1 t\ \ 1 HFDI j^ff^ ^MPmiiJiiMJii ! ^^^^p^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ , ^% ■■■■■■■■HMH|M|HpHNVRpt ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M iPi >%?£ V 1 f| ^^^^■^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^8 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^»^^^^^ ■■■■■■■Wl ■■■■■HN ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^«^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^s^^^m^»^ ^^^^^^^^K^^^» ^^^^^^^^^^^«3 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M |l|Sf| : '^?||>|i| ■■ ^liilil liiS ■i Hnl B LIBRARY OF CONGRESS., BV^Hrtf UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ELEMENTS OF MORAL THEOLOGY BASED ON THE SUMMA THEOLOGIZE OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS J JOHN J. ELMENDORF, S.T.D. LECTURER IN MORAL THEOLOGY AT THE WESTERN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AND SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN RACINE COLLEGE, U.S.A. NEW YORK JAMES POTT & CO., PUBLISHERS 14 and 16 Astor Place -G , E (o Quvmodo dilexi legem Tuam, Domine: told die ?neditalio mea est. COPTRIGHT, 1892, BY JAMES POTT & CO. Press of J. J. Little & Co. Astor Place, New York TO THE BIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM EDWARD McLAREN, D.D., D.C.L., BISHOP OF CHICAGO, AND TO THE RIGHT REVEREND CHARLES CHAPMAN GRAFTON, S.T.D., BISHOP OF FOND DU LAC, WHOSE KIND ENCOURAGEMENT HAS SO LARGELY INAUGURATED AND BROUGHT TO COMPLETION THIS HUMBLE ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE SOUND MORALS IN THE CHURCH OF GOD, ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF GOD, IT IS MOST RESPECTFULLY AND DUTIFULLY DEDICATED BY THEIR SON AND SERVANT IN CHRIST AND THE CHURCH. - * IMPRIMATUR. An unlimited imprimatur has not been requested, and could not be expected for this first edition of the Elements of Moral Theology ; but episcopal approbation, expressed in general terms as follows, has not been lacking. The author can only add that, if in any, even the minutest particu- lar, he have deviated from the Divine law as given by the Catholic Church, or as applied to us by that National Church to which he most directly owes loyalty and submission, he makes in advance a humble retractation of any such statement. The Bishop of Maine: "I am sure it will be very valuable." The Bishop of Albany: "I am very sure that it will be well done . . and I am very glad to help along the publication of such a book." Tlie Bishop of New Jersey : " I am sure your book will be . . . good all through. It will meet a long felt need." The Bishop of Chicago: "I have heard with pleasure of your intention to publish. . . . There is imperative need which I am sure your book will do much to supply." The Bishop of Springfield: " I hasten to express my gratification at the prospect of possessing in English your paraphrase of St. Thomas, with your own valuable additions. May your effort, so likely to confer lasting benefit upon the Anglican communion, be crowned with success." The Bishop of Florida : " I am glad to hear that we are going to have a treatise on moral theology at last." Tlie Bishop of Delaware : " I am really glad to know of the work which you have taken in hand." The Bishop of Fond du Lac: "It gave me much pleasure to see your MS. on Moral Theology. . . It will be welcomed by our theological semin- aries and by many of our clergy. You will make a most valuable con- tribution to the Church's literature." The Bishop of Ohio : " You are truly engaged in a noble work for the Church and her teachers." The Bishop of Milwaukee : " Your work is certainly very timely. I doubt not the immediate good it will do in making our students and clergy more familiar with that magnificent treasury of moral theology (the Summa.) The Bishop of Pittsburgh : " I am sincerely glad to know that you have been able to translate and prepare it for the press." J. J. E. Western Theological Seminary, May, 1892. SUBSCRIBERS. BISHOPS. The Right Rev. John Williams, D.D., LL.D., Middletown, Conn. Charles Todd Quintard, D.D., LL.D., Sewanee, Tenn. Henry Adams Neely, D.D., Portland, Me. William Croswell Doane, D.D. (Oxon.), LL.D., Al- bany, N. Y. John Franklin Spalding, D.D., Denver, Col. John Scarborough, D.D., Trenton, 1ST. J. William Edward McLaren, D.D., D.C.L., Chicago, 111. George Franklin Seymour, S.T.D., LL.D., Spring- field, 111. David Buel Knickerbacker, D.D., Indianapolis, Ind. Henry Codman Potter, D.D., LL.D., New York. William Paret, D.D., LL.D., Baltimore, Md. Edwin Gardner Weed, S.T.D., St. Augustine, Fla. Leighton Coleman, D.D., LL.D., Wilmington, Del. Charles Chapman Grafton, D.D., Fond du Lac, Wis. William Andrew Leonard, D.D., Cleveland, 0. Isaac Lea Nicholson, D.D., Milwaukee, Wis, CLERGY. Alcorn, Edwin C. Ashley, Edward. Ashley, William B. Ashton, Amos T. Averill, Edward W. Babcock, John H. Batterson, Hermon G. Bigelow, Frank H. Blanchet, Clement T. Boorom, Sylvester D. Boyd, Melville. D.D. D.D. Brewster, S. T. Brown, W. R. Brugler, Charles E. Burleson, Allan L. Burnett, Charles P. A, Burrell, Frederick H. Butler, G. H. H. Cady, Philander K., D.D. Carter, George G., D.D. Cavanagh, William H. Clayton, Francis J. SUBSCRIBERS. Coale, William A. Coit, Henry A., D.D. Coleman, William B. Cooder, Charles L. Crockett, Stuart. Crozier, F. B. Cunningham, Herbert N. Davenport, Frederick P., D.D. Davidson, Philip G. Davis, James 0. Davis, John. Dealey, A. Sidney. Dix, Morgan, D.D., D.C.L. Douglas, George W., D.D. Drake, Charles F., M.D. Drane, Robert B. Durlin, Fayette. Dyer, H. Page. Edmunds, Charles C, Jr. Fenn, Percy T. Forster, J. W. Francis, J. M. Fulcher, Thomas B. Gailor, Thomas F., D.D. Gardner, Walter R., D.D. Gibson, Frank M. Goddard, Edward N. Gold, William J., D.D. Grabau, H. P. L. Green, Stephen H. Hall, Francis J. Hall, Joseph C. Harding, Alfred. Harding, McA. Harper, Edward J. Harris, Robert. Harrison, Jesse B. Harrod, George W. Hart, Samuel, D.D. Hickman, Percival H. Higgins, Jesse. Hodge, G. Woolsey. Hodges, J. Sebastian B., D.D. Hoffman, E. S. Hoffman, Eugene A., D.D. Hopkins, Lucius D. Horsfield, Frederick H. T. Houghton, George H., D.D. Hubbard, William F. Jacob, Thomas P. Jones, W. Bedford. Keator, F. W. Kidner, Reuben. Knowles, John H. Lanpher, Louis A. Lightner, Peter B. Lobdell, Frederick B. Locke, Clinton, D.D. Love joy, David H., M.D. Magill, G. Ernest, Mallory, Charles L. Mann, Cameron, D.D. McDougall, Howard. Mcllwaine, Joseph W. MeKim, John. McLean, Thomas W. McMurphy, Jesse G. Mead, James B. Meade, P. Nelson. Miller, Alexander J. Miller, John S. Mills, William W. Molineux, John H. Moore, Melville M. Morris, P. Moyses, Edward. Murphy, Edgar G. SUBSCRIBERS. IX Murphy, P. Murray, Gustavus M. Neely, Henry R. Nelson, Henry W., Jr., D.D. Nelson, Richard H. Nott, John W. O'Brien, W. J. Odell, Daniel I. Osborne, Richard H. G. Pardee, Luther. Parker, Edward M. Percival, Henry R., D.D. Phares, Edmund. Piper, Arthur, D.D. Pond, Sylvanus B. Pope, William C. Prout, John. Quin, Charles C. Quinn, James C, D.D. Reazor, Frank B. Rede, Wyllys. Richey, Alban. Riddel, H. 0. Ritchie, Arthur. Roberts, Daniel 0., D.D. Sage, John C. Saltus, A. "Weight. Sanborn, Frank A. Scudder, Henry T. Seibt, C. Theodore, D.D. Sherman, Addison M. Slidell, James. Smedes, Bennett, LL.D. Smith, George Henry. Smith, G. Williamson, D.D., LL.D. Smith, Joseph H. Smith, J. Stewart. Smith, Meredith 0. Smith, S. Borden. Snyder, William T. Spencer, A. Steele, J. Nevett, D.D Susan, Charles T. Taylor, Elbert B. Taylor, Frederick W., D.D. Thompson, James J. N. Thrall, S. Chipman, D.D. Tibbits, E. Dudley. Tomlins, William H. Towers, Frederick. Townsend, I. L., D.D. Townsend, John H. Turner, C. H. B. Underbill, Gilbert R. Upjohn, Samuel, D.D. Van De Water, George R., D.D. Walker, Millidge. Walker, William Bogert. Waterman, Lucius. Whitaker, Arthur. Williams, John. Williams, Pelham, D.D. Wright, Edward P., D.D. Wrigley, Charles F. J. Zorn, Joseph T. LAITY. J. Acworth, Gen. Theo. Sem., N. Y. George A. Armour, Chicago, 111. A. Beaumont,' Stockbridge, Mich. H. H. Bogart, Faribault : Minn. C. N. C. Brown, Gen. Theo. Sem. ; New York. SUBSCRIBERS. H. L. Burleson, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. Christian Literature Co. (Rev. S. M. Jackson), New York. Mrs. C. L. Cleveland, Concord, N. H. C. L. C, Chicago, 111. F. W. Corey, Highland Park, 111. G. H. Dennison, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. J. W. Diggles, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. E. S. P. Dodge, St. Simon's Mills, Ga. E. Floyd-Jones, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. J. M. Gilbert, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. Wm. L. Glenn, Baltimore, Md. H. B. Gummey, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. W. W. Hance, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. B. V. K. Harris, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. W. L. Hayward, Nashotah, Wis. Hunt & Eaton, Detroit, Mich. A. W. Jenks, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. Dr. Z. S. Leonard, New York. D. Porter Lord, Poughkeepsie, N. Y. W. T. Manning, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. W. A. Masker, Jr., Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. W. H. Meldrum, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. F. S. Moore, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. P. C. Pyle, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. C. M. Boome, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. W. N. Sanford, Poughkeepsie, N. Y. C. Satterlee, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. Sisters of Saint Mary, New York. W. W. Smith, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. E. A. Souder, Philadelphia, Pa. C. E. Spalding, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. C. W. Swing, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. Trinity College, Hartford, Conn. N. D. Van Syckel, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. H. A. Walton, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. A. D. WiUson, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. H. B. Wright, Gen. Theo. Sem., New York. PREFACE. The reader of these Elements of Moral Theology, a student, as I hope, of this great science of God's law, will doubtless indulge the writer in a few prefatory words. My humble office is that of editor rather than that of author. But even as such I would gladly have resigned the task to abler hands if any such had appeared. My best hope is that this poor attempt will soon be superseded by something better. I have called our study a science, for such it is ; sc, the science of the law of God, as given to man, in what- ever way it is given. This definition distinguishes it from Moral Philosophy, which seeks to account for and develope, from reason only, the laws and principles of right living. Moral Tbeology, on the other hand, is the science of the Divine Will as revealed to man. Well understood, these two must needs coincide, although their methods may be differeut. Moral Theology, making use of the other, is also grounded on it, as that in turn is grounded on the nature of man and the being of God. Both the philosophy and the theology, therefore, require a sound psychology, and a true theosophy, which in these Elements are assumed. For, like every other special science, Moral Theology has its assumptions — e.g., that the law of God is revealed in Holy Scripture ; that the Catholic Church has authority to apply that law, and to add positive laws, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, which bind the con- science of every Christian man ; and that the gifts of gra- cious help for the due keeping of God's holy law are freely bestowed through the ordained channels of grace. Like every other science, also, Moral Theology has its dis- puted topics. There are many propositions contained in these Elements which, if properly discussed and defended against all attacks, might fill many yolumes. It should be, indeed, and it has been, the aim of the writer to assert dog- matically nothing which is not accepted by the masters of our science ; but further than this no scientific manual can go. It would be absurd to expect that a primer of astron- nomy should give a demonstration of every assertion. It may be justly required that principles laid down shall be consistent with one another, make a harmonious system, and be capable of demonstration or verification. No more, I think, can be demanded. But our science is indispensable for the priest who is ex officio the teacher of God's law. "The priest's lips should keep knowledge, and they should seek the law at his mouth, for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts " (Mai. ii. 7). Although the Holy Scriptures are the supreme source of that law, yet in them truth and righteousness are only gradually revealed, and with special application to the special cases which elicited the Divine enunciations. Moral Theology stands or falls with Dogmatic Theology, both being equally needed for intelligent understanding and application of revealed truth and law. And not only does the pastoral office imply a capacity to speak with knowledge as well as with authority, in public teaching or private counsel ; the injunction, also, to "heal the sick " requires a knowledge of inward diseases. Above all, no priest should, except in case of extreme necessity, receive confessions, who is not duly instructed in Moral Theology and casuistry. These elements, as their title indicates, are chiefly based on the Summa Theologian of S. Thomas Aquinas. For the contributions to our science in the Anglican Church since the Eeformation have been very, very few. See the list provided for students of theology by the bishops of the American Church ; and the chief among those few — sc, Bishop Taylor and Dr. Sanderson, afterwards bishop — based their work chiefly on the common sources of older Moral Theology. (See Whewell's Hist. Moral Phil., Lect. 12.) Of the numerous contributions to our science in the modern Latin Church I have made moderate use and with great reserve. A very large part of their minute casuistical distinctions are based on a very different practical discipline of the Christian life from our own. The first three parts are not a translation of the Summa Theologian of S. Thomas Aquinas ; much less are they original work. They are not a translation ; on the contrary, I have avoided, as far as was possible for me, the peripatetic modes of expression which mark the Angelic Doctor's work. I am perfectly aware that, in doing so, precision of thought and expression is, more or less, sacrificed, and I am the farthest possible from being satisfied with the result. But, remem- bering that few are trained in scholastic philosophy, while every priest, at least, has absolute need of the first prin- ciples of Moral Theology, I have dared to hope for some benefit to the student, even from so poor an effort. Peripatetic expressions are avoided " as far as possible/' but Aristotelian thought and terminology are too deeply engrafted on the language of common life to render such an avoidance completely possible. A considerable part of the Prima Secundae, valuable in itself, did not seem essential to these rudiments of Moral Theology. Such portions have been greatly abridged, or wholly omitted. What I have thought needful to add, however, is generally relegated to Part IV. , the Supplement. But even for that all claim to originality is explicitly discarded. What place for originality is there when we are to treat of that Holy Law which has, been, once for all, Divinely given ? Moral phil- XIV PREFACE. osophers may ingeniously demolish all preceding theories, and try their hand at original reconstruction. But Moral Theology can only enunciate, systematize, and apply the Law of God. The first two have been so well done by S. Thomas Aquinas that he would be a bold teacher who should try to do so over again. But the application of that holy law to each changing cycle of the world's history opens new and gravest questions. As the world moves, so must Moral Theology move in order to direct aright. I have not ventured to ignore all new problems in casu- istry, the application of Moral Theology to the practical guidance of life. I trust that the road previously marked out has been carefully followed. But problems which seemed to call for further discussion have been indicated as " Queries," even when I have been tempted to give a brief and dogmatic answer. In the Supplement, citations from the common and civil law are introduced because these are among the highest applications of the natural virtue of justice, and because duty under such law is part of the revealed will of God. Moral Theology, therefore, cannot omit all reference to this part of its subject-matter. The writer has not aimed at completeness in this respect. He has selected what seemed illustrative of his subject, or of special practical value. And he takes this opportunity to make cordial acknowl- edgment of the valuable aid in careful revision of the text afforded by H. H. Martin, Esq., Counsellor-at-law, Chicago, 111. The priest will, of course, notice that all such general statements of civil law, however correct in form, are prac- tically limited by exceptions and qualifications, so that the advice of an expert is the only prudent course to be fol- lowed. Statements made in the Supplement must be so construed. It only remains that the writer lay this poor attempt at enunciating the will of our one Lord at His blessed feet, PREFACE. XV publicly entreating pardon for its errors, and asking the prayer of every Christian reader to the same end. " Unusquisque offert ad tabernaculurn Domini quod po- test, alius aurum, argentum, gemmas ; alius pelles aut pilos caprarum. Omnibus enim his opus habet Dominus, et placet voluntas sequaliter eorum qui insequaliter offerunt." S. Jerome. J. J. E. Western Theological Seminary, 1892. CONTENTS. Part I. — Introduction. CHAPTER I. PAGES On Beatitude 1-7 § 1. What is man's ultimate end ? § 2. What is beati- tude ? § 3. On the obtaining of this beatitude. CHAPTER II. On Will 8-24 § 1. What constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary ? § 2. On the circumstances of human acts. § 3. Acts elicited by the will. 1. The end. What is willed in reference to the end. § 4. On motives. § 5. How is the will moved ? § 6. On the choice of means for the end. § 7. On acts commanded by the will. CHAPTER III. On Good and Evil in Human Acts 25-43 § 1. Whence are they derived ? § 2. The good and evil of the inward acts of the will. § 3. On good and evil in outward human acts. § 4. What results from the moral character of human acts ? CHAPTER IV. On Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul 44-5? § 1. General view. § 2. Love. § 3. Hate. § 4. Concu- piscence. § 5. Pleasure. § 6. Pain and sorrow. § 7. Anger. XV111 CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. PAGES On Virtues 58-75 § 1. On habits. § 2. The essence and subject of virtue. § 3. On Intellectual virtues. § 4. On moral virtues. § 5. On the theological virtues. § 6. How are virt- ues acquired ? § 7. On the connection of virtues. CHAPTER VI. On Vices and Sins 70-117 § 1. The nature of vice and sin. § 2. Divisions. § 3. On the comparative guilt of sins. § 4. The subject of sin. § 5. The causes of sins. § 6. Relations of ignorance to sin. § 7. The moral relations of sense- appetite to sin. §8. Sins of malice, i.e., of deliberate wickedness. § 9. External causes of sin. § 10. The effects of sin. §11. Venial and mortal sins. CHAPTER VII. On Law 118-152 § 1. What is law ? § 2. Eternal law. § 3. The law of nature. § 4. Human law. § 5. Divine law. § 0. The Evangelical law. Part II. — The Theological Virtues. CHAPTER I. Faith and its Opposite Vices 153-174 § 1. Faith. § 2. The inward act of faith. § 3. The outward act of faith. § 4. The virtue of faith. § 5. Infidelity, heresy, apostasy, and blasphemy. CHAPTER II. Hope and its Opposite Vices 175-184 § 1. Hope. § 2. Vices opposed to hope : despair and presumption. CONTENTS. XIX CHAPTER III. PAGES Charity 185-237 § 1. Charity in general view. § 2. Charity in subjective view. § 3. The object of charity. § 4. The order of charity. § 5. Love. § 6. Joy. § 7. Peace. § 8. Mercy and pity {misericordia). § 9. Benefi- cence. § 10. Alms-giving. § 11. Fraternal cor- rection. § 12. The precepts of charity. CHAPTER IV. Vices Opposed to Charity 238-260 § 1. Hatred. § 2. Spiritual sloth (" acedia "). § 3. Envy. § 4. Discord and strife. § 5. Schism. § 6. Wars, quarrels, and seditions. § 7. Scandal. Part III. — The Cardinal Virtues. CHAPTER I. Prudence and its Opposite Vices 261-271 § 1. Prudence. § 2. Vices opposed to prudence. CHAPTER II. Justice and Injustice 272-295 § 1. Right. § 2. Justice. § 3. Injustice. § 4. Judg- ment. § 5. Commutative and distributive justice ; restitution. CHAPTER III. Vices Opposed to Justice 296-324 § 1. Respect of persons. § 2. Homicide. § 3. Theft and robbery. § 4. Injustice in legal proceedings. § 5. Injurious words. § 6. Frauds in trade. § 7. Sins of Omission. XX CONTENTS. CHAPTER IV. PAGES Religion and Vices Opposed to it 325-362 § 1. Introduction. § 2. Religion. § 3. Devotion and prayer. § 4. Outward acts of Divine worship : Adoration, sacrifices, and oblations. § 5. On Vows. § 6. On oaths. § 7. Superstition. § 8. Irreligion ; viz., Tempting God, perjury, sacrilege, and simony. CHAPTER V. puties towards others, depending on justice, and their Opposite Vices 363-402 § 1. Piety, reverence, and honour. § 2. Obedience and disobedience. § 3. Gratitude, ingratitude, and ven- geance. § 4. Veracity and vices opposed to it. § 5. Affability and liberality, with their opposite vices. §6. Equity (" epicheia ' ; ). § 7. The precepts of justice : the Ten Commandments. CHAPTER VI. Courage and Fortitude : Their Allied Virtues, and Their Opposite Vices 403-423 § 1. Courage and fortitude (fortiiudo). § 2. Cowardice and rashness. § 3. Magnanimity, and its opposite vices, presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillan- imity. § 4. Magnificence, and its opposite vices, meanness and wasteful extravagance. § 5. Patience and perseverance, with their opposite vices. CHAPTER VII. Temperance : its Allied Virtues and Their Opposite Vices 424-498 § 1. Temperance. § 2. The sense of shame (verecundia). § 3. Abstinence, fasting. § 4. Gluttony, sobriety, ebriety. § 5. Chastity, modesty, virginity. § 6. Lust (Juxuria). § 7. Continence, incontinence. § 8. Meek- ness and clemency ; anger ; cruelty. § 9. Humil- ity. § 10. Pride. § 11. Moderation ("modes^'a "). § 12. Precepts of temperance. CONTENTS. XXI Part IV. — Supplement. CHAPTER I. PAGES Conscience 499-502 CHAPTER II. Supplementary Notes on Law 503-509 § 1. General principles. § 2. Human law. § 3. Ecclesi- astical law. § 4. Civil law. CHAPTER III. Supplementary Notes on the Ten Commandments 510-521 CHAPTER IV. Right and Justice 522-529 § 1. Definitions and divisions. § 2. Dominion. § 3. How is dominion acquired ? CHAPTER V. Injury 530-542 § 1. Definitions and divisions. § 2. Theft. § 3. Resti- tution. § 4. Damnificatio. § 5. The unjust acces- sory. § 6. What things are to be restored ? CHAPTER VI. Contracts 543-556 § 1. Definitions and divisions. § 2. Requisites for a yalid contract. § 3. Defects in consent. § 4. Gra- tuitous contracts. § 5. Onerous contracts. CHAPTER VII. The Law of Sacraments 557-592 § 1. Sacraments in general. § 2. Holy Baptism. § 3. Con- firmation. § 4. The Holy Eucharist. XX11 CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. PAGES Sacramental Penitence 593-606 § 1. The virtue and the sacrament. § 2. Contrition. § 3. Confession. § 4. Absolution. § 5. Satisfac- tion. CHAPTER IX. The Visitation of the Sick 607-009 CHAPTER X. Holy Orders 610-619 § 1. Introductory. § 2. Holy Orders a sacrament. § 3. The law. CHAPTER XI. Holy Matrimony 620-043 § 1. The law of nature. § 2. The sacrament of Holy Matrimony. § 3. The contract. § 4. Impediments. § 5. Divorce. CHAPTER XII. Duties and Obligations of the State and of the Citizen. 644-647 MORAL THEOLOGY. Part I. — Introduction. CHAPTER I. OK BEATITUDE. § 1. What is man's ultimate end? Man, as a free and rational agent, directs his actions for the attainment of some end. Those actions are properly human which are character- istic of man as man. Now he differs from irrational creat- ures in having lordship of his acts. Such acts are properly human. But man is lord of his acts through reason and free will, whereby he chooses to do what he does. Other acts of his may be called actions of a man, but they are not properly human, since they do not proceed from that delib- erate will which is characteristic of man as man. And since every power is directed to its appropriate object, and the object of the will is some end, some good, it is evident that human acts are for the attainment of some end. This end may be last in execution, but it is first in the agent's intention. It is therefore called the final cause. The very action itself may be the ultimate end, but still it is voluntary. The human power called the Will may produce something objective to itself, as walking or talking for some remoter end ; or it may will the action for its own sake. Then this action is the end which the will aims at. 2 ON BEATITUDE. [Qu. I. 2, 3, 4. To act for an end is peculiar to a rational creature directing self toioards that end. Every agent in the universe in acting is directed towards some end. Otherwise, it would no more produce any one result than any other. In order that it shall produce a de- termined result it must have a direction (from without or from within) towards that result. But in a rational being this is done by that rational seeking of an end which is called the Will. An action or motion may tend to its end from either of two causes : either because the agent moves itself towards that end, as our consciousness informs us that man does ; or because it is directed by another, as an arrow moves towards the mark. Rational beings move them- selves towards the end, because, through free choice, they have lordship over their own actions. This then is peculiar to a rational being, for if the brute has not this power, he may apprehend the imme- diate end of his actions, but he does not, properly speak- ing, move himself towards it, nor know the ultimate end. Some other and a rational being is needed to direct the brute towards that ultimate end. He may, and doubtless does, seek some particular good for himself ; but the notion of the good in general as the object of action he has no power to comprehend. Human acts are moral acts. As such they differ in kind according to the ultimate end aimed at. For this is prior in intention. Each act, in- deed, is directed to some immediate end which determines the species of act. But the same specific act, the killing of a man, for example, may be directed to various remoter ends. And these remoter ends will determine the moral character of the act as good or bad. Ttiere is an ultimate end in human action. The end directly sought may have a remoter end for Qu. I. 4, 5, 6.] WHAT IS MAN'S ULTIMATE END? 3 which it is the means ; but it is impossible that there should be regress of this kind ad infinitum. In such a chain if you take away the first link, you annul all that follow. In ends there is a two-fold order : that of inten- tion, and that of execution ; and in both there must be a first. That which is first in intention is the mover of the desire for all that follows from it. Take away this, and that desire is moved by nothing. The first in execution is that from which operation begins. Take that away, and no one begins to do anything. But the ultimate end is that which is first in intention ; other things are willed only as means to attaining this. And the first in execution is the first of those means to attaining the end desired. On neither side is it possible to proceed ad infinitum. For if there were no ultimate end nothing would be sought, no action determined to an end, no aim would rest in any- thing. And, on the other hand, if there were no first in the means used, no one would begin to do anything, no plan would be determined in any direction. All this is true, however, of a connected order only. Where there is none, there may be an indefinite number of aims or means. One man can make, at one time, only one tiling his ulti- mate end, Because each one seeks that as his ultimate end which is for him the perfect good that rounds up and completes his nature. This is for him his good. It fills up his desire and leaves nothing more to be sought for. Therefore there cannot be two such objects of desire. Men may seek at once pleasure, rest, goods of nature, virtue ; but all these as going to make up that one perfect good which is the ultimate end. All things which man seeks for, he seeks on account of the ultimate end, Because whatever man seeks for he seeks as good, if not 4 ON BEATITUDE. [Qu. III. 1, 2. as the perfect good which is his ultimate end, yet as tending towards that. It is not necessary that that ultimate good should be consciously in the mind at the time, but its power remains in every desire. So it is not necessary that he who is going anywhere by a road, should at every step think of the end of his journey. Do all men seek the same ultimate end ? The question admits of two answers. If we have in mind the (subjective) idea of that end, since all seek their per- fection, all agree in seeking one end. But if we speak (objectively) of that in which the notion of such perfection is found, by no means do all agree, since some make riches the perfect good, others, pleasure, and so on. So tastes differ, though all like the agreeable. Even in sinning, man seeks a seeming good. Different courses of life result from men's finding their ultimate good in different objects. § 2. What is beatitude? Is it any created tiling ? Our term, "the end," is equivocal, since it may mean either the thing which we desire to obtain, or the getting, the possession, use, or enjoyment of that thing. Thus the avaricious may desire money simply for itself ; the ambitious, the pleasure-seeker, for what it gives. In the first sense, the ultimate end of every man is uncreated good, even God, because He only, by His infinite goodness, can perfectly satisfy our will. But in the other sense, the ultimate end of man is something created, and existing in himself, sc, the obtaining and the fruition of that ultimate end. Men obtain beatitude by participation in the perfect beatitude of God. Beatitude is perfect activity. For it is the final perfection of man. But nothing is perfect in which any power remains in purely potential ex- Qu. in. 2, 3, 4.] AVHAT IS BEATITUDE ? 5 istence. Beatitude, indeed, is said to be eternal life (Eom. vi. 22) ; but life, in this sense of the word, is not mere existence ; it is the fulfilment of the operations of life (S. John, xvii. 3). Such operations of the inward life are thinking, feeling, willing. Such can constitute beatitude. Perfect beatitude is not to be found in this life ; for that activity of the soul in which man may find some imperfect union with his heavenly Father cannot be uninterrupted union. There may be some participation of beatitude, but its fulness can only be found where there is one, continuous, uninterrupted union with God. This beatitude has not its seat in the sensitive nature, sc, in the feelings and sensations by which we now attain to intellectual truth. Its seat is in spiritual reason and holy will. Yet true it is that in the resurrection this perfect beatitude may overflow into the lower parts of the perfected human nature. It is the vision of God, of which S. John spoke (1 Ep. iii. 2). This leaves nothing more to be desired and sought for. And it is reason's highest flight and final rest to know the first cause, the source of all that is. What are the conditions of this beatitude ? (1) Joy is caused by the rest of desire in the good obtained ; therefore beatitude cannot exist without the con- comitant spiritual pleasure. (2) Three things must concur in perfect beatitude, viz., perfect vision, which is perfect knowledge of the end of reason ; comprehension of the object of vision, which implies its presence in the soul ; fruition, which is perfect delight in the object of love known and possessed. (3) Eectitude of will is required both antecedently and concomitantly. The first, because attaining to the end implies a due order of the will with reference to that end, and the means of reaching it ; the second, because the 6 OK BEATITUDE. [Qu. v. 1, 2, 3. will of one who sees God necessarily loves whatever he loves in its relations to God (Heb. xii. 14). § 3. On the obtaining of this beatitude. It is the obtaining of perfect good. Man is capable of this perfect good, for his spiritual reason can comprehend it, and his will can seek it ; not perfectly under present conditions indeed, but when he has attained to the perfection of the supernatural life for which he was created. Since beatitude is perfect and sufficient good it must exclude all evil, and satisfy all desire. In this life all evil cannot be excluded ; ignorance, inordinate affections, bodily pains all stand in the way. Neither can all desire be satisfied. For man naturally desires permanence of the good which he possesses ; but the goods of this life are transitory ; and so is life itself, while man naturally shuns death. Therefore perfect beati- tude cannot be found in this life. If we consider, again, that in which beatitude peculiarly consists, sc, the vision of God, of which man is in this life incapable, the conclusion will be the same. In this life man can only rejoice in hope of it or in some imperfect participation of it. Tliis beatitude can never be lost. For, (1) it satisfies all desire, and excludes all evil. But man naturally desires to keep the good which he has, and he cannot be perfectly happy if he thinks that he may lose it. Or if, again, he is deluded by false opinion that he will never lose it, that false opinion is itself an evil, while per- fect beatitude excludes every evil. And («2) this vision of God so satisfies the soul, is so per- fectly free from every drawback to felicity, that the blessed Qu. V.4, 5.J (XN" THE OBTAINING OF THIS BEATITUDE. 7 cannot wish to lose it ; God will not withdraw it, which would be penalty for fault ; neither has anything the power to withdraw the soul from this vision. Man is made to par- ticipate in the eternity of God, finding his own destiny in this everlasting beatitude (S. Matt. xxv. 46). Man, by his natural powers, cannot acquire beatitude. For its perfection is found in the vision of God ; but this is above the nature of every creature. Its natural cognition is after the manner of its being. But the Divine essence infinitely exceeds every created substance ; therefore no creature can by its natural powers obtain this ultimate beatitude. It is indeed the end of man ; but in this, as in other respects, man, having free will, is to use that in turn- ing to the One who alone can make him perfectly happy. The greatness of the end makes him exalted above those irrational creatures which can attain their end, so much lower than his, by their own natural powers. CHAPTER II. OJST WILL. § 1. What constitutes the voluntary and the involuntary? Human acts are peculiarly voluntary. In some actions or motions the impulse which produces them is to be found in the agent, or thing moved. In others, we find an external impulse. Thus we speak of the attraction of the earth towards a stone, and of the stone towards the earth, as if there were an inward impulse pro- ducing the motion. But when the stone is thrown upwards, the impulse is from without. But some of those actions or motions which proceed from within are those of self- moving things, others are not. Granting that there is an end or object to be attained by the motion or action, we find that some things act with knowledge of that end ; they act on account of, for the sake of, that end. In these there is not only the impulse to act, but to act for the sake of that end. Where there is no knowledge of the end, which nevertheless guides the action, an external principle or cause must be assumed which possesses that knowledge. Such things are not said to be self-moved, but to be moved by others. But those which have knowledge of the end are called voluntary agents. Now man knows the end of his operation, and moves himself ; therefore human acts are voluntary. It may be objected, (1) that his desire is moved by what is desirable. But this does not conflict with the definition of the voluntary given above, for the inward principle of action need not be the- first principle of action ; i. e., if we Qu. VI. 1,2.] VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY. 9 consider some other kind of motion or action, such as is the presenting ah extra of some object to our desire.* Every new motion or action of "desire must have an out- ward antecedent as a condition of the new existence, but this does not hinder the inward motion being self-caused with knowledge of the end, i. tin- end. We may speak of bodily habits, when we mean, not the natural operations which require no habit, but that which the body does in the direct service of the soul. The body may }>v well or ill disposed as the servant of the soul. Such dispositions of the body we call habits. But habits are specially in the powers of the soul. Some are found in the sensitive soul, not as it operates from natural instinct, but as it aets under the dominion of reason. Since a habit is something which we can rationally use or not use, we cannot properly say that the brutes have habits. There are habits of the intellect and of the will, which will be treated of when we consider particular virtues. Some habits are implanted in us by nature, whether dis- tinctive of human nature in general, or peculiar to the individual. Thus some men may have a natural habit of temperance or chastity. Qu. LIII. 3.] ON HAL ITS. 59 But many habits are caused in our faculties, so far as they are naturally passive, by repeated acts. Thus the habits of the desires are rendered virtues, by repeated acts according as they are moved by reason. Some habits are infused by God. For, first, there are some habits by which man is well constituted with reference to an end exceeding the powers of human nature (in itself). Such habits must be propor- tioned to their end. Therefore they cannot be naturally in man, but need to be supernaturally given ; sc, the super- natural virtues and gifts. Secondly, God may show His power by supernaturally giving habits which might have been (slowly) produced by natural powers. Thus He gave to the apostles the habit of speaking in languages which they had not acquired by study. Habits are increased by acts if the intensity of the act is proportioned to the strength of the habit. If the intensity of the act is deficient in this respect, such a negligent act tends to weaken the habit. As habits are generated and increased by acts, so ceasing from action diminishes them and sometimes totally destroys them. For it removes those acts which keep off causes that cor- rupt or diminish those habits. Habits are per se corrupted or diminished by contrary agents. And where those con- traries increase with lapse of time, such habits may at last be totally destroyed by long-continued cessation from their operation, as is manifest in habits of virtue and knowledge. For when any one does not use his habit of virtue to moder- ate his passions or inward operations, it is necessary that they advance beyond the limits of virtue, owing to the (natural) inclination of sense appetite and other powers which are directed to outward objects. So it is with those intellectual habits whereby one judges rightly concerning 60 ON VIRTUES. [<^U. LVI. 3. the objects presented in the imagination. When a man ceases from the use of his intellectual habits, extraneous images arise and sometimes distract the mind ; so that, unless by frequent use of the intellectual habit they be cut off or repressed, a man is rendered less apt to judge rightly, and sometimes is totally disposed to the contrary. And so, by cessation from action, the intellectual habit is diminished or destroyed. § 2. The essence and subject of virtue. Human virtue is a habit. The word virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power or "faculty of the soul." But the perfection of each thing is specially viewed with reference to its end. Now the end of a power is action, and hence a power is said to be perfect as it is determined to its act. But there are some powers which in themselves are de- termined to their acts, as the natural active powers. These arc sometimes called virtues (in a loose or wider sense of the word). But the rational powers which are peculiar to man are not determined in any one direction, but are indeter- minate towards many directions. They are determined to acts through habits, and therefore human virtues are habits. Virtue is a good habit of action, and productive of good. S. Augustine's definition is, Virtue is a good quality or habit of the soul, by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly, and which God as the sole efficient cause produces in us. Aristotle says that '"'virtue is that which renders him that has it good, and his work good." (Xic. Eth., ii. G.) Can the intellect he the subject of virtue ? Virtue, according to our definition, is a habit which one uses well. But a habit is ordained for good action in two ways : (1) Inasmuch as by a habit of this kind is acquired Qu. LVI. 3.] ESSENCE AND SUBJECT OF VIETUE. 61 a faculty of good action. Thus man may acquire the fac- ulty of speaking correctly, through what may be called the grammatical habit, although he does not always actually so speak. (2) In another way habit gives not only facility in acting well, but also brings it about that one rightly uses his faculty, as justice not only makes a man's will prompt to do just things, but also causes him actually to do them. But we call good not what is merely potential, but what is actual. Therefore from habits of this latter kind a man is said to do good, and to be a good man. And since "virtue is what makes a man good, and his work good," habits of the second class are properly and specially called virtues. But habits of the first class are not simply called virtues, because they do not make the work good except as one faculty is concerned, neither do they make the agent good. A man may be a good grammarian or a good arti- san without being a good man. He is good secundum quid, and so there are intellectual virtues which are virtues secundum quid. But the subject of virtue proper is the will or some other human power as it is moved by the will. The will moves the powers of a man, as they are rational, to their respective acts. And therefore when a man actually does well, this results from his having a good will. The intellect may be moved by the will, when one con- siders anything because he wills to do so. And so, as the intellect is related to the will, it may become the subject of virtue, properly speaking. In this way the reason is the subject of faith, for it is moved to assent to the objects of faith by the dominion of the will. For no one unwillingly believes. This belongs to the speculative intellect. But the practical intellect is the subject of the virtue prudence. For since prudence is "right ideas concerning things to be done," it requires that a man be well disposed with reference to the principles of those things, i.e., to the ends for which they are the means, which right disposition comes from rectitude of will. 62 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. LVI. 4. All proper virtues depend in a certain way on love, which is the virtue of the will ; therefore they depend on a good will. It is true that intellectual virtues do not make a good man ; but since the end of each thing is its good, and since the true is the end of the mental powers, to know the true is a good act of those powers. Hence, such a habit may be called an intellectual virtue. Are the passions the subject of virtue? We may consider the irascible and the concupiscible pas- sions as they an- in themselves, belonging to the sensitive nature of a man. So viewed, they cannot be the subject of virtue. In another way they may be considered as they are naturally made to obey reason, and BO participate in reason. So viewed they can be the subject of human vir- tue. For the act which proceeds from one power as that power is moved by another, cannot be perfeel unless both powers are well disposed with reference to their respective activities. So the act of the artificer cannol be perfect in its kind, unless he, as artificer, is in good condition, and his instrument also. In those things, therefore, which are done through the passions as moved by reason, there must be some habit perfecting to good action, not only in the reason, but also in the irascible or concupiscible nature. Tlie latter virtue is nothing else than a certain habitual conformity to reason in those powers. Brutes cannot have such virtues, though they have such passions, because their passions are not subject to the em- pire of reason. (1) S. Paul, indeed, said (Rom. vii. 18), C 'I know that in my flesh (i.e., sense-appetite) dwells no good thing." But this is doubtless spoken of it as it is in itself. (2) It might be objected, again, that since virtue is en- tirely in the soul, all that virtue belongs to the rational part which governs the rest ; as virtue is not in the body, Qu. LVI. 6.] ESSENCE AND SUBJECT OF VIRTUE. 63 but in the soul which governs the body. But very different is the government of the passions from the government of the body. It is a very suggestive observation of Aristotle (Polit. i. 5), that "the soul rules the body with a despot- ical rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule." Therefore there is no virtue in the body, but only in the soul. But the passions do net obey like a slave, and they have their own proper motions, by which they sometimes oppose reason. Therefore there must be in the passions some virtues by which they may be well disposed for (good) action. (3) Another objection. The principal act of moral virtue is choice. But the passions do not choose, but only the reason chooses ; therefore virtue is found in reason only. I answer that in choice are found two things ; sc, aiming at the end, which pertains to moral virtue, and selecting of means to that end, which pertains to prudence. But right intention as respects the end is (partly) due to a good disposition of the passions. Therefore there are moral virtues of the passions, while prudence belongs to reason. There are virtues of the will. Any power of the soul needs a habit perfecting it for good action, i.e., a virtue, when the proper nature of that power does not (by itself) suffice for that purpose. So far, then, as the object of the will is a good of reason propor- tioned to the will, so far no perfecting virtue of the will is needed. But if any good ought to be willed by man which exceeds the natural limits of the one who wills, whether it be a good transcending the natural limits of human nature, or a good which exceeds the natural proportions of the in- dividual (as the good of his neighbour) ; therein the will needs a virtue. And therefore virtues of this kind, which order the affections of man towards God and towards his neighbour, have the will for their subject, as charity, jus- tice, and the like. Each thing, it is true, naturally seeks G4 OX VIRTUES. [Qu. lvii. 1, 2. its own good, and so does the will naturally tend to rational good. But this is the good of the one who wills, manifested in the virtues of the passions, as temperance, fortitude, and the like.* The virtue of the will (which is rational by its partici- pating in reason) is either moral or theological. § 3. Intellectual virtues. Every virtue is ordained for the good ; but any habit is called virtue for one or both of two reasons : first, that it gives the power to act well ; secondly, that with the power is also a good use of the power. Speculative intellectual habita do not perfect the will, but only the intellect. T efore they may be called virtues in the first sense of tin- word, since they give a power of good action as regards truth, which is the good of reason ; but they are not virtues in the second sense, since they do not secure a good use of the power or habit. But a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, causes one to use well these specula- tive habits. There are three intellectual virtues. This will appear if we consider that the perfection of the speculative intelli- gence has reference to the consideration of the true, Avhich is its proper good. Now the true may be contemplated in two ways : first, as self-evident ; in another way, as known through some other truth. Self-evident truth, seen im- mediately when presented to the mind, implies a virtue of the mind perfecting the intelligence to such contemplation. This virtue may be called spiritual reason (" intellectus"). But the true which is known indirectly — i.e., through the medium of something else, through rational search — may be either the ultimate in our special subject of inquiry, * All virtues, indeed, are voluntary ; but for these the nature of the •will (so far as the will is concerned) suffices. But a special virtue of the will is needed where an extrinsic good is to be sought for. Qu. lvii. 5. J INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. Go or the ultimate in all human thought. For the first, there is a virtue, science (" scientia"), which perfects intelli- gence. For the second, there is a habit, a virtue, by which one assents promptly to those necessary truths which are first in the order of truth, but last to be discovered by us. This is wisdom {" sapientia"). Art may be called a fourth intellectual virtue, operative (not speculative), since it gives the power of producing good work, though not, as art, of making a good use of the work. Prudence is distinguished, as an intellectual operative virtue, from art by the consideration of the things to be done by each. Art concerns things to be made ; prudence, things to be clone. The latter not only gives the power of doing good work, but also of making a good use of the thing which is done ; for it presupposes rectitude of desire. It is related to human actions, as art is related to things which are made. We see that prudence requires that man be well disposed towards the ends which he aims at, which is by right desire ; and therefore this virtue requires moral virtue, which is not presupposed by art. The artificer who intentionally errs is more praised than the one who goes wrong unwillingly. But the man who sins willingly errs more against prudence than he who goes wrong uninten- tionally. Prudence is a virtue peculiarly necessary for human life. For living well consists in acting well. And for this, it is demanded not only that the action be good in itself, but that the manner of doing be good also; sc, that it be done according to a right choice, and not merely from the im- pulse of passion. But since choice is of means to the end sought for, rectitude of choice requires both a due end, and suitable means for that due end. For the latter, man is disposed by the virtue which perfects the appetitive soul. But for the choice of suitable means he must be perfected by a habit of reason ; for taking counsel and choosing are 5 66 ON" VIRTUES. [Qu. LVIII. 2, 4. actions of reason. This virtuous habit is prudence. It is therefore peculiarly necessary for a good life. On the distinctions hehueen intellectual and moral virtues. Eeason is the primal constituent of all human opera- tions ; and whatever other constituents are found, obey reason, some without contradiction, as the members of the body ; but others may oppose reason or impede its opera- tion. In order, then, that man may act well, not only must reason be well disposed by a habit of intellectual vir- tue, but also the will and desires must be well disposed by a habit of moral virtue. As, then, the will and desires are distinguished from reason, bo are the one kind of virtues distinguished from the other kind. And as the appetitive soul is a principle of human action participating in reason (after a certain manner), so a moral habit, so far as it is conformed to reason, is human virtue. Can moral virtue exist without intellectual virtue? Wisdom, science, art, are not necessary for moral virtue, but spiritual understanding (" intellectus ") and prudence are indispensable. For moral virtue is a habit by which a good choice is made ; and this requires (as we have al- ready seen) not only that the will seek a good which accords with reason, which is its due end, but also that man rightly take the means for attaining that end ; and this can only be through reason's rightly considering, judg- ing, and commanding, which pertain to prudence and the virtues adjoined to it. Hence moral virtue cannot exist without prudence ; and, for the same reason, not without spiritual understanding ; for by this are known natural principles both for speculation and for action ; and prudence presupposes these principles, which are naturally known. Something more than a natural inclination is needed, for inclination in moral virtue is accompanied by a free exer- cise of choice. Qu. LVIII. 5.] INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES. 67 It is not necessary that every exercise of reason be per- fect in order that a man be virtuous, but only as respects what things are to be virtuously done. In those, the vir- tuous man is the rational man. Natural inclination to any moral good is a certain in- choate virtue, but it is not perfect virtue. For inclination of this kind can be more dangerous the stronger it is, unless right reason be adjoined to it, by which is made right choice of means for the due end. So a horse running away, if he is blind, strikes an obstacle the harder, and injures himself the more, the faster he runs. Can intellectual virtue exist without moral virtue ? Every such virtue can so exist, prudence alone excepted. Prudence is right reason applied to things which are to be done, not only in certain general principles but also in such particulars as actions are. For right reason demands prin- ciples from which it may proceed. But when it is em- ployed about particulars, it proceeds not only from general laws, but from principles which specially concern the special case before it. As regards the first, man is rightly guided by his natural understanding of primary principles, by which he knows that evil is not to be done, etc. But this does not suffice for right reasoning about particular cases. For a general principle of this kind may be cor- rupted in its particular application by some passion. When, e.g., concupiscence overcomes a man, that appears to be a good which he desires, although it may be against the general judgment of reason. And, therefore, as man is rightly disposed respecting general principles by his virtue of spiritual understanding, or by his (moral) " science," so in order that he may be rightly guided in the special prin- ciples of his action, he requires certain habits by which it may become natural, so to speak, for him to judge rightly respecting his ends ; and this is brought about by moral virtue. For the virtuous rightly judges about the end of 08 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. LXI. 2. virtue. Therefore, for prudence it is requisite that man have moral virtue. Many may deliberate well, who lack prudence, which not only considers rightly, but also judges and orders well. This cannot be unless first be removed the impediment of passions which corrupt the judgment and the precepts of prudence. § 4. On moral virtues. Can any moral virtue exist apart from the passions? Understand here, as previously, by the word passion any motion of sense-appetite. So understood, it is evident that moral virtues which have the passions for their proper sub- ject cannot exist without those passions. For, otherwise, moral virtues would render those passions wholly inoper- ative. But it does not pertain to virtue that those things which are subject to reason want their proper actions, but that they obey the command of reason while fulfilling their natural functions. Hence as virtue orders the members of the body with reference to their due outward acts, so it orders the sense-appetite for its proper and appointed acts. But moral virtues which do not directly order the passions, but concern operations, can exist without passions ; e.g., justice, by which the will is applied to its due act, which is not passion. But yet on the act of justice follows joy, which, although it is not a passion, may by a certain " re- dundance " overflow into the sensitive nature (the feel- ings). And so, the more perfect the virtue, the more feeling it may excite. Wliy have four virtues teen distinguished as cardinal? TTe can consider the essence of virtue, its "formal prin- ciple," which is rational good. If we consider reason in itself, we find one principal virtue, which is prudence. Or w 7 e can again look at the objects to which the order of practical reason is applied. And these we find to be either operations, the virtue of which is justice ; or pas- Qu. LXII. 1.] ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES. 69 sions, concerning which there are two virtues. For passions may impel to something which is contrary to reason, in which case it is necessary that the passion he suppressed by the virtue of temperance. Or the passion may keep us hack from what reason dictates, through fear of dangers or labours. And so it is necessary that we be strengthened in what is reasonable, and this virtue is fortitude. In like manner we may look at the subjects of the virtues, which are four in number. And practical reason is per- fected by prudence ; the will by justice ; the concupiscible nature by temperance ; and the irascible, by courage or fortitude. § 5. On the theological virtues. Are there any theological virtues? Through virtue man is perfected for the acts by which he is prepared for beatitude. Now there is a two-fold beati- tude or felicity of man. One is proportioned to human nature, which can be attained by natural principles. But there is another, exceeding human nature's powers, to which man can attain only by divine virtue, a certain participa- tion of Divinity, of which S. Peter speaks (2 Ep. i. 4, "partakers of the Divine nature"). And because this bless- edness exceeds the proportion of human nature, natural principles do not suffice to order men for this beatitude. It is accomplished by certain principles divinely super- added. Aud these are well named theological, both because they have God for their chief object, because they are in- fused by God only, and because our knowledge of them rests on revelation only, through the Holy Scriptures. What man has not by nature, he may have by participa- tion with the Divine. Note, also, that these virtues are called Divine, not because they are imputed (as such) to God, but because by them we are Divinely made virtuous, virtuous towards God. Will and reason are naturally or- dained for God, as their beginning and their eud, but still 70 OST VIRTUES. [Qu. LXII. 2, 3. according to the proportions of nature. But for God, as the object of supernatural beatitude, they are not by nature sufficiently ordained. Tliese principles sufficiently distinguish theological vir- tues from the intellectual and moral virtues. The object of the first is God Himself, as He exceeds the natural cognition of our reason. The object of the sec- ond is something which can be comprehended by human reason ; e.g., the intellectual virtue of wisdom considers divine things so far as they can be investigated by natural reason ; theological virtue goes beyond that. The natural love or affection which may be found in the four cardinal virtues is not the supernatural gift and virtue of charity. Tlie three theological virtues are those which the apostle names (1 Cor. xiii. 13), viz., faith, hope, and charity. For theological virtues prepare man for supernatural blessedness, as by natural inclination he is ordained for his natural end. But this comes about in two ways : first, as his intellect contains the primal, universal principles known by us through the natural light of reason ; secondly, through rectitude of will, which naturally tends towards rational good. But these two fall short of what is requisite for supernatural beatitude, as the apostle says (1 Cor. ii. 0), ■• Eye hath not seen, and ear hath not heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him." Hence, it is necessary that in both respects something be supernatu- rally added to man which may prej)are him for this super- natural end. And first, indeed, are given to his intelligence certain supernatural yet fundamental truths which are received through divine light. These can be believed, and the vir- tue which receives them is (the theological virtue) faith. Qu. LXin. 1.] HOW ARE VIRTUES ACQUIRED ? 71 But, secondly, the will may tend towards that end as attain- able by us, which pertains to the virtue of hope ; and may reach a certain spiritual union with its object, which is gained by charity, a certain conformity of the will with its (supernatural) end. In the natural order, indeed, faith and hope imply a cer- tain imperfection ; since faith is of things not seen, and hope of tilings not possessed. But to have faith and hope respecting things which exceed our natural faculties, is supernatural virtue. § 6. How are virtues acquired ? Are any virtues naturally in us 9 There is certainly in us by nature an aptitude, a certain imperfect foundation for virtue, in two ways, both as re- spects the constitution of human nature, and of the indi- vidual man. For the first, in man's reason are natural principles of things to be known and things to be done, the seed-plots, so to speak, of moral and intellectual virtues. In the will, also, is naturally a rational desire of good. For the second, the nature of the individual, some men are (naturally) better or worse constituted with respect to certain virtues, through their bodily constitution, so far, namely, as their nervous system aids or impedes the actions of their sensitive soul (which depend on that nervous sys- tem), and, consequently, the operations of their rational powers which make use of the sensitive soul. One man, accordingly, has natural aptitude for science, another for courage, another for temperance. But this natural aptitude for certain virtues is not the consummation of them. For nature is determined to one end alone, whereas perfected virtue is not directed in one channel only, but is varied according to the diverse matters and the diverse circumstances wherein the virtue operates. (Consider the natural operation of instinctive sympathy.) 72 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. LX1II. 2, 3. As from bad acts habits of vice are produced, much rather from good acts are produced habits of virtue. Man's good is measured by rule. That rule is two-fold ; sc, human reason, and Divine law. And because Divine law is the superior rule and measure, its extent is wider ; whatever is regulated by human reason is regulated also by it, but not conversely. The virtue which is regulated by human reason can be caused by human acts, inasmuch as acts of this kind proceed from reason, under whose power and regulation stands the good of man. But the virtue which ordains man for good, as regu- lated by Divine law, and not simply by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, but only by Divine operation. But is it not true that man needs the grace of God in order that he may avoid sin ? And is not sin incompatible with the possession of virtue ? I grant that the perfection of supernatural virtue is incompatible with any mortal sin ; but this is not true of virtues acquired by human efforts. For the employment of our habit is subject to our will. But not by one act of sin is a habit destroyed ; for act is not directly contrary to habit, but the contrary habit is. Therefore, although without grace man cannot live without committing some mortal sin, yet lie is not hindered thereby from acquiring some habit of virtue by which he may in general abstain from evil deeds, especially those which are in the highest degree contrary to reason. There are, also, some mortal sins which man without grace cannot possibly avoid, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues. Are any moral virtues infused by the Spirit of God ? All virtues, intellectual and moral, which are acquired by human acts, proceed from certain natural principles pre- existing in us. But for a supernatural destiny other vir- tues are needed which bear the same relation to the three Qu. lxv. 2, 3.] CONNECTION OF VIRTUES. 73 theological virtues, as moral and intellectual virtues do to their seminal principles. § 7. On the connection of virtues. Can moral virtues exist without charity '? Since moral virtues, so far as operative of good with reference to an end which does not exceed our natural faculties, can be acquired by human efforts, it follows that they may be so acquired without charity. So it has been in the case of many heathen. But as they are operative of good for a supernatural end, they are more truly and per- fectly virtues ; and such cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such moral virtues cannot exist without charity. This may be proved as follows : The other moral virtues require prudence as an essential condition of their existence. (See page 66.) And pru- dence cannot exist without moral virtues which are pres- ent in consequence of it ; inasmuch as moral virtues cause one to be well related to certain ends, and this involves the idea of prudence. But much rather does true prudence demand that one shall be well related to the ultimate end, which is the work of charity. Hence it is manifest that neither can the infused prudence exist without charity, nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, which cannot exist without prudence. Imperfect virtues, virtues of the lower order, may be found in evil men, but not in their perfection, since they make him good who has them. Can charity exist without the other moral virtues'? God works as perfectly in grace as in nature. But in nature's works we see that where a faculty of any kind is found there are also found the means for its due operation. But it is manifest that charity, ordaining men for the ultimate end, is the principle of all good works which are related to that end. Accordingly, together with charity 74 ON VIRTUES. [Qu. lxv. 8, 4. are infused all moral virtues needed in order that man may be able to perfect the various kinds of good works belong- ing to his supernatural life. He, then, who loses charity through mortal sin, loses also all infused moral virtues. (1) These are not superfluous where charity exists. For in following the means by which the supernatural end is reached, man must not only have the virtue which con- cerns the end — i.e., charity — but also the virtues which concern the means. These, indeed, are subordinate to the other, but nevertheless they are also requisite. And S. Taul. in speaking of charity (1 Cor. xiii.), is pointing out the principle and the motive of the subordinate virtues, which principle and motive is charity alone. (2) It may still farther be objected that one who lias a virtuous habit finds pleasure in the exercise of that habit ; whereas many who have charity, and are free from mortal -in. nevertheless find difficulty in virtuous acts, and no pleasure except as the acts are referred to the motive of charity which produces them. But the answer is that the habits of infused mural virtues encounter difficulty of this kind through some contrary dispositions which are due to the effect of preceding acts. This difficulty does not ap- pear in the acquired moral virtues, because, through the exercise of those acts by which they are acquired, the con- trary dispositions arc removed. (3) All the true children of God have the grace of charity ; but they may lack some virtues. " The saints are more humbled on account of the virtues which they do not possess, than exalted by the virtues which they have." But the truth is that they have the habits of all the (infused) virtues, but may find difficulty in the exercise of them. Can faith and hope exist without charity ? We may consider faith and hope as existing, like moral virtues, in a certain inchoate state, which is very different Qu. LXV. 4, 5.] CONNECTION OF VIRTUES. 75 from their perfection as virtues. Perfect virtue produces perfectly good work. Not only is that good which is done, but it is well done. Thus, if any one does just actions, he does good things, but they are not perfectly good, unless they are well done, i.e., through rectitude of choice, which is prudence. Therefore justice without prudence cannot be perfect virtue. In like manner, faith and hope may exist after a manner without charity, but they are not per- fect virtues. For since it is faith's office to believe God, but to believe means to assent with one's will, if a man does not duly will, faith will not have its perfect work. But it is by charity that one wills in due manner, since charity j)erfects the will. The same thing is to be said of hope. For the act of hope is the expecting future beatitude from God. And this act is perfect if it is a well-grounded hope ; and this requires charity. But if one expects the same things through merits which he has not as yet, but pro- poses to acquire, this imperfect act of hope can exist with- out charity. Can charity exist without faith and hope? Charity signifies more than loving God. It implies what we may call a fellowship of mutual love and communion. So S. John says (1 Ep. iv. 16), "He that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God and God in him." This converse with God begins in this life through grace, but it Avill be per- fected in the future life. Now, no one can have such friendship with another if he disbelieve or despair of the possibility of having fellowship with him. So one cannot be truly called (as Abraham) the "friend of God," unless he have faith in this converse of man with God, and hope that he will attain to it. So charity cannot exist without faith and CHAPTER VI. ON VICES AND SINS. Is vice contrary to nature? Vice is contrary to virtue. But the virtue of each thing consists in its being well disposed towards what is agree- able to its nature. And vice cousists in the contrary dispo- sition. But man is specifically distinguished by his rational soul. Therefore that which is contrary to the order of reason, is contrary to the nature of man, as man. But man's good is the living according to reason, and his evil is the living unreasonably. Therefore human virtue which "makes a man good, and his work good/' is so far accord- ing to his nature, as it agrees with reason ; but vice is so far against human nature, as it is contrary to the order of reason. (1) But virtues are not naturally in us, since they are produced either by inspiration, or by practical efforts : how, then, can vices be contrary to nature ? I answer that it is true that perfect virtue is not caused by nature, but yet virtue inclines to what is according to nature, i.e., what is according to the order of reason. So far, virtue is accord- ing to nature, and vice contrary to it. (2) It may be objected, also, that nothing which is con- trary to nature is found in the majority of those who have that nature ; but vices are found in the majority of men. But man has a two-fold nature, sensitive and rational. Through the operations of sense man arrives at rational Qu. Lxxi. 4, 5.] NATURE OF VICE AND SIN. 77 acts ; and more follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than those who follow the order of reason, and so they fall into vices and sins. Can sin coexist together ivith virtue? Sin is related to virtue as a bad act to a good habit. But a habit in the soul does not necessarily produce its opera- tion ; but a man uses that habit when he wills to do so. Hence, while a habit remains in a man, he is able to refrain from using that habit, or he can produce an opposite act. So, while still having a virtue, he may proceed to the act of sin. And a single act does not destroy a habit, any more than it creates such a habit. But if we consider the causes of virtues, we shall see that some virtues may be corrupted by a single act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues as virtues. And therefore by one act of mortal sin, charity being excluded, all the inspired virtues are excluded also as virtues. Faith and hope, then, may remain in a dead condition after mor- tal sin, but they are not virtues. But venial sin, since it is not contrary to charity, excludes neither it nor the other virtues. But the acquired virtues are not taken away by any one act of sin. So, then, mortal sin cannot coexist with the in- fused virtues ; but it can so exist along with the acquired virtues ; but venial si a may coexist with both. In every sin is there some act ? S. James answers this question (iv. 17), saying, " To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Sins of omission are now before us. And if we consider in them that only which, per se, pertains to the idea of sin, Ave see that sometimes the sin of omission is ac- companied by an inward act, as when one wills not to go to church, to stay away. But sometimes the sin of omission has no act either inward or outward, as when one, at the 78 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXI. 5. hour in which he is bound to go to church, does not think either of going or of not going. But if in the sin of omission we include the causes or the occasions of the omission, then it is necessary that there be some act. For there is no sin of omission unless one pre- termit what he is able to do or to leave undone. But our not doing that which we can do or leave undone, must be from some cause or occasion conjoined or preceding. And if, on the one hand, that cause is not in a man's power, the omission is no sin, as when one omits going to church on account of some (physical) infirmity. But if the cause or occasion of the omission is subject to the will, the omission is sin; and then, in every case, that cause, as voluntary, has some act, at least the interior act of the will. This act indeed is sometimes directly turned to that omission, as when one wills not to go to church in order to avoid the trouble of doing so. Then such an act, per se, pertains to the omission. Fur the willing of any sin pertains to that sin, since all sin is voluntary. But sometimes the act of the will is directed to some- thing else, through which a man is hindered from doing what he ought. This may be conjoined to the omission, as when one wills to play at some game when he ought to go to church ; or it may precede the omission, as when one wills to sit up late, and in consequence misses the morning service in church (when he ought to be there). In this case the inward act is per accidens with respect to the omission, since the latter was not intended. "We may say, then, that some sin can exist without any act. Eemember that more is required for good than for evil, since the good demands "the whole, complete cause, but evil arises from particular defects/' Merit, therefore, can- not exist unless what one does he does voluntarily and as he ought. So it requires an act. The act of sin is not parallel with this. Qu. LXXII. 2.J DIVISIONS. 79 Every sin is voluntary ; and where there is no will there is no sin. But the not-willing is voluntary whenever it is in the power of a man to will or not to will. There is a seeming objection, that if this be true one sins continually who never does what is his due act. But this is false. I answer that we must remember that the sin of omission is against some affirmative precept. And such precepts do not bind continually. The sin, therefore, is prolonged just as long as the precept binds which is neglected. § 2. Divisions. (1) S. Augustine's division, viz., a toord, deed, or thought which is contrary to eternal law, rests upon most solid foundation. For while the primary cause of sin is in the will, yet there are outward acts commanded by the will which are in themselves bad and so are distinguished in the division. And the root of sin in aversion from God is pointed out in the second part of the definition, viz., sin is "contrary to eternal law" {i.e., the Divine Eeason and Will). Accord- ing to positive law, indeed, not every sin is evil because it is prohibited ; but some things are prohibited because they are evil. But according to the law of nature, which rests upon eternal law, every sin is an evil because it is pro- hibited. (2) Sins are also either spiritual or carnal. They take their species from their objects. But every sin consists in inordinate desire of some changeable good ; and, consequently, when that good is obtained, there is in- ordinate pleasure. But pleasure is two-fold : one, spiritual, derived from the apprehension of some thing desired and possessed, e.g. , the applause of men; another, corporeal or natural, from which may spring carnal sins, as glut- 80 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. lxxii. 4. tony or lust. In sins of the latter kind there is a spiritual act — sc, the act of reason— but the end is corporeal pleasure. (3) Sins are also either against God, against self, or again it our neighbor. Sin is an inordinate act. But there is a three-fold order to which ii i;in is hound to conform : one, the rule of reason as the director of all our actions ami passions ; another, the rule of Divine law by which we ought to la- directed in all things. And if man were naturally a solitary being, this two-fold order would suffice. But man belongs to society, and a third order is needed by which man may he ordained with respect to other men among whom he ought to live. But the second of these orders (the Divine law) contains the first, and exceeds it. For whatever things are con- tained under the order of reason are contained under the law of God Eimself. But some things an- contained under the latter which exceed human reason, as those things which are of faith, and are due to God alone. Heme, those who sin in such things are said to sin against God, as the heretic, the sacrilegious, the blas- phemer. Similarly, the .second order contains the third and exceeds it. For in all things which concern our neighbour we are to be directed by the rule of reason. But in some things we are directed by reason which concerns ourselves only, and not our neighbour. In these a man is said to sin against himself, as the intemperate, and the wasteful. This distinction is according to the objects of sins, which diversify their species. Observe, also, that by the theological virtues man is ordered with reference to God ; temperance and courage are cardinal virtues directed towards self; but justice is towards one's neighbour. Qu. LXXIII. 1.] COMPARATIVE GUILT OF SDsTS. 81 Do circumstances change the species of sin? Where the motive for transgression is different, there is difference in the sin ; for the motive is the end and object. But sometimes where the circumstances are corrupt the motive remains the same ; as the illiberal man from the same motive may keep when he ought not to do so, and where he ought not, and more than he ought, all on account of his inordinate desire of wealth. In such corrupt cir- stances, the sin is one and the same. But when such cor- ruptions spring from different motives, the species of sin is changed. § 3. On the comparative guilt of sins. Are all sins necessarily involved in one another? The intention of him who acts virtuously in following reason is different from him who sins in turning away from reason. For the aim of the virtuous is one, sc, to follow the rule of reason ; and therefore all virtues tend towards the same end, and are connected in the right view of things to be done, which is prudence. (See page 65. ) But the aim of the sinner is not to recede from what reason demands, but is rather towards some desirable good, from which his sin derives its specific character. But such goods are diverse, have no (necessary) connec- tion, and are sometimes even contrary to one another. Sins therefore have no necessary connection. (1) But does not S. James say (c. ii. 10), ''Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all " ? But he is speaking of sin, not as the turning to transitory good, but as aversion from the commands of Divine law. But all the commandments have one and the same origin, as S. James himself says. And so in every sin God is despised. Thus he who offends in one point is guilty of all because he incurs the penal guilt of contempt of God, which is one in all sins. 6 82 ON VICES AND SINS. [QtJ. Lxxm. 3, 5. (2) Bat as the love of God is the root of all virtues, is not self-love the root of all sins, and consequently the ground of connection, so that he who has one, has all ? I reply that the cases are opposites ; for the love of God draws our affections from many to one ; and therefore the virtues which are caused by that love are connected. But self-love draws thr affections to various and diverse ends, and therefore the vices and sins which arc caused by it are not so conn Sins differ in gravity according to their objects. The gravity of sins differs as one sickness is more serious than another. For as the good of health consists in a cer- tain proportion of the animal frame, its constituents, n functions, to the needs of the animal, bo the good of virtue depends upon the proportion of human acts, their due relation, to the rule of reason. But the sickness is more serious the further the departure from the above standard, and the nearer it approaches to the vital organs. Disease of the heart is ordinarily more dangerous than disease in So in is more grave the more the disorder touches higher principles. Bui reas m orders all actions with reference to the end ; therefore the sin is gi which concerns the higher end-. And the end of the on. Thus difference in the gravity of sins depends on the difference in their ohjects. ■ sin against a man is greater than the sin which concerns merely external things ; homicide is more serious than theft. And still greater is the sin which is committed immediately against God, as infidelity or blasphemy. Spiritual sins are of greater guilt titan carnal sins. that every spiritual sin is greater than any carnal sin : but, other things being equal, the former are of greater guilt. And this for three reasons. (1) Spiritual sins pertain to the spirit to which it belongs to be converted Qu. lxxiii. C] COMPARATIVE GUILT OF SINS. 83 to God or to turn away from Him. But carnal sins are consummated in fleshly pleasure which chiefly turns to corporeal good. And therefore carnal sin (as such) is more marked by a turning towards the thing. But spiritual sin contains more of aversion (from God), from which comes the guilt, and it is therefore a greater sin. (2) Carnal sin, as such, is against one's own body, which, in the order of charity, is less to be loved than God and our neighbor, against whom spiritual sins are committed ; and therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. (3) .The stronger the (outward) impulse towards sin, the less is its guilt. But carnal sins have the stronger im- pulse (outwardly), from the inborn concupiscence of the flesh. And therefore, once more, spiritual sins are, as such, of greater guilt. There are apparent exceptions to this rule — e.g., adultery is a graver sin than theft ; but the former is not only the fleshly sin of lust, but the spiritual sin of injustice, and that of a graver sort than simple theft. And the devil is said to rejoice especially in the carnal sin of lust, because it cleaves most closely to a man, and is most difficult to escape from. Incontinent concupiscence, which is carnal, is also more shameful than incontinent anger, because it is irrational, and makes man more like the brutes. Does the gravity of sins depend upon the cause of sin? The question is equivocal, because we may consider, first, what is per se the proper cause of sin, which is the will to sin. Sin is the fruit of that tree, and "the tree is known by its fruit." And the greater this cause, the greater is the sin. But other causes are extrinsic and remote, from which the will is inclined to sin. And we must distinguish among these. For some induce the will to sin, in agree- ment with its own nature, as, e.g., the end, which is the 84 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LX3UU. 8. proper object of the will. And from such a cause the sin is rendered greater. For he sins more gravely whose will, aiming at a worse end, is inclined to sin. But there are other causes which Incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will itself, which is naturally made to move freely by its own direction according to the reason. Eence causes which diminish the judgment of reason — e.g., ignoranci — or which diminish the free action of will, as infirmity, or \ iolence, or Eear, in diminishing the voluntary, diminish also the sin. Ami if the act in; altogether invol- untary, ii is lot a .-infill act. It may be -aid that the greater the concupiscence, the • the sin, and therefore the greatness of the cause makes the Bin bo much the less. But it' we include in concupis- the motion of the will itself, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is greater -in. Bui if by con- cupiscence we mean a passion of our lower nature, then greater concupiscence, if it precede the judgment of the reason ami the motion of the will, diminishes the Bin ; be- cause he who -ins under the influence of greater passion, falls through greater temptation, and le-< is imputed to him. But if concupiscence, bo understood, follows the jndgment of the reason and the motion of the will, then, where there - _■ ti r concupiscence, then- is greater sin. For sometimes this stronger passion rises because the un- bridled will is tending to its desired object. 7s sin greater as the injury //one is greater? The injury has one of three relations to the sin. (J) It is foreseen and intended, as a malicious homicide or theft. And then the quantity of injury directly increases the grav- ity of the sin,, because injury \± per se the object of the sin. (.2) Sometimes, again, it is foreseen, hut not intended, as when one, passing through a field in order to commit a crime, knowingly does harm to the growing crop, but not with the intention of doing harm. Then, also, the quan- Qu. LXXIII. 8.] COMPARATIVE GUILT OF SINS. 85 tity of injury aggravates the sin, but indirectly ; inasmuch as it proceeds from a will inclined to sin, that he does not avoid doing harm either to himself or another, which, simply, he would not have willed to do. (3) But sometimes the injury is neither foreseen nor intended, and if it is accidental with respect to the sin, it does not directly aggravate the sin. But, on account of negligence in not considering the injury which might hap- pen, the evils which happen unintentionally incur a penalty if a man was engaged in an unlawful act. (Cp. Common law.) (4) But if the injury per se follow from the act of sin, though it be neither intended nor foreseen, it directly ag- gravates the sin ; because whatsoever per se follows from sin pertains in a certain way to the sin itself ; e.g., if scan- dal follow from the sin, though not sought for nor clearly foreseen, the sin is directly aggravated by this. But be- cause sin is aggravated by the injury done, it does not follow that this is the only aggravating condition. For sin per se is greater as it is more inordinate. And the injury itself aggravates the sin so far as it makes the act more inordinate. So it does not follow that if sins against our neighbor do most harm, they are therefore the worst of sins. There is greater disorder in sins against God, and in some of those which are against one's self. It may be said, also, that although no injury can be directly done to God, it may be attempted against those things which are especially related to God, as the attempt to exterminate the faith, to profane what is holy, which are gravest sins. It is said, also, that no one willingly injures himself, and that this shows that consequences do not aggravate sin, for some of the gravest sins — e.g., suicide — are against one's self. But this is only true secundum quid, for the suicide knowingly and willingly does harm to himself, though he is seeking as his end some apparent good. 86 OX VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXIV. 1, 2. § 4. The subject of sin. Is the will the subject of sin f There are acts which do not, like sawing wood, pass over to exterior matter, but remain in the agent of them, as de- siring and knowing. -Moral acts, whetherof virtue or vice, are of this latter class. So, then, the proper subject of the .sinful act is the power which is the principle of activity. And since it is characteristic of moral acts that they are voluntary, it follows that the will, which is the source of voluntary acts, is the scat of sin. It might be objected, (' > 'ha! evil is always against will and intention. And that is true, it' it be regarded as evil. But some evil is apparent good, and sin is so regarded, and is voluntary. (2) But, agaii . ajar ling evil as good seem rather defect of understanding than defect of will ? 1 answer that if the defect of knowledge wen- oot subject to our will, there would be no sin cither in will or judg- ment. This is true of those who labor under invincible ance. But, otherwise, this defect of understanding is sin. Ts (he wiU alone tht subject of sinf Voluntary we have seen (sec page LO), are not only those which are elicited from the will, but those which are commanded by the will, and which other powers execute, all those powers which can be moved to their acts by the will, or restrained from thos the will, can be the subject of sin. And these same powers also are the subject of moral habits, good or bad. Will, then, is the cause of sin, not the only subject of it. The members of the body are not a parallel case. For they are merely the organs of activity, and are in no sense free. Therefore there is no moral transgression in them. Qu. lxxiv. 3.] THE SUBJECT OF SIX. 87 There may be sin in sense-appetite. For there may be sin in any power of the sonl whose act is voluntary and inordinate. Among .such acts are those of sense-appetite ; therefore there can be sin in them. (1) But is not this sensuous nature common to us and the brutes ? Whereas sin is peculiar to man, who alone is praised or blamed for his acts. So it seems that there can be no sin in it. The answer to this is easy. Our sensuous nature is joined to reason and fitted to obey reason. Thus the acts of our sense-appetite may be voluntary, and the subject of sin. (2) Again, it may be said that no one sins in what he cannot avoid; but we cannot avoid the inordinate acts of sensuality as long as we live this mortal life. I answer that it is true that the perpetual corruption of our sense-nature, our birth-sin, is never totally taken away in this life. But such corruptio fomitis does not prevent man from re- pressing by reasonable will each inordinate motion of sensuality as it arises, say, by diverting his thoughts into another channel. But while one is doing this, some inor- dinate motion may arise from this new source. Thus when one, wishing to avoid the inordinate motions of concupis- cence, turns his thoughts to science, some unpremeditated thought of vainglory may arise in his soul ; and so man can- not avoid motions of this kind, on account of this innate corruption. But the idea of voluntary sin in this con- nection implies that we can shun the separate motions as they present themselves. (3) There is indeed no deliberate action in these cases, and what a man does without rational deliberation is not perfectly his act. Consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of vice. Hence, such motions of sensuality, anticipating reason, may be venial sin, as sin (in a certain way) imperfect. 88 <>N VICES A XIi 3IN8. [Qu. i.xxiv. 1. :>. Ca« ///'/•- h mortal sin in ovr sense-nature f Disorder which corrupts the principle of spiritual life, the altimate end, causes the spiritual death of mortal sin. But to ordain anything Eor its end docs not belong to sensuality, bul to the reason alone. To it. there- fore, alone belongs inordination with respecl to the end. Eence, mortal sin i< n<>t attributed to the lower nature, but i- only in tin- bigher. (l) We may sin mortally with reference to sensuous ob- because the sensuous act can concur in that .-in. I int. the sin is not mortal because it belongs !•> Bense-appetite, hut bi - a rational act, and it is reason's office to order man with reference to the end which he aim- at. , there are virtues of the irrational nature, such a- ten ind fortitude : hut the act of virtue ie per- by reason and will which has power to choose ; for the act of virtue requires choice. Hence, with the virtue <>f tic ' the passions, is joined (if they arc com- pletely vir; of prudence, which perfects our rational nature. So i- i'. also, in mortal sin. (3) Tin- venial sin which ma. exisl in the Bensuous natun □ for mortal .-in which belongs to the rational nature only. Y : and that in t. For reason's office is two- . to know its proper object, which i- any truth: powers of the soul. In both re- - there can he sin in reason. First, as it errs concern- ing the truth, when it can know and is hound to know that truth : next, when it either commands the inordinate of the lower nature, or deliberately neglects to check them. The objector may ask, Is not error due to defect in .to ignorance, which is an excuse for wrong rather than a sin ? And this ohjection stands, if we speak of in- voluntary ignorance. A madman is not responsible for Qr. lxxiv. 6, 7, 8.] THE SUBJECT OF SIN. 89 his acts. ' But ignoranee of that which one can know and ought to know, is itself a sin. But reason's defect iu directing the other powers of the soul is always imputed to it as a sin. Is voluntary pleasure in the thought of sin, "morose delectation," a sin of reason ? Eeason can direct not only outward acts, but also inward passions. And when it fails to do so, there is sin in it. But there are two kinds of sin in this inward government ; one, when a man deliberately excites in himself the (inor- dinate) passion of anger or concupiscence (or whatever the passion may be) ; another, when he does not repress the illicit motion of passion. He perceives that the thought is inordinate, but yet he allows it to remain, does not expel it. So, the sin of morose delectation is in the reason (though not in that alone). I am not speaking of the mere length of time that the evil thought remains in the mind, but of the deliberate failure to repress the thought of evil, in which the desires of the soul find pleasure. The supreme judgment and final consent to the act of sin, which inwardly consummates that sin, is in the higher reason alone which turns aioay from the eternal law of God. Consent to the pleasure of that sin is only a preamble to that final judgment, and is a lower act of reason. Consent to pleasure in the thought of sinful acts is itself a sin ivhen it means that the affections are voluntarily in- clined to those acts. For one takes pleasure only in that which is conformed to his spiritual or bodily state. But that one deliberately choose such conformity of his disposition to mortal sins, is itself a mortal sin.* * We may distinguish three forms of internal sin : (a) free and con- tinued pleasure in imagined evil, implying consent to it, the " deledatio '.ft OH VICES AND SIN8. [Qu. lxxv. 1. § 5. The causes of sins. //■■"' can sin have a can - sin is any inordinate act. As act, thru, it must have a . like any other act. But as inordinate, it has a cause ijatioD or privation ia caused. Bui a cause of a nega- tion may be assigned in two ways : first, the absence of the productive cause is a cause of the negation as such. For on removing of the cause follows removing of the effect; : the sun is the cause <>f darkness. But, in r way, that cause which produces a certain result is negation— u .. of the ab- imething else which is inconsistent with that ally follows from the acting cause. Thus, if col : I as positive \ bing, the fire is the ■ idens of il the inordination of Bin and every evil wh ever are not mere negations, but privations <>f that which a thii .. i_ r ht to have, such inordinai ion must have an efficient causi dens. For that which anything naturally has and ought to have will nev.-r be pt through some impeding cause. And thus it, vil which consisl a in any priva- tion ha }," or an efficient cause per acci- ■ this carries us back to an efficient cause per se. ie, then, sin on the part of the inordination has an efficient cause \ ■ pari of the act done it lias an efficient cause p^r se, it follows that the in- ordination of t ; Its from thecal of the -. morosa " of the tex* ; rin, implying appro- •f it, although ski! in trade), may be admired with- out approving the act, as "the lord commended the unjust steward" (lascivious tales, however, having their own special danger) : (c) sinful - with an act of will, which is efficacious, when there is intention of acting out the desire (S. Matt. v. 28). The evil thought rejected at not sin. Qv. LXXV. 2, 3.] THE CAUSES 01' SINS. 91 And our conclusion is that the will which is not directed by the rule of reason and the Divine law, in aiming at some transitory good, causes the act of singer se, but the inor- dination of the act per accidens, and apart from the inten- tion ; for the lack of order in the act results from lack of direction in the will. We find a cause of sin, therefore, because sin is not only privation, but an act in which that privation is found. And causality does not here imply necessity of sin, for necessary causality means a sufficient cause with no hin- dering cause. And sin as caused, is not necessary effect, because the result can be hindered. One might ask whether good or evil is the cause of sin, and say that good cannot be such a cause, and evil is the very sin itself which is in question. But I reply that ungoverned will is the cause of sin, and the cause is good, along with the absence of another good.* We may find four inward causes of sin, and sometimes all four concur. First, the senses or the imagination, which present some- thing pleasurable to the soul ; next, desire, which is inclined to it as pleasurable ; next, reason, which approves of it without reference to the due rule and law ; lastly, the will, which consents and perfects the act of sin. Has sin an outward cause ? Such outward cause, if it exist, might be the cause of sin in either of three ways ; either by directly moving the will itself, or by acting on the reason, or by moving sense-appe- tite (the senses, the imagination, or the desires). But God only, who cannot be the cause of sin, can direct- ly move the will. Nothing outward, then, can be the cau&« * The reasoning of S. Thomas Aquinas may here seem very subtle to one who has not previously looked into its subject. But it demands and will well repay careful and prolonged thought. — J. J. E. 92 OH VICES AXI> sixs. [Qu i.x.ivi. 1. of .-in. unless it move the reason by persuasion, or unless it move the sensual desires, as Borne outward sensible tilings act upon those desires. But when anything is to he done. persuasion does nol move the reason by force of necessity. o outward thing i\ move the desires except in certain abnormal conditions of the soul (when one is not responsible for his acts). Desire, also, does not of and will. Eence an outward cause may contribute to the .-infill act, hut is not an adequate can-'-. That adequal the will only. > 6. Relations of ignorance to sin. Is ignorance err the tin f A cause may be Buch per accidens, by removing what hinders the result (as a flaw in a casting may he, per acci- steamer). In this way may he thi Infill act, for i; privation of that knowledge which perfects reason as di- of human actions ami capable of prohibiting tin- act of sin. B - human acts through two-fold know: ral, the other particular (knowledge of the law, ami knowledge of the fact). For when one con- nail do, he has a sort of syllogism in his miml ; and his conclusion i- his judgment, choice, or oper- And his particular decision i.- brought under some al rule or law by Bome particular proposition. Thus a man is prevented from the act of parricide by knowing that fathers are not to he killed, and by knowing that this man is his father. Therefore ignorance of the law or igno- rance of the fact may cause the act of parricide. Hence it is evident that not all ignorance on the part of the sinner is the cause of his sin, hut only that which prevents the knowledge which would have prohibited the act of sin (ante- cedent ignorance is cause of the outward act ; consequent ignorance, of its sinfulness). Hence if the will of any one Qu. LXXVI. 2.] RELATIONS OF IGNORANCE TO SIN. 93 is so disposed that lie would not be hindered from the act of parricide by knowing that the man is his father, his igno- rance of his father (concomitant ignorance) is not the cause of his sin. He does not sin through ignorance, but he sins in ignorance. (Nic. Eth., iii. 1.) (1) Ignorance may be purely a negative ; but negatives may be causes per accidens, in removing what hinders a result. (2) It is true, also, that every sin is in a bad will, and that a thing must be apprehended and not unknown, in order that it may be willed. But that which is willed may be partly known and partly unknown. Thus one may know that the being whom he kills is a man, without know- ing that it is his father. Is ignorance a sin ? Distinguish ignorance from nescience. The latter is simply negative, the simple negation of knowledge. But ignorance is privative, privation of knowledge of those things which one is fitted to possess. But some of these things every one is bound to know ; sc, those things without which it is impossible to perform rightly the acts which are due from us. Hence all are bound to know the first principles of the faith and of the law of nature ; and individuals are bound to know those things which belong to their state or office. But there are other things which we are fitted to know, which we are not in general bound to know, as the theorems of geometry. But it is manifest that whosoever neglects to possess or to do what he is bound to have or to do, is guilty of a sin of omission. Ignorance, therefore, of those things which one is bound to know, if it be due to negligence (" conse- quent ignorance "), is a sin. But negligence is not imputed to a man who does not know what he cannot know. This ignorance is called invincible, that which cannot be overcome by due inquiry. Such ignorance, not being in our power, 04 OX VICES A\H SINS. [Qu. LXXVI. 2, 8. is involuntary and is not sin. But vincible ignorance is sin, if .it concern those things which one is bound to know.* (1) This is not inconsistent with our definition of sin, as "a word, deed, or thought opposed to God's law/' for the opposite negations are included in the definition, so far as • on has the nature of sin. And so negligence which makes ignorance to be Bin, is included as a (wilful) passing by of what oughi to be said, done, or thought, in order to acquire due knowledge. (2) Sin is more directly opposed to grace than to igno- rance. I *» i ; i privation of grace is rather a penalty follow- ing on .-in than itself a sin. Why. then, i- privation of knowledge a .-in. and not privation of grace? To this I reply tiiat i . also, in preparing one's Belf Tor the tion of that grace, may it-e|f be a .-in. And yel even herein there is a difference; since man can acquire the knowledge now Bpoken of by his own acts, hut grace is purely tire gift of God. (3) Again, it may be objected that sin is taken away by penitence, bui ignorance is not so removed, and therefore it cannol be .-in. Bui observe that the negligence doe- not remain after penitence, and so what makes ignorance to he removed. tli Though the .-infill ignorance constantly continues in the .sinner, he docs not continually .-in. hut. as in other sins of omission, only at that time when the affirmative precept i? obligatory; »c, when there is fit opportunity to acquire that knowledge which he is hound to possess, f Does ignorance totally excuse from si Ignorauce in itself renders the act which it causes an * If one knows that the outward action is wrong, no invincible ignorance respecting the laws of spiritual morality can excuse his evil desire of that action. + Affirmative laws bind only under suitable conditions ; negative laws are continually binding. Qu. LXXVI. 3.] MORAL RELATIONS OF IGNORANCE. 95 involuntary act. But ignorance is said to cause that act which would be prohibited by the corresponding knowl- edge. Such an act would be contrary to the will if knowl- edge were present ; i.e., it would be involuntary. But if that knowledge would not prevent the act from being done, because of the will's inclination to it, ignorance of this knowledge does not make a man to act involuntarily, but he acts, not willing the result. (Note the distinction between unwilling, and not-willing.) (Nic. Eth., iii. 1.) Such ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, not causing the involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same is true of any ignorance which does not cause the sinful act, but is consequent upon or concomitant with the sinful act. But ignorance antecedent to the act of will, since it causes the act, produces au involuntary act, and does excuse from sin. And yet sometimes that ignorance which is the cause of the sin does not totally excuse it, for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing which is unknown. For ignorance so far excuses from sin, as one does not know the action to be sin. But it may happen that one is ignorant of some circum- stance which, if known, would prevent his doing the sinful act, and yet he knows that he is doing wrong. He may do bodily injury to some one, knowing that he is injuring a man, and yet not know that that man is his father, which is a circumstance constituting a new species of sin. Or per- haps he does not know that, striking another, he will be struck back, which knowledge might hinder his doing so. And although such a one sins on account of ignorance, yet he is not totally excused from sin, because he knows that he is doing wrong. Again, the ignorance itself may be voluntary, either directly, as when one does not wish to know, in order that he may be more free in sin ; or in- directly, as when one, on account of the labor required, or other occupations, neglects to learn that which would keep him back from sin. Such neoiigence makes the i°;norance 96 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXVI. 4. voluntary and a sin, if it is of those things which one can know and is bound to know. Such ignorance, therefore, docs not totally excuse from sin. But if there be ignorance altogether involuntary, either because it is invincible, or becanse it is of that which one is aol bound bo know, such ignorance altogether excuses from sin. Does ignorance diminish sinf Sine,, every .-in is voluntary, so far as ignorance dimin- ishes the voluntary, bo far il diminishes sin. lint it is mauifest that the ignorance which totally takes away the voluntary, and bo takes away the .-in, does no! diminish, hut annuls it. But the ignorance which is not the cause of the -in, hut concomitant with it. neither diminish* augments the .-in. Therefore only that ignorance can diminish the sin, which i- the cause of it, and yet does imt totally excuse it. Bui Bometimes it happens that such ignorance is directly and per 86 voluntary (consequent ig- norance), as when one wilfully is ignorant in order that he may more Ereely .-in. Ami such wilful ignorance (" ign. affectata") ms to increase the voluntary, and the sin. But Bometimes the ignorance which is the cause of sin is not directly voluntary, but only indirectly ; as when one is too lazy to study, and bo is ignorant ; or he wishes to drink wine immoderately, and so loses Bober judgment. Such ignorance may diminish the voluntary and the sin. For when anything is not known to be sin, it is not directly chosen as sin. Hence the contempt of Divine law is less, and consequently the sin is les3. So S. Paul says (1 Tim. i. 13), "I obtained mercy because I did it igno- rantly." It is true that every sinner is ignorant, but his ignorance is not the cause of his sin, but it is something consequent to the proper cause, which is a passion or habit inclining to sin. Qu. LXXVII. 1, 2.] MORAL RELATIONS OF SENSE-APPETITE. 97 § 7. The moral relations of sense-appetite to sin. Is the will moved by the passions ? Passion cannot directly draw the will after it, but it can do so indirectly in two ways : first, by what we may call abstraction. I mean that since the soul is one agent (and of limited power), when it acts in any one direction, its power in other directions is reduced, or even totally an- nulled. In other words, the operations of the soul require a certain energy, which, if it be vehemently applied to one object, cannot at the same time be applied to another. And in this way, when the motion of sensuous appetite is strengthened through some passion (this is so far an ab- straction of mental strength), of necessity the strength of rational appetite, i.e., of the will, is diminished or to- tally impeded. Secondly, the same result is produced on the side of the object of the will, which is the good apprehended by reason. For the judgment and apprehension of reason are impeded through the vehement and inordinate act of the imagination and that animal power of apprehension which we share with the brutes (vis cestimativd). We see this in many insane persons. But this apprehension and judg- ment follow the passions, just as the judgment in taste fol- lows the condition of the nerves of the tongue. Hence we see that men who are moved by any passion do not easily turn their imagination from the things which so affect them. Consequently the rational judgment, and then the motion of the "will which is naturally adapted to follow that judgment, follow the impulse of the pas- sions. Can reason be overcome by passion, against its 'knowledge'? That is, is it possible for a man overcome by passion to do what he knows is forbidden, while he knows this ? Socrates thought that knowledge could never be overcome 98 ON VICES AND SINS. |_Q U - &*XVn. 2. by passion, and hence he assumed that all virtues were (habits of) knowledge, and all sins resulted from ignorance. And this, in a certain way. is true ; because, since wc always will the good or the apparent good, the will is never moved to evil as evil, but only as an apparent good. Ig- norance or error of reason accompanies all transgression. But experience also shows that many act contrary to their own knowledge. '''That servant which knew his lord's will, and made not ready, nor did according to his will, shall he beaten with many stripes " (S. Luke x i i . 47). "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (S. James iv. L7). We mnsl therefore make a distinction. (Nic. Eth., vii. 3.) For since man is directed in right conduct by a two-fold knowledge, defect in either suffices to hinder rectitude of will and act (p. v.',. (1) Sometimes it happens that a man has knowledge of the universal law, hut yet does not know in particular, that his desired act conies under the law. This will suffice to prevent his will from following the principle which he clearly knows. (•-2) Again, it is to be considered that nothing prevents a thing from being habitually known, which is not actually taken into consideration. It may happen therefore that a man knows the principle of conduct and has correct knowl- edge of his individual act. and yet does not actually con- sider, and so he may act against his knowledge. But that a man does not consider in the particular case what he habitually knows, may result (a) from defect of intention alone ; as when he is familiar with the principles of geometry, but lias no intention of considering the con- clusions of the science, which he can do at once if he chooses so to do : (b) but sometimes a man does not con- sider what he habitually knows, on account of some super- vening impediment, say, on account of some other occupa- tion, or of some bodily infirmity. And in this mode, he Qu. LXXVII. 2, 3.] MORAL RELATIONS OF SENSE-APPETITE. 99 who is under the strong influence of some passion does not consider in the particular question before him what he knows in its principle. And passion may impede his con- sideration, first, by what we have previously called a kind of abstraction ; next, by opposition, since passion generally inclines to the opposite of what is known in its principle ; and lastly, through the bodily effect produced by passion, which may prevent reason from freely exerting its proper influence. So sleep and intoxication through the body en- chain the mind. Certainly this may happen also through intensity of passion, which may be so strong as to render a man totally deprived of reason, and (for the time at least) insane. (1) It may seem as if the stronger were overcome by the weaker, since the certitude of knowledge is the most fixed of our mental possessions. But it must be remembered that general principles which are so fixed, are not chief in action which concerns particulars, individual things. It is not so strange, therefore, that passion should act against knowledge of principles, when consideration of the particu- lar application of those principles is lacking. (2) It is passion which makes some thing appear good to reason, which is not so, and thus the special judgment is against reason's general knowledge. (3) It is true that one cannot have two contrary opinions at once. But he can have one habitual principle while its opposite is immediately before his mind. (4) Speaking logically, he may subsume his particular judgment, under another universal (say, that pleasure is to be sought for) instead of the one which he habitually pos- Sins of passions are rightly called sins of infirmity. For as the body is infirm when any of its operations are enfeebled or hindered by the disorder of any of its organs, so the soul may be impeded by the disorder of any of its 100 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. LXXVII. 4, 6. powers. And as the parts of the body are said to be disor- dered when t hoy do not follow the order of nature, so we speak of an inordinate condition of the soul, when reason is not supreme. Sins of infirmity, thru, are found when the passions affect the sensuous soul, contrary bo the order of reason. Inordinate self-love is the cause of all sin. For the proper and per se cause of sin is the turning of the soul to transitory good. This comes Erom some inor- dinate desire. But this inordinate desire has its origin in inordinate self-!. n inordinate desires are distinguished by the apostle as " the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life" (l Ep. S. John ii. 16). Do passions diminish the gravity of sins f Sin consists essentially in the act of free choice, which proceeds from the reason and the will. But passions, the motions of sense-appetite, can either precede or follow this free choice. Antecedently, the passion may incline the reason and the will. But, on the other hand, subsequently, the intensity of our will may draw after it the passions. Now in the firsl passion which precedes the act of sin dimin gravity. For the act is so far sin as it is voluntary, and in our own power. And the less our act proceeds from the impulse of passion, the more fully vol- untary it is. Passion, then, diminishes sin so far as it diminishes the voluntary nature of our act. But it is the opposite with consequent passion, which is a sign of the greatness of the sin, because it shows the intensity of the will in sinning. (1) More intense passion does not make greater sin, be- cause the passion is the cause of the sin on the side of sin's turning to seeming good. But the gravity of sin, on the other hand, depends upon the soul's turning away from God (or, the intensity of the will in such turning away). Qu. LXXVir. 7.] MOKAL RELATIONS OF SEXSE-APPETITE. 101 (2) In like manner good sentiments following the judg- ment of reason, increase the merit of virtuous acts ; but if they precede it, the man acts more from feeling than from reason, and his act is less meritorious on that account. Does passion totally excuse from the guilt of sin ? Any act which is bad in itself is entirely excusable only when it is entirely involuntary. Passion, then, which has this effect renders the act excusable ; otherwise, not. With respect to this consider two things : (1) a thing may be in itself voluntary, when the will is directly turned to it ; or it may be voluntary in its cause when that cause is willed, and the effect is not directly willed. Thus, to him who voluntarily intoxicates himself, his drunken acts are rightly imputed. (2) A thing may be voluntary directly or indirectly when the will could prohibit it and did not. Passions, then, may be so great as to take away totally the use of reason. But if the beginnings of the passion were voluntary, the resulting acts are voluntary in their cause, and are imputed as sin. Here is the voluntary in- toxication of the soul. But if the cause was not voluntary but natural — say, some bodily disease depriving of reason — then the act is strictly involuntary, and is no sin. But often the passion is such as does not intercept totally the use of reason, and then the passion can be excluded by our turning to other thoughts, or by our impeding its re- sults. Such passion does not entirely excuse from sin. (1) But does not S. Paul say (Gal. v. 17), "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; for these are contrary the one to the other ; so that ye may not do the things that ye would" ? And, if so, does not passion totally excuse sin ? I answer that the impossibility spoken of does not refer to the outward act, but to the inward motion of concupiscence, from which the Christian would gladly be free. So S. Paul says (Rom. vii. 19), 102 ON VICES AND sins. [Qu. i.xxvii. 8. "The evil which I would not, that I do." It is true, also, that the will through passion ads against its own preceding purpose. (2) But if passiou causes ignorance in the particular case in question, why is it not a complete excuse for sin? I reply that the excusing ignorance is that (invincible) igno- rance of the circumstances of the case which cannot he sur- mounted by any diligence. Hut passion causes ignoranoe of the law iii its Bpecial application, by hindering one from applying his knowledge of the law to his particular case, ■which passion reason ran repel. (3) Bodily infirmity may be a total excuse, since it is involuntary . as in the insane. Sim of passion may be ///<>/•/"/ sins. Mortal .-in consists in aversion from God, man's ultimate end. This aversion belongs to deliberative reason, whose oilier it i-' to ordain man with reference to hi.- end. The only way, therefore, in which it cau happen that the in- clination of the soul t<> what is contrary to its ultimate cud may not he mortal .-in. i- thai deliberative reasou has no -hare in that inclination. This happens in the sudden llloti' ••!!. But when any one proceeds from this to the act of sin, or to deliberate consent, this is not a sudden action. And deliberate reason can exclude, or, at least, impede, the pas- sion. If it does not, the sin is mortal. So we sec that many murders and many adulteries arc committed through passion. (1) But is not sin of infirmity venial ? And are not sins of passion sins of infirmity? But observe that venial is used iu three different senses : (a) When the sin has some cause of pardon which diminishes the sin ; and so sin of infirmity or of ignorance is called venial in that sense. (b) Again, all sin becomes venial — i.e., obtains pardon — through repentance, (c) There arc certain sins which are Qu. lxxviii. 1.] SIN'S OF MALICE. 103 venial in their nature, as an idle word ; and only in this sense is venial opposed to mortal. The objection is based on the first meaning of the word venial. (2) Observe, again, that passion is the cause of the sin, on the side of the turning to transitory good ; but what makes it mortal, is the turning away from God. And so, though in the sensuous nature cannot be mortal sin, yet the sin proceeding from passion may become such. § 8. Sins of malice, i.e., of deliberate wickedness. When does any one sin from malice, i.e., from deliberate wickedness 9 Man naturally desires the good. Hence, if his desire de- cline to evil, it is because of some corruption or some inor- dination in him. But the principles of human action are intellect and sensuous or rational desire, which latter is called will. Some sin, therefore, results from defect in the intelligence, as when one sins through ignorance. Sin also results from defect in sensuous desire ; these are sins of pas- sion. And, lastly, sin results from inordinate will. But the will is disordered when the less good is more loved than the greater good ; when, consequently, any one chooses to suffer loss respecting the good which is less loved, in order to obtain what is preferred. So a man may deliberately consent to have his leg cut off, in order to preserve his life, which he values more. In this way, when any one inordi- nately loves some temporal good, as riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or of Divine law — i.e., more than the love of God — it follows that he may be willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good in order to get the other, the temporal good. And since evil is nothing else than priva- tion of some good, it follows that he is consciously willing some spiritual evil for the sake of earthly good. Such a one sins from fixed malice or deliberate purpose, since he consciously chooses the evil. 104 OX VICES AMI SIN'S. [Qu. LXXVIII. 2. (1) Is there any ignorance in such sin ? Sometimes one is ignorant that the thing which he is doing is wrong in general ; his is a sin of ignorance. Sometimes the sinner docs not know that the particular act which he is then doing is wrong ; as when he sins from passion. But some- times there is do thought that the evil is not to he chosen in order to gain the desired ir< "..l ; though he knows that it is simply evil. This is the ignorance of malicious wicked- ness. (2) Evil cannoi be, as such, aimed at by any one. But yel it may be aimed at in order to avoid some other evil, or to attain some g 1: and in such a case the Binner would to attain the good for which he seeks, even with loss of the otlur. So a lascivious person would prefer to enjoy his pleasure without offending God ; bui if the two alter- natives are presented, he wills to incur the displeasure of God by sinning, rather than to be deprived of his pleasure. ? every om who sins from habit sin from malicious wicked V it is not the same thing to sin while possessing a habit, and to sin from the habit. For it ig noi Decessary that the habit shall be constantly ased. it is used when we will : and. therefore, as it can happen thai one having a vicious habit does some virtuous act,, because his reason is not totally corrupted by his habit, so it may happen also that instead of acting from his vicious habit, he sins from - m or even from ignorance. But whensoever he uses his vicious habit, he must sin from malice, because, when any one has a habit, that is chosen which is agreeable to it, the habit becomes a second nature, and certain things are now '• connatural."' But this thing which is agreeable to the vicious habit, excludes spiritual good ; and so spiritual evil is chosen in order to get what habit makes to appear good. This is sinning from malicious wickedness. There are habits of venial sins, indeed ; but since these Qu. lxxviii. 3, 4.] SIX8 OF MALICE. 105 do not exclude the love of Grod, say, the habit of using idle words, they are vicious habits secundum quid, but not simply such. What shall we say of the remorse of habitual sinners ? He who sins from habit always rejoices in his act while he is using his habit. But he is able also not to use it, and may be sorrowful when his reason, as yet not totally cor- rupted, is dictating some other thing. He grieves at what he has done through sinful habit, not in general, because the sin is in itself displeasing to him, but because of some unpleasant result. But one may sin from malice who is not sinning from vicious habit, some hindrance being removed which has prevented his inordinate soul from acting out its choice and forming a vicious habit. Sins of malicious wickedness are graver than sins of passion. There are three reasons why this is true : (1) Since sin is primarily in the will, the more the will is concerned in it, the greater, other things being equal, is the sin. In malice the motion to the sin is more purely from within, i.e., from the will ; whereas in sins of passion there is an out- ward impulse. Hence the more vehement the malice, the greater the sin ; whereas, as we have seen, the more vehe- ment passion diminishes the gravity of the sin. (2) The passion which inclines to sin is transient, and so a man may quickly return to a good purpose, but the habit by which one sins from malice is a permanent quality. The one is more likely to be penitent after sin than the other. (3) He who sins from malice is badly disposed with reference to the end itself. So his deficiency is more dan- gerous than that of him who sins from passion, whose 106 OX VICES AND SINS. [Ql\ LXXIX. 