction — for its own sake, instead 
 of something really valuable which deserves to be made 
 beautiful, is a perversion of life and its functions, and 
 must be placed among the aberrations of the mind. 
 To put the fanciful and imaginative in place of the real, 
 is a species of insanity. 
 
 The ethical element in aesthetics deserves more at- 
 tention, not merely for the sake of ethics, but also of 
 aesthetics. Numerous tendencies in art prove this, and 
 the claim has actually been made that aesthetics is inde- 
 pendent of moral considerations. It has been tacitly 
 held, and also publicly proclaimed, that artists are not 
 to be judged by the same moral standards as humanity 
 at large. Such views are destructive both of aesthetic 
 and of moral health. 
 
 But in its proper place aesthetics cannot be too highly 
 prized. Thus the soul, life, ethics, religion, worship, 
 and all that is noble, may be developed to perfection 
 and become beautiful. Not by assigning to beauty 
 a fictitious realm by itself, but by putting it into true 
 and organic connection with ethics, does it obtain a 
 worthy mission. We want to develop to beautiful per- 
 fection the substance found in metaphysics, the thought 
 found in noetics, and the right discovered in ethics. 
 
 The student will probably find peculiar difficulty in 
 determining exactly the nature and sphere of aesthetics. 
 In the current literature on the subject he will be struck 
 more by the multitude of details than by the precision 
 
296 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and definiteness of the discussion. --Esthetics is still 
 in its preparatory stage ; the discussion is tentative, 
 materials are gathered, and classifications are made. 
 But the time for synthesis into a compact, completely 
 rounded, and sharply limited system has not yet come. 
 
 After the preceding general consideration of the 
 subject, the student's attention is now directed to two 
 points as especially worthy of consideration, both for 
 the sake of obtaining clearness, and a basis for future 
 progress. These two points are : the determination of 
 the exact sphere of the aesthetic emotion, and the ex- 
 planation of the conditions of aesthetic appreciation. A 
 careful consideration of these points will lead into the 
 very heart of the subject, and will concentrate attention 
 on what is most essential in aesthetic theory. 
 
 First, then, What is the sphere of the cesthetic emo- 
 tions f 
 
 The very question implies that there is in these emo- 
 tions something which constitutes them a peculiar class. 
 What now is it that makes them peculiar ? What are 
 the characteristic marks of what we term the aesthetical ? 
 Evidently we make a mistake if we treat beauty as the 
 characteristic mark of the aesthetic. That beauty does 
 not exhaust the sphere whose limits we are seeking, is 
 tacitly admitted by all writers on aesthetics when they 
 draw so many other subjects into the discussion. Thus, 
 in considering the representative arts, they cannot con- 
 fine attention to beauty, that being but one of many 
 elements entering into those arts. .Esthetics as the 
 theory of these arts must necessarily include all per- 
 taining to them, while beauty alone leaves much in 
 them unexplained. But the sublime, the tragic, the 
 comical, are usually treated as also belonging to aes- 
 thetics, — surely sufficient proof that there is a large 
 
ESTHETICS. 297 
 
 class of objects having in common what is called aes- 
 thetical, and that of these objects beauty forms but a 
 part, not the whole. We must thus try to discover 
 what beauty and these allied subjects have in common 
 to constitute them aesthetical. 
 
 That aesthetics lies in the domain of the agreeable, is 
 universally admitted. Thus, whatever its source may 
 be, the aesthetic effect is always pleasing. Even when 
 the subject is tragic, it must be so presented as to be 
 fascinating. But the peculiarity of the pleasure in 
 such cases has not been clearly defined ; and for this 
 reason the aesthetic element in agreeable objects has 
 often been confounded with the agreeable in general. 
 It is of first importance, therefore, to seek the charac- 
 teristic mark of the pleasing element in aesthetics. 
 
 We have already seen that whatever is low or merely 
 sensual is not aesthetic. The vulgar does not belong to 
 the sphere we are seeking. The same is true of all that 
 does not rise above the limits of mere sense-impressions 
 into the sphere of the intellect. Likewise the impres- 
 sions through the lower senses are excluded ; they do 
 not furnish material for such intellections as are required 
 in aesthetics. Taste, smell, touch, and the organic sen- 
 sations are too grossly real, too directly adherent to the 
 material, to admit of the spiritualization found in aesthetic 
 concepts. Sight and hearing are more intellectual, the 
 media through which they are excited are more refined, 
 their spheres are more exalted ; and, while less domi- 
 neered by gross matter, they are more free for intellect- 
 ual play. The very extent of the spheres of these two 
 senses suggests a certain degree of freedom ; while the 
 others move in a small sphere, and are severely limited. 
 The higher senses give immediate play to the intellect, 
 while what the other senses present must be dropped 
 
298 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 before such play is possible. The latter are therefore 
 properly called the lower senses, and are the conditions 
 for the lower pleasures of life, while the others are higher 
 in the intellectual scale, and furnish material for aesthet- 
 ics. Whatever is aesthetic must transcend the vulgarly 
 or physically agreeable, such as the pleasures of appe- 
 tite, and must rise into the sphere of intellectual con- 
 templation. The aesthetic emotions consequently imply 
 a certain degree of intellectual development, and also 
 culture and refinement. The aesthetic element in Plato's 
 "Symposium" consists in the intellectual, not in the 
 gustatory, feast. 
 
 Having now risen to the agreeable as a mental qual- 
 ity, and having taken aesthetics out of the realm of 
 vulgar pleasures, it remains to determine its exact place 
 among refined gratifications. The question is, What is 
 the intellectual character of aesthetic pleasures, or what 
 peculiarity in our intellectual operations constitutes the 
 charm of aesthetics ? 
 
 All aesthetic pleasures are, of course, subjective, but 
 they are not personal ; that is, they do not spring from 
 the fact that on me, as an individual, any benefit has 
 been conferred. What is purely personal and exclusive, 
 pertaining to me only, and of interest only to me, is 
 excluded from aesthetics. There is thus nothing selfish 
 in it. The joy that springs from an acquisition of for- 
 tune or of honor is no more aesthetic than is the taste of 
 a savory meal. Neither is a tragedy in real life aesthetic. 
 This gives an important hint as to the place of aesthetic 
 emotion ; it is not found in any natural affection, nor in 
 any real experience. Joy and sorrow occasioned by real 
 personal affections are not in the sphere of aesthetics. 
 
 Nor is the purely intellectual element, intent only on 
 truth and understanding, the sphere of aesthetics. This 
 
ESTHETICS. 299 
 
 excludes mathematics, logic, and science. However 
 great the pleasure connected with the discovery of 
 truth, the demonstration and judgment of truth do not 
 constitute the essence of aesthetics. That these may be 
 the occasion of aesthetic emotions, is not questioned, but 
 from them these emotions do not spring directly. 
 
 It is thus evident that the real alone does not consti- 
 tute the sphere we are considering. It must be some 
 particular aspect of the real, or some relation it sustains 
 to the intellect, or some notion or suggestion of the real. 
 Thus the mere reality of a flower, or the science of that 
 flower, or the fact that edible fruit will grow from the 
 flower, has no aesthetic significance. For the cow that 
 eats it, but not for the artist, the mere reality of the 
 flower is the only consideration. That nevertheless 
 truth and reality, particularly in the form of ideals, are 
 essential to genuine aesthetics, has already been suffi- 
 ciently indicated. 
 
 The entire discussion forces us to regard the imagin- 
 ation as the sphere of the aesthetic emotion. Not the 
 logical inferences from the real and from truth consti- 
 tute aesthetics, but what the mind in its free play, accord- 
 ing to the laws of possibility, makes of them. The 
 combinations and creations in aesthetics must be true 
 (according to rational principles) while free. Thus the 
 imagination is not wild, not a lawless fancy, and its 
 products are not monstrosities, but it works within the 
 domain of reason. All its productions, if aesthetic, have, 
 however, a relation to our emotional nature ; their appeal 
 to the soul is responded to by a feeling of pleasure. 
 
 The imagination deals with the real in a representa- 
 tive manner, and this representative element is charac- 
 teristic of all aesthetic objects. Not, then, what an object 
 is in itself, but what it represents, what it is in point 
 
300 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of suggestiveness, makes it aesthetic. The mere fact of 
 brilliancy, no more than its carbon, makes the diamond 
 an aesthetic object; that fact maybe made simply the 
 occasion of scientific inquiry, without an appeal to 
 the emotions. So a real sorrow is simply sorrow, but its 
 representation or description may be aesthetic. See the 
 storm with King Lear ! Suffering itself is painful ; yet 
 its description is not only free from actual suffering, but 
 may also be very fascinating. So the descriptions of 
 pleasure may, by means of representative elements, pro- 
 duce aesthetic effects. Thus, in what are termed beauti- 
 ful arts, the effect depends on what they suggest, on 
 what they represent, and on the manner of the represen- 
 tation. In thus transferring the sphere of the aesthetic 
 emotions from the real to the representative, we find 
 the interpretation of the conspicuous part played in 
 aesthetics by symbolism. 
 
 The representative element in art will readily be 
 admitted, but its existence in natural objects termed 
 beautiful may not be so evident. This may be a reason 
 why aesthetics has by some writers been limited to art, 
 while the beauty in nature has been excluded. But a 
 careful study of the aesthetic effects of natural objects 
 will also prove that these effects depend on representa- 
 tive elements. Thus no natural object has an aesthetic 
 significance if beyond its bare reality it has no sugges- 
 tions or inspiration for the mind. A landscape viewed 
 merely as so much nature, or as of certain utility, has 
 no aesthetic value. But when, aside from its utility and 
 science, nature appeals to the imagination, it may have 
 aesthetic effects. A mouse may be one thing to the 
 peasant, and something very different to the poet 
 Burns ; yet its bare reality may be to either of less 
 significance than to a cat. It is thus evident that the 
 
ESTHETICS. 301 
 
 aesthetic effect depends in every instance on what the 
 mind associates with an object, or on what the imagin- 
 ation interprets into an object or constructs from it. 
 Not the little faded flower is charming, but the withered 
 hopes it symbolizes make it so attractive. 
 
 The discussion of the sphere of the aesthetic emotions 
 has already led us to the second point, which we must 
 now consider more fully; namely, the conditions of 
 aesthetic appreciation. 
 
 The consideration of this point confirms in a remark- 
 able degree the correctness of the indicated sphere of 
 the aesthetic emotions. We do not look for aesthetic 
 appreciation where the training has been merely utilis- 
 tic or scientific ; how, then, is it obtained ? 
 
 This appreciation is only possible when we rise above 
 the naturalistic and realistic standpoint, into the realm 
 where the imagination moves amid symbols and repre- 
 sentations, and is free to form its own constructions. 
 ^Esthetic appreciation thus depends on a peculiar kind 
 of culture, — a culture in the discernment of the repre- 
 sentative element in objects, and also a culture of the 
 feelings which respond to this element. All other 
 things being equal, the minds richest in suggestiveness 
 (minds called by the Germans geistreicli) will be most 
 aesthetic. With the richness of suggestion we must not 
 confound the depth of emotion ; what a mind lacks in 
 variety of suggestiveness may be compensated for by 
 depth of emotion. The broken column on a tomb may 
 be richer in suggestion to the poet than to the mother 
 who erected the monument ; but the one suggestion to 
 the mother excites deeper emotions than all the sugges- 
 tions of the poet. 
 
 The aesthetic faculty, as it may be called, like all 
 other mental powers requires exercise, training, develop- 
 
302 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ment. The first things that claim attention are such as 
 meet physical needs ; hence the appetites are so pre- 
 dominantly exercised for years, and we cannot speak of 
 aesthetic appreciation in the infant. For the develop- 
 ment of this appreciation, or taste, the exercise of the 
 imagination is the condition. With its earliest intel- 
 lectual operations the child enters the sphere of the 
 representative. Thus the very name " mamma " is a 
 symbol, being representative, as all language is. 
 
 In order to understand the conditions of aesthetic 
 appreciation, we must again recur to the formation of 
 mental states. We are apt thoughtlessly to regard 
 every judgment as independent of our subjective state ; 
 we treat it as if invariable and universal : in other 
 words, we treat subjective judgments as if they were 
 objective. Where judgments are purely mathematical, 
 logical, or scientific, we of course place ourselves on the 
 objective standpoint ; and we generally make the mis- 
 take of regarding all judgments as of the same char- 
 acter. This is fruitful of error, particularly in social, 
 ethical, aesthetic, and religious matters, and in all cases 
 when a purely subjective element enters into the judg- 
 ment. There is a large class of subjects which cannot 
 be determined according to the strict principles of exact 
 science. We might call judgments respecting them 
 subjective, determined largely by the estimated value 
 of objects to ourselves; although the aim should con- 
 stantly be to attain the objective standpoint, which is 
 the norm. 
 
 Since so many of our judgments, opinions, and views 
 depend on our subjective condition or state, it at once 
 becomes evident that attention to the state is of first 
 importance. The very word " taste " refers to the sub- 
 jective state, and thus implies that the norms of taste 
 
ESTHETICS. 303 
 
 are not necessarily found in objective nature or art. 
 Let us call this inner condition, on which so much of 
 aesthetic appreciation depends, the sesthetic state. How 
 is it formed ? 
 
 We have seen that, whatever of our mental processes 
 is conscious, the formation of mental states of more or 
 less permanence is a process below the horizon of con- 
 sciousness. As in the growth of plants and animals, 
 so in the development of mental states, we can see 
 the results, but not the process itself. The temporarily 
 conscious operations of the mind leave a permanent im- 
 press on the mind itself: they must be viewed as real 
 operations or conditions of that mind, not as mere hap- 
 penings on its surface. Every thought, in proportion 
 as it is deep, works changes in the mind, and no thought 
 leaves us as it finds us. Particularly by repetition are 
 ideas and thoughts embodied in our state, assimilating, 
 as it were, the mental organism to them, and determin- 
 ing the character of its life. All habit is an illustration 
 of the fact that there is a tendency in our nature to 
 become what we do. 
 
 Under certain processes of culture the representative 
 element becomes a permanent and a prominent factor in 
 our mental state. Thus certain objects become sym- 
 bols, and their real meaning may have less significance 
 than the symbolical. But not only does an object lose 
 its real in its representative element, but the thing sym- 
 bolized is also lost in the symbol. How often is a word 
 taken for the concept, and the sign for the thing signi- 
 fied ! Idolatry is a striking illustration. Thus we may 
 have hieroglyphics, but not their interpretation. The 
 power of symbols or of the representative element 
 depends on mental association ; and this association de- 
 pends on past experience and training, as they have 
 
304 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 become permanently embodied in the state which they 
 have formed. The very fact that they have formed the 
 state implies that they are somehow subsumed into that 
 state, and continue to live and work in it. Thus on 
 our past history the associations and the suggestions 
 of our minds depend. Owing to the difference of states 
 and of consequent associations, that which causes one 
 to weep makes another laugh. 
 
 The process of forming representative elements and 
 symbols goes on ceaselessly. While all language is 
 based on this process, it is most apparent in that which 
 is figurative. One thing is made to stand for or to 
 represent another, so that an object may be the symbol 
 of an infinite variety of objects. Then the association 
 of an object takes the place of the object itself. Thus 
 the joy that springs from an object may make that 
 object the symbol of joy in general ; as light, a feast, 
 a song, or a dance. In this way objects which most 
 deeply or most frequently affect us become representa- 
 tives of all objects of the same class. 
 
 There is thus a constant cultivation of a state in 
 which the representative element is prominent, a state 
 which is the condition for aesthetic appreciation. And 
 our aesthetic state depends on the difference in the 
 mind's symbolism. The moonlight has a different 
 effect on one who sees in it only a condition for more 
 efficient work at night, from what it has on him to 
 whom it has associations of poetry, music, and love. Its 
 effect on lovers on the Grand Canal at Venice differs 
 from that on the gondolier who earns a few more sous 
 than in a dark night. 
 
 In the state formed gradually by culture we have the 
 standard of aesthetic appreciation. It may be a prosaic 
 or poetic, a commercial or an aesthetic, a scientific or 
 
ESTHETICS. 305 
 
 an imaginative state ; but whatever the state, it is 
 always the condition of aesthetic effects. We judge, 
 esteem, appreciate, feel, according to that state which 
 conserves in itself the sum total of the impressions made 
 on us during the past ; the present factors in influ- 
 encing that state must of course not be overlooked. 
 Hence the difference in impressions on the same person, 
 by the same object, at different times. 
 
 Just because the state itself determines the nature of 
 the impressions, we are not conscious of the standard 
 according to which the impressions work. In aesthetics 
 there is usually an immediate beholding ; the impres- 
 sion is received directly, intuitively, as it were, by the 
 sum total of the state. The mental process in the im- 
 pression is, like all other mental processes, known only 
 in its results. The mind's standard in the appreciation 
 is the state that mind is in ; or we may say that the 
 standards are latent in the mind, being there potentially 
 and working there, but not consciously. Thus it re- 
 quires a special effort of reflection to determine the 
 reason of aesthetic appreciation, the taste being first 
 and immediately active as appreciative, and then as 
 critical ; it first receives the aesthetic impression, and 
 then searches for the cause of that impression. Appre- 
 ciation and criticism are therefore not necessarily equally 
 strong in the same person. 
 
 The immediateness of the aesthetic beholding or in- 
 tuition is proof that the mind is, at the time, not con- 
 scious of the standards according to which it acts ; yet 
 it is commonly ignored that the mind unconsciously 
 acts according to its standards or ideals, just as it 
 unconsciously forms them. Even when in vigorous 
 exercise, they may elude the efforts of reflection to dis- 
 cover them ; and it is not surprising that but few per- 
 
306 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sons are aware of the standards which determine their 
 appreciation. In order to determine all the elements 
 which enter into the appreciation of a flower, scene, or 
 picture, all the factors embodied in our state through 
 the whole course of past development, and now working 
 there, would have to be known. No more in a purely 
 intellectual than in an aesthetic appreciation is the whole 
 past experience involved. We must therefore conclude 
 that the ideals formed in the process of development 
 and actively working in the mind are its standards of 
 appreciation ; but these ideals are embodied in our 
 state, or help to constitute it, so that they work in that 
 state itself, though unconsciously. 
 
 Since unconscious associations and unconscious ideals 
 operate in aesthetic appreciation, we can understand 
 why so much remains obscure in the process. We have 
 not consciously at command all the factors which enter 
 into aesthetic emotion. In art criticism we, however, 
 seek to interpret the emotion by analyzing its elements. 
 The various processes which the student of art at first 
 performs slowly, laboriously, and consciously, at last 
 become habitual, easy, and unconscious. Thus even 
 the rules of criticism, like those of grammar, work 
 directly, and are applied unconsciously. While aesthetic 
 appreciation is therefore immediate, the condition for 
 its immediateness and character may be the product of 
 years of development. 
 
 There is a striking difference in the effect produced 
 by the different arts. This is largely owing to the 
 nature of the representative element. Poetry is the 
 most definite of the arts, music the most indefinite. 
 The preceding views will help us to understand this. 
 It has been said that poetry appeals to the feelings 
 through thought, but music to thought through feeling. 
 
^ESTHETICS. 307 
 
 Indeed, we may arrange the various arts according to 
 the distinctness of their representative elements, — a 
 striking confirmation of the theory that the representa- 
 tive is the sphere of aesthetics. Poetry is so definite 
 because it uses language which expresses ideas in the 
 clearest manner. But let one hundred musicians hear 
 the same piece of music, and the chances are that no 
 two of them will agree exactly as to the thoughts 
 intended to be expressed. The explanation is found 
 in the symbol used ; namely sound, but not in the 
 form of articulate language. Sound, as a symbol, is 
 vague, the same tone being capable of different inter- 
 pretations. The obscurity of the symbol thus explains 
 the fact that the appeal of music to the imagination is 
 so indefinite. And yet therein, in part, is its power, 
 since it gives so much free scope to the imagination. 
 
 After determining the exact place of aesthetics and 
 the conditions for aesthetic appreciation in general, spe- 
 cial inquiries can be instituted respecting beauty, the 
 chief object of aesthetics. In beauty we have the high- 
 est object of aesthetic appreciation, the culmination of 
 taste. All that constitutes the aesthetic element in any 
 object must also be found in beauty. Thus its sphere 
 is found in imagination, in an intellectual symbolism. 
 Perhaps the most serious mistake has been made in the 
 attempt to treat it as the only aesthetic object, or as 
 peculiarly aesthetic, whereas it shares its general charac- 
 teristics with other aesthetic objects. But in beauty 
 certain aesthetic qualities reach their highest develop- 
 ment. Into beauty enter the reason, the spirit ; beauty 
 pertains to what is most agreeable to the imagination. 
 Perhaps the term " beauty " is used so vaguely, and 
 applied to so many merely agreeable objects, just be- 
 cause it lacks those striking peculiarities which have 
 
308 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 been sought in it. Whatever is beautiful has a pecuilar 
 excellence ; and, instead of a peculiarity of quality, 
 beauty is rather an exalted degree of qualities also 
 found in objects not pronounced beautiful. Beauty is 
 an cesthetic emotion, excited by a pleasing object which 
 appeals to the imagination with a degree of perfection 
 approaching the ideal. Beauty, thus, always pleases. 
 The medium of the pleasure is the imagination ; and 
 it pleases, because it approaches the highest concepts 
 of excellence in representation. Thus the blending of 
 agreeable sounds in music, the harmonious arrangement 
 of colors in painting, the symmetry of form in statuary, 
 are beautiful in proportion as they present to the imagi- 
 nation representations of pleasing objects in a state of 
 perfection approaching or suggesting the mind's ideals. 
 
 Beauty is thus mental : it is an idea, existing in the 
 mind. But there are numerous symbols of beauty. 
 The idea may be embodied in an object ; that is, cer- 
 tain objects may be symbols of the idea, or they may 
 represent ideals. 
 
 Since beauty, like sight and sound, whatever its occa- 
 sion may be, is always mental, the soul is peculiarly 
 drawn to objects in which beauty is represented. The 
 soul seems to discover itself in such objects. Beauty, 
 so far as spoken of in objects, meets, expresses, and 
 interprets the soul's longings, though often indistinctly, 
 as in music. And genius in art consists in the power 
 to form constructions and creations which appeal with 
 an ideal effect to the imagination, and express most 
 perfectly the soul's conception of representative 
 excellence. 
 
ESTHETICS. 309 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Etymology, Meaning, and History of ^Esthetics. 
 Define Feeling. Importance of a theory of the Feel- 
 ings. Their Origin. Their relation to Thought and 
 Volition. Their Immediateness. Does Feeling deter- 
 mine Values? What is Beauty? Relation to the 
 Pleasurable. Is Beauty always an idea or ideal em- 
 bodied in form? Unconscious mental basis of the 
 Beautiful. Beauty in mind and in objects. Freedom 
 or play of the soul in contemplating Beauty. Power 
 of contrast on the emotion of the Beautiful. Effect of 
 reflection on the emotion. Relation of Beauty to Good- 
 ness and Truth. Distinction between Beauty and its 
 conditions. Is Beauty in the ideal, or in its represen- 
 tation? Views of Beauty in empirical and idealistic 
 schools. Is it mere form ? What is Genius ? In what 
 sense is it a law unto itself? Is it unconscious of its 
 law ? Define Art. Give its divisions. Aims of the 
 so-called Fine Arts. Classify them. Indicate the 
 aesthetic element in each. Advantages and disadvan- 
 tages of the Opera. ^Esthetic value of the various 
 Arts. Aim of ^Esthetic Criticism. Define Taste. Can 
 Beauty ever exist as the sole quality or characteristic 
 of an object ? If Beauty is perfection of substance (in 
 quality or form), can Beauty have a value independent 
 of the substance ? Apply this to Poetry, Oratory, 
 Style. What value is attributable to Beauty in objects? 
 Application of ^Esthetics to education, religion, and 
 other departments. Define the sphere of the ^Esthetic 
 Emotions. The significance of the representative ele- 
 ment. Symbolism. Conditions of ^Esthetic Apprecia- 
 tion. How are mental states formed ? What elements 
 are conserved in our states ? 
 
310 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ETHICS. 
 
 However complete a thought may be in itself, we 
 regard it as complete in its relation to our personality 
 only when it somehow affects the feelings and the will. 
 When knowledge becomes aesthetical and ethical, we 
 have seed and flower and fruit. But also in another 
 sense we see in ethics the crown of philosophy. Being 
 based on a knowledge of thought, of being, and of feel- 
 ing, it concentrates the results thus obtained, in order 
 to find the principles of morality, and to construct the 
 theory of doing. While thus the completion of rational 
 thought, it is, on the other hand, also fundamental, 
 since ethical principles are involved in the construction 
 of logic, metaphysics, and aesthetics. 
 
 As a philosophical discipline, ethics seeks the princi- 
 ples of the volitions or of conduct. It is rational and 
 theoretical, aiming at the discovery of the principiant 
 element in action. It is frequently placed under the 
 head of practical philosophy, since it aims to give 
 the law for all practice ; yet it is not an art, but the 
 philosophy of the art of the true life. There are numer- 
 ous phases of life which it does not discuss directly, 
 but in no sphere is practice possible whose fundamental 
 principles are not found in ethics. It seeks not the 
 totality of reason in conduct, but this reason so far as 
 it has a moral bearing. Hence, instead of ethics, we 
 have the term " morality," or moral philosophy. 
 
ETHICS. 311 
 
 A clear and distinct apprehension of the idea of 
 morality reveals a sphere different from metaphysics, 
 noetics, and aesthetics, yet intimately connected with 
 them. All it has in common with them is made pecul- 
 iar in that it is viewed exclusively in its moral aspect. 
 It is the peculiarity of the ethical concept on which 
 attention is now to be concentrated. 
 
 Both an intelligence which works necessarily, and a 
 law which operates blindly, exclude the ethical idea. 
 This idea involves, as a constitutive element, the con- 
 ception of an alternative. A being without choice is 
 reduced to the level of natural objects, controlled by 
 force, and cannot be moral. The doctrine of fate anni- 
 hilates the will, and makes ethics impossible. Equally 
 destructive of ethics is the doctrine of chance. If there 
 is no unalterable law, then there is no standard to 
 which conduct must be conformed in order to be 
 moral. Morality cannot be arbitrariness. If each will 
 can determine arbitrarily the ethical, then morality is 
 not objective : it is not grounded in reason, and cannot 
 fix a rule of action. If fatalism retains the name of 
 ethics, it reduces the discipline to a natural science, 
 while chance reduces it to chaos. 
 
