lass 
 
 A\ 52.3 
 
 Uook 
 
 JL 
 
 PRESENTER BY 
 
LETTERS WRITTEN 
 FROM ENGLAND 
 
 AUGUST 4 TO NOVEMBER 4, 1914 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR CROSBY LUDINGTON 
 
9> 
 
 LETTERS WRITTEN 
 FROM ENGLAND 
 
 AUGUST 4 TO NOVEMBER 4, i9H 
 
LETTERS WRITTEN 
 FROM ENGLAND 
 
 AUGUST 4 TO NOVEMBER 4> 1914 
 
 BY 
 
 ARTHUR CROSBY LUDINGTON 
 
 NEW YORK 
 1915 
 
v> 
 
 IK 
 
 m. 
 
 ? 
 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 ARTHUR CROSBY LUDINGTON was the son of 
 -^^- Charles Henry and Josephine Noyes Ludington 
 and was born in New York City on March 6th, 1880. His 
 preparation for college was received at the Black Hall 
 (Connecticut) School, and at St. Paul's School, Concord, 
 New Hampshire. After graduating with honors from 
 Yale University, he was connected for nearly three years 
 with a banking firm in New York City, and then went 
 to Princeton as instructor in Political Science and assis- 
 tant to President Woodrow Wilson. In the summer of 
 1907 he went to Germany and studied at Heidelberg Uni- 
 versity, and later took courses at Columbia. At this time 
 he identified himself with political reform work in New 
 York and gave especial attention to the betterment of 
 election laws, helping to frame the direct nominations and 
 Massachusetts ballot bills which are now laws of New 
 York State. He served for several years as a member of 
 the Legislative Committee of the Citizens' Union of New 
 York City and was active in the National Short Ballot 
 Association. Among other things, he made a compilation 
 of the variations in the forms of the ballot, from the days 
 of the "vest pocket" variety to the present Australian and 
 composite forms. Before his last trip abroad, he was at- 
 tached for a time to the Department of the Interior at 
 Washington, writing a report on the Indian policy of the 
 United States Government. 
 
 In November, 19 13, because of ill health, he went to 
 
 !>] 
 
England, intending, if he had not recovered after a winter 
 there, to take a trip around the world. At the outbreak of 
 hostilities, this trip was abandoned, and he remained in 
 England and devoted himself to a study of the war. As 
 his health returned, he became anxious to help in some 
 active way and volunteered for the English army. Find- 
 ing that he must give up his American citizenship in order 
 to be accepted, he turned to the Red Cross, and was going 
 to France to work in connection with the Australian Vol- 
 unteer Hospital in Boulogne, when his death occurred, on 
 November 4th, following the accidental discharge of his 
 revolver. 
 
 The following letters were written from August 4th to 
 November 4th, when he was living at Cromer and 
 Sheringham on the Norfolk coast. Although done 
 hastily and with no thought of publication, they give 
 his first attempts to shape an opinion from events as 
 they occurred and from wide reading on the ques- 
 tions involved. The occasionally didactic tone was in 
 response to an appeal for information from the sister to 
 whom many of them were sent. Living quietly in the 
 country where he saw only the English papers and peri- 
 odicals and a belated "New York Times," he knew little of 
 what Americans were thinking and saying, and did not 
 realize how copiously the war was being discussed on this 
 side of the water; so he was unconscious of covering fa- 
 miliar ground. But, even so, his friends will be interested 
 in the letters because they are his, and because while they 
 were written during the early months of the struggle, their 
 subject matter is not out of date, and his general position is 
 supported by later developments. 
 
 Because of the pressure of unfamiliar questions which 
 the suddenness of the outbreak occasioned, the early letters 
 deal more with facts than with underlying principles; but 
 
as time went on, his mind was turning from the immediate 
 causes to the deeper issues of the conflict. 
 
 Purely personal and irrelevant matters have been 
 omitted and the sections where he covered the same 
 ground in writing to different people are condensed, ex- 
 cept where the reiteration of certain ideas shows what 
 aspects of the subject were most on his mind. 
 
 On] 
 
LETTERS WRITTEN FROM 
 ENGLAND 
 
LETTERS WRITTEN FROM 
 ENGLAND 
 
 North Cromer, August 4, IQI4- 
 Dear K.: 
 
 Your cables of Saturday and yesterday reached me here, 
 where I have been staying for the past two weeks. Of 
 course, I am disappointed— terribly disappointed— that 
 you are n't coming, but I must say that I think you are 
 right in giving up the trip under the circumstances. With 
 four great nations already at war and the possibility very 
 strong, in view of Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House 
 last night, that England will be drawn in in a day or two 
 by Germany's wanton disregard of neutrality treaties, 
 there is no telling what conditions may be a week or two 
 hence. I am quite sure there will not be the least danger 
 to non-combatants who remain quietly in England and 
 mind their own business, but there may be a good deal of 
 inconvenience, and it is surely no time for a pleasure-trip. 
 . . . Perhaps the war won't last long, though that seems 
 hardly probable. 
 
 I have a splendid room with three big windows looking 
 out over the North Sea and I can tell you it gives one a 
 thrill to watch the English battleships go by, moving 
 northward, and to realize that in a few days one of the 
 greatest naval battles in modern times may take place only 
 
a few miles away! Every one here is excited about the 
 war, yet things go on about as usual and the bank holiday 
 crowds yesterday were rather larger than usual. Yet the 
 English fleet is mobilized and the army in process of 
 mobilization, and the papers are full of the war to the ex- 
 clusion of everything else. 
 
 It is remarkable how completely the Irish situation 
 seems forgotten and all thoughts concentrated on whether 
 or not England shall intervene. I have great sympathy 
 for the Norman Angell followers, who in the main, I be- 
 lieve, are right and who are opposed to war unless Eng- 
 land is actually attacked. It needs great courage to take 
 this stand at a time like this, more than anyone can realize 
 who is not here. But I believe Sir Edward Grey and the 
 Government are right in supporting the neutrality of 
 Belgium, even by force, and in preventing France from 
 being too severely injured. 
 
 Do read Norman Angell's books now ("The Great Il- 
 lusion" and "Foundations of International Polity"). 
 They are really epoch-making and you ought to under- 
 stand his position, especially at a time like this. However 
 much his views may need to be qualified by fuller experi- 
 ence of 20th century conditions, there can be no doubt— it 
 seems to me— that he is fundamentally right. He is no 
 "peace at any price" man and he realizes that as long as 
 unenlightened nations believe that material benefits can be 
 gained by aggressive war, the enlightened, who see the fal- 
 lacy of this point of view, must still arm. But he has taken 
 an enormous step in advance of the older sentimental 
 peace advocates, high-minded and useful as they are, and 
 he is right in believing that the only solution is sounder 
 public opinion among great masses of people. 
 
 [4] 
 
North Cromer, August 8. 
 Dear C: 
 
 It is hard to realize, sitting quietly at this window over- 
 looking the North Sea, that the war which has always 
 seemed a nightmare of the yellow journals has actually 
 begun. The last week, although I have been shut up in 
 my room, has been one of the most thrilling I have ever 
 passed through. 
 
 If anyone has believed that England was decadent and 
 unable to face a great crisis he should have been here since 
 Tuesday night and seen the way the nation took the news 
 and set itself to reorganizing the national life on a war 
 basis. He would not have kept his belief in decadence 
 very long! Outside of a few Jingo newspapers— and they, 
 rather mild under the circumstances— there has been no 
 brass band demonstration on the one hand nor panic on the 
 other; only an immensely impressive energy and concen- 
 tration on the business of getting ready. The Government, 
 though the war came most unexpectedly and at a time 
 when Parliament was worn out with the bitterness of the 
 Irish controversy, rose to the occasion and in less than a 
 week has accomplished a most remarkable feat of organi- 
 zation, not merely in the way of mobilizing the regular 
 army and navy and territorials and preparing hospital 
 service, coast defence and other military services but also 
 in re-shaping a great part of the financial, commercial and 
 industrial activities of the nation. No great war has been 
 fought under modern conditions, or since the establish- 
 ment of a world-wide and highly sensitive system of inter- 
 national credit, so there were few precedents to follow. 
 
 In all this activity what has struck me has been the 
 absence of confusion and aimless excitement; the quiet, 
 purposeful way in which the nation has set itself to work 
 under what cannot fail to be considered able and effi- 
 
 LSI 
 
cient leadership. That a supposedly easy-going, sport-lov- 
 ing, non-regulated and non-centralized people, suddenly 
 called to such a task, should be able to shake itself free 
 from shock and at once begin planning and working, 
 shows a genius for effective organization as well as the 
 more common qualities of courage and steadiness. 
 
 Another thing that is most striking is the unitedness of 
 the nation in the face of danger— the instant abandonment 
 of internal disputes. Party lines in Parliament, even the 
 bitter dissensions over the Irish question, were wiped out 
 for the time being. Redmond's stirring promise that Eng- 
 land might withdraw every soldier from Ireland to-mor- 
 row and leave her coast to be guarded by Nationalists and 
 Ulster Volunteers— a promise that Carson backed up- 
 furnished the best sort of foundation for a compromise on 
 the Home Rule question until the war is over. Unionist 
 ex-ministers are working with the Cabinet daily and F. E. 
 Smith, a Unionist firebrand who a few weeks ago was 
 pouring abuse on all Liberals, is running the official news- 
 bureau by government appointment! 
 
 I am delighted to see that public opinion in the United 
 States is so nearly unanimous in its sympathy with the 
 Triple Entente as against the Triple Alliance. With all my 
 liking for the German people and with every effort to see 
 the German-Austrian side of the case, I cannot doubt that 
 Germany planned and forced on the war (look at Sir 
 Edward Grey's speech on Monday the 3rd), nor feel any- 
 thing but abhorrence for her conduct since the crisis be- 
 gan. Fortunately the group of militarists who seem to be 
 in control of her affairs have already shown themselves to 
 be as stupid as they are arrogant and conscienceless— and 
 by their bungling have lined up almost the whole world 
 against them. One thing seems fairly sure, that if Ger- 
 many is beaten the result will be a popular reaction among 
 
 C6] 
 
Germans against their present form of government— as in 
 France in 1870 and Russia in 1905. Military defeat may 
 be a blow to the ruling oligarchy. 
 
 North Cromer, August 10. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 I am just beginning to get American papers of about 
 August 1 st telling how the first threats of war were re- 
 ceived at home. ... I am delighted to see from them, as 
 well as from the more recent reports in papers here, that 
 American opinion is almost wholly on the side of the Allies. 
 
 The papers here have been giving quotations from a lit- 
 tle group of men in Germany who have been working for 
 years to bring on something of this sort, and particularly 
 from a book by General Bernhardi, highly endorsed by 
 the Crown Prince. They are exceedingly illuminating— 
 the most brazen programme that you can imagine. I re- 
 member well, when I was in Germany, how men connected 
 with the Government service had absorbed this point of 
 view and were always quoting and praising the historical 
 writings of von Treitschke, a Prussian, now dead. He 
 was brilliant but belonged to the extreme wing of this 
 school. 
 
 Their propaganda has had a tremendous effect through- 
 out Germany. Most of the influential Prussian newspa- 
 pers (except those representing the more liberal and 
 largely Jewish financial interests), and South German 
 papers like the "Frankfurter Zeitung," were written 
 chiefly from this point of view. For instance, at Wernige- 
 rode, the T.'s got virtually their whole idea of the out- 
 side world from the "Tagliche Rundschau," a poison- 
 ously narrow, Jingo, Pan-German sheet, and would not 
 listen to any other opinions, and their brother, an East 
 
 [73 
 
Prussian Konigliche Bauinspector, was even worse! Such 
 papers, and even some of the better sort, are under the 
 thumb of the Government— especially in the field of for- 
 eign politics. 
 
 Under such (comparatively recent) influences the older 
 intellectual and humanizing elements of German opinion 
 have become weaker, and the younger generation has gone 
 mad with a dream of military and naval predominance for 
 the German Empire. An interesting article from the 
 "Times" which I am sending you describes this condition 
 of "swelled head" into which a great part of the nation 
 has fallen. ... I know that there are other enormously 
 important sides to the German character, and I was ex- 
 tremely fond of them when I was there, but I can verify 
 from my own experience much that these English articles 
 say. 
 
 Many of the English writers are surprisingly detached 
 and free from bitterness, but they emphasize the fact that 
 such a state of public opinion, held by a nation as powerful 
 as Germany, is a world-wide menace while it continues 
 and must be put an end to in the interest of European 
 peace. 
 
 No one here would have listened to the suggestion of 
 waging a war for this purpose, but now that leaders of 
 German opinion have precipitated the crisis, a large sec- 
 tion of English opinion welcomes the chance to settle the 
 matter — at least for a generation or so— and I can't help 
 having a lot of sympathy with this feeling. 
 
 Go back to the Agadir incident or Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina in 1908, or only last winter, Zabern— and it is hard 
 not to wish these Prussian bullies humiliated! At bottom 
 I see the truth— and the greater importance— of the Nor- 
 man Angell point of view, but I confess my lower nature is 
 often to the front, these days, as I read war news! 
 
 [8] 
 
I want to see Germany, after her treatment of Belgium, 
 beaten to her knees— I want France to get back Alsace- 
 Lorraine, and Servia to get Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet 
 at the same time, the more level-headed part of me realizes 
 that over-harsh terms only mean permanent bitterness and 
 the acute danger of another war. Defeat itself would be 
 a bitter enough pill for Germany to swallow, and for the 
 good of Europe her position as a great state should be left 
 to her. 
 
 I am sending you most of the current issue of the "Na- 
 tion" with an article by Lowes Dickinson and one by Nor- 
 man Angell— I could n't altogether agree with them in 
 their opposition to the war— but I know that they are the 
 really helpful and far-sighted leaders of opinion. There 
 is also a fine tribute to Jaures. 
 
 Things go very quietly here on the East coast— though 
 from my window the other day I watched, with a spy- 
 glass, two English torpedo boats capture a German mer- 
 chant ship and tow her toward Yarmouth. A destroyer 
 goes up and down the coast patrolling every morning, and 
 often aeroplanes go by. The roads are full of troops— 
 though less so now that mobilization is nearly completed. 
 
 North Cromer, August 18. 
 Dear K.: 
 
 Perhaps the most interesting thing that has happened 
 since I last wrote is the Czar's manifesto to the Poles. 
 Much of it reads strangely, coming from Russian lips— I 
 wonder that a Russian bureaucrat could read it with a 
 straight face, in view of recent history! But I believe, 
 nevertheless, that it is sincere. Indeed, Hanotaux writes 
 that the Czar outlined the plan to him in 1896, soon after 
 his coronation, with genuine enthusiasm, and has been 
 
 C93 
 
honestly meaning to carry it out ever since. This is quite 
 possible. I only hope his advisers won't persuade him to 
 change his mind, if Russia wins! France and England 
 will do their best to hold him to his promise. At any rate 
 it is a fine stroke so far as immediate effect is concerned. 
 
 Did you read about the death of young Baron Mar- 
 schall von Bieberstein, son of the former German Ambas- 
 sador to England and one of the first German officers to be 
 killed, in a frontier skirmish? I remember him at Prof. 
 Endemann's house in Heidelberg, a modest and winning 
 young fellow, about my own age. All he had time to say 
 before he died, after the French came up to where he lay, 
 was "I 've done my duty to my country, gentlemen, as you 
 are doing yours." It is what one would have expected 
 from a man of his type, and makes the war, all at once, 
 seem close at hand to me. I am as sorry for Germans of his 
 sort, whom I like and admire, as I am bitter against the 
 stupid, arrogant type of Prussians who have brought on 
 this tragedy. 
 
 My marginal notes on the articles I have sent will have 
 shown you how I feel in general about the war. I want it 
 to be conclusive, and to put an end, once for all, to the sort 
 of terror under which Europe has been living for the past 
 decade, with the resulting burden of armaments. 
 
 I was rather amused at the instant "resolutions" con- 
 demning the war and calling for arbitration, which were 
 introduced in Congress— by some of the very men, too, 
 who have fought arbitration treaties and worked against 
 the repeal of the Panama Tolls Act! Even if sincere, such 
 resolutions are futile mockery in a crisis like this. As if 
 the nations that have plunged unwillingly into what they 
 know will be a life and death struggle would now be held 
 back by any Mrs. Partington's mop of this sort! 
 
 The President's offer of mediation was a different mat- 
 
 Do] 
 
ter and well enough in its way, though to my mind a bit 
 premature. No one here considered it officious, however, 
 as they did the "resolutions." Indeed, everyone realizes 
 that American "good offices" may be immensely helpful 
 later on, and they now have a high personal respect for the 
 President, especially since the Panama Tolls matter. His 
 strict preservation of American neutrality, for instance, is 
 favorably commented on. But nothing could be more un- 
 desirable than a premature or indecisive ending to the 
 war, and fortunately no such result is in the least likely! 
 Terrible as it is, the war seems destined to bring about a 
 number of valuable results ; but it may take a long time. 
 
 North Cromer, August 21. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I am sorry I can't give you more vivid personal descrip- 
 tions of what is going on here. This little place is so cut 
 off— it is two miles from the nearest town— that all my 
 news comes from the papers. In many ways I wish I 
 could have been in London during these last weeks— but 
 until the hot muggy weather there is over I don't want to 
 go back, especially as I have n't been over well lately, and 
 this place agrees with me splendidly. Later, I want to be 
 in London— perhaps within a couple of weeks. This war 
 is n't going to be over in a month, or in a year. 
 
 Within the last day or two the German advance in force 
 has begun, and the first great battle of the war is actually 
 under way. Very little news comes through and the pa- 
 pers are careful to emphasize that the real fighting has 
 hardly begun and that German successes are to be expected 
 at the start. 
 
 The news sent out by the Wolff Bureau, the semi-official 
 German agency, and by German writers, continues to be a 
 
remarkable assortment of distorted facts and baseless fab- 
 rications. Many of their methods, especially those of Ger- 
 man residents in foreign countries, are, to say the least, 
 peculiar! 
 
 I think President Wilson has rather overdone the busi- 
 ness of American neutrality, especially when he urges 
 private citizens not to discuss the war or take sides. It is 
 right to make Government officials and army and navy 
 officers keep quiet, and, of course, private citizens must n't 
 act in a way that tends toward a breach of the peace, but 
 beyond that it is unreasonable to expect people to keep 
 from forming opinions as to a controversy in which most 
 of the world is engaged. . . . Also, I fail to see any sound 
 reason for forbidding private bankers to finance loans to 
 the belligerent governments, though I am quite humble 
 and open to argument on this point. 
 
 I am sure the strong expression of American sentiment 
 at the beginning of the war was a good thing and an eye- 
 opener to the Prussian governing clique. How, for heav- 
 en's sake, if neutral nations don't express their opinions, is 
 anything like a general public opinion in regard to these 
 great and urgent questions to be arrived at? 
 
 I will send you soon a review of the German official 
 "White Book" setting forth their side of the case. I want 
 to be fair and to see all sides, but that is a different thing 
 from hanging on to the fence. ... I hope that the en- 
 trance on the scene of Japan isn't going to have a bad 
 effect in the United States. In view of their very clear 
 promise to limit their action and to give back Kiau Chau 
 (if that is how you spell it) to China, and in view of the 
 fact that the English Government, which wishes to retain 
 American good will, knew of their intentions in advance, 
 I hope any misunderstanding will be avoided. 
 
 [12] 
 
North Cromer, August 24- 
 DearK.: 
 
 No more letters from you since I last wrote you— as a 
 matter of fact it is only three days ago! But I hope before 
 many days to hear that my letters have begun to reach you 
 again. 
 
 I have been much interested to read about the campaign 
 which the German-American Press (apparently with the 
 aid of a contemptible section of the Irish-Americans who 
 are utterly out of touch with the leaders of Irish Nation- 
 alism over here) has been conducting for the purpose of 
 winning the United States to the German side. I hope it 
 will fail as completely as the reports here indicate it is 
 likely to. It is just these sections of American opinion 
 which have been, in the past, the worst offenders in setting 
 selfish racial interests ahead of American patriotism in 
 such matters as arbitration treaties with England, Tolls 
 Repeal, etc. 
 
 British-Americans are not following suit, I am glad to 
 see. American opinion in favor of England is not, I be- 
 lieve, based on mere racial feeling, but on a reasoned dis- 
 like of Germany's aims and policy. For this reason I 
 don't believe an essentially racial attack on the generally 
 adopted American attitude can alter it very much— even 
 if, as I fear, the Hearst papers should follow their usual 
 line of cheap attacks on England and appeals to racial 
 prejudice. 
 
 The strongest line, clearly, that the German press can 
 take, is to attack Russia, exploiting the feeling in America 
 against Russia's bad record, calling her the aggressor and 
 ignoring every other aspect of the situation. Personally, 
 much as I hate Russian brutality and obscurantism, I hon- 
 estly believe that Prussian militarism and ambition toward 
 world sovereignty are a more pressing danger to civiliza- 
 
 C133 
 
tion. I think, too, that most of the talk about "Russian 
 barbarism threatening German culture" is sheer rot,— 
 quite irrelevant. Prussian militarism is a far more in- 
 sidious danger to German culture than any Russian attack, 
 and German "culture"— the real thing that all of us ad- 
 mire—is never going to be advanced by aggression, or 
 insane ambition toward territorial aggrandizement or 
 military prestige. 
 
 German culture did n't lose ground when Napoleon 
 held all Germany, and it certainly has n't benefited of late 
 years by the growth of Prussian prestige. This is n't of 
 course to say that Germany had better have stayed weak 
 and disunited, but that successful military aggression is the 
 last thing likely to benefit the very culture on behalf of 
 which these specious arguments are being made— even, I 
 am sorry to see, by men like Harnack! 
 
 It is n't as if there were a real danger of Russian con- 
 quest and absorption of Germany. . . . 
 
 Also, how has the extension of German culture— say in 
 Bosnia— benefited humanity? This whole line of argu- 
 ment only distracts attention from the real issue. 
 
 One should remember, too, that while practically no 
 Germans are now under the rule of Slavs (except those in 
 the Baltic provinces of Russia, whom even extreme Pan- 
 Germans like Bernhardi hardly dream of bringing back 
 into the German Empire), millions of Slavs are being 
 held, very much against their wills, under the domination 
 of Germany (in Posen and W. Prussia), and of Austria- 
 Hungary, and that Austria-Hungary is greedily reaching 
 out, with Germany's approval, for new territory and a 
 controlling interest in the Balkans. 
 