1. general purpose may tend to the good end, although his purpose has been temporarily interrupted by his passion. This malicious wickedness is in one way based on igno- rance, but it is self-chosen ignorance, which does not palli- ate the sin. Both in sin of passion and of malice there is a choice of evil, but the first is not a sin from choice, because choice is not the primal principle of the sin. Something is chosen which would not have been ohosen but for the passion. Whereas the .-in of malice is a deliberate choice of evil, and this choice is the primal principle of the sin. S 9. External causes of sin. / Qod the cause of sin .' (I mean, not the positive and moral ad, which, owing to defect i'i it. ie sin, hut of the sin as sin.) Man maybe the cause of .-in in another man, either directly, by temp- tation, by inclining the will of that other to sin ; or indirectly, by ooi doing one's besl to withdraw another from the aci of ,-iii. But God cannot !"• directly the cause of sin in any one, because all sin is departure from God, the ultimate end <'i' II - creatures. But God draws all beings i" Eimself, aa t<> their ultimate end. Neither can He be indirectly the ca lb- may not afford that aid which would, if given, hinder nun from sinning against Him ; hut this is done according to the order of His wis- dom and justice. Hence the sin of any being is not to be imputed to Him as the cause of it ; just as the pilot is not the cause of the shipwreck of the steamer which he does not steer, except when he is able, and when it is his duty, to take charge of the vessel. (1) It is said (Rom. i. 28), "God gave them up unto a reprobate mind to do those things which are not fitting." But the very words show that those spoken of had that rep- robate mind, and God did not prevent their following it. Qu. LXXIX. 2, 3.] EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN. 107 (2) But it is, also, a familiar objection, that God is the author of freedom of the will, which is the cause of sin ; and, therefore, the author of the cause is the originator of the effect, which proceeds from that cause. And this is true when the mediate cause is subjected to the ordering of the primal cause ; but if that mediate cause violates the order in which it is made to act, the result is not imputable to the first cause. If an agent does anything contrary to the express command of his employer, that employer is not (morally, at least) answerable for the consecmences. He is not the cause of them. Is the act of sin from God ? The sinful act, as act, is being and act. But every being whatsoever is derived from the primal Being. And every action is caused by some being which has active (not pas- sive) existence. But all activity is reducible to the primal activity as its cause ; i.e., God, who is pure activity, is the cause of every action. But sin is being and action containing some defect, which defect is from the created cause, viz., free-will departing from the order of God the primal agent. Hence that defect is not reducible to the causality of God, just as a halting gait is referable to defect in the bones of the leg, etc., not necessarily to the motive power of nerves and muscles. The act of sin is a certain motion of free-will, but the will of God is the cause of all motions, therefore His will is the cause of the act of sin. Is God the cause of blindness and hardness of heart ? These may mean two different tbings ; first, a motion of the soul cleaving to evil and averse from Divine light. This is mortal sin of which God is not the cause. But, again (as penalty), there may be a withdrawal of Divine grace, so that the mind is not Divinely illuminated L08 <>N" \ K ES A Nil suss. [Qu. LXXX. 1. to see rightly, and the heart of man is not softened to live rightly. So far God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart. God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls (S. John i. 9 : "That was the true light which en- lighteneth every man that cometh into the world''). So the sun i.s the universal cause of the illumination of bodies. This is through uecessity of nature, but God is the cause of spiritual light according to His will and wisdom. But the Bun may find Borne impediment and leave a body dark, as when the window Bhntters are closed; and the sun is not the cause of that darkness, bul its cause is the one who the shutters. The sun exercises no judgment in the matter, bul God, according to His own judgment, withholds the light of His grace, where He finds Borne obstacle to it. the cause of the absence of grace is not only he who puts the obstacle in its way. but also God according to His righteous judgment. So He is the cause of blindness of sight and dulness of hearing, in not perfecting the mind by the gift of wisdom, and of hardness of heart in not soften- ing the soul through the fire of charity. Is the devil directly the cause of sins committed by man .' Thu proper principle of the sinful act is the human will, since all sin is voluntary. But God is the only Being who can directly act upon our will. The will, indeed, is moved not only by this inward Divine influence, but also by its object. This in three ways : (1) by the object itself which is proposed, as we Bay that food excites the desire of eating ; (2) by him who proposes or offers an object of this nature ; (3) by him who persuades that the proposed object is good, because he thus proposes the specific object of the will, which is rational good, cither real or apparent. In the first way, sensible things move the will to sin. But in the second and third ways, the devil or our neighbour may incite to sin, either by offering to sense or imagination what is desirable, or by persuading the reason. But none of these are the Qu. LXXX. 2, 3.] EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN". 109 direct cause of sin, because the will is not of necessity moved by any object except the ultimate end. Can the devil offer inward temptations to sin ? The soul has three functions, viz., feeling, knowing, will- ing. The latter cannot be directly influenced by Satan and his angels. And the intellect, per se, is moved by what illuminates it to know the truth, which illumination is cer- tainly not the aim of the devil, but rather a blinding of the reason through imagination and sense-appetite, in order that it may consent to sin. Hence the whole inward operation of Satan seems to be on the imagination and the sense-appe- tite. Images may be presented to the phantasy, appetite may be excited to some passion. For corporeal nature (as we see in our own physical constitution) naturally is subject (within certain limits) to spiritual forces. It is conceivable (to say the least) that the brain should be acted upon by demons, whether the man is waking or sleeping. In which case images will be the result. Passions also result from a certain condition of the brain and nervous system, and it is conceivable again that the devil may cooperate in these, at least through the brain, etc. (1) Images, feelings, etc., are, indeed, the works of a liv- ing agent, and require an inward impulse ; but environment also cooperates, and we are regarding outward temptation as the environment of the soul. There is nothing in this which contradicts the known order of nature. Can the devil produce a necessity of sinning ? S. James (iv. 7) says, " Eesist the devil and he will flee from you." This would not be true if Satan had power to produce necessity of sin. For he has no direct power over the reason ; and if it be free, there is no necessity of sinning. If there be a case where Satan takes entire posses- 110 ON" VICES AND SIN'S. [Qr. i.xxxv. 1, 2. sion of a man. so that his acts are no longer free, his acts are not sinful. That which is apprehended by sense or imagination, whether presented by demons or in any other way, does not of necessity move the will it' a man still has use of his reason. | 10. The effects of sin. Does sin diminish the good of )tithtrc? We may consider (1) the Brsl principles of human nature which constitute thai nature, and the properties resulting from them, such as are often called the faculties of man ; (-.') the \er\ inclination to virtue, which is itself a good of nature; (3) the gift of original righteousness, which, in the lir.-t man. was conferred on the human race, and can be called a natural good. The firsi is neither taken away, nor diminished by sin ; hut the third was totally taken away through the sin of OUT lir.-t parents. But the second is diminished through sin. For through human acts comes a certain inclination to similar act-, ami anything which is inclined to one of two contraries, ha- diminished inclina- tion to the other. Heme, since sin is contrary to virtue, man'- .-in diminishes the natural good of an inclination to virtue. Can the whole good of nature be taken away through sin? We mean now the natural inclination to virtue which belongs to man as a rational being. Sin cannot take away man's rationality, for then he would be no more capable of sinning. This good of nature, then, cannot be totally taken away through sin. But it is diminished so far as hindrances are put in the way to prevent its reach- ing its end. So it can be diminished ad infinitum, because hindrances can be increased ad infinitum. But the root of such inclination to virtue still remains, since human nature remains with all its essential attributes. There would be no remorse of conscience in the lost if Qu. lxxxy. 3, 5.] THE EFFECTS OF SIX. Ill there were not remaining in them the natural inclination to virtue. What are the four wounds of human nature? Through the gift of original righteousness reason per- fectly governed the lower powers of the soul, and reason itself was perfected by being subject to God. This original righteousness being taken away through the sin of our first parents, all the soul's powers remain deprived of their proper order. And this constitutes the four wounds. For there are, as we have seen (page 60, ff.), four powers which can be the subjects of virtue : sc, the reason, which is the seat of (spiritual) prudence ; the will, in which is justice ; the irascible soul, the seat of courage ; and the concupiscible, in which is temperance. Now the reason, destitute of its due relation to truth, is afflicted with the wound of ignorance ; the will, destitute of its due order with reference to the good, is wounded with malice ; the irascible nature is wounded with infirmity, and the con- cupiscible nature is wounded with the inordinate desire of pleasure. And since the inclination to virtue is diminished by actual transgression, those four wounds result, also, from other sins ; the reason is dulled concerning what is to be done ; the will hardened with respect to the good ; the difficulty of acting rightly increases, and concupiscence burns more hotly. What shall we say of death, and other corporeal defects ? Per accidens one thing is the cause of another if it re- move hindrances in the way of that result. Thus he who pulls down a column is per accidens the cause of the fall of what rests upon that column. So the sin of our first parents is the cause of death and other like corporeal defects, by tak- ing away that original righteousness by which not only the lower powers of the soul were subject in orderly way to 112 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. lxxxvii. 1. reason, but the body was the perfect servant of a perfect soul. The loss of this original righteousness renders human nature corruptible in all its parts, even to the disorganiza- tion of the body itself. This is the penalty of the firsi Bin, nol aimed at by the sinner, but ordained by the punitive j u Mire of God. Considered in itself, the animal body is corruptible, but God (by special L r it't) supplied the defect of nature, and made man's body to be incorruptible through the super- natural spiritual gift The penal guilt of sin (reatus). It is a law of nature and of man, that whatever rises •:her will be put down, if possible. But wliat- evi r things are contained under one order arc in a certain way, one in that order. Hence whatever rises against any order will be put down by that order and by its head. Bui -in is any inordinate art, it is manifest that he who sins offends against some order which will Beet to put him down. This is penalty. Now there are three orders against which man can sin. and with a three-fold penalty lie can he punished : In- human nature is subject firsi to his own proper reason : next, to outward government, spiritual or temporal ; lastly, to the universal order of Divine rule. He wh - against reason, against human law, against Divine law. Therefore be incurs a three-fold penalty — «?., from himself, remorse of conscience ; from man. what law inflicts ; and lastly, (rod's punishments. The penalty indeed is just, whether from man or from God ; and so it is good, and not directly the effect of sin, which can have no good effects. But sin makes man guilty, which is an evil. "To be punished is not an evil, but to become worthy of punishment is an evil." Every disordered soul is its own punishment ; but also it becomes liable to other punishment from perverting the order of Divine or human law. Qu. lxxxvii. 3.J THE EFFECTS OF SIN. 113 Does any sin incur eternal penalty? Sin incurs guilt, because it perverts some order. But while the cause remains, the effect remains. Hence, as long as this perversion of order continues, so long continues the penal guilt. But sometimes one perverts order irrepar- ably, and sometimes not. For if defect destroy the founda- tion of anything, its first principle, such defect is irrepa- rable. But otherwise, this first principle remaining, it may have power enough to repair the defect. But if by sin is corrupted the principle of order by which the human will is subject to God, this inordi nation is in itself irreparable ; only Divine grace can repair it. But this principle is the ultimate end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, in taking away charity, incur the guilt of eternal penalty. (1) It is commonly objected that just penalty is adequate penalty ; but sin is a transient thing, and therefore cannot incur eternal punishment (which would be out of all pro- portion to the offence). But I answer that it is true that the sharpness of punish- ment is proportioned to the offence both in Divine and in human judgment. But this is not the question of duration. In no judgment is proportion sought for in that respect. A murder may be committed in a moment, yet the punish- ment may be imprisonment for life. The murderer is cut off forever from the society of the living, and so he repre- sents, after his manner, the eternity of punishment Divinely inflicted. S. Gregory points out the justice of this, when he says (dial. iv. c. 44), " He who has sinned in his own eternity against God, is punished in the eternity of God/' Man's " own eternity " does not mean simply the contin- uation of his act during this transient life, but that, having made sin his end, he has the will to sin forever. " The unjust would will to live forever, in order that they might forever continue in sin " {Greg., Moral., iv.). (2) But are not punishments medicinal ? And no such 8 114 ON VICES AND SINS. [Qu. Lxxxvill. 5. curing process can run on forever. I reply that not all human punishments are for the cure of him who has offended ; the murderer is hung, that others may fear to offend. And the eternal punishment of the reprobate may be medicinal for others who (more earnestly) abstain from sin. (3) Again it is said thai do one forever docs that in which he takes do pleasure. But God takes no pleasure in the perdition of men ; therefore it will not go on forever. The reply is that God takes do pleasure in suffering on its own account, bu< Ee takes pleasure in the order of His own justice, which requires the penalty of sin. Penalty is proportioned /<> sin. But in sin are two elements ; the one, aversion from the infinite incommutable good. On this side sin is infinite ; its penalty, infinite loss {pana damni), the loss of infinite good, sc, of God. On the other side, sin is inordinate turning to mutable good. This is Unite, like the good itself. For it is doI the act of ao infinite creature. To this corre- sponds a finite penaby of suffering (proportioned to the offence). §11. Venial and mortal sins. are either venial or mortal. This distinction follows from the diversity of the inor- dination which is involved in sin. For there is a two-fold in- ordination : one which casts off the very principle of order, another which still preserves it, although this inordination concerns things which are derived from that order. So in the body disorganization may attack the very life itself, and death is the result ; or it may appear as sickness (which is not mortal disease). But the first principle of all order in morals is the ulti- mate end. Hence, when the soul is disordered through sin even to aversion from the ultimate end. which is God, to Qu. Lsxxvnr. 1.] VENIAL AND MORTAL SINS. 115 whom we are united through charity, the sin is mortal. But when the disorder does not proceed so far as that, the sin is venial. For as in the body mortal disorganization is naturally irreparable (while sickness which is not mortal may be cured by suitable means), so is it with the soul. He that sins by (wilfully) turning away from the ultimate end, so far as the nature of the sin is concerned, undergoes irreparable loss, and therefore his sin is mortal, its penalty eternal. But he who sins without wilful aversion from God, is disordered in a manner which, according to the nature of the sin, can be repaired, because the first prin- ciple of spiritual life is preserved ; and therefore he is said to sin venially, because the result is not eternal death. Mortal and venial sin differ infinitely as respects the aversion in the two sins. But it is not so as respects the turning to transitory good. Hence, in the same kind of sin may be found the one and the other, as the very first motion of the soul towards the sin of adultery may be venial, and an idle word, which is often venial, may become a mortal sin. Venial sins contain inordination, not with respect to the end, for the life of charity remains in the soul, but with respect to the means for that end. Such sins are repar- able. (1) It might be said that all sin is mortal because it is against the law of God. But venial sin is imperfectly siu, for it is not a Avord, thought, or deed (intentionally done) against that law. He who sins venially does not do what the law prohibits, nor omit what the law commands ; but he acts aside from law, in not observing those limits of reason which the law aims at. (2) It is commanded, indeed, that we do all things to the glory of God ; and he who sins venially does not at that time do so. But he may habitually refer himself and all his affairs to the glory of God, which is essentially obe- dience to such an affirmative precept. 116 OX VICES AND SINS. [Qu. lxxxvih. 3. Some sins are venial in their species, some are mortal. Some sins may be venial from their cause, as infirmity or ignorance, which diminishes the gravity of the offence. Or, again, and this is what we are now considering, venial sins may be those which do not take away due relation to the ultimate end, oor merit everlasting punishment. In this sense, and aa the object determines (he specific character of the act, some sins are venial in their proper nature, and some are mortal. For when the will is directed to any- thing which in itself is opposed to charity, which orders man for his ultimate end, the Bin is mortal in kind, whether it be against the love of God, as blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or againsi the love of our neighbour, as murder, adultery, and the like. But if the will is directed Id that which contains some inordination, indeed, but is not directly contrary to the love of God and of our neighbour, as the idle word. etc.. Buch bid is venial in its kind. But Since moral acts take their character not only from (heir objects, but also from the disposition of the agent, what is in itself venial may become mortal on the pari of that agent, either because he makes it his ultimate end, or be- cause he uses it as means for some other and a mortal sin. So again, on the part of the agent, that which is in itself mortal may become venial, because the act is imperfect, i.e., not proceeding from deliberate reason.* * But inadvertence itself, which of ten seems to be a note of venial sin, may show an habitual affection for sin, even when the act is not perfectly voluntary; i.e., a perfected sin. A positive doubt respecting the deadly malice of the- act may itself constitute full advertence, and make the sin a mortal one. Deadly, also, maybe needless exposure to the danger of falling into mortal Bin; it may be the sin of presumption. It is grave sin to deliberate about consent to mortal sin. The matter of venial acts may coalesce into mortal acts. Thus the apparently trifling act of giving light weight and short measure in re- tail trade accumulates its results, and it may enrich one, who may be thus guilty of serious theft. Qu. lxxxviii. 3.] VENIAL AXD MORTAL SINS. 117 Observe that in choosing what is opposed to Divine char- ity, a man prefers that thing to the love of God ; he loves himself more than God. This is mortal sin. In two tuays venial sin may dispose towards mortal sin. (1) The habit being augmented by repeated acts, the lust of sinning can increase so far that he who sins makes the venial sin his end. And so by repeated acts of venial sin, the sinner is prepared for mortal sin. This on the part of the agent. (2) Again, a human act may jjrepare the way for some- thing by removing hindrances. Venial sin may thus pre- pare the way for mortal sin. For in accustoming the will in minor matters to neglect the due order of life, the way is prepared for casting off that order as respects the ulti- mate end, in choosing mortal sin. Sin in itself venial may become mortal (a) through an erroneous conscience, which regards it as a more serious offence ; (b) through scandal given by it ; (c) through gravely evil intention, as contempt of the lawmaker (consider the "forbidden fruit" in Paradise); (d) through evil affection preferring the little sin to God ; (e) through directly leading to mortal sin. (In doubt, especially in the case of sensitive souls, the confessor takes the milder view and leaves the rest to God.) CHAPTER VII. OS LAW. § 1. What is law? Law is grounded in reason, For law is bhe rule and measure of acts, commanding or forbidding them. Bat reason is the rulo and measure of human arts, for it ie reason's office to ordain man with : bo his end. Mere will without reason would nut make the law, but rather injustice. /. ■ it ■ \ys ordained for the common good. In practical reason, bhe firsi principle is the ultimate end and aim. Law, therefore, the rational rule and measure of conduct, must principally and especially aim at that. Now- tin- ultimate end of human life is felicity or beatitude. This, therefore, is the special object <>f law. And, again, Bince every part is ordained for the whole, and each man is a part of tin- community, law properly regards the common felicity. Properly speaking, then, no pre- cept is law which has not relation to the common good. This, of course, does not exclude special aims and particu- lar goods, hut all must have the general good as the ulti- mate aim. Who can make I Since it primarily regards the order for the common good, and since to ordain anything for the common good belongs either to the whole community or to their vice-gerent, the power of making law belongs either to the whole com- munity, or to him who has charge of that community. Ql\ xc:. 1.] ETERNAL LAW. 119 For they to whom that end belongs have the right and duty of ordaining for the end. In a certain way, you may say that each one is a law to himself, as participating in the rational law which regu- lates his life. A private person can only admonish ; but his admonition has not that co-active force which is essential to law. But the community or its vice-gerent has such force to compel obedience, or to inflict penalties for violated law. The head of a family can lay down precepts for his household, but they are not properly laws, because that family is ordained for the good of the complete community, the state of which it is a part. Promulgation is essential in law. For as rule and measure it must be applied to what is regulated and measured by it. Hence, in order that law may obtain obligatory force, which is essential to it, it must be applied to the men whom it is to regulate. But such application is bringing it to men's notice, i.e., promulga- tion. This, therefore, is essential for the validity of law. From these four principles we may collect a definition of law; sc, Law is an ordination of reason with reference to the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community. ^ § 2. Eternal law. If the whole universe is directed by Divine Providence, the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine reason. That very government of all things, existing in God as the Lord of the universe, contains the idea of law, and because the Divine reason conceives an eternal thought, such law must be called eternal. Not that the things gov- erned are eternal, but they are foreknown and foreor- dained in that eternal Eeason. 120 ON LAW. [Qu. xcm. 1, 2. As in every artificer preexists the idea of those things which are to he produced by his art, so in every governor jneexists the idea of the order of those things which are to be done by those who arc under his rule. This is part of the idea of law. But God by His Wis- dom is the founder of the universe, and the governor of all the acts and motions which are found in the individual beings of the universe. And as the thought of Divine Wisdom, by which all things were created, is the pattern or ••idea" of all things thai are, bo the thought of Divine Wisdom, moving all things to their due end, is law. We define eternal law, therefore, as the thought of Divine mi, directive of all actions and all motions. This one law directive of acts in order to the common good, gives unity to the multiplicity of species of things. Do nil know eternal lawt A thing may be known in two ways : in itself, or in its in which some similitude of it is found. One may not know the Bubstance of the sun, hut still may know its irradiation. So no one of men on earth can know eter- nal law, as it is in itself; but every rational creature knows it, more or less, according to some irradiation. For all knowledge of truth is a certain irradiation and participa- tion of eternal law, which is incommutable verity. But all, in some way. know the truth, at least the general principles of the law of nature But otherwise, some participate more, some less, in the knowledge of the truth, i.e., of eternal law. (See Rom. i. 20.) Although every one according to his capacity may know something of eternal law in the man- ner indicated above, none can comprehend it, for it is not totally manifested in its effects. It is not requisite, there- fore, for such knowledge that the whole order of things should be known. Qu. xcill. 3, 5.] ETERNAL LAW. 121 All laws whatsoever are based on eternal law. Wisdom says (Proy. viii. 15), "By me princes decree justice." Law, as we have seen, is grounded in reason directive of acts to their end. But as in all ordered motions the power proceeds from the first mover, so in the administration of government the governing reason of the superior is derived to the subordinates. Since, therefore, eternal law is the Reason of the supreme ruler applied in governing the universe, necessarily all lower reason in sub- ordinates is subject to that, is derived from eternal law. Hence all laws, so far as they participate in right reason, are based on eternal law. And S. Augustine well says (Lib. Arb. i. 6), " In human law nothing is just and legi- timate which men have not derived for themselves from law eternal." (1) What, then, shall we say of unjust laws ? Human law is so far truly law as it agrees with right reason. But so far as it recedes from that, it is unjust, and is to be called oppression rather than law. And yet even in such injustice is preserved a semblance of law, on account of the authority from which the law (so-called) proceeds. For "there is no power but of God " (Rom. xiii. 1). (2) Again ; how, then, can S. Augustine say (Lib. Arb. i. 5) that "human laws rightly permit many things which are avenged by Divine Providence " ? Is not eternal law the thought of that Providence ? I reply that human law may permit some things, not as approving of them, but because it is unable to direct them. Many things are directed by Divine law which cannot be touched by human law. Hence, this non-interference of the latter is itself part of the order of law eternal. It would be very differ- ent if human law should approve what the other condemns. To this eternal laic are subjected all created things, whether necessary or contingent. Herein is a wide difference between human laws and the 123 on law. [qv. xciii. G. law of God. For the former only extends to rational creat- ures, who can be subject to the community. For law directs the actions of those only who are subject to its gov- ernment. Hence, no one, properly speaking, imposes a law on his own actions. But whatsoever things are done in using the irrational things which are subject to man, are done by the act of the man himself moving those things. Therefore man cannot impoBe a law on those irrational things, although they may be in his power. For they do not move themselves. l'.nt as man may imprint on human minds his law with its precepts and warnings, so God imprints on all nature the principles of its proper acts. " He has given them a law which cannot be broken" (Ps. cxlviii. 6). Thus all motions and actions of all nature arc under eternal law; irrational creatures being moved by Divine Providence, but rational creatures knowing the law which governs them. Even defects in natural things arc subject to the higher laws of Providence, though they seem to be outside of the regular laws of the creature concerned in them. All human affairs are subject to eternal law, though dif- ig in the case of the good and of the lad. There are two modes in which anything is subject to eternal law : one, by participating in it through knowledge of it ; another, by action and passion. In this latter mode irrational creatures are subject to it. But rational creatures are subject in both manners. For they have some (imper- fect) notion of it, and there is in them a natural tendency towards what is in harmony with that eternal law; for man is made for virtue (Xic. Eth., lib. ii.). But both these are corrupted in the wicked, the natural inclination to virtue being depraved by vicious habit, and the natural knowledge of good being obscured by passions and evil habits. But in the good each mode is found more perfectly, be- cause to the natural knowledge of good is superadded the Qu. XCIV. 2.] THE LAW OF NATURE. 123 knowledge of faith and wisdom ; and to the natural inclina- tion for virtue is superadded the inward motives of grace. The spiritual are not under the law (Gal. v. 18), as a burden on them, because, through that charity which the Holy Ghost pours into their hearts, they fulfil the law vol- untarily, and not unwillingly and through fear of the pun- ishments which the law denounces on those who break it. § 3. The law of nature. The rational creature in a peculiar manner is subjected to Divine Providence, inasmuch as it is a participator of that Providence in providing for itself and for others. In itself it participates in eternal reason, through which it has a natural inclination to its due act and end. Such a participation of eternal law in a rational creature is called the "law of nature." What does the law of nature command f As being is what first falls under the notice of simple apprehension, so the good is what first comes to the notice of practical reason which is ordained for operation. There- fore the first principle of practical reason is, " The good is what all things seek/' And the first precept of the law of nature is that " the good is to be done and sought for, and the evil is to be shunned/' On this are founded all other precepts of the law of nature. The good has the idea of the end, and hence reason naturally apprehends as good all those things to which man has a natural inclination ; and, consequently, they are to be actively sought for, while their contraries are evil and to be shunned. According, there- fore, to the order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of natural law. And there is in man, first, the inclination to his own good according to his nature, in which he communicates with all beings, since each one after its manner seeks its own conservation. According to this inclination those things pertain to the law of nature by L24 on LAW. [Qu. xciv. 3, 4. which the life of man is preserved and the opposites are hindered. ("Self-preservation is nature's first law.") Secondly, there is in man a natural inclination to some more special things in which he communicates with other animals. In this way those things are of the law of nature which nature teaches all animals, as the propagation of the species, the bringing up of children, and the like. Thirdly, there is in man a natural inclination to rational good, which is peculiar to him. And thus man has a natural desire to know the truth concerning God, and to live in society with his fellows. And so to natural law per- tains thai man avoid ignorance, that he do no harm to t hose \\ ith whom he is to associate, etc. Are all virtuous acts part of the law of nature f Certainly everything to which man by nature is inclined pertains to the law of nature. Bui thai natural inclination is to act according to reason, which is all one with acting according to virtue. In this way all virtuous acts are ac- cording to the law of nature. But if we consider the sepa- rate acts of virtue, we perceive that many things are virtu- ously done to which nature does not at first incline, hut by rational search they are found useful for a virtuous life. Some acts are virtuous in certain persons, according to their condition and state of life, which would not he so in others. Is the law of nature one law among all men ? To the law of nature, as we have seen above, pertain all those things to which man is naturally inclined, among which, peculiar to man, is the acting according to reason. But reason proceeds from general principles to special de- ductions from them, while practical reason is concerned with contingent things, among which are human opera- tions. And, therefore, while those universal principles may be necessary ones, as we descend to particular infer- ences we are liable to find deficiency. In speculative prin- Qu. XCIV. 4.] THE LAW OF NATUKE. 125 ciples which deal with necessary truths, the truth is the same among all men, both in its first principles and in the deductions from them, though the conclusions are not equally known among all. But, in practical matters, there is not among all the same truth or practical rectitude in special inferences, but only in the general principles. And where there is the same rectitude in special applications of first principles, it is not equally known by all. So, then, as respects the general principles of reason, whether specu- lative or practical, our answer to the question is, that there is one verity or rectitude among all and equally known by all. But as regards the special conclusions of speculative reason, there is the same verity among all, though, not equally known by all. Thus, among all it is true that the sum of the three angles of a plane triangle is equal to two right angles, though this is not known by all. But as respects the special conclusions of practical reason, there is not the same verity or rectitude among all, nor, even where it is the same, is it equally known by all. For among all it is right and true that they should live according to reason. But from this principle it is plain deduction that a loan should be repaid. And this is true in most cases. But it might happen that doing so would be doing harm, and consequently irrational {e.g., a drunken man's revolver ; or if the loan were going to be used against the country of the parties concerned). And the more we descend to particulars, the greater the contingency in the conclusions, as if, say, that the loan be returned in such a manner or on such a day. The more particulars are specified, the more multiplied are the possi- bilities of defect making it not right to return the loan under those conditions. So, then, we assert that the law of nature is the same among all in its primal general princi- ples, both for rectitude and for knowledge of it. But for inferences from those principles, it is generally the same, though in some cases there may be deficiency both in recti- tude and in knowledge. And this because some have reason L26 ox law. [Qu. xci. 3. depraved by passion, or bad customs, or evil constitution of nature. the law of nature be changed? Something may be added to it ; nothing hinders its being changed in thai way. And many things beneficial to human lift' have been Baperadded both by Divine law and by human laws. Bui If we speak of subtracting anything from the primal priucipli - of the law of nature, and bo changing it. it is altogether immutable. But if we speak of second- ary deductions from it. special impeding causes may rarely occur which release from the obligation of such precepts. Can the law of natun be expelled from the hearts of men? If we mean those general principles <>f living which are known by all, those cannot hi- expelled from the mind. But if we have in view practical applications of them, may In- hindered in making them by concupiscence or other past ;. :iL r ain, if we refer to remoter deduc- tions from those first principles, the law of nature can be expelled through evil persuasions, or depraved customs, and corrupt habit-. ;j 4. Human law. What is hi i in" i bin- .' q the case of speculative reason, from indemonstrable principles intuitively known are produced the conclusions of various sciences which are not innate but discovered by processes of reasoning, so also from the precepts of natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, reason proceeds to order the special details of human life. These special orderings so derived are human laws, under the con- ditions specified for law in general. This practical reason being directed to individual and contingent things (viz., actions), cannot give to laws that Qu. XCV. 1.] HUMAN LAW. 127 infallibility which belongs to the conclusions of demonstra- tive sciences. The measure, therefore, of human acts pro- Tided by human laws is not altogether fixed and infallible, and the approach to this is to be sought for only under the necessary limitations. The utility of human laws. Though there is in man by nature a certain aptitude for virtue, yet man must reach the perfection of virtue by some discipline. So we see that in natural needs, as food and clothing, man has the natural provision of reason and hands, but must aid himself by his own art and industry, while other animals are better provided by nature. But for this discipline in right living, man is scarcely sufficient for himself, because the perfection of virtue con- sists in withdrawing him from undue gratifications of his passions, to which he is very prone. Youth especially needs this efficacious discipline. This discipline, therefore, must come from without. And paternal discipline may suffice in youth where there is disposition for the acts of virtue either from natural character, or from habit, or, rather, from Divine bounty. But because some are found who are "headstrong" and prone to vice, and not easily moved by admonition, it is necessary that they be restrained by force or fear, that they may both leave others to pass a quiet life, and by force of habit may themselves be led to do voluntarily what they began to do through fear, and so may become virtuous. But this discipline, compelling the vicious through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Hence human laws are necessary for the peace and virtue of men. " Man when perfected is the best of ani- mals ; but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all" (Arist., Pol. i. 2,) ; because he has the arms of reason to expel concupiscences and ferocities, which other animals have not. (1) It is true that well-disposed men are better led vol- 128 02* law. [Qu. xcv. 2. untarily by admonition than driven by force ; but there are also those who cannot be so led and must be compelled. (2) But why not leave all such matters to the arbitra- ment of upright judges ? Is not living justice in that form better than inanimate justice under the name of laws ? There arc three reasons why law is preferable: (a) It is easier to find the few skilful legislators than the many up- right judges who would be needed for all the separate cases of judgment; (b) the law-makers have abundant time for reflection on all the various cases which may come under ili'- bco] f ih'- law, while judgments in individual cases must be given more <>r less " off-hand ; " * (c) legislators judge in the general and of the future ; in the other case, nun judging of the preseni are liable to be affected bv love or bate or some cupidity and so their judgment may be depraved. Because, therefore, the animated justice of the judge is doI found in many, and because it is liable to swerve from the right, it is necessary that in as many cases as possible law determine what is to be judged, and that the fewest possible things be left to the discretion of the judge. (3) Human acts are countless in detail, and we admit that there are endless details which law cannot reach, say, ler the act charged has been committed or not. Many things, therefore, must be left to judge (and jury). Is human positive law derived from, the law of natun ? That is not truly law which is not just. So far as a statute has justice, so far it has the force of law. But in human affairs that is just which is right according to the rule of reason, and reason's first rule is the law of nature. Therefore, every law made by man has so far the nature of law as it is derived from the lex natures. But if in any * I should add here that the decisions of such judges create a pre- cedent and custom which soon obtains the force of unwritten law. as in the common law of England and the United States, which did not come within the purview of our author. Qu. xcvi. 1, 2.] HUMAN" LAW. 129 respect it is discordant from that, it will not be truly law, but a corruption of law. But this derivation may be in two ways : (1) from the general principles of the law of nature conclusions may be drawn. " Thou shalt do no murder/' is a conclusion drawn from the lex naturae, "thou shalt do no harm to any one." (2) Determinations may be made of the same law of nature ; e.g., since it requires that he who does the wrong shall be punished, the law of nature may be deter- mined by human positive law in fixing the punishment as this or that. The former are not merely positive laws, but derive some force from the lex naturae. The latter are purely positive laws, and rest on human enactment only. (They may order or prohibit what is in itself indifferent.) * The first give us "jus gentium," laws which are requisite in every organized community ; the second, "jus civile," laws which vary according to the different conditions of human society. Human laws should be general, not individual " privi- legia." The end of the law is the common good, and must be proportioned thereto. But the common good consists of many things, and the law, therefore, must regard that many, both as respects persons, and actions and time. For the community is composed of many persons, and its good is derived from manifold actions, and it is established for a permanent duration. It does not pertain to human law that it prohibit all vices. The measure should be homogeneous with what it meas- ures. Now, law is the rule or measure of human acts. Therefore it should be imposed upon men according to their condition. It should be possible, and according to nature and the custom of the land. Now, the power of * For conditions of positive law, see Supplement, p. 5. 130 OX LAW. [Qu. XCVI. 3. action proceeds from interior habit or disposition ; for the same things are not possible to him who has not a habit of virtue and to the virtuous, nor to the boy and to the grown man. Many things are permitted to boys which are denounced in adults and punished by law. And, similarly, many things are permitted to men of imperfect virtue which would not be tolerated in virtuous men. But hu- man law is made for the multitude, the majority of whom fall far short of the standard of perfection. Therefore all vices from which the virtuous abstain arc not prohibited by human law. bul only those graver vices from which it is possible for the greater part of the multitude to abstain, and especially those vices which injure others, and without the prohibition of which human society conld not subsist : as homicide, theft, and the like. Human law must aim to make men virtuous, not by a sudden hap. but gradually. On the imperfect multitude it would be useless and worse to impose a burden which they could not bear, but, easting it off, would fall into greater evils (of license and lawlessness). The new wine of the precepts of a perfect life must not be pul into the old wine- skins of imperfect men. else the skins burst, and the wine is spilled; /.<.. the precepts are contemned, and through contempt men rush headlong into greater evils. Neither does human law enjoin the acls of all virtues. All the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of some person, or to the common good of society. Thus the acts of courage can be directed either to the preservation of the state, or of the rights of a friend. But law is ordained for the common good, and therefore there is no virtue whose acts the law might not enjoin. Bat yet human law does not give order concerning all acts of all virtues, but only concerning those which can be ordered for the common good, either directly or mediately, as having reference to that good discipline by which the Qu. xcvi. 4.] HUMAN LAW. 131 common good of justice and peace is preserved. (Qu. : The closing of liquor "saloons " on Sunday ?) Note that an act may be called virtuous in two -ways: (1) it is viewed simply as an act external to the will ; thus it is an act of justice to do right things, and an act of courage to do courageous things ; and so the law enjoins some acts of virtue ; (2) an act is called virtuous because it is done as a virtuous man does it (out of a good heart) ; such acts proceed from virtue, and do not fall under the prescription of law. But they should be the law-giver's aim. Does human law impose obligation on conscience f Laws enacted by man are just or unjust. If they are just, they oblige in foro conscientice, by reason of the eter- nal law from which they are derived. (Prov. viii. 15.) But laws are called just both from the end, sc, when they are ordained for the common good, and from their author, when the law enacted does not exceed the legislator's authority ; and from their form, when burdens are laid upon those subject to the law in due equality of propor- tion in order to the common good. Each man is part of society, and is what he is, and has what he has, as such a part. Laws, therefore, which impose burdens in due pro- portion are just, and oblige in foro conscientice ; they have the true idea and form of law. But laws may bo unjust in two ways : (1) they may be opposed to the common good in either of tbe three points just named — either (a) in their end, when the law-maker imposes onerous laws, not pertaining to the common good, but rather for his own interest or ambition ; (h) when he issues a law beyond his authority to enact ; (c) when unequal burdens are laid upon the members of the community, even though they be ordained for the common good. These are rather acts of oppression than laws. "That does not ap- pear to be law which is not just" (S. Aug., Lib. Arb. i. 5). Hence such laws do not oblige in foro conscientice, except, 132 ON LAW. [Qu. XG VI. 5. perhaps, for avoiding scandal and disturbance (the lex na- tures comes in prohibiting such scandal or riot) ; on account of which a man ought to yield his right, according to the Gospel law (S. Matt. v. 41), "If any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also." (2) In another way laws may be unjust through opposition t<> Divine good, as laws of tyrants informer ages compelling idolatry, and, in our age, whatever is against Divine law. Such laws ii is ii"! lawful in any manner to observe : "We oughi to obey God rat her t han man " (Acts iv. 19 ; v. 29). But how ran the lower power which enacts human law impose obligation before that Divine tribunal which we call "in- conscience ? The Apostle replies (Rom. xiii. 1), '• There is do power hut of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God ; therefore he that resisteth the power" (in those things which pertain to it) " withstandeth the ordi- nance of God." And this makes him guilty before the bar of conscience. How are all under law ? Law is not merely the rule of human acts ; it has (as such) co-active force. As regulated in action by law, all are under it who are under the authority which enacts it. though higher authority by its dispensation may release from the laws of lower authority {eg., State law and national law). But, in another way, some are under law as constrained by it ; and in this way virtuous and just men are not subjected to law, but only evil-doers. For that which is constrained and violent is contrary to the will ; but the will of the good is in harmony with the law from which the will of the evil is discordant. In this sense the Apostle says (1 Tim. i. 9), " Law is not made for a righteous man," because such "are a law to themselves, in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts" (Rom. ii. 15). Spiritual men are led by the law of the Spirit, which is Qlt. xcvi. 6.] HUMAN LAW. 133 higher than any human law, and they are not under such law as opposes that guidance ; but still it is part of that guidance that those who are led by the Spirit be subjected to human laws. So S. Peter says (1 Ep. ii. 13), "Be sub- ject to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake." Is it ever admissible to act contrary to the letter of the law ? Every law is ordained for the common good, and thus gets its force and meaning. As it departs from this it loses its obligatory power. "~No law or equity allows that the things which are introduced for the benefit of men, should by us be turned, through too rigid interpretation of them, to a severity which is against the common good." But it oftentimes happens that something is generally useful to be observed for the common benefit, which in some cases is highly injurious. Therefore, because the legislator cannot consider every individual case, he enacts a law which fits the great majority of cases, directing his intention to the com- mon utility. Hence, if cases emerge in which the observ- ance of such a law is injurious to the community, it is not to be observed (natural equity and common sense are higher law). But if there be no sudden emergency which must be met at once, it does not pertain to each one to judge what is useful or injurious to the commonwealth, but the question must be submitted to the proper courts. But in case of sudden emergency necessity itself dispenses from the law ; it " knows no law." This is not to judge the law, but the individual case where the law does not bind. Evident injury may show that the legislator did not have such case in his intention. In doubt, the letter of the law must stand or authority be consulted. No doubt wise legislators knew how to express their meaning in their words, but there are limits to the possi- 134 ON law. [Qu. xcvn. 1, 2. bilities of such expression ; and, even if it were possible to consider every case, still it would lead to hopeless confusion to attempt it. Laws must be made for what ordinarily occurs. Tlie mutability of human laivs. Law is the dictate of human reason whose natural prog- ress is from the imperfect towards the perfect. The first attempts at legislation proving to be deficient in many cases, Bubsequenl legislation corrects more or less of those deficien- cies. Also, since laws regulate human conduct, they are rightly changed with the changed condition of men, for which different things become expedient. "If a people be Belf-controlled and serious, it is a righi law that such a peo- • •<•! the magistrates by whom the commonwealth may be directed, Bui it. little by little, tin- same people become venal in the exercise of suffrage, and entrust the govern- ment to the most corrupt anions them, it will be right that they lose the power which they have so abused " (8. Aug., . Arb. i. 6). The law ^f nature, beinga participant of it' rnal law, is, like it, immutable. But human reason is imperfect and mutable; therefore so is its law. Natural law contains aniversal precepts (fitted to all circumstances), but human law contains special precepts for certain vari- able conditions. A measure ought to be a- permanent as the nature of things admits; but in mutable things, no such measure may Vie possible. It is true, also, that what is once right is always right ; but it does not follow that what is once law should always be law, for the rectitude of law is relative to the common utility, which is a variable thing. Should human law always he changed whenever something better j)re*e/ifs itself? It is rightfully changed if the common utility calls for Qu. xcvn. 3.] HUMAN LAW. 135 such change. But the very change in itself, as change, is detrimental to the common good, because custom is a weighty element in law. What is clone contrary to usage, even if it be easier in itself, seems harder to do. When law is changed, the sense of obligation towards it is dimin- ished, inasmuch as custom is violated. Change there- fore demands an equivalent compensation for this loss. That is, either there must be the greatest and most evident utility in the change, or the gravest necessity for it, or some manifest wrong in the established law, or some great injury done by it. Laws may be based on reason, but much of their force is due to usage. Can custom obtain the force of law? The reason and will from which law proceeds are mani- fested not only by words respecting what is to be done, but by deeds. Each one seems to choose that as good which he actually does. Now, as human words, manifesting reason's thought, can enact and change laws, so, through manifold acts which create custom, can law be enacted or changed. For when a thing is oftentimes done, it seems to proceed from the deliberate judgment of reason. In this way cus- tom gets the force of law, abolishes law, and interprets laws. (1) But no custom proceeding from human will can change the Divine and the natural law or have any force against them. " Custom must give way to authority ; law and reason must overcome evil usage" (Isidore). (2) Some one objects, again, that many wrongs cannot make a right. He who first begins to act against the law does wrong ; multiplied acts of the same kind can never make the action right. But I reply, also, that human law is necessarily deficient in some cases ; and hence it is possible in such a case that the act which is contrary to the law is not evil. And when such cases are multiplied 136 ox LA\v. [Qu. xcvir. 4. through the changed condition of society, then custom shows that the law is no longer useful as distinctly as if a contrary law were promulged. But if, on the other hand, the grounds of the law still remain unchanged, then law has the supremacy over custom, not custom over law, unless perhaps when the law seems useless, heing not possible according to the custom of the country, which custom was one of the conditions of the w >ry law in quesl ion. (3) It may be argued i hat cu>tom -rows strung from the acts of private individuals as such: hut thai they cannot make a law. But, 1 reply, where there is a free people which can pass a law for itself, the assenl of thai people to the obsen ing of any regulation is of t be essence of law, and this assenl is manifested by custom. Individuals as such cannol make a law, bul the whole people can. And even if the people are aol free to make and to abolish laws, yet pn valenl custom among them gets the force of law, because it is tolerated by the law-makers ; and so they seem to ap- prove whal custom has introduced. ("Silence gives con- sent.") .1 power of dispt nsatio from purely human law, not from the law of nature, may fitly be (nt rusted to the rulers of the people. For a precept which is generally advantageous for the common good may not fit this particular person or this special case, because some better thing may be prevented or some serious evil be brought about ; and, except in evident and sudden danger, there is great risk in leaving this power of dispensing with law for one's self in each individual's hands. It is safer and better, within the sphere of human authority, to entrust that power of dispensation to the executive. (Pardoning power.) Qu. XCI. 4.] DIVINE LAW. 137 § 5. Divine law. Besides the lex naturm and human law, a Divine law is necessary for the direction of human life. This for four reasons : (1) Because by law man is directed towards acts which, are related to his ultimate end. And if, indeed, man were only ordained to an end which did not exceed the proportion of his natural faculties, he might need no other direction on the part of reason than the law of nature and human law derived from that. But because he is ordained to an eternal beatitude which exceeds the proportion of his natural faculties, he needs to be directed towards this end by a law Divinely given. for this purpose. (2) On account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially in contingent and particular cases, judgments about human acts are diverse, from which also proceed diverse and contrary laws. Therefore, in order that man without any doubt may know what he is to do and what he is to avoid, he needs to be directed in his proper acts by law Divinely given, in which there can be no error. (3) Man can make law only concerning those things in which he is able to judge. But his judgment cannot be respecting the hidden inward acts, but only respecting the outward apparent motions. And yet the perfection of virtue requires that man be right both outwardly and in- wardly. Therefore, human law cannot restrain and ordain sufficiently inward acts, but a supervening and Divine law is needed. (4) Human law cannot punish or prohibit all things which are ill done, because in aiming to take away all evils, many good things would be taken away also, and the utility of the commonwealth, which is necessary for human conservation, would be impeded. In order, therefore, that no evil remain unprohibited and unpunished, a Divine law is needed which prohibits all sins. We may find all four reasons for Divine law in Ps. xix. 7 : " The law of the Lord 138 ON" law. [Qu. xcvm. 1. is an undefilcd law," permitting no turpitude of sin ; "converting the soul," because it directs not only outward acts but the inward also ; "the testimony of the Lord is sure," on account of its certitude of truth and righteous- ness ; " giving wisdom unto the simple," by ordaining man to his supernatural and Divine end. Divine I""' is either the old and imperfect, or the new and perfect. The one was for children, the other for grown men (Gal. iii. 23). Note the difference between the perfect and the imperfect in three respects: (1) It pertains to law that it order for the common good a- i he end ; the Old Law ordered directly for a sensible and (.'art lily good, the New for a spiritual and heavenly good. (2) Law directs human.con- iluct according to the order of righteousness j the New Law is above the Old in ordering the inward acts of the heart. (S. Matt. v. 20: ■• Except your righteousness shall exceed thai uf the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven.") Therefore it is said that •• the Old Law restrains the hand, the New Law restrains the Bool." (3) It pertains to law that it lead men to observe its mandates. This the Old Law did by threats, bat the New Law by love which is shed abroad in our hearts through the grace of Christ, figured in the Old Law, conferred in the New. How was the Old Law imperfectly good ? It was good, for it harmonized with created reason in ]■• pressing concupiscence whicb is opposed to reason ; e.g., saying, ''Thou shalt not covet." Thus it prohibited very many sins which are contrary to reason. But that may be good which is, nevertheless, imperfect in its kind. In the means to an end, that is perfectly good which is per se suf- ficient for that purpose. But the imperfectly good con- tributes to that end without being sufficient, as medicine Qu. xcix.j DIVIDE LAW. 139 may benefit a man without curing his disease. But the end of Divine law is different from that of human law. The latter aims at the tranquillity of an earthly society, at which it arrives by restraining outward acts, in those evils which can disturb the peaceful state of society. But the end of the Divine law is to lead man to eternal felicity, which end is hindered by every sin, inward as well as outward. There- fore what suffices for the perfection of human law — sc, that it prohibit sins and affix their penalties — does not suf- fice for the perfection of Divine law ; but it must make man fit for the participation of everlasting felicity, which can only be done through the grace of the Holy Ghost, through which love is poured into our hearts and fulfils the law. For "the gift of God is eternal life" (Rom. vi. 23). The Old Law could not confer this grace ; it was re- served for Christ. "The law was given by Moses; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (S. John i. 17). All the precepts of the Old Law were one in the end sought for — sc, the love of God and our neighbour (S. Matt. xxii. 40) — but their multiplicity includes three classes of pre- cepts, viz., moral, ceremonial, and judicial- It had moral precepts, because the chief aim of Divine law is to establish friendly communion between man and God, which can only be through virtue. It had ceremonial precepts, because it ordained man with reference to God, which is done not only by inward acts of the mind, as be- lieving, hoping, loving, but also by those outward actions in which man offers homage to God. The worship of God as an act of virtue pertains to the moral law ; it is part of the law of nature ; but the determination of this precept to such and such gifts and sacrifices belongs to Divine posi- tive law — i.e., to the ceremonial law. The Old Law had judicial precepts, for it determined, the law of nature respecting justice between man and man by positive laws which we name judicial. 140 ON LAW. [Qu. C. 1, 2. All precepts of the Old Law are reducible to these three, or to directions respecting the manner of observance. The moral precepts of the Old Law. Moral precepts regard those acts which pertain to a good life; such harmonize with reason, the proper principle of human conducl ; and every judgment of human reason is in some way derived from natural reason, cither by direct, immediate, simple deduction from principles naturally known, or after more careful consideration of special cir- cumstances has been required, <>r where special Divine in- struction has l"ii! necessary. In one way or other all moral precepts pertain t<> the law of nature. " Honour thy father and thy mother; fchon shall do no murder; thou shall not steal" reason instantly judges thai these arc right. But the command to rise ap before the gray head, and to honour the person of the aged, is deduction from first principles. For the Second Gommandmeni Divine instruction was nec- essary, although it is part of the lex natures. .i/v ,/// acts of virtue embraced in the moral precepts of It is a different community for which Divine law is or- dained from that for which human law is ordained. For the latter regards the civil community of men in their sev- eral relations to one another. But men are so ordered by outward acts, through which they communicate with one another. And communication of this kind pertains to the idea of justice, the virtue of civil society. If other virtues are ever enjoined in civil law, it is still under the same idea (Xic. Eth. v. 1). But the community for which Divine law ordains is that of men with God. Its precepts, therefore, order all those things by which man is put into his due rela- tions with God. But man is joined with God by his rea- son, which is the image of God ; and, therefore, Divine law gives precepts concerning all those things by which reason Qu. C. 3, 5.] DIVINE LAW. 141 is well ordered — i.e., the acts of all virtues — some as com- mands which are essential to the order of virtue, some as counsels which are advantageous for the well-being of per- fect virtue. All the moral precepts of the Old Laiv are reducible to the Decalogue. The Ten Commandments are said to have come directly from God, and man by himself has knowledge of them as Divine. Either they can be known at once by simple de- duction from the primary universal principles, or they are immediately evident to faith divinely infused. Two classes of precepts, therefore, do not appear in the Decalogue ; sc, first, those which are primary and universal, which need no promulgation, are written in natural reason, being self- evident, as that man shall harm no one, etc.; and, secondly, those which require the diligent reflection of the wise to discover their harmony with right reason, for these were given to the people through Moses and the prophets. Yet each of these kinds of laws is contained in the Decalogue ; the first, as the principles from which their proximate con- clusions are derived ; the second, as deductions which the wise can make from the Ten Commandments. Note, of course, that the Fourth Commandment is at once ceremonial and moral. Why does the Decalogue contain nothing of a man's duty to himself? First, those Ten Commandments are based on love of God and our neighbour, and natural law respecting this has been obscured by sin ; but not so with self-love ; the law of nature is quite enough. Secondly, the Decalogue, coming immediately from God, contains, as we have seen above, those things which the minds of the people can receive as soon as they are heard. But every true man sees at once that he owes something to God and to his neighbour. But 142 ON LAW. [Qu. c 8. that something is due in what belongs to himself, and in which at first sight he appears to be absolutely free, this is not so immediately apparent. Therefore precepts prohibit- ing acts of disorder with respect to one's self came to the people through their wise legislators. The same remarks may be applied to the Fifth Commandment. Tlte power of dispensation can in no way reach to the Decalogue. Dispensation, as we have Eound, (p. L36), applies to cases in which, if the letter of the law were observed, the inten- tion of the law-maker would be contradicted. But that intention is, primarily, the common good, and, secondly, the order of justice and virtue by which that good is attained and preserved. Therefore the precepts which explicitly contain these, contain the intention of the law- maker, and are indispensable. Dispensation i- admissible only in precepts which are ordained for those higher pre- cepts, determining them in special modes. Thus the law of treason is indispensable ; but certain ads which have been legally treasonable may in special cases be allowed, without prejudicing the law of treason or the intention of the law-maker, on account; of some great utility. But the Ten Commandments contain the very intention of God, the sovereign Legislator ; the first table contains the order for the general and final good, which is God; the second, the order to be observed among men ; viz., to give each his due, and to wrong no one. Such order is indis- pensable and immutable. But as respects their determina- tion and application to special acts (determining what is theft, murder, etc.), there may be change by Divine author- ity in that which is instituted by Divine authority alone (Divine positive law), or even by human authority, in that which belongs to men's jurisdiction. Qli. c. 9.] DIVINE LAW. 143 Does the mode of virtuous action fall under the precept of law f Law has coactive force ; that, therefore, directly falls under the precept of law to which the law compels. But the coaction of law is through fear of its penalty. That is commanded for which the penalty of law is inflicted. But herein Divine law differs from human law. For the penal- ties of violated law are only inflicted on those concerning whom there can be judgment, because the law punishes after judgment. But man, the maker of human law, can only judge of outward acts ; God alone, the author of Divine law, judges the hidden motions of the will. So, then, in one respect, both human and Divine law consider the mode of virtuous action ; in another, only Divine law ; in another, neither human nor Divine. But the mode of virtuous action consists in three particulars (ISnc. Eth. ii. 4) : (1) The knowledge possessed by the agent. Both human and Divine law take this into consideration, for what one ignorantly does is accidental. Both human and Divine law judge whether there was ignorance of the fact on the part of the agent, and acquit or condemn accord- ingly. (2) The mode involves the willing or choosing the action and the purpose in choosing, the two-fold inward motion of will and intention. Human law does not judge of these, but the Divine law does ; for human law does not condemn of murder one who wishes to kill and does not, but Divine law condemns him. " He that is angry with his brother shall be liable to the judgment " (S. Matt. v. 22). (3) The third particular is the acting firmly and immov- ably ; and this fixity of virtuous action belongs to rooted habit. This is not contained in either human or Divine command, for neither by man nor by God is one punished as a transgressor who pays due honour to his parents, al- though he may not yet have formed the fixed habit of filial piety. (This habit is the end of the law, and actions are Ill OX LAW, [Qu. c. 10. commanded which may create the habit, and make men truly virtuous.) The end of the precepl is not the same with the matter of the precept, the latter being means to the former. But, you may \ Jesus Christ." Therefore it was fitting thai the grace flowing from the [ncarnate Word should be derived for us through some outward sensible means, and thai from the inward grace by which the flesh is Buhdued to the spirit, Borne outward sensible works should be pro- duced. S », then, outward works in two ways can pertain to grace. In one way, after a certain manner, they may lead to grace ; ich are the works required by the Sacramenl a of i be New . Holj Eucharist, and the like. But others arc outward works which are produced from the impulse of grace. And among th tain difference is to be noted. I ronection w ith, or opposition to, the inward grace, which consists in faith working through i : and outward works of this kind are commanded or prohibited in th . rion of the fait h i- commanded, and denial of il is prohibited (S. Matt. x. other works which have not such nec- connection with faith working through love. And such works were not commanded or prohibited at the first institution of tl w, but were left by Christ, the h one who had charge of any such thing. And so it is free to each one to determine respecting such things what it i- at for him to do or to avoid, and to each oue who has authority over others to ordain for them in such things what is to be done or avoided. Hence, the Gospel is called a law of liberty, for the Old Law deter- mined many things, and left few to he freely detenu i: men themselves. God for the conduct of human life. See, for example, Lutheran treat- ment of the sacrament of Holy Matrimony. Qu. CVIII. 1.] THE EVANGELICAL LAW. 149 (1) But it is objected that "The kingdom of God is within us " (S. Luke xvii. 21) ; and " The kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost " (Eom. xiv. 17). Therefore, the New Law does not command or prohibit outward acts. The kingdom of God does, indeed, consist principally in inward acts ; but, consequently, all those things pertain to that kingdom without which the inward acts cannot exist. If the kingdom of God is inward righteousness and peace and spiritual joy, it follows that all outward acts which are opposed to righteousness and peace and spiritual joy are opposed also to the kingdom of God ; and, therefore, they are prohibited in the Gospel of the kingdom. But those actions which are indifferent in this respect, as eating this or that food, do not constitute the kingdom of God, as the apostle says. (2) Again, it may be objected that the New Law is the law of the Spirit, "and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. iii. 17). But there is no liberty where men are compelled to do or to avoid any outward works. These, therefore, do not belong to the New Law. But I answer that he is free who is "causa suij" he freely does anything who acts from himself. But what a man does from a habit agreeing with his nature, he does of himself. But if a habit should be repugnant to nature, the man would not act of himself, but only according to a supervening corruption of his nature. Because, therefore, the grace of the Holy Spirit is a kind of inward infused habit inclining us to operate rightly, it makes us freely do those things which harmonize with grace and avoid those things which are repugnant to it. So, then, the New Law is called a law of liberty for two reasons : First, because it does not constrain us to do or to avoid anything except those acts which are in their very nature either necessary or repugnant to our salvation, which things fall under the precept or the prohibition of the law. 150 ON LAW. [Qu. (Mil. 3. Secondly, because it enables us freely to fulfil precepts or prohibitions of this kind, inasmuch as they are fulfilled from the Inward motion of grace. For these two reasons the New Law i.- railed the "law of perfect liberty " (S. Janus i. 85). What outward acts an commanded or prohibited in the X< w J. We have seen that only those are found in the New Law by which we are received into grace, or which necessarily pertain t<> the right use of it. And because we cannot obtain -rare of ourselves but only through Christ, there- in r«- the Bacramente by which we obtain grace were insti- tuted by the L IB mself, and are Bacraments of the New Law. (Their laws, therefore, arc an essential part of .Moral TheoL But the right use of grace is through the works of charity, which, indeed, as requisite for virtue, pertain to the moral precepts which were given in the Old Law. In this respect, then, the New Law had nothing to add regarding outward acts. But the determination of those works, so far as the worship of (i<>d is concerned, pertains to the ceremonial pro- of the law: and bo far as our neighbour is concerned, to the judicial precepts. And, therefore, because those determinations are not in themselves necessary for inward grace in which the New Law consists, they are not com- manded by it, but are left to human judgment; some to each individual man, but others, which pertain to the com- mon utility, to rulers, temporal or spiritual. So, then, the \ . Law commanded or prohibited no outward works, except sacraments and such moral precepts as are of the essence of virtue. Sacred rites in which grace is not given, and which, there- fore, do not of themselves pertain to the necessity of inward grace, the Lord left to be instituted by the faithful accord- ing to their judgment. Qu. cviii. 4.] THE EVANGELICAL LAW. 151 The Sermon on the Mount contains the complete guide of the Christian life in its perfect ordering of the inward motions of the heart. Besides commands, the New Laiv contains some deter- minate counsels. The difference is that a precept implies necessity of ful- filment, but counsel is left at the option of him to whom it is given. It is the law of liberty which adds counsels to commands, not the Old Law, which was a law of bondage. The precepts of the New Law refer to those things which are necessary for the obtaining of the end — sc, eternal beat- itude — into which the New Law immediately introduces man. But counsels are of those things through which man can better and more expeditiously reach that end. But man is so placed between the things of this world and those spiritual goods in which his eternal beatitude consists, that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he recedes from the other, and conversely. He, then, who entirely cleaves to the things of this world, seeking the end of his being in them, making them the reason and rule of his actions, totally abandons spiritual goods ; and, therefore, inordina- tion of this kind is forbidden by absolute commands. But in order to arrive at that end it is not necessary to cast away entirely the things of this world, because man can use them without making them his end, and so reach eternal beatitude. But he will do so more expeditiously by that renunciation which is the Evangelical counsel. But the goods of this world, which are useful in human life, are three in number; sc, (1) Outward riches, which lead to the lust of the eyes ; (2) sensuous pleasures, which lead to the lust of the flesh ; and (3) worldly honours, which per- tain to the pride of life (1 Ep. S. John ii. 16). But to abandon these three as far as is possible pertains to the Evangelical counsels, as in the three-fold vow of poverty, celibacy, and obedience. And, furthermore, observance of 152 OUTLAW. [Qu. cviii. 4. any one of them, in any particular case, pertains to counsel in that special case ; as when a man gi\ r es alms to the poor without any direct obligation to do so, he follows counsel in thai action. Or when for some determined time he abstains from sensuous pleasures in order to have more time for prayer, he follows counsel for that period. Or when he gives up his will in any particular, although he could law- fully haw it. he Ml<»\vs counsel in thai case — say, if he bene- fits his enemies when ho is not bound to do so, or passes by an injury for which he might justly demand compensation. (1) It is true thai these counsels as such are expedient for all. but owing to the spiritual state of some one, they may not be expedient for him, because his affections arc other- wise inclined. Accordingly, the Lord, in proposing tbe Evangelical counsels, always makes mention of the fitness of men for observing them. "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thon hasl " Matt. six. 21); "He thai is able to receive it, let him receive it" (ib. v. 12); and S. Paul says, "This I say Eor your profit, aol that I may cast a snare upon you" (L Cor. vii. 35). Observe, with reference to the example cited above, that love of enemies, as a preparation of the soul, is necessary to salvation, and is bo commanded : sc, that a man be ready to do good to his enemies, etc., when need so requires. But that one should go out of his way to do so, when there is no Bpecial need, pertains to special counsels.* * The remainder of the Prima Sccuntkc of the Summa, discussing the subject of Grace, although it has intimate bearing on Moral Theol- ogy, yet being equally connected with Dogmatic Theology proper, is relegated to that subject. Part II. — Theological Virtues. CHAPTER I. FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. § 1. Faith. In order to consider rightly the virtue of faith, we must inquire first into its object, then into the act of faith itself Faith assents to nothing except as revealed by God, and because it has been revealed by God. Therefore it rests on the primal verity, on God. This is faith's " formal " part, the essence of faith. But if we consider the things which are received by faith, the " material" part, not only God's existence but many other things also are believed, which, however, do not fall under tbe assent of faith, except as related to God. In both ways, then, the object of faith is primal verity (either God Himself, or the Divine veracity in revelation). Is the object of faith things or propositions ? Things known are in the knower after his proper manner. Now the proper mode of human intelligence is through propositions which analyze or synthesize. So, then, the ob- ject of faith also can be considered in two ways ; one, on the side of the thing believed, and so the object of faith is the very thing (or being) concerned ; another, on the part of the believer, and so the object of his faith is some inward proposition of his mind. But the act of faith is not ter- 15-4 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. I. 3, 4. minated in the proposition, but in the thing (or being) which is the object of the proposition. And thus we say, '•I believe in God the Father Almighty." Can the false be the object of faith ? No ; for nothing can be embraced in the faith which does not stand under that primal verity which is its "formal''" object. (1) Truth is the good of intelligence ; therefore all the virtues which perfect is. and chiefly faith, totally exclude the false. Eope and charity may in a certain way be de- ceived, bul these perfect the will, whose good is a different good from that of intelligence. (2) Human conjectures may be attached to the object of faith, and may err, hut this is nut error in the faith. Faith is " the proving of things not seen " (Heb. xi. 1). Faith signifies the assent of the mind to that which is believed. But that assent is given, first, when the mind is moved to it by the object itself, which is either known per se — sc, primary Belf-evidenl truths — or known through another object, the necessary inference or conclusion of sci- entific knowledge. But that assent is given also, secondly, nut because the intellect is sufficiently moved by its proper object, but because through some choice the mind volun- tarily inclines to one side rather than to the other. And if indeed this is done with hesitation and fear of the other side, it will be opinion ; but if with unhesitating certitude, it will be faith. But the things which, per se, move our intelli- gence to know them, are seen by the senses, or by the mind. Hence it is manifest that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen by sense or by the intellect. A thing may be seen to be credible, to harmonize with the habit of spiritual faith, and so on ; but this is not literally seeing with the mind the object of faith. Qu. II. 1.] THE INWARD ACT OF FAITH. 155 Can those things which are of faith be known or demon- strated ? All knowledge comes through principles known per se ; i.e., they are seen. And, therefore, whatever things are known, in some way are seen. But the same thing cannot at the same time, and by the same person, be known and believed. Still it can happen that what is seen and known by one, may be believed by another. ' ' Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face" (1 Cor. xiii. 12). What we believe, the saints see and know. The same thing may be true in this present state of life. But that which is j^roposed to all men in general to be believed, is in general not known ; it is simply the object of faith. (1) This is not the ignorance of unbelief ; but through the light of faith, not through demonstration, the faithful see what they are to believe. (2) As science demonstrates its conclusions, so the truth of the faith is argued in two ways ; one, not demonstrative but persuasive argument, showing that the things believed are not impossible ; another, deducing the articles of faith from the Holy Scriptures, the foundations of the faith. (3) Some things are believed which philosophy under- takes to demonstrate, as the being and unity of G-od, etc. But these are numbered with the articles of the faith, both because they are preambles of the faith, and because where they are not demonstratively known they must at least be believed.* What is it to believe ? If we say that it is thinking with assent, we shall need to examine our terms. What is it to think ? (1) Aiv. consideration of a thing by the mind may be called so ; and * Other articles on the object of faith, though of great Talue, are omitted as not essential to Moral Theology. 156 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. II. 2. he who considers the things which he knows does so with assent to them. But this is not belief. (2) It may mean a consideration of some subject with inquiry into it, before there is perfect insight into it. This is an act of the deliberating intellect. Now there are acts pertaining to the intelligence in which, without further reflection, there is firm assent, as when one considers what he already knows or sees to be true. And there are acts of intelligence also in which there is a thought without linn assent, inclining sometimes to neither side, as in doubt; or to one side through Borne trilling indication, as in suspicion; or adher- ing to one side with fear of the opposite, as in opinion. But in belief there is linn adhesion to one side, and so far it agrees with knowledge and intellectual insighi ; and yet. there is not perfect knowledge through clear insight, and so far it agrees with doubt, suspicion, and opinion. And so this mental reflection with assent, is peculiar to belief. Bui the inquiry is not into direct demonstration of the things which air believed, but into the reasons for believing, Bay, that tiny have been spoken by God, are con- firmed by miracles, etc., etc. A- -eiu may also be said to be the act of will, because the mind of him that believes is determined to one propo- sition, m>t by reasoning but by his will. So assent as here used signifies the act of the intelligence, as it is determined by the will to one thing. (The reason why the will assents to what the mind dues not see. is because God has said it.) There are three acts of faith in relation to its object. For since believing pertains to the intellect as it is moved to assent by the will, the object of faith may be viewed either on the intellectual side of the act, or on the side of the will moving the intellect. If the first, we may consider the very thing believed, the " material " object of faith. This is God. For nothing is proposed to faith, except as it per- tains to God. This is " credere Deum " (believing that God Qu. II. 3.] THE INWARD ACT OF FAITH. 157 is). Or we may consider why the assent is given, the " formal " part of the object. And this is primal verity , to which man adheres, on account of it assenting to what he believes. This is credere Deo (believing what God says). But we may consider, thirdly, the object of faith, as the reason is moved by the will. So viewed, the act of faith is credere in Deum (to tend to G-od as the ultimate end on account of whom we will to believe). The unbeliever, indeed, may admit that God exists ; but he does not believe it under those conditions which faith determines. Is it necessary to salvation to believe anything which is above natural reason f Eational nature alone has immediate relation to God. Its perfection requires not only what naturally belongs to it, but what is given to it through a certain supernatural participation of the Divine goodness. Hence the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the supernatural vision of God. (See page 4.) To this man can attain only as he is taught of God (S. John vi. 45). But this discipline is not instantaneous, but gradual, according to the laws of man's nature. But every one who is taught must believe in order to reach perfect knowledge. Hence if man would attain his perfect beatitude, he must believe his teacher, God. (1) The things to be believed exceed natural reason, be- cause the nature of man depends on a higher nature. (2) It is true that man cannot judge of what is proposed to his faith, by referring it to those primary truths through which we judge of all things besides. But there is no risk of illusion in this. For as by the natural light of reason man assents to principles, and as a virtuous man through his habit of virtue has right judgment respecting those things which harmonize with his virtue, so, by the light of faith divinely infused, man assents to those things which are of faith, but not to their contraries. 158 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Ql T . I. 4, 5. Is if necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason — e.g., that ) There is the same necessity of belief in order that there may he certitude. For human reason is very defec- tive in Divine things, and even ahoul human affairs philos- opher- have widely differed, and many have erred. In order, therefore, that there might be unhesitating certitude respecting God, Divine tilings (even those which might he proved) were delivered to faith as spoken by God. Man is bound to I" lieve explicitly all the articles of the full h, and implicitly whatsoever is contained in tin 1 Holy Scriptures. "'He that comcth to God, must believe that lie is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek after Him" (Heh. xi. 6). For the determination of the act of any virtue to its proper and perse object is part of the command, like the act of the virtue itself. And the object of faith, per se, is that by which man is rendered blessed. But the determination of the virtuous act to things which are accidentally or secondarily related to its proper object is not commanded except under the suitable condi- tions of place and time. And thus man is bound implicitly or in preparation of soul to believe whatever the Divine Scriptures contain. (The argument seems to require, as Qu. II. 9.] THE INWARD ACT OF FAITH. 159 qualification, the contents of Holy Scriptures as connected with the primary object of faith. It may not be possible to draw the line of division, but if, beside the Divine ele- ment in Holy Scriptures, there is a human element — say, numbers, names, and the like — the argument hardly seems to reach to that ; in fact, that element was probably not in the mind of the saint at all.) (1) But how can a man be bound to that which is not in his power ? " How shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard ? " (Eom. x. 14). Man is bound to many things which he cannot reach without assisting grace, as, to love God and his neighbour. (2) But the good of faith consists in obedience (Rom. i. 5), and the virtue of obedience does not require that one observe any determinate precepts, but it suffices that he have a ready mind (Ps. cxix. 60). Therefore it seems to suffice for faith that one have a ready mind to whatever may be Divinely proposed, without explicitly believing anything. But I answer that the virtue of obedience is properly in the will, and, therefore, to the act of obedience (not to the act of faith which is in the intellect) it suffices that there be a promptitude of will subject to the one who commands ; and this is properly and per se the object of obedience. Faith is a meritorious act, (in the sense in which we speak of virtuous acts as being meritorious ; see p. 42). " Through faith " the saints of old time " obtained promises " (Heb. xi. 33). This could not be if their faith had no merit.* Observe, then, that our acts ob- tain reward, are meritorious, in so far as they proceed from free-will moved by the grace of God. Hence, every human act which is under free-will can be meritorious if it is referred * The illustration shows that S. Thomas is here speaking of a holy life as the effect of heavenly grace, and of its worthiness to receive a supernatural reward. Cp. the 13th Article of Religion, and consult Summ. I. ii. 114. 1G0 FAITII AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. II. 10. to G-od. But faith is the act of the intellect assenting to Divine truth at the command of the will which is moved by the grace of God. Therefore it can be meritorious. (1) Charity indeed is the principle of merit. But nature and faith arc precedenl to charity; nature, as the matter in ■which charity is found ; faith ( fides informis), as a prece- dent disposition. But when charity is come, nature and faith act in virtue of that (fides formal a), and so neither nature nor faith can produce a meritorious act without charity : bul charity Bupervening, the act of faith is ren- dered meritorious by it. as is the act of nature and the natural act of free-will. c.') Even in knowledge something of a similar kind may be found. For while assent is compelled by the cogency of demonstration, and is neither subject to free-will nor is meritorious, yel the actual consideration of the thing in question is so subject, since it is in a man's power to con- sider or not to consider. And so the considering may be meritorious if ii be referred to the end of charity; i.e., to the honour of God or the good of our neighbour. (3) A superficial objection says that if a man assent to anything with faith, he either has sufficient reason leading him to believe, or be has not. l( he has. his faith is Dot meritorious, because he is not free to believe or disbelieve. If be has not, he -hows empty credulity. Either way there is do merit in the case. But I reply that be who believes has sufficient motive for doing so, since he is led by the authority of Divine doctrine confirmed by miracles, and, which is more, by the inward drawing of God Himself. Hence, faith is not credulity. But still there is none of the compulsion of demonstration, and merit is not taken away. Do credible arguments for the fait!', diminish the merit of that virtue ? Keason may precede the will in believing — say, when one Qu. III. 2.] THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH. 101 either would not have a believing will, or not so prompt a one, if human reasons had not led up to faith ; and so they diminish the merit of faith, for we ought to believe, not on account of human arguments, but of Divine authority. (Of course, in point of time motives for believing must precede, if we would not fall into mere credulity. But the author is speaking of the cause, the reason of assent.) In another way reason may follow the will of him who be- lieves ; for when a man has a will prompt to believe, he loves the verity which he believes, and he reflects upon it, and delights in finding reasons for it. This does not de- tract from faith, but rather increases its merit. § 3. The outward act of faith. Spoken words are ordained to signify what is conceived in the heart ; and outward confession of the faith is an external act of faith. Is it necessary to salvation ? The apostle says, "With the mouth confession is made unto salvation." But this confession as an affirmative act can fall only under an affir- mative precept. It is necessary to salvation after the manner of other affirmative commands. Now, these are of perpetual obligation, but not at all times {''semper, non ad semper "). But they bind in certain times and places according to due circumstances, in accordance with which the human act must be limited in order to make it an act of virtue. So, then, confession of the faith at all times and in every place is not essential to salvation, but confession in some place and time is so ; when, sc, through omission of this confession honour due to God would be withheld, and even the benefit of our neighbour criminally neglected; say, if one who is asked respecting his faith should keep silence, and so should be taken for an unbeliever, or others should be turned away from the faith through his silence. (1) But cannot our hearts cleave to Divine truth without speaking of what we believe ? I answer that the end of 1G2 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. IV. 1. faith, as of other virtues, must be referred to charity, the love of God and of our neighbour. Now, when the honour of God or the utility of our neighbour demands this con- fession, a man ought not to be content to possess Divine trut; lips. Bui apari from any benefit to the faith or to the faithful, it is not laudable to proclaim one's faith if tumult among unbelievers ie the result. If good is reasonably hoped for, let the disturbance be despl § 4. The virtue of faith. What is the virtue offaitht If we consider the apostle's description (Heb. xi. 1), we shall sec that it contains all that is essential to definition. " Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the proof of things not Been." Primal verity is the end and object of this theological virtue, verity not seen as yet. And so it i.s spoken of as "hoped for." For to see the truth is to pos- t. But no one hopesforthat which he already has, but for that which be has not. So, then, the relation of the act of faith to its end, which is the object of the will, is expressed thus: "the Bubstance of things hoped for."' Substance here means the beginning of a thing when all that follows is virtually contained in its beginning. So we may say that primary indemonstrable principles are the substance of science, because they are first in logical order, and virtually contain all science. This is likewise true of faith, because the first beginnings of the things hoped for are in us through the assent of faith, which virtually con- tains all the things hoped for. For we hope to be blessed in seeing face to face the truth to which we adhere through faith. But the relation, secondly, of the act of faith to the object of the intelligence, as it is object of faith, is next described, viz., "the proof of things not seen/' Proof is here taken for the effect of proof. Faith is thus distin- Qu. IV. 2, 3.] THE VIRTUE OF FAITH. 1G3 guished from all other things which pertain to the mind. "Proof" or evidence distinguishes it from opinion, sus- picion, and doubt, in which there is no firm adhesion of the mind to anything. " Things not seen " distinguishes it from knowledge and understanding. And, finally, "the substance of things hoped for " distinguishes the virtue of faith, from faith in general, which is not ordained for the beatitude hoped for. "We say, " the things hoped for," not '•'the things loved," for love may be of things seen, which cannot be the object of faith. Note, too, that evidence from the proper principles of the thing makes it to be (inwardly) seen ; not so the proof from Divine authority (except in a common figure of speech). Faith is primarily a virtue of the speculative intellect. For believing is primarily an act of the intellect, because the object of this act is the true, which properly pertains to the intellect. And therefore it is necessary that faith, which is the proper principle of this act, be there also. To faith succeeds vision ; " now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face." But vision is in the intellect, there- fore faith also is. The act of faith, indeed, as we have seen, proceeds from will also which moves to assent. Therefore both powers must be perfected by their respective habits, in order that the act of faith may be perfect in its kind. Living faith. The object of the will is the good, and the act of faith, as we have just seen, is ordained for this end. But this Divine good, which is the end of faith, is the proper object of char- ity. Therefore by charity the act of faith is perfected and "informed " (fides format a). Faith works through love. Dead faith and living faith are one so far as intellect is concerned ; but what distinguishes living faith is found in the will; i.e., the grace of charity. Fides formata is a virtue, for "we are justified by faith" 164 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. IV. 8. (Rom. v. 1). Since believing is the act of the mind assent- ing to the true under the command of the will, in order that the act may be perfect [i.e., proceed from virtue), two things are required: first, that the mind infallibly tend to the true; next, that the will be infallibly ordered with t to the ultimate end on account of which that assent is given. Both "t' tin-'' are found in the act at fides formata. For, first, faith i- directed to the true, since the false canimt be the ohject of true faith (see page 154) ; mxt, charity by which faith is " informed " (rendered liv- ing) directs the will to the good end. But dead faith is not a virtue, due,' ii lacks the due per- fection on the part of the will. Why is faith iirst among virtues {in order of genera- •Since, in things which are to be done, the end is their first principle, necessarily the theological virtues, which have 06 their object the ultimate end, are prior to other virtues lit' we speak of the perfeel virtues). But the ulti- mate end itself must be in the intelligence before it is in the will, because nothing can be willed which is not previ- ously cognized, apprehended by the mind. Hence, since the ultimate end is in the will, indeed, through hope and love, but in the intellect through faith, t he latter is neces- sarily first among virtues. Per accidens, however, other imperfect virtues may prepare the way for faith, as humil- ity may remove the pride which mak submit itself to the verities of the faith. Charity is the foundation of the spiritual edifice (Col. iii. 14), which binds all parts of it together; but thi3 does not make it first in order of generation. Is faith more certain than knowledge (scientia) and the other intellectual virtues ? Wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, the three intel- Qu. IV. 8.] THE VIRTUE OF FAITH. 165 lectual virtues which concern necessary truth, resemble faith in this, and are thus distinguished from prudence, which concerns contingent truths. The question before us plainly regards the three first, since prudence cannot have the same certitude in its object. Observe, also, that the same three names are applied to three of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. If, now, we speak of the three intellectual virtues as compared with faith, certitude is of two sorts : one depend- ing on the cause of certitude. That is more certain which has the more certain cause. In this way faith is more cer- tain (objectively), because it rests on Divine veracity ; but the three intellectual virtues rest on human reason. But certitude may be viewed (subjectively) on the side of the one who has it, and so that is said to be more certain which the mind of man more fully attains to ; and, in this way, since the things of faith are above human understanding, but the objects of the aforesaid virtues are not, faith, on this side, is less certain. (Not that one adheres less firmly to the first, but the mind cannot rest with an intellectual in- tuition of the truth beyond the reach of disturbing doubt.) But if we speak of the gifts, faith is their principle, and is presupposed, which renders faith more certain than they. (1) There can be no doubt in the three intellectual vir- tues, as there can be in the believing soul. But then this doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but in our- selves, as understanding does not fully attain to the objects of faith. (2) Cceteris paribus, sight is more certain than hearing, and faith comes by hearing (Bom. x. 17). So that it might seem as if faith had less certainty than the intellectual vir- tues have. But if he from whom we hear far exceeds us in power of sight, then hearing may be more certain than sight. A " layman " in science is apt to have more certainty from what scientific people tell him than from his own unassisted observations. And so man is more certain of what he hears 166 FAITH Axn ITS OPrOSITE VICES. [Qu. v. 3. from God, who cannot be deceived, than of what he sees by the light of his own reason (1 These, ii. 13). (3) Understanding is more perfect than faith, because through faith we arrive al understanding. But this greater manifestation in understanding and knowledge does not im- ply a more fixed adherence and certitude, because all their certitude as spiritual gifts proceeds from the certitude of faith. And, as intellectual virtues, they rest on the natural Light of reason, which falls short in certitude from the Word of God on which faith rests. Can he who disbelieves one article of the faith have dead faith {fides in/ormis) in the other articles .' In the heretic who rejeots one article of the faith remains neither living nor dead faith. The formal object of virtue being taken away — i.e., what makes it virtue — the virtue is destroyed. But the formal object of faith is primal truth as manifested in the Holy Scripture-;, and in the Leaching of the Church which proceeds from the primal verity mani- Boly Scriptures. Hence he who does not adhere to the doctrine of the Church as an infallible and Divine rule, has not the habit of faith, and if he hold any- thing which agr.es with articles of the faith, he does not hold it through faith, but in some other way. So a man may hold a scientific conclusion ; but if he have no scientific proof of it, it is his opinion, ami it is not science. But he who adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, assents to all which the Church teaches. But if he holds what he likes of Church teaching, and what he does not will to hold he does not hold, he adheres to his own will, not to the doctrine of the Church. Hence it is manifest that the heretic who pertinaciously rejects one article of the faith is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church. If this is not pertinaciously done, be is not a heretic, but is merely in error. But it is manifest that the heretic concerning one article of the faith has not faith Qu. VI. 1.] THE YIKTUE OF FAITH. 167 respecting the other articles, but only some opinion accord- ing to his own self-will. (There is only one mode of approach for all articles of the faith. In wilfully rejecting that mode of approach for one, it is virtually rejected for all.) He who has faith is prepared to believe explicitly all that is contained under it, but one may explicitly believe more than another. And, also, one may adhere to primal verity with more certitude than another, with more firmness, promptitude, devotion, or confidence. Is faith acquired, or is it infused by God? There are two recmisites for faith ; one, that credible things (things to be believed) be presented to man, in order that he may explicitly believe something; the other, assent of the believer to the things so presented. As regards the first, faith is necessarily from G-od, for the articles of faith exceed human reason, and so do not fall under man's cog- nition unless God reveal them ; to some immediately — e.g., apostles and prophets ; to others through the medium of preaching the Gospel (Eom. x. 15). But as regards assent, wo may find two causes, one out- ward, like miracles seen or the persuasive preaching of men : neither of which is sufficient, for one man believes, and another does not. Therefore, it is necessary to recog- nize another inward cause, which moves a man inwardly to assent to the things of faith. This cause is not man's free- will, as the Pelagians vainly talk, because in this assent man is raised above himself, and so there must be an inward supernatural cause moving him, which is God. Faith, indeed, comes by hearing, and it is voluntary, but the hearing is only of what is to be believed (not the cause of belief in it) ; and the will must be prepared by grace in order that it may be raised to what is above nature. (Eph. ii. 8): "By grace have ye been saved through faith; and that not of yourselves ; it is the gift of God/' 1G8 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. X. 1. The effects of faith are, from dead faith servile fear; from living faith filial, reverential fear ; purification of the soul from error by dead faith ; from all imparity by faith informed by love. To the virtue of faith correspond the spiritual gifts of understanding and knowledge (qu's. viii. and ix.). The tiiM is a supernatural light which man needs in order that in' may penetrate further in knowing what he could not know by natural light. X<»t that the very same things bc- lieved by faith an- understood through the gift ; bul things connected with the faith are better understood, though im- perfectly, ''Mi yel enough t<> know that apparent difficulties are no good reason for departing from the Eaith. This gift \- bestowed only on those who have already received justi- fying grace, "gratia gratum faciens" and clearer light is thrown on the objYcts of faith, making more explicit what is beli( Knowledgi lond gift, because the faithful for perfect assent of faith to what is revealed not only a char insight of understanding, bul also, in order thai be may not err in hi- tx lief, in and right judgment, dis- tinguishing what is of faith from what is not. This ie not discursive or argumentative, hut direct and simple. This definition of the gift of knowledge would lead us also to the gift of wisdom ; but we may make the distinction that the latter has reference to Divine things as such ; the former considers human things as connected with the faith. It knows what is to be believed on the earthly side of heavenly things. § 5. Infidelity, heresy, apostasy, and blasphemy Is unbelief a & There is an unbelief which is purely negative, the mere absence of positive faith. So viewed in those who have never heard of the faith, it is not sin, but rather the pen- Qi\ x . 2, 3.] INFIDELITY. 169 alty of sin, because such ignorance of Divine things is the fruit of our first parents' sin. Such infidels, if they are condemned, are condemned not on account of their infi- delity, but because of other sins which cannot be remitted without faith (S. John xv. 22). But there is also (a privative infidelity) an infidelity of contradiction, by which one resists or even despises the hearing of faith (Isa. liii. 1). This is perfect infidelity and is mortal sin (S. John iii. 18). (1) As every sin is against nature, so, although super- natural faith is not in human nature, yet that the mind of man should not resist its inward promptings and the out- ward preaching of the truth is certainly natural. (2) If you say that no one sins in what he cannot avoid, and therefore unbelief is no sin, you are speaking of purely negative unbelief. (3) Infidelity proper may be traced to the capital sin of pride, through which a man is unwilling to subject his intellect to a creed as the rule of faith (and to the teaching of a Church composed of fallible men like himself, no wiser, if so wise and learned, etc.). Infidelity is a sin of the intellect. Every sin, indeed, is in the (depraved) will, which com- mands all the acts of sin ; for every sin is voluntary. But sin has also its proper and proximate principle, which elicits the act of sin, as gluttony and lust are found in the con- cupiscible soul. But dissent, like assent, is the act of the mind as moved by the will. Therefore unbelief, like faith, has the intellect for its proximate subject, but the will as its prime mover. Contempt of the word preached, for example, has its cause in the will, but the unbelief pro- duced is in the intellect. Is unbelief the greatest of sins ? Since the essence of all sin is aversion from God, any sin 170 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. X. 4. is graver the more man through it is separated from God. But this is especially true of unbelief, since true knowledge of God is rejected ; but by falsehood respecting Him, one does not draw near to Him, but rather removes self from Him. The unbeliever's false opinion is not God at all. Thus it is manifest that infidelity is worse than sins which consist in perverse morality. It is otherwise with sins which are opposed to the theological virtues. (See page ISO.) (1) It does not follow that the unbelief of a heretic is than the immorality of a ( latholic Christian, for what is worse in kind may be rendered lighter by palliating cir- cumstances, as also the Bio of a Catholic may be aggravated by the circumstances of it. Although infidelity is wilful opposition to the faith, yei it may be joined with ignorance, which palliates it, especially when one, like Saul, the persecutor, docs not sin from malice ( 1 Tim. i. L3). (3) It is true, also, that sorer punishment falls on the faithful for their sins than on infidels (Heb. x. 29) ; but infidelity as sin may. nevertheless, deserve heavier punish- ment than any one sin of another kind. But the believer sins more gravely in any offence, cateris paribus, than the unbeliever, both because of his greater knowledge of the truth derived from the faith, and because he has received the sacraments of faith, which through his sin he tramples under foot. Is every action of the unbeliever sinful? We have seen that mortal sin takes away justifying grace ["gratia gratum faciens") (see pages 110, 115), but it does not totally corrupt the good of nature. Hence, since infidelity is a mortal sin, the infidel has not that grace, but natural good still remains in him. It is plain, then, that infidels cannot do those meritorious works which come from grace, but, in some way, they may do those good actions for Qu. XI.] HEEESY. 171 which nature is sufficient. It is not necessary, then, that they sin in whatever they may do. But whensoever any- thing is done from unbelief, then they sin. For as one who has faith can commit some sin in an act which he does not refer to the end of his faith, so also the infidel can do some good act in that which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief. Faith, indeed, directs the intention with respect to the supernatural end, but the light of natural reason can direct the intention with respect to some connatural good. : is it a species of infidelity 9 He who rightly holds the Christian faith, of his own will assents to Christ in those things which truly pertain to His doctrine ; and any one can deviate from the rectitude of Christian faith by refusing to assent to Christ. Such an one has an evil will respecting the end itself. This is the infidelity of those who reject the Church altogether, as heathen and Jews. Or, in another way, one may intend indeed to assent to Christ, but fail in choosing those things in which the assent is given. Heresy is this evil choice. The heretic does not choose those things which are truly delivered by Christ, but those which his own mind suggests to him. Therefore heresy is a species of infidelity pertain- ing to those who profess the faith of Christ, but corrupt its dogmas. (It may be defined as "pertinacious error mani- festly repugnant to the faith, in him who has professed that faith in its verity/') It is counted among the works of the flesh (Gal. v. 19), by reason of its remote cause, which is pride, cupidity, etc., the desire of some wrong end. This evil choice may be made in what directly and prin- cipally pertains to the faith, as the articles of the Christian creed ; or indirectly and secondarily, in those things from which follows the corruption of any article. Not all differences among theologians are to be called 172 FAITH ANI) ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XIII. 1, 2. heretical, because, as S. Augustine says (Ep. 43), "If any one defend his judgment, although it be false and per- verted, without pertinacious obstinacy, and seek the truth with careful solicitude, ready to be corrected (by it) when he shall have found it, by no means is he to be counted among heretics," because he makes no choice contradicting the doctrine of the Church. Differences, then, which arc not heretical may concern those things which will not affect the faith whichever way they are decided {e.g., the historical or scientific value of the Holy Scriptures), or those things which, though they are connected with the faith, have never been determined by the Church. (Articles against toleration of infidels and heretics are omitted. ) Aposli />•//. It is an aggravated form of infidelity, since it is a depart- ure from, a casting off of, the faith after it has been re- ceived (2 Pet ii. -.'1). Blasphemy: what is if ? Whoever denies of God anything which belongs to Him, or asserts respecting God that which does not belong to Him, derogates from the Divine goodness, for He is the very essence of goodness, and whatever, therefore, belongs to Him, pertains to His goodness. But this derogation from the Divine g todness may be only in the intellect, or it may be also accompanied by a certain detestation in the affec- tions (which constitutes the perfect sin of blasphemy). If this is found in the heart only, it is blasphemy of the heart ; if it is also uttered, it is blasphemy of the lips. It is a mortal sin, because it is repugnant to Divine char- ity, inasmuch as it is derogatory to the Divine goodness which is the object of charity. It may be venial sin only when one does not observe that he is speaking blasphemy, in sudden heat bursting out in words whose significance he does not consider. Qu. XV. l.J BLASPHEMY. 173 But in itself it is aggravated infidelity, because a detesta- tion of will is directed against the Divine honour. It is worse than homicide, because the latter is sin against our neighbour, but this is directly against God. Of course, if we speak of injurious effects, the case may be different, but the gravity of sin depends more upon the perversity of the will than on the effects of the action. The " sin against the Holy Ghost " takes various forms ; but, in general, we may understand it as a casting off in contempt that which might have hindered the choice of evil, as hope is rejected through despair, and godly fear through presumption. But all these hindrances to the choice of evil are the effects of the Holy Ghost in us. And this malicious wickedness is sin against the Holy Ghost. There are six forms of it : (1) despair, (2) presumption, (3) that impenitence which implies a purpose of remaining impenitent, (4) obstinate adherence to sin, (5) impugning of known truth in order that one may more freely sin, and (6) envy not only of a brother's prosperity but of the grace of God in him. Spiritual blindness and dulness of heart are vices opposed to spiritual knowledge and understanding . Mental blindness is privation of the principle of mental vision. Now this principle is three-fold : (1) The light of natural reason, of which the rational sonl is never de- prived, although it may be hindered from its proper activ- ity through impediments in lower mental powers which the mind needs for thought. (Note this view of ordinary forms of insanity.) (2) Another principle of mental vision is an habitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, and this light indeed is sometimes taken away from the soul. This is penal blindness, the light of grace being taken away as the penalty of sin. (3) Another principle of mental vision is a certain men- 174 FAITH AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XV. 2, 3. tal principle by which a man understands other things, at which principle the soul can aim, and is able not to aim. And tins not aiming at it is due sometimes to a will spon- taneously turning itself away from its consideration, of which the Psalmist speaks (Ps. xxxvi. 3). But sometimes, also, this blindness is due to mental preoccupation with things which are loved more, and this blindness of con- cupiscence, like the preceding, is sin. To understand the truth is, indeed, in itself agreeable to every one ; but it may become hateful, if a man is hindered thereby from things which he more loves. Instead of absolute moral blindness, there may be a dul- ;' moral feeling in the consideration of spiritual goods, and both are opposed to that gift of spiritual understand- ing through which man apprehends and knows spiritual goods, and keenly penetrates into their deepest recesses. And this dnlness of vision is sin just so far as it is directly or indirectly voluntary, as in him who, strongly affected towards carnal pleasures, feels disgust for spiritual things, or neglects them. These are especially the sinful fruits of fleshly sins, be- t he soul is most strongly drawn to that in which it finds the intensest pleasure, and consequently the mind is bled with respect to spiritual things ; while, on the other hand, the opposite virtues of abstinence and chastity especially dispose a man's soul for spiritual activity. And this is more or less true even of those who have a natural gift or an acquired habit of intellectual speculation. CHAPTER II. HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. § 1. Hope. Why is hope a virtue f Virtue has already been defined in Aristotle's words, as "that which makes him who has it good, and renders his work good " (Eth. Nic, ii. 5). Therefore, wherever any good act of man is found, some human virtue corresponds thereto. But in all things which are subject to rule and measure, the good depends on their attaining that proper rule ; as we call a coat good which neither exceeds nor falls short of the due measure. But we have seen (see page 80) that there is a two-fold measure of human acts, one proximate and homogeneous with those acts, sc, reason; another, supreme and transcendent, sc, God. And on this account every human act which attains to reason or to God is a good act. But the act of hope, of which we are now speaking, attains to God. For the object of the natural passion of hope is future good, difficult of attainment, yet possible to be had. Now, anything is possible for us either through our own selves or through others. But in so far as we hope for anything as possible to us through Divine aid, our hope attains to God, on whose aid it rests. And so it is plain that such hope is a virtue, since it makes a man's act good, attaining to its due rule and measure. (Define this theological virtue, then, as " a habit of soul, Divinely in- fused, through which with sure confidence we expect to obtain the spiritual good of eternal life by Divine aid.") This hope is not the natural passion (though grounded in that), but a spiritual habit, purely the gift of grace. 176 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Q,V. XVII. 2, 5. What is the proper object of hope ? The apostle answers when he says (Ileb. vi. 19) that hope " enters into that which is within the veil." It attains to God, in resting on Ilis aid for the obtaining of the hoped- for good. Now the effect must be proportioned to its cause. And therefore the good which properly and principally wo ought to hope from God, is infinite good, since that is pro- portioned to the power of Him who aids us. But this good, is eternal life, which consists in the fruition of God Him- self. For not less is to be hoped from Him than He Him- self is, since His goodness by which He communicates blessing to nis creatures is not less than His infinite es- sence. Therefore, the proper and principal object of hope is eternal beatii iide. (1) But how can man hope for what exceeds the desire of his soul? (1 Cor. ii. 9). I answer I hat man at present cannot perfectly know what beatitude is ; but he can ap- prehend it under the general notion of perfect good, and so he can hope for it; and thus his hope '''enters into that which is within the veil." (2) But prayer interprets hope, and we can lawfully pray for the goods of this present life, both spiritual and tem- poral goods, and for deliverance from evils, which will not exi-t in the eternal beatitude. But whatever other good things we ask from God, we are bound to ask with reference to eternal beatitude. And so, besides its principal object, hope may have objects derived from this and dependent on it. In a similar manner Ave regarded the virtue of faith. Through love one may hope and desire for another as for himself. Why is hope a theological virtue? It is a virtue from its attaining the supreme rule of human actions, which it attains both as that rule is its primal efficient cause, on whose aid it rests ; and as that rule is its ultimate final cause, and it expects beatitude in Qu. xvii. 6, 7, 8.] HOPE. 177 the fruition of that end. Hope's object, then, as virtue, is chiefly God. And in this consists the notion of theological virtue, that it has God for its object. (See page 69.) Hope, therefore, is a theological virtue. If other good things are expected by it, this is in relation to God as their ultimate end, or from God as their efficient cause. There are moral virtues also which are based on expecta- tion, on patient waiting, but hope's distinguishing charac- teristic is its expectation of Divine aid. God is the object of all the theological virtues, but in dif- ferent manner. Love makes man cleave to God for His own sake ; hope, as the source of eternal beatitude for us ; faith, as the source of truth. In the creed of faith you say : "I look for the life of the world to come," wherein the act of faith is manifested by the act of hope. If we speak of the order of theological virtues, we must distinguish betioeen the natural order of generation in which the imperfect precedes the perfect, and the {rational) order of perfection. In the first way faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity. It is necessary, if one hope for anything, that it be presented to him as possible of attainment. Now the objects of hope are eternal beatitude and Divine aid. And each of these is proposed to us by faith, which makes known that we can reach eternal life, and that Divine aid for this has been prepared on our behalf. " He that comes to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that seek after Him " (Heb. xi. 6). Hope also brings in charity, inasmuch as one who hopes to be rewarded by God is induced to love Him and keep His commandments. But, in the order of perfection, love is prior. Perfect love, which cleaves to God for His own sake, renders hope 12 178 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XX. 1. more perfect, for we hope most from those who are our friends. This is " spes formata," in which one hopes from God because He loves and is loved. The act of hope belongs to the " appetitive " soul, because it is a seeking after the good ; but it docs not per- tain to the sense-appetite, because the object is nut sensible good, but Divine good. Along with this virtue maybe considered the spiritual gift of godly fear (qu. xix.). We may fear that which is evil, or thai from which the evil proceeds. In the first way, God cannol be feared. In the second wa\ Ee can. This evil proceeding from God, evil secundum quid, though good simply, is the evil of punishment, "malum imnw" which is the ground of servile fear, in which one (urns to God through fear of His judgments. Or, with filial fear one ma) dread separation from G-od through his own fault, '• malum culpa" or, again, there may be thai worldly fear which the Lord prohibited as evil (S. Matt. x. 28), in which, through love of the world and dread of worldly loss, one departs from the service of God. It is filial fear which is the gift of the Holy Spirit, like the other spiritual gifts, a certain habitual perfection of the soul, by which it is made prompt to follow the guidance of the Holy Ghost, just as moral virtues render the passions prompt to follow reason. § 2. Vices opposed to hope : despair and presumption. 