 All morality involves choice between alternatives, 
 but not every choice is a moral act. The character of 
 the choice is determined by the end in view, and by the 
 means for the attainment of that end. The ultimate 
 end chosen (design, purpose, aim, motive) always in- 
 volves ethics; but the choice of the particular means 
 for its attainment is not necessarily moral. If the ulti- 
 mate aim is carnal gratification, the choice is manifestly 
 immoral ; if right is the aim, the choice is moral. It is 
 the ultimate aim, — the object sought as the consumma- 
 tion of all choices, — which determines the character of 
 
312 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the life, casting its light or darkness over the entire 
 course. There may be mistakes in the choice of means 
 to attain the end, but success or failure may involve 
 much that lies beyond our power; and we are not 
 responsible for the inevitable, nor for a knowledge 
 beyond our reach. Not results beyond our control, but 
 solely the ends honestly chosen, and consistently sought, 
 determine the moral quality of life. Hence the attri- 
 butes generous, miserly, noble, selfish, good, bad, right, 
 wrong, may designate the life as a totality, giving the 
 ruling motive as the vital force, and determining the 
 ethical character of the products. Hence character, 
 judged as a totality, and not according to separate acts, 
 which may be exceptional, must be measured by the 
 end chosen, and by the measure of consistency with 
 that end. That life's aim also affects the choice of 
 means, and determines the character of the means, is 
 evident. Consistency with a good purpose makes bad 
 means impossible. But for the realization of certain 
 ends various means may appear to be equally effective 
 and good. In that case it becomes morally indifferent 
 which is chosen. If means are morally equal, the 
 choice may depend on other than ethical grounds. By 
 following to its utmost consequences all the considera- 
 tions which enter into a choice, we should undoubtedly, 
 in every instance, come to an ethical principle ; but this 
 does not mean that what ultimately involves ethics also 
 implies an ethical element in the details of the choice 
 of an individual, since the ultimate principles rationally 
 involved may lie wholly beyond his reach. Not what 
 is ultimate in ethics, but what is ultimate for me, in my 
 peculiar circumstances and with my peculiar attain- 
 ments, is the standard of my responsibility. Such 
 reflections make evident the need of a general theory 
 
ETHICS. 813 
 
 of conduct as a preparation for ethics, just as in 
 aesthetics we felt the demand for a general theory of 
 the emotions. 
 
 Can a being perfectly good, and meeting with no 
 opposition, be called moral? Its perfection would be 
 much like that of a law of nature ; the difference being 
 that the perfect being would work intelligently, with a 
 definite end in view. God is moral in the sense that 
 He is always perfectly in accord with the moral law, 
 not because He has an alternative. We must view 
 Him as the source and embodiment of the moral law, 
 and His deeds as expressive of the perfection of His 
 nature. He is free in that He is not subject to exter- 
 nal restraint. His acts are determined by His own 
 nature. In Him, therefore, we find freedom and neces- 
 sity united. The term " morality " can consequently 
 be applied to God in a peculiar sense only ; and to pre- 
 vent confusion, it is better to avoid it altogether, and 
 substitute for it " holiness." 
 
 The subject-matter of ethics is the good, or that 
 which has moral worth. If in the good is found the 
 characteristic mark of all that is ethical, it must be 
 determined what constitutes the distinctive peculiarity 
 of the good, what its criteria are, how it is related to 
 truth and aesthetics, wherein consists its distinction 
 from the pleasurable and the useful, and how it can be 
 attained. Such subjects as man's personality, his rela- 
 tion to God, the freedom of the will, the nature of con- 
 science and character, the essence of right, virtue, duty, 
 responsibility, and the questions connected with motives, 
 means, and ends, — all belong to ethics. It thus deals 
 with the problems which involve the greatest concerns 
 and the deepest interests of life ; and one need but 
 appreciate its significance, to understand why so many 
 
314 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 thinkers have viewed it as the culmination of all 
 philosophy. 
 
 We distinguish between philosophical and theological, 
 or Christian, ethics. While the latter discusses the 
 principles of morality found in and demanded by the 
 Christian system, the former investigates those discover- 
 able by human reason. In speculative theological ethics 
 (especially the work of Richard Rothe), there is a union 
 of Christian and philosophical elements. While Chris- 
 tian and rational ethics may be treated separately, they 
 cannot be permanently divorced. A complete philo- 
 sophical ethical system must include the Christian ele- 
 ments which are rational ; and a Christian system of 
 morality cannot ignore any ethical demands of the 
 reason. They cannot both be final unless there is an 
 essential agreement between them. If such an agree- 
 ment cannot be established, either the Christian or 
 the rational system will be regarded as supreme, and the 
 other subordinate, or else the one will attempt to super- 
 sede the other. If Christian ethics is viewed as a 
 purely human product, philosophical ethics will seek to 
 give its rational explanation, and will wholly absorb 
 it, — all that is in it being valued only so far as it is 
 rational ; but if viewed as divine in its origin, its rela- 
 tion to philosophical ethics will have to be determined. 
 Christian ethics must be rational, not indeed in the 
 sense that all its principles can be discovered or fully 
 explained by limited human reason, but in the sense 
 that faith in them must be reasonable. We are con- 
 cerned here, however, only with philosophical ethics.* 
 
 * On the relation of Christian to philosophical ethics, see Dorner, 
 System of Christian Ethics, 17-28. For the literature on ethics, philo- 
 sophical, as well as Christian, see the same work, 28-42. The valuable 
 list of English and American works on the subject, 39-42, is by the 
 translator, Professor C. M. Mead. 
 
ETHICS. 315 
 
 While in theological ethics the principles are taken 
 from Scripture, philosophical ethics searches for them 
 in the light of reason. The objects of its search are 
 the good, absolutely and relatively, and the ultimate 
 grounds and norms of conduct. Its principles must be 
 universal, applying to all moral beings, and including 
 in their application both the individual and society. 
 The essence of the ethical impulse is the imperative 
 ought While it works immediately, unconscious of the 
 ingredients involved, it is really very complicated, and 
 includes all that pertains to the moral process. That 
 something ought to be, implies that it is not, and also 
 that it will not come of itself. The very possibility of 
 ethics, therefore, implies incompleteness, imperfection, 
 — a recognition of a more perfect state than the existing 
 reality, and the need of effort for its realization. We 
 do not feel ourselves bound by the things that are, but 
 by that which ought to be. The imperfect real is not 
 our standard, and cannot give it. The ideal is our law. 
 Being in antagonism with the existing reality, this 
 law cannot have its origin in the things about us. The 
 consciousness of an ought springs from a contemplation 
 of the contrast between the real and the ideal. Ethics 
 is a forecasting, a projection of the mind beyond what is, 
 and a prophecy of better things. We stand on the real, 
 but only to rise above it, and to work up to something 
 beyond. We must not, however, imagine that the mere 
 contemplation of the imperfect and the perfect makes 
 morality possible. We must recognize ourselves as 
 related to both, as somehow responsible for the relation 
 sustained, and as able to promote the ideal by the use 
 of the real. Thus the ethical always involves a process, 
 an effort, a development. It is possible only in a world 
 that is imperfect, and yet has in it the seeds and condi- 
 
316 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tions of perfection : it involves ideals, the possibility 
 of their attainment or of approach thereto, and a con- 
 sciousness of responsibility respecting their realization. 
 Much as intellect and feeling have to do with ethics, 
 the will is the supreme factor. 
 
 From the time of Socrates till the present, an effort 
 has been made to discover the principle of morality, or 
 the standard of right. The fundamental question has 
 been, What is the ultimate appeal, the final law? In 
 opposition to the sophists, who made morality, as well 
 as truth, something subjective, individual, a matter of 
 opinion, Socrates aimed to establish it on a universal 
 and eternal basis. Plato finds the moral ideal in God, 
 who is the supreme good ; and this is the view preva- 
 lent in his school. While the same idea lies at the 
 basis of Aristotle's ethics, he discusses, in his book on 
 that subject, moral conduct and the particular virtues 
 more fully than the fundamental principles. The impor- 
 tance of the subject has led to the frequent discussion 
 of ethics in recent times. Principles formerly thought 
 to have been firmly established are now attacked. 
 Different philosophical schools have set up different 
 standards of right ; and in this, as in the other depart- 
 ments of philosophy, the conflict of different views is 
 radical. Respecting details, as well as many general 
 rules, there is -much unanimity; but respecting the 
 ultimate principles, such as the nature, the basis, and 
 the criteria of the good, there is great diversity. It 
 is in ethics that the fundamental differences of theism 
 and atheism, of idealism and materialism, are most 
 apparent. While much remains to be done in order 
 to determine particular moral laws, the most essential 
 thing needed is the discovery of the basis on which the 
 whole system of ethics rests. 
 
ETHICS. 317 
 
 Viewed with respect to this basis, the various ethical 
 schools are usually grouped under two heads ; namely, 
 the intuitional and the utilitarian. These names, how- 
 ever, embrace a great diversity of views. Frequently 
 the intuitional and utilitarian principles are represented 
 as diametrically opposed; but sometimes an effort is 
 made to unite, or at least to reconcile, them. Too fre- 
 quently the fundamental principles adopted are stated 
 so indefinitely that their exact nature cannot be deter- 
 mined. The terms "intuitionalism" and "utilitarian- 
 ism" themselves need more careful definition. As a 
 general rule, the intuitional school finds the standard of 
 moral conduct inherent in man, as something a priori, 
 not learned from experience. If this is taken in the sense 
 that the capacity for morality is innate, so that man need 
 only be properly developed in order to become ethical, 
 it is difficult to see how any objection can be found to 
 this position. It puts the innate element in morals on 
 exactly the same basis as that in noetics and aesthetics. 
 But if the a priori element excludes the a posteriori, so 
 that not merely the capacity for morals, but also the 
 moral ideas, are made innate, intuitionalism is subject 
 to the same objection as the doctrine of innate ideas in 
 general. But if it is found that there is a basis for 
 morality in the very constitution of our being, ethics 
 will be placed on an immovable foundation. Eight will 
 have its source and law in the very nature of things, 
 and should be done for its own sake ; and then it is an 
 end in itself, not merely means for attaining something 
 else. It is this absoluteness and ultimateness of right 
 which the intuitional school seeks to establish. The 
 utilitarian school, on the other hand, denies that there 
 is such an inner, inherent standard, but holds that the 
 useful determines the right ; hence the name " utilita- 
 
318 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 rianism." The useful has itself been variously con- 
 ceived, sometimes being taken in a lower, at others in 
 a higher sense ; sometimes as the means of pleasure, or 
 happiness, or well-being, or some other real or imagined 
 good. Bentham held that it is the aim of morals to 
 secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and 
 this view has generally prevailed in modern utilitarian 
 ethics. 
 
 It is not surprising that the relation of the principles 
 of the two schools continually varies. Sometimes these 
 principles approach each other, as if a truce was to be 
 made ; and then again they are antagonistic. They are 
 treated as if they excluded each other, when this is not 
 necessarily the case. A utilitarianism may be possible 
 which is in perfect harmony with intuitionalism. The 
 subjects overlap : they are two circles which intersect 
 and thus have a part in common. Both, if they go deep 
 enough, must take something as innate ; both must learn 
 from experience ; both recognize the useful. Hence, 
 in reality, both are intuitional, and both are utilistic. 
 According to their usual treatment they, however, 
 differ in their intellectual apprehension of the right, 
 not respecting what is innate, unless intuitionalism 
 means innate ideas, or utilitarianism means that absurd 
 empiricism which finds outside of the mind what can 
 only be in the mind. There is no reason in intuitional- 
 ism itself why it should not regard right as inherent 
 in our nature, and determined by the constitution of 
 things, and yet regard the right as the useful. The 
 difference is thus less a question of inherence than of 
 intellectual development ; though it is evident that the 
 intuitional school seeks a metaphysical basis, while 
 the utilitarian moves more in the realm of the phenome- 
 nal. Yet when traced back to its source, the impuise 
 
ETHICS. 319 
 
 to do right, whether it be synonymous with the useful 
 or not, must necessarily have its basis in the nature of 
 our being. Whatever may be its external occasion, the 
 ought is always inner, personal. 
 
 As intuitionalism refers primarily only to the psycho- 
 logical source of ethics, so utilitarianism refers primarily 
 only to means, not the end. Both names are, therefore, 
 objectionable as a designation of the entire system of 
 morality. A less satisfactory word than " utilitarianism " 
 could hardly have been chosen for the ultimate princi- 
 ples of morality. The useful is always means, never 
 an end. How, then, can the means to an end be the 
 end of moral conduct ? Perhaps we cannot conceive 
 an ethical system in which the right and useful are not 
 in the end perfectly harmonious. But if the useful is 
 the law for ethics, we at once ask : Useful for what? 
 
 There are certain precepts which we regard as of 
 binding authority. What constitutes them an impera- 
 tive command ? 
 
 It is here assumed that this authority really exists 
 for every normally developed human being. Its non- 
 existence would prove a being not moral. If the intel- 
 lect may be so perverted that the normal exercise of 
 thought becomes impossible, why may not the moral 
 nature be so perverted as to fail to discern between 
 right and wrong ? But the moral perversions of men, 
 and the diversity of views respecting the right, are no 
 evidence that morality has no basis hi the constitution 
 of human nature. 
 
 Morality, being something objective, and the same 
 for all responsible beings, not mere subjective prefer- 
 ence, whim, opinion, or arbitrary determination, it is as 
 subject to laws as are our reasoning faculties. The 
 deepest inquiry must always conclude that these laws 
 
320 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have their basis in the nature of things ; and that, in 
 their ultimate consequences, they must tend to produce 
 harmony. Laws which govern phenomena cannot them- 
 selves be made phenomenal. Were there no moral order 
 in the universe, our moral laws would not be harmless 
 fiction merely, but an actual perversion. However we 
 may define the right, its last interpretation must be 
 consonant with our own being and with the design of 
 things. This broad and deep view of morality reveals 
 it as objectively real and eternal. But we must distin- 
 guish between the absolute norm for morality and its 
 conscious possession. Just because so deep, it is diffi- 
 cult of discovery ; and different views of the standard 
 of right arise from different apprehensions of the nature 
 and source of things, or because the individual and the 
 temporal, instead of the universal and eternal, are made 
 the basis of morality.* 
 
 We are not born with a code of morals ready for 
 immediate application ; such a code can only be formed 
 by training and education and surroundings. As these 
 vary greatly, so may the views on particular points of 
 conduct, however universal and alike the innate moral 
 basis. But why is a moral training at all possible ? 
 Because there is moral capacity in man, making him 
 
 * It is the narrow and shallow conception of morality which con- 
 stantly leads us to misapprehend its nature. The very terms generally 
 used to designate moral conduct and relations need hut he understood 
 in their full hreadth and depth in order to get at the essence of morals. 
 When we speak of the right, we do not get the full meaning of the term 
 unless we take it in all its relations; namely, right in consideration of 
 all that exists. We want to do what is due and proper, not merely 
 when we consider ourselves only, hut in view of other men also, of the 
 universe, and of God. If we cannot take all this into the account in 
 moral action or in determining the right, the difficulty is with our intel- 
 lect; and our inability to apprehend the broad, eternal basis of the right 
 should not lead to a perversion of morality itself. 
 
ETHICS. 321 
 
 susceptible to moral impressions, and capable of moral 
 aspiration and of resisting immoral tendencies. 
 
 While no amount of training or education could 
 make a being ethical unless it had an innate moral 
 capacity, the peculiar direction of morality in an indi- 
 vidual depends largely on the intellectual development. 
 The different elements of our nature are so intimately 
 related that the state of the one must also affect that 
 of the other. The innate element of conscience consists 
 not in the apprehension of this or that conception of 
 right, for that would imply the existence of innate 
 ideas. With increased knowledge, our previous judg- 
 ments may be reversed. It is thus seen that they are 
 intellectual, dependent on our mental attainments. So 
 long as the purely theoretical element in morals is made 
 its essence, conscience cannot be regarded as either 
 innate or unchangeable. Conscience is an impulse to 
 the right. This impulse has its basis or possibility in 
 the nature of our being. Without this emotional or 
 impulsive element, we might contemplate truth theo- 
 retically, without any feeling of personal responsibility 
 respecting it. When the intellect has discovered the 
 right, conscience impels us to do it. Conscience, viewed 
 as merely or mainly a discerner of right, is put on an 
 intellectual basis. How inadequate this view, is evi- 
 dent from the fact that conscience does not merely 
 impel to do the right known, but also impels to seek 
 the right and the truth. Thus instead of being an 
 intellectual apprehension, conscience is an impulse 
 behind all intellectual activity ; it is the ethical energy 
 in human nature. 
 
 Viewed in this light, conscience reveals a most im- 
 portant aspect of our nature. The fact that we are 
 not indifferent to right and wrong establishes the truth 
 
322 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that we are moral beings, — a truth whose significance 
 for our position and relations in the universe is of in- 
 estimable value. This truth is the basis of all ethics. 
 We may not always be able to determine with absolute 
 certainty what is right, but that does not interfere with 
 the absoluteness of conscience. The way to the right 
 may be lost, but this very possibility implies that it 
 exists. So the impulse to seek and to do the right may 
 be partly suppressed by lust or other agencies, and thus 
 the normal action and development of conscience may 
 be hindered. But the absence of certain tendencies 
 and impressions, under particular circumstances, does 
 not prove that in a normally developed human being 
 they would not be present. The arguments against 
 the innateness of conscience are largely of this negative 
 character, and in reality prove nothing against morality 
 as an essential element of human nature. 
 
 While emphasizing healthy moral views as a condi- 
 tion of healthy moral conduct, we need not hold with 
 Socrates that correct knowledge is the only thing re- 
 quired. In a being otherwise perfect, this would 
 indeed be the case ; but, as we have seen, there is as 
 striking evidence in human nature of emotional and 
 volitional as of intellectual perversion. What is appre- 
 hended as right by the intellect must be chosen by the 
 will before there can be moral conduct. The frequent 
 rejection by the will of what is recognized as right, is 
 too common to require special mention. The different 
 elements of our nature, involved in morality, greatly 
 complicate the subject. While the will is the most 
 essential factor in the realization of morality, this will 
 depends largely on the proper relation of the intellect 
 and the emotions to the right. In morals we have an 
 aspect of truth different from that given in logic and 
 
ETHICS. 323 
 
 aesthetics, an aspect which puts us into peculiar relation 
 to it : the relation of responsibility. In morality we are 
 made to sustain a personal relation to the truth.* An 
 intellectual being without the ability to discern right 
 and wrong, and without the feeling of responsibility, 
 would wholly miss a certain aspect of truth. The truth 
 would be viewed only in its objective relation, not as 
 having a personal interest. Such a being would lack 
 a peculiar sense, and all that pertains to morality would 
 be as foreign to him as color to a blind man. 
 
 That personal relation to the truth which exists in 
 morality is the ground of all moral law or of duty. 
 Take that away, and it becomes absurd to talk of 
 morals. How do we account for the consciousness of 
 this relation ? Why can we not rest in the contempla- 
 tion of the ideal good, just as we do in that of the ideal 
 beauty ? Ethics begins when besides the contemplation 
 of the ideal we recognize any degree of responsibility 
 for its realization. There is always in morality a cate- 
 gorical imperative, though its content may differ from 
 that formulated by Kant. What makes this imperative 
 ought, always found in morals and never in any thing 
 else? We have answered that it has its seat in con- 
 science ; but this leads to the question, How did it get 
 there ? In rational ethics we seek an explanation of that 
 impulse which is the basis of morality. 
 
 In harmony with a broad tendency of modern 
 thought, conscience has been pronounced a product of 
 evolution. How this was possible is not explained sat- 
 isfactorily, nor is there agreement as to the exact nature 
 of the process ; but whatever the differences respecting 
 
 * A relation involving the whole person as a person. Personality 
 involves self-consciousness (the consciousness of self as distinct from ali 
 other objects) and self-determination. 
 
324 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 details, evolutionists usually regard conscience and the 
 whole of ethics as the product of natural development. 
 Some lay the stress on heredity, by means of which cer- 
 tain predispositions and tendencies are supposed to be 
 explained ; others emphasize the training, the influence 
 of the environment, and the association of ideas induced 
 by habit. The theory of evolution has certainly di- 
 rected attention to important elements heretofore too 
 much neglected. The basis with which an individual 
 starts (whether the product of heredity or not), the his- 
 torical development into whose results he is placed, the 
 statutory laws, the customs of the people, the prevalent 
 views of morality, and the habits he forms, are all potent 
 factors in determining his views of morals and his moral 
 conduct. The correct theory of ethics cannot be found 
 by ignoring or rejecting these factors, but by fully 
 considering them, and critically distinguishing their real 
 from their imagined influence. Since what is innate 
 and implicitly (potentially) present may be subject to 
 evolution so as to be explicitly (really) present, there 
 is no reason why intuitionalism and evolution may not 
 be harmonized. 
 
 Over-zealous Darwinians (especially materialists like 
 Carl Vogt) are apt to create suspicion even respecting 
 those elements in the theory which are well-founded. 
 Thus, as is so common in such cases, the theory is estab- 
 lished before the inductions justify it, and then it is 
 used as an absolute law to interpret facts. The efforts 
 to evolve morality and religion from brutes depend 
 wholly on analogical reasoning ; and it is evident that 
 frequently human elements are interpreted into brutes, 
 in order to discover in brutes ethical and spiritual germs. 
 If the animal could develop itself up to man, or if some- 
 thing could be added to it which would make it human, 
 
ETHICS. 325 
 
 the question would be settled. But this very possibility 
 remains to be proved. The process of evolving men 
 from brutes is too often accomplished by first making 
 men brutes. Here is a region in which hypotheses luxu- 
 riate in the name of exact science. Some of the very 
 advocates of this theory fail to study man himself as an 
 individual, as a part of humanity, and in connection 
 with the history of human development. Until the 
 specific element of morality is found in matter or in 
 the animal, — not merely an imagined something from 
 which its evolution may be imagined, — we shall be 
 limited to its discussion where certainly found, namely 
 in man. The apparent analogies, mere interpretations 
 on our part, do not establish a real likeness or sameness. 
 Heredity, the laws of association, historical develop- 
 ment, the training of the individual and his environ- 
 ment, the statutory laws and prevalent views of legal 
 right, can at best account only for prevailing moral 
 opinions. They never lead beyond the historical and 
 psychological contemplation of morality. Let us sup- 
 pose, too, that, in accounting for what is, they explain 
 the opinions respecting what ought to be, and give an 
 impulse to seek what is recognized as right. Now, if 
 besides these nothing else were involved in morality, 
 the question of its origin might be settled, very largely 
 at least, by an appeal to these factors ; the origin of the 
 imperative ought would of course not be explained. 
 But these are not the only factors. Instead of letting 
 all that may have come through inheritance, the laws of 
 association, historical development, training and envi- 
 ronment, the constitution and laws of a land, the views 
 of legal right, or any or all existing views and theories, 
 determine the ethical laws, I subject all these to criti- 
 cism, interpret them rationally, accept some and reject 
 
326 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 others, and form a standard of right which is not given 
 by all of them combined. There is such a thing as his- 
 torical morality, but we distinguish it from the rational 
 and philosophical. The latter may even use the historical 
 as a help in the formation of its ideals ; but history or 
 custom can never determine the character of rational 
 ethics. The laborious ethical process starting with the 
 historical, the hereditary, and the environment, but ris- 
 ing above them under the sole guidance of reason, and 
 making all of them subject to its criticisms and laws — 
 sure]y no one will claim that this process is hereditary, 
 or associational, or historical, or a product of the envi- 
 ronment. The fact is, that purely evolutional morality, 
 in ignoring the rational element, is not morality at all ; 
 it reduces the moral processes to natural law, and thus 
 robs them of the very thing that makes them moral. 
 But rational morality can use all that such evolutionists 
 claim, and can give it full weight in determining the 
 character of morality. Give evolution something to 
 evolve ; give education something to educate ; give the 
 environment something that is environed ; determine not 
 merely what the laws of association do, but why they 
 work as they work ; in other words, let reason give an 
 adequate philosophical explanation, instead of the par- 
 tial psychological and historical ones usually given, and 
 all that enters into morality will receive its proper place 
 in the system. We only get morality when we interpret 
 what is, and what must be, into an ought; and this 
 interpretation is only possible if the interpreter is 
 rational, personal, and responsible. I can be moral just 
 because I can rise above all that I have been made by 
 heredity and other influences, toward an ideal which 
 springs from my own being, and whose contemplation 
 impels me to seek its realization. 26 
 
ETHICS. 327 
 
 Whoever admits the distinction between what is and 
 what ought to be, virtually admits the supremacy of 
 mind in moral questions. It is in morality that the 
 autonomy of mind appears in its most perfect form. 
 Unless we are a law unto ourselves, whatever may be 
 needed to develop us to become such a law, a system of 
 ethics is impossible. Man is an ethical being because he 
 can be himself in the inexorable nexus of things, and 
 can say yes when the environment says no. In ethics 
 man lifts himself to the height of his own ideals, and 
 rises from things to personality. Morality is not a 
 creation out of nothing, but from that which is only in 
 mind. We cannot go behind this : our mind is so con- 
 stituted that in its normal development the moral 
 ideals are produced. This may be called idealism, be- 
 cause the ordinary realism cannot produce it or even 
 account for it; but it is an idealism which is the 
 intensest, and the only true and abiding realism. 
 
 We have already found that the utilitarian and intui- 
 tional schools do not necessarily exclude each other. 
 Even if the basis of morality is intuitive, that does not 
 exclude a utilitarianism which adapts means to a certain 
 end, though it opposes the substitution of means for 
 end. The end sought by utilitarianism may be pleas- 
 ure for the individual or society at large, or it may be 
 the preservation of the individual and society, or wel- 
 fare, well-being, health, efficiency. In all these cases 
 the right (in the sense of means) is determined by the 
 useful. Where morality is viewed as part of biology 
 or natural history, it will be regarded as somehow the 
 product of the effort of conscious life to follow " the line 
 of least resistance " or " the line of least pain," and to 
 make hunger or physical craving its occasion or source. 
 
