THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. Agalite Slating for Black-boards. To cover 50 feet, <*ne coat, POST-PAID. 1 00 Aids to School Discipline, containing 80 Certificates, 120 Checks, 200 Cards, 100 Merits. Per box 1 25 Supplied separately; per 100 Merits, 15 cts; Half Merits, 15 cts; Cards, 15cts; Checks, 40; Certificates, 50 cts. Alden (Joseph) First Principles of Political Economy. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 153. 75 Babcock's Excelsior Grading Blanks, per hundred 1 00 Bales (C. R.) The Diacritical Speller. A practical course of exercise iu Spelling and Pronunciation. 8 vo, pp. 68 50 Bardeen (C. W) Common Sclu-oi Law. A digest of statute and common lawas to the relation of the Teacher to the Pupil, the Parent, and the District. With 400 reference to legals decisions in 21 different States. To which are added the 1400 questions given at the first seven New York Examinations for State Certificates. 7th thousand. Cloth 12 mo. pp. 188 and Appendix. Corrected to 1885 . .? 50 Dime Question Book on Temperance, prepared expressly to meet the y law for public instruction. 16mo. pp. 40 lfj Roderick Hume. The story of a New York Teacher. Cloth, 18mo, pp. 295. 1 25 Verbal Pitfalls. A manual of 1500 misused words, Cloth, 18mo, pp. 295 ... 75 Some Facts about our Public Schools. 8vo. pp. 32 25 Educational Journalism. 8vo, pp.30 25 Teaching as a Business for M en. 8vo. pp 20 25 The Teacher's Commercial Value. 8vo, pp 20 25 -The School Bulletin Year Book. Educational directory of New York >f,.rlpavp(!. no. 160 1 00 illustrative 1 00 45 1 25 15 50 3 00 25 State for Bassett (J. questions Edix Pupils' Beesau (An Bennett ;F Bible The, i Blanchard kSJieil' L. I |) of Unite< States oi Bradford (' Brown (0. Buckliam | \ps. Cloth, 16mo, pp BuelKC. J.. 15 Bulletin Blank Speller. Boards, 5 3 i xT'*. rounu comer-., Vl >. so . . 15 — Spelling Pad.-*, 70 pages. Each Book-Keeping Blanks. Day-Book, Journal. Ledger, ('ash-Book, S Book. In sets or singly. Prpss-board, 7x8^, pp. 23. Each 15 — Book. Manilla, 7x9, pp. 44 . . 15 (loss Register. Designed by Edward Smith, Superintendent of Scl Syracuse N. Y. Press-board com . . Sizes, (a) 6x7, for terms of twenty weeks (Jo 5x7. for terms of fourteen hen nor other- wise specified this size is always sent. Pp.48 25 (r.) Like (b) but with one-half more < 72) pages 35 ool Ruler, Two Styles, (a) Manilla. {!>) Card-board. Each ! Per hundred 1 00 Bur hard (O. R.) Tiro Months in Europe. Paper, 161110, pp. 168 50 Catalogue of 8500 Books for Teacher.: 8V0, pp. 32 25 Chart of Life Series of Physiology Charts. Per set of four 12 00 a spring rollers ^0 18 50 Cheney (F.) A( \r Schools. Boards, 16mo, pp. 95 50 Colored Crayon, for J M 30 1885 TUB SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. Collins (Henry.) The International Date Line. Paper, 16mo, pp. 13 15 Conntitution of the United States and of the State of New York. Flexible cloth, 12mo, pp. 82 25 Cooke (Sidney G.) Politics and Scliools. Paper, 8vo, pp. 23 25 Craig (Asa H.) The Common School Question Boolt. Cloth, 12ino, pp. 340. 1 50 Davis (W. W.) A Manual of Suggestions for Teaching Fraction* Es- pecially designed to accompany a Fractional Apparatus for developing the idea of Fractions. Paper, 12mo, pp. 43 25 * Fractional Apparatus, in box 4 00 De Graff (E. V.) Practical Phonics. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 108 75 PocRet Pronunciation Hook. Manilla, l6mo, pp. 47 15 The School-Room Guide, embodying the instruction given by the author at Teachers' Institutes in .New York and other suites, and especially intended to assist Public School Teachers in the practical work of the school-room. Thirteenth Edition, from entirely new plates. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 449 150 Development Lesson*. Cloth, 8vo., pp. 301 1 50 The Song Budget A collection of Songs and Music for schools and Educational gatherings. Paper, small 4to, pp.- 76. 100th thousand. ... . 15 The School-Boom Chorus. A collection of 200 Songs, suitable for Public and Private Schools. Boards, small 4to, pp. .147 35 Calisthenics and Disciplinary Exercises. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 39 > 25 Dickinson (J. W.) Limits of Oral Teaching. Paper, 8vo, pp.8 15 Diplomas, printed to order from any design furnished. Specimens sent. (a) Bond paper, 14x17, for 25 5 00 " 50 6 50 (h) " " 16x20, " 25 5 50 " 50 7 50 (c) Parchment, 15x20 " 5 6 00 Each additional copy. , 75 Emerson (H. P.) Latin in High Schools. Paper, 8vo, pp. 9 25 Farnham (Geo. L.) The Sentence Method of teaching Heading, Writing, and Spelling. A Manual for Teachers. Cloth, 12rao, pp.50 50 Fitcb (Joshua G.) The Art of Questioning. Paper, 12mo, pp. 36 15 — -The Art of Securing Attention,. Paper, lHmo, pp. 43. Second Edition.. 15 Lecture* on Teaching, English Edition. Cloth. 12mo, pp. 436, net The same, new Reading Clu<> Edition; net 1 00 Gitfin i Win. M.) How Not to Teach. Paper, lOnio, pp. 31 15 Green (S. T.J Duties and Fitness of a Teacher. 8vo, pp. 16 Hailmann (•'»'. N.) Kinder g art n Manual. Primary Helps. Boards, 8 vo, pp.58. 14 colored plates 75 The New Education. A summary of Kindergarten Principles and A!-!' ' vo, pp. 146. Two series. Each Harlow (W. B.) An Introduction to Early English Literature, from the Lay of Beowulf to Edward Spenser. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 138 Hemlrick (Mary F.) A series of Questions in E-nglish and American Literature. Boards, 12mo, pp. 100, interleaved HooHe (James H.) Studies in Articulation' Cloth, 16mo, pp. 70 50 On the Province of Methods of Teaching. A professional study. With an introduction by Prof. Charles W. Bennett, D. D; Cloth. 16rao, pp /' teachers' Mau ual and First- t-Book for pupils in the firsl grade, flrsl year, oi public schools. Based upon Pestalozzi's method of teac tentary number. Boards, 16mo, pp. 217 n. Boards, 16mo, pp. 156 Hough (F, B.) The Thousand islands of the St. Lawrence. Cloth, 16i pp. :;07 .. . Hughes f.LiiW^ L.) reaching. American Edition. With Contents and Index. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 135 !!'■ , < loth, 16mo, pp. ! 50 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/outlinesofpsycho01sull OTHER READING-CLUB BOOKS ON TEACHING. The growth of State Reading-Circles among teachers within the past year or two has been a marvel. The following are the books on Pedagogy recently adopted ; and these editions have been prepared with Notes, Analyses, etc. , expressly to meet this demand. Sully's Psychology, abridged and annotated with Review, Test, and Examination Exercises, and Pedagogical Ref- erences, by J. A. Reinhart, Ph.D. 16mo, pp. 373. Special price to Reading Circles $1.00 Tate's Philosophy of Education, only complete edition. Pp. 330 1.50 Payne's Lectures on Education, indexed and analyzed. Pp. 281 1.00 DeGraff's School-Room Guide, the standard work on Practice. Pp. 449 1.50 Eoose's Province of Methods in Teaching. Pp. 376 1.00 The above volumes are uniform in binding. Quick's Educational Reformers. 12mo, pp. 331 1 . 50 Fitch's Lectures on Teaching. 12mo, pp. 437 1.25 Page's Theory and Practice of Teaching. 12mo, pp. 422 1.25 Johonnofs Principles and Practice of Teaching. Pp. 395.. 1.50 Partridge's Quincy Methods. 12mo, pp. 660 1.50 Parker's Talks on Teaching. 16mo, pp. 182 1.00 AH references in this volume are to the editions named above. OUTLINES of PSYCHOLOGY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE THEORY OF EDUCATION. JAMES SULLY, M. A., EXAMINER IN THE UNIVERSITY OP CAMBRIDGE, ETC. READING-CLUB EDITION; ABRIDGED AND EDITED, WITH APPENDICES, SUGGESTIVE QUESTIONS, AND REFERENCES TO PEDAGOGICAL WORKS, J.»- M. A. REINHART, Ph.D., PRINCIPAL OF THE HIGH AND NORMAL TRAINING SCHOOL, PATERSON, N. J. ^6 "a± / SYRACUSE, N. Y.I C. W. BARDEEN, PUBLISHER. 1886. . LB/05/ .6$ Copyright, 1886, by C. W. Bardeen. PREFACE. Psychology seems about to share with Educational Theory, Method and History in a substantial revival fein the regard and studies of the teaching profession. The work of which this volume is an abridgment was upon its first appearance recognized as a most lucid, syste- matic, and popular exposition of the general facts of mind. In addition it was, as the title page states, written with special reference to the Theory of Educa- tion. The original edition was voluminous and ex- haustive, and there was a demand for an abridgment which should serve as a hand-book of the Science of Mind for students of educational science, and which should emphasize the connection between pedagogics and psychology. This edition has therefore been prepared with refer- ence to the needs of students of pedagogics in general, teachers-in-training in Normal Schools, and members of Teachers' Reading Circles. All discussions not bearing on educational processes have been eliminated, the voluminous notes and citations of authorities have been abridged, and the remainder of the treatise pre- sented in the form of the original edition. VI PREFACE. A Brief Appendix has been added to each chapter, with the special design of facilitating the study of the connection between Psychology and Educational Sci- ence. This appendix includes: 1. Suggestions for Students of Psychology. 2. Review, Test and Examination Questions. 3. Applications of Psychology to the Theory: and Practice of Teaching; and 4. Pedagogical References to Standard Works on Education, read by Teachers' Reading Circles. The ' Suggestions ' will, it is believed be found help- ful to those reading the text. The 'Review, Test and Examination Questions' may be used as an expeditious review of the general argument of each chapter, and as frequently pointing out the educational aspects of the discussions. kThe I /Applications of Psychology to Teaching ' are mainly in the nature of an exposition of the [logical relations between the principles of psy- chology and the maxims of theory and method in edu- cation. In the course of this exposition numerous quotations are made from the best authorities on educa- tional procedure, which are of great value when viewed in their logical connection with the teachers of mental science. The c Pedagogical References to Standard Educa- tioual Works ' are so arranged that the principles of psychology may be compared with, and studied in con- INDEX. Vll nection with the related pedagogical doctrines and methods described in such works as Parker's Talks on Teaching, Quick's Educational Reformers, Payne's Lectures on Educa- tion, Page's Theory and Practice, Fitch's Lectures on Teach- ing, Tate's Philosophy of Education, Spencer's Education, Johonnot's Principles and Practice of Education, etc. These references are available with any edition of the works above mentioned in general use in this country. Where there is more than one edition, as of Payne or Tate, reference is made to the author's divis- ions and sub-divisions and often to the specific part of the sub-divisions of the lecture on chapter, etc. The pages given for these two authorities are those of Bardeen's editions. J. A. K. Paterson, N". J., January, 1886. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. SCOPE AND METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. What is meant by Psychology. Psychology or Mental Science is our general knowledge of Mind reduced to an accurate and systematic form. Relation of Psychology to the Science of Education. A knowledge of Psychology, the science of mind, is an essential part of the mental outfit of every student of Education. In connection with Ethics, the science of Duty, and with Logic, the science of the conditions under which the mind can know, Psychology furnishes a very large part of those truths or data upon which as a basis the science of Pedagogics rests. In a large sense of the word, Psy- chology may be said to include both Ethics and Logic. This would give emphasis to the apparent intimate relations between Psychology and Pedagogics. The latter must have a body of general truths or principles. These are to a very great extent deduced from our knowledge of mind. The principles of Peda- gogics, i. e., the Science of Education, are not necessarily identi- cal with the laws of mind. But they are either (1) Laws of mind established by the sciences of Psychology, Ethics and Logic, or, (2) principles readily to be deduced from these laws, or, finally, (3) they are principles established inductively by the concurrent experience and observation of the great body of teachers of ancient and modern times. What is meant by Mind. We familiarly talk about minds. All men have minds, and many of the lower animals are commonly supposed to have them. Human 2 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. minds are, however, those which are of chief interest here. We distinguish between a mind as a unity, or a sub- stance, and the several phenomena or states of this mind. What mind is in itself, as a substance, is a question that lies outside psychology, and belongs to philosophy. As a science psychology is concerned only with the phe- nomena of mind, with mental states, psychical facts, or whatever else we choose to call them. What mental phenomena are. How, now, shall we mark off these psychical facts from other phenomena? We cannot define such phenomena by resolving them into something simpler. They have nothing in common beyond the fact of being mental states. Hence we can only use some equivalent phrase, as when we say that a mental phenomenon is a part of our conscious life, or a state of our consciousness. 1 Or again we may enumerate the chief varieties of these mental phenomena and say that mind is the sum of our processes of knowing, our feelings of pleasure and pain, and our voluntary doings. Popularly, mind is apt to be identified with knowing or intelligence. A man of mind is a man of intellect. But though intelligence is perhaps the most important part of mind, it is not the whole. In mental science we must reckon the pain of a bruise as part of mind. Or finally we may set mind in antithesis to what is not mind. Mind is non-material, has no existence in space as ma- terial bodies have. We cannot touch a thought or a i This is a rough popular way of speaking. The question whether there are any mental phenomena which are unconscious, that is, which do not enter into our conscious life or experience, is a subtle and much- disputed point in psychology. HOW TVE STUDY MIND. 3 feeling, and one feeling does not lie outside of another in space. These phenomena occur in time only. Mind and Body. While it is important thus to set mind in strong opposition to material things, we must keep in view the close connection between the two. What we call a human being is made up of a bodily or- ganism and a mind. Our personality or " self " is a mind connected with or embodied in a material frame-work. More particularly all mental processes or operations are connected with actions of the nervous system. The most abstract thought is accompanied by some mode of activity in the brain-centres. Hence, while we must be careful not to confuse the mental and the material, the psychical and the physical, as though they were of the same kind (homogeneous), we cannot exclude the latter from view in dealing with mind. We must always think of mind as attended by, and in some inexplicable way, related to, the living organism, and more particularly the nervous system and its actions. How we Observe and Study Mind: Subjective Method: Introspection. There are two distinct ways of knowing mind. The first is the direct, internal, or subjective way. By this method we direct attention to what is going on in our own mind at the time of its occurrence, or afterwards. 1 We have the power of turning the at- tention inwards on the phenomena of mind. Thus I can attend to a particular feeling, say admiration for a i Strictly speaking we never observe a mental phenomenon at the exact instant of its occurrence. All introspection is retrospection. But we distinguish broadly between studying an Immediately antecedent mental state, and one which occurred some time before. (See my work on Illusions, Chap. VIII. , p. 1 ( J0 n.) 4 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. beautiful object, in order to see what its nature is, of what elementary parts it consists, how it is affected by the circumstances of the moment, and so on. This method of internal or subjective observation is known as introspection (" looking within "). Objective Method. In the second place we may stndy mental phenomena not only in our own individual mind but as they present themselves externally in other minds. This is the indirect, external, or objective way of study- ing mental phenomena. Thus we note the manifestations of others' feelings in looks, gestures, etc. We arrive at a knowledge of their thoughts by their speech, and observe their inclinations and motives by noting their actions. This objective observation embraces not only the mental phenomena of the individuals who are personally known to us, old and young, but those of others of whom we hear or read of in biography, etc. Also it includes the study of minds in masses or aggregates, as they pre- sent themselves in national sentiments and actions, and in the events of history. It includes too a comparative study of mind by observing its agreements and differ- ences among different races, and even among different grades of animal life. The study of the simpler phases' of mind in the child, in backward and uncivilized races, and in the lower ani- mals, is especially valuable for understanding the growth of the mature or fully-developed human mind. Finally, the external or objective method includes the study of mental phenomena in connection with bodily and, more particularly, nervous processes. All external THE TWO METHODS MUST BE COMBINED. 5 observation of mental phenomena takes place by noting some of their bodily accompaniments (movements of expression, vocal actions, and so on). In addition to this, psychology seeks to study the connection between different modes or phases of mind and special kinds of nervous activity. The nature of these enquiries will be indicated presently. Both Methods must be combined. Scientific knowledge is characterized by certainty, exactness, and generality. We must observe carefully so as to make sure of our facts, and to note precisely what is present. And we must go on from a knowledge of the particular to a knowledge of the general. From this rough definition of what is meant by scientific knowledge we may easily see that neither the internal nor the external method is complete without the other. To begin with: since we only directly observe what is passing in our individual minds, some amount of introspection is the first condition of all certain and accurate knowledge of mental states. To try to discover mental phenomena and their laws solely by watching the external signs and effects of others' thoughts, feelings, and volitions, would plainly be absurd. For these external manifestations are, in themselves, as empty of meaning as words in an unknown tongue, and only receive their meaning by a reference to what we ourselves have thought and felt. On the other hand, an exclusive attention to the contents of our individual mind would never give us a y^w^'fl /knowledge of mind. In order to eliminate the effects of individu- ality we must at every step compare our own modes of thinking and feeling with those of other minds. The 6 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. wider the area included in our comparison, the sounder are our generalizations likely to be. Powers of Abstraction and Imagination must be cultivated. Each of these ways of studying mind has its character- istic difficulties. To attend closely to the events of our mental life presupposes a certain power of " abstraction." It requires at first a considerable effort to withdraw the attention from the more striking events of the external world, the sights and sounds that surround us, and to keep it fixed on the comparatively obscure events of the inner world. Even in the case of the trained psy- chologist, the work* is always attended with a peculiar difficulty. On the other hand there is a serious danger in reading the minds of others, due to an excess of the propensity to project our own modes of thinking and feeling into them. This danger increases with the remoteness of the mind we are observing from our own. To apprehend, for example, the sentiments and convic- tions of an ancient Roman, of a Hindoo, or of an uncivilized African, is a delicate operation. It implies close attention to the differences as well as the similari- ties of external manifestation, also an effort of imagina- tion by which though starting from some remembered experiences of our own, we feel our way into a new set of circumstances, new experiences, and a new set of mental habits. If children could ever pass their opinion on the observations made on their feelings by adults, they would probably declare a large part of these observations to have been very wide of the mark. 1 i On the errors incident to Introspection and the interpretation of other minds, see my work on Illusions, Chaps. VIII. and IX. SCIENCE GENERALIZES OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 7 General Knowledge of Mind. As has been observed, science consists of general knowledge, or knowledge expressed in a general form. Hence mental science seeks to generalize our knowledge of mine!. In the first place, it aims at grouping all the phenomena observed under certain heads. That is to say, it classifies the endless variety of mental states according to their re- semblances. In so doing it overlooks the individual differences of minds and fixes attention on their common features. Laios of Mind. In the secoud place, every science aims not only at ordering its phenomena, but at making certain assertions about them. There are general truths or laws which hold good of numerous varieties of phe- nomena. When the phenomena are occurrences in time, these laws have to do with the relation of events to other events preceding or succeeding them. That is to say, they formulate the relations of causal depend- ence of phenomena on other phenomena. Mental Sci- ence seeks to arrive at such truths or laws of mind. That is to say, it attempts to determine the conditions 1 on which mental phenomena depend. Now a little attention to the subject will show that mental phenomena are related in the way of dependence, not only to other phenomena immediately preceding, but to remotely antecedent phenomena. For example, the quick response of a child to a command depends on the formation of a habit, which process may have been going on for years. Hence the consideration of relations i A condition is any circumstance necessary to the production of a phenomenon. All the conditions of a phenomenon taken together consti- tute its cause. 8 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. of dependence leads on to the view of mind as a process of growth or development. The most important laws of mind are laws of mental development. Mind and Nervous Conditions. These laws of mind in- clude truths with respect to the dependence of mental facts on nervous conditions. As already pointed out, in saying that mental phenomena have nervous actions as their conditions, we make no assumption respecting the ultimate nature of mind and body or of their conjunc- tion. All that is meant is that the phenomena of mental life are somehow connected with the activity of the nervous system; that variations in the latter are attended with variations in the former; and that by modifying by purely physical agencies the state of the nervous system, we can indirectly influence the mental accom- paniments. 1 The study of this connection of mind and body is a valuable preparation for a systematic study of psychical phenomena. As it is the borderland between physiology and psychology, it is best taken up at the outset. Knowledge of the Physiology of the Brain important to the teacher. It is all-important to the teacher to know how the varying state of the brain affects mental efficiency. Now owing to the present imperfect state of our know- i It is not even implied that the nervous actions precede the mental in time. This is no doubt true in certain cases. The stimulation of a sense-organ and the propagation of the nervous actions to the brain centres precede a sensation. But do the changes in the brain precede the mental phenomena which accompany them? This question need not per- haps much concern us, as it is a disputed point whether the cause or conditions do necessarily precede an effect in time. (See J. S. Mill, Logic, Book IV, Ch. V., §6; G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, First Series. Vol. II., Prob. V, Ch. II., p. 391.) BRAIN EFFICIENCY AND MIND EFFICIENCY. 9 ledge respecting the particular portions of the brain concerned in particular modes of mental activity, we are not able to determine the relation between the two with scientific precision. At the same time we have certain generalizations respecting the variations of men- tal activity that accompany variations in the condition of the brain as a whole, which it may be useful to indicate here. Brain Efficiency and Mind Efficiency. It is abundantly proved, alike by everyday observation and by scientific experiment, that the amount of mental activity possible at any time is limited by the quantity of disposable energy in the brain. The more vigorous the brain at any time, the greater the amount of mental expenditure possible. This applies not merely to intellectual work, but also to feeling and action. A healthy and vigorous brain is the condition of numerous and vivid feelings, and of energetic actions. On what Efficiency of Brain Centres depends. The state of the brain, its degree of readiness for work, fluctuates with the degree of disposable energy of the nervous system as a whole. This is affected by regular or peri- odic causes, the changes incident to the natural altern- ating rhythm of waking and sleeping. It is also affected by irregular circumstances, such as changes of bodily health, and the exhaustion due to great mental agitation. In the second place, the condition of the brain, like that of all other organs, is affected by the extent to which the particular structures have recently been exer- cised. After long and severe brain-work of any kind, 10 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. the organ becomes fatigued and incapable of further work. On the other hand, a prolonged rest, as during a summer holiday, leaves the organ with the maximum degree of disposable energy. So far as we are sure of the existence of special cen- tres, we may apply the same considerations to these. The condition of any given centre, say that of vision, will vary according to the amount of work recently done. One part of the brain may in this way be much more vigorous than another. At the same time it is to be remembered that the several parts of the brain stand in the closest organic connection one with another, and that great exhaustion of any one part will affect the degree of efficiency of the other parts. It follows, too, that since (as we shall see more fully by and by) all kinds of mental work involve attention, the centres espe- cially concerned in this activity will become fatigued in every case as the direct consequence of mental strain or effort. Need of Brain Rest. It follows from these truths that, in order to maintain brain efficiency, we must supply the necessary conditions of repose and alternation of activ- ity. After a certain amount of work, the brain should be allowed to repose as a whole. An approximate con- dition of repose is reached by play, which by calling forth the muscles into easy and familiar modes of activity relieves the higher centres of attention and thought. Within these limits of extreme and general fatigue of the biain, efficiency can only be secured by varying the kind of work so as not to tax any one region of the brain RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO THE OTHER SCIENCES. II overmuch. A change from manual to vocal exercise in the kindergarten may be taken as an illustration of this rule. Relation of Psychology to other Sciences. Psychology is a positive science dealing with a certain class of phe- nomena, and to this extent is on a level, or co-ordinate, with the special physical sciences, as chemistry, botany, and so on. Not only so, owing to the connection be- tween nervous and mental processes, psychology enters, as we have seen, into a peculiar relation with physiol- ogy. On the other hand, psychology is above, and complementary to, the special sciences. For in consid- ering mind, it views knowing as a mental phenomenon, as an operation or process in our mental life. Thus all knowing, whether of chemistry, botany, or physiology, inasmuch as it is the activity of some mind or knowing- subject, is a part of the subject-matter of psychology. In other words, mental science considers what goes on in the mind when we know. On the other hand, it does not enquire into the. truth or falsity of this know- ing. It simply views the process of knowing on its subjective side, and leaves the consideration of knowl- edge on its objective side, as true or valid, to Philosophy or Theory of Knowledge which includes Logic. Psychology and Practical Science. Psychology is a the- oretic, as distinguished from a practical science. A theoretic science concerns itself about things as they are, how they happen or come to pass. A practical science concerns itself with things as they ought to be, or as we wish them to be. Practical science, though 12 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. thus contrasted with theoretic, is really very closely connected with it. In order to gain our end, we must have a certain knowledge of the agencies we employ. Thus a sculptor must know something about the prop- erties of clay and marble, a physician something about the functions of the body, and so on. Viewed in this way, psychology forms the basis of a number of practical sciences. All the practical sciences, indeed, which aim at guiding or influencing our thoughts, feelings, or actions, have their footing in psychology. Thus the principles of oratory, of legislation, and so on, are based on a knowledge of the properties and laws of the human mind. These relations may be roughly set forth as follows: — (A.) Psychology, as a whole, supplies the basis of Education, or the Practical Science which aims at cultivating the mind on the side of Know- ing, Feeling, and Willing alike. (B.) In its special branches, psychology supplies a basis to the following practical sciences: — Psychology of Knowing — Logic, or the regulation of reasoning processes; together with the allied art, rhetoric, or the art of persuasion, and that of forming opinion. 1 Psychology of Feeling — ^Esthetics, or the regulation of feeling according to certain rules or principles, to wit, the admirable, or beautiful. Psychology of Willing — Ethics, or the determination of the ends of action and the regulation of con- iThat is so far as the process is a strictly intellectual one. So far however, as it involves appeals to feeling it falls under the next head. CONNECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION. 13 duct by principles of right and wrong; together with the allied arts of politics and legislation. General Connection of Psychology and Education. We see,, at once, from this rough scheme, the peculiarly close connection betweeu Psychology and Education. This is the only practical science which is engaged in guiding or controlling the whole of mind. The educator of the young may be said to unite in himself the functions of logician, art critic, moralist and legislator. He has to direct thought, to cultivate feeling, and to control action. We may still further see the closeness of this connec- tion by glancing at the dependence of Education on other sciences. As a practical science which aims at an end, Education must lean on Ethics, which seeks to determine the true ends of all action, the ultimate nature of what we call good and desirable. But this implies a limited connection only. When once the end is settled,. Education asks no more aid from Ethics. Again, as a practical science greatly concerned with the training of the thinking or reasoning powers, Education derives considerable aid from Logic. This study, by supplying rules for clear thinking and sound reasoning, and by pointing out (to some extent) the best methods of ex- pounding knowledge, is a matter of great practical value to the teacher. The relation of Education to Psycho- logy is, however, a closer and a more pervading relation. Being a theoretic, as distinguished from a practical science, it does not, it is true, give rules for regulating mind. But it gives us an account of mind as a whole, the way in which it operates, the laws of succession and 14 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. dependence which govern mental phenomena, and lastly a theory of mental growth or development. And since Education in all its branches is engaged in producing some mental result (e. g., accurate knowledge, good feeling), it needs continually to revert to psychology. 1 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I. I. SYNOPSIS OF THE METHODS OF STUDYING PSYCHOLOGY. f 1. Introspection, i. e., the observation We Study Psychol- J of our own mental states, and by : ogy by J 2. External Observation, i. e., of the [ mental phenomena of others. Note 1. — The Method of Induction. In both of the above cases, the method of proceeding is the Inductive one, just as in chemistry or any other natural science. Observe the phe- nomena, and classify them. Then infer from them as many general truths as possible. Note 2. — Method of Verification. The conclusions arrived at by our personal study of Mental Phenomena, whether by the Introspective or the Objective method, and those reached through reading, must be continually verified by an appeal to our own con- scious experience. II. MAXIMS OF THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 1. The Method of Psychology demands the cooperation of Introspection with Observation. — G. H. Lewes. il have not touched on physical education here. This plainly rests ■on physiology, just as mental education reposes on psychology. MAXIMS OF THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 15 2. It has often been shown that the method of Induction admits, mutatis mutandis, of an application to the study of the human mind, as well as to that of the material universe. The dif- ference in the application lies mainly in this, that in the one case we use self-consciousness or the internal sense, whereas in the other we employ the external sense, as the organ or instrument. — James McCosh. 3. The Laws of our Rational Faculty, i.e., The Human Mind, like those of every other natural agency are only learnt by seeing the agent at work. — J. S. Mill. 4. The Order of Mental phenomena must be studied in the phenomena themselves. — J. S. Mill. 5. Psychology is only an evolution by consciousness of the facts which consciousness itself reveals. — Sir William Hamil- ton. 6. "Whatever is known by consciousness is known beyond possibility of question. — J. S. Mill. 7. Everything presented to our observation, whether exter- nal or internal, whether through sense or self-consciousness, is presented in complexity. Every modification of mind is a complex state. What ought I to do ? Divide et impera, divide and con- quer. Analyze it into its parts, consider each separately; finally, by synthesis, view these parts in relation to each other and to the whole of which they are the constituents. — Abridged from Sir William Hamilton. 8. The fundamental procedure of psychology is Analysis. But still this is but a means to an end. We analyze only that we may comprehend. We comprehend only as we are able to reconstruct in thought the complex effects which we have ana- lyzed into their elements. Analysis and synthesis are only the two necessary parts of one and the same method. — Sir Wm. Hamilton. III.. SUGGESTIONS. 1. Consult some standard dictionary, or, better still, such a work as Fleming's Vocabulary of tlie Philosophical Sciences, on the words : Metlwd, Analysis, and Synthesis. 16 METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY. 2. Fix the full import of these words in the Mind. 3. By reference to the dictionary or cyclopaedia investigate the distinction between Inductive Method and Deductive Method. 4l. Make out a scheme for studying the mental processes of those under your instruction. "What studies exercise mainly their knowing powers ? Which bring into play their Emotions? Which of their pursuits calls into activity the Will ? 5. Consult some biographical dictionary or cyclopaedia on the life, works, and authority of the authors quoted above, under Maxims of the Study of Psychology. IV. SYNOPSIS OF THE RELATION OF PEDAGOGICS TO PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. Some sciences are derived from a single principle or a few axioms. Mathematics is an example. Others, like Medicine, are constructed differently, the data being drawn from a number of other sciences. All the data of Medicine, however, relate to a single point, the Health of the Body. So in the case of Peda- gogics: its principles are derived from a number of sciences; the dataVelate to one central point, the Mental Development of the Child. — Sold an. 1. Pedagogics, or the Science of Education, depends for its aims or ends on Ethics, the science which determines the ends of action and the regulation of Conduct. 2. Pedagogics derives its data, its aggregate of knowledges, its principles, very largely from the sciences of Psychology, Logic, and Physiology. These data are derived directly, or are deduced from the truths of these respective sciences. 3 . Besides the Deductive element in the Science of Pedagog- ics, there is also an Inductive one consisting of truths obtained from the observation and experience of the teachers and educa- tors of all times. CHAPTER II. MENTAL OPERATIONS AND THEIR CONDITIONS. Mental Phenomena and Operations. Matter and Aim of Mental Science. Mental Science consists, as we have seen, of a body of statements, truths, or laws with respect to mental phenomena. The aim of the Science is to es- tablish as many general statements or propositions about mind as possible. In order to do this we have first to ascertain what our phenomena are, and to arrange them in general groups or classes, based oh fundamental points of likeness. Mental phenomena are known by different names. They are commonly called states of mind, or states of consciousness. Again, since they are phenomena in time, having a certain duration and a succession of parts, they are just as often spoken of as mental processes or operations. It is to be added, however, that we some- times distinguish between a mental process or operation, and its result or product. Thus, as we shall see, we dis- tinguish between a process of perception, and its result, a percept. Matter and Aim of Educational Science. By way of discrimi- nation and contrast, we may here state the matter and aim of Pedagogics. It, too, consists of a body of statements and laws — all of which relate to Education. Its aim is to establish as many general propositions as possible about the training of youth and the formation of Character. But these statements, truths and B 18 MENTAL OPERATIONS. laws are not all, nor mainly, derived by induction from observa- tion, as in Mental Science. Pedagogy assumes the phenomena and general truths of psy- chology and some other sciences, and from them deduces the main part of the body of its doctrine. These deductions arranged in logical order, supplemented and verified by the teachings and in- ductions of experience, constitute the Science of Pedagogics. Analysis of Mental Operations. At any one moment our mind presents a complex mass of mental phenomena or an intricate chain of mental operations. For example, when a person is sitting under a tree on a summer day, his mind is receiving numerous impressions of sight, sound, touch, etc., which affect him agreeably or other- wise; at the same time, perhaps, it is carrying on a train of imagery, recalling a sequence of past events, or fancying some bright future. At any one moment, the mind is a sort of tangle of psychical states or threads of psychical j)rocesses. It is the business of the psycholo- gist to unravel this tangle, and to take apart the threads. This is called analysis (splitting up, taking apart). 1 By so doing, he resolves a complex mental state into its simple elements, a complex operation into its constituent parts. Classification of Mental Operations. In thus breaking up or analysing a complex mental state, the observer is at the same time classing its parts w r ith those of other complex states. Thus in distinguishing certain sensa- tions from images he is referring to a class, sensations, and a class, images. In other words, he is making the beginning of a classification of mental operations. lOn the nature of psychological analysis, see Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. II., Lect. XXI., pp. 21, 22. CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL OPERATIONS. 19 Common popular thought has long since drawn certain distinctions among mental phenomena. Thus, in our everyday language, we describe particular sorts of mental operations as perceptions, judgments, and so on. All science is nothing but common knowledge made more precise and systematic. Hence, mental science naturally sets out with the rough classifications adopted by popular psychology. If we examine these everyday distinctions, we find that there are three fairly clear divisions which do not seem to have anything in common beyond being classes of mental phenomena. Thus we ordinarily describe such facts as perceiving, remembering, and reasoning as intellectual operations. So, again, we bring sorrow, joy, love, anger, and so on, under the general description of feeling or emotion. And finally, we gather up operations like purposing, deliberating, doing things, under the head of will. We broadly mark off these three sides of mind, and talk of men as exhibiting now one and now another aspect. Feeling, Knowing, and Willing. Mental Science adopts this threefold division. (1) Under Feeling we include all pleasurable and painful conditions of mind. These maybe very simple feelings, such as the so-called bodily distress of hunger, or the pleasure of the palate. Or they may be of a more complex nature, such as love, or remorse. (2) Knowing, again, includes all operations which are directly involved in knowing, as, for example, observing what is present to the senses, recalling the past, and reasoning. (3) Finally, Willing or Acting covers all active mental operations, all our doings, such 20 MENTAL OPERATIONS. as walking, speaking, attending to things, together with efforts to do things, active impulses and resolutions. The perfect type of action is doing something for an end or purpose. This is what we ordinarily mean by doing a thing with will, or voluntary action. Opposition letween Knowing, Feeling, and Willing. These three kinds of mental state are, as we have seen, in general clearly marked off one from another. A child in a state of strong emotional excitement contrasts with a child calmly thinking about something, or another child exerting his active powers in doing something. Strong feeling is opposed to and precludes at the time calm thinking (recollecting, reasoning), as well as regu- lated action (will). Similarly, the intellectual state of re- membering or reasoning is opposed to feeling and to doing. The mind cannot exhibit each kind of pheno- menon in a marked degree at the same time. This opposition may be seen in another way. If we compare not different states of the same mind, but different minds as a whole, we often find now one kind of mental state or operation, now another in the as- cendant. Minds marked by much feeling (sensitive, emotional natures) commonly manifest less of the intellectual and volitional aspects or properties. Simi- larly, minds of a high degree of intellectual capability (inquiring or inquisitive minds), or of much active endowment (active minds) are, as a rule, relatively weak in the other kinds of endowment. Connection letween Knowing, Feeling, and Willing. Yet while knowing, feeling, and willing are thus broadly KNOWING, FEELING, AND WILLING. 21 marked off from, and even opposed to, one another, they are in a way closely connected. A mind is not a mate- rial object which can be separated into distinct parts, but an organic unity made up of parts standing in the closest relation of interdependence. Or, to put it another way, feeling, knowing, and williug are properties of mind, and cannot exist in perfect isolation from one another any more than the color, form, and so on, of a plant. If we closely examine any case of feeling, we find some intellectual and volitional accompaniments. Thus, when we experience a bodily pain (feeling), we instantly localize the pain or recognize its seat (knowledge), and endeavor to alleviate it (volition). Most of our feel- ings, as we shall see, are wrapped up with, or embodied in, intellectual states (perceiving, remembering, etc.). Again, intellectual operations, observing, thinking, etc., are commonly accompanied by some shade of agreeable or disagreeable feeling, and they always involve volun- tary activity in the shape of attention or concentration of mind. Finally, willing depends on feeling for its motives or impelling forces, and on knowledge for its illumination or guidance. The relation of Feeling, Knowing, and Willing one to another is roughly indicated in the common distinc- tion between the passive and active sides of mind. On the one hand, feeling is (comparatively) passive, and so is set in contrast with willing, which is active. Know- ing, on the other hand, is called passive-active, because, while it depends for its material on passive receptivity, it involves the active control of its operations by means of voluntary attention. It follows that our threefold division of mind is a di- 22 MENTAL OPERATIONS. vision according to the most prominent feature or aspect. It rarely happens that two aspects are so nearly equal in their prominence as to occasion any difficulty in refer- ring a mental state to one of these three classes. Species of Knowing, Feeling, and Willing : Mental Faculties. Popular psychology recognizes certain divisions or spe- cies of knowing, feeling, and willing under the head of faculties, capabilities, powers, and so on. More partic- ularly we speak of Intellectual Faculties, such as Per- ception and Imagination; Emotional capacities, as Love, Anger; and. Active Powers, such as Movement, Choice, Self-Control. Analysis of Faculties. In adopting these popular dis- tinctions, however, the psychologist does not imply that the several processes of perceiving, remembering, and so on, are distinct one from the other fundamentally, that is to say, with respect to their elementary parts. We endeavor to break up the several processes of per- ceiving, etc., into simpler or more fundamental opera- tions, of which we regard them as so many various modifications or modes of combination. The discussion of the ultimate nature of the so-called faculties and powers of the mind belongs to rational psychology, or that branch of philosophy which treats of mind as substance. The hypothesis of faculties can, however, be criticized from the point of view of empi- rical psychology in so far as it succeeds or does not succeed in giving a clear account- of the phenomena. Looked at in this way, it must be regarded as productive of much error in psychology. It has led to the false FUNCTIONS OF INTELLECT. 23 supposition that mental activity, instead of being one and the same throughout its manifold phases, is a juxta- position of totally distinct activities answering to a bundle of detached powers, somehow standing side by side, and exerting no influence on one another. Fundamental Intellectual Operations : Functions. Employ- ing this instrument of " analysis," the psychologist seeks to reduce the several sorts or varieties of intellectual operations, such as perception and judgment, to more fundamental processes. The essential operation in all varieties of knowing is the detecting of relations be- tween things. The most comprehensive relations are difference or unlikeness and agreement or likeness. All knowing means discriminating one impression, object, or idea from another (or others), and assimilating it to yet another (or others). I perceive an object, as a rose, only when I see how it differs from other objects and more especially other varieties of flowers, and at the same time recognize its likeness to other roses previously seen. And so of other forms of knowing. Hence Discrimina- tion and Assimilation have been called properties or functions of intellect. 1 Another property of intellect, according to Prof. Bain, is Retentiveness. All knowledge clearly implies the capability of retaining, recalling, or reproducing past impressions. But retentiveness occupies a different i For an account of the fundamental intellectual processes, see Prof. Bain, Senses and Intellect— Intellect, pp. 321-327: compare H. Spencer's theory of ' relations between feeling,' Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., Pt. II., Chap. II., and Vol. II., Pt. VI., concluding chapters, especially XXVI. and XXVII.; also G. H. Lewes's distinction of function and fac- ulty, Study of Psychology (Problems of Life and Mind, 3d Series, Prob. I), p. 27. 24 MENTAL OPERATIONS. place in knowing from that of discrimination, etc. It is rather the condition of knowing, of coming to know and continuing to know than a part of the active know- ing process itself. Besides, as we shall see later, it is the principle which underlies the growth or development of intellect, and not only of this, but of mind as a whole. Grades of Intellectual Operation. By thus assuming cer- tain fundamental intellectual functions, we are able to regard the distinctions of perceiving, imagining, and so on, as so many grades or stages of knowing. They be- come forms or modes of the fundamental processes of various degrees of complexity. In this way we obtain a scale of intellectual processes. Thus, at the lower end we have, in what is commonly called sensation, the dis- crimination of a sense-impression from others: in percep- tion, a marking off of a group of impressions under the form of an object or thing; in thinking, the separation of a whole class of objects. This serial arrangement of intellectual operations prepares the way for a theory of mental growth or development. Truths or Laws of Mind. As was observed just now, the psychologist analyzes and classifies mental phe- nomena in order to go on to make comprehensive asser- tions about them. These assertions are truths of mind. The most important of them are commonly spoken of as laws of mind. These truths or laws set forth the rela- tions between certain j>sychical phenomena and other phenomena, psychical or physical. These relations are for the most part relations of succession and dependence. The truth or law formulates the causal connection be- LAWS OF MIND. 25 tween a phenomenon and its antecedents or accompani- ments. That is to say, it seeks to account for a phe- nomenon by enumerating the conditions which are necessary to its production. Here again mental science is supplementing and ren- dering precise the inductions reached by popular thought. Men have for ages observed certain relations of dependence between circumstances and character, and one trait of character or habit and another. All the well-known sayings about character and life embody these observations. Such trite remarks as " experience is the best teacher," "first impressions last longest," contain the rough germ of psychological truths. The psychologist seeks to take up these wise sayings into his science, embodying them in larger and more accurate propositions, that is to say, in laws. Special and General Conditions and Laws. If we consider the conditions of any class of intellectual operations, we find that some are special and peculiar to the class whilst others are of a more general character. Thus a perception will be found to have as its special conditions a present sense-impression and a recalled group of past impressions; while it will be seen to depend too on attention which is a much wider and more general con- dition. Among the very general conditions is change of impression or contrast of mental state, which seems necessary to any kind of continued mental activity. To set forth such more general conditions is to formulate the highest laws or first principles of psychology. 26 MENTAL OPEEATIONS. Sum of conditions. In order to explain any class of mental operation, it is needful to specify all the con- ditions whether special or general which co-operate in bringing it about. This will compel ns, in certain cases at least, to take note not only of proximate or immediately preceding (or accompanying) circumstances but also of remote antecedents. Thus, to account for the remem- brance of a thing, we must specify not only the presence at the time of something which reminds us of that thing but also the fact that the reminder and that of which it reminds us have been conjoined or l associated ' in our past experience. To analyze an operation of mind is thus in a manner to assign its conditions and account for it. Thus we explain a percept, that is, the result of the process of perception, by unfolding the mechanism of the process, distinguishing its stages, the reception of a sense- impression, the recalling of a group of conjoined im- pressions, and so on. 1 Attention as a Condition of Operations. Among these constituent parts of an operation none is more important than attention. This, as has been remarked, is a general condition of mental operations. Knowing, feeling, and willing, in so far as they are vivid and distinct phases of mental life, involve attention. Favorable and Unfavorable State of Mind. Among the conditions which help to determine a mental result we must not overlook the whole mental circumstances or iG. H. Lewes attempts roughly to assign the physiological correlatives of feeling, cognition, and action. See Problems of Life and Mind, Third Series, Vol. II., Prob. III., Chap. II. NERVOUS CONDITIONS. 27 composite state of the mind at the time. The effect of calmness of mind and of emotional agitation respectively on intellectual operations is a matter of every day ob- servation. Our minds are prepared for a special mode of activity in very different degrees. After a disturbing shock attention requires time to recover its balance, and so intellectual operations are interfered with. Nervous Conditions. In specifying all the conditions of a class of Rental operations we must refer not only to psychical but to physical circumstances. More particu- larly we need to specify a vigorous state of the organs concerned. This applies not only to intellectual opera- tions, as learning or acquiring knowledge, but also to feelings and actions. A vigorous state of the brain is a condition of lively feeling, as of energetic intellectual activity. And as we shall see, voluntary action is modified by the varying state of the motor organs. Individual Differences of Mental Capability. Mental oper- ations are not precisely similar in all minds. They vary in certaiu respects, and these variations are referred to differences of mental power or capacity. Now as we have seen, psychology, as science, has to do with the general facts and truths of mind. It takes no account of individual peculiarities. Nevertheless, the practical importance of estimating individual differences has led psychologists to pay considerable attention to this con- crete branch of their subject. The particular problem to be discussed here is the possibility of estimating with an approach to scientific precision the several differences of mental capability that we find among individuals. 28 MENTAL OPEKATKXNS. Sow Minds Vary. One mind may differ from another in respect of one whole phase or side of mind. Thus we speak of one man or one child as more intellectual or more enquiring than another. Similarly, ODe mind has more emotional susceptibility, or more active im- pulse or will than another. Again, we may make our comparison more narrow, and enquire how one mind differs from another with respect to a special mode of intellectual (or other) operation. Thus we ask whether one mind has more discrimination or a finer sense of difference than another, or whether it is endowed with a keener sense of likeness. Or we may take some special faculty, and enquire how two minds differ in respect of observing, imaginative, or reasoning power. Or, finally, we may select some particular mode of operation of a faculty, and compare two minds with respect to their perception of objects in space, or of events in time: their memory for things (visible objects) , for names, and so on. Teacher must note Differences of Mental Capability. This subject is of the utmost practical importance. The instructor realizing the abstract possibility of great differences in individual capacity, susceptibility and excitability must be on the lookout for instances of these conditions among those under his instruction whether the variations are above or below the average mind. The point is that the external stimulus to the mental action of the student, i. e., the nature of tasks set, the degree of approbation or disfavor foreshadowed, must be within limits accommodated to the individual peculiarity. Concrete Psychology the Teacher's Province. It is often said that the teacher should "study the characters of his pupils." 'Con- crete psychology,' that is, the study of individual differences of mind marks out to the instructor the necessity and scope of what MEASUREMENT OF FACULTY. 29 is called a knowledge of Human Nature, the study of the char- acteristic variations in human minds, the peculiarities and distinctive tendencies of individuals. Varying degrees of the power of acquiring knowledge, varying emotional susceptibility and will power constantly present to the instructor problems of greater or less gravity. Measurement of Mental Faculty. In order to make our comparison of one mind with another exact, we ought to be able to measure one against the other. This is only jDossible, in most regions of mind at least, in a very rough way. Mental phenomena are not material objects the size of which can be accurately estimated by juxta- position. Yet, if rough, these measurements may serve as useful data for practice. Quantitative Aspects of Mind. Mental operations have three quantitative aspects, each of which is susceptible of measurement more or less exact. These are degree, duration, and number. (a) Degree. — By the degree of a mental state or phe- nomenon is meant its intensity. Our sensations and feelings clearly vary in intensity. We can say that one impression is more vivid than another, one feeling more acute than another, and so on. Our actions, too, differ in degree according to the amount of energy we con- sciously expend. And our intellectual operations simi- larly display differences of degree. Thus, we speak of the degree of distinctness and vividness of an impression or of an idea. Also, we may speak of the degree of activity (attention) involved in an intellectual operation. (b) Duration. — The duration of operations is a matter which lends itself peculiarly well to exact measurement. 30 MENTAL OPEKATIONS. For time is susceptible of objective estimation, that is to say, of measurement by means of an external standard, such as a clock. Our measurements of the intensity or degree of mental states are rough. Thus, we can only say that one operation is l easier ' than another, or at best, that it is ' much easier.' With respect to dura- tion, however, it is possible to measure exactly by means of external arrangements. (c) Number. — In order to estimate number it is enough that we can distinguish one operation from another, or one stage of an operation from another. We measure mental processes, such as trains of thought, under this aspect when we compare the number of distinct steps involved in them. The estimate of the complexity of a mental state, for example, a ' flight of fancy ' or a mingled emotion, takes place by reckoning the number of elements or details of which it is made up. Modes of Measuring Faculty. There are two well-marked methods of measuring faculty: (1) by making the ex- ternal excitant or stimulus 1 equal in two (or more) cases, and comparing the mental reactions, or (2) by inquiring what difference in the stimuli is required to bring about equal mental reactions in two cases. Although these methods can only be applied with any degree of exact- ness in the simpler region of mind, sensation, they may be employed roughly in other regions as well. First Method. — In this case, we must be careful to make the stimulus equal as far as possible in two cases, i By stimulus is meant strictly an external agent (as mechanical pressure) applied to a sense-organ (e. g., the hand) which it is capable of exciting to activity. The word may be extended so as to include all ex- citants of mental activity. MODES OF MEASURING FACULTY. 31 and compare the psychical results. Thus we might test the discriminative sensibility of two persons by present- ing exactly the same amount of 'objective' difference, e. g.> between two shades of color or two degrees of brightness of one color. Here we must be careful to make the circumstances equally favorable to discrimina- tion in all respects. Thus the object presented must be similarly placed in relation to the observers. Also, the external circumstances and the internal state of mind must be equally favorable to concentration of attention. Having thus made the stimuli equal, we compare the reactions as to quantity. Thus the sense of difference in one case may be more distinct and vivid than in an- other. A much better criterion is duration. If one person detects a difference sooner than another under precisely similar circumstances, he has the greater dis- crimination in that region of impression. In complex operations, number may enter into the estimation. Thus if the power tested be that of imagination or the faculty of picturing visible objects, it may be found that one person is able to form fuller and more complete pictures than another under similar circumstances. Second Method. — The second method has certain ad- vantages over the first. In general we can compare quantitatively two stimuli much better than their psychical results. We can make one physical agent twice or three times as large as another, but we can never say that one mental impression is three times as strong or vivid as another. Moreover it is possible, in some cases at least, to fix on a definite quantity of psychical effect and make this our unit of comparison. This is done by taking the smallest quantity of an effect that 32 MENTAL 0PEEATI0NS. is perceptible or recognizable. Thus the best way to measure the power of discrimination in the region of sense im- pressions is to find by experiment the amount of objec- tive difference, that is, the amount of difference between two agents or stimuli {e. g., weights laid on the hand, etc.), that will just produce a sense of difference; in other words, be barely recognized as a difference. Beaeings of the eoeegoing on Education. The Teacher should know the Terms of Psychology. A word or two may suffice to indicate the more important bearings of this chapter on the art of Education. To begin with, since Education is engaged with exercising the faculties of the mind — memory, judgment, and so on, it is well for the Educator to know what these are, that is to say, what mental processes are covered by the words. A careful analysis of the operations of mind carried to a certain point is necessary to a perfect grasp and comprehension of educational processes. For ex- ample, a teacher cannot intelligently exercise a child's powers of observation (perception) till he grasps the fact that observation implies discrimination, the mark- ing off of the several peculiarities of color, shape, and so on, of an object from those of other objects. The Teacher should Jcnow The Laws of Mind. It is ob- vious, further, that a knowledge of the laws of mental operations, in other words, of their conditions, is a mat- ter of the greatest practical utility to the Educator. Since his aim is to call forth a faculty into exercise, that is to say, to bring about a particular mental result, he needs to know the laws according to which the particu- THE TEACHER SHOULD KNOW MIND. 33 lar faculty operates, or the conditions on which the particular result depends. Thus in order to render the meaning of words clear and definite to a child's mind, he will do well to note the conditions on which clear notions or concepts in general depend, such as familiarity with a wide variety of concrete examples. The Teacher should know Mind as a whole. Again, though the art of Education is concerned more immediately with the intellectual than with the other operations of mind, it cannot afford to be ignorant of these. The teacher is expected to help in moulding the taste and in forming the moral character of his pupils, and here some knowledge of the feelings and the will and the laws which govern them is of importance. And even if we look upon the function of the teacher as having to do exclusively with the exercising of the intellectual powers, we shall still see that some knowledge of the processes of feeling and willing is necessary ; for feeling and will- ing under the form of interest and voluntary application of mind are in a measure involved in intellectual work. The Teacher should be able to compare individual Minds. Finally, in order to give due flexibility to his system of training, and to adapt it to the numerous differences of capacity and tastes among children, the teacher should be able to compare individual minds as exactly as possi- ble. Hence a knowledge of the means which are at our disposal here will be of practical use. References. On the threefold Division of Mind and the nature of the "Faculties," see Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, I., Lect. XI. ; Prof. Bain, Senses and Intellect (3rd Ed.), Introduction ; James Ward, second article on Psychological Principles, in Mind, October, 1883. 34 MENTAL OP EATIONS. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II. SUGGESTIONS. 1. By reference to the preceding pages and to the unabridged dictionary, fix in mind the exact meanings of the words, 'phe- nomena, analysis, classification, general statement. 2. Consider what is meant by the phenomena of heat, the phenomena of electricity. In the same manner, determine what is included and what is excluded by the term phenomena of mind. 3. Consider what is the difference between a science and an art; whether all the sciences have corresponding arts; or, whether some of the sciences simply supply the basis of other sciences. 4. Do not omit to aim at becoming yourself a practical psy- chologist. Test the statements of this treatise by the introspec- tion of your own consciousness and the observation of the work- ings of the minds of others. 5. Note what is said of the use of imagination in endeavor- ing to see what is going on in the mind of another. Consider your own mental -processes while reading the mind of another; e. g., of a child while learning, by successive efforts, a new word. 6. Look up the meaning, use, and importance of the terms, subjective and objective. Find, if possible, why they are so impor- tant in Mental Science. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. What is meant by saying that the psychologist is con- cerned merely with the phenomena of Mind? 2. What is a law of mind ? 3. What is meant by deducing a pedagogical principle from a law of mind ? APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 35 4. If Pedagogics consists of an aggregate of knowledge drawn from various sciences, such as psychology, etc., what gives unity and consistency to the science ? 5. What is the difference between the terms, conscious-subject, Ego, Self, and Mind ? 6. "Why is it so important that a teacher should understand the fact of varying emotional susceptibility and the like ? 7. To what method of studying psychology does Mr. Lewes allude when he says, "Man, being a part of Nature, ought to be studied on the method which alone has proved successful in the study of Nature ? " APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 1. The Importance of Classification. When our knowledge of the nature of the child is classified, we can survey our possessions, and the better command them to our service. The classification of the learner's powers into those of intellect, feeling, and will, signify the extent of true education, that it includes not only the evolution of the intelligence, but also cultivation of right senti- ments, and training of desire and will. Thus the teacher is bound to educate the pupil to the trinity of the True, the Beauti- ful, and the Good. It is, also, very important to name the tools and instruments of one's craft, and to assign any event or fact to its proper place in the scale of knowledge. Thus classification of the mental operations promotes accuracy of thought and comprehension of view. 2. Primary classification of Mental phenomena applied to Rhetoric. There are two kinds of composition addressed to the Intellect, — Explanatory and Argumentative, — and one to the Emo- tions and the Will, — Persuasive. By the former, we instruct and convince; by the latter, we persuade. — Bancroft. 3. Regarding the Faculties as simply degrees of development of self-activity enables us to look at mental growth as a gradual progress along certain successive grades or stages of knowing 36 MENTAL OPERATIONS. from sensation to reasoning. This gradual evolution of the learner's powers is the unity to which all efforts of teaching should tend. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS, READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. (From Chapters I. and II.) 1. On the Science of Education as founded on Psychology, see Payne's Lectures on Education: The Science and Art of Edu- cation, p. 41 ; also the Lectures entitled The Theory or Science of Education, under Intellectual Education, p. 67, and, The Impor- tance of the Training of the Teacher, near the end, p. 204 ; also H. Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 120. 2. On Education as an art having a corresponding science, see Dr. Youmans, quoted in Payne, The Theory or Science of Edu- cation, under Intellectual Education, p. 67; on what the Art of Edu- cation is, see Payne, Science and Art of Education, Lectures, p. 31, and the Lecture on The Practice or Art of Education ; on the definition of the Art of Education, Payne's Lectures, p. 161 ; Education both a science and an art, Fitch, Lectures on Teach- ing, chap. L, and Tate's Philosphy of Education, Introduction. 3. On the want hitherto of a Science of Education, see Quick, Educational Beformers, p. 244, and H. Spencer's Education, chap. II. ; on the importance of psychological analysis in relation to teaching, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, part II. , chap. I. ; and on the importance of right views of education, see Page's Theory and Practice of Teaching, chap. V. 4. On what is included in the complete equipment and training of the teacher, see Payne, The Importance of the Train- ing of the Teacher, at the end, Lectures, p. 208; on intellectual philosophy as a necessity for the teacher, see Page's Theory and Practice of Teaching, chap, IV., and Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 116. 5. For Education defined in terms of Psychology, see Payne, The Importance of the Training of the Teacher, Lectures, p. 204; PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 37 on psychology as the test of the art of teaching, Ibid; on teach- ing as the explicit display of the principles of the Science of Education, Ibid, p. 161. 6. On the present condition and future progress of educa- tional science, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, chap. II., p. 27 ; on the character of the true teacher, Ibid, p. 59. 7. On the gulf between ideal and actual teaching bridged by study of human nature, Quick, Educational Reformers, p. 194, and on the difference between a teacher and a learner as to the need of Psychology, see Payne, Importance of the Training of the Teacher, Lectures, p. 199. 8. For an illustration of psychological analysis for pur- poses of education, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, chap. III., first part; and for an express illustration of psychologic study leading to the adoption of a particular method of teaching, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, Talks I-Y. 9. For summary of the principles of education, see Princi- ples of Science of Education, Payne's Lectures, p. 156, and H. Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 120. CHAPTER III. MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. Mental Development Defined. In the last chapter we were concerned with ascertaining the nature and conditions of the several kinds of mental operation, without any reference to the time of life at which they occur. But mental operations differ greatly in different periods of life, owing to what we call the growth or development of capacity. We have now to consider this far-reaching process of mental growth. We shall seek to distinguish between the successive stages of mental life and point out how these are related one to the other. By so doing, we may hope to account not merely for the single oper- ations of a faculty, but for the mature faculty itself viewed as the result of a process of growth. This part of our subject constitutes the theory of Mental Develop- ment. Growth and Development. When speaking of the physi- cal organism, we distinguish between growth and development. The former is mere increase of size or bulk; the latter consists of structural changes (increase of complexity). While growth and development usually run on together, there is no proper parallelism between them. Thus in abnormal growth development is hin- dered. And an organ, as the brain, may develop long after it has ceased to grow. It is possible to apply this analogy to mind. We may say that mind grows when it increases its stock of materials. It develops in so far CHILD AND MAN COMPARED. 39 as its materials are elaborated in higher and more com- plex forms. Mere growth of mind would thus be illus- trated by an increase in the bulk of mental retentions, that is, in the contents of memory: development, by the ordering of these contents in their relations of difference and likeness, and so on. But the analogy cannot be pressed very far. Characteristics of Development. In order to see how the later stages of growth differ from the earlier, let us compare the intellectual operations of a man with those of a child, (a) We observe, first of all, that in the former case, the operations are more numerous and various. In the course of a day, a man goes through many more processes of observing, judging, and so on, than a child, (b) Secondly, we observe that in general the operations exhibit a greater degree of perfection. Thus the observations of the man are more discriminat- ing and accurate, and effected more easily and rapidly, (c) Thirdly, it is noticeable that the operations of the adult are as a whole more complex, consisting of longer and more intricate processes than those of the child. Thus he performs elaborate processes of abstract thinking w r hich have no place among childish operations. Development oj Single Faculty and of Sum of Faculties. This aggregate of changes which constitutes the growth of mind appears to resolve itself into two parts. On the one hand, we see that the several faculties which oper- ate in the case of the child have expanded and increased in vigor. On the other hand,, we notice that new facul- ties, the germs of which are hardly discoverable in the 40 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. child, have acquired strength. We see, thai is to say, that while the faculties have each grown singly, there has been a certain order of unfolding among thein, so tbat some have reached mature vigor before others. Much the same thing is observable in the develop- ment of the other sides of mind, feeling and will. Here too we notice a great increase in the number and com- plexity of the phenomena. The emotions, resolutions and actions of a man are both more varied and more composite in their nature than those of a child. And further, we see that the several emotional capacities and active powers have been strengthened, while there has been a successive unfolding of higher and higher capacities and powers. Growth of Separate Faculties. We may now confine oar- selves to the intellectual side of mind, and view the development of it under each of the two aspects just distinguished, the development of the several faculties singly, and that of the sum of faculties. The growth or improvement of a faculty includes three things, or may be regarded under three aspects, (l) Old operations become increasingly easy and rapid 3 requiring less stimulus, less effort of attention, and so on. Thus the recognition of one and the same kind of object, the recalling of the same impression, tends to become easier with the repetition of the operation. This is im- provement of a faculty in a definite direction. (2) New operations of a similar grade of complexity will also grow easier. Thus the improvement of the observing powers (perception) includes a growing facility in not- ing and recognizing unfamiliar objects: that of memory DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIND. 41 includes a greater readiness in retaining and recalling new impressions. This is improvement of a faculty generally. (3) This general improvement is completed by the attainment of the capability of executing more complex, intricate, and difficult operations. The growth of observation means the progressive capability of not- ing less conspicuous objects, of detecting finer differ- ences between objects, and of grasping more complex and intricate wholes — that is to say, objects and groups of objects made up of more parts or details. Development of Sum of Faculties. In the second place, we may view the development of the mind as a whole through successive stages corresponding to the several faculties. This is known as the order of development of the faculties. There is a well-marked order in the growth of intellect, (l) The process of attaining knowl- edge sets out with Sensation, or the reception of external impressions by the mind. Sense supplies the materials which the intellect assimilates and elaborates according to its own laws. (2) Sensation is followed by Percep- tion, in which a number of impressions are grouped together under the form of a percept, or an immediate apprehension of some thing or object, as when we see and recognize an orange or a bell. (3) After Perception comes Representative Imagination, in which the mind pictures, or has an image of what has been perceived. It may represent this either in the original form (Repro- ductive Imagination), as when we recall the face of a friend; or in a new form (Constructive Imagination), as when we imagine some historical personage. (4) Finally, we have General or Abstract Knowing, otherwise 42 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. marked off as Thinking. This includes Conception, or the formation of Concepts or general Notions out of percepts and images, such as l metal,' ' organism,' ' life,' and so on; Judgment, or the combination of Concepts, as when we assert that no men are omniscient; and Reasoning, or the combination of Judgments, as when we conclude that a particular writer, say a newspaper correspondent, is not omniscient, because no men are so. A glance at this order will show that the later opera- tions are marked by increasing complexity. Thus Perception is more complex than Sensation, since it arises by an aggregation of sensations. Again, Con- ception is more complex than Imagination, since concepts are formed out of a number of mental images. v Similarly Judgment is more complex than Conception, and Rea- soning than Judgment. With this growth in complexity is intimately associ- ated another feature of this series of changes, viz., increase of inwardness, or aloofness from external sense. Cognition begins with outer sense-impressions and euds in the inner processes of abstract thought. This aspect of development is described by saying that the move- ment of growth is from the presentative, or what is directly presented to the mind through sense, to the representative, what is indirectly set before the mind under the form of mental images or notions. It is evident, further, that this transition from the presentative to the representative implies a growth in the generality of knowledge. All presentative knowledge is of the individual. In representation, however, we are able to take many individuals together and think of them as a class. The progress of knowledge is thus UNITY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT. 43 from the individual to the general, or from the concrete to the abstract. Since the faculties each grow singly, and at the same time unfold themselves in a certain order, we see that the growth or development of a mind consists in a series of parallel movements, certain of which begin later than others. Just as the growth of a plant consists of unfoldings of leaf, petal, and so on, some parts of the organism being in advance of others, but the progress of the earlier continuing after that of the later has begun, so the growth of a mind is at once a succession and a contemporaneous group of changes. 