 In view of these facts it is a brazen absurdity to talk 
 about the "Russian danger" merely because Russia's pol- 
 icy of protecting the minor Slav races and building up a 
 
strong Balkan federation stands in the way of German 
 aggression. Of course Russia defends her fellow Slavs and 
 if she also wants to free from German and Austrian rule 
 those who are aching to be freed, I, for one, don't much 
 blame her. 
 
 There is no evidence, apart from German assertions, 
 that she would ever have brought on a European war for 
 this purpose. She went to the very limit in persuading Ser- 
 via to accept the excessive demands of Austria. ... It 
 was only the bare-faced attack on Servia's very existence 
 as an independent State that roused Russia to her defence. 
 I sincerely hope that at the end of the war the various na- 
 tional groups which Austria-Hungary (the Magyars are 
 even worse than the Austrians) has been hanging on to and 
 repressing for generations will be joined to the respective 
 nations with whom their real sympathies lie. Austria had 
 better become a member State in the German Empire, and 
 Hungary, stripped of her subject races, be left to stand 
 alone, or to make terms with the strong new Balkan feder- 
 ation. If only as many as possible of these old danger 
 spots can be wiped out, the chance of future world wars 
 will be lessened. 
 
 The dismemberment of a unified national State with 
 strong racial sentiment and a desire to be left undisturbed 
 (e.g., Denmark in 1864 and France in 1870) is the stupid- 
 est sort of crime and is certain to bring trouble. The dis- 
 memberment of an artificial conglomerate like Austria- 
 Hungary, which is almost splitting apart of itself, would 
 be a step toward permanent peace. 
 
 The Balkan States are preponderantly Slavic, and if the 
 establishment of a Balkan federation means— as is prob- 
 able—an increase of Russian prestige and influence, such 
 an increase is only founded on natural and insuperable 
 factors. Germany has no right to oppose it in the interest 
 
 ['S3 
 
of an unnatural Teutonic sovereignty over that part of 
 Europe. If the Russian power threatens Hungary or any 
 non-Slavic State which is weak or isolated, the remedy is 
 an international guarantee of neutrality such as England 
 and France are righting to uphold in Belgium. 
 
 I believe these considerations, in addition of course to 
 the strong case which Sir Edward Grey established 
 against the final chapter of German diplomacy, entirely 
 demolish the arguments which Germany is trying to pass 
 off on the United States. The danger to the Russian lib- 
 eral movement— that military success may be likely to 
 increase the prestige of the anti-liberal forces— will be 
 partly offset by Russia's closer contact with France and 
 England, and the active efforts, I hope, of the latter. 
 
 I was delighted to-day to find in the "Nation" an article 
 by Wells which takes much the point of view that I have 
 been working out for myself for some time back. It has 
 a fair attitude towards Russia in general, though I don't 
 agree with him in brushing away the enormity of Russia's 
 treatment of the Jews. I quite appreciate that there is a 
 real difficulty here— the helpless Russian peasants are no 
 match for the type of Jewish trader or money-lender com- 
 mon in Russian villages, and their hatred, much of it, may 
 be spontaneous and not artificially stimulated— but this is 
 no excuse for the Russian Government's having handled 
 the question as it has. I really know next to nothing about 
 this Russo-Jewish question— this is only my general im- 
 pression. 
 
 I have been reading with the most intense interest Bern- 
 hardi's "Germany and the Next War," of which I have 
 heard a great deal. In a few days I will send it on to you. 
 It is the most brazen defence of an abominable, reaction- 
 ary point of view which I have ever come across— so 
 brazen that its very brazenness has a blunt honesty which 
 
 on 
 
is almost attractive. The man is evidently a serious relic 
 of a century or two back, personally no doubt an admira- 
 ble character, who would have been most useful, say, in 
 the 17th century. The significant thing about the book is 
 that it fits in with and explains a large body of German 
 opinion, as one gathers the latter from newspapers and 
 magazine articles, speeches and, in my case, every-day 
 conversation with people of all sorts. It startles one chiefly 
 because the thesis is carefully thought out and carried to 
 its logical conclusion. It probably goes farther in many 
 directions than most Germans would be willing to follow, 
 but there is no possible doubt that it faithfully represents 
 the character and tendency of such propaganda as the 
 Navy League, the Pan-German movement and a large 
 and growing section of German thought— popular as well 
 as educated thought. There are, no doubt, large elements 
 of public opinion opposed to this point of view — it is to 
 combat these elements that the book was written— but the 
 opinion which it represents is the opinion which has 
 forced on this war. That is why the book is so important. 
 It is the whole conception of international relations, na- 
 tional life and world development which it upholds which 
 must be the irrevocable aim and final justification of the 
 war to destroy. I shall be surprised if you don't feel this 
 as intensely as I do. 
 
 I am inclined largely to discount the charges of brutal- 
 ity made against the German soldiers, but some of the 
 methods which the German Government has unquestion- 
 ably sanctioned — e.g., indiscriminate use of mines, indem- 
 nities from Belgian cities, seizure of hostages, as well as its 
 rule that non-uniformed defenders of an invaded territory 
 are to be treated not as combatants (as they are under Eng- 
 lish military law, subject to slight modifications) but as 
 outlaws and murderers— are as detestable as its treatment 
 
 C17] 
 
of Belgian neutrality. Most of the alleged cruelties are 
 no doubt traceable to this different point of view in regard 
 to what English manuals call a levee en masse, but this 
 does n't make the German theory any less harsh and revolt- 
 ing. 
 
 I hope the feeling apparently aroused in America by 
 Japan's intervention has since quieted down. It is quite 
 natural for us to distrust her a bit, but I believe it is unnec- 
 essary in this case. It would be a pity if this incident, 
 played up for all it is worth by the German press, were 
 allowed to confuse our whole attitude. 
 
 I hope our Government will not allow the purchase of 
 the Hamburg-American ships and the payment to Ger- 
 many of $20,000,000 — especially since we fell over back- 
 ward in the matter of the proposed French loan. This 
 would be distinct partiality towards Germany, and Sena- 
 tor Lodge, who is now in London, has come out with a 
 protest against it, although he says that reports from 
 America may be misleading and the Government may not 
 contemplate anything so one-sided. 
 
 North Cromer, August 2jth. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 This morning comes the news of the fall of Namur— a 
 blow which was unexpected and which will prove a se- 
 rious danger to the Allied armies. I only hope it may not 
 be as bad as the papers seem to fear; at least they are hon- 
 est with the public, however over-censored the news may 
 be. I could hardly feel more anxious and keenly inter- 
 ested if it were our army that was fighting. ... I try to 
 keep open-minded towards the German point of view- 
 but I confess I feel pretty strongly! 
 
 On one point on which I had not felt very clear, I have 
 
now made up my mind ; that however badly the Germans 
 may be beaten in the end, if things go as one hopes, yet 
 their colonies in the main should be left to them. I be- 
 lieve they have distorted England's position in the past as 
 to "hemming them in" and preventing their acquiring, 
 even by fair means, any territory for the overflow of sur- 
 plus German population, and personally I do not think it 
 necessary for Germany to control all of the regions where 
 Germans settle— she would gain little by such control- 
 but it must be admitted that England sets great store her- 
 self on controlling the regions where Englishmen settle, 
 and Germany's desire for German-controlled colonies is 
 understandable and unobjectionable, so long as she does 
 not try to grab other nations' colonies by brute force. She 
 came late into the game of colonial expansion and cannot 
 blame other nations if they insist in holding on to what, 
 partly owing to her lack of foresight, they have already 
 acquired. But if the other nations try to keep her from 
 following their example (and they may possibly have 
 been guilty of this in the past— I do not think Sir Edward 
 Grey takes this position now), then Germany has a valid 
 complaint against them and one with which I sympathize. 
 To deprive her of her present colonies if she is beaten 
 would give force to this complaint and cause a bitterness 
 prejudicial to the chances of permanent peace. I except 
 Kiau Chau because of the way in which Germany seized 
 it, and because I believe that for Germany to meddle in 
 the Far East is dangerous to the integrity of China. The 
 fact that other nations have in the past seized and are 
 holding Oriental possessions to which they have no better 
 claim does not excuse a continuance in such practices, in a 
 particularly flagrant form, in the 20th century. Germany 
 has, however, large commercial interests in Asia Minor, 
 and if with the consent of Turkey she can expand her pres- 
 
 [■9] 
 
ent footing there and find an outlet for her energies and 
 surplus population in that direction, while at the same 
 time developing a backward region, I do not think Eng- 
 land and the Allies should take an attitude of jealous oppo- 
 sition — so long as Germany does not try to seize Constan- 
 tinople or threaten English communication with India. 
 The Constantinople problem is one for which I make no 
 attempt at a solution — it is too complicated for my present 
 state of ignorance! I have gone into this question because 
 I want you to see that I am trying to consider both sides. 
 
 I am keen to hear again from you what the people at 
 home with whom you talk are thinking about it all. 
 Please send any magazines or articles that show how 
 American opinion is shaping. English opinion, Liberal 
 and Socialist as well as Tory, is almost wholly favorable 
 to the war— that is, it believes that the Government did 
 right in declaring war, however terrible and unwelcome 
 the war may be, and that it has an unanswerable case. A 
 small group, mostly from the Radical wing of the Liberal 
 party and from the Labor party, and represented by Ram- 
 say Macdonald, Arthur Ponsonby, Keir Hardie, Bertrand 
 Russell, and others, attack the action of the Government in 
 intervening as wrong and unnecessary. This group is 
 nothing like as strong as the Pro-Boers fifteen years ago, 
 but is composed of similar elements. I heartily admire 
 their courage and sincerity but disagree with their reason- 
 ing. Their chief criticism of the Government is not so 
 much for its recent actions as for not having, years ago, 
 broken loose from the whole theory of the "Balance of 
 Power" and from the entangling entente with France, 
 which had been handed down from a Conservative admin- 
 istration. This entanglement, they say, was concealed 
 from the public (I do not think this is true), and, like the 
 rest of England's foreign policy, subject to very slight 
 
popular control, has prevented England from acting in a 
 purely impartial way as a mediator. I believe that in spite 
 of the entente, Sir Edward Grey did act as a substantially 
 unbiased mediator and went as far as was humanly pos- 
 sible in this direction. 
 
 As a statement of what is desirable for the future, and 
 what, it is to be hoped, will be feasible after the war, their 
 point of view is sound and just, I believe. As a criticism 
 of Sir Edward Grey's policy up to the present, it seems to 
 me unfair. It fails to take account of the actual difficulties 
 in the way of an English foreign minister and of the extent 
 to which public opinion in other countries is less advanced 
 than in England. Even here most people are not up to this 
 point of view yet, and an English Government cannot dis- 
 regard the mass of the nation in order to carry out the 
 ideas of an advanced section. Also, while the ideas put 
 forward in Bernhardi's book continue to have the vogue 
 which they now seem to have in Germany, I believe the 
 nations which are opposed, in the main, to such doctrines 
 must take thought for their defence and stand together. 
 (It was Bismarck who forced France into the Russian 
 Alliance, for example.) 
 
 The critics of the Government also ask, as a test ques- 
 tion, "Suppose France had been first to violate Belgian 
 neutrality, would England have attacked her?" I believe 
 that, according to published documents, Sir Edward 
 Grey's final offer that if Germany would make any fair 
 proposal calculated to secure peace, and if France and 
 Russia refused to agree, he would abandon them in spite 
 of the entente, shows pretty clearly what his attitude 
 would have been if France had been the aggressor. As a 
 matter of fact, France instantly promised to observe Bel- 
 gian neutrality, while Germany refused. The fact that the 
 French border was considered impregnable to a quick 
 
 [2in 
 
assault and that Germany's whole military plans for years 
 past have depended on a sudden attack by way of Belgium 
 before Russia could complete mobilization, is no excuse 
 for Germany breaking a treaty which she had solemnly 
 re-confirmed (at the second Hague Conference in 1907, in 
 the "Convention" there adopted). The efforts of the 
 peace party here in England to make it appear that in so 
 doing she was excused by necessity are a weak and indeed 
 actually wrong-headed part of their arguments. Germany 
 should have thought of this "necessity" before she forced 
 a general war; and the truth is, of course, as her railway 
 system shows, that she did think of it long ago and went 
 shamelessly ahead nevertheless. England does not accuse 
 her of any deep-laid plot to destroy the British Empire— 
 indeed, it is clear that Germany hoped England would 
 stay out of this war— but she does accuse her of planning 
 cold-bloodedly to extend German-Austrian power at the 
 expense of Russia and France, by methods similar to those 
 which she used in the Bosnia-Herzegovina "shining ar- 
 mor" coup in 1908, and of caring little, so long as her side 
 proved the stronger, whether such methods plunged the 
 world into war. Also, of refusing, even when war became 
 imminent, to submit the Austrian case to the decision of a 
 concert of powers on the ground that it was "unworthy the 
 dignity of a great State like Austria" to submit her free- 
 dom of action to the settlement of a "European Areop- 
 agus," as might a minor Balkan State: i.e., taking the 
 position that it was nobody's business whether or not she 
 brought on a general conflict! Also, of breaking faith 
 with a smaller, weaker nation and with the world, and 
 endangering that faith in solemn agreements on which all 
 intercourse depends. 
 
 It is such considerations as these, overlooked by the 
 English peace party in their anxious effort to be fair to the 
 
 [22^ 
 
other side and loyal to the cause of world peace, that jus- 
 tify England in righting to the last gasp to put an end, once 
 and for all, to such pretensions by any country. 
 
 North Cromer, August 2$th. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I can't resist adding a line or two to the enormous letter 
 which I sent off to you this morning, as I have been read- 
 ing copies of the "New York Times" of the nth and 12th. 
 I must say that, strongly in favor of England as I am, I 
 think the American papers as quoted in the "Times" have 
 been a bit unfair in their personal attacks on the Kaiser 
 and the stories which they are printing of German "atroci- 
 ties." The Kaiser has plenty of faults and is in a position 
 which no man should occupy, but I believe that in the past 
 he has honestly worked for peace to the extent of jeop- 
 ardizing his popularity with his own people. He has ex- 
 posed himself to bitter attacks. The truth is, I think, that 
 the war party and its doctrines have been growing in 
 strength and have overcome the Kaiser's natural inclina- 
 tion towards peace — either by winning him over or by 
 making themselves too strong to resist. 
 
 As to "atrocities," I believe now that most of such stories 
 are fictitious or exaggerated, and in so far as they are true, 
 are true more or less of both sides. For example, the 
 populace of Brussels got out of hand and destroyed Ger- 
 man lives and property— though on the whole the Bel- 
 gians have been just and decent towards their enemies. So 
 in Berlin, the crowd got badly off its head at one time and 
 behaved outrageously— but in other places French and 
 English people were treated with great kindness. The 
 discourtesy shown the French and Russian Ambassadors 
 and Consuls was rather disgraceful and not matched by 
 
anything similar in France or England or even in Austria. 
 Also, the German theory of war with regard to civilian 
 participation is harsh beyond that of other nations; but 
 nothing is gained by making out that the German army as 
 a whole are brutes and murderers ! ( I see, though, that the 
 German-American papers are even more unfair to Eng- 
 land and France and quite beyond arguing with.) 
 
 North Cromer, August 28. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 I am sending you two very interesting articles from 
 August reviews on the Balkan-Austrian situation just 
 prior to the war. The one by von Sosnosky, "The Balkan 
 Policy of the Hapsburg Empire," quite bears out what I 
 wrote in my last letter (before I had read either of these 
 articles) and shows Austrian foreign policy in a far from 
 amiable light! Sir Harry Johnston's article, "Germany, 
 Russia and Austria," is by a far abler man than von Sos- 
 nosky. He is a friend of the J.'s; a Liberal and a colo- 
 nial administrator, with a distinguished career. He, like 
 von Sosnosky, describes German and Austrian policy in 
 the Near East, and while he shows that it might have been 
 developed in such a way as not to be harmful to the other 
 countries involved, he also shows that the Prussian spirit 
 — the spirit of overbearing aggressiveness and lack of any 
 generosity in dealing with conquered races — was bound, if 
 persisted in, to make their policy distasteful to all other 
 nations and bring it to grief. In itself, if it had meant 
 merely the peaceful extension of German influence toward 
 the Southeast and the gradual attraction of Balkan peo- 
 ples into a great confederation, with Germany and Austria 
 playing a controlling part, such a policy would, I agree, 
 have been one with which England should have had no oc- 
 
 C24: 
 
casion to interfere. I said in my last letter that England 
 should not oppose Germany's reasonable expansion of in- 
 fluence in Asia Minor. Even if such a policy had antago- 
 nized Russia, and if Germany had been unable to come to 
 an understanding with her, I believe, as he says, that Eng- 
 land should have kept hands off and let them settle it be- 
 tween themselves. 
 
 But as the other article (von Sosnosky's) shows, this was 
 not the spirit in which they went about gaining their ends ; 
 and although it was the situation in the West which finally 
 brought England into the war, the case of the Triple En- 
 tente in the East is also a sound one. Sir Edward Grey 
 showed in the Balkan negotiations last year that whatever 
 he thought personally of the justice of her action, he was 
 willing to give Austria a pretty free hand, and that he 
 would never have blocked any legitimate Austro-German 
 designs in this direction. But this was n't enough for 
 Vienna and Berlin, and now they will probably lose every- 
 thing! 
 
 The two "histories" of the war (issued by the "Times" 
 and "Daily Telegraph") which I am sending you, discuss 
 the causes leading up to it and make clear what I have 
 always felt, that for years past Germany has been the trou- 
 ble-maker: i.e., in the Algeciras incident, the Bosnia-Her- 
 zegovina row (though this, I believe, originated with the 
 Austrian Crown Prince), and finally, the Agadir trouble, 
 each of which came near to bringing on war. Very likely 
 she did n't actually want war at any of these times, but she 
 wanted to use the threat of war to further an essentially 
 aggressive policy. To gain her ends by reasonable agree- 
 ment or compromise has not been her way for the past 
 twenty years. She regards war or the threat of war in the 
 same light as Treitschke and Bernhardi, as a mere incident 
 
in her general policy. This I think is proved up to the hilt, 
 and it is this which must be put a stop to. 
 
 Recently Bernard Shaw came out with a statement that 
 while he approved England's declaration of war on other 
 grounds, the general denunciation of Germany for her 
 violation of Belgian neutrality was mere hypocrisy. That, 
 under circumstances similar to those in which Germany 
 was placed, England would have done the same thing and 
 would have found an excuse for it as she always has for 
 her conduct in the past. I have tried to think this out for 
 myself without bias— and I am convinced that it is a mis- 
 chievous perversion of the facts. I believe more than ever 
 that Germany's action deserved all the denunciation 
 which it has aroused. It is a well recognized rule of inter- 
 national law that the use of a neutral's territory by either 
 belligerent for any purpose is a violation of neutrality. If 
 consented to it involves the neutral in hostilities and prob- 
 ably war with the aggrieved belligerent. In this case, for 
 example, suppose Belgium had allowed Germany to 
 march her troops across to the French frontier and use 
 Belgian territory as a base. France would probably have 
 declared war on Belgium, and would have been quite jus- 
 tified in so doing. Even if she had not, suppose the cam- 
 paign had gone against Germany and her troops been 
 forced back on Belgian soil — the French must have pur- 
 sued and Belgium, while nominally neutral, would have 
 suffered all the losses of a war carried on within her bor- 
 ders. What possible right had another State to demand 
 that she put herself in this position, even aside from all 
 questions of solemn pledges and guarantees? It was per- 
 fectly possible for Germany to act on the defensive within 
 German territory. Belgium was "necessary" to her only 
 as a means of attacking France (France having just as- 
 
 E26J 
 
sured both Belgium and England that she would not vio- 
 late Belgian neutrality). 
 
 England has done things in the past that are hard to 
 defend, but I don't think she has ever sunk to quite this 
 level of shameless brutality! Even if it be argued that a 
 merely defensive war with Russia and France as antago- 
 nists was fatal and that swift attack on France offered the 
 only hope of success (an unsound argument, I think, in a 
 war in which Germany had Austria as ally and only two 
 antagonists— for this argument was advanced before Eng- 
 land came in), still the fact remains that Germany need 
 never have put herself in a position where she would be 
 faced with such an alternative. Also, both the writings of 
 her generals and the known arrangement of her strategic 
 railways show that for years, in spite of recent assertions to 
 the contrary, she has cold-bloodedly planned to make use 
 of Belgium in just this way. Bernard Shaw had better 
 find some worthier paradox to support! I believe he is 
 honest, but his hatred of hypocrisy makes him see it where 
 it does n't exist. His fondness for the off side has led him 
 into a false position. No one could read Sir Edward 
 Grey's and Asquith's speeches and find the slightest touch 
 of hypocrisy in the anger which Germany's proposals 
 roused in them. 
 
 An interesting suggestion, which is likely to be carried 
 out, is that lecturers— persons thoroughly familiar with 
 European history— be sent about the country to make clear 
 to English citizens the exact causes of the war and the 
 principles for which England is fighting. A number of 
 university professors have volunteered already. Some 
 labor leaders have felt that such lectures might degener- 
 ate into "Jingo spellbinding," but if this danger be 
 avoided, the plan ought to prove a good one. 
 
 As I have thought over the question of the United States 
 
 [27: 
 
purchasing the Hamburg- American ships and using them 
 to export grain, possibly through Holland to Germany, I 
 realize that since we are sending grain to England there 
 can be little objection to our doing the same for Germany 
 — though, of course, either English or German war-ships 
 could seize such grain as conditional contraband. Wells, 
 in his "Appeal to the American People," which I am send- 
 ing you, admits our legal right to send grain in this way, 
 but urges us for the sake of shortening the war not to make 
 use of this right. This is, I am afraid, hardly fair to Ger- 
 many! The sounder ground of objection to our purchase 
 of the ships is the direct aid to Germany of the $25,000,000 
 payment and the indirect aid of relieving them from the 
 heavy cost of maintaining the ships idle. So long as they 
 stay shut up they are a burden to her, and if they come out 
 she risks losing them altogether. Our purchase of them 
 might be a blow to England's naval efficiency and her abil- 
 ity to injure Germany's commerce. So I still hope the 
 plan will not be carried out. The seizure, too, of condi- 
 tional contraband in American Government-owned ships 
 by English war vessels might easily lead to friction. Starv- 
 ing out Germany is an essential part of England's policy, 
 and she could not possibly abandon any legitimate means 
 to this end. Feeling here continues grateful and cordial 
 to America. 
 
