aass_l 1. Book^£5i£ THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE JOHN FISKE BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 1892 %^ Copyright, 1889, Bt JOHN FISKR All rights reserved. •vlA 1 1908 EIGHTH EDITION. ITie Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. Slectrotyped and Printed hj H. 0. Houghton & Company. CONTENTS. C iAP. PAGE I. Introduction 1 II. The Colonies in 1750 4 III. The French Wars, and the First Plan of Union 26 IV. The Stamp Act, and the Revenue Laws . 39 V. The Crisis . . *" . ' 78 VI. The Struggle for the Centre . . . 104 VII. The French Alliance 144 VIII. Birth of the Nation 182 Note. — The maps are used by permission of, and by ar- rangement with, Messrs. Ginn & Company. Z^(^^ PKEFACE. This little book does not contain the substance of the lectures on the American Revolution which I have delivered in so many parts of the United States since 1883. Those lectures, when com- pleted and published, will make quite a detailed narrative ; this book is but a sketch. It is hoped that it may prove useful to the higher classes in schools, as well as to teachers. When I was a boy I should have been glad to get hold of a brief account of the War for Independence that would have suggested answers to some of the questions that used to vex me. Was the conduct of the British government, in driving the Americans into rebellion, merely wanton aggression, or was it not rather a bungling attempt to solve a political problem which reaUy needed to be solved ? Why were New Jersey and the Hudson river so impor- tant ? Why did the British armies make South Carolina their chief objective point after New vi PREFACE. York ? Or how did Cornwallis happen to be at Yorktown when Washington made such a long leap and pounced upon him there ? And so on. Such questions the old-fashioned text-books not only did not try to answer, they did not even recognize their existence. As to the large histories, they of course include so many details that it requires maturity of judgment to discriminate between the facts that are cardinal and those that are merely incidental. When I give lectures to schoolboys and schoolgirls, I observe that a reference to causes and effects always seems to heighten the interest of the story. I therefore offer them this little book, not as a rival but as an aid to the ordinary text-book. I am aware that a narrative so condensed must necessarily suffer from the omission of many picturesque and striking de- tails. The world is so made that one often has to lose a little in one direction in order to gain some- thing in another. This book is an experiment. If it seems to answer its purpose, I may follow it with others, treating other portions of American history in similar fashion. Cambridge, February 11, 1889. THE WAE OF INDEPENDEITOE, CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. Since the year 1875 we have witnessed, in many parts of the United States, public proces- sions, meetings, and speeches in commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of some important event in the course of our struggle for national independence. This series of centennial celebra- tions, which has been of great value in stimulat- ing American patriotism and awakening through- out the country a keen interest in American history, will naturally come to an end in 1889. The close of President Cleveland's term of office marks the close of the first century of the gov- ernment under which we live, which dates from the inauguration of President Washington on the balcony of the Federal building in Wall street, New York, on the 30th of April, 1789. It was on that memorable day that the American Rev- olution may be said to have been completed. The Declaration of Independence in 1776 de- tached the American people from the supreme 2 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. government to which they had hitherto owed allegiance, and it was not until Washington's in- auguration in 1789 that the supreme government to which we owe allegiance to-day was actually put in operation. The period of thirteen years included between these two dates was strictly a revolutionary period, during which it was more or less doubtful where the supreme authority over the United States belonged. First, it took the fighting and the diplomacy of the revolutionary war to decide that this supreme authority be- longed in the United States themselves, and not in the government of Great Britain ; and then after the war was ended, more than five years of sore distress and anxious discussion had elapsed before the American people succeeded in setting up a new government that was strong enough to make itseK obeyed at home and respected abroad. It is the story of this revolutionary period, ending in 1789, that we have here to relate in its principal outlines. When we stand upon the crest of a lofty hill and look about in all direc- tions over the landscape, we can often detect re- lations between distant points which we had not before thought of together. While we tarried in the lowland, we could see blue peaks rising here and there against the sky, and follow babbling brooks hither and thither through the forest. It was more homelike down there than on the hill- top, for in each gnarled tree, in every moss-grown INTRODUCTION. 3 boulder, in every wayside flower, we had a friend that was near to us ; but the general bearings of things may well have escaped our notice. In climbing to our lonely vantage-ground, while the familiar scenes fade from sight, there are gradu- ally unfolded to us those connections between crag and meadow and stream that make the life and meaning of the whole. We learn the " lay of the land," and become, in a humble way, geographers. So in the history of men and nations, while we remain immersed in the study of personal inci- dents and details, as what such a statesman said or how many men were killed in such a battle, we may quite fail, to understand what it was all about, and we shall be sure often to misjudge men's characters and estimate wrongly the importance of many events. For this reason we cannot clearly see the meaning of the history of our own times. The facts are too near us ; we are down among them, like the man who could not see the forest because there were so many trees. But when we look back over a long interval of years, we can survey distant events and personages like points in a vast landscape and begin to discern the mean- ing of it all. In this way we come to see that history is full of lessons for us. Very few things have happened in past ages with which our pres- ent welfare is not in one way or another concerned. Few things have happened in any age more in- teresting or more important than the American Revolution. CHAPTER II. THE COLONIES IN 1750. It is always difficult in history to mark the beginning and end of a period. Events keep rushing on and do not pause to be divided into chapters ; or, in other words, in the history which really takes place, a new chapter is always begin- ning long before the old one is ended. The di- visions we make when we try to describe it are merely marks that we make for our own conven- ience. In telling the story of the American Revo- lution we must stop somewhere, and the inaugu- ration of President Washington is a very proper place. We must also begin somewhere, but it is quite clear that it will not do to begin with the Declaration of Independence in July, 1776, or even with the midnight ride of Paul Revere in April, 1775. For if we ask what caused that "hurry of hoofs in a village street," and what brought together those five-and-fifty statesmen at Philadelphia, we are not simply led back to the Boston Tea-Party, and stiU further to the Stamp Act, but we find it necessary to refer to events that happened more than a century before the Revolution can properly be said to have begun. THE COLONIES IN 1750. 6 Indeed, if we were going to take a very wide view of the situation, and try to point out its re- lations to the general history of mankind, we should have to go back many hundreds of years and not only cross the ocean to the England of King Alfred, but keep on still further to the ancient market-places of Rome and Athens, and even to the pyramids of Egypt ; and in all this long journey through the ages we should not be merely gratifying an idle curiosity, but at every step of the way could gather sound practical les- sons, useful in helping us to vote intelligently at the next election for mayor of the city in which we live or for president of the United States. We are not now, however, about to start on any such long journey. It is a much nearer and narrower view of the American Revolution that we wish to get. There are many points from which we might start, but we must at any rate choose a point several years earlier than the Declaration of Independence. People are very apt to leave out of sight the "good old colony times " and speak of our country as scarcely more than a hundred years old. Sometimes we hear the presidency of George Washington spoken of as part of " early American history ; '* but we ought not to forget that when Washington was born the commonwealth of Virginia was already one hundred and twenty-five years old. The first governor of Massachusetts was born three cen- 6 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, turies ago, in 1588, the year of the Spanish Ar- mada. Suppose we take the period of 282 years between the English settlement of Virginia and the inauguration of President Benjamin Harrison, and divide it in the middle. That gives us the The half-way J^^^ 1T48 as the half-way station in the AmlJkiin history of the American people. There history. were just as many years of continuous American history before 1748 as there have been since that date. That year was famous for the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which put an end to a war between England and France that had lasted five years. That war had been waged in America as well as in Europe, and American troops had played a brilliant part in it. There was now a brief lull, soon to be followed by another and greater war between the two mighty rivals, and it was in the course of this latter war that some of the questions were raised which presently led to the American Revolution. Let us take the oc- casion of this lull in the storm to look over the American world and see what were the circum- stances likely to lead to the tlirowing off of the British government by the thirteen colonies, and to their union under a federal government of their own making. In the middle of the eighteenth century there were four New England colonies. Massachusetts extended her sway over Maine, and the Green Mountain territorv was an uninhabited wilder- THE COLONIES IN 1750. 7 ness, to which New York and New Hampshire alike laid claim. The four commonwealths of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island had all been -in existence, under one form or another, for more than a century. The men who were in the prime of life there in 1750 were the great-grandsons and great-great- grandsons of the men who crossed the ocean be- tween 1620 and 1640 and settled New England. Scarcely two men in a hundred were of other than English blood. About one in a hundred could say that his family came from Scotland or the north of Ireland ; one in five hundred may have been the grandchild of a Huguenot, -njejo^j Upon religious and political questions ^njjjj^* these people thought very much alike. ^^^' Extreme poverty was ahnost unknown, and there were but few who could not read and write. As a rule every head of a family owned the house in which he lived and the land which supported him. There were no cities ; and from Boston, which was a town with 16,000 inhabitants, down to the smallest settlement in the White Mountains, the government was carried on by town-meetings at which almost any grown-up man could be present and speak and vote. Except upon the sea-coast nearly all the people lived upon farms ; but all along the coast were many who lived by fishing and by building ships, and in the towns dwelt many merchants grown rich by foreign trade. In 8 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. those days Massachusetts was the richest of the thirteen colonies, and had a larger population than any other except Virginia. Connecticut was then more populous than New York ; and when the four New England commonwealths acted to- gether — as was likely to be the case in time of danger — they formed the strongest military power on the American continent. Among what we now call southern states there were two that in 1750 were more than a hundred years old. These were Virginia and Maryland. The people of these commonwealths, like those of New England, had lived together in America long enough to become distinctively Americans. Both New Englander and Virginian had had time to forget their family relationships with the kindred Virginia and ^^ft behind SO long ago in England; Maryland, though there wcrc many who did not forget it, and in our time scholars have by re- search recovered many of the links that had been lost from memory. The white people of Virginia were as purely English as those of Connecticut or Massachusetts. But society in Virginia was very different from society in New England. The wealth of Virginia consisted chiefly of tobacco, which was raised by negro slaves. People lived far apart from each other on great plantations, usually situated near the navigable streams of which that country has so many. Most of the great planters had easy access to private wharves, THE COLONIES IN 1750. 9 where their crops could be loaded on ships and sent directly to England in exchange for all sorts of goods. Accordingly it was but seldom that towns grew up as centres of trade. Each planta- tion was a kind of little world in itself. There were no town-meetings, as the smallest political division was the division into counties ; but there were county-meetings quite vigorous with politi- cal life. Of the leading county families a great many were descended from able and distinguished Cavaliers or King's-men who had come over from England during the ascendency of Oliver Cromwell. Skill in the management of public affairs was hereditary in such families, and dur- ing our revolutionary period Virginia produced more great leaders than any of the other colonies. There were yet two other American common- wealths that in 1750 were more than a hundred years old. These were New York and little Dela- ware, which for some time was a kind of append- age, first to New York, afterward to Pennsyl- vania. But there was one important respect in which these two colonies were different alike from New England and from Virginia. Their popu- lation was far from bein^ purely Eno^- New York lish. Delaware had been first settled by and Deia- Swedes, New York by Dutchmen ; and the latter colony had drawn its settlers from al- most every part of western and central Europe. A man might travel from Penobscot bay to the 10 ' THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. Harlem river without hearing a syllable in any other tongue than English ; but in crossing Man- hattan island he could listen, if he chose, to more than a dozen languages. There was almost as much diversity in opinions about religious and political matters as there was in the languages in which they were expressed. New York was an English community in so far as it had been for more than eighty years under an English govern- ment, but hardly in any other sense. Accordingly we shall find New York in the revolutionary pe- riod less prompt and decided in action than Massa- chusetts and Virginia. In population New York ranked only seventh among the thirteen colonies ; but in its geographical position it was the most important of all. It was important commercially because the Mohawk and Hudson rivers formed a direct avenue for the fur-trade from the region of the great lakes to the finest harbour on all the Atlantic coast. In a military sense it was impor- tant for two reasons ; firsts because the Mohawk valley was the home of the most powerful confed- eracy of Indians on the continent, the steady al- lies of the English and deadly foes of the French ; secondly^ because the centre of the French power was at Montreal and Quebec, and from those points the route by which the English colonies could be most easily invaded was formed by Lake Champlain and the Hudson river. New York was completely interposed between New England THE COLONIES IN 1750. 11 and the rest of the English colonies, so that an enemy holding possession of it would virtually cut the Atlantic sea-board in two. For these reasons the political action of New York was of most crit- ical importance. Of the other colonies in 1750, the two Car- olinas and New Jersey were rather more than eighty years old, while Pennsylvania had been settled scarcely seventy years. But the growth of these younger colonies had been rapid, espe- cially in the case of Pennsylvania and North Car- olina, which in populousness ranked third and fourth among the thirteen. This rapid ThetwoCar- increase was mainly due to a large im- Ge^gia"*^ migration from Europe kept up during fnTpe^Si- the first haK of the eighteenth century, ""^"^^ so that a large proportion of the people had either been born in Europe, or were the children of peo- ple born in Europe. In 1750 these colonies had not had time enough to become so intensely American as Virginia and the New England col- onies. In Georgia, which had been settled only seventeen years, people had had barely time to get used to this new home on the wild frontier. The population of these younger colonies was very much mixed. In South Carolina, as in New York, probably less than half were English. In both Carolinas there were a great many Hugue- nots from France, and immigrants from Germany and Scotland and the north of Ireland were stiU 12 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, pouring in. Pennsylvania liad many Germans and Irish, and settlers from other parts of Eu- rope, besides its English Quakers. With all this diversity of race there was a great diversity of opinions about political questions, as about other matters. We are now beginning to see why it was that Massachusetts and Virginia took the lead in bringing on the revolutionary war. Not only were these two the largest colonies, but Why Massa- ^ . chusettsand their pcople had become much more Virginia took the thoroughly welded together in their thoughts and habits and associations than was as yet possible with the people of the younger colonies. When the revolutionary war came, there were very few Tories in the New Eng- land colonies and very few in Virginia ; but there were a great many in New York and Pennsylvania and the two CaroHnas, so that the action of these commonwealths was often slow and undecided, and sometimes there was bitter and bloody fighting between men of opposite opinions, especially in New York and South Carolina. If we look at the governments of the thirteen colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century, we shall observe some interesting facts. All the colonies had legislative assemblies elected by the people, and these assemblies levied the taxes and made the laws. So far as the legislatures were concerned, therefore, aU the colonies governed THE COLONIES IN 1750. 13 themselves. But with regard to the executive department of the government, there were very- important differences. Only two of the colonies, Connecticut and Rhode Island, had governors elected by the people. These two colonies were completely self-governing. In almost everything but name they were independent of Great Brit- ain, and this was so true that at the time of the revolutionary war they did not need . . « 1 The two re- to make any new constitutions tor them- pubHcs ; •^ , , Connecticut selves, but continued to live on under and Rhode Island. their old charters for many years, — Connecticut until 1818, Rhode Island until 1843. Before the revolution these two colonies had com- paratively few direct grievances to complain of at the hands of Great Britain ; but as they were next neighbours to Massachusetts and closely connected with its history, they were likely to sympathize promptly with the kind of grievances by which Massachusetts was disturbed. Three of the colonies, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, had a peculiar kind of govern- ment, known ?i^ proprietary government. The proprie- rrM • ••11 • • Ti 1 ^*^y govem- Iheir territories had originally been ments;Pena. , sylvania, s^ranted by the crown to a person known Delaware, ° *' ^ ^ and Mary- as the Lord Proprietary, and the lord- land. proprietorship descended from father to son like a kingdom. In Maryland it was the Calvert family that reigned for six generations as lords proprietary. Pennsylvania and Delaware had 14 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. each its own separate legislature, but over both colonies reigned the same lord proprietary, who was a member of the Penn family. These colo- nies were thus like Uttle hereditary monarchies, and they had but few direct dealings with the British government. For them the lords proprie- tary stood in the place of the king, and appointed the governors. In Maryland this system ran smoothly. In Pennsylvania there was a good deal of dissatisfaction, but it generally assumed the form of a wish to get rid of the lords proprietary and have the governors appointed by the king ; for as this was something they had not tried they were not prepared to appreciate its evils. In the other eight colonies — New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia — the governors The crown wcrc appointed by the king, and were theTroyaT*^ commouly kuowu as " royal governors." governors. Xhcy wcrc somctimcs natives of the colonies over which they were appointed, as Dud- ley and Hutchinson of Massachusetts, and others ; but were more often sent over from England. Some of them, as Pownall of Massachusetts and Spotswood of Virginia, were men of marked abil- ity. Some were honest gentlemen, w^ho felt a real interest in the welfare of the people they came to help govern ; some were unprincipled adventurers, who came to make money by fair means or foul. Their position was one of much dignity, and they THE COLONIES IN 1750. 15 behaved themselves like lesser kings. What with their crimson velvets and fine laces and stately coaches, they made much more of a show than any president of the United States would think of making to-day. They had no fixed terms of office, but remained at their posts as long as the king, or the king's colonial secretary, saw fit to keep them there. Now it was generally true of the royal govern- ors that, whether they were natives of America or sent over from England, and whether they were good men or bad, they were very apt to make themselves disliked by the people, and they were almost always quarrelling with their legislative assemblies. Questions were always coming up about which the governor and the legislature could not agree, because the legislature repre- sented the views of the people who had chosen it, while the governor represented his own views or the views which prevailed three thousand miles away among the king's ministers, who very often knew little about America and cared less. One of these disputed questions related to the gov- ernor's salary. It was natural that the ^j^^ question governor should wish to have a salary as to salaries. of fixed amount, so that he might know from year to year what he was going to receive. But the people were afraid that if this were to be done the governor might become too independent. They preferred that the legislature should each 16 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. year make a grant of money sucli as it should deem suitable for tlie governor's expenses, and this sum it might increase or diminish according to its own good pleasure. This would keep the governor properly subservient to the legislature. Before 1750 there had been much bitter wrangling over this question in several of the colonies, and the governors had one after another been obliged to submit, though with very ill grace. Sometimes the thoughts of the royal governors and their friends went beyond this immediate question. Since the legislatures were so froward and so niggardly, what an admirable plan it would be to have the governors paid out of the royal treasury and thus made comparatively independ- ent of the legislatures ! The judges, too, who were quite poorly paid, might fare much better if remunerated by the crown, and the same might be said of some other public officers. But if the British government were to undertake to pay the salaries of its officials in America, it must raise a revenue for the purpose ; and it would naturally raise such a revenue by levying taxes in America rather than in England. People in England felt that they were already taxed as heavily as they could bear, in order to pay the expenses of their own government. They could not be expected to submit to further taxation for the sake of paying the expenses of governing the American colonies. If further taxes were to be laid for such a pur- THE COLONIES IN 1750. 17 pose, they must in fairness be laid upon Amer- icans, not upon Englishmen in the old country. Such was the view which people in England would naturally be expected to take, and such was the view which they generally did take. But there was another side to the question which was very clearly seen by most people in America. If the royal governors were to be paid by the crown and thus made independent of their legislatures, there would be danger of their becoming petty tyrants and interfering in many ways with the liberties of the people. Still greater would be the danger if the judges were to be paid by the crown, for then they would feel themselves re- sponsible to the king or to the royal governor, rather than to their fellow-citizens ; and it would be easy for the governors, by appointing corrupt men as judges, to prevent the proper adminis- tration of justice by the courts, and thus to make men's lives and property insecure. Most Amer- icans in 1750 felt this danger very keenly. They had not forgotten how, in the times of their grand- fathers, two of the noblest of Englislnnen, Lord William Russell and Colonel Algernon Sidney, had been murdered by the iniquitous sentence of time-serving judges. They had not forgotten the ruffian George Jeffreys and his " bloody assizes " of 1685. They well remembered how their kins- men in England had driven into exile the Stuart family of kings, who were even yet, in 1745, 18 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. making efforts to recover their lost throne. They remembered how the beginnings of New England had been made by stout-hearted men who could not endure the tyranny of these same Stuarts; and they knew well that one of the worst of the evils upon which Stuart tyranny had fattened had been the corruption of the courts of justice. The Americans believed with some reason, that even now, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the administration of justice in their own common- wealths was decidedly better than in Great Britain ; and they had no mind to have it disturbed. But worse than all, if the expenses of govern- ing America were to be paid by taxes levied upon Americans and collected from them by king or parliament or any power whatsoever residing in Great Britain, then the inhabitants of the thirteen American colonies would at once cease to be free people. A free country is one in which the gov- ernment cannot take away people's money, in the shape of taxes, except for strictly pub- " No taxation "^ i . i i n without rep- he purposes and with the consent of the resentation." people themselves, as expressed by some body of representatives whom the people have chosen. If people's money can be taken from them without their consent, no matter how small the amount, even if it be less than one dollar out out of every thousand, then they are not politi- cally free. They do not govern, but the j)ower that thus takes their money without their consent THE COLONIES IN 1750. 