1 Unity of Intellectual Development. It has already been pointed out that modern psychology seeks to reduce the several operations of Perception, Imagination, etc., to certain fundamental processes, of which discrimination and assimilation are the most important (see p. 23). If this is so, it may be possible to regard the successive unfoldings of the faculties as one continuous process. The higher and more complex operations of thought would thus appear as only different modes of the same fundamental functions of intellect as underlie the lower and simpler operations of sense-perception. In other words, our distinction between the development of a single faculty and the development of the sum of fac- ulties would be seen to be a superficial one only. Now, a little reflection will show that we can view the development of intellect as a whole in this way. Thus i On the order of intellectual development, viewed as taking place in the history of the race, see Mr. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, Vol- II., Pt. VIII., Ch. II. and III. 44 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. the simplest form of knowing, sensation, involves the discrimination of sense-impressions; and the highest form of knowing, abstract thinking, is a higher mani- festation of the same power. Again, the perception of a single object is a process of assimilating present to past impressions; and abstract thinking is assimilating or classing many objects under certain common aspects. We may thus say that the several stages of knowing, perception, conception, and so on, illustrate the same fundamental activities of intellect employed about more and more complex materials (sensations, percepts, ideas, etc). Growth and Exercise of Faculty. We have just seen how each faculty progresses or improves, and how the suc- cessive unfolding of the several faculties may be viewed as only a continuous growth of the same fundamental capabilities or functions. We have now to inquire into the meaning of this complex process of growth, in other words, into the principles or laws which underlie and determine it. The most obvious of these principles or laws is that all intellectual growth results from the exercise of fac- ulty or function. In other words, the faculties or func- tions are strengthened by exercise. Let us take the case of a single faculty first. The power of observation (perception), of detecting differences among colors, forms, and so on, improves by the repeated exercise of this power. Each successive operation tends to improve the faculty. Immediately, it tends to improve it in a particular direction only. Thus if the power of obser- vation is exercised with respect to colors, it will be INTELLECT DEPENDS ON SENSATION. 45 strengthened more especially in this direction, but not to the same extent in other directions, e. g., with respect to forms. Let us now look at the development of intellect as a whole. Since perception, conception, and so on, are only different modes of the same intellectual functions, the exercise of these in the lower form prepares the way for the higher manifestations. This truth is recognized in the common saying that, in training the senses, we are laving the foundations of the higher intellectual culture. But this is not all. No amount of exercise of the observing powers will secure a full development of the powers of abstract thought. In order that the succes- sive phases of intelligenee may unfold themselves in due order, the separate exercise of the fundamental func- tions in each of these phases is necessary. What Exercise of Intellect Involves : Sense -Materials. The exercise of the intellectual powers, as a whole, may be roughly described as the employment of the fundamen- tal functions upon the materials supplied by the Senses (Sensations, Sense-impressious). As we have seen, sen- sation is the elementary phase of the intellectual life. The senses supply the pabulum or nutriment which the intellect assimilates or elaborates according to its proper laws. The highest manifestations of intellect, abstract thought and reasoning, illustrate this dependence of intellectual activity on the elements, materials, or 'data' of sense. The growth of intellect by repeated exercise thus implies a continual supply of sense-materials, a multiplication of sense-impressions, to be worked up into intellectual products. 46 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. Retentiveness. In the second place, it is plain that this growth of intellect by exercise implies retentiveness. By this term is meant, generally, that every operation of mind leaves a trace behind it which constitutes a disposition to perform the same operation or same kind of operation again. This truth obviously underlies the generaliza- tion, 'Exercise strengthens faculty.' The increased power of discriminating colors, sounds, and so on, due to repeated exercises of the discriminative function, can ■ only be accounted for by saying that each successive activity modifies the mind, strengthening its tendency to act on that particular side or in that particular mode. Growth and Habit. This persistence of traces, and formation of a disposition to think, feel, etc., in the same way as before underlies what we call habit. By this term is meant a fixed tendency to think, feel, or act in a particular way under special circumstances. The form- ation of habits is a very important ingredient of what we mean by intellectual development; but it is not all that is so meant. Habit refers rather to the fixing of mental operations in particular directions. Taken in this narrow sense, habit is in a manner opposed to growth. By following out a train of ideas again and again in a certain way, we lose the capability of varying this order, of re-adapting the combination to new circumstances. Habit is thus the element of persistence, of custom, the conservative tendency; whereas growth inches flexibility, modifiability, susceptibility to new impressions, the pro- gressive tendency. In order that the intellectual powers, as a whole, may be exercised and grow, a higher form of retentiveness is DEVELOPMENT IMPLIES RETENTION. 47 needed. The traces left by intellectual activities must accumulate and appear under the form of revivals or reproductions. The impressions of sense when discrim- inated are, in this way, recalled as images. This retention and revival of the products of the early sense-discrim- ination is clearly necessary to the higher operations of thought. Images, though the products of elementary processes of discrimination and assimilation, supply in their turn the material for the more elaborate processes of thought. We thus see, that the growing complexity of the intellectual life depends on the accumulation of innumerable traces of past and simpler products of intellectual activity. Grouping of Parts: Laws of Association. One other law or principle involved in this process of intellectual development has to be touched on. The growth of intellect, by repeated exercise of its functions, leads to an increasing complexity of the products. This means that the several elements are combined or grouped in certain ways. This grouping goes on according to the Laws of Association. These laws will be fully discussed by and by. Here it is enough to say that the main law runs somewhat as follows: Two or more men tal' phe- nomena which have occurred together tend to recur together. The building up of perceptions out of sensa- tions, of trains of images, of judgments (combinations of conceptions or ideas) and so on, all illustrate this process of combining. Summary of Process of Development. Let us now try to gather up, as succinctly as possible, the results of our 48 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. analysis of the process of intellectual development. To begin with the Senses, these supply the materials, and call into play the functions of discrimination and assim- ilation. This early stage of intellectual activity involves only a rudimentary form of retentiveness, namely in the traces of past sensations blending with present and like ones. The repeated conjunction of certain impressions leads to the grouping of these in complex aggregates of a particular kind (Perception). This involves a distinct germ of representation. Later, through the cumulation of many traces of impressions and per- ceptions, the formation of images becomes possible (Imagination, including Memory). Finally, through the multiplication of images and their connections, and the strengthening of the functions of discrimination and assimilation (aided by the growth of the power of vol- untary attention), the process of forming concepts of classes, and combinations of such concepts, becomes pos- sible (Thought). Development of Feeling and Willing. While for the sake of simplicity, we have confined our attention to the development of intellect, it is necessary to add that the same features and the same underlying principles are discoverable in the growth of feeling and will. The earlier feelings (bodily pleasures and pains) are simple and closely connected with the senses: the higher feel- ings (emotions) are complex and representative in character. Again, the first actions (bodily movements) are simple and external, being immediate responses to sense-impressions, whereas the later are complex, in- ternal and representative (choosing, resolving, etc.). NO KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT EMOTION. 49 Interdependence of Intellectual, Emotional, and Active Devel- opment. We have so far viewed the growth of intellect, of feeling, and of volition as processes going on apart, independently of one another. And this is in a measure a correct assumption. It must, however, be remembered that mind is an organic unity, and that the processes of knowing, feeling and willing in a measure involve one another (see before, p. 20). It follows from this, that the developments of these phases will be closely con- nected. Thus, intellectual development presupposes a certain measure of emotional and volitional development. There would be no attainments in knowledge, if the con- nected interests (curiosity, love of knowledge) and active impulses (concentration, application) had not been developed. Similarly, there can be no development of the life of feeling without a considerable accumulation of knowledge about nature and man, nor can there be any development of action without a development of feeling and the accumulation of a store of practical knowledge. The mind may develop much more on one side than on the others 3 but development on one side without any development on the others is an impossi- bility. This connectedness of one side of development with the others may be illustrated in the close dependence of intellectual growth on the exercise and improvement of the power of Attention. As has been remarked, atten- tion, though related to the active or volitional side of mind, is a general ingredient or condition of intellectual operations; and this being so, its growth is implied in the growth of intellect. It is the improvement of this capability which makes successively possible accurate D 50 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. observation, steady reproduction, and all that we mean by thinking. Psychical and Physical Development. Just as in study- ing mental operations at a particular time, we have to include in our view nervous concomitants, so in studying mental development, we must ask what changes in the nervous organism, and more particularly in the brain- centres, accompany these psychical changes. Growth and Development of Brain. The brain, like all other parts of the organism, grows in bulk or size, and develops or manifests certain changes in its formation or structure. The two processes, growth and development, do not progress with the same degree of rapidity. The size nearly attains its maximum about the end of the 7th year, whereas the degree of structural development reached at this time is not much above that of the embryonic condition. 1 By increase of structural development is here meant greater unlikeness of the several parts, or a higher de- gree of 'differentiation'; also, a higher degree of intricacy of arrangement which seems to be best definable as the formation of special connections between part and part. Order of Development of Brain-organs. There is a further order of development noticeable. The higher structures, known as the cerebral hemispheres, seem to develop later than the lower structures (basal ganglia, etc.). These higher structures appear to have greater complex- i See Bastian, The Brain as an Organ of Mind, p. 375. BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE. 51 ity, that is to say, to involve more intricate arrangements among themselves and with other structures, than the lower brain centres. Brain Development and Exercise. The brain, being an organ closely connected with the rest of the bodily organism, would tend to grow to a certain extent with the growth of the organism as a whole, and indepen- dently of any activity of its own. But such growth would be rudimentary only. Like all other organs, it grows and develops by exercise. This physiological law is clearly the counterpart of the psychological law that exercise strengthens faculty. This increase of brain power through exercise implies two things. (1) All brain-activity reacts on the partic- ular structure engaged, modifying it in some unknown way and bringing about a subsequent ' physiological disposition ' to act in a similar manner. The most striking manifestation of this effect is seen when a man who has lost his sight is able to picture visible objects. The brain is now able to act independently of external stim- ulation, having acquired a disposition so to act through previous exercises under external stimulation. (2) In the second place, we have to assume that differ- ent parts of the brain which are exercised together acquire in some way a disposition to conjoint action. This fact has been expressed by Mr. Herbert Spencer by saying that * lines of least resistance ' are gradually formed for nervous action by the repeated flow of nerve energy in certain definite directions. 52 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. Mental Development as Adjustment to Surroundings. So far, we have been regarding the growth of an individual mind as a process apart, having no relation to anything beyond it, save the accompanying nervous changes. But this double process of psychical and nervous devel- opment may be viewed as related to certain external agencies. Let us first look at the relation of these external agencies to the mental process. We have seen that the materials of the intellectual life are supplied by the senses. Sense-impressions clearly depend on the action of certain external agents, bodies emitting sound, reflecting light, and so on. Further, the order of the physical agencies of time and space will determine the order of our perceptions, and resulting images and thoughts. Thus the fact that in our sense-experience a peal of thunder follows a flash of lightning, serves to determine the connection be- tween our images of these events, and between our scientific conceptions of them. Similarly with respect to the space order. The relative position of two coun- tries, of two stars, and so on, determines the particular way of mentally picturing and thinking about them. To this extent, then, the order of our mental processes follows, and is conditioned or determined by the order of external facts or events. It follows, further, that all growth of knowledge means an increasing adaptation or harmonizing of the internal to the external order. With growth of repre- sentative power, the mind takes in remote relations of events or things in time and space, the succession of the seasons, the coexistence of remote parts of the earth's ADAPTATION TO SURROUNDINGS. 53 surface and so on. And the transition from particular representation or imagination to general representation or thought involves the adjustment of the intellectual processes to large groups or classes of external facts. What is true of the growth of knowing is true of that of feeling and of willing. Feeling gradually adjusts itself to external surroundings. Things or persons beneficial to the individual come (as a rule) to be objects of pleasurable feeling or liking: those injurious to him come to be objects of dislike. The higher and more representative feelings such as patriotism, the sense of justice, and so on, involve adjustments to more numerous and extended external relations. Lastly, knowing and feeling lead on to acting. And in action we have the final outcome of the process of adjustment. In acting, we seek what is beneficial and avoid what is injurious. In this way, we react on our surroundings and so pro- mote the harmonious adjustment of inner to outer re- lations. All growth of will illustrates an increasing adaptation to the facts and circumstances of life. Prudent conduct differs from hasty impulsive conduct, in the fact that it involves a representation of remote as well as near results, of permanent as distinguished from temporary circumstances of life. Interaction of Environment and Nervous Organism. Let us now look at the other part of this process of adapta- tion, the adjustment of the nerve-structures to external circumstances. It is plain that external things act upon the mind through the medium of the nervous organism. The physical agencies, the vibrations known as light ? sound, and so on, act upon the appropriate nerve struc- 54 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. tures calling forth reactions which are accompanied by psychical states. Through innumerable interactions between the nervous system and the environment, the former becomes gradually modified in conformity with the latter. Thus nervous connections are built up in the brain-centres corresponding to external relations. The nervous structures are thus, in a manner, moulded in agreement to the external order, to the form or structure of the environment. Internal and External Factor in Development. Taking this view of mental development as a process related to and conditioned by the action of the environment, we may say that the growth of an individual mind is brought about by the co-operation of two sets of agencies or factors. Of these the first is the Internal Factor. By this is meant the mind itself with its several capabilities considered as original or primordial, not susceptible of being resolved into anything simpler. With this must be taken the nervous organism with which mental activity is somehow connected. The second is the Ex- ternal Factor. By this is meant the surroundings or the environment which acts upon the mind in connection with the nervous structures. Internal Factor. By this is meant, first of all, the sim- ple and fundamental capabilities of the mind. It includes the several ultimately distinguishable modes of sensi- bility to light, sound, and so on. Further, it includes the fundamental intellectual functions, discrimination, and assimilation. In like manner, it will include the primary or fundamental capacities of feeling, and powers INHERITED TENDENCIES. 55 of willing. To these must be added the property of retentiveness itself, which, as we have seen, underlies what we mean by mental growth. These several capa- bilities must be assumed as present from the first. They are original properties of the mind which cannot be further analyzed or accounted for. Inherited Dispositions. In addition to these common fundamental capabilities of mind, the internal factor probably contains a more special element. This is known by the name of inherited tendencies or dispositions to think, feel, and act, in particular ways. An alleged example of such a tendency is the disposition to think of events as related one to another by way of causation, or as causes and effects. We must clearly understand what is meant by an inherited mental tendency. In the first place, it implies that the tendency has not been acquired in the course of the individual life or experience. We mean that the transmitted tendency is a result of ancestral experience, that it represents an acquisition made in the course of the history of the race. It is important to add that these inherited tendencies need not manifest themselves at the beginning of life. Some amount of individual experience may be necessary to the manifestation of the inherited bent. It is a much disputed question how far such inherited dispositions extend. In the region of intellect, we have as probable examples, the tendency to connect touch and sight experiences in the visual perception of objects, the tendency to group events under the relation of cause 56 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. and effect, and so on. In the region of feeling, inherit^ ance seems to play a still more extensive part. The pleasurable feeling called forth in the infant mind by the sight of the mother's face, the painful feeling evoked by the looks and tones of anger and rebuke, the fear manifested by young children at the sight of strangers, and certain animals, are illustrations of such inherited emotional tendencies. Finally, in the region of action, we find apparent tendencies in the individual to fall in with the customary or habitual ways of action of his ancestors. Thus, the infant tends instinctively and apart from the teaching of experience to move his eyes sym- metrically, to stretch out his hand to seize an object, and to carry objects to his mouth, and so on. External Factor. In the second place, the development of an individual mind implies the presence and co-oper- ation of the External Factor, or the Environment. By this we mean, in the first place, the physical environment or natural surroundings. The growth of intellect, feel- ing and will is, as we have seen, conditioned by the action of the several physical agencies, by the form and arrangement of things making up our natural habitat. The contents and the order of arrangement of the en- vironment thus help to determine the form of our mental life. The Social Environment. In addition to what we com- monly call the Natural or Physical Environment, there is the Social Environment. By this we mean the society of which the individual is a member, with which he THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. 57 holds certain relations, and by which he is profoundly influenced. The Social Medium, like the Physical, affects the individual mind through sense-impressions (sights and sounds); yet its action differs from that of the natural surroundings in being a moral influence. It works through the forces which bind man to man, such as imitation, sympathy, and so on. The presence of a social medium is necessary to a full normal development of mind. If it were possible to maintain a child in bodily health and at the same time deprive him of all companionship, his mental develop- ment would be but rudimentary. The child comes under the stimulation, the guidance, and the control of others, and these influences are essential to a normal mental development. Thus, his intellectual growth is determined by continual contact and interaction with the social intelligence, the body of knowledge amassed by the race, and expressed in everyday speech, in books, etc. Similarly, the feelings of the child quicken and grow under the touch of social sentiment. And finally his will is called forth, stimulated and guided by the habitual modes of action of those about him. These social influences embrace a wider area as life progresses. Beginning with the action of the family, they go on expanding by including the influences of the school, of companions, and finally of the whole commu- nity as working through manners, public opinion, and so on. Undesigned and Designed Influence of Society. A part of this social influence acts undesignedly, that is, without any intention to accomplish a result. The effects of 58 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. contact of urind with mind, of example, of the prevail- ing tone of a family or a society, all this resembles the action of natural or physical agencies. On the other har.d, a considerable remainder of this influence is clearly designed. To this part belong all the mechan- ism of instruction, the arts of suasion, moral and legal control, and so on. Both kinds of social influence co-operate in each of the three great phases of mental development. Thus, the intellect of a child grows partly under the influence of contact with the social intelligence reflecting itself in the structure of language; and partly by the aid of sys- tematic instruction. Similarly, feeling develops partly through the mere contact with other minds, or the agencies of sympathy, and partly by direct appeals from others. Finally, the will develops partly by the attrac- tion of example and the impulses of imitation, and partly by the forces of suasion, advice, reproof, and the whole system of social discipline. Scheme of Development. The reader may perhaps be able the better to comprehend the above rough theory of mental development by help of the following diagram. Since all these factors must co-operate in some mea- sure in bringing about what we call the normal devel- opment of an individual mind, we cannot separate this complex effect into parts, referring one part to one fac- tor, another part to another factor. Still, by observing the variations in the effect which attend variations in any particular factor, we may form a rough idea respect- ing the comparative value of each of the co-operant conditions. This question of comparative value arises DIAGRAM OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. 59 more especially with respect to the Social Factor. Psy- chologists, as a rule, have paid but little attention to the influence of the social surroundings on the growth of the individual mind. Yet it is now commonly ac- knowledged that this is an essential condition of a full normal development. As to the extent of its influence,, however, there is still room for wide differences of opinion. 1 i The importance of the Social Environment has heen emphasized by the late G. H. Lewes. See Problems of Life and Mind, First Series, VoL I., p. 152 seq.; and The Study of Psychology, Chap. IV. 60 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. Varieties of Development While all minds pass through the same typical normal course of development, there are endless differences in the details of the mental his- tory of individuals. In no two cases is the process of mental growth precisely similar. These diversities of mental history answer to the differences between mind and mind spoken of in the previous chapter. Such dif- ferences of development may be referred to one of two causes or factors: (a) variations or inequalities of orig- inal capacity, or (b) differences in the external circum- stances, physical and social. All differences in the final result, that is, the mature or developed aptitude, must he assignable to one (or both) of these factors. As every teacher knows, the processes of education applied to two children at approximately the same level of attainment result in widely unlike amounts of pro- gress. Such inequalities in capability of mental growth (connected in part with different degrees of retentive- ness) constitute some of the most striking among the original or inherent differences of aptitude among indi- viduals. Training of the Faculties. The subject of training is closely connected with the action of the social environ- ment. All education or training is, indeed, the designed influence of society on the individual concentrated and reduced to a systematic form. The training of a faculty means the regular calling of it into activity by supply- ing the conditions of its exercise. This includes, first of all, the presentment of suitable materials. The powers of observation, of memory, and so on, can only be called into activity by supplying materials, such as objects to TRAINING OF THE FACULTIES. 61 be inspected, words to be committed to memory. To- this must be added the application of a social stimulus in the shape of a motive to intellectual effort (concen- tration of mind), such as a promise of favor, or a threat of punishment. Training must be based on Laws of Mental Development. Thus, it has to conform to the great law of all growth that it is appropriate exercise which strengthens faculty. That is to say, it will aim directly at calling forth a fac- ulty into its proper mode of action by supplying materi- als and motives adapted to the stage of development reached at the time. And here it may be well to say that there should be an adequate but not excessive stimulation of the faculty. By adequate stimulation is meant an excitation of sufficient strength and variety to secure completeness of growth. By excessive stimula- tion is meant an amount of excitation which forces the activity to such a point as is unfavorable to growth. Training must be based on the Natural Order of Development. In the second place, the whole scheme of training should conform to the natural order of development of the fac- ulties. Those faculties which develop first must be exercised first. It is vain, for example, to try to culti- vate the power of abstraction before the powers of ob- servation (perception) and imagination have reached a certain degree of strength. This self-evident proposi- tion is one of the best accepted principles in the modern theory of Education, though there is reason to apprehend that it is still frequently violated in practice. 4 62 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. Child Life divided into Periods. Writers on pedagogics have sought to divide early life into periods distin- guished by the predomiaance of certain faculties. Thus Beneke recognizes four periods: (1) To about the end of the 3rd year, the period of sense and instinct in which the child is mainly engrossed with external things; (2) To about the end of the 7th year, in which internal mental activity comes up to and balances external activ- ity (sense-perception) ; (3) To the end of the 14th year, in which inner activity becomes free of sense and gains a distinct ascendency over this; and (4) To the end of school life, in which the higher mental powers (thought) appear in fuller development. It is obvious, however, that ail such demarcations must be rough and inexact. The process of development is at once too continuous and too complex to allow of such sharp divisions, though it may be of great practical value to adopt them as rough contrivancies. A Scientific Method of Training will cultivate Faculty to a certain point only. Once more, a method of training based on scientific principles will aim not only at taking up a faculty at the right moment, but also at cultivating it rip to the proper point, and not beyond this. By this is meant that each faculty should be strengthened up to the level which answers to its rank or value in the whole scale of faculties. In other words, the exercise of each capability must be adequate aud not excessive, as esti- mated by reference to a proportionate development of the sum of capabilities. In training the imagination or the memory, for example, we should keep in view the METHODS MUST BE ELASTIC. 63 importance of this faculty in relation to the attainment of knowledge and mental activity as a whole. Methods of Training must be adapted to individual capacities. Finally, training in order to be adequate must be to some extent elastic, adapting itself to the numerous differences among young minds. Up to a certain point, a common result, namely a typical completeness of development, will be aimed at. It would not be well, for example, that any child however unimaginative should have his imagination wholly untrained. At the same time, this typical plan of cultivation must be modified in detail. The greater the natural aptitude, the more economical the production of a given psychical result. Hence, it would be wasteful to give as much time and thought to the training of a bad as of a good germ of faculty. Nor do the practical ends of life im- pose such a disagreeable task on the teacher. Variety of individual development answers to the highly elabo- rated division of life-work which characterizes civiliza- tion. References. For a fuller account of the nature and causes of mental development, the reader is referred to Mr. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, especially Vol. I., Parts III, and IV. A brief statement of the characteristics of development as bearing on the work of the teacher will be found in Mr. Spencer's Essay, Education, Chap. II. 64 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III. SUGGESTIONS. 1. When you have read through the volume, ~e-read this Chap. III. It is difficult because largely made up of generaliza- tions, the full reasons for which are yet to be detailed. 2. Distinguish carefully by reference to the preceding pages, the unabridged dictionary, or some such work, as, Fleming's Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, the fundamental powers of the intellect (See Bain's Senses and Intellect, p. 321.): (1.) Consciousness of Difference (Discrimination). (2.) Consciousness of Agreement (Assimilation). (3.) Retentiveness. 3. Consider, now, that the preceding chapter declares mental development to be from beginning to end the result solely, of the exercise of these three fundamental functions. 4. Note how the old notion of the different nature of the Faculties now disappears, since they are all fundamentally, capacities for detecting agreements and differences. 5. Look up carefully the meanings of the following terms: ' increase of complexity ', ' increase of inwardness ', ' increase of generality! of knowledge.' Seek for illustrations of these in your knowledge of the development of individual minds. 6. Consider closely how the development of the Feelings favors intellectual development. What emotions or sentiments should we associate with schools and studies? REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. What is meant by Mental Development? What by growth as distinguished from development? Illustrate this distinction by reference to the bodily organism. Show how we can apply it to mind. PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGICS. 65 2. How are the successive stages of mental life related to each other? In what respects are they alike? In what respects do they differ? 3. Why is it possible to regard mental development as one continuous process? 4. In which factor, the External or the Internal, is each of the following influences on Mental Development to be classed: the family, the school, the state, the church, society, the news- paper press, the tendency to too great sensitiveness to rebuke, the tendency to left-handeduess? 5. What is meant in mental development by the "adaptation of the internal order to the external order? " MAXIMS OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE. Many of the current maxims of educational theory and prac- tice have a very close logical connection with the preceding theory of mental development. We can indicate briefly a very few of these connections: 1. ' The process of attaining knowledge sets out with Sensation. Sense supplies the materials which the intellect assimilates and elabor- ates according to its own laics' (p. 41). With this dictum of Psy- chology compare the following maxims of Education: a. The faculty of intuition, (i. e., the power of gaining knowledge in the direct presence of, and from, the object of knowledge) is the basis of all intellectual culture. — Diesterweg. b. All instruction in elementary schools must rest upon real intuition. — Diesterweg. c. The development of mind begins with the reception of Sensations.— JosEPn Payne. d. All knowledge must be ultimately founded on experience. — .Teyons. e. Personal experience is the condition of development, whether of body, mind or moral sense. — Joseph Patne. 2. 'The later operations are marked by increasing complexity' (p. 42). Now this complexity of operation is itself an evidence of E 66 MENTAL DEVELOPMENT. higher potential energy, — is a witness to the possession of the higher powers of mind. Compare therefore this educational maxim : The comparative utility of any teaching, any method, any subject of study is to be principally estimated, not by the com- plement of truths of which it puts us in possession, but by the degree in which it determines our higher capacities to action. —Hamilton. 3. ' The movement of growth is from the presentative to the representative ' (p. 42). With this dictum of Psychology compare : a. The development of mind, which begins with the recep- tion of sensations, is carried on by the formation of ideas. — Joseph Payne. 4. 'This movement of growth from the presentative to the repre- sentative implies a growth in the generality of knowledge. ' "With this compare: a. The mind, in gaining knowledge for itself, proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, from particular facts to general facts, or principles; and from principles to laws, rules and definitions; and not in the inverse order. — Joseph Payne. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. For a summary of the processes of mental development from the educational stand-point, see Payne, Principles of the Science of Education, under General Principles, Lectures, p. 156; on mental development the chief object of primary education, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. IV., principle II., p. 103; on education as development, not merely instruction, see Page's Theory and Practice, chap. V., near beginning, p. 70, and Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 185 ; on elementary educa- tion as having two objects, development and useful knowledge, see Tate, Introduction; on the humanistic or disciplinary, and realistic or utilitarian views of education, see Landon's School Management, chap. I. PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 67 2. On methods of teaching as simply adjuncts and supple- ments to nature's teaching, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., principle I., and Payne, the summary" of principles above referred to, at the end of Principles of Natural Education, Lectures, p. 161 ; on methods of teaching as founded on the study of the order and mode of the development of the natural faculties, see Tate, Part L, chap. L, under Philosophy of Method, p. 39; for Pestalozzi's theory of development, see Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, p. 238, and Quick, p. 185. 3. On the historical development of mind as an aid to psy- chological analysis of mind, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., near beginning, p. 65; and on Comte's similar doctrine — the famous generalization, that the genesis of knowledge in the individual must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race,— see H. Spencer's Education, chap. II., p. 122; on the four distinct stages of human development, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., near the middle, under Classification of the^ Faculties, p. 75. 4. On nature's development as continuous — natura non oper- atur per saltum, — see Quick on Comenius, p. 58; on instruction as progressive, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., principle IV., p. 109. 5. On the two factors in mental development, inherited pow- ers, and environment, see Parker, Talks on Teaching, p. 22; on the struggle of development as having its ideal in knowledge and skill sinking into the automatic, see the same, p. 159; on the contrast between the two ideals of quantity learning and har- monious mental growth, see preceding reference. 6. On all education as self education, all teaching as self- teaching, all development as self-development, see Payne, sum- mary of the Principles of 'the Science of Education, as before referred to, Lectures, pp. 158 and 101, and The Practice or Art of Education ; also the following It cture, Educational Methods, and indeed passim, everywhere, in all Mr. Payne's teachings; on true teach- ing as fostering the principle of self-development, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., principle V., p. Ill; on humanity progressing solely by self-instruction, see II. Spencer's Edncatto/,, chap. II., p. 125; on advantages of making education a process of self-evo- lution, see the same, p. 125. CHAPTER IV. ATTENTION. As we have seen, attention, though closely related to the active side of the mind and illustrating the laws of volition, is a general condition of our mental operations. We must, therefore, understand something about this mode of activity and its laws at the outset. Definition of Attention. Attention may be roughly denned as the active self -direction of the mind to any object which presents itself to it at the moment. 1 It is somewhat the same as the mind's 'consciousness' of what is present to it. The field of Consciousness, how- ever, is wider than that of Attention. Consciousness admits of many degrees of distinctness. I may be very vaguely or indistinctly conscious of some bodily sensa- tion, of some haunting recollection, and so on. To attend is to intensify consciousness by concentrating or narrowing it on some definite and restricted area. It is to force the mind or consciousness in a particular direc- tion, so as to make the objects as distinct as possible. Objects of Attention. The phenomena of intellect, emotion and will may alike become directly or indirectly objects of attention. The most conspicuous clajss of objects is that of external impressions, the sights, sounds, iThe idea of activity and effort is directly suggested by the etymology of the word, ad tendere, to stretch (sc. the mind) towards. EFFECTS OF ATTENTION. 69 etc., which make up objects of sense. 1 When the teacher talks about ' attending', he commonly means actively listening, or actively looking. In addition to external impressions and objects, internal images, ideas and thoughts, may be attended to. Feelings of pleasure and pain, if not directly attended to, are so indirectly, through the fixing of the attention on the exciting cause of the feeling, whether an external object or an internal image. Finally, we attend to our actions when we fix our minds closely on what we are about, and, more particularly, on the result which we are immediately aiming at. Effects of Attention. An act of attention serves to give greater force, vividness, and distinctness to its object. Thus an impression of sound becomes more forcible or impressive, and further has its character made more definite, when we direct our attention to it. A feeling of pleasure or pain is manifestly intensified, when we attend to it, or its cause or conditions. Attention and Intellectual Operations. We may say, then, that attention enters as a constituent into all classes of mental operation, and this co-operation of attention is specially conspicuous in the case of intellectual operations. The objects which present themselves to our senses are only clearly discriminated one from the other, and classed as objects of such and such a class, when we attend to them. So again, present impressions only exercise their full force in calling up what is associated iThe reader will see presently that external impressions and objects dilfer from one another. Here they are alike spoken of as 'objects of attention.' 70 ATTENTION. with them when we keep them before the mind by an act of attention. Once more, all thinking is clearly an active state of mind involving a voluntary fixing of the attention. We thus see that attention, though a form of action or will, stands in the closest relation to the intellectual processes. It may be described as the func- tion of will in relation to knowing, the co-operation of the active side of mind in aiding, directing, and con- trolling the mechanism of intellect. This being so, it is desirable to single it out for consideration before entering on the exposition of intellect. Extent of Attention. Attention has already been defined as a focussing of the mind for a given point, a concen- trating of its activity from a diffused inattentive con- dition. All attention is thus, in a measure, concentra- tion. But two acts of attention may have unequal extent of object. Thus in looking at a picture, I may attend now to some small detail, now to the whole com- position of the picture. So in listening to music, I may single out a particular note, or direct my attention to the ensemble of notes making up a chord. Relation of Extent to Force or Intensity. There is a very important relation between the extent or area of object that we try to attend to at one moment and the effect- ive force of the act. This relation may be expressed as follows : When an equal effort is made, the effective force of an act of attention varies inversely as the ex- tent of object attended to. "Pluribus intentus, minor est ad singula sensus." In other words, the more we comprehend or embrace in the act of attention the less STIMULI TO ATTENTION. 71 penetrating will it be. The closest and most fruitful attention, therefore, implies the maximum of concentra- tion. On what the degree of Attention depends. The amount of attention exerted at any time depends on two chief circumstances (a) the quantity of active energy 1 dispos- able at the time ; (b) the strength of the stimulus or force which excites the attention or rouses it to action. If there is great active energy, a feeble stimulus will suffice to bring about attention. The healthy vigorous child in the early part of the day has a superabundance of energy, which shows itself in attention to small and comparatively uninteresting matters. On the other hand, a tired or weakly child requires a proportionately powerful stimulus. External and Internal Stimuli. The stimulus to an act of attention may be either something external con- nected with the object attended to, or something inter- nal. An external stimulus consists of some interesting or striking feature in the object itself, or in its accom- paniments, by reason of which the attention is said to be attracted and arrested, such as the brilliance of a light, or the strangeness of a sound. An internal stimulus is a motive in the mind which prompts it to put forth its attention in a particular direction, such as the desire of a child to please his teacher, or to gain a higher place in his class. i By active energy we mean mental capability as conditioned by the state of the motor organs (nerves and muscles) involved. 72 ATTENTION. Non- Voluntary and Voluntary Attention. When the mind is acted upon by the mere force of the object presented, the act of attention is said to be non-voluntary, It may also be called reflex (or automatic), because it bears a striking analogy to reflex movement, that is to say, movement following sensory stimulation without the intervention of a conscious purpose. On the other hand, when we attend to a thing under the impulse of a desire, such as curiosity, or a wish to know about a thing, we are said to do so by an act of will, or volun- tarily. Attention and Interest. The word 'interest' may be used in a wide sense as including the effect of impres- sions generally in rousing the attention. In this sense, the familiar saying, ' we attend to what interests us,' is a perfectly tautological expression. More usually the term refers to the rousing effect of an object through the medium of feeling. We are interested in a thing when we are affected by it either pleasurably or pain- fully. In the first case, we call our interest a pleasur- able one, in the second, a painful one. In a peculiar manner, those things are interesting to us, or awaken our interest, which answer to, or are connected with, our particular sensibilities, tastes, and related habits of thought. Thus, a conceited person is specially inter- ested in any talk, flattering or otherwise, about himself; a person with artistic taste is specially interested in objects of beauty, and so on. The objects which inter- est a person thus serve as an index or clue to his custom- ary and dominant feelings and tastes. While, however, anything which touches us on the side of feeling, ATTENTION AND INTEREST. 73 whether pleasantly or unpleasantly, is said to be inter- esting, the term interest usually refers more particularly to the attractive force of pleasurable impressions. This special reference of the word 'interest' to what is pleasurable points to the superior importance of vol- untary attention, and to the fact that reflex attention easily passes into the higher form. A thing which fully interests us excites t lie will to a deliberate concentration of the attention with a view either to prolong or gain some pleasure or satisfaction, or to get rid of or avert some pain. And since the positive end of voluntary action is pleasure or happiness, the term interest natur- ally comes to point to those objects and related activities which arc immediate sources of enjoyment, or which are connected with, or have a bearing on these. Our 'interests,' such as our home, business, country, favor- ite art, are the great and permanent sources of our happiness. Change of Stimulus. Any stimulus will exert a greater effect on the attention in proportion as the degree of change introduced into the mental state of the moment increases. All change, contrast, or transition of mind from one state to another acts as a kind of rousing shock. The sudden introduction of a sound into the stillness of a country retreat acts as a potent stimulus to the attention. Effect of Novelty. What is oft recurring and familiar, as for example, the stroke of a clock, produces little effect on the attention. A sound much less powerful than that of a good-sized clock, provided it were of a 74 ATTENTION. wholly unfamiliar sort, would certainly arrest the attention. Familiarity and Interest. While it is thus certain that novel sights and sounds, as such, strike the attention momentarily, it does not follow that mere novelty will succeed in holding the mind. As Volkmann observes, the absolutely new does not chain (the attention). In order to effect this result, an object must possess, over and above the superficial quality of novelty, the deeper attribute of interestingness. Now, as we have seen, a thing interests us when it touches our feelings, and this it can only do by linking itself on somehow to our recurring and habitual trains of imagery and thought. A good part of our interest in things (more particularly our intellectual interest) is connected with the fact of their intelligibility. To one who knows nothing of mechanics, the complicated movements of a machine are apt to be a tedious spectacle. We see with interest and enjoyment what we are prepared to see by previous experience and knowledge. Hence, the very circum- stance of familiarity will sometimes constitute a source of interest. If, for example, we happen to overhear a person speak in an unknown language and suddenly catch a familiar English word, our attention is instantly excited. Mechanism of Reflex Attention. Under ordinary circum- stances, the attention is solicited in a number of direc- tions simultaneously. Provided there is the necessary activity of mind, the attention will be drawn in a direc- tion determined by the foregoing considerations. Speak- THE WILL AND ATTENTION. 75 ing roughly, one may describe what takes place as a sort of struggle for existence among stimuli, in which the greatest, the most interesting, or the most novel survives. At the same time, each survival is but momentary, it being of the very nature of reflex atten- tion to be easily drawn off by new stimuli. Function of the Will in Attention. It is important to understand the precise scope of the will's action in attention. What is called voluntary attention is not a wholly new phase of the process. After the action of the will has supervened, the forces of non-voluntary attention continue to be active as tendencies. And the range of the wili's action is limited by these. Thus, the student most practised in abstraction could not resist the allure- ment of a beautiful melody sung within his hearing. Again, though we can undoubtedly (within certain limits) direct our attention in this or that quarter at will, we have not ihe power to keep our attention closely fixed on any object which we (or somebody else for us) may happen to select. 1 Something further is necessary to that lively interaction of mind and object which we call a state of attention and this is interest. By an act of will, 1 may resolve to turn my attention to something, say a passage in a book. But if after this preliminary process of adjustment of the mental eye, the object opens up no interesting phase, all the willing in the world will not produce a calm settled state of concentra- tion. The will introduces mind and object: it cannot i " Experience itself, soon teaches ns that it is not possible to concen- trate our attention with any degree of strength we choose, on any object we choose." ( Waite, Lehrbuch f Attention; because it is only the labor of attention which has light for its reward. — MA.LEBRA.NCHE. 88 ATTENTION. 2. 'Wlien an equal effort is made, the effective force of an act of attention varies inversely as the extent of object attended to ' (p. 70). This is called, by Sir Wm. Hamilton, the Law of Limitation. It implies that the intension of our knowledge is in the inverse ratio of its extension, in other words, that the fewer objects we consider at once, the clearer and more distinct will be our know- ledge of it. Sir Henry Holland suggests the phrase direction of consciousness as a substitute for the word attention, and, similarly, Hamilton says attention is to consciousness what the contraction of the pupil is to sight; or to the eye of the mind what the microscope or telescope is to the bodily eye. From the Law of Limitation may be deduced several educa- tional principles and maxims : a. One thing at a time, one study at a time, one author only from which to learn a language. — Ratich. b. Only one thing should be taught at one time, and an ac- cumulation of difficulties is to be avoided especially in the begin- ning of the study. — Marcel. c. When our interest in any particular object is excited, and when we wish to obtain all the knowledge we can concerning it, it behooves us to limit our consideration to that object to the exclusion of others. — Hamilton. 3. 'The Will introduces mind and object' 1 (p. 76). i What the will does is to determine the kind of interest which shall prevail at the moment. ' Voluntarily to turn the mind to a thing is to exclude what is irrelevant and distracting ' (p. 78). The most important and comprehensive educational application of this psychologic truth we shall state in the words of Carpenter: "It is solely by the Volitional direction of the attention that the will exerts its domination, so that the acquirement of this power, which is within the reach of every one, should be the primary object of all mental discipline. The power of the will, though limited to selection, is unbounded. It can virtually determine what shall be regarded by the mind, through its power of keeoing the attention fixed in some other direction ; and, thus, APPLICATIONS TO TEACHING. 89 it can subdue the force of violent impulse, and give to the con- flict of opposing motives a result quite different from that which would ensue without its interference. This exercise of the Will will tend to form the character; . . . and our Character and Conduct in Life will come to be the expression of our best Intel- lectual energies, directed by motives which we determinately elect, as our guiding principles of Action." Analyzing this statement, we shall have : (1) The primary object of all discipline is the direction of the attention by tcill. (2) The power of the will can not introduce any new thought, or emotion to consciousness: it can only select among the many objects claiming the soul's attention. (3) But its power to select is unbounded and having chosen that to which we shall attend, other things are excluded. (4) This is the only way we can form our characters. It is evident that a large body of educational doctrine can be deduced from this admirable statement of the principles of attention. a. We may learn to be attentive in the same manner that we learn to walk or to write, by practice in attending. And the teacher should be insistent in presenting right motives to the mind of the learner, and in urging him to a right choice in selecting the objects of his attention. b. The habit of directing the faculties promptly and intently to whatever subject comes before us lays the foundation of the intellectual character. This habit requires careful cultivation : all pupils should be expected to concentrate the whole of their powers of observation on the subject before them. — Tate. c. When sympathy fails (to produce attention) try curiosity; when curiosity fails, try praise; when praise begins to lose its effect, try blame; and when you go back again to sympathy, you will find that after this interval, it will have recovered all its original power. — Tate. d. Strenuous energy is the one condition of all improvement; yet this energy is, at first, and for a long time, comparatively 90 ATTENTION. painful. It is painful because it is imperfect. Pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded energy. — Sir W. Hamilton. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS, READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. For a definition of Attention from the teacher's stand- point, see Payne's summary of the Principles of the Science of Ed- ucation, under Principles of Natural Education, XL, Lectures, p. 159 ; for memory as the result of Attention, see the same refer- ence; for attention as an attitude, not of the body, but of the mind, and for the distinction between real and apparent atten- tion, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, XXIV., p. 157. 2. For a study of the different kinds of attention we may expect in infancy, early childhood, childhood, early youth, and youth, refer to Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. III., at the end; on the evils of ' imparting knowledge ' when the student does not attend, see Payne, The Science and Art of Edu- cation, near the middle, Lectures, p. 33; on the efficiency of a lesson as dependent on the part taken iu it by the pupil, not by the teacher, see the same reference ; for the different causes of the inattention of differently constituted minds, see Tate, Part II., chap. III., a most excellent chapter throughout. 3. On arousing interest — 'waking up mind,' — see Page's Theory and Practice, chapter VI., section IV., p. 86, also chap. IX., section II., p. 166; for a classification of the proper motives of action, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., near the end, p. 95; on the proper incentives to study, see Page, chap. VIII., section III., p. 139; on the fact that the interest must be either in the study itself or in the results of the study, see Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 264; on the attractiveness of the study itself as creating, under natural teaching, an enthusiastic love for study, see Parker, XXIV., p. 161. 4. On the student's interest, the first and most important matter, see Quick, p. 275; on Rousseau's saying the desire of knowledge is the chief thing, see the same, p. 133; on the habit of Attention as the great mainspring of Education, see Tate, PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGICS. 91 Parti., chap. IV., principle XVI., p. 161; on attention to be cultivated by all possible artifices, see the beginning of chap. III., Part II. , of Tate. 5. On all subjects as made interesting by emulation, see Quick, p. 265; and on how the Jesuits made use of the princi- ple of emulation, see the same, p. 8; on the evils of stimulation by prizes, see Page, chap. VIII., section II., p. 127; on the mis- take of using too violent or too persistent stimulus to attention, see Miss Edgeworth, quoted by Tate, Part II., chap. III., p. 189; on good teaching alone sufficient to create the closest and most prolonged attention, see Parker, XXIV., p. 161; on impressions as secured by either repitition or by the strong desire or interest of the learner, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. V., p. 130; on one topic taught so as to arouse genuine interest, more profit- able than one hundred superficially taught, see Parker, XXL, p. 146. 6. On the highest and best teaching as that which leads pupils to work for themselves, sec Quick, p. 263, and Payne everywhere, particularly pp. 38, 87 and 88. 7. On great energy as only possible when great interest is aroused, see Quick, p. 263; on the connection between play and attention and knowledge, see Payne, Fnrbel and the Kindergar- ten, ne;ir the middle, p. 263; on Pestalozzi as no friend to the plan of always disguising learning as amusement, see Quick, p. 193; on attention as deadened by long expositions, and by too easy or too monotonous exercises, see Tate, Part II., chap. III., p. 188; and on the relation of questioning to attention, see Fitch, chap. VII., p. 159. CHAPTER V. SENSATION. All knowledge takes its rise in the senses. No intel- lectual work, such as imagining or reasoning, can be done till the senses have supplied the necessary materials. These materials, when reduced to their elements, are sensations or sense-impressions, such as those of light and color which we receive by means of the eye, of sound which we have by way of the ear, and so on. An examination of our most abstract notions, such as force, matter, leads us back to these impressions. Our ideas can never go much beyond our sensations. The want of a sense, as in the case of one born blind, means de- priving the mind of a whole order of ideas. The addition of a new sense, if such a thing were possible, would enrich our minds by a new kind of knowledge respecting the world. Relation to Pedagogics. With the psychology of Sensation, the student of Educational Science should connect the doctrine that Intuition (sense-experience) is the absolute basis of all in- struction; that all learning is founded on the direct personal ex- perience of the learner ; and the doctrine of knowledge as of two kinds, — Immediate and Mediate, presentative or representative. There will be frequent occasions to return to these fundamental distinctions in the science of Pedagogics, but the reader should anticipate them even here, endeavoring to see their relation to the following exposition of Sensation. THE ORGANIC SENSE. 93 Definition of Sensation. A sensation being an element- ary mental phenomenon cannot be denned in terms of anything more simple. Its meaning can only be indi- cated by a reference to the nervous processes on which it is known to depend. Accordingly, a sensation is commonly defined as a simple mental state resulting from the stimulation or excitation of the outer or per- ipheral extremity of an ' incarrying ' or sensory nerve. Thus the stimulation of a point of the skin by pressure or rubbing, or of the retina of the eye by light, gives rise to a sensation. Sensibility . The mind's capacity of being acted upon or affected by the medium of the stimulation of a sen- sory nerve is called sensibility. Sensibility is simply another name for the mind's capability of having sensa- tions. Strictly speaking, this property belongs to the mind and not to the body. Yet we are accustomed by an allowable looseness of expression to ascribe sensibil- ity to the organism in so far as it is the medium by which sensations are produced. Thus, we talk of the sensibil- ity or sensitiveness of the skin, and of the retina of the eye. General Sensibility : Organic Sense. The sensations fall- ing under this head are marked by absence of definite characters. They are vague and ill-defined. Their dis- tinguishing peculiarity is that they have a marked pleasurable or painful aspect or complexion. Such are the feelings of comfort and discomfort connected with the process of digestion and indigestion, and with inju- ries to the tissues. These sensations are not directly 94 SENSATION. connected with the action of external objects, but arise in consequence of a certain condition of the part of tbe organism concerned. Thus they give us no knowledge of tbe external world. They can at best inform us of the condition of the organism, and they can only do this adequately when we are able to c localize ' them or refer them to their precise seat in the organism. And this, as we shall see later, is only possible in the case of sensa- tions produced by actions going on in the external parts of the organism. Special Sensibility: Special Senses. The special sensa- tions arising through the stimulation of the eye, the ear, and so on, are marked off one from another by great definiteness of character. This peculiarity is connected with the fact that each sense has its own specially mod- ified structure or ' sense organ,' such as the eye, or the ear, fitted to be acted upon by a particular kind of stimulus (light-vibrations, air-waves, etc.). Owing to tbis definiteness of character, the special sensations are much more susceptible of being discriminated and recognized than the organic sensations. * Moreover, these sensations are (in ordinary cases) brought about by the action of external agents or objects lying outside the organism, and are on that account called impressions. For these reasons they are fitted to yield us knowledge of the environment. It is the special senses which will chiefly interest us in tracing the development of intelli- gence or knowledge. The Five Senses. The Special Senses consist first of all of the well known five, namely, Sight, Hearing, Touch, CHARACTERS OF SENSATIONS. 95 Smell, and Taste. They each involve a special mode of sensibility, and a particular kind of ' end-organ ' or terminal structure, fitted to be acted on by a certain kind of stimulus. The only apparent exception to this is Touch. This, as sensibility to mechanical pressure, is very closely related to Common Sensibility. Indeed, Touch has been called the fundamental Sense out of which the other and special senses are developed. 1 But what we distinguish as Touch proper or Tactile Sensi- bility is possessed in a specially fine form by certain portions of the skin, as the lips and the finger-tips, and here certain modifications of nervous structure are found to exist. Hence, we may speak of a special sense, and a special organ, of touch. Characters of Sensations. The importance of the sj^ecial senses depends, as we have seen, on their possessing cer- tain well-defined characters, whereby they are fitted to be signs or indications of qualities in external objects, as well as of the changes which take place in these. The sum-total of our knowledge of things is limited by the number of distinguishable characters among our seusa- tions. We will first enquire into these distinguishable characters generally, and then briefly indicate their vary- ing importance in the case of the different senses. ' Intensity or Degree. The most obvious difference of character among our sensations is that of degree or in- tensity. The difference between a bright and a faint light, a loud and a soft sound, involves a difference of i See Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. XXVII.; and H. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., Part III. Chap. IV. 96 SENSATION. intensity in the sense-impressioDs. All classes of sensa- tion exhibit differences of degree. Those of the special senses exhibit them in greater number than other sensa- tions. These differences of degree are intellectually important as a clue to the nature or structure of bodies, the force exerted by them, their distance from us, and so on. Thus, a vivid sensation of light indicates (ac- cording to circumstances) the brightness of an object (e. g., a flame, a mass of snow), or its nearness to the eye. Quality of Sensation. Next to differences of intensity or degree we have differences of quality among our sensations. By a difference of quality is meant one of kind and not simply of degree. The group of sensa- tions making up a particular sense, as those of sound, are marked off by a broad difference of generic quality. In addition to these broad differences, there are finer differences of specific quality within each sense. Thus, there are differences of quality answering to different colors in sight, to sounds of different pitch and of differ- ent timbre or musical ' quality ' in hearing, and so on. These differences of quality are much sharper or more definite in the case of some sensations than in that of others. Such differences, like those of degree, serve as a clue to the properties of external objects. The differ- ence between gold and iron is partly a difference of color. Musical instruments, including human voices, are distin- guished partly by their peculiarities of timbre. It is important to observe that we are apt to ascribe a difference of quality to objects, on the basis of a dif- ference of degree in our sensations. Thus we are often disposed to think of two shades of one and the same DURATION OF SENSATIONS. 97 color as two colors. Yet in this case there is no differ- ence of quality in the sensation, only one of degree answering to degrees of brightness. Similarly, the dif- ference between heavy aijd light bodies appears to turn on a difference of degree in the sensations. Other Characters of Sensation : Duration. We have now discussed the two leading characters of Sensation, its degree or intensity, and its quality. In addition to these, our sensations exhibit other characters, tbough these are not so distinctly present in all classes of sen- sation as are degree and quality. The first of these is Duration. All Sensations, as indeed all mental states, have duration: they endure for a shorter or longer period. Such differences of du- ration range from the shortest possible, that of a mo- mentary sensation, up to the longest possible, that compatible with a protracted direction of the attention. Yet all classes of sensation do not present this aspect with equal clearness. Some sensations, as tastes and smells, are much less sharply defined in respect of their commencement and termination than others: their du- ration is less distinct or definite than that of other sensations, as those of sound. The importance of this difference will appear later on. Coming now to the senses in detail, we see that they do not exhibit the same degree of definiteness or the same number of distinct characters. We usually speak of Taste and Smell as the coarse or unrefined senses, whereas Hearing and Sight are highly refined. By at- tending simply to the degree of refinement, we may G 98 SENSATION. arrange the senses in the following ascending order, Taste, Smell, Touch, Hearing, Sight. No detailed exposition of the senses can be given here, but only a brief enumeration of their characters. Taste and Smell. These present a decidedly low meas- ure of refinement. Indeed, the sensations of these senses may be said to approach the organic sensations in want of definiteness, and in the predominance of the element of feeling (pleasure and pain). These peculi- arities are connected with the fact that these senses have as their function the determination of what is wholesome or unwholesome to the organism as a whole. The very position of the organs at the entrance of the digestive and respiratory cavities suggests that they are sentinels to warn us as to what is good or ill. The sensations of taste and smell are easily confused one with another, cannot be definitely distinguished either in degree or quality. We cannot distinguish a number of simultaneous tastes and odors as we can distinguish a number of touches locally separate from one another. Again, owing to the persistence of sensations, we can- not discriminate two odors or two tastes in rapid suc- cession. And lastly, both modes of sensibility are liable to great fluctuations, temporary and permanent. Hence they are of little importance as knowledge-giving senses. It is only under special circumstances, as those of the chemist, the wine-taster, and so on, that these 'servants of the body ' supply a quantity of exact knowledge about the properties of objects. Touch. By the sense of touch is meant the sensations we receive from the contact of bodies with the tactual THE SENSE OF HEARING. 99 organ. These are either sensations of mere contact or pressure, or those of temperature. Although sensibility to pressure is probably the simplest and least specialized form of sensibility, the sense of touch supplies us with much more knowledge than those of taste and smell. In its highest and more special form, connected with definite portions of the bodily surface, more particularly the hands, and especially the finger-tips (with which the lips may be reckoned), the tactual sensibility be- comes a most important means of ascertaining the properties of bodies. Besides differences of degree in the case of sensations of touch, we have important differences of quality, as between those of smoothness and roughness. To these differences must be added the important qualitative dif- ference between hot and cold. Hearing. The Sense of Hearing ranks high as an intellectual or knowledge-giving sense. This is owing to the high degree of definiteness of its sensations. In respect both of intensity and of quality, fine differences are recognizable. The high intellectual character of hearing shows itself most plainly in the qualitative differences. We have here the broad contrast between musical and non- musical sounds or noises. The former depend on regularly recurring or periodic vibrations of the air, the latter on irregularly recurring or non-periodic vibrations. In the case of musical sounds, we have the remarkable phenomena of a scale of sensation. If we pass upwards from a low note to a higher one through all distinguish- able gradations, we experience a continuous variation of 100 SENSATION. sensation in one respect, namely, pitch or height. This scale or series of similar or analogous changes (increase or decrease of pitch) is described as a ' continuum ' of one dimension. All these differences of pitch are known to answer to changes in the rate of vibration of the medium (the atmosphere). The higher the note, the more rapid the vibrations. In the discrimination of pitch, the ear shows a deli- cacy far superior to that of the other senses. The smallest difference recognized in our musical scale (a semi-tone) is by no means the smallest perceptible. In the median region of the scale, an unpracticed ear can easily distinguish tones which differ by only a few vibrations per second; and a practised ear can even detect a difference of a fraction of a vibration. In addition to this scale of pitch-quality, there are the differences known as timbre or ' musical quality.' These are the qualitative differences in sensations of tone answering to differences in the instrument, as the piano, the violin, the human voice. These differences have been explained as due to the various composition of the several kinds of tone. . Enough has been said to illustrate the high degree of refinement characterizing the sense of hearing. The delicate and far-reaching discrimination of quality, aided by the fine discrimination of duration, enables the ear to acquire a good deal of exact information, as well as to gain a considerable amount of refined pleasure. The delight of music sums up the chief part of the latter. The former is illustrated in the wide range of know- ledge derived by way of that system of articulate sounds known as language. SENSE OF SIGHT. 