 By the way, if you want extra copies of the war histories 
 or any articles I have sent you, to pass on, let me know. 
 The "Daily Telegraph" history seems to publish all the 
 diplomatic correspondence preceding the war quite fully. 
 Also, if you can get me a copy of the official German pam- 
 phlet "Why Germany Went to War," which is said to 
 have been circulated widely in the United States, I shall 
 be very grateful. It is hard to get hold of here, only re- 
 views and criticisms of it having appeared. 
 
 All remains quiet here on the East coast. 
 
North Cromer, September 1st. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I am sending Bernhardi to-day— also the "Daily Tele- 
 graph" history and several interesting articles, particu- 
 larly one by "Politicus" from the "Fortnightly" which 
 gives quite a new view of the Kaiser's personal responsibil- 
 ity for the war. I must say the author makes a strong case. 
 The published official report of the British Ambassador's 
 last days in Berlin certainly shows up the Kaiser in an un- 
 pleasant light. 
 
 Do read the first seven chapters and the last of Bern- 
 hardi's book (the rest are more or less technical), for it is 
 one of the evidences of modern German opinion, at least 
 in high circles. The Crown Prince praises it to the skies! 
 I shall also send you, when I have read them, J. A. 
 Cramb's "Germany and England" and Usher's "Pan-Ger- 
 manism"; both of them, to judge from the reviews, the 
 more convincing because of the extent to which the au- 
 thors have themselves been influenced by the appeal of 
 this new German gospel of "efficiency" for the purpose of 
 armed aggression. I am sending reviews of both books. 
 
 The "Daily Telegraph" history is fairly free from one- 
 sided comment, but it does not publish all the official 
 documents and gives in some respects an incomplete record 
 of the sequence of events. Don't bother with Courtney's 
 introduction— it is thin and superficial. Dr. Dillon's ar- 
 ticles, written from Vienna, seem to me rather reactionary 
 but are valuable as giving Austria's point of view. 
 
 From all the diplomatic correspondence several points 
 seem to me to emerge clearly. In the first place, Germany 
 was greatly to blame for refusing Sir Edward Grey's pro- 
 posal of a four-nation conference. She gave no sound 
 reason for such a refusal. In the second, while the Chan- 
 cellor and Foreign Secretary von Jagow worked honestly 
 
 [>9] 
 
up to July 31st to prevent war, their efforts were not only 
 feeble, but were hampered by the character and sym- 
 pathies of the German Ambassador at Vienna and by the 
 apparent understanding between him, the Kaiser and the 
 Austrian Government, quite inconsistent with the German 
 Government's avowed position. In the third place, I have 
 seen no adequate justification for the Russian Govern- 
 ment's action in converting their partial mobilization into 
 a general one, and this seems a most unfortunate mistake 
 on their part. However, their excuse that Germany, un- 
 der cover of what is known as a proclamation of "Kriegs- 
 gefahr," was to all intents and purposes mobilizing against 
 them, may have been right. Russia has no such provision 
 for a legally disguised mobilization, and as she requires 
 nearly twice as long to mobilize as Germany on account of 
 her great distances and lack of railway facilities, it was 
 natural that she should not want Germany to get too great 
 a lead. Still, as I say, I feel she would have done better 
 to keep her record entirely above criticism, whatever 
 provocation was given. 
 
 Finally, and most important of all, the Kaiser's action in 
 sending an ultimatum to Russia with only twelve hours for 
 reply, was absolutely inexcusable. Mobilization, though 
 serious, is not war. It could have been sufficiently met by 
 full mobilization on the part of Germany and Austria, 
 which would have left an opening for King George's elev- 
 enth-hour offer of mediation and for the negotiations 
 which were still going on between Petersburg and Vienna, 
 and were admittedly more favorable at that time than at 
 any earlier stage. The Kaiser's brusque ultimatum was 
 equivalent to a declaration of war and put an end to any 
 hope of a favorable settlement. It is this act which must 
 bear the chief blame for finally precipitating the world 
 war. 
 
 [30] 
 
I have just received the English "White Book," and 
 when I have read it I will send it to you. It is worth not- 
 ing that the English Government publishes merely the 
 documents and lets them speak for themselves. The Ger- 
 man "White Book," on the other hand, gives only a por- 
 tion of the correspondence and prefaces it with a long 
 argument justifying its own position. 
 
 I feel confirmed in thinking that Sir Edward Grey's 
 critics have been unfair to him. Their two main points 
 are mutually contradictory— for one is that he was com- 
 pelled by his relations with France and Russia to act, not 
 as an impartial mediator, but as their ally, — and the other, 
 that his position was so non-committal up to the last mo- 
 ment that Germany gained no clear idea of England's 
 intention and was led on to actions which she would have 
 avoided had she known that England would fight! 
 
 The true explanation seems to me to be that while all the 
 world knew that England was a friend of France and Rus- 
 sia and to a certain extent bound to stand by them, Sir 
 Edward Grey, for the sake of peace, abandoned for a time 
 this position and made such extreme efforts to act as an 
 impartial peacemaker that he gave serious alarm to both 
 France and Russia. If Germany had shown any real will- 
 ingness to help him, the war could have been avoided. At 
 the same time, he gave Germany several clear warnings 
 but refused to commit himself to any of them as long as 
 there was a hope of maintaining peace. Germany's com- 
 plaint that he showed solicitude as to France's colonies and 
 prestige, but none as to Germany's, is absurd. At that stage 
 of the game, when war between France and Germany had 
 practically begun, of course England had to think first of 
 her ally. She could not be expected, whether she fought 
 or not, to remain unmoved when her ally was actually at- 
 tacked; but this by no means casts doubt upon the sin- 
 
cerity of her earlier efforts for peace at a stage when the 
 whole situation was different. 
 
 In fact, the more closely one studies the documents, the 
 more strikingly do Sir Edward Grey's character and 
 methods shine by contrast with the German statesmen. 
 His proposition to the German Chancellor at the eleventh 
 hour, that if the crisis could be averted he would work for 
 a concert of the powers, gives promise for the future, since 
 he, more than any other one man, seems likely to shape or 
 influence the final settlement. 
 
 Austria's position, while I cannot sympathize with it, 
 is at least clear. Her leaders honestly believed that Ser- 
 via's existence as a strong, independent State was incom- 
 patible with the prosperity of their own country, and they 
 had at least some ground for so thinking. To them it was 
 a simple question as to which of the two rival States was to 
 be crushed (or, in Austria's case, disintegrated). I think 
 myself that they have their past misdeeds largely to thank, 
 and that even at the present time their safety does not ne- 
 cessitate the destruction of Servia— still less, ambitious 
 designs toward a forcible hegemony over the Balkan 
 States or a seaport on the iEgean. But one cannot, after 
 all, expect them to see the matter quite disinterestedly, or 
 to admit that the breaking-up of the Austrian Empire 
 would be a desirable thing and a step towards a more se- 
 cure peace! But Germany,— she had no such excuse for 
 disturbing the whole status quo. With her there was no 
 question of merely preserving her present power and 
 avoiding a danger honestly feared. Her only possible 
 motive for raising a disturbance was a desire to fish in 
 troubled waters. . . . 
 
 This dastardly burning of the entire older portion of 
 Louvain has made me see a bit red, I must confess ! It was 
 so entirely wanton, even if all that the Germans say— 
 
 [32] 
 
which seems open to grave doubt— were true as to civilian 
 attacks. I hope America will take the lead in arousing 
 neutral nations to protest against such barbarities. Pos- 
 sibly, our Government cannot act, but certainly the Amer- 
 ican people ought to have no personal doubt as to where 
 they stand in regard to such actions. I hope the Belgian 
 delegation, which is now on its way to America, will meet 
 with a warm reception and will secure some practical as- 
 sistance in protecting their gallant little country against 
 such damnable outrages. Do write me how they are re- 
 ceived. 
 
 The methods of the German Ambassador and his efforts 
 to stir up bad feelings in America against Japan will not 
 bring him much success, unless I am greatly mistaken. 
 Write me what America is thinking of it all — the America 
 that the "New York Times" doesn't tell me all about! 
 
 Sheringham, Norfolk, September 4th. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I have moved over to Sheringham, a few miles from 
 Cromer. It is practically on the water's edge, or rather 
 the edge of cliffs overhanging the beach. I am counting 
 on this splendid air and plenty of exercise to put me in 
 first-rate condition again. 
 
 I am sending you the September "Contemporary" with 
 an interesting article by Dr. Dillon— also a lot of newspa- 
 per clippings and articles from the September "Nine- 
 teenth Century." The ones by Sir Harry Johnston and J. 
 Ellis Barker are especially good. It is interesting to see 
 that they take practically the same view as Dr. Dillon: 
 that Germany is acting like a maniac and must for the 
 sake of safety and civilization be not only beaten but ren- 
 dered powerless for further harm. The task seems likely 
 
to take a long time, far longer than the first estimates— but 
 I can't doubt that it will be accomplished in the long run. 
 At any rate, England has set her teeth and will fight on for 
 twenty years if necessary, or until she is destroyed, before 
 she will consent to make peace on terms that do not insure 
 Germany's suppression. This is no exaggeration, but 
 only sober fact. At the start public opinion was inclined 
 to treat the war lightly, as something that might be over in 
 a few months. Now people talk of a year, or several years. 
 There is some hope that Germany's resources will be so 
 exhausted that she will be forced to stop. I hope so— but 
 I should rather see a five-year war than an inconclusive 
 peace. 
 
 Recruiting has taken a jump during the last few days 
 and is progressing at the rate of 30,000 a day as against 
 7,000 or 8,000 a day the first few weeks. It took the news 
 of the first heavy losses to the British army and of the bru- 
 talities of the German soldiers to wake the nation, and 
 Germany will learn during the coming months what a 
 force she has raised against herself. 
 
 One good result of the increased seriousness of the pub- 
 lic opinion will be— I hope— the settlement of the Irish 
 question, in spite of a very unfortunate revival of party 
 bitterness in the House on Monday. That incident appar- 
 ently frightened even the participants, and there was no 
 doubt of the intense disapproval of the public at large. A 
 good sign was an editorial in the "Daily Telegraph," one 
 of the most out-and-out Tory papers, which I am sending 
 you, urging a settlement on what I feel are very fair lines : 
 i.e., the passage of the Home Rule Bill now (it will be- 
 come law automatically on the adjournment of Parlia- 
 ment), but with a provision postponing the date on which 
 it is to take effect. This will give time for the pas- 
 sage of an amending bill before there is any question 
 
of the bill's coming into actual operation, and will 
 obviate any legitimate fears on the part of Ulster that 
 the Nationalists may get an unfair advantage from the 
 war. When the amending bill does pass, I believe it will 
 provide for the exclusion, without time limit, of the four 
 unquestionably Protestant counties (Armagh, Antrim, 
 Derry and Down), and of parts of Tyrone and Fer- 
 managh, those parts which are predominantly Protestant. 
 Possibly a bill of this sort can be agreed to before Parlia- 
 ment adjourns— this would be an ideal solution— but it 
 can only come if Carson and his Ulstermen abandon their 
 absurd demand for the exclusion of the whole of Tyrone 
 and Fermanagh, in both of which counties there is a small 
 Catholic majority. It would be a crime if a small group 
 of selfish bigots could cheat the rest of Ireland of the 
 Home Rule for which they have already waited too long, 
 and which, since Redmond's fine speech, even fair-minded 
 men on the Unionist side are convinced that they deserve. 
 The strongly Protestant corner of Ulster should not be 
 forced in against its will, but I believe there is little doubt 
 that it will join the rest of Ireland of its own accord, if the 
 settlement that I speak of is agreed to. At any rate there is 
 already a very different feeling among Unionists toward 
 Home Rule. England at last, with few and decreasing 
 exceptions, feels cordially towards the Irish people, and 
 the news of the way the Irish soldiers fight at the front 
 wins enthusiastic admiration. Tell K. and H. and P. that 
 they should be proud to-day of their country, and that I 
 believe there are good times ahead for Ireland! 
 
 I am glad to see that the burning of Louvain has 
 aroused people in the United States to active protests. I 
 hope this will be felt in Berlin! I have no use for a neu- 
 trality that keeps quiet when such things are being perpe- 
 
trated. I am glad to see that the German Ambassador's 
 campaign of justification is falling flat already. 
 
 The most disagreeable feature of the whole business, to 
 me, is the conduct of men like Harnack and Eucken— 
 whitewashing their Government's record! It shows how 
 widely the poison of Prussian militarism has worked. One 
 could understand their keeping quiet in a moment of na- 
 tional peril, though men like Ramsay Macdonald over 
 here have n't hesitated to oppose the action of the English 
 Government— mistakenly, I believe, but with sincerity and 
 courage. The kind of political views upheld by Harnack 
 and Eucken are a disgrace to German scholarship. The 
 only excuse I can find for them is the long-continued dis- 
 tortion of foreign news in the German papers ; but scholars 
 ought to have outside sources of information and some in- 
 dependence of moral judgment. It does seem to show that, 
 with all their erudition and fine qualities, German profes- 
 sors, like the bulk of their countrymen, are incompletely 
 civilized. 
 
 It occurs to me to warn you not to take too seriously the 
 criticism by Wells, that I sent you, of the way in which the 
 recruiting is being handled here. There was some basis 
 for it, and I hate as much as he does the "Maffick" press, 
 but his criticism lacks balance and is bad-tempered. 
 Things are n't going badly now. 
 
 Sheringham, September $th. 
 Dear Mrs. J.: 1 
 
 Thanks very much for the "War and Peace" magazine 
 and two copies of the "Labor Leader." I read them last 
 night with great interest, but I do not agree with Ramsay 
 
 1 The "Mrs. J." to whom this letter, and two others, were written is an English 
 friend with whom he often discussed politics, and whose judgment and know- 
 ledge of these questions he greatly valued. 
 
 [36: 
 
Macdonald or the letter from a soldier at the front. The 
 latter seems to me hopelessly unfair to his own country and 
 inaccurate as to facts. I can't believe that he represents 
 the point of view of more than an infinitesimally small 
 proportion of the army or the nation. Ramsay Mac- 
 donald is, of course, of a different calibre, but I must con- 
 fess that his two articles made me angry and disgusted. 
 After a night's sleep I am able to consider them more dis- 
 passionately (!), but they still seem wrong-headed and 
 unfair to the Government. 
 
 I think if you had lived, as I have, for a year in Ger- 
 many and listened to lectures by German professors on his- 
 tory and politics and talked with people of all sorts on the 
 subject of international relations and got the "feel" of the 
 modern German attitude towards other nations, you would 
 agree with me that this war could not have been avoided— 
 that it was brought on by the gradual poisoning of Ger- 
 man public opinion by professorial and militarist propa- 
 ganda, and that until the Germans have been beaten and 
 made to realize the disastrous results of their present atti- 
 tude, there will never be real peace. In their state of mind 
 before the war it was useless to argue with them— they 
 simply laughed and "knew better"— I have heard army 
 officers quote Treitschke till one was sick. Bernhardi's 
 views, which "War and Peace" refers to as confined to a 
 tiny minority of militarist extremists, were table-talk at 
 pensions where I stayed, and among students at Heidel- 
 berg; not in the form of reference to his books but as com- 
 monly accepted notions. English Liberals may not believe 
 this, but it is so. 
 
 Now with a nation in this state of mind, especially when 
 it is led by men imbued with the same ideas (see their 
 speeches and articles in the poisonous German press), the 
 only thing that will awaken them to the real meaning of 
 
 l37l 
 
their mental condition is a tremendous shock. I believe 
 they will get such a shock and that it will have a profound 
 effect. Not that, all at once, the German nation by a sort 
 of miracle will undergo conversion— but I believe they 
 will be forcibly awakened from their hashish dream and 
 started thinking in an opposite direction. 
 
 Possibly this could have been brought about in time by 
 well directed educational work. Certainly no one would 
 have dreamed of forcing on a war in order to accomplish 
 it. But what has happened is that Germany has forced 
 war on the rest of the world, and now, horrible as it is, I 
 believe the good results will in the long run outweigh the 
 bad. Many peace advocates like Ramsay Macdonald be- 
 lieve that instead of decreasing the military spirit in Ger- 
 many, defeat will increase it. I think they misread present 
 facts and the teaching of history. What happened in 
 France after 1870 (aside, that is, from the resentment over 
 Alsace-Lorraine), and in Russia after 1905? If the (hof- 
 fentlich) victorious Allies refrain, as I am convinced they 
 will, from seizing essentially German territory, I don't be- 
 lieve there will be any repetition of the national military 
 revival which followed Jena. The German colonies are 
 more of a danger-spot, and I hope they will be spared, 
 since the nearest approach to a legitimate grievance that 
 Germany has is that her overseas expansion has been 
 thwarted. I don't think this complaint is sound— see Sir 
 Harry Johnston's article in the September "Nineteenth 
 Century" as to England's recent concessions and readiness 
 to make fair arrangements— but I don't want the Germans 
 to have any excuse for alleging unfair treatment or for 
 harboring thoughts of a "revanche." 
 
 Of course I believe, with Lowes Dickinson and Wells 
 and every sane observer, that the alliance system must go 
 and a more or less formal "concert of powers" take its 
 
 C38] 
 
place. I doubt if anything so ambitious as Dickinson's 
 plan can be effected at once— but I believe that something 
 which will have the practical advantages of such a plan 
 will be brought about when the war is over. See, for ex- 
 ample, Asquith's Guildhall speech, as a justification of Sir 
 Edward Grey's efforts already in this direction and an 
 indication of the future attitude of the Government. 
 
 What I don't agree with and consider thoroughly unfair 
 and lacking in a sense for realities, is the criticism of Sir 
 Edward Grey for his failure to achieve such results before 
 the war. Such criticism entirely overlooks the contemp- 
 tuous refusal of the German Government to have a part in 
 any such effort (not merely at the last moment but for a 
 long time back), and fails to consider the extent to which 
 average continental opinion lags behind Liberal and So- 
 cialist thought in this direction. No such plan stood the 
 ghost of a chance of being considered in the face of Ger- 
 many's attitude or so long as she and other nations were 
 increasing their armaments. Ramsay Macdonald's talk 
 about ten years' educational work being sufficient seems to 
 me arrant nonsense. Of course, such work must go on, and 
 in the long run nothing else can achieve adequate results— 
 but there is nothing gained by talking as if the impossible 
 could be made possible merely by the efforts of one well- 
 meaning and enlightened foreign secretary. 
 
 Another thing Sir Edward Grey's critics fail to remem- 
 ber is that, as the result overwhelmingly proves, he did 
 represent and satisfy the majority of his countrymen. He 
 could not fairly be asked to go far in advance of them, sup- 
 ported only by a small group of men ahead of their time. 
 
 I hope that you will not consider me a backslider into 
 English "Prussianism," beguiled by the "Maffick" press! 
 I have done nothing for the last month but read and think 
 about the causes and the bearings of the war, and tried to 
 
 l39l 
 
put my ideas into words in long letters to my sister. I have 
 spent hours going over the "White Book" and have read 
 everything that I could get hold of on the German side 
 and from the critics of the Government here in England. 
 I have tried hard to be fair and open-minded. I can't 
 come to any view but that which I have been trying, very 
 inadequately, to express to you. Indeed, the more I think 
 and read, the more convinced I become. 
 
 I have had a lot to do with "reformers" at home. They 
 are my best friends! I hope I am, to some extent, one of 
 them and that I am sympathetic toward their point of 
 view. But I have found that the more advanced — with 
 whose views I often completely agreed so far as the future 
 was concerned— were very unfair critics of the men who 
 are trying to make the present machinery of government 
 run. These latter are often quite at one with the advanced 
 thinkers in criticising existing conditions, and even in re- 
 gard to the new conditions which it would be desirable to 
 bring about. But they are forced, day by day, to meet 
 practical obstacles which even the fairest of advanced 
 thinkers seldom takes into account. Probably it is best for 
 the world that reformers don't think too much about the 
 obstacles, but concentrate their energies on making clear 
 to others the end to be achieved; but, just for this reason 
 they are seldom sound critics of current events. All shades 
 of approach to the pure white of their ideal become 
 merged, for them, in an undifferentiated dark gray! 
 Whereas to onlookers these various shades may differ 
 widely in their relative blackness or whiteness. In so far 
 as the reformers do differentiate, they are apt, in their ef- 
 fort to be hard on themselves and fair to others, to see as 
 blackest the deficiencies of their own city government, or 
 nation. 
 
 These ideas are platitudinous but they bear directly on 
 
 [40] 
 
the present situation. The critics of the Government have 
 forgotten, largely, the difficulties with which it has been 
 faced. In their efforts to be fair they have lost their sense 
 of proportion. This has been particularly evident in re- 
 gard to Germany's breach of Belgian neutrality, on which 
 point the attitude of men like Ponsonby (whom I im- 
 mensely admire and respect) and Bernard Shaw and Mac- 
 donald is to me simply inconceivable. They distort all the 
 facts leading up to the final declaration of war. After all, 
 one's own nation is not necessarily wrong or belief in the 
 justice of her cause necessarily unenlightened! They ap- 
 pear to start from the premise that it is. Treaties are 
 treaties and the very foundation on which all public 
 morality and all hope of better international relations rest. 
 If France had done what Germany has done, I firmly be- 
 lieve that England's public opinion would have con- 
 demned her and the English Government would have 
 given her a sharp warning to halt. The assumption that 
 England's protest was hypocritical and that she merely 
 wanted a pretext for supporting France seems to me de- 
 moralizing and calculated only to shake one's confidence 
 in the judgment of the men who maintain it. These men 
 have fine records— they are valuable public leaders— but 
 for just this reason they owe it to themselves not to descend 
 to this level. They have been unfairly abused in the press 
 and are doubtless smarting under a sense of unjust treat- 
 ment and impotence to accomplish the ends for which they 
 have striven, but this is no excuse for bitterness and unfair- 
 ness in their own criticism of others— far less, for turning 
 white black and black white in the effort to prove their 
 case. 
 
