^^^ <^' "oo \ - \ c> o5 -''r^ \ ^ > .- \ ■^c ^^ x^^. ■"oo^ -^^ x^-^^. '7- xO :% ■=^. %'' "o( X^^^ .*" r -;sV xO°^. "oc . * -, V ^ .♦^ .^-^ A HISTORY SEPOY WAR IN INDIA 1857-1858 JOHN WILLIAM KAYE, F.R.S. AUTHOR OF "TUE history of the war in AFGHANISTAN" VOL. I. mtntb BOition (1880) LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO. LONDON, NEW YORK, AND BOMBAY 1896 All fightg reserved 69570 TMP^fa -0229 U 1 SHOULD HAVE DEDICATED THESE VOLUMES TO LORD CANNING; II A -^ I IF. LlVIil : I NOW INSCRIBE THEM REVERENTIALLY TO HIS MEMORY. CONTENTS OF VOL I BOOK I.— INTEODUCTOEY. CHAPTER I. THE CONQUEST OF THE PUNJAB AND PEGU. FAOZ The Administration of Lord Dalhousie — His Tarewell Minute — Ue- irospect of the First Sikh War— Tiie Military Occupation of the Punjab— Tiie Council of Regency— The Second Sikh War— The Annexation of the Punjab — Its Administration under tlie Law- rences — The Conquest of Pegu 1 CHAPTER II. THE "right OE lapse." The Administration of Lord Dalhousie — Adoption — The *' Right of Lapse" — Sattarah — Nagpore — Jhansi — Kerowlee — The Carnatic — Tanjore — Tiie Case of the Peishwah — DundooPunt, Nana Sahib — Sumbhulnore 69 CHAPTER III. THE ANNEXATION OF OUDE. The Annexation of Oude — Early History of the Province — The Treaty of 1801^-Effects of the Double Government— Creation of tlie Kingship — Progress of Misrule — Repeated Warnings — The Unratified Treaty — Colonel Sleeman's Reports — Lord Dalhousie's Minute — Yiews of the Court of Directors — Sir James Outram Piesident — Annexation proclaimed 112 VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. mOGKESS OF ENGLISHISM. Destruction of the Native Aristocracy — Retrospect of Eeveniie Administration — The Settlement of the North-West Provinces — The Ousting of the Talookhdars — Resumption Operations — The Inam Commission — Decay of Priestly Power — Social Reforms — Moral and Material Progress 153 BOOK II.— THE SEPOY ARMY: ITS RISE, PROGRESS, AND DECLINE. CHAPTER I. EA.RLY HISTORY OF THE NATIVE ARMY. The Sepoy Army of the Company — Its Rise and Progress — TliePirst Mutiny in Bengal— Deteriorating Influences — Degradation of the Native Officer — The Reorganisation of 1796 — Progress of Innova- tion — The Mutiny of Yellore — Later Signs of Disaffection — Causes of the Mutiny 201 CHAPTER IL DETERIORATING INFLUENCES. Subsidence of Alarm— The Soldier in England and in India — The Sepoy and his Officer — Deteriorating Influences — The Drainage of the Staff — Progress of Centralisation — The Reorganisation of 1824 — The Barrackpore Mutiny— The Half-Batta Order— Abolition of Corporal Punishment . .252 CHAPTER III. THE SINDH MUTINIES. The War in Afghanistan — Pernicious Effects of Defeat— The An- nexation of Scinde — Results of Extension of Empire — The Indus Allowances — Mutiny of the Thirty-fourth Regiment — Embarrass- ments of Government — The March of the Sixty-fourth — Mutiny at Shikarpore — Disaffection in the Madras Army .... 274 CONTENTS. Vli CHAPTER IV. THE PUNJAB MUTINIES. Page The War on the Sutlej — Tlie Patna Conspiracy — Attempt to Corrupt the Sepoys at Dinapore — The Occupation of the Punjab — An- nexation and its Effects — Reduction of the Sepoy's Pay — The Mutinies at Rawul Pindee and Govindghur — Lord Dallionsie and Sir Charles Napier 303 CHAPTER V. DISCIPLINE OF THE BENGAL ARMY. Character of the Bengal Sepoy — Conflicting Opinions— Caste-^The Seniority System — The Officering of the Army — Regular and Irre- gular Regiments — Want of Europeans — The Crimean War — Indian Public Opinion — Summary of Deteriorating Influences . • 324 BOOK III.— THE OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY. CHAPTER I. LOUD CANNING AND HIS COUNCIL. Departure of Lord Dalhousie — His Character— The Question of Suc- cession — Arrival of Lord Canning — His Early Career— Commence- ment of his Administration — His Fellow-Councillors — General Low — Mr. Dorin — Mr. Grant— Mr. Barnes Peacock — The Commander- in-Chief 353 CHAPTER II. THE OUDE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PERSIAN WAR. Lord Canning's Eirst Year— The Oude Commission— Waj id AH and the Embassy to England — The Persian War — The Question of Command— James Outram — Central-Asian Policy — Dost Mahomed — John Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes at Peshawur — Henry Law- rence in Lucknow ... 39 5 Vlll CONTENTS. CHAPTER III. TH2 RISING OF THE STORM. PAGB Lord Canning and tlie Army — The Call for " More Officers" — Dread of the Black "Water — The General Service Enlistment Act — Anxie- ties and Alarms — Missionary Efforts— Proselytising Officers — Poli- tical Inquietudes — The Prophecy of Fifty-seven . . . .455 CHAPTER IV. THE FIRST MUTINY. The new Rifled Musket— The Story of the Greased Cartridges — Dum-Dum and Barrackpore — Excitement in the Native Regiments — Events at Berhampore— Mutjnv of th** "^J'neteenth Regiment — Conduct of Colonel MitcijeJ . . . • • . .487 CHAPTER V. PROGRESS OF MUTINY. Causes of delayed Action — The Government and tlie Departments — Investigation of the Cartridge Question — Progress of Disaffection at, Jbarrackpore — The Story of Mungul Pandy — Mutiny ot tne Thirty-fourth — Disbandment of the Nineteenth . . . .510 CHAPTER VI. EXCITEMENT IN UPPER INDIA. Progress of Alarm — The Panic at Umballah — General Anson and the Rifle Depots — Incendiary Eires — General Barnard — Events at Meerut — The Bone-dust Elour — The Story of the Chupatties — Intrigues of the Nana Sahib 548 CHAPTER VII. BURSTING OF THE STORM. The Montli of May — General Survey of Affairs — State of Feeling at the Rifle Depots — The Rising Storm in Oude — The Revolt at Meerut — The Seizure of Delhi — Measures of Lord Canning — The Call for Succours 581 Appendix ^ , . . . 619 FKEFAOE- It was not without mucli hesitation that I under- took to write this narrative of the events, which have imparted so painful a celebrity to the years 1857-58, and left behind them such terrible remembrances. Publicly and privately I had been frequently urged to do so, before I could consent to take upon myself a responsibility, which could not sit lightly on any one capable of appreciating the magnitude of the events themselves and of the many grave questions which they suggested. If, indeed, it had not been that, in course of time, I found, either actually in my hands or within my reach, materials of history such as it was at least improbable that any other writer could obtain, I should not have ventured upon so difficult a task. But having many important collections of papers in my possession, and having received promises of further assistance from surviv- ing actors in the scenes to be described, I felt that, though many might write a better history of the Sepoy War, no one could write a more truthful one. X PKEFACE. So, relying on these external advantages to com- pensate all inherent deficiencies, I commenced what I knew must be a labour of years, but what I felt would be also a labour of love. My materials were too ample to be otherwise than most sparingly dis- played. The prodigal citation of authorities has its advantages ; but it encumbers the text, it impedes the narrative, and swells to inordinate dimensions the record of historical events. On a former occa- sion, when I laid before the public an account of a series of important transactions, mainly derived from original documents, public and private, I quoted those documents freely both in the text and in the notes. As I was at that time wholly unknown to the public, it was necessary that I should cite chapter and verse to obtain credence for my statements. There was no ostensible reason why I should have known more about those transactions than any other writer (for it was merely the accident of private friendships and associations that placed such pro- fuse materials in my possession), and it seemed to be imperative upon me therefore to produce my cr© dentials. But, believing that this necessity no longer exists, I have in the present work abstained from adducing my authorities, for the mere purpose of substantiating my statements. I have quoted the voluminous correspondence in my possession only where there is some dramatic force and propriety in the words cited, or when they appear calculated, without impeding the narrative, to give colour and vitality to the story. And here I may observe that, as on former occa- sions, the historical materials which I have moulded into this narrative are rather of a private than of a public character. I have made but little use PREFACE. XI of recorded official documents. I do not mean that access to such documents has not been ex- tremely serviceable to me; but that it has rather afforded the means of verifying or correcting state- ments received from other sources than it has sup- plied me with original materials. So far as respects the accumulation of facts, this History would have differed but slightly from what it is, if I had never passed the door of a public office ; and, generally, the same may be said of the opinions which I have expressed. Those opinions, whether sound or unsound, are entirely my own personal opinions — opinions in many instances formed long ago, and confirmed by later events and more mature consi- deration. No one but myself is responsible for them ; no one else is in any way identified with them. In the wide range of inquiry embraced by the considera- tion of the manifold causes of the great convulsion of 1857, almost every grave question of Indian govern- ment and administration presses forward, with more or less importunity, for notice. Where, on many points, opinions widely differ, and the policy, which is the practical expression of them, takes various shapes, it is a necessity that the writer of cotempo- rary history, in the exercise of independent thought, should find himself dissenting from the doctrines and disapproving the actions of some authorities, living and dead, who are worthy of all admiration and re- spect. It is fortunate, when, as in the present in- stance, this difference of opinion involves no diminu- tion of esteem, and the