 Usually hedonism and eudaBmonism reject the ego- 
 
328 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tistic and favor the altruistic or social view, recog- 
 nizing the happiness or welfare of society at large as 
 the great aim of morals. It is admitted, too, that the 
 pleasures sought are not the low ones, but the highest. 
 Sometimes they are spoken of as rational, and the desire 
 to attain them is called a rational desire in distinction 
 from the sensuous. The meaning of course is not that 
 the libertine and savage, in the pursuit of gross pleas- 
 ures, have morality to perfection. This is not even the 
 doctrine of Epicureanism, though it is frequently so 
 understood. The social and rational are connected as 
 intimately as possible with this pleasure. But taken 
 even in its most rational sense, can pleasure or happiness 
 be regarded as the ultimate end of conduct? 
 
 In examining utilitarian writers, one is struck with 
 the difficulty of remaining consistent with their theory. 
 It is frequently found that they actually abandon the 
 theory, or else make concessions on important points. 
 Thus J. S. Mill, a true Benthamite in the theory that 
 pleasure is the only good, makes a significant confes- 
 sion.* Speaking of a crisis in his mental history, he 
 says, " I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that 
 happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end 
 of life. But I now thought that this end was only to 
 be attained by not making it the direct end. Those 
 only are happy "(I thought) who have their minds fixed 
 on some object other than their own happiness ; on the 
 happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, 
 even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, 
 but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something 
 else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments 
 of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make 
 it a pleasant thing, when they are taken en passant, 
 
 * Autobiography, 142. 
 
ETHICS. 329 
 
 without being made a principal object. Once make 
 them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. 
 They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask 
 yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. 
 The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end 
 external to it, as the purpose of life. Let your self- 
 consciousness, your scrutiny, your self-interrogation, ex- 
 haust themselves on that ; and if otherwise fortunately 
 circumstanced, you will inhale happiness with the air 
 you breathe, without dwelling on it or thinking about 
 it, without either forestalling it in imagination, or put- 
 ting it to flight by fatal questioning. This theory now 
 became the basis of my philosophy of life." Surely a 
 strange end that is defeated when made "the direct 
 end " ! If enjoyments are to be taken " en passant, 
 without being made a principal object," it is hard to 
 understand in what sense they are to be made the 
 ultimate end or " principal object." 
 
 If happiness is the sole object, then the means for its 
 attainment must be right, and there is no difference in 
 the moral quality of pleasures ; yet this the advocates 
 will not admit. As soon as any moral quality aside from 
 the pleasurable itself is admitted, pleasure ceases to 
 be the sole object of moral choice. If the happiness of 
 others is the final moral law, then if I have the choice 
 of making fifty good men or fifty-one bad men supremely 
 happy, I ought to confer the happiness on the bad, and 
 leave the good in misery. If not, why not ? 
 
 The debauchee makes pleasure the ultimate rule of 
 conduct: why condemn him? To say, because his 
 pleasures are wrong, is yielding the whole point, and 
 making something else than pleasure the rule. At 
 best it can only be claimed by the hedonist that the 
 debauchee is mistaken as to the means of obtaining 
 
330 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pleasure, since by his licentiousness he destroys the very 
 capacity for enjoyment, and ruins himself. The state 
 of a man may be such that what pleases him works 
 destruction ; then he must be put into a state in which 
 his pleasure will conduce to his welfare. This means 
 that if a man's state is right, his pleasures will be bene- 
 ficial. Make yourself what you ought to be, then you 
 will do what gives the highest pleasure. No one doubts 
 that if he becomes perfect his greatest pleasure will be 
 in the perfect, and that this pleasure will be right. 
 But here character is made the great aim, being viewed 
 as the end to be attained irrespective of the pleasure, 
 while pleasure is regarded as but a natural consequence 
 of that character. Not what is merely means is sought, 
 but the end for which the means are the condition ; not 
 what is merely phenomenal, as pleasure, is the aim of 
 ethics, but what is substantial and permanent, namely a 
 state or character. 
 
 But if character is the ultimate aim for the individ- 
 ual, why shall he make any thing else, as happiness or 
 welfare, his aim in dealing with his fellow-men? If 
 for himself character is the condition of the highest 
 well-being, must it not likewise be so for every other 
 member of society? Those who admit this may still 
 claim that, while character is the great aim, it is sought 
 solely for the sake of the happiness it affords. One 
 need but state the proposition in this bald way to show 
 that no one can really advocate it; and it may be 
 unconditionally affirmed that he who seeks character 
 solely for the sake of pleasure, will neither form a 
 perfect character nor attain the highest pleasure. 
 
 If pleasure or happiness is the aim, how can I ever 
 feel it a duty to sacrifice for the sake of others? It 
 may not be to me a pleasure to sacrifice myself for 
 
ETHICS. 331 
 
 others ; indeed, if it is a pleasure, it is hard to under- 
 stand wherein it is a sacrifice. Hedonism either de- 
 stroys all sacrifice for human welfare, or else reduces 
 it to the blind instinct or impulse of the brute. To 
 regard sacrifice as the result of calculating the amount 
 of pleasure to be gained, destroys its nobility. Sacrifice 
 is noble when performed for the sake of right and duty, 
 and it is regarded noble in proportion to the intensity 
 of the suffering. That the joy of doing right more than 
 balances the pain of the suffering, may be true, but it 
 does this because it is right ; but the right is not done 
 for the sake of securing greater pleasure. 
 
 Frequently the appeal is made from pleasure to the 
 right. A man finds his joy in the lowest pleasures,* 
 and he is urged to forsake them because they are 
 wrong. Surely in such cases the appeal is not made 
 from one pleasure to another, but to something quali- 
 tatively different. If the difference in the pleasure is 
 only quantitative, the man living in the grossest pleas- 
 ures of vice differs only in degree from the man who 
 is virtuous, benevolent, and in every respect morally 
 perfect. With pleasure as the standard, misery is the 
 only vice. 
 
 In the discussion of utilitarianism, it is common to 
 confound things that are wholly distinct, and for this 
 reason so much of the discussion is inconclusive. The 
 confusion is largely the result of confounding an intel- 
 lectual with an emotional element. Thus the appre- 
 hension of the right is continually contrasted with the 
 desire for happiness, whereas the two may be in perfect 
 harmony. The conflict in this case, if there is any at 
 all, is between the intellect and the emotions. Instead 
 of contrasting the intellectual apprehension of right 
 * How can pleasures be low if the pleasurable is the right ? 
 
332 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 with a desire, we should compare the intellectual appre- 
 hension of right with the intellectual apprehension of 
 the pleasurable. When this is done, it will at once be 
 seen that the two are not synonymous. The apprehen- 
 sion of the right, in the broadest sense, takes into 
 account all moral relations. Applied by the individual 
 to himself, it implies a correct relation to all things. 
 If he takes account only of his intellect, or only of 
 his feelings, or only of his conduct, his view of the 
 relation will be partial ; he must take his whole being 
 into account. This relation must include the family, 
 humanity, in fact, all things in all their bearings, in 
 order to be full and perfect. In all respects the indi- 
 vidual wants to be right in his relation to all things. 
 The right in this full sense is what is due or becoming, 
 what is in harmony with truth, with God, with the 
 perfect ideal. The fact that we cannot take so deep 
 and broad a view of things does not interfere with the 
 idea and the eternal basis of right itself. This Tightness 
 of relation, this correctness of myself in view of the 
 whole universe of being, involves the right relation of 
 my being, and all that proceeds from it; and thus 
 includes character and apprehension and desire and 
 conduct, and not feeling merely. 
 
 When now we turn from this broad, all-comprehen- 
 sive, rational view of right, to the pleasurable, what is 
 the difference? While the former includes the pleas- 
 urable so far as right, but only as an element in con- 
 nection with Tightness of being, thought, and conduct, 
 the pleasurable as the aim of morality takes a partial 
 view of right, namely only so far as related to the 
 feelings, and ignores all the others. For this reason, 
 however the pleasurable may be harmonized with right, 
 it can never be the complete basis of ethics ; it puts a 
 
ETHICS. 333 
 
 part for the whole, and thus destroys the possibility of 
 a perfect system. Another vice in this method is the 
 fact that it makes this part an emotional instead of a 
 rational element. 
 
 The deeper we pursue these considerations, the more 
 defective hedonism appears. Its advocates cannot be 
 consistent, because they put on the throne what is 
 subordinate ; they make the conclusion the major prem- 
 ise. It is certainly strange that vulgar pleasures and 
 the highest approval of conscience should be put into 
 the same category as pleasurable. Better substitute for 
 pleasure Tightness of emotion, and under this include 
 all the feelings which spring from a proper relation to 
 objects. It thus includes intellectual joys, peace, and 
 all true gratification, but rejects false pleasures which 
 have their source in a false relation to things. We 
 thus distinguish ethical from base pleasures. The stand- 
 ard of the former is something objective ; the standard 
 of the latter is subjective only. 
 
 This rightness of being and relation, demanded by 
 ethics, presupposes that there is a possible harmony 
 between the moral being and the universe.* With this 
 deep basis of ethics in the nature of things, we shall 
 have no difficulty in harmonizing the views which 
 make the right and the pleasurable the end of morals. 
 We have already seen that the former, as the more 
 comprehensive, includes the latter. If there is reason 
 in the universe, then the right relation of being must 
 result in pleasure to a creature with sensibility. Pleas- 
 ure is, in fact, only a harmonious emotional relation. 
 Rightness in being and relation implies harmony, satis- 
 
 * To view man only in relation to his environment is belittling, 
 unless the whole universe, physical and spiritual, is regarded as that 
 environment. 
 
334 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 faction, and all the emotions which can spring from 
 the proper influence of one being on another being. 
 Where the right, then, in the full comprehensiveness 
 of its meaning, is attained, pleasure must be one of the 
 results. It is an effect, but not the whole, there being 
 other effects also ; it is not a cause or the end. It is a 
 good ; but a good which has its source in the supreme 
 good, in a character which puts a man in every respect 
 into the right relation. When this right relation is 
 contemplated rationally, I get the idea of right ; when 
 I view it in relation to my emotions, I get the notion 
 of pleasure, happiness, welfare ; when I view it in 
 relation to conduct, I get the law for moral action. 
 
 When morality is compressed into the sphere of the 
 emotions, instead of being viewed as a rational prin- 
 ciple, its aim must of course be made happiness or 
 pleasure. If the desire refers to a feeling as the object 
 sought, it must of course be happiness. All feelings are 
 pleasurable or painful; no one can desire the latter, 
 unless he can desire what is not desirable. To speak of 
 a desire for pleasure, is really tautology ; we can have 
 no other desire as desire. In opposition to all such 
 efforts to make morality merely emotional, Kant is right 
 in emphasizing the purely rational element in ethics ; 
 but he goes too far in wholly rejecting the emotions 
 from ethical con-duct. A course is not right because I 
 desire it, but I ought to desire it because it is right. 
 
 Is feeling the sole motive power of the will ? Many 
 claim that this is the case, and it is taken for granted 
 by those who affirm that the pleasurable determines the 
 right. But in spite of the generally adopted theory 
 to the contrary, feeling is not the sole motive power of 
 the will. There is no feeling unless it is felt ; and it 
 is evident that much of our conduct is not preceded by 
 
ETHICS. 335 
 
 emotion. So in the purely theoretical contemplation 
 of the right, we can decide what it ought to be in 
 the abstract, without considering our emotional nature. 
 Having decided what it is theoretically, in the abstract, 
 it can be chosen as the theory of conduct without con- 
 sidering its personal application and without giving an 
 occasion for any personal feeling to arise. Not in the 
 abstract determination of right, any more than in any 
 other abstract question of truth, need my feelings be 
 aroused. But in the specific application of the theory, 
 when it comes to practical details, personal feeling 
 enters into consideration. In determining the right in 
 the abstract, we carry on a purely intellectual process. 
 And when the right has once been determined, there is 
 no reason why it should not be made the law of con- 
 duct, without considering feeling, or even against feel- 
 ing. We seek the truth because it is the truth, some- 
 thing final in itself; we seek the right because it is 
 right, also something final. And if feeling or prejudice 
 interferes with truth, we reject such interference ; and 
 we do so equally respecting the right. So far from let- 
 ting our emotions determine conduct, reason demands 
 that its own voice is supreme and shall alone be heard. 
 A moral judgment is an imperative ; but just because it 
 is a judgment, it is not an emotion. The love of duty 
 or the pleasure in the doing does not lessen the morality 
 in the case ; the moral element is, however, not in the 
 love or the pleasure, but in the duty. As in aesthetics, 
 so in ethics, we form a state (character), and the norms 
 embodied in this state act directly, without waiting for 
 an emotion to intervene. In ethical conduct we do 
 what we are, not merely what we feel. 
 
 The root of many perversions in ethics is to be found 
 in the false theory that feeling is the sole motive power 
 
336 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the will. Can we not choose to make reason the 
 standard instead of feeling? Undoubtedly. But what 
 is the motive in thus choosing reason ? The fact that 
 this choice is worthy of my being. I thus prefer worthi- 
 ness of being to phenomenal emotion. Only by con- 
 founding preference, which may rest on other than 
 emotional grounds, with pleasure, does the theory of 
 feeling as the sole motive of the will find any basis. 
 There may indeed be a choice between different pleas- 
 ures, but there may also be a choice between pleasure 
 and reason. Even if we view ethics wholly in the light 
 of values, we can value the law of reason above the 
 impulse of an emotion. We can choose nothing in 
 which we do not somehow have a personal concern and 
 an interest; but it is a mistake to regard feeling, or 
 more specifically the feeling of pleasure, as the only 
 human concern. I may even recognize it to be my 
 duty to do the very thing my feelings oppose ; if, then, 
 conscience can oppose all impulses to pleasure, how can 
 pleasure be the impulse of conscience ? By making 
 subjective pleasure the standard of ethics, its ideals are 
 degraded and destroyed. 
 
 One of the latest German works on ethics * affirms 
 that " what is in no sense a good for me, I cannot desire 
 solely for the sake of good to others ; but only in case 
 it also has for me 'a perceptible and appreciable value. 
 In this sense it must be affirmed that in every human 
 volition is necessarily involved not merely eudsemonism, 
 or a reference to the feeling of pleasure in general, but 
 also egoism, or the reference to the feeling of personal 
 pleasure. It is totally impossible for a human being to 
 choose an end, and the necessary means for its attain- 
 ment, which have no relation to his personal feeling." 
 * Vorfragen der Ethik, von Dr. Christoph Sigwart; 886, p. 6. 
 
ETHICS. 337 
 
 It should readily be admitted that every choice is related 
 to our feelings, and the realization or failure will neces- 
 sarily effect the feeling ; but this is not the point in dis- 
 pute. The question is whether feeling is necessarily 
 the motive or the aim of the choice ? This presents a 
 radical problem, and the character of a system of ethics 
 will depend largely on the nature of the solution. 
 
 In ethics we move in the domain of values, and no 
 choice is possible unless the object chosen has some 
 worth in our estimation. This is implied in the choice 
 itself, and is an essential element in all volition. But 
 it is a mistake to make the feeling of pleasure the test 
 of worth. If an object has worth for me, I of course 
 rejoice in its attainment ; but if I choose it because it is 
 noble, true, right, it is a perversion to make the joy 
 which is merely an incidental result of this choice the 
 motive of the choice. I do not choose the true for 
 the reason that I prefer it to the false, for that is putting 
 truth on a level with mere subjective whims ; but I prefer 
 it to the false because it is the truth. In other words, the 
 ultimate ground of choice is not the mere fact of prefer- 
 ence ; but the fact of truth is the reason for the pref- 
 erence, and the ultimate ground of choice. I thus make 
 truth the rule for my preference, not my preference the 
 rule for the apprehension of truth. In choosing the truth 
 as truth, I do not at all consider the effect on my feel- 
 ing ; how, then, can feeling be the motive of the choice ? 
 By making it the motive, we simply make an effect the 
 cause. The very fact that I can choose what is right in 
 the abstract, and because it is right, without regard to 
 the feeling produced, is conclusive proof that I choose 
 for the sake of the right, not for the sake of any pleas- 
 ure it may produce. Even in the choice of the right, 
 I have satisfaction or pleasure ; but it is not for the 
 
338 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sake of this pleasure that I make the choice, but for 
 the sake of the right, and the pleasure is simply a con- 
 comitant of the choice. Let us say that we love the 
 right, and that we choose it because we love it ; then of 
 course the choice of right, as a mere choice, is put on a 
 level with the choice of the basest gratification, although 
 it may spring from the noblest nature. But why do we 
 love the right ? Not because it produces pleasure in us, 
 but because it is in harmony with a righteous character. 
 And where reason has become the guide of life, the right 
 is loved and chosen for the sake of what it is, not for 
 the sake of the emotion it excites. So I affirm that I 
 take pleasure in truth ; but does that mean that I value 
 truth only for the sake of the pleasure it excites ? It 
 is thus evident that the real motive in choice, whether 
 selfish or altruistic, or purely rational, or whatever it 
 may be, depends on the character of the person, and on 
 the rule adopted for life. I, of course, cannot prefer a 
 thing without preferring it; but that does not mean 
 that I prefer a thing because it gratifies, since the ques- 
 tion of gratification may not at all have entered into the 
 consideration. If I can contemplate an object as it is 
 in itself, abstracting wholly from its relation to my feel 
 ing, then I can also abstract from my feelings in choos- 
 ing it. Against my feeling I can put an imperative 
 ought, and can e'hoose a standard against my feelings. 
 In other words, reason, conscience, character, as well as 
 the desire for pleasure, can be made the motive of con- 
 duct. Epicureanism is possible, but so also is stoicism. 
 It is thus evident that a sharp distinction must be 
 made between the motive of the choice and the feeling 
 which is merely concomitant. The very fact that there 
 may be reason in a choice, implies that the rational 
 element may predominate over the emotional. 
 
ETHICS. 339 
 
 The position here taken disposes of such questions as 
 these : Does ethics depend on* something inherent in 
 the mind and on the relations of the mind, or does it 
 consider only results ? Is it grounded in the constitu- 
 tion of things, or in considerations of what is yet to 
 become? Such inquiries are based on a supposed 
 antagonism, where in reality there is none. What 
 results, and what ought to become, must somehow be 
 in the constitution of things. In the completeness with 
 which it contemplates objects, ethics takes into account 
 both what is and what ought to be. But in consider- 
 ing what ought to be, ethics again takes into account 
 the constitution of things. It aims at a state, something 
 that abides, not merely to produce a transient emotion. 
 Instead of making a feeling the standard of reason, it 
 makes reason the standard, and feeling an element in 
 the process of realizing its end. By making emotion 
 its law, we reduce ethics to the level of aesthetics ; but 
 by making it inhere in the constitution of things, and 
 seek a state or condition in harmony with the ideal of 
 this constitution, we get the true idea of ethics. 
 
 We have now attained a standpoint from which we 
 can judge all moral claims. Every aim short of the 
 Tightness mentioned falls short of the final aim. This, 
 of course, does not imply that the aim itself is wrong ; 
 it may be right but not final ; it may be embraced in 
 that final aim, as an arc in a circle. If it is said that 
 the aim is the survival of the fittest, we ask, fittest for 
 what? If the survival of the fittest means the fittest 
 to live, that is likely to survive without any help. How 
 can the fittest to live do otherwise than survive the 
 unfit or the less fitted ? If the aim is the preservation 
 of life, the question arises, why preserve life ? Neither 
 is the " efficiency of the social organism " the final aim. 
 
340 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Efficiency for what ? Every aim short of Tightness of 
 being and relation fails to reach the tap-root of ethics. 
 Every deep inquiry pushes down to this rightness ; and 
 while the modern horror of metaphysics may seem to 
 absolve men from the necessity of finding this tap-root, 
 it does not oblige them to deny its existence, and to 
 affirm that the roots lying on the surface are the 
 deepest. 
 
 Do what we may, we cannot get morality as a natural 
 process, but only as a process of reason. To the must 
 in nature, I oppose the ought of reason. So if the pleas- 
 urable only is the object of choice, we are forced to 
 take our place with Socrates, and say that we need but 
 know the right to do it. The ought in this case, as 
 much as in the other, becomes a must. I ought, how- 
 ever, to do the right even if I cannot see just what 
 pleasure will flow from it ; I ought to do it even with- 
 out considering the question of pleasure. If the pessi- 
 mist sees in suicide, not merely of the individual but 
 of humanity, the only hope of relief from misery, why 
 not commit suicide ? Ought not the parent to strangle 
 his child if that is the only way to save it from misery ? 
 What right has he to let it live if happiness is the 
 reason of the ought? 
 
 The freedom of the will involved in ethics has caused 
 much speculative difficulty. Its theoretical explanation 
 was regarded by Kant as impossible, but he held that 
 it is a necessary postulate of the practical reason ; and 
 he did not hesitate to declare that the primacy belongs 
 to the practical, not to the speculative reason. Alter- 
 natives are presented to us, as, for instance, the objects 
 of reason and of sense, and we choose the one and reject 
 the other. So far there is no practical difficulty. True 
 or ideal liberty is frequently spoken of as a union of 
 
ETHICS. 341 
 
 freedom and necessity, namely, the voluntary choice 
 of that which is true, right, eternal, or which is for 
 reason a necessity. This removes from the freedom of 
 the will all mere arbitrariness. If it wants to be truly 
 free, it must choose what is objectively true and right. 
 The ultimate ground of tins freedom is in the spirit ; 
 it is free because it has the power of self-determination 
 so far as its own conduct is concerned. It can choose 
 between an external and an internal law ; it can become 
 a slave of things, or can be a law unto itself. This is 
 involved in the idea of personality. Our reasoning is 
 so involved in the chain of cause and effect, that we 
 usually regard all cause as itself only the effect of 
 something else. We even regard being as involving 
 the idea of cause, when it does nothing of the kind. 
 Change involves the idea ; but being is that which is, 
 while only that which becomes involves the idea of 
 cause. A being that is free does not necessarily create, 
 but it chooses. It cannot be part of the mechanism of 
 nature, that mechanism which in our day is often so 
 exclusively viewed as to be made the standard for 
 judging all things. The spirit cannot be mechanical 
 and yet have choice. We, indeed, imagine that we 
 understand the mechanism of nature, while the choice 
 of the spirit is pronounced an unfathomable mystery. 
 But we have seen that we understand the one just as 
 perfectly as the other, the necessity in nature being 
 not a whit more explicable or rational than the choice 
 of the spirit. Besides, if the mechanism of nature is 
 the law of mind, then not only does all the mystery 
 remain, but thought is also involved in contradictions. 
 How can this mechanical necessity produce the con- 
 viction of freedom, of choice, and all the activity of 
 conscience ? Then the belief in freedom, and all other 
 
342 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 views, true or false, are a necessity. But if necessary, 
 they must be true ; in other words, error is truth. Not 
 on a mechanical, but only on a rational basis, is a system 
 of ethics possible. 
 
 In our subject philosophy verges on religion; moral- 
 ity is, in fact, their point of contact and the ground 
 which they have in common. While in rational ethics 
 we consider man in his relation to the universe, in reli- 
 gion we consider his relation to God. But ultimately 
 his relation to the universe depends on his relation to 
 God, and thus religion and ethics are found to have 
 essentially the same basis. In any true sense, a system 
 of ethics is impossible on atheistic principles. If, for 
 instance, there is no design in the universe, there can 
 be no end which I ought to realize. It is absurd to 
 claim that man ought to seek certain results, if he is 
 not made or intended for any thing. In ethics we have 
 the very strongest argument for design. Even utilita- 
 rianism need but be probed to the bottom in order to 
 discover that it must finally rest on a theistic basis. 
 With nothing but matter and invariable laws, it never 
 can establish the fact that I ought to sacrifice for the 
 good of the greatest number ; all it can do is to claim 
 that I must let myself go as the unalterable laws force 
 me. Even if I can persuade myself that there is a moral 
 order of the universe, or a moral law, whose source is 
 not in a personality, I do not see how this involves 
 an imperative. Why not let this law or order take 
 care of itself? It must be self-evident, that without 
 the conception of obligation a system of ethics is not 
 possible ; but it is equally clear that to affirm obligation 
 without giving its ground is irrational. For the fact of 
 the ought, the reason demands the why, in order to learn 
 whether the fact is authorized. Just here is the point 
 
ETHICS. 343 
 
 where various systems fail : they attempt to build ethics 
 without laying the foundation. They do not go deep 
 enough; they assert responsibility without giving a 
 sufficient reason for it ; they construct a system which 
 has significance only for personality, but ignore person- 
 ality itself, or at least its legitimate inferences ; and 
 their whole work is an effort somehow to conjure from 
 the must of nature the ought of reason. What wonder 
 if in such systems of ethics the essential characteristic 
 of ethics is wanting? However we may try to avoid 
 them, there are certain postulates without which a 
 moral system is impossible : Personality as the ground 
 of obligation and the condition for its apprehension ; 
 reason or design in the universe, giving certain ends 
 or an end to be realized ; and a future life for meting 
 out that justice which is not attained here. If these 
 are admitted, it will also be necessary to postulate the 
 existence of God, without whom it is impossible to find 
 for them a rational basis. 
 
 REFLECTIONS. 
 