101 As a set off against these advantages, we see that hearing has very little local discrimination. We cannot distinguish two or more simultaneous sounds with any nicety according to the position of their external source. Hence, hearing only gives us (directly), as we shall see by and by, very little knowledge of the position of bodies in space, and of their figure and magnitude. Sight. The sense of Sight is by common consent allowed the first place in the scale of refinement. The delicate and intricate structure of the organ, and the nature of the stimulus (ether-vibrations), give to its impressions a special degree of definiteness. The scale of intensity in the case of visual sensations is obviously a very extended one. It answers to all distinguishable degrees of luminosity from the brightest self-luminous bodies which we are capable of looking at, down to the objects which reflect a minimum of light and are known as black. The eye's capability of recog- nizing at a glance the nature of an object and of a multitude of unlike objects in a scene, rests in part on this delicate discriminative sensibility to degrees of light. In sight, again, we have numerous and fine differences of quality. Of these the most important are color dif- ferences. The impressions of color, like those of pitch, fall into a series of gradual changes. Passing from one extremity of the spectrum (or rainbow) scale to another, the eye experiences a series of perfectly gradual tran- sitions. These changes fall into the series, violet, blue, green, yellow, orange, and red, together with certain finer distinctions, as indigo blue, greenish blue. These 102 SENSATION. differences of quality accompany (as in the case of pitch- sensations) changes in the rapidity of the vibrations constituting the stimulus. Thus the violet rays make about 661 billions, the red rays about 456 billion vibra- tions per second. The several kinds of rays when all combined, as in sunlight, produces the impression white. The same sensation may result from combining different pairs of the several varieties of light in certain proportions. Such pairs of rays, and the accompanying impressions of color, are spoken of as complementary one to another. Thus blue and yellow, purplish red and green, are com- plementary. If we add purple to the spectrum series and represent this by a circle, we find that any two kinds of light standing opposite to one another or at the extremities of one diameter are thus complementary. Such complementary colors are commonly said to go well or to harmonize with one another. Muscular Sense. Over and above the five special senses, there is a sense of great importance in relation to knowledge known as the Muscular Sense. This con- sists of the sum of simple mental states or 'sensations' which immediately accompany the action of the muscles. These have well-marked characters of their own. The sensations which accompany an exercise of the vocal organ, a movement of the arm or leg, an effort to push a heavy body, have certain common traits, and these mark them off from all other special classes of sensation. Variety of Muscular Sensations. The sensations which accompany muscular action may be conveniently divided SENSE-IMPRESSIONS AND ATTENTION. 103 into two main varieties. Of these the most important are (a) sensations of movement or of unimpeded energy, and (b) sensations of strain or resistance, that is of ob- structed or impeded energy. The first are illustrated in the mental accompaniments of movements of the eyes or of the arms in empty space; the second are ex- emplified in the mental state which accompanies the act of pushing against a heavy object, or holding a heavy weight in the hand. This is the great difference of quality among our muscular sensations. Sense- Impressions and Attention. For the production of clear or distinct sensations, whether in respect of degree, quality or local color, it is not enough that the sense- organ be stimulated. The brain centres must react. Or to speak in psychological language, the mind must react in the form of attention. Only by this means will a sensation rise into the region of clear conscious- ness. Discrimination of Sensation. No impression is definite or clear unless it is picked out and distinguished from others. When we are inattentive, our minds may be receiving a mass of visual, tactual and other sensations which remain blurred and confused. The direction of attention to any one of them separates it from the ad- jacent crowd and gives distinctness to it. This fact may also be expressed by saying that it is ' differenced ' or discriminated. To have a clear sensation is to have a consciousness of its difference from other sensations accompanying it or immediately preceding it. As we have seen, the higher senses admit of much finer differ- 104 SENSATION". ences than the lower. In the case of hearing, two impressions when they immediately follow one another are finely distinguished. And impressions of touch and sight are similarly distinguished in succession by means of the mobility of the organs. Finally, in the case of touch and sight, two simultaneous impressions may be sharply bounded off one from the other by means of the discriminative local sensibility. Classing of Sense-impressions. A clear sensation involves not only a singling out of the impression from the pres- ent surroudings but a connecting of it by way of assim- ilation with past impressions. In order, for example, to have a definite sensation of a bitter taste, or of a blue color, the mind must instantly identify it with, assimi- late it to, past sensations of the same sort. This shows that clear sensations involve a germ of retentiveness. They take on a familiar or recognizable character owing to the persistence of traces of past similar sensations. This combination of traces of past sensations with a pres- ent one, which always happens in the case of the adult, is seen with special clearness in the case of faint impres- sions. A moment's reflection will tell us that a faint smell, or a feeble sound would not have the definiteness which it has, were it not reinforced by these traces of past impressions. Growth of Seme. There is an improvement of Sense as life advances. Although the child has the same sense-organs and the same fundamental modes of sensi- bility as the man, his sensations are more crude, vague, and ill-defined. The repeated exercise of the senses in t IMPROVEMENT OF THE SENSES. 105 connection with attention leads to the gradual differen- tiation of sense-impressions, and the rendering of them definite in their character. This growth of sense involves two things: (a) an increasing power of sense-discrimi- nation, and (b) a growth in the power of identifying impressions through the cumulation of ' traces.' In other words, our senses become more delicate or acute in distinguishing impressions, and more quick or keen in identifying them. Improvement of Sense-discrimination. As has been said, the discriminative is the more important side of sense. The infant's sensations at first run together, and are not distinguished. The first distinctions (next to that of the pleasurable and painful) are those of degree" or quantity. Thus, the impressions of light and darkness, of a bright and a dark surface, are distinguished before those of colors. As the senses are exercised, and traces of impressions stored up in the mind, discrimination im- proves. With respect both to degree and to quality, this improvement is gradual, beginning with the detec- tion of broad and striking contrasts, and proceeding to that of finer differences. Thus the contrast of loud and soft, of heavy and light is arrived at long before nice differences of loudness or weight. Similarly, the contrast of the reds with the blues is arrived at before the finer differences between the several sorts of red. In this way, the senses become more acute with exercise. It is found that practice in the experiments referred to above, for example, those which aim at measuring the limits of local discrimination, considerably increases the capa- bility of discrimination. 106 SENSATION". Differences of Sense-capacity. Striking differences of sense-capacity present themselves among different indi- viduals. These are of several kinds. Thus A may be superior to B in respect of absolute sensibility or the quickness of response to stimulus. The tendency to re- spond to a very weak stimulus, coupled with good retentive or identifying power, would constitute a sense quick or keen in the full meaning of the word. This may be illustrated by the case of an eye that detected a very faintly shining star. Again A and B may differ in the range of their sensibility as measured by the strength of stimulus to which the organ can respond. What is commonly called a ' sensitive ' person is one whose sense-organs cannot go on responding as the stimulus increases in strength, but become fatigued. From these differences, we must carefully separate inequalities in discriminative power. This is the truly intellectual side of sense-capacity. It is found to char- acterize the more educated and intellectual classes. It stands in no constant relation to the preceding differ- ences. A may be more quickly responsive to a stimulus than B, and may have a wider range of sensibility, and yet not be more discriminative. 1 These inequalities are partly native and connected with differences in the organs engaged. General dis- criminative power probably implies from the first a fine organization of the brain as a whole, whereas good special sensibility is connected rather with original structural excellence of the particular sense-organ con- cerned. On the other hand, not a small part of the iSee Mr. Galton's new work, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, Section ' Sensitivity,' and following. EXEECISE OF THE SENSES. 107 superiority of certain individuals (and races) over others in respect of discriminative sensibility is the result of exercise. This is strikingly illustrated in the exceptional delicacy attained by those who have occasion to employ a sense much more than other people. In this way, we account for the fine tactual sensibility of the blind, the delicate gustatory sensibility of wine or tea tasters, and so on. It must be remembered, however, that exercise does not improve capacity to the same extent in all cases. Capability of growth is one of the distinguishing features of individuals. Eefebences. A fairly complete account of the physiology of the Senses is contained in Prof. Bernstein's Five Senses of Man. A detailed classification of the Sensations is to be found in Prof. Bain's Compendium of Mental Science, or the larger work, Senses and Intellect (" Movement Sense and Instinct"). With this may be compared the resume of the facts of Sensation in M. Taine's work, On Intelligence, Pc. I., Book III. APPENDIX. SUGGESTIONS. 1. The following are the important terms used in the preced- ing chapter. By reference to the dictionary fix carefully in mind their general meaning, then study their special use by our author in the preceding chapter: sensation, sense-impressions, stimulation , in-carrying nerve, sensibility, medium of sensation, organic sensation, special sensibility, degree, quality, and duration of sensations, dis- crimination, traces of past sensations, and retentiveness. 2. Find out what is meant by the following assertion: ' All knowledge takes its rise in the senses.' Find out, if you can by careful study and inquiry, why such statements have given rise to bitterly contested disputes in the history of philosophy. 108 SENSATION. 3. Consider the following quotation, from. J. S. Mill, Logic, Bk. VI. , Chap. IV.: "It is usual, indeed, to speak of sensations as states of body, not of mind. But this is the common confusion, of giving one and the same name, to a phenomenon and to the approximate cause or conditions of the phenomenon. The immediate antece- dent of a sensation is a state of body, but the sensation itself is a state of mind." Is sensation a power of the mind or a power of the body ? Is it the eye that sees, or the mind ? Is it the ear that hears, or the mind ? 4. Ask yourself ' what goes on when a nerve is stimulated ? ' For example, the olfactory nerve by the odor of a rose. This is the answer of G. H. Lewes : "What takes place in the nervous system under stimulation and reaction is neither demonstrable to Sense, nor discernible by Intuition; it is, and will long remain, mere guess-work. This may seem a hard sentence to those who have been relying on the hypothesis of vibrations, wave-movements, chemical or electrical processes, cell-functions, seats of sensation, seats of emotion, seats of volition, seats of thought. But it is a sentence which will be confirmed by every one who has seriously investigated the evidence of such hypotheses." {The Study of Psychology, chap. XI.) 5. Study up, as far as possible, the physiology of the brain and nervous system. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. Are the senses powers of mind or of body ? How many senses are there ? How many sense-organs ? Why are they called the inlets of knowledge ? Why would the addition of a new sense add largely to our knowledge ? 2. Why can not sensation be denned ? What is meant by sensibility ? What is meant by the eye being the medium of sen- sation of sight ? 3. In what does all knowledge take its rise ? What kind of knowledge is the first knowledge of a young child ? What is the REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 109 relation of abstract knowledge to sense knowledge ? Which chapters in this work treat of the passage from a knowledge of sensible things to the knowledge of general terms ? 4. What is the distinction between the organic sense and the special senses ? What is meant by localizing a sensation ? 5. Name the special senses. What are the sense-organs cor- responding to each ? Into how many classes may our sensations be divided ? Which of our mental operations are preceded by a change of body ? 6. What is meant by a stimulus ? Which stimuli are appro- priate to the organ of sight ? Which to the organ of hearing ? To the organ of smell ? To the organs of touch ? To the organ of taste ? 7. What is meant by intensity of a sensation ? By the quality of a sense-impression ? By the duration of a sensation ? Show by examples that sensations differ in these three respects. 8. Name the senses in the order of their knowledge-giving power. Which of the senses enable us to participate in the knowledge contained in Language ? 9. What is meant by the ' brain-centers reacting ? ' State this phrase in psychological language. 10. What is meant by the discrimination of sensations ? Among which class of sensations is it possible to discriminate most sharply ? 11. Show how a 'clear sensation' involves past sensations. Show how they involve a germ of retentiveness. 12. Show what is meant by the differentiation of sense-impres- sions. Show how the power of discrimination is improved by the accumulation of past impressions. What connection has great discriminative power with high intellectuality ? CHAPTER VI. PERCEPTION. Sensation and Perception. Sensations, even when discriminated and classed, are not knowledge, but only its raw-material. They become elements of knowledge when the mind refers them to some region of space, that is to say, localizes or externalizes them. In its complete form, this external reference implies the attri- bution of an impression, as a quality, to a particular object situated somewhere in space; which object is regarded as external to, or distinct from the mind which perceives it. Thus we refer a sensation of sound of a certain kind to a particular direction in space, say to the right of us, and to a particular object, say to a bell, and in doing so we attribute the quality (or state) of sounding to this object. This process of localizing sensations and referring them to definite objects is known as Perception. Whenever we perceive a thing, we are thus attributing some sensation received to an object. To perceive an orange, for example, is to refer a number of sensations of light and shade and color to an object called an orange. The result of this process, that is to say, the completed psychical product, is called a Percept. It will at once be seen from this, that perception is much more of an act of mind than sensation. In sen- SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. Ill sation the mind is comparatively passive and recipient; in perception it not only attends to the sensation (or sensations), discriminating and identifying it, but passes from the impression to the object which it indicates or makes known. Intra-organic and Extra-organic reference of Sensations. All classes of sensations are in some way referred to external things or externalized. The lowest class, the organic sensations, are referred to a part of the organism itself, as when we localize a sensation of burning or tickling in a certain part of the skin. This may be called intra- organic reference of a sensation. It is known as the localization of sensation. In the case of the special senses, there is a further extra-organic reference, as when we say we taste sugar, smell a rose, hear a sound to the right of us, and so on. Here the mind does not attend to the sensation as such and localize it, or apprehend its seat, but passes from the subjective phenomenon, the sensation, to the object qualified by the sensation. What is commonly called Perception is this reference of impressions of light, sound, touch, etc., under the form of qualities, as brightness, hardness, to things external to, that is lying outside the organism. Perception the Invariable Accompaniment of Sensation, In adult life there never occurs a sensation which, provided it is discriminated from others, is not at once referred to an object in space. The reference may be more or less definite and complete. Thus a sound may be referred to a particular object, as a belfry, or only to some un- known object vaguely localized in space. But in a 112 PERCEPTION. perfect or imperfect form, such a reference always takes place. And it takes place so automatically (that is to say without any intention or wish on our part), and so instantaneously, that it is difficult for the student at first to distinguish the act of perception from the mere sensation. Perception the result of Acquisition. There is every reason to suppose that this simple act of referring im- pressions to things or objects in space is the result of a long process of acquisition or learning from experience. An infant in the first weeks of life betrays no signs of recognizing the bodily seat of his sensations of heat and cold, pressure, and so on. Nor does he show by an appropriate turning of the head that he perceives the direction of a sound, the impression of which he evi- dently receives. Perception is probably aided from the first by definite inherited tendencies; but it is only fully developed by the aid of individual experience. Perceptual Process Analyzed. When on hearing a par- ticular sound, we say, 'A bell is sounding in such or such a direction,' we discriminate and identify the sensation. This is obviously the first stage of the process. If we had never had an impression before similar to this in some respect, we could not now refer it to a particular portion of space or to a definite kind of object. The second stage, that of perception proper, involves the recalling of other sense-impressions besides that of the bell-sound. As will be shown more fully by and by, when we say (on the ground of an auditory sensation alone) * we hear a bell,' it is because in our past experi- PERCEPTION INVOLVES REPRESENTATION. 113 ence this particular sensation of hearing has become conjoined, co-ordinated, or associated with other unlike sensations, more particularly touch and sight sensations, passive and active. If we had never handled or seen a bell before, the present sensation would not be referred to such an object. The percept is thus the result of a process of grouping. It is a complex psychical phenom- enon, of which the parts or elements are sensations. It is to be noticed that this grouping of sense-elements involves a germ of representation. The tactual and visual sensations, answering to the feel and look of the bell, are not actually present when we hear it and recognize it by the sound. They are revived, recalled or repro- duced. In referring the impression of sound to the bell, we are mentally representing, picturing or imagining the look and feel of the bell. A part at least of our meaning in saying that we hear a bell in such a direction or at such a distance is that we know we might move in a particular way, say to the right, and come in view of, and into contact with, the bell, that is to say, renew these visual and tactual experiences. Hence, perception has been described as "a presentative representative process " ] It contains not only a presentative element, the actual sensation of the moment, but also a mass of representative elements, picturings of sights and touches. Definition of Perception. By aid of the foregoing brief analysis, we may define perception as follows. Percep- tion is a complex mental act or process, involving pre- iBy Mr. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., Part VIII., Chap. II., p. 513. H 1 1 4 PERCEPTION. sentative and representative elements. More particularly, perception is that process by which the mind, after discriminating and indentifying a sense-impression (simple or complex), supplements it by an accompani- ment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggre- gate of actual and revived sensations being solidified or ' integrated' into the form of a percept, that is, an apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an object now present in a particular locality or region of space. This definition may be accepted provisionally. We shall be better able to judge of its appropriateness after we have analyzed the perceptual process more fully. Touch and Sight as Sources of Knowledge. Touch and Sight are marked off from the other senses by having local discrimination and an accompaniment of muscular sensation. Owing to these circumstances, these two senses supply us with a wider and more varied know- ledge of objects than the other senses. In smelling a flower, I can only apprehend one aspect or quality of a thing, its odor: in looking at it, I instantly take in a number of aspects, as its color, shape, and size. The additional knowledge gained by means of local discrimination and movement is moreover of a most important kind. To begin with, what we mean by perception in its simplest form is externalizing or referring a sensation to a point in space. Now it is only touch and sight which give us any direct knowledge of space, the situation of objects with reference to one another and to ourselves. In hearing, as we shall see by and by, we find out the direction and distance of an THE SENSES SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 115 object (so far as we find them out at all) in a circuitous way. Again touch and sight directly make known to us the space-qualities of bodies, figure and size, and this they do by help of local discrimination supplemented by movement. With these ' geometrical ' or space proper- ties of bodies must be coupled the 'mechanical' or force properties, resistance under its several forms of hardness, weight, etc., as made known by active touch. These qualities are of much greater importance than those made known by the other senses, such as the taste or flavor of a substance and the sound or sonorousness of a body. We know more about an object when we hav T e ascertained its shape or size than when we have heard its sound. Tactual Perception. Although, as has been observed, we commonly mean by perception visual perception, touch (by which we mean active touch) must be regarded as an important channel of perception, especially in early life. As we have seen, we obtain by means of this sense the largest amount of important knowledge respecting objects. The bulk, figure, hardness, weight of a thing are directly known to touch. Hardness and weight are known only to this sense, and these qualities are obviously an important part of what we call material objects, or bodies. Hence, touch seems to bring us into the closest relation to external things. It is for all of us the sense to which we make appeal when we want to be certain of a thing being present. We call a thing, of whose reality we are sure, something ' tangible.' In order to understand what we can know of things 116 PERCEPTION. through touch alone, we must, of course, suppose sight away as in the case of the blind. Perception of Single Things and of a Number. At first there would be no clear discrimination between a single object and a number of objects. Continuous quantity or magnitude, and discrete quantity or number, would impress the child's mind in much the same way. The one perception would be gradually differentiated from the other by the recognition of certain marks. One and the same surface would allow of a continuous movement accompanied by touch, and of continuous simultaneous series of tactual sensation (when the hand was spread over it). A plurality of objects, as a row of bricks, would be distinguished by an interruption of the tactual sensation in the case of movement, and by the discon- tinuity of the series of sensations of contact in the case of the hand at rest. Perception of Moving Objects. Along with the percep- tions of space, and of one and many objects in space, the child would gain the perception of things as moving, or as changing their position. This would take place by following the moving object with the hand. The per- ception of ' objective,' as distinguished from ' subjective movement' (that is to say, of the movement of the object, and not simply of the hand), would be based on the persistence of one touch-sensation (as distinguished from a series of unlike ones, as in the case of moving the hand over a surface) ; and also ,on the recognition that the direction and velocity of the movement were determined for him but not by him. The full recogni- PERCEPTION OF TEMPERATURE. 117 tion of the movement as such, would only arise after the tactual space-perception had been developed. It would then be recognized as a movement in space, from one point to another. Perception of Temperature. By means of Touch, we obtain a knowledge not only of the situation of an object in space, its form and its magnitude, but also of other qualities. Of these, temperature is the simplest quality. By touching a stone, a piece of cloth, a human hand, and so on, a child distinguishes degrees of temper- ature and refers corresponding degrees of heat (or 1 cold ') to the objects. The knowledge of ' objective ' temperature, however, gained in this way, is very un- certain. Our sensations of temperature vary consider- ably according to the e subjective ' temperature, that is, the degree of heat of the part of the body which touches, or (more correctly) the relation of this to the temperature of the surface touched. We have continu- ally to verify our subjective impressions of temperature by comparing them with those of others, and by resort- ing to physical tests. Perception of Hardness and Softness. Of more import- ance than the knowledge of this secondary and highly variable quality is that of hardness and softness, elasticity and inelasticity, weight, and roughness and smoothness, in their varying degrees. The recognition of these qualities, unlike that of temperature, involves a variety of sensations. They are perceptions reached by way of Active Touch. Thus, it is plain that a child learns the several degrees of hardness of objects by exerting mus- 118 PERCEPTION. cular energy in pressing, squeezing, and pushing against them. In so doing, however, he receives touch-sensa- tions proper as well. The recognition of a certain de- gree of hardness or inelasticity is based on the relation between these experiences. If the substance is a soft one, as clay, the exertion of force is followed by little increase of sensation of pressure: it yields to the force, and there is a certain amount of movement. On the other hand, if the substance is a harder one, as wood, increase of exertion is followed by increase in the intensity of the sensation of pressure, and little if any movement. Perception of Weight. In like manner, the perception of weight involves experiences of Active Touch. 1 We usually estimate the weight of a substance by lifting it in the hand. The heavier the body, the greater will be the degree of nervous energy expended in sustaining it, and the greater the attendant tactual sensation of pressure. The co-operation of this last with muscular sensation is seen conspicuously in lifting a body by means of a string, when the difference of pres- sure makes itself felt by distinctly painful sensations of various intensities. Perception of Roughness and Smoothness of Surface. Lastly? we have the perception of roughness and smoothness of surface in their various degrees. The roughness of a i This is usually the case, though when the objects are not very heavy their weight may be appreciated by sensations of pressure alone, as when the hand is laid on the table and light weights placed on the hand. PERCEPTION OF SURFACE QUALITIES. 119 surface, as that of a piece of undressed stone, may be recognized to some extent by merely laying the out- spread hand on the surface. In this case, the percep- tion of roughness arises by means of the different inten- sities of the sensations of pressure received by way of different points of the hand, and definitely localized in these points. This experience at once suggests inequal- ities of surface, projecting and receding points. But the perception is much more distinct when the hand moves over the surface. In this case all the little un- evennesses are made known as impediments to move- ment. Such a rough surface offers resistance to movement, whereas the hand glides easily over a smooth surface as that of marble. It is to be observed that the essential nature of per- ception as a presentative-representative process is illus- trated even in these apparently direct perceptions. Thus after appreciating weight by active touch, the passive tactual experience will be enough to call up the corresponding muscular experience. Similarly, after gaining a complete perception of roughness or smooth- ness by the aid of movement, mere contact of the hand with the surface will suggest this fuller active experi- ence. Thus throughout, in respect of qualities like hardness, weight, etc., as well as of geometrical qualities (figure and magnitude), tactual perception involves an element of representation. Tactual Intuition of Things. By means of these several tactual perceptions, a blind child is able to obtain dis- tinct intuitions of things. Thus in handling a piece of iron, he has one group of sensations (of temperature, 120 PEECEPTION. weight, roughness, etc.), while in taking up a piece of wood, he has another group. The several sensations of each group must be first distinguished one from another, and the corresponding perceptions of definite qualities (smoothness, weight, etc.) arise in the mind; after this the group as a whole is distinguished from other groups. By ascertaining the shape, magnitude, weight, temperature, etc., of each individual object, and each kind of object, as an orange, a key, a blind child would acquire a wide grasp of its distinctive char- acters or qualities. The perception of the object as a thing persisting in space implies repeated tactual perceptions. Every time a blind child handles a particular object, as his toy-horse, his cat, and so on, he has the same aggregate of sensations or perceives the same assemblage of qualities. And it is this recurrence*of a perfectly similar group of tactual experiences which would supply him with a basis for the recognition of the thing as persisting, as remaining one and the same (whether or not in the same locality), A lesser amount of resemblance in the group of tactual experiences supplies the ground of recognizing a thing as one of a kind, as of an orange, or a book. Finally, in thus identifying the group of tactile prop- erties the child would apprehend the presence of a whole object with its other qualities not directly presented to sense at the moment. Thus in touching an orange, he would, by means of the complex of touch-experiences, identify the object as an orange, that is to say, an object with a particular taste; in touching a bell, he would similarly identify the object throughout, in respect of its sound as well as its tactile qualities. Observation of IMPORTANCE OF SIGHT. 121 the blind shows that these tactual intuitions of things are capable of being highly developed in respect of dis- criminative fineness and of rapidity. Tactual and Visual Perception. The above brief account of tactual perception may suffice to indicate its peculiar character. It is the most direct mode of apprehending things. The presentative element is large in proportion to the representative. On the other hand, it is limited in its range at any one moment. A blind child would only be able to seize with his mind directly at the same time a small portion of the external world, namely only such objects as were within his reach and capable of be- ing simultaneously touched. Visual perception stands in marked contrast to this direct but limited mode of apprehension. In normal circumstances, seeing is, as has been remarked, the dom- inant mode of perception. It greatly transcends touch- ing in the range of its grasp of external things. Thus in vision we apprehend objects not only near us, but at vast distances from us, such as the heavenly bodies. Again, by sight we are capable of apprehending in a single moment a wide group of objects in different directions and at different distances from us, that is to say a whole region of the external world. The full significance of sight is brought out by the modern theory of vision, named after its founder Bishop Berkeley, the Berkeleian. According to this view, this sense derives much of its apparently direct knowledge of external things from touch. That is to say, the visual perception of space is representative in that it gathers up and symbolizes the more direct tactual per- 122 PEKCEPTION. ception. This characteristic of vision, though often regarded as a defect, may be viewed as its peculiar excellence. It is only because it can thus embody and signify the results of active touch that sight is fitted to take the lead as the channel of perception. Perception of Space. Here, as in the case of touch, the local discriminative sensibility (of the retina) would not suffice to give us a knowledge of space. This must be supplemented by experiences of move- ment. Visual Intuition of Number. Closely connected with the development of the perception of things in space having figure and magnitude is the growth of the visual intui- tion of a multitude or multiplicity of things. A plural- ity of objects is recognized in the case of the eye, as in that of the hand, by the local separateness or discreteness of the impressions. This holds good whether we pass the eye over them or embrace them by a single glance. In vision we are able to take in in one view a considerable number of objects, seeing them together as a 4 collection or assemblage of things. Resume. Visual perception though an instantaneous automatic operation in mature life, is the result of a slow process of acquisition involving innumerable ex- periences in early life. It is probable that in connection with the inherited nervous organism, every child has an innate disposition to co-ordinate retinal sensations with those of ocular movement, and visual sensations as a whole with experiences of active touch. But individual ASSOCIATIONS OF SIGHT AND TOUCH. 123 experience is necessary for the development of these instinctive tendencies. A moment's thought will show that the experiences of early life must tend to bring about the closest pos- sible associations between sight and touch, and to favor that automatic interpretation of " visual language " which we find in later life. The child passes a great part of his waking life in handling objects, in walking to and from them, and at the same time looking at them and noting the changes of visual impression which accompany these movements. Thus in countless instances be notices the increase of the * apparent magnitude' of a body when he moves towards it: the dissimilarity of the two visual impressions received from a solid body while he is handling it, and so on. In this way, an inseparable coalescence of signs and significates takes place at a period of life too far back for any of us to recall it. "When this stage of automatic visual perception is reached, reference to touch in all cases is no longer necessary. Sight has completely absorbed the touch- elements, and is now independent. In the large majority of cases, we recognize distance, real magnitude, and solidity, without any appeal to movement and touch. Seeing has now become the habitual mode of perception. It is only in doubtful cases that we still go back to touch to test our visual perceptions. While, however, vision is thus in a manner based on tactual perception, it far surpasses this last in respect of discriminative fineness as well as in comprehensive range. Seeing is more than a translation of touch-knowledge into a new language, and more than a short-hand ab- 124 PERCEPTION. breviation of it. It adds much to this knowledge by reason of its more perfect separation and combination of its sense-elements. 1 Intuition of Things. In looking at an object, as in touching it, we apprehend simultaneously (or approxi- mately so) a group of qualities. These include its degree of brightness as a whole, the distribution of light and shade of its parts, its color (or distribution of colors), the form and magnitude of its surface, and its solid shape. These seemingly immediate intuitions involve, as we have found, tactual as well as visual elements. 2 This may be called the fundamental part of our intui- tion of a particular object. In looking at a new object, as a gem in a cabinet, we instantly intuit or take in this group of qualities, and they constitute a considerable amount of knowledge concerning the nature of the object as a whole. In proportion to the distinctness with which these qualities are discriminated both -severally (e. g., the color blue from violet, the oval form from the circular) and collectively (e. g., the aggregate of properties of one mineral or plant from that of another), will be the clearness and accuracy of our per- cejrtion of the thing as a whole. The recognition of any individual object, as a partic- ular toy or cat, or of one of a class of things, as an iA rough analogy is suggested by the phrase 'visual symbols.' Just as the use of symbols in mathematics and logic (owing to their very nature) helps us to reach ideal results which only remotely represent actual facts, so the addition of the visual symbols to tactual perception allows of a kind of idealizing of onr experience of active touch. 2 It may be remarked that the distribution of light and shade on the surface of an object as an orange, suggests not only the curvature of the surface, but its roughness or pittedness. IDENTIFYING OBJECTS. 125 orange, presupposes a repetition of this assemblage of qualities. In this case, the group is not ouly discrimi- nated bu identified. Thus ont seeing an orange, a child at once ' classes ' the aggregate of qualities (yellow color, roundness of form, etc.), with like groups, previously seen. Not only so, in thus classing a particular group of qualities (visual and tactual), a child takes up along with these other conjoined qualities. Thus, in recogniz- ing an object as an orange, he invests it more or less distinctly with a particular weight, temperature, taste, and smell. In this way, visual perception (embodying important tactual elements) suffices for the full appre- hension of an object clothed with its complete outfit of qualities. Identifying Objects. The recognition of a thing as identical with something previously perceived is a com- plex psychical process. It involves not only the identifica- tion of the group of impressions, but also the germ of a higher intellectual process, namely the comparison of successive impressions and the detection of similarity amid diversity or change. Thus a child learns to iden- tify a particular object, as his hat, or his dog, at differ- ent distances and under different lights (in bright sunlight, evening dusk, etc.). Of these changes of aspect, one of the most important is that due to the position of the object in relation to the spectator. The difference of impression in looking at a hat * end on,' or foreshortened, and from the side, or in having a front or side view of a face, is considerable. Children require a certain amount of experience aud practice before they 126 PERCEPTION. recognize identity amid such varying aspects. Finally, there are the changes which take place in the objects themselves, such as alterations of form due to accident, or to movements of certain parts, and of magnitude due to growth. It is not surprising, then, that the clear recognition of the identity of the individual objects belongs to a comparatively late period of child life. 1 Finally, it is to be observed that the identification of objects is greatly aided by the social environment and by language. A child learns to perceive and recog- nize objects in association with others. From the first the mother or nurse is pointing out objects to him; describing their characteristics, and naming them. By these interchanges of impressions and this social guid- ance, he learns that others see things as he sees them, that external things are common objects of perception. And by hearing them again and again called by the same name, he learns more quickly to regard them as the same.- Perception of our own Body. In close connection with the perception of external objects, the child comes to know the several parts of his own body. As has been said, sensations when not referred to external bodies are in adult life localized in some part of the organism. Thus all organic sensations, as skin-sensations of " creeping," burning, or tickling, are definitely localized in some i The recognition of a particular substance, as wood, iron, or glass, illustrates the mere process. The similarities of color, texture, and lus- tre, are detected amid differences of form. The assimilation of very unlike things, as oranges, grapes, etc., under the head of a wide class of objects, fruits, involves a higher exercise of the assimilative function to be illustrated by and by. BODILY OEGANISM AND SELF. 127 region of the arm, foot, and so on. Even in the per- ception of external objects, there is more or less distinct reference to the sense-organ concerned. In the act of hearing a sound, and even of seeing an object, we are vaguely aware of receiving the sensation by way of the ear or eye. In touching objects, this reference to the organ becomes much more distinct. In grasping a thing, as a spoon, a child is directly aware (by the local char- acters of his touch sensations and by muscular sensa- tions) of the locality or position on the surface of the hand of the several impressions received. The recogni- tion of the form and magnitude of the spoon is indeed based on this localizing of his sensations of touch in certain definitely represented portions of the hand. Bodily Organism and Self. To a child his bodily organ- ism is marked off from all other objects by the fact that it is connected in a peculiar way with his conscious life, and more particularly his feelings of pleasure and pain. The experience of touching his foot with his hand differs from that of touching a foreign body inasmuch as there is not only a sensation in the hand, but an addi- tional one in the foot. The contact of a soft or agree- able, or of a hard and painful substance with the skin is an (immediate) antecedent of a pleasurable or painful sensation. His pleasures and pains are largely bodily feelings. And these, whether due to external influences (as a blow or caress), or to internal changes {e.g., in the circulation or temperature), are always found to be connected with some part of the organism. Hence, his body is regarded as a part of himself, and in early life probably makes up the chief part of the meaning of the 128 PERCEPTION. word ' self.' It is contrasted with all other and foreign objects on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with all other like human organisms. The child has little power of abstraction and cannot, therefore, turn his attention inward or reflect on his own thoughts and feelings. What is known by the term 'in- ternal perception,' or 'reflection,' that is to say, the obser- vation of the mind's own states, is a comparatively late attainment. The young have, of course, some little knowledge of their feelings, but this is of a very vague character. The reason of this is that they cannot attend to their mental states in themselves and apart from the objects which excite them and the bodily organism with which they are connected. And the same is true of their knowledge of the feelings of others. Thus the antithesis of self and not-self, the internal mind and external things is imperfectly developed in the first years of life. The recognition of things as external, so far as a child attains to this knowledge at all, seems to imply outness in relation to the bodily orgauism. 1 A knowledge of externality iu the sense of detachment from and independence of percipient mind is only attained much later, in connection with that of the per- manence of objects; though, as we have seen, the child at an early period begins dimly to descry this relation. Perception and Observation. All perception requires some degree of attention to what is present. But we i In the case of all of us this reference to the bodily organism is always present. The very word ' externality ' implying relation in space points to this. The most abstract of philosophers never succeeds alto- gether in projecting his own body into the external world and regarding it as a part of the not-self. PERCEPTION AND OBSERVATION. 129 are often able to discriminate and recognize an object by a momentary glance which suffices to take in a few prominent marks. Similarly, we are able by a cursory glance to recognize a movement or action of an object. Such incomplete fugitive perception is ample for rough everyday purposes. On the other hand, we sometimes need to throw a special degree of mental activity into percep- tion so as to note completely and accurately what is present. This is particularly the case with new and unfamiliar objects. Such a careful direction of the mind to objects is known as Observation. To observe is to look at a thing closely, to take careful note of its several parts or details. It implies, too, a deliberate selection of an object or action for special consideration, a preparatory adjustment of the atten- tion, and an orderly going to work with a view to see exactly what takes place in the world about us. Hence, we may call observation regulated perception. 1 Distinctness and Accuracy of Observation. Good observa- tion consists in careful and minute attention to what is before us. Thus in order to observe nicely a particular flower or mineral, we must note all the individual char- acteristics, the less conspicuous as well as the more prominent. Similarly, if we wish to observe a pro- cess such as evaporation, or the movements of expression in a person's face, we must carefully seize all the steps of the operation. By such a close effort of attention, we give distinctness to our observations, and accurately i Observation commonly means a prolonged or extended act of atten- tion to things with a view to note the relations of objects to their sur- roundings, and of events to succeeding events. I 130 PERCEPTION. mark off what we are looking at from other and partially similar objects or processes with which they are liable to be confused. 1 It is to be added that accuracy of observation implies freedom from prepossession. We are apt to think we see what we strongly expect to see, and in this way we fall into illusory perception. To observe accurately is to put aside prepossession, to restrain the imagination, and to direct the mind with singleness of purpose to what is actually present to the senses, 2 Development of Perceptual Power. Our analysis of per- ception has suggested the way in which our percepts are gradually built up and perfected. In the first weeks of life, there is little if any recognition of outer things. Impressions are made on the child's mind, but at best, they are only vaguely referred to an external world. It is by the daily renewed conjunctions of simple sense- experiences that the little learner comes to refer any impression, when it occurs, to an object in space. Of these conjunctions the most important are those of touch and sight. By continually looking at the objects han- dled, the visual perception of direction becomes per- fected, as also that of distance within certain limits. The child learns to put out its hand in the exact direc- tion of an object, and to move it just far enough. 3 The i We often distinguish between a ' clear ' and a distinct perception. Thus we may see an object distinctly, in the sense tbat it is discriminated from its surroundings, without seeing it clearly, in the sense that it is well lit and so distinct in its parts or details. 2 On the nature and sources of illusory perception see the author's work, Illusions, Chapters III. -VI. 3 A child known to the present writer was first seen to stretch out his hand to an object when 2Y 2 months old. The hand misses the exact point at first, passing beside it, but practice gives precision to the move- DEVELOPMENT OF PEKCEPTION. 131 perception of the distance of more remote objects remains very imperfect before locomotion is attained. The change of visible scene, as the child is carried about the room, impresses him no doubt, but the meaning of these changes only becomes fully seized when he begins to walk about, and. so find out the amount of locomo- tive exertion answering to the different appearances of things. It is some years, however, before he begins to note the signs of distance in the case of remote objects. 1 After many conjunctions of impression, the child begins to find out the nature of objects and the visible aspects which are their most important marks. That is to say, he begins to discriminate objects one from another by means of sight alone, and to recognize them as they reappear to the eye. Sight now grows self-sufficient. What may be roughly marked off as the touching age gives place to the seeing age. Henceforth the growth of perception is mainly an improvement of the visual capability. At first this power of discerning the forms of objects with the eye is very limited. 2 The child notes one or ment. The same child at 6 months knew when an object was within reach. If a biscuit or other object was held out of his reach, he made do movement, but as soon as it was brought within his reach he instantly put out his hand to take it. On the other hand, Prof. Preyer says his boy tried to seize the lamp in the ceiling of a railway compartment when 58 weeks old {Die Seeh cles Kindes, p. 38) . i The same remark applies to the perception of solidity. A good many experiences of picture-books, etc., are necessary before a child distinguishes a flat surface from a solid body. 2 The first objects to be recognized are, of course, those of most inter- est to the child, that is to say, most directly connected with his pleasura- ble (or painful) sensations. Prof. Preyer says that of inanimate objects bottles were among the first which his child carefully observed and recog- nize. I {Die Seele ilea Kindes, p. 42). 132 PERCEPTION. two prominent and striking features of a thing but overlooks the others. Thus in looking at real animals, or at his toy or picture imitations, he will distinguish a quadruped from a bird, but not one quadruped from another. Similarly, he will distinguish a very big dog from a small one, but not one dog from another of sim- ilar size. The progress of perception grows with increase of visual discrimination, that is to say, of the capability of distinguishing one color, one direction of a line, and so on, from another. It presupposes further the growth of attention. As experience advances, the child finds it easier to note the characteristic aspect of things and to recognize them; and he takes more pleasure in detecting their differences and similarities. In this way his obser- vations tend gradually to improve in distinctness and in accuracy. Not only so, an increased power of atten- tion enables him to seize and embrace in a single view a number of details. In this way his first ' sketchy ' per- cepts get filled out. Thus a particular flower, or animal, is seen more completely in all its details of color, and its relations of form. At the same time, he acquires the power of apprehending larger and more complex objects, such as whole buildings or trees. Waitz remarks that the apprehension of forms by the child takes its start, not from the periphery or coutour of the object, but from some striking detail (e. g., the trunk of the elephant). Little by little he acquires the power of taking up into his view the other adjacent parts of the figure. Finally, by following the contour (in alternation with this simultaneous apprehension) he comes to grasp the whole form in its unity and its dis- TRAINING OF THE SENSES. 133 tinctness from its surroundings. {Allgemeine Pcedagogik, l er Theil, § 8, p. 108). 1 The observing powers may develop in different direc- tions according to special natural capabilities, or special circumstance. A particularly good color-sense, accom- panied by a lively interest in colors, will lead to a more careful observation of this aspect of things. Thus the painter will observe the delicate tints of objects of which others are hardly sensible. A naturalist has a keen eye for details of form which escape the common eye. Objects may thus be said to acquire a different content for different individuals according to the habitual direc- tion of their observing powers. And this applies not only to the perception of the visible aspects, but to that of others as well. Thus to a man accustomed to handle and so test the quality of woollen stuffs, the sight of these objects will convey more than they do to another who is without these experiences. The visual impression, which a piece of furniture makes on the mind of a car- penter, is supplemented by a peculiarly rich accumula- tion of tactual and muscular associations. The Training of the Senses. Clear sense-impressions the necessary condition of accurate knowledge. If the senses give us the materials of knowl- edge, the proper use of them constitutes an important element in the economy of mind. To exercise the i Progress in power of perception and observation may be roughly measured by the rapidity with which the forms of familiar objects are recognized, as in looking at drawings of animals, etc., at some distance: also the rapidity with which complex groups or numbers are distinctly apprehended; and the rapidity with which similar forms are distin- guished. 134 PERCEPTION. senses in the best way so as to accumulate the richest store of clear impressions, is the first step in the attain- ment of wide and accurate knowledge about the world in which we live. An eye uncultivated in a nice detec- tion of form, means a limitation of all after-knowledge. Imagination will be hazy, thought loose and inaccurate, where the preliminary stage of perception has been hur- ried over. The best modern theories of Education have grasped this truth, and tried to impress it on teachers* minds. Yet practice is, alas, far behind theory, and teachers make haste to build up the fabric of ideas in the young mind without troubling about a solid, firm foundation of sense-knowledge. Sense-knowledge a matter of personal experience. The exer- cise of the senses implies the voluntary direction of attention on the part of the child to what is present. Sense-knowledge is gained by the young mind coming into contact with things immediately, and not mediately by the intervention of another mind. Hence, the func- tion of the teacher in this first stage of the growth of knowledge is a limited one. A good part of the exercise of the senses in early life goes on, and it is fortunate that it does so, with very little help from mother or nurse. 1 The child's own activity, if he is healthy and robust, will urge him to use his eyes, his hands, and other organs in exploring things about him. Nevertheless a good deal may be done indirectly to help on this process of acquisition. The mother has the i Of course a good deal is done undesignedly in training the senses of the child. Thus he tends from the first to follow the lead of others, to in- spect what they are looking at and talking about. EXEECISE OF THE SENSES. 135 control of the child's surroundings, and may do much to hasten or retard the development of sense-knowledge by a wise attention to them or an indolent neglect of them. To supply children from the first with suitable materials for the exercise of their sense-organs, more especially those of touch and sight, is the first and prob- ably most important part of what is meant by training the senses, at least in very early life. Next to this comes the more direct co-operation of mother, nurse, or teacher in directing their attention to unobserved points in objects, and in arousing interest in things by appeal- ing to the impulses of curiosity, and so on. It may be added that a large part of the gain of such co-operation is realized independently of any methodic procedure. There are no rules of good observation which would enable one to teach it as an art. A child will profit more by daily companion ship with an acute observer, be he teacher or playfellow, than by all systematic attempts to train the senses. A boy privileged to be the companion of his naturalist father in his daily walks will insensibly fall into the way of attending to the phe- nomena of nature, of being on the look-out for things. Intuitional instruction should precede formal school instruc- tion. The training of the senses ought to begin very early in life, and a good part of it should be got over before the child comes under the more systematic disci- pline of the schools. In the nursery he should have his discriminative sensibility exercised by the supply of a sufficient number and variety of sense-impressions. Thus a number of colored objects should be placed before him, so that he may gradually distinguish shades of 136 PEKCEPTKW. color. The differences must first be wide and striking, smaller ones being introduced as the discriminative power of the sense advances. And here the mother will do well to bring the colors to be distinguished into juxtaposition, so that the attention may easily pass from one to the other, and the differences be carefully marked. 1 With variety should go a certain repetition of previous impressions, so that they may become fa- miliar and be easily identified. All the senses should be exercised according to their relative importance. And this means that the child should be allowed the utmost possible liberty of action in handling things, examining their surface, their internal structure, and so on, and also in moving about so as to bring the muscu- lar sense into full exercise. As we have seen, an im- portant part of the knowledge of material objects is directly gained through the exercise of the muscles. The young child delights to exercise his, and finds a large part of his pleasure in investigating by his own active experiments the qualities of bodies. Not only so, the very play of the child may be turned to good account in furthering sense-knowledge. There is no toy he tires of less rapidly than a box of bricks. And the manipulating of these with a view to construction, is au excellent means of ascertaining the form of objects. By thus supplying food for his active impulses as well as his senses, we are putting the child in the way of co-ordinating his experiences of movement and touch on the one hand, and of sight on the other, and i A special chart of colors suitable to the education of the eye has been published by H. Magnus, of Breslau, under the title, Tafel zur Er- ziehung des Farbensinnes. CONCENTRATION NECESSARY. 137 so of arriving at a rapid automatic recognition of things by sight alone. As has been said, sight takes the lead in observation, and when once the visual signs of posi- tion, solid figure, and magnitude and nature of surface have been learnt, the training of the observing powers will consist mainly in exercising vision. Too great variety of sense-impressions harmful. Objects must be brought before the child's eye in sufficient vari- ety, so that the stimulus of change and novelty may be introduced, and the power of readily discriminating one thing from another may be strengthened. On the other hand, there must be a certain measure of perma- nence in the young inquirer's environment, in order that the deeper sort of curiosity may be awakened, the observation of things grow in depth, and the power of rapidly identifying objects be exercised. A young child may easily have a redundance of good things in the shape of new toys, new picture-books, etc. In like manner, he may easily be taken about too much and shown too many sights. A habit of close inspection presupposes a certain measure of familiarity with things, and a certain depth of interest which only comes of daily companionship with them. The School training of the Senses. The school may be made a field of exercise for the senses in a number of ways. In the regulated play of the Kindergarten, the senses are rightly the thing most attended to. Frcebel has built on solid psychological ground in maintaining that knowledge and activity are closely related; that the child's spontaneous activity is the force that sets the 138 PERCEPTION. mechanism of the senses in movement; that perception includes the employment not only of the eye but of the hand; and that a nice perception of form is only gained in [connection with the device of manual reproduction. The well-known active employments of paper-folding, stick-building, and better still, modelling, train the sense of form by compelling a close attention to it in a way that no mere presentation of an object to passive con- templation could do. 1 Nor is this all: the execution of. the required manual movements in all such simple con- structive employments helps to bring out more promi- nently the correspondence between the visual and tactual experiences concerned in the perceptions of form. 'The same line of remark applies too to drawing. An experi- enced draugetsman reads more than another man into the forms submitted to his eye. The eye should be trained to a fine perception of form. The vast importance of a fine perception of form may sug- gest that every child should undergo a systematic train- ing of the eye in this particular. Such training would, of course, begin in the nursery by presenting a variety of concrete forms to the child's notice, as those of ani- mals, plants, etc. Striking differences, as that between an elm and a cedar, would be at first selected, and then finer differences, as that between an oak and a beech, introduced. Uncolored drawings, supplementing the objects themselves or models, would be useful here, as removing the more interesting feature of color. After a sufficient amount of exercise in discriminating concrete i In the same way the color-sense is best trained by painting, the sense of pitch in sound by singing. INTUITIONAL INSTRUCTION. 139 forms, and when the powers of attention were strong enough, the more abstract considerations of form by observing the less striking form-elements should he en- couraged. Lines, curves, and their simpler combinations would now be learnt. Finally, this synthetic treatment of form should go on hand in hand with an analytic treatment of concrete forms of objects. The pupil should be led on to discover the vertical line, the spiral curve, the triangular figure, etc., in natural or artificial objects, as the tree-stem, the coiling vine tendril, the house-gable. In this way, the perception of concrete forms would grow in distinctness. 1 In every study the first thing is an appeal to the faculty of intuition. An appeal to children's own observation is now rightly resorted to as much as possible in every branch of instruction. The teaching of Natural Sci- ence sets out with the object lesson, which in its simplest form is a mere exercise of the pupils' observing powers in noting the properties of a thing. Whatever the dif- ficulties of the object lesson, nobody really doubts that a large amount of valuable knowledge about simple sub- stances, as chalk and coal, natural forms, as those of plants and animals, as well as art products, can be given to a number of children in this way. This first- hand knowledge of things through personal inspection is worth far more than any second-hand account of them by description. Hence the desirability of using models and maps in teaching geography, of pictures in teach- ing history, and of such an apparatus as Mr. Sonnen- 1 Mr. Spencer insists on beginning with concrete forms, even in teach- ing the child to draw, Education, Chap. II., p. 80. 140 PERCEPTION. schein's in teaching the elements of number. Yet while the senses may thus be appealed to in almost any branch of instruction, they are far more concerned in some departments than in others. It is now generally admitted that the careful and thorough study of one or more of the natural sciences supplies the most efficient training in sense-observation. It is plain, for example, that a wide observation of the characters of plants, as required by botany, must tend greatly to sharpen the sense of color and form. References. For a fuller account of the way in which we learn to localize impres- sions and perceive objects, the reader is referred to Prof. Bain's Senses ■and Intellect, under ' Sense of Touch,' Sect. 13, etc. ; under ' Sense of Sight,' Sect. 12, etc.; and later, under 'Intellect,' Sect. 33, etc.; also to the excellent analysis in Mr. H. Spencer's Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., Pt. VL, Chaps. IX. to XVIII. With these may be compared M. Taine's interesting chapter on External Perception and the Education of the Senses, On Intelligence, Pt. II., Bk. II., Chap. II. On the practical side of the subject, the training of the Senses, the reader will do well to consult Mr. Spencer's Essay on Education, Chap. II., and Miss Youmann's little work on the Culture of the Observing Pow- ers of Children. The difficult subject of the Object Lesson is dealt within a suggestive way by Dr. Bain, Education as a Science, Chap. VIII., p. 247, etc. ; and by Mr. Calkins, New Primary Object Lessons (Harper & Broth- ers), p. 359, etc. APPENDIX. SUGGESTIONS. 1. By reference to the preceding chapter and to the una- bridged dictionary, fix in mind the meaning of each of the following terms: Sensation, Perception, Percept; discrimination EDUCATION OF THE SENSES. 141 of sensations, identification of sensations, localization of sensa- tions, reference of sensations to outward objects. 2. Do not forget how important is the use of the dictionary- while reading. Even learned scholars, trained in the strictest schools of thought, do not omit this. Fix, therefore, thoroughly in mind the meaning and use of all the important terms in each chapter: you will notice each new discussion introduces its own peculiar words, and only by a careful mental effort will they reveal to you their full content of knowledge. Note what the author says of the perils of empty words, in Chapter IX. 3. To your definitions of each one of the important words mentioned above, affix in thought an example; remember a term is only known when we can illustrate its application. 4. Consider carefully how perception is related to sensation. Which comes first in the order of experience ? Are they both matters of gradual acquisition ? Can you distinguish clearly any given sensation from the accompanying act of perception ? On the question of the gradual acquisition, in the early stages of ex- perience, of the powers of sensation and perception, note the fol- lowing quotation, from G. H. Lewes {Biographical History of Philosophy, p. 525): "Our senses have to be educated, i. e., to be drawn out, de- veloped. We have to learn to see, to hear, and to touch. Light strikes upon the infant retina, waves of air pulsate on the infant tympanum: but these as yet produce neither sight nor hearing: they are only the preparations for sight and hearing. Many hun- dred repetitions are necessary before what we call a sensation (that is, a distinct feeling corresponding to that which the object will always produce upon the developed sense). Many sensa- tions are necessary to produce a perception : a perception is a cluster of sensations with an ideal element added." 5. Show that any sensation, as the sound of a bell, recalls other sense-impressions, and in its completed form becomes a perception. 6. Consider carefully the completed provisional definition of perception. What is meant by perception being a ' presentative- representative process?' 142 PERCEPTION. 7. One very important term introduced in this chapter is Intuition. By the faculty of intuition is to be understood the power the mind has of getting knowledge in the immediate pres- ence of the object of thought. Intuitions are sense-knowledges: intuitions form the basis of the whole superstructure of knowl- edge. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. What is meant by saying that a percept is a psychical pro- duct ? What is meant by perceiving an orange ? Which is the more subjective, the act of sensation or the act of perception? Which is a testimony to the existence of the me? Which to the not-me ? 2. Give an example of intra organic reference of sensations: of extra-organic reference. In the case of the special senses which is the more attended to — the subjective sensation or the reference of the sensation to some object ? What is the relation between the sensations and the qualities of the object which gives Tise to the sensations ? 3. Into what two stages can the process of perception be analyzed ? Describe the first stage ; the second stage. Show that in the second stage, there is a representative element ? What is represented ? By what is represented ? Give examples. 4. Which of the special senses are pre-eminent as knowl- edge-giving senses ? What is meant by Touch and Sight having a 'local discrimination?' By having an 'accompaniment of muscular sensation ? ' Illustrate. 5. What sensations give rise to the perception of plurality; of temperature; of elasticity; of roughness; of weight? 6. What perceptions are involved in the intuition of a globe? Which sensations represent or recall others ? What qualities not present to sense at the moment would be involved in the per- ception ? 7. Show that looking at an object we apprehend, at once, a group of qualities. Does this immediate sight-intuition involve any tactual elements ? By what are they suggested ? Show that in such cases there is a reference of the object to a class. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 143 8. What kind of a psychical process is the identifying of one object of perception with its perception at a previous time ? Illustrate. 9. What is the distinction between perception and observation ? What is meant by saying that observation is regulated perception? What is meant by distinctness of observation ? What state of mind is implied in accurate observation ? 10. Trace the way in which, in a young child, his percepts are gradually built up. 11. Why is the proper training of the senses so important in education ? What will be the educational result of hazy and imperfect perceptions ? 12. What is the result of communicating ideas before the corresponding perceptions have been developed ? What is the value of Pestalozzi's great principle of From Intuition to Notion? What is meant by notion in this sense of the word ? 13. Which of the two kinds of knowledge — Immediate or Mediate — Presentative or Representative — is given directly by the senses ? What degree of Attention is desirable in sense-obser- tion ? 14. What are the proper materials for the exercise of the senses ? What are the direct perceptions — the intuitions, which fit a student to understand a description of natural scenery ? What are the intuitions necessary to the comprehension of geography as a science ? To the understanding of the language of geome- try ? Why should there be in every study, in the preliminary stage, an appeal to the senses ? APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO TEACHING. 1. The dictum of Psychology that ' All Knowledge takes its rise in the Senses,' gives rise to several important doctrines in Pedagogics. To illustrate : a. Impressions or sensations being incapable of resolution Into anything simpler than themselves are the fundamental ele- 144 PERCEPTION. ments of all knowledge. The development of mind begins with the reception of sensations. — Joseph Payne. b. All our knowledge of the material world is derived through the senses. — Tate. c. Through sensation the immaterial (mind) comes into con- tact with the material, and springs (through its own inherent energies) into all the various forms of developed intelligence. Without sensation, the mind could not germinate; and without the reflex power, which the mind exercises over these sensations, intelligence could not exist. — Tate. d. Development begins with the perceptions of sense. e. Pestalozzianism is education to spontaneous activity, by means of knowledge acquired by the perceptions. — Diester- weg. 2. The consideration of the nature of the process of percep- tion, and the doctrine of the complex character of our visual in- tuitions of things suggest the importance of what is called intu- itional instruction, i. e., that fundamental exercise of the senses which, alone, can give a basis to instruction through language. Some of the pedagogical doctrines and maxims are as follows: a. Intuition is the power the mind has of getting immediate knowledge, i. e., directly from the object of knowledge, whether that object be thing, act, or state of mind. — Mansel. b. It is to be noted that the term intuitions includes all direct experiences gained through the senses, and through the power of self-consciousness revealing to us all the phases of our inner experience. The faculty of intuition, then, includes the Special Senses and self-consciousness. Intuitional instruction is instruction in seeing, hearing, etc., and in the inner perceptions, i. e., of space, time, number, motion, duty, reverence, beauty, love, friendship, fidelity, etc. c. The faculty of Intuition has two sides ; one is turned toward the outer, and the other toward the inner world of mind. The former is first unfolded, and leads to the development of the latter. Hence, the child in school, as in the natural world, must open his senses to outward impressions, in order that the quali- 145 ties and objects of the outward world may be reflected in pictures upon his mental retina, and become to inner intuitions the foundation of all later mental culture. — Diesterweg. d. The faculty of intuition is the basis of all intellectual cult- ure. — DlESTERWEG. e. All the materials of perfect intelligence exist in the pri- mary or primitive intuitions, but they have to be reduced to defi- nite forms and consistent combinations. — Tate. /. Our intuitive perceptions are, of all our forms of intelli- gence, the most vivid and comprehensive. They give us all the elements of our subsequent knowledge, not in signs, or abstract representations, but immediately in our self-consciousness. — Tate. g. But what are books ? They, in themselves, furnish nothing more than a guidance to the treatment of the intuitions. Where, then, are the intuitions themselves ? These are, not in lifeless books, but only in life. To this, then, must we refer the teacher. Look into life, into nature, into society, into the world of small and great men, into yourself; ' keep your eyes open ! ' — DlESTERWEG. h. From Intuition to Notion. This is declared by Pntf C. W. Bennett to be the ground principle of the whole philosoph- ical system of Pestalozzi. 3. The psychologic dicta that ' all perception requires some degree of attention,' that 'observation implies a deliberate selec- tion of an object or action for special consideration, a preparatory adjustment of the attention, and an orderly going to work to see exactly what takes place in the world about us,' give rise to several maxims and rules. The following may be instanced : a. The child, then, must be made to observe accurately, and to reflect on its observations. — Quick. o. Unfolded is the world only to the observing mind ; the only avenues to the mind are the Senses. — Feuerbach. c. Therefore, whenever it is possible, there should first be observation of life and nature, and afterwards reflection till every 146 PERCEPTION. perception is brought into the realm of a clear consciousness. — Dies- TERWEG. d. No perception without attention. — Carpenter. e. The entire course of observation must be accompanied with suggestion, question, and information by the teacher. Mere sensation will not of itself lead to the result we aim at; a sense may continue sluggish, where circumstances present the most abundant materials for its exercise — Currie. /. The teacher's art consists mainly in the depth of emotion, of which he can make the child conscious in the act of percep- tion; and the surest test of his success is the unsolicited obser- vation by the pupil of the qualities of things which may not be the immediate subject of the lesson, or, which may not be in school at all. — Currie. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. On all knowledge acquired by sensation and observation, see Quick on Pestalozzianism, Educational Reformers, p. 188; for Comenius on knowledge of things to be communicated together with the knowledge of words, see the same, p. 60; for Rousseau on perfecting the senses first, see the same, p. 109 ; and for Locke's similar view, see p. 95. 2. On the exercise of the senses as not mere use of the senses, but learning, judging, and knowing through them, see Rousseau quoted, Quick, p. 112; on perception as the first stage of intelli- gence, see Tate, Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. III., under Primitive Intelligence, p. 69; on nature's education of a child through his perceptions, see Payne, Science and Art of Ed- ucation, Lectures, p. 29; for Dr. John Brown, on necessity of knowledge as self-experience, see the same, p. 39; and on an appeal to the senses, as the first thing in instruction, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., Principle VI., p. 114. 3. On observation as a compound faculty, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., nnder Classification of the Intellectual Faculties, p. 79; on the order of observation, memory, reflection, and speech, see PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 147 Quick, pp. 30 and 188; on reflection as following accurate obser- vation, see the same references; on the need of a systematic cul- tivation of the perceptions, see Spencer's Education, p. 138; on the way to the understanding through the senses, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, p. 193; and on the unseen as imaged to the mind only through the seen, see Parker, Talks on Teaching, p. 127. 