historian can discern worthy motives, and benevolent designs, and generous striv- ings after good, in those whose ways he may think erroneous and whose course of action he may deem unwise. Xll PREFACE. Indeed, the errors of which I have freely spokeit were, for the most part, strivings after good. It was in the over-eager pursuit of Humanity and Civilisa- tion that Indian statesmen of the neAv school were betrayed into the excesses which have been so griev- ously visited upon the nation. The story of the Indian Rebellion of 1857 is, perhaps, the most signal illustration of our great national character ever yet recorded in the annals of our country. It was the vehement self assertion of the Englishman that pro- duced this conflagration ; it was the same vehement self-assertion that enabled him, by God's blessing, to trample it out. It was a noble egotism, mighty alike in doing and in suffering, and it showed itself grandly capable of steadfastly confronting the dangers which it had brought down upon itself. If I have any pre- dominant theory it is this : Because we were too English the great crisis arose ; but it was only be- cause we were English that, when it arose, it did not utterly overwhelm us. It is my endeavour, also, to show how much both of the dangers which threatened British dominion in the East, and of the success with which they were encountered, is assignable to the individual characters of a few eminent men. With this object I have sought to bring the reader face to face with the principal actors in the events of the Sepoy War, and to take a personal interest in them. If it be true that the best history is that which most nearly resembles a bundle of biographies, it is especially true w^hen said with reference to Indian history ; for nowhere do the cha- racters of individual Englishmen impress themselves with a more vital reality upon the annals of the country in which they live ; nowhere are there such great opportunities of independent action ; nowhere PREFACE. Xiii are developed such capacities for evil or for good, as in our great Anglo-Indian Empire. If, then, in such a work as this, the biographical element were not prominently represented — if the individualities of such men as Dalhousie and Canning, as Henry and John Lawrence, as James Outram, as John Nichol- son, and Herbert Edwardes, were not duly illus- trated, there would be not only a cold and colourless, but also an unfaithful, picture of the origin and pro- gress of the War. But it is to be remarked that, in proportion as the individuality of the English leaders is distinct and strongly marked, that of the chiefs of the insurrectionary movement is faint and undecided. In the fact of this contrast we see the whole history of the success which, by God's providence, crowned the eiForts of our countrymen. If the individual energies of the leaders of the revolt had been com- mensurate with the power of the masses, we might have failed to extinguish such a conflagration. But the whole tendency of the English system had been to crush out those energies :, «o again, I say, we found in the very circumstances which had excited the rebellion the very elements of our success in sup- pressing it. Over the Indian Dead Level which that system had created, the English heroes marched tri- umphantly to victory. In conclusion, I have only to express my obhga- tions to those who have enabled me to write this History by supplying me with the materials of which it is composed. To the executors of the late Lord Canning, who placed in my hands the private and demi-official correspondence of the deceased &ti*.t<^s- man, extending over the whole term of his Indian administration, I am especially indebted. To Sir John Lawrence and Sir Herbert Edwardes, who have XIV PREFACE. furnished me with the most valuable materials for my narrative of the rising in the Punjab and the measures taken in that province for the re-capture of Delhi ; to the family of the late Colonel Baird Smith, for many interesting papers illustrative of the opera- tions of the great siege ; to Sir James Outram, who gave me before his death his correspondence relating to the brilliant operations in Oude ; to Sir Robert Hamilton, for much valuable matter in elucidation of the history of the Central Indian Campaign ; and to Mr. E. A. Reade, whose comprehensive knowledge of the progress of events in the North-Western Pro- vinces has been of material service to me, my warmest acknowledgments are due. But to no one am I more indebted than to Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, who has permitted me to con- sult the official records of his Department — a privi- lege which has enabled me to make much better use of the more private materials in my possession. No one, however, can know better or feel more strongly than myself, that much matter of interest contained in the multitudinous papers before me is unrepre- sented in my narrative. But such omissions are the necessities of a history so full of incident as this. If I had yielded h} tlie temptation to use urj illustrative materials more freely, I should have expanded this work beyond all acceptable liinits, London, October, IS 64. . . , For to think that an handful of people can, vmn the GREATEST COURAGE AND POLICY IN THE WORLD, EMBRACE TOO LARGE EX- TENT OF DOMINION, IT MAY HOLD FOR A TIME, BUT IT WILL FAIL SUDDENLY. — Bacon. ... As FOR MERCENARY FORCES (WHICH IS THE HELP IN THIS CASE), ALL EXAMPLES SHOW THAT, WHATSOEVER ESTATE, OR PRINCE, DOTH REST UPON THEM, HE MAY SPREAD HIS FEATHERS FOR A TIME, BUT HE WILL MEW THEM SOON AFTER. — BaCOn. If THERE BE FUEL PREPARED, IT IS HARD TO TELL WHENCE THE SPARK SHALL COME THAT SHALL SET IT ON FIRE. ThE MATTER OF SEDITIONS IS OF TWO KINDS, MUCH POVERTY AND MUCH DISCONTENTMENT. It IS CERTAIN, SO MANY OVERTHROWN ESTATES, SO MANY VOTES FOR TROUBLES. . . . ThE CAUSES AND MOTIVES FOR SEDITION ARE, INNOVATIONS IN RELIGION, TAXES, ALTERATION OF LAWS AND CUSTOMS, BREAKING OF PRIVILEGES, GENERAL OPPRESSION, ADVANCEMENT OF UNWORTHY PERSONS, STRANGERS, DEATHS, DISBANDED SOLDIERS, FACTIONS GROWN DESPERATE ; AND WHATSOEVER IN OFFENDING PEOPLE JOINETH AND KNITTETH THEM IN A COMMON CAUSE.— Bacon. mSTORY OF THE SEPOY WAR. BOOK I.— INTEODUCTOET. [1846—1856.] CHAPTER L THE ADMIN ISTRATIOX OF LORD DALHOUSIE — HIS FAREWELL MINUTE — BETROSPECT OF THE FIRST SIKH WAR — THE MILITARY OCCUPATION O^ THE PUNJAB — THE COUNCIL OF REGENCY — THE SECOND SIKH WAR — THE ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAB — ITS ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE LAWRENCES — THE CONQUEST OF PEGU. Broken in bodily health, but not enfeebled in spirit, 186G. by eight years of anxious toil, beneath an Indian sun, Lord Dalhousie laid down the reins of govern- ment and returned to his native country to die. Since the reign of Lord Wellesley, so great in written history, so momentous in practical results, there had been no such administration as that of Lord Dalhousie ; there had been no period in the annals of the Anglo- Indian Empire surcharged with such great political events, none which nearly approached it in the rapidity of its administrative progress. Peace and War had yielded their fruits with equal profusion. On the eve of resigning his high trust to the hands of another, Lord Dalhousie drew up an elaborate state- B 2 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1856. paper reviewing the eventful years of his government. He had reason to rejoice in the retrospect ; for he had acted in accordance with the faith that was within him, honestly and earnestly working out his cherished principles, and there was a bright flush of success over all the apparent result. Peace and prosperity smiled upon the empire. That empire he had vastly extended, and by its extension he believed that he had consolidated our rule and imparted additional security to our tenure of the country. Of these great successes some account should be given at the outset of such a narrative as this ; for it is only by understanding and appreciating them that we can rightly estimate the subsequent crisis. It was in the Punjab and in Oude that many of the most important incidents of that crisis occurred. Lord Dalhousie found them Foreign States ; he left them British Provinces. 1845-d6. Lord Hardinge conquered the Sikhs ; but he spared First occupa- the Punjab. Moderate in victory as resolute in war, tion ot tlie -j^Q i^f^ ^^Q empire of Runjeet Singh, shorn only of its outlying provinces, to be governed by his successors, and strove to protect the boy-prince against the law- lessness of his own soldiers. But it was felt that this forbearance was only an experimental forbearance; and the proclamation which announced the restora- tion of the Punjab to the Maharajah Duleep Singh sounded also a note of warning to the great military autocracy which had well-nigh overthrown the State. " If this opportunity," said the victor, " of rescuing the Sikh nation from military anarchy and misrule be neglected, and hostile opposition to the British army be renewed, the Government of India will make such THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF LAHORE. 