 Definition of Ethics. Relation to other departments 
 of Philosophy. Rational and theological Ethics. Basis 
 of Ethics in human nature. Different Systems of 
 Ethics. Their relation to this basis. Relation of Right 
 and Happiness. Criticism of Intuitionalism and Utili- 
 tarianism. What is Conscience ? How regarded by 
 Evolutionism? Objections. What is involved in the 
 concepts of Obligation and Responsibility? Define 
 Personality. The Useful, or Means as an End. The 
 Conception of Freedom demanded by Ethics. Ethics 
 of Materialism. Source of Ethical Ideals. What is 
 the Good ? God as ethical. Personal and social Ethics. 
 Relation of Law, Politics, Sociology, to Ethics. Ethical 
 
344 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 demands in view of Socialism. Pleasure and Worthi- 
 ness. Ethics of Feeling and of Reason. Why seek 
 the Happiness of the Greatest Number ? Sacrifice ; 
 Benevolence. If Pleasure is the end of Morality, how 
 can pleasure ever be wrong? What is involved in the 
 conception of base pleasures ? Brute-impulse and Con- 
 science. Hope of Immortality as based on Ethics. 
 Kant's Argument on Immortality. Heredity, Environ- 
 ment, and Rational Ethics. Objective Standard of 
 Ethics. Mind freeing itself from things in Ethics. 
 Ethics and Design. Is he responsible for any thing 
 who is not intended for any thing? Kant's Categor- 
 ical Imperative. His Essence of Morality in a Good 
 Will. Aristotle's Essence of Morality in the realization 
 of the Design of our being. Is a Good Will original 
 or acquired ? How is Remorse possible ? Is a knowl- 
 edge of Right and Wrong innate? What is innate? 
 The relation of Reason and Feeling to Volition. 
 Ethics as the culmination of Philosophy. Freedom of 
 the Will. Relation of Morality to Religion. Postu- 
 lates of Ethics. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 345 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE SPIRIT AND THE METHOD IN THE STUDY 
 OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Inquiry among students from the most prominent 
 institutions has revealed the surprising fact that they 
 were permitted to finish their collegiate course without 
 receiving special instruction respecting the aim and 
 value of the particular studies, and respecting the 
 proper spirit and best method in their pursuit. As a 
 consequence, certain branches were studied simply be- 
 cause required as conditions of graduation, not because 
 their importance for mental development and practical 
 application was appreciated. Under these circum- 
 stances it is not strange that so many studies are pur- 
 sued in a mechanical way, and tend to hinder rather 
 than to develop the spirit of the real student. A 
 study should be made rational by indicating its nature 
 and aim, and by showing how it can be pursued most 
 successfully. It is certainly presuming too much to 
 suppose that the student understands the purposes of 
 studies which are entirely new to him ; and many who 
 are eager to learn do not get the full benefit of instruc- 
 tion in the classics, mathematics, history, and philosophy, 
 because they are left to grope their way in the dark. 
 The answer of many students to the question, Were 
 you taught the aims of your various studies, and the 
 best method of pursuing them ? is, " No ; I was left in 
 
346 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the dark until I discovered, after years of hard toil, 
 what I should have known in the beginning." Not a 
 few admit, even after graduation, that they do not 
 know how to study. 
 
 Of all studies, philosophy is the most purely rational ; 
 and in order that its pursuit may be rational, the 
 student should get a clear idea of the nature of philos- 
 ophy, of the aim and spirit in the study, and the best 
 method for attaining success. If heretofore the chief 
 aim has been to determine the nature and purpose of 
 philosophy, the attention will now be concentrated on 
 the demands made by philosophy on the investigator ; 
 in other words, we shall now consider the spirit and 
 method in the study of philosophy. 
 
 While this spirit and method are necessarily involved 
 in all the preceding discussions, their separate treat- 
 ment affords an opportunity for a definite statement of 
 what was all along implied, and for giving a summary 
 of the conditions essential for the solution of the prob- 
 lems presented. While this chapter is therefore in part 
 a review of the course already taken, its chief aim is to 
 help the student to become an independent philosoph- 
 ical inquirer. 
 
 Philosophy is theoretical wisdom, or the idea of wis- 
 dom traced to its ultimate principles. The study of 
 philosophy requires practical wisdom, which consists 
 in the choice of a worthy end, in identifying the spirit 
 with that choice and end, so that it becomes an embodi- 
 ment of them, and in selecting the best means for the 
 attainment of the end. For the student of philosophy, 
 practical wisdom therefore requires a clear conception 
 of philosophy itself, and a knowledge of the way to its 
 attainment, — requirements peculiarly difficult when the 
 mere comprehension of the nature of the desired object 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 347 
 
 demands such laborious investigation as philosophy. 
 If an object can be discovered only by pursuing the 
 way that leads to that object, it is not very logical 
 to ask the student to determine definitely the object 
 desired, in order that he may find the way to it. This 
 forecasting of the mind, this anticipatory and prophetic 
 element, which becomes the impulse and guide to reali- 
 zation and fulfilment, is among the most important of 
 our mental functions. A sketch is thus made by the 
 mind which it afterwards fills out ; an ideal is shad- 
 owed, and life is absorbed in the effort to make the 
 ideal itself clearer and real. Thus we define an object, 
 and then we seek the object itself with all its wealth 
 of fulness. Were the definition more than a shadow, 
 we should not be required to follow its outlines so long 
 and laboriously in order to find the substance. But 
 how important the shadow of philosophy if it leads to 
 the substance which casts it ! 
 
 The object of search is brought nearer and becomes 
 more distinct in proportion as progress is made in the 
 journey. The mountain outlined against the distant 
 horizon gives but a faint idea of the real ascent. Just 
 as the domain of science grows clearer, as conquest 
 after conquest is made, so the nature and the sphere 
 of philosophy can be understood only in the ratio of 
 progress in philosophical study. The student must 
 expect the greatest difficulties in the beginning; but 
 with the right start, he will find that every forward 
 step leads him to greater clearness and to richer pos- 
 sessions. The most extensive view can be obtained 
 only on the summit ; but every progress in the ascent 
 enlarges the view and makes the summit itself more 
 distinct. 
 
 Philosophy, then, is presented to the student simply 
 
348 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 as a problem for solution. He is requested to define 
 it sharply, and to ponder the definition until the out- 
 lines stand distinctly before his mind. But for the 
 contents of philosophy we are obliged to refer him to 
 the solution itself. 
 
 The subject-matter of philosophy may be represented 
 by concentric circles ; the outer one representing being ; 
 the next, the theory of knowledge ; the third, the theory 
 of feeling, or sesthetics ; the fourth and innermost, the 
 theory of volition, or ethics. Philosophy does not pro- 
 pose to exhaust the contents of these circles, but c-nly 
 to give the principles and their rational systems. In 
 each case philosophy goes behind the details to find the 
 first thought, the beginning, not dependent on other 
 thoughts, but itself the condition of all thinking in that 
 particular circle. A dark background, impenetrable to 
 our reason, may lie behind that basis from which all 
 our reasoning must start ; but human philosophy does 
 not demand the discovery of what is absolutely first, but 
 only what is necessarily the starting-point for human 
 thinking. If we are unable to comprehend the whole 
 circle of truth, philosophy demands that the mind pass 
 to the utmost limit of its capacities, so that it may 
 reach what for human reason is ultimate. Philosophy 
 is thus a limitation for the sake of a determination of 
 the first and last rational thought. Distinct from reli- 
 gion, and yet in many respects intimately related to it ; 
 sharply separated from the special sciences, yet giving 
 the basis and completion of all science ; related to 
 psychology as the temple to the vestibule ; related to 
 history as the rational to the phenomenal, and to life 
 as the theoretical is to the practical, — the ideal philoso- 
 phy is peculiar, with its domain clearly marked, and 
 yet in living connection with all the other realms of 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 349 
 
 thought. Philosophy can no more exist by itself than 
 we can breathe without air; and other departments are 
 no more complete without philosophy than is the gene- 
 sis of the oak without the acorn as its seed and fruit. 
 
 Philosophy, which is viewed objectively as a system 
 of ultimate rational principles, is to be made subjective, 
 or the real possession of the mind. In the effort to 
 solve this problem, the question respecting the spirit 
 required in the study of philosophy is of fundamental 
 importance. While the spirit is first considered, we 
 are well aware that it cannot be wholly separated 
 from the method. Thus dogmatism, scepticism, criti- 
 cism, eclecticism, empiricism, and idealism indicate a 
 particular method in philosophy, but also a certain 
 spirit as the source or accompaniment of the method. 
 While the one always accompanies the other, we give 
 the preference to the spirit as supreme, and as really the 
 determining factor. 
 
 An attractive view of truth regards it as a seed 
 planted in the mind as the soil, and growing according 
 to its own inherent powers and laws, into the whole 
 system of truth. This makes a truth its own spirit 
 and method, the mind merely furnishing the nourish- 
 ment required for the growth. Then a correct thought 
 deep and broad enough need but be discovered and 
 planted in order to develop itself into the whole system 
 of philosophy. The figure certainly has the merit of 
 indicating the absorption of the mind required in the 
 development of philosophic systems. But the objection 
 to it is that a process is attributed to thought which is 
 really performed by the mind itself. No thought grows 
 of itself; all the productiveness attributed to it inheres 
 in the mind. It is consequently better to change the 
 figure, and to regard the truth as an organism which 
 
350 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 has become independent of the womb, and develops 
 itself, and appropriates all that enters into contact with 
 it. This organism is the spirit itself as the embodiment 
 of a particular truth. The energy of thought is but the 
 intellectual energy of the mind itself. Without hyper- 
 bole we can say that the truth becomes spirit, and the 
 spirit truth. It is no more possible to divorce the spirit 
 from its thought, than to separate the sap from the 
 living tree. The consideration of the condition of the 
 spirit is therefore of primary importance, since its char- 
 acter and degree of attainment determine its apprehen- 
 sion of truth, beauty, and goodness, and the nature of 
 the development formed by the apprehension of them. 
 
 Intellectual development is as truly self-culture as is 
 the formation of character ; and it can never be under- 
 stood so long as we regard it as a process which takes 
 place in us, but of which we are not a part. Of every 
 one it must be said, " As he thinketh in his heart, so 
 is he." A new thought is a new mental fibre ; it both 
 gives us what we had not, and makes us what we were 
 not. The mind is not a receptacle into which thought 
 is put and held, as something distinct from it ; but an 
 organism, which in the production of a fresh thought 
 puts all its mental attainments into new relations by 
 introducing this new element, and also itself attains 
 new relations and assumes new attitudes. Whatever 
 it may be potentially or ideally, the intellect is really 
 only what it thinks ; and in the deepest sense a man 
 possesses intellectually only what he thinks. 
 
 This view of the organic union of the mind and its 
 products — instead of the mechanic one permitting a 
 total separation of the two — reveals the essentialness 
 of a true spirit in the investigation of truth. In our 
 thoughts we have not merely a manifestation of truth 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 351 
 
 or error, but also a revelation of the intellect. It is 
 not exact enough to say that in intellectual progress 
 there is a constant series of action and re-action, for 
 there is in reality only mental action ; but we can say 
 that the truth grows in the mind, and the mind grows 
 in the truth. 
 
 Since the mind and its products constitute an organ- 
 ism, all that has intellectual significance must enter 
 this organism and become part of its constitutive ele- 
 ments. There are in reality no laws for a mind except 
 so far as they are laws of that mind. Rules for a study 
 or an art are valuable in proportion as they become 
 spirit. Their aim is pedagogical. Coming first as a 
 foreign element, they are to domineer over the mind 
 until it is trained into harmony with them, and becomes 
 an embodiment of them. We learn rules of grammar 
 to forget them ; but we so completely grow them into 
 ourselves that we naturally speak correctly. The same 
 is true of logical, sesthetical, and ethical rules ; their 
 mission is accomplished when they become life and 
 spirit, act spontaneously, and require special reflection 
 if we are to become conscious of them. Genius does 
 not ignore law ; it is law become personality and spon- 
 taneity. Since its rules are so purely personal and sub- 
 jective, not foreign and external, genius may be least 
 able to explain its operations. 
 
 Rules being for discipline and for training, their sig- 
 nificance, particularly in philosophical studies, consists 
 less in what they teach than what they make us. The 
 spirit itself must be true if its impulses are to be toward 
 the truth. In a peculiar sense a man's philosophy 
 depends on himself; in the system he produces, the 
 philosopher gives expression to himself. Hence Fichte 
 said, " The philosophy which one chooses is determined 
 
352 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by the character of the man ; for a philosophical system 
 is not a dead article, it is animated by the soul of the 
 man who has it." In the case of Fichte, as well as of 
 Kant, the strong moral elements of the man are seen in 
 his philosophy. How can a philosophy be true to the 
 man, unless he himself is the soul of the system ? We 
 can seek and comprehend only that to which there is 
 an analogy in the mind; and we can produce those 
 thoughts only whose seeds are within the soul. These 
 considerations make it evident that philosophy, so often 
 treated as purely objective and as a mere abstraction, 
 can become real, concrete, only by becoming subjective ; 
 and that the subjective state, the character of the spirit, 
 will determine the objective character of the philosophy. 
 This is only an application of the law that the cause 
 must be equal to the effect. 
 
 The influence of thought on volition is universally 
 recognized, but the power exerted by the will on the 
 thoughts is not fully appreciated. Thinking contains 
 an ethical as well as a logical element ; and frequently, 
 when mistakes and errors occur, the will rather than 
 the intellect requires changing. Pestalozzi's saying 
 applies to intellect as well as to life : " If a man resolves 
 any thing firmly, he can accomplish more than he be- 
 lieves." Jacobi affirms,* that experience and history 
 had taught him, " that the action of man is less depend- 
 ent on his thinking, than his thoughts depend on his 
 conduct." We are not philosophers by nature, nor is 
 the usual training calculated to make us philosophical 
 thinkers. In order to philosophize, it is necessary to 
 infuse the energy of thought with the energy of the will. 
 Amid the ordinary interests and tendencies of men, it 
 requires a character of peculiar strength to devote the 
 
 * In a letter to Hauiann. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 353 
 
 intellect to the problems of philosophy, and to make 
 the sacrifices involved in this devotion. The Greeks 
 regarded philosophy as in a special sense a free choice, 
 as something that must be deliberately willed, and 
 purely for its own sake. He who cannot exercise this 
 rational choice, and put his whole spirit into it, has not 
 grasped the meaning of philosophizing. The necessity 
 for philosophy is in the irresistible energy of the free 
 mind. So far is it from finding its occasion in the ordi- 
 nary pursuits of life, that philosophy may even interfere 
 with many of them, regarding them unworthy of the 
 effort required. It is not accidental that it does not 
 usually appear among a people until their immediate 
 necessities are supplied, and industrial and commercial 
 interests have ceased to absorb the attention. Philos- 
 ophy is not pursued as a bread-and-butter study ; it 
 does not lead to wealth, but it gives riches their true 
 value as means, while despising them as an end; the 
 learned professions do not make it a condition of mem- 
 bership ; it is not necessary to make a man popular, but 
 rather unfits him for the usual level of popularity. 
 " No man of science ever has in view the utility of his 
 work," said Liebig ; indeed, he is too much absorbed by 
 science itself to consider any ulterior aim. The same is 
 true of the philosophic spirit. It does not ignore or 
 question the utility of its pursuit, but neither does it 
 permit this utility to distract its purely rational aim. 
 The immediate use of philosophy consists in the satis- 
 faction it affords the mind itself, and in that it constantly 
 impels the mind to become deeper, higher, and broader. 
 If what is vulgarly called "practical" robs the mind of 
 its ideals, or leads to their depreciation, philosophy 
 denounces it as a positive degradation of individuals 
 and nations. The ideals, as forecastings and prophecies 
 
354 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the mind, give freshness, inspiration, and a worthy 
 aim to the spirit, and furnish the standard by which the 
 practical should be measured. They are real, not as 
 actual attainments, but as ends to be sought ; and their 
 destruction means the death of the highest mental life. 
 Where the ideals die, pessimism flourishes. 
 
 If asked to concentrate into one term all that consti- 
 tutes the true spirit of the student of philosophy, I refer 
 to the etymology of the word, and answer : the love of 
 wisdom. Love is an affection, and cannot be translated 
 into thought ; but when wisdom is loved, the affection 
 has its source in the conviction of the desirableness of 
 wisdom, and the consciousness of its lack. Where con- 
 ceit flourishes, there is no room for philosophy. Humil- 
 ity grows with depth ; and the profoundest philosopher is 
 intellectually the humblest. Intellectual pride may lift 
 the empty head, never the full one. Few fathom self 
 enough to know how little they know. The true stu- 
 dent of philosophy soon learns that mental verdancy 
 culminates in conceit, just as the folly of fashion in 
 vanity ; and in proportion to the depth attained will he 
 appreciate the well-known saying of Newton, " I do not 
 know what I may appear to others, but to myself I seem 
 to have been only like a boy playing on the seashore, 
 and diverting myself in now and then finding a 
 smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, 
 whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered 
 before me." Only those who know not of the undis- 
 covered ocean are lost in pride over the pebble and the 
 shelL 
 
 The work of Socrates consisted largely in leading the 
 mind to examine itself with a view of becoming con- 
 scious of its needs. The knowledge of one's ignorance he 
 regarded as the essence of wisdom. Plato {Symposium) 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 355 
 
 puts into his mouth the sentiment that neither the gods 
 nor any one already wise either philosophizes or desires 
 wisdom, for one longs only for what he has not. Nor 
 do the ignorant seek wisdom, because they are satisfied 
 with their ignorance. Both the stupid and the conceited 
 are thus excluded from philosophy. Plato frequently 
 emphasizes knowledge of self as the most important 
 object of search. In his Phcedros, Socrates says that he 
 has no time to spend on the interpretation of the myth- 
 ologies, and states as the reason the fact that he does 
 not yet know himself, and so long as he is ignorant of 
 self he regards it ridiculous to investigate other objects. 
 Self-knowledge is thus made the object of supreme 
 importance. When he comes with Phsedros to a plan- 
 tain-tree, on the bank of the Ilissos, Socrates breaks 
 out in rapture over the beauty of the scenery, which is 
 strange to him. Phsedros is surprised that the scenery 
 is not familiar ; but Socrates answers that he is eager 
 to learn, but that country and trees teach him nothing, 
 while he can learn from men in the city. Without 
 depreciating other knowledge, we must emphasize, with 
 Socrates and Plato, the knowledge of self and man in 
 general, as a primary condition for the study of phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 The love of wisdom gives both the impulse and the 
 aim in philosophical inquiries. Wisdom can be found 
 only in the truth. All truths are not equally impor- 
 tant, but whatever is not true is worse than worthless. 
 Philosophy, viewed as a subjective state, is an absorbing 
 passion for the highest and the final truth. With the 
 purity of this passion no interest must be permitted to 
 interfere. However intense the passion itself, the pur- 
 suit requires singular calmness and deliberation. The 
 mind must concentrate its energies on the subject under 
 
856 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 consideration, losing itself in that, and following it 
 unhesitatingly to its legitimate conclusions. The truth 
 alone excepted, no results whatever are to be considered. 
 Philosophy wants to get at the heart of things, so as to 
 discover their source and interpret their nature ; these 
 do not conform to our views and inclinations, but we 
 must conform to them. The philosophic spirit is revo- 
 lutionary, and yet conservative, being ready to destroy 
 itself and all things else if not conformed to the truth, 
 and equally ready to sacrifice all to preserve existing 
 truth. Not seeking to make the subjective objective, 
 but the reverse, it cannot be enamoured with the arbi- 
 trary, is not controlled by the accidental, and laughs at 
 the transient fashion in opinions. It seeks the eternal, 
 and knows that nothing but truth is eternal. The 
 power of truth is the thinker's power and hope. The 
 reception given to the views of Copernicus made Gali- 
 leo hesitate to publish the results of some of his investi- 
 gations. But Kepler wrote : " Have confidence and go 
 forward, Galileo ! If I see aright, there will be few of 
 Europe's more important mathematicians who will dis- 
 sent from our view, so great is the power of truth." 
 Every student of philosophy must say with Locke : " It 
 is truth alone I seek ; and that will always be welcome 
 to me, when or from whence soever it comes." It is 
 not necessary for a man to be a philosopher ; but if he 
 wants to be one in reality, not merely in name, he must 
 be true to the truth. 
 
 Schopenhauer declared that it was not in harmony 
 with devotion to truth, for a philosopher to accept a 
 position as professor of philosophy. He affirmed that 
 in the teaching of philosophy in the university the 
 disadvantages were greater than the advantages; and 
 he spoke with contempt of the philosophy of the cathe- 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 357 
 
 dra QKathederphilosophie). He thought it unworthy 
 of a philosopher to be dependent on the appointing 
 powers, and held that the considerations of the state 
 and religion might induce him to swerve from the 
 truth ; and to accept pay for his instruction made it 
 seem as if the teacher was more intent on making the 
 truth minister to himself and family than to devote 
 himself wholly and disinterestedly to the truth. This 
 view may be an extreme ; but it must be admitted that 
 an official position as teacher of philosophy has by no 
 means always been promotive of an unbiassed and inde- 
 pendent relation to the truth. And from Descartes to 
 Hartmann, some of the most influential philosophers 
 have not been professors, — among them, besides the 
 two just named, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 
 Leibnitz, and many others, particularly English phi- 
 losophers. A discipline whose realm is the highest 
 truth can evidently be promoted by those only who 
 unreservedly consecrate themselves to the truth, re- 
 gardless of emoluments and of opprobrium ; and a 
 philosophy that is not free is not worthy of the name. 
 But if the philosopher retains his freedom, an appoint- 
 ment as teacher of philosophy may be an efficient way 
 of promoting the truth. 
 
 For the philosophic thinker, the danger of prejudice 
 consists in the fact that its influence is mainly uncon- 
 scious, working so insidiously as to make its cause the 
 synonyme of truth, and then enlisting all the energies 
 in favor of that cause. When once entertained, preju- 
 dice never rests until it becomes universal and om- 
 nipotent. The persistence of force applies fully to 
 the mind. A course deliberately chosen will in time 
 control the intellect unconsciously; it forms habits to 
 which every thing is made tributary. A single volition 
 
358 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 may be as a seed which grows through life and assimi- 
 lates to itself intellect, heart, and will. However diffi- 
 cult it may be to become conscious of the principles 
 which control us, they must be known if the pernicious 
 power of prejudice is to be destroyed. 
 
 Views transmitted from generation to generation are 
 thoughtlessly adopted and, fortified by the blind zeal 
 of prejudice, are made norms of thought and action. 
 Where heredity, history, and the dominant factors of 
 an age, usurp the place of reason, we find men thrust 
 into ruts from which they can be forced only with a 
 painful wrench. Whoever has seized the idea of phi- 
 losophy as reason in the exercise of its universal and 
 eternal functions, can hardly understand the possibility 
 of making national prejudice a factor in philosophical 
 studies.* Endowed with the universality of reason, 
 philosophy is superior to the peculiarities of ages, 
 nationalities, and schools. It is better to call it super- 
 national than international, since its principles repre- 
 sent what is above the nations, rather than what is 
 interpenetrative and common to them. What difference 
 can it make to him who is absorbed solely in the search 
 
 * This prejudice is most senseless in philosophy, yet not uncommon: 
 traces of it are, in fact, found in every land. Speaking of the disciples 
 of Rosmini and Gioberti, Barzellotti (Philosophy in Italy, Mind, 1878) 
 says: " The disciples clung to the words of their masters, and rejected 
 all innovation and all impartial study of foreign doctrines. The senti- 
 ment and the idea of ' Italianism ' in philosophy, which were certainly 
 exaggerated by Gioberti, but yet when he wrote had some justification, 
 became in some of his followers a prejudice and a pretext for narrow- 
 ness of mind and ignorance of all modern culture." " The upholders 
 of Italian doctrines erred in despising German philosophy, while they 
 did not know it; the Hegelians and Kantians erred in wishing to make 
 Italians think wholly in the manner of Germans." Professor Mahaffy 
 says, " In reviewing the theories of past thinkers, the main objects with 
 Stewart and his school were to magnify them if they were Scotch, and 
 to decry them if they were unorthodox." (Princeton Rev., 1878, July, 
 225.) Similar instances might be multiplied. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN TEE STUDY. 359 
 
 for truth, whether a system originated in Greece, Ger- 
 many, England, Scotland, or America, if only it is true? 
 The philosophic spirit scorns every effort to make truth, 
 science, philosophy, or religion, questions of nationality, 
 just because it seeks what is deep and broad as human- 
 ity. While philosophy thus transcends the temporal 
 and the local, it does not ignore the abiding and uni- 
 versal elements in them, but seeks their interpretation 
 and appropriation. A system is necessarily largely 
 influenced by the age and national peculiarities, and 
 it cannot be true to its author and his surroundings 
 unless it has a flavor of both. If the development of 
 philosophy is to be promoted among a people, the 
 growth and present condition of the nation must be 
 considered. The attainments made are the starting- 
 point for all future progress, and the soil into which 
 all imported seeds of culture must be planted. Every 
 system of philosophy is racy. Imported systems must 
 consequently be grafted on the tree of knowledge 
 already growing ; they must somehow be adapted to 
 the national life if they are to be assimilated ; or, the 
 national life, if false, must be so changed as to bring 
 it into harmony with the truth. But it is not the 
 temporal or national peculiarities which give a philo- 
 sophical system its rational excellences. Truth is 
 cosmopolitan. 
 
 Whatever the ideal of philosophy may be, every 
 actual system is, in a measure, the product of past 
 systems and of the environment. Even those which 
 laid greatest claim to absoluteness are no exception. 
 Hegel held that it is the mission of philosophy "to 
 seize the present and the real." He regarded the truly 
 real as the rational, and said, " It is the task of philoso- 
 phy to comprehend that which is; for that which is. 
 
360 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is reason. As far as the individual is concerned, he is, 
 of course, a son of his age; and philosophy likewise 
 is the translation of the age into thought. It is as foolish 
 to imagine that any philosophy transcends its present 
 world, as that an individual leaps beyond his age." * 
 While there is truth in this, every system, to be 
 worthy of attention, must be more than a reproduction 
 of past systems and of its own age : it must be an inter- 
 preter, critic, and prophet. Above all, philosophy must 
 not become the imitator of the prevailing fashion. The 
 philosopher, seeking to get from his age those elements 
 which are eternal, namely, the principles lying behind 
 phenomena and controlling them, must maintain his 
 independence, and strive to rise above the particular, 
 individual, and variable, into the realm of pure and 
 universal reason. A philosophic system is the product 
 of a free, rational thinker, under the influence of past 
 systems and his own age. Especially to philosophers 
 does the saying of the historian Ranke apply : " Great 
 men do not make their age, but neither are they made 
 by it. They are original minds, who independently 
 participate in the conflict of ideas, concentrate the 
 mightiest of them, those on which the future depends, 
 develop them, and are developed by them." 
 
 A philosopher cannot divest himself of his peculiari- 
 ties and individuality : how should they affect his phi- 
 losophy? No one can deny or transcend his nature, 
 but he can cultivate it into the truth. The principal 
 point to be decided is, whether the individual should 
 be made the test of truth, or whether the universal is 
 the law to which all that is individual must conform. 
 Individuality is the standpoint of the ego, universality 
 that of reason. Philosophy seeks the truth, not my 
 * Preface to Philosophie des Eechts. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 361 
 
 truth. History deals largely with opinions, with the 
 exceptional and the individual ; philosophy, with what 
 is universally the eternally rational. 
 