4. On Pestalozzi's object-lessons, see Quick, p. 190; on the proper conduct of object-lessons, see Spencer, p. 136, and Tate, Part I., chap. IV., Principle VI., p. 118; for Rousseau's view on this, see Quick, p. 109 ; for Comenius', p. 60, and for Basedow's, p. 145; on the mother's object-lessons, see Spencer, p. 133. 5. On the knowledge of external things to be taught by com- parison and contrast, see Tate, as last referred to, p. 116; on things at first not so much objects of thought as of feeling and sentiment, see the same authority, Part I., chap. III., p. 80; on Froebel and the Kindergarten, in relation to development of per- ceptive faculties, see Payne, Fmbel and the Kindergarten, Lec- tures, p. 264, also Fitch, p. 195 and 199; on what children learn at their games, see Tate, Part I., chap. IV., under Infant School System, p. 138, 6. On the claims of natural sciences to a place in the school curriculum, see Fitch, p. 396, Spencer, p. 85, and the following: also Payne, True Foundation of Science-teaching, Lectures, p. 211 ; and for a careful criticism of Mr. Spencer's argument for the sci- ences, see Quick, p. 231. CHAPTER VII. REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION (MEMORY). After-effects of Perception. Perception is the great primal source of knowledge. But the act of perception is momentary, and there would be no enduring knowl- edge of things if we were limited to sense-cognition. The existence of such lasting knowledge depends on the fact that the impression made on the mind in the act of perception persists after the removal of the object. 1 In other words, the percept is in a manner retainable. The form in which it appears after the removal of the object is known as a mental image or representative image. 2 Every vivid and distinct impression begets a mental image, properly so called, which endures for a much longer period. Thus after seeing a friend, the image of his face lingers in consciousness awhile, and contin- ues for some time to revert of itself as soon as other i * Percept ' and ' impression ' are used much in the same sense in reference to this after-effect. 2 The term image in psychology points to a double distinction. On the one hand, it is representative whereas a percept is presentative (or largely so); on the other side, it is a representation of a concrete object, or a mental picture, and is thus distinguished from a concept or general notion which typifies a class of things. The term ' idea ' is commonly used to in- clude both images and concepts, marking off the whole region of the representative from the presentative. But like the term notion, it tends now to be confined to concepts. WHAT IS MEANT BY IMAGINATION. 149 objects of attention are removed. This temporary image may be observed to become little by little blurred and indistinct. There is thus a gradual subsidence or dying away of percepts. Persistence and Revival of Impressions. This temporary * echo ' of impressions is, however, of little account for knowledge. When we talk of picturing or mentally representing an object, we imply a mental capability of having permanent images, as distinguished from the temporary ones just spoken of. That is to say, we sup- pose an ability to recall, revive or recover a past impres- sion after an interval. All such revival of percepts is known in Mental Science as Imagination. Thus we imagine when we call up a mental picture of a person's face or of a particular church, when we recall some par- ticular word, or the taste of a certain fruit. Since vis- ual perceptions constitute the most important kind of sense-knowledge, visual images form the chief part of our mental representations. Hence the employment in psychology of the term ' image ' for all varieties of representation. Speaking generally, we may say that the revival of an impression is more perfect soon after its actual occur- rence, and becomes less perfect as the interval increases. We can commonly recall with ease, and in a consider- able degree of distinctness, a face or a tune that im- pressed us a few days before, though after the lapse of a month or six months, the mind loses its hold on the impression. Images may be said (roughly) to lose in vividness and distinctness in proportion to the remote- ness of the corresponding percepts. 150 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Reproductive Imagination. The simplest kind of imagi- nation is that in which the several parts of the repre- sentation follow the order of perception. This is known as Reproductive Imagination. What is commonly understood by Memory, that is to say the recalling of particular impressions and pieces of knowledge (as dis- tinguished from the retention of general truths) thus falls under the head of reproductive imagination, Another variety of imagination which answers more closely to the popular use of the term will be discussed in the next chapter. Retention and Reproduction. It is customary to distin- guish the stage intervening between the perception and the representation as that of Retention or Conservation; and the process of representation itself as that of Re- production. Impressions, it is commonly said, must be laid up in * the store-house,' or the \ pigeon-holes ' of the mind before they can be brought forth and made use of by the reproductive faculty. 1 It is a point of dispute as to what the retention as distinguished from the repro- duction, of an impression involves. Without discussing this question, we may distinguish retention from actual representation as the capability of representing. If a child retains an impression for a week, this implies that he has been capable of representing it at any time dur- ing this interval. Images how distinguished from Percepts. We have no difficulty in general in distinguishing between an actual i For an account of the various ways of conceiving and describing the fact of retention, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. XXX. IMAGES INVOLVED IN PERCEPTS. 151 perception and an imagination of a thing. We instantly feel the difference between looking at an objects as a horse, and forming a mental picture of it when it is absent. We roughly define the difference by saying that the image is the copy of the percept, that it is less vivid, and less distinct in its parts. Images involved in Percepts. Just as in mature life we rarely or never have a sensation without some admixture of the representative element which constitutes it a per- cept, so we rarely, if ever, have a percept in which an image is not embodied. Since to recognize an object is to identify it with some object previously seen, it is plain that all recognition involves the co-operation of an image, the product of the previous act of perception. When a child sees a familiar person, as his nurse, the percept is overlaid with a whole series of images. That is to say, there coalesce with the percept the residua or traces of previous percepts. Such a nascent, undeveloped state of an image must, however, be distinguished from an image proper, that is to say, one distinct and fully developed. We are often able to identify an object, as a face, when we ac- tually see it, without having any corresponding power of imaging it when it is absent. A dog will recognize his master after years of separation, but it is doubtful whether he could distinctly picture his appearance in his absence. The power of identifying objects is independ- ent of the power of picturing them, and is often found in great perfection where the latter is very im- perfect. 152 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Distinctness of Images. The chief merit or excellence of a representative image consists in its distinctness or clearness. By this is commonly meant that the image be definite and not vague, that the several parts or fea- tures of the object be distinctly pictured in their rela- tions one to another. Thus we have a distinct image of a person's face when we call up its several features, as the outline or contour of the whole, the shape of the mouth, and the color of the eyes. On the other hand, the image is spoken of as indistinct, obscure, or vague, when instead of all the details or lineaments of the ob- ject being pictured with sharp definition, only a few are represented, or when the details are pictured in a vague or hazy manner, as in the case of a blurred or half- effaced portrait. Closely connected with the distinctness of images as just defined, is their distinctness in relation to other im- ages. The expression, " a distinct mental picture," seems often to imply detachment from other pictures. Thus we are said to represent a face " distinctly " when we do not confuse it with another face. Our mental imagery shows all degrees of distinctness. Many of our representations are vague, blurred, and in- distinct, and as a consequence tend to be confused one with another. Befiniteness and Accuracy of Images. From the distinct- ness of an image we must, carefully distinguish its accuracy. By this is meant its fidelity as a copy, or its perfect correspondence with the original, the percept. Want of distinctness commonly leads to inaccuracy, if CONDITIONS OF [REPRODUCTION. 153 in no other way, in that of deficiency. But what we ordinarily mean by an inaccurate image includes more than this. It implies the importation of some foreign element into the structure of the image. Thus we have an inaccurate image of a face, when we ascribe a wrong color to the eyes, etc. It is probable that all images tend to become inaccurate, by way not only of loss, but of confusion, of elements, with the lapse of time. It is to be added that though there is confusion here, there need be no sense of confusion as there is in what we commonly call a ' confused image.' Conditions of Reproduction. The capability of represent- ing an object or event some time after it has been perceived depends on two conditions. In the first place, the impression must be stamped on the mind with a certain degree of force. This circumstance may be called the depth of the impression. In the second place, there is needed, in ordinary cases, the presence of something to remind us of the object or to suggest it to our minds. This second circumstance is known as the force of association. (a) Depth of Impression : Attention and Retention. In the first place, then (assuming that there has been only one impression), we may say that a distinct image presup- poses a certain force and distinctness of the impression. A loud sound will, in general, be recalled better than a faint one; a bright object distinctly seen, better than a dull one obscurely seen. For this reason, actual im- pressions are in general much better recalled than pro- ducts of imagination. We recall the appearance of a 154 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. place we have actually seen better than one that has been described to us. The habit of repeating words audibly when we want to remember them is based on this principle. Again, the permanence of an impression is determined not merely by its external character, but by the attitude of the mind in relation to it. If our minds are preoccu- pied, a brilliant object may fail to make a lasting impression. Hence we have to add that the permanence of an impression depends on the degree of interest excited by the object and the corresponding vigor of the act of attention. Where a boy is deeply interested, as in watching a cricket match, he remembers distinctly. Such interest and direction of attention ensure a clear discrimination of the object, both in its several parts or details, and as a whole. And it is on the fineness of the discriminative process that retention appears directly to depend. The interest determining the force of attention may, as we have seen, arise directly out of some aspect of the object, as its novelty, beauty, its suggestiveness, and so on. A pleasurable feeling springing up in the very process of perception is the best guarantee of close at- tention and fine discrimination. 1 The events of early childhood which are permanently retained commonly show an accompaniment of strong feeling (wonder, delight, awe, and so forth). Where this powerful in- i This is true within limits only, for, as has been remarked above, strong emotional excitement is unfavorable to nice discrimination . Power- ful feeling seems to stamp impressions on the mind simply by the added strength it gives to attention, and independently of the degree of intel- lectual (discriminative) activity called forth. Such a state of mind would be favorable to subsequent vividness of reproduction. EFFECTS OF REPETITION. 155 trinsic interest is wanting a vigorous effort of voluntary- attention may bring about a permanent retention. But this is hardly as effective as the first. We find it hard to retain an impression, however closely we attend to it, if it fails to arouse some degree of pleasurable interest. Finally, it is to be observed that our minds are not always equally susceptible to this process of stamping in impressions. Much will depend on the degree of mental vigor and brain vigor at the time. A fresh condition of the brain is an important element in the retention of impressions. Repetition and Retention. We have just assumed that the object or event represented has been perceived but once only. But a single impression rarely suffices for a lasting representation. Every impression tends to lose its effect after a time. The surviving image grows faint and indistinct unless it be re-invigorated by new impres- sions. Most of the events of life are forgotton just because they never recur in precisely the same form. The bulk of our mental imagery answers to objects which we see again and again, and events which repeatedly occur. Here then, we have a second circumstance determining the depth of an impression. The more frequently an impression is repeated the more enduring will be the image. Where the repetition of the actual impression is impossible, the repeated reproduction of it serves less effectually to bring about the same result. We are able to remember permanently a few events of early life by going back to them from time to time and so freshening the images of them. 156 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION". Frequency of Repetition. It is important to add that it is not the mere number of repetitions which determines the final depth of the impression; it is the frequency of the repetitions. As has been remarked, every im- pression loses its effect after an interval. In order then that a second impression A 2 should add something to the effect of the first A l5 it must occur before this interval has expired. Only in this way can there be a cumula- tive effect. In learning a new language, we may look up in a dictionary an uncommon or rarely occurring word, and a common or a frequently recurring word exactly the same number of times, and at the end retain the latter but not the former. The process may be likened to that of damming a stream with stones. If we throw in the stones with sufficient rapidity, we may suc- ceed in fixing a barrier. But if we throw in one to-day, and another to-morrow, the effect of the first throw will be obliterated by the force of the stream before the sec- ond is added. These two conditions, a certain amount of attention and a certain frequency of repetition, are both necessary to permanent retention. As we have just seen, repeti- tion is commonly needed to supplement attention. And on the other hand, mere repetition without attention is ineffectual. We cannot distinctly represent even such a familiar object as a friend's face unless we have care- fully attended to its several features. (b) Association of Impression. When an impression has been well stamped on the mind, there remains a pre- disposition or tendency to reproduce it under the form EFFECTS OF ASSOCIATION. 157 of an image. The degree of facility with which we recall any object always depends in part on the strength of this predisposition. 1 Nevertheless, this predisposi- tion will not in ordinary cases suffice in itself to effect a restoration after a certain time has elapsed. There is needed, further, something present to the mind to suggest the image, or remind us of the event or object. Thus the sight of a place reminds us of an event which hap- pened there, the hearing of a person's name, of that per- son, and so on. Such a reminder constitutes the 'exciting' as distinguished from the 'predisposing' cause. The reason why so many inpressions of our life, including our deeply interesting dream-experiences, appear to be wholly forgotton is that there is nothing to remind us of them. Now we are reminded of an impression by some other impression (or image) which is somehow connected in our minds or 'associated' with it. Thus the event is associated with the place which recalls it, and the per- son with his name. Hence we speak of association as the other great condition of reproduction. Association by Contiguity. Of these kinds of association the most important is that known as contiguous associa- tion, or Association by Contiguity. By this is meant the association of two or more impressions through, or on the ground of, their connection in time. Its principle may be stated briefly as follows: Presentations or im- pressions which occur together, or in immediate succes- i The strength of this predisposition will, of course, be greatest in the case of recent impressions. 158 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. sion, will afterwards tend to revive, recall, or suggest -one another. It is obvious from this bare statement of the principle of Contiguous Association, that it implies two facts and a relation of dependence between them. First of all we have a fact of the external order, the presentation, simultaneously or in close succession, of two objects. This is marked off as the conjunction of impressions. Secondly, we have a fact of the subsequent internal order, the appearance or occurrence together of the cor- responding images. The term ' association ' properly applies, not to the conjunction of impressions in itself, but to the connection of images resulting from this. 1 We see at once that this kind of association covers not only the connection of contemporaneous or succes- sive events, such as the flash and the sound of an explo- sion, the flow and ebb of the tide, but also that of cause and effect, and of objects in space as co-existent. For the relation of cause and effect clearly makes itself known through a connection in time. And it is easy to see that we observe the local relations of objects by re- peated successions of percepts. Thus we know the situ- ation of a building in relation to its surroundings by successive acts of attention : we know the situation of a town or of a river relatively to adjacent places by moving from one to the other. Law of Contiguity. In order to understand more pre- i The reader should note the ambiguity in the current phrases ' asso- ciation of impressions,' or ' of objects.' As the classical phrase • associa- tion of ideas ' shows, the term association refers directly to the resulting relation of the representations. ' LAW OF CONTIGUITY. 159 cisely what is meant by the Law of Contiguous Associ- ation, we may let A and B stand for two impressions (percepts) occurring together, and a and b for the two representations answering to these. Then the Law asserts that when A (or a) recurs, it will tend to excite or call up b ; and similarly that the recurrence of B (or b) will tend to excite a. Thus the actual sight of a per- son or the mental picture of that person calls up the image of the place where we last saw him. It is to be added that the actual impression A will tend to call up b more powerfully than the representation a. Seeing a place will bring back an occurrence that happened there much more certainly and forcibly than merely imagining that place. Finally, what is true of two percepts or impressions is true of any number. Of a whole group of contempo- raneous events, any one may call up the image of any other. In the case of a series of events, each link tends to call up the adjacent links, the consequent more forci- bly than the antecedent. Degrees of Associative lorce. The Law of Contiguity speaks of a tendency to call up or suggest. This means that the suggestion does not always take place, that A is not always followed by i, and that in some cases it is much more prompt than in others. We may easily see by observation that this is so. Thus we sometimes hear names of persons and places without representing the corresponding objects, in other words, the names do not call up the appropriate images. In other cases, again, the revival is certain and rapid, as when a familiar word in the native tongue, as 'home,' 'father,' calls up its im- 160 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. age. Indeed, in a certain class of cases the revival is so rapid that the mind is hardly aware of a transition from antecedent to consequent. Such are the suggestions of a vocal action by the connected sound (articulate or musical), of a manual movement by a visible sign or signal, and of a feeling, say of anger, by the visible ex- pression. We express this fact by saying that there are various degrees of associative or suggestive force. On what Associative Force depends. The associative force in any case depends mainly on the same two circum- stances as we found governing the persistence of im- pressions regarded as single or apart. These are first the amount of attention given to the impressions A and B in conjunction; and secondly the frequency of their concurrence. After what has been said as to the effect of these circumstances on single impressions, a word or two will suffice to illustrate their effect on conjunctions of impressions. (a) Connective Attention. Two (or more) impressions may become closely associated with one another by a special act of conjoint attention at the time. Thus, a child sees a stranger and hears his name, and by attend- ing closely to the two things together, and in their con- nection, his mind in a manner makes one object of them, so that the recurrence of the one suggests the other. A place vividly recalls some pleasurable or painful inci- dent which happened there, just because the mind being greatly excited at the moment threw a special force of attention into its perceptions, seizing the several parts of its surroundings in one comprehensive glance. A FORCE OF ASSOCIATION. 161 voluntary concentration of mind on a plurality of objects or events in their connection one with another will, to some extent, effect the same result. The greater the force of attention directed to two objects, and the more closely the mind connects them by one act of attention, the stronger will be the resulting association. It follows from this that the order of our representa- tions is not wholly determined by the external order. We ourselves determine this order to some extent by the direction we give to our attention. Our interest in the objects presented is an important factor in fixing the special mental connections formed. This may be seen by comparing the dissimilar internal results of the same external order of impressions on different minds. Two persons, say an uneducated and an educated man, will give very unlike accounts of an incident which they have witnessed, or of a speech w T hich they have heard. In the former case, the path followed by the attention in watching the event or listening to the discourse (which in this instance is determined largely by external forces, or degrees of impressiveness), shows itself in the want of any logical connection in the several parts of the recital. In the latter case, the path of attention (here largely voluntary and determined by a desire to piece together and understand) show T s itself in the presence of such a logical connection in the narration. (b) Repetition and Association. It is, however, but rarely that a single conjunction of two experiences effects a permanent association. Repetition of the original ex- periences is necessary in the great majority of instances. All our enduring knowledge about the things around K 162 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. us, such as the persoDS and places we are familiar with, the permanent natural objects, sun, moon, and stars, together with their movements, actions, or changes, owes its persistence to a number of recurring conjunc- tions of impressions. The more frequent the conjunc- tion of two percepts or impressions, the stronger the resulting bond of association between them. The closest associations, such as those between vocal actions and the resulting sounds, words and the things named, the movements of expression and the feelings expressed, are the result of innumerable conjunctions extending throughout life. It is to be observed that the order of our presenta- tions varies greatly at different times. Thus we find the same animal form with different colors : we en- counter persons in different places ; and we come across words and phrases in different connections. So far as this is the case, no firm associations are possible. The dissimilarities of the concomitants tend to counteract one another, and the image of the object is not associ- ated with any one of them. On the other hand, the fixed order of nature, and of human life, implies uniformity in variety, a certain amount of repetition, along with much variation, of concomitants. This is illustrated in the uniform relation between natural phenomena and their conditions, between human actions and cer- tain corresponding circumstances and motives, and between words and their grammatical connections. It is by the aid of this cumulative effect of many repeti- tions that the mind comes gradually to disentangle these uniformities of connection among things. REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 163 Trains of Representations. All that has been said re- specting pairs of representations applies also to a whole series. A good part of our knowledge consists of trains of representations answering to recurring and oft-repeated series of presentations. Thus, our knowl- edge of a street, and of a whole town, consists of a recoverable train of visual images. In like manner, we are able to recall a series of visible movements or actions, as those of a play, and a succession of sounds as those of a tune. Our knowledge of every kind is closely connected with language, and is .retained to a considerable extent by help of series of words. Again our practical knowledge, our knowledge how to perform actions of various kinds, such as dressing and undress- ing, speaking and writing, is made up of numerous chains of representations. All such chains illustrate the effects of attention and of repetition. The more closely we have attended to the order of a dramatic action, the better will the sev- eral links of the chain be connected. And the more frequently we have seen a play, or heard a musical composition, or written out a sentence, the easier will it be for the mind afterwards to run over the series. It is to be noticed that in the case of all such recurring trains, the effect of repetition is to beget a powerful tendency to pass from one number of the series to the following numbers. The attention here moving in a habitual path, cannot easily arrest or fix any member of the series, but tends to be carried off to its successors. The full effect of this repetition is to reduce the required amount of attention to a minimum. We take in a familiar tune, 164 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. and repeat a familiar train of words in a semi-conscious or automatic way. At tirst these trains of representation are not self- supporting. They are bound up with, and dependent on, actual presentations. Thus a child learning a tune is able at first only to recall the successive notes step by step, as he hears the tune sung (or plays it himself). That is to say, revival is still dependent on the stronger suggestive force of actual impressions. Gradually the series of representations becomes independent. The child's mind, on the recurrence of the first notes, can move on in advance. Not only so, when the train is perfectly built up, he will be able to recall it as a whole without any aid from external impressions. Composite Trains. Again, in nearly all cases of repre- sentative trains, we have to do not with a single series of elements, but with a number of concurrent series. For instance, our representation of a play is made up of a visual series, answering to the several scenes, move- ments of the actors, etc, and an auditory series, answer- ing to the flow of the dialogue. The repetition is here to bind together the several elements of each successive complex experience into one whole, and each of these wholes to succeeding ones. Thus each visible situation is firmly associated with the corresponding words, and this composite whole associated with what precedes and follows it. Frequent repetition tends here to consolidate each successive group into one mass, so that the whole series approximates to a single series. At the same time, a certain independence of the several concurrent SYMBOLIC SERIES. 165 series remains, since the attention is able to fix itself according to circumstances, now on one series, now on another. Thus in recalling a familiar play, sometimes the series of visual images is the prominent one, at other times, the series of auditory representations. Symlolic Series. An interesting variety of such com- posite trains is that of symbolic series. Here we have a chain of presentations or impressions of no interest in themselves, but employed as marks of other things. The visual symbols answering to musical or articulate sounds may be taken as an example. Here the first step in the process of association is to knit together firmly the sev- eral symbols or signs with the symbolized objects or significates. The degree of perfection attained here will depend on the careful discrimination of each sign and of each significate from other members of its respective class, and the connection of the two members of each couple by repeated acts of conjoint attention. When this point is attained, the mind is able to recog- nize each symbol rapidly and with the slightest amount of attention, and to pass from this to the representation of a significate. Thus after thoroughly learning her notes a girl at once recalls the sound on seeing a visual symbol So rapid does this process of interpreting symbols tend to become that at last the mind is hardly aware of attending to the symbols at all. When this process of firmly coupling the separate symbols with their meanings or contents has been com- pleted, there is a further process of association in binding together numbers of these couples in series. Learning 166 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. • the scale of printed notes, or the printed alphabet, may be taken as illustrating the process. By the frequent repetition of such a train, each mem- ber at once calls up, and leads the mind on to, the suc- ceeding one. Every successive going over the scales of note-symbols and sounds concurrently confirms this tendency, so that the learner gradually becomes inde- pendent of the presentations, and finally on the rein- statement of the initial members of the train, anticipates the whole succession. Series of Motor Representations. Another group of these recuring composite trains of representation, closely re- lated to the last, are those answering to our repeated or habitual actions. Every voluntary movement pre- supposes a representation of that movement, or a motor representation. Before we stretch out the hand to take something we rapidly represent this action. Hence the performance of a series of actions is immediately sup- ported by a series of motor representations. Not only so, along with this series there goes one or more series of sensory representations, namely, those of the sense- impressions immediately resulting from the several movements. Thus in walking, there is not only the series of images answering to the muscular actions, but that answering to the sensations of contact due to the bringing of the feet alternately to the ground, and in most cases, too, that corresponding to the visual sensa- tions arising from the changing appearances of the moving organ, and of the ground. So in singing or speaking, the series of vocal representations is bound up with one of auditory images. VERBAL ASSOCIATIONS. 167 Verbal Associations. Among the most important of our associations are those of words. Language is the medium "by which we commonly recall impressions. This arises from the circumstance that we are social beings, dependent upon communications with others. A word is at once a passive impression and a vocal action. And this points to the two-sided function of language as the medium of imparting and of receiving knowledge. The conditions of social life have, as their result, the intimate association of verbal signs and images generally. Hence words play a most important part in the revival of impressions. If, further, it is remembered that language is the medium by which all the higher products of intellectual activity are retained and recalled, its importance will be still more apparent. It follows from this brief account of words that verbal associations will illustrate the characteristics of sym- bolic association and motor combination just described. The building up of verbal associations begins with the knitting together of the several elements entering into each verbal complex or word. Here the first step is the linking of the vocal action to its respective sound. To this must be added, in the case of the educated, the com- bining of this pair with a visual symbol, more particu- larly the printed word. 1 Not only so, since words are sym- bols of interest only as representing ideas, the building up of these verbal aggregates is completed by the firm attachment of the word-complex to the corresponding image or idea. Here, too, the general conditions of association hold good. The better the several elements, i The other visual symbol, the written word, is only of importance in connection with the action of writing. 168 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. sounds, vocal actions, visual symbols arid, finally, ideas, are discriminated from other members of their respect- ive classes; and the closer and more frequent the act of attention to the different constituents of each group or complex in their relation one to another, the firmer will be the association. When this process of association is complete, any member of the verbal aggregate tends instantly to call up the others. But all the elements are not called up with equal distinctness in every case. To begin with, since the words are symbols, interesting only as standing for ideas, words tend in general to call up ideas more powerfully than these last to call up words. The sound or sight of a word, instantly carries the mind on to some image of an object. But we may have images of per- sons, places, etc., with only a very faint verbal accom- paniment. 1 Not only so, all the elements of a verbal aggregate are not always called up with equal distinctness. Thus when listening to the words of another, the mind (if interested) is instantly carried on from the sounds to the ideas, and there is only an incipient resurgence of the images of the vocal actions. On the other hand, in speaking, in reading from a book, the vocal representa- tions become much more distinct. The verbal groups or complexes just described are capable of becoming associated in definite series, 2 and i The strong tendency of words to call up ideas is, however, counter- acted in certain cases. Like human representatives, words tend to become the substitutes of that for which they stand. This will be touched on by and by. 2 Strictly speaking a word is a (short) series of sounds, vocal actions, and visual symbols. MEMORY AND EXPECTATION. 169 it is by the aid of such series that our knowledge of things in their order of time and place is largely built up. The general conditions of the formation of such highly composite series are the same as before. The more closely the several elements (sounds, vocal actions, etc.), have been attended to in their succession, and the more frequently the series had been run over, the firmer the bond of connection. It follows from what we said just now, that in learn- ing a train of words together with its accompanying ideas, all the elements of the complex are not commonly presented. Thus when a child is learning a poem out of a book, and repeats the words audibly, there is the full operation of the different associative agencies (the linking of one visual symbol, of one vocal action, etc., to its successor) at work. On the otter hand, in com- mitting to mind what has been said to us, the retention turns principally on the knitting together of the suc- ceeding sounds; and in learning a passage from an author the process of acquisition depends, to some con- siderable extent, at least, on firmly binding together the visual symbols. Memory and Expectation. Our images and trains of images are commonly accompanied by some more or less distinct reference to the corresponding presentations, and to the time of their occurrence; in other words, by some amount of belief in the corresponding events. In some eases, no doubt, this accompaniment is of the vaguest kind. In a state of listless reverie, we may have a series of images without any distinct reference to the corresponding experiences. We simply picture 170 EEPE0DUCTIVE IMAGINATION. the objects, without reflecting where or when we have seen them or shall see them. In other cases, however, we distinctly refer the images to some place in the time- order of our experience. This reference assumes one of two well-marked forms: (a) a reference to the past or Memory, or more fully, Memory of Events; and ( h) a reference to the future, or Expectation. Both memory and expectation involve a series of images ordered in time, and both illustrate the action of association. Thus in remembering the events of a par- ticular day, the mind retraces the (principal) steps of a succession of experiences, the images following in the order of the events, and being ' localized ' in this order. Similarly in anticipating the succession of the events of a journey similar to one already performed, the mind passes over a succession of images having the same time- order as the events of which they are copies, and held together by the bond of contiguity. Again, both memory and expectation are modes of belief; but they are perfectly distinct modes. In mem- ory we have to do with a reality which is over, which is no longer. Representation of Time. The mental states marked off as memory and expectation plainly involve the repre- sentation of time. To recall an event is to refer to a past, to expect one is to refer to a future. Both ex- pectation and memory are developed in close connection with the growth of this representation of time. It is difficult for us at first to conceive that a child could ever have had a succession of unlike experiences and not instantly referred these to their positions in the REPRESENTATION OF TIME. 171 time-order, as before and after. Yet there is every reason to think that the knowledge of time is a late acquisition. In its developed form, the representation of events in their temporal order is attained much later than that of objects in their spatial or local order. The genesis of the former is intimately connected with the process of reproductive imagination, whereas the origin of the latter is connected with that of sense-perception. Children attain very clear ideas about the position of objects in space, the relations of near and far, inside and outside, &c, before they have any definite ideas about the succession and duration of events. Thus a child of three and a-half years, who had a very precise knowl- edge of the relative situations of the several localities visited in his walks, showed that he had no definite representations answering to the terms ' this week,' 1 last week,' and still tended to think of ' yesterday ' as an undefined past. Sow Representation oj a Past arises. The simplest form of time-apprehension would seem to arise in the follow- ing way. A child is watching some interesting object, say the play of the sunbeam on the wall of his nursery. Suddenly the sun is obscured by a cloud and the marvel of the dancing light vanishes. In place of the golden brilliance, there now stands the dull commonplace wall- paper. This cessation, however, as we saw above, does not imply an instantaneous sinking of the presentation below the level of consciousness. The image persists, and attracts the attention by reason of its interesting- ness. At the same time there is the actual present, the sight of the sunless wall. Here, then, the contrast 172 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. between presentation and representation, the actual ex- perience of the present, and the represented experience which is not now, would disclose itself. The antithesis of now, and not-now would be reached. Personal Identity. It is only as memory is developed in this distinct and complete form that there arises a clear consciousness of personal identity, that is to say an idea of a permanent self continuing to exist in spite of the numberless changes of its daily experience. Since the consciousness or knowledge of self thus pre- supposes a considerable development of representative power, it is attained much later tham a knowledge of external things. Association by Similarity. Although the principle of contiguity covers most of the facts of memory, it is usual to lay down other principles of association as well. Of these the most important is Association through Similarity. This principle asserts that an impression (or image) will tend to call up an image of any object previously perceived which resembles it. Thus a new face suggests by resemblance another and familiar one, a word in one language as the Italian toro, a word in another as the Latin taurus, and so on. The more con- spicuous the point of resemblance between two things, and the greater the amount of their resemblance com- pared with that of their difference, the greater the sug- gestive force. This kind of association is strongly marked-off from the first. Contiguity associates things which are adja- cent in our experience, that is to say events which are LAW OF SIMILARITY. 173 contemporaneous or immediately successive in time, and things contiguous in place. Similarity, on the other hand, brings together experiences widely remote in the time order. Thus a face seen to-day in Loudon may remind us of one seen years ago in a distant part of the globe. Influence of Law of Similarity. The force of similarity exerts a wide influence on the flow of our representa- tions. When it is impossible by an act of reflection to find a link of contiguity connecting an antecedent im- age and its consequent, the thread of connection can be found in some likeness or analogy. Among these links of similarity must be included what has been called the 'Analogy of feeling.' One thing is apt to remind us of another and disconnected thing by reason of its similar emotional effect. Disparate sensations, as those of color and of tone, have certain similarities in their emotional accompaniment. Hence, the transference of the language proper to one class to another, as when we talk of a ' harsh tone ' in a picture, or of the ' rich coloring ' of an orchestral accompaniment. We have classical authority for likening a trumpet note to a brilliant scarlet color. The strange associations formed by some, as the now famous brothers Nussbaunier, between certain sounds and certain colors may be due in part to such an analogy of feeling. 1 Acquisition is greatly aided by this ' attraction of similars ' as it has been called, or the tendency of like to call up like. If everything we had to learn, whether i For an account of these curious associations of colors and sounds, see G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, Prob. III., Chap. IV.; F. Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty : Color Associations, p. U5, &c. 174 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. by actual observation or by books, were absolutely new, the labor would be colossal. When we study a new language, for example, the similarities very greatly shorten the labor. Thus, when the German word Vogel calls up the familiar name fowl, its meaning is at once, fixed. The new acquisition is permanently attached to the pre-existing stock of acquisitions through a link of similarity. Or as we commonly express it, the new is assimilated to the old. Association hy Contrast. In addition to the principle of Similarity, another principle of association known as Contrast is commonly laid down. By this is meant that one impression, object, or event tends to call up the image of its opposite or contrast. Thus it is said that black suggests white, — poverty, wealth, — a flat country a mountainous, and so forth. 1 Contrast plays only a limited part in memory or acquisition. Its chief use is to arouse attention and thereby to stamp deeper on the mind what is unusual, exceptional, and in contrast with the ordinary run of experience, such as the sight of a giant or a dwarf, the roar of Niagara, and so on. In some cases, it appears to co-operate with contiguity in bringing about an as- sociation between the images of two objects or events. The impression made on the memory by the juxtaposi- tion of barren mountains and fertile valleys, by the combination of a high-sounding name and a very i Drobisch adds that, in all cases of suggestion by contrast, the sug- gestive force resides in the likeness, and not in the contrast. Thus when a drawing of a group of laughing faces reminds us of another of a group of weeping faces previously seen, the revival "takes place manifestly only through the similarity of the faces in their juxtaposition." (Empiri- sche Psycliologie, § 32, p. 85.) COMPLEX ASSOCIATION. 175 insignificant-looking person,or by the succession of a prosperous and an adverse reign in English history, illustrates the effect of contrast in confirming a contigu- ous association. 1 Complex Association. So far, it has been assumed that association is simple, that one and the same image only enters into a single associative combination. But this does not correspond with the facts. Association is highly complex. One element may enter as a member into a number of distinct combinations. Thus the image of the Colisseum at Rome is associated with that of events in my personal history, of pleasant days passed at Rome, of historical events, such as the gladiatorial combats of the empire, its conquests and luxury, etc. The threads of association are not distinct and parallel, like the strings of a harp, but intersect one another, forming an intricate network. Convergent Associations. One result of this complexity is that different threads of association converge in the same point; so that the recall of an image may take place by a number of suggesting forces. This co-oper- ation of associative forces is involved in the composite trains of images described above. The process may be very well illustrated by the case of a succession of words. A verbal series committed to memory consists, as we have seen, of series of auditory, vocal, and visual repre- sentations; and this composite series is supplemented by 1 For an historical account of the different views held as to the Laws of Association, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. XXXI. 176 REPKODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. a series of object images. The whole series is thus a highly intricate sort of cord in which a number of threads are intertwined. Hence in recalling a series of words, as those of a poem, the mind may travel along any one of the ])arallel series of images. Thus it may move now along that of the sounds, now along that of the visual signs, and now along the picture-series cor- responding to the objects described and events narrated. It follows, that if the members of one series are not firmly knit together, the mind can pass by one of the other series. Association of Numbers. The advantage to memory of such parallel and connected threads of association seems to be shown in the fact that many young persons visual- ize numerals in certain number-forms, or geometric schemes, more or less elaborate, and in some case highly colored as well. 1 The explanation seems to be as fol- lows. The learning of numbers illustrates the associating of a series of sound-representations with a series of vis- ual images. In the case of the lower numbers, the sound tends to call up a concrete image of the number, e. g., the arrangement of the dots on a domino or card. But in the case of the higher numbers no such image is possible. Here all that is called up (in the way of a con- crete object) by the number-sound is the visual symbol (as 100, 1000, etc.). Thus the association of the double series of auditory and visual symbols is the main process in learning numbers. What the child requires, indeed, in manipulating numbers, whether working out a sum i Nearly one in four of the Charterhouse boys was found to visualize numbers in some form. CO-OPERATION OF ASSOCIATIONS. 177 on a slate, or mentally calculating, is a clear representa- tion of these visual symbols. This co-operation of associations is seen in another form in those cases where one and the same image is attached to a number of quite disconnected images or series of images. In this case, the mind may return to a particular point by a number of paths, not running side by side as in the case of composite trains, but start- ing from widely remote points. In most of our acquisitions, there is this form of com- bination of associative forces. Thus the date of an historical event is associated with that of simultaneous events at home or abroad, and of preceding and succeeding events. And it may be recalled by way of any one of these channels. These combinations include associations by similarity as well as by con- tiguity. A person's name may be recalled not only by recalling his appearance, the book of which he is the author, and so on, but also by hearing another name which resembles it. The succession of the Saxon kings is aided by the similarity of their names. So the learn- ing of the verses of a poem is aided by the similarities of metre and rhyme. Divergent Associations. While looked at from one point of view, the fact of the complexity of association is an aid to memory, looked at from another, it is an obstruc- tion. If an image is associated with a number of other and disconnected images, then the mind in setting out from this image may move along any one of a divergent series of paths. Accordingly it is less likely to strike upon any one particular path that is required at the 178 EEPEODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. moment. It is like being in a town and having to find one's way out in a particular direction, instead of being outside and having to find the way into it. The multi- plicity of paths which was an advantage in the one case, is a hindrance in the other. The errors of confusion to which we are liable in repeating a poem, or playing a tune from memory, are due to the fact that certain members of the series enter into other associations, and so lead us astray. This aspect of association has been marked off as Obstructive Association. Passive and Active Memory : Recollection. The reproduc- tion of presentations is a passive or mechanical opera- tion. It is independent of -the will and controlled by its own laws. When there is perfect retention, the flow of images goes on automatically without the least inter- vention of the active mind. In many of our idle moments, as in taking a walk in the country, we thus give ourselves up to the unimpeded flow of images. In this passive process of reproduction, the particular sequence followed at any time will be the resultant of all the forces of revival acting at the time. The actual impressions of the moment, or of recent events, will con- stitute the starting points. These will call up images of other objects and events associated with them, ac- cording to the degree of firmness of the associative bonds and the strength of the general tendency of the images to recur. 1 The continual incursion of new and i It follows from our exposition of the laws of the revival of images, that every revival is the resultant of two forces : (a) the disposition of the image to recur which depends on the whole number of repetitions of this impression (whatever its accompaniments), and which is greatly strengthened by recency of impression; and (b) the degree of cohesion between the image and the antecedent which excites it. ATTENTION AND EECOLLECTION. 179 disconnected impressions, which start new trains of images, as well as the co-operation of similarity with contiguity, and the frequent calling off of the mind from one train by divergent paths, will serve to give to such a purely passive flow of images the appearance of a dis- orderly chaotic impression. In contrast to this passive reproduction, there is an active reproduction in which the will co-operates. Here the succession of images is still ultimately determined by the laws of association. The will cannot secure a revival of any impressions except by the aid of these laws. That is to say, a person cannot recall a thing by directly willing it. All that he can do is to put himself in the mental attitude suitable to remembering it. But this ability to look out for, and aid in the revival of, an image, tends greatly to modify the passive flow of im- ages described above. Hence we say that the process of reproduction, though an automatic process, is sus- ceptible of being controlled by the will. This active side of memory is best marked off as Recollection. 1 Attention and Recollection. In order to understand this co-operation of the will in the processes of reproduction, we will first examine the case in which its activity is present in a marked degree, viz., in the process known as * trying to remember ' a thing. The will works here, as in the case of all other intellectual operations, through the attention. To try to remember is to con- centrate the mind on the operation, to shut out disturb- ing influences. The very bodily expression of the iSir W. Hamilton, following Latin writers, gives to it the name Rem- iniscence. 180 REPKODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. attitude, the fixed look, compressed lips, and so on, shows that there is a special effort of concentration. The effect of this effort of attention is to give greater distinctness and persistence to what is before the mind. Thus if a child is asked the date of a certain battle, he may by an act of attention give clearness and fullness to the representation of the battle. And by so doing he helps to give effect to the associative force connect- ing the event and the date. Not only so, the will accomplishes an important work in resisting obstructive associations, turning away from all misleading sugges- tions, and following out the clues. The revival of an impression, as of a name, or an event, is a gradual pro- cess. We are often dimly aware beforehand of the character of the image we desire to call up clearly. And so we know well enough whether we are on our way to it, or are going away from it. 1 It is obvious that this process of trying to remember a definite fact shows deficient memory, absence of per- fect associative ' cohesion.' And at best it can but poorly compensate for the want of a firm mental con- nection. Yet its value is not to be under-estimated. In the case of the most tenacious memory, there must be many loose associations which need the co-operation of attention. It may be added that even where trying to recollect seems futile, it may effect something. The sudden return of a name after many efforts to recollect it, points to the conclusion that the revival of the image had been, in a measure, furthered, by these acts of con- centration. i On this partial consciousness of what we want in recalling, see Dr. Maudsley, The Physiology of Mind, Chap. IX., pp. 519, 520. COMMAND OF IMAGES. 181 Commanding the Store of Images. It is, however, not in this form of severe effort to aid in the revival of some particular image, that the co-operation of the will is chiefly important. It enters, in a less marked manner, into all our ordinary processes of revival. Even in repeating a familiar poem the will, by an effort so slight that we are scarcely aware of it, steadies the whole op- eration, securing the due succession of the several mem- bers of the train, and the avoidance of misleading suggestions. This ability to control the reproductive processes reaches its highest development in a habit of going over the contents of memory, and following out, now one path, now another, according to the purpose in hand. Thus when a poet needs a simile, or a scientific teacher an illustration of some kind, he is able to inspect the store of his accumulations in so far as it bears on the purpose in hand. This ready command of images by the will presupposes that there has been an orderly ar- rangement of the materials, that when new acquisitions were made, these were linked on (by contiguity and similarity) to old acquisitions. It is only when there has been the full co-operation of the will in this earlier or acquisitive stage, that there will be a ready command of the materials gained in the later stage of reproduc- tion. Degrees of Recollection: Forgetfulness. Our ability to recall impressions varies indefinitely from total inability up to the point at which all sense of effort vanishes and the reproduction is certain and instantaneous. At one extreme, we have total forgetfulness or oblivescence; at 182 KEPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. the other, perfect recollection and perfect knowledge as determined by retentiveuess. Perfect recollection at any time embraces but a very few of the impressions recalled by the mind. The con- ditions of such facile recall are too complex to allow of its realization in the large majority of cases. Interest, repetition, association with what is near at hand and so offers a starting point in the process of recovery, are all necessary to this result. What we can recollect instantly, and without mental exertion is either included in, or firmly attached to, our permanent surroundings, dom- inant interests, and habitual pursuits. Thus w r e can at any time recall without effort the scenery of our home, or place of business, the sound of our friends' voices, the knowledge we habitually revert to and apply in our daily actions, our professions, amusements, etc. Next to this perfect recollection comes that which involves a greater effort and is less uniform and certain. This applies to a good many of our acquisitions which have been firmly built up at the outset, but to which we have had little occasion to go back of late. Our knowledge of many striking events of the more remote past, much of our school knowledge, as that of classics or mathematics, not turned to practical account in later life, is an illustration of such imperfect recollection. We can only recall by a prolonged effort and by the help of special circumstances, e. g., talking with some old ac- quaintance, or steeping our minds for a while in a Latin or Greek author. Partial OMivescence. Here, it is obvious, we reach the first stage of Forgetfulness or Oblivescence. There is FORGETFULNESS — PAETIAL AND TOTAL. 183 partial or temporary oblivescence, yet not total forget- fulness. The mind has evidently retained, but an exceptional strength of reviving or resuscitative force is needed to call up the image. This temporary forget- fulness may be momentary only, and due to the condi- tion of the brain and mind at the instant, as fatigue, emotional agitation, * absence of mind,' or preoccupation. Or the inability to recall may extend over a longer period. For instance, our difficulty in speaking a foreign lan- guage which we learnt some years ago and have not recently had any occasion to make use of, may require for its removal a day or two's sojourn in the country. Total OMivescence. The first stage of perfect oblives- cence is reached when no effort of will, and no available aid from suggestive forces succeeds in effecting the re- production. This holds good of the large majority of our impressions. After a short interval they fade into complete oblivion. Reproduction in their case is prac- tically impossible. Divisions of Memory. Although we speak of memory as if it were a simple indivisible faculty, we must bear in mind that it is really made up of a number of distinct parts, as the retention of sights, sounds, and so forth. It is one thing to recall a musical sound or a series of such sounds, another to recall a group of visible objects. There are as many compartments of memory as there are kinds of impression. Thus there is a memory for visual impressions, and another for auditory impressions. Within the limits of one and the same sense, too, there 184 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. are distinct differences of memory. Thus the memory for colors is different from the memory for forms, the memory for musical sounds, from the memory for artic- ulate sounds. In addition to these retentions of passive impressions, there are retentions of active experiences, as our various manual movements and vocal actions. Speaking generally, and disregarding for the present individual differences, we may say that the higher the sense in point of discriminative refinement, the better the corresponding memory. We appear to recall sights best of all; then sounds, tastes and smells. Further, since the muscular sense is characterized by a high degree of refinement, the retention of our active expe- riences is in general relatively good. It must be remem- bered, too, that our muscular experiences are uniformly attended with passive impressions, and that these serve materially to support the retention. Thus the mechanic recalls his manual performances partly by representing the visual appearance of the moving hands; similarly, the orator recalls a string of vocal utterances by help of the images of the sounds which immediately follow them. Remembering Things and Remembering Words. Of all im- pressions visual percepts are the most important. As has been shown above, visual perceptions, gathering up as they do the results of our sense-experience as a whole, make up the chief part of sense-knowledge. And since sight is the most discriminative of the senses we find that visual percepts are better recalled than any others. Visual images or pictures of objects thus constitute the REMEMBERING WORDS. 185 staple of our ordinary recallings. In representing a par- ticular object, as the interior of a room, Westminster Abbey, John Smith, and so on, we picture its visible aspect, and represent other qualities (even though the most interesting, as the taste of an orange) only vaguely in the back-ground. To remember a thing is thus pre- eminently to recall its look or visible aspect. Next to visual images come those of words. Owing to the importance of verbal signs pointed out just now, representations of these constitute a large fraction of our mental reproductions. So close, indeed, is x the as- sociation between words and things that we rarely represent an object without, at the same time, more or less distinctly reproducing its name. Not only so, the retention and reproduction of all the higher products of intellectual activity, general notions, judgments and trains of reasoning, are effected by way of language. To remember a name, however, is not necessarily to remember the corresponding object (or idea). We may distinctly recall the name of a particular place or person, and yet possess only a very vague and indistinct representation of the visible object denoted. In order to preserve distinct images in connection with words, it is necessary first of all to have deep impressions, or clear precepts of the objects, and secondly to associate these closely with the corresponding names. Growth of the Reproductive Faculty : Beginning of Memory. Memory presupposes Sensation and Perception. Im- ages do not appear till sense-knowledge has reached a certain stage of development. Retentiveness in the 186 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. early period exists only as the power of recognizing objects when they are present. A child less than three months old will remember the face of his nurse or father for some weeks. The first images only appear later as the result of many accumulating traces of per- cepts. They are such as are immediately called up by the actual impression of the moment. The interesting experiences of the meal, the bath, and the walk are the first to be distinctly represented. As the interest in things extends and the observing powers grow, distinct mental pictures of objects are formed. M. Perez tells us of a child of eight months who had been accustomed to watch a bird singing in a cage, and who on seeing the cage without the bird showed all signs of bitter dis- appointment. Repetition of Experience. As experiences repeat them- selves and traces accumulate, representations become more distinct, and are more firmly associated ; also, the number of representations and of associative links in- creases. The learning of the meaning of words, which, as is well known, may precede the actual employment of them by several months, greatly enlarges the range of suggestion. After this the mother or the nurse is able to call up the image of absent objects, such as per- sons or animals, by talking of them. The repetition of conjunctions of experience further brings about whole groups and series of representations. The child's mind is able to pass not only from the actual impression of the moment to the image of something immediately ac- companying it, but from this last to another image, HOW MEMORY IMPROVES. 187 and so on. Thus a child of eighteen months will men- tally rehearse a series of experiences, as those of a walk : " Go tata, see gee-gee, bow-wow," etc. New Experiences. The child's experience is not a mere series of repetitions. There is a continual widening of the range of presentations, an addition of new experi- ences. This extension of the area of impression is due in part to the expansion of his interest in things, and in part to the changes in his environment. In this way, fresh materials are being stored up in the memory. To some extent these displace the old. The temporary im- pressions of last week are dislodged by the temporary impressions of this week. But the growth of memory means an increase in retentive capacity. The progress of the child is marked by the fact that the new dis- places the old less and less, that there is a gradual en- largement of the store of permanent acquisitions. How Memory Improves. This process of growth, this continual increase in the store of acquisitions, implies an improvement in the power of seizing and retaining new impressions. By this is meant that any particular acquisitive task will become easier, and that more diffi- cult feats of retention will become possible. The progress of retentive and reproductive power may be viewed under three aspects. First of all im- pressions will be acquired or stored up more easily (for a given time). Less concentration is needed for the stamping in of an impression. Or to put it other- wise, a given amount of concentration will lead to a 188 KEPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. storing up of more material, that is, more complex groups of impressions. Secondly, impressions are re- tained longer. A given amount of effort in the acquis- itive stage will result in a more enduring or permanent retention. This aspect maybe marked off as an increase in the tenacity of memory. Thirdly, this progress im- plies a more perfect form of revival. That is to say, impressions will be recalled more readily and in a higher degree of distinctness and fidelity than formerly. The details of the mental image will be fuller, and the whole image or group of images better separated from other like images or groups. The three characteristics of a good memory here touched on are not wholly independent one of another. The memory may develop under one aspect and not to the same extent under the other. Thus there may be a growth of acquisitive skill in the shape of a quickness of mind in seizing new impressions and retaining them for a short time. This, however, would only amount to an improvement of temporary retention. Similarly, there may be an improvement of tenacity without any commensurate increase in readiness of reproduction. Different individuals show these aspects of memory in very unequal degrees. 1 i On the essentials of a good memory, see D. Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Pt. I., Chap. VI. Drobisch recognizes lour characteristics of a good or ' strong ' memory : (1) Facility of appre- hension or acquisition ; (2) Trustworthiness, or fidelity of conservation and reproduction; (3) Lastingness or permanence; and (4) Serviceable - ness, i. e., readiness of recollection, Empirische Psychologie, § 35. Locke points out that the two main defects of memory are oblivion, i. e., want of tenacity, and slowness (want of readiness in reproduction), Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II., Chap, X., Sect. 8. GROWTH OF MEMORY. 189 Causes of Growth of Memory : Plastic Power of Brain. This increase in retentive power is due to some consid- erable extent to the spontaneous unfolding of the brain powers. All mental acquisition appears to involve cer- tain formations or structural changes in the brain. The capability of the brain of undergoing these chauges, or what has been called its plastic power, increases rapidly during the early part of life. Impressions of all sorts stamp themselves more deeply on the mind of a child ten years old than on that of a child three or four years old, owing to this greater plasticity of the brain. This condition explains the precocity of memory. It is commonly said that the power of storing up new im- pressions reaches its maximum in early youth, and the fact is undoubtedly connected with the physiological fact that later on the structure of the brain is more set, or less modifiable. Just as memory is one of the first faculties to be de- veloped, so it is one of the first to be impaired by age. The loss of the power to build up new acquisitions, as the names of new acquaintances, marks the proximity of the culminative point of mental development. The decline of memory, like its development, shows well marked stages. The weakest associations {e. g., between proper names and their objects) corresponding to the low- est stage of nervous organization, are the first to give way. The same order of decliue is seen in mental disease. Thus in disorders involving loss of memory for words, those classes of words which answer to the lowest degree of cohesion or nervous co-ordination disappear first. 1 1 For an account of the physical changes involved in the decline of memory with old age, see Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, Book II., 190 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Improvement of Memory by Exercise. Yet allowing its full weight to this fact, we can easily see that a large part of the improvement of memory is due to exercise. The successive changes in the plastic power of the brain assign limits to acquisition : but the actual amount of retention reached is determined (within these limits) by the amount of exercise. New Acquisitions aided hy Old. In one sense all acquisi- tion renders further acquisition easier by offering more points of attachment. A student of 25, well versed in languages, will master a new language in much less time than a boy of 12 or 15, even though the plastic power of his brain is less. All fresh acquisition, in so far as it is assimilating new to old material, is assisted by the results of past acquisition. In this sense exercise improves memory, and enables it to go on developing long after the plastic age has been past. 1 Habits of Memory. Not only so, memory is strength- ened by exercise in a narrower and stricter sense. In- crease of facility in acquiring and reproducing new knowledge is aided by the formation of intellectual habits. By these are meant close concentration of mind Chap. X., § 351. The order of failure of words in mental disease (aphasia) is said by M. Ribot to be from the particular to the general. Thus proper names are lost before common, substantives before adjectives. This corresponds according to M. Ribot, with the range of the uses of these classes of words, and so with the degree of co-ordination involved. See his work, Les Maladies de la Memaire, Chap. III., p. 132, etc. i It follows that there is a reciprocal benefit in linking on new to old knowledge. The new is attached to what is already in our grasp, and this last, being revived in connection with the new acquisition, is kept fresh. KINDS OF MEMORY. 191 on the subject-matter learnt, searching out and noting all its points of attachment to previously acquired im- pressions or facts, repetition or going over the new impression, and finally concentration of mind at the moment of recall. The more perfect these habits, the higher will be the capacity for seizing and retaining new knowledge. Varieties of Memory, General and Special. There is prob- ably no power which varies more among individuals than memory. The interval which separates a person of average memory from one of the historical examples, as Joseph Scaliger or Pascal, seems enormous. 1 There is every reason to think that some excel others in their power of memory as a whole, by which is meant their capability of retaining and reproducing impressions generally. More commonly, however, the observed differences appear in some special direction, or with respect to some particular class of impressions. Thus one person has a good retentive power for visual or auditory im- pressions as a whole ; or for those of some variety of these, as impressions of color, or of musical sound ; or, finally, for a circumscribed group of objects, as faces. In this way arise what are known as the pictorial memory, the musical memory, the local memory, etc. i Casaubon says of Scaliger— "He read nothing (and what did he not read ?) which he did not forthwith remember." Pascal says he never forgot anything which he had read or thought. For other examples of capacious memory, see D. Stewart, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Pt. I., Chap. VI., §3; and Sir W. Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, Vol. II., Lect. XXXI. 192 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. As illustrations of such exceptional retentive power in particular directions, may be mentioned Horace Ver- net and Gustave Dore who could paint a portrait from memory, Mozart who wrote down the Miserere of the Sistine Chapel after hearing it twice, Menetrier who could repeat three hundred disconnected words after once hearing them. 1 Even differences in general power of memory prob- ably turn to a considerable extent on special differences, namely in verbal retention. Although, as we have seen, to recall words is not the same as to recall things, the latter operation cannot be carried on to any consider- able extent apart from the former. Hence a good memory for impressions generally has, in all cases, been largely sustained by an exceptional verbal memory. 2 The differences of memory among individuals are numerous, and by no means easy to classify. To begin with more general points of inequality, persons may differ from one another with respect to the relative degrees of prominence of the aspects of memory dis- tinguished above. For instance, some boys are quick in acquisition but not tenacious : they can carry im- pressions for a short time, but not for a long period. Others again are tenacious but not correspondingly ready to call forth and apply what they know. Again, if we look to more special differences, we find that minds vary not only with respect to the particular im- i For other instances, see Taine, On Intelligence, Pt. I., Bk. II., Chap. I. « This is amply illustrated in the historical instances given by Hamil- ton, as well as by the well-known case of Macaulay. DIFFERENCES OF MEMORY. 193 pressions which are best recalled, but also with respect to the particular mode of grouping which is most suc- cessful. Thus some appear to connect visible objects locally better than others ; whereas these last may have a better power of linking together successive pictures answering to events. The former would have a better local, pictorial, or geographical memory, the latter a better historical memory. 1 Closely connected with these differences are those due to the habitual way of committing things to memory, or arranging acquisitions in the mind. We have already touched on the fact that some minds tend to connect things with their adjuncts of time and place, whereas others order or arrange facts according to their relations of similarity, cause and effect, etc, In the same way different minds adopt different habits of ' memorizing ' verbal material. Hence the threefold division of memory emphasized by Kant : (a) the Mechanical memory, which is satisfied with linking together the words (auditory or visual symbols) in series; (b) the Ingenious memory which calls in the aid of series of pictures somehow resemb- ling the series of sounds, visual symbols, or the ideas signified ; and (e) the Judicious memory, in which the understanding takes part, and the logical relations of the ideas are made the connecting bond. 2 i This difference would affect the retension of scientific facts, such as the coexistences (in place) of physiography, astronomy, etc., and the successions in time of the action of forces as dealt with by mechanics. 2 See Drobisch, Empirische Psychologie, §36. As an example of in- genious memorizing, he gives the following : we remember the date of Charlemagne's death, 814, by regarding the first cipher as an hour glass, the symbol of death, the second as a spear, the symbol of war, and the M 194 KEPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Causes of Differences. These differences are plainly due either to native inequalities or to differences in the kind and amount of exercise undergone in the course of the past life. There are probably native differences of retentive power generally. One child is from the first capable of retaining impressions of all kinds more easily than another. Such inequalities are no doubt connected with differences in the degree of structural perfection of the organs as a whole, including the brain. l There are also special differences to start with, which are connected with the varying degrees of per- fection of particular sense-organs. Thus a child with a good natural ear for musical sounds would be likely to retain these impressions better than another child want- ing this sense-endowment. And this for a double rea- son : (1) because such a superiority would imply a finer discriminative capacity in respect of sound (and reten- tiveness varies roughly with the degree of discrimina- tion) ; and (2) because this natural superiority commonly carries with it a special interest in the impressions concerned. A child with a good ear for musical sounds will in general take special pleasure in noting their peculiarities. third as a plough, the symbol of peace. D. Stewart has some good re- marks about the distinction between a ' Systematical ' or • Philosophical' memory, which connects things according to their deeper resemblances, their relations of cause and effect, etc., and the Casual Memory which links them together only by their more superficial resemblances, and their accidental juxtaposition in time and place, Op. cit., Chap. VI., Sect. 2. i Prof. Bain emphasizes this degree of natural retentiveness or plas- tic power of the brain as setting limits to each individual's memory as a whole. See Mind and Body, Chap. V., p. 93, etc. IMPROVEMENT OF MEMORY. 