3 Other arrangements for the future government of the 1846. Punjab as the interests and security of the British power may render just and expedient." Thus was the doubt expressed; thus were the consequences fore- shadowed. It did not seem likely that the experi- ment would succeed; but it was not less right to make it. It left the future destiny of the empire, under Providence, for the Sikhs themselves to deter- mine. It taught them how to preserve their national independence, and left them to work out the problem with their own hands. But Hardinge did more than this. He did not interfere with the internal administration, but he esta- blished a powerful military protectorate in the Punjab. He left the Durbar to govern the country after its own fashion, but he protected the Government against the lawless domination of its soldiery. The Sikh army was overawed by the presence of the British battalions ; and if the hour had produced the man — if there had been any wisdom, any love of country, in the councils of the nation — the Sikh Empire might have survived the great peril of the British military protectorate. But there was no one worthy to rule ; no one able to govern. The mother of the young Maharajah was nominally the Regent. There have been great queens in the East as in the AVest — women who have done for their people what men have been incapable of doing. But the mother of Duleep Singh was not one of these. To say that she loved herself better than her country is to use in courtesy the mildest words, which do not actually violate truth. She was, indeed, an evil presence in the nation. It rested with her to choose a minister, and the choice which she made was another great suicidal blow struck at the life of the Sikh Empire. It may have been difficult in this u 2 4 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. IS4G, emergency to select the riglit man, for, in truth, there were not many wise men from whom a selection could be made. The Queen-Mother cut through the difficulty by selecting her paramour. Lai Singh was unpopular with the Durbar ; un- popular with the people ; and he failed. He might have been an able and an honest man, and yet have been found wanting in such a conjuncture. But he was probably the worst man in the Punjab on whom the duty of reconstructing a strong Sikh Government could have devolved. To do him justice, there were great difficulties in his way. He had to replenish an exhausted treasury by a course of unpopular retrench- ments. Troops were to be disbanded and Jagheers resumed. Lai Singh was not the man to do this, as one bowing to a painful necessity, and sacrificing himself to the exigencies of the State. Even in a coun- try where political virtue was but little understood, a course of duty consistently pursued for the benefit of the nation might have ensured for him some sort of respect. But whilst he was impoverishing others, he was enriching himself. It was not the public treasury, but the private purse that he sought to re- plenish, and better men were despK)iled to satisfy the greed of his hungry relatives and friends. Vicious among the vicious, he lived but for the indulgence of his own appetites, and ruled but for his own aggran- disement. The favourite of the Queen, he was the oppressor of the People. And though he tried to dazzle his British guests by rare displays of courtesy towards them, and made himself immensely popular among all ranks of the Army of Occupation by his incessant efforts to gratify them, he could not hide the one great patent fact, that a strong Sikh Government THE FALL OF LAL SLXGII. 5 could never be established under the wuzeerat of Lai ]84G. Singh. But the British were not responsible for the failure. The Regent chose him ; and, bound by treaty not to exercise any interference in the internal administra- tion of the Lahore State, the British Government had only passively to ratify the choice. But it was a state of things burdened with evils of the most obtrusive kind. We were upholding an unprincipled ruler and an unprincipled minister at the point of our British bayonets, and thus aiding them to commit iniquities which, without such external support, they would not have long been suifered to perpetrate. The com- pact, however, was but for the current year; and even for that brief period there seemed but little pro- bability of Lai Singh tiding over the difficulties and dangers which beset his position. Very soon his treachery undid him. False to his own country, he was false also to the British Govern- ment. The province of Cashmere, which was one of the outlying dependencies taken by the British in pay- ment of the war-charges, had been made over to Gholab Singh, chief of the great Jummoo family, who had paid a million of money for the cession. But the transfer had been resisted by the local governor, who had ruled the province under the Sikh Rajahs, and covertly Lai Singh had encouraged the resistance. The nominal oiFender was brought to public trial, but Dec. 18 1ft. it was felt that the real criminal was Lai Singh, and that upon the issue of the inquiry depended the fate of the minister. It was soon apparent that he was a traitor, and that the other, though for intelligible reasons of his own, reluctant to render an account of his stewardship, was little more than a tool in his 6 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. IS4G. hands. The disoTace of the mmister was the im- o mediate result of the investigation. He left the Durbar tent a prisoner under a guard, an hour before his own body-guard, of Sikh soldiers ; and the great seal of the Maharajah was placed in the hands of the British Resident. So fell Lai Singh ; and so fell also the first experiment to reconstruct a strong Sikh Government on a basis of national independence. Another experiment was then to be tried. There was not a native of the country to whose hands the destinies of the empire could be safely entrusted. Tf the power of the English conqueror were demanded to overawe the turbulent military element, English Avisdom and English integrity were no less needed, in that conjuncture, to quicken and to purify the corrupt councils of the State. Sikh statesmanship, protected against the armed violence of the Praetorian bands, which had overthrown so many ministries, had been fairly tried, and had been found miserably wanting. A purely native Government was not to be hazarded again. Averse as Hardinge had been, and still was, to sanction British interference in the internal ad- ministration of the Punjab, there was that in the com- plications before him which compelled him to over- come his reluctance. The choice, indeed, lay between a half measure, which might succeed, though truly there was small hope of success, and the total abandon- ment of the country to its own vices, which would have been speedily followed, in self-defence, by our direct assumption of the Government on our own account. Importuned by the Sikh Durbar, in the name of the Maharajah, Hardinge tried the former course. The next effort, therefore, to save the Sikh Empire from self-destruction, embraced the idea of a native Government, presided over by a British states- HENRY LAWRENCE. 7 man. A Ccitlicil of Regency was instituted, to be 1846. composed of Sikh chiefs, under the superintendence and control of the Resident ; or, in other words, the British Resident became the virtual ruler of the country. And this time the choice, or rather the accident, of the man was as propitious, as before it had been untoward and perverse. The English officer possessed well-nigh all the qualities which the Sikh Sirdar so deplorably lacked. A captain of the Bengal Artillery, holding the higher rank of colonel by brevet for good service, Henry Lawrence had graduated in Punjabee diplomacy under George Clerk, and had accompanied to Caubul the Sikh Contingent, attached to Pollock's 1842. retributory force, combating its dubious fidelity, and controlling its predatory excesses on the way. After the return of the expedition to the British provinces, he had been appointed to represent our interests in Nepaul ; and there — for there was a lull in the san- guinary intrigues of that semi-barbarous Court — im- mersed in his books, and turning to good literary pur- pose his hours of leisure, he received at Catamandoo intelligence of the Sikh invasion, and of the death of George Broadfoot, and was summoned to take the place of that lamented officer as the agent of the Govern or- General on the frontier. In the negotiations which followed the conquest of the Khalsa army, he had taken the leading part, and, on the restoration of peace, had been appointed to the office of British Resident, or Minister, at Lahore, under the first ex- periment of a pure Sikh Government hedged in by British troops. If the character of the man thus placed at the head of afi^airs could have secured the success of this great compromise, it would have been successful far beyon'^ 8 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1846. the expectations of its projectors. For no man ever undertook a high and important trust with a more solemn sense of his responsibility, or ever, with more singleness of purpose and more steadfast sincerity of heart, set himself to work, with God's blessing, to turn a great opportunity to great account for the benefit of his fellows. In Henry Lawrence a pure transparent nature, a simple manliness and truthful- ness of character, were combined with b'gh intel- lectual powers, and personal energies which nothing earthly could subdue. I may say it here, once for all, at the very outset of my story, that nowhere does this natural simplicity and truthfulness of character so often as in India survive a long career of public service. In that country public men are happily not exposed to the pernicious influences which in England shrivel them so fast into party leaders and parlia- mentary chiefs. With perfect singleness of aim and pure sincerity of purpose, they go, with level eyes, straight at the public good, never looking up in fear at the suspended sword of a parliamentary majority, and never turned aside by that fear into devious paths of trickery and finesse. It may be that ever since the days of Clive and Omichund an unsavoury odour has pervaded the reputation of Oriental dij)lomacy ; but the fact is, that our greatest successes have been achieved by men incapable of deceit, and by means which have invited scrutiny. When we have opposed craft to craft, and have sought to out-juggle our op- ponents, the end has been commonly disastrous. It is only by consummate honesty and transparent truth- fulness that the Talleyrands of the East have been beaten by such mere children in the world's ways as ]\Iountstuart Elphinstone, Charles Metcalfe, James Outram, and Henry Lawrence. HENRY LAWPvENCE. y Henry La^vrence, indeed, was wholly without guile. 