 Philosophy is destructive of credulity as well as of 
 prejudice. Whatever of Kant's system may be rejected 
 in the progress of thought, the critical spirit he intro- 
 duced will remain. The philosopher takes for granted 
 nothing which is subject to demonstration ; and if any 
 thing accepted cannot be demonstrated, he must give 
 the reason for this inability, and the reason for the 
 acceptance. In this respect he is no less rigid than 
 the mathematician. Indeed, he is in some respects 
 more rigid. While the mathematician assumes axioms, 
 the philosopher makes axioms themselves objects of 
 rational inquiry. Errors long cultivated are with great- 
 est difficulty rooted from the mind, and even after the 
 most critical investigation the truth may escape our 
 grasp. It is particularly in adopting a system or prin- 
 ciples, that the student should be on his guard.* 
 
 * Whoever would learn with what caution philosophical works 
 should be read, need but examine any thorough criticism of eminent 
 authors. The student who is in danger of undue influence from a 
 favorite author or teacher would do well to consider that ages of careful 
 testing may be required to determine a correct estimate of a system. 
 Thinkers are still intent on sifting the systems of Kant and Hegel, and 
 even the relative merits of Plato and Aristotle have not been finally 
 settled. With all their excellences, H. Spencer's works, as a system 
 of philosophy, cannot stand the tests of the criticism of the age in which 
 they appeared. On this subject the student will find the articles, begun 
 in the Contemp. Rev., December, 1877, by the late T. H. Green, valuable. 
 In the same journal, January, 1878, Jevons gives an instance of the 
 difficulty of discovering the errors of a subtle philosophical writer. 
 He states that, according to the traditional requirements of the London 
 University, he was obliged to use part of J. S. Mill's works as text- 
 books. For twenty years, he says, he made these works a study, and for 
 fourteen he used them as text-books. " Some ten years of study passed 
 before I began to detect their fundamental unsoundness. During the 
 last ten years, the conviction has gradually grown upon my mind that 
 Mill's authority is doing immense injury to the cause of philosophy and 
 
362 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In the deepest sense the philosopher seeks reality, 
 aiming constantly to get at the essence of things. Not 
 that he despises phenomena or form, but he seeks to 
 value them at their worth. The steady aim at intel- 
 lectual realities is especially demanded in an age when 
 so many delight in visions. Truth has not set its seal 
 on the soul which requires rhetoric, poetry, or fictitious 
 adornments to make the truth acceptable. It may 
 require considerable philosophic depth to distinguish 
 between the truth and its trappings, between the sub- 
 stance and the style. 
 
 Few things are more intolerable than the scholastic 
 boor, who wears his logic on his sleeve, demands a dem- 
 onstration for what belongs to natural impulse, and 
 who deadens thought, emotion, and inspiration, by tor- 
 turing them into the Procrustean bed of his syllogisms. 
 Philosophy is not to pervert nature, but to aid it in 
 realizing its ideal. The era of Wolff, when men wanted 
 every thing in lectures, sermons, books, and conversa- 
 tion, to conform to mathematical rules, is past; the 
 mechanical and artificial character of his philosophy is 
 not adapted to an age of vigorous and healthy thought. 
 Rousseau was right : education is a naturalization of 
 men, not their transformation into machines. 
 
 It would be a wrong to the student to leave on his 
 mind the impression that in the study of philosophy 
 any thing can take the place of the severest toil. Men- 
 tal power is essential, but not enough ; it must be con- 
 verted into energy. The mind must put itself wholly 
 
 good intellectual training in England." He even declares: "I under- 
 take to show that there is hardly one of his more important and peculiar 
 doctrines which he has not himself amply refuted." Many other 
 equally severe charges are made against him. Numerous other 
 examples might be given, all of which are warnings, especially to the 
 beginner, to be extremely slow and critical in adopting a system. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 363 
 
 into the subject. Whatever genius may do in art, he 
 who depends on it in philosophy will fail. All philoso- 
 phers have been toilers. The student of philosophy, 
 as well as of science, may learn a lesson from the 
 patient, steady labors of Newton. He would admit no 
 difference between himself and others, except in perse- 
 verance and vigilance. " When he was asked how he 
 made his discoveries, he answered, 4 By always thinking 
 about them ; ' and at another time he declared that if 
 he had done any thing, it was due to nothing but indus- 
 try and patient thought : ' I keep the subject of my 
 inquiry constantly before me, and wait till the first 
 dawning opens gradually, by little and little, into a full 
 and clear light.' " * 
 
 It should not be the first aim of the student to learn 
 many things, or to adopt or form a system; but to 
 think, to think correctly and profoundly. If this is 
 well learned, it makes him the master of systems ; and 
 if nothing else is gained, it will pay him for the effort 
 to penetrate the most abstruse subjects, and to solve 
 the most intricate problems. If in other studies the 
 attention is directed mainly to the acquisition of knowl- 
 edge, in philosophy the aim is depth, — the pursuit of a 
 thought to its ultimate source, and the reduction of the 
 multiplicity of phenomena to their underlying princi- 
 ples ; so that, instead of gathering new materials of 
 knowledge, the aim is rather to find the absolute expla- 
 nation of what is already found. But by this thorough 
 appropriation of what we have, the deepest and best 
 new possessions are gained. The delving process 
 reveals treasures of wisdom never to be found on the 
 surface. Just as in the chemical substances, so in intel- 
 lect, much that was thought to be simple is found to 
 
 * Whewell, II. 192. 
 
364 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be compound; what was viewed as isolated, is seen 
 to be intimately connected with other thoughts and to 
 lead to them ; what was pronounced exhausted is, by 
 renewed study, made to yield fresh seed-thoughts; 
 hidden recesses, new principles, and undiscovered terri- 
 tories are thus revealed, and new applications are made 
 possible.* The mind, thus disciplined, in the course 
 of time forms the habit of looking at things from the 
 rational point of view, and the deep, exhaustive study 
 of subjects becomes the natural bent of the intellect. 
 The spirit endowed with energy of thought, with a 
 comprehensive grasp, with a disposition to go to the 
 depths, and with the ability to descend through the in- 
 finite variety to the fundamental unity, has the elements 
 of a philosopher. The one advice to be given to the 
 student, and always to be repeated and emphasized, is 
 — Think.f 
 
 The requirements are such that, if fully appreciated, 
 they may deter many, who are eager to learn, from 
 devoting themselves to philosophy. Without comply- 
 ing with these hard conditions, much may be learned 
 from the reading of philosophic works ; but they must 
 be fully complied with if the subject itself is to be 
 truly entered and the philosophic spirit cultivated. The 
 
 * Herbart (EinleUimg, 192) says, " Every system which does not 
 wholly separate its theoretical from its practical part, has hidden 
 sources, which the author himself does not fully understand, hut which 
 must he exposed in the course of the examination." 
 
 t Schaarschmidt (Phil. Monatsh. 1877, 5), speaking of what is required 
 of him who would become a philosopher, says, "It is the activity of 
 the polymathist, one might almost say of the panmathist, which is 
 required as a preliminary. And yet the positive, so-called exact knowl- 
 edge is still the least of the requirements; for it is not knowledge which 
 constitutes the philosopher, but thinking, concentrated, thorough, 
 methodically trained thinking, to which the sum total of scientific at- 
 tainment is but a premise with which it starts in its search for the last 
 abstractions and highest ideas." 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 365 
 
 numerous efforts to popularize systems may have a 
 measure of success, but what is deepest in philosophy 
 cannot be made popular. There is no hope of success 
 for those who do not think in the best sense, except 
 that they may get a smattering of what others have 
 thought ; but their minds can more easily be filled from 
 other sources than philosophy. The study is not for 
 those who want to taste many things and digest noth- 
 ing, or who neglect solid food in order to live on 
 desserts, a process which promotes mental dyspepsia. 
 Those who want to receive their truths as happy intui- 
 tions, or imagine themselves philosophers by instinct, 
 should be sent to learn a lesson from the instinct of the 
 ant and the bee. Philosophy may be dreamt of, but is 
 never dreamt. But for the slow, patient plodder, there 
 is every encouragement : for that brilliancy, however, 
 which wants to scintillate its philosophy, there is none. 
 Where independent thought is wedded with a genius 
 for toil, the best results may be expected. A man may 
 be an orator, a poet, or an artist, who cannot be a phi- 
 losopher ; he may be a philosopher, and lack the quali- 
 ties which shine before men. Philosophy does not go 
 by leaps. Every foot of ground must be conquered and 
 earned before it can be possessed ; nothing is inherited, 
 nothing comes by lot or chance, nothing is bestowed as 
 a gift. The student of philosophy may learn a valua- 
 ble lesson from the slowness and accuracy of scientific 
 investigation. Herbart said: "Instruction in philos- 
 ophy, without exactness, makes only fantasts and fools." 
 Enthusiasm may be a help, but it creates no truth ; it is 
 valuable if it leads to depth, but an injury if it encour- 
 ages flights from solid ground into regions of revery and 
 mythology. Philosophy has no oracles, and no miracles 
 of speculation. It is the most prosaic prose, whose sole 
 
366 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 apology for existence is the fact that the mind cannot do 
 without it. 
 
 When beheld from the street, the painted windows of 
 a cathedral are all blurred ; in order to see the figures 
 distinctly, and to learn what sacred scenes are repre- 
 sented, one must enter the temple, and view them from 
 the sanctuary itself. So it is with philosophy : to see 
 and appreciate it, the temple itself must be entered. 
 Many come to the door, few pass through the vestibule ; 
 perhaps the momentary opening of the door gives a faint 
 and fleeting impression of the grandeur, and affords a 
 hasty glance at significant but uninterpreted symbols. 
 However others may hesitate, let the true student enter 
 boldly; it is his sanctuary. For the earnest thinker, 
 there is every encouragement to study philosophy. If 
 little has as yet been done that can be regarded as final, 
 so much the more remains to be accomplished. Her- 
 bart's words apply to our day as well as to his own : 
 " The truth lies before, not behind us ; and let him who 
 seeks it look forward, not backward. In his reflections, 
 let him advance as impelled by the problems presented." * 
 He will find limitations, but even their discovery is of 
 great value ; and within the limits of the mind he will 
 find more than enough to enlist his best energies in 
 philosophic pursuits. Should it be discovered at last 
 that the ultimate problems of being are unsolvable, he 
 will find even in metaphysics vast regions which the 
 mind can explore and in which new discoveries are pos- 
 sible ; while the theories of knowledge, of feeling, and 
 of volition are practically inexhaustible. There maybe 
 subjects which are not worthy of great energy ; but 
 worthy of greater effort than we can exert are those 
 problems which underlie all others, involve our deepest 
 interests, and constitute the domain of philosophy. 
 
 * Einleitung, 212. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 367 
 
 Having considered the Spirit, we now turn to the 
 Method in the study of philosophy. 
 
 This method must not be confounded with any sup- 
 posed absolute method of philosophy itself, nor with 
 the method adopted by a particular system, as eclecti- 
 cism, idealism, or the Hegelian dialectic process. It is 
 not our purpose here to determine how philosophy 
 itself must proceed, but how the mind ought to proceed 
 in order to study philosophy. The subjective method 
 of study, not the objective method of philosophy, is 
 under consideration. 
 
 The pedagogical training for philosophy is one thing, 
 the mastering of a philosophical system another, and 
 different from both is the formation of the system itself. 
 While the first is the chief aim of this volume, it can 
 accomplish its purpose only by keeping the other two 
 continually in view as the goal of the mental discipline. 
 In the process through which the student himself must 
 pass, he wants not merely to learn philosophy, but also 
 to become a philosopher. Out of his present self and 
 his surroundings, he seeks to develop himself to the ideal, 
 so that the highest prophecy embodied in his intellectual 
 being may be fulfilled. According to Hegel, what the 
 mind is implicitly (an sich), potentially, or in idea, that 
 it should strive to become really. The thinker knows 
 that reason as attributed to the human mind is an 
 abstraction, not a concrete reality. Reason, like phi- 
 losophy itself, is in a process of becoming; but it is 
 not yet. When the student objectifies philosophy, 
 abstracting it as something wholly apart from mind, 
 he recognizes it as still requiring a certain process of 
 development toward perfection. That process which 
 he ascribes to objective philosophy, must be performed 
 by his own mind in the study and the development of 
 
INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 philosophy. This subjective process is long and labo- 
 rious, and his habitual methods of intellect may have to 
 be changed. Instead of thinking around and about 
 things, he must try to enter their heart, so that he may 
 get their essence. Not by magic does he pass from the 
 surface to the interior ; he must slowly drill his way 
 into the innermost part, in order there to get a stand- 
 point so as to view the whole circumference from the 
 centre. Every description of an object from the surface, 
 or from a point between the surface and the centre, is 
 partial : it misses the centre, and all that lies between 
 the point of view and the centre. These descriptions 
 may be true so far as they go ; but their mistake begins 
 when they proclaim themselves as an exhaustion of the 
 subject. Thus there are works on noetics, metaphysics, 
 sesthetics, and ethics, which are rich in excellent sugges- 
 tions ; but the inquiries move along the shell, and there- 
 fore fail to reach the kernel, the seat and source of all life. 
 The ultimate philosophic aim is always the idea, — 
 the perfect idea, not isolated, but in a completed system. 
 In its idea an object is comprehended ; in that, and in that 
 only, we see what it is. In its most compressed form 
 the idea is a word, as " philosophy," " metaphysics ; " or 
 it is a definition. But a word is a mere point, a defini- 
 tion is a mere outline ; the developed idea is the whole 
 system in its completeness. Thus "philosophy" is a 
 word, of which we give a definition, and which stands for 
 a perfect system. This process from the empty to the 
 full, from poverty to wealth, from the compressed to 
 the expanded, is common to all ideas. We can say that 
 the term " philosophy " contains the definition and sys- 
 tem ; this is true, but they are contained in a latent form, 
 and the problem is how to make all the implied content 
 a real possession of the mind ; just as the word "spirit" 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 369 
 
 contains in nuce all that conscious personality involves, 
 but just what this really means has been the deepest 
 problem of philosophy in all ages. Indeed, there has 
 been much discussion whether this spirit exists in all 
 possible fulness as conscious personality, or is still toil- 
 ing its way up to the real of its ideal. 
 
 From this it is clear what the aim of the student 
 of philosophy must be: not to think at objects or of 
 them, but to think the objects themselves, that is, to 
 apprehend them intellectually. This he does by getting 
 into the centre, by grasping the idea. But this idea is 
 not to be seized merely as a word or definition, but as a 
 system with all its wealth of thought. In this way he 
 is to master philosophy by comprehending its idea, not 
 as a mere point or outline, but in its fullest develop- 
 ment and with the richest content. 
 
 This aim of philosophy is again emphasized here 
 because its clear apprehension is the condition for secur- 
 ing the method that leads to the desired goal. 
 
 The appreciation and rational elaboration of the pro- 
 found problems of philosophy require preparatory disci- 
 pline as well as mental maturity. The subject naturally 
 belongs to the higher classes in college or to a post- 
 graduate course. In Germany, the university is re- 
 garded as the proper place for its study. All rational 
 inquiry, the study of principles, generalizations, abstrac- 
 tions, and profound investigation of any kind, may serve 
 as a preparation ; but the best discipline for the mind 
 properly prepared is philosophy itself. In the prepara- 
 tory training, all is valuable in proportion as it teaches 
 the pupil to think for himself, to be critical, exact, 
 thorough and discriminating, and to distinguish between 
 subject and object, and between the object before the 
 mind and what it represents. 
 
370 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPUT. 
 
 The best work in philosophy requires the union of the 
 scholar and the thinker. The supreme aim is to philos- 
 ophize on the deepest and broadest basis. Multa for the 
 sake of multum, is the motto of the philosophic student ; 
 and no department of thought, no interest of humanity, 
 is to him a matter of indifference. The larger the field 
 in which he gathers his materials, and the more compre- 
 hensive his view, the more complete will be his gener- 
 alizations, and the more reliable his inductions and 
 deductions. While going back to the beginning, and 
 taking for granted nothing that needs proof, the pro- 
 gressive philosophic thinker makes what has already 
 been accomplished the starting-point for what remains 
 to be done ; in the known he seeks the thread to the 
 unknown. While philosophy is not to be studied ex- 
 clusively in its history, that history must nevertheless 
 be mastered for the sake of penetrating the various sys- 
 tems of the past, and understanding the philosophical 
 tendencies and needs of the present, thus securing the 
 basis on which thinkers must build. In that history 
 the weightiest problems of reason are presented, as well 
 as the efforts of the greatest minds to solve them. 
 The genesis of problems in history corresponds largely 
 with that in the mind of the individual ; and the genetic 
 study of philosophic thought not merely develops the 
 mind, and both, reveals and solves difficulties, but it also 
 develops philosophic thought. Memory is valuable as 
 an aid in philosophizing, but a hinderance if it becomes 
 the substitute. The philosopher is not made by learn- 
 ing, but by critically mastering systems ; not by com- 
 mitting, but by thinking and perhaps transcending the 
 thoughts of other thinkers. 
 
 Original thinking, so strongly emphasized as essential 
 for the true study of philosophy, is often but little 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 371 
 
 understood by those expected to engage in it. Perhaps 
 they think it implies that even the basis and the con- 
 tent of the thought are to be originated. They forget 
 that the mind does not create its objects of philosophic 
 contemplation out of nothing, and also that reason acts 
 according to established and unvarying laws. Not a 
 few make fancy the most active agent in what they call 
 thinking, regarding it a merit to be able to begin any- 
 where and end nowhere. Not a few systems would be 
 less brilliant, but more substantial, if their fictions were 
 banished, and only their rational thought were permitted 
 to stand. 
 
 Being subject to the most rigorous laws, original 
 thinking rejects every thing that is merely subjective. 
 Thinking is not original because peculiar to him who 
 performs it, but because he does what all who truly 
 think must do in the same way if they take up the 
 same course of thought.* The original thinker is one 
 who does independently a work which is really as uni- 
 versal as mind. If his work lacks that universal char- 
 acter (or objectivity), it may have a psychological 
 interest as a peculiarity, an eccentricity, or as a mon- 
 strosity ; but it has no claim to philosophic thought. 
 
 The thought we pronounce original must be about 
 something. Whence this material of thought? We 
 have already seen that the mind does not absolutely 
 create it ; the material must somehow be given to us, 
 or be the product of something thus given. In an 
 absolute sense, that is, without a posteriori conditions, 
 
 * There is no private property in thought. If a man can originate 
 any thing intellectually, which has significance for himself only, and 
 which cannot be communicated, he is welcome to hoard it. He has 
 found something which everybody else would have thrown away as 
 worthless. My feelings may be my own, but my thought must be 
 universal if it is to be rational. 
 
372 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 no thought is a priori; just as in an absolute sense 
 none is a posteriori. The object of original thought 
 is either found in consciousness (so full of materials 
 before philosophic reflection begins), or is given through 
 the senses, or is obtained from the thinking or investi- 
 gation or observation of others. The subjects thus 
 obtained, or found by reflecting on these materials, 
 are elaborated by thought, worked over mentally, so 
 that the mind may discover what is in them, or may 
 be inferred from them. If the mind adds any foreign 
 matter to them, it is not done by original thinking, but 
 contrary to all thought. What is original in the sense 
 of adding unwarranted elements, should be sedulously 
 avoided as the root of error. Real objects, and valid 
 thought on these objects, are the conditions of original 
 thinking in the true sense. Such thinking is solid, 
 fruitful, and abiding; and its value consists in the 
 very things which distinguish it from the processes 
 which are arbitrary, vague, unsubstantial, and wild. 
 
 It is thus evident that any real subject may be the 
 occasion of original thinking. The mind can take it 
 up in order to fathom it, so as to discover all it is, 
 intellectually considered. Original thought consists in 
 all those efforts of thinking which lead to the discovery 
 of what was before unknown to the thinker himself, 
 though it may have been known to others. A discov- 
 ery to the individual may be old in history ; we may 
 learn much that is new to us, without producing any 
 thing new. 
 
 Ordinarily the mind is left to its spontaneous oper- 
 ations, without an effort to give its thought special 
 energy or a particular direction, much less to make 
 the thinking itself an object of rational inquiry. Phi- 
 losophy checks this vagrant course, in order to throw 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 373 
 
 thought back on itself, and oblige it to give a full 
 account of itself. Even when the object is not the 
 thinking, but the content of thought (the thing thought 
 of), the question which philosophy considers is : What 
 must I think of this ? Thus in metaphysics, although 
 real existence is the object of thought, the question 
 to be answered is : What must I think of existence ? 
 What do the laws of thought require respecting it? 
 If in the experimental sciences (psychology, of course, 
 excepted), the mental processes are largely or wholly 
 ignored, while the attention is absorbed by the object ; 
 in philosophy, whatever the object, the claims of the 
 thinking subject are fully recognized. The mind knows 
 that the object is its own, and that the treatment to 
 which that object is subjected depends wholly on the 
 mental laws. 
 
 There is thus good ground for the view that philoso- 
 phy is intimately connected with psychology. For all 
 the purposes of philosophy, a knowledge of psychology 
 is of fundamental importance. Although philosophy is 
 not psychological, but rational in its method, — consid- 
 ering what must be, not giving descriptions of what 
 occurs and an account of the laws uniting phenomena 
 into a system, — psychology helps us to find the philo- 
 sophical problems. The concepts given in conscious- 
 ness, but not fully elaborated by psychological study, 
 give the materials with which philosophy begins, as 
 well as the divisions of philosophy. What must be 
 left by psychology as problems, is taken up by phi- 
 losophy for rational solution. All other subjects also 
 furnish such problems, but it is by the study of the 
 mind itself that we become most fully conscious of 
 them. 
 
 After the processes of cognition have been consid- 
 
374 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ered psychologically, we take up for philosophical con- 
 templation, first of all, the theory of knowledge. It 
 occupies the first place in the study of philosophy 
 proper, because on it, as a foundation, the entire super- 
 structure rests. Men may, indeed, think correctly with- 
 out understanding the laws of thought ; but philosophy 
 is only possible when thought is self-conscious. This 
 self-consciousness is particularly demanded when the 
 prevalent scepticism can only be met by an appeal to 
 the criteria of thought. Taking into account the con- 
 dition of philosophy and the spirit of the age, it is not 
 strange that so many emphasize this theory as the main, 
 if not the sole, problem of philosophy. To its solution 
 we must look for a firm basis and reliable method. The 
 stress placed, since Aristotle's day, on logic as propae- 
 deutic to all other studies, must be extended to the 
 whole theory of knowledge. The student who prizes 
 philosophy as rational knowledge will proceed ration- 
 ally only if he, first of all, inquires into the nature, 
 the origin, the validity, the method, and the limits of 
 this knowledge. 
 
 It is, of course, not meant that no other part of phi- 
 losophy should be taken up until all that pertains to 
 this theory has been finally settled. In that case we 
 should never get beyond the theory. As all the other 
 parts of philosophy learn from this theory, so it may 
 learn from all of them. Only by developing all depart- 
 ments and elements of knowledge, can the theory itself 
 be made complete. It is no evidence of vigorous, 
 healthy thinking, to regard knowledge itself impossible 
 until the details of the theory are settled, or to spend 
 all the time on the theory and miss the knowledge for 
 whose sake it exists. 
 
 After the theory of knowledge, it seems most logical 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 375 
 
 to take up metaphysics, both on account of the funda- 
 mental character of the thought of being, and because 
 this thought is involved in aesthetics and ethics. But 
 the inherent difficulty of the subject, and the present 
 unsettled state of metaphysical inquiry, may make it 
 expedient to leave it to the last. All the other philo- 
 sophical studies will then be a preparation for it, and 
 the mind will come to it after that thorough discipline 
 which is required in order to apprehend its problems. 
 This course is the more practicable now, because the 
 other departments of philosophy avoid, as much as 
 possible, the introduction of metaphysical questions. 
 Still the ideal course makes ethics the crown of the 
 whole ; but even if placed before metaphysics in the 
 course of study, it may be made the goal of all. Its 
 study before metaphysics does not determine its place 
 in the system, nor does it imply that ethics is to be 
 finished then ; it can afterwards be made a specialty, and 
 all other investigations tributary to its development. 
 The whole course of study in college or university is, 
 after all, only preparatory for later philosophizing. 
 From the seed then planted, the whole life is to 
 develop and reap the fruit. 
 
 The scheme then is : Psychology, Theory of Knowl- 
 edge, ^Esthetics, Ethics, Metaphysics. The applications 
 of philosophy are almost endless, and this is not the 
 place to discuss them ; their consideration must be left 
 to those who take up the specialties to which they see 
 fit to apply philosophy. Thus the jurist will prefer 
 the philosophy of law, the statesman the philosophy 
 of politics, the linguist the philosophy of language, 
 and the theologian the philosophy of religion. Just as 
 with the application of philosophy, so with the study 
 of its own departments ; one may choose this, another 
 
376 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that department, as a specialty, each according to his 
 peculiar needs. But for completeness all are neces- 
 sary. 
 
 If antiquated subjects live only in history, others 
 live both in history and in the present. Among the 
 latter we class philosophy. For this reason we cannot 
 agree with those who treat it as worthy of study in 
 its history, but not according to what it is in itself. 
 Only what is finished can be found in perfection in 
 history. 
 
 In the study of philosophy, what place shall, then, 
 be assigned to its history ? * Were there a history of 
 philosophy itself, — of the connected and progressive 
 development of philosophic thinking, of the growth of 
 the organism of rational thought, — not merely of the 
 various philosophic systems, it might serve as a most 
 valuable introduction to the study of philosophy. 
 Even when the history of philosophy means the history 
 of the successive systems, as is now the case, there are 
 advantages in placing it at the beginning of the course 
 as an introduction to philosophy itself. The thoughtful 
 student finds this history fascinating, and full of inspira- 
 tion ; and the effort to master the various systems is 
 a fine discipline for philosophizing. But there are also 
 serious disadvantages in putting it first. The student 
 is not yet prepared to comprehend the leading problems, 
 much less the systems themselves ; for this, the study 
 of philosophy proper is the only adequate preparation. 
 The mind unprepared for this history is confused by 
 the numerous perplexing themes, and lost in the laby- 
 
 * The impulse given by Hegel has led to the production of many 
 valuable histories of philosophy, and the most eminent living writers 
 on the subject have come from his school ; as Erdmann of Halle, Zeller 
 of Berlin, and Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 377 
 
 rinths of speculation.* Instead of clear conceptions, 
 a medley of indistinct notions is usually the result. 
 Some imagine that in this history they study philosophy 
 itself, and perhaps claim to understand philosophy after 
 learning a few ideas from different systems. Many 
 current views of philosophy have their source in the 
 reading of the philosophic thoughts of others, rather 
 than in the study of philosophy itself. 
 