7s despair a sin ? It is a noteworthy remark of Aristotle's (Nic. Eth., vi. 2), that seeking and aversion in the will correspond to affirma- tion and negation in the intellect. And good and evil in the latter correspond Avith the true and the false in the former. And, therefore, every motion of desire which is conformed to the truth of the reason is in itself good, and Qu. xx. 2.] DESPAIR. 179 every motion of desire which follows the false is in itself evil and sin. But the true thought of the mind concerning God is that from Him come our salvation and pardon for sinners (Ezek. xviii. 23). And the false opinion is that He denies pardon to the penitent, or that He does not turn sin- ners to Himself by justifying grace. And as hope which is conformed to correct estimation of God is laudable and virtuous, so the opposite, which is despair based on a false estimation of God, is vicious and a sin. Every mortal sin whatsoever is some kind of aversion from the infinite Good ; but the sins which are opposed to the theological virtues consist, primarily and chiefly, in this aversion, as hatred of God, despair and infidelity, because the theological virtues have God for their direct object ; and he that deserts God necessarily turns himself to some changeable good. But other sins consist principally in the turning to such good, and, consequently, in aversion from God. For the sensualist does not intend to depart from God, but to enjoy his pleasure ; from which follows the aversion from God. Fear of God is good ; yet indirectly evil fruit may pro- ceed from a good root, when one uses the good in a bad way, taking occasion for despair from his servile fear. Does despair necessarily imply infidelity ? The latter belongs to reason, the former to the will. But reason considers universals, while the will is moved to par- ticular things. Now, one can have a correct estimation of universal principles, while his estimation of particulars is corrupt. His general judgment necessarily proceeds to the desire of some particular thing through the medium of some particular judgment ; and hence it is that one may have a right faith in general, while his will fails in the particular thing, his estimation of that particular thing being cor- rupted by habit or by passion, One may rightly believe in the forgiveness of sins in Holy Church, yet give up to 180 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XX. 3, 4. despair; sc, that in his present state there is no hope of pardon for him in particular. According to their specific character the gravest sins are those which are opposed to the theological virtues. These have God for their object ; those are direct aversion from God. Such sins are infidelity, hatred of God, and despair. In themselves the two former are even graver than the last. For infidelity comes from rejecting the veracity of God; hat nil, from a will opposed to the Divine good- ness; despair, from the want of hope that one will be a sharer in thai g Iness. The two former, therefore, are directly againsl God as Be is in Eimself; the last, as His goodness is participated by as. Bat, on our side, despair is more dangerous, because by hope we are recalled from evils, and led to seek for u r 1 : but hope being taken away, nun rush into unbridled vices and are held back from efforts for good. Causes of the mortal sin of despair. We have seen (page 175) that the object of hope is good difficult of attainment, but possible to be obtained through one's own efforts or by another's aid. Hope of beatitude, then, may fail in either of two ways : either that felicity is not regarded as such a good, or it is deemed unattainable. If our affections are corrupted by the love of sensual pleas- ures, spiritual good things are distasteful, and are not hoped for as difficult goods. So lust (luxuria) produces despair. But, on the other hand, spiritual sloth (" acedia") casts down the soul so that the difficult good is viewed as unat- tainable. So this capital sin produces despair.* * This mortal sin of despair caused by lust or spiritual sloth should bo distinguished from what may outwardly resemble it : (a) the scru- pulous conscience which is always finding difficulties in the way of salvation that cast down the mind, and tend to obscure its hope ; (b) Qu. xxi. 1.] PRESUMPTION - . 181 Presumption : zvhat is its object ? Presumption implies unwarranted, immoderate hope. Now, hope is of what is possible, and that possibility refers either to one's own powers, or to the Divine aid. There are, then, two kinds of presumption : one, by which any one is seeking some good as possible for himself, though it exceed his powers ; another, by which any one is seeking some good as possible through the power and mercy of God, when it is not possible — e.g., he hopes to obtain pardon without repentance, or glory without deserving it. But this kind of presumption is a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, since by it is taken away or despised the aid of the Holy Ghost by which man is recalled from sin. (1) Does there seem to be greater presumption in trust- ing to one's own powers than in trusting to Divine power ? But the gravest sin is sin against God. Hence, the pre- sumption which inordinately rests on God is graver sin than that which trusts to one's own power. For it is dero- gating from God when one expects to obtain through His aid what it is unworthy of God to bestow. He sins more gravely who diminishes the holiness of God than he who exalts his own powers. (2) Is it objected that other sins arise from sin against the Holy Ghost, and that self-confidence, which is rooted in self-love, is the source of many sins rather than presump- tion respecting God's mercy ? And so, that it is the first kind of presumption which is sin against the Holy Ghost. But inordinate presumption respecting God includes self- love by which one inordinately desires his own good. For what we greatly desire we deem easy of attainment through others' aid, even when that is not possible. (3) Presumption in Divine mercy is true aversion from what is not infrequent in our age, incipient ' ' melancholia " taking a religious form, and perplexing the family and the priest, who have not detected the approach of insanity. 182 HOPE AXD ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XXI. 2, 4. God, because it attributes to God what is unworthy of His holy nature. Briefly, as from despair one despises the Divine mercy on which hope rests, so from presumption one despises the Divine justice which punishes sinners. But both mercy and justice are in God. Therefore, as despair is inordinate aversion from God, so presumption is inordinate turning to Him (which is true aversion from some part of the infinite good. See (3) above). Is presumption a sin .' What was said with respect to sin is once more to be repeated ; sc. t thai every act of will which conforms to falsehood in the intellecl is in itself evil and a sin (page 179). J'-iii presumption is such an act. For as it is false that be penitent, or thai He does uot turn sin- ners to repentance, so it is false thai He grants pardon to those who persevere in sin, and that He glorifies those who from g .1 works. On which false estimation pre- sumption is based. Therefore it is a sin, less in its kind, pair is, since it is God's " property always to h aye mercy " and " to forgive sins " rather than to punish them, because of His infinite goodness ; for that belongs to His nature, but this to His justice according to our sins. Note thai this presumption is not excess of hope, hoping too much of God ; for it is hoping to obtain from God what is unworthy of His holiness, which is even hoping less from Him, because it is detraction from Him. The source of presumption is the capital sin of pride or vainglory. Self-presumption, inordinate trust in one's own powers, is manifestly the child of vainglory. And inordinate trust in the power or mercy of God comes from pride, when one thinks himself of so much consequence that God will not punish his sins, or exclude him from glory. Qu. xxii.] PEECEPTS OF HOPE. 183 Precepts of hope and fear. Of the precepts which are found in the Holy Scriptures some belong to the substance of Divine law, and some are preambles to that law. The latter are presupposed, because, if they did not exist, there would be no place found for law (none would be subject to that law for whom it should be promulged). Of this nature are precepts of faith and hope, because by the act of faith the mind of man is led to recog- nize the authority of the author of the law, and by hope of reward man is led to obedience. But those precepts are of the substance of the law itself, which are given to one already subject to the law, and ready to obey it ; they per- tain to rectitude of life. But precepts of hope and faith were not set forth as precepts, because, if man did not already believe and hope, the law would be set forth in Yain. (Note that faith in God being presupposed, through which the human mind is submitted to God, commandments can be given concerning other things which are to be believed, as is apparent in the New Law of the Gospel. See qu. xvi., omitted above.) But as the precept of faith was prefixed to the proclama- tion of the law — sc, "I am the Lord .thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt" (Ex. xx. 2) ; and "Hear, Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord " (Deut. vi. 4)— so also the precept of hope in the first giving of the law was in the form of promises attached to the second and the fifth com- mandments. For he that promises rewards to the obedient, by that very thing incites them to hope. But when the law is once imposed, men are urged to ob- serve its preambles, as in Ps. lxii. 8 : "0 put your trust in Him alway, ye people ; pour out your hearts before Him, for God is our hope." (1) Nature sufficiently inclines to good proportioned to human nature, but man must be inclined to hope for super- natural good both by promises and by admonitions or pre- cepts. And yet even for that to which natural reason tends, 184 HOPE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. XXII. 2. precepts of Divine law are necessary for the sake of greater firmness in them, and because reason is apt to be clouded by sinful concupiscences. (2) Prohibition of opposite sins must of course be under- stood whenever the law in any manner incites to hope or faith. The same tilings may be said of fear. But we must remember the distinction between servile fear, the fear of penalties, and Glial fear which springs from love. The first giving of the law did not command fear, but it threatened penalties on the violators of law. (Sec the Second Commandment.) But filial fear and love are pream- bles to the acta which the law commands. So it was said (Dent. x. 12), "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of Thee, bnl to fear the Lord thj God, to walk in all His ways, and to love IIim?"etc. These are the principles common to the whole law. And this injunction to fear suffices to exclude presumption (its opposite vice). CHAPTER III. CHAEITY. § 1. Charity in general view. Wliat is charity ? The Lord said (8. John xv. 15), " No longer do I call you servants, but I have called you friends.-" This friendship is charity. Note the distinction between love of friendship, which is love of benevolence, when we so love any one that we wish for his good, and love of concupiscence, when we do not seek the good of the things loved, but seek their good for ourselves. Thus one may love wine, or a horse. For it is absurd to say that one has friendship for wine or for his horse (except by a sentimental personification). But benevolence alone is not sufficient for friendship ; a certain mutual affection is requisite also ; each loves the other (S. Johnxiv. 21 : "He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father, and I will love him "). But such mu- tual benevolence is founded on some fellowship. And such communion there is between man and God, according as He communicates His blessedness to us (1 Cor. i. 9). Love founded on this communion is charity, a certain friendship between man and God. (1) Charity is now imperfect, because although our spir- itual " conversation is in heaven," yet it is very imperfect. (2) If this definition is correct, how, then, can one have charity for his enemies ? I answer that friendship may ex- tend to any one on his own account, in which way it can reach only our friends. But friendship may also extend itself to another in respect of some other person. If one loves 186 CHARITY. [XXIII. 2. another man, on account of that love he loves what pertains to him, as his children or servants. And the love of a friend can he so great, that for the sake of that friend those who pertain to him are loved even though they offend us or hate us. And after this manner the love of charity may extend even to enemies, whom out of charity we love in their rela- tions to God, to whom is chiefly directed this love of charity. In this way it is possible that sinners be loved. Ts cha rity an infused habit in the soul (or is it simply the operation of the Holy Ghost in and through the soul) ? The motion of charity docs not so proceed from the Holy (ihost moving the human bouI that it is only moved and is in no way the principle of that motion, like an inanimate bodj propelled by external force. For that is contrary to the idea of the voluntary which has its principle in itself. V>t "iily avoids being drawn into hatred od account of the injury done to him, but also through benefits he aims to draw his enemy into loving him. | 4. The order of charity. Charity tends towards God as the source of beatitude, and, therefore, there is an order in charity depending on the relation of other things to the first principle of this love, which is God. Is God to be loved more than our neighbour ? (Xote that this love is esteem, not necessarily intensity of love.) Every friendship chiefly regards that in which is chiefly found the good in whose communication the friend- ship is grounded. But the friendship of charity is grounded on the communication of beatitude which essentially is in God, from Him derived to all who are capable of it. God, therefore, is to be loved in the first place, as the cause of beatitude ; but our neighbour, as participating along with us in that beatitude so derived. And the Lord said (8. Luke xiv. 26), "If any man come to Me, and hate not his Qu. XXVI. 3.] THE OEDEE OF CHAEITY. 203 father and mother — he cannot be My disciple/' Neigh- bours, then, are to be hated if they lead away from God — i.e., God out of cbarity is to be loved more than they. (1) But S. John says (1 Ep. iv. 20), "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen ?" Sight is the cause of love as a medium of acquiring it. Not that anything is lovely be- cause it is visible, but because through vision we are led to love. Not that that which is more visible is to be more loved, but it is the first to meet our love. So argues the apostle. For our neighbour is the first object which meets our love, and if any one love not him, it may be argued that he does not love God, not because his neighbour is more worthy of love, but because he is its first object. (2) Likeness is cause of love, and there is greater simili- tude between man and man than between man and God. But the latter is prior, and the cause of the former. Par- ticipating from God in that which our neighbour also has from Him, we are made like our neighbour. This, there- fore, is an argument for loving God the most. (3) But is not God loved in our neighbour ? Yes ; but our neighbour has not that goodness which is the ground of love essentially, but only by participation. (Inferior goodness is the reason for inferior love.) /Should man out of charity love God more than he loves We can receive two goods from God — the good of nature, and the good of grace. On the communication of the first is founded natural love, by which not only man in his sound, natural condition loves God above all things, but so does also every creature after its manner, tending to the common good of the whole, rather than to its own individ- ual good. Much more is this true in the love of charity, which is founded on the communication of the gifts of grace. 204 CHARITY. [Qu. xxvi. 4. Therefore, man ought to love God, who is the common good of all, above himself, because beatitude is in God, as in the common fount, for all who can participate in it. (1) It may be asserted that anything is loved as being one's own good, and therefore self, which is the cause of the loving, is more Loved. And it is true that the part loves the good of the whole, according as that good is convenient for Lfcself : bnl yet it docs not refer that good of the whole to itself (selfishly), but it refers itself to the good of the whole. (2) Again, it may be .-aid that in loving the fruition of God one loves himself, Bince this is the highest good which one can wish for himself. But love of desire is not love of friendship, and towards (iud the latter is greater than the former, because greater is the good which lie is, than the good in which we can participate through eternal joys. Should man out of charity love himself more than he loves his neighbour .' The Lord said (S. Matt. xxii. 39), ''Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Love of self, then, is the exemplar, the pattern, of love for our neighbour. But the pattern is more than that which is patterned after it. Therefore, man should love himself more than he loves his neighbour. Man is said to love himself, because his spiritual nature is the object of his love (see page 48). And after this man- ner man ought to love himself the most after God. Consider the very idea of this love. God is loved as the source of good on which is founded the love of charity. But man loves himself out of charity, as he is a participator of that good, but his neighbour is loved as an associate in that good. But such association is the reason of love according to a cer- tain union in relation to God. But unity is more powerful than union, and that man himself participates in Divine good is a more potent reason for loving than that another is associated with him in that participation. And a further Qu. XXVI. 5.] THE ORDER OF CHARITY. 205 proof that man ought to love himself more than his neigh- bour is that man ought not to incur any sin (even the slight- est venial sin) which is a hindrance to the participation of beatitude, in order to deliver his neighbour (or any number of neighbours) from sin. (1) A man ought to bear corporeal losses for his neigh- bour, but in this very thing he spiritually loves himself more, because this pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a spiritual good. (2) Why, then, is it said that " Charity seeketh not her own"? (L Cor. xiii. 5). Because, I answer, she seeks the common good, preferring that to her own proper good. Ought man to love his neighbour more than his own hody ? That is to be more loved out of charity which has more fully the idea of a "lovable object." But association in beatitude, which is the reason for loving our neighbour, is a greater reason for loving than such share of beatitude as indirectly belongs to the body, which is the reason for extending the love of charity to our own body. Therefore, the salvation of our neighbour's soul is more to be loved than our own body. (1) Our body, indeed, is nearer to our soul than our neighbour is ; but as regards the participation of beatitude, his soul is nearer ours than our own body is. (2) But, it is said, each one exposes that which he loves less, for that which he loves more, and every man is not bound to expose his own body for the safety of his neigh- bour, for this belongs to the perfect in charity, as the Lord said (S. John xv. 13) : " Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." But I answer that every one has the care of his own body, and every one has not the care of his neighbour's salvation, ex- cept in case of necessity. Therefore, it is not essential to charity that one offer his body for the salvation of his neigh- 206 cnARlTT. [Qu. xxvi. G. bour except where he is bound to provide for it. That he should freely offer himself pertains to the perfection of charity. (Every one is bound by charity to succour his neighbour in extreme spiritual necessity, even with certain peril of death, if there be hope of benefit thereby.) It is plain from this that those who have the cure of souls are bound to run any risk of pestilence, etc., for the grave spiritual necessity of those under their charge. But where there is do official duty, charily may gain for one a double reward. Are all neighbours to be loved equally .' Some have said that all are to be equally loved inwardly out of charity according to the affection of the heart, hut not as regards outward effects of it ; that greater benefits are due to those who are nearer. But this is a mistake. For the inclination, whether of nature or of grace, is pro- portioned to the things which are to be done through it. We niu-i have Lntenser alTection of charity to those whom we ought to benefit the more. According to the affection of the soul on- neighbour is to he loved more than another. And the reason is that since there are two principles of low — viz., God, and the one who loves — love necessarily varies according to the propinquity of the one who is loved to one or other of these two principles. Again, the degree of lose is to be measured by the gravity of sins against love. But he sins more grievously who acts against the love of some neighbours than he who offends against others. And the Old Law says (Lev. xx. 9), " He that curseth father or mother shall be put to death." This is not commanded against all who curse others. Therefore we ought to love some neighbours more than others. (1) In one way all are to be loved equally, viz., that we desire eternal beatitude for all ; but equal intensity of love is not due to all alike. Inequality in beneficence, also, must be observed, because we cannot do good to all. But Qu. XXVI. 8.] THE OKDEE OF CHAEITT. 207 in good-will such inequality has no place. We can wish equal beatitude for all, though not with equal intensity of love. (2) Some also are nearer to God through greater good- ness, and such are to be more loved for that reason. Ought we to love our relatives more than better men ? S. Paul seems to say so, when he says (1 Tim. v. 8), ' ' If any provideth not for his own, and specially his own household, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel." Love, like every activity, takes its specific char- acter from its object, but its intensity from the one who loves. But the object of the love of charity is God ; the one who loves is man. Therefore the specific diversity of love of charity which distinguishes it from natural emotion depends on the loving our neighbours in relation to God; sc, that out of charity we will greater good for him who is nearer God. For although that good is one in itself, viz., eternal beatitude, still it has different grades in the diverse participation of it. And it pertains to charity to desire that the justice of God bear rule., <• id that the better par- ticipate more perfectly in beatitude But the intensity of the love depends on the one who loves, and charity more intensely desires good for those who are nearest than it desires greater good for better men. Again, out of charity I can wish that he who is conjoined to me by earthly bonds be better than another, and so attain to higher beatitude. Again, out of charity we may love in various ways those united to us by earthly bonds. For with those not so conjoined we have only the friend- ship of charity ; but with relatives, we have other kinds of friendship. But when the good on which that other friendship is founded is ordained to the end of charity, charity itself may command the act of that other friendship {e.g., love of man and wife). Thus the loving another be- cause he is a blood-relation or united otherwise, or because 208 CHARITY. [Qu. XXVI. 8. he is a fellow-citizen, may be commanded by charity ; and so from charity both eliciting and commanding in various ways, we love those united to us more than better men. (1) But there may be grounds of hating in some manner those connected with us (S, Luke xiv. 2G), whereas the good can in no way be hated. I reply that we are not bidden to hate those nearest to us because of their connec- tion, but as they keep ns away from God ; so far they are enemies, uoi relatives (Mic. vii. 6). Bnt God loves more those who are better, and charity makes us mosl like to God. I answer, yes; in due propor- tion — \iz., thai man .-hall be -> related to what is his, as - related bo what is Bis. And some things charity may had as to will, as Buitable Eor us, which God does not will, because it is not holy and righteous that He should will them. (3) But by natural affection we love more those who are more clos fly united to US, as parents and children ; whereas charity i.s founded on the communion of beatitude, in which better men have the larger share. Yes ; but charity not only elicits the act of love according to the character of its object, but also according to the state of the one who loves. Should /r< loved the most ? It has been shown that out of charity those who are more united to us are to be loved more, both because they are loved more intensely, and because they are loved for more reasons. The intensity depends upon the union. And therefore the love of diverse persons is to be measured ac- cording to the diverse nature of the union ; each one is to be loved more in that which pertaius to the fellowship ac- cording to which he is loved. And love is to be compared with love, as fellowship is compared with fellowship. Thus, then, the friendship of kindred is founded on common origin, but that of fellow-citizens on civil communion, etc. And therefore in those things which pertain to nature, we Qu. XXVI. 11.] THE ORDER OF CHARITY. 209 ought more to love our kindred ; but in those things which pertain to civil life, our fellow-citizens, etc. But if we compare one fellowship with another, it is evident that natural kinship is prior and more permanent ; but other unions supervene on that and can be removed. And there- fore love of kindred is the more lasting ; but other friend- ships can be more potent in that which is proper to each of them. (1) But friends are made by free choice and judgment. Yes ; and therefore such friendship preponderates where we have our choice in what we are to do along with them. But kinship is more stable, since it exists by nature and pre- vails in that which belongs to nature. "We are more bound to assist kindred in need than we are to aid near friends. (2) If spiritual children have higher claims as regards the communication of grace, children by nature have higher claims for bodily assistance. And note that in the Decalogue parents are named as the nearest by blood, and therefore the nearest in affec- tion. (Looking at love objectively, S. Thomas finds ground for loving a father above a child ; but subjectively— i.e., on the side of the one who loves — he reverses this view. Also he places father above mother in the order of filial love.) Should a man love his wife more than father or mother ? S. Paul (Eph. v. 28) says that husbands ought " to love their wives as their own bodies." But a man ought to love his neighbour more than his own body, and parents are near- est neighbours. So it might be argued that parents are to be loved more than wife. This needs examination. The degree of love depends, on the one hand, on the idea of the good ; on the other, on the degree of union with the one who loves. According to the first, parents are to be more loved, because the good in the parental relation is preemi- nent. But according to the second, the wife has the prefer- 14 210 CHARITY. [QU. XXVI. 11. ence, for husband and wife arc " one flesh " (S. Matt. xix. C). We conclude that the wife is to be loved more in- tensely, but greater reverential love is due to parents. But why do the Scriptures say that a man " shall leave father and mother" for his wife ? (Gen. ii. 24.) This is said of cohabitation, not of abandonment in all respects, for in certain respects a man's first duly is still to his parents. The word "as " in Eph. v. 28 is not an adverb of equal- ity, but it gives the reason for the Love of her who is most <■]..-■ I\ conjoined to one's Belf. i A similar new is adopted with respect to benefactors and those who receive benefits ; the latter have before them the good as the objeel of love : the former are more closely united to the object of benefaction.) In the Christian's fatherland God will be first in love, by uninterrupted action. And in that perfect conformity of the human will to the Divine, as regards the good which each wishes for each, the best will be best loved, in the wish that they may most perfectly enjoy the common beatitude. He will be regarded as nearest neighbour who i- nearest to God. But self will be most intensely loved, since each one will, first of all, direct all his powers towards God. And this pertains to self-love. (I do not find this char and satisfactory. — J. J. E.) That provision of love by which each one is bound to succour kindred in their need will cease, and bo far the inclination of charity towards them. But still, in the fatherland, one may love his kin- dred in various ways, for the causes of honourable love will not come to an end. But incomparably above all these reasons for love will be the nearness to God. Nature is not taken away by glory, but perfected. (Seven acts or effects of charity may be distinguished : first and chief, love ; then three internal acts, joy, peace, and mercy ; then three outward acts or kind deeds in general ; sc, "beneficence," alms-giving, and brotherly correction. Qu. xxvii. 2, 3, 5.] LOVE. 21 i The first four -will be abridged from the author's fuller statements.) § 5. Love. Is love (dilectio), as the act or effect of charity, the same as benevolence ? Benevolence, as the word intimates, is the act of the will by which we will another's good. But this, even when founded in judgment, may exist without true love. Spir- itual love, as distinguished from the passion in the sense-ap- petite, implies a union of affections, so that the one who loves regards the one who is loved as in a certain way one with himself or as belonging to himself, which is not implied in benevolence. Love, then, includes the other, but adds to it. God is to be loved out of charity for Himself alone. That is, He is the ultimate final cause of all, and there is nothing beyond Him on account of which we may love Him. Again, His goodness is Himself, underived, and the exemplar and source of all goodness in other beings. He cannot, properly speaking, be loved on account of His goodness, because He is goodness. But, again, from other sources the love of God for Himself alone may spring up in the heart ; thus He may be loved because of benefits received or rewards promised (1 S. John iv. 19). How can we "love God with all our heart"? (Deut. vi. 5.) If we speak of loving God wholly, we may have one of three different things in mind : (1) We may mean that everything which pertains to God is loved ; (2) we may mean what is commanded above, that we love God with all our power of love, and ordain all things which fall under our power with reference to that love, both of which we can and ought to do ; or (3) we may refer to the object 212 CHARITY. [QU. XXVII. 7. of love, and speak of loving in a manner adequate to the object of love. This, of course,, in this case is impossible. For God's goodness is infinite and infinitely lovely. There is no limit to that love. The more God is loved, the better is that love. There can be no excess in it. Is it more meritorious />> love an enemy than to love a friend? Remember that God is the ground <>f our loving our neighbour out of charity. Loving an enemy, then, and loving a friend, may he compared in two ways, either on the side of the neighbour who is loved, or on the side of the reason for loving him. In the first way, the love of a friend i~ superior because a friend is better and more united with us. Here is a more suitable object for love, and the love i< therefore better, as. also, its opposite is worse. For it is worse to hate a friend than to bate an enemy. Ami since it is better to love the bitter, and a friend is better than an enemy, so far it is more m. ritorious to love a friend. But now, on the other hand, let us consider the reason ring. First, we see thai some other reason than God may produce the love of a friend ; but the love of an enemy is due to God only as the reason for it. And, in the next place, even if we suppose that both are loved for sake, the love of God is stronger when it extends more widely, even to the loving of our enemies. So that is the hottest fire whose influence is felt the most widely. The stronger love fulfils the more difficult things. But as the fire acts more powerfully on the nearer objects, so charity more fervently loves those who are joined in bonds of love. In this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more fervent and is better than the love of enemies. Why, then, did the Lord say (S. Matt. v. 40), "If ye love them that love you, what reward have ye ?" I answer that the love of friends is there regarded in itself — i.e., their being loved because they are friends, which has Qu. xxvni.] JOY. 213 no reward with God. And this seems to be the case whenever friends are so loved that enemies are not loved. Is it more meritorious to love our neighbour than to love God ? In such a comparison as that, we may consider each love in itself, and so viewed, there is no doubt that the love of God is more meritorious. For the reward is promised to that on its own account. The ultimate reward is the frui- tion of God, and the Lord said (S. John xiv. 21), "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, . . . and I will manifest Myself unto him." But again, in this comparison, we may, on the one hand, consider God as being the only object of love, and compare that with the love of our neighbour, which is for God's sake. Such love includes the love of God, while the love of God did not include the love of our neighbour. That is, perfect love of God, which extends itself to our neigh- bour, is compared with insufficient and imperfect love. In this sense, the love of our neighbour is superior. For " this commandment have we from God, that he who loveth God, love his brother also" (1 Ep. S. John iv. 21). But is it not easier, more natural, to love God ? And is not the more difficult task of loving one's neighbour therefore meritorious ? I reply that the good has more to do with virtue and merit than difficulty has. Not every more difficult task is more meritorious, but only when it is more difficult because it is better. § 6. Joy. Spiritual joy is caused, in the first place, by the Divine good considered in itself ; for what we love, we rejoice in seeing to possess its proper good. Or, again, the joy is caused by the participation of that Divine good, the pres- ence of that which is loved in the soul. The first is bet- ter, and the special effect of charity. If what is loved were 214 CHARITY. [QlJ. xxix. altogether absent, sorrow would be the effect of charity ; but there is a presence through grace, which is the cause of joy. The Lord said, indeed, ''blessed are they that mourn," etc. But this mourning for what is opposed to the loved good has the same ground with the joy in that good itself. The Divine good considered in itself is the cause of the unmingled spiritual joy of charity (Phil. iv. 4) ; but that joy which results from participation in that infinite good can be mingled with sorrow, because that participation can be impeded either in ourselves or in our neighbour, whom we love as ourself. The plenitude of joy cannot be looked for in this life, for desire always continues, seeking to draw nearer to God through grace. And so long as desire is not fully satisfied, the rest of spiritual joy in all its perfection is not attained. We i:.u-t qoI regard joy as a separate virtue, but as an act, an effect, or a fruit of charity. And it is the subject of Divine precept because it is an act of charity. £ 7. Peace. Peace is more than concord. It embraces that and more Wherever peace is found, there is concord ; but concord may be found where peace does not exist. For concord is relative to others; it means the harmony of di- verse wills agreeing with one consent. But the heart of one man also is distracted, both by the conflict of diverse desires (Gal. v. 17. " The flesh lusteth against the spirit"), and by the same desire seeking for diverse objects which cannot be at once possessed. But there must be inward as well as outward harmony to constitute that peace of which we now are speaking. Wars and dissensions are not sought for as an ultimate end, but as means for a more perfect peace. This inward and outward peace is the effect of charity ; for when God is loved with the whole heart, and all things Qu. xxx. 2.] MERCY AND PITY. 215 are referred to Him, there is inward harmony of ail desires. And when our neighbour is loved as ourself, his will is sought for as our own. Friends will the same things. This outward peace does not, in this life, where there is imperfect knowledge of the truth, imply perfect concord of opinions, but only concord in the chief goods of our spirit- ual life. Dissension, then, in little things and in opinions, like that of SS. Paul and Barnabas (Acts xv.), is not repug- nant to the peace of charity. For opinions pertain to judg- ment, which precedes desire. It is the latter where the concord is to be sought for. Again, where there is concord in the chief goods, dissension respecting trifles is not contrary to charity, for that dissension comes from diversity of opin- ions, where one judges the matter of dissension to pertain to the good in which all agree, while the judgment of the other holds the contrary opinion. Such dissension is op- posed to the perfect peace of fatherland, not to the imper- fect peace of the pilgrims thither (in via). We must not regard peace as a separate virtue, but as the act, effect, or fruit of charity. And as such act it is com- manded by the Lord (S. Mark ix. 50). § 8. Mercy and pity (misericordia). These are compassion for the evil which another is suf- fering, especially when he suffers without his own fault. But compassion may embrace even sinners, not as regards the voluntary sin, for pity concerns the involuntary evil, but as fault has attached to it that which is involuntary. So the Lord had compassion for the multitude (S. Matt. He that loves, regards his friend as a part of himself , and his friend's evil as if it were his own. He "rejoices with them that rejoice;" and he "weeps with them that weep" (Rom. xii. 15). Anger and pride 216 CHARITY. [Qu. XXX. 3, 4. oppose this virtue, because the first lifts above the appre- hension of evil ; the other, because it leads to contempt of others, and to the notion that they suffer worthily. Is mercy a special virtue ? Pain at another's trouble may be a passion of the sensi- tive nature. But, again, it may be an emotion of the higher intellectual soul, as the evil of another is displeasing to us. And this motion of the soul can be regulated by reason, and so can govern the brute passion of pity. Hence, S. Au- gustine says (('i\. Dei, ix. :>) "that emotion of the soul is obedienl i>> reason when mercy is shown in such a way that justice is preserved, whether help is given to the needy, or pardon to the penitent." And since virtue consists in gov- erning the motions of the soul by reason, such mercy is consequently a virtue. (1) It is the sentiment of compassion in the emotional soul which may impede justice. i j i The Bentiment of vengeance and compassion are two contrary passions, each of them laudable in its place, the one pained at unworthy suffering in another, the other pleased at Buffering which is due, and pained at the pros- perity of the unworthy. (3) Mercy is a Bpecial virtue, because it adds a new idea — sc, the soitow which is compassionated. /.-• mercy tlte highest of virt In itself it is so, because it spreads abroad to others, and, still more, it supplies the defects of others. Hence it is the peculiar property of God, and in it His omnipotence is specially manifested. But if we look, not at the thing in itself, but at him who has it, mercy is not the highest vir- tue unless he who has it is highest, having none above him. For if one has a superior, it is greater and better to be united to that superior than to supply the defects of an inferior. Charity, therefore, by wbich man is joined to God is more Qu. xxxi. 1.] BENEFICENCE. 217 than mercy. But mercy is chief among the virtues which regard our neighbour. (1) God "desires mercy and notsacrifi.ee" (Hos. vi. 6), because outward gifts and sacrifices are ordained not on His account, but ours and our neighbours. For He does not need our sacrifices, but He wills that they be offered to Him for the sake of our own devotion and for the benefit of our neighbour. Therefore mercy, which supplies the needs of others, is the most acceptable sacrifice, since it comes nearer to the benefit of our neighbour. " To do good and to com- municate, forget not ; for with such sacrifices God is well pleased" (Heb. xiii. 16). "But above all these things, put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness" (Col. iii. 14). (2) Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as respects its outward manifestation ; by it we are assimilated to G-od in His operations, for "His mercy is over all His works," and the Lord says: "Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is merciful" (S. Luke vi. 36); but higher is the inward affection of charity by which we are united to God and assimilated to Him. § 9. Beneficence. How is beneficence the outivard act of charity ? Doing good to another may come under the idea of pay- ing him his due ; it is then an act of justice. It may come under the idea of relieving misery or defect ; it is then an act of mercy. But it may also come under the general idea of the good, and so it is an act of friendship, of charity. For in the act of love is included benevolence, by which we will good to our friend. But will accomplishes its purpose if it have the power to do so. Therefore, beneficence fol- lows from the act of love. But it is the act of charity from him who is in some way superior. Therefore, it is God's act of love towards us, not ours towards Him (but ours towards our brethren). 218 CHARITY. [Qu. XXXI. 2, 3. "As toe have opportunity, toe must do good to all men''' (Gal. vi. 10). Beneficence proceeds from the superior to the inferior ; hut the grades among us arc not immutable, for men can suffer manifold defects, and he who is superior in one re- spect may be inferior in another. And, therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence must be pre- pared to extend to all according to place and season. For all acta of bhe virtues are limited by their due circum- stances. (1) In practice, it is not possible to do good bo all ; and virtue does not demand the impossible. But still there is no one who may not at some time, or place, or in some way, have a special claim on beneficence, and charity requires at leasl the preparation of bouI to do good when opportunity be itself, and the prayer of charity embraces all. cj i Sinners are noi excluded, for they have their claim as men. which is bo bo met, without Cooperating in their sin. (:>) The same remark applies to enemies of the church or the state. Benefits are withdrawn in order that, if possi- ble, they may be restrained from their fault. But in case of grave necessity, help is to be given under due restric- tions, unless, in the latter ease, they are suffering the pen- f just law. Do we oive mod beneficence to our nearest neighbours ? Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is instituted by Divine wisdom. But in that order of nature every natural agent diffuses its action first and most ener- getically to those things which are nearest to it, as the fire warms most what is closest to it. But the bestowing of benefits is an action of charity towards others, and, there- fore, it must be most shown to those who are most near. But the nearness of one man to another depends on the various things in which men communicate with one another Qu. XXXI. 3.] BENEFICENCE. 219 — kinship, citizenship, fellowship in spiritual things, etc. And according to these diverse fellowships diverse benefits are to be dispensed, to each one that benefit which pertains to his relationship to us. Yet this will be varied according to the diversity of places, times, and other circumstances. For in some cases the stranger in extreme necessity has higher claim than even a parent who has no such need. (1) But the Lord said (S. Luke xiv. 12), " When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen, but bid the poor,'' etc. Yes ; but the Lord did not simply prohibit the inviting of friends or kinsmen, but the doing it for the sake of a return in kind, which is not charity but cupidity. Still it can happen that strangers have the first claim on account of greater need. Cwteris paribus, the nearer are to be benefited first. But if, in the case of two persons, one is nearer and the other more needy, no universal rule can determine who is first to be aided, because there are various degrees of propinquity and of need. This requires prudent judgment. (2) But debts are to be paid before gratuitous benefits are conferred ; therefore benefactors have the preference over neighbours (by kinship, etc.). I answer that there are two kinds of debt ; one, which is not to be counted among the goods of him who owes, but rather among the creditor's goods, say, if one has another's property which has been stolen from him, or which is a loan, or a deposit, or any- thing of that nature. A man has first to restore this debt, rather than to do good out of it to those who are connected with him, unless perhaps there should be grave necessity, in which case it would even be lawful to take another's prop- erty in order to relieve the immediate want. But even in this case the condition of each in other respects would have to be prudently considered, and no universal rule can be laid down for the infinite variety of cases. But there is another debt which is reckoned among the goods of him who owes it, due not from necessity of justice, 220 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxii. 1. but from a kind of moral equity, as in the case of benefits freely received. But no benefactor as such is equal to parents. Therefore parents, in the recompensing of benefits, are to be preferred to all others, unless grave necessity should give the preponderance to the other side, or some other condition should do so, say, the common utility of the Church or the republic. But in other cases estimation is to be made of the benefaction and of the propinquity, and no general rule can be laid down which will determine each particular case. Note thai beneficence is not a virtue distinct from char- ity, but is one <>f those "inward acts of charity which are commanded (S. Mai t. v. 44). § 10. Alms-giving. Is alms-giving an act of charity f Outward acts arc referred to thai virtue to which pertains the motive for those acts. But the motive for alms-giving is the relief of suffering and need. Ilcncc it may be defined as the giving to the needy, for God's sake, out of compas- sion. Now this motive pertains to mercy, which is the effect of charity. Consequently, alms-giving is an act of charity, through mercy. (1) But S. Paul said (1 Cor. xiii. 3), "Though 1 bestow all my goods to Eeed the poor, and have not charity, lam nothing,'' which implies that alms-giving is not the work of charity. But I reply that a thing done may be out- wardly a virtuous act, when the virtue itself does not exist ; as doing just things is an act of justice, which may be done out of natural temperament, or fear of consequences, or hope of getting some advantage (acts "materially " just). But in another way acts are inwardly virtuous ("forma- "), as it is the act of justice to do just things in the manner in which the just man does them — sc, promptly and with pleasure ; and in this way the virtuous act cannot exist without the virtue. To give alms, then, as an outward act, simply, can be without charity ; but true alms-giving Qu. xxxii. 2, 3.] ALMS-GIVING. 221 — that is, for God's sake, pleasurablv, and jwomptly, and in all other respects as one ought to do— cannot be without charity. (2) The proper act elicited by one virtue may be attrib- uted to another which commands it, and ordains it to its own end. So the prophet Daniel presented alms-giving as a work of satisfaction in the penitent, saying (Dan. iv. 27), " Eedeem thine iniquities by showing mercy to the poor." And the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. xiii. 16) speaks of alms-giving as an act of worship towards God : " With such sacrifices God is well pleased." S. John is conclusive (1 Ep. iii. 17), " Whoso hath this world's goods and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him ?" The corporal works of mercy are well distinguished as seven in number : to feed the hun- gry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to entertain the stranger, to relieve the prisoner, to visit the sick, and to bury the dead. Seven, likewise, are the spir- itual works of mercy; viz., to teach the ignorant, to counsel the doubting, to console the sorrowful, to correct the erring, to forgive the offender, to bear the infirmities of the weak, and to pray for all. Compare the corporal and spiritual ivories of mercy. In themselves the spiritual have the preeminence, for three reasons : (1) That which is given is a nobler gift, be- cause it is spiritual ; (2) it is a nobler thing to benefit the soul, the higher part of man ; for as a man ought first to provide for his own soul, so in the case of his neighbour whom he loves as himself ; (3) the acts themselves are nobler acts. But, on the other hand, there may be some particular case in which some corporal work of mercy is preferable to some spiritual act, as feeding a man who is 222 en A KIT Y. [Qu. xxxii. 4, 5. dying- of famine is bettor than teaching him (preaching to him). So it may be with some other very needy man. (1) It may be true, in some cases, that there is more recom- pense for spiritual works of mercy, but this does not detract from their praise and merit, if it be not the aim. So human glory is nn detraction from the merit of virtue, if it was not the motive for action. (2) It is true, also, that the needy is likely to be more grateful for corpora] mercy, and so there is more consolation for him in such acts. Bui merit docs not depend on that in which the will of him who receives help actually rests, but rather on that in which he ought rationally to rest. Have the corporal works of mercy a spiritual effect ? We may consider them in time ways: (1) In their sub- stance; and so, of course, they have only material effect, in supplying the corporal needs of oar neighbour. (2) But we may consider also their cause, the love of God and our neighbour. So viewed, tiny have spiritual fruit. "Give alms of thy goods, and never turn thy face from any poor man. and then the face of the Lord shall not be turned away from thee" (Tob. iv. 7). (3) We may consider their effect ; and so they have spiritual fruit if the one who is succoured prays for bis benefactor. (1) But it is the sin of simony to try to purchase spirit- ual good. Yes ; but he who gives alms does not intend to buy heaven, because he knows that spiritual blessings are infinitely more valuable than his gifts; but he aims through charity to merit spiritual good. (2) The widow in the Gospel (S. Luke xxi. 1), in giving more according to her proportion, showed greater charity, from which the corporal works of mercy derive their spirit- ual efficacy. Are corporal zcorks of mercy obligatory ? That question is answered in the twenty-fifth chapter of qv. xxxn. 5.] ALMS-GIVING. 223 the Gospel of S. Matthew. For some are punished with eter- nal penalty for the omission of the corporal works of mercy. The love of our neighbour is commanded ; therefore all things without which that love cannot be preserved fall under the precept. But it pertains to that love not only that we will our neighbour's good, but also that we effect it. " Let us not love in word and in tongue, but in deed and in truth " (1 Ep. S. John iii. 18). This requires that we aid his necessity by giving of alms. But precepts are given respecting the acts of virtues, and the giving of alms falls under command as the act is necessary to the virtue ; sc, as right reason requires, considering both the giver and the receiver. On the one side, that which is to be given is what is superfluous ; i.e., over and above what is necessary for the giver's own sustenance. And I say " su- perfluous," not only as respects the individual giver, that which he needs for his own support, but also as regards others of whom he has charge. And that is to be consid- ered as necessary for him (and for them) which is needful for their station in life. For each one is bound to provide first for himself and for those of whom he has charge, and afterwards out of the residue to aid the needs of others. And on the part of the recipient, he must have necessity, for otherwise there would be no reason for giving alms to him. But since it is not possible for any one to relieve the necessities of all, not every necessity falls under the precept, but only those where Avithout others' aid the needy cannot be sustained. So, then, to give alms of superfluities falls under the precept, and likewise to give alms in case of ex- treme necessity. But otherwise alms-giving is of counsel, as counsels are given for the attainment of higher spiritual good. (1) What, then, shall we say of the much talked-of rights of property ? Temporal goods are Divinely con- ferred as regards ownership. But as regards the use of them they are not the owner's alone, but also they belong to others who can be sustained out of the owner's superflui- 224 CHARITY. [Qu. XXXII. G. ties. Well says S. Basil (Horn, in S. Luc. xii.), "If you say that your wealth is given to you by God, is He unjust in His distribution to us ? Why have you abundance while your brother is in distress, unless that you may have the merit uf being a good dispenser of the Divine bounty, and he be honoured with the prize of patience ? It is the bread of the hungry which you are keeping ; it is the clothing of the naked which you have under lock and key ; it is the money of the needy which you have deposited in bank, or invested in stocks. You injuriously keep what you are able to give." iJ) Another objection. Everything which falls under an affirmative precept obliges at some determined time, and thru transgression is mortal sin. Therefore, if alms-giving immanded, there will be some determinate time in which he sins mortally who does not give alms. Bui this does doI appear to be so : because in every case it may be probably judged that the needy will be otherwise relieved, and what is called for by way of alms may prove to be necessary for the owner in the future, at least. But I reply thai the determinate time when one sins mortally who re- to give aim- is the time when there is evident and urgent . and do one appears ready to give aid. And, on the part of the giver, the time is when he has superfluities which are not necessary for his present situa- tion according to his best judgment. Looking forward to all cases which may possibly occur in the future is contrary to the Divine command (S. Matt. vi. 34). The superfluous and the necessary must be judged according to the ordinary probabilities of things. The Fifth Commandment selects the most prominent ex- ample of giving aid to others in their need. Ought one to (jive alms out of what is necessary for him- self? The Lord said (S. Matt. xix. 21), "If thou wouldst be perfect, go, sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and Qu. xxxii. 6.] ALMS-GIVING. 225 them shalt have treasure in heaven." This shows that what is necessary may be given in alms. But there are two kinds of necessaries : (1) Those without which life is impossible. Such needful things may not be given away ; say, if one has only what is absolutely needful for the support of his chil- dren and others dependent on him. To give away this is to destroy himself and his. A case may indeed occur where the safety of the Church or the state is concerned, and he may laudably expose himself and those belonging to him to peril of .death, since the common good is to be preferred to one's own. But (2), in another way, a thing is said to be necessary when without it life cannot be suitably passed according to the state and condition of a person and of others for whom he is responsible. The limit of this neces- sity is not marked by a distinct line. If many things are added, you cannot say just when the line of the necessary is passed ; if many things are taken away, still may remain all that is necessary for passing life becomingly accord- ing to one's proper state in it. To give alms out of these so-called necessities is good, and falls under counsel, not under precept. But it would be an inordinate act if one should withdraw so much from his property, in order to bestow it on others, that with the residue he could not properly fulfil the duties of his station in life. For no one ought to lead such a life as that would imply. But there are three exceptions to this statement : (1) When one changes his state in life, e.g., by entering on the "religious" life ; for then he makes himself poor for Christ's sake (following the counsel, " If thou wouldst be perfect," etc.); (2) when those things which are withdrawn from the conveniences of life can be made up again ; (3) when extreme necessity of any private person occurs, or grave necessity on the part of the commonwealth. For in these cases any one would laudably resign what is necessary for the decency of his state in life in order to provide for a greater necessity than his own. 15 226 charity. [nr. xxxii. 7, 8. May alms le given of what is unjustly acquired? A tliiug may be illicitly acquired in either of three ways \ (1) Where what is acquired is due to him from whom it lias been gotten, and cannot be retained by the one who lias possession of it, as in robbery, theft, and usury. A man is bound to make restitution ; he cannot give thai away in alms. (2) But a thing may be illicitly acquired when he who has gotten it hasno righl to keep it. neither ia it due to him from whom it has been obtained, because the one has taken it unjustly, and the other has unjustly given it. This is the case in simony, where both giver and receiver violate the justice of Divine law ; restitution ought not to Ie, but the gift should be bestowed in alms. This is • ; i the giving and the receiving are contrary to law. (3) A thing may be illicitly acquired when the getting is itself lawful, but that from which it is acquired is unlawful, as in all cases of base contract, "turpi ■.. a prostitute Bhamefully breaks the law of God, but in receiving money she does not act un- justly, or contrary to law. What i- in such ways illicitly gained may be kept, and alms given out of it. (1) The mammon of unrighteousness of which the Lord ks (S. Luke xvi. 9) is not riches unjustly acquired. What .-hall we Bay of the gains of gambling ? Some things are forbidden by Divine law ; gc., getting the money of those who, like minors have no power to alienate what oticing another to gamble, with the motive of cupidity in the hoar-. ag fraudulent gains; these call f'»r restitution, not alms-giving. But something fur- ther is forbidden by civil law. and wdieresuch law is extant, and not obsolete, restitution is obligatory, unless the one has lost who through cupidity enticed to gamble. lie is unworthy to receive ; the other cannot lawfully keep. In such a case they must have recourse to alms-giving. "Wives, children, servants, cannot give alms from what is not their own, without the consent, expressed or justly pre- Qu. XXXIII. 1.] FRATERNAL CORRECTION. 227 sumed, of the head of the family, except in case of grave necessity. Who are first to receive alms ? First, those who are most closely connected with us, dis- cretion being used with respect to the degree of connection, of holiness, of utility. For to one much holier, suffering greater need, and more useful to the common weal, alms should be given in preference to the person nearer in kin- ship, especially if the latter is not very near by blood rela- tionship, and is not specially under our care, and if the necessity is not grave. " If thou hast much, give plenteously/' in proportion to thy meaus, hot for the superfluity of the recipient. § 11. Fraternal correction. Is it an act of charity ? Sin may be viewed either as injurious to the sinner, or as doing harm to others who are injured or scandalized by it, and also as doing harm to the common good. There is, therefore, a two-fold correction of the delinquent ; one which applies a remedy to the sin as an evil in the sinner, and that is properly fraternal correction which is ordained for the amendment of the delinquent. But removing evil from any one is equivalent to procuring his good, which is a work of chanty. Hence, fraternal correction also is a work of charity, because by it. we repel evil from our brother ; sc, sin. And the removal of that is a greater work of charity than removing outward loss or corporal injury. Fraternal correction, therefore, is a nobler act of charity than the cure of bodily infirmity or the relieving of outward need. But there is another kind of correction which is an act of justice; viz., the applying a remedy for the sin as it is an evil against others, and especially as it is injurious to the common weal. 228 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxiu. 2. Fraternal correction is not opposed to the " bearing one another's burdens " (Gal. vi. 2), but rather flows from it. For one supports the erring when he is not turned against him, but keeps such good will towards him that he tries to amend him. Fraternal correction is obligatory. But once more note the distinction between affirmative and negative commands. As the Degative prohibit the acts of sins, so the affirmative had bo the acts of virtues. But ts of -in are in themselves evil ; they cannot become good in any manner, time, or place. Fur in themselves they are joined to a bad rod. Therefore, negative laws bind always, on all occasions, under all circumstances. But the acts of virtues ought, not to be done in every man- ner, but with observation of those due circumstances which qnisite in order that the act may be a virtuous one ; 8C. } that it be done where il onght, and when it ought, and in the manner it onght to be done. And because the due arrangement of the means depends upon the end sought for, in those circumstances of virtuous action is chiefly to be noted the end, which is the good of virtue. If, there- . there be any such omission of any circumstance of a virtuous act as totally takes away the good of virtue, this act is contrary to the precept. But if there be defect in any circumstance which does not totally annul the virtue, though the act may not reach the perfect good of virtue, it is not contrary to the precept. So fraternal correction, which is ordained for the amendment of a In-other, falls under the law (obligation) so far as it is deemed to be nec- for that end, but not so that the delinquent must be corrected in every place, and at every time.* * The conditions which render this act of charity obligatory are : (a) the sin or the near danger of sinning is certain ; (b) there is hope ot amendment in connection with this act of charity ; (c) no other is more fit to employ it ; (d) grave injury will not be done to the cor- Qu. xxxm. 3.] FRATERNAL CORRECTION. 229 (1) But this, you say, proposes a task which is practically impossible. Yes ; man's operation cannot be efficacious without Divine aid, and yet we are bound to do our part, so far as in us lies, with hope of Divine assistance. (2) In one way, it may be meritoriously omitted out of charity, when an opportune season is waited for, or there is reasonable fear of making the offender worse, etc. But, again, its neglect is mortal sin when fear of being unpopu- lar or of some annoyance is preferred to fraternal charity, although one has reason to think that his correction will be a benefit to the sinner. In another way, omission of this is venial sin, when fear or other motive makes one more tardy in correcting his brother's faults, not, however, that he would neglect it if he were certain of doing good thereby. (3) It cannot be said that if fraternal correction is obli- gatory, it is a debt which must be paid ; and therefore, as in the case of any other debt, we must go around and search for our creditors, which in this case is impossible, because of the multitude of sinners, for whose correction one man is not sufficient. This is mistaken, because what is due to any determinate and fixed person must be paid, whetber it is corporal or spiritual good, without waiting for him to come to us, but having due solicitude in seeking him out. This is true of pecuniary debt, and of one who has special charge of another. He ought to seek out that other if he go astray. But in the case of those benefits, spiritual or corporal, which are not due to any certain person, but to all our neighbours in general, we are not bound to go around searching for those to whom we may pay our debt, but it suffices that we do so when we meet with them. Does fraternal correction pertain only to those who hold some office ? We have seen above that one kind of correction is an act rector ; (e) the correction is judged to be necessary for the amendment needed. 230 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxni. 4, 5. of charity ; viz., that which specially tends to the amend- ment of an erring brother by simple admonition. Such correction is the duty of every one who has charity, whether he is in office or not. But there is another kind of correction, which is an act of justice aiming at the common good, which common good is sought for not only by fraternal correction, but sometimes by punishment, in order that others may be afraid and cease to do wrong. Such correction pertains to governors alone, whose duty it is not only to admonish, bnl also to correct by punishing. (1) Though fraternal correction pertains to all, yet those win) have charge of others have graver responsibility in that respect. (2) But he who has sound judgment is superior in that respect, and is bound to employ it in this way. Is any one bound to correct Ms superior .' "We are not now speaking of the act of justice, which belongs to one in office alone, bui of l he act of charity, which embraces all to whom charity is due, if in any one is found what ought t<« be corrected. But because a virtuous act must be restricted to the due circumstances, therefore in o'rrection of superiors a due mode must be employed ; sc, not rudeness and insolence, but mildness and respect- fulness il Tim. v. ]). How can a si finer cornet the delinquent ? Such correction belongs to him who has sound judgment. But sin does not totally destroy the good of nature, and sound rational judgment may still remain. But yet pre- vious sin puts a three-fold obstacle in the way of this cor- rection : (1) because preceding sin, especially if it be a greater one, renders a person unfit to correct the erring (S. Matt. vii. 3) ; (2) because of scandal, if the sin of the one who corrects is public ; he seems to be correcting, not out Qu. XXXIII. 6.] FRATERNAL CORRECTION - . 231 of charity, but out of ostentation (S. Matt. vii. 5) ; (3) because of the pride of the corrector, who thinks lightly of his own sins and in his heart sets himself above his neigh- bour, judging others' sins with strict severity, as if he were a righteous man. "Well says S. Augustine (Semi. Dorn. in Monte, ii. 19), '"Let us reflect, when necessity compels us to reprove another, whether we have never fallen in the same way ; and then let us consider that we are human, and might have had the same fault ; or that we once were under its dominion even if now we are not ; and then let our common frailty come to mind, and pity, not hatred, precede that correction. But if we shall find that we, too, are guilty in the same way, let us not chide our brother, but lament with him our common sin, and not invite him to yield to us, but with us to avoid the common destruc- tion." It is plain, then, that if the sinner correct the erring with humility, he does not sin anew and get for him- self fresh condemnation, although in this way, either in his brother's conscience, or, at least, in his own, he may find himself worthy of condemnation for his past sins. May one give up fraternal correction through fear lest the erring he rendered ivorse hy it f That correction which is the duty of superiors is ordained for the common good and has coactive force. Such correc- tion is not to be neglected for fear of troubling him who is corrected, both because he must be forced, if possible, through punishment to desist from his iniquity, if he will not amend of his own accord ; and because, if he is incor- rigible, the common good must be provided for, the order of justice being preserved, and others deterred by the exam- ple given. But fraternal correction is another thing ; its end is amendment of the sinner, not through compulsion, but through simple admonition. Therefore, when it is prob- able that the sinner will not receive the admonition, but be 232 CHARITY. [Qu. xxxtii. 7. rendered worse by it. such correction is to be avoided, for the mean- to an end ought to be regulated by the end itself. If it hinder the ei\d. it is not a good ; it does not fall under the precept. The order of fraternal correction. The due order is commanded by our Lord Eimself (S. Matt. wii:. L5) : "If thy brother sin againsl thee, go, show him his fault between thee and him alone. If he hear t her, thou basl gained thy in-other. Bui if he hear thee not, take wit!; thee one or two more, thai at the mouth of two Witnesses or three, every word may be established. And if he refuse to hear them, tell it unto the church." But we mufll distinguish between open and secret sins. \\ the sin is public, the remedy is nol only for the Binner thai he may be mad- better, but for others that they may nol he Bcandalized. Such open Bins are i" !»■ openly re- buked, as S. Paul Bays >i Tim. \. 20), "Them that sin re- prove in the sighl of all, that tie- L'l -I also may be in fear."' Bui if the sins . the Lord's command seems to apply to the case. For when thy brother sins againsl thee publicly, he .-in- nol only againsl thee, hut also againsl others. But even in bi I here is a difference. For some may b againsl our neighbours when they produce injury, whether spiritual or corporal, t/ the' community, as when any one Becretly deals with the' enemy in order to betray the nation, or when a heretic secretly tries to turn the faithful from the truth, lie who secretly sins in such a manner sins not only against you, bul also against others ; and it is right to proc -pen denunciation, in order that the injury may be stopped, unless, possibly, you judge that private admonition will answer the purpose. But some sins are wholly between man and man, the injury being only that of the sinner and the one sinned against ; and then the question is of aiding an erring Qu. XLIV. 1.] THE PRECEPTS OP CHARITY. 233 brother. And as the surgeon restores to health, if he can, without amputation (or ought to do so), but if he cannot, he amputates what can be lost for the preservation of life, so, also, he who aims at the amendment of his brother ought so to do it, if possible, that his brother's good name may be saved. For this is useful to him, both in an earthly way, since he would suffer great detriment from the loss of it, and in a spiritual way, because the dread of infamy helps to keep many back from sins into which they would rush without restraint if their good name were lost. For other reasons we are bound to preserve the good name of our erring brother. The ill name of one becomes the ill name of many. When something false is reported of one exercising sacred functions, or some true charge is made public, there are many who are eager to believe the same of all (S. Aug., Ep. ad plebem Hippon. 77). And, again, the sins of one made public encourage others to sin ; notably, the sins of the clergy. But because a good conscience is of more value than a good name, the Lord willed that even with loss of good name the conscience of our brother should through public denunciation, if necessary, be freed from sin. It is com- manded, then, that secret admonition precede public de- nunciation. Even God Himself gives the sinner secret warnings (Job xxxiii. 15). § 12. The precepts of charity. Wliat God requires of us is the sudject of commandment ; hut God requires that man love Him. Therefore, commandments are given respecting the acts of love. A precept implies a debt, something due. But something is due in two ways: one, per se; another, on account of something else. The end is what is due, per se, in each case, because it has, per se, the idea of the good ; 234 CHARITY. [Qu. XLIV. 2. but the means are due on account of something else. Thus, it is the physician's duty per se to try to make a cure ; but it is his duty to give medicine on account of the cure. But the end of the spiritual life is that man may be united to God, which is done by charity, and all things which pertain to the spiritual life are ordained for this end. For all the virtues respecting whose acts precepts are given are or- dained cither to purify the heart, from the filth of passions, or for a good conscience respecting our actions, or for a right faith, as those commandments which refer to Divine worship : and theso three are the recpiisite conditions for loving God. For an impure heart is drawn away from His love by passions inclining to earthly things ; and a bad con- science makes one Bhrink from a just God through fear of His punishments; and a false faith draws the affections to that which is not God, separating from Bis truth. But as the end is more pneious than the means, the chief com- mandment regards the love which proceeds from charity. It might be objected that charity which is poured into our hearts by the Holy Ghost makes us free, for ''where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. iii. 17). Bui the obligation of commandments is not opposed to liberty except where the mind is averse to what is com- manded, as in those who obey out of fear alone, while the precept of love can only be fulfilled out of our own will ; and. therefore, it is not repugnant to liberty. Observe, also, that all the ten commandments are or- dained for the acts of love to God and our neighbour. Therefore, the precepts of charity (as such) are not given there, but are included in all. Hie love of God, indeed, is the end, and that to which the love of oar neighbour is ordain"!. But because all do not really see what is contained in the "first and great commandment/' a second is added (which "is like unto it") ; viz., the love of our neighbour. yu. XLIV. 3.] THE PJRECEPTS OF CHAKITY. 235 And these two are sufficient. 11 On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets " (S. Matt. xxii. 40), for the love of charity is love of the good ; sc, either of the end, or of that which is for the end, of God or of our neighbour for God's sake. (1) No precept respecting love of self and our own body is needed ; but the mode of doing so — sc, in due order — is implied in the love of God and of our neighbour. (2) Other acts of charity, as joy, peace, beneficence, fol- low from love as their cause. And precepts respecting these are, therefore, included in that of love. And yet, since some are slow to fulfil these, explicit precepts are added respecting them: "Kejoice in the Lord always" (Phil. iv. 4) ; " Follow peace with all men " (Heb. xii. 14) ; (f While we have time, let us do good unto all men" (Gal. vi. 10). Different acts of doing good, also, are commanded in Holy Scripture. God is to be loved as the ultimate end to which all things are referred. Therefore, He is to be loved with the whole heart. The whole heart, it is true, may not be actually and always directed to God. This is the perfection of the Christian's fatherland, not of the road thither. But the heart is to be habitually so directed to God that it receives nothing which is contrary to that love ; this is the perfec- tion "of the road," to which venial sin is not directly con- tradictory; since it does not totally destroy the habit of charity, it does not aim at the opposite, but only impedes the action of charity. Our intellect, our desires, our outward acts, are to be subject to that loving will which is expressed by loving God "with all the heart." Therefore it is added, "and with all thy mind, and soul, and strength." Fully and perfectly the precept of the love of God will be fulfilled in heaven, for its end is that man be totally united with God. But here, not so ; yet there need be no departure from that end, no mortal sin. 236 CHARITY. [Qu. xliv. 7. Do not say that the impossible would be commanded, if the precept of perfect love could not be fulfilled in this life. For he that runs towards the goal must know which way he is to run. (See S. Aug., De Perf. Justit., cap. 8.) The precept of love of our neighbour gives the reason for loving and the manner of loving. It gives the reason ; for others are our neighbours both according to the natural image of God and t In • i r capability of glory. Call others neighbours, call them brothers, it is all one. It gives the manner of loving — sc, "as thyself." This is nol equality, bul similitude, and that in three par- ticulars; first, the end ; as one loves himself (out of char- ity) for Cud'., sake, bo his brother is to be loved. This is holy tove. Next, as oue satisfies bis own will in what is good (or though! to be so), so he yields to his neighbour in good things, nol in evil. This is just love. And lastly, the reason for loving is that one love his neighbour not for his own benefit or pleasure, bul wills his neighbour's good as he wdls his own. This i- true love. As thus under- stood, even enemies are brothers of ours. The order of charity is part of the precept. Man does more to gratify him whom he loves more. And so, if he should love less him whom he ought to love more, he would be doing more to satisfy him to whom he owes less ; and bo would be doing injury to the other. Accord- ingly, the order of love is explicitly laid down in Iloly Scrip- ture. " With all thy heart/' places God above all things. ■• As thyself," places thine own salvation next. " "We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren " (1 Ep. S. John iii. 16), places our neighbour before our own body. ''Espe- cially unto the household of faith " (Gal. vi. 10), and, " If auv provide not for his own. and specially his own house- hold " (1 Tim. v. 8), places the better and those nearer to ourselves above other neighbours. Qu. XLV,, XLVI.] THE PRECEPTS OE CHARITY. 237 S. Thomas regards the spiritual gift of wisdom as espe- cially correlated to charity. It is wisdom in the things of God, and he that has it can judge and order all his spiritual life by Divine rules. It is not merely speculative, but also eminently practical wisdom. Its seat is the intellect, but it springs from charity, a loving will. It is not the intel- lectual virtue which is acquired by our own efforts, and it is different from faith which assents to Divine verity ; wis- dom is judgment according to Divine truth. It is not the mere use of reason giving right judgment, but it is grounded on the affinity for Divine things which charity possesses through union with God. It is incompatible, therefore, with mortal sin. It is for the guidance of the spiritual life in what is necessary to salvation, through justifying grace, " gratia gratum faciens." The opposite sin is spiritual folly ; not any natural dul- ness of judgment, but that stupidity of folly in spiritual things which results from a Christian man's burying him- self in carnal pleasures. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolishness unto him ; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged" (1 Cor. ii. 14). This child of lust ("luzuria") may not be directly willed, but those things are willed from which it is necessarily generated and born. CHAPTER IV. VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. § 1. Hatred. Can a ini one hate God .' [f not, wliv did the Lord say (8. John xv. 24), "But now have they both seen and hated both Me and My Father" ? Observe, then, thai haired is a passion moved by something which i- apprehended. But God may be apprehended either in Hi- essence or in His effects. Bnt in His essence He is that Goodness which no being can hai.', bnt all must love. There are some of His effects, also, which cannot be in any way contrary to our will, as life and thought, which lie produces, and which are sought by all. So far d cannot be hated. But there are certain - of God which the inordinate will opposes, as the infliction of penalty and the restraint of sins by Divine law. And as regards the consideration of such effects, God can be hated. Hatred of God is the greatest of sins. For the defect in sin consists in aversion from God. (See page 107.) But such aversion would not be guilt if it were not voluntary. Guilt (" culpa "), therefore, consists in voluntary aversion from God. But this voluntary aver- sion from God is found, per se, in hatred of God, while in other sins it exists, as it were, by participation. For as the will, per se, cleaves to that which it loves, so in itself it shuns that which it hates. Hence, when any one hates God, his will, per se, is averted from God. But, in other sins — say, Qu. xxxiv. 3.] HATKED. 239 in sensual sins — the will is indirectly averted from God, in- asmuch as it seeks inordinate pleasure, to which this aver- sion is annexed. Hence, hatred of God is the gravest of sins. (1) This hatred is deliberate malice, which is sin against the Holy Ghost. (2) Infidelity is a fault only as it is voluntary ; and the more voluntary it is, the graver is the sin. But its being voluntary comes from one's hating the truth which is pre- sented to him. Hence, it is evident that the sin in infi- delity springs from hatred of God, whose truth is the object of faith. Therefore, as the cause is more potent than the effect, the hatred of God is a greater sin than the infidelity. (3) It is not true that whoever hates punishment hates God, who is the author of it. But to rush into hatred of God as punisher, is hating the justice of God, which is the gravest of all sins. 7s all hatred of our neighbour a sin ? Hatred is opposed to love ; and hatred is so far evil as love is good. But love is our neighbour's due according to what he has from God ; i.e., according to nature and grace. But love is not his due according to what he has from him- self and the devil ; sc, according to sin and defect of right- eousness. And therefore it is lawful to hate sin in our brother, and all that pertains to defect of righteousness ; but one cannot hate his brother's nature and grace without mortal sin. But this very thing, that we hate in our brother his fault and defect of good, pertains to love of our brother, for it is all one to will another's good and to hate his evil. Understood simply, then, hatred of our brother is always sin. " He that hateth his brother is in darkness " (1 Ep. S. John ii. 9). But is it not natural, and therefore right, to hate our enemies ? For they are opposed to us and aim at our ruin. 240 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXIV. 4, G. Bat according to what they have from God, they are not contrary to us, and are to be loved. We ought to hate that they are enemies. As hatred of our neighbour the gravest sin against him ? The evil of sin against our neighbour is two-fold : one, the disordered will of him who sins, which is the root of sin ; another, the injury which is done to our neighbour. As regards tin- first, hatred is greater sin than outward injurious acts, and if the outward acts were inordinate without any inordination of will, they would not be sin, as when one ignorant lv. or in zeal for justice, kills a man. And if there is any Eauli ill outward sins which are com- mitted against our neighbour, all springs from inward ha- tred, l'.ut as respects the injury which is dune, nut ward -in- are worse than inward hatred. llatnd is nol counted among the capital sins, because it is last, i; o\ iir- ■. in the order of destruction of what is vir- tuous in man ; for it is mosl opposed to nature. It is most natural to man to love bis neighbour's good. Does 1ml ret spring from envyf Hatred <>f our neighbour is the ultimate in the progress of sin, in that it is opposed to the natural love of our neighbour. But the reason why one recedes from what is natural is that he aims to avoid what is naturally to be shunned. But naturally every animal shuns what causes sorrow, and seeks what gives pleasure. And as from pleas- ure springs love, so from sorrow springs hate. Hence, since envy is sorrow at another's good, it follows that that good is rendered hateful to us, and from envy springs hatred. In another way. and more indirectly, as disposing to the ultimate, anger may cause hatred. For anger at first seeks our neighbour's evil, under the notion of just vengeance ; but afterwards, being prolonged, a man may desire abso- lutely that evil, which pertains to hatred. Qu. XXXV. 1, 3.] SPIEITUAL SLOTH. 241 § 2. Spiritual sloth ("acedia "). This is opposed to that spiritual joy in Divine good which is the inward effect of charity.* 7s spiritual sloth a sin f It is "a torpor of a mind which neglects to begin good things" (S. Aug., Ps. cvi.). But a sorrow of this kind respecting spiritual good is evil in itself. Even sorrow re- specting what is truly evil may be bad in its effects, if it so load down a man that he totally withdraws himself from good works. Spiritual sloth, therefore, is evil, both in itself and in its effects. And, therefore, since it belongs to the will, it is a sin. Humility, looking at one's own defects, does not exalt self ; but it is ingratitude if one despise the good things which God has given, and from such contempt follows spiritual sloth. As a special vice it wearies of the Divine good, in which charity rejoices. Is spiritual sloth a mortal sin ? Mortal sin destroys the spiritual life in which God dwells in us through charity. And that sin is mortal which in its own proper nature is opposed to charity. Now spiritual sloth is such ; for the effect of charity is joy in God ; but spiritual sloth is weariness of spiritual good as Divine. But sins which are in themselves mortal are only such when they attain their consummation. And the consum- mation of human sin, which consists in a human act, is in the consent of reason. Hence if the beginning of sin is in the sense-nature alone, and does not reach the consent of reason, the sin is venial on account of the imperfection of the act. So concupiscence is mortal or venial sin ac- cording as it has or has not the consent of reason. So also * See the suggestive essay prefixed to Canon Paget's Spirit of Dis- cipline, 1891. 1(5 242 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXVI. 1, 2. the motion of spiritual sloth is sometimes iu the sensuous nature alone, through the repugnance of the flesh against the spirit, and then it is venial sin. But sometimes it reaches the reason, which consents to flight from the Divine good, and feels horror of it and detestation of it, the flesh altogether prevailing against the spirit. This is manifestly mortal sin. It is a capital sin, because on ac- count of it many evil things are done cither to avoid the disagreeable efforl required by the spiritual life, or because the burden of this spiritual sloth produces sinful acts which harmonize with it. S. Gregory (Moral, x.wi. 17) names sis daughters of Bpiritnal sloth : (1) Despair of the end; (2) pusillanimity with respect to the means; (3) sluggishness respecting obedience to God's commands; (4) rancor at spiritual counsellors who urge to a better life; (5) an evil mind towards spiritual goods themselves; (6) a heart wearied with spiritual joy and wandering after corporal pleasure. § 3. Envy. Wluit is envy / Another's good may be apprehended as one's own evil, and so there can be sorrow at it. And this in two ways : one, when danger of injury threatens one's self, and so one is saddened at another's good; as when his enemy is ex- alted, and bo be fears that harm maybe done to himself. Such Badness is nol envy, but rather the effect of fear. But, again, another's good may be esteemed as one's own evil, diminishing one's own glory or excellence; in this way envy is troubled at another's good. Envy, therefore, especially regards those goods from which glory arises, and in which men love to be honoured and held in high repu- tation. Is envy a sin ? Sadness at another's good may arise in four ways : (1) "When one fears injury to himself or to his good things, as Qu. xxxvi. 3.] ENVY. 243 the result of such prosperity. This is not envy, and may exist without sin. " It may happen that without loss of charity, an enemy's ruin makes us glad, and again his glory saddens us without envy ; since we believe that by his fall others will well be lifted up, and in his prosperity we fear that many will be unjustly oppressed " (Greg., Moral, xxii. 6). (2) One may be saddened in consequence of another's good, not because he has it, but because that good is want- ing in ourselves. And this is properly emulation ; and if that emulation concerns moral goods, it is laudable. But if it refer to earthly goods, it may be sinful, or it may not be so. (3) He for whom the good happens may be unworthy of it. Sadness at this, indeed, cannot arise from those moral goods by which any one is made righteous. But it may spring from wealth acquired, and from other such things as both the worthy and the unworthy can obtain. And this sadness pertains to indignation (" nemesis "), and is connected with good habits. But such a view of earthly goods leaves out of sight the eternal verities. But according to the doc- trine of faith, the temporal goods which the unworthy ob- tain are distributed according to the just ordination of God, either for the correction of the unworthy, or for their con- demnation. Goods of this kind are as nothing in compar- ison with the future goods which are reserved for those who are worthy of them. Such sadness is forbidden by the Holy Scriptures: "Fret not thyself because of the un- godly, neither be thou envious against the evil doers " (Ps. xxxvii. 1). (4) One is saddened at another's good, inasmuch as that other exceeds himself, and this is properly envy ; and this is sin, grieving at what ought to cause rejoicing, sc, another's welfare. Is envy a mortal sin ? It is certainly a species of mortal sin. For sin gets its specific character from its object. Now envy, according to ) The grief which the Psalmisi expressed ("nemesis") was at the prosperity of the unworthy (Ps. lxxiii. 3), which is the opposite of envy at the prosperity of the worthy. Envy is a capital sin. The child of pride is vainglory, and this begets envy. The daughters of envy are secret backbiting and open de- traction, exultation at our neighbour's adversity and efforts to impede his prosperity, and, last, and the culmination of all, hatred of our neighbour. £ 4. Discord and strife. Discord is a mortal sin. S. Paul (Gal. v. 20) places divisions among the works of the flesh, and "they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Discord is opposed to concord, which springs from charity joining the hearts of many, first, in Divine good, and next, in the good of our neigh- bour. Therefore discord is sin. But discord may take away this concord, first, per se — i.e., according to the intention, when one knowingly dissents from Divine good, and his neighbour's good to which he Qu. XXXVII. 1.] DISCOKD AND STRIFE. 245 ought to consent. This is mortal sin in kind, because it is opposed to charity, although the first motions of this dis- cord may be venial through their beiug imperfect acts. But discord may, again, destroy concord per accidens — i.e., without such intention, when different persons aim at some good which pertains to the glory of G-od or the benefit of our neighbour, but one judges a certain course to be good, while another has a contrary opinion. Then discord is, per acci- dens, contrary to the Divine good or the good of our neigh- bour. Such discord is not sin, nor contrary to charity, unless there be error respecting what is necessary to salva- tion, or undue obstinacy in one's opinion. For concord, which is the effect of charity, is the union of wills, not the union of opinions (page 215). Discord, then, is some- times the sin of one, when he knowingly resists the good which another wills ; and sometimes it is the sin of both parties, when each dissents from the good of the other and loves his own good. (1) But you may say that another's will is not the rule of yours, but only the Divine will is such. And this is true of that other's will considered in itself ; but when that will adheres to the Divine, it does become the rule for others also, and discord with such a will is discord with the Divine rule. (2) But S. Paul excited discord between the Pharisees and the Sadducees (Acts xxiii. 6). I answer that to destroy that good concord which charity produces is a grave sin ; "He that soweth discord among brethren is an abomination unto the Lord" (Prov. vi. 16). But to take away the evil concord of bad wills is laudable, and the Lord Himself said (S. Matt. x. 34), " I came not to send peace, but a sword." (3) The discord between SS. Paul and Barnabas (Acts xv. 39) was per accidens, because each was aiming at the good, but to the one a certain course seemed to be good ; to the other, another. This was due to human imperfection, for the controversy did not concern what is necessaiy to salva- 246 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. xxxvill. 1. tion. Even this dissension was ordained by Divine Provi- dence for the resulting benefit of the world. If discord is viewed as a departure from another's will, it may be called the daughter of envy ; but viewed as depend- ing on self-seeking, it is the child of vainglory. Is contention {strife) a mortal sin? S. Paul (Gal. v. 20) places it with discord among the works of the flesh which exclude any one from the king- dom of God ; therefore it is a mortal sin. As discord ex- presses contrariety of wills, so contention implies the same in speech. But we must look at the intention, and at the manner of contending. In the intention we must consider whether one is contending against the truth, which is blameworthy, oragainsl falsehood, which is laudable. And in the manner, we are to consider if it is suitable to the persons and the things; for if so, it is laudable. If, then, contention signify impugning the truth and an inordinate manner of contending, it is mortal Bin. But if it be an im- pugning of falsehood with proper acrimony, it is laudable. But if. again, it be contending against falsehood in an in- ordinate manner, it may be venial sin, unless perhaps the inordination is so great as to cause scandal of others. So S. Paul says of such strife (2 Tim. ii. 14), that it tends to " the subverting of the hearers." * When the disciples contended (S. Luke xxii. 24), they did not nn-an to impugn the truth, for each one was defend- ing what he thought to be true ; but their contention was inordinate, being about an improper object ; sc, the primacy of honour, for they were not yet spiritual men. Therefore the Lord checked their contention. Contention, like discord, is the daughter of vainglory. For pride and vainglory seek one's own superiority, which may be done in speech and cause strife of words. * S. Thomas seems to understand the " logomachy " here spoken of, as wordy strife rather than as strife about words. Qu. xxxix. 1.] SCHISM, • 24.7 § 5. Schism. Is schism a special sin ? It is directly and per se opposed to unity, and it is a spe- cial sin when one intends to separate himself from that unity which charity makes, which not only unites one to another in the spiritual bond of love, but also unites the whole Church in the unity of the Spirit. And, therefore, properly speaking, schismatics are those who spontaneously and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church, which is the principal unity. For the particular unity of Christian man with Christian man is ordained for the unity of the Church, as the union of member with member in the body is for the unity of the whole body. But the unity of the Church depends on two things ; first, the communion of the members with one another, and next, the subordination of all the members to the one Head (which is Christ), "the Head from whom all the body, being supplied and knit together through the joints and bands, increaseth with the increase of God" (Col. ii. 19). (1) All sin separates man from God ; but this is not nec- essarily schism, since it may not be the intention of the sin- ner to separate himself from God, but to turn inordinately to temporal good. (2) Every sinner disobeys the precepts of the Church, but the schismatic does so with rebellion, since he perti- naciously despises those precepts and refuses to submit his judgment. Every sinner does not do this. (3) Heresy is opposed to faith, but schism per se is opposed to the unity of charity in the Church. Therefore, as faith and charity are diverse virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks also charity, so schism and heresy are diverse vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. And yet, as loss of charity is the road to loss of faith (1 Tim. i. 6), so schism is the road to heresy. 248 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XXXIX. 2. Hence., S. Jerome well remarks that ''there is no schism which does not invent to itself some heresy (note this), in order to justify its separation from the Church" (Ep. ad Titum, cap. 3). Is sch ism a. graver sin Ikon infidelity? The gravity of a sin depends upon the species of the sin and also upon its circumstances. But the particular cir- cumstances are infinite in Dumber and infinitely varied. And bo, in comparing two sine in order to find which is the worse, we have to look only at their specific character. But this depends upon the objeel : and, therefore, that sin is the opposed to the greater good, as sin against God is worse than Bin against our neighbour. But infi- delityis sin againsl God Bimself as the primal verity on which faith rests; while schism is againsi Church unity, which is a derived good and less than God Bimself. So it is plain that the sin of infidelity is specifically graver than the Bin of schism, although it may happen that some schismatic sins more deeply than some infidel, either on account of greater contempt or greater peril to others' souls, or some such rea=on. (1) But schism is against the good of the multitude, whereas infidelity is only against the particular good of one. Yes ; but there is a greater good than either of those, which is the Divine verity, to which unbelief is op- posed. (2) But schism is a sin against charity, which is a higher virtue than faith, to which infidelity is opposed. Yes ; but charity has two objects, Divine goodness, and our neigh- bour's good. And schism is a sin against the good of our neighbour, which is less than the object of faith, viz., God Himself. Yet, of all the sins against our neighbour, schism seems to be the greatest, because it is against the spiritual good of the multitude. Qu. XL. 1.] -WARS, QUARRELS, AND SEDITION'S. 249 Here note that schismatical clergy have the authority which helongs to their orders, for this sacramental power is conferred once for all through a consecration to that end. Heresy or schism does not annul it, for if they return to the Church they are not ordained or consecrated anew. (See the Novatian schism, Cone. JSTic, canon viii.) But this sacramental power is not lawfully used "without the sanction of superior authority in the Church. If, how- ever, it should be illicitly used, it has its ordained sacra- mental effect, because in sacraments man is only God's instrument, and the fault of the minister does not destroy the efficacy of what he instrumentally does. But authority of jurisdiction is conferred by men who have it, and is not indelible, like Holy Orders. Open schis- matics and heretics may lose by man's decree what man has given. § 6. Wars, quarrels, and seditions. Is making war always a sin f Three requisites are demanded for a righteous war : (1) due authority — sc, that of the commonwealth — for it does not pertain to any private person to make war, since his private right can be prosecuted through the judgment of his supe- rior. And, again, to summon the people, which is neces- sary in war, cannot be done by a private individual. But as those who have charge of the commonwealth may lawfully defend it with the sword against internal disturbance, pun- ishing malefactors with death (Rom,, xiii. 4), so it belongs to them to defend the state from external enemies with the sword of war. (2) A just cause for war is requisite ; viz., that those who are attacked deserve attack for some grave fault. (3) There must be right intention on the part of those who make war ; sc, that good be promoted or evil avoided. But it can happen that war is declared by legitimate 250 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XL. 1. authority and for a just cause, and yet the war may be un- rig!) teoui 3 on account of the evil intention of those who begin it; e.g., their eagerness to injure, their fierceness of revenge, their implacable mind, their lust of new do- minion. (1) But did not the Lord say (S. Matt. xxvi. 52), "All they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword"? But S. Augustine says justly (Cont. Faust, xxii. 70), "He takes the sword who is armed against; another's life without any superior or legitimate authority which orders or per- mits him to do so." If any private person with due au- thority, oi any public person through zeal for justice and with God's authority, use the sword, he does not him- self take ir. but he- employs it as entrusted to him by another. And those also who sinfully use the sword are not always slain with the sword, but they themselves always perish through their own sword, because for the sin of the sword they are punished everlastingly, unless they repent. (2) But, again, the Lord said (S. Mutt. v. 39), " Resist not evil ; " and in the Epistle to the Eomans we read (Rom. xii. 19), "Avenge not yourselves, but give place unto wrath.'' I reply that precepts of this nature (affirmative), as S. Augustine Bays (Serm. Dom. in Monte, i. 19), are always to be observed in the preparedness of the soul ; sc, a man must always be prepared to make no resistance, to give up self-defence, if there be reason for doing so. But some- times it is a duty to act otherwise, for the sake of the good of the community, or even for the sake of those against whom one contends. If license to work iniquity be taken away thereby, it is well to conquer in war. (3) But war is contrary to the virtue of peace. Yes ; but those who wage just war are aiming at lasting peace, not that evil peace of which the Lord said, "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth" (S. Matt. x. 34). Qr. xu.] WARS, QUARRELS, AND SEDITIONS. 251 Is it lawful for priests and bishops to engage in ivar ? For the good of human society many things are necessary, and some are inconsistent with others, so that they cannot well be exercised by the same persons. And military affairs are most of all repugnant to those duties which belong to priests and bishops for two reasons ; first, they withdraw the mind from that Divine service for which the clergy are appointed ; nest, the clergy are ordained to set forth the sacrifice of Christ ; therefore, instead of shedding others' blood, they should be ready to give their own for Christ's sake. (1) It pertains indeed to prelates and priests to resist wolves, robbers, tyrants ; but their weapons are not carnal, but spiritual (2 Cor. x. 4) ; i.e., admonitions, prayers, and excommunications. (2) The clergy may spiritually aid those waging just war by their spiritual ministrations. They may call on others to undertake a just war, for engaging personally in it is not forbidden to them because it is wrong, but because it is inconsistent with their holy office. Promised faith must be kept, even with enemies in war ; but just war may call for stratagems and secret snares ; for such things, in such a case, are not repugnant to justice, nor do they spring from inordinate will. Are quarrels, "fightings" (rixm), always sin? As contention implies contradiction in words, so these private " fightings " imply the going to blows. It is a sort of private war, without public authority, and springing from an inordinate will. Such quarrels always imply sin. In him who unjustly attacks another, it is mortal sin, for injury wilfully done to our neighbour cannot be without mortal sin. But in him who defends himself there may be no sin at all, or venial sin, or mortal sin, according to his mind and manner in defending himself. For if he only intend 252 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLil. 2. to repel injury offered, unci with, due moderation defend himself, the quarrel is not on his side. But if he do so with a vindictive mind, or one filled with hatred, or in undue excess, there i.s always siu ; venial, iudeed, when the sinful impulse is not a grave one, or the lack of mod- eration is not serious ; hut mortal, when he is steadily hent on doing serious injury to the other party. Fightings of this kind are the children of anger rather than of hatred. For the latter aims absolutely at harming an enemy; whether openly or secretly, matters not. But anger, the desire for vengeance, is ool satisfied with secretly doing harm, hut desires that the other party may know that he is suffering the consequences of his wrong-doing. And this is implied also in quarrels, or fightings ("rizcB"). Is ft dit ion it n., It has something in common with wars and fightings; hut the first are properly against external foes, nation arrayed against nation ; the second are the conflicts of one against one, or of few . : hut sedition is properly u th.' different parts of one people disagreeing with part of the state contending with another. And. therefore, because it is opposed to a special good — sc, the unity ami peace of the community — it is a special sin. Is sedition always a mortal sin? The unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of justice and the common good, and it is mortal sin in its kind, and so much the graver sin as the common good is of more importance than that private good which is impugned by private quarrels. But the sin of sedition primarily and principally belongs to those who stir up sedition : these sin most gravely ; hut next, those are involved in it who follow those disturbers of the common peace. But those who resist them and defend the common Qu. xliii. 1.] SCANDAL. 253 good are no more seditious than those who defend them- selves are quarrelsome. The rule of tyrants is not just, because it is not ordained for the common good, but for the private benefit of the ruler himself. And, therefore, arousing the people against this tyrannical rule is not sedition, unless possibly when this tyranny is so inordinately attacked that the subject people suffer more detriment from the consequent distur- bance than they did from tyrannical rule. But it is rather the tyrant who is seditious, nourishing discords and sedi- tions among the people, in order that he may more easily keep them down. § 7. Scandal. What is scandal ? This vice, opposed to the beneficence of charity, may be defined, with S. Augustine (Contra Faust, xxii. 27), as "a word or deed deficient in rectitude, giving occasion for the spiritual ruin of another.'" As one may put a stumbling- block in another's way, so that, if he encounter it, he is liable to get a fall, so, in the progress along the spiritual road, one by his advice, persuasion, or example may lead, another into sin; this is scandal. But nothing according to its proper nature disposes any one to spiritual ruin, unless it be deficient in rectitude. For that which is per- fectly right rather strengthens one against a fall than leads him to his ruin. Both that is defective in rectitude which is evil in itself, and that which has the appearance of evil ; for even if there be no corrupt intention in it, it may give occasion for another's fall. And therefore the apostle said (1 Thess. v. 22), "Abstain from every appearance of evil." The word or deed of any one can be in two ways the occasion for another's sin. First, per se, when the evil word or deed is actually intended to induce another to sin (direct, active scandal) ; or, even though not so intended, the action 254 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLIII. 2. is of such a nature that it incites another to do wrong (in- direct, active scandal) ; as when one publicly sins, or does what has the appearance of evil. And then he who does anything of this kind, properly speaking, gives occasiou for falling. These are active scandals. But, secondly, per accidens some word or deed of one person is the cause of another's sinning, when, apart from the inten- tion of the one who does bhe action, and without the action itself having any such tendency, some one ill-disposed is by t hie action induced to sin, say, to envy another's goods ; and then he whose action is right does not give occasion, but the other takes it. This is passive scandal without any active scandal. Sometimes, then, it happens that active scandal is found in one and passive Bcandal in another, as when one induces another to commit sin. But sometimes there is active Bcandal without the passive, as when one by word or deed tries to had another into sin, and he does not consent. And finally there is sometimes passive scandal without active (the scandal of the weak through ignorance or infirm- ity, and the Bcandal of the Pharisee through his own mali- cious wicked Is scandal a & Passive scandal — i.e., the scandal in him who receives it — is always sin in him, since he is not, properly speaking, Bcandalized, unless in Borne way he fall into spiritual ruin, which is sin. (Note that "offence," Rom. xiv. 21, is in- dignation against him who sins, which can exist without this fall.) But passive scandal can exist without any sin on his part from whom the scandal proceeds, as when any one is scandalized by those things which another has done with perfect rectitude. Similarly, active scandal also is always sin in him who gives the occasion for it, because either what he does is sin, or, if it have only the appearance of evil, he is bound in charity to avoid it, since it is the duty of every one to care for his Ql\ xliii. 3, 4.] SCANDAL. 255 neighbour's salvation. And so he who does not avoid occa- sion for scandal acts against charity. But we have seen that the active scandal may exist without any sin on the other side {e.g., one may be "offended," without himself falling). (1) The Lord said (S. Matt, xviii. 7), " It must needs be that offences (scandals) come." But this is not to be understood in the sense of absolute necessity. There is a conditional necessity of what God foreknows or has fore- told ; also there is a conditional necessity of that which is useful for some end, and scandals are useful that they "who are approved may be made manifest" (I Cor. xi. 19). Scandals are conditionally necessary, also, according to the condition of men who will not keep themselves from sin. So a physician might say, when he saw the mischievous diet of his patient, "He is bound to have along spell of sick- ness ; " meaning, if he do not change his diet. Active scandal per se — i.e., when one hy his word or deed intends to draiu another into sin — is a special sin, not that which is per accidens, there being no such intention {direct or indirect). For the aiming at a special end constitutes a new sin over and above the original sinfulness of the act in question. And so active scandal may be found apart from other sins, as when one scandalizes his neighbour by an act which is not sin in itself, but which has the appearance of evil. Is scandal a mortal sin ? Passive scandal may be a stumbling only, without actual fall ; this will be venial sin, as when one through the inordi- nate word or deed of another is moved in a venial manner only. But passive scandal may be mortal sin, as when one in such a case proceeds to actual mortal sin. But active scandal, if it be per accidens (not intended either directly or indirectly), may be venial sin, as when the thing which is done is in itself venial, or has only the 256 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLI1I. 7. appearance of evil, and is committed through some light indiscretion. But sometimes it is mortal sin, whether because the act is in itself such, or because the salvation of our neighbour is made of no account, and one does not for the sake of that give up what he chooses to do. But if we speak of active scandal per se — viz., the intending to lead another into sin — it is mortal if the sin is such, or it' the intention is such in him who gives scandal ; but it may be venial if sin and intenl ion are such. In this way we may understand the Gospel (S. Malt, xviii. 6), andS. Paul (] Oor. viii. L2). Those win. perfectly adhere to God through love take no occasion of stumbling from others' words or deeds. Much less do they give reasonable occasion for active scandal to the weak. Through human infirmity, indeed, they may fall somewhat short of the perfect standard set before them, but the}' do nol go far away, nor so far that another can reasonably take occasion of Bin from their words or deeds. Remember, however, thai one may scandalize himself (Pharisaic scandal). Consider the case of S. Peter (Gal. ii. 1-1) ; was his sin so grave that others could be justly scandalized? (Or did he fall, and repent, and return to the measure of a perfect man ?) Venial sins may be found in perfect men, but they are chiefly those sudden motions of the passions which arc inward and do not give scandal. If those infirmities ap- pear outwardly in venial sins, those sins are so light as not to have in themselves power of giving scandal. May spiritual goods be given up on account of scandal ? There can be no question about active scandal. Sin can never be lawful. But if we speak of passive scandal, there may be a question as to what is to be given up lest another be scandalized. But among spiritual goods there are some which are necessary for salvation, which cannot be aban- Qu. XLIII. 7.J SCANDAL. 257 cloned without mortal sin. But it is manifest that no one ought to commit mortal sin in order to hinder another from doing wrong. In the order of charity man ought to place his own spiritual safety higher than another's. Things, therefore, which are necessary to salvation may not be left undone for the sake of avoiding scandal. But in the case of spiritual goods which are not necessary to salvation, we should distinguish two kinds of scandal. For the scandal which arises from these sometimes springs from malice, when there are those who wish to hinder such spiritual goods by exciting scandals. Such were the Phar- isees who were scandalized at our Lord's teachings (S. Matt. xv. 12). This sort of scandal the Lord taught us to treat with contempt. But sometimes the scandal comes from infirmity or igno- rance, the scandal of the weak. On account of this, spiritual goods may he kept hidden or even sometimes deferred when there is no imminent spiritual danger in doing so, until, further explanation having heen given, the scandal may cease. But if after such explanations it still endure, it may possibly seem to come from malice ; if so, spiritual goods are not to be relinquished on account of it. (Note that argument may not put an end to scandal of the weak, however sound the argument may be. For the weak may be very weak in logic, or have their heads full of other arguments, with no room for more ; or they may be so hardened in old habits that arguments run off from the surface of their minds, unable to enter any further.) (1) But S. Augustine teaches that the discipline of sins may sometimes be passed over if there be great danger of schism (Contra Epist. Parmen. ii.). So a spiritual good, an act of justice, would be neglected on account of scandal. But I reply that punishment is not to be sought on its own account, but penalties of Church discipline are medicinal, intended to prevent sins, and they are so far just as they have that tendency. But if, through enforcing Church discipline, 17 258 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. xun. 7. manifestly more and greater sins will follow, then the inflic- tion of penalties will not come under the idea of justice. This is the case of which S. Augustine is speaking, where the excommunication of some will probably be followed by the schism of others. (2) But sacred truth is to be held back on account of scandal. " Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, nei- ther casi ye your pearls before swine; lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you" (S. Matt. vii. (j). I reply that sacred truth and the teaching of it are here to be distinguished. That truth is so necessary to salvation thai the contrary of it may under no circum- stances be taught fur fear of any scandal whatsoever which will follow the proclamation of the truth. Buthcwho.se duty ir is to teach the truth will give it according to what fits the times and the persons. This teaching is one of those spiritual works of mercy of which we shall presently speak. (3) Fraternal correction, also, is intended for the amend- ment of a brother, and it is a spiritual good so far as this can be attained. But if he be scandalized by it, it is not a spiritual good. Tiierefore, if such fraternal correction be ; by through fear of scandal, a spiritual good is not given up. (4) But you may say that the giving of alms and the fol- lowing of spiritual counsels may sometimes be left undone on account of scandal. I reply that counsels or works of mercy are not to be left undone on account of scandal, al- though, for the sake of the weak, they may be concealed or deferred. But sometimes the observance of spiritual coun- sels or the works of mercy may be necessary to salvation. There are those who have vowed to follow the counsels of perfection ; there are those whose office and duty it is to assist the poor or to teach the ignorant ; there are cases occurring of extreme necessity : in all such cases the prin- ciple already laid down respecting what is necessary to sal- Qu. XLIII. 8.] SCANDAL. 259 vation applies ; they may not be neglected through fear of scandal. (5) But ought not one to commit some trifling venial transgression on account of some grave scandal — say, to hinder another's mortal sin ? For a man ought to hinder the damnation of his neighbour, if he can do so without loss of his own soul. But there is contradiction in these terms. For if the thing may be lawfully done, it is not evil, it is not even venial sin; for sin can never bo rightly chosen. I grant, however, that it may happen that something which would be venial sin under other circumstances, may be no sin at all, those circumstances not being present. A jest is venial sin under certain circumstances, but if it be uttered for reasonable cause it is not an idle word, it is no sin. Are temporal goods to be given up on account of scandal? Observe that a distinction must be made between what is our own and what is entrusted to our care, if we are guard- ians of Church property or of the goods of the common- wealth (or trustees of minors, etc.). Such deposits we are bound to preserve, and they are not to be resigned on ac- count of scandal ; neither are those things which are neces- sary for human life to be given up. But as respects those things over which we have dominion, sometimes on account of scandal we ought to let them go by giving them up, or not seeking them when others have them, and sometimes we ought not to do any such thing. For if the scandal arise from the ignorance or infirmity of others (scandal of the weak), temporal goods are to be abandoned, or the scandal is to be stopped by proper admonition. But sometimes scandal originates in malice (the scandal of Pharisees). Property is not to be surrendered on account of those who excite such scandal, because such a course would be injurious to the common good, giving occasion for robbery to the evil-disposed ; and it would be injurious 260 VICES OPPOSED TO CHARITY. [Qu. XLIII. 8. to the plunderers themselves, who, by keeping others' goods, would continue in open sin. (1) It is true that we ought to prefer the spiritual salva- tion of our neighbour to any earthly goods ; but this prin- ciple can only apply to scandal of the weak. (2) When S. Paul said: ''Destroy not with thy meat him for whom Christ died" (Rom. xiv. 15), he was speak- ing, of couth', of what is not necessary for bodily suste- nance; as again in 1 Cor. viii. 13: "If meat maketh my brother t<> Btumble, I will eat no ilesk for evermore, that I make not my brother to stumbL ." (3) Our Lord (S. Mail. v. 40) Baid : " It' any man would go i" law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also." And S. Paul to the same effect (1 Cor. . i . But this is .-.iid <»!' preparedness of soul when such a course is i xpedii nl ; but sometimes it is not expedient.* • If there is a question of positive dul vo injury to t to others, passive scandal may be permitted. But distinguish between moral precepts, including the law of nature, and purely positive law. The former may not !»• broken in order to avoid scandal ; the latter may 1"- freely suspended by the higher law of charity. It i- not the .-in of scandal to permit a sin in onler to hinder many sins ; e.g., the theft of a child or a sen 1 in order to detect and stop pilfering, or a marked letter or coin for a similar purpose. (Qu. 1. Observance of the "Sabbath," and tin- use of fermented drinks, a- passive scandal of the weak or the Pharisee. Sacramental wine rests on a dill Qu. i. Dances, and " low-necked " gowns 7) Part III. — The Cardinal Virtues. CHAPTER I. PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. § 1. Prudence. What is prudence f It is a virtuous habit of the practical reason by which one judges rightly of the future from the past and the pres- ent. The prudent man considers what is to come as aiding or impeding what is immediately to be done. Prudence judges of the means for the end which is sought. Eeason gives this counsel ; on it follows the choice of the will. There may be an application of practical judgment to some special end, making a man prudent in that special way ; but prudence, taken simply, is the habit of right practical judgment respecting a good life. It is not wis- dom, for that looks to the ultimate and highest cause — i.e., God ; but it is wisdom in a lower sense, wisdom in human affairs as human. To prudence pertains not merely rational consideration, but its application to action. And since action is concerned with particulars, it is necessary that the prudent man know both the universal principles of reason, and those particu- lars in which he is to act. Those particulars may be in- finite in number, but experience reduces them to a limited number of general rules applicable to most cases which occur. This is not a question merely of observation by acute senses, but of memory and experience, which furnish the ma- terials which practical reason uses in its prudent judgments. 