195 On the other hand, these differences are due in part to the differences of circumstances, exercise, and edu- cation. While each individual has in his amount of 1 natural retentiven ess' or degree of 'brain plasticity' limits set to his memory as a whole, much may be done to improve the memory within these limits by exercise. Speaking roughly we may say that the educated have, as a rule, a better memory than the uneducated. It is, however, in the improvement of memory in spe- cial directions that the effects of exercise are most con- spicuous. The habitual direction of the mind to any class of impressions strengthens the retentive power in respect of these. Each mind thus becomes specially retentive in the direction in which its ruling interest lies, and its attention is habitually turned. Thus every special employment, as that of engineer, linguist, or musician, tends to produce a corresponding special re- tentiveness of memory. It is to be added that the growth of general and of special memory are in a measure connected. While everybody's retentive power is limited, while a special development of memory in one direction precludes an equal development in others, the exercise and improve- ment of the memory in one direction tends, to a certain extent, to the strengthening of the memory as a whole. For the growth of memory takes place by the formation of certain habits (concentration, repetition, arrangement of materials) ; and these habits will stand a person in good stead when he goes on to commit new kinds of material to memory. 196 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Training of the Memory. The training of the memory, though it is not the whole of intellectual education, is certainly an important portion of it. " Tantum scimus quantum memoria tenemus." To know a thing implies the rememberance of it. Only when the memory is well stored with distinct images and series of such images, can the higher operations of the understanding be carried out. As Kant observes, "The understanding has as its chief auxiliary the faculty of reproduction." 2 The culture of a child's memory may be said to begin with the use of language by the nurse and mother in naming to him the various objects of sight. The syste- matic training of the memory should be first carried out in close connection with observation. The meaning of words should be taught by connecting them with the real objects, that is to say, by simultaneously naming and pointing out an object. And as supplementary to this, the child should be exercised in recalling by means of words the impressions directly received from external objects. After a sufficient store of first-hand knowledge has thus been accumulated, the memory should be trained in the acquisition of knowledge about things at second- hand, that is to say through the medium of verbal (oral and literary) communication. The early period of school life is commonly said to be the most favorable one for the building up of such verbal acquisitions. It costs less effort in this early stage of development to 2 Ueber Pcedagogik, p. 492 (Werke Ed n - Hartenstein). The relation of a good memory to intellectual power as a whole is discussed by both Stewart and Hamilton in the works referred to. TRAINING THE MEMORY. 197 learn the concrete facts of history, geography, or lan- guage, than it would cost at a later date. Hence it has been called the ' plastic period.' ' Two Branches of Mnemonic Training. The training of the memory by the teacher falls into two parts: (a) the calling forth of the pupil's power of acquisition, or stor- ing up knowledge; (b) the practising him in recalling what he has learnt. In respect of each part a judicious and effective training will proceed by recognizing the natural conditions of retention, and the particular stage of development reached. Exercise in Acquisition. In this stage the first rule to be attended to is to take the child at his best. Committing anything to memory is a severe demand on the brain energies, and should so far as possible be relegated to the hours of greatest vigor and freshness. Then every- thing must be done to arouse the attention by making the matter as interesting as possible. The teacher should aim at exciting a pleasurable state of mind at the time in connection with the object of acquisition. Sometimes a painful experience may have to be resorted to. A boy who has made a ridiculous error in history, e. g., by confounding Sir Thomas More and the poet Tom Moore, and has been well laughed at, is little likely afterwards to forget the difference. Further, the subject learnt must be put before the mind again and again, so that there be a sufficient deepening of the impression. The i Prof. Bain regards the period of maximum plasticity as extending from about the 6th to the 10th year. (Science of Education, p. 186.) 198 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. writing out of a lesson is a familiar aid in fixing in the mind a piece of new knowledge. And the child should be encouraged to dwell on the subject committed to memory, and to go back to it, so that the full force of repetition may be realized. Lastly, the teacher must be careful to point out the relations between one part and another of the subject-matter, and between this as a whole and previously acquired knowledge. In this way, the binding forces of association will be brought into play. Thus in narrating an event in history, as the Norman Conquest, the several incidents with their relations of dependence should be pointed out, and the points of similarity and of contrast between this and other invasions (those of the Romans, and Saxons) set in a clear light. 1 Learning by Rote. Hardly anything requires to be said, perhaps, at this time of day on the necessity of learning things not simply words. The cardinal doctrine of the modern theory of education is that all knowledge has to do with real objects, and that language is simply the medium by which such knowledge is conveyed, and by which it can be recalled. The insistence on the adequate exercise of the senses and the powers of observation points clearly to the idea that knowledge has to do with sensible realities. As has been already pointed out, cultivation of the memory should at first, to a consider- able extent, proceed hand in hand with the exercise of i The connecting of events in their relations of dependence, etc. clearly involves an appeal to the higher faculties of Understanding and Reason. To explain a thing is one way of fixing it in the memory. ART OF MNEMONICS. 199 observation. Not only so, when the age is reached for acquiring large additions of second-hand knowledge, or book-lore, it is of the highest consequence that the realities underlying the words should be distinctly realized by means of clear and vivid representations. 1 It is only when the facts of history, geography, and the images of poetry are fully grasped by the mind that the subjects can be said to be truly learnt. Art of Mnemonics. In ancient times great importance was attached to certain devices for aiding memory and shortening its work, which devices were called Mne- monics. This idea of relieving memory was connected with the exploded theory that the main business of learning is to commit words to memory. 2 When this theory obtained, learning was necessarily a dry occupa- tion, and the pupil's mind was wearied by excessive tasks in verbal acquisition. Hence the eagerness to find devices for shortening the toil. Now that this theory is abandoned, less importance is attached to a mnemonic art. The inventions of rhyme, alliteration, and so on, obviously help the mind to retain a series of rules. But when things are taught only in so far as they can be understood, it is held that the relations between the facts, or the ideas learnt, should form the main basis of acquisition. In other words, the more things i How such representations are to be formed will be explained in the following chapter. 2 We are apt to treat this theory too contemptuously, perhaps, by forgetting that when the written records of knowledge were less easily accessible, the verbal memory was a matter of much greater consequence than it is now. 200 REPKODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. are connected in their natural relations, the less will be the task imposed on the verbal memory. 1 Although there are no definite rules for aiding the memory which are valid in all cases, there is such a thing as a skilful management of the memory. This will include the formation of habits, not only of concen- tration and repetition, but of selecting and grouping or arranging. Memory-labor is greatly economized by de- tecting what is important and overlooking what is unimportant; and children should be exercised in such selection. It is furthered, too, by finding appropriate ' pegs' on which to hang new acquisitions. 2 Here indi- vidual differences must be studied. Some children will remember ideas better by the aid of visual pictures, others better by series of sound-representations. The young are wont to help themselves out of the difficulty of retaining what is difficult, e. g., letters, numbers, dates, by the aid of visual forms (geometrical schemes, and so on). And teachers would do well to find out these spontaneous tendencies of children's minds and to aid them in the process of economizing intellectual labor. 3 i For a fuller inquiry into the value of mnemonics see James Mill's Analysis of the Human Mind, pp. 324, 5; Dugald Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Chap. VI., § VII. 2 Among these pegs must be reckoned the places in which informa- tion can be found. To associate book-knowledge with particular books, and places in these, other kinds of knowledge with particular persons (experts), is a great saving of memory-labor. s Compare what was said above on the different modes of memoriz- ing. Kant thought lightly of the • ingenious ' memory, as involving an unnecessary loading of the mind. But this is to overlook the fact pointed out in dealing with the co-operation of associations, that the addition of EXERCISES IN RECOLLECTION. 201 Exercize in Recalling, The mere act of taking in new- facts and truths is not enough. The teacher aims, or should aim, at keeping fresh and clear in the pupil's mind what is learnt, or in other words, at rendering the memory quick and accurate in reproducing what has been learnt. This result can only be secured by renewed exercises in reproduction. Here again it is important to seize the right moment. To recollect is to concentrate the mind on itself, to ' reflect,' as we commonly say, and implies a higher effort of attention than external obser- vation. In this way, a habit of going back on what has been learnt may be gradually induced. A considerable element in the art of teaching is skill in putting questions to children so as to exercise their power of recalling and reproducing what they have learnt. It is only by frequent going back that the meaning or content of verbal knowledge is preserved fresh. In order to test the knowledge of things, the teacher must call on the pupil to give out what he has learnt in his own words. By such skilful questioning, he will find out how far the learner has seized and retained the distinctive features of the subject-matter attended to, so as to keep his mental images clear and distinct. Not only so, by this same practice of ques- tioning the manifold ramifications and connections of each piece of knowledge are more clearly brought into a new series of elements often lightens the labor, provided first that the new series can be better retained than the other which it is the special object to retain and secondly that it is firmly attached (by the force of analogy or otherwise) to this series. The importance of noting individual peculiarities with a view to determine the most advantageous medium of reproduction in any given case is well brought out by Dr. Mortimer Granville in his little work, Secret of a Good Memory. 202 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. view. It is impossible to point out all, or even most of these at the moment of acquisition: they can only be found out gradually by repeated processes of repro- duction. 2 Subjects which Exercize the Memory. All branches of study exercise the memory in some measure. The student of the higher mathematics remembers the prin- ciples and the demonstrations of his science, and this largely by the aid of language or other visual symbols. But when we talk of a subject exercising the memory, we mean more (or less) than this. We refer to those subjects which have to do mainly with the particular and the concrete, and which appeal but little to the understanding. Such subjects are Natural Science, in its simpler or descriptive phase, Geography, History, Language, and the lighter departments of Literature. Arithmetic, though now recognized as a subject which necessarily calls forth the child's powers of generalizing and reasoning, also makes a heavy demand on the verbal memory. Training of Memory but a part of Education. It cannot too clearly be borne in mind, that to acquire any amount of knowledge respecting the particular and concrete is not to be educated. Perfect knowledge implies the taking up of the particular or concrete into the general, 2 The importance of exercises in reproduction in training the memory is well illustrated by Mr. Landon in his volume, School Management. Chap. IV., p. 75, etc. The two branches of memory-exercise here distin- guished should of course be carried on together. Linking on new know- ledge to old is at once an exercise in acquisition and in reproduction. OVER-STIMULUS OF THE MEMORY. 203 the connecting of a variety of particulars under a uni- versal principle. It follows that memory may be over- stimulated. A certain knowledge of the concrete, a certain store of images, is undoubtedly necessary to the exercise of the higher intellectual faculties: but if the teacher aims simply at mass or volume of details, the higher powers of the mind will be unexercised. Such a course would involve growth, or bare increase in the bulk of mind, but not development. The danger of over-stimulating the memory is all the greater owing to the great natural inequalities among children. It may be necessary that every child should have a certain minimum of knowledge in subjects like geography and history; but it is neither necessary nor desirable that a child with a poor retentiveness for languages should be made to study a number of foreign tongues. To judge in a given case how much time and energy should be given to pure memory work is one of the nicest problems in the art of Education. References. The reader who has the time may follow Prof. Bain through his detailed illustrations of the Law of Contiguity {Senses and Intellect or Compendium). An interesting account of Memory, its varieties and the means of improving it, may be found in Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Part I., Ch. VI. With this may be compared Sir W. Hamilton's account of Memory, Lectures on Metaphysics, especially Lectures XXXI. and XXXII. The German reader may with advantage consult a small work, Ueber das Qeddchtniss, by Prof. J. Huber. On the practical side the reader will do well to consult Locke, Some Thoughts on Education, especially § 176; Maria Edgeworth, Essays on Practical Education, Vol. II., Ch. XXI. : J. G. Fitch, Lectures on Teaching, Chap. V.; Beneke (Erzieh und Unterrichtslehre, Vol. I., §§ 20-22) aud Waitz {Allgem. Posdagogih, 2nd Part, 3rd Sect.) There are some good remarks on the cultivation of Memory in Kant's Essay, Ueber Poedagogik. 204 EEPEODUCTTVE IMAGINATION. APPENDIX. SUGGESTIONS. 1. In your review of the argument of this chapter on Repro- ductive Imagination, there are certain very important words to be carefully noted. Seek to understand the import of these words, as terms in psychology. First, there is, arranged in the natural history order, i. e., the order of the ' natural history ' of the human mind, this series : a. Sensation, perception, imagination. What are each of these respectively as acts of mind ? Can I define them ? Can I give examples ? Do I clearly discriminate the one from the other ? What is the necessary and logical de- pendence of these several acts of mind upon each other ? Such questions as these may very properly be asked as helps to an ac- curate knowledge of the words in question. There are other words which should be studied in connection; for example, o. Sense-impression, percept, image. c. Presentation, Representation. d. Reproductive imagination, constructive imagination. e. Reproduction, Laws of Association, Trains of Represen- tation. Discriminate the different meanings of the terms above re- ferred to; fix very thoroughly in mind the use of each. 2. Consider carefully what is meant in mental science by imagination; note how extended and yet how well defined is the meaning of the term, including both the revival of percepts in the order in which they were originally perceived, (reproductive imagination) and also the imaging of these percepts to the mind in new forms (constructive imagination.) Note how closely connected with the acquisition of knowl- REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 205 edge are the acts of imagination, how all instruction and all learning implies the active exercise of this power of mind. 3. Verify the statements in the text, by examples from your own experience. Some of the most interesting exercises in inter- spection may be had by seeking the answer to the following question with regard to any unexpected image, or idea coming into consciousness: What suggested this thought to my mind ? What was I thinking of before ? And what before this ? Why did these three thoughts succeed each other ? 4. Trace carefully the logical connection between the princi- ples of psychology set down in this chapter, and the educational data expounded therewith. Consider closely how one depends on the other; how if the psychological doctrine were different, the maxims of education would be different. Note that both theory and rules may be deduced from the psychological princi- ples unfolded. 5. Look up in cyclopaedia or elsewhere the history and the value of the educational authorities quoted in this appendix. EXAMINATION AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. What would be the state of our minds if our mental pro- cesses were limited to sense-cognition ? What is meant in Mental Science by an image ? What is the difference between a percept and an image? Why are images called representative images? Of what are they the representatives ? 2. How many sensations conspire to make a percept ? (See quotation from Mr. Lewes, p. 141). How many percepts con- spire to make an image ? Why is every kind of representation called an image ? 3. What is Reproductive imagination? What is Constructive imagination ? What is the distinction between Retentiveness and Reproduction? How are images to be distinguished from percepts? In what does the distinctness of images consist ? In what, the accuracy of an image ? 4. What is the connection between Attention and Retention? What two circumstances determine the permanence of an impres- 206 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. sion ? What is the connection between Repetition and Retention? Is there any limit to the deepening influence of Repetition ? What is the effect of Repetition without attention ? 5. What is meant by the predisposition or tendency of an impression or a precept to be revived ? Distinguish between the * reminding ' or • exciting ' cause, and the predisposing cause of the recurrence of an image. Why are so many impressions never recalled ? 6. What is meant by the association of ideas ? Is this ' asso- ciation ' (here referred to) an association of objects of thought or of impressions of these objects, or of images of these percepts ? Is this association of ideas a subjective or an objective relation ? Is this association a matter determined by our will or by circum- stances ? Is the fact that there is an associative link binding together two impressions, one, of which, we are at the time of the impression, conscious ? 7. Give the Law of Contiguous Association. Why should this law be expressed as a tendency f Is it the external order of objects which is alluded to in the Law of Contiguity or the inter- nal order of images ? Is the contiguity referred to a contiguity of time or of place ? Show that the relation of cause and effect may be included in the law of contiguity. 8. Upon what does the ' degree of associative force ' depend? Show, by examples, how a simultaneous Attention to two or more impressions makes a bond or link between ideas. Show how Attention modifies the order of representations. 9. Show the importance in the acquisition of knowledge of a Repetition of* associative acts. 10. What is meant by a train of representations? Compare this with the common phrase — train of thought. 11. Why are verbal associations so important? What is the first step in this association? Why is a word here called a word- complex? 12. What is the distinction between Memory and Expecta- tion? Show how each illustrates Association. PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION. 207 13. What is meant by Association by Similarity? To what tendency does this law refer? Give instances of what is called in psychology the 'Attraction of similars. ' Show what educational use may be made of Contrast. 14. What is meant by the automatic succession of images? Why is this called a 'passive reproduction' ? Distinguish Recol- lection from passive Reproduction. Show how Attention aids Recollection. Which are more easily recalled, visual images or images of words? 15. Give a resume of the facts of the growth of memory. Ex- plain what is meant by the plastic power of the brain. Illustrate good habits of memory; state their importance. Should the memory be specially trained, or only incidentally, in the process of accquisition and using of knowledge ? CONNECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY WITH THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION. From the preceding statement of the conditions of reproduc- tion, discussed under the general heads of Depth of Impression and Association of Impression, it follows that the educational doctrine of Retention and Recollection (Memory) resolves itself almost wholly into a discussion of proper methods of acquiring knowledge, — the secret of a good memory being right acquisition, —good teaching, good supervision of the learning process being almost sufficient of itself to solve the question of Retention and Recollection. It is the doctrine of the text that Retention has two conditions, Attention and Repetition (see p. 161). 1. Attention. The very act of Attention to any mental ex- perience imparts immediately a certain vividness and distinctness to this experience, and ' These two conditions are a certain amount of attention and a certain frequency of repetition. Logically con- nected with the first part of this principle are the following max- ims of education : (1) The vividness and distinctness of knowledge is in pro- portion to the intensity of the act of attention, and, 208 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. (2) The fewer objects we consider at once, the clearer and more distinct will be our impressions of them; and, (3) The more clear and distinct our impression, the more permanent will be our hold upon it: therefore, if you wish your pupils to retain permanently their acquisitions, (4) Secure their concentrated attention to the subject matter before them ; Let the learning process be a matter of strenuous energy. It of necessity follows that, (5) Habits of attention and concentration are the great main- springs of education.— Tate. The careful reader will refer this maxim to (1) and (2) as above; that is, will connect habits of attention with (1) and refer the necessity for concentration to the principle mentioned in (2). (6) The habit of directing the undivided force of the facul- ties to a given subject is the great main-spring of self -education. —Tate. (7) The great problem in education is, therefore, how to in- duce the pupil to undertake and go through with a course of exertion, in its result good and even agreeable, but immediately and in itself, irksome. There is no royal road to learning. — Sir Wm. Hamilton. Having now heard from two great English writers on Educa- tion, let us consider the following noble words from the great Frenchman, Malebranche : (8) ' The discovery of truth can only be made by the labor of attention; because it is only the labor of attention that has light for its reward.' (9) ' The attention of the intellect is a natural prayer by which we obtain the enlightenment of reason; ' (10) ' Without the labor of attention, we shall never compre- hend the grandeur of religion, the sanctity of morals, the little- ness of all that if not God, the absurdity of the passions and of our internal miseries. ' But attention and consequent permanence of impression de- pend largely on the degree of interest excited. Hence follow the following maxims : PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION. 209 (11) Instruction should give pleasure to children and where this is not the case there is something wrong as regards either the mode of instruction, or the subject-matter selected for instruc- tion.— Tate. The highest pedagogical as well as the highest psychological doctrine on the connection between ' interest ' and attention is that of Sir Wm. Hamilton. First the pedagogical doctrine: (12) • Besides placing his pupil in a condition to perform the necessary process the instructor ought to do what in him lies to determine the pupil's will to the performance. But how is this to be effected? Only by rendering the effort more pleasurable than its omission.' This undoubtedly meets the case. But what kind of effort is pleasurable? What is pleasure? The psychological answer is as follows : 1 Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power, of whose energy we are conscious. ' ' The more perfect an energy is, the more pleasurable.' The conclusion is, That as the pupil is often of an age at which present pleasure is more persuasive than future good, therefore, (13) The pain of exertion must be overcome by associating with it some passion in the cause of improvement; we must awaken emulation, and allow its gratification only through a course of vigorous exertion. Without the stimulus of emulation, what can education accomplish? — Hamilton. (14) The principle of emulation and a judicious system of rewards are two of the most powerful supplemental aids in the cultivation of habit. — Tate. On the relation of curiosity to attention, Archbishop Whately has a good maxim : ' Curiosity is as much the parent of attention as attention is of memory; therefore, the first business of the teacher— first, not only in point of time but of importance— should be to excite not merely a general curiosity on the subject of study, but a par- is, 210 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. ticular curiosity on particular points in that subject. To teach one who has no curiosity to learn, is to sow a field without plowing.' 2. If we consider the doctrine of Association of Impressions with a view of deducing the proper maxims of educational. pro- cedure, we come to the same conclusion as before, that the doc- trine of Recollection is fundamentally the doctrine of right ac- quisition. The manner of acquisition determines the principles on which knowledges shall be associated. It is the teacher who meditaes between the pupil and the idea, and also between ideas themselves, that is to say, who determines what shall be re- membered and which impressions shall be remembered together, and whether they shall be associated on arbitrary or on rational principles. On this general point, we have the following educa- tional maxims: (1) Children should be accustomed to examine, analyze, and inspect every object of interest around them, — the flowers and minerals by the wayside, the animals of the fields, the warblers of the forest, the various household utensils, etc., all present excellent subjects for exercising the faculties. — Tate. (2) Never teach by rules, when you can teach by principles; never get a child to learn anything by rote until he understands the subject-matter. When he understands it, then he will readily learn it by heart and not by rote; the subject will have pene- trated his soul, — he will love it because it has become a part of himself, — it will be engraven on his mind as with a pen of iron, and there it will remain, unchanged and unchangeable, forever. —Tate. (3) Attend carefully to the logical sequence of ideas, trace cause into effect, place one fact that it may in part suggest the next, connect the various parts of your teaching. — Landon. (4) Cultivate habits of observation, inquiry, comparison, and steady perseverance ; exercise the faculties, not independently, but in relation. — Landon. (5) A conspectus, a survey of the science as a whole, ought, therefore, to precede the study of its parts ; we should be aware of its distribution before we attend to what is distributed ; we PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 211 should possess the empty frame work before we collect the mate- rial with which it is to be filled. — Hamilton. (6) Readiness in recalling our knowledge depends greatly upon philosophical association. We must form the habit of referring facts to the laws on which they depend, and of tracing out laws to the facts by which they are exemplified. — Wayland. (7) There should first be observation of life and nature, and afterwards reflection till every perception is brought into the realm of a clear consciousness. — Diesterweg. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. On the application of the doctrine of founding associa- tions to teaching reading, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, Talks III., IV., V. ; on the use of the spoken word as assisting acts of association between the idea and the written word, see Talk VI. ; on different forms of association, see Fitch's Lectures on Teach- ing, chap. V., page 126, Johonnot's Principles and Practices of Teaching, page 37, and Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part II., chap. IV., p. 236; on the law of similarity and its relation to the phonic method, see Parker, p. 50, and Johonnot as above; also Payne, Lectures, p. 159. 2. On learning and remembering, see Fitch, chap. V., p. 124; on how knowledge is gained and how retained, see Johon- not, chap. II. ; on the power of memory as limited by one's predilections, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part II., chap. IV., p. 212; on Jacotot's doctrine that we should learn so as to remember forever, see Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 212; also Payne, Educational Methods, Lectures, p. 144. 3. On associations of resemblance and contrast, see Tate, Part II., chap. IV., p. 225; on philosophical associations, seethe same chapter, p. 219; on geographical and historical contrasts, see the same reference, p. 230. 4. On importance of repetition, see Payne, Educational Meth- ods, Lectures, p. 144; for Jacotot's doctrine, 'learn one thing and 212 REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION. refer everything to that, ' see the same reference ; on impressions as secured by repetition and interest, see Fitch, p. 131. 5. On concrete and abstract, verbal and rational memory, see Fitch, chap. V., p. 131; on the error of emphasizing the culture of memory at the expense of the higher faculties, see Tate, Part II., chap. IV., page 208; for an extended consideration of meth- ods of memorizing, see Johonnot, chap. X., p. 168; for the three ways of reading a model book, see Quick, page 212 ; on the value of having learned what has been forgotten, see the same, page 214 ; for Basedow on importance of reducing the wretched exer- cises of memory, see the same, page 146 ; on science as the best instrument for training the memory, see Spencer's Education, p. 87; on the doctrine that only that which is understood may be committed to memory, see Payne, Lectures, p. 130, and Quick, p. CHAPTER VIII. CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Reproductive and Constructive Imagination. Memory is the picturing of objects and events in what are called images, and is thus a form of imagination. In memory, however, the images are supposed to be exact copies of past impressions. In other words imagination is here reproductive. But what is popularly known as imagin- ation implies more than this. When we imagine an unfamiliar coming event, or a place which is described to us, we are going beyond our past personal experience. The images of memory are being in some way modified, transformed, and recombined. Hence this process is marked off as Productive or Constructive Imagination. And the results of the process may be spoken of as secondary or derivative images, in contradistinction to the primary or radical images of memory. Modes of Imaginative Activity. Imagination works in different ways altering or modifying the products of retention. Thus it transforms by omitting certain ele- ments. The mind pictures an object as a house or tree apart from its usual local surroundings, or leaps over a number of links in a chain of events. We can imagine an object reduced in size, or wanting one of its features. In addition to this isolating activity of imagination, there is the combining. By this is meant connecting 214 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. parts of different wholes, whether juxtapositions in space or sequences in time, in new combinations. Thus the mind of the child adds new features to an object, or pictures its size greatly enlarged, and interposes new incidents in a series of events. And by this double process of separating and adding, imagination weaves together portions of unlike experiences into new com- binations. This is the perfect form of imaginative activity commonly known as Construction. What Imagination includes. We may see at once from this definition that imagination is much wider than poetic imagination or phantasy, that is to say the pictur- ing of the unreal. It stands in an intimate relation to knowledge. In anticipating what is going to happen from moment to moment, in picturing the aspects of new objects before actual inspection, the child's imagin- ation is ever coming into play. Still more widely is it exercised in learning about things from others. Every time he listens to his mother's narratives and descriptions he is working up the images supplied by his own past observation into new forms. To learn is thus to employ the imagination as well as the memory. Further, imagination is concerned in interpreting the signs of others' thoughts and feelings. To ■ read ' the mind of another is to represent a new mental state by aid of the memory of our own past states. Finally, construction, which is the essential thing in imagination, enters into action, in the discovery and mastering of new combin- ations of actions. In this form it is known as Invention. Every new sentence which the child utters, every new manual movement which he executes, takes place by WHAT IMAGINATION INCLUDES. 215 bringing together in a new form representations of actions previously performed. Analysis of Constructive Process. (1) Reproduction of Images. — This process of construction may be said roughly to fall into two stages. Of these the first is the revival of primary images, or images of memory, ac- cording to the laws of association. Thus the poet in imagining scenes and events of his ideal world sets out by recalling the facts of his experience, the images of which serve as the elements out of which the new image-structure is to be built up. It follows that the excellence of the constructive process is limited by the strength of the reproductive faculty. Unless memory restore the impressions of our past experience we cannot picture a new scene, or a new event. Thus unless a child recalls, with some measure of distinctness, one or more of the blocks of ice which he has actually seen, he cannot imagine an iceberg, or a glacier. The same applies to practical construction or invention. The elementary movements must first be mastered and retained before there can be the process of building up new combinations. (2) Elaboration of New Images. — The images of memory being thus recalled by the forces of suggestion or as- sociation, they are worked up as materials into a new imaginative product. This is the formative or construc- tive act or process proper. The process resembles that of building a new physical structure out of old materials. Certain of these are rejected, others are selected and held before the mind. Some materials are available 216 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. after a process of lopping off or breaking up. Finally the approved materials are joined together into a new whole. This active process is controlled by a representation of the result aimed at, and a sense or judgment as to what is fitting for the purpose in hand. And it is on the quality of this guiding sense that the excellence of the constructive process mainly depends. According as a poet, for example, has a clear and discriminating, or a dull and obtuse, seDse of what is aesthetically valua- ble, congruous, harmonious, etc., his constructive work will be well or ill performed. The result aimed at and the corresponding guiding sense of fitness, will differ in different cases. In read- a book of travels or a poem we seek to frame clear mental pictures which fit in with the rest of the series- We know when we have hit on the right combination of images in this case by the feeling that we understand what we read. Again in combining movements in order to bring about a wished-for practical end, we are guided by the representation of this end. The child combining words in order to express a want, knows he has succeeded when his want is understood and relieved. Receptive and Creative Imagination. The constructive act assumes one or two unlike forms which it is a matter of some practical importance to distinguish. Sometimes the direction of the activity is determined by definite external suggestion. Thus in reading a poem and form- ing a mental picture of the object described the mind of the reader is tied down to the particular combination originated by the poet and expressed by a particular LIMITS TO IMAGINATION. 217 order of words. This may be called receptive imagina- tion, and is a comparatively simple operation. The imagination of the poet, on the other hand, which cre- ated the combination had no such framework within which to confine its activity. The act of construction in this case is of a higher order, involving more com- plex processes of reproduction, rejection, and selection, and direction solely by an internal sense of what is beautiful or harmonious. Hence we commonly mark this off as original imagination. In the region of practical construction, again, the same difference is illustrated in imitative movements, such as those of drill exercises, and free inventions, where the child hits out new combinations of movement for himself. Limits to Imagination. All imaginative activity is lim- ited by experience. To begin with, it is confined to breaking up or separating and re-combining experiences. There is no such thing as a perfectly new creation. The greatest imaginative genius could not picture a perfectly new color. Again the processes of separation and combination are limited. When two things have always been conjoined in our experience it is impossible to picture them apart. Thus we cannot picture the surface of an object having no color (including under ' color' black, white, and gray). The more uniformly two things are conjoined, the more difficult it is to separate them. Thus it is much easier to picture a moving object, as a man, apart from local surroundings than a stationary one, as a church. On the other hand the mind finds it difficult to combine images as new wholes when experience suggests that 218 CONSTUCKTIVE IMAGINATION. the elements to be combined are incompatible. The Oriental king could not picture solid water or ice. We all find it hard to imagine persons on the other side of the globe with their feet towards ours, and yet not falling downwards. Just in proportion to the uniform- ity or invariability of our experience is the difficulty of breaking up and regrouping its several parts. Hence the reason why we so easily imagine objects greatly increased in size, as a giant, or greatly altered in color, as a gold mountain: for in respect of apparent magni- tude and color our experience is highly variable. Various Forms of Construction. It has been remarked that the essential process in imagination enters into a variety of mental operations. These may be grouped under three heads: (1) Construction as subserving knowledge about things; (2) Practical construction as aiding in the acquisition of knowledge how to do things, or to adapt means to ends; and (3) Construction as satisfying the emotions. The first may be called the Cognitive Imagination; the second, the Practical Im- magination or Invention ; and the third, the ^Esthetic or Poetic Imagination. (a) Cognitive Imagination. It must be evident that the expansion of knowledge beyond the bounds of personal experience and observation involves imaginative activ- ity. This is seen alike in the acquisition of new knowl- edge from others respecting things, places, and events, and also in the independent discovery of new facts by anticipation. The first illustrates the receptive, the second, the creative kind of imaginative activity. COGNITIVE IMAGINATION". 219 Imagination and Acquisition. The process of recalling, selecting, and regrouping the traces of personal experi- ence is illustrated in every case of acquisition. What is ordinarily called 'learning' whether by oral commu- nication or by books, is not simply an exercise of mem- ory; it involves an exercise of the imagination as well. In order that the meaning of the words heard or read may be realized, it is necessary to frame clear and' dis- tinct pictures of the objects described or the events nar- rated. Thus in following a description of a desert the child begins with familiar experiences called up by the words 'plain,' 'sand,' and so on. By modifying the images thus produced by memory he gradually builds up the required new T image. It may be noted that here as elsewhere knowledge consists in discriminating and assimilating. The child has to assimilate what is told him in so far as it is like his past observations, and at the same time to note how the new scene differs from the old ones. The formation of a distinct and accurate image will greatly depend on the degree of perfection attained in this part of the process. In following a description children are too apt to import too much into their mental picture, and take up the adjuncts of the images and ideas corresponding to the words. That is to say, the process of selection is incomplete. On the success of this imaginative effort what is known as the understanding of the description will depend. If, for example, the mind of a child, in following a description of an iceberg, pictures a mass of ice, but does not distinctly represent its magnitude, he will not understand the dangers arising to ships from these float- 220 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. ing masses. Here we see the close relation between clear imagination and clear thinking, a relation to be spoken of again by and by. Imagination and Scientific Acquisition. The activity of imagination enters not only into the study of subjects like geography and history, which have to do in the main with concrete objects and events, but to some extent also into the study of Science. Science has to do with the gen- eral. Yet before the mind can seize the general it must have clear images of concrete examples. These must of course be based as far as possible on perception ; but this cannot be the case always. The movements of the planets, the circulation of the blood, are things which we are called on to a great extent to imagine by aid of analogies with objects of perception. Even the ob- jects and processes which escape the observation of the senses, as the vibrations of light and heat, the conjunc- tions and disjunctions of atoms and molecules in chemical changes, have in a way to be pictured by the mind, and so the understanding of these may be said to exercise the imagination. 1 Only when clear pictures of the par- ticulars are first formed can the subsequent operations of generalization and reasoning be well carried out. Reducing the Abstract to the Concrete. This kind of im- aginative work, so far from being easy, is exceedingly difficult. It must be remembered that language is in its nature general and abstract. Hence all verbal descrip- i That is, pictured up to a certain point by the aid of analogous sense- experiences, though, as we shall see later on, there can in this case be no perfect imagination of the objects thought about. COGNITIVE IMAGINATION. 221 tion involves a gradual process of qualification or indi- vidualization. That is to say, the general name has to be supplemented by a number of qualifying terms, each of which helps to mark off the individual thing better. Thus the historian depicts a particular king or statesman by progressively enumerating his several physical and mental qualities. Now each of these qualifications, again, is in itself nothing but an abstraction. Thus the terms, ''tall,' 'handsome,' and so on, applied to a per- son are abstract terms, and each applicable to a number of persons. The process of realizing the description turns on the combination of these into a concrete object. The scientific description of a new animal or plant by means of a highly technical terminology illustrates the difficulties of this process of l concreting the abstract ' in a yet more marked manner. And a still greater strain is imposed by the description of the ' extra-sensi- ble ' world of atoms and molecules, with their intricate interactions. To ' visualize ' or see with the internal eye what is thus described implies a considerable exer- tion of the imaginative power. Imagination and Discovery. The discovery of new knowledge is largely a matter of careful observation and patient reasoning from ascertained facts and truths. Yet the scientific imagination materially assists in the process. The inquiring, searching mind is always pass- ing beyond the known to the unknown in the form of conjecturings which cannot be reduced to a process of conscious reasoning. The power of thus divining un- observed facts is known as imaginative insight into things. The child shows this capability when picturing 222 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. to himself the make of his toys, the way in which plants nourish themselves and grow, and so on. Not only does imagination thus reach out in anticipa- tion of unobserved facts, it is busy devising hypotheses for the explanation of them. A scientific hypothesis when fully developed assumes the form of a general truth. But it is reached by the help of a process of constructive imagination. That is to say, the mind pic- tures to itself the action of the forces at work by aid of past observations. Thus the undulatory movements of sound and light were at first 'visualized' by the help of certain visible undulations, as for example those of the sea. Imagination has thus a close connection with scientfic curiosity. Each reacts on the other. The desire to know stimulates the imagination to frame pictures of unexplored realities; and the activity of imagination, leading to conjectural prevision, quickens the desire to investigate in order to verify the conjecture. It is true that imagination, if not controlled by a critical spirit, may take the place of patient investigation. But when duly restrained by judgment, it is a great aid to investi- gation. * Imagination of Untried Experiences. Our knowledge has to do not simply with the outer world, but with the in- ner world of feeling and thought. And this knowledge, too, implies in addition to memory, a process of imagin- ative construction. Our knowledge of ourselves consists not merely in recalling what we have actually felt and done, but in representing how we should feel, think, and act in new circumstances. In anticipating the future, PRACTICAL CONTRIVANCE. 223 we are continually representing to ourselves the effects of new surroundings on our emotional susceptibilities and our active inclinations. 1 (b) Practical Contrivance. 2 A process of construction enters into practical acquisition, learning how to do things, as talk, dress, write, draw, and so forth. The child's movements are being continually modified, sep- arated, and recombined in conformity with new cir- cumstances and new needs. He is by nature endowed with plentiful active energy, and this of itself leads con- tinually to new tentatives, new experiments. A good part of the child's mental energy thus finds its natural vent in the direction of practical imagination. Imitative Construction. Much of this new motor acqui- sition is guided by others' actions. The impulse of imi- tation leads a child to attempt all sorts of action which he sees others perform. This is seen plainly enough in his play, which is largely a mimicry of the serious actions of adults. This is the receptive side of practical imagination. The exercises of the school, such as sing- ing and writing, illustrate the same process. The sim- pler actions of the voice or of the hand which are already mastered are combined in more complex opera- tions under the guidance of an external model. i The imagination of others' experiences, their feelings and doings, illustrates the same process. This will be shown more fully when we come to deal with sympathy. 2 Although the exercise of constructive activity in practical invention is related to the growth of will, there is some convenience in anticipating and treating it here along with imaginative construction in the narrow sense. 224 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Such combinations are rarely hit on precisely at once. The child's first attempts at vocal imitation are often wide of the mark. 1 The same applies to the manual actions involved in drawing, or writing. In many cases, moreover, the new combination implies a separation of movements previously associated, and such separation adds to the difficulty of the operation. Thus we may observe that the child in building up new vocal combi- nations is apt to be clogged by irrelevant associations. Hence it is only by repeated trial and gradual approxi- mation that the required combination is effected. Pro- gress in such acquisition depends on his previous com- mand of the muscles in simpler movements, and on concentration of mind and perseverance. Original Construction: Invention. While new practical acquirements are thus learnt by imitation and instruc- tion, they are also being gained by individual origina- tion and invention. Children find out many new com- binations of movement for themselves. Their strong active impulses find a satisfaction in manual and other experiments. The pleasure of doing a thing, of over- coming difficulty, is an ample reward for many an effort in practical construction. Such activity is, moreover, closely connected with the impulse of curiosity, the desire to find out about things, their structure and less obvious qualities. In this way practical invention assists in the discovery of facts and truths. A considerable part of the knowledge of things is thus gained, experi- i This is by no means always the case. Indeed, one is often surprised at the readiness of a young child endowed with a good ear and a good articulation in giving back a new grouping of sounds. AESTHETIC IMAGINATION. 225 mentally, that is to say, by means of actively separating, dividing, combining, and otherwise manipulating ob- jects. (c) JEsthetic Imagination. ^Esthetic or Poetic Imagin- ation is not subservient to the pursuit of knowledge, whether knowledge about things or knowledge how to attain results. It aims at immediate enjoyment. This applies alike to the receptive and to the creative side of the process. The child listening to a story, or inventing a story for himself, is in each case impelled by the desire for the enjoyment which the images afford. It is this mode of constructive activity which answers to the popular conception of imagination. Imagination and Feeling. ^Esthetic Imagination is thus distinguished by the presence of feeling or emotion. This gives a peculiar vividness to imagination, and also directs it in certain channels which answer to the feeling. Any feeling may thus stimulate the activity of imagin- ation. Thus when fear is excited in the mind the imagination is swayed and bent in the direction of what answers to the feeling, that is to say, the terrible and horrible. The pleasurable emotions, such as love, the emotion of power, the sentiment of beauty, are wont to indulge themselves, or seek a certain mode of satisfaction or gratification through the activity of imagination. Thus the mother dwells on the future of her child: the boy dreams of great achievements: the poet shapes forms which thrill the mind with wonder and yield the pure delight of beauty. In this way the mind adds what is called 'ideal,' to its real satisfactions. The mother o 226 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. by dwelling in fancy on the possibilities of the future, gains a measure of the same enjoyment which the actual realization of her wishes would bring. The imaginary scenes and actions of poetry afford something of the same delight which the actual perception of such objects would supply. Transcending the Real. We have seen that imagination is able (within certain limits) to vary or transform the actual events of our experience. Under the stimulus of an emotion, such as the feeling for the beautiful, or the sublime, imagination is wont to rise above the ordinary level of experiences and to picture objects, circumstances, and events surpassing those of every day life. The ideal creations of the imagination are thus apt to trans- cend the region of sober fact. Hence the realm of romance and fairyland. Imagination opposed to Intellect. The indulgence in these pleasures of imagination is legitimate within certain bounds. But it is attended with dangers, moral and intellectual. A young person whose mind dwells long on the wonders of romance may grow discontented with actual life. Or he learns to find his satisfaction in such ideal indulgence; and so by the habitual severance of emotion and volition, ceases to feel the presence of every day motives, a result illustrated by the history of Coleridge and other 'dreamers.' This constitutes the moral danger. The intellectual danger is that by an excessive activity of imagination the regions of fact and fiction may become confused. All vivid imagination appears, as was suggested above, to be attended with a INTELLECTUAL VALUE OF IMAGINATION. 227 measure of belief. Children of very lively imagination easily drift into the belief that their dream-images and their waking fancies answer to realities. Intellectual Value of Imagination. We have now seen that the imagination stands in a double relation to in- tellection or knowing. On the one hand, when controlled by the will and directed to the ends of truth it is an important ancillary in the acquisition and discovery of knowledge. On the other hand, when uncontrolled, or when subjected to the powerful sway of emotion, it easily opposes the progress of knowledge. Writers on the imagination have been wont to dwell rather on this second aspect, and to overlook the function of the imagination in thinking and understanding. The old opposition of imagination and understanding rested on an inadequate apprehension of its operations. No doubt imagination and thought are broadly contrasted, since the former has to do with the concrete in its fulness of detail, while the understanding has to do with the general in its bareness and simplicity. 1 Yet there is a connection between the two, which recent psycholo- gists have come to see. When duly controlled imagin- ative activity prepares the way for the higher processes of thinking. By giving mobility and flexibility to the images of memory it is an essential preliminary to the activity of thought. Thus by breaking up or dissolving complex images and series of images into their parts and allowing the isolated picturing of objects and i The broad contrast between the two has been illustrated in a very interesting way by Mr. Galton. As he justly remarks, " our bookish and wordy education tends to repress this valuable gilt of nature.'" Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 113. 228 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. events, it facilitates the processes of abstraction (turning the mind from the complexities of individual things). And by combining mental pictures in new wholes it paves the way for the synthetic activity of thought in combining thought-elements (notions) in new relations. Development of Imagination. Just as memory only be- gins to develop when the faculty of perception has been exercised up to a certain point, so imagination only distinctly appears when memory has attained a certain stage of perfection. This applies alike to construction as concerned with objects and with actions. The child must be able to recall distinctly a number of pre- vious sense-experiences before he can build up new pictures of what is going to happen, or strike out new combinations of movement. Germ of Imagination. Although the infant shows the germ of imagination under the form of anticipating what is new, it is not till language is mastered that its activity becomes well marked. It is in listening to the simple narrations and descriptions of the mother or nurse that the power of framing new pictures is first exercised. It is noteworthy that the child will only manifest interest in such narrations after he has been accustomed to a verbal recital of his own personal expe- riences. The capability of representing a new series of events depends on the exercise of the reproductive im- agination in recalling old successions. In this way the child's knowledge of things gradually widens, passing outwards from the narrow circle of his individual obser- vations, and embracing larger and larger regions of space and time. children's fancy. 229 Children's Fancy: Nature of Play. After a certain amount of exercise of constructive power in this simple receptive form, the child shows a spontaneous disposi- tion to build up fancies on his own account. The feel- ing of possessing a new power seems to act as a motive here. At first this activity of fancy manifests itself in close connection with the perception of actual objects. This is illustrated in children's play. Play offers as we have seen ample scope for practical ingenuity: it is the natural vent of active impulse, the liking to do things, and to find out new ways of doing them. But it owes its interest to another circumstance, namely that it is a mimicry and kind of make-believe of the actions of adults. When at play the child realizes by an exercise of fancy the objects and actions which he is mimicking. The actual presentations supply a basis of fact on which the imagination more easily constructs its fabric. 1 By the alchemy of imagination the doll becomes in a man- ner transformed into a living child, the rude stick into a horse, and so on. A very rough basis of analogy will suffice for these creations of fancy: hence a boy will derive as much pleasure from a broken and shapeless hobby-horse as from the most life-like toy. Play thus illustrates in a striking manner the liveliness of children's fancy. In their spontaneous games they betray the germs of artistic imagination: they are in a sense at once poets and actors. Children' 8 Fictions. A child of three or four years who has heard a number of stories will display great activity i The aid rendered by the presence of an actual object to the activity of imagination is illustrated in the fact quoted by Mr. Galton that chess- g layers can think out a game better when they have the empty chess- oard present. 230 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. in modelling new ODes. 1 These fabrications show the influence of the child's own experience and observation as well as of the narratives of others. At this period original fancy often assumes extravagant shapes. A strong susceptibility to the excitement of the marvellous, often supplies the impelling force in these constructions. Young children are wont to project themselves in- fancy to distant regions of space and to transform themselves into other objects. Thus a child barely three years was accustomed to wish she might live in the water with the fishes, or be a beautiful star in the sky. The daring of these combinations is to a considerable extent ac- counted for by the child's ignorance of what is impossi- ble and improbable in reality. To the young mind to fly up into the sky is an idea which has nothing absurd about it. The riotous activity of children's fancy is thus due in part to their want of experience and judg- ment. Imagination brought under Control. The progress of ex- perience and the growth of knowledge lead to a moder- ation of childish fancy. From the first spontaneous form in which it is free to follow every capricious impulse, it passes into the more regulated form in which it is controlled by an enlightened will. That is to say, its activity becomes directed by the sense of what is true, life-like, and probable. The old nursery stories cease to please. Narratives based on real life, histories i These fanciful creations are often built up on a slender basis of ob- servation. Thus a little girl (5% years) once found a stone with a hole in it, and set to work to weave a pretty fairy tale respecting It. To her fancy it became the wonderful stone, having inside it beautiful rooms, and lovely fairies who dance, sing and live happily. TRAINING OF THE IMAGINATION. 231 of children, their doings and experiences, take their place. In this way the earlier impulses, the love of the marvellous, the liking for the grotesque and ridiculous, are replaced by higher motives, a desire to learn about things, and a regard for what is true to nature and life. Training of the Imagination. The side of imaginative activity which will chiefly interest us here is the cogni- tive side. The peculiar position of the faculty in rela- tion to Intellect on one side and Emotion on the other gives rise to problems of peculiar difficulty. As we have seen, the power of picturing what has never been actually seen is of the utmost value for knowledge. And yet this same power if indulged in to excess may give rise to illusions, and so frustrate the purposes of intellect. Restraining Immoderate Fancy. That imagination requires restraining nobody will doubt. " Nothing is more dangerous to reason than the flight of imagination. . . Men of bright fancies may in this respect be compared to those angels whom the Scriptures represent as cover- ing their eyes with their wings." ] In the case of children of very vivid imaginations the treatment of the faculty is often a matter of some difficulty. Wild, dis- concerting, and injurious fancies must, it is plain, be dispelled. And the vividness of fancy must not be carried to the point of confusing fiction and reality. In such a case the immediate object of training should be to strengthen concurrently the powers of judging and reasoning as a make-weight against a too lively imagin- ation. i Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I., Pt. IV., §7. 232 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. Guiding the Fancy. It seems probable, however, that the perils of indulging children's fancy have been some- what exaggerated. In the case of healthy children who are kindly treated the exercise of fancy rarely leads to bad moral or intellectual consequences. Children appear to dream vividly, yet as a rule they soon distinguish between their dreams and their real waking experiences. A strong native bent to imaginative activity requires to be guided rather than resisted and frustrated. By a judicious course of training it may be transformed into the germ of a tine historical, scientific, or poetic imagination. Stimulating the Imagination. Not only so, in average cases it is desirable to stimulate the imaginative power by supplying appropriate objects. The habitual narration of stories, description of places, and so on, is an essential ingredient in the rudimentary stages of education. The child that has been well drilled at home in following stories, will, other things being equal, be the better learn- er at school. The early nurture of imagination by means of good wholesome food has had much to do with determining the degree of imaginative power, and, through this, of the range of intellectual activity ulti- mately reached. Conditions of Sound Training. In order to train the imagination wisely we must attend to the natural laws of its operation. Thus it is obvious that the constructive tasks imposed should be adapted to the experiences of the child. The first rule then is to see that the child has command of the necessary materials. By these are STIMULATING THE IMAGINATION. 233 meant not only the images which supply the elements or details of the mental picture, but a representation or representations which may serve as a rough model for the composition. Thus, to take a simple example, a child will be aided to form a mental picture of a snow mount- ain not only by recalling the mountain form and the white snow, but also by referring to some familiar object which shall serve as type or model, as a loaf of sugar. The second rule is to awaken an adequate interest or motive. The materials provided for constructive activity, the scene described, or the action narrated, must be interesting and attractive, as well as within the child's grasp. Here the study of the emotional side of child-nature, and of its many variations is necessary. Gradation of Exercise. The imaginative faculty, like every other faculty, must be called into play gradually. Not only must the constructive operation be adapted to the growing experience of the child, and the natural order of unfolding of his feelings, it must be suited to the degree of imaginative power already attained. Thus descriptions and narrations should increase in length and intricacy by gradual steps. The first exercises of the imagination should be by means of short accounts of interesting incidents in animal and child life. Such stories deal in experiences which are thoroughly intel- ligible and interesting to the child. The best of the traditional stories, as that of Cinderella, are well fitted by their simplicity as well as by their romantic and adventurous character to please and engross the imagin- ation. And fables in which the moral element is not made too burdensome, and in which the child's charac- 234 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. teristic feelings, e. g., his love of fun, are studied, will commonly be reckoned among his favorites. When new feelings of curiosity unfold, and the imaginative faculty gains strength by exercise, more elaborate and less exciting stories may be introduced. Children^ Literature. It may be safely said that a good part of the so-called children's literature offends by inattention to the obvious conditions of success. It is not needful to dwell on the ' night mare ' stories which injure children by disposing them to images of the terrible, though examples of this are not wanting in classical collections of fairy-tales. Nor need one refer to the ' goody ' books which commonly weary them (when they succeed in engaging any measure of their attention at all). It is enough to touch on the common error of describing experiences, situations, impressions and feelings, quite out of their mental reach. The writers of children's books but too rarely have the art of looking at the world with the eyes of a young person. His powers of understanding and his emotional capa- bilities are alike over-rated. He is expected to under- stand intricate motives, to appreciate delicate touches of humor which would escape many an adult, and to manifest an aesthetic taste on a level with the latest refinements. Anybody who will take a little trouble to scan the so-called ' popular' children's stories of the present day, and what is more, carefully observe how children read them, will satisfy himself that even in this prolific age the stories which really come home to young minds are few enough. IMAGINATION IN TEACHING. 235 Exercise of the Imagination in Teaching. As we have seen, the imagination is called into activity in all branches of teaching. In some branches, as History and Geography, it is more especially exercised. Here then a knowledge of the laws of operation of the faculty will be a matter of great importance to the teacher. A word or two must suffice on this head. To begin with, since new images can only be formed out of old materials, it is desirable to call up past im- pressions in the most vivid way. This end will be secured to some extent by a wise selection of words. These must be simple and familiar, fitted to call up images at once. More than this, the teacher should remind the child of facts in his experience the represen- tations of which may serve as the elements of the new image, or as its model. Thus in describing an historical event the several features must be made clear by parallel facts in the child's small world and the whole scene made distinct by the help of rough analogies. In doing this, however, the teacher must be careful to help the child to distinguish the new from the old and not to import into the new image the accidental and irrelevant accessories of his experience. Once more, the teacher must seek to follow the nat- ural order in exercising the imagination. He should remember that clear images are built up gradually. There is first a dim outline, a blurred scheme, and this gradually grows distinct by additions of detailed features. Thus the description of a country best begins with a rough outline of its contour, its surroundings, and its larger features, as mountain-chains, etc. Simi- larly historical narrative best sets out with some general 236 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. outline of events which may serve as a time-scheme for the particular incidents to be dealt with. Not only so, the teacher should progress by steps from the known to the unknown and from the simple to the complex. The method in teaching geography, of setting out with the child's immediate surroundings, and gradually passing to more distant regions, illustrates the importance of the first condition. The practice in the teaching of history, of giving a biographical account of a sovereign with the least possible reference to social circumstances, illustrates the importance of the second condition. Fi- nally, the imagination may be greatly aided by sense- presentations. It has been remarked above that fancy builds up its creations most easily when there is a basis of actual observation at the moment. And this condi- tion is complied with by a judicious use of maps, models, pictures, etc. References. The processes of constructive imagination have not been fairly dealt with by English psychologists. The accounts given by D. Stewart and Sir W. Hamilton are slight and inadequate. Prof. Bain deals more fully with the theme in his own manner under the head of ' Constructive Asso- ciation ' (Senses and Intellect : Intellect, Chap. IV.). There are some good remarks on practical constructiveness in Miss Edgeworth's Essays, Vol. II., Chap. XXI. (On Memory and Invention). The application of the psychology of the imagination to the teaching of History and Geography is well illustrated in Mr. Fitch's treatment of these subjects, Lectures on Teaching, Chaps. XII. and XIII. APPENDIX. SUGGESTIVE AND TEST EXERCISES. 1. Give exact examples from your own mental experiences or those of your pupils, of each of the following acts of mind. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 237 That is to say, select some past mental operations which may- serve as illustrations of the general acts of mind here set down : Reproductive Imagination, constructive imagination, the isolating 'activity of the imagination, the combining activity of the imagination, receptive imagination, original imagination, cognitive construction, practical construction, and poetic construction. 2. Set down in thought also examples of the following men- tal operations : (1) A learning process which is purely reproductive. (2) A learning process which is both reproductive and con- structive. (3) A learning process which is almost purely inventive. (4) A learning process of motor acquisition. (5) A learning act of constructive imagination resulting in the full understanding of subject-matter. 3. As an exercise in the practical study of mind, consider exactly what mental processes a child goes through in reading for the first time the following sentence. Suppose him to be well prepared to read the sentence but never to have seen the particular collocation of words before: John's hat is in the well. 4. Make a special study, in connection with these chapters on imagination, of the 'psychology of learning to compose,' that is, of the mental operations involved in the framing of a new oral sentence. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. In what respects is Memory a form of imagination? What is the difference between an act of reproductive and an act of constructive imagination? Which is the more simple process, and why? Which is the higher form of energy, and why? How are the images of memory modified when we picture an unfamil- iar coming event? 2. Show how large a part of our mental processes involves imagination. How is it related to the acquisition of knowledge? In what way does imagination enter into our study of the minds of 238 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. others? Show that in every new word or sentence learned by the child there is a new form of imagination. 3. What are the two stages of the constructive process?^ Which of these is logically first? What determines the perfec- tion or excellence of the constructive process? Illustrate. 4. How do we know that we have the thought or contents of what we read? How do we know that we understand the desires and thoughts of a pupil? In what way can we know the student comprehends our teaching? Show how imagination enters into all the learning and teaching processes just referred to. 5. What is the distinction between receptive and creative im- agination? Is this distinction the same as that of reproductive and constructive imagination? Show the difference. Which is the higher form of energy, reading Enoch Arden or composing a simi- lar imaginative sketch? Which is the higher form of learning, perfecting one's knowledge of the definitions of physics or invent- ing new forms of physical apparatus ? 6. Show how the acquisition from others of new knowledge of things, places, and events involves receptive imagination. Show how design in drawing is related to imagination. How does sim- plifying the construction of apparatus involve the same form gf activity? 7. What is learning? What does it involve besides memory? Show from the standpoint of constructive imagination that all learning must be based on previous knowledge. What intuitions must a child possess in order to follow a description of a desert ? To understand the relation of the planets to the sun? Show the connection between clear imagination and clear thinking. 8. How is the acquisition of historical knowledge related to imagination? What are the intuitions which fit the mind for understanding a description of a siege? Of the opening of parlia- ment? Of Luther at the Diet of Worms? AVhat class of intu- itions — images of what concrete objects and events — fit a student for the exercise of an historical imagination? 9. Show how the acquisition of a knowledge of Astronomy involves constructive imagination. Of Physiology? Of Physics? PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 239 Of Chemistry? What sensible intuitions are the necessary prep- aration for the study of each of these sciences? 10. What is meant by 'visualizing' a description? What by ' idealizing ' an historical event, or a geographical climatic condi- tion? What is meant by 'concreting the abstract'? In what way is Language here involved? Show that these processes of 'visualizing,' 'realizing,' and 'concreting' are the necessary con- ditions of all learning through oral teaching as well as from books? Is there any substitute for language as the medium of instruction and culture? REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. For Reading as mental action, as constructive imagination in getting the thought of the printed page, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, p. 29. On the importance of perfecting the construct- ive imaginative process in reading before proceeding to expres- sion, see the same, pp. 38 and 69. On oral reading as a means of knowing whether the reader has perfectly imaged to himself the thought of the writer, see the same, pp. 38-39. 2. On Intuition (Anschauung) — the power of gaining knowl- edge by direct experiences — as the basis of reproductive and con- structive imagination — as the basis of all knowledge, see Pesta- lozzi as quoted by Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, pp. 243 and 250; also Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 188; on Comenius's doc- trine as to this, the same, p. 60; see also Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I., chap. III., Primitive Intelligence; on Locke's reference to real knowledge, Quick, p. 88; on Rous- seau's anticipation of Pestalozzi's object-lessons, the same, pp. 109-113. On the things of the world to be known first directly through the senses and then more extendedly through imagina- tion as in pictures, see the same, p. 146, and on the general use of pictures, p. 267. 