19 is the power that governs ; and there is nothing to prevent such a power from using the money thus obtained to strengthen itseK until it can trample upon people's rights in every direction, and rob them of their homes and lives as well as of their money. If the British government could tax the Americans without their consent, it might use the money for supporting a British army in America, and such an army might be employed in intimidating the legislatures, in dispersing town- meetings, in destroying newspaper-offices, or in other acts of tyranny. The Americans in the middle of the eighteenth century well understood that the princi- ple of "no taxation without representa^ fundamental tion" is the fundamental principle of English T 1 • • liberty. tree government. It was the principle for which their forefathers had contended as^ain and again in England, and upon which the noble edifice of English liberty had been raised and consolidated since the grand struggle between king and barons in the thirteenth century. It had passed into a tradition, both in England and in America, that in order to prevent the crown from becoming despotic, it was necessary that it should only wield such revenues as the representatives of the people might be pleased to grant it. In Eng- land the body which represented the people was the House of Commons, in each of the American colonies it was the colonial legislature ; and in 20 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. dealing with the royal governors, the legislatures acted upon the same general principles as the House of Commons in dealing with the king. It was not until some time after 1750 that any- grand assault was made upon the principle of " no taxation without representation," but the fre- quent disputes with the royal governors were such as to keep people from losing sight of this princi- ple, and to make them sensitive about acts that might lead to violations of it. In the particular disputes the governors were sometimes clearly right and the people wrong. One of the princi- pal objects, as we shall presently see, for Sometimes i • i i i the royal which the govcmors wanted money, was governors . . c i <• • were in the to maintain troops for defence against right, as to , the particu- the French and the Indians ; and the lar question. legislatures were apt to be short-sighted and unreasonably stingy about such matters. Again, the people were sometimes seized with a silly craze for " paper money " and " wild-cat banks " — devices for making money out of noth- ing — and sometimes the governors were sensible enough to oppose such delusions but not alto- gether sensible in their manner of doing it. Thus in 1740 there was fierce excitement in Massachu- setts over a quarrel between the governor and the legislature about the famous "silver bank" and "land bank." These institutions were a public nuisance and deserved to be suppressed, but the governor was obliged to appeal to parliament in THE COLONIES IN 1750. 21 order to succeed in doing it. This led many peo- ple to ask, " What business has a parliament sit- ting the other side of the ocean to be making laws for us ? " and the grumbling was loud and bitter enough to show that this was a very dangerous question to raise. It was in the eight colonies which had royal governors that troubles of a revolutionary char- acter were more likely to arise than in the other five, but there were special reasons, besides those already mentioned, why Massachusetts and Vir- ginia should prove more refractory than „ -r» 1 1 Bitter mem- any oi the others. Both these great ories ; in ,,,,,. . Virginia. commonwealths had bitter memories. Things had happened in both which might serve as a warning, and which some of the old men still living in 1750 could distinctly remember. In Virginia the misgovernment of the royal gov- ernor Sir William Berkeley had led in 1675 to the famous rebellion headed by Nathaniel Bacon, and this rebellion had been suppressed with much harshness. Many leading citizens had been sent to the gallows and their estates had been confis- cated. In Massachusetts, though there were no such scenes of cruelty to remember, the grievance was much more deep-seated and enduring. Massachusetts had not been originally a royal province, with its governors appointed by the king. At first it had been a republic, such as Connecticut and Rhode Island now were, with 22 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. governors chosen by the people. From its foun- dation in 1629 down to 1684 the commonwealth of Massachusetts had managed its own affairs at And in Mas- ^^^ ^^^ good pleasure. Practicallj it sachusetts. j^^^ -^^^^ ^^^ ^^^j self-govemiug but almost independent. That was because affairs in England were in such confusion ^^hat until after 1660 comparatively little attention was paid to what was going on in America, and the liberties of Massachusetts prospered through the neglect of what was then called the " home government." After Charles II. came to the throne in 1660 he began to interfere with the affairs of Massachu- setts, and so the very first generation of men that had been born on the soil of that commonwealth were engaged in a long struggle against the Brit- ish king for the right of managing their own af- fairs. After more than twenty years of this struggle, which by 1675 had come to be quite bit- ter, the charter of Massachusetts was anmdled in 1684 and its free government was for the moment destroyed. Presently a viceroy was sent over from England, to govern Massachusetts (as well as several other northern colonies) despotically. This viceroy. Sir Edmund Andros, seems to have been a fairly weU meaning man. He was not es- pecially harsh or cruel, but his rule was a despot- ism, because he was not responsible to the people for what he did, but only to the king. In point of fact the two-and-a-half years of his adminis- THE COLONIES IN 1750. 23 tration were characterized by arbitrary arrests and by interference with private property and with the freedom of the press. It was so vexar tious that early in 1689, taking advantage of the Revolution then going on in England, the people of Boston rose in rebellion, seized Andros and threw him into jail, and set up for themselves a provisional government. When the affairs of New England were settled after the accession of Wil- liam and Mary to the throne, Connecticut and Rhode Island were allowed to keep their old gov- ernments ; but Massachusetts in 1693 was obliged to take a new charter instead of her old one, and although this new charter revived the election of legislatures by the people, it left the governors henceforth to be appointed by the king. In the political controversies of Massachusetts, therefore, in the eighteenth century, the people were animated by the recollection of what they had lost. They were somewhat less free and in- dependent than their grandfathers had been, and they had learned what it was to have an irrespon- sible ruler sitting at his desk in Boston and sign- ing warrants for the arrest of loved and respected citizens who dared criticise his sayings and doings. "Taxation without representation" was not for them a mere abstract theory ; the/ knew what it meant. It was as near to them as the presidency of Andrew Jackson is to us ; there had not been time enough to forget it. In every contest be- 24 TEE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. tween the popular legislature and the royal gov- ernor there was some broad principle involved which there were plenty of well-remembered facts to illustrate. These contests also helped to arouse a strong sympathy between the popular leaders in Massa- chusetts and in Virginia. Between the people of the two colonies there was not much real sym- pathy, because there was a good deal of differ- ence between their ways of life and their opin- ions about things ; and people, unless they are unusually wise and generous of nature, are apt to dislike and despise those who differ from them in opinions and habits. So there was little cor- Grounds of diality of feeling between the people of bS"ween^ Massachusctts and the people of Vir- SSTm' giiiia, but in spite of this there was a irgrnia. g^^at and growing political sympathy. This was because, ever since 1693, they had been obliged to deal with the same kind of political questions. It became intensely interesting to a Virginian to watch the progress of a dispute be- tween the governor and legislature of Massachu- setts, because whatever principle might be victo- rious in the course of such a dispute, it was sure soon to find a practical application in Virginia. Hence by the middle of the eighteenth century the two colonies were keenly observant of each other, and either one was exceedingly prompt in taking its cue from the other. It is worth while THE COLONIES IN 1750. 25 to remember this fact, for without it there would doubtless have been rebellions or revolutions of American colonies, but there would hardly have been one American Kevolution, ending in a grand American Union. CHAPTER III. THE FRENCH WARS, AND THE FIRST PLAN OF UNION. It was said a moment ago that one of the chief objects for which the governors wanted money was to maintain troops for defence against the French and the Indians. This was a very serious matter indeed. To any one who looked at a map of North America in 1750 it might well have seemed as if the French had secured for them- selves the greater part of the continent. The ^. , ^ western frontier of the Ensrlish settle- Disputed <^ frontier be- mcuts was 2:enerallY within two hun- tween <-> «^ English CO?- ^^^^ miles of the sea-coast. In New onies. York it was at Johnson Hall, not far from Schenectady ; in Pennsylvania it was about at Carlisle ; in Virginia it was near Winchester, and the first explorers were just making their way across the Alleghany mountains. Westward of these frontier settlements lay endless stretches of forest inhabited by warlike tribes of red men who, everywhere except in New York, were hostile to the English and friendly to the French. Since the beginning of the seventeenth century French towns and villages had been growing up along THE FRENCH WARS. 27 the St. Lawrence, and French explorers had been pushing across the Great Lakes and down the valley of the Mississippi river, near the mouth of which the French town of New Orleans had been standing since 1718. It was the French doctrine that discovery and possession of a river gave a claim to all the territory drained by that river. According to this doctrine every acre of Ameri- can soil from which water flowed into the St. Law- rence and the Mississippi belonged to France. The claims of the French thus came up to the very crest of the Alleghanies, and they made no secret of their intention to shut up the English forever between that chain of mountains and the sea-coast. There were times when their aims were still more aggressive and dangerous, when they looked with longing eyes upon the valley of the Hudson, and would fain have broken through that military centre of the line of English com- monwealths and seized the keys of empire over the continent. From this height of their ambition the French were kept aloof by the deadly enmity of the most fierce and powerful savages in the New World. The Indians of those days who came into contact with the white settlers were divided into many tribes with different names, but they all belonged to one or another of three great stocks r^^ Indian or families. First, there were the Mo- *"^^^' bilians^ far down south ; to this stock belonged 28 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. the Creeks, Cherokees, and others. Secondly, there were the Algonquins, comprising the Dela^ wares to the south of the Susquehanna ; the Miamis, Shawnees, and others in the western wiklerness ; the Ottawas in Canada ; and all the tribes still left to the northeast of New England Thirdly, there were the Iroquois, of whom the most famous were the Five Nations of what is now central New York. These five great tribes — the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas ■ — had for several generations been united in a confederacy which they likened to a long wigwam with its eastern door looking out upon the valley of the Hudson and its western toward the falls of Niagara. It was known far and wide over the continent as the Long House, and wherever it was known it was dreaded. When Frenclmien and Englishmen first settled in America, this Iroquois league was engaged in a long career of conquest. Algonquin tribes aU the way from the Connecticut to the Mississippi were treated as its vassals and forced to pay trib- ute in weapons and wampum. This conquering career extended through the seventeenth century, until it was brought to an end by the French. When the latter began making settlements in Canada, they courted the friendship of their Al- gonquin neighbours, and thus, without dreaming what deadly seed they were sowing, they were led to attack the terrible Long House. It was easy THE FRENCH WARS. 29 enough for Cliamplain in 1609 to win a victory over savages who had never before seen a white man or heard the report of a musket ; but the victory was a fatal one for the French, for it made the Iroquois their eternal enemies. The Long House allied itseK first with the Dutch and afterwards with the English, and thus checked the progress of the French toward the lower Hudson. We too seldom think how much we owe to those formidable savages. The Iroquois pressed the French with so much vigour that in 1689 they even laid sies'e T»/r 1 -r^ 1 ^r^r^n i T-i i The French to Montreal. But by 16 96 the Irench, and the assisted by all the Algonquin tribes within reach, and led by their warlike viceroy, Count Frontenac, one of the most picturesque figures in American history, at length succeeded in getting the upperhand and dealing the Long House a terrible blow, from the effects of which it never recovered. The league remained formid- able, however, until the time of the revolutionary war. In 1715 its fighting strength was partially repaired by the adoption of the kindred Iroquois tribe of Tuscaroras, who had just been expelled from North Carolina by the English settlers, and migrated to New York. After this accession the league, henceforth known as the Six Nations, formed a power by no means to be despised, though much less bold and aggressive than in the previous century. 30 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. After administering a check to the Iroquois, the French and Algonquins kept up for more than sixty years a desultory warfare against the Eng- lish colonies. Whenever war broke out between England and France, it meant war in America as well as in Europe. Indeed, one of the chief ob- jects of war, on the part of each of these two na- tions, was to extend its colonial dominions at the expense of the other. France and England were at war from 1689 to 1697; from 1702 to 1713; and from 1743 to 1748. The men in New York or Boston in 1750, who could remember the past sixty years, could thus look back over at least four-and-twenty years of open war ; and even in the intervals of professed peace there was a good deal of disturbance on the frontiers. A most frightful sort of warfare it was, ghastly with tor- ture of prisoners and the ruthless murder of women and children. The expense of raising and arming troops for defence was great enough to subject several of the colonies to a heavy burden of debt. In 1750 Massachusetts was just throw- ing: off the load of debt under which she had staggered since 1693 ; and most of this debt was incurred for expeditions against the French and Algonquins. Under these circumstances it was natural that the colonial governments should find it hard to raise enough money for war expenses, and that the governors should think the legislatures too THE FRENCH WARS. 31 slow in acting. They were slow ; for, as is apt to be the case when money is to be borrowed with- out the best security, there were a good many things to be considered. All this was made worse by the fact that there were so many separate gov- ernments, so that each one was inclined to hold back and wait for the others. On the other hand, the French viceroy in Canada had despotic power ; the colony which he governed never pretended to be self-supporting ; and so, if he could not squeeze money enough out of the people in Canada, he just sent to France for it and got it ; for the gov- ernment of Louis XY. regarded Canada as one of the brightest jewels in its crown, and was always ready to spend money for damaging the Enerlish. Accordinoiy the Frenchman getting the 111 1 • • 111- 1 ^"^""^^ ^°^- could plan nis campaign, call nis red oniestoact -. ^ ^ ^ f. .i" concert. men together, and set the whole frontier in a blaze, while the legislatures in Boston or New York were talking about what had better be done in case of invasion. No wonder the royal governors fretted and fumed, and sent home to England dismal accounts of the perverseness of these Americans ! Many people in England thought that the colonies were allowed to govern themselves altogether too much, and that for their own good the British government ought to tax them. Once while Sir Robert Walpole was prime minister (1721-1742) some one is said to have advised him to lay a direct tax upon the Ameri- 32 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. cans ; but tliat wise old statesman shook Ms head. It was bad enough, he said, to be scolded and abused by half the people in the old country ; he did not wish to make enemies of every man, woman, and child in the new. But if the power to raise American armies for the common defence, and to collect money in America for this purpose, was not to be assumed by the British government, was there any way in which unity and promptness of action in time of war could be secured ? There was another way, if people could be persuaded to adopt it. The thirteen colonies might be joined together in a federal union ; and the federal government, with- out interfering in the local affairs of any single colony, might be clothed with the power of levy- ing taxes all over the country for purposes of common defence. The royal governors were in- clined to favour a union of the colonies, no matter how it might be brought about. They unfon be-* thought it ucccssary that some decisive E^ig^rsb col- step should be taken quickly, for it was ""^ * evident that the peace of 1748 was only an armed truce. Evidently a great and decisive struggle was at hand. In 1750 the Oliio Com- pany, formed for the purpose of colonizing the valley drained by that river, had surveyed the country as far as the present site of Louisville. In 1753 the French, taking the alarm, crossed Lake Erie, and began to fortify themselves at THE FRENCH WARS. 33 Presque Isle, and at Venango on the Alleghany river. They seized persons trading within the limits of the Ohio Company, which lay within the territory of Virginia ; and accordingly Governor Dinwiddie, of Virginia, selected George Washing- ton — a venturous and hardy young land-sur- veyor, only twenty-one years old, but gifted with a sagacity beyond his years — and sent him to Venango to warn off the trespassers. It was an exceedingly delicate and dangerous mission, and Washington showed rare skill and courage in this first act of his public career, but the French com- mander made polite excuses and remained. Next spring the French and English tried each to fore- stall the other in fortifying the all-important place where the AUeghany and Monongahela rivers unite to form the Ohio, the place long afterward commonly known as the " Gateway of the West," the place where the city of Pittsburgh now stands. In the course of these preliminary manoeuvres Washington was besieged in Fort Necessity by overwhehning numbers, and on July 4, 1754, was obliged to surrender the whole of his force, but obtained leave to mafch awjiyT^'^'^'S^- . the French got possession o^ .ilio; mueh-cc)Vi'teil sitiiBiion, and erected there j^ort T)iiquesne~as" a mena^ to aU future Englis|r^rMe&s. l^s ';^%iff^d not been declared i^^^en Fran!f calamities. CHAPTER V. THE CRISIS. The surest way to renew and cement the union was to show that the ministry had not relaxed in its determination to enforce the princij^le of the Townshend acts. This was made clear in August, Salaries of l^T^^, whcu it was Ordered that in Mas- the judges, sachusctts the judges should henceforth be paid by the crown. Popular excitement rose to fever heat, and the judges were threatened with impeachment should they dare accept a penny from the royal treasury. The turmoil was in- creased next year by the discovery in London of the package of letters which were made to support the unjust charge against Hutchinson and some of his friends that they had instigated and aided the most extreme measures of the ministry. In the autumn of 1772 Hutchinson refused to call an extra session of the assembly to consider what should be done about the judges. Samuel Adams then devised a scheme by which the towns of Massachusetts could consult with each other and agree upon some common course of action in case of emergencies. For this purpose each town was to appoint a standing committee, and as a THE CRISIS. 79 great part of their work was necessarily done by letter they were called " committees of -I M fTM • 1 Committees correspondence. ihis was the step of cone- . . -i-» 1 • spondence. that fairly organized the Revolution. It was by far the most important of all the steps that preceded the Declaration of Independence. The committees did their work with great effi- ciency and the governor had no means of stopping it. They were like an invisible legislature that was always in session and could never be dis- solved ; and when the old government fell they were able to administer affairs until a new govern- ment could be set up. In the spring of 1773 Virginia carried this work of organization a long step further, when Dabney Carr suggested and carried a motion calling for committees of cor- respondence between the several colonies. From this point it was a comparatively short step to a permanent Continental Congress. It happened that these preparations were made just in time to meet the final act of aggression which brought on the Revolutionary War. The Americans had thus far successfully resisted the Townsheud acts and secured the repeal of all the duties except on tea. As for tea they had plenty, but not from England ; they smuggled it from Holland in spite of custom-houses and search- warrants. Clearly unless the Americans could be made to buy tea from England and pay the duty on it, the king must own himself defeated. 80 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. Since it appeared that tliey could not be forced into doing this, it remained to be seen if they could be tricked into doing it. A truly ingenious scheme was devised. Tea sent by the East India Tea ships sent Company to America had formerly paid as a Siai-"^' a duty in some British port on the way. enge. This duty was now taken off, so that the price of the tea for America might be low- ered. The company's tea thus became so cheap that the American merchant could buy a pound of it and pay the threepence duty beside for less than it cost him to smuggle a pound of tea from Holland. It was supposed that the Americans would of course buy the tea which they could get most cheaply, and would thus be beguiled into submission to that principle of taxation which they had hitherto resisted. Ships laden with tea were accordingly sent in the autumn of 1773 to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston ; and consignees were appointed to receive the tea in each of these towns. Under the guise of a commercial operation, this was purely a political trick. It was an insulting challenge to the American people, and merited the reception which they gave it. They would have shown themselves unworthy of their rich political heritage had they given it any other. In New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston mass- meetings of the people voted that the consignees should be ordered to resign their offices, and they THE CRISIS. 81 did so. At Philadelphia the tea-ship was met and sent back to England before it had come within the jurisdiction of the custom-house. At Charleston the tea was landed, and as there was no one to receive it or pay the duty, it was thrown into a damp cellar and left there to spoil. In Boston things took a different turn. The stubborn courage of Governor Hutchinson pre- vented the consignees, two of whom were his own sons, from resigning ; the ships arrived and were anchored under guard of a committee of citizens ; if they were not unloaded within twenty days, the custom-house officers were empowered by law to seize them and unload them by force ; and having once come within the jurisdiction of the custom- house, they could not go out to sea with- Howthechai- out a clearance from the collector or a ce^fl^^thr' pass from the governor. The situation Pa^?y*°"D?c! was a difficult one, but it was most nobly ^^' ^"^' met by the men of Massachusetts. The excite- ment was intense, but the proceedings were char- acterized from first to last by perfect quiet and decormn. In an earnest and solemn, almost prayerful spirit, the advice of all the towns in the conmionwealth was sought, and the response was unanimous that the tea must on no account what- ever be landed. Similar expressions of opinion came from other colonies, and the action of Mas- sachusetts was awaited with breatliless interest. Many town-meetings were held in Boston, and the 82 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. o\ATier of the ships was ordered to take them away without unloading ; but the collector contrived to fritter away the time until the nineteenth day, and then refused a clearance. On the next day, the 16th of December, 1773, seven thousand peo- ple were assembled in town-meeting in and around the Old South Meeting-House, while the owner of the ships was sent out to the governor's house at Milton to ask for a pass. It was nightfall when he returned without it, and there was then but one thing to be done. By sunrise next morning the revenue officers would board the ships and unload their cargoes, the consignees would go to the cus- tom-house and pay the duty, and the king' s scheme woidd have been crowned with success. The only way to prevent this was to rip open the tea-chests and spill their contents into the sea, and this was done, according to a preconcerted plan and with- out the slightest uproar or disorder, by a small party of men disguised as Indians. Among them were some of the best of the townsfolk, and the chief manager of the proceedings was Samuel Adams. The destruction of the tea has often been spoken of, especially by British historians, as a " riot," but nothing could have been less like a riot. It was really the deliberate action of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the only fit- ting reply to the king's insulting trick. It was hailed with delight throughout the thirteen colo- nies, and there is nothing in our whole history of THE CRISIS. 