 A method to be highly recommended is the simulta- 
 neous study of every department of philosophy, both 
 according to its essence and in the light of its history. 
 In this way the history of philosophy will be studied by 
 subjects. Where this is done, there is hope of clearness 
 and definiteness, and results both fruitful and lasting 
 may be expected. Thus in connection with the study 
 of logic its history might be considered, especially the 
 views of Aristotle and Kant, and those prevalent during 
 this century. Besides the general history of the sub- 
 ject, the views of eminent philosophers on particular 
 points should be studied when these points are under 
 consideration. By this method the history will bring 
 the subject itself into clearer light, and the study of the 
 subject will promote the understanding of the history. 
 Thus the theory of knowledge cannot be properly 
 studied unless the views of Locke, Hume, Reid, Kant, 
 and others are taken into account. The same is true 
 of metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics ; a knowledge of 
 their genesis and development essentially promotes their 
 comprehension. After the various parts of philosophy 
 have thus been studied in connection with their history, 
 
 * Hegel was certainly not inclined to make philosophy easy for stu- 
 dents; but he pronounced the history of philosophy, which Herbart and 
 Schelling recommended as propaedeutics to philosophy, too difficult for 
 that purpose. — Philosophische Propaedeutik, XVIII. 
 
378 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the student will be prepared for the study of the entire 
 history of philosophy, which can then be taken up. To 
 master a subject at the same time in the light of its 
 history, and rationally, is the true philosophical method ; 
 and with every branch of philosophy, the essential ele- 
 ments of its history should be connected. 
 
 Besides the study of the history of philosophy by 
 subjects, as a preparation for its study as a whole, the 
 reading of the principal works of eminent philosophers 
 is to be commended. Among the ancients, selections 
 may be made from Plato (Symposium, Phmdros, Repub- 
 lic) and Aristotle (particularly those on Dialectics and 
 Ethics) ; among the moderns, Locke, Spinoza (Ethics), 
 Hume (Treatise, first part, or Inquiry), Kant (Prolego- 
 mena, Kritik of Pure Reason, and Kritik of Practical 
 Reason), Hegel (Philosophy of History, Phenomenology, 
 and Logic), and Lotze are worthy of special mention 
 for this purpose. If only a few works can be read, let 
 them be taken from Plato, Aristotle, Locke, and Kant, 
 with selections from philosophers in the present century. 
 
 Hardly less important than its history is the study of 
 the present status of philosophic thought. In it will 
 be found many of the conditions and demands with 
 which the philosopher must reckon. The exact status 
 of philosophy is, however, an exceedingly difficult prob- 
 lem, particularly at a time when there is a multitude 
 of philosophical thinkers, but no dominant system of 
 philosophy. Isolated problems, conflicting tendencies, 
 a search for a reliable basis for system, criticism, eclec- 
 ticism, and all the uncertainty and mere tentativeness, 
 so common in crises, are characteristics of philosophic 
 thought in this age. The present neglect of philosophy 
 is not so significant when it is remembered that Kant 
 and Hegel also complained of this neglect in their day. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 379 
 
 The lack of unity and continuity in the philosophic 
 literature of the day is cause for greater regret. 
 
 The status of philosophy can be learned from the phil- 
 osophic literature of the day, particularly from the vari- 
 ous philosophical journals.* While the problems of 
 philosophy are always the same, peculiar circumstances 
 may make special demands for the solution of particu- 
 lar ones. The very uncertainty prevailing at present, 
 respecting the criteria and the limits of knowledge, 
 makes noetics especially valuable. The importance of 
 metaphysic, and the suspicion with which it is viewed, 
 attach peculiar interest to the question whether we can 
 really get behind phenomena to the underlying reality. 
 Theism and atheism, spiritualism and materialism, are 
 of as momentous significance now as ever. The prob- 
 lems of realism and idealism, of empiricism and ration- 
 alism, also press for solution. Perhaps the exclusivism 
 in past tendencies has made it evident that systems are 
 apt to err rather in what they deny than in what they 
 affirm, and that now the time has come for the union 
 and harmonious co-operation of tendencies formerly 
 regarded as hostile. Thus the a priori and the a poste- 
 Won elements in knowledge are both essential factors; 
 realism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism, really 
 seem to be complements to each other, rather than 
 antagonistic. The philosophic movements within a cen- 
 tury have at least proved that systems supposed to be 
 opposite may both have elements of truth. In Germany 
 there is a tendency toward English empiricism ; in Eng- 
 land and America there is a tendency toward German 
 speculation, — certainly a hint that each by itself is not 
 
 * The philosophical tendencies in Germany, since the death of Hegel, 
 are given in a work just published: Die Philosophie der Gegenwart, by 
 Dr. Moritz Brasch. 
 
380 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sufficient. A narrow and exclusive method cannot 
 meet the demands of the day. The one-sided tenden- 
 cies of particular systems in the past may have served 
 to produce a greater development of certain phases of 
 thought than would otherwise have been possible ; but 
 the development of a principle to the utmost may also 
 serve to prove that it is not comprehensive enough to 
 include and explain what was expected of it. Thus a 
 one-sided course, by exhausting itself, may prepare the 
 way for a synthesis of what was before repellant. 
 
 The synthesis necessary for that comprehensiveness 
 and unity which are so urgent a demand on philosophic 
 thought, may require a much more thorough elabora- 
 tion of particular concepts, as a preparatory stage. 
 The exhaustive treatment of particular thoughts is as 
 fruitful now as ever, and may be more impartially per- 
 formed than when a reigning system demands solutions 
 according to its own peculiar principles. 
 
 Among the multitude of problems demanding solu- 
 tion, those suggested by natural science are made espe- 
 cially prominent. Aside from materialism and evolution, 
 the question of design demands attention, also the lim- 
 its of scientific accuracy, and the reliability of thought 
 transcending the domain of science. The very tend- 
 ency to specialization in science also suggests the need 
 of the unity of the various sciences, as well as the 
 ultimate unity of all thought. Pessimism, agnosticism, 
 and the great interests of faith and hope, also present 
 numerous important problems. From all that has been 
 said in the various cha£>ters, it is evident that the criti- 
 cal demands of the age are such as to place the empha- 
 sis in philosophic thought on laying the basis rather 
 than on rearing superstructures. 
 
 The philosophical problems have become so numerous 
 
SPIEIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 381 
 
 in our day as actually to be bewildering, and the stu- 
 dent may be puzzled to decide which to take up for 
 study. Where so many seem to be urgent, the tempta- 
 tion may be strong to make the study comprehensive 
 rather than thorough. The two methods do not ex- 
 . elude each other, however ; there may be a comprehen- 
 siveness which is a preparation for thoroughness, and 
 thoroughness in a limited sphere may be the road to 
 comprehensiveness that is thorough throughout. 
 
 Those who make a specialty of philosophy will of 
 course regard their studies at college or in the univer- 
 sity as merely laying the foundation on which they 
 hope to build in after-life. Even they may find it 
 advisable to concentrate their efforts on a particular 
 department after completing the general study of phi- 
 losophy. Others, who cannot make a specialty of it, 
 may yet want to master some one of its divisions. 
 Which to choose will depend mainly on capacity, taste, 
 aim, and calling. Psychology, as an introduction to 
 the whole, cannot be omitted, whatever part may be 
 selected for special investigation. Of philosophy proper, 
 the theory of knowledge and ethics are the most essen- 
 tial. Were the theory of the emotions fully developed, 
 it might take its place beside (or between) these, as 
 almost or quite as important. The subject of aesthetics 
 has special significance for artists, critics, literary men, 
 and public speakers. The theologian, besides ethics, 
 will find metaphysics indispensable. 
 
 Thus far the attention has been directed chiefly to 
 the study of philosophical systems, and to the training 
 of the mind in philosophizing. A philosopher may add 
 no new contributions to the stock of knowledge, but 
 he must, as we have seen, be an independent thinker. 
 With the laws of thought as his sole guide, he cannot 
 
382 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be the slave of any system, not even of his own, except 
 so far as slavery means absolute subjection to the truth. 
 
 The exalted aim of the student to become an inde- 
 pendent thinker is worthy of highest commendation. 
 He does not merely want to learn what has been said 
 about a subject, but what is actually in it. For the 
 method necessary to realize this aim of the original, 
 independent thinker, we must refer to the full discus- 
 sion of the theory of knowledge, but preliminary hints 
 may here be given. 
 
 The notion that philosophy has a method peculiar to 
 itself, is false. The laws of the mind are always the 
 same, but the objects to which they apply differ. Thus 
 there are objects of sense, and objects of pure thinking. 
 Our reasoning respecting objects is of course condi- 
 tioned by their nature. Thus mathematical reasoning 
 is valid only for mathematical objects. But we are 
 tempted to postulate in the mind itself such divisions 
 as pertain only to the nature of the objects contem- 
 plated. The same laws of thought are seen in differ- 
 ent lights, according to the difference of the objects. 
 The process of reasoning in all thinking is that of 
 induction and deduction, the one never wholly separated 
 from the other. While in its reasoning, in its analyti- 
 cal and synthetic judgments, philosophy does not differ 
 from science, the aim and objects (phenomena) of sci- 
 ence attach it "more closely to observation, and the 
 results of its reasoning can consequently be more 
 readily tested by experience. Science thus has means 
 of verification which philosophy cannot have. 
 
 The fact that its conclusions cannot be verified by 
 experience, makes it the more necessary that the reason- 
 ing in philosophy should be infallible. Its method is 
 absolutely reliable ; if, then, its start is equally so, there 
 
SPIBIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 383 
 
 is no reason for questioning the results legitimately 
 obtained. The result of scientific investigation would 
 require no verification if it were not for the liability to 
 error in the process itself. The same is true of philoso- 
 phy. With a firm basis and a reliable method, there 
 is a possibility of error only when the method itself is 
 not strictly followed. 
 
 In philosophizing, the first aim should consequently 
 be to secure a starting-point which is absolutely reliable. 
 Without such a foundation, the validity of the entire 
 superstructure will be doubtful ; or, if the basis is false, 
 the system which rests upon it must be so likewise. 
 Therefore both in examining other systems, and in 
 independent philosophizing and constructing new ones, 
 the beginning or seed of all must be subjected to the 
 most thorough scrutiny. 
 
 Modern philosophy began with an effort to find a 
 basis whose validity cannot be questioned. If here 
 scepticism is not rooted out, it can never be done. 
 Without stopping to consider the value of the results 
 of Descartes' investigations on this point, it is enough 
 for our purpose that the one thing which cannot be 
 questioned, even if all others may, is the fact given in 
 consciousness. That there are such facts ; that I am 
 conscious of something, or that there is a consciousness 
 of something, — is beyond all doubt. What these facts 
 mean, is of course a different question. 
 
 With this consciousness we start in philosophy, as 
 well as in science. But while the latter asks, How am 
 I to explain the thing experienced ? philosophy asks, 
 The experience being given, what do the laws of mind 
 (reason) require ? Science attends more to the external 
 conditions of experience, philosophy more to the inter- 
 nal ; science attempts to explain phenomena by discov- 
 
384 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ering their laws, philosophy seeks to get at their essence 
 by finding what the laws of mind must infer from the 
 phenomena. To science the phenomena themselves are 
 the principal subject of consideration, being the centre 
 around which all the investigation moves ; to philosophy 
 they are but the occasion for deeper inquiry, the start 
 for the speculative work of reason. 
 
 Philosophy thus, like science, beginning with experi- 
 ence, with the given and the real, which it seeks to 
 interpret, has a perfectly reliable basis. Its proper 
 sphere is the real ; only so far as related to the real 
 does it consider the imaginary and the possible. Begin- 
 ning with what is given, philosophy carries its induc- 
 tions as far as thought can go. The phenomena given 
 to philosophy are of course not those pertaining merely 
 to the external world ; they include also the subjective 
 elements in thought, feeling, and volition, all of which 
 are made objects of rational inquiry. Any germinal 
 thought legitimately obtained may be made the nucleus 
 of a system ; but the comprehensiveness of the germinal 
 power is also the limit of the system. 
 
 A critical study of philosophical systems proves that 
 many of them rest on mere assumptions. Their char- 
 acter as assumptions is not changed by the fact that 
 their authors regarded them as intuitions or self-evident 
 truths. Particularly respecting what is deepest, most 
 mysterious, and of" greatest concern, has an effort been 
 made to secure axioms or some kind of intellectual 
 vision. The repeated failure of attempts to found phi- 
 losophy on such a basis has made thinkers suspicious of 
 all systems constructed on a priori principles. No one 
 doubts that truths are more valuable isolated than when 
 spuriously connected so as to form a false system. 
 There is, however, great fascination in the idea of 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 385 
 
 developing all philosophy from a single principle ; and, 
 indeed, it is the only ideal method for completeness of 
 system. The aim in such cases is to make philosophy as 
 much as possible like mathematics. Having adopted its 
 principle, it calls in the aid of axioms and definitions to 
 evolve the system. The most perfect example is found 
 in Spinoza's Ethics. A system thus constructed is, of 
 course, valid for those only who accept the premises and 
 definitions ; and by successfully attacking these, the 
 whole superstructure falls. In view of the imperfections 
 and limitations of philosophy, the application of this 
 ideal method has thus far been found more valuable for 
 attaining unity, or at least system, than absolutely 
 reliable conclusions.* 
 
 After the principles have been found, this method is 
 comparatively easy. Thus the germinal notion may be 
 that of substance, monads, the ego, the subject-object, the 
 unity of thought and being, the unconscious, or some- 
 thing else ; all that is required being the unfolding of 
 the seed-thought. Any fruitful thought, if comprehen- 
 sive enough, can be made the basis of a system ; great 
 ingenuity may be displayed in developing the principle 
 adopted, and the logic can be rigid as in mathematics : 
 
 * Instead of banishing the a priori method from philosophy, as Kant 
 aimed to do, it flourished most vigorously among his immediate suc- 
 cessors. Thus Reinhold laid stress on the establishment of one supreme 
 principle from which the whole of philosophy is to be evolved. Fichte 
 eagerly seized this idea, and wrote to him that he looked on him (Rein- 
 hold) as having introduced among men the conviction that all inquiry 
 must proceed from a single fundamental principle. And then the search 
 for this principle began. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel sought to find 
 the idea which contains the explanation of the universe. Absolute 
 knowledge, and the knowledge of the absolute, have an irresistible 
 attraction for the eager student; and it is not surprising that the prom- 
 ises made by these men, especially the last, aroused great hopes and 
 enthusiasm. The culmination of all philosophy was supposed to have 
 been reached, and the key which unlocks the mysteries of the universe 
 to have been found. 
 
386 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 yet as an interpretation of reality the whole may be 
 worthless, explaining not what is, but only what would 
 be if the assumptions were true. The essential ques- 
 tions in determining the beginning are not sufficiently 
 weighed : Is the basis true ? Is it adequate ? Is it 
 fruitful ? Systems depending on definitions are in dan- 
 ger of being purely verbal, explanatory of words but of 
 nothing real, thus defeating the very aim of philosophy. 
 The starting-point of a system being assumed, instead 
 of being found as something given, or instead of being 
 demonstrated, it may become necessary to construct the 
 system for the sake of proving the assumptions. Thus 
 if an unconscious something is assumed as the reality 
 behind phenomena, it may require the philosophy of 
 the unconscious to justify the assumption of the uncon- 
 scious, or to prove that the assumption is inadequate. 
 It must not, however, be supposed that in philosophy 
 any more than in science we can dispense with hypoth- 
 eses and theories. Much as philosophy may accomplish, 
 it never can, by any induction, reach the absolute begin- 
 ning of all things. Thus far all efforts have failed to 
 ascend, step by step, from the infinite variety of phe- 
 nomena to the ultimate unity of all being. In our 
 efforts to do so, we soon become painfully conscious of 
 our limitations. Not satisfied with isolated truths, we 
 seek completed systems ; in order to construct these, 
 we need principles which cannot be discovered by 
 induction. But if theories become a necessity, there 
 must be some valid basis for them, depending on reality 
 and reason, not on imagination. The mind finds in the 
 phenomena themselves hints of what must be behind 
 them; but they are mere hints. All the suggestions 
 and hints given must be weighed in forming the theo- 
 ries ; and after being formed, every possible test must 
 
SPIB1T AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 387 
 
 be applied to them. Thus, a theory must be consistent ; 
 it must accomplish all that is required of it ; and it 
 must not come in conflict with any known truth. And 
 after all these conditions are complied with, it must be 
 regarded as what it really is ; namely, a mere theory. 
 Other theories may also comply with these conditions, 
 and yet they cannot all be true. 
 
 By claiming for its statements only what they are 
 worth, philosophy will gain in modesty, but also in 
 reliability. Whatever is demonstrated must be held 
 as immovably fixed; many things may be true which 
 cannot be mathematically demonstrated, but we must 
 not hesitate to treat assumptions and theories according 
 to what they really are. It may require some sacrifice 
 to take this position with reference to a pet theory, 
 but it is the only safe and honest course. Theories are 
 to be held as continually subject to verification ; but 
 whether or not held as such by their advocates, suc- 
 ceeding systems will not fail to test them according to 
 their worth. If under these severe conditions a final 
 system is impossible, philosophy has the consolation at 
 least of sharing the same fate with all subjects of human 
 inquiry: there will always be a contrast between the 
 real and the ideal. 
 
 It is respecting the ultimate of all thought, that the- 
 ories are most prevalent. This x unknown to philoso- 
 phy, however apprehended by faith, is too far removed 
 to be an object of observation ; nor can we ever hope 
 to extend the chain of our logic to that x. Hence the 
 resort to theory. The theories proposed can, perhaps, 
 neither be demonstrated as true, nor proved false ; yet 
 their origin and grounds, their consistency with them- 
 selves, and their application to reality, are valuable 
 tests; and the history of philosophy consists largely 
 
388 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the critical tests to which the various theories have 
 been subjected in the progress of thought. 
 
 The mind cannot rest in a void. If unable to pene- 
 trate to the essence of the reality behind phenomena, 
 and to the ultimate basis and source of the universe, 
 it may be obliged to resort to postulates or hypotheses 
 as a practical rest for thought. Plato's realm, in which 
 ideas have a metaphysical existence, may be fiction ; 
 but even fiction may contain truth, and even a myth 
 may be but the clothing of a precious philosophic 
 thought. The various functions attributed by theistic 
 thinkers to God may not be mathematically demonstra- 
 ble as realities ; but there must be a First Cause of that 
 which reveals itself as not primitive but derived ; and 
 is there not a deep philosophy, to say nothing of theol- 
 ogy, in the very effort of the mind to find a Being in 
 whom all truth and beauty and goodness inhere, and 
 from whom finite minds derive their fragmentary con- 
 ceptions of them? Less, perhaps, in the final results 
 attained does the mind reveal its true character, than 
 in its strivings and tendencies ; and even in its aspira- 
 tions and postulates the philosopher beholds reflections 
 of the otherwise hidden depths of the soul. 
 
 These considerations justify the conclusion that phi- 
 losophy is ideal, and that the real systems must be 
 viewed as aspirations and essays, not as realizations. 
 Nevertheless, systems which are not final may have 
 valuable truths and needed aspects of truth; and the 
 fundamental principle adopted may be true, even if 
 not demonstrable. The value of philosophic thought 
 by no means consists solely, or even chiefly, in the 
 completed systems produced ; it may do the best ser- 
 vice in removing existing errors, and in establishing 
 individual truths and principles. Even the fragments 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 389 
 
 of philosophy may be very precious, though the master- 
 builder is not found to form of them a symmetrical 
 structure. In philosophy the preconceived plan of the 
 system does not determine how the materials must be 
 shaped and fitted into it, but the character of the 
 system is determined by the nature of the materials. 
 If heretofore the architect has come first with his plan, 
 and has made that the law for the selection and adapta- 
 tion of the building material, we may henceforth be 
 obliged to reverse the process, and make the careful 
 gathering and shaping of the stones for the building 
 the condition for the plan and structure of the edifice 
 itself. The philosophic builder must be a quarrier and 
 a stone-cutter before he becomes an architect. 
 
 It is frequently found that the principles adopted by 
 philosophers are true, but that there is a mistake in 
 their application ; they are taken as absolute and final, 
 when they are relative and limited. May not spiritual- 
 ism and materialism both have spheres in which they 
 are true, while their application outside of these is 
 false ? There is no doubt a harmony and unity under- 
 lying the differences between matter and spirit ; but so 
 long as the unity in the duality is not discovered, we 
 must apply each to its sphere and limit it strictly to 
 that. However stringently the mind may demand mon- 
 ism, no .monism brought about by violence can receive 
 philosophical sanction. According to an innate impulse 
 of our minds, we must aim at the final explanation of 
 all things by discovering the ultimate principles ; but 
 we must distinguish between the aim and the actual 
 attainments. That this distinction must never be lost 
 sight of, is a lesson taught both by the present status 
 and by the whole history of philosophy. 
 
 Another evil to be deprecated results from a desire 
 
390 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to propose something new, and to develop original 
 systems. Such a spirit may become a passion, in which 
 case it is the philosopher's evil genius. The sole aim 
 in philosophy is truth, no matter who its author, or 
 whether it be old or new ; and whoever cannot sacrifice 
 the itching for novelty, and the vanity of ambition, to 
 this aim, lacks the requisites of a philosopher. Lotze 
 justly remarks that in our day philosophy is less in 
 need of originality than of exactness. A signal advan- 
 tage in the natural sciences has been their continuous 
 development. The results of past investigations have 
 been made the beginning of new progressive move- 
 ments. Scientists have worked with and for one an- 
 other, and have thus co-operated in promoting organic 
 growth in science. But in philosophy the spirit of 
 individualism has largely prevailed. Instead of seek- 
 ing to promote continuous development, philosophers 
 seem rather to have been intent on the destruction of 
 the labors of their predecessors, and on the construction 
 of a peculiar system of their own. The destruction of 
 systems was the more easy, because their foundation 
 was not solid, or because they were badly constructed. 
 Healthy growth and lasting results cannot be expected 
 unless the conservation of old truth is regarded as 
 sacred a duty as the discovery of new truth.* 
 
 * The evil here deprecated has been deeply felt by philosophers, and 
 repeated efforts have been made to secure more co-operation among 
 them, and more regular and steady progress in philosophy. Trendelen- 
 burg, preface to Logische Untersuchungen, says, " Philosophy cannot re- 
 gain its former power until it acquires permanence; and it cannot gain 
 permanence until it grows in the same way as the other sciences, 
 namely, until it develops continuously, not beginning and ending in 
 every head, but historically taking up the problems and unfolding 
 them." Various methods have been proposed to secure this continuity, 
 such as conventions of philosophers to discuss philosophical questions, 
 and philosophical associations. But the end can only be attained if 
 philosophic minds themselves resolve to do this work. A philosopher 
 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 391 
 
 The student is, however, in greater danger of an evil 
 the opposite of this ; namely, the hasty adoption of the 
 system of another as the embodiment of all truth. The 
 authority which in philosophy belongs only to the truth 
 is frequently transferred to an able and admired teacher. 
 Intellectual receptivity and independent thinking, deep 
 appreciation and a critical spirit, should be united in 
 healthy proportion. The true teacher always makes 
 his system and instruction subordinate to the truth. 
 The very vigor and independence of a philosopher may 
 serve to make mere disciples, as well as profound and 
 original thinkers. The schools of Kant and Hegel have 
 shown that the disciples of eminent philosophers may 
 be blind in proportion to their enthusiasm, and that a 
 philosopher's cloak may conceal an imitator and a fana- 
 tic. Although in his lectures Kant continually warned 
 his hearers against this spirit, he could not suppress it. 
 The wise student regards all books and instructions as 
 means of mental discipline, as well as for the communi- 
 cation of truth ; and he will find it consistent with the 
 deepest respect for teachers, to subject all that is taught 
 to the severest tests of reason. Absolute dependence 
 on the truth is the only true independence. 
 
 The numerous conflicting systems, which have arisen 
 from the fact that there was no continuous develop- 
 ment, have added to the suspicion that philosophy is 
 caprice rather than reason. If the scepticism of the 
 day is not as deep as that of Greece, it at least doubts 
 the ability of philosophy to discover the highest truth. 
 The consequent criticism to which the systems have 
 been subjected is cause for congratulation on the part 
 
 need not produce a new system, but he must make truth the sole aim 
 of his search, and recognize it according to its real worth wherever 
 found. 
 
392 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of those who have confidence in the power of truth to 
 maintain itself. The most thorough diagnosis may be 
 required for the transition from disease to health. The 
 sceptical spirit and critical method, connected with a 
 conservative tendency, have given rise to eclecticism. 
 This refuses to accept any system of the past, but claims 
 that there is truth in all, and hence selects from all.* 
 But if eclecticism is to be of philosophical value, it must 
 have fixed principles to determine the method of its 
 selections ; in other words, there must be a philosophy 
 behind eclecticism, if it is to lay claim to rational pro- 
 cedure. The ability to select the truth presupposes a 
 standard by which it can be tested ; this standard, what- 
 ever it may be, is itself the nucleus of a philosophical 
 system. How far eclecticism is from being final, is 
 evident from the fact that it may be based on either 
 rationalism or empiricism. A man's philosophy is not 
 determined by his eclecticism, but his eclecticism by 
 his philosophy. Nevertheless, it has an important mis- 
 sion. It proceeds on the supposition that all systems 
 have truth, but that none has it all ; and it is an admis- 
 
 * It has flourished most in France, under the leadership of Victor 
 Cousin. It naturally promoted the study of the history of philosophy. 
 Bigot (Eclecticism in France, Mind, 1877, 367) says, " Its fundamental 
 principle was this: In philosophy every thing has been said; the age 
 of systems is past; all we have to do is to question history, to take what 
 is true out of each system, and from all these elements to form a peren- 
 nis philosophia. ... It was a doctrine without originality, and standing 
 absolutely aloof from the discoveries of science." Cousin's eclecticism 
 is brilliant rather than deep, eloquent rather than definite or conse- 
 qiient, inspiring rather than convincing, and rhetorical rather than 
 philosophical. Instead of seeking an immovable basis, it skips from 
 one system to another, taking what pleases its fancy, but ignoring the 
 rest. 
 