1846. He had great shrewdness and sagacity of character, and he could read and understand motives, to which his own breast was a stranger, for he had studied well the Oriental character. But he was singularly open and unreserved in all his dealings, and would rather have given his antagonist an advantage than have condescended to any small arts and petty trickeries to secure success. All men, indeed, trusted him ; for they knew that there was nothing selfish or sordid about him ; that the one desire of his heart was to benefit the people of the country in which it had pleased God to cast his lot. But he never suffered this plea of beneficence to prevail against his sense of justice. He was eminently, indeed, a just man, and altogether incapable of that casuistry which gives a gloss of humanity to self-seeking, and robs people for their own s'ood. He did not look upon the mis- government of a na.tive State as a valid reason for the absorption of its revenues, but thought that British power might be exercised for the protection of the oppressed, and British wisdom for the instruction and reformation of their oppressors, without adding a few more thousand square miles to the area of our British possessions, and a few more millions of people to the great muster-roll of British subjects in the East. Above the middle height, of a spare, gaunt frame, and a worn face bearing upon it the traces of mental toil and bodily suffering, he impressed you, at first sight, rather with a sense of masculine energy and resolution than of any milder and more endearing qualities. But when you came to know him, you saw at once that beneath that rugged exterior there was a heart gentle as a woman's, and you recognised in his words and in his manner the kindliness of nature 10 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1846. which won the affection of all who came within its reach, and by its large and liberal manifestations made his name a very household word with thousands, who had never felt the pressure of his hand or stood in his living presence. But, with all this, though that name was in men's mouths and spoken in many languages, no unknown subaltern had a more lowly mind or a more unassuming deportment. Such was the man who now found himself the virtual sovereign of the empire of Runjeet Singh. The new protectorate, established at the end of 1846, gave to Henry Lawrence "unlimited authority," "to direct and control every department of the State." He. was to be assisted in this great work by an efficient establishment of subordinates, but it was no part of the design to confer upon them the executive manage- ment of affairs. The old officers of the Sikh Govern- ment were left to carry on the administration, guided and directed by their British allies. Under such a system corruption and oppression could no longer run riot over the face of the land. It was a protectorate for the many, not for the few; and for a while it seemed that all classes Avere pleased with the arrange- ment. Outwardly, indeed, it did not seem that feel- ings of resentment against the British Government were cherished by any persons but the Queen-Mother and her degraded paramour. IS4.7. And so, in the spring of 1847, the political horizon was almost unclouded. The Council of Regency, under the control of Henry La^vrence, seemed to be carrying on the government with a sincere desire to secure a successful result. Tranquillity had been re* stored ; confidence and order weT(3 fast returning. The Sikh soldiery appeared to be contented with their ELEMENTS OF DANGER. 11 lot, and to be gradually acquiring habits of discipline 1S47. and obedience, under a system which rendered them dependent on the British officers for whatever most promoted their interests and contributed to their comforts. But it did not escape the sagacious mind of the Resident, that serene as was the aspect of affairs, and promising as were the indications of con- tinued repose, there were, beneath all this surface- calm, dangerous elements at work, waiting only for time and circumstance to call them into full activity. The memory of frequent defeat was still too fresh in the minds of the humbled Khalsa to suffer them to indulge in visions of at once re-acquiring their lost supremacy. But as time passed and the impression waxed fainter and fainter, it was well-nigh certain that the old hopes would revive, and that outbursts of desperate Asiatic zeal might be looked for in quarters where such paroxysms had long seemed to be necessary to the very existence of a lawless and tumultuous class. It is a trick of our self-love — of our national vanity — to make us too often delude ourselves with the belief that British supremacy must be welcome wheresoever it obtrudes itself. But Henry Lawrence did not deceive himself in this wise. He frankly admitted that, however benevolent our motives, and however conciliatory our demeanour, a British army could not garrison Lahore, and a British func- tionary supersede the Sikh Durbar, without exciting bitter discontents and perilous resentments. He saw around him, struggling for existence, so many high officers of the old Sikh armies, so many favourites of the old line of Wuzeers now cast adrift upon the world, without resources and without hope under the exist- ing system, that when he remembered their lawless 12 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. IS47. habits, their headstrong folly, their desperate suicidal zeal, he could but wonder at the perfect peace which then pervaded the land. But whatsoever might be taking shape in the future, the present was a season of prosperity — a time of promise — and the best uses were made by the British functionaries of the continued calm. Interference in the civil administration of the country was exercised only when it could be turned to the very apparent advantage of the people. British authority and British integrity were then employed in the settlement of long-unsettled districts, and in the development of the resources of long-neglected tracts of country. The subordinate officers thus employed under the Resident were few, but they were men of no common ability and energy of character — soldiers such as Edwardes, Nicholson, Reynell Taylor, Lake, Lumsden, Becher, George Lawrence, and James Abbott ; civilians such as Vans Agnew and Arthur Cocks — men, for the most part, whose deeds will find ample record in these pages. They had unbounded confidence in their chief, and their chief had equal confidence in them. Acting, with but few exceptions, for the majority were soldiers, in a mixed civil and military character, they associated with all classes of the community ; and alike by their courage and their integrity they sustained the high character of the nation they re- presented. One common spirit of humanity seemed to animate the Governor-General, the Resident, and his Assistants. A well-aimed blow was struck at infanticide, at Suttee, and at the odious traffic in female slaves. In the agricultural districts, a system of enforced labour, which had pressed heavily on the ryots, was soon also in course of abolition. The weak were everywhere T>^oi^''«ted against the strong. An FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORTS. 13 entire revision of the judicial and revenue systems of 1847. the country — if systems they can be called, where system there was none — was attempted, and with good success. New customs rules were prepared, by which the people were greatly gainers. Every legiti- mate means of increasing the revenue, and of con- trolling unnecessary expenditure, were resorted to, and large savings were eiFected at no loss of efficiency in any department of the State. The cultivators were en- couraged to sink wells, to irrigate their lands, and otherwise to increase the productiveness of the soil, alike to their own advantage and the profit of the State. And whilst everything was thus being done to advance the general prosperity of the people, and to ensure the popularity of British occupation among the industrial classes, the Army was propitiated by the introduction of new and improved systems of pay and pension, and taught to believe that what they had lost in opportunities of plunder, and in irregular largesses, had been more than made up to them by certainty and punctuality of payment, and the interest taken by the British officers in the general welfare of their class. As the year advanced, these favourable appearances rather improved than deteriorated. In June, the Resident reported that a large majority of the dis- banded soldiers had returned to the plough or to trade, and that the advantages of British influence to the cultivating classes were every day becoming more apparent. But still Lawrence clearly discerned the fact that although the spirit of insurrection was at rest in the Punjab, it was not yet dead. There were sparks flying about here and there, which, alighting on combustible materials, might speedily excite a blaze. " If every Sirdar and Sikh in the Punjab," he 14 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1847. wrote, with the candour and good sense which are so conspicuous in all his communications, " were to avow himself satisfied with the humbled position of his country, it would be the extreme of infatuation to believe him, or to doubt for a moment that among the crowd who are loudest in our praise there are many who cannot forgive our victory, or even our forbearance, and who chafe at their own loss of power in exact proportion as they submit to ours." People were not wanting even then, in our camp, to talk with ominous head-shakings of the " Caubul Catastrophe," and to predict all sorts of massacres and misfortunes. But there was no parallel to be drawn between the two cases, for an overweening sense of security had not taken possession of the British functionaries at Lahore. They had not brought themselves to believe that the country was "" settled," or that British occu- pation was " popular" among the chiefs and people of the Punjab. With God's blessing they were doing their best to deserve