262 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. xlvii. 4, 5, G, 7. Is prudence a virtue? Recall the definition, e< virtue is what makes him that has it good, and renders his work good.'' But the good may be viewed either as that wiiich in itself simply is so, or as that which the agent so regards. The good viewed as such is the object of the desires. Therefore, if there are any habits which give a correct rational view, without rela- tion to rectitude of desire, they have less of the nature of virtue, ordaining to what is materially good but not under the notion of good. But those habits which imply recti- tude of desire have more of the idea of virtue in them, he- cause they regard the good as good. Now prudence is the application of right reason to act inn, which is not done with- out right desire. Therefore prudence is not only a virtue in the sense in which the other intellectual virtues are BO, but it U a moral virtue also, ami numbered among them. It is a special virtue clearly distinguished from others In its object. A- an intellectual virtue it is distinguished from the others, since wisdom, knowledge, and understanding con- c Tn necessary things ; but this regards solely contingent things. So, indeed, does art; but that concerns external things to be made, as a house or a picture, while prudence is concerned with the agent and what he has to do. But it is distinguished from the moral virtues by its belonging to another power of the soul, the intellectual, not the appeti- tive. Prudence does not prescribe their end to the moral vir- tues. That belongs to the moral judgment, " synderesis ;" but it is the office of the former to judge what are suitable means for the attaining of those ends. In the government of the passions by moral virtues, it judges of the means by Qu. XLVII. 8, 9, 10, 13.] PRUDENCE. 263 which the rational and happy mean may be attained which constitutes those virtues (Nic. Ethics). Its first act is deliberative, taking counsel, inquiring what means and circumstances are suitable for the end in view. Speculative reason may form a theoretical judgment of what should be done, along with its attendant circumstances ; but practical reason goes further, in prescribing and apply- ing to operation what has been counselled and judged. This is the principal act of prudence. Care and vigilance follow as part of the same virtue, not only for the private good of one, but for the good of the whole community. Can sinners have prudence ? There are three sorts of prudence. (1) Since the prudent man is he who well arranges what is to be done for the attainment of some good end, he who skilfully fits his means to some bad end has a kind of false prudence. Thus, we may speak of a prudent thief, who skilfully manages his plans for stealing and for escape from being found out. (2) There is another sort of prudence which fits, the means to a good end, but it is imperfect ; first, because the good which it takes for an end is not the common end of all human life. Such is the prudence of a merchant or a ship-captain. This is the prudence of the children of this world, who, in their way, may be "wiser than the children of light." It may be deficient in another way, when oue rightly counsels and rightly judges respecting what pertains to the whole life, but does not efficaciously prescribe action to himself. (3) But the third kind of prudence is true and perfect, which rightly takes counsel, judges, and prescribes how to attain the good end of the whole life. This sinners can- 264 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. xlvii. 14, 15. not have. But the second, imperfect on account of its par- ticular aim, is common to good and bad. J 's prudence possessed by all who are in a state of grace? All such have charity, and with it come all other Chris- tian virtues ; and so it is necessary that prudence be in them. For no one has grace, unless he is virtuous. But no one can be virtuous unless he have prudence. For if the other virtues act not prudently in what they seek after, they are not entitled to the name of \ irtues. (1) Yet such may Beem to lark that diligent carefulness by which they provide well for what is to be done. Yes; but understand that we are speaking now of that prudence which concerns what is necessary to salvation, of which S. John Baid (1 Bp. ii. 27), "Hisanointing teacheth you con- cerning all things. " (2) But many, yon say, who have grace need to be guided by others' counsel. Yet they, in this very thing at least, know how to counsel well for themselves, in that they oth< T-' counsel, and distinguish the good from the bad. (3) Again, it may be objected that many young people are in a state of grace, and yet the young are not prudent. Acquired prudence, indeed, is caused by repeated action, and needs experience and time. And so the young cannot have it, either as a habit or actually. But the prudence of grace is an infused virtue, given even to baptized infants as a habit, though not in actual use. But in those who have the use of reason, it is actual so far as concerns what is essen- tial to salvation ; and through exercise of it as of the other virtues, increase is merited until the perfect virtue is gained. Prudence is not implanted in us by nature. We have seen that it includes a knowledge of universal principles and of particular things to be done to which the prudent man applies those universal principles. The com- Qu. xlvii. 16.] PRUDEXCE. 265 mon principles of prudence, indeed, are connatural to man ; but other principles of a practical kind are acquired by experience or instruction. Again, as regards the particular cognition of those things which concern action, we must distinguish between what directly concerns the end, and what concerns the means to that end. For the right ends of human life are fixed and determined. Therefore, there can be a natural inclination towards those ends. Some have certain virtues by their natural disposition, by which they are inclined to right ends, and, consequently, have naturally right judgment respecting those ends. But in human affairs the means for the end are not determined, but are manifoldly diversified accord- ing to the diversity of persons and things. Hence, since natural inclination is always to some determined thing, such knowledge cannot be in man by nature, although from natural disposition one may be more apt for discernment of these means than another is. Prudence, then, is not a natural virtue. Brutes seem to have a sort of natural prudence, but they have determined ways of reaching the ends of their exist- ence ; and so all of one species act in the same way (even when the action has become useless as means to an end ; thus a beaver or a squirrel in captivity goes through the usual operations of his instinctive prudence). How is prudence lost? Forgetfulness applies to knowledge only. Science and art may be forgotten. But prudence does not consist in knowledge only, but also in desire, since its principal act is to prescribe what is to be done; i.e., to apply knowledge to seeking and acting. Prudence, therefore, is rather cor- rupted by passions than taken away directly by forgetful- ness. Yet this can impede the operation of the virtue, inasmuch as it prescribes what is to be done from some knowledge which may be lost through forgetfulness. 26G PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. LIU. 1. " Integral " parts of prudence are such virtues as (a) teachableness, by which one care- fully, frequently, and reverently applies his mind to the teachings of those who have gone before him, neither neg- lecting them through sloth, nor contemning them through pride ; (b) foresight, circumspection, i.e., accurate considera- tion of the circumstances of action ; and (c) caution, i.e., careful consideration of the attendant evils and impedi- ments of action. Corresponding to the virtue of prudence is the spiritual gift of counsel. For human reason cannot comprehend all the particular and contingent events which may occur (espe- cially in connection with the Christian life) ; and therefore his prudence needs to be directed by God aiding and per- fecting it. The Decalogue contained no command respecting pru- dence In, mum it was concerned with the dictates of natural reason, and these chiefly concern the ends of human life, not the means for those ends. But subsequent documents of the Old Testament added the means to those ends, and the perfect Evangelical doctrine instructed man in all that pertains to rectitude of life. This, therefore, said (S. Matt. x. 1G), " Be ye wise (prudent) as serpents/' § 2. Vices opposed to prudence. Imprudence : is it a sin ? The merely negative absence of prudence may exist without Bin; but privatively, imprudence exists when one lack- the prudence which he is fitted to have and ought to have, and this is sin by reason of the negligence through which he does not use efforts to obtain this virtue. And, again, imprudence is to be taken in contradictory signification, when reason is moved to acts contrary to pru- dence, as when right reason acts after taking counsel, and the imprudent spurns counsel. In this way imprudence is a sin according to the proper idea of prudence. For a man Qu. Lin. 4.] VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE. 267 cannot act contrary to prudence except he turn away from those rules by which the prudent is guided aright. If this happen by aversion from Divine rules, it is mortal sin, as when one acts precipitately through contemning and repu- diating the Holy Scriptures. But if the neglect of Divine rules is without contempt or detriment to those things which are necessary to salvation, it is venial sin. (1) It may seem that imprudence is not voluntary, and therefore is not sin. And it is true that no one wills the deformity of imprudence ; but yet he who wills to act rashly, wills the imprudent act. (2) It is true that imprudence is born with man, and that the young are naturally imprudent. But this is the merely negative imprudence, which, however, is part of that lack of original righteousness which once perfected the whole soul, which deficiency is called original sin. (3) By repentance is restored infused prudence, but not the habit acquired by experience. But the contrary act is removed in which properly consists the sin. Various sins are contained under this, as rashness or temerity, inconsiderateness of judgment, inconstancy, and negligence. (1) There are steps by which prudence advances, such as memory of the past, consideration of the present, sagacity in viewing the future, reflection comparing one thing with another, docility towards the judgments of elders. But rashness leaps over all these steps, acting under the impulse of will or passion. It is a special form of the sin of impru- dence. (2) Inconsiderateness is another special form of this sin, when one fails to judge rightly because he despises those things from which right judgment proceeds, or neglects to attend to them. The Lord (S. Matt. x. 19) forbade His disciples to be anxious how or what they should speak, trusting in the Divine counsel ; but to neglect to do what we can, expecting Divine aid, seems to be tempting God. 268 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [QlT. LIV. 3. (3) Inconstancy denotes a withdrawal from some pro- posed good which had been resolved upon. Such with- drawal has its beginning, indeed, in the desires, for no one changes his purpose except on account of something which inordinately pleases him. But this withdrawal is consum- mated by defect in reason, which repudiates what it had rightly accepted. If reason does not resist the impulse of passions when it can do so, the fault is due to its weakness, not holding firmly to the proposed good which it has con- ceived. Therefore the consummation of inconstancy per- tain-; to defeel of reason ; i.e., t<> imprudence. These three vices arc the daughters of lust ("litxuria"), because sen- sual pleasure absorbs the niiud and extinguishes the judg- ment of reason. Negligence : is it a special sin .' 1 1 implies the lack of due care and watchfulness. But every defect of due acts is sin. And as that careful vigi- lance is a special virtue, bo its opposite is a special sin (es- pecially in those things which pertain to our salvation). The matter about which the diligence or the negligence is concerned may be any moral question, but the want of the special act of reason which is due constitutes the latter a special sin over and above any other which may be present also. Sins of omission pertain to the outward acts which arc due. and such omission is the effect of negligence, the in- ward Bin which pertains to imprudence. < 'an negligence be a mortal sin ? Holy Scripture seems to answer that question for us when it says (Prov. six. 1G), " He that is careless of his ways shall die." Xegligence comes from remissness of will which is not anxious to prescribe what it ought and in the way it ought. This can be mortal sin in two ways ; first, as respects that which is omitted through negligence; for Qu. LV. 3, 4, 5.] VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE. 269 if this be necessary to salvation, whether it be an act or a circumstance of the act, there will be mortal sin. And again, if the will is so remiss regarding what belongs to God that it totally loses charity, such negligence is mortal sin, and this happens especially when the negligence fol- lows from contempt. Otherwise, if the negligence consist in the omission of some act or circumstance which is not necessary to salvation, and if this be not done through con- tempt, but from lack of fervour which is sometimes im- peded by some venial sin, then the negligence is not mortal but is venial. Craftiness : is it a special sin ? S. Paul says (2 Cor. iv. 2), " We have renounced the hidden things of shame, not walking in craftiness." That answers the question. Sin against prudence may have some resemblance to the virtue in two ways : either the efforts of reason may be directed to some end which is not truly good, but only apparent good ; or one in seeking some end, whether good or bad, may use, not the true paths, but feigned and seeming right. This is craftiness. (1) This is not the '• subtlety " offered to the simple by the Proverbs of Solomon (Prov. i. 4). (2) A good end does not sanctify the bad means. Guile (" dolus") pertains to the carrying out of crafty designs, chiefly indeed by words, but also sometimes by actions. He that medi- tates evil, tries to find the way to fulfil his purpose, and usually the guileful way is au easier one than open vio- lence. Fraud also pertains to the carrying out of crafty designs, but if we make any distinction between it and guile, it may be that fraud proper has to do with actions. 270 PRUDENCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. LV. G, 7. Is it lawful to have solicitude respecting temporal things"? The Lord said (S. Matt. vi. 31), " Be not anxious, say- ing, What shall we eat ? or, What shall we drink ? or, Where- withal shall we be clothed?" Solicitude leads to anxious endeavour to obtain something. Where there is fear of failing, there is more zealous endeavour ; but where there is security respecting the end, there is less solicitude. So, then, this anxiety aboui temporal things may in three ways be unlawful : (1) On the side of what we are anxious about, if we seek temporal things as our end; (2) on the side of the anxiety, if it be such as to withdraw a man from those spiritual things which he ought chiefly to follow; ''the care of the world chokes the word " (S. Matt. xiii. 22) ; (:)) on the side of tin- needless fear, when one fears lest neces- saries fail him through doing whal he ought to do. This fear the Lord excludes by three arguments addressed to his timid disciple : first, that greater benefits, without any anxiety of his, are Divinely conferred, \iz., on soul and body; next, that God provides for beasl and plant without human labour ; and lastly, that it is ignorance of Divine Providence which makes an infidel, an atheist, or a heathen man anxious aboul this world's goods. (1) Man. by Divine ordinance, has the use of this world, hut not that he may make it the end of his life. (2) Man must work in order to live ; hut this is moder- ate! care, not superfluous anxiety. May in" /„■ anxious for the future? The Lord answers (S. Matt. vi. 34), "Be not anxious for the morrow." No work can be virtuous unless it he clothed with due circumstances, among which is the lit time. " There is a time to every purpose which is under the heaven." Each day brings with it its own proper care, the time to plant or the time to reap. If in the time of planting one is anxious about the harvest, that may be the superfluous care which the Lord prohibited. " Sufficient Qu. LV. 7.] VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDEHCE. 271 unto the day is the evil thereof;" i.e., the trouble and care. This does not prohibit prudence with respect to the fu- ture, providing what is needed for the future, since Christ Himself taught us that by His example (S. John xii. 6). These vices of craftiness, guile, fraud, and inordinate anxiety are especially the daughters of avarice. CHAPTER II. JUSTICE AND I N.I I STICK. in. e Supplement, Chapters TV. ami V.) | 1. Right. Right [jus) is (he object of justice, for it is what is just. \ • it is peculiar to justice among the virtues that it ordains man in those things wherein he is related to another man. Other virtues perfect him in what belongs to himself; bui in jusi action, the right considers cot only the agent, hut also another person. For that is called just action in which there is a certain relative equality, as when work is paid for with its due wages. The just anion does nol necessarily regard the manner in which the thing is done (e.g., whether freely or not). And thus justice is distinguishable from other virtues. Because justice implies a certain equality, and we can recompense God by no equivalent for His bounty, properly speaking, justice is between man and man ; yet justice tends to this, that man requite His Heavenly Father as much as he is able, by entire subjection of his soul to God. Right is eitJter natural or positive right. One thing may be adequate to another, (I) according to its very nature, as when any one gives as much as he has received. This is natural right. (2) It may be adequate or commensurate according to some compact or common agreement, when one deems himself compensated if he receive so much. This may be either a private agreement between two individuals, or it may be by public consent, the Qu. lvii. 2.] RIGHT. 273 whole people, with or without legal ordinance, agreeing that some one thing is adequate and commensurate to another. (1) But it might be objected that what is natural is immutable, and is the same among all men ; but no such thing is found in human affairs, because all the regulations of human right are defective in some cases and do not pre- vail everywhere. And this is true of what has an immuta- ble nature ; it must be always and everywhere the same. But man's nature is mutable, and so what is natural to man can sometimes be deficient. Thus it is naturally just and equal that what has been left in our charge be returned to its owner ; and if human nature were always what it should be, this law would be immutable. But because it some- times happens that the will of man is depraved, a case may occur in which such deposit is not to be returned ; say, if a madman or an enemy of the republic demand the arms which he has left with us. (2) Another objection, whose solution will help in clear- ing up the matter. Positive right proceeds from human will ; but such a thing is not necessarily just ; otherwise the will of man could never be unjust. I reply that the will of man, by the common consent of the people, can make something to be just where there is no natural repug- nance to natural justice. Positive right is concerned with such things. " The legally just is that which in the begin- ning might have been thus or thus, and it mattered not which. But when it is decreed, then it does matter" (Nic. Eth. v. 7). But if anything has in itself repugnance to natural right, it cannot be made just by human will ; say, if it be decreed lawful to steal or to commit adultery. "Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees" (Isa. x. 1). (3) Divine right {jus divinum) is divisible in the same way. It is what is promulgated by God. But that is partly what is naturally just, though its justice may not be seen 18 274 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LVIII. 1, 2, P>, 4. by all men ; partly what is made just by Divine institu- tion. In Divine law, accordingly, some tilings are commanded because they are good, and others prohibited because they are bad ; but some things also are good because they are commanded, and others bad because they are prohibited (a very noteworthy distinction). What is jus gentium f The law of nature {jus naturals) is what nature teaches all animals, as the union of male and female, and the bring- ing up of children (Instit. i., tit. ii.), but tho jus gentium is what natural reason has established among all men, which needs no special institution, and is found among all nations. The rights of a father in respect to his children, and of a master over his servants, are to be distinguished from sim- ple right. Servants and children are, as it were, a part of father and master {i.e., their time, work, etc., are not absolutely their own). As human beings, they have their individual rights; but as under another, justice, taken sim- ply, does not express what is their due, but an imperfect justice based on their peculiar relations to father or master. For the relation is not the simple relation of one person to another, but is based on the special relation in these cases. § 2. Justice. Justice is a constant and perpetual will to render to every one his right (Instit. i., tit. i). Justice is a virtue which concerns our relations to others. Its seat is in the will. It pertains to this virtue to rec- tify human actions, establishing an equality in the relations of one to another. This rectification makes a man so far good and his work good, which effect ranks justice among the virtues. And it is a virtue of the will, not of the intel- lect, because it does not direct our knowledge but rectifies Qu. lviii. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.] JUSTICE. 275 our action. It is not a virtue of sense-appetite, because that does not consider our mutual relations, nor is it capa- ble of being disposed to render every one bis right. Distinguish general justice, "legal justice," from pri- vate or particular justice. Justice ordains man in relation to others. But this may be in relation to another individual, or to the community of which he is a part. As a general virtue it orders the acts of all virtues for the common good, just as charity orders them for Divine good, and this is also a general virtue. I call this general justice "legal justice" because by it man is in harmony with law, whose function it is to direct man's actions for the common good. It is distinct from the virtues which it orders for the common good, because they have their immediate end, which is different from this higher end of the public good which general or legal justice gives them. But man also needs to be ordered in his actions towards other individuals ; hence there is also particular (or pri- vate) justice. Its special object is not the inward passions, which need other rectifying virtues, but those outward actions and those outward things by which men have inter- course with one another. Inward passions, in their effects — sc, outward operations — may extend to others, but they do not in themselves so extend ; this is peculiar to justice. Justice is not directly concerned with the passions of the soul. This we have already seen ; the subject of justice is the will ; its matter, the things in which we are related to one another. But further explanation may be given of the relation between justice and inward passions. Actions are intermediate between outward things which are the object of those actions and the passions from which those actions spring. Sometimes there may be defect in one of those 2TC JUSTICE VXD INJUSTICE. [Qu. lviii. 12. without defect in the other ; as if any one take another's property, not with desire of getting it, but with a wish to do him harm ; or, conversely, if lie desire what is another man's, but does not will to steal it. The rectification of actions, therefore, so far as the outward part is concerned, belongs to justice ; but the rectification of those actions in the inward part belongs to other moral virtues which are concerned with the passions. Thus justice prevents steal- ing as being againel thai equality which is to be preserved in outward things; Imt liberality prevents it as it proceeds from immoderate lust of riches. It is especially legal justice, winch is ordained for the common good, which extends to the inward passions of the soul, since the good of the whole is the end of each mem- ber of t he whole. But even legal justice is chiefly concerned with the outward operations of those virtues which con- cern the passions, Buch actions cominir within the scope of law. So law may punish cowardice, intemperance, cruelty, etc., if they show themselves in action (Nic. Eth. v. 2). The proper act of justice is to render to each one what is his. Justice is /'/■>i : //ii/ i c/if among moral virtues. This is manifestly true of general, legal justice, because the common good is of more importance than the good of any individual. But even particular justice has the same preeminence for two reasons ; first, it is in the nobler part of the soul, the rational appetite — i.e., the will; while the other moral virtues belong to sense-appetite and its passions. And, in the second place, while those virtues have for their object the good of one person, justice aims also at the good of another. Justice ranks even above liberality ; for in considering the common good, the former extends to all who are related, while liberality does not ; and liberality which gives of one's own must be founded on justice which gives what is due. Qit. MX. 1, 2, 3.1 INJUSTICE. 277 § 3. Injustice. Is it a special vice ? There are two kinds of injustice. The first is illegal, opposed to legal justice. This is a special vice, for it has a special object ; sc, the general good which it contemns. But in its aim it is rather a general vice than a special one ; for through contempt of the general good man can be led into all kinds of sins ; and all vices, as repugnant to the general good, have the nature of injustice, are derived from it. The other kind of injustice is based on inequality towards another, when one wishes to have more of good things than is just — say, riches and honours ; and fewer evils — say, labours and losses. In this way injustice has its own special matter, and is a special vice opposed to private justice. Private injustice is opposed, indeed, indirectly to all vir- tues, as regards their outward acts. Thus it is opposed to chastity in the act of adultery, to kindness in the act. of homicide, etc. Who is an unjust man? Not always he who does an unjust action. For, first, if he did not intend to do an unjust thing, the action does not make him unjust per se, but per acciclens. The action is unjust, but it is not unjustly done ; it is not a wrong, an injury [adiurjfia). Secondly, the wrong may proceed from some passion, as anger or concupiscence ; or it may be deliberately done, when the wrong per se gives pleasure. In this latter case it proceeds from a habit. But to do an unjust action from intention and choice is the mark of an unjust man. He is called unjust who has the habit of injustice. But unintentionally, or from passion, one may do an unjust action without having a habit of injustice. Can any one willingly suffer wrong f " Scienti et volenti non fit injuria.''' A man properly and per se does that which he willingly does ; and he 278 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. Lix. 3. properly suffers that which lie suffers contrary to his will ; because so far as he is willing, he is rather active than passive. No one, then, can, properly speaking, do a wrong unless lie wills it, nor suffer a wrong unless he be unwill- ing. But, per accidens, and according to the "material" pari of the action, one can unwillingly do that which is per se unjust, as when he ads against his intention ; or he can willingly suffer an injustice, as when he of his own will gives to another more than is due. (1) Y<elf alone ; and so, if he does any harm to himself, it may be some other sin, as intemperance or imprudence, but it is not injustice. But also man may be considered as a part of society, or as the creature and image of God. And so he who kills himself does an injury to the state and to God. There- fore both Divine and human laws inflict a penalty. (3) Another objection. No one does an unjust thing unless there be some one who suffers that injustice. (The two are correlative.) But he may do an unjust thing to one who wills it, as when he sells a thing for more than it is worth. So it seems that one can willingly suffer injus- tice. But I reply that in the doing and the suffering an unjust thing, we may look at the "'material" part, the outward action considered in itself. In this respect, the Qu. LX. 1.] JUDGMENT. 279 doing and the suffering are always concomitant. But again we may look at the will and intention, the "formal" part of the action. In this regard one may do an unjust thing intending to do such a thing, and yet the other may not suffer injustice because he willingly allows the action. (Thus, in a case of fraud in a bargain, one may pay the excessive price, intending to make a donation of the excess to the cheat.) And, conversely, one may unjustly suffer, because he unwillingly suffers that which is unjust ; and yet he who does the action will not be acting unjustly, because he is ignorant of the nature of what he does. Whoever does an unjust action is guilty of mortal sin. He directly violates the law of God ; his act is opposed to charity, through which is the life of the soul. .For every injury done to another is repugnant to charity which wills another's good. (1) What shall we say of ignorance ? Ignorance of the fact, of the circumstances, merits pardon ; but ignorance of the law does not excuse (the laws of justice can generally be known by one who wills to know them). But he who ignorantly does an unjust thing, does so only per accidens. (2) What shall we say of very trifling acts of injustice ? Possibly some such thing may not be, properly speaking, perfect injustice at all ; for it may be considered to be not altogether contrary to the will of him who suffers it ; as if any one take an apple or some such thing, when there is probably no harm done, nor any displeasure resulting if the act be known. § 4. Judgment. Judgment is the definition or determination of what is just and right. But that any one well determine anything in virtuous acts proceeds from a habit of virtue ; and therefore judg- ment is an act of justice. It is an act of reason, indeed, 280 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. IX. 2. perfected by prudence, but a fit disposition for judging rightly is also requisite ; and so, in what pertains to justice, judgment springs from the virtue of justice, as in what per- tains to courage it comes from that virtue. "He that is spiritual judgeth all tilings'' (1 Cor. ii. 15), because from charity he has the disposition to judge rightly all things according to Divine rules, through t lie gift of wisdom ; as the jusl man, through the virtue of prudence, pronounces judgment out of the rules of right. But the meaning of the term judgment is amplified to embrace righi determination in any things whatsoever, and in other virtues the judgment of him who is vir- tuous in their regard is required. But when we speak of justice, jndgmenl is used in its restricted and proper mean- ing. />• it lawful to judge f It is plainly lawful so far as it is an act of justice. But this requires three things: (1) It must proceed from the disposition to be just and to do just actions ; otherwise ii is 3( the rectitude of justice; it is perverse and unjust. (2) It musl proceed from due authority, not from judging in things where one has no such right ; otherwise it is usurped judgment. (3) Judgment must be made according to rational prudence. "When certitude is lacking, as when one judges about doubtful or secret things by some light conjectures, such a judgment is rash and suspicious. Whichever of these three requisites is lacking, the judg- ment is illicit and vicious. (1) The Lord said, indeed (8. Matt. vii. 1), "Judge not, that ye be not judged." But He prohibits rash judg- ment, or that which is not of good will, but from bitter- ness of spirit. (2) S. Paul, also, said (Rom. xiv. 4). " Who art thou that judgest another's" servant ? To his own master he standeth orfalleth;'" which seems to indicate that God is the only Qu. LX. 3.] JUDGMENT. 281 judge. But judgment may be made by " the minister of God " (Deut. i. 17). (3) But the apostle seems to say, again (Rom. ii. 1), that it is not lawful for a sinful man to judge ; and all are sin- ners. And this is true when the judge's sins are open and similar, or greater; for great scandal arises from such judg- ments. But when the sins are not notorious and official duty requires, he can rebuke or judge with humility and fear. He does not thus condemn himself with new con- demnation, but he shows himself worthy of condemnation for the same or like sin. Is judgment from suspicion illicit ? Suspicion is an evil opinion of another based on light indications or proofs. And this arises in three ways : (1) He who is himself an evil-doer, conscious of his malice, easily forms a bad opinion of others. (2) He may be ill- affected towards another, and, despising or hating him, or being angry or envying him, he forms his opinion from trifling proofs, because one easily believes what he desires to be true. (3) Suspicion results from long experience. " The old are most suspicious, because they have had most expe- rience of others' deficiencies " (Arist. Ehet. ii. 13). The first two causes of suspicion manifestly pertain to perverse affections ; but the third cause renders the judgment less that of suspicion, inasmuch as experience gives more of certitude. Suspicion, then, implies a certain vice, and the further the suspicion proceeds, the greater the sin. But there are three grades of suspicion : (1) A man from light indications begins to harbour doubt about another's good- ness. This may be light and venial sin, for it pertains to those human temptations from which life cannot be free. (2) One from light indications may hold for certain the wickedness of another. And if this be in a grave matter, it is mortal sin, for it implies contempt of our neighbour. " If we cannot avoid suspicions, since we are men, yet we 282 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LX. 4. can and we ought to restrain definite and fixed judgments." (3) A judge out of suspicion may proceed to condemn another. This is directly an act of injustice, and a mortal sin. (1) It is true that in particular and contingent tilings we can never have absolute certainty ; but we can have that moral certainty which results from suitable proofs. (2) Suspicion, being only in the opinion of the mind, may Beem to be doing no injury ; but if one without suffi- cient can-' has a bad opinion of another, ho unduly con- temns Iiim ; therefore he does an injury to him. (See 1 Tim. vi. 4.) The inward judgment, as it is related to the • •utuard judgment, pertains to injustice in the same way in which anger is related to homicide. (The one may be venial, the other is mortal sin.) Doubts respecting (mother's wickedness are to be decided in the more favourable »< nse ( unless we simply suspend judg- ment, a ml "judge not at all "). For we have no right to contemn or do injury to another without the most cogent reasons. (1) It may happen that he who puts the most favourable interpretation on others' words and actions is oftenest de- ceived. But it is better that one be frequently mistaken in having a good opinion of a bad man than that he be more rarely mistaken in having a bad opinion of a good man. For injury is done to another by this, hut not by the first error. (2) It is one thing to judge of things, and quite another to judge of men. For in judging about things, there is no good or evil done to the thing, in whatever way we may judge of it. It is only the good of the judge which is in question ; the good, if he judge rightly ; or the evil, if he judge falsely ; because the true is the good of reason, and the false is its evil. And therefore each one ought to strive to judge of things precisely as they are. Qu. LX. •"">.] JUDGMENT. 283 But, in judging men, the good and evil is chiefly on the side of him who is judged, who is deemed worthy of honour if he receive favourable judgment, and worthy of contempt if he be judged unfavourably. Therefore in such judgment we ought to aim to judge a man to be good unless manifest reason for the contrary appear. And if we err in our favour- able judgment, the error does not pertain to the evil of reason, for its perfection is not found in knowledge of par- ticular contingent things ; but the error rather pertains to well-constituted affections. We are not now considering the application of remedies for spiritual diseases. There we may assume the worse condition, since the remedy which fits that graver disease will suit still more the lighter one. Written laws. These are made to set forth either natural right or positive right, but not both after the same manner. For written law contains natural right, but does not create it ; it gets its force, not from the law, but from nature ; whereas writ- ten law both contains and establishes positive right, giv- ing it its authority and binding force. Judgment, then, must be made according to such law, otherwise it would fall short either of natural justice or of positive justice. (1) Laws, indeed, are sometimes unjust. But, since law gives no force to natural right, it cannot take away or diminish the force of that right, because man's will cannot change nature. Therefore, if law contain anything against natural right, it is unjust, and creates no obligation of obedience. Positive law comes in where it makes no differ- ence as regards natural right whether the action be done in one way or in another. Unjust laws, so called, are prop- erly no laws at all, but rather corruptions of law. (2) No law can comprehend all particular events. In some cases, if the law-maker were present, he would judge contrary to the letter of the law. The best laws, laws per- 884 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. IAI. 1. fectly just, fail to meet some cases. If they were observed in those cases they would he contrary to natural right. In such casea judgment is not to be given according to the letter of the law, but recourse is to be had to that equity which the law-maker was bound to intend. "No consid- eration of right or benignity of equity endures, that what was beneficially introduced for the good of mankind should, rarer interpretation, be used against the advantage of those who are subject to law." [fa jusl law-maker had con- sidered .mum! cases, he would have determined them by just law. (In doubtful cases, recourse is to be had to those who have authority to interpret, to judge, to decide.) Usurped judgment. Since judgmeni is to be given according to law, he who does so interprets the law in applying it to the particular case before him. But it belongs to the same authority of government to make law, and to interpret it (by prac- tical application i nforcing it). Therefore, as law can only be made by public authority, so judgment can only be me. And so, as it would be unjust that any one should compel another to observe some regulation which was not sanctioned by public authority, so it is also unjust that any one should compel another to submit to judgment which has not the same sanction. § 5. Commutative and distributive justice ; restitution. Divisions of justice. There are two species of particular justice, commutative and distributive ; for justice, in this sense of the word, directs each individual as part of the community. Now part may be related to part — i.e., one individual to another; and commutative justice directs the relations which one man bears to another (as in buying and selling, and similar contracts). But another relation is that of the whole to the several Qu. LXI. 2, 3.] DIVISIONS OF JUSTICE. 285 parts ; that which belongs to the whole community in its relations to particular persons. Distributive justice di- rects this relation, assigning the common goods (honours, rewards, etc.) according to a certain proportion in dignity and merits. In distributive justice the equality of one thing to another is not considered, but the proportion of things to persons; so that, as one person exceeds another, what is given to the one exceeds what is given to the other. This is the reason why Aristotle spoke of a geometric proportion in distributive justice (Nic. Eth., v. 3). For the equality is not that of two things, but of two ratios (A's merits are to A's share, as B's merits are to B's share). But in exchange, something is given to one person on account of what he has himself given. And, therefore, the one thing must be equal to the other, as in buying and selling ; and if one have more of the other's goods than is equal to what he has given, commutative justice requires him to make restitution of the excess. And so a sort of arithmetical equality is established. If we consider punishments, retributive justice, in this light, we shall notice that in actions and passions the con- dition of the persons concerned contributes to the quantity of the thing ; for greater injury is done when a person holding official station is struck than when a private person is so injured. We may examine commutative justice somewhat more in detail. Justice, as we have seen, is concerned with outward operations ; sc, distribution and exchange. These opera- tions concern some external things, or persons, or services ; things, as when one takes away or restores another's prop- erty ; persons, as when one injures another's person by striking or slandering him, or on the other hand pays him 28G JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LX1I. 1. proper respect ; and lastly, services which may be justly demanded from another or rendered to him. In the exchanges between two persons which commutative justice directs, some are voluntary, some are involuntary. They are involuntary when one uses the property, the per- son, or the service of another against his consent, secretly through fraud, or openly through violence. Secretly one may take another's property, and we shall have the crime of theft ; or it may be done openly, which is robbery. Personal injustice may be directed against one's own per- son, or againsl those who belong to us ; it may be directly againsl our person, or againsl oui honour and reputation. The person may be secretly injured, as by treacherous murder — e.g., poisoning and the- like — or by open violence. Honour and reputation may be secretly injured by detrac- tion, backbiting, etc., or by public abuse, false wil etc. Through those belonging to us we may be injured by secret adultery, <»r by enticing from our service those who owe their work to QB. Voluntary exchanges are of very numerous kinds. If one simply transfer his property to another without any obligation so to do, as in a gift, it is not an act of justice, but of liberality. Justice implies something due, some kind of debt ; as in buying, selling, hiring, etc. (See, further, Supplement. Chapter VI.) Restitution is an act of commutative justice. To restore is to put another in possession or dominion of his own property, according to the equality of justice, whether the thing has been possessed with the owner's knowledge and consent, as in a loan or deposit, or without that knowledge and consent, as in theft and robbery. (It is either a returning of the thing received, or compensation for loss.) It is not the mere giving back of a material thing, which may be a donation ; it implies the obligation to do so, the returning what is justly another's. Qu. LXII. 2.] RESTITUTION. 287 The first meaning of restitution has to do with outward things which remain the same, and whose dominion can be transferred from one to another. But a secondary signifi- cation of the word transfers it to actions or passions which concern the honour or injury, the benefit or harm of per- sons. The action may not remain, but its effects abide ; e.g., the slanderous word passes away, but the loss of a good name is a permanent loss, and demands restitution so far as that is possible. To restore that which has been unjustly taken away is an indispensable requisite of salvation. For only the just man can be saved, and restitution is an indispensable act of justice. " Sender to all their dues. Owe no man anything but to love one another" (Rom. xiii. 7, 8). (1) Sometimes complete restitution is impossible, as when a limb or even life itself has been destroyed. But where the equivalent cannot be returned, as in the case of the honour due to God or to parents, there the obligation is limited to what is possible. The loss of a limb cannot be fully recompensed, yet justice will demand pecuniary com- pensation or other restitution, according to the circum- stances of the case. (2) It is objected that one man may take away another's good name by saying what is true concerning that other ; and he cannot restore a good character without telling a lie. But there are three ways in which a good name is taken away : (1) When the truth is justly spoken, according to the due order of things, and restitution is not due ; (2) when the words spoken were false and unjust, and the restitution of a good name is bounden duty, by a frank confession of the error ; (3) when the truth was spoken, but unjustly, as when any one betrays the crime of another without due warrant for so doing ; and he is bound to restore the good name, so far as is possible, without telling a lie. One may 288 JUSTICE AXD INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXII. 3. truly say that he ought not to have spoken in such a way ; thai he unjustly injured the other's character ; or, if he cannot restore a good character which he has taken away, and which every man is entitled to until it is lawfully taken away, he is bound to make other compensation. (3) Sometimes what is done cannot be undone ; unjust insult cannot be directly repaired. Yes; hut its effects which remain — sc, loss of respect before men — may be partly repaired through special exhibition of reverence. This is partial restitul ion. (4) Suppose one hinder another from obtaining some good — say, a lucrative office ; it is like taking it away. Is he bound to make restitution ? Oftentimes that would be impossible. 1 answer that one might be justly kept out of thi- office for the honour of God, or the good of the Church or of tin' commonwealth, in order thai a more worthy i should gut that dignity. Of course, in such a case no restitution is called for nor any compensation. But this may be unjustly clone, as through hatred, desire of ven- geance, unjust prejudice, etc. ; and, then, if the worthy be hindered before it has been settled that he shall have the . some compensation is due according to the circum- stances, hut not full restitution, because there might have been other hindrances to getting the office besides this one. But if the matter have been settled, and any one for im- proper causes procure that the appointment be revoked, it is all one with his taking away the good which the other has, and equal restitution is obligatory, or compensation to the extent of his ability. Is it sufficient simply to restore what has been unjustly taken away ? Two things are to be considered. First, there is inequality as respects the thing in question, which sometimes can exist without injustice, as when you hire a thing which is to be returned with additional compensation for the use of it. Qu. lxii. 4, 5.] RESTITUTION. 289 So far the remedy for the unjust taking is restitution, which restores equality. But there is, secondly, also the fault of injustice, which can exist without the actual taking away ; as when one in- tends to use violence, but does not succeed in his attempt. The remedy for this fault is a penalty inflicted by the proper judge. Therefore, before condemnation by such a judge one is not bound to restore more than he has re- ceived ; but after condemnation, he is bound to pay also the damages imposed. Is any one ever bound to restore what he has not tahen away ? Whoever causes loss to another may be said to take away that in which the loss is caused, whether he himself gets any advantage from his action or not. And, therefore, a man is bound to restitution as far as he has caused loss. (See, in Supplement, the case of the possessor in bad faith, chap. v. § 3.) But there are two ways of causing loss. First, that may be taken away which one actually has. Such loss is always to be restored with equal recompense. Thus, if any one cause loss by destroying the house of another, he is bound to as much as the actual damage. But, secondly, one may cause loss to another by preventing his obtaining what he was in the way of getting. Such damage is not to be recompensed according to equality in the thing, because that might be giving more than the existing state of things demanded. A future possibility is worth less than a pres- ent reality ("a bird in hand/' etc.). Some compensation, however, is due according to the condition of persons and things. Thus, if a field be injured which has been already sown, the indemnification is not equal to the entire crop expected from that field. Restitution is to be made to the one who has less than his own right through the unjust talcing away. But (1) the thing restored may be evidently very injuri- 290 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXII. 5. ous to the receiver or to some one else, as if a drunken man's revolver should be put into his hands, because it belongs to him. In such a case restitution is not to be made, because it is ordained for the benefit of him to whom it is made. But also he who detains another's property, even in such cases, has no right to appropriate it to him- self, but he is bound cither to preserve it in order to restore it at a fitting season, or else to hand it over to some one else for safer keeping. (••3) But it may be said that he who unlawfully gives any- thing does not deserve to receive it back ; and sometimes one unlawfully gives what another unlawfully receives, as in bribery or simony. Therefore restitution is not always to ]„■ made t<> the person from whom a thing has been re- ceived. But one -wrongfully gives anything in either of two ways. The giving itself may be wrong and contrary to law, as in giving with inteni of bribery or simony. Such a giver deserves to lose what he has given, lie has no claim for restitution ; but because he who receives docs so wrongfully, he ought not to keep anything for himself, but to devote it to charitable uses. In another way, one gives wrongfully, because he gives for a Avrong purpose, although the giving itself is not unlawful. (Query, the giving part of one's claim on government, when demanded by officials as a condition for just payment of the same?) A penitent prostitute would not be required to give back all which she had received, however shamefully and wick- edly. (3) Sometimes it is impossible to make restitution to the very person concerned, because he is dead, or too far re- moved, or is not known (as in common frauds in trade). As respects the unknown, if diligent inquiry give no infor- mation, the poor are to be the heirs of that unknown owner, an offering being thus made for the good of his soul. If he be dead, his lawful heirs take his claim for restitution. If he be far distant, there is ordinarily, in these days, no diffi- Qu. LXII. 6.] KESTITUTIOST. 291 culty iu sending to him, or, at least, in notifying him, that his rightful claim is waiting bis order. (4) One ought first to recompense those from whom, as from parents, he has received the greater benefits. Such benefits are far more than the worth of a loan or a deposit. So it may be said ; but benefactors cannot be recompensed from others' property. If you have what is another's, that is first to be returned, except, perhaps, in case of extreme necessity of that benefactor, for " necessity knows no law." Is he who has received what is another's always bound to make restitution ? He who has sinned is always bound to make satisfaction for his sin. But restitution is a satisfaction ; therefore it is always obligatory. But this principle requires further ex- plication. "When one has received what is another's, two things are to be considered ; the thing received, and the act itself of receiving. As regards the first, one is bound to re- store it, as long as he has it, because what he has over and above what is his own ought to be taken away from him and given to him to whom it belongs. This is required by com- mutative justice. But the taking of the thing may have either of three con- ditions. For (1) sometimes it is an injury when the thing is taken against the will of him who has lawful dominion of it, as in theft and robbery. And then the taker is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even if the thing be no longer in his possession. For as he who strikes another is bound to recompense that other for the injury, although he him- self have now no result from the wrong which he has done, so he who steals or robs is bound to recompense for the loss sus- tained, even if he have no benefit remaining from the wrong ; and, besides, he ought to be punished for the injury done. (2) In another way, one receives another's property for his own advantage without doing any injury, as when he 202 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXII. 7. hires a piano. And then lie who receives is bound to resti- tution not only by reason of the thing, but also of the re- ceiving, even if he have lost what he borrowed. For he is bound to recompense the one who has given him a benefit, which recompense would not be paid, if loss were incurred by the lender. (3) In the third way, one receives what is another's with- out injury, bul not for his own benefit, as when a hank takes charge of valuables belonging to depositors. He who so receives is not hound by reason of the receiving; rather he confers a favour by doing so; but he is bound by reason of the thing. Therefore, if the tiling be taken from him without any fault of his, he is not bound to make restitu- tion : but it would h>' otherwise if he should lose it through gross negligence.* M'iy those who have not taken be bound to restore? One is bound to make restitution not only by reason of the thing which belong- to another, but also by reason of injurious taking of it. And, therefore, whoever is the cause of that unjust taking is bound to make restitution, lie may be the cause directly or indirectly. He is directly the cause when he induces another to do the wrong. This direct cooperation may he (1) by exhorting or commanding; (2) by counselling ; (3) by consenting openly, or (4) by praising such an aet ; (5) by sheltering him who unjustly takes what is another's, or by giving him assistance ; (6) by participa- tion in the theft or robbery, or whatever the wrong may be, or by .-baring its fruits. Indirectly he is the cause of the unjust taking when he does not hinder it, although he can do so, and ought to do so, either because he (7) keeps back the command or coun- sel which would have prevented the wrong, or (8) because he withholds his aid which would have prevented it, or (9j because he conceals the fact. * See, further, Supplement, on Restitution, chap. v. £ 3. Qu. LXII. 7.] COOPERATION. 293 Five out of these nine modes of cooperation require res- titution ; and, primarily, command, because he who gives his order is the first mover in the act, and he, therefore, whether he give his order openly or tacitly, is chiefly bound to make restitution ; next, consent, in the case of him without whom the wrong could not have been committed ; thirdly, shelter- ing the wrong-doer ; fourthly, participation in the act or in its fruits ; and lastly, not hindering when duty or office re- quires it. Thus the official guardians of justice are bound to restitution if through their negligence wrongs are multiplied. In the other cases enumerated restitution is not always obligatory, for it is not always the case that advice or appro- bation is the efficient cause of the wrong. If it should be so, however, the adviser or the applauder before the wrong is clone, incurs the same obligation.* * Formal cooperation is joining in the bad intention ; material cooperation is affording to another opportunity for sin, while your action is not conjoined to his in will and intention. Material coop- eration only may be given provided that (a) your act is good, or, at least, indifferent ; (6) your motive is good ; (c) the bad effect is compen- sated by immediate good (see note on scandal, page 260). But consider also (d) whether you cannot hinder another's sin, or are not bound in charity to do so ; (e) how great the sin is ; (/) the probable effect of your refusal upon the sinner ; (g) how near to the sin your cooperation will be ; (7i) what right you have to do what is in question ; (i) how far the sin does injury to others ; (k) is there serious loss to yourself in refusal ? (Qu. 1. Communicating those privately known to be unworthy ? 2. Working a distillery or other property frequently abused ? 3. Liquor sellers ? 4. Church lotteries ? 5. Paying part of your rightful claim on government to a committee on claims in order to secure the rest ? 6. A clerk of a corporation is bidden to violate a law of the nation which is habitually violated by other corporations also, and he is bidden to withhold endamaging documents from the inspection of the court ? 7. Paying a legislator in order to secure the passage of a necessary bill ?) In general, observe that some things minister directly to sin ; in these intentional cooperation may be " partaking of other men's sins." But other things may not be directly sinful which are often abused. Herein, when the cooperation does not violate the law of justice as laid down 291 JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE. [Qu. LXil. 8. (1) It is not only ho who executes the act, but he who in any way is the cause of sin, who is a sinner. (2) He is principally bound who is principal in the act ; viz., first, the one who orders, and, next, the one who exe- cutes the command ; then the others in their turn. But if "in- restore to him who has suffered the loss, the others are released from this obligation. But those who are princi- pals in the act, ami have it< fruits, are bound to restore to the accessories, if those have made restitution. I'.ut if anyone give a command of this nature which is not executed, there is qo Buch obligation, since its object is principally to make righi the Loss incurred unjustly. It may be said that qo "tie is bound to expose himself to grave danger in order to preserve another's property, such danger as might be incurred by arresting or resisting a rob- ber. l»ut these are cases also which do not always demand restitution. It is the official guardians of the law (judges, military, police) on whom t he obligation rests. 117/'// is '////' //"////'/ Id make restitution? As taking another's property is sin against justice, so also in tin' text, it may oi may not violate the law c,f charity. (Duct. Dubitant., IV. i. Rule ll>. And civil law certainly has the right to interfere and forbid what, otherwise lawful, is frequently abused. In common law criminal cooperation is participation in some way in the felonious design. But if counsel is given for one crime, and another, different in object and not merely in circumstances, is com- mitted, the counsellor is not responsible. An accessory after the fact is one who conceals the offender or aids him to escape. (Qu. : Suppose that he is a near relative ': Common law makes no exception of such a case ; does moral law ?) Compounding of felony is punishable by common law, and is an iusult to justice ; but assaults and other similar misdemeanours {e.g., -- may be compounded (Blackst., iv. :j3, 38, 133). Conspiracy, by common law (modified in the United States), is an agreement to commit an act injurious to health, morals, trade, com- merce, or law. But if there be no felony, there must be some overt act to constitute it a crime. Qu. lxii. 8.] RESTITUTION. 205 is retaining it. For the owner is wrongfully hindered from its use and injury is done to him. It is not permitted to abide in sin for any length of time ; therefore every wrong- doer is bound to make immediate restitution, if he can, or else to ask a delay from him who can grant the use of the thing in question. (1) Affirmative precepts, it is true, do not oblige at all times, but this obligation is also negative : " Thou shalt not retain what is another's. " (2) No one is bound to what is impossible ; but he ought to ask for remission or delay respecting the obligation, either personally or through another who will not expose the unknown injurer. The old law of wages expresses the universal rule in this matter (Lev. xix. 13), "The hire of the labourer shall not abide with thee until the morning." CHAPTER III. SOTS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. § 1. Respect of persons. Is it i* merits or fitness something else may be considered : as, in bestowing office, wealth or relation- ship, or party claims, and the worthiness of the candidate may be totally l'H < >u i of v'u-w \ This is '• respeci of persons." The person may have claims of one kind when he has none of another kind. Consanguinity may constitute a claim as an heir, when it gives no claim to civil or ecclesiastical office. And what is respect of persons in one relation, is not so m another. The question is not of worthiness simply — say. a good moral character — hut of worthiness relatively to the honour bestowed. And since respect of persons violates the proportion which distributive justice requires, it is evidently a sin. The greater the matter in which justice is violated, the greater the sin. And since spiritual things are more precious than tem- poral things, respect of persons is a greater sin when Church offices are bestowed than it is in " politics." Yet the dis- tinction just made is to be remembered. For he who most abounds in the spiritual gifts of grace is simply and in him- self the most worthy ; but relative worthiness has relation to the common good, as in the choice of a bishop. He Qu. lxiv. 1.] HOMICIDE. 297 who is less holy and less of a theologian may be able to con- tribute more to that common good on account of his execu- tive ability or power of influencing men, etc., etc. And since spiritual offices are ordained for the common good, it may be no respect of persons to prefer him who is less ad- vanced in a holy life to one who is more advanced. But if the reason for preference is not germane to the matter, the law of God is broken (S. James ii. 1) — " Hold not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, with respect of persons." What shall ive say of honour and reverence ? One may rightly receive these not only on account of some merit of his own but for another's sake, even if he be in himself unworthy, as magistrates and prelates, who represent G-od and the community over which they preside. So also parents and masters are to be honoured as in a cer- tain way participating in the dignity of Him who is Father and Lord of all. Old age is venerable as a sign of virtue, although that virtue may be absent. Eiches may be a mark of higher station in the community (or possibly of eminent talents of an honest sort) ; but if the rich man is honoured solely on account of his riches there is the sin of respect of persons (S. James ii. 1). The judge is corrupt who allows respect of persons to influence his judgment. § 2. Homicide. Notice, first (and especially with reference to an old Manichean error reviving in certain quarters), that it is lawful to hill the brutes for food of man. In the natural order of things, the less perfect is for the use of the more "developed." * Plants are for the use of * This argument might be questioned, unless it could be maintained that carnivorous animals stand higher in the scale of being than those whose food is vegetable. 298 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXIV. 2. animals; the brutes for mail's use. And food is among the chief uses. Vegetable life, accordingly, is destroyed for the food of herbivorous animals ; and beasts, according to Divine ordinance (Gen. ix. :>), for the food of man. Brutes have not rational life, bo as to govern their own actions; their nature constitutes them instruments for the use of rational creatures, including food. Is capital punishment right ? Every pari of an organized whole is ordained for the good of that whole. If the health of the whole body of a man require the amputation of some member of it, because it is mortified and is corrupting the other parts of the body, it must be cit off. Ami each individual in society is a part of the whole community. Therefore, if any man through his crime- be dangerous to the community, corrupting its most vital existence, he is laudably and rightfully killed in order thai the common good may be saved. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump " (1 Oor. v. G). (1) The Lord (S. Matt. xiii. 29) commanded that the be spared in order that the wheat might not be in- jured by rooting oul the weeds. Something like this may happen in times of widespread anarchy or rebellion, when the extermination of wrong-doers will involve many inno- cent persons in their fate, so that they cannot be put to death without grave injury to the common good. Bui this case is an exception to the law that public safety may re- quire the execution of criminals. (2) Human justice, as far as possible, imitates the Divine ; and God sometimes defers His penalty of death, giving time for repentance, and sometimes cuts off the transgressor in the midst of his sin. Human justice, in like manner, cuts off those who are most pernicious to others, but gives them space for repentance, and spares others whom it may hope to reform, who have not injured society so gravely. (3) It may be true that, considered in itself, it is wrong Qu. lxiv. 3, 5.] HOMICIDE. 2U9 to take human life, because we are bound to love all men, even sinners. But a man, naturally free and existing for himself in the dignity of a man, may reduce himself to bestial slavery (Ps. xlix. 20). A man may become worse and more injurious than a wild beast ; and he is as justly cut off from life. Such was the Old Law (Ex. xxii.), and such is the Gospel law (Rom. xiii. 4).* Is it right for a private person to take human life? To kill the malefactor is right as ordained for the preser- vation of the life of the community ; therefore, in every organized and civilized community, this office belongs ex- clusively to those who have the care of the common good. But killing a murderer or horse-thief is very useful to the community, and may not any man do what is useful for the common benefit ? I answer that he certainly may, pro- vided that he do harm to no one. But if this doing good to the community requires the doing harm to some part of that community, it must be through the judgment of one who has the charge of that community.! Lynch law in organized communities is an offence against the state and against God. Is suicide laiuful? It is mortal sin for three reasons. (1) It is unnatural, ■ contrary to natural self-love, and to charity, which requires that each one love himself as the creature and image of God. (2) Man belongs to the community, and in killing * The subject of capital punishment may call for fuller treatment in our day than S. Thomas Aquinas found it to require in his age. f The physician is guilty of mortal sin if he be confederate in pro- ducing abortion. (Qu. : Suppose that he judge this to be the only means of saving the mother's life ? Suppose that for this end he de- stroy an unborn child at parturition ?) 300 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXIV. 5. himself he inflicts an injury on the community of which he is a part. (3) Life is a gift from God, and subject to His power only, whose are the issues of life and death. Therefore he that deprives himself of life sins against God. (1) In one way it is a sin against charity, but in relation to the community and to God it is a sin against justice. C.'i Even a malefactor is not judge or executioner in his own case. (3) Perhaps tin- most plausible argument for suicide in certain cases is thai .^ince it is lawful to incur a less danger in order to avoid a greater one, one's own death may be a less evil than misery or disgrace, and be rightly chosen in- stead of the worse coudition. But I answer that free-will makes man master of himself, and lie can lawfully dispose of himself so far as those things are concerned which are ruled 1>\ his tree choice. But the passage from this life to a better one is doI subjeci to hie tree-will but to Divine power. So it is not lawful for a man to kill himself in order to go to Paradise. Similarly, also, it is not lawful to commit Baicide in order to escape the miseries of this pres- ent life, for its last and greatest evil is the death of such a being as man is. Suicide is choosing a greater evil in order ape a less one. (This argument, taken singly, hardly seems to reach the case of shortening incurable sufferings.) Likewise it is not lawful to kill one's self on account of sin committed, both because he cuts short his time for repent- ance, and because he is not judge in bis own case of the penalty to be inflicted for his sin. In like manner, it is wrong for a woman to kill herself in order to escape violation. For she ought not herself to commit the greatest crime in order to avoid another's crime. It is the mind, not the body, which can be polluted. Again, one may not kill himself to escape temptations, for we may not do evil that good may come or evil he avoided. And, further, this apprehended evil is an uncer- tain one, for God is able to preserve in the hour of trial. Qu. LXIY. 6, 7.] HOMICIDE. 301 Judge and jury must proceed according to evidence, even if they have private information that the evidence is false. If they find the innocent guilty of a capital offence, it is not they who kill the innocent, but those who bear false witness against him. The private information is to be used in another quarter (sc, the executive). The sheriff and the executioner are simply the ministers of justice, and if there be no manifest injustice in the sen- tence, their private knowledge does not affect the question of their duty. It is not they who kill the innocent if he suffer by a regular sentence of law. Is it lawful to kill another in self-defence ? An act may have two effects, one of which is intended, the other being aside from the intention. But moral acts get their specific character from the intention of the agent. Now, from the act of self-defence two effects may follow ; viz., the preservation of one's own life and the killing of the assailant. An act of this nature, if its aim be the pres- ervation of life, is not illicit, because self-preservation is nature's first law. But such an act, with good intention, may become illicit if it be not proportionate to the end (exceeding that end in any manner, or deviating from it). Therefore, it is wrong if any one in self-defence use greater violence than is absolutely necessary. One is not bound to neglect a moderate defence in order to avoid the killing of another, for a man is more bound to preserve his own life than that of another man. But it is illicit to intend to kill another without public authority. With that authority a man may refer his act to the public good and intend to kill, as soldiers do in time of war. When the apostle (Rom. xii. 19) says, "Avenge not your- selves, but give place unto wrath," he prohibits that defence which has the motive of revenge, as the shooting a burglar while escaping. 302 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXVI. 1, 2. Accidental homicide. What is casual is neither intended nor voluntary. And because every sin is voluntary, casual actions as such arc ins. But it may happen thai wli.it i> not actually and per se willed or intended, i- bo />< r accidens, because whatever re- moves hindrances is in thai wayacauseof the consequences. Eence, he who does qoI remove those things from which homicide results, when he oughl to remove them, incurs in some manner the guilt of voluntary homicide. This may happen either when one is engaged in illicit acts which ho oughl to avoid, or when, being lawfully employed, he does no! use due diligence. In either case, if from his action the death of a man result, he docs not escape the guilt of homicide. Bui it is otherwise if he be engaged in lawful business and use due precautions. Accidental death is not imputable to him.* § 3. Theft and robbery. The natural right of property. ThePsali '. i. 0), '-'Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet;" i.e., man's feet. Man's ownership <<\' external things is a law of nature. But those tiling- may \w viewed, Brat, as regards their own nature; and this i- not subject to human power hut only to the Divine. But also we may consider the use of things, and bo man has natural dominion over them, because through reason and will he can use them for his own benefit as if they were created for him. And this natural dominion over other creatures., which belongs to him as endowed with reason in which is found the image of God in man, is set forth in the very creation of man (Gen. i. 26). But this dominion goes further ; it is the right of indi- vidual personal property — that is to say, first, man has the right to manage and dispose of outward things, his personal * See further, Supplement, Sixth Commandment, chap. iii. Qu. lxvi. 3.] THEFT AND ROBBERY. 303 possessions. This power is necessary in the proper conduct of human life, for three reasons : (1) Every one is more solicitous in managing what belongs to himself alone than in that which belongs to everybody, because, shunning needless labour, he leaves to another that which is every- body's business ; (2) human affairs go on more orderly when each has his own business to manage, while there must be confusion if every one indiscriminately attend to every- thing; (3) in this way greater harmony is likely to be pre- served when each knows what is his and what he has to do with it. In the second place, this dominion gives the power to use external things. In this respect man has no right to treat them as if they were exclusively for himself alone ; he is bound to use them as the common possession of all, being ready to communicate them for others' necessity (1 Tim. vi. 18). (1) Communists say that by the law of nature all things are common, and that "property is robbery." But I deny that natural right dictates that all tilings be held in com- mon, and that nothing shall be held by any one as his prop- erty. But I grant that any existing distinction of posses- sions does not rest on the law of nature, for it is a matter of human arrangement ; it rests on positive law. Property is not contrary to natural right, but things are divided as they are now distributed according to what is superadded to the law of nature (sc, according to jus gentium). (2) The rich man does not act wrongfully in keeping what in the beginning was common to all, if he also share with others in the fruits of his possessions ; but he sins if without distinction he exclude others from the use of them. What is theft ? It is the secret taking of what is another's. The unjust keeping of what is another's is an injury of the same kind, and to be included in the same general title. 304 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxvi. 5, 6. Both theft and robbery imply involuntary loss ; but in the one the loser is ignorant of the act of taking, in the other he loses through violence. Is theft always a sin .' It is so, first, because of its opposition to justice which renders to every man his due, his own. And, secondly, it is a sin because of the sinful guile or fraud which the thief emplo What Bhall We say of "lie who finds what is not his own, and secretly takes possession of it ? [s he a thief? What is found may never have had ao owner, as uncut gems and pearls ; or it may have been lost so long that no claimant of the property can be found. Then it naturally belongs to the finder, unless civil law limit bis righl ; but it is lim- ited onlj after judicial sentence. Again, the finder may sincerely believe thai the thing has been abandoned by its recent owner ; he is no thief if he keep it alur due inquiry. Otherwise the keeping is un- doubtedly theft. /* theft mortal sin ? The apostle (1 Cor. vi. 10) says that thieves shall not '• inherit the kingdom of God." Theft is opposed to char- ity, because it does harm to our neighbour, and if it were universal human society would perish. As contrary to char- ity in which is the spiritual life of the soul, it i3 mortal sin. What is to be said of stealing trifling things ? They may, possibly, be so trifling that if the owner knew of the act he would not think that it did him injury, and he who takes can presume that his doing so is not against the owner's will. So far there may be no mortal sin ; but if he have the intention of stealing and doing harm to his neighbour, the theft of even little things is mortal sin. So is even consent to the thought of doing so.* * See, further, Supplement, chap. v. § 2. Qu. lxvi. 7, 8.J THEFT AND ROBBERY. 305 Is it right to take another's property in case of extreme necessity f Human law cannot derogate from natural or Divine right. Now, according to the natural order instituted by Divine Providence, the things of this world are ordained for the supply of man's necessities, and the division and appro- priation of things, which are based on human law, cannot hinder man's necessities from being relieved in this way. Therefore what some have in superabundance, by natural right is due to the support of the needy. "It is the bread of the hungry which thou keepest ; the clothing of the naked which thou shuttest up ; the redemption of the mis- erable is the money which thou usest in ' speculation ' " (S. Ambros., Serm. 64, De Temp.). But because the needy are many, and all cannot be assisted by the same things, the dispensing of such things is en- trusted to the owner of property that he may do his share in relieving want. If, however, there be urgent and extreme necessity (peril of life), then one may rightly relieve his need from an- other's goods without waiting for the owner's permission, and this is not robbery or theft. Such necessity makes to be his own what he immediately needs to save his life. And in case of similar necessity on the part of his neighbour which he himself is unable to relieve, he may do the same for his brother. (Restitution, however, must be made when that necessity is passed.) Robbery. This implies violence and compulsion through which an- other's property is taken from him. But in society no private individual has this right, but only public authority ; therefore whoever, acting as a private citizen, takes another's goods by violence is a robber. Executive authority is the guardian of justice, and can use violence and coactive force only according to the prescriptions of justice in fighting 20 30G SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. Lxvu. 2. against public enemies, or punishing malefactors. What is taken through such violence is not robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. But unjust taking 1>\ those who use public authority and so pervert it, is robbery, and the wrong- doer is bound to make restitution like any other thief or robber. In war, fighting for plunder and lawless depredation are common forms of robbery which demand restitution. Why is robbery a graver sin {and more severely punished) Hum theftt First, because there is more of the involuntary in the former on the pan of bim who is deprived of hie own ; and, secondly, there is noi only the loss of goods, but great prob- ability of personal disgrace or injury (and natural conse- quences add to the gravity of a crime). § 4. Injustice in legal proceedings.* Is if right for a judge to act contrary to what he privately knows .' II with pnblic authority and acts officially; ore be musl judge by what, he officially knows, not by his private information. He follows public laws, Divine or human, as the ease may he. against which he can admit no arguments. But in the special case before him he has testi- mony of various kinds, which is the sole ground of judg- ment. His private knowledge will guide him in searching more strictly the evidence, and perhaps indicate where addi- tional evidence is to be found; but his final decision can rightly rest only on the testimony officially laid before him. God alone judges with proper authority ; human judges have only delegated power, and are bound to restrict them- selves to its limits. * A large part of the author's discussion of questions bearing on this topic i> suited to a different state of society from ours, and is therefore omitted. LXYIII. 1, 3.] INJUSTICE IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 307 Is a man bound to bring crimes of which he has knowledge before the cognizance of the proper tribunal ? There is this difference between fraternal denunciation, of which we have spoken above (page 227), and accusation, that in the former the amendment of a brother is the aim, but in the latter the punishment of crime. But the penalties of this present life are not sought for on their own account, because in this world is not the final retribution ; but they are medicinal, contributing either to the amendment of the criminal, or to the good of the commonwealth, whose good order is sought for in the punishment; of criminals. There- fore, if the crime were such as tended to the public detri- ment, a man is bound to make accusation of the criminal, if he have sufficient proof of the offence. And this detri- ment may be either bodily or spiritual. But if the sin be doing no injury to state or Church, as the case may be, or if there be not sufficient proof of the crime, there is no obligation of bringing accusation, for no one is bound to that which he cannot carry through in due manner. This principle applies to laymen in their relations to the priesthood, and to priests in their relation to their bishop, if all be done out of charity. Friendship is no bar to duty in this respect. To reveal secrets and cause evil to a friend is against fidelity, but not if they be revealed on account of the common good, which is to be preferred to any private good. Therefore no secret maybe kept (even though secrecy has been promised) to the injury of the community. Besides, that is not altogether secret which can be proved by sufficient testimony. But injustice may insinuate itself into accusation in the form of malicious calumny imputing crime falsely, or as pre- varication, when the nominal accuser fraudulently attempts to impede the course of justice ; or as tergiversation, when he totally desists from what he has begun (being frightened or bought off). 308 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXIX. 1, 8, 4. May the criminal accused 'plead not guilty f (Here S. Thomas has in view the criminal process of most European, especially southern, countries. The accused is bound in justice to answer truthfully all questions lawfully asked, or, at least, not to tell a lie. But he may refuse to answer, or appeal to another court. But under Anglo- Saxon institution.-, the plea of '"'not guilty" is, no doubt, uuderstood to be the demand for the production of evidence in the case, a demand which every accused person may rightly make. ) //• is //"/ bound f'i confess his guilt before a human courl : In- may defend himself by concealing fart- in all proper ways, using no guile, fraud, or lies, bo- cause his public condemnation can justly occur only under due process of human law and clear evidence. lie is not bound to give any assistance in this.* I ' lawful for one who is condemned to death to resist if he fin t 8. Paul says (Bom. xiii. 2), " He that resisteth the power, withstandeth the ordinance of God ; and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgment ; " therefore he seems But distinction must be made between just and unjust condemnation. The latter is akin to the violence of robbers, and may be resisted unless grave scandal is to he avoided, or serious disturbance is feared. But it is quite otherwise if the sentence of condemnation is a jut one. (1) It is true that nature inclines every one to make resistance in such a case, but reason and conscience are * By parity of reasoning, his advocate in court can defend one whom he knows to be guilty, because that is doing injustice to no one; and the question is not of sin, but of legal crime. (Qu. : In civil cases, may he advocate an unjust claim? The cases are not parallel, and he is certainly bound to discourage needless or injurious litigation.,) Qu. LXX. 1.] INJUSTICE IX LEGAL PROCEEDINGS. 309 given to man that he may govern his nature. Not every kind of defence is lawful. (2) No one is bound to do that whence death may follow, but merely to submit to the just sentence of the law. He is not bound to remain in prison if a way of escape is open ; but he may not resist the authority which executes the sen- tence of the law. Is a man bound to be a witness in court f His testimony may be demanded by an authority which, in matters of justice, he is bound to obey. Doubtless he is then bound to bear witness in those things in which accord- ing to rightful order he is required to give testimony. Such a case is one of manifest wrong — i.e., a wrong which can be jjroved — and one which public infamy has preceded. But if his testimony be demanded in other cases — say, secret crime, or one where there is no public infamy — he is not bound to testify. Even if the truth be not brought to light, it may be that no one incurs any special loss in consequence. But, demanded or not demanded, his testimony may be needed to liberate a man from unjust penalty, loss, or in- famy ; then charity requires him to testify. And even if his witness be not required, he is bound to do what in him lies to bring the truth before some one who can be of service to the accused. What shall we say of things confidentially communicated to any one ? What is heard in confession can in no case be revealed, either in court or under any other circumstances. The priest knows it, not as he is a man, but as he is the minister of God. This bond is greater than any commandment of men. But with respect to things otherwise confidentially com- municated, a distinction must be made. For there are things which a man is bound to make known as soon as they come to his knowledge, such as corrupt the spiritual 310 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxi. 8. or corporal well-being of the community, or work grave loss to some person. Such things a man is bound to divulge by testimony or denunciation; and no secret or confidential communication can excuse from this obligation, because it pertains to the fidelity which we owe. as part of charity, to the community and to our brother who is injured. But other things arc privately known (as by legal coun- sellors, physicians, etc.) which no command of a superior can warrant our revealing ; because keeping faith is a law of nature, and nothing can be commanded by man which is contrary to natural right. /s bearing fa ' \lways mortal sin f False wines- has :; three-fold depravity; first, from the accompanying perjury, which is always mortal sin ; next, from the violation of justice, which is mortal in its kind, like any other injustice, and bo says the commandment, "Thou shalt not hear false witness against thy neighbour f and. lastly, from the falsehood contained, for every lie is a sin. In this last respeel the false witness may possibly be a Bin which is not mortal (the false witness being thoughtlessly given, harming no one, and not intended to do so). Of course one may not f c< rtain knowledge that of which he is not certain. But from failure of mem- ory one may think himself certain of that which is false, and if he have ased due care he dor-; not mortally sin in ng it. He does not intentionally hear false witness, but it is accidental and contrary to what he intended. But if he afterwards discover the falsity of his testimony, he is bound to retract it if he can do so without serious loss; otherwise he is bound to make compensation for any loss incurred through his false witness. Does a ? iwyer sin who defends a cause which /><■ knows to he Unjust .' It is illicit to cooperate with another in doing evil, Ql\ lxxii. 1.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 311 whether by counselling him, or aiding him, or consenting in any manner. The apostle (Kom. i. 3g) specifies it as an added sin, "knowing the ordinance of God, that they which do such things are worthy of death, they not only do the same, but also consent with those that practise them." i\ow, a lawyer gives aid and counsel to him whose cause he undertakes (the argument evidently applies only to civil cases, not criminal ones), and he is bound to make restitu- tion of any loss which the opposite party unjustly incurs. (But a case may be doubtful, and, his client being informed of the uncertainty, the lawyer may go on with the case. Criminal cases evidently stand on a different basis ; for just condemnation can only be that which is legally established. Not the actual guilt, but the proof of that guilt, is the question before the criminal court.) The lawyer may possibly show his skill by winning in a bad case, as a physician shows his skill by curing a des- perate disease. But the two are not parallel, for the lawyer unjustly injures the opposing side. If, in the course of the trial, he discover that he has no case, he is not bound to assist the opposite side by betray- ing what is confidentially communicated to him, but he ought to withdraw or try to effect a compromise. § 5. Injurious words. Contumely. One man may dishonour another by depriving him of some excellence for which he is duly honoured, which is done by such deeds as have been discussed above (pages 297 ff.). But, also, he may bring forward to his notice and that of others what dishonours that other, and this is con- tumely. It properly consists in such injurious words, but the same thing also may be effected by equivalent actions. In tjiis way injurious loss may be produced ; viz., injury to honour or that respect which is due from others. There- fore the contumely is greater which is spoken in the pres- 312 SIN'S OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxii. 2. ence of many ; but even if it be uttered to the one insulted alone, it may be.an injustice regarding the respect which is llllC Insults and taunts are offences of the same kind, for all call attention to some defect in detriment of honour. But while contumely refers to mental defects, insult may apply to bodily defects. If one injuriously call another hump- backed, ii may be insult; if he call the other a thief, it is contumely, also; while taunt.- may refer to station, as pov- erty or servitude; e.g., if one injuriously remind another that he Was aided by public charity. Is contumely or insult ,i mortal sin f The Lord said (S. Matt. v. ■.»■.>;.•• Whosoever shall say to his brother. Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire," which is the due of mortal sin only. Words are more than sounds ; bhey s aifical ive sounds, and t heir meaning proceeds from the mind and heart. Therefore, in sins of words we must; espe- cially consider the intention. Insult or contumely properly consists in the intention to derogate from the due honour of another; and this is no less a mortal sin than theft or robbery. (•' Who steals my purse," etc.). But if one has spoken insulting or contumelious words, not with a view to dishonour, but for correction or something of that kind, it is not, properly Bpeaking, formal insult or contumely, even though the words will bear that construction (" materi- ally"); and this may be venial sin or no sin at all. But discretion and caution are necessary, because the reproach may be so severe as injuriously to affect the honour of him against whom it is uttered, and then a man may sin mortally even though he did not intend to dishonour his brother ; just as criminal negligence may cause serious bodily injury and make one responsible for the consequences. (The satisfaction which penitence requires, is special and public signs of honour and respect.) (1) Even reproaches in joke may be vicious, if they tend Qu. lxxii. 3.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 313 to the same result and "hurt the feelings" of the one so insulted. (2) The Lord's example, when He said, "0 fools, and slow of heart to believe" (S. Luke xxiv. 25), shows that reproaches for the sake of discipline or correction are admissible under the due limitations demanded by our own imperfection. (3) Since these sins depend upon the mind of the speaker, they may be venial, when the reproach is a trifling one and not greatly dishonouring a brother, uttered from some lev- ity of mind or angry haste, without any fixed purpose of robbing another of due respect and honour. (Notice here the violent words of many of the lowest class in the com- munity, especially of angry women reviling one another without any serious intention.) Should one endure contumely uttered against Mm ? The same patience is required in what is spoken against us as in what is done against us. But the precepts of patience refer to the preparation of soul. One is not always bound actually to follow the letter of the Sermon on the Mount ; for the Lord who said, " Whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," did not do this when He rebuked the smiter and said, "Why smitest thou Me ? " Contumelious words and injurious actions are to be treated in the same way. We are bound to have a mind ready to bear reproaches and insults if ifc be expedient so to do. But sometimes it is inexpedient, and the insult should be repelled, either for the good of the insulter him- self, that his impudence may be repressed and that he may not try the same course with others, or for the good of others, that our influence over them be not hindered by the contumely uttered against us and- apparently with our consent. (1) It may be an obligation of charity, not the lust for private honour, which moderately represses the insulter. 314 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxiii. 1, 2. Hence the two opposite proverbs (Prov. xxvi. 4, 5), " Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him. Answer a i'ool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceits." (2) One ought not to tolerate insult offered to another ; his repressing it is more likely to proceed from charity to his brother; and there is certainly no lust of his own honour. Contumely is one of the fruits of immoderate anger. Detraction. As contumely corresponds to robbery, so detraction to theft. For the one is open injury through words, the other is secret injury of the same kind. Honour is not directly attacked, bul a L r ""d name is taken away, since those who hear form a bad opinion of him who suffers detraction. The end is different then, as well as the means employed. But the two may be united, as when one openly but falsely accusi a another of a crime, or truly, but still pnblicly, charges thai which i secret. The Bpecial distinction, then, is that while contumely is said to a man's face, detraction is uttered when he is absent and ignorant of it, whether it be utti red before many or to one alone. It is not necessarily diminishing the truth, but it is low- ering another's good name. This can be done directly or indirectly ; directly, in four ways, by imputing what is false, by exaggerating what is true, by exposing what is tied, by imputing bad intention to what is rightly done; indirectly, by denying another's good action, by maliciously keeping silence, by diminishing the merit of his action, or approving it in such a way as to have the same effect. Is detraction a mortal sin ? In Rom. i. 30 backbiters are placed among those who are worthy of spiritual death. And the taking away any Qu. lxxiii. 4.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 315 person's good name is gravest injury, because in this life there is nothing more precious, and the loss of it hinders a man from well doing his work in life. Therefore detraction is per se a mortal sin. But .sometimes it happens that words are spoken which are injurious to some one's character, when not this but something else is intended. This is not " formal " detrac- tion (which consists in the evil intention), though it is outwardly (" materially " ) such. And if the words spoken are uttered for some necessary good, the due conditions being observed, it is not detraction nor sin at all. These conditions are : (1) No more is revealed nor to any more persons than is necessary for avoiding the evil or attaining the good ; (2) the revelation will probably have a good result ; (3) it is done with good intention ; (4) the good sought for or the evil to be averted is of serious consequence. Detraction is naturally the child of envy. Is it grave sin to listen approvingly to detraction? It is sin to consent to another's sin (Rom. i. 32) ; and this is done either directly or indirectly ; directly, when one leads another into sin, or takes pleasure in it ; indi- rectly, when one does not oppose it, being able to do so ; not through taking pleasure in the sin, but through fear of man. So if any one listen to detraction without opposition, he seems to consent to the detractor, and becomes a participator in his sin. But if he induce any one to be guilty of detrac- tion, or take pleasure in it because he hates the one injured by the detraction, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more than he ; more, when he sins against char- ity in the sin of scandal towards the detractor, as well as against justice towards the one defamed. But if the sin does not please him, and he is silent through fear or negligence or diffidence, he sins indeed, but much less than the detractor, and in general venially. 310 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxv. But sometimes even this may be mortal sin, when official duty requires the correction of the detractor, or grave danger results from the keeping silence, or when the Eear of man is itself ;i mortal sin. The detractor may be saying what is true ; he cannot he resisted by denial of the facts, hut either he can be charged with his bid of detract ion, or, at least, it can be shown to be offensive to the listener, by expressive silence, by leaving him, or by changing the subject of conversation. The " make-bate " (susurro) uses the same means with the detractor ; bnl his objeel isadifferenl one, for he aims by his malicious whisperings to break up friendships, and therefore he selects such seeming evil things to say as may tea 1 i" this end. This tale-bearing is even a graver sin than detraction or calumny, because the injury done to our neighbour is the measure of the sin againsl him, and a friend is the most precious of outward tilings. I>< ft -ll. king at another is intended to put him to shame. The different end mark- a Bpecial Bin, different from those just described. This "laughing to scorn " is directed at some evil, some defect. But a great evil is not treated jestingly, but seriously. Hence, if any such thing is made' subject of derision, it is treated as a small thing in its kind, small in itself, or relatively to the person. But when any one turns the evil or the defect of another into ridicule, becanse it is in itself trifling, the sin is venial. But this derision may imply contempt of the person ; sc, that his evil is of no more consequence than a child's or a fool's. This great contempt and dishonour constitute a graver mortal sin than contumely. Gravest of all is mocking at what belongs to God in any special way. In the second place stands the sin of deriding parents, who are entitled to the highest earthly reverence. "The eye that mocketh at Qu. lxxti.] INJURIOUS WORDS. 317 his father . . . the ravens of the valley shall pick it out, and the young eagles shall eat it" (Prov. xxx. 17). Next in order comes derision of the just, since honour is the reward of virtue, and such derision hinders others from imitating the virtuous actions of the one derided. Cursing. Malediction is speaking evil of another. Consider, there- fore, the three modes of speaking it ; and, first, simple enunciation of evil, which has been already considered in its various forms. There remain, then, commanding and wishing evil, respecting which observe that what may be done, may be wished ; and, conversely, what may be law- fully wished, may lawfully be done. If any one command or wish another's evil as evil, intending that evil, it is the sin of cursing, properly speaking. But if any one command or wish the evil of another as a good, it is not a sin, it is not cursing. Now this good may be justice, and so a judge lawfully utters his malediction on him whom he sentences for crime, the Church anathematizes heretics, and the prophets in Holy Scripture imprecate evil on sin- ners, conforming their will to the Divine justice, although imprecations of this kind may be understood as declara- tory. Or, again, this good which justifies the wishing of evil may be utility, as when one wishes that a sinner may suf- fer some of the consequences of his ill-doing, in order that he may be made better, or at least cease from harming others. (1) The apostle (Rom. xii. 14) said, " Bless, and curse not ; " but cursing proper, i.e., with evil intention, is what he prohibited. (2) It may be said that man cannot know the mind of another, nor whether he is cursed by G-od ; therefore be ought only to pray for all. But the sinner's heart is revealed by some manifest sin, for which penalty is to be 318 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXXV1I. 1. inflicted by the command which speaks evil against him. And in like manner, although it cannot be known whom God will curse with final reprobation, it can be known whom He is cursing for the guilt of a present flagrant crime. Is it mortal sin to curse another f To command or wish evil to another, which is cursing him, is in itself a violation of charity which requires us to will our neighbour's good, and therefore it is mortal sin; and so much the graver as the person cursed is entitled to more 1<>\<- and respect. •• Every one thai curseth his father or his mother Bhall Burely be put to death" (Lev. xx. 9). Bui the words ottered may he venial sin, cither on account of the insignificant evil which is wished, or because the words are ottered in jesl or thoughtlessness or sudden sur- Por sins of words chiefly depend on the inward affection of the soul s; 6. Frauds in trade. : Is if lawful t" sell a. thing for more than if is worth? The great law of the Gospel is, f< "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them " (S. Matt. vii. 12). This answers the question; for no one wishes a thing to be sold to himself for more than it is worth. To employ fraud in order that a thing may be sold for more than a just price, is altogether sin because our neighbour is deceived to his loss. But if there be no fraud, then we may speak first of buying and selling as they are in themselves. They are instituted for the com- mon benefit of both parties to the contract ; each needing or desiring what the other has. But what is undertaken for the common benefit ought not to burden one side more than the other ; the contract should he equal. But the quantity of those things which serve man's physical needs * See Supplement, Chajjter on Contracts. Qu. LXXVII. 1.] FRAUDS IN TRADE. 319 is measured by the price, for which purpose civilized na- tions have used coined money. And therefore if the price exceed the value of the thing, or the value exceed the price, just ecpiality is destroyed. Therefore, to sell a thing for more than it is worth, or to pay for it less than it is worth, is in itself unjust and illicit. But we may speak of buying and selling as accidentally they turn to the benefit of one and the detriment of another. For example, one much needs to have a thing and the other is hurt if he go without it. In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing itself but on the loss to the seller. And so he can lawfully sell for more than the market price, though he may ask no more than the thing is worth to himself. But if the thing be greatly needed by the buyer, and he who sells incur no special loss by the sale, the latter is not warranted in going above the highest market price, because the benefit derived by the other does not depend upon the seller, but on the condition of the buyer. Of his own accord the buyer may choose to give some bounty in such a case, but the seller has no right to trade in another's special need. (1) Civil law may tolerate and recognize such unjust bar- gains as we have been speaking of, because laws are made for a multitude of unjust dealers. Therefore human law cannot prohibit everything which is contrary to virtue ; it suffices that it prohibit what destroys intercourse. Other things it may allow, not as approving them, but simply as not finding it expedient to punish them. Buying too cheaply and selling too dearly may escape punishment or restitution if there be no fraud in the contract or the excess be not too outrageous. But Divine law leaves no injustice unpunished. Before that tribunal all inequality of justice is condemned, and he who has gained too much is bound to recompense him who has suffered loss, if the loss be a notable one. And I add this because the just price of things is not exactly determined, but depends on fluctuat- 320 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. lxxvii. 2. ing opinion, so that a moderate addition or subtraction may not destroy a just equality. (2) It is a very common desire, that of selling dear and buying cheap. But its being general does not show it to be natural, for vice is common to many who follow the broad way of sin. Defects in the thing sold render the sale illicit and un- just. Defeol is (1) in the substantial character of the thing. If the Beller know it, he is guilty of fraud in the sale, the sale is plainly illicit. The contracl between the parties is null through defect of consent.* (2) Defect is in the quantity as measured, and if any ono knowingly use deficient weights or measures, be is guilty of fraud, and the sale ie illicit. Of such injustice the Lord said (Dent. xxv. 16), "All that do such things, even all thai '1" unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord thy God." (3) Defect, again, is in the quality of what is sold, as in selling an unsound animal for one sound in all essential ■;-. If knowingly done it is fraud, and illicit. In till such cases the injustice done demands restitution. But if the seller he ignorant of the defect, his action, indeed, is not sinful injustice (since the evil intention is absent, it is a "material," not a "formal," injustice); hut he is bound, if damages are demanded, to recompense the buyer for his loss (unless the sale is at the buyer's risk). What has been said of the seller is equally true of the buyer. The seller may be ignorant of the substantial char- acter of what he is selling — e.g., selling a real diamond under the impression that it is only paste. If the buyer know the fact, he acts unjustly in his getting possession of the valuable thing and is bound to make restitution. The * See, further. Supplement, Contracts, chap, vi.; 2. Qu. LXXVII. 3.] FRAUDS IN TRADE. 321 same principle applies to defect in quality or quantity ; e.g., stealing a long ride on the railway,, with a ticket for a shorter distance. Is the seller bound to disclose the defects of the thing There are two moral principles which govern the answer to this question : first, it is always unjust to afford another man occasion of danger or loss ; secondly, it is not neces- sary that a man always give aid or counsel for the benefit of whatsoever person he has dealings with. (This may he an act of charity, but we are now considering what justice demands.) This is an obligation in some determined cases ; e.g., when you are responsible for the other's action, he being under your charge, or when the other needs assist- ance and he can get it from no other. But the seller, in offering a defective thing for sale, if its defect be of such a nature as to cause loss or danger, violates the first law of natural justice just indicated. He gives occasion for loss if he subtract nothing from the price of the inferior article but demand full value for it. He gives occasion for danger if the defect hinder or render unsafe the use of the thing, as in selling a saddle-horse that shies, or adul- terated medicines or food. If such defects are not manifest to the buyer, and the seller does not disclose them, the sale is illicit and fraudulent, and the seller is bound to make compensation for the loss. But if the defect can be readily discovered by a buyer using ordinary precaution, as when the horse sold is blind in one eye, or when the defect makes the article useless to the seller, but others may have use for it, and if the seller duly reduce the price demanded, he is not bound to call atten- tion to the defect, because the buyer might then demand too great a reduction in the price. So the seller may guard himself against loss by keeping silence respecting defects. (1) Suppose that you say that the buyer is not under compulsion ; the thing is submitted to his judgment, and 322 SINS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXXV1I. 4. the other is not bound to supply him with judgment for his bargain. But there can be no judgment where a thing is not manifest. One judges according to what he knows. So there is an essential difference between manifest defects and those which cannot be detected by ordinary observa- tion. If the seller does not call attention to the latter, the thing is not sufficiently presented to the buyer's judgment. (2) But why should any one stand in his own light, impede Ids own business ? It is not necessary to make pub- lic proclamati if faults and keep off buyers ; but natural justice requires that in pointing out the good qualities of what he ofEers for sale, be also indicate hidden defects which may cause loss or danger to another. Even so, he is nol bound to thrust moral advice on everyone whom be encounters ; bu I if his own art- bhreaten moral danger to others unless be tell the truth concerning them, he is bound to give proper explanation of them. (3) But a man may have private information that the article for which he is demanding a high price will shortly be cheaper because a large supply is coming on the market ; and yet he is perfectly just in demanding that high price, without giving others information which would lower the price. What, then, is the difference between that case, and the one which we are now considering ? I answer that it is precisely the difference between the present and the future. The existing defect makes the present value of the thing less than its apparent value. In the other case, the value is going to be lower ; but in just contracts de prmenti, the question is of the market value for the day, not of some coming day, unless the bargain be explicitly in ''futures." This being true, the buyer also may have private knowledge that prices are shortly to go up ; he is not bound to publish that information. what makes it just to buy cheap and sell dear? The mere lust for gain is criminally base, knowing no Qu. lxxix. 3.] OMISION. 323 honorable or necessary terminus, but stretching out ad infin- itum to a vicious end. But gain, which is the object of bid- ing and selling, has in itself no such vicious end, for it may be merely the means for necessary or virtuous ends, as the support of a family or the doing good to the community. Moderate gains of trade so sought for, not as an end but as the rewards of labour, are certainly lawful and honourable. (The author seems to overlook the service which is done to the community by bringing the producer and the consumer into relations of mutual service. This benefit is conferred by ''middlemen," by wholesale and retail trade, which is certainly entitled in justice to its fair profits. The author's discussion of usury is omitted. His argu- ment concerns the lawfulness of profit for the use of money, and he regards the prohibition of such "usury" among the Israelites as a universal law against what is simply unnatural and evil. The lawfulness of demanding compensation for loss on the part of the lender is only glanced at ; compensa- tion for the risk of losing the loan is left out of view.) § 7. Omission. Bins of omission. As transgression, implying contempt of negative com- mands, is a special sin, so is omission, as implying contempt of affirmative commands. It implies neglect not of every good, but of that good which is due. But the good viewed as a debt, pertains to justice. Hence, in the way in which justice is a special virtue, omission is a special sin, distinct from the sins which are opposed to the other virtues ; it is the neglect of that good which justice commands. Omission is sometimes involuntary, as when one has lost what he is bound to restore, or when a priest is hindered from fulfilling his duties. But omission proper is only of that due good to which one is bound. Now, no one is bound to the impossible, nor is there sin of omission in not doing what one is unable to do. (The sin of omission 324 SIKTS OPPOSED TO JUSTICE. [Qu. LXXIX. 8. consists in not willing, not saying, not doing what one is bound to will, to say, to do, having the requisite power thereto.) When does this sin of omission "begin f Is one sinning all the time in which he is not doing what is obligatory ? The sin of omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, which command the good. But such precepts do not bind at all time- bo far as action is concerned, but at a determined time, place, etc. And at that time the sin begins. At thai time, il is true, he may be anabletoact, and if thai inability be Dot his fault he does not neglect whal is due. But if that inability proceed from previous fault — say. negligence in taking care of what he is bound to restore— thai negligence is the cause of the sin of omission ; but this latter Bin begins, cot with the negligence, but with the determined time Eor restoring, or whatever the neglected duty may be. But the omission is voluntary, since itscause- is so : therefore it is a sin. CHAPTER IV. KELIGI0N AND VICES OPPOSED TO IT. § 1. Introduction. In a very general sense every virtue contains the idea of what is due to Divine or human law. So viewed, justice embraces them all. But, as a special virtue, it regards the good as what is due to our neighbour, as general justice is concerned with what is due to the com- munity or to God. In both of these, avoiding the evil and doing the good are integral parts. In doing the good, in acting justly, equality in relations is established as far as is possible. In shunning the evil, in avoiding injustice, such equality is preserved. Virtues annexed to justice. Since justice is relative to another, all virtues which imply such relation may be connected with it ; yet they may fall short of the perfect idea of virtue as it is found in the chief virtue of this class, which is justice, the giving to others what is due and the full equivalent of what is due. Other virtues may give what is due without giving all that is due. (1) First, all that man can render to God is due, but he cannot render as much as he ought. Religion, theu, is a virtue annexed to justice. (2) Parents cannot be recompensed fully for what they have done. Filial piety is an imperfect form of justice. (3) Man cannot recompense virtue as it deserves. Out- ward respect and honour (" observantia ") is an imperfect form of justice. 32G RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXI. 1, 2. But virtues annexed to justice may full short of it, also, as regards the idea of what is due. .Morally duo is what one owes according to the propriety of virtue. It may be so necessary that without it an honourable life cannot be pre- served. On the part of the one who owes this obligation, the duty is that he show himself in words and deeds such as he is in reality. (4) Truthfulness is annexed to justice. Or, on the part of the one to whom the debt is due, one recompenses another for the kindness which he has shown, (.".) b\ gratitude in word and deed. Or, (6) in the case of ill which lias beni d<>n.' (of course, with those due motives which have been heretofore pointed out), proper vengeance i- a \ irtne annexed to jusl . . Bui this deW of virtue, which ought to be paid, may con- tribute to an honourable life withoiii being essential to it. Such virtu-- are (1 liberality, affability, and the like, in which the idea of debt almost vanishes. § 2. Religion. 117 'onf It is a virtue by which man renders to his God due hom- a:_ r <\ worship, honour, and reverence. Giving any one his due is a virtuous act, and if it proceed from a corresponding habit, marks a virtuous man. Manifestly, then, the defini- tion of virtue heretofore given applies to religion. (1) Whal 8. J (i. 37) does not conilict with this. For religion produces acts of two kinds; some are its proper and immediate acts elicited by it, through which man is ordered with respect to God only, as sacrilice, ado- ration, and the like ; but it has other acts which it produces through the virtues which it directs as means to its end, which end is homage to Almighty God. Such acts are " vis- iting the fatherless and the widows in their affliction," acts elicited by mercy, and " keeping self unspotted from the world," an act commanded by religion, but elicited by tem- perance or some such virtue. Qu. LXXXI. 3, 4, 5.] EELIGIOlsr. 327 (2) We owe one another service in the Church of G-od (Gal. v. 13), but God's dominion and right is infinitely exalted, and the service which is due to Him ("latria") is preeminent and distinct from any other. (3) Men may have a claim to marks of honour (" with my body I thee worship "), but the honour clue to God is special and distinct, "■ Eusebeia " or " Theosebeia." This virtue gives reverence to one God as the Creator, Governor, Father of all men. It has various outward acts, but they are all reducible to those Divine honours which are paid from reverence for His infinite excellence, or that service which is due from God's subject creatures ; but these two are the one act of reverential homage. Eeligion is a special virtue, because of the special good for which it is ordained ; viz., paying due and peculiar hon- our to God. Every virtuous act is a sacrifice, so far as it is ordained for reverential homage to God. But so it is commanded by the special virtue of religion. All things, says the apostle (1 Cor. x. 31), are to be done to the "glory of God." But the same remark applies ; such acts are religious, not relig- ion, because they pertain to it, not as elicited, but as com- manded by that reverential homage which is religion. Is religion a theological virtue ? Worship of God springing from reverential homage is a dictate of natural reason ; it is natural religion. What posi- tive Divine or human law has done is merely to determine it in this way or that way. (This fact itself shows that religion is not a theological virtue ; but the author thoroughly ex- amines the ground of denial.) Theological virtues have God for their direct object. He is the object of faith, of hope, of love. But He is the end of religious acts, not their direct object or " matter ; " their matter is worship ; for 328 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXI. 6, 7. due worship is offered — say. sacrificial offerings — outof rev- erence for I rod. "By faith, hope, and charity " (S. Aug.. Enohir. 3) whioh have God as their proper object. God is worshipped, because i hey command acts of religion as things ordained to I he end of i hose \ irtues. Religion, as ^~<- have Been, is a pari of the moral virtue of justice. Religion is preeminent among the moral virtues, because, while all those virtues have God for their end, it. comes nearer to thai end than the others do, producing what is directly and immediately ordained for the Divine honour. ill The praise of virtue consists in the good will, nol in the power of doing much. Religion cannot pay all thai ie due, bul thai is no derogation from the supreme rank of this moral virtue. (2) God, it is true, needs nothing from us; but it is in those things which are bestowed on others for their benefit that gifts to the more needy arc the more laudable, because they are more useful. Bul nothing is offered to (Jod for Hi.- benefit, hut for Eis glory and our own good. /) es ■ ligion require outward acts f We offer reverence and honour to God, no! on Eis account, since we can add nothing to His glory, but on our own account. The perfection of our own soul is found in this subjection. But the human soul needs, in order that it may he united to God, the guidance and assistance of sen- sible things. Therefore in Divine worship it is neci to employ outward, bodily acts, in order that by them, as by signs of the inward act, the soul may be lifted up in its spiritual acts by which it is joined to God. There- fore religion has inward acts as chief, and a3, per se, its Qu. lxxxii. 1, 2.] DEVOTION" AND PRATER. 329 own ; but outward acts as secondary and ordained for the other. Therefore Christ said (S. John iy. 24), "God is a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and truth." The outw r ard corporal acts may be similar to those which are presented out of respect to men (bowing or kneeling, etc.), but they are only needful signs of inward and spiritual actions. Is religion the same as the virtue of holiness ? Holiness is attributed to those things which are applied to Divine worship, so that not only men but churches and sacred vessels are said to be sanctified by being so applied. Now, inward purification is necessary in order that the mind may be elevated to God, because the soul is defiled by cleaving to lower things ; sanctity is that virtue "without which no man shall see the Lord " (Heb. xii. 14). Since, then, holi- ness is that by which the mind of man directs itself and its actions to God, it does not differ from religion in essence but only in our conception of it. For religion offers to God due service in that which pertains to Divine worship, as sacrifices, oblations, and the like ; but holiness refers to God not only these but the acts of the other virtues, or fits man for Divine worship. § 3. Devotion and prayer. Devotion is a special act of religion, being the act of a will prepared to do promptlij what belongs to the service of God. It is the same virtue which does the thing and has the prompt will to do it. Charity is the root from which spring both religion and devotion. It is meditation on the Divine bounty and benefits and the consideration of our own needs which is a special cause of devotion. 330 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXm. 1-S. Prayer is an act of reason moved by a loving will, in which God is asked for what is fitting for Him to grant. It tends to the end of charity, which is to be united with God, both because this is the chief object of prayer (Ps. xxvii. -1). and because he thai makes an] petition must approach bim of whom be asks it. Prayer, then, implies an uplifting of the soul to God. Is prayer a proper act of religion ' Thai ii is an acl of religion is evident, Cor it pertains to thai to offer reverence and honour to God, and all things by which Buch reverence is manifested belong to religion. Bnl in prayer such reverence is manifested in subjection and acknowledgment thai God is the author of all good for tin.- Bupply <>f human need. All good desires fall under the precepi of charity, but the asking under the precepi of religion. "Ask, ami it .-hall be given you" (8. Matt. \ii. In asking, the bouI, subjecting itself, makes nidation of itself, which is Car above all outward and corporal obla- and Bacrifii And prayer is fitting, no withstanding the three-fold error of ami. 'in and modern heathen : (1) It is vain to pray if human affairs are nol ruled by Divine Providence; (2) prayer - • I •- if Bome physical necessity control all - : (3) prayer is superstition if it suppose that Divine Providence is variable, and thai God's good will can be N te the familiar but profane objection <>'.' the day.) In maintaining the usefulness of prayer, we neither impose necessity on human affairs subjected to Divine Prov- idence, nor deem the Divine good pleasure to be mutable. Divine Providence not only orders effects, bul also from what causes and in what order they shall come. But among those causes are human acts; and men must do certain things, not that they may change the Divine will, but that by their acts they may fultil the order appointed by God for Qu. lxxxiii. 