 It is in just these respects that Norman Angell and his 
 group have shown up so well. They have refrained, so far 
 as I have seen, from personal attack or criticism and have 
 
 C40 
 
turned their entire energy into constructive work looking 
 towards the terms of peace and what will follow. This is 
 the true work of the reformer, in which he is of inesti- 
 mable value. Even in their case, however, greatly as I 
 sympathize with their aims and methods, I think that from 
 their preoccupation with long-range views, they under- 
 value the immediate advantages which may fairly be 
 looked for as a result of the war, and insufficiently em- 
 phasize the difference in moral standards between the 
 German and English Governments, as shown by official 
 documents. I don't at all mean that I think war the best 
 way of securing these advantages— only, that war was in- 
 evitable, from Germany's conduct and views, and that 
 being so, it is worth while to get as much comfort as pos- 
 sible from the justice of England's cause, and the real 
 benefits which are fairly within sight as the result of a vic- 
 tory for the Allies. I include among the latter a rear- 
 rangement of the map of Europe on the basis of the 
 natural principle of nationality and the wishes of the in- 
 habitants. Another advantage would be the complete dis- 
 crediting, in Russia, of Prussian bureaucratic and militar- 
 ist ideas (to which in the past have been due many of the 
 worst crimes of Russia's rulers), and an openness to Eng- 
 lish influence and thought. I do not agree with Wells's 
 exaggerated hopes of immediate regeneration in Russia, 
 but still less with the intolerant bitterness of many English 
 Liberals and the majority of my own countrymen towards 
 an abstraction which, in their ignorance of the real Russia, 
 they have set up to represent her. The "diabolical Russia" 
 of some labor leaders is as unreal as the "Holy Russia" of 
 the "Morning Post." But I am honestly convinced that 
 there is less danger to civilized international relations 
 from a successful Russia than from a successful Germany. 
 I can't go into a detailed discussion of the "White 
 
 [42] 
 
Book" or the broader grounds on which I base my con- 
 demnation of Germany, and if I did you would be too 
 bored by this time to read it— but I do feel that if there 
 ever was a righteous war, and a war in which England was 
 not to blame, it is this one. This is fully as strong as my 
 conviction about our own Civil War, and I only hope it 
 will be fought on the Allies' side with Lincoln's steady in- 
 domitableness— and terminated in the spirit which Lin- 
 coln showed towards the Southerners. 
 
 Of course there is danger that in conquering Prussian 
 militarism the rest of the world will become contaminated 
 with the same ideas. But surely there was at least a sim- 
 ilar danger in the spectacle of a phenomenally prosperous 
 and successful Prussia, brazenly increasing her power, in 
 spite of diplomatic blunders, and winning the unwilling 
 admiration of other countries. It would have been hard, 
 for example, in the coming decades, if Prussia had con- 
 tinued to get what she wanted by her recent methods 
 (either with or without war), to convince such undevel- 
 oped nations as Servia and Bulgaria that these methods 
 were not the best. In view of the (probably) unforget- 
 able failure of these methods, it will be an easier task to 
 prove that honest mediation and friendly co-operation are 
 not only more moral but more practically successful. 
 
 As for England, it looks as if the war was helping toward 
 a better understanding with Ireland— though heaven 
 knows there is still the most awful stupidity and wicked 
 prejudice standing in the way of a settlement! The suc- 
 cess, so far, of the voluntary enlistment system (in spite of 
 Wells's bad-tempered criticism of recruiting arrange- 
 ments and the foolish hounding of young men, which he 
 rightly attacked) will go far to discredit any first steps 
 toward conscription, like "compulsory training." Of 
 course Lord Roberts and the other "Prussians" will shout 
 
 [43 3 
 
for it when the war is over, but I believe they will find 
 even less public support than they did before the war. 
 The insidious, unconscious growth of "Prussian" ideas 
 will be far more dangerous, but— though perhaps I am 
 merely a shallow optimist— I have faith that they can be 
 overcome. The "horrible example" of Prussianism will 
 be fresh in the public mind if Liberal leaders only make 
 good use of it. 
 
 I did n't start out to inflict such a screed as this on you— 
 but I wanted, since reading the articles you sent, to try to 
 show why I disagree with them and what my own point of 
 view is. When you have sufficiently recovered from the 
 strain of wading through it perhaps you will be good 
 enough to mail it to my sister, as it sums up several things I 
 have tried to say to her, and I know I shall never rise to 
 such an effort again! 
 
 Sheringham, September Jth. 
 Dear Mrs. J.: 
 
 I have just finished J. A. Cramb's "Germany and Eng- 
 land" and have been so much impressed with the matter- 
 not the point of view— that I am taking the liberty of hav- 
 ing a copy sent to you. The first three or four chapters are 
 well worth reading, and the fact that the author is a "Prus- 
 sian" himself, of the deepest dye, largely owing to the 
 early influence of Treitschke, makes his testimony only the 
 more important. The chapter on T.'s influence in modern 
 Germany is particularly interesting and my own know- 
 ledge bears out what he says. Along similar lines is 
 Usher's "Pan-Germanism"— an independent testimony 
 from an American point of view, by a man who, like 
 Cramb, has evidently felt the false glamour of modern 
 German ideals. The vigor and honesty with which these 
 
 [443 
 
romantic Jingo views are held, and the immense practical 
 intelligence with which it is being sought to put them into 
 effect, make them all the more dangerous. I can see now 
 the good kind Fraulein at whose house in Wernigerode I 
 spent the summer of 1907, with the little tin war-ship bank 
 in which she was trying to get contributions for the Navy 
 League, and I can hear her ready-made views on foreign 
 affairs, all trustfully taken from the poisonous "Tagliche 
 Rundschau." Her brother was a "Konigliche Bauin- 
 spector" from Ost Preussen. He and I climbed the 
 Brocken together, and his myopic bitterness against the 
 English and general views on international politics made 
 me want to tear his hair at intervals. And I can still hear 
 young Doctor M., at the pension in Heidelberg, calmly 
 declaring: "Of course, every one knows that the only way 
 England conquered and held India was by making all the 
 Hindoos drunk"— and this young man was an able medi- 
 cal student and a Ph.D.! Professor O., too, son of a well- 
 known historian, and lecturer on Modern Diplomatic 
 History, was always ridiculing the English statesmen and 
 exalting Bismarck. This sort of thing, which one met in 
 widely different parts of Germany and among widely dif- 
 ferent sorts of people, cannot be overlooked. 
 
 My own feeling at the time was that the Germans, with 
 all their intelligence and culture, are in matters of human 
 intercourse which are essential to generous, mutually tol- 
 erant and chivalrous relations between human beings, un- 
 disciplined and incompletely civilized, and nowhere is 
 this truer than in university circles. 
 
 Their political thinking is still dominated by memories 
 of Frederick the Great and Bismarck; and the sufferings 
 and glorious revival of 18 13 to 18 15, followed by the suc- 
 cesses of 1864-67 and hallowed by a sentiment like that of 
 our own grandfathers and fathers for the American Revo- 
 lt 3 
 
lution and the Civil War, have turned their ambitions and 
 hopes in a false direction. Then, too, the shallow bril- 
 liance of the present Kaiser's personality and his curious 
 (though, I believe, partly sincere) leanings towards peace, 
 have had a bad effect on the naturally romantic tempera- 
 ment of the Germans, something like Napoleon III on 
 France. Just as the latter, with his satellites, cheapened 
 the traditions of the Revolution and of the First Empire 
 and brought ruin on his nation, so the Kaiser and the men 
 around him, building on the sincere and misguided teach- 
 ings of a generation of German professors (Treitschke, for 
 example, might parallel Lamartine), have cheapened the 
 traditions of Frederick and Bismarck and have now 
 brought their nation to disaster. The tradition in each 
 case, though it had within it the germs of unsoundness 
 —false dealing, brutality, perversion of patriotism- 
 had a basis of true grandeur, and the glamour of success 
 added to it, enabled it to capture the imagination of the 
 people. But in each case the unsoundness became evi- 
 dent, eating like a canker to the heart of national life, and, 
 culminating in the reign of a brilliant and shallow ruler, 
 brought its inevitable punishment. The sham idealism 
 with which the Germans have clothed the 18th-century 
 ideal, the atmosphere of keen modern critical thought in 
 which they have developed it, and the organized efficiency 
 with which they are seeking to put it into effect,— none of 
 these alter its essentially reactionary character or moral 
 unworthiness. They only add to the tragedy. 
 
 Of course, a false national idea like this, held by mil- 
 lions of people, can't be overcome by war, although war 
 can have an important effect by the mere shock and stimu- 
 lus toward readjustment which defeat may bring. France 
 was certainly sobered by the debacle, though resentment 
 at the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the need for maintain- 
 
 C46] 
 
ing the prestige of the army (see the Boulanger and Drey- 
 fus incidents) interfered with the awakening of a worthier 
 national spirit which is now so evident. Only an English 
 "Prussian" could believe that you could thrash a man into 
 sounder ways of thinking, but thrashing can sometimes be 
 a preliminary to open-mindedness on the part of the 
 "thrashee," which no amount of peaceful propaganda, not 
 even ten years of Labor party and Socialist propaganda, 
 can accomplish. When your intended convert hates and 
 despises you and believes that your efforts towards peace 
 are merely a cowardly effort to keep the "swag" of past 
 depredations from a sturdier and younger adventurer, 
 viz., himself, patience and persuasion are rather thrown 
 away! Even generosity towards a man who is aching to 
 demolish you is apt to be wasted until he has forced you to 
 regretfully administer a good licking. Then it is essential. 
 
 In the long run it is only propaganda work that brings 
 results, but it would have been hard to make anti-slavery 
 propaganda successful in the South before the Civil War; 
 and the modern Germans are in some ways not unlike our 
 ante-bellum Southerners. They believe in their militar- 
 ism as the Southerners believed in their "peculiar institu- 
 tion." They try to promote it with the same hot-blooded, 
 arrogant ruthlessness. Their professors defend it with the 
 same fervent consciousness of moral rectitude as the 
 Southern clergymen defended slavery. The South forced 
 on the war, as the Germans have done. Was the North 
 wrong in fighting? Did the ideas of the South conquer 
 its conquerors? 
 
 Please forgive this second lengthy outburst — but I feel 
 so strongly that Keir Hardie and Ramsay Macdonald, for 
 all their courage and sincerity (though with a tendency to 
 hit a shade below the belt) , are wrong about the war, that 
 
 U7l 
 
I can't hold in! Like every enthusiast, I want the friends 
 whose opinion I respect to agree with me. 
 
 P.S. The important thing for enlightened Liberals is 
 to make clear why they are supporting the war and what 
 they believe England is fighting for; not to let the English 
 "Prussians" becloud the issues or make use of war to push 
 conscription and false ideas of what national interest de- 
 mands. This should be easier because of the odium which 
 Prussian "Prussians" are bringing on their own doctrines, 
 an unpopularity which even their English counterparts 
 are forced to take account of. All that lies bound up in 
 Jingo ideas of conquest was never easier to bring home to 
 "the man in the music hall" than at the present time. Em- 
 phasis on the sound justification for the war and the ad- 
 vanced British ideals which are sought to be upheld 
 should offset the cheap conceptions which we find in the 
 evening papers and even in some of the morning papers. 
 The "Times" has on the whole been pretty sound, in spite 
 of a rather smug horror at the wickedness of the Germans. 
 The "Nation" is doing this sort of work splendidly. "War 
 and Peace" is very properly keeping on its own lines and 
 looking forward to the terms of peace and what will fol- 
 low. If all the leaders of liberal thought lend a hand, I 
 don't believe the "Prussians" will profit much by the war. 
 
 But unfair criticism of the Government will only 
 weaken the critics' influence when it is most needed. 
 
 Sheringham, September II. 
 Dear C: 
 
 I am having sent you to-day a package of books, etc., 
 bearing on the war. Will you keep a copy of each for 
 
 [48: 
 
yourself and give the extra ones where you think they will 
 do the most good? I will gladly send more if you can use 
 them to advantage. I am keen to have as many people as 
 possible at home realize what this war is about. The Eng- 
 lish "Nation" has been admirable and gives a good idea of 
 how even the most advanced and pacifist section of Eng- 
 lish thought feels toward the war. 
 
 The opposition here is small ; nothing like what it was 
 at the time of the Boer war, being confined generally to the 
 Independent Labor party— the Socialist branch, not to be 
 confused with the larger body, the Labor party, which 
 with the great Trades Union Congress is heartily support- 
 ing the war and urging its members to enlist and to 
 recruit. The Fabian Socialists, represented by the "New 
 Statesman" and by Wells's articles in various periodicals, 
 are also vigorously behind the Government. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3rd is one of the 
 chief documents for the English side, and is splendid evi- 
 dence of his position— also Asquith's Guildhall speech of 
 September 4th. 
 
 Personally I believe that Norman Angell is right about 
 war in general, and I hope the result of this war will be 
 the end of the system of alliance groups and an establish- 
 ment of a more or less formal "concert of powers," which 
 can grow in time into something like a federation of the 
 States of Europe. Probably it will not be possible to 
 make the first step a very drastic or sweeping one, but the 
 growth of the English constitution shows clearly that new 
 precedents, apparently unimportant in themselves, may 
 prove in the long run of vast importance. What is needed 
 is conscious turning in a new direction; further progress 
 will be sure to follow. 
 
 C493 
 
Sheringham, September 8th. 
 Dear K.: 
 
 Just after I had sent off my last letter to you, came yours 
 of the 23rd, and I was glad to hear that you were neither 
 seriously ill nor permanently estranged! I shall be inter- 
 ested to hear further what you think of the war. The lat- 
 ter and what may follow it, occupies most of my mind 
 nowadays. 
 
 I enclose in this letter, so that you will not miss it in the 
 mass of other clippings, a fine article by Wells on "Amer- 
 ica's Opportunity" (indeed, duty), in connection with the 
 war. It is just what I have been thinking and what I tried 
 to say the other day in a letter to Mrs. J. ; one of two long 
 ones (which I asked her to send you), in reply to some 
 articles by Ramsay Macdonald in the "Labor Leader" and 
 "War and Peace." I had hardly thought out just what 
 America's duty in connection with the settlement should 
 be, but it seems to me very important that the British 
 "Prussianism" should not be allowed by Liberals to mis- 
 state the issues of the war and secure at the end of it an 
 undesirable settlement. It is "Liberalism" (in the best 
 and widest sense of the term) , all over the world, that is at 
 stake and that stands, if the Allies are successful, to win 
 really great and permanent benefits for mankind, and Lib- 
 erals must not let this be forgotten. That is why I endorse 
 Wells's views in regard to America's interest in seeing that 
 the settlement is made on liberal rather than reactionary 
 lines. So strongly do I feel the importance of this that I 
 have ordered 200 copies of the article to send to friends at 
 home to distribute. I want the people who think and who 
 direct thought to get this idea as soon and as strongly as 
 possible. 
 
 I am reading a good deal of modern history these days, 
 besides all the newspapers and periodicals I can lay my 
 
 [50] 
 
hands on. If you have time, I should suggest J. Holland 
 Rose's "Development of the European Nations, 1870- 
 1900" as a good book to begin with. Another is Seigno- 
 bos's "Political History of the Nineteenth Century"; 
 another, Wickham Steed's "The Hapsburg Monarchy." I 
 have n't read this but it is well spoken of. 
 
 Sheringham, September Ilth. 
 DearK.: 
 
 ... As to Wells's article, I don't like the idea of any 
 foreigner dictating to us which side we should take, even if 
 he is on the side which I consider right— and the way the 
 Allies have, on the whole, as compared with the Germans, 
 refrained from doing this has been a help to them among 
 fair-minded Americans. But asking us to use our influ- 
 ence to make the settlement the basis of a sound and lasting 
 peace is a very different thing, and this I heartily approve. 
 The English "Prussians" are almost as bad as the German 
 ones, and the same may be said at least as strongly of their 
 French and Russian colleagues. The important thing is 
 to get all the liberal-minded elements in these countries 
 and in the great neutral countries to work together for a 
 far-reaching settlement on liberal rather than on Jingo- 
 imperialist lines. 
 
 If you want to get the difference vividly between the 
 two points of view, read Leonard Hobhouse's splendid 
 "Democracy and Reaction" in contrast to Cramb and 
 Bernhardi. Every American can do something to help 
 build a sound point of view in our own country. 
 
 To judge by the papers that I get and extracts from 
 other papers that I see, the foundations for such an opinion 
 are ready and waiting. President Eliot's interview, as 
 
reported here, seemed to take very clearly the right point 
 of view. . . . 
 
 The main impression that I find in my mind after read- 
 ing Cramb is the tragedy of a national ambition gone 
 wrong; of a national ideal, once not unworthy or unsuited 
 to its age, remaining narrow and finally becoming, in a 
 more enlightened generation, a curse and danger not only 
 to the nation which held it but to the world. This is all 
 the more so because of the world-wide prestige and un- 
 doubted sincerity of this nation. One might say that 
 ideals, like all living things, in order to live healthily, must 
 grow and keep pace with the changing world around 
 them. If they do not they will decay and fester and 
 spread all manner of demoralization. 
 
 In the time of Frederick the Great the policy of terri- 
 torial aggrandizement, carried out by force and fraud, 
 was something very different from such a policy to-day. 
 When founded on sincere patriotism, assisted by the prin- 
 ciple of nationality as against dynastic compulsion as the 
 basis of a State, and carried out with courage and far- 
 sightedness, it was distinctly admirable in comparison 
 with the 18th-century standards. Still more so was the 
 burst of national feeling, the military and political and 
 spiritual revival of 1813-15. But it was unfortunate that, 
 even then, military strength (contrasted with their na- 
 tional feebleness), and a narrow and aggressive patriotism 
 (in contrast with their highly enlightened cosmopolitan- 
 ism, in many ways unsuited to its age), were glorified and 
 over-emphasized. The growing generation came to feel 
 that all that was fine and worth preserving in the national 
 life was bound up with these two ideals. 
 
 Then began, after the struggle for liberty, the struggle 
 for German unity. First the Liberals of the type that 
 afterwards came to America in such numbers and took 
 
 [523 
 
such a prominent part in the Civil War, the idealistic but 
 unpractical dreamers, had their whack, and after months 
 of useless wrangling accomplished next to nothing— noth- 
 ing, that is, toward a unified Germany. They did succeed 
 in their various state governments, particularly in South 
 Germany, in securing the adoption of constitutions and 
 numerous liberal reforms. But in the Congress at Frank- 
 furt they got no further than a few unimportant modifica- 
 tions of the old futile confederation that followed the 
 Napoleonic wars. 
 
 Then came Bismarck; his fight with the Liberal Diet in 
 Prussia, resulting in the creation, by almost illegal means, 
 of a strong, well organized army; the wars with Denmark, 
 Austria and France and the founding of a modern Ger- 
 man Empire. No wonder that not only the Prussians but 
 the more liberal and easy-going South Germans were daz- 
 zled and carried off their feet! Here was the great.end 
 which the best of them had dreamed of for generations, 
 achieved in such a way that Germany jumped all at once 
 from a subordinate position in Europe to the undisputed 
 primacy of the continent. No wonder they came to rather 
 despise the liberalism which had done little more than talk 
 and to exalt the "blood and iron" policy! 
 
 These results, however, as many of the best Germans 
 themselves saw, had not been achieved without cost; — how 
 heavy, probably few were then able to realize. 
 
 The old German idealism, love of liberty, and friendly 
 cosmopolitanism were discredited— particularly after the 
 school of von Sybel and Treitschke had systematically ex- 
 alted the unworthy along with the worthy qualities of 
 Frederick the Great and Bismarck. The nation had come 
 to believe that military strength and forcible aggression 
 were the only means to national greatness. Bismarck's 
 treaty-breaking, systematic abuse of the influence of the 
 
 [53] 
 
press, brutality toward weaker nations, underhand and 
 unscrupulous diplomacy and actual bribery of govern- 
 ments and individuals — faults which show up far darker 
 against the background of the 19th-century civilization 
 than had Frederick's against the 18th century— were 
 either minimized, or, worse still, exalted into the neces- 
 sary accomplishment of a patriotic foreign policy. What 
 had gone far to excuse these flaws in the national ideal had 
 been the really great ends toward the accomplishment of 
 which this ideal had been directed: national liberty and 
 national unity. Now since these ideals have both been 
 secured, no really comparable national need remained or 
 has since arisen to take their place— at any rate, no one 
 clear guiding aim, offering an easily understood founda- 
 tion for the whole national policy. Only a boundless 
 ambition remained, fed by the pride and overweening 
 self-confidence resulting from such an immense growth of 
 prestige; occupied with recent territorial acquisitions 
 rather than more solid national achievement; — an ambi- 
 tion for mere size and power and military glory, apart 
 from any uses to which such power could be put. It is as 
 if the soul had died out of the national ideal, leaving it 
 only tawdry and meaningless. 
 
 Of course the Germans feel that they have such a con- 
 ception—some vague idea of "spreading German culture" 
 and founding a new Germanic world-empire. But one 
 feels instinctively that these ideals are not sound in quality 
 and that they are not in keeping with the best thought of 
 the present generation. This is the more convincing, now 
 that we see them at work and see the results that they are 
 producing in action, both in the present temper and be- 
 havior of the German nation at home and the armies 
 beyond its borders. Even if culture could be spread, in 
 
this day and generation, by force, it certainly can never be 
 spread by force applied in this way! 
 
 But it is all one huge tragedy— one of the greatest in 
 history— for the German nation. For the rest of the 
 world, in spite of the terrible suffering involved, and the 
 setback to social progress, I truly believe that it will bring 
 a reward far beyond these evils, and set future social prog- 
 ress on a sounder foundation. In this reward Germany 
 will eventually share. 
 
 Sheringham, September 14th. 
 Dear Mrs. J.: 
 
 Many thanks for your last letter and the manifesto of 
 the Civil Union— and the letter from Macdonald, Angell 
 and Trevelyan. I assure you your opinions have n't been 
 "suspect" except at the time when I first read the two 
 "Labor Leader" articles. Then I did wonder a bit 
 whether you might agree with Macdonald. After I got 
 your letter in answer to mine, such minor doubts as I had 
 quite vanished away. I am glad you like the "English 
 Review" article and found Cramb interesting. 
 