83 which an educated American should feel more proud. The effect upon the king and his friends was maddening, and events were quickly brought to a crisis. In spite of earnest opposition retaliatory acts were passed throuo^h Parliament in ^ * TheRetalia- April, 1774. One of these was the Port tory,Acts, j^ ^ April, 1774. Bill, for shutting up the port of Boston and stopping its trade until the people should be starved and frightened into paying for the tea that had been thrown overboard. Another was the Regulating Act, by which the charter of Mas- sachusetts was annulled, its free government swept away, and a military governor appointed with des- potic power like Andros. These acts were to go into operation on the 1st of June, and on that day Governor Hutchinson sailed for England, in the vain hope of persuading the king to adopt a milder policy. It was not long before his prop- erty was confiscated, like that of other Tories, and after six years of exile he died in London. The new governor, Thomas Gage, who had long been conmiander of the military forces in America, was a mild and pleasant man without much strength of character. His presence was endured but his authority was not recognized in Massachusetts. Troops were now quartered again in Boston, but they could not prevent the people from treating the Regulating Act with open contempt. Courts organized under that act were prevented from sit- 84 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. ting, and councillors were compelled to resign their places. The king's authority was everywhere quietly but doggedly defied. At the same time the stoppage of business in Boston was the cause of much distress which all the colonies sought to relieve by voluntary contributions of food and other needed articles. The events of the last twelve months had gone further than anything before toward awakening a sentiment of union among the people of the colo- nies. It was still a feeble sentiment, but it was strong enough to make them all feel that Boston was suffering in the common cause. The system of Continental Corresponding committees now ripened meets7sept. ^^^^ ^^^^ Continental Congress, which ^^^*' held its first meeting at Philadelphia in September, 1774. Among the delegates were Sam- uel and John Adams, Robert Livingston, John Rutledge, John Dickinson, Samuel Chase, Edmund Pendleton, Richard Henry Lee, Patrick Henry, and George Washington. Their action was cau- tious and conservative. They confined themselves for the present to trying the effect of a candid state- ment of grievances, and drew up a Declaration of Rights and other papers, which were pronounced by Lord Chatham unsurpassed for ability in any age or country. In Parliament, however, the king's friends were becoming all-powerful, and the only effect produced by these papers was to goad them toward further attempts at coercion. Mas- THE CRISIS. 85 sachusetts was declared to be in a state of rebel- lion, as in truth she was. While Samuel Adams was at Philadelphia, the lead in Boston was taken by his friend Dr. War- ren. In a county convention held at Milton in September, Dr. Warren drew up a series of re- solves which fairly set on foot the Revolution. They declared that the Regulating Act was null and void, and that a king who violates the char- tered rights of his subjects forfeits their allegiance ; they directed the collectors of taxes to refuse to pay the money collected to Gage's treasurer ; and they threatened retahation in case Gage should venture to arrest any one for political '^ ^ The Suffolk reasons. These bold resolves were Resolves, Sept. Iu4. adopted by the convention and sanc- tioned by the Continental Congress. Next month the people of Massachusetts formed a provisional government, and began organizing a militia and collecting military stores at Concord and other inland towns. General Gage's position at this time was a try- ing one for a man of his temperament. In an unguarded moment he had assured the king that four regiments ought to be enough to bring Mas- sachusetts into an attitude of penitence. Now Massachusetts was in an attitude of rebellion, and he realized that he had not troops enough to command the situation. People in England were blaming him for not doing something, and late in 86 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. the winter he received a positive order to arrest Samuel Adams and his friend John Hancock, then at the head of the new provisional government of Massachusetts, and send them to England to be tried for high treason. On the 18th of April, 1775, these gentlemen were staying at a friend's house in Lexington ; and Gage that evening sent out a force of 800 men to seize the military stores accumulated at Concord, with instructions to stop on the way at Lexington and arrest Adams and Hancock. But Dr. Warren divined the purpose of the movement, and his messenger, Paul Re- vere, succeeded in forewarning the peoi3le, so that by the time the troops arrived at Lexington the birds were flown. The soldiers fired into a company of militia on Lexington common and slew eight or ten of their number ; but by the time they reached Concord the country was fairly Battle of aroused and armed yeomanry were com- Apru^S"' ^^& upon the scene by hundreds. In a ^^^^' sharp skirmish the British were defeated and, without having accomplished any of the ob- jects of their expedition, began their retreat toward Boston, hotly pursued by the farmers who fired from behind walls and trees after the Indian fashion. A reinforcement of 1200 men at Lex- ington saved the routed troops from destruction, but the numbers of their assailants grew so rap- idly that even this larger force barely succeeded in escaping capture. At sunset the British reached THE CRISIS. 87 Charlestown after a march wliich was a series of skirmislies, leaving nearly 300 of their number killed or wounded along the road. By that time yeomanry from twenty-three townships had joined in the pursuit. The alarm spread like wildfire through New England, and fresh bands of militia arrived every hour. Within three days Israel Putnam and Benedict Arnold had come from Connecticut and John Stark from New Hamp- shire, a cordon of 16,000 men was drawn around Boston, and the siege of that town was begun. The belligerent feeling in New England had now grown so strong as to show itself in an act of offensive warfare. On the 10th of May, just three weeks after Lexington, the fort- rry 1 /^ n • Capture of resses at Ticonderos^a and Crown Jromt, Ticonderoga, . . . May 10, 1775. controllino- the line of communication between New York and Canada, were surprised and captured by men from the Green Mountains and Connecticut valley under Ethan Allen and Seth Warner. The Congress, which met on that same day at Philadelphia, showed some reluctance in sanctioning an act so purely offensive ; but in its choice of a president the spirit of defiance toward Great Britain was plainly shown. John [Hancock, whom the British commander-in-chief 1 was under stringrent orders to arrest and send over to Eno^land to be tried for treason, was chosen to that eminent position on the 24th of May. jThis showed that the preponderance of sentiment 88 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. in the country was in favour of supporting the New England colonies in the armed struggle into which they had drifted. This was still further shown two days later, when Congress in the name of the " United Colonies of America " assumed the direction of the rustic army of New England men engaged in the siege of Boston. As Con- gress was absolutely penniless and had no power to lay taxes, it proceeded to borrow £6000 for the purchase of gunpowder. It called for ten com- panies of riflemen from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, to reinforce what was henceforth known as the Continental army ; and on the 15th Washin ton ^^ Juuc it appointed George Washing- Smiiland**^ tou commandcr-in-chief. The choice of june^Sf' Washington was partly due to the gen- ^^^^' eral confidence in his ability and in his lofty character. In the French War he had won a military reputation higher than that of any other American, and he was already commander- in-chief of the forces of Virginia. But the choice was also partly due to sound political reasons. The Massachusetts leaders, especially Samuel Adams and his cousin John, were distrusted by some people as extremists and fire-eaters. They wished to bring about a declaration of independ- ence, for they believed it to be the only possible cure for the evils of the time. The leaders in other colonies, upon which the hand of the Brit- ish government had not borne so heavily, had not THE CRISIS. 89 yet advanced quite so far as this. Most of them believed that the king could be brought to terms ; i they did not realize that he would never give way because it was politically as much a life and death struggle for him as for them. Washington was I not yet clearly in favour of independence, nor was Jefferson, who a twelvemonth hence was to be en- I gaged in writing the Declaration. It is doubtful if any of the leading men as yet agreed with the Adamses, except Dr. Franklin, who had just re- turned from England after his ten years' stay there, and knew very well how little hope was to be placed in conciliatory measures. The Adamses, therefore, like wise statesmen, were always on their guard lest circumstances should drive Mas- sachusetts in the path of rebellion faster than the sister colonies were likely to keep pace with her. This was what the king above all things wished, and by the same token it was what they especially dreaded and sought to avoid. To appoint G jorge Washington to the chief command was to go a long way toward irrevocably committing Virginia to the same cause with Massachusetts, and John Adams was foremost in urging the appointment. Its excellence was obvious to every one, and we hear of only two persons that were dissatisfied. One of these was John Hancock, who coveted military distinction and was vain enough to think himself fit for almost any position. The other was Charles Lee, a British officer who had served 90 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. in America in the French War and afterward wandered about Europe as a soldier of fortune. He had returned to America in 1773 in the hope of playing a leading part here. He set himself up as an authority on mil- itary questions, and pretended to be a zealous lover of liberty. He was really an unprincipled charlatan for whom the kindest thing that can be said is that perhaps he was slightly insane. He had hoped to be appointed to the chief command, and was disgusted when he found himself placed second among the four major-generals. The first major-general was Artemas Ward of Massachu- setts ; the third was Philip Schuyler of New York ; the fourth was Israel Putnam of Connec- ticut. Eight brigadier-generals were appointed, among whom we may here mention Richard Mont- gomery of New York, William Heath of Massa- chusetts, John Sullivan of New Hampshire, and Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island. The adju- tant-general, Horatio Gates, was an Englishman who had served in the French War, and since then had lived in Virginia. While Congress was appointing officers and making regulations for the Continental army, re- inforcements for the British had landed in Boston, making their army 10,000 strong. The new troops were commanded by General William Howe, a Whig who disapproved of the king's policy. With him came Sir Henry Clinton and THE CRISIS. 91 John Burgoyne, who were more in sympathy with the king. Howe and Burgoyne were members of Parliament. On the arrival of these reinforce- ments Gage prepared to occupy the heights in Charlestown known as Breed's and Bunker's hills. These heights commanded Boston, so that hostile batteries placed there would make it necessary for the British to evacuate the town. On the night of June 16, the Americans anticipated Gage in seizing the heights, and began erecting fortifica- tions on Breed's Hill. It was an exposed position for the American force, which might easily have been cut off and captured if the British had gone around by sea and occupied Charlestown Neck in the rear. The British preferred to storm the American works. In two desperate as- ^^^^^^ ^^ saults, on the afternoon of the 17th, J;\',;^'i^f^"' they were repulsed with the loss of one- ^'^^' third of their number ; and the third assault suc- ceeded only because the Americans were not sup- plied with powder. By driving the Americans back to Winter Hill, the British won an impor- tant victory and kept their hold upon Boston. The moral effect of the battle, however, was in favour of the Americans, for it clearly indicated that under proper circumstances they might ex- hibit a power of resistance which the British would find it impossible to overcome. It was with George III. as with Pyrrhus : he could not afford to win many victories at such cost, for his supply 92 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. of soldiers for America was limited, and liis only- hope of success lay in inflicting heavy blows. In winning Bunker Hill his troops were only holding their own ; the siege of Boston was not raised for a moment. The practical effect upon the British army was to keep it quiet for several months. General Howe, who presently superseded Gage, was a brave and well-trained soldier, but slothful in temperament. His way was to strike a blow, and then wait to see what would come of it, hoping no doubt that political affairs might soon take such a turn as to make it unnecessary to go on with this fratricidal war. This was fortunate for the Americans, for when Washington took command of the army at Cambridge on the 3d of July, he saw that little or nothing could be done with that army until it should be far better organized, dis- ciplined, and equipped, and in such work he found enough to occupy him for several months. Meanwhile Congress, at the instance of John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and John Jay of New York, decided to try the effect of one more candid statement of affairs, in the form of a petition to Last petition ^^^ ^ii^g' ^his paper reached London and'lL^^^' on the 14th of August, but the king answer. rcfuscd to reccivc it, although it was signed by the delegates as separate individuals and not as members of an unauthorized or revolu- tionary body. His only answer was a proclama^ THE CRISIS. 93 tion dated August 23, in which he called for volunteers to aid in putting down the rebellion in America. At the same time he opened negotia- tions with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the duke of Brunswick, and other petty German princes, and succeeded in hiring 20,000 troops to be sent to fight against his American subjects. When the news of this reached America it produced a profound eifect. Perhaps nothing done in that year went so far toward destroying the lingering sentiment of loyalty. In the spring Congress had hesitated about en- couraging offensive operations. In the course of the summer it was ascertained that the governor of Canada, Sir Guy Carleton, was planning an invasion of northern New York and hoping to obtain the cooperation of the Six Nations and the Tories of the Mohawk valley. Congress accord- ingly decided to forestall him by invad- « i^ 1 rT\ ^^ f ' • Americans mg Canada. Iwo lines or invasion invade can- were adopted. Montgomery descended 1775-juue, Lake Champlain with 2000 men, and after a campaign of two months captured Mon- treal on the 12th of November. At the same time Benedict Arnold and Daniel Morgan set out from Cambridge with 1200 men, and made their way through the wilderness of Maine, up the val- ley of the Kennebec and down that of the Chau- diere, coming out upon the St. Lawrence opposite Quebec on the 13th of November. This long 94 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. march through the primeval forest and over rugged and trackless mountains was one of the most remarkable exploits of the war. It cost the lives of 200 men, but besides this the rear-guard gave out and went back to Cambridge, so that when Arnold reached Quebec he had only 700 men, too few for an attack upon the town. After Montgomery joined him, it was decided to carry the works by storm, but in the unsuccessful as- sault on December 31, Montgomery was killed, Arnold disabled, and Morgan taken prisoner. During the winter Carleton was reinforced until he was able to recapture Montreal. The Amer- icans were gradually driven back, and by June, 1776, had retreated to Crown Point. Carleton then resumed his preparations for invading New York. While the northern campaign was progressing thus unfavourably, the British were at length driven from Boston. Howe had unaccountably neglected to occupy Dorchester heights, which Washington Commanded the town ; and Washington, tonrM^?ch after waiting till a sufficient number of 17, 1776. heavy guns could be collected, advanced on the night of March 4 and occupied them with 2000 men. His position was secure. The British had no alternative but to carry it by storm or retire from Boston. Not caring to repeat the ex- periment of Bunker Hill, they embarked on the 17th of March and sailed to Halifax, where they THE CRISIS. 95 busied themselves in preparations for an expedi- tion against New York. Late in April Washing- ton transferred his headquarters to New York, where he was able to muster about 8000 men for its defence. Thus the line of the Hudson river was now threatened with attack at both its upper and lower ends. This change in the seat of war marks the change that had come over the political situation. It was no longer merely a rebellious Massachu- setts that must be subdued ; it was a continental Union that must be broken up. During the win- ter and spring the sentiment in favour of a dec- laration of independence had rapidly grown in strength. In November, 1775, Lord Dunmore, royal governor of Virorinia, moreinVir- sought to intimidate the revolutionary party by a proclamation offering freedom to such slaves as would enlist under the king's banner. This aroused the country against Dunmore, and in December he was driven from Norfolk and took refuge in a ship of war. On New Year's Day he bombarded the town and laid it in ashes from one end to the other. This violence rapidly made converts to the revolutionary party, and further lessons were learned from the experience of their neighbours in North Carolina. That colony was the scene of fierce contests between Whigs and Tories. As early as May 31, 1775, the patriots of Mecklenburg county had 96 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, adopted resolutions pointing toward independence and forwarded them to their delegates in Con- gress, who deemed it impolitic, however, to lay them before that body. Josiah Martin, royal governor of North Carolina, was obliged to flee on board ship in July. He busied himself with plans for the complete subjugation of the south- ern colonies, and corresponded with the govern- ment in London, as well as with his Tory friends ashore. In pursuance of these plans Sir Henry Clinton, with 2000 men, was detached in January, 1776, from the army in Boston, and sent North Caro- i -xt i /-^ t n t Una and Yir^ to the JN orth Carolina coast ; a neet under giuia. Sir Peter Parker was sent from Ireland to meet him; and a force of 1600 Tories was gathered to assist him as soon as he should arrive. But the scheme utterly failed. The fleet was buffeted by adverse winds and did not arrive; the Tories were totally defeated on February 27 in a sharp fight at Moore's Creek ; and Clinton, thus deprived of his allies, deemed it most pru- dent for a while to keep his troops on shipboard. On the 12th of April the patriots of North Caro- lina instructed their delegates in Congress to eon- cur with other delegates in a declaration of inde- pendence. On the 14th of May Virginia went further, and instructed her delegates to propose such a declaration. South Carolina, Georgia, and Rhode Island expressed a willingness to concur in any measures which Congress might think best THE CRISIS, 97 calculated to promote the general welfare. In the course of May town-meetings throughout Mas- sachusetts expressed opinions unanimously in fa- vour of independence. Massachusetts had already, as long ago as July, 1775, framed a new government in which the king was not recognized ; and her example had been followed by New Hampshire in January, 1776, and by South Carolina in March. Now on the 15th of May Congress adopted a resolution ad- vising all the other colonies to form new gov- ernments, because the king had "withdrawn his protection " from the American people, and all governments deriving their powers from him were accordingly set aside as of no account. This res- olution was almost equivalent to a declaration of independence, and it was adopted only after hot debate and earnest opposition from the middle colonies. On the 7th of June, in accordance with the instructions of May 14 from Virginia, Rjchard Eichard Henry Lee submitted to Con- SoSontn"'" gress the following resolutions : — Congress. " That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States, that they are absolved from all allegiance to the Brit- ish Crown, and that all political connection be- tween them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved ; " That it is expedient forthwith to take the 98 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. most effectual measures for forming foreign alli- ances ; " That a plan of confederation be prepared and transmitted to the respective colonies for their consideration and approbation." This motion of Virginia, in which Independ- ence and Union went hand in hand, was at once seconded by Massachusetts, as represented by- John Adams. It was opposed by John Dickinson and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and by Rob- ert Livingston of New York, on the ground that the people of the middle colonies were not yet ready to sever the connection with the mother country. As the result of the discussion it was decided to wait three weeks, in the hope of hear- ing from all those colonies which had not yet de- clared themselves. The messages from those colonies came promptly enough. As for Connecticut and New Hamp- shire, there could be no doubt ; and their declara- tions for independence, on the 14th and 15th of June respectively, were simply dilatory expres- sions of their sentiments. They were late, only because Connecticut had no need to form a new government at all, while New Hampshire had formed one as long ago as January. Their sup- port of the proposed declaration of independence was already secured, and it was only in the formal announcement of it that they were somewhat belated. But with the middle colonies it was dif- THE CRISIS. 99 ferent. There the parties were more evenly bal- anced, and it was not until the last moment that the decision was clearly pronounced. This was not because they were less patriotic than the other colonies, but because their direct grievances were fewer, and up to this moment they had hoped that the quarrel was one which a change of ministry in Great Britain might adjust. In the earlier stages of the quarrel they had been ready enough to join hands with Massachusetts and Virginia. It was only on this irrevocable decision as to in- dependence that they were slow to act. But in the course of the month of June their responses to the invitation of Congress came in, — from Delaware on the 14th, from New Jersey on the 2 2d, from Pennsylvania on the 24th, from Maryland on the 28th. This action of ^.^^ middle the middle colonies was avowedly based ''oio^^es. on the ground that, in any event, united action was the thing most to be desired ; so that, what- ever their individual preferences might be, they were ready to subordinate them to the interests of the whole country. The broad and noble spirit of patriotism shown in their resolves is worthy of no less credit than the bold action of the colonies which, under the stimulus of direct aggression, first threw down the gauntlet to George III. On the 1st of July, when Lee's motion was taken up in Congress, all the colonies had been heard from except New York. The circumstances 100 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. of this central colony were peculiar. We have already seen that the Tory party was especially strong in New York. Besides this, her position Difficulties in ^^^ morc cxposcd to attack on all New York. g^^^^^g ^^L^^ ^J^j^^ ^^f ^j^y ^^j^gj. g^^^^g^ ^g the military centre of the Union, her territory was sure to be the scene of the most desperate fighting. She was already threatened with invasion from Canada. As a frontier state she was exposed to the incursions of the terrible Iroquois, and as a seaboard state she was open to the attack of the British fleet. At that time, moreover, the popu- lation of New York numbered only about 170,000, and she ranked seventh among the thirteen colo- nies. The military problem was therefore much harder for New York than for Massachusetts or Virginia. Her risks were greater than those of any other colony. For these reasons the Whig party in New York found itself seriously ham- pered in its movements, and the 1st of July ar- rived before their delegates in Congress had been instructed how to vote on the question of inde- pendence. Richard Henry Lee had been suddenly called home to Virginia by the illness of his wife, and so the task of defending his motion fell upon John Adams who had seconded it. His speech on that occasion was so able that Thomas Jeffer- son afterward spoke of him as " the Colossus of that debate." As Congress sat with closed doors THE CRISIS. 101 and no report was made of the speech, we have no definite knowledge of its arguments. Fifty years afterwards, shortly after John Adams's death, Daniel Webster wrote an imaginary speech containing what in substance he might have said. The principal argument in opposition was made by John Dickinson, who thought that before the Americans finally committed themselves to a deadly struggle with Great Britain, they ought to establish some stronger government than the Con- tinental Congress, and ought also to secure a promise of help from some such country as France. This advice was cautious, but it was not sound and practical. War had already begun, and if we had waited to agree upon some permanent kind of government before committing all the col- onies to a formal defiance of Great Britain, there was great danger that the enemy might succeed in breaking up the Union before it was really formed. Besides, it is not likely that France would ever have decided to go to war in our behalf until we had shown that we were able to defend ourselves. It was now a time when the boldest advice was the safest. During this debate on the 1st of July Congress was sitting as a committee of the whole. The l^QCXSLTBr and at the close of the day a preliminary tion of inde- ^ T •! 11 1 • pendence, vote was taken. Like all the votes m July i to 4, the Continental Congress, it was taken by colonies. The majority of votes in each 102 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. delegation determined the vote of that colony. Each colony had one vote, and two-thirds of the whole number, or nine colonies against four, were necessary for a decision. On this occasion the New York delegates did not vote at all, because they had no instructions. One delegate from Del- aware voted yea and another nay ; the third dele- gate, Caesar Rodney, had been down in the lower counties of his little state, arguing against the loyalists. A special messenger had been sent to hurry him back, but he had not yet arrived, and so the vote of Delaware was divided and lost. Pennsylvania declared in the negative by four votes against three. South Carolina also declared in the negative. The other nine colonies all voted in the affirmative, and so the resolution received just votes enough to carry it. A very little more opposition would have defeated it, and would probably have postponed the declaration for sev- eral weeks. The next day Congress took the formal vote upon the resolution. Mr. Rodney had now ar- rived, so that the vote of Delaware was given in the affirmative. John Dickinson and Robert Morris stayed away, so that Pennsylvania was now secured for the affirmative by three votes against two. Though Dickinson and Morris were so slow to believe it necessary or prudent to declare in- dependence, they were firm supporters of the dec- laration after it was made. Without Morris, in- THE CRISIS. 