5.] DEVOTION" AND PRAYER. 331 the accomplishment of certain results. "We do not pray in order that we may change our Father, but in order to ask what God has arranged to be fulfilled through prayer. " Men by asking merit to receive what G-od arranged to give before the world was made" (S. Greg.). (1) We do not pray that we may inform God of what we need : "Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things " (S. Matt. vi. 32) ; but we pray in order that we ourselves may consider that in our needs we are to seek Diviue aid. (2) God, unasked, wills to give us many things from His own boundless liberality ; but that He wills to give us some things when we ask, is for our own benefit; sc., that we may go to our Father with confidence, and that we may recognize Him to be the author of all good. In prayer ought we to make any special petition? There are things which a man can use well or ill, which may prove mischievous for himself ; but there are also good things which a man cannot use so, and these are asked for absolutely. (1) It is true that "we know not how to pray as we ought" (Rom. viii. 26) ; but it is also true that the " Spirit helpeth our infirmity," inspiring us with holy desires, that we may rightly ask. (2) In making determined petitions one may seem to be trying to incline another's will towards his own, whereas our aim should be, not that God should will what we will, but rather that we should will what He wills. But in ask- ing what pertains to our salvation (however special the peti- tion maybe), we do conform our will to His who "willeth that all men should be saved" (1 Tim. ii. 4). And, finally, our Lord Himself taught His disciples, in the " Lord's Prayer," to make determined and special petitions. 332 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXI1I. 6, 7. / man in his prayer to ask for earthly things? Agar Baid (Prov. \\\. 8), "Feed me with the food thai is needful forme;" and S. Augustine says (Ep. ad Prob. •• It is lawful to pray for that which it is lawful to desire." lint temporal things may be lawf ally desired, ool indeed as an end, bul as means t<> an end, by which we are aided in seeking beatitude, since by them the corpora] Life ined ami tin;, can serve tin' acts of virtue. (I) The i. 3. M 33), " Seek ye Bret the kingdom of God ami His riirii i * •• »u - 1 1. -~ . ami all these things shall be added nnto you." They cannot lawfully hold the chief place, hut are to have a subsidiary one ; t he true riohes are to I"- sough! a our chief g 1 ; these as needful for our earthly life. \ all care for such things is prohibited iS. Man. \ i. 25 |, but inordinate am (3) When the soul s.i k - earthly goods as its res', ii is 1 to their level ; hut when it prays for them in their relation to its beatitude, it is uplifted to that ami to God. th They are not asked for unconditionally, hut in rela- tion to something else; that is. as they are expedient for ■ Ivation. Intercession is a form of prayer ; we ought to pray for others. For charity requires that we desire others' good (S. Jas. v. 16) ; and what we ought to desire we ought to pray for. • Bay, "My Father," hut "Our Father:" nor do "Give me," but "Give u<." ''The Lord of unity was unwilling that each should merely pray separated}- for himself He willed that one should pray for all, since in His one Person lie bore the burden of all" S. Cyprian., De Orat. Domin.). Prayer for another may not always be granted, even when it is faithful and persevering and for things pertaining to salvation, because of obstacle.- which that other puts in the Qu. LXXXIII. 8.] DEVOTION" AND PRAYER. 333 way of an answer ; but nevertheless such prayer, spring- ing from charity, is meritorious like any other work of charity. Prayer is to be made for the just, that they may persevere and go forward ; for sinners, that they may turn and be saved (1 Ep. S. John v. 16). We know not who the repro- bate are, therefore prayer is to be made for all sinners (1 Tim. ii. 1). We ought to pray for our enemies (S. Matt. v. 44). Prayer for others is a work of charity : as, therefore, we are bound to love our enemies, so are we bound to pray for them. But hew we are bound to love our enemies has been already considered (see page 200). We are to love their nature, not their sin. We are not commanded to give them special love, except in the preparation of a soul ready to love an enemy with special love and to help him in neces- sity or if he ask pardon. More than this is love's perfec- tion, not its indispensable obligation. The like obligation applies to our prayers ; enemies are not to be excluded. But that we pray specially for them, when not in necessity or other peculiar circumstances, is a work of perfection, not of absolute obligation. (1) Holy Scriptures, indeed, contain many imprecations against enemies, as in Psalm xl. 14, and many others. But these imprecations are to be understood, first, as prophetic denunciations ; secondly, as temporal chastisements for the correction of sinners ; next, as directed against the kingdom of sin, not against particular sinners, that by the correction of men sins may be destroyed ; and, lastly, as conforming the will of man to Divine justice. (We may add that Chris- tians speak the Psalms in the name of their Lord against His enemies. ) So the martyred saints beneath the altar in heaven say, "How long, Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth ?" (Rev. 33-4 RELIGION' AND OPrOSED VICES. [Q.F. LXXXIII. 12. vi. 10). But they pray for the overthrow of the kingdom of sin and rejoice at the work of Divine justice. (2) It may be said that men's prayers should not contra- dict their actions, and it is lawful to fight against enemies, for wars arc sometimes lawful. But the object of just war is to put down evil, and this brings good to enemies as well as to others. So prayer and action need not contradict one another. Should prayer be rural f Prayer is either private or public, i.e., the prayer of the faithful ] pie of God offered for them by the ministers of the Ohnrch. This should be known by all the people for whom it is offered, which cannot be if it is not vocal. So the < Ihnrch orders respeci ing it. I'.ut the private prayer of an individual for himself or for (•tiers oeed nol be vocal. Set the voice is added to such prayer for three reasons ; first, ontward signs of devotion, .sueh as spoken words are, may excite the inward devotion by which the soul is uplifted to God. But if the soul stracted by these outward signs, whatever they may be, or be hindered in any manner, they are to be discon- tinued ; and this is especially true of those who are suffi- ciently prepared for devotion without these outward signs of it. Secondly, vocal prayer is added to inward prayer as pay- ing what is due ; 8&, that man serve God with all that ho has from God — i.e., not only with his mind but with his body (Hos. xiv. 2). Thirdly, the warm affections of the soul break forth in audible language. Vocal prayer is not uttered to inform God of what He is ignorant, but to raise the mind to God. It is not wrong to be "seen of men" (S. Matt. vi. G), but to pray outwardly in order that we mav be seen of men. Qu. iaxxiii. 13.] PRAYEE. 335 Must prayer he with fixed attention? This question chiefly concerns vocal prayer. If we speak of necessity in this matter, it signifies either that by which the end is better reached, or that without which the end is not reached at all. For the first, attention (undistracted) is absolutely necessary. But there are three effects of prayer. The first, which is merit, is common to all acts which are "informed" by charity. And for this effect it is not necessarily required that there be fixed attention throughout the prayer, but the first actual attention with which one began his prayer renders the whole efficacious in this way (this is virtual attention ; one began with hearty desire to pray, but was unwillingly distracted). The second effect of prayer is peculiar to it ; viz., the obtaining a petition ; and the first intention, which God chiefly regards, suffices for this effect also. But if the first intention to pray is absent, there is merely the empty form of outward prayer ; it is neither meritorious, nor does it obtain any answer from God. The third effect of prayer which it directly produces is a spiritual refreshment of the soul ; and for this actual atten- tion is necessary. The sense of the words may be attended to, or the mind may be fixed on God and the thing prayed for ; and this latter is in the highest degree necessary. (1) They that worship God "must worship Him in spirit and in truth " (S. John iv. 24). But they do this who begin their prayer from the prompting of the Holy Spirit, even if, through infirmity, their mind afterwards wander. (2) Through infirmity of nature, the mind cannot long be lifted up on high ; its own heavy load drags it down. (3) If any one purposely wander in mind during prayer he mocks God ; he sins, and loses the fruit of prayer. But unintentional distractions do not take away the first and second fruits of prayer. 33G RELIGION ASH OPPOSED VICES. [Qu.LXXXm.l4 Continual prayer. The Lord said, " Men ought always to pray, and not to faint" (S. Luke xviii. 1 ) ; and S. l'aul said, " Pray without ceasing" (1 Thess. v. 17). The cause of prayer is the desire which Bprings from charity, which desire ought to be continually in as, either actually <>r virtually, for this desire virtually abides in all thin::- which we do from the motive of charity. Bui we ought to do all things to the glory of God (1 Cor. x. 31). In this way we ought always to pray. Bui prayer considered in itself cannot he continual, for there are other duties in life; "therefore, at certain inter- vals of time we call npon God in words also, thai I >y those Bigns of inward devotion we may admonish ourselves, dis- cover how far we have advanced in thai desire, and excite. yes more zealously to increase it " (S. Aug., ad Pro- bam, Ep. 130). But the (juantity of a thing should he pro- portioned to the end. Prayer, then, should last as long as it is useful to excite the fervour of inward desire. But when • this measure, so thai it cannot, las! without weariness, it should not he protracted. This principle applies also to public and common prayer as compared with the devotion of the people. (Well worthy, I think, to he noted.) (1) Christ said that the heathen " think that they shall be heard for their much speaking ■" (8. Matt. \i. 7). But •• it is not much speaking to pray a long time. For much speech is one thing, enduring affection is another. The Lord Himself continued all night in prayer, giving us an example of protracted devotion. Much speaking is using superfluous words ; but much praying is entreating Him to whom we pray with long and devout uplifting of the soul " (S. Aug., Joe. (MS). (2) The Lord did not give His prayer as the only form, but to show us what things we are to desire and ask for. To pray without ceasing is to persevere in the appointed Qu. lxxxiii. 15.] PRATER. 337 times for vocal prayer, and to have its effects remaining in a more devout soul. Is prayer a meritorious work ? It is so inasmuch as it proceeds from the root of charity, whose proper object is eternal good, for whose fruition char- ity fits us. Prayer comes from charity through religion, whose act is prayer, along with other virtues which are requisite for a good prayer; viz., humility and faith. Re- ligion offers the prayer, charity gives the desire of what is prayed for. Faith is necessary, for we must believe that we shall obtain what we ask for. Humility is necessary, for we must recognize our need. But prayer is efficacious from the grace of God, who also leads us to pray. (1) But does not prayer precede grace, since the Lord says (S. Luke xi. 13), " Your heavenly Father will give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him " ? Yes ; but prayer without justifying grace is not meritorious ; neither is any other virtuous act. And yet the prayer which asks for this grace proceeds from some grace, since that very prayer is the gift of God. (2) But if prayer is meritorious at all, it seems to merit to be heard. But oftentimes it is not heard, as we notice in S. PauFs case. I answer that the merit of prayer may apply to a different thing from that which is asked for. For merit is chiefly the fitness for beatitude, but many other things are prayed for. If, then, that thing which is asked for is not serviceable for that beatitude, it is not merited. Sometimes it is neither necessary to salvation nor mani- festly contrary to it ; and then, though the prayer may merit eternal life, it does not merit to obtain the petition. " Mercifully it may be heard, and mercifully it may be re- jected. What is useful for the sick man, the physician knows better than he" (S. Aug.). S. Paul was not heard, because it was not expedient that he should be heard. But if that which is asked for pertain to the soul's life, 22 338 RELIGION AXn OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. i.xxxiv. 1. it is merited not only by prayer but by other works of charity. Undoubtedly the petition is granted, but at a fit- ting time, which granting can be hindered if one does not persevere in prayer. Hut since man cannot merit eternal life by his worthiness, nor be worthy of the things which pertain to eternal lib 1 , he is nol always heard in praying for another. There are then four conditions, which concurring, one always obtains his petition — .«•., th.at he ask Eor himself, what is necessary t<> salvation, devoutly (i.e., with faith, hope, love, humility, and attention) and perseveringly. Do si n if r< i r> r obtain anything from God /"/ prayt r .' 'Idie publican in the Gospel did not saj in vain, " r nature thai male- factors be punished; but the kind of punishmenl depends upon positive law, human or Divine. So, also, sacrifioe in general is a law of nature. l>ui its determination belongs to human or 1 divine institution. ■ / to God only. For il is offered as a saored symbol. What is outwardly offered signifies the inward spiritual sacrifice, in which the bouI offers itself to God (" The sacrifice of God is a broken spirit,"' I's. li. l'.'i. for outward acts of religion are or- dained f"r the in Bui the soul offers itself for a sacrifice to God as its Creator, and the only source of its beatitude. Therefore, as we are to offer to God alone the spiritual sacrific >ught to offer to Bim alone its outward 8j mbol. 7' .."'■'. act of religion. i\ is praia worthy only as done out of reverence for God. Other virtu - • maybe intended for the Bame end, as g aim-, or patiently enduring affliction, hut sacrifi- cial acts arc for tin- end alone. Man's good is three-fold, and each may he offered to God, and in a general way is then called a sacrifice. First, there is the good of the soul, which is offered to God in the inward sacrifice of devotion and prayer. This is the principal sacrifice. But next there is the good of man's body, which is offered to God in mar- tyrdom, abstinence, continence. And it is said (Bom. xii. 1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice. " And, third, there is the good of external things, which are directly a sacrifice when we offer them to God, and they are iudi- Qu. LXSXVI. 1.] OUTWARD ACTS OF WORSHIP. 341 rectly a sacrifice when we communicate them for God's sake. " With such sacrifices God is well pleased " (Heb. xiii. 16). Every sacrifice is an oblation, an offering to God ; but not every oblation is a sacrifice, because the latter signifies also that some religious change is made in the oblation ; thus, animals were killed and burned, and bread is blessed, broken, and eaten. First fruits are oblations because they are offered ; they are not sacrifices, properly speaking, because no further action follows. Are all bound to offer sacrifice 9 What is the law of nature obliges all, and this is part of the law of nature ; therefore all are bound in some way to offer sacrifice. All owe the inward sacrifice of presenting to God a devout and humble spirit. But the outward sacrifice, as we have just seen, is of two kinds ; one which is laud- able only because some outward thing is offered in token of subjection to God. Those who are under revealed law, whether the Old Law or the new Gospel law, are bound to offer certain sacrifices according to the commandment given to them. But those who were not under the law revealed, were bound to do certain outward things for the Divine honour, according to the fitting customs of their place and nation. The other outward sacrifice is when outward acts of other virtues are undertaken as marks of homage to God, and some of these are bound upon all. Priests, indeed, offer those sacrifices which are especially instituted for Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for others ; but there are other sacrifices which each one can offer for himself. Oblations. —As a general term the word applies to all things which are offered in Divine worship. If the offering is converted into a sacred thing, at that 342 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXVIII. 1. time to be consumed, it is both sacrifice and oblation. But if it remain to be employed in Divine worship, or for the use of the ministers of the sanctuary, it is an oblation and not a sacrifice. Such offerings must be voluntary ; but they may also be obligatory, as Church rates, or subscriptions and gifts bequeathed fco bhe Church, or offerings for the support of i he clergy, etc. Gifts to the poor arc not, strictly speaking, oblations unless they are first offered to God through lie priest (Hob. v. 1). These oblations may be consecrated and set apart, as sacred vessels and vestments are, for the service of God. Then they cannot be turned to common uses; but other- i.-\ may be dispensed by the clergy. (See the Offer- tory rubric.) command (Prov. Hi. 9), u Honour the Lord with thy substance," ipplies to all things justly possessed. Things unjustly acquired and possessed cannot be made an oblatioD to God. Accidentally, even that which is law- fully | annot be so used; say, if doing so tend to the injury of another, as a son's offering what his father needs, or any offering which causes scandal, etc. The imposing of tithes, while it rests on the law of nature, belongs to the positive law of the Church, which has authority in this regard. (But the subject is here omit- ted as not directly applicable to our circumstances.) ^ 5. Vows. A vow implies a certain obligation to do or leave undone anything. Obligation between man and man is created by a prom- ise, a rational promise, made through outward signs of it, as spoken or written words. But a promise may be made to God in the thoughts of the heart, although the Qu. lxxxviii. 2.] VOWS. 343 outward signs of it may stir one up to its fulfilment, or call others to witness it. But a true promise proceeds from the deliberate purpose of a will which intends to bind itself. So, then, a vow re- quires three things : first, deliberation ; next, purpose of the will; and thirdly, a promise, to which may be super- added the words of the lips and the witness of other men. The Divine law of vows is given in Deut. xxiii. 21 : "When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, a free-will offering which thou hast promised with thy mouth, thou shalt not be slack to pay it ; for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee ; and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee." It would be a vain promise if any one should promise that which would not be accepted. Therefore nothing illicit, nothing indifferent, may be made the subject of a vow, but only some act of virtue. But be- cause a vow implies a voluntary promise, nothing which is absolutely necessary to be or not to be can be the subject of a vow. But that which is not absolutely necessary, but is so only on account of the end sought for, as that which is neces- sary for salvation, may be vowed because it is voluntary. But that virtuous act which is not necessary to salvation is altogether voluntary, and is most peculiarly the subject of a vow. It is some greater good which is vowed. (1) The vow of baptism (renewed in confirmation) is vol- untary ; so far it justly takes the name of a vow ; but it is not a vow in the narrower sense just explained. (2) Jepbtha's vow, in itself considered, had a good object, but an unlooked-for event made it evil, and it was not to be observed, for what is evil cannot be the subject of a vow. (3) Ascetic practices like vigils and fasting are acceptable only as they are virtuous, which is when they are adopted ■M4 RELIC4I0X AX1) OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXVIII. 3, 4. with due judgment to restrain concupiscence without injur- ing the body. So far they may be vowed. So the apostle (Rom. xii. 1), after he had said, ''Present your bodies," etc., added, "which is your reasonable service." Such vows are better observed or set aside under advice of su- periors : inn if it cannot be had, and greal and manifest injury is felt, one ought not to keep such a vow. (This is not omitted, fchougli there is reason to suspect that it is little applicable to a luxurious and easy-going age.) But • iik-li are made respecting vain and useless things are rather to be laughed ;it than observed. Every run-, when m> give testimony, to manifest the truth, as by punishing the Wax {imprecatory oath). An oaths lawful .' Holy Scripture - vs, "Thou 3hali swear by His Name" (Dent. vi. 13). A thing may be in itself good, and yet turn to evil in his case who uses it ill. And the oath is in itself lawful and good, as will appear both from its origin and from its end. The oath is introduced because men believe that Grod has infallible veracity and universal foresight and knowledge of all things. Its end is to justify men, and put a stop to controversies. " The oath is linal for confir- mation " (Heb. vi. 1G). But it may be turned to ill, in being used without need and without due caution. For he seems to have little rev- erence for God who invokes His attestation in a trifling * For a fuller and thorough treatment of the subject, see Bishop Sanderson, De Juramento. Qu. LXXXIX. 3, 4, 5.] ON OATHS. 349 cause, and such as he would hardly venture to call a man of standing to witness. Besides, there is great danger of perjury in such cases. The Lord said, " Swear not at all " (S. Matt. v. 34) ; but the example of S. Paul shows us how those words are to be understood ; viz., that we avoid forming the evil habit of swearing lightly and on trivial occasions. S. Paul's oaths in his Epistles are for confirmation of truth delib- erately committed to writing (S. Aug., De Mendacio, c. 5). What are the conditions for a lawful oath ? An oath is lawful if it be lawfully used^ but this good use of it requires, first, that one swear, not lightly, but dis- creetly and from a necessary cause. Judgment (i.e., dis- cretion) is the first condition of a lawful oath. Next, what is confirmed by the oath must not be false nor any unlawful thing. Veracity is the second condition of a law- ful oath. Lastly, justice is the third condition ; what is confirmed must be licit. A rash oath lacks discretion ; a false oath, veracity ; an iniquitous or illicit oath lacks jus- tice (Jer. iv. 2). Is the oath an act of religion or Divine worship ? He who swears invokes the Divine testimony to confirm what he says ; and his oath contains a profession that Grod is all powerful, of indefectible veracity and perfect omnis- cience. This is an act of reverence, and therefore it is an act of religion or worship. The object of the testi- mony is some human affair, but the testimony invoked is Divine. The earthly aim may be to certify something before men, but with this goes the aim of offering reverence and honour to God. The oath is not sought for its own sake, but as an aid in human defect or infirmity, a sort of necessary medicine, 350 RELIGION" AXD OPPOSED VICES. [Qc lxxxix. 7. because man disbelieves the witness of his fellow-man. Such things, necessary on account of the imperfections of this lifu, arc unduly used if they are needlessly em- ployed. An oath differs from a vow, because what is confirmed by the oath does not on that account become an act of religion, whereas the vow makes the action (fasting, continence, etc.) such. Has an oath obligatory force t The question is of the force of promissory oaths. In an assertory oath, the obligation does not concern the thing which baj been or is, bat the acl itself of taking the oath; on,- .-wears thai which is or has been true. But in the promissory oath, the obligation concerns the thing which has been confirmed by an oath. One is hound to make that true which he has sworn ; otherwise his oat li lack- the essential condition of veracity. But if the oath cannot possibly be kept, it lacks discretion or judgment; unless, perhaps, it was possible to keep it when made, but it has been rendered impossible by some unforeseen event ; as when 01 that he will pay a certain sum of money, which has afterwards been .-tolen from him. Then ins to be excused from doing what he has sworn. although he is bound to do what in him lies to fullil bis prom:- . But if the fulfilment is possible, indeed, but ought not to be done, either because it is evil per se, or is a serious impediment to the good, then the oath lacks justice, and therefore the oath is not to be kept when it is sin, or a serious hindrance to good. (It was sin to take such an oath ; it is an added sin to keep it.) "Whoever, then, swears that he will do a thing, is obliged to do it, that truth may be kept, provided that judgment and justice are also present (Num. xxx. 2). (1) The promise has veracity, if it express the present Ql\ lxxxis. 7.] ON" OATHS. 351 purpose ; but the oath invokes the Divine attestation to a fixed and unchangeable purpose. (2) An oath may tend to evil in two ways ; in one way, because it had from the beginning an evil result, either be- cause the thing sworn is evil in itself, or because it is an impediment to some greater good. Such oaths are illicit from the beginning, but differently. For if one swear that lie will do some sin, he sins in swearing, and 'he sins in keeping the oath. But if he swear that he will not do some better good, which, however, he is not bound to do, he sins in swearing by opposing the Holy Spirit, who is the inspirer of every good purpose ; but he does not sin in keeping his oath, although he would do better if he did not keep it. An oath may have a bad result in another way, on account of some unforeseen event, as was the case with Herod's oath, who swore to give his daughter whatever she asked for. This oath might have been lawful at first, the due condi- tion being understood, viz., that she should ask for what it was right to give ; but the fulfilment of the oath was illicit. (3) Suppose that one takes alawful oath under compul- sion. There is a two-fold obligation to be considered ; one to the man who receives the promise — such obligation is an- nulled by the force employed ; he does not deserve that the promise to him be kept. But there is another obligation to God, the fulfilling what has been promised in His name. Conscience is not released from that obligation (unless the force destroyed all rational power of action). "We ought rather to endure temporal loss than break an oath. But one may seek release in court, or denounce to authority even if secrecy have been sworn respecting the force employed ; for such an oath tends to a worse result, being against public justice. (4) Suppose a difference of understanding of the meaning of the oath between the two concerned in it. If this come 352 RELIGION AXI) OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. LXXXIX. 9. from the fraud of Mm who takes the oath, he is bound to keep it according to the sound understanding of it on the part of the one who receives it. Bui if there have been no guile, the oath must be understood according to the inten- tion of the one who takes it. Can any human authority dispense from keeping an nail, .' We have 9een thai the necessity of dispensation in the ( :' laws or vows arises Erom the fact thai what i in itself or in general virtuous and useful may. through Bome particular circumstances, become immoral and injurious, and bo cannot be €11 objeel for either law or vow. Bui the same principle applies to oaths. If the thing be immoral, it is repugnani to thai justice which is an essential condi- tion of a licil oath : if it be injurious, it is repugnant to that judgmenl or discretion which is also requisite. And since a man is not the best judge in hie own case, and has no authority to be judge, by parity of reasoning ii follows that the power of dispensal led, and is to be found in the Church, which has n ived authority to loose as well as to bind (S. Matt, xviii. L8). (1) Bui veracity is required equally in promissory as in ry oaths; ami no power of dispensation can permil an oath contrary to truth respecting the pasl or the present; therefore no power can permit that anyone make that to he false which he lias promised with an oath respecting the future. I answer that the power of dispensation cannot extend to Divine commands, cannot allow anything to be done contrary to what has been sworn. But that authority may decide that what was included in the oath is no longer such, as being unfit matter for an oath. The object of the assertory oath, being past or present, is immutable ; and as there is no power to dispense from the veracity of the oath itself, there is no power of dispensation at all. But the ob- Qu. xcni. 1.] SUPEESTITION". 353 ject of the promissory oath is something in the future which is variable, and may become immoral or injurious, and con- sequently unfit matter for an oath, Such an object may come under the power of dispensation. (2) A man may promise with an oath what is for another's benefit. That other can release him from his obligation. But in another way one may promise another what pertains to the honour of G-od, or the benefit of the community (as the promise made to the bishop in ordination). The prom- ise is chiefly made to God ; he who receives it cannot release it (unless he have power of dispensation). Since the oath is for confirmation of veracity, and implies some doubt, it seems to be decent that the priesthood should not ordinarily take such an oath in temporal affairs. (Let him claim his privilege in courts of law, etc.) § 7. Superstition. (The greater part of the author's discussion of topics under this head is adapted to a different state of society from ours. What seems to be of special and permanent value will be briefly indicated.) Superstition is a vice opposed to true religion in its ex- cess ; not that it offers to God in worship more than re- ligion does, but it gives Divine homage to what it ought not, or in a manner it ought not. Pernicious worship may possibly he offered to the true God. Thus a lie is most pernicious in what pertains to religion. But it is a lie if any one express outwardly by signs, as in religious worship, what is contrary to the truth. This is a pernicious worship, and it may occur in two ways : First, as respects the thing signified, which may be discordant from the signification of Christian worship. Thus it would now be pernicious to use those ceremonies of the Old Law by which Gospel mysteries were prefigured. (And sitting at 23 35-4 RELIGION .VXD OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. xeiv. the reception of the Holy Eucharist was, not many ages ago, made a symbol of unbelief in the Lord's Real Presence therein.) In another way, falsity in outward worship may directly concern the worshipped especially in public worship which is presented by ministers in the name of the whole Church. For as it is fraud to claim authority for action where none has been given, bo he is guilty of falsity who in the name of < hnrch offers worship to God contraryto what has been with Divine authority established by the Church, or is cus- toinarv in the Church (so far as custom has the force of positive law). They that worship God must worship Bim nol only in .-pint but "in truth." (A warning against lawlessness in the Church.) thing be superfluous in Divine worship? Certainly not, if we speak merely of quantity; for man can do nothing which is not less than he owe.- to God. But, something may be superfluous in not being proportioned to the end. The end of Divine worship is that man may glorify God, ami Bubject himself to God both in body ami in spirit And, therefore, whatever a man does which pertains to the glory of God and the subjection of his soul, and of his body also, according to the ordinances of God and the Church and the customs of those with whom he li not, superfluous. But if there be anything which does not come under any one of these heads, it is to be deemed super- fluous and superstitious, as consisting only in outward ob- servances which have nothing to do with inward worship. '•The kingdom of God is within you," condemns those superstitious persons who give their chief attention to out- ward ceremonies. Idolairij. It is a species of superstition which gives Divine honour where it is not due. As in idolatry it is offered to some Qu. xciv. 2, 3.] SUPERSTITION". 355 creature of God through sensible signs — say, sacrifices, etc. — so, also, the creature worshipped may be represented by some sensible form, which is called au idol (Rom. i. 23). Idolatry is a mortal sin, whether it be giving the outward or the inward worship, a sin condemned by the Second Commandment. All supe- riors are to be revered, but not all with the same reverence. Special marks of reverence are due to Almighty God ; viz., Divine adoration (" latria "). " Outward sacrifices are signs of the inward sacrifice, as spoken words are signs of things. "Wherefore, as in prayer and praise we direct our words to Him to whom we offer in our hearts the reality which we signify with our lips, so in sacrifice we know that we are to offer the visible j)art to none save to Him before whom we present in our hearts the invisible sacrifice, the offering of ourselves " (S. Aug., Civ. Dei, x. 19). In the temple under the Old Law, and in the Church to-day, images or pictures are not introduced that Divine homage may be paid to them, but for the sake of what they signify ; that faith may be made more real and strength- ened in the minds of the beholders. Idolatry is in its own nature the gravest of sins. The gravest rebellion in a commonwealth is setting up another in place of the lawful ruler. So, while sins against God are the greatest of all sins, the worst of those sins seems to be the paying Divine honours to any creature, which, so far as it goes, is setting up another in place of God. But the gravity of sin depends also upon the sinner's inward state; for sins of malice are far worse than sins of ignorance. And so the heretic who with eyes open corrupts the faith which he has once received, may be worse than the ignorant idolater. 350 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. xevn. Attempts at divination, through " clairvoyance " or other- wise, are not uncommon sins. The future may be foreseen through its causes, and if those causes have necessary and invariable effects, thus,' effects may be foretold with absolute certainty, as in the prediction of eclipses. Ami certain events are so generally followed by others thai the firsi may be reasonable ground Eor prediction, as in the ease of medical diagnosis. But there are other causes, like the free-will of man. which arc uoi determined bo one accessary result, and their effects can licted bj God only, who in His eternity sees in one vision what we eall past, present, and future. And if any one presume to have this knowledge of future contingencies, he manifestly usurps whal belongs bo God alone. This is the siu of divination. it maybe from the temptation of devils, who try to seduce the minds of men by such idle Bearch into the unknown l'ut are. The end Bought may be idle curiosity, hut the means used belong to evil Buperstition. (See [sa. viii. L9.) | 8. Irreligiou ; viz., Tempting God, perjury, sacrilege, and simony. We are imw to consider vices opposed to religion, which spring from contempt or irreverence towards God and holy things. T> mptii g We try another by our words, in order to ascertain whether he knows what we ask or is able or willing to do it. We try another by our actions to prove his judgment, will, or power. We try him openly, professing our purpose, or secretly, as the Pharisees tempted Christ (S. Matt. xxii.). So man tempts God sometimes in words, sometimes in deeds. One would be expressly tempting God in His prayers if he should ask anything in order to make experiment of Qu. XCVIII.] PERJURY. 357 God's love, power, or Knowledge (as in the "prayer-test" proposed by Professor Tyndall). Constructively he does the same who asks what is of no other use than such a test. In his deeds one expressly tempts God when, by what he does, he intends to make trial of his God ; constructively he may be doing the same thing by his words. When, therefore, on account of some necessary or useful end one commits himself in his petitions or in his actions to the Divine aid, he does not tempt God. But apart from such occasions the commandment is, ' ' Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God " (S. Matt. iv. 7). Tempting God, then, is a sin. For no one tries experiments on that of which he is cer- tain. Every trial proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in him who makes the trial, as when he wishes to find out the qualities of a thing, or in others, as when he tries an experiment to show something to those others. In this lat- ter way God is said to tempt us. But ignorance or doubt of what pertains to God's perfection is a sin. Tempting God, then, in order to know His power, is a sin. But it is not tempting God when one desires to show to others the great- ness of God, for some just necessity or pious utility. For so the apostles (Acts iv. 30) prayed, and asked God that "signs and wonders might be done through the name of Jesus/' for the conversion of unbelievers. Since tempting God is a direct act of irreverence in doubt- ing of His excellency, it is directly opposed to religion. Perjury. This in assertory oaths is falsity ; but if a man swears what he believes to be true, though it is in reality false, his act is perjury (material perjury), but he is not a perjurer (formal perjury). This of assertory oaths ; but an imperfect kind of perjury may be found also in promissory oaths, when they lack justice. For in swearing an illicit thing, he incurs 358 RELIGION AN T D OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. XCVHI. falsity, because he is under obligation to do the contrary of his oath. And if he swear indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of being false to bis oath. Every act of perjury is a sin against religion, for it is a sign of irrevereuce towards God that he is invoked to attest a lie. This implies either that God does not know the truth, or thai he is willing to attest a falsehood. (1) lie who swears that he will do an unlawful action commit- imperfeel perjury in the act of swearing, on account of the lack of justice : but there is no perjury in not doing what he bas sworn to do, because the thing was not the proper objeel of an oath. (There need be no perplexity in such a ease. The sin was in swearing ; it would bean added sin to fullil the oath.) i.'i In like manner, he who swears that he will not do some good action which he ought to do, sins in the lack of judgment But he is not perjured if he do that action, for what he swore to could not be lit object of an oath. (3) So, again, if one swear that be will do another's will, obey another's commands, the due conditions are implied; ac. s that the command be lawful, virtuous, and not intoler- ably difficult to execute. Otherwise there is no perjury in violating the oath. (4) But may not some change occurring after the oath is taken release from its obligation ? Xew members join the society which has taken an oath; are they bound by it? New statutes are made in an institution. Does the former oath which has been taken respecting old statutes bind one to observe the new ? To the first case I answer that the oath is a personal action, and does not bind him who has not taken it. But if any one enter a society and share its advantages, he is bound to submit to its burdens, or else to leave it at once. To the last question I reply that the oath does not bind one to keep new laws for all future time, but the member of the institution is bound by the co- active force of its laws so long as he remains in it. Qu. c. 1.] SIMONY. 359 Perjury is mortal sin, both because it directly violates the express command of God (Lev. xix. 12), and because it implies contempt of Him. Even he who swears jestingly is guilty of irreverence towards God. But he who swears falsely through " lapsus Ungues" if he be fully conscious of his act, is not excused from contempt of God ; but if the action were inadvertent, there was no intention of taking an oath, and no perjury. Sacrilege. "What is set apart for Divine service is sacred ; reverence for it is referable to God, whose it is in special manner. Irreverent treatment of it is doing injury to God ; it is sacrilege. It has its own special deformity, in violating sacred things ; it is therefore a special sin, opposed to religion, which rev- erences what belongs to God. Sacrilege differs as what is sacred differs. There are con- secrated persons, consecrated places, and consecrated things. The greater the sanctity violated, the greater is the sacrilege. Violation of sacred persons is graver than violation of sacred places, for the place was made sacred for man, not man for the place. Similarly, in the third kind of sacrilege, that against things, most sacred are the sacraments by which man is sanc- tified ; gravest, therefore, is sacrilege respecting the Holy Eucharist, the sacrament of the Lord's Body and Blood. Next comes sacrilege respecting the holy vessels of the sacra- ments ; then what pertains to the ornaments of the Church and the vestments of its ministers ; then sacrilege respect- ing what is offered to God for the support of the ministers of the altar. Whoever sins against any of these falls into the crime of sacrilege. Simony is a sin. Spiritual things cannot be bought and sold. First, they 3G0 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. LQu. C. 2. cannot be compensated by any earthly price. And S. Peter condemned the depravity of Simon in its very root when he said. " Thy money perish with thee ; because thou hast thought that the gift of God cau be purchased with money" (Acta viii. 20). Secondly, no one can sell what is not his own. The clergy are not owners of spiritual things, I > u t . only dispensers of them, "stewards of the mysteries of (i >d " (i Cor. iv. 1). Thirdly. Belling is repugnant to the origin of spiritual things, which come from the free grace of God. "Freely ye have received, freely give" (S. Matt, x. 8). Therefore simony, or buying and selling sonic spir- itual thing, is the Bin of irreverence towards God and Divine things. When simony ie defined as the deliberate buying or sell- ing some spiritual thing, or what i- annexed to such a thing, understand by bnying or selling any contract which is not gratuitous. Is 'i always unlawful to givt and to receive money for the sacramt The sacraments of the Gospel are preeminently spiritual -. inasmuch as they are the means of spiritual grace value cannot be estimated in money ; and it is against their nature that they should not be given gratuitously. But they ;;: I by the ministers of the Church, who must be supported by the people ; so the apostle says (1 Cor. ix. 13), '•Know ye not that they who minister abont sacred things eat of the things of the temple, and they' which wait the altar have their portion with the altar ?" There- fore to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacra- is the crime of simony, which no custom can excuse, because custom cannot violate natural or Divine law, and simony is forbidden by both of them. And by money is to be understood anything whose value can be estimated in money. But to receive money for the support of those who min- Qu. c. 3.] SIMONY. 3G1 ister Christ's sacraments is not simony nor any sin. For it is not taken as pay, but as a necessary stipend. It is better to go without the sacraments than to sin by purchasing them. The same remark applies to Holy Matrimony. The bless- ing of the Church cannot be purchased. If the priest merely solemnized the civil contract, he might be paid for doing so. Is it lawful to give and to receive money for other spir- itual ministrations ? As the sacraments are called spiritual because they con- fer spiritual grace, so certain other things are called so be- cause they either proceed from spiritual grace or dispose man for it. Yet these require the ministry of men, who must be sup- ported by those who receive these benefits (1 Cor. ix. 7). To sell or buy acts of this nature is simoniacal. But to give and receive something for the support of those who minister in these spiritual things, according to the ordi- nance of the Church and approved custom, is lawful, if the simoniacal intention be not there, and if the demand be not made on those unwilling to contribute, by withholding those spiritual ministrations. For this would be a kind of selling. But when spiritual ministrations have been already freely bestowed, it is lawful to demand, from those who are able but unwilling to give, the appointed and customary offering for clerical support (say, the pew rent). The case of the physician or lawyer is not the same. He who has any science does not get with it the obligation to use it for every one alike, as do the ministers of spiritual things. The former may receive pay, not as selling their science, but in exchange for their labours. But if they were bound by the obligation of their office to give their services, as in the case of a hospital physician, etc., they would grievously sin in selling their services. 3G2 RELIGION AND OPPOSED VICES. [Qu. c. 4. Some things are so annexed to spiritualities as to depend upon them, as the benefice of a rector, which can only he held bij a <■!, rgyman. The sale of such things would be understood as the sale of spiritual things, and is unlawful. But other things are annexed to the spiritnal as being ordained for them, as the righl of presentation to a living, or the Bacred vesselB (not yel consecrated and used) which are prepared for sacramental use. Such things precede the spiritual in order of time, and may be sold, but not as annexed to I he spiritual. In case of need for the Ohurch or the poor, even the con- Becrated vesselfi may be broken and Bold for their value as precious metals. There is another form of simony, when spiritual things — Bay, office in the Church -are given as a reward for personal Bervice, or, in response to a request, in order to obtain some temporal advantage. Whai can be estimated in pecuniary value is equivalent to money, when Bimony is in question. Nepotism is a sin in these matters, hut it is not simony, unless some temporal advantage is in some way expected. CHAPTER V. DUTIES TOWAEDS OTHERS, DEPENDING ON JUSTICE, AND THEIE OPPOSITE VICES. § 1. Piety, reverence, and honour. What is piety towards men f Man becomes a debtor towards others in various degrees and manners, according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits which he receives from them. In both God holds the highest place, as infinitely excellent and as the first principle of our being and of our direction in life. But, in the second place, as the source of our being and the orderers of our life, stand our parents and our country. Next to God, then, Ave owe service to our parents and our country. But in this service due to parents is included that of our near relatives who are descended from the same parental stock. And in the service of our country is implied that of our fellow-citizens and of all friends of our country. (Patriotism is a part of piety towards man.) The word "piety" is often applied to the service which we owe to God, who is the Father of us all. But the greater includes the less, and now we use the term in the more restricted sense. Works of mercy, also, are sometimes called pious works for a similar reason, being part of our service towards God. It is filial piety to provide for the support of parents. For the Lord, in rebuking the Pharisees (S. Matt. xv. 5), taught us that this is part of the honour due to those who are the source of our being. 304 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CI. 8, 4. Some fchinga are due to parents and fellow-citizens as Buch : Borne thin-- are due in special circumstances. To a father, as father, are due reverence and dutiful conduct. Bui he may be sick ; then provision must be made for his infirmity. He may be poor; then his children our him support, and all Bnoh things arc included in dutiful oon- duot. This is part of the law of nature, as well as of t In- civil coda 1 Common Law is to the Bame effect. "The child is equally compellable, if of Bufficienl ability, to maintain and provide for a wicked and unnatural progenitor, as for one who has shown the greatest tenderness and parental piety" (Blackst., i. p. '• Why, then, does S. Paul Bay (2 ('or. lii. 11). "The chil- dren ought n"t to laj up for the parents, bul the parents for the childre:; L86 the father i-- bound to this . since children are his natural successors. But the child is not bound to lay up for a parent whom in the of nature he will survive. Tic case before as, how- ex. r, is tb it, not fut tire, need. Piety lias its special object ; sc, parents and country, and t these, under the Bpecial idea of paying duty and those who are the Bources and Ives. Therefore piety is a special virtue, a special manifestation of charity. May the duties of filial piety be neglected on account of religious ni< of mercy which are done to our neighbours are offered to Bim; and the King will say, "Inasmuch as ye did il unto the leasl of these My brethren, ye did it unto Me" (S. Matt. rxv. I I repeat, if our service is ssary to earthly parents that they cannot be duly supported witboul it, and they do not induce us to anything against God, we ought nol them for the sake of religion. But in u -i rin in order to fulfil those duties to them, or even if without our assistance they can be did;. .. it is lawful to leave those filial duties at the call f the soul, and r will, through which all ol her goods arc used. Therefore, in itself obedience is more laud- able, in its giving up nvill, than any other moral virtue. II 3. < (loc. cit. ). " Obedience is than the Bacrifioe of outward things, because this may offer the flesh of another, bul obedience sacrifices our own will." Hem any kind are accepted i as meritorious in His re done through this mol to Hie ill. For if I my body to be burned in martyrdom, or bestow all my to feed the poor, unless I ordain this for the fulfill- ing <>f the Divine will, I am nothing. Charity cannol without obedience, and without charity all my work- are empty of title to reward. •• He thai saith, I know God, and keepeth nol His commandments, is a liar and the truth in him. B keepeth His word, in him yerily hath the love of God Eected " 1 1 Ep. S. John ii. 1). Why tli'l Samuel Bay 1 1 Sam. rv. 22 . " To ob than sacrifice," which is a moral virtues? I answer that obedience in a.11 its species springs a superior which oiler.- him worship and honour. As it proceeds from reverence for - who hold high office, it is contained in observance. As it comes from reverence for parents, it belongs to piety. But as it proceeds from reverence towards God, it is a part of religion, and pertain- to devotion, which is the chief act of religion. In this aspect of it. to obey is more laudable Qu. CIV. 5, 6.] OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE. 371 than to offer sacrifice ; to offer our own will than to immo- late the flesh of a victim. Are those subject to authority bound to obey their supe- riors in all things 9 Holy Scripture says (Acts v. 29), " We ought to obey God rather than men." And sometimes the commands of those who have authority are against the will of God. Therefore obedience is not due in all things. For two rea- sons the inferior may not be bound always to obey his su- perior. First, a higher power may give an opposite com- mand ; and secondly, the superior may pretend to command where he has no authority to do so. The better part of a man comes under no earthly dominion ; in the inward actions of the will man is bound to obey no one but God. Man may be subject to man in what he has to do through bodily action, but in what pertains to his body itself God is the only Lord. For all are created equal in what pertains to the support of life, the creation of a family. Hence ser- vants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in contracting matrimony, or choosing celi- bacy. But in what pertains to the ordering of life's actions the subject is bound by his superior's commands within the limits of his authority, as the soldier to his officer in mili- tary affairs, the servant to his master in servile works, the son to his father in life's discipline and domestic affairs. This, doubtless, is the meaning of what the apostle said (Col. iii. 20), " Children, obey your parents in all things ;" i.e., all things within the scope of parental right. In reasonable doubt we must stand by authority, for " melior est conditio possidentis''' Christians are bound to obey the secular power. " Be subject to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake ; whether it be to the king as supreme, or unto gov- 372 DITTIES TOWABDS OTHERS. [Qu. CV. em ore, as Bent by him" (l S. I'm. ii. 13). For the faith of chri-t is the wry foundation of justice; and by thai faith the order of justice is not taken away, but rather established. Hut the order of justice requires that the r obey the Buperior, otherwise human Bociety could not continue. (1) lint are nol "the children fre< "? Y ; through the gra< f Christ, free from the spiritual bondage of sin. But thai '-' not liberate from corporeal defects, or from earthly rul< B ii 8. I' I • - ■• dead to the law *' (Rom. \ii. I), and human law account than the Divine law of Old Tef 5 - : but that < Md Law was a fig- ure of the V .', T< stament, and so came to an end when the truth appeared. The oof similar in human law. But] ' bound to obev robbers : and many a Btate is founded in usurpation >r robbery, and many a ruler •ijust as tfa V • : but obedience is due so far as justice requires, and no farther. No one is bound - irped power i until, al era) acci ptance - of legitimacy), or unjust commands, except accidentally, to avoid scandal or danger to self <> God. Ami then it may, under due conditions, he avenged, and ought to he avenged. Klijah and Eli.-ha followed the law of righteousness in what they did, though the injuries done were primarily directed against them-.! ■ (5) What shall we say of the .-in of a multitude, as in lynch law executed by a mob ? Their -in is more injurious than that of one only. Yet vengeance is not to he taken for it. A whole diocese cannot he excommunicated for the .-in of the great majority of its members. " Let both grow together until the harvest," lest the wheat be rooted up (S. Matt. xiii. 30). I answer that when the whole people sins, vengeance may visit that people, as it does in many a just war ; see also the story of the golden calf, in Ex. xxxii. But if the correction of the multitude who follow a few leaders is to be hoped for, Qu. cviii. 3, 4.] VENGEANCE. 379 vengeance may select the chief offenders, as in Num. xxv. 4. But if offenders and. innocent are so mingled that there is no distinguishing of the one from the other, severity may be unwise. So with respect to rulers. Their sin is to be tolerated, if it cannot be punished without great scandal among the people, unless the temporal or spiritual injury is of more account than the scandal which is to be feared. (A very serviceable rule concerning evil and scandal in the Church.) Observe that the natural inclination to remove what is injurious is in all animals, including man. And in us it is a certain aptitude for a special virtue, which special virtue proper vengeance is. Are penal statutes on the whole just and expedient f Vengeance restraining the evil is lawful and virtuous. Now there are those who have little or no love for virtue, who are so restrained through fear of losing what they value more than what they gain by doing wrong. Fear does restrain sin. Therefore proper vengeance consists in taking away what men most value. This is life, liberty, and outward goods. The proper penalties, therefore, are capital punishment, flogging, imprisonment, exile, loss, ignominy. (1) The Lord forbade the tares to be rooted up, when that would endanger the wheat. But sometimes the bad can be sent out of this world, not only without danger to better men, but even for the great advantage of the latter. (2) All mortal sins are worthy of eternal death, according to the Divine judgment. But the penalties of this present life are rather medicinal ; and therefore only those offences deserve capital punishment which are the most harmful to other men. Is vengeance to light on those who sin involuntarily ? Penalty is due only to sin. But all sin is voluntary ; 380 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. OIX, therefore involuntary transgression is aol to be followed by vengeance. But this applies to vengeance as such. By penalty is re- paired the violation of justice, due equality is restored ; he who has Binned by unduly following his own will, suffers something contrary to his will. But penalty may he con- sidered also ae medicinal ; it may aid the healing of past wound-, preserve from future one-, promote some good. So viewed, punishment sometimes cornea on one without lit, bul m»t without cause This medicinal punishment, as such, never takes away a greater good for the sake of lesser good ; bul the less maj be losi for the sake of helping the greater. Thus one may lose earthly goods without his fault for the sake of spiritual humiliation or probation. This is Divine visitation. But do one is punished with the loss of spiritual goods except through hie own fault. § 4. Veracity and vices opposed to it. Veracity is a special virtue by which our outward words and actions are duly made signs of the thoughts of our It is a part of justice ; Dot that there is herein any question of legal obligation, but there is a moral debt which we owe to others. (They have a right not to he deceived by us.) man ie made for society, is " ial animal," law of nature that each owes to other that without which society cannot he preserved. But mi n cannot live bly and securely with one another, unless they trust one another's words and actions as signs of their thoughts. Therefore veracity is a moral debt which we owe to one an- other. In affirmation one may, without deceit, fall short of the whole truth, as when one does not manifest the whole good that is in himself, his knowledge, holiness, or something else of that nature. This does not prejudice the truth, for Qu. ex.] VERACITY AXD VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 381 the less is contained in the greater (2 Cor. xii. 6). But negation is different ; for to deny that one possesses what is really in him, is falsity. Lying. A moral act takes its character as such from its direct object and from its end as the object of the will. Veracity and lying consist in voluntary manifestation of thought through external signs. And the object of the manifesta- tion is the true or the false. But the intention of the evil will is two-fold : first, to enunciate the false, and, next, the effect of that ; viz., to deceive another. If, then, those three concur, a falsehood enunciated, the will to enunciate what is false, and the intention to deceive, then we have (1) actual, "material" falsity ; (2) moral, " for- mal " falsity, and (3) effectual falsity in the wish to deceive. But falsehood proper depends on the second of these, and a falsehood is that enunciation which is contrary to the mind of the enunciator. If any one, therefore, enunciates what is false, believing it to be true, it is a " material" falsehood, but not formally, morally such, because the falsity is contrary to the intention of the ennnciator, and the assertion falls short of the perfect idea of a falsehood. But if any one utter what is formally false — i.e., having a will to enunciate falsehood — what he says may be actually true, but, as voluntary and moral, his act has falsity per se and truth accidentally ; it is a falsehood. The same prin- ciples apply to falsity in action. That any one intend to deceive another, as the effect of his enunciation, is not included in the definition of falsehood (menclacium), for so would be excluded falsehoods uttered in joke, where there is no intention of deceiving. But this intention goes to make up the perfection of falsehood.* * The English language, and the English-speaking races, so far as their language expresses their moral thought, seem to stand on a higher 382 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CX. 2. ILnr are falsehoods (mendacia) divided? Falsehood may transcend the truth, in exaggeration or boasting; it may fall short of the truth, in what we will call " irony." But as a fault or sin. we may divide falsehood according to the end aimed at, which aggravates or diminishes the fault. (1) Another's harm may be intended; this is an injurious falsehood (mendacium perniciosum); (2) some benefil or the removal of Borne harm may be aimed at ; this rviceable falsehood, a ••white lie" (mendacium officio- 3 ii may be uttered .-imply to give pleasure, as in facetious falsehoods, compliments, flattery, etc. (mendacium are at least of a less grave character. jtine's divisions (De Mend. c. 14) with reference to the end sough! for are more completo : (1) Falsehood I, in the doctrines of religion; (2) against man with the intention of injuring some one. and not of benefit- ay one ; (3) with intention of injuring some one for another's benefit. These are forms of injurious falsehood. ■ in the mere desire of deceiving, or Baying what is false, which come from the habitual liar. hoods which hurt no one. and are uttered for the at ion of property ; (6) for the saving of life ; (7) for the preservation of chastity. These three belong to ser- ial Lastly come falsehoods uttered in iompliments, flattering remarks. They belong to the third class mentioned ab plane than the Latin language, and the nations using its derivatives. For oar two words, "falsehood" and " lie," express moral differences which are lost or blended in m ndaemm. The lie, as we use the word, seems to imply the intention to deceive : and to call a man a liar is the gravest insult, because we impute an evil intention which we can only infer. But the falsehood may be uttered without that intention, through ignorance, or carelessness, or in joke. Falsehood, therefore, seems to come nearer than the stronger word, "lie," to ''mendacium," as the term is used by S. Thomas Aquinas. Qu. ex. 3.] VERACITY AND VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 383 Is every falsehood a sin ? Falsehood is evil in itself, being contrary to the law of nature ; for signs are naturally so connected with things signified that it is unnatural and wrong to signify what one has not in his mind. "He that uttereth lies shall not escape"" (Prov. xix. 5). (1) Are examples of falsehood in Holy Scripture ever spoken of therein with commendation ? For example, the midwives in Egypt told a downright lie with intention to deceive (Ex. i. 21). But they had their reward with G-od, not for their lie, but for their godly fear and benevolence. Examples of perfect virtue may be found in Holy Scripture ; but some are commended there (as Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite), not for perfect virtue, but for a virtuous dis- position, which was sullied with many imperfections. (Yet, to the best of her knowledge, Jael was on the Lord's side against the enemies of the Lord's elected people.) (2) It may be said that a less evil is to be chosen in order to avoid a greater one ; and there is less harm done in gen- erating a false impression in the mind of another than in killing or being killed. Therefore it is lawful to lie in order to keep one man from homicide, and to save another from death. But the lie is sin not merely from the harm done to a neighbour, but from its own violation of God's order. " Speak ye truth each one with his neighbour ; for we are members one of another" (Eph. iv. 25). And it is not per- mitted to use any illicit violation of Divine order in order to hinder the doing of injury. So it is not permitted to steal in order to have something to give away. Therefore, it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to liberate another from some peril. But it is lawful prudently to keep back the truth. (3) It may be said, also, that it is a falsehood if one does not fulfil what he has promised ; but not all promises are to be fulfilled ; evil ones should be violated, and, therefore, not every falsehood is a sin. But he who promises anything with the intention of keeping his promise does not tell a 38-4 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CX. 4. falsehood, for he does not speak contrary to what he has in his heart. If he does not do what he has promised, he seems to he acting faithlessly in changing his mind. But he is excusable, first, if he have promised what is manifestly unlawful ; he sinned in promising, he docs well in changing his purpose. Next, he is excusable if the condition of per- sons and things be altered. A man is bound to do what he has promised provided thai all importanl conditions remain unchanged. Otherwise, he was neither false in promising, L8e he promised what he had in his mind, the due conditions being understood; nor is he faithless in not doing what he promised, because those conditions no longer exist (4) Compliments, and other mendacia jocosa, have the nature of falsehood as acts, for there is the will to utter what is known to be false; but there may be no intention to deceive, and no actual deception may be produced. ■ ry falsehood a mortal sin / Mortal sin is properly what is opposed to charity whereby the bouI lives in union with God. But a falsehood maybe opposed to charity in three way-: (1) First, in itself, as signifying whal is untrue. If this regard Divine things, it is opposed to the love of God, whose truth is hiddeu or cor- rupted by such a falsehood. This is not only opposed to charity, but to faith and religion, and this falsehood is, therefore, most grave, and is mortal. But if the false expression concern that whose knowledge pertains to man's good — e.g., to the perfection of knowledge and instruction concerning the moral life — such a falsehood, causing loss to one's neighbour through false opinion, is opposed to love of our neighbour, and is mortal sin. But if the false opin- ion thus produced concern something which is indifferent, where it matters not whether it be known or not, then a neighbour suffers no loss from such a falsehood ; e.g., if one were deceived in small, contingent particulars with which he Qr. ex. 4.] VERACITY AXD VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 385 had do concern. Such a falsehood, viewed in itself, is not a mortal sin. (2) By reason of the end aimed at a falsehood may be opposed to charity, as when what is said is intended to do injury to God's honour, or other attribute of His, which is contrary to religion and is always mortal sin ; or when it is intended to injure our neighbour's property, person, or good name ; and this, also, like any wilful injury of another, is mortal sin. By merely intending to do what is mortal sin, one sins mortally. But if the end aimed at be not con- trary to charity, the falsehood will not, so viewed, be mortal sin, as is apparent in complimentary remarks, and some "white lies" which are intended for some benefit to a friend. (This does not imply that they are no sin, but that they are not that deadly sin which destroys the spiritual life.) (3) Accidentally, even such a lesser sin may be contrary to charity by reason of the scandal given to others, or some resulting harm which will make even a "white lie" to become mortal sin. (1) But the Psalmist says (Ps. v. 6), " Thou shalt destroy them that speak lies." This, no doubt, is said of those who are injuring others by their falsehoods. (2) Is not every kind of falsehood prohibited by the Ninth Commandment ? Since all the precepts of the Decalogue are reducible to the love of God and our neighbour, false- hood is so far against the Ninth Commandment as it is con- trary to charity. Hence, " bearing false witness against our neighbour " is explicitly named. (3) But it is to be remembered that venial sin is iniquity, being against just equity ; therefore S. Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ, i. 36), " Every one who utters a falsehood violates confidence ; for he certainly wishes that another whom he tries to deceive have confidence in him, which confidence he violates. But every violator of trust is in- iquitous." (So the apostle, Eph. iv. 25. And note that the argument applies with force to beneficial lies {mend. 25 386 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CXI. 1, 2, 4. ojjiciosa), which are violations of fidelity, if not directly of charity.) Simulation and hypocrisy. — All simulation is sinful. For we have seen that veracity is the virtue by which one presents himself outwardly through external signs such as lie inwardly is. But these signs are not only words but actions al-o. As, then, it is opposed to the virtue of verac- ity that one express in words what is not in his heart, it, is equally so t" make use of outward things or actions for the same purpose. This simulation is an acted falsehood. And since every falsehood is a .-in, every simulation is a sin (un- der tie- same conditions). A- it i> not falsehood to be lawfully silent respecting what actually exists, BO it is not simulation to fail to signify in other manners than by words what actually is. Thus it is let the sin of simulation to conceal a .-in, for fear of scandal given to others AU hypocrisy is simulation, hut not all simulation is hypocrisy, but only that which sim- ulates another*.- person, as when the .-inner pretends that he i- a ju.-t man. lie wear- a mask, as the name hypocrite indicates. But it may ho objected that the hypocrites of the Gospel when they were giving alms showed outwardly what they were inwardly doing (S. Matt. vi. 2). I answer that the outward action naturally signifies the intention. When, therefore, in good works which naturally pertain to G-od's service, any one does not seek to please God, but to please men, he feigns a right intention which he does not po Is hypocrisy always mortal sin ? The hypocrite of the Gospel is a mortal sinner, for he has two vices, defect of sanctity, and simulation of it ; and his aim is both these vices : that is, he does not care to be Qu. cxil. 1, 2.] VERACITY AJKTD VICES OPPOSED TO IT. 387 holy, but only seeks to appear such. This is mortal sin ; for no one is totally deprived of holiness except through mortal sin. But if he who conceals his sin, and therefore inten- tionally feigns a holiness which he does not possess, be called a hypocrite, his sin indeed may be mortal, but the act of simulation is not an added mortal sin. This you may see from considering the end aimed at. If the simulation be opposed to the love of God or one's neigh- bour, say, that the end is to spread heresy abroad, or to get office in the Church when one is unfit for it, or money, or reputation, as the end of the hypocrisy, any of these or the like makes the sin evidently mortal. But if the feigning were out of pure vanity {e.g., delight- ing in the clerical garb without reference to the sanctity which it symbolizes and requires), sinful as it is, it may pos- sibly not destroy totally the love of God in the soul ; that is, it may be venial sin. Boasting ("jactafitia"), and its opposite vice (" ironia"), self-depreciation. There are two kinds of boasting, or extolling one's self in words. One may speak of himself not, indeed, above what he is in truth, but above men's opinion of him, which sort of boasting the apostle disclaims in 2 Cor. xii. 6. But in another way one may extol himself above what he truly is, and this is more properly boasting, and is manifestly a vice opposed to truth. Perhaps its most frequent cause is the arrogance of pride, elevating one inwardly above his measure, and finding out- ward expression in boastful words, although personal vanity may produce the same result. Its end is vainglory or worldly gain. Is it mortal sin f As a form of falsehood it is sometimes directed against the glory of God, like the boasting of the Prince of Tyre (Ezek. xxviii. 2). Sometimes it is opposed to love of our 388 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxtv. neighbour, like the Pharisee's boasting in S. Luke xviii. 11, "God, I thank Thee that I am not as the rest of men," etc. These arc mortal sins (Ps. xii. 3). But sometimes one boasts out of idle vanity, neither against God nor againsi his neighbour : this is sinful, but it may be venial sin. But, again, we may consider its cause, as pride, lust of gain, or vainglory ; and if its cause he deadly sin. go will be the boasting from that cause. The lust of gain may lead to boasts for the purpose of deceiving and causing loss. This is deadly Bin. And, again, the vanity which produces it may set one's Belf* above God's love, or lead bo contempt of Divine com- mands. This will make i h< • apparently harmless boasting a deadly eviL depreciation ( " ironia "i. There are two kinds of this also. One may be truly vera- cious, while he Is reticent respecting the better things which he knows to be in himself, but discloses the faults which he knows that he has. This in itself is not Bin, though the circumstances may make ir Buch. But, also, one may decline from truth in asserting some vile thing of himself which he does not recognize to he in him, or denying some good thing which he perceives that he possesses. This is the sin which, for lack of a better word, I have called •• ironia." It is no excuse for this sin that we are avoiding the oppo- site sin of self-exaltation, or pride. § 5. Affability and liberality, with their opposite vices.* I mean by affability that courtesy or friendliness by which * Note here and throughout this work that a moral deterioration in the English language is found in the use of the term " vice'." Origi- nally it was any habit of sin, and the word is so used throughout this manual of Moral Theology. But popular use has lowered the word, morally speaking, to any habit supposed in any way whatsoever to be injurious ; say. the " vice " of using tobacco. Qu. CSV.] AFFABILITY AXD LIBERALITY. 389 a man becomingly orders his intercourse with other men in words and deeds. It is a special virtue of outward conduct even towards strangers. It is a part of justice, or a virtue annexed to justice, for though there is here no question of a debt of legal obliga- tion, there is a moral obligation on the part of a virtuous man to treat others in a becoming way. Since man is by nature " a social animal,'' it is a law of nature not only that he preserve fidelity in his relations to his fellows, but that he take all pains to make his fellowship a source of pleasure to others ; for pleasure as well as ve- racity is essential to human intercourse. The exception is when for some good cause it is necessary to produce bene- ficially the opposite feeling in men with whom we have to do ; say, when some good is to be accomplished or some evil avoided by blame, etc. Adulation. One may attempt on all occasions to use flattering words, either for his own profit, or simply for the purpose of giving pleasure to another. The motive or other circumstances will determine whether or not the praising others is a sin. One may wish to console in trouble by giving pleasure, or to help another's progress in good ; and, other due conditions being observed, this may pertain to the virtue of friendli- ness. But it will be the vice of adulation if one praise another for that which is not laudable, or is, perhaps, posi- tively wrong ; or if by doing so he incite to vainglory ; or if his flattery aim at some personal advantage for him- self. Flattery is sometimes a mortal sin, and sometimes a sin not so deadly. It is mortal when- ever it is contrary to charity, as when what is sinful is praised ; for this is contrary both to the love of God and to the love of our neighbour. Again, it is mortal by reason 300 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxvn. of the intention ; as when one flatters another in order to injure him fraudulently either in body or in soul. Again, adulation may give to another occasion to sin even without any such direct intention. And then it will be necessary to consider whether the occasion was actually given, or merely taken, and also what kind of injury resulted. The question is like that of scandal, which has already been con- sidered (page 254). But if one, simply oul of an eagerness to give pleasure to oth.r-. use flattering language, or even if its object be to avoid some evil, or to obtain Borne needed good, the adula- tion is not against charity, and the sin will .-land on the Bame footing with other falsehoods of similar character. Unfriendliness, captiousness, moroseness (" litigium"). Contradicting others may be due to discord, when one refuses t.. assent to what another 3aye on account of a want of charity towards him. But. again, one may contradict another from a general mo hich bas no hesitation in making • disagreeable. This is opposed to that virtue which we have named affability. This form «>f contentiousness is, in itself, a graver sin than flattery, although the injurious motive may make adulation a more sinful thing. That which is baser in human actions is not always the graver sin. For the glory of man is his reason; and therefore carnal sins, by which the flesh gets lordship son, are more degrading than spiritual Bins ; although these are graver, because there is more contempt of God in them. Similarly, sins which have guile in them are baser, although open sins may some- time- contain more contempt of God. So it happens that guileful adulation seems to be baser, although quarrelsome- ness seems to be graver. Liberality. Liberality is the virtue by which we use well the things Qu. cxvu. 5.] AFFABILITY AND LIBERALITY. 391 of this world which are granted to us for the support of our earthly life. (1) Natural inclination, indeed, leads each one to pro- vide for himself rather than for others. But this is not contrary to the virtue of liberality, because a very little suffices for one person, and also the liberal man does not so provide for others that he neglects himself and those be- longing to him. He uses money, and whatever can be measured by money, not as throwing it away in prodigal fashion, but judiciously securing, first, provision for his own support and for what is needful for executing his vir- tuous works. (2) The prodigal is not to be regarded as a liberal man, because he does not follow the dictates of right reason as virtue does. And, on the other hand, the virtuous poor may be liberal, because the virtue does not consist in a multitude of gifts, but in the virtuous affection of the giver (Nic. Eth. iv. 1). Those passions which are concerned with money or its equivalent are the immediate subject of liberality, as love of riches, desire for them, pleasure in them, sorrow at part- ing with them. Liberality hinders any inordinate affection for money from preventing the due use of it. But this due use is two-fold ; first, for the owner's expenses ; next, for others through gifts to them. The liberal man is free in his expenditure, free in convenient gifts. But, of course, the virtue is far greater which leads to the giving than that which leads to the expending. Liberality is not, properly speaking, apart of justice, be- cause the latter returns to another ivhat is his ; but liberal- ity bestows ivhat is its own. Yet there is a certain relation between them ; first, because they are both primarily relative to another ; and secondly, because they are both concerned with external things. 392 DUTIES TOWABDS OTHEBS. [Qu. CXVIU. 1, Liberality, also, is not concerned with legal debt as jus- tice is, but it recognizes a moral obligation. Beneficence and pity also give, but their giving proceeds from Borne special affection towards its object, and there- - nil giving pertains to charity or friendship. But liberal giving is dm- to n special affection with regard to money which is neither inordinately desired nor loved. !! ■ the giving is not only to friends or to the suffer- ing. Is liberality chief among virtm py virtue ie directed to some good ; and the greater the good, the greater the virtue. But primarily and per se liberality directs the bouI with respeel to the possession and the use of money. This places it below such virtu ranee, which govern bodily concupiscences and pleas- : and below courage and justice, which are ordained for the common good; and -till more hi low those virtues which are ordained for Divine good. This is the order: first, Divine good ; then, the common good ; then, private good of soul, of body, and, lastly, private good in outward thing<. lint liberality may !>«■ directed to any or to all of these, and bo it will have a secondary excellence as useful for many things. God, indi . • . th to all men liberally, and upbraid- eth noi '" I S. • ' us. i. 5) : but this Divine giving comes from Divine love, not from such mode of regarding external o our definition of liberality in man. Avarice : is if a sin ? God's Word says (Heb. xiii. 5), " Be ye free from the love of money ; content with such things as ye have." In everything the good requires a due measure, and evil comes from going beyond or falling short of that measure. This applies to all things which exist for a certain end ; they Qu. cxviii. 1.] AVARICE. 393 must be commensurate with that end, as medicine with reference to recovery of health. But outward goods are things useful for some end ; and therefore, necessarily, the good of man, so far as they are concerned, consists in a certain measure, a man seeking to have them so far as they are necessary for his life according to his condition in the world. Therefore there is sin in going beyond or falling short of this measure, when, namely, one beyond or within the due mode wishes to acquire or to keep outward riches. Avarice is immoderate love of possession. Therefore it is a sin. (1) The desire of external things is natural to man, but as means to an end. It is therefore free from sin so far as it falls under a rule derived from its end. But avarice ex- ceeds this rule. (2) But is it sin against G-od, against self, or against our neighbour ? It may be against all three ; for it implies disordination outward or inward. The getting or the keep- ing of riches may be directly sin against our neighbour, when one man superabounds in wealth through the poverty of many others. Or, again, the lust of riches, immoderate love of them or pleasure in them, is a sin of man against himself, be- cause his inward affections are disordered. And avarice, like any other mortal sin, is against God, inasmuch as man for the sake of temporal good despises the eternal good. (3) It is true that the old, on account of failing powers, do naturally seek the aid of external things, like any other needy persons (Nic. Eth. iv. 1) ; but natural inclinations are to be governed by reason, and the aged are not free from sin if they exceed reason's due measure. The special sin is the inordinate seeking of a special good ; sc, riches as numbered among the goods useful to man (Eom. i. 29). Avarice may be opposed to justice in the getting and 394 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. i ■win. 5. keeping riches against the rights of others ; but when we consider the inward affection, the immoderate lust for riches, even apart from any wish to plunder from others, there is the sin of avarice plainly opposed to liberality. It neglects not the legal debt of justice, but the moral debt of Is avarice always mortal sin? When opposed to justice it ia mortal Bin, for it involves unjustly taking or keeping whal i- another's. But, like thefl i 304), the imperfection of the act may make it venial. But, as opposed t'> liberality, avarice implies inordinate love of riches. And if this so increase that it is set above charity. 30 that through love of riches one docs not fear to acl againsl the love of God and his neighbour, avarice is mortal .-in ( RoUL i. 29 i. But if tin- inordinate love keep within this, SO that it is not preferred to Divine love, and one ia not willing to do anything _ G-od or his neighbour for the sake of riches, avarice is venial Bin. lust of riches darkens the soul whenever it excludes the light of charity. I '/rice the [i' Evi ry sin, because it is evil, consists in some corruption or privation of some good ; but, as it is voluntary, it con- ! the desire of some good. So the relative gravity of sins may be viewed in two ways ; first, a- regards the good which is despised or corrupted ; the greater that good, the graver is the sin. In this way the sin which is against God is the greatest of all sins ; next to that, the sin against the person of man ; after that, sin respecting outward things which are intended for man's service, among which sins is avarice. But, in another way, the grade of sins may be viewed ac- Qu. cxviit. 6, 7, 8.] AVARICE. 395 cording to the good to which human appetite is inordinately subject. The less that good, the more shameful is the sin. But external goods are the lowest that man can obtain ; less than corporeal goods, which, again, are less than the good of the soul, which is exceeded by Divine good. Thus viewed, avarice has the greatest deformity. But since the corrup- tion or privation of good is the essence, the "formal part" of sin, and since the conversion to transitory good is the " material part/' the gravity of sins depends rather on the first than on the second. Therefore avarice is not simply the greatest of all sins. Yet avarice has its own special danger ; sc, that it is most difficult to be eradicated from the soul, always increasing with increasing age and need of outward help. Avarice is a spiritual, not a carnal, sin. Sins are rooted in the affections or passions of the soul, and they are consummated in its pleasures and pains. Some of these pleasures are carnal, some are spiritual ; and those are called fleshly sins which are completed in fleshly pleas- ures ; those are spiritual sins which are completed in spirit- ual pleasures resulting from apprehension of the mind. And such a sin is avarice. It has a material object, indeed, but the pleasure is not corporeal but mental. The sin, however, may be said to have an intermediate place between purely spiritual sins, like pride, and purely fleshly sins, like lust or gluttony. Avarice is a capital sin. Sins are so called which, being viewed as an end, originate other vices. Now the end most of all sought for is felicity, which riches promise in offering what is sufficient for all needs. As all pleasures can be purchased, or seem purchas- able, money virtually appears to contain them all, and so its possession seems to be the height of felicity, and so orig- inate — 300 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxix. 2. The daughters of avarice ; viz., treachery, fraud, deceit- ful words, perjury, restlessness of soul, violence, hardness of heart. Prodigality. Prodigality is the vice which is opposite to avarice. The avaricious loves riches to excess, but the prodigal lacks due care for what is an earthly means to a well-ordered life. The prodigal goes to excess in giving, but falls short of duty in getting ami preserving, while the avaricious, on the con- trary, fails in giving, but goes to excess in getting and in keeping. Tie' prodigal son (S. Luke xv. 13), " wasted his sub- stance in riotous living." And so prodigality may seem to be opposed to a temperate and continent manner of life. And this is most frequently the case. But prodigality as such may be directed to other evil ends, or it may he the mere indifference t<> riches which leads to wasting them. So it is directly opposed to avarice. Is prodigality << Virtue is corrupted by defect as well as by excess. And although the apostle 'Said that the inordinate "love of money is the root of all evils" (1 Tim. vi. 10), that does not imply that all evils always spring from avarice, but that there is no evil which does not sometimes originate in that capital sin. Even prodigality sometimes originates there, as when one prodigally wastes many things in order to win the favour of others, and to get a larger return. When the apostle (1 Tim. vi. 17) said, " Charge them that are rich in this present world, that they be ready to distribute," he spoke of giving according to duty, which is precisely what the prodigal does not. Prodigality is not liberality. For the excess of the former is not a question of mere quantity in giving, but rather of going beyond duty Qu. CXX.] EQUITY. 397 and propriety. The liberal sometimes gives more than the prodigal, if it be necessary to make large gifts. Prodigality, considered in itself, is not so grave a sin as avarice. For, first, it is not so far away from the virtue of liberality, which also freely gives. Secondly, the prodigal is useful to many by giving to them ; the avaricious is use- ful to none, not even to himself. And, lastly, prodigality, as such, is far more easily cured, both by advancing age, by losing what has been wasted, and by the easy transi- tion from this vice to liberality; whereas avarice is rarely cured. Both of them sin against others and against themselves. The prodigal sins against himself in wasting what is useful to himself, and against others in consuming what ought to be properly dispensed for the needy. And this is conspicu- ously true of the clergy, if they expend on themselves in luxuries or in pleasures what ought to be bestowed for the needy and for the Church. The avaricious also sins against his neighbour and against himself ; but while the prodigal may do good to some one, the avaricious benefits neither others nor himself, because he does not dare to use his goods even for his own benefit. § 6. Equity ("epicheia"). Human acts, concerning which laws are promulgated, can vary infinitely ; and therefore it is not possible that any rule of law should be instituted fitted to all cases which may occur. Legislators are obliged to fit their laws to what gen- erally occurs, but in some cases keeping to the letter of the law would be contrary to the equality of justice, and to the common good which is the aim of the law. Thus, law decrees that deposits shall be returned to their owner, because this is ordinarily just. But it may be injurious ; e.g., an insane person may demand a revolver which he has left with you, or a rebel may demand what he intends to use against the people. In such cases it is evil to follow the letter of the 398 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CXXII. 1. law, and it is right to do what the law intended and the common good demands. This is the virtue of equity. (1) This is not judging the law instead of judging by it. For he judges the law who says that it is not a good law. But lie who says that the law does not apply in the particular case in question, judges of that case. (2) In doubt concerning the meaning of the law, the in- terpretation of the law-makers or of the court having juris- diction must stand. But where the case is plain there is no need of interpreting, bul only of applying. Equity is a part of justice viewed in its widest significa- tion ; but it is a " higher law," directive of legal justice. 8. Thomas Aquinas regards the Spiritual gift of "godli- ness," or "pietas," as perfective of natural religion. As the other Spiritual gifts are habitual dispositions of the soul mak- ing us prompt to be moved by the Holy Ghost, so this gift produces a filial disposition bowards Q-od. "Ye received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father" (Bom. viii. 15). To worship God as Creator and Lord belongs to religion ; but to draw near to God as our Father in heaven is through the inspiring gift of the Holy Ghost. Nor this alone ; for the same gift prompts to honour all thai belongs in special manner to the Father. It honours the saints; it listens with reverence to the Holy Scriptures ; it succours the needy as children of the same Father. § 7. The precepts of justice : the Ten Commandments. The Decalogue contains the primal principles of law, to which natural reason at once assents as most manifest prin- ciples. The first four commandments refer to the acts of religion as the highest part of justice ; the fifth to piety, which stands next to religion ; the others to justice in general as applied to our equals. (1) The law aims at making all men virtuous, but it be- gins with manifest obligations of duty. Qu. CXXII. 2, 3.] THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE. 399 (2) The judicial precepts of the Old Law are determina- tions of its moral precepts towards our neighbour, as its ceremonial precepts are of the moral precepts towards God. (3) The Ten Commandments have charity as their end (1 Tim. i. 5) ; but they directly command just acts.* The First and Second Commandments. Why do they begin the Decalogue ? Since the law's aim is to make good men, consider the order of the process. It must begin with the will ; but the goodness of that depends upon its end ; and God is that ultimate end. And, first of all, impediments must be removed out of the way of true religion, and the chief impediment is the worship of false gods — "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon " (S. Matt. vi. 24). When those impediments are removed by negative precepts, then can come the positive law of religion in the Fourth Commandment. TJie Tliird Commandment. Not only superstition is an impediment to true religion which must be removed out of the way. Irreligion, defect of reverence by which God is despised, is an impediment. Superstition has substituted some other object in place of God. But irreligion, professing to receive Him, robs Him of His due honour. (1) Not every assumption of the Holy Name is forbidden, * Our author, following S. Augustine, as the Roman and Lutheran communions of modern times also do, places three commandments in the first table, uniting into one the first and second, as the English and American Church divide them. Polytheism and idolatry are thus prohibited in one commandment. And there are good ethical reasons for this arrangement according to the author's system. Superstition is prohibited in all its forms in the First, irreligion in all its forms in the Second, Commandment. The reasons for separating polytheism from idolatry need not here be stated. Let it suffice to note that idolatry, not polytheism, is one of the special dangers of a superstitious part of the Christian Church itself. Throughout this manual the com- mandments are numbered as the Anglican Church numbers them. 400 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. CXXII. 4. but false oaths, whether assertory or promissory, false vows, etc. (2) Not only swearing falsely is taking God's name in vain, but also swearing truly, without judgment, in levity, etc. (3) The more common sins are specified ; and vain swear- ing is more common than blasphemy, though the latter is equally prohibited. The Fourth Commandment The impediments to true religion having been removed, then comes the precepl of true religion which worships God. And as inward worship i- presented to us in Holy Scripture under corporeal similitudes, so the outward wor- ship of God is presented through some sensible sign of it. Man is led to the inward worship of prayer and devotion by the inward guidant f the Holy Ghosl ; but the precept of the law is given concerning outward worship in its sensible sign, a Bigo of the common benefit of the Creation, winch ended on the day of rest. (1) Literally taken, the precept is partly moral, partly ceremonial. Ir is moral in requiring that man set aside some part of his life for Divine tilings. The natural reasou which sets aside some time for recreation, etc., also demands some time for spiritual refection. So far the Fourth Commandment is moral. But in determining a particular time as a sign of the Creation, it is ceremonial. It is ceremonial also in its alle- gorical signification, pointing to Christ's Sabbath rest in the new tomb. It is ceremonial also in its moral signifi- cation of the soul's rest in God. As moral, not as cere- monial, this commandment takes its place in the Decalogue. (2) Distinguish the end, the having time for Divine ser- vice, and the rest from servile work. The service of God was not servile work ; therefore circumcision (S. John vii. 23), and the priests' and Levites' work, on the Sabbath were not prohibited (S. Matt. xii. 5). Qu. CXXII. 5.] THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE. 401 But other works are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath inasmuch as they impede our attending to Divine things. There are also corporal works not pertaining to God's ser- vice which are not properly servile, because they are com- mon to all, both servants and masters. Thus every one, servant or not, is bound to provide in necessary things not only for himself but for his neighbour, especially what con- cerns the support of life or the avoiding of great loss (Deut. xxii. 1 ; S. John vii. 23 ; S. Matt. xii. 2). (3) The observance of the Lord's Day under the Gospel law takes the place of the Sabbath, not by force of the pre- cept of the Old Law, but by the authority of the Church and Christian custom. The Lord's Day is not figurative like the Sabbath. No such strict prohibition of work, therefore, belongs to it. Cooking food was prohibited ; it is now allowed, etc. And needful dispensation, even in what is prohibited by the Church, is more readily obtained under the Gospel's easy burden.* Tlie Fifth Commandment. The end of the Decalogue is love of God and our neigh- bour. But among neighbours parents hold the highest place. Therefore this commandment heads the second table ; but since parents are the source of our being, it holds close affinity with the first table, and some — e.g., Jo- sephus and Philo — have placed it there. (1) Parents take the precedence of other relatives and of our country. Nevertheless, in this precept is understood whatever pertains to rendering due honour to others accord- ing to their rightful claim. (2) Eeverential honour is due to parents as such in every case ; but there are special duties in special cases, like sup- port in time of need, which are implied in the general law. * See, further, Supplement, chap. iii. page 511. 402 DUTIES TOWARDS OTHERS. [Qu. cxxn. 6. The last five commandments. These pertain to justice in general, which gives all indif- ferently their due. (1) Why are they all negative ? Why is there no affirma- tive precept? Man is always and universally bound to do no harm to anyone; and so the commandments prohibit it. But positive duties to our neighbours vary with person, time, place, etc.; therefore they do not appear in these uni- versal laws. (•.') Are there not many other injuries beside homicide, adultery, theft, and false witness? Why are oDly these specified? These are chief in their respective classes, and the others are reducible bo these. Thus, all injury to the person of our neighbour is included in homicide, as tho chief injury; wrongful deeds ivine aid (2 Oor. iii. •">). Ambition. This is the inordinate love of honour among men. Re- member that honour implies a certain reverence exhibited to any one for a testimony of his superiority or excellence. X iw man has not this from himself ; it is the gift of God ; therefore the chief honour is due to Ilim. Also it is to be remembered that this gift of God is bestowed for the benefit of other men. Thus, then, the love of honour is inordinate, first, when one seeks testimony of an excellence which he does not possess ; next, when he desires honour for himself without referring it to God ; and, lastly, when he makes his glory his end without referring it to others' benefit. Such ambition is always a sin. Honour is not the reward of virtue as if that reward were itself a virtuous thing which ought to be sought for as an end. The value of the reward lies in what it testifies to on the part of others who have no greater reward to give. Qu. cxxxn. 1.] VAINGLORY. 413 Ambition in its excessive love of honour goes beyond true greatness of soul, as presumption does in undertaking what is beyond its strength. Vainglory : is it a sin ? Glory properly signifies the conspicuous manifestation of some one as distinguished for what is honourable among men, whether that be some corporeal or some spiritual good. But, taken more widely, glory consists not merely in the opinion of the world in general, but even of a few, or of a single individual, or even of one's self alone when he con- siders his own peculiar good as worthy of praise. But that any one know and approve his own good is not sin. So in 1 Cor. ii. 12, " We received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God ; that we might know the things which are freely given to us by God." Neither is it sin that any one wishes his good works to be approved of men. "Let your light so shine before men," etc. (S. Matt. v. 16). The desire of glory, therefore, in itself expresses nothing vicious. The desire of vainglory is another thing. Glory may be vain, (1) when the glory is sought in that which is perish- able (Jer. ix. 23) ; (2) when it is sought from the uncer- tain judgment of man (S. John v. 44) ; (3) when the love of glory is not referred to its due end ; viz., the honour of God or the good of our neighbour. (1) God seeks His own glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. And in like manner man may seek his own glory for the benefit of others, " that men may see his good works, and glorify his Father which is in heaven." (2) It might be said that the love of glory excites men to, worthy deeds, and that the Holy Scriptures themselves promise glory as the reward of good works (Rom. ii. 10). But glory before God is not vainglory. " He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord ; for not he that commendeth himself is approved, but whom the Lord commendeth " (2 414 COURAGE AND FORTITUDE. [Qu. CXXXII. 2, & Cor. x. 18). It is certainly true that some are provoked to virtuous acts from the love of human glory, as they may be from the desire for money or any other earthly good. But that man is not a truly virtuous man who does virtuous acts for the sake of human glory (S. Aug., De Civ. Dei. v. 12). (3) To seek laudable fame is not sin, provided that it is not sought for on its own account. For it contributes nothing to man's perfection. It may be sought for so far as it is in some way useful; cither (1) that God may be glorified among men: or (".') that others may imitate a good example: or (3) that the man himself, knowing by the testimony of others the good that is in him, may be zealous to persevere in it and go <>n to better things. So it is laudable to have a care for a good name and to provide things honourable in the Bight of God and man. This is not vainly delighting in the praise of men (S. John xii.43). True magnanimity use> honour and glory in quite an- other fashion. Honour, power, riches are little things in the righl of it. It cares more to be than to seem, more for truth than for Opinion. A small thing frith it is the praise of men. Vainglory, on the other hand, is contentions for small things because il esteems them to be of great consequence. Is vainglory a mortal sin? I answer that the sin of vainglory considered in itself does not seem to be contrary to charity so far as the love of our neighbour is concerned. But it may be contrary to the love of God in two ways. First, one may glory falsely. •• What hast thou that thou didst not receive ? But if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it ?" (1 Cor. iv. 7). Or one may set the earthly good in which he glories above God. " Let not the wise man -lory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might ; let not the rich man glory in his riches ; but let him that glorieth, glory in this that he knoweth Me " Qu. cxxxn. 4.] VAINGLORY. 415 (Jer. ix. 23). Or one may prefer the testimony of men to the testimony of God, as the Pharisees did (S. John xii. 43). These regard the object of the vainglory. But, again, on the part of the one who glories vainly, he may refer his intention to glory as the ultimate end, doing even virtuous acts for that, and in order to obtain it not avoiding to do what is against God (S. John v. 44). But if the love of human glory, although it be vain, be not repugnant to charity in either of these two ways, it may be venial sin. But the Lord said (S. Matt. vi. 1), "Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen of them, else ye have no reward with your Father which is in heaven ; " and nothing excludes from the eternal reward except mortal sin. Yes ; a virtuous act has no merit as regards eternal life if it be done for vainglory, even if that vainglory be not mortal sin ; for no one by sinning is ren- dered fit for eternal life. But when one absolutely loses the eternal reward on account of vainglory, and not only as regards a single action, then it is mortal sin. Eemember, however, that vainglory is in the highest degree dangerous and injurious, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a preparation for grave sins, rendering a man presumptuous and self-confident ; and so, little by little, he loses the inward gifts of Grod. Is vainglory a capital vicef Some place pride among the capital sins, and these per- sons omit vainglory from the list. But pride may be called the queen of all vices, and then vainglory, which immedi- ately springs from it, must be regarded as a capital vice ; for from the inordinate desire of glory among men arise a numerous throng of vices. Observe that it is not necessary that a capital vice should be a mortal sin ; for this can arise from venial transgression, inasmuch as the latter prepares the way for the former. 41G COUEAGE AND FORTITUDE. [QtJ. cxxxiu. What are the children of vainglory? Those vices which are naturally ordained for its end, which end is the man- ifestation of one's own superiority. (1) A man may aim at this directly in his words; this is vain boasting; or (2) he may aim at it in his deeds, which, if they are true and greatly admired, may produce the sin of ostentation (or pre- sumptio novitatum); (3) thedeedsmay bea false manifesta- tion, and so the third child of vainglory is hypocrisy; (4) one may indirectly try to show his superiority in mind by his unwillingness to receive a better judgment, which is the sin of obstinacy; or (.5) bis will may be in view when he will not give it up for the sake of harmony with others, and this child is discord ; or (6) the superiority may be implied m speech, when one clamorously disputes with others; the sixth child of rainglorj is contention ; and (7) lastly, vain- glory may produce an unwillingness to carry out a superi- or's command ; this child ie called disobedience. Pusillanimity. Everything which is contrary to the law of nature i- sin. Bui as through presumption one exceeds the proportion of his powers, Btriving after greater things than he hae capac- ity fur. bo the pusillanimous, in bis 3eeming humility, which is not humility at all. refusi a to aim at what is commen- surate with his powers. This rs unnatural, and a sin like presumption. Accordingly, in the Gospel the servant who buried in the earth the money which he had received from his master, out of pusillanimous fear shirking his responsi- bility for it, was punished at his master's return. This vice may arise even from pride, when one rests on his own judg- ment of what he is lit for or capable of. Contrast with this self-willed pusillanimity the true humility of Moses (Ex. iii.j, and Jeremiah (Jer. i.). Divinely called to holy work, they considered the insufficiency of their human weakness, and so held back. But pertinacious refusal would have been pusillanimous pride. Qu. CXXXIV.] MAGNIFICENCE AND ITS OPPOSING VICES. 417 § 4. Magnificence, and its opposing vices, meanness and wasteful extravagance. (Following the Nicornachean Ethics, our author gives a special place to the virtues and the vices of the rich. I give only a brief outline of his thought. — J. J. E. ) Magnificence aims to produce great works at large expense for the Church, for the commonwealth, for charitable purposes (as hospitals, orphanages, etc.). The magnificent man does not chiefly aim at great expense in personal outlay ; not that he does not seek his own good, but because that is something- small in comparison, as his magnanimous spirit views it. But when some great occasion or permanent result is in question, as a wedding or a suitable residence, he may show his magnificence in a more personal way. He is liberal, though every liberal man is not magnifi- cent, because he may not have the means for being so. He is such, however, in his habit of mind. Magnificence is a special virtue, a species of magnanimity, its special object being what is great in size, value, dignity. Its great works are for great ends ; first, of course, the hon- our of God ; then, the good of man. Such great works imply large outlays and oppose the inordinate love of money. Like fortitude, magnificence overcomes difficulties, not those of personal perils but those of large expenditure. But it is not the great expense which the virtue aims at, it is the greatness of the work. Meanness and extravagance are the opposite vices (the special vices of the rich). The mean rich man, with his little soul, aims at mean expense, and, consecmentiy, at small results. His sin consists in withholding what is ration- ally due to the greatness of the work presented to him. The vice at the opposite extreme consists in senseless extravagance out of all proportion to the importance of the 16 418 COURAGE A.TSD FORTITL'DE. [Qa. ( xxxvi. 1, 3. work in hand, out of ostentation and vainglory, or some other sinful motive. ^ 5. Patience and perseverance, with the opposing vices. Is patience a virtue ? Moral virtues are ordained for good, preserving the good of reason against the assaults of the passions. But sorrow lias its place among those passions. "The sorrow of the world worketh death " (2 Cor. vii. 10). It is needful, then, to have .-Miir virtue through which the good of reason may be preserved against sorrow, lest reason give up to it. This virtue is patience. By it we bear evil with equanimity; i.e., with no disturbance from sorrow which might make us abandon the g 1 through which we may arrive at still better things (S. Am:.. I>e Patientia, c 2). The patient man will rather bear evil in not committing it than commit it by not bearing it. ( 'an patience be had without the grace of God? •• Desiri a have power to produce toleration of labours and pains : and no our voluntarily bears what produces suffer- ing except for that which gives him pleasure" (8. Aug., De Patientia, c. -4). Therefore, thai good on account of which one is willing to suffer evils is more willed and loved than the good whose privation produces the [tain which we pa- tiently endure. But that any one prefer the good of grace to all natural goods from whose loss pain can be caused, is due to charity which loves God above all things. Hence, it is manifest that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, which S. Paul says (1 Cor. xiii. 4) '-suffereth long." But it is manifest that charity cannot be had except through grace (Rom. v. 5); therefore, patience cannot be had with- out the help of grace. (1) But some, through their own native strength, pa- tientlv endure ills on account of some evil without the aid Qu. cxxxvr. 3.] PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. 419 of grace; "men endure many labours and pains for what they viciously love" (S. Aug., loc. cit.). But it is much more rational and natural to bear evils on account of the good, which is being truly patient. Therefore it seems that grace is not needed. I answer that rational inclination would prevail in man if his nature were uncorrupted. But in this corrupted nature of ours the inclination of concu- piscence prevails. And so man is more prone to endure ills for the goods in which concupiscence delights in the present hour than to bear ills for future goods which are rationally sought for. Yet this latter is true patience. (2) You may say again that some who are not in a state of grace abhor the evils of vices more than corporeal evils. Some noble heathen have endured the greatest tortures rather than to betray their country or commit some other disgraceful deed. But this is being truly patient. Yes ; but the good of political virtue is commensurate with human nature, and our will can aim at it without the help of justi- fying grace, though not without G-od's assistance. But the good of grace is supernatural, and man cannot aim at that by virtue of his own nature. (3) You may argue, again, that some for the sake of re- covering bodily health willingly suffer gravest pains ; but that the salvation of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health ; therefore for it, also, one can patiently bear many evils without the aid of Divine grace. But the toleration of evils which one sustains for the sake of bodily health comes from the natural love of one's own body. The patience which proceeds from supernatural love is very different. Patience is a virtue annexed to fortitude ; for both en- dure with equanimity the evils which come from without. But it is quite consistent with both these virtues that, when there is need, he be attacked who produces these evils. The patient man may be also courageous. "To be patient under one's own injuries is laudable, but to endure injuries 420 COURAGE AXI) FORTITUDE. [Qu. csxxvil. 1. directed against God is impious." "The precepts of pa- tience are not contrary to the welfare of the commonwealth for whose preservation conflict against its enemies is carried on" (S. Aug., Ep. ad Marcell., 138). Long-suffering {longa n imitas) . This I define as the virtue of one who aims at what is long deferred. Like magnanimity, it is based on hope of good. But like patience, it endures presenl evils in view of future good, only the delay makes thai endurance still more difficult. Also, "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick " (Prov. \iii. 12); i.e., it produces sorrow which requires patience to sustain and constancy to continue the execution • 1 work. Long-suffering and constancy, therefore, are included La patience. Those who en- from infirmity rather than from fixed pur- pose are endured with long-suffering; this only is unen- durable, that they long persevere in evil; but those who with pertinacious mind exult in their faults, sinning through pride, may be endured with patience. /\ perseverance a special virtue ? Virtuous work has goodness and difficulty not only from the nature of the act itself, but also from the length of time required. Therefore, to persist long in any good until it reaches its consummation pertains to a special virtue. (1) S. Augustine says (De Persever. c. i.), " No one can be said to have perseverance while he lives ; he must perse- vere until death. 7 ' But we must notice that the same word is used for a virtue and for its act. But one may have a habit of virtue who is not exercising its act. And some- times one who has the habit begins indeed its exercise, but does not complete it. So a builder may begin a house and leave it unfinished. The word perseverance, then, is some- times used for the habit by which one chooses to persevere, Qu. CXXXVII. 3, 4] PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. 421 and sometimes for the act by which one actually perseveres. And sometimes one who has the habit chooses indeed to persevere and begins to act accordingly, enduring for a time, but does not complete the act, because he does not perse- vere until the end. But there are two ends, the end of the work, and the end of life. Perseverance per se requires that one continue to the end of his virtuous work, as the soldier perseveres to the end of the conflict, and the mag- nificent to the end of his great work. But there are certain virtues whose acts ought to endure throughout our whole life ; such are faith, hope, and char- ity, which regard the ultimate end of our whole human life. In these chief virtues the act of perseverance is not consummated until the end of life. In this view S. Augus- tine uses the word for the consummated act. (2) But is not immovable persistence required for every virtue ? Yes ; for that is included in the definition of vir- tue ; it is a "quality with difficulty changed." But perse- verance aims at this as its special end, making this virtue a special one. It is a secondary virtue annexed to fortitude, sustaining the difficulty which comes from prolonged good work, and governing the passions of fear, of fatigue, or of failure through prolonged effort. Constancy has the same end ; but while the difficulty which persever- ance overcomes arises from the mere length of the act, constancy persists in good against other outward impedi- ments. Perseverance requires the aid of Divine grace. The virtuous habit needs the gift of habitual grace, as the other infused virtues do. But the actual perseverance enduring until death needs also the gratuitous aid of God, preserving man in good until the end of life. For free-will 422 COURAGE AXD FORTITUDE. [Qu. cxxxvin. in itself is changeable, and this changeablencss is not re- moved from it by habitual grace in this present life. And thus, though free-will may choose the good, even when re- newed by grace it has not power to remain immovable in good. Choice may be in out power, but not execution of what we choose. The virtue of perseverance inclines to steadfastness ; but, like any other habil which one uses when he wills, it is not necessary thai he who has the habil use it immovably until death. (This requires sustaining grace.) But some persevere in sinful works, which are sometimes more difficult than virtuous action. This is true; but man by himself can fall into sin ; but be cannot rise again with- out the aid of grace. The very falling into sin, accord- ingly, make- bun persevere in it. unless he be liberated by the grace of God. Bui his doing some good thing does not. make him persevere in good, because In- i.- still able to sin ; we ueed to be "furthered by God's continual help." Weakness of spirit {mollities). This i< feebly withdrawing from good on account of its difficulties which are found intolerable. Bui a thing is not judged weak which yields to great ami overpowering force; nor is that man reputed weak who yields in like manner. What I am now speaking of is not the yielding to fear of perils, nor even the giving up to violent desires ; for, prop- erly speaking, he is weak of spirit who gives up the good on account of regret for absent pleasures. (This is a kind of effeminacy or self-indulgence. Nic. Eth. vii. 7.) It is due to two causes. One is habit ; for when any one is accustomed to self-indulgence in pleasures, it is harder to bear their absence. Another cause is natural constitution, for some are born with an effeminate dispo- sition. The pleasure-loving cannot endure the labours Avhich impede their enjoyment. This is another form of the same Qu. cxxxvin.] PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. 423 sin ; or, again, excessive devotion to recreations, shrinking from bard works and laborious days. Tbe opposite vice is obstinacy or pertinacity, out of vainglory persisting in one's own opinion beyond rational measure ; or inordinately persisting in one course of con- duct through all difficulties (proud of being "consistent"). CHAPTER VII. TEMPERANCE: ITS ALLIED VIBTUES AMI TIIEIll OPPOSITE VICES. § 1. Temperance. Is f, mperance <> virtue ? Human virtue is ili.it which inclines us to what is accord- ing to reason. Now temperance means a rational govern- menl of certain desires and pleasures ; it is plainly, there- fore, a \ irtue. (1) It might be objected, indeed, thai no virtue is op- 1 to natural inclination, because there is in man a natu- ral aptitude for virtue, while temperance holds one hack from natural pleasures. Bui nature inclines to that which is suitable for each creature; ami man, accordingly, desires that gratification which is suitable to his nature But man as man is ra- tional, and consequently the pleasures which arc suited to his nature are those which are according to reason. Tem- perance does not withhold him from these, and so it does not oppose the inclination of human nature, hut rather har- monizes with it. What it does oppose is the inclination of bestial nature which is not subject to reason. (2) Again, it has been said that all the virtues are con- nected with one another; hut some seem to he temperate who lack other virtues ; they may be miserly, or cowardly, etc. But the perfect virtue of temperance cannot exist with- out prudence, the common ground of all the moral virtues, which every vicious man lacks. Those, then, who have not' the other virtues, but are slaves to their opposite vices, have Qu. CXLI. 2, 3.] TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. 425 not the virtue of temperance, even if they lead temperate lives out of natural disposition or acquired habit. Such imperfect virtue lacks that rational ground which consti- tutes the perfect virtue. (3) To every virtue corresponds some spiritual gift ; what gift corresponds to temperance, if it be a virtue ? I answer, godly fear, by which one is restrained from sinful carnal pleasures. " My flesh trembleth for fear of Thee " (Ps. cxix. 120). Is temperance a special virtue 9 The word may be used for that general moderation which right reason imposes on all human operations and passions, which is common to all moral virtues, drawing away from all those things which allure appetite contrary to reason. But in a more limited sense we now employ the word for a special virtue which has its special object ; viz., those desires and pleasures which most allure man from the rignt path, the rule of reason, and the Divine law. The beauty of virtue is especially attributed to temperance for two reasons ; first, because it consists in a well-governed and suitable proportion of things which is the very idea of beauty ; but also because those things which temperance restrains in man are the low- est part of his nature, the bestial part. By these a man is most debased, and temperance is comely and honourable in repelling that baseness. Temperance is concerned with sensuous concupiscences, their attendant pleasures, and the sorroio for the aose?ice of We have already seen that moral virtues defend reason against repugnant passions. But the motion of the passions is two-fold ; one, in seeking sensible and corporeal goods ; the other, in avoiding sensible and corporeal evils. The first is chiefly repugnant to reason through immoderation ; for sensible and corporeal goods in themselves are not repugnant 42G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPrOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLI. 6. to reason, but rather serve it as instruments which reason uses to attain its proper end ; but they are repugnant when sense-appetite aims at them in an irrational manner. Here, then, is the office of moral virtues; sc, to govern those passions which seek after the good. This is the field of temperance, including the sorrows which arise from the ab- . ence of I hose pleasures. But if we consider the desires and pleasures of the senses, we find a wide difference among them. Some belong to the means Eor preserving the life of the individual or that of the race. These concern the senses of touch and taste. The desires and the pleasures of these senses arc the most vehement, and tempera nee is the \ irtue which governs them. Sight, bearing, even smell, belong to a higher sphere, and serve nobler purposes. In the brute, indeed, these higher - are the mere auxiliaries of the tonch and taste. And so far temperance in man may, consequently, direct them. But their proper pleasures are not connected with the pres- ervation of human life, and do not fall under the control of temperance in its restricted .sense. Spiritual pleasures, also, are in their own nature greater than corporeal pleasures ; but not being perceived by sense, they do not so vehemently affect sense-appetite, and do not, as spiritual pleasures, need to be restrained in the same way. Restraint is required only when they hinder another higher and more obligatory pleasure. TJie rule of temperance is based on the necessities of this prest at lit'-. Mural virtue is good in its following the order of reason. But this order of reason chiefly consists in its ordering for the end ; and the end itself is the rule for the means. Now all the pleasures of touch and taste have for their end some necessity of life. And, therefore, temperance takes this necessity as the rule of the pleasures which it uses, employ- ing those pleasures as the needs of life require. Qu. CXLI. 7.] TEMPERANCE. 