 As to the manifesto of the Civil Union and the letter, I 
 agree with almost everything they contain— but I am 
 afraid that I have, to some extent, lost confidence in the 
 judgment of the men back of them. . . . This applies 
 hardly at all to Norman Angell but very much to the 
 other two. I hardly feel prepared, without further con- 
 sideration, to back this particular movement. In the first 
 place, if a person so predisposed to agree with them and, 
 from their point of view, so "sound" as myself, can't help 
 distrusting them a trifle, how is the mass of moderate peo- 
 ple in all parties likely to feel — not toward the ends they 
 are after, but toward their leadership? You have pointed 
 
out, yourself, how the Tory press has received their an- 
 nouncement. May it not prove that the leadership of just 
 these men at just this time will hinder rather than help the 
 very cause they are working for? I am afraid that not 
 only rabid Tories, but even moderates, may read in the 
 movement (because of their distrust of its leaders) more 
 than is really intended, and may from blind fear and 
 prejudice take an actually more reactionary stand than 
 they otherwise would. Besides, it seems to me the situa- 
 tion is n't so bad and discouraging, as it is. Churchill's 
 speech sounded quite the right note. Even in papers like 
 the "Observer" and the "Pall Mall Gazette" it is being 
 repeatedly urged that the final settlement must respect 
 national feelings and must create no new "Alsace-Lor- 
 raine." This is only one point, but it indicates that the 
 very fervor with which the Tory press is attacking Prus- 
 sian militarism is almost unconsciously leading it into 
 opposing many of the characteristics of militarism in gen- 
 eral. 
 
 There is, to be sure, considerable tendency on the part 
 of the "National Service" advocates to say, "I told you 
 so," but hardly as much as one would expect, and all the 
 facts are combining to prove the adequacy of the volun- 
 tary army theory — only the voice of the egregious Mr. 
 Maxse is raised in really bitter attack on Liberal prin- 
 ciples and leaders— and I can't believe such cheap vitupe- 
 ration carries any weight with the moderate mass of the 
 nation. Therefore, I am inclined to think that a too active 
 pressing, just at this time, of the ideas contained in this 
 pamphlet, by this group of men, will not do good. 
 
 As to the settlement itself, I am firmly convinced that it 
 should not come until Germany has been thoroughly 
 beaten. Anything which the German ruling class could 
 by any stretch of the imagination regard as an indecisive 
 
 [56] 
 
result would be disastrous. After they are soundly 
 thrashed and realize it, after the mass of the German na- 
 tion has been startled out of its present hallucination, then 
 will be the time to talk openly of fair and generous terms, 
 of which I am entirely in favor. When that time comes, I 
 believe a far larger number of thoughtful people than we 
 now expect will come very close to agreeing with and 
 supporting the plan of settlement proposed in the pam- 
 phlet. I can't believe the English will be vindictive. Per- 
 haps all this is too optimistic — but anyway it is what I 
 believe! 
 
 I have not yet written Wells, because of several articles 
 which I have since seen, indicating a certain irritation in 
 America over a tendency on the part of some writers, Eng- 
 lish as well as foreign, to advise the United States as to its 
 own best interest. I don't think there is much cause for 
 this feeling, but editorials in a number of papers show 
 that it exists. Wells is somewhat to blame because he has 
 advised us as to our interests, a matter in regard to which, 
 as American papers quite properly point out, we are en- 
 tirely capable of forming our own opinion. Churchill's 
 interview also erred a bit in this direction. Presenting 
 the facts to us, refuting German lies, asking for our aid in 
 securing a sound and liberal settlement at the end of the 
 war— all of this is eminently wise, and, so far as I can see, 
 Americans have welcomed it and shown their sympathy 
 with England spontaneously and enthusiastically. But 
 warning us is another matter, as is also any effort to drag 
 us into the conflict against our will. 
 
 Wells's article, "America's Opportunity," starts with a 
 warning. What I first saw in it and seized upon, and still 
 think admirable, was his appeal to Americans to recognize 
 their duty in promoting the right sort of settlement. It is 
 this which I hope will be impressed on the leaders of 
 
 ZS7l 
 
American opinion and spread over the country. But be- 
 cause of the slight tension at present, and the somewhat 
 unfortunate opening of Wells's article, I want to go a bit 
 carefully in bringing it to the attention of American 
 friends. I shall send it accompanied with a word of ex- 
 planation. Also, in writing to Wells I want to make clear 
 just what I am trying to arouse support for at home. 
 
 You may be amused to hear that, in spite of first im- 
 pulses, I decided that it was none of my business to lecture 
 him on his ill-tempered reference to Norman Angell! I 
 quite agree with your desire to keep American friends in 
 touch with the best Liberal point of view here and shall be 
 glad to help in any way I can. 
 
 Sheringham, September I $. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 Among the best pieces of news that have come so far is 
 the magnificent wave of loyalty that has spread over India. 
 When the news was read in the House of Commons, even 
 that decorous assembly went wild with enthusiasm. 
 Equally inspiring is the almost unanimous loyalty of 
 South Africa. This is wonderful proof of the fundamen- 
 tal soundness of English colonial administration. Now 
 that the Government have at last, thank goodness, an- 
 nounced their intention of passing the Home Rule Bill (in 
 spite of an ill-timed partisan protest from the Unionists), 
 the only serious exception to England's fine record in the 
 treatment of dependent nations has been cleared away. 
 What a contrast to Germany's handling of the Poles, Al- 
 sace-Lorraine and West Africa! 
 
 You are quite right about the improvement in the 
 American papers since the first few days of the war. I 
 notice it especially in the "New York Times." One ex- 
 
 cs8n 
 
cuse for their publishing so much rubbish was the impos- 
 sibility of getting reliable news through over the cables. 
 The censorship was ridiculously stupid and obstructive at 
 first. It has since been put under a Press Bureau and 
 greatly improved. 
 
 President Eliot's article in the "New York Times" of 
 September 7th was fine. I am delighted to see that he en- 
 dorses the view of American neutrality which I expressed 
 in a letter to Mrs. J. President Wilson defined it too rig- 
 idly. His refusal to take any steps, at the request of the 
 Belgian mission, to investigate atrocities for which a 
 strong prima facie case had already been made, seems to 
 me a mistake (although I appreciate the motives which led 
 him to place so strict an interpretation on neutrality) . We 
 owe a duty to the world as well as ourselves. I am open to 
 conversion on this point, but that is the way I feel now. I 
 don't see why an impartial investigation should involve us 
 in any undesirable way. 
 
 The manifesto of the English authors which I sent you 
 is an interesting contrast to the manifesto of the German 
 theologians! It handles the u Kultur" argument in the 
 right way. I also sent you lately some interesting articles 
 by Russian liberals showing their attitude toward Rus- 
 sia's part in the war, and their expectation of what the re- 
 sult will be if she is successful. 
 
 I have just finished reading "Pan-Germanism" and find 
 that I detest the author's point of view even more than 
 Cramb's romantic militarism. Usher, like Cramb, studied 
 in Germany and evidently absorbed the cynical attitude 
 toward all international relations that underlies the very 
 policy which he is describing and which characterizes 
 modern German thinking in politics and history. Moral- 
 ity has no place in international politics; every State is the 
 natural enemy of every other, except in so far as two or 
 
more combine to further their selfish interests at the ex- 
 pense of others; a State can benefit itself or even maintain 
 its position only by forcible aggression (approaching 
 more or less closely to war) ; "all" nations, whether they 
 attempt it or not, act only from motives of unscrupulous 
 self-interest, and so on, ad nauseam. I wholly dissent from 
 this conception of modern world politics — as I need 
 hardly tell you. I believe that any State which bases its 
 policy upon it is as stupid and short-sighted as it is bar- 
 barous. His attempt to justify this view on the ground of 
 "impartial scholarship," superior to hypocritical preju- 
 dice, is entirely unconvincing. Impartial scholarship does 
 not require any one— least of all an American with our 
 traditions— to leave out of account all the achievements of 
 civilization in the way of generally recognized standards 
 of national conduct. Only the worst type of modern Ger- 
 man scholarship could fall into such a fallacy. He im- 
 putes to all nations indiscriminately (in his otherwise 
 interesting and suggestive summary of recent European 
 history) the most Machiavellian intentions and unscrupu- 
 lous ambitions. This, it seems to me— and several good 
 reviews of the book agree on this point— often leads him 
 to draw wrong deductions from well-known facts, and 
 even his facts themselves are occasionally inaccurate. It 
 lends to his descriptions of international intrigue an E. 
 Phillips Oppenheim atmosphere of melodrama which I 
 can't believe is true to life. I am sure, for example, that 
 the United States cherishes no such deep, far-reaching 
 schemes of aggression in Central America as he imputes 
 to her, though this is what most Germans devoutly be- 
 lieve! I am sure that England and France have not acted 
 recently from the motives he alleges. England, for exam- 
 ple, has been honestly trying for several years past to come 
 to an agreement with Germany, and has abandoned her 
 
 [60] 
 
former tendency to a stupid obstruction of Germany's ef- 
 forts at expansion, especially in the Near East. She has 
 been quite willing to further, so far as she was able, all 
 Germany's legitimate ambitions which did not unblush- 
 ingly aim at the spoliation of other nations. 
 
 Germany could have gained all she had any right to ex- 
 pect, including control over new territory for the settle- 
 ment of her expanding population, if she had been willing 
 to confine herself to honest and open negotiations with the 
 Triple Entente. But she has let herself be carried away 
 by the mad belief in armed aggression, and now she will 
 pay the penalty. An American at the present time finds it 
 hard to believe that a civilized nation can possibly be 
 under such delusions, or cherish such barbarous intentions 
 —but the answer is "Belgium" ! 
 
 In spite of the serious defects in Usher's book, it is worth 
 reading. The most valuable thing about it is the strong 
 evidence it gives of the ambitions and beliefs of modern 
 Germany — evidence too strong to be discredited. Prince 
 von Billow's "Imperial Germany" (to say nothing of 
 Bernhardi), many of the best-known German historians 
 and political theorists, a host of pamphlets and most of the 
 German newspapers and periodicals take the same point 
 of view. The "Anglo-German Problem" by Sarolea 
 bears witness to this. 
 
 There is no use whatever in well-meaning peace enthu- 
 siasts in America (and I am as strongly against war as any 
 one) proposing any premature settlement of this great 
 struggle. It would only leave Germany free to arm to the 
 teeth and begin the war again as soon as she saw a favor- 
 able opportunity. The Allies will not listen for a moment 
 to any such proposal. Only by killing Prussian militarism 
 can they lay the foundation for any sound and lasting 
 peace. 
 
 C6i] 
 
There is some danger— I can see it from following the 
 English papers as closely as I do— that in fighting Prus- 
 sian "Prussianism" the Allies may become more or less 
 Prussianized; may seek at the end vengeance rather than 
 justice, and material rewards rather than a fair and lasting 
 settlement. I do not believe that such a result is likely— or 
 at least in any crude form— but the forces making for re- 
 action even in England are not to be neglected, and in 
 Russia they will need careful watching. All those in neu- 
 tral countries who are liberal-minded, and who are anx- 
 ious that the settlement should be "progressive" in the best 
 sense of the word, should combine to throw their influence 
 in favor of such a settlement. 
 
 It must not be premature but it must be fair and enlight- 
 ened! 
 
 Sheringham, September 22. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I was much interested to hear that D. felt so strongly 
 on the side of the Allies. You might send him the pam- 
 phlet issued by the Oxford Faculty of History and the Sep- 
 tember number of the "Round Table." I have just finished 
 reading the first three articles in the latter, and they are 
 even better than the Oxford pamphlet. The second of the 
 three, particularly, is the sanest, the most temperate and at 
 the same time vigorous analysis of the Anglo-German situ- 
 ation that has yet been published. It is a magnificent state- 
 ment of England's case. The third, with a valuable 
 ethnographic map of Europe, is an almost equally good 
 analysis of the Austro-Serbian situation, though it does not 
 get down to such bed-rock principles as the second. They 
 are worth preserving. 
 
 I am especially interested this week in the German Gov- 
 
ernment's attempt to place England in the wrong before 
 the world by making it appear that Germany would now 
 be willing to stop the war and call it a "draw," but that 
 England and the Allies are vindictively bent on humiliat- 
 ing and dismembering the German nation ! Of course, the 
 Allies have no such intention. They do intend to beat 
 Germany to a standstill and destroy the power of militarist 
 Prussia to terrorize Europe— and in so far as this involves 
 humiliation, to humiliate the German people. But the 
 latter have humiliated themselves by their methods far 
 more than any defeat after a brave fight could. Only the 
 "peaceful penetration" of saner ideas can really accom- 
 plish the regeneration of the German character— a fair 
 and generous settlement would pave the way for this— but 
 force has a preliminary task to accomplish. It is the only 
 thing which German militarist leaders in their present 
 frame of mind can understand or to which they will yield. 
 In the meantime it is absurd to talk of a premature peace. 
 The Germans— although they do not admit it— seem to 
 want such a peace now, and quite naturally. They must 
 see that they miscalculated badly and began the war under 
 unfavorable conditions. But is this any reason why the 
 Allies should give them five or ten years' breathing-spell 
 in which to recuperate with a view to seizing a more fa- 
 vorable opportunity later on? Five or ten years during 
 which Europe would more than ever resemble an armed 
 camp ! I have no patience with the fatuous peace-lovers 
 who fail to see by this time the significance of modern 
 German ambitions— who cherish an amiable hope that, if 
 let off now, the German ruling classes would undergo con- 
 version and adopt the programme of a Chautauqua Con- 
 ference. People who believe this sort of thing must be 
 kept from doing mischief for the next six months, or, if 
 necessary, six years. It would be treachery to the men who 
 
 [63H 
 
have given their lives for the dream of a better Europe if 
 the Allies were to listen for a moment to talk of a settle- 
 ment until they have secured absolute guarantees— some- 
 thing more concrete than "scraps of paper" — that the 
 present situation can never be repeated. 
 
 What Americans seem slow to realize is that two great 
 systems of political thought— two civilizations— are face 
 to face and striving for the mastery of the world as truly as 
 they ever were at Marathon and Salamis, only on a larger 
 scale. Do Americans want to do anything which would 
 help the lower of these civilizations to triumph? If not, 
 let them study the facts and realize the nature of the events 
 through which we are passing. Without endangering the 
 neutrality of the United States Government, they can 
 throw their individual influence on the side of the higher 
 civilization and see that the ring is kept open until a con- 
 clusive settlement is reached. I hope you feel this as 
 strongly as I do. 
 
 Another matter on which there is no longer much room 
 for doubt is the methods by which the Germans have been 
 conducting the war. The third report of the Belgian 
 commission of inquiry and the wanton destruction of 
 Rheims Cathedral only put the finishing touches on the 
 conviction which the accumulating reports of the earlier 
 weeks must have forced on every thinking man and wo- 
 man outside of Germany and Austria. Discount seventy- 
 five per cent, if you wish, of the sworn statements sifted 
 and vouched for by the distinguished men who composed 
 the Belgian commission; disregard, even, all charges of 
 misconduct on the part of individual German officers and 
 soldiers, and there still remains the great mass of outrages 
 admitted by the German Government itself, for which 
 they are trying to make a feeble and hypocritical justifica- 
 tion. These include the destruction in Louvain, Rheims 
 
 [6 4 : 
 
and numerous other places, the taking of hostages under 
 pain of death (often inflicted) if their neighbors are guilty 
 of even imaginary resistance, the wholesale shooting of 
 unoffending non-combatants in revenge for isolated acts of 
 resistance, the imposition of huge war indemnities on cap- 
 tured towns, the refusal to recognize non-uniformed 
 civilian defenders of invaded districts as combatants, the 
 scattering of mines broadcast in the North Sea which has 
 already resulted in the destruction of property and loss of 
 life to unoffending neutrals— in short, the whole system- 
 atic policy of terrorization. 
 
 And at first it was right for America to be skeptical 
 about such charges, but (in spite of the reports of certain 
 American correspondents who accompanied the German 
 armies and were allowed to see only what the Germans 
 wanted them to) skepticism is no longer possible in the 
 face of the accumulating evidence. 
 
 Sheringham, September 2 J. 
 Dear A.: 
 
 I am reading hard, principally history and international 
 politics, to get as complete a background as possible for 
 the tremendous events we are going through. Few of us, 
 I believe, realize how the world is likely to be transformed 
 as the result of victory for the Allies. Lloyd George's 
 splendid speech, which I enclose, suggests what such a 
 victory may mean. Another article by Wells, of which I 
 am sending a number of copies, suggests the duty of the 
 United States to see to it that no reactionary forces control 
 the final settlement and the new framework of European 
 politics after the war. There are such forces even now at 
 work— less in England than elsewhere, but nevertheless 
 clearly marked— and unless they are counteracted, all the 
 
 C653 
 
immense loss and suffering of the war may bring a smaller 
 result in solid permanent reconstruction than we have a 
 right to hope for. 
 
 Dr. Eliot's fine letter in the "New York Times" has 
 summed up the relics of medievalism in Europe that 
 ought to be done away with: irresponsible diplomacy, 
 swollen armaments, autocratic governments, and hostile 
 groupings of the powers. The combined force of liberal 
 opinion all over the world must be brought to bear at the 
 settlement before the nations have slumped back into the 
 old bad ways. I believe it will be, but I want to see my 
 own country do her full part and realize her responsibil- 
 ity. I agree that it should be a carefully reasoned opinion, 
 based on impartial study of the facts, and not on previously 
 existing sentiments, racial ties or prejudice, and also that 
 it should be expressed fairly and without bitterness. (The 
 fact that German-American opinion has so little fulfilled 
 these requirements probably explains very largely the 
 President's attitude.) But the firm and vigorous expres- 
 sion of our opinion, subject to these conditions, seems to 
 me not only legitimate but essential to the preservation of 
 the standards and ideals in which we Americans believe 
 with all our hearts. To remain indifferent and aloof with 
 regard to such events as are taking place around us would 
 be inhuman. 
 
 I hope that all Americans will see that any premature, 
 inconclusive peace— the sort of peace for which already 
 the German Government longs, although it dare not admit 
 it— would be nothing short of a tragedy for the rest of the 
 civilized world. The Hearsts and Champ Clarks— noble 
 exponents of the best American thought!— may think first 
 of the loss to American business or the German-American 
 vote, or the sentimental appeal of any old kind of peace 
 to well-intentioned and undiscriminating people— but I 
 
 [66] 
 
hope that the mass of Americans will take a more far- 
 sighted and disinterested view and will insist that the 
 "ring be held" fairly and without ill-judged meddling 
 until these two rival systems of thought and of life have 
 settled their controversy thoroughly. This is what the 
 Allies want and will insist upon— and what I say is, 
 "More power to them!" 
 
 Sheringham, September 2Qth. 
 Dear K.: 
 
 I was much interested to hear that you want to go into 
 the Russian-Austrian-Balkan end of things. I have sent 
 you, during the last two weeks, a number of very valuable 
 and interesting clippings on the present situation in Russia, 
 an article from the "Daily Chronicle" by Harold Williams 
 who is an expert on Russia, letters from Professor Vino- 
 gradofr", BourtsefT, and a number of other Russian liber- 
 als, and extracts from Russian newspapers. Also to-day 
 an article from the "Chronicle" asserting the essentially 
 non-aggressive character of the Russian national spirit and 
 of Russian policy. I think it is mistaken as to the foreign 
 policy of the Czars and the bureaucracy in Asia, especially 
 between 1880 and 1905— but entirely right as to the spirit 
 of the Russian people and the foreign policy of the Gov- 
 ernment in Europe with but few exceptions. Alexander II 
 was an idealist and enthusiast, and the Russo-Turkish war 
 was an immensely popular war in Russia, fought largely 
 to free the Balkan Christians from Turkish misrule. It 
 was Disraeli's wickedly misguided policy of backing Tur- 
 key (with the mistaken idea of protecting the route to 
 India) which first aroused Russia's indignation and 
 caused her for a generation to try and get square with Eng- 
 land in Afghanistan and Manchuria: this, and the secret 
 
 [673 
 
treaty with the Sultan, first disclosed at the Berlin Confer- 
 ence of 1878, by which Disraeli secured the Island of 
 Rhodes and the right to stand as protector of the Chris- 
 tians in Turkey— a right which England subsequently 
 failed to make use of at the time of the Armenian mas- 
 sacres. England under Gladstone and Lord Salisbury 
 reversed Disraeli's policy— you remember Salisbury's re- 
 mark about England's having "backed the wrong horse" 
 — but it wasn't until 1907 that the bad effect of her selfish, 
 short-sighted policy began to be removed by the Anglo- 
 Russian Entente. 
 
 I have gone into this because it partly justifies Russia's 
 aggressiveness in Central Asia and explains the fears that 
 England entertained of an invasion of India from the 
 North. These fears were not ill-founded — Skobeleff ac- 
 tually prepared plans for such an invasion— but the fact 
 that Russia became such an awful bogy to England (she 
 still is to some Englishmen) was chiefly due to England's 
 own unjustifiable policy in the Near East, a policy which 
 is now and was then bitterly condemned by the best Eng- 
 lish critics. 
 
 At the Berlin Congress in 1878 Bismarck and Disraeli 
 got the best of Gortchakoff and upset the treaty of San 
 Stefano which Russia had extorted from Turkey. At that 
 time Bosnia and Herzegovina were put under an Austrian 
 protectorate instead of being given to Serbia as Russia had 
 planned. One of the great causes of Austro-Serbian bad 
 feeling, therefore, was directly due to Austria's greed and 
 to Bismarck's assistance. The Sanjak of Novi-Bazar, 
 which Russia had assigned to Serbia, was handed back to 
 Turkey— also the larger part of Bulgaria, a state created 
 through Russian efforts, as Roumania and Serbia had been 
 before. 
 
 Thus Russia's plan, which was similar to the result 
 
 [68: 
 
which it is to be hoped will follow from the present war 
 and the Balkan wars, was largely spoiled by the greed of 
 Austria, who feared an increase in Slav influence, and by 
 the selfish fears of England in connection with the route to 
 India. Bismarck's help clinched the arrangement and 
 forced Russia to agree to it against her will. 
 