103 deed, it is hard to see how the Revolution could have succeeded. He was the great financier of his time, and his efforts in raising money for the support of our hard-pressed armies were wonder- ful. When the turn of the South Carolina delegates came they changed their votes in order that the declaration might go forth to the world as the unanimous act of the American people. The question was thus settled on the 2d of July, and the next thing was to decide upon the form of the declaration, which Jefferson, who was weak in de- bate but strong with the pen, had already drafted. The work was completed on the 4th of July, when Jefferson's draft was adopted and published to the world. Five days afterward the state of New York declared her approval of these proceedings. The Rubicon was crossed, and the thirteen Eng- lish colonies had become the United States of America. CHAPTER VI. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 1 "While these things were going on at Philadel- phia, the coast of South Carolina, as well as the harbour of New York, was threatened by the British fleet. When the delegates from South Carolina gave their votes on the question of in- dependence, they did not know but the revolu- tionary government in Charleston might already have been taken captive or scattered in flight. After a stormy voyage Sir Peter Parker's squad- ron at length arrived off Cape Fear early in May, and joined Sir Henrys Clinton. Along with Sir Lord Corn- P^tcr Came an officer worthy of especial waiiis. mention. Charles, Earl Cornwallis, was then thirty-eight years old. He had long served with distinction in the British army, and had lately reached the grade of lieutenant-general. In politics he was a New Whig, and had on several occasions signified his disapproval of the king's policy toward America. As a commander his promptness and vigour contrasted strongly with the slothfulness of General Howe. Cornwallis was the ablest of the British generals engaged in the Revolutionary War, and among the public THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 105 men of his time there were few, if any, more high-minded, disinterested, faithful, and pure. After the war was over, he won great fame as governor-general of India from 1786 to 1794. He was afterward raised to the rank of marquis and appointed lord - lieutenant of Ireland. In 1805 he was sent out again to govern India, and died there. On the arrival of the fleet it was decided to at- tack and capture Charleston, and overthrow the new government there. General Charles Lee was sent down by Congress to defend the city, but the South Carolina patriots proved quite able to take care of themselves. On Sullivan's Island in Charleston harbour Colonel William Moultrie built a low elastic fortress of palmetto ^^^^^^ ^^ logs supported by banks of sand and ^JeJ'^me^" mounting several heavy guns. In the ^s, me. cannonade which took place on the 28th of June this rude structure escaped with little injury, while its guns inflicted such serious damage upon the fleet that the British were obliged to abandon for the present all thought of taking Charleston. In the course of July they sailed for New York har- bour to reinforce General Howe. On the 12th of that month the general's brother, Richard, Lord Howe, arrived at Staten Island to take the chief command of the fleet. He was one of the ablest seamen of his time, and was a favourite with his sailors, by whom, on account of his swarthy com- 106 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. plexion, he was familiarly known as " Black Dick." Lord Howe and his brother were author- ized to offer terms to the Americans and endeavour to restore peace by negotiation. It was not easy, however, to find any one in America with whom Lord Howe's *^ negotiate. Lord Howe was sincerely w^?dconcii- dcsirous of making peace and doing iation. something to heal the troubles which had brought on the war ; and he seems to have sup- posed that some good might be effected by private interviews with leading Americans. To send a message to Congress was, of course, not to be thought of ; for that would be equivalent to rec- ognizing Congress as a body entitled to speak for the American people. He brought with him an assurance of amnesty and pardon for all such rebels as would lay down their arms, and decided that it would be best to send it to the American commander ; but as it was not proper to recog- nize the military rank which had been conferred upon Washington by a revolutionary body, he ad- dressed his message to " George Washington, Esq.," as to a private citizen. When Washing- ton refused to receive such a message, his lord- ship could think of no one else to approach except the royal governors. But they had all fled, ex- cept Governor Franklin of New Jersey, who was under close confinement in East Windsor, Con- necticut. All British authority in the United States liad disappeared, and there was no one for THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 107 Lord Howe to negotiate with, unless he should bethink himself of some way of laying his case before Congress. Military operations were now taken up in ear- nest by the British, and were briskly carried on for nearly six months. They were for the most part concentrated upon the state of New York. Before 1776 it was Massachusetts that was the chief object of military measures on the part of the British. That was the colony that since the summer of 1774 had defied the king's troops and set at naught the authority tiie^British of Parliament ; and the first object of piai.^die to the British was to make an example of the colonies ^ 1 1 IT intheDeda- that colony, to suppress the rebellion ration of in- . dependence. there, and to reinstate the royal govern- ment. The king believed that it would not take long to do this, and there is some reason for sup- posing that if he had succeeded in humbling Massachusetts, he would have been ready to listen to Hutchinson's request that the vindictive acts of April, 1774, should be repealed and the char- ter restored. At all events, he seems to have felt confident that things could soon be made so quiet that Hutchinson could return and resume the office of grovernor. If the kinar and his friends had not entertained such ill-founded hopes, they would not have been so ready to resort to violent measures. They made the fatal mistake of sup- posing that such a man as Samuel Adams repre- 108 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. sented only a small party and not the majority of the people. They had also supposed that the other colonies would not make common cause with Massachusetts. But now, before they had accomplished any of their objects, and while their troops had even been driven from Boston, they found that the rebellion had spread through the whole country. They had a belligerent govern- ment to confront, and must now enter upon the task of conquering the United States. The first and most obvious method of attempt- ing this was to strike at New York as Brifishcon- tlic military centre. In such a plan their attack everything seemed to favour the British. state of New Tlic statc was Comparatively weak in fork. , . ^ ^ -^ , population and resources ; a large pro- portion of the people were Tories ; and close at hand on the frontier, which was then in the Mo- hawk valley, were the most formidable Indians on the continent. These Iroquois had long been under the influence of the famous Sir William Johnson, of Johnson Hall, near Schenectady, and his son Sir John Johnson. Their principal sa- chem, Joseph Brant, or Thayendanegea, was con- nected by the closest bonds of friendship with the Johnsons, and the latter were staunch Tories. It might reasonably be expected that the entire force of these Indians could be enlisted on the British side. The work for the regular army seemed thus to be reduced to the single problem of capturing THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 109 the city of New York and obtaining full control of the Hudson river. If this could be done, the United States would be cut in two. As the Americans had no ships of war, they could not dispute the British command of the water. There was no way in which the New England states could hold communication with the South except across the southern part of the state of New York. To gain this central posi- tion would thus be to deal a fatal blow to the American cause, and it seemed to the British gov- ernment that, with the forces now in the field, this ought easily to be accomplished. General Carle- ton was ready to come down from the north by way of Lake Champlain, with 12,000 men, and General Schuyler could scarcely muster half as many to oppose him. On Staten Island there were more than 25,000 British troops ready to attack New York, while Washington's utmost ex- ertions had succeeded in getting together only about 18,000 men for the defence of the city. The American army was as yet very j)oor in organization and discipline, badly equipped, and scantily fed ; and it seemed very doubtful whether it could long keep the field in the presence of superior forces. But in spite of all these circumstances, so favourable to the British, there was one obstacle to their success upon which at first they did not sufficiently reckon. That obstacle was furnished 110 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. by the genius and character of the wonderful man who commanded the American army. mmta^^ °" ^ In Washington were combined all the highest qualities of a general, — dog- ged tenacity of purpose, endless fertility in re- source, sleepless vigilance, and unfailing courage. No enemy ever caught him unawares, and he never let slip an opportunity of striking back. He had a rare geographical instinct, always knew where the strongest position was, and how to reach it. He was a master of the art of concealing his own plan and detecting his adversary's. He knew better than to hazard everything upon the result of a single contest, and because of the enemy's superior force he was so often obliged to refuse battle that some of his impatient critics called him slow ; but no general was ever quicker in dealing heavy blows when the proper moment arrived. He was neither unduly elated by victory nor dis- couraged by defeat. When all others lost heart he was bravest ; and at the very moment when ruin seemed to stare him in the face, he was craft- ily preparing disaster and confusion for the enemy. To the highest qualities of a military com- mander there were united in Washington those of a political leader. From early youth he possessed the art of winning men's confidence. He was simple without awkwardness, honest without blunt- ness, and endowed with rare discretion and tact. His temper was fiery and on occasion he could THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. Ill use pretty strong language, but anger or disap- pointment was never allowed to disturb the justice and kindness of his judgment. Men felt them- selves safe in putting entire trust in his head and his heart, and they were never deceived. Thus he soon obtained such a hold upon the people as few statesmen have ever possessed. It was this grand character that, with his clear intelligence and unflagging industry, enabled him to lead the nation triumphantly through the perils of the Revolutionary War. He had almost every im- aginable hardship to contend with, — envious ri- vals, treachery and mutiny in the camp, interfer- ence on the part of Congress, jealousies between the states, want of men and money ; yet all these difficulties he vanquished. Whether victorious or defeated on the field, he baffled the enemy in the first year's great campaign and in the second year's, and then for four years more upheld the cause until heart-sickening delay was ended in glorious triumph. It is very doubtful if without Washington the struggle for independence would have succeeded as it did. Other men were im- portant, he was indispensable. The first great campaign began, as might have been expected, with defeat on the field. In order to keep possession of the city of New York it was necessary to hold Brooklyn Heights. That was a dangerous position for an American force, because it was entirely separated from New York by deep 112 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. water, and could thus be cut off from the rest of the American army by the enemy's fleet. It was necessary, however, for Washington either to oc- cupy Brooklyn Heights or to give up the city of New York without a struggle. But the latter course was out of the question. It would never do to abandon the Whigs in New York to the tender mercies of the Tories, without at Battle of 1 n T o 1 ... Long Island, least OUC gOOQ light. OO tllC pOSltlOU lli Brooklyn must be fortified, and there was perhaps one chance in a hundred that, through some blunder of the enemy, we might succeed in holding it. Accordingly 9000 men were stationed on Brooklyn Heights under Putnam, who threw forward about half of this force, under Sullivan and Stirling, to defend the southern approaches through the rugged country between Gowanus bay and Bedford. On the 22d of August General Howe crossed from Staten Island to Gravesend bay with 20,000 men, and on the 27th he defeated. Sullivan and Stirling in what has ever since been known as the battle of Long Island. About 400 men were killed and wounded on each side, and 1000 Americans, including both generals, were taken captive. A more favourable result for the Americans was not to be expected, as the British outnumbered them four to one, and could there- fore march where they pleased and turn the Amer- ican flank without incurring the slightest risk. The wonder is, not that 5000 half-trained soldiers THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 113 were defeated by 20,000 veterans, but that they should have given General Howe a good day's work in defeating them. The American forces were now withdrawn into their works on Brooklyn Heights, and Howe ad- vanced to besiege them. During the next two days Washington collected boats and on the nio^ht oi the 29th conveyed the army ton's skii- ■I -I-. -!-». XT Ar 1 ful retreat. across the East River to Jacw York. With the enemy's fleet patrolling the harbour ^nd their army watching the works, this was a most remarkable performance. To this day one cannot understand, unless on the supposition that the British were completely dazed and moon- struck, how Washington could have done it. People were much disheartened by the defeat on Long Island and the immediate prospect of losing New York. Lord Howe turned his thoughts once more to negotiation, and at length, on Sei3tember 11, succeeded in obtaining an in- formal interview with -Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge. But nothing was accom- plished, and seventeen eventful months elapsed before the British again seriously tried negotia- tion. General Howe had extended his lines north- ward, and on the 15th his army crossed ^^^^ ^^^^^ the East Eiver in boats, and landed ^fpl^iSf' near the site of Thirty-Fourth street. ^^^^• On the same day Washington completed the work of evacuating the city. His army was drawn up 114 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. across the island from the mouth of Harlem river to Fort Washington, and over on the Jersey side of the Hudson, opposite Fort Washington, a de- taclunent occupied Fort Lee. It was hoj)ed that these two forts would be able to prevent British ships from going up the Hudson river, but this hope soon proved to be delusive. On the 16th General Howe tried to break through the centre of Washington's position at Harlem Heights, but after losing 300 men he gave up the attempt, and spent the next three weeks in studying the situation. A sad incident came now to remind the people of the sternness of military law. Nathan Hale, a young graduate of Yale College, captain of a company of Con- necticut rangers, had been for several days within the British lines gathering information. Just as he had accomplished his purpose, and was on the point of departing with his memoranda, he was arrested as a spy and hanged next morning, la- menting on the gallows that he had but one life to lose for his country. As Howe deemed it prudent not to attack Washington in front, he tried to get around into his rear, and began on October 12 by landing a large force at Throg's Neck, in the Sound. But Battle of Washington baffled him by changing Sain« Oct fi'ont, swinging his left wing northward 28, 1776. ^g £^j. ^g ^^i^ite Plains. After further reflection Howe decided to try a front attack once I THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 115 i more ; on the 28th he assaulted the position al , White Plains, and carried one of the outposts, I losing twice as many men as the Americans. Not wishing' to continue the fight at such a disadvan- tage he paused again, and Washington improved i the occasion by retiring to a still stronger position at Northcastle. These movements had separated W^ashington's main body from his right wing at Forts Washington and Lee, and Howe now changed his plan. Desisting from the attempt ; against the American main body, he moved south- ; ward against this exposed wing. 1 A sad catastrophe now followed, which showed f how many obstacles Washington had to contend with. It was laiown that Carle ton's army was on the way from Canada. Congress was ner- vously afraid of losing its hold upon the Hudson ! river, and Washington accordingly selected W^est [ Point as the strongest position upon the river, to ; be fortified and defended at all hazards. He sent ; Heath, with 3000 men, to hold the Highland I passes, and went up himself to inspect the situa- tion and give directions about the new fortifica- tions. He left 7000 of his main body at North- ; castle, in charge of Lee, who had just returned from South Carolina. He sent 5000, under Put- nam, across the river to Hackensack ; and ordered Greene, who had some 5000 men at Forts W^ash- ington and Lee, to prepare to evacuate both those strongholds and join his forces to Putnam's. 116 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 1 If tliese orders had been carried out, Howe's movement against Fort Washington would have accomplished but little, for on reaching that place, he would have found nothing but empty works, as at Brooklyn. The American right wing would have been drawn together at Hackensack, and the whole army could have been concentrated on either bank of the great river, as the occasion might seem to require. If Howe should aim at the Highlands, it could be kept close to the river and cover all the passes. If, on the other hand, Howe should threaten the Congress at Philadel- phia, the whole army could be collected in New Jersey to hold him in check. But Washington's orders were not obeyed. Congress was so uneasy that it sent word to Greene to hold both his forts as long as he could. Accordingly he strengthened the garrison at Fort Howe takes Washington, just in time for Howe to SjtoiTNov overwhelm and capture it, on the 16th 16,1776. ^£ November, after an obstinate resist- ance. In killed and wounded the British loss was three times as great as that of the garrison, but the Americans were in no condition to afford the loss of 3000 men taken prisoners. It was a terrible blow. On the 19th Greene barely suc- ceeded in escaping from Fort Lee, with his re- maining 2000 men, but without his cannon and stores. Bad as the situation was, however, it did not THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. Ill become really alarming until it was complicated with the misconduct of General Lee. Washino^- ton had returned from West Point on the 14th, too late to prevent the catastrophe ; but after all it was only necessary for Lee's wing of the army to cross the river, and there would be a solid force of 14,000 men on the Jersey side, able to con- front the enemy on something like equal terms, for Howe had to keep a good many of his troops in New York. On the 17th Washington ordered Lee to come over and join him ; but Lee Treachery of disobeyed, and in spite of repeated or- Charles Lee. ders from Washington he stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to Washington. A good many people were find- ing fault with the latter for losing the 3000 men at Fort Washington, although, as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of Conofress. Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would surely become his successor in the command of the army, and so, instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they had been able to do for themselves since they Washington's started from Staten Island. It was the [hroTgh New cause of Washington's flight through ^^^^^^' New Jersey, ending on the 8 th of December, when 118 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 1 lie put himself behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3000 men. Here was another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present, they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time had expired. It was gener- ally believed that Washington's army would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not think it worth while to be at the trouble of col- lecting boats wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned to New York to celebrate the oc- casion. J While the case looked so desperate for Wash- ington, events at the north had taken a less un- favourable turn. Carleton had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted Arnold's na- n n i • i vai battle at up a Small flcct to opposc his advaucc, Valcour Id- and, Oct. 11, and on the 11th of October there had 1776. been a fierce naval battle between the two near Valcour Island, in which Arnold was de- feated, while Carleton suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced upon Ticon- deroga, but suddenly made up his mind that the season was too late for operations in that latitude. Tlie resistance he had encountered seems to have THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 119 made him despair of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d of November he started back for Canada, This retreat relieved General Schujder at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and presently he detached seven regi- ments to go southward to Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the Hud- son with 4000 men, and proceeded slowly to Mor- ristown. Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it cer- tainly was. Whatever Iris plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud. For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an un- guarded tavern, about four miles from his army ; and there he was captured next mornino^ Charles Lee by a party of British drag-oons, who is captured . 1 1 • ^r- 1 • -r» • ^y British carried him on to their camp at Prince- dragoons, ^ Dec. 13, 1776. ton. The dragoons were very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they could not have done the Americans a greater service than to rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid of Washing- ton. Even after tliis force and that sent by Schuyler had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6000 men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly 120 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and in the history of the Revolutionary- War. On Christmas, 1776, and the following nine days, all Washington's most brilliant pow- ers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 Batti strong, lay at Princeton. The principal Jrenton,Dec. geucrals, thinking the serious business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced party of Hessians, 1000 strong, was posted on the bank of the Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at Bur- lington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts, and arranged his troops accord- ingly, but when Christmas night arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2500 in number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hes- sians at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington, on hearing the news, re- treated to Princeton. By the 31st Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton. Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others who had just gone home. At this ., critical moment the army was nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning Rob- I ert Morris was knocking at door after door in | Philadelphia, waking up his friends to borrow the Ij WashljTQfons Campaign's NE^^^fL^HS^n' 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 121 fifty thousand dollars which he sent off to Tren- ton before noon. The next day Cornwallis ar- rived at Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a rear-guard of 2000 men left to protect his communications, came on toward Tren- ton. When he reached that town, late in the after- noon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware river. " Oho ! " said Corn- wallis, " at last we have run down the old fox, and we will bag him in the morning." He sent back to Princeton, and ordered the rear-guard to come up. He expected next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and then press him back against the broad and deep river, and compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and en- trenching, and made a fine show with his camp- fires. Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Carnwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he en- 1 1 -r» • • 1 If Battle of countered the British rear-gfuard, fousfht Princeton, a sharp battle with it and sent it flymg, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The 122 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. booming gnns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown. There was small hope of dislodging such a gen- eral from such a position. But to leave Washing- ton in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hud- son on the one hand, and the roads to Philadel- phia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York — which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion — they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In nine days the tables had been completely turned. The attack upon an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The ill- timed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied ; the treach- ery of Lee was checkmated ; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local ; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means. The American war had begun to awaken inter- est in Europe, especially in France, whither THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 123 Franklin, with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, had been sent to seek for military aid. The '' Effects of the French government was not yet ready ^mpaign, in to make an alliance with the United States, but money and arms were secretly sent over to Congress. Several young French nobles had asked the king's permission to go to America, but it was refused, and for the sake of keeping up appearances the refusal had something of the air of a reprimand. The king did not wish to of- fend Great Britain prematurely. One of these nobles was Lafayette, then eighteen years of age, who fitted up a ship at his own expense, and sailed from Bordeaux in April, 1777, in spite of the royal prohibition, taking with him Kalb and other officers. Lafayette and Kalb, with the Poles, Kosciuszko and Pulaski, who had come some time before, and the German Steuben, who came in the following December, were the five most eminent foreigners who received conamissions in the Continental army. During the winter season at Morristown the ef- forts of Washino-ton were directed toward the es- rablishment of a regular army to be kept together for three years or so long as the war should last. Hitherto the military preparations of Congress had been absurdly weak. Squads of militia had been enlisted for terms of three or six months, as if there were any likelihood of the war being ended within such a period. While the men thus 124 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. kept coming and going, it was difficult either to maintain discipline or to carry out any series of military operations. Accordingly Con- raising an stress now proceeded to call upon the army. o a -l states for an army of 80,000 men to serve during the war. The enlisting was to be done by the states, but the money was to be fur- nished by Congress. Not half that number of men were actually obtained. The Continental army was larger in 1777 than in any other year, but the highest number it reached was only 34,820. In addition to these about 34,000 militia turned out in the course of the year. An army of 80,000 would have taken about the same pro- portion of all the fighting men in the country as an army of 1,000,000 in our great Civil War. Now in our Civil War the Union army grew with the occasion until it numbered more than 1,000,000. But in the Kevolutionary War the Continental army was not only never equal to the occasion, but it kept diminishing till in 1781 it numbered only 13,292. This was because the Continental Congress had no power to enforce its decrees. It could only ash for troops and it could only ash for money. It found just the same diffi- culty in getting anything that the British ministry and the royal governors used to find, — the very same difficulty that led Grenville to devise the Stamp Act. Everything had to be talked over in thirteen different legislatures, one state would THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 125 f I wait to see* what another was going to do, and meanwhile Washington was expected to fight bat- tles before his army was fit to take the field. f Something was gained, no doubt, by Congress I furnishing the money. But as Congress could i not tax anybody, it had no means of raising a rev- I enue, except to beg, borrow, or issue its promis- sory notes, the so-called Continental paper cur- rency. While Congress was trying to raise an adequate I army, the British ministry laid its plans i /. , 1 • rri The British tor the summer campaign. Ine con- plan for con- quest of the state of New York must be York in . 1777. completed at all hazards ; and to this end a threefold system of movements was de- vised : — Firsts the army in Canada was to advance upon Ticonderoga, capture it, and descend the ; Hudson as far as Albany. This work was now I entrusted to General Burgoyne. Secondly^ in order to make sure of efficient support from the Six Nations and the Tories of the frontier, a small force under Colonel Barry St. Leger was to go up the St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario, land at Oswego, and march down the Mohawk valley to reinforce Burgoyne on the j Hudson. I Thirdly^ after leaving a sufficient force to hold I the city of New York, the main army, under Sir William Howe, was to ascend the Hudson, cap- 126 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. ture the forts in the Highlands, and. keep on to Albany, so as to effect a junction with Burgojme and St. Leger. It was thought that such an imposing display of military force would make the Tory party su- preme in New York, put an end to aU resistance there, and effectually cut the United States in two. Then if the southern states on the one hand and the New England states on the other did not hasten to submit, they might afterward be attacked separately and subdued. In this plan the ministry made the fatal mis- take of imderrating the strength of the feeling which, from one end of the United States to the other, was setting itself every day more and more decidedly against the Tories and in favour of independence. This feeling grew as fast as the anti-slavery feeling grew among the northern peo- ple during our Civil War. In 1861 President Lincoln thought it necessary to rebuke his gen- erals who were too forward in setting free the slaves of persons engaged in rebellion against the United States. In 1862 he announced his purpose to emancipate all such slaves ; and then it took less than three years to put an end to slav- ery forever. It was just so with the sentiment in favour of separation from Great Britain. In July, 1775, Thomas Jefferson expressly declared that the Americans had not raised armies with any in- tention of declaring their independence of the THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 127 mother-country. In July, 1776, the Declaration of Independence, written by Jefferson, was pro- claimed to the world, though the consent of the middle colonies and of South Carolina seemed somewhat reluctant. By the summer of 1777 the Tories were almost everywhere in a hopeless minority. Every day of warfare, showing Great Britain more and more clearly as an enemy to be got rid of, diminished their strength ; so that, even in New York and South Carolina, where they were strongest, it would not do for the Brit- ish ministry to count too much upon any support they might give. It was natural enough that King George and his ministers should fail to understand all this, but their mistake was their ruin. If they had understood that Burgoyne's march from Lake Champlain to the Hudson river was to be a march through a country thorouglily hostile, perhaps they would not have been so ready to send him on such a dangerous expedition. It would have been much easier and safer to have sent his army by sea to New York, to reinforce Sir WiUiam Howe. Threatening movements might have been made by some of the Canada forces against Ticonderoga, so as to keep Schuyler busy in that quarter ; and then the army at New York, thus increased to nearly 40,000 men, might have had a fair chance of overwhelming Washington by sheer weight of numbers. Such a plan might have failed, but it is 128 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. not likely that it would have led to the surrender of the British army. And if they could have disposed of Washington, the British might have succeeded. It was more necessary for them to get rid of him than to march up and down the val- ley of the Hudson. But it was not strange that they did not see this as we do. It is always easy enough to be wise after things have happened. Even as it was, if their plan had really been followed, they might have succeeded. If Howe's army had gone up to meet Burgoyne, the history of the year 1777 would have been very different from what it was. We shall presently see why it did not do so. Let us now recount the fortunes jof Burgoyne and St. Leger. Burgoyne came up Lake Champlain in June, and easily won Ticonderoga, because the Ameri- cans had failed to secure a neighbouring position Burgoyne wMch Commanded the fortress. Bur- derogafjury ^^T^^ ^^^^ Ticoudcroga from Mount 6,1777. Defiance, just as the Americans would have taken Boston from Bunker Hill, if they had been able to stay there, just as they afterward did take it from Dorchester Heights, and just as Howe took New York after he had won Brooklyn Heights. When you have secured a position from which you can kiU the enemy twice as fast as he can kill you, he must of course retire from the situation ; and the sooner he goes, the better chance he has of living to fight another day. The THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 129 same principle worked in all these cases, and it worked with General Howe at Harlem Heights and at White Plains. When it was known that Burgoyne had taken Ticonderoga, there was dreadful dismay in Amer- ica p,iid keen disappointment among those Whigs in England whose declared sympathies were with us. George HI. was beside himself with glee, and thought that the Americans were finally de- feated and disposed of. But they were all mis- taken. The garrison of Ticonderoga had taken the alarm and retreated, so that Burgoyne cap- tured only an empty fortress. He left 1000 men in charge of it, and then pressed on into the wil- derness between Lake Champlain and the upper waters of the Hudson river. His real danger was now beginning to show itself, and every day it could be seen more distinctly. He was plunging into a forest, far away from all possible support from behind, and as he went on he found that there were not Tories enough in that part of the country to be of any use to him. As Burgoyne advanced, General Schuyler prudently retreated, and used up the enemy's time by breaking down bridges and putting every possible obstacle in his way. Schuyler was a rare man, thoroughly disin- terested and full of sound sense ; but he had many political enemies who were trying to pull him down. A large part of his army was made up of New England men^ who hated him partly for the 130 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. ^ mere reason tliat he was a New Yorker, and partly because as such he had taken part in the long quarrel between New York and New Hampshire over the possession of the Green Mountains. The disaffection toward Schuyler was fomented by General Horatio Gates, who had for some time held command under him, but was now in Phila- schuyier dclpliia currying favour with the dele- and Gates, g^tes iu Cougrcss, especially with those from New England, in the hope of getting himself appointed to the command of the northern army in Schuyler's place. Gates was an extremely weak man, but so vain that he really believed himself equal to the highest command that Congress could be persuaded to give him. On the battle-field he seems to have been wanting even in personal cour- age, as he certainly was in power to handle his troops ; but in society he was quite a lion. He had a smooth courteous manner and a plausible tongue which paid little heed to the difference be- tween truth and falsehood. His lies were not very ingenious, and so they were often detected and pointed out. But while many people were dis- gusted by his selfishness and trickery, there were always some who insisted that he was a great gen- ius. History can point to a good many men like General Gates. Such men sometimes shine for a while, but sooner or later they always come to be recognized as humbugs. While Gates was intriguing, Schuyler was do- THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 131 ing all in his power to impede the enemy's prog- ress. It was on the night of July 5 that the garrison of Ticonderoga, under General St. Clair, had abandoned the fortress and retreated south- ward. On the 7th a battle was fought at Hubbardton between St. Clair's rear, Hubbardton, under Seth Warner, and a portion of the British army under Fraser and Riedesel. Warner was defeated, but only after such an ob- stinate resistance as to check the pursuit, so that by the 12th St. Clair was able to bring his re- treating troops in safety to Fort Edward, where they were united with Schuyler's army. Schuyler managed his obstructions so well that Burgoyne's utmost efforts were required to push into the wil- derness at the rate of one mile per day ; and meanwhile Schuyler was collecting a force of militia in the Green Mountains, under General Lincoln, to threaten Burgoyne in the rear and cut off his communications with Lake Champlain. Burgoyne was accordingly marching into a trap, and Schuyler was doing the best that could be done. But on the first of August the intrigue against him triumphed in Congress, and Gates was appointed to supersede him in the command of the northern army. Gates, however, did not arrive upon the scene until the 19th of August, and by that time Burgoyne's situation was evi- dently becoming desperate. On the last day of July Burgoyne reached Fort 132 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. Edward, wliich Schuyler had evacuated just be- fore. Schuyler crossed the Hudson river, and continued his retreat to Stillwater, about thirty miles above Albany. It was as far as the Ameri- can retreat was to go. Burgoyne was already get- ting short of provisions, and before he could ad- vance much further he needed a fresh supply of horses to drag the cannon and stores. He began to realize, when too late, that he had come far into an enemy's country. The hostile feelings of the people were roused to fury by the atrocities committed by the Indians employed in Burgoyne's army. The British supposed that the savages would prove very useful as scouts and guides, and that by offers of reward and threats of punish- ment they might be restrained from deeds of vio- lence. They were very unruly, however, and apt to use the tomahawk when they found a chance. The sad death of Miss Jane McCrea has been described in almost as many ways as there have been people to describe it, but no one reaUy knows how it happened. What is really known Jane Mc- ^^ *^^*5 ^n the 27th of July, while Miss crea. McCrca was staying with her friend Mrs. McNeil, near Fort Edward, a party of Indians burst into the house and carried off both ladies. They were pursued by some American soldiers, and a few shots were exchanged. In the course of the scrimmage the party got scattered, and Mrs. McNeil was taken alone to the British camp. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 133 Next day an Indian came into the camp with Miss McCrea's scalp, which her friend recognized from its long silky hair. A search was made, and the body of the poor girl was found lying near a spring, pierced with three bullet-wounds. The Indian's story, that she was accidentally killed by a volley from the American soldiers, may well enough have been true. It is also known that she was betrothed to David Jones, a lieutenant in Burgoyne's army, and, as her own home was in New Jersey, her visit to Mrs. McNeil may very likely have been part of a plan for meeting her lover. These facts were soon woven into a story, in which Jenny was said to have been murdered while on her way to her wedding, escorted by a party of Indians whom her imprudent lover had sent to take charge of her. The people of the neighbouring counties, in New York and Massachusetts, enraged at the death of Miss McCrea and alarmed for the safety of their own firesides, began rising in arms. Sturdy recruits began marching to join Schuyler at Stillwater and Lincoln at Manchester in -the Green Mountains. Meanwhile Burgoyne had made up his mind to attack the village g^ttie of of Bennington, which was Lincoln's ^^^^iC""' centre of supplies. By seizing these ^^^^' supplies, he could get for himself what he stood sorely in need of, while at the same time the loss woidd cripple Lincoln and perhaps oblige him to 134 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. retire from the scene. Accordingly 1000 Ger- mans were sent out, in two detachments under colonels Baum and Breymann, to capture the vil- lage. But instead they were captured themselves. Baum was first outmanoeuvred, surrounded, and forced to surrender by John Stark, after a hot fight, in which Baum was mortally wounded. Then Breymann was put to flight and his troops dispersed by Seth Warner. Of the whole Ger- man force, 207 were killed or wounded, and at least 700 captured. Not more than 70 got back to the British camp. The American loss in killed and wounded was 56. This brilliant victory at Bennington had impor- tant consequences. It checked Burgoyne's ad- vance until he could get his supplies, and it de- cided that Lincoln's militia could get in his rear and cut off his communications with Ticonderoga. It furthermore inspired the Americans with the exulting hope that Burgoyne's whole army could be surrounded and forced to surrender. If, however, the British had been successful in gaining the Mohawk valley and ensuring the su- premacy over that region for the Tories, the fate of Burgoyne might have been averted. The Tories in that region, under Sir John Johnson and Colonel John Butler, were really formidable. As for the Indians of the Iroquois league, they had always been friendly to the English and hos- tile to the French ; but now, when it came to mak- THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 135 ing their choice between two kinds of English — the Americans and the British, they hesitated and differed in opinion. The Mohawks took Sides with the rJritish because oi the the Mohawk valley. friendship between Joseph Brant and the Johnsons. The Cayugas and Senecas fol- lowed on the same side ; but the Onondagas, in the centre of the confederacy, remained neutral, and the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, under the in- fluence of Samuel Kirldand and other mission- aries, showed active sympathy with the Americans. It turned out, too, that the Whigs were much stronger in the valley than had been supposed. After St. Leger had landed at Oswego and joined hands with his Tory and Indian allies, his entire force amounted to about 1700 men. The principal obstacle to his progress toward the Hudson river was Fort Stanwix, which stood where the city of Kome now stands. On the 3d of August St. Leger reached Fort Stanwix and laid siege to it. The place was garrisoned by 600 men under Colonel Peter Gansevoort, and the Whig yeomanry of the neighbourhood, under the heroic General Nicholas Herkimer, were on the way to relieve it, to the number of at least 800. Herldmer made an excellent plan for surprising St. Leger with an attack in the rear, while the garrison should sally forth and attack him in front. But St. Leger's Indian scouts were more nimble than Herkimer's messengers, so that he 136 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. obtained his information sooner than Gansevoort. An ambush was skilfully prepared by Brant in a ravine near Oriskany, and there, on the Battle of .; ' ' oriskany, gth of August, was f ought the most des- perate and murderous battle of the Revolutionary War. It was a hand to hand fight, in which about 800 men were engaged on each side, and each lost niore than one-third of its number. As the Tories and Indians were giving way, their retreat was hastened by the sounds of battle from Fort Stanwix, where the garrison was making its sally and driving back the besiegers. Herkimer remained in possession of the field at Oriskany, but his plan had been for the moment thwarted, and in the battle he had received a wound from which he died. Benedict Arnold had lately been sent by Wash- ington to be of such assistance as he could to Schuyler. Arnold stood high in the confidence of both these generals. He had shown himself one of the ablest officers in the American army, he was especially skilful in getting good work out of raw troops, and he was a great favourite with his men. On hearing of the danger of Fort Stan- wix, Schuyler sent him to the rescue, with 1200 men. When he was within twenty miles of that stronghold, he contrived, with the aid of some friendly Oneidas and a Tory captive whose life he spared for the purpose, to send on before him ex- aggerated reports of the size of his army. The THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 137 device accomplished far more than he could have expected. The obstinate resistance at Oriskany had discouraged the Tories flight.Aug. and angered the Indians. Distrust and dissension were already rife in St. Leger's camp, when such reports came in as to lead many to be- lieve that Burgoyne had been totally defeated, and that the whole of Schuyler's army, or a great part of it, was coming up the Mohawk. This news led to riot and panic among the troops, and on August 22 St. Leger took to flight and made his way as best he could to his ships at Oswego, with scarcely the shred of an army left. This catastrophe showed how sadly mistaken the Brit- ish had been in their reliance upon Tory help. The battle of Bennington was fought on the 16th of August. Now by the overthrow of St. Leger, six days later, Burgoyne's situation had become very alarming. It was just in the midst of these events that Gates arrived, on August 19, and took command of the army at Still- water, which was fast growing in numbers. Mi- litia were flocking in, Arnold's force was returning, and Daniel Morgan was at hand with 500 Virgin- ian sharpshooters. Unless Burgoyne could win a battle against overwhelming odds, there was only one thing that could save him ; and that was the arrival of Howe's army at Albany, according to the ministry's programme. But Burgoyne had not yet heard a word from Howe ; and Howe never came. 138 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. This failure of Howe to cooperate with Bur- goyne was no doubt the most fatal military blun- der made by the British in the whole course of the war. The failure was of course unintentional Why Howe ^^ Howc's pai't. He meant to extend erate with^^ sufficicut support to Burgoyuc, but the Burgoyne. troublc was that he attempted too much. He had another plan in his mind at the same time, and between the two he ended by accom- plishing nothing. While he kept one eye on Al- bany, he kept the other on Philadelphia. He had not relished being driven back across New Jersey by Washington, and the hope of defeating that general in battle, and then pushing on to the " rebel capital " strongly tempted him. In such thoughts he was encouraged by the advice of the captive General Lee. That unscrupulous busy- body felt himseK in great danger, for he knew that the British regarded him in the light of a de- serter from their army. While his fate was in suspense, he informed the brothers Howe that he had abandoned the American cause, and he of- fered them his advice and counsel for the summer campaign. This villainy of Lee's was not known till eighty years afterward, when a paper of his was discovered that revealed it in all its black- ness. The Howes were sure to pay some heed to Lee's opinions, because he was supposed to have acquired a thorough knowledge of American af- fairs. He advised them to begin by taking Phik THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 13t adelphia, and supported this plan by plausible arguments. Sir William Howe seems to have thought that he could accomplish this early in the summer, and then have his hands free for what- ever might be needed on the Hudson river. Ac- cordingly on the 12th of June he started to cross the state of New Jersey with 18,000 men. But Sir William had reckoned without his host. In a campaign of eighteen days, Washing- ton, with only 8000 men, completely blocked the way for hinl, and made him give up the game. The popular histories do not have much to say about these eighteen days, because they were not marked by battles. Washinojton won by his •^ ... . . Washington's marvellous skill in choosing positions masterly , -T . . , campaign in where Howe could not attack him with New jersey, June, 1777. any chance of success. Howe under- stood this and did not attack. He could not en- tice Washington into fighting at a disadvantage, and he could not march on and leave such an en- emy behind without sacrificing his own communi- cations. Accordingly on June 30 he gave up his plan and retreated to Staten Island. If there ever was a g^eneral who understood the useful art of wasting his adversary's time,' Washington was that general. Howe now decided to take his army to Phila- delphia by sea. He waited a while till the news from the north seemed to show that Burgoyne was carrying everything before him ; and then he 140 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. thought it safe to start. He left Sir Henry Clin- ton in command at New York, with 7000 men, telling him to send a small force up the river to help Burgoyne, should there be any need of it, which did not then seem likely. Then he put to sea with his main force of 18,000 men, and went around to the Delaware river, which he reached at the end of July, just as Burgoyne was reaching Fort Edward. Howe's next move was very strange. He af- terward said that he did not go up the Delaware ■river, because he found that there were st?a!fgemove- obstructious and forts to be passed. PhUadeiphia, But hc might have gone up a little way Chesapeake and landed his forces on the Delaware *^' coast at a point where a single march would have brought them to Elkton, at the head of Chesapeake bay, about fifty miles southwest from Philadelphia. Instead of this, he put out to sea again and sailed four hundred miles, to the mouth of Chesapeake bay and up that bay to Elk- ton, where he landed his men on the 25th of Au- gust. Why he took such a roundabout course cannot be understood, unless he may have at- tached importance to Lee's advice that the pres- ence of a British squadron in Chesapeake bay would help to arouse the Tories in Maryland. The British generals could not seem to make up their minds that America was a hostile country. Small blame to them, brave fellows that they THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 141 were ! They could not make war against America in such a fierce spirit as that in which France would now make war against Germany if she could see her way clear to do so. They were al- ways counting on American sympathy, and this was a will-o'-the-wisp that lured them to destruc- tion. On landing at Elkton, Howe received orders from London, telling him to ascend the Hudson river and support Burgoyne, in any event. This order had left London in May. It was well for the Americans that the telegraph had not then been invented. Now it was the 25th of August ; Bur- goyne was in imminent peril ; and Howe was three hundred miles away from him ! All these movements had been carefully watched by Washington ; and as Howe marched toward Philadelphia he found that general blocking the way at the fords of the Brandywine •^ -^ Battle of the creek. A battle ensued on the 11th of Brandywine, Sept. 11, 1777. September. It was a well-contested battle. With 11,000 men against 18,000, Wash- ington could hardly have been expected to win a victory. He was driven from the field, but not badly defeated. He kept his army well in hand, and manoeuvred so skilfidly that the British were employed for two weeks in getting over the twenty-six miles to Philadelphia. Before Howe had reached that city. Congress had moved away to York in Pennsylvania. When 142 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. he had taken Philadelphia, he found that he could not stay there without taking the forts on the Delaware river which prevented the British ships from coming up ; for by land Washington could cut off his supplies, and he could only be sure of them by water. So Howe detached part of his army to reduce these forts, leaving the rest of it at Germantown, six miles from Philadelphia. On the 4th of October, Washington at- Battle of Ger- ' ^ . mantown, tackcd thc f orcc at Germantown in such Oct. 4, 1777. a position that defeat would have quite destroyed it. The attempt failed at the critical moment because of a dense fog in which one American brigade fired into another and caused a brief panic. The forts on the Delaware were cap- tured after hard fighting, and Washington went into winter quarters at Valley Forge. The result of the summer's work was that, be- cause Howe had made several mistakes and Wash- ington had taken the utmost advantage of every one of them, the whole British plan was spoiled. Howe had used up the whole season in getting to Philadelphia, and Washington's activity had also kept Sir Henry Clinton's attention so much occu- pied with what was going on about the Delaware river as to prevent him from sending aid to the northward until it was too late. Sir Henry was once actually obliged to send reinforcements to Howe. Thus Burgoyne was left to himself. He sup- THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CENTRE. 