427 (1) But it may be objected that if corporeal necessity were the rule of temperance, whoever should gratify himself with any pleasure beyond the absolute necessity of nature, which is contented with very little, would exceed the rule, and sin. But necessity must be understood in its wider significa- tion. That is absolutely necessary without which a thing cannot in any way exist ; as food is necessary for an animal. But that also is necessary without which a tiling cannot suitably exist. And temperance has in view this kind of necessity as well as the first. " The temperate man feels moderate and proper desire for all those pleasant things which conduce to health or a sound habit of body " (Nic. Eth. iii. 11). But of those things which are not necessary in this second way some are impediments to health or good condition, and these the temperate uses in no manner, for that would be a sin against temperance. But there are others which are not such impediments, and these he uses moderately according to time and place, and conformity to those with whom he associates. (2) But it might be objected again that if bodily needs were the rule of temperance, whoever should employ any pleasure on account of bodily need, say, for the sake of health, would be free from sin, for no one attaining to the rule is sinning ; but that this is manifestly untrue. But it has been said that temperance views necessity according to what is convenient for life. Now this depends not only on what is fitting for the body, but also on fitness according to station and means of living and other outward things, and still more it depends on what is honourably fitting. " The temperate man feels the same desire for those other pleasures which do not hinder health, etc., which are not contrary to the hon- ourable nor beyond his means" (Nic. Eth., loc. cit.). Why is temperance called a cardinal virtue ? The moderation which is requisite in every virtue is espe- 428 TEMPBEANCB AXH ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [QtT. cm.ii. cially laudable in the pleasures of touch and taste, both because such pleasures are more natural to us and therefore more difficult to restrain, and because their objects are more necessary in this present life. This fact entitles temperance bo a place amoDg the principal virtues. Bui in the scale of virtues it does Qoi rank as high as justice or fortitude, be- cause it is primarily Belf -regarding, and virtues are higher which have a higher object than our individual self. Insensibility, or false asceticism {insensibilitas). Everything which is contrary to natural order is vicious. r.ui oature has attached pleasure to those operations which are necessary for human life (or its well-being). Therefore natural order requires thai man use those pleasures bo faras --an for human conservation, whether of the individ- ual or of the species. If any one, therefore, should so slum pleasure as to avoid those things which are necessary for nature's preservation, he would Bin by his repugnance to the natural order. And yet from such pleasures it is sometimes laudable or even necessary to abstain in order to attain some end. Thus, for the sake of bodily health Borne abstain from some pleasures of eating and drinking, or from venereal pleae and. again, on account of some work undertaken, as athletes aud soldiers. In like manner, penitents for their souls' health use as a kind of diet abstinence from pleasures; and men who wish to have time for contemplation and for Divine things must withdraw from carnal desires. None of these are involved in the vice of insensibility or false asceti- cism, because they follow right reason. So Daniel in the heathen court abstained from pleasures of sense, not abhorring them on their own account as evil in themselves, but for a laudable end. Because man cannot use his reason without employing his sensuous faculties, which require a bodily organ, man must support his body in order to use his reason. But the body Qu. cxlii. 2.] INTEMPERANCE. 429 is sustained through pleasurable operations ; and, therefore, the good of reason cannot exist in man if he abstain from all pleasures. This necessity is more or less according as the act of reason more or less requires the corporeal virtue. Therefore men who have undertaken spiritual contempla- tion and the labour of transmitting spiritual good to other men may laudably abstain from many pleasures from which those whose office is different laudably do not abstain. Intemperance.* Why does Aristotle (JSTic. Eth. iii. 12) call it a " childish " vice ? He does not mean that children are peculiarly sub- ject to intemperance, but he uses figurative language. In- temperance is the sin of excessive concupiscence, which is like a child in three respects : (1) Like a child, concupis- cence seeks what is base. Beautiful and goodly is what is ordained according to reason ; but, like the child, concupis- cence does not listen to reason. (2) If the child be left to his own will, he grows self-willed ; so concupiscence if sat- isfied increases in strength. '* While lust is served, habit is formed ; and while habit is not resisted, necessity is pro- duced " (S. Aug., Confess, viii. 5). (3) The child's amend- ment is brought about by coercion. " Withhold not cor- rection from the child. . . . Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and shalt deliver his soul from hell'' (Prov. xxiii. 13). So by resisting concupiscence we bring it down to due limits. It may be said that children have only natural concupis- cences, in which (if Aristotle is correct, iii. 11) comparatively "few err, and only in excess." But " natural " here means what nature requires for its preservation, in the desire of which there is no sin except in excess. But other things in which sin more abounds are incitements of concupiscence which men have devised, as delicately prepared foods and the ornaments of the female sex. * Here used, as temperance is above, in its widest signification. 430 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qr. CXLII. 3, 4. Intemperance is a graver sin than cowardice. For the latter is impelled by the necessity of preserving life, while the former is concerned with pleasures not so nec- essary, and most largely with tho.se which are invented and not strictly natural. And, again, grave fears and sorrows stupefy the mind, which pleasure dors not. Also, what is done through fear is not absolutely voluntary, having an exterior impulse ; while what is done for the sake of pleasure is simply voluntary. The individual pleasurable thing is chosen by the intem- perate, although he would not choose intemperance in general. And, again, it is easier to employ remedies against intem- perance than againsl cowardice; for the pleasures with which the former is concerned are life-long, and the temper- ate man ran exerl himself in the practice of his virtue; at all seasons, which ie not true of the other. 77/'- sin of intemperance is most y deliberate preference" (Nic. Eth. ii. 6) ; but the sense of shame is not a habit, but a passion or emotion; and its action is not from choice but from emotional impulse. It is not ra- tional : it is, perhaps, 3een in some of the higher brutes. It has more to do with temperance than with any other cardinal virtue, not as a passion, for it is a species of fear, but as its inciting cause is what is base (which temperance restrains). But if the sense of shame implies a laudable act, do not many such acts form a virtuous habit ? Yes ; of an acquired virtue through which shameful acts are avoided, but not a habit of feeling shame. From that habit of acquired virtue one is in such condition that he would be more ashamed if there were cause for shame (which there is not). 'Hie object of shame is blame or reproach. TTe have seen that shame is the fear of what is base. But there is a two-fold turpitude ; one, of vice, the deformity of Qi\ CXLIII. 2.] THE SENSE OF SHAME. 433 a voluntary act. This is not the direct object of shame, for fear is of an evil difficult to avoid, and what is voluntary does not come under this description. But there is another turpitude, as it were, a penal turpi- tude, consisting in the blame of others, as glory consists in their honouring us. This blame is viewed as evil difficult to avoid, and therefore shame or the fear of turpitude pri- marily regards blame or reproach. And as blame is properly due to vice, consequently and indirectly shame applies to vicious turpitude. Hence, "men are less ashamed of defects which do not come from their own fault." But shame may have two effects ; either one may cease to do vicious acts on account of the fear of blame, or in the vicious things which he does he may avoid jmblic notice. (1) But sometimes those who are doing nothing base suffer disgrace. "For Thy sake have I suffered reproof; shame hath covered my face" (Ps. lxix. 7). I answer that shame properly regards disgrace according as it is due to fault, to voluntary defect. But the reproaches which are laid upon one on account of virtue are despised by the virtuous man. So the apostles '"rejoiced that they were counted worthy to suffer dishonour for the Name" (Acts v. 41). But from imperfection of virtue it may happen that one is ashamed of reproaches which he receives on account of virtue ; whereas, growing in virtue., he learns to contemn outward goods and evils. So the Lord said to the right- eous, " Fear ye not the reproach of man, neither be ye dis- mayed at their reviiings " (Isa. li. 7 ; 2 Tim. i. 8). (2) But men are ashamed also of what is no sin. I an- swer that as honour, although it is not truly due to anything except virtue, yet is bestowed on any superiority, so, also, reproach, although it is properly due to fault only, yet, in men ; s opinion, is applied to any defect. And, therefore, men are ashamed of poverty, or low birth, or servitude, etc. 434 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLIII. 4. (3) But sometimes men are ashamed of doing virtuous acts (S. Luke ix. 26). No ; not considered in themselves, but per accidens, owing to men's opinion of them, or to the wish to avoid appearance of presumption or hypoc- risy. (4) But if shame were properly of base acts, u man should be more ashamed of the baser acts, which is not the case. Men may he ashamed of light offences and glory in the graves! Ps. lii. 1). But sometimes it happens that graver sins arc i he less shameful, either because there is less turpi- tude in them, as spiritual sins are more grave and less shame- ful than carnal Bins; or because there is more temporal good connected with them. So a man is more ashamed of cowardice than <>l* rashness, and more ashamed of theft than of robbery (in Italy, perhaps; hardly in the United States, where defalcations may be condoned so readily), on account dt some appearance of power in them. Can shame be fmi ad i n a in turf nous men? That any evil be not feared may happen from two causes, either because it is not esteemed as evil, or because one docs not think it possible that it should reach himself, or that it is difficult to avoid. So shame may be absent from any one for two reasons; he may not regard his vices as things to blush at. and, in this way, men hardened in sin have no shame — they rather glory in their sins. But, again, one may not apprehend turpitude as possible for himself, or as not easy to avoid ; and in this way the aged and the virtuous are not shamefaced. But vet they are so disposed that if there should be in them anything disgraceful they would be ashamed of it. Shame, then, is specially found in those who occupy a sort of middle position, who have some love of good, but are not secure against vice. (1) But are not virtuous men ashamed of the appearance, at least, of evils which are not truly in them ? The virtu- Qu. cxlvi. 1.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 435 ous man avoids the appearance of evil, for to do so is part of God's law (1 Thess. v. 22). (2) But shame is the fear of disgrace, and virtuous men may be dishonoured by being falsely defamed, or unworthily reproached ; therefore they may feel shame at such things. Yes ; the emotion of shame may, like that of any other pas- sion, anticipate reason ; but that gets its supremacy, and the virtuous man contemns infamies and reproaches which he does not deserve, having the "testimony of a good conscience." § 3. Abstinence, fasting. Is abstinence a virtue? The word taken simply may mean deprivation of food, and so it expresses neither virtue nor a virtuous act, but something morally indifferent. But, again, it may mean such a voluntary deprivation regulated by reason for good ends ; e.g., conformity to those with whom one lives, or the demands of health. (1) "The kingdom of God," indeed, "is not meat and drink" (Rom. xiv. 17). "Meat will not commend us to God ; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse ; nor if we eat, are we the better" (1 Cor. viii. 8). But either of these, if it rationally spring from faith and God's love, does pertain to the kingdom of God. (2) But is not this rather a matter of dietetic science than of moral virtue ? Yes ; if you think simply of the bodily health. But if you consider the inward affections in rela- tion to a rational good, the governing of the appetite for food pertains to the virtue of abstinence ; and S. Augustine well says (Qusest. Evang. ii. 11), "Virtue is not concerned with what one eats, or how much he eats, provided that he does so in conformity with those with whom he associates, and the demands of his own health. But virtue is con- cerned with the readiness and serenity of mind with which he goes without those things, whenever it is fitting or need- ful to do so." 436 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLVII. 1. (3) But it is said that impatience and pride are fostered by abstinence; can one virtue injure another? No; those vicious acts come from irrational abstinence. Right reason makes one abstain as he ought; sc, with cheerfulness of spirit and for good reason, sc, for God's glory, not for one's own. Abstinence is a special virtue, because the special pleas- ures of the table naturally tend to withdraw man from rational good, both because those pleasures are great and because they are connected with the most pressing needs of life. Is fasting mi act of virtual An acl is virtuous which is ordained through reason to some honourable good.. Such the act of fasting may be. 1 1 ) 1 1 is done to repress fleshlv concupiscences (2 Cor. vi. 5); (2) it is doue thai the mind may In- more freely elevated to contemplate t he mosl exalted things ( 1 ►an. x. 3); (3) it is done as a "satisfaction "' for sins, as the Lord commands, saying (Joel ii. 12), "Turn ye unto Me with all your heart, and with fasting,'' etc. "Fasting purifies the soul, uplifts the mind, subjects the flesh to the spirit, makes the heart con- trite and humble, disperses the clouds of concupiscence, ex- tinguishes the fires of lusts, kindle- the true light of chas- tity" (S. Aug.. Serm. De Orat. et Jejun., 230 De Temp.). (1) If fasting is a virtuous act, why is it not always ac- ceptable with God ? (Isa. Iviii. 3). Because an act which in its kind is virtuous may become vicious from some of its attendant circumstances. So it is found in Isaiah's proph- ecy just referred to : "'Behold, in the day of your fast ye find your own pleasure, ... ye fast for strife and contention," etc. (2) This is not a question of quantity of food, as such, but of right reason. And reason judges that, for special cause, one may take less food than he ordinarily does ; e.g., to avoid sickness, to accomplish more expeditiously some Qa. cxlvii. 3.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 437 undertaking, and much rather to avoid spiritual evils and to attain spiritual goods. But right reason does not subtract so much food that nature cannot be 'preserved. " It makes no difference whether you destroy yourself in a long or in a short time, because he offers a sacrifice from robbery who immoderately afflicts his body by too great lack of food or sleep" (S. Jerome). In like manner, right reason does not subtract so much food that a man is rendered incapable of doing the work set before him in life. S. Jerome, therefore, says again, "A rational man loses worthiness (dignitas) who prefers fasting to charity, or vigils to the integrity of his If, then, we use the word " abstinence " for the virtue under discussion, fasting is the act of that virtue. " Fast- ing from sin" is a figure of speech, meaning the abstaining from all injurious things, among which sins are included. Is fasting commanded? Is it an obligation? As the state has power to lay down statutes determinative of the law of nature in what concerns the common earthly utility, so the Church has power to lay down laws which pertain to the common benefit of the faithful in spiritual goods. Now, fasting is useful to restrain and remove sin, and to raise the mind to spiritual things. And each one is bound by natural reason to use fasting so far as it is needful to him for these purposes. Fasting, in general, then, falls under the precepts of the law of nature. But the determination of the time and mode of fasting according to what is con- venient and useful for Christian people falls under the pre- cepts of positive law laid down by the Church. (1) But if fasting is obligatory according to law, must it not everywhere and always be equally observed by all ? Understand that fasting, in itself, is not desirable but it is medicinal or penal ; it is rendered eligible by its being 438 TEMPERANCE AN'l) ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. I xi.vn. 4. useful to sonic other end. Therefore, absolutely considered, it is not obligatory, but it is so for each one who needs such a remedy. Men in genera] do need it—'- In many things wo all -nimble (S. Jas. iii. 2); and. "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (G-al. \. 17) — and, therefore, it was fitting that the Church decree 3ome fasts bo be observed by all, not as commanding thai which is superfluous, but as determining in a Bpecial way what is necessary in general. ('.') But whoever transgresses against a commandment is guilty of mortal sin: if , then, fa-ting be commauded, do nol all who break a fas! incur the loss of salvation ? Thus a great suare Beeras to be sel for human feet. I answer that precepts sei forth as general statutes do nol bind all in the same manner, but as the end requires wlneli the law-giver has in mind, [f any one, in breaking the statute, contemn bis authority, or hinder the end which thai law-giver has in new, he Bins mortally. But if from some reasonable cause he does nol observe the statute, especially when the law-giver, if he were present, would not enforce it, such transgression is nol mortal sin. Not all who do not keep the fasts of the Church sin mortally. Such persons may e\en, in good faith, think that they have sufficient cause for nol observiug the fast when such is not the case. Then there is no mortal sin, no intention of breaking the law of t he < 'hurch. (3) Church laws respecting fasting are not contrary to Christian liberty bur rather in its favour by impeding the servitude of sin (Gal. v. 13). Are all, then, bound to keep the fasts of the Church? General laws are propounded according to the needs of the people as a whole. But if any special case arise which is repugnant to the observance of the law, the legislator does not intend to lay obligation in that case. Discretion, however, is to be used. For if the case be perfectly evident, a man may lawfully at once set aside the Qu. cxlvii. 4.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 439 observance of the statute in his case, especially if supported by custom, or if it be not possible to have ready recourse to authority in the question. But if the case be doubtful he ought to refer it to a supe- rior who has power of dispensation. This general principle applies to fasts instituted by the Church, to which all are obliged unless some special impediment exist. (1) But the precepts of the Church are of obligation like those of God; for the Gospel says, "He that heareth you heareth Me" (S. Luke x. 16), and all are bound to keep the commands of God ; therefore, all are bound to observe the fasts instituted by the Church. I reply that the command- ments of God are those of natural law which, in themselves, are necessary to salvation. But positive Church laws are of things not per se necessary to salvation, but only as or- dained by the Church. And, therefore, there can be im- pediments — weakness, necessity, greater good incompatible with fasting — on account of which some persons are excused from fasting. (2) What shall we say of children ? In them, most of all (we may add, in the aged, also), there is evidently good reason for not fasting. Their feebleness makes them need to take food more frequently than older persons, though little at a time. Besides, they are growing, and need more food on that account. As long, then, as they are growing, they are not bound to observe the Church fasts. Still, it is convenient that even at that age they be exercised in self- denial suited to their tender years, which can be done with- out injury to health, if not rather beneficially. (3) What shall we say of labourers and travellers ? Are not spiritual things, such as the spiritual benefit of fasting, to be preferred to the temporal profits of bodily labour ? Are not necessary things, like the statutes of the Church, to be preferred to unnecessary things, like travelling for pleas- ure, for profit, or even for spiritual ends ? I answer that here we must make a distinction. If the travel or labour 440 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qc cxlvii. 5. can be conveniently deferred or decreased without detriment to bodily health and what is required for the preservation of the bodily and spiritual life, the fasts of the Church are not to be omitted. But if there be need of making the journey immediately, and of taking food accordingly, or if exhaust- ing bodily labour be imperative, whether for corporeal sup- port or for something essential to spiritual life (e.g., long journeys with many sermons and addresses), and with these the lasts of the Church cannot be observed, a man is not bound to fast, because it does not seem to have been the in- tention of the church in appointing them that through this other pious and more necessary things should be hindered. 1 ma, however, that in such cases recourse should ho had to the dispensation of authority, unless where custom has already settled the matter. For the silence of those in an; horny seems to give consent. (Note thai the author, familiar with a mild climate, takes no accounl of such an inclement winter as that of the North- ern United States and Canada. In a Lent when the ther- ] neter is below the zero of Fahrenheit, ami may vary thirty or forty degrees in an hour, the rules which would suit Italy would he evidently out of place according to that "righi reason" which is called "common sense." Absti- nence from flesh on the coast of Labrador might require a supply of canned vegetables !— J. J. E.) Days and seasons of fasting. The author only notices Lent, the ember-days, and the vigils of certain feasts. The American Church omits all vigils, but, like some parts of the Latin Church, add- the rogation days, and, like the whole Latin Church, all Fri- days in the year, unless Christmas should fall on one of them, which one is an exception. The fast of Lent, says S. Thomas Aquinas, besides its general purpose of purify- ing the soul from sin and lifting it up to God in devotion, has special relation to preparing the faithful for a devout Qu. CXLVII. 5.] ABSTINENCE, FASTING. 441 Easter. The ember-days are based on the Lord's own ex- ample (S. Luke vi.), and are primarily for those who confer and those who receive Holy Orders, but secondarily for the people in whose behalf Holy Orders are conferred. Our rubric, indeed, names only two fasts, sc, Ash Wednesday and Good Friday, but calls all the others men- tioned " days of fasting," and indicates one of the objects of fasting ; sc, " abstinence suited to extraordinary acts and exercises of devotion/' Abstinence seems to be used, not as S. Thomas Aquinas employs it, for the virtue of which fasting is a manifestation, but as a modified form of fasting itself. Its connection with penitence is implied, not clearly expressed. But certainly it should not be overlooked that the Amer- ican Church claims her right to make positive laws having Divine sanction and binding conscience, an authority as explicitly asserted as by any civil government or any other part of the Catholic Church. " The Church requires such a measure of abstinence," etc. Our author gives three articles to the rules of fasting as they existed in the Western Church of his age ; sc, one meal only each day, at about three P.M., with abstinence from flesh, eggs, milk, and its products. Wine and spiritu- ous drinks are not included in the prohibition (" potus non solvit jejuniwm"), on the ground that the stimulus is tran- sitory, while the solid food prohibited, in addition to its nu- tritive qualities, is more stimulating to animal desires than other food is. It is evident that these rules of fasting are widely differ- ent from those of the early Church, and are not those of the Latin Church to-day. And I name the Latin Church, because the Anglican Church lays .down no positive law beyond the general statement that she requires such a meas- ure of abstinence as is more especially suited to extraor- dinary acts and exercises of devotion. First, then, as regards the time for ending the fast. The 442 TEMPEKANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLVII. 5. hour for the breakfast, "dejeuner," being in the author's age near noon, as is still common in Latin countries, with some coffee or chocolate and a light solid addition, "not exceeding four ounces on days of fasting/' and the hour for breaking the fast on days of fasting being about three p.m., the special fast would be about three hours in duration. This, with our habits, would bring the principal meal of the day on or a little before noon. Such was the rule of the Western Church in the middle ages ; one meal only in twenty-four hours. S. Thomas Aquinas knows nothing of an allowed "collation," or half meal, in the evening, unless it exchange with the other, and become a light breakfast at noon, with a full dinner in the evening. Little need be added concerning the kind of food on days of abstinence. The object of Church fasts being in part to repress carnal concupiscences, whenever the Church has laid down express rules, those articles of food have been partially or altogether interdicted which are most pleas- ant and most stimulating. There is more superfluous nu- triment in a dinner of flesh meat than in an equal quan- tity of fish ; other things being equal, the former is more agreeable, although very delicate dishes may in this regard evade the intention of the law while its letter is observed. On the same grounds, it is a more rigid abstinence to refrain from eggs, milk, and its products. If such stricter abstinence be observed at all, it belongs to Lent as a time of more rigid fasting. So far we may follow in our author's steps. Of stimulat- ing condiments and superfluous luxuries on the table he says nothing. Finally, in the absence of explicit law, it is evident that episcopal or pastoral counsel is the only guide in addition to a Christian man's sober judgment. Qu. cxlviii. 1, 2.] GLUTTONY. 443 § 4. Gluttony, sobriety, ebriety. Is gluttony (gula) a sin ? It is the inordinate appetite of eating and drinking. Now, that appetite is inordinate which departs from that rational order in which the good of moral virtue consists. Anything is sin which is contrary to virtue ; therefore glut- tony is a sin. (1) The Lord said (S. Matt. xv. 11), "Not that which entereth into the mouth, defileth a man ; " i.e., food accord- ing to its own substance and nature has no spiritual influ- ence. But inordinate concupiscence of food and drink does spiritually defile a man. (2) But no one sins in what lie cannot avoid ; and "who is there who does not take some food beyond the limits of necessity?" (S. Aug., Confess, x. 31). But understand that the vice of gluttony does not consist in the quantity of food which is taken, but in a concupiscence not regulated by reason. And, therefore, if any one exceed in quantity of food or drink, not through concupiscence but through mis- taken judgment, that is not due to gluttony but to igno- rance. Gluttony is found when the pleasures of the table lead one consciously to exceed his proper limit. (3) But the first motion of sin partakes of the nature of sin, while there is no sin at all in hunger and thirst. Yes ; but man has two kinds of appetites ; one which belong to his "vegetative" soul, in which there cannot be virtue or vice, because they are not subject to reason. Such appe- tites are hunger and thirst. But there are other appetites which belong to the sensu- ous nature, and the first beginnings of inordination in these "have the nature of sin." (See the 9th Anglican "Ar- ticle of Eeligion.") Is gluttony a mortal sin ? , The order of reason in regulating concupiscence admits of a two-fold view. Either it regulates the means to the 444 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CXLVIII. 3. end when they are not duly proportioned to that end, or it looks to the end itself when concupiscence turns a man away from his due end. If, then, the inordinate desire in the form of gluttony turn one away from the ultimate end, gluttony is a mortal sin (S. Luke xxi. 34 ; Eom. xiii. 13 ; Gal. v. 21). This happens when a man is so addicted to the pleasures of the table as his end ("his god is his belly") that he despises God, being ready to act against God's commandments in order to obtain his gratifications. But if the inordinate concupiscence only concern the means to an end — namely, that one too much desires the pleasures of the table, but still would do nothing against God's law on this account — it is venial sin.* (1) Not all mortal sins are directly against the Deca- logue, but only those which contain injustice. (2) Gluttony, in turning one away from the ultimate end of man, is contrary to charity. This makes it mortal sin. Is gluttony the greatest of sins ? (Be careful to note that the word in popular use is lim- ited to one very gross manifestation of this sin. In Moral Theology Ave look, also, at the more refined sins of society, all " revelling and drunkenness," all epicurean sensuality. See the next article. ) The gravity of a sin depends upon three considerations : first, and principally, the subject matter (materia) of the sin. From this point of view sins respecting Divine things are the greatest sins. And the vice of gluttony is not the greatest, for it concerns things which belong to bodily sustenance. But next is to be con- sidered the one who sins : and in this regard the sin of * Gluttony and intemperance, then, are mortal sins when they are injurious to the health of body or soul, when they prevent the fulfil- ment of duties and obligations. Observe that, as producing physical diseases, the remedy is physical as well as spiritual. Qu. cxlviii. 4-6.] GLUTTONY. 445 count of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of distinguishing and controlling what is fitting in such matters. Thirdly, we are to consider the resulting effects. And in this respect gluttony is a very grave sin, inasmuch as it is the parent of various mortal sins — e.g., lust, proud boastings, contentions, quarrels, etc. (1) The penalties of this sin are many and great, either on account of its cause, as in the expulsion from Paradise, or by reason of the sins which follow from it. (2) A man injures himself by this sin ; but this is acci- dental so far as he is concerned. He does not intend to in- jure himself, but to gratify his appetite; and yet the sin is aggravated by tbe injurious consequences, which could be foreseen. Diverse circumstances distinguish diverse species of this sin. Inordinate concupiscence may be marked by the kind of food, an epicurean searcb for dainties, or over nicety in their preparation, or excess in their quantity; or, again, in the very act of taking food, the unseasonable time, or the eagerness, which does not proceed from hunger, but from this sin. Gluttojiy is a capital sin. Let it be remembered that from a capital vice other vices spring having it for their final cause, inasmuch as it is an end greatly sought for, and hence from desire of it men are excited to sin in manifold ways. ISTow, an end is greatly desired which promises some sort of felicity, as pleasure does. And as the pleasures of touch and taste are the chief sensual pleasures, the vice of gluttony takes its place (with lust) among the capital sins. Food, indeed, is naturally sought for as means to an end — sc, the preservation of human life — and a large part of human labour is devoted to this necessary end. But the sin of gluttony is directed to the pleasures of food rather than to food in itself. But a capital sin, which has an end in the highest degree 44G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE YICES. [Qu. CL. 1. sought for, does not necessarily take the highest place in the catalogue of sins. Its children are five — foolish gladness, scurrility, filthiness, gabbling words, dulness of mind. Sobriety. In a general sense the word is applied to various matters (as in Tit. ii. 12), but, used more strictly, it applies to the well-governed use of drinks whose excess can intoxicate. And it is a special virtue, because it removes a special im- pediment to reason. Is the use of wine altogether unlawful ? The apostle implies a negative in what he says to Timothy (1 Tim. v. 23), " Be no longer a drinker of water, but use a little wine/' etc. No food or drink is in itself unlawful, ac- cording to the Lord's words (S. Matt. xv. 11), " Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man." Still, per accidens, drinking wine can become unlawful ; sometimes from the condition of the drinker, if wine easily injure him, or he have made a vow not to touch it ; sometimes from the manner of using it, when it is taken immoderately ; and sometimes with reference to other men (especially in many parts of the United States), if they are scandalized by its use (Eom. xiv. 21). When the apostle says (Tit. ii. 6), "Young men likewise exhort to be sober-minded,"' he intimates that the young have special need of this virtue for the restraining of con- cupiscences. But when he commands the aged men to be temperate (Tit. ii. 2), and says (1 Tim. iii. 3) that a bishop must be temperate and sober-minded, he intimates that they have special need of a clear head and of restraining what impedes the use of reason. Ebriety. — Is drunkenness a sin? It may mean the penal defect brought about through excess in intoxicating drinks which take away the use of Qu. cl. 2.] EBRIETY. 447 reason ; or " ebriety " may mean the act by which any one puts himself in such a condition, which may happen in more than one way. From inexperience of the strength of the drink, ebriety may happen without any fault on the part of him who uses it, especially if there have been no negligence on his part. Thus Noah may have become intoxicated through inexperience in the strength of wine. But, again, inebriation may be a species of gluttony, aris- ing from inordinate concupiscence as well as the use of the wine. This is a sin, for there are two species of gluttony, revelling and drunkenness. The resulting defect is involuntary, for no one wishes to be drunk ; but the immoderate use of intoxicating drink, in which consists the sin, is voluntary. What shall we say of him who offers wine to another ? He may be ignorant of the condition of his neighbour, un- aware of any evil result ; certainly he does no wrong act. But if he does know this, both are sinning, the one in offer- ing as the other in taking what produces the evil result. Is ebriety a mortal sin ? If one be ignorant of the strength of the drink, and that what he takes is immoderate, there is no sin at all. Or he may notice that the quantity is great, immoderate, but not suppose that its strength will affect him ; then ebriety may be venial sin. Or, again, both circumstances may be observed — sc, the immoderation and the strength — and yet one may choose rather to be intoxicated than to abstain from drink- ing. Such a one is properly an inebriate, because mortal sins get their character from the intention. Such inebriation is mortal sin, because a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason by which he may do good works and decline from sin. It is mortal sin to commit one's self consciously to the peril of sinning mortally. (Qu. : May one submit to his physician, who designs to produce this result as beneficial in dangerous sickness ?) 448 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CL. 3, 4. Is ebriety the gravest of sins ? The greater the good which is taken away by any evil, the greater is that evil. But it is manifest that Divine good is greater than human good. Therefore sins which are directly against God, are graver than intoxication, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason. (1) S. Ohrysostom says that nothing is such a friend to the devil as ebriety and lasciviousness ; but this is true not because they are graver than other sins, but because they are most common, men being prone to them through concupis- cences which originate in their nature. (2) But a thing is called sin because it excludes the good of reason, which is what ebriety does in the highest degree. But the evil is greater in what is contrary to reason than in what temporarily takes away its use. For the use of reason which inebriation takes away may be either good or bad ; but the good of virtues which is taken away by what is con- trary to reason is always good. Does intoxication excuse from sin? Distinguish once more between the resulting evil and the preceding act. So far as the resulting defect which hin- ders the use of reason is concerned, ebriety excuses from sin, because through ignorance it causes the involuntary. And, again, we must make a distinction as regards the preceding act. For if the inebriation followed from it with- out sin (say, altogether inadvertently, involuntarily, as may have been the case with Lot), then the resulting sin is en- tirely exculpated. But if the preceding act (the taking intoxicating drink) was culpable, then the resulting sin is not wholly excusable, because it is rendered voluntary by the preceding voluntary act, and inasmuch as the sin is the consequence of being engaged in au illicit act. But the resulting sin is diminished in guilt, as the vol- untary is diminished. Qu. CLI. 1, 2.] CHASTITY, MODESTY, VIRGINITY. 449 (1) But the inebriate may be twice punished ; i.e., heavily punished once for the crime of drunkenness, and again for the injury done when he is drunk. And the public utility which requires the repression of injuries may justly be very strict in this matter. (2) We are not making one sin an excuse for another ; but the loss of reason and self-control, the resulting defect, is viewed as partial excuse. (3) Concupiscence is no excuse for sin, because it does not totally hinder the use of reason, as intoxication does ; and yet passion may diminish sin, because sins of infirmity are less than sins of malice. § 5. Chastity, modesty, virginity. _ Is chastity a virtue ? Since chastity signifies the government of the concupis- cence of venereal pleasures according to the dictates of right reason, it is manifestly a special virtue, having its special subject. So it is opposed to the vice of lust. It governs the body, indeed, but its immediate subject is the inward motions of special concupiscences. The body may be vio- lated by violence, but if the soul remain inviolate, the violence of another's lust cannot take away even the sanc- tity of the body (S. Aug., De Civ. Dei, i. 18). The bodily purity of an unbeliever is not truly the per- fect virtue of chastity, for it is not referred to its due end ; and virtues are distinguished from vices, not by their acts but by their ends. " One is not truly virtuous unless he be righteous ; and he is not truly righteous unless he live by faith"' (S. Aug., Contra Julian, v. 3). But the word chastity, like its correlative, "fornication,"' has in Scripture use a wider and metaphorical signification. For in the union of the soul with certain things there are pleasures which may be admitted or resisted or restrained. (See 2 Cor. xi. 2, and Jer. iii. 1.) 28 450 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLII. 2. We have considered temperance as applicable to all pleas- urable desires of the senses of touch and taste. Abstinence was one species of temperance, referring to the pleasures of the table, the actions by which the individual is preserved. Now we have another species of temperance, relating to the actions by which the human race is preserved. Modesty applies not only to the acts which chastity governs, but to any signs of them, as immodest looks, kisses, embraces. Modesty, then, is not a distinct virtue, but a certain circum- stance of the virtue of chastity. (Every chaste person is also modest.) Shame has reference to every base act, but most of all to those which have most turpitude as least under reason's control. Thus shame and reproach reach their climax in the sphere of modesty. Virginal chastity is not so much bodily purity as the fixed purpose of the soul to abstain perpetually from venereal pleasures. The " material" part is the sensible pleasures which are re- nounced; the "formal" part is the purpose of the mind (which purpose is the essence of any moral act). If, then, those pleasures are experienced contrary to the consent of the mind and its fixed purpose, through violence, or in sleep, or from infirmity of nature, the essence of vir- ginity is not lost, because such pollution does not happen through lewdness, which virginity excludes. Is virginity illicit ? In human acts, that is vicious which is against right rea- son. But this demands that one use the means for any end in such measure as agrees with that end. Now, man's good is three-fold ; first, outward things, like riches; next, cor- poreal goods ; and, lastly, spiritual goods, among which those of the contemplative life are superior to those of the active Qu. CLII. 2.J CHASTITY, MODESTY, VIRGINITY. 451 life (Nic. Eth. x. 7), as the Lord said (S. Luke x. 43), " Mary hath chosen the good part/' Of these goods the outward are ordained for the service of the body ; and those of the body for the soul ; and those of the active life for the contemplative life. Eight reason, then, uses each of these in its proper place. Hence if any one abstain from possessing anything which it would be otherwise a good to possess in order that he may provide for his bodily health or attend to the contemplation of the truth, this is not vicious, but is according to right reason. In like manner, if any one abstain from corporeal pleasures in order that he may more freely contemplate the truth, he follows right reason. But for this purpose holy virginity abstains from all venereal pleasures, in order that it may give itself with less distraction to Divine contemplation ; for the apostle says (1 Cor. vii. 34), " She that is unmarried is careful for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and in spirit ; but she that is married is careful for the things of the world, how she may please her husband." No sin can lawfully be counselled, But virginity is coun- selled (1 Cor. vii. 25). Therefore -it is not illicit. (1) But is not everything which is contrary to nature's laws illicit ? And is not the law of nature promulgated in Gen. i. 28, viz., "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth " ? And, therefore, as he would sin who should abstain from all food to his own injury, does not he sin who violates this command, against the good of the race ? I answer that an obligation may be due in either of two ways ; either it must be fulfilled by each one, and can be omitted by none without sin ; or it may be due from the people as a whole, and then each one of that multitude is not bound to such fulfilment. For many things are neces- sary for the people as a whole which no one of them is sufficient for, but which are in part accomplished by one, in part by another. 452 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLII. 3. The precept of the law of nature concerning eating must necessarily be obeyed by every one. But the precept con- cerning the continuation of the human race regards the multitude, which needs not only this, but also spiritual ad- vancement. Therefore the continuance of the race is suffi- ciently provided for by the great mass of the community who are married ; but the glory and beauty and salvation of the race may be promoted by those who, abstaining from marriage, have more leisure for the contemplation of Divine things. Thus in an army some guard the camp, some carry standards, some use the rifle, some look after the wounded — all these things are due for the whole and from the whole, but they cannot be fulfilled by one. (2) But is not this going to extremes — sc, instead of moderating pleasures, abstaining from them altogether ? It would be so if it were done contrary to right reason, as by one abhorring pleasures in themselves, an unnatural savage. But we are not considering such an abstinence. Is virginity a virtue f Its essence is the purpose spoken of above, and that pur- pose is rendered laudable by the end ; sc, the having leisure for Divine things. Virginity, therefore, is a virtue, and a special one having its own material part. It is related to chastity as magnificence is to liberality ; the one more gen- eral, the other of rarer obligation, but of special excellence. We have seen (see page 73) that he who has one virtue has all, which seems to present a difficulty ; sc, that none but virgins can enter the kingdom of heaven. This, of course, is only apparent difficulty, for the connection of virtues does not depend upon their outward ("material") part but on their inward essence ("formal part") ; they are united in charity or prudence. A virtuous man may have opportunity for the exercise of one virtue who has not for another, as the poor can practise temperance but not mag- nificence. So the virtuous man may be prepared in mind Qu. CLIX. 4, 5.] CHASTITY, MODESTY, VIRGINITY. 453 for the virginal state if it were permitted to him, even as one in prosperity is prepared to bear adversities with equa- nimity ; and without this preparation of mind no one can be a virtuous man. Penitence does not undo the consequences of sin. If the magnificent man have wasted his goods, penitence will not restore them. So he who has violated his purpose of vir- ginity by yielding to fleshly pleasures can never be as though he had not sinned ; but penitence may restore the broken purpose, the essence of the virtue. If virginity mean a pious and rational jiurpose of remain- ing unwedded — a virtuous purpose — it is evident that it can- not be lost without sin. Is virginity a higher state than conjugal continence f The apostle (1 Cor. vii. 33, seq.) makes virginity a matter of counsel as being a greater good ; and this with reason, both because divine good is higher than human good, and the good of the soul is preferable to corporeal good 5 and be- cause the good of the contemplative life is preferable to that of the active life. Now, religious virginity is ordained for the good of the soul in a contemplative life, " caring for the things of the Lord •" while marriage is ordained, first, for earthly good, the increase of the human race, and, next, for the active life, because the wedded pair must necessarily be "careful for the things of the world." Although virginity is in itself better than conjugal con- tinence, yet the wedded may be better than the virgin, both in the prepared mind, and in other superior saintliness. Is virginity the highest of virtues f It is so in its kind ; i.e., as respects chastity, it is superior to that of widows or of the married. But absolutely it is not so. For the end always excels the means to that end ; and the more efficaciously a thing is ordained for the end, 454 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLIII. 1, 3. the better it is. But the end which alone renders vir- ginity laudable is freedom for Divine things. Hence, the theological virtues and the virtue of religion, whose acts are about Divine things, are preferable to virginity. The vir- gins "follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth," because they most closely in that regard imitate Christ, but other virtues make them come nearer to God by spiritual saint- liness. § 6. Lust (luxuria). Lust is inordinate desire of venereal pleasures. In a more general sense it is extended to excess in other sensuous pleasures. These pleasures are not necessarily sinful. Sin in human acts, as has been often said, is what is con- trary to the order of reason. This order of reason ordains each thing suitably to its end. Therefore there is no sin if the end be good, and if the means be used as reason dic- tates, in fitting manner and order. But as it is a good that the corporeal nature of the individual be preserved, so it is a superior good that the human species be preserved. And, therefore, as the use of food is free from sin if it be em- ployed in due manner and order, so, also, the marriage bed in due manner and order for the ends of its institution. But among the works of the flesh are enumerated (Gal. v. 19) the sins of lust. The more necessary a thing is, the more the order of reason must be preserved in it ; and, con- sequently, the more vicious it is if the order of reason be set aside. But lust exceeds the order and manner of reason in venereal pleasures ; therefore, it is a sin. Man is not the absolute lord of his own body. "Ye are not your own, for ye were bought with a price ; glorify God, therefore, in your body" (1 Cor. vi. 20). He that inordi- nately, through lust, abuses his body, does injury to God, who is the Lord of our body. Qu. cliv. 2.] LUST. 455 Lust is a capital sin. For it has an end greatly sought after, through desire of which man proceeds to perpetrate many sins, which all spring from that fountain of vice. The end of lust is vene- real pleasure in sense-appetite, most sought after, both on account of its vehemence, and on account of its being a " connatural " concupiscence. Its children are blindness of mind, want of consideration, rashness, inconstancy, selfishness, hatred of God, love of the world, dread and despair of the future state (Eph. iv. 19), disorders of both reason and will.* Sins of lust may be sins against nature when the produc- ing of offspring is prevented ; or the due bringing up of children is hindered, as in fornication ; or the honour due to another is violated, as in incest ; or injury is done to an- other's right, as in adultery, seduction, or rape. Here are six species of these sins of uncleanness and lasciviousness. Is simple fornication a mortal sin ? The Word of God directly answers that question. " They which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God " (Gal. v. 21). Every sin which is committed directly against the life of man is mortal. But fornication is an inordinate act which tends to the injury of that life which would nat- urally proceed from such sexual intercourse of the unmar- ried with the unmarried. For the due rearing of the human child not only the mother's care is required, but even more that of the father, by whom the child is to be supported and protected. We may find the law of nature even in beasts, where father and mother are both needed for the off- spring, and promiscuous concubinage is not found. Still * Its antidotes are, (a) flight from temptation , from the places, the persons, the things which produce temptation; (b) hard work, producing moderate fatigue; (c) judicious asceticism; (d) receiving the Holy Com- munion. 45G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. cliv. 3. more is promiscuous concubinage contrary to the nature of man. His nature requires that he remain with one female, not for a brief period, but for a long time, or even for his whole life. The man needs to be certain of his own progeny, because of bis responsibility for that progeny. This determination to one settled female is matrimony, a part of the law of nature. Because sexual intercourse is ordained for the common good of society, and common goods fall under the deter- mination of law, consequently matrimony is rightly and necessarily determined by human law. Fornication is none the less mortal sin if any one suffi- ciently provide for the bringing up of an illegitimate child ; because that which falls under the cognizance of law is judged by what ordinarily happens, and not according to that which may happen in some exceptional case. (1) It may be asked why, if this is mortal sin, it is placed, in Acts xv. 20, with such things as eating blood and things strangled, which certainly is not mortal sin. But the ob- ject of the decree was to reconcile Jewish and Gentile Chris- tians. And while the Gentiles were warned against the sin of lust, which was commonly held to be no sin, they were also bidden to respect the scruples of their Jewish brethren concerning what is not in itself illicit. (2) It is not merely inordinate concupiscence which makes this sin to be mortal, for a single act of this nature is inor- dinate ; it may have the result of injury to progeny, and be the cause of separation from the love of God. TJiis sin "being against the good of a future child, is graver than sins like theft, which are against outward goods. But it is less than sins like unbelief, which are directly against God, and sin like homicide, against the life of a hu- man being already born. (1) It comes, indeed, from the most immoderate of de- sires, but what aggravates sin consists in the inclination of Qu. cliv. 4.] LUST. 457 the will. Passion in sense-appetite diminishes sin, because the greater the passion from whose impulse the sin is com- mitted the lighter is the sin. "Through lust of the flesh the human race is more subjected to the devil than through any other" (Isidore). (2) "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body" (1 Cor. vi. 18) ; but this does not make it the gravest of sins ; for reason in man is of more consequence tha?i his body, and if any other sin is still more repugnant to reason, it is a graver sin. (3) But the sin of fornication is against the good of the human race, and against Christ. " Shall I take away the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot ?" (1 Cor. vi. 15). But homicide is still more repug- nant to the good of the race, and Divine good is greater than the good of the human race. Therefore, sins which are against G-od are greater. Fornication is not sin directly against God, but like all other mortal sins it is so in its result. But as the members of our body are the members of Christ, so, also, our spirit is one with Him (1 Cor. vi. 17). Hence, also, spiritual sins like heresy are more against Christ than fornication. May there be mortal sin in touches and hisses ? Some things may be mortal sin in themselves, "in their own species." In this way kisses, embraces, touches are not mortal sin, for they may be made without inordinate desire, either according to the customs of the people, or on account of some necessity or reasonable cause. But, again, some things may be mortal sin from their cause ; as he who gives alms in order to seduce some one into heresy mortally sins because of his corrupt intention. But it has been already seen (see page 89) that not only consent to the act of mortal sin, but consent to the pleas- ure of it, is itself mortal sin. And, therefore, since form- 458 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLIV. 5. cation and, still more, other species of lust are mortal sins, consent even to the sinful pleasure is also sin of the same kind. Therefore lustful embraces and kisses fall under the same condemnation. In themselves they do not hinder the good of human offspring, but they spring from the root of this evil. Is nocturnal pollution mortal sin ? Not in itself, for every sin depends upon the judgment of reason. The first motions of sensuality are sinful only as they can be repressed by reason. If the judgment of reason is removed from them, sin also is removed.* The sleeper is visited by images over which he has no control, and, therefore, what he does in sleep, without any choice of his, is not his fault. But this is not the end of the matter, for we must con- sider the cause of the pollution. It may be purely corporeal, the body relieving itself of superfluities, and, through the brain, acting upon the imagination, so that the dream is the result of the bodily action. But all this may be due to some culpable cause, as excess in eating or drinking (stimulating drinks), and then the cause makes the pollution also culpable. But if there were no culpable cause, then the pollution is not sinful in itself nor in its cause. But, again, previous waking thoughts may produce the same result, whether these thoughts have been in the way of duty, or whether they sprang from voluntary thought of carnal vices with desire of such gratifications. Here, again, the gravity of the cause makes the sleeping act also gravely culpable. Whereas, if the thought were in the course of scientific study, or accompanied by detestation of the sin, then the pollution is not sinful in itself nor in its cause. Again, there may be an external cause, if evil spirits have * The author is not discussing the deadly sin against nature, pollu- tion produced iu a manner directly voluntary — sc, " masturbation." Qu. cliv. 5.] LUST. 459 power to excite the imagination or the brain. And this, indeed, may be with preceding sin — sc, neglect of due preparation to resist the illusions of evil spirits. This is the spirit of the Compline hymn : ' ' Drive far from us our ghostly foe, That no pollution we may know." Our conclusion, then, is that nocturnal pollution is never sin, but it is sometimes the result of previous sin. Observe that the action of reason is not entirely suspended in sleep. In the dream the soul observes and apprehends, but no longer, in free choice or moral judgment, exerts dominion over the images presented to it. What the author further says on this question of the various forms of lust may be greatly abridged. If simple fornication be deadly sin, much more those other forms of lust which add new deformity to it. In seduction, and still more in rape, there is the injury done to another and to a family, which demands satisfaction according to the laws of God and man (Ex. xxii. 16 ; Dent. xxii. 28). In adultery, beside these, there is the further injury to a. husband's or a wife's right, and to the claims of offspring. A still graver violation of nature's law is incest ; for (1) by that law we are bound to honour those nearest to us by ties of blood (Lev. xviii. 7) ; (2) by that law a natural check is put- upon the familiar intercoui*se of members of the same family, which is guarded against unbridled lust ; and (3) familiar intercourse with a husband's or a wife's nearest kin is rendered possible, which would be prevented if there were no such law rendering future marriage im- possible. At the same time observe that this impediment of sexual intercourse among those who are nearly related by consan- guinity or affinity is partly founded on natural reason, as between parents and children ; and is partly, also, founded 460 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. f'LV. 1. on custom and Divine and human law, which have varied respecting what is decent and indecent. And remember that what is ordained for the common good, as sexual inter- course is, falls under the direction of human law.* Sacrilege of persons again adds a new deformity to those already mentioned — sc., when a person has taken a vow of perpetual virginity, and that vow to God is broken. Finally, there remain those unnamable sins, unnatural deeds of darkness (Rom. i.), against right reason, against nature, and the ends for which sexual intercourse has been instituted by God, some of which are the prevalent curse of Protestant communities to-day. In violating nature, which is God's order and law, injury is done to God Himself. § 7. Continence, incontinence. Is continence {self-restraint, iynpatzia) a virtue ? The word is used by some to express abstinence from venereal pleasure. So understood, the chief and perfect continence is virginity, which has been already shown to be a virtue, under certain conditions. Vidual continence comes next to it, and is to be estimated by the same prin- ciples. But others (see Aristotle, Nlc. Eth., lib. vii.), under- stand by continence the resisting of vehement depraved concupiscences. So understood, continence has somewhat of the nature of virtue, inasmuch as reason Js steadfast against passions so as not to be misled by them ; but still it does not (as temperance does) reach the perfect idea of moral virtue, according to which even sense-appetite is so subdued to reason that vehement passions contrary to rea- son do not arise in it. But using the word virtue loosely for any principle of laudable actions, we may call continence a virtue. It may be said that self-restraint can be used badly, which * See, further, Supplement, chapter on Matrimony, § Qu. CLV. 2.J CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE. 461 is not true of virtue. But man is truly man according to reason. And a man, properly speaking, uses self-restraint when he keeps himself to the dictates of right reason. He only is truly continent, not he who follows perverted reason. But depraved desires are opposed to right reason, as good desires are opposed to perverted reason. And, therefore, properly and truly, he is continent who abstains from evil concupiscences, adhering to right reason. But he who ab- stains from good desires, persisting in perverted reason, is not to be called self-restrained, but rather obstinate in evil. Continence * and incontinence properly apply to the de- sires of the pleasures of touch and taste. Continence implies a certain bridling of one's self so as not to be led by passions. Therefore it properly applies to those passions which impel one to pursue something wherein * The difference between temperance and continence may not be at first sight clear' to the student who is not familiar with the accurate moral distinctions of the Nicomachean Ethics. (1) The desires and passions, if not naturally moderate, may be so moderated by acquired virtue that one shall feel only proper desires for all those pleasant things which conduce to health, a sound habit of body, or are connected with the perpetuation of the human race. The habit is formed and has become a second nature ; one acts from it with deliberate preference. This is the virtue of temperance. Intemperance is the opposite — the vice of the concupiscible passions. The man is like a child, in that his desires are the rule of his life. There is no protest of moral judgment. But, unlike a child, his per- verted reason has adopted a vicious rule of life, and he follows it by deliberate choice. (2) But, again, a man may have violent passions which require the strongest effort of his will to subdue, and they are perpetually strug- gling against his conscience and the curb of his will. If one succeed in curbing them, which he cannot do by his own unassisted powers, he is " self-controlled " — he is continent. But the imperfect virtue which he possesses is in his will. It is manifest that, in this sense of the word, the Lord Jesus Christ could not be called continent. If a man's will does not control these violent passions, he is inconti- 462 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLV. 3, 4. it is laudable that reason hold one back ; but it does not apply to those passions which imply a drawing back, as fear and the like. In these the firmly following what reason dictates is laudable. But passions impel the more vehemently after something the more they follow natural inclinations, such as are the inclinations for what is necessary to preserve the individual and to preserve the human race. These, then, are the proper objects of continence and incontinence. Yet it will be no- ticed that the terms are used in wider scope of all vehement desires, as of honours, riches, and the like. Continence has for its subject the hitman will. Every virtue makes its subject different from the disposi- tion which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. But the concupiscible nature is in the same condition in the continent and in the incontinent, in both breaking forth into violent and depraved desires. Both of these also have the same right reason, and, when free from passion, pur- pose not to follow illicit desires. The primary difference between them is in their choice. The continent, although he suffer violent desires, chooses not to follow them, since his moral judgment protests against them ; but the inconti- nent chooses to follow them despite the protest in his soul. Therefore continence is in the will, whose action is choice. The object of continence is sensuous desires, but as resist- ing them ; and this requires another power of the soul to make this resistance. Is continence better than temperance ? Continence as equivalent to virginity has been already discussed. But now we mean the resistance of moral reason nent. His moral judgment protests, as it does not in the intemperate. He knows, in calmer moments, that his desire is bad ; but when the time of action comes his will resists the protest, and he acts contrary to his deliberate preference and judgment. Qu. CLVI. 1.] CONTINENCE, INCONTINENCE. 463 to depraved and violent concupiscences. And in this sense of the word temperance is much greater than continence. For the good of virtue is laudable in being according to reason. And this good is much more vigorous in the tem- perate man, in whom sense-appetite is subdued by reason, than in the continent man, in whom it vehemently resists reason through its depraved desires. (1) But does not the continent man make the greater struggle and therefore gain a title to higher reward ? I an- swer that the greatness or the feebleness of concupiscence arises from two causes. Sometimes it comes from natural physical constitution, some being naturally more prone to concupiscence than others are. And, again, some have greater opportunities and external temptations. And in such a case the greatness of the concupiscence resisted in- creases the merit of resistance. But sometimes, as in the temperate man, the feebleness of the desire results from a spiritual cause, as the warmth of charity or the strength of reason. And then the feebleness of the desire by reason of its cause increases merit. (2) One might be inclined to say that temperance belongs to a lower sphere, because it is the virtue of sense-desires, not of the will. But observe that the good of reason which makes virtue laudable is shown to be greater in reaching not only to the will, but to the sensuous passions, so that the whole man is formed anew. Incontinence is a state of the soul, and not merely a matter of physical temperament. The body merely gives occasion for incontinence. For sense-appetite is the operation of an organized body in which, owing to the condition of that body, violent passions may arise. But passions, however violent, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but only the occasion for it, because while reason is in operation man can always resist those pas- sions. If they should grow so powerful as to take away the 404 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVI. 2. use of reason, as in " emotional insanity/'' neither conti- nence nor incontinence would be possible, because the moral judgment which the continent preserves, and the incontinent abandons, would no longer exist. The cause of inconti- nence, therefore, is in the soul, which does not resist the pas- sions. And this may be either because it gives way to pas- sions before reason has deliberated, which may be called " precipitancy," or because the man weakly does not abide by his determinations, through " infirmity of purpose." (1) We notice that the bodily condition gives occasion to incontinence, for the soul has certain powers which use bodily organs and are conditioned by the state of those organs ; and the operation of these powers of the soul with their organs contribute to those mental actions which do not use corporeal instruments ; i.e., to the action of the reason and will. For the reason receives its materials from sensibil- ity, and the will is impelled by the passions of sense-appetite. So it happens that women in general, although there are marked exceptions, are weaker in purpose because of their bodily constitution (acting from impulse rather than from fixed moral judgment. We might call the virtuous woman temperate rather than continent.) They are usually led by their feelings rather than by solid moral judgment. (2) Again, there are some men who are naturally ' ' quick- tempered," whose passions anticipate judgment ; or who are "choleric," in whom the vehemence of their passions pro- duces the same result ; and, on the other hand, there are men of the feminine temperament, infirm of purpose ; but no one of these things is sufficient cause of incontinence. The concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit (G-al. v. 17), not of necessity, but through the negligence of the spirit itself, which does not will a firm resistance. Is incontinence a sin? It is recorded as one of the special sins of "the last days " in 2 Tim. iii. 3. And it is a sin for two reasons, because it Qu. clvi. 3.] COHTINEKCE, INCONTINENCE. 465 is a departure from what right moral judgment dictates, and because it is a plunging into shameful pleasures. This is said of incontinence in its proper and simple meaning. But one may be said to be incontinent with respect to some particular thing, as when he transcends the limits of reason in his desire of riches, honours, and the like, which in themselves are good things. The sin herein consists in not observing due limits. Figuratively speaking, one might be called incontinent who was " carried away" by good desires, which would be in accordance with reason. This would pertain to the per- fection of virtue. (1) But no one can by his own strength avoid inconti- nence ; for the Lord says, "Without Me ye can do nothing" (S. John xv. 5). But man's need of Divine aid for conti- nence does not prevent incontinence from being sin. (2) But in him who is incontinent reason's moral judgment is overcome. (He makes good resolutions, but does not keep them.) Yes; but there is no necessity in this yielding; that would take away the idea of sin. It arises from the negligence of the man, who does not firmly apply himself to resist passion. (Hence he may feel remorse and shame.) Is the incontinent more sinful than the intemperate ? Since sin lies chiefly in the will, where there is greater in- clination of will to sin, there is graver sin. But the intem- perate man's will is inclined to sin from deliberate prefer- ence, which proceeds from a habit which he has acquired by custom ; whereas in the incontinent the will is inclined to sin by some passion. And because passion quickly comes to an end, but habit is "a quality hard to change," the incon- tinent feels regret when his passion ends ; but the intem- perate takes pleasure in his past sin, because habit has made it "connatural" to him. "They rejoice to do evil, and delight in the frowardness of evil " (Prov. ii. 14 ; Nic. Eth. vii. 7). 30 4GG TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLTI. 3. (1) There is an apparent objection to this, viz., that one seems to sin more gravely who acts against his conscience (S. Luke xii. 47), and the incontinent man knows how evil are the things which he desires, but nevertheless passion leads him to act against his conscience ; whereas the intemperate man judges that the things which he desires are good, and so does not seem to oppose his own conscience. This objection raises once more the question of ignorance excusing or not excusing sin. Ignorance in the reason some- times precedes the inclination of appetite and causes it. Then the greater the ignorance, the more the sin is dimin- ished, and it may be totally excused, since such ignorance makes the action involuntary so far as sin is concerned. But, again, ignorance may follow the inclination of ap- petite, and the greater such ignorance the graver is the sin, because the sinful appetite is greater. But the ignorance of both the incontinent and the intemperate comes from ap- petite being inclined to something ; in the one case through passion, in the other through habit. But this causes greater ignorance in the latter than in the former. This is true, first, as respects duration ; for in the incontinent the ignorance lasts only while the passion lasts, like the attacks of fever and ague. But the ignorance of the intemperate endures on account of the permanence of his habit, like a pulmonary consumption. But, again, the ignorance of the incontinent regards some particular thing which he estimates as at that time to be chosen. But the intemperate is ignorant in respect of the end itself, judging it to be good that he follow his unbridled desires. (His moral principle is destroyed; the voice of conscience is silenced.) (2) For this reason his cure is more hopeless. The "light within him is darkness/' and his fixed habit resists admonition and correction. His cure, if it come at all, will be in the same way with that of the incontinent; viz., by Divine aid, and admonition and correction. Qu. CLYII. l.J MEEKNESS AJ5TD CLEMENCY. 467 (3) But is not lustful passion greater in the incontinent, and does not this aggravate the sin ? Yes, and no. The lust of the will which does aggravate sin is greater in the intemperate. But the lust of sensuous appetite may be greater in the incontinent, for he sins only from violent pas- sions ; while the intemperate sins from lighter concupis- cence, and sometimes even anticipates it. "Every one would think a man worse if he did anything disgraceful when he felt no desire, or only a slight one, than if he felt very strong desires ; and if he struck another without being angry, than if he had been angry ; for what would he have done if he had been under the influence of passion ? " (Nic. Eth. vii. 7). Is incontinent anger ivorse than incontinent concupis- cence f The latter is baser because it has greater inordination. For (1) the passion of anger has something rational con- nected with it, inasmuch as the angry aims to avenge him- self for injury done to him, which, in a certain way, reason dictates. The defect lies in not aiming at the due manner of vengeance. But concupiscence is totally sensual and in no respect rational. (2) The motion of anger follows the physical constitution in the quick-tempered more closely than in the lustful through concupiscence. This seems to make the excessively angry more pardonable. (3) Anger acts "above board/' while concupiscence is sly and treach- erous. (4) Concupiscence acts with pleasure, but anger has been preceded and compelled by sorrow. But, on the other hand, we may consider the injury done to our neighbour, and so anger is generally graver in this respect. § 8. Meekness and clemency ; anger ; cruelty. Is clemency the same as meekness (mansuetudo) ? Moral virtue is concerned with passions and actions. But 468 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVII. 2, 3. inward passions are the source of outward actions or they are impediments to action. And, therefore, the virtues which moderate the passions concur with the virtues which moderate actions, although they differ in species, in produc- ing the same effects. Thus, justice restrains a man from stealing, to which one may be inclined by the inward pas- sion of love for money, which inordinate love is moderated by liberality ; so liberality concurs with justice in the result, the abstaining from theft. So, in the matter now before us, by the passion of anger one is provoked to demand heavier punishment. But clemency diminishes this punishment, which mild course of action might be hindered by excessive anger. And so meekness, by restraining anger, concurs in the same effect with clemency. But the difference is that while clemency moderates outward punishments, meekness diminishes the passion of anger. The latter regards the appetite for vengeance, the former the penalties which ven- geance demands. To clemency is opposed cruelty ; to meekness, rage, wrath- ful passion {iracundia). Are loth these virtues? Since virtue alone subjects appetite to reason, and both meekness and clemency do this, it is evident that they are both virtues. (1) Observe that inflexible severity in inflicting punish- ment, and clemency concerning punishment, are not oppo- sites ; each has its place according to right reason. There are occasions for the one, and, again, for the other. (2) Clemency is related to severity as equity to legal jus- tice ; it considers special circumstances on account of which it diminishes penalties. Meekness and clemency are virtues annexed to temperance. The common ground of the three virtues is restraint of passions ; the difference is in the object of restraint. The Ql\ CLVII. 3.] MEEKNESS AND CLEMENCY. '469 object of temperance, as we have seen, is the vehement desire of the pleasures of touch and taste ; the object of the virtues which we are now considering is anger and its effects. Equity has reference to the intention of the legislator going beyond the letter of his law ; but clemency moderates passion, so that a man does not use all his power in inflict- ing penalties. So far as right reason allows, it shuns all that which can give sorrow to another. The virtues which simply ordain man for good, as faith, hope, and charity, and also prudence and justice, are higher virtues than meekness and clemency, which with- draw man from evil. (Well worthy to be noted against affected sentimentality.) But yet, among virtues which resist depraved affections these may have a certain superiority. For anger, which meekness moderates, may exceedingly hinder a man from judging of the truth, and, therefore, meekness helps to makes a man master of himself. But temperance is the cardinal virtue, because fleshly concupiscences are baser, and more constantly beset a man. Clemency also approaches to charity, the chief among virtues, which seeks all good for one's neighbour, and hinders his evil. (Such is the example of Christ's meek- ness : " Learn of Me, for I am meek." See, also, 1 Pet. ii. 23.) Meekness prepares a man for the knowledge of God by removing the impediment of anger and making one master of himself. Also, it hinders one from contradicting the words of truth. Concurring in the same effect with charity, these virtues make a man acceptable with God and with men. Piety and mercy, also, may have similar effects, each from different motive ; piety, from reverence to superiors ; mercy, from regarding others' evils as pertaining to one's self; meekness, from removing anger ; clemency, from mild judgment of other's faults. 470 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVIII. 1. Anger. — Is it lawful to be angry? Anger is a passion of sense-appetite. Now, in the passions of the soul, evil is found in two ways : First, the passion is evil on account of its object, as passion. Thus, envy in itself is evil, because it is sadness at another's good, which in itself is repugnant to reason. Badness is implied in the very word (Nic. Eth. ii. 6). But this is not true of anger, which is the desire of ven- geance on evil, which may be sought for rightfully (right- eous zeal for good) or wrongfully (Eph. iv. 26). Secondly, evil may be found in any passion from its ex- cess or deficiency. So evil may be found in anger, when it is more or less than right reason dictates ; otherwise it is laudable. (1) But does not anger disturb the soul's tranquillity, dis- regard reason, and blind the mental vision ? I answer that it may, indeed, precede reason, and drag it away from rec- titude, and so be evil. But, also, it may follow reason, sen- sibility being excited against vices according to rational order, and this "zeal" is good. ''Take care lest anger, accepted as the instrument of virtue, become mistress of the mind ; but keep it as a servant, prepared to obey reason, and never departing from following its rightful lord" (S. Greg., Moral, v. 30). "Zeal may, indeed, cloud the eye of reason, but wrath blinds it." Yet it is not contrary to the idea of virtue that reason's deliberations be intermitted in the execution of what has been rationally decided. Thus, one working at any art would be impeded in the time for action if he should be deliberating when he ought to be acting. (2) But is it lawful to seek vengeance ? Is not this re- served for God? "Vengeance is Mine, and recompense" (Deut. xxxii. 35). It is certainly illicit to seek vengeance for the sake of the evil of him who is to be punished ; but to seek vengeance for the correction of vices and the pres- ervation of justice is laudable. And the emotions as moved Qu. clviii. 2.] AXGER. -iTl by reason can aim at this. When vengeance is taken ac- cording to the order of justice, it is from God, whose minister is any authority which rightfully punishes (Eom. siii.). (3) But it may be said that what removes us from the Divine likeness is evil, and anger does so. But we can and we ought to be like God in the desire of good ; only in the manner of seeking it we cannot altogether resemble Him. For in God are not human passions, which we, however, can make the servants of our moral reason. 7s anger a sin ? S. Paul says (Eph. iv. 31), " Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, ... be put away from you." The pas- sions are good so far as they are regulated by reason ; but if they exclude its order, they are evil. But in the order of reason must be considered, first, what is sought for by way of vengeance. Zeal, righteous ven- geance, seeks what moral reason demands (S. John ii. 17). This is laudable anger. But one may seek vengeance con- trary to the order of reason, as when he desires that an- other be punished who does not deserve to be punished, or beyond what he has deserved, or when he seeks an unlaw- ful punishment, or for some other end than what is right, which is the preservation of justice and the correction of faults. This is unrighteous anger, the bitterness of wrath. But, again, must be considered the mode of the anger ; for if it be immoderate, whether in outward manifestation or in inward passion, it will not be without sin, even though one seek for righteous vengeance. (1) Passion, absolutely considered, has neither merit nor demerit, neither praise nor blame. But when regulated by reason it is meritorious and laudable ; when not so reg- ulated it has demerit, and is blameworthy. (2) But it may be said that no one sins in what he cannot avoid, which is true of anger. "Every one who acts from 472 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Q u - CLVin. 3. anger, acts under a feeling of pain" (Nic. Eth. vii. 6), and such pain is contrary to the will. I answer that man is lord of his own acts through ra- tional choice ; and, therefore, the emotions which antici- pate the judgment of reason are not so in the power of a man that he can prevent their arising in his soul, although reason can impede each one, individually, as it arises. And thus the emotion of anger is not so in a man's power that he can hinder its presence within. But it is so far under control that its inordination is sinful. And the pain of which Aristotle speaks is not pain from anger, but from the injury done ; and this pain moves the soul to seek for ven- geance. (3) It is true that anger is natural emotion, and so far is according to reason; but, also, it is naturally subject to reason ; and if it oppose the order of reason, it is un- natural. is all anger mortal sin ? If one seek unjust vengeance, anger is mortal sin, as con- trary to charity and justice. But this passion may be venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus, the emotion may precede the judgment of reason, or one may "vent his spite" in some trifling way, as when he gives a troublesome boy a trifling though angry pull by the hair. Or, again, the manner of the anger, although the emotion is justifiable, may be wrong in its excess, which may be venial ; or it may be mortal sin, if one from the vehemence of his anger depart from charity towards God and his neigh- bour (Col. iii. 8).* When the Lord said (S. Matt. v. 22), " Every one who is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment," * Distinguish, then, three manifestations of this capital sin : (a) re- venge is sought for in the name of righteous vengeance, even when the law is invoked ; (&) vengeance is taken without due authority {e.g., "lynch law"); (c) the penalty inflicted is more than justice demands, being the gratification of personal hatred. Qu. clviii. 4, 5.] ANGER. 473 He had been speaking of the Old Law respecting murder ; and He shows its spiritual meaning — sc, that the inward disposition which seeks another's injury with deliberate consent of reason is mortal sin. Is anger the gravest of sins ? If we consider what the angry man seeks for, his passion seems to be the least of sins of its kind ; for he seeks the evil of penalty, as righteous vengeance — i.e., as a good. In the first respect the sin of anger is like that of envy and hatred. But hatred seeks evil for a neighbour absolutely as evil, and envy does so through vainglory. So it is plain that hatred is graver than envy, and envy than anger. But, as seeking what appears to be good, anger agrees with the sin of concupiscence. And in this respect the sin of anger in itself appears to be less than that of concupis- cence, because better is the good of justice which the angry seeks for than the pleasurable or useful good which the lustful seeks for. When we consider, however, the inordination of the sin, anger has a certain superiority on account of the vehemence and swiftness of the passion. " Wrath is cruel, and anger is outrageous" (Prov. xxvii. 4). Distinctions in anger, as a sin, may repay a moment's consideration. (See Nic. Eth. iv. 5). The irascible are too quickly angry, and from any trifling cause. " Bitterness of spirit " is shown by per- sistent dwelling upon the injury done ; by "letting the sun go down upon one's wrath." The revengeful seek for sat- isfaction with obstinate desire. But the Lord (S. Matt, v.) pointed out, not the species of anger, but its grades in the progress of sin. First, the thought of the heart ; then the outward manifestations of it, saying to a brother "Kaca;" and finally the com- pleted act of sin in doing injury under the notion of re- 474 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLVIII. 6, 7, 8. venge, saying, "Thou fool," which is meant for injurious words, the lightest form of injury. And if the first of these is mortal sin in the case of which the Lord is speak- ing, how much more the others, which are worse. Anger is a capital sin, both because its object is regarded as just, honourable, and desirable, which makes the sin become the parent of many others, and because of the violence of anger, which hurries the soul into inordinate acts of various kinds. The six daughters of anger are indignation and tumult in the mind, uncontrolled clamour, blasphemy and contumely in words, strifes and all other injurious actions. Is defect of anger a sin ? One may seek to inflict just penalty, not out of passion, but from sober judgment of what is right and best. Herein defect is undoubtedly sin. But of necessity the motion of sense-appetite in man follows the simple motion of the will. This is one of nature's laws. Therefore, if anger be totally absent from the feelings, there must be absence or feebleness of the action of the will. Consequently deficiency in anger is vicious, as the defect of will also is. (1) He who is never angry when he ought to be angry may imitate God in his absence of passion, but he is unlike the righteous Judge of all the earth. (2) The passion of anger is useful, like all the other mo- tions of sense-appetite. It makes a man more prompt to execute what reason dictates. G-od makes nothing in vain ; and if this were not so, the emotions would have no good function to fulfil. (3) Eeason's judgment does not remain entire if there be no anger in the soul ; for that judgment causes not only the simple motion of the will, but the following emotion of the sensitive soul. And the absence of anger is a sign of the absence of rational moral judgment. Qu. CLXI. 1.] HUMILITY. 475 Cruelty is the opposite of clemency, inflicting severer punishments than reason requires. Bat it shoald be distinguished from that unnatural vice called ferocity, barbarity, inhumanity, which takes delight in others' pain simply as pain. Such vice is not human ; it can only be called bestiality, if it does not rather place man below the level of the brute. § 9. Humility. Is humility a virtue f The Lord answered that question when He said, " Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly of heart." Let us consider what place humility holds among the virtues. Difficult good has something which attracts desire — sc, the idea of the good ; and it has something which repels — sc, the diffi- culty of obtaining it. The first excites hope, the other tends to despair. There must be, then, on the one side a moral virtue, moderating and restraining hope within its due limits ; on the other, a moral virtue strengthening and impelling against despair. The first hinders the soul from unduly aiming at the highest things, and this is humility ; the second impels the soul to aim at great things according to right reason, and this is "magnanimity." Abasement may come from an external cause : "He that exalteth himself shall be abased." And this is penal. Bat it may also proceed from an inward cause, and so it is some- times virtuous, as when one contemplates his defects and puts himself in the lowest place, like Abraham, who said (Gen. xviii. 27), " Behold now I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, who am bat dust and ashes.'' But such self-abasement may also be evil, as when a man, not understanding his dignity as a man, considers himself nothing more than a developed brute, and makes himself like his progenitors. Aristotle, with all his admirable analysis of virtues, 476 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. clxi. 2, 3. to have no place for humility. The explanation may be that he was considering man as a "social animal/' not as the child of God by creation and Providence. But hu- mility, as a special virtue, has in view especially mams sub- jection to God, for whose sake he is humble towards others also. (Aristotle is, I think, the most unspiritual of the world's great thinkers. His morality leaves out conscience towards God.) Does humility direct the intellect or the desires f It makes one check himself from seeking what is above his powers. And for this he must know what his deficien- cies are. The knowledge of one's weakness belongs to hu- mility as a rule directing the desires. (See Rev. iii. 3 7, 18.) (1) Bat are we not told to ''desire earnestly the greater gifts " ? And if that is consistent with humility, what can the virtue be but a humble mental judgment of one's self ? To aim at great things with confidence in one's own powers is indeed contrary to humility, but to aim at the highest attainable good through Divine assistance is not so ; on the contrary, " he that (so) humbleth himself shall be exalted." (2) Maguanimity strengthens the mind against despair in order that one may not be rendered unworthy of obtaining the good which belongs to him. But the ground of humil- ity in repressing presumption is reverence towards God, which prevents a man from attributing more to himself than belongs to him according to the place where God has put him. And this is the reason why humility especially implies man's subjection to God, the virtue of " the poor in spirit," which is perfected by the spiritual gift of godly fear (S. Aug., De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i. 4). Does humility make a man subject himself to every one? The Divine rule is (Phil. ii. 3), "In lowliness of mind each counting other better than himself." In man may be considered what he has by special gift of God, or what he is Qu. CLXI. 3.] HUMILITY. 477 as man. But all deficiency is his own, and from G-od is whatever pertains to salvation and perfection. And when a man considers whathe is in himself, the humble reverence by which he subjects himself to God makes him subject him- self to his neighbour in what that neighbour has from God. But humility does not require that any one subject God's gifts in himself to what in another appears to be from God. For those who receive God's gifts may know that they have them (1 Cor. ii. 12). And therefore, without prejudice to humility, they can prefer the gifts which they themselves have received to what appears to have been conferred on others (Eph. iii. 4, 5). In like manner, humility does not require that one subject what he is as man to what another is in the same way, otherwise it would be necessary that each one should deem himself greater sinner than any other ; whereas the apostle, without prejudice to his humility, says, " We being Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles." But one can and ought to think some hidden good to be in his neighbour which he himself does not possess, or some evil (even unknown) to be in himself which is not in the other; and so each " counts other better than himself." (1) But it was said that humility chiefly consists in being subject to God ; why, then, also to man ? Because we ought to revere God not only in Himself but in whatever is spe- cially His, though not, indeed, with the same kind of rever- ence ; e.g., sacrificial worship. "Be subject to every ordi- nance of man for the Lord's sake " (1 Pet. ii. 13). (2) But would it not be false pretence for those in the highest station to subject themselves to inferiors ? If we prefer in our neighbour that which is of God to that which is our own in us, we cannot incur falsity. (3) But if we in humility subject ourselves to another, may not this be doing harm to him through his growing, proud or despising us ? No ; for humility, like the other virtues, is chiefly in the soul. And, therefore, man can sub- 478 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXI. 4, 5. ject himself to his neighbour in inward affections without giving occasion for detriment. But in the outward expres- sion of humility, as in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation is to be exercised, lest harm be done. But if one do what he ought to do, and another from this take occasion of sinning, this is not imputed to him who acts humbly, because he does not give scandal (active), although the other is scandalized (passive, pharisaic scandal). Humility is a virtue annexed to moderation or temper- ance. • Temperance has been denned as the curbing or repressing the attack of auy passion (see page 425). Therefore all virtues which act in this manner are parts ("potential") of temperance, or virtues annexed to it. But as meekness represses the emotion of anger, so humility represses pre- sumption, the emotion of hope aiming at too great things. Humility is that moderation of spirit spoken of by S. Peter (1 Ep. iii. 4) — "the incorruptible apparel of a meek and quiet spirit." The theological virtues are the causes of this virtue, because they have God for their object ; but this truth is not inconsistent with our proposition. (Moderation or tem- perance may be Divine virtue in the same way. ) Is humility the chief among virtues f The Holy Scriptures give that chief place to charity. " Above all these things put on charity " (Col. iii. 14). For the good of virtue depends upon the order of reason, and this principally regards the end. Therefore the theo- logical virtues, which have for their object the ultimate end, are the chief. But in the next place the order of reason considers the means as ordained for that end. And this ordination con- sists essentially in reason itself as ordaining (the intellectual virtues) ; but, by participation, in the desires as ordered by Qu. CLXI. 5.] HUMILITY. 479 reason, which justice, especially legal justice (not only for private relations between man and man, but for society), universally accomplishes. But humility makes man subject to this rational ordina- tion for all things in general, as each virtue does in its own special matter. (1) In the parable of the Pharisee and the publican (S. Luke xviii.) humility is not placed above general justice, but above justice to which pride is joined, for then there is no true virtue ; while, on the other hand, humility secures the remission of sins. " This man went down to his house jus- tified rather than the other" (v. 14). (2) In one way humility is the foundation of the spiritual edifice. For while true virtues are the gift of God, im- pediments must be removed. So humility holds the first place in expelling pride which God resists, and making man submissive to God, and opening his heart to the influx of Divine grace. For "God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble" (S. Jas. iv. 6). But in another way that is directly the first among virtues by which we draw nigh to God ; and that is faith (Heb. xi. 6). Faith, then, is the foundation of the spiritual edifice in a nobler way than humility. (3) Humility has its own special promise — "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (S. Luke xiv. 11) ; just as he that despises earthly riches is promised heavenly treasure (S. Matt. vi. 19), and they that renounce earthly joys are promised heavenly consolations (S. Matt. v. 5). (4) You may observe that Christ proposed to us the ex- ample of his own humility. " Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart" (S. Matt. xi. 29). He commended humility to us because it removes the chief impediment to our salvation, to our aiming at heavenly and spiritual things. So humility is the preparation of soul for free access to spiritual and Divine goods. But those goods are better than the preparation for them. 480 TEMPEEAHCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. clxi. 6. S. Benedict's twelve steps of humility. This virtue consists essentially in desire restrained from inordinately and presumptuously seeking what is above its natural power. But humility has its rule in cognition ; sc, that one does not think of himself " more highly than he ought to think," and the principle and root of both is reverence towards God. But from the inward humility which is the gift of grace proceed outward signs of it, in words and deeds and gest- ures, by which are manifested what is hidden within the soul. And he that aims at humility first restrains its out- ward signs, in order that he may extirpate the buried root. This latter order is that followed by S. Benedict. In ex- plaining it, we will follow the reverse order. (12) The root is, fearing God and being mindful of all which He com- mands. Considering our desires, which must not inordi- nately aim at our own superiority, we reach the next step, (11) not following one's own will ; and (10) submitting one's self obediently to a superior; and (9) patiently submit- ting in hard and disagreeable matters. Three more steps pertain to a man's recognition of his own deficiencies : (8) Confession of faults and sins ; (7) confessing and believing one's self unworthy of greater things and unfit for them ; (6) preferring others to self in this respect. Then we come to outward signs of humility : (5) Not pretending to be dif- ferent from others, aping singularity, out of pride deviat- ing from what is usual ; (4) learning to keep timely silence without hasty speech ; (3) using few, rational, quiet words. Finally, in gestures humility is marked by (2) a subdued demeanour and (1) a quiet repressing of extravagant and idle laughter, etc. Observe that the discipline of the deadly sin of pride fol- lows the reverse order from that here given. Do not object' that the sixth and seventh steps may be based on a low and false estimation of your own merits and Qu. CLXII. 1.] PRIDE. 481 fitness for a higher place than you now have. For you can consider in yourself your secret faults, and the hidden gifts of God in others. And you can most truly confess your own unfitness for greater things, referring all your sufficiency to God, as S. Paul did (2 Gor. iii. 5). § 10. Pride. Is pride a sin ? It is inordinate desire of one's own superiority, whereas right reason demands that the will of each one be directed to what is proportioned to himself. What is against reason is sin; therefore this is sin. "It is a perverted imitation of the Most High, hating equality with equals under Him, and wishing to impose its own lordship over them in His place" (S. Aug., De Civ. Dei, xix. 13). And it is a special sin (S. Mark vii. 22), having its own proper object, which is one's own superiority. But it has also a certain generality, because all other sins can originate in pride, being ordained for its end, and having hindrances removed from their way, because pride makes man despise the Divine law. I do not say that all sins always originate from pride ; for although a man can transgress every pre- cept of the law in that contempt of it which conies from pride, he may also break God's law through ignorance or infirmity. Although pride is a special sin, it may corrupt every kind of virtue by abusing it, taking occasion for pride from the virtue itself. For its object may be found in the most di- verse matters. Pride is found in the sense-appetite, the "irascible de- sires " (cannot brutes be rivals of one another for superior- ity ?), and also in the will. For the difficult good which pride aims at is found in both sensuous things and in spiritual things. In the one case, the pride is in sense- appetite ; in the other, in the rational appetite ; i.e., in the 31 482 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXII. 4. will. Devils have pride of will. " The beginning of pride is apostasy from God" (Ecclus. x. 14). (1) What, then, do we mean by " pride of intellect " ? The knowledge of truth is two-fold ; one is purely specula- tive, which pride directly impedes by withdrawing its cause. For the proud man does not subject his intellect to God in order that he may learn the truth from Him. Neither does he condescend to learn from men. The truth is hidden from "the wise and prudent" — that is, from the proud who are wise and prudent in their own eyes — and revealed "unto babes," i.e., to the humble (S. Matt. xi. 25). But there is another knowledge of truth which is joined with love of it. And such knowledge of truth is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, pleased with their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth. " With the lowly is wisdom " (Pro v. xi. 2). (2) The cause of pride may be found in the intellect of the proud man. He neglects that rule of right reason, not "to think of himself more highly than he ought to think/' And this comes from his inordinate desire of his own su- periority, for what one vehemently desires he readily be- lieves to be true, and hence his desire is turned to things too high for him. His considering also the defects of others has contributed to his high opinion of himself. But all this connection of reason and pride does not prove that pride is an intellectual vice. S. Gregory s four species of pride. (1) The more good one has, the greater his excellence. Therefore, when any one attributes to himself greater good than he actually possesses, he is aiming at his own superi- ority in an inordinate manner. One species of pride, then, is boasting of good which does not belong to the boaster. (2) The good in any one is more excellent if it proceed from himself than if he derived it from another. And, therefore, when any one estimates the good which he has Qu. clxii. 4.] PRIDE. 483 from God as if it were altogether his own, he is unduly ex- alting himself by his pride. " Who maketh thee to differ ? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive ? But if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it ? " (1 Cor. iv. 7). (3) So, also, one may believe that he has received super- abundant gifts on account of his own merits, which is equally the sign of pride. "By grace ye are saved through faith ; and that not of yourselves ; it is the gift of God ; not of works, that no man should glory" (Eph. ii. 8). (4) One despising others may wish to appear to be of sin- gular excellency, like the Pharisee in the Gospel (S. Luke xviii.). (1) The second and third would be infidelity if they were made general propositions, that good is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits ; but the proud man is thinking of himself alone. Since the ungrateful attributes to himself what he has derived from another, it is evident that these two kinds of pride are also marked by base ingratitude. (2) The boasting spoken of is the falsehood — inward, per- haps — which belongs to pride. Excusing one's sin is sim- ilar, for it is attributing to self an innocency which is not (3) Presumptuously aiming at what is above one's powers may be referred to the fourth species of pride, where one wishes to be above his fellows. (4) We have seen the twelve steps of humility. S. Ber- nard points out the twelve opposite steps of pride. First in manner and looks : (1) The inquisitively and inordinately looking round at everything ; (2) the shallow mind showing itself in proud words ; (3) the ready laughter at what is thought ridiculous in others ; (4) the readiness to boast of one's own achievements ; (5) the aiming to appear singu- lar, as if one were holier than others ; (6) arrogance, pre- ferring one's self to others ; (7) presumption in thinking 481 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXII. 5. one's self sufficient for great undertakings ; (8) defence of faults and sins ; (9) unreal confession of sins, with unwill- ingness to bear penalties imposed ; (10) rebellion against superiors ; (11) unbridled will, delighting in doing freely one's own pleasure ; (12) habitual sin, which implies con- tempt of God. Is pride a mortal sin t Pride is opposed to humility, which subjects man to God. Failing in this subjection, one extols himself above what is assigned to him according to the Divine rule or measure. He is of the opposite mind to S. Paul (2 Cor. x. 13): " We will not glory beyond our measure." Thus, "the beginning of pride is apostasy from God," and, therefore, it is mortal sin in aversion from God. But, as in other mortal sins, there are some motions of the soul which anticipate the judgment of the mind and the consent of the will, and so are venial transgressions ; so, also, there are some motions of pride to which one may not give consent, which are therefore venial sins. (1) Pride is not universal sin in its essence, but from it all other sins may arise. Hence, it does not follow that all sins are mortal, except when they arise from completed pride. (2) Pride is always contrary to the love of God, in not being subject to the Divine rule ; and sometimes, also, to the love of our neighbour, when one inordinately prefers himself to another, or refuses due subjection. Then, again, the Divine law is contemned which institutes orders of men, placing one under another. (3) Virtues do not produce pride as causes per se, but only as one takes occasion for pride, and makes his virtues to be no virtues at all.* * Notice, as familiar forms of pride, the receiving of the Blessed Sac- rament without due preparation, rather than to appear less devout than others; and, again, the keeping up display at home, etc., which can- not be paid for. Ql\ CLXII. 6.] PRIDE. 485 Pride is the gravest of sins. In sin we have already seen that we must consider two elements; viz., the turning to transitory good, which is the " material " part, and the aversion from unchangeable good, which is the "formal" and completing part of sin. Now, on the part of the first, the conversion to something, pride is not the greatest of sins, for an elevated position which the proud man inordinately seeks has not in itself the greatest repugnance to the good of virtue. But on the part of aversion, pride has the gravest char- acter, because in other sins man turns away from G-od either on account of ignorance, or of infirmity, or of desire for some other good ; but pride turns away from G-od because it will not be subject to Him and to His law. ''While all vices avoid G-od, pride alone resists Him" (Boetius). Wherefore it is especially said (S. Jas. iv. 6), " God re- sisteth the proud." Aversion from God and His precepts, then, which is, as it were, a consequence in other sins, is the essence of pride whose act is contempt of God. This makes it, in itself, the gravest of sins in that which completes sin. (1) But is not the sin which is tlie most difficult to avoid the lighter on that account ? Does not S. Augustine say, (Ep. 211), " Other sins are carried out in evil works, but pride insinuates itself into good works that they may be destroyed " ? I answer that there are two ways in which a sin is difficult to avoid ; one is on account of the violence of the assault, as anger is, for this reason, hard to resist, and concupiscence still more so on account of its connection with our sensuous nature. But, in another way, some sins are hard to avoid, on ac- count of their being hidden. Such a sin is pride. And, therefore, the motions of pride, secretly stealing into the soul, have not the gravest character before they may be de- tected by the judgment of reason. But when so detected, there are considerations which render them easy to be avoided : (a) The thought of our own infirmity. "Why is 48G TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLX1I. 7. dust and ashes proud ? " (b) The thought of the Divine greatness (Job xv.), and (c) reflection on the imperfection of the goods of which man is proud. " All flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof is as the flower of the field" (Isa. xl. 6). (2) In this aversion from God pride increases the great- ness of other sins. Infidelity is rendered far more grave if it proceed from proud contempt than if it come from ignorance or infirmity. So with despair and the like. (3) In order to convict the pride of men, God permits some to fall into carnal sins which, though less, have more manifest turpitude. ' ' The fault of pride is less felt because it is found in the most elevated persons, or because it takes its origin from works of virtue. But lusts of the flesh are likely to be noted by all, and are degrading, though they be sins of less guilt than pride. But he who is the slave of pride and does not feel his slavery, falls into carnal sin in order that he may be humbled and truly rise " (Isidore). And this very fact shows the gravity of pride itself. Thus, the good physician may produce a less serious illness by his medicaments in order to cure a more deadly disease. Pride is the first sin and the foundation of all sins. Aversion from God, which completes sin, belongs to pride per se ; to other sins as resulting from pride. It is, there- fore, the primal sin, and the source of all other sins ; not that every individual act of sin arises from pride, but every kind of sin naturally springs from it. (1) The order of sins is not the order of virtues. That which is first generated is the last to be corrupted. And, therefore, as faith is the first of virtues in order of produc- tion, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which man is some- times led through other sins, as we read in 1 Tim. i. 19 : "A good conscience, which some having thrust from them, made shipwreck concerning the faith/' (2) Lighter sins, committed through ignorance or infirm- Qu. CLX.] MODEEATION". 487 ity, in point of time may precede this gravest sin. But it causes the gravity of other sins by reaching the very foun- dation of all sin. "It is last in those returning to God ; it is first in those departing from G-od/' (Compare the order in Dante's Purgatorio, Div. Comm.) Is pride a capital sin f Some, viewing it as a special sin from which many kinds of sin arise, have numbered it among the capital sins ; but S. Gregory, considering its universal influence over all sins, made it queen and mother of all vices. It is not the same as vainglory, which has its place among the capital sins, but it is the cause of that ; for while pride inordinately seeks for superiority, vainglory aims at its man- ifestation. (It may be instructive to notice what the author points out in qu. clxiii. ; viz., that the first sin of our first parents was pride, the inordinate desire of spiritual good and excel- lence. That first sin could not be appetite for sensible good, because in them there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. A spiritual good was sought for against G-od's rule, and above their measure. They yielded to the tempter saying, "Ye shall be as gods." Disobedience was caused by this ; from it came the sin of fleshly appetite. It was pride that yielded to the sinful desire of knowledge, of " knowing good and evil.") § 11. Moderation ("modestia "). (In the author's arrangement humility is included under this. But for convenience we now consider other forms of it abridged from our text. Moderation is the virtue by which one restrains himself inwardly and outwardly within the limits of his station, talents, and fortunes. It is a virtue annexed to temperance, the latter moderating what is most difficult to control, sc, the concupiscence of the pleasures 488 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXVii. of taste and touch ; the former, other desires where the difficulty is not so great.) Moderation controls four elements of our inward and out- ward life : (1) The desire of superiority, through humility, which Ave have already considered ; (2) the desire of knowl- edge ; (3) outward actions, whether in the serious affairs of life or in recreations ; (4) outward apparel, ornaments, household furniture, etc., etc. Virtuous desire of hnoivledge (" studiositas"). All men naturally desire to acquire knowledge. (Curi- osity begets philosophy, asking, what ? whence ? whither ? why ?) But this desire of knowing needs to be governed, for its results may be either good or bad. And, on the other hand, "much study is a weariness to the -flesh;" therefore a virtue is needed to overcome what stands in the way of a proper pursuit of knowledge. "We are not now reentering the domain of intellectual virtues, for the good now presented to our notice is an act of desire — sc, that a man have a right desire to apply his mind in this way or that, to this thing or that. On the other hand, there is a vicious or idle curiosity {" curiositas"). The question is not of knowledge per se, which in itself is good, but of the desire and zeal to acquire it. This may be either good or perverted ; first, when the evil accidentally attached to knowledge of the truth is the motive for seeking it, as when the motive is simply vicious pride. ("Knowledge puffeth up" — 1 Cor. viii. 1). Or, again, when the knowledge is sought for in order to get more freedom in sin. Secondly, there may be inorclination in the desire itself. It may be turned from the useful and obligatory to idle or frivolous questions (1 Tim. i. 4 ; 2 Tim. iii. 7). It may be eager to learn something respecting the works of God while referring nothing to its due end ; sc, the knowledge of Cod Qu. CLXVin. 1.] MODERATION. 489 (a prevalent sin of these days). Or, thirdly, it may be con- cerned with fruitless questions about matters which are in- scrutable by any powers which we possess. (And so a vain conceit of knowledge or " philosophy " blinds the soul's simple faith in the truth revealed by Christ Jesus our Lord.) (1) It cannot be truly objected that since all knowledge is good there can be no vice in curiosity ; for the highest good of man does not consist in knowing every fact iu the universe, but in perfect knowledge of the highest truth (Nic. Eth. x. 7, 8). (2) Nor can it be justly objected that all knowledge what- soever assimilates man to God, who knows all things. That only shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, but not that it cannot be abused or inordinately sought for. (3) Philosophical studies are laudable on account of the truths which have been found in that way, God revealing them. But, also, such studies are continually abused in perversion of the faith. " Take heed lest there shall be any one that maketh spoil of you through his philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudi- ments of the world, and not after Christ" (Col. ii. 8). Neither should we overlook the "lust of the eyes," sinful use of the pleasures of other senses beside touch and taste, which temperance controls. To consider others' doings for our own utility — e.g., that we may be provoked to better things — or for others' benefit — sc., that they may be cor- rected where they have gone wrong — is an act of obedience to the Divine word : "Let us consider one another to pro- voke unto love and good works" (Heb. x. 24). But it is quite another thing, the meddlesome, curious spying into others' affairs idly, if not for contempt and detraction. Moderation in bodily action and gesture. — Does any vir- tue apply to outward movements ? Moral virtue orders through reason all that belongs to man as man. And a man's movements and gestures, so far 490 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXvni. 2. as they are governed by reason, can be ordered by it. This ordering by reason is either according to what is becoming to the individual man, or what is fitting with reference to other persons, to places or occasions. (1) It is true that every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul ; but motions and gestures are a sign of the inward disposition. Government of these requires gov- ernment of the inward passions. (2) Eelatively to others this moderation pertains to friend- ship or affability; and as gestures and motions are signs of inward dispositions, the moderating them pertains also to truthfulness ; a man presents himself in words and deeds such as he inwardly is. Is there a virtue which concerns recreations and amuse- ments f A man needs corporeal rest for the refreshment of his body. He cannot labour without intermission, because his powers are finite, proportioned to limited labours. So, also, is it with his soul, whose finite power is in like manner proportioned to limited operations. And, therefore, when he extends his mental operations beyond his limit, his work becomes labour, and he is fatigued, especially because in mental work the body also (i.e., the brain) is employed, the intellect using powers which operate through corporeal organs — the senses, the imagination, the memory. But the soul's rest is pleasure ; and, therefore, the remedy for mental fatigue is some pleasure, reason's vigorous action being intermitted. But words or actions of this kind, in which nothing is sought for except mental pleasure, are called amusements, frolics, games, merry pastimes. Such things are sometimes necessary to be used for the soul's rest. But a virtue is needed, since there are three things which must be avoided : (1) First, and chiefly, that this pleasure be not sought in base or injurious words or actions ; (2) Qu. CLXVIII. 3.] MODERATION". 491 that sobriety of soul be not utterly lost ; (3) that, as in all other human actions, regard be had to what suits the per- son, the season, the place, and other circumstances. Now- all this is ordained by reason's rule, and a habit which operates according to such rule is a moral virtue. Aristotle calls it urbanity, ivrpansXia (JSTic. Eth. iv. 8). This, then, is a form of moderation restraining man from im- moderate sports and recreations. In themselves, of course, such things are useless ; but the end of the pleasure which they afford is the refreshment of the wearied soul. Is there sin in superfluous amusement ? "What exceeds reason's rule is superfluous ; what falls short of it is defect. First, this excess may be found in the kind of things used for sport ; as shameful words or actions, or what tends to injure our neighbour. Such excess is mortal sin. But, secondly, due circumstances may be lacking; as when men amuse themselves at unsuitable seasons, or in improper places, or with what does not befit the circum- stances or the persons. And this, indeed, can sometimes be mortal sin on ac- count of the excessive addiction to amusement, which pleas- ure is preferred to the love of God, so that one does not hesitate to resort to such things against the precept of God or of His Church. Or, again, one may be not so addicted to amusement, although too fond of it ; and this may be venial sin. (1) But that which excuses from sin cannot be itself a sin ; and amusement (a thing " done in joke ") sometimes does excuse from sin ; therefore it is never, even in excess, a sin. Yes ; some things are sins only by reason of the intention of doing harm, which intention jesting excludes, since its aim is only pleasure. And in such things the sin is less, or none at all. But some things also are sinful in 492 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXVin. 4. themselves, and such things are not excusable because they were said or done in jest ; on the contrary, the amusement is criminal and detestable. (2) But what, then, would we have to say of actors of plays, and all whose business it is solely to amuse the pub- lic ? If all excess in amusement is wrong, must not all such people be in a state of sin ? And must not all be sinning who patronize them and so cooperate in their sin ? It has been shown that amusement is necessary in the conduct of human life. But for all things which are useful in this way, employments and services are lawfully assigned. And therefore the actor's profession, and that of all those who provide amusements for the people, are not in them- selves immoral ; nor are such people in a state of sin, pro- vided that they use their profession lawfully — i.e., that they employ no wrong words or actions in their occupation, nor exhibit their plays, etc., on unfit seasons. And although, " as a matter of business," they have no other duty in rela- tion to others except what seems so trifling', yet in relation to themselves and to God, they may lead a serious and virtuous life in habitual prayer, in governing their passions and their actions, and, as they not infrequently do, by large gifts for charitable purposes. (This liberal and kindly view of a large class in society is very different from the popular notion of mediseval Christians, and equally wide of the Puritan pharisaic assumptions.) Those, then, who with virtuous moderation aid them are not sinning, but acting justly in giving them the reward of their ministration to the social good. The sin lies in wast- ing one's property on such persons, or contributing to im- moral performances, which is cooperation in the sin. Is there any sin of an opposite hind ? Since man is a '-'social animal," the virtues of "good- fellowship" must have a place in Christian morals ; and Aris- totle was not far out of the way in giving a place in Ethics Qu. clxix. 1.] MODEKATIOX. 493 to his " eutrapelia." Whatever in human affairs is con- trary to reason is vicious. Now, it is contrary to reason that one make himself irksome to others, taking no pains to please them, and even hindering others' pleasures. But those fall short in the proper refreshment of life who offer no amusement themselves, and make themselves disagree- able to those who do so. Such are harsh, clownish, morose ; they are vicious in their way. But since recreation is useful for rest and pleasure, and these in human life are not to be sought on their own account, but for the end of virtuous operation, therefore de- ficiency in respect of amusement is less vicious than excess in it (Nic. Eth. x. 6). " A few friends for pleasure's sake are enough, like sweetening in our food " (ib. ix. 10). It is an act of penitence for sins to abstain from amuse- ments ; but this, of course, is not the vice of deficiency here spoken of. Moderation in dress and furniture. — Can virtue or vice be connected with outward adornments ? The only vice can be in the man who immoderately uses them. And this immoderation is either relative to the usages of the society in which one lives, or in the inordinate affection of the user, when he employs such things intem- perately, whether it be according to the fashions of the world around him, or contrary to those usages. This inordination in superabundance of adornments shows itself in three w T ays. First, when one is seeking the admira- tion of others by his display. The purple and fine linen are the food of vainglory. Next, when one is pampering his own body with effeminate luxuries ; and, lastly, when, though there may be no inordination as respects the end, there is sin- ful solicitude concerning such things. We may distinguish, therefore, three virtues in this matter : the lowly mind, which seeks no vainglory ; the mind contented with the nec- essary conveniences of life, following the apostle's words, 494 TEMPERANCE AND ITS OPPOSITE VICES. [Qu. CLXIX. 