3. On the importance of the cultivation of the imagination, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part II. , chap. V. ; on the • picturing out' method of teaching, see same chapter; also Lan- 240 CONSTRUCTIVE IMAGINATION. don's School Management, Part I., chap. V., p. 86; on poetry, drawing, music, and art in general, in relation to education, the same, also Landon, as above. 4. On imagination as the only means of teaching Geography, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, Talk XVIII., near the beginning; on the fact that all that we remember must be imaged in space, and on the true imagination-method in geography as illustrated in the method of modern historians and novelists, see the same chapter; on the intuitions — sense-products — which are the neces- sary preliminary to geography, see Talk XIX,, near beginning; on geography as the best means of cultivating imagination, see the same; for 'home-geography' as the best means of imaging to the mind the distant and new, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. XII. 5. On common school education as heretofore tending to crush imaginative development, see Parker, p. 127; oa all knowl- edge of the unseen as dependent on imagination, p. 126. 6. On Invention — constructive imagination — as a part of self-instruction, see Payne, The Practice or Art of Education, Lectures, pp. 98 and 101; for Burke quoted on the method of discovery in teaching, the same, p. 101 ; see also Page's Theory and Practice, chap. V., section III., near the end. 7. On Diesterweg's distinction of Elementary and Scientific methods of teaching, see Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, p. 247 ; the elementary method as inventive, and the ' scientific method ' as opposed to invention, the same, p. 249. 8. On the danger of didactic instruction when the imagination does not respond, see Rousseau, quoted by Quick, Educational Beformers, p. 133, also Payne, True Foundation of Science Teach- ing, near the end, Lectures, p. 225. CHAPTER IX. CONCEPTION. Particular and General Knowledge : Thought. The intel- lectual operations hitherto considered have had to do with individual things. To perceive, remember, and imagine has reference to some particular object, as the River Thames, or a particular occurrence, as the open- ing of the New Law-Courts. But we may reflect and reason about rivers or ceremonies in general. When we do so, we are said to think. All thinking is repre- sentation like imagination, but it is a different sort of representation. It is the representation not of individ- ual things (e. g., John Smith), but of classes (e. g., Eng- lishman, human being). In thinking we are concerned not with single objects in their ' concrete ' fulness of individual peculiarities or characteristics (e. g., this tree with all its individual peculiarities of form, color, etc.), but with certain of their ' abstract ' qualities, that is to say, aspects common to them and many other things (e. g., the possession of life). This higher province of intellectual activity broadly marks off human from ani- mal intelligence. Thinking Defined. Thinking may be roughly defined as a going over, sorting, and arranging the store of par- ticular cognitions gained by sense-perception and re- tained by memory. Like the simpler forms of cognition 242 CONCEPTION. it consists in discrimination and assimilation, in detect- ing differences and agreements. It differs from these in the mode of exercise of these fundamental functions. Thinking is discrimination and assimilation performed on the results of sense-perception and reproduction. Not only so, as we shall see presently, it is assimilation and discrimination of a higher kind, involving much more activity of mind. Thinking and Understanding. Thinking is closely re- lated to Understanding, and indeed the two words are ofteu used to mark off the same region of intellectual operation. When we view an object as a concrete whole, we apprehend it: when, however, we regarfl it under some common aspect, we comprehend it. The child apprehends this particular building, that is to say, as an individual thing distinct from surrounding things, having a particular shape, size, etc.: he comprehends it when he recognizes it as a church. Similarly he under- stands an event when he assimilates it to other and already familiar events on the ground of a common cause. Thus he understands the fall of snow when he takes a lump into his hand and finds out that it has weight To understand things is thus to assimilate them to other things, and this is just what we mean by thinking. Thinking based on Comparison. All thinking implies comparing one object with another. By an act of com- parison is meant the voluntary direction of attention to two or more objects at the same moment, or in immediate succession, with a view to discover their differences or STAGES OF THINKING. 243 their agreements. The objects may be both present to- gether, and placed in juxtaposition, as when a teacher compares the handwriting of a child with the copy; or, as often happens, may be (either wholly or in part) rep- resented, as when we recall a person's face in order to compare it with another which we are now observing. Thinking and Language. It is allowed by all that there is an intimate connection between thinking and language. Man is distinguished from the lower animals by the at- tribute of speech as well as by that of understanding. The thinking powers of the several races of mankind vary with the degree of complexity and elaborateness of their language. The child's power of thought grows step by step with his power of speech. Much of our thinking is plainly carried on by the aid of spoken lan- guage, namely all that is connected with conversing or exchanging ideas. And even in the case of solitary or silent thought, internal observation at once tells us that an inaudible or suppressed speech co-operates. Language is in its very nature a system of general signs or symbols which may be applied to an indefinite number of objects. And it is only by the help of lan- guage (or some other equivalent set of signs) that we can think, in the strict sense of the word, that is to say, con- sider things under their general or common aspects. Stages of Thinking. We commonly distinguish three stages of thinking. First of all there is the formation of general notions or concepts, which may be said to con- stitute the elements of thought, such as ' material body', 'weight.' This is called conception. Next to this 244 CONCEPTION. comes the combining of two concepts in the form of a statement or proposition, as when we say ■ material bod- ies have weight.' This is termed an act of Judgment. Lastly, we have the operation by which the mind passes from certain judgments (or statements) to certain other judgments, as when from the assertions ' material sub- stances have weight,' 'gases are material substances,' we proceed to the further assertion i gases have weight.' This process is described as Reasoning, or drawing an inference or conclusion. These distinctions have been fixed by logicians and not by psychologists. The mental process in each case is substantially the same. Not only so, as we shall see presently, these operations are not carried on separately, but are involved one in the other. Nevertheless, since they roughly mark off the more simple and the more complex modes of thinking, and products of thought, it is convenient ?to the psychologist to adopt the distinc- tions. We shall accordingly in the present chapter deal with the process of conception, or concept-formation, and in the following chapter consider the processes of judg- ing and reasoning. Definition of General Notion or Concept. A concept, other-wise called a general notion or a general idea, is the representation in our minds answering to a general name, such as soldier, man, animal. There has been much discussion concerning the nature of these general representations, or ' abstract ideas ' as they are some- times called. It is clear that they are related to con- crete images of particular objects. Thus the concept ' soldier ' is connected in my mind with the representa- HOW CONCEPTS ARE FORMED. 245 tions of various individual soldiers known to me. But when I use the word 'soldier' I do not fully represent any individual soldier with his particular height, style of uniform, etc., nor do I distinctly represent a succession of such individuals. What is in my mind is a kind of composite image formed by the fusion or coalescence of many images of single objects, in which individual dif- ferences are blurred, and only the common features stand out distinctly. Thus my representation of a soldier cor- responds to a rough sketch of the soldier figure with some kind of uniform and carrying some kind of weapon. This may be called a typical or generic image. How Concepts are formed. The more concrete concepts or ' generic ' images are formed to a large extent by a pas- sive process of assimilation. The likeness among dogs for example is so great and striking that when a child already familiar with one of these animals sees a second he re- cognizes it as identical with the first in certain obvious aspects. The representation of the first combines with the presentation of the second, bringing into distinct re- lief the common dog-features, more particularly the canine form. In this way the images of different dogs come to overlap, so to speak, giving rise to a typical image of dog. 1 Here there is very little of active direc- tion of mind from one thing to another in order to dis- cover where the resemblance lies: the resemblance forces itself on the mind. When, however, the resem- blance is less striking, as in the case of the more abstract iMr. Galton compares these generic images to composite pictures formed by the overlapping or superimposing of a number of photographic impressions on a plate. See Inquiries into Human Faculty, Appendix, 1 Generic Images,' p. 349. 246 CONCEPTION. concepts (e. g. y animal), a distinct operation of active comparison is involved. This is the operation which we have now especially to investigate. Comparison, Abstraction, and Generalization. The active mental process by which concepts are formed is com- monly said to fall into three stages, comparison, abstrac- tion, and generalization. These are however very intimately related, and are only distinguishable aspects of the same mental operation. First of all it is needful that a number of objects having a certain degree of likeness should be somehow brought before the mind. As already pointed out, these objects may be actually present or may be called up by the representative imagination. We then compare them, that is regard them by a special act of attention in their mutual relation, in order to see how far, and in what respects, they resemble one another. Now when things are widely unlike one another, as for example different fruits, as a strawberry, a peach, and so on, we must in order to note the resemblance turn the mind away from the differences of form, color, etc. This is the difficult part of the operation. Great differences are apt to impress the mind, and it requires a special effort to turn aside from them and to keep the mind directed to the underlying similarity. This effort is known as abstraction. It implies a high exercise of the power of voluntary attention acting in opposition to what is impressive or interesting (see p. 79). 1 The greater i Abstraction means etymologically the active withdrawal (of atten- tion) from one thing in order to fix it on another thing (Lat. db and trdho). Although we commonly speak of abstraction in reference to turning away from differences to similarities the same process shows itself in other CONCEPTION AND NAMING. 247 the vigor of mind thrown into this act of abstraction, the clearer or more perfect will be the detection of the common features (e. g., the fruit marks or traits). Finally, having thus seized by an effort of abstraction the common traits of the several individual specimens of fruit, the child generalizes, that is to say forms a notion of a class of things which have the qualities detected. That is to say out of the images thus brought together and compared he forms a general notion of a class of things. Conception and Naming. This process of conception takes place in immediate connection with naming. For the sake of simplicity we will first suppose that the child begins to use the name when he compares a number of objects, and seizes the points of resemblance among these; just as a scientific discoverer invents a name to mark off some newly-discovered class of things. He applies the term fruit to the various objects compared and found to have certain common characters or marks. The name is thus given not to one object but to a number; and it is given to them with special reference to their points of similarity. That is to say, by being given to the several objects, pears, oranges, etc., the name serves in a peculiar way to indicate, define, and fix this relation of similarity among them. But for the appending of a name the recognition of points of simi- larity would be vague and momentary only. forms. Thus in looking at a face we may withdraw attention from the eyes and fix it on some less impressive feature. If two things (e. g., two sheep) are very like we need to make an effort of abstraction in order to overlook the similarities and attend to the differences. 248 CONCEPTION. Our observer will be henceforth disposed to apply the name fruit to any object (familiar or unfamiliar) in which he discovers the marks or characters specially associated with the name. Thus on seeing a lemon or a fig, he will call the object a fruit. That is to say just as on meeting with the name the concept or typical idea will be called up, so on meeting with any of the corres- ponding things the name will be called up. The name has thus become a class-name, denoting a number of objects resembling one another in certain particulars; and connoting these common characters by virtue of which the objects are mentally connected and called by one name. We must now, however, abandon the supposition that the child fashions his concept at one time and in the systematic way described above. The process of ab- straction is a slowly progressive one. Thus the notion fruit is only gradually extricated from percepts and images after many successive comparisons, each of which adds an element of exactness to the growing concept. And this implies that words are not at first used as general signs. Thus the name fruit might at the outset be applied to one kind, or at most to two kinds, of fruit. At this stage it would call up a blurred image, or a nascent or rudimentary concept only. The growth of the concept progresses step by step with the extension of the name to new objects. Discovering the Meaning of Words. One other correction of the above account of the conceptual process remains to be made. We have supposed that the child brings objects together and compares them on his own account NOTIONS WHICH INVOLVE SYNTHESIS. 249 without any guidance from others. This process does actually take place. Children discover resemblances among things and call them by the same name quite spontaneously and without any suggestion from others. At the same time it is obvious that the greater part of their concepts are formed (in part at least) by listening to others and noting the way in which they employ words. The process is in this case very much the same as before. A child finds out the meaning of a word, such as ' man,' ' good boy,' and so forth, by comparing the different instances in which it is used, abstracting from the variable accompaniments and fixing the atten- tion on the common or essential circumstance. Notions which involve Synthesis. Many of our notions involve, in addition to a process of abstraction and analysis, a process of combination or synthesis. That is to say, we require to regroup the results of abstrac- tion in new combinations. Thus in the study of history we have to build up out of the results of observation and abstraction such notions as * Roman Emperor,' * feudal system,' etc. This process, the synthetic formation of complex concepts, goes on in many cases hand in hand with a process of constructive imagination. By this last an image, or a number of images, are first elaborated, which give the peculiar form or structure to the con- cept. In this way we should form an idea of a Roman consul, of a volcano, and so forth. In other cases, however, this accompaniment of constructive imagination is wanting. Conception passes beyond the limits of distinct visual representation. 250 CONCEPTION. Ideas of Magnitude and Number. This process of trans- cending the limits of imagination is illustrated in the formation of ideas of all objects of great magnitude and of these magnitudes themselves. Our ideas of objects of small size, as a single building, a troop of soldiers, a yard-measure or a bushel, as well as of small durations, as a second, are all based on percepts and images. On the other hand, our notions of objects or collections of vast size, as a city, a planet, a nation, the distance from the earth to the sun, and of vast durations, as a century, do not correspond to any distinct images. These ideas are reached by a process of continued summation or addition of magnitudes which are themselves intuitable and picturable. Thus in forming an idea of the earth we have to take some familiar magnitude, say that of a school globe, and to perform a prolonged process of piling up quantity on quantity, or measure on measure. Notions of Geometry. This synthetic activity is illus- trated in a somewhat different way in the formation of another class of notions. Our idea of a mathematical line, a circle, and so forth, does not exactly answer to any observable form. No straight line, for instance, discoverable in any actual object, perfectly answers to the geometric definition. Even the most carefully drawn line would be found on closer inspection to deviate to some extent from the required type. It follows that these notions involve more than a simple process of ab- straction, such as suffices, for example, for the detection of the quality color or weight. They presuppose in addition to this a process of idealization. The student of geometry in thinking about a perfectly straight line ACCURACY OF CONCEPTS. 251 has to frame a conception of something to which certain actual forms only roughly approximate. The notion thus represents, like that of a large number, the result of a prolonged mental process which surpasses the limits of distinct imagination. Accuracy and Inaccuracy of Concepts. As in the case of images, so here we have to distinguish between the mere indistinctness of a concept, and its positive inaccuracy. A distinct notion depends on our clearly representing the marks we take up into our notion: an accurate notion depends on our taking up the right elements. By this is meant that we include the common characters of the class, or more exactly, all those included in the cur- rent meaning of the word, and no others. Or, to express the same thing in different language, an accurate con- cept is such that the word in which it is embodied will cover or *tand for all the things commonly denoted by that name, and for no other. Notions which are too Narrow. In the first place, a notion may be formed on too narrow an observation of things, the consequence of which is that accidental fea- tures not shared in by all members of the class are taken up into the meaning of the word as part of its essential import. For example, a child that has only seen red roses is apt to regard redness as a part of the meaning of rose. Similarly an uneducated Englishman is apt to think of government as implying the existence of a monarch. Such notions are too narrow. Notions which are too Wide. In the second place, a no- tion may be inaccurate by being too wide. If the ob- 252 CONCEPTION. nervation of things is superficial and hasty, only a part of the common traits or marks are embodied in the name. The notions of children and of the uneducated are apt to be too wide. They pick up a part, but only a part, of the significance of the words they hear employed. Thus they observe among different fish the conspicuous circumstance that they live in the water, and so they are disposed to call seals, dolphins, and so on, fish. In a similar way a child will call all meals ' tea,' overlooking the fact that ' tea ' connotes besides the characters of ' meal,' that of taking place towards the close of the day. Revision of Notions. It follows from the above that perfect concepts commonly presuppose not one process of comparison an'd abstraction simply, but a succession of conceptual processes, by the aid of which the first crude concepts are perfected, and also the tendencies in words to lose their significance are counteracted. De- fective conception at the outset (whether ending in a vague or a positively erroneous notion) can only be made good by more searching inspection of the things submitted to examination, and also by a wider and more varied observation of objects in their similarities and dissimilarities. Not only so, even when the concepts have been prop- erly formed they can only be kept distinct, and conse- quently accurate, by going back again and again to the concrete objects out of which they have in a manner been extracted. Only when we do this shall jwe avoid the error of taking empty names for realities, and keep our representations fresh and vivid. Conception is in RELATION OF CONCEPTION TO IMAGINATION. 253 this way continually renewed by contact with actual concrete fact by way of perception and imagination. The frequent application of names to individual things is thus a condition of preserving vitality in our con- cepts. Thinking is not the same thing as imagining,, yet it is based on it and cannot safely be divorced from it. Clear concepts imply images of particular objects in the back-ground, ready to come into the full light of consciousness as occasion requires. We only attach a definite meaning to a name when we are in a position to recall a concrete example, or rather a variety of concrete examples. Relation of Conception to Imagination. The above remarks help to bring out still more distinctly the relation be- tween imagination and thought. As we have seen, a notion differs from an image in that it contains a repre- sentation of common features only, and not of individ- ual peculiarities. At the same time, notions are formed out of images. Thinking is thus based on imagination (both reproduc- tive and constructive). The meaning or content of a word is wholly derived from the inspection of concrete things. Hence a notion in order to be full, distinct, and stable must be continually supported by images. To every word there ought to correspond several tendencies to form images; though since the images are often very dif- ferent, these tendencies should in general counteract one another. Only when there is this vital connection be- tween thought and imagination can the mind steer clear ol the perils of empty words. 254 CONCEPTION. On Defining Notions. Our notions are rendered distinct and accurate not merely by going back to concrete facts or examples, but by a number of supplementary processes which may be roughly grouped under the head of definition. To define a word in the logical sense is to unfold its connotation, to enumerate more or less completely the several characters or attributes which make up its meaning. As we have seen, we form many concepts, such as 'metal,' 'man,' 'civilized country,' before we are able to represent distinctly the several attributes which compose the connotation of the words. It is only when the mind's power of abstraction in- creases that this higher stage of analysis becomes possi- ble. When it has been performed the mind will be able to retain the essentials of the concept by means of the verbal definition. When for example the child has learnt that glass is a transparent substance, composed of certain materials, brittle, easily fused by heat, a bad conductor of heat, and so on, the string of properties stored up by aid of the verbal memory will serve to give distinctness to the concept. Finally our notions may be defined or rendered more sharp in outline by a reference to a classification of things. Logicians say tfiat the best way to define a class name (especially when the qualities are too numerous, and many of them too imperfectly known, for us to enumerate them completely) is to name the higher class, or ' genus,' and add the ' difference,' that is the leading features which mark off the class from co-ordinate classes. Thus we may define a parallelogram by saying that it is a four-sided figure (higher class) having its opposite sides parallel (difference). GEOWTH OF CONCEPTUAL POWER. 255 Growth of Conceptual Power. As we have seen, the power by which the mind frames general notions is merely an expansion of powers which show themselves in a germinal form in the earlier intellectual processes of perception. The essential mental process is seizing similarity in the midst of diversity. This the child does in the first year of life. To recognize the mother's voice, for example, as one and the same amid all the changes of loudness and softness, and all the variations of pitch, clearly implies a certain rudimentary power of abstraction. Early Notions. The gradual development of the power of comprehending things or classes, or of form- ing general notions is one of the most interesting phases in the mental history of the individual. By a careful observation of children at the time when they begin to understand and use words we may learn much as to the way in which this power grows. In studying this phase of intellectual progress we must be on our guard against a source of error. As has been pointed out before, children do not learn to speak as the race may be supposed to have acquired language, that is to say inventing new names to express the similarities of things which they first notice. The child finds a language ready made for him, and through the force of imitation and the need of making himself understood, he is impelled to adopt the signs employed by others. Now it would be absurd to suppose that when he first understands and reproduces a name he attaches to this sign the same general meaning that adults attach to it. Such names as ' puss,' ' bow-wow,' 256 CONCEPTION. and so on, when first used have not the full force of concepts (or generic images) as they will afterwards have. The growth of the conceptual power at this early stage is best illustrated perhaps by means of the child's own unaided extensions of the application of words to new cases. As might be expected, the first notions to be formed correspond to narrow classes of objects having a number of striking points of resemblance; and, further, to those varieties of things which have a special interest for the child. Thus he readily recognizes particular objects of diet, as milk and pudding. In like manner he soon learns to assimilate certain kinds of toy as -tops, and other objects having well-marked resemblances, as watches and clocks. For the -same reason, he at once extends the term ' bow-wow ' or l puss ' to a number of dogs or cats, and the name 'papa' to other male adults. Growth of Conception and of Discrimination. It is to be noted that the child's concepts grow in clearness and definiteness with the power of noting differences as well as likenesses. At first there seems to be no clear dis- crimination of classes from individuals. The name is used for a number of objects as seen to be alike, but, so far as we can see, without any clear apprehension whether they are the same thing or different things. This is probably true of the extension of the word papa to other men besides the father. The concept becomes definite just in proportion as differences are recognized and the images of individual objects, this and that person, this and that dog, and so on, acquire separate- ness in the mind. This same circumstance explains FORMING ABSTRACT CONCEPTIONS. 257 another fact, namely, that the child often uses the names of genera (if not too large classes) before those of species. Thus he lumps together animals resembling dogs, as goats, under the name ' bow- wow.' In like manner he will apply a word like apple to fruit generally or a variety of fruits as apple, pear, orange, etc. Simi- larly, he will understand in a rough way the meaning of the word flower before he comprehends the names 1 daisy,' or * rose.' Formation of more Abstract Conceptions. A higher step is taken when the child forms classes founded on a single property. The first examples of this higher power of abstraction occur very early in relation to aspects of objects of great interest to him. He first displays a considerable power of generalization in grouping to- gether edible things. Mr. Darwin in his interesting account of the early mental development of one of his children tells us that when just a year old he invented the word 'mum' to denote different kinds of food. He then went on to distinguish varieties of food by some qualifying adjunct. Thus sugar was ' shu-mum.' At- tention to common visual features comes later. A little boy known to the present writer when in his eighteenth month extended the word ' ball ' to bubbles which he noticed on the surface of a glass of beer. This implied the power of abstracting from color and size and at- tending to the globular form. As experience widens and the power of abstraction stregthens less conspicuous and more subtle points of agreement are seized. Children often perplex their elders with their use of words just because the latter Q 268 CONCEPTION. cannot seize the analogy between things or events which the young mind detects. By degrees the young mind advances to the formation of more abstract ideas. One of the earliest of these is that of disappearance, or the state of being absent, commonly expressed by the sign ' ta-ta ' or some similar expression. Period of Fuller Development. The power of abstraction, of analyzing things and discovering their common as- pects, qualities and relations, only attains a considerable strength in the stage of youth as distinguished from that of childhood. The earlier period is pre-eminently that of concrete knowledge. During this time the number of concepts formed is comparatively small, and these are such as involve the presence of numerous or obvious re- semblances. But from about the fourteenth year on- wards a marked increase in the power of abstraction is observable. In cases where the powers observation and of imagination have been properly cultivated we may notice at this stage a marked disposition to assim- ilate particular objects and occurences. The language becomes more general and more abstract. Training of Power of Abstraction. The problem of ex- ercising the power of abstraction and generalization is attended with peculiar difficulties. Children, it is com- monly said, delight in the concrete, and find abstraction arduous and distasteful. Nevertheless it is certain that the young are much given to discovering resemblances among things and to a certain kind of generalization. There is indeed a distinct intellectual satisfaction in dis- covering similarities among things. A young child's TRAINING OF POWER OF ABSTRACTION. 259 face may be seen to brighten up on newly discover- ing some point of similarity. 1 And to some extent this pleasure may be utilized in training the child's powers. His lack of interest in generalities is often due to the fact that his mind is not supplied with the neces- sary concrete examples out of which the notions have to be formed. 2 When this training should begin. The training of the conceptual powers should begin in connection with sense- observation. Objects should be laid in juxtaposition and the child invited to discover their similarities of form, etc. And here his active impulses may be appealed to, by giving him a confused multitude of objects and inviting him to sort them into classes. By such a direct inspection of a number of examples together notions of simple classes of natural objects, as species of animals and flowers, as well as of geometric forms and numbers may be gained. The process of generalizing may be still further aided by a judicious selection of particulars for inspection. It is well, as a rule, to set out with good average specimens of the class, in which the common characters are conspicuous and not disguised by striking individual peculiarities of color, etc. These would serve as typical specimens. After this, extreme instances may be introduced. A sufficient variety of instances must be supplied in every case, but the number required will 1 E. g., when a boy (26 months old) watching a dog panting after a run, exclaimed with evident pleasure, * Dat like a puff puff ' (locomotive). 2 " There is nothing the human mind grasps with more delight than generalization or classification, when it has already made an accumula- tion of particulars ; but nothing from which it turns with more repug- nance in its previous state of inanition."— Isaac Taylor. 260 CONCEPTION. differ according to the character of the notion to be formed. 1 Throughout this process of calling into play the power of abstraction the teacher should seek to com- bine the exercise of discrimination with that of assimi- lation. He should invite the child to contrast one chemical substance, one class of plants or animals with another. The essential marks of a triangle are brought out by a juxtaposition with quadrangles, etc. This operation of comparing and classing should be supple- mented by naming the objects thus grouped together, and pointing out in the form of a definition the more important of the traits they have in common. 2 In these exercises of the conceptual power the mother or teacher must be satisfied in the first instance with the discovery of the more prominent points of likeness among the things examined, and the naming of these. It would be absurd for example to expect a child at the outset to point out all the structural differences which character- ize a particular species of plant. The definitions mnst gradually increase in fulness and. precision as the power of abstraction grows. Development of Notions removed from Seme. The special difficulty in this branch of intellectual training arises in connection with the formation of these notions which cannot be reached by direct inspection of objects. The i As Dr. Bain points out, a child may obtain a notion of a single prop- erty as weight by the aid of one or two instances only, whereas he re- quires a good many examples of the classes metal, plant, etc. (Education as a Science, Chap. VII., p. 197.) a It is evident that this exercise of the child's powers of comparing different objects with a view to classification should arise naturally, and by insensible gradations, out of the earlier exercise of inspecting single objects already illustrated (p. 188). EXACT USE OF WORDS. 261 child is continually hearing words which he does not understand. Many of these lie out of his reach, and it is well to let him know it. But all instruction involves the unfolding of the meaning of general terms. Id the most elementary lesson in geography or history general terms are necessarily employed. Here the learner will be called on to perform a process of synthesis, to recom- bine the results of abstraction practised on objects of di- rect personal observation. His success will depend on the degree of perfection of these first efforts, as well as on the force of his imagination. Cultivation of exact use of words. There is perhaps no part of intellectual training which requires so much careful attention as the control of the child's use of words. It is vain to expect him from the first to seize the exact meaning of all the terms which he employs* He must discourse with others, and the improvement of his conceptions progresses partly in connection with his employment of words. On the other hand, the mind is only too prone to be satisfied with loose and vague no- tions about things, and this intellectual indolence is the most fatal obstacle to clear and accurate knowledge. The dangers can only be averted by seeking to form in the pupil's mind from the outset a habit of making his notions as clear and distinct as possible. He should be exercised from the first in explaining the words he em- ploys. It is a good rule never to let a child employ a word without attaching some intelligible meaning to it. He should be questioned as to his meaning, and prove himself able to give concrete instances or examples of 262 CONCEPTION. the notion, and (where possible) to define his term roughly at least. The meaning which he attaches to the word may be far from accurate to begin with. But the teacher may be satisfied with a rough approximation to accuracy as long as the meaning is definite and clear to the child's mind. As knowledge widens the teacher should take pains to supplement and correct these first crude notions, substituting exact for rough and inexact definitions. At the same time he should aim at giving greater precision to the pupil's notions by encouraging him in the discrimination of closely allied words, includ- ing proximate synonyms. When to take up the abstract sciences. The problem when to take up the subjects requiring a considerable meas- ure of the power of abstraction, such as the physical sciences, grammar, and so on, is one of the most perplex- ing ones in the art of education. It is probable that individuals differ so much in respect of the rapidity of this side of intellectual development that no universal rule can be laid down. What is certain is that subjects which mainly appeal to the memory and imagination like geography and history should precede these which make a large demand on the powers of abstraction and gener- alization. There is a psychological error in attempting to teach the generalities of grammar before the mind has been well stored with particulars. It is probable that even the rudimentary branches of mathematics, namely arithmetic and geometry, though deriving so much aid from sense-intuition, are apt to be begun too soon for the most economic management of brain-power. APPENDIX. 263 But in the case of arithmetic at least the recognition of the paramount utility of the study is likely to override purely theoretical considerations. References. On the nature of abstraction, see Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Meta- physics, Lect. XXXIV. Compare jProf. Bain's chapter on abstraction, M ental Science, Book II., Chap. V.; and M. Taine's account of general notions in his work on Intelligence, Part II., Book IV. For an account of the development of the generalizing power the student may consult the articles already referred to in Mind (1877) by Mr. Darwin and M. Taine. On the practical side of the subject the reader may read Locke's valuable chapters on the Imperfection and Abuse of Words, Essay, Book III., Chap. IX.-XI. The difficulties of exercising the powers of abstraction and the best means of alleviating these are dealt with by Dr. Bain, Edu- cation as a Science, Ch. VII., pp. 191-197. In connection with this subject the teacher should read those chapters in Logic which deal with terms and their distinctions, and with division and definition (e. g., Jevons, Ele- ementary Lessons in Logic, III.— V. and XII.). APPENDIX. 1. Study carefully in relation to the art of questioning the doc- trine of revision of notions and of Classification and Division. Learn by persistent practice of the art of questioning to detect any failure to seize the meaning of a general term. Look up what is meant by the extension and intension of terms. As an exercise in classification make a list of the acts of the human mind, i. e., to perceive, to imagine, to recollect, etc., and then clas- sify them. Turn these verbs into their corresponding verbal nouns, — for example, perception, imagination, recollection, etc., — then compare the notions which these names represent, co- ordinating and subordinating them into a series of notions. 2. Take the term ' instruments of labor ' and divide into species and sub-species. Proceed in the same way with the 264 CONCEPTION. notions, 'mental phenomenon, ' 'school- exercise,' 'method of teaching,' 'school.' REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. Show that imagination and thinking are both representa- tive acts, and not presentative. How does the representative act differ in the two cases? Which of the two processes is subord- inate, Thinking or Perception? What is the logical order of the three following processes: thinking, perception, imagina- tion? 2. What is the difference as a learning process between ap- prehending and comprehending ? Show that understanding involves assimilation. That thinking is based upon comparison. When does comparison involve reproduction ? 3. Show that analysis and synthesis are involved in thinking. Show that analysis and synthesis are involved in forming a per- fect notion of the number 10. What is the connection between thinking processes and language? What does Hamilton mean by saying that ' Speech is an analytic process? ' 4. What are the three stages of thinking ? Are children cap- able of performing each of these processes? What common men- tal process is implicit in each? Which of the three stages indicates the highest order of mental energy? Which is the low- est? 5. What is meant by a general notion ? What is the differ- ence between notions and general names? How are concepts formed, that is, what is the natural history of the process? What are the three stages of the process? What does a class name denote? What does it connote ? What is the distinction between the extension and intension of class-names? 6. Are general terms general to the child-mind? What is the natural way of discovering the meaning of words? What is the only true way of finding the sense in which an author, say in an aucient manuscript, uses a term? How do students learn such notions as 'Revival of Learning,' 'Pre-Raphaelitism,' etc.? REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 265 7. How do our ideas of large and small numbers differ in origin? What is the proper method of teaching small numbers? What takes its place in the teaching of large numbers? 8. In what sense of the word are the simple geometrical con- ceptions abstractions ? Do the general terms of physics transcend the limits of distinct imagination? 9. What is meant by the classification of notions? What is the advantage of classification? What is meant by saying a class is a species? What by saying it is a genus ? Show what is meant by co-ordination of notions. What by the subordination of classes. 10. Which sciences furnish the best illustration of a perfect system of classification ? Which subjects can be most satisfactor- ily taught, those in which the phenomena have been thoroughly classified or those in which this has been but imperfectly realized? What is the educational value of having the student make his own classifications? 11. Show what is meant by the distinctness of concepts. Il- lustrate this by the terms ' enr oiled-student, ' ' average-attendance, ' ' learning, ' ' attending, ' pedagogics, psychology, knowing, feeling, willing, sensation, perception, imagination, conception, notion, con- cept. 12. What is the best test of the distinctness (in the mind of a learner) of a concept? What is the best evidence of distinctness of conception in the case of the following terms: 'transitive verb,' 'figure of speech,' 'sentence-method,' 'word-method,' 'teaching,' 'educating,' 'training,' 'reading,' 'recitation,' 'declamation,' 'instruction,' 'examination'? 13. What is meant by the definition of notions? Show why the construction of definitions is a difficult art. Show why the acquisition of verbal definitions comes late in the course of instruction. How can we avoid teaching empty terms instead of real notions? What results when thinking is divorced from con- crete objects? From what, in the last analysis, is the meaning of a word derived? What degree of mental cultivation is implied in the accurate use of such terms as 'action,' 'life,' idea?' What 266 CONCEPTION. are the evidences of a student's progress in the power of forming conceptions? REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. The intimate connection between thinking and Language, the fact that all Representative Knowledge, as distinguished from Presentative, is gained through Language, and the further con- sideration that language — oral or written — is the universal medium of instruction will justify the following extended references : 1. On the power of using written language as the highest evidence of development of the representative faculty, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I, chap. III., pages 82, 83; od all true education as the development of thought, see Parker, Talks on Teaching, page 84; on the general connection of thought, language, and mental power, see Tate, Part II, chap. III., near the end ; on the place of Language as a faculty in the order of mental development — as the faculty of learning, see the same, Part II., chap. I., p. 169. 2. On the true mode of cultivating the faculty of Language, see Tate, Part II, chap. II, at the end, page 185; the reason for making language-training the main part of education, see Fitch, Lectures on Teaching, Chap. VII, near the beginning, pages 226-7; for Mr. Spencer's protest against an exclusively literary educa- tion, see Education, chap. I, What Knowledge is of Most Worth; for Milton's similar protest, see Quick's Educational Reformers, pages 41, 42 and 303; for Mr. Spencer's argument for scientific as against literary education, see as last referred to; for Spen- cer's argument answered, see Quick, pages 227-242 inclusive. 3. On words never to be taught before the things signified, Pestalozzi's statement, see Quick, p. 190; on a knowledge of things to be communicated with a knowledge of words (Come- nius), see the same, p. 60; for Rousseau's doctrine as to this, see the same, page 114. PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 26 7 4. On the understanding of a subject to be taught previous to the exercising of the memory and the speech on it (Comenius), see Quick, p. 57; on much so-called teaching as consisting in the training of expression without regard to thought, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, page 89 ; on the mistake of too didactic teach- ing, see Rousseau quoted, Quick, page 114; and Wilson quoted by Payne, Educational Methods, near the middle, p. 140. 5. On general forms of expression as mystifying to children, see Tate, Part I, chap. IV, Principle IX, page 124; on the folly of beginning scientific instruction with definitions and abstractions, see Payne, The Practice or Art of Education, near the end, p. 108; for how to teach abstract terms and abstract propositions, see Tate, Part I, chap. IV, Principle VIII, p. 121 ; for how to teach definitions of terms, see the same, Part II, chap. II, near the end, page 182. 6. On the difference between the simplest and the more abstract conceptions, see Tate, Part I, chap. Ill, under Nature of the faculties, — page 87; on the child's first abstractions, the same reference. CHAPTER X. JUDGMENT AND REASONING. Higher Stage of Thinking: Judging and Reasoning. Think- ing as we have seen includes besides Conception, or the process of forming concepts, the operations commonly- marked off as judging and reasoning. Having a concept we may go on to apply this to some individual thing or class of things, as when we decide that a particular piece of stone is granite, or that diamonds are combustible. We are then said to judge. And having framed given judgments we may pass from these to other judgments, as when we conclude that air has weight because all material substances have weight. We are then said to reason. These two remaining processes of thinking, which are closely connected one with the other, are to be the subject of the present chapter. Judgment Defined. In everyday discourse the word judge is used to express the process of coming to a decision about a thing, when we do not reason out a conclusion explicitly or formally, but apply in a rapid and automatic manner the results of past experience to a new case. Thus we judge that a man is sincere or in- sincere, that a plan is good or bad, and so forth. In Mental Science we greatly extend the application of the term. Whenever we connect two representations one with another under the form of a statement we perform JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION. 269 an act of judgment. It does not matter by what mental process we reach the assertion, whether directly by observation, as when we say ■ This rose is blighted,' or by a process of inference, as when we conclude from certain signs iu the sky that it is going to rain. Judgment and Proposition. The result of an act of judg- ment is a verbal statement or proposition. The connec- tion between judging and asserting in words is quite as close as that between forming a concept and naming. An infant or an intelligent brute may probably form a few rudimentary judgments (e.g., I am going to be fed) without language. But in later life we rarely if ever judge without making a verbal statement or proposition externally or internally. Every proposition is made up of two principal parts: (1) the subject or the name of that about which something is asserted, (2) the predicate, or the name of that which is asserted. Thus when we affirm ' This knife is blunt,' we affirm or predicate the fact of being blunt of a certain subject, namely 'This knife.' Similarly when we say 'Air corrodes,' we assert or predicate the power of corroding of the subject ' air.' Judgments about Individuals and Classes. It is evident from these examples that the predicate of a judgment is always some general notion. On the other hand, the subject may be either a representation of an individual thing, that is, a representative image, or a general notion about a class of things. Thus I can assert something about a particular flower, or a particular man, as when I say ' This flower is faded '; 'John Smith is an industrious man '. These are known as Singular Judgments. They 270 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. are the first to be formed by the child, and constitute a very important step in the development of thought. In addition to these Singular Judgments we have what are known as Universal Judgments, that is to say, statements about classes. The propositions ' Laurels are evergreens,' 'Wise men are not dogmatic,' are such general or universal statements. These Universal Judg- ments stand in much the same relation to others as general names to names of individuals (proper names.) They gather up in a succinct form our knowledge respecting an indefinite number of individual objects. Concepts are formed by means of a succession of judg- ments. In mentally bringing objects together on the ground of their likeness we ' judge ' them to be similar. So, too, in separating things on the ground of their dissimilarity. Not only so, our concepts are built up gradually, by successively discovering new points of likeness among things. Thus a child after knowing the more obvious properties of iron, as its color, weight, and hardness, finds out less conspicuous properties, as that it is softened by great heat. And every such addition to his knowledge about iron takes the form of a judg- ment. Judgment and Belief. If we look at the process of judging a little more closely we shall see that it is' accompanied by the mental state known as belief. As was pointed out above, in connecting two representations we are representing the corresponding things as connec- ted with, or related to, one another. And this repre- sentation or apprehension of a relation between things involves belief. When I represent iron as capable of BELIEF AND DOUBT. 271 being softened by heat, I believe in its possessing this property. A mere joining of two representations cannot constitute an act of judgment if this element of belief is wanting. When, for example, in a state of idle reverie there is a chaotic conflux of ideas, there is no belief at- tending the momentary combinations. We only believe when we look on our ideas on their objective or repre- sentative side, that is to say, view them as representative of real things, and make some relation between the things the object or matter of distinct thought. Affirmation and Negation. Judgment begins in affirma- tion, in combining two representations, and in deciding that there is a connection between the corresponding things. But all our judgments are not affirmative. We deny as well as affirm. We declare that things are not, as well as that they are. Negation presupposes affirma- tion. To say ' It is not going to rain ' implies that the corresponding affirmation ('It is going to rain') has actually been made by somebody, or has somehow been proposed or suggested to the mind (e. g., by a question, 1 Is it going to rain ? '). Negation is the rejection of an affirmation as untrue or false. Our minds refuse to perform the process of synthesis required. Belief and Doubt. So far, it has been assumed that the mind either accepts or rejects a statement, that it must come to some decision about the matter. But this is not the only alternative. We may waver between ac- ceptance and rejection, and suspend our judgment. This is a state of doubt. 272 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. Sources of Belief. Our beliefs, and along with these our doubts, are products, having their conditions. We cannot at will bring any two ideas together in the mind and entertain belief or doubt respecting the correspond- ing external relations. We say that our belief has been generated or produced in a certain way, as by observa- tion of facts, reasoning, tradition, etc. The psycholo- gist seeks to group these conditions or sources of belief under the most general heads. (1) ^Experience and Association. The most obvious con- dition or generative antecedent of belief is experience. The combination of presentations in our experience de- termines, as we saw above, the association of representa- tions. And the force which commonly determines the combination of representations in the act of judgment is this force of association. This was illustrated in the simplest types of belief, memory, and expectation. In both cases the belief is determined by the order of experiences. (2) Verbal Suggestion. Experience is not the only agency which effects a combination of representations in the form of a judgment. Other influences play a considerable subordinate part in generating and mould- ing belief. Of these the most important is verbal sug- gestion. The close connection between the act of belief and its expression in a verbal statement or propo- sition has already been pointed out. The proposition is the external embodiment of the internal belief. Hence the closest possible association between the two. Hence, SOURCES OF BELIEF. 273 further, the tendency to accept another's statement quite apart from any process of ' weighing testimony. The combination of words strongly excites in the hear- er's or reader's mind the combination of ideas and a nascent belief in the corresponding connection of things. We see this in the momentary disposition to believe another's statement, even when this is made in a playful manner. It is seen, too, in the reflex effect of our own utterances in fixing our beliefs. As Hartley has ob- served, a person by the mere act of repeating a story which he does not at first credit, comes in time to believe in it. (3) Effect of Feeling. Once more, our beliefs are greatly influenced by our feelings and wishes. As was pointed out when dealing with the influence of feeling on imag- ination, emotional excitement gives greater vividness to the images called up, and determines the order of their combination. By bringing together ideas and dwelling on them under the sway of strong feeling, the mind tends strongly to believe in the corresponding realities. This is seen in the strength of belief attaching to the wild dreams of youth. Commonly, of course, the com- bination has some support in the order of experience. What the feeling does is to keep a certain suggestion or class of suggestions before the mind, and to exclude others which, but for the feeling, would be much more powerful than the first. This is the state of mind known as bias or prejudice, in which strong likings and dislik- ings exert a powerful control over the trains of thought, interfering with the proper action of the intellectual forces. 2 74 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. What a sound judgment involves. A sound judgment presupposes a combination of many conditions. An act of judgment is the outcome of our whole experience, and involves the processes of observation, reproduction, comparison, etc. It is only when these processes are perfectly performed that the judgment will be free from imperfections. A sound judgment implies, too, a con- siderable development of the power of controlling the thoughts and the feelings, or fixing the mind on the matter in hand, and of resisting the forces of bias. Nature of Reasoning. To reason is, as we have seen, to pass from a certain judgment or certain judgments to a new one. This implies that the mind accepts the con- clusion on the ground of the premises. In other words, the resulting belief is in this case due to a recognition of the relation between the new and the old judgments, of the fact that the premises carry with them or neces- sitate the conclusion, or that the latter follows from the former. What, it may be asked, is th essential intellectual process here? What relation does the mind detect between premise and conclusion in thus passing from a belief in the one to a belief in the other ? In order to ascertain this, let us take a simple example of reasoning: 'The barometer is falling, therefore it is going to rain '. In drawing this conclusion we identify the present state of the barometer with past states which we have observed or heard about. But we do not simply identify this phenomenon as an isolated fact: we identify it in respect of its accompaniments or attendant circum- stances (altered state of the atmosphere, and results of this, rain). From this it appears that reasoning is only NATURE OF REASONING. 275 a higher and more complex process of assimilation, identification, or classing. It differs from perception (the recognition of a single object), and from conception (the assimilation of many objects) inasmuch as it is the assimilation of things in their connection with certain other things, or, briefly, the identification of relations among things. Inference and Proof. While we thus assume that in reasoning the mind consciously passes from premise to conclusion, we must remember that this does not answer to the actual order of mental events in many, and per- haps, the majority of cases. The conclusion presents itself first, and the ground, premise, or reason, when it distinctly arises in the mind at all, recurs rather as an after- thought, and by the suggestive force of the similarity between the new case and the old. The distinct reference to the antecedent judgment is rather a part of the final re visional process of proof, than of the first process of inference. Here again we must be on our guard against taking the logician's account of how our processes of thought may be carried on as rep- resenting faithfully the manner in which they actually take place in ordinary cases. Implicit Reasoning. This operation of passing from one or more judgments to another may assume one of two well-marked forms. In the first place we may pass directly from one or more singular judgments to another singular judgment without clearly setting forth to our- selves or to others the ground of our conclusion under the form of a general truth or principle. Thus a boy 276 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. having observed on one or more past occasions that particular pieces of wood float in water will conclude directly in a new instance that this piece of wood will float. This has been called reasoning from particulars. It may also be called implicit reasoning, because the general ground or principle is implied and not explicitly set before the mind. Explicit Reasoning. It is evident when we reflect on these reasoning processes that we do implicitly assume a general statement. The boy in our example tacitly assumes that ' All wood floats '. If he were not sure of this he would have no business to conclude, ' This piece of wood will float'. And as soon as he is asked to give the ground of his conclusion, or to 'prove' his assertion, he sets forth this general statement. Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. The full explicit process of reasoning by way of a universal judgment is commonly said to fall into two parts or stages. Of these the first (a) is the operation of reaching a general judgment or assertion. This is known as induction. The second (b) is the operation of applying the truth thus reached to some particular case (or class of cases). This is know as deduction. Induction is an upward movement of thought from particular instances to a general truth, principle, or law: deduction, a downward movement from some general statement to a particular statement, or at least a statement less general than the first. Nature of Inductive Reasoning. The psychological process in passing from particulars to a general truth INDUCTIVE REASONING. 277 illustrates the essential process of all thinking, the detecting of similarity amid diversity. Let us examine an instance of inductive reasoning. The child observes that his toys, spoons, knives, he himself, and a vast multitude of other objects when not supported fall. He gradually compares these facts one with another and seizes the essential feature of them or the general truth implied in them. He discovers that what all these things have in common is that they are material bodies. He then extricates this general conception, and along with it the circumstance (falling to the ground) which has invariably accompanied it. That is to say, he judges that all material bodies (when unsupported) fall to the ground. The operation is a process of reasoning or inference because his mind in making the universal assertion passes beyond the limits of the observed cases. 'All ' includes not only all the instances he has examined, however numerous these may be, but all unobserved cases. Spontaneous Induction. The child has a natural tendency to generalize from experience. A single instance often suffices to beget the inference to a general rule. One experience of the burning properties of fire is enough to produce the belief that all fire burns. This natural impulse leads in early life to hasty induction. Regulated Induction. This natural impulse to generalize on a narrow and precarious basis becomes corrected by wider experience, as well as by education. Thus the child who generalizes that all nurseries have a rocking horse like his own, that all dogs take to the water, and 278 JUDGMENT AND SEASONING. so on, learns either by his own observations or from what others tell hirn that his conclusion is hasty and inaccurate. Pulled up, so to speak, in his early attempts to generalize, he grows more cautious. The impulse to generalize is not arrested, it is simply guided and con- trolled. Induction now proceeds in a more circumspect and methodical manner. The young inquirer takes pains to collect a wider variety of observations. He examines the instances he thus collects more closely in order to ascertain their essential, as distinguished from their accidental, resemblances. Thus, for example, he finds out that the fact of growth is connected with those properties of things which we call life, and he will con- sequently restrict the idea to living things. Deductive Reasoning. By Induction the child reaches a large number of general or universal judgments. These are supplemented by all the general statements made to him by others in the way of instruction. Having these universal statements he is able to pass on to the second stage of explicit reasoning, namely, Deduction. By this is meant reasoning downward from a general truth or principle to some particular case or class of cases. Thus a child who has been told that all persons are liable to make mistakes, is apt to apply the truth by arguing that his mother or his governess makes mistakes. The type of deductive reasoning when fully set forth is known as a syllogism, and is as follows: All M is P. Everything made by labor costs money. All S is M. Toys are made by labor. Therefore All S is P. Therefore Toys cost money. Or for negative arguments: ACTIVITY OF MIND IN REASONING. 279 No M is P. No naughty children are loved. All S is M. This is a naughty child. Therefore No S is P. Therefore he will not be loved. It is evident from this that the nature of the mental process is substantially the same as in the case of induc- tive reasoning. The essential fact is still assimilation. We recognize an identity between the particular case (S) and a class of cases (M) in respect of its possessing (or not possessing) a certain adjunct or concomitant (P). Thus in the first of the above examples we assimilate toys to other things as products of labor, and by so doing we further assimilate them as having the peculi- arity of costing money. Here, again, we must distinguish between the logical order, required for purposes of proof, and the actual psychological order of the process of inference. We rarely (if ever) proceed in the formal way here set forth from premises to conclusion. In some cases the conclusion first distinctly presents itself to the mind, and the other judgments rise into distinct consciousness later; and in other cases the mind does not at any stage distinctly represent more than one of the two truths making up the premises. Activity of Mind in Reasoning. From this brief account of the chief varieties of the reasoning process the reader will see its close dependence on the earlier intellectual processes, observation, and reproduction. To carry on a process of reasoning it is necessary that the mind be well stored with facts gained either by personal obser- vation or by instruction. It is further necessary that the mind have a firm hold on truths or principles fitted 280 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. to explain new facts. To this must be added facility in construction, in forming new notions and hypotheses. Nor will all this avail without a proper development of voluntary attention and the power of concentration. To reason out a thing implies intense and prolonged activity of mind. Not only so, when the process is perfect the will is called on to resist the tendencies to confusion, and the influences of feeling and bias, which have been spoken of above. The greater the concentra- tion, the more perfectly the representation of the desired result dominates all the mental processes of the time, compelling them to converge on this result, the higher will be the quality of the reasoning. First Reasonings about Cause. By the end of the third year a child is wont to perplex his mother by asking the 'Why?' of everything. He now looks at things as occurring for a purpose, and can only understand them in so far as they present some analogy to his own pur- posive actions. As the child's mind expands the real relations of things are more clearly detected and set forth in the shape of inductive conclusions. He now begins to apprehend the true nature of causation, to understand the working of the forces of nature about him. But it is probable that no adequate discrimination of the region of human action and of natural causes is reached in average cases till the period of youth is entered on. And it is only in this later stage of development when the powers of abstraction are acquiring strength that the higher inductions which we call the laws and principles of science can be fully grasped. VARIETIES OF REASONING POWER. 281 Varieties of Reasoning Power. There are well marked differences of reasoning power among individual minds. One person has a greater aptitude in discovering simi- larities among things and their relations, in seizing and applying a principle, than another person. Thus of two men in view of the same group of facts, one will leap quickly to the general law or principle underlying them, while another will fail to detect it. Similarly one man much more readily brings new facts under old truths than another. Superiority of reasoning power is roughly measurable by the facility with which new principles are thus discovered and old ones applied to new cases. These differences, like those in the case of the other faculties, are general or special. A may be a better reasoner all around than B. But.it usually happens that A will show his superiority in some special direction. To begin with, there may be a special leaning to one kind of reasoning process. There is the ' inductive mind,' quick in the observation and analysis of facts, and de- lighting to trace out the laws of phenomena. Such a mind is wont to refer from principles to facts, and to be sceptical of assertions not grounded on observed facts. On the other hand, there is the deductive or demonstra- tive mind given to dwelling on abstract truths rather than on concrete facts, and skilful in combining these into an orderly argument. The first type is that of the physical inquirer, the second that of the mathematician. A third type is the practical reasoner, apt at seizing all the principles bearing on a complex case, and balancing one reason against another so as to arrive at a just or probable conclusion. 282 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. Training of the Powers of Judgment and Reasoning. To train a child's power of judging is to exercise him in framing judgments by inviting him to observe and de- scribe an object, to narrate something which has happened to him, to repeat carefully what he has heard, to submit propositions for his acceptance and rejection, and so on. Here the mother or teacher should aim at caution and accuracy of statement. The tendency of children to exaggerate needs to be carefully watched and counter- acted. The child should be accustomed to think well about the words he uses, to see all that is implied in them, as well as all that is contradicted by them. And here a knowledge of the logical processes called opposi- tion, conversion, and ob version will prove serviceable to the teacher. All this regulation of judgment is however a matter of some delicacy. Children delight in vivid and picturesque statement, and a touch of exaggeration is perhaps pardonable. A too strict insistence on pre- cision in the early stages may discourage confidence, and lead to an untimely hesitation in judgment. Authority and Individual Judgment. A perplexing problem in the training of the judgment is to draw the line between excessive individual independence, and undue deference to authority. The power of judgment is, as we have seen, more fully exercised when the child forms an opinion for himself than when he passively receives one from his mother or teacher. To exercise the judgment is thus to draw out his power of judging for himself. And this can be very well done in certain regions of observation, as for example in judging about REASONING OF CHILDREN. 283 the beauty of natural objects and works of art. On the other hand, it is obvious that with respect to other matters the child's liberty of judging must be curtailed. It would not do to allow a young child with his limited experience to decide what is possible or probable in a given case; and still less to permit him to pronounce on the rightness or wrongness of an action. To combine the ends of authority and of individuality in respect of judging requires much wisdom and skill in the trainer of the young. Differences of children's temperament (sexual and individual) must here be taken account of» To train a boy's power of judgment is in general a dif- ferent process from that of training a girl's. A timid child disposed to rely on others requires another regime from that suitable to a rash and confident child disposed to question all authority and to set up dogmatically his own views of things. Reasoning and judgment. The training of the Reason- ing Powers must go on hand in hand with that of Judg- ment. In the earliest stage (from about the beginning of the 4th year) the mother is called on to satisfy the child's curiosity or desire for explanation. This period is an important one for the subsequent development of the child. Parents are apt to think that children not infrequently put questions in a half-mechanical way, without any real desire for an explanation, and even for the sake of teasing. Without as yet going into the question" of the nature of children's impulses of curi- osity, we may say that so far as their questionings involve a genuine desire for knowledge, it is well in general to heed and satisfy them. It seems a good 284 JUDGMENT AND SEASONING. rule to give an explanation wherever a simple one is possible, provided of course that the knowledge is not attainable by the child's own intellectual exertions. This is Locke's advice: 'Eucourage his Inquisitweness all you can, by satisfying his demands, and informing his Judgment, as far as it is capable {Some Thoughts concern- ing Education, § 122) V It may be even well at first to descend to the child's level, and to look at the world through his anthropomorphic glasses. The forces of nature may be personified and so her simple processes (e. g., the exhaltation of vapor and its condensation in rain) presented to the child in a form which is not only intelligible but which is certain to interest him by its picturesqueness. 2 Reasoning to he trained by questioning. But the training of the reasoning powers includes more than the answer- ing of the spontaneous questionings of children. The learners must be questioned in their turn as to the i Of course children's questions are often unanswerable. Thus a lit- tle girl of 4% years once drove her mother to one of the most difficult problems of philosophy— thus : She sees a wasp on the window pane and wants to touch it. Her mother says, ' No, you must not, it will sting you'. Child: 'Why doesn't it sting the glass?' Mother: 'Because it can't feel'. Child: 'Why doesn't it feel?' Mother: 'Because it has no nerves'. Child : ' Why do nerves feel ? ' The young must be exercised in taking some truths on trust, and not asking the ' why ? ' of everything. George Eliot says somewhere: 'Reason about everything with your chiid, you make him a monster, without reverence, without affections'. The prob- lem how to deal with children's questions is thoughtfully handled by M. Perez, L'Education des le Berceau, Chap. II., p. 45, seq. The solution of the problem clearly turns largely on our view of the nature of children's curiosity, a subject to be touched on by and by. 2 This way of presenting simple scientific facts and truths to children has been attempted with eminent success by Miss A. Buckley in her pleasant volume, The Fairyland of Science. TRAINING OF THE REASONING POWERS. 285 causes of what happens about them. A child cannot too soou be familiarized with the truth that everything has its cause and its explanation. The mother or teacher should aim at fixing a habit of inquiry in the young mind by repeatedly directing his attention to occurrences, and encouraging him to find out how they take place. He must be induced to go back to his past experiences to search for analogies, in order to explain the new event. The systematic training of the reasoning powers must aim at avoiding the errors incident to the processes of induction and deduction. Thus children need to be warned against hasty induction, against taking a mere accidental accompaniment for a condition or cause, against overlooking the plurality of causes. This sys- tematic guidance of the child's inductive processes will be much better carried on by one who has studied the rules of Inductive Logic. In like manner the teacher should seek to direct the young reasoner in drawing conclusions from principles, by pointing out to him the limits of a rule, by helping him to distinguish between the cases that do, and those that do not fall under it, and by familiarizing him with the dangers that lurk in ambiguous language. And here some knowledge of the rules of Deductive Logic will be found helpful. All studies train the reasoning power. The training of the powers of judgment and reasoning should be com- menced by the mother and the elementary teacher in connection with the acquisition of common everyday knowledge about things. Its completion, however, belongs to the later stage of methodical school instruc- 286 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. tion. There is no subject of study which may not in the hands of an intelligent and efficient teacher be made helpful to this result. Thus the study of physical geography should be made the occasion for exercising the child in reasoning as to the causes of natural phe- nomena. History, again, when well taught, may be made to bring out the learner's powers of tracing analogies, finding reasons for events (e. g., motives for actions) and balancing considerations so as to decide what is probable, wise, or just in given circumstances. Science the great agency for development of Reasoning. The teaching of science is however the great agency for strengthening and developing the reasoning powers. Science is general knowledge expressed as precisely as possible,, and the study of it serves to give accuracy to all the thinking processes. Science is further an orderly arrangement of knowledge according to its dependence. It sets out with principles gained by induction, and then proceeds in a systematic way to trace out deductively the consequences of these principles. It thus serves to train the reasoning powers in an orderly and methodi- cal way of proceeding. Some sciences exhibit more of the inductive process, others more of the deductive. The physical sciences are all, to some extent, inductive, resorting to observa- tion, experiment, and proof of law by fact. And some of these, as for example chemistry and physiology, are mainly inductive. In these the inquirer is largely con- cerned with observing and analyzing phenomena, and arriving at their laws. On the other hand, the mathe- matical sciences are almost entirely deductive. Here INSTRUCTION AND DISCOVERY. 