 Mind you, I don't assert that Russia was wholly disin- 
 terested and magnanimous in her stand! She undoubt- 
 edly had designs on Constantinople (not an unjustifiable 
 ambition, as it is partly due to her desire for a warm water 
 port and to protect her Black Sea traffic, and partly to 
 religious enthusiasm for replacing the Crescent on Sancta 
 Sofia by the Cross) . Greece possibly has the best claims to 
 Constantinople and the East coast of the iEgean on the 
 ground of history and existing interests, and I hope that 
 she will get them now that the Young Turks have shown 
 themselves so little of an improvement over the old re- 
 gime; but Russian occupation would not, I believe, cause 
 any of the evils that England used to fear, and if any other 
 nation gets them, Russia ought to have special rights in the 
 Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The immediate inten- 
 tion of occupying Constantinople at that time, however, 
 was confined probably to some of the Grand Dukes and a 
 few hot-heads. Alexander II had shown himself remark- 
 ably moderate and long-sufTering between 1870 and 1878 
 and would hardly have allowed any rash action against 
 the wishes of Western Europe. 
 
 Worse than any ambitions of this sort was Russia's treat- 
 ment of Roumania, a nation which had helped her most 
 generously and effectively in the war against Turkey. At 
 the end of the war, Russia seized Bessarabia and "compen- 
 sated" Roumanian feelings by a less valuable strip on the 
 Bulgarian border. This inconceivably stupid and brutal 
 action wiped out all the gratitude which Roumania had 
 
 [69] 
 
felt toward Russia for her original liberation and threw 
 the former into the arms of Austria— and subsequent ef- 
 forts have hardly yet extricated her. If Russia wants to 
 take the best means of securing Roumania's help in the 
 present war, she will offer her not only the Roumanian 
 populations of Transylvania and Bukowina (at Austria's 
 expense!), but also Bessarabia. She may have made this 
 offer— at any rate, it looks now as if Roumania would 
 declare war against Austria at any time. 
 
 Another instance of selfish stupidity on Russia's part 
 was her treatment of Bulgaria after 1878, which, as in the 
 case of Roumania, wiped out for a long time any gratitude 
 on Bulgaria's part. Alexander III, who succeeded Alex- 
 ander II in 1 88 1, was a very different type of man— nar- 
 row, autocratic, reactionary; as industrious and as stupid 
 as George III. He determined to make Russian influence 
 control in Bulgaria and to keep the country under a sort 
 of Russian protectorate. With this purpose he deter- 
 mined that the annexation of Eastern Roumelia, long con- 
 templated by the Bulgarians, should be brought about, 
 not by their own action, but by Russia, so that they might 
 be still further bound to her. He filled Sofia with Rus- 
 sian agents, bullied Alexander of Battenberg, and did 
 everything to make the liberty-loving Bulgarians hate the 
 very name of Russia. Gradually Alexander of Batten- 
 berg was brought into closer sympathy with the Bulgarian 
 liberals, of whom Stambuloff was the very able leader, and 
 finally, in 1885, Eastern Roumelia was suddenly annexed 
 by them without so much as a "by-your-leave" to Alexan- 
 der III. The latter was naturally furious and determined 
 to get his revenge. With the aid of Austria, he egged on 
 Serbia, then under Austrian influence, to attack Bulgaria, 
 but contrary to all expectations, Bulgaria gained a smash- 
 ing victory (very much as in 1913, when Austria per- 
 
 C703 
 
suaded Bulgaria to attack Serbia, Serbia utterly surprised 
 her by winning!). Alexander III then set to work to 
 undermine his too independent namesake's influence in 
 his own capital, and finally, by means of an artificially 
 stirred-up revolution, had him kidnapped and exiled — 
 one of the most disgraceful episodes in all modern history. 
 
 Alexander of Battenberg later returned in triumph, but 
 through Russian trickery and his own discouragement at 
 Russian opposition, was finally led to abdicate. Stambu- 
 loff, however, remained in power. Ferdinand, the new 
 Prince, proved little more tractable than his predecessor, 
 and, for all his intrigues, Alexander III only succeeded in 
 rendering Bulgaria more defiantly independent than ever. 
 
 Even during these years, however, when he was doing 
 so much to make Russia distrusted in the Balkans, Alexan- 
 der III pursued a cautious policy toward the Western na- 
 tions in general, and was anything but dangerously 
 aggressive— in the West. In the East, his generals, follow- 
 ing up Russia's long-continued expansion in this direction 
 and with a special new incentive now to get square with 
 England, pushed their conquests over all Turkestan up to 
 the borders of Afghanistan and Persia. His successor, the 
 present Czar, has continued the policy of expansion, but 
 in the Far East rather than in Central Asia. His high- 
 handed action in Manchuria, his joint protest with Ger- 
 many and France against Japan's seizure of Port Arthur 
 and the Liaotung Peninsula after the Chinese war, his 
 subsequent seizure of Port Arthur himself (under guise of 
 a lease from China, Germany immediately taking Kiau 
 Chau on a slender pretext by way of compensation), and 
 his whole unscrupulous policy of expansion at the expense 
 of China and Japan (a policy in which he was egged on 
 and accompanied by Germany), was finally brought to an 
 end by Russia's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904. 
 
 C70 
 
Since then has come the Anglo-Russian Entente and a 
 Russo-Japanese "understanding," and Russia's policy in 
 recent years has turned its face to the westward again— 
 though not in any aggressive way. It is only since her at- 
 tempt to keep Russia busy outside of Europe failed that 
 Germany has come to dread the "Russian peril"! 
 
 But Nicholas, especially during the first ten years of his 
 reign preceding the Japanese war, has also been guilty of 
 another very unjust and outrageous policy toward the sub- 
 ject races in his own Empire, especially the Finns and 
 Poles. It was at the instigation of Prussia that Poland was 
 originally dismembered; it has been under Prussian influ- 
 ence, and with the example of Prussia's treatment of her 
 own Polish subjects, that Russia has pursued her "national- 
 izing" policy of crushing out the national characteristics, 
 languages and independence of her non-Russian citizens, 
 and it does not lie in the mouth of any Prussian statesman, 
 in view of Prussia's conduct in her own Eastern provinces, 
 to utter any reproach! 
 
 The treatment of the Jews is even less defensible than 
 the treatment of Finland and Poland— that must certainly 
 be admitted without question. But to my mind this is 
 rather irrelevant to the general issue as between Russia 
 and Germany. It is a mere taunt with which Germany 
 seeks to bolster up an otherwise weak case, by creating 
 (just) prejudice against Russia, and a taunt which bids 
 fair, before long, under English and French influence in 
 Russia, to become obsolete and undeserved. The real issue 
 is not whether Russian governmental policy and Russian 
 "culture" are of a higher or lower type than those of Ger- 
 many, but whether German "culture" and Germany's po- 
 litical power and prestige were in any danger of being 
 attacked or overwhelmed by Russian aggression. It is on 
 the latter charge (that they were in such danger) that 
 
Germany has sought to defend her own and Austria's ac- 
 tion in the present crisis. Any such assertion can rather 
 easily be shown to be ridiculous— so to bolster up her argu- 
 ment and confuse the issue, Germany begins abusing Rus- 
 sia on general grounds and instituting unfavorable com- 
 parisons with her own pre-eminent cultural attainments! 
 (As a matter of fact, though it is irrelevant, I believe that 
 Russian "culture" is more truly Christian and more truly 
 civilized in its essential inner spirit than that of modern 
 Germany! The real trouble is that in neither country 
 recently has its best "culture" succeeded in controlling the 
 action of the Government.) 
 
 My whole summary of recent history (I rather apol- 
 ogize for making it so long, but I have been going over all 
 this ground quite carefully, and I don't know any one 
 book where you would find just such a summary in brief 
 or unconfused form) is intended to show that Russia's 
 European policy for thirty years past has not been such as 
 to cause any of the larger Western nations any just anxiety 
 or to lay her open (with the exceptions above noted) to the 
 charge of aggressiveness. 
 
 Let me now go back for a moment to the Balkans. Aus- 
 trian influence was predominant, on the whole, in Serbia 
 up to 1907 or 1908, though the fall of the Obrenovitch 
 dynasty dealt it a heavy blow about 1903. What forever 
 finished it was Austria's annexation, against all fairness 
 and international law, of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, 
 with the help of Germany. This one act, with its accom- 
 panying insult to Russia, is one of the main underlying 
 causes of the present war. If it is possible to discover in it 
 any evidence of Russian "aggression," I should be glad to 
 have this pointed out! The aggression, indisputably, was 
 all on the other side. Austria has within her borders 
 nearly thirty million Slavs whom, with the recent excep- 
 
 L731 
 
tion of the Poles in Galicia, she has been treating abomi- 
 nably and almost all of whom are eager to throw off her 
 yoke. She has bitterly resented every extension of Russian 
 influence in the Balkans, and every sign of growth in inde- 
 pendence and vigor of the Balkan nations, because she has 
 been constantly afraid of losing her own Slav subjects. 
 One can easily understand her point of view, but it is very 
 hard to have any sympathy with it. Just as she now op- 
 poses Slav freedom and union (which would be partly at 
 her expense), so she opposed Italian freedom and union 
 (also partly at her expense) fifty years ago— but the 
 world rightly sympathized with Italy, not with an essen- 
 tially tyrannical, reactionary, ramshackle, artificial em- 
 pire, whose only real unity was, and still is, dynastic. 
 Germany sides with Austria for racial reasons and because 
 of her keen ambition to secure Germanic control of the 
 Balkans with a view to the more complete political con- 
 quest of Asia Minor (which she now largely controls 
 economically). Russia's sympathy for the independence 
 of the small Slav nations of the Balkans and her desire to 
 protect her Black Sea outlet and also the Greek Christians 
 in Turkey, constitute a stumbling-block in the way of 
 these ambitions— but as between racial sympathy and de- 
 sire to protect an undeniable economic interest on the one 
 hand, and dreams of expansion involving the domination 
 of alien races on the other, which should command the 
 sympathy and support of neutral nations to the greater 
 extent? Which is the more justifiable, the more consistent 
 with modern ideas? Which can more honestly be termed 
 aggressive? Also, in what way does Russia's support of 
 the Balkan Slavs threaten German "culture" or German 
 independence? German ambitions, indeed, may be inter- 
 fered with— but can one wish that these ambitions should 
 succeed at the expense of the Balkan nations? It may be 
 
 C743 
 
said that Russia in the past has threatened the indepen- 
 dence of these Balkan States— but if her idea is to domi- 
 nate them, why does she seek, not to keep them small and 
 weak and divided, as do Germany and Austria, but to 
 enlarge and strengthen them in accordance with their own 
 wishes? — especially, knowing as she does from experience, 
 that the stronger they grow the more they will resent ex- 
 ternal interference, even from a kindred great power. 
 Finally, which influence — Russian or Austrian— do the 
 Balkan States themselves fear more? They resent any 
 outside interference, no doubt, but there is also little ques- 
 tion that, as between Russia and Austria, they have less to 
 fear from the former (especially Serbia). 
 
 No— the German bogy of Russian aggression, of a dan- 
 ger to European civilization, simply won't hold water! 
 Just as, when the Kaiser was shamelessly robbing Japan 
 and China, he beat the tom-tom to the tune of the "Yellow 
 Peril," so now, when he and his Austrian ally want to gain 
 ground in Southwestern Europe at the expense of the Slav 
 races, he raises a howl about the "Russian Peril"! One 
 warning is about as justifiable as the other. Both are de- 
 signed only to distract attention from his own designs. 
 
 The only really aggressive "culture" to-day, the only 
 one that despises the culture of all other nations and 
 threatens to extend its influence by armed force, is 
 that of Germany. Even some of the best exponents of 
 German "culture" seem to have a competitive conception 
 of it, seem to regard it as "threatened" by the development 
 of any other brand of "culture." Isn't it generally true 
 that the man (or the nation) which is constantly dreading 
 attack and imputing to others an intention of injuring him, 
 is the one who himself harbors the notion of injuring oth- 
 ers, and who is conscious of having given others reason to 
 distrust him? 
 
 l7Sl 
 
An able Russian liberal has recently said that, at bot- 
 tom, this war is a struggle between the "free, organic, 
 democratic imperialism of the English type" (which he 
 holds as a model for Russia in future: the type based on 
 voluntary union between self-governing commonwealths) 
 and "the barrack-room imperialism of Germany." Is 
 n't this a truer description of the real issue than the Ger- 
 man "Slav barbarism versus Teuton culture" description? 
 
 Sheringham, October 2nd. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 I did n't really have time to finish my last letter— I had 
 to leave part of my argument about Russia hanging in 
 mid-air, and I can't remember just now how much I got 
 down on paper and how much was still in my head, as I 
 was writing at top speed toward the end. I think, how- 
 ever, that I finished most of my main points. 
 
 I sent you with the last lot of clippings a splendid article 
 on Russia by the same "Politicus" who wrote the article 
 on the Kaiser's personal responsibility for the war, in the 
 September "Fortnightly." It ought to reach you about 
 the same time as this letter. This article reviews the 
 Russo-German relations for the last century, covering, 
 however, very little of the same ground which I covered 
 in my last letter, and it shows most convincingly the strong 
 influence toward a reactionary, repressive policy which 
 Prussia had exercised for years, up till quite recently, on 
 the Russian court and bureaucracy. Indeed, this bureau- 
 cracy has actually been, to a very large extent, German. 
 The vices peculiar to such Prussianized bureaucracy are by 
 no means characteristic of the Russian nation. Russians 
 are liable to sudden, emotional relapse into savagery, and 
 this national tendency in connection with a highly system- 
 
 C76] 
 
atized, cast-iron administration, utterly unsympathetic to 
 the national habits and temperament of the Slav, has pro- 
 duced many of the worst abuses for which the Russian Gov- 
 ernment has been responsible— abuses which an equally 
 rigid administration has not produced (at any rate to any- 
 thing like the same degree) among the more docile, phleg- 
 matic Germans. Some one has recently said that the vices 
 of Russians are those of a young growing nation just shak- 
 ing itself free from the last vestiges of barbarism. They 
 are faults of immaturity, and, as I have argued above, for 
 many of the faults of its Government the Russian nation is 
 not to blame. The faults of the Germans, on the other 
 hand, are those of a race, in most directions, highly civil- 
 ized—one which has turned aside from its best traditions 
 and exalted that side of its development which was at best 
 an unfortunate necessity into a national ideal. Their faults 
 are essentially vices of the 18th century, reinforced by the 
 whole external paraphernalia of 20th-century civilization. 
 Along with these are some vices peculiar to the 20th cen- 
 tury, with which we in the United States have had to fight: 
 commercialism, brutal materialism, and the other qual- 
 ities which accompany a too sudden and overwhelming 
 business prosperity. 
 
 These vices of modern Germany, carried to the extent to 
 which she has carried them, seem to me far more danger- 
 ous to the rest of the world than those from which Russia 
 is emerging. What is more, the mass of the Germans 
 seem to love these characteristic vices of theirs, while the 
 mass of the Russians are ashamed of the excesses of their 
 Government. What VinogradofI said of Bernhardi is 
 illuminating on this point. Another of the clippings 
 which I sent you points out that the eyes of all of the pro- 
 gressive elements of Russia are more and more turned to 
 England. I do not think it is mere facile optimism to 
 
 l77l 
 
believe that this new influence of English example will be 
 a powerful force during the next generation when the two 
 nations have become for the first time really friendly and 
 intimate. 
 
 Before I began reading Tolstoy, TourgeniefT, Dostoiev- 
 sky and Tcheckoff, I felt a very strong prejudice against 
 Russia, a good deal of which I can now trace back to one 
 or two of Kipling's stories and to various articles in Eng- 
 lish reviews. No one, however, could read Dostoievsky's 
 "Crime and Punishment" or Tolstoy's "Resurrection" or 
 many of Tourgenieff's stories without being impressed 
 with their intense feeling for justice and mercy and broth- 
 erliness, or without coming to love the men who wrote 
 them and the people about whom they were written. If 
 these books are in any way true to the real character of the 
 Russian nation— and surely one can assume that they are 
 true to a considerable extent at least— then Europe need 
 have little fear of any such organized, ruthless aggression 
 from Russia as that for which Germany now stands. Even 
 the other side of Russian life, as shown in a book like Dos- 
 toievsky's "The Brothers KaramazofT," rouses little fear 
 of this particular danger. 
 
 The Germans have the right, logically speaking, to re- 
 proach Russia with her pogroms, her Siberian prisons and 
 other extreme abuses of this sort— but they have no right, 
 in view of their own utterly unsympathetic and repressive 
 treatment of Alsace-Lorraine and their Polish provinces, 
 to reproach Russia with her attempt to denationalize her 
 subject races, the Finns, Poles, Lithuanians and Little 
 Russians. This false national policy, undertaken some fif- 
 teen or twenty years ago by the present Czar, is not likely 
 to last long after the war. In the action of India, South 
 Africa and the other English colonies, Russia will have 
 before her eyes a brilliant example of the results of the 
 
 C78] 
 
opposite policy— and Sir Edward Grey may be trusted, I 
 believe, to emphasize the lesson. The new feeling of 
 friendliness, unity and national enthusiasm in Russia itself 
 ought also to facilitate the adoption of a fair and liberal 
 policy for the future. 
 
 There are several recent incidents which you ought to 
 keep in mind in connection with the review of Balkan his- 
 tory which I gave in my last letter. I meant to mention 
 them then, but did n't have time. Since the annexation of 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina permanently embittered the Ser- 
 bians, Austria has tried hard in every way to injure Serbia 
 and reduce her to a helpless position. Also she has mal- 
 treated and repressed her own Croato-Serbian subjects— 
 though the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, if he had lived, 
 would probably have worked hard to secure for them such 
 generous treatment as would in time have reconciled them 
 to their position in the Dual Monarchy. According to 
 the confession of the German official "White Paper" it- 
 self, it was largely the success of Serbia in the two Balkan 
 wars which aroused the fears of both Austria and Ger- 
 many. In short, these two countries had managed to 
 manoeuvre themselves into a position where, according to 
 their own opinion at least, their future "safety" depended 
 on their crushing and reducing to subserviency a sturdy, 
 patriotic, intensely independent little nation— not an anar- 
 chic half-barbarous Asiatic or African country (like Per- 
 sia, for example), but a rapidly developing, civilized, 
 efficient State with a peculiarly strong national conscious- 
 ness and a really great history. I don't think it is any 
 exaggeration to say that Southern Italy and Sicily in 1859- 
 61 were more backward, more open to just disparagement 
 in many ways, than is Serbia to-day. Yet one of the few 
 acts for which Napoleon III was most deservedly praised 
 was his coming to the assistance of Piedmont against 
 
 [79H 
 
Austria on behalf of a united Italy— and France is far less 
 closely related racially to Italy than Russia to Serbia. 
 Why then was it an act of wicked aggression for Russia 
 this year to step in and prevent the subjugation of her 
 weaker relative— especially when she did so after urging 
 that relative to go to the very limit of submissiveness in 
 accepting demands confessedly so framed as to be unac- 
 ceptable? 
 
 The general contrast between Russia's Balkan policy 
 and that of the two Germanic nations seems to me too 
 strong to need further emphasis. . . . 
 
 I was much interested in what you said in your last let- 
 ter as to the instinctive distrust of Germany so widely felt 
 in the United States. I think you are quite right that such 
 a feeling existed, and was all ready to spring to life at even 
 a small provocation. Americans in general were not suf- 
 ficiently interested in European politics, or sufficiently in- 
 formed in regard to them, to form any clearly reasoned 
 opinion as to the character and probable result of Ger- 
 many's recent ambitions, but a number of incidents, small 
 in themselves, though sufficient when taken together, had 
 aroused irritation and disapproval and had left behind 
 them a half-conscious distrust. As soon as the facts in re- 
 gard to the present crisis began to be known, this feeling 
 developed into a clear-cut, reasoned condemnation of 
 Germany's action— but even before this, the first instinc- 
 tive reaction was all against her, the old distaste and sus- 
 picion flared out spontaneously. Certainly there was never 
 a better instance of a nation's being unable, even by the 
 most patient efforts (for instance, Prince Henry's visit 
 after the Spanish war), to escape the consequences of its 
 past misdeeds. I imagine the Zabern incident last winter 
 did nothing to lessen America's feeling! . . . 
 
 One good result of the war will be the education of 
 
American opinion in regard to European politics, — the 
 awakening of the great mass of Americans to a better-in- 
 formed interest in matters outside their own country. 
 
 Sheringham, October 6th. 
 DearK.: 
 
 What you say about keeping an "open mind" I abso- 
 lutely sympathize with— but as to the most important Bel- 
 gian atrocities, it seems to me that the well established 
 facts leave no room for further suspension of judgment. 
 No doubt there has been much exaggeration in the stories 
 of individual acts by German soldiers, but these are rela- 
 tively unimportant— some such acts are almost invariably 
 committed by large armies, and in regard to them there is 
 always exaggeration. What is almost a new thing, how- 
 ever, and a far more dangerous return to barbarism, is the 
 systematic policy of terrorization pursued by the German 
 higher commanders with a brutality unequalled for cen- 
 turies past, and defended or extenuated with a mixture of 
 falsehood or mere appeal to some fancied "military neces- 
 sity." As to this, it is difficult to speak too harshly or 
 sweepingly! 
 
 The conduct of the British in South Africa was open to 
 a good deal of criticism, but their offences (for which 
 there was far more "military necessity" than there ever has 
 been in Belgium) were confined to the burning of farm- 
 houses, and even this policy was postponed until all other 
 means of ending guerilla warfare had failed. They "con- 
 centrated" the non-combatants in huge camps toward the 
 end of the war, but they never shot down women and chil- 
 dren, nor killed scores of men for an attack upon them by 
 one or two hot-heads. Their whole military law as to 
 civilian resistance is very different. 
 
 C813 
 
Dr. Eliot's two letters have been splendid, particularly 
 the last. Dernburg's answer is misleading and tricky, and 
 there is no escaping the conclusion that it is intentionally 
 so. His whole correspondence with Fosdick showed the 
 same untrustworthiness and deliberate attempt to create a 
 false impression. In this answer to Dr. Eliot he says that, 
 while Belgium was nominally neutral, all her defensive 
 preparations were directed against Germany, and that she 
 was secretly hand in glove with France and England. The 
 latter statement is mere unfounded assertion. The former, 
 which seems to back up this assertion and make it more 
 plausible, omits to mention that for years past Germany 
 has been building miles of railway near the Belgian bor- 
 der, with huge platforms only suitable for detraining 
 armies and their equipment— railways and platforms 
 which had no economic but only a military justification. 
 They were useless for any purpose except an invasion of 
 France through Belgium. Also for years past, numerous 
 German military writers have been openly proclaiming 
 Germany's intention of making use of this route, and all 
 her system of mobilization was based upon this intention. 
 In view of these incontestable facts, naturally Belgium 
 fortified herself on the side on which she was threatened. 
 Her only mistake was that she delayed her preparations 
 too long— a few years hence they would have been more 
 complete! France had almost no fortifications on her 
 Belgian border, and absolutely no such system of strategic 
 railways leading to it. Both she and Belgium trusted Ger- 
 many's word ! The whole attempt by Germany to confuse 
 the issue as to her violation of the Belgian treaty is a tissue 
 of lies and misstatements, made up recently since she has 
 seen the effect which her action had upon the opinion of 
 the whole world. The truth is what the Chancellor and 
 
 [82] 
 
von Jagow told the British Ambassador in Berlin, and 
 what the former told the Reichstag. 
 