success, but they knew well that they might some day see the ruin of their hopes, the failure of their experiments, and they were prepared, in the midst of prosperity, at any hour to confront disaster. Even then, fair as was the prospect before us, there was one great blot upon the landscape ; for whilst the restless nature of the Queen-Mother- was solacing itself with dark intrigues, there was a continual source of disquietude to disturb the mind of the Resident with apprehensions of probable outbreaks and seditions. She hated the British with a deadly hatred. They had deprived her of power. They had torn her lover from her arms. They were training her son to be- come a puppet in their hands. To foment hostility against them, .wheresoever there seemed to be any BANISHMENT OF THE MAHARANEE 15 hope of successful revolt, and to devise a plot for the 1847. murder of the Resident, were among the cherished objects by which she sought to gratify her malice. But she could not thus labour in secret. Her schemes were detected, and it was determined to remove her fix)m Lahore. The place of banishment was Sheiko- poor, in a quiet part of the country, and in the midst of a Mussulman population. When the decision was communicated to her by her brother, she received it with apparent indifference. She was not one to give her enemies an advantage by confessing her wounds and bewailing her lot. She uttered no cry of pain, but said that she was ready for anything, and at once prepared for the journey. The autumn passed quietly away. But an im- portant change was impending. Lord Ilardinge was about to lay down the reins of government, and Colonel Lawrence to leave the Punjab for a time. The health of the latter had long been failing. He had tried in August and September the effect of the bracing hill air of Simlah. It had revived him for a while, but his medical attendants urged him to resort to the only remedy which could arrest the progress of disease ; and so, with extreme reluctance, he con- sented to quit his post, and to accompany Lord Hardinge to England. He went ; and Sir Frederick Currie, a public servant of approved talent and in- tegrity, who, in the capacity of Political Secretary, had accompanied the Govern or- General to the banks of the Sutlej, and who had been subsequently created a baronet and appointed a member of the Supreme Council of India, was nominated to act as Resident in his place. Meeting the stream of European revolution as they journeyed homewards, Hardinge and Lawrence came 16 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1848. overland to England in the early spring of 1848. Brief space is allowed to me for comment ; but before I cease to write Lord Hardinge's name in connexion with Sikh politics and history, I must give expression, if orly in a single sentence, to the admiration mth whioli I regard his entire policy towards the Punjab. It was worthy of a Christian warrior : it was worthy of a Christian statesman. It is in no wise to be judged by results, still less by accidents not assign- able to errors inherent in the original design. What Hardin ge did, he did because it Avas right to do it. His forbearance under provocation, his moderation in the hour of victory foreshadowed the humanity of his subsequent measures. It was his one desire to render British connexion with the Punjab a blessing to the Sikhs, without destroying their national inde- pendence. The spirit of Christian philanthropy moved at his bidding over the whole face of the country — not the mere image of a specious benevolence dis- guising the designs of our ambition and the impulses of our greed, but an honest, hearty desire to do good without gain, to save an Empire, to reform a people, and to leave behind us the marks of a hand at once gentle and pow^erful — gentle to cherish and powerful only to sustain. conquest of The portfolio of the Indian Government now passed unjab. jj^^^ ^YiQ hands of Lord Dalhousie, a young statesman of high promise, who, in the divisions of party politics at home, had been ranged among the followers of Sir Robert Peel, and professed the newly- developed libe- ralism of that great parliamentary chief. Held in esteem as a man of moderate views, of considerable administrative ability, and more than common assi- LORD DALIIOUSIE. 17 Julty 111 the public service, his brief career as an 1S4\ English statesman seemed to afford good hope that, in the great descriptive roll of Indian Viceroys, his name Avould be recorded as that of a ruler distinguished rather for the utility than for the brilliancy of his ad- ministration. And so, doubtless, it seemed to him- self. What India most wanted at that time was Peace. Left to her repose, even without external aid, she miirht soon have recovered from the effects of a suc- cession of wasting wars. But, cherished and fostered by an unambitious and enlightened ruler, there was good prospect of a future of unexampled prosperity — of great material and moral advancement — of that oft -promised, ever realisable, but still unrealised blessing, the " development of the resources of the country." The country wanted Railroads, and the people Education, and there was good hope that Dal- housie would give them both. When he looked beyond the frontier he saw that everything was quiet. The new year had dawned auspiciously on the Punjab. The attention of the British functionaries, ever earnest and active in well- doing — for the disciples of Henry Lawrence had caught much of the zealous humanity of their master — was mainly directed to the settlement of the Land Revenue and the improvement of the judicial system of the country. They had begun codifying in good earnest, and laws, civil and criminal, grew apace under their hands. In a state of things so satisfactory as this there was little to call for special remark, and the Governor-General, in his letters to the Home Government, contented himself with the simple ob- servation, that he "forwarded papers relating to the Punjab." But early in May intelligence had reached Uaicutta which impelled him to indite a more stirring G 18 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 18.48. epistle. The Punjab was on the eve of another crisis. In September, 1844, Sawun Mull, the able and energetic Governor* of Mooltan, was shot to death by an assassin. He was succeeded by his son Moolraj, who also had earned for himself the reputation of a chief with just and enlightened views of government, and considerable administrative ability. But he had also a reputation very dangerous in that country : he was reputed to be very rich. Sawun Mull was be- lieved to have amassed immense treasures in Mool- tan ; and on the instalment of his son in the govern- ment, the Lahore Durbar demanded from him a suc- cession-duty f of a million of money. The exorbitant claim was not complied with ; but a compromise was effected, by Avhich Moolraj became bound to pay to Lahore less than a fifth of the required amount. And this sum would have been paid, but for the convul- sions which soon began to rend the countrj^, and the disasters which befel the Durbar. On the re-establishment of the Sikh Government the claim was renewed. It was intimated to the Dewan that if the stipulated eighteen lakhs, with cer- tain amounts due for arrears, were paid into the Lahore Treasury, he would be allowed to continue in charge of Mooltan ; but that if he demurred, troops Avould be sent to coerce him. He refused payment of the money, and troops were accordingly sent against him. Thus threatened, he besought the British Go- vernment to interfere in his favour, and consented to adjust the matter through the arbitration of the Resi- dent. The result was, that he went to Lahore in ihe ♦ I have used the word most in- financial manager or revenue-farmer telligible to ordinary English readers, of the district, with tiie control of but it does not fitly represent tiie the internal administration. office held by the *' Dewan," who was -f Nuzzuraua. AFFAIRS OF MOOLTAN. 19 autumn of 1846 ; promised to pay by instalments the isis. money claimed ; and was mulcted in a portion of the territories from which he had drawn his revenue. The remainder was farmed out to him for a term of three years. With this arrangement he appeared to be satisfied. He was anxious to obtain the guarantee of the British Government ; but his request was refused, and he returned to Mooltan mthout it. For the space of more than a year, Moolraj re- mained in peaceful occupation of the country which had been leased out to him. There was no attempt, on the part of the British functionaries, to interfere with the affairs of Mooltan. That territory was espe- cially exempted from the operation of the revenue settlement, which had taken effect elsewhere, and of the new customs regulations which had been esta- blished in other parts of the Punjab. But the com- pact which had been entered into with the Lahore Durbar did not sit easily Tipon him. He thought, or affected to think, that its terms were too rigorous; and accordingly, about the close of 1847, he repaired to the capital to seek some remission of them. He soon began intriguing with the Durbar for the reduc- tion of the stipulated rents ; and not coming to any satisfactory arrangement, intimated his wish to resign a charge which he had found so little profitable. He was told that his resignation, when formally tendered, would be accepted ; but was recommended to reflect upon the subject before finally coming to a determi- nation, which could not be subsequently revoked. Moolraj quitted Lahore ; and sent in first a somewhat vague, and afterwards a more distinct, resignation of his office ; and the Durbar at once appointed a suc- cessor. Sirdar Kan Singh, who was described as "a brave soldier and intelligent man," was nominated to c 2 20 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALIIOUSIZ. 