287 the principles are simple and self-evident, and the stress of the reasoning is the combining of these and arriving at new results by deduction or demonstration. Hence physical science offers a better training in inductive reasoning, whereas mathematics supplies the better ex- ercise in deductive reasoning. All sciences grow deductive. All sciences as they progress tend to grow deductive. That is to say, deduction plays a larger and larger part in them. This is illus- trated in the growing application of mathematics or the science of quantity to the physical sciences. It holds good, however, of all branches of science. Thus, for example, it applies to grammar and the science of lan- guage. At first men had to observe and analyze the facts, the various forms and connections of words, as used in every-day speech, and to discover the laws which govern them. But the laws once reached, the science takes on a deductive form, that is, sets out with defini- tions and principles and traces*out their results. Method of Instruction and Method of Discovery. This be- ing so, it follows that the proper order of exposition, or the method of teaching, may deviate from the natural order of arriving at knowledge by the individual mind left to itself. In other words, the 'Method of Instruc- tion ' differs from the ' Method of Discovery.' ' Yet the natural order ought never to be lost sight of. Prin- ciples cannot be taught before some examples are given, though it may be unnecessary to retravel over all the inductive steps by which the race has arrived at these i See Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Lesson XXIV. 288 JUDGMENT AND REASONING. principles. Even such 'self-evident' truths as the axi- oms of geometry require, as mathematical teachers are well aware, a certain amount of illustration by concrete instances. 1 Thus the right method of teaching a subject illustrates in a manner the order of discovery. Order of Subjects. Much the same kind of considera- tions as apply to the best order of expounding a single subject apply to the best order of dealing with different subjects. This is broadly determined by psychological principles, the laws of the growth of faculty. Psycho- logy tells us that subjects appealing mainly to memory and imagination (e. g., geography and history) should precede subjects exercising the reasoning powers^ (math- ematics, physical science). But within these broad limits the special arrangement has to be determined by logical considerations. That is to say, we have to con- sider the relative simplicity of the subjects, and the dependence of one subject on another. By such con- siderations we arrive at the rule that applied mathemat- ics should follow pure, and that physiology should come after chemistry. 2 i What applies to practical principles applies to those of Science : " Longum iter est per praecepta: Breve et efficax per exempla." 2 In connection with this subject the reader should read Prof. Bain, Education as a Science, Chap. VI., ' Sequence of Subjects— Psychological,' Chap. VII., 'Sequence of Subjects— Logical'; also his appendix on the classification of the Sciences in his Manual of Logic. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 289 APPENDIX. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. What are the three stages of Thinking? How does Judg- ment differ from conception ? What is the difference between conception and reasoning ? 2. What is the distinction between a judgment and a propo- sition ? What is the difference between singular and universal judgments ? Show that concepts are formed by a succession of judgments. Show that each addition to a child's knowledge takes the form of a judgment. 3. Distinguish between judgment and belief. Name the three general sources of belief. Under which is to be classed be- lief on the testimony of another ? 4. What is the difference between an intuitive and a reasoned judgment ? Between inference and proof ? Between implicit and explicit reasoning ? Between inductive and deductive rea- soning ? 5. Distinguish the various forms of intellectual activity im- plied in reasoning ? Why is the training of the reasoning faculty intimately connected with precision of expression ? In what way does the authority of the master tend to interfere with in- dependence of judgment ? What is meant by warning children against hasty inductions ? 6. Which of the school studies give the best opportunities for development of the reasoning powers ? Which are to be pre- ferred in this respect, arithmetic and geometry, or physical geog- raphy and history ? Why are the physical sciences so valuable in this regard ? What is the chief point of difference between the Method of Instruction and the Method of Discovery ? s 290 JUDGMENT AND EEASONING. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. On Logic as part of the professional knowledge of the teacher, see Payne, The Theory or Science of Education, Lectures, pages 75 and 83; and Page, Theory and Practice, chap. IY., page 59; on the inductive method of inquiry applied to the general question of educational method, see Tate, Philosophy of Educa- tion, Part I., chap. II., p. 35. 2. On inductive and deductive methods of learning and teaching, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. XL, p. 315, also Tate, Part I. , chap. III. , pages 85 and 89 ; on mathematics as a school training in logic, see the same, p. 318; on Arithmetic as logic, see the same, p. 320, and Parker's Talks on Teaching, pages 92 and 99 ; on the superiority of natural science for disciplining the judgment, see Herbert Spencer's Education, p. 88, also Fitch, chap. XIY. ; on the sciences as constantly appealing to the learn- er's individual reason, see Spencer, p. 89; on the true method of teaching the natural sciences, see Payne, Educational Methods, page 140, note, and 220 ; also the same, The True Foundation of Science, Lectures, page 211; on geography as an instrument for the development of reasoning power, see Parker, pages 129 and 130, and Fitch, page 345. 3. On Education as like all other sciences based on induc- tion, see Tate, Part I., chap. III., page 39; on the peculiar nature of children's reasonings, see the same, page 88; and on the com- parative complexity of reasonings, see the same, page 89; on exercising the minds of children first in easy processes of reason- ing, the same, Part I., chap. YL, page 256; on the mistake in teaching of setting out with 'first principles' see Quick, p. 250. 4. On the elementary method as inductive and the scientific method as deductive, see Payne, Pestalozzi, Lectures, page 248 ; on the method of investigation, see Quick, page 225 and Payne, PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 291 pages 140 and 220; on the student's own method of study as the true method of science, see Payne, True Foundation of Science Teaching, near the end, Lectures page 223; and on text-book work in the sciences as almost worthless, see the same reference ; on the other hand for disciplinary failure of practical instruction in chemistry, see Dr. Volcker quoted by Payne, The Curriculum of Modern Education, near the end, (English edition, page 278). CHAPTER XL FEELING. Having now briefly reviewed the growth of intellect, we may pass on to trace the second great phase of men- tal development, the growth of the feelings. Feeling defined. By feeling is meant any state of con- sciousness which is pleasurable or painful. Every feeling is either pleasurable or painful, agreeable or disagreeable in some degree. At the same time there are many mixed states of feeling, such as grief, anger, and so on, which are partly the one and partly the other, and it is sometimes difficult to say which element preponderates. Thus the term covers first of all those simple mental effects which are the direct result of nerve-stimulation, and which are commonly marked off as ' sensations ' of pleasure and pain, such as the pains of hunger and thirst, and the corresponding pleasures. In the second place, the term feeling comprehends the more complex effects which depend on mental activity of some kind, and which are marked off as emotions, such as fear, hope, admiration, and regret. Importance of studying the Feelings. As we have seen, the feelings constitute a distinct, well-marked phase or division of mind. Our pleasures and pains make up the interesting side of our experience. The objects of RELATION OF FEELING TO KNOWING. 293 the external world only have a value for us in so far as they touch our feeling. The life of feeling, of joy and sorrow, is in a peculiar sense our own inner life. Our knowledge has to do with external things, our actions when carried out are external events, but our feelings belong to the inner subjective world. On the one hand, feeling is connected with intellectual growth, since it supplies the interest of study. Hence no theory of intellectual culture can be complete without some reference to the emotional susceptibilities. On the other hand, feeling stands in intimate connection with action and will. The incentives and motives to action are represented feelings (anticipations of satisfactions of various kinds). The habitual directions of conduct follow the lead of the dominant feelings. Hence the study of the feelings is of great practical moment as a preparation for the theory of moral culture, and the formation of character. Relation of Feeling to Knowing. In the first place, feel- ing and knowing are in a manner opposed. The mind cannot at the same moment be in a state of intense emo- tional excitement and of close intellectual application. All violent feeling takes possession of the mind, masters the attention, and precludes the due carrying out of the intellectual processes. Even when there is no strong emotional agitation present, intellectual processes may be interfered with by the subtle influence of the feelings on the thoughts working in the shape of bias. Thus a child that finds a task distasteful is apt to reject the idea that the study is useful. His feeling of dislike prejudices his mind and blinds him to considerations 294 FEELING. which he would otherwise recognize. Hence the spe- cial difficulties which, as every teacher knows, are con- nected with the intellectual training of children of a highly emotional temperament. On the other hand, as we saw above, all intellectual activity, since it implies interest, depends on the pres- ence of a certain moderate degree of feeling. It may be said, indeed, that all good and effective intellectual work involves the presence of a gentle wave of pleasura- ble emotion. Attention . is more lively, images recur more abundantly, and thought traces out its relations more quickly when there is an under-current of pleas- ure. Hence rapid intellectual progress is furthered by lively intellectual feelings. It would appear to follow from this that the growth of intellect itself in all its higher phases implies the strengthening of certain feelings. In order that there may be an interest in study and a motive for intel- lectual effort certain emotions must be developed in the child's mind, such as the pleasure of gaining reward, affection, and the ' intellectual emotions ' of curiosity and love of knowledge. The highest feelings of all, such as reverence for truth and the sentiment of justice, presuppose a process of abstract thought, and consequently a considerable measure of intellectual development. Hence the changes of emotional life attending changes of intellectual pur- suits, and the progress of intellectual culture. This dependence of feeling on intellectual activity makes it convenient that the exposition of the Emotions should follow that of the Intellect. We thus see how the cultivation of intellect and of LAW OF PLEASURABLE ACTIVITY. 295 emotion involve one another in a measure. In order to exercise the intellectual powers to the utmost, we must aim at making study pleasurable. And if we wish to strengthen the higher emotions, such as the moral sentiment and the love of truth, we must seek to exer- cise the intellectual powers. Law of Pleasurable Activity. Pleasurable activity lies between two extremes of excessive or strained, and de- fective or impeded exercise. It is important to add that the terms moderate, excessive, and defective are rela- tive to the customary amount of activity answering to the natural strength, and the acquired habits of the organ. The moderate degree of activity is, further, re- lated to the temporary condition of an organ as fresh and vigorous, or feeble. An amount of muscular exer- cise which is pleasurable to a vigorous child will be painful to a weakly one. We may say then that pleas- ure depends on a due balance between the process of stimulation on the one hand, and that of reinvigoration on the other, or between the expenditure and the ac- cumulation of energy. Change in Degree of Activity. Activity is pleasurable in so far as it is a transition from a previous state of inactivity or of less activity. Thus we greatly enjoy fresh air after being deprived of it for a while. Similarly the full enjoyment of health, liberty, and so on, depends on a temporary loss and sense of need of these posses- sions. Again, a transition from a state of excessive to one of moderate activity is a common condition of pleasure. 296 FEELING. When a task either bodily or mental is beyond our powers, anything which lightens it gives a pleasant sense of ease. The removal of hindrances or impediments which have necessitated a painful effort brings pleasure by allowing activity to proceed at its natural pace. Change in the Kind of Activity. What are known as the pleasures of Novelty are but one illustration of this law of change or Variety. What is new, unfamiliar, or rare, acts, as we have seen, as a very powerful stimulus to the attention, and the mental activity as a whole: it involves a marked change from customary modes of activity. A novel experience in early life, such as the first party, the first visit to the Pantomime, the first journey abroad, calls out new activities of mind, or exercises the faculties in a fresh and unaccustomed way. Hence the peculiar intensity of enjoyment belonging to these first experiences of life. Where the perfect en- joyment of novelty is precluded a modest substitute for it is found in the rarity or infrequency of an experience. The coming holidays are always a pleasant excitement to a boy or a girl at school. Any experience which is disconnected with preceding events, and so comes upon us unexpectedly has something of the same effect. Two Opposing Principles. The craving for change, and the clinging to what is customary, are two great opposed principles in our emotional life. The new ceases to delight when it implies a rupture of continuity with the past, the customary type of experience. Our happiuess depends on a due adjustment of these conditions. It may be added that different minds have by nature these CLASSES OF FEELING. 297 two tendencies in very unequal measure. Some children are by temperament fond of excitement, variety, novelty. They delight in seeing new faces, in being taken to new houses, and so on. Others cling tenaciously to the old and familiar. Classes of Feeling: Sense-Feelings and Emotions. Feelings of pleasure and pain fall into two main divisions. The first (popularly marked off as bodily feelings) involve processes in the outlying parts of the organism and may be briefly called sense-feelings. The second being con- nected with central nerve-processes (in the brain) may be described as centrally excited feelings or as Emo- tions. (a) Importance of Sense-Feelings. We may dismiss this class of feelings at once with a word or two. They are of great importance for our happiness and misery. More particularly in early life before the emotions are developed they constitute a chief part of the life of feeling. The pains of indigestion, of cold, of hunger, and so on, make up a chief part of the infant's misery. On the other hand, the pleasures of eating and drinking, of warmth, of contact, light and sound, make up most of his happiness. It is to be remarked further that owing to the close connection between body and mind, the organic feelings have a far-reaching effect on the higher emotional life. An uneasy attitude of body, the pressure or chafing of a garment, or the chilliness of a limb, is quite enough to depress the mental powers, to induce irritability of temper, a disposition to pevishnesss, and to outbreaks 298 FEELING. of angry passion. On the other hand, pleasurable states of the body lead to a cheerful, hopeful state of mind. (b) Emotions and their Classes. The higher feelings or emotions clearly fall into certain well-marked varie- ties of pleasurable, together with the corresponding painful, susceptibility, such as the pleasures and pains of Self-esteem, Love, and so on. It is the object of mental science to discover the deepest or most essential resemblances and differences among these commonly recognized groups of feeling, and to classify them ac- cording to these. No very satisfactory classification has as yet been settled on, and we must content our- selves with taking a few of the best marked varieties and grouping these roughly according to some principle. Order of Development of the Emotions. As has been re- marked, the emotions appear to unfold themselves in the order of increasing complexity and representative- ness. Thus fear and anger precede the feelings of benevolence and justice, because they are much more simple in their composition, and involve a smaller amount and an easier kind of representative activity. Although we cannot trace out the order of growing representativeness into all the details of the emotional history, we may show that it is the order of develop- ment when looked at as a whole, or in its broad outlines. Three orders of Emotion. Looking, then, at emotional development in this way, we may conveniently distin- guish between three groups or orders of emotion, con- stituting successive stages in the progress of the emotional life. First of all comes what may be called ORDERS OF EMOTION. 299 the Individual or Personal Emotions. By these are meant those emotions which are confined to the indi- vidual, depending on some special personal experience or relation to an object. In the second place we have the Sympathetic Feel- ings. By these are meant participations in others' pleasurable and painful experiences, and kindliness or benevolence of disposition generally. These are purely representative feelings. In sympathy or fellow-feeling with another we have to imagine or represent how another feels. And the sympathetic feelings follow the personal feelings because they presuppose some amount of 'first-hand' emotional experience. In the third place we have a group of highly com- plex feelings known as sentiments, such as patriotism, the feeling for nature, for humanity. These are com- monly brought under three heads, the Intellectual Senti- ment, or the attachment to Truth, the ^Esthetic Senti- ment or admiration of the Beautiful, and the Moral Sentiment or reverence for Duty (including the worship of moral excellence and the feeling for humanity). These emotions in their developed form attach them- selves to certain qualities in things or abstract ideas, truth, beauty, moral goodness. In admiring a beauti- ful painting, or in feeling delight at some new scientific truth we are not thinking of ourselves or our own indi- dividual interests. The mind is turned wholly away from self and its concerns, and is engaged in a disinter- ested contemplation of an object. And these senti- ments can be participated in by a number. Knowiedge or Truth, Beauty and Human Goodness, are common objects of contemplation or thought. 300 FEELING. Social Feelings of Childhood. Children are from the first social beings. The pleasure in the infant's face when he gazes at the mother attests this. A child goes to his mother for companionship, for the expression of interest and sympathy in his doings and concerns. A boy of sixteen months showed this desire for sympathy in his pleasures. When he saw anything which de- lighted or amused him, he used to touch his mother's face, and try to turn it in the direction of the object. The proximity of the mother or nurse evidently gives pleasure. He is happy when at her side engaging as much of her attention as possible, and occasionally in- dulging his young love by a warm caress. On the other hand, he is miserable when long away from her, whether alone or with strangers. The very dependence of childhood on parental care forms a bond that binds the child to his mother. But this early affection is largely a personal and interested feeling. The child feels the mother or playmate to be necessary to him. He values them as sources of pleasure to himself. He has as yet hardly any disinterested feeling for their concerns, and as little appreciation of what they are in themselves, and out of relation to himself. Love of Approbation. One of the most valuable traits of childhood is its strong love of others' recognition, good opinion, and approbation. This is not a non- personal or disinterested feeling. When a child finds pleasure in another's approval he is obviously think- ing of himself. It is thus a form of self-love or self-appreciation. The child is pleased (according to the principle of harmony) when others' opinion is SELF-ESTEEM, ETC. 301 favorable, chiming in with his instinctive disposition to think well of himself. At the same time this feeling is distinct from other personal feelings in one impprtant respect, that it in- volves a reference to others. To set store by the good opinion of others means that we respect others. Not only so, it implies a vague reference to the feelings of others. It is another's pleasurable feeling which is the ground of the self-gratulation in the case, anothers* painful feeling which is the basis of the self-humiliation or sense of shame. Hence the moral and educational value of this feeling. It is, to use Mr. Spencer's ex- pression, an ' ego-altruistic ' sentiment which serves to bind the child to others, and prepares the way for a purely disinterested type of social feeling. Self-Esteem, etc. As however a child's powers unfold themselves, a,nd he learns to reflect about himself and his concerns, distinct feelings of self-satisfaction and self-approval arise. The very instinct of self-preservation would, as just remarked, further the growth of self- esteem. And where circumstances are favorable and the child succeeds in accomplishing his daily objects, there grows up in the way already explained a mass of agreeable feeling in relation to himself and his surround- ings. The boy feels abreast with his surroundings: he is conscious of progressing in physical power, knowledge, and the accumulation of material possessions. And so there arises in connection with the persistent conscious- ness of self, a customary mode of agreeable feeling which, viewed in slightly different ways, we call pride, self-complacency, or self-esteem. The customary 302 FEELING. strength of this pleasurable feeling serves to determine to a considerable extent the amount of the individual's happiness. Cultivation of Emotion. The practical problem of cultivating the emotions is beset with peculiar difficulties. The means of stimulating the intellectual powers of the child lie in the teacher's hand. He can set objects before his eye, communicate knowledge by means of words, and so directly act upon his faculties. But how is he to work on the feelings of the child? It is plain that much less can be done in the way of commanding results in the case of the feelings than in that of the intellect. Moreover the vast differences in emotional temperament among children complicate the problem of cultivating emotion in a peculiar manner. Let us see what resources Education has with respect to the culture of feeling. The culture of the emotions falls into two well-marked divisions, (a) the negative culture, and (b) the positive culture. Repression of Feeling. There are emotions which are apt to exist in excess, such as fear, and the anti-social feelings, anger, envy, etc. These must to a certain extent be repressed, and kept within due bounds. The problem of subduing the force of feeling in the young is in some respects a peculiarly difficult one. As we have seen, their emotional outbursts are marked by great violence. Moreover, the great agency by which, as we shall see by and by, the force of emotion is checked and counteracted, namely an effort of self-restraint, STIMULATION OF EMOTION. 303 cannot be relied on in the case of young children, owing to the feebleness of their wills. On the other hand, the very mobility of the child's mind is favorable to an easy diversion of his attention by a skilful educator from the exciting cause of the passion. In addition to seeking to subdue the force of undesir- able feelings when actually excited, the wise teacher will aim at weakening the underlying emotional sensi- bilities. In some cases he has to take care that feelings needing repression are not too powerfully excited. A timid child should be shielded to some extent from circumstances likely to excite terror. An envious child ought not to be placed in a situation which is pretty certain to excite this feeling. An emotional suscepti- bility may to some extent be weakened and even 'starved out' through want of exercise. Again, feelings may be weakened by strengthening the intellectual side of the child's mind, adding to his knowledge and exercising his powers of reflection and judgment. In this way, for example, groundless terror will be undermined, and the violence of grief and anger mitigated. Finally, the weakening or deadening of an undesirable feeling may often be most effectively carried out by exciting some opposed or incompatible feeling. Thus, every exercise of a feeling of regard for others' good qualities tends to enfeeble a child's conceit. Every exercise in kindness and consideration for others helps to weaken the impulses of anger and envy. Stimulation of Emotion. What we call the culture of feeling is, however, largely concerned with the problem of awakening and strengthening desirable and useful 304 FEELING. emotions, such as affection, the sense of duty, and so on. Speaking roughly we may say that as the egoistic feel- ings require to be weakened, sympathy and the higher sentiments need to be strengthened. Since feeling grows by exercise the problem is how to call forth an emotional susceptibility into full and vigorous play. There are two things which the educator can do here. (1) First of all the child may be introduced to objects, circumstances, modes of activity, which are fitted to excite a particular feeling. Thus objects may be pre- sented, e.g., in a pathetic story, which are fitted to excite his sympathy. Beautiful objects of nature and art may be submitted to his notice, and so the aesthetic feeling of admiration awakened. Noble actions may be narrated to him, and so the moral sense stimulated. Finally, by inducing him (by the application of any motive) to put forth his activities we set him in the way of acquiring experiences, and discovering new modes of pleasure. In this mariner an indolent, unambitious child may be roused to activity by a first taste of the pleasures of success, and the delight of well-earned commendation. (2) In the second place, much may be done by the habitual manifestation of a particular feeling by those who constitute the child's social environment. Children tend to reflect the feelings they see expressed by their parents, teachers, and young companions. This fact will be touched on again when we come to the subject of sympathy. Here it is enough to name it as affording one of the great instrumentalities by which (the teacher may to some extent mould or give shape to the growing emotional nature of the child. In seeking to stimulate the feelings the Educator MANAGEMENT OF THE EGOISTIC FEELINGS. 305 needs to be on his guard lest he repress what he seeks to foster. This risk is peculiarly great in education owing to the frequent need of stimulating sensibility on its painful side, for purposes of deterring. As was pointed out above, the oft-repeated wounding of any emotional susceptibility tends to deaden it. This is specially the case with a delicate feeling like shame, which as Locke points out "cannot be kept and often transgress'd against". 1 The Management of the Individual or Egoistic Feelings. The problem of the Educator with respect to the egois- tic feelings is partly one of repression, partly one of development. There is no doubt that they are apt to exist in excess in children. The mother and teacher have to seek to restrain the violent painful emotions as terror and grief. More particularly the anti-social feel- ings, angry passion, antipathy, envy, and other unlovely feelings have to a great extent to be stamped out. Yet the problem is not merely a negative one. The emotions which grow up about self are needful for the child's continued existence and success in the struggle for life. We cannot eradicate them even if we would, and it would not be well to do so if we could. The egoistic impulses may even be deficient and require positive stimulation. There are listless and lethargic children whom it is well to try and rouse to self-asser- tion. In their case it may be desirable to seek to quicken the feelings of pride, ambition, and (in extreme cases) even the distinctly anti-social feeling of antago- nism and delight in beating others. On the otber hand, i Thoughts concerning Education, §60. T 306 FEELING. an over-rash child may require a strengthening of the emotion of fear. Even when there is no natural deficiency in these feelings the educator has not so much to repress them as to direct them to higher objects or aspects of objects. He seeks to transform them by refining them. Thus he aims at leading the child up from the fear of physical evil to the fear of moral evil; from the enjoyment of bodily contest to that of mental competition; from pride in the possession of material objects (personal beauty, etc.) to pride in the possession of intellectual qualities, and so forth. This process goes hand in hand with the exercise of the higher and disinterested emotions. Emulation in Education. The difficulties of the educa- tional problems connected with the management of the egoistic feelings come out clearly enough in current dis- cussions respecting the proper motives to be appealed to in intellectual education. The way to deal with the feeling or impulse of emulation or rivalry is one of the puzzles of educational science. In its pure form this emotion is an egoistic and anti-social feeling and there is no doubt that among school-competitors it often develops into genuine hatred. A boy from habitually regarding another as his rival, as one who may obtain the prize he covets, and with whom he is called on to measure his strength, comes unconsciously, perhaps, to cherish a special dislike or antipathy towards his oppo- nent. Hence the impulse must be checked. At the same time, the feeling is far too powerful, as well as too necessary a force to be dispensed with in education. Provided it be kept within due limits, and SYMPATHY. 307 tempered by kindly generous feelings under the form of a friendly rivalry, it is unobjectionable. The great practical objection to it is its limited range. Rivalry comes into full play in competition for prizes and other honors. Hence slow and backward children come little under the influence of this feeling. And since clever children may in general be supposed to derive more pleasure" from study itself than stupid ones, the applica- tion of the stimulus of reward for absolute attainment, looks very much like giving "to him that hath." This points to the need of habitually exercising another feeling, the love of approbation. This acts on all alike, and as a semi-social feeling is of a higher moral value than the feeling of rivalry. Hence the more the educa- tor can appeal to this feeling in the early stage of school- life the better. By uniformly recognizing effort made, and progress attained, in other words, relative as dis- tinguished from absolute proficiency, the teacher is helping to build up a feeling of self-reliance and self- esteem, which when sufficiently developed will make the intellectual industry of the pupil independent of all external stimulus. Sympathy. The transition from the lower level of per- sonal Emotion to the higher plane of non-personal Sentiment, is, as we have seen, affected to a large extent by the development of the capacity for sympathy. By sympathy is meant, as the etymology of the word sug. gests ( $w, with, and TtaQoS, feeling), fellow-feeling or feeling along with others. It is the great force which binds the individual to his social environment (family, school, or nation). In its perfect form it constitutes 308 FEELING. disinterestedness, or altruistic feeling, a readiness to sacrifice personal comfort and happiness for the welfare of others. Growth of Sympathy. Sympathy in its complete con- scious form, fellow-feeling, first appears as a feeling of pity or commiseration for others. The pains first sym- pathized with are of course the familiar bodily feelings, such as cold, fatigue, injury, together with the simple emotional states as fear and disappointment. A very young child will show unmistakably the signs of dejec- tion and sorrow at the actual sight or narration of another child's sufferings. And the lower animals with their simple and easily apprehended emotional experi- ences come in for a considerable share of this early pity. To give an instance, a boy of 21 months on seeing a drowned dog taken out of a pond and buried, burst into tears, and continued for days to talk in plaintive tones of the unfortunate quadruped. Every mother knows how much the interest of nursery stories depends on a gratification of the impulses of pity. Uses of Sympathy in Education. The impulses of sym- pathy are a matter of prime concern to the teacher. The fundamental fact of sympathy, that feeling tends to propagate itself, is fraught with important educational consequences. The maxim that the teacher should ex- hibit good feeling himself, and cultivate a healthy tone of sentiment in his class or school, depends on this cir- cumstance. In its fuller and more complete form, too, sympathy is a matter of supreme interest. The teach- er's success with a pupil will turn largely on his ability CULTIVATION OF SYMPATHY. 309 to cultivate and maintain a relation of mutual sympathy between himself and his charge. His object should be to stimulate the young learner to enter to some extent into his own feeling of enthusiasm for knowledge, into his tastes, and so on; and for this purpose he should know something of the way in which sympathy is excited. Finally sympathy plays a prominent part in moral development. The child grows moral to some extent by unconsciously imbibing the moral feelings of those about him. But, more than this, sympathy with others is, as we shall see presently, an essential ingredi- ent in the moral sentiment. The disinterested love of right presupposes the capacity and habit of representing and realizing the interests and claims of others. It fol- lows from all this that the cultivation of sympathy will occupy a prominent place in intellectual and moral training. Cultivation of Sympathy. The problem of cultivating sympathy is complicated by the very great differences of native temperament among children. Leaving these out of sight we may lay down one or two general con- siderations for the guidance of the mother or teacher. To begin with, the capacity for sympathy must be sup- plied with appropriate stimuli. Objects may be sup- plied, either in actual life, or, in default of these, in fiction, for the purpose of exciting sympathy. 1 The child should from the first be made familiar with the i As a part of moral training, that is, the exercise of the will in action for the relief of others' distress and the promotion of their happiness, the presentment of ideal objects is of far less efficacy. It tends, when re- sorted to in excess, to beget the habit of feeling for others without acting on the feeling. 310 FEELING. experiences of others. Since want of sympathy is often due to inadvertency, it behooves the teacher to exercise the child in a habit of attending to others' feelings. More particularly he should be prompted to note the effects on others of his own actions. Thus he should be led to see how he wounds and hurts others by his acts of folly and insubordination, by his propensity to self- indulgence. And on the other hand he should be encouraged to note the happy results of good conduct, the comfort and satisfaction he confers on others. Fi- nally the child should be exercised in the following out of sympathetic impulses, that is to say, in benevolent actions. He should be encouraged to relieve distress whenever he is able, and to confer happiness on others by giving up his toys, books, and so on. This exercise should be gradual, beginning with the sharing of a pos- session with another, and going on to the more difficult feat of self-denial. In this way he will reach an experi- ence of the delights of sympathy, and have the disposi- tion to sympathize fixed as a ruling motive to conduct. An important auxiliary agency in the cultivation of a child's sympathy is the manifestation of sympathy with him. Children are at first egoistic and cannot rise to the height of pure unrewarded disinterestedness. Their first outgoings of sympathy are a kind of exchange for similar favors received. Hence they first confer their sympathy on those (as mother and nurse) who are kind and sympathetic towards them. The more the teacher shows kind consideration for his pupil, enters into his special difficulties, troubles, and his favorite interests, the more likely is he to evoke a responsive sympathy. If the teacher wishes his pupil to step up to his level of PLEASURES OF KNOWLEDGE ANALYZED. 311 feeling, he must first descend to his humbler level. In addition to showing sympathy to the particular child, the teacher will help to cultivate his capacity of sym- pathy by showing a kindly disposition in general. Sympathy, like other modes of feeling, is acquired in part through the influence of example. Children brought up in the midst of those who are considerate are them- selves likely to grow considerate. The Intellectual Sentiment : Love of Knowledge. Having briefly considered the nature of sympathy, we pass to the consideration of those non-personal emotions or sentiments which gather about certain objects and ideas common to all. Of these the first is the Intellectual Sentiment or the pleasurable feeling which attaches itself to knowledge and truth, together with the corre- sponding painful emotion which connects itself with ignorance and error. This sentiment is developed in connection with the pursuit of knowledge. Viewed under slightly different aspects it is known as the satis- faction of curiosity, the pleasure of discovery, and the reverence for truth. Pleasures of Knowledge Analyzed : Delight in New Knowl- edge. All mental activity is as we have seen pleasurable provided it is suitable to the strength of the faculty and to the condition of the brain at the time. Intel- lectual occupation of all kinds is thus within certain limits agreeable. But the enjoyment only becomes con- siderable when the charm of novelty is added. To observe a familiar object, to recall a well-know fact, gives little enjoyment. On the other hand, to exercise 312 FEELING. the powers of observation on a new object, or to recall an occurrence that seemed forgotten, yields keen enjoy- ment. Hence all acquisition and discovery of new knowledge is fitted to give pleasure, the enjoyment being greater when the facts or truths contrast strik- ingly with our previous knowledge. In this case we experience the pleasurable excitement of surprise or wonder. The first introduction of the young mind to the new world opened up by science (e. g., Astronomy, Chemistry) gives a thrill of delightful wonder. Pleasures of Discovering Knowledge. The full enjoyment of intellect is known only in those more prolonged operations when the mind is actively searching for some new fact or truth. The passive reception of a new piece of knowledge, even when the pains of ignorance or of perplexity have preceded, gives but little delight com- pared with the active discovery of it for oneself. A boy who works out unaided a problem in geometry has an amount of satisfaction wholly incommensurable with that of another who has the solution at once supplied him. In this case the full activity of the mind is awakened, trains of ideas pass rapidly through the mind, and there is the glow of intellectual excitement. In addition to this there is the pleasure of pursuing an end, the delight of intellectual chase. A certain amount of resistance only stimulates the powers further, and so adds to the zest. At the end there is the joyous feeling of successful attainment of difficulties overcome and of triumph. Pleasure in Possessing Knowledge. When the knowledge is attained its possession is accompanied by a pleasur- EARLIER STAGE OF INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENT. 313 able consciousness of power. The mind is aware of being enriched by a new possession. And the new at- tainment is felt to be a source of strength. It has les- sened for us the region of the unknown and obscure, and adds to our self-confidence in confronting the world about us. In many cases, too, the new possession gives us a firmer hold on previous acquisitions. It throws light on facts which were once obscure, it serves to bind a number of fragments of knowledge under some uniting principle. Finally, the new acquisition gives us the pleasurable sense of increased active efficiency. Knowledge is power in the sense that it enables us to act or do things. The consciousness of knowing some- thing involves an agreeable confidence in our ability to act on it when the time comes. Other forms of Intellectual Sentiment : Logical Feelings. Besides the feeling of pleasure which springs up in con- nection with the pursuit and attainment of knowledge, there are other feelings incident to intellectual processes, which may be styled the Logical Feelings. As we have seen, all doubt is in a measure a painful state of discord, whereas belief is a state of agreeable repose. State- ments which run counter to our experience give the sense of contradiction, whereas those which chime in with it are wont to be assented to with a pleasurable sense of harmony. Earlier Stage of Intellectual Sentiment. In the early stages of school life the child's interest in knowledge is due to no small extent to the value which is put on it by others. The boy or girl finds that everybody else is 314 FEELING. busy amassing knowledge. Progress is rewarded: the children who get up their lessons well are approved, and regarded with favor by their teacher and by their com- panions. Thus a reflected feeling of respect for knowl- edge is acquired, which will vary in intensity according to the susceptibility of the child to the pleasures of ap- probation and reputation. He is proud of knowing his lesson mainly because others hold knowledge in high esteem. Affection and Sympathy will, as we have seen, also play a part. The affectionate child takes to study because he wishes to please his teacher. Moreover he finds that his ignorance excludes him from the pleasures of companionship and sympathy, and that every ad- vance in knowledge brings him nearer his teacher. Finally knowledge will be valued for its practical utility. Children set store by those kinds of knowledge which they can turn to practical account. Where, as often happens, the usefulness of knowledge is not ap- parent they are apt to feel less concern about it. Here too we see the effects of habit in limiting the range of the feeling. The child comes to value knowl- edge of certain kinds only, namely, those which are most closely related to his natural tastes, or those which he has made a special object of pursuit. Later Stage of Intellectual Sentiment. A purely disinter- ested love of knowledge is more than this, and embraces a feeling of curiosity for knowledge of all kinds, that which lies outside our special region of observation and study, as well as that which lies within it. This wide impartial interest in knowledge is rarely developed in early life. It presupposes a considerable measure of CULTIVATION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENT. 315 intellectual culture. Even among adults it is one of the rarest attainmeuts. The development of the Logical Feelings, the senti- ment of consistency and accuracy, is a slow process which only begins in the ordinary period of school life. Children often show a certain quickness in spying out inaccuracies and inconsistencies in others' statements, but the interest here is rather the feeling of pleasure in "taking another down," than a genuine intellectual repugnance to contradiction. Such feelings in their keener form are rare, and presuppose a certain refine- ment of emotional nature to begin with. Their devel- opment is closely connected with intellectual progress and the growth of a love of knowledge. A keen desire for knowledge leads naturally to a deep respect for ac- curacy and consistency. This last is further promoted by a practical experience of the evils of inaccuracy and error. The Cultivation of the Intellectual Sentiment. The cultiva- tion of the emotions which grow up about knowledge goes on hand in hand with intellectual culture. The best kind of intellectual training necessarily involves the calling forth of a genuine interest in knowledge and of a habitual feeling of curiosity. Here the thing to attend to is to adapt as far as possible the work to the capabilities and natural tastes of the child so that the fullest enjoyment may be derived from it. The pupil must be led (at the outset by the help of adventitious motives) to make acquaintance with the pleasures of intellectual activity, of finding out things and of over- coming obstacles. A judicious use should be made of 316 FEELING. the principle of association. All the accompaniments of study should be made as agreeable as possible, so that a pleasurable feeling may be reflected on to intel- lectual pursuits. The ' get up ' of a text-book may materially affect the child's liking for a particular study at this early period. And the more attractive the school surroundings, the more likely are the scholars to take kindly to learning. Further, in seeking to awaken a pleasurable interest in knowledge resort must be had to the principle of contrast. The pleasures of knowledge cannot in themselves be very keen at first; but by inducing beforehand a feeling of ignorance, of wonder and perplexity, we may be able to excite a strong impulse of curiosity, the satisfaction of which craving will greatly enhance the pleasure which attends the actual attainment of knowledge. Once more, whenever it is practicable the young should be invited to make their own discoveries in order that they may taste the full enjoyment of intellectual pur- suit. A skilful method of instruction will always man- age to leave some room for the play of the child's impulse to divine facts, and search out reasons. The JEsthetic Sentiment. The second of the three senti- ments to be now considered is known as the Esthetic Emotion, the Pleasures of Beauty or the Pleasures of Taste. These include a variety of pleasurable feelings, namely those corresponding to what is pretty, graceful, harmonious, sublime, ludicrous, in natural objects (in- cluding human beings) or in works of art. To these pleasures there correspond the disagreeable feelings excited by what is ugly, inharmonious, and so forth. ORIGIN OF AESTHETIC ENJOYMENT. 3l7 Origin of JEsthetic Enjoyment. The whole effect of a beautiful object, so far as we can explain it, is a harmo- nious confluence of the delights of sense, intellect, and emotion, in a new combination. Thus a beautiful natural object, as a noble tree, delights us by its gradations of light and color, the combination of variety with symme- try in its contour or form, the adaption of part to part, and of the whole to its surroundings; and finally by its effect on the imagination, its suggestions of heroic persistence, of triumph over the adverse forces of winds and storms. Similarly a beautiful painting delights the eye by supplying a rich variety of light and shade, of color, and. of outline; gratifies the intellect by exhibiting- a certain plan of composition, the setting forth of a scene or incident with just the fulness of detail for agreeable apprehension; and lastly, touches the many- stringed instrument of emotion by a harmonious impression, the several parts or objects being fitted to strengthen and deepen the dominant emotional effect, whether this be grave or pathetic on the one hand, or light and gay on the other. The effect of beauty, then, appears to depend on a simultaneous presentment in a single object of a well-harmonized mass of pleasurable material or pleasurable stimulus for sense, intellect, and emotion. Good or Healthy Taste. By this is meant what answers to a perfect and healthy nature well adapted to its en- vironment. A normal aesthetic faculty presupposes the common human sensibilities and faculties. This idea would help us to say, in certain cases at least, whether any particular aesthetic judgment was sound, or whether 318 FEELING. it indicated a good or healthy taste. Thus, for example, we could condemn the Chinese taste for pinched feet or the English taste for pinched waists as bad, because indicating a state of feeling out of harmony with the conditions of life. Similarly, we might pronounce against a preference for dingy over bright colors, because this is a sign of feebleness in the organ concerned. Refined Taste. We are apt to talk of a good and a refined taste as though these were the same; but this is not accurate. ' A good taste ' points to what is common to all (normal) men, 'a refined taste' points to what distinguishes a higher stage of development or culture from a lower, whether among individuals or races. Now we may assume perhaps that culture tends on the whole to the increase of well-being, to the better adaptation of nature to surroundings. So far as this is the case a good and refined taste coincide. Refinement as contrasted with coarseness of taste clearly involves this superiority. Varieties of Fine Art. The working out of this artistic impulse in its various forms has lead to the cultivation of the several Fine Arts. Of these the best recognized varieties are five, namely, Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, and Poetry. These may be variously distinguished. Thus we may mark off (a) the Visual Arts, namely, those arts which appeal to the eye or make use of visual impression as their material (Painting, Sculpture, Architecture), from (b) the Auditory Arts, or those which appeal to the ear, or make use of auditory impression (Music and Poetry). Or we may divide them into (a) Imitative Arts, those which imitate natural THE EDUCATION OF TASTE. 319 objects and are greatly controlled by the ends of truth (Painting, Sculpture, and Poetry) ; and (b) No n- Imitative Arts, those which are more free and in a peculiar sense creative (Music and Architecture). Id the imitative arts the element of suggestion or ideality prevails over the formal element: in the non-imitative arts beauty of form is the main thing aimed at. The Education of Taste. The full and healthy develop- ment of taste implies certain external influences. Among these, education or training plays an important part. Although a mother or teacher cannot implant a faculty of taste if this is wanting, they may do much to ' draw out ' and strengthen the natural aptitude. (a) The Environment of the child should be tasteful. To begin with, since the aesthetic faculty, like the other faculties, grows by exercise on suitable material, it is important to surround the child from the first with what is pretty, attractive, and tasteful. As far as possible he should be taken out into the fields and woods so as to become familiar with nature's beauties, both sights and sounds. It is only by such early companionship with nature that the most valuable associations which lend so deep a charm to stream, wood, and mountain side can be built up. And in the artificial surroundings of home, neatness and picturesqueness should be aimed at. First impressions produce the deepest effect in the edu- cation of taste as well as in that of the other faculties. The influence of a refined mother who studies grace in furniture, pictures, and in her own dress and manner, may be all-important in awakening the first feeling for 320 FEELING. what is graceful and beautiful. Custom, as has been remarked, plays a great part in determining our stand- ard of what is correct in matters of taste. It is all-im- portant, therefore, to accustom the child at the outset to what, though simple and adapted to the child's sensibil- ities, is in good taste. By daily familiarity with exam- ples of what is becoming and harmonious in dress, house-decoration, gesture, modulation of voice, and generally what we call manners, a standard will be unconsciously built up by the child, by a reference to which he will afterwards judge as to what is aesthetically right. (b) The child's attention should be called to the beautiful. In the second place much may be done by the mother or other educator by way of directing the attention to what is beautiful, pointing out those aspects of objects which are fitted to please the eye and mind, and so calling the aesthetic faculty into exercise. The training of the sensuous side of the faculty is in itself a considerable work. We all tend to overlook the exact character of sense-impressions, the finer details of color and line in objects, owing to the superior interest of their sugges- tions, namely the objects themselves, and their uses, etc. A child looking at a tree-trunk overgrown with moss, or an old wall tinted with lichens and flowers is wont to think of the tree and the wall as wholes or things, to wonder how high they are, whether he could climb them, and so on. In order to see exactly what is pres- ent to the eye, a special interest in sense-impressions and a habit of close attention is necessary. A cultivated mother or teacher may do much to exercise the child's THE EDUCATION OF TASTE. 321 faculty by repeatedly calling off his attention from ideas of doing things, and fixing it in quiet contempla- tion on some of the main beauties of Nature's sights and sounds. In addition to calling his attention to what is worthy in the sense-impressions of Nature, the educator should exercise him in noting the beauties of form of natural objects, the symmetry of the mountain, the serpentine windings of the stream, and the beautiful regularities and proportions of crystals, and of organic structures. Lastly, it is obvious that the cultivation of a feeling for art, for painting, music, and so forth, consists largely in this systematic direction of the child's attention to what is beautiful both in the elements (color, line, sound), in their combinations (symmetrical form, rhythm, etc.), and in the meaning of the whole (what it represents or expresses). (c) The (esthetic faculties should be actively exercised. In the third place, the faculty of taste should be exercised on its active side. A child's feelings for what is agree- able, refined, or elegant in vocal utterance and expres- sion, gesture, dress, etc., is only fully cultivated when he is led to take pleasure in producing these effects himself. A fine feeling for beauty of color, line, or sound, is best secured by exercising the child in repro- ducing what he sees or hears. The teaching of draw- ing, painting, singing, or other art is the only effective means of developing a fine and discriminative aesthetic faculty. Great care should be taken not to hurry the process of cultivation. Children who have too refined a stand- u 322 FEELING. ard set before them are apt to affect a taste for what they do not really care about. Young persons should not only be allowed but even encouraged to relish simple aesthetic enjoyments, the charm of brilliant colors, and forcible contrasts of color, of simple symmetrical patterns, and so on. Great care must be taken not to over-refine their taste, to deaden the healthy instinctive feelings, and so unduly narrow the region of enjoyment. With respect to the exercise of the aesthetic judg- ment children should be encouraged to be natural, and to pronounce opinion for themselves. The teacher should never forget the great individual differences of sensibility and taste, and should allow a legitimate scope to independent judgment. Taste is the region which ad- mits of the greatest freedom of opiuion, and constitutes, therefore, the best field for the exercise of individual judgment. On the other hand, the child should be taught to express opinion modestly, to avoid dogmatism, and to respect the tastes of others. The Sentiment of the Beautiful in Practical Education. The cultivation of the aesthetic sentiment may enter into almost every department of education. On one side it stands in close connection with intellectual training. The feeling for what is graceful or elegant may be developed to some extent in connection with the seem- ingly prosaic exercises, learning to read and to write; and by this means a certain artistic interest may be infused into the employment. The teaching of the use of the mother-tongue in composition offers a wider field for the exercise of the aesthetic sense in a growing feel- ing for style. Physical geography may be so taught as ^ESTHETIC AND MORALS. 323 to elicit a feeling for the picturesque and sublime in nature, and history, so as to call forth a feeling of ad- miration for what is great and noble in human character and life. Even the more abstract studies, as geometry and physical science, may be made a means of evoking and strengthening a feeling for what is beautiful (e. g. y regularity, symmetry in geometric figure, the beauties of form and color of minerals, plants, and animals). JEsthetic and Morals. On another side the training of the aesthetic sense comes into contact with moral train- ing. To adopt and practise in mode of dress, in speech, and generally in manners, what is agreeable to the aesthetic feelings of others, is a matter of so much social importance that it is rightly looked on as one of the lesser moral obligations. Hence the stress laid in the early period of training on the cultivation of naturalness, ease, fitness, and grace in movement, tone of voice, selection of words, etc., The full systematic training of the aesthetic feeling will go beyond these exercises and make use of special modes of cultivation in connection with the Fine Arts. Singing, music, drawing and painting, and finally poetry and literature, are the most important instruments of aesthetic discipline. Study of art in School Instruction. The question how far the study of art should enter into the ordinary course of education, and what branches of art are of most educational value, raise important practical ques- tions which cannot be fully discussed here, bnt one or two considerations bearing on the question may be just 324 FEELING. touched on. Among these, the most important is that of the place filled by aesthetic delight in the whole enjoy- ment of life. From this point of view the cultivation of music might be regarded as all-important, and this preference might be confirmed by a reference to the socialistic and moralizing effects of the art. On the other hand, an art like drawing might be preferred on the ground of its value in connection with intellectual discipline and practical training. Perhaps poetry might be placed highest in respect both of the amount of pleasure it brings immediately, and of its intellectual importance. A certain order of artistic culture should be adopted answering to the order of development of the special sensibilities and faculties concerned. Thus, for example, singing may be taught with advantage before drawing, and this again before literary composi- tion. fflhical or Moral Sentiment. We now come to the last of the three sentiments, that known as the Ethical or Moral Sentiment. This feeling is commonly spoken of under a variety of names, such as the Feeling of Moral Obligation or the Sentiment of Duty, the feeling of reverence for the Moral Law, the Sentiment of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation, the Love of Virtue. Sow the Moral Feeling is called forth. The Moral Senti- ment has for its proper object conduct or action of a certain kind. It is called forth by a perception of, and reflection upon, actions which we commonly distinguish as good and bad, and more narrowly as right and wrong. These actions may be our own or those of another. We THE MORAL STANDARD. 325 approve what is right in ourselves and in others. Right action may be provisionally defined as that which con- forms to the moral law. This law seeks to define and determine the conditions of the common good. It is based on the recognition of the social relations, of the interdependence of individuals, and of the fact that each may in a number of ways further or retard the interests and happiness of others. It is important to add that the moral feeling is only pure when it is free from all personal reference. A child's regret at wrongdoing, if it means simply a fear of punishment, is personal and non-moral. Similarly his impulse to requite a wrong done by another to himself involves a feeling of personal resentment, and so is non- moral. A genuinely moral feeling approves what is right or good in itself, or merely as right or good, and not because of its bearing on our personal interests. The Moral Standard. Men's judgments as to what is right and wrong are not perfectly uniform. We find different standards set up in different communities or in the same community at different times. Thus among Oriental nations we find a standard of morals differing in several respects from our own. The same differences show themselves in smaller communities. In one school current ideas and feelings about what is mean, dishonor- able, and so on, may vary considerably from those reigning in another school. Yet in spite of numerous differences there is a large region of uniformity. All men agree (within certain limits at least) that it is wrong to kill, to rob, or to deceive others. The moralist com- pares different systems of morals with a view to find out 326 PEELING. what is common to them. He then seeks by reflection on the highest and best interests of man to construct an approximately correct statement of the moral law. Such a construction supplies roughly at least a universal and correct standard of right and wrong. Origin of the Moral Sentiment. It has been long disputed whether the moral faculty is innate and instinctive, or whether it is the result of experience and education. Writers have been wont to suppose that the authority of conscience would be impaired if it were allowed that it could be developed out of simpler feelings. But this view is less common now than it was. It is recognized that the question of the validity of conscience is to some extent distinct from that of its origin. Even if it is not directly implanted in the child's nature, but has gradu- ally grown up as the result of a process of education, it may still possess all the authority ever claimed for it. That the moral sentiment is in part instinctive may be allowed. Yet supposing this to be so it remains indisputable that the moral faculty is to a large extent built up in the course of the individual life. The Training of the Moral Faculty. The problem of exercising the child's moral feelings is clearly connected with that of forming his moral character. As we have seen, the feeling of right and wrong is essentially a practical emotion, bearing directly on conduct, and the educator is chiefly concerned with it as a motive to right action. Here we are concerned with the preliminary problem of rendering the moral feelings quick and vivid, and the moral judgment sound and exact. TRAINING OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 327 It is hardly too much to say that the whole influence of the parent and teacher on the child should be directed to the helping on of the growth of the child's moral faculty. The first thing here is to make the system of discipline under which the child lives as effective and beneficial as possible. Rules must be laid down abso- lutely, and enforced consistently, yet with a careful consideration of circumstances and individual differences. Only in this way will the child come to apprehend and respect the moral law as a fixed and abiding system, perfectly impartial in its approvals and disapprovals. Much too will depend on the spirit and temper in which discipline is enforced. A measure of calm becomes the judicial function, and a parent or teacher carried away by violent feeling is unfit for moral control. Everything like petty personal spite should be rigorously excluded. Training the Moral Faculty by self-reliance. The training of the moral faculty in a self-reliant mode of feeling and judging includes the habitual exercise of the sympa- thetic feelings together with the powers of judgment. And here much may be done by directing the child's attention to the effects of his conduct. The conse- quences of wrong- doing and the beneficent results of right-doing ought to be made clear to the child, and his feelings enlisted against the one and on the side of the other. Not only so, his mind should be exercised in comparing actions, in detecting similar moral character- istics in a variety of actions, and in distinguishing be- tween like actions under different circumstances, so that he may become ready and apt in pronouncing moral judgment. 328 FEELING. Moral Training ly Examples of Duty and Virtue. What is called moral instruction should in the first stages of education consist largely of presenting to the child's mind examples of duty and virtue with a view to call forth his moral feelings and to exercise his moral judg- ment. His own little sphere of observation should be supplemented by the page of history and of fiction. In this way a wider variety of moral action is exhibited, and the level of every-day experience is transcended. Such instruction is moral education in the full sense, since it attracts (or repels) the feelings as well as en- lightens the judgment. On the other hand, the mere teaching of the parts of the moral law, the code of duties, the classification of virtues, and so on, while giving knowledge, and to some extent aiding the intel- lectual side of the moral faculty, does not call the feel- ings into exercise. Moral development aided by the whole social environment. It follows from the above account of the way in which the moral faculty grows that in order to a full and complete development, the influence of the parent and teacher must be aided by other influences. The companionship of other children is an important condition of a healthy growth of the moral feelings. The sense of justice grows up in connection with the interplay of a number of individual interests and claims. A single child brought up alone is commonly wanting in this feeling. The free region of activity, the nursery and play- ground, have a moralizing effect by accustoming each child to consider himself as one of a number, to see the reciprocity of good conduct (honesty, kindness, etc.), MORAL TRAINING THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION. 329 and to limit his expectations in deference to others* claims. Not only so, this daily contact with a number of chil- dren is morally important as familiarizing the child with the non-personal character of the moral law. In the home he finds the germ of a public opinion in the com- mon sentiment of the family. But it is in the school that this new agent exercises its full power. Where there is a healthy moral tone in a school, a contempt for cowardice, meanness, cruelty, and an admiration for pluck, fidelity, generosity, it is a most valuable agency in fashioning the growing moral sentiment of the indi- vidual. It is in this wider experience that the boy comes to recognize that the distinctions of right and wrong are not the impositions of an individual, however good and wise, but are imposed and enforced by the common will; that the moral law is a universal law sustained by the collective voice of mankind. And it is by this ampler experience of membership of a society that he comes to realize fully his own part in represent- ing and enforcing the moral law. Moral Training through Public Opinion. It follows from this that the guidance and illumination of this common sentiment and public opinion is one of the main func- tions of the moral educator. Custom has an enormous force in determining our moral standard. Even adults are wont to think the fact that society allows a thing, a sufficient proof of its intrinsic tightness. And in early life we are strongly inclined to steer our individual judgment by the compass of the sentiment of the body to which we belong. If then a child falls into a com- 330 FEELING. munity where unhealthy moral feelings exist, his moral development will be hindered. The head of a school must be careful to see that the force which is so valua- ble an aid to moral growth when it acts in the right direction is not working in the opposite direction, per- verting the moral faculty. Ebferences. On the cultivation of Sympathy in the young, see Miss Edgeworth, Essay on Practical Education, Chap. X. On the nature and growth of the Moral Sentiment, see Bain, The Emotions and the Will, L, Chap. XV, On the training of the moral faculty by discipline, etc., see H. Spencer, Edu- cation, Chap. III. APPENDIX. SUGGESTIONS. 1. Realize to yourself the great importance, from an educa- tional point of view, of the application of right motives. Con- sider, in this connection, the Pestalozzian doctrine that ' the positive work in education consists in stimulation ; the science of education is a theory of stimulation, or the right application of the best motives.' How influential are such sentiments as the love of approbation, the love of knowledge, and the desire for the possession of knowledge! 2. Consider how much is implied in the title of one of Cous- in's books, The True, the Beautiful and the Good. Compare this with the phrases: The Intellectual Sentiment, the ^Esthetic Sen- timent, and the Moral Sentiment. 3. Make application of the dictum as to the development of the Logical Feelings— 'the sentiment of consistency and accur- acy.' A slow process — its perfected development rarely met with — but its eliciting in the young the triumph, intellectually considered, of the teacher's forceful art. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 331 REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. How is Feeling as a phase of mind to be distinguished from Intellect? In what respect does it differ from Will? Who first proposed this three-fold division of mind? 2. When is a man in a 'predominant state of intelligence? * When in a predominant state of feeling? ' When in a ' predomi- nant state of action and determination? ' Can an act of knowing be performed without the will? Can an act of will be performed without the intellect? Can either of these take place without some feeling mingling in the process? Are all these operations of one mind? What is the unity of which intelligence, feeling, and will are the manifestations? What is meant by saying these are ' phases of mind? ' 3. Why are the feelings said to be the elements of happiness or misery? What are the pleasures of * the intellectual life? ' On which phase of the three-fold division of mind is the theory of moral culture based? 4. Show that feeling or emotion is at different times an aid, a necessity and a hindrance to close intellectual application. 5. What is pleasure? (See p. 207.) How can the perform- ance of a task be made more pleasurable than its omission? Why is a change in the degree of activity pleasurable? Why is a change in the kind of activity an important principle in education? 6. Name the three orders of Emotion. Show that they are successive stages of mental life. Show that they are progressive stages. Under which of these three classes would you place self- esteem? Love of home? Friendship? Love? Patriotism? Moral obligation ? 7. Why is the love of approbation so important an emotion, educationally? Self-esteem? Love of knowledge? Show that love of knowledge involves three things: satisfaction of curiosity, pleasure of discovery and reverence for truth. What pleasurable emotions arise from the possession of knowledge? What is the educational importance of the development of the Logical feel- ings of the sentiment of logical consistency? 332 PEELING. 8. When does the aesthetic sentiment begin to develop? What are the conditions of its perfect development? What is the educational value of this sentiment? When does the moral senti- ment first manifest itself? Why is it pre-eminently a social sen- timent? How is the moral distinguished from the Intellectual and the aesthetic sentiment? Which of the three sentiments im- ply a law or command outside of us? Which hath the greatest authority ? REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS ^READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. 1. On sympathy as the crowning qualification of the teacher, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. I. , p. 25 ; for the dictum that the great ruling principle in a school should be love, see Tate's Philosophy of Education, Part I., p. 141; on the teacher's main- tainance of a cheerful, happy temper, see Fitch, as above, p. 15; on the teacher's sympathy with scholars, see Page's Theory and Practice, chap. XIV., Sect. II., pp. 307 and 315; on the corporate life — the esprit du corps— of the school, see Fitch, chap. IV., p. 98. 2. On sympathy as sometimes a better reward than praise, see Tate, Part II, chap. III., p. 201; on importance of friendship between parents and children, see Spencer's Education, chap. III., p. 193 ; on importance of friendship between master and scholars, see Page, as above, p. 315; for Pestalozzi on the development of the social emotions, see Quick, p. 187; on Pestalozzi's sympathy for his scholars — the ' enthusiasm of humanity ' — see the same reference; on enthusiasm as a great motive power, see Spencer's Education, p. 165; on sympathy as leading to the adoption of the golden rule, see Tate, Part II., chap. I., p. 173; on the teacher's duty to guard himself against prejudice, chap. XIV., sect. I., p. 292 ; on children's being as much as possible in company of their parents, see Quick, p. 82. 3. On turning to account children's natural love of the won- derful, see Tate, as above, Part IV., p. 137; on Locke's dictum that all intellectual exertion should be made pleasurable, see Quick's Educational Reformers, p. 82; on the pleasure of learning, PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 333 the chief motive in getting the attention of children, see Tate, as above, p. 133; on desire for knowledge the first thing, see Quick, p. 133; on dejection of scholar as fatal to learning, see the same, p. 80 ; on dejection of master fatal to teaching, see the same, p. 287. 4. On the love of the beautiful, see Tate, Part II., chap. L, p. 173; on aesthetic culture, see Johonnot's Principles and Prac- tice of Education, chap. XII., p. 216, and Spencer, p. 238; on the early development of Taste, see Tate, Part II., chap. I., p. 172. CHAPTER XII. THE WILL. We may now pass on to the consideration of the devel- opment of the third side or phase of mind, namely the Active side or Willing. Phenomena included under Will. The term Will is used in Mental Science to include all active operations of mind. By active operations are meant not only ex- ternal actions or movements, but also internal acts of mental concentration, together with certain preliminary stages of action, as desiring a thing, reflecting or delib- erating about an action, and resolving to do a thing. Of these phenomena, completed external actions are the most important. What we commonly mean by a manifestation of will is some outward action or move- ment. Will is thus seen to stand in close relation to the motor side of the nervous system. As we popularly phrase it, the active organs (limbs, voice, etc.) are the instruments of the will. Actions or movements, though in a wide sense be- longing to the region of will, are not all commonly called voluntary. We distinguish between voluntary and involuntary, or better, non-voluntary movements. Warding off a blow with the hand is voluntary, blink- ing when an object is suddenly brought near the eye is non-voluntary. Some of these non-voluntary actions, NATURE OF WILLING. 335 as we shall see presently, are scarcely mental operations at all, since consciousness enters very faintly into them. Others, again, though having a distinct mental accom- paniment are not consciously directed to any end. Voluntary actions in the full and complete sense may thus be marked off as actions accompanied by con- sciousness, and characterized by the presence of a pur- pose or end. Briefly they may be described as actions consciously directed towards some end. Relation of Willing to Knowing and Feeling, Voluntary action always includes an element of knowing and of feeling. The motive to voluntary action, the end or thing desired, is the gratification of some feeling (e. g., ambition, or the love of applause). And we cannot act for a purpose without knowing something about the relation between the action we are performing and the result we are aiming at. Thus it is feeling which ulti- mately supplies the stimulus or force to volition, and intellect which guides or illumins it. Nature of Willing. A voluntary action has been de- fined as an action consciously directed to some end. We have now to examine a little more closely what is involved in such an action. Let us take an example out of child life. A boy sees a flower growing on the wall above his head. He raises his body and stretches out his hand to pluck it. This is a voluntary act. What happens here ? The sight of the flower calls up to his mind a representation of the pleasure of smelling it or carrying it in his buttonhole. This at once excites a desire for or impulse towards the object. The desire 336 THE WILL. again suggests the appropriate action which is recog- nized as the means which will lead to the desired end. In other words there is the belief (more or less distinctly present) that the action is fitted to secure the result desired. Take another case. A girl playing in the garden suddenly feels heavy drops of rain and hears the mur- murs of thunder. She runs into the bower. Here the action is similar, only that it is due rather to an impulse away from a disagreeable experience than to an impulse towards an agreeable one. We say that the force at work here is not a desire for something pleasurable, but an aversion to something painful. These simple examples may suffice to show that the fundamental element in willing is desire, either in its positive form, as desire for what is agreeable, pleasur- able, or in its negative form, what we best mark off as aversion. The inclination, or tendency of the active mind towards what is pleasurable and away from what is painful, is the essential fact in willing. Experience teaches the child what is pleasurable or painful, and what kind of actions are fitted to realize the one and avoid the other. But the impulse to seek pleasure and to avoid pain is primordial and instinctive. Relation of Desire to Feeling. It is to be noted that the relation between feeling and desire is a particularly close one. We mark off a pure feeling as a passive phenomenon. There is no ingredient of activity in an enjoyment, say that of a delicate flavor, that the whole state of desire is a mixed state in which a pleasurable element (the accompaniment of the representation) is HABIT AND ROUTINE. 