143 posed that Howe was coming up the Hudson river to meet him, and so on September 13 he crossed the river and advanced to attack Gates's army, which was occupying a strong position at Bemis Heights, between Stillwater and Saratoga. It was a desperate move. While Burgoyne was making it, Lincoln's men cut his communications with Ticonderoga, so that his only hope lay in help from below ; and such help never came. In this extremity he was obliged to fight on ground chosen by the Americans, because he must either fight or starve. Under these circumstances Burgoyne fought two battles with consummate gallantry. The first was on September 19, the second on Burgoyne is October 7. In each battle the Amer- ^^^tSd icans were led by Arnold and Morgan, ^^^'J^'^S'lt and Gates deserves no credit for either. ^'^^' In both battles Arnold was the leading spirit, and in the second he was severely wounded at the mo- ment of victory. In the first battle the British Vvere simply repidsed, in the second they were totally defeated. This settled the fate of Bur- goyne, and on the 17th of October he surrendered his whole army, now reduced to less than 6000 men, as prisoners of war. Before the final catas- trophe Sir Henry Clinton had sent a small force up the river to relieve him, but it was too late. The relieving force succeeded in capturing some of the Highland forts, but turned back on hear- ing of Burgoyne' s surrender. CHAPTER Vn. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. This capture of a British army made more ado in Europe than anything which had happened for many a day. It was compared to Leuktra and the Caudine Fork. The immediate effect in Eng- Lord North ^^^^ ^^^ *^ wcakcu the king and cause f?oTl\id ^^^^ North to change his policy. The iMh tea-duty and the obnoxious acts of 1774 Feb., 1778. ^^qj-q repealed, the principles of colonial independence of Parliament laid down by Otis and Henry were admitted, and commissioners were sent over to America to negotiate terms of peace. It was hoped that by such ample concessions the Americans might be so appeased as to be willing to adopt some arrangement which would leave their country a part of the British Empire. As soon as the French government saw the first symp- toms of such a change of policy on the part of Lord North, it decided to enter into an alliance with the United States. There was much sym- pathy for the Americans among educated people of all grades of society in France ; but the action of the government was determined purely by hatred of England. While Great Britain and her col- THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 145 onies were weakening each other by war, France had up to this moment not cared to interfere. But if there was the slightest chance of a recon- ciliation, it was high time to prevent it ; and be- sides, the American cause was now prosperous, and something might be made of it. The moment had come for France to seek revenge for the dis- asters of the Seven Years' War ; and on the 6th of February, 1778, her treaty of alliance with the United States was signed at Paris. At the news of this there was an outburst of popular excitement in England. There was a strong feeling in favour of peace with America and war with France, and men of all parties united with Lord North himself in demanding that Lord Chatham, who represented such a policy, should be made prime minister. It was rightly believed that he, if any one, coidd both conciliate America and humiliate France. There was only one way in which Chatham could have broken the new alliance which Cons^ress had so lono^ been seeking. The faith of Congress was pledged to France, and the Americans would no longer hear of any terms that did not begin with the acknowl- edgment of their full independence. To break the alliance, it would have been necessary to con- cede the independence of the United States. The king felt that if he were now obliged to call Chat- ham to the head of affairs and aUow him to form a strong ministry, it would be the end of his cher- 146 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. ished schemes for breaking down cabinet govern- ment. There was no man whom George III. hated and feared so much as Lord Chatham. Nev- . ertheless the pressure was so great that, death of })ut for Chatham's untimely death, the Lord Chat- ^ -^ ' i?°i778^^ king would probably have been obliged to yield. If Chatham had lived a year longer, the war might have ended with the surren- der of Burgoyne instead of continuing until the surrender of Cornwallis. As it was, Lord North consented, against his own better judgment, to remain in office and aid the king's policy as far as he could. The commissioners sent to America accomplished nothing, because they were not em- powered to grant independence ; and so the war went on. There was a great change, however, in the man- ner in which the war was conducted. In the years 1776 and 1777 the British had pursued a definite plan for conquering New York and thus severing the connection between New England and the southern states. During the remainder of the war their only definite plan was for conquering the southern states. Their operations at the north were for the most part confined to burn- the conduct ing and plundering expeditions along the coast in their ships, or on the fron- tier in connection with Tories and Indians. The war thus assumed a more cruel character. This was chiefly due to the influence of Lord George THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 147 Germaine, the secretary of state for the colonies. He was a contemptible creature, weak and cruel. He had been dismissed from the army in 1759 for cowardice at the battle of Minden, and he was so generally despised that when in 1782 the king was obliged to turn him out of office and tried to console him by raising him to the peerage as Viscount Sackville, the House of Lords protested • against the admission of such a creature. George III. had made this man his colonial secretary in the autumn of 1775, and he had much to do with planning the campaigns of the next two years. But now his influence in the cabinet seems to have increased. He was much more thoroughly in sympathy with the king than Lord North, who at this time was really to be pitied. Lord North would have been a fine man but for his weakness of will. He was now keeping up the war in America unwillingly, and was obliged to sanction many things of which he did not approve. In later years he bitterly repented this weakness. Now the truculent policy of Lord George Ger- maine began to show itself in the conduct of the war. That minister took no pains to conceal his willingness to employ Indians, to burn towns and villages, and to inflict upon the American people as much misery as possible, in the hope of break- ing their spirit and tiring them out. In America the first effect of Burgoyne's sur- render was to strengthen a feeling of dissatisfac- 148 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. tion with Washington, which had grown up in some quarters. In reality, as our narrative has shown, Washington had as much to do with the overthrow of Burgoyne as anybody ; for if it had not been for his skilful campaign in June, 1777, Howe would have taken Philadelphia in that month, and would then have been free to assist Burgoyne. It is easy enough to understand such things afterward, but people never can see them at the time when they are happening. This is an excellent illustration of what was said at the be- ginning of this book, that when people are down in the midst of events they cannot see the wood because of the trees, and it is only when they have climbed the hill of history and look back over the landscape that they can see what things really meant. At the end of the year 1777 people could only see that Burgoyne had surrendered to Gates, while Washington had lost two battles and the city of Philadelphia. Accordingly there were many who supposed that Gates must be a better general than Washington, and in the army there were some discontented spirits that were only too glad to take advantage of this feeling. One of these malcontents was an Irish adventurer, Thomas Conway, who had long served in France and came over here in time to take part in the battles of Brandywine and Germantown. He had a grudge against Washington, as Charles Lee had. He thought he could get on better if Wash- 1 THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 149 mgton were out of the way. So he busied himself in organizing a kind of conspiracy against Wash- ington, which came to be known as the ^he conway " Conway Cabal." The purpose was to ^^^=*^- put forward Gates to supersede Washington, as he had lately superseded the noble Schuyler. Gates, of course, lent himself heartily to the scheme ; such intrigues were what he was made for. And there were some of our noblest men who were dis- satisfied with Washington, because they were ig- norant of the military art, and could not under- stand his wonderful skill, as Frederick the Great did. Among these were John and Samuel Adams, who disapproved of " Fabian strategy." Gates and Conway tried to work upon such feelings. They hoped by thwarting and insulting Washing- ton to wound his pride and force him to resign. In this wretched work they had altogether too much help from Congress, but they failed igno- miniously because Gates's lies were too plainly discovered. The attempts to injure Washington recoiled upon their authors. Never, perhaps, was Washinoi:on so g-rand as in that sorrowfid winter at Valley Forge. When the news of the French alliance arrived, in the spring of 1778, there was a general feeling of elation. People were over-confident. It seemed as if the British might be driven from the coun- try in the course of that year. Some changes oc- curred in both the opposing armies. A great deal 150 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. of fault was found in England with Howe and Burgoyne. The latter was allowed to go home in the spring, and took his seat in Parliament while still a prisoner on parole. He was henceforth friendly to the Americans, and opposed the fur- ther prosecution of the war. Sir William Howe resigned his command in May and went home in order to defend his conduct. Shortly before his appointment to the chief command in America, he had uttered a prophecy somewhat notable as coming from one who was about to occupy such a position. In a speech at Nottingham he had ex- pressed the opinion that the Americans could not be subdued by any army that Great Britain could raise ! Howe was succeeded in the chief command by Sir Henry Clinton. His brother, Lord Howe is su- __ . , . t c , i persededby Howc, remained in command oi the Clinton. .i i it fleet until the autumn, when he was suc- ceeded by Admiral Byron. During the winter the American army had received a very important reinforcement in the person of Baron von Steu- ben, an able and higlily educated officer who had served on the staff of Frederick the Great. Steu- ben was appointed inspector-general and taught the soldiers Prussian discipline and tactics until the efficiency of the army was more than doubled. About the time of Sir William Howe's departure, Charles Lee was exchanged, and came back to his old place as senior major-general in the Conti- THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 151 nental army. Since his capture there had. been a considerable falling off in his reputation, but nothing was known of his treasonable proceedings with the Howes. Probably no one in the British army knew anything about that affair except the Howes and their private secretary Sir Henry Strachey. Lee saw that the American cause was now in the ascendant, and he was as anxious as ever to supplant Washington. The Americans now assumed the offensive. Count d'Estaing was approaching the TheAmeri- coast with a powerful French fleet. Soffi^^- Should he be able to defeat Lord Howe Slnduct and get control of the Delaware river, mo^tT,"june the British army in Philadelphia would ^^' ^"^'^'^• be in danger of capture. Accordingly on the 18th of June that city was evacuated by Sir Henry Clinton and occupied by Washington. As there were not enough transports to take the British army around to New York by sea, it was necessary to take the more hazardous course of marching across New Jersey. Washington pur- sued the enemy closely, with the view of forcing him to battle in an unfavourable situation and dealing him a fatal blow. There was some hojje of effecting this, as the two armies were now about equal in size — 15,000 in each — and the Ameri- cans were in excellent training. The enemy were overtaken at Monmouth Court House on the morning of June 28, but the attack was unfor- 152 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. tunately entrusted to Lee, who disobeyed orders and made an unnecessary and shameful retreat. Washington arrived on the scene in time to turn defeat into victory. The British were driven from the field, but Lee's misconduct had broken the force of the blow which Washington had aimed at them. Lee was tried by court-martial and at first suspended from command, then ex- pelled from the army. It was the end of his public career. He died in October, 1782. After the battle of Monmouth the British con- tinued their march to New York, and Washington moved his army to White Plains. Count d'Es- taing arrived at Sandy Hook in July with a much larger fleet than the British had in the harbour, and a land force of 4000 men. It now seemed as if Clinton's army might be cooped up and com- pelled to surrender, but on examination it ap- peared that the largest French ships drew too much water to venture to cross the bar. All hope of capturing New York was accordingly for the present abandoned. The enemy, however, had another considerable force near at hand, besides Clinton's. Since December, 1776, they had occupied the island which gives its name to the state of Rhode Island. Its position was safe and convenient. It enabled them, if they should see fit, to threaten Boston on the one hand and the coast of Connecticut on the other, and thus to make diversions in aid of Sir THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 153 Henry Clinton. The force on Rhode Island had been increased to 6000 men, under command of Sir Robert Pigott. The Americans believed that the capture of so large a force, could it be effected, would so discouras^e the Newport, . Aug. 1777. British as to bring the war to an end; and in this belief they were very likely right. The French fleet accordingly proceeded to Newport ; to the 4000 French infantry Washington added 1500 of the best of his Continentals ; levies of New England yeomanry raised the total strength to 13,000 ; and the general command of the American troops was given to Sidlivan. The expedition was poorly managed, and failed completely. There was some delay in starting. During the first week of August the Americans landed upon the island and occupied Butt's Hill. The French had begun to land on Conanicut when they learned that Lord Howe was approach- ing with a powerful fleet. The count then reem- barked his men and stood out to sea, manoeuvring for a favourable position for battle. Before the fight had begun, a terrible storm scattered both fleets and damaged them severely. When D'Es- taing had got his ships together again, which was not till the 20th of August, he insisted upon go- ing to Boston for repairs, and took his infantry with him. This vexed SuUivan and disgusted the yeomanry, who forthwith dispersed and went home to look after their crops. General Pigott 154 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. then tried the offensive, and attacked Sullivan in his strong position on Butt's Hill, on the 29th of August. The British were defeated, but the next day Sullivan learned that Clinton was coming with heavy reinforcements, and so he was obliged to abandon the enterprise and lose no time in get- ting his own troops into a safe position on the mainland. In November the French fleet sailed for the West Indies, and Clinton was obliged to send 5000 men from New York to the same quar- ter of the world. In the years 1778 and 1779 the warfare on the border assumed formidable proportions. The Tories of central New York, under the Johnsons and Butlers, together with Brant and his Mo- hawks, made their headquarters at Fort Niagara, from which they struck frequent and terrible blows at the exposed settlements on the frontier. Early in July, 1778, a force of 1200 men, under Wyoming Johu Butlcr, Spread death and desola- vauJyljiay tiou through the beautiful valley of -Nov., 1778. ^jQj^^ii^g in Pennsylvania. On the 10th of November, Brant and Walter Butler de- stroyed the village of Cherry Valley in New York, and massacred the inhabitants. Many other dreadful things were done in the course of this year ; but the affairs of Wyoming and Cherry Valley made a deeper impression than all the rest. During the following spring Washington organ- ized an expedition of 5000 men, and sent it, under THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 155 Sullivan, to lay waste the Iroquois country and capture the nest of Tory malefactors at Fort Ni- agara. While they were slowly advancing through the wilderness, Brant sacked the town of Minisink and destroyed a force of militia sent against him. But on the 29th of August a battle was fought on the site of the present town of Elmira, in which the Tories and Indians were defeated with great slaughter. The American army then marched through the country of the Cayugas and Senecas, and laid it waste. More than forty Indian vil- lages were burned and all the corn was destroyed, so that the approach of winter brought famine and pestilence. Sullivan was not able to get be- yond the Genesee river for want of supplies, and so Fort Niagara escaped. The Iroquois league had received a blow from which it never recov- ered, though for two years more their tomahawks were busy on the frontier. At intervals during the Revolution there was more or less Indian warfare all along the border. Settlers were making their way into Kentucky and Tennessee. Feuds with these encroaching immigrants led the powerful tribe of Cherokees to take part with the British, and they made trouble enough until they were crushed by John Sevier, the "lion of the border." In 1778 Colonel Hamil- ton, the British commander at Detroit, attempted to stir up all the western tribes to a concerted at- tack upon the frontier. When the news of this 156 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. reached Virginia, an expedition was sent out un- conquestof ^^^ George Rogers Clark, a youth of westS-n^" twenty-four years, to carry the war into i77s^79^' *^^ enemy's country. In an extremely interesting and romantic series of move- ments, Clark took the posts of Kaskaskia and Cahokia, on the Mississippi river, defeated and captured Colonel Hamilton at Vincennes, on the Wabash, and ended by conquering the whole northwestern territory for the state of Virginia. The year 1779 saw very little fighting in the northern states between the regular armies. The British confined themselves chiefly to marauding expeditions along the coast, from Martha's Vine- yard down to the James river. These incursions were marked by cruelties unknown in the earlier part of the war. Their chief purpose would seem to have been to carry out Lord George Ger- maine's idea of harassing the Americans as vexa- tiously as possible. But in Connecticut, which perhaps suffered the worst, there was a military purpose. In July, 1779, an attack was made upon New Haven, and the towns of Fairfield and Nor- walk were burned. The object was to induce Washino:ton to weaken his force on the Hudson river by sending away troops to protect the Con- necticut towns. Clinton now held the river as far up as Stony Point, and he hoped by this diver- sion to prepare for an attack upon Washington which, if successful, might end in the fall of West THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 157 Point. If the British could get possession of West Point, it would go far toward retrieving the disaster which had befallen them at Saratoga. Washington's retort was characteristic of him. He did, as always, what the enemy did not expect. He called Anthony Wayne and asked storming of him if he thought he could carry Stony !i?;^?5^"^"'' Point by storm. Wayne replied that ^'^^* he could storm a very much hotter place than any known in terrestrial geography, if Washington would plan the attack. Plan and performance were equally good. At midnight of July 15 the fort was surprised and carried in a superb assaidt with bayonets, without the firing of a gun on the American side. It was one of the most brilliant assaults in all military history. It instantly re- lieved Connecticut, but Washington did not think it prudent to retain the fortress. The works were aU destroyed, and the garrison, with the cannon and stores, withdrawn. The American army was as much as possible concentrated about West Point. In the general situation of affairs on the Hudson there was but little change for the next two years. It may seem strange that so little was done in all this time. But, in fact, both England and the United States were getting exhausted, so far as the a^bility to carry on war was concerned. As regards England, the action of France had seriously complicated the situation. England had 158 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. now to protect her colonies and dependencies on the Mediterranean, in Africa, in Hindustan, and How England in the Wcst Indics. In 1779 Spain ened and dcclarcd war against her, in the hope of hampered, . . r^ •! i i i t-<-i • i 1778-81. regaining (jibraltar and the Hondas. For three years Gibraltar was besieged by the allied French and Spanish forces. A Spanish fleet laid siege to Pensacola. France strove to regain the places which England had formerly won from her in Senegambia. War broke out in India with the Mahrattas, and with Hyder Ali of Mysore, and it required all the genius of Warren Hastings to save England's empire in Asia. We have already seen how Clinton, in the autumn of 1778, was obliged to weaken his force in New York by sending 5,000 men to the West Indies. Before the end of 1779 there were 314,000 British troops on duty in various parts of the world, but not enough could be spared for service in New York to defeat Washington's little army of 15,000. We thus begin to realize what a great event was the surrender of Burgoyne. The loss of 6,000 men by England was not in itself irreparable ; but in leading to the intervention of France it was like the touching of a spring or the drawing of a bolt which sets in motion a vast system of machinery. Under these circumstances George III. tried to form an alliance with Russia, and offered the island of Minorca as an inducement. Russia de- THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 159 clined tlie offer, and such action as she took was hostile to England. It had formerly been held that the merchant ships of neutral nations, em- ployed in trade with nations at war, might law- fully be overhauled and searched by war ships of either of the belligerent nations, and their goods confiscated. England still held this doctrine and acted upon it. But during the eighteenth century her maritime power had increased to such an ex- tent that she could damage other nations in this way much more than they could damage her. Other nations accordingly began to maintain that goods carried in neutral ships ought to be free from seizure. Early in 1780 Denmark, Sweden, and Russia entered into an agreement known as the Armed Neutrality, by which they pledged themselves to unite in retaliating upon England whenever any of her cruisers should molest any of their ships. This league was a new source of danger to England, because it entailed the risk of war with Russia. During these years several bold American cruis- ers had made the stars and stripes a familiar sight in European waters. The most famous of these cruisers, Paul Jones, made his name a pauuones, terror upon the coasts of England, ^^'^• burned the ships in a port of Cumberland, sailed into the Frith of Forth and threatened Edinburgh, and finally captured two British war vessels off Flamborough Head, in one of the most desperate sea-fights on record. , 160 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. Paul Jones was a regularly commissioned cap- tain in the American navy, but because the British did not recognize Congress as a legal body they called him a pirate. When he took his prizes into a port in Holland, they requested the Dutch government to surrender him into their hands, as if he were a mere criminal to be tried at the Old Bailey. But the Dutch let him stay in port ten weeks and then depart in peace. This caused much irritation, and as there was also perpetual quarrelling over the plunder of Dutch ships by British cruisers, the two nations went to war in December, 1780. One of England's reasons for entering into this war was the desire to capture St. Eustatius, *^^ little Dutch island of St. Eustatius Feb., 1781. jj^ ^]^g West Indies. An immense trade was carried on there between Holland and the United States, and it was believed that the stop- page of this trade would be a staggering blow to the Americans. It was captured in February, 1781, by Admiral Rodney, private property was seized to the amount of more than twenty mil- lion doUars, and the inhabitants were treated with shameful brutality. As England was thus fighting single-handed against France, Spain, Holland, and the United States, while the attitude of aU the neutral powers was unfriendly, we can find no difficulty in un- derstanding the weakness of her military oper- ations in some quarters. The United States, on THE FRENCH ALLIANCE, 161 the other hand, found it hard to carry on the war for very different reasons. In the first place the country was really weak. The Americans military strength of the American Union ened and in 1780 was inferior to that of Hoi- The want of land, and about on a level with that of Denmark or Portugal. But furthermore the want of union made it hard to bring out such strength as there was. In the autumn of 1777 the Articles of Confederation were submitted to the several states for adoption ; but the spring of 1781 had arrived before all the thirteen states had ratified them. These articles left the Continental Con- gress just what it was before, a mere advisory body, without power to enlist soldiers or levy taxes, without federal courts or federal officials, and with no executive head to the government. As we have already seen, the only way in which Congress could get money from the people was by requisitions upon the states, by ashing the state- governments for it. This was always a very slow way to get money, and now the states were unusu- ally poor. There was very little accumulated cap- ital. Farming, fishing, ship-building, and foreign trade were the chief occupations. Farms and plantations suffered considerably from the absence of their owners in the army, and many were kept from enlisting, because it was out of the question to go and leave their families to starve. As for ship-building, fishing, and foreign trade, these 162 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. occupations were almost annihilated by British cruisers. No doubt the heaviest blows that we received were thus dealt us on the water. The people were so poor that the states found it hard to collect enough revenue for their own purposes, and most of them had a way of issuing paper money of their own, which made things still worse. Under such circumstances they had very little money to give to Congress. It was necessary to borrow of France, or Spain, or Hol- land, and by the time these nations were all at war, that became very difficidt. From the begin- ning of the war Congress had issued paper notes, and in 1778 the depreciation in their value was already alarming. But as soon as the exultation over Burgoyne's surrender had subsided, as soon as the hope of speedily