'ia4S xhe Governorsliip of Mooltan, on a fixed annual salar}'. At the same time, Mr. Vans Agnew, a civil servant of the Company, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the Bombay army, were despatched to Mooltan Avith the new Governor, and an escort of iive hundred men, to receive charge of the place. On their arrival before the city there were no symptoms of any hostile intentions on the part of its occupants. Moolraj him- self waited on the British officers on the 18th of April, and was peremptorily called upon to give in his ac- counts. Disconcerted and annoyed, he quitted their presence, but next morning he met them with a calm aspect, and conducted them through the fort. Two companies of Goorkhas and some horsemen of the escort were placed in possession of one of the fort-gates. The crisis was now at hand. Moolraj formally gave over charge of the fort ; and as the party retired through the gate, the British officers were suddenly attacked and severely wounded. Mool- raj, who was riding with them at the time, offered no assistance, but, setting spurs to his horse, galloped off in the direction of his garden-house, whilst the wounded officers were carried to their own camp by Kan Singh and a party of the Goorkhas. In the course of the following day all the Mooltanee troops were in a state of open insurrection. Moolraj himself, who may not have been guilty in the first in- stance of an act of premeditated treachery, and who subsequently pleaded that he was coerced by liis troops, sent excuses to Vans Agnew, who, with the generous confidence of youth, acquitted him of all participation in the outrage. But he was soon heart and soul in the work ; and his emissaries plied their trade of corruption with unerring effect. Before nightfall, the commandant of the escort, ^vith all his MURDER OF AGNEW AND ANDERSON. 21 men, went over to tlie enemy. The building in which 1848. the wounded officers lay was surrounded. A motley crew of ruffians — soldiers and citizens — men of all classes, young and old, moved by one common im- pulse, one great thirst of blood, came yelling and shouting around the abode of the doomed Ferin ghees. In they rushed, with a savage cr}^, and surrounded their victims. The wounded officers lay armed on their beds, and helpless, hopeless as they were, put on the bold front of intrepid Englishmen, and were heroes to the last. Having shaken hands, and bade each other a last farewell, they turned upon their assailants as best they could; but overpowered by numbers, they fell, declaring in the prophetic lan- guage of death, that thousands of their countrymen would come to avenge them. The slaughter tho- roughly accomplished, the two bodies were dragged out of the mosque, and barbarously mutilated by the murderers, with every indignity that malice could devise. Irretrievably committed in the eyes both of our coun- trymen and his own, Moolraj now saw that there was no going back ; he had entered, whether designedly or not, on a course which admitted of no pause, and left no time for reflection. All the dormant energies of his nature were now called into full activity. He took command of the insurgents — identified himself with their cause — bestowed largesses upon the men who had been most active in the assault upon the British officers, retained all who would take service with him, laid in stores, collected money, and ad- dressed letters to other chiefs urging them to resist- ance. He had never been looked upon by others — :iever regarded himself — as a man to become the leader of a great national movement ; but now circumstances '22 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. ^^^-* had done for him what he would never willingly have shaped out for himself; so he bowed to fate, and be- came a hero. Thus was the second Sikh War commenced. Out- wardly, it was but the revolt of a local government — the rebellion of an officer of the Sikh State against the sovereign power of the land. But, rightly con- sidered, it was of far deeper significance. Whether Moolraj had been incited to resistance by the prompt- ings of a spirit far more bitter in its resentments, and more active in its malignity than his own, is not very apparent. But it is certain that when he raised the standard of rebellion at Mooltan, he did but antici- pate a movement for which the whole country was ripe. Already had ominous reports of ill-concealed disaffection come in from some of the outlying dis- tricts, and though the mortifying fact was very re- luctantly believed, it is certain that the state of things which Henry Lawrence had predicted was already a present reality, and that the Sikhs, chafing under the irritating interference of the European stranger, were about to make a common effort to expel him. A finer body of officers than those employed under the British Resident in the Punjab seldom laboured for the good of a people. That they worked, earnestly and assi- duously, animated by the purest spirit of Christian benevolence, is not to be doubted. But it was not in the nature of thinas that even if the thino- done had been palatable to the Sikhs, they would have reconciled themselves to the doers of it. Habituated to rule in all parts of the world, and to interfere in the affairs of people of all colours and creeds, Eng- lishmen are slow to familiarise themselves with the idea of the too probable unpopularity of their inter- ference They think that if they mean well tliey must secure confidence. They do not consider that FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE EFFORTS. 23 our beneficent ways may not be more in accordance 18^8, with the national taste than our round hats and stiff neckcloths ; and that even if they were, alien inter- ference must in itself be utterly distasteful to them. It is not to be doubted, I say, that the young Eng- lishmen first employed in the Punjab laboured earn- estly for the good of the people ; but their very pre- sence was a sore in the flesh of the nation, and if they had been endowed with superhuman wisdom and angelic benevolence, it would have made no differ- ence in the sum total of popular discontent. But it is probable that some mistakes were com- mitted — the inevitable growth of benevolent igno- rance and energetic inexperience — at the outset of our career as Punjabee administrators. The inter- ference appears to have been greater than was con- templated in the original design of the Second Pro- tectorate. At that time the God Terminus was held by many of our administrators in especial veneration. The Theodolite, the Reconnoitring Compass, and the Measuring Chain were the great emblems of British rule. And now these mysterious instruments began to make their appearance in the Punjab. We were taking sights and measuring angles on the outskirts of civilisation ; and neither the chiefs nor the people could readily persuade themselves that we were doing all this for their good ; there was an appear- ance in it of ulterior design. And, as I have hinted, the agents employed were sometimes wholly inexperienced in business of this kind. *' My pre- sent role^' wrote a young ensign* of two years' standing in the service, whose later exploits will be recorded in these pages, "is to survey a part * W. R. Hodson (" Ilodson of the fate of Anderson at Mooltan, for Hodson's Horse"), Januar}-, 1848. he had been selected in the first in» This young officer narrowly escaped stance to accompany Vans Agnew. 24: THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALIIOUSIE. 1548. of the country lying along the left bank of the Ravee and below the hills, and I am daily and all day at work with compasses and chain, pen and pencil, following streams, diving into valleys, bur- ro Aving into hills, to complete my work. I need hardly remark, that having never attempted anything of the kind, it is bothering at iirst. I should not be surprised any day to be told to build a ship, compose a code of laws, or hold assizes. In fact, 'tis the way in India ; every one has to teach himself his work, and to do it at the same time." Training of this kind has made the finest race of officers that the world has ever seen. But the novitiate of these men may have teemed with blunders fatal to the people among whom they were sent, in all the self-confidence of youth, to learn their diversities of work. As they advance in years, and every year know better how difficult a thing it is to administer the afi'airs of a foreign people, such public servants often shudder to think of the errors committed, of the wrong done, when they served their apprenticeship in government without a master, and taught themselves at the expense of thousands. The most experienced administrators in the present case might have failed from the want of a right understanding of the temper of the people. But it was the necessity of our position that some who were set over the officers of the Sikh Govern- ment knew little of the people and little of adminis- tration. They were able, indefatigable, and con- scientious. They erred only because they saw too much and did too much, and had not come to under- stand the wise policy of shutting their eyes and leaving alone. And so, although the rebellion of jMoolraj was at first only a local outbreak, and the British autho- rities were well disposed to regard it as a movement EVILS OF DELAY. 