2. " Having food and covering, let us be therewith content " (1 Tim. vi. 8) ; and, lastly, the simple mind, which excludes inordinate desire for outward show. But, on the side of defect, there may be also inordinate affection in the negligence which will not employ attention or trouble to comply with what is becoming to one's station and the society of which he is a part. Or, again, one may take a sort of pride in his own sordidness, and it may be the more mischievous if it masquerade as religion (S. Aug., De Serm. Dom. in Monte, ii. 12). Observe that dignitaries in the state and the ministers of the altar are rightly clad in costly vestments, not for their own ostentation, but to express the excellence of their office or the glory of Divine worship. Also, it is possible to use a poor garb, etc., not for pride, but for a discipline of humility, and because one chooses his part with the poor. S. John Baptist did so as a preacher of repentance to men. Can women adorn themselves without mortal sin? What has been already said applies to this question ; but, besides, there is the special grievous sin of provoking men to lasciviousness by the manner of dress. The woman can lawfully take pains to please her husband, if she be married ; but she mortally sins if she intend to attract other men. But if her improper dress and ornaments be only from levity or vanity, her sin may be venial or it may be mortal. Customs of society also may make excusable in dress what is not laudable. (Qu. : " Low-necked dresses " in " fashion- able " society ?) (Our author recognizes the position of marriageable girls, to whom, mutatis mutandis, what has been said will also apply.) Do the ornaments of women seem to be prohibited by the Divine law ? S. Peter said (1 Ep. iii. 3), " Whose adorn- ing let it not be the outward adorning of plaiting the hair, Qu. CLXX.] PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE. 495 and of wearing of jewels of gold, or of putting on of ap- parel.'' S. Cyprian spoke very severely from this text (De Hab. Virg.). " Clad in purple and silk, they cannot put on Christ ; adorned with gold, pearls, necklaces, they have lost the true ornaments of soul and body." But compare what S. Paul says (1 Tim. ii. 9), " Let women adorn themselves in modest apparel with shamefastness and sobriety," and learn that sober and quiet ornament is not prohibited to women, but superfluous and immodest dress. (A lesson for some modern sects in their first enthusiasm, which soon, however, fly from one extreme to the other which is worse.) S. Cyprian, in the same treatise, is still more severe against personal embellishments. But they are mortal sin only when they are used lasciviously or in contempt of God. Besides, it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty which is not real, and another thing to conceal some unpleasant deform- ity arising from sickness or other such cause ; for this is permissible (1 Cor. xii. 23). Observe, also, that since women may lawfully adorn them- selves according to their station in life, and may even add something to please their husbands, it follows that the workers in the arts so employed have a lawful occupation, even though their products be frequently abused. § 12. Precepts of temperance. The end of the commandments is charity, to which we are led by two precepts respecting the love of God and of our neighbour. This is the object of the Decalogue. But among the vices most opposed to temperance adultery seems to be that which most conflicts with love of our brother, and therefore this sin is specified. Gluttony, inebriety, even other forms of lust, are not so directly opposed as this sin is. The Decalogue contains no affirmative precept respecting temperance, because it gives the universal principles of 496 TEMPERANCE. [Qu. clxx. Divine law, whereas sucli affirmative rules must vary accord- ing to the diverse laws and customs of men. In themselves the virtues annexed to temperance have no direct relation to the love of God and of our neighbour, but they rather regard one's own self ; they are " self -regarding " virtues. It is otherwise with their effects, and accordingly the effects of vices opposed to these annexed virtues are pro- hibited. Thus, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, may result homicide or dishonouring of parents, which also may proceed from the pride by which many transgress the precepts of the first table. Pride is not found in the Decalogue, because the Ten Commandments are the sum of primary principles known per se ; whereas pride, though it is the beginning of sin, is hidden in the heart, and its inordination is not manifest to all. Humility and meekness are not enjoined in the Decalogue, for they presuppose the law, indicating the temper in which it is to be received. Part IV. — Supplement. INTKODITCTION. S. Thomas Aquinas did not live to complete the Summa.* His editors have tried to supply what is wanting from his other works. For the purpose which the present writer has in view he will freely use the materials thus provided, or any other standard authorities, such as the Ductor Dubitantium of Bishop Taylor, the contributions to our science made by Sanderson when he was professor at Oxford, or any others. No attempt is made to consider all possible cases ; only such are selected as are most likely to occur, or are most serviceable illustrations and expansions of what has pre- ceded. It was said in the preface, but may now be repeated, that only a cursory glance can here be given at many topics — e.g., the obligations of the state and the citizen — for each such topic would require a volume. Nothing more can be aimed at than to indicate, before this Supplement is con- cluded, some of the problems which Moral Theology must consider, since their solution belongs to the law of God, although those problems are here left unsolved. To prove every proposition laid down in a brief manual of this kind would be practically impossible. And the ele- ments of every science require the writer of them to assume a dogmatic tone even when proof could readily be furnished. Let it suffice, then, that the present writer has taken his utmost pains to lay down no proposition which does not express either the common law of the Catholic Church * Pars Tertia breaks off at qu. xc. 32 498 INTRODUCTION - . or direct deduction from the revealed law of God. Where lie may have erred he submits his judgment to the lawful authority, duly expressed, of the Church from which he has received his commissiou as priest and teacher. Some questions which seemed open to discussion among those who are loyal to the moral authority of the Christian Church have been indicated in parentheses, even when the writer might for his own part regard some of them as closed questions. CHAPTER I. CONSCIENCE. Conscience, as a question belonging to psychology, was discussed by S. Thomas Aquinas in Pars Prima, lxxix. 12, 13. He found in man a habit of practical reason ("synde- resis ") by which we know the primary principles of things which are to be done ; e.g., that good is to be followed and evil to be shunned. What that moral good and evil are is to be otherwise determined. But the act by which we apply to our own conduct our knowledge of good and eyil, whether our judgment be correct or incorrect, is called conscience. In this act man testifies to himself respecting himself, holds himself bound or absolved, approves or con- demns his own actions. Divisions. Conscience is correct or erroneous ; certain or doubtful ; scrupulous or lax. An erroneous conscience dictates falsely — i.e., contrary to objective and binding law — through ignorance of that law. (On ignorance in this regard, see Introduction, pages 12, 92, 466, seq.) A correct conscience testifies, judges, approves, etc., in ac- cordance with the objective law as it truly is. But it has only moral certainty in its judgments. Both a correct con- science and one invincibly ignorant, as we have seen, are to be followed, for it is always sin to act against one's con- science, whether it be correct or erroneous (Rom. xiv. 23 ; see Bishop Sanderson's excellent sermon on this text). But there may be sin in using its permission, since vincible error is wilful and sinful error. "The conscience hath power in obligations and necessities, but not so much nor 500 CONSCIENCE. so often in permissions" (Duct. Dubitant. I. i. rule ?; I. iii. rule 2). But duty requires that one should earnestly and stead- fastly seek for that outward light which illuminates con- science to see the right path for conduct (W he well, El. Moral, iii. 365). When should the priest enlighten an erring conscience^ (See Supplement, page 599.) If the error be probably in- vincible, and the erroneous opinion which has been followed be consistent with a state of grace, the error must be opened or not according to prudent consideration of the person and his affairs. But let the priest beware of converting mate- rial sin into "formal" sin; and also of "casting pearls be- fore swine " (Duct. Dubitant. I. iii. rule 8 ; I. iv. rule 14 ; cp. Eom. vii. 7 ; 1 Tim. i, 13). A doubtful conscience. Only a few words can here be added respecting that wide subject in Moral Theology known as "probabilism." Since opinion, with its uncertain judgments founded on fallible arguments, and with appre- hension of a possible opposite, must often be our only guide to the right, and since in such a case we are compelled to act without moral (subjective) certainty that we are right in our choice of action, a few well-settled principles may be a useful clue in our difficult course. (1) Where there is obligation of obtaining a determined end, it is not lawful to reject the surer and safer means of reaching it in order to follow what will probably enable us to reach that end. This condemns, e.g., the popular Protestant sentiment, "We are all travelling to the same place, and it matters not what road we take." Again, the priest must apply this rule where questions arise respecting sacraments " generally nec- essary to salvation. " Again, this rule prohibits the physician's trying exper DOUBTFUL CONSCIENCE. 501 inients on his patient if the healing art provide remedies which are morally certain to have good effect (Duct. Du- bitant. I. iv. rule 3 ; I. v. rule 5). (2) When the question is of the existence of an obliga- tion or a law, a probable opinion may be followed, even if it be not the safer one, for an uncertain law does not bind con- science. This moral principle, e.g., is calculated to meet a specious argument for perverting to the Eoman communion — sc. , " You are not morally certain that it has no claim on you ; but you admit that submission to the Roman see is the safer course." Unless you are morally certain that duty requires you to leave your religion and join that or any other, you sin in doing so. Therefore, you imperil your salvation by such a course. (3) Note here the difference between uncertainty of the law and uncertainty of the fact ; for in the latter case the rule is precisely the opposite. In doubt whether you have fulfilled an obligation under the law, that law may still be binding respecting that obligation. (4) In doubt or uncertainty you may act on presumption as if you were possessed of moral certainty. " Melior est conditio possidentis. " (5) If the principal and most essential fact be certain, but you are doubtful respecting other circumstances or necessary conditions, you may act upon probability ; doubt is to be decided favorably. (6) Decide, then, in favour of liberty if there be no con- trary presumption, and the public good put no obstacle in the way of that liberty. But observe that civil law may be stricter than the moral law in this respect ; e.g., in ques- tions connected with the matrimonial contract. (7) In doubtful cases, favours are to be regarded liberally, and extended as far as possible ; penalties, on the other hand, are to be construed strictly ; e.g., in case of an eccle- siastical trial. 502 CONSCIENCE. Conscience may be perplexed, being compelled to choose between two evils. But observe the ambiguity in our proposition. If the "evils" be sins, you are not allowed to choose either of them ; both must be rejected. But, on the other hand, the evils may be results of sins between which {"mala pcence") you are compelled to choose. Then applies the maxim, "Of two evils choose the least " (San- derson's Praelect. ii. 18; Duct. Dubitant. I. iv. rule 3; I. v. rule 8). The choice, e.g., may lie between continuing in a corrupted church and implicitly favouring apostasy and unbelief. Again, a wife may have to choose between condoning a husband's infidelity to her by living with him, or break- ing up a family. Eemember, also, that laws are of four different grades (page 503), and that the lower must always yield to the higher. Ductor Dubitant. I. v. rule 8, defends the opinion that a lesser sin may be made a counsel to him who is bent upon a greater one. Thus, Pilate might rightly have counselled the Jews to scourge the Lord and let Him go ; " not abso- lutely, but comparatively ; that is, rather that than the other (the crucifixion), if ye will do one" of them. CHAPTER II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. § 1. General principles. Conscience, as the internal rule of human acts, needs an external guide, and law is this guide. And since Cod alone is the all-sufficient guide of man, all law is grounded on the Divine law. The atheist is the true " anomist." But that Divine law is communicated to man under human conditions, through human agents. Thus there are four grades of law binding conscience : (a) per se simpliciter, i.e., absolutely, the command of God, as His command ; (b) per se, but not simpliciter, human law given by a supe- rior who possesses authority ; (c) per se, but not simplic- iter (for this and the next can be changed), law proceeding from self, in vows and promises ; (d) per accidens (variable according to time and place), the law of avoiding scandal (q.v. page 253). (See Sanderson's Praelect. iv. 6.) Although affirmative laws always imply a negative pro- hibition, and negative prohibitions imply a positive com- mand, yet there is an essential distinction between them as such. The negative law is always obligatory, while the affirmative law is only so under its appropriate conditions. This principle is universal in casuistry, and of great prac- tical importance. (See Duct. Dubitant. II. iii. rule 1, §§ 13, 14.) The " law of nature" the Divine will manifested by the natural light of reason, teaching what can be derived from right reason (the subject of Moral Philosophy), has for its 504 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. object all that agrees with, or is necessary for, a rational creature. Its three fundamental precepts are " honeste vivere, al- teram non Imdere, suum cuique tribuere" (Instit. I. i. 3), '.' to hurt nobody by word or deed, to be true and just in all my dealings." Distinguish carefully, however, (a) these primary and unchangeable principles of the law of nature ; (b) immedi- ate deductions from them as in the Decalogue ; (c) remoter inferences in which differences of judgment may arise. Eyery rational man is possessed of the first and second of these as a promulgated law (Rom. ii. 15 ; see also Sander- son's Praelect. iv. 24). Ignorance of laws like these, which one is bound to know, is no excuse for their violation. This also is an established principle in the civil and the common law. " Ignoratio leg is quam quisque tenetur scire neminem excusat." Ignorance of the fact which comes under the law is a valid excuse. A doubtful law does not bind conscience, and liberty may be used, if no other principle forbid. Here applies the maxim, " Melior est conditio possidentis." But where there is doubt of the abrogation of a certain law, according to the same maxim, we must stand by the law. Also, in doubt of fact under the law, we must stand by the law; e.g., we are certain of a debt, but not certain that it has been paid ; then we are bound to pay it. § 2. Human law. Though human laws under their requisite conditions are binding in conscience (Introd. page 131 ; Rom. xiii. 5), they have no right over judgment ; i.e., they demand only out- HUMAN LAW. 505 ward obedience with a willing mind, both in public and in private (Col. iii. 23). In the authority to make laws is implied not only the lay- ing down deductions from the law of nature, but also the binding on conscience things otherwise indifferent, "posi- tive laws" (Duct. Dubitant. III. i. rule 1, § 13). Conditions requisite in the laiv-mcther are : (a) the author- ity must be competent to make a law ; (b) the matter must not transcend the limits of the authority, e.g., religion and conscience in the case of civil law, the secular life in the case of ecclesiastical law (Qu. : Has the state authority to make laws respecting education ?) ; (c) the law-maker must not be legislating for the advantage of a clique, " or trust," or for other undue ends. Conditions requisite in human law. The thing com- manded must be (a) possible ; (b) not immoral, for human laws are not obligatory if they are not just and good, i.e., if they violate the higher law of nature ; (c) useful to the com- munity (1 Tim. ii. 2) ; (d) not unequal in application to the subjects of the law (Duct. Dubitant. III. i. rule 3 ; Sanderson's Praelect. v. § 7) ; (e) permanent and univer- sal, not a " privilegium "' ; (f) promulgated, not an "ex post facto" law (Duct. Dubitant. III. i. rule 6), for the subject of the law must have opportunity of knowing it if he will. /-Otherwise there may be a civil offence, but there is no sin, because the ignorance is invincible ; and invin- cible ignorance, like physical or moral incapacity, excuses violation of law. This applies even to the Gospel law (S. John xv. 22). (Qu. : Does positive law, if unequal, bind in conscience ? Sanderson's Praelect. ix. §§ 9-1 L.) What was said (Introd. page 133), that human law is not binding when per accidens serious injury will result and no manifest good will come from it (see also Sanderson's Praelect. vi. 8), is also true of Diviiie positive law (Duct. 506 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. Dnbitant. III. i. rule 2, § 8), but not of the law of nature. But the principle applies equally to civil and ecclesiasti- cal law ; e.g., promises of aid to the Church, if meanwhile relatives fall into need ; rubrics of the Church, etc. The application of law, e.g., judicial sentence, founded on false presumption of fact, does not bind conscience. (Qu.: What means may be used to escape from the law ?) But in all these cases, per- contra, scandal must be avoided. To justify evasion, (a) the matter must be serious ; (b) the injustice certain ; (d) the law must be against the pub- lic good, not merely inconvenient for the individual. Interpretation of the law may be by (a) the legislator himself ; (h) by experts, e.g., judges ; (c) by custom. Words are to be taken in their ordinary and usual meaning if nothing absurd or unjust follow. In doubt consider (a) the intention of the legislator ; (Z>) the object of the law ; (c) the concomitant or subsequent circumstances (Duct. Dubitant. III. vi.).. Penal law is to be narrowed as far as possible, and not to be extended to parallel cases ; favourable law, on the other hand, is to be amplified by " parity of reasoning." Laws also founded on the law of nature, e.g., the fifth commandment, extend to all cases which are similar, or have equal or similar reason, when such is the law's evident intent (Duct. Dubitant. III. vi. rule 3, § 24). On equity see Part III. page 397. Human law loses its force (a) when it is formally abol- ished ; (b) when the motive for its establishment comes to an end (Duct. Dubitant. III. vi. rule 3) ; (c) through desue- tude, implying tacit consent of the law-maker (Qu. Canon law ?). But when the end does not apply in special cases, those cases are not released from the obligation of the law (ib. § 4). CIVIL LAW. 507 On Dispensation the rigorist view will be found in San- derson, De Jur. Oblig., vii. § 3. But see, per contra, the case of rash vows as treated by him. § 3. Ecclesiastical law. This directs the Church for the common spiritual good and for eternal beatitude. The authority to make laws which bind conscience is implied in the existence of a di- vinely instituted society ; Christian sects cannot possess it. And, conversely, the existence of such Divine laws implies the existence of one visible and apostolic Church (S. Matt. xvi. 19, xxiii. 2 ; S. Luke x. 16 ; S. John xx. 23 ; Heb. xiii. 1?). When the old law, ceremonial and judicial, was abro- gated, the natural — the moral — law remained unchanged and unchangeable. But while the new (the evangelic law) makes the remote deductions from the law of nature be- come clearer, its peculiar characteristic is that it is a law of love and grace — the law of a supernatural life (Sander- son's Praelect. iv. 26, 32). It is (a) moral, including the three theological virtues ; (b) ceremonial, e.g., the Holy Eucharist ; (c) a law of coun- sels of perfection (see Introd., page 151). Positive laws of apostolic origin, i.e., of purely external order, are binding only so far as the Church has perpetuated them ; e.g., concerning eating blood and things strangled ; widows of four-score ; women speaking in church ; the un- covered head in church ; bishops not novices (S. Ambrose), etc. A fortiori, this principle will apply to primitive canons. § 4. Civil law. Civil law directs earthly societies to the common good of such communities. It is (a) the Roman law (the civil law in narrower sense of the word), based on Justinian's Code, the Institutes (elements), the Digest or Pandects, and the Novelise ; it is (b) the unwritten law of the Teutonic races, 508 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON LAW. on which are based the decisions of courts, thus originating the common law ; * and (c) it is enactments of the legisla- tures of the state or the nation, which have sometimes boldly deviated from the common law. The aim of civil law being the temporal good of the com- munity, that good may require the toleration of moral evil ; i.e., like the law of Moses, it may overlook certain forms of evil which are not inconsistent with the preservation of so- ciety. (See Introd., page 129.) Or, again, though not pro- hibited, they may be put under such regulations as reduce them to the narrowest possible limits ; e.g., high license for the sale of distilled liquors ; gambling-houses ; stews under the Papacy (Sand. Praelect. vi. 18). (May not a " license " for such things be viewed as an annual fine ?) Within its due limits civil law is binding on conscience, but ceases to be so if it be allowed to fall into desuetude. This, of course, is not true if the law be intrinsically bad ; for whatever is certainly forbidden by the law of nature cannot be enjoined by civil law, and whatever the law of nature commands — e.g., the care and education of children — cannot be taken away or forbidden by the civil law which is only indirectly Divine (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 10). But although civil law may not interfere with natural duties, it may restrain natural rights (ib. § 5). Laws "purely penal" bind conscience only to the pen- alty ; i.e., a right conscience may choose between obedience and submission to the penalty, e.g., "Five dollars fine for" etc. But " mixed penal " laws bind to obedience, and not * Civil and canon law, although they do not always agree between themselves, came into conflict with the common law in England, espe- cially under King Stephen (12th cent.), when the civil law was brought thither. E.g., in the question of the legitimation of bastards, the canon law mercifully allows it upon the marriage of the parents; but the laity in Parliament said, " nolumus Anglke leges mutare " (Blackst. Introd. page 19). CIVIL LAW. 509 merely to a penalty for disobedience. If the penalty be just, that binds conscience after sentence, not before; i.e., we are bound to yield to that penalty and not evade it (Sand. Prae- lect. viii. 17, 24). Unwritten law, or custom, under due conditions can ob- tain the force of law, abrogate, modify, or interpret old law. (See S. Aug. quoted in Duct. Dubitant. II. iii. 19.) The requisite conditions are : (a) the custom must be good, and useful to the community ; (b) it must rest upon repeated, voluntary, and public acts of the community, im- plicitly intended as binding ; (c) the custom must have been long continued, without authoritative protest. Custom under law certainly aids in its interpretation (Duct. Dubitant. III. vi. rule 6) ; but if it be plainly against the law, the law prevails, although the tacit consent of the law-makers may make that contrary custom a virtual revocation of the law, if it be revocable. No custom, how- ever, can change laws which in their nature do not admit of change. CHAPTER III. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. The Divine law in its primary applications, as given in the Ten Commandments, has been so fully presented in our text from S. Thomas Aquinas that only a few words of prac- tical application need be added. But the student will not overlook that admirable expansion of those commandments, so serviceable also for self-examination by them, which is contained in the Church Catechism. The First and Second Commandments concern faith, holy fear, love and worship towards God. (See Part III., page 399.) On the sin of simony, Jesuitical distinctions concerning it, and the making pay a motive for the priest's work, see the twelfth Provincial Letter of Pascal, with the defence of it, usually appended to " Les Provinciales." The test for conscience may be to ask how the work is done. Is it with equal zeal, labour, and love where no earthly recompense can be expected ? On the Third Commandment, see Part III., page 399. "Curses," "swearing," as ordinarily heard, need not be always regarded as mortal sin in themselves, for charity will presume that there is absence of intention. Commonly, among us, at least, they may be indications of a profane spirit, and habits of other and mortal sins. But in this matter it would not be wise to overlook the very different associations of different classes, and the very different cus- toms of different European nations. In oaths, assertory or promissory, there must be lawful matter ; otherwise they create no obligation. Furthermore, THE FOUKTH COMMANDMENT. 511 the implied conditions in a promissory oath are (a) that no serious injury will be done in observing it ; (b) that there shall be no serious change of circumstances ; (c) that the other party shall observe his pledge also ; and (d) that he will not give up his claim to the fulfilment of the oath. Perjury, in common law, is crime only in judicial pro- ceedings, and in what is material to the case in question (Blackst. iv. page 137). TJie Fourth Commandment. Giving time for Divine wor- ship is a law of nature. But since the ceremonial law of ancient Israel has been abolished, the observance of Sundays, together with other feasts and fasts of obligation, rests upon positive ecclesiastical law (Duct. Dubitant. II. ii. rule 6). Such law is found in canons 13, 14, and 15, §§ 13, et seq., of 1603 (respecting "the Lord's Day, commonly called Sunday, and other holy-days, " . . . "such days as are appointed to be kept holy by the book of Common Prayer/' etc.), and title i., canon 18, of the American Church. The law is (a) affirm- ative, as in these canons ; i.e., binding under due conditions. Grave injury to body or soul is full excuse from the outward obligations of such a law; e.g. , for harvesters in case of need ; the sickly and nurses of the sick ; travellers on long voyages by land or sea ; those who are engaged in cooking, mothers in charge of infants, and domestic servants; those who reside at great distance from church, etc., etc. (b) The law is negative in requiring abstinence from un- necessary servile work. But to this must in practice be added the obligation of abstaining from what causes scandal, especially where Judaizing notions are prevalent, and from what tends to sin, seeking what promotes spiritual edification. With this limitation, it cannot well be maintained that liberal works or recreations of any honest sort are prohibited by the law. At the same time, we have no right, under the law of charity, to make our recreations a cause of servile work and of the neglect of holy time on the part of others. 512 NOTES ON" THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. The common servile work, duly limited in respect of time, such as cooking, sweeping, etc., is not a violation of the law. Servile work, also, for charity or piety is to be admitted without hesitation. The Fifth Commandment. (See Part III., page 363.) The honour due to a father and a mother here stands for the various obligations which spring from the natural relations of human life. These are considered in various parts of our Moral Theology, and need not be now repeated. But let us add respecting children, that in the choice of a work for life, as well as in the choice of a partner for life in life's duties, they are not subject to their parents' will, be- cause these are the appointed and natural means of their reaching the ultimate end of their existence. They are to serve God and do their duty "in that state of life unto which it shall please God," not their parents, "to call them." But the law of nature, as well as the common law, is not to be overlooked, which requires that in their work for life they shall not forget to provide for the support of aged parents in their time of need. Parents also have a negative on their children's choice, at least until full maturity is reached. And this will apply equally to the choice of Holy Orders as life's work, or to the " religious " life for girls. (Qu. : The child is converted, and parents oppose the receiving of the Christian sacraments ?) Parents may violate this commandment by their neglect of spiritual instruction and training, and of moderate correction. (Qu. 1. Suppose that husband or wife is an infidel and opposes those necessary things — e.g., Holy Baptism — which are the blessings of children ? Also, that the other parent devoutly seeks for the same ? Qu. 2. May parents lawfully commit the care of their children to heretical schools ?) THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT. 513 The husband's special sins are neglect of his wife, tyranny towards the weaker partner, dissipating funds which are needed for family expenses. The wife's special sins are lack of Christian submission (Col. iii. 18), irritating words, "scolding," needless provo- cation in general, exposing the husband's faults, etc. Caution : Let the priest beware of lending a ready ear to a wife's complaints, which many are so ready to pour into a pastor's ears, and of taking part in family quarrels, because there is usually fault on both sides; e.g., among many, exas- perating a drunken husband by "nagging" words instead of meeting him with patience and forgiveness. If the husband be negligent in providing for his family, the wife may justly expend, out of the common income, what is suitable for her station in life, what is necessary for children, and other domestic expenses. If, through the husband's ex- cesses, the family's support be endangered, she is not morally obliged to consult bim in her action. (Qu. 1. Debts are due at the husband's death, and she also and her little children must be provided for ; which has the prior claim ? Qu. 2. May investments be withdrawn from business, and released from claims of creditors, for her benefit ? Qu. 3. Can parents justly cut off children, in case of a runaway match, from all inheritance, and expel forever from the family ?) The master's and employer's special duty is to make prompt and just payment, and to see that due time is provided for spiritual improvement, and for recreation. The servant's and employee's duty is to avoid slovenly work, work for self in hours which belong to the other, and using unlawfully, selling, or giving away that other's goods. (Qu. : Suppose that the servant or employee leave before the stipulated time expires, what is the moral obligation ? 33 514 NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. Certainly, if loss ensue thereby, there is no claim for pay ; but suppose no serious loss ?) The Sixth Commandment. (See Part III., page 297.) This, of course, includes the grave sins of hatred, dissen- sion, etc., which find their consummation in the malicious taking of human life. The law of nature is repeated in Eevelation (Gen. ix. 6), "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, etc., for in the image of God made He man." But God, by His agents, may demand the life which He has given (Rom. xiii. 4, the ideal of civil government). Lynch law, therefore, in organized society is murder. Divine law, however, does not forbid, and human law makes it lawful, to protect one's own life and what is nec- essary to life, even at the cost of the life of the aggressor — e.g., the burglar — provided that no other means will serve the purpose. Charity may demand the same course in de- fence of one's neighbour against the unjust aggressor. Manifest limitations of this natural right are : (1) He who takes what is not necessary to life is not lawfully killed ; (2) no such injury shall be done after the aggression. That would be revenge, not lawful defence (Blackst., iii. page 3). Common law accords so strictly with the spirit of this commandment that it may be well to note its distinctions. Homicide is — (1) Justifiable in order to save life or limb, but not uni- versally in order to save property. Special cases under common law, making homicide justifiable, are, (a) in case of arrest for felony, the accused taking flight or resisting ; but it is murder to kill a felon without due process of law ; (b) if a house be broken into for robbery at night (day-time also, New York), or if an attempt be made to burn it ; (c) in defence of chastity, either by the woman or her relatives (Qu. : her neighbour ?), but not in case of a woman taken in adultery, for there violence is absent ; (d) in case of attack THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT. 515 threatening grave injury, with clearly felonious intent (Blackst., iv. pages ITS, 181, 184). (2) Excusable homicide is in case of attack threatening grave injury, if no means of escape — e.g., retreat — be pres- ent. But if the affray be over, or the assailant running away, homicide is criminal revenge. Husband and wife, parent and child, may use the same means in general for one another (page 186). (3) Manslaughter is homicide : (a) voluntary, but through sudden passion ; (b) involuntary, but while doing any un- lawful act. Attempt at murder is not judged so gravely in common law as in morals (except poisoning, in England; Blackst., page 196) ; it is only on a par with manslaughter. Killing another instead of the one intended is equally murder in law. An act dangerous to others, even when care is used, may result in the sin of homicide. It is the same sin for the physician to shorten human life for the purpose of avoid- ing suffering. Abortion is homicide, but the mother's life may be saved by what is injurious to her offspring. (Qu. : Killing it to save the mother's life — can one life be taken, when it will be certainly lost, in order to save an- other ?) Defensive war is lawful, for the life of the state is more precious than that of the individual ; therefore all that is essential to war is also lawful. Stratagems are lawful, ex- cept those which no prudence can avoid. If the innocent necessarily suffer in sedition, riot, or war, that is not in- tended, and there is no sin in the result. Suicide, as we have seen (Part III., page 299), is sin against nature, for though man has direct dominion over his body, it is only "dominium utile," received from G-od and to be accounted for. Since suicide is also a crime against society, it is murder 51 G NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. by common law, and the adviser of it is guilty of man- slaughter (Blackst., iv. page 189). The only admissible question in determining the guilt of it is, as in any other case, did the person at the time know right from wrong ? Be- ware of the sentimental sympathy which condones the crime. (Qu. : The priest is expressly forbidden to use the burial service in such a ease. "What should he do if called upon ?) But exposure of life for a good end is lawful ; e.g., in war, the blowing up of a vessel with imminent danger to self. The end sought for is not self-destruction. There is no moral obligation of extraordinary — e.g., sur- gical — means to preserve life. On the other hand, immod- erate asceticism, if it injure bodily health, is unlawful, even if the aims are good. The Seventh Commandment has been fully discussed in Part III., Chapter VII. Only a few words, therefore, need be added. Questions connected with it require the utmost caution, both personal and official, because the soul's desires are soonest reached through the imagination. The Gospel law is given (Gal. v. 19-21), forbidding in- ordinate (not merely excessive) acts of impurity, gluttony, intemperance ; in the Tenth Commandment are forbidden the corresponding desires, imaginations, and other proxi- mate causes of temptation to outward acts of sin (S. Matt. v. 28 ; Eph. iv. 29). (1) Luxuria, lust, is against nature's primary law, because the appetite is given for the continuance of the human race, and the creation of the family society (Gen. ii. 18). Proximate causes, which may become mortal sin, are kisses, even touches, exciting novels acting on the imagina- tion, obscene speech (sometimes venial), obscene songs. Voluntary self -pollution, so prevalent among the young, must be approached most cautiously, for fear of suggestion. The prevalent sin of avoiding the ends of matrimony, THE NINTH COMMANDMENT. 517 mortal as it is, can only be treated in the most general way, by frequent iteration of the ends of this Divine institution (1 Cor. iii. 17). (2) Sensuality is inordinate gratification of the five senses, especially taste. (Qu. : Is gratification, purely as such, wrong?) Temperance in eating, drinking, sleep, recreation, ap- parel, are alike commanded. In general, such moderation is commanded as will favour the best condition of our souls. Beyond this, asceticism is matter of counsel, or charity, in avoiding scandal of the weak. Note that sins against the body may produce bodily dis- ease, and demand bodily remedies. The Eighth Commandment is against unjust acts ; the Tenth against unjust desires. (See chapters on Right and Justice, on Injury, and on Contracts.) The Ninth Commandment forbids (a) perjury, as a sin against justice and against our neighbour ; then (b) lying, for the same end ; (c) slander ; (d) calumny ; (e) detrac- tion ; (/) rash judgment ; (g) injurious suspicion. (See Part III., page 311 et seq.) Lying. The Gospel law seems to be explicit : " Putting away lying, speak ye truth each one with his neighbour ; for we are members one of another " (Eph. iv. 25). But what is lying ? We can only answer, it is false speaking or acting with intent to deceive (S. Aug., De Mendacio, Contra Mend. c. iii.). It is not a material falsehood, for he may lie who speaks the truth when he thinks that it is not true. Lying, formally, is the wish, the will to deceive, enunciated in any manner whatsoever, whether by word or gesture, by equivocation or mental reservation. "He lies who has one thing in mind and enunciates another in any way. For the lying and the not lying are to be judged from the intention 518 NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. of the mind." The enunciation of what is known, believed, or supposed to be untrue, is only the " material " part. The essence of truth is not in the uttered words, but in the mutual understanding. Therein lies the obligation of truth, "for we are members one of another." The Jesuitical distinction, making lawful " partial men- tal restriction " and equivocation, seems to be corruptive of sound morals. Such casuistry says that since the other has no right to know the truth he may be allowed to deceive himself respecting your enunciation. The answer is that he has a right not to be told a lie even indirectly, for "we are members one of another." A true man will say, " You have no right to an answer," and bear the consequences. Evasion is no lie ; amphibology is a lie in intention (Whewell's El. Moral, iii. 393, seq.). Is a useful lie (mendacium officio sum) a sin? Bishop Taylor justifies it (Duct. Dubitant. III. ii. rule 5, qu. 1, §§ 9, 11, 13).* But, on the rigid side, consider the argu- ments presented by S. Aug., Cont. Mend., c. v.: (a) Holy Scripture seems to condemn all lying (Ps. v. 6 ; S. Matt. v. 37 ; Eph. v. 25 ; Eev. xxii. 15). The deceit of S. Peter is rebuked (Gal. ii. 12). (b) Not even to save earthly life is life eternal to be risked by sin. (c) Nor to preserve chastity, for the purity of the soul is more precious (c. vii.). (d) Nor in the hope of benefiting others spiritually ; for how can religious trust be put in one who will lie for a good cause ? (c. viii.). (e) Nor to prevent others from doing us an injury (c. ix.). Lighter sins are not to be done in order to save others from greater sin ; we choose neither of them ; we condemn both. Each one must answer for his own sin (c. xiii.). Sin is not to be measured by tem- poral consequences. The Divine command (Rom. vi. 13) is, " Present not your members unto sin as instruments of unrighteousness ; " and the tongue is such a member. If *See, also, Scott's comment on the case of Rahab, Josh. ii. 5. THE NIXTH COMMANDMENT. 519 we may use it for a falsehood with good intention, why not any other member ? S. Thomas Aquinas (see page 381 et seq.) shows that mendacium officiosum is always a sin, even if it be a venial one. If so, like other venial sins, it aids in forming a char- acter ; and it is an easy step downwards to mendacium perniciosum ; e.g., in detraction. (Qu. 1. May another be allowed to deceive himself through your words, actions, or silence, when he has no right to the truth — e.g., in the case of lawyers, physi- cians, confessors, confidential secretaries, ambassadors, com- manders in time of war ? Qu. 2. Compliments in "good society" ? "Not at home" may not be a lie, though servants may so understand it. Qu. 3. May an advocate assert that his client's cause is just ?) "Lies of necessity" — e.g., to save life — must stand or fall with other compulsory acts. It is said that " necessity knows no law." But constraint of liberty or threats are not necessity, for there is always more or less constraint of fear or force. It is sin to have cowardly fear. Only such fear as destroys the freedom of a well-governed man constitutes necessity, or such force as makes compulsion. Heroic vir- tue rises above the common standard of compulsion. Another's necessity, a father's, husband's, etc., stands on the same plane with one's own. But antecedent rules are not serviceable for such cases, since formal sin is avoided when they are left to the emergency which is supposed to be outside of the law.* On libel and slander, see Chapter on Injury, § 6. * In fiction the question of mendacium officiosum is very forcibly presented in Scott's Heart of Mid-Lothian (c. xviii.). Tet Jeanie Deans acted a lie (c. xxix.) in order to save her life. Cooperation, also, in the form of silence, not denouncing crime, will be found in c. xxxii. ; perhaps, in another form, in c. li. 520 NOTES ON THE TEN COMMANDMENTS. Detraction, secret and unjust injury of another's good name (see Part III., page 314), is (a) simple detraction when the offence charged is true ; it is (b) calumny when it is false. It is (a) direct when, if the charge be not abso- lutely false, yet the truth is amplified injuriously, or what is entitled to secrecy is manifested, or bad motives are im- puted to a good or an indifferent act. It is (b) indirect, when good acts are denied, or diminished, or silence kept while others applaud, or praise is coldly given. The gravity of the sin is measured by the gravity of the intention and of the injury. But it is worse than theft. " Who steals my purse," etc. Eevealing wrong becomes a duty only when grave injury is effected by not doing so, or when another is entitled to know the facts. Caution : The priest among his people is but too apt to be made the hearer of detraction, and needs the greatest care in distinguishing what he is entitled to know from idle or malicious tale-bearing. It is sin against charity, not against justice, if a notorious offence be related to those who are ignorant of it. Listen- ing to detraction is sin against justice, if thus inducement to it be offered ; otherwise it is sin against charity. (Qu. : Talking of injury done to one's self ?) Restitution is obligatory after these sins, so far as is pos- sible ; and usually the confessor will defer absolution until it is made. The good name is to be repaired or restored, and compensation is due for loss, if any there were, even if the fault revealed were actually committed. (Without enunciating or implying falsehood one can say, " I ought not to have said that respecting him.") Public restitution is due for public detraction, private for private. Even in- advertent detraction has the same claim. Excuses. Restitution maybe excused (a) if the fault have been otherwise revealed, or the good name otherwise restored. (b) An old charge may have been forgotten ; then to apologize for it would be to recall it. THE NINTH COMMANDMENT. 521 (c) Restitution may be morally impossible, a good name being utterly lost. (d) Tbe detraction may have been unheeded ; e.g., the speaker being perceived to be angry. (Qu. : Suppose tbat the injured party has been guilty in the same way ?) Satisfaction for insult may recall the offence, and it is therefore not usually to be offered. CHAPTER IV. EIGHT AND JUSTICE. The subject of the next three chapters — viz., Right and Justice, their violations through injury, and contracts based on justice — might here be considered as questions of Moral Theology alone, and no reference might be made to civil law except when it conflicts, which it rarely does, with the principles of our science. But, even with all the rudeness necessary in general laws, which, as such, cannot recognize the inevitable exceptions occurring and recognized in morals, the civil and the com- mon law are in large measure so admirable an application of justice to human life, and the practical use of some ac- quaintance with the first principles of common law as thus applied is so great, that it seems best to consider our topics both from the point of view of Moral Theology and of the laws of civil society. § 1. Definitions and divisions. Justice, as we have seen (Part III., page 274), is a moral virtue inclining the will to render to every one what is right, i.e., his due. Our Lord gives the law and its crite- rion (S. Matt. vii. 12), although His law, no doubt, extends beyond the natural virtue of justice to the domain of super- natural charity. Duty, the obligation of giving what is due, is correlative with right. Divisions. (1) Legal justice was defined (page 275) as the form of justice which gives to society its rights. But if we take the narrower definition of it — sc, civil justice ex- DEFINITIONS AND DIVISIONS. 523 pressed in -written law — the supremacy of moral over legal justice is emphatically presented in Blackstone's remark (iii. page 392), that "a second trial is not granted in cases of strict right or summum jus, where the rigorous exaction of strict legal justice is hardly reconcilable to conscience/' Summum jus summa injuria. The same principle will he illustrated, also, by the case of '•'accident;'' special inconvenieuce of general law from unusual circumstances will warrant equitable jurisdiction from a court of chancery (Blackst. iii. 431). It will rectify some mistakes, some frauds, which may not be cog- nizable by common law ; it will issue injunctions to prevent invasion of rights. (2) Distributive justice gives honours and imposes bur- dens in due and just proportions (Part III., page 285). (3) Commutative justice regulates exchange between pri- vate individuals. (4) Retributive justice is a form of (2), exacting penalties for wrong-doing. Note that in particular matters of justice, ordinarily and regularly, lawyers are the most competent judges ; in mat- ters of justice which are to be conducted by general rules, as, also, in religion and charity, theology is supreme (Duct. Dubitant. I. iv. rule 10). Jus, right, is the lawful claim to do, to keep, or to obtain anything whatsoever for one's own benefit. It is the object of the virtue justice. Divisions are (1) right in things already possessed (" things real"); (2) right to things not so possessed ("things per- sonal"); i.e., jus in re, and jus ad rem. These give rise to real and personal actions in law. Property is rights in things (Blackst. ii. c. ii.). This, as jus in re, is either real or personal, the former being lauds, tenements, and hereditaments. But the last divis- 524 RIGHT AND JUSTICE. ion, expressing all that can be inherited, will include, also, personal property (c. xxiv.). To distinguish then things personal, they are called chattels, which are either chattels real, as a lease or a mortgage, or chattels personal, viz., movables (c. xxv.). Property, as possession, is either absolute or qualified. This fact will give us a four-fold division of right ; viz., (1) dominion ; (2) use ; (3) usufruct, use with further benefits ; (4) service and jurisdiction, as the bishop's right, the pater- nal right, the right of masters, etc. § 2. Dominion. Absolute dominion belongs only to G-od (Ps. xxiv. 1). But man can rightly have property as against other men (Part III., page 302), receiving it from God, and being in it independent of others. This is both natural law and posi- tive Divine law (Gen. i. 28). Human dominion, or the right to dispose of a thing in any manner as one's own, is (1) perfect when there is the right to dispose of the thing and of its use ; (2) imperfect if the right cover only one of these. "Eminent domain" {"dominium altum") is in the state, since its claim is superior to that of individuals; "domi- nium htimile" is that of private persons. A qualified right of property is in many cases recognized as existing (1) in the case of water, as appropriated by oc- cupancy (Blackst. ii. 403). Obstructions, therefore, the fouling or diverting of water, etc., may constitute legal in- jury as well as a violation of justice, and often of charity. (2) In "bailment/' also — i.e., delivery of goods in trust — qualified property is acquired ; e.g., by a carrier, an inn- keeper, a pawnbroker. A servant in charge does not so acquire. Jus ad rem is another example of qualified property, called "property in action," or "chose in action;" e.g., money due on a bond, or a promise or covenant to do any- HOW IS DOMINION" ACQUIRED ? 525 thing (Blackst. ii. 397). If there be failure in such a case, common law will give compensation for the qualified prop- erty. Imperfect dominion is direct when it is over a thing ; it is indirect when it is over the use of the thing. Man has, by Divine gift, the second, "dominium utile," over his goods of body and soul. He has not direct domin- ion in either of these goods. (See notes on the Sixth Com- mandment, page 515.) Over external goods, however, he has both direct and per- fect dominion. (Qu. : Can he rightly have dominium utile over another person ? ) diildren and the insane are not incapable of dominion through a guardian. With respect to dominion on the part of minors, common law is more liberal than the civil law — i.e., the rights of parents over children, so far as regulated by human law, are more restricted by the former ; but both common and civil law agree with the law of nature that the parent has perfect dominion over his child's earnings while that child is under age, ''the child living with him and being maintained by him" (Blackst. i. 453). But the former makes the emancipation of the infant very easy ; for the father may relinquish all his right to the services and earnings of a minor child, in which case the child will have perfect dominion over them. In the case of other property held by the child, as by gift, bequest, etc., the father, if he be appointed guardian of that property, stands in the same position as a trustee ; and the child's dominion is limited by the power of administration which is in the parent as guardian of the property in ques- tion. The father receives the profits of his child's prop- erty, but must account for them when his child comes of age. § 3. How is dominion acquired ? (1) Dominion is acquired by "occupancy " — i.e., the actual 526 RIGHT AND JUSTICE. taking possession of what belongs to no one ; e.g., wild land or animals — under requisite conditions ; sc, (a) that the thing is a proper object of private dominion (Qu. : land ?), and belongs to no one ; (b) that no human law stands in the way ; (c) that the occupier intends to make it his own, and actually takes it (Instit. III. tit. i.). FercB natures (Blackst. ii. page 392). By jus gentium beasts, birds, and fish are the property of the captor, and may be taken anywhere, but the owner of the land may prohibit entry thereon. If such wild animals escape from their captor, they become the property of any one who cap- tures them again. By common law, however, there is a qualified property in them, " per industriam hominis," in confining or taming them. But this is only while they are actually possessed through occupancy, unless, like turkeys and pigeons, they are in the habit of returning. (Op. the seal as an international question in 1891.) It is felony, however, to steal those which are used as food (page 394). Dogs, cats, etc., are not so protected by common law. (2) Finding, or discovery, is either of (a) te thesaurus," money lost ; or (b) of other things lately lost ; or (c) of things abandoned ; or (d) of things not owned (Instit. ii. tit. i. 9). Thesaurus goes with the land if found by the owner of the same ; " treasure trove/' however, may be reclaimed by the owner if he appear. (Op. Koman and com- mon law.) ' (3) Prescription either (a) gives some acquired dominion ; or (b) some positive obligation, though unfulfilled, is released through lapse of time. Divide, then, into acquisitive and liberative prescription. Human law has the right to sanction this mode of ob- taining dominion, without the previous owner's consent, as morally necessary for the common good ; for otherwise HOW IS DOMINION ACQUIRED ? 527 strifes would often arise from uncertain possession. Due prescription in transferring dominion therefore is obligatory in foro conscientim. There are five conditions of lawful prescription : {a) "Sit res apta ; (b) fides bona sit ; (c) titulus quoque Justus ; (d) poss ideas juste ; (e) completo tempore legis. " The first condition (a) requires that the thing possessed be a salable thing over which dominion has been exercised (not a loan, etc.), public, undisputed, certain, and uninter- rupted. (b) The second condition is a firm persuasion that the title acquired is one's own ; otherwise there is moral (Qu. : legal ?) obligation of restitution. The same principle ap- plies to liberative prescription. Ignorance of the law does not constitute this " good faith ; " although ignorance of facts may do so (Digest. xxii. vi. 4, 6). According to the civil law, subsequent knowledge of facts does not vitiate legal possession, what- ever moral obligation there may be (Digest, xli. iii. 48). (c) The title must appear to be a true one ; e.g. , buying, gift, etc. (d) But a long period of uninterrupted possession is equiv- alent to a title of some other nature. This length of time, however, is different when accompanied with other title, and again when so unaccompanied. It differs also widely in the case of movables (in most cases under the statute of limitations the period being six years) and of immovables, which require a much longer period for prescriptive title. Thus, by the statute of limitations, no entry shall be made upon lands unless within twenty years after a man's right shall accrue (Blackst. iii. page 178). Prescription is suspended by the minority of the claimant, and by other insuperable obstacles. It does not apply to anything fraudulently obtained, for there must be bona fides; and no length of possession under such circumstances can make a wrong become a right. 528 RIGHT AND JUSTICE. Liberative prescription, also — i.e., lapse of right — lias its term fixed by civil law. But what law permits may not always be what a good conscience can rightly claim. (4) Accession. The thing acquired may be so united with one's own property by natural processes that dominion is gained over it. Thus, the offspring of brutes goes with the mother, "partus sequitur ventrem" (Instit. II. i. 31, 33; and trees, etc., go with the soil. The bona-fide possessor of land is entitled to all gathered fruits, unless the owner claim them ; but there can be no action for gathered fruit against the " usufructuarius " (vid. infra). But if one be pos- sessor of the land mala fide, he must restore what he has gathered or compensate for it. " Specification" is another example of accession. Manu- facture with another's materials, if in good faith, gives property in the product, the materials being paid for (Qu. : legal rights ?). This if the thing be properly new ; but if merely the form be altered, as in making a coat, the owner of the material can still claim it (Blackst. ii. page 404). Alluvion, another example of the same, is the slow (not the sudden) growth of land on the bank of a running stream, which gives rightful claim to the accession. " Adjunction" is a similar example, If a man build on his own ground with another's materials, he owns what ac- cedes to the soil, but the other has a lien on the materials. If any one build on rented ground, the building becomes the property of him to whom the ground belongs ; but if the builder acted bona fide he must be compensated ; if he acted mala fide he can only take away the materials. (Note that the present law of "betterments " is uncertain.) In case of confusion of goods without consent of both parties, the entire property belongs to him whose dominion is invaded (Blackst. ii. page 405). We are discussing right and justice, but the higher law HOW IS DOMINION ACQUIRED ? 529 of Christian charity may overrule the demands of strict justice in all such cases. (5) Conveyance. Another's title may be transferred to a new owner for a satisfactory consideration, or as a gift. (See the chapter on Contracts.) Use and usufruct. The first is the right of using an- other's property, the substance of it being preserved for the owner ; the second is the right of using and enjoying it ; i.e., of taking the fruits for one's own on like conditions. This gives dominium utile. The fair expenses connected with the thing are to be paid, and also all ordinary obligations ; e.g., an annuity on the property. It must be restored in reasonably good condition, and the owner must not injure the usufruct ; e.g., parents using children's goods. Use, then, does not apply to perishable goods, as articles of food. The usufructuarius can sell his right, but the usuarius cannot. Tenant right, subletting, etc., sometimes involve grave moral questions which cannot be here discussed. (See, fur- ther, the chapter on Contracts.) 34 CHAPTER V. INJURY. § 1. Definitions and divisions. Injury {"injuria") is the violation of another's right. It is at once sin against the individual man, against society, and against God, whose law of justice and charity is broken. Divisions. It is "formal injury" when it is intended; it is only " material " injury, when it is not intended. It is grave or light relatively to the injured person. It is direct, or it is indirect when it is foreseen and permitted in its cause. Note that the question of involuntary injury — e.g., that done by one intoxicated — has been considered under the question of ignorance, q. v., page 466. But common law accepts no such defence, considering the ease with which such plea is made, and punishing the vol- untary loss of reason (Blackst. iv. page 25). Damnum, loss, may be caused without injury, for " scienti et volenti nonfit injiiria," except when a man cannot law- fully yield his right. (Qu. 1. Parental right versus legislation concerning chil- dren's education ? Qu. 2. Abridging the suffering in case of mortal injury when so requested ?) Injury also may be caused without loss, as in the case of rash and unjust judgment. Injury may be otherwise divided according to its object, as done to goods of fortune, of body, of soul, of good name. For the ends of civil society the most fundamental divi- THEFT. 531 sion is, (1) private wrongs, infringement of the private or civil rights of individuals considered as such ; and (2) pub- lic wrongs, " nef as," where the community as well as the individual is considered to have been injured. The latter are crimes and misdemeanours. In civil law a crime or a misdemeanour (a lighter act of similar nature) is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law. To con- stitute a crime in the view of civil law there must be an overt act, as well as a vicious will. Felony in the United States is a crime punishable with death or confinement in a State prison. Minoi's. By common law an infant under seven years cannot be guilty of felony ; between seven and fourteen years, inquiry must be made whether he is " doli capax." If he be over fourteen years, without question the felonious act is felony in him. § 2. Theft. TJieft (see Part III., page 302) is unjust taking of an- other's property, the owner being unwilling. The " formal " part is the intent to defraud. Divisions. It is (1) simple theft, the secret taking ; (2) robbery, taking with violence ; (3) fraud, deceiving in con- tracts; (4) sacrilege; (5) peculation, the very common stealing from the public purse. All are mortal violations of the law of nature. The evil intention is the formal part of the sin in theft ; but the crime of stealing is not altogether so viewed in com- mon law. Thus the attempt to commit a felony is only a misde- meanour. So also is cooperation in the form of solicitation or incitement to commit the theft. "The attempt and not the deed confounds us," is not true of common law. In theft also, as viewed by common law, there must be actual 532 INJURY. possession taken, and not the mere preparation for it (Blackst. iv. 222, 231). To constitute stealing, however, there must be felonious intent ; otherwise the act may be only trespass (page 232), But if other injury be done, even though unforeseen, while one is guilty of an unlawful act, he is held to be answerable for that injury. Homicide committed by one engaged in a felonious act may be viewed as murder. Blackmail. Sending letters which threaten to accuse of crime, etc., with a view to extort money, is an attempt to rob, and crime by modern law. The theft may be of a thing so trifling as to cause no appreciable injury (see Part III., page 304) ; but it is not to be overlooked that by accumulation the thief may be enriched ; e.g., retail dealers by short measure and light weight. (Qu.: Suppose that the price set upon the goods is pro- portioned to the light weight or short measure ?) In the case, again, of children and servants, it is cer- tainly true that if the article be trifling in value, or be consumed, not preserved, given away, or sold, the owner may be presumed to be less unwilling to part with it than in other cases of theft. But this applies only to the " ma- terial " part of the act. We are bound to consider the formal intent, and the tendency of whab may possibly be venial sin in itself. It may be suggested, indeed, that the taking of the little thing without the owner's knowledge or assumed consent may neither harm him, nor intend to do so, nor sensibly enrich the taker. In this case there is, undoubtedly, the sin of theft, but surely not so grave as other sins which vio- late justice and charity. Since the fruits of productive property, including private RESTITUTION. 533 or public funds, belong to the owner of the same until he transfers its use, it is evident that if the guardian or trustee or treasurer of that property appropriate to himself those fruits of it — say, using for himself the interest on those funds, or seeking profits on tbem in " speculation " — he is indirectly a thief, even if he restore the property undimin- ished. For he is not a " usufructuarius." * Extreme necessity — i.e., immediate danger of life or limb, etc. — "knows no law." I mean that there is a natural right to use, sufficiently for the pressing necessity, what- ever can be found, and that taking it is no theft. For the owner's dominium utile is subject to G-od's higher domin- ion and law, and the human steward is bound not to be un- willing in such a case of need. (Qu. : Suppose that the extreme need is in another, and that you yourself have no means of supplying it from your own resources ?) But restitution afterwards is due, if that become possible. What was secretly taken may be secretly restored. § 3. Restitution. (See Part III., page 286.) Violation of right, being an offence against G-od, must in * Note on arrest. — A warrant from a justice of the peace is prefer- able to a private arrest if the offender be not likely to abscond ; because if it be erroneously granted, no action lies against the party obtaining it unless it be proved that he obtained it maliciously. The warrant, however, is limited by the jurisdiction of the magistrate who issues it. By common law, a justice of the peace, a sheriff, a coroner, or any peace-officer, may arrest any person on reasonable charge of felony presented to him, or if he himself witness any suspicious act (Blackst. iv. 291). But where a felony is actually committed, any private per- son may arrest the felon, and is bound to do so. Even on reasonable ground of suspicion he may do so, though he is liable to action for assault and false imprisonment. Any private person may interfere to prevent a felony, and may apprehend and detain the one attempting it (page 293). (Qu. : Disturbance in church ?) 534 INJURY. all cases be made good as a condition of pardon from Him. Compensation, indemnification, etc., are required by com- mutative justice in the law of nature, and in the revealed law (S. Jas. v. 4), as well as in human law. But violations of distributive justice or of charity as such do not demand restitution, because, strictly speaking, they cannot be made good in the same manner with violations of commutative justice. The fault can be amended, but the past loss cannot be repaired. This is the principle which applies to penitence in respect of retributive justice. A propitiatory sacrifice must supply what penitence cannot. Note, however, that the same offence may violate both forms of justice. Thus a negligent ruler may cause grave loss to the ruled, and violate the implied contract with them, and become subject to the law of restitution proper. Kestitution is based upon the law of nature that " since all wrongs may be considered as merely a privation of right, the plain natural remedy for every species of wrong is the being put in possession of that right whereof the person in- jured is deprived" (Blackst. iii. 116). As a negative law — sc, " Thou shalt not withhold his right from thy brother" — restitution is always obligatory ; but as a positive law — sc, "Bestore at once his right" — it is binding under the due conditions. The obligation arises from (1) unjust posses- sion of another's property ; (2) from unjustly causing loss ; (3) from unjust cooperation in injury done by another. Maxims. (1) " Res clamat domino." The right of the owner follows the thing wherever it may go. By common law he may recover his property even from a iona-fide pur- chaser wherever it may be found (Blackst. iii. 4 ; iv. 363). In such a case, however, the original hona-fide pur- chaser is not bound in conscience to make restitution if the thing have passed into other hands and cannot be re- covered. RESTITUTION". 535 (Qu. : Suppose that in good faith he has sold the thing, to whom does the price of it belong ?) (Note that property thus found must not be taken with violence. The owner must not be guilty of a " breach of the peace.'' He may not enter a third person's house for the purpose of getting his own, if that third person have not been accessory to the wrong. He may take possession of his own house or land, and eject an intruder, as also he may abate a public or private nuisance as an injury to the public — e.g. , nuisance made by an act of commission — only it must be done without riot. He may distrain goods for rent not paid, and cattle trespassing on his premises (Blackst. iii. 5, 218; iv. 167). " Sic utere iuo ut alienum non Icedas," says com- mon law as well as the Divine law.) Prescription, as already noted, gives claim to property in pure water, etc. But damage, if any, must be direct, not consequential. (2) " Res fructifica \t domino ;" i.e., the natural fruits or profits of a thing, and the use or enjoyment of it, belong to the owner thereof. This is included in the idea of domin- ion. (3) "Res naturaliter perit domino ;" i.e., when the ob- ject ceases to exist, dominion of it ends ; but there may be still existing an equivalent which belongs to the owner of the previous property. (4) "Nemo ex re alter ius locupletari debet;" i.e., no one may rightfully be enriched through another's prop- erty ; hence it follows that the measure of restitution due in such a case is the quantity of the thing detained from its owner, together with the accrued profits. (Qu. : If a public treasurer or a trustee of funds make a profit by "speculating" with those funds, to whom does the profit belong ?) How and to whom restitution is to be made. (See Part III., page 285. ) In the common frauds in trade the owner 536 INJURY. may be unknown or cannot be reached ; then that which is gotten by fraud, not belonging to the possessor, can only be restored by giving to charitable uses for which society at large is responsible. In many cases it is impossible to make full restitution for the injury done against commutative justice ; then the restoring such part as is possible is obligatory on conscience as a condition of pardon for the sin. Extreme necessity justifies delaying or withholding resti- tution. The restitution may be made secretly, or through an- other; all that is required is that the wrong be made right. Note the grave sin — very common — of keeping up the expenses of life, and thus defrauding creditors. The possessor bona fide, as soon as he knows that the thing possessed is not his own, is bound to restore it to the rightful owner, if he be known ; and this, in whole or in part, as the thing may be at the time, together with the profits which have been derived from it, if any there have been. If he have bought stolen property, he has run his risk in doing so, and he must lose, since the rightful owner cannot justly be made the loser (Blackst. iv. 363). But the possessor bona fide is bound to no compensation if he have consumed, destroyed, given away, or lost the thing, or if it have been stolen from him. For it is not the materially causing loss (damnificatid) which demands resti- tution, but the formal injury. But the case is different if he have become richer by the possession of another's property ; then he is bound to re- turn the natural and the civil fruits of the thing, but not such fruits of it as he has gained by his own industry in using it. Suppose that this wrongful possessor has sold the thing ; then, if the owner reclaim it, the seller is bound to return DAMNIFICATIO. 537 the price to the buyer, for in the contract of sale a good title to the thing was implied. (Qu. : Suppose that he has sold at a profit, to whom does that profit belong ?) The possessor mala fide — i.e., knowing that the thing is not his own — is bound to compensate the owner for every kind of loss, including profits, which might have been de- rived if the thing had remained in the owner's possession. There are various difficult cases of conscience in this regard, but the maxims given above will generally solve them. If the thing unjustly possessed pass through various hands in bad faith, each person so receiving it is responsi- ble for the whole. The possessor in doubtful faith is bound to make careful inquiry. If this be done, and the title still remain in uncer- tainty, he may retain the thing with a good conscience ; for " melior est conditio possidentis j" the presumption is in his favour, and other claimants to the thing must show a better title than his. § 4. Damnificatio. Though unjust damage requires indemnification, yet the moral fault, which offends Grod, must be distinguished from juridical fault as resting on a sentence from a civil court. For the law will punish omission of due care if it cause loss, whether there has been any moral fault or not. The unjust damager is bound to full restitution of the thing or its equivalent, and also of its profits ; e.g., if a house be burned, or if workmen lose time through your neglect, those who suffer loss must be indemnified for rent in the one case, for loss of wages in the other. Conditions, (a) There must have been an unjust act of omission ; (b) it must be the cause of the loss and morally culpable — i.e., through foresight, intention, or criminal 538 injury. negligence. These conditions are requisite to constitute the moral fault ; but even otherwise the sentence of the court in finding juridical fault binds conscience — e.g., if one have used all ordinary or due care. E.g., suppose that animals belonging to you cause the loss ; if it be through your negligence, you are morally bound ; if not so, you are not bound to make compensation until the sentence of the court so decrees. Suppose, again, that without moral fault on your part loss occur through your fulfilment of your official obliga- tions, as in the case of a physician ; there is no obligation of restitution. Suppose, again, that you at first caused the loss without fault, but afterwards did not do your best to stop that loss ; you owe restitution. (Qu.: Suppose that loss is caused to society by your aid- ing in giving office to the unworthy ?) § 5. The unjust accessory. (See Part III., page 292.) Cooperation may now be further considered in its appli- cation to injury done. (1) Command causing moral compulsion requires restitu- tion for injury done if the loss directly result from the com- mand, and this also if the one commanded suffer loss in consequence of his obedience to the command. (Qu.: Eesponsibility of the one commanded — e.g., a clerk executing fraudulent orders ; a railway clerk obeying the orders of his superiors ?) (2) Advice may be a cause of loss ; and restitution is due if that advice were efficacious ; but it is not due if the act would have been done in the same way without the advice. The advice may have aided in causing the result, without its being properly efficacious. Again, it may be inquired whether that advice were given with the weight of authority. If not, there may be no obli- THE TJX JUST ACCESSORY. 539 are not experts volunteering their advice in difficult matters. Compare the injurious advice of the priest, the lawyer, the physician, with the friendly words of neighbours ; the former may be the efficacious cause of loss when the latter count for very little. The one who follows bad counsel, knowing it to be bad, may suffer in consequence thereof ; but he has no claim for indemnification from his adviser. " Scienti et volenti nonfit injuria.'' (3) Consent binds to restitution for loss, if it be effica- cious. Consider the political obligations of voters, and their contributing to public loss by knowingly voting for the less worthy, or by withholding their votes from the worthy. (4) Praise or blame before the act is done is equivalent to counsel, and is to be judged by the same rules. Eestitu- tion is not due when the act already done is applauded. (5) Participation may be either in the injurious act or in its profits. In both cases restitution for injury done is obligatory, subject to the conditions respecting cooperation which have been already pointed out. (6) By silence, by not hindering, by not revealing, nega- tive cooperation in injury is given. For the injury is not hindered when it is possible so to do {e.g., not voting for the more worthy candidate for office). In such cases the law of charity is violated, which sin calls for repentance and amendment, not for restitution, unless the duties of one's office have been neglected. Observe that the superior is answerable, in common law as well as in morals, for the negligence of his employees, if his own negligence were culpable. This is true of both servants and agents. But in common law exception is made if the negligence of those employees were wilful, criminal injury, or out of the line of their authority. But, on the other hand, owners of hacks, or inn-keepers, are liable for injuries done through drivers or servants, and can claim no such exception (Blackst. i. 430). 540 INJURY. § 6. What things are to be restored 1 ? (1) Goods of the soul The injury which is done through deceit, fraud, or unjust fear must be repaired ; otherwise, only charity binds the conscience, for " scienti et volenti non fit injuria." Such unjust injury may be error in faith or in morals, and it is the erroneous official teacher, not the unofficial, who is bound to correct the error, if it were due to ignorance or negligence, not to guile or deceit. Common law is very careful in defining what slander and libel are actionable (Blackst. iii. 123), setting very definite limits in this regard ; e.g., limiting the time within which action may be brought. But note the attempt of American newspapers to relax the common law of libel. But though it is strictly just so far as it goes, conscience must go much further to the intended wrong and the injury actually done. For the truth of the charge will not release conscience from its obligation, whatever American news- papers may claim, if there were no just warrant for the pub- lication. But the legal distinction between malice in fact — i.e., actual malice — and malice in law — i.e., a wrongful act intentionally done — is equally serviceable in our science of Moral Theology. (2) Goods of body — e.g., loss of life or limb, or violation of chastity — -call for retributive justice, and no proper restitu- tion can be made. ( Vid. infra, Satisfaction.) But all con- sequent losses which can be measured demand strict resti- tution. (Qu. : Is the seducer who has not made promise of mar- riage bound to marry the seduced ? If illegitimate progeny be in question, both human and Divine law make him re- sponsible for the support and education of that offspring, and, in many cases at least, this may require marriage.) (3) Goods of fortune have been already considered as a question between man and man ; but they are also due to the state, according to Divine command as well as the law WHAT THINGS ARE TO BE RESTORED ? 541 of nature, since they are necessary for the common good. Lawful government, therefore, has a right to part of the people's goods, and that part may be collected either directly or indirectly, as excise or tariff. Conditions, (a) Taxes must be just, i.e., imposed for the common good ; (h) they must be laid equally on all ; if so, they are binding on conscience (S. Matt. xxii. 21 ; Eom. xiii. G). Note, therefore, the sin of evading such burdens, thereby increasing those of other citizens ; of corrupting assessors, custom-house officers, tax collectors, etc. But there are many difficult questions involved in the determining what is right. Injuries in trade. " Forestalling " the market — i.e., con- tracting for merchandise on its way to market, etc., with a view to the undue enhancing of the price of it ; " engross- ing" provisions by buying them up for the same purpose ("corners"); spreading false rumours for the same end; getting a monopoly of necessaries, or making a combination for the same purpose, are offences punishable by common law * as well as by the Divine law (Blackst. iv. 158). Should they not be, at least, as severely treated by human legislation as "conspiracy" among labourers? The same principles apply to interference with workmen, preventing them from hiring themselves, compelling them to join unions ("scabs"), or other interference with the freedom of labour. (Qu. : Do harmless adulterations violate the law of justice if the price of the article be reduced accordingly ?) Satisfaction to retributive justice. (See Part III., page 308.) The question is not now of what is due to Divine ret- ribution, but of penalties inflicted by human law, such as capital punishment, confinement in prison, exemplary dam- * Recent decisions with respect to ' ; trusts" extend the scope of the civil law. 542 INJURY. ages, and the like. These rest upon the just sentence of human law, and not on the satisfaction which the penitent voluntarily offers to the broken law of God. One is bound, therefore, when condemned, to bear the penalty of the law if he be guilty and if the law be just ; but no moral law requires him to come forward and denounce himself. It follows, also, that escape by breaking jail is justly treated as felony by common law, as also " rescue/' or aid- ing another to escape. (Qu. 1. Suppose that the condemned to death or long imprisonment has opportunity to escape without injuring others ; is he guilty before God in doing so ?) Qu. 2. Suppose that he is innocent, or known to be so, what is his right ? What is the duty of the one who knows his innocence ?) Observe that public nuisances, being an injury to the community, are subject to similar retributions of justice, and by common law may be suppressed or fined. Such are houses of prostitution, gambling houses, lotteries, tramps, and vagabonds (Qu. : drinking "saloons"?) (Blackst. iv. 168). CHAPTER VI. CONTRACTS. § 1. Definitions and divisions. As viewed by Moral Theology, these are constantly recur- ring applications of the. laws of justice, especially of com- mutative justice. But common law and moral law some- times move on different lines. What is a contract ? It is an agreement by which one or more persons bind themselves to one or more, collectively or severally, to do, to give, or to omit something. Divisions. (1) Common law supposes some "considera- tion," good or valuable, which makes the contract (a) oner- ous. In morals, however, contract may be (£) gratuitous, which, for our purpose, at least, may include such contracts as " mutuum" and " depositam" (vid. infra). An equitable consideration, however, is of no avail if it tend to deprive third parties of their just rights ; otherwise it will stand, if accompanied by deed or immediate posses- sion. A promise, though morally binding, or a moral duty not- enforceable by law, will not be recognized as adequate con- sideration. In law, a promise is binding only if it have been accepted, and another promise given in exchange, or some act done, which constitutes the consideration. (Qu. : Legal force of subscriptions, apart from expenses incurred in consequence of such subscriptions ?) On the other hand, if the consideration be valuable, law will not inquire into its adequacy if there be no evidence of 544 CONTRACTS. fraud. Inadequacy of consideration, or hardship in fulfill- ing the contract, does not per se avoid a contract, unless fraud, or force, or want of understanding of it, be proved (Blackst. ii. 445). If a benefit accrue to him who makes a promise, or loss to him who accepts it, there is sufficient consideration. (2) Civil law makes four species of contracts : (a) "Do ut des" — e.g., a sale or loan; (b) "facio ut facias" — e.g., marriage, or exchange of services ; (c) "facio ut des," as in the case of employees; (d) "do ut facias," as in hiring workmen for wages. (3) Distinguish, also, express contracts from implied ones; e.g., in employing a person to do work, wherein is implied the contract "do ut facias ; " or in buying goods without express stipulation concerning the price of them, implying the contract "do ut des." In morals, other ex- amples may be found in persons accepting office with the implied contract of faithful fulfilment of its obligations. Express contracts are formally manifested in words or other signs of consent. Implied agreements are "quasi- contracts," in which consent is only implied in suitable action. Thus, a physician, in the exercise of his art, is under what we may call a "quasi-contract" to use his utmost skill and to do all which his profession implies. Where there are social duties to be fulfilled, common law supposes an implied contract which can be enforced. " Im- plied contracts are such as reason and justice dictate, and Which, therefore, the law presumes that every man has con- tracted to perform ; and, upon this presumption, makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-per- formance" (Blackst. iii. 159). (4) Contracts are also either executed or executory in futuro, conveying a " cliose in action." Common law, also, divides them, and therefore divides debts, into (a) parol contracts, which, even if reduced to writing, require consideration, "ex nudo pacto non ori- REQUISITES FOR A VALID CONTRACT. 545 tur actio;''' (b) sealed contracts— i.e., deeds and covenants in which the seal is by common law supposed to be evidence of consideration, although some of the United States have altered this. A deed, also, is not affected by the statute of limitations as ordinary debts are, which are limited to six years, although minors and married women are exceptions to this rule. (Qu. : the moral obligation ?) Also, since the object of the limitation is to bar forgot- ten claims where evidence has been lost, etc., any indirect acknowledgment of the contract will suspend the limita- tion. (c) Contracts of record are judgments, recognizances, etc., and since they have the sanction or order of the court, there is no going back to defect in the original transaction except by writ of error. § 2. Requisites for a valid contract. (1) There must be suitable matter — i.e., things and ac- tions, or whatever falls under full dominion and free administration. Conditions, (a) The matter must be physically and mor- ally possible ; (b) it must be existent, or probable in the future (Qu. : contracts in "futures"?) ; (c) it must be the property of the contractor ; (d) it must be licit, prohibited by no right, otherwise promises and contracts are binding neither in morals nor in law ; (e) it must be determinate in quantity and quality, an individual thing or act, etc. In morals we would be bound in this regard to consider the mutual understanding and intention. (2) There must be a lawful cause. In bilateral exchange the cause is the obligation assumed by the other party. Causeless contract, or one based on false or illicit cause, is binding neither in morals nor in law. (Qu.: Profits gained by a base contract ? See Part II., page 226.) (3) There must be a capable subject of the contract. He C5 540 CONTRACTS. must be in possession of his reason, and not hindered by any law. The contracts of wives, minors, drunken persons, etc., are ruled by the common law. But, by the law of nature, the contracts of those who are morally responsible may be binding on conscience when by human law, which looks to the universally expedient, they are not so binding* I mean that if the contract have been to his injury, one may con- scientiously use the protection of the law ; but he may not benefit himself by his contract, and then shelter himself thus (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 5, § 4). In common law the contract of an infant is voidable ; i.e., it is void if the court find it injurious ; otherwise it may be avoided when the minor reaches full age, or he may enforce it on the other party. His contract for necessities is bind- ing on his guardian. But when a reasonable sum has been allowed for an absent child's expenses, a parent is not liable for his extravagant expenditure. A minor is not legally responsible if he borrow money, but he is answerable for his " torts "" in that or any other matter. (4) Common law requires legal proof of contracts ; but they are equally binding on conscience when there is no legal evidence (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 5). (5) Legitimate consent must be manifested outwardly, but it must also be inward and it must be mutual. Even if the contract be gratuitous, there must be an acceptance of it. Consent, also, must be free and deliberate. An imper- fect act cannot produce perfect obligation. Suppose that a fictitious contract is made, one of the parties to it having no intention of binding himself, or of fulfilling the stipulations of the contract. Although, prop- erly speaking, there may be no contract, because there has been no true inward consent, yet the deceiver is bound in conscience to indemnify the deceived in all damages DEFECTS IN CONSENT. 547 incurred ; and, if he cannot otherwise do so, to stand by his nominal contract. ( Vid. infra, fictitious marriage.) In law and in morals a contract made by an agent within the limits of his authority is completed by his act. But, for legal purposes, distinguish herein general from special agents. The principal acquires the resulting rights and incurs the resulting obligations. Silence gives consent in the case of a contract if the matter be favourable to the silent party. But saying to some third person that you make a coutract with one who is ab- sent is not legally making it. § 3. Defects in consent. Error, fraud, force, and fear, under certain conditions, avoid a contract. (1) Error is (a) with reference to the matter or thing involved in the contract ; (b) with reference to the nature of the contract itself — e.g., renting, selling, etc. Every such error annuls the contract even if, the error having been discovered, the contract have been entered on, unless there has been a renewal of it. Eor the parties must have assented to the same thing in the same sense ; otherwise there was no contract. This is true both in morals and in law. (c) Error respecting the qualities of a thing does not usually void the contract if there be no evidence of fraud. The general rule is, ' ' caveat emptor. " But the quality may be virtually a part of the essence of the thing ; e.g. , in buying a horse, his having some defect which ordinary vigilance cannot discover. In such a case the previous principles will apply. In gratuitous contract, also — e.g., subscription for a char- itable object — error of this kind voids the contract ; for this supposes a fully voluntary act in despoiling one's self with- out any return for so doing. (d) Error respecting the person does not usually avoid an onerous contract, except in the case of matrimony. 548 CONTRACTS. (e) In morals, not in law, error respecting the motive, if that be the final end sought for, invalidates the contract, for it affects the substance of it ; e.g., subscribing to what is reported to be in need when such is not the fact. (2) Fraud is cause of nullity in a nominal contract when without that fraud there would have been no contract made. This means that (a) the fraud must be material to the contract ; that (b) the fraud works actual injury whether the statement be literally true (e.g., stating that property in question is worth so much, when it is heavily mortgaged), or be known to be false when the statement was made ; and (c) that the injured party relied upon the fraudulent state- ment, and had a right to rely upon it. Thus was created a special trust. A false and even injurious statement be- lieved to be true by the person who makes it is not a legal or moral fraud. (See, further, § 5, Sales.) (3) Fear is grave or light, produced from an intrinsic or an extrinsic cause, necessary or free, just or unjust, pro- duced in order to compel the contract or otherwise. All sorts of fear greatly disturbing the reason of a well-gov- erned rational man invalidate a contract ; if they be not so great as to amount to that, they do not avoid a contract. Force, also, moral or physical, is in effect the same. If a contract be made with one who takes wrongful advantage of necessities, or uses actual and extreme violence or threats producing well-grounded apprehension of such violence, that contract is voidable in law. (Qu. : Suppose that the force or fear is for just cause, what is the moral obligation of the contract ?) In gratuitous contracts, however, fear or force counts for more than it does in onerous contracts. The obligation of the contract is to all things fairly im- plied in it, and not merely to the letter of it. The obliga- tion is not created or the contract made binding by an oath GRATUITOUS CONTRACTS. 549 if the contract be per se invalid ; and the oath is void if it cannot be kept without sin. § 4. Gratuitous contracts. (1) A promise is a gratuitous contract in which one freely and spontaneously obliges himself to give something gratu- itously to another, or to do or to omit something in his favour. Conditions, (a) There must be at least the implied will of obligating one's self ; (b) the promise must be free from all error and fraud respecting the thing and the final cause of it, from all compulsion and fear, even though they be just ; (c) the promise must be outwardly given and ac- cepted. Note, therefore, that simple promises usually express merely the purpose of the promiser, and, if all these con- ditions be not present, the promise may be revocable. The promise (WhewelPs El. Moral. III. xv. 377) is to be interpreted like any other contract, not only by the inten- tion of the promiser, but also by the sense in which, with- out amphibology, he at the time believes that it is accepted. This makes the mutual understanding, the implied con- tract. If the conditions on which the promise is made be un- fulfilled, the promise is null, for he that accepted it was bound to do so subject to those conditions. Unlawful promises were void ab initio ; it is an added sin to fulfil them. Here may arise a seeming conflict of duty, for the promisee appears to have a claim on the prom- iser. But we must apply the rules for a perplexed con- science, and the promiser's conscience is to be the judge herein. Fear and force have been already considered. Note that a promise without consideration is not binding in common law. (Qu. 1. Promising the less worthy candidate that you will vote for him ? 550 CONTRACTS. Qn. 2. A promise of marriage, carelessly made, and therefore a sin — should it be kept ?) (2) Donation includes (a) testament. This requires ca- pacity to give de facto and de jure, and also ability to receive on the part of the recipient. Infants, etc., however, may receive through guardians ; but to non-existents in general no testament is valid ; and since in some States a legacy can- not be left to uncertain persons, or to a charitable object apart from an existing corporation, the remedy is to ap- point definite trustees, which should be done in all cases. The limits of age in the capacity to bequeath, as well as of title to receive in other than the natural heirs, etc., are fixed by the laws of the State. {E.g., in New York males must bo eighteen years of age, and females sixteen, before they can make a valid testament.) Observe, as a caution for the priest, the objection in common law to the attending physician or priest or law- yer's receiving a legacy. Note that witnesses ought not to be beneficiaries under a will. Every natural heir on succeeding to his inheritance ought to make allowance for what he has previously received by gratuitous donation. Civil law may seem to contravene the law of nature in requiring legal formalities for a valid tes- tament, but such formalities must be viewed as necessary for the security of society. But if the will of the testator were just and clearly expressed, conscience, says Bishop Taylor (Duct. Dubitant. II. i. rule 5, § 7), is not released from its obligation. This assumes that the rights of prop- erty extend beyond the owner's death. But if, on the other hand, man have not the natural right to direct the succes- sion to his property, such succession is strictly subject even foro conscientim to the law of the land (Blackst. ii. 13). But, again, if the heir accept the testament and act under it, does he not do so subject to all the testator's conditions, even informal ones ? GRATUITOUS CONTRACTS. 551 In cases of doubt, the law must decide, and the general rule applies, l< beati possidentes." (b) Gift. In common as well as in civil law there must be actual delivery or else a deed of gift. Anything else would be construed as a mere promise, for the only valid donation is in prcesenti. Without delivery of the gift there is merely a contract in futuro, which requires a considera- tion. Conditions, (a) The gift must not be prejudicial to creditors ; (b) the donor must be competent to give, e.g., of sound mind at the time ; and (c) not circumvented by false pretences, surprise, or inebriety. Any of these defects will void in law and in morals even a deed of gift. Gifts are either "causa mortis," which come nearer to testaments, or "inter vivos." The former are revocable in the life-time of the donor, if he recover, even after delivery ; not so the latter. (3) " Bailment ;" loans and borrowing. Civil law makes various classes of bailment, which more or less affect moral and legal responsibility in the matter. (a) " Commodatum" is a gratuitous contract by which a thing is granted for the sole use of the " bailee " during a certain time, with the obligation of restoring that thing at the expiration of the appointed time. If revocable at the pleasure of the "bailor," it is called " precarium." (b) " Mutuum" is also a gratuitous loan, but the thing being perishable, a similar thing is to be returned. Money- lending would be an example of mutuum if, as in former ages, interest were illegal and held to be morally wrong. These are ordinary forms of borrowing. But in the former the bailee has no dominion over the thing ; he cannot loan or rent it, and if it be stolen or lost he must give full rec- ompense to the owner, unless he can prove extraordinary care (Instit. iii. tit. xiii.). If the injury have occurred despite all such precautions, he is not morally bound for 552 CONTRACTS. the loss, but the question will be one of civil law as well as of morals.* In mutuum, also, the borrower being solely benefited is bound in case of accidental loss. A quasi contract of this kind is a loan made to a minor, which cannot be recovered in law. So, also, if a payment be made to him when it is not due. (c) "Depositum " is a gratuitous contract where the bene- fit is solely on the side of the bailor, as when valuable papers are left in care of a banker. Imperfect dominion is given, — i.e., of the thing, not of its use. The bailee is bound in re — i.e., he must restore the thing as it was with all its increase, if any there be ; but he may in good faith deliver it to another who claims and is believed to be the rightful owner. He is only answerable for his fraud, or for gross negligence in the care of it. If loss occur otherwise he is not morally answerable for that loss. Similarly, if one find property, he is not bound in justice to take charge of it ; but if he do so, he becomes a deposi- tary, and must use the same care as if the thing were his own, and he is answerable for gross negligence. (Qu. : A lawyer has gratuitous charge of his client's funds ; by forged endorsement they are withdrawn from the bank ; which, if either, is answerable for the loss ? I answer, prob- ably the bank, as having an onerous contract, deriving profits, and being bound, therefore, to use the greater care.) (d) A pledge binds in re, and the bailee {e.g., a pawn- broker) is bound to use ordinary care, for the benefit is supposed to be on the other side. So, he is not answerable if the thing be stolen from him. (e) " Mandatum" is a gratuitous commission where the * A very conspicuous and interesting case of commodatum is that of Carlyle's lending to J. S. Mill the first ms. volume of the French Rev- olution, if this were done simply for Mill's gratification. But how did the loss of the ms. occur? If it were due to the negligence of Mill's servant, the sending of the £200 was an act of justice. OXEEOUS CONTEACTS. 553 mandatory agrees to do something with or about the thing bailed. Being for the exclusive benefit of the bailor, the bailee is held only for gross negligence. If one undertake to do simply what is requested, no property being put in his possession, he is not legally liable unless he begin to execute his agency. In that case he is liable for malfea- sance, but there is no mandatum, no contract in law. § 5. Onerous contracts. In ordinary onerous contract by mutual consent a right is transferred on both sides ; dominion is given by delivery of some thing. (1) " Locatio," hiring, is (a) of things lent for pay. He who hires a thing must take ordinary care ; if he do so, he is not responsible for loss or injury unless his servants were negligent. The owner is bound to keep the thing in good repair, and if the bailee is obliged to do so, he must be rec- ompensed by the owner. But tenants of houses under lease are subject to special rules. What they have added they may remove, if they can do so without injury. (b) "Locatio operis faciendi," as when mechanics are employed to use materials furnished to them. They war- rant ordinary care and the requisite skill. If the work- man deviate from the terms of his instructions or contract, and so render his work of no use, he is entitled to no pay, either in law or in morals. The workman retains a passive lien (not a right of sale) upon the materials for his pay. Inn-keepers are another example of the same. They are liable for loss through servants, other guests, robbery, etc. (If a trunk be lost in the free hack they are liable.) They have a lien for pay on the property, not the person, of their (c) " Locatio merciinn vehendar'um ; " carriers, both pri- vate and common. (The latter carries for any who will hire him ; e.g., cartmen, express agents, etc.) Common carriers are responsible for all loss or injury, except the "act of 554 CONTRACTS. God, or the public enemy." The private carrier is an- swerable only in case of negligence. Without special agree- ment, the carrier can receive only the usual pay. He is bound to deliver what is intrusted to him ; but the common carrier has a lien on the goods for his pay. The private carrier has no such lien. " Miduum," money-lending, has become a case of (a) in modern times. Usury has been debated. Moral justice de- mands that a full equivalent for the loan be returned, and interest will be grounded (1) on the lender's loss, if any, in parting with the money ; or (2) on gain having ceased ; or (3) in the fact that there is risk of losing if the money be lent. By the law of nature you are not bound to risk the losing, except in case of grave necessity. Ordinary fear of loss would give no just title to interest ; extraordinary does. (Qu. : Interest when none of these are true ?) (2) Sale or exchange. (Blackst. ii. 449.) Real property when sold requires the formality of a deed, but a contract to sell binds in law and in morals with due limitations. Personal property may be transferred by parol contract even without immediate delivery. Dominion may be trans- ferred at once, even if the contract name a future day for delivery. If the seller retain possession, he is bound to use ordinary care. In that case gain or loss, if any, accrues to the buyer. If a finder or thief sell, the owner may take wherever he finds, without compensation to the holder. This is moral justice. The thing sold must be substantially as described. Fraud- ulent misstatement avoids a sale. A buyer also is discharged from a sale made under "catching conditions." If the misstatement were not fraudulent, compensation must be made for any loss thereby. This is law and morals. A warranty guarantees all statements. The seller, eveu if ONEROUS CONTRACTS. 555 not asked, is bound to show all substantial defects relatively to the end of the buyer. If asked, he is bound to show secret defects, for then the contract is of the nature of a special trust. The seller is not bound to call attention to manifest defects, if he have charged a suitable price. Special cases are determined by law. " Caveat emptor" applies herein. {Notes on common laiu of sale. If the value exceed $50, in order to bind the contract part must be paid down ("earnest "), or the goods, in part at least, delivered, or a memorandum of the contract signed. But the vendee can- not take the goods unless the price is paid, or the contract has been for future payment. Delivery may be made to a carrier on credit, but the goods may still be stopped in transitu before actual delivery. In such a case loss, if any, falls on the vendee. If, e.g., a horse thus delivered die, the vendor is still entitled to the price. But some of the United States have abolished these restrictions on sale.) (Qu. 1 . May you sell at a high price when you know that there will be a speedy fall ? Yes ; justice does not require you to impart your special information. Qu. 2. Suppose that the article is harmlessly adulter- ated, or the quantity diminished, and the price is propor- tional ?) Monopoly by private persons is immoral, (1) when, by fraud or falsehood, in order to keep up the price, other mer- chandise of the same nature with that monopolized is hin- dered from coming on the market ; (2) when the market is bought up for the same reason ; (3) when false intelligence is spread for the same reason ; (4) when workmen conspire to keep up the price of labour by excluding others. gambling, lotteries are not immoral per se, as con- tracts, but through attendant evils. Relatively large gam- 556 CONTRACTS. bling debts, however, are not binding in conscience, though culled " debts of honour." * * On payment of debts : What is binding in morals may not be binding under civil law, in which, experience has shown the need of many precautions. To be legal tender, the sum must be actually pro- duced, not promised or offered to be produced. It must be uncondi- tionally tendered at the time named. A tender of money cannot be pleaded in an action for general damages, or for a tort, or for volun- tary trespass, or in action against a carrier for goods spoiled, unless he have, by valid contract, limited his responsibility. (Some of the United States, however, have abolished this.) Tender may be made in case of involuntary trespass. Tender of money due on a promissory note stops the interest ; but it admits the contract. One may pay into court what he acknowledges to be due ; and then, if the creditor proceed, it is at his own peril. If he do not recover more than the amount paid into court, costs and interest are saved. The debtor may also plead a "set-off," and pay into court what he claims to be the balance. But set-off is not allowed where damages are un- certain ; as in action for tort, trespass, replevin, etc. (Blackst. hi. page 303}. CHAPTEE vrr. THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. § 1. Sacraments in general. Since the doctrine of sacraments in general as well as of the sacraments individually belongs to Dogmatic Theology, only so much of it need here be indicated as is necessarily assumed in Moral Theology. A sacrament is denned with theological precision in the catechism of the Anglican Church. It is (1) "an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given to us, (2) ordained by Christ Himself, (3) as a means whereby we receive the same and a pledge to assure us thereof." This definition is substantially one with that of other parts of the Catholic Church — e.g., the catechism of Trent ; sc, 11 a visible sign of an inward grace, instituted for our justi- fication.'' In a wider sense the word has been employed in the Church for any sign of a sacred thing, as the Paschal Lamb in the old covenant, " sacrce rei signum " (S. Aug.) ; or for a hidden mystery outwardly signified, "sacrum secre- tumj " or for an oath as a sacred thing. A sacrament is (1) commemorative of the Passion of Christ ; (2) demonstrative of present grace conferred ; (3) prognostic of future glory (Summ. Theol. III. lx. 3). Requisites. It follows that three things are required to constitute a valid sacrament : (1) " An outward and visible sign" for the eye, some material thing or action ; (2) a form of words, a sign for the ear ; (3) a person authorized to administer the sacrament, because it has been ordained by G-od as a means of sanctification, and He, through His agent, is the only one who can confer what is signified. 558 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. The first two requisites are based upon the nature of man (III. lx. 4). Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its nature and limits ; " to each according to his several ability " (8. Matt. xxv. 15). But it is natural to man to arrive at spiritual realities through sensible things ; and a sign is that by which one communicates with another. Hence, since the holy realities which are signified by sacra- ments are spiritual blessings by which man is sanctified, they are outwardly expressed by sensible things, just as God speaks to man in the Holy Scriptures in a similar manner. Considered in themselves, sensible things do not pertain to the kingdom of God (S. John iv. 24 ; Eom. xiv. 17), but only as they are signs of those spiritual realities which belong to that kingdom. (1) The material tiling employed in the sacrament must be substantially that, according to the judgment and cus- tom of men, which was determined by Christ for that pur- pose. For example, the Holy Eucharist requires bread and wine ; nothing else can take their place ; and the bread must be that, leavened or unleavened, which was so named and used at the time when our Lord instituted the Holy Eucharist ; the wine also must be what was known and used as wine. Any substantial change in this regard nulli- fies the religious act as sacrament. There is no sacrament. Thus some other article of food might be taken ; or currant juice, or some other drink ; but, even if ignorantly done, it would be a profane and idle imitation of a sacrament and destitute of inward grace. (2) The form of words (" accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum," S. Aug., Super Joan., 80) is grouuded (a) on the nature of the Incarnate Word who took sensible flesh ; (b) on the nature of man, since " faith comes by hearing ; " (c) on the perfection of the sacrament itself, which is more fully expressed by spoken words than by SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. 559 visible signs. Thus the pouring of water may signify either ablution or cooling; but the words, "I baptize thee/'' manifest that the water is used to signify a spiritual cleansing. The words employed are an inward thought outwardly spoken in whatever language is used among men. Thus the Greek Catholic will say in his language, " The servant of God, 1ST., is baptized/' etc., and the form for lay baptism given in the constitutions of Archbishop Peckham (1279) is : "Icrysten thee in the Name of the Fader, and of the Son, and of the Holy Goste." But the essential form and meaning are preserved. But this being understood, it must be also remembered that Christ, not man, is the author of sacraments, and that the determinate words and matter which are of Divine appointment are essential to the exist- ence of a sacrament. Hence it follows (a) that if either matter or form be essentially defective, there is no sacrament, and the priest must act accordingly, ignoring the so-called sacrament. (b) There may be corrupt intention perverting the words ; e.g., heretical denial of the faith may lead to a pretended baptism "in the name of God" or " of Christ," etc. There is no intention to do what Christ and the Church have ap- pointed ; there is no sacrament. Or a man at his table may say, " Let us eat and drink in memory of our Saviour ;" or in a public assembly, under the influence of the so-called "temperance" movement, grape or currant juice may be distributed. Again there is absence of the requisite inten- tion ; there is no sacrament. (c) Through inadvertence there may be "lapsus Ungues." If more or less voluntary it will be a graver or lighter sin ; but the essential question will be whether the sense of the words has been materially affected or not. In the one case, there is no sacrament ; in the other, the error does not affect it. (cl) A deaf mute cannot act as priest in the most essential 5G0 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. parts of the priestly office. It is impossible to divide a sac- rament so that one person should do the visible part and another use the requisite words. Repetition in case of doubt. Sacraments were made for man, and should be repeated if there be prudent doubt of their validity. Charity, justice, religion demand this. If there be no such grave doubt, it is sin to repeat them. But reverence for the sacrament requires that the repetition be made conditionally, either mentally or in spoken words. (See the rubric at the end of the Office for Private Baptism.) The words, "If thou art not already baptized," etc., are then audibly uttered, lest persons present may think that baptism can be repeated. What has just been said applies especially to those neces- sary rites of the Church of God which can be celebrated only once, viz., Baptism and Holy Orders ; in those the doubt need not be so great as in other cases in order that con- ditional repetition be justified. But a merely light apprehension that the essential words have not been used will not justify repetition ; it is to be taken for granted that all has been duly said and done. The minister of the sacrament contributes nothing to it by his fitness or holiness, although he, like any other,, may add his private prayer for special benediction upon it. The minister, the matter, the words, are one in this respect. God alone works the inward effect of the sacrament, for He alone can reach the soul. Grace is spiritual, and from G-od only. The "character" which is given by some sacraments as a "sealing" of the soul, can only come from Him who uses material agents instrumentally for His supernatural work. The prayers which are used in conferring the sacraments are offered to God, not on the part of any individual, but from the Church, whose prayers are acceptable with God SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. 5G1 (S. Matt, xviii. 19). Any devout person may ask and he heard also. But the effect of the Sacrament is not from any prayer but from the merits of the Passion of Christ, whose power operates in and through His appointed means. The effect is not more because of a worthier ministrant, although the prayer may gain an added blessing. The celebration of sacraments has rites and prayers added by the Church, like the consecration of the water for Holy Baptism; not that they are essential, but for greater solem- nity and decency, and to excite greater devotion and rever- ence in those who receive the sacraments. The Church cannot add to the sacraments, for "they are ordained by Christ Himself" (III. lxiv. 1, 2). It follows from this that the sacraments can be validly administered by those who are in mortal sin, although for themselves they add new sin to their load of guilt by cele- brating in such a state. The instrument acts only through the power of Him who uses it. So the physician who uses the art of his mind in healing others may himself be dis- eased in body ; and the pipe through which water flows may be of silver or of lead. The unbelief of the minister is parallel with any other sin of his. Whether he utterly lack faith or charity, he is still the instrument used by the power of Christ. He may utterly disbelieve that any effect will follow from what he does, but he is not ignorant that the Church for which he acts has faith, and that her faith is expressed in the com- mission which he has received from her. He acts as her agent, and her faith supplies the lack of his. (1) But can one give what he does not possess ? Can the unclean cleanse the impure ? It is not the ministers of the Church who give or cleanse. That is done only by Christ through them by His own power (1 Cor. iii. 5). (2) But is he not cut off from Christ, since only those who " dwell in love dwell in God " ? Yes : but the instru- 5G2 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. nient may be a dead one and cut off from any union with Him who emplovs it, and yet He may do all that He wills by it. (3) What is lacking is not what is essential to the sacra- ment, but what is fitting for decency and reverence (III. lxiv. 5). (Lev. xxi. 17 ; see also the 26th Article of Relig- ion.) It follows, also, that there is no sin in receiving from such an unworthy minister of sacraments. For it is not the in- dividual as such who is resorted to, but the minister of the Church ; and, therefore, as long as he is tolerated by the Church in his ministry, he who receives a sacrament at his hands does not cooperate in the sin, but communicates with the Church which uses such ministry. But if the unworthy minister be suspended or degraded, then he who receives a sacrament from him does cooperate in the sin. It has been said that those who are in a state of sin are guilty in administering the sacraments in such a state, since they are profaning most holy things. But there is no need of perplexity in this truth, as if the same person would sin also in refusing to celebrate the sacrament when it is his duty so to do ; for he can repent of his sin. And if he will not repent he ought to be perplexed, for he sins in refusing or in not refusing to celebrate what he was ordained to per- form. But in case of necessity he would not be sinning in baptizing one who could find no other minister, for even a layman would be justified in celebrating the sacrament in such a case. So with regard to open and avowed heretics, cut off from the body of Christ. They may, and often do, neglect the essentials of a valid sacrament, giving neither it nor its grace. But they may fully observe the requisite form, and then their sacrament is valid and cannot be repeated, al- though the inward grace may be suspended in the recipient until he has found his place in the Lord's body. It is, of course, sin to receive the sacraments from such persons, SACRAMENTS IX GENERAL. 563 and no inward grace can be expected therefrom, unless, perhaps, ignorance is an excuse. It should be understood, also, that the power of confer- ring sacraments pertains to that indelible "character" which is further explained on page 566 ; and one who is suspended or degraded from his office does not lose this power, but he is deprived of the right to exercise it law- fully. He confers the sacrament, but sins in doing so ; and he who receives it from him sins also, and fails of the in- ward part, unless ignorance excuse him (III. lxiv. 9). What shall we say of mock sacraments f The Roman doctrine of intention presents serious difficulties, while the Anglican Church seems to have said nothing upon the sub- ject. It is evident, however, that the sacramental action may have more than one meaning ; it may be done either seriously or in jest. It could hardly be pretended that a profane mockery of Holy Baptism or Holy Eucharist was a valid sacrament because all outward requisites were pres- ent. There is presumed, at least, a serious intention of doing what Christ commanded and what the Church does. But there is patent objection to a sweeping doctrine that true intention is always requisite — sc, how can any one know another's intention ? If, therefore, the intention of the minister be requisite for the perfection of the sacrament, a man can never be sure that he has received it, and must lack the assurance of salvation which it was intended to be- stow. S. Thomas Aquinas's words are so moderate and judi- cious that they seem to be worth quoting in full (III. lxiv. 8) : "Some say that the defect of mental intention in the minister is supplied in the case of children by Christ who inwardly baptizes ; and in adults who devoutly seek the sac- rament by their faith and devotion. And this might be well said as regards the ultimate effect, which is justification from sins. But as regards the 'character' which some sacraments imprint on the soul, it does not seem that de- 5G4 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. vout faith can supply what is wanting in this case, for that is never imprinted except by a perfect sacrament. There- fore, others better say that the minister of the sacrameut acts in the person of the whole Church, and in the words which he utters is expressed the intention of the Church, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament, unless the contrary is outwardly indicated by the minister or the recipient." "Perverse intention perverts the man's work, not an- other's. And, therefore, from the perverse intention of the minister is perverted what he does as man, not what Christ does ; just as if some one with corrupt intention should carry alms to the poor, which his master had sent with kind intention." (The alms would be equally bene- ficial whatever the intention might be.) Of course, this matter of intention should not be mis- understood ; whatever view is taken of it, it does not apply to such cases of distraction as are liable to occur when one does not observe what he is doing while using the most solemn words and actions. In such a case the habitual in- tention of the soul is what counts, although there may be grievous sin in the negligent inattention. The minister's obligation is to give the sacraments cheer- fully and without pay. But he must deny them to the unworthy (S. Matt. vii. 6). This means, (1) that to the secret sinner privately asking, the sacraments must be denied. (2) That to the open and notorious sinner privately or publicly applying, they must be refused (see the rubric be- fore the Order for Holy Eucharist). (3) That the secret sinner publicly presenting himself must not be rejected. Scandal, disturbance, and aversion on the part of others are grave public evils which must be avoided, and the priest is not a partaker of another's sin if he so avoid them. SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL. 565 Requisites in the subject of the sacraments. The recip- ient contributes nothing but his preparation for the super- natural work. He can only supply what is required of him as conditions for receiving the grace. But distinguish what is required of him for a valid sacra- ment, from what is requisite for the inward part of it, the "res sacramenti." The first does not require faith on his part ; for if, un- believing and in a state of sin, he should receive the sac- rament, still it cannot be repeated, if it be a sacrament conferred once for all. Its effect is suspended until the spiritual obstacle is removed. Again, in infants, of course, no preparation or intention is required. But in adults intention to receive is requisite for a valid sacrament, for none can be unwillingly baptized. Other sacraments require that one shall have been previ- ously baptized, for they are ordinances "of the living," sac- raments for the Church. A "sacrament of the dead" — i.e., of one uncleansed from his sin — requires acts of faith, hope, and penitence. And the minister is bound, so far as lies in his power, to see that such spiritual acts are elicited from the candidate for spiritual blessing. For the "sacraments of the living/' still more is requi- site. He that comes must be in a state of grace ; for they are ordained for its augmentation, and they presuppose it. It is an added sin to receive the Holy Eucharist in mortal sin. (See the shorter exhortation to those proposing to re- ceive.) "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily is guilty of the Body and Blood of the Lord." Why are sacraments necessary to salvation ? (1) From the condition of human nature, which is led to spiritual things through corporeal and sensible things; (2) from the present state of man, who by sinning has subjected his affections to sensible things, and it was fitting that God 50H THE LAW OF SACRAMEKTS. should apply His remedies to the disease which makes man incapable of purely spiritual things ; (3) from the character of man's pursuits and actions, which are chiefly engaged in corporeal things. Sacraments are ordained in tender mercy to him who would find it too hard to abstract himself en- tirely from the earthly, while also he must be withdrawn from superstitious use of material things and actions. The grace of God is, indeed, sufficient for all ; but God gives man that grace in a manner fitted to His creature. The Cross of Christ is the sufficient cause of our redemp- tion, but sacraments get their power from that, and apply that to the soul. "All we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into His death " (Rom. vi. 3). The Passion of Christ has made the sacraments instru- mental causes of grace ; i.e., God bestows His gift through them. The instrument is nothing but a material channel for the virtue of the Divine agent (Tit. iii. 5). This being assumed from Dogmatic Theology, now notice that there are some rites of the Church which cannot be repeated, because they stamp permanently on the soul what we have called a "character," like a seal on wax. Indeed " sealing" is the very word employed in Holy Scripture (2 Cor. i. 21). Such rites are Holy Baptism, Confirmation, Holy Orders. Some spiritual power is received for self or for others, either way for God. Thus the baptized are made a "spiritual priesthood/' participators in the eternal priesthood of the First-born among many brethren, offering up spiritual sacrifices acceptable with God through Him (III. lxiii.). Such character or seal is indelible because it gives a share in the everlasting priesthood of Christ (Ps. ex. 4). The mutable soul of man may lose its grace through his own free will ; but the character does not dejoend on man, but on Him who consecrates His people. But what has been said applies only to the Christian rites which have been specified ; not, for example, to the HOLY BAPTISM. 