 Equally absurd are Dernburg's statements denying the 
 existence of "militarism" in Germany and the autocratic 
 control by the Kaiser (in practice) of foreign affairs and 
 his complete control of military matters, and asserting 
 that England's control of the sea is a greater danger to the 
 United States than any increase in German power! Eng- 
 land's maritime position has altered little for decades past 
 and will not be greatly altered if she wins in this war. 
 How has that position of hers ever injured us? The char- 
 acteristic thing about her whole policy since the early part 
 of the 19th century— except for her relations to savage or 
 backward races in Asia and Africa— has been its lack of 
 aggressiveness toward other powers and its recognition of 
 the rights of other powers. Also its steady maintenance of 
 free trade has given other nations almost as much benefit 
 from its colonies as it has derived itself. 
 
 Sheringham, October 8th. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I was interested in the articles by Roosevelt which you 
 sent and agree with you entirely. While most of his de- 
 ductions from the war are undoubtedly true, I believe his 
 emphasis is wrong. He is, it seems to me, in many ways 
 "progressive," but is not consistently "liberal." The pres- 
 ent Liberal party in England has added its social 
 "progressivism" to a solid foundation of sturdy liberal 
 principles; merely correcting the excessively individual- 
 istic character which liberalism developed early in the 
 19th century, and expanding its basic doctrines to fit the 
 facts of 20th-century life. (Read Hobhouse's "Liberal- 
 ism" if you want to get a good idea how it has done this.) 
 
 C83] 
 
But liberalism applies to the foreign policy of a nation as 
 well as to its internal affairs. What it means in this field 
 of foreign policy could hardly be better set forth than in 
 "Democracy and Reaction," which was written as a protest 
 against the Unionist policy that led to the Boer war. (In 
 some ways, however, I think that policy was justified in 
 South Africa, though not the political theories that accom- 
 panied and were used to justify it.) If progressivism in 
 America is to become the force which I hope it will, it 
 must see that its doctrines are preached, not at the expense 
 of, but in addition to, the sound old tested principles of 
 liberalism as developed in centuries of English constitu- 
 tional struggles. It must make all the planks in its plat- 
 form sound and mutually consistent. Anything more 
 absurd and contradictory than a progressive policy at 
 home and a Jingo policy in foreign affairs can hardly be 
 imagined. It is only because foreign affairs are such a 
 closed book to most Americans— because they are so 
 poorly informed and so unaccustomed to think thoroughly 
 or systematically about them— that this contradiction is 
 not more clearly perceived. It disgusts English Liberals, 
 and in general has blinded them to Roosevelt's real merits 
 and attainments. Gladstone taught them liberalism in 
 foreign affairs— or perhaps it would be more accurate to 
 say that John Bright and Cobden and the "philosophical 
 liberals" taught both Gladstone and the Liberal party. 
 We have not yet learned the lesson. We vacillate between 
 Jingoism on the one hand and sentimental pacificism on 
 the other. But we are learning, and this war, I hope, will 
 mark a stride forward in our intelligent grasp of foreign 
 problems and of the sound principles which should under- 
 lie international relations. Of course experience has been 
 England's great teacher; we have n't had this advantage. 
 Where Roosevelt is right is in asserting that no policy of 
 
 [843 
 
mere disarmament is safe or wise as long as some nations 
 cherish medieval standards of national conduct and me- 
 dieval ambitions. Norman Angell admits this frankly, 
 though it seems to me that his recent criticisms of Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey recognize the fact insufficiently. No group of 
 individuals would deprive themselves of the means of self- 
 defence if one or more of their number were (to take an 
 extreme illustration) criminal maniacs or if they openly 
 announced their belief in treachery and robbery. To urge 
 indiscriminate disarmament is merely to render pacificism 
 ridiculous. Disarmament and pacific relations between 
 nations, as between individuals, depend upon and presup- 
 pose the attainment by all the members of a given group 
 of at least an approximately similar stage of political de- 
 velopment, or else upon the agreement of a strong major- 
 ity among them to unite in suppressing any backward 
 members of the group who threaten its security. The lat- 
 ter ideal, of course, is the one aimed at by most thoughtful 
 liberals in the present situation in Europe, but it is diffi- 
 cult of attainment, and could not, I believe, have been 
 secured by the single efforts of Sir Edward Grey prior to 
 the war. This is where Norman Angell, like Ramsay 
 Macdonald ( though in a far less unfair and offensive way) , 
 has been mistaken in his criticisms of English foreign 
 policy under the present Liberal Government— i.e., since 
 the end of 1905. He has asked the impossible and has 
 blamed Sir Edward Grey bitterly, and, as I believe, un- 
 justly, for adopting the policy of defensive alliances in- 
 stead of striving to create a "concert of the powers." Sir 
 Edward Grey has striven for this latter object, and As- 
 quith's Cardiff speech showed that he has done so, and 
 how and why the effort failed. In protecting England, 
 meanwhile, by the only possible method— -/.£>., the Triple 
 Entente— from a danger openly threatened, Sir Edward 
 
 C8s3 
 
Grey was taking the only safe and patriotic course, it 
 seems to me. To refuse to admit this, and to persist in 
 rather bitter criticism, is hardly what I should have ex- 
 pected from Norman Angell— and it is bound to injure his 
 future influence in England. His constructive work, look- 
 ing to the future, I heartily sympathize with— but it 
 would be quite possible for him to take the position of 
 urging certain policies to follow the war, without blaming 
 Sir Edward Grey for failing to secure them before the 
 war. Also, I think there is just a suspicion, in his recent 
 writings and those of his followers, of the "holier-than- 
 thou" attitude which is so often the bane of reformers — a 
 tendency to overlook the possibility that people of quite 
 different views— even Tories— might agree with many of 
 his aims; and to speak a little as if the whole salvation 
 of Europe depended on the Norman Angell movement. 
 This tendency, though very slight, naturally irritates the 
 conservative people, even those who agree with much that 
 N. A. advocates. You know from my letter to Mrs. J. 
 what I think of the expediency at this time of any organ- 
 ized propaganda from men whose criticisms of Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey have strongly prejudiced the public against 
 them. The more important the object, the less they ought 
 to risk injuring it now in this way. They should have 
 some confidence in their fellow-Liberals and Laborites, 
 and realize that not all of England, outside their group, 
 has fallen a victim to "Prussianism." 
 
 Of course, the whole "defense" argument can be readily 
 perverted into the very fallacious and entirely distinct 
 theory that armaments prevent wars— or it can be exagger- 
 ated and misused as Roosevelt has misused it. It is an 
 argument which is applicable only in exceptional cases, 
 such as that of Europe in the last forty years. Where na- 
 tions are reasonably advanced in their development (and 
 
 [86] 
 
not undergoing temporary pathological reactions!) the 
 argument hardly applies at all. In the case of the United 
 States it applies only slightly. We need a reasonably 
 strong navy, I believe, but certainly not any panicky resort 
 to militarism. On the other hand, it is an argument which 
 cannot be wholly neglected in the present condition of the 
 world. If the advocates of disarmament had had their 
 way in England recently, where would she be now? All 
 nations must agree to disarm at the same time; and if one 
 or more treat such proposals as England has twice made to 
 Germany in recent years as merely an indication of cow- 
 ardice or treachery, and proceed, as Germany actually 
 did, to speed up their military preparations, then disarma- 
 ment for any one of the group becomes an impossibility. 
 
 In fact the peace movement is essentially a matter of 
 education— of the propagation of a sounder view, particu- 
 larly in those countries which regard forcible aggression 
 as a legitimate object of their policy. Until they can be 
 converted, or restrained by force, the social development 
 of the other nations will necessarily be retarded. This is 
 why Germany must be beaten in this war; though the only 
 hope of a permanently satisfactory arrangement lies in her 
 conversion— not in mere forcible restraint. The fact that 
 her Government has had to persuade its citizens that the 
 war is a "defensive" one, and that the other nations, not 
 Germany, are the peace-breakers, in order to gain their 
 united support, shows that a great many Germans are 
 peace-loving and could be converted to a proper attitude 
 toward other nations. What is at fault with them, as their 
 uncritical acceptance of their Government's assertions 
 shows, is not so much their lack of peacefulness as a strik- 
 ing and fatal lack of political discernment— of any power 
 of independent criticism. Also, the propaganda carried 
 on among them for years has certainly converted a great 
 
 C873 
 
many, including those who carry the most weight and con- 
 trol the Government, to an utterly barbarous attitude to- 
 ward their neighbors (see on this point a book by Bourdon 
 called "What the Germans Think"; also, the leading ar- 
 ticle in the "Times" literary supplement which I am send- 
 ing you to-day) . It seems to me that Norman Angell and 
 his fellow-critics of the English Government fail to give 
 due weight to the known record of the German Govern- 
 ment and to its action before and during the present war. 
 They also overlook the remarkable manifestos which are 
 being issued by leading Germans. Read the last issue of 
 "War and Peace" and see if you don't agree with me. 
 There is a slight tendency to regard the Germans as in- 
 jured innocents and to blame the brutal British press for 
 its attitude toward them. Now, I don't defend exaggera- 
 tion and blind hatred and reliance upon a mere forcible 
 "crushing" of Germany, nor do I approve of the exaction, 
 later on, of excessively harsh terms. But it seems to me 
 absurd to overlook all the gross faults of the German Gov- 
 ernment and nation and blame the far less guilty English 
 Government and nation— and this, to a considerable ex- 
 tent, is what "War and Peace" seems to do. Let criticism 
 begin at home, if you will, — that is healthy enough,— but 
 at least be fair and state the facts accurately. The average 
 Englishman reading "War and Peace" merely feels its 
 unfairness, and the effect it has is to make him boiling mad 
 and to destroy any influence which the magazine might 
 exert. There is the clearest evidence of just this result in 
 the whole public press, even among the more moderate 
 papers, and I can't find them wholly to blame at a time 
 like this, if their replies to the Norman Angell group are 
 bitter and unfair. It is hard these days to keep one's bal- 
 ance and see both sides, but I really do try— in spite of oc- 
 casional lapses when I read some of the reports from 
 
 [88] 
 
Belgium or the German "explanations" ! I must stop now 
 —but I hope to have given you a reasonably fair and com- 
 plete statement of my attitude toward the peace move- 
 ment, which I think was what you wanted. 
 
 Sheringham, October 1 2th. 
 DearM.: 
 
 I have been reading lately some of the literature issued 
 by the Pan-German League, and more virulent, poisonous 
 rubbish you never saw. This League is composed chiefly 
 of ex-army and navy officers, financiers, commercial lead- 
 ers who see fabulous riches in an enlarged colonial empire 
 and control of the sea, armament manufacturers, journal- 
 ists and professors. A large majority of the school-teach- 
 ers in the country belong to it and preach its doctrines to 
 their pupils. It controls almost completely the "Rheinisch- 
 Westfalische Zeitung," the "Tagliche Rundschau," the 
 "Reichspost" and the "Kreuz-Zeitung"— all of which are 
 leading newspapers which you probably know by name. 
 Other papers, like the "Kolnische Zeitung," "Munchner 
 Neueste Nachrichten" and the "Tageblatt," are more or 
 less under its influence, and print a lot of its stuff. A great 
 many university professors preach its doctrines, and a host 
 of speakers and pamphleteers keep its propaganda con- 
 stantly before the public. No wonder the docile, politi- 
 cally unsophisticated Germans readily swallow the poison, 
 especially as all the teaching which they get in schools, if 
 not actually colored by Pan-Germanism, is at least of a 
 character which rather predisposes them to its views. 
 
 No other European nation, so far as I know, has ever 
 permitted such a propaganda, openly directed against the 
 liberty of half a dozen friendly neighboring States, to be 
 carried on not only with impunity but with its tacit ap- 
 
 C893 
 
proval. Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the late foreign 
 minister, was quoted by a witness under oath in a court of 
 law as having said to him (the witness was an agent of the 
 Pan-German League) : "I am as good a Pan-German as 
 you are"! The League has often been too strong for the 
 Government, even when the latter has tried faint-heart- 
 edly to curb some of its worst excesses. It was the League's 
 influence, really, which raised such a hornets' nest about 
 the Kaiser's ears for his pro-English interview in 1908, 
 and which enabled a member of the Reichstag to openly 
 refer to him as a "poltroon" after the failure of the Agadir 
 coup in 191 1. 
 
 In view of the activity of this League and its allied or- 
 ganizations, such as the Navy League, and the enormous 
 success which they have had (it was they who backed up 
 Dernburg's campaign for a "biirgerliche" majority in 
 1906 and gave the Socialists the only bad beating they 
 have had in many years), it is absurd for the Germans to 
 refer to themselves as "peaceful." Why, pamphlets issued 
 by the League openly advocated seizing a great strip of 
 France stretching from Toulon and Marseilles to Calais 
 and Boulogne, driving out all the French inhabitants (in 
 order to avoid the troubles which Alsace-Lorraine has 
 given), and settling this territory with German colonists! 
 Other publications demand the annexation of Belgium, 
 Holland and Denmark, and the formation of a great cen- 
 tral European federation under the leadership and control 
 of Germany, stretching from the Baltic to the iEgean and 
 on through Asia Minor to Persia! This literature is full 
 of envy, hatred and malice toward almost all the other 
 nations, of lies about their history and present condition, 
 and of sweeping assertions as to the superiority of German 
 "culture" to that of all other races and the duty of impos- 
 ing it upon them by the sword! A more utterly damnable 
 
 [903 
 
and pernicious set of political teachings you could not 
 imagine. I had some notion of this when I was in Ger- 
 many, but I never fully realized it until I began reading 
 up on the subject. There can be no security or progress in 
 Western Europe until this festering sore has been cut out 
 of German life by a very drastic surgical operation! 
 
 Sheringham, October 1 2th. 
 Dear L. : 
 
 Nowadays, of course, the one thing that one is inter- 
 ested in is the war. There are a great many territorials 
 stationed all along the coast for home defense, one wing of 
 the hotel being occupied by a company of engineers. They 
 have been digging trenches and putting the whole coast in 
 a state to withstand a possible German raid. At night no 
 lights are allowed to be shown in the town on the side of 
 the North Sea. The other morning early all the troops 
 near here were suddenly called out to "man the trenches," 
 to give them practice at the operation. No one expects 
 invasion, but it is realized that armed raids are quite pos- 
 sible and may be attempted. 
 
 I have talked quite a bit with the officers stationed here, 
 and they are all keen to be sent to the front. Most of them 
 probably will be when they have had some training. A 
 few have gone to France already to reinforce the "expe- 
 ditionary army," and others have replaced garrisons in 
 Malta, Egypt and elsewhere, releasing them for active ser- 
 vice. The men whistle and sing wherever they go, and are 
 a most jolly, good-natured and likable lot— all of them 
 very fit and serviceable-looking. Every person one meets 
 has friends or relatives in the army, and many are already 
 in mourning. The nation has taken the crisis most won- 
 derfully and goes quietly and cheerfully about its business 
 
 E90 
 
— except for the very large number of people who are 
 connected in one way or another with military prepara- 
 tions or with relief work. Recruiting goes on as fast as 
 the War Office can handle the new men and provide them 
 with officers (non-commissioned officers), the crying need 
 at present, and equipment. Over 600,000 of the new army, 
 in addition to some 900,000 regulars, reserves and terri- 
 torials, are already organized and in training. The Gov- 
 ernment expects them to be ready by early spring — 
 perhaps before. This number will be raised to 1,000,000 
 or possibly 2,000,000 before the war is over. Germany is 
 certain to be beaten in the long run, but no one expects it 
 to be a short or easy job— and no one will be contented 
 until it is done, and done thoroughly. The menace of 
 armed aggression must be put an end to once and for all. 
 
 Sheringham, October IJth. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I have been thinking a bit more about what I wrote you 
 as to the Progressive party. The Progressive party's 
 job, it seems to me, has been to socialize and adapt to mod- 
 ern needs the too individualistic liberalism of Jefferson's 
 and Jackson's time. But it must also develop and round 
 out American liberal theory, which has never received 
 the systematic, philosophical exposition and development 
 which English liberalism received from men like Cob- 
 den, Bright and Mill, particularly the latter; who, by the 
 way, became strikingly more socialized in his point of 
 view toward the end of his life. We have never devel- 
 oped a clear, consistent, comprehensive set of liberal prin- 
 ciples which could be applied to any new political 
 problems that might arise. The English Liberal party 
 has done this only imperfectly, but it has done it to a far 
 
greater extent than we; and English Liberals are much 
 more thorough and consistent in their liberalism than most 
 American liberals. 
 
 The old individualistic, laissez faire liberalism has 
 been largely perverted to the selfish benefit of the capital- 
 istic middle class, the manufacturing and commercial 
 interests— as the Socialists long ago (before 1850) per- 
 ceived and pointed out. This has not been a phenomenon 
 by any means confined to the United States, though the 
 evil there was slower in being recognized, and attained in 
 the meantime a more aggravated form than in other coun- 
 tries. In Austria, as Wickham Steed points out, the 
 Jewish bankers and business leaders from the third quar- 
 ter of the 19th century on developed very much the same 
 sort of economic tyranny as that which we have seen in the 
 last decade at home; and defended themselves politically 
 by false appeals to "liberal" principles (just as our own 
 business men have done, supported by thinkers like Nich- 
 olas Murray Butler), until they made the very word "lib- 
 eralism" hated in their country. The result in Austria 
 was the rise of a strong "Christian Socialist" party under 
 the leadership of Dr. Lueger, a man who, in his vigorous 
 opportunism, tinged with a certain appreciation of the 
 Socialist viewpoint, was curiously analogous to Roosevelt. 
 The party was neither very "Christian" nor very "Social- 
 ist" — it was clerical, anti-Semitic and paternalist — a more 
 curious hodge-podge than our own Progressive party. 
 But, like our Progressive party, it was probably the best 
 available compromise at the moment and accomplished a 
 good deal of solid work. 
 
 What has been impressed on me lately, however, is that 
 we ought not to let the Nicholas Murray Butlers, with 
 their early 19th-century conception of "liberalism," make 
 us hate the true essential doctrine of liberalism as the Aus- 
 
 [933 
 
trian pseudo-liberal party made that nation hate what 
 they had come to understand by the word, i.e., mere ex- 
 emption for a privileged class from necessary govern- 
 mental regulation in the interest of the whole community. 
 German efficiency and centralized control has been a good 
 deal in the mind of modern social reformers as an antidote 
 to this pseudo-liberalism, the hatefulness of which has 
 been peculiarly emphasized in America by the immense 
 economic development of the latter part of the 19th cen- 
 tury. This "State Socialism" of Germany (if I am right 
 in using this term) has brought with it many of the advan- 
 tages which a more democratic Socialism offered and ad- 
 vocated — but it has also developed to a very great extent 
 the vices which the opponents of all forms of Socialism 
 have never tired of attacking. They have used the faults 
 of German bureaucratic social reform as a welcome argu- 
 ment against any kind of social reform— and in reply, the 
 progressive-minded people have had a tendency to defend 
 not only social reform as the best and most democratic of 
 its advocates conceived it, but also, quite unnecessarily, 
 the more extreme forms of State regulation which Ger- 
 man example seemed to prove desirable. Now that we are 
 beginning to see more clearly what this development of 
 bureaucratic control over the life of the nation has meant 
 in Germany, it seems to me that we ought to be on our 
 guard against paying too high a price for social efficiency 
 — against purchasing social reform at the expense of the 
 old, tested advantages of liberalism. It would n't do us 
 much good to jump from the pseudo-liberalism that em- 
 phasized too much the liberty of the individual "to do what 
 he damn pleased" to a pseudo-socialism that denied the 
 right of free self-development and destroyed the healthy 
 variety and initiative which the best English liberal think- 
 ers have had in mind. I am afraid that we should find this 
 
 [943 
 
fire far worse than the frying-pan! I certainly would 
 prefer even our unregulated American system of twenty 
 years ago to the more efficient but less sound and healthy 
 system of modern Germany. The inner rottenness and 
 bankruptcy which the German system is now exhibiting 
 must be a warning to us to develop our progressivism and 
 social reform in harmony with true liberalism and democ- 
 racy. 
 
 Of course, it would be absurd to lay the blame for Ger- 
 man militarism, political ambitions, and social degeneracy 
 at the door of German administrative centralization and 
 efficient governmental control. All that one need con- 
 clude from recent events is that excessive control by the 
 State of the education and daily life of its citizens has a 
 dangerous tendency to expose these citizens to poisonous 
 influence, which under a freer political system would have 
 less chance to grow or do harm. It checks their freedom 
 of development and prevents independent thinking and 
 criticism, however much it increases their immediate well- 
 being and efficiency. The social environment produced 
 by English and American historical development, for all 
 the faults which an insufficient "sense of the State" and 
 absence of intelligent central control have exposed it, is at 
 any rate a far healthier, sounder environment than that in 
 which the rank weeds of "Pan-Germanism" and "militar- 
 ism" have flourished so astonishingly. I don't believe 
 that, even if the historical background and geographical 
 situation in England and America had been as unfortunate 
 as those of poor Germany, we should even then have un- 
 dergone the disastrous demoralization which efficient, 
 "model-governed" Germany has undergone in the last 
 forty years. 
 
 All this makes one look back with a new feeling of sym- 
 pathy and discriminating admiration to the English tradi- 
 
 [953 
 
tion of free institutions and individual liberty— in spite of 
 the faults which this traditional system has at times devel- 
 oped. These were chiefly because of its insufficient recog- 
 nition of other political ideals besides "liberty." We have 
 been too ready, perhaps, to think of the constitutional 
 struggles of the 17th century and the revolutions achieved 
 by Adam Smith, Bentham and Cobden as of little impor- 
 tance to us nowadays. We have been too apt to remember 
 the narrowness of the conception of liberty for which these 
 men fought so successfully— its inadequate application to 
 the great mass of modern wage-earners— and to forget 
 what an enormous gain it represented over the political 
 tyranny and the fussy, ill-conceived meddling with the 
 economic life of the nation against which these earlier re- 
 formers protested. We must maintain the continuity of 
 our progress, and go on to new reforms without losing the 
 benefit of those won for us by our forefathers. 
 