25 against the Sikh Government, not as an oatrage espe- 1818. cially directed against ourselves, that fiction could not be long maintained — for every day it became more and more apparent that the whole country was ripe for another war with the intruding Feringhee. The Dur- bar officers did not hesitate to express their conviction that to send Sikh troops to act against Moolraj would only be to swell the number of his adherents. To have despatched with them a small English force would have been to risk its safety and precipitate the conflict. An overwhelming display of force, on the part of the British Government, might have crushed the rebellion at Mooltan and retarded the general rising of the country. But the season was far advanced ; the responsibility was a great one. The Commander-in-Chief of the British army in India was not far distant. Currie, therefore, though his own judgment inclined to the commencement of im- mediate hostilities, rightly referred the momentous question to the military chief. Lord Gough was JT® against immediate action ; and the head of the In- dian Government unreservedly endorsed the de- cision. The remnant of the old Khalsa army eagerly watched the result, and were not slow to attribute our in- activity, at such a moment, to hesitation — to fear — to paralysis. I am not writing a military history of the Second Sikh War, and the question now suggested is one which I am not called upon to discuss. But I think that promptitude of action is often of more im- portance than completeness of preparation, and that to shoAv ourselves confident of success is in most cases to attain it. The British power in India cannot afford to be quiescent under insult and outrage. De- lay is held to be a sign of weakness. It encourages enmity and confirms vacillation. It is a disaster in 26 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1848. itself — more serious, often, than any that can arise from insufficient preparation, and that great bugbear the inclemency of the season. On the other hand, it is not to be forgotten that to despise our enemies is a common national mistake, and that sometimes it has been a fatal one. We have brought calamities on ourselves by our rashness as we have by our Indecision. The History of India teems with ex- amples of both results ; the most profitable lesson to be learnt from which is, that, however wise we may be after the event, criticism in such a case ought to be diffident and forbearing. But whilst the Commander-in-Chief, in the cool mountain air of Simlah, was deciding on the impossi- bility of commencing military operations, a young lieutenant of the Bengal army, who had been engaged in the Revenue settlement of the country about Bun- noo, was marching down upon Mooltan with a small body of troops, to render assistance to his brother- officers in their perilous position, and to support the authority of the Lahore Durbar. A letter from Vans Agnew, dictated by the Avounded man, had pro- videntially fallen into his hands. He saw at once the emergency of the case ; he never hesitated ; but aban- doning all other considerations, improvised the best force that could be got together, and, with fifteen hundred men and two pieces of artillery, marched forth in all the eager confidence of youth, hoping that it might be his privilege to rescue his country- men from the danger that beset them. The name of this young officer was Herbert Ed- wardes. A native of Frodley, in Shropshire, the son of a country clergyman, educated at King's College, London, he had entered the Company's service as a cadet of infantry, at an age somewhat more advanced HERBERT EDWARBES. .?7 than that which sees the initiation into military life lS4i of the majority of young ofiicers. But at an age much earlier than that which commonly places them in possession of the most superficial knowledge of the history and politics of the East, young Edwardes had acquired a stock of information, and a capacity for judging rightly of passing events, which would have done no discredit to a veteran soldier and diplomatist, He had served but a few years, when his name be- came familiar to English readers throughout the Pre- sidency to which he belonged, as one of the ablest anonymous writers in the country. His literary talents, like his military qualities, were of a bold, earnest, impulsive character. Whatever he did, he did rapidly and well. He was precisely the kind of man to attract the attention and retain the favour of such an officer as Henry Lawrence, who, with the same quiet love of literature, combined a keen appre- ciation of that energy and fire of character which shrink from no responsibility, and are ever seeking to find an outlet in dashing exploits. In one of the earliest and most striking scenes of the Punjabee drama, Edwardes had acted a distinguished part. When the insurrection broke out in Cashmere, he Avas despatched to Jummoo, to awaken Gholab Singh to a sense of his duty in that conjuncture ; and there are few more memorable and impressive incidents in Sikh history than that which exhibited a handful of British officers controlling the movements of large bodies of foreign troops, — the very men, and under the very leaders, who, so short a time before, had contested with us on the banks of the Sutlej the sovereignty of Hindostan. On the reconstruction of the Sikh Government, after the deposition of Lai Singh, Herbert Edwardes 28 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALIIOUSIE. 1848. was one of the officers selected to superintend tKe internal administration of the country ; and he had just completed the Revenue settlement of Bunnoo, when the startling intelligence of the Mooltanee outbreak reached his camp. He marched at once to succour his brother-officers ; crossed the Indus, and took pos- session of Leia, the chief city in the Sindh Saugor Doab. But tidings by this time had reached him of the melancholy fate of Agnew and Anderson, and there was then no profit in the immediate movement on Mooltan to compensate lor its certain danger. But the demonstration still had its uses. It was something that there was a force in the field with a British officer at the head of it to assert the cause of order and au- thority in the name of the Maharajah of the Punjab. Such a force might, for a time at least, hold rebellion in check in that part of the country. But Edwardes dreamt of higher service than this. To the south of Mooltan, some fifty miles, lies Bahwulpore, in the chief of which place we believed that we had a staunch ally. In the name of the British Government, Edwardes called upon him to move an auxiliary force upon Mooltan ; and he had little doubt that, after forming a junction with these troops, he could capture the rebel stronghold. The confidence of the young soldier, stimulated by a victory which he gained over a large body of rebels on the great anni- versary of Waterloo, saw no obstacle to this enterprise which could not be overcome if the Resident would only send him a few heavy guns and mortars, and Major Napier, of the Engineers, to direct the opera- tions of the siege. He knew the worth of such a man in such a conjuncture, and every year that has since passed has made him prouder of the }^outhful forecast which he then evinced. EDWARDES AT MOOLTAN. 29 The Baliwulpore troops were sent, the junction was 134S. formed, and the forces marched down upon Mooltan. Phicing himself at the head of a considerable body of men, the rebel chief went out to give them battle, but was beaten by Edwardes, aided by Van Cortlandt, a European officer in Sikh employ, Avho has since done good service to the British Government, and Edward Lake, a gallant young officer of Bengal Engineers, directing the Bahwulpore column, who has abun- dantly fulfilled, on the same theatre of action, the high promise of his youth. But much as irregular levies, so led, might do in the open field, they were powerless against the walls of Mooltan. Again, there- fore, Edwardes urged upon the Resident the ex- pediency of strengthening his hands, especially in re- spect of the ordnance branches of the service. Only send a siege train, some Sappers and Miners, with Robert Napier to direct the siege, and — this time, for the difficulties of the work had assumed larger pro- portions in his eyes — a few regular regiments, under a young brigadier, and we shall "close," he said, " Moolraj's accounts in a fortnight, and obviate the necessity of assembling fifty thousand men in October." In the early part of July this requisition was re- ceived at Lahore. The interval which had elapsed, since the disastrous tidings of the rebellion of Moolraj had reached the Residency, had not been an unevent- ful one at the capital. Early in May, discovery was made of an attempt to corrupt the fidelity of our British Sepoys. The first intimation of the plot was received from some troopers of the 7th Irregular Cavalry, who communicated the circumstance to their commanding officer. The principal conspirators were one Kan Singh, an unemployed general of the Sikh army, and Gunga Ram, the confidential Vakeel of the 30 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. IS 18. Maharanee. These men, and two others, were seized, tried, and convicted. The two chief conspirators were publicly hanged, and their less guilty associates transported. That they were instruments of the Maharanee was sufficiently proved. The conspirators acknowledged that she was the prime instigator of the treacherous attempt, and her letters were found in their possession. With this knowledge, it could no longer be a question with the Resident as to what course it behoved him to adopt. The mother of the Maharajah and the widow of Ruiijeet Singh could no longer be suffered to dwell among the Sikhs. She had already been removed from Lahore to Sheikopoor. It now became necessary to remove her from the Punjab. Accordingly, certain accredited agents of the Lahore Durbar, accompanied by two British officers, Captain Lumsden and Lieutenant Hodson, were despatched to Sheikopoor, with a mandate under the seal of the Maharajah, directing her re- moval from that place. Without offering any resist- ance, or expressing any dissatisfaction, she placed her- self under the charge of the deputation ; and, when it became clear to her that she was on her way to the British frontier, she desired — not improbably Avith that blended irony and bravado which she so well knew how to employ — that her thanks might be con- veyed to the Resident for removing her to the Com- pany's dominions, out of the reach of the enemies who would destroy her. With a considerable retinue of female attendants, she was conveyed to Ferozepore, and eventually to Benares, where she was placed under the charge of Major George Macgregor, an Artillery officer of high personal character and great diplomatic experience, who had well sustained in the Punjab the brilliant reputation which he had earned at Jellalabad THE RISING OF THE NATIOX. 