5G7 Holy Eucharist, for it is the completion arid consummation of the Christian life in union with Christ ; therefore it does not confer this sealing which is for a further end. Holy Eucharist can be many times repeated. § 2. Holy Baptism. We must again assume from Dogmatic Theology what is necessary in determining the law of God. The outward and sensible part of the sacrament of Holy Baptism (the matter and the words) is clearly expressed in the catechism of the Anglican Church. It is (1) " water wherein the person is baptized (2) in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.'' The sacrament is an ablu- tion, the " washing of regeneration " (Tit. iii. 5). There is no sacrament in the water as such ; its consecration for its sacred use is a yery expressive rite, but not an essential one. Compare in this regard the great sacrament of the Holy Eucharist. The sacrament consists in the application of the water to the human body after the manner of an ablution ; it is water "wherein the person is baptized/' The word which completes the sacrament is applied to the person receiving it ; ''I baptize thee," or the " servant of God, 1ST., is baptized.'' And observe once more that in the other chief sacrament the word, the form of sacramental words, is applied to the elements, not to the recipient. The inward part is man's justification and illumination — "a death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness; by this sacrament we are made children of grace." "In baptism I was made a member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." In this washing of regeneration is applied to the soul a sealing consummated in Confirmation, an indelible char- acter which marks it forever, whether in glory or in ever- lasting loss. From these dogmatic truths follow — (1) Nothing else can replace the element of water ; that 568 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. is Divinely appointed and no man can make a substitute. " Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God " (S. John iii. 5). (2) The benediction or consecration of the water, though not essential to the sacrament, is not needlessly to be omitted, for it is added as a becoming rite for greater solem- nity and to excite devotion. The rubric does not expressly require it in case of private baptism ; but it is indirectly suggested "if time and present exigence will suffer.'" (3) Since the form of words contains two essential parts — sc, (a) the indicating of the sacramental act which declares the intention of the Church and distinguishes the act from other ablutions, and (b) the naming of Him who inwardly baptizes, according to the commandment given to the Church (S. Matt, xxviii. 19) — baptism "in the name of God," or "in the name of Christ," or any other such for- mula of heresy, is invalid. Such pretended baptism must be entirely ignored. Immersion. It has been said above that the outward part of the sacrament is a corporeal ablution signifying the in- ward ablution of sins. Christ " cleansed the Church by the washing of water with the word " (Eph. v. 26). And this corporeal ablution may be by immersion of the whole body or of the head. This adds a new signification, not indeed essential to the outward rite, but very expressive of its in- ward part, the " burying with Christ in baptism/' Since the head is the principal member of the body and the chief seat of the soul, it, if not the whole body, is im- mersed, or water is poured on it. Such immersion was the usage of the primitive Church, as we find, for example, clearly indicated in S. Chrysostom's 24th Homily on S. John : "We burying our heads in water as in a sepulchre, the old man is buried ; submerged, it is hidden there, and again arises in the new life." It is certainly wise to follow the more general usage of HOLY BAPTISM. 569 the Catholic Church through eighteen centuries, although the prevailing custom has usually the warrant of necessity or charity — necessity in the case of the feehle and sick, who would otherwise die unbaptized or be put to the greatest risks ; and it hardly need be said that sacramental obligations do not override the laws of natural right. It is no less open to remark that three thousand persons cannot rationally be supposed to have been immersed in or near Jerusalem in one day (Acts ii. 41). Charity may no less imperatively demand the alternative pouring (sprinkling, though valid, being illegal in the An- glican Church). The usual scruples of parents in the case of infants, the absence of sufficiency of the element, the severity of a northern climate rendering baptism in outdoor waters a risk of life, the feebleness of the recipient even when the biptism is not clinic — all these and the like render needless any scruples respecting deviation from the preva- lent rule of the Church in favour of the exceptional mode, which also has the sanction of every age of the Church. The priest, of course, is bound to be sure that the water flows upon the head ; for without this there is no signifi- cant washing. And indifferent or unbelieving carelessness in this regard is the ground for conditional baptism in the case of converts from religious sects more or less heretical with respect to sacraments. Trine immersion or pouring. Either one or three ablu- tions is valid ; the former signifying the unity of the Name, the latter the three Divine persons named. The laws of the Church in this regard have varied at different periods ; but our own ancient and still unrepealed rule points to the trine immersion or pouring. See also the 50th Apostolical Canon : " If any bishop or presbyter does not perform the one initiation with three immersions, but with giving one immersion only, into the death of the Lord, let him be de- posed. For the Lord said not, Baptize into My death [it is 570 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. subordinate in signification], but, ' Baptize all nations in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.' " Why cannot baptism de repeated when a convert is re- ceived into the outward communion of the Church? (1) Since it is the spiritual new birth, it can be had only once (S. John iii. 5 ; Heb. vi. 4). (2) We are baptized into Christ's death, and rise with Him into a new life ; this can only once be done. (3) An indelible character is given. The minister of Holy Baptism. The priest receives in his ordination authority to " dispense the word of God and His holy sacraments." This gives validity to his official acts ; but he must also have jurisdiction in each particular application of his authority in order that it may be lawful. See Canons of the American Church, title i. 12, § 6 : " No minister . . . shall officiate either by preaching, reading prayers, or otherwise, in the parish, or within the parochial cure, of another clergyman, unless he have re- ceived express permission for that purpose,'' etc. (Qu.: Parishioners leaving tkeir parish for the official services of another priest ? Has that other priest jurisdiction in such a case ?) As the title of the office of deacon indicates, it is not part of his official wort to bnptize. As a work of charity, in case the official minister of the sacrament is not accessible, he may baptize infants. So may a layman, but the deacon more fully represents the authority of the Church from which the sacramental commission proceeds, and may cele- brate a solemn public baptism, which the layman may not do. What the priest's conscience ought to tell him the Church has been careful to enforce so far as in her lies. See the unrepealed canons of 1603, Nos. 68 and 69 : " No minis- ter shall refuse or delay to christen any child . . . HOLY BAPTISir. 571 that is brought to him upon Sundays or hol}'-days to be christened, . . . convenient warning having been given him thereof before. . . . If he shall refuse to christen . . . he shall be suspended by the bishop of the dio- cese from his ministry by the space of three months." "If any minister, being duly, without any manner of col- lusion [false pretexts for not bringing a child to church], informed of the weakness and danger of death of any infant un baptized in his parish, and thereupon desired to go up or come to the place where the said infant remaineth, to bap- tize the same, shall either wilfully refuse so to do or of pur- pose, or of gross negligence shall so defer the time that . . . it dieth through such his default, unbaptized : the said minister shall be suspended for three months ; and before his restitution shall acknowledge his fault, and prom- ise before his ordinary that he will not wittingly incur the like again." Lay baptism. Unrepealed canons provide for this in case of pressing need ; although the first rubric on the sub- ject in the Order for Private Baptism names a "lawful minister." But, in the inquiries to be made respecting the child supposed to be baptized, the matter and the words are all that are named as essentials to baptism. God has ordained for this sacrament the most universal element, essential to man's life, so that it is the rarest thing in his experience to be where water cannot be had. And so this sacrament, " generally necessary to salvation/' can rarely be desired when it may not be had. In case of pressing need, then, any man, or, in his absence, any woman, should do this work of charity. It would be grave sin, however, for the layman to take the priest's official duty upon himself when God's ordained minister can be had ; for he would be offending against the reverence due to so great a solemnity. It follows from this that baptism by heretics, by any out- 572 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. side of the Church's communion, is valid, if matter and words be duly employed. Provision is made for condi- tional baptism if there be prudent doubt concerning this ; but the Church makes no question concerning the person who administered the sacrament. (1) But how can an unbaptized man give what he does not possess ? I answer that the minister of the sacrament supplies only the outward part; it is Christ who inwardly baptizes, and He can use all men at His will. (2) But how can such an one be a minister of the Church, and receive another into the body of Christ to which he does not himself belong ? But he can intend to do what the Church does, and we suppose that he employs the Church's form ; and Christ's power is not bound to baptized men any more than it is limited to His sacra- mental means. (3) But if such a man cannot receive the other sacraments, how can he do a greater thing, sc, confer one of them ? The answer is that this sacrament is necessary to salvation, and therefore G-od provides for its administration generally where it is desired (III. Ixvii. 5). (See, further, a clear and fuller statement of the question in Blunt's Annotated Book of Common Prayer, Introduc- tion to Offices for Holy Baptism.) It is unseemly, to say the least, for a priest to baptize his own child. Sponsors. Although the 29th canon of 1603 requires that they shall be communicants, and decent regard for the office would demand the same thing, yet our recent permission to parents to act as sponsors, if it be so desired, seems to be a relaxation of the older discipline ; for parents may be, and in fact often are, godless people. Apart from this permission, it were better to have a single sponsor or none at all beside parents, rather than that there should be a profane mockery of a solemn obligation by nominal spon- HOLY BAPTISM. 573 sors who have no intention of accepting the obligations involved. And the American Chnrch makes provision for a contingency of this kind. Sponsors are to present the child, " when they can be had." The parental relation is not directly recognized in the rite. God-fathers and god-mothers present the child, re- ceive it from the priest, and are charged with its spiritual care, which they may see to directly or indirectly. For in the case of a Christian household it may often be assumed that parents will do their duty in the religious education of their children. But if there be reason to apprehend the contrary, the sponsors become directly answerable to God and the Church, so far as their power extends. Private baptism is only lawful in case of "great cause and necessity." Of course, sponsors are not to be employed, for the child is required to be presented in church for a public reception there, when the sponsor's office is called for. (Qn. : Can a priest be permitted to violate the law of the Church when wilful lawlessness refuses to bring a child to church ? May he plead the law of charity ? Or must the sin lie at the door of those who know their duty and will not do it ?) The recipient. He who neither is baptized nor wishes to be baptized, cannot enter the kingdom of God (S. John iii. 5), for there is manifest contempt of the sacrament. But the desire proceeds from living faith, through which God inwardly sanctifies His creature ; and since He is not limited to His own means, He may count the will for the deed, and inwardly justify without the outward sacrament (TIL lxviii. 2). Since the baptism of infants cannot lawfully be deferred, the rubric requires the pastor to admonish the people often that they defer not the baptism of their children longer than the first or second Sunday after their birth, or other holy-day falling between, unless upon a great and reason- 574 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. able cause. Such, cause would doubtless be in many places the inclemency of the seasou. But parents should be also instructed not to let a mother's wish to be present stand in the way of dutiful obedience to a law based upon the great necessity of this sacrament. But in the case of adults there is more than one reason why Baptism should not be hastily administered : (1) The Church takes reasonable care not to be deceived, examining the candidate's faith and morals ; (2) she needs time for instruction and spiritual exercises of the candidate ; (3) she has usually preferred such solemn times as the eve of Easter and Pentecost, although special exigency, peril, and the like will override such reasons for delay. The sacrament is for sinners, ordained for their cleans- ing (Eph. v. 26). But habitual sinners, who have no fixed intention of abandoning every evil course of life, cannot be baptized. ("He who made thee without thy cooperation, will not new create thee without it" — S. Aug.) (1) They cannot be incorporated into Christ, which is the object of the sacrament (Gal. iii. 27) ; (2) there can be no cleansing when the will to sin remains ; (3) there must be no falsity in the sacramental sign ; and the outward sign of coming for ablution is utterly false if there be no fixed desire for inward purification (III. lxviii. 4). Conditions. (1) The candidate for Holy Baptism is a voluntary, if a passive agent. (" Wilt thou be baptized in this faith ? " ) It would be manifest profanity, and no sac- rament, if the form were used for one who was forced, or in any way unwilling to receive it. Man can die to the old life only by free renunciation of it ; he must intentionally desire the new life. If such a profanation of the holy sacrament should ever occur, it must be treated as void ; the sacra- ment must be duly administered when the penitent sincerely desires it (III. lxviii. 7). (2) While true penitence for the past and a purpose to lead HOLT BAPTISM. 575 a new life are required, and the priest must have reasonable assurance of this, a confession to him is not to be required. If the penitent wish so to do he is not to be refused ; but no penance is to be imposed, no absolution given ; the con- fession is only for deeper repentance, for truer confession to God, for more serviceable counsels resj^ecting the new life. (3) The justifying grace of God is given only to faith ; therefore a right faith, explicit concerning the chief truths of the Gospel, implicit concerning all that God has revealed through His Church, is requisite (Rom. iii. 22). "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved " (S. Mark xvi. 16). This is not requisite for the character which is imprinted by God only and which is not perfected through faith. If one be truly baptized without the true faith, say, into an heretical sect, the baptism is valid ; but no remission of sins is given, since that requires faith. ("Dost thou believe all the articles of the Christian faith ? I do/') One who is baptized may not have full faith i-especting the sacrament ; but he must intend to receive what Christ instituted and the Church delivers ; that is implied in the very act of presenting himself. ("Wilt thou be baptized in this faith ? That is my desire.") The haptism of infants. (See the 27th Article of Relig- ion.) Rom. v. 17, 18, applies to infants as included in the human race. They are able to receive the grace from their Lord, the character from God. S. John iii. 5 is absolutely universal in its application. Herein, also, is secured, as far as is possible, the nurture of children in the Christian life. They cannot bring the intention which is required in adults, but the intention of others offers them and is warranted by the Gospel. "As from others they derive the sins which are remitted in baptism, so by others they believe " (S. Aug., Cont. duas epist. Pelag., i. 22). 576 THE LAW OP SACRAMENTS. The parents may be unbelieving, but " children are offered to receive spiritual grace, not so much by those who hold them in their arms as by the whole society of the faithful, by whose charity they are united to the communion of the Holy Ghost" (S. Aug., ad Bonifac, ep. 98). Consent of parents. It is contrary to natural justice that children who have not reached maturity of conscience and judgment should be baptized without their parents' con- sent. (Qu. : Suppose that one parent consents and the other refuses ?) When they have reached such age as to be morally and spiritually responsible for their actions in what belongs to Divine and natural law, they are answerable for themselves, and may be baptized without their parents' consent. Human law then holds minors answerable for their actions in similar manner. WJiat shall we say of idiots and the insane ? If the latter, in their previous rational state, penitently desired the sacra- ment, the suspension of outward manifestations of reason through brain disease is no hindrance to the grace of Christ which they need ; they should be baptized. (Cp. Conf. S. Aug. iv. 4.) If they never expressed such a desire, and no charitable ground exist for supposing that they had inward desire and preparation, they should not be baptized. But the case of idiots, born so, is like that of infants. They are human in their immortal spiritual nature, although its outward action is impeded by defective physical constitu- tion. They should undoubtedly be admitted into the king- dom of God, wherein they may have their place when they are set free from life-long bondage (III. lxviii. 12). § 3. Confirmation. Confirmation has its " outward and visible sign of an in- ward and spiritual grace." That this sign was used and CONFIRMATION". 577 appointed by the apostles is unquestionable, and it was therefore virtually, if not actually, "ordained by Christ Himself as a means whereby we receive the grace and a pledge to assure us thereof." But it holds a subordinate and complementary place with respect to Holy Baptism, as the means of conveying the seven-fold gifts which jDerfect the greater and more neces- sary sacrament. The new birth is only the first step towards moral and spiritual manhood. The natural virtues, as we have seen (Part I., page 69), need to be lifted up to the higher plane of the spiritual life, and the seven-fold gifts are ordained for this purpose, making the soul prompt to follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and ready in His strength for conflict with the world, the flesh, and the devil, not only inwardly for self, but outwardly against Christ's enemies. This may justify Bishop Cosin's words, " The nature of this holy sacrament (for so we need not fear to call it in a right sense) will be more easily understood/' etc. But the Catechism of the Anglican Church excludes it from the rank of the two greater sacraments " generally necessary to salvation." Otherwise it would always be con- ferred, as the Eastern Church, adhering to primitive usage, confers it, at the same time with Holy Baptism. It hardly needs to be added that wilful refusal, virtual contempt of God's ordinance, is a bar to salvation. The visible sign or "matter" The Church has used as the matter of Confirmation either the laying on of hands, the sign of grace conveyed ; or unction, the Scriptural sign of the Holy Ghost, or both of them. Both appear to have Scriptural warrant (Acts viii. 14 ; xix. 6. Heb. vi. 2. 2 Cor. i. 21. 1 John ii. 27). Those who have regarded Confirmation as a sacrament in the narrowest sense of the word have not agreed respecting the essential matter, the visible sign. But the Anglican 37 578 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. Church, by her action in recent ages, has shown that she re- gards the laying on of hands as the essential sign ; the other as an added expression of significant meaning, which may be omitted without detriment to the rite. The words or form. The Anglican Church does not seem to regard any form of words as essential to this ordinance, which fact again will distinguish it from the greater sacra- ments, wherein the words admit of no essential change. The spiritual grace, as already intimated, is that of strength for spiritual combat. It is a further " sealing/' in addition to that of Holy Baptism, and is so called in Holy Scripture. It also imprints a character. The spiritual priesthood of the Christian receives a grace for its outward manifestation. The age for Confirmation. As a "sealing " and the comple- ment of Holy Baptism, it naturally follows immediately after the greater sacrament (Tert., De Bapt. vii. 8 ; S. Cypr., ep. 70). But the Anglican Church indicates the reason for de- ferring what is not absolutely necessary to salvation, saying, " To the end that Confirmation may be ministered to the more edifying of such as shall receive it, the Church hath thought good to order that none [hereafter] shall be con- firmed but such as can say the creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments ; and can also answer to such other questions as in the short catechism are contained ; . . . to the end that children being now come to years of discre- tion [i.e., power to distinguish between right and wrong]," etc. Here is no fixed rule established respecting the age of confirmation ; nor is there any rule elsewhere appointed. To the same effect, but more precisely, is the charge given to sponsors : "Ye are to take care that this child be brought to the bishop to be confirmed by him, so soon as he can say," etc. With careful instruction according to the charge given, children should ordinarily be ready on or before the CONFIRMATION. 579 age of twelve, and they will have power of moral ff discre- tion;" but circumstances certainly vary too Avidely for any more precise rule to be given. Instruction of children. Both the English and the American Church make this very explicitly the duty of parish priests, and of deacons whose official duty it is "to instruct the youth in the Catechism." The 59th canon of 1603 begins, "Every parson, vicar, or curate, upon every Sunday and holy-day, shall, for half an hour or more, ex- amine and instruct the youth ... in the Ten Command- ments, the Articles of the Belief, and in the Lord's Prayer ; and shall diligently hear, instruct, and teach them the Cate- chism set forth in the Book of Common Prayer." The American Church is less definite, although she orders to the same effect (title i. can. 19) : "The ministers of this Church who have charge of parishes or cures, shall . . _ . be diligent in instructing the children in the Catechism." Whatever may be said of " Sunday-schools," it seems quite certain that "Bible lessons" there are no substitute for this obligation, but rather, on the contrary, an immoral evasion of a sacred duty. The American Church has even ordered the duty of the diocesan with regard to Confirmation (title i. can. 13, § 11) : "Every bishop in this Church shall visit the churches within his diocese at least once in three years, for the pur- pose of . . . administering the apostolic rite of Con- firmation," etc. risites for Confirmation. (1) The unbaptized cannot be confirmed, for the grace is the complement of that of Holy Baptism. Baptism is the gate which admits to all Christian privileges ; and outside of that door there are no sacraments. Therefore, if one discover that his reputed bap- tism was void, he should be again presented for Confirmation, 580 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. even if lie have gone to the bishop before. (The same prin- ciple applies to Holy Orders. An unbaptized person cannot receive the grace ; he has never been validly ordained, even if the outward form have been celebrated for him.) (2) Since Confirmation is a "sacrament of the living," he that receives it must be in a state of grace ; he must bring a penitent and believing soul, according to his age and capac- ity ; but the grace conferred, if rightly received, may deepen that penitence and faith. The faithful pastor has the one special opportunity in the life-time of his spiritual charge for the most direct and thorough private spiritual guidance. The age of the candidate, the tender and solemn feelings awakened, the dawning sense of responsibility to God and man, the special possibility at that period of a true conver- sion from the errors of childhood, open a way for God's priest to the inmost recesses of the soul, whither he may carry the Word of Life. Woe to him if he negligently prefer his own ease to this private ministration to each indi- vidual soul. Such a time is an eminently proper one to encourage the young disciple to make his first confession, if, as is prob- able, his conscience, being awakened by the admonitions given, be not at rest. He will need little encouragement to "open his grief," although the Church has given no such exhortation to him as lie will receive at the time of his first communion. (3) In case of doubt, conditional Confirmation is permis- sible, although the obligation is not to be pressed on one who reasonably thinks that he has received the sacrament. The sick are to be confirmed if they desire and Confirma- tion can be had ; but it is not to be urged as " necessary to salvation. " Finally, "there shall none be admitted to Holy Com- munion until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 581 desirous to be confirmed." If fit and prepared for the lesser rite, be is fit and prepared for the greater, and not otherwise. But, also, if fit and prepared for the receiving of the Lord's Body and Blood, he cannot refuse the grace and the "apos- tolic rite" without the mortal siu of contempt of God's order. If the thing be known, it is an " open and notorious sin." But the law of the Church which binds the priest's con- science always, because it is a negative precept, must not be misunderstood. As in the case of any other sin, a person who publicly presents himself while guilty of this contempt, cannot be excluded from Holy Communion without grave scandal. "Admission" must therefore be regarded as ex- press consent given to a person's so presenting himself. A priest cannot give such consent without violation of law, which is an offence against God and man. § 4. The Holy Eucharist. Moral Theology cannot present the law which binds our consciences respecting this transcendent mystery without assuming from Dogmatic Theology the revealed truth con- cerning it. The law is based on the truth. He that rejects the law virtually denies the truth. He that denies the truth knows no law claiming his obedience for which he must answer before the bar of God. It is not possible here to do more than briefly to state the truth as the Catholic Church receives it, and in her litur- gies gives it, teaches it, and confesses it by her faith before God. Lex credendi is both lex orandi and lex faciendi. Many questions, also, regarding the manner of celebrating this august rite, answers to which bind the devout priest as part of his law, must be relegated to the department of liturgies and ritual. First in order of time the Holy Eucharist is a sacrifice, a sacred thing offered to God in memory of the Cross and Passion of the Lord, a sacrifice of thanksgiving for the inef- 582 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. fable benefits of that meritorious sacrifice which it presents before God through the great High Priest. It is offered for the obtaining of " remission of sins, and all other benefits of Christ's Passion." Secondly, it is a Holy Communion through which we participate in the perfect nature of Christ, perfect God and perfect man in one indissoluble unity, and through Him are united to one another in the mystical Body. It is the " Viaticum " as the appointed way to the future glory of the saints. We will consider the doctrine and the law of each. (1) The Holy Communion. The outward part or sign is " bread and wine which the Lord hath commanded to be received."' The inward part, the " res sacramenti," is " the Body and Blood of Christ which are verily and indeed (spirit- ually) taken and received by the faithful," i.e., the baptized people of Christ. Here at once we must notice a distinction between this sacrament and what we have previously examined. The in- ward part of Baptism is " a spiritual grace," whereas in the Holy Eucharist the inward part is distinct from "the bene- fits whereof we are partakers thereby." It is really and truly what is signified by the outward part. No such thing can be affirmed of Holy Baptism. The consecrated water is not per se the sacrament; that consists in the ablution with the use of the sacred Name ; but receiving bread and wine in memory of the Lord's Passion is not the Holy Eucharist. This is completed in the consecration, although consump- tion perfects the sacrifice. The sacrament, sign and thing, was ordained for the food of the soul. The consecration makes such food by the power of Him who is the Giver and the Food. The truth of the Real Presence, then, is essential to a comprehension of the Divine law of the sacrament. The THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 583 inward part of the sacrament is really and truly in, with, and under the outward part, but spiritually, not after the manner of natural bodies, because the Lord's body is glori- fied ; therefore not locally subject to laws of time and space. This Real Presence, real because not figurative nor merely virtual, is admitted to be unimaginable, because our knowl- edge of body is derived through the senses, and the body of the Lord is not subject to the laws of sense. The Presence is discerned by reason and faith alone. " If thou hast spir- itually understood the words of Christ respecting His Body, they are spirit and life to thee ; if thou hast understood them carnally, they are still spirit and life, but not for thee" (S. Aug., Super Joan. 27). But the Presence is the presence of Christ, God and Man ; where His glorified Body is, there is His glorified Soul, and there, in special manner, is His Divinity, which was never separated, not even in death, from His human nature. The " res sacramenti " indeed is the glorified Body and Blood; but by natural " concomitance,'' all that Christ is, is there, making "His Flesh meat indeed, and His Blood drink indeed." He is in both parts of the sacrament, for they are one and not two ; but He is there in different manner, and for different ends. Where His glorified Body is, there is His Blood, for " He dieth no more." But it is joined to His Body by natural concomitance, not by the act of consecration. And the case is similar in the sacrament of the Precious Blood. Both re-present the " full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice," but the sacrament of the Precious Blood specially re-presents that which was shed for the "re- mission of sins." * Christ is not present after the manner of bodies with their three dimensions. However the consecrated elements * Two elements do not make two sacraments. There is one spiritual food (S. John vi. 56), though there are two outward parts, because it derives its virtue from the Passion of Christ which it commemorates, and in that Passion His Blood was separated from His Body. 584 THE LAW OF SACKAMESTTS. are divided, the Presence is not withdrawn from any part. Each and every part is a perfect sacrament, outward and inward. The law of the sacrament The matter, the outward and visible sign, must be, (1) wheaten bread, the purest that can be obtained. The common article sold under that name, more or less mixed, may suffice for a valid sacra- ment ; but believing reverence will certainly seek for some- thing different, if it may be had ; " the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten " (English rubric). It may be leavened or unleavened ; and the laws of the Catholic Church from the earliest ages have differed in this respect ; but the words of the English rubric as they now stand — sc, " It shall suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten" — -compared with the rubric of 1549, sug- gest that the law of the Western Church is not repealed, but only permission given to deviate from it for weighty and sufficient reasons. Very good reasons, based on decency and reverence, may be given for complying with the old law and custom of the English Church, as renewed at the Eeformation : " It is meet that the bread prepared for the Communion be made . . . unleavened and round, as it was afore, but without all manner of print," etc. " And men must not think less to be received in part than in the whole, but in each of them the whole Body of our Saviour Jesus Christ." (2) The wine must be true wine; i.e., the juice of the grape, not that of currants, apples, or the like. Christ so constituted His sacrament, and man has no power to change it. The unfermented juice of the grape is certainly unlawful material ; whether it annul the sacrament is, perhaps, an open question. But, also, it must not be over- looked that pure wine being liable to acetous fermentation, if that change be complete, there can be made no sacrament THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 585 of the Blood. The consecration must be repeated with true wine.* The mixed chalice, following the example of our Lord, who blessed the cup to which a little water had been added, has the warrant of all parts of the Catholic Church, was required by rubric at the Eeformation, and is most expressively significant of the union of the Divine and human, first in the Incarnation, then in the Holy Com- munion. But the omission of the rubric undoubtedly sus- pends the law. Whether the opposite usage is now obliga- tory is quite another question. (See the recent judgment of the Archbishop of Canterbury.) The quantity of water added must be very small. The form. The words of consecration spoken in the per- son of Christ, who invisibly consecrates, are invariable. The nature of the sacrament itself is illustrated by com- paring the variable words in communicating the faithful with the absolutely unchangeable form of consecration. S. Thomas Aquinas, III. Ixxviii. 1, clearly presents the sub- ject : iC This sacrament differs from the other sacraments in two particulars ; first, that this sacrament is perfected in the consecration of matter ; but other sacramental rites in the use of consecrated matter. Secondly, in those the consecration consists only in a benediction, . . . but in the Holy Eucharist it consists in a change which can be accomplished only by God's power. Hence the minister in this sacrament can only utter the words. [In Baptism he must pour the water ; in Confirmation he must lay his hands on the candidate, etc.] And, therefore, the form of this sacrament, as suitable to the end, differs from other like forms in two respects. First, the others imply the use * As there is reason for thinking that the consecration of the bread is completed before the other copsecration is begun, it may be held that the previous consecration counts, and that the wine only, if it can possibly be obtained, need be consecrated. 586 THE LAW OF SACHAMENTS. of a sign, as, e I baptize thee ' (or, ' Keceive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands'). But the form of this sacrament expresses only the consecra- tion of matter. And, secondly, other like forms are ex- pressed, like those just given, in the person of the minister, either as doing the act, or claiming authority, or imploring the Divine gift (as in the absolution of the liturgy, ' Have mercy upon you,' etc.). But the form of this sacrament is uttered in the person of Christ, that all may understand that the minister contributes nothing to its perfection, but only utters the words " (while Another consecrates the elements). The minister. The priest in his ordination receives au- thority to consecrate the Holy Eucharist. He is enjoined to be "a faithful dispenser of the Word of God and of His holy sacraments," of which this one is chief. But he needs power of jurisdiction if he exert his office for the benefit of the faithful. He is not a minister to all man- kind, but to that flock committed to his care. And we have seen already (page 570) the law of the Church which regulates this jurisdiction. If Holy Orders are indelible, however, lawlessness or any other sin— e.g., heresy or schism — does not take away the power of making a valid Eucharist. The priest sins in using his functions, and the res sacramenti gives him no spiritual grace, but rather that condemnation for unworthy approach to sacred mysteries of which the apostle speaks. And the faithful are certainly bound to avoid him, and not to be partakers of his sins (2 Ep. S. John v. 11). Distinction, however, must be made between one who is publicly sentenced by the Church and one who is privately known to be wrong. For the latter is still tbe minister of the Church, and it is not partaking of his sin to join in his sacrifice where he has jurisdiction, and to receive the Holy Communion from his sinful hands. THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 587 Doctrine and law of reception. How can we express in few words the benefits which are partaken by a devout reception of the Holy Communion ? They are all which Christ gives to the loving soul ; for, in giving Himself, He gives all— (1) Increase of grace previously bestowed, sustain- ing and strengthening the spiritual life ; (2) new gifts of grace according to devout prayer for it ; (3) the weakening of sinful concupiscences, so that devout reception becomes a spiritual medicine for the weak ; (4) through increase of love, and therefore more sincere contrition, pardon for ven- ial sins committed ; (5) union with Christ (S. John vi. 56) ; (6) union with His members in the one mystical Body ; (7) preservation in future temptations ; and, lastly, (8) the pledge of glory (v. 54). Tin's is a sacrament of the living, and he that eats must first be cleansed (1 Cor. xi. 29). If he himself place impedi- ments in his way, he cannot be united with Christ, though he receive His Body and His Blood. (See 29th Article of Eeligion.) He is not a "partaker of Christ;" i.e., he does not spiritually receive the precious nutriment of his soul. The distinction, then, between a sacramental reception and a spiritual communion is real and fundamental. The sacramental may lack the spiritual effect, while, on the other hand, the rubric respecting the communion of the sick gives most explicit instruction concerning spiritual communion where there is a hearty desire and preparation for sacramental communion. Children who have not reached the "age of discretion" are not in the Western Church admitted to sacramental communion, yet it would surely be derogatory to the love of their Saviour to suppose that the devout desire of the Church which brings them to Holy Baptism is unavailing for their spiritual communion with Him. But he that receives in mortal sin is further guilty of sacrilege. He signifies by his act that he is united with 588 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. Christ and incorporated in the mystical Body, which cannot be without faith and love. Therefore he acts a profane lie. He may do this ignorantly — ignorant of the law which he has broken, but which does not excuse him for his igno- rance ; or, ignorant of his sin, because he has not examiued himself as he is bound to do (1 Cor. xi. 28) ; and he sins in receiving, because his very ignorance is sinful. But, again, he may grieve for his sin, and resolve to avoid it, while he has not that perfect contrition which would spring from perfect love ; then his contrition will be deepened in the reception itself. He has not sinned in the reception. Or he may have forgotten his sin even with due examination of himself ; then his general contrition will doubtless make him a worthy communicant (III. lxxx. 4). What was said (page 564) with reference to the minister's giving the sacraments to the unworthy need not be here repeated. Fasting communion. Catholic custom and law are un- varying in this respect. The few exceptions only prove the rule. S. Augustine is trustworthy witness to usage when he says (Ep. ad Januarium, 54) that that custom "is ob- served throughout the world ; " so that he is bold to say : " It pleased the Holy Ghost that in honour of so great a sacrament the Lord's Body should enter the mouth before other food." The words "fasting communion" may be somewhat mis- leading, since fasts are an exercise of penitential devotion. Such fasting precedes the day of reception ; but here the words simply imply that the Holy Food shall be the first to be taken on the day of reception, counting from the begin- ning of that clay. Communion in the evening naturally involves a violation of this law and custom. Spiritual devotion, from which are gained the effects of this sacrament, naturally demands that the offering of the THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 589 soul in Holy Eucharist be the first duty of the new day ; and if an act of private thanksgiving be added, there will be, after reception, a decent separation made between the heavenly banquet and the common table of home, with the other occupations of the day. At the same time, it should surely be remembered that "fasting communion " is not a moral law, but an outward observance, which, like any other positive law of Church or State, admits of exceptions. Even where the law is strictest, exception is made in case of communion of the sick. And parity of reasoning may apply the same judgment to other cases of infirmity, especially in a rigorous northern climate. For no merely positive law overrides the certain demands of a weak, sickly nature ; nor should such be de- prived of sacramental communion when it may be had. (Qu. : If necessity, which knows no law, compel a viola- tion of the rule for the sake of charity, is there any good reason for partial abstinence ?) Decent reverence for the consecrated water of Holy Bap- tism requires that it be carefully removed ; say, by an outlet at the bottom of the font, or otherwise. And yet that water is not a sacrament. But the sacrament of the altar is per- fected in the consecration, and the res sacrament i remains there as long as the outward part endures in its natural con- dition of bread and wine. Hence comes the obligation of reverent consumption of what remains after communion, and the profanity of carelessness respecting fragments of the consecrated elements. Wilful negligence is due either to unbelief in the Church's doctrine or to sinful profanity. Also, it will be seen that if taken from the church to the sick, or kept for that purpose, it is still the sacrament, both matter and thing. The "Viaticum." Although the Greek Church gives the Holy Communion to infants after their baptism, the general 590 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. law of necessity of sacramental reception seems to apply to those who have some nse of reason, however imperfect it may be, and who can therefore offer some inward devotion in their receiving. This being understood, it appears that the Viaticum should be administered to all baptized persons who are old enough to receive it devoutly, and have shown some desire for it, some inward devotion to the Lord who died for them, some contrition for their errors and their sins, the minister putting the most charitable con- struction upon words uttered in feebleness, and perhaps in pain. The fact that before the priest arrives to give the Viati- cum the sick has lost his reason, can hardly be considered a bar to fruitful reception, if previously he were penitently desirous and prepared to receive it. The sick is like the in- fant receiving Holy Baptism, but has added his own faith and love to his spiritual needs. If he is to be debarred, would not distraction of mind at the instant of receiving be also a bar to fruitful reception on the part of the most sincere penitent who presents himself at the altar ? Surely the love of Christ finds no obstacle in such a case. This also is the law of the Church whenever she has made any declaration upon the subject ; e.g., of the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 76 : ce If it is believed that he is dying, having sought reconciliation with Cod before his delirium, let him be rec- onciled by the laying on of hands, and let him receive the Holy Eucharist." One who has never had the use of reason, or has never shown evidence of penitence and desire for the Viaticum, must be left to his Judge. (Qu. : Can the deacon, in case of absolute necessity, carry the Viaticum and admin- ister the same ?) Frequent communion is rather a matter of counsel than of precept. But the law of the Anglican Church fixes a mini- mum in three times a year. (Canons 21 and 22 of 1603) : " Every lay person is bound to receive the Holy Commun- THE HOLY EUCHARIST. 591 ion thrice every year," " whereof the feast of Easter to be one." Christmas and "Whitsuntide, though not named in those canons, are properly the other two seasons for receiv- ing. (2) The Eucharistic sacrifice is offered to God as "the memorial His Son has commanded us to make," saying, " Do this in remembrance of Me." It is offered as a sacrifice of thanksgiving "for the innumerable benefits procured unto us" by Jesus' Passion and Death, His Resurrection and Ascension, for it is not the sacrifice of a dead victim, but it is offered by a living High Priest who offers Himself. It is offered through the merits of our Saviour, and in its in- ward part offered by Him for the " obtaining the remis- sion of sins and all other benefits of His Passion," for those who offer and for "all His whole Church." It is then the duty of every priest to fulfil the function for which he was ordained and to offer this holy sacrifice as often as he may, the ordinary maximum being once daily, except on special occasions like Easter, Whitsunday, and Christmas, or when serving two congregations. The An- glican Church seems to have fixed no minimum ; but as the question now before us is of the offering of the Chris- tian sacrifice, not of the communion of the people, it is evident that the priest who has no cure is not released from his obligation of making frequently the Eucharistic obla- tion. The American Church has omitted the rubric requiring the presence of some of the faithful at the sacrifice to repre- sent the congregation. But the law must still be consid- ered binding that, except in case of unforeseen accident, there shall always be some one at least to unite with the priest, and claim the promise that " when two or three are gathered in Christ's name, He will be with them." Christ has been immolated once for all ; but in this me- morial sacrifice the "one, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice" 592 THE LAW OF SACRAMENTS. is re-presented to God, and its effects become fruitful for us and for all in whose behalf it is offered (III. lxxxiii. 1). Provision is made for fulfilling S. Paul's injunction through S. Timothy (1 Tim. ii. 1), at the Offertory prayer, and for the departed after the consecration, in the words " we and all Thy whole Church ; " and although there is no positive law to that effect, there can be no good reason for not inviting the faithful to join inwardly in those special intercessions for individuals which the devout priest will desire to make at those periods in the liturgy. CHAPTER VIII. SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. § 1. The virtue and the sacrament. Penitence is a moral virtue of the will, producing painful detestation of past sin from some spiritual motive, with purpose of casting off that sin and of bearing whatever God may lay upon the penitent as a penalty (not equivalent) for his sin. As a moral virtue of the will, it should be distinguished from the inward sorrowful passion of sensibility, sorrowful shame, pain at loss or disgrace, and the like, which are not part of the virtue, although they may accompany it. Tears, therefore, and similar signs of sorrow, although they are natural, are not parts of repentance, though they may be signs of it. But they may also be absent from true repent- ance. The virtue is in a will which freely chooses to for- sake evil, and in a rational soul which detests its actual sin as an offence against God. As such a virtue, not as a pas- sion of the sense-appetite, it is commanded, because we can freely intend to blot out sin so far as lies in our power to do so, and to use the Divine means for removing it. Such a repentance proceeds from filial fear, and can spring only from some love of God in the soul (III. lxxxv. ). Perfect repentance blots out all sin through the merits of Christ's Cross (Ezek. xviii. 21), for the Passion of Jesus our Saviour avails for the sins of the whole world (1 Ep. S. John ii. 2). But the condition required implies the ability to repent, not merely the feeling remorse for the conse- quences of sin, but the hating it for God's sake. For no 594 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. sin that man wishes to be destroyed, will God permit not to be destroyed. The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which is irremissible, seems to be that sin which comes from such utter hardness of heart that no repentance will ever follow it. Furthermore, repentance is an indispensable condition of salvation ; and no actual mortal sin can be remitted without it. For the offence of mortal sin consists in aversion from God and turning to some transitory good. Hence for its remission is required that our will be so changed that it turns to God with detestation of that choice of other good and full purpose of amendment of life. This is the virtue of penitence (III. lxxxvi. 1, 2). Since venial sin is not absolutely inconsistent with the love of God, a general sorrow for whatever is displeasing to our Father, and a sincere and persistent effort against such offences, a general confession of them in the Lord's Prayer so far as they are perceived, may be acceptable proofs before God of a penitent mind with respect to such transgressions (III. lxxxvii. 1). The consequences of sin are not taken away in its remis- sion. The soul turns to God and is forgiven, but the dis- position to fall, and other penalties also, may still remain, the " chastening " of the Lord. Bat our Lord instituted a sacrament of penitence for the remission of sins committed after baptism (S. John xx. 23). No material thing is consecrated as the instrument of Jesus' love for sinners, but He consecrates certain living agents to do His will. And yet, in the narrowest and strictest sense of the word sacrament, this gracious gift of Jesus' love may not be so entitled in the Anglican Church. For though there is an " outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace" — sc, the person consecrated for the purpose — we may not be able to say that any one visible or audible sign THE VIRTUE AND THE SACRAMENT. 595 besides the minister of grace is so determined by Christ's institution that the grace given is inseparable from that sign or those words. * The schoolmen, in accordance with their theory, made sins as detested, the matter of the sacrament ; inward repen- tance, the res sacramenti; the form lately adopted in the West— viz., "Ego te absolvo "—the necessary words ; and the remission of sins, the spiritual gift. But the Anglican Cath- olic will regard this scholastic subtlety as a needless narrow- ing of the gracious love of the Redeemer. TJie matter. Although the 25th Article mentions the fact that the Lord seems to have attached His absolution of sins to no "visible sign or ceremony," the laying on of hands is an apostolic sign of the conveyance of some special grace, and it became so commonly associated with sacramental ab- solution that the rite itself was called by that name (Cone. Carthag. 4). But though, for the reasons just given, this ceremony cannot be considered as essential to a valid sacra- ment, and in the public absolutions of the Church it is quite impossible, yet in private confession it will be certainly expedient to follow primitive usage in this respect when the absolution is given. (See Blunt's Annotated Prayer Book, page 285). The form. S. Thomas Aquinas (III. lxxxiv. 3) shows that the words, "I absolve thee," are most suitable, " conveni- entissima," but not that the grace is tied to that form ; and we know that the early Church seems to have employed prec- atory forms, like those now used in the Anglican Church in public absolutions. But the priest is consecrated with authority to do what the more personal words, like the cor- responding form, ci l baptize thee," express ; and though not * See Homily on Common Prayer and Sacraments. Nothing here or elsewhere said of sacramental ordinances in the Church must be con- strued as consciously conflicting with that homily, which the writer ex ammo accepts. 59G SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. necessary for validity, those words are eminently suitable ones for private absolution, as in fact the English Church requires them in the only case where the form of private ab- solution has been appointed; sc, in the confession of the sick. On the other hand, the American Church, in her only provision for private absolution after confession, sc, that of prisoners appointed to die, has required the Absolution of Communicants to be used. Either form, then, must be re- garded as equally valid ; but the one is personal, the other plural in form, and seems therefore less suitable for the ordinary exercise of this sacerdotal office. Christ Himself has ordained this sacrament in His Church, but not as " generally necessary to salvation " in the sense in which the two greater sacraments are necessary. For Baptism and Holy Eucharist would be needed for all in order to attain to union with Christ, under any circum- stances ; but this is a refuge in case of lapse from baptis- mal grace, necessary as medicine in sickness, the ordained means for spiritual cure by Him who said, "Whose sins thou dost remit they are remitted to them ; and whose sins thou dost retain they are retained/' Contrition for sin being regarded, in accordance with the spirit of the Anglican Church, as the requisite condition for a beneficial use of this ordinance, whether in private or in public ("Ye who do truly and earnestly repent you of your sins," etc.), its three parts will be (1) confession, (2) absolution, (3) satisfaction. § 2. Contrition. Contrition is detestation of past sin, which causes inward pain on account of it and humbling before G-od, with fixed purpose not to offend again, and cheerfully to bear whatever God may impose because of it. It is perfect when it pro- ceeds from charity, from the love of Cod. It is imperfect confession. 597 when the motive, although supernatural, is lower — e.g., thought of the baseness of sin, fear of hell, not merely of temporal consequences, and desire of heaven. But this im- perfect contrition may be, and doubtless often is, deepened into perfect contrition for sin as an offence against the love of God, by a devout use of this means of grace. Contrition, however, in both cases must be complete to be effectual ; i.e., the sin must be detested more than anything beside, and the penitence must be, implicitly at least, uni- versal, as including all sins. Intensity of feeling, as we have seen in viewing the virtue of penitence, is not essential to complete contrition ; for it is in the rational soul which hates and detests sin, not in the sensitive feelings, except accidentally and by a kind of over- flow. Some sins ma}" be forgotten, and then only a general con- trition, like that expressed in the daily offices of the Angli- can Church, can be offered to God. But they may be par- tially forgotten, and then the searching of conscience which is obligatory will bring them more fully before the soul, and will itself be a sign and cause of more complete contrition. The purpose for the future must be an efficacious one ; i.e., the fixed intention of using all necessary means and efforts to avoid all occasions of sin. (Qu. : Expressed fears of re- lapse ?) Such contrition, finally, is life-long ; for the lost state of innocence can never be recovered, the time lost in the turn- ing from the road to blessedness never brought back ; and pardon therefore does not wholly wipe out the past. Perfect contrition, with purpose of confession to God and due satisfaction, gives full restoration to His love, a full title to absolution. Charity covers the multitude of sins, and brings full remission of their eternal consequences. § 3. Confession. Confession is an outward act of penitence, made with the 598 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. lips which speak to God. It is public, made with the whole congregation assembled together, or it is private confession of particular offences made to the minister of God's absolu- tion alone, in order that pardon may follow for the individ- ual soul. The manner of confession is a matter of positive ecclesiastical law, and has varied in different parts of the Church in different ages. Since the Anglican Church has now no positive law respect- ing confession, even in case of mortal sickness, the sinner being only counselled in the matter, private confession must be regarded as subject of counsel, not of precept. The argu- ment for it, so far as the penitent is concerned, is the greater certainty of the requisite conditions of absolution ; the "confession, not in general terms, but of actual particu- lar offences against Divine love. The very act of confession, where it is not obligatory, which is our own case, makes the private act a far more weighty sign of true contrition than the habitual and familiar words of a general confession can be. The Roman argument for the necessity of private confes- sion, so far as the minister of absolution is concerned, is based upon his office as spiritual judge. He is to receive the worthy, to reject the unworthy, to bind and to loose on earth what is bound or loosed in heaven. But it is evident that the priest's judgment must necessarily be limited to what is truly and fully laid before him. So far we can be of accord with Roman discipline. The question asked by the penitent, "Am I fit to come to Holy Communion ?" may well be answered by the counsel, " Make your private confession, and then your priest will be your earthly judge, and give you, if you be truly penitent, the comfortable per- sonal ministration which God has employed him for." But the assertion that he is to be judge in all cases what- soever, is not that of the Anglican Church ; it does not seem possible, even if expedient ; for it implies a knowledge which cannot be had, which even the penitent himself may confession. 599 not have. How, for example, can he be judge of sins which the penitent has forgotten, or of the reality of a general contrition for those offences ? Neither has trial proved it expedient, if supposed to be possible, judging by such testi- mony as we find in Gaume. The Anglican Church gives warning that we must judge ourselves, so far as that is possible ; she commands a con- fession following on self-examination, and there would seem to be no good reason for not making very brief pause in order to recall the " manifold sins " . . . in "'thought, word, and deed." But if the private confession be made, there are plain obligations of the priest in hearing it. (1) He must avoid all signs of wonder, horror, even of rebuke, during the confession, lest the penitent be discour- aged and even cloak his sins. Let him rather give encour- agement to continue, because there is no sin too great for the love of Jesus to cleanse. (2) He must allow no needless mention of others' faults ; even cooperators in sin must not be named, and tbe ap- proach to that must be promptly checked. (3) If ignorantly in fault the penitent may be better instructed (a) in what is necessary to salvation ; (b) when society is concerned and scandal is to be avoided ; (c) when tbe penitent himself is in doubt and makes inquiry ; (d) when there is reasonable hope of ultimate good from doing so, and no danger of great injury to any other. If none of these four conditions be present, the confessor is not always bound to make known obligations which would probably be not fulfilled if known. Silence is sometimes golden. For example, restitution may be certainly due, but the penitent has been acting in good faith, and will certainly not be able to see his obligation. (4) After tbe penitent has finished what he has to say, only the fewest and most necessary questions should be asked, and those suited to tbe age and person. Spiritually 600 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. intelligent adults may need none, except perhaps to elicit necessary or qualifying circumstances. Boys, and in general those unaccustomed to self-examina- tion, may be assisted in this respect. (5) In questioning children, say, in preparing for Con- firmation, the utmost caution must be used respecting pur- ity of life, lest they be prompted to evil knowledge ; but, on the other hand, it may be quite too readily presumed that no unchaste words or actions have defiled their souls, even in the case of girls. (6) The sick need, of course, the greatest tenderness ; and in mortal disease favourable presumption must be stretched to its utmost limit. Half-articulate words, dis- tracted attention, drowsiness, the effect of medicines excit- ing the brain, or producing partial delirium or somnolency — all tbese and the like seem almost insuperable obstacles, and charity will take the most favourable view which cir- cumstances reasonably allow. The seal of confession can under no circumstances what- ever be broken. Outside of his ministry for God the priest does not know what in confession he hears ; it must be as though it had never entered his ears. Not even to the penitent himself may God's minister allude to it, without permission first asked and obtained ; and this even when action with respect to others is expedient. The Anglican Church, while recognizing private confession, has ruled that the seal is sacred, adding, however, an exception from the ordinary law of the Church. Canon cxiii. of 1603 says,* " If any man confess his secret and hidden sins to the minister, . . . we do straitly charge and admonish (said minister) that he do not at any time reveal and make * References of this nature are based on the assumption that unre- pealed canons of the English Church {mutatis mutandis) are part of the Canon Law of the Church in the United States. ABSOLUTION. 601 known to any person whatsoever any crime or offence so committed to bis trust and secrecy (except they be sucb crimes as, by the laws of this realm, his own life may be called into question for concealing the same), under pain of irregularity" — i.e., of deposition. § 4. Absolution. Tbe Church bas received the keys of the kingdom of heaven (S. Matt. xvi. 19). The door stands open, because Christ has opened it, to all believers. But it is sin that closes it again, and the power whicb removes tbat obstacle is called a "key." G-od alone has tbat power ; but in the Man Christ Jesus was that power to take away tbat ob- stacle by tbe merits of His Passion, and He has the keys. But tbe ministry of them is on earth, and bas its outward as well as its inward part. As He inwardly washes in Holy Baptism, employing the visible element of water, so He in- wardly absolves, employing tbe consecrated instrument on earth. But the keys are a power of binding as well as of loosing, of shutting as well as of opening. As God Himself puts no impediment in the way of any one trying to enter the king- dom of heaven, but withholds His grace from the un- worthy, so the priest can make no impediment on earth, but be may be bound not to use the keys in opening and loosing, because be cannot remove impediments unless God first inwardly take them away. God Himself must first absolve, in order that there may be place for tbe absolution of the priest. If God do not absolve, the other is an empty form. Furthermore, in this, as in every other ministerial act, tbe priest must have jurisdiction as well as authority. Such jurisdiction he receives when some part of the Lord's people is committed to his care. Special jurisdiction he may receive in special cases, as the law, custom, or special license of the Church allows. G02 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. (Qu. : Must not consent of the pastor be had in receiving the private confession of a parishioner ?) The chief earthly union with Christ is in Holy Com- munion ; but it is a sacrament of the living. If sin close the door to that union, the door must be unlocked through confession and absolution. The Anglican Church, accord- ingly, has made these an essential part of her liturgy. And her people should be instructed not to receive if they come so late to church that they have not truly and ear- nestly confessed their sins and received that public absolu- tion. Art. xxxiii. and the canon law of the American Church (title ii. can. 12) distinctly claim the authority of the Church to refuse to open the door of the kingdom of heaven ("depriving of all privileges of Church member- ship ; " excommunication), which of course excludes from even the outward form of confession and absolution. Doubts respecting the present disjjosition of the penitent are to be decided in his favour when absolution is in ques- tion. The minister, who has only the outward part of sac- raments to perform, leaves all beyond to the only competent Judge. Conditional absolution may sometimes be given ; not, in- deed, conditioned by any future act, but when the return of a relapsed penitent does not fully justify refusal to give absolution, and charitable presumption, on the other hand, is unable to solve the doubt in his favour. Or, again, a sick and dying man may have expressed some contrition and sent for the priest, and God's minister may be doubtful whether, if the sick had the power so to do, he would penitently confess his sins. If there had cer- tainly been intention to make a contrite confession, there would be no ground for keeping back absolution because the priest arrived too late to receive that confession in God's ABSOLUTION. 603 name. But in the doubtful case the conditional absolution may be given. Absolution must he denied (1) when there is no evidence of a determination to amend ; (2) when restitution or sat- isfaction is refused ; (3) when the remedies directed are refused, or previously proposed remedies have not been employed, especially when evil habits are concerned, and no special contrition is exhibited on account of the new sin ; (4) when there is evident unwillingness to forgive others ; (5) when perseverance in evil ways is shown by an unwillingness to avoid the proximate occasions of sin, or of giving occasion to others' sin, those occasions being volun- tary and not necessary. By "proximate occasions" understand those which, in the particular case, bring strongest temptation and great probability of sin. Some of these are morally involuntary ; but others are voluntary ; i.e., they will cause only trifling- loss, if any. The latter must be abandoned, no matter what purpose of resisting the temptation is professed, and absolution must be deferred until this is done. Round dances and the use of stimulants may serve for examples when they are occasions of sin. Fear of future relapse, even if reasonable, is not good ground for withholding ab- solution from a contrite soul, if there be no evident cling- ing to the sin. Absolution may be deferred for a short time, and the delay may aid in deepening penitence for sin, (1) when the penitent has previously promised to avoid occasions of sin but has not done so ; (2) if, able to make thorough self- examination, he have neglected it ; (3) if he have promised restitution or signs of forgiveness to another, and have not done so ; in general, it may be safer to defer absolution .until obligatory restitution has been made. (4) Habitual sinners may be absolved only if there seem to be full purpose of amendment of life ; but if there have been 604 SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. neglect of previously prescribed discipline, absolution should surely be deferred until sincerity has been more fully evinced than by the feeling, perhaps a transient one, shown at the time of confession. In such cases, also, it is wise, and may prove very bene- ficial, to require an explicit promise of return immediately upon the first lapse, if any should occur. This very thing will itself be a most salutary penance and discipline, if there be any sincerity in the sinners soul. Absolution, however, should not be deferred in these cases for a long period ; a fortnight will usually be long enough. § 5. Satisfaction. Although satisfaction is an act of justice in paying a penalty for past transgression, a penalty either voluntarily assumed or made voluntary by cheerfully accepting God's chastisement, no equality according to justice can be dreamed of. Sin is of infinite guilt, and no earthly pains can be adequate compensatiou. Satisfaction is not to be so understood. But, yet, penalty is accepted as just, and as a painful medicine curing past sins and preserving from fu- ture ones. Something has been taken from the honour due to God; therefore something is to be taken from self and given to God as a partial return of that lost honour. If it be asked how man can "satisfy" or pay his debt to God, we shall reply that man becomes a debtor to God in two ways : first, by benefits received ; next, by sins com- mitted. And as thanksgiving and worship is the return in the one case, so is satisfaction in the other. But there can be no equivalent return for all that God has done for us ; we can only do what lies in our power by way of return. And love accepts this as a just return. So, also, as re- gards satisfaction to love for offences against it, no equiva- lent can be paid ; but something may be offered to love which love will accept for the sake of Christ's merits. SATISFACTION. 005 Chastenings from God take something from ns without our will, hut patient bearing of them makes them become voluntary satisfactions for sin (Heb. xii. 6). So, also, since satisfaction is penal, we can impose penalty on our- selves which, though love makes it light, is still penalty. "We can give goods of fortune in alms ; goods of body in abstinence or fasting ; goods of soul in special prayers. And each of these and the like may be j)enal satisfaction. Such penances may be imposed upon himself by any one who turns to God. But since in private confession the soul is submitted to the priest as an earthly judge with power to bind and loose under the Supreme Judge, he is bound to impose suitable penalties while remitting sins in the name of his Lord. These, it has been seen, must be punitive, salutary, and medicinal ; if possible, all in one. Thus, the taking away of outward and proximate occasions of sin will be at once punitive, salutary, and medicinal. Games lawful in themselves, society not immoral, may have proved an overcoming temptation ; it is properly imposed satisfaction to forbid them. Fleshly lusts may have overcome the weak soul, and the body is punished when its luxuries are pro- hibited ; and so on. The penance, then, should be according to the sin ; but also adapted to the age and condition of the penitent, being- such as to test the sincerity of his repentance and to deepen it. It should not be too long continued ; a fortnight is usually long enough ; it should not be public, not very diffi- cult to observe, or such as will cause physical weariness. Thus, fasting or abstinence, though punitive discipline, may be unsuitable for labourers or children ; but other acts of mortification respecting luxuries may be easily substituted for these. As medicinal, the penance should be adapted to the special sin. Thus special prayer for enemies is a remedy for an unforgiving spirit. At the same time, it will be re- membered that long prayers, much time spent in church, GOG SACRAMENTAL PENITENCE. and the like, are not marks of penitence or devotion, or fit penances, but rather the doing all in the name of Christ. Finally, a few words may be added respecting venial sins as coming before the confessor. These may be compared to sins against a father when the son has still filial affection in his heart, and is not turned out of doors. But, on the other hand, they may indicate a habit which, if not re- pented of, will show mortal contempt of the Father ; and if they grow into habits they are sure to end in mortal sin. If they be not consented to ; if they arise from negli- gence, inattention, sudden motions of the soul, like wan- dering thoughts in prayer, impatience, vain words, etc., they may receive repeated absolutions under due conditions. For example, let them be followed up by regular and suit- able discipline — say, each evening after a fall, by light penances adapted to them, etc. If there be sincere contri- tion for them, and a persistent effort to amend, with steady though feeble progress, the penitent is entitled to repeated absolutions for them. CHAPTER IX. THE VISITATION OP THE SICK. Moral Theology cannot overlook the special law of God respecting the sick. There is a corporal work of mercy for all Christians, of which the Lord will say at the last: "I was sick, and ye visited Me ; " but there is also a religions obligation of positive law laid down in rubric and canon : ' ' When any person [i.e., any member of the Church] is sick, notice shall be given thereof to the minister of the parish ; who coming to the sick person's house shall say," etc. (The law respecting prisoners, i.e., under like conditions, is the same.) Here is an official duty and obligation, based on the law of God (S. Jas. v. 14). " Is any sick among you ? Let him call for the elders of the Church." It is to be fulfilled in a solemn and official way, like any other func- tion of the priest's office ; e.g., vested with surplice and stole. The canon of 1603 does not seem to require even official notice. " When any person is dangerously sick in any parish, the minister or curate having knowledge thereof, shall resort unto him or her," etc. But, of course, for an official visit, such as is contemplated by the rubric, some previous arrangement will be convenient. This official and obligatory visit has other objects beside the provision, on the one hand, for sacramental penitence and Holy Eucharist elsewhere discussed, and, on the other, such charitable consolation, advice, and prayer as any Christian may take to the sick-room. It is, so to speak, the coming of the Lord to His sick member, in the person of His minister, for spiritual strength and help. " The G08 THE VISITATION OF THE SICK. prayer of faith shall save the sick." This is the spirit of the office provided by the Anglican Church. But it is still more distinctly presented in that rite of the primitive Church which God's Word appointed through S. James (v. 14); se., " They shall pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord." Unction of the sick belongs to the whole Catholic Church, Eastern, Latin ; and the Anglican Church retained it in the Prayer Book of 1549. It may be called sacramental in the general sense of the word ; viz., " an outward and visible sign of an inw'ard and spiritual grace;" but it may be doubted whether it is a sacrament in the narrowest sense of the word. None maintain that it is "generally necessary to salvation," and the omission of the Unction of the Sick in the Prayer Book of 1552, and ever since, seems to leave the rite as a matter of counsel, not of precept, and to treat it accordingly as sacramental rather than as a proper sacrament. I mean that the Anglican Church appears to regard the outward and visible sign as not permanently fixed by Divine appoint- ment. Thus if we read that the Lord (S. Mark vi. 5) laid His hands on the sick, His disciples (v. 13) "anointed them with oil and healed them." If S. James spoke of the anointing, the Lord, before He ascended, said that His disciples shall "lay hands on the sick, and they shall re- cover." So, also, no form of words can fairly be pointed out as essential to this sacramental rite. Prayer over the sick was ordained through S. James, but the Catholic Church has no such form of words for the unction as is essential to proper sacraments. This seems necessary to be said when a law of the Catholic Church is in question. Viewing the unction of the sick, then, as a Divinely appointed means of grace, but not with us of precept, but only of counsel, if it be devoutly desired by those who are truly penitent, and have received abso- lution of their sins, they may with confident faith expect to receive (1) pardon for the feebleness of spirit which their UNCTION OF THE SICK. 609 sin has produced ; (2) strength and comfort from the Holy Ghost for special trials of sickness, and support in the last dread hour of dissolution ; or, if it so please God, res- toration to bodily health. " The prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord shall raise him up ; and if he have committed sins they shall be forgiven him." To those who cannot recognize and devoutly receive this spiritual help, it will not be given. Catholic usage implies that the oil employed for anointing of the sick shall be blessed by a bishop, for its sacred use. Finally, it must be added, whatever lawless custom may tolerate, that the law of the Church still binds every con- scientious priest ; and if he be called to do the last earthly office for those who are departed from this life, he may not use the Order for the Burial of the Dead "for any unbaptized adults, any who die excommunicate, or who have [while possessed of their ordinary faculties of self- government] laid violent hands on themselves," and so have died excommunicated by their own act. What the priest shall do when he is called upon in any such case, this is not the place to consider. But he is certainly bound to re- member that these days are such as render disobedience to the law here given more than ordinarily sinful, because lawlessness makes man the master of his own life, and the priest is bound to protest in the name of God and His Church ; and that protest can only be duly given by dis- tinct separation in death of the voluntary suicide from him whose life has been surrendered when God called for it. Also, it must surely be remembered, in determining whether suicide has been voluntary or not, that a coroner's jury is not an ecclesiastical tribunal. That may have respectful atten- tion, but the Church must judge for herself respecting her own offices, with all charity, but also with truth and loyalty to God. 39 CHAPTER X. HOLY ORDERS. § 1. Introductory. The doctrine of Holy Orders, their divine origin, their authority and functions, cannot here be discussed. But some few propositions, familiar to Churchmen, but wholly rejected or unknown by the great majority of religious people among us, must here be assumed. For he who be- lieves the truth revealed from God in this matter — sc, the Divine authority of the Christian priesthood — necessarily finds a law binding upon himself, whether he be priest or layman, and he must answer before God for his obedience to it. Whereas, on the other hand, he who knows no such truth, knows no law in this matter ; while the Protestant scoffer at '"'sacerdotalism" is only consistent in scoffing at the law, which, perhaps, if he be a priest, he has sworn before God that he will diligently observe and keep. The existence of Holy Orders as a Divine institution in the Catholic Church is based upon the existence of sacra- ments, and especially of the Holy Eucharist as sacrament and as sacrifice. Preaching the Gospel, the prophetical office, is superadded ; but, important as it is, it is not of the essence of Holy Orders. Any Christian man may be licensed, if the Church see fit, to carry the Gospel to the world. The fountain of this authority, indeed, is the apostolic office, for apostles and their successors were bidden to carry the Gospel to all the world, assured that their Lord would be with them in doing so until the consummation of all earthly his- tory. God has set prophets in His Church after apostles. Not all are apostles ; not all are prophets (1 Cor. xii. 28). INTRODUCTORY. Gil But Holy Orders are ordained for the external ministra- tion of sacraments. The Lord said, " Make disciples of all nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost " (S. Matt, xviii. 20) ; "This do in remembrance of Me" (S. Luke xxii. 19); " Eeceive ye the Holy Ghost ; whosesoever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them, etc." (S. John xx. 22). All visible authority is summed up in the apostles, by them to be divided and distributed to various orders and offices in the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The apostles were "deacons" of the Church (and so are their successors), but they gave this function of the one ministry to chosen men (Acts vi. 6). The apostles were priests (and their successors may be vested as priests and do the priest's peculiar work of consecrating the Holy Eucharist), but the Church needed resident priests wherever the faith- ful were found and required their ministration. Therefore the apostles gave this function to others (1 Tim. v. 22 ; Tit. i. 5). But they reserved to themselves and those whom, like S. Matthias or Barnabas or Timothy, they asso- ciated with themselves in the full authority of their office, the general power to dispense sacred things, and to rule the Church. The Church of Christ, as an organized, visible body, was found wherever their authority was found. Where there was no such authority there could be no organized and visible Church. Difference in orders, then, depends upon the different degrees of participation in the fulness of the apostolic com- mission. The body of Christ has many members, "and all the members have not the same office " (Rom. xii. 6 ; 1 Cor. xii. 5. See Art. xxiii.). But each and all are servants of their brethren ; they minister, not " in their own name, but in Christ's, by His commission and authority," re- ceived directly from those to whom He has previously given it. " It is evident unto all men, diligently reading Holy 612 HOLY ORDERS. Scripture and ancient authors, that from the apostles' time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ's Church — bishops, priests, and deacons." And so, since the law of faith is the law of prayer, we pray in the Collect at the Ordering of Priests, " Almighty God, giver of all good things, who by Thy Holy Spirit hast appointed divers orders of ministers in Thy Church, etc." He who does not believe this, has no right to profane the service of God by present- ing himself to receive such a holy office. A devout Christian is not a priest because he is a good man. In the inward and spiritual order, indeed, he is one of the "holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices ac- ceptable to God through Jesus Christ." He has a "holy priesthood" (1 S. Pet. ii. 5); but in the outward order he is not an apostle, he is neither king nor priest in the visible Church. For all are not apostles having authority to rule ; and it is not grace which is conferred by the visible priest, but the sacraments of grace, while God only can bestow the inward part. A good man can teach by word and example ; he may be licensed to read Holy Scripture in public, to use public prayers with the faithful ; even, if law permit, to ex- ercise the prophetic office which he receives from the suc- cessors of the apostles ; but the existence of sacraments, as has been said, implies men consecrated for this instrumental service without which necessary grace cannot in general be had. § 2. Holy Orders a sacrament. There is (1) " an outward and visible sign " — sc, the lay- ing on of hands — (2) "of an inward and spiritual grace" (3) " ordained by Christ Himself as a means whereby we receive the same and a pledge to assure us thereof." But Holy Orders have not " like nature of sacraments with Baptism and Holy Eucharist." And this will be evident enough when we consider the matter and the form, and compare them with the two sacraments "generally necessary to salvation." HOLY ORDERS A SACRAMENT. G13 In the latter case there is an indispensable material thing required without which there can be no sacrament. Not so in the ordering of bishops, priests, and deacons. TJie matter. If, then, in a general way, we define Holy Orders as a " sacrament of the Church in which is given spiritual authority, and grace is conferred for due perform- ance of ecclesiastical offices," we shall keep ourselves within the sure boundaries of our faith ; but if we undertake to find dogmatically the essential "matter" and form of words, we may involve ourselves in needless difficulties. It is enough for Anglican Churchmen to know, and for Anglican theology to affirm, that the laying on of hands is an apos- tolic sign attached to this conferring of authority by those who have authority. The state of the case is not very different with respect to the oral sign, the form of words in this sacrament. In Holy Baptism and Holy Eucharist there is a form of words un- varying from the beginning and throughout the Catholic Church. But if we seek for any such form in Ordination we may fail to find it. The intent is plain enough in all varying forms. It is the transmission of authority from him who possesses it with power to confer it. PATERNAL || /(FATHER & U //maternal UNCLE J] \\ MOTHER J \\ UNCLE i TABLE OF CANONICAL DEGREES. IMPEDIMENTS. 633 is poor, sickly, quarrelsome, of intemperate habits, a widow, a false nobleman, etc. A T one of these things affect the essence of the contract, and it must stand, even if it would not have been made in case the circumstances were known. This is the law of both Church and state. (b) Consanguinity is the natural relationship of those descended from the same father or mother, or both. As an impediment to marriage, it depends partly upon the law of nature, partly on Divinely revealed law, and partly upon human positive law. And these may establish different de- grees of prohibitory consanguinity. Observe that the question of legitimate descent does not enter into consideration. The line of cognation is either direct or collateral ; direct, as between parent and child ; collateral, as between brother and sister. The student of the subject is liable to be con- fused at first in the numbering of degrees, since the civil law numbers in different mode from the canon law. It will be convenient for our purpose to adopt the degrees of the civil code, which reckons the number of persons concerned. Thus, either grandchild or sister stands in the second degree ; first cousins, in the third degree, etc. According to the canon law, as will be seen in the ac- companying table, brothers and sisters are related in the first degree, first cousins in the second degree ; the reckon- ing being made from the middle line. It will appear from the table that by ascending one more degree, and then de- scending to right and left, we should have cognates in the fourth degree, and so on. (See table of degrees.) In the direct line, ascending and descending, consanguin- ity avoids marriage indefinitely. This is ruled by the law of nature. For the relation of husband and wife is inconsis- tent with that of parent and child. But the Divine revealed law goes further, and protects the family relation by pro- hibiting marriage to those who are ordinarily associated 634 HOLY MATRIMONY. already by the intimate ties of the family. In other words, marriage is prohibited within the third degree, inclusive (degrees of civil law). This is the Levitical code, and the law of the Anglican Church, and courts of common law will treat such marriages as voidable (Blackst. i. 434). It will be observed that half-brothers and sisters count as those related through the same father and mother. Positive canon law has varied in extending still further prohibited degrees. The modern Roman Church prohibits marriage within the fourth degree, inclusive (canonical de- grees) ; but the law being merely a positive ecclesiastical regulation grounded on the already existing intimacy of the relatives, dispensation from it may be obtained when good reasons are presented. The Church cannot claim the power of dispensing from Divine law ; and the question must therefore present itself how far this law extends. Beyond brothers and sisters (i.e., second degree), the question may possibly belong to positive ecclesiastical law. (c) Affinity. This is created by conjugal union, whether licit or illicit. The Divine law says, "They are no more twain, but one flesh " (S. Matt. xix. 6). The husband be- comes related to his wife's family as he is connected by blood with his own. And the wife takes the same position with respect to her husband's relatives. Affinity, therefore, according to the law of the Anglican Church and the common law, follows the same rules with consanguinity. The death of husband or wife leaves affinity unchanged, because, like consanguinity, it depends upon a past act which is unalter- able ; sc, that man and wife have been conjoined and be- come one flesh ; not that they are so conjoined. S. Paul explicitly extends the principle here involved to unlawful concubinage (1 Cor. vi. 1G). This seems to rest upon a law of nature. For if affinity create no such cognation, a man might marry his step- IMPEDIMENTS. 635 mother, which Revelation declares to be an abomination (Lev. xviii. 8). At the same time it is to be noticed that the limit of prohibitory degrees of affinity seems to be a question of positive Church law. And as the bond is not so close as that of consanguinity, marriages may be allowed in the one which would be prohibited in the other. So the Roman canons, extending prohibited affinity to the fourth degree (canonical degrees) in case of lawful union, set the limit at the second degree in case of unlawful union. No affinity is created between the blood relations of hus- band and wife. Two brothers may marry two sisters, or father and son may marry mother and daughter ; or the father may marry the daughter and his son may marry the mother, etc. "Affinitas non parit affinitatem." (d) Fear or force. For our purpose these are the same, since we mean by either of them an excessive disturbance of mind through fear of present or future clanger of life or per- son. Such an excessive fear avoids marriage when the cause is external, the force unjust, and impelling to the contract. If these conditions be absent, fear does not annul the contract. Parents may urge an unwelcome marriage upon a child. If a daughter were overwhelmed with fear of her parents' displeasure, it might be maintained that there was no free consent. But, on the other hand, the pressure exerted may be that of arguments and persuasions, and then the compul- sion will be a moral force, not that which constitutes a true impediment to valid marriage. The violence which avoids marriage is the carrying off of a woman under protest for the purpose of marriage. If threats be used against a seducer to compel his prom- ised marriage with his victim, the force is not unjust and the contract is valid. (e) Impotence. Physical impotence or mental malady will annul the contract of matrimony ; in the former case, 636 HOLY MATRIMONY. because of impossibility of fulfilling all of its obligations; in the latter case, because no contract is made, since that implies a deliberate and intelligent consent. Physical impotence, however, will not be a bar to a valid sacra- ment, if it be known to the parties married. Since the contract is for life, neither of these, if it follow after marriage, can annul what has once been validly done. (/) Age. Under seven years of age, a pretended marriage is absolutely void ab initio. Over that age it is voidable ; i.e., the party concerned, on reaching the age of legal con- sent or marriageable age, may annul the contract. The age at which marriage becomes valid, though unlawful — i.e., the age of "legal consent" — is fixed by Church law and the common law at fourteen for males, and twelve for females. But note the changes made by laws in some of the United States. (See Blackst. i. 436.) (g) Crime. Formal adultery — i.e., the crime committed with knowledge of an existing marriage relation — is a bar to matrimony between the guilty parties. Two adulterers may not marry at the death of husband or wife. Or if the lawful partner be murdered in order to marry another ; if there were mutual conspiracy, it would be pro- faning holy things to give the Church's benediction on such a contract. (Qu. : Suppose, in either of these cases, repentance, con- fession, absolution ?) (h) Disparity of religion. This can be no impediment to a valid civil contract sanctioned by the laws of the state to which the parties belong. But the case is altered if we have before us the Christian union which the Church con- templates. An unbaptized person is incapable of entering into it. Matrimony with such a person is not the sacra- ment of Holy Matrimony. The Church cannot give her IMPEDIMENTS. 637 benediction upon the union, and the priest who should con- sciously repeat the words in such a case would be guilty of a profane fiction (2 Cor. vi. 14). For Christian marriage has for one of its chief goods the training of children as the children of God ; which, in the case supposed, is excluded by the wilful rejection of the baptismal covenant. But since the contract lawfully made is valid matrimony so far as it goes, though it be imperfect matrimony from the Christian point of view, two wedded unbelievers re- ceived into Christ's fold will not be remarried, but may receive the nuptial benediction. (Qu. : On the other hand, if the state annul their contract, will the Church regard it as binding on their conscience if they be converted to the Christian faith ?) Special difficulties of" conscience occur where one partner in the marriage tie is converted to the Christian faith and is baptized, while the other is not. Frequent as such cases are, the moral conditions vary extremely, and this brief man- ual is not the place for their discussion. Only it must be insisted on that laws of nature and the moral law of God are irreversible by any human power. And they are binding even on those who are ignorant of them, for they could know them if they would. On the other hand, ecclesiastical posi- tive law can be suspended, the power of dispensation being in the Church which makes the law, and the exercise of that power in general being in the ordinary of the diocese where the case occurs. Such cases being frequent in the early Church, are partly ruled by S. Paul (1 Cor. vii.). The convert may not separate from the unbeliever, if no serious hindrance to the Christian life arise from the union ; children in such a family have claims which the Church must recognize, etc. (Qu. 1. Suppose that the marriage has been one within the prohibited degrees. If it be prohibited by the Divine law, it remains unlawful. If prohibited only by the posi- tive law of the Church, it may be sanctioned by the power of dispensation. 638 HOLY MATRIMONY. Qn. 2. Suppose, again, the frequent ease of a convert where a second civil marriage has been consummated while there is still living a previously married husband or wife, the state having annulled the first contract. There has been no sacrament of Holy Matrimony in either marriage. What does the law of nature require concerning the permanence of the marriage tie, and can the state dispense from the law of nature ? Qu. 3. Suppose that one of two so divorced parties be- comes a convert to the Christian faith, is that person free to marry in the Lord if the unbeliever have fundamentally broken the marriage vow ?) Denunciation of impediments. This is an obligation on every one who has reasonable ground of suspicion of their existence, whether those impediments are " impedientia " or " dirimentia." (See the preface to the Anglican mar- riage service.) Not even an oath to keep the objection secret will be binding against grave injury done to the com- munity or to a third person. (Qu. 1. Suppose a confidential communication officially made to the physician, the lawyer, the priest, not in con- fession, is not this a possible exception ? Qu. 2. Suppose that grave injury will be done to the re- vealer of the impediment ?) One credible witness presenting an impediment, even impediens, must stop the ceremony until the case can be investigated, due security for indemnification being pro- vided. (See the rubric in the marriage service.) Doubtful cases. Suppose that the parties to the proposed union are in doubt respecting the existence of an impedi- ment to their union. The doubt may concern an impedi- ment arising (1) from Divine law or the law of nature ; or, (2) from positive ecclesiastical law. The first will require moral certainty for a favourable decision, for the Church IMPEDIMENTS. 639 cannot supply the defect by her power of dispensation ; e.g., one supposes that his partner is dead (Enoch Arden). If the fact be not so, however strong has been the probability of it, and whatever civil authority may have decided, the second union will be no Christian marriage. But, in the second case, if doubt remain after careful inquiry, and the doubt concern the fact, not the law, the marriage cannot be celebrated. But if the same doubt arise after marriage, under the same conditions the mar- riage must be regarded as valid. (Qu. : A case of special difficulty is where a marriage, invalid according to Divinely revealed law, has been already contracted in good faith — say, before the conversion of the party to it — and children's claims, etc., have arisen from it, and there is probability of infamy, scandal, etc., if its nul- lity be publicly exposed. Shall the material sin be left ? Is the case like that of restitution due, when the debtor is in good faith ? In such a case may restitution be left unre- quired, if it be foreseen that admonition will work grave injury, and effect no countervailing good ? A plain exception to the laxer course, if it be admitted at all, is (1) when the public good overrules the advantage of an individual ; (2) when the penitent's conscience is alarmed and asks the question of moral obligation and validity of marriage. Then, if the marriage were by Divine law void db initio, let the penitent live as if unmarried.) Rehabilitation. This is the perfecting of Christian mar- riage between parties who have lived together as man and wife. Its principles are implied in what has been already written, but they may be summed up in this place as fol- lows : (1) If there have been no true consent to matrimony, on one side or on both, such consent may be given privately, or before confidential witnesses, and the nuptial benediction received. G40 HOLY MATIilMONY. (2) If clandestine marriage have been duly blessed by a priest, the form is empty of blessing, but repentance may restore it. Or, if there have been a ceremony, binding, in- deed, on conscience, but celebrated by some justice of the peace, some Protestant minister, or other person who can- not give the nuptial benediction, there may be a private perfecting of the marriage in the presence of confidential witnesses, without scandal or loss of good name. (Say, the latter part of the marriage service, "I pronounce, etc.," together with the blessing.) (3) Suppose that public scandal has already been given by the conduct of the parties ; their duty requires them to make public reparation by a public ceremony. (Qu. : Suppose that only one of the two consents to this reparation; may not the bishop give dispensation, and a private ceremony be celebrated ?) (4) Again, there may have been an impediment known to exist at the time of marriage, so that the ceremony was null ab initio, and this impediment may have been after- wards removed. In such a case, the consent of the parties can be privately renewed ; or, if the impediment be publicly known, the consent can be renewed before witnesses ; that is, the marriage service which was null before will be duly celebrated. § 5. Divorce. The inseparability of man and wife is part of the law of nature (S. Matt. xix. 4-6). God has joined them so that "they are no more twain, but one flesh ; " and " what God hath [so] joined, let not man put asunder." Children are the common good of man and wife ; the family relation is in its very nature a permanent one ; and as this requires the indissoluble union of man and wife, such a union is part of nature's law. But only the law of Christ has restored that perfect law of nature to its due perfection. DIVORCE. 041 But if this be true of the marriage contract, much rather is it true of the sacrament of Holy Matrimony in the Church, a mystical representation of the inseparable union of Christ and the Church. In the life-time of husband or wife it is impossible for the other to be married again. The cere- mony is a nullity (1 Cor. vii. 10, 39). Many of the United States confound divorce a vinculo with divorce a mensa et thoro. But the distinction is fundamental in Moral The- ology, and well guarded in common law also. Divorce a vinculo is based on impedimenta dirimentia, which must have existed at the time of the pretended nup- tial contract. The Western Church, at least, including the Anglican canon law, allows no such divorce for crime occur- ring after marriage (Blackst. i. 441). But compare the canon of the American Church, title ii. 13: "No minister of this Church shall solemnize matri- mony in any case where there is a divorced wife or husband of either party still living; but this canon shall not be held to apply to the innocent party in a divorce for the cause of adultery/' etc. This may seem to be sanctioning such a marriage "by indirection." Per contra, in this difficult question note the arguments of S. Augustine, De Adult. Conjug. (comparing with his Retract.) i. 6, 7, ad. fin., 22 ad fin.; ii. 1, etc. He seems to know no Church disci pline in the matter ; and naturally so, for marriages with unbelievers (as standing on a different basis), common as they were, would tend to confuse legisla- tion. But he thinks that S. Matthew gives no warrant for remarriage.* Does the innocent party cease to be spouse because of the other's guilt ? Can an evil-doer thus annul a bilateral con- * In S. Matt. xix. 9, the adultery of the wife is understood to be the ground of the putting her away, not the justification of a second marriage. 41 642 HOLY MATRIMONY. tract ? If so, the guilty also is free to marry (the ordinary course in the United States). Divorce a thoro is not divorce a vinculo (a distinction easy to be overlooked in the ordinary quotations from primitive sources). Objection may be made (ii. 10) that this law of indissolubility is a severe one for the innocent. But incurable disease or any separation a mensa et thoro is equally so. A contentious, offensive, imperious wife is sent away ; a good wife is abandoned by a drunken sot ; is there freedom on both sides in such a case because of the manifest hardship? (Cp. Canon of 1603, No. 107.) To the same effect S. Augustine argues in De Bono Conjug., c. 7. The law of God is not subject to the varying and imperfect human law. Divorce a thoro, whether sanctioned by the state or privately made, is certainly lawful for grave causes, for a serious breach of contract by one of the two parties may release the other from its obligations. The state does not make the divorce, but sanctions it with reference to the civil rights involved. This separation is permitted, not commanded (S. Matt. v. 32). The innocent may pardon the offence, even in case of adultery, not as condoning sin, but as forgiving the penitent ; for divorce is not a penalty for the innocent (Duct. Dubitant. I. iv. 8). There are cases, however, when sound morals will for- bid a separation, even in case of adultery ; e.g., both parties may be equally guilty in this respect ; or the innocent may have condoned the offence by subsequent cohabitation ; or, after long absence, it may have been supposed that the ab- sent partner is dead, etc. This separation for good and sufficient reasons may be made by mutual consent, provided there be no danger of incontinence, or other grave injury. Grave danger to body or soul — e.g., danger of perversion or apostasy — may even make separation become a positive duty. DIVORCE. 043 At the same time, it may be well to caution the inex- perienced priest not to lend a ready ear to all complaints, especially of wives, but to remember that his office is that of peace-maker, not of encouraging separation and neglect of vows, where the other course is possible. It Avill not be overlooked that man and woman in making the marriage contract are on a footing of absolute equality, and any breach of that contract is in itself of the same criminality, whether husband or wife be the guilty party, although the wife's sin may involve more injurious conse- quences, and so become a graver offence. CHAPTER XII. DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE AND OF THE CITIZEN. The state is a community of men living together for earthly ends, under one law and one government, whose function is to execute the law and defend the society against assaults from within, sedition, privy conspiracy and rebellion ; treason and war from without. The Divine law respecting the state is given, Rom. xiii. 1-7 ; Matt. xxii. 21. (I.) Its rights are: (1) In the person of its duly con- stituted representatives, to be obeyed within its due limits. Herein its sanction is Divine, and obedience is part of the Gospel law. But difficulty at once arises in determining those limits ; the higher the functions of the state are placed the greater the difficulty. (See Dan. ii. 44.) In general, however, these limits are : (a) The moral law, the law of Christ, which is superior ; and (b) the Catholic Church, as guardian of relig- ion and morals, which, in her sphere, has a superior law. If any part of that church intrude on the secular sphere, per contra, the state is supreme. (Cases : The Roman Catholic communion ; the Mormons.) (c) Personal rights or family rights, of both which the state is the appointed guardian. If the state touch these, its ordinance is null. (2) The state has eminent domain over the lives and property of its citizens. For personal rights would be in- operative without the protection and order of civil society. DUTIES OF THE STATE. 645 Both life and property, accordingly, are demanded in case of extreme need. Its law commonly accepts a man's last will and testament, but may annul them. (3) The state has the right to make war in national de- fence, and to put down sedition by force. Therefore it has the right to use the lives and property of its citizens for this purpose. Herein is clear proof that the state is an entity, and not a mere aggregate of individuals. For acts are done by men which, if privately done, would be robbery and murder (Whewell, v. § 837). (4) The state has the right to punish, even with loss of life, for public and private wrongs (Rom. xiii. 4). For it has the right to do what is necessary for its existence (Qu. : The right to punish injury done to one's self, as a member of the state ?), and is bound to protect its citizens. (5) It has the right of contract under the laws of commu- tative justice ; and (6) In general, of all acts necessary to its preservation or its well-being. Such are to impose taxes (Eom. xiii. 6, 7), including tariffs ; to require the education of its children (Qu. : To try to educate them itself ?) ; to regulate or re- press, by fine or other punishment, public vices which injure its social life (lotteries, gambling, drinking-saloons), even when these are not direct violations of the moral law. (II.) The obligations and duties of the state correspond to its rights. Through the ministry of those who are voters, and their representatives in executive, legislative, and judicial power, it is bound (a) to preserve itself in well-being, through national defence against enemies without and within, and for this end to provide and sustain an effi- cient _army and police ; (b) to uphold and enforce the laws impartially with respect to all, high and low ; (c) to make just laws for the purposes of its own existence. Hence 64G DUTIES OF THE STATE AND OF THE CITIZEN". arise the duties of civil station, in governors, legislators, judges, officers of the army, etc. The special virtue of the state, therefore, and of those who represent it, is justice, both distributive, commutative, and retributive. Further than this, the question has difficulty, because first must be decided what is the function of the state. Is it more than to protect the lives, liberty, property of its citizens, as a social police, leaving all other moral, intellectual, relig- ious, and charitable functions to the voluntary association of its people ? If so, we escape, to a large degree, the clash- ing of different means for similar ends. Is that government the best which governs least ? The tendency just now is altogether in the opposite direction. (Bennett law in Wis- consin.) Or has the state moral duties ; e.g., to promote purity and good living by repressing obscene publications, lotteries, etc. ; to promote science by observatories, etc. ; intelli- gence by universities, etc. ; humanity by putting down the slave-trade, cruelty to animals, towards Indians ; hospitals, asylums, poor-houses, etc. ; education, however imperfect, by public schools ? Or are all these the province of volun- tary associations on the part of those only who approve, and agree in the means for promoting these objects ? If the former, we are logically led into the religious sphere, and a conflict of church and state ensues. Besides, that cannot be. duty which cannot be well done. Or, thirdly, while providing primarily for its own preser- vation and the social well-being of its members, may the state — i.e., governors, judges, legislators — be indirectly influ- enced by moral considerations, without making them the primary object of action ; e.g., not enforcing immoral con- tracts, bets, etc. ; choosing for necessary taxation what in- jures the moral standing of the people ; providing schools for those not otherwise taught ; aiding parochial schools, etc. ? DUTIES OF THE CTTIZEJST. 647 Notice, also, that many laws— e.g., marriage laws, punish- ments of crime, etc. — are indirectly auxiliaries to the moral education of the people, stamping with the reprobation of society what are also sins. Emanating from the conscience of a people who are generally Christian in their training, if not in their lives, they stamp with public reprobation vices which civilization, as such, cannot check. It did not in Greece or Eome ; on the contrary, they grew with that civili- zation as they did in the renaissance of it. Duties to the state correspond to the duties of the state, and need not be further developed. Eespect, obedience, support, defence are implied, and these as Christian obliga- tion. The state has divine right. What rights, is a debat- able question (Whewell, § 881). Sins against the state are, (1) sedition ; if secret, privy conspiracy ; if open force, rebellion ; like schism, setting up a rival power against that which has Divine right. (2) Fraud, in depriving it of its just dues. (3) Treason (Whew- ell, § 883), in this nation, " giving aid and comfort" to its enemies. What has been said in Part III. of obligations to authorities can here, mutatis mutandis, be applied once more. But our space forbids more than this brief allusion to topics which, like so many previously introduced, can only receive a cursory glance in these first Elements of Moral Theology. Miserere, IESU. INDEX. Abortion, artificial, 515. Absolution, 601 ; conditional, 602 ; denial of, 603 ; deferral of, 603. Abstinence, 435. Accession, 528. Accessory, the, 292, 538. Accidental homicide, 302. Acedia, 241. Acts, good and evil in, 26, 37 ; voluntary, 27 ; indifferent, 28 ; circumstances of, 29 ; conse- • quences of, 39. Actors of plays, 492. Adjunction, 528. Adoration, 338. Adulation, 389. Adultery, 459. Advocate in court, 310. Affability, 388. Affinity, impediment of, 634. Age, impediment of, 636. Alms-giving, 220. Ambition, 412. Amusements, 490, 619. Anger, 55, 470 ; absence of, 474. Anxiety, 270. Apostasy, 172. Appetites, the, 16, 19. Arrest of criminals, 533. Asceticism, 428. Assent, 160. Attention in prayer, 335. Audacia, 409. Authority, limitations of, 371 ; secular, 371. Avarice, 392. Backbiters, 314. Bailment, 551. Baptism, Holy, 567 ; immersion in, 568 ; trine, 569 ; minister of, 570 ; by laymen, 571 ; private, 573 ; recipient of, 573 ; requi- sites for, 574 ; of infants, 575 ; of idiots and the insane, 576. . Beatitude, 4 ; conditions of, 5. Belief, 162. Beneficence, 217. Benevolence, 211. Betrothal, 625. Bishop, the, 616. Blame, 40. Blasphemy, 172. Blindness, spiritual, 173. Boasting, 387. Capital punishment, 298. Captiousness, 390. Cardinal virtues, 68. Cause, final, 1. Character imparted in Sacraments, 566. Charity, 73, 144, 184, 190 ; not an emotion, 190 ; loss of, 194 ; order of, 202 ; charitas vim, 191 ; charitas patrim, 191, 194 ; precepts of, 233. 650 INDEX. Chastity, 449 ; virginal, 450. Children's duty to parents, 363, 512 ; instruction of, 579. Choice, 21. Circumstances of acts, 14, 26, 29. Clandestine marriages, 630. Clemency, 467. Commandments, the Ten, 141, 398, 495, 510. Commodatum, 551. Communion, Holy, 582 ; fasting, 588 ; as viaticum, 589 ; fre- quent, 590. (See Holy Eu- charist.) Communism, 303. Compassion, 215. Compliments, 382. Concubinage, 621. Concupiscence, 11. 49. Confession, 309 ; private, .597 ; seal of, 600 ; in court of law ; 308 ; duty of the confessor, 549. Confidential knowledge, 309. Confirmation, 576 ; visible sign in, 577 ; form of, 578 ; requisite age for, 578. Consanguinity, impediment of, 633. Conscience, 499 ; perplexed, 502 ; erroneous, 30, 500. Consequences of acts, 39. Constancy, 421. Contention, 246. Continence, 460. Contracts, 542 ; consideration in, 542 ; express, and implied, 544 ; requisites in, 545 ; of minors, 546 ; error in, 547 ; fraud in, 548 ; fear and force in, 548 ; gratuitous, 549 ; onerous, 553 ; of Holy Matrimony, 622, 626. Contrition, 246, 596. Contumely, 311. Cooperation, 292, 538. Correction, fraternal, 227. Counsel, 151 ; spiritual gift of, 266. Courage, 403. Cowardice, 407. Craftiness, 269. Crime, denunciation of, 307 ; im- pediment of, 636 ; plea of the criminal, 308 ; the criminal de- fending himself, 308 ; arrest of, 533. Cruelty, 475. Curiosity, 488. Cursing, 317, 510. Custom, law of, 509. Damnificatio, 530, 537. Deacon, the, 616. Death, 111 ; fear of, 405. Decalogue, the, 141, 398, 495, 510. Defects in things sold, 320. Degrees of consanguinity, table of, 633. Delectatio morosa, 89. Denunciation of crime, 307 ; of impediments, 638. Depositum, 552. Derision, 316. Despair, 178. Determinism, 16, 20. Detraction, 314, 520. Devotion, 329. Discord, 244. Disobedience, 372. Disparity of religion as an impedi- ment, 636. Dispensation, 136, 142, 347, 352. Dissension, 215. Divorce, 640 ; a thoro, 642. Dolus, 269. Dominion, 524. Donation, 550. INDEX. 651 Doubts concerning impediments, 638. Dress and furniture, moderation in, 493. Drunkenness, 446. Bulla, 367. Dulness of heart, 173. Ebriety, 446. End and aim of man, 1. Enemies, love of, 200, 212 : prayer for, 333. Envy, 242. Equity, 397. Error as an impediment, 632. Eucharist, Holy, 581 ; the matter of, 583 ; the form of, 585 ; the min- ister of, 586 ; reception of, 587. Eucharistic sacrifice, 591. Evangelical law, the, 145, 507. Evil in acts and in will, 25. Exchanges, 285. Exti'avaganee, 417. Faith, 75, 162 ; and reason, 157 ; confession of, 161 ; fides for- mata, 163 ; certitude of, 164. Falsehoods (see Lies), 381. Fasting, 436 ; obligation of, 437 ; appointed times for, 440 ; who are excused from, 438. Fear, 11, 183, 407 ; excuse of, 409; godly, 476 ; of death, 405 ; in contracts, 548 ; as an impedi- ment, 635. Female temperament, 464. FercB natures, 526. Flattery, 389. Folly, spiritual, 237. Food, animal, 297. Force, 10 ; in contracts, 548 ; in matrimony, 635. Fornication, 455, 621. Fortitude, 405. Fraternal correction, 227. Fraud, 269 ; in contracts, 318. Freedom of the will, 22. Gambling, 226, 555. Gifts, 551 ; spiritual, 237. Glory, 413. Gluttony, 443. Godliness, spiritual gift of, 398. Good, the, in acts, 25 : in will, 29, 35. Gratitude, 373. Guile, 269. Habits, 58 ; infused, 59 ; of sin, 104. Hate, 48, 56, 238 ; hatred of God, 239 ; of our neighbour, 239 ; of truth, 49. Heresy, 166, 171, 247. Hiring, 553. Holiness, 329. Homage, 367. Homicide, 297 ; justifiable, 514 ; excusable, 515 ; accidental, 302. Honour, 297, 367, 412. Hope, 175, 183. Humility, 475 ; twelve steps of, 480. Husband, sins of the, 513. Hypocrisy, 386. Idolatry, 354. Ignorance, 12, 504 ; sins of, 92, 466. Immersion, 568. Impediments of matrimony, pro- hibitory, 630 ; annulling, 631. Impotence, as impediment, 635. Imprecatory Psalms, 333. 652 Imprudence, 266. Incest, 459. Inconsiderateness, 267. Inconstancy, 268. Incontinence, 463 ; of anger, 467. Indifference to danger, 409. Infant Baptism, 575 ; consent of parents to, 576. Infidelity, 168, 248. Infirmity, sins of, 99. Ingratitude, 376. Injury, 530 ; in trade, 541. Injustice, 277 ; in legal proceed- ings, 306. Insensibility, 428. Instruction of children, 579. Insult, 311. Intemperance, 429, 461. Intention, 33. Intercession, 332. Interest for money loaned, 554. Involuntary, the, 8. Ironia, 387. Jactantia, 387. Joy, 213. Judgment, 279 ; lawfulness of, 280 ; from suspicion, 281. Jurisdiction, 570, 586, 601, 617. Jus, 272 ; jus gentium, 274 ; jus divinum, 273. Justice, 274 ; legal, 275, 522 ; private, 275 ; commutative, 285 ; distributive, 285 ; retributive, 285. Knowledge, desire of, 488. Latvia, 355. Law, 118, 503 ; eternal, 119 ; of nature, 123, 503 ; written, 283 ; human, 126, 131, 504 ; unjust, 121, 131, 306 ; Divine, 137 ; the old and the new, 138 ; the evangelical, 145, 507 ; muta- bility of, 134 ; of custom, 135; when not binding, 133 ; inter- pretation of, 506 ; civil, 507 ; penal statutes of, 379 ; the law- yer, 310. (See Equity.) Dispen- sation, 136, 142 ; promulgation, 119. Lay baptism, 571. Liberality, 390. Lies, 381, 517 ; " white lies," 518 ; ",lies of necessity," 519. Loans, 551. Locatio, 553. Long-suffering, 420. Lord's Days, 400, 511. Lotteries, 555. Love, 47; of God, 211, 235 ; of neighbours, 197, 202, 205, 213, 236 ; of enemies, 200, 212 ; of relatives, 207 ; of a wife, 209 ; of brutes, 198 ; of self, 100, 198, 203 ; of one's own body, 198 ; of sinners, 199. Lust, 454, 516. Lynch law, 299, 378. Magnanimity, 411. Magnificence, 417. " Make-bates," 316. Malediction, 317, 510. Malice, sins of, 103, 105. Mandatum, 552. Manslaughter, 515. (See Homi- cide.) Martyrdom, 406 Masters and servants, 513. Matrimony, Holy, 620 ; sacrament of, 622 ; subject of, 623 ; minis- ter of, 624 ; conditions of, 625, G53 627 ; marriage of those not Christians, 623 ; with a heretic, 624 ; contract of, 622, 626 ; dis- solution of, 640 ; fictitious, 628 ; of minors, 629 ; impediments to, 629 ; clandestine, 630 ; rehabili- tation of, 639. Meanness, 417. Means, 15 ; choice of, 21. Meekness, 467. Jleudacia. (See Falsehood.) Mercy, 215 ; corporal and spiritual works of, 221. Merit and demerit, 41, 159, 337. Minors, 531 ; rights of, 525 ; mar- riage of, 629. Mixture in the chalice, 585. Moderation {Jlodestia), 487. Modesty, 450. Mollities, 422. Money-lending, 551, 554. Monopoly, 555. Moroseness, 390, 493. Mortal sins, 102, 114, 195. Motives, 15. Mutuum, 551, 554. Necessity, 305, 533. Negligence, 268. Nocturnal pollution, 458. Oaths, 348 ; assertory and promis- sory, 510 ; obligation of, 350 : construction of, 371 ; dispen- sation from, 352. Oblations, 341. Obedience, 368, 371. Observantia, 367. Occupation, 525. Offices, daily, 618. Omission, sins of, 323. Orders, Holy, 610 ; sacramental, 612 ; matter and form of, 613; requisites for, 614. Ornaments of women, 494. Pain, 63. Parents, 512 ; duty to, 363. Passions, 44 ; good and evil in, 45 ; order of, 46 ; sins of, 97, 101. Patience, a supernatural virtue, 418. Patriotism, 363. Penalty, eternal, 112. Penitence, 593 ; sacramental, 594 ; the matter and the form, 595 ; penance, 605 ; penal statutes in civil law, 379. Perjury, 357. Perseverance, 420. Piety, 398 ; filial, 363, 512 ; claims of, 364. Pity, 215. Pleasure, 50 ; natural and un- natural, 51 ; the measure of the good, 53 ; moral character of, 52. Pledge, 552. Possessor, bona fide, 536 ; mala fide, 537 ; in doubtful faith, 537. Praise, 40. Prayer, 330 ; special, 331 ; for earthly goods, 332 ; for enemies, 333 ; vocal, 333 ; distraction in, 335 ; continual, 335 ; meritori- ous, 337 ; of sinners, 338. Prescription, 526. Presumption, 181, 412. Pride, 481 ; of intellect, 482 ; the first sin, 486 ; twelve steps of, 483. Probabilism, 500. Prodigality, 396. Promises, 383. Property, 302, 523. 654 INDEX. Prudence, 65, 261. Punishment, 285, 377 ; of sin, 112. Pusillanimity, 416. Quarrels, 249. Rashness, 267, 409. Real presence, the, 582. Reason and faith, 157. Realus, 112. Recreations, 490. Rectitude, 39. Rehabilitation of marriage, 639. Religion, 325 ; disparity of, 636. Reproaches, 312. Resistance to law, 308. Restitution, 286, 520, 533 ; to whom made, 535 ; what to be restored, 540 ; of good name, 287. Respect of persons, 296. Retribution, 48. Revenge, 377. Reverence, 366 ; to man, 367. Rich, the, virtues and vices of, 410. Rights, 272 ; natural and positive, 272 ; divine, 273 ; of property, 302; of minors, 525; of the state, 644. Robbery, 302, 305. Sabbaths, 400, 511. Sacraments, recpiisites of, 557 ; matter and form of, 558 ; ficti- tious, 559, 563 ; repetition of, 560 ; minister of, 560 ; requisites in the subject of, 565 ; necessity of, 565 ; character, sealing, im- parted in, 566. Sacrifice, 339 ; the eucharistic, 591. Sacrilege, 359. Sale, 554 ; defects in, 555. Satisfaction, 541, 604. Scandal, 253. Schism, 247 ; schismatical clergy, 249. Sedition, 252. Self-command, 23. Self-defence, 301. Self-depreciation, 388. Self-love, 100, 198. Self-restraint, 460. Shame, sense of, 432. Sick, Visitation and Unction of, 607. Simony, 359, 510. Simulation, 386. Sin, 77, 87, 97 ; venial, 114 ; mor- tal, 102, 114, 195 ; causes of, 90, 106 ; punishment of, 112 ; divi- sions of, 79 ; effects of, 110 ; gravity of, 82, 100 ; injury in, 84 ; of the heathen, 170 ; of omission, 78 ; of husbands and wives, 513. Slander. (See Detraction.) Sloth, spiritual, 241. Sobriety, 446. Solicitude, 270. Sorrow, 63. Specification, 528. Sponsors, 572. State, the, rights of, 644 ; func- tions of, 646 ; duty to, 647. Strife, 244. Studiositas, 488. Suicide, 299, 515, 609. Sundays, 511. Superstition, 353. Suspicion, 281. Swearing, 510. Tale-bearing, 316. Taunts, 312. 05; Temperance, 424, 461 ; rule of, 426 ; divisions of, 431 ; precepts of, 495. Temptations of the devil, 109 ; tempting God, 856. Testaments, 550. Testimony, legal, 307, 309. Thefts, 302, 531. Truth, 153. Turpe lucrum, 226. Tyranny, 253. Unbelief, 168. Unction of the sick, 608. Unfriendliness, 390. Unjust gains, 226. Use and usufruct, 529. Usury, 554. Vainglory, 413. Vengeance, 377. Venial sins, 114, 606. Veracity, 289. Verecundia, 432. Viaticum, the, 589. Vices, 76. Violence, 11. Virginity, not illicit, 450 ; how far a virtue, 452. Virtues, cardinal, 68 ; intellectual, 60, 64 ; theological, 69, 176 ; moral, 62, 68 ; acquired, 71 ; infused, 73 ; relation to charity, 188. Visitation of the sick, 607. Voluntary, the, 8, 27. Vows, obligation of, 342 ; expedi- ency of, 344 ; of minors, 346 ; dispensation from, 347. War, 249 ; the clergy in, 237. Weakness of spirit, 422. Wife's sins, 513. Will, the, 8, 16 ; freedom of, 22, 24 ; good and evil, 29. Wine, use of, 446. Wisdom, 65 ; spiritual, 237. Witness, in court of law, 309 ; false, 310. Worship, 338. Zeal, 471. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS II II III II llll III II III III 022 168 921 5