337 continually opposed and counteracted by a painful (the sense of deficiency, shortcoming). Element of Activity. Desire is essentially an active phenomenon. It is this characteristic which differences it at once from knowing and from mere feeling. It is in virtue of this characteristic that it constitutes the connecting point between knowing and feeling on the one side and willing on the other. In desiring, the mind is in a state of active tension, or active tending towards the realization of the feeling only represented at the moment. Willing and Attending. It is customary to distinguish between two branches of will the External, muscular action or movement, and the Internal, mental action, voluntary attention or concentration. These two phases are rightly distinguished. They answer roughly to two directions of will-development, illustrated in the man of thought and the man of action. Habit and Routine, In a measure all customary successions of movement illustrate the effect of the principle of habit. The performance of one action or chain of act-ions suggests and excites its usual successor. In this way much of our daily routine tends to take on a semi-automatic character. Thus the man of routine passes with only a faint or nascent volitional impulse from the meal to the walk, from the walk to the business of the day, and so forth. That this force of habit involves a process of physiological adjustment is seen in the fact that the due succession brings, a certain satis- 338 THE WILL. faction to the mind, while any interruption of the customary sequence produces a feeling of distress ana- logous to that which accompanies the obstruction of a natural instinct. Strength of Habit. Habits (like associations between representations) are of very different degrees of strength. The degree of perfection of a habit may be estimated by the promptness, and uniformity of the active re- sponse to stimulus. Thus the soldier's response to an order is 'mechanically perfect' when it follows immedi- ately and in every case. Conditions of the Strength of Habit. The conditions on which the strength of a habit depends are (1) the amount of motive force brought to bear and of attention given at the outset in order to make the action perfect. The action must it is obvious be perfect as a voluntary one before it becomes habitual. The will must itself gain full possession of an action before it can hand it over to its subordinate, habit. (2) The frequency with which the action has been performed. Repetition is the great means of fixing movement in the channels of habit. (3) The uniformity or continuity of its performance in like circumstances. The importance of not intermitting the performance of an action is known to every parent and teacher. For example, a child may put away his toys after playing with them a good many times, and yet not acquire a habit of doing so, if he now and again omits to perform the action. A perfect habit presupposes a certain length of unbroken or unvarying experience. THE TRAINING OF THE WILL. 339 Learning and Unlearning Halit. There is another reason why it is so much more difficult to form a new habit as life advances. It commonly involves the unlearning of an old habit. The problem is thus greatly complicated. A child that has acquired an awkward way of sitting, or unpleasant tricks of manner, gives special difficulty to the educator. In order to build up the new habit he has to work against; the resisting force of the old one. Movement tends to set in the old direction, and many a painful effort is needed to check the current. The Training of the Will and the Exercise of the Active Organs. The exercise of the muscular organs belongs in part to what is called physical education. It is carried on to a considerable extent for purposes of bodily health. The march and dance of the Kindergarten, the drilling lesson of the school have a direct reference to health, and are dictated by the rule ' A healthy mind in a healthy body.' Not only so, bodily practice is carried on to a large extent for the sake of attaining some distinctly physical excellence, a well developed physique, robustness and agility of limb. This applies to the train- ing of the Greek youth which had a military significance, the training of the modern runner, oarsman, and so on. On the other hand, the exercise of the active organs stands in a close relation to intellectual education. This applies more particularly to the hand and the voice. Teaching children to speak distinctly, to read, and to write, is commonly looked on as a part of intel- lectual instruction. It is obvious that these actions largely subserve the ends of knowledge, and are indeed necessary to the taking in and giving out of knowledge. 340 THE WILL. While the special exercise of the active organs in particular directions seems thus to fall under physical or intellectual training, the general exercise of them comes more appropriately under the head of moral training. As we have seen, the growth of the will begins with the attainment of the power of command- ing the organs of movement. The outgoings of desire or active impulse first appear in connection with move- ment. It is in movement that clear purpose and inten- tion first display themselves. And it is here that perseverance in trial and resolution first manifest them- selves. Further, all the higher actions of life depend on the attainment of a general control of the bodily organs. Consequently the exercising of these capabili- ties involves a rudimentary training of the will. All practice in doing things, then, whatever its primary ob- ject may be, is to some extent a strengthening of voli- tional power. It should be borne in mind at the outset that children are disposed to activity and in their self-appointed occu- pations and play show that they are capable of making real x>rogress without any direct control from parent or teacher. The young child should from the beginning have ample opportunity for exercising his active organs. His nursery and his play-ground should be provided with objects fitted to call forth movement, manual and bodily. The important part played by imitation in the growth of voluntary movement suggests the advantages of companionship in these early occupations. A child is stimulated by the sight of others doing some new thing. The special province of the educator in the training THE TRAINING OF THE WILL. 341 of the will in the performance of bodily movement begins with showing the child how to do things. This requires judgment. It is better for the child to find out the way to do a thing for himself where he can, just as it is better for him to discover a fact or a truth for him- self. Nothing is more fatal to growth of will than that indolence which shrinks from trial and experiment, and which comes helplessly to parent or nurse crying, * What shall I do ? ' or ( Do this for me.' But there are many things which the child obviously cannot do with the best of wills. Hence an occasional intrusion into children's play with new suggestions will often prove a useful stimulus and encouragement to renewed activity. From the first the child has to be taught to obey, to do things when he is told to do them. Thus he is required to sit at table and eat his food in a certain way, and so forth. Here the educator becomes in a new and more important sense the trainer of the child's will. As we have seen, movement under command is one im- portant stage in the growth of voluntary action. The exercise of a firm but wise discipline in this early stage of youth will do more than anything else to strengthen voluntary power. Hence the importance of making the connection between command and action as close as possible, so that the responses may be certain and prompt. Here it is desirable not only to observe the general conditions of a wise and effective authority, but to consult the child's powers, not to demand what is beyond these, and even to consider his varying degrees of readiness to act. When the mother or teacher has suc- ceeded in gaining a perfect control over the child's actions the power of educating the young will is greatly enlarged. 342 THE WILL. Almost all school exercises involve the co-operation of the child's active powers to some extent. Even the oral lesson demands that children should take up a certain bodily attitude, and keep the head and the eyes fixed in a particular direction. The reading and writing lessons and the drilling lesson each call forth activity in their special way. The great agency here is still com- mand supplemented by example or showing the child how to perform the required movement. The impulses of imitation should be appealed to, so as to realize the full benefit of educating children in numbers. It must never be forgotten that the growth of the active powers, like other mental growth, is a gradual process. The ready command of the active organs is the result of a long series of experiences. The child may of course fail to execute the required movement because he is not concentrating his mind on what he is doing. Then the teacher is justified in blaming him. If, however, as often happens, the failure is the result of insufficient preparatory exercise of the organ concerned, the blame rather falls on the teacher for imposing an unsuitable task. The careful graduation of work ac- cording to capability is well illustrated in teaching deaf mutes to speak by a process of imitative movement. The teacher begins with movements of the external parts of the body which are distinctly visible to the child when he himself performs them. Only after a certain practice of the imitative capability in this simple form does he go on to call forth the more delicate and hidden movements of the organ of articulation by the aid of the sense or touch. A proper understanding of the principle of habit is a AIMING AT PERMANENT ENDS. 343 matter of great importance to the teacher. Throughout the whole of practical training, from the acquisition of those simple actions which enter into good manners, up to the most elaborate manual and vocal performances, the force of habit is called into requisition. In teach- ing a child to talk, to write, to be well-behaved, and so on, the teacher aims at bringing about an easy, rapid, and quasi-mechanical mode of action. The conditions necessary to the formation of habit need to be attended to. A clear recognition of the truth that a perfect habit represents a long series of repetitions, will tend to make the teacher patient and hopeful. Aiming at Permanent Ends. As a further result of this development of intelligence and emotion the ends of action become greatly enlarged or expanded. The child comes to apprehend the existence of enduring interests, permanent conditions of pleasure which constitute hap- piness. In this way he learns to regard health, knowl- edge, reputation, and so on, as things which last, which are of value to-day and to-morrow alike, and which form parts of the enduring good of life. Similarly he comes to apprehend a larger or wider good than his personal happiness, the interests of his family, his school, his country, and of mankind at large. When his mind is able to seize these comprehensive and enduring ends his action becomes intelligent or rational in a new sense. He now acts with a reference not merely to immediate results in the present case but to the bearing of his action on this sum of permanent good. Thus he will be industrious in pursuing knowl- edge not only for the pleasure which every new acqui- 344 THE WILL. sition of knowledge brings directly, but for the sake of the permanent value of this knowledge. Similarly he will seek to please his teacher not simply with a view to the immediate advantages which the action brings, but with the thought of improving his permanent rela- tions with his teacher, gaining a higher place in his esteem, and so on. When the child begins to view each individual action in its bearing on some portion of his lasting welfare, bis actions become united and consolidated into what we call conduct. Impulse as an isolated prompting for this or that particular enjoyment becomes transformed into comprehensive aim and rational motive. Or to express the change otherwise, action becomes pervaded and regulated by principle. The child consciously or un- consciously begins to refer to a general precept or max- im of action, as 'maintain health,' 'seek knowledge,' 'be good,' and so forth. Particular actions are thus united under a common rule, they are viewed as mem- bers of a class of actions subserving one comprehensive end. In this way the will attains a measure of unity. Complex Action. Action, as we have seen, gains in re- presentativeness as the mind of the agent takes remote consequences into account. And this increase of repre- sentativeness implies an increase in complexity. By a complex action is meant here one which is not the result of a single impulse tending towards an immediate end, but involves a plurality of impulses, a representation of a number of objects of desire or aversion, and so an ex- pansion and complication of the internal representative process. CHOICE OR DECISION. 345 This expansion of the representative stage of action assumes one or two very unlike forms. In the first place, the desires or impulses simultaneously called up may be harmonious and co-operative, converging to- wards the same action. In the second place, the desires may be discordant and opposed, or diverging into differ- ent lines of action. Choice or Decision. After duly weighing the pleasure and pain, the good and evil, resulting from any action the one is seen to preponderate over the other. Then the mind knowingly chooses or decides to act or not to act. Thus, to return to our illustration, the child finding that the probable evil of running out into the garden is greater than the good, abandons the wish, and decides not to act. This involves a dismissal of the alluring image from the mind. Similarly in the case of rival ends. Thus, to revert to our other example, the girl finding that on the whole the pleasure of remaining at home is greater than that of taking a walk decides on the former course, deliberately selecting it as the better. In like manner the mind chooses between different means, deciding which course of action is best fitted to bring about a desired end. It is to be added that the resulting decision is rarely of the perfect form here described. The force of activ- ity or the tendency to do something, aided by an impulse to escape from the painful state of conflict, fre- quently helps to resolve the point, both in choosing ends and choosing means, in a comparatively passive way. This is particularly true of the decisions of early life. 346 THE WILL. Calmness and Strength of Will. The ability to check impulse or postpone action, and to deliberate and choose, is the characteristic of a calm enlightened and regulated will. Its development is a slow process and only com- mences in early life. The young child cannot defer act- ing. In cases of conflict the pressure of impulses, assisted by the pain of the" state of conflict itself, is too much for him, and he is unable to master the rival forces and reduce them to order. He wants too the intelligence for comparing and deciding. Disciplined strength depends on a combination of active vigor, strength of desire and impulse, on the one side, and of cautiousness on the other. Resolution : Perseverance. One other common accom- paniment of this higher and more reflective type of action remains to be touched on, namely, resolution. By this is meant the formation of a distinct determina- tion to perform an action which is seen to lead to a desired end. It is something more than deciding on an end, and an appropriate action, as good. Such decision often passes instantly into action, in which case the stage of resolution is not fully developed. Thus resolution has reference to an action not capable of being carried out at the instant. For example, a child breaks some- thing: decides that it is best to tell his mother: and finally resolves to do so when he next sees her. Resolu- tion is thus the internal equivalent of a complete volun- tary action (and so differs from a mere desire to act), though the completed mental process is debarred by the circumstances of the moment from issuing in the final stage, the external action. CONTEOL OF THE THOUGHTS. 347 Control of Feelings. The growth of will thus manifests itself in checking and overpowering impulse or lower motive, and generally in curbing and governing move- ment. But this is not the only form of self-control. The will is called on to restrain and regulate other forces lying outside the region of action proper. Of these extraneous forces the first and most obvious is feeling, emotion or passion. Feeling as we have seen discharges itself in movement. The control of feeling is thus analagous in certain respects to that of impulse. The first thing a child has to do in checking the force of passion (anger, grief, etc.) is to inhibit the external actions, such as crying, and throwing the arms about. The control of feeling is a more difficult attainment than that of active impulse. Children's feelings are violent and all-subduing at the time, and the will is sometimes called on to stay a torrent. The first efforts at self-restraint only begin when the power of controlling active impulse has been exercised up to a certain point* Control of the Thoughts. A second group of forces against which the will has in a manner to work in order to subordinate them to its own ends, are those of intel- lect. By these are meant the tendency of all presenta- tions or representations when they occur to attract the attention, together with the tendency of these when present in the mind to suggest or call up other images or thoughts in any way associated with them. The in- hibitory action of the will in counteracting these forces is, as was pointed out above, immediately connected with a positive action, namely, the fixing and detaining 348 THE WILL. of certain presentations or representations before the mind so as to secure their greatest measure of distinct- ness, and the aiding in the calling up of representa- tions of which the mind is at the time in need. As we have seen, intellectual growth and discipline imply at every stage the control of these forces or tendencies by the will. Observation means the ability to keep the attention concentrated on an object for a time, and to resist the natural tendency of the mind to flit from this to that object. Again, in learning or com- mitting something to memory, the will is called into play in the form of concentration on the subject of study. And in order to keep his mind steadily fixed on his lesson the child must have a certain power both of shutting out external impressions, and of excluding any associations with the words or facts he is committing to memory which happen to be foreign to the matter in hand. And this power of controlling the forces of sug- gestion is seen in 'trying to remember' something. Finally in the higher processes of constructive imagina- tion, of abstraction and reasoning, this power of turning the attention away from what is interesting and of resist- ing the forces of suggestion, is called into exercise in a much higher form. All calm and regulated thinking im- plies not only the power of turning away from external objects, of ' abstraction ' in the popular sense, but also the command of the intellectual trains themselves, the cap- ability of interfering with the natural flow or succession of the images or ideas, selecting those which are suita- ble and retaining them before the mind, and excluding those which are unsuitable. MORAL CHARACTER. 349 Definition of Character. The character is used in every day language to mark off any sort of difference in mental or moral qualities. We speak of intellectual peculiarities, special tastes, and so on, as entering into a man's character. There seems, however, in all cases to be a special reference to qualities belonging to the active side of the mind. Willing or conduct being the final outcome and all-important result of mind as a whole, the word character has come to connote in a special manner active qualities, as ruling inclinations and degree of volitional energy, and emotional and intel- lectual peculiarities only so far as they are related to these. Moral Character. In addition to this everyday mean- ing the word character has acquired an ethical signifi- cance. It refers not to the variable peculiarities (original and acquired) of individuals but to certain common moral qualities which it is the businesss of social discipline and education to cultivate in all alike, In other words * character' has come to stand for 'good character.' And a good character means a moral and virtuous con- dition of mind, such a disposition of the will, and, in connection with this, of the feelings and thoughts, a& will subserve the ends of morality. We thus see that every good or moral man possesses a character in a double sense. He has certain peculiarities of feeling and motive, etc., which give his mind its special color. This is his individual character. Along with this he possesses certain virtuous tendencies which make up his moral character and assimilate him to other moral men. This moral character is largely acquired, being the product 350 THE WILL. of circumstances and education supplemented by indi- vidual reflection. Training of the Will. By the phrase the training of the will we mean the exercising and strengthening of it by the various agencies of command, encouragement, and instruction. This educational influence and control include first of all the supplying of motives to good conduct (deterrents and inducements). The very rela- tion of educator and child allows of this extension of motive force. The parent or teacher holds out the prospect of penalties and rewards, and so alters the direction of action. But the discipline of the will is more than this. It includes the art of guiding the young mind in reflecting on the results of his action, of calling into play as motives feelings which are feeble and fitful, and apt therefore to be stifled in the surging of stronger inclinations. The training of the will thus includes in a measure the exercise of the intellectual powers, and the cultivation of the emotions. Need of Discipline. The need of authority, of com- mand, or what is more especially meant by discipline, arises as soon- as the child acquires by the growth of his bodily organs a wider scope for action, and by the devel- opment of intelligence is enabled to understand the meaning of words. Unless he were prohibited from do- ing this and that which his love of activity, curiosity, or other impulse, leads him to do, he would seriously injure himself and be a nuisance to others. It would not do in every case to let the child find out the natural results of foolish or wrong action. In many cases {e.g., in play- CONDITIONS OF DISCIPLINE. 351 ing with fire, water, and so on) the experience would be disastrous. In other cases again the child's intelligence would be too weak to detect the relation between action and result. Thus he would not connect over-eating with its effect on his health. With respect to conduct affecting others again, it may be safely said that if children were permitted to tease and molest others, as they are often inclined to do, everybody would soon shun their society. Artificial restraints, the interposition of authority, are thus necessary. There must be commands laid down, and penalties attached to the breaking of these. And this system of discipline is a necessary condition of the early growth of character. As we have seen the moral sentiment presupposes some form of external constraint. The first stage in the growth of character is a habit of obedience. Consequently the first requisite in the form- ation of character is some system of authority, command or law. Conditions of Discipline. The effect of discipline depends on the fact that certain consequences, and more partic- ularly disagreeable consequences or punishments, are attached to actions of certain kinds. Where this association is wanting there is no moral force supplied. Thus when an impatient mother now scolds and slaps her child for doing a thing, now allows him to do it with impunity, according to her changing mood, there is no motive power applied to the young will. The very beginning of discipline is the institution of a rule or command of a general nature embracing a certain class of actions, and prohibiting these by definite penalties. 352 THE WILL. Hence the most essential conditions of a good discipline. — (a) The rule must be intelligible, dealing with dis- tinctions in conduct which the child can understand. The actions prohibited must be simple classes of action, such as taking what belongs to another, saying what is false, and so forth, (b) The rule must be enforced uniformly, so that the child will closely associate the action with the consequence; in other words be certain of the evil result of disobedience. These are the most general or fundamental conditions of what we call discipline. We will now pass to more special considerations affecting the limits and proportion of punishment. Limits of Punishment. All punishment is suffering, and as such, an evil. More than this, it seems to estrange educator and child rather than bring them together. Finally it is repressive, checking and arresting, instead of evoking and encouraging activity. Hence it can only be inflicted when necessary either for the good of the offender himself or by way of example and warning to others. Vindictive punishment, blows and harsh words administered in temper and as a relief to feelings of annoyance, check the will without disciplining it. Pun- ishment cannot be justified except in cases where it is likely to be effective as a deterrent. Thus it ought never to be inflicted where it is likely to be inoperative through feebleness of will. Children have only a certain power of self-restraint, and of anticipating consequences. Hence to punish them for actions lying beyond their control, as for example crying, may be pure cruelty. Again it is inhuman to punish a child for actions which PROPORTIONING OF PUNISHMENT TO FAULT. 353 are in no sense wrong. Trifling faults, such as obstrep- erousness in an active boy, are not meet subjects for punishment. Great care should be taken before punish- ing a child for an action to see that there has been an evil intention. Thus it would be immoral to punish a boy severely for breaking a vase the value of which he could not be supposed to know. Also the motive must be taken into account. Thus a child who plucks a flower in the garden in order to give pleasure to a sick brother or sister ought not to be punished. Finally where natural penalties can be counted on artificial ones should not be resorted to. As Mr. Spencer has shown, a child may be cured, to some extent at least, of such a bad habit as untidiness by being led to experience the ill effects of the habit. Proportioning of Punishment to Fault. Not only does it need much care to determine what cases are meet for punishment, it is a matter of delicate judgment to decide what the degree or amount of the punishment should be in any case. The most important consideration here is that the punishment is. intended to supply a counteract- ing motive. If it does not supply a sufficient force, it is useless. Weak indulgent parents averse to severe punishment are often unkind in the worst sense by administering slight punishments which are wholly inadequate and so of no good to the child. If on the other hand the penalty is more than adequate for the purpose of counteracting an impulse, the excess is so much cruelty. To determine the proper amount of punishment in any case requires not only a general knowledge of children's feelings and active propensities, w 354 THE WILL. but a special knowledge of the sensibilities and impulses of the individual child. Since this knowledge is only acquired gradually it is a good rule to begin with slight punishments, and only go to more severe ones as these prove necessary. There is room for judgment too in selecting the hind of punishment appropriate to a particular fault. The question what sorts of punishment are best, is a very troublesome one. What is wanted is some kind of penalty the evil of which is little affected by differences of individual sensibility, and which easily lends itself to graduation or gradual increase. Over and above these considerations there is another, namely the appropriate- ness to the particular kind of offence. There is often a certain fitness between a wrong act and the punishment. A child who has neglected his work for play is appro- priately punished when he is kept in during play hours to make up arrears. Enough has been said to show how much scope there is for individual knowledge, good feeling, and tact in administering any system of discipline. It is hardly too much to say that every parent and teacher who has a discipline at all, has his own method of discipline, the moral effects of which vary widely according to the degree of its severity, the fineness of moral discrimina- tion shown, and so on. 1 Reward, Encouragement. Punishment is for the most part negative in its effect: it deters from action or arrests i On the considerations which should determine the limits of punish- ment, and the apportioning of it in different cases, the reader should read Bentham's rules quoted by Dr. Bain, Education as a Science, p. 106. REWARD, ENCOURAGEMENT. 355 impulses to action rather than excites to activity. Even where it is employed as a stimulus to action, as when a child is punished for not preparing his lesson, its depress- ing influence is still seen. The little delinquent feels himself driven or forced to be industrious, and his activity is in consequence put forth without heartiness and even grudgingly. Moreover as a mode of pain, the fear of punishment has only a restricted range. As soon as the minimum quantity of task-work is done the pressure of the motive ceases. As was pointed out above, aversion to pain, though a powerful spring of action, is necessarily limited in its effects. Discipline includes not only the checking of impulse by deterrents, but the stimulating of activity by posi- tive inducements. That is to say, it makes use not merely of the child's natural aversion to pain, but of his equally natural, and more far-reaching desire for pleasure. It may be a question how far such artificial stimuli are necessary or desirable. Where it is possible it is well perhaps for a child to be industrious, good, and so on, in view of the natural consequence of his action (the good opinion and love of others^etc). But the weakness of the social feelings in the young makes some amount of artificial stimulation necessary. And there seems to be a certain correlation between punish- ment and reward, blame and praise. Here, again, there is room for wise discernment and moral judgment in determining the right occasion and ground of reward, and the amount of reward merited. Just as in the case of punishment there are the two ex- tremes of over-severity and laxity, so here there are the extremes of lavish and stinted reward. The moral 356 THE WILL. effect of reward will depend much on what is regarded as the ground of merit. We have already seen that the rewarding of absolute, as distinguished from relative proficiency exerts but a limited influence. The incident of the motive is just where it is (in general) least need- ed. To this it may be added that the rewarding of ef- fort and industry, as distinguished from intellectual ability, has a much better effect on the growing charac- ter of the young. It serves to accentuate and dignify the moral element, the exertion of will, in all intel- lectual attainment. Relaxing of Discipline. Discipline both on its negative and on its positive side is intended to be temporary only. It is the scaffolding needed for the building up of the simpler moral habitudes. As the habits grow in fixity, a smaller amount of punishment becomes neces- sary. Physical pain, loss of liberty, and so on, cau now be exchanged for the milder penalties, exposure to shame, private rebuke. A look, or a tone of voice, is enough, in the case of a well-trained boy or girl, to check any nascent impulse to wrong-doing. Similarly as good habits become formed the need of reward grows less. The renumeration of good conduct by tangible gifts is no longer necessary: the word and look of com- mendation are a sufficient reward. In this way the good habits, industry, punctuality, politeness, become inde- pendent and self-supporting. The educator may help on this higher stage of moral attainment by exercising the powers of reflection and judgment, and strengthening the higher emotions. This can be effected to some extent in connection with EXERCISE OF FREE WILL. 357 the processes of discipline themselves. At first the child has to obey unintelligently, blindly, knowing nothing about the reasons or grounds of the rule en- forced. But moral training includes much more than the securing of such blind obedience. A moral habit such as veracity, is as we have seen only fully formed when the child's mind has come to reflect about it and voluntarily to adopt it. It is only when he discerns an action to be right, and when he makes free choice of it irrespectively of the penalties attached to the non-per- formance of it, or the reward following the performance of it, that it is in the full sense his own act, an outcome of his own 'second nature'. The parent and teacher should have this end in view, and seek as soon as pos- sible to enlist the child's intelligence and good feeling on the side of what is wise or prudent, and morally good. Exercise of Free Will. Over and above this the educator should take care to secure to the child a free region of activity uncontrolled by authority where other feelings besides those specially appealed to in discipline may be exercised as motives, and where the powers of reflecting and choosing may be brought into full play. Nothing is more fata! to will-growth than an excess of discipline, permeating the whole of a child's surroundings. Free- dom, in the popular sense of the term, that is liberty to decide what to do for oneself, is essential to the development of the will. The educator will find ample scope for the exercise of a fine judgment in determining the boundaries of the several regions of compulsion, persuasion, mere suggestion or guidance, and absolute 358 THE WILL. neglect, or laissez-faire. Play owes no little of its moral value to the fact that it provides this area of unrestricted activity. Discipline of the Home and of the School. The home is the garden of moral character. If the will and moral character are not nourished and strengthened here, they will fare but ill when transplanted into the more artifi- cial surroundings of school life. In the home the whole life is in a mannner brought under the supervision of the educator. Not only so, the strong and close affection which grows up between the parent and child gives a unique character to the home discipline. On the one side, the mother is solicitous about her charge as the teacher cannot be, and is far better able as well as much more strongly disposed to study his moral peculiarities. On the other side, the child's feeling of dependence and his love are strong forces tending from the first in the direction of obedience. Here then the foundations of character have to be laid if they are to be laid at all. The relations of home moreover serve to bring out and exercise all the moral habits, not only the rougher virtues of obedience, veracity, the sense of right and justice, etc., but the more delicate virtues of sympathy, kindli- ness, and self sacrifice. Contrasted with this the discipline of the school has but a very restricted moral effect. The immediate object of school discipline is indeed not moral training at all, but rather the carrying on of the special business of the school, namely, teaching. Incidentally the management of a school necessarily does subserve moral education, calling forth habits of obedience, orderliness, HOME AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE. 359 industry, deference, etc. And the teacher is expected to make the best of his opportunities for training the will and forming the character of his pupils. The limitations here are obvious. The first is the restricted range of life brought under the master's control. School occupations are a kind of artificial addition to the child's natural life, and offer but little play for his characteristic tastes and inclinations. Again, since the teacher has to do with numbers there must necessarily be wanting the aid of those moral forces of close individual sympathy and strong personal attachment which play so important a part in home discipline. These defects are, however, made good to some extent by the presence of a new agency in the school, namely that of public opinion. We have already touched on the effect of this in shaping and giving strength to the growing moral sentiment of the individual. To this must now be added that the existence of public opinion, of a mass of corporate feeling on the side of order and right conduct, is a powerful force working in the direc- tion of good conduct. Such a body of sentiment may, indeed, be said to be, in these days at least, a necessary support of the master's authority. It is to the school- master what public opinion is to the ruler of a state. School experience familiarizes the mind of the boy with the fact that he is a member of a society, that the command to be brave, or truthful, is enjoined by the voice not of an individual but of a community. In this way he learns to regulate his actions by a reference to a social law, and a common rule of conduct. The effect of the ideal school regime, the master re- moved at a certain distance, inspiring a feeling of awe, the 360 THE WILL. little society of the school sustaining his authority and fol- lowing out the principles and spirit of his discipline even in the playground and in his absence, is to cultivate a certain type of moral character which is in a manner supplementary to that specially cultivated by home sur- roundings. The mind acquires a manly tone of self-re- liance, and the severer virtues, obedience and respect for law, courage, ambition, sense of honor and of justice, are nourished. Where this regime is- happily favored by the presence of a fine and admirable personal character in the governor, and of a healthy and lofty public spirit among the governed, it is capable, as we know, of doing much to mould the permanent character. References. On the nature of the processes of Deliberation and Choice, see Prof. Bain, Emotions and Will, Ch. VII.; Dr. Carpenter, Mental Physiology, Ch. IX., § 4; H. Spencer, Principles of Psychology, I., Pt. IV., Ch, IX. On the nature of Moral Habit and of Character, see Bain, op. cit., Ch. IX; Carpenter, op. cit , Ch. VIII. On Discipline and the Formation of Character, see Locke, On Educa- tion, especially §§ 32-117 ; H. Spencer, Education. Ch. III. ; Bain, Education as a Science, pp. 100-119. APPENDIX. SUGGESTIVE AND TEST EXERCISES. 1. Review the general argument of this work. Consider carefully the author's aim and his general plan as now developed, questioning yourself thus: What topic was discussed in the first chapter? What has been the logical succession of topics? What methodical elements has this order of presentation? 2. Compare the three-fold classification of mental powers — Intellect, Feeling, and Will— with J. S. Mill's classification of KEVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 361 the various states of consciousness: Sensations, Thoughts, Emo- tions, and Volitions. {Logic, Bk. VI., chap. IV., § 1.) 3. In perfecting your comprehension of the general drift of this treatise, re-read the chapter on Mental Development. Take the topic, 'Unity of mental development' (see page 44), and trace the doctrine there expressed throughout the succeeding chapters. See clearly, if possible, that the complete develop- ment of intellectual faculty consists simply in exercising the fundamental functions, — the 'Power of Detecting Differences ' and the 'Power of Detecting Agreements.' Note that this doc- trine of assimilation and discrimination may be used in the treatment of the phenomena of Feeling and of Will. REVIEW AND TEST QUESTIONS. 1. What phenomena are included under Will? With what propriety does Sir William Hamilton speak of the same class of mental states as 'the Phenomena of Will and Desire '? In what respects is the relation of Willing to Intellect and Emotion an ' opposition '? In what respects are they closely connected? 2. What is a voluntary action? Can such a term be accu- rately defined other than by an example? How is belief related to an act of volition? Show the intimate connection of desire or aversion with such an act. Is desire a state purely pleasurable or one of mixed pleasure and pain? Justify your answer. 3. Is an act of Willing always accompanied by external action? Illustrate your answer. What is the educational im- portance of ' Habit and Routine ' ? How may the strength of a habit be estimated? Name three conditions on which such strength depends? Does 'nature ' train the child's will? How? 4. What is meant by aiming at 'permanent ends'? At what period of development can a child realize health, knowl- edge, reputation as enduring goods? What is meant by actions becoming united and consolidated into ' conduct'? 5. What is meant by 'complex action'? Illustrate what is meant by Choice or Decision. What are the characteristics of an enlightened and regulated will? What is implied by the term individual character? What by moral character? 362 THE WILL. 6. When does the need of discipline and command begin* At what stage does it end? Why are artificial restraints neces- sary? What is the educational use of a wise relaxation of restraints? To what extent is public opinion, i. e., of a school or community, an educative force? How would you describe the ideal character which a good school should tend to form? RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO EDUCATIONAL THEORY. 1. ' The performance of one action or chain of actions suggests and excites its usual successor.' 'In this way much of our daily routine tends to take on a semi-automatic character ' (p. 337). This dictum of psychology which the most ordinary experi- ence daily confirms, leads to the doctrine of Automatic Activity, the exposition of which from an educational point of view is the object of Dr. Carpenter's Menial Physiology. The great practical importance of the subject (he thus states) is ' To bring into clear view the distinction between the automatic and the volitional oper- ation of the Intellectual Faculties, Propensities, and Emotions, which has long appeared to me to be the only sound basis for Edu- cation and Self-education.' Several important educational maxims may be instanced as intimately connected with this doctrine of education into auto- matic intellection, emotion and volition. (1) It is impossible not to recognize the influence of Habit, — that is to say of the voluntary repetition of similar acts under similar circumstances — in establishing a condition of the nervous apparatus which leads to the automatic performance of such acts. — Carpenter. (2) Any sequence of mental action which has been frequently repeated tends to perpetuate, so that we find ourselves automatic, ally prompted to think, feel or do, what we have been before accustomed to think, feel, or do under like circumstances, with- out any consciously formed purpose or anticipation of results. — Carpenter. (3) The struggle of development, consists in acquiring knowledge PEDAGOGICAL REFERENCES. 363 and skill so thoroughly that it can sink into the automatic, thus leav- ing the mind free for new attainments — Parker. REFERENCES TO STANDARD EDUCATIONAL WORKS READ BY TEACHERS' READING CIRCLES. The following references on character, action, and conduct should be considered in connection with the preceding chapter: 1. On moral science in schools, see JohonuoVs Principles and Practice of Teaching, chap. XII., page 277; on the means of moral strength and growth, see the same, p. 20; on the basis of moral instruction in schools, see the same, chap. XII., pp. 253 and 259 ; on moral teaching in school exercises, see the same, chap. XV., p. 429; on moral teaching latent in school exercises, see the same, p. 431 ; on the influence of study of science on morals, see Spencer's Education, p. 89. 2. On moral and religious education, see Quick's Educa- tional Reformers, p. 282; on the cultivation of the moral powers, Page's Theory and Practice, chap. V., p. 71; on the teacher's re- sponsibility as respects religious training, see the same, chap. II., sect. IV., p. 30; on the slow evolution of the moral faculties, see Spencer's Education, chap. III., p. 207; on parental unwisdom as the source of juvenile perversity, see the same, p. 167; on all moral training as based on religion, see Tate's Philosophy of Edu- cation, Part II., chap. VII., p. 288, also Quick, p. 282; on the intimate connection of the sense of the beautiful and the moral sense, see Tate, chap. L, p. 173; on morality more important than learning, see Quick, p. 282; for Rousseau's dictum that the aim of true education is 'complete living,' see the same, p. 104. 3. On the terrible mistake of the teacher's divorcing moral and intellectual training, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, p. 167; on the teacher's responsibility for the moral training of the child, see Page, as above, chap. II., sect. II., p. 26; the school no place for a master without principle, see the same, chap. IX., sect. I., p. 158, and chap. II., sect. II., p. 29; on minds of pupils as controlled in three ways, see Parker's Talks on Teaching, p. 168; on teacher must not wholly neglect moral and spiritual 364 THE WILL. training, see the same reference; on the insufficiency of mere meditation to form good habits, see Fitch's Lectures on Teaching, chap. IV., p. 103; on the influence of the master on the moral tone of the school, see Quick, pp. 282-3; on the influence of the boys on the tone of the school, see the same, p. 289. 4. On emulation, — worthy and unworthy, - see Page, chap. VIII., sect. I., p. 120; on the proper incentives to action, see the same chapter, sect. III., p. 139; on influence of rewards and pun- ishments on the school and on characters of the pupils, see Fitch, chap. IV., p. 108; and for Rousseau, Bain, and Spencer on the discipline of consequences, see the same, chap. IV., p. 117; on natural and rational punishments, see Spencer, p. 181; for Locke quoted on the effects of chastisement, see the same, p. 204; on the motives with which a teacher should stimulate a poor struggling boy, see Tate, Part II., chap. III., p. 200; on the only way of curing a bad habit, see Parker, p. 169; on the point beyond which the will of the parent or teacher must not be carried, see the same reference. INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND NAMES. Abstraction, the second stage in concept-formation, 246; ab stract conception, 257; training of the power of abstraction, 258; when this training should begin, 259; when the ab- stract sciences should be taken up, 262. Activity, laws of pleasurable activity, 295; change in degree of, 295; in kind of, 296. ^Esthetics, the aesthetic sentiment, 316; origin of aesthetic en- joyment, 317; good taste, 317; refined taste, 318; education of the taste, 219-221; varieties of Fine Art, 318; exercise of the aesthetic faculties, 321 ; the aesthetic sentiment in practi- cal education, 322; aesthetics and morals, 323; the study of art in schools, 323. Apprehending, how related to comprehending and understand- ing, 241. Approbation, love of, 300. Ascham, quoted on Attention, 87. Association of impressions, 156; by contiguity, 157; law of con- tiguity, 158; degrees of associative force, 159; association and repetition, 161; verbal association, 167; association by similarity, 172; by contrast, 172; of numbers, 176. Attention, definition of, 68; objects of, 68; effects of, 69, 87; extent of, 70; degree of, dependent on what, 71; external and internal stimuli, 71; attention and interest, 72; effect of novelty on attention, 73; non-voluutary and voluntary, 72; reflex attention, mechanism of, 74; function of will in atten- tion, 75; laws of voluntary attention, 77; development of power of attention, 77; impulse of curiosity in attention, 78; keeping attention fixed, 79; concentration of, 79; concentra- tion and genius, 80; grasp of, 81; transition of, 81; habits of, 82; varieties of, 82; training of, 83; power of, in children 366 INDEX. rudimentary, 84; teacher's duty to arouse and develop, 85; new and old pedagogical rules of, 85; educational doctrine of, 87-89; Ascham quoted on, 87; Hamilton, 88, 89, 208; Marcel, 88; Malbranche, 87, 208; Ratich, 88; Tate, 89; Sir Henry Holland, 88; pedagogical doctrine on interest and attention, 209. Belief and doubt, 271; sources of, 272; effect of feeling on, 273. Brain, physiological knowledge of, important to teacher, 8; effi- ciency of brain centres, 9 ; need of brain rest, 9. Beneke, on periods of child-life, 62. Carpenter quoted on volitional direction of the attention and on the formation of character, 88, 89 ; on no perception without attention, 146 ; on decline of memory in old age, 189. Causaubon, on Scaliger's powers of memory, 191, note. Cause, first reasonings about, 280. Child-life, periods of, 62. Classification, importance of, 35. Complexity, increase of, in mental development, 42. Comprehension, how related to apprehension and understand- ing, 242. Concentration, 79; concentration and genius, 80; Hamilton on, 88. Concept, as involving a synthesis, 249; concepts of magnitude, number, and geometry, 259; accuracy and inaccuracy of concepts, 251 ; concepts which are too narrow, 251 ; too wide, 250; revision of concepts, 252. Conception, growth of, 256; formation of abstract conceptions, 257. Connection of knowing, feeling, and willing, 20, 49, 293. Conditions of mental operations, 25-26 ; attention a condition of mental operations, 26; nervous conditions, 27; conditions of belief, 272. Currie, on observation and questioning, 146; on perception and emotion, 146. Deductive element in pedagogics, 1, 16; deductive reasoning, 276, 278. Development and growth distinguished, 38; characteristics of mental, 39; development of single faculty, 39; of sum of INDEX. 367 faculties, 41 ; unity of development, 43; scheme of develop- ment, 58 ; varieties of, 60 ; from presentative to representa- tive knowledge, 66; development begins with sensation, 66, 146; development through perception, 144. Diesterweg quoted on intuition, 65, 145; on Pestalozzianism, 144; on what the intuitions are, 145; on instruction as hav- ing two sides, 144; on observation and reflection, 145. Dispositions, inherited, 55. Drobisch on association by contrast, 174, note; on ingenious memory, 193. Education, relation of, to psychology, 1; principles of, not necessarily laws of mind, 1; three-fold classification of prin- ciples of, 1. Emotions, order of developmemt, 298; three orders of, 298; cul- tivation of, 302; stimulation of, 303. Emulation, in education, 209, 306. Environment, external factor in development, 56; adjustment to, 52. Ethics, relation to pedagogics, 1, 16; ethical or moral sentiment, 324. Exercise, what is involved in exercise of intellect, 45; improve- ment by exercise, 44. Experience, a source of belief, 272. Factors of development, internal and external, 54. Faculty, modes of measuring, 30; exercise of, 44; growth of single faculty, 40; training of faculty, 60; faculties to becul- vated within limits, 62. Feeling, a source of belief, 273; defined, 292; importance of studying, 293; relation of feeling to knowing, 293, 294; classes of feelings, 297, 298; the social feelings of childhood, 300; love of approbation, 300; cultivation of emotion, 302; self-esteem, 301; repression of, 302; management of egoistic feelings, 305. Functions, fundamental, of intellect, 23. Fundamental intellectual processes, discrimination and assimi- lation, 23. Galton, on bookish and wordy education, 227, on chess playing, 229. 368 index. Genius and attention, 80; and concentration, 80. Granville, on memory. 201. Growth and development, 38; of faculty, 44; and habit, 46; of brain, 50; movement of growth from presentative to repre- sentative, 42, 66. Hamilton, quoted on definition of psychology, 15; on analysis, 15; on estimating comparative utility of methods, 66; on law of limitation in attention, 88; on reminiscense, 179; no royal road to learning, 208; on interest and attention, 209; on emulation, 209. Images, representative, 148; distinguished from percepts, 150; involved in percepts, 151; conditions of reproduction of, 153. Imagination, reproductive, 148; constructive, 213; definition of, 149; imagination and memory, 150; includes what, 214; analysis of constructive imagination, 215; receptive and cre- ative, 216; limits to, 217; imagination in scientific acquisi- tion, 220; in discovery, 221; in invention, 224; imagination and feeling, 225: and intellect, 226, 227; development of, 228; imagination of children, 229; training of, 231; restraint of, 231; gradual development of, 233; imagination in teach- ing, 235 ; pedagogical references on, 240. Impressions, persistence and revival of, 148; depth of, 153; as- sociation of, 156. Inductive method, 15; inductive reasoning, 276; spontaneous and regulated induction, 277. Inference and proof, 275. Intellect, the intellectual sentiment, love of knowledge, 311; earlier stage of, 313; later stage, 314; cultivation of intel- lectual sentiment, 315; the logical feelings, 313; what exer- cise of intellect includes, 45. Introspection is retrospection, 3, note; introspection and obser- vation, 3, 5; Lewes quoted on, 14. Intuition, definition of, 144; has two sides, 145; the basis of all instruction, 92; intuition of things, 119, 124; of number, 122; 'from intuition to notion,' 145. Intuitional instruction, place of, 135; importance of, 92, 139, 145; doctrine of, 144; quotations on, 144, 145; defined, 144. Judgment, defined, 268; judgments about classes, 269; judg- * INDEX. 369 ment and proposition, 269; judgment and belief, 270; af- firmative and negative, 271. Kant, on ingenious memory, 200, note. Knowledge, opposition and connection between knowing, feel- ing and willing, 20, 293; species of , 22; particular and gen- eral, 241 ; increase of complexity of knowledge, 42 ; love of knowledge, 311; pleasures of knowledge, 311; pleasures of discovery and of possession of knowledge, 312; the logical feel- ings in relation to knowledge, 315. Landon, on memory training, 202, note; on habits of inquiry, observation and comparison, 210. Language, and thinking, 243 ; discovery of the meaning of words, 248; connection of naming and conception, 247; parallel growth of speech and thought, 243. Laws of mind, 1, 7, 24, 25. Lewes, on methods of studying psychology, 14; on drawing out the senses, 141. Logic, relation to pedagogics, 1, 12, 16; logical feelings, 315. Malbranche, on habits of attention, 87, 208. Mansel, on intuition, 144. Marcel, on one thing at a time, 88. Maudesley, on recollection, 180, note. McCosh, on methods of studying psychology, 15; on inductive method in psychology, 16. Memory, as reproductive imagination, 148, 150; conditions of reproduction, 153; attentive and retentive, 153, 207; repeti- tion and retention, 155; memor}*- and expectation, 159; pas- sive and active memory, 178; recollection, 178; divisions of memory, 183, 191 ; memory of things and words, 184: growth of memory, 185, 189; habits of, 190; training of, 196; mne- monic training, 197, 199; learning by rote, 198; exercises in recalling, 201 ; memory-subjects, 202; memory-training but a part of education, 202; educational maxims on memory, 208, 209; maxims on recollection, 210; pedagogical refer- ences on memory, 211, 212. Mental Development, defined, 38; and growth distinguished, 38; characteristics of, 39; unity of development and sum- mary of process of, 43, 47. x 370 INDEX. Mental Phenomena, whether ever unconscious, 2; analysis of, 18; primary classification of, applied to rhetoric, 35. Mental Science, what it consists of, 17. Methods, inductive and deductive, 16, 276,278; of instruction and discovery, 287. Mill, J. S., on certitude of consciousness, 15; on laws of mind, 15; on order of psychologic study, 150. Mill, J., on value of mnemonics, 200. Minds, how they vary, 28; quantitative aspects of mind, 29; teachers must note differences of, 28; should be able to com- pare minds, 33. Moral Sentiments, 324; moral standard, 325; training the moral faculty, 326-329; by self-reliance, 327; by examples, 327; by social environment, 328; by public opinion, 329-330. Notion, definition of general notion, 244; how notions are formed, 245, 248; notions which involve synthesis, 249; no- tions of magnitude, number, and geometry, 250; accuracy and inaccuracy of, 251 ; notions too narrow, 251 ; too wide, 251; notions formed out of images, 253; defining notions,. 254; early notions, 255; abstract notions, 257. Novelty, pleasures of, 295. Observation, 128; distinctness and accuracy of, 129; child must observe accurately, 145, and must reflect on its observations, 145; the world unfolded only to the observing mind, 145; Diesterweg on, 145; observation must be accompanied with suggestion and question, 146. Opposition between knowing, feeling, and willing, 20, 293. Order of mental development, 41 ; order of subjects of instruc- tion, 288. Payne, quoted on mental development, 65, 66; on the funda- mental elements of knowlenge, 144. Pedagogics, relation to psychology, 1; derives its data from psychology, physiology, and logic, 16; derives its aim from ethics, 16; deductive and inductive element of, 1, 16; matter and aim of, 17; unity of, 16; assumes the general truths of psychology and other sciences, 18. Perception, 110; the invariable accompaniment of sensation, 111; the result of acquisition, 113; process of, analyzed, 112; INDEX. 371 definition of, 113; source of knowledge, 114, 148; tactual perception, 121 ; perception of number, 116, of temperature, hardness, and softness, 117; of weight, roughness, and smoothness, 118; of space, 122; of our own body, 126; per- ception and observation, 128; development of perceptual power, 130; training the perceptual power, 133; educational doctrine on perception, 143-146; Carpenter on, 146; percep- tion an emotion (Currie), 146. Pestalozzianism defined, 144; fundamental maxims of, 145. Pleasure, the reflex of unimpeded energy (Hamilton), 209; Law of pleasurable activity, 294. Proof and Inference, 275. Psychology, definition of, 1; scope and method of , 1 ; relation of, to educational science, 1, 16; methods of studying, 14; maxims of study of, 14; synopsis of relation of pedagogics to, 16; concrete psychology the teacher's province, 28. Quick, quoted on observation and reflection, 145. Ratich, on one study at a time, 88. Reasoning, the higher stage of thinking, 268; nature of, 274; implicit reasoning, 275; explicit, 276; inductive and deduct- ive, 276, 278; first reasoning, 280; training the reasoning power, 282; reasoning and judgment, 283; reasoning taught by questioning, 284: reasoning and the sciences, 286. Reflection, should follow observation, 145; leads to clear con- sciousness, 145. Representation by mental images, 148; trains of representa- tion, 163; motor representation, 166; of time, 177; of the past, 171. Reproduction, 150; conditions of, 153; repetition, a condition of, 155; frequency of, 156; retention and reproduction, 150. Science, Mental, aim of, 17; educational aim of, 17; all sci- ence grows deductive, 287. Self-esteem, cultivation of, 301. Sensations, defined, 93; characters of, 95, qualities of, 92; dis- crimination of, 103. Sense, organic, 93; special senses, 94; five senses, 94; taste, smell and touch, 98; hearing, 99; sight, 101; muscular sense, 372 INDEJJ 102; sense-impressions and attention, 103; classes of sense- impressions, 104; improvement of, 105. Social Environment, 56 : social feelings of childhood, 300. Society, influence of in mental development, 47. Soldan, quoted on pedagogics and other sciences, 16. Stewart, quoted on essentials of a good memory, 188, 196. Stimulation of emotions, 303. Sympathy, a non-personal sentiment, 307 ; growth of sympathy, 308 : uses in education, 308 ; cultivation of, 309 ; the aesthetic, 316-320. Sentiments, the intellectual, 311-315; the moral, 324-329. Tate, quoted on expedients for securing attention, 89 ; on habits of concentration, 89, 208 ; on knowledge derived through the senses, 144; on sensation, 144; on the primary intuitions, 145; on emulation, 209; on instruction should give pleasure, 209. Teachers, to develop interest, 85; concrete psychology the teacher's province, 28; to note how minds vary, 29; should be able to compare minds, 33 ; should know the terms of psy- chology, 32. Thinking, denned, 241 ; three stages of, 243 ; all thinking is re- presentation, 241; thinking and understanding, 242; based on comparison, 242; based on imagination, 253; connected with language, 243. Thought, 48; definition of, 241; thinking denned, 242; thought and imagination virtually connected, 253. Training of judgment and reasoning, 282, 288; of abstraction, 258; of the faculties, 60; based on laws of development, 61; methods of, must be adapted to individuals, 63; training the imagination, 231; the attention, 83; the senses, 133; training of memory, 196-203. Understanding, of a description, 219; what is meant by under- standing a thing, 242. Verbal- Suggestions, 272. Wayland, quoted on philosophical association, 211. Whately, quoted on curiosity, 209. Words, perils of empty words, 253. THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. Dime Series of Question Books, With Full Answers. Notes, Queries. Etc., ly A. F. Southwick. Elementary Series. 3. Physiology. 4. Theory and Practice. 6. U. S. History and Civil Gov't. 10. Algebra. 13. American Literature. 14. Grammar. 15. Orthograph and Etymology. 18. Arithmetic. 19. Physical and Political Geog. 20. Reading and Punctuation. Advanced Series* 1. Physics. 2. General Literature. 5. General History. 7. Astronomy. 8. Mythology. 9. Rhetoric 11. Botany. 12. Zoology. 16. Chemistry. 17. Geology. PRICE TEN CENTS EACH. The immense sale of the Regents' Questions in Arithmetic, Geog- raphy, Grammar, and Spelling has led to frequent inquiry for similar questions in advanced subjects. To meet this demand, we have had prepared this series of Question Books, which, compared with the many books of the sort already published, presents the following advantages : 1. Economy.— The teacher need purchase books only on the subjects upon which special help is needed. Frequently a $1.50 book is bought for the sake of a few questions in a single study. Here the studies may be taken up one at a time, a special advantage in New York, since applications for State Certificates may now present themselves for examination in only part of the subjects, and receive partial certifi- cates to be exchanged for full certificates when all the branches have been passed. The same plan is very gererally pursued by county superintendents and commissioners who are encourageing their teach- ers to prepare themselves for higher certificates. 2. Thokoughness.— Each subject occupies from 32 to 40 pages, care- fully compiled, and referring to the leading text books. The questions in large type compare in number with those given in other Question Books, while besides these there are many notes, queries, and practical hints, that fill the learner's mind with suggestions to further investi- gation and personal thought upon the subject. In this particular these Question Books escape the severe critisism that has been passed upon the mere Cramming -Books. 3. Utility.— The Dime Question Books are printed in three sizes of type, carefully distinguishing which is most essential, that the teacher who has but little time may concentrate it upon salient points, and afterward fill in the interesting but less important matter at leisure. The handsome page and the clear type add much to the attractiveness of the series. The Entire Series is now ready. Each sent Post-paid for 10 cts. Each Series of Ten in one book, oloth bound, $1.50. Address, C. W. BARDEEN, Publisher, Syracuse, N. Y. THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. The Best Books for Teachers. Standard, Uniform, Practical. I. Common School Law. A digest of Statute and common law as to the relations of the Teacher to the Pupil, the Parent, and the District. With 400 references to legal decisions in 21 different States. To which are added the 1400 questions given at the first seven New York Examinations for State Certificates. 7th thou- sand. Cloth, 12 mo, pp. 188 and Appendix. Price 50 cents. An hour to each of the seven chapters of this little book will make the teacher master of any legal difficulty that may arise; while ignorance of it puts him at the mercy of a rebellious pupil an exacting parent, or a dishonest trustee. II. Buckham's Hand-Books fob Young Teachers. No. 1, First Steps. Cloth, 16mo, pp 152. Price 75 cts. This manual thoroughly and completely covers a ground not yet trodden. It is simple, it is practical, it is suggestive, it is wonder- fully minute in detail ; in short, it anticipates all the difficulties likely to be encountered, and gives the beginner the counsel of an older friend. III. DeGrafTs School Koom Guide, embodying the instruc- tion given by the author at Teachers' Institutes in New York and other States, and especially intended to assist Public School Teachers in the practical work of the school -room. Tenth edition with many additions and corrections. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 449. $1.50 This book bears the same relation to modern teaching that Page's Theory and Practice bore to the teaching of thirty years ago. It is in every way a Complete Manual, invaluable and indispensable. IV. Primary Helps. Being No. l of a new series of Kinder- garten Manuals: by W. N. Hailmann, A. M., editor of The Kind- ergarten Messenger and the New Education. Large 8 vo, pp. 68, with 15 full-page illustrations. Price 75 cents. In these days, no teacher can afford to be ignorant of **■ The New Education," based on the great principal of directing instead of repressing the activity of childhood. As is well remarked by the New England Journal of Education,— "The general principles here laid down have been applied in many public schools but the method has never before been thoroughly systematized and per- fected." V. Hughe's Mistake in Teaching. American edition, with contents and index. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 135. Price 50 cts. Superintendents frequently choose this book for their less thoughtful teachers, assured that its pungent style and chatty treatment will arrest their attention and produce good results. Any of the above sent post-paid on receipt of the price. C. W. BARDEEN, Publisher, Syracuse. N. Y. THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. Helps in Teaching History. 1. A Thousand Questions in American History. 16mo. cloth, pp. 247. Price $1.00. This work has been prepared by an eminent teacher for use In his own school— one of the largest in the State. It shows rare breadth of view and discrimination, dealing not merely with events but with causes, and with the side issues t'hat have so much to do with determining the destiny of a nation. It brings the narrative down to the Presidential election of 1884, and will give valuable hints to every teacher in United States history. 2. Helps in Fixing the Facts in American History* By Henry C. Northam. l6mo, cloth, pp, 298. Price $1.00. Here all facts are presented L— exington. In groups. The key- word to I— ndependence. the Revolution, for instance, is B— urgoyne's Surrender. LIBERTY, as shown in the ac- E— vacuation. companying table of Key- R— etribution. Words; and in like manner the T— reason, events of the late civil war are Y— orktown. kept chronologically distinct by the key-words SLAVES FREED. Chart No. 1 indicates by stars the years in each decade from 149* to 1789 in which the most remarkable events occurred, while the colored chart No. 2 arranges the events in twelve groups. 3. Dime Question Books, No. 5, General History, and No. 6, United States History and Civil Government. By Albert P. Southwick. l6mo, paper, pp. 37, 32. Price 10 cts. each. 4. Tablet of American History, with map of the United States on the back. By RItfus Blanchard. Heavy paper, mounted on rollers, 3Vi by 5 feet. Price, express paid, $3.00. The demand for a colored chart to hang upon the wall and thus catch the often-lifted eye of the pupil, has led to the preparation of this chart by an experienced author. The events of the four centuries are grouped in parallel belts of different colors, and upon the corners and sides are names of the States and Terri- tories with their etymology, etc., history of political parties, portraits of all the Presidents, Coats of Arms of all the States, etc. The map is engraved expressly for this chart by Rand a McNally, is colored both by State* and by counties, and gives all the latest railroads, the new arrangement of time, etc. Indeed the map is as indispensable as the chart, and the combination of both at a low price makes perhaps the most desirable purchase for the school- room that has ever been offered. C. W. UAKDEEN, Pub., Syracuse, N. Y. THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. Helps in Teaching Literature. 1. A Series of Questions in English and American literature, prepared for class drill and private study by Maet F. Hendrick, teacher in the State Normal School, Cortland, N. Y. 16mo, boards, pages 100, interleaved. 35 cents. This edition is especially prepared for taking notes in the literature class, and may be used in connection with any text-book or under any instruction. a. Early English Literature, from the Lay of Beowulf to Edmund Spenser. By Wm. B. Harlow, instructor in the High School, Syracuse, N. Y. 16 mo, cloth, pp. 138. Price 75 cents. This handsome volume gives copious extracts from all leading authors, of sufficient length to afford a fair taste of their style, while its biographical and critical notes give it rare value 8. Dime Question Book No. 2, General Literature, and No. 13, American Literature, bv ALBERT P. SouTHWlCK. 16mo, paper, pp. 35, 39. Price 10 cents each. These are among the most interesting books in the series, abounding in allusion and suggestion, as well as giving full answers to every question. They afford a capital drill, and should be used in every class as a preparation for examination. 4. How to Obtain the Greatest Value from a Book. By the Rev. R. W. Lowrie. 8vo, pp. 12. Price 25 cents. No one can read this essay without pleasure and profit. 5. The Art of Questioning. By JOSHUA G. Fitch, lfimo, paper, pp . 36. 15 cts. Mr. Fitch, one of Her Majesty's inspectors of schools, now recognized as the ablest of English writers on education, owed hi» early reputation to this address, the practical helpfulness of which Is everywhere acknowledged. 6. The Art of Securing Attention. By JOSHUA O. Fitoh. iflruo, paper, pp. 43. 15 cts. The Maryland School Journal well says : " It Is itself an exem- plification of the problem discussed, for the first page fixes the attention so that the reader never wearies till he comes to the last and.then wishes that the end had not come so soon." O. W. BARDEEN, Pub., Syracuse, N. Y. THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. Huntington (Rt. Rev. F. D.) Unconscious Tuition. Paper, 16mo, pp. 45. .. 15 Hutton (H. H.) A Manual of Mensuration. Boards, 12mo, pp. 168 50 Jackson (E. P.) Class-Record Cards. A short marking system, consisting of SO white and 10 colored cards, with instructions and hints 50 Johnson's Cliart of Astronomy. On blue enamelled cloth, 40x4(5 inches 3 50 Keller (0.) Monthly Report Cards. 2%x4 inches. Per hundred .... .' 100 Kennedy (John.) The Philosophy of School Discipline. 16mo, pp. 23... 15 Lawrence (E. C.) Recreations in Ancient Fields. Cloth, 12mo, pp.177... 1 00 Maps* for the Wall. New York State, revised to the present time, colored by counties and towns. 2^x3 feet. Paper, $1.00. Cloth 2 00 The Same, 68x74 inches, cloth 10 00 United States, colored by States and counties, 3^x5 feet, with Chart .... 3 00 Dissected Maps. United States sawn into States 75 — Also, New York State sawn into Counties 75 Marenholz-Buelow (Baroness) The School Work- shop. Translated by Miss Susan E. Blow. Paper, 16mo, pp. 27 15 Maudsley (H.) Sex in Mind and Education. Paper, 16mo, pp. 42 . . 15 Meiklejohn (J, M. D.) The New Education. 16mo, pp. 35 15 Michael (O. S.) Algebra for Beginners. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 120 75 Miller (Warner.) Education as a Dep't of Government. Paper, 8vo, pp. 12. 15 Milton (John) A Small Tractate of Education. Paper, 16mo, pp. 26 25 Mottoes for the School Room. Per set of 24, 12 cards, 7x14 1 00 New York State Examination Questions. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 180 50 Northam (Henry C.) Civil Govrnment for Common Schools. Cloth,* 16mo, pp. 185 '. 70 Fixing the Facts of American History. Cloth. 12mo, pp. 3u0 75 Conversational Lessons Leading to Geography. 16mo, pp. 39 25 Northrop (B. G.) High Schools. Paper,8vo, pp. 26 25 Northrup (A. J.) Camps and Tramps in the Adirondacks. 16mo, pp. 302. Paper, 50 cents ; in Cloth -. 1 25 Number Lessons. On card-board, 7x11, after the Grube Method 10 Payne (Joseph.) Lectures on the Art of Education. Cloth, 8vo, pp. 384. . . 1 50 The same, Reading-Club Edition with full analyses. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 281. 1 00 The same, Paper, 16mo, pp. 281 50 Payne (W. H.) A Shyrt History of Education. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 105.... 50 Periodicals. The School Bulletin. Monthly, 16 pp., 10x14. Per year 100 Bound Vols. I-XI. Cloth, 200pp., each 2 00 The School Room. Monthly, 16 pp., 7x11. Per year 50 Phillips (Philip.) Song Life. Oblong, boards, pp. 1.6 50 Pooler (Chas. T.) Chart of Civil Government. Cloth 25 The Same, in sheets 12x18. per hundred 5 00 Hints on Teaching Orthoepy. Paper, 12mo, pp. 15 10 Quick (R. H.) Essau* on Educational Reformers. Cloth, 12mo, pp., 331 ... . 1 50 ♦Regents' Examination Paper. Six styles. Per ream, $1.75 to 2 50 Regents' Examination Record. Cards, per hundred 50 The same on sheets 5 to page, 72 pages for 720 scholars, bound, 1 00 Regents' Questions. To June 1882. Ten Editions. 1. Complete ivith Key. The Regents' Questions from the first exam- ination in 1866. Being the Questions for the preliminary examinations . for admission to the University of the State of New York, prepared by the Regents of the University, and participated in simultaneously by more than 250 academies, forming a basis for the distribution of more than a million of dollars. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 473 2 CO 2. Complete. The same as the above, but without the answers. Pp. 340. 1 (0 3. Arithmetic. The 1,293 questions in Arithmetic. Pp. 100 25 4. Key to Arithmetic, Answers to the above. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 16 — 25 THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS. 5. Thousand Regents' Questions in Arithmetic, printed on 500 slips of card-board, with book 1 00 6. Geography, The 1,987 questions in Geography. Pp. G8 25 7. Key to Geography. Answers to the above. Manilla, I61110, pp. 28 — 25 8. Grammar. The 2,976 questions in Grammar. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 109 25 9. Grammar and Key. The 2,976 questions in Grammar, with com- plete Key, and references. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 198 100 10. Spelling. The 4,800 words given in Spelling. 2,900 of them being marked in selections from popular authors, to be read to the class ana the emphasized words spelled. Manilla. 16mo, pp. 61 25 Richardson (B. W.) Learning and Health. Paper, 16mo, pp. 39 15 Roe (Martha.) A Work in Number, for Junior Classes in Graded Schools. Cloth. 12mo, pp. 160 50 Roget (P. M.) Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases. Entirely new edition. Cloth, 12mo. pp. 800 2 00 Russell (Hattie Sanford.) Half a Hundred Songs for the School-room and Home. Boards, 12mo, pp. 103 35 Ryan (G. W.) School Record. 112 blanks 50 Sanford (H. R.) The Word Method in Number. A system of teaching Rapid Numerical Combinations. Per box of 45 cards, printed on both sides 50 Sherrill (J. E.) The Normal Question Book. Cloth. 12mo, pp. 405 l 50 Slate Pencil Blackboard Slating. Dustless, Distinct, Durable. In tin cans, ready for use. Pints, covering 75 feet, one coat 1 50 Quarts, " 150 " " 2 75 Gallons. " 600 " " 10 00 Slated Paper, per square yard 50 Sornberger (S. J.) Normal Language Lessojis, being the instruction in Language given in the State Normal School at Cortland, N. Y. Boards, 16ino, pp. 75 50 Southwick (A. P.) Twenty Dime Question Bnoks, with full answers, notes, queries, etc. Each 10 Elementary Series. 3. Physiology. 4. Theory and Practice. 6. U. S. History and Civil Gov't. 10. Algebra. 13. American Literature. 14. Grammar. 15. Orthography and Etymology 18. Arithmetic. 19. Physical and Political Geog. 20. Reading and Punctuation. — The Elementary Question Book, including in one volume the Ten Question Books of the Common School Series, as above. Cloth, 16mo, pp.387 150 The Advanced Question Book, including in one volume the Ten Question Books of the Advanced Series, as above. Cloth, 16mo, pp. S6G 1 60 — Quizzism. Quirks and Quibbles from Queer Quarters. 16mo, pp. 25 25 starkweather (Asher) An Aid to English Grammar. Designed princi- pally for teachers. 16mo, pp. 216 ."(I Straight (H. II.) Practical Aspects of Industrial Education. Taper, Advanced Series. 1. Physics. 2. General Literature. 5. General History. 7. Astronomy. 8. Mythology. 9. Rhetoric. 11. Botany. 12. Zoology. 16. Chemistry. 17. Geology. 8vo, pp. 12. .hi Sully (James) Outlines of Psychology, abridged by .1. A. Reinhart, Ph. D., Reading Circle Edition. 16mo, pp B75 l 50 Swett (John) Manual of Elocution, 12mo, pp. 800, net 100 Tate (Thos.l The Philosophy <>f Education With an introduction by Col. i<\ w. Parker. Cloth, 12mo, t>p. 380. Only complete editi n 1 50 Thousand Questions in U. S. History. Kimo, pp.200 1 00 Thurber (S.) Recent Criticism* on our Public Schools. Paper, 8vo. pp. II... 15 Tiliinghast fWm.) The Diadem of School Songs. Ito, boards pp.160.. 50 Underwood (L. M.) Systematic Plant Record. Manilla, 7x8)4 pp. 52 80 Any of the a!>ove not starred sent post-paid on receipt of the price. C. W. BARDEEN, Publisher, Syracuse, n. y. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Ml 019 878 517 9