driving out the British had been disappointed, people soon lost all con- fidence in the power of Congress to pay its notes, Fall of the ^^^ ^^ 1779 their value began falling cu;" - with frightful rapidity. In 1780 they rconune'"' bccamc wortlilcss. It took 1150 in Con- tinental currency to buy a bushel of corn, and an ordinary suit of clothes cost '$2000. Then people refused to take it, and resorted to barter, taking their pay in sheep or ploughs, in jugs of rum or kegs of salt pork, or whatever they could get. It thus became almost impossible either to pay soldiers, or to clothe and feed them prop- erly and supply them with powder and ball. We THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 163 thus see why the Americans, as well as the British, conducted the war so languidly that for two years after the storming of Stony Point their main armies sat and faced each other by the Hudson river, without any movements of importance. In one quarter, however, the British began to make rapid progress. They possessed the Flori- das, having got them from Spain by the treaty of 1763. Next them lay Georgia, the weakest of the thirteen states, and then came the Carolinas, with a strong Tory element in the population. For such reasons, after the great invasion of New York had failed, the British tried the plan of starting at the southern extremity of the Union and lopping off one state after another. In the autumn of 1778 General Prevost advanced from East Florida, and in a brief campaign succeeded in capturing Savannah, Sunbury, and Augusta. General Lincoln, who had won distinction in the Saratoga campaign, was appointed to command the American forces in the South. He sent General Ashe, with 1500 men, to threaten Au- ^he British gusta. At Ashe's approach, the British ^^^^l, abandoned the town and retreated to- ^^^^* ward Savannah. Ashe pursued too closely and at Briar Creek, March 3, 1779, the enemy turned upon him and routed him. The Americans lost nearly 1000 men killed, wounded, and captured, besides their cannon and small arms ; and this victory cost the British only 16 men killed and 164 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. wounded. Augusta was reoccupied, the royal governor, Sir James Wright, was reinstated in office, and the machinery of government which had been in operation previous to 1776 was re- stored. Lincoln now advanced upon August^, but Prevost foiled him by returning the offensive and marching upon Charleston. In order to pro- tect that city, Lincoln was obliged to retrace his steps. It was now the middle of May, and little more was done till September, when D'Estaing returned from the West Indies. On the 23d Sa- vannah was invested by the combined forces of Lincoln and D'Estaing, and the siege was vigor- ously carried on for a fortnight. Then the French admiral grew impatient. On the 9th of October a fierce assault was made, in which the allies were defeated with the loss of 1000 men, including the gallant Pulaski. The French fleet then departed, and the British could look upon Georgia as re- covered. It was South Carolina's turn next. Washing- ton was obliged to weaken his own force by send- ing most of the southern troops to Lincoln's as- sistance. Sir Henry Clinton then withdrew the garrisons from his advanced posts on the Hudson, and also from Rhode Island, and was thus able to leave an adequate force in New York, while he himself set sail for Savannah, December 26, 1779, with a considerable army. After the British forces were united in Georgia, they amounted to THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 165 more than 13,000 men, against whom Lincoln could bring but 7000. The fate of the American army shows us what would probably have hap- pened in New York in 1776 if an ordinary gen- eral instead of Washington had been in command. Lincoln allowed himself to be cooped up in Charleston, and after a siege of two Charleston, with Lin- months was oblio^ed to surrender the coin's army, 11 1 ^ o 1 r. ^^y 12' 1^^- city and his whole army on the 12th of May, 1780. This was the most serious disaster the Americans had suffered since the loss of Fort Washington. The dashing cavalry leader, Tarle- ton, soon cut to pieces whatever remnants of their army were left in South Carolina. Sir Henry Clinton returned in June to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis with 5000 men to carry on the work. The Tories, thus supported, got the upper- hand in the interior of the state, which suffered from all the horrors of civil war. The American cause was sustained only by partisan leaders, of whom the most famous were Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter. When the news of Lincoln's surrender reached the North, the emergency was felt to be desperate. A fresh army was raised, consisting of about 2000 superbly trained veterans of the Maryland and Delaware lines, under the Baron de Kalb, and such militia as could be raised in Virginia and North Carolina. The chief command was given to Gates, whose conduct from the start was a se- 166 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. ries of blunders. The most important strategic point in South Carolina was Camden, at Battle of ^ , . . . , Camden, Aug. the intersection of the principal roads 16, 1780. ^ ^ from the coast to the mountains and from north to south. In marching upon this point Gates was met by Lord Cornwallis on the 16th of August and utterly routed. Kalb was mortally wounded at the head of the Maryland. troops, who held their ground nobly till over- whelmed by numbers ; the Delaware men were cut to pieces ; the militia were swept away in flight, and Gates with them. His northern lau- rels, as it was said, had changed into southern willows ; and for the second time within three months an American army at the South had been annihilated. This was, on the whole, the darkest moment of the war. For a moment in July there had been a glimmer of hopefulness when the Count de Hochambeau arrived with 6000 men who were landed on Ehode Island. The British fleet, how- ever, soon came and blockaded them there, and again the hearts of the people were sickened with hope deferred. It seemed as if Lord George Ger- maine's policy of " tiring the Americans out " might be going to succeed afte¥ all. When the value of the Continental paper money now fell to zero, it was a fair indication that the people had pretty much lost all faith in Congress. In the army the cases of desertion to the British lines averaged about a hundred per month. THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 167 This was a time when a man of bold and im- pulsive temperament, j)rone to cherish romantic schemes, smarting under an accumulation of in- juries, and weak in moral principle, might easily take it into his head that the American cause was lost, and that he had better carve out a new ca- reer for himself, while wi-eaking vengeance on his enemies. Such seems to have been the case with Benedict Arnold. He had a great and Benedict Ar- well-earned reputation for skill and soifjui/-^^ bravery. His military services up to ^p*'^^^^- the time of Burgoyne's surrender had been of priceless value, and he had always stood high in Washington's favour. But he had a genius for getting into quarrels, and there seem always to have been people who doubted his moral sound- ness. At the same time he had good reason to complain of the treatment which he received from Congress. The j^arty hostile to Washington sometimes liked to strike at him in the persons of his favourite generals, and such admirable men as Greene and Morgan had to bear the brunt of this ill feeling. Early in 1777 five brigadier gen- erals junior to Arnold in rank and vastly inferior to him in ability and reputation had been pro- moted over him to the grade of major-general. On this occasion he had shown an excellent spirit, and when sent by Washington to the aid of Schuyler, he had signified his willingness to serA^e under St. Clair and Lincoln, two of the juniors 168 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. who had been raised above him. Ai-nold was a warm friend to Schuyler, and perhaps did not take enough pains to conceal his poor opinion of Gates. Other officers in the northern army let it plainly be seen that they placed more confidence in Arnold than in Gates, and the residt was a bitter quarrel between the two generals, echoes of which were probably afterwards heard in Congress. If Arnold's wound on the field of Saratoga had been a mortal wound, he would have been ranked, among the military heroes of the Revolu- tion, next to Washington and Greene. Perhaps, however, in a far worse sense than is commonly conveyed by the term, it proved to be his death- wound, for it led to his being placed in command of Philadelphia. He was assigned to that position because his wounded leg made him unfit for active service. Congress had restored him to his rela- tive rank, but now he soon got into trouble with the state government of Pennsylvania. It is not easy to determine how much ground there may have been for the charges brought against him early in 1779 by the state government. One of them concerned his personal honesty, the others were so trivial in character as to make the whole affair look somewhat like a case of persecution. They were twice investigated, once by a commit- tee of Congress and once by a court-martial. On the serious charge, which affected his pecuniary integrity, he was acquitted ; on two of the trivial THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 169 charges, of imprudence in the use of some public wagons, and of carelessness in granting a pass for a ship, he was convicted and sentenced to be rep- rimanded. The language in which Washington couched the reprimand showed his feeling that Arnold was too harshly dealt with. If the matter had stopped here, posterity would probably have shared Washington's feeling. But the government of Pennsylvania must have had stronger grounds for distrust of Arnold than it was able to put into the form of definite charges. Soon after his arrival in Philadelphia he fell in love with a beautiful Tory lady, to whom he was presently married. He was thus thrown much into the society of Tories and was no doubt influ- enced by their views. He had for some time con- sidered himself ill-treated, and at first thought of leaving the service and settling upon a grant of land in western New York. Then, as the charges against him were pressed and his anger increased, he seems to have dallied with the notion of going over to the British. At length in the early sum- mer of 1780, after the reprimand, his treasonable purpose seems to have taken definite shape. As General Monk in 1660 decided that the only way to restore peace in England was to desert the cause of the Commonwealth and bring back Charles XL, so Arnold seems now to have thought that the cause of American independence was ruined, and that the best prospect for a career for 170 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. himself lay in deserting it and helping to bring back the rule of George III. In this period of general depression, when even the unconquerable Washington said " I have almost ceased to hope," one staggering blow would be very likely to end the struggle. There could be no heavier blow than the loss of the Hudson river, and with base- ness almost incredible Arnold asked for the com- mand of West Point, with the intention of betray- ing it into the hands of Sir Henry Clinton. The depth of his villainy on this occasion makes it probable that there were good grounds for the sus- picions with which some people had for a long time regarded him, although Washington, by putting him in command of the most important position in the country, showed that his own confidence in him was unabated. The successful execution of the plot seemed to call for a personal interview between Arnold and Clinton's adjutant-general, Major John Andre, who was entrusted with the negotiation. Such a secret interview was ex- tremely difficult to bring about, but it was effected on the 21st of September, 1780. After a mar- vellous chapter of accidents, Andre was captured just before reaching the British lines. But for his hasty and quite unnecessary confession that he was a British officer, which led to his being searched, the plot would in all probability have been successful. The papers found on his per- son, which left no room for doubt as to the nature THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 171 of the black scheme, were sent to Washington ; the principal traitor, forewarned just in the nick of time, escaped to the British at New York ; and Major Andre was condemned as a spy and hanged on the 2d of October. Only five days after the execution of Andre an event occurred at the South which greatly relieved the prevailing gloom of the situation. It was the first of a series of victories which were soon to show that the darkness of 1780 was the darkness that comes before dawn. After liis victory at Camden, Lord C(^nwallis found it necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting that he would soon conquer all the states south of the Susquehanna river. But his line of march now lay far inland, and the British armies were never able to accomplish much except in the neighbourhood of their ships, where they could be reasonably sure of supj^lies. In traversing Mecklenburg county Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and danger- ous region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his best partisan commanders. Major Ferguson, penetrated too far into the Battle of mountains. The backwoodsmen of Ten- Mountain, nessee and Kentucky, the Carolinas, and ^^^' ^' ^^^' western Virginia were aroused ; and under their superb partisan leaders — Shelby, Sevier, Cleave- land, McDowell, Campbell, and WiUiams — gave 172 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. chase to Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and all the rest, 700 in num- ber, surrendered at discretion. The Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. There were some points in this battle, which remind one of the British defeat at Majuba Hill in southern Africa in 1881. In the series of events which led to the surren- der of Cornwallis, the battle of King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow him. The events, however, were much more complicated in Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves. Burgoyne surrendered within nine anxious weeks after Bennington ; CornwaUis maintained himself, sometimes with fair hopes of final victory, for a whole year after King's Moun- tain. As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army, recruited and reor- THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 173 ganized since its crusliing defeat at Camden, ad- vanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by Greene, who arrived command in upon the scene on the Aa oi December, lina, Dec. 2, ... I'^so. Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable ability, — Daniel Morgan ; William Washington, who was a distant cousin of the commander-in-chief ; and Henry Lee, familiarly known as " Light-horse Harry," father of the great general, Robert Edward Lee. The little army numbered only 2000 men, but a considerable part of them were disciplined veterans fully a match for the British infantry. In order to raise troops in Virginia to increase this little force, Steuben was sent down to that state. In order to interfere with such recruiting, and to make diversions in aid of Cornwallis, de- tachments from the British army were also sent by sea from New York to Virginia. The first of these detachments, under General Leslie, had been obliged to keej) on to South Carolina, to make good the loss inflicted upon Cornwallis at King's Mountain. To replace Leslie in Virginia, the traitor Arnold was sent down from New York. The presence of these subsidiary forces in Vir- ginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into two bodies, one of which cooperated 174 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. with Marion's partisans in the northeastern part of the state, and threatened CornwaUis's commu- nications with the coast. The other body he sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland posts and their garrisons. Thus wor- ried on both flanks, Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarletonwith 1100 men, to Battle of the disposc of Morgan. Tarleton came up Jrnr with Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781. 1781, at a grazing-ground known as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which ensued was well fought, and on Mor- gan's part it was a wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in oj)en field he surrounded and nearly* annihilated a superior force. The British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 pris- oners, and all their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost 12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles. King's Mountain and the Cow- pens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light- armed troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to march the two parts of his army in con- verging directions northward across North Caro- lina and unite them in spite of Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always get- THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 175 ting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in South Carolina. It was brilliant strategy on Greene's part, and entirely successful. Cornwallis had to throw away a great deal of his baggage and otherwise weaken himself, but in spite of all he coidd do, he was outmarched. The two wings of the American army came g^ttig ^^ together and were joined by the rein- March'^is, forcements ; so that at GuiKord Court ^^^^' House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, two hundred miles from the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the Americans were repulsed. But Corn- wallis coidd not stay in such a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in Virg^inia was bein^ heav- * Ar 1 mi Cornwallis ily remforced from New York. The retreats into Virginia. only safe course seemed to march north- ward and join in the operations in Virginia ; then 176 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. afterwards to return southward. This course Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene, after pursuing Cornwallis for about fifty miles from GuiKord, faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, a hun- dred and sixty miles distant. Whatever his ad- versary might do, he was now going to seize the great prize of the campaign, and break the enemy's hold upon South Carolina. Lord Raw- don held Camden. Greene stopped at Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson surrendered ; on the 25th Eawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's Hill, but as his communications were cut, the victory did him no good. He was obliged to re- camden, treat toward the coast, and Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced every one of the in- Battie of land posts. At last on the 8th of Sep- springs, tember he fought an obstinate battle at Sept. 8, 1781. j^^t^^ Springs, in which both sides claimed the victory. The facts were that he drove the British from their first position, but they ral- lied upon a second position from which he failed to drive them. Here, however, as always after THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 177 one of Gre3ne's battles, it was the enemy who re- treated and he who pursued. His strategy never faiied. After Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under cover of their ships, and the American government was reestablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in history that have been conducted with small armies, there have been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's. There was something especially piquant in the way in which after Guilford he left Cornwallis to himself. It reminds one of a chess-player who first gets the queen off the board, where she can do no harm, and then wins the game against the smaller pieces. As for Cornwallis, when he reached Petersburg, May 20, he com'^vairis^'in found himself at the head of 5000 men. Maf-sept., 1781 Arnold had just been recalled to New York, and Lafayette, who had been sent down to oppose him, was at Richmond with 3000 men. A campaign of nine weeks ensued, in the first part of which Cornwallis tried to catch Lafayette and bring him to battle. The general movement was from Richmond up to Fredericksburg, then over toward Charlottesville, then back to the James river, then do^vn the north bank of the river. But during the last part the tables were turned, and it was Lafayette, reinforced by Wayne and Steuben, that pursued Cornwallis on his retreat to the coast. At the end of July the British general 178 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. reached Yorktown, where he was iv nforced and waited with 7000 men. We may now change our simile, and liken Corn- wallis to a ball between two bats. The first b;i1b, which had knocked him up into Virginia, was Greene ; the second, which sent him quite out of the game, was Washington. The remarkable movement which the latter general now proceeded to execute would have been impossible without French cooperation. A French fleet of overwhelm- ing power, under the Count de Grasse, was ap- _ proaching Chesapeake bay. Washine:- Washington's . ^. ^ . "^ ° masterly tou, lu rcadincss for it, had first moved movement. Rochambeau's army from Rhode Island across Connecticut to the Hudson river. Then, as soon as all the elements of the situation were disclosed, he left part of his force in position on the Hudson, and in a superb march led the rest flown to Virginia. Sir Henry Clinton at New York was completely hoodwinked. He feared that the real aim of the French fleet was New York, in which case it would be natural that an Amer- ican land-force should meet it at Staten island. Now a glance at the map of New Jersey will show that Washington's army, starting from West Point, could march more than half the way toward Philadelphia and still be supposed to be aiming at Staten island. Washington was a master hand for secrecy. When his movement was first dis- closed, his own generals, as well as Sir Henry THE FUENCH ALLIANCE. 179 Clinton, took it for granted that Staten island was the point aimed at. It was not until he had passed Philadelphia that Clinton began to surmise that he might be going down to Virginia. When this fact at length dawned upon the Brit- ish commander, he made a futile attempt at a diver- sion by sending Benedict Arnold to attack New London. It was as weak as the act of a drowning man who catches at a straw. Arnold's expedition, cruel and useless as it was, crowned his infamy. A sad plight for a man of his power ! If he had only had more strengt) i of character, he might now have been marching with his old friend Washing- ton to victory. With this wretched affair at New London, the brilliant and wicked Benedict Arnold disappears from American history. He died in London, in 1801, a broken-hearted and penitent man, as his grandchildren tell us, praying God with his last breath to forgive his awful crime. Washington's march was so swift and so cun- ningly planned that nothing could check it. On the 26th of September the situation was complete. Washington had added his force to that of La- fayette, so that 16,000 men blockaded Cornwallis apon the Yorktown peninsula. The great French fleet, commanding the waters about Chesapeake bay, closed in behind and prevented su„ender of escape. It was a very unusual thing for 5oSS^! ^* the French thus to get control of the ^'*- ^^' ^^^^• "^vater and defy the British on their own element. It 180 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. was Washington's unwearied vigilance that, after waiting long for such a chance, had seized it with- out a moment's delay. As soon as Cornwallis was thus caught between a hostile army and a hostile fleet, the problem was solved. On the 19th of October the British army surrendered. Washing- ton presently marched his army back to the Hud- son and made his headquarters at Newburgh. ^ When Lord North at his office in London heard the dismal news, he walked up and down the room, wringing his hands and crying, " O God, it is all over ! " York town was indeed decisive. In the course of the winter the British lost Georgia. The embers of Indian warfare still smouldered on the border, but the great War for Independence was really at an end. The king's friends George iii.'s had for somc time been losing strength schemes, in Enp'land, and Yorktown completed May 1784 * their defeat. In March, 1782, Lord North's ministry resigned. A succession of short- lived ministries followed ; first, Lord Rocking- ham's, until July, 1782 ; then Lord Shelburne's, until February, 1783 ; then, after five weeks with- out a government, there came into power the strange Coalition between Fox and North, from April to December. During these two yeats the king was trying to intrigue with one interest against another so as to maintain his own personal government. With this end in view he tried the bold experiment of dismissing the Coalition and THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 181 making the young William Pitt prime minister, without a majority in Parliament. After a fierce constitutional struggle, which lasted all winter, Pitt dissolved Parliament, and in the new election in May, 1784, obtained the greatest majority ever given to an English minister. But the victory was Pitt's and the people's, not the king's. This election of 1784 overthrew all the cherished plans of George III. in pursuance of which he had driven the American colonies into rebellion. It established cabinet government more firmly than ever, so that for the next seventeen years the real ruler of Great Britain was William Pitt. CHAPTER VIII. BIRTH OF THE NATION. The year 1782 was marked by great victories for the British in the West Indies and at Gib- raltar. But they did not alter the situation in America. The treaty of peace by which peace, 1782- Great Britain acknowledged the inde- pendence of the United States was made under Lord Shelburne's ministry in the autumn of 1782, and adopted and signed by the Coalition on the 3d of September, 1783. The negotiations were carried on at Paris by Franklin, Jay, and John Adams, on the part of the Americans ; and they won a diplomatic victory in securing for the United States the country between the Alleghany mountains and the Mississippi river. This was done against the wishes of the French govern- ment, which did not wish to see the United States become too powerful. At the same time Spain recovered Minorca and the Floridas. France got very little except the satisfaction of having helped in diminishing the British empire. The return of peace did not bring contentment to the Americans. Because Congress had no means of raising a revenue or enforcing its de- BIRTH OF THE NATION. 