 In all countries, eclecticism as a method rather than a system plays 
 a prominent part. The prominence given to the history of philosophy 
 is evidence of this. Even if no system is regarded satisfactory, scholars 
 want to get what they can from the various systems. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 393 
 
 sion that we are not yet prepared to construct the final 
 system. It is a characteristic of the philosophic spirit, 
 that it critically examines the various systems to dis- 
 cover their truths and reject their errors. But this is 
 only a preparatory process ; it trains the mind, and fur- 
 nishes it with materials for reflection. The mind goes 
 beyond eclecticism as soon as it inquires why it seeks, 
 and how it knows, the truth. This inquiry leads to the 
 root, while eclecticism is but the fruit. 
 
 The criticism so much insisted on here is by no means 
 the end in philosophical training ; it is but a method 
 for attaining something better. Mere criticism is not 
 production ; and it has been observed that critical 
 minds are not usually productive ones. Filing is not 
 a process of growing. When the critical habit is intent 
 only on the discovery of error, what wonder if the 
 truth itself is missed? The discernment of error is 
 important on account of the hidden truth discovered in 
 the process. The value of the scavenger consists in the 
 cleanliness he promotes. Criticism for the truth's sake, 
 and as promotive of productiveness, is therefore the 
 aim. But even if criticism is only a handmaid, its work 
 in a philosophic Babel may be of supreme importance 
 when under the guidance of a wise mistress. 
 
 As the start in philosophy is most difficult, the stu- 
 dent may need something more specific respecting the 
 beginning. It has been stated that we are to rise from 
 psychology, science, and other departments, to philoso- 
 phy ; but how ? Take any supposed knowledge, and 
 test it to the utmost ; the tests applied to it will involve 
 the theory of knowledge. Get what these tests imply, 
 or the ultimate basis on which they rest, and you will 
 have the theory itself. Each division of philosophy is 
 like the side of a pyramid: thus, if we begin with 
 
394 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 any concept of knowledge, and trace it far enough, we 
 come to the apex, the principles of knowledge. The 
 same is true of being. All that is, must contain all 
 the principles of being; and these are the objects of 
 search in metaphysics. Concrete objects are infinite ; 
 but follow the concept gained by studying any one to 
 its utmost limits, and it will be found at every step 
 to tend toward these principles. We find that this is 
 also the law for aesthetics and ethics. The endless 
 variety is unified in the principles. Thus every object 
 termed sesthetical must contain all that is required to 
 constitute aesthetic quality; and it is this element, and 
 the system founded on it, which constitute aesthetics. 
 Neither can any moral act be traced to its ultimate 
 principle without attaining the primary thought of 
 ethics. By thus taking any concept, and tracing it back 
 far enough, we arrive at the principles of that division 
 of philosophy to which it belongs. This shows how any 
 thought pursued far enough must lead to philosophy. 
 Indeed, we shall not go astray if we view philosophy as 
 an exhaustive elaboration of concepts ; the aim being 
 to discover principles which cannot be exhausted any 
 more, but which embrace, principiantly, the universe of 
 thought, of being, of feeling, and of conduct. 
 
 Since the rational laws, like reason itself, are unvary- 
 ing, the method pursued in philosophy must always be 
 the same in principle ; but there is abundant room for 
 variety in details. There may be various processes in 
 elaborating the concepts, but their ultimate results must 
 harmonize. The details in the method may be left to 
 each one who has the qualification for philosophical 
 studies ; they may be largely determined by the pecu- 
 liarity of the subject under consideration, and by the 
 specific aim. While numerous avenues may be chosen, 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 395 
 
 they must all lead to principiant truth. After the right 
 beginning, the intellect is probably in greatest danger 
 of taking as exhausted what is not exhausted, and in 
 accepting as certain what has not been demonstrated. 
 Not that the demonstrable is the limit of the true, nor 
 philosophy the only sphere of human interest and 
 human confidence ; but we must distinguish between 
 knowledge and faith, between hypothesis and theory on 
 the one hand, and demonstration on the other. The 
 true method in philosophy is that in which reason 
 beholds itself. 
 
 For training the mind into this harmony with the 
 truth, or to be true to itself, which is one of the prin- 
 cipal aims of this Introduction, the following summary 
 may be helpful : — 
 
 1. Exert the mind to the utmost limit of its powers. 
 In order to get the full length of a cable, it must be 
 stretched as far as possible without breaking. Constant 
 mental strain tends to weakness and final destruction ; 
 but frequently to tax the healthy mind severely, but 
 without overstraining, is a condition for promoting vig- 
 orous health. For this discipline the deepest problems 
 should be selected. Continuous exercise of the mind on 
 them will train it for the most successful philosophical 
 effort. Only in dealing profoundly with deep problems 
 can the mind itself become profound. 
 
 2. Learn by practice to rivet the attention on a sub- 
 ject until you are through with it, or voluntarily aban- 
 don it. Nothing is more destructive of philosophical 
 thinking than to skip from subject to subject, touching 
 each one tenderly. In such a course it is a lawless 
 fancy, not reason, which holds the reins. The object 
 chosen for reflection should be held up in every light, 
 and viewed from every standpoint, by itself and in its 
 
396 INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 relations, and all pertinent questions respecting it should 
 be asked. A twofold power of abstraction is necessary ; 
 namely, the subject must be abstracted (distinguished) 
 from all others, and the mind must abstract its atten- 
 tion from every thing else. This twofold power of 
 abstraction is the condition for greatness of mind. 
 Mental superiority consists largely in power of concen- 
 tration. The mind must be its own lord ; it must be 
 master of its thoughts, and must rigorously resist the 
 inclinations and whims which make them wander. 
 Distraction is the deadly foe of profundity. 
 
 3. The most important subjects should be chosen, — 
 subjects whose interest is such as to enlist all the ener- 
 gies. Among profound themes, the mind should choose 
 the most valuable, so that it may become supremely 
 strong, and supremely fruitful in its strength. 
 
 4. Get clear and distinct ideas, — clear, because what 
 they are in themselves is apprehended; and distinct, 
 because they stand out boldly, sharply marked off from 
 all their surroundings. Explain the compound by its 
 simple elements, and relations by denning the related. 
 Distinguish the word from the thought, the thought 
 from the object for which it stands. Whatever severity 
 it may require, the mind must give a strict account of 
 itself. It will attain philosophic clearness in proportion 
 as it heeds the ancient maxim : Know thyself. 
 
 5. Fathom what is given, and, by fathoming, develop 
 it. Then classify and systematize. Avoid heteroge- 
 neity by discovering the unity in multiplicity. Philoso- 
 phizing consists in unravelling the thought involved in 
 thoughts. Not in the exclusivism of scepticism or dog- 
 matism or criticism or eclecticism or intuitionalism or 
 empiricism, but in the rational element in all of them, 
 is the true method of philosophy formed. 
 
SPIRIT AND METHOD IN THE STUDY. 397 
 
 6. Many of the problems of philosophy are thrust 
 upon it by science. In the co-operation of philosophy 
 and science, not in their antagonism, is there hope for 
 depth, comprehensiveness, exactness, and completeness. 
 Between the facts of nature and of psychology, and 
 the speculations of philosophy, there must be the rela- 
 tion of foundation and superstructure. Phenomena are 
 materials from which concepts are formed, but phe- 
 nomena are not the law of philosophy. It speculates, 
 in the etymological sense of looking about, beholding 
 and investigating ; but the speculation of philosophy is 
 the work of reason, not the play of fancy. Owing to 
 the objects of philosophic contemplation, it may be 
 misleading to speak of scientific exactness in philo- 
 sophic thought ; but the method which leads to the 
 philosophical investigation of what is, as in metaphys- 
 ics, and of what ought to be, as in noetics, aesthetics, 
 and ethics, is as rigid as in science. The reason, and 
 the general laws of thinking, with which the scientist 
 operates, are also those of the philosopher. Not its 
 method, but its principiant aim, namely to unify all 
 thought in the ultimate principle or principles, and to 
 form of all thought a system which, like an organism, 
 consists of articulated members, — a system as rich in 
 variety as it is perfect in unity, — constitutes the diffi- 
 culty of philosophic inquiry. 
 
 EEFLECTIONS. 
 
 Importance of the right Spirit in a study. Why 
 study Philosophy ? Theoretical value. Practical value. 
 Intellectual craving. Love of Truth. Enthusiasm in 
 its pursuit. Power of prejudice. Mental power and 
 energy. Penetrative, exhaustive thought. Abstraction. 
 How does Philosophy begin ? Why do all thoughts 
 
398 INTBODUCTION TO STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ultimately lead to Philosophy ? How does Philosophy 
 unify Knowledge? Principiant Knowledge. How do 
 Psychology, Science, and History furnish the problems 
 of Philosophy ? Order in the study of the divisions of 
 Philosophy. How study the History of Philosophy? 
 Philosophical works and systems worthy of special atten- 
 tion. Relation of the student to teachers and systems. 
 Original thought. Independent thinking. Relation of 
 the Philosopher to his age and nation. What is neces- 
 sary thought, and why is it final ? Truth and error in 
 eclecticism. Define Speculation. Healthy Philosophy 
 and baseless speculation. The learner, the scholar, and 
 the thinker. Continuity of philosophical thought. 
 Division of labor in Philosophy. Fruitful and empty 
 concepts. Depth and narrowness, breadth and shallow- 
 ness. Union of breadth and depth in philosophy. 
 Concentration of thought. Scientific and philosophic 
 definiteness and exactness. Summary of requirements 
 necessary for attaining the right Spirit and proper 
 Method in the study of Philosophy. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 1. In an article on Philosophy at Cambridge, in Mind, 
 1876, Mr. Sedgwick says, " The use of the general term 
 4 philosophy ' to mean physics, which Continental writers 
 have noticed as an English peculiarity, has been especially 
 at home in Cambridge since the time of Newton. . . . Phi- 
 losophy without qualification was generally understood to 
 mean ' natural philosophy.' That which is now usually un- 
 derstood by philosophy was, therefore, not at all included. 
 In 1779 Dr. Jebb speaks of the transition (in the examina- 
 tion in the university) ' from the elements of mathematics to 
 the four branches of philosophy, viz., mechanics, hydro- 
 statics, apparent astronomy, and optics. . . . The modera- 
 tor, having closed the philosophical examination, sometimes 
 asks questions in Locke's Essay on the Human Understand- 
 ing, Butler's Analogy, or Clarke's Attributes.'' " 
 
 In the introduction to the History of the Inductive Sciences, 
 Whewell frequently uses " philosophical " for " scientific." 
 He also speaks of the ' ; experimental philosophy of the 
 Arabians." Yet the title of his work on the Philosophy 
 of the Inductive Sciences implies that he wants to distin- 
 guish between the two terms. Other writers also desire to 
 make a distinction ; but in spite of their efforts, the old 
 habit of confounding the terms gets the better of them. 
 Thus Sir Alexander Grant, in the article "Aristotle," in 
 the Ency. Brit, (ninth edition), refers to the different ele- 
 ments of Greek thought, and pronounces u the one purely 
 
400 APPENDIX. 
 
 philosophical, the other scientific. ' ' Other expressions also 
 indicate that he recognizes the difference. But, in the same 
 article, he takes " natural philosophy " in the usual English 
 sense, and speaks of "a modern physical philosopher." 
 The English literature of the day abounds in similar exam- 
 ples. 
 
 Hegel ridiculed the looseness with which the English 
 employ the words " philosophy " and " philosophical. "He 
 sa} T s that they term thermometers, barometers, and simi- 
 lar instruments philosophical, whereas nothing but thinking 
 should be regarded as the instrument of philosophy. He 
 also quotes the title of a pamphlet, " The Art of Preserving 
 the Hair on Philosophical Principles." That confusion of 
 the terms which Hegel regarded as a peculiarity of the Eng- 
 lish was, however, formerly common on the Continent as well 
 as in England. 
 
 2. The prevalent view of philosophy in the leading sys- 
 tems of Germany emphasizes the rational in distinction from 
 the empirical. As purely rational, philosophy is theoretical 
 as distinct from the practical, and speculative (the reason 
 beholding all objects in its own light) as distinct from 
 observation. As transcending experience, it is transcen- 
 dental. It consequently deals with concepts (ideas, no- 
 tions), not with percepts. Kant defines philosophy as 
 rational knowledge by means of concepts ( Vernuvfterkennt- 
 nisse aus Begriffen), and regards the following as its primary 
 problems : What can I know ? What ought I to do ? What 
 dare I hope ? What is man ? Hegel pronounces philosophy 
 the science of reason comprehending itself {die Wissenschaft 
 der sich selbst begreifenden Vemunft) . Herbart views it as 
 an elaboration of the concepts {die Bearbeitung der Begriffe) . 
 Struempell : Einleitung in die Philosophies 19-22. Fichte 
 wanted the whole of philosophy to be a rational develop- 
 ment of a single idea, and Schelling claimed that philosophy 
 must construct even the real world according to concepts or 
 ideas of reason. In a recent work on Philosophie als Be- 
 
APPENDIX. 401 
 
 griffswissenschaft, G. Biedermann says, "Philosophy is, and 
 always was, a science of concepts." 
 
 3. However much we may dissent from the contents of 
 this book, we must admit that in it Kant gives valuable hints 
 respecting the province of reason in religion. The purely 
 rational elements are, of course, legitimate subjects for phil- 
 osophical inquiry. If the elements are only partly rational, 
 then they belong to philosophy only so far as rational. If 
 a philosophical system claims that all the contents of religion 
 must be rational, it fails to distinguish between knowledge 
 and faith, between speculation and history, and between the 
 facts of experience and rational inferences. Much of the 
 confusion of philosophical speculation respecting religion 
 arises from the failure to distinguish between the exact 
 sphere of each. I cannot believe what is in direct conflict 
 with reason ; but I can, and may even be obliged to, believe 
 much which I cannot raise from faith into knowledge, and 
 which, consequently, I cannot subject to purely philosophical 
 or rational tests. In religion the emotions have a right to 
 be heard ; and it is important for philosophy, as well as for 
 religion, to determine the significance of their voice. Emer- 
 son truly says, "The affections are the wings by which the 
 intellect launches on the void and is borne across it. Great 
 love is the inventor and expander of the frozen powers, the 
 feathers frozen to our sides. It was the conviction of Plato. 
 of Van Helmont, of Pascal, of Swedenborg, that piet}^ is an 
 essential condition of science, that great thoughts come from 
 the heart." 
 
 4. Those who treat religion with levity are justly chargea- 
 ble with a crime against human nature itself, to say nothing 
 of a higher Being. A system which ignores what has affected 
 humanity most deeply, and involves man's highest interests, 
 cannot even be regarded as a serious inquiry into man's 
 nature, and is surely neither a deep nor a broad philosophy. 
 To treat God, the soul, sin, and immortality, as if they were 
 
402 APPENDIX, 
 
 trifles and unworthy of regard, proves a man wholly unfit for 
 philosophic thought. We must not, however, confound with 
 the trifler the man who has thought profoundly on these sub- 
 jects, and come to conclusions different from ours. Ear- 
 nest thought is always worthy of respect, regardless of its 
 consequences, and may demand the deepest research to con- 
 firm or refute its conclusions. But the frivolous spirit should 
 be as mercilessly expelled from the fraternity of philosophers, 
 as a traitor from the assembly of patriots. 
 
 5. "The hypothesis that there is a Creator, at once all- 
 powerful and all-benevolent, is pressed, as it must seem to 
 every candid investigator, with difficulties verging closely 
 upon logical contradiction. The existence of the smallest 
 amount of sin and evil would seem to show that he is either 
 not perfectly benevolent, or not all-powerful. No one can 
 have lived long without experiencing sorrowful events of 
 which the significance is inexplicable. But if we cannot 
 succeed in avoiding contradiction in our notions of element- 
 ary geometry, can we expect that the ultimate purposes of 
 existence shall present themselves to us with perfect clear- 
 ness ? I can see nothing to forbid the notion that in a higher 
 state of intelligence much that is now obscure may become 
 clear. We perpetually find ourselves in the position of finite 
 minds attempting infinite problems ; and can we be sure that 
 where we see contradiction, an infinite intelligence might not 
 discover perfect logical harmony?" — Jevons, Principles of 
 Science, 3d ed. 736. 
 
 6. With his merciless criticism, Kant, just because so 
 rigid, denied the ability of philosophy to determine a priori 
 that revelation and miracles are impossible. If any one 
 claimed that they were impossible, he himself offered to 
 show the fallacy of his reasoning. He wanted the rational, 
 therefore he opposed the narrow dogmatism of philosophy 
 as well as of religion. See his book on Religion within 
 the Limits of Pure Reason. The dogmatic spirit is gener- 
 
APPENDIX. 403 
 
 ally found to rest on assumptions which are the very points 
 in dispute. If we despise bigotry in religion, let us not 
 deem it less despicable when it is dubbed "philosophical " or 
 "scientific." Jevons {Principles of Science, 736) says, 
 4 ' There are scientific men who assert that the interposition 
 of Providence is impossible, and prayer an absurdity, be- 
 cause the laws of nature are proved to be invariable. Infer- 
 ences are drawn, not so much from particular sciences as 
 from the logical nature of science itself, to negative the 
 impulses and hopes of men. Now, I may state that my own 
 studies in logic lead me to call in question such negative 
 inferences. Laws of nature are uniformities observed to 
 exist in the action of certain material agents ; but it is logic- 
 ally impossible to show that all other agents must behave 
 as they do." Men are apt to take their prepossessions for 
 demonstrations. In speaking of God as acting on nature, 
 W. B. Carpenter (Contemp. Rev., vol. 27, 281) sa3 r s, "I 
 deem it presumptuous to deny that there might be occasions 
 which in His wisdom may require such departure. I am not 
 conscious of any such scientific ' prepossession ' against 
 miracles as would prevent me from accepting them as facts 
 if trustworthy evidence of their reality could be adduced." 
 See also Lotze, Grundzilge der Religionsphilosophie, 60-63. 
 
 7. At the close of his volume on the Principles of Science, 
 Jevons says, " Now, among the most unquestionable rules 
 of scientific method is that first law that whatever phenom- 
 enon is, is. We must ignore no existence whatever ; we 
 may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin, 
 but, if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of 
 explanation. If, then, there is to be competition for sci- 
 entific recognition, the world without us must yield to the 
 undoubted existence of the spirit within. Our own hopes 
 and wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phe- 
 nomena within the sphere of consciousness. If men do act, 
 feel, and live as if they were not merely the brief products 
 of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the instruments of a 
 
404 APPENDIX. 
 
 far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phenomena 
 and pass over these? We investigate the instincts of the 
 ant and the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are 
 led by an inscrutable agency to work towards a distant pur- 
 pose. Let us be faithful to our scientific method, and inves- 
 tigate also those instincts of the human mind by which man 
 is led to work as if the approval of a higher Being were the 
 aim of life. ,;> 
 
 8. That Bacon was far from giving a specific and com- 
 plete scientific method, is admitted in England as well as in 
 Germany. Thus we read in Jevons's Principles of Sci- 
 ence, 506, "Bacon's method, so far as we can gather the 
 meaning of the main portions of his writings, would corre- 
 spond to the process of empirically collecting facts, and ex- 
 haustively classifying them. . . . The value of this method 
 may be estimated historically by the fact that it has not been 
 followed by any of the great masters of science. Whether 
 we look at Galileo who preceded Bacon, to Gilbert his con- 
 temporary, or to Newton and Descartes, Leibnitz and Huy- 
 ghens, his successors, we find that discovery was achieved by 
 the opposite method to that advocated b}' Bacon. Through- 
 out Newton's works, as I shall show, we find deductive rea- 
 soning wholly predominant ; and experiments are employed, 
 as they should be, to confirm or refute hypothetical anticipa- 
 tions of nature." 
 
 The right beginning is so important to students, that the 
 principles here advocated cannot be too strongly emphasized, 
 particularly at a time when so many expect success by ignor- 
 ing them. The mere collector and classifier of facts must 
 be content with the position of a journeyman to the thinker, 
 instead of attaining the heights of science. The leaders in 
 science are, and ever must be, the thinkers, — those who 
 esteem facts sufficiently to regard them worthy of pro- 
 foundest thought. I add another quotation from Whewell : 
 " Invention, acuteness, and connection of thought are ne- 
 cessary, on the one hand, for the progress of philosophic 
 
APPENDIX. 405 
 
 knowledge ; on the other hand, the precise and steady appli- 
 cation of these faculties to facts well known and clearly con- 
 ceived. . . . The facts, the impressions on the senses on 
 which the first successful attempts at physical knowledge pro- 
 ceeded, were as well known long before the time when they 
 were thus turned to account, as at that period. The motions 
 of the stars, and the effects of weights, were familiar to man 
 before the rise of the Greek astronomy and mechanics : but 
 the ' divine mind ' was still absent ; the act of thought had 
 not been exerted, by which these facts were bound together 
 under the form of laws and principles. And even at this 
 day, the tribes of uncivilized and half-civilized man over the 
 whole face of the earth, have before their eyes a vast body 
 of facts, of exactly the same nature as those with which 
 Europe has built the stately fabric of her physical philoso- 
 phy ; but, in almost every other part of the earth, the pro- 
 cess of the intellect by which these facts become science, is 
 unknown. The scientific faculty does not work. The scat- 
 tered stones are there, but the builder's hand is wanting.'' 
 
 9. Those who imagine that reason is liable to err, but that 
 knowledge obtained through sensation is absolutely reliable, 
 agree neither with philosophers nor with the leading scien- 
 tists. The history of science shows that observation is 
 very apt to make mistakes ; and what is termed the scien- 
 tific method is intended to prevent these mistakes, as well as 
 to make the observation as full as possible. Reason and 
 sense must co-operate, but the supremacy of the former is 
 unquestioned ; " reason acting as interpreter as well as judge, 
 while the senses are merely the witnesses, who may be more 
 or less untrustworthy and incompetent, but are nevertheless 
 of inconceivable value to us, because they are our only 
 available ones." — Tait, 347. 
 
 10. Whewell says, " Man is not a practical creature 
 merely ; he has within him a speculative tendency, a pleasure 
 in the contemplation of ideal relations, a love of knowledge 
 
406 APPENDIX. 
 
 as knowledge. It is the speculative tendency which brings 
 to light the difference of common notions and scientific ideas. 
 . . . The mind analyzes such notions, reasons upon them, 
 combines and connects them ; for it feels assured that intel- 
 lectual things ought to be able to bear such handling. Even 
 practical knowledge, we see clearly, is not possible without 
 the use of reason ; and the speculative reason is only the 
 reason satisfying itself of its own consistency.' ' 
 
 Zoellner, in the strange volume Ueber die Natur des 
 Cometen, 51, says, " In the present state of natural science, 
 the need of speculation is so deeply felt that the English, a 
 people now almost exclusively devoted to induction, cannot 
 resist the temptation to speculate even on mathematico- 
 physical hypotheses." Sometimes in reading certain scien- 
 tific works we wonder whether the fancy is not aroused to 
 assert itself by the very rigors of science, so luxuriantly 
 does it flourish in those works. There is no end to inter- 
 esting illustrations of this, but they are too evident to the 
 thoughtful reader to require special notice. 
 
 11. Helmholtz, 363, says, "During the first half of the 
 present century we had an Alexander von Humboldt, who 
 was able to scan the scientific knowledge of his time in its 
 details, and to bring it within one vast generalization. At 
 the present juncture, it is obviously very doubtful whether 
 this task could be accomplished in a similar way, even by a 
 mind with gifts so peculiarly suited for the purpose as 
 Humboldt's was, and if all his time and work were devoted 
 to the purpose." " 
 
 Professor Roscoe (address before the British Association, 
 1884) pronounces the progress of organic chemistry in the 
 last twenty years " so vast, that it is already impossible for 
 one individual, even though he devote his whole time and 
 energies to the task, to master all the details, or make him- 
 self at home with the increasing mass of new facts which 
 the busy workers in this field are daily bringing forth." 
 The president, Lord Rayleigh, at the same meeting referred 
 
APPENDIX. 407 
 
 to mechanics, electricity, heat, optics, acoustics, astronomy, 
 and meteorology, and said, "Any one of these may well 
 occupy the lifelong attention of a man of science ; and to be 
 thoroughly conversant with all of them is more than can be 
 expected of any one individual, and is probably incompati- 
 ble with the devotion of much time and energy to the actual 
 advancement of knowledge." 
 
 12. Professor Zoellner (p. ix.) declares that he has come 
 to the conclusion "that the majority of the representatives 
 of the exact sciences in our day lack a clear knowledge of 
 the first principles of the theory of knowledge." It became 
 the habit to gather mere facts, and those who gathered them 
 were unable to use them in drawing conclusions from them. 
 "Yes, it even came to this, that the most modest effort to 
 raise a part of the gathered facts, by means of inductive 
 generalization, to a law or a principle, was branded by 
 specialists as savoring of philosophical speculation." He 
 holds, that, with all the mass of materials gathered by obser- 
 vation, our age is behind that of Newton in the conscious 
 application of logical inductive principles. These facts have 
 been so keenly felt by eminent scientists, that they have 
 found it incumbent on them to connect with their scientific 
 lectures, instruction on the laws of reasoning, and hints on 
 the theory of knowledge. In 1874 Wundt said, " How one 
 would have been astonished twenty 3-ears ago, to have dis- 
 covered, in a work purely physical, an excursus on the prob- 
 lem of knowledge ! Or how would it have been thought 
 possible for a teacher of physics to have felt the need of 
 giving his pupils a special lecture on the logical principles 
 of his science?" (Wundt, Aufgabe der Philosophie in der 
 Gegenivart, 5.) The fact that attention is now paid to these 
 problems is regarded by Wundt as evidence that scientists 
 are beginning to appreciate the need of a nearer approach 
 to philosophy. 
 
 13. Wundt, Aufgabe, 19, says, " The science of our day 
 strives to obtain an harmonious view of the world, and has 
 
408 APPENDIX. 
 
 already gathered many stones for the structure. But the 
 requirements of the special sciences are not met by any 
 of the existing systems, for they lack that circumspect use of 
 scientific experience which the special sciences, and particu- 
 larly the natural sciences, have a right to demand according 
 to their present degree of development." That which the 
 special sciences demand but cannot do, he regards as lying 
 within the province of philosophy. Everywhere in the nat- 
 ural sciences he sees philosophical problems proposed, which 
 accounts for the revival of interest in philosophy on the 
 part of scientists. "The interest in philosophy has again 
 been revived in the more general spheres of the scientific 
 world, in which for a considerable time it was almost wholly 
 neglected." Paulsen says, "The impulse to seek ultimate 
 knowledge is the soul of all inquiry, even in the special 
 sciences." 
 