 To the extent that they preach this valuable lesson, 
 which perhaps some of us were in danger of forgetting, 
 men like Nicholas Murray Butler (I keep coming back to 
 him as a type) have been doing a useful and genuinely 
 "conservative" work. Only— because they were right in 
 this, they were not necessarily right in defending the faults 
 and inadequacies of traditional liberalism; nor need we 
 stop working for the further developments of liberalism 
 which are already being achieved in England, and which 
 we so need in our own country. 
 
 It would be an extremely interesting thing if some man 
 like Giddings or Ross would make a sociological study of 
 the German nation and show just how far their present 
 grave faults are the result of their unfortunate political 
 history for centuries past,— of their lack of that training in 
 living considerately and "gently" (i.e., like gentlefolk) 
 among themselves and with their neighbors, to which the 
 
 C963 
 
absence of any national unity has condemned them. I 
 imagine that the pre-eminent development of just these 
 social-political virtues among the English and French has 
 been due, as much as to anything, to the very early period 
 at which these two peoples became unified under a strong 
 central Government and began to develop a real national 
 life. One feels so strongly in the Germans that lack of 
 any recognition of the rights of others— any ability to un- 
 derstand other points of view and sympathize with them— 
 which is noticeable in an undisciplined child, a child 
 which has not knocked about enough with other children 
 to develop a satisfactory modus vivendi. Certainly his- 
 torical "chance" has had something to do with German 
 failings, as it has with English success, in these directions 
 —but that is no reason why they should not now be taught 
 better ! One may make excuses for an undisciplined child, 
 but, for the sake of others, one can't spare it the unavoid- 
 able consequences of selfish aggressiveness! 
 
 I enclose various clippings, two of which deal with the 
 interesting question of the inviolability of treaties. The 
 first of these cites an article by John Stuart Mill (which I 
 haven't yet been able to get hold of ) , to the effect that few, 
 if any, treaties can be absolutely permanent because of the 
 necessarily changing circumstances of the nations which 
 enter into them; and that every nation must reserve the 
 right to alter a treaty to which it is a party if its interests 
 compel it to do so. This theory, which of course is per- 
 fectly sound, the author of this letter to the "Outlook" 
 (English) cites to prove that the Germans cannot justly be 
 blamed for violating the treaty guaranteeing the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium. The fallacy of any such line of argument 
 ought to be evident and is pretty completely exposed by 
 the answers in the "Outlook" (for the following week). 
 A good instance of an outgrown treaty was the Clayton- 
 
 [973 
 
Bulwer treaty between ourselves and England in regard to 
 the Panama Canal — but we did not simply violate it with- 
 out warning and at the expense of all notions of common 
 fairness and decency, as did the Germans in the case of 
 Belgium. On the contrary, we frankly told England that 
 we thought circumstances had altered since the treaty was 
 made, and invited her to negotiate a new one. This led to 
 the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Later, when we attempted to 
 discriminate in favor of our own coastwise shipping, 
 President Wilson, ignoring our possible technical legal 
 rights and considering rather that the rest of the world 
 agreed with England in her interpretation of the treaty, 
 secured the repeal of this act. His main argument was 
 that the large-minded, generous course of action toward a 
 neighbor nation was the only course compatible with our 
 own national dignity. How very different this was from 
 the theory on which Germany acted! 
 
 Another case of a treaty which we "denounced" and ter- 
 minated was our commercial treaty with Russia, but this 
 contained a specific provision allowing either party to it 
 to "denounce" or refuse to renew it at certain given inter- 
 vals. We merely took advantage of this provision. 
 
 I can conceive of a case where, without any such pro- 
 vision, a nation would be justified in refusing to be bound 
 by treaty. Suppose, to take an extreme case, we had 
 bound ourselves years ago to join Germany, should some 
 opportunity arise in the future, in conquering and par- 
 titioning China. When the opportunity came— supposing 
 we had been conscienceless enough not to demand the 
 repeal of the treaty in the meantime and the substitution 
 of some other agreement as "compensation" to Germany— 
 I think we should have had at least an arguable right to 
 refuse to abide by our promise on the ground that moral 
 standards had altered since the treaty was made. It is the 
 
 [98] 
 
possibility of cases like this, though not so flagrant as this, 
 which justifies the assertion that the obligation of treaties 
 can't be regarded as unconditionally binding, irrespective 
 of any circumstances which may afterwards arise. But 
 even this slight reservation is dangerous, and should be 
 admitted with the greatest reluctance— for, as Lloyd 
 George said, "treaties are the currency of international in- 
 tercourse," and if that currency becomes debased, civil- 
 ized intercourse between nations becomes impossible. 
 
 In fact, I think that, if the performance of the treaty in- 
 volves only an injury to the nation called upon for such 
 performance, unless that nation has taken steps to relieve 
 itself of the unwelcome obligation, there can be few con- 
 ceivable situations in which a refusal to perform such an 
 obligation can be excused. My illustration, above, in- 
 volved an injury to an innocent third party, and was to 
 that extent a much clearer case. But, in the case of the 
 German violation of the Belgian neutrality, not only was 
 there no such excuse for Germany, but consideration for 
 the rights of the innocent third party was an additional 
 reason for observing— not for violating— the treaty. 
 
 Sheringham, October IJth. 
 DearE.: 
 
 I was interested in what you said as to the vogue of 
 
 Usher's "Pan-Germanism" at present in America. It is a 
 
 book which has real value as showing, from the viewpoint 
 
 of an outsider, himself considerably "Germanized," what 
 
 modern Germans think of other nations and what is their 
 
 ambition for their own country's future. It is well that 
 
 the rest of the western world should learn as vividly as 
 
 possible just what these opinions and this ambition mean 
 
 for all of Germany's neighbors! But beyond this Usher's 
 
 C993 
 
book is pretty shallow and second-rate. As history it has 
 no real standing— both its facts and conclusions drawn 
 from them are most unreliable. Occasionally his imagina- 
 tion and his readable style make his survey of recent Eu- 
 ropean events quite suggestive— but unfortunately one has 
 to discount about half of what he writes. 
 
 Bernhardi's book is more important, as being written by 
 a German, and one who had considerable vogue in his own 
 country. Cramb's book, though I don't like his glorifica- 
 tion of militarism, is far sounder and more trustworthy 
 than Usher's. 
 
 I shall also send you, when I can get a duplicate copy 
 (this is slow work these days), a pamphlet by an Oxford 
 doctor containing a lot of most interesting and illumi- 
 nating information about the "Pan-German League"— 
 backed up, as Usher's work almost never is, by actual 
 quotations from their propagandist "literature," and in- 
 formation as to their personnel, etc. Some of their writ- 
 ings are really almost unbelievable! How a country like 
 Germany could have permitted such a propaganda to be 
 carried on under semi-official auspices, and with the open 
 support of members of the Government, is almost more 
 than one can understand. A very large proportion, for 
 example, of all the school-teachers, who in Germany are 
 public officials, are active members of the League and 
 spread its poisonous doctrines in their schools. Many of 
 the best-known newspapers are known to be "organs" of 
 the League, and most of the others give a great deal of 
 space to its publications. Its lectures and pamphlets are 
 innumerable, and in every part of the country its propa- 
 ganda is familiar and readily accepted. Allied organiza- 
 tions, like the Navy League, work with it toward the same 
 general aims in world politics. The writer of this pam- 
 
phlet says that the Government has long been afraid of its 
 power, and has not dared to curb even its worst excesses— 
 and there is a good deal of evidence to support this belief. 
 Unfortunately this writer (C. R. Fletcher) is himself a 
 very prejudiced, intemperate sort of person, and makes a 
 good many assertions which he will find it hard to prove — 
 but these affect very little the trustworthiness of the actual 
 information which he has collected, the most striking part 
 of which is his quotation from "Pan-German" pamphlets. 
 The name of his own pamphlet is "The Germans and 
 What They Covet"— wait until you read it. I have read 
 enough in many of the German newspapers myself, espe- 
 cially the "Tagliche Rundschau," to know that the poison 
 of "Pan-Germanism" is wide-spread and virulent. 
 
 Sheringham, October l6th. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 I sent you the other day a new popularly written pam- 
 phlet by a man named Cloudesley Brereton — a very read- 
 able and, with a few very slight exceptions, fair, well 
 written and enlightened statement of the English case. It 
 seems to me a particularly good book for popular con- 
 sumption, for though it is popularly written it is not by 
 any means cheap or trashy. The last chapter, indeed, is 
 really fine and contains several thoughtful, valuable sug- 
 gestions as to the final settlement. 
 
 The fall of Antwerp was discouraging from the point of 
 view of the poor, harried, persecuted Belgians, but other- 
 wise it is not thought it will have much effect on the gen- 
 eral military situation. Germany cannot use this city as a 
 naval base because the mouth of the Scheldt is wholly in 
 Dutch territory and any military use of it would involve 
 
 [ioiH 
 
immediate violation of Dutch neutrality. The Dutch, it 
 is certain, will go to war with Germany rather than permit 
 this, and England, who respected Dutch neutrality when 
 it was to her advantage to use the Scheldt to send troops 
 and supplies to Antwerp, will certainly not allow the Ger- 
 mans to violate this neutrality with impunity. Besides, the 
 Germans will have to pass the English fleet to get any 
 ships South to the mouth of the Scheldt. As a base for 
 airship raids, which will probably be attempted, Antwerp 
 is no better than Brussels, and sheds and other equipment 
 for Zeppelins will take a long time to prepare. 
 
 An invasion of England from the North Sea is being a 
 good deal talked of, and, if the British fleet could be en- 
 tirely left out of the calculation, it would undoubtedly be 
 a real danger. Even as it is, the plan may be tried, but the 
 English are not losing much sleep over it. Their prepara- 
 tions have long been made, and it is shrewdly suspected 
 that the recent discussions in the newspapers are intended 
 as much as anything to buck up recruiting. Something 
 over 700,000 men out of the million asked for have already 
 been raised, and probably the whole number could have 
 been secured by this time if the War Office could have han- 
 dled them fast enough, and provided them with training 
 quarters, equipment, and, most difficult of all, experienced 
 non-commissioned officers. It is in this latter direction 
 that the greatest difficulty will be felt, but England has a 
 large supply of retired soldiers, veterans of past wars, who 
 will be available. In order to stem the rush of recruits a 
 few weeks ago the War Office raised the height require- 
 ment io 5 feet 6 inches, but recently it has reduced it to 
 5 feet 5 inches. Originally it was 5 feet 3 inches, and be- 
 fore long it will probably be put back at this figure. The 
 rate of enlistment will then be considerably accelerated. 
 
 [102] 
 
Sheringham, October 20th. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I have been reading lately a very able study of the 
 whole case as between Germany and England— Sarolea's 
 "Anglo-German Problem." It is thoroughly readable 
 and so good that I have sent you two copies. The author 
 is a Belgian by birth, cosmopolitan by education, now a 
 professor at the University of Edinburgh, Belgian consul 
 in Edinburgh, editor of "Everyman," and a thoughtful, 
 well-informed, broad-minded Liberal. A better combina- 
 tion for a study of Anglo-German relations would be hard 
 to find, and the book was written nearly two years ago, 
 before the present war was thought of. You may think, as 
 you read the introduction, that he is too hard on the Ger- 
 mans, but he is quite ready to admit their good points, and 
 he does seem to me to prove his case. 
 
 I shall send you shortly a pamphlet by Sir E. Cook 
 called "How Britain Strove for Peace," a careful review 
 of the English efforts to come to a friendly agreement with 
 Germany during the last fifteen years. I haven't yet read 
 it, but I imagine it will cover just the ground that I have 
 been wanting to see covered fully. Sarolea takes up this 
 same question and is strongly of the opinion that Ger- 
 many's grievance is almost entirely groundless. His book 
 is any amount more able and reliable than Usher's and 
 much more satisfactory than Cramb's. 
 
 Georgian House, London, England, 
 October 2Jrd. 
 DearK.: 
 
 In some ways I hated to leave Sheringham, as I enjoyed 
 all of the last two weeks there, but it is interesting to get 
 back again nearer the centre of things, and I shall be glad 
 
to see my friends. I expect to go to the H.'s for a few 
 days next week, and for Sunday, November ist, to the B.'s 
 at Oxford. W. C. has gone to France with his car for Red 
 Cross work. The D.'s are also here, though the war has 
 almost put a stop to the new business that J. D. was trying 
 to build up. 
 
 Georgian House, London, England, 
 October 31st. 
 DearK.: 
 
 I went down to Weybridge on Tuesday and stayed there 
 with the H.'s until last night. I was so glad to see them 
 again. Mrs. H. is helping run a house for twenty Belgian 
 refugees and she took me over to see them. A Louvain 
 professor— a nice, quiet, intelligent man— is in charge 
 there for the Committee, and I talked a little halting 
 French with him and some of the other men. They 
 are mostly elderly tradespeople from the southeastern 
 French-speaking portion of Belgium, and they are piti- 
 fully destitute. They are not by any means saints— they 
 quarrel among themselves, poor things, as any average 
 families would, being dumped down together indiscrimi- 
 nately in strange surroundings, and with no regular work 
 to keep their minds employed ; but the Committee has sent 
 some of them to other places and substituted more conge- 
 nial people and gradually the situation is being smoothed 
 out. Naturally, they were all very bitter against the Ger- 
 mans. . . . 
 
 I have a tremendous confession to make! I tried to en- 
 list to-day, and was turned down. I have n't written you 
 about this before, although I have been more and more 
 determined to try it, as soon as I could get "fit." I wanted 
 to see first whether it would be possible, and not to get you 
 stirred up unnecessarily! I tried the "Sportsmen's Battal- 
 
ion" to-day, and was told that no one who wasn't an Eng- 
 lish subject could take the oath of allegiance to King 
 George. Naturally, I couldn't give up my American 
 citizenship, even temporarily. . . . 
 
 I shall probably try for some Red Cross work, or some- 
 thing of this sort. I do want to be doing something to 
 help. . . . 
 
 All the news is splendid these days. I am glad Turkey 
 is in the game at last, as it will give a chance to remove a 
 plague-spot at the end of the war. The Allies have been 
 more than patient and generous with her for months past 
 — but quern Deus vult perdere . . . 
 
 The German offensive has pretty well broken down in 
 all quarters— Germany's bolt, I believe, is shot. She will 
 hang on, though, for a long while yet. . . . 
 
 Georgian House, London, 
 November Jrd. 
 Dear K.: 
 
 You may be surprised to see "Georgian House" at the 
 head of this letter instead of Hindhead, where I told you I 
 would be. I was there until this morning, but last night I 
 got a telegram from Mrs. J. which brought me back by 
 an early train. I had written her about trying to enlist, 
 and told her that I wanted to get some Red Cross work to 
 do. She wired that Captain W., son of the Lady W. that I 
 wrote you about, was going to France to-day with the 
 Australian Volunteer Hospital, and would like to have 
 me go with him, if it could be arranged. I got him on the 
 telephone from Hindhead, and arranged to meet him 
 here this morning. 
 
 I met Lady W. and the whole family, come to see him 
 off, and had a talk with him. He said he would like to 
 
 Dos] 
 
have me with him on his car, if the Hospital would send 
 me, and gave me a letter to them. I went there and talked 
 with them, and found that only the driver was sent with 
 each car— there being really nothing for any one else to do 
 between the front (where orderlies put the wounded men 
 on the cars) and the hospital at Boulogne (where the doc- 
 tors take charge of them). All the space in each car is 
 needed for the wounded. They said, however, that if I 
 would learn to drive a car, they could put me in charge of 
 one in a week or two, and I could then join Captain W. at 
 Boulogne. 
 
 I told them that I would do this, and am to begin lessons 
 at the Motor Schools, Ltd., to-morrow morning. I shall 
 also take French lessons at a Berlitz school. ... I won- 
 der if, when you read all this at first, you will think I am 
 entirely crazy? I 'm not! I have felt more like myself 
 since getting back to something definite and worth while, 
 than for months past. This work will be out-of-doors, and 
 ought to be entirely possible for me now, as my last weeks 
 at Sheringham have left me quite fit again. 
 
 Captain W. is a rare person, one with whom I shall be 
 immensely glad to work. . . . He was very friendly about 
 wanting me to go with him, and it really seems an un- 
 usually good chance. If for any reason this plan falls 
 through, I shall try for one of the other field hospitals. 
 
 To-night I dine with the J.'s, to-morrow night with 
 E. P. My days, I imagine, will be fairly full with motor- 
 car lessons and French— but it is a pleasure to feel fit for 
 something again. ... I have been coming more and 
 more to feel that I must have a hand in this war in some 
 capacity— and this Red Cross work, I believe, I can do 
 now. So do say you approve! It will be at least two 
 weeks before I can get away, in any case, so there will be 
 
 [106] 
 
plenty of time to write you more about my plans. I will, 
 of course, leave my address with the F. L. & T. Co., 
 though letters will then, I fear, be a bit delayed. I shall 
 have a good deal to write you about, if I get there! 
 
 Georgian House, London, 
 November 4th. 
 Dear K. : 
 
 I am starting in with my motor and French lessons, and 
 am very keen to learn to drive as soon as possible so they 
 can send me out with a car. It will be painful work, but 
 useful and important. The British troops are showing up 
 magnificently— in the hospitals, as well as on the field- 
 but Mrs. J. tells me that the incessant strain of fighting 
 against superior numbers, as well as the noise, and the 
 physical and nervous fatigue, has actually driven a num- 
 ber of otherwise uninjured men temporarily insane. War 
 is horrible, — and I shall soon know it, I imagine, only too 
 well— but I shall be glad to be helping. ... I am going 
 to buy some of my kit to-day— water-proof khaki clothes, 
 sleeping-bag, pistol, etc. If I can only keep feeling as 
 well as I am now I sha'n't have any trouble, and I really 
 believe the out-door work will do the business. I am sure 
 you wouldn't want me to give up the thing I feel best 
 fitted for now and believe I am well enough to do, just 
 because of some risk of my insides going wrong again! 
 
 I had a nice evening with the J.'s yesterday. They look 
 tired and worn out, but were so friendly and cheerful. . . . 
 
 Here the letters were ended by his death. What the fur- 
 ther development of his opinions would have been can only 
 be conjectured. But knowing his temperament and the 
 
 [1073 
 
way in which his political convictions were arrived at, one 
 is warranted in believing that he would not have narrowed 
 into partisanship, but would have been increasingly con- 
 cerned with the permanent and international aspects of the 
 war. 
 
 His strong sympathy was with England and the Allies ; 
 he would have been glad to fight on their side. But 
 this was due to his belief in the principles which he felt 
 were bound up with their cause; and after the war, in the 
 reconstruction which must follow in all parts of the world, 
 he would surely have found some place among the work- 
 ers for a new and finer civilization. 
 
 C108] 
 
IN MEMORIAM 
 
 artfmr Crosbp ilutitngton 
 
 1880-1914 
 
 The friends of Arthur C. Ludington, whose names are 
 signed below, had intimate opportunity to know the work 
 which he did for this City and State. 
 
 To the solution of civic problems in New York he con- 
 tributed a keen intelligence, trained in political science at 
 Yale, at Heidelberg, and as assistant to President Wilson 
 at Princeton. Having an income sufficient for his daily 
 needs, he chose to devote his whole energy to public ser- 
 vice. His patience, skill and reliability in gathering and 
 marshalling facts, and in devising and improving legisla- 
 tion, made him indispensable in many public undertak- 
 ings. In the struggle for honest elections, direct primaries, 
 Massachusetts ballot, short ballot, legislative reform and 
 many kindred proposals he played a part which was al- 
 ways immensely useful, yet rarely conspicuous. 
 
 It is significant that hardly a piece of work is identified 
 with his name or capable of being singled out as exclu- 
 sively his handiwork. Yet few important movements were 
 undertaken without receiving from him some real con- 
 tribution. He worked always in such unselfish and inti- 
 mate co-operation with others that these contributions, 
 large though they were, cannot be detached from those of 
 other men. He rendered important service to the City 
 Club, the Citizens' Union, the Honest Ballot Association, 
 the Direct Primary Association, the Short Ballot Organi- 
 
zation, the legislative committee of the Progressive party, 
 the Congestion Committee, and to Governors, Mayors and 
 members of the Legislature. 
 
 His untimely death by accident in London on Novem- 
 ber 4th deprives this city of a citizen whose later life 
 would surely have been of still greater value and emi- 
 nence. 
 
 We who have suffered a personal loss in his death feel it 
 our duty to bring home to citizens of New York the debt 
 of gratitude which they, too, owe to his memory. And 
 especially should he become an inspiring example to other 
 young men of education and means. Freed from the ne- 
 cessity of earning a living, he felt an imperative call to 
 freely give public service. For he held, with Robert 
 Louis Stevenson, that "no man can be honest who does not 
 work." 
 
 Everett V. Abbot 
 George B. Agnew 
 Walter T.Arndt 
 Albert S. Bard 
 Charles A. Beard 
 Robert S. Binkerd 
 Emory R. Buckner 
 William M. Chadbourne 
 Richard S. Childs 
 Julius Henry Cohen 
 Albert de Roode 
 Arthur Du Bois 
 Mansfield Ferry 
 Edward R. Finch 
 Felix Frankfurter 
 Joseph O. Hammitt 
 
 Robert L. Hoguet 
 William H. Hotchkiss 
 Raymond V. Ingersoll 
 T. Catesby Jones 
 Clarence N. Lewis 
 Sam A. Lewisohn 
 Walter Lindner 
 Robert McC. Marsh 
 Philip J. McCook 
 Henry Moskowitz 
 Joseph M. Proskauer 
 William L. Ransom 
 Samuel J. Rosensohn 
 William J. Schieffelin 
 William Allaire Shortt 
 Laurence A. Tanzer 
 
 Frank B. Williams 
 [no] 
 
Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
 Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
 Treatment Date: yiy TflM 
 
 PreservationTechnologies 
 
 A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 
 
 111 Thomson Park Drive 
 Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
 (724)779-2111