31 Such was the apparent growth visible at the British 1S43, Residency, recognised in our State-papers, of those three months in the Punjab. But in the hands of a Sikh historian these incidents would form but a small part of the national annals, for all over the country the great chiefs were actively maturing the plan of their emancipation, calling upon all true Sikhs, in the name of the great Founder of their Faith, to exterminate the Christian usurpers, and even those nearest to the throne were among the arch-promoters of the movement. The daughter of Chuttur Singh and the sister of Shere Singh was the betrothed wife of the Maharajah ; but these Sirdars, though anxious to veil their designs until the whole country was ripe for a simultaneous rising, were intriguing and plotting for our overthrow. The former was in the Hazareh, where his fidelity had been for some time suspected by James Abbott — another officer of the Bengal Artillery, friend and comrade of Henry Lawrence, who had been set- tling that part of the country — one of those men whose lot in life it is never to be believed, never to be appreciated, never to be rewarded ; of the true salt of the earth, but of an unrecognised savour ; chivalrous, heroic, but somehow or other never thoroughly emerging from the shade. He was not one to estimate highly the force of the maxim that " speech is silver, silence is gold ;" and his sus- picions are said not to have been acceptable at Lahore. But though it may be good to suspect, it is doubtless good, also, not to appear to suspect. And if Currie, in that conjuncture, had betrayed a want of confi- dence in the Sikh Sirdars, he would have precipitated the collision which it was sound policy to retard. So, whatever may have been his genuine convictions, he 22 TUE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHOUSIE. iHi, still appeared to trust the chiefs of the Regency ; a^id Shere Singh, with a strong body of Sikh troops, wis sent down to Mooltan. It was wise to nnaintain, as long as possible, the semblance of the authority of the Sikh Durbar — wise to keep up the show of sup- pressing a rebellion by the hand of the native Go- vernment. To send down that undeveloped traitor to the great centre of revolt may have been a hazardous experiment, but it was hazardous also to keep him where he was ; and the master-passion of the Sikh soldiery for plunder might have kept his battalions nominally on the side of authority, until they had glutted themselves with the spoils of Mooltan, and pre- parations had, meanwhile, been made in the British provinces for the commencement of military operations on a scale befitting the occasion. But the repeated re- quisitions of Edwardes for British aid at last wrought upon the Resident, and Currie determined to send a force to Mooltan, with a siege-train for the reduction of the fortress. In General Samson Whish, of the Artillery, under whose command the force was de- spatched, there was not literally what Edwardes had asked for — " a young brigadier" — but there was a general officer of unwonted youthfulness of aspect and activity of body, who could sit a horse well, could ride any distance at a stretch, and was gene- rally esteemed to be one of the best artillery officers in the service. This forward movement w^as not countenanced in high places. The Commander-in- Chief shook his head. The Governor-General shook his head. But the Resident had ordered it, and it could not be countermanded, without encourao^inir a belief that there w^as a want of unanimity in British councils. So the besieging force inarched upon Mooltan, .ard THE DEFECTION OF SIIERE SINGH. 25 arrived before the city in higli health and excellent 184a. spirits. On the 5th of September, in the name of the Maharajah and Queen Victoria, the British General summoned, the garrison to surrender. No answer was returned to the summons, and. the siege commenced. But on the 14fe^ when our guns were within breach- ing distance of the walls of the town, Whish, to his bitter mortification, was compelled to abandon the siege. The Sikh force under Shere Singh had gone over to the enemy. This event had long been matter of anxious specu- lation in the British camp, and now took no one by surprise. It was known that the hearts of the soldiery were with Moolraj ; but there was something of a more doubtful character in the conduct of the Rajah himself, who had on more than one occasion testified his zeal and loyalty by voluntary acts of service in our cause. In his ow^n camp, the Khalsa troops said contemptuously, that he was a Mussulman. With Edwardes he was outwardly on the best possible terms ; spoke freely of the conduct of his father, Chuttur Singh ; declared that he washed his hands of all the old man's rebellious projects ; and candidly avowed his mistrust of the Sikh troops. But in all this he was playing a part. He had written to his brother to say that he intended to go over to the enemy on that very 14th of September, and he kept his word to the letter. On the morning of that day, the whole Durbar force sought entrance into the city. Doubtful of the real nature of the movement, Moolraj at first refused them admittance ; but soon satisfied of their intentions, he opened his gates ; the long dreaded and fatal junction was efifected ; and th^. British General was under the mortifying neces- sity of raising the siege of Mooltan. Si THE ADMINISTRATION OF LORD DALHQUSIE. yns. The whole truth was now visible before the world. It was impossible any longer to maintain the fiction of a local rebellion, to pretend that the Lahore Go- vernment, assisted by British troops, was endeavour- ing to coerce a refractory subject. The very heads of that Government were in open hostility to the British, raising the standard of nationality in the name of the Maharajah. It was obvious that the war now about to be waged, was between the Britisli and the Sikhs. Some hope was at one time to be drawn from the fact of long-standing feuds among the different Sikh families. Then there was the not unreasonable conviction that the Mahomedan popu- lation of the Punjab might easily be kept in a state of enmity with the Sikhs. But these assurances soon melted away. Hostile families and hostile religions were content to unite for the nonce against the Feringhees; and the Commander-in-Chief, as the cold weather approached, was gratified by finding that there had been no premature birth of victory — that the work was yet to be done — and that an army of twenty thousand men, under his personal command, was required to take the field. And from that time Mooltan ceased to be the focus of rebellion and the head-quarters of the war. In the Hazareh country Chuttur Singh had thrown off all vestments of disguise, and plunged boldly into the troubled waters that lay before him. The thoughts of Shere Singh soon began to turn towards that quarter — indeed, such had been his desire from the first — and before the second week of October had passed away, he had marched out of Mooltan to join his father. The whole country was now rising against us. Having used the name of the Maharajah, the Sikh leaders were eager to possess themselves of MOVEMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL. 35 the person of tlie boy- King, and but for the vigilance 1811 of the Resident they would have achieved an object which would have added a new element of strength to the national cause. Duleep Singh remained in our hands virtually a prisoner at Lahore. All this time the Govern or- Gen era! was at Cal- cutta, watching from a distance the progress of events, and betraying no eagerness to seize a favour- able opportunity for the conquest of the Punjab. In- deed, it has been imputed to him, as a grave political error, that he did not at an earlier period make due preparation for the inevitable war. But, it would seem that in the summer of 1848, his desire was to recog- nise as long as possible only internal rebellion in the Sikh country — to see, not the rising of a nation against a foreign intruder, but the revolt of a few un- loyal chiefs against their own lawful sovereign. But with the first breath of the cool season there came a truer conception of the crisis, and Lord Dalhousie pre- pared himself for the conflict. " I have wished for peace," he said, at a public entertainment, early in October; "I have longed for it; I have striven for it But if the enemies of India determine to have war, war they shall have, and on my word they shall have it with a vengeance." A few days afterwards he turned his back upon Calcutta, and set his face towards the north-west. All the energies of his mind were then given to the prosecution of the war. The British army destined for the re-conquest of the Punjab assembled at Ferozepore, and crossed the Sutlej in difl'erent detachments. On the 13th of November the head-quarters reached Lahore. At that time it could hardly be said that British influ- ence extended a rood beyond the Residency walls. In all parts of the country the Sikhs had risen against d2 36 THE ADMINISirwATlOii OF LORD DALHOUSIE. 1S48. the great reproacli of the English Occupation. Id many outlying places, on the confines of civilisa- tion, our English officers were holding out. in th( face of every conceivable difficulty and danger, with constancy and resolution most chivalrous, most heroic, hoping only to maintain, by their own per- sonal gallantry, the character of the nation they re- presented. There was, indeed, nothing more to be done. We had ceased to be regarded as allies. S(; eager and so general was the desire to expel thr intruding Feringhee, that the followers of Govincl sank for a time all feelings of national and religion: i animosity against their Afghan neighbours, and in- voked Mahomedan aid from the regions beyond the passes of the Khyber. On the 21st of November, Lord Gough joined the army on the left bank of the Sutlej. A veteran com- mander, who within the space of a few years ha