 14. My study of Comte left the impression of breadth 
 without depth and thoroughness and earnestness. There is 
 a lack of sharp distinctions, of critical acumen, and of pene- 
 tration to the ultimate consequences of the processes of 
 thought. The most essential points are often treated super- 
 ficially, and the disposition made of them shows that the real 
 problems involved are not appreciated. Instead of regard- 
 ing Comte as one of the main pillars of science, he has more 
 properly been classed with the ancient sophists. All this 
 can be admitted without depreciating his merits, especially 
 in sociology ; his works have been valuable as a ferment. I 
 find my view of Comte confirmed by Huxley (Lay Sermons, 
 "The Scientific Aspect of Positivism"). Comte's works 
 had been recommended to him as a mine of wisdom ; but he 
 says, "I found the veins of ore few and far between, and 
 the rock so apt to run to mud, that one incurred the risk of 
 being intellectually smothered in the working. . . . That 
 part of M. Comte's writings which deals with the philosophy 
 of physical science appeared to me to possess singularly 
 little value, and to show that he had but the most superficial 
 
APPENDIX. 409 
 
 and merely second-hand knowledge of most branches of what 
 is usually understood by science." 
 
 15. Reuschle, Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft, 28, 
 gives some interesting illustrations how the extremes of 
 speculation fifty years ago promoted the opposite extreme 
 of empiricism. The journals on natural science, as a rule, 
 published only empirical articles. Thus J. R. Mayer's 
 article on The Powers of Inanimate Nature was rejected 
 by one of the most prominent of these journals, because of 
 its speculation. Yet that paper, which afterwards appeared 
 in Liebig's Annals of Chemistry, contained the first pub- 
 lished information of the mechanical theory of heat, one of 
 the greatest discoveries of the nineteenth century. " Mayer 
 was led to his discovery of the mechanical equivalent of 
 heat, by means of speculative considerations." Reuschle 
 mentions as particularly prominent in connecting philosophy 
 with natural science, the names of Helmholtz, Zoellner, 
 Du Bois-Reymond, Hering, Darwin, Wallace, Faraday, 
 Fechner, Liebig, and Haeckel. The list might be greatly 
 increased by eminent names from America, England, France, 
 and Germany. 
 
 16. The quotation is from Mind, 1876, 5. How little 
 agreement there is among scientists, is evident, among other 
 things, from the controversies occasioned by the address of 
 Du Bois-Reymond on TJie Limits of Natural Science. The 
 disputes connected with evolution and Darwinism are so 
 well known that they need no special mention. "When we 
 come to questions pertaining to experience and necessary 
 truth, there is any thing but agreement among scientists. 
 The fact is, few of them are at home in philosophical ques- 
 tions. Some agree with Wundt, who says (Aufgabe), 
 " However high the natural science of the day places experi- 
 ence, not a few physicists agree that in our knowledge of 
 nature certain a priori elements are actively concerned, 
 among which is found especially the principle of causality." 
 
410 APPENDIX. 
 
 Others agree with Jevons (738): "I demur to the assump- 
 tion that there is any necessary truth even in such funda- 
 mental laws of nature as the indestructibility of matter, the 
 conservation of energy, or the laws of motion." Can agree- 
 ment be expected among scientists so long as there is no 
 agreement on the principles ? And if scientists cannot agree 
 respecting the philosophical principles on which all their in- 
 vestigations depend, can they blame philosophers for their 
 disagreement ? 
 
 17. The fundamental problems in Hume's philosophy 
 were discussed by the author in an address on Grundprobleme 
 in Hume, before the Philosophical Society of Berlin, and 
 published by that society (Philosophische vortraege: R. 
 Strieker, Halle). 
 
 Professor Adamson, in Ency. Brit., article " Hume," refer- 
 ring to the influence of Locke and Hume in determining the 
 course of English philosophy, says, " It was left for Hume 
 to approach the theory of knowledge with full consciousness 
 from the psychological point of view, and to work out the 
 final consequences of that view, so far as cognition is con- 
 cerned. The terms which he employs are not those which 
 we should now employ ; but the declaration, in the introduc- 
 tion to the Treatise, that the science of human nature must 
 be treated according to the experimental method, is, in fact, 
 equivalent to the statement of the principle implied in 
 Locke's Essay, that the problems of psychology and of the 
 theory of knowledge are identical. And this view is the 
 characteristic of what we may call the English school of 
 philosophy." Mr. Sedgwick {Mind, 1876, 228) also holds 
 that English thinkers, with few exceptions (Berkeley and 
 Coleridge), are psychologists, not philosophers. They take 
 it for granted that there is a world external to the mind, 
 hence they do not enter into a critical examination of the 
 existence of an external world. "All our philosophical writ- 
 ers are dominated by the notion of a separation between 
 consciousness and its objects, and approach philosophical 
 
APPENDIX. 411 
 
 questions with the notion of settling what we can know of 
 objects, with what certainty we can know it, and what our 
 wisest course of action is in consequence. But this is to 
 adopt the distinction between the mind and its organism, and 
 the world external to the mind, as an ultimate one. Our 
 English writers are thus psychologists in the above-explained 
 sense of the term, and not philosophers in the strict sense." 
 
 18. Although there is no agreement among thinkers 
 respecting the exact nature of psychology, it is generally 
 admitted that it should be taken wholly out of metaphysics. 
 Mansel holds that psychology inquires, " what are the acutal 
 phenomena of the several acts and states of the human mind, 
 and the actual laws or conditions on which they depend." 
 Sedgwick (Mind, 1876, 223) claims that " the main purpose 
 of psychology is to investigate the laws by which different 
 states of consciousness either co-exist or follow one 
 another." A clear distinction between consciousness and 
 its contents is made by Hodgson (Mind, 1884, 70) : " Psy- 
 chology has nothing to do with consciousness qud content, 
 or with the relations of its parts as content, in which aspect 
 it is the mirror or subjective side of the universe of things. 
 That is the domain of philosophy. The business of psychol- 
 ogy is with sentient beings, witb the classification and exam- 
 ination of their faculties, the genesis of the various modes 
 of their sentience and intelligence, and generally the real 
 actions and relations between them and their environment." 
 Similar views prevail to some extent in Germany. Steinthal 
 declares, " Psychology is altogether an experimental science, 
 and its aim cannot extend further than to determine the 
 conditions under which by experience a certain result may 
 be expected. Further than this natural science also does 
 not extend, and every step farther in the direction of causa- 
 tion or teleology belongs to metaphysics and the philosophy 
 of religion." Benno Erdmann says, "The general, formal 
 science of mind, that is, the science of the laws of the 
 psychical processes of development, is psychology." 
 
412 APPENDIX. 
 
 Other views of psychology also prevail. Thus Ueberweg 
 defines it as u the science of the nature and natural laws of 
 the human mind." Spencer makes his psychology in part 
 what others have termed a theory of knowledge ; that is, a 
 theory of the relation existing between sensation and the 
 object producing it, or between thought and its external ob- 
 ject. (Psychology, I. 132, 133.) Volkmann (Grundriss der 
 Psychologies 3) defines psychology as " aiming to describe the 
 several activities of the soul, to interpret their laws, and to 
 throw light on the nature of the soul." Without making psy- 
 chology itself metaphysical, it is but natural that its results 
 should be used for a better understanding of the soul itself. 
 Hoffding, the Danish psychologist, pronounces psychology 
 the doctrine of the soul, or the doctrine of that which thinks, 
 feels, and wills, in distinction from physics, which treats of 
 what moves in and fills space. Just as in physics the begin- 
 ning is not made with determining the essence of matter, so 
 in psychology the nature of the soul is not the starting-point. 
 He treats the subject as purely empirical, and wants facts to 
 be carefully distinguished from theories. Bain declares that 
 "the only account of mind strictly admissible in scientific 
 ps} T chology consists in specifying three properties or func- 
 tions, — feeling, will or volition, and thought or intellect, — 
 through which all our experience, as well objective as 
 subjective, is built up. This positive enumeration is what 
 must stand for a definition." (Mental and Moral Science, 2.) 
 Sully (Outlines of Psychology, 1) says, "What mind is in 
 itself as a substance, is a question that lies outside psychol- 
 ogy, and belongs to philosophy. As a science, psychology 
 is concerned only with the phenomena of mind, with mental 
 states, psychical facts, or whatever else we choose to call 
 them. Bowne (Introduction to Psychological Theory, 1) 
 says, "Psychology deals with mental facts and processes. 
 It aims to describe and classify those facts and processes, to 
 discover and state their laws, and to form some theory 
 concerning their origin and cause." 
 
APPENDIX. 413 
 
 19. Utterances similar to those given in the text might be 
 quoted from numerous scientific authorities. In his address 
 before the British Association, the president, Professor All- 
 mann, said, "Between thought and the plrysical phenomena 
 of matter there is not only no analogy, but no conceivable 
 analogy. . . . The chasm between unconscious life and 
 thought is deep and impassable, and no transitional phe- 
 nomena can be found by which, as a bridge, we may span 
 it over." I shall add a quotation from Romanes, a Darwin- 
 ist : " And here I may as well at once give it as my opinion 
 that, of however much service the theory of materialism 
 may be made up to a certain point, it can never be accepted 
 by any competent mind as a final explanation of the facts 
 with which it has to deal. Unquestionable as its use may 
 be as a fundamental hypothesis in physiology and medicine, 
 it is wholly inadequate as an hypothesis in philosophy." In 
 an address on Descartes, Professor Huxley also admits the 
 inadequacy of materialism to account for mental phenomena. 
 In Germany, popular scientists like Buechner have popular- 
 ized materialism ; but among the deeper scientists they 
 have no standing, and they cannot claim to speak in the 
 name of science. The leading physiologists admit that 
 matter does not explain the facts of mind. 
 
 20. T. M. Lindsay (Mind, 1877, 481) says that the phi- 
 losopher loses much if "he attempts to confine his philo- 
 sophical observations either to the working of his own mind, 
 or to an examination of the writings of previous or contem- 
 porary thinkers. It is his duty to measure the pulse of 
 human thought, to note its movements, its expressions, to 
 understand its nature, and to describe it. His task is 
 to reduce thought and its movements to scientific formulae. 
 But if he isolates the problem, if he examines mind only by 
 the introspective method, if he measures its movements in 
 some narrow technical fashion, if he overlooks the upheav- 
 als of mind in art, poetry, and science, or its crystallization 
 in political and ecclesiastical institutions, he has wantonly 
 
414 APPENDIX. 
 
 and arbitrarily limited the sphere of his observation, and his 
 attempt must be abortive. . . . The professional metaphysi- 
 cian who keeps within merely technical limits is liable to 
 make a caricature, not the living reproduction of thought." 
 This applies especially to the psychologist, whose views 
 should be broad as well as deep, comprehensive as well as 
 thorough. He must aim to give an account of the operations 
 of mind, not merely of a mind. 
 
 21. " Even if it explains the form of thought, logic leaves 
 unanswered another fundamental question of rational self- 
 criticism, namely, whether and how far the content of con- 
 sciousness corresponds with reality ; that is, the question 
 respecting the possibility and validity of knowledge. For 
 this another subject is necessary, namely, the Theory of 
 Knowledge. . . . It is the first task of this theory to explain 
 how we happen to refer the content of our consciousness, 
 which is produced by us, and which we therefore recognize 
 as ours, to something which we are not, so as to be able to 
 speak of knowing and comprehending a reality different from 
 ourselves." (Schaarschmidt in Philos. Monatsh., 1878, 7.) 
 Benno Erdmann holds that it is the aim of this theory to 
 determine the relation of the object to our knowledge of it ; 
 " to give the laws of the relation of knowledge to things." 
 Ulrici held that the theory is to determine whether by cor- 
 rect thinking we attain a knowledge of reality. There 
 might be correct thinking, even if there were no external 
 world. 
 
 22. Intuitionalism has been used in various senses ; but 
 the disputes respecting it are on the ground and validity 
 rather than on the fact of intuitions. On the use of the 
 word, H. Calderwood (Mind, 1876, 201) says, "Intuition is 
 a direct beholding of an object or a truth. It is immedi- 
 ate knowledge of the thing itself. It stands in contrast with 
 knowledge of one thing through means of another, as in 
 reasoning ; and also in contrast with admission of real 
 
APPENDIX. 415 
 
 existence without personal observation of the thing, as in 
 belief. It is direct vision. . . . Intuition, then, is percep- 
 tion in contrast with comparison or judgment, though the 
 term has been applied to the notion obtained by simple com- 
 parison. It is a single and direct act in contrast with a men- 
 tal process." Applying the doctrine of intuitions to morals, 
 he says, "Let me begin with a concise statement of the 
 intuitional theory of moral distinctions. Self-evident laws 
 of conduct afford the only rational basis for distinguishing 
 the moral qualities of actions ; and self-evident moral laws 
 are intuitively known by men, that is, directly recognized by 
 the reason. Or, to throw it into another form, moral laws 
 are applied by all men, and are recognized as essentially 
 true and authoritative, though their validity has not been 
 determined by personal induction, nor established by expe- 
 rience of past ages, nor by the consensus of opinion among 
 the more intelligent and civilized nations, but is self-evident 
 to the reason." Dr. M'Cosh {Princeton Review, Novem- 
 ber, 1878, 805) says of the " marks and tests of our intui- 
 tions : " "Their primary and essential character is not 
 necessity, as Leibnitz held, nor necessity and universality, 
 as Kant maintained ; but self-evidence. Thej^ look immedi- 
 ately on things, and contain their evidence within them- 
 selves. Being so, they become necessary, that is, have a 
 necessity of conviction, which is the secondary test ; and 
 universal, that is, entertained by all men, which is their terti- 
 ary corroboration." The essential points are the reality, the 
 reason, and consequent authority, of their " self-evidence." 
 One man may reject what another pronounces " self-evident 
 to the reason." How, then, shall the dispute be decided? 
 
 23. Whately says, " Logic is entirely conversant about 
 language," which is true so far as language is the instrument 
 used in reasoning. De Morgan says, " Formal logic deals 
 with names, and not with either the ideas or things to which 
 these names belong." " Names are exclusively the objects 
 of formal logic." Mill claims that logic has to do with 
 
416 APPENDIX. 
 
 facts or things themselves, rather than with our ideas about 
 them. Jevons says, "We may therefore say that logic 
 treats ultimately of thoughts and things, and immediately of 
 the signs which stand for them." Venn says, " Every one, 
 it is to be presumed, will admit that a proposition is a state- 
 ment in words of a judgment about things." I should say, 
 no proposition ; thus making the sense the very opposite. 
 A proposition is always a statement in words of a judgment 
 about concepts. Herbert Spencer's peculiar view of logic, 
 as distinct from the process of reasoning, is found in his 
 Psychology, II. 87. These conflicting views respecting the 
 very nature of logic and its subject-matter will show the 
 student how much is yet required to bring harmony and unity 
 into this study. In spite of the great attention devoted to 
 the subject, its sphere and fundamental principles are not 
 even agreed upon. 
 
 24. In Mind, 1883, 18, the editor states that the sense 
 of metaphysics best justified historically is " ontology or 
 theory of being." While plrysics is concerned with "the 
 being of things as they appear," " metaphysic, as going 
 beyond physic, has then to do with the being of things as 
 they are, or with their being as the ground of their appear- 
 ing." Speaking of transcendental metaphysics, J. S. Mill 
 {Logic, first edit. I. 9) says, "To this science appertain 
 the great and much-debated questions of the existence of 
 matter ; of the existence of spirit, and the distinction between 
 it and matter ; of the reality of time and space, as things 
 without the mind," and distinguishable from the objects which 
 are said to exist in them." Unfortunately, later English 
 writers have used the term so vaguely, or have made it so 
 general, that it can hardly be claimed to represent a definite 
 sphere of inquiry. There are definitions in which scarce a 
 trace of the historic use of the word is found. Professor 
 Bain (Cont. Rev., 29, 928) says, " By metaphysical study, 
 or metaphysics, I mean — what seems intended by the desig- 
 nation in its current employment at present — the circle of 
 
APPENDIX. 417 
 
 the mental or subjective sciences. The central department 
 of the field is Psychology ; and the adjunct to psychology is 
 logic, which has its foundation partly in psychology, but still 
 more in the sciences altogether, whose procedure it gathers 
 up and formulates. The outlying and dependent branches 
 are, the narrow metaphysics or ontology, ethics, sociology, 
 together with art or aesthetics. There are other applied 
 sciences of the department, as education and philology." 
 Another writer (C. E. Appleton, Cont. Rev., vol. 28, 925) 
 makes the " collective ego " the subject of metaphysics. 
 "This collective ego, this best self, this element of common 
 consciousness in man as a member of society, standing 
 behind and operating through the ordinary individual con- 
 sciousness, is precisely, and from first to last, and nothing 
 else than, the subject-matter of metaphysic as it has been 
 understood since Kant. Metaphysic is the science conver- 
 sant with the collective consciousness of man as a member 
 of society." 
 
 25. This view, particularly prominent in Vischer's Aes- 
 thetic, is by no means confined to the Germans, but is gen- 
 erally accepted by those who make beauty more than the 
 agreeable and mere sentience. Thus Cousin in his Lectures 
 on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good (Wight's transla- 
 tion, 149) , says, " Form cannot be simply a form : it must be 
 the form of something. Physical beauty is, then, the sign 
 of an internal beauty, which is spiritual and moral beauty ; 
 and this is the foundation, the principle, the unity of the 
 beautiful." He quotes Reid's Essay on Taste, in which 
 the Scotch philosopher also argues "that sensible beauty is 
 only the image of moral beauty." Cousin repeatedly states 
 the same thought. Thus he says, "The foundation of the 
 beautiful is the idea ; what makes art is before all the reali- 
 zation of the idea, and not the imitation of such or such a 
 particular form" (158). " Every work of art that does not 
 express an idea, signifies nothing ; in addressing itself to 
 such or such a sense, it must penetrate to the mind, to the 
 
418 APPENDIX. 
 
 soul, and bear thither a thought, a sentiment, capable of 
 touching or elevating it" (171). " Genius is a ready and 
 sure perception of the right proportion in which the ideal 
 and the natural form and thought ought to be united. This 
 union is the perfection of art." He also says, " that all 
 arts are such only so far as they express the idea concealed 
 under the form, and are addressed to the soul through the 
 senses" (178). The idea or ideal, as the essential element 
 in beauty, dates back to the philosophy of Plato. 
 
 26. Ideals, as we have seen, are purely mental products, 
 though in their formation the mind receives important help 
 from existing objects. They do not inhere in things, nor 
 can they be produced by any energy in things. Of much 
 that is, I declare that it ought not to be ; and of much which 
 is not, that it ought to be. Experience is necessary to 
 form these ideals, but they are not given by the experience 
 of what is. We meet real, not ideal men ; from the past and 
 present we learn what governments have been and are, not 
 what they should be. We place the ideal against the real, 
 and condemn the latter in the interest of the former. Nor 
 are these ideals a composition, a conglomeration formed by 
 choosing the most perfect elements from what exists. The 
 perfections in ideals are not scattered about in that way, 
 they do not at all exist externally. But even if they existed, 
 how could the mind discover and select them, and form them 
 into unity, unless it had in itself a standard of perfection? 
 All such eclecticism implies a principle of selection and uni- 
 fication. How could a compound be recognized as the ideal 
 unless the mind had a standard with which to compare it? 
 Pushing our inquiries back into matter itself, we cannot find 
 in that the explanation of morality. Combine the chemical 
 elements as we please, we can never get any thing from them 
 except what is really (though perhaps only in embryo) -in 
 them. By multiplying these elements, or by subjecting them 
 to any known laws of physics, we never rise above what 
 is to what ought to be. Nor is the ideal even an inference 
 
APPENDIX. 419 
 
 drawn from things. If a certain thing is, I may infer that 
 something else must be ; but, that something else ought to be, 
 is not a logical deduction from things, simply because it is 
 not in things. We may call it the logic of the entire per- 
 sonality, but not merely of the intellect. If so absurd a 
 notion as this were advocated, that the ideal is inherited, 
 it would not meet the case at all. It is not merely the trans- 
 mission of the ideal which is to be accounted for, but also its 
 first origin. If only an inheritance, I may reject it ; only if 
 it is rational, am I bound by it. Does inheritance make it 
 rational ? Does environment, or history, or training ? These 
 things become clear as soon as the question is answered : 
 What ultimately determines the ideal of morality ? 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abstraction, 227, 228. 
 
 Abstract and Concrete, 190. 
 
 Esthetics, 268. 
 
 -Esthetics — Definition, 271. 
 
 Esthetic Appreciation, 301. 
 
 ^Esthetic Emotion, its Sphere, 296. 
 
 ^Esthetics and Ethics, 294. 
 
 Agnosticism, 70. 
 
 Analysis and Synthesis, 238. 
 
 Art, 287; Characteristic in, 290, 
 
 292. 
 Arts, Division of, 293; Fine, 289. 
 Atoms, 123. 
 
 Beauty, 273. 
 
 Beauty and the Agreeable, 276, 280. 
 Beauty as Form and Substance, 282. 
 Beauty in Objects, 284. 
 
 Categorical Imperative, 323. 
 Causation, 211. 
 Character, 330. 
 Communism, 321. 
 Conscience, 321. 
 Consciousness, 145, 149. 
 Criticism, 285. 
 
 Eclecticism, 392. 
 
 Eleatics School, 27, 29, 44. 
 
 Emotion, 268, 275. 
 
 Epicureans, 30. 
 
 Equality, Law of, 215, 226. 
 
 Ethics: Aim, 310; Conditions of, 
 311, 315; Philosophical and Theo- 
 logical, 314; Principles of, 316. 
 
 Experience, 203. 
 
 Experience and General Laws, 211. 
 
 Faith, Rational, 58, 83. 
 Feeling, Religious, 63, 74. 
 Feeling and the Will, 334. 
 First Cause, 70. 
 Force, 124. 
 
 Freedom of the Will, 340. 
 Freedom, Philosophical, 90; Re- 
 straints of, 80. 
 
 Hedonism, 327, 333. 
 Heredity, 212. 
 History, 231. 
 Hypotheses, 263. 
 
 Ideals, 214. 
 
 Imagination, 299. 
 
 Inferences, 236. 
 
 Innate Aptitudes and Ideas, 196. 
 
 Intuition, 199. 
 
 Intuitionalism, 246, 317. 
 
 Knowledge, Completion of, 229; 
 Definition, 183; Development of, 
 230; Limits of, 193; Origin of, 195, 
 219; and the Real World, 206, 219; 
 Unity of, 159. 
 
 Laws, Mental, 213. 
 Logic, 181, 224. 
 
 Materialism, 72, 141. 
 Materialists, 202. 
 
 421 
 
422 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Memory, 145, 147. 
 
 Mental Faculties, 170. 
 
 Mental States, 152. 
 
 Metaphysics, 29, 30, 34, 242; Basis 
 of, 261; Definition, 247; Divisions, 
 252; Growth in, 263; Importance 
 of, 253, 259; Necessity of, 254; 
 Needs of, 257; and Noetics, 244; 
 Problems of, 250. 
 
 Mind, 130, 135. 
 
 Mind as Entity, 264. 
 
 Monism, 139. 
 
 Morality, Evolution of, 323. 
 
 Morality and Religion, 342. 
 
 Mysterious Mental Phenomena, 
 136. 
 
 Mysticism, 199. 
 
 Noetics, 173. 
 
 Notions, General, 191, 215. 
 
 Opera, The, 293. 
 
 Pantheism, 72. 
 
 Penetrative Method, 233. 
 
 Peripatetics, 30. 
 
 Philosophize, 24. 
 
 Philosophy, Definition, 13, 45; Di- 
 vision of, 159, 165; Etymology, 21 ; 
 in the Catholic Church, 78; His- 
 tory of the Term, 20; How regard- 
 ed in Greece, 23; How regarded 
 in the Middle Ages, 30; How re- 
 garded in England, 31; How re- 
 garded in America, Scotland, 
 Germany, and other lands, 37; 
 Method of Study, "367; National- 
 ity in, 358; in the Protestant 
 Church, 80; Popular View of, 12; 
 Problems leading to, 7; reduced 
 to Psychology, 134; Scientific, 93; 
 its Sphere, 12 ; Spirit in its Study, 
 349; Subjects included, 42; Vague- 
 ness of the Term, 16. 
 
 Physics among the Ancients, 162. 
 
 Positivism, 3, 111, 255. 
 
 Principles, 46. 
 
 Psychology, Abstract Terms in, 150; 
 Applications of, 154; Definition, 
 129; Experimental, 188; and Nat- 
 ural Science, 138; Metaphysical, 
 133, 139; Propaedeutics to Philoso- 
 phy, 156; its Sources, 146; Spe- 
 cialists in, 148, 153; Value of, 155. 
 
 Psycho-Physics, 154, 168. 
 
 Rational, 47. 
 
 Reason, Limits of, 69, 83. 
 
 Reasoning, Analogical, 141. 
 
 Religion, 60, 63; Conflicts with Phi- 
 losophy, 83; its Origin, 61; Rela- 
 tion to Philosophy, 57. 
 
 Right, 331. 
 
 Rightness, 339. 
 
 Sacrifice, 330. 
 
 Scepticism, Philosophical, 69, 178. 
 
 Sceptics, 30. 
 
 Science, Definition of, 94; Limits of, 
 
 105, 120; and Philosophy, 96, 112; 
 
 and Religion, 73. 
 Sensation, 208. 
 Sensationalism, 210. 
 Socialism, 4. 
 Socratic School, 28. 
 Sophists, 23, 28, 41, 44. 
 Soul, 132; its Activity, 144. 
 Specialization, 228, 232. 
 Stoics, 30. 
 Sublimity, 287. 
 Substance, 233. 
 System, 47, 237. 
 
 Taste, 302. 
 
 Tendencies, Empirical and Ideal, 2. 
 Theory of Knowledge, 175; its Re- 
 lation to Logic, 180. 
 Things per se, 222. 
 Thinking, Pure, 233. 
 Thought, 225; Energy of, 231. 
 
 Utilitarianism, 317. 
 
 Wisdom, 25, 28, 30, 44. 
 
2 1804 
 

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