183 crees, it was unable to make itself respected either at home or abroad. For want of pay the army- became very troublesome. In January, 1781, there had been a mutiny of Pennsylvania and New Jersey troops which at one moment , , 't . T ,1 • p Troubles with looked very serious. In the spring- oi the army, 1781—83 1782 some of the officers, disgusted with the want of efficiency in the government, seem to have entertained a scheme for making Washing- ton king; but Washington met the suggestion with a stern rebuke. In March, 1783, inflammar- tory appeals were made to the officers at the head- quarters of the army at Newburgh. It seems to have been intended that the army should overawe Congress and seize upon the government until the delinquent states should contribute the money needed for satisfying the soldiers and other public creditors. Gates either originated this scheme or willingly lent himself to it, but an eloquent speech from Washington prevailed upon the officers to reject and condemn it. On the 19th of April, 1783, the eighth anni- versary of Lexington, the cessation of hostilities was formally proclaimed, and the soldiers were allowed to go home on furloughs. The army was virtually disbanded. There were some who thought that this ought not to be done while the British forces still remained in New York ; but Congress was afraid of the army and quite ready to see it scattered. On the 21st of June Congress was 184 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. driven from Philadelphia by a small band of drunken soldiers clamorous for pay. It was im- possible for Congress to get money. Of the Con- tinental taxes assessed in 1783, only one fifth part had been paid by the middle of 1785. After peace was made, France had no longer any end to gain by lending us money, and European bankers, as well as European governments, regarded Amer- ican credit as dead. There was a double provision of the treaty which could not be carried out because of the weakness of Congress. It had been agreed that Congress should request the state governments to able to fulfil repeal various laws which they had made the treaty. „ . . r. • i from time to time confiscating the prop- erty of Tories and hindering the collection of private debts due from American to British mer- chants. Congress did make such a request, but it was not heeded. The laws hindering the payment of debts were not repealed ; and as for the Tories, they were so badly treated that between 1783 and 1785 more than 100,000 left the country. Those from the southern states went mostly to Florida and the Bahamas ; those from the north made the beginnings of the Canadian states of Ontario and New Brunswick. A good many of them were reimbursed for their losses by Parliament. When the British government saw that these provisions of the treaty were not fulfilled, it re- taliated by refusing to withdraw its troops from BIRTH OF THE NATION. 185 the northern and western frontier posts. The British army sailed from Charleston on ^^^^^ Britain the 14th of December, 1782, and from ^feSfng New York on the 25th of November, Snttof 1783, but in contravention of the treaty ^^^IflZng small garrisons remained at Ogdens- *^®^**^^^- burgh, Oswego, Niagara, Erie, Sandusky, Detroit, and Mackinaw until the 1st of June, 1796. Be- sides this, laws were passed which bore very se- verely upon American commerce, and the Amer- icans found it impossible to retaliate because the different states would not agree upon any com- mercial policy in common. On the other hand, the states began making commercial war upon each other, with navigation laws and high tariffs. Such laws were passed by New York to interfere with the trade of Connecticut, and the merchants of the latter state began to hold meetings and pass resolutions forbidding all trade whatever with New York. The old quarrels about territory were kept up, and in 1784 the troubles in Wyoming and in the Green Movmtains came to the very verge of civil war. People in Europe, hearing of such things, believed that the Union would soon fall to pieces and become the prey of foreign powers. It was disorder and calamity of this sort that such men as Hutchinson had feared, in case the control of Great Britain over the colonies should cease. George III. looked upon it all with satisfaction, 186 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. and believed that before long the states would one after another become repentant and beg to be taken back into the British empire. The troubles reached their climax in 1786. Be- cause there seemed to be no other way of getting money, the different states besran to issue The craze for . . *^ paper money their promissorv uotcs, and then tried and the Shays ^ i i i rebeuion, to compel people by law to receive such notes as money. There was a strong "paper money" party in all the states except Connecticut and Delaware. The most serious trouble was in Ehode Island and Massachusetts. In both states the farmers had been much im- poverished by the war. Many farms were mort- gaged, and now and then one was sold to satisfy creditors. The farmers accordingly clamoured for paper money, but the merchants in towns like Boston or Providence, understanding more about commerce, were opposed to any such miserable makeshifts. In Rhode Island the farmers pre- vailed. Paper money was issued, and harsh laws were passed against all who should refuse to take it at its face value. The merchants refused, and in the towns nearly all business was stopped dur- ing the summer of 1786. In the Massachusetts legislature the paper money party was defeated. There was a great outcry among the farmers against merchants and lawyers, and some were heard to maintain that the time had come for wiping out all debts. In BIRTH OF THE NATION. 187 August, 1786, the malcontents rose in rebellion, headed by one Daniel Shays, who had been a cap- tain in the Continental army. They began by trying to prevent the courts from sitting, and went on to burn barns, plunder houses, and attack the arsenal at Springfield. The state troops were called out, under General Lincoln, two or three skirmishes were fought, in which a few lives were lost, and at length in February, 1787, the insur- rection was suppressed. At that time the mouth of the Mississippi river and the country on its western bank belonged to Spain. Kentucky and Tennessee were rapidly be- coming settled by people from Virginia _ _ ° , ^ T. 1 1 T The Missis. and JNorth Carolina, and these settlers sippiques- . r r\ m tion, 1786. wished to trade with New Orleans. The Spanish government was unfriendly and wished to prevent such traffic. The people of New Eng- land felt little interest in the southwestern country or the Mississippi river, but were very anxious to make a commercial treaty with Spain. The gov- ernment of Spain refused to make such a treaty except on condition that American vessels should not be allowed to descend the Mississippi river below the mouth of the Yazoo. When Congress seemed on the point of yielding to this demand, the southern states were very angry. The New England states were equally angry at what they called the obstinacy of the South, and threats of secession were heard on both sides. 188 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, Perhaps the only thing that kept the Union from falling to pieces in 1786 was the Northwest- ern Territory, which George Rogers Clark had conquered in 1779, and which skilful diplomacy had enabled us to keep when the treaty was drawn up in 1782. Virginia claimed this territory and actually held it, but New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut also had claims upon it. It was the idea of Maryland that such a vast region ought not to be added to any one state, or divided between two or three of the states, but ought to The north- ^® *^^ commou property of the Union, rito^Tthe Maryland had refused to ratify the Ar- domSn/''"^^ tides of Confederation until the four 1780-87. states that claimed the northwestern territory should yield their claims to the United States. This was done between 1780 and 1785, and thus for the first time the United States gov- ernment was put in possession of valuable prop- erty which could be made to yield an income and pay debts. This piece of property was about the first thing in which all the American people were alike interested, after they had won their inde- pendence. It could be opened to immigration and made to pay the whole cost of the war and much more. During these troubled years Congress was busy with plans for organizing this territory, which at length resulted in the famous Ordinance of 1787 laying down fundamental laws for the government of what has since developed into the BIRTH OF THE NATION. 189 five great states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michi- gan, and Wisconsin, While other questions tended to break up the Union, the questions that arose in connection with this work tended to hold it together. The need for easy means of communication be- tween the old Atlantic states and this new coun- try behind the mountains led to schemes which ripened in course of time into the construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio and the Erie canals. In discussing such schemes, Maryland and Vir- ginia found it necessary to agree upon some kind of commercial policy to be pursued by both states. Then it was thought best to seize the occasion for calling a general convention of the states to de- cide upon a uniform system of regular tions for commerce. This convention tionatAn- was held at Annapolis in September, Sept. li, 1786, but only five states had sent del- egates, and so the convention adjourned after adopting an address written by Alexander Ham- ilton, calling for another convention to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday of the follow- ing May, "to devise such further provisions as shall appear necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigen- cies of the Union." The Shays rebellion and the quarrel about the Mississippi river had by this time alarmed people so that it began to be generally admitted that the 190 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. federal government must be in some way strength- ened. If there were any doubt as to this> it was removed by the action of New York. An amend- ment to the Articles of Confederation had been proposed, giving Congress the power of levying customs-duties and appointing the collectors. By the summer of 1786 all the states except New York had consented to this. But in order to amend the articles, unanimous consent was neces- sary, and in February, 1787, New York's refusal defeated the amendment. Congress was thus left without any immediate means of raising a revenue, and it became quite clear that something must be done without delay. The famous Federal Convention met at Phila- delphia in May, 1787, and remained in session four months, with Washington presiding. Its work was the framing of the government under which we are now living, and in which conventioiT tlic cvils of the old Confederation have phia, May- bccu avoided. The trouble had all the ^^ * " while been how to get the whole Ameri- can people represented in some body that could thus rightfully tax the whole American people. This was the question which the Albany Congress had tried to settle in 1754, and which the Federal Convention did settle in 1787. In the old confederation, starting with the Con- tinental Congress in 1774, the government was all vested in a single body which represented states, BIRTH OF THE NATION. 191 but did not represent individual persons. It was for that reason that it was called a congress rather than a parliament. It was more like a congress of European states than the legislative body of a nation, such as the English parliament was. It had no executive and no judiciary. It could not tax, and it could not enforce its decrees. The new constitution changed all this by creat- ing the House of Representatives which ^he new stood in the same relation to the whole f^ Xcrtha American people as the legislative as- Sarc^nsum. sembly of each single state to the people °'^*^'^' ^^^^' of that state. In this body the people were repre- sented, and could therefore tax themselves. At the same time in the Senate the old equality be- tween the states was preserved. All control over commerce, currency, and finance was lodged in this new Congress, and absolute free trade was established between the states. In the office of President a strong executive was created. And besides all this there was a system of federal courts for deciding questions arising under fed- eral laws. Most remarkable of aU, in some re- spects, was the power given to the federal Su- preme Court, of deciding, in special cases, whether laws passed by the several states, or by Congress itself, were conformable to the Federal Constitu- tion. Many men of great and various powers played important parts in effecting this change of gov- 192 THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. ernment which at length established the American Union in such a form that it could endure ; but the three who stood foremost in the work were George Washington, James Madison, and Alex- ander Hamilton. Two other men, whose most important work came somewhat later, must be mentioned along with these, for the sake of com- pleteness. It was John Marshall, chief justice of the United States from 1801 to 1835, whose pro- found decisions did more than those of any later judge could ever do toward establishing the sense in which the Constitution must be understood. It was Thomas Jefferson, president of the United States from 1801 to 1809, whose sound democratic instincts and robust political philosophy prevented the federal government from becoming too closely allied with the interests of particular classes, and helped to make it what it should be, — a " govern- ment of the people, by the people, and for the people." In the making of the government under which we live, these five names — Washington, Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Marshall — stand before all others. I mention them here chronologically, in the order of the times at which their influence was felt at its maximum. When the work of the Federal Convention was sanctioned by the Continental Congress and laid before the people of the several states, to be rati- fied by special conventions in each state, thei*e was earnest and sometimes bitter discussion. Many BIRTH OF THE NATION. 193 people feared that the new government would soon degenerate into a tyranny. But the century and a half of American history that had already olapsed had afforded such noble political training for the people that the discussion was, on the whole, more reasonable and more fruitful than any that had ever before been undertaken by so many men. The result was the adoption of the Federal Constitution, followed by the inaugura^ tion of Creorge Washington, on the 30th of April, 1789, as President of the United States. And with this event our brief story may fitly end. COLLATERAL READING. The following' books may be recommended to the reader who wishes to get a general idea of the American Revolu- tion ; — 1. General Works. By far the most interesting and readable account is given by Irving in his Life of Wash- ingtoriy vol^ i.-iv. I have abridged and condensed these four octavos into one stout duodecimo entitled Washington and his Country, Boston, Ginn & Co., 1887. Our young friends may find Frothingham's Rise of the Republic rather close reading, but one can hardly name a book that will more richly reward them for their study, Greene's His^ iorical View of the Revolution should be read by every one. Carrington's Battles of the Revolution makes the military operations quite clear with numerous maps. Very young readers find it interesting to begin with Coffin's Boys of Seventy-Six. The social life of the time is admirably por- trayed in Scudder's Men and Manners in America One Hun- dred Years Ago. See also Thornton's Pulpit of the Revolu- tion. Lossing's Field Book of the Revolution — two royal octavos profusely illustrated — is an excellent book to browse in. 2. Biographies. Tyler's Patrick Henry, Tudor's Otis, Hosmer's Samuel Adams, Morse's John Adams, Frothing- ham's Warren, Quincy's Josiah Quincy, Barton's Franklin and Jeffersony Fonblanque's Burgoyne, Lossing's Schuyler, Riedesel's Memoirs, Stone's Brant, Arnold's Arnold, Sar- gent's Andre\ Kapp's Steuben and Kalb, Greene's Greene, 196 COLLATERAL READING. Amory*s Sullivan^ Graham's Morgan, Simms's Marion^ Abbott's Paul Jones, John Adams's Letters to his Wife, Morse's Hamilton, Gay's Madison, Roosevelt's Gouverneur Morris, Russell's Fox, Albemarle's Rochinyham, Fitzmau- rice's Shelburne, MacKnight's Burke, Macaulay's essay on Chatham. 3. Fiction. Cooper's Chainbearer, Miss Sedgwick's Linwoods, Paulding's Old Continental, Mrs. Child's Rebels, Motley's Morton's Hope. There is an account of the battle of Bunker Hill in Cooper's Lionel Lincoln. Thompson's Green Mountain Boys gives interesting descriptions of many of the events in that region. The border warfare is treated in Grace Greenwood's Forest Tragedy and Hoffman's Grey- slaer. Simms's Partisan and Mellichampe deal with events in South Carolina in 1780, and later events are covered in his Scout, Katharine Walford, Woodcraft, Forayers, and Eutaw. See also Miss Sedgwick's Walter Thornley, and Cooper's Pilot and Spy. For further references, see Justin Winsor's Reader^ Handbook of the American Revolution, a book which is ab- solutely indispensable to every one who wishes to study the subject. INDEX. Adams, John, 46, 84, 88, 89, 98, 100, 113, 149, 182. Adams, Samuel, 53, 58, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 78, 82, 84, 85, 88, 107, 149. Aix-la-ChapeUe, treaty of, 6. Albany Congress, 34, 190. Albany Plan, 35. Algonquins, 28-30, 37. Alleghany mountains, 27. Allen, Ethan, 87. Andre, John, 170, 171. Andros, Sir Edmund, 22. Annapolis convention, 189. Antislavery feeling, 126. Armada, the Invincible, 6. Armed Neutrality, 159. Army, continental, 88, 124 ; dis- banded, 183. Arnold, Benedict, 87, 93, 94, 118, 136, 137, 143, 167-171, 173, 175, 177, 179. Ashe, Samuel, 163. Attucks, Crispus, 75. Augusta, Ga., 163. Bacon's rebellion, 21. Baltimore, Congress flees to, 118. Barons' War, 19. Barr<5, Isaac, 69, 75. Barter, 102. Baum, Col., 134, Berais Heights, 143. Bennington, 133, 134, 137, 172. Berkeley, Sir W., 21. Bernard, Sir F., 68, 72. Boston, 7, 44-47 ; " Massacre," 72- 75 ; " Tea Party," 79-83 ; Port Bill, 83 ; siege of, 87-94. Braddock, Edward, 36. Brandywine, 141. Brant, Joseph, 108, 135, 136, 154, 155. Breymann, Col., 134. Briar Creek, 163. Brooklyn Heights, 111-113, 128. Bunker Hill, 91, 128. Burgoyne, John, 90, 125-134, 137, 140-143, 148, 150, 158, 172. Burlington, N. J., 120. Burke, Edmund, 62, 69. Butler, Col. John, 134, 154. Butt's Hill, 154. Byron, Admiral, 150. Cahokia, 156, Calvert family, 13. Camden, Lord, 69. Camden, S. C, 166, 171, 17S, 176. Campbell, Col. William, 171. Canada, invasion of, 93, 94. Canals, 189. Carleton, Sir Guy, 93, 94, 109, 115, 118. Carlisle, Pa., 26. Carr, Dabney, 79. Castle WiUiam, 73, 75. Caudine Fork, 144. Cavaliers, 9. Cavendish, Lord John, 69. Charles II., 22, 43, 45. Charleston, S. C, 80, 165. Charlestown, Mass., 86. Chase, Samuel, 84. Cherry Valley, 154. Choiseul, Duke de, 38. Clark, George Rogers, 156, 188. Cleaveland, Col., 171. Cleveland, Grover, 1. Clinton, Sir H., 90, 90, 140, 142, 150- 152, 156-158, 164, 165, 178, 179. Coalition ministry, 180. Cobden, Richard, 61. Colonial trade, 42-44. p^i Committees of correspondence > Commons, House of, 19, 58-61. Concord, 85, 86. Congress, Continental, 79, 84, 87-90, 100-103, 106, 115-117, 161, 162, 183, 184, 191. Congress, Stamp Act, 56. Connecticut, 13, 21, 23, 77, 98, 156. Conway, Henry, G9. Conway Cabal, 148, 149. Cornwallis, Lord, 104, 121, 122, 165, 171-180. Cowpens, 174. 198 INDEX. Cromwell, Oliver, 9. Crown Point, 87. Currency, Continental, 162, 166. Deane, Silas, 123. Declaration of Independence, 97-103, 127. Declaratory Act, 58. Delaware, 9, 10. Delaware river, 142. Denmark, 159. Desertions, 166. D'Estaing, Count, 151-154, 164. Dickinson, John, 84, 92, 98, 101, 102. Discovery, French doctr»ne of, 27. Dorchester Heights, 94, 128. Duumore, Lord, 95. " Early " American history, 5. Edinburgh, 159. Elkton, 140, 141. Elmira, 155. Eutaw Springs, 176. Fairfield, Conn., 156. Federal convention, 190, 191. Ferguson, Major, 171, 172. Five Nations, 29. Flamborough Head, 159. Fort Duquesne, 33; Edward, 131, 132, 140; Lee, 114-llG; Moultrie, 105 ; Necessity, 33 ; Niagara, 154, 155; Stanwix, 135-137; Washing- ton, 114.-117, 165 ; WatsoD, 176. Ports on the Delaware, 141. Pox, Charles, 69, 180. Franklin, Benjamin, 34, 54, «9, 113, 123, 182. iFranklin, William, 106. Fraser, Gen., 131. Frederick the Great, 150 French power in Canada, 10, 20, 26- 38. Frontenac, Count, 29. Frontier between English and French colonies, 26. Ga^ ,, Thomas, 39, 83, 85, 91, 92. Gansevoort, Peter, 135. Gaspee, schooner, 77. Gates, Horatio, 39, 90, 130, 131, 137, 143, 148, 165, 166, 168, 173. George III., his character and schemes, 59-71, 146 ; glee over news from Ticonderoga, 129 ; tries to make an alliance with Russia, 158, 159 ; his schemes overthrown, 180, 181. Georgia, 11, 96, 163. Germaine, Lord George, 147, 156, 166. fl^ermantown, 141. Gib-M.a-, 158, 182. \ Glaa.tone, W. E., 61. . Governments of the colonies, 13-1 G. I Grasse, Count de, 178. • Green Mountains, 77, 87, 131, 185. Greene, Nathanael, 90, 115, 110, 1G7, 173-177. i Grenville, George, 41, 49, 51, 54, \ 124. 1 Gridley, Jeremiah, 46. GuUford Court House, 175, 177. \ Hackensack, 115, 116. Hale, Nathan, 114. Hamilton, commandant at Detroit 155. Hamilton, Alexander, 189, 192. Hancock, John, 86, 87, 89. Harlem Heights, 114, 129. Harrison, Benjamin, 6. Hastings, Warren, 158. Heath, William, 90, 115. Henry VIIL, 59. Henry, Patrick, 48, 55, 58, 84, 144. Herkimer, Nicholas, 135, 136. Hessian troops, 93. Hobkirk's Hill, 176. Holland and Great Britain, 160. \ Hopkins, Stephen, 77. Howe, Richard, Lord, 105, 106, 113, / 150, 153. '1 Howe, Sir WiUiam, 39, 90, 94, 104, ' I 105, 112-118, 125, 127, 137-143, 148, 1 150. Hubbardton, 131. Hudson river, 95, 115, 128, 157, ' Hutchinson, Thomas, 46, 56, "^ -o, 77, 78, 81, 83, 107, 185. Hyder, Ali, 158. Impost amendment defeated by New York, 190. Indian tribes, 27, 28. Iroquois, 28, 29. Jay, John, 92, 182. Jefferson, Thomas, 55, 89, 100, 103. 126, 127, 192. Jeffreys, George, 17. Johnson, Sir John, 108, 134. Johnson, Sir William, 108. Johnson Hall, 26, 108. Jones, David, 133. Jones, Paul, 159, 160. Kalb, John, 38, 123, 165, 166. Kaska&kia, 156. Kentucky, 155, 171, 187. King's friends, 64, 69, 84. King's Mountain, 171, 172, 174. I Kirkland, Samuel, 135. Kosciuszko, Thaddeus, 123. INDEX. 199 Latayette, 123, 177. Land Bank, 20. Lee, Arthur, 123. Lee, Charles, 89, 105, 117-119, 122, 138, 140, 148, 150-152. Lee, Henry, 173. Lee, Richard Henry, 84, 97, 100. Lee, Robert Edward, 173. Leslie, Gen., 173. Leuktra, 144. Lexington, 86, 183. Lincoln, Abraham, 126. Lincoln, Benjamin, 131, 134, 143, 163-165, 167, 187. Livingston, Robert, 84, 98. Long House, 28, 29. Long Island, battle of, 112. Lords proprietary, 13. Louis XV., 31. Macaulay, Lord, 49. McCrea, Jane, 132, 133. McDowell, Col., 171. Mclfeil, Mrs., 132, 133. Madison, James, 192. Mahratta war, 158. Majuba Hill, 172. Manchester, Vt., 133. Marion, Francis, 165, 174. Marshall, John, 192. Martha's Vineyard, 156. Martin, Josiah, 96. Maryland, 8, 99, 140, 188. Massachusetts, 21, 22, 68, 71, 72, 83, 97, 107. , Mecklenburg county, N. C, 95, 171, 173. Minden, 147, Minisink 155. Minorca, , '8, 182. Mississippi valley, 182, 187. Mobilians, 27. Molasses Act, 49-51, 67. Monk, Gen., 169, Monmouth, 151, 152. Montgomery, Richard, 90, 93, 94. Morgan, Daniel, 93, 94, 137, 143, 167, 173, 174. Morris, Robert, 102, 120. Morristown, 119, 122, 123. Moultrie, William, 105. New England colonies, 6-8. New Hampshire, 76, 98. New Haven, 156. New Jersey, 11, 99. New Whigs, 60-62, 69. New York, 9, 66, 76, 80, 100, 108, 125, 143, 190. Newburgh, 180, 183. Norfolk, Va., 95. North, Lord, 66, 76, 144-147, 180. North Carolina, 11, 77, 96, 171-175. Northcastle, 115. Northwestern Territory, 188, JS unification of the Regulating Act, 85.. Norwalk, 156. Ohio, 189. Ohio Company, 32, Old Sarum, 59. Old South church, 53, 72, 82. Old Whigs, 59-64, 69. Otis, James, 45-47, 62, 72, 74, 144. Paper money, 20, 162, 186. Parker, Sir Peter, 96, 104. Parsons' Cause, 47, 48, Paxton, Charles, 44. Pendleton, Edmund, 84, Penn family, 14. Pennsylvania, 11, 13, 77, 99, 102. Pensacola, 158. Periods in history, 4. Petersburg, Va., 177. Petition (last) to the king, 92, Petty William (Earl of Shelbume), 61, 69, 180, 182. Philadelphia, 80, 84, 138-142, 151, 168, 183. Pigott, Sir Robert, 153. Pitt, William (Earl of Chatham), 57, 61, 62, 64, 06, 69, 71, 84, 145, 146. Pitt, William, the younger, 61, 181. Pontiac's war, 38, 41. Pownall, Thomas, 14. Preston, Capt., 74. Prevost, Gen.. 163, 164. Princeton, 120, 121. Proprietary government, 13. Protectionist legislation, 43, 50. Pulaski, Casimir, 123, 164. Putnam, Israel, 39, 87, 90, 112, 115. Rawdon, Lord, 176. Reform, parliamentary, 61-63. Regulating Act, 83, 85 ; repealed, 144. Representation in England, 58-61, Requisitions, 31, 54, 161, Retaliatory acts, 83 ; repealed, 144. Revere, Paul, 4, 86. Rhode Island, 13, 21, 23, 76, 77, 96, 153, 154, 164, 166, 186, Riedesel, Gen,, 131. Riots in Boston, 56. Rochambeau, Count, 166, 178. Rockingham, Lord, 57, 64, 180. Rodney, Caesar, 102, Rodney, George, 160, Rotten boroughs, 59, 62. Royal governors, 14-18. 200 INDEX. 4 Russell, Lord John, 61. Russell, Lord "William, 17. Russia, 159. Rutledge, Edward, 113. Rutledge, John, 84. St. Clair, Arthur, 131, 1G7. St. Eustatius, 160. St. Leger, Barry, 125, 126, 135- 137. Salaries, 15-18, 65-68. Savaimah, 163, 164. Savile, Sir George, 69. Schuyler, Philip, 90, 109, 119, 129- 133, 136. Secession, threats of, 187. Senegambia, 158. Sevier, John, 155, 171. Shays rebellion, 186. Shelburne, Lord, 61, 69, 180, 182. Shelby, Isaac, 171. Shirley, William, 52. Sidney, Algernon, 17. Silver bank, 20. Six Nations, 29, 34, 93, 125. Snyder, Christopher, 74. Sons of Liberty, 57. ' South Carolina, 90, 102, 104, 105, 127, 173-177. Spain declares war with Great Brit- ain, 158. Spanish possessions in North Amer- ica, 37, 158, 182. Spotswood, Alexander, 14. Stamp Act, 4, 41, 52, 58, 124. Stark, John, 39, 87, 134. Staten Island, 109, 117, 122, 139, 178. Steuben, Baron, 123, 150, 173, 177. Stillwater, 132. Stirling, William Alexander, called Lord, 112. Stony Point, 156, 157, 163. Strachey, Sir Henry, 151. Stuart Kings, 17, 60. Suffolk resolves, 85. Sullivan, John, 90, 112, 153-155. Sumter, Thomas, 165. Sunbury, 163. Supreme court, 191. Sweden, 159. Tarleton, Banastre, 165, 174. Taxation, 16-20, 31, 52-54, 62. Tea Party, Boston, 4, 79-83. Tennessee, 1.55, 171, 187. Throg's Neck, 114. Ticonderoga, 87, 118, 125, 127, 128, 131, 134, 143. Tories, 12, 60, 93, 126, 154, 155, 163, 184. Town meetings, 7, 53. Townshend Acts, 64-68, 76, 78 ; re- pealed, 144. ^reaty of peace, 182. ^ , Tuscaroras, 29. -\ " ^«> Union, want of, 34, 77, 161, 162, 182 191. Valcour, Island, 118. Venango, 33. Vincennes, 156. Virginia, 8, 21, 24, 47, 48, 76, 79, 96 97, 173. Walpole, Sir Robert, 31. War expenses, 30-32, 36, 40, 41. Ward, Artemas, 90, 117. Warner, Seth, 87, 131, 134. Warren, Joseph, 85, 86. Washington, George, 1,4, 5, 39, 55 his mission to Venango, 33 ; sur- renders Fort Necessity, 33 ; in Vir- ginia legislature, 76 ; in the Conti- nent ongress, 84 ; appointed to com. ^d the army, 88 ; not yet in favour of independence, 89 ; takes command at Cambridge, 92 ; takes Boston, 94 ; addressed by Lord Howe, 106 ; his character as gen- eral and statesman, 110, 111 ; with draws" his army from Brooklyn Heights, 113 ; masterly campaign in New York and New Jersey 114-122 ; endeavours to secure aii efficient regular army, 123-125 ; campaign of June, 1777, in New Jersey, 1^9 ; Brandy wine and Ger- mantown, 141, 142 ; intrigues of his enemies, 148, 149 ; Monmouth, 151, 152; sends a force against the jlj Iroquois, 154, 155; Stony Point, ■ 156, 157 ; his favourite generals often ill used by Congress, 167 ; his superb march and capture of York- town, 178-180 ; scheme for making him king, 183 ; elected first presi- dent of the United States, 193. Washington, William, 173. Wayne, Anthony, 157, 177. Webster, Daniel, 101. West Point, 115, 117, 157, 170. ] Western frontier posts, 185. \ White Plains, 115, 129. , Wildcat banks, 20. William III., 45. i Williams, James, 171. ; Wilson, James, 98. \ Winchester, Va., 26. Winnsborough, S. C, 172. Wright, Sir James, 164. Writs of assistance, 